Specters of ’68: Protest, Policing, and Urban Space

by

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Abstract

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Political protest is an increasingly frequent occurrence in urban public space. During times of protest, the use of urban space transforms according to special regulatory circumstances and dictates. The reorganization of economic relationships under neoliberalism carries with it changes in the regulation of urban space. Environmental design is part of the toolkit of protest control.

Existing literature on the interrelation of protest, policing, and urban space can be broken down into four general categories: radical politics, criminological, technocratic, and technical-professional. Each of these bodies of literature problematizes core ideas of crowds, space, and protest differently. This leads to entirely different philosophical and methodological approaches to protests from different parties and agencies.

This paper approaches protest, policing, and urban space using a critical-theoretical methodology coupled with person-environment relations methods. This paper examines political protest at American Presidential National Conventions. Using genealogical-historical analysis and discourse analysis, this paper examines two historical protest event-sites to develop baselines for comparison: Chicago 1968 and Dallas 1984. Two contemporary protest event-sites are examined using direct observation and discourse analysis: Denver 2008 and St. Paul 2008.

Results show that modes of protest policing are products of dominant socioeconomic models of society, influenced by local policing culture and historical context. Each of the protest event-sites studied represents a crisis in policing and the beginning of a transformation in modes of protest policing. Central to protest policing is the concept of territorial control; means to achieve this control vary by mode of protest policing, which varies according to dominant socioeconomic model. Protesters used a variety of spatial strategies at varying degrees of organization. Both protesters and police developed innovations in spatial practice in order to make their activities more effective.

This has significant consequences for professionalized urban design. Both protester and policing spatial innovation involves the tactical reorganization and occupation of urban space. As urban space plays a constituent role in protest and policing, environmental designers must be aware of the political consequences of their designs.
Dedicated to Inger Cecilie Nordhagen and Jonas Berkeley Sagan Nordhagen.
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Introduction:

“In the past, we mastered riots by rifle and cannon. Today we use pick and trowel.” Anonymous Parisian builder in 1858.

“We get up early, to BEAT the crowds” - Denver Police DNC commemorative t-shirt, 2008

Free and open speech is a fundamental right in democratic states. Whether in public or in private, the individual's right to open speech about political rule is well-protected in democracies. However, when people assemble in public spaces, and as a group vocally protest together, different forces and legalities come into play. Because any large group of people massed in an urban setting is not the normal state of affairs, these gatherings represent a potential threat to governing bodies. A mass political protest is only a few steps from a riot. At what point does a political demonstration become civil disobedience? What is the role of urban space in supporting or suppressing public political speech? How is public space used by demonstrators and regulators? What are the methods and goals of those who use and reorganize urban and public space? What role, if any, does the public-ness of public space have in affecting the beginnings, the processes, and the conclusions of protest? What are the implications or protest policing and crowd regulation for urban space?

Mass protest has taken on new significance and new dimensions since the start of the first Gulf War. Prior to this, mass protest was usually related to specific protest issues, either on a local scale or national (specifically groups protesting apartheid in South Africa, nuclear disarmament, or poverty). However, protests since then take as their cue dissatisfaction and frustration with issues of greater scope. First, these protests are in reaction to large systems and multinational problems; globalized markets have also resulted globalized resistance. Second, the protests tend to target localized events, in particular international economic summits. These summits and meetings are localized embodiments of neoliberal regimes in the developed world, and protests are reactions against the deregulation of industry and retreat of the state under neoliberal economic policies.

Based on surveys of recent literature, news reports, and white papers, mass protests are gaining in both size and frequency. While political protests in urban space are nothing new, the number and scale of mass assemblies for political purposes in public spaces has taken on new dimensions in the last decade. This increase in scale and scope of protests is accompanied by changing protest policing tactics. Spatial control tactics used against protesters worldwide, such as the “free-speech zone” and “kettling,” are taking on similar characteristics worldwide.

Perhaps the signature protest event of this new era was the protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999, where an unprecedented 40,000 protesters clashed with police over a few days, resulting in mass beatings, arrests and property damage....along with new spatial tactics of policing as well as of protest. The next significant event came in 2003 in the protests in Miami against the Free Trade Area of the Americas conference, where police used a new model of enforcement against tens of thousand of protesters, deploying innovations in protest policing under

1 Jones 367.
2 Tonkiss, as well as Dellaporta, Peterson and Reiter.
3 Ortiz et al tracks the increase in protest incidence across the globe from the period of 2006 to 2013, generally in response to economic issues. Global protest incidence grows steadily from 59 events in 2006 to 111 in the first half of 2013. The Global Database of Events, Language and Tone tracks incidences of protests and other events and shows a steady increase since 1979. Powers and Vogele explore an increase in protest movements from the Civil Rights era through the middle 1990s, Brenner and Theodore discuss the increasing number of protest events against neoliberalism (1979-2002) (4), and Sandine discusses crowd events from across American history, with particular focus on assembly rights in the 21st century (Chs. 6-9). Further evidence is in the sheer record-breaking scale of protest events since 2003.
what is now called the “Miami Model of Protest Policing.” Police used this approach again in 2004 in Los Angeles and New York City during the presidential conventions, and French police used similar tactics against protests across France in 2006.

A significant element in the organization of urban political protest and the enforcement thereof has been the internationalization of methods of both protest and response. The largest protests occurring under neoliberal governance has been in response to issues that affect several nations at once. These protests typically have occurred in response to economic or military plans made in the developed world that have significant impact in the global south. The internationalization of economic and military policy under neoliberalism, combined with increasing availability of information on international developments available to citizens worldwide through communications media, has internationalized the protest response to these policies. Thus, the large protests in cities like Miami, Rostock and Seattle have not been against local events or even national policies, but rather held in solidarity with non-local and extra-national victims of said policies.

Political protest has been a tradition in the United States dates to before the founding of the Republic, and the right of assembly and the protection of public speech is ensured by the Constitution. However, the United States has never been as intertwined in international and global networks of power and trade as it is today, and, likewise, never before have protests in the United States been as connected to the international forces of resistance to those powers. Dozens of books have been written about globalization and its economic effects on both the global North and global South, the reorganization of power relationships between property owners and renters, and between mobile capital and embodied labor. Do these new power relations entail changes in how protests are organized and managed? Have there been changes in how protest events are organized by protesters, and regulated and administered to by police and enforcers? How are these changes reflected in the urban fabric that supports mass assembly? What are the roles and responsibilities of professional environmental design in managing and policing protest?

These new global economic relations are part of a shift from liberal economic policies into a new international economic formation called “neoliberalism.” Economic changes under neoliberalism bring with them new understandings of the economic relationships which underpin the production and regulation of urban space and urban life. According to geographer David Harvey, the main project of neoliberalism is the restoration of class power and the concentration of wealth among the already very wealthy. This project is accomplished through financial and economic processes that reorganize urban economic relationships, altering relationships between users and regulators of urban space. This has caused a crisis in conceptions of public space, resulting in social and economic conflicts over rights to and uses of public urban spaces. When the vast array of stakeholders in urban life far outnumbers those who have direct economic stakes in urban property, how are mass public demonstrations treated? Along with new economic relationships, new spatial and administrative practices have developed under neoliberalism. How do these new relationships in urban living change the legal and procedural expectations of the role of citizen?

These economic changes have brought about a corresponding shift in the administrative

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4 Fernandez Ch. 4.
5 Particularly in the First Amendment, where the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly are laid out.
6 Specifically globalization as it relates to cities and urban form; see Cox, King 2004, Sassen, Smith, M., 2001.
7 Aihwa Ong’s work on the relationship between neoliberalism, urban space and political economy.
8 Oscar Newman in particular deals with spatial design and crime prevention, and of course there is an entire subfield of build architecture entitled ‘Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design’ (CPTED), but other work (Lefebvre 1991, Low 2003, Kohn for some examples) specifically addresses transformations in urban space based on social and/or political practice.
10 Harvey 2005, 17 and most of Chapter 1.

Sagan
logics of spatial management, from prior models emphasizing participatory citizenship in democracy, to an emergent model focused on addressing protest crowds as unruly populations needing to be managed.\textsuperscript{11}

This shift in administrative logic implies a new or modified set of spatial practices to regulate dissent. Are recent political demonstrations, specifically those actions in protest of neoliberal policies (not limited to the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the 'G-20'\textsuperscript{12} or the Iraq War), being treated differently than similar events in the past?\textsuperscript{13} How are the rights and privileges of citizenship in liberal democratic societies contested by either the demonstrations or the administrative reactions to them? These forms have the potential to change the way we interact with the urban environment on daily basis, and, in turn, affect how citizens view their lives in cities and in the political systems they house, and pose significant problems to the role of professional environmental designers.

\textsuperscript{11} Specifically, cultural theorist Lauren Berlant's model of 'Infantile Citizenship' and sociologist Thomas Janoski's exploration of the changing rights and responsibilities of citizenship over time are salient here. The concept of 'population management' is an extension of Michel Foucault's conception of 'governmentality' (Foucault 1980, 2003, 2007, Rabinow 1989 and Dean 1999); the use of 'population' in this sense comes primarily from Foucault 2007. This is also excellently connected to policing in particular in the work of legal scholar Thomas Dubber.

\textsuperscript{12} The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors; this umbrella organization of financial planners and regulators representing 2/3rds of the world population and 85% of the global gross domestic product (http://www.g20.org.)

\textsuperscript{13} Hazen is an excellent populist report of the events following the Rodney King beating trial in Los Angeles in 1992. Barber discusses crowds, protest and enforcement specifically in Washington D.C., and Farber discusses in detail the events surrounding the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968. In addition, there are several texts written by members of the military regarding the historical use of military forces on domestic soil in order to quell urban civil disobedience (Scheips is the most comprehensive for the period 1945-1992.)
1.0: Background:

Urban political protest is not a new phenomenon. Protests have been occasional occurrences in cities throughout their varied histories.\(^1\) The massing of bodies in urban space has been an effective political tactic used by both those in power and those resisting power. Reasons behind protest event-sites vary widely, ranging from popular reactions to unfavorable political conditions to spectacular displays of state power. Further, each city where the protest event-site occurs has unique social and spatial conditions, presenting a new context for each protest. Police and regulators have used discrete techniques and forms or protest control for centuries to counter urban civil disobedience. For example, some historical techniques have been: specialization of riot control police, active local roles for national military or paramilitary forces, and the use of anti-crowd chemical agents.\(^2\) These regulatory responses, deployed as legitimized violence against unruly citizenry, stem from monopolies of power (state and otherwise), and are typically justified by those who authorize and use them as vital and necessary actions.

The increasing number of urban political protest event-sites over the last few years, combined with ubiquitous electronic media and personal communication devices, has given these event-sites media prominence.\(^3\) Given that police are the most visible sign of regulatory action, often expressed through dramatic photographs or videos of protests, the actions of police and the tactics of protest policing have also come under increased public scrutiny. Recent tactical shifts in the way that regulatory bodies have addressed urban political protest point to both a heightened concern about the political implications of such events and to an increasingly sophisticated set of methods of addressing and mediating urban civil disobedience.

Although traditional elements of crowd control continue to be mobilized (specifically since the Los Angeles Rodney King riots in 1992 to the present\(^4\)), these older methods are joined by new physical technologies (such as mobile barricades), electronic technologies (video and electronic surveillance, and research into ultra-low-frequency sound cannons used to incapacitate large crowds, for example) large-scale implementation of older technologies (concrete berms around entrances to public and corporate buildings, gates around civilian housing enclaves, large trucks or bicycles used as easily deployed roadblocks) and, most critically for this project, new spatial techniques (such as the infamous “free speech zones”). Police mobilization of these techniques, taken as a kind of social technology of control, have brought with them questions about the governmental logic behind their uses.\(^5\) Furthermore, the use of these techniques and

\(^1\) See Gilje in particular for an overview of American events that have turned riotous; Barber for such events in Washington D.C., and Zinn examines these events in the larger context of popular political struggle.

\(^2\) Fillieule and Jobard 4.

\(^3\) Including, but not limited to: Los Angeles, Rodney King riots, 1992; San Francisco, Iraq War protests, 2003; Seattle, World Trade Organization protests, 1999; Seattle, Iraq War Protests, 2003; Washington DC, various protests against the Bush administration, 2000-present; New York City, Iraq War protests and Bush administration protests, 2001-present; Vancouver, WTO and Iraq War protests, 2001-2003; London, Barcelona, Rome, Iraq War protests, 2003; Parisian suburban riots, 2005 and 2007; Anti-military dictatorship protests in Myanmar, 2007; Iran 2009; etc.

\(^4\) It is important to note that while the 1992 Los Angeles riots did result in a new type of urban spatial policing (Herbert), they are distinct from the other mentioned examples in that they were not pre-organized political protests. However, as this work will show, in the eyes of enforcement, the line between “riot” and “protest” is both exceedingly fuzzy and exceedingly elastic.

\(^5\) The idea of a “social technology” is here based on Polanyi’s definition as “those practices which intensify control
tactics highlight the contested status of citizenship in a democratic state. If, under neoliberal governance, the role of citizenship is attenuated and reduced to that of consumer in the marketplace, then how is the ‘citizen’ supposed to act in public? What defines appropriate and inappropriate (and possibly illegal) behavior? What design moves and spatial transformations in urban spaces are being implemented, and to what effect?

1.1: Research Questions

The capacity for urban space to accommodate mass protest is a necessary component of functioning democracies. However, such acts of protests often pose threats to the legitimacy of ruling regimes. These regimes provide the legal and administrative frameworks for spatial regulation and design. Accordingly, there is a constant tension between the technical practice of urban place making and the political use of that space by protesters. This presents challenges for designers and regulators alike. My overarching research question is: how is urban space used to manage political protests, and what are the administrative logics behind this management? The answers to this question have consequences for citizens, regulators and designers alike.

In this dissertation, I seek to explore these questions through a methodological and theoretical approach which, while based on existing modes of research, extends them into new areas of inquiry, generally using a cultural materialist approach. This approach allows me to outline six components of this inquiry:

- First, language and practice are mutually constitutive. In the case of protest policing, short term decisions are made at a regulatory level about how to engage mass protests, and long term practices develop as a part of education and training. The language used to determine regulatory conditions and categories constitutes the scope of the regulatory activity. The way something is discussed becomes the framework for how reality is perceived.
- Second, these regulatory decisions involve institutional logics of classification which enable certain policing practices.
- Third, spatial practice is a form of administration: protesting and policing both are enacted as human bodies massing in urban space.
- Fourth, in the current economic and political context (1999-present), administrative spatial practices of enforcement are focused on overarching policy goal of mitigating terrorism. These practices are similar to and originate in a historical policing focus on ameliorating crime.
- Fifth, protest practices which critique the status quo, and/or practices which do not fit within an ill-defined and contingent set of ‘acceptable’ spatial practices, are criminalized. This criminalization is a regulatory reaction to protest goals of disrupting daily life or “business as usual” through demands for public or media attention to political issues.

over human (social) activity through new regimes of visibility and discipline” (Ong and Collier 7).

6 Case studies for this dissertation occur both prior to this date (1968 and 1984) as well as after (2008). This date is given as an indicator of new types of mass protest (the 1999 anti-WTO protests in Seattle). Another significant date would be 2003, which represents the implementation of new kinds of policing (the 2003 Miami Model of policing designed to counter the anti-FTAA protests in Miami).
Policing agencies' preoccupation with security and defending against terrorism limit the range of possible policing and regulatory responses to protests.

- Sixth, these regulatory responses have significant consequences for spatial practitioners, especially as there is strong economic and professional incentive for them to work within established institutional, administrative, and regulatory frameworks.

This study's relevance is based on the aforementioned increasing incidence of mass protest in the last thirteen years, and the increasing sophistication and widespread use of urban space as a medium for protest policing. If the development and implementation of the design practice of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is an indicator of precedent, then designing to minimize the impact of protest will be a significant goal for regulators, who then set the terms of urban design. Research on the administrative logics of spatial control and instances of implementation of those logics has the potential to affect how designers respond to clients and administrators who are concerned with site security. Designing urban space to accommodate human use has long been considered critical to the creation of successful places, and the protection of speech rights in the form of protest is still a fundamental component of citizenship in a healthy democracy. Further, this research could add to the study of how policies of space use affect political behavior, and could aid in the development of spatial practices that protect the rights of citizens while minimizing disproportionate regulatory response. Also, development of such practices also has the economic benefit on the local scale of reducing instances of property damage or damage awards from civil suits by protesters mistreated. This work could also support moves to make protest more effective while reducing regulatory anxiety.

Existing research in several fields addresses similar research questions, but in different ways, often restricted by disciplinary considerations. For example, some of the approaches are criminological, some historical, some critical geographical. The varied approaches to these issues and tensions should indicate the complexity of the interrelation between urban space, human behavior and political speech. These approaches are discussed in the literature review in Chapter 4 as well as in the theoretical discussion in Chapter 3. Despite the significant volume and variety of this research, there is little work specifically on the use of urban space itself as a medium of protest policing.

The literature reviewed for this dissertation also generally does not make explicit the connection between urban space and protest administrative logic. The current project's goal is to remedy this and to point the way for future research and possible spatial intervention. As the field of person-environment relations has grown and changed since the 1960s, it has incorporated different academic approaches to social research, such as semantic ethnography,7 neurology8 and psychology.9 For studying the intersection of space, culture and power, the field might also benefit from including the approaches of human geography,10 cultural studies11 and critical theory.12 Such inclusion makes available some of the latest research in the complexities of power relations in the urban environment, and re-emphasize person-environmental relations focus on

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7 Cranz 2006, Cranz and Pavlides.
8 Zeisel.
9 Proshansky et. al.
11 Williams 1980.
12 Bratich et. al.
the necessity of understanding cultural processes as evidence upon which to base designs. Political systems and administrative logics exist as kinds of what education researcher Herb Childress calls “hidden programs” within existing physical structures, and as such, the more complete the analysis of such programs, the better the outcomes for design.

1.2: The Structure of the Current Project

In the following sections of this theoretical introduction, I want to clarify the concepts under which I have undertaken research for the current project. This is particularly important due to the complexity of the issue of protest policing and urban space. Additionally, I will examine several bodies of literature that approach this issue from separate methodological and philosophical positions. Each of these sections, as they deal with large bodies of research, will necessarily be summary in character.

I will then detail the historical conditions of four separate case studies, which vary according to the economic, spatial, social and political conditions of their contexts. Each of these case study sections will examine the historical details of these instances of protest policing, the type of social movement involved, the nature of the crises that spawned the protests, the spatio-temporal contexts and administrative logics, and a section containing interpretive analysis. This format will help develop a framework for understanding more recent political protest event-sites, which I begin to discuss in Chapters 9 and 10. The historical case studies (Chicago 1968 and Dallas 1984, as well as brief discussions of Seattle 1999 and other significant protest event-sites) primarily use archival accounts and some secondary analysis by others in order to analyze public protest and policing response up to 2008. The contemporary case studies (Denver 2008 and St. Paul 2008) rely on direct observation supported by archival research.

1.3: Goal

My goal is to produce an inclusive body of research, mobilizing the best tactics of study from person-environment relations, applied to the varied experiences of the participants of urban civil disobedience through examining varied forces and discourses that have real material and political effects on their lives, analyzed and interpreted through a critical-theoretical framework.

In this project, I intend to investigate the challenges to urban political protest through social and spatial tactics of control, specifically through examining political protest in an urban context, particularly how protest is spatially managed through urban form. I include my four case studies as moments of crisis or change within protest event-sites, either on the side of protesters or on the side of police. Some of my case studies represent the full development of either a mode of policing or a mode of protest.

To accomplish this investigation, in each of my case studies I will examine the relationship between several facets of urban civil disobedience:

- first: *active* attempts to use public space as a setting for political action
- second: *reactive* changes in the built urban environment made by regulators in response
to (or in anticipation of) urban civil disobedience;

- third: preventative changes implemented in order to affect or prevent urban civil disobedience, and;
- last: how those changes affect the behavior of those engaging in urban civil disobedience.

Each of the aforementioned actions, reactions and changes can be both static (built) or dynamic (tactical and contingent,) and can happen over varying lengths of time.

This open-ended, discovery science based, exploratory immersion in direct experience based on scholarly literature provides evidence for the following claims:

1. That there has been a change in the role and conception of citizenship based on a change in the scope of regulatory mechanisms of massed bodies in space. While people engage in urban civil disobedience, their actions can be considered outside both 'normal' everyday urban behavior and outside 'normal' legal behavior. This disengagement with common practice enables new regulatory responses. Therefore, regulatory agencies act as if they are dealing with masses of extra-legal citizens, their possible 'criminal' status to be defined at a later regulatory stage. Thus, the participants exist in a state of exception from historically legal regulatory actions.

2. Urban space is not merely the backdrop or setting for such activities; rather, space has a constitutive role in the dynamic interplay between populist urban civil disobedience and regulatory responses. This role goes beyond territorially or the representational role of urban space. Part of this argument is that conceptions and uses of public urban space itself both produce and are produced by the dialectical struggles that events of urban civil disobedience represent.

3. A precondition of this change in regulatory response is the shifting of state regulation under neoliberalism from logics of social welfare to logics of social control. This change in the role of the state has brought with it a change in the scope of state power to use legitimate force. States use force as a final instrument of authority in crises or emergency circumstances. The official labeling and declaration of crises or emergencies (or "heightened circumstances") legitimate the use and application of force by the state. In this construction, state violence is only legitimate during a declared "emergency.” However, attenuated state power under neoliberalism redefines states of emergency. This redefinition (described by Giorgio Agamben as a ‘state of exception’) further legitimizes formerly illegal or untenable state responses to subjects engaged in urban civil disobedience. These new regulatory techniques have both an administrative component (namely, policy and enforcement) and a spatial component (emplaced changes in the built environment and contingent changes to access to and mobility through urban spaces.)

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework:

2.1: Introduction to Theory

Multivalent and complex phenomena like policing and protest, each as large- and medium-scale social and cultural practices, require theoretical and analytical approaches that necessarily transcend traditional disciplinary barriers, especially when these two phenomena are in conflict through the already-complex medium of urban space. Particularly, because I am looking at the interrelation of urban space and political behavior, I have had to use a variety of methods and theoretical approaches that are best suited to the specifics of each.

I will begin by defining the core concepts of this study: urban space, political protest and spatial regulation. Both person-environment relations and critical social theory have theoretical approaches to these ideas and processes that have bearing on this particular project. However, I need to clarify a distinction between them along the lines of methodology vs. theory. Person-environment relations, as a sub-field of sociological, anthropological and psychological theory,\(^\text{14}\) has a clearly defined set of methodologies for addressing particular spatial and behavioral research concerns.\(^\text{15}\) Theoretical conclusions based on these methods are typically limited to the very specific set of spatial and social circumstances studied. The findings in empirical studies are difficult to generalize their theoretical findings to other contexts. Social thought based in positivist thinking can be very good about isolating subjects within a network of measurable variables and producing discrete results, however, this practice delimits different epistemological approaches to one ‘truth.’

In short, Person-Environment Relations\(^\text{16}\) is an excellent approach to spatial design research and spatial evaluation. Studies in the sub-field present results that are measurable and can be implemented in a concrete sense, both literally and figuratively. Further, because Person-Environment Relations studies tend to be limited to analysis of discrete sites and behaviors, or a catalog of behaviors within specific sites, the complexity of protest behavior in an urban environment lends itself to methods that address questions of power and politics in addition to the behavior of bodies in space.

Architecture researcher Amos Rapoport writes in his book *Culture, Architecture, and Design* that Environment-Behavior Studies, as a multidisciplinary approach to understanding the interrelation of human behavior and the built environment, necessarily relies on a wide variety of other disciplines for both data gathering and theoretical analysis.\(^\text{17}\) These disciplines, such as sociology, history, evolutionary science, cognitive science, and so on, already engage with and use the concept of culture to draw conclusions about human behavior. Rapoport argues that this appropriation of the work of other disciplines helps to make Environment-Behavior Studies' understanding of human behavior much more complete. The current study also takes this

\(^{14}\) Sommer 1969, Proshansky et. al., Rapoport 1969 and Newman all represent early efforts in this multidisciplinary approach from (at the time) more established disciplines.

\(^{15}\) Rapoport 2005 in particular, but also Zeisel and Groat and Wang.

\(^{16}\) Variously named; I have chosen Person-Environment Relations, or PER, as title for this subfield, but equally appropriate would be Amos Rapoport's title of 'Environment-Behavior Studies,' or EBS.

\(^{17}\) Rapoport 2003 14-17.
approach, integrating works of sociology, economics, geography, critical theory, and cultural studies to lend more weight to conclusions about protests and protest policing in urban space.

2.2: Critical Social Theory

Critical social theory offers another way to conceptualize political and social relations in urban space. The critical social theory uses sets of tools of theory and inquiry to access problems that person-environment relations has a difficult time formulating.18 Depending on the object of study, critical social theory (inasmuch as its varied theoretical and philosophical approaches can be distilled into the reductive term ‘critical social theory’) mobilizes a wide range of cross-disciplinary methodological approaches, appropriating and articulating them according to the project at hand. While this can lead to a maddening disunity of terminology and even philosophical foundations, critical theory is also a productive approach to dealing with multi-determinant and culturally amorphous phenomena.19 For example, critical theory addresses the study of the human behavior in the built environment, where variables cannot be so easily eliminated, isolated, controlled for, or even defined with much certainty and without resort to an all-inclusive (and intellectually useless) over-estimation of interconnected and determining variables. Thus, using both methodological approaches, we can define ‘urban space’ in this sense as a both constitutive and framing element in this study, in that space is the scene in which social activity occurs, and space is one of the factors that influences social behavior.

Spatial researchers Robert B. Bechtel and Jon Zeisel discuss how different social science disciplines approach molar and molecular behavior; how, for example, environment-behavior studies focuses on molar behavior, whereas human factors research investigates molecular behavior.20 The authors note that the scale of behavior exists as a continuum, and the characterization of molar or molecular varies between projects irrespective of discipline. Through this way of thinking, the current project relies on EBS for the observable molecular behavior, and critical social theory for the molar or large-order behavior. The study of crowds through environment-behavior studies offers new possibilities for the discipline, as rarely do researchers have opportunities to observe the large-scale behavior of thousands or tens of thousands of people at once.

2.3: Definition of Terms; Urban Space under Neoliberalism

How can we define 'urban space' itself? Whole chapters of books have been devoted to what a slippery term 'space' is when used in a critical sense.21 To add the adjective 'urban' helps

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18 See Hall in McRobbie.
19 Critical social theory has origins in sociology, anthropology, psychology and philosophy, Marxian critique, among other disciplines.
20 Bechtel and Zeisel 11-12.
21 In particular, Harvey 2006 devotes the entire third essay of the book discussing how 'space' itself might be defined, touching on Raymond Williams, Leibniz, Newton, Descartes, Euclid, Spinoza and Lefebvre. I have chosen to follow this line of thought. The text takes as a point of departure space as a social construction.
in that it differentiates the urban from the rural, but gets us little closer to a handy definition. Urban space is defined by a density of structures and people, with an inherent heterogeneity implicit in both. There is also an element of intensification in urban space. Cities are sites dense social interactions, which can be measured as either the total number of direct contact with strangers any person has, or as an absolute measure of bodies in space.\textsuperscript{22}

To a certain extent, in finding a definition of 'urban' we come across similar relational networks of understanding. As the definition of an urban space characterized in the perception of the user, we must consider who the users of said space are, and take our definitions from those who we study, working with ethnographic methods and building a kind of linguistic taxonomy. In short, urban areas are defined by the users. In the case of this study, the users are those protesting and those administering to those protests.

Let us go further then and add another adjective: public. This is particularly useful for this project, as I am looking at a specific set of behaviors (protest and protest management) in a particular set of event-sites; as such, the spatial and temporal boundaries of these event-sites are well defined.\textsuperscript{21} Furthermore, there are legal and cultural definitions in place for what constitutes public space. The Introduction in Mitchell 2003 contains a quote from architect Anthony Vidler on how to look at public space in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11\textsuperscript{th} 2001:

\begin{quote}
The street is a site of interaction, encounter and the support of strangers for each other; the square (is) a place of gathering and vigil; the corner store (is) a communicator of information and interchange. These spaces, without romanticism or nostalgia, still define and urban culture, one that resists all attempts to 'secure' it out of existence. (3)
\end{quote}

In their introduction to the edited volume \textit{Public Space and Democracy}, political theorists Maurice Henaff and Tracy Strong further define public and private spaces. They see such spaces as socially defined, discussing the distinctions between both public and private spaces and between common and sacred spaces, which are defined (historically) by appeals to the divine.\textsuperscript{24} For this project, the important distinction that they make is that the difference between private and public is in ownership: public space is owned by the public within the framework of citizenship, that is, citizens within a representative democracy as owners and stakeholders of land and property in common. Therefore, public space is subject to a specific and defining set of rules and restrictions for its use. In public space, which has a long historical relationship to mass communication and theatricality, one can expect public expression and sharing of ideas, such as mass political protest.\textsuperscript{25}

\section*{2.4 Definition of Terms: Political Protest}

The definition of political protest here starts to take form. Protest is a social activity in which participants vocally and physically proclaim their dissent and resistance to the organized

\textsuperscript{22} Architect and sociologist Amos Rapoport discusses these metrics in Rapoport 1975.
\textsuperscript{23} See below for specifics.
\textsuperscript{24} Henaff and Strong 4-7.
\textsuperscript{25} The authors go on to explain in detail how the act of public theatricality is essential for democracy.

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practices of a specific group of people. Mass, urban and political protest requires a relatively large body of people together, physically within the concentration of activity and attention in urban space, and socially within the set of social and legal processes of communication that exist within public urban space. Criminology researcher Luis Fernandez analyzes the interrelation of protest and the social control of dissent through protest policing. His approach presents protest as a phenomenon that opposes the state while confronting the primary body the state's monopoly on force, that is, police.  

Political protest, defined generally, is organized public dissent. Dissent is a means of publicly expressing and affirming shared views that contrast or conflict with dominant political practices or events. According to political theorist Frances Fox Piven, in capitalist societies, power is not legitimated through the development of mysteries (such as religious ritual and belief, control over the calendar, or the Divine Right of Kings), but rather by obscuring the relationship of the powerful to the means of production. The dichotomy comes when the electoral system is proclaimed the source of legitimate power within a nation, but access to wealth and proximity to the means of production in fact set the terms of that power. The power of wealth overwhelms the power of the franchise.

However, historically, electoral-representative procedures are sometimes able to accomplish a substantial dispersal of power. This was particularly evident in the political climate of the West in the wake of the late 1960's civil rights and student protest movements. In my discussion of historical case studies below, I cite 1968 as the watershed year in the 1960's student protest movement, particularly for the impact it had on protest policing for the following forty years.

According to Piven, the development of protest movements themselves are a product of the transformation of both consciousness and behavior. The transformation of consciousness comes when the obfuscation of power relations becomes apparent, and the public becomes aware of the above-mentioned dichotomy of power relations. Subsequently, the public changes their behavior, and acts defiant and becomes much more willing to break traditions of behavior and public social norms. This is seen in particular when protests are organized, and large numbers of people act in similar ways based on their shared perception of injustice.

Piven then goes on to discuss the sociological literature on social movements, some of the more later works I will touch on below. She does critique the (then contemporaneous, as she was writing in 1976) general sociological perception that social movements could be understood within the context of the organization of protest movements. She stated that such an approach, that is, by focusing on organizations specifically, missed the potential wider range of possible means of dissent and protest actions. To quote Piven:

> Just as electoral political institutions channel protest into voter activity in the United States, and may even confine it within these spheres if the disturbance is not severe and the electoral system appears responsive, so do other features of institutional life determine the forms that protest takes when it breaks out of the boundaries of electoral politics. (311)

At its core protest is that set of actions in which participants withhold their accustomed social cooperation, and deliberately cause institutional disruption.

This act of collective defiance satisfies a deep social need. Especially in the context of social belonging, when protesters recognize their group-being in common and in opposition to

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26 Fernandez 19-23.
27 Piven 298.
the dominant political structure, by recognizing their unity, they affirm their collective identity and entrench their opposition. This behavior is analogous to expressions of religious group belonging, according to sociologist Emile Durkheim:

There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity and its personality. Now this moral remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of re-unions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments; hence some ceremonies, which do not differ from regular religious ceremonies, either in their object, the results which they produce, or the processes employed to attain those results. What essential difference is there between an assembly of Christians celebrating the principal dates of the life of Christ, or of Jews remembering the exodus from Egypt, or the promulgation of the decalogue, and a reunion of citizens commemorating the promulgation of a new moral or legal system, or some great event in the national life? (427)

Protesters come together to affirm their being and beliefs in common. Protest groups find and bond over collective moral sentiments.

2.5: Public Space and Political Protest

A necessary element for mass political protest is the use of urban space as stage for massing. Urban space also conveys other benefits to protest groups, such as: proximity to meetings and groups being protested against, access to travel networks, and population density (to mobilize both protesters and the attention of onlookers and media). That many urban spaces are designated public, that is, with free and open access to all, is a prerequisite for the use of such spaces for large gatherings.

National-level or multinational organizations typically choose large cities for their high-level administrative meetings. Large cities have the advantages of proximity to large airports, making travel easier for those participants who have strict travel schedules. Large cities also feature facilities which can host large and complex meetings. In the case of the DNC in Denver 2008, both the Pepsi Center and the Convention Center were in use by the DNC, in addition to office and staging areas around and in between these two large facilities. Likewise, large cities offer recreational and cultural amenities, as well as opportunities for fine dining, which draw well-heeled travelers. The protests go where the decision makers go.

Decision makers often wish to avoid large scale protests, and so schedule their activities at sites far removed from urban centers. These sites must still provide the amenities desired, and so resort-like settings are sometimes used. For example, the WTO ministerial meetings in 2001, the next meeting immediately following the 1999 Seattle protest event, were held in Doha in the Qatar, in an environment much more conducive to isolation and limited access, especially for possible protesters.

That cities have access to travel networks is also of advantage to protesters. Specifically, these networks allow for large numbers of protesters from other areas to converge on cities and mobilize local protesters.

Architecture researcher Max Page in his “Urban Design and Civil Protest” discusses the importance state symbols in the selection of protest sites. The presence of symbols of state power is often a criteria for the selection of a site of protest. As these material symbols, typically buildings, statues, monuments and civic plaza are also chosen by governmental bodies as
symbols of state power, their usefulness as a site of contradiction by protesters is clear. The greatest density of these sites is in urban centers.

Population density also plays a role in the relationship between public space and protest. Specifically, greater population density means that mobilization of large numbers of protesters is made easier. As a percentage of the population of any given city has the same political concerns as the protesters, some of them can be relied upon to join a protest organization or take part in a protest event. Greater density results in shorter travel times and lower costs of opportunity for local protest sympathizers, allowing for greater numbers of massed protesters.

Cities are also chosen by protesters because of the ubiquity of media present. News organizations are typically centralized around business districts, government centers and urban downtown areas, which are typically areas of greater structural density. By holding protest events near media centers, protester take advantage of lower opportunity costs for media outlets to cover their events. Visual publicity is a necessity to convey clear messages about the cause and goals of the protest event.28

Furthermore, sociologist Fran Tonkiss in Space, the City and Social Theory: Social Relations and Urban Forms (2005) discusses why and how urban form itself provides the site for political action. Space is both a point of struggle and a resource for both protesters and enforcement. Military metaphors about control over space and “taking” space abound in literatures of both protest and enforcement. By interrupting the rituals of daily life and the banality of mundane space, protest activates them into sites of resistance, potentially as disruptive as protests in and around citadels of power. The taking of space is the taking of power:

One of the most visible ways of exercising power, after all, is to occupy or to control space; architecture, meanwhile, makes power legible in material forms. … Modes of political, legal, constitutional, economic, police and military authority are materialized in space and made concrete in institutions. Political power can be mapped around the space it occupies. (60)

Specifically, the politics of resistance, for example, using tactics of demonstration, picket, direct action and occupation, frequently makes its point in and through the use of space. Urban spaces are stages for larger political conflicts, or points of symbolic contention (especially public spaces, civic buildings and monuments).

Tonkiss identifies three ideal-types of public space, particularly for urban politics:

1. the square, a site of collective gathering and belonging;
2. the cafe, a site of more intimate interpersonal exchange; and
3. the street, a site of informal encounters. (67)

Public space refers to spaces “provided or protected by the state, affording equal and in principle free access to all users as citizens.”29 The term also refers to a space of social interaction, in the sense of being “out in public.” Public spaces are always already politicized; they come into being through particular economic and civic contexts of public honor and financial support, and as such come with a range of meanings associated with established social relations and the economic status quo. Put another way, “urban space is both the object of political agency and its medium.”30

Tonkiss outlines a set of spatial and social conditions that make possible the formation of protest groups:

1. The city provides public space
2. cities offer information and mobilization networks (media and transport)

28 Oppenheimer and Lakey 51-52.
29 Tonkiss 67.
30 Tonkiss 63.
3. cities provide places for social groups to meet (density)
4. this density aids the formation of communities of interest (63)

These densities and interconnection of networks reinforce the highly symbolic nature of urban protest and politics. In urban centers, visibility and connections are maximized. In short, when there are more people around you, more people can hear your voice.

This is similar to the Habermasian idea of the public sphere, where bourgeois social values are established and maintained through display of bourgeois social mores. The act of display of mores in public space acts as regulatory mechanism and organizing force: those who behave in certain ways can be classified according to which segment of the public sphere they belong. Likewise, one's belonging to a social group deeply influences one's behavior, and sets a baseline for polite and appropriate actions in public spaces.

Social movements engage with politicized public space on the grounds of access, ownership, and networks of meaning. Social movements bring these practices and ideas into question by breaking written and unwritten social rules of the use of public space. The privatization and regulation of public spaces is highlighted and contested through such activities (in particular by Critical Mass, for example).31 Such activities become “tactical move(s) within the enemy's field of vision.”32

Political theorist John Parkinson claims that public space is essentially for properly functioning healthy democracies. He bases his sociological exploration of democracies on Habermas’ claims about the role that public space plays in the public sphere. The rules of the public sphere outline the conditions under which spaces are public or private. Private spaces are normative spaces where citizens are free to make autonomous decisions, and public spaces are where citizens can resolve conflicts arising as a result of those private decisions. The agreement as to where these boundaries lie, and in the specific cases of which instances, are context-specific. Parkinson gives the example from feminist thought and practice on the liberal-democratic ideal of privacy about how the home hides the political dimensions of domestic arrangements.33

Public spaces can theoretically be entered by anyone at any time, with no restrictions on access based on identity or time. In private spaces, entry is controlled by an individual or group who can decide who may enter and under which circumstances. Architecture critic and theorist Kim Dovey in Dovey 1999 and 2004 argues that certain urban redevelopment schemes contain implicit social, economic or spatial barriers to entry, thus increasing the likelihood of homogenization of the designed 'public' spaces. Thus accessibility is the key component that defines whether a space is public or private. Barriers to entry can be physical or social.

However, does accessibility necessarily equal democratic? Does public always equal free access? Does private always equal constrained? Rules of behavior and social norms certainly still apply in 'free' and public spaces. Expected public behavior in democracies is generally linked to one's social position within civil society, and broadly to one's position in relation to one's economic class. Parkinson 2006 claims that civil society needs to have public spaces open to all.

31 The bicycle awareness movement.
32 DeCerteau 37.
33 The relations of gender to public and domestic spaces is a theme taken up by several researchers within Person-Environment Relations as well as architectural theorists and historians, such as Margaret Crawford, Beatriz Colomina, Louise Mozingo, and Dolores Hayden. The relation between capitalism and the domestic sphere is the basis of J.K Gibson-Graham's The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It).
members regardless of position:

So, thinking about the informal public sphere directs us to consider whether or not a given society has space available for the use of its citizens. This should include privately-owned space free from state surveillance—the living rooms and private clubs in which groups in civil society meet—but there are questions about how inclusive and democratic a purely private style of civil society can be (Berman 1997). In addition, there should be publicly owned space available, including not just town halls, but also village halls and public assembly rooms; or meeting rooms in public libraries, rooms that do not charge convention-centre rates for the privilege, and which are easily accessible by a variety of people. There should also be town squares and plazas which can be used by people to press public demands. The accessibility requirement in turn implies not just things like disabled access, but reasonably extensive public transport networks and other infrastructure that enable all kinds of people to participate in collective life, as well as strict limits on the degree to which security services, both public and private, can interfere with the pressing of those claims. (9)

Parkinson also rightly points out that this position, that of the need for public space in healthy democracies, goes back to political philosopher Thomas Carlyle:

This is not just a recent view – it is one eloquently expressed by Thomas Carlyle in his London lectures of 1840. On this view, it is important to the health of democracy that many different locations for public debate are available, and ones that are not overwhelmed by the power of the state. (8)

In the American context, Alexis deTocqueville recognized the need within a democracy for public spaces in which citizen could be heard and where they could take part in public life. Public space was the basis for the education of democratic citizens. This was a contrast from the overly-administrative European state, in which, in deTocqueville's opinion overly constrained and surveilled their citizenry. Thus American democracy was democracy in full flourish because of its public spaces. Such spaces promoted behaviors that supported and reinforced the democratic ethos and way of life. Public space was the vital medium which allowed citizens to learn about and act upon their rights, and to organize and act collectively in order to determine their political fate. The open nature of the American public space, so similar in Tocqueville's perception to the Athenian Agora, let Americans be free and equal participants in democracy.

Sociologist Thomas Janoski analyzes the rights and privileges of citizenship in his book _Citizenship and Civil Society_ from 1998. He builds a contrasting set of active rights, such as political rights in the public sphere (which he defines as politics) and participation rights in the private sphere (defined as markets), and passive rights, such as legal rights in the public sphere and social rights in the private sphere. Crucially, social movements and protest as a function of citizenship rights are political rights. Thus, having public space is necessary for the enabling of certain active rights, which must be performed to be exercised. The active citizen and participating member of democracy is politically active in public space.

These last two analyses omit the workings of power and economics. David Harvey approaches the role of public space and development maintenance of political dissent with a more critical eye. Late capitalist societies have different organizational logics that do not always map over discursive constructions of liberal democracies such as deTocqueville and Janoski. For Harvey, economics is a much greater determinant of how public spaces are used: “(One of the) principal tasks of the capitalist state is to locate power in those spaces that the bourgeoisie controls, and dis-empower those spaces which oppositional movements have the greatest potentiality to command” (237).

Here we see a position that integrates the ordering principles of economics into the political participation of citizens. Relationship to class power, for Harvey, is a much greater determinant of space use than relationship to civil society. He examines the spatialization of
social conflicts arising from the implementation of governmentality as applied to urban sacred spaces. In Harvey 1985, he views social movements being instrumental in how local population resist administration by dominant classes and the planning elite. He focuses on collective action, and does not present an analysis of how the built environment itself influences human behavior. As I discuss above, any such relationship is based on discursive practices of ordering and administration of both places and populations.

2.6: Definition of Terms: Discursivity and Urban Space

Critical human geography, then, and its conception of “public space” as a product of economic and cultural relations, offers us a way to problematize and critique the economic relations that determine, in part, the social-spatial relations involved in mass urban political protest and protest management. While the globalization of capital and trade relations has had a profound impact on urban space and how it is administered, the usefulness of 'globalization' itself as a term has limited usefulness for this study. Rather, examining the influence that the overarching global economic relationship has on the administration of local urban space is much more useful. Therefore, as a base for this study, I am defining neoliberalism as a global project of capitalist power restoration that takes as its philosophical base the maximization of happiness through individual economic freedom, but in practice serves to reorganize wealth and power toward greater and greater concentration among the already-wealthy through business deregulation and privatization of hitherto public assets. Harvey 2005 calls this process “capital accumulation by dispossession” (154). I agree with Harvey's general claim that neoliberalism as an economic ideology is globally hegemonic. However, for this project, I focus on the idea that neoliberalism as the main philosophical force behind certain actions taken to control urban space and mitigate dissent, thus bringing to light internal contradictions in the practice of neoliberalism. In this case, neoliberalism promotes individual liberty for some while denying liberty to others. I discuss the specifics of these regulatory actions taken through the medium of urban space in a following section.

This strategy of governing is partially based on the philosophical underpinnings of neoliberal economic thought. Ways of managing populations is part of a way of thinking about proper ways of governing. Social theorist Michel Foucault (2007) claimed that a particular mentality, which he termed 'governmentality', had become the basis for all modern forms of political thought and action:

First, by 'governmentality' I understand the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. Second, by 'governmentality' I understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time and throughout the West, has constantly led toward the pre-eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, discipline and so on – of the type of power that we can call 'government' and which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses on the one hand, [and, on the other] to the development of a series of knowledge. (108)

34 Sanyal 46.
35 Ong, in particular, but also Mitchell, Harvey 2001, Pile and Keith, and Hackworth, among others.
36 Harvey 2005, Ch. 1.
He goes on to describe a third understanding of governmentality that relates to justice in the development of European states in the 15th and 16th centuries. In the case of said development, governmentality represents an important distinction between state of justice/society of laws (typified by Middle Ages sovereignty) vs. state of administration/society of regulation (modern sovereignty). This formulation places the current state of Western governmentality within a spectrum of rationalized population management.

Societies such as our own can be defined and characterized by the specific ways in which the ways of knowledge regarding social problems transform into ways of being addressing those constructed and perceived problems. Governments conceptualize and define goals for their nations, they organize and utilize the material and technical means to those ends, and develop bodies of knowledge to achieve those ends. Ideas form the basis for political administration. Specific modes of thought leads to specific ways of solving social problems. New tactics of classification, evaluation, documentation and administration result. In the example of protest policing, the governmental goal (broadly) is the maintenance of public order, the organization of technical means is the social technology of policing, and the body of knowledge is the spatial tactics of said policing, with the specific object of suppressing dissent manifested in mass protest.

This begs the question of the economic determination of cultural production. The fundamental idea behind material production determining social activity is the Marxian base and superstructure model; that is, that the relationship of a society to the material means of production (the base) determines cultural practices and social institutions in that society (the superstructure). In short, social consciousness comes from material consciousness. However, this model appears to be much simpler than how consciousness actually functions. Cultural theorist Raymond Williams argues that Marx's own position was not that the economic base of a society determines to the last degree all the cultural forms of that society (in fact, the original German word 'bestimmen' is used when discussing determination, which, more broadly interpreted, can mean 'govern', 'affect' or 'condition.') Williams rightly interprets Marx's analysis of deterministic relationships as being foremost human activities; that is, based in cultural production itself, and not existing as a result of abstract forces. Under this formulation, governmental rationalities are the result of human decisions to order the world. These decisions are based on ideas, which come from culturally developed economic relationships. Governmentality shapes action through discursivity.

According to economic theorist Peter Miller and sociologist Nikolas Rose, neoliberal governmental rationalities involve leaner, smaller government administrations and 'governing-at-a-distance', "mechanisms which promise to shape the economic or social conduct of diverse and institutionally distinct persons and agencies without shattering their formally distinct or 'autonomous' character." For Miller and Rose, neoliberal governmentality is about the exercise...
of political rule. Political power under neoliberalism is no longer limited to state actions. Using language as a focus for analysis helps to understand how political objects are formed; they are in fact “intellectual technologies” which render existence code-able and actionable.

Governmentality, then, has a discursive character: it produces and supports a kind of language, the above-mentioned 'intellectual technology', of how to discuss things. Governmentality produces bodies of knowledge, and the practices and standards through which that knowledge can be accessed and utilized. Language and politics are mutually constitutive. Political rationality needs its own language and sets of practices, and uses that language as a filter through which to view events and situations. The language of political rationality does not always map clearly onto popular, vernacular or procedural language regarding the management of populations, and thus arise conflicts of interpretation.41

This is analogous to cultural theorist John Tomlinson's argument: because objects of economic policy and discursively constructed, they are based upon highly interrelated and contingent sets of administrative bodies working together independently, and cannot be reduced to the actions or interests of a singular agency.42 These agencies coordinate through use of a shared vocabulary of enforcement and action.

2.7: Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is a way to approach protest and policing through understanding language as a constitutive element in the social and cultural processes of engaging with urban space for political purposes. As legal considerations are based on careful construction of language, and as practices of protest and protest policing both rely on close understandings of law, understanding the ways in which these processes are discussed and how they are thought about leads to a clarification of their interrelation, and their interrelation with urban space. This approach is primarily ethnographic and epistemological, focusing on large scale behavior, and how such behavior expresses larger social, cultural, and economic conditions.

I drew primary inspiration in this from Michel Foucault’s writings on governmentality and biopower.43 His approach to issues of power and control explore the deep history of ideas and how they transform not only material life, but even how we conceptualize and compartmentalize our experiences.

My study of power and resistance is closely related to this mode of discourse analysis, but focuses specifically on emplaced practices. In this research I examine both symbolic change, that is, changes in perception and conception, as well as material change, or changes in both form and material practice. Also necessary to this segment of the work is an examination of a wide range of practices of dominance and resistance.

Urban spatial practice is professionalized both in policing as well as environmental design. Careful examination of these practices involves investigating both the literature and material which serves as documentation of practices, as well actual manifestations of these

41 Collins and Glover detail these linguistic crises in Collateral Language; I will return to the idea of linguistic ambiguity and shifts in meaning in my discussion and conclusion chapter.
42 Tomlinson 73-87.
43 Foucault and Rabinow, also Foucault 2000, 2003, and 2007.
practices in the built environment. This is necessary to properly frame the institutional, epistemological and ontological processes behind the control of urban space. Understanding the approach other disciplines have taken to these issues. My research to date has uncovered four major approaches to issues of riot control and the behavior of massed bodies in space. I discuss these approaches at length in Chapter 4. I focused on actual examples of the urban built environment and the professionalized practices that designed and implemented them, specifically examples from the four event-sites mentioned above and discussed in greater detail in section 3.4.

Part of the logic behind these spatial techniques of control is that any change in the physical environment results in a change in human behavior. While the status of this way of thinking (usually called ‘environmental determinism’) is a subject of historical debate among theorists of the built environment, my research shows that these theories exist as some of the foundational principles behind regulatory movements and practices to control protest in urban space. Through my examination of these bodies of literature I investigate extent of this theory and determine how explicitly ideas of social control through spatial control have been mobilized. Regulatory bodies’ conception of environmental determinism is radically different from that of theorists of the built environment, and as such large bodies of parallel research exist, that are not in communication, each showing different results. Professional literature on the policing of space shows that environmental determinism is the baseline for policing activity, and that controlling behavior through using space is possible and desirable. Other academic approaches to understanding the relationship between behavior and space are much more varied.

Environmental and Mass Psychology approaches the issue from a behavioral perspective, focusing on motivations and actions of individuals and groups. This approach is useful for determining individual actions and speculation as to motive, but lacks a historicized approach, a larger social or economic context.

The bulk of mass behavior studies in sociology are temporally located in the early 1960s through mid-1970s, at which time the line of inquiry seems to have faded. As might be expected given the historical position of the research, it seems inordinately occupied with ethnicity and role in riots of ‘the Negro’, and focuses exclusively on empirical and statistical methods of measurement. This approach lacks self-reflectivity, makes ahistorical assumptions and is deeply ideological. These traits limit its usefulness to my project, but the literature provides a good point of comparison to show the evolution of spatial and social technologies of control.

Hand-in-hand with sociological mass behavior studies is the criminological/administrative approach to riot control. The premiere literatures of this theoretical approach are police and military training manuals and public policy documents. Most of these documents are tactical manuals, detailing procedures and on-site formations of anti-riot troops, with occasional forays into speculation as to origins and causes. Although the literature is replete with information about on-the-street tactics and formations, it deals little with the built environment. Where it does, this literature treats the built environment as a threat, attempting to target potential sites of disturbance, often through thinly-disguised racism. The literature is

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44 Stokols and Altman is a core text of environmental psychology.
45 This is true in at least the American context. I have limited my study of mass behavior sociology to the American body of work.
sometimes paranoid and conspiratorial in tone, citing the dangers of sniper attacks on policemen and the identification and removal of ‘professional instigators’ and individual riot agitators. The material is very dated, having been produced at the same time as the mass behavior work in sociology.

In contrast, the current project requires the most recent information possible, especially as the United States government has instituted new anti-terrorism training programs across its various enforcement agencies in the wake of the attacks on September 11th, 2001. As such I have found and used many documents on police and paramilitary training for crowd control. While this may seem a tangential connection, my research has uncovered a troubling confluence of crowd control tactics and anti-terror training. Accordingly, I have found and used many documents on police and paramilitary training for crowd control.

Another useful approach is the social history of protest and urban space. An extensive body of literature on specific riots and their historical significance to American politics and public life covers American protest history from the events leading to the American Revolution (1776) all the way to the Occupy Movement (2011) and beyond. This material, although rich in contextual information, is rarely critical, rarely deals with the specific spatial conditions of (or reactions to) riots and demonstrations, and is concerned primarily with chronicling the events.

2.8: Definition of Terms: Protest Policing

Protest policing is the set of ideas and practices designed to quell, contain, or defend against large scale crowds. The strict definitions between the terms crowd, protest, and riot are fluid and context-driven, and are generally used to legitimate degrees of repressive policing tactics. According to retired San Francisco Police Captain Charles Beene, “Crowd and riot control is a police science that demands specialized, aggressive, positive action by law enforcement authorities.” Beene goes on to list a number of ways in which crowd control policing differs from ordinary policing, with particular awareness of the politically charged nature of public protest and the need for military-style command and control. This illustrates how policing is both a set of procedures and a set of ideas. Protest policing functions as a social technology, a set of ideas and action designed to affect social behavior toward a larger purpose.

Police approaches to protest are historical products of the dominant culture of policing at the time of the protests, affected by local contexts and conditions. The professionalization of policing has led to nationwide standards of conduct and legal frameworks within which police

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46 Specifically the relatively new umbrella organization the Department of Homeland Security, which has succeeded both the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Federal Emergency Management Agency; a merger which is itself telling.

47 Richman and Vorderbrueggen. The story details how an anti-terrorism training test identifies protest as ‘low-level terrorist behavior.’ Although the American Civil Liberties Union has challenged this conflation and successfully called for its removal, its initial inclusion is a troubling insight into the perceptions of regulators and law enforcers. The characterization of protest as terrorism persists, however, as shown by protest categorized as domestic terrorism in Bolz et. al.

48 Zinn, Barber.

49 Beene ix.

50 Beene 1.

Sagan 18
operate. These standards and sets of best practices have changed over time as police methods have been tested and challenged in various ways. These challenges have resulted in an escalating exchange of police and protester spatial and tactical innovation, which has resulted in large scale shifts in protest policing applications.

In this project, I rely on an approach to crowd control and riot policing policy over time detailed “Aspects of the ‘New Penology’ in the Police Response to Major Political Protests in the United States, 1999–2000” by sociologists John Noakes and Patrick F. Gillham. Despite the apparently limited time frame, the text actually analyzes historical approaches to protest policing, breaking them down into three periods: pre-1970, 1970 to 1990s, and current. I have reproduced their chart from page 101 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Escalated force (pre-1970s)</th>
<th>Negotiated management (1970–1990s)</th>
<th>Strategic incapacitation (current)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Amendment rights</td>
<td>Denied to all</td>
<td>Stated top priority</td>
<td>Low priority (denied to transgressive protesters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance of community disruption</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate (more likely to be tolerated for contained than transgressive protesters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High with contained; selective with transgressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of arrests</td>
<td>Frequent</td>
<td>Last resort</td>
<td>Strategic; no longer last resort (used to incapacitate transgressive protesters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of force</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Last resort</td>
<td>Strategic; no longer last resort; expanded by use of less-lethal weaponry (used to incapacitate transgressive protesters)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998.

What is most useful for the current project is that these three time periods roughly correspond to the three time periods of my own case studies: Chicago in 1968 falls under the first time period, Dallas 1984 the second, and 2008 Denver and St. Paul the third. Even more important, I argue the events of the protests in Chicago in 1968 which were instrumental in the shift in policy from the first to the second model of protest policing. As I demonstrate in each case study, the event-sites I study very closely follow each model as appropriate to the time period, namely, Chicago 1968 follows the escalated force model, Dallas 1984 follows the negotiated management model, and 2008 Denver and St. Paul each followed the strategic incapacitation model, each to slightly different degrees. Each model has its own approaches to urban space, which I detail in each case study.

2.9: Public Space and Self-governance

Particularly important in this line of thought is the practice of governing the self. In the first half of the 20th century, this took the form of constituted “citizens as social being(s) whose

51 Noakes and Gillham 2006.
powers and obligations were articulated in the language of social responsibilities and collective solidarities. After World War Two, however, the emphasis shifted from practice of collective citizenship to a focus on personal choice, particularly personal consumption choices. Is this new model, the citizen was one who made consumer choices, and who consistently increased consumption, for the benefit of him or herself and for the nation. Thus, there was a direct relationship between the private choices of the individual and the health of the nation. The best form of government, then, was one that supported and maximized the consumer choice of its citizens. This was not however accomplished directly, but rather through the setting of policy on such activities as advertising, fiscal services, credit and so forth. Through the setting of these policies, habits of consumption could be generally organized and channeled. Workers and their desires are instrumentalized. Thus, “the 'autonomous' subjectivity of the productive individual has become a central economic resource.” The capacity of individuals to self-regulate becomes aligned with the economic and political objectives of the system of political power described above, that is, through an ensemble of forces, sharing a common language, focused on common goals.

A key component of Foucault's theory of governmentality is self-management. The theories of governmentality describes how citizens learn, or are disciplined, through the administration of populations and the processes of governance. This self-management places citizens within closely proscripted, typically determined through administrative processes. That a citizens is categorized in a certain way allows the law to act upon them in certain ways based on that categorization. Under a neoliberal regime of governmentality, these roles are very limited: consumer, market actor, regulator, and so on. These categories are not administrative categories, rather they are perceptions of proper behavior. Cultural theorist Lauren Berlant describes this as the “passive citizen” model. Berlant states that “publics” can be constructed as a means of education and survival when people are disenfranchised from the general culture. In a set of cultural and administrative shifts that began under the Reagan administration, private intimate behavior supplanted civic acts as a measure of ideal citizenship; that is, what one did in private was more important, and somehow, more proper than what one did in public. In this estimation, political speech is considered almost rude and impolite. Further, protest becomes a threat when done publicly, lest others be blocked or prevented from participating in the ongoing commerce. Berlant's analysis is that this process is dangerous because protest represents a step in the decoupling of law enforcement from the rule of law; there is the sense that one may be arrested for speaking in public that which should be spoken privately. The passive citizen, to echo Janoski, was one who did not exercise public rights.

This is in contrast to Tonkiss' approach. Tonkiss states that a feature of protest movements is an “...emphasis on autonomy and self-management, and a suspicion of representation or mediation by official leaders, delegates or spokespeople.” These differing modes of self-management come from radically different positions vis-a-vis political participation.

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52 Tomlinson 23.
53 Tomlinson 24.
54 Tomlinson 25.
55 Tomlinson 26.
56 Tonkiss 62.
2.10: Public Space and Social Technologies

The administration of bodies in space and the governmental logics behind such administration can be described as kinds of social technologies. Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier trace the development of the idea of a social technology through the work of Karl Polanyi and Michel Foucault. For Polanyi, a “social technology” was a way of intensifying control over human activity through new regimes of visibility and discipline. This intensification of control resulted from a shift in thought in British liberalism: that the state should be based on the biological nature of man, not a political order. Governance should not be based on politics, but on rational understandings of the biological needs of man. Economic society was distinct from the political state. Through the development of the welfare state, neoliberalism attempts to reform and rationalize social welfarism, in contrast to traditional liberal-democratic states. Neoliberal states emphasize personal economic freedom over social responsibilities, and regulate social policy and develop governmental practices aimed at lowering regulatory barriers to the free transmission of capital while at the same time dismantling state responsibilities for social services. Military and police spending is maintained or increased under neoliberal regimes.

A social technology, then, is a set of practices that intensify and increase control over human behavior. Foucault also calls this 'biopolitics', the biological basis for political and economic behavior. The biological being-in-common of people was that element by which they should be governed. In Foucault's *Order of Things*, he shows how the human sciences were developed as a means of discovering human beings as objects of systematic scrutiny and analysis. Biological life and social life alike were problematized as objects for study. This involved the concomitant creation of a baseline for assessment, or what we can understand as normativity; that is, the creation of a category of 'normal' against which the newly classified life can be judged.

In *Discipline and Punish*, as well as in a his lecture series and interviews with Paul Rabinow, Foucault analyzes the historical development of the use of social technologies of space, specifically through the application of administrative practice to the human body and architecture. In this analysis, architecture serves as a political technology that works out in space the administrative concerns of the existing government. Control and power over individuals is maintained through the arrangement and administration of the spaces of their daily lives, such as factories, barracks, schools and hospitals. The goal of such political technology is the creation of the “docile body,” analogous to the above-mentioned “passive citizen,” where the human subject gives over agency for him or herself and gives access to his or her body over to the state administration.

Note, however, that humans as such are not universal, but must be understood through their individual contexts and histories and through the conditions of their collective and social life. In architecture theorist Setha Low's 1990 article on social production theories, she outlines how normativity and social technologies apply to analysis of the built environment; from Low 1996:

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57 Ong and Collier 6.
The most promising new direction for anthropologists lies in the area of social production theories. These approaches seek to place their understanding of built forms within the larger context of society's institutions and its history.... As an object of study, the building becomes a point of spatial articulation for the intersection of multiple forces of economy, society and culture. Further, the meaning of the built environment as revealed through its metaphorical connections and ritual practices constitutes an important but still incompletely explored dimension....The analysis and interpretation of building decisions cannot be understood apart from social and economic institutional forces that continuously influence actors, nor can the interpretation of symbolic meaning be divorced from these forces or history. (861)

The statement that Lawrence and Low make about buildings being sites of spatial articulation of “multiple forces of economy, society and culture” can be equally applied to urban public spaces as well; perhaps even more so, because of the stake that protesters have in the 'public-ness' of public spaces. Buildings themselves are nominally owned, private spaces, which, by their very nature of privacy and containment make mass protest behavior at best awkward and at worst impossible.

The role of state administration of the spaces of daily life is further examined by architecture theorist James Holston in his analysis of the master planned city of Brasilia. The state-sponsored design and development of the city aimed to make daily life the target for master planning. Political domination was to be maintained through the political and spatial intervention into the architecture of daily life. The control over the movement of bodies according to limited means, specifically through the creation of vast plazas and motorways in a sparsely populated and poor region, in addition to the development of modernist apartment blocks as the primary residential development, was meant to promote political behavior that supported the government's perception of modernization.

In terms of regulation and enforcement, geographer Steve Herbert's analysis of territoriality and policing goes into detail regarding the actual practices of enforcement. The surveillance of bodies in space and regulation based on territoriality is the core of his ethnographic analysis of the Los Angeles police force. He examines the social technology of policing, and how the control over and denial of access to space is fundamental to the practice of enforcement. There are a series of “normative orders” that emerge during the experience of policing. These normative orders serve to maintain a monopoly on access to space, and define categories of people on the basis of that monopoly.

2.11: Summation

Each philosophical and methodological approach brings with it a whole philosophical and intellectual genealogy which intersects with others only occasionally. These theoretical divisions are by no means immutable or reductive, rather, the current project uncovers and traces many overlappings, confluences and lines of interconnecting between them. Given the tension between and drawbacks within each approach, this work draws from each.

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60 Holston 1989.
61 Herbert 1997 3.
3.0: Methodology and Methods:

3.1: Person-environment Relations and Critical Theory

Based on my two primary theoretical frameworks of person-environment relations, and critical theory, I have divided my work according to suitability for the research purposes at hand. Specifically, as discussed above, I use the methods of person-environment relations to gather information which is interpreted through a critical theory format. While there are several distinct bodies of literature approaching the issue of mass behavior (sociological, historical-cultural, criminological, environmental-psychological, etc.), I examine this problem primarily through both critical theory and through person-environment relations.

This speaks to the strengths of both methods. First, person-environment relations, with its origin points in empirical social science, has an appropriative and holistic outlook on the use of data gathering methods. PER in general has appropriated methods from sociology, psychology and anthropology early in its life, and recently has incorporated methods from geography, environmental theory and neuroscience. Cranz and Pavlides write that social science research methods are particularly useful for addressing the specifics of how people use spaces and buildings, looking at the direct relationship between people and places. Second, these methods are useful for the evaluation of spaces as such, and any such applied studies of behavior in space. In particular, the empirical basis of PER methods and the focus on combining qualitative and quantitative data are an integral part of the design process in post-occupancy evaluations. As I am looking at discrete urban places and city form, the suitability of PER methods is clear.

Likewise, critical theory in general, and cultural studies in particular, shares PER's appropriative and multidisciplinary approach to issues of culture. It is a set of practices of inquiry that focuses on cultural practices and their relations to power, cultural events within their proper historical and political contexts, and, through investigation and exploration, challenges modes of political and material power. To follow these goals, critical theory focuses on interpretation and analysis of social and cultural events and practices. Ideally, critical theory is theory applied to practice. That is, there are stakes to the choices made informed by critique. This is true not only of how people understand their own culture and social relations in space, but also doubly so for spatial practitioners. As we are in the last instance physical beings, social and cultural life is impossible without a space to provide for it a frame and stage.

Further, critical theory shares with PER a focus on discovery science as a means of formulating research questions. PER uses on empirical methods of study, which have their origin in the physical sciences. This produces an analytical framework which is ill-suited to investigating larger overarching and complex issues, such as power and politics, especially in their relation to finding testable and provable hypotheses about the built environment and behavior. As Cranz and Pavlides write, “hypothesis-testing [in studies of the built environment] research has produced findings with only limited uses for architects because the approach

62 The publication history of John Zeisel's text Inquiry by Design shows some of this development, as later editions incorporated neuroscience into the book.
63 Cranz and Pavlides 194-195.
64 Zimring 307-308.
validates information already well-known and understood by architects through experience.”65 I would clarify this further by stating that not only architects take limited use from hypothesis-testing, but so do other designers and regulators of the built environment as well, such as planners, urban administrators. Further still, developers, real-estate workers and others who have primarily economic and exploitative relationships with the built environment have a particular ideology of space which resists any hypothesis-testing, or any testing whatsoever, the results of which might limit extracting profit from developed space. They share this reactionary position with enforcers and police, who, due to their increasing militarization and the concomitant application of military logic to urban space, come to regard any shift the built environment outside of their direct control as a possible threat.

Finally, both critical social theory and environment-behavior studies have a shared ethos of approaching using evidence and analysis to improve human experiences. The broadly stated basic aims of the two fields are the same, but they differ on focus and object of study. The distinction in the object of study is that of culture vs. built environment, inasmuch as they can be disentangled and considered separate. EBS generally recognizes culture's importance in people's understanding and use of space. Critical theory has undergone what has been widely called a “spatial turn” in the last few decades, emphasizing the role that the built environment plays in developing and influencing culture.66 The design and understanding of the built environment expresses culture. The status of the two as separate modes of inquiry is a product of their institutional positions in the academy. Critical theory tends to be used in departments that formerly fell under the banner of the humanities, whereas EBS is tied to design programs. Despite this administrative separation, both fields have the same goal: making things better through more informed practices.

This strategy is similar to grounded theory. Grounded theory involves the researcher entering a setting or event without preconceived notions of how to interpret events.67 After gathering the data, the researcher builds a theory from what is observed. Then the researcher examines the theory in light of the data, checking the theory for validity. I utilized a similar intensive and open-ended approach to the study of urban space and protest policing. This approach has many overlappings with both discovery science and interpretive-historical research, and several elements of each are functionally identical.

Discovery science, as proposed by spatial theorists Galen Cranz and Eleftherios Pavlides,68 offers another model of inquiry that better suits this project. Discovery science is the practice of widely gathering data, assembling it, and seeking and analyzing patterns therefrom. While the use of this method in the physical sciences typically begins with large amounts of quantitative data, the processing and organization of which made easier through electronic means, the method still has relevance for social science of the built environment. Cranz and Pavlides state that such a method for use of study of the built environment works best when it finds anomalous or outlier information, typically gathered from interviews or photo elicitation methods. I argue that discovery science methods can also be applied use similar techniques as Clifford Geertz's ethnographic thick description; that is, analyzing all that is available regarding a certain phenomenon, gathering what extra is necessary, surveying all of it, and uncovering what

65 Cranz and Pavlides 195.
66 Most recently by Warf and Arias 3.
68 Cranz and Pavlides 195.
patterns may emerge. Therefore, using empirical methods first-hand, physically being present at event-sites, in order to gather copious unexpected data, is the best method of study for this project (detailed below in section 3.4).

Spatial theorist Michel deCerteau, in his essay “Walking in the City,” discusses an approach to studying urban space which has particular resonance for this study, and reinforces my research.69 For him, the danger in being a spatial practitioner comes from having the wrong perspective. He links the technical practice of space-making with an abstract and unattainable point of view, that is, a god's-eye perception of the urban fabric.70 In particular, he blames Renaissance illustrators for developing perspectives that no human eye could see. “His elevation makes him into a voyeur.”71 This is also taken up, with a slightly different focus, by critical theorist Jonathan Crary in 2001, where he links perception and subjectivity. DeCerteau is right to argue that such a vantage point removes one from the daily life of cities, and they must be experienced first-hand to understand their production fully. He argues later that space is something produced as it is lived and experienced, not as it is designed and constructed. The spatial rules of walking and relation to other urban objects in space serves as the process of defining that space. Being-present gives the walker the opportunity to take in data that greatly aids thick description and discovery science alike.72

Architects, planners and spatial regulators take a similar approach when considering urban space: examine any plan or elevation, and you will see its flatness, its regularity, its occupation of an impossible vantage point. Rather than trace how the designer’s gaze has come into being, the current study follows and expands on Crary's research. I challenge that the previous body of work on protest policing follows the same abstracted and removed approach. This abstract perspective has consequences for the subjectivity of the researcher as well as for the designer.

Despite the value to research of the researcher being present and experiencing urban space directly, there are drawbacks to being physically present. In a study such as this, where the object is not the lifeways of a certain people, which can be studied at the micro-behavioral level, but rather urban spaces and public places and the behavior therein, the scale of the subject precludes behavioral thick description.73 It is not possible for the researcher to take in everything. Rather, as I outline below, I took the approach of using a variety of methods to gather as much data as I could, and interpret the patterns and tensions within. This allows my investigation to be open-ended and opportunistic in terms of material available.

3.2: Discovery Science and Research Hazards

Discovery science has several advantages over hypothesis science for this study. First, isolating behavioral variables in the context of these event-sites is problematic. They are urban,

69 Chapter VII in The Practice of Everyday Life.
70 DeCerteau 92.
71 DeCerteau 92.
72 Further, any good day in the city should be an experience in discovery science!
73 Using Geertz’s thick description on each of the physical actions and words and intonations of each of tens of thousands of people in a dynamic and possibly dangerous urban environment is a challenge beyond this researcher's capabilities.
with large numbers of participants of varying inclination, and the activities observed are reactive and fraught with physical and legal danger for the incautious researcher. Due to the shifting and contingent perception of legal behavior during mass protests on the part of regulators, and due to the possibility that significant legal problems could result from simply being the wrong place during one of these event-sites, hypothesis science is not really possible. This is to say nothing of the ethical considerations of the researcher being present for events in which possible harm may be delivered upon one set of human subjects of this research by another set of human subjects. When studying protest and policing directly, the researcher is in harm's way, and might be witness to or unwilling participant in physical violence.

There are difficulties in being both part of a crowd and attempting to remain separate and objective; to an extent, my mere presence was enough to affect the flow of events and contaminate my data.\textsuperscript{74} I counter, however, by stating that no social researcher is ever fully separate from his or her subjects; socialized people naturally react when others are present. To mitigate this, as mentioned above, I remained as objective and observational as possible. Further, strictly avoiding participant observation in social-spatial research is impossible, especially if one physically investigates the site involved. The researcher's physical presence means that to some degree the researcher is participating. When dealing with such inflammatory issues as the rights of citizens, no researcher can truly be a mere observer. Rather, following Stuart Hall, observers of protest enforcement in urban environments occupy a dual position, that of both consumer/user of space, and producer of space through the act of occupation, that is, with a physical presence.\textsuperscript{75} One more body on the street might not make the difference, but certainly such an observer cannot be said to be removed and protected.

Studies of protest policing typically circumvent this ethical bind and physical danger by eliminating on-site research, focusing on archival research or post-facto interviews, relying entirely on secondary sources.\textsuperscript{76} I do not believe this approach is sufficient to capture the experience of participants and regulators, especially in relation to the urban environment. Protests are full of tension for all involved. Regulators, protesters, those protested against and bystanders alike all are continually aware of the possibility of escalation into violence.

University of California Committee for Protection of Human Subjects research guidelines do not state that intervention to prevent harm is recommended, and in fact restrict responsibility for harm to the following criteria:

\begin{itemize}
\item Unanticipated problem involving risks to subjects or others: Any incident, experience, or outcome that is:
\begin{itemize}
\item (1) \textit{unexpected} (in terms of nature, severity, or frequency) given (a) the research procedures that are described in the protocol-related documents, such as the IRB-approved research protocol and informed consent document;
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{74} Often, the events include bystanders without their explicit permission. In the case of protest or policing studies, researchers (and many journalists) are particularly vulnerable to being affected, either through arrest or through contact with crowd control chemical agents. Such an event occurred during the course of my data gathering; in St. Paul I experienced tear gas firsthand.

\textsuperscript{75} Hall 1991a.

\textsuperscript{76} Dubber in particular studies policing through historical examination only, with the bulk of his sources from the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries. Rosanvallon approaches protest policing as a political issue. Boykoff focuses on media and regulation. Herbert does lots of on-site ethnographic work, but examines only policing, and not protest. McPhail et. al., who write about protest policing 1960-1995, take a historical-archival approach. The two groups who produce protest policing literature who draw their primary experience from being present during protests are the protesters and the police themselves, the products of neither of which can be relied upon for completeness and objectivity.
and (b) the characteristics of the subject population being studied;

(2) related or possibly related to a subject’s participation in the research (i.e., a reasonable possibility exists that the problem, event, incident, experience, or outcome may have been caused by the procedures involved in the research study); and

(3) suggests that the research places subjects or others at a greater risk of harm (including physical, psychological, economic, legal, or social harm) related to the research than was previously known or recognized.

- CPHS Guidelines – Reporting Unanticipated Problems and Adverse Events, Committee for Protection of Human Subjects University of California, Berkeley (emphasis in original)

At no time did my research cause any of my subjects to be in greater danger than they were by their own choice to be present, and at no time did my research produce unexpected harm or danger to any of my subjects. I have taken the further step of anonymizing all participant data. The subject of my research was not in fact violence or harm, or indeed any actual physical condition of any subject. In short, that anyone came to harm during the course of this study was entirely out of the researcher's hands. To attempt to have prevented any harm to come to any of my subjects, who were adults who had decided to appear in public, or who were professionals acting in the line of their duties, would have jeopardized the research by placing the researcher in physical and legal danger. For these reasons I was wary of engaging in participant-observer research. Any participation in these events beyond mere presence and observation would represent an ethical breach of this research. As such, my involvement was strictly observational.

3.3: Tactics Overview

In general, I followed a set of qualitative methods as outlined by architecture researchers Linda Groat and David Wang in their book *Architectural Research Methods*.\(^\text{77}\) I place an emphasis on people and activities in their natural settings. Although protest is an infrequent event, it provides the backdrop for real experiences in the daily lives of subjects. My focus is on interpretation and meaning, looking at events and data and analyzing them. I use multiple research methods, detailed below, to gather sufficient amounts of data from various phenomena. Without standardized measures of data gathering, such as surveys, the direct experience of the researcher becomes the primary measurement device. Although the events were limited in duration, I undertook the lengthiest exposure possible, by spending whole days at the event-sites. And finally, my approach was holistic, in that I hoped to gain a systematic and integrated overview of the phenomena at hand. Thus, my methods are interpretive-historical in character and contemporary in focus.

Overall, my methodology is to approach protests and protest policing in urban space as a product of historical, intellectual, and spatial concerns. Each event-site grows out of its context and conditions. I focus on the historical development of both protest and policing as sets of ideas and sets of practices, then examine how each interacts with the particular urban spaces of each city. This involves the survey of historical literature on protest, policing, and cities. For analysis, I rely on theoretical models from diverse fields, largely based in the social sciences, put with particular application to the study of the built environment. My analytical model is both

historical-genealogical, that is, examining the historical development of ideas and their implementation, as well as critical, reflecting on events and processes and examining their workings and effects.

3.4: Objects of Study

To investigate the historical development of protest policing and urban space, I have examined four events of urban civil disobedience, and placed them within their proper historical, spatial, and social contexts. These four event-sites are:78

The Democratic national convention in Chicago, August 26th-29th, 1968 (pre-neoliberalism)
The Republican national convention in Dallas, August 20th-23rd, 1984 (early neoliberalism)
The Democratic national convention in Denver, August 25th-28th, 2008 (neoliberalism)
The Republican national convention in St. Paul, Sept 1st-4th, 2008 (neoliberalism)

The first two event-sites show an increasing sophistication of crowd and protest management techniques based on contemporaneous models of protest policing. The 1968 event-site is particularly illustrative for its dramatic and wide reaching protests. Further, these events are well-documented. As I will show, the Chicago '68 event-site holds a particular resonance and object-lesson for regulators. This event-site is the example against which their activities are judged by themselves and the public. It represents a crisis in protest enforcement: the collision of mass protest and hardline response.

The Dallas '84 event-site represents a legal crisis for neoliberalism, cities and citizenship. This crisis dealt specifically with the extent of free speech and the rights of citizens. When regarding the 1984 event, note that neoliberal economic policies were in their infancy, and neoliberal social strategies (especially regarding urban space) were in very early stages of transformation. The 1984 event is less well-documented, but is nonetheless appropriate for this study because it involved similar demonstrations, albeit at a much smaller scale.79 It is particularly noteworthy for being the site of an event of flag-burning which later was deliberated by the United States Supreme Court.80 I have relied on archival materials in order to establish a baseline of comparison with the two later event-sites from 2008. Furthermore, as I was unable to directly observe the 1968 and 1984 events, I rely on abundant recorded testimonial accounts of the events by witnesses and participants. These two event-sites were selected for their notoriety, documentation, historical roles, and political similarity to the more recent event-sites.

Chicago 1968 and Dallas 1984 represented crises in citizenship and protest, and both events in 2008 represent attempts to work out those crises in new and unique ways. I based the choice of the second two event-sites on their political similarities to their predecessors and on their availability for direct observation. I went to both cities during the time of the events, and

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78 Being a combination of spatial and temporal factors; e.g. these events occurred in a specific place at a specific time.
79 It is the case that little or no spatial data is available for the Dallas protest event-site; I include it because of the juridico-legal confrontation between protesters and organizers; see footnote 9.
had direct access to many of the participants and events. In addition, the 2008 events took place under an emerging and developing neoliberal regime of citizenship through 'working-out' the aforementioned crises. It is these earlier crises of citizenship that neoliberal spatial practice is attempting to transcend; they are the titular specters of the past that haunt the regulators of neoliberal spaces and cities.

My choice of party-based national conventions was designed to limit the number of variables involved in this research. That these events were scheduled and planned well ahead of time increased the likelihood of large numbers of participants. Due to their limited frequency of once every four years, these events were bellwethers of the political state of the nation. Candidates focused on perceived issues of governance, and protesters used these events as a chance to air larger grievances and publicly display their shared moral sentiments. In addition, because of the national character of the presidential conventions, they acted as an opportunity for massing of protesters from around the nation. As the individual political parties focus their national energies and resources on these infrequent national meetings, so do the dissatisfied. In addition, the prominent party line division in the United States means that the political issues being protested at each event will differ. The difference, however, does not matter for this project: I will be looking at the spatial tactics and reactions.

The four cities have different urban topographies. Each was in a city planned on a grid with relatively level topography. St. Paul is a notable exception. The urban core and site of the convention and protests is edged by a sheer drop down to the Mississippi river, forming a significant barrier. In my chapter on the St. Paul event-site, I chart how significant this barrier proved.

3.5: Methods

My data collection techniques are:81

Archival research: While developing the methodological and theoretical basis for the current project, as well as developing a robust literature review, I conducted archival work designed at discovering both the spatial-formal and social conditions of each event. I looked for typologies of massed bodies in space in literature on crowd control in order to determine the constituent characteristics of and similarities between specific events. Due to the fact that two of my selected case studies were historical, using archival materials was the only way to study them.

In order to examine the role of neoliberal regulation in the enforcement of urban protests, I have examined as many legal and legal-philosophical documents that pertain to crowd control as possible. It could be that the language used by regulators indicates that certain practices are permission or forbidden, depending on the operational ideology of the social technology of enforcement. In specific, I sought photographs, written accounts and police incident reports. I looked for several factors: the plan, if available, of the demonstrators prior to the event(s), documents and archival material related to regulatory responses to the event(s), material changes

81 The archival work and observation, as they deal with behavior in the built environment, are based on both Zeisel and Groat and Wang. My genealogical-historical analytical is much more along the lines of Anthony King, Michel Foucault and Aihwa Ong.
In addition, I examined prior responses in the built environment to urban protest control to establish its historical-genealogical development. In this process I focused on the tradition of urban spatial-political control in Western society. In particular I examined political protests rather than riots, but there is some overlap depending on the viewpoint of the individual historian. Although there have been examples of urban design to affect the movement and activities of massed populations since there have been cities, my focus has been on the Western city since 1800; that general period represents the establishment of the modern liberal democracy, with particular emphasis on post-World War II America and Europe. I examined such historical factors as urban elements designed for crowd control, discourse on both protest and policing, protest policing tactics, protester tactics, the effects of those tactics, and contingent changes in the built environment in response to those tactics. This focus helped to limit the number of variables and amount of ground covered when researching these politically charged scenes.

Some of the data available on crowd control and massed bodies in space has been in such disparate fields as criminology, fluid dynamics, and computer simulation. These approaches have in common the philosophical position that crowds are in general irrational and dominated by emotionality. This position is based on early research on crowd behavior, such as The Crowd by Gustav Le Bon and Elias Canetti’s much later Crowds and Power. This reactionary perception of crowds underlies a segment of contemporary literature on policing, and forms the core of the “population management” paradigm of crowd control and political protest. In fact, there are several computer modeling programs that have been developed to simulate the dynamics of large numbers of people in bounded spaces, behaving according to limited rulesets. These simulations are used for such various purposes as modeling people escaping from fires to crowd control at large sporting events.

Within the body of environmental design professional literature, there is a subfield entitled Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, or CPTED. CPTED focuses on the reduction of crime through spatial design. While the field took its early influences from Oscar Newman and Robert Sommer, the application of behavior modification through design has found an ideological home rather far from the humanist goals of its early influences. The data gathering techniques for both periods of CPTED's lifespan have remained the same, and the physical designs have remained constant, but the ideology behind the implementation of these methods has changed drastically. The field started its development from suggested designs for making modern and Modernist structures more appealing for human use, through application of such design goals as improving user surveillance and allowing for more personalization. However, this user-centered approach gave way over time to an owner- or management-centered approach, exclusively emphasizing internal and external building “security” and prevention of crime over

82 Similarly, many of these documents were unavailable. I was likewise primarily reliant on public presentations of information. Counter-intelligence and agents provocateurs are real threats to organizations seeking to protest en masse. Many groups disseminate organizational information very widely in order to attract more people to their events.

83 One such is proprietary to the British ‘Crowd Dynamics’ consultancy; another is the ‘MASSIVE’ program developed by WETA, used in the ‘Lord of the Rings’ films, still another is the ‘CrowdIT’ application for the popular design program 3DMAX. There is also the video game ‘Riot Police,’ published by Activision in 2003, where the player takes the role of a police chief commanding riot control squadrons against an array of unruly citizens. The game’s tag line is “May I suggest the night stick officer?”

Sagan
user welfare.

Finally, there are copious amounts of information on the 2008 events in the popular media. This me to gain multiple journalistic perspectives on the events which I observed firsthand.

*Interviews:* I conducted interviews of protesters, police, onlookers and bystanders during my field study in Denver and St. Paul. The subjects of my study were people involved with attempts to control space to control political behavior, as well as those people affected by such attempts, including (but not limited to) participants (demonstrators, protesters, rioters, provocateurs, organizers, marchers, etc.) and administrators (policy makers, police commanders, police riot suppression units, military strategists, urban planners, architects of urban spaces, etc.) Interviews in the field were primarily of protesters, observers, and non-participant bystanders. All police and other regulators I interviewed during my field work were very reluctant to answer questions, and instead communicated only official commands. I retained anonymity of all interviewees that were not acting in an official capacity. These interviews were conducted in accordance with all university rules governing research on human subjects.

*Observation:* Necessary to this study is site survey and urban form analysis. Responses to urban civil disobedience are multiple and contingent, and I have examined both static and dynamic responses. Specifically, the static forms exist on multiple scales: the near-environment, street-level, district, even the whole urban area. Also, I endeavored to determine the correlation of specific forms and objects with intentions behind their implementation. The dynamic responses were incident- or policy-specific procedures and techniques of physical control, such as formations, enclosures or dispersals. These lists are not exclusive, rather, they were places to begin and over the course of my research these categories overlapped and merged.

All of my observational work occurred while present at these events. My observation tactics were based on Zeisel 2006, consisting of what he calls 'observing physical traces' and 'observing environmental behavior.' To be specific, while conducting physical traces observation, I looked for evidence of use and changes in the physical environment related to protests or protest policing. An incomplete list of these changes included a range of adaptations and alterations to the physical urban environments which were the settings of the protests, such as temporary structures, closed access points, public and unofficial signage, by-products of use, refuse, decorations and signage. I recorded these traces through note-taking, diagrams, drawings, and photography.

My observations of environmental behavior included watching behavior of protesters, police, media, observers, and bystanders in and around the protest event-sites. I was particularly interested in behavior en masse, as the protest events I observed in my field work consisted of

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84 In fact one group of police in Denver abruptly ended the conversation and quickly moved away when I told them I was from Berkeley. Because of this general reluctance I rely on policing literature, inference, and observation to determine regulators' perspectives on protest.

85 As this research focused on social processes and the built environment, I gathered no information identifying respondents. All presented data which could be used to identify respondents has been anonymized.

86 Zeisel 159-190.

87 Zeisel 191-226.

88 Zeisel 160-179.
thousands of participants. The protests represented natural settings; although they were planned and organized, I did not contrive any situations for the benefit of observation. I focused particularly on formations, or large groups of people acting in concert, taking up urban space in deliberate collective forms. Some of these formations consisted of thousands of participants, and some were as small as a dozen or less.

Following Zeisel's discussion of observer roles, field study of urban protest and policing poses some challenges to the models as they are presented.\(^89\) The most ethical observation research position is to present full disclosure and acquire informed consent as to all research aims and practices. In an urban setting during a dynamic events like protests, this is impractical at best. None of Zeisel's four models of observer positions strictly apply. The observer cannot be secret, as the events occur in public urban space. The observer cannot be a recognized outsider due to the already heterogenous composition of people in and around protest situations, further complicated by the adversarial character of protest events. This adversarial character also means that one cannot be a marginal or full participant without risk of arrest or injury. Further, participant observation of protest presents issues with objectivity. To join one side or the other, to the extent that it is possible, poses significant threats to the ability to simply continue the research. Thus my observer position had to be a hybrid of marginal participant and secret outsider: my participation was marginal in that I was present at the protest event-sites at the same time as the rest of the users, and was one body in urban space among many; I was a secret outsider to the extent that I simply could not feasibly inform everyone being studied of my research and intentions. I did clearly identify myself and described the project in all direct interactions with participants. I recorded my observations of behavior using maps, photographs, diagrams, and sketches.

\(^{89}\) Zeisel 196-199.
4.0: Literature Review:

4.1: Justification

In studying the available literature on the interrelation of protest policing and urban space, I discovered four general bodies of literature. Each literature defined the terms and ideas in different ways. This variation comes from the variety of disciplinary and administrative positions that each body of literature represents. The different definitions stem from both popular literature and scholarly research in each of the areas. In general, the four bodies of literature do not agree with one another on definitions of terms like 'crowd' and 'protest', and serve to show how contested language results in contesting approaches to behavior in the built environment.

In setting its own definitions and frameworks for understanding the issue of urban political protest and policing, each literature establishes its own political position. Through each literature's identification of problems in the field of protest policing, and through its prioritization of certain values (“freedom of expression,” “law and order,” “operational security,” for example), each literature works generally within its own theoretical framework. These frameworks in general do not interconnect, with some notable exceptions.90

This disconnection reveals different stakeholder positions in regard to urban protest policing within each of these bodies of literature. These positions emerge through identification and problematization of specific issues within protest policing. Different groups view protest and protest policing fundamentally differently, and see problems in what other groups see as standard or desired behaviors. Further, each literature develops over time in reaction to events, but rarely in communication with other bodies of literature on the same topics.

My survey of urban protest policing literature was initially organized around recognized crowd theory and policing literature. However, this quickly revealed that these distinctions did not often look at the role that the urban built environment played in protest policing. Further, the literature shows a kind of speciation; sociological approaches to understanding crowd behavior split into the groups I describe below. This split is based on core ideas within sociology and attempts to operationalize theoretical concepts, mobilized for different aims (analytical or regulatory). In particular, sociological literature on human use of space and specifically the idea of 'defensible space' are core concepts in the field of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, which is aimed at spatial protection and threat mitigation for property owners. This is a radical change from the idea's origin as as a user-centered approach to safety originally espoused by architect and sociologist Oscar Newman.

This literature review differs from traditional literature reviews in that it looks at both the academic and theoretical approaches to urban protest policing as well as professional literature. In each set of sources the literature is mostly primary and documentary in nature. There are several secondary analytical sources in each as well, particularly in the radical politics and criminological sections. The primary sources are useful for explaining events, procedures, plans,

90 There is some overlap between criminological literature and technical policing literature. This is perhaps telling in that both are mirrors of the other in terms of political position, but focusing on different scales and administrative processes.
and positions. The secondary sources are by their nature more removed, theoretical, and analytical, which is helpful in establishing academic theoretical trajectories and frameworks of understanding of urban political protest.

Further, and perhaps most tellingly, there is no singular theoretical academic approach to protest policing that integrates both the role that the built environment plays in the management of protests with a historical-genealogical analysis of how this situation came to be. Several sources (identified below) look at formations of urban politics or urban policing, but none present a coherent spatial analysis of protest policing from a critical standpoint. This apparent lack is only modestly addressed in the current project, and might prove a fruitful avenue of future investigation and development. This lack led me to broaden my literature review to a greater variety of sources.

In addition, my historical-genealogical approach to the current project means that tracing the development of ideas over time requires the following of those ideas through a wide variety of available sources. This is reinforced by the discovery science nature of this project. Many sources of all varieties produce a vast amount of data out of which patterns and repeated themes can be identified. In short, the variety and type of literatures I reviewed for this project were chosen both for depth and breadth.

### 4.2: Literature Groups

I have organized the literature reviewed into the following four groups: radical politics, criminological, technocratic, and technical-professional.

Three key terms are defined and problematized differently in each body of literature. One is the idea of the crowd. How crowds are conceived of and constructed vary according to the degree to which they are seen as a problem through each perspective. Likewise is the idea of space defined differently in each literature; in some, space is a medium, and in others, a commodity. Finally, protest is differently defined in each literature as well, sometimes as social pathology, sometimes as the highest expression of citizen's rights. These definitions are commonly held across these bodies of literature, and form the points of departure through each theoretical approach for understanding other phenomena. Explicit explanations of these definitions do not exist in every body of literature, and are rather deduced from the way each literature discusses these ideas. The only contrary example of this is the technical-professional literature, of which police training manuals are one example. This is due to the emphasis on following the letter of the law in policing practice, and being able to refer to specific linguistic definitions of conditions to justify police activity. The chart below illustrates these definitions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literature</th>
<th>Crowds</th>
<th>Space</th>
<th>Protest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radical Politics</td>
<td>Desirable, vehicles of political change, representative of the public</td>
<td>Stage for political drama, tool to occupy or deny, contested field,</td>
<td>Means to effect political change, highest expression of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The radical politics literature looks at political protests as a fundamental right of citizens in democratic states. The literature in general comes from political science, with emphasis on democratic societies, participation, direct action, and the history of political dissent. Given the subject matter of this project, a thorough survey of this literature is necessary, particularly given the group self-concept of protesters, and the historical legacies from which they draw and to whom they feel themselves descended. Further, some of the sources in this category have to deal with political and spatial tactics of organization and engagement. These sources are highly relevant, as the protest groups involved in the events used these same sources as organizational material.

The criminological literature stems from early sociological and psychological literature, particularly sociology of crowds and crowd psychology. It is generally reductive and reactionary, focusing on authoritarian approaches to the management of people in space, and problematizing crowds in general and political protest in particular as deviant behavior. The criminological literature represents the operationalization of sociological theories of crowds into regulatory frameworks. I believe this speaks to how academic sociology was appropriated by criminology throughout the middle of the 20th century, and how social issues from the 1950s through early 1970s promoted the mobilization of social theories in order to predict and control mass behavior. Ultimately, that is a study for another time.

Technocratic literature shares this appropriation of sociological studies, and uses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literature</th>
<th>Crowds</th>
<th>Space</th>
<th>Protest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political will, expressions of solidarity</td>
<td>medium for political speech</td>
<td>citizen's rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminology</td>
<td>Social pathology, source of danger, emotional and irrational, to be tightly controlled</td>
<td>Commodity, divided into public or private, with strict rules regarding behavior in each</td>
<td>Deviant, dangerous, and a source of possible threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technocratic</td>
<td>To be surveilled and monitored, to be restricted and carefully policed</td>
<td>To be used in an instrumental and tactical fashion to limit undesired mass social behaviors</td>
<td>Irrational and disruptive, possibly dangerous, symptomatic of social problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical-professional</td>
<td>Source of sudden dangers or emergent threats, to be managed through crowd control techniques</td>
<td>To be tightly controlled, secured, protected, and carefully monitored through formations, blockages, and area denial</td>
<td>Implicitly criminal, a threat to spatial control, to be prevented, isolated from the law-abiding public, or nullified; in practice, targets for repressive violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
examinations of social problems as the basis for the development of social policy. Technocratic literature treats urban political protest as symptomatic of larger social problems, which can be mitigated through social policy. These social policies focus on techniques of quantitative data gathering and analysis which culminate in strategies of population management. In this sense, the term “technocratic” refers to the development and implementation of sophisticated techniques (social technologies) of organizing people in space. Some key components of this literature include data and technological surveillance for purposes of social control, the militarization of police, and data-driven modeling of crowd behavior.

The body of technical-professional literature is similar to the technocratic, but where the technocratic literature concerns itself with the higher-level strategies for population management, technical-professional literature concerns the actual techniques and tools for organizing and controlling bodies in space. Topics included in this group include policing formations and procedure, literature on the architectural subfield CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design), and design guidelines and regulation to deter undesired spatial gatherings.

In the following sections I will explore each of these bodies of literature, summarizing major works and tracing key ideas.

4.3: Radical Politics

Literature on protest policing that comes from the standpoint of political theory and radical politics focuses on the participatory nature of modern states and the democratic engagement of a state's citizens. Literature that comes from the standpoint of radical politics consists generally of sources which examine the role of political protest in the American system of politics, sources which are guidebooks or manuals on the practice of protest, and sources which examine the processes of protest itself. Sources which examine radical politics as a historical object of study are useful to the current study for the overview of political protest within its historical and political contexts. Given the current project's historical-genealogical methodology, understanding as much of the context and circumstances surrounding each event of protest is very important.

One drawback of this literature is that its approach is viewing protest through a macro or distance lens. Protest itself is seen as one expression of a larger movement, or as another event in a historical sequence of similar events. The drawback this presents for the current project is that this literature de-emphasizes how protest itself can be seen as a working-out of political crises on the street level, often exposing political and economic contradictions in a dramatic fashion. Further, this literature ignores the interrelation of politics and urban space, and how people's behavior en masse during protest is affected by the way that urban space and public space are physically constituted. Urban space plays a role in how protests are organized, develop, and are administered to via law enforcement, and finely grained analysis like this is difficult to see through a historical perspective.

Historian Howard Zinn's history of the effectiveness of mass demonstrations in the United States is one such text.91 It approaches protest specifically with an eye toward the

91 Zinn.
optimistic, focusing on the fear of those in power and power of the multitudes to effect change through mass action. This is in contrast with political philosophers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri on crowds,\textsuperscript{92} which they characterize as the networked action of many peoples, specifically transnational, to contest through mediated means the spread of Empire.\textsuperscript{93} This contrasts further with social theorist Elias Canetti's attempt to incorporate multiple disciplines of crowd theory, specifically the connection between ruling and paranoia, and how rulers will always be in fear of crowds.

Several texts address the role of public space in the organization and administration of protests, but few examine the finely grained actual shapes and formations of spaces. One such text is from historian Lucy Barber, which addresses the symbolic and practical role of public space in Washington DC for the purposes of protests. Her historical exploration looks at how various groups at different times in American history have prioritized different areas of the capital as being valuable for their causes. The primary protest tactics in the city are marching, picketing, and occupations. The books goes on to discuss the symbolic value of particular spaces for individual protest groups, and although Barber discusses protest as a core American value, there was no dedicated protest space in Washington DC prior to 1894. The protest of Coxeys Army, protesting economic conditions of the working class, challenged previous modes of understanding and using public space in the city. Their occupation of public parks and the Capitol lawn challenged the constitutionality of the 1884 Act to Regulate the Grounds, which forbade marches and protests in public spaces in the city.\textsuperscript{94}

The role of architects and planners in the administration of protest is discussed in urban research Robert Goodman's critical work on technocratic planner, entitled \textit{After the Planners}. He examines cities as colonies, presaging later critical human geography work on the “spatial fix,” referring to the economic role of cites as the “urban-industrial complex.”\textsuperscript{95} He also looks at the use of government funds for urban pacification earmarked for urban pacification in the wake of the passage of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The political disaster of the Vietnam War meant there were no markets for military hardware. Laws like the 1968 bill created markets by criminalizing public dissent. Goodman notes that Time Magazine predicted a 10% rise in stock per year throughout the 1970s of firms making riot control equipment.\textsuperscript{96} Because of the June 1968 “Safe Streets” act, federal anti-crime aid to cities rose from $63 million to $500 million. This came with a simultaneous 10% increase in FBI and police training for riot control. This text is critical to understand how protests in urban space were considered as part of the larger economies of crime control. Goodman also critiqued the role of architects and planners in the administration of protests: “We architects and planners aren't the visible symbols of oppression, like the military and the police. We're more sophisticated, more educated, and more socially conscious. We're the soft cops.”\textsuperscript{97}

The role of parks as public space, and how social constructions of the proper role of parks changed over time, is the subject of architecture sociologist Galen Cranz, in her historical-analytical text \textit{The Politics of Park Design}. Her book explores the roles of parks in urban society.

\textsuperscript{92} Hardt and Negri 2001.
\textsuperscript{93} Their capitalization.
\textsuperscript{94} Barber 27-28, as well as references throughout the text.
\textsuperscript{95} Goodman 35.
\textsuperscript{96} Goodman 38.
\textsuperscript{97} Goodman, cover.
over a range of decades, using a historical-genealogical method, presenting a historical overview of park design and implementation from 1850-1965. She examines a set social problems of the time, and looks at how parks attempt to remedy these problems through an official program, all within a socioeconomic context. Her text is one of the very few to examine the actual physical elements of parks, and how their shape and form play roles in their social functions. Her method shows that no single view of park design dominated in 1968. She recognizes the associating of parks with radicals and protesters throughout history, emphasizing the role of parks in the socialization of immigrant populations.98 She also notes historical resistance to parks being used for political purposes, speeches, organizing and the like, particularly Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago, all of which had large immigrant populations.99 Parks were however allowed for purposes of military drill.100 The role of parks continually comes back to constructions of the public good, as parks needed to be seen as nonsectarian in order to show fairness in public expenditure. Political activity in parks was often informal, but the public nature of parks and the virtue of their open spaces made them attractive for rallies.101

The nature of public space under neoliberalism is addressed by urban theorists Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore. In their edited volume, and in their article from that volume “Cities and Geographies of 'Actually Existing Neoliberalism!',” they examine the interrelation of urban space and the political-economic changes under neoliberal regimes through the lens of critical geography. In their estimation, cities play a strategic role in neoliberal remaking of political-economic space. The local context and history matters, and make the implementation of 'pure' neoliberalism problematic. In so many words, they are saying that locals' willingness to protest and contest the process of neoliberalization can result in effective interference in the process. As they define it, neoliberalism is:

...a mixture of neoclassical economic fundamentalism, market regulation in the place of state guidance, economic redistribution in favor of capital (known as supply-side economics), moral authoritarianism with an idealized family at its center, international free trade principles (sometimes inconsistently applied), and a thorough intolerance of trade unionism. (119-120) This definition is contradicted to an extent by the process of actually implementing neoliberal policies. Promoting freedom of markets and loosening of state restrictions can only be done with "... a dramatic intensification of coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to impose market rule on all aspects of social life."102 In general, this has meant a shift to protect the already-powerful and removal of support for the weak. The authors present evidence for this across a wide range of institutions and scales.103

The work of Brenner and Theodore is followed by geographers Helga Leitner, Jamie Peck, and Eric Sheppard, who follow a similar critical geographical approach in their text Contesting Neoliberalism, but emphasize the role of popular struggle and political protest in contesting neoliberalization.104 Particularly, they make the case that technologies of governance construct neoliberal subjectivity, entailing a re-conceptualization of human behavior along purely

98 Cranz vii.
99 Cranz 23.
100 Cranz 23-24.
101 Cranz 237.
102 Brenner and Theodore 5.
103 They present evidence from Amin, Bourdieu, Gill, Isin, Jessop and Stones, and Peck and Tickell, among others.
104 Leitner et al.
Political direct action against these processes in neoliberalism is a prominent and high visibility practice, particularly because it is a visible contestation of new subjectivities... in other words, simply acting in a manner counter to expectations under neoliberalism draws attention to the actors. The prevalence of direct action is based on historical and legal context. For example, direct action is not unusual in France, but more unusual in United States. The American pattern is to effect political change through lobbying and legislative action. One method of protest is re-signifying place as a means of contestation. Bodies moving in space is integral to contestation. Massed bodies appearing in unexpected spaces is a core tactic of direct action. Increased networking among resisters, particularly through use of communications technology, has allowed for scale-jumping: as local and regional protests can be linked into global events, the size of protests can be increased dramatically. These protests occur in urban space due to the rich symbolic value of these spaces. Cities are thus the central spaces where hegemonic struggles against neoliberalism are being fought; to paraphrase spatial theorist Henri Lefebvre from his work *The Production of Space* from 1991, the setting itself is the stakes for the struggle.

However, direct action alone is not potent enough to resist global neoliberalism; no one small action can undermine a global system. Ultimately, policing is a means to enforce neoliberal urban governance. That policing has been increasingly militarized shows some of the tension in the neoliberal project. Local police forces are recipients of national-level surplus military hardware. Police are used as a method of social control of last resort; when all other methods have been stripped away, nothing but policing remains. As policing becomes harder, in terms of policing armament, policy, and tactics, so too will architects and planners create harder and harder spaces. Echoing Robert Goodman, the authors state that architects and creators of the built environment occupy a difficult position. They receive their pay from producing spaces of exclusion. That architecture is a luxury only affordable by the very wealthy is fundamental to the profession.

The role of anti-capitalist resistance to neoliberalization is explored further in the work of political scientist Stephen Gill. Gill explores neoliberalism itself as a restoration and reinforcement of the class power of capital. His formulation of “disciplinary neoliberalism” emphasizes privatization, deregulation, and competitiveness, all supported by state power. This has resulted in a polarization of incomes and wealth, resulting in increasing massive resistance. This new global anti-neoliberal movement is underpinned by four contradictions: first, there is a contradiction between democracy and capitalism when states cede power to global corporations; second, there is an increasing exploitation of labor due to globalization; third, lessened state supports means that neoliberalization falls more heavily on women, as women's life chances were bolstered by the social welfare state; and fourth, social and biological diversity is being replaced by corporate and environmental monoculture, bringing a loss of food and water security and greater health risks. Because of these contradictions, the emergent anti-neoliberal protest movement is global in character. Gill uses the Gramscian notion of a historic bloc, a way of conceptualizing class relations based on congruences of material forces, institutions and

105 Leitner et al., 4.
106 Leitner et al., 15.
107 Leitner et al., 18.
108 Leitner et al., 21.
109 Gill.
ideologies. These alliances may be politically different, but coalesce around hegemonic ideas, giving strategic direction and coherence to its constituent elements. For a new historic bloc to emerge from this, its leaders must engage in “conscious planned struggle.”

Literature which serves as manuals or guides to how to organize or administer protest is excellent for working out protestor conceptions of and relations to space. In general, these texts address the use of urban space tactically, as a field of struggle, or as a site for direct action. These texts are very useful for understanding the institutional and organizational forces behind protest, and how protest can be similar in tactics despite difference in goals. One drawback of this literature is its partisan nature...in reading these texts, one must be able to parse out the most relevant material. This literature is designed to be partially practical and partially proselytic, as such, it is very optimistic about protests and their effectiveness, and almost reads like cheerleading. The careful reader must keep a critical and intellectual distance.

Political protest is a form of political activity called 'direct action', as detailed in political activists Martin Oppenheimer and George Lakey's *Manual for Direct Action* from 1965. Oppenheimer and Lakey define a crowd as simply a large number of people, a mob is a crowd spurred into motion, and a riot is three or more persons who wish want to overcome opposition to their action by lawful or unlawful means. They go on to discuss various means of spatial occupation and actions that interrupt normal spatial “business as usual.” This definition is supported by a quote from early French social theorist Gustav Le Bon: “When the crowd changes into a mob, its individual members lose their identity and merge into a cruel, primitive body which has lost civilized restraints and suddenly has no respect for those law enforcement agencies which resist it.”

Certainly Oppenheimer and Lakey’s conception of direct action serves as a counter example to Le Bon, demonstrating that crowds, particularly crowds in protest, are expressions of groups of people all acting rationally to a higher purpose, and breaking social conventions for political purposes.

The Root Activist Network of Trainers (also called the RANT collective), an organization of political activists, describe the role of affinity groups in organization of protest: affinity groups have their historical origin in anarchist and workers' movements created in the late 19th century, and they fought fascism in the Spanish Civil War. They are a form of decentralized organization and are exercises in direct democracy. The affinity group is based on the 'tertulia', a term for a small group of friends who would meet in cafes to debate ideas and propose plans of action. In 1888, the 'tertulia' was used as the basis of organization for the Anarchist Organization of the Spanish Region (OARS). The Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI), consisting of 50,000 members, was organized into affinity groups and confederated into local, regional and national councils. The FAI was organized with delegates from each affinity group. Each of these affinity groups acted like cells, with only limited contact with other cells, expecting to work independently. Each affinity group remained autonomous: educating, organization, local struggles. The intimate structures of affinity groups made recognizing police infiltrators easier. These structures were in place when Generalissimo Francisco Franco launched his military coup of Spain in 1936. Affinity groups formed the basis of resistance against the fascist takeover of Spanish society. Under Generalissimo Francisco Franco, dictator of Spain from 1939 to 1975, many elements of the technical and industrial infrastructure of Spain were collectivized: factories, transportation,
telecommunications, and retail establishments, forming between 1200 and 1800 worker-managed collectives.

In the United States, the origin of affinity groups began with anti-nuclear protesters in 1977, and the occupation of the Seabrook nuclear power plant in New Hampshire. The affinity group model was adopted by antinuclear and disarmament movements. It was also used in the Central America solidarity movement, gay and lesbian liberation, Earth First, earth liberation movements throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and later during mass actions against World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and against political conventions. Affinity groups are organized into clusters, often ad hoc for purposes of one particular event or protest action.

One transgressive protest direct action tactic is the use of the 'black bloc', a mass (or 'bloc') of people dressed similarly in black clothing and concealing face masks to aid anonymity, who engage in property destruction on symbolic targets, then disperse and use their anonymity to escape prosecution. The black bloc is also a useful tactic of anonymous nonviolent protest. Black bloc participant gear and clothing often also includes riot protection gear, gas masks, steel-toed boots, riot helmets, shields, goggles, and other sorts of protective gear. The similarity of appearance and massing of bodies in space is designed to create the appearance of unity and anonymity. Some black bloc actions take place as part of a larger protest march, and some begin and act independently. The bloc members also engage in acts of demonstration without a permit, vandalism, rioting, street fighting with police, distracting or misleading authorities, building, using and maintaining barricades (see my photos from St. Paul for a poor example), attacking police, and administration of first aid to injured protesters.

Persons engaged in medic activities clearly and prominently wear red crosses on a white background on the their clothing, identifying their primary goal in their presence at a protest is that of first aid and support. Medics also provide first aid to victims of tear gas. However, police and other enforcers, are not supposed to honor such self-distinctions, and deal with street medics as they do with other protesters. In fact, black bloc medics are often become the target for arrest because of their distinct actions, separate from the mass.

Property destruction carried out by black blocs tends to have symbolic significance: common targets include banks (especially in anti-capitalist protests), institutional buildings (governmental, administrative, educational), outlets for multinational corporations (of note: Gap, Starbucks, Nike, especially in WTO protests in Seattle, 1999), gasoline stations, video-surveillance cameras (to further support anonymity in street action.) As black blocs are organized in a similar manner as affinity groups, there can be several independent black blocs at any particular event. They are primarily ad hoc, and are distinct from affinity groups in that regard. They tend to be unified by presence, intention and generally leftist politics and willingness to engage with enforcement in a potentially violent manner.

The black bloc was developed after intensification of police activity following the Brokdorf protests in Germany in 1977, which were aimed primarily at squatters and antinuclear activists. The attack by police on over 5000 nonviolent protesters encouraged them to take up violent methods in response. One action in Berlin in December 1980 was dubbed “Black Friday." Many of 20,000 protesters wore black, and attacked and damaged a shopping center in response to escalating police violence. The use of black clothing in a large portion of the protesters allowed for the protesters to more easily elude the police and remain anonymous. This was followed by protests in Hamburg which used 'der schwarze Block,' attacking and burning a series
of stores. It was used again in Germany after the Chernobyl disaster, Ronald Reagan's visit to Berlin in 1987, against the World Bank and IMF in 1988.\textsuperscript{112}

Thus affinity groups and black blocs are significant because they are not only social and organizational, but spatial as well. They use particular formations of spatial organization as resistance, but massing then dispersing. These and other protest tactics are a kind of autonomism, which focuses on self-organization and resistance to capitalism through everyday acts of resistance, not reliance on trade unions or state actors. This requires a fundamental difference in conceptualizations of consciousness; in liberalism, consciousness is the product of individual psychology and choices. It is the basis of individual freedom and the actions one takes therefrom are the basis of enforcement. It is more akin to a class consciousness, described by Georg Lukács in History and Class Consciousness.\textsuperscript{113} In this formulation, consciousness is based on social class and comes through experience, rather than being focused on the individual and individual choices. Rather, consciousness emerges as a kind of empathy for others and a recognition of the historical and economic forces which form the context of daily life. Thus, this kind of group consciousness comes from recognizing global economic conditions. In this case, group consciousness comes from recognizing the effects of advancing neoliberalization and the concentration of wealth. This is radically different from classical theories of mass behavior like Le Bon's, who contended that any crowd or mob was emotional and irrational. Rather, crowds can be the both the expressions of solidarity and the vehicles of transformation.

\subsection*{4.4: Sociological and Criminological Literature}

This body of literature is sociological and criminological in origin, and takes the approach that crowds and protests are a kind of social pathology. Texts along this line of thought go back to classical theories, which show an evolution over time. The earlier works, exemplified in Le Bon and Canetti, make no distinction between crowds in protest or crowds in riot. These ideas eventually gave way to a more nuanced and analytical approach, looking at protests as its own phenomenon separate from mere crowd behavior, with the bodies of literature speciating into criminological literature, which is reactionary and authoritarian in nature, and mainstream sociological works, which are more analytical-theoretical in nature. There is very little research on protests within the sociological-environmental design subfield of person-environment relations.

Summarizing this main throughline of thought on protests and crowds is a challenge due to its historical breadth. The early, more classical theories are useful because they demonstrate legacy ways of thinking about people in space. This is useful not because these theories represents mainstream thought on protest, which they do not, but that they represent a historical-genealogical development of ideas, which are latent or sometimes active in current spatial practice. This means that although these earlier ideas, such as crowds being irrational and politically dangerous mobs, as we see in Le Bon or Canetti, may have been superseded by more

\textsuperscript{112} Grauwacke.
\textsuperscript{113} Lukacs first published \textit{History and Class Consciousness} in 1923, and it was republished in 1968 and again in 1971.
sophisticated thought based on vastly more data, they still form the substrate underneath modern practice. Even if more modern modes of thought inform modern spatial practice, the shape of the substrate affects outcomes, and will be sometimes taken as a fallback or default position. This is parallel to etymological understanding of words, where the historical origins of the word shed light on its underlying modern connotations.

The modern development of this body of literature into two separate streams requires further discussion. Criminology is a subfield of sociology, but with specific operationalizations as its goals. Criminological literature, and criminology as a field in general, take as the point of departure from sociology that law and criminality are a binary opposite, and that criminal acts are violations of social consensus that result in harm. Criminology has developed over time, with several periods in which one particular approach or another dominated. To trace this intellectual development of a whole field is beyond the scope of the current study. Law researcher David Garland in his 2001 text *The Culture of Control* discusses the disjuncture between academic criminology and practice law enforcement, noting that changes in the field in academia do not always transform law enforcement practice, and often take considerable time to have any impact. However, criminology is a kind of applied sociology, with a narrow focus on understanding why people break the law, and determining the appropriate official social response to lawbreaking. Criminology focuses on wrongdoing and the penal system only, and as such is rarely self-reflective, and does not easily integrate philosophical or sociological critical or analytical-theoretical developments. Mainstream sociology has vaster concerns that reflect nuanced approaches to mass human behavior. The criminological approach to crowds and protests is that they are something to be monitored at best and repressed at worst. In the McLaughlin and Muncie text, historian and criminologist Clive Emsley writes that social history tends to conflate crowds and riots, and that more nuanced approaches to understanding motivations behind mass behavior are necessary.

Classical theories of crowd behavior are based on understanding the crowd as a problem to be solved. Again, there was generally no distinction made in the motivations behind the crowd behavior, so finer gradation in mass behavior such as protest or riot were as yet unconceived. This can be seen in Thucydides, possibly the first western thinker to consider crowds and crowd behavior. As examined in historian Virginia Hunter's research, Thucydides describes a group of sailors as 'crowd.' In Greek, the word can be translated as mass, crowd or multitude. Their gathering was seen as a transitory phenomenon, collective behavior which was "...spontaneous, responding to some unusual or unstructured situation." Further, in Thucydides, "Crowds are temporary, heterogeneous, often anonymous groups which congregate. Rather than focus on one another, they fix their attention on some central object or event. Polarized in this way, they act shoulder-to-shoulder, being for a brief time mentally homogeneous." This is in contrast to the contemporaneous Alcibiades, who uses the term 'mob' or 'mixed rabble' to describe Sicilians. Used elsewhere, the term indicates the "common people or lower classes who comprised the

114 McLaughlin and Muncie 59.
115 Garland 65-68.
116 At the risk of sounding glib, criminology is the “business end” of sociology, with all that entails.
117 McLaughlin and Muncie 175.
118 Hunter.
119 Hunter 18.
120 Hunter 18.
majority in the democracy.” The term varies according to who uses it and under which circumstances. In Thucydides, the crowd has emotions as a body that supersedes the emotions of the individuals within that crowd, such as depression, dejection, or despair, and these emotions can be swayed through political speech. Such speech can in fact bring a crowd back to a rational state. Thucydides believed that irrational crowd behavior and social unrest were the results of the breakdown of social order within the polis. Athenian democratic assembly institutionalized the crowd into a rational and voting mass.

Hunter then makes the connection to the later work of Le Bon, who similarly lived through a period of social unrest. His despair at his perception that France was in decline made him believe that the reason for such decline was the political activities of the irrational and even bestial crowd. For Le Bon, crowds were a contagion, a social and political disease, which could be studied as a sort of social pathology. His works lack an explanation of the intent of crowds, and by his definitions, such collective intent is almost impossible. Crowds can only be emotional, fickle, and destructive. Through the works of Scipio Sighele and Gabriel Tarde, the crowd was an essentially primitive and criminal force, which was a constant threat to civilization.

According to writer and historian Elias Canetti, mobs and crowds were never treated by authorities or historians just as a mass of people doing something (or nothing), but rather as something more. Even when there was nothing more to it, magistrates would always claim some sort of criminal conspiracy at the heart of every crowd. According to the author, there were two ways of viewing crowds throughout history; first, that the mob had an intentionality and drive all its own, that it was savage and irrational, and could only lead to unrest, wars, and social destabilization. As such, the best and only thing to do with mobs was to channel their energies, to control the crowd. The second view was that the crowd contained revolutionary and transformative energy, and its very primitiveness was a virtue.

This was taken up as a historical study in political historian J. S. McClelland's *The Crowd and the Mob*. This work consists of analysis of historical writings on crowd psychology. The sense of the mass of people as important was new to the political scene beginning at the end of the 18th century. The specter that haunted Europe in 1848 was the Bastille Mob. The mob in this sense was an expression of the will of the people, and was the root of popular sovereignty. This gave rise to the perception that mobs or large crowds and urban unrest were the tip of a wedge of social change, change away from the concentrated power of the elite and toward a dissipation of long-held riches. The elite against which such mobs were set in the 19th century believed that any mass politics was mob politics, and behind that mob (interchangeably called 'the masses', 'the People', or 'the crowd') waited the Guillotine. The Commune was no different from 1848, which was no different from 1789. Hence Le Bon's attitude of the irrationality of crowds and the dangers they posed when he compiled all studies of crowds since 1870, first publishing his work in 1895. In “The Law of Mental Unity of Crowds,” crowds possessed a “group mind” that functioned differently than the minds of individuals, and it functioned essentially unconsciously. His theory was very much based in class politics, that is, the middle

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121 Hunter 20.
122 Le Bon.
123 Canetti.
124 McClelland. I have included it here out of chronological sequence due to its historical character.
125 McClelland, 6.
and upper classes, those who were lettered and educated and had stakes in the outcomes of society (as he saw it), could not in fact look down upon members of a 'crowd' as irrational and a threat to societal stability without considering that they themselves could be threats to society were they subjected to similar crowd situations. This self-reflection was a threat to the upper class' perceived fundamental authority. It constituted a threat to the classical liberal sense that rationality was the way to ensure human welfare. Anyone could lose their rationality en masse in the right circumstances.

Le Bon...blamed Rousseau as the progenitor of the French Revolution and the inspirer of the revolutionary mob, which Le Bon invited his readers to to see as the fundamental cases for irrational barbarism in the modern era. The crowd tradition by 1895 was inviting anyone who would listen to see irrationality and regression in any form of collectivity... (16-17)

Totalitarianism and democracy were two competing forms of crowd control. Democracy bureaucratized and institutionalized the masses, while totalitarianism made the only safe place to be within those masses. McClelland uses the example of Riefenstahl's “Triumph of the Will”: all those street battles bringing the Nazis to power had as their outcome an orderly mob in the form of a vast marching army.

Sociologist Emile Durkheim took an entirely different approach. For him, being a part of a crowd was an opportunity to reaffirm socially-held beliefs. It was an expression of social solidarity. Crowds were networks of collective moral sentiment, holding society together through mass affirmation of belief. In fact, society could only be held together through this mass public affirmation of belief. By extension, then, Durkheim would argue that mass expression of belief was critical to democracies:

There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity and its personality. Now this moral remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of re-unions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments; hence some ceremonies, which do not differ from regular religious ceremonies, either in their object, the results which they produce, or the processes employed to attain those results. What essential difference is there between an assembly of Christians celebrating the principal dates of the life of Christ, or of Jews remembering the exodus from Egypt, or the promulgation of the decalogue, and a reunion of citizens commemorating the promulgation of a new moral or legal system, or some great event in the national life? (427)

Thus crowds serve as the means to maintain communal identity, which is right in line with later convergence theory, which states that communal identity is closely related to the mass of people who surround one, independent of national identity, and more closely linked to social or economic class. Here in Durkheim, however, there is still no distinction between crowd and protest, and, despite the huge influence that he had on early sociological thought, these constructions of the social utility of crowds did not translate into mainstream criminology or policing practice.

Perhaps the first thinker to engage with crowds in a serious analytical fashion was George Lefebvre, who explored the role of crowds in the French Revolution. Critical of Le Bon, his study of “mentalities” was an early exploration of the social and historical patterns of mass behavior. For Lefebvre, “crowd” was a specific designator for a particular type of social formation. This brought in the distinction between crowd and assembly. A crowd was an involuntary gathering, whereas an assembly was a collection of people gathered together to

126 Lukes.
127 Lefebvre 1951 and 1957.
express an association or purpose. However, despite his attempt to mark out different mass behaviors based on intention, he did not develop an analytical framework on how to make such distinctions.

The distinction between crowds-at-protest and crowds-at-riot came a bit later with the writing of social and economic historian Eric Hobsbawm. In his “Primitive Rebels. Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” he traces the development of more sophisticated approaches to crowd behavior. In his work, he traces this to the beginnings of industrialized society and labor movements. Around 1850, labor movements gained sufficient sophistication that they were able to convince people to gather in order to contest specific elements of their poor treatment at the hands of capitalists. He cites the holding of a specific ideology as being the element that transforms crowd behavior from primitive to sophisticated. The “mob” was pre-political, to be replaced in industrialized societies by the working class. Here, riots and mobs are still conflated, and the issue of protests as a motivator for crowd behavior begins to emerge. Significant confusion with terminology still remains, however, as each of the words in question has undergone significant historical change and development.

Social historian Al Sandine continued Hobsbawm's line of inquiry in his book *The Taming of the American Crowd*, and applied this analysis to the development of a particularly American political life. He examined the political role that crowds played in the development of the United States as a democratic nation. He traces the readiness of American crowds to assemble and to riot based on existing political circumstances. This was especially important during the early years of the republic, when politics were in flux and no professional policing system existed as yet. He makes the observation “Any collective action which moves beyond the ridicule of privilege...or demands for better working conditions...will set up a chorus of calls for more muscular law enforcement.” He does make the claim that the protest has since replaced the riot as the main public means of political expression, but that policing of said events does not often honor the distinction.

A further historical study was conducted by economics researcher Robert J. Holton in his “The Crowd in History,” with a focus specifically on the 20th century. His critique of Le Bon is trenchant, assessing Le Bon's perception of crowds as hostile, symbols for the irrationality of mass politics. He mobilizes George Lefebvre's critique of Le Bon as well. Lefebvre studies what he labeled “mentalities” in the 1930s. In his work “Foules Revolutionnaires” from 1934, Lefebvre was perhaps the first to study crowds in a systematic and analytical fashion. Lefebvre demonstrated the patterns of crowd phenomena through both historical and social lenses. He made the label of “crowd” a distinction in the method in which a mass of people was gathered, namely involuntarily. Thus a crowd could be a group of people in line for food, in a marketplace, or talking after church, for example. He made that distinction from the word “assembly,” which was used to denote groups which gathered deliberately, such as for a political meeting. The informal nature of crowds was essential during the French revolutionary period for its role in the sharing of social and political knowledge, and were important in disseminating popular communication before mass circulation of the press. This distinction between “crowd” and

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128 Hobsbawm, 108.
129 Sandine. While out of the historical sequence, I include it alongside Hobsbawm due to the similarity of approach and findings.
130 Sandine 149.
“assembly” is important in that this represents an attempt to classify the causes of behavior, but in practice the differences are not so easy to discern.

Sociological approaches to crowds and protests varied widely throughout the 20th century, but always focused on the irrationality of crowds and the menace they posed to orderly political and urban life. There was still little discrimination of the motivations behind protests. The can be seen in the convergence theory of social psychologist Floyd Henry Allport in 1924 in his text *Social Psychology*, where he contended that crowds and protests were essentially irrational responses to larger economic conditions, namely the current stage of a society's industrial development. As such, all such industrial societies would experience protests at roughly the same level of development. The emergent-norm theory of Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, from the first edition of their text *Collective Behavior* from 1957, held that crowd behavior was the result of new norms emerging from a crisis. This theory grew from Le Bon, but critiqued his assertion that crowds had no norms. Neil Smelser's *Theory of Collective Behavior* from 1962 focuses on the “craze” as an expression of new emergent norms, and crowds functioned as social “release valves” for pressures created by social change. Each of these approaches fundamentally held that mass behavior was irrational.

Designating crowds as “irrational” continued in mainstream sociology as late as 1968, where the term formed the foundation for how crowds were considered in more modern criminology. Sociologist Carl Couch's study on crowds contested what had become the predominant model. In his “Collective Behavior: An Examination of Some Stereotypes,” which was originally published in the journal *Social Problems*, got its exposure in the 1969 edited volume *Readings in Collective Behavior* by sociologist Robert Evans, which was the first collection of its type. Based on the ideas laid out in 1963's *Invitation to Sociology* by sociologist Peter Berger, Couch applied the sociological perspective to the collection of traditional and everyday beliefs about how crowds behaved; these beliefs were the underpinning of sociology to date, and, by extension, formed the foundations of criminological approaches to crowd control. Through this application, Couch debunked the common sense beliefs about crowds. Couch critiques nine crowd stereotypes: suggestibility, destructiveness, irrationality, emotionality, mental disturbances, lower-class participation, spontaneity, creativeness, and lack of self-control. He showed that those stereotypes were empirically false, and that they did not distinguish motivations behind collective behavior, nor did they make distinctions between crowds, protests, or riots. This work of using empirical evidence to debunk myths about crowds was later taken up by sociologist Clark McPhail, discussed below.

The civil rights movement and the protests of the 1960s and 1970s, in conjunction with the rise and expansion of American sociological thought in response to social problems of inequity, lead to an entirely new approach to protest and its motivations. One such study was by political scientist and sociologist Frances Fox Piven, entitled “The Social Structuring of Political Protest.” She very clearly outlined the problem as follows: “Common sense and historical experience combine to suggest a simple but compelling view of the roots of power in any society. Crudely but clearly stated, those who control the means of physical coercion, and those who control the means of producing wealth, have power over those who do not.” Although simplistic in comparison to modern theories of power, such claims are perhaps a product of the social and political context surrounding the conditions of this study's production, namely, the
social movements in the United States in the early 1970s. Piven acknowledges the effects of power to control thought as well as behavior, here, loosely called “culture” or “superstructure,” through an elaborate system of beliefs and ritual behaviors, which evolved under conditions of unequal power. Electoral-representative political cultures posit that the state system itself is the source of the legitimate use of power. She uses the term 'franchise' to describe the protections and rights of the state apparatus, as the 'franchise' is evenly distributed even when, in a capitalist society, wealth is unequal distributed. She references the discrediting of the dominant pluralist tradition by the left during the 1960s, stating that power rooted in wealth overwhelmed power of the franchise. On occasions in which protest is possible, its forms and impacts are delimited by the social structures from which they arise, which usually diminishing the protests' extent and force. Electoral-representative systems allow for some social change through the voting mechanism, channeling constituent dissatisfaction into feedback into the electoral system. Piven critiques other contemporaneous approaches to political protest by identifying primary characterizations of protest behavior by author: sociologist Talcott Parsons called it “irrational," sociologist Neil Smelser called it “primitive” and “magical,” and psychologist Arthur Kornhauser called it “unstable” and “antidemocratic.” Piven claims these labels further rob dissent of legitimacy. The author recognizes that responses to social movements and disruption vary according to the political and electoral tenor of the times: to ignore it, conciliate, or punish. Periods of rapid social and economic change make the relationship between politicians and their constituents less certain: as such, the responses to protest become less certain. The response is further modified by how central the protesters are to the machinery of economic production; the greater the threat to the economic well-being of the society, the less the enforcers are able to use force with legitimacy, and greater the likelihood of conciliatory behavior on the part of politicians. Piven uses the example of worker's strikes in the 1930's, as well as the terminology of the late 1960's, for example, “law and order,” and “workfare, not welfare.”

This emphasis on empirical study of protest was further developed in 1977's “Social Protest and Social Control” by sociologist John Wilson. His work was an outgrowth of the sociological literature on crowd control and protest, and defined social control narrowly as reactions to social deviance. The author was implicitly saying that social protest in effect is deviant. The paper calls for empirical studies to assess the relationship between protesters and social control agents, which outlines the paucity in sociological thinking of this period on protests and protest policing, to say nothing of the role of urban space. Wilson's empirical framework codes social control agents as those who are endowed with the public's trust to identify and deal with social deviants, which, according to the author, is any sort of collective attempt to bring about or resist political change through any non-institutional means.

Sociologist Sam Wright's 1978 Crowds and Riots explored the phenomenon of collective behavior through the lens of direct observation and social science. The author used direct observation through field work on actual crowds and riot situations, often as a participant observer, observing the small group and large group behavior of individuals in protest situations. His work relies on his first-person observations in a journalistic and anthropological style. I used

131 Such as Michel Foucault's ideas of power being pervasive. Although Foucault and Piven were contemporaries in many regards, Foucault's work was not to become popular in the United States until the 1980s. As such the two were never in dialogue.

132 The term 'franchise' is easily confused with other meanings, and has generally been superseded with other theoretical political and philosophical works on citizenship.
a similar method in my own field work, examining protest crowd and policing behavior at the street level through direct behavior observation. Wright notes that some crowds follow the existing political order, and some, mainly protests and riots, challenge it. His formulation of crowd “task activities” examines how crowds in protest can be oriented toward a single goal.

A critical work on the social phenomenon of protest itself was written by sociologist John Lofland. Titled simply *Protest*, Lofland's book explores both elementary and complex forms of collective behavior. He looks at protests in their social contexts, examines the causes of protest, and looks at how members of a protest associate with one another. He explains that protest is significantly different from other modes of collective behavior in that protest is planned, articulate, and sustained, meaning that it is engaged deliberately, and with significant forethought and planning. He presents a very useful systematic analysis of actual protest types and tactics, such as harassment, system overloading, blockades, and occupations. However, Lofland still follows many of the myths of crowd behavior later contested by sociologists David Schweingruber and Ronald Wohlstein, such as the emotionality of crowds.

The embedding of common sense myths about crowds into fundamental sociological thought was challenged by sociologist Clark McPhail in 1991 and 1997. Working from Couch as a starting point, Schweingruber and Wohlstein explore these myths and how they pervades sociological thinking. Couch's approach is taken for granted in modern sociology, but earlier sociological texts still teach what McPhail calls the “the myth of the madding crowd.” In my estimation, the earlier sociological texts form the basis of criminological approaches to crowds, and this article traces how those approaches have been discredited in more academic sociology. These myths and their refutations are: irrationality: crowds may indeed be rational if a crowd's activity can be seen as the best possible means of obtaining a goal; emotionality: emotionality does not necessarily lead to irrational conduct, and in fact recent studies in neuroscience show that emotionality is an integral part of rational decision making; suggestibility: has been disproven by fact they crowds do not automatically disperse when ordered to do so; destructiveness: Couch argues that when crowds and authorities come into conflict, authorities in fact commit more violence than the crowds, which is borne out by other research, and police response has a determinant effect on crowd behavior; spontaneity: the authors argue that no research shows this to be the case, furthermore, the more recent convergence theory counters this myth; anonymity: unaccountability and loosening of social mores underlines Le Bon's theory of crowd behavior, which is countered by the research that shows crowds are usually assembled of smaller groups of whom the members are socially familiar, such as families, friends, or colleagues.

The developing sophistication of approaches to protest behavior can be seen in de la Roche from 1996. In “Collective Violence as Social Control," the author outlines a hierarchy of collective violence. In Le Bon, crowds were fickle, emotional, destructive. Collective violence was an expression of emotionality and anonymity, whereas collective violence is now considered

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133 Lofland 265.
134 Ehrenreich (in Sandine), Ackerman and Duvall, as well as through my own research.
135 My own research shows that affinity groups are one such social group, and that most modern protests consist of groups of different groups massing to coordinate protest efforts. However, in defense of this particular myth, the success of the tactic of the Black Bloc (detailed above) is predicated on anonymity, the use of clothing to obscure identities, and the ability to disperse after targeted and symbolic vandalism.
an outgrowth of dissatisfaction and a form of protest. Lynching and rioting took individual accountability, where vigilantism and terrorism required collective accountability. This was further defined by the amount of organization, the context, and the spontaneity of public violence. This article is included to show the separation in sociological thinking of crowds and protest and collective violence.

Following earlier social-historical explorations of crowds and public life, such as Sandine, Patrick Joyce's *The Rule of Freedom* from 2003 looks at the role of self-control and governmental logic in cities in the modern age (late 19th and early 20th centuries). Joyce's book synthesizes the literature on urban life and “governmentality” in the modern age, examining how public life is a vector of governance, and how ideas of public and private behavior are constructed by existing political and governance structures. As such, the experiences of daily life and are subject to organization by processes of public administration. Accordingly, the rules of crowd behavior are governed by the ruling political ideology of the given society in which they occur. In the past, protest was considered a subset of crowd behavior. There were no provisions for protest in architecture or urban design, perhaps because of its relative infrequency during the period Joyce examined.

However, my research and historical events show an increase in the frequency of protests since the rise of neoliberal regimes. This means that frequent protests are now a feature of the urban daily life that Joyce discusses, and are subject to regulation under governmentality. Due to the challenges these protests pose to conceptions and uses of urban public space, environmental design is one way that governmentality is made manifest. Many of these newer protests have been in reaction to economic issues, and have on occasion resulted in property damage to corporate or public facilities. This exacerbates the general Western (and particularly Anglo-American) preoccupation with “security,” especially since the terrorist attacks on New York on September 11th, 2001. In response to this perceived heightened threat posed by protests, environmental design is being increasingly mobilized to add 'security' to urban spaces. This is accomplished through the subfield of CPTED. Through an emphasis on designing in elements of “security” to protect from frequent unruly demonstrators, architecture as a practice is aiding the criminalization of protest.

This new role for environmental design can be seen in the speciation of different bodies of sociological and criminological literature on protest and crowd behavior. The literature I have just explored shows the mainstream sociological development of perceptions and models of protest. Criminological literature takes a practical and operationalized approach to ideas and conditions which sociology explores in a theoretical and analytical manner. Operationalizing sociological study of protests and crowds means to seek and develop tools and tactics to manage political protest. This management, as a strategy of governmentality, has little consideration for the reasons behind the protests, and is much more concerned with finding philosophical, juridical, and procedural justifications for repression. I explore both the justifications and tactics of this enforcement in the next two sections.

### 4.5: Technocratic Literature: Protest Policing Techniques and

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136 De la Roche, 98.
Technologies

This next section deals with literature on policing protest: both how-to and about. The body of literature about protests and protest policing that I call technocratic focuses on strategies of spatial engagement with an already-problematized protest situation. There are three main sections within this body of literature, each of which cross over at various points: military, police, and environmental design. This current section deals with engagement on the strategic level, examining military logic of spatial engagement, and studies of and approaches to protest policing. In the following section, the focus is on procedural literature that addresses the environmental design consequences of strategic engagement with the spatial dimensions of crowds and protest. These texts are generally manuals or guides to learning techniques, along with a selection of theoretical-critical work about both the practice of military engagement with urban space, as well as works analyzing protest policing.

This body of literature differs most from sociological approaches in that it is concerned with practicalities and the reasoning behind strategic approaches to protest policing. As military strategy is about organizing spatial tactics of attack and defense against bodies in space, the value of the application of military thought to protest policing should be obvious. Thus I will examine how military thought conceptualizes and operationalizes its approaches to urban space. The value of this body of literature to understanding how protests and protest policing are considered is that the literature tends to be very straightforward in description of procedures and tactics to be taken. Thinking strategically about space has an immediacy and immanence which focuses on the practical, procedural, and physical. Sociological thought is considerably more abstract and reflective.

A drawback of military and policing literature on urban space and protest is in its very nature; this literature cannot be self-reflective, because implementation of military strategy draws on strict hierarchies and chains of command. This is not to say there is no military literature that critiques other military literature, but it is rather an issue of approach. The pragmatism of military thinking makes analysis of that thought a second-order task; in other words, there is always a sense of act-now and think-later. The literature is part of the process of governmentality, both setting the tactics and rules of engagement for unruly citizens, and determining which citizens are targeted for engagement. Protest policing is a very visible implementation of a society's ruling ideas.

This is important, because the reasons behind crowd behavior are not considered in these bodies of literature. The crowd is already a problem, whether gathering for peaceful protest, violent protest, riot, spatial transgression, or simply festival or entertainment. There is example after example in each body of literature I examined of police attacking crowds of people seemingly without provocation. If these attacks are described in policing or military literature, there is usually listed some petty provocation from the crowd which sparked the police response, or some declaration that the breakage of police discipline was an isolated event. The repetition of this breakage indicates that such attacks, if not planned and organized, at least serve the overall purpose of intimidation of crowds. In a pattern reminiscent of spousal abuse, if such an attack happens once, it could happen again at any time, which is something protesters are made more aware of with every assault. The intimidation latent in protest policing is a very deliberate consideration.
In short, this literature deals with the militarization of urban space, approaching crowd management through spatial domination. The mobilization and formations of police work as force concentration, applying overwhelming force (more v. less) and force multipliers (less v. more) to achieve situational dominance and tactical superiority. Urban space is the scene in which these conflicts play out, and is an element in the application of these tactics.

One of the oldest and most foundational military strategy texts is ancient general and philosopher Sun Tzu’ *Art of War*, from 500 BC. The book addresses many fundamental aspects of military strategy, which apply regardless of technical or technological sophistication. The procedures and principles of warfare as outlined in Sun Tzu are the basis of the techniques of implementing military strategy. They are techniques of military governance. This becomes significant when we consider that urban space is one possible field of battle. Sun Tzu's military strategy of cities forms the basis for any spatial and military engagement of massed bodies in space. The difficulty of such situations is explained thus: “The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative ... [T]hose skilled in war ... capture his [enemies’] cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations.”

While this deals with assaulting walled cities, the policy points to the complexity of the task of maneuvering and achieving tactical dominance in urban spaces. Sun Tzu continues:

> It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force. (III: 8-10)

This is pertinent to the practice of protest policing. The best strategy is to surround or encircle a protest, providing police numbers are larger than protesters. Further, police can use 'force multipliers' such as batons or formations to augment the effectiveness of smaller police groups. Sun Tzu's strategy might also explain the tendency of police to attack when they slightly outnumber protesters, and work to divide protesters if there are fewer police, or ignore them and let them pass peacefully if significantly outnumbered.

Prussian general and military theorist Claus Von Clausewitz wrote *On War* at the beginning of the 19th century, and the first edition of the book was published in 1832. At the time of its publication, it was hailed as a revolution in warfare. For the first time, a book on military strategy dealt with formations and spatial maneuvers of an army based on firearms and cavalry. Clausewitz himself served as an aide-de-camp in the Napoleonic army, later served in the Russian army, and finally served as a Major-General for the Prussian army, leading their military academy. His strategy book was based on rigorous historical research as well as his own considerable personal experience. He wrote “[t]he weaker the forces that are at the disposal of the supreme commander, the more appealing the use of cunning becomes.” In this case, cunning is manifested in strategically approaching any military situation.

Architecture critic and urban theorist Michael Sorkin writes about the pragmatism of military thinking about urban space in his book *Indefensible Space*. He focuses on the realistic and practical thinking of military strategists, how they are eager to use and mobilize all available knowledge about cities in their strategic planning. This includes vast amounts of intelligence gathering, as well as historical and technological research into how cities work, so that they may be more ready to engage with the physical reality of cities and urban warfare. This same strategy

137 Sun Tzu, III: 4-6.
is followed by police in preparation for an anticipated protest event, and indeed is a core principle of every day policing. Cities and human behavior both become easier to control with abundant information about the major forces involved.

This is supported by urban theorist M. Christine Boyer’s “Urban Operations and Network Centric Warfare.” Boyer explores the interrelation of urban form and military operations, and how wars are increasingly fought within cities rather than in open fields or wilderness, and how this is predicted to increase as the 21st century continues. The American assault on Iraq in the first Gulf War was heavily supported by surveillance and intelligence technology, providing battlefield commanders with unprecedented levels of information about their foes. She suggests that a shadow system of military urban research has been established without mainstream architects or planners involved. While the professional environmental design fields have had an intermittent relationship with governmental apparatuses of war, the recent developments have occurred independently of the profession. The devastation of World War I brought into focus the need to design cities to resist air power, especially as proposed by LeCorbusier. His advice was not enough, however, to prevent the destruction caused by massive aerial bombardment across Europe and Asia in World War II. The issue of urban survivability became even more pronounced under the Cold War, as logics of mutual annihilation under ever more powerful nuclear bombs made urban defense planning irrelevant. Boyer explains that modern troops have very difficult terrain to contend with:

Contemporary cities are daunting environments that must be analyzed and understood by an invading army: they contain a maze of urban canyons and underground tunnels that restrict troop movement, change the rules of engagement, and diminish technological superiority. Buildings and man-made constructions superimposed on the terrain block lines-of-sight essential for deploying precision weapons; they interrupt radio frequencies and make GPS satellite positions difficult to obtain. Since the enemy controls the location of the conflict on what they consider to be friendly terrain, the invading force is required to maneuver in long columns along fixed routes, alleyways and dead-ends with increased exposure from multiple points of attack without the ability to concentrate their firepower. These are the same streets and alleyways that offer the enemy routes of escape into which they can vanish. (n.p.)

The same spatial tactics of urban control and defense apply for police dealing with masses of protesters. As policing is increasingly militarized, the professional will take advantage of this military research, and use both military tactics of engagement as well as techniques of observations to nullify protests at any stage.

While Boyer describes more recent developments in military strategy for urban spaces, the practice of using urban space itself as a means to contest and disperse opponents has earlier origins. Field Marshall Thomas Bugeaud addressed the actual process of engagement with opposing forces in urban spaces in his The War of Streets and Houses, written after the French army campaign in Algeria in 1848. His work is a practical manual of how to engage foes in an urban environment, dealing with actual street configurations and tactical formations:

Although the streets could be compared, up to a certain point, with corridors, one must refrain from attacking them with shallow, ranked columns. This is sometimes done in ordinary war because it acts as a means of opening up the enemies' ranks and because, faced with the possibility of finding a strong enemy beyond the corridor, one must meet him with a force strong enough to clear the passage and to hold it long enough so that the troops, when their time comes, can draw in to unblock and quickly reinforce those who passed first. Thus one tightens the ranks in order that the tail approaches as close as possible to the head. (n.p., in Boyer)

138 roundtable.kein.org/node/723, n.d.
139 Originally titled La Guerre Des Rues Et Des Maisons.
This tactic addresses the need to press forward in streets with large forces. Police follow this logic through massed ranks of skirmish lines (detailed below). Significantly, Bugeaud also addresses how to manage opponents who have erected barricades in the streets:

The same necessity is not met in street warfare against a riot. One should completely avoid approaching the barricade with columns; one must attack them only with the *tirailleurs*. The *tirailleurs'* conduct should be very audacious; they should convince themselves that one does not remove barricades with gunfire. To fire upon them is a fool's game, since the defenders are covered and because the assailants are visible from head-to-toe. It is by means of running and climbing that one removes barricades. When the summit of the barricade is reached, material equality is established, but the moral superiority is on the side of the assailant because he has given his adversaries a strong sense of his courage by braving their fire and by crossing the obstacle. (n.p.)

Dating from the Napoleonic period, *tirailleurs* is a term used to define the group of light infantrymen fighting ahead of the main columns. In French colonial campaigns, these troops were often drawn from Algerian and sub Saharan African populations. The strategy here is to use expendable colonial troops to root out the most intractable foes. Bugeaud also writes extensively about the dangers of houses and buildings along the streets, and how insurgents can cause trouble for troops in the streets by sniping and throwing rocks and other objects down upon them. No doubt, this is the reason why protest police work to secure all buildings from protester access during protests. 140

Urban and architecture theorist Eyal Weizman traces the strategic instructions of Bugeaud through the urban design of Paris. One of Bugeaud's students was 19th century city planner and urban designer Baron Haussmann, who designed boulevards and urban renewal under Napoleon III to give the new urban bourgeoisie places to spend their new-found wealth, and expel the riotous and barricade-prone urban poor from the center of Paris with its newly-valuable real estate. Bugeaud's shift from large bodies of massed troops to the more nimble columns and skirmish lines worked well in urban spaces against agile foes. Weizman analyzed Bugeaud's tactics and recommendations for spatial approaches to urban insurrections as an approach to town planning. He used Algiers as a testing ground for his ideas, and proposed that military attacks on cities would be made easier through building broad streets and easily controlled intersections. Bugeaud's proposals of new urban typologies on different scales were later implemented by Haussmann in Paris, designing and building the poor and resistant out of the urban fabric through imposing the project of urban modernity. “In Paris, both conservative and progressive elites considered the city congested, filthy, decadent, and, above all, dangerous. The bourgeoisie feared the revolutionary ferment that was generated around the densely populated, desperately poor, and rapidly growing workers' slums.”

Weizman takes this further in his interview in “Military Options as Human Planning.” He cites the then-current discourses on urban security, and how police exhibit nervousness in public spaces due to possibility of attack Recent plans for urban security represented the newest development in the history of urban design in relation to warfare long history of defensive design in cities. The Clausewitzian definition of war as “symmetrical engagement between state armies in the open field” did not apply in cities, particularly due to the uneven ground, unequal information, and unequal forces of urban warfare; protest policing makes these elements even more relevant. In general, historical cities are organized either with the logic of defense or the

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140 In one such notable event, the Chicago police stormed the office of a politician during the 1968 convention under the suspicion that objects had been thrown at police from the office's windows. From the evidence, this was an exercise in intimidation and retribution more than defense.
logic of commerce, relating the form of the city to the current technology of destruction. The roots of the current form of urban warfare are from Europe in the 19th century, primarily proletarian insurgencies based on class struggle. The highest example of this was Paris during the Commune, which resulted in it being overrun by French forces after less than a year...perhaps due to the design of the streets themselves. The constants of urbanity, density, congestion, diversities, heterogeneity, and formal diversity, create a situation of deep tactical complexity. One way to make the way easier is to simply destroy large parts of the city, or to re-organize them to make warfare easier. There is the historical example of Marshall Thomas Robert Bugeaud's attempt to break popular support of Algeria's resistance leader Abder Kader by attacking the urban infrastructure, destroying neighborhoods and villages, and widening roads for military use, thus destroying the city and destroying the way of urban life of the resistances. Not to oversimplify the history of American urban design, but American cities were almost entirely built during or after the Enlightenment, on Enlightenment principles initially, then following the dictates of mercantile capital. This means they have never been built for warfare, defense, or security. The two dimensional character of military thinking is displayed on strategic approaches to cities in the most literal sense. Even the addition of aerial surveillance historically and wide scale implementation of surveillance technology more recently only provide two dimensional information. In representing the city, urban form and the security activity within in become intertwined. The strategies of urban warfare were on display in the destruction of infrastructure in the war in Bosnia, through the specific targeting of the infrastructure, community centers and symbolic architecture of the opposition, such as churches, mosques, cemeteries, public squares. In this sense, protest policing locks down elements of urban space which have symbolic value for protesters, denying them access to symbolically powerful spaces, despite the contradictions of access to public space under liberal democratic state systems. Weizman also sees this in the settlement patterns of Israelis on the west bank of the Jordan. These developments and tactics are somewhat beyond legal status, as “Architecture and planning intersects with contemporary warfare in ways that the semantics of international law are still ill-equipped to describe.”

The need for comprehensive urban warfare training has also been seen by the Research and Development (RAND) Corporation, a think tank whose members have advised and informed United States military and foreign policy since the 1950s. In the wake of the Seattle police department's failures to contain or suppress the protests against the World Trade Organization in 1999, they called for a new kind of policing force, dedicated to urban operations and protest pacification. This force would take the place of American military forces, already stretched thin in a series of global deployments. The further militarization of America's police would create a kind of domestic stability force, in place to counter urban dissent, maintain basic law and order and discourage criminal activity.

Due to these same recommendations, the United States military began a series of training operations designed to improve joint command operational efficiency in urban environments. Called Project Urban Resolve, this series of urban warfare simulations was designed to advance military tactics in urban environments. Recognizing the challenging nature of urban spaces for
warfare, the program was designed to predict different urban spaces and possible tactical approaches to them through both computer and live simulations. Conducted in collaboration with several military commands and research labs, these trials underscored the need to transform how force operates in an urban environment. David Ozolek, executive director of the Joint Futures Laboratory, remarked “Our conceptual work in this experiment really focused on isolating threats within the urban environment from the population, protecting the population and assisting with the restoration of the services.” This requires extensive intelligence, communications support, and on-the-ground tactical superiority, all of which translates directly to advance control over urban protest situations.

Examining the literature of protest policing itself reveals some of the strategic thinking behind implementation of urban engagement tactics at the street level. In “Seeing Blue: A Police-Centered Explanation of Protest Policing” from January 6, 2004, sociologists Jennifer Earl and Sarah A. Soule put forth the the “blue” theory of protest policing. They claim that current theories of protest policing are inaccurate. The theories they critique posit a direct correlation between the likelihood of police violence based on level of threat the protesters pose to elite interests, or an increased likelihood of police repression of protests by minorities. Rather, institutional norms and organizational culture within police organizations have the biggest impact on level of violence and repression by police of protests. Situational threats are the biggest predictor. The authors discuss the explicit tie between policing and elites in American history, especially during the early part of the 20th century, which coincided with the advent of the professionalization of policing. Note that the data for this study comes from 1968-1973 policing actions in New York State. The authors accurately point out that not violence against protesters but containment of protest is the primary mode of state response. The mode and intensity of protest control often vary according to existing political realities:

...any undifferentiated conceptualization of state repression and protest control misses important theoretical distinctions between the various types of protest control. ...one such distinction is how tightly connected official protest control agents are to national political elites. This theoretical difference is suggested to have important consequences for explanations of protest control. For instance, some protest control agents, such as military bodies, are tightly linked to national political elites and are likely to have a different relationship to the concerns of political elites than more decentralized, local, or civilian police agencies, which are much less structurally tied to national political elites. (14)

This linkage of police to elites suggests that military-informed protest policing is likely to be repressive due to the proximity of military command to political command, whereas police protest control responses will be in response to conditions and threats on the street and in the moment. Physical emplacements at protests probably contribute to an officer's sense of control over a protest situation...physical barriers between them and protesters (aside from the officer's personal equipment: body armor, shields, helmets and the like) likely decrease the perception of personal risk to the police, and, subsequently, make the likelihood of repressive action smaller.

This is addressed through identifying the core concept of policing, namely control:

Thus, although political scientists and sociologists have hotly debated exactly what political elites perceive to be threatening, socio-legal scholars and criminologists have been able to pin-point one major perceived threat by police officers: the loss of control. Put quite simply, policing in the U.S. involves a significant institutional emphasis on control. This suggests that while elites may be concerned about more diffuse threats such as the articulation of revolutionary goals by a protest group or movement, the police are more concerned with situational threats that indicate that they may lose control (or have already begun to do so) of a community or a crowd. This insight resonates with other
recent work examining the effects of police-protester interactions on police action at protests (McPhail and McCarthy 1998). (16)

The authors contend that control is always the main idea behind any policing action: control over a crowd, control over people, or territorial control over urban space.

This is supported by Herbert's study of policing in Los Angeles called Policing Space: Territoriality and the Los Angeles Police Department. In his study, he conducted ethnographies and ride-alongs with Los Angeles police officers. He discovered that three major factors governed police culture and police responses to criminals: machismo, dramatic narratives, and territoriality. Machismo was about not showing weakness or indecision in front of either suspects or other officers, regardless of the officer's gender. Machismo is closely linked to American policing's reliance on patriarchy, as explored by law researcher Markus Dubber in 2005 in his text The Police Power. Dramatic narratives were ways of justifying police behavior, casting themselves as heroes in a hard world, defending the innocent against unfeeling criminal scum who would attack them at any provocation. Part of the dramatic narratives was a string of insulting nicknames which police used for suspects, deliberately dehumanizing them. Third, policing was about open display of spatial dominance, using displays of force and numbers to establish and maintain territorial domination over unruly neighborhoods or individual crime scenes. For protest policing, these three factors translate to a readiness to use violence to repress protests, dehumanizing and “othering” protesters through name-calling, and aggressively defending urban space against protester spatial moves.145

The issue of dramatic narratives of policing is also addressed by Peter Manning in “Theorizing Policing: The drama and myth of crime control in the NYPD” from 2001. He states there is no systematic theory of the role of police in politics, rather, that police studies tend to focus on street-level issues. His article discusses the synergy of media representations of crime and threat with the drama of policing, and how the drama itself was socially created and maintained.

These illusions of controlling disorder deflect attention from the massive gains in wealth of the top two percent in the USA, and the increasing marginality of the poor. It feeds into stereotypical notions that the major problem and source of crime is in the streets, committed by poor people of color and, less importantly, accomplished in corporate board rooms, banks, among politicians and fiduciary agents. It further elevates and sanctifies the law in the hands of a vigilant police under courageous leadership, a myth, as the primary resource in creating social order. (335)

This myth of the heroic police officer is directly applicable to protest policing. Few policing situations are more dramatic or require more group discipline to maintain unit cohesion than protests. To be confronted with hundreds or thousands of protesters antipathetic or openly hostile to the police attempting to manage them is highly stressful, and so to cope with that stress, police need to devise psychological and cultural mechanisms which support the moral righteousness of the situation.

Noakes and Gillham are explicit in characterizing the pre-1970 model of protest policing as out of date and unreflective of the modernization of law enforcement.146 My research on Chicago 1968 corroborates this. In general, protest policing lags behind other kinds of policing both in policy and in tactics.

145 Although these three factors likely apply to policing in general in any jurisdiction, the particular policing culture of the LAPD is an especially emphatic example of these factors at work, as shown by police conduct at the 2004 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles, which I discuss in Chapter 7.
146 Noakes and Gillham 101.
Each of these periods of protest policing reflect prevailing wisdom of the proper
techniques to be used against crowds. This can be traced through the historical progression of
police training manuals which detail crowd control techniques. During the escalated force model
of protest policing, the training manuals were based on World War II-era close combat
handbooks, such as Colonel Rex Applegate's *Kill or Get Killed: Riot Control Techniques,
Manhandling and Close Combat for Police and the Military* from 1943, which was used to train
the United States armed forces and police in hand-to-hand fighting.\(^{147}\) This book went
through several revisions, and spawned several descendants in different fields, all of which used
techniques and text from the original. One such text was the U.S. Army Field Manual 19:15, first
published in 1945 and updated periodically through at least 2005, which deals with the
deployment of army troops under times of domestic disturbances. The manual follows several of
the myths of crowds debunked later by Couch, such as emotionality and anonymity, and makes
little distinction between mobs, crowds, and protests. In addition to a number of considerations
for how to manage urban space itself during these disturbances, such as closing roads, setting
barricades, and limiting public gatherings, the book provides the basic formations for crowd
control.\(^{148}\) The basic form is the line, otherwise known as the skirmish line, which is a squad of
troops standing shoulder-to-shoulder, with command units in the rear. This basic formation can
be shifted into a wedge formation or a diagonal formation, later called an echelon. The manual
then goes on to show how these formations can be deployed in streets, in courtyards/plaza, or in
open fields. Special weapons are also addressed, in particular riot control agents such as tear gas
or smoke. This manual uses some of the exact same formations and tactics recommended by Col.
Applegate in *Kill or Get Killed*.

Applegate himself followed up his combat training manual with a guide specifically for
department of police on how to manage protests, first published in 1964, entitled *Crowd and Riot Control*.\(^{149}\)
After World War II, Col. Applegate moved to Mexico to advise the national police force in how
to manage riots. His experience in the field led to the development of his 1964 text, which used
exactly the same formations and combat techniques from his earlier manual, but with added
information about the causes and motivations of protests. This was a timely publication, as it
came during the most intense period of civil rights protests and just prior to the larger student
protests of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In essence, these protests were administered to using
World War II close combat tactics which had been extensively field tested in Mexico, and
dominated crowd control thinking and tactics until the 1980s. Every later police training manual
uses these same formations and tactics, even if the ideas behind their application changes.

One such technique is the skirmish line, discussed above. Another is the flying wedge
formation, which consists of a squad in a V-shaped formation, armed with shields and batons,
charging an opposition line, with the purpose of breaking the line and dividing and flanking the
opposing force. This maneuver can be followed up with a 'snatch squad', which is a group of
police which presses through an opening in the skirmish line to remove a particular person from
the opposing line, then returns under cover of the flying wedge. These formations have been used

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\(^{147}\) The subtitle was only added in later editions of the same text. The initial text was simply called *Kill or Get
Killed*.

\(^{148}\) FM 19:15 25.

\(^{149}\) Like his previous work, this text went through several revisions and republications, with the same tactics and
formations, but with the earlier language updated. Much of the language expunged reflected prevailing political
attitudes of the time of its production.
since classical Greek warfare. Interestingly, the flying wedge has been banned for use in American football due to a high rate of injury on both sides of the formation.

This image shows how a column of police will advance forward and split into a skirmish line, with the command unit designated with the diagonal line square. The same procedure can be used for form a wedge. The column is the means by which police are moved into location. Image: Beene 2006 50.

This shows a 'platoon line' from FM 19-15. The same formation in policing manuals is referred to as a 'skirmish line'. Image=FM 19-15, Ch. 8.
A double platoon line, from the same chapter. This shows command and special weapon units in the rear. The circle with a cross is the unit commander. Skirmish lines may also be deployed three deep, but four deep or more and the flexibility of the formation is compromised. Image=FM 19-15, Ch. 8.

This image shows the basic wedge formation, also known as the flying wedge. It is especially effective when officers stand shoulder-to-shoulder and are armed with riot shields. This same tactic was used in Greek phalanx warfare, where it was called a spear-point or arrowhead. Double skirmish line formations were called shield walls. Image=FM 19-15, Ch. 8.
San Francisco police officer Captain Charles Beene followed Applegate's texts with his own *Police Crowd Control* in 1992. Applegate figuratively passed the torch to Beene by writing a foreword to Beene's guide. Beene addresses the change in composition of protest groups since the 1960s, and how contemporaneous protest groups were based around issues and organized into affinity groups. He makes no description of protests from the 1960s, other than to characterize their difference from more recent protests. He organizes his book around the principles of protecting 1st Amendment rights, police being prepared for increasing numbers of protests, and that protests being in the public eye. Each of these three main points seems a direct response to the protest policing failures of Chicago in 1968, in which police did not protect protesters' rights, were not prepared for the size and scope of the protests, and did not recognize the role of media in publicizing police misdeeds. The books still uses the crowd myths debunked by Couch in 1968, particularly the anonymity and emotionality of crowds. The book can be seen as a prime representative of the negotiated management model of protest policing as described by Noakes and Gillham, with a focus on protester rights and managing crowds.

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150 Beene 1992 18.
Part of successful engagement with crowd management is done through an application of discipline, rigorous training, and technical equipment. Police sergeant Ken Hubbs' *Riot Response: An Innovative Approach* from 1997 is one such text, that serves as a training and operations manual for protest policing. The author tellingly makes no distinction between protesters and violent rioters. In the imagination of policing authority, any crowd is a potential threat. Police officers who minister to crowds are not called riot squads, but rather “crowd-management units.” Their ideal use is to calm people and get them to go home. The ideal use of force (even less-lethal or non-lethal) is that force should only be used as a last resort. Police must work with an establishment of ground rules of protest and public conduct ahead of time in order to keep order to a maximum. Specially trained officers are assigned to monitor the events. Ideally, police will come to the event with an unbiased attitude, regardless of their personal feelings on the matter being protested. This allows for passive policing; the police being seen as being in charge.  

Note the characterizations of historical crowd behavior that underpin the logic of the text:

Over the centuries, organized societies often have spawned violent civil disturbances. Countless civil uprisings have been motivated by personal, religious, or political purposes, and many have prompted significant societal changes. Recent decades witnessed race riots across the United States in the 1960s, protests over American involvement in Vietnam in the 1970s, abortion clinic demonstrations in the 1980s, and disturbances stemming from allegations of police brutality in the 1990s.  

Police repression is only alleged and not admitted to. This chronological list of events is akin to rewriting one's own history to cast oneself as a hero in a dramatic narrative, as claimed by Herbert and Manning.

Hubbs goes on to describe spatial formations and tactics useful for quelling unruly crowds. He discusses two techniques in specific: the augmented skirmish line and the TANGO team. An augmented skirmish line: "... usually consists of a line of officers with hats and bats, several line backers, and a leader. Once the skirmish line is in place, the police give a dispersal order, commanding the members of the unlawful group to leave the area.” A significant weak point with the skirmish line is that the limit of spatial control is dependent on the span of the skirmish line; protesters can simply go around if necessary. The augmented skirmish line is divided into smaller units with individual commanders, with an overall commander per skirmish line. This innovation allows for more fluid response and quicker overall command and control. Frequently, unruly groups contain only a handful of aggressive or violent members. The majority are onlookers who just want to be part of the event. Therefore, the presence of uniformed law enforcement officers formed into the skirmish line and outfitted with helmets and riot batons usually has an intimidating effect on the crowd. In most cases, this effect lasts about 2 minutes, then some members of the crowd become vocal in an attempt to provoke an altercation. As time passes without action from either side, a small faction within the crowd might begin to search for objects to throw at the officers maintaining the skirmish line. This is especially true if the officers are carrying shields. Essentially, absent other activity between the crowd and the skirmish line, the shields become missile magnets, inviting the crowd to start throwing things. Unfortunately, the police often have no contingency plans for responding to a rain of rocks and bottles. In the absence of other procedures, the leader commands the line to charge, batons start flying, and the police completely lose control of the incident. (2)

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153 This coincides neatly with the “negotiated management” model of protest policing as described by Gillham and Noakes. At the time of the production of Hubbs' text, that would have been the dominant model of protest policing, and reflects those principles.

154 Hubbs 1.

155 As my research discovered was a significant problem for police on Chicago's wide downtown streets in 1968.

Sagan
Note there is no provision for “unruly” groups without aggression. According to Soule and Earl, police are at their discretion for deciding how and when to apply force given their perceived level of threat. With training manual language of this nature, that threshold seems deliberately left vague. Hubbs then discusses the TANGO team, which stands for “Tactically Aggressive and Necessary Gambit of Operations.” Hubbs is well aware of alternate meanings for tango, and in fact makes a pun that such groups engage and “dance” with the crowd. However, he goes on to describe the steps in this “dance,” making well clear who he considers the leading partner. The TANGO team is a special weapons and tactics unit, heavily armed and armored, and designed as shock troops. TANGO stands for “Tactically Aggressive and Necessary Gambit of Operations.” Hubbs is well aware of alternate meanings for tango, and in fact makes a pun that such groups engage and “dance” with the crowd. However, he goes on to describe the steps in this “dance,” making well clear who he considers the leading partner.

The Tango Team can bring to bear the entire spectrum of use-of-force options—from command presence through deadly force—in a controlled, self-contained package. This unit of special weapons team members can be mobilized to support riot response teams in the event of violent activity by angry crowds. Using extended range weapons (e.g., rubber bullets and beanbag ammunition), the Tango Team can strike selected targets in the crowd from beyond rock and bottle receiving range. This not only deters the crowd but also helps protect officers from injury. (2)

The author makes clear that the level of force chosen for any particular event is in response to crowd activity.

According to the Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training for the State of California, the “Crowd Management and Civil Disobedience Guidelines” lists a set of priorities for protest policing: “Issues to Consider: Protection of Constitutional Rights, Fair and Impartial Enforcement of Laws, Protection of Life and Property, Protection of Vital Facilities, Prosecution of Violators, Public and Peace Officer Safety, Potential for Disruption to Commerce and Community Affairs. *Note: This sampling is not in order of priority.”\(^{156}\) The asterisked note means that police officers have discretion to protect certain rights and values above others. Officers must ostensibly maintain neutrality, and "...must not be affected by the content of opinions being expressed, nor by race, gender, sexual orientation, physical disabilities, appearances or affiliations of anyone exercising their lawful First Amendment rights."\(^{157}\) By way of preparing officers for the variety of field conditions and crowd behaviors, the manual gives a sampling of possible crowd behaviors: lawful, orderly, compliant, non-compliant, active resistance, violent resistance, or rioting. The manual also gives a sampling of potential spatial crowd management strategies: establish an overt police presence, designate public assembly areas when reasonable, establish inner and outer cordonning, establish mobile booking and arrest teams, or prepare to use specialty vehicles as necessary. Specific spatial tactics are designating areas for dispersal, use of barriers for isolation and containment, unlawful assembly declaration/announcement, mobile booking teams, mobile tactical formations, transportation issues, mounted tactical formations, mobile field force concepts, separation of opposing factions, and traffic management. When using a dispersal order to order a crowd to disperse, police must be sure to give routes of escape and “reasonable” amount of time for dispersal. Again, the definition of “reasonable” in this case is situational and up to the discretion of the officers on the scene. Police consider when to use a range of applications of force based on a number of

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\(^{156}\) Hubbs 2.

\(^{157}\) Hubbs 2.
considerations, including the compliance or non-compliance of crowd, the mobility of suspects/protesters, and the available avenues of controlled departure.

The training manual then goes on to provide police definitions for situations and actions in a protest setting. Rather than list them all, I will present relevant highlights. The following definitions describe the procedural elements of protest policing. They present definitions that describe situations and administrative procedures. The definitions themselves become categories and preconditions for certain actions. For example, if a crowd should become a mob and engage in civil disorder at a flashpoint, police may use control devices and compliance techniques to restore discipline. Importantly, the vague definitions of some of these terms give officers a large amount of discretion to decide what is “significant” or “reasonable.”

- Civil Disorder is an unlawful event involving significant disruption of the public order.
- Civil Disobedience is an unlawful event involving a planned or spontaneous demonstration by a group of people.\(^\text{158}\)
- Compliance techniques are reasonable, lawful use-of-force methods intended to encourage suspect cooperation.
- Control Devices: devices intended to assist peace officers in gaining control of subjects who refuse to submit to lawful authority (e.g. batons, electrical stunning units, restraint, chemical agents, etc.)
- Crowd Management: Strategies and tactics employed by law enforcement agencies to deal with lawful assemblies in an effort to prevent escalation of events into an unlawful assembly or riot.
- Crowd Control: Law enforcement response to a pre-planned or spontaneous event, activity or occurrence where there is potential for unlawful activity or the threat of violence.
- Crowd: a number of persons collected into a close body.
- Discipline: pattern of behavior consistent with demonstrating self-control, teamwork, moderation, and restraint.
- Flashpoint: specific location(s) which can be anticipated to attract criminal elements and become the origin or focal point of civil disorder.
- Mob: a disorderly group of people engaged in unlawful activity.
- Non-compliant behavior: behavior that does not yield to a lawful officer.

This training guide also provides definitions of spatial conditions or formations. As with the other definitions, the precise determinations of these conditions is internal to policing language and administration, and is contingent on determinations made by officers under field conditions.

- Cordonning: surrounding or enclosing a particular problem area; also referred to as perimeter control.
- Dispersal order: lawful orders communicated by law enforcement personnel commanding individuals assembled unlawfully to disperse.
- Dismounted tactics: non-mobile tactical formations generally involving team (4-5), squad (8-12) and platoon (25-60; two or more supervised squads)-sized units.
- Formations: coordinated unit tactics utilized by law enforcement to control crowds, stop unlawful activity, and disperse and/or arrest violators.
- Mobile tactics: the ability to rapidly deploy law enforcement personnel using vehicles. The vehicles may also be used for crowd control and containment.
- Sectoring: defining the overall area of operation and dividing it into sub-sections based upon geographical and/or artificial boundaries.

The character of the language used to define these situations and conditions is such that it can provide the groundwork for the administrative justification of police action. Once a situation is defined, certain enforcement actions become possible.

Beene updated his 1992 book with the 2006 manual *Riot Prevention and Control*. The book uses the same set of tactics and formations listed all the way back to Applegate. This

\(^{158}\) Note that any act of civil disobedience by its very definition is illegal.
updated volume has numerous brief summaries of successful and unsuccessful protest policing events, explores crowd dynamics, and addresses the role of internet communications in protester organization. One notable protest policing failure was Seattle in 1999. Beene's critique is that police expectations of protester willingness to negotiate was incorrect, and thus is a direct criticism of a primary focus of the negotiated management model of protest policing. In fact, I argue that Seattle 1999 was the event that caused the shift from negotiated management to strategic incapacitation, along with increasing militarization of policing. Beene's discussion of crowd dynamics is cut short, as such an exploration is beyond the scope of his manual. However, his book echoes the rhetoric of control: if a crowd disturbance is not controlled immediately, it will spread like a fire. His formulation that protest policing has to be active and predictive directly contradicts his previous work, in which he states that protest policing is mostly reactive. This is yet another indicator that the model of protest policing has shifted.

Beene outlines an organized set of procedures for dealing with crowd events. Whether or not to use force is not in question, but rather the issue is of when and how much. Again, the reason behind the gathering is not addressed, so riots and peaceful protests exist in a continuum of crowd behavior, but all are assumed worthy of having police inflict violence upon them. The term “minimum necessary force” is variable by both situation and locality. Local police often have years of experience regarding what is considered dangerous, or fun and appropriate, behavior for their local communities. When crowd control forces are pulled from several agencies and municipalities, the advantage of specialized local knowledge is lost, and issues of autocratic command and control of police forces becomes all the more important. The book presents examples of the display of women's breasts in public; there are differing community and event standard between, for example, New Orleans during Mardi Gras and Sturgis, North Dakota during its annual motorcycle rally. That the author chose that as his only example speaks to both his personal professional policing experience as well as that of his perceived audience.

As with his prior text, Couch's debunked myths of crowd behavior are still extant in Beene. Beene cites several examples where the anonymity of crowds becomes a reason for violence, or how crowd members lose their individuality, or how crowds automatically become more emotional and have a mind of their own. His discussion is replete with name-calling, referring to some crowd members as "criminals," "thugs," or "psychopaths." These categories within the larger ideological structure of law enforcement have a remarkable consistency. The author discusses the presence of civilian monitors observing police actions; in the text, monitor is in quotes, implying that the author does not recognize the legitimacy of civilian observation of police activity. He discusses crowd tactics, including communication using cell phones and walkie-talkies, distraction techniques, arming and defense, the use of batons masquerading as flag poles, etc. The author also discusses a video game from 2002 called 'State of Emergency,' which allows the player to simulate an urban riot, with the police as the antagonist. The author does not mention the 2003 video game entitled 'Riot Police,' produced by a different company, which allows the user to play as agents of crowd control, encouraging them to use water cannon and tear gas on an array of protesters.

Beene also lists and displays a number of formations and tactics that police should use during crowd control situations, in no particular order of importance. Officers must always

159 Beene 2006 16.
160 Herbert, Dubber.
maintain the appearance of impartiality, and not accept favors from either side. Crowd control tactics used must be legal, fair and effective. On-line officers are not allowed to speak to individuals in the crowd. The spatial uses of police formations are to isolate crowds, deny access to areas, make selective arrests, move, or disperse crowds. Officers must not use tactics that will inflame rather than pacify a crowd. Each formation includes the presence of one or more command officers who remain behind the formation. These formations, again, are exactly the same as Applegate's.

- Skirmish line: line of officers standing side by side; offers mobility from a column of files, used to move crowds or deny them access to certain areas
- Wedge: inverted V formation; used to split crowds
- Echelon: left or right diagonal lines. Also used to move crowds.
- Platoon: column of files. Consists of four squads. Four platoons make a company, four companies make a regiment, four regiments make a battalion, four battalions make a division; same as military organization.
- Platoon on line: three or four squads (usually ten officers) lined shoulder-to-shoulder. Can reach 30 yards or more. Used to move large crowds.
- Skirmish line with lateral support: bigger skirmish line (three or four squads) with one or two squads as side protection. Looks like an open-sided box. Used to clear streets with buildings or deny access to large areas.
- Encirclement: large circle of officers around a crowd. Officers arrest everyone within the circle, including media and bystanders. This tactic is especially useful when the crowd members are outnumbered by the police.\(^{161}\)

Part of the 'move the crowd' purpose of some of these formations is the implicit use of the formation to concentrate the crowd, to make the same number of people in the crowd occupy a smaller space, in effect to increase a crowd's density.

Beene discusses the usefulness of mounted police, whether on light motorcycles or on horses. The primary utility of these modes of transportation is in their rapid mobility, but they have the additional benefits of aided visibility by allowing the officer a point of view higher than the surrounding crowd, intimidating the crowd, and allowing for powerful forward movements.

The primary use to move crowds is through the 'controlled push' tactic, which I witnessed in St. Paul, and is described in detail in that chapter.

The two main fundamental tools of crowd control are barricades and batons.\(^{162}\) If the barricades don't work, the baton will. Batons have an iconic status in crowd control. A platoon of police advancing and beating on their riot shields with their batons is a powerful symbol of authority through threat of violence. Batons, simply, are used to push or strike crowd members. These can be backed up with special weapons and tactics that require special training and authorization. These are pepper spray: based on oleoresin capsicum, the same substance that gives heat to chili peppers, tear gas, less-than-lethal munitions (rubber buckshot, beanbags, foam batons, wooden dowels, rubber bullets and stinger grenades, which spray an area with rubber pellets), stun guns, or water hoses. Water hoses are very rarely used, and are primarily avoided due to public image issues. Historically, water hose use has been associated with police brutality against civil rights protesters in the 1960s. Police dogs are useful for maintaining perimeters and chasing down suspects, but are rarely used due to their association with excessive police force.

Beene stresses working with the community to avoid the worst crowd control excesses. Ideally, police can meet with crowd leaders ahead of time to work out issues and head off

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\(^{161}\) Beene 2006, 49-58.

\(^{162}\) I discuss Beene's depiction of the uses of barricades in the next section.
potential problems. Ongoing communication and good relations with community groups are of critical importance. The author mentions the 'iron fist in a velvet glove' ideal of policing.\footnote{Beene 2006 92.} Beene also stresses the need to maintain good press relations. As such, despite the publication date, this manual represents Noakes and Gillham's strategic incapacitation model, which succeeded the negotiated management protest policing model. The newer Beene text refers to greater strategic use of force, the need to remove or deal with particularly transgressive protesters, and how police should still attempt to negotiate with “contained” protest groups, but should not allow community disruption.

4.6: Technical-Professional Literature: Defensive Space at the Institutional Level (CPTED)

This fourth and final body of literature is about the design of the built environment for purposes of enhancing social control over crowds and protests. Like the previous body of literature, these sources both practical manuals on the process of designing the built environment with security in mind (however that might be constituted) as well as other kinds of texts that examine the process of designing security into the built environment from a more abstract perspective. In a larger sense, this literature is what I could call technical-professional. The literature consists of manuals of techniques which, when mobilized through the work of professional designers, become the means by which ideologies of social control in the built environment take effect. Because architecture and urban design are elite practices, they involve projects primarily designed around client needs.\footnote{According to Dovey in \textit{Framing Places}, 1999, placemaking is an elite practice, controlled by those who have the resources to do so.} These designers command high fees for their work, meaning that these design professionals attract wealthy clients, concerned with protecting their wealth, and who are anxious about crowds and security. As much as police are concerned about crime in behavior in urban environments, so too are designers concerned for safety and security in these spaces. To be sure, built environments must support human use and satisfy user needs, and one such need is the need for shelter and security. This can be accomplished through a variety of design features, such as natural surveillance, natural access control with clear separations of public and private spaces, territorial reinforcement, and social activity support. This body of literature shows confusion about environmental determinism. Although environment-behavior studies has shown repeatedly that built environments cannot determine human behavior, this body of technical-professional literature takes as its very foundation that people can be prevented from behaving in certain ways based on the shape of the environment.\footnote{Rapoport Ch. 1.} This is particularly apparent when we examine the development of thought about how to design the built environment to ameliorate crime and increase security. Crowds, protests, and riots are as yet poorly addressed in literature on architecture and urban design, but given policing's preoccupation with control over space and behavior in an urban environment, particularly control over criminal and transgressive behavior, the literature on spatial design for purposes of crime control or increasing security is highly
relevant, and in fact runs parallel to literature on space-based policing techniques.

Urban planning researchers Richard Schneider and Ted Kitchen trace the history of place-based crime prevention in their book *Planning for Crime Prevention: A Trans-Atlantic Perspective*. They describe the three primary means of spatial control: impeding access, facilitating surveillance, and territorial control. Their work includes an exploration of historical models of place-based crime prevention strategies: including caves, castles, citadels, walls and trenches. These historical forms represent the development of the same logics, that is, they are design solutions for the same problems. The authors provide examples of Paleolithic defensive structures at cave mouths and high ground; neolithic defenses around the first cities, such as walls and towers in Jericho circa 7000 BCE; palisade walls in Jamestown, Virginia; English curtain walls, as well as motte and bailey construction, which was later known as moat and bailey, a precursor to castle designs; and Renaissance cities with elaborate earthworks designed to repel invading armies and dominate the landscape. The authors explore the various urban defensive works of military engineers such as Vauban, Filarete, Martini, Di Giorgio, van Noyen.166

For millenia, cities served as engines of war, designed to repel or confound invading armies and serve as strategic defense sites. This was accomplished through double and triple curtain walls providing access control and surveillance functions. British cities generally did not have them, or only had them in early periods, due to the relatively early political unification of the island of Great Britain, and of the defensive value of the sea. This allowed British cities to grow outward. European cities in the general period from 1400-1850 were constrained by walls, and could only grow upward. Only eleven cities in the United States had walls of any sort, and cities in general had much lower population densities than similarly-sized cities in the Old World. Schneider and Kitchen claim that walls in urban design produced a greater degree of cultural tolerance for urbanity.167 The authors state in their conclusion to this section that walls are an adaptive strategy against predation, but that, as simple solutions to complex problems, their strategy of separation and denial typically fails. Rather, "...the answers to defensibility are likely to lie in much more complex interplay among social, physical, political, and economic forces that we are only starting to recognize and understand in our modern cities and towns."168

They make a similar argument against the citadel as a defensive form, quoting historian Christopher Duffy's *Fire and Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare 1660-1860*: citadels were “the only kind of fortification which could be turned equally against foreign enemies and fellow citizens.” Likewise, Duffy notes the problems of citadel-style defensive logic in a free and democratic society, quoting the French populist Carnot, who wrote “A citadel is a monstrosity in a free country, a refuge of tyranny which should be the target of indignation of every free people and every good citizen.”

The authors then discuss the foundational work of Oscar Newman and his principles of defensible space. Four critical factors affect the level of security of design. These are:

- territoriality: defined as “the capacity of the physical environment to create perceived

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166 Schneider and Kitchen 78.
167 I would also argue that such with defensive structures comes an easy political coding: *us* and *them*. *Us*, we, those of us who are on the inside of the wall, for whom the wall serves a protective function. *Them*, they, those on the outside of the wall, who represent a grave threat.
168 Schneider and Kitchen 88.
zones of territorial influence;”

- natural surveillance: which is the “capacity of the physical environment to provide surveillance opportunities for residents and their agents”
- boundary definition: which is clearly dividing and marking spaces to identify the shadings between public and private use; and,
- image and milieu of sites and structures: which is the use of sensitive design in order to mitigate the social stigma of public housing.

Defensible space has two components in order to function: that people can see and be seen, and that people are willing to intervene when a crime is being committed. Territoriality has physical, psychological, socio-biological, cultural and civic dimensions, which are difficult to measure. Schneider and Kitchen note the deep interconnection between territoriality and home ownership in free market economies, where civic virtue has property ownership as its highest expression. Thus home ownership, with the economic and social status it brings, is the highest expression of territoriality in capitalist society, with private property ownership as the cornerstone of the capitalist economic system. Territoriality in public spaces, however, rests on much more complex interrelations of power, civic engagement, and public participation in space-making and space-use. The authors make the claim that Newman's work laid the foundation for the later CPTED principle of *maintenance*, that is, the physical upkeep of places in order to deter what political scientists James Q. Wilson and George Kelling called the 'broken window' theory. CPTED and defensible space theories have their origins in the period of 1968-1974, a period of intense social upheaval and political turmoil. They were critiques of existing rationalist and modernist architecture and planning, which were viewed as having failed to prevent or ameliorate the conditions that produced said turmoil. The original CPTED text from 1971 has the same name as the practice. The text was contemporary with Oscar Newman's Defensible Space, which was published in 1973.

According to the International CPTED Association, “CPTED is defined as a multi-disciplinary approach to deterring criminal behavior through environmental design. CPTED strategies rely upon the ability to influence offender decisions that precede criminal acts by affecting the built, social and administrative environment. Pronounced “sep-ted,” the term is known by various labels or names around the world such as Designing Out Crime and other acronyms.” Further, “CPTED, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, has as its basic premise that the proper design and effective use of the physical environment can lead to a reduction in the incidence and fear of crime, thereby improving the quality of life.” In short, CPTED is the set of techniques and practices of designing and creating the built environment specifically with crime prevention and security in mind. In CPTED, to maintain a space shows

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169 Newman 51.
170 Newman 78.
171 Further, image and milieu can be used to mask design specifically for security as well, independent of perceived social status of the building. That is, some security features can be masked within structures.
173 Schneider and Kitchen 101.
174 *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*, C. Ray Jefferey, 1971. Jefferey claimed that sociologists had overstated the social origins of crime and underestimated the environmental causes. Many of his arguments cited biological causes for criminal behavior, such as lead water pipes causing brain damage, leading to crime.
that it is cared for and watched over. The congruence between Newman and CPTED is extensive: "...the fundamental principles embraced by CPTED theorists and practitioners are nearly identical to those posited by Newman: surveillance, boundary definition, access control, the importance of the relation between land use and activity locations and territoriality." They make a note, however, that in CPTED, territoriality is less emphasized than it is in Newman, on the basis that is is more difficult to operationalize. Surveillance, however, is easy to operationalize through the use of video cameras.

The principles of “clearly marked transitional zones” and “border definitions of controlled space” of CPTED are spatial control tactics shared by law enforcement during times of protest. Decades later Beene (2006) presents a myriad of spatial technologies and techniques designed to maintain control over space through both demarcation and denial. For example, barricades are used to deny access to certain areas. One such common barricade is the concrete K-rails, also called “traffic dividers” or “Jersey dividers.” They are 42” high concrete walls with wide bases. The name “K-rail” is the California Department of Transportation designation for the unit. They can also be made of polyethylene and filled with water to aid mass, interlocking metal gates, “Do Not Cross” tape, concrete planters, etc. These emplacements can be used by police as force multipliers, as it takes far fewer officers to control an area of space when these barricades are used.

Schneider and Kitchen discuss how New Urbanism adopts fundamentally identical principles to CPTED. However, New Urbanism takes the philosophical position "...that its physical design prescriptions can profoundly influence behavior, and, in doing so, prevent crime and reduce the fear of crime." The authors note that the use of CPTED and principles of defensible space in the design of public spaces is rarely discussed.

The role of design in deterring crime is explored further in urban designer and architect Ian Colquhoun's Design Out Crime: Creating Safe and Sustainable Communities. Researched and written in the context of the United Kingdom, the book examines public housing in the UK, and is aimed at planners, architects and developers, but includes police. The author assumes "...a dynamic interplay between the physical environment and the behavior of offenders,” and "...there is a strong relationship between crime, social and economic deprivation and the state of the local environment.” He cites the perception in British population of the increase of crime, while omitting the fact that crime had diminished. He makes the argument that mitigation of the fear of crime is more important in the assessment of good living conditions than the prevention of crime itself. He explores three modes of thought regarding fear of crime: defensible space, CPTED, situational crime prevention. Building on literature of safety in cities, he cites urbanist Jane Jacobs' The Death and Life of Great American Cities, in which she states there must be a clear demarcation between public and private spaces. Further, Colquhoun cites Oscar Newman's position that clarity in spatial function is critical for maintaining a territoriality, that is, a sense of control over one's nearby environment.

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177 Schneider and Kitchen 101.
178 I found many examples of this in both my archival work on my two historical case studies, and in my field work on my two contemporary case studies. Later chapters will show these items in use and describe the contexts.
179 Schneider and Kitchen 109.
180 Colquhoun 1.
181 Colquhoun 7.
182 Newman 9.
Colquhoun moves from these theories to design principles specifically for housing, such as window placement and fence heights, citing the work of Danish CPTED expert Bo Gronlund of the Royal Danish Institute of Fine Art School of Architecture. Gronlund discusses the tension between an open society and the implementation of CPTED, particularly how CPTED carries profitability for developers and security experts, while meeting resistance from architects and builders on ideological or technical grounds. Further, insurance companies have little stake in the implementation of CPTED, as they indirectly profit from fear of crime. The enforcement of CPTED principles also carries with it threats to equal rights and freedom of use. Gronlund's assessment leads to traditionalist and “architectural anti-modernism” in the Scandinavian context. Colquhoun likens this to New Urbanism and Smart Growth movements in the United States. For purposes of safer housing, the author cites criminologists Ronald V. Clarke and Pat Mayhew, *Designing Out Crime*, from 1980, focusing on limiting permeability through principles and elements of design, such as sturdier locks and doors, target removal, and formal surveillance.

Architect Barbara Nadel's *Building Security* from 2004 is a professional handbook for CPTED principles for almost any site. The author is a fellow of the American Institute of Architects, and this book is perhaps the standard manual for design for security of that organization. Significantly, the book mentions 9-11 six times even before the table of contents, and another 126 times in the 592 page book. The book takes the position that good design combines security with freedoms in an open and democratic society. The goal is to achieve transparent security; visible security consists of things like Jersey barriers, bollards or other barriers, and invisible security means replacing such things with public art, planters, benches, trees, and so forth. The author makes the point that protest is legal, but can lead to illegal activities, such as trespassing, obstructing access, harassment or intimidation, etc. As such, sensitive places such as women's clinics should be designed to allow for low-key and secure alternate entries. Nadel cites the history of CPTED through criminologist Ray Jeffery's coining of the term CPTED in his 1971 book of same name.

For purposes of building security, civil disturbances or protesters are ranked a low to medium threat with low to medium consequences, as indicated on table 30.2. Nadel presents the ranked threat levels for public events as determined by the Department of Homeland Security. Level 4 is a “special event,” with a high degree of security risks. These events which require a number of special procedures and practices to maintain security, such as the participation of the secret service, coordination and participation of national, regional, state and local law enforcement, magnetometer checkpoints, as well as mobilizing public safety officials, and restricting local police from carrying firearms. These highly public events have thousands of patrons, with some from other countries, and require extra security measures due to the high public profile of these events. The conventions I conducted my field work at were both at this threat level.

Perhaps because of their relative infrequency, protests themselves are not a primary reason behind using CPTED in urban design. Rather, they contribute to the growing fear of crime and urban dissent, creating a perception of a problem to which CPTED was the solution. This is similar to how Colquhoun recognizes that it is often more important for good design to reduce fear of crime rather than reduce crime itself.

183 Nadel 30.7.  
184 Nadel 4.8.
This is also explored by security researcher Bruce Schneier in Beyond Fear from 2003, as well as in his ongoing research and writing on security theater, exploring what he terms security theater, or the process of displaying actions which give the appearance of reducing risk. Thus security theater makes people feel more secure rather than actually reducing the chance of risk. While he singles out airport security measures as being particularly poor at reducing real risk, Nadel's principles of CPTED acknowledge the social dimensions of the practice, and how belief in the techniques' effectiveness can lead to client confidence.

Effective Physical Security, by security consultant Lawrence J. Fennelly, outlines further CPTED strategies.\textsuperscript{185} In language that is similar to the binary oppositions depicting protesters as sub-human, the author opines that “crime and loss are by-products of a human system that is not working.”\textsuperscript{186} The intellectual foundations the author uses to make this sweeping claim are unclear. The author proposes a series of CPTED strategies to minimize user anxiety and apprehension about danger in public space, further supporting the social dimensions of CPTED and security in public space. The relevance of these principles to protest policing is manifest based on the literature on protest policing, above, as well as my own research in the field (detailed in Chapters 5 through 8). The nine major CPTED strategies explained in the text are:

1. provide a clear border of controlled space
2. provide clearly marked transitional zones
3. relocation of gathering areas; for purposes of surveillance and control, design can designate permitted gathering spaces
4. place safe activities in unsafe locations, which allows for surveillance and making space safe through safe activities
5. placing unsafe activities in safe locations: placing vulnerable activities near windows to aid surveillance, etc.
6. re-designate the use of space to provide natural barriers: mutually fear-producing activities should be separated spatially or topographically. Note: “The threat does not have to be real to create the perception of risk for the normal or desired user.”\textsuperscript{187}
7. improve scheduling of space to create a reduced perception of risk
8. redesign space to increase the perception of natural surveillance: the perception of surveillance is more powerful than its reality.\textsuperscript{188}
9. Overcome distance and isolation through connection of spaces

The author goes on to critique several elements of urban design which fail to support feelings of security. Narrow sidewalks decrease pedestrian traffic for fear of vagrants and nearness of traffic. Pedestrian malls failed to attract pedestrians due to loss of lines of sight. The presence of litter and bird droppings leads to a sense of neglect, and such public places are avoided.\textsuperscript{189} The natural barriers of time and distance are good for arranging activities in space, as activities which might come into conflict should be separated. Means to improve feelings of safety in public spaces

\textsuperscript{185} Fennelly, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., 1997. The first edition was published in 1989, and the 4\textsuperscript{th} edition was published in 2012.
\textsuperscript{186} Fennelly 35.
\textsuperscript{187} Fennelly 36.
\textsuperscript{188} This lends weight to the idea that the built environment can play a normative role in establishing behavioral norms. Normal environments that use abundant natural surveillance become panoptic.
\textsuperscript{189} The author seems to be basing this particular argument on Wilson and Kelling’s “broken window” hypothesis.
include wider sidewalks, two way traffic, and closed streets with portable amenities for festival occasions.

The Australian Capital Territory Planning Authority further explores urban design for security in its publication *Role of Urban Design in Crime Prevention and Community Safety*, prepared by urban planners Wendy Bell, Ben Woodroffe and Graham Gaston. The findings in this text are particular to the Australian context, and to the particular context of Canberra, a highly planned city of relatively recent origin, which was founded in 1908, and constructed starting in 1913 along Garden City principles. However, the text is useful because of its overarching approach to CPTED and its description of urban design as a facet of CPTED. According to this report, urban design is a secondary deterrent to crime, behind social and economic macro- and policy-level solutions, but ahead of policing, the usefulness of which the report describes as being limited, as policing tends to be repressive. Primary prevention targets the whole of the general public, secondary prevention targets those most likely to offend, and tertiary prevention targets those who have already offended. Thus jails and prisons serve as tertiary prevention targets.

The Australian authors base their work on *Environmental Crime Prevention* by architect and social researcher Barry Poyner from 1983. This work proposes the following urban design moves intended to reduce the incidence of crime: the privatization of residential streets, limiting pedestrian access, separating residential and commercial uses, arranging apartment doors and windows carefully, making sure schools are visible from other buildings, limiting access to the rear of houses, and so on. The book also cites Felson 1987 on doing away with 'open-campus' designs, in favor of using more controlled access master plans. The following basic CPTED practices will lead to higher incidences of inclusion and less likelihood of crime: police patrol cars able to easily reach all sides of a building, streets are wide and straight enough to give patrolling police an unobstructed view, buildings set far enough back from the street to produce a sense of semi-private space, defensible spaces: clusters of houses, clear use of spaces, etc. The text emphasizes natural surveillance of the physical environment. They are careful to note there is no evidence that any environmental design features are on their own a predictor of crime. “The many problems in inner city spaces may be attributed not so much to the design of spaces as to the opportunities created by the magnets of human activity...”190

190 Bell et al, 15.
5. Chicago 1968: “The Police are There to Preserve Disorder.”:

5.1: Introduction

In order to understand the interaction between police, protest, and urban space in Chicago in 1968, we must first establish the general historical and political context that spurred the protests. The Presidential National Convention in Chicago in 1968 came near the end of tumultuous decade in American history, marked by the civil rights movement, assassinations of multiple prominent establishment and reform political leaders, such as President John F. Kennedy in 1961, and black revolutionary leader Malcolm X in 1965, civil rights leader Martin Luther King in April of 1968, and most recently Democratic candidate for President Robert F. Kennedy in June of that same year. The variety of events of civil and political unrest in the United States led to periodic protest events and riots across the country, such as race riots in Birmingham in 1963, New York in 1964, Los Angeles in 1965, Chicago in 1966, and Detroit in 1967. These were in addition to widespread student protest and unrest across the nation, with relatively frequent events of violent and non-violent resistance, protests, and political direct action.

In the wake of these events, President Johnson’s National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (also known as the Kerner Commission) formed in July 1967 to discover what had caused the epidemic of civil unrest, and what could be done to prevent future riots. The 426-page Kerner Report, released in February 1968, laid out the perceived causes of the riots in detail; namely, the black community’s frustration with institutionalized racism and limited economic opportunity had reached a boiling point. The commission also recommended solutions that would, in its view, ameliorate urban civil unrest. These solutions were primarily in the realm of policy moves: an increase in the urban housing stock, expanded employment opportunities, and an end to ghettos and de facto segregation. In short, the Commission recognized the spatialization of economic inequality in the United States, and made recommendations for development which would decrease the likelihood of urban unrest in the future.

Of particular importance to urban policing was the suggestion by the commission that law enforcement agencies should greatly increase surveillance and undercover policing of possible agitators and dissidents. The commission recommended law enforcement agencies: “...establish an intelligence system to provide police and other public officials with reliable information that may help to prevent the outbreak of a disorder and to institute effective control measures in the event a riot erupts.”

It is significant that the Kerner Commission report was not accepted by President Johnson. The commission and its report, focusing as they did more on economic and environmental solutions than upon law enforcement, were generally dismissed by President Johnson and Republican lawmakers as being “too soft on crime.” Solutions that focused on preventative measures rather than enforcement, it seems, were untenable in the political climate of the time. Addressing the problems outlined in the report in any regulatory fashion would take

191 Kerner 16.
192 Arike 41.
several more years of civil disorder in the United States, as well as a patchwork of laws and policy moves. A similar bill, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, led to the creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, that dealt at the federal level with the distribution of funding to law enforcement agencies, and promoted research into innovations into urban law enforcement methods. The Kerner Report noted that police were still using the same riot control tactics and tools as they had been using since 1863 (e.g. wooden stick and gun). In the commission's estimation, these tactics were no longer effective, and more broad-based approaches were needed. The commission's report also noted that tools designed to destroy, not control, have no place in urban policing. This comment was directed specifically at automatic weapons and firearms in general. The need for balance of show of power, but not in enough excess to spark further rioting, was necessary. The commission's solution was the widespread police adoption of nonlethal enforcement equipment, such as dyes, adhesives, bright lights and sounds, or anything promoting “temporary disability.”

The rejection of the Kerner Commission report's recommendations meant that in 1968 there was neither a coherent, organized strategy to prevent nor contain civil unrest, nor the political will to implement one. When civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated April 4, riots erupted in over 100 cities across the country. By this time, opposition to the Vietnam War (and the draft) was reaching a critical mass, and anti-war demonstrations were becoming familiar fixtures at universities and virtually every major city. A counterculture of activism and resistance to authority was slowly becoming a major component of popular youth culture.

This popularization of resistance in the youth counterculture was instrumental in the mobilization and organization of protesters for the 1968 Democratic National Convention. One main protest group, whose leadership were famously indicted in the events of the Chicago 7 trial, were the Yippies. Founded by Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman, the Yippies were a vocal group combining the hippie counterculture with the politics of the New Left. This was accomplished through tactics of outrageous antics, symbolic clowning, and media oriented activism. The idea was to keep dissent public and in the public eye, if not in public space itself.

In October of 1967, a protest organization called the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, popularly known as "the Mobe," organized a national demonstration in Washington DC that drew nearly on hundred thousand participants. For this event, the police granted permits given for marches, workshops, etc. to be held in public spaces; however, many protesters (including Noam Chomsky and Norman Mailer) left the designated areas and engaged in civil disobedience. (Barber, Marching on Washington). This protester tactic of violating police rules happened again in April of 1968, when protest group Students for a Democratic Society protest took over Columbia University. Historian James Tracy notes that: “...the subsequent brutality displayed by the police while clearing Columbia's buildings after several days of standoff fed a disturbing and increasingly common belief among activists on the nation's campuses that it was a revolutionary activity to engage in petty provocation of the police.”

These events set the stage for the August 1968 protests at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The antiwar movement unified through their anger at the Democrats, who were likely to nominate Humphrey, who was generally in favor of continuing and escalating the Vietnam War. Protest groups managed to attract 10,000 protesters for the various protest

193 Tracy 146.
events, which ranged from large, organized political assemblies and marches to the political theater of the Yippies. The variety of protest tactics reflected the divisions within the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, which was split between three factions: the radical pacifists, the New Left student activists led by Tom Hayden and Rennie Davis, and the Yippies, led by Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin. The three sides could not agree on tactics or aims for protest of DNC: some wanted nonviolent resistance, some wanted direct confrontation, and some wanted political street theater to challenge the legitimacy of the political process.

The high visibility of the convention made the last strategy particularly effective.

Televised media had grown expansively throughout the 1960s, as the Vietnam War was the first war from which American citizens could watch televised reports. The Convention was heavily telecast, and many scenes of the violence in the streets were broadcast as well. The American public was shocked at the violent police response to the protesters, broadcast across the nation. NBC in particular intercut images of the convention proceedings with events from the protests.¹⁹⁴ Mayor Richard Daley was very vocal in his hatred of the protesters. He had the Chicago police put up massive barricades around the convention and denied the protesters permits for demonstrations and parades. Daley also called in the National Guard, swelling the ranks of law enforcement to over 25,000. Daley 'made it clear he intended to teach the protesters a lesson.' Five thousand demonstrators who met in Lincoln Park were greeting by the combined forces twenty thousand police and national guards. These troops assaulted protesters regardless of their behavior. Police indiscriminately attacked anyone in the streets, protesters and bystanders alike. These bystanders included ordinary citizens, journalists of all sorts, even Red Cross medics who were trying to aid the wounded were chased, gassed, beaten, and arrested in a chaotic running street battle in what the Walker Report eventually called a 'police riot.'

The police crackdown on protesters, combined with the fragmented leadership of protest groups over their disagreement on tactics, resulted in many fights in the streets. The sheer brutality of these tactics, the indiscriminate approach to violence on the part of the police, and the high visibility of the protest events caused significant public backlash against the police, Chicago politicians, and by extension the Democratic party and the political establishment of which it was a major part. Democratic Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut accused Daley of using 'Gestapo tactics' to quell dissent.¹⁹⁵ Protest leader Dave Dellinger showed enthusiasm and exhilaration with the confrontational tactics. The police, and by extension the whole political establishment, were being shamed by their uncontrolled violence, which many protesters felt was analogous to the out-of-control Vietnam War.

In summary, the tactics of the protesters varied in their models and modes of effective protests. While some protest leaders had planned to provoke police and escalate violence, the level of violence would likely not have reached the intensity of a 'riot' were it not for the police responses to the protests. The generally working-class conservative political views of the police, combined with weeks of paranoid planning and anticipation, along with their perception that Chicago was being invaded, made them view protesters as enemies.¹⁹⁶ The televised violence and

¹⁹⁴ To be clear, many of these events did not happen simultaneously, and thus NBC’s promotion of the drama of the events was overstated. This eventually resulted in a Federal Communications Commission investigation of the network for dishonesty.
¹⁹⁵ Tracy 148.
¹⁹⁶ Farber's research shows that police anticipated such outlandish protester actions as attacks from mortar emplacements and LSD in the city's water supply.
riots tainted police legitimacy, Chicago politics, and the political establishment alike. This ultimately affected the perceived viability of the Democratic party during the 1968 election, which resulted in a Republican victory, as Richard M. Nixon won the Presidency.

In the following section I will explore and analyze the important factors in understanding the role of spatial control played in the protests in Chicago in 1968 and the enforcement thereof. As discussed previously, first I examine these events by outlining the existing modes of both protest and protest policing, and the interaction thereof. Next, I describe the nature of the political crisis that spurred the protest event. Then, I examine the spatio-temporal context of the protest event-site, namely, the physical structures of the setting and the spatial maneuvers of the actors involved. Finally, I will present an analysis in which I describe the outcomes and effects of the events in Chicago 1968, and propose a set of interpretations and conclusions regarding this specific protest event-site that can be compared and contrasted with the analysis of subsequent event-sites.

5.2.1: Type of Social Movement and Model of Enforcement

Understanding both the type of protest and mode of protest policing in Chicago in 1968 is important because it establishes a baseline for comparison across protest event-sites. By understanding the historical conditions of protest and protest policing, and placing them in their relevant administrative and spatio-temporal contexts, we can begin to understand why these events were significant to understandings of urban space, and how they set the stage for later protest and policing events.

The primary mode of protest in Chicago 1968 was that of direct action. James Tracy defines direct action as an attempt to achieve political goals through means other than traditional political channels. In the case of the students and young people participating in the protests in Chicago, the existing political situation in the United States was unacceptable. Widespread dissatisfaction with American involvement in Vietnam, a perception of limited personal freedoms, and a broad focus on increasing social justice had spurred direct action political movements in United States since the middle 1950s.

Prior to this, there had been relatively little coordinated protest movement in the United States after the labor struggles of the 1920s and 1930s. There had been some instances of resistance to World War II and conscientious objectors who protested the national draft, as well as continuing smaller scale labor resistance. A group of protesters called the “Union Eight” from Union Seminary resisted the power of the federal government to conscript men into the army. Their resistance was based on their commitment to radical pacifism and nonviolent resistance. For them, powers of the federal government to determine people's fates were totalitarian, and to fight conscription meant fighting totalitarianism. They were eventually arrested and charged with

197 Spatio-temporal in this case means considering a space as it existed at that particular moment in time. Spatial change in the build environment happens at a slower scale than human interaction with those spaces, and so it is critical to understand human use of the space as it was at the time.
198 Tracy, introduction.
199 The entire history of protest in the United States is beyond the scope of this work; however, a summary of relevant and significant events can be found in both chapters 4 and 5A.
felonies. While imprisoned, they held an antiwar demonstration, for which they were further punished by being confined to their cells. Other conscientious objectors were punished with forced service in Civilian Public Service camps. Many conscientious objectors were religious, coming primarily from the Peace Churches: Mennonites, Church of the Brethren, and Quakers. Six thousand conscientious objectors were imprisoned throughout World War II, eventually comprising one-sixth of the US prison population.

The Congress of Racial Equality was an early direct action political organization dedicated to racial equality in the United States. From its founding in 1942, the CORE was dedicated to using nonviolent protests as direct action, and was inspired by the writings on protest strategy by Bayard Rustin.\(^\text{200}\) CORE planned and executed a protest at segregated Chicago restaurant Stoner's in 1942. The protests functions by the protesters entering the restaurant and waiting to be seated, sometimes for hours, and by attempting to dine in the restaurant in multiracial groups. While police were called, even several times, the patience and nonviolence of the protesters meant that the police did not have cause to arrest and remove them. No more than sixty-five protesters were ever involved in this sit-in action. Through these actions the protesters exposed the discriminatory practices of the restaurant and eventually ended its discriminatory practices.

Overall, protest throughout the mid-20\(^{th}\) century was tailored to small groups of activists. Protest tactics involved calling attention to injustice through obtrusivity: sitting in at segregated lunch counters, small groups waiting to be served in restaurants and drug stores, or smaller scale marches and pickets. One of the goals of direct action is to interrupt the smooth flow of activity in unjust institutions. This is done in order to remove implied or explicit consent for the existing unjust practices or activities. A second goal is to challenge assumptions about society. By attracting attention to injustice, and by keeping the protest in the public eye, direct action seeks to sway public opinion away from injustice. One of the philosophical and political goals of direct action is to reassert the autonomy of the individual in resistance to a corporatist or authoritarian society.

The spatial tactics of direct action involve the use of public spaces for non-designed and unintended purposes. The purpose of this is to draw attention to the protesters' aims by subverting ordinary spatial practice, thus interrupting 'business as usual' to disrupt complacency and resistance by adherence to habit. Thus spatial occupation serves as a show of the role of space in maintaining unjust social practice. For example, Dorothy Day's annual anti-authoritarian protest involved occupying a civil defense shelter use during the Cold War.\(^\text{201}\) CORE used such tactics, as did other civil rights protest organizations, such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference initially led by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (SCLC). Some of these smaller-scale events were freedom rides and freedom marches. The general tactic of these groups was to place people outside of the places socially dictated to them.

The most basic form of protest was the rally. Generally consisting of a few-to-many communication model of public address, a rally consisted of a speaker or series of speakers addressing a large assembled body of people occupying a public space. The level of participant engagement could be quite low; simply being present would be enough to participate. Rallies

\(^{200}\) CORE, “Cracking the Color Line,” 1-4.
\(^{201}\) Tracy 87-88.

Sagan 78
were often held in large public space, such as squares or parks. This allowed large numbers of people to congregate, which had the effect of drawing attention to the aims of the protests. The use of public spaces also allows for easy transit both to and exit from the site, as large public spaces have multiple avenues of approach, and are generally centrally located in cities, with many streets connecting. Further, parks and public squares have a symbolic value of representing popular use. To occupy these spaces is symbolically represent the will of the general public. Rallies are generally static affairs. Should the rally be organized into a march, it becomes a dynamic event, moving through the city to other symbolically or strategically important destinations, where a further rally or picket might be held.202

A further spatial protest tactic was the picket, or picket line. Long used by protesters and strikers, a picket line is a line of protesters who march back and forth or in a circle around an entry to a symbolically significant facility, such as factory gates, corporate offices, or police headquarters. The strategy is that of general denial. Those who wish to enter the facility must be seen publicly crossing the picket line, which is tantamount to disagreeing with the aims of the protest. Such transgressors then become subject to scorn, ridicule, and potential physical intimidation. The picket achieves protester goals by using this disruption and denial to decrease the number of people who are able to use symbolically important facilities, increase local public awareness of the grievances of the protesters, mobilize local support for the protest, and possibly attract media attention to the protest. The tactic had been used as a means of peaceful protest since at least the late 19th century labor struggles, and had become the standard mode of protest in the United States.203 Pickets were an effective way to use a relatively small number of protesters strategically to achieve larger aims.

Protesters in Chicago used another spatial tactic called the “washoi.” The washoi was a spatial formation of people developed by Japanese student protesters during their protests early in 1968, consisting of a line formation of people linking arms at the elbow.204 By coordinating, the formation could move forward, backward, or to the side, moving a large number of people quickly and safely. The formation was designed to move people out of danger on the street in an orderly fashion, and could also be used to resist police pushes. This maneuver was also called “snake dancing,” based on the visual similarity between the tactic in action and the motion of a snake. The name originated as a rallying cry or chant in Japanese folk festivals, particularly the Hadaka Masturi festival, which involves large groups of men running or marching together in unison and in close proximity, sometimes carrying wooden shrines. There is no direct translation in English, but idiomatically it means “heave ho,” with a significant element of unification and togetherness.205 Perhaps an appropriate English equivalent would be “Hey-Ho-Let's-Go!” While the washoi was planned and practiced prior to the protest, there is no evidence for it being used regularly or at large scale. Protest marshals simply felt that protesters had not the time to master the technique, and perhaps did not have the sense of unity that was seen as necessary for

202 These tactics are detailed in A Manual for Direct Action, 73-75. The manual dates from 1965, and was almost certainly used by protest organizers in Chicago. The manual as a whole only lists the two spatial tactics of the rally and the picket.

203 Lofland 263-269. Lofland categorizes spatial modes of protest slightly differently, based on Sharp. They are: harassment, system overloading, blockage, and occupation. The 'system overload' classification characterizes the innovation in mass protest of this period.

204 Walker Report 130-132.

205 Nihon Kokugo Daijiten.
successful mobilization of the washoi. Some other tactics for defending against the police included something similar to the washoi: linking arms, standing with feet as spread shoulder-width, and throwing their own bodies against the arms of the police in order to free arrested demonstrators.\(^{206}\)

The tactics of spatial occupation and disruption were at the core of the Students for a Democratic Society's (SDS) protests. The SDS combined non-violence with generally socialist economics and political anarchism in equal measure in order to combat creeping authoritarianism and bureaucratization. This was augmented by the media-savvy antics of the Yippies.

Part of the promotion of the protest events was the planning of a 'Festival of Life'. The Yippies developed and implemented a media campaign to attract people to Chicago during the convention to attend a series of concerts modeled after the Monterey Pop Festival, which drew more than one hundred thousand audience members. Protest organizers hoped that the sheer mass of people attending the concert would serve as counterpoint to the warmongering and conservatism of the convention, and the critical mass of youth would disrupt the city and disrupt the convention, and by extension expose to the world (through the media) the moral corruption of the American system and its continued escalation of the Vietnam War and repression of minorities. The Chicago 'Festival of Life' was promoted as the next big event, in the vein of the Monterey Pop Festival and the Washington DC antiwar protest of 1967, and was hyped well in advance through relentless promotion.\(^{207}\) Protest leaders planned for the Chicago event to be a visible and high profile demonstration of youth culture, a carnival of alternative life choices and opportunity to spread creative solutions to living and challenging existing social structures. Theatricality was a core element in promotion and dissemination of alternative visions of living. Yippie leaders and promoters encouraged mass participation in protests against the Democratic Convention, and suggested people to "...bring pot, fake delegate's cards, smoke bombs, costumes, crud to throw and all kinds of interesting props, also football helmets."\(^{208}\) Yippies planned all sorts of creative chaos in small groups to disrupt the 1968 Democratic Convention proceedings.

The Yippies and SDS, along with the Mobe, coordinated, organized, and planned much more massive protests for the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August 1968. There had been a series of protest events coordinated by each of these groups in the preceding few years, in particular a protest of more than 100,000 participants in Washington in October 1967. Some other notable mass protests of the preceding few years had been the Women Strike for Peace in 1961 with 50,000 participants across the United States, and a massive protest march in Washington DC in 1963 organized by the Civil Rights movement which had between 200,000 and 300,000 participants. The smaller numbers of protesters at the Chicago event-site meant that protest organizers felt their protests had to be bigger and more disruptive to make up for the difference in sheer numbers.

A major factor in the effects of these protests was that protests at these large scales were new kinds of events. They differed in character from the smaller sit-ins and occupations that characterized the earlier protest movements' tactics. While protest activity at both scales used generally the same spatial logic, that of occupation, subversion of spatial rules, and non-violence,
the scale of the protests meant that whole districts of cities could serve as stages for the activity, not just lunch counters or city offices. Entire public spaces, such as the Great Mall in Washington DC, could be filled with protesters. Parks and symbolic landmarks could be occupied for their symbolic value, with the scale of the public impact commensurate with the scale of the protest group.

This gigantic scaling up of protest activities was an innovation in protest organizing. These protests produced crowds of unprecedented size. This meant that prior modes of protest policing were no longer as effective, putting law enforcement agencies on the defensive. Their administrative procedures and spatial tactics could not be adjusted fast enough to counter spatial use innovations by protesters at scale. That these large scale events did not end in violent repression by the police is surprising. Probably this is a result of several factors, namely the size and scale of the groups, generally far outnumbering the police; the express goal of non-violence of these protest groups, coupled with actual non-violent protesting; and the high visibility of large protest groups to national news media.

5.2.2: Protest Policing

Protest policing at this time was generally rudimentary. According to Noakes and Gillham, the dominant model of protest policing could be called the 'escalated force' model.\(^{209}\) In this model, police met protests with shows of force and intimidation, and if these failed to disperse crowds, then they would be followed up with actual violence. Constitutional rights were denied to all protesters, police had low tolerance for community disruption, little to no communication with protest organizers, frequent arrests and high use of force.\(^{210}\) For each protest tactic, police had a counter tactic. Picket lines were generally broken through direct removal and arrest in small groups, marches were met with skirmish lines, either alongside if the protest was sanctioned, or blocking the march if the protest were deemed illegal or threatening. The only spatial response police had to very large scale protests was a combination of critical area denial and riot control mobilization.

This paucity in the range of response was a reflection of the administrative logic of protest policing at the time, which was rooted in classical and simplistic theories of crowd behavior. The dominant theoretical model of behavior among police through the early 20th century was not rooted in sociological understandings of mass behavior, nor was based on empirical evidence, but was rather based on classical theories of crowds acting as emotional and mindless mobs. Classical theories of crowd management, reviewed and summarized in Chapter 4, state that crowds have a will all their own, and that people lose their inhibitions in large groups and act in irrational and emotional ways. The reader will recall that this line of thinking can be traced back to Gustav Le Bon's theories of crowds. Police in general were not educated in sociology at this time, and were generally not equipped as organizations to understand the


\(^{210}\) This is despite repeated attempts on the part of the protest organizers to obtain permits or to work with police prior the protest in order to minimize violence and chaos. In the case of Chicago 1968, the police flatly refused all negotiation and permits, and in fact threatened the protesters repeatedly prior to their arrival.
reasons behind or accurately predict crowd behavior.

Le Bon's theories of crowds did not come from a position of sociological analysis, but rather as a symbol for the psychology of mass politics. Le Bon was writing in a period of popular revolution in Europe, and so crowds were viewed as irrational vehicles for the imposition of a kind of brute will. Crowds were the violent vehicles through which irrational mass politics were expressed and implemented.\textsuperscript{211} Crowds were masses that were by definition irrational and potentially violent.

This sense of a blurry line of distinction between madding crowd and orderly protest carried through crowd policing throughout the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century. As discussed by McPhail, early criminology approached crowds as always potentially dangerous. In the view of police, there was no difference in how crowds were treated based on the intent of the crowd...protests and riots were dealt with in generally the same way. Any mass gathering regardless of intent was a potential riot, and police had to be ready to respond. In general, police were representatives and defenders of the existing power structure. As such, they acted as enforcers of public social order as much as public behavioral order.

Policing training of the time emphasized formations and tactics that would not have been out of place on ancient Greek battlegrounds. Police held the monopoly on legitimate violence, as they were state-sanctioned enforcers of public peace. This Weberian model of legitimacy meant that the military held the sole legitimate violence by the United States outside its borders, and the police were the only legitimate violent organization within the United States.\textsuperscript{212} This meant that the tactics of policing public order were often tactics of overt or barely-concealed violence. The role of the police as enforcers of social order, coupled with a perception that crowds were always potentially riots, and that the police could legitimately inflict violence on such crowds, meant there was no incentive to develop more subtle tactics for street-level enforcement of protests. While official recognitions of the different intentions behind protests and assemblies existed, the spatial tactics and tactics of enforcement were exactly the same.

Cohesive unit discipline, in combination with extensive training, under the direction of clear lines of command and control, are all critical factors in the success of any of these formations or maneuvers. Once unit cohesion is lost, if officers begin to act on their own, lose control over their emotions, or if units can no longer receive communications and orders, then these formations lose their effectiveness and chaos ensues. This is precisely the situation that occurred in Chicago in 1968, causing the police riot.

Spatial-based protest policing regardless of period relies on attempts to control the crowds' activity.\textsuperscript{213} In 1968, this was attempted through spatial logics of dispersal, removal, and denial. Each of these tactics represents the then-current logic of administering to large crowds, and reflects police expectations of crowd behavior. As the prevailing conception of crowds was of emotional and irrational mobs, both high-level strategies of protest policing and street-level tactics of crowd control relied on aggressive response, inflexible demands of submission to police authority, and military-style tactics of spatial control.

Dispersal is the tactic of reducing the size of crowds through encouraging participants to

\textsuperscript{211} Holton, “The Crowd In History.”
\textsuperscript{212} Max Weber on state holding monopoly on legitimate violence.
\textsuperscript{213} At the time, all attempts by police to control the actions of large group were called 'riot control' by policing organizations, denoting the logic involved. The current term for the sets of practices is 'crowd management', which speaks to the shift in governmentality regarding protest (Beene 24).
leave the mass assembly. This would ideally have the effect of reducing the number of people in
the crowd, which, according to the prevailing logic of understanding crowds, would reduce the
irrationality of the overall group, and result in more orderly behavior all around. General tactics
of dispersal could be accomplished through intimidation, such as advancing lines of police
beating riot shields in unison, demanding via loudspeaker or bullhorn that protesters disperse,
advancing lines of national guardsmen with bayonets fixed on rifles, or advancing lines of
mounted or vehicular cavalry. One such vehicular cavalry unit from the Chicago DNC protest
policing was an armored car or jeep fronted with a large network of barbed wire on a frame
mounted to the front of the vehicle. This would naturally cause serious injury if the crowd did
not disperse from in front of it. The straight roads of downtown Chicago aided in dispersal of the
large protest marches, as police attempted to divide the march at intersections, particularly with
the aid of cavalry charges. In general, dispersal was achieved through using intimidation, force,
and the threat of force to subdue protesters.

Removal is similar to dispersal in that the process involves reducing the size of the
protest crowd. However, this differs in that in dispersal, the police do not have a set place to
which they want the crowd to disperse. Protests must simply be away from that particular spot.
In the tactic of removal, police specifically and deliberately remove members of the protest
group to a specific place. The could partially be achieved through individual or mass arrests, but
slowly, and possibly at the cost of further inciting the crowd. Breaking the large group into
smaller groups would make arrests easier and less visible. High value individuals marked for
arrest, such as protest leaders or inciters, could be targeted by police skirmish lines and removed
individually by snatch squads. A snatch squad was a special detachment of police that would
wedge into crowds specifically to access these high value targets. Removal was also used to clear

National Guard jeeps covered with barbed wire frame proceed south down Michigan Avenue toward protesters.
Image source=Getty Images, LIFE magazine.
whole areas, such as sections of Lincoln Park or Grant Park which protesters had occupied.

Denial was the tactic of refusing protesters entry or access to specific areas. This was used particularly to block streets, intersections, bridges, or other means of travel. This denial of access and communication was used to prevent protest groups from moving freely through Chicago, and preventing them from accessing vital points or from assembling into larger groups. Roadblocks were used widely in this tactic, utilizing movable barriers such as metal or wooden traffic barricades, police vehicles blocking roads, chain link fences in large rolls on temporary bases, and skirmish lines of armed and armored police. Denial is analogous to protective fortification, making spatial targets harder to access or occupy.

Denial was first and primarily used by the regulatory organizations of the city of Chicago. All protests and demonstration activity was forbidden by order of the Chicago Mayor's Office. All permits for large scale public assembly were denied in advance. The city refused to meet with or coordinate with protest organizations whatsoever. This provided a base line to deny access to the city to any who planned disruption, and the legal basis for prosecuting any such protesters.

These spatial control tactics were implemented through the technology and techniques of street-level policing. Typical riot control techniques of the period involved the use of force multipliers, or techniques and technologies designed to increase the amount of force would could be brought to bear to force compliance. Force in this case is the ability to affect the behavior of other people. Some force multipliers were protective equipment issued to the rank and file police officer, such as armored helmets, riot shields, heavy padding, torso armor, gloves, shin armor, and other blunt trauma personal protective equipment, as well as gas masks. Weaponry and implements provided to rank and file officers included batons, nightsticks, and handcuffs. Special units were equipped with tear gas grenades and grenade launchers, wooden bullet launchers, as well as water cannons. Cavalry units were either mounted on horses or motorcycles. Special mobile units of military jeeps were also utilized, often with frames covered in barbed wire mounted to the front. These vehicles could be deployed quickly and parked side-by-side to create barriers.

The means by which these tactics were implemented was through formations, by police marching and moving in coordinated lines and blocks, maneuvering through the urban space and mobilizing formations where necessary to suppress the protests. The formations are exactly the same as military formations, such as the skirmish line, echelon, and flying wedge. As mentioned above, these formations are ancient methods of multiplying military force in groups, and have been used in warfare since the ancient Greeks and their contemporaries. The formations are all based around a column of files, also called ranks, in essence a line of police that can be moved into various positions. These basic configurations can be mobilized quickly and change formation according to immediate need and street conditions.

A skirmish line is a long row of police standing shoulder to shoulder, sometimes augmented by another skirmish line behind them, backed up further by cavalry and command and control units to the rear, possibly with flanking skirmish lines or echelons as well. The skirmish line has the advantage of being able to block streets readily, and police discipline means that formations can be kept when advancing or retreating. The echelon is a type of skirmish line oriented at a diagonal to the street grid or to the protester group, and differs in that police enter
an echelon at an angle from their file.

Another form in use by Chicago police in 1968 was the flying wedge. A flying wedge is an police squad in an inverted V-shaped formation. Generally armed with shields and batons, the flying wedge is used to charge an opposition line, with the purpose of breaking the line and dividing and flanking the opposing force. This is sometimes followed up with a 'snatch squad', with another squad of police following the wake of the flying wedge, in order to remove a particular person from the opposing line under cover of the flying wedge. This formation has been used since classical Greek warfare. It has a reputation for high amounts of personal injury association with it due to the force and momentum of the participants, as well as their increased exposure to resistance. For this reason the formation has been banned for use in American football due to a high rate of injury on both sides of the formation.

These techniques had been institutionalized in protest policing at this point in history. The high amount of injury they inflicted was a core value, as these techniques had been in practice against the various participants in the civil rights movement, especially against minority populations. The high degree of force threatened by these formations serve as a means to intimidate and control crowds.

In the case of Chicago in 1968, several factors combined to escalate the police response to the protests to the level of a violent police riot. The high degree of xenophobia on the part of the police, with deep distrust of 'outside agitators', the racism of the police force (the police viewed protesters in general as being sympathetic to civil rights), and perceptions of class struggle (the generally working-class Chicago police perceived the protesters to be privileged and effete snobs) resulted in a type of siege mentality among the police. The city and convention organizers had planned since January to defend the city against all threats to the convention proceedings. Numerous potential threats were conveyed to the police intelligence through confidential sources, such as planned invasions by black nationalists, hippie spiking of the city water supply with psychedelic drugs, revolutionaries planning to start a revolution at the same time, raids on police armories, guerrilla warfare, adding ground glass to food in downtown restaurants, and even planned assassinations of the presidential candidates230. The police were anticipating huge numbers of protesters engaging in a huge variety of threatening activities, and had been commanded by the Chicago political establishment to offer no leeway to the protesters.

This combination resulted in rampant violence and repression of the demonstrators over the few days of the convention, much of which was amply covered by both print and visual media. Labeled a “police riot” by the Walker Report, the police reacted to the protesters with exceptional aggression, leading to hundreds of injuries among the police and thousands among the protesters. Despite the widespread violence, no one was killed during the actual convention.214

The brutality of the police actions against the DNC protesters was called “gratuitous, malicious, ferocious and mindless” in the Walker Report. Further:

...testimony of horrendous police action, the clubbing of innocent and injured citizens namely because they were dirty or long-haired or affluent or educated or for no reason

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214 Notably, just prior to the convention, Chicago police shot 17-year old Native American Jerome Johnson after he ran from police and shot a .32 pistol at them while near the Hilton Hotel. Police claimed he was a protester, but protest groups denied his affiliation (Walker Report 133). Other sources list his name as Dean Johnson (Gitlin, Kusch). There was no independent eyewitness corroboration of Johnson shooting at the police.
at all, the gassing of orderly and unprotected knots of onlookers, and the abuse, verbal and physical, of the pettiest of violators and even of stray passersby and people minding their own business in their homes and neighborhoods. (vii)

To understand how the mode of protest and the tactics of protest policing worked in relation to each other, and how both used urban space tactically, I will delineate the sequence of actions by both sides at the event-site, and discuss the role that space played in actions by both sides, as well as by bystanders and DNC attendees.215

In the lead-up to the DNC, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley was very vocal about his hatred of protesters. This sentiment was echoed by police and media, who released press articles enumerating the various potential (and unfounded) threats implied by the protesters. These anticipated threats included hallucinogenic gas spread by malicious protesters, poison or drugs in the city water supply, kidnapping, looting, burning, and coordination between protesters and local gangs. Jack Mabley's article in *Chicago's American* listed the following possible acts of disruption and sabotage: cutting power, damaging natural gas lines, poisoning food, even shelling the convention center with mortars (175). How exactly the protesters were to come by military grade artillery was left to the imagination of the police and the citizenry. These anticipated calamities were planned for by denying parade or assembly permits to protest groups, preparation of barricades and roadblocks, and mobilizing the National Guard in advance of the convention. Chicago was bracing for an invasion. In all, more than 25,000 police and National Guard troops faced around ten thousand protesters.

The protest organizing coalition made repeated permit requests for parks in Chicago for a 'Festival of Life' to be held at the same time as the Convention. Abbie Hoffman made attempts to negotiate for joint operations with the south-side 'Blackstone Rangers', and African-American street gang, but the gang made it clear that they would have no part of the "honky revolution."216 Hoffman produced and widely distributed a map of a proposed “Yippie City” within Lincoln Park. The official Chicago stance was of total non-cooperation.

In 1960, Chicago Police superintendent O.W. Wilson began modernizing and clearing the corruption from the Chicago police force. He had invested in new equipment and specialized training, modernizing and updating the police force in order to combat the popular perception that society was lenient on criminals. He also pushed for racial integration: by 1968, 25% of police force was black. Recent Supreme Court decisions *Miranda vs. Arizona* in 1966, which ensured the rights to silence and to legal counsel, and *Escabeda vs. Illinois* in 1964, which gave the right to have an attorney present during questioning, aided the perception that criminals were being protected. Societal tolerance of criminality and increased public complaints against perceived police brutality created in police a heightened perception of feeling constrained in regards to aggressive prosecution of criminals. In 1967, 1 of 8 police officers across the United States had been assaulted.

In preparation for the protests, National Guard summer training camp prepared troops by staging mock demonstrations. The Mayor moved to limit television media access to the city by restricting mobile camera crews to the hotels and convention itself. The International Amphitheater, site of the convention itself, located west of downtown adjacent the Chicago

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215 Much of the following section is based on the excellent account of the event-site in Farber, *Chicago '68*, with significant detailed information from the Walker Report, Gitlin, *The Sixties*, Kusch, *Battleground Chicago*, and Schultz, *No One Was Killed.*

216 Farber 52.
Stockyards, was protected by a barbed wire fence some 2136 feet long, roadblocks, restricted airspace and even sealed manhole covers.\textsuperscript{217} Other major convention events were to be held at the downtown Hilton hotel, located on Michigan Avenue, facing Grant Park.

Protesters and protest organizers began arriving in Chicago as early as Sunday August 18\textsuperscript{th}. Protest organizers designated marshals, who would coach and organize smaller groups of protesters throughout the convention week, and serve as points of information for whatever sorts of protest activities would be happening, as well as locations and times. Protest organizers chose Lincoln Park as their base of operations and symbolic 'territory'. Protest organizers planned to use both Lincoln and Grant Parks as staging areas for protests, as well as rest and resupply areas. Lincoln Park is located just to the north and east of downtown Chicago, while Grant Park is between downtown Chicago and Lake Michigan. Protest organizers submitted requests to the Chicago Parks Commission weeks in advance of the events requesting that the parks be made available for sleeping. Thousands of anticipated protesters could not stay in hotels or private homes, so the parks would serve as temporary encampments during the convention. All permits were denied. Protest organizers also worked in local offices, store fronts, and church basements, coordinating 'movement centers' to plan and coordinate the upcoming protests, as well as recruiting and training medics, arranging legal defenses, and plan march routes. Significantly, protest organizers did not specifically plan which streets the protest marchers would take due to anticipated police interdiction and area denial. The protest march strategy was deliberately one of unpredictability and chaos.\textsuperscript{218}

Due to the promotional work by the three protests organizing groups (the Mobe, SDS, and the Yippies, although there were dozens of other unaffiliated or loosely affiliated protest groups), protest organizers expected between thirty and one hundred thousand protesters, although the Yippies widely spread their much more dramatic expectation of more than a hundred thousand protesters. No doubt these public declarations added to the police perception of an impending invasion, and contributed to the severity of the police response.

On Saturday August 24\textsuperscript{th}, prior to the convention, the Festival of Life went ahead in Lincoln Park as arranged, with little police intervention but heavy police presence and surveillance. Twenty-five other protest centers were organized around the city with smaller events. Participants and protesters clustered around a tree-covered knoll in the center of Lincoln Park. Various areas of the park were designated for assembly, information, or medical support. Police moved in small groups through the park without incident. There was a curfew of 11 PM in place for park use. In order to allow festival goers to leave the park without being accosted by the police, one escape tactic was to organize into small groups of four or five and leave the park to create distractions and disturbances elsewhere (trash fires, stopping traffic, and the like) in order to loosen the police line and allow more people to leave the park. Police Commander Robert Lynsky attempted to enforce the curfew by moving officers into the park to issue warnings and make arrests if necessary. One rank of twenty motorcycle police was followed by two twenty-man police skirmish lines, which pushed people north out of the park into the streets. The mass of people evicted from the park formed an unintentional roadblock, preventing more police reinforcements from arriving from the north. Overall the park was cleared in small groups and few arrests were made.

\textsuperscript{217} Farber 159.
\textsuperscript{218} Walker Report 80.
On the morning of Sunday August 25th Lincoln Park was empty of protesters. Groups of protesters gathered again throughout midday, and around 1:30 there was a protest rallying cry over a bullhorn, encouraging pickets of the downtown hotels where delegates were staying. Protesters marched south on Clark Street towards downtown, with 800 protesters eventually reaching the Hilton, where most delegates were staying. The protesters were relatively peaceful and no arrests were made. The second day of the Festival of Life in Lincoln Park drew five thousand participants. Of those, two thousand left the park before curfew, and were clubbed and attacked by police. The police attacks at this point were marked by heavy use of skirmish lines, particularly around the park bathrooms, and in attempts to clear the park after curfew, augmented by tear gas. Yippie organizer Jerry Rubin expressed elation at the conflict, hoping for a declaration of martial law.219

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219 Blobaum, n.p.

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On Monday August 26th, one thousand protesters marched toward police headquarters, before turning north to Grant Park, where they were again dispersed and attacked by police. The Convention itself officially opened, with Mayor Daley stating in his opening speech that “As long as I am mayor of this city, there’s going to be law and order in Chicago.” Protesters attempted to 'take the hill' featuring the statue of Civil War General John Logan, in which around one thousand protesters very briefly occupied a small knoll near the Hilton in Grant Park. The police reacted 'very strongly' to the occupation and cleared the knoll within ten minutes. Another one thousand people attempted to remain in Lincoln Park after curfew, behind hastily constructed barricades. Police entered park in skirmish lines, and advanced using tear gas. This resulted in a disorderly rout of the protesters, with police pursuing. Small-group street violence followed, and the police attacked protesters and ordinary citizens indiscriminately, with some local resident pulled off of their porches and beaten by police. Many reporters were attacked despite displaying credentials and announcing their status. Many police officers removed their badges and nametags, preventing identification.

220 Farber 132.
Tuesday, August 27th saw another thousand-protester march from the north side near Lincoln Park west to 39th and Halsted, less than a half-mile from the convention center. This was the closest any protest got to the actual convention. The protesters set up a picket line that lasted for twenty hours. Bobby Seale, Black Panther Party Chairman, spoke in Lincoln Park, urging people to defend themselves from the police by any means necessary. Two thousand protesters marched from the Chicago Coliseum to Grant Park. Again, two thousand protesters remained in Lincoln Park past curfew, where they were again beaten and tear gassed. Four thousand people attended a rally in Grant Park, which was just across Michigan Avenue from the Hilton. The police allowed protesters to stay in the park all night.

Wednesday August 28th featured the largest amount of police and protester clash of the convention. Fifteen thousand protesters gathered at Grant Park for antiwar rally. At least six hundred police formed skirmish lines on all sides of the rally, with additional National Guard troops stationed nearby. Part of the politics of the Convention itself were the struggle between the 'peace plank', a selection of anti-war candidates and policies, generally led by Eugene McCarthy, and the more hawkish faction led by Hubert Humphrey. After the 'peace plank' is voted down at the DNC, a protester attempted to lower the American flag in Grant Park; he was beaten and arrested by police. A group containing at least one undercover police officer completed the flag lowering, and replaced the flag with either a bloody or a red shirt. At this
provocation, the police attacked again. A line of protest marshals stood between police and protesters in an attempt to deflect the police attack, but the line of marshals crumpled under a savage police assault.

After the rally, six thousand protesters moved in small groups to participate in a march to the Amphitheater, which police deemed un-permitted and illegal. The march was denied access to the sidewalks by the police, and could not march on the streets, and as such was prevented from moving. After an hour of negotiating between protest marshals and the police, the march began to break up into small groups. The Balbo and Congress bridges had been sealed, but protesters discovered that the Jackson street bridge was unguarded, and surged onto Michigan Avenue. Significantly, police skirmish lines did not have enough manpower to entirely blockade streets, so protesters simply used sidewalks to go around the lines. This occasionally resulted in police breaking ranks to pursue and beat protesters. Deputy Police Superintendent James Rochford ordered the police to clear the streets, resulting in running street battles. Many protesters and bystanders were beaten, sprayed with mace, and arrested. The fight lasted about 17 minutes and was filmed by TV crews at the Hilton. Senator Abraham Ribicoff, in his speech nominating George McGovern, denounced the “Gestapo tactics on the streets of Chicago.” Mayor Daley's shouted reaction to this was on camera but not on microphone. Lip-readers later recorded an expletive-filled rage. Five thousand protesters were allowed to stay in Grant Park overnight.

The next day, Thursday August 29th, in an attempt to quell the disturbance, Senator Eugene McCarthy addressed the crowd of five thousand gathered in Grant Park. Several attempts were made to march to the Amphitheater, some led by Convention delegates, but all were turned back by tear gas.

Friday August 30th saw a further escalation of police violence when police raided McCarthy campaign offices in the Hilton on accounts of items had been thrown from windows. Several campaign workers were beaten. The arrest count for the week was 668, with hospitals treating 111 protesters, and many more injuries undocumented and untreated. The protest group the Medical Committee for Human Rights estimated that their medics treated over 1,000 demonstrators over the course of the protests. Police reported 192 officers injured, with 49 officers treated at hospitals, suffering injuries ranging from abrasions to a supra-orbital fracture.

Chicago official responses to the violence blamed protesters and all manner of unproven threats to justify police action. Mayor Daley and other Chicago representatives spoke repeatedly in media about how the chaos in Chicago was police merely responding to conditions. However, with the abundance of press coverage of the violence, the development of the Walker Report, and the public perception that the Democratic Party could not keep order at its own convention, public opinion was at best divided on the legitimacy of Chicago's police and political system. In defense of the police, in a press conference on September 9th, Mayor Daley makes a now-famous slip of the tongue: “The policeman isn’t there to create disorder, the policeman is there to preserve disorder.” Protest organizers were investigated by the House Un-American Activities Committee, and the 'Chicago Seven' protest organizers were arraigned and eventually sentenced for crossing state lines to incite a riot. The federal anti-riot statute—18 USC §2101—makes it a felony to engage in interstate travel to “organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot.” The Democrats lost the presidential election, and Republican Richard Nixon took the

221 Bresler 75.

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presidency.

In their own defense, protesters and protest organizers took the violence inflicted upon them as further evidence of a political establishment run amok, dedicated to brutalizing any dissent. Protest organizer Tom Hayden characterized protester organization as “We are forced into a military style not because we are 'destructive' or 'nihilistic' but because our normal rights are insecure and we must be able to survive...”222 The Yippie leadership had an explicit understanding and use of advertising principles. They used the tactics of branding, emotionality and promotion to communicate their messages.223 This was accomplished by exploiting forms of cultural production familiar to youth, creating consciousness through cultural production. Further, they exploited popular media and television, which they realized thrived on the sensational for sales. As such, their proclamations and media statements were deliberately designed as hyperbole to attract media attention and widespread dissemination, thus further increasing the Yippies' notoriety, as well as that of youth culture in general. Before, these tools had been used primarily by the 'Establishment' in order to promote a passive consumer culture.

This strategy can be seen in how the Yippies directed spatial occupation and organization during the convention protests. Yippie leaders said explicitly that Lincoln Park was their 'territory'. For example, the Monday attempt to 'take the hill' featuring the statue of Civil War General John Logan was an exercise in claiming space that was high-profile and symbolically powerful. Further, the lowering of the American flag after the voting down of the peace plank, and the raising of the aforementioned red flag (or bloody shirt) in its stead worked in a similar symbolic fashion, and incited the police to violent retribution.

5.3: Nature of the Crisis: Crisis of Liberal State

In discussing the role that spatial control played in protest and protest policing in Chicago in 1968, we have to understand the type of overall crisis that the state was going through that spurred the dissatisfaction behind the protests themselves. Mass protest is one way of working out state crises, bringing contradictions and constraints within the system into greater focus and transforming perception and policy in its wake. Modes of state administration both frame and legitimize their own administrative processes, particularly the processes of law enforcement. The particular mode of state administration produces acceptable practices of law enforcement. Law enforcement itself is an expression of governmentality, both administering to a population (through acts of protest policing) as well as modeling proper citizens (repressing youths and youth culture through enforcing normative social relations).

The dominant model of the state at the time was liberalism. Loosely defined, liberalism holds personal freedom as one of the highest goals of society. Part of the crisis of the state was that personal freedom could only be expressed through narrowly defined consumer-capitalist cultural norms (what youths called 'straight' culture), and was directly contradicted by the compulsory draft. In Alan Hunt's 'Governing the City: Liberalism and Early Modern Modes of Governance,' liberalism is defined

222 Ramparts Wall Poster, from Farber 175.
223 Farber 189.
as form of governmentality, that is, the mentalities and rationalities associated with the practices of governing. A liberal state ideally governs less, as liberalism is predicated on separation between the state and the public sphere. Policing is a component of an administrative state, but also serves to defend cultural norms through both enforcement of formal and informal rules. In a liberal-democratic-administrative state, one could expect minimal state oversight of personal freedoms, and impartial administrative processes to ensure said freedoms. Part of the crisis of legitimacy and authority that the United States had between 1968 and Watergate was that the state was actively repressing freedoms at home and abroad.

Protesters' resistance to the continuation of governmentality-as-usual represented an overall dissatisfaction with technocratic bureaucracy and the reliance on war as diplomacy. The Vietnam war had escalated throughout the 1960s, and the compulsory draft meant that the State could abrogate a young man's life and conscript him into the military, transforming him into a soldier regardless of his feelings on the matter. The protests in Chicago were a moment in much larger struggle of the 1960s, within the US and worldwide. 1968 was a watershed year in particular. The protests in Chicago and across the United States had common cause with Mexican student protests, Japanese student movements, French student and labor coalition protests, and popular resistance to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Each of these movements were youth-based protests against the advancing technocracy and authoritarianism.

The Yippies believed that the 20th century focus on expertise, specialization and certification had come at the expense of mass sovereignty; created a caste of experts who dictated policy and daily life. To combat this, they would use cultural production to stimulate a dormant revolutionary consciousness exposed by the contradictions in the capitalist system. The same tools used to deceive could be used for liberation. Yippies believes that the elite in the United States was essentially undemocratic, and held onto its power through the use of both a rational, scientific discourse, and by the machinery of mass culture. This stance was partly influenced by Marshall McLuhan, but their epistemology was based primarily in their own experiences. Encapsulating this ideas, Jerry Rubin said “Which do you trust, Richard Milhous Nixon or your own sense organs?”

The protesters were united in their explicit opposition to the 'military machine'. Todd Gitlin, ex-president of the SDS, said that some protest organizers left Chicago with a 'fetishism of the streets,' desiring to unleash the anger of the disenfranchised urban lower class. Protest leader Tom Hayden held that the response to the protest proved the illegitimacy of the political system, in that its best and only response to dissent was violence. Hayden and other protest leaders viewed the new scale of protests as a useful method to block up city and political systems, forcing them into a crisis, ideally leading to a collapse.

The New Left leadership believed that massive demonstration was the only way to restore the government to the people. A core Yippie idea was a conception of the street as the stage,

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224 Hunt 167.
225 There were several modes of resistance to the draft other than protest. One was to leave the country, and many young men emigrated to places like Canada. Another was to proclaim that one was a “conscientious objector.” As noted above, this generally resulted in jail time instead of military service. The draft has since been abolished and replaced with voluntary enlistment.
226 Farber 212.
227 Farber 216.
228 Farber 221.
using visibility was a way to promote the idea of alternate ways of living. This was explicit in Jerry Rubin's proclamation that "Chicago is LBJs stage and we are going to steal it."229 The Chicago event was a kind of deliberate provocation on the part of Rubin, insisting that the Left needed repression from the Right and Center in order to have cohesion as a movement. The protests movement had at its core ideas of participatory democracy, open planning and community involvement, in direct contrast to the much more authoritarian society at large. These provocations lead to the March 22 'Yip-in' at Grand Central Station in New York City. Presaging the later Chicago protests, the event turned bloody, with police clubbing hundreds, arresting 57, and sending 22 to the hospital. One of the in-group critiques of the carnage at the Yip-in had to do with the space being 'all wrong.'230 Perhaps the Chicago streets would be more conducive to forcing the state system into collapse.

Police expression of the crisis in the liberal state was shown through the dual position of police as enforcers of law and enforcers of social norms. After the New York City, 'Yip-in', an unnamed NYC police officer declared: "Here's a bunch of animals who call themselves the next leaders of the country...I almost had to vomit. It's like dealing with any queer pervert, mother raper, or any of those other bedbugs we've got crawling around...as a normal human being, you feel like knocking every one of their teeth out. It's a normal reaction."231 In Chicago, the Mayor and newspapers articles in favor of the Mayor's and police's policies equated the protesters with 'terrorists.'232 Politician and police positions, contrasting with protest organizer statements, display a strong sense of distinction between sides in a conflict. The role of the police to enforce both formal and informal rules produced a xenophobia within the police force and Chicago political establishment. Police had a sense that they were being invaded, and the best way to defend against an invasion was through violence.

The antagonism of the police toward the protesters could also be seen as expressing the crisis of the liberal state in that the class backgrounds between the groups differed considerably. Police possessed a significant perception of inequality between poorly-paid working class police and privileged young white demonstrators. Common in recruiting police in Chicago through 1960s was to appeal to working class Chicagoans, thus setting up conflict between hard-working local men vs. privileged middle class college students from out-of-town. The class distinction produced hate and contempt of the demonstrators by the Mayor and the police, not only for the perceived privilege of the college-going youth, but fear they would inspire the poor and repressed of the city, and the unrest would spread far beyond the Convention.

Tony Ward discusses this kind of 'othering' in his exploration of the myth-making process of collectivization and democracy.233 Part of the aims of totalitarianism and any authoritarian enterprise is the reduction of human beings to abstract subjects. This can be done through a range of administrative processes, use of state architecture or state spaces with narrowly proscribed permissible behaviors, or through taxonomies or hierarchies of people and the rights given thereto. In another sense, authoritarian governmentality creates non-persons, at the same time establishing its own legitimacy to repress them. This can be accomplished through any number

229 Farber 22. This was prior to Johnson's announcement that he would not seek the nomination.
230 Farber 36. No other details on this quote are given. It points to a sense among protesters of the interrelation of spatial form and political action, but the details of this thought are unarticulated in this instance.
231 Farber 297. Emphasis in original.
232 Farber 203.
233 Ward, 'Totalitarianism, Architecture and Conscience.'
of anonymizing schemes such as number or labeling. In the case of the New York police officer quotes above, the name-calling and normative labeling of the Yippies meant that it became 'normal' for him to want to beat them. The protesters' collective otherness was total. They were called terrorists, outside agitators, perverts, and any sort of opprobrium could not be strong enough to describe the establishment's distaste. Quoting Republican Vice-Presidential nominee (and later Vice-President under Richard Nixon) Spiro Agnew: “When I talk about trouble makers, I'm talking about muggers, and criminals in the street, assassins of political leaders, draft dodgers and flag burners, campus militants, hecklers and demonstrators against candidates for public office, and looters and burners of cities.” The protesters represented the crisis of the liberal state, and they happened to be representing the wrong side of it.

5.4: Spatio-temporal Context

The particulars of the Chicago city form at the time of the protests are significant to how the protest and policing events actually unfolded. Chicago has a number of physical features of its downtown urban space in common with the other three cities that I will examine in the following case studies. First I will list these features, then describe the particulars of each, along with a brief discussion of the effects of these forms on the protest and protest policing of the 1968 Democratic National Convention. The relevant physical features are:

- flat and level ground
- the streets are in a grid pattern
- downtown Chicago streets are relatively broad
- downtown Chicago has a border of water at the lakefront and another at the Chicago river. The river has several bridges that act as conduits and choke points
- parks and squares: Chicago has two major parks that were used for the protests: Grant Park and Lincoln Park
- density: the downtown area is densely built with tall buildings

Chicago is built on flat and level ground typical of cities in the American Midwest. The city was founded on marshy ground at the connection of the Chicago River to Lake Michigan as Fort Dearborn. The level ground allowed the city to readily expand in each direction away from the lake over its history. This level ground has no more than a fifty-foot variation in topography from Lake Michigan to more than fifteen miles inland. This flatness creates no natural topographical barriers to either sight or motion in any direction. Development of the city over time leveled any smaller topographical protrusions long prior to the 1968 Convention. The parks each had a number of smaller hillocks or knolls that attracted attention as protesters attempted to occupy them as gestures of symbolic domination. These attempts were quickly rebuffed and protesters were dispersed by police on each occasion. The slightly higher vantage points offered by the small hills in the park allowed for slightly greater visibility and line of sight to the protesters. Perhaps because of these reasons the police saw the occupation of these higher places

234 Ward 41.
235 United States Geological Service topographical map.

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as unacceptable. Another possibility is that the higher ground simply represented domination of space in kind of crude king-of-the-hill sense in which police could not resist knocking protesters down.

The streets of Chicago’s downtown are arranged in a grid pattern, with broad thoroughfares laid out in the 19th century and expanded in the early 20th century. Many of Chicago’s downtown streets were widened in 1911. The Michigan Avenue Bridge is 91.7 feet in width, and Michigan Avenue itself is 130 feet across.236 Under normal circumstances, this makes foot transit across the downtown area relatively easy. Vehicular traffic across this gridiron is constrained under normal conditions as many streets are one-way and have restricted vehicular access. During times of protest, particularly during the DNC protests, many downtown streets were closed or blocked to protesters by either ranks or skirmish lines of police, police manning barricades. Due to the gridiron pattern this strategy of blockade did not always work, as protesters would simply turn at the nearest corner and proceed down a different, parallel street. Due to the model of protest policing at the time, Chicago police did not deem it necessary to block every street or deny access to the city core. Further, under the model of democratic liberalism, a city could not be shut down or heavily constrained during major political events such as the DNC, and as such there was no political will or power to exert by blockading the entire downtown area.237 The narrative of protest policing was one of invasion, but invasion by an unruly and irrational mob, ineffective due to their numbers. Had the expected one hundred thousand protests materialized, no doubt the police would have been overwhelmed as hoped by the protest organizers, and the convention and the business of downtown Chicago would have been significantly disrupted. As it was, the police went into the protest with the intention to deny marches, intimidate protesters, and demonstrate through violence their moral and physical superiority to the protesters. They did not anticipate protester agility and innovation in protest approaches, particularly the theatricality and highly visible small-group action espoused by the Yippies, and they were not prepared for the scale of protests hoped for and anticipated by the protest organizers.

As mentioned above, the breadth of the downtown Chicago streets also played a role in how the protests functioned and how the police responded to them. The streets could not all be blockaded due to the prevailing political conception of the role of the police at the time, and even if they could, the police did not have the manpower to control every street, nor did they anticipate the swarming effect of protest marches splintering off into smaller autonomous groups. In particular, as police did not have enough officers to cover the breadth of most downtown streets, protesters simply swirled around and past the loose skirmish lines and ran along sidewalks. This occasionally resulted in police breaking ranks and pursuing small groups of protesters, typically to be beaten and/or arrested, but this only exacerbated the problem of street coverage as the skirmish lines then had fewer police officers to block access. This created a cycle of advancing chaos, as more and more protesters pushed through thinner and thinner police lines, aggravating the police and escalating the violence on protesters, media reporters, and ordinary citizens alike. Report after report describes police breaking ranks and indiscriminately attacking pedestrians and anyone in their path in attempts to corral protesters, who were by and large

236 “Wide Boulevard Scheme Chosen.” Chicago Tribune, July 11, 1911. 3.
237 As I will demonstrate in coming chapters, this differs considerably from later neoliberal models of urban governance and control.
younger, nimbler, and less encumbered than the armored police who pursued them. Further, the embarrassment of being outmaneuvered on Chicago's broad streets, combined with numerous examples of police discipline breaking, no doubt caused the ferocity of the police to escalate.

Modern Map of Chicago. Lincoln park is just above the top of the map. Image=Chicago Cartographies.
The water barriers adjacent to the downtown area were also significant. The Chicago river, which runs east-west just north of downtown, was a barrier between mobilization in Lincoln Park and the rest of the protest activity in Grant Park, outside the Hilton, and marching toward the convention. The bridges themselves acted as chokepoints, constraining easy motion between the northern Lincoln Park staging ground and the rest of the convention. Several of the bridges across the river were blockaded at different times according to police orders and organization, but when those blockades were poorly implemented or failed, such as in the mêlée of August 28th, protesters easily streamed across. Further, Lake Michigan provided the eastern edge of downtown. If routed or dispersed from Grant Park, protesters could only feasibly escape into downtown. Between Grant Park and Lake Michigan lies Lake Shore Drive, which even in 1968 was a multi-lane thoroughfares with few stops. The only thing beyond was the Lake, which was of limited interest to the protesters, considering the 'action' of the convention was downtown. Thus the water features acted as barriers to the protest action.

As described, the parks and squares of Chicago served as staging and rally areas for the protests, and often served as symbolic grounds in the contest between police and protesters. The parks themselves were public property, and as such were subject to public laws. One such law was the 11 PM curfew, which was generally not enforced in the city. Police made very public prior to the convention that the curfew would be enforced, and further denied permits for all assemblies, rallies, and marches during the convention. Sleeping outside was forbidden during the time of the convention, although police did allow protesters to overnight in the parks on several occasions during the proceedings. The public status of the parks made them contested ground; police and protesters each had very different constructions of what exactly 'public' meant in the context of the protests. Protesters and police had a clash of conception of what could be possible in public space, and what would be allowed. The police held a particular social construction of 'public' that was rigid and not open to variety, interpretation, or challenge. A core value of the protesters was to increase and maximize their personal freedom, and their conception of 'public space' included expressing that freedom. The parks themselves were stages for the action of the struggle over the ideological meaning of public. This struggle anticipated the later struggle over proper terminology, which we see in later protests and protest policing in later events and later chapters, particularly in the concept of "collateral language, where the very meaning of terms is part of the contest of the protest policing. In the case of Chicago, parks were manifestly areas of contestation over spatial jurisdiction, as the protesters rallied and the police railed against 'outside agitators.'

Territoriality and territorial control are at the core of policing values and practice. According to Steve Herbert, in his exploration of the Los Angeles police force in “The Normative Ordering of Police Territoriality: Making and Marking Space with the Los Angeles Police Department”: "...power is ineffectual without the capacity to influence the movement of people and goods across space. This is certainly the case for agencies of the state such as police. ...Simply put, many police strategies to create public order involve creating boundaries

238 To be fair, Yippie protest organizers called for rampant lovemaking on the beach, along with a bona fide hippie beach party, in order to increase the consternation of the 'straights' and attract attention to the Yippies' political goals.
and restricting access.” Herbert's analysis is based on both Weberian conceptions of the state as a social agency that exerts coercive force across a specific territory, specifically from Weber's *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. Important in Weber were issues of rationalization and centralization; bureaucratic efficiency is primary. This means that police are both enforcers of the law and bureaucrats, with an interest in maintaining public order as well as their own operational efficiency. For Foucault, power comes through the exercise of discipline. This focus on variety and omnipresence of power contrasts with the centralization model of Weber. Herbert posits that police power works both as a set of formal institutions as well “as a set of processes through which informal norms may be expressed.” This is essentially based on a central concept (civic order) expressing informal norms (personal politics) through a process of violent normativity...act like we want you to, or you will be beaten. In the case of the Chicago protests, this meant that protesters were beaten specifically because they used space wrong, and therefore thought differently, thus challenging public order. This is backed up further by Herbert, who notes that officers generally act with "...discretion, that is, the capacity of officers to render justice as they wish." This can be affected by factors such as mood of officer, time of day, demeanor of the suspect. Again, in the case of Chicago, the outlandish behavior of the protesters made the police feel as though they were essentially begging to be beaten. Herbert supports this by noting that "...legal order is more a resource than a constraint, that is, officers may use the law to justify any action they may wish to take." In Chicago, personal discretion and a desire for violence overcame unit cohesion and turned the parks into battlegrounds.

5.5: Meaning and Interpretation

The DNC protests were part of larger movement toward increased personal liberty in the later 1960's and 1970's. Protest groups were generally youth-based and focused on limiting governmental and state overreach in both law and society. The Chicago protests are generally viewed as having been a victory for protesters, even though unable to attain their goals of disrupting the convention or stopping the Vietnam War, but in that the high degree of publicity attracted a greater degree of attention to the technocratic state and helped sway public opinion against the war, and increase sympathy for youth-based movements for social change. The Chicago protest event-site was the high-water mark for protest in that later events are often held to Chicago 1968 as the standard for direct action. Part of the 'success' of the protests was that they brought issues of personal liberty and attention to social justice into increasing public focus during the 1970s. This broader social and cultural shift cannot be directly tied to the Chicago protests, but the symbolic victory of the protesters did aid the general cultural and social shift over the next few years.

The situation was somewhat different for the police and the political establishment. The inability of the police to maintain discipline and control the protests, especially in the eye of the national media, led to a crisis of identity on the part of the police. The situation also represented

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239 Herbert 568.
240 Herbert 572.
241 Also Herbert 572.
242 This claim is supported by my own research, and will be described in later chapters.
a failure of enforcers to maintain their desired order and legitimacy, which would haunt enforcers for decades to come. This crisis of ability and legitimacy prompted significant self-examination of enforcement agencies and resulted in changes in protest enforcement philosophy and tactics. The crisis of the liberal state had resulted in largely ineffective protest policing tactics, which were based partly on the prevalent enforcement perception of crowds and crowd management, resulting in spatial control techniques that were primitive; the primary means of crowd control was denial and violence. The brutality of the Chicago police was a proxy for the violence inherent in the American political establishment.

Gilje compares the character of the protests and riots of the late 1960s to similar events across the 18th century across Europe. Each of the events was based on democratic rhetoric, with each side believing they were the true vanguard of the will of the people. The protesters believed that they represented an emergent social and cultural form that stood as an alternative to the existing technocratic liberal-democratic-administrative state, and the police and enforcers believed their position was “normal” and that they were defending the status quo against perverts and criminals.

Protest itself is not necessarily an act of spatial transgression, however. Rather, protest exists in a conditional position, based on the local context of enforcement, the temporal proximity to the event-site against which it is directed, and the intensity of the activity of which it is comprised. This is similar to the primacy of context in the determination of ideology...what is perceived to be appropriate is based thoroughly in local political and legal conditions. Thus the spatial dimension of protest is contingent on local constructions of proper use of space, in particular public space.

In the case of the Chicago protests, the failure of the police to maintain spatial order created a crisis in police legitimacy. This called several of their administrative logics into question: how to control protests physically and spatially, the process of addressing threats to public order, the recruiting and training of police, the maintenance of police discipline, the role of the police in the defense of social norms, and even police as legitimate representatives of social order. This failure was to haunt policing for decades to come. The specter of ‘68 was the prevailing anxiety among police that their methods were ineffective and their authority illegitimate.

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243 Gilje 181.

Sagan
6. Dallas 1984: “Morning in America”:

6.1: Introduction and Intervening Events

In this chapter I will detail the protest event-site at the Republican National Convention in Dallas in 1984. This event is significant along the timeline of protest policing development because the event-site represents an example of the negotiated management model of protest policing, with a particular approach to urban space unique to that model. The protest event-site can be seen as transitional, as the national economy was shifting from a social welfare state model to a neoliberal model, which was causing social and administrative change in its wake. I will first detail the changes since 1968 in each of the following areas: protest, policing, politics, and public space, establishing the context and background of the Dallas 1984 event-site. Then I examine a series of pertinent factors of the Dallas 1984 protests: the type of social movement and mode of protest policing, the nature of the state crisis that spurred the protests, the spatial and temporal specifics of Dallas during the protests, and end with an analysis and discussion.

Between 1968 and 1984 protest underwent a significant change. The protest movements of the 1960s and early 1970s can be characterized as promoting personal freedom, civil liberties, and rejecting the technocratic state. The protest in Chicago in 1968 resulted in a high-profile lawsuit prosecuting the organizers of the protests, collectively referred to as the “Chicago 7,” with charges of conspiracy to commit a riot. As the difference between protest and riot was largely one of definition, the trial was seen as a political attempt to discredit the protest movement. All seven were eventually found not guilty of the charge of conspiracy, but were cited with contempt of court for their vocal and outspoken challenges to the legitimacy of the courts. These convictions were later overturned. Thus the Chicago 7 trial was the capstone in the crisis of state legitimacy in the face of growing protest.

Protest movements between 1968 and 1984 saw transformation of the aims of protests. Now that the goals of the civil rights movement had largely been achieved, at least in the realm of legal protections, protests for civil rights dwindled. Protests around social change, or against technocratic government, had largely died out as well, as the Vietnam War ended and youth protesters aged and assumed greater social and economic control over their own lives, and focused on building careers and families. By and large, the youth counterculture movement of greater personal liberty had been achieved.

Protests through the 1970s were largely about single issues, such as women's rights, gay rights, anti-nuclear power, anti-American militarism, and so on. Protest groups organized around single issues or smaller clusters of issues into affinity groups, the structure of which will be detailed in the next chapter. Powers et al. details the range and variety of protest movements which emerged from the civil rights and anti-war movements throughout the 1960s. Protest groups throughout the 1970s and early 1980s began to take narrower focuses and organize around smaller sets of issues. This, combined with the aging of the protesters from the 1960s, meant that protest groups were more atomized and less effective. The large scale protests of the 1960s could not be maintained. As such, scale as a spatial tactic for protests was not possible for

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244 Chicago Seven trial transcripts.

Sagan
the smaller protest groups, whose leadership largely did not coordinate activities.

Policing in the United States after 1968 entered a crisis. As discussed at the end of the prior chapter, the Chicago protest event-site demonstrated very publicly the ineffective tactics and culture of brutality of the state of the art in protest policing. The dominant protest policing model of escalated force was proving ineffective against protesters and civil rights demonstrators who were using urban space in innovative ways. In the summer of 1968, prior to the events in Chicago that fall, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control Bill. This legislation established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which provided federal funding to local and state law enforcement agencies, and created the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice: Research Division. These organizations were dedicated to the research and development of enforcement technologies. This included the research and development of non-lethal weapons for law enforcement. In the wake of the widespread civil unrest as part of the civil rights movement, and prior to events of Chicago, American legislators recognized the need to modernize and further increase the technical sophistication and professionalization of policing. This legislation did not have enough time to make a significant impact on the protest policing in Chicago in 1968, but did inform the shift from the escalated force model to the negotiated management model.

This meant that protests between 1968 and the early 1980s were handled increasingly under the negotiated management model. Based on Noakes and Gillham, this model of protest policing differed significantly from the prior model. Where the escalated force model generally denied 1st Amendment rights, these rights were stated as top priorities under the new model. Similarly, prior low tolerance of community disruption changed to high tolerance, poor communication between police and protesters was replaced with ample advance and mid-protest communications, frequent arrests gave way to arrests as a last resort, and frequent use of force was replaced by force only in extreme circumstances. Practically, this had the effect of allowing protests to take place unmolested, and in fact protected by police. This “softer” touch on policing meant that, although protests themselves were smaller in scale through the 1970s and early 1980s, they went forward with greater safety and publicity.

This was to change in the early 1980s. This reform movement was augmented by the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act signed into law by President Ronald Reagan in 1981. Infamous for bringing in the National Guard to quell student demonstrators at the University of California – Berkeley during his term as Governor of California, Reagan showed increasing administrative support for the closer connection of policing and the military. Also known as Public Law 97-86 and in the United States Code as title 10 in Chapter 18, this law allows for large-scale assistance of domestic law enforcement by the military. It further allows for military-style training of police. At the time, this did not represent a whole cloth shift in policing toward militarization, but, through training and sharing of tactics, set the stage for later deeper interconnections between police and military.

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245 These agencies have since been reorganized and integrated into the Department of Justice.
247 Noakes and Pellham, 101.
248 Based on the focus in policing on machismo and territorial domination detailed in Herbert, and the emphasis on policing and patriarchy in American history explored by Dubber, it seems reasonable to consider this shift in policing styles led to many crises of policing culture in individual precincts and police officers.
249 Mitchell 2003 Ch. 3.
organizations.

The politics of the United States between 1968 and 1984 can broadly be characterized first as a shift toward greater social and economic liberalism, followed by a recession or “malaise,” followed by a resurgent populist social conservatism and economic neoliberalism.\(^{250}\) The national conservative political establishment under Nixon had succeeded the welfare state and social-program focused Democratic presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson in the 1960s. Nixon escalated American involvement in Vietnam and rolled back many social benefits that had been enacted by the American government since World War II, with particular emphasis on dismantling some of President Johnson's “Great Society” reforms. Nixon's actions in the White House, particularly his spying on citizens and political rivals, and his inability to make a significant improvement in the American economy, eventually led to a discrediting of conservatism as a product of the scandals of the Nixon presidency. Technocratic governance underwent a crisis of confidence as the Vietnam War ground on into the 1970s, ending with an American withdrawal and North Vietnamese victory. Nixon's successor Gerald Ford's presidency was marked by gaffes and blunders on domestic and foreign policy, and did not mark a substantive change or redemption of conservatism. Democratic President Jimmy Carter was elected to office in 1976. His presidency was marked by a weak economy, beset by inflation with a rising national debt, and oil and energy shortages. His period in office did little to advance either social welfare or economic stability.

These long years of perceived decline and stagnation that resulted in a 1980 presidential election victory of Republican Ronald Reagan by a large margin. Reagan won the election by capitalizing on working class dissatisfaction and backing from traditional conservatives, resulting in a redemption of conservatism through charismatic leadership. Reagan put in place a wide range of economic policy changes aimed at breaking union power, lowering many taxes, raising some taxes on consumer spending, weakening government oversight over business and finance, all of which characterized early neoliberalism.\(^{251}\)

A key cultural-political shift of the Reagan era was the transformation of constructions of citizenship. Discourses of citizenship under Reagan had a greater moral dimension than in previous administrations; the personal and private lives of citizens became a measure by which their patriotism and commitment to the “American Way” was judged. This was partially due to the increasing influence of Christian conservatives over the Republican party. One effect was a kind of “market fundamentalism,” a joining of the fervor and purity of fundamentalist Christianity and liberal economic thought, meaning that in all instances, policies should be made to make the “free market” find solutions to social and cultural problems.\(^ {252}\) This also meant that public displays of behavior outside of the narrowly-defined “moral” character of American citizens became suspect and subject to scrutiny, derision, othering, and possibly arrest.\(^ {253}\)

The role of public space in protest policing under the Reagan administration and the negotiated management model of protest policing had not yet had time to notably change from

\(^{250}\) In the words of President Carter in the lead-up to the 1980 presidential election, where he was defeated by Ronald Reagan, who proclaimed that it was “Morning in America”.

\(^{251}\) Harvey 2005 73, 84. Also Thorsen and Lie. One particular high-profile union breaking action was in 1981, when Reagan fired the striking air traffic controllers of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers’ Organization.

\(^{252}\) Amable 4-5.

\(^{253}\) This is a very brief summary of the main points of Harvey 2005 Chs. 2 and 6, as well as Berlant. I will discuss Berlant’s idea of passive citizenship later in this chapter.
the earlier liberal-democratic model. The American public showed greater social acceptance of public protest than in the 1960s and 1970s, as indicated by the negotiated management model of protest policing. However, the moral dimension of citizenship under Reagan began to reduce the acceptance of the public-ness of public space. Urban space was being opened more and more to speculation and development, as a means of perpetuating the capitalist imperative of the “spatial fix” to solve problems of excess finance, in this case. The loosening of global rules on finance meant that greater amounts of capital could be made available to transform urban spaces as development and profit schemes, transforming public spaces and swathes of substandard buildings into gleaming new corporate high-rises and “festival market” shopping spaces. This transformation of public space of assembly to privately owned spaces of consumption would come to be much more significant later in the 1980s. At this point the issues were nascent, and thus the events of the 1984 Dallas RNC are significant in their role in defining appropriate political behavior in public space.

6.2.1: Type of Social Movement and Model of Enforcement

The social justice gains in 1970s were not total, and a number of groups protested at the 1984 Dallas RNC who sought justice for these remaining causes. As discussed above, these groups were organized as affinity groups, but in general did not coordinate protest activities. Protest groups included Women Running Against Reagan, punk rockers, Iranian students, anti-nuclear demonstrators, Freeze Reagan-Bush, the Rainbow Peace Movement, the War Chest Tour, the National Lawyers' Guild, Rock Against Reagan, the Rainbow Tribe, the Greens, The Iran Society, the World Association of Iranian Monarchist Students, ACORN, the Alliance for Justice, San Francisco's Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence, and, notably, the Yippies, this time with younger, punker members mixed in with the now-graying older guard.

However, despite the variety of groups, they did not in general coordinate efforts. Further, again, despite the number of different groups, each group could only muster a few members to protests, and as such, there were no more than 1500 protesters over the course of the whole four day convention. This was partially also due to the extreme temperature of Dallas during the convention, with heat sometimes in excess of 104 degrees Fahrenheit.

254 Mitchell 137-142.
255 Harvey 2001. He discusses the various meanings of the term “fix” earlier in the article: fixed as set within a larger structure, fixed as in repaired, “fix” as in the drug addict's temporary satisfaction of a need. I would also add “fixed” can also mean to be prevented from moving, similar to the first definition, in the sense of tying capital up into a physical form through development. Harvey explicitly means fix in the third sense, but each sense applies.
256 Mitchell 139.
Protesters used a number of standard protests tactics, and little in the way of other direct actions. The basic spatial tactics used were the rally, the march, and the picket. Some groups of protesters were more anarchic, and engaged in traffic disruption, unapproved and unorthodox marches (as discussed with the image below), petty vandalism, spray painting, set off fireworks, spat on RNC delegates, splashing paint, playing in fountains, and symbolic direct action (again, discussed below). These unorthodox activities, in particular the symbolic burning of an American flag, resulted in considerable media and legal attention, with the flag-burning protesters eventually tried before the Supreme Court. Notably, protesters were allowed contact with delegates, in testimony to the police tolerance of protest activity.
6.2.2: Protest Policing

Although policing in general followed the negotiated management model, the city of Dallas still refused permits to a number of protest groups who wanted to establish a protest camp on public land. They eventually relented. The encampment, called “Tent City” by the city and “Reagan Ranch” by the protesters, was placed on the flatlands next to the Trinity River, about one mile from the convention. Security for the encampment was provided by the Guardian Angels. Protesters marched from the tent city to the Kennedy memorial, then proceeded on a rally to the Dallas Convention Center.

Police in general protected the non-transgressive protesters. There was only one instance of police interference with a protest, when a group of Iranian students “worked themselves into a frenzy” outside the convention hall.257 All of the arrests were of protesters who committed property damage. The protesters in the above image were among 93 protesters arrested for vandalism. Of these arrested, many claimed they were rounded up illegally in a mass arrest. Most of the protesters were held until the Tuesday after the convention ended. Notably, protesters who picketed the delegate entrance to the convention center were not asked to move by the police, demonstrating the negotiated management model of protest policing, in that the rights of the protesters were protected and held above the need for public order.258 Further, police deliberately did not arrest protesters smoking marijuana in public.259 No reports cite police attacking any protesters at this protest event-site. In fact, Kurt Albach of Dallas, part the American Civil Liberties Union monitoring police activity, noted that police had shown “more restraint than I

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257 McCarthy.
259 Samuels et al.
ever have seen.”

The mass arrest proceeded after the unruly protesters were surrounded and cornered in City Hall Plaza, near the convention hall. After encircling the protesters, police let them out two-by-two to be arrested. This action presages later “kettling” actions by police at later events, but in this case the police arrested the protesters quickly, rather than letting them stay kettled for hours. The restraint showed by police was remarkable, but calculated. According to police Cpl. C.W. Franklin Griffin, the police waited for the protesters to enter a large open area so they could be arrested en masse. He was quoted as saying “It's not like we wouldn't like to take action.” This indicates that police waited for the right time and place for their chosen method of arrest, showing that their tactics of protest control could not counter the protesters except under ideal spatial conditions. The police literally did not have the tools to stop the protester vandalism prior to that. The two tactics of mass arrests and detention were later codified into standard protest policing practice, and used to great effect in subsequent protest event-sites.

Regulators and enforcers were shocked at the symbolic display of violence that came with the burning of an American flag, and arrested the perpetrator on charges of desecrating a national icon. This serves as an example of the struggle over citizenship framed in personal morality that is a hallmark of the Reagan age. Police also received criticism for not stopping the protester vandalism earlier, letting protesters damage public art with paint, and allowing them to disrupt business as usual at downtown banks. The image of the police as impotent and unable to stop the flag-burning emphasized the need for greater image control and maintaining a good image of the police in the minds of the public. This image control extended to the kind of visual access that delegates had of demonstrators. Despite some demonstrators coming close to the convention center, the approved protest site was out of their general view. The struggle with protesters was ideological as well as spatial. Access to information, specifically visual information, had a heavy effect on how the protests were perceived, and how the legitimacy of

260 Graczyk.

Sagan
the convention and the enforcement system was maintained.

6.3: Nature of Crisis: Early Neoliberalization

At the time of the 1984 Dallas RNC, the United States was going through the early stages of the process of neoliberalization. The general shape of the social and economic effects of neoliberalism were not yet apparent to the majority of Americans, and were likely not the main reasons behind the protest. Rather, protesters were voicing their opposition to a range of cultural and political issues tied closely to neo-conservatism, such as gay rights, women's rights, anti-nuclear weapons, anti-militarism, and so on. The nation was beginning to experience an economic rebound after years of malaise, so likely Americans in general were pleased with Reagan's governance. This is further supported by his wide margins of victory in both the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections. The inability of the many protest groups in Dallas in 1984 to muster more than 1500 protesters is also a testament to the satisfaction and complacency of most Americans at the time.

The crisis can be characterized as one of transformation, and the public mood can be described as complacent. The economic effects of neoliberalism were starting to be felt, but the highly publicized cultural and social programs of the conservative Reagan administration were the targets of most protest. The crisis of the liberal-social-democratic model of governance was long past, and the Reagan presidency was still too new to be clearly defined. The United States was just coming out of a recession, which meant that many Americans were economically better off than they had been in previous stagnation during the late 1970s. In the near future, the loosening of restraints on finance and capital would mean that upper level incomes would rise steeply, but in 1984 many Americans were satisfied enough that protest seemed a step too far. The size of protest crowds would not rise again until globalization and neoliberalism had fully taken hold. These later protests would eventually supersede the numbers of the protests of the late 1960s.

6.4: Spatio-temporal Context

Dallas has a number of features in common with Chicago and the other cities in my case studies which form a baseline of spatial comparison. Due to the very small scale of the 1984 RNC protests, roughly 1500 protesters at maximum, the issues of protest scale and urban space do not apply. Generally, the urban spatial features of Dallas are of such capacity that an additional 1500 pedestrians, particularly if they are acting in small groups, can easily be absorbed without congestion or obstruction. Further, with the exception of the protest event detailed above, the protest marches followed pre-appointed routes and did not come into conflict with police.

Despite the low density of protesters in Dallas in 1984, the following features each play a role how both the protests and the protest policing transpired. I will list, then describe the significance of each of these following features:
Dallas is situated on a floodplain in a bend of the Trinity River. The roughly two square mile of the downtown city core where the convention took place has no more than a fifty-foot change in elevation over its area. The Dallas Convention Center, where the RNC was held, is located at the south point of downtown. Downtown Dallas is surrounded on four sides by major highways, which form barriers to easy movement outside of the downtown area.

The whole Dallas metro area is built on a series of grids, intersecting at different angles. The downtown two square mile core has two grids which join at Pacific Avenue: a northern section, which is oriented roughly northwest-to-southeast, and a southern section, which is oriented roughly west-south-west to east-north-east. South of this section, the northern section repeats. Thus, the southern section is an interruption of the larger grid pattern.

Streets in downtown Dallas range between sixty and eighty feet wide, with three-, four- and five-lane traffic. However, the relative width of the streets is immaterial in this case. Although most protests consisted of marches that generally fill streets to their width, no organized policing effort was in place to block streets. I can find no evidence of skirmish lines being used in the streets by protest policing. Very few streets were closed during the time of the convention. The most significant protester actions took place partially in the streets and partially through buildings, as shown in the map below.

The water borders of downtown Dallas are also not significant to protest policing in this particular case study. While situated at a bend of the Trinity River, downtown Dallas is bordered more by a series of highways than waterways. The role that water barriers played in the protests was that the flat Trinity River floodplain, abutting the river around 1 mile away from the convention center, hosted the “Reagan Ranch” tent city. No water barrier existed between any of the protests and the convention.

Regarding parks and squares, again, due to the relatively small number of protesters, assembly space for rallies was not significant. The few rallies that occurred did take place at plazas like the Kennedy Memorial. Some plazas were reserved for protest activity, but went unused. The most significant use of a plaza or park was the corralling and mass arrest of the transgressive protesters mentioned above. The police formations used to arrest them could only be used in a large open space.

Notably, the Dallas Convention Center is about eight blocks from the John F. Kennedy Memorial Plaza, which is two blocks from Dealy Plaza, where John F. Kennedy was killed in 1963. Liberal protesters and democrats were definitely aware of the RNC's choice to host their convention in Dallas, the “city that killed Kennedy," as a symbolic move of dominance, and a break with America's social-liberal past.

The density of downtown Dallas streets is also not a significant variable, due to the small numbers of protesters.

The map above shows the layout of Downtown Dallas. The Convention Center is in the lower center, marked with a
City Hall Plaza is in the center right, and the Kennedy Memorial is in the center left. Note that the Trinity River is outside of the map area, but the Greenbelt Park, which borders the river, is in the lower right of the map. Also note the border of highways around downtown. Photo=Avalon Travel.
After assembling at the Kennedy Memorial, protesters march down Elm St. to their first stop, outside Dresser Industries, 1505 Elm.

2. Group moves next door and enters ETV Building at 1525 Elm.

3. Taking Akard to Thanksgiving Square, they enter the underground there.

4. Via the underground, they enter the Republic Bank Building at 3300 Commerce and go to the second floor.

5. After Republic Bank, group takes Bryan to Harwood, stopping at the Diamond Shamrock building at 717 N. Harwood.

6. They follow San Jacinto and go into the Plaza of the Americas at 701 N. Pearl.

7. There they enter the skywalk system and go into the Sheraton-Dallas Hotel of the Southland Center.

8. Leaving the hotel, protesters head down St. Paul to Main Street and turn west going inside, Hennan-Marcus at 1618 Main.

9. Crossing to Commerce, group stops outside Dallas Power & Light Co. at 1506 Commerce.

10. Continuing west on Commerce, they reach Akard and split onto the plaza at Southwestern Bell, stopping to play in the fountain.

11. Group follows Akard south to City Hall, where they are denied entrance to the building. Protesters begin milling on the City Hall Plaza and swimming in the reflecting pool, while about 150 police officers in riot gear line up along Young and Akard streets. After about 30 minutes, protesters are arrested.
The above image shows the path of the main body of around one hundred transgressive protesters who passed through both streets and buildings, committing vandalism along the way, before being corralled and arrested in City Hall Plaza on Wednesday, August 22nd, 1984. Image=Dallas Times Herald.

On Wednesday August, 22nd, around one hundred and fifty protesters marched through downtown on a chaotic route seemingly guided only by chance or caprice. The “War Chest Tour” splattered paint on buildings, spray painted signs and slogans, marched down one-way streets, threw paper forms around in the inside of a bank lobby, and eventually burned an American flag outside City Hall. Police were specifically instructed not to interfere with protesters, and to let the demonstration run its course. After the flag-burning event in City Hall Plaza, police encircled and arrested the protesters, charging most of them with disorderly conduct. The protester who burned the flag, Gregory Lee Johnson, was arrested on charges of desecrating a national symbol. I discuss the outcome of his actions in the next section. At the same time, four hundred protesters staged a peaceful pro-union rally at the Kennedy Memorial.

In the evening of August 23rd around one hundred Iranian students in two opposing groups demonstrated outside the convention. One group was in favor of monarchic rule, and one against. Thirty police officers in riot gear were deployed to keep the groups separate, marking the only use of riot equipment during the protest event-site. The protest desisted without violence after about two hours. At the same time, a group of about thirty protesters circulated among convention souvenir vendors, quietly holding placards protesting the war in El Salvador, and in were in general ignored by both police and convention delegates. Other planned rallies, each anticipated to attract more than one thousand protesters, never materialized.

6.5: Meaning and Interpretation

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261 Graczyk.
263 McCartney.
Protester Gregory Lee Johnson being arrested immediately after burning an American flag on the steps of Dallas City Hall. August 22nd, 1984. Photo=Associated Press.

Of the four protest event-sites I examined during this study, certain features of the protester groups make Dallas the least illustrative of the relationship between protest and urban space proper. The protest groups were of very modest size, behaved in a generally orderly fashion, and did not coordinate actions between protest groups. The small size and disorganized actions of protest groups meant that protest strategies of occupation and jamming the system could not work. Rather, there were two significant events which speak to the importance of the Dallas event-site to the interrelation of protests, policing, and urban space.

These two events were, first, the arrest of nearly one hundred transgressive protesters after a chaotic and destructive march, and second, the arrest of Gregory Lee Johnson after burning an American flag at the same event. The first event is significant because it shows the negotiated management model of protest policing in action: the protesters were protected or ignored, allowed to get quite close to the event they were contesting, and the police tolerated a high degree of community disruption with no violence. The second event is significant because it represents a turning point in the aspect of protest policing that involves controlling the public image of authority.

Johnson was arrested on the charge of desecrating a venerated object, which was a Texas state statute. His case was eventually tried before the United States Supreme Court in 1989. The Court ruled that Johnson's act of protest was protected speech, and that the law prohibiting flag desecration was aimed at nullifying the impact of Johnson's ideal message. Congress then passed the Federal Flag Protection Act of 1989, but the court again ruled on the side of a protester in another similar case in 1990, finding that prohibiting flag burning was an attempt to suppress unpopular speech, and as such, was a violation of the 1st Amendment, and the Federal Flag Protection Act was taken off the books.

This arrest and trial can be seen as free speech and citizens' roles in protests on trial. Johnson's act was to voice a minoritarian and unpopular opinion, and he was arrested for it. His arrest is in line with police-centered theories of protest policing, which state that police have wide latitude in interpreting and enforcing the law, if such enforcement helps suppress or nullify protests. In this case, the police who arrested him, despite having been given orders to let the protest run its course, decided that his actions were unacceptable and that he needed to be punished for them. Possibly they thought his actions would incite the crowd to violence, but those were not the charges levied against him. His arrest was a clear assertion of image control: anyone challenging the authority or legitimacy of the nation to a certain degree would be punished.

Johnson was loosely affiliated with the Yippies, and was a member of the Revolutionary Communist Youth Brigade. His efforts were the last attempts of protests movements from the 1960s to affect the decline of attention paid to social justice as neoliberalism rose. The theatricality of the act of burning a flag was designed to incite and inflame the ire of the Republican political establishment, and Johnson's choice of setting for this act was telling. What could be more public than a public square outside of a building housing the machinery of a representative government? Free speech, in the eyes of the protest, meant speech free from

264 Earl and Soule.

Sagan
The politics of the Reagan presidency play a role here. As discussed above, one significant new element of the Reagan administration was the transformation of private lives into political acts. According to Berlant, intimate details of people’s lives suddenly took on new dimensions as standards of civic life and ideal citizenship. Anger with the government was seen to be a private matter, inappropriate to be made public. Protest was simply rude, a sentiment echoed by business workers unable to “get back to work” at their banks during the disruptive protests of August 22nd. This reconfiguration of politeness and free speech was dangerous for protesters because it represents a step in the decoupling of law enforcement from the rule of law. Law enforcement could now be arbiters of appropriate behavior, not just legal behavior. Police could arrest protesters for being impolite or immoral, thus nullifying the protest and blunting its possible impact.

The history of public spaces as unmediated venues for speech is a relatively new idea. As Mitchell explains, the idea of public space in democratic societies is intrinsically linked to exclusion. He argues that the historical development of free speech in public places has been one of contingent permissions. Historical public spaces, such as the Greek agora, Roman forums, and 18th century German coffeehouses, have all been spaces in which the highest values of free speech are proclaimed, while at the same time setting rules for who can speak, when, and how. Each of these spaces only allowed certain people to use them, thus limiting speech to those already socially accepted. The idea of a space of unrestricted and unmediated communication is a modern one.

In this formulation, Johnson’s arrest can be seen as a throwback from unmediated American public spaces to a more restricted model of free speech in public. That the highest judicial authority in the United States eventually and repeatedly ruled on the site of free speech in this issue is remarkable, and shows a break from the exclusionary practices of prior representative governments.

This decision was chilling for protest enforcers. If people could be allowed to speak and say what they wished in public spaces, even if the message was extremely unpopular to the point of offense, then the legitimacy of people against whom the speech was being made would be in question. Such challenges to authority go deeply against the grain of American policing. American policing is built around the idea of control, not only of space, territory, and behavior, but of image. In order to maintain their control, police must be seen to be competent, professional authority figures who enforce the laws of the entire nation. Where the nation is publicly besmirched, police see a grave threat to public perceptions of their own legitimacy. It was that perception of legitimacy that was deeply challenged after the Chicago 1968 protests, and haunted the police of Dallas in 1984. The moral dimensions of politics in the Reagan era heightened the sense of police as arbiters of morality and protesters as rude and immoral. If a flag can be burned with impunity, thereby challenging the authority of the United States, police feared that so too could people feel that police authority could be questioned and challenged.

This fear resulted in a subsequent renewed focus on protest control and police public relations. Although there were very few protests over the next fifteen years in any scale that

265 Berlant.
266 Giannettino.
267 Mitchell 130.
268 Dubber, Herbert, among others.
rivaled the Chicago 1968 event-site, part of the negotiated management model meant that police would communicate with protesters in advance, setting the boundaries for protests, arranging marching routes, limiting protest times and areas. Atlanta in 1988 at the Democratic National Convention was the first recorded use of the free speech zone, an innovation that sprang from the idea that free speech should not be free in space.\textsuperscript{269} In the late 1980s, the Non-lethality Policy Review Group at U.S. Global Strategy Council worked to develop and mobilize more non-lethal riot control technologies, allowing police a greater range of techniques and technologies to prevent freer expression of dangerous ideas that might challenge national legitimacy, and, by extension, the legitimacy of police. Control had to be maintained, not only of individual police through increased discipline and training, but of protesters, generally through the application of administrative force.\textsuperscript{270}

Generally, protest groups after 1984 developed according to specific political issues: anti-nuclear power, concerns for the environment, smaller-scale labor protests, women's rights, and so on. There were very few large-scale protest events in the late 1980s, as the Baby Boomers who participated in the protests of the 1960s aged and became committed to families and careers. Not until the 1990s did protests occurred widely and at the same kind of scale that they had occurred in the late 1960s. Widespread resistance to the First Gulf War, coupled with increasing globalized communication, meant that protesters could organize at scales that rivaled earlier protest movements. Growing public awareness of environmental, social, and economic issues helped mobilize smaller protest groups, called affinity groups, to coordinate their protest activity to achieve greater critical masses of protesting bodies in urban spaces.\textsuperscript{271}

An affinity group is a group of people joined together to use direct action to accomplish political goals, typically around a concept, issue, or cluster of issues. Affinity groups operate in a cell-like structure, communicating with other affinity groups, and sometime coordinating direct action protests that mobilize several affinity groups for one action, but operate independently. Each affinity group follows a different set of organizational rules, but is generally centered around taking responsibility for its own members, and self-organize to maintain group cohesion. Affinity groups can be organized around the culture or identities of its constituents, serving as a means to advocate for issues particular to them. Affinity groups were first used in Spain in the 19th and early 20th centuries by anarchist and fringe political groups as a way to organize around political issues and accomplish goals. The form was revived by anti-nuclear activists in Europe and the United States in the 1970s, where it was combined with political direct action to protest by disrupting “business as usual” and bring awareness to their specific issues. Protesters in affinity groups can take a number of roles dependent on their interest and skills, such as medic, legal support, media liaison, arrestable members, and so on.\textsuperscript{272} Several affinity groups can be organized into “clusters” and “spokescouncils” to perform specific mass actions during large protests, such as block specific intersections or constructing barricades, or serving as points of coordination and communication between groups. Affinity groups have been the primary component of protest groups in the United States from the late 1980s.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{269 Warren.}
\footnote{270 In the beginning of the next chapter, I will discuss in brief the general protest events and conditions after Dallas 1984.}
\footnote{271 DellaPorta et al. describes the course of protest and policing development (Policing Protest, introduction.) This is also explored in Powers, et. al.}
\footnote{272 Libcom.org.}
\end{footnotes}
After 1984, police and law enforcement groups continued their process of self-evaluation and increasing sophistication. Police agencies across the United States began receiving more funding, more equipment, and training as part of the national War on Drugs policy enacted by Reagan and continued under George Bush and Bill Clinton. Police forces continued their modernization of equipment, training, and procedure. The 'escalated force' model of protest policing had given way to the 'negotiated management' mode of policing, where police held Constitutional rights as a top priority, with a high degree of tolerance for community disruption, a high degree of communication with protest organizers, use of arrests and violence only as a last resort.

The shift in protest policing strategy was part of a general modernization and professionalization move among police in the United States in this period. The failures of the police to keep order during the protests of the 1960s, and rising crime rates through the 1970s, prompted policy shifts to reorganize the police to be able to respond to public disorder better. Part of this administrative reorganization was a greater emphasis on training, which included education and sociology-based policing, the advancement of the field of criminology, and a focus on maintaining discipline and command over police in the field.

A series of events across the United States through the 1990s prompted a heightened degree of police alertness regarding potentially dangerous urban situations. The racial violence in the wake of the Rodney King verdict in 1992 has caused widespread urban unrest in Los Angeles and in many cities across the country. Further, a string of domestic bombings in urban centers, such as a van bomb attack on the World Trade Center buildings in 1993, a fertilizer truck bomb at the Murrah Federal Office building in Oklahoma City in 1995, and a backpack-sized explosive planted at the Atlanta Olympics in 1996, increased police awareness of terrorist tactics. The variety of groups behind these attacks contributed to a focus on generalized urban security among police, coupled with an increased sense among police of urban space as contested ground under siege.

The scaling up of tactics and techniques under the negotiated management model occurred throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. During this time, police implemented new training regimes and public relations campaigns designed to more effectively counter protests. The effectiveness of this model of protest policing came into crisis in 1999, when police strategies were tested beyond their breaking point at the World Trade Organization protest in Seattle. There, police were confronted with the specter of '68 once again, as their tools and methods failed to contain the crowds.

Sociologist Christian Parenti's *Lockdown America* details the militarization of American police. This has been explored more recently in Balko's *Rise of the Warrior Cop*, which details the transformation of policing under the War on Drugs and the PATRIOT Act. My discussion of the effects of this militarization on protest policing is below in section 7.1.

Noakes and Gillham, 101. Their position is informed and supported by the much broader McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy, which addresses the time period 1960-1995.

Herbert describes this sense of fear and territoriality in his ethnography of police officers in Los Angeles in *Policing Space*.
7. Denver 2008: “We Get Up Early, to BEAT the Crowds”:

In this chapter, I will examine the 2008 Denver Democratic National Convention protest event-site. I will do this by structuring the chapter into the following sections. First, I will address relevant protest and policing history since the last case study. This includes a general assessment of protest and protest policing between 1985 and 2007. Then I will present a breakdown of significant considerations of the 2008 Denver protest event-site which I observed firsthand. I examine both the type of social movement and the mode of enforcement (through both analysis of the different forces and how they are structured, as well as a basic chronology of events of the protest event-site), looking at the nature of the crisis that spurred the protests, exploring the spatio-temporal specifics of the protest and policing activity (particularly an examination of the specifics of Denver's urban spaces and their role in protest and policing), and end with a discussion and interpretation of the events.

7.1: History and Context

A complete review of all protest and protest policing developments between 1985 and 2007 is outside of the scope of the current study. However, there were a number of significant protest events in the few years prior to the 2008 Democratic National Convention, which I will survey here. The coalitions and international coordination of protest movements, prompted by rising inequality and environmental degradation in the wake of a wave of neoliberalization across developing nations, combined with an absence of any institutional means of the public giving policy input, spurred a series of protest event that became iconic as sites of citizen mobilization: Seattle against the World Trade Organization in 1999, in Washington DC against the World Bank in 2000, and in Miami in 2003 against the World Trade Organization. Seattle 1999 was a crisis for protest policing, and Miami 2003 represented implementation of whole new police strategies. The two events in particular set the stage for Denver 2008, and I discuss them below by way of introducing the conditions in Denver. Further, there had been some innovations in protest policing at protest events around the globe, which I will briefly discuss as part of a chronological listing of protest events leading to the 2008 DNC.

As my research shows below, the internationalization of protest was met with the internationalization of protest policing methods. During this period there had been a growing coalition of global protest movements against a number of economic factors, including unequal north-south development, environmental concerns, wealth inequality, indigenous rights, anti-warfare, and so on. These protest movements had been communicating and collaborating more and more internationally, and protesting against international issues. This is significant for the Denver DNC protests in that the aims and concerns of the protest reached beyond the national borders, and could be said to have been protests against a growing transnational regime of

neoliberalization and the negative effects of globalization.

### 7.1.1: Seattle 1999: Protester Innovation

The first important event prior to the 2008 DNC was the Seattle protests against the World Trade Organization in 1999. Sometimes called 'The Battle in Seattle,' the protests occurred over several days in the week of November 30th, 1999.\(^{277}\) The protests were the result of coordination between dozens of protest groups, in collaboration with larger unions and environmental groups. The event drew at least 70,000 protesters from a wide variety of protest groups. Protest action included a number of non-violent tactics including the rally, the march, the occupation, and the picket.\(^{278}\) Protest groups used a decentralized organizational structure based on affinity groups that acted as autonomous cells of protest activity. The protesters generally took two different approaches: negotiation with the police for permits and non-violent demonstrations, and disruptive and confrontational tactics.

Part of the spatial innovations of the protesters came from the implementation of the Direct Action Network's plans for spatial control of key places in downtown Seattle and disruption of the WTO proceedings. The primary means of spatial control by the protesters was to block intersections to prevent WTO delegates from participating in any WTO proceedings. This was accomplished through the use of 'lockdown formations', which were groups or circles of protesters who would link arms, then be physically bound together using duct tape, chains, locks, chicken wire, PVC piping, and so on.\(^{279}\) These formations would be formed in the middle of intersections or across building entries, and would be very difficult to remove without serious physical injury to the protesters concerned, even if the police attempting the removal could have uncontested access to the lockdown protesters.

Another disruptive protest activity was the black bloc. The black bloc was a smaller group of protesters within or alongside the larger body, who are generally identified by the outside as "anarchists."\(^{280}\) The basic black bloc tactic relies on anonymity to accomplish their protest aims, which are primarily that of direct confrontation and disruption. A typical black bloc action works as follows: member of the black bloc arrange a pre-determined signal or time and activity that they will engage in (such as window smashing, attacks on stores, disruption of commerce in any way, and so on). They then prepare by wearing all black clothes (that are not out of place in a protest situation, nor in fact out of place in street wear), prepping protective clothing such as shin pads, helmets, or padded clothing, along with backpacks filled with potentially useful items, such as hammers, stones or bricks, or spray paint. Key to the clothing preparation is items that can mask the face of the protester, such as a bandana or mask of some sort. The black bloc members then integrate themselves into a larger protest march and wait for

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277 Particularly by popular media of the time, and further by author Janet Thomas, who used the title for her book detailing the protests.
278 Descriptions of these tactics are in earlier chapters.
279 Thomas 85. Also referred to as a 'sleeping dragon', NYPD Intelligence Documents 14.
280 This label was applied to the black bloc by dozens of media reports on the Seattle protests from media organizations as large as the New York Times and salon.com. The label was applied regardless of actual political affiliation of black bloc participants. Further, many protesters who were anarchists did not participate in Black Blocs. The use of the term is generally considered disparaging and sensationalistic (Young 20).
the signal. Upon hearing the signal, black bloc protesters affix their masks and hide their faces, and engage in disruptive activities such as those listed above. After the chaos, black bloc members scatter, and remove their facial coverings. The participants cannot then be definitively linked to the damage caused, and are free to continue the protest elsewhere. Black Blocs are focused on confrontation of the issues at hand through directly attacking or disrupting the proceedings protested against. In the case of Seattle in 1999, Black Blocs attacked stores and shopping areas, most famously Niketown, in attempts to damage the world corporate system and draw attention to complicity of consumer society in maintaining unfair economic and ecological situations. One of the effects of the Black Blocs was to widen general protest disorder, and, in doing so, further alarm the police and escalate police action.

![A black bloc at the G-8 protests in Rostok, Germany, in 2007. Photo credit 4bblogspot.](image)

Seattle Police had been notified well in advance of the aims of most of the protest groups. Following the policing model of negotiated management, police tried to work with protesters to ensure minimal disruption. However, a major goal of the protest groups was a complete shutdown of the WTO activity, which of course the police could not allow. Further, the Seattle police, in coordination with dozens of other agencies, was not well prepared for the size and intensity of the protests. This lead to dozens of incidents of police discipline failing, as police broke ranks, beat protesters, used tear gas indiscriminately, fired rubber bullets and sandbag guns at protesters, and met peaceful protests with brutality both individually and collectively. Tear gas was often used in crowded situations with many bystanders. The American Civil Liberties Union report on the protest policing cited anonymity among the officers as a significant reason for their violent response; without being identifiable under their riot gear, and with badges and nameplates obscured, the police believed that they could act with impunity. Detractors called this a “police riot.” In a rushed decision after the initial crackdown, Seattle mayor Paul Schell attempted the establishment of 'no-protest' zone in downtown Seattle. Consisting of an area of 50

281 The almost exclusively young and white character of the black bloc protest leads me to reflect on the peculiar inversion of Franz Fanon's 'Black Skin, White Masks.'
282 As discussed above in Section 4.3, the black bloc tactic was first used in Germany in 1977.
283 Young 10.
284 Chasan and Walker 2.
285 Interview with Kevin Danaher, University of Washington WTO History Archives.
blocks, this zone was meant to forbid protests in an area around the WTO proceedings and isolate protesters from the summit. It was not successful.

As in the Chicago protests in 1968, media coverage of the event was extensive. The media was reporting on the events as they occurred, and stories and images from Seattle made it around the world. Media production and development had improved significantly in the thirty-one years since Chicago, and there was more information available faster to more people. The high media profile of the event, brought even more into the public eye due to the attendance of President Bill Clinton at the WTO summit, meant that any protest or violent activity would be widely viewed. Protesters took advantage of this, using similar street theater tactics as the Yippies had used in the late 1960s, attempting to spread awareness of the issues at hand and detract attention from the summit proceedings. Some media outlets, particularly Seattle local news departments, refused to cover any protest activity in attempts to minimize protester impact. This awareness of the power of media on the part of the protesters can be seen in the frequently-used protest chant “This is what democracy looks like!” This chant is used to show the power of masses of people coming together for collective political action, as well as showing the role of police repression of public demonstration. Importantly, in Seattle 1999, the early rumors (in the New York Times) of Molotov cocktail use by the protesters likely contributed to the police response. That the brutal police response was so much in the public view, and that protesters got so much media attention to their causes, resulted in significant critique of how the Seattle police managed their officers and the protests, and caused a series of internal and external investigations of the Seattle police.

In general, the protests in Seattle were a hallmark of sophistication, organization and order within protest groups. Black blocs caused significant damage and brought further media attention to the issues espoused by the non-violent protesters. The disorder and brutality of the Seattle police, and their inability to maintain discipline among themselves or order in their city resulted in widespread public disapproval of their tactics. As in Chicago in 1968, the protesters achieved many of their aims of disruption, and succeeded in spreading awareness of their causes. These events can be seen as a crisis and failure of the negotiated management model of protest in the face of decentralized protest organization, protests at massive scales, and disruption by smaller protest groups committed to innovation. The many failures of the police caused significant embarrassment and prompted another crisis of legitimacy among police across the nation. As in Chicago 1968, while the political system protested against continued, the public narrative surrounding these events shifted, as did public perception of the effectiveness and legitimacy of police. In this sense, in Seattle as in Chicago, the protesters won and the police lost.

The massive protests in Seattle in 1999, and their success in disrupting the WTO convention, and their success in bringing media attention the machinery of neoliberalism, was the rising specter of ‘68. It had the kernel of a growing integrated protest movement, linking affinity groups and labor groups, inspiring legislative resistance to the WTO agreements. The threat of such a movement's success spurred subsequent policing policy changes that were crystallizing in the Miami Model of Policing from the FTAA protests in 2003, and which were

286 Young, 21-22. Young and other authors explore more in depth the role that media played in the Seattle protests, so I will leave it to those authors who are more specialized in media and society studies to pursue those lines of inquiry.

287 Wainwright 186.
designed specifically to nullify protests before and as they occurred.

7.1.2: Washington DC and Los Angeles 2000: Clashes and Crackdowns

On April 16th 2000 Washington DC the same protester groups organized an anti-World Bank protest that attracted more than 25,000 protesters by some counts, or as few as 10,000 by others. Again, protesters contested the non-democratic institutions that made globalization policy that enriched the few at the expense of the many, and trampled environmental concerns along the way. The organization of the protesters was similar to that in the Seattle protests, namely, as a coalition of smaller protests groups that operated in a decentralized manner to achieve their protest aims. As in Seattle, some black bloc groups caused disruption and property damage. Again, as in Seattle, the police cracked down on the protesters, assaulting them with rubber bullets, tear gas, beatings, and pepper spray. Here again police covered their badges and nametags. Police also used pre-emptive arrests, arresting people suspected of planning to participate in protests, generally under other legal pretexts. Further, the police set up a restricted perimeter around the IMF proceedings, aiming to keep protesters and IMF events as separate as possible. The exclusion zone spread over 100 blocks, but was penetrated by at least one column of demonstrators, who insisted on being arrested. Eventually, more than 700 people were arrested. The violence and aggression of the police eventually led to a series of successful class action civil suits against the Washington DC police on the grounds of 1st and 6th Amendment violations.

The protest policing in Washington in 2000 showed the continued ineffectiveness of the negotiated management model of protest policing, and the inability of police to react effectively to decentralized protest planning at scale, and coordinated action between smaller affinity groups. The several months between the Seattle and Washington protests were not enough time for policing to develop a new administrative or tactical approach to protest policing. The level of repression by the police showed the frustration and confusion among the police hierarchy about effective responses. The only spatial response police had at the time was denial; the cordoned-off and barricaded area was a return to a kind of medieval siege mentality, where the protesters could only be dealt with as an invading army.

The Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles in 2000 brought another significant protest event. The Los Angeles Police department had been recently criticized for their perceived lax enforcement of a victory riot after a Los Angeles Lakers victory. In the wake of this criticism, and with the legacy of the disruption in the 1992 Rodney King riots, the LAPD planned much more aggressive and proactive action against the DNC protesters. As with the Washington protest, downtown Los Angeles was divided into a series of zones. “Free speech zones” had been used as a tactic of protest policing since at least 1988, but were not used widely until 2000. Zones in which protest was permitted were at a significant distance from the convention (denoted as a “public assembly area”), and the area around the convention itself was walled off with jersey barriers and a fourteen-foot-high chain link fence. Protesters who refused to use the free speech

zones were detained and arrested. At least ten thousand protesters convened for a concert by musical act Rage Against the Machine, known for their vitriolic lyrics and trenchant leftism. As the concert continued, the LAPD cut the electricity, mounted the stage, and demanded the crowd disperse within fifteen minutes. Ten minutes later, the police began pushing mounted skirmish lines into the crowd, using both horse and motorcycle units. At the same time, other groups of police began firing rubber bullets, water cannon, and beanbag rounds at the crowd, and people leaving the protest were attacked and beaten by police wielding nightsticks and batons. The next day saw another attack by police on protesters, who attempted to picket the Staples Center, where the convention was being held. As with prior protest policing events, police were roundly criticized for their violence. The lesson to take away from the Los Angeles DNC protests is the same as the prior Washington protests: that the existing model of protest policing was ineffective, and that other methods had to be found. The actions of the LAPD can been seen as a reversion to a prior mode of enforcement ('escalated violence') rather than a progression and innovation.

The 2000 Republican National Convention had similar events at smaller scales. The notable part of the protest policing at the 2000 RNC was the extensive pre-emptive arrests. On August 1st, 140 police raided a warehouse that was being used as a protest staging area and workshop to build protest puppets, and arrested 75 people. They were held for more than the legal limit of 48 hours without being charged, and given exorbitantly high bails. Documents left sealed for a month after the raid showed that police believed that protesters had been receiving funding from former Soviet-allied trade unions. Further, police documents also revealed that police had extensively infiltrated protest groups to gather intelligence on their activities and disrupt their plans. A number of protesters used tactics seen in prior protests: rallies, marches with arm-linking, occupation of intersections, system overloading, and black blocs. The spatial tactics of the police at this convention were similar to Washington and Los Angeles, but with less violence.

The fall of year 2000 brought a deeply contested Presidential election in the United States, with Republican George W. Bush appointed President by the Supreme Court amid aborted recounts and widespread allegations of electoral irregularities. Bush was part of a political movement called 'neo-conservatism', which espoused free trade, the loosening of government oversight on trade, labor, and the environment, and deeper support of police and military forces. His presidency was widely viewed as advancing the neoliberal agenda opposed by most protest groups.

Protest zones were seen again in protests against the G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy in July 2001. Two hundred thousand protesters from dozens of nations marched against increasing internationalization, and against the monetary policies of the G-8 and the World Bank. Designated "free speech zones," yellow zones were for police and protesters, and red were for delegates, thus zoning debate out of the proceedings.

As the negotiated management model of protest policing was increasingly recognized as ineffective, police tried different strategies of spatial control, attempting to keep control over

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290 As with other events, different sources list wildly differing numbers. Some sources list as many as fifty thousand protesters in attendance (Bleyer). The actual number seems more likely to be around ten thousand, so I use that figure here. Protest organizers tend to publicize significantly higher numbers than police.

291 It is unclear how the police believed these Soviet groups had survived the fall of the USSR.

292 Harvey 2003 and 2005, Giroux, and many others.
protests that had been increasing in frequency and scale since 1999. The 2002 protests in Washington DC were the first use of pens for protesters, which were fortified free-speech zones places well out of sight of the actual proceedings. These were zones that were enclosed by jersey barriers and tall chain link fences, in which protesters were not allowed to leave for long periods of time. They were used again in the anti-World Economic Forum protests in New York City in 2002, where they were a mere ten by ten feet.293

The above image shows one such ten by ten protest pen in use in New York City in 2002.  
Source=Richard Perry, New York Times (in Rangels.)

The size of these pens, and the increasing micromanagement of protesters displayed by police, indicate some adaptation on the part of the police. Prior strategies of negotiated management could not cope with coordinated alliances of smaller protest groups, nor could they counter anarchic black bloc actions. The escalated force model from the late 1960s did not lend police any more credibility or public respect when it was re-deployed in Los Angeles.

7.1.3: Miami 2003: Police Adaptation and Response

The most significant pre-Denver protest event-site was the 2003 Miami protests against the Free Trade area of the Americas (FTAA). The Miami protest policing was marked by

293 Bruno, Allen, and Flanders each give details. Pens in Washington DC were of various sizes between 10 and 40 feet to a side.
significant review and preparation by the Miami Police Department and affiliated enforcement agencies. This resulted in a comprehensive overhaul of protest policing procedures and tactics. This represents the turning point from the negotiated management model of protest policing and a new, emergent model, called 'strategic incapacitation,' also known as the Miami Model of Protest Policing.294 This model incorporated some of the spatial innovations in the protest policing transition period between 1984 and 2003, as well as other new approaches to protest policing and urban space, in coordination with police departments across the United States as well as federal security agencies.

The core concepts of protest policing according to the model of strategic incapacitation (the Miami model) represent a significant shift in how protesters are engaged and dealt with, and incorporate a sophisticated understanding of the role of urban space in the effectiveness of protest tactics, particular of tactics of mass assembly and crashing the system. The Miami model places a low priority on constitutional protections for protesters and denying them entirely to transgressive protesters. Police following the model show a moderate toleration for community disruption; the more contained the protesters, the more community disruption is allowed. Transgressive protesters are allowed much less latitude. Similarly, the model calls for a high degree of communication with contained protesters, but only selective communication with transgressive protesters. Arrests are used strategically to direct and nullify protests. They are no longer employed as a last resort as under the prior model, and police specifically target transgressive protesters for arrest and detention, even if such transgression is not strictly illegal. Violence is also employed strategically by police, particularly in conjunction with force multipliers such as riot control agents, tear gas, pepper spray, cavalry, and the like. Violence is more typically applied to transgressive protesters under this model of policing, which serves to intimidate and threaten more peaceable demonstrators.

The Miami model represents a comprehensive shift in approach to protest policing, which I believe brings the approach in line with neoliberal approaches to urban governance, mainly in its similarity to how citizenship and urban access are being redefined within the process of urban neoliberalization. Police administration of urban space under the Miami model is one of the means by which neoliberalization is enacted.

The Miami 2003 protest event-site had a particular influence on the mode of enforcement that shows innovations in the use of urban space to disperse, channel or isolate protest crowds. Further, enforcement actions taken under the Miami model of protest policing work to nullify protests at every level, acting proactively to block or deny access to public space in several ways. Detailed extensively in Fernandez 2008295 as well as in the City of Miami Civilian Investigative Panel Report on the Free Trade Area of the Americas Summit from 2006. The Miami model itself was developed prior to the 2003 FTAA protests, and was a set of police procedures and legal maneuvers designed to nullify the protests through several avenues. The Miami FTAA protest event-site was the first time all of these spatial and procedural innovations were mobilized together. It represents the integration, unification, and implementation of several of the spatial and administrative developments which had occurred piecemeal between 1985 and 2003.

First, the model involves the widespread arming of police officers with “less-lethal” armaments, such as tasers or gas pellet shooters. These weapons were to be prominently

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294 Noakes and Gillham 101.
295 Fernandez 68-91.
displayed throughout the protest policing event, and many of the officers displaying these weapons were not penalized for obscuring their name tags or badge numbers.

Second, the Miami model involves coordination and collaboration between dozens of policing agencies. The joint, unified, multi-agency command structure meant that many more officers could be brought into the event than prior models, and all could be directed from a central command point. Although not all officers were well-trained in protest policing, this resulted in an overall well-organized system of command and control of police units. Further, police widely employ undercover units and agents provocateurs embedded within protest groups.

Third, legal challenges to the protests are launched months in advance of the planned event, hoping to limit the scale and scope of the protests. This involves surveillance and collection of intelligence on the protest groups for months in advance, large scale pre-emptive arrests, the denial or delay of march or parade permits, the declaration of a State of Emergency or other executive order allowing for military-style policing and abrogation of civilian rights, and the recruitment and deployment of civic groups and organizations to aid in police support. General legal and courtroom business is suspended during protests to aid in processing mass arrests.

Fourth, in the case of Miami 2003, a number of city ordinances were passed a mere four days prior to the protests that forbid a number of typical protest behaviors and tactics, such as: redefining marches and parades to be any meeting of more than 3 people or vehicles that inhibit the usual flow of vehicular or pedestrian traffic, forbidding the wearing of gas masks or other facial coverings, carrying ordinary objects that could be used for violence (such as sticks, pointed objects, unfilled balloons, bottles, rocks, spray paint, and so on), or forbidding body armor or protective wear. Further, existing minor offenses like jaywalking would be prosecuted aggressively, echoing the “zero tolerance” policing philosophy.

Fifth, the model calls for an emphasis on maintaining positive images of the police through media and public messages, while emphasizing the dangerous and transgressive activities of protesters through public relations. This was accomplished through embedding of corporate media with the police, offering media publicity interviews with police officials prior to the events, referring to officers as brave and well-trained and to protesters as terrorists or violent, or emphasizing that events like the FTAA are meaningful targets for terror attacks, promoting the violent imagery of previous protests like Seattle 1999, displaying confiscated implements dressed up as weapons to demonstrate the ill intent of protesters, targeting independent media and confiscating cameras and recording equipment, and attempts to divide protest groups during public hearings. Officials, officers, or public groups who are reluctant to comply with these plans are pressured by federal agencies such as the FBI, the Secret Service, or the Department of Homeland Security, who often use the threat of diminished funding to ensure compliance. In the case of Miami, this even extended to the Miami Police Department denying the Operational Plan for the protest policing from a later citizen investigation panel investigating police misconduct during the protests.

Sixth, most importantly for the current study, the Miami model of policing brought innovations in spatial control for the purposes of controlling protest. The tactics revolved around the core concepts of area denial, protest march redirection, protest march constriction, and

296 Fernandez 71.
297 Miami CIP Report 10.
protester isolation. Many of these spatial changes are done ahead of time, in advance of the actual protest beginning. Under the Miami model, police identify locations that might be strategically valuable to protesters, such as public parks or plazas, and reserve or block their use ahead of time. This includes securing public buildings, reinforcing important local businesses, and making other strategic places inaccessible (such as parking ramps, which allow for lines of sight and high ground). As mentioned above, one of the means of spatially nullifying protest is to forbid gatherings of any size. Prior to the planned protest, police will engage in public training drills and mass shows of force in order to publicize their preparedness, enforcement techniques, and abundant protest control tools. One such tool is the mass detention center, typically a warehouse or space with a large interior, generally miles from the proposed protest site. These facilities are arranged and prepared ahead of time to handle mass arrests. A further step is the division of the protest area, generally an urban downtown, into a series of zones based on access. These zones are similar to military “hard” or “soft” zones, and are enforced through roadblocks, barricades, fences, and checkpoints. People who the police suspect of being protesters are harassed, detained, or arrested when they enter the area, generally on the basis of the “zero tolerance” policing approach detailed above. This extends to disruption of protester organizing spaces, assembly areas, staging grounds, or housing, again, typically based on minor infractions such as suspicion of fire code violations or exceeding capacity. These raids are executed on small pretenses, but serve to both intimidate protesters and disrupt protest plans.

During the actual protest event, these spatial control plans are augmented by several practices. Police generally set up and utilize video and visual surveillance of protest crowds, both through area wide surveillance and security cameras, and through street level surveillance. Many different types of field forces are mobilized, such as skirmish lines and platoons on foot, bicycle-mounted police, horse-mounted cavalry, motorcycle or dirt bike cavalry, and personnel carriers, such as large trucks, armored military vehicles, or SUVs with extra mounted running boards. Checkpoints are manned, and small squads of police are set to guard high profile facilities. The protests rallies and marches themselves are blocked or obstructed in any way possible, and marches and pickets are channeled and redirected away from vital areas. If necessary, the streets are cleared using weak legal justifications followed quickly by applied force. During the street clearing, special weapons such as tear gas or pepper spray may be used. The clearing is followed with mass arrests and pursuit of escapees. Those arrested are removed to the distant detention facilities, held for the maximum legal time or longer, then charged and released far from the original protest site.

The Miami model of protest policing has come under significant criticism from citizens' groups, protester organizations and affinity groups, and even the very municipalities where the model is implemented. In the case of Miami itself, the Civilian Investigative Panel reviewed police conduct and found significant police activity of concern and wrongdoing. First, the MPD's policies and practices did not adequately protect Constitutional rights, and in fact intimidated citizens into silence. The police did not ensure that legal marches could continue. The police used indiscriminate force against demonstrators, including attacks on retreating protesters, including the use of tasers, which were banned at the time. Police protected property far more than people, except for the property of the protesters, which was not treated well. Police were rude and aloof to demonstrators, even to the point of clearly protecting some people and not protecting others. Protesters were profiled, unlawfully searched, detained, and arrested, even
though the majority of arrests at the protests did not result in findings of guilt. This policing overreach resulted in a number of lawsuits against the City of Miami, Dade County, the MPD, and other enforcement agencies, generally on the basis of false arrests, physical damage, and civil rights violations. As a result of these investigations and lawsuits, three months after the protests, the Miami city council voted to rescind the ordinances that formed the legal foundation for Miami model of protest policing. However, the model has been adopted since by police departments across the United States and around the world, and is now the new standard model of protest policing.

7.1.4: Global Antiwar protests, 15 February 2003

The United States' involvement in the Second Gulf War under George W. Bush can be viewed as reprisals for the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. This war brought another round of massive protests against American foreign military action. Groups that had previously protested a wide array of issues collaborated with new protests aimed at voicing public disagreement with the new Gulf War, creating massive marches in cities across the world. The largest day of demonstrations was on the 15th of February 2003, where protesters in more than sixty nations marched, producing the largest mass protest in the history of the world, and the largest protests since the Vietnam War. Somewhere between 8 and 30 million total protesters marched in Berlin, London, Rome, Paris, Madrid, Barcelona, Damascus, Melbourne, Sydney, San Francisco, Amsterdam, Montreal, Valencia, Seville, Dublin, Los Angeles, Athens, Zagreb, and Brussels. Most of the protests used city streets to march, and many of them used public parks or plazas for assembly and rally. In some cities, certain streets were blocked off. The protests proceeded without significant interference or arrest by police, except in New York City. In general, there had not been enough time for the practices of the Miami model of policing to be institutionalized in police departments across the United States, and due to the massive size and scope of the protests, police followed no prior model of protest policing, instead opting to simply monitor the massive protests for public safety. No available evidence indicates this to have been a coordinated decision across police departments around the world, rather, it was a pragmatic approach arrived at independently by each local administration.

The New York situation was markedly different. Ignoring prior models of protest policing, the NYPD refused to issue permits for marches, did not communicate with march leadership, used indiscriminate arrests, and attacked peaceful demonstrators repeatedly using mounted cavalry, pepper spray, batons, and tear gas. The police blocked off many streets, and again employed “demonstration pens” to isolate protesters into cordoned-off areas. These

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299 Noakes and Gillham, and Fernandez.  
300 Guinness.  
301 Dunn et. al. 23.  
302 Dunn et. al. 30.  
303 Dunn et. al. 26.  
304 Dunn et. al. 28.  

Sagan 127
small areas were blocked off with tall chain link fences, with only one or two narrow openings, allowing protesters to enter or leave very slowly, and under direct police supervision. This served to rigidly control protesters' use of space, and had the added effect of intimidation, as police would always outnumber those entering or leaving the protest, and police always control when the entrances/exits are open and available. The 2003 New York protest event-site eventually resulted in between 275 and 350 arrests. This is a significant example because this protest represents an outlier in spatial management in protest policing. This mode of protest policing is a throwback to the escalated force model as it was on display in Chicago in 1968, combined with newer spatial innovations such as the 'protest pen.' The NYPD was taking a course of protest policing development significantly different and significantly more repressive than the rest of the country.

This course continued in the New York Police Department's response to the protests at the 2004 Republican National Convention. The NYPD collaborated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation well in advance of the protests, identifying a number of possible threats to the convention proceedings and emphasized security. Critics of this connection pointed to the conflation of protest with terrorism. Part of this collaboration can be explained by the presence of a sitting president at the convention, as well as the site of New York City having been the target of the terror attacks in 2001, and the subsequent national preoccupation with security. On the street policing was conducted by NYPD, several other regional and national law enforcement agencies, in joint collaboration with federal law enforcement personnel and agencies. The protests themselves drew between five hundred and eight hundred thousand participants, and resulted in around 1800 arrests. Protesters used Central Park and Union Square gather, organize, and rally, and to serve as endpoints to marches. Once again the NYPD used free-speech zones to control protesters, as well as blocked streets, barricades, intelligence-gathering on protesters, videotaping protests and protesters, plainclothes or undercover police acting as agents provocateurs, mass arrests, and arrests for heretofore unprosecuted activities. Police also used 'divide-and-arrest' tactics, pushing through marches using vehicular and mounted cavalry, surround demonstrators, and arresting them en masse. Bicyclists and pedestrian protesters, media personnel, and some bystanders were rounded up in large sections of mobile and flexible fencing and netting by New York Police, demonstrating another spatial innovation by police. Further, the police set up remote detention centers for protesters and bystanders who had been arrested. These temporary prisons were of exceptionally poor quality, and held large numbers of protesters in small spaces, sometimes up to 40 in a 10 foot by 20 foot area, for long periods of time without charges or access to lawyers. At least one protester was held for 57 hours, and some had been held for more than 72 hours. These temporary jails served to dampen the protests by both keeping protesters off the streets as well as intimidating other protesters. The condition of the detention facilities and the treatment of the arrestees was so unusual that protesters and media

305 Vitullo-Martin.
307 I contend this emphasis on security is a part of the neoliberalization of urban space; any spatialized activity that takes place outside a narrowly-defined set of acceptable spatial rules is 'othered' and criminalized. I detail this argument in a later chapter. This is also discussed in Collins and Glover, Collateral Language.
308 Vitale.
310 Ferguson.

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nicknamed the facilities “Guantanamo on the Hudson,” named after the notorious long term holding facility for enemy combatants at Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where the United States Military holds suspected terrorists for long periods. Enough similarity existed between the actions of the police and the actions of the United States Military in not following conventional rules for prisoner treatment that protesters and critics were able to draw a strong parallel between increasing militaristic authoritarian control both in at home America and abroad.

The militarization of police forces across the United States in the wake of 9/11 is further explored by London School of Economics sociologist Christian Parenti in Lockdown America. Parenti explains the policing practice of “zero tolerance,” in that police are given wide latitude to prosecute even the smallest crimes with heavy responses in order to preserve “quality of life.”

This aggressive prosecution of law is meant to curb “disorder” in all its forms, and ensure the unimpeded processes of urban space. This movement spread in the United States with security consultant William Bratton. Bratton was commissioner of the NYPD from 1994 to 1996, and the LAPD from 2002-2009. Bratton's lessons remained in the culture of policing in New York, and were attractive enough to police in Los Angeles for them to recruit him. Focusing on proactive and pre-emptive policing, zero tolerance policing stems from the “broken window” theory of popular sociology, first published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1982 by criminologists James Q. Wilson and George Kelling. The basic idea is that one broken window on any street, left unrepaired, with produce increasing crime on that street. The extension to policing is that small infractions of the law will result in ever greater boldness on the part of criminals. Making arrests for small infractions could be the way to detain lawbreakers and give the police opportunities to find or escalate other more serious charges. Thus, police felt it necessary to give no ground and focus ever more on controlling protests, even to the point of pre-emptive arrests, refusing permits, attacking protesters, and using military tactics to control urban space.

Similar security features were used at the Democratic National Convention in the same year. Held in Boston, the protests were smaller and the police action less violent. There were fewer protesters than in the New York event-site, but Boston police fielded the largest force in decades. The Boston event-site was notorious for its use of free-speech zones, that were: “surrounded on all sides by concrete blocks and steel fencing, with razor wire lining the perimeter. Then, there is a giant black net over the entire space.” The pens themselves were located under a train line, adjacent to a bus parking lot, far away from delegates and convention activity. National Lawyer's Guild representative Michael Avery described the “free speech zones” during the 2004 Democratic national convention in Boston:

“The zone is large enough only for 1000 persons to safely congregate and is bounded by two chain link fences separated by concrete highway barriers. The outermost fence is covered with black mesh that is designed to repel liquids. Much of the area is under an abandoned elevated train line. The zone is covered by another black net that is topped with razor wire. There will be no sanitary facilities in the zone and chairs will not be permitted. There is no way for the demonstrators to pass written materials to the convention delegates.” -Michael Avery, 290, Boykoff.

311 Parenti 70.
313 Author's note: These are elsewhere called “Jersey Barriers.”

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The convention center itself was fenced and blockaded. Tom Hayden, one of the 'Chicago 7' who were tried in the wake of the Chicago 1968 protest event-site, also came to Boston in 2004 to lead protests. The presence of similar tactics and conditions in Boston as in New York lead me to speculate that some of the police departments involved shared information about how to deal with protesters, perhaps in collaboration with federal policing agencies, considering the common factor was political conventions. However, I have no evidence for this, and such investigation lies outside of the scope of this work. A guidebook for how to prepare for public events that the President attends, and the document presents guidelines on how to deal with demonstrations. Most of the instructions deal with promoting counter-demonstrators called “rally squads” and placing them strategically to block views of other protesters, and to have the rally squads chant loudly pro-presidential messages such as “USA! USA! USA!” to drown out dissenting messages. The section on how to deal with protesters in the street, however, is presumably among content that has been redacted. Clearly the focus is on maintaining control over the public political messages.

Europe also saw significant protest event-sites prior to the 2008 Democratic National Convention in Denver. 2005 saw widespread urban and suburban unrest in France. The demonstrations were ethno-economic and age based, as suburban France is generally the realm

314 Greenhouse.
316 Presidential Advance Manual, 2002, pages 36 to 66 have been redacted. Significant other sections have been redacted. The public version of the 103-page manual has been reduced to 12 pages, including the cover and blank pages listing only the redactions.
of immigrants, youth, and the poor. There were also large protests against the G-8 in Rostock, Germany, which featured widespread use of black blocs, blockades, and tear gas. They are included here to demonstrate the global character of protest movements against neoliberalization and economic injustice.

7.1.4: Comparison of Event-sites

The preceding events (Seattle 1999, Washington DC and Los Angeles 2000, Miami 2003, New York and Boston 2004, as well as the European events) show the following five significant factors:

First, an increasing sophistication of police considerations and mobilization of spatial control over protests, through use of designated zones, barriers and fences, pens, and the use of divide-and-arrest tactics, in addition to the standard range of spatial tactics traditionally used in protest policing.

Second, that the 'negotiated management' of protest policing could not cope with variety of protest groups, with their decentralized organization, novel tactics (such as the lockdown formation) and with the deliberate sabotage by some groups, particularly the black blocs. The sheer scale of the protests, coupled with the variety of participants, made the 'negotiated management' model untenable.

Third, the manifest inability of the prevailing model to cope with protester innovation caused a crisis in protest policing and its approach to space. This crisis resulted in a partial reversion to a prior model of protest policing socio-spatial technologies, namely the 'escalated violence' model, combined with the addition of new technologies of policing, such as less-lethal weaponry. In general, this transitional period was marked by spatial tactics of holding protesters and dispersing protests before a more sophisticated set of tactics could be devised.

Fourth, this crisis spurred the development of an emergent model of protest policing aligned with the neoliberalization of urban space, and significant police innovation in strategic protest nullification. The 'strategic incapacitation' model shows a sensitivity to protester visibility and disregard for liberal-democratic models of rights to space and space access.

Fifth, the crisis and failures of protest policing prior to 2003 are analogous to Chicago 1968, particularly in how badly the police tactics failed, and how visible that failure was to the media and general public. Both Chicago 1968 and Seattle 1999 are widely viewed as protester victories. The emergence of the Miami Model of Protest Policing, also called the the 'Strategic Incapacitation' style of protest policing, were attempts to develop new policing tactics to deal with transgressive protesters. These new models used urban space in ways that were more in line with neoliberal re-constitutions of urban space than prior liberal-democratic models of urban space. These tactics are part of the militarization of policing, and the police conception of urban space as a combat zone.
7.2: Denver 2008: Welcome to Denver

The Democratic National Convention in 2008 took place in Denver, Colorado between August 25th and 28th. It was accompanied by protests of up to twenty thousand participants. As police and enforcement agencies expected nearly fifty thousand protesters, they coordinated more than fifty different agencies and jurisdictions to organize security for the convention and manage protests. The nomination of liberal Barack Obama to the candidacy stood in stark contrast to the prior 8 years under the neoconservative regime of George W. Bush, and protesters combined dissatisfaction with guarded hopeful anticipation.

I was present and in Denver between August 24th and 29th 2008 to conduct direct observation on the protest event-site during the Democratic National Convention. In the following section, as with the previous two chapters, I will explore and analyze the most important factors in understand spatial control in the protests and protest policing in Denver in 2008. These four factors are: the type of social movement and the mode of enforcement, the nature of political crisis that inspired and provided the context for the protest, the spatio-temporal conditions of the protest itself, complete with a chronological exploration of events, and finally, I offer an interpretation and conclusions about this particular event-site, and comparison with the other event-sites discussed in this dissertation.

7.2.1: Type of Social Movement and Model of Enforcement

The type of social movement that produced the protesters for the protest event-site in Denver 2008 can best be described as a movement of movements. The protest groups differ from
those at the Chicago and Dallas event-sites in that they were much more interested in global concerns, and could generally be described as anti-globalization, or at least against the model of globalization as it had been presented and promoted by financial and governmental organizations. In this sense these groups represented the globalization of protest, and the link between local action and international issues. These protest groups were collections and coalitions of smaller affinity groups. When coordinated and joined together, these collections of affinity groups can create large protest bodies in relatively little time, especially with the use of modern communication technology. Such coalition and unification was on display in Denver, as hundreds of affinity groups each contributed some dozens of protesters to the overall protest body.

In the case of St. Paul and Denver in 2008, affinity groups were responsible for organizing themselves and participating in protests. One of the primary means of group identification within affinity groups was common recognition, that is, that each member of any given subset of a larger affinity group knew every other member personally. The means by which affinity groups recognized their purpose for protest in common was the use of color. Colors were used as part of the protesters clothing and paraphernalia as means of identification with both other protesters and against certain political situations. Protesters, very much like the police and federal agents also in the streets, wore what could be considered uniforms. While I discussed the use of the color black in clothing in an earlier section, note that although some members of affinity groups were present at the protests and were wearing black, they did not en masse participate in black bloc tactics. These colors were worn as any part of clothing that was prominent: shirts, hats, tops, patches, etc. While other colors were worn on each protester according to his or her preference, colors that clashed or contrasted with their affinity group's identifying color were in general not used. In particular, affinity groups that were present to protest capitalist policies wore red prominently, affinity groups that were protesting environmental degradation wore green, and groups that protested the detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay or in America's prison system wore orange. Affinity groups protesting women's issues wore pink, sometimes clad entirely in the color, as with the affinity group “Code Pink.” Some affinity groups and protest groups had members within them who served as field medics, who were trained ahead of time to administer first aid (especially in case of tear gas attack or police attack) on protesters and bystanders. These first aid providers were identified by the medical red cross on a white background, usually as an armband or patch, on both their persons and on their medical kits.

As with prior events, the primary mode of protest was direct action, organized by coalitions of affinity groups. The direct action at Denver generally took the form of the rally and the march, occupying public space en masse to bring attention to the political issues at hand. As the main protest body was made up of affinity groups working together, these affinity groups used color coding to maintain small group cohesion while protesting. This use of coordinated colors and flags was a form of non-verbal communication on the part of the protesters, signifying affiliation and political stance.\(^\text{317}\) They would gather and remain together in small groups, identifying each other and their group belonging by their prominent displays of their chosen

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\(^{317}\) In contrast, police were almost universally clothed in very dark blue or black clothing. Visiting officers from other jurisdictions generally wore the uniforms of their divisions, but all of the front line riot police wore black. No doubt the color was selected for its potential to intimidate protesters.
color representing their causes (red, green, pink, orange, and so on) on otherwise generally black clothing. These affinity groups further coordinated their positions within larger marches by the use of colored flags.

Use of rally flag by affinity groups can be seen here. Note the orange and black flags, denoting that this group is protesting prison conditions and police violence. Also note the loose skirmish line of police blocking the group from proceeding. Also note colored stripes on police helmets denoting rank and function.

Protesters used parks and plazas as staging areas at the beginning points of marches. March routes (sometimes called “parade routes” on signage and official notifications) were mapped out ahead of time in coordination with police, perhaps in an attempt to stem any violence resulting from unpredictable protesters behavior. Not all marches were permitted, however, as the unscheduled march in the above photo was called illegal, cordoned off, and dispersed by police. These staging areas were assembly points within public parks where protesters could rest from the 90+ degree heat, collect information, coordinate activities, and resupply for the coming protests. The photo below shows one such staging area in Civic Center Park, in the heart of downtown Denver. Note the yellow “police line do not cross” tape stretched across trees, marking a “safe zone” for protesters. The dividing tape is marked with signs that proclaim this place a “Green Safe Zone – No Cops Allowed.” Due to the informal nature of the protesters gathering in the park, most likely this official police tape was appropriated by protesters and was being deployed here to humorous and
ironic purpose, inverting the implied power relationships indicated on the tape. This symbolic taking of space was not challenged by police, though the tape barriers are purely symbolic. Given the “strategic incapacitation” model of protest policing in evidence in Denver, had the protesters become unruly or sought to fortify their position in this open field, no doubt the police would have not been stopped by the tape barrier, and would have used all means at their disposal to clear the park.

Convergence sites were marked by handmade signage that varied according to affinity groups and function. Some signs marked directions, such as the photos below, others provided information on topics relevant to the protest, others general civic information. These stalls and information booths in the parks were also permitted by the police, but were always under observation.
Convergence site directions on display in Civic Center Park.
Spray-painted arrows on display at Cuernavaca Park. The cross above the arrow and word 'medic' below indicate that this arrow points to a medic support station.
Each of the protest marches was in the core area of downtown Denver, near the Convention Center, but at a significant distance from the Pepsi Center. The Convention Center was used for lower level DNC meetings, but the Pepsi Center was where the Democratic National Convention was actually being held. One significant march took place down the main shopping thoroughfare in downtown Denver, on the 16th street mall, on the 24th of August. The march itself had roughly five thousand participants. The march functioned as a long and mobile picket. The protests chanted in addition to using picket signs, with the most common chants being call-and-response “Whose Streets?”-“OUR streets!,” “No Justice, No Peace!” and the rhythmic “This is what democracy looks like!” These chants foreground the struggle over legitimacy of political behavior in public space, contesting state monopolies on legitimate speech.
and power. The march was closely monitored by an escort of bicycle mounted police, seen below.

The flexibility and mobility of the bicycle police line meant that police could cut into the march, break it up, and arrest transgressive protesters at any point. In this case, the relationship between the protesters and the police was cordial and professional, and there were no such transgressive incidents.

One such event occurred early the next day, as a black bloc assembled and attempted to damage property in and around 16th street. The black bloc tactic of spatial organization as resistance, as discussed above, relies on speed, anonymity, and dispersal to accomplish aims of chaos and provocation. At this occasion, around one hundred black bloc participants broke from another march and began damaging store fronts. They were quickly hemmed in, then individually isolated and detained. Most were arrested, and those not arrested were dispersed by police.
7.2.2: Mode of Protest Policing

How these black bloc protesters were dealt with by the Denver police is emblematic of the mode of protest policing observed in Denver. The black bloc was surrounded by police in a maneuver called “kettling.” The kettling maneuver involves police approaching a demonstration from each of four sides (note the rectilinearity of the streets in the image...the street formation itself makes kettling a relatively simple maneuver), compressing them into a small area, then letting them trickle out where they can be arrested. Kettling earns its name from the amount of time the police remain

Kettling in action. Phase 1 is relatively quick, as police skirmish lines advance on protesters from each angle. Phase 2 can take significantly longer as police wait out the protesters' stamina and willpower. Phase 3 also happens slowly,
in formation, with the protesters inside the “kettle.” The idea is to let the protesters exhaust themselves over a long time, then let them slowly leave to either disperse or be arrested. The “kettle” in the name comes from the idea of “bottling up” the protesters under pressure. In the case of the Denver black bloc, all but two were charged and released with plea bargains. After arrest, the protesters were first moved to an off-site detention facility nicknamed “Gitmo on the Platte,” similar to the facility in New York City in 2004, named after the notorious Guantanamo Bay Prison Camp, but here located on the Platte River, near in northeastern Denver, in an industrial area several miles from downtown. The improvised holding warehouse holding facility featured a series of 18 by 18 foot chainlink cages each meant to hold 20 protesters. The initial designs called for razor wire along the tops of these cages, but after community review and criticism of the harshness of such material, these were changed to simple chainlink covers. The facility itself was remote from downtown, and after the protesters were held all night, they were released and left on their own to travel away. No bus service was provided.

The way that the black bloc was dealt with shows how the new model of protest policing succeeded the 'negotiated management' model of Noakes and Gillham, and emerged from the violence and chaos of the crisis period exemplified by New York City. This new model, 'strategic incapacitation', focuses on neutralization and isolation rather than confrontation and escalation. The strategy of 'negotiated management' was used less and less, and 'strategic incapacitation' was used more and more. During the 1990s and early 2000s, increasing funding for military-grade equipment, an emphasis on national security in the wake of the First Gulf War, and a national neoliberal policy of improving federal support to police all aided this shift in the mode of protest policing. Further, this shift was encouraged by the professionalization of policing dating back to the 1980s. By 2008, police who entered the profession in the 1980s have now had the chance to achieve positions of seniority, allowing the lessons of professionalization and the integration of sociological and criminological thinking to inform the strategy and tactics of protest policing.

One result of the professionalization of policing was the integration of more sociological understandings of human behavior. This meant that older ways of viewing human mass behavior were being supplanted by newer positions informed by developments in sociological and human sciences. Protest policing has always been a social technology. It exists as a set of practices, and techniques designed to control populations through a combination of spatial procedures and applied paramilitary technology. It is an implementation of governmentality, disciplining populations to behave certain ways in urban spaces, and reinforcing that behavior with on-the-ground enforcement. The discipline comes through selective application of laws, communication in advance, intimidation, shows of overwhelming force, pre-emptive arrests, and overpowering force applied to removing transgressive elements.

One such sociological idea integrated into police thinking was the challenge to the idea that crowds are irrational and emotional chaotic masses. According to McPhail, the “myth of the madding crowd” strongly critiqued sociological assumptions about crowd behavior, and showed earlier police resistance to including sociological thinking in their considerations of protest policing practice. Based on Carl Couch's 1968 assessment of what had become the

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318 Theuptake.org.
319 Featured in Schweingruber and Wohlstein.
predominant image of the acting crowd, McPhail continues debunking the nine crowd stereotypes: suggestibility, destructiveness, irrationality, emotionality, mental disturbances, lower-class participation, spontaneity, creativeness, and lack of self-control. Couch showed that these stereotypes were empirically false and that they did not account for all forms of crowd behavior. The critiques can be summarized as the following:

1) **Irrationality:** crowds may indeed be rational if a crowd's activity can be seen as the best possible means of obtaining a goal.

2) **Emotionality:** Emotionality does not necessarily lead to irrational conduct. Recent studies in neuroscience show that emotionality is an integral part of rational decision making.\(^{321}\)

3) **Suggestibility:** disproven by fact they crowds do not automatically disperse when ordered to do so.

4) **Destructiveness:** Couch argues that when crowds and authorities come into conflict, authorities in fact commit more violence than the crowds. Thus, police response has a determinant effect on crowd behavior.

5) **Spontaneity:** authors argue that no research shows this to be the case; furthermore, the more recent convergence theory counters this myth.\(^{322}\)

6) **Anonymity:** unaccountability and loosening of social mores; this underlies Le Bon's theory of crowd behavior. It is countered in that crowds are usually assembled of smaller groups of whom the members are socially familiar, such as families, friends, and, affinity groups. However, the effectiveness of the black bloc tactic depends on anonymity.

These critiques had become mainstream in sociology by the mid 1990's. As part of the increased education required of police officers from the 1970's onward, sociological understanding of crowds eventually became an essential part of police training.\(^{323}\) As such, police entering protest situations are aware that they are dealing with rational people who are engaging in deliberate acts, that police response to these acts is important in maintaining order, and so police discipline must be maintained. Further, police recognize the potential for disruption, and so deal sharply with transgressive behavior.

Jennifer Earl and Sarah A. Soule explore this further in “Seeing Blue: A Police-Centered Explanation of Protest Policing.” Researched and written during the transition period between the 'negotiated management' and 'strategic incapacitation' models of protest policing, and published on January 6, 2004, their article puts forth the 'blue' theory of protest policing, that is, that then-current theories of protest policing are inaccurate. As discussed above, their research shows that the largest influencing factor on police conduct during protest policing events is norms within policing organizations. Increased availability to military style tactics and equipment shift the culture of policing toward militaristic mindsets.

A core component of policing culture as identified by Stephen Herbert is territoriality and spatial control. Part of how spatial control is assessed is through perception of risk, particularly personal risk of serving policing officers. If police feel physically threatened by protesters,

\(^{320}\) McPhail 1991.
\(^{321}\) McPhail cites Demassio 1994.
\(^{322}\) In this sense, sociological convergence theory states that industrialized economies will produce protest at various times as results of social and political pressures.
\(^{323}\) McPhail and McCarthy.
particularly if protesters seem organized and effective in taking and occupying space, then the personal risk felt by police is much greater. Physical barriers between police and protesters likely decrease the perception of personal risk to the police, and, subsequently, make the likelihood of repressive action smaller. Therefore, police discipline in riot situations decays when police come into direct contact with protesters, and is bolstered with the presence of physical barriers.

Situational threats differ from what the authors call diffuse threats. Situational threats are immediate and pressing such as protesters in the streets, or the chaos of a black bloc action. Diffuse threats are more nebulous or distant, such as the critiques or social goals of the protesters. Earl and Soule show that police are much more concerned with situational threats, that is, the situations in the streets and public order, and the maintenance of control over the situations. Thus, police are preoccupied with control over the situation on the street, and will be on alert for potential physical threats. Combined with the militarization of the police, and the strategic incapacitation model of policing, this means that police will use overwhelming force in any protest policing situation, and will not hesitate to abrogate rights to urban space based on existing, emergent, or anticipated situations.

In order to forestall unrest and maintain spatial control, police relied on intimidation and show of force, using the implied threat of violence to cow protesters into inaction. One of the ways this one was done was through disciplined formations, as described above. Another was through uniforms and gear. Police were issued a broad variety of field gear for a range of possible actions. Protective armor is frequently used by front rank skirmish line police. These police are typically armed with less-lethal armaments, such as truncheons, batons, nightsticks, or tasers. Other police who back up the skirmish line might be armed with pepper spray guns or guns that shoot pepper spray capsules, or guns that shoot heavy bean bags or rubber or wooden bullets. Almost all police carry a number of plastic zip-tie restraints in quantity in place of handcuffs; the plastic restraints are lighter and can be applied to a number of arrestees before needing to resupply. These armaments are relatively recent developments in protest policing, and their mobilization has expanded the range of possible police responses to protest. Further, the potential to alter protester behavior through implicit threats of violence means that the strategic use of these implements is a core enabling element of the 'strategic nullification' model of protest policing.

324 Other than individual officer's personal equipment, such as body armor, shields, helmets, and the like.

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The policeman in the preceding photo shows the array of armor and weaponry issued to a front line skirmish line officer. The personal protective armor covers the head, protecting the eyes and face from projectiles. Reinforced kevlar armor covers the torso, with additional forearm and shoulder pads. Knee, shin, and metatarsal guards protect against attacks to the foot or legs. Armored gloves protect from blades or lacerations. The officer is armed with a baton that he is holding at parade rest. He is also armed with a taser, which is the bright yellow device at his right hip. Note that the officer does not carry a lethal firearm. Also note the large bag hanging at the officer's left side; this contains a gas mask and other protective gear to be donned in event of a tear gas action. This officer prominently displays his serial number and badge. Some officers in other protest event-sites, such as Seattle, New York, and Los Angeles, covered their badges and name tags in attempts to remain anonymous, thus protecting them from prosecution after enhanced repressive activities.

The technical precision of protest policing, combined with interdepartmental collaboration and rank-and-file discipline, created a mobile body of enforcers who could respond to emergent protest conditions, control urban space by controlling access to areas in flexible ways, and act quickly to arrest and detain transgressive protesters at any point in the protests. The Denver Police Department was augmented by officers visiting from more than fifty jurisdictions. A large number of different enforcement bodies from across the country came to
join the effort to control Denver's streets during the convention.

This image shows a skirmish line of police from at least two different agencies wielding batons and blocking access to a side street. The march they are monitoring is occurring parallel to this skirmish line just outside the frame to the right. Note each officer is equipped with helmet, baton, and tear gas mask.

One of the social technological means of protest policing is through control over terminology. The names given to processes and procedures both evokes the purpose of that process as well as an association for that process. For example, groups of police in units, which can deploy in skirmish lines or other formations, are not called riot squads, but rather “crowd-management units.” Their ideal use is to calm people and get them to go home, and the name reflects the aim. The ideal use of force should only come as the situation deems necessary, even if such force is less-lethal or non-lethal. If force is necessary, or if police need to extract individuals from the protesting mass, they might form a “TANGO team.” Proposed by FBI officer Ken Hubbs, the TANGO team is a formation of officers heavily armed, with 37mm shell launchers, 12 gauge beanbag shooters, shields, sub-machine guns and canisters of aerosol agents (CN, CS or OC gases). Ordinary officers who are assigned to monitor the protest events receive special training for weeks or months ahead of the event-site. This is intended to help police officers serve in crowd control capacities while remaining unbiased, despite personal political inclination or disposition toward protesters.

325 Discussed in Chapter 4.
326 2-Chloroacetophenone (CN), o-chlorobenzylidene malonitrile (CS) and oleoresin capsicum (OC). These are each kinds of tear gas or pepper spray designed to incapacitate unruly protesters. Schep, Slaughter, and McBride.
This official attitude of cooperation, reasonable response, and professionalism does not always match police officers' actual attitudes and responses, however. The outward professionalization of the police does not always extend to changes in policing culture. Some unidentified members of the Denver Police Department privately issued some DNC commemorative t-shirts to certain officers. These t-shirts caused a public furor when one was leaked to the media. The front of the shirt shows a number “68” with a circle-bar over it, indicating that 1968 was not to be repeated in Denver. The back of the shirt showed a caricature of a gigantic riot police officer with a crazed and eager grin leering over a skyline of Denver, wielding a massive riot baton, with the outline of a tiny protesting crowd below. The caption on the back of the shirt read “We get up early, to BEAT the crowds, 2008, DNC.”\footnote{327 Emphasis in original. Clearly the intent here is to emphasize the action of beating protesters.} The implication is that police were looking forward to committing violence on protesters, and were gleefully anticipating their repressive and brutal activities.\footnote{328 Denver News, Colorado Independent, boing-boing.} The Denver Police Union claimed the shirts were the work of a few officers, and did not represent the feelings of the whole department, but refused to disavow the message contained on the shirts.

No 1968 in Denver. DPD commemorative t-shirt, front. Image courtesy Ernest Luning.
This mismatch in outward professionalism and inward brutality serves the goal of further intimidation. The message carried by this event was that although, on the surface, officers would be professional, any one of them could at any time find any excuse to apply more violent and repressive techniques of control. No officers were publicly identified as wearing the shirts, and no officers were reprimanded for producing possessing one. The shirts themselves, and the media response, served as a further tool of governmentality and social control.

The shirts convey another message, namely that the police profession in the United States was still haunted by the failure to contain the protests in Chicago in 1968. The public humiliation that these officers and organizations felt in the wake of their heavily televised and media reported violence has lasted at least forty years. As I discuss earlier, 1968 was viewed as a catastrophic failure of policing which prompted years of self-examination and revision of police education.

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329 The nature of the t-shirt and the protocol of police wearing uniforms in public make it entirely possible that the shirt was worn under the uniforms of police officers making up skirmish lines confronting protesters.
training, and policy, with the attendant loss of machismo and a perception of diminished authority. This period of examination resulted in the shift of models of protest policing from 'escalated force' to 'negotiated management.' As discussed in both Dubber and Herbert, core to policing values are the sense of power and control that stem from machismo and the ability to threaten violence. The 'negotiated management' model of protest policing states that violence should only be used as a last resort, and that protesters should be given wide latitude in community disruption.

Through their public statements and professional demeanor, the Denver police were publicly showing their most professional face, emphasizing their skills, training, and equipment, and declaring that Denver's Democratic National Convention will go smoothly and peacefully. Inwardly, privately, however, they were committed to avoiding the chaos of 1968 specifically because, in 1968, the police very publicly lost that which they held most dear: control. Worse, they lost control to a bunch of kids, more easily dehumanized, insulted, and derided than understood. Under no circumstances would the Denver police let that happen to them...even if it meant beating every protester. No doubt the contradiction of the message was lost on the creators of the shirt.

Possibly the media leak of the shirts was intentional by the shirt's producers. If the shirts had remained private, then they would indicate that the fear of another 1968 occurring was a private and chilling reminder to police. If, however, the shirts were deliberately leaked, then the exhortation that 1968 would not occur again was another subtle threat aimed directly at potentially transgressive protesters. The existence and activity in Denver of a protest organizing group calling themselves “Recreate '68” lends some weight to this. Perhaps the shirts were simply another social technology of control through intimidation.

### 7.3: Nature of Crisis: Failures of Neoliberalism

The nature of the crisis that spurred the protests during the 2008 Denver DNC protest event-site is the process of neoliberalization. Based on Brenner, Peck, and Theodore, neoliberalization is the processes of regulatory restructuring under post-1970s and post-2008 capitalism. As analyzed in Harvey 2005, neoliberalism is about the fundamental ideals of Western civilization, specifically personal freedom and human dignity, and the process of transforming them into economic principles, and reorganizing state relationships to capital so to maximize the freedom of capital.\(^{330}\) In practical terms, this means the widespread loosening of state oversight of financial relationships, weakening any organization that seeks to strengthen the state, and the increase in power of transnational organizations, such as corporations or non-governmental organizations, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In practical effects, this has resulted in a restoration of class power, increasing global wealth inequity and transferring wealth to the already wealthy.\(^{331}\) I refer to the process as neoliberalization rather than neoliberalism after Brenner, Peck, and Theodore because the term refers to the process of undergoing a change to a new condition rather than a static condition itself. Brenner, Peck, and Theodore define the three major dimensions of neoliberalization as

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\(^{330}\) Harvey 2005 5-7.
\(^{331}\) Harvey 2005 16-17.
follows: (i) regulatory experimentation; (ii) inter-jurisdictional policy transfer; and (iii) the formation of transnational rule-regimes. Further, neoliberalization "prioritizes market-based, market-oriented or market-disciplinary responses to regulatory problems; it strives to intensify commodification in all realms of social life; and it often mobilizes speculative financial instruments to open up new arenas for capitalist profit-making."

The social and cultural effects of these economic transformations are complex, wide-ranging, and innumerable. It is beyond the scope of this study to trace them all. To delineate each of the reasons that brought each of the protesters to the streets of Denver is impossible, but their dissatisfaction can be traced to neoliberalization as the root cause. I have listed some of the causes behind the formation of affinity groups above, but to reiterate, here are some of the larger issues protested against in Denver: women's rights, unequal global North-global South trade relationships, indigenous rights, prison reform, police brutality, environmental degradation, income inequality, consumer culture, political representation, American military involvement in the Middle East, and civil rights, to name the most common. Neoliberalization's emphasis on weakening state controls and the commodification of social life transform each of the social relationships behind each of the affinity groups' causes in ways that said affinity groups find detrimental to said relationships. The crisis spurred by neoliberalization is one of far-reaching social change. In general, neoliberalism was not showing results that its backers claimed it would.

An additional relevant condition could be constituted as a crisis as well. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the conservative regime of President George W. Bush implemented a wide series of reforms focused on national security. Part of these reforms was the implementation of the War on Terror, part retributive, part preventative, designed to ferret out and destroy any who would use terror as a weapon against the United States. Part of the War on Terror was a preoccupation among law enforcement with the idea of security, and an emphasis on vigilance. This was particularly true during events of national importance, such as the Democratic National Convention. This emphasis on security was one of the ideological expressions of neoliberalism; any activity out of the ordinary could be seen as a threat.

One of the means of assessing threat was a color-coded warning system designed and implemented nationally by the newly-created Department of Homeland Security, called the Homeland Security Advisory System. The chart was a way for ordinary citizens to be aware of possible threats to the nation at any time. In a color system that progressed from green (low threat) through blue (general risk of terrorist attack), yellow (significant risk of terrorist attack), orange (high risk of terrorist attack), to red (severe risk of terrorist attack). The system was in place between 2002 and 2011, and never dipped below yellow. The system was emblematic of the vague fear that Americans were supposed to have at all times, constantly on alert for terrorists. This national preoccupation with terror and security, and the invocation of 9/11 as justification, allowed for greater militarization of policing and the growth of the security state to proceed with little popular resistance. The fear of terrorists was used as the justification for the reorganization of civil rights and the abrogation of urban business as usual, especially during

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333 In a very broad sense, this gives weight to the Marxian model of base and superstructure. Neoliberalization is a shift in economic relations, which brings about changes in social relationships.
334 The full scope of the War on Terror is beyond this study.
important events. When I visited Denver in 2008, I was met with a DHS Orange Alert placard at the doors to the airport. No doubt the convention could have been a high-value target for terrorists.

Suspension of normal laws by a sovereign during a period of crisis or emergency is called a 'state of exception.' The state of exception is made possible in the United States post 9/11 by a set of extraordinary rules and laws put in place as security measures. Political theorist Jules Boykoff lists these as 1) designated protest zones, 2) presidential signing statements, and 3) the USA PATRIOT act. The legality of the protest zones, although challenged by protesters and civil liberties groups, was upheld by federal judges. Presidential signing statements are amendments added to bills being signed into law by the President; it is a way of saying “yes, AND....” In the case of protest policing, these signing statements cumulatively added new power to police and federal agencies, designed to protect Americans from terrorism, effectively allowing each law to be superseded and suspended by military or police concerns over security. The USA PATRIOT act affects protest policing through:..a shift of focus onto political activity, especially of people with non-mainstream beliefs and opinions; the resurrection of guilt by association as the paradigm for both criminal and immigration law; the loosening of FBI surveillance standards so that the bureau might more easily surveil, investigate, and infiltrate political, religious, and ethnic groups; and the criminalization of peaceful – albeit dissident – activity by transforming support for the humanitarian and political activities of certain foreign-based groups into a federal crime. We have seen from the Miami model of protest policing that each of these conditions is met. Thus the protest policing at the 2008 Denver DNC protest event-site, through following the Miami model of protest policing, was operating under extraordinary rules.

These extraordinary rules are spelled out in a Department of Homeland Security document. Certain events can be designated “National Special Security Events” by the President or by the Director of Homeland Security. First developed in 1998, the NSSE is predicated on a number of factors: anticipation of visiting dignitaries, size of the event, political, historical, or symbolic significance of the event, the duration of the event, the availability of law enforcement resources, and national threat assessments. Examples of these events are state funerals, political conventions, and major sporting or cultural events. There had been a total of 27 such events prior to the 2008 Denver DNC. Security procedures during a NSSE read like a manual of Miami model tactics: inter-agency coordination and inter-operability, increased police presence, increased police training and armament, extensive road closures, security fencing, barricades, and other security technology. Participating and coordinating agencies include local and state law enforcement agencies, the Secret Service, the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST), Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams, national Emergency Response Teams (ERT-N), the Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT), and the Strategic National Stockpile and Mobile Emergency Response System (MERS), among others. This document is significant because it

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335 Agamben 2005; I explain the state of exception in greater detail in Chapter 9.
336 Boykoff 290-297. A fourth law, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, deals with how foreign combatants are legally tried, and effectively has little to no bearing on protest policing. If protesters are arrested, and are United States citizens, they are still nominally protected under United States law, and cannot be tried by a military tribunal. In fact, very few protest policing arrests end in conviction.
337 An acronym: “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing the Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.” It is clear that protest police are some of those tools.
338 United States (Reese). First signed into law by President Bill Clinton in May 1998.
provides an explicit breakdown of procedures during the Miami model of protest policing, as well as a set of legal expressions of the state of exception. If the President/sovereign should declare a NSSE/state of exception, normal laws, rights, and rules of spatial access are abrogated for the duration of the event/emergency.

7.4: Spatio-temporal Context

To understand the actual conditions of the protest policing in Denver in 2008, I relied on a number of social science methods, detailed earlier in my chapter on methodology and method. In particular, I took advantage of being present at the event-site to record as much data as I could through a variety of methods. I relied on Zeisel's presentation of these methods as a guide for proceeding. I used the methods of behavior observation, interview, physical traces, and archival research. I observed and recorded the behavior of protesters, police, and bystanders. I interviewed several protesters, and I attempted to interview police officers, but was largely unsuccessful, as officers were reluctant to give anything other than official information. I examined the physical traces of the protest environment and urban space. My archival work on site was limited to material I could gather on site, and was generally of an informational or political nature. My later off-site archive work was more substantial.

What follows is a summary of the spatio-temporal context of the protest policing event-site in Denver in 2008 and is an account and summary of my field work. It is brief because this summary focuses on events at the place and time rather than a comprehensive analysis (which forms the body of the rest of this dissertation).

Denver has a number of physical features in common with the cities in my other case studies. These features are:

- flat and level ground
- the streets are in a set of two interlocking grid patterns that intersect at a 45 degree angle
- downtown Denver streets are relatively broad; ancillary streets are relatively narrow
- downtown Denver has a border of water at the north and west sides. Bridges across the western water boundary were tightly controlled.
- parks and squares: Denver has two major parks that were used for the protests: Civic Center Park and Cuernavaca Park
- density: the downtown area is densely built with medium tall buildings

As many other American plains cities founded in the 19th century, Denver is built on a modified gridiron pattern on flat and level ground adjacent a major river, in this case the South Platte. The ground is level and flat throughout, rising less than 100 feet through the entire downtown area from the edge of the South Platte one mile southwest, which was the entire scene of the protest event-site. The downtown area grid pattern is oriented northwest to southeast at a 45 degree angle to the rest of the Denver city grid. The protest event-site occurred entirely on this smaller, embedded grid, and so the orientation of the grid, and its relationship to the surrounding grid, is not relevant in this case.

Most of the protest marches I studied occurred on the main, broad avenues in downtown
Denver. One such avenue was the 16th street mall, which is a pedestrian and transit-only thoroughfare 80 feet across, with 19 foot sidewalks, which focuses on retail and shopping. One significant march that was un-permitted was routed to and eventually blocked on an ancillary street (details below). Further, the march that best displays the principles of the Miami model of protest policing's approaches to urban space (on August 27th, also detailed below) was routed through ancillary streets into even narrower spaces. In the case of the Denver 2008 protest event-site, the narrowness of the ancillary streets aided the police tactic to delay and let protests run out their energy. Narrower avenues allow for lower throughput of marchers, which means that marches take longer, which means marchers tire more easily near the end. The loss of protester energy eventually means that protest marches are easier to contain or disperse.

Denver's two water borders, the South Platte on the North and Cherry Creek to the west, serve different functions for the protests and protest policing. The South Platte is lined with parks, such as Cuernavaca Park, which makes it attractive to marchers as a staging and convergence area. As no convention events occurred north of the river, no protests occurred north of the river. Thus, the South Platte acted as a barrier not because of its spatial traits, but rather due to administrative reasons. It could very well be possible that the form of the river, and how it splits northern Denver from downtown Denver, led to the avoidance of scheduling events there. More likely this is not the case, however, as the Convention Center and the Pepsi Center, which were both centers of convention activity, are adjacent to downtown south of the river. In this case the South Platte was a social rather than a physical barrier. Out of the eleven streets which run diagonally from downtown Denver to Cherry Creek, seven of them have bridges spanning the water, meaning there are seven bridges connecting downtown and the larger convention events over a distance of one half mile. Police closed all but the Colfax Avenue bridge with limited access, checkpoints and multiple layers of fencing. The Convention Center, where most of the administrative components of the DNC were held, was on the east side of the creek, connected with downtown, whereas the Pepsi Center, which is where the big convention events and speeches were held, was across the creek from downtown. The Pepsi Center's separation from downtown streets was increased by its surrounding ring of parking lots, creating large open spaces that were subdivided and rigidly controlled by police.

The two major parks used for the protest organizing were Cuernavaca Park, which is directly north of downtown along the South Platte, and Civic Center Park, which forms the southeast corner of the downtown area (specifically the area of the event-site; no protest activity took place east of Civic Center park). The entire downtown edge of the South Platte is green space, but much of it was blocked from access to major avenues into downtown, and as such was not as attractive as starting places for marches. Further, the parks were at some distance from downtown, and the parks near the Pepsi Center were inaccessible, which means they were too distant from convention activities to be useful for rally purposes.

The density of downtown Denver meant that protest activity was confined to the streets and intersections. There were very few open parcels of land, either empty or parking facilities, that protesters could access. Further, any open spaces other than streets or parks were private property, so protesters risked arrest by using them. In addition, the protesters did not directly object to private property users within Denver's downtown, but were rather focused on the convention and its symbolic spaces, particularly the Pepsi Center. This meant that public spaces

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339 Pei Cobb and Freed.
were better targets for protest, as well as being legal to use.

I began my field study on Sunday, 24 August 2008. Although protesters and police groups each anticipated around fifty thousand protesters, according to media sources and police at the time, the actual number was in the twelve to fifteen thousand range. They were joined by fifteen thousand members of the media and 4,440 DNC delegates. Police from over 50 jurisdictions were present, as well as law enforcement from a number of federal agencies, such as the Secret Service and the Department of Homeland Security.

Concrete bollards and jersey barriers were used extensively, particularly as roadblocks, and around the convention center itself. Public notices were posted throughout downtown stating that no protests were allowed within 100 yards of the Convention Center itself. However, a very vocal group of pro-life demonstrators with visually graphic anti-abortion signs and bullhorn speeches immediately outside the Convention Center, holding a small rally. This gathering was not dispersed by police. Police officers I interviewed said they did not know why they had no orders to clear these demonstrators, who were ideologically opposed to the vast majority of the rest of the demonstrators.

The heat of the day was considerable, close to a 96 degree Fahrenheit high. On the streets around Civic Center Park a number of rows of portable toilets had been provided by the city, all of which looked to be in very good condition. There were also free water fountains and filling spigots around the Convention Center and set up through downtown. Civic center park itself had a DNC sponsored merchant fair. Merchants who are not pre-arranged were not allowed, which resulted in several enterprising unauthorized t-shirt sellers being evicted from the park by police.

Many streets were blocked with concrete roadblocks and tall steel fencing, some with checkpoints, sometimes augmented by dump trucks parked and blocking small gaps in the barriers. This was the first time I had seen trucks used as temporary gates in this fashion. The official parade routes were unblocked, but side-streets leading off of the parade routes were rigidly controlled. Protest organizers publicized a number of alternate non-sanctioned parade routes, some of which were used (see below).
The above photo shows the use of heavy utility or dump trucks to aid a blockade. Weighing many tons, these heavy vehicles were put in place to serve as gates to otherwise blockaded streets.

This bridge over Cherry Creek was blocked with concrete barricades.

I witnessed one such march on that Sunday. Protesters declared to police their route ahead of time, and their plan to march from the Civic Center Park to the Convention Center, and to hold a rally there. The march itself proceeded down auxiliary streets through Downtown that were significantly narrower than the main thoroughfares. The march was flanked by police the
whole route, and eventually blocked 1 ½ blocks from Convention Center. At this point the police formed a double skirmish line, preventing the march from proceeding forward, and kept the crowd between the march and the Convention Center separate from the march through use of loose skirmish lines and police using bicycles as barriers. The skirmish line police were all in riot gear, and used verbal commands to try and get the march to disperse. The protesters were told that their march was an illegal gathering, and that they had to clear the street, with stated times before forcible dispersal. The police on bicycles who were using them as barriers to prevent spectators from entering area of confrontation were followed by police guard line, who were standing at ready with batons at 6-8 foot intervals, facing the sidewalk to prevent resurgence into the street, with mounted police held in reserve, complete with horses equipped with riot shields on their faces.

This image shows police in a loose line using bicycles as temporary barriers to prevent bystanders from reaching protesters behind police skirmish lines to the left of the photo. Note the police control over the parking facility, which had strategic value as high ground with multiple entrances, serving as a gateway through a city block, possibly useful for circumventing blocked roads.

The protesters themselves were a fairly motley collection of various affinity groups. The protest crowd contained a large number of punks in stitched black garments, and lots of young people. In addition, many hippie types as well carrying signs reading 'peace and love' and other such messages that served as visual and verbal reminders the protests in Chicago in 1968. Several protesters I interviewed believed that the anniversary was an opportunity to link the present struggle with the drama of that year, as evidenced by the 'Recreate '68' protest organizing group. Others thought the group was a false protester group designed to provoke confrontation. Protesters used clothing colors and flags to denote their affinity groups: orange and black for antiwar/anti-torture causes, pink for code pink, black and green for eco-protestors, black and red for economic issues. I saw each group represented in this march. Further, many groups had embedded field medics, who were trained to EMT specs to deal with minor injuries and chemical weapons.

This march was eventually broken up and dispersed by mounted motorcycle police.

Sagan
These cavalry units had been part of the protest escort and had been riding slowly along the march's flanks. When the order was given to the police that the time had come to disperse the crowd, these officers used their motorcycle's loud engine revs and circular movement to disperse protesters. The loud engine revs frightened and startled protesters, and the tight maneuvering circles of the heavy motorcycles were intended to push protesters back so they would not be injured. The rest of the skirmish line police then advanced and dispersed the crowd from the narrow and confined street. I did not witness any arrests.

The crowd was halted at that location because the next building was a parking structure. Police showed a strategic interest in denying these structures to protesters, perhaps because of the easy access to higher ground and the roof. It is likely that police wanted to secure these spaces from possible sniper attacks or thrown objects. Neither I nor reporters noted concrete threats of this nature, however, so more probably these measures were preventative and for the sake of security and strategic spatial control.

I was joined in my observation of this protest by at least four legal advisory groups who had organized to observe police activities and enforcement tactics; these groups were Copwatch, The American Civil Liberties Union, the People's Law Project, and the National Lawyers' Guild. Members of each organization wore fluorescent-colored uniforms made of t-shirts, caps, or safety vests, which prominently identified their affiliation. Their high visibility and color-coding was a reminder that police were being held accountable here in ways that they had not in prior protest situations.
On Monday, the 25th of August, 2008, I went into the Convention Center itself, where most of the caucus meetings were being held. The same group of pro-life protesters had stationed themselves outside the Convention Center, with bullhorns and rather graphic banners. The main convention was being held in the Pepsi Center, to which I could get no access. The Pepsi Center was behind several layers of security, with roadblocks, checkpoints, video surveillance, and security fencing surrounding it in layers as far out as 1500 feet. Access to the Convention Center itself was through a metal detector and security screening. Some locations within were off limits.
Father and son on checkpoint duty, preventing unauthorized personnel from approaching the Pepsi Center. Note platform on backside of security fencing, able to serve as high ground if the fence is attacked. This is approximately one-half mile from the Pepsi Center. The parking structure in the background appears in another photo below from the opposite angle. (Relationship between gatekeepers is conjecture on the part of the author based on shared physique and physical stances.)

The streets outside were filled with skirmish lines or clusters of police on loose guard. Cameras seemed ubiquitous. Protesters, bystanders, media, and even police had them, with video cameras mounted on police bicycle handlebars and filming crowds. Containing and shaping a singular message about police conduct and protester aims in the street may be impossible when tens of thousands of individual image-producers and owners are at large. Mass produced media can be fed and manipulated, particularly if that is a tactic that is followed as part of the Miami model of protest policing, but so many independent video producers could not ever be silenced. Further, the police were monitored by National Lawyers' Guild legal observers, marked by fluorescent green hats, filming police at all times. Visibility was a major factor for the protesters, the observers and the police alike. The feeling of intimidation by police is real and palpable even when they merely stand at parade rest. This is no doubt due in part to the obvious presence of their weaponry, armor, and discipline.

On Tuesday the 26th of August 2008, roughly a dozen protesters were arrested in civic center park after a confrontation with right-wing counter-protesters. Following this, I followed and traced the cordoned-off area surrounding the Pepsi Center. The stated and posted distance limit for protest was 1000 feet away from the Pepsi Center. At least 3 layers of a variety of fencing surrounded the Pepsi Center at a distance of roughly one-half mile, punctuated by guarded access points. Police and DNC representative were very cagey about getting photos taken of these checkpoints and the security measures. After being warned off from several spots,
I was allowed to remove myself to a larger distance so that I would be out of visual range, but that I could still take the picture. I made good use of both my zoom lens and my business card to allay any fears on the part of security.

Denver protest march, August 27th 2008. Note parade marshal in safety vest, civilian monitor wearing fluorescent hat, and lines of bicycle police escorting the march.

Wednesday, 27th August 2008 brought a march led by the Veterans Against the War protest group, from Cuernavaca Park, with the stated destination of the Pepsi Center. Cuernavaca Park had been the site of "Tent State University," an information and organizing camp, that took its name from Kent State University in Ohio, the site of a notorious protest event where the National Guard shot and killed four students in 1970 and wounded nine others.

The march consisted of around seven thousand marchers who followed an approved path through downtown. They were flanked and followed by police, on bicycles, in phalanxes, and on motorcycles. The march was funneled down hurricane-fenced streets, which were partially blocked by concrete traffic barricades. Horse-mounted police behind the fences followed demonstrators in case of fence-breaching. Weak points and access points in the fencing were guarded by multiple ranks of riot police. The protest march itself was guided by parade marshals, who were volunteers in fluorescent green vests, on alert for agents provocateurs and troublemakers. Marshals formed their own lines preventing people from breaking away from parade route. Marshals were further backed up by concrete bollards and several ranks of riot police.

I counted using headcounts and area estimation. This is the primary means of gauging crowd sizes at any such gathering, especially in the absence of crowd-counting technology like turnstiles. This is generally called "Jacob's Method", after its inventor, journalist Herbert Jacobs.

340 I counted using headcounts and area estimation. This is the primary means of gauging crowd sizes at any such gathering, especially in the absence of crowd-counting technology like turnstiles. This is generally called "Jacob's Method", after its inventor, journalist Herbert Jacobs.
The march was also escorted by squads of police armed with less-lethal armaments riding on platforms affixed to police SUVs. These vehicles with police ready to deploy were a common site during the protest event-site.

The police escort and marshals marched the protest into prearranged and prepared area near the Downtown Auraria Campus of the University of Colorado – Denver, university campus, which had been closed for the week, and as such was empty of students. The march was guided into a cul-de-sac formed by fences and barricades in parking lot A facing the Pepsi Center, but no nearer than 1000 feet. I discovered later that the march was stopped on the side of the Pepsi Center opposite from where the delegates entered the facility. This meant that the protest had been managed and arranged in such a way that they were heard and seen eventually only by themselves and the police. This manipulation and arrangement for protests meant that the march took place where delegates could not see or hear, occurring in the exclusion zone surrounding the Pepsi Center, out of the media eye.\textsuperscript{341} Dubbed the “freedom cage,” this protest zone was 47,000 square feet, and at its fullest contained likely five thousand protesters.\textsuperscript{342}

Once the protest march was contained in the cul-de-sac, police took a strategy of containment and waiting, using tactics of patience and reactivity. The entire march at times was cordoned off in a street merely 12 feet wide. Notably, there was an absence of public toilets on the second half of the march. Bottled water distributors offered water to the crowd. Heat was a factor, although the temperature was less hot than it had been the prior few days. The temperature was around 86 degrees Fahrenheit, where prior days had been between 92-96 degrees Fahrenheit. Once corralled, the protest slowly died away as the marchers left in small groups.

\textsuperscript{341} This was the same tactic used by police in New York in 2004. Kellner 154. 

\textsuperscript{342} Sabar.
This image shows the fencing along the final leg of the parade route. Protesters could do nothing but advance. The Pepsi Center, site of the convention, is in the background, and from the protest appears to be the destination of the march.

The march route became even more constrained the further it went, at points no more than 12 feet wide. At this point the march was outside of downtown, deep into the University of Colorado – Denver's Auroria campus, which was closed and empty.
Exits from the parade route were heavily guarded, in this case by two skirmish lines of police in full riot gear, backed by Secret Service officers behind the fencing.

The march was also escorted in the rear by these police columns of files in platoon strength. Note protester in all-pink in the foreground; she was a member of the Code:Pink affinity group.
The march ended in a cul-de-sac made from security fencing in the middle of a parking lot around 1000 feet from the Pepsi Center. There were no other buildings around. Note police stationed at the top of the parking structure in the background of the photo.

This tactic of moving the protest into a cul-de-sac, away from media and delegate attention, was a way of getting the protest to diminish through sapping of protester energy. This is similar to the tactic of kettling, which is based on the military tactic of encirclement, where police control all the space around the protest, and can prevent protesters from leaving, allowing them to disperse slowly or be arrested one by one. Whereas the kettling tactic is notorious for holding protesters penned for hours, denying them food, water, bathrooms, and legal counsel, the cul-de-sac maneuver I describe above merely resulted in a slow reduction in protest size and intensity, as marchers were allowed to leave in small groups, which they did as the evening wore on, and no one was present to hear them but police and themselves.

7.5: Meaning and Interpretation

Eventually, 153 people were arrested during the protests. Many of them were arrested in one mass arrest event, where the police rounded up and corralled everyone on the street, and arrested them all. Arrestees were detained and processed at the above-mentioned remote detention facility "Gitmo on the Platte." These 93 arrestees filed suit through the American Civil
Liberties Union against the Denver Police Department for violations of the 1st and 4th amendments, as many of their convictions were quickly overturned. The lawsuit was not settled until 2011.\footnote{Burnett and Mitchell.} Note that this number of arrests was significantly lower than any other protest of this scale between 1999 and 2008. Assistant Denver City Attorney David Broadwell credits this small number of events to their non-confrontational approach to protest policing.\footnote{Banda.}

This is corroborated by my research. According to my findings, the DPD and associated enforcement agencies did not follow each precept of the Miami model, and in particular avoided the use of indiscriminate attacks on protesters or use of tear gas or special weaponry. I can only speculate as to the reason for this stance. It could be related to the politics of the political party whose convention it was, as Democrats have been historically (since the middle 1960s) been associated with labor rights, civil rights, and populism. It is also the case that the Democrats were the challenging party in the election, and could have been seeking to differentiate themselves from the neoconservative Republican incumbent party, who would possibly not show such restraint. It could also have been a result of the large amount of independent media scrutiny, or the presence of legal observers, although these two factors were also present in St. Paul at the Republican National Convention, which had more than 800 arrests and several instances of police violence.\footnote{Discussed in the next chapter.} Is police response independent of intent under a state of exception? Is police response independent of politics? Is there a difference in spatial approach as a result of this? These may be questions for a future study.

The high security of the event, and the stance of enforcement agencies that any breach in control over urban space is tantamount to chaos, point to a conflation of dissent and terrorism. Political theorist John Collins and sociologist Ross Glover examine how the idea of terrorism is so broad and vague that any sort of transgressive political or spatial behavior can be viewed as a threat and dealt with harshly.\footnote{Collins and Glover 157.} In the wake of 9/11, any spatial practice that is not explicitly stated by law or culturally appropriate becomes suspect. The prevention of crime becomes simply the prevention of any unwanted spatial behavior. As discussed above, particularly in relation to the Miami model of protest policing, the idea of security is an ideological manifestation of neoliberalism; the sense that any activity outside of the norm is a potential threat to existing order, and as such must be dealt with harshly by law enforcement.

Chicago 1968 still haunts the strategic nullification model of protest policing. It is a kind of revenge fantasy made real, a chance for police to rigidly control that that could not be easily controlled in Chicago: protester exuberance and effectiveness in publicly shaming police. Increased professionalization of policing, greater police discipline, heavier weapons and equipment, and selective application of force all add up to feelings of increased police spatial control and protester ineffectiveness. Intimidation and spatial control keep protesters literally in line better than a police riot, but the Chicago police riot is still the low point against which all subsequent protest policing has been measured. The eagerness that the Denver Police Department showed in “getting up early to beat the crowd,” coupled with the events and legacy of 1968 being framed as the enemy, prove that the specter of ’68 still haunts the strategic brains of the militarized police of the 21st century.

In the following chapter I will explore the 2008 Republican National Convention in St. Paul Minnesota. This chapter is structured like the previous three case studies: a section where I establish the background and context, an exploration of the type of social movement protesting and law enforcement's mode of protest policing, the nature of the crisis that spurred the protests, the spatio-temporal context of the protests, and end with analysis and discussion.

8.1: History and Context

The background and history of the larger social and economic forces behind the 2008 St. Paul protest event-site are substantively the same as the Denver DNC, which took place the week before. Like the Denver event-site, the RNC was designated a National Special Security Event by the President and the Director of Homeland Security. This meant that life as usual in St. Paul was suspended, as the city was subject to a state of exception from ordinary law, which was functionally suspended while the city hosted the convention.

The Republican Party was the incumbent in the then-imminent 2008 Presidential Election. Standing President George W. Bush was about to come to the end of his second contentious term after winning two hotly contested elections, each fraught with widespread allegations of voter suppression and election fraud. President Bush presided over the deadliest terrorist attack on the United States in its history, the prosecution of two deeply unpopular wars, expansion of the security and surveillance state, advancing neoliberalization and wealth inequality, increasingly militarized police, mismanagement of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, and
finally, the worst financial crisis in the United States since the Great Depression, the Great Recession, which was then in its infancy. With this track record, Republicans had to show that they could be effective leaders and distance themselves from Bush's terrible record and sinking public opinion. The party's choice of veteran soldier and veteran lawmaker John McCain as Presidential Candidate, and his nomination of the inexperienced Alaskan part-term Governor Sarah Palin were calculated to sway the voting public toward a measured dose of governing experience combined with populist vigor. Protesters were not swayed by this combination, and added to their slate of issues their perceived mismanagement of the nation under the ruling party.

8.2.1: Type of Social Movement

The type of social movement in the St. Paul 2008 protest event-sites has little to no difference from the Denver event-site: the primary players the same, save the change in political party. The protest groups are the same affinity groups and a protest organizations working in a loose coalition, protesting a range of global and domestic issues. Again, their decentered leadership and cell-like structure meant that no single protest leadership organization existed with whom the police could negotiate and establish rules of engagement. The presence of protesters was widely supported by the historically liberal cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, and visiting protesters were aided by local liberal political groups of long standing.348

As mentioned above, protesters came to St. Paul to protest the same set of globalized issues that they had in Denver, with the additional of expressing dissatisfaction with the course of the United States under Republican leadership for the prior 8 years. Protesters used the same methods of group identification, colored coded according to affinity group, as well as protesters who simply dressed comfortably, to represent their ethnicity of nationality, or dressed for confrontation. The protesters used the overall tactic of direct action, using the rally, the march, the picket, and occupation. There was at least one instance of a black bloc action. At one significant point protesters attempted to build a barricade and symbolically take territory in defiance of police. I detail that event below.

Protesters again used parks as staging grounds, as well as the area in front of the State Capitol building, which served as the origin point for at least two marches. Protesters would stage a rally at the stage capitol building, then march to the convention center, or along a predetermined parade route. Some attempts were made to march on routes not designated as parade routes, and each of these attempts was quickly countered by police, meeting protesters with multiple skirmish lines backed by cavalry and special weapons units. The use of parks as open spaces was especially important during this protest event-site, as the temperature was in the upper 80s to lower 90s Fahrenheit. The openness of the parks meant better air flow, and shade from trees. Parks were also used for the same purpose by police, as discussed below. The temperature was enough that volunteers marched alongside protesters supplying water bottles and mist sprays.

348 Source: interviews with protesters.

Sagan
8.2.2: Model of Enforcement

The mode of protest policing at the 2008 St. Paul RNC protest event-site followed the guidelines of the Miami model of protest policing quite closely, and could be said to be a textbook example of strategic incapacitation. The St. Paul police worked in coordination with dozens of local, regional, and federal enforcement agencies, as is standard practice when policing a National Special Security Event in the greatest deployment of law enforcement resources in the history of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area.\(^{349}\) Police expected between thirty and fifty thousand protesters, although the final total was close to seventeen thousand.\(^{350}\) Enforcers displayed the following protest policing tactics above and beyond those shown in Denver: pre-emptive arrests, use of moles and informants, explicit invocation of terrorism, and application of force.

Law enforcement activities were coordinated by the MACC, or "Multi-Agency Communications Center." Some participating agencies were the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD), Minnesota Department of Transportation (MN DOT), Minnesota State Police (MSP), Hennepin County, Ramsey County, St. Paul Police Department (SPPD), the Defense Department's Joint Task Force Minnesota (JTF-MN), the Department of Homeland Security's Operations Division (DHS' OPS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the United States Secret Service (USSS), and the DHS Office of Risk Management & Analysis (RMA) and, as revealed in Burghardt and published by Wikileaks, representatives from the Pentagon's U.S. Northern Command. Further, enforcement agencies displayed flexibility in response to protest situations that is a hallmark of the Miami model – that enforcement agencies can make take adaptable and reactive action in response to emrgent conditions.\(^{351}\)

The St. Paul police aggressively pursued preemptive arrests. In the week prior to the convention, Ramsey County police acted on surveillance information and intelligence gathered to raid a series of apartments and gathering houses for people planning to protest. Press releases by the police follow the Miami model quite closely, describing protesters as "anarchists," "terrorists," and "criminal," displaying weapons and implements of disruption claimed to have been seized from protesters.\(^{352}\) The raids were conducted under the legal pretext of fire code violations or probable cause of conspiracy to riot in the 2nd degree in the furtherance of terrorism.\(^{353}\) Such charges are used for preventative detention, where those suspected can be held for several days without charges, and require no actual criminal activity to have been committed. Search warrants show that police were looking for items like "...electronics and MP3 players, rags, jars, Molotov cocktails, communication between RNC Welcoming Committee members, urine and feces."\(^{354}\) The RNC Welcoming Committee listed in the search warrant was a protest organization. The group was one of several protest groups targeted in these pre-emptive raids, along with I-Witness Video (a group that monitors police during protests), Food Not Bombs, the Glass Bead Collective, IndyMedia of the Twin Cities, and the Poor People's

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\(^{349}\) Smith 2008.
\(^{350}\) Brown.
\(^{351}\) This was an explicit goal, codified in the motto "Semper Gumby", or "always flexible". Smith 2008 29.
\(^{352}\) Simons, Estrada, and McAuliffe.
\(^{353}\) Burghardt.
\(^{354}\) Simons, Estrada, and McAuliffe.
Economic Rights Campaign. SWAT team officers conducted these raid wearing body armor and gas masks and armed with automatic weapons.

This demonstration of a willingness to use flimsy legal pretext to conduct pre-emptive raids on protest groups has significant consequences for the administration of urban space. Police actions in this case blur the line between private and public space. The reach of the state is such that no space is private if there is suspicion of lawbreaking, particularly under the model of zero-tolerance policing. A central policing tactic during the "War on Drugs" was to conduct raids on pretexts of minor offenses, using heavily armed officers to conduct raids. The difference under the Miami model of protest policing, and under the strategic incapacitation model of policing, is that these tactics can be mobilized against political dissent before such dissent actually occurs. Although these raids resulted in very few actual arrests, and fewer convictions, their effect was to demonstrate the reach of the police, and to intimidate protesters and dissidents. The police logic behind the tactic can be described as preemptive and indiscriminatory; protesters can be cowed into submission before they even enter the streets.

Intelligence on these protest groups and used in these raids was most likely gathered by embedded police surveillance agents. According to Snyders 2008, St. Paul police, in collaboration with the FBI's Joint Terrorism task force, entering into a partnership between multiple federal agencies and state and local law enforcement, recruited a number of "moles" to inform or lead groups in protests. In the lead-up to 2004 Republican National Convention in NYC, the NYPD's intelligence division used moles internationally to gather intelligence on and surveil international protest groups. The program's scope specifically included non-violent protest groups, like theater troupes and church groups. The justification for such subterfuge was the invocation of terrorism; any of these groups could be a terror group planning an attack. This represents another use of the umbrella term 'terrorism' to describe any activity that defies current political authority. Similar moles and intelligence agents may have been used for the 2008 Denver DNC protests as well, but there are no media reports of them.

The protest policing agencies in St. Paul in 2008 showed a greater willingness to use force against protesters, particularly in the form of special weapons such as tear gas. Tear gas as a riot weapon dates back to before World War I in France, where police used chemical crowd control agents in bombs filled with ethyl bromoacetate, which was an early form of teargas. It was also used extensively in crowd control actions by British colonial troops. In particular, the substances CN (chloroacetophenone) and CS (chlorobenzylidene malonitrile) were used starting in 1956 in 124 occasions across the British colonial holdings. Some authors, such as Lilly & Knepper and Christie see the rise of riot control gasses in peacetime policing situations as a by-product of the end of the Cold War, as defense and munitions industries could no longer rely on governmental military agencies for contracts and sales, and had to diversify their buyer base, thus extending offers to police agencies. Such developments aided the advancing militarization of policing in the United States and throughout the world.

The two crowd control gases, CN and CS, were also joined with various means of deploying pepper sprays or pepper spray pellets. One such pepper spray substance is OC, or oleoresin capsicum, which is concentrated pepper in an oil suspension, making applications of...
the substance thick and sticky. These substances are outlawed for use in military deployments, but can be used in military training situations to test the reaction time of recruits donning gas masks. According to the United States Centers for Disease Control, “Riot control agents (sometimes referred to as 'tear gas') are chemical compounds that temporarily make people unable to function by causing irritation to the eyes, mouth, throat, lungs, and skin.” Those temporarily exposed to these agents might experience excessive eye tearing, blurred vision, burning in the nose and mouth, running nose with swelling, drooling, difficulty breathing, irritation in the lungs resulting in coughing, rashes and burns on the skin, and nausea and vomiting. More permanent effects could be blindness, glaucoma, or respiratory failure resulting in death. Yet, these gases are part of the "less-lethal" protest policing arsenal.

A spatial problem with dispensing these gases in order to control crowds is that gasses expand to fill the available area, and will drift according to prevailing wind patterns. These gases are deployed to clear streets of protesters, as exposure to these gases is extraordinarily unpleasant. If police use these gases to clear a protest, and if the gas should drift, then bystanders will also be affected. I discovered this through direct experience myself while observing a protest march, as I will detail below.

![Tear gas dispersal diagram under ideal conditions. Note that this diagram shows at least two escape routes for protesters. Under real conditions, such exits are not always considered or provided for. Field Manual 19-15.](image)

359 CDC Fact Sheet: Facts About Riot Control Agents.
In line with the Miami model of protest policing, permits for marches were allowed, but with vague conditions and non-negotiable parade routes. This resulted in some marches (particularly the Poor People's Economic Campaign march on September 2nd 2008) being routed far away from their intended destination.\textsuperscript{360} This determination of parade routes meant that police had great control over the direction and distance that the marches took place. Preventing the marches from getting close to the Xcel Energy Center meant that the main message of the protest marches never reached the delegates. Further, as police controlled the march routes, they made changes to the parade routes close to the march time, allowing the marches to begin at the pre-arranged spot, but redirected without enough time for protest organizers to contest the new terms and new route. Each protest march planned to march to the convention center, and each was rerouted some 2.5 miles away.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image}
\caption{This particular march's end goal was the Xcel Energy Center, but was turned back by police at the corner of Wabasha and Kellogg.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{360} Brown.
Protesters retaliated by forming this barricade with plastic newspaper boxes. No other material was available, hence the permeability of the barricade.

The barricade in the above photo was very quickly met with the above response. This is a double skirmish line of police, flanked with bicycle police to form mobile barriers, and backed with mounted cavalry. Note the gas masks.
As implied by the gas masks in the prior photo, police responded to the barricade with tear gas and mass arrests. This photo represents tear gas dispersal in real conditions, in contrast to the idealized dispersal diagram showed above. Due to the winds coming up from the cliff face to the right of the photo, just below Kellogg Avenue, the tear gas spread through downtown St. Paul. I was lucky enough to be able to experience the spread of tear gas first hand. It was very unpleasant. That experience represented my involuntary participant observation. The ease with which tear gas spreads from its intended target area creates deleterious social effects, as detailed in 2009.

8.3: Nature of Crisis: Failures of Republican Rule

The nature of the crisis that inspired the protests in Denver two weeks earlier was essentially the same; neoliberalization had not appreciably advanced in the time between the two protest event-sites. As discussed above, protesters were also contesting the policies of the last eight years of a neoconservative regime, as the Republican Party hosted the convention.

Prior to the protest, I wondered if the police enforcement actions at the RNC would be more repressive than at the DNC, perhaps on the basis of the different politics between the two parties. According to Earl and Soule, any variance in repression in protest policing would be due to institutional culture among the police and the perception of street level threats, rather than directed from the elites who the police ostensibly serve; these elites would be more concerned with the vague threats posed by the potentially revolutionary messages of the protests. Based on this theory, any differences in protest policing between Denver and St. Paul would be a product of how the police themselves perceived threats to their control over the event-scene. Due to the extensive pre-emptive raids, the incidence of more than 800 arrests during the events of the
convention, the use of tear gas on several occasions, the mass arrests, harassment of journalists, and kettling tactics of the police, it follows that the police must have perceived significant street level threats from the protesters.

8.4: Spatio-temporal Context

I used the same methods of research to examine the St. Paul protest event-site that I did in Denver; I used behavior observation, physical traces research, archival research, and interviews. I conducted archival research on site, as well as prior to and after the event. My interviews were entirely of protesters and bystanders, as no police officers agreed to be interviewed. I also engaged in involuntary participant observation, which points to the difficulty in remaining separate from the action when researching dynamic events in urban environments.

Like the other three cities in my prior case studies, St. Paul has the following relevant physical features in common with the other cities:
- flat and level ground
- grid pattern on downtown streets
- narrow downtown streets
- border of water
- parks and squares
- density: the downtown area is densely built with medium tall buildings

Downtown St. Paul stands on a bluff top adjacent to the Mississippi River. The topography of the city itself is relatively flat, with a 50 foot rise over two square miles. The river embankment itself is on a sharp and steep cliff, seventy feet or more in height, bordered by Kellogg Boulevard. Thus topography was not a factor in the protests, with the exception of the cliff and water barrier.

St. Paul's downtown is built on a grid roughly aligned northwest to southeast. A fenced-off exclusion zone around the Xcel Energy Center, which hosted the convention. Many of the streets in downtown St. Paul were blocked off with either roadblocks or security fencing, with openings in some barricades further blocked by dump trucks, as I had also witnessed in Denver, although I saw many more in St. Paul. This grid pattern made intersections significant, as they were used as larger assembly areas, and were generally strictly controlled by police.

361 Foley and Lohn.
362 RNC Commission report 49, 57, and supported by my own data.
363 RNC Commission report 66.
364 RNC Commission 22.
Hamm Plaza blocked with re-purposed concrete planters.

A side street on the north side of the exclusion zone. Presumably the pattern of the jersey barrier roadblocks is to prevent the fence from being breached by vehicles at speed. Note the security fencing in the background and the delegate bus. No doubt protesters found amusement that one local bus company hired to shuttle delegates proudly displayed their company name on each bus: “Lamers.”
An example of a checkpoint, manned with armed police, behind security fencing, with vehicular barriers. Note suspicious look on police officer on right hand side of photo. USA Today newspaper box included for irony and humor value.

St. Paul's downtown streets are the narrowest streets in the four cities I examined for the current study. The typical width of St. Paul's downtown streets is 60 feet, with few streets 66 feet across, and very few 80 feet across, including sidewalks, with most downtown streets having only one or two lanes of traffic, with the second or third lanes used for traffic. This narrowness made police skirmish line tactics easier to execute, as it took fewer officers to block in protesters and repulse marchers. The narrow width of the streets also meant that protest marches, if effectively channeled, could be drawn out over longer distances, eventually tiring the marchers, as occurred in Denver.

366 Brown 2008, as well as my own observations.
This photo shows the narrow width of downtown St. Paul streets. My back was against a building facing these two skirmish lines back by bicycle police. Also note the fluorescent hat on the National Lawyer's Guild observer on the right hand side. Also note the bundle of plastic quick restraints on the belt of the police officer in the forward right of the photo. These police lines kept protesters and bystanders separate.

This series of three photos shows the tactical value of intersections on the narrow St. Paul streets, and how police responded to protester attempts to “take” space. The tactic taken by police is called a “controlled push” by Beene 2006. The motley group of protesters on the right
are members of the protest group “Funk the War," and had a small mobile sound system on a child's wagon playing funk and disco music. This group had moved into the intersection above to have an impromptu dance party. Note the advancing motorcycle police officer on the left hand side of the photo, with police lights flashing. He was advancing, revving his engine loudly, and blaring a warning tone on his loud speaker.

The first motorcycle police officer was soon joined by additional officers, who revved their engines and together pushed the protesters back to the sidewalk.
Here is the full squad of motorcycle police officers having pushed the protesters out of the street and onto the sidewalk. Note the bicycle police group in the background on the left, who are ready to chase down fleeing protesters.
The Kellogg Avenue East border of downtown is on the southeast side of downtown, forming a barrier along Kellogg Avenue's far side. The street is built at the edge of the bluff edge, with a broad walkway and overlook, with views of the Mississippi and Harriet Island. This overlook extends for five blocks from the intersection of Kellogg Avenue East and Wabasha Street North, which is the southeastern border of the 40-block exclusion zone surrounding the Xcel Energy Center. This serves as an edge to the downtown area and a barrier to travel over the water. The Wabasha Bridge links Wabasha Street with Harriet Island.

The below map shows both the 40-block exclusion zone around the Xcel Energy Center, as well as parking restrictions throughout downtown St. Paul during the convention. Image source, City of St. Paul.

The two significant parks in downtown St. Paul are the green space around Constitution Avenue near the State Capitol, and Mears Park across downtown from Xcel Energy Center. Although not all marches started in these parks, they served as rally points and points of rest and restoration. Significantly, both protesters and police used the green space near the capitol.
building. In the Miami model of protest policing, police or governmental agencies will block off or reserve parks to prevent their use by protesters. In the case of St. Paul, protesters and police shared the space. Due to the high heat during the events, police massed in these parks to be showered in cool water by fire hoses.

St. Paul's downtown is high density by its own description: “Downtown streets host a wide range of high-density uses and provide access to a complex mix of office, retail, restaurants, arts and entertainment and growing residential uses.” This high density, coupled with narrow streets and a lack of open lots, meant that protest marches could only use streets and sidewalks, and could only use streets and sidewalks not barricaded or fenced off by police. This further constrained parade and protest routes, routing protest marches away from convention and into light industrial areas or little-populated downtown fringes. In Denver, the protest march was routed into the large parking lot surrounding the Pepsi Center, and in St. Paul, the protest march was channeled out of downtown and past county and state governmental facilities. Police guarded both the rear of the march and blocked any potential exit from the street, keeping the protesters contained on the streets and locked into a police-determined route. This kept the protest march from splintering and dividing as the route took the march further and further out of downtown.

This photo shows the police forces that trailed after a protest march. These ranks of police would advance after protest marches to prevent marchers from leaving.

367 St. Paul Street Design Manual 158.

Sagan
These motorcycle police officers flanked a protest march and prevented any marchers from leaving the march. Groups of police like this blocked all possible exits from the pre-arranged march route. Note that this march has been channeled into a low-density neighborhood outside of downtown, roughly 1.5 miles from the protesters' stated goal of reaching the Xcel Energy Center. The police channeled this march a total of 2.5 miles away from the convention center.

This photo shows the kind of barriers lining the protest march above. The march was channeled around the Ramsey County Jail, with police on the other side. Having the protest march past the jail was likely another intimidation tactic. Note the embedded National Lawyer's Guild representative on the right hand side of the photo, wearing a
fluorescent green cap.

Near the end point of the above march. Note the lack of any structures around the march whatsoever, save for the freeway overpass. The march had started in mid-afternoon, and had taken several hours to reach this point. Protester energy was flagging, and the only people who heard their chants at this point were the protesters themselves.

In total, around 12,000 people marched on the RNC at the Xcel Energy Center in downtown Saint Paul. On each day, protesters engaged in a series of rallies, marches, direct actions, and black bloc activities. The anarchist journal “Rolling Thunder” compiled a list of all protest events on September 1st, which I have used to augment my own findings. Their series of maps details spatial moves by both police and protesters, cataloging and placing them in chronological order. I include one of these maps in their entirety as a sample of the breadth of protest activity at the 2008 RNC. The extensive quality of these maps exceeds any individual field work effort on my part, as I was unable to be present at each protest event. These maps show the extent and variety of protest actions, as well as demonstrating the chaotic and multi-vector approach that came as a result of decentralized planning on the part of protest organizers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:30 AM</td>
<td>Massed police temporarily prevent students from marching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00 AM</td>
<td>Coalition to March on the RNC and Stop the War rally begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00 AM</td>
<td>Protesters push a trash bin into a squad car, narrowly missing a pig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:15 AM</td>
<td>Five arrested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30 AM</td>
<td>Intersection blocked with caution tape and twine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:45 AM</td>
<td>150 people massed near Triangle Park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00 PM</td>
<td>Funk the War march begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:20 PM</td>
<td>Police try to stop the Funk the War march.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:30 PM</td>
<td>Six people lockdown in an intersection using lockboxes and a car.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:35 PM</td>
<td>Macrina Commons permitted meetup underground.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:45 PM</td>
<td>Three people break the security perimeter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:55 PM</td>
<td>Campus Antifa Network successfully blocks intersection—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>including police buses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:59 PM</td>
<td>A line of bike cops formed along Minnesota, directing Funk the War to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>turn right on 7th. 20-30 people rush the line with raincoats;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>banners, but are pepper sprayed and pushed back.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:40 PM</td>
<td>Protesters blockading the intersection. Fight with cops, one officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dispersed by 12:50 PM with one arrest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:45 PM</td>
<td>Blockers near the capital, surrounded by police. Heading back on,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Ireland Blvd toward downtown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:55 PM</td>
<td>Lockdown on Shepard Rd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00 PM</td>
<td>Blockade broken, 30 demonstrators detained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:30 PM</td>
<td>Rejoin the Streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:00 PM</td>
<td>Two sandbags and a traffic sign thrown off the overpass to the highway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ramp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:01 PM</td>
<td>Bash/Bak! Blockade: Benches and dumpsters are broken in the street.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RNC successfully holds their line against bus and toric charges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:10 PM</td>
<td>The Westboro Baptist Church (God Hates Fags) are attacked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:15 PM</td>
<td>Vandalize border at 74th st ramp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:30 PM</td>
<td>Many from Bash/Bak! join the black bloc as it passes by. Windows of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>delegate bus smashed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:00 PM</td>
<td>Large trash bin used to block road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:15 PM</td>
<td>Legal observers surrounded by police blockade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:25 PM</td>
<td>Police cut activists out of lockboxes. Blockade is cleared with six</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>arrests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:45 PM</td>
<td>Windows broken, squad cars tires slashed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:00 PM</td>
<td>Pagan cluster blockades delegate buses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:10 PM</td>
<td>Attack on an empty delegate bus. One cop tries to make an arrest, is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hit against the back of his head, and involved to the ground. He uses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pepper spray and retreats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:30 PM</td>
<td>First national bank windows smashed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:45 PM</td>
<td>Windows smashed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:55 PM</td>
<td>Unpermitted march, swarming from all directions—joined by a black bloc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:00 PM</td>
<td>Breakaway march making total destruction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note the legend on the map showing the variety of actions: blockade, property destruction, marches, occupations, barricades, crossing boundaries, lockboxes or lockdown formations, vandalism, obstruction, and basic organization by a variety of groups. It also details police actions: skirmish lines and massing, bicycle barriers, use of pepper spray and tear gas, cavalry charges, mass detentions, and attacks on protesters.

8.5: Meaning and Interpretation

More violence occurred on the streets of St. Paul during the Republican National Convention than during the Democratic National Convention in Denver. I interpret this as not due to the response by elites to the vague threat posed by the protesters, nor by the institutional culture of the St. Paul police, but by the actions of the protesters themselves.\textsuperscript{368} I had anticipated that the internal culture of the police might play a stronger role in determining police action, but the larger variable between St. Paul and Denver was protester aggression. The chaotic and de-centered organizing strategy followed by these coalitions of affinity groups put police on the defensive. It is police recognition of these anarchic tactics that partially spurred and led to the extensive spatial control or downtown urban space in St. Paul. Because police anticipated that they would not be able to counter so many groups of protesters over all of the downtown area, each with different goals and tactics, they instead relied on spatial emplacements and target hardening to demonstrate and defend their control over space. The higher instance of violence and repression in St. Paul over Denver can be seen as a result of the aggressive dissent of the

\textsuperscript{368} As discussed in Earl and Soule.
protesters who contested Republican (neoliberal and neo-conservative) policies. Thus the actions of the elites affected protester action, and protester action affected the police action. I speculate that had the Democratic Convention taken place in St. Paul, and the Republican Convention in Denver, that the Denver protest event-site would have seen more violence.

The narrow streets also contributed in some fashion. In the Chicago 1968 protest event-site, protesters were able to use the width of streets to evade the police, who did not have enough personnel to stretch skirmish lines all the way across intersections or broad avenues. In the case of St. Paul, the 60 foot streets meant that fewer officers were needed to block and hem protesters in, and further, more officers in a smaller space acted as force multipliers. Barricades were easier to implement as well, and the density of the downtown area meant that protesters had no choice but to go where allowed. All of the plaza areas close to the Xcel Energy Center were blocked or access was severely restricted, which prevented protesters from massing near the convention.

The police’s pre-emptive and reactive actions were possibly (but unprovably) linked to the politics of the party holding the conference. As Republicans have used fear of crime and a “law-and-order” approach to governing since the Presidency of Richard Nixon, this might possibly have translated into an institutional policing culture of easier repression and more rigorous spatial control. If Republican policies on war and crime affect police behavior, we would see a rise in reorganizations of space around concepts of security and anti-terrorism in cities where Republican lawmakers are in power. This position is supported by cultural theorist Henry Giroux, who writes “...under the guise of an unlimited war against terrorism, public spaces on the domestic front are increasingly being organized around values supporting a bellicose, patriarchal, and jingoistic culture.” As neoliberalism and neoconservatism have been closely linked, more and more likely that public space under neoliberalism will become more and more militarized.

Political scientist Robert Warren discusses the role of physical space in urban settings in *City Streets – The War Zones of Globalization: Democracy and Military Operations on Urban Terrain in the early 21st Century*. According to Warren, since the development of neoliberalism and globalization, roughly since the very late 1970s, cities are becoming more likely to take on two conditions: first, the militarization of urban space under conditions other than war; and second, cities act as mobilization sites for tens of thousands of protesters. Police and regulators see militarized urban terrain as necessary for crowd control. As anti-globalization protests are against implementation of policies that support interests of corporations and capital over those of non-elites. This results in a kind of “spatial chess”: first, a large group meetings announces, then protesters mobilize, then police mobilize by transforming the site of these meetings into virtual fortresses, which then serve as scenes of protests and their repression. This is alongside the slower historical spatial innovation and counter-innovation by protesters and police. The military logics of enclosure, advance, dispersal, and binary considerations of us vs. them turn cities during protests into virtual fortresses. The contests over democratic practice create conditions where local residents have their freedoms and rights abrogated through periodic imposition of military control over sections of the city. This elimination of the public sphere in cities compromises a basic component of participatory democracy.

This is even more the case when these meeting include the presence of tens of thousands of additional people, such as protesters, delegates, police, media, and politicians and their

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369 Giroux and Kellner.
entourages. These additional users place a strain on the city resources and infrastructure, which meeting organizers expected would be offset by the additional capital and spending power these visitors would bring to the cities, as well as by the prestige of hosting such an event. City leaders are typically more than willing to suspend normal law to prevent “terrorism” in order to reap these economic and social benefits.

My research showed this only a limited extent in Denver and St. Paul. Principally, the downtown zones were occupied. As the bulk of the citizenry of either cities lives on the periphery, minimal disruption took place outside of those controlled zones. Police set up roadside checkpoints and roadblocks on major avenues even miles from the downtown zones. Thus minimal disruption took place in residential areas of these cities, with notable exceptions, per my case studies, above. However, in both cities, tens of thousands of visitors (protesters, delegates, police, media, politicians and their entourages) placed a strain on the city resources and infrastructure. The St. Paul city government expected that these costs would be offset by the additional capital and spending power these visitors would bring to the cities.³⁷⁰

The RAND Corporation, a policy analysis think tank that has advised American politics and military since the 1950s, and has been instrumental in advising US defense policy, has noted a parallel rise in military and police interest in urban operations. In 2000, after the 1999 WTO Seattle protest event-site, RAND criticized the organization of American police forces, noting that they could not handle decentralized protest groups.³⁷¹ One result of their recommendation was a series of training exercises called Project Urban Resolve. Between 2003 and 2006, the United States Military Joint Forces Command created a simulation of a variety of urban spatial environments for purposes of determining effective tactical approaches.³⁷² In 2009, RAND called for domestic US 'stability police force', which would be analogous to US military stability operations in Iraq. These police units would be specifically trained and used for crowd control.³⁷³ While no evidence directly links the RAND policy documents and actual police practice, the convergence of military and police thinking urban space, and the obviously shared spatial tactics, certainly suggests that RAND policy recommendations have been taken very seriously by police administrations.³⁷⁴

Public statements made by St. Paul officials made it clear that they would be treating downtown St. Paul as their protected territory, and that protesters would be accommodated, but given very short leashes, so to speak. This is further supported by the public statements of St. Paul officials prior to and during the protests.³⁷⁵ In a series of broadcast press conferences, police officials repeatedly stated that protest would be welcome, but violence would not be tolerated. This official stance of welcoming was repeated often in official city communications about the upcoming convention.

The official position that protesters would be welcome was not supported by actual police activity. In a series of after-action reports, city officials received abundant complaints from local business leaders regarding the level of violence on display and the amount of disruption caused

³⁷² Pursell.
³⁷³ Kelly et. al.
³⁷⁴ Field Manual 19-15 Chapter 8 for military crowd control tactics, which are exactly the same in police training guides Applegate 1964 and Beene 1992.
³⁷⁵ City of St. Paul.
by both the police control of space and protester activity. Further, aggressive police response to protesters resulted in a series of lawsuits which the city eventually settled out of court.\(^{376}\)

On one occasion in St. Paul, I witnessed one field medic and two other protesters detained by several police (at least six officers). Each of the protesters and the field medic were cuffed with plastic zip-tie style handcuffs. One policeman and one protester were injured in some way. Injuries on both parties appeared to be minor, nothing more than scrapes and bruises, with some bleeding on both sides. It is possible the injury sustained by the protester was somewhat more severe, as she was crying and wailing loudly, proclaiming that her vocalizations were emotional responses to her pain. I would guess that her statement declaring the reason for her cries lying in pain was meant to clarify for the police her injured state, and that her vocalizations were not for any other purpose. Although I have no evidence for this, the very specific wording and its consistency in repetition made me believe that this injured protester's speech was the result of protester training, that is, how protesters are trained to respond to injury and pain in the immediate presence of police.

One of the arrested field medics was asking the police to be cut loose from her plastic restraints in order to tend to her injured comrade. She was refused this request. The police officer who had sustained injury was being looked after by another officer. What was particularly noteworthy about this corner-side interaction was that the field medic repeatedly offered her medical assistance to the injured officer as well. This assistance was refused in a very hostile manner, with the officer yelling and cursing at the field medic, very vocally refusing to be approached or touched. My supposition was that the policeman who was injured bore a deep mistrust of the field medic, and regardless of her offers of help, lumped her together with the protesters in opposing the police.

I interviewed a policeman later during the convention protests, and I asked about the incident, inquiring as to the treatment of both the field medic and the actions of the injured policeman. I was told that law enforcement policy was to treat all people who aided the protesters in any way as if they were protesters themselves, extending to field medics, people who offered protesters bottled drinking water in the 90+ degree heat, or people who guided the protests along parade routes, in essence anyone who was not a city official, law enforcement officer, or convention representative. In short, this meant anyone who marched with or aided the protesters in any way, or who just happened to be on the wrong side of police lines, would be treated as a protester.

This policy was later directly demonstrated to me. I had followed a march out of downtown St. Paul as the protest was led by police through a prearranged corridor, away from the Excel Energy Center and toward the state capitol as I attempted to cross a highway back toward downtown and my research assistant's parked car. Each of the bridges over the highway between downtown and the state capitol were blocked with temporary chain link barricades, with access points through the barricades manned by armed police. I attempted to pass through the checkpoint in order to return to our vehicle and end my field work for the day. My assistant and I were met with deep skepticism by the police trooper, and were refused passage for more than twenty minutes, through repeated requests and exhortations that we were not protesters, and that we only wanted to leave the downtown area. That we were eventually let through I credit not to our repeated requests, but rather to the unexpected kindness of the policeman and his on-the-spot

\(^{376}\) Report of the Republican National Convention Public Safety Planning and Implementation Review.
decision to break with official protocol.

This series of events shows the on-site reality of the tightly cordoned spatial control enacted by the SPPD during the convention. It further shows the demeanor of individual police officers, who served as the most visible representatives of the city government during the convention. The mismatch between public messages by the city and actual police activity is striking. It points to a divergence between police declaration and police intent. Police and public officials prioritize maintaining absolute spatial control over cities when protesters gather, while at the same time publicly claiming to support protesters' rights. While largely true according to the letter of the law, the effective spatial control by the police results in nullification of the protests' effects. The lesson learned by protest policing in Dallas in 1984 resulted in the integration and prioritization of public relations and maintenance of a positive police image in the minds of the public. The lesson learned by protest policing in Seattle in 1999 was that protesters must not be allowed to control the urban setting of the protests in any way, and any attempts by protesters to “take” or control space must be met with militaristic overwhelming force.

The advancing convergence of military logic and policing was on display in St. Paul. The rigidity of the police and the heavily controlled streets gives weight to criticisms that urban space is being addressed tactically, and that protesters are considered adversaries. This attitude is echoed by groups of protesters themselves, as evidenced by black bloc and lockdown tactics. If the protesters are not actually assaulting police officers, then they are working hard to circumvent police spatial control in all ways, and to use media and public space to bring attention to police repression, through the vehicle of protesters making their physical presence as visible as possible. Police work to ensure that the physical presence of the protesters is minimized in any way possible, either by pre-emptive removal, spatial division or zoning. The specter of ‘68 still lingers, as police fear the loss of legitimacy by letting protesters take territorial control over the streets.
9. Conclusion:

This chapter is broken into the following sections: a summary of findings with discussion and support from sources, an exploration of the implications of these findings for the larger theoretical understanding of protest and urban space, some recommendations for designers, police, and protesters, a set of suggestions for future design theory and practice, a section discussion the limitations of the current study, and a final section discussing possibilities from this work for future research.

9.1: Summary of Findings

To understand the current state of protest policing, and how the practice uses urban space to accomplish its goals, I examined the origins of the administrative process of protest policing and its theoretical and intellectual foundations. In the past, protest was considered a subset of crowd behavior. No provisions for protest existed in architecture or urban design, perhaps because of the relative infrequency of occurrence. Prior modes of protest policing involved either overt violence or negotiated management. Since the rise of neoliberal regimes and globalized communications, protests have become more and more frequent. Police responses to protest over time have shown increasing sophistication, particularly in the areas of temporary changes to the urban environment by police, as well spatial tactics of rerouting and nullification of protest behavior. My research shows the spatial and social examples of the theories of Tonkiss and Lawrence and Low, namely that buildings and public places articulate through space the “multiple forces of economy, society and culture.” This is especially true as protests dating from the beginning of the neoliberal period have been in reaction to economic developments as well as militarism. As some of these have on occasion been in direct contest to corporate policies, and have resulted in property damage to corporate facilities, the police as public representatives have been called upon to defend corporate private property through the use of military tactics. The main goal of these tactics has been the division and control urban space in order to nullify protests. This interrelation between public servants and private interests aligns with what Miller and Rose identify as the effect of decreasing public oversight on finance and increasing expenditure to military and police organizations. This has been exacerbated by the general Western (and particularly Anglo-American) preoccupation with “security,” especially since 9-11.

These spatial tactics have a parallel in CPTED, or Crime Prevention through Environmental Design. In CPTED, environmental design is being increasingly mobilized to add “security” to urban spaces, particularly to protect against terrorist attacks. Literature and evidence shows an increasing conflation of protest with terrorism, alongside of conflation of dissent with treason. Because of the elite nature of the professions, and its dependence on wealthy clients, architecture and urban design are aiding the criminalization of dissent.

377 Lawrence and Low 455.
378 Miller and Rose 12.
379 Giroux and Kellner, Collins and Glover.
380 Jeffrey, Rosenbaum, and Schneider and Kitchen.
concomitant with an advancing security state.\footnote{Dovey.}

This shift is partly the result of changes in the class structure of advanced industrial and late capitalist societies under neoliberalism. Urban space plays an instrumental role in the maintenance of power relations through the regulation of the physical presence of users. This is the case due to the interrelation of space and politics, and how space affects politics through affecting behavior. Harvey 1989 writes that one of the “...principal tasks of the capitalist state is to locate power in those spaces that the bourgeoisie controls, and disempower those spaces that oppositional movements have the greatest potentiality to command.”\footnote{Harvey 1989, 237.} Thus command and control over the physical forms of the urban environment is critical in maintaining class power, especially at times when that power can be contested through the biopower of masses of protesters, or through the symbolic power of dissenting speech. According to political scientist John R. Parkinson, space and form relate to physical behavior in the following three ways: first, in an absolute, preventative manner; second, in a suggestive or encouraging manner; third, in a symbolic fashion, working through symbol systems or through meanings associated with forms.\footnote{Parkinson 77-83.} I have shown how these three strategies are used, depending on context, in protest policing event-sites; use of walls, fences, barricades, and tactical formations; the arrangement of “designated” protest spaces; or the use of signage and public messages.

The administrative and legal bases for these strategies work in several ways. While people engage in urban political protest, their actions can be considered outside both 'normal' everyday urban behavior and outside 'normal' legal behavior. This disengagement with common practice enables new regulatory responses. Therefore, regulatory agencies act as if they are dealing with masses of extra-legal citizens, their possible 'criminal' status to be defined at a later regulatory stage. Thus, the participants exist in a state of exception from historically legal regulatory actions. Urban space is not merely the backdrop or setting for such activities, rather, it plays a formative role in the dynamic interplay between populist urban civil disobedience and regulatory responses.

By serving as a means of expressing and enforcing political power, the formative role of urban space goes beyond territoriality or representation. A precondition of this change in regulatory response is the dismantling of state regulation under neoliberalism. This change in the role of the state has brought with it a change in the scope of state power to use legitimate force. In liberal democracies as well as neoliberal states, force is used as a final instrument of state authority in crisis or emergency circumstances, and these crises or emergencies legitimate the use and application of force by the state.\footnote{In other forms of states, such as totalitarian or fascist, force and violence are used with much less discrimination.} However, attenuated state power under neoliberalism redefines states of emergency. This redefinition further legitimizes formerly illegal or untenable state responses to subjects engaged in urban civil disobedience.\footnote{Described by Giorgio Agamben as a 'state of exception', in Agamben 2005, as well as Ong 2006.} These new regulatory techniques have both an administrative component (namely, policy and enforcement) and a spatial component (emplaced change in the built environment and contingent changes to access to and mobility through urban spaces.)

An ongoing and demonstrated disjuncture exists between sociology and criminology, and

381 Dovey.
382 Harvey 1989, 237.
383 Parkinson 77-83.
384 In other forms of states, such as totalitarian or fascist, force and violence are used with much less discrimination.
385 Described by Giorgio Agamben as a 'state of exception', in Agamben 2005, as well as Ong 2006.
an even further separation between academic criminology and practical law enforcement. This gap between systematic understanding and field tactics of law enforcement has resulted in a dominant mode of protest policing that is a result of local policing culture and officer action on the ground rather than careful study and understanding. Thus protests get policed according to local policing contexts, which emphasize duality and machismo. This was worked out under the escalated force model of protest policing (up until around 1970) through intimidation, ignoring protester civil rights, and repression. Under the view of national and international media, this approach proved ineffective and embarrassing in Chicago in 1968, which spurred a crisis in policing. The resulted new model, negotiated management, worked out duality and machismo by putting them into the background, and attempting to approach protest carefully and respectfully. The failure of the negotiated management model in dealing with decentered protester organization resulted in the failures of police to contain the protests in Seattle in 1999. This event, coupled with the rise of “zero-tolerance” policing strategies, and with the increasing militarization of policing, has resulted in a shift into a new, third model of protest policing. This new model, strategic incapacitation, abrogates citizen's rights, uses force selectively but ferociously, and mobilizes urban space itself as a means to quell protests, as seen in the Miami Model of protest policing, on display in Denver and St. Paul in 2008.

Common in each model of policing is the demonization and othering of protesters, using epithets like “bad guy,” “idiot,” “asshole,” “knuckleheads,” or having “attitude problems.” This is discussed by Herbert and Ward as being essentially totalitarian in aspect; the process of dehumanization, seeing protesters as alien or subhuman, allows the kind of violence that is always latent in protest policing to come to the surface, and acts as a system of legitimation for repression. This linguistic duality feeds into the security state developed after the terrorist attacks on 9/11/2001, and is part of the maintenance of public fear of transgressive behavior in public space. Before I discuss this linguistic and cultural shift, I will briefly examine the role that urban space plays in shaping these developments.

Robert Warren's warning about the militarization of urban space (discussed above) points to the dangers of using urban space to effect social behavior. Military logic is effective when organizing large groups of trained individuals across space, and is preoccupied with spatial control to achieve tactical objectives. Reliance on this logic means that cities become treated like war zones, and that everyday legal protections must be lifted in order to ensure security.

This is a dangerous position for liberal democracies. Henry Giroux notes the increase in the use of public space to accomplish goals of social control. This means a constant maintenance of low-level fear as a means of affecting social behavior, creating a culture of fear, which lowers resistance to transforming law to allow for less oversight of capital and greater wealth inequity. Any law which appears to reduce fear is considered welcome. Peter K. Manning cites the drama of policing as a means to distract from growing wealth inequities held by

386 Garland 65-68.
388 Beene 2006.
389 Herbert 1996 574 and 577, as well as Ward. Further, Herbert 1996 574 notes how police officers occasionally conflate gang members with “terrorists”. This can be seen further in The Counterterrorism Handbook by Bolz et. al., which features a large portion on protests since Seattle 1999 under the section heading “Domestic Terrorism.”
390 Giroux 2005 1.
different social and cultural groups in cities:

These illusions of controlling disorder deflect attention from the massive gains in wealth of the top two percent in the USA, and the increasing marginality of the poor. It feeds into stereotypic notions that the major problem and source of crime is in the streets, committed by poor people of color and, less importantly, accomplished in corporate board rooms, banks, among politicians and fiduciary agents. It further elevates and sanctifies the law in the hands of a vigilant police under courageous leadership, a myth, as the primary resource in creating social order. (335)

It is easy to extrapolate from there and apply the same model at the regional or national scale. One might speculate that both public and private space might be allocated oligarchically, on terms of acquired provable wealth. Right of access to public space could come with a literal price of admission. In fact, this spatial control and reorganization is emblematic of a kind of spatial fix, an intensification and an inward-turn in imperialism, where sites of contest are re-asserted as bastions of neoliberal power, and no demonstrations to the contrary are allowed.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 are mobilized as justification or explanation for the increased or “heightened threat” conditions under which protests are surveyed and administrated. As such, the design language of dense urban spaces becomes that of crime prevention through environmental design CPTED. Downtown urban space is under threat, and so must be secured. As demonstrated above, the dualistic language of policing is easily transformed into public discourse; there is an easy linguistic slide from protester to criminal to traitor to terrorist. Even though the individual expression of political displeasure is nominally protected by law, most famously by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, when that expression is presented en masse, the rules of engagement change. No longer are authorities dealing with the voice of one irate individual citizen, well within his or her rights to speak plainly about his or her political values, but rather a problematic mass of people who might, at any moment, cross the barrier into riot and mayhem. It is that perception of a shift from citizen to population that makes possible the reorganization of urban space around ideologies of fear. This process is maintained through constant fear of crime, instilled through a series of social mechanisms. As Jacques Donzelot puts the emergence of a culture of fear from late capitalist space formations in Massumi:

If the capitalist economy is indeed a war economy, only able to proceed by an always more advanced and intense colonization of terrestrial space, it must recognized that this economy implies an administration of the prospective terror which radically modifies this space. In order to make fear reign, a space of fear must be created... (23)

This fear is of terror, and of crime, which can be constituted in any kind of transgressive spatial behavior, as defined in an ad-hoc and contingent fashion.

Protest itself is not necessarily an act of spatial transgression. Rather, protest exists in a conditional position, based on the local context of enforcement, the temporal proximity to the event-site against which it is directed, and the intensity of the activity which comprised it. This is similar to the primacy of context in determinating ideology; what is perceived to be appropriate is based thoroughly in local political and legal conditions. The variety of actual protest tactics presents a variety of possible responses. The carnivalesque character of protest activity can result in a range of policing and spatial responses. What matters is the degree to which the protests are transgressive, that is, “out-of-place.” This spatial transgression of protesters makes them into

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391 Garland explores these in depth, particularly how neoliberalism and neoconservatism result in fewer and fewer restraints on the wealthy and more and more inhibitions on the poor. Garland 196-197.
392 As discussed in Cresswell.
targets for enforcement. The danger posed by these protesters does not have to be real, and can instead prompt fear in citizens and enforcement alike simply through its deviation from standard behavior. Thus the enforcement response is not always proportionate to the actual events, but is instead a reaction to specters in the enforcer's minds. While the protesters might not be the things that police or citizens actually fear, they might be the only ones present upon whom it is permitted to enact that fear.

In this sense protest policing is normative. According to Steve Herbert, spatial-based policing is combination of bureaucratic application of power and the omnipresence of power as discipline.\textsuperscript{393} State actions are a set of processes through which norms are enforced. This is a kind of discretionary justice, a tension between the Weberian centralization of power versus the Foucauldian omnipresence of power, where officers may act as they see fit. This tension between Weberian and Foucauldian theories of power is expressed through the role of the police. The influence from Weber comes primarily from the conception of the state as a social agency that exerts coercive force across a specific territory, which comes from Weber's \textit{Theory of Social and Economic Organization}. Important in Weber were issues of rationalization and centralization, and bureaucratic efficiency is primary. For Foucault, power comes through the exercise of discipline. This focus on variety and omnipresence of power contrasts with the centralization model of Weber. Herbert posits that police power works both as a set of formal institutions as well "as a set of processes through which informal norms may be expressed."\textsuperscript{394} This working-out of these two models creates a kind of spatialized normativity based on a central concept (civic order) expressing informal norms (personal politics.) This is expressed through urban space in the following manner: "...power is ineffectual without the capacity to influence the movement of people and goods across space. This is certainly the case for agencies of the state such as police. ...Simply put, many police strategies to create public order involve creating boundaries and restricting access."\textsuperscript{395}

This issue of police discretion is important, as it is the “capacity of officers to render justice as they wish.”\textsuperscript{396} This can be affected by factors such as the mood of the officer, time of day, or demeanor of the suspect. The law works as justification rather than motivator: “legal order is more a resource than a constraint, that is, officers may use the law to justify any action they may wish to take.” However, to what extent can this reliance on discretion be extended to larger enforcement bodies, or assemblages of smaller enforcement bodies, as witnessed in St. Paul and Denver? With higher-level political activities (such as conventions, when many high ranking officials are present), command and control is reasonably centralized, but this command cannot extend to the minute actions of the street-level enforcer. Policing relies on bureaucratization and and the centralization of administration, reliance on rational responses to situations, which accounts for the paramilitary command and control structure of policing. The training and organization of police officers, and their enкультuration into local policing cultures, is part of the movement of the “professionalization” of policing throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The various models of protest policing discussed above are manifestations of this professionalization, as ideas about protest turn into strategies and street-level tactics. Herbert's construction of spatial-based policing as a way of maintaining normative order charts a path between the

\textsuperscript{393} Herbert 1996.
\textsuperscript{394} Herbert 1996, 568.
\textsuperscript{395} Herbert 1997, 11.
\textsuperscript{396} Herbert 1996, 572.
Weberian bureaucratic application of power and the Foucauldian omnipresence of power as discipline. As such, the state cannot be viewed as a primary actor from either perspective. As Herbert states it, the state is not “some sort of coherent, transcendental unity;” rather, state actions and practices are often contradictory and inconsistent with the state's ideological position. State practice is internally fragmented and stems from inconsistent motivations.

Police as agents of social control express the will of ruling elites. These elites are “materially in a superior position to be able to promote particular political visions that underpin a desired and imagined social order.” These elites are essentially sectoral and tied to particular interests at the expense of the common good. This involves using technical and legal forms of social control oppositional to the popular sentiment. These forms of control are means of reinforcing power relations. The categorization of behavior as deviant begins the process of the criminalization of behavior. This process of criminalization of behavior through its categorization as deviant is part of a means of creating consensus. Based on the conception of normativity in Foucault 1977, normalization filters through the social body through the creation of categories of people, such as delinquent, deviant, insane, or criminal, which makes them knowable and controllable. These control processes work upon the power to label, classify, segregate and rehabilitate deviants into correctly-functioning individuals. The mechanisms of rule are both internal and external to the state. This aids in state survival, as these mechanisms are not the sole source of regulatory action. As Foucault writes, “In broad terms, governmentality refers to the targeting of the population as an object of social scientific knowledge in both social and individual settings, and is orientated toward the maximization of health, wealth, economic production and social stability.” Accordingly the liberty of the individual is enjoyed only through its responsible application. Thus a form of reasoning produces a type of government, which produces a type of policy and policing. The transformation of urban space is intimately tied to these formulations of normativity: “Changes in state form and its effectivity in the governance of urban areas cannot be separated from questions relating to the development of a 'new order' in the urban realm and the social control processes that accompany it.”

As expressed by Hardt and Negri, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 seem to have worked as a pivotal point with respect to this development. The state and its attendant apparatuses defend themselves against dissent through the production of a culture of fear. Hardt and Negri's assessment of modern protest crowds acting as the networked action of many peoples, specifically transnational, act to contest the spread of Empire through mediated means.

In contrast to this, Zinn's history of the effectiveness of mass demonstrations in the United States presents a much more optimistic appraisal. By focusing on the fear of those in power and the power of the multitudes to effect change through mass action, crowds in protest can successfully challenge power and succeed in bringing about significant change. Fear of crowds is a fear of insecurity of power. Part of defending this power is to create and maintain an atmosphere of fear as social control.

397 Coleman 14.
398 Coleman 21.
399 Coleman 66.
400 Their capitalization. This is their “dwindling Empire” proposition: that Empire must defend itself, in Hobbesian fashion, against a rising tide of a Multitude (also their capitalization). Empire vs. Multitude is a core theme in their works.
Criminologist Murray Lee discusses the development and maintenance of this fear in his study *Inventing Fear of Crime: Criminology and the Politics of Anxiety*. The reduction of the fear of crime is a governmental rationality, or a governmentality. Historical contingencies result in changes in disciplinary practices and governmental rationalities. These practices and governmentality set the stage for the current state of public discourses and conceptualizations of crime and fear. The fear of crime itself, to which I would add the fear of terrorism, is a subject of governmental rationalities. Empirical studies of crime produce sets of rationalities that presuppose a particular subjectivity of fearing, that is, the creation of subjects-who-fear. Fear of crime has not diminished alongside the diminishment in the number of actual crimes being committed. Increasing governmental means of fear reduction paradoxically results in the increase of fear. The fear of crime has served as the basis for other governmental rationalities of fear. The administrative and regulatory boundaries between 'crime' and “terror” are blurred, particularly in how military-juridical axes such as the “War on Drugs and the “War on Crime” have flowed into the new “War on Terror,” all of which serve to justify vast public military and paramilitary expenditure.

Considering the centrality of the fear of terrorism to urban security and administration of urban space, it is necessary to try and understand 'terrorism' as a term. Collins and Glover explore the development of the term and its relevance to understanding how the label ‘terrorist’ is used to describe any detractors against state power. Historically, the term has a rich history of association with anti-authoritarian paramilitary practice. Post-revolutionary France had the ‘reign of terror’, and Russian revolutionaries were labeled 'terrorists' because of their use of violence to further their goals against the monarchy. The term was later used to describe the activities of various non-state paramilitary groups, such as the Italian Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and so on. Collins and Glover go on to describe the rising tide of anti-authoritarian activism in the United States in the 1960s, and how Richard Nixon was elected to the presidency of the United States in 1968 on a platform extolling 'Law and Order.' Nixon oversaw the expansion of government power to deal specifically with internal threats, such as were revealed by the Church Committee hearings, which brought to light tactics of political intimidation, wiretapping, monitoring and disruption of Nixon's political enemies.

Furthermore, Nixon created the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism in 1972, and appointed a special assistant to the Secretary of State to deal with terrorism. These structures were left in place by President Ford, with the exception of the dismantling of some of the more public domestic surveillance projects, and streamlined under President Carter, who created several agencies to deal with terrorism: the Executive Committee on Terrorism, the Working Group on Terrorism and the Special Coordinating Committee, comprised of members of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Commission and the Departments of State, Energy, Justice, Treasury, Transportation and Defense.

The Carter administration's failure to broach a successful resolution to the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979-80 opened the door for Ronald Reagan to get elected to the presidency with a similar ‘law and order’ focus as Nixon's. Under Reagan, counter-terrorism as foreign policy took on a high profile. In addition, global covert military activity was greatly expanded under Reagan, prompting violent response to attempts at perceived American (and capitalist) hegemony. The combination of covert activity and violent response aided the author's assessment of the surprise

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401 Lee 133.

Sagan 195
and outrage of the American media (and people) at their perceived victimhood. Collins and Glover then discusses the intertwined relationship between the academy and anti-terrorist policy, contributing to an 'institutional web' of terrorism experts who sustain narrow views on terrorism while shifting from policy institution to the academy to government agencies and back again.\(^{402}\)

Current uses of the term 'terrorism' are built on this earlier foundation, with the perceived enemy of the 'West' shifting from Marxism to Islam. Any explicit definition of terrorism could in fact be used to identity and condemn the actions of the United States and its allies. Terrorism becomes a kind of floating signifier for any activity that works against the goals of the United States administration. The vague, tautological and self-constructing definitions of terrorism are necessary for U.S. Policy: were an explicit definition given, the actions of the United States itself would be called into question as possible terrorism.

The term 'terrorism' has acquired new meanings under the post-9/11 regime. Edward Said said in response to the 1986 American bombings of Libya that the very notion of the idea of terrorism needs to be examined and questioned because of its vagueness. Its use at the time was primary as a label for a state's or regime's political enemies. In was being used in particular by the United States and Israel. Collins and Glover mention in brief the selective public amnesia in the United States of those who easily forget the many military and bombing campaigns the United States has undertaken in various actions throughout the 'Third World' in the latter half of the 20\(^{th}\) century, and how that amnesia allows Americans to be shocked when confronted by people who remember the violence inflicted upon them.\(^{403}\) “‘Terrorism' is the result of specific actions taken by specific people to define certain examples of political violence (typically violence committed by those who are opposed to U.S. policies in the world.)”\(^{404}\)

Collin and Glover go on to state that within the academic field of cultural studies, words that masquerade as neutral truth or as objective reality, while actually expressing the narrow interests of a dominant group, are called 'ideology.' In essence, labeling something as 'terrorism' is to make opponent's political positions illegitimate. As discussed by Boykoff, the evidence for this is in the vastly increased surveillance of nonviolent political organizations such as Greenpeace and United for Peace and Justice.\(^{405}\) Quoting Anthony Romero of the American Civil Liberties Union: “What the FBI regards as potential terrorism strikes me as civil disobedience.”\(^{406}\)

This preoccupation with terrorism and security, coupled with the militarization of policing, has lead to a transformation in policing's approach to urban space. As demonstrated above in my discussion of the Miami model of policing, protest policing treats protesters as enemies and potential terrorists. There is an emphasis on military style checkpoints, spatial division into zones, hierarchical command and control, high-tech weaponry, target hardening, and strategic approaches to territoriality in urban space. The suspension of ordinary, daily life in cities during protests is deliberate, because the rules of engagement for warfare are radically different than ordinary life. Protest event-sites become States of Emergency when ordinary laws are lifted and special military procedures take precedence.

Political philosopher Giorgio Agamben calls this suspension a 'state of exception'. Based

\(^{402}\) Collins and Glover 163.
\(^{403}\) This gives new meaning to the term “fire and forget”.
\(^{404}\) Collins and Glover 157.
\(^{405}\) Boykoff 279.
\(^{406}\) Boykoff 279.
on the theories of political theorist Carl Schmitt, whose ideas undergird neoconservative political and neoliberal economic thought, the state of exception is the sovereign's ability to suspend the rule of law in the name of the public good. In the case of protest policing, the “sovereign” is a diffuse collection of governmental and extra-governmental entities who set urban policy and administration. Ultimately, the state is the arbiter of the state of emergency, but as we see from the example above of the Miami Civilian Investigation Panel, the oversight of civilian authorities can sometimes be superseded by police or federal enforcement agencies. Agamben acknowledges the gray area between the legal fact of the state of exception and its mobilization in practice. Part of the development of the idea is that a state of exception can be declared when a city is under siege. In the case of protest policing, law enforcement agencies act as if the city is being invaded, and in the spatial qualities of modern cities that do not have walls for defense, this means the enemy might march unopposed through city streets. To meet this threat, police need to not be concerned with the preservation of Constitutional or civil rights in order to meet this extraordinary threat. A significant question remains, which Agamben addresses: what of the rights of resistance during the state of exception?

The selective reduction of the fear of crime is a tactic of governance. Garland discusses two kinds of criminologies, or, sets of rationalities around criminal behavior. The first, a criminology of the self, “characterizes offenders as normal, rational consumers, just like us;” and the second, a criminology of the other, which depicts criminals as threatening, embittered, outcast, strangers. Garland further describes these two criminologies as operating simultaneously, affecting public policy in a schizoid manner, producing embodied contradictions in public discourse, policy and enforcement.

Use of the fear of crime as a governing tactic is a kind of biopolitics, that is, of the transference of political restrictions from overt moves of the state to internalized practices of the individual. That is, through the biopolitics of the reduction of the fear of crime, the individual polices him or herself. No explicit rules about how to avoid crime might exist, but individuals undertake actions to ensure their personal security. The individual's responsibility is to keep him or herself and his or her personal belongings (and personal spaces) safe from theft, damage, vandalism or other crime. Further, that security of the individual and that individual's property is at the heart of biopolitics. One must take care of the self for society to function properly.

This extends from the individual person to the individual building; fearing subjects create fearing spaces. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 were a kind of signal event that accelerates and crystallizes public fears of terrorism. In its wake came a wave of construction and renovation of public buildings in the United States following the principles of “defensive architecture,” or “target hardening” in CPTED terminology. Lee claims these refurbishments in fact misunderstand or misrepresent Oscar Newman's defensible space principles. Lee's research shows that design principles intended to increase safety and human welfare not only cannot always guarantee improvement in human well-being, but ironically can be used to defend and preserve capital and power inequities.

In closing, the “Specters of '68” that I mention in the title of this study and throughout the document are multiple. Of course, the term a play on “specter of communism” mentioned in the opening passages of Marx's Communist Manifesto. The governments in Europe at the time were in fear of a rise of populist revolution that would topple bourgeois power. This applies well

today, as those in power are in fear of a specter of possible revolution in the form of a popular uprising.

The year 1968 was a watershed for protest worldwide. It represented the virtual takeover of campuses and urban centers by students and workers around the globe, in particular Mexico City, Tokyo and other cities in Japan, and Paris and most of France. A result of these events was that the political ideas behind the protests became more and more incorporated into each protest group's larger social context. While the protests might not have achieved their immediate goals, their sheer size and frequency transformed public discourse and resulted in social, administrative, and legal changes. The specter haunting the powerful is that of crowds rising and protesting and changing the structures of power, and threatening the power of the elite by subsequently transforming society.

In the context of the United States, 1968 was also a dramatic year for protest. The events of the Democratic National Convention in Chicago illustrate this. The Chicago protests were the scene of seemingly indiscriminate violence against protesters and bystanders alike by a Chicago police force that rioted against any and all perceived transgressors. The violence of Chicago tainted the public image of the legitimacy of policing, and generally caused violence and force-based policing to lose its moral standing. The specter of 1968 is that police will once again lose their moral authority, and that transgressing protesters will dictate social change and new political movements, threatening the status of police.

The modern manifestation of this fear is a pervasive anxiety within law enforcement of the loss of control over a protest situation, of losing control of the city streets, of the political narrative, of letting the events of 1968 replay, complete with riots, assassinations, fires and chaos. This overshadows and stifles the goals of real protesters, who by the vast majority do not seek the destruction of the very streets that form the stage for their dissent; rather, who demand the attention of the powerful and seek redress of their grievances. Given the success of the protesters over the course of the early 1970s, such as increase civil rights, attention to the needs of minorities, end to the war in Vietnam, and greater acceptance of marijuana and other recreational drugs, the real specter of '68 was not contained within that year itself, but rather was the result of all the prior protests. My inference from my research is that the anxiety over control displayed by the police and enforcers of urban space in general is not that protests themselves will occur as they did in 1968, but rather that those protests will serve as catalysts for larger social movements that bring more democratic and more egalitarian processes to society at large.

In closing, the specter haunting police today is the specter of 1968: that the protesters are morally right, and no amount of spatial control or force-based policing will prevent that. It is a deeply conservative fear that, despite the youth or radical political positions of tens of thousands of organized protesters, somehow the position the police and the political establishment is the incorrect and immoral. It is a fear that the protesters might actually be right, and the system that the police support is not in fact morally right. This fear goes strikes at the very core of professional policing.

9.2: Implications of Findings

These findings show some of the spatial consequences of the neoliberalization of urban
space, and my interpretation of these findings show the social and political consequences of the control of urban space. Space becomes the means by which power is expressed. In the case of protest policing, this means that protests themselves become spatially restricted to the point of irrelevance, or criminalized outright. The means by which cities, and the elites that design and pay for them, protect themselves is through the language of security as it applies to urban design and architecture, expressed by the practice of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design.

This has significant implications for the future of environmental design as a professional practice, urban design and the creation of urban spaces, and the administrative systems that oversee the use of said space. The very definition of the rights of public space is called into question when laws can be suspended at the anxieties of the powerful. In *Private Lives, Public Spaces: Democracy Beyond 9/11*, Henry Giroux and Douglas Kellner examine the consequences of the belief that neoliberal economic freedom is the highest and best form of democracy. Any behavior that does not fit into roles determined by neoliberalism is deemed either unwanted or in fact becomes incomprehensible to that system, and is therefore a threat to that system. In particular, Giroux and Kellner emphasize the criminalization of youth and the commercialization of public space. We are undergoing a “collapse of public discourse, the increasing militarization of public space, and the rise of a state apparatus bent on substituting policing functions for social services.”

They view that criminalizing the behaviors of one group of people or another is a step along the way to totalitarianism. Giroux and Kellner see the need to maintain discourse on social responsibility: “The first casualty is a language of social responsibility capable of defending those vital public spheres that provide education, health care, housing, and other services crucial to a healthy democracy.”

They liken the retreat of the liberal state and the rise of neoliberalism as a kind of domestic warfare, creating discourses of governance where whole populations get cast into the role of transgressors or enemies: "...as the War on Poverty ran out of steam with the social and economic crises that emerged in the 1970's, it has been replaced with an emphasis on domestic warfare, and that the policies of social investment, at all levels of government, have given way to an emphasis on repression, surveillance and control." They make the claim that due to the social and economic shift following the 1970's, the period coequal with the rise of neoliberalism, that criminalization is a standard operating procedure of social policy. Concomitant with this increasing criminalization as social policy has come domestic militarization. They describes the passage of the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act as the beginning of a sweep of 'no-tolerance' law enforcement practices, and they cite the majority of the funding allocated by the act being for prison construction and operation.

Giroux and Kellner are discussing a shift in governmentality that equates crowd control to population management. Partha Chatterjee in *Politics of the Governed* discusses how those deprived of rights are treated as populations vs. citizens. I would invert this: those who are governed as populations rather than citizens are deprived of rights. Further, those who are treated as a mass of people obstructing space are granted only minimal rights, and those are conditional, subject to abrogation or revocation depending on the mood of the arresting officer.

The management of national in-group/out-group status is a core concept around which

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408 Giroux and Kellner 31
409 Giroux and Kellner 82.
410 Giroux and Kellner 39.
411 Giroux and Kellner 40.

Sagan 199
national identity is constructed. Further, fear of the ‘other’ as fundamental to this identity. The ‘other’ acts in ways that are not part of the system, undisciplined and unruly, and needs to be both managed and punished. This management takes place through both administrative processes and through spatial management. “Good” citizens stay off the streets and shop, “bad” citizens take to the streets and protest. This is the prioritization of neoliberal values in an urban setting; only neoliberal constructions of behavior are normal and valid.

This transliteration of economic values into the social realm codes normalcy as how things should be. This particular coding of behavior as desirable or undesirable, as normal or criminal based on their relationship to the freedom of the markets and the financialization of social relations, is a core component of imperialism. The spatial expressions of this transliteration neoliberalism are expressed in urban cores, as well as distant shores, through capitalism's “spatial fix,” as explored by David Harvey. This “fix” is a way of working out crises of accumulation of capital, or of surpluses of labor. Money invested in places serves to increase capital over time while increasing its scarcity in the short term. Offering employment in highly populated areas drives down the cost of labor, reducing the surplus of labor in the short term. Under early neoliberalism, this is done through offshore investment and the mobility of capital. Perhaps the next phase is an interior imperialism, transforming citizens into guest workers, creating special zones where labor laws do not apply.

Political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski's discussion of the origins of the word “terror” in policy explores this possibility. He criticizes use of the term as excessively vague, a kind of “floating signifier” for all manner of fears. Terrorism, in fact, is a technique of asymmetrical warfare: killing unarmed non-combatants for purposes of political intimidation. This technique of inspiring fear develops it own momentum, taking over discourses, leading to social and policy changes. This leads to pervasive fear, which can be allayed by producing secure environments. The drive to feel safe eventually makes security features ubiquitous, with every environment hardened against fears of imagined enemies. As described by analyst of the built environment Robert Sommer, these “tight spaces” contribute to a siege mentality, reinforcing the sense of unknown and lurking danger.412

The problem with this preoccupation is that terrorists are a vague and ill-defined threat. What does a terrorist look like? What are their goals? What do they do? Terrorists could be anywhere, at any time, ready to wreak havoc. Defining terrorism is tautological...terrorism is that which is committed by terrorists, and terrorists are the one who commit terrorism. Terrorism is a floating signifier that can be attached to any activity that can be interpreted as working against American interests. As citizens gather to protest, their actions are unusual in the neoliberal urban order. The fact that protester actions are non-normal and aggressively expressive means that they are possibly criminal and need to be contained by police. Any action which works counter to the normativity of urban space can be lumped together, criminal, protester, and terrorist alike. As the process of the hardening and securitization of urban spaces continue, the specters of lurking terrorist danger increases, and repression of protests ensues.

In chapters 2, 5, and 7 of this project I mention the idea of “collateral language,” the idea that discourses of political meaning subsume and transform previous words, giving them new meanings in new contexts. The term ‘terrorism’ has acquired new meanings under the post-9/11 regime. Edward Said said in response to the 1986 American bombings of Libya that the very

412 Sommer 1974.

Sagan
notion of the idea of terrorism needs to be examined and questioned because of its vagueness. The term's use at the time was primary as a label for a state's or regime's political enemies. It was being used in particular by the United States and Israel. Collins and Glover mention in brief the selective public amnesia in the United States of those who easily forget the many military and bombing campaigns the United States has undertaken in various actions throughout the 'Third World' in the latter half of the 20th century, and how that amnesia allows Americans to be shocked when confronted by people who remember the violence inflicted upon them. This gives new meaning to the term “fire and forget!” Terrorism is the result of specific actions taken by specific people to define certain examples of political violence, typically violence committed by those who are opposed to U.S. policies in the world. The practice of labeling something as “terrorism” makes one's own positions legitimate by contrast.

This becomes even more relevant when examining the intertwined relationship between the academy and anti-terrorist policy, contributing to an institutional web of terrorism experts who sustain narrow views on terrorism while shifting from policy institution to the academy to government agencies and back again. Current uses of the term 'terrorism' are built on this earlier foundation, with the perceived enemy of the “West” shifting from Marxism to Islam. Any explicit definition of terrorism could in fact be used to identity and condemn the actions of the United States and its allies. To avoid being pinned down to an operational definition, “terrorism” as a floating signifier represents any activity that works against the goals of the United States administration. The vague, tautological and self-constructing definitions of terrorism are necessary for U.S. Policy: were an explicit definition given, the actions of the United States itself would be called into question as possible terrorism.

Professional academic as experts on terrorism rely on professional designers who have become experts at security to create spaces in cities in response to fears of terrorism. As these fears rise, and as cities host major events, which they are told through a network of threat warning systems could be targets for terrorism, the need for spatial security against these specters rises. Professionals are called upon for a wide range of problem solving, both the development of policies or the creation of spaces.

This emphasis on physical security and urban spaces might result in the increase in attention to various environmental design means to increase security. Designers should be aware of the ideology behind their client's proposals, and carefully examine their own subject positions. Are they willing to enforce a spatial order of the privileged to satisfy their own aesthetic goals? With the increasing focus on architecture and design as a taste-expressing processes, and a diminishment of architecture as analyzing and designing systems, more and more designers will likely make choices that sacrifice democracy for art, as described by Tony Ward, or for profit, as described by Dovey. It is possible that these fears of terrorism, distastes for the downtrodden, and

413 Said 1988.
414 The term was colloquially used to describe ballistic missles, in that they could be launched and relied upon to strike their targets without further guidance. In this sense, the violence inflicted upon the 3rd world through proxy wars between the superpowers throughout the latter half of the 20th century was easily put out of mind of the citizens of 1st world nations. That the United States military claimed that Iraqi citizens would greet Americans as “liberators,” in the words of former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, shows a fundamental lack of understanding of history.
415 Collins and Glover 157.
416 Collins and Glover 163.
privileging of the privileged will result in a kind of neo-medieval design aesthetic, a return of moats and baileys, an emphasis in urban design on walls and zones. As Setha Low notes, this has resulted in suburban walled enclaves and gated communities. Target hardening might become part of the sales pitch for any design project. Looking at urban space through the logics of dispersal and containment might produce cities more like stockyards and abattoirs than gardens or playgrounds. The invocation of 9-11 as justification for any and all urban security or CPTED redesigns threatens to subsume all other social discourses under the rhetoric of 'security'.

Design professionals and spatial regulators occupy a dual role when it comes to urban civil disobedience: they are players on the stage of spatial conflict, but they also can observe, analyze and critique these same spaces and conflicts. This presents them a singular opportunity: to create a place of agency within a system paralyzed with contradictions and apparent impossibilities, by creating spatial practices that serve to transform the social relations of those using them. Does this mean that architects also become activists? If not, perhaps they should be; otherwise, through their silence and complicity, they may be allowing the enactment of injustice against urban dwellers and advancing the decay of democracy.

Of course, those who decide where capital goes might simply decide that particular environments or regulatory climates are too costly. Fernandez explores this in examining how Seattle was a poor choice for the 1999 WTO due to its status as a nexus of protest groups, with a long history of civil disobedience. Later WTO meetings were held in remote or inaccessible locations to which only the very wealthy had access. Two years after Seattle, the WTO met in Qatar, a Persian Gulf Arab state monarchy known for strict immigration laws: protesters could not afford access, nor would it have been granted if their purposes were known. In 2003, the WTO met in Cancun, Mexico, with the conference on a small island, with rigorous security checkpoints at every entrance. Other high level financial meetings such as the G8 removed their meetings from urban spaces to remote resorts, thus separating protesters from their networks of support, and making access unfeasible. As long as capital is mobile, and as long as those who hold it fear for their security, it will remove itself to places where it can advance unimpeded.

But, as is the case in the West, huge amounts of capital are tied up in cities and urban spaces that cannot be so easily abandoned. The occasional ministerial meeting is one thing, but what of corporate headquarters, regulatory centers, administrative centers, banks, and the like? Despite the promises of communication technology, physical places still need to exist to hold bureaucratic processes. One way that these new robber barons might insulate themselves from the transgressive masses outside is through ever-more exclusive and secure urban enclaves, resulting in new urban fortresses.

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417 Fernandez 92-95.
The U.S. Embassy compound, deep within Baghdad's “Green Zone.” Image=ESRI, NGA, East View, Think Progress.
This type of thinking is already in evidence. Military spatial logic in cities includes zones as means to control the movement of people and material. Mike Davis writes about the administrative partitioning of Los Angeles into a variety of “zones of exclusion,” places in which those who can afford control over spatial designs create places that deliberately exclude people whose presence and/or behavior those wealthy find objectionable. In the second Gulf War, the United States established a massive military, administrative, and diplomatic enclave called the “Green Zone” in the heart of Baghdad. This miniature city had all of the comforts of American cities, but behind tall concrete walls and numerous checkpoints. This bastion of American privilege in the center of a war zone eventually became untenable as the second Gulf War wound down. Likely, the military and civilian architects of this fortress city have taken their lessons back to the United States, and are ready to apply them to the next urban core renewal or corporate campus design.

The global neo-medieval presents vast opportunities for urban design. As described by cultural critic Bruce Sterling, nation-states are less and less representative, as billions live in conglomerated state capitalist systems tied to globalized corporate entities. These entities are increasing creating “special zones” of economic activity from the Persian Gulf to southern China to sub-Saharan Africa. This creates opportunities for urban design unencumbered by concern over public space or equal access to services.

The fortress mentality also applies to architecture. The techniques of defensible space can easily be turned around to defend the wealthy and privileged. Again, Mark Davis writes about mean-spirited deterrents to street life in Los Angeles, from benches that are impossible to lay upon, to timed sprinklers discouraging rough sleeping, to baroque enclosures of trash receptacles to deter scavenging. These encrustations of space are thorough rejection of William Whyte’s recommendations for urban space.

The fortress design of the global neo-medieval perhaps has no better exemplar than the designs for the new United States embassy in London. For site purchased in 2008 and currently under construction, architecture firm Kieran Timberlake designed nothing less than a 21st century castle. Surrounded by a moat, with long entrance ways circling the building, blocked at several points by earthwork berms and concrete bollards, with thick walls of reinforced concrete, windows with steel shades from which residents can peer suspiciously at visitors, this building broadcasts security and insecurity in every design detail. If this building should win design awards, and become the vanguard of a new typology of exclusion, the consequences would be chilling.

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418 Davis 1998.
419 This bastion of Americanism is very similar to the military bases Gillem describes in America Town.
421 Khanna, as well as Sterling.
422 The logic of including security features such as moats, soil and earth berms, and terraces outside of facilities like the U.S. Embassy might be made more palatable by framing them as “green” or sustainable design elements.
This bunker mentality is a natural extension of an environmental design focus on security and processes of target hardening under CPTED. Paul Virilio and Sylvere Lotringer explore this further in *Pure War*. In this book, they make the claim that all cities have been built with one of two logics in mind: defense or commerce. Under the regime of the global neo-medieval, why not both? In their chapter on bunkers, Virilio traces the line of war from military war, to intra-military war, to traditional civil war, to war on civilians. He cites the World Trade Center, Gaza, and Darfur as examples. Bunkers can be used to defend, but they also can be used as means of passage, as kind of dead-end corridors of protection. He analyzes the towers of Shanghai, with their millions of square feet of space, absolutely inaccessible to all but the most select elites and their servants. He also cites the fact that Mohammad Atta, architect of the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, was in fact educated as an architect, with degrees from Alexandria and Hamburg. Virilio and Lotringer contend the WTC was a type of vertical bunker that has special symbolic value in being broken by an architect's obsession with the creation of a

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423 Virilio and Lotringer 20-21.
424 Virilio and Lotringer 210.
425 Virilio and Lotringer 216.
convincing aesthetic image.

In less grandiose terms, the desire to protect and secure space can be seen in a myriad of spatial and design elements. Geographer Steven Flusty in “Building Paranoia,” within the larger volume *Architecture of Fear*, discusses the transformation of his family home from a place of comfort and sociability with the neighbors to a place existing behind multiple levels of checkpoints and security. He describes this as “crusty space,” “a space that cannot be accessed due to obstructions such as walls, gates and checkpoints.” He presents the example of gated communities, where access to residences and amenities, including “public spaces” or “commons,” are restricted according to various spatial tactics and administrative procedures, such as access only by appointment, ID checkpoints, memberships, and so on. Services typically provided by the State, such as cleaning, maintenance, trash removal, security, etc., are provided by private firms, typically contracted by the developers. This produces a sense of community based on exclusion and isolation, and aids in the development of a siege mentality.

The historical predecessor for such forms and communities is the medieval castle, which developed in turn from fortified Roman camps and earlier walled cities.

Environmental anthropologist Setha Low 2003 expresses the same spatial logic:

*Living in a gated community represents a new version of the middle-class American dream precisely because it temporarily suppresses and masks, even denies and fuses, the inherent anxieties and conflicting social values of modern urban and suburban life. It transforms America's dilemma of how to protect themselves and their children from danger, crime, and unknown others while still perpetuating open, friendly neighborhoods and comfortable, safe homes. It reinforces the norms of a middle-class lifestyle in a historical period in which everyday events and news media exacerbate fears of violence and terrorism. Thus, residents cite the 'need' for gated communities to provide a safe and secure home in the face of a lack of other societal alternatives. (11)*

That ‘need’ for security in (sub)urban space that eliminates choice in how to achieve that security. Security is of the highest, indeed the only priority. Other needs must be addressed afterward, if at all. Fearing subjects create fearing spaces.

This administrative division of people in space is a core component of neoliberalism. Under neoliberal regimes, liberty refers to economic freedom rather than personal liberty, much less political liberalism, which is vilified. Anthropologist Aihwa Ong discusses this as a part of the concept of governmentality. Discussed above, governmentality is, “an array of knowledges and techniques that are concerned with the systematic and pragmatic guidance and regulation of everyday conduct.” Further, “Neoliberal governmentality results from the infiltration of market-driven truths and calculations into the realm of politics.” This infiltration can only be exercised in lacunae of existing juridical systems. The concept of exception comes from the political theorist Carl Schmitt, who declares that the sovereign's monopoly over decision making power of rests outside juridical process, and is the essence of the state's sovereignty. This monopoly in Schmitt's formulation pertains in particular to the sovereign's delineation of allies and enemies during wartime. According to political philosopher Giorgio Agamben, the enemy, identified via declaration by the sovereign, stands outside the juridical order, and may be acted

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426 Ellin and Blakely, eds.
427 Flusty 49.
428 This is also explored extensively by Blakely and Snyder, in their contribution to *Architecture of Fear*, “Divided We Fall: Gated and Walled Communities in the United States.”
429 Ong 4.
430 Ong 4.
upon in an extra-legal fashion. The enemy is a non-citizen, and is stripped of juridical protections.\textsuperscript{431} Ong extends this idea from exclusion to inclusion, that is, that the sovereign may legally also decide to specifically include particular populations within specific neoliberal policies and procedures. Schmitt extends this idea further, claiming that the monopoly on decisions by the sovereign should make government more flexible. As crises are akin to war, exceptions to legality can be made situational and reactive. This allows for a varied situational response to changing circumstances.

The Miami model of policing, as discussed above, can be seen as social technology of applied neoliberalism response to the chaos of 1968 Chicago and 1999 Seattle. As Chicago 1968 caused a crisis in protest policing, shifting from the escalated force model to the negotiated management model, so too was Seattle 1999 the crisis that brought the shift from the negotiated management model to the strategic nullification model. With each new model, protest policing's engagement with urban space has grown more sophisticated. Under the escalated force model, space was something to be held and defended as territory. Under the negotiated management model, urban space was seen as something to be shared and protestor access to public space defended, even at the cost of smooth procedures for nonparticipating citizenry. Under the strategic nullification model, urban space was considered as a battlefield, divided into zones, with significantly controlled access. This comes as the same time as urban space undergoes the process of neoliberalization, with the powers of the state in retreat, except for military and paramilitary force. These strategies of policing and their engagement with space are part of the militarization of both policing and of urban space.

As governmental has to do with the management of populations, the identification of these populations provides targets for said specific inclusion. According to Ong, this can be accomplished through technologies of subjectivity, which are arrays of knowledge and expert systems to induce optimal self-government of citizens, for example health regimes, education, or entrepreneurship. They can also be accomplished through technologies of subjection such as “political strategies that regulate populations for optimal productivity, increasingly through spatial practices.”\textsuperscript{432} This can be seen in the militarization of urban space, control of travel, zoning and development. Ong describes the disarticulation of traditional elements of citizenship, such as rights, entitlements, privileges, territory, and how these elements are being re-articulated through market forces. Citizenship is becoming redefined through a neoliberal matrix. Ong notes “Agamben draws a distinction between citizens, who have juridical rights, and excluded groups, who exist outside legal protections. The exception thus allows the institutionalization of innovative spatial administration.”\textsuperscript{433} According to Agamben, outside of citizenship, non-citizens live within "...a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit, in which the very concepts of subjective right and juridical protection no longer [make] any sense... .”\textsuperscript{434} The reordering of citizenship comes with a reordering of urban space.

Physical manifestations of this reordering are already in place in regions around the world where the neoliberal process has further advanced. Urban theorist Teresa Caldeira explores how the same culture of fear has over time helped to produce what she calls “fortified enclaves," hardened and defended sites that are socially and spatially segregated, keeping the poor

\textsuperscript{431} Agamben 1998 and 2005.
\textsuperscript{432} Ong 6.
\textsuperscript{433} Ong 19.
\textsuperscript{434} Agamben 1998 170-171.
excluded. While these are extreme examples of urban form used to enforce politics, the techniques of isolation, separation and militarization are the same. These enclaves represent a radical new form of urban space that totally overwrite former senses of urban modernity based on public space. Enclaves and the logics and tactics behind their creation spatially reinforce class boundaries and class homogeneity as separate from and superior to public heterogeneity and urban difference. Thus, the tendency toward design for security is profoundly anti-democratic.

What consequences then for urban design and public space? As architecture theorist Max Page puts it, “Shouldn't urban designers be able to create better spaces for the exercise of democratic protest?”

“Protesters chose their sites, their routes, their rituals and their songs to highlight the distance between a regime's symbols and the needs and desires of the people. A protest can only succeed...if it defies the regime by occupying space usually denied it, or occupies it in a way that transforms the place's meaning.” The energy of the protest comes from the tension between the symbols of the regime (including its spaces) and the aims of the protest. Does then this mean that public spaces and political protest must needs be at odds? Page argues “The element that remains constant over virtually all of these protest is this: the feeling of being surrounded by hundreds of thousands of other people who share beliefs. ...A massive rally is supremely uplifting for the protesters themselves and the movement they represent, reminding them of a simple point: you are not alone.” Perhaps, then urban designers can continue to advocate for open places and public spaces, designing in the spatial elements of democracy and public dissent.

If designers fail in this, what can be done? If their need to express their aesthetics and good taste (and to get paid while doing so) overrides their social responsibility to the public good, what then are the consequences for urban spaces? Can protesters and spatial transgressors continue the cycle of innovation and devise new spatial strategies for dissent? The creativity displayed in subaltern approaches to both the physical and symbolic qualities of renegade spatial interventions, like those explored in sociologist Jeff Ferrell's *Tearing Down the Streets: Adventures in Urban Anarchy*, present some encouragement. His argument is staunchly humanist, suggesting that human creativity and the drive to express freedoms through spatial interventions can transform spatial design practice. Despite the cynical premise that design can only be done by designers, the fact that architecture and urban design are elite practices points a way forward. Critical Mass rides, graffiti culture, punk rock warehouse collectives, even the arts festival Burning Man suggest possible ways to engage with space that has not been colonized or territorialized by capital under neoliberalism. Not all buildings need professional design, and not all spaces need sanctioned reorganization. I discuss these possibilities further below.

Further, cities are heterogeneous. By their very nature cities are networks of interlocking systems of all varieties. While the logic of bunkers and fortresses might transform cities to make dissent less noticeable for elites, as long as people have access to information and can organize themselves, then they will continue to use urban space as a medium of civil disobedience.

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435 Caldeira 2001 256.  
437 Page 86.  
438 Page 87.
9.3: Suggestions for Future Policy and Practice

In this section I discuss some suggestions for policy and practice based on my findings above. I present these recommendations in three sections: recommendations for designers, recommendations for policing, and recommendations for protest organizers.

9.3.1: Lessons for Designers

As John Parkinson writes in “Holisitic Democracy and Physical Public Space,” there exists a need for public space in healthy democracies. Several authors maintain the same position, such as David Mitchell, Setha Low, David Hackworth, Alexis deTocqueville, Mike Davis, David Harvey, Michael Sorkin, Jurgen Habermas, to name a few. This position, outlining the conditions under which spaces are public or private, seems to be a core value of critical social theory about space. In this formulation, private spaces are normative spaces where citizens are free to make autonomous decisions, and public spaces are where citizens can resolve conflicts arising as a result of those private decisions. The agreements as to where these boundaries lie, and in the specific cases of which instances, are context-specific. Parkinson gives the example of feminist thought and practice regarding the liberal-democratic ideal of privacy and the home hides the political dimensions of domestic arrangements. Public spaces can theoretically be entered by anyone at any time; no restrictions on access based on identity or time. In private spaces, entry is controlled by an individual or group who can decide who may enter and under which circumstances. Dovey 1999 and 2004 argues that certain urban redevelopment schemes contain implicit social, economic or spatial barriers to entry, thus increasing the likelihood of homogenization of the designed 'public' spaces. Thus accessibility differentiates public from private, using barriers physical and otherwise.

Designers should ask themselves significant and probing questions about what they ethically believe to be good in society. Does accessibility necessarily equal democratic? Does public always equal free access? Does private always equal constrained? Rules of behavior and social norms still apply in 'free' and public spaces. In-between these two poles are zones of semi-private and semi-public, and the spectrum in between, each with its own rules of access and behavior, all of which complicate the issue. What is expected of public behavior in democracies? And what should designers do to ensure that their designs follow their beliefs? Some of the practices and language of environmental design for maintenance of social well-being are now being used as part of a toolkit of social control. This reminds professionals of environmental design that their work has social and political as well as physical outcomes. Furthermore, engagement with the ethics of public design opens up an opportunity for scholars and practitioners to re-engage with the design of urban centers with protest and political speech in mind.

Some spatial elements are core components of the public sphere and liberal democracies. As stated above, Parkinson 2006 asserts that free, publicly owned space should be available for

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439 Parkinson 2006.
440 This is also taken up by J.K. Gibson-Graham in The End of Capitalism.
Examples of this type of space are meeting rooms in public libraries, village halls, town squares, or public plazas. Based on the founding document of the United States, the Constitution, accessibility should be open to all. These spaces should also be protected legally from interference by private or public security forces. The design of these spaces falls to professional environmental designers.

The professional status of environmental design is such that designers must be educated and certified to be able to practice their craft. This means that they go through an extensive period of both skills training and enculturation to the culture of professional design. Often this design culture reflects the prevailing philosophical and theoretical positions of the professional, at least as design culture exists in relation to the economic status of design. That is to say, designers not only have to learn how to design, but they learn how to be “designers.”

This points to the need for ethical and sociological education for designers, particularly on the interrelation of the forms of the built environment and human behavior. Certainly organizations like the National Architecture Accrediting Board certify schools that have basic study of human behavior on their curricula, but these administrative and accrediting bodies can change focus or alter their criteria periodically, as they did recently when NAAB changed the definitions and requirements for social content in architectural education, making the meaning more general and less explicit. Spaces do not change so fast, and the needs of liberal democracies change even more slowly. This means that while architectural tastes and conceptions might change over a few years, urban spaces last much longer. Architects should be educated with longer term plans in mind.

Further, to what degree are designers held ethically responsible for the effects of their designs? A quick survey of current architectural periodicals reveals that the focus seems to be on buildings that are shaped by computer algorithm. Form following function has been replaced by form following functions. Lauded architecture seems to follow the rules of fancy and caprice, with the forms of buildings following the shapes that are easy for particular software tools to render. What is the role of human behavior in all this? Are these designers called back to the table when their designs have no provision for assembly? Or when the buildings are sponsored by clients in repressive states? Or if the buildings themselves perpetuate existing power and economic relations? Where is the accrediting board that checks buildings and urban designs for improving lives and the participation of users in the political process? Architecture’s independence as a profession is limited, as designers are closely bound by client needs and legal obligations.

Weizman cites the founder of Médicins sans Frontières, discussing the value of embedded research, or, what would in this case be called field work. The professionals who have access to environments and information denied others must be prepared to perform their professional tasks as well as “bear witness to the truth of injustice, and to insist on political responsibility.” This begs the question: what, in the case of urban design, is the object of political responsibility? If the subject of research is the production and regulation of the built environment in order to affect political behavior, where does justice lie? While architects and planners are not bound by the Hippocratic oath, what responsible practitioner can say they are willing to design in order to allow harm to come to another? To what degree does conscientious research inform real design

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441 Parkinson 2000, 14.
442 The Environmental Design Research Association's “Good Places” award is a candle in a vast darkness.
and construction practice? Does theory in general always turn into practice? Does architectural research turn into the built environment? While downtown Denver and downtown St. Paul are not the river Jordan's West Bank, the militarization of space under neoliberal late capitalism is pervasive. Designers must be aware of whom they serve.443

This points again to the economic role that designers fill. Designers are paid by clients to fulfill clients' needs. These needs vary, but center around the core principles of social function, safe structure, and satisfying aesthetics. Clients want buildings and spaces that fulfill their needs, are well-built, sturdy, and durable, and that please their sensibilities. Rare is the opportunity for the designer to let their own aesthetics dominate the client's. This means that, regardless of the education or ethical inclination of the designer, they are beholden to the client's wishes. If the client believes that the militarization of urban space is the best practice, and the securitization of architecture will yield the results they want, then the architect will have to work toward those goals or risk losing the contract. How then can architects and urban designers maintain social responsibility in the absence of direct financial compensation for it? The client's desires for security, and the fact that the client pays the bills, means that the client's fears heavily influence designed forms. Urban designers might not be interested in the military, but you can be sure than the military is interested in them.

Still, there are some good examples of environmental design practice that keeps political engagement at the forefront, focusing on ways to serve public needs, provide those spaces essential to liberal democracies, and generally improve the quality of life of users. The Project for Public Spaces is one such organization. Founded in 1975 and following the methods and principles of sociologist William H. Whyte, the PPS non-profit emphasizes public good in all its designs. Ideally, practices like this should be at the core of all urban placemaking practice.

9.3.2: Lessons for Policing

Strategies of policing under neoliberalism have been generally successful in their attempts to nullify protests. From my research, the strategic nullification method of protest policing has been most successful in shielding the elite from the dissent of the masses. Further, the strategy of holding meetings or events that might draw tens of thousands of protesters in remote and inaccessible sites also has been successful at discouraging the presence of dissent, and making sure the business of late capitalism can proceed smoothly.

However, the prior mode of protest policing was far more successful at minimizing violence and ensuring the civil rights of protesters. Negotiated management works to ensure legal protections for protesters even at the expense of local functioning as usual. This is in fact one of the aims of protesters, to use their spatial tactics to disrupt ordinary processes to bring attention to injustices. If protesters are blocked from doing this, and if police act repressively, the evidence shows that protesters will continue to innovate and circumvent any policing spatial tactics. Repressive actions by the police almost always escalate the chaos and violence of a protest situation, and will only damage police reputation in the long run.

Any recommendations I might have for policing are on the basis of overreach and

443 Quoting philosopher and poet Angelo Moore: “For whom do you write? For whose pleasure and whose delight? Do your readers see your light?”

Sagan
interpretation. As the role of police is to defend the elite, and as the elite are becoming increasingly globalized and less connected to local contexts, then there might be an opportunity for local police, who are rooted in local traditions and act from localized and context-specific policing cultures, to work more closely with local demonstrators. Local policing cultures largely determine what police believe is appropriate or dangerous in protest policing situations.

However, to the degree that police are professionalized, then they too are products of a system of education and local cultures of belonging. Part of police training should be how to understand what protesters want and how they can be engaged productively. The theoretical and methodological split between sociology and criminology, and the continuance of myths about crowd behavior, point to the need for a systemic overhaul of policing education and training.

Also, just as architects and designers work for clients, police are always enforcing a vision of the law held by elites. Police are organized along paramilitary lines with chains of command going up to local political figures. This limits the degree to which policing can be independent to pursue engagement with protests on its own terms. The best police can hope for in this case is a good relationship with city governments who in turn consider civil rights important. The predominance of fear and security in enforcement is a challenge, as the promulgation of fear exists as a means of social control. One particularly problematic area arising from good relationships with local governments is xenophobia and suspicion of visitors to their jurisdictions; police generally know less about visitors than they might about locals, and so any outsider has the potential to have ill intent.

Police should remain aware of their influence on the communities they serve, just as larger forces influence them. The maintenance of low-level fear as a means of social control might produce more docile citizens, but certainly less happy ones. Police should not be a vector of that fear, but rather its amelioration.

9.3.3: Lessons for Protest

The research I have done points to extraordinary courage and commitment by protesters. Placing themselves in harm’s way to speak truth to power has a long and honored history in liberal-democratic societies, and should rightfully be lauded as a civic virtue. Protests, despite their danger and intensity, are also fun. The carnivalesque atmosphere of many protests, with colorful clothing, songs, chants, puppets, stories, and so on, is easily overlooked when we consider the political realities of the situation and the always-imminent danger of repression. According to my research and experience, the celebratory atmosphere of protests comes from a feeling of being a part of a larger body unified in purpose, breaking the rules for the ordinary uses of urban space, suspending ordinary rules for behavior, and engaging with other people in new ways, all while affirming a shared bond stemming from beliefs in common. This kind of liberation should be celebrated and protected.

The consistent spatial innovations of protesters are remarkable. Their abundance and variety exemplify parallel minds working on the same problems...how do we get our message heard in the face of adversity? How can we use urban space as a medium for our messages? The history of direct action shows a diversity of spatial tactics, which vary according to circumstances and contexts. The sit-ins of the civil rights movement showed how the occupation
of spaces normally denied one can be powerful signals of inequity. The rallies and marches of Chicago 1968 confronted the political establishment and publicly demonstrated their refusal to participate in larger injustices. Black Bloc tactics use tactics of anonymity and dispersal to express points in sometimes destructive ways. As long as police attempt to block or deny protesters the opportunities to protest, protesters will find new spatial means to evade and embarrass the police.

The spatial innovations of scale worked very well for protests in the 1960s. Although bringing tens of thousands of protesters to the streets provoked heavy police response, it also had the best chance of overwhelming urban systems and making policing ineffective. Masses of protesters work along the tactic of “overloading the system” as described in Lofland 1985, filling cities with more people than they or police can handle produces results. Mobilizing enough people to fill streets in this manner is a challenge, especially during times of relative satisfaction. However, the converse is true as well: the more dissatisfied the nation, the easier it will be to fill the streets. The ubiquity of personal telecommunications devices, such as cellular phones and personal computer, along with a globally connected decentered communications network (the Internet), has helped protesters since the late 1990s to organize and coordinate large scale protests which dwarf those of the late 1960s. Strong potential exists here to make good use of the “overloading the system” approach.

For any protester tactics to be effective, protest organizers must possess awareness of the strategies of spatial protest policing. Protesters must know what to expect from police, and whether they will be able to negotiate to have their demands and needs met. Given the Miami model of protest policing’s tactic of poor communication or last-minute changes to permits, corroborated by what I witnessed in Denver with a march route change with little notice, protest policing is prepared for this, and will do what it can to keep protesters reactive and unsure of what to expect.

Part of protesters' preparation should be a full understanding of the urban conditions of the place in which the protest will occur. Local police have extensive intelligence and local knowledge of the forms and processes of the urban environments they monitor. Protest organizers should do their best to acquire similar intelligence. Even if they do not treat protest events as if they are going into battle, the police definitely will.

Black bloc tactics are also effective, and confound police when they occur. Protesting anonymously is problematic as it requires masks or disguises, and considering the ubiquity of media and surveillance. However, if the disguises can be donned in secret, then discarded, then it is much harder to have evidence connecting someone with wrongdoing. The destructive actions possible with black blocs, while cathartic, are not the highest and best purpose of the tactic, however. Black blocs could be used to surprise police, to effect unexpected protests in unusual spaces, can work around policing's need to set and control the stage of the protest, and still provide necessary anonymity without producing public ire. Police are very quick to respond to property damage or personal violence, and will almost always respond with overwhelming force. Black blocs might be more effective and gain a better reputation amongst police and protesters if the bloc does not engage in violence, but rather uses their anonymity to accomplish highly visual acts of communication that can benefit from anonymity. The anonymity of the black bloc must

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444 Such as in Dallas 1984, when Americans were by and large pleased with the social and economic effects of the Reagan Presidency.
be considered carefully here, however, as there is abundant evidence of police using agents provocateurs undercover, embedded within organizations. Anonymity might hide a police officer as much as it obscures a protester's identity. Further, black bloc protesters could use communications technology to coordinate activities, very much like how flash mobs operate. However, this is also problematic, as these communications are sometimes public, sometimes monitored if private, and can always serve as a record of intent if presented as evidence at a trial.\footnote{445 My research shows that protester social media is heavily monitored by police intelligence (Power, 2010). There has been some protester innovation in this regard, as the creation of apps for smartphones can be done relatively easily. Doctorow 2011 writes about 'Sukey', an app designed and mobilized to track police movements during protests to avoid kettling maneuvers. The app has since been pulled due to police objection.}

The generally youthful aspect of protesters is an advantage. As protest organizer Abbie Hoffman put it,

\begin{quote}
We need young people in the front, because young people have creativity, personal computers, energy.... You don't get these thoughts when you're middle aged, it's when you're young that you get these ideas that you can change things. You're plugged into the cultural communications. You have that one ingredient which is necessary for social change, that you can't have at middle age or older. Young people are impatient, they want it now.\footnote{446 Hoffman 1985.}
\end{quote}

This energy and creativity of youth, combined with the prevalence of young people at protests, should lead to continued innovation of protest methods. This was especially the case in protests in the 1960s when college students became part-time students and full-time protesters. As the price of post-secondary education in the United States is vastly more expensive than in the 1960s, far fewer students have free time or available funds to participate in protests. Student debt, and the fear of debt, helps stem the youthful energy of protests.

Still, my research suggests continued spatial innovation in protest tactics. The generally middle-class character of these youthful protesters puts them in a dangerous position; as neoliberalization advances, the rights of workers and protections on labor are further eroded. In an uncertain and competitive job market, employers will be more likely to hire young people without criminal records. Being arrested at a protest at a young age might prevent career advancement later. These youthful protesters possess a remarkable bravery to risk their own futures to challenge what they feel is wrong and ethical. As it was the case in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, like Marx said, protesters ‘...have nothing to lose but their chains...they have a world to win.’

\section*{9.4: Limitations of the Current Study}

While this study is longer than I expected it to be, it still is not a totalized and comprehensive study of the role of urban space in policing protest. I limited my study to the American context, and limited it further by looking only at political conventions in depth. I omitted hundreds of protests events at a variety of scales. A thorough examination of each would take a document of this size for every event. Further, the globalized nature of protest issues lends importance to global protests and protest policing tactics. The context in which each of these events occur is very important, but impossible to detail in the short space and time I have had for this project. Given the global concerns of protest and the global techniques of protest policing,
this is a serious omission.

My research was limited in time. I had to restrict my study to my four major case studies as well as interstitial historical details. This means that I did not study protest policing in any depth for the period prior to 1968 or after 2008. There were many events prior to my case studies that had a bearing on how Chicago 1968 manifested, with such historically significant events as the Ludlow Mining Massacre and the Bonus Expeditionary Force. These precedents matter, but I was unable to investigate them in depth.

Further, many very significant protest events occurred since 2008 that I did not study. They are important enough that I feel the need to address them in an epilogue to the current work. The events of Tahrir Square, the Arab Spring, the Occupy Movement, and of Ferguson point to the increasing relevance of this type of study. However, I could not include data on these events without getting further off track. Sadly I have not studied these events in any depth.

I also used a methodology that focuses on the economic basis for social change. This is based in the Marxian theory of the base and superstructure, which proposes that any change in the economic conditions of a society bring attendance changes in the institutions of that society. This is a vulgar Marxist and over-simplistic formulation that has been roundly critiqued, particularly by Stuart Hall.\footnote{Hall 1977.} I have followed this model only generally, emphasizing the role of context and local cultures in shaping how protest and protest policing function in urban space. Still, I assume this relationship exists, even if it is not completely determinant, without fully exploring it.

I was unable to investigate the role of citizenship in relation to urban space with enough depth to make a significant contribution to my overall exploration. Self-governance as a tactic of social control is a potentially rich field of inquiry in looking at political protests. While I do address the administrative categorization of peoples and activities during protests, I do not fully explore the consequences of these administrative processes on the rights and privileges of citizenship beyond civil rights. This was an intitial goal for the project that I was unable to pursue.

This project's emphasis on processes and backgrounds does not lend itself to spatial design recommendations. It is a challenge to go from context to spatial specifics, and my education was not as a designer. This means that my words perhaps lack the persuasive power that someone more used to the design of the built environment might possess. I can only speculate on this point. I stand behind my method as an expression of my own education and convictions, but recognize that the method itself might not be the most effective in expressing the spatial specifics of a professional field of design.

My exploration of sociological theories is limited. The method that I have chosen is historical-genealogical, which means that it examines the historical development of ideas and how they get implemented in practice. A more sociological approach to this same study would have resulted in far more data on actual behavior. A more empirical study, carefully constructed, would have hopefully revealed similar findings, but in a much more complete and thorough way. Though my methods were empirical, they lack the explanatory power that a purer sociology might have had. Many sociological theories that could have been used to explain protest policing, like symbolic interaction, convergence theory, or theories of deviance, all of which I considered, integrated, or omitted, perhaps to this project's detriment. I could easily have chosen...
to perform a study that was hypothesis science rather than discovery science, which no doubt would have been easier and more concise. All told, multidisciplinarity sacrifices depth for the sake of breadth.

Further still, my choice to frame my methodology as historical-genealogical and my methods as coming from person-environment relations was a distinct choice that perhaps does not give enough weight to either method. My choice here was my own and should not reflect on any of my instructors or interlocutors.

Likewise, many architectural and urban theories that say important things about urban space, protest, observation, liberalism, and cities. I made choices in the above work that omitted many potentially fruitful avenues of study. Ideally one day I can return to the above work and integrate Deleuzian thinking on capitalism and schizophrenic state responses to dissent, or Debord's critique of societies of the spectacle, Habermasian constructions of the public sphere, or produce a close Derridian reading of protest or policing literature.

I could also have conducted a more orthodox Marxian and/or Marxist study of protest in public space. This would require the inclusion of a close reading of a number of core Marxian texts and using them as a framework to interpret events. The role of class struggle in political protests could be very illuminating, as it is likely to reveal both contradictions and constraints, making promise of a new system in birth. While it is true that Marxian thinking on class and conflict undergird this study, such foundations are by no means unified or unadulterated.

I chose my research methods because they were the methods with which I had most familiarity, and that I believed to be most appropriate to the study at hand. I could easily have focused more on one method or another, or chosen an entirely different approach. Theses limitations are artificial, and produce a limited view of the subject. Participant observation could have yielded more nuanced data (as well as it could have jeopardized my well-being). Perhaps I am a bit cowardly in not wanting to take to the front lines of a protest for the purposes of study. Were I a younger man with fewer responsibilities and obligations this no doubt would have been the case. Similarly, I could have taken a more technological approach to the study, as many have done, modeling crowd behavior as if the people in the protest were mere algorithms, pushing this way and that based on virtual stimulus. In fact the use of crowd modeling is growing in police training and in urban design, and such a study promises illuminating and provocative results.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of the flaws and limitations of the preceding study. The longer I spend with it, the more flaws I am certain to find.

9.4: Suggestions for Future Research

Several future directions of study are implied in the current work. Many thinkers have researched the relationship between urban space and political behavior. My work touches on some of their theories, and applies them as means to understand the events I researched and witnessed. In the following section, I discuss some questions raised by my research that might be

448 Which I believe in this case supports the myth of the passive citizen, which Rosanvallon rejects.
449 I am deeply critical of Habermas' approach to rationality in the negotiation of power differences, preferring to follow a Foucauldian model of power working omnipresently.
450 The distinction of course being generally economic vs. political. In practice the two are deeply intertwined.
worthwhile to pursue following some of these theoretical inquiries more closely.

The practice of law enforcement interventions in urban space aid categorizing people, with clear divisions in space actually creating categories, such as good citizens and bad citizens, innocents and terrorists, and so on, furthering the conflation of “good citizenship” with docility. Has the legal status of citizens has undergone a change based on those citizens' spatial behavior? This redefinition of the role and idea of 'citizen' could have dramatic and deleterious consequences for democratic societies and the maintenance of a just society. Are people citizens or populations? Are they consumers or stakeholders? What is the tension and interplay between these poles, and what are the consequences for protests and policing? This is contrasted by political theorist Pierre Rosanvallon, who shows that the passive citizen is a myth, and rather that democracy requires involvement and expression; people want to participate. If personal morality plays a role in constructions of citizenship as cultural theorist Lauren Berlant suggests, what does this mean for public acclaim of protesters?

If the role of the citizen under the liberal state has consciousness as the basis of individual freedom and of the social contract, how does this relate to the class consciousness model proposed by Lukacs, which states that consciousness is an achievement of economic classes to understand the concrete totality of the historical processes? What does this mean for governmentality, if, as Joyce explores, 19th century liberalism produced docile urban subjects of capitalism, which turned into a process of self-monitoring and self-regulating citizens, especially when these citizens break those rules and transgress for what they perceive to be higher political purposes?

What exactly is Foucault's view of the social role of the police? Are they enforcers of governmentality, as my research suggests, or do they work differently? Does the omnipresence of power in Foucauldian theory mean that protesters constitute police as much as opposition to the police constitutes them? According to Nicholas Rose, governmentality as specified in Foucault is oppositional to a notion of the police, for liberalism predicated on separation between the state and the public sphere. Liberalism succeeds police in a developmental and genealogical fashion. Policing is a component of an administrative state. How does this relate to the mass biopolitics of protests at scale?

What rights and privileges do citizens have? How are these rights legally abrogated during protests? What are the spatial configurations that enforce that abrogation? Based on Janoski, what rights and privileges are conditional, and what role does urban space play in the establishment or challenging of those conditions? Spatial ethics can only be articulated through local contexts and conditions; they are not global or universal, but rather contingent and dependent on specific local conditions.

Yet, according to Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier regimes of ethical regulation have a global scope. Nonlocal conditions create local conditions. How does the globalization of both protest and protest policing manifest these influences? How specifically do nonlocal conditions affect local protests?

Polanyi's formulation of “social technology” comes from a shift in thought in British liberalism: the state is based on the biological nature of man, not a political order. Economic

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451 Rosanvallon 18-22.
452 Janoski.
453 Ong and Collier.
society was distinct from the political state. Treating humans as having essential rights and needs upon which no cost could be placed allowed for the development of the welfare state. Neoliberalism attempts to reform and rationalize social welfarism, and social technologies intensify control over human activity through new regimes of visibility and discipline. How exactly does this function for protests?

Further work could further explore the speciation of sociology and criminological texts, particularly with an eye toward urban space. How might an advance in criminology affect protest policing, and subsequent urban design?

What I discovered missing in my background literature was an explicit delineation of a person-environment relations method of observing crowds and protests. Rather, such observations had to come from basic sociology and criminology. What form might a person-environment relations method of crowd observation take? How might it be constituted?

Policing involves manipulation and control of other people. What are the specific spatial means of this control? Biderman's chart of coercion, generally used to analyze and defend against cult programming, promises insight into the means of understanding the actual mechanisms of control. A particularly interesting study would be to cross-link these methods of control with political and economic circumstances on one hand and urban spaces on the other.

Biderman's chart of coercion. Becket et. al.

As urban space is used strategically by both protesters and policing, developing a theory of reciprocal spatial innovation is necessary. This could prove problematic, however, by one group or another. Engaging in this study would require careful thought regarding the researcher's political subjectivity.

454 Amnesty International.
What exactly is the status and role of sociological analysis and critical theory in architectural education? What benefits does the greater integration of such thinking have for architectural education, especially as the pendulum has swung toward architecture as an aesthetic practice rather than a practice of systems analysis and design, to follow Ward's formulation? If the benefits are worthwhile, how might these schools of thought compete for a place in curricula already full of classes teaching an array of ever-more complicated tools for design? Does the fascination for technical approaches to design overshadow social utility? What does this portend for the future of multidisciplinary design education?

As a practical consideration, what is the role of ethics in architectural accreditation and licensing? How are designers held accountable for their actions, creating spaces that perpetuate social injustice? What should be these limits of expected responsibilities for these designers? To what extent can they be held accountable for the social or political effects of the places they design?

What are the spatial semiotics of protest? Beyond languages of classification, or languages of resistance, what are the symbol systems at work in organizing or resisting protest? To what degree does the context matter in the determination of a protest symbol-system, and how can such a system be constituted if post-structuralist thinking on language is true?

A valuable study would be a full and detailed exploration of CPTED and discourses of security. CPTED professionalizes and operationalizes discourses of security. Any users who are not expressly planned for an accommodated are considered unwanted security threats. What are the effects of CPTED on access to urban space? How is CPTED used in public buildings, which are ostensibly designed for broad access?

Surveillance works both ways; the idea of “sousveillance” posits that those at the bottom can surveil those at the top as easily as they themselves are observed. Theorists of the built environment Jane Jacobs and Oscar Newman each examined the effect of observation by users on behavior. What consequences would a “many-to-many” rather than a “few-to-many” model of surveillance have for the designs of urban space as neoliberalization progresses? Is there an opportunity in this type of observation, especially as it is more and more integrated with global personal telecommunications and the easy availability of information? And what happens in places where that information is restricted or heavily controlled...do urban spaces function differently according to the context?

Another future project could be the further exploration of the idea of the event-site. Was each event-site I studied a crisis? What constitutes a crisis, and how should such a crisis emerge within a particular theoretical framework? If each crisis reveals contradictions in the normative spatial relationship as well as contradictions in the political system, what are the consequences for urban design, especially as exclusion vs. inclusion is a core principle of neoliberal urban practices and places.

Finally, how might we deal with the apparent dearth of method explanation in major theorists? How did they develop each theory? While this is ultimately peripheral to my project, a future project might explore these methods in detail in order to better develop methods for creating spatial theory out of spatial practice.
10: Epilogue: Events since 2008:

There have been significant protest event-sites since performing my primary research. The relevance of these event-sites to the current project has been so great that I have several times been tempted to integrate data about these protests into my larger dissertation. These events have been important both politically and analytically, as they represent developments in protest and police innovation in protest policing. Urban space has continued to play a constituent role in these event-sites, which is important for urban design. In this epilogue, I will mention a few of these major protest event-sites, and discuss what they might mean for the study of protest policing in urban space.

10.1: Protests since 2008

The rise in number and scale of protests since 1999 that I discuss in Chapter 1 has continued. The years 2008-2012 saw large scale protests erupt in cities around the world. Many of these protests were based on economic issues, as governments around the world reacted to the sharp economic downturn of 2008-2009 by supporting big corporations, bailing out major banks, all further aiding financial industries, all while cutting public services, raising tuition costs, and implementing austerity programs. These economic moves made sense under the logic of neoliberalism; markets must be freed from all restraint so that they may once again bring prosperity. Critics of these policy moves such as Naomi Klein noted that capitalism flourishes on crises like this, taking advantage of voter distraction and fear to implement sweeping reforms of financial systems, designed to increase the transfer of wealth from governments into private hands.

Protests against this transfer of wealth took many forms, generally beginning with student protests. One of the first set of protests was the occupations and riots across the University of California system between September and December of 2009. In response to the state budget deficit, the University of Cal Board of Regents passed a 32% tuition hike. Protesters noted that this put a huge burden on already-poor students, and that state prioritized funded prisons over higher education.

Students, faculty and workers reacted to these tuition hikes with a series of direct actions, including building occupation, sit-ins, marches, blockades, and teach-ins educating protesters on economic issues. These protest event-sites took place over several months across every campus of the University of California system. These were the largest protests seen on California campuses since the 1960s. Protester strategy occupation, and protester use of the word 'Occupy' as a slogan, would later become emblematic of the Occupy Movement.

Police forces reacted to these protests generally following the negotiated management model, rather than the then-current strategic incapacitation model. Police did not have significant advance time to re-organize campus spaces to nullify protests, neither were they able to preemptively arrest possible troublemakers. Rather, police had to react to student actions in progress. This likely extended the duration of student actions. Further, the high visibility of students, and the role of campus and city police to protect students, also likely contributed to the
use of the negotiated management model. Police did eventually use violence and “less-lethal” tactics against protesters in several incidents, resulting in several lawsuits. More than 700 people were eventually arrested across California as a result of these actions. The next year, the UC Board of Regents voted in another tuition hike of 8%. Tuitions were then frozen between 2012 and 2015.


Police reacted to these protests generally using the strategic incapacitation model, but were in general unable to contain the large numbers of protesters. Again, this was a result of insufficient lead time for planning and organization. Police were placed in a reactive position, and had to respond to protester movements rather than direct them. Police compensated for poor lead time by extensive use of kettling, where large numbers of protesters were surrounded by smaller groups of police in formation, locking them into a small area for sometimes hours. This resulted in a diminishing of protester energy over time, allowing police to slowly incapacitate protest groups. The London Metropolitan police also used violence on several occasions, and were eventually the subject of numerous lawsuits. The protesters did not prevent the government's reforms.

Beginning on the 17th of December, 2010, a series of protests in Tunisia against the government's treatment of a street merchant led to what would soon be called the Arab Spring. This wave of massive protests spread across the Arab region and touched more than a dozen nations. In Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen, these protests resulted in revolutions and regime change. In Syria the protests turned into an ongoing civil war. Several nations saw wide governmental responses to the protests, integrating protest demands into new legislation. Other nations, such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, crushed the protests. The protests involved millions of protesters and resulted in close to 175,000 casualties.

In general, the protests were against repressive government rule, authoritarianism, human rights violations, inflation and unemployment, and stemmed from dissatisfaction among youth, particularly about wealth distribution and future prospects. Protesters used a broad variety of protest tactics, including marches, demonstrations, social media campaigns, occupations, sit-ins, strikes, and even urban warfare and uprisings. Protests events occurred more or less continually across Arab nations through mid-2012. Arab Spring protests lead to a wave of similar protests across sub-Saharan Africa and central and east Asia.

Police responses to these events were as numerous as protester tactics. Generally, police followed the escalated force model of protest policing, resulting in many deaths and injuries. Due to the massive number of protesters, the tactic of 'crashing the system' put police on the defensive, making the negotiated management model more effective. Police in most Arab nations did not have the equipment and training generally seen in the United States, so it is difficult to apply protest policing models in this different context. The scale and breadth of the protests resulted in regime changes and shifts in governance across the Arab region.

Governmental responses in Greece to the global economic downturn resulted in a series of anti-austerity marches in protest beginning on the 5th of May, 2011. Protesters reacted to a
broad swathe of cuts in social services coupled with a rise in taxes. The main protest was in Athens, with an estimated protest group size of 100,000 to 500,000 protesters. The protests in Greece were the largest since 1973, when protesters ousted the military junta ruling the country. Organized generally through social media, the 2011 protests contested unemployment, inflation, corruption, and mismanagement of public debt. Protester tactics were similar to those in other nations, utilizing demonstrations, strikes, occupations, and sit-ins. Some protests escalated to riots. Many protesters were injured and killed.

As in other nations, police were placed in a reactive position, and were unable to contend with the vast numbers of protesters in effective ways. This resulted in a general reliance on the escalated force model, with a few examples of kettling and other maneuvers from the Miami model. Police widely used beatings and tear gas to disperse crowds. The Greek government reacted to the protests by pledging to amend the Greek constitution, a process which has still not been completed. Greece has seen other protest events since 2011.

Reactions to the global financial crisis resulted in a series of occupations and protest actions in the United States eventually called the Occupy Movement. Beginning with Occupy Wall Street in Zuccotti Park in New York City on the 17th of December of 2011, Occupy protests spread to hundreds of cities across the United States and around the world. On the 15th of October 2011, the Occupy movement staged protests in more than 900 cities around the world. Occupy protested economic issues and wealth disparity, coined the now-famous slogan “We Are the 99%.” These protests were in direct reaction to the effects of neoliberalization, particularly what David Harvey calls the restoration of class power, with a vast increase in wealth of the top 1% of wealth holders.

Protester tactics ranged from the titular occupation to picketing, marches, rallies, demonstrations, strikes, social media campaigns, and various direct actions. Protesters used a number of strategies to organize and communicate, such as social media, repeated chants called a “human microphone” to amplify an individual speaker's voice, and a series of hand signals to discuss issues and organize large groups. Some protest camps, such as in Zuccotti Park in New York and Frank Ogawa Plaze in Oakland were in place for months, serving as bases of operations for protest groups. The public nature of these plazas meant that access was open to all. However, Zuccotti Park in New York was privately owned, with the owners generally supporting protester presence.

Citing sanitation concerns, Zuccotti Park was cleared by the NYPD at 1 AM on November 15th, eventually erecting steel barricades to prevent re-occupation. Other police tactics generally followed the negotiated management model, as the number of protesters and the duration of the protests meant that police had to manage emplaced protesters over a long period of time. As in other events where police did not have advance planning time, and had to contend with superior protest numbers, the strategic incapacitation model generally did not work. One police innovation against the Occupy Movement was the gathering of intelligence and surveillance information on protesters. Police forces worked with the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Joint Terrorism Task Force, meeting and sharing information with representatives from banks and the New York Stock Exchange about the protests. As in St. Paul, the FBI used informants to infiltrate and provide intelligence on the protesters.

The policy impact of these protests was ultimately minimal, but they did succeed in raising awareness of economic issues and unequal distribution of wealth. The terms “99%” and
“1%” have entered the political vocabulary of candidates contending for the 2016 United States presidential elections. However, no substantive change resulted from the Occupy Movement.

Police forces in coalition with national security agencies have used electronic surveillance in order to deter dissent. In addition, the militarization of policing in the United States has resulted in new methods of training and equipping police, as well as changes in police operational scope. Each of these developments stems from earlier mobilization of new modes of protest policing detailed above. The stakes involved in protest policing have clearly been raised, thus making close attention to the role of the designing urban space ever more critical for the project of democracy.

This is by no means an exhaustive list. It does however point to the general dissatisfaction of citizenry with the unequal benefits of neoliberalism, and the potential for greater social and political change yet to come. The role of urban space in these protests is constitutive, and considerations of protests will likely play a larger than before role when designers and clients regard the recent past.

10.2: Some Closing Thoughts on Recent Protests

Based on these events, the most effective protest tactic is crashing the system. By organizing at massive scales, protesters are able to outnumber police and bring city systems to a standstill. Occupation and organization across protest groups is effective to mobilize larger crowds. While affinity groups still form the core of recent protests, the economic issues are broader and have an impact on almost every issue that affinity groups organize around. The popularization of information on economic issues has driven many more people to protest who were not previous aligned with affinity groups, thereby helping to increase the size of these protests. To be effective, this scale must be maintained.

If the protest has been pre-organized, and the police have had some time to prepare, then the default model of protest policing is negotiated management, with police in a reactive position, generally avoiding violence. Strategic incapacitation as a model of protest policing works best when police have had advance preparation time and have been able to change the urban environment in anticipation of the protest. If protests are spontaneous, massive, and sustained, and when a police force is on the defensive, unprepared, and significantly outnumbered, they will generally follow the escalated force model of protest policing as a fallback.

The mobilization of urban space as a means to nullify protest is a core value of the strategic incapacitation model of protest policing, but such mobilization depends on advance planning and knowledge of the protest events. If police forces anticipate protests, they can work with city governments to restrict and control access to urban spaces. This has the potential to affect the longer-term planning of cities, possibly integrating fear of protests into the design of new urban spaces.


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