Title
Land Grabs in Urban Frontiers: Producing Inequality in Senegal's Dakar Region

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Land Grabs in Urban Frontiers:
Producing Inequality in Senegal's Dakar Region

By
Nicole C. List

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Geography
in the
Graduate Division
of the
University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:
Professor Michael Watts, Chair
Professor Gillian Hart
Professor Nancy Peluso
Professor Ananya Roy

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Land Grabs in Urban Frontiers:
Producing Inequality in Senegal's Dakar Region

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Nicole C. List
Abstract

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Doctor of Philosophy in Geography

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Professor Michael Watts, Chair

This dissertation examines urban political struggles surrounding the proliferation of middle-class and elite housing estates in Senegal, where urban real estate developments have emerged as a center of political friction and commercial dynamism. Utilizing a variety of methods, including ethnographic fieldwork and textual analysis of secondary sources, this project explores two case studies of large-scale land conflicts in sites of middle-class and elite housing developments in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Through five empirical chapters, I explore how the social, political, and economic context of neoliberalism in urban Senegal has not only produced urban land grabs, but has also fundamentally reconfigured how land is governed and urban politics are practiced.

In focusing on urban land governance, my project examines changes in the cartography of political relationships between and within central/local governments, farmer associations, housing cooperatives, traditional leaders, and international institutions. This dissertation consequently deepens spatial readings on civil society and state relations in sub-Saharan Africa, using conflicts produced through urban land grabs as a lens to examine the spatial logics of in/formal housing, territorial patronage relations, political decentralization reforms, and contentious politics in Senegal’s Dakar Region. This dissertation also throws fresh light on research documenting a recent increase in land conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, drawing attention to how coalitions brokered by farmer associations negotiate legal settlements to land conflicts by relying on private mapping projects, Senegalese courts, formal land laws, and public protests. In studying the outcomes of these urban protests and legal settlements, this research describes how the rise of a new and powerful African middle-class is not only reshaping urban political life, but producing new landscapes of urban inequality.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANCAR</td>
<td>National Agency for Rural and Agricultural Training or Agence Nationale de Conseil Agricole et Ruraux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APIX</td>
<td>Investment Promotion and Major Projects Agency, or Promotion des Investissements et Grands Travaux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>Alliance for the Republic, or Alliance Pour la République</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSM</td>
<td>Together We Look After What Belongs to Us, or And Samma Sa Moomel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAHSO</td>
<td>Low-Cost Housing Assistance Office, or Bureau d’assistance aux collectivités pour l’Habitat Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHS</td>
<td>Senegal Housing Bank, or Banque de l’Habitat du Sénégal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNDS</td>
<td>National Development Bank, or Banque Nationale de développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBEAO</td>
<td>West African Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCE</td>
<td>Central Fund for Economic Cooperation, or Caisse centrale de Coopération économique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREI</td>
<td>Court of Repression of Illicit Enrichment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCOS</td>
<td>Directorate for the Monitoring and Occupation of Land or La Direction de Surveillance et de l’Occupation du Sol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Fund for Aid and Cooperation, or Fonds d’aide et de Coopération</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCFA</td>
<td>Senegal’s currency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIE</td>
<td>Economic Interest Group, or Groupement d’Intérêt Économique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOANA</td>
<td>Grand Agricultural Offensive for Food Security, or Grand offensive agricole pour la nourriture et l’abondance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Technical Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGE</td>
<td>General Inspectorate, or L’Inspection Générale de l’Etat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHDP</td>
<td>Municipal and Housing Development Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MURHE</td>
<td>Ministry of Urban Renewal, Housing, and the Lived Environment, or Ministere du renouveau urbain, de l’Habitat et du cadre de Vie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHLM</td>
<td>Office of Moderate Priced Housing, or Office des Habitations à Loyers Modérés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Senegalese Democratic Party, or Parti Démocratique Sénégalais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Socialist Party, or Parti Socialiste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPROH</td>
<td>Professional Horticulturalist Organization, or Regroupement des Professionnels Horticoles de l’Ornement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTTC</td>
<td>Right to the City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAT-URBAM</td>
<td>Central Society for the Development of Urban Land, or Société Centrale d’Aménagement des Terres Urbains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SICAP</td>
<td>Real Estate Society for the Cap-Vert, or Société Imobilière du Cap Vert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMRTAP</td>
<td>Urban Management and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAC</td>
<td>Joint Development Zones, or Zones d’aménagement concerté</td>
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Acknowledgements

This dissertation grew out of a Fulbright Fellowship (2004-2005), which introduced me to Dakar’s urban farming sector. In the numerous research trips I have undertaken over the past thirteen years, I met with countless farmers, produce traders, government officials, NGO staff, religious leaders, and urban planners who generously gave their time to answer my questions and share their insights on the politics of Dakar’s urban transformations. While it would be impossible to list everyone who helped me during my fieldwork, I would like to specifically thank El Hadji Oumar, Pape, Khady, Ngumba, Diougou, Bira, Mamadou, Nogay, Seydou and Abdou Aziz for the patience, hospitality and kindness they showed me while I was conducting my field research. Special thanks to Abdou Salam Fall, Mohamadou Sall, and Mame Demba Thiam for providing grounded feedback, practical guidance, and workspace at the Université Chiekh Anta Diop.

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Disappearing Farmscapes

When I first began fieldwork in Pikine in 2004, many of the people I met were shocked that large tracts of farmland -employing hundreds of farmers- were under cultivation in Pikine. This included friends and acquaintances who lived and worked a mere ten minute walk away from Pikine’s urban farms. Others residents who were aware of Pikine’s farmland frequently cautioned me about visiting the fields, arguing that the zone was a refuge for bandits hiding from police. Moreover, families that lived alongside the fields frequently complained about snakes and other small wildlife entering their homes. Yet the farmers I met frequently railed against these critical accounts of their zone, arguing that government officials and urban developers often painted Pikine’s farmland in a negative light in order to expropriate their farmland and advance new housing projects.

Instead, Pikine farmers have argued that urban farming is economically beneficial for the zone. Many farmers have made handsome profits from their farms, well above what many of their counterparts earn in entry-level office jobs. Farmers have also contributed jobs to the local economy, as nearly every farm employs local populations and young men who have migrated from Dakar’s interior to perform farm labor on urban farmland (Fall and Fall 2000). Pikine’s farmland has also provided much of the horticultural produce that is consumed in Dakar. Vegetables produced on Dakar’s urban farmland have also been exported internationally and to regions in Senegal’s interior that are not as favorably suited for vegetable production (République du Sénégal and ISRA 1997; Niang 1999; Mbaye and Moustier 2000; Moustier and Fall 2004). Farmers have also been quick to describe their longstanding emotional connection to the land. During one interview I conducted with a group of farmers in the summer of 2005, several farmers explained how they used to spend their summer school vacations in the fields. One farmer, Mamadou Ndiaye, described how he learned farming as a child by helping his father in his fields. Looking around his plot, Mamadou criticized nearby farmers who had sold their plots to housing developers, arguing that he and his family would never sell his field.

When I revisited Mamadou in 2007, however, I found that his farm -and numerous other fields surrounding his farm- had been converted into a middle-class housing estate. By this time, Senegal’s construction boom was well established in the Dakar Region. Walking city streets, it was nearly impossible to find two consecutive streets that were not littered with piles of construction debris, mounds of sand, or the cement blocks used to build urban houses. In this sense, many single-family houses in established neighborhoods were being torn down and replaced by taller apartment buildings. At the same time, various other urban and peri-urban farms that I knew well and had visited throughout Senegal’s Dakar Region had also been converted into middle-class and elite housing estates. These new housing developments complemented the rapid growth of new housing stock that was popping up alongside popular thoroughfares. All of these new housing developments were composed of 10x15 meter plots that are arranged in grids and hooked up to public services. Eerily similar, each plot contained a
single-family residence or multi-story apartment building owned by middle-class and elite residents.

Yet in all their similarity, these housing estates belie the various configurations of political struggle and dispute adjudication that surrounds their construction. Accounts of land speculation and land conflicts punctuate Senegalese newspapers on a weekly -if not daily- basis. These news reports not only document the residents and farmers displaced by middle-class and elite housing developments, but reflect larger debates over how to develop Dakar’s few remaining pockets of green space. For example, conflicts that I witnessed in the Dakar Region have centered around whether multiple hectares of farmland should be used to increase urban food security, produce
horticultural exports managed by agribusiness entrepreneurs, or converted into new housing, sports arenas, and roads.

This dissertation explores these debates over how to best develop Dakar’s urban landscape, focusing specifically on large-scale land conflicts that unfold during efforts to build middle-class and elite housing developments in Senegal’s Dakar Region. By focusing on large-scale land conflicts in urban settings, my research intersects with the flurry of news articles, policy reports and scholarly literature on ‘land grabs’ that have been underway throughout the developing world since 2006 (Cotula 2009; Deininger and Byerlee 2010; Zoomers 2010; Amanor 2012; Hall 2013; Wolford et. al. 2013; McMichael 2014). Much of the writing on land grabs has focused on rural and agrarian forms of land speculation, sidestepping analyses that examine how urban areas and residents are also affected by large-scale land grabs. My research thus sheds fresh light on this land grab literature, drawing attention to how these recent efforts to build middle-class and elite housing projects has transformed vast tracts of Dakar’s urban and peri-urban farmland. In particular, my work focuses on how these contemporary urban land grabs -like those underway in rural areas- have not only been buoyed by a new set of local and international actors and financial relationships, but new mechanisms of land control, forms of urban governance, and justifications for landed dispossession (Peluso and Lund 2011).

Specifically, I examine how efforts by government actors and urban real estate developers to build new middle-class and elite housing estates are imbricated in efforts to reframe and rebuild Dakar as a ‘world class’ city. Much of the research on efforts to build world-class cities in African contexts has focused on how urban planners are increasingly drawing upon the rhetoric of ‘smart’ and ‘eco-cities’ when drafting plans to attract foreign capital to showcase capital cities as models of ‘Africa rising’ (Watson 2014; Mahajan 2014). I take a different approach, drawing from a significant body of research that examines how the development of residential real-estate sectors in world city-making projects has aggravated urban dispossession, produced new financial relations, and redefined urban political life (Harvey 2008; Holston 2008; Yiftachel 2009a, 2009b; Hsing 2010; Ghertner 2010, 2011; Goldman 2011a, 2011b; Searle 2014;). I consequently argue that large-scale land conflicts in Dakar not only increase inequality and social differentiation (Peters 2004), but also serve as a lynchpin for larger struggles over urban development, political authority, territory, and citizenship (Berry 2001; Lund and Boone 2013).

The next section describes the spatial and temporal context for the large-scale land conflicts I researched in greater detail. This is followed by three additional sections that focus a spotlight on the key theoretical debates and scholarly literatures that inform my dissertation. Together, these sections constitute the analytical framework that undergirds my understanding of how Dakar’s urban political and economic landscapes are reconfigured during -and through- struggles over urban development. The final section briefly explains my research methods and provides an outline of my dissertation chapters.

Context: Dakar’s Frontier for Real-estate Development

Within Senegal, contentious struggles over land are especially prominent in the Dakar Region. This region houses Senegal’s capital city, Dakar. Like many cities throughout the African continent, Dakar has experienced rapid urbanization. Statistics generated by the World Bank
(n.d.) estimate that the annual urban population growth rate in 2015 was 3.8 percent. At present, more than one quarter of Senegal’s population lives in the Dakar region—even though this region only comprises a mere 0.3 percent of the national territory (UN Habitat 2008).

As a result of these urbanization pressures, industry and housing developments have swallowed up nearly all undeveloped land in downtown Dakar. The new ‘frontier’ (Roitman 2005; Tsing 2005; Li 2014) for real estate development and accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2008) -which I understand as an ongoing process in which a variety of government actors and private housing developers have employed a variety of extra-economic measures to expropriate land in order to fuel processes of capital accumulation (Levien 2012)- is now situated on farmland found in the cities and peri-urban villages bordering Dakar. Specifically, Dakar’s residual peri/urban farmland is situated in the Niayes Zone, an ecological zone that hosts some of the nation’s best agricultural land. Much of the ethnographic material I present is consequently drawn from two case studies of land struggles over housing developments built on Niayes land in Pikine (a highly urbanized city located roughly fifteen kilometers from downtown Dakar) and Bambilor (a peri-urban community, classified as a rural community for administrative purposes, located thirty-five kilometers from downtown Dakar). Pikine and Bambilor were chosen as field sites in part because they bear remarkable similarities; they are both home to speculative real estate markets and occupy central roles in national political debates and struggles over land. Both were situated on land historically used and/or sold by Dakar’s indigenous Lebu populations. Yet differences in the historical formation of land markets and current forms of land governance draws out the spatially contingent manner in which Senegal's political and economic landscapes are changing.

![Figure 3: Map of the Niayes Zone](Source: Programme d’Aménagement et de Développement Économique des Niayes n.d.)
For instance, Pikine grew rapidly from a handful of Lebu villages after the French colonial administration expropriated villagers’ farmland in the early 1950s to house bidonville residents who were displaced by elite housing projects in Dakar. During this period, Pikine residents and spaces were stigmatized as Dakar’s lesser ‘other’ (Vernière 1977). Senegal’s post-colonial governments continued to move Dakar’s informal populations to Pikine, and these populations were later joined by a massive influx of low-income migrants from Dakar’s interior. As Pikine has grown, it has always been characterized in terms of crime, poverty, and informality (Maack 1980; Salem 1998; Abdoul 2002; Simone 2004a). Davis (2006) has also referred to Pikine as one of the African continent’s largest slums.

Yet the new housing estates that are under construction in Pikine defy these characterizations. In one interview I held while walking through a new housing estate in West Pikine, the farmer I was speaking with pointed to multi-storied buildings flanked with SUVs. “These houses,” he argued, “were not built by farmers.” Other farmers who still worked and lived alongside these new developments later confirmed this statement, pointing out houses built by key government officials, Senegalese living in the diaspora (largely Europe and the United States), and Dakar’s growing middle-class and elite populations.
A host of new middle-class and elite housing estates have also been built recently in Bambilor. While Bambilor has grown at a rate that is considerably slower than Pikine, various elite populations have a long history of using the community’s land for speculative purposes. During and after colonialism, colonists and politically connected urbanites became what locally populations jokingly referred to as *paysans de dimanche* (Sunday farmers) who invested in livestock production, horticultural farming, and weekend homes. As such, Bambilor farmers comprise a heterogenous body that is marked by a distinct history of class difference.

Furthermore, Bambilor has only recently faced urbanization pressures. As local urbanization pressures have increased over the last fifteen years, Bambilor has risen to the center of several national political debates. For example, after central government police shot and killed one Bambilor resident during protests over land rights and the Ministry of Decentralization’s attempts to redraw administrative boundaries in 2011, Bambilor emerged at the forefront of debates about police violence and authoritarian governance in Senegal. In 2014, the Senegalese state’s General Inspectorate -or *L’Inspection Générale de l’Etat*, or IGE- provided a detailed examination of how a large-scale land conflict underway in Bambilor served as a key example of bad land governance during President Wade’s regime (*République du Sénégal and Inspection Générale d’Etat 2014*).
The urban land grab that I studied in the rural community of Bambilor—and which I will focus on throughout this dissertation—was the same land struggle that was highlighted in this 2014 IGE report. This land conflict covered 2,411 hectares that included 1,042 farm plots in seven different villages. Villages involved in the conflict included: Bambilor (the same village where administrative offices for the rural community of Bambilor are situated), Deny Birame Sud, Deny Birame Guedj, Gorum 2, Mbaye, Ngendouf, and Wayembame.¹

All of the farmers I spoke with about this conflict agreed that it could be traced back to an inheritance dispute that took place in 1897. This dispute was heard before French colonial courts, and the individual who won the suit paid his French lawyer in land that was located in village of Bambilor. Oral history describes how this lawyer—and several other colonial actors who later bought and sold the plot—attempted many times to extend his landholdings, yet all of these efforts were thwarted by local populations. The plot was eventually purchased by General Emile Maurice Chevance Bertin, who was best known his work for the French Resistance during World War II and his assignment as the Deputé for Guinee in 1945 (Johnson 1996). Yet in the rural community of Bambilor, General Bertin is best known for his efforts to extend the size of his landholding by expropriating farmers’ land—without compensation—in 1986. In 2010, this longstanding conflict between colonial actors and Bambilor farmers and residents resurfaced when President Abdoulaye Wade bought and resold the land rights claimed by General Bertin’s descendants to housing developers.

The land dispute that I studied in Pikine transpired over a significantly smaller surface area—which Pikine farmers estimated was around 70 hectares—in what remains of what is known as Pikine’s Grande Niayes. Much of Pikine’s Grande Niayes have already been converted into housing, and the fields are flanked by two large urban districts: North Pikine and West Pikine. The large-scale conflict that I study began in the mid-1990s, when a horticultural enterprise—Regroupement des Professionnels Horticoles de l’Ornement, or REPROH—received formal land rights to land under cultivation by farmers. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, REPROH formed an alliance with government actors in the Ministry of Rural Development and several high-ranking government officials in order to develop an agribusiness project that would produce seeds, flowers and saplings for international markets. While Pikine residents and farmers were able to thwart the horticultural enterprise’s efforts to initially expropriate their land, the enterprise maintained their claims to land in Pikine. This dissertation examines how these initial efforts to expropriate farmers’ land transformed into several other efforts by REPROH to convert farmland in Pikine’s Grande Niayes into middle-class and elite housing developments.

¹Since Senegal’s 1972 decentralization reforms, local government has been officially administered by urban communes and rural communities. Both urban communes and rural communities are formal administrative categories; an urban commune consist of several urban cities and districts, whereas a rural community is comprised by a group of villages. These distinctions are important to note, especially with reference to the administration of local government in the rural community of Bambilor. The rural community of Bambilor includes the village of Bambilor. As described above, the village of Bambilor is but one of many villages located in the rural community of Bambilor. To avoid confusion, I will always notate when I am writing about the village of Bambilor. I will not always do the same for the rural community of Bambilor, which I at times refer to simply as ‘Bambilor.’
This dissertation describes these series of land conflicts in greater detail, drawing attention to the new roles played by international and local actors in urban land grabs underway in Senegal’s Dakar Region. As such, my research uses these instances of accumulation by dispossession in peri/urban Senegal as a lens to explore larger set of struggles and shifts in how urban politics are practiced, urban citizenship is constituted, and landed inequality is produced. The next three sections explain in greater detail how I frame my analysis of these struggles in relation to academic scholarship on land rights, protest politics, and the African state.

**Land Conflicts and Social Inequality**

While it has long been believed that labor shortages have played a chief role in constraining agricultural productivity and that land in sub-Saharan Africa is sparsely populated, a growing body of scholarly literature has argued against these assumptions by calling attention to how conflicts over land have become increasingly prevalent throughout the region (Bassett 1993; Berry 2002; Bernstein 2004; Peters 2004). For example, academics have argued that Kenya’s 2007 post-election violence was rooted in longstanding land conflicts and competition over land (Kanyinga 2009; Boone 2014). Policy analysts, journalists, and academics have also called attention to how relatively recent civil wars in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo were partly driven by land conflicts. Similarly, a growing body of academic literature on contemporary land grabs in African rural contexts has drawn attention to land conflicts in areas subject to foreign investors’ investments in biofuel production, food security, or conservation projects (Ariyo and Mortimore 2011; Tsikata and Yaro 2011; Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; Hall 2012). As Boone (2014) describes, political tension and conflict over land also frequently unfolds without capturing international headlines.

This evidence of increased competition over land throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa has pushed many academics to revisit and question longstanding assumptions about African land rights. Most notably, a large body of research has emerged from MacPherson’s (1978, p. 2) understanding that property is “not things but rights, rights in or to things” that are enforced by society or states. While many scholars still support MacPherson’s claim that property is a political relation, more recent writing has underscored how attention to questions of access—rather than rights—helps us to better understand power relations and who is able to benefit from resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003).

This focus on access to land—and land rights—has been especially prominent in the literature on African land rights, where land rights have long been characterized by juridical ambiguity and overlapping systems of access (Fortmann 1985; S. Moore 1986; Shipton and Goheen 1992; Berry 1993). For instance, Fortmann (1985) describes how distinctions between—and within—land and tree tenure have frequently been overlooked in common property systems. Berry (1989) builds on Fortmann’s claims, examining how access to resources in African contexts depends on social relations and the ability to access—or be included/excluded from—the social institutions regulating resources and various other political-economic considerations.

Property relations are thus largely mediated by how individuals and/or social groups negotiate conflicts. In this sense, property is a political economic and social process—rather than a set of rules—that are continuously negotiated and renegotiated (Berry 2001). It is this logic of
negotiability that explains why land struggles in sub-Saharan Africa frequently persist for
generations, as land conflicts are not always conclusively resolved. For example, in an essay
that outlines the integral role that negotiability plays in African land systems, Berry (2002) describes
how indigenous land users have worked to strengthen social networks, relying on long, endless
negotiations in order to thwart elites’ attempts to expropriate landholdings. A number of books
and scholarly articles have been written in support of these arguments, examining how farmers,
traditional leaders, and a host of other local actors engage in strategic negotiations to secure
access to land (Shipton and Goheen 1992; Lavigne Delville et. al. 2002; Juul and Lund 2002;
Lund 2008).

Yet as Peters (2004) points out, much of this literature downplays limits to negotiability and
the extent to which the rising tide of land conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa has increased
inequality and social differentiation. My dissertation responds to Peters’ work by providing an
ethnographic account of the limits to negotiability that farmers and residents in Senegal’s Dakar
Region face during land conflicts that are fueled by the proliferation of middle-class and elite
housing estates. Specifically, I question: who is ‘winning’ - or ‘losing’ - during contentious struggles
over how to develop Dakar’s urban landscape?

In responding to this question, my research draws from a large body of research in Africa
that studies how intensifying competition over land has produced social differentiation in terms
of identity and class struggles. For example, I examine how Dakar’s urban land grabs have at
times produced new alliances and/or exacerbated tensions between Dakar’s Lebu populations -
who were the first inhabitants in the Dakar Region (Sylla 1991)- and migrant groups. In reading
shifts in how Lebu populations’ govern land systems and their relations with migrant farmers, my
dissertation thus draws on a body of research on autochthony to study how large-scale urban
land conflicts in Dakar have produced new forms of social differentiation. Following Geschiere's
(2009, p. 2) reading of autochthony, which describes how land users’ assert land claims based on
their understanding of being “from the soil” while also holding an authentic sense of belonging
to a specific territory, my dissertation also intersects with literature that examines how land
conflicts between autochthonous land users and migrant populations has contributed to
inequality and social differentiation in many rural sub-Saharan African contexts (Geschiere and
Jackson 2006; Page et al. 2010; Boone 2013). Furthermore, my focus on how middle-class and
elite actors are transforming peri/urban farmland into new housing estates also speaks to how
class differentiation - which has been under examined in the African land rights literature
(Bernstein 2004)- plays into contemporary land conflicts. Lastly, I also draw upon work that
examines gendered dynamics of land conflicts (Carney and Watts 1990; Goheen 1996; Schroeder
1999) to examine how urban land grabs in Senegal’s Dakar Region have exacerbated gendered
cleavages. In situating this research on identity and class struggles, my work also follows Stuart
Hall's (1985) approach by examining how various social categories -including age, religion,
ethnicity, and gender - articulate with class structures to produce complex relations of dominance
and struggle.

At the same time, my dissertation also sheds light on how local and state political actors in
Senegal’s current political-economic moment - in which the implementation of political
decentralization reforms and the rise of multiparty politics figure prominently - frequently play
roles in land disputes that increase social differentiation and inequality. The significant roles
played by local and central state government actors cannot be underestimated. Yet much of the research on African land systems ignores - or downplays - roles played by government actors (Peters 2013), focusing largely on the roles played by local traditional authorities and land claimants. Only a few studies have analyzed how political decentralization reforms have influenced land governance in sub-Saharan Africa (Galvan 2004; Faye 2008; Lund 2008; Bruce and Knox 2009). Furthermore, much of the African land rights literature glosses over how government actors do not always act as a cohesive socio-political bloc. My dissertation addresses the frequently contradictory roles played by Senegalese state actors, drawing attention to tensions within political parties and conflicts that develop between actors working for central and local governments.

Examining the complex roles played by state actors also provides a particularly useful lens to examine relations between property and authority. Plenty of academic discussion has studied how property relations and political authority are mutually constituted (Goheen 1992; Berry 2001, 2002, 2009; Lund 2006, 2008). As Sikor and Lund (2009, p. 10) point out, “claimants seek out socio-political institutions to authorize their claims, and socio-political institutions look for claims to authorize” in their efforts to “build and solidify their legitimacy in relation to competitors.” I consequently understand conflicts within political parties - or between central state actors and decentralized authorities - over how to administer land rights and / or mediate land conflicts as struggles over who speaks for the state on land-related conflicts.

At the same time, my project highlights how local actors and associational life - including farmer associations, women’s groups, traditional associations, etc. - play an integral role in land struggles, frequently engaging in negotiations with a variety of private and public actors to secure land rights. By engaging in these negotiations, farmers and residents are also exercising claims to citizenship (Lund and Boone 2013) and urban space that frequently stem from claims to autochthony or based on their political involvement with associational life. The next section examines these claims to citizenship in more detail, working to weave literatures on agrarian land rights with writing on urban citizenship and contentious politics over how to use, manage, and develop city space.

**Episodes of Urban Contention**

Urban questions have historically examined processes of capital accumulation in north-Atlantic cities. Researchers have largely focused on the relations between capitalist modes of production, built infrastructure, and urban political life (Castells 1977; Berman 1982; Sassen 1991; Harvey 2003). Postcolonial writing on cities critiques how this work has led to the geographical polarization within the urban literature, in which 'global,' north-Atlantic cities are defined in contradistinction to 'developmentalist' cities in the global South (Robinson 2002). My project bridges this polarization between 'global' and 'developmentalist' cities by engaging with current academic debates surrounding informality and the right to the city (Roy 2009; Roy 2011a). These two fields are useful in explaining how peri/urban processes are reconfiguring the spatial logics of capital, governance and identity (Yiftachel 2009b) in Senegal's Dakar Region.

Within the literature on informality, my work breaks with research that emphasizes the existence of an autonomous informal sector or civil society that operates outside of - or separate
from- formal sectors (K. Hart 1973; Tripp 1997; Simone 2004a). In this sense, I examine relations between the informal and formal sectors in Pikine and Bambilor, drawing from literature that sees informality as a key mode of regulation (Perlman 1976; Roitman 1990; Abdoul 2002; Roy and AlSayyad 2004). My research consequently challenges dominant analyses of informal urban life in the Dakar region (e.g., Simone 2004a), bringing to light the complex, interwoven relationships between central state actors, decentralized government officials, and associational life.

My dissertation also examines how research on informal politics intertwines with current debates over ‘right to the city’ (RTTC) movements. Lefebvre’s (2008b, 2009) initial musings on the ‘right to the city’ provided a radical critique of urban political life and processes of capital accumulation. As such, Lefebvre describes the revolutionary political work that participants in RTTC movements must undertake to appropriate -and thus ultimately transform- urban space. There exists, however, a significant gap between Lefebvre’s writing on the RTTC and more recent liberal interpretations of the RTTC that have expanded definitions of RTTC movements to include all struggles over substantive citizenship rights (Kipfer et. al. 2012; Purcell 2013). A large body of this liberal scholarship on RTTC movements pivots around class and housing interests, examining residents right to use, exchange, and manage city spaces (Appadurai 2001; Murphy 2004; Holston 2008). While these liberal readings distort the revolutionary demands implicit in Lefebvre’s work, it is important to recognize that they also reflect the extent to which many contemporary RTTC movements are actually undertaking radical -or moreover liberal- efforts to transform urban space. In this sense, RTTC movements in urban Senegal are centered less around radical approaches that would abolish private property and allow all residents and farmers to use and inhabit urban spaces and more around which groups and/or individuals should be able to access private property rights for urban land, as these land rights largely influenced who was able to use -or expropriate- peri/urban farmland.

The RTTC movements underway in urban Senegal consequently intersect with a large branch of the RTTC literature on class and housing interests. So far, however, little has been written that examines how contemporary RTTC struggles over the construction of new housing estates are also enmeshed in peri/urban agrarian struggles. This is especially significant given that new housing estates -such as those popping up in Senegal’s Dakar Region- frequently raze and build over peri/urban farmland. And while urban housing developers work to transform farmland into middle-class and elite housing estates, their efforts are frequently counteracted by farmers who are mobilizing -alongside a wide range of public and private actors- to use and develop land for agricultural purposes. By calling attention to how RTTC movements in Senegal’s Dakar Region are thus informed by housing and agrarian questions, my research is in conversation with writing that emphasizes how urban and agrarian questions are mutually constituted (Berry 1985; Roy 2003).

At the same time, my dissertation joins a growing body of research in Latin America (O’Dougherty 2002; Holston 2008) and Asia (Ray and Qayum 2009; Hsing 2010; Roy 2011b) that documents how low-income residents RTTC campaigns articulate with RTTC campaigns spearheaded by middle-class and elite residents. With the exception of South Africa, research in sub-Saharan Africa has only recently started exploring how the growth of a new middle-class is
altering urban political life and producing poverty and landscapes of uneven development (Gastrow 2014; Watson 2014; Simon 2015).

In paying attention to these divergent opinions about how Dakar’s farmland should be developed, my dissertation also draws from research that examines how RTTC movements and debates over urban development are influenced by aesthetics and diverse ways of seeing urban spaces. For example, Ghertner (2010, 2011) describes how the absence of maps in Delhi has coalesced with a socially produced aesthetic -referenced through decorative posters, photographs, etc.- that not only differentiates urban slums from middle-class and elite neighborhoods, but also helps residents, planners, and courts determine which urban spaces should be targeted for urban redevelopment. Yet Senegal’s Dakar Region is hardly devoid of maps. Instead, the region has continuously been mapped and re-mapped. Colonists drew exploratory maps of Dakar to plan military expeditions, just as government bureaucrats have produced maps that delineate proposed boundaries for urban conservation work. Similarly, farmers and housing developers have commissioned maps for land they intend to use and develop. My research draws from these layers of mapping in Dakar to examine how different communities in Senegal’s Dakar Region see-and plan- how to use, exchange, and manage city spaces. In other words, I examine how different groups -for example, groups of farmers, or coalitions of housing developers- use maps to not only justify their visions of urban development but frame their understanding of who has a -or the- right to Dakar’s city spaces.

In examining differing visions of urban development and contentious debates over who has a right to develop Dakar’s peri/urban farmland, my work also relies on the vast interdisciplinary literature on contentious politics. Research on contentious politics encompasses “all situations in which actors make collective claims on other actors, claims which, if realized, would affect the actors’ interests, when some government is somehow party to the claims” (McAdam et al. 1997, p. 143). In this sense, research on contentious politics aims to study and explain varying forms of political contention, which includes-but is not limited to- revolutions, transnational movements, or instances or religious and ethnic conflict. However, scholars have noted that the contentious politics literature only loosely integrates spatial analyses (Sewell 2001; Martin and Miller 2003; Tilly 2003). While some research has begun to examine dynamics of contention in relation to Lefebvrian understandings of how space and social life are mutually constituted (Cresswell 1996; Mitchell 2003; Wolford 2003), spatial analysis remains an interesting lacuna in research on contentious politics. Notably, Tilly (2008) has addressed this gap in research on contentious politics by exploring how contentious politics are performed in different countries, specifically examining the role of regime-type in relation to varying mechanisms and processes of contention.

This dissertation builds upon Tilly’s (2008) analysis by examining sub-national geographies of contention, specifically focusing on spatial variation in what I call episodes of peri/urban contention.” By focusing on episodes of peri/urban contention, my dissertation works to integrate research on contentious politics literature and recent writing that examine the spatial logic of informal politics and RTTC movements (Roy 2003; Yiftachel 2009a). At the same time, by focusing on episodes of peri/urban contention my work provides a spatial reading of the state and civil society relation in Africa. The following section describes the analytical framework for this research in more detail, drawing attention to how state and society relations in Senegal’s
Dakar Region are structured by political economic factors and spatially contingent conflicts over territory, clientelism, and political decentralization reforms.

Towards a Spatial Reading of State and Civil Society Relations in Senegal

Academic debates on ‘the state’ in sub-Saharan Africa have largely focused on relations between state institutions and civil society actors. Exactly how state and society relations are constituted remains a polemical and disputed terrain of research. Scholars have described relations between African states and civil society as neocolonial (Leys 1975; Williams 1977; Cruise O’Brien 1991; Gardinier 2000), or argued that African states themselves were imported (Badie and Birnbaum 1979; Badie 1992), neo-patrimonial (Richards 1996; Hyden et. al. 2000; Van de Walle 1994, 2003; Beck 2008), predatory (Frimpong Ansah 1991; Fatton 1992; Luiz 1997), privatized (Adedeji 1993; Hibou 2004), and as either weak (Jackson and Rosbery 1986; Reno 2004) or failed states (Mazrui 1995; Zartman 1995; Herbst 2000). Much of this literature has been dominated by institutional and Weberian analyses of state institutions, which have largely defined the state in contradistinction to civil society and associational life.

My research diverges from these institutionalist readings on the African state, joining a body of work that draws from Gramsci’s understanding of state and civil society relations (Geschiere 1986; Fatton 1987; Hart 2002; Moore 2005; Fredericks 2009; Bayart 2010). A key component of Gramsci’s conception of state and civil society relations is his particular understanding of civil society as “not as distinct from the state (à la liberalism), but as partially constitutive of and absolutely essential to the modern state” (Mann 2013, p.104). The state is thus composed of political society -which is upheld by the dominant class through coercive force (e.g., police and military bureaucracy)- and civil society actors and institutions (e.g., political parties, schools, unions, etc.) that continuously work to produce consent and consensus (Coutinho 2012, pp. 81-82). Moreover, it is by analyzing relations between political society and civil society that Gramsci’s crystallizes his distinct analysis of hegemony. As Hart (2002, p. 26) points out, Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony “does not refer to ideological domination, manipulation, or indoctrination” but a constant, moving political process in which social groups struggle to secure and maintain political-economic dominance through a combination of coercion and the production of consent.

Gramsci’s writing on the state and hegemonic processes was also informed by a sensitivity to space, place, and territory (Kipfer 2002; Jessop 2006; Ekers et. al. 2013). For example, Gramsci’s (2000a) essay The Southern Question examines how alliances between peasants and industry workers and cleavages between town and country could produce -or inhibit- the formation of a national (and ultimately, international) critical consciousness. Throughout the Prison Notebooks (2000b), Gramsci also grounds his analysis of social and political relations in specific historical conjunctures in ways that bring spatial questions to the forefront.

Following Gramscian-inspired methods and theory that various scholars have described as “spatial historicism” (Ekers and Loftus 2013, p. 25; Kipfer 2013, p. 87), my dissertation also draws from Lefebvre’s writing on the production of state space (l’espace étatique). Through his writing on the production of state spaces in the twentieth century, Lefebvre (2008a, 2009) describes how state actors are increasingly playing a crucial role in producing and maintaining
spaces that encourage capital accumulation and preserve leaders’ political authority. Lefebvre consequently argues that state actors strategically produce and groom their respective territories and use space as a political technology (Elden 2010). Examples of state efforts to produce territory-or state spaces- include the mapping of national territory or the construction of meaningful architectural forms that symbolize state powers over property and territory. State spaces are also produced through territorial strategies to control patterns of industrial development, land use, or transportation (Brenner and Elden 2009). Similarly, social groups -such as NGOs, associations, women’s groups, etc.- also produce territory and state spaces.

My dissertation thus focuses on the configuration of various overlapping and intertwined state territorial strategies (Agnew 1994; Mbembe 2000; Moore 2005) that have produced Dakar’s frontier for real-estate development. I consequently investigate how central government territorial strategies to gain various economic and political rents from the production of middle-class and elite housing projects may contradict with landowners' territorial strategies to protect farmland and/or build informal housing projects. In studying these competing territorial strategies, my research calls attention to how social groups are increasingly advancing their territorial projects by forming what I call ‘territorial alliances’. For example, farmer organizations actively seek out territorial alliances with NGO actors and/or government officials in order to safeguard farmers’ land claims. In turn, these territorial alliances compete against territorial alliances formed by housing developers and government actors seeking to develop new housing projects on Dakar’s peri-urban farmland. I argue that conflicts between competing territorial alliances represents a new way of practicing politics in Senegal’s Dakar Region.

Reading the political work undertaken by territorial alliances is also particularly useful for understanding how clientelist relations are produced, maintained, and dismantled in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Senegal has long served as a paradigmatic example of the patrimonial state in Africa, largely through an extensive literature describing clientelistic relations crafted through the exchange of public services for votes or political support (Cruise O’Brien 1975; Copans 1980; Coulon 1981; Villalón 1995; Salem 1998; Boone 2003a; Beck 2008; Arriola 2009). Most of these accounts of patronage networks depict central government officials or religious leaders as Senegal’s primary patrons. By doing this, these accounts ignore -or at best, downplay- the important roles that are increasingly played by local government actors. By examining how local government leaders in Senegal’s Dakar Region form territorial alliances to undertake territorial projects -for example, through the construction of new housing developments, or the implementation of mapping taxes- my dissertation describes how local government leaders have increasingly created new patronage networks that compete against patron-client alliances managed by central state authorities. Moreover, by focusing a spotlight on the presence of struggle and violence in and between competing patronage alliances, my research pushes back against traditional readings of clientelism that largely ignore the important role that coercion and conflict plays in creating and dismantling patronage networks.

Studying contention between competitive territorial alliances in Senegal’s Dakar Region also sheds new light on how political decentralization reforms are unfolding in sub-Saharan Africa. Political decentralization reforms have a long history in African political landscapes. During the 1990s, policy-makers began promoting decentralization reforms to correct what they saw as an ‘over-centralization’ of the state in African urban and political centers (Wunsch and
The decentralization of key government services was expected to improve governance; local governments were not only understood to be more efficient and responsive to residents’ needs, but were also expected to increase popular participation and decrease inequality (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Blair 2000). A considerable body of research has documented how decentralization reforms have failed to meet these expectations (Gibson and Marks 1995; Crook and Manor 1998; Boone 2003b; Manor 2004). My dissertation specifically intervenes in research that describes how central authorities in African contexts have worked to effectively re-centralize governing powers that were decentralized to local authorities (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Wunsch 2001; Ribot 2009; Awortwi 2010; Dickovick 2011). By examining the decentralization of land administration in Senegal’s Dakar Region -which I argue has emerged at the center of ongoing and highly contested struggles between competing territorial alliances over how political decentralization should unfold- I draw attention to how this understanding of decentralization qua recentralization does not account for the reconfiguration of political and economic relations through conflict, when local government actors and their alliances take -or negotiate- for powers claimed by central government officials. By foregrounding these struggles between local governments’ and central governments’ territorial alliances over the decentralization of land administration in urban Senegal, my research challenges readings of decentralization that highlight a single, discrete political outcome to political decentralization reforms by advancing an understanding of decentralization as a contentious political process.

The amalgamation of this research provides new insight into spatial readings of the state in Africa. In rooting my analysis in struggles over territory, my dissertation pays particular attention to the formation of competitive territorial alliances with distinct territorial strategies and projects. In doing this, my research also provides new insight into the geographies of clientelism and political decentralization in sub-Saharan African contexts. My research thus uses the proliferation of middle-class and elite housing estates as a lens to examine how complex struggles over territory articulate with ongoing struggles over political authority and citizenship.

**Research Methods and Chapter Overview**

Informed by twenty-two months of fieldwork in Senegal’s Dakar Region between 2008 and 2013, this dissertation is grounded in a critical ethnographic approach that is based primarily on participant observation and in-depth interviews. My fieldwork involved extensive participant observation at government buildings, association meetings, protests, peri/urban farms, and at the households of farmers and residents affected by land conflicts in Senegal’s Dakar Region. I also conducted more than 100 individual, semi-structured interviews with academics, government officials, NGO staff, farmers, and residents who were involved with peri/urban land disputes in Senegal. Interviews were conducted in government/NGO offices, at land conflict sites, and in respondents’ homes and farms.

Doing ethnographic research on land conflicts presented certain challenges. Given that land conflicts were not only highly contentious but ongoing, many actors involved in land conflicts refused to be interviewed for this project. This included many housing developers associated with the new housing estates I studied, military and police actors, and some high-level government officials. I was able to interview many government actors, housing developers, and
farmers who directly dealt with officials who refused interviews. I later triangulated interviews to support research claims made throughout this dissertation. This allowed me to provide thick descriptions of land conflicts underway in Pikine and Bambilor that challenge common assumptions about Dakar’s housing market, peri/urban development plans, and Senegalese politics.

I personally conducted all of the interviews in French and/or Wolof without the help of a translator, and the vast majority of the interviews I conducted were digitally recorded. All translations (from Wolof to English, or from French to English) from interviews and from primary and secondary literature are my own, except for ten interviews that my Senegalese field assistant translated into French. A handful of respondents chose not to be recorded; in these instances, I assembled extensive field notes during and after interviews. I have also attempted to protect the anonymity of my respondents by providing pseudonyms for low-level government officials and actors involved in land conflicts. I have, however, used the real names for highly public individuals (for example, President Abdoulaye Wade), organizations, and places.

Following this introduction, Chapter 1 examines how longstanding and gradual efforts to privatize Senegal’s housing sector have played into a current flurry of land conflicts surrounding the proliferation of middle-class and elite housing estates in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Beginning with an examination of Senegal’s Parcelles Assainies sites and services project, this chapter draws attention to how large shifts in Senegal’s political economy -namely, the increased role of the World Bank, urban development projects undertaken both prior to and during structural adjustment, the devaluation of Senegal’s currency, and political decentralization reforms- all worked to advance urban land titling initiatives and to increasingly privatize housing construction in Senegal’s Dakar Region. As such, this chapter speaks to a set of debates on land privatization in sub-Saharan Africa, the spatial logic of informality, and speculative urban governance.

In Chapter 2, I examine new roles played by local government actors in administering land rights and mediating -or producing- land conflicts. In my analysis, I focus specifically on roles that local government officials have played in creating new -and highly contentious- patronage networks since Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms. In examining the alliances that local government actors have formed with central government officials and/or farmer organizations, this chapter is in conversation with writing on political authority, decentralization, and clientelism in sub-Saharan Africa.

Chapter 3 examines how struggles over how various public and private actors see and plan out efforts to use, manage, and develop the remaining tracts of green space in Pikine and Bambilor play into current land conflicts. I examine these struggles through the abundance of mapping projects that have been undertaken in the Dakar Region. I argue that many of these mapping projects are rooted in a dominant mapping tradition that has organized Dakar’s urban space through urban plans and cadastral maps that are tied to property records. In examining new layers of Dakar maps that have been layered on top of these first plans and mappings of Dakar, this chapter illuminates recent trends towards the privatization of mapping services in urban Senegal and the ways in which maps commissioned by farmer organizations have been used by -and frequently incorporated into- dominant mapping traditions.
This is followed by Chapter 4, which provides a deeper analysis of property relations and the application of Senegalese land laws in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Specifically, I examine why farmers and residents threatened with displacement in large-scale land disputes in Pikine and Bambilor are reluctant to use courts to adjudicate land disputes. The chapter thus begins by providing an overview of Senegalese land laws, examining various barriers that prevent Dakar’s peri/urban farmers from accessing formal land rights. In describing the various ways that residents and farmers have attempted to secure formal land titles and negotiated legal settlements to land disputes, this chapter provides a fresh perspective to research examining the use of courts, racialized forms of dispossession, and the production of consent in African land systems.

Finally, Chapter 5 turns to the ways that farmers and residents in Pikine and Bambilor have mobilized to defend their land claims in contemporary urban land grabs. Through an examination of the roles played by farmer organizations in both communities, I reflect on how farmers and residents whose land is threatened with dispossession are breaking with older forms of governing and resolving land conflicts. Specifically, I argue that farmers and residents are increasingly relying on alliances brokered by farmer organizations to mediate land disputes. In making these arguments, this chapter seeks to build on research on farmer organizations, social movements, and urban politics.
Shady Land Deals

Since construction began in 2009, Senegal’s African Renaissance monument has been mired by political scandals. Standing taller than the Statue of Liberty and featuring a family rising from a volcano that overlooks the Atlantic Ocean, then-President Wade (who spearheaded the monument’s construction) faced widespread critique for his promotion of a ‘glamour’ project amidst widespread food insecurity and poverty in Senegal. This latter critique was compounded by the central government’s decision to contract a North Korean firm and its foreign workers -to the tune of $27 million- to build the monument, Wade’s decision to siphon part of the monument’s profits to his private foundation, and the speculative land deals that financed the project’s construction (‘Statuesque or grotesque?’ 2010; Quist-Arcton 2010).

In their accounts of the shady land deals that financed the monument’s construction, journalists reported how an established politician and one of Wade’s prominent supporters bought the tract of land where the statue is situated from the government for around 4,200FCFA/m² (around $5/m²) and later resold part of this tract -presumably at the insistence of government authorities- to Ipres (a retirement and pension institution, co-managed by the private sector and the Senegalese government) at 150,000FCFA/m² (around $300/m²). This land sale raised twice as much money needed to construct the statue. Moreover, the politician cum real estate broker who initially bought the land used for the monument reputedly planned to use the remaining land -the tracts that weren’t used for the statue or sold to Ipres- to build 270 elite residences costing around $300,000 each, ostensibly bringing in an additional $81 million profit from this land deal (Coly and Sy 2012).

Public debate and critique of the corrupt -and speculative- land deals that financed the construction of Senegal’s African Renaissance monument provide a lens into the political and economic stakes of the countless land deals that have populated newspaper headlines after President Wade began his first term in 2000. Reporting on land scandals became so prevalent after Wade assumed the presidency that a host of politicians in opposition parties -who often voiced their critiques in the opposition presses- identified President Wade and his administration as the root of all problems surrounding land speculation in Dakar.

Despite these attempts to vilify President Wade, there is no consensus on what dynamics are fueling Senegal’s current construction boom. For example, Senegalese representatives from Transparency International argue that money laundering -from funds garnered through illicit drug trafficking, stolen money, etc.- is the primary motor fueling Dakar’s real estate market (Saelens 2014). This analysis stands in direct contrast to reports made by industry analysts and various non-profits and foundations working in Dakar’s housing markets. These actors call attention to how rapid rates of urbanization have placed severe constraints on who gets access to adequate housing and how the government manages Dakar’s urban real estate sector (The OPEC Fund for International Development 2005; Sikiti da Silva 2012; ‘African Real Estate’ 2015).
While I do not discount the role that money laundering, rapid rates of urbanization, or Wade’s administration have played in shaping Dakar’s current housing market, a central claim advanced in this chapter is that these predominant analyses of Dakar’s housing market ignore how longstanding efforts to privatize Dakar’s formal housing market play into Dakar’s housing boom. This chapter consequently provides a counterpoint to ahistorical accounts that equate land speculation and shady land deals with President Wade’s regime and effectively widens the scope of analysis on Dakar’s housing boom by examining efforts to privatize Senegal’s housing industry over the last forty-five years. I argue that this method of understanding Dakar’s current housing sector in relation to its historical context sheds light on how the seeds of corrupt and speculative land deals were planted in previous administrations. This logic helps us understand why speculative land practices and protests over corrupt land deals did not disappear after President Sall replaced Wade as Senegal’s president.

At the same time, this argument sheds light on the spatially and historically contingent foundations of ‘speculative urbanism’ (Goldman 2011a, 2011b) in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Writing about speculative urbanism in Bangalore, Goldman describes many ‘worlding’ processes that resonate with Dakar’s contemporary housing sector. This includes, but is not limited to, massive waves of dispossession and development of peri-urban and rural land, the rise of new funding streams for world-city projects, and the important roles played by transnational policy networks and local government actors. Even so, speculative urbanism has played out differently in Bangalore and Dakar. While a detailed comparison that teases apart all of these differences is beyond the scope of this chapter, I do highlight the ways in which Dakar’s enmeshment with speculative urbanism has depended less on the IT sector and municipal bond markets and more on a long series of reforms—spearheaded by Senegalese government officials and the World Bank—to privatize and reform Dakar’s housing sector. By providing a historical account of efforts by Senegalese government and World Bank actors to privatize Dakar’s housing sector, this chapter also builds on Goldman’s ahistorical research by shining a spotlight on how Dakar’s entanglement with speculative urbanism is embedded in longstanding efforts to privatize Senegal’s urban housing sector.

In building these arguments, this chapter begins by examining efforts to privatize Dakar’s housing sector in the 1970s. Housing policy during this decade was dominated by efforts to implement a ‘sites and services’ housing project that aimed to provide Dakar’s low-income populations with formal housing options. One of the key ways that public officials cut costs to serve low-income residents was by privatizing housing construction. While this project ran up against many difficulties—including speculative land practices and elite capture of housing plots—the following section examines the ways in which the sites and services project was perceived by many officials as a marked success. For state actors and World Bank officials, the privatization of housing construction proved to be an efficient means of regulating the growth of Dakar’s informal sector. Formal housing estates were consequently built alongside informal housing settlements in order to cut-off the rapid, outward expansion of neighborhoods marked by high population densities and lack of formal planning measures and public services.

The next section examines how Senegal’s housing policy during structural adjustment expanded on these initial efforts to both privatize public housing and thwart the growth of Dakar’s informal housing sector. This included the formation of new institutions geared towards
quickly converting undeveloped land into formal - rather than informal - housing estates. The concluding section of this chapter argues that both President Wade and President Sall’s regimes have relied on these housing institutions created during structural adjustment to push the rapid construction of new housing estates.

In making these arguments, this chapter joins scholarship in the African land rights literature that examines how private land rights - and land privatization measures - have long held a central role in African land systems (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006, Colin and Woodhouse 2010). Yet while much of this new research examines land privatization in customary land systems in rural areas, this chapter examines how government and a host of international actors have undertaken to privatize and provide formal land titles for urban land. This chapter thus confronts more recent research claiming that land reform and land titling initiatives have only recently come back on the policy agenda in sub-Saharan Africa (Peters 2013). At the same time, it argues that public concern over shady land deals, government corruption, and the illicit accumulation of wealth by a variety of public and private actors involved in Dakar’s construction industry does not represent a new phenomenon, but is intimately linked to longstanding efforts to construct urban housing and register land incorporated in formal housing estates.

Parcelles Assainies and the Rise of Formalized Self-Help Housing

As described in the introduction, many mainstream narratives on Senegal’s housing policy frequently lament how President Wade’s regime (2000-2012) and/or rapid rates of urbanization in contemporary Dakar have produced an insufficient supply of adequate housing units and unsanitary, unplanned living conditions in informal neighborhoods. In this section, I break from these accounts by drawing attention to how critiques of widespread land speculation, elite capture of housing, and rapid rates of urbanization also circled efforts to introduce a Sites and Services project in Senegal’s Dakar Region during the 1970s and 1980s. I argue that this housing project was important because it served a crucial turning point in Dakar’s housing market, marking the presence of new international institutions in Senegal’s housing sector that began efforts - alongside central government actors and local populations during President Senghor (1960-1980) and President Diouf’s (1981-2000) regimes - to increasingly privatize Senegal’s housing sector.

These efforts to privatize Senegal’s housing sector are interesting given the growth of Senegal’s public sector during the 1970s. Beginning in the early 1970s, Senegal increasingly contracted loans - with commercial banks, bilateral institutions, and multilateral funding agencies - that helped nationalize various enterprises, supported Senegalese import substitution policies, and the growth public sector jobs (Boone 1992; Tshibaka 2003). These debt relations were initially buoyed by a precipitous upswing in prices for phosphate, Senegal’s primary mineral export, right around the same time as the first oil crisis. Yet phosphate prices declined sharply in 1976. This combined with recurrent droughts, rapidly declining terms of trade for Senegal’s main export crop (groundnuts), and the second oil crisis created the political and financial climate that pushed Senegal into structural adjustment negotiations and loan agreements in the late 1970s (Lewis 1987).
These monumental changes in Senegal’s economy during the 1970s were integrally connected to broad shifts in housing policy and Senegal’s real estate market. Up until the mid-1970s, the bulk of Dakar’s formal housing market was dominated by two public housing programs that were formed during the final years of French colonialism. This included the Société Immobilière du Cap Vert (SICAP, Real Estate Society for the Cap-Vert) and Office des Habitations à Loyers Modérés (OHLM, Office of Moderate Priced Housing). Both of these government programs were funded through a variety of mechanisms, including loans provided by the French CCCE (Caisse centrale de Coopération économique, France’s public lending institution), BNDS (Banque Nationale de développement, Senegal’s national development bank), and FAC (Fonds d’aide et de Coopération) and a four-percent tax that was garnered from all public and private salaries (Osmont 1973; Vernière 1977; Ly 2004). Houses were built for rent or purchase, yet were so expensive that only the most elite tiers of salaried workers were able to afford to buy or rent in SICAP or OHLM neighborhoods. Populations without access to these housing schemes increasingly built or rented housing in informal housing settlements.

Yet in the early 1970s, government efforts began to shift away from SICAP and OHLM housing projects due to the reconfiguration of debt relations I briefly described above. Most notably, French lending authorities at CCCE—which had provided significant funding for SICAP and OHLM projects—stopped providing loans for Senegal’s real estate sector in 1972 (Barro 2008). After the withdrawal of the CCCE, the construction of formal housing in Senegal was increasingly financed through the private sector (Ly 2004).

These changes were also complemented by a new stream of financing through the World Bank, which became increasingly involved in financing projects oriented towards alleviating poverty in the developing world during the 1960s and 1970s (Goldman 2006). While many of the World Bank projects focused on rural development, World Bank loans to Senegal included an $8 million loan in 1972 that addressed urban poverty. This loan marked one of the Bank’s first efforts to work on housing sector reforms—if not urban poverty— in African contexts (World Bank 1983), and had lasting effects on Senegal’s housing sector.

Specifically, the 1972 loan provided by the World Bank financed the Parcelles Assainies Sites and Services project, which was officially completed in 1981. It is important to note that the loan did not finance the SICAP and OHLM housing projects that had traditionally been funded by the CCCE. Instead, the Senegalese government created a new executing agency within OHLM to manage the Parcelles Assainies Sites and Services project (World Bank 1972a, 1972b).

2 In fact, OHLM housing projects were initially advanced in the late 1950s in order to provide housing to individuals and families that were unable to afford SICAP housing prices. Despite these efforts to provide housing to more of Dakar’s working-class residents, SICAP and OHLM housing continued to serve only the wealthiest tier of Dakar residents. For example, the majority of salaried workers earned less than 15,000 FCFA per month in 1958, yet 85% of SICAP household heads earned more than 20,000FCFA per month and 60% earned more than 30,000FCFA per month (Maack 1978: p. 176). Other sources indicate that by the beginning of the 1970s only 20% of Dakar households had revenues sufficient to qualify for SICAP or OHLM housing (Arecchi 1985). This resulted in a situation where some individuals who paid the 2% housing taxes through their salaries were still unable to afford OHLM housing.
At its core, the Parcelles Assainies housing project was designed to improve the efficiency of Dakar’s formal housing sector. Both SICAP and OHLM were widely criticized for their inability to meet Dakar’s rising demands for housing in the early 1970s. The Parcelles Assainies project was thus intended to address these concerns by rapidly converting 400 hectares of land on the outskirts of Dakar into 14,000 housing plots that would accommodate 140,000 people (World Bank 1972b).

These measures to improve the efficiency of new housing construction in Dakar combined with efforts to increasingly provide formal housing options to low-income families. During the early 1970s, OHLM housing typically cost around $5,100 per house. Planners aimed to reduce these costs by only providing residents with housing plots that were hooked up to public services. Plot recipients were expected to finance and build their own housing -largely through unpaid, manual labor- within two years in order to receive secure property rights. This privatization of housing construction reduced projected costs for each housing plot to around $500-$1,000. Defraying costs of housing construction to plot recipients was thus projected to reduce overall projected costs for the Site and Services project while also providing low-income families with secure, affordable housing (World Bank 1972a, 1972b).

Yet when the project was implemented, government and World Bank authorities clashed over how this privatization of housing construction would unfold. World Bank staff assumed that low-income residents in Parcelles Assainies would build or move their shacks to their new housing plots. These shacks would serve as temporary housing while residents built more permanent structures. Senegalese officials, however, strongly discouraged the erection of temporary housing in Parcelles Assainies. Those officials feared that the erection of temporary housing settlements would recreate the same types of flimsy housing settlements that the project was working to eliminate. Senegalese housing authorities consequently insisted that plot recipients adhere to design standards that were more expensive than those advocated by the World Bank, which meant that many low-income applicants could not afford to build houses in the Parcelles housing project (World Bank 1983).

It didn’t take long before government and World Bank authorities realized that struggles such as these over how to privatize housing construction precluded many low-income families from building homes in the Parcelles Assainies housing project. In order to help lower income families afford the cost of building housing on their assigned plots, the World Bank began extending small loans to plot recipients in 1976. Yet by the early 1980s, more than 88% of construction loans provided in Parcelles Assainies were in default (World Bank 1982; Sarr 1984). These problems were compounded by critiques that the Parcelles Assainies Sites and Services project was unable to adequately serve low-income populations because it was mired by corruption. For example, choice corner plots were mysteriously assigned to high-income individuals. Elite residents also

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3 The World Bank’s (1983) final project report notes on the Parcelles Assainies project indicated that the sites and services project significantly improved the speed of public housing delivery. In the same time that it took to prepare 12,000 serviced plots in Parcelles Assainies, OHLM only produced 2,000 new housing units (World Bank 1983).
bought up the plots that low-income residents couldn’t afford to develop (Ayres 1983; Sarr 1984; Arecchi 1985; White 2014).

By the time the Parcelles Assainies project drew to a close in 1981 -four years behind schedule, and in the midst of Senegal’s early entanglements with structural adjustment loans- both World Bank Staff and Senegalese housing officials were highly critical of how the sites and services project was implemented. Yet despite this troubled foray into funding urban projects in Senegal, the World Bank continued to play a crucial role in reshaping Senegal’s urban housing policy during the 1980s. During this decade, urban housing policy did not revert to previous iterations of housing policy that relied on the SICAP and OHLM as the primary source of formal housing construction in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Instead, the housing alliance between Senegal and the World Bank that germinated during the Sites and Services project set in motion a series of efforts to increasingly privatize Senegal’s housing market in the 1980s and 1990s.

The next section examines how these initial efforts to privatize Senegal’s housing sector dovetailed with larger concerns over how to regulate the rapid growth of Dakar’s informal neighborhoods. Specifically, I draw attention to how the Senegalese government -in partnership with local and international actors- developed a new spatial logic to manage the growth of formal and informal neighborhoods in Senegal’s Dakar Region. This spatial logic emerged alongside the Parcelles Assainies sites and services project, and was undergirded by efforts to quickly and efficiently build new, formal housing estates that adhered to strict design standards. I argue that this set the precedent for government actors -and to a lesser extent, international partners- to focus more on quickly producing ‘formal’ neighborhoods rather than ensuring whether new housing estates under construction actually housed Dakar’s growing low-income populations.

**Blocking Dakar’s Informal Housing Sector**

The Parcelles Assainies project reconfigured how Senegal’s formal housing sector was managed by introducing new measures that encouraged the privatization of housing construction. At the same time, the project marked a large shift in how government and international actors managed the rapid growth of new, informal neighborhoods. Throughout Senegal’s colonial period and the first two decades of President Senghor’s regime, the rapid increase in informal housing settlements was primarily managed by what was popularly referred to as the ‘politics of the bulldozer’ (Hesseling 1986), in which informal housing settlements were razed and replaced with middle-class and elite housing prepared by SICAP and OHLM.

In the 1950s, these politics resulted in the creation of Pikine. Located roughly fifteen kilometers from downtown Dakar, Pikine was originally created to house residents whose informal housing settlements were bulldozed and replaced by OHLM housing (Vernière 1977). In order to secure land for displaced residents who were moved to Pikine, the colonial government negotiated with Lebu leaders in the nearby village Thiaroye-sur-mer (also known as Thiaroye Guedji in Wolof), who ceded land that had most recently been used as farmland. Residents I spoke with who resided in Pikine during its first years described how the neighborhood lacked access to public transportation, markets, health centers, and schools.
Despite these difficult living conditions, the city grew faster than any other city in Africa during its formative years (Salem 1998).

Pikine’s rapid urbanization, however, was largely due to the growth of the city’s informal housing sector. Prior to 1955, Pikine was mostly populated by migrants who were displaced or moved voluntarily from Dakar into Pikine’s formal neighborhoods. Yet after 1955, the city increasingly housed urban and rural migrants who rented or built housing in the informal neighborhoods. During this same period, many residents in Pikine’s formal neighborhoods also sold their house plots and used proceeds from land sales to buy larger tracts of land in Pikine’s informal neighborhoods, which better accommodated residents’ family size and housing needs (Vernière 1977, Maack 1980).

In their attempts to regulate these rampant land sales and the proliferation of informal neighborhoods during the 1960s, the Senegalese government curtailed efforts to regulate informality solely through the ‘politics of the bulldozer’ by strategically building formal housing estates on the borders of Pikine’s rapidly growing informal housing settlements. By building these new formal housing estates on the outskirts of informal housing settlements, the Senegalese government worked to effectively cut-off and block the outward expansion of informal neighborhoods. Salem (1998) documents these efforts through a series of maps of Pikine dating from 1958 until 1980, which are shown on the next page. The first map in this series highlights how informal settlements -those marked by dark pink and white stripes- are limited to the traditional Lebu villages in Cambérène, Thiaroye-Guedj, Yembeul, and Thiaroye-Gare. Formal housing estates -marked as solid pink- consist of the original government projects started in Pikine.

Subsequent maps demonstrate how the government focused on quickly building formal neighborhoods north of Pikine’s original formal housing estates during the 1960s in order to halt the rapid, westward expansion of informal settlements. This was complemented by construction of new, formal housing projects in Pikine extension and Guediawaye during the 1970s, which blocked the northward expansion of informal housing estates in the Pikine Irregulier neighborhood (marked by light pink and white stripes in the 1968-69 map).

As a result of these practices, Pikine’s informal neighborhoods were increasingly boxed in by the government’s formal housing projects (Salem 1998). Yet as described above, these strategic efforts to effectively block off the expansion of Pikine’s informal neighborhoods did not work to regulate all land sales and speculators land practices in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Instead, this form of regulation primarily focused on halting land sales and speculatory land practices that

4 It is important to note, however, that not all residents who sold their plots in Pikine’s formal neighborhoods relocated to Pikine’s rapidly growing informal housing sector. A large number of displaced residents also began renting housing in the Medina -a formal neighborhood located on the periphery of downtown Dakar- which quickly became more densely populated than the informal settlements that the government aimed to eliminate. These relocation patterns underscore how the traits and/or practices of informality were not solely linked to bidonville or slum neighborhoods that have been traditionally associated with informality in African contexts. As formal neighborhoods grew, they quickly surpassed the population densities that public officials criticized in informal neighborhoods (Maack 1980).
would expand the geographic scope of Pikine’s informal neighborhoods. In doing so, these efforts limited many traditional Lebu landowners’-and in some cases, individuals with fraudulent land claims- ability to profit from land sales that would produce informal housing settlements. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, it is important to note that land speculation by middle-class and elite actors purchasing housing plots and houses in formal neighborhoods were not penalized. Land sales by Lebu actors with land claims (be they valid or not) and efforts to build new informal neighborhoods were the subject of numerous government regulations and projects.

Figure 6: Growth of Pikine’s formal and informal neighborhoods, 1958-1980 (Source: Salem 1998)
The next section explains how these efforts to thwart the expansion of new informal neighborhoods were intensified during the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, land sales and speculative practices within Dakar’s formal housing sector remained on the periphery of government regulatory efforts. Instead, a combination of government and international actors worked to create and implement a variety of new housing policies and institutions that increasingly focused on occupying and developing land faster than the informal housing market. In making this argument, my account doesn’t discount other means of discouraging informality—such as bulldozing informal housing settlements, or preliminary efforts to restructure informal neighborhoods in Pikine—that were prominent during this time period. These efforts have been well documented in the literature on Dakar’s informal housing sector (White 1985; Cohen 2007; Durand-Lasserve and Ndiaye 2008), while the scholarly literature has not extensively examined the various ways that Senegal—with aid from international actors—bolstered efforts to quickly produce formal neighborhoods that blocked the growth of Dakar’s informal sector. The next section consequently describes key changes in Dakar’s housing sector during structural adjustment, drawing attention to how new efforts to privatize Dakar’s housing industry produced housing that was increasingly captured not by Dakar’s low-income populations, but by Dakar’s middle-class and elite residents with formal jobs and Senegalese migrants living in the diaspora.

Urban Housing during Structural Adjustment

The economic stabilization and structural adjustment reforms implemented in Senegal—and much of the developing world—during the 1980s are frequently associated with trade and investment liberalization, tightened fiscal and monetary policies, measures aimed at increasing export-led growth, cuts to public spending, and efforts to privatize public sector enterprises (Biersteker 1990; Taylor 1997). Yet as evidenced in the Parcelles Assainies project, Senegalese authorities were already engaging in significant efforts to cut public spending for Senegal’s housing sector before they signed the country’s first economic stabilization loan with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This section examines measures undertaken during the 1980s and early 1990s that built on the initial efforts in the Parcelles Assainies project to promote the privatization of Senegal’s housing sector and increase the rate—and scale—at which new formal housing projects were built. Specifically, I focus on how the Senegalese formal housing sector increasingly relied on private actors to construct housing and prepare housing plots by forming a variety of new public-private housing institutions.

The most notable efforts to extend the role of private actors in Senegal’s housing sector can be read through the reports that summarize urban projects undertaken by Senegalese government officials and World Bank staff. During this period, two urban projects were implemented: the Urban Management and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project (UMRTAP, which ran from 1984 to 1989) and the Municipal and Housing Development Project (MHDP, approved in 1988 and closed in 1997). Contrary to the first Senegal and World Bank urban project—which aimed to strengthen Dakar’s formal housing sector by developing a sites and services project in one single neighborhood, Parcelles Assainies—both of the UMRTAP and the MHDP projects aimed to provide a more comprehensive approach towards reforming housing policy by focusing on building new, formal housing projects throughout the entirety of Senegal’s Dakar Region. Projects throughout this period also focused on developing new urban

In this sense, both projects explicitly recognized that in order to develop Dakar’s affordable housing market they also needed to bolster local government’s administrative and fiscal capacities. These efforts were partially achieved through legislation that was passed by President Diouf’s regime in 1990 that gave new powers to municipalities and rural councils (Faye 2008). Specifically, this legislation included provisions that gave urban mayors and the presidents of rural councils the ability to create and manage local budgets (Gellar 2005). Urban projects supported by the World Bank during this period also worked to identify and train administrative personnel for municipal positions, help localities finance technical facilities and key civil works equipment, improve public transportation and urban road systems, and strengthen the finances of local authorities through the establishment of a new credit fund. Crucial to each of the World Bank and Senegal’s urban projects were efforts to update Dakar’s fiscal cadastre and improve collection of municipal taxes (World Bank 1988).

This work to reinforce municipal governments’ fiscal and administrative capacity was carried out alongside efforts to increase the role of the private sector in Senegal’s housing market. It was thus in this context that a new land development agency, SCAT-URBAM (Société Centrale d’Aménagement des Terres Urbains), was created in 1988 (World Bank 1991). Similar to the Parcelles Assainies sites and services project, SCAT-URBAM was created in order to decrease the bottleneck in Dakar’s formal housing sector by developing and marketing serviced housing plots to Dakar populations that could not afford plots or houses managed by SICAP or OHLM.

SCAT-URBAM departed from standards set during the Parcelles Assainies project in several key ways. First, residents purchasing serviced plots had ready access to commercial centers, schools, public transportation, and other community facilities (World Bank 1991). SCAT-URBAM projects were also dispersed throughout Dakar, rather than concentrated in one specific neighborhood. Another crucial function of SCAT-URBAM during this period was the land development agency’s ready provision of private, freehold titles to plot owners.

Provision of private land titles was a point of heated contention during the Parcelles Assainies project. Senegalese housing authorities were very reluctant to provide freehold titles throughout the Parcelles Assainies project, arguing that plot recipients should receive use rights -rather than freehold property rights- for serviced plots. This policy stance conformed with Senegal’s land laws, and in the World Bank completion report for the Sites and Services project Senegalese housing authorities described how “Faced with the Bank’s firm insistence on this matter, the Government suspected a political, even ideological motivation that concern for the proper implementation of the project alone did not warrant” (World Bank 1983, p. 65).

These sentiments and land titling efforts forcefully contradict scholarly arguments that assert African countries did not face significant pressure to implement land privatization and land titling programs until the mid-1980s (Plateau 1992; Bassett 1993) and more recent work arguing that land titling initiatives have only recently re-entered policy agendas (Peters 2013). Land titling was a crucial -and sometimes contentious- component in all urban housing projects supported by the World Bank in Senegal. World Bank projects in the 1980s and 1990s worked to overcome the
Senegalese government’s officials reservations towards land privatization through various measures. Project documents consequently described how World Bank projects did not need to focus on land reforms because existing legislation in Senegal was already “well suited to the development of private ownership” on urban land (World Bank 1988, p.8). Instead, Bank staff focused on decreasing administrative inefficiency and the significant delays associated with registering land and obtaining private land titles in Senegal. One of the key functions of SCAT-URBAM - in addition to transforming land and hooking up plots to public services - was thus to complete all administrative tasks and assure that each plot was associated with a private land title. World Bank reports describe how this not only increased the supply of formal housing in Dakar, but also “substantially improv[ed] the functioning of the land market” (World Bank 1988, p.12).

While many of these SCAT-URBAM plots were bought and developed by public housing developers (e.g., SICAP, OHLM), they were also being purchased and transformed into new housing estates by private housing developers. SCAT-URBAM’s efforts to develop serviced and titled plots thus boosted the role of private housing developers in Senegal’s formal housing market. In this sense, SCAT-URBAM and the reforms associated with World Bank projects helped provide housing plots to private housing developers that had frequently been building housing in Senegal’s informal neighborhoods because they were unable to quickly navigate Senegal’s cumbersome procedures for land privatization. At the same time, private housing developers were also increasingly able to invest in SCAT-URBAM plots - and build new housing estates for Senegal’s formal housing sector - because of changes underway in Senegal’s financial sector.

Specifically, private housing developers were increasingly able to obtain loans to finance housing projects. These new lending relationships materialized through loans provided by the Senegal Housing Bank (Banque de l’Habitat du Senegal, or BHS). Founded in 1979, BHS was formed as a public-private joint venture to finance both public and private housing projects. By the mid-1980s, both the Senegalese Government and the West African Central Bank only held a 9 percent stake in BHS, with the remaining share divided amongst a variety of public and private shareholders. Yet as economic stabilization and structural adjustment reforms unfolded during the 1980s, BHS was increasingly affected by credit restrictions imposed by the West African Central Bank (CBEAO). To counteract this, the MHDP World Bank project financed a significant IDA credit -$13.3 million, or 17 percent of the entire loan - that in part helped the BHS avoid the ramifications of the 1980’s credit squeeze in Senegal (WB 1988). This effectively allowed BHS to increase lending - notably during a moment when the national economy and other sectors’ lending streams were decreasing - and help a variety of public and private housing developers build new housing estates. At the same time, these loans specifically helped support the growth of Dakar’s formal housing sector, as BHS loan packages were only approved for land that was hooked up to public services and held under secure title.

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Public enterprises and funds include OHLM and SICAP (which each held a 2.73% share of BHS), the National Social Security Fund (7.27% share), the National Pension Fund (IPRES, 7.27% share) and insurance companies (with 5.14% share). The remainder of shares were held by other banks and the International Finance Corporation (IFC, 8.63% share) (World Bank 1988).
Even though the majority of BHS loans went to public sector land development and construction companies (e.g., SCAT-URBAM, SICAP, OHLM) and private housing developers that built new housing estates, it is important to recognize that this IDA credit also helped BHS provide mortgages to individuals and families building single-family homes and apartment buildings. Equally important, the BHS also started building stronger lending relationships with Senegalese housing cooperatives during the 1980s.

Housing cooperatives have a long history in Senegal. For example, Osmont (1973) describes how numerous low-income families collectively mobilized to form a housing cooperative that built the Castors neighborhood, which is located on the outskirts of downtown Dakar. Through this cooperative, families were able to finance and build ninety houses in the Castors neighborhood between 1954 and 1956. By the end of 1959, the Castors housing cooperative had built an additional one-hundred houses (Osmont 1978).

Housing cooperatives that were formed in the 1980s differed significantly from the cooperatives that were formed in the 1950s. While most housing cooperatives were still composed of low and middle-income residents, fewer housing cooperatives were formed by neighborhood associations. Instead, cooperatives were increasingly formed by salaried individuals who all worked together in a single workplace. For example, housing cooperatives could be formed by a group of bureaucrats working in a government office or by workers regrouped in a factory. In this sense, many bureaucrats who had traditionally obtained housing through SICAP and OHLM increasingly financed and participated in private housing cooperatives to access urban housing. Moreover, the growth of the housing cooperative movement also increasingly gave non-government workers in salaried positions access to Senegal’s formal housing market. Yet cooperative movements during this period did not regularly provide non-salaried workers - e.g., many business owners, or informal sector workers - with loans to purchase and/or build housing. This was because the BHS - and other banks providing loans - considered individuals’ savings and paychecks as collateral when providing loans.

Nonetheless, access to mortgages and financing through the BHS helped housing cooperatives gain a strong foothold in Senegal’s housing market during the 1980’s. This was complemented by efforts by the Senegalese state and various international partners to support the housing cooperative movement. For example, the Senegalese state passed legislation that formalized how Senegalese housing cooperatives functioned in 1983 (République du Senegal and Ministere l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat, de la Construction et de l’Hydraulique 2009). This was followed by the establishment of the Low-Cost Housing Assistance Office (Bureau d’assistance aux collectivités pour l’Habitat Social, or BAHSO) in 1987. Founded with the assistance of UN-Habitat and GTZ (German Technical Cooperation Agency), BAHSO worked to promote the development of housing cooperatives. BAHSO also helped ensure that housing cooperatives adhered to legal procedures governing housing cooperatives - including helping cooperatives obtain legal signatures and stamps for legal paperwork - while also working with cooperatives to secure necessary financing for their projects.

Yet not all formal housing projects during this period were financed through mortgages and loans provided by Dakar’s emergent banking sector. Housing during structural adjustment was also marked by the emergence of a new group of investors who began buying up land and
housing en masse: international migrants. This included Senegalese who had amassed small fortunes in the African diamond trade, Lebanese and Syrian traders seeking to diversify their investments in Senegal, and wealthy Senegalese migrants in the diaspora who increasingly invested their profits in Senegal’s urban housing sector (Sall 2004; Tall 2009). Indeed, considerable research has also shown how Senegalese in the diaspora prioritize investments in Senegal’s housing sector after assuring that their families’ everyday household expenses are covered (Sall 2004; Barro 2008; Sinatti 2009, Tall 2009).

While migrants and non-migrants were equally represented in Dakar’s housing market during the 1970s, Tall (2009) describes how this relationship was fundamentally reconfigured in the 1990s. Specifically, Tall argues that the devaluation of the FCFA in 1994 was crucial to this reconstitution. This was in part because Senegalese living abroad saw their buying power double after Senegal’s currency was devalued, which meant that Senegalese migrants were better situated to buy housing plots and construction materials (most of which were imported) than residents who hadn’t migrated. Moreover, Tall describes how migrants who had deposited their savings in Senegalese banks were increasingly wary of using Senegal’s banking sector. Many migrants were frustrated when their hard-earned savings were devalued, while others feared another devaluation. Migrants wary of the Senegalese banking sector consequently invested their savings into housing projects instead of depositing savings into banks. Surveys that Tall (2009, p. 159) conducted in several Dakar neighborhoods confirm this argument: not only did housing construction increase after 1995, but migrants purchased twice as many houses as their non-migrant counterparts during the 1990s.

Senegal’s housing sector consequently underwent significant changes during structural adjustment. Most importantly, efforts to privatize Senegal’s housing sector—which were initiated during the World Bank’s Sites and Services project—were undertaken on a much larger scale. The Senegalese government consequently set up SCAT-URBAM, which set about developing housing plots—that had secure land rights and access to public services—in multiple neighborhoods throughout Dakar. The government and various institutional partners also supported the growth of the BHS, which in turn helped private housing developers, housing cooperatives, and international migrants gain a foothold in Senegal’s housing sector. While a small number of low-income residents were able to secure housing through newly formed housing cooperatives, these efforts to privatize Dakar’s housing sector largely benefited migrants in the Senegalese diaspora and Dakar’s middle-class and elite residents who held formal jobs. The next section examines how these efforts to privatize Senegal’s formal housing sector were once again not only intensified, but joined by a host of new, dynamic governmental actors after Senegal implemented decentralization reforms in 1996.

**Political Decentralization and Senegal’s Housing Sector**

As described in the previous section, Senegal’s urban housing policies during the 1980s and 1990s were dominated by efforts to support institutions that would further privatize housing construction. Notably, this included measures to bolster local governments’ administrative and fiscal capacities in 1991. As the 1990s progressed, efforts to implement structural adjustment reforms—including the 1994 devaluation of Senegal’s currency, the privatization of public
enterprises, etc.- combined with approaches that viewed local governments and populations as key drivers of economic development (Mohan and Stokke 2000).

In Senegal-as in many countries throughout the global South- this renewed focus on the local translated into a series of political decentralization reforms. Senegal’s decentralization reforms were implemented in 1996, and mandated that the central government transfer management of several key public sectors to local government bodies. International agencies frequently explain how these reforms created new opportunities for local participation in political life, while also producing more efficient governing processes (Ribot 2002; Treisman 2007).

This rationale for decentralization has frequently been critiqued. For example, an important body of literature questions the extent to which decentralization reforms have produced participative governance (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Ribot 2000; Chhatre 2008; Dickovick 2011). Critiques of political decentralization reforms also have focused on how many central governments have resisted -and ‘re-centralized’- decentralized responsibilities (Wunsch 2001; Ribot et. al. 2006). Academics studying Senegalese politics have also pointed out that the 1996 decentralization reforms provided a politically expedient way to offload expensive social responsibilities -including education, health, etc.- to local government bodies (Williams 2010; Dickovick 2011). Indeed, several governing authorities I met with lamented how the central government had ‘only transferred problems’ and not the fiscal or technical resources to effectively implement local programs in all sectors of decentralized government.

Yet in the urban and peri-urban areas I studied in Dakar, land administration and the construction of new housing estates frequently served as the exception to this rule. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, local governments in Senegal’s Dakar Region began to form special land commissions after Senegal implemented its 1996 decentralization reforms. In areas zoned as rural areas, these land commissions have helped local governments administer land, and frequently serve a key role in the provision of land rights and the mediation of land disputes. Land commissions formed in urban areas have also worked to mediate small-scale land conflicts and discourage illicit land sales. In this sense, local governments in peri-urban and rural areas were increasingly active in managing land and housing construction in their jurisdictions.

Yet many local governments did not limit their involvement in land administration to the provision of use rights and the mediation of land disputes. During this period, many local governments also became increasingly involved in the construction of new housing estates. In the rural community of Bambilor, for example, local council members described how they frequently sign agreements (protocole d’accord) with private real estate developers. These private real estate developers are charged with acquiring land, preparing land for housing estates (which usually includes bulldozing and leveling fields), and hooking plots up to public services. Half of housing plots prepared in this manner were allocated to the housing promoter (who would either finance construction and sell completed houses or just sell serviced plots) and the remainder of plots went to the rural community government. Many of the council members I spoke with in Bambilor

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6 Key public sectors that were decentralized include education; health; urbanism and housing; economic development planning; management and protection of the environment; land use planning and management; and sports, culture and youth activities (République du Sénégal 1996).
insisted that these plots are gifted to low-income women and youth, but I was unable to find any public documentation that accounted for how these plots were distributed. In fact, many individuals I spoke with who lived in Bambilor also described how these plots were only given to party militants or sold to fund campaigns headed by local political leaders.

It is also important to note that how local governments manage housing construction -and the types of housing estates created- is not uniform throughout Senegal. For example, in my interviews I realized that quota systems used to manage the distribution of plots in housing estates differed significantly between the rural community of Bambilor and urban municipality of Pikine. Within Pikine, local governments authorities I spoke with described how individuals selling land rights (or whose land rights were expropriated) generally received 65% of housing plots. Moreover, local government agencies only obtain 10% of plots (compared to 50% in Bambilor), central government agencies receive 10% of plots (whereas Bambilor did not allocated plots to central government officials), and the remaining 5% of plots was used to finance work conducted by private housing developers and cartographers.

These quota systems highlight the new work that local government officials perform in the production of Dakar's housing market. Similar to the housing projects coordinated by SCAT-URBAM and the Parcelles Assainies Sites and Services project, local government officials are increasingly teaming up with private housing developers to create new housing estates. They work to identify land that can potentially be developed for housing projects, and broker deals with private housing developers. This has helped augment the number of plots available for purchase -by Senegal's growing middle class, or Senegalese in the diaspora- and has contributed to Dakar's housing construction boom.

Local governments have only been able to enter into -and profit from- the production of new housing estates because of previous efforts to privatize Senegal's housing sector. Prior to the Parcelles Assainies project, all sectors of housing construction were managed by central government actors. The sites and services project began to privatize housing construction by delegating housing construction to plot recipients, just as BHS was created to provide loans for private housing construction and SCAT-URBAM was formed in order to provide registered plots for housing developers. The 1996 decentralization reforms consequently facilitated the rise of a new set of actors in Dakar’s housing sector, as local government actors increasingly performed jobs that were traditionally conducted by central government workers. In Dakar’s housing sector, the end result of these reforms facilitated the rapid production of new, formal housing estates that were spearheaded by local governments.

At the same time, the quota systems used by local government actors draws attention to important differences in how housing plots were -and are- distributed in these new housing projects. Local governments that I spoke with about this quota system did not have centralized records that detailed how -and to who- plots were distributed, and central government officials and local populations alike questioned why some actors received complimentary house plots while others were denied plots. Thus while I was unable to determine who received plots distributed by local government actors, I argue that these critiques -by central government officials and local populations- of how housing plots are distributed in housing estates spearheaded by local governments are important, as they draw attention to how public censure
of shady land deals and land speculation in Dakar was increasingly directed towards local
government actors and plot recipients. In this sense, public censure was no longer limited towards
Dakar’s traditional elite or central government authorities.

The final section of this chapter examines the various transformations that reshaped Dakar’s
housing market after President Wade entered office in 2000 alongside increased attention to -and
volume of- public critiques over the outcomes of land deals in Senegal’s Dakar Region. In writing
this section, I argue that the foundation for the housing policies implemented during Wade’s
regime were rooted in the pro-privatization housing policies that I’ve described throughout this
chapter. Wade -and subsequently President Sall- relied on a host of institutions and housing
policies that had been developed before and during structural adjustment. Yet public critique -
and censure- of these policies shifted significantly after the return of heavy rains in 2005 forced
Wade to reconsider how Dakar’s informal housing sector was managed. Following this shift in
housing policy, I argue that public contention over who obtains -and profits from- land deals and
the construction of new housing estates has re-emerged as a central focus of public debate in
Senegal.

Presidential Interventions

When Abdoulaye Wade became president in 2000, Senegal’s housing sector was on the heels
of major transformations. President Senghor and President Diouf’s administrations had created
new institutions- such as SCAT-URBAM, BAHSO, BHS- that produced serviced housing plots,
provided increased access to housing and construction loans, and furnished technical assistance
to housing cooperatives. While SCAT-URBAM closed their housing operations in 2003 due to a
lack of resources (Sané 2013), other institutions -such as BAHSO, BHS, and a variety of public-
private enterprises- and housing policies that favored privatization continued to gain prominence.

One of the key policies that received increased support during Wade’s regime were efforts to
promote joint development zones (Zones d’aménagement concerté, or ZACs). Still in existence, this
program requires that central government actors find and designate land to be used for housing
development. After central government authorities designate land for housing developments as a
ZAC zone, various institutions -e.g., local governments, public housing agencies, housing
cooperatives, or private housing developers- can apply for land grants. Each institution that
receives a land grant is required to ensure that the houses in their proposed housing development
are hooked up to public services and that plots are set aside for public purposes (e.g., roads,
markets, schools, health clinics, etc.). Similar to the previous housing projects, the stated goal of
ZAC projects is to quickly transform land into affordable and formal housing units by creating
new, dynamic partnerships between public and private actors (UN Habitat 2013).

While legal provisions for the creation of ZACs were implemented in 1988, the first ZAC
project only broke ground in 2000 (and officially closed in 2006). This ZAC occupied 80 hectares
and was situated in Mbao, which is located in the outskirts of Pikine, in the Dakar Region. Over
a period of six years, roughly 3,200 houses were built on this site. In fact, most of the housing in
ZAC Mbao was built by housing cooperatives. An additional 140 hectares was eventually added
to this original site, and ZAC projects were also implemented in many other Senegalese Regions
(Barro 2008). Yet despite efforts for ZAC projects to overcome many of the shortfalls experienced
by the Parcelle Assainies housing project, they still -at best- have served Senegal’s middle class. This was because low-income populations is unable to afford plots prepared by private housing developers, and are frequently precluded from loans provided by BHS to individuals and housing cooperatives. Low-income populations are relegated to building housing in informal neighborhoods or renting housing in both formal and informal neighborhoods (UN Habitat 2013).

By 2005, the tenor of Senegal’s housing market once again underwent dramatic changes due to seasonal flooding in Dakar’s informal neighborhoods. Specifically, Wade’s regime began increasingly relying on public-private partnerships to construct housing and resettle residents from informal neighborhoods subject to seasonal flooding in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Starting in 1989, the Dakar Region was marked by strong, seasonal storms that flooded many informal neighborhoods in the outskirts of Dakar. But during the 1980s and 1990s, this flooding was punctuated by drought years, and many years would pass when informal neighborhoods were not subject to seasonal flooding. This changed during the 2000s, when drought conditions receded and seasonal flooding increasingly affected Dakar’s informal neighborhoods. Much of this recurrent flooding in the Dakar Region was localized in the informal housing settlements in Pikine and Guediawaye. In part, these neighborhoods were more susceptible to seasonal flooding because they had been built directly on top of lakes and floodplains during Senegal’s prolonged drought. Floods in these neighborhoods frequently destabilized foundations and walls, forcing many residents to abandon their houses. Those who didn’t vacate their houses sought to raise their house’s foundation (Cissé and Sèye 2016) and/or build makeshift housing on rooftops (Thiam 2011). Inundations in Pikine and Guediawaye also provided ideal conditions for the production of dangerous mold in households, damaged household furniture and appliances, and increasing left residents susceptible to waterborne diseases. Official statistics estimate that roughly 25,000 families were affected by seasonal flooding in 2005, compared to 27,000 families -or 360,000 individuals- in 2008 (Thiam 2012; Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 2014). These urban floods also had deadly consequences; in 2012, seasonal flooding reportedly caused the deaths of 26 individuals (Sané 2013; Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 2014).

Government response to this flooding included increased funding to various neighborhood restructuration programs undertaken by Fondation Droit à la Ville (an NGO funded by the Senegalese government, German Technical Cooperation Agency, and various other partners) and APIX (the Investment Promotion and Major Projects Agency, a public agency aimed at increasing large-scale investments and business ventures in Senegal). These agencies sought to rebuild houses affected by flooding, provide flood protection, help residents obtain secure property rights, and organize neighborhoods according to modern planning standards. However, progress on these restructuration projects was slow (World Bank 2002; Durand-Lasserve and Ndiaye 2008), and they only focused on a few of Dakar’s informal neighborhoods affected by flooding. These restructuration programs were thus complemented by government measures to house affected populations in temporary housing (e.g., schools, tents) while pumping floodwaters away from affected neighborhoods. This strategy proved costly and was unsustainable, and ultimately led Wade administration to form new programs -such as the ‘One family one roof’ (Une famille un toit) program and the ‘Plan Jaxaay’- that sought to move residents from flooded
neighborhoods into low-cost housing -built in part by private housing contractors- in Dakar’s outskirts.

President Wade’s regime received a significant amount of criticism on how the Plan Jaxaay was implemented. Critics denounced the slow pace at which the Jaxaay neighborhoods were built. By 2009, only 1,798 housing units had been completed, despite government plans to build 3,000 housing units for residents displaced by the 2005 floods (Barro 2008). Residents that central government officials moved into tent villages -under assurances that housing would be completed in 30 months- also complained about tents falling apart and poor sanitary conditions in the tent villages (‘État des lieux’ 2006).

Displaced residents that did receive homes in the Jaxaay housing developments also raised a variety of complaints. Ironically enough, the residents in the newly built Jaxaay neighborhoods experienced flooding in 2010, 2011, and 2012 because of inadequate sanitation and rainwater drainage systems (Schaer et. al. 2017). And while the Jaxaay housing developments were hooked up to water and electricity, many residents criticized how they lacked markets, hospitals, police stations, and paved roads. Low-income Jaxaay residents also argued that housing prices were unaffordable. Lastly, critics argued that the central government gave housing in the Jaxaay neighborhoods to individuals -if not entire neighborhoods- that had not been affected by flooding (Gbaya 2007).

These criticisms of Plan Jaxaay were significant given the political and financial stakes of the project. At $52 million, the Plan Jaxaay carried a hefty price tag. President Wade argued that the only way to pay for this project was by delaying parliamentary elections -which were rescheduled to be held alongside the 2007 presidential elections- and using funds allocated for the parliamentary elections to finance the Plan Jaxaay. While parliamentary elections were ultimately delayed, plans to hold the presidential and parliamentary elections concurrently fell through. In the end, the increased costs associated with postponing parliamentary elections and funding Plan Jaxaay were absorbed by funds that had been earmarked for the construction of low-income housing projects (Thiam 2013; Schaer et. al. 2017). This -combined with allegations that Jaxaay funds were misused and popular discontent over Jaxaay neighborhoods described above- added fuel to growing public outcry against the corrupt political practices that increasingly characterized Wade’s regime.

These criticisms of the Jaxaay project also marked a key shift in how the Senegalese public imagined and understood Wade’s presidency. President Wade hinged his 2000 presidential campaign on a call for change (sopi), and the early years of his presidency were characterized by audits of the previous socialist regime’s major projects and by measures to attract foreign capital to build a variety of large-scale public works projects. In this sense, the Jaxaay housing project represented one of the first -and definitely the most prominent- of the many urban public works projects that led many observers to jokingly refer to the Dakar Region as a gigantic construction zone. Efforts to build Plan Jaxaay neighborhoods were also complemented by plans to build a new international airport, the expansion of Dakar’s main port, construction of the African Renaissance monument mentioned at the introduction of this chapter, and a string of elite hotels, shopping malls, and upscale housing along Dakar’s oceanfront property. The Senegalese central government also teamed up with the World Bank on an ambitious project to improve Senegal’s
road infrastructure, effectively building roads that linked Dakar with the planned international airport located 30 kilometers from Dakar. This project also resettled residents displaced by this road network and restructured informal neighborhoods that were located along the roads’ trajectory (World Bank 2009). It is important to note that these improvements to Dakar’s road network also stimulated the construction of middle-class and elite housing estates alongside new roadways. Wade’s efforts over the years even prompted some reporters to give him the nickname of ‘President-Architect’ or even ‘Pharaoh’ (Sarr 2013, p. 417). The president added to this popular imagining by mobilizing his 2007 presidential campaign behind a slogan -“Together, Let’s Continue to Build Senegal”- that rallied behind Senegal’s construction boom (Melly 2010, p. 41).

Yet as nearly each and every one of these large-scale construction projects were woven into Senegal’s urban fabric, they attracted widespread criticism from Senegal’s opposition parties and urban residents. Critiques of the Jaxaay project were thus complemented by a political scandal over the misappropriation of public funds for a large-scale infrastructural project undertaken by Wade’s Prime Minister in 2005. Public censure of the string of five-star hotels and other luxury buildings built along Dakar’s coast in anticipation of Senegal’s hosting the 2008 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC, which became the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 2011) also exemplified this increased political contention surround how public construction projects

Figure 7: Dakar’s new road infrastructure. (Source: APIX 2006)
unfolded during Wade’s tenure (Sy et. al. 2009). Near the end of Wade’s presidency, Wade’s son -who was charged with managing the construction of new roadways in Dakar and highways that led from Dakar to Senegal’s interior- also faced charges of money laundering and corruption.

Concerns over political corruption and land speculation also played out in the infrastructural and agricultural development projects implemented by a variety of central and local government actors in municipalities and rural communities. As I will describe in more detail in the following chapter, a key locally elected official in Sangalkam was arrested for allegedly partaking in illegal land sales, whereas local government officials in Pikine were censured by President Wade and the local population for taking part in shady land deals. Reports also indicate that local and central government officials -operating under the GOANA (Grand offensive agricole pour la nourriture et l’abondance, or Grand Agricultural Offensive for Food Security, an initiative created to boost agricultural production) allocated land used by rural, smallholder producers to Senegal’s political and religious elite (Kaag et. al. 2011). Residents in the rural community of Podor also demonstrated against land deals -arranged by rural council members and central government officials- that would have allocated 20,000 hectares to a combination of Senegalese and Italian investors. Wade’s regime only withdrew support for the project after local protests culminated in destruction of a public building, multiple injuries, and the deaths of three protestors (Diome 2014).

The examples that I’ve provided are just a few of the many land deals and public works projects that attracted criticism during Wade’s tenure as president. What is remarkable about these urban projects, however, is that they bear remarkable similarities to previous projects described earlier in this chapter. All of these projects involve the allocation of large tracts of land and the increased reliance on private individuals, housing developers, and contractors to build urban infrastructure. Yet while this privatization of Senegal’s housing sector has increased the rate at which new, formal housing is built in Senegal’s Dakar Region, it has also contributed to rising public frustration over the interlinked concerns of economic inequality, political corruption, and land speculation in Dakar. Opposition leaders and ordinary citizens are not only questioning -as they did, for example, during the Parcels Assainies project- which private actors benefitted -or lost- from land deals associated with large infrastructural and housing projects. Yet during Wade’s regime, these questions were also joined by new critiques, as Dakar residents asked: How were housing developers and private contractors chosen for projects? Were residents dispossessed of land used in these projects properly compensated? Journalists also increasingly pointed out how these new public-private partnerships provided new opportunities for money laundering and corrupt land governance.

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7 Senegal’s local press published a litany of articles that called attention to how construction on Dakar’s coast posed severe environmental and health risks. Construction along Dakar’s coast was also criticized by Senegal’s Architect Union, which detailed a variety of technical irregularities in construction projects contracted by the Senegalese government. This was complemented by claims that building contractors overcharged for the services and reports of contractors laundering money through proposed hotel and housing projects (Sy et. al. 2009). Lastly, President Wade was criticized for having his son -Karim Wade-manage the OIC construction along Dakar’s coast. In all, critics of Wade’s preparations for the OIC meeting were more impressed by the corruption surrounding the infrastructural projects than the meeting, roads, and housing developments themselves (‘Trouble at Home’ 2009).
During the 2012 presidential campaigns, these questions and concerns were especially crucial for many voters whose property had been targeted for expropriation (or whose property had already been expropriated). Macky Sall—who won the 2012 presidential election—responded to these concerns with a campaign platform that included calls to prosecute state actors who illicitly accumulated wealth during Wade’s regime. Sall also promised to conduct an audit of various contentious land transactions throughout Senegal. In fact, Sall began voicing concerns over contentious land deals in the Dakar Region on a campaign visit to Ouakam (a municipality located in the Dakar Region) on his second day on the campaign trail, where he argued that a national land audit was needed to shed light on how land was unjustly distributed throughout Senegal during Wade’s Regime (‘Macky a-t-il peur’ 2015).

In the wake of Sall’s election, many landowners who were threatened with eviction due to land deals brokered during Wade’s regime viewed the outcome of their ongoing land conflicts with guarded hope. When I visited farmers embedded in the Bertin land conflict in Bambilor after Sall was elected, they animately described watching housing developers withdraw bulldozers and other large construction machinery. Yet farmers—in both Bambilor and Pikine—were left waiting for word on Sall’s national land audit. As Sall’s presidency progressed, their optimistic hopes that Sall would resolve existing land conflicts gradually began to fade.

This was partly because after President Macky Sall was elected, his efforts to weed out governmental corruption largely centered around the prosecution of a few key political actors associated with Wade’s regime. These efforts were dominated by Sall’s formation of a special court—known as the CREI, or Court of Repression of Illicit Enrichment— that prosecuted politicians and individuals who were charged with having illicitly accumulated wealth during Wade’s regime. The most notable conviction made by this court was of Karim Wade, President Wade’s son, who was responsible for managing many of Senegal’s large public works projects (as described above). Karim Wade was officially charged with using his public office to acquire more than $230 million in illicit acquisitions (Ba 2015). A variety of evidence was brought against Karim Wade during his trial, including testimonies asserting that Karim Wade engaged in a variety of illicit land deals in Senegal’s Dakar Region. In their testimonies, witnesses argued that Karim Wade not only used state funds to purchase multiple properties in Dakar, but also drew from state funds to develop—and sell—commercial and residential buildings (Sy et al. 2009; ‘Bara Tall devant la CREI’ 2014).

While Sall focused on prosecuting members of Wade’s regime on counts of corruption and illicit acquisition of wealth, progress on Sall’s campaign promise to implement a national land audit was slow. This being said, my review of local newspaper articles indicates that land audits were started shortly after Sall was elected. Senegal’s local press reported that these audits were to provide detailed accounts of land transactions during Wade’s regime, paying particular attention to procedures used to allocate land and who benefited from land allocations. Reports indicate that audits were consequently undertaken to study land transactions surrounding Dakar’s airport, plots near Dakar’s Léopold Sédar Senghor stadium, and land included in the Bertin land conflict in Bambilor. President Sall also ordered an audit of land in the Niayes region—the 180km band of land amenable for agriculture that spans from Dakar to Saint-Louis—in part due to concerns...
voiced by the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Equipment that vast tracts of farmland in this zone were threatened by uncontrolled and rapid rates of urbanization.

Yet the local press has largely been silent on the outcomes of these audits. In my review of local newspaper articles, the only results I found from these audits was the arrest of the ex-sub-Prefect of Bambilor due to his alleged involvement in land sales (notably, these land sales were not connected to the Bertin conflict). None of the land conflicts Sall addressed in his campaign promises have resulted in arrests for corrupt government agents or efforts to return land to individuals who were illegally displaced. In the ‘Bertin’ Bambilor conflict, it even appears that Sall has sided with Wade’s regime: bulldozers have continued to raze tracts for new housing developments, and housing projects under construction before Sall took office are now complete. In fact, both the 2012 and the 2013 annual reports issued by the Senegal Housing Bank (BHS) highlight how housing built by a housing cooperative -and financed by BHS- on land included in the Bertin dispute served as a key example of a successful public-private housing partnership (Banque de l’Habitat du Sénégal 2012; Banque de l’Habitat du Sénégal 2013).

As such, popular protests over land rights and speculative land deals in the Dakar Region have continued to dominate Senegal’s local press throughout Sall’s presidency. For example, various civil rights groups criticized how Sall’s government authorized construction of the Turkish Embassy along Dakar’s coast despite opposition of Dakar’s city council; in a 2014 protest of this construction project 23 people were arrested (Saelens 2014). Recent headlines documenting the government’s destruction of 402 houses alongside Senegal’s national airport in Ouakam also highlights the ways in which Sall’s government is upholding land and housing regimes set in place during previous presidencies. Ouakam residents whose homes were bulldozed received no compensation from Sall’s government. Moreover, Ouakam residents were quick to point out how many housing plots that were untouched by bulldozers were housing plots that had been bought -and resold- by real estate developers involved in the Monument de la Renaissance scandal mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Many residents thus asked: why did the bulldozers target their homes and not the homes occupied by Senegal’s political, religious, and economic elite? And in response to the government’s assertions that the bulldozed homes were built too close to the airport, residents questioned the timing of their displacement. Ouakam residents were well aware that plans were underway to shut down and possibly redevelop Dakar’s airport. Displaced residents thus speculated that their homes were not torn down because of concerns over airport security but because Sall’s administration planned to use the land where their homes are situated for the construction of elite housing estates or other large-scale infrastructural projects (Brice 2015).

Thus while Sall promised to provide a comprehensive land audit and help Dakar residents resolve contentious land disputes during his presidential campaign, Sall’s presidency has also been marked by land scandals. Many long-standing conflicts still await resolution; those that have been resolved -for example, plots of farmland that were allocated to housing cooperatives in the Bambilor ‘Bertin’ conflict- have permanently dispossessed farmers in order to uphold Wade’s rulings. Sall’s housing regime has thus continued politics that favored Dakar’s middle-class and elite residents and permanently expropriated many low-income farmers land and dispossessed them from their livelihoods. Given evidence pointing towards the ways in which political elites in Sall’s administration are also profiting from shady land deals -one example being the conflict over

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land near Dakar’s airport in Ouakam, described above- points towards how Sall’s administration has in many ways continued the corrupt land politics that took shape during Wade’s regime, just as Wade’s presidency continued many of the corrupt practices established during earlier regimes. In this sense, both Wade and Sall’s regimes have relied on a housing infrastructure produced during Senegal’s entanglement with structural adjustment. This housing regime has advocated privatization of Senegal’s housing industry, which notably includes the recent surge of housing cooperatives, private housing developers, and new institutions -including local governments- that help individuals finance, plan, and build new housing estates.

Conclusion

Over the forty-five year period that I’ve covered in this chapter, land and housing prices in Dakar have continued to steadily increase. In the early 2000s, this growth was exponential. Land in downtown Dakar that would have cost between 400,000-500,000FCFA ($840-1,050 in 2010 dollars) per square meter before 2000 cost between 800,000-1,000,000FCFA ($1,650-2,100 in 2010 dollars) per square meter in 2010 (Diatta 2010). While prices for land in Dakar are much higher in downtown Dakar than in the neighborhoods surrounding downtown Dakar, all neighborhoods in Senegal’s Dakar Region have experienced similar -if not greater- increases in real estate prices. As such, the Senegal National Statistics Agency has estimated that property prices in the Dakar Region increased by around 256% between 1994 and 2010 (‘Senegal’s property boom’ 2014).

When I asked farmers in Bambilor about the going rate for land in 2011, I found that most farmers would frequently give me one of two prices. The first price -which was more than double what it had been when I was conducting fieldwork several years before- was the price they would sell it to someone who wanted to farm. The second price -which was up to five times higher than the price they quoted for farmland- was what they expected to be paid if the land was bought by housing developers and turned into a housing estate. Yet many farmers I spoke with argued that nowadays they’d only sell their farmland for the prices that housing developers paid. “We’re awake now,” one of my respondents argued, recognizing that the majority of Bambilor’s farmland would likely be transformed into housing in the next several decades.

This exponential increase in land prices and rapid proliferation of new housing estates has unfolded alongside considerable speculation about why land conflicts are so pervasive and prominent in Dakar. As mentioned in this chapter’s introduction, the popular press has consequently drawn attention to how recent high rates of urbanization have reconfigured Dakar’s housing market. Yet even the most cursory of analyses of historical statistics, housing policy reports, and scholarly articles sheds light on how rapid rates of urbanization in Senegal’s Dakar Region have long been associated with the growth of Dakar’s housing sector. Local and international press reporting on Dakar’s current housing boom also provide a host of other simplistic explanations to account for Dakar’s growing real estate market. This includes arguments that housing prices have sky-rocketed due to money laundering, or corruption during President Wade’s administration. While this chapter has hardly discounted these assertions, I

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8 For example, World Bank reports cite rapid rates of rural-urban migration as a key reason for financing the Parcelles Assainies housing project during the 1970s and early 1980s (World Bank 1972b).
have argued that they provide inadequate explanations for Dakar’s housing boom and the recent surge in land conflicts. In this sense, these arguments frequently ignore how multiple factors—for example, the privatization of Senegal’s housing sector, money laundering, rapid urbanization, and corruption—play into Dakar’s contentious land market.

The amalgamation of the arguments presented in this chapter thus reinforces my primary contention that there is no single dynamic that is responsible for the rapid growth in Dakar’s real estate market. Instead, my analysis sheds light on how the longstanding and gradual processes of privatizing Senegal’s public housing sector have unleashed—and enabled—a new housing agenda that prioritizes the rapid production of formal, planned housing estates. The Parcelles Assainies sites and services project thus served as a precursor for a variety of efforts that aimed at increasingly privatizing Senegal’s housing sector in the decades that followed. This included the development of new financial institutions to provide mortgages, public-private agencies that helped secure private land rights—despite claims that land titling initiatives were not on the policy agenda during this period—and develop land used in private housing estates. Measures were also undertaken to encourage a variety of public and private actors—such as housing cooperatives, local government officials, private housing developers—to develop and build new housing developments. In tracing this push towards privatization back to massive reconfigurations in Senegal’s political-economy—including the demise of the CCCE, increased role of World Bank funding, the devaluation of Senegal’s currency, and decentralization reforms—this chapter builds on Goldman’s (2011a, 2011b) account of ‘speculative urbanism’ by describing the historical trajectory of political and economic relationships and entanglements that have greatly contributed to contemporary efforts to develop Dakar’s peri-urban and rural land. At the same time, this chapter highlights how ‘speculative urbanism’ underway in Dakar’s housing sector depends less on municipal bonds or an IT industry—as Goldman describes in Bangalore—and more on a set of housing institutions and financial relations that were produced—and reproduced—by Senegalese government and World Bank officials over the last forty-five years.

This chapter has also focused on how much of the emphasis on privatizing Senegal’s public housing sector was prompted by concerns over the rapid growth of Dakar’s informal housing sector. Both the Senegalese government and international actors were worried about the rapid growth of unplanned neighborhoods without access to public services in Pikine, and these actors strategically situated formal housing estates in locations that would effectively cut-off the growth of informal housing settlements. Demand for housing among Dakar’s growing population was very high, and many of these new, formal housing developments became the home to middle-class populations. This underlines how efforts to privatize Dakar’s housing sector has not benefited all of Dakar’s residents; a variety of public and private actors have exploited this housing system in order to illicitly accumulate wealth. Public sentiment over who was able to benefit from efforts to privatize the public housing sector has, however, changed dramatically during Wade’s regime. I’ve argued that this shift resulted from a combination of factors, which include—but are not limited to—the privatized housing sector that Wade’s administration inherited, public outcry over the government’s management of flooded neighborhoods, and widespread concerns over corruption and the illicit accumulation of wealth by actors involved in large construction projects. Continued public protests over land administration in Sall’s regime also points to the long-standing legacy of corruption and privatization processes surrounding Dakar’s housing sector.
Chapter 2
Decentralization as Process

Introduction

After learning that President Wade intended to issue a presidential decree that would subdivide the rural community of Sangalkam and disband the region’s rural council, women in Sangalkam’s largest women’s association informed Wade’s administration and Senegalese presses that a group of women planned to collectively self-immolate if the President executed his plan (‘Contre le découpage’ 2011). The President of Sangalkam’s rural council also threatened to start a revolution against Wade and his regime (‘Nouveau découpage administratif’ 2011). Despite these threats, President Wade signed a presidential decree in April 2011 that set in motion plans to dissolve the rural community of Sangalkam. In its place, the decree created two new rural communities (the rural community of Bambilor -which is where the Bertin conflict I discuss throughout this dissertation is situated- and the rural community of Tivaouane Peuhl-Niaga) and two urban communes (Sangalkam and Jaxaay-Parcelles-Niakoul Rab). Locally elected officials were discharged from their governing positions, and local governments were administered by ‘special commissions’ -or délégations spéciales- comprised of bureaucrats appointed by Wade’s administration. Central government officials argued that these changes were necessary to improve governance in affected zones; villages subject to intense urbanization pressures were now categorized as urban communes rather than rural entities, and residents in all communities would profit from living closer -and thus having greater access- to local government headquarters and services.

Many residents took issue with this logic. Instead, they argued that the central government dismantled the rural community of Sangalkam’s government and isolated the village of Sangalkam from surrounding areas in order to cut off Oumar Gueye -who at that time was the President of Sangalkam’s rural council, a key politician in Senegal’s opposition, and resident in the village of Sangalkam- from his political base. Residents and politicians I spoke with also argued that central government actors undertook this project to gain control over and profit from land administrative duties and land speculation in affected zones. With this reasoning, residents opposed to government efforts that split up the rural community of Sangalkam and dismissed locally elected officials argued that the central government had orchestrated a localized coup d’état. Armed with machetes, youthful protesters mobilized against the central government’s efforts to appoint local government officials. Yet these protesters were outnumbered by armed gendarmes (state police) who ultimately shot and killed Malick Ba, a young bystander who had only ventured into Sangalkam streets during protests to buy medicine needed to treat his asthmatic child.

This conflict underscores how Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms -combined with a variety of other efforts to privatize construction of housing developments (Chapter 1), struggles over how to see and plan out efforts to develop the few remaining tracts of green space in the Dakar Region (which will be discussed in Chapter 3), and territorial alliances mobilized by farmer associations (which will be covered in Chapter 5)- have reconfigured local political life in the Dakar Region. As such, this chapter seeks to address how the political and economic forces structuring Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms have reshaped the administration of land rights and reconfigured relations between -and within- various levels of government and civil
society organizations. Specifically, I draw attention to how local government actors have increasingly started playing an important role in peri/urban land conflicts and the administration of land rights, building clientelist relations that strengthen -or confront- patronage networks managed by central government officials. Paying attention to those patronage networks headed by local government officials is important, in part because most research on clientelism in Senegal merely views local government actors as mediators between central government officials and local populations. In making these arguments, this chapter contributes to the small literature examining the decentralization of land administration in African contexts (Faye 2008; Lund 2008; Bruce and Knox 2009) by examining the extent to which political and economic forces structuring political decentralization reforms have reshaped the administration of African land rights and political relations. It also documents how land conflicts and struggles over patronage relations have ultimately led to the dispossession of many farmers and residents in peri/urban Senegal.

This chapter consequently begins with a brief review of political decentralization in Senegalese history, drawing attention to how Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms were implemented in response to the economic and political unrest that shaped Senegal’s landscape in the wake of structural adjustment policies. Moreover, I argue that examining Senegal’s decentralization reforms in historical perspective highlights how political decentralization reforms have not produced a single, discrete political outcome but have instead become embedded in ongoing struggles and political negotiations.

The following section advances this argument by focusing on how Senegal’s political decentralization reforms unfolded in the rural community of Sangalkam. It is important to emphasize here that I focus on how decentralization reforms unfolded in the rural community of Sangalkam prior to the 2011 decision that ultimately subdivided Sangalkam into several administrative districts (which includes the rural community of Bambilor, which is where the Bertin conflict I discuss in this dissertation is located). Specifically, I examine how local politicians in this zone have worked to create, join, and maintain territorial alliances that allow them to strengthen patronage networks and profit -both politically and economically- from Dakar’s dynamic real-estate market. The next section builds on this argument, examining how local and central government actors have increasingly engaged in struggles over who should control the patronage networks created by local government actors. By studying these struggles between local and central government actors, this section also pays attention to how many Senegalese clientelist networks are formed -and maintained- through political conflict and violence. As such, these sections describe how clientelist relations not only take on different forms under different political regimes, but also argue against common assumptions that undergird our understanding of how clientelist relations function.

The subsequent section draws on evidence from local governments’ involvement in -and efforts to mediate- land conflicts over the development of new housing estates in West Pikine and on land in the disputed Bertin Zone. Specifically, I examine the extent to which local governments are -or aren’t- accountable to central government authorities and local residents when administering land rights and mediating land conflicts. I argue that while local populations are often able to hold government actors involved in shady housing deals partly accountable for their actions, many farmers and residents are still being forced to relinquish their land rights. In
drawing attention to the extent to which local governments are held accountable to central
government authorities, this chapter concludes by questioning decentralization narratives that
imply local governments’ powers and authorities have been uniformly captured and recentralized
by central government authorities.

Political Decentralization in Historical Perspective

Political decentralization has long been a centerpiece of Senegal’s political landscape. Efforts
to build and reinforce powers held by local governments in Senegal date back to colonialism,
when French authorities created the municipalities of Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque, and Dakar
(Ba 2007; Faye 2008). Decentralization policies were also a crucial part of Mamadou Dia’s failed
efforts to galvanize Senegal’s cooperative movement shortly after independence (Schumacher
1975; Gellar et. al. 1980; Diop 2013). In 1972 and 1990, political decentralization reforms also
reemerged at the center of Senegalese policy reforms. These reforms decentralized local
administrative structures -effectively creating rural councils and reconfiguring how municipalities
were governed and financed- in order to promote local development initiatives (Vengroff and
Johnston 1989; Faye 2008). As such, Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms were framed by
previous efforts to decentralize Senegal’s government.

At the same time, it is important to recognize how the 1996 political decentralization reforms
also emerged from major transformations in Senegal’s political and economic landscape during
President Diouf’s regime. President Diouf officially became president in 1981, when President
Senghor decided to resign from office and transfer his presidential powers to Diouf. Shortly after
assuming his role as president, Diouf lifted restrictions on the number of political parties allowed
to participate in Senegalese politics. Fatton (1987) describes how this decision to encourage multi-
party politics in Senegal was a critical strategic move. Public discontent -most notably manifest in
the malaise paysan and a series of strikes and violent confrontations in 1968- remained high when
Diouf was named as Senghor’s successor. Yet by accepting opposition leaders’ demands for
unlimited pluralism, Diouf neutralized opposition parties. Fatton describes that this was because
opposition parties were unable to coalesce behind a single candidate in the 1983 presidential
elections. Diouf consequently won the 1983 elections by a landslide, garnering 83 percent of the
popular vote.

Yet the political maneuverings behind the passive revolution Fatton describes only provided a
temporary fix to the problems facing Diouf’s regime. As the structural adjustment and economic
stabilization reforms (described in greater detail in Chapter 1) unfolded during the 1980s,
political contention over Diouf’s presidency and Senegal’s faltering economy grew considerably.
Political struggles within and between factions in the Parti Socialiste (PS, Senegal’s dominant
political party) increasingly convinced many political leaders to join, create and/or support
opposition parties (Diaw and Diouf 1998). The 1980s also saw the proliferation of urban civil
society organizations -including a variety of trade unions, student activists, and human rights
groups- that became central to opposition politics. These groups were especially prominent in
mobilizations against structural adjustment reforms and Diouf’s presidency (Young and Kante
1991; Diouf 1996; Diaw and Diouf 1998; Diop 2013a).
Senegalese central government officials responded to ongoing political unrest during Diouf’s presidency through several measures. The Diouf government passed several constitutional reforms that addressed critiques levied by opposition leaders. Diouf also formed a ‘government of national unity’ in 1991 that provided opposition leaders with key ministerial posts (Galvan 2001). After Diouf won the 1993 presidential elections, Diouf once again worked to stymie political discontent by appointing key opposition politicians to high-level government positions (Schaffer 2000). This was later complemented by legislation that President Diouf’s regime enacted in 1996 that reworked how local governments were organized and financed. As outlined in Chapter 1, these decentralization reforms transferred administration of nine different government functions, which included land administration, urbanism and housing, and the management and protection of the environment, among other sectors.

Senegal was not alone in establishing political decentralization reforms in the 1990s. During this period, a variety of development actors - in which the World Bank played a central role - argued that democratic decentralization would increase governmental efficiency, service delivery, and political participation while also reducing poverty and rendering government officials more accountable to local populations (Blair 2000; Heller 2001; Ribot 2002). In Senegal, scholars have also argued that Abdou Diouf and the Parti Socialiste undertook political decentralization reforms in order to strengthen clientelist networks that had weakened during structural adjustment. For instance, decentralization reforms created many new posts for elected officials; in the 1996 local elections the PS won 300 (out of 320) rural council seats and 56 (out of 60) mayoral offices (Beck 2008). The election of PS actors to decentralized positions thus placated many PS allies in rural and urban areas (Dickovick 2005). Similarly, Boone (2003) notes how Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms helped retain patronage relations between central government actors and local elites in Senegal’s groundnut basin. Many of these local elites had lost control over the distribution of seeds and other government subsidies during structural adjustment. Yet after they were elected to local government positions, these same elites were able to assume control over the resources distributed by rural councils. Furthermore, the decision to divide urban areas into communes d’arrondissement in Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms was also intended to decrease political powers that opposition parties could gain in urban centers (Vengroff and Ndiaye 1998). As such, Senegal’s decentralization reforms were undertaken to shore up political support for Senegal’s dominant political party.

Despite these efforts, the PS was increasingly unable to fully rely on Senegalese patronage networks to win the 2000 presidential elections (Beck 2002; Dahou and Foucher 2009). Most notably, Galvan (2001) describes how Diouf’s refusal to retire from politics created “patronage compression” within the PS, which ultimately led several high-level politicians to break from the PS in order to campaign against Diouf in the 2000 elections. Wade also capitalized on widespread political unrest in urban centers by tailoring his campaign platform - which focused on decreasing unemployment and improving the urban water supply - to promise new clientelist relations with urban youths (Galvan 2001; Resnick 2013). This campaign strategy proved effective in Dakar, where Wade captured 76 percent of the vote (Resnick 2014). Moreover, this was the first election where opposition parties were able overcome what Diaw and Diouf (1998, p. 135) describe as a “history of splits, excommunications, and denunciations” to effectively form a coalition that opposed Diouf’s candidacy. All of Senegal’s opposition parties - with one exception - united behind Wade and his political party - the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais, or PDS-
During the second round of voting, which effectively helped Wade secure a majority of the popular vote (Galvin 2001; Gellar 2005). Yet when Wade assumed office, PS actors still controlled the bulk of decentralized posts in urban and rural communities. Wade’s administration and the PDS thus began working to consolidate political support from politicians holding posts in local governments. One key way that the PDS gained support in *communes* and rural communities was by usurping many of the territorialized patronage networks that had been managed by PS leaders. Wade’s did this by delaying local elections until after locally elected officials’ terms for decentralized posts had expired. Delaying local elections allowed Wade’s administration to dismiss locally elected PS authorities after their terms had expired, replacing them with special commissions -or *délégations spéciales* - composed primarily of PDS actors (Fall 2009; Resnick 2014). As incumbents, PDS officials who were appointed as part of special commissions gained an advantage over their PS counterparts in the 2002 local elections. In fact, the PDS and its coalition partners captured two-thirds of Senegal’s rural and municipal councils in the 2002 elections (Resnick 2014). Thus by 2002, the PDS was the dominant political party in most urban and rural sectors.

Yet in 2005, Senegal’s political situation once again underwent dramatic changes. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Wade’s regime was increasingly criticized over how it responded to flooding in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Conflict within the PDS also became increasingly prominent when Idrissa Seck, who served as the country’s Prime Minister and the mayor for the *commune* Thies (Seck’s hometown), was released from his position as Prime Minister and charged with corruptly managing government funds that were used to construct large-scale infrastructural improvements in Thies. Many political commentators have argued that Seck was publicly censured in part because he used this project to shore up political support to better situate himself as Wade’s successor. Diop (2013a, p. 80) thus describes how those close to President Wade “had no difficulties representing [Seck] as a ‘man in a hurry’ who was determined eventually to ‘murder’ his father [President Wade].” In this sense, Wade’s administration was increasingly concerned that Seck was gaining too much authority in the PDS and building patronage networks -in part, through infrastructural projects- that could eventually undermine President Wade’s authority.

After he was dismissed from the PDS, Seck founded a new political party -Rewmi- that was largely populated by politicians who defected from the PDS. Yet the dismissal of Seck was hardly the only example of struggles in the PDS. Wade appointed -and replaced- six different Prime Ministers during his regime (2000-2012) (Diop 2013b). This included Moustapha Niasse, who

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9 In order to win presidential elections in Senegal, candidates are required to secure more than 50% of the popular vote. In the presidential elections held in 1983, 1988, and 1993 Diouf obtained more than 50% of the popular vote in the first round of elections. However, Diouf only received 41% of the vote (compared to Wade’s 31%) in the first round of the 2000 presidential elections. Wade and the PDS formed coalitions with several opposition parties that were not participating in the second round of the 2000 elections, which helped him effectively capture 58% of the popular vote in the second round of the 2000 presidential elections (Galvan 2001).

10 As many scholars have pointed out, infrastructural projects are frequently a key means of strengthening patron-client relationships in Senegal (Tall 2005; Magrin 2007).
formed a new party and competed against Wade in the 2007 and 2012 presidential elections. Macky Sall, who ultimately won Senegal’s 2012 presidential elections, also formed a new party, L’Alliance pour la Republique (APR), after he was dismissed from his post as Prime Minister. It is important to note that both Seck and Sall were able to build support for their respective opposition parties while also serving as the mayors for the decentralized governments in their respective hometowns. In this sense, decentralized government outposts increasingly served as a political home for Senegal’s opposition leaders, who referred to the regions and communes they governed as their political fiefdoms.

By examining Senegal’s decentralization reforms in historical perspective, this section has drawn attention to how Diouf and Wade have drawn on decentralization reforms to build patronage networks and shore up political support. By examining how Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms at different historical moments—and thus different political-economic contexts—have produced different political outcomes, this section underscores how Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms have not produced any single, discrete political outcome. Instead, this section has emphasized political decentralization as an ongoing process that is at the center of political strategy, conflict, and negotiation.

The next section examines these struggles over political decentralization in more detail, focusing on how decentralization processes unfolded in the rural community of Sangalkam during Wade’s regime. Specifically, I focus on how Sangalkam’s decentralized local government reconfigured patronage networks through its work administering formal land rights and mediating land conflicts. By focusing on the local politics of land administration in the rapidly urbanizing rural community of Sangalkam, my research counters traditional readings of patronage that largely focus on central government officials and religious leaders as Senegal’s principal patrons and view local politicians merely as intermediaries between local and central state actors. Instead, the following section describes how one key local politician worked to build up a political base and patronage relations that frequently ran up against political patronage networks organized by central state actors.

Local Patrons

At the outset of Wade’s presidency, Sangalkam’s local government was aligned with the PDS and President Wade’s political regime. Sangalkam’s local government was dominated by PDS actors and forged strong ties with Idrissa Seck—the Prime Minister that Wade dismissed under charges of corruptly managing funds used to improve public infrastructure in Thies, as described above—when he served as Prime Minister. Because of these ties, it would hardly be an understatement to argue that Sangalkam’s relations with the PDS and Wade’s administration changed dramatically after Wade dismissed Seck from his role as Senegal’s Prime Minister.

Most notably, most of Sangalkam’s prominent local politicians defected from the PDS and joined Rewmi, the political party that Seck founded. Sangalkam’s rural council was thus no longer dominated by local PDS actors and was largely cut off from PDS patronage networks. This change was largely influenced by the president of Sangalkam’s rural council—Oumar Gueye—who held a longstanding political alliance and personal friendship with Seck. In many ways, Gueye served as Seck’s right-hand man. Gueye not only helped file the paperwork that
created Rewmi, but it has also been argued that Gueye provided vital evidence in his testimony before Senegal’s Criminal Investigation Division that helped secure Seck’s release from prison and the judiciary’s decision to suspend the corruption charges against Seck when he was accused of corruptly mismanaging infrastructural projects in Thies, as described earlier (‘Oumar Guèye, bénéficiaire’ 2013).

Gueye was also able to convince other rural council members -and in turn, his constituents- to maintain ties with Seck and defect to Rewmi because of his longstanding efforts to forge new clientelist relations in his community after Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms. Specifically, Gueye strengthened his relations with his constituents and fellow politicians through a variety of land deals and land transactions. For example, Sangalkam’s rural council under Gueye’s administration saw a dramatic increase in revenues collected from a mapping tax, which was paid by each individual who applied for formal use rights from the rural council. For example, mapping taxes in 2000 were expected to generate 20,000,000FCFA (or 33 percent of total revenues); by 2007, the same taxes were projected to generate 750,000,000FCFA (or 59 percent of total revenue). At the same time, both the head tax and state allocated funds decreased as a percentage of total budgeted revenue. Thus while head taxes generated roughly the same revenue as mapping taxes levied in 2000 (roughly 31 percent), they only represented a mere 1 percent of budgeted revenue in 2004 (the same year that mapping taxes generated 22 percent of budgeted revenue). By 2009, mapping taxes were projected to comprise 43 percent of the rural council’s budget compared to the 1 percent generated by state allocated funds and head taxes combined.

In this sense, revenues collected from mapping taxes in Senegal provided the lion’s share of revenues received by the local council, vastly exceeding funds allocated from the central government (known as fonds de dotation) and other sources of tax revenues. Moreover, revenues generated from these taxes helped Oumar Gueye and Sangalkam’s rural council finance many public services and development projects. This focus on developing Sangalkam helped Gueye build -and maintain- a strong political base and clientele in Sangalkam. When interviewed, Gueye’s supporters frequently related that they voted for him because of his investments in public schools, health care, or efforts developing markets in some of Sangalkam’s more rural villages.

Gueye also relied on the construction of new housing developments to reinforce his political base in Sangalkam. During his tenure, Gueye’s administration spearheaded a variety of land deals that transformed farmland into new housing estates. In many of these land deals, the original land user was provided with half of the serviced plots that were produced for the new housing estate. Local government officials I spoke with explained that members from the rural council and a village chief (whose jurisdiction overlapped with the new housing estate) would decide how to divide the remaining plots. After determining which plots they would provide to housing developers to defray costs related to developing the land, the traditional authorities and government officials I spoke with noted that remaining plots -which several local government officials estimated comprised around 35% of the housing plots- were usually provided to youth, unmarried/widowed women with dependents, and Sangalkam’s low-income populations.

Yet when I spoke with Gueye’s political opponents, they repeatedly denied these claims. Instead, they argued that serviced plots in these new housing estates were only given to Gueye’s
most vocal political supporters (known as militants). Rumors also circulated that Gueye’s administration sold -rather than gifted- housing plots, using revenues from such land deals to finance local and national political campaigns. While I was unable to fully confirm or deny these rumors during my research, their very existence speaks to how PDS and PS members who lived in Sangalkam understood the local government’s involvement in building new housing estates as a driving force in local patronage networks.

Sangalkam’s local government also worked to increase their territorial authority in their community by mediating local land conflicts. During interviews I held with local politicians who held seats in Sangalkam’s local council before the rural community was dissolved in 2011, several elected officials described to me how the majority of land conflicts that the rural government mediated concerned small tracts of land claimed by two parties. Moreover, council members described how they had established a land commission, which was comprised of elected council members whose primary jobs were to review all applications for formal use rights and adjudicate land disputes in Sangalkam. Commission members I spoke with thus described how the bulk of the land disputes brought before the land commission took place on nationalized land -which is typically administered by local governments, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4- and were settled after commission members reviewed local maps and formal use rights paperwork for the disputed plot. For example, if two individuals claimed a land plot but only one of the individuals had obtained formal use rights, commission members insisted that they would settle the dispute in favor of the individual who had sought out and obtained formal use rights to the disputed plot. In disputes where both individuals had obtained formal use rights to the same plot of land, the land commission would rule in favor of the individual who first obtained a formal use right paper for the disputed plot. Sangalkam’s land registration system thus helped commission members determine which disputant held formal use rights to land under dispute. In fact, land disputes on land that is typically administered by local governments were only brought before Senegal’s centralized judiciary -rather than local land commissions- in the rare instances when one of the parties involved in the land conflict did not accept the solution provided by Sangalkam’s land commission.

Yet Sangalkam’s land commission did not follow these same procedures when it attempted to help mediate the Bertin dispute when the conflict re-emerged in 2011. This was because the land claimed by Bertin’s descendants was formally registered as private freehold property (which is managed by central government authorities) rather than being registered as formal use rights (which are administered by local governments). As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, many local residents argued that this title was obtained fraudulently; others questioned whether the TFInv1975/R land title even existed. Concerns over the legality of this title were compounded by the fact that Sangalkam’s rural council provided many farmers with claims to land in the disputed zone with formal use rights during the 1980s.

However, while Sangalkam’s rural council in the 1980s denied General Bertin’s -and his descendants’- land claims, the same cannot be said for Oumar Gueye and Sangalkam’s rural council in 2011. Instead, Oumar Gueye initially attempted to mediate the land conflict by convening a meeting with the village chiefs who governed villages included in the land conflict. During this meeting, Gueye proposed to write a letter to President Abdoulaye Wade that would be signed by the village chiefs in each of the affected communities. Specifically, Gueye argued
that the letter should ask the government to provide affected residents with part of the disputed land if farmers and residents agreed to formally cede their land rights. Gueye also wanted to request that the central government set aside land surrounding the affected villages; Sangalkam’s rural council would help organize -with housing developers and local populations- to ‘extend’ the villages, thereby providing affected villages and displaced farmers with additional housing plots. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the village chiefs for the villages affected by the Bertin conflict -and their respective local populations- refused to support this plan and Sangalkam’s rural council’s efforts to build new patron-client relations. One rural council member I spoke with -who was also part of Rewmi- characterized this plan as “insane,” arguing that “you don’t ask someone to give you part of the boubou [traditional Senegalese clothes, worn by men] that you are already wearing.”

Gueye’s attempts to form an alliance with Wade’s administration, Sangalkam’s local government, local traditional authorities and the farmers and residents affected by the Bertin conflict is perhaps somewhat surprising given Gueye’s -and the local government’s- longstanding alliance with Rewmi and opposition politics. The next section examines in more detail why Sangalkam’s local government would have attempted to mediate the Bertin land conflict by crafting this new alliance with central government officials. Specifically, I draw attention to how the decentralization of land administration responsibilities and the creation of new patronage networks -as described in this section- have produced new conflicts between local and central government officials. In reading these conflicts over decentralization processes, my focus on struggles between local and central government officials over who should control patronage networks associated with urban land governance builds on traditional readings of patronage that ignore the presence of struggle and violence in clientelist networks.

Conflict in and among Patronage Networks

In the wake of Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms, Sangalkam’s local government undertook significant governing responsibilities in relation to land administration. In conjunction with efforts to provide residents with formal use rights for landholdings, the local government levied mapping taxes that significantly decreased the community’s reliance on funds allocated from central government sources. The local government also became increasingly involved in the mediation of land disputes and the construction of new housing estates. While undertaking these new land governance activities, Sangalkam’s political leaders followed Idrissa Seck when he defected from the PDS and started his own political party. This political shift dramatically reconfigured the cartography of patronage networks in Senegal’s Dakar Region, as revenues from mapping taxes and new housing estates were increasingly used to shore up political support for Rewmi, one of Senegal’s main opposition parties.

In response to the stronghold that Oumar Gueye -and by extension, Idrissa Seck- held over Sangalkam, Wade’s administration attempted to destabilize Oumar Gueye’s regime on numerous occasions by enacting localized coup d’êtats. The first of these coup d’êtats was undertaken in 2008, not long after Gueye publicly supported Idrissa Seck’s failed 2007 presidential campaign. Oumar Gueye was arrested -and quickly released- on charges of illicit land deals and land speculation. Shortly after Gueye’s arrest, Wade’s administration appointed a ‘special commission’ -or délégation spéciale- of PDS bureaucrats who took over governing responsibilities of Sangalkam’s decentralized government. While most of the opposition politicians who were displaced by this
commission won back their seats in the 2009 local elections, Sangalkam residents who were loyal to Gueye—and by extension, Rewmi—argued that in the short period that the special commission was in power its leaders illegally expropriated land from many farmers and sold off large chunks of land in Sangalkam to housing developers.\(^\text{11}\)

After regaining their seats, many council members I spoke with argued that they attempted to cultivate a more conciliatory relationship with central government officials over land governance issues. In part, this was because local government officials were concerned that central government officials would once again dissolve Sangalkam’s rural government if local politicians publicly protested central state efforts to expropriate land in Sangalkam for large-scale housing projects supported by the central state. For example, several council members that I spoke with argued that Oumar Gueye’s decision to recognize General Bertin’s land claims was a direct response to rumors that the Ministry of Decentralization was planning to dissolve Sangalkam’s local government and split the rural community into several new administrative districts. Faced with these rumors, Gueye sought to create a new coalition between central government actors and the communities threatened with displacement that would not only resolve the Bertin conflict but improve relations between central and local government actors.\(^\text{12}\)

After local communities rejected Oumar Gueye’s efforts to mediate the Bertin conflict, local and central government actors were unable to form any sort of alliance to resolve the Bertin conflict. Moreover, several months after Oumar Gueye’s failed attempts to mediate the Bertin dispute the rural community of Sangalkam was dissolved and locally elected council members were replaced by a special commission. This second special commission was installed in May 2011, and was accompanied by violent protests, as described in this chapter’s introduction. Just as in the previous special commission, Gueye and other locally elected council members were replaced by PDS actors appointed by Wade’s administration. Equally—if not more—important, the act of subdividing the rural community of Sangalkam into several rural communities and communes effectively cut Oumar Gueye’s political fiefdom—and clientelist networks—into pieces.

This breakdown in patronage networks stemmed from the decision to create two new rural communities (the rural community of Bambilor and the rural community of Tivaouane Peuhl-Niaga) and two new communes (the commune of Sangalkam and the commune of Jaxaay-Parcelles-Niakoul Rab) from what had been the rural community of Sangalkam. This subdivision of the

\(^{11}\) This assertion was frequently repeated to me by opposition party members during my fieldwork. However, more research is needed to ascertain whether farmers were indeed displaced or if these claims were political hyperbole.

\(^{12}\) In their efforts to make this alliance, local government actors not only demonstrated that local government actors recognized the central government’s powers over the administration of land registered under private title in their community, but also showed that they respected the patron-client relations that central government actors were producing—or maintaining—through land deals on privatized land. As mentioned previously, many high-level religious and government actors obtained large tracts of land in the Bertin zone from central government authorities for prices that were significantly lower than the market value for land. In this sense, rural government actors promises to provide displaced residents with housing plots in the zone represented the rural council’s efforts to integrate the local government and local populations within the central state’s patron-client networks.
rural community of Sangalkam effectively isolated the commune of Sangalkam from much of the political and economic rents associated with land speculation in the region. This was because most of the new middle-class and elite housing developments under construction in the outskirts of Dakar were situated outside of the commune of Sangalkam’s boundaries. Thus when Oumar Gueye was elected as the commune of Sangalkam’s mayor in the 2014 local elections, he was governing a community that no longer benefited from the relative financial security produced through mapping taxes. Given that the commune of Sangalkam had comparatively fewer tracts of farmland that would be suitable for the construction of new housing estates, Gueye was also unable to profit from the political and economic rents associated with the construction of new housing estates.

It is in this context, then, that we must read Gueye’s decision to break ties with Idrissa Seck -and Rewmi- and work with President Sall when he took office in 2012. Of course, when Gueye was first appointed to a ministerial post in Sall’s government, political analysts assumed that Gueye -and Rewmi- were being compensated for their support of Sall in the second round of the 2012 presidential elections. Sall’s ministerial cabinet was comprised of many other leaders and members of opposition parties that had formed a coalition in the second round of voting to secure Sall -rather than Wade- with a majority of the popular vote. Yet when Idrissa Seck began to criticize Sall’s government in 2013, Gueye officially left Rewmi and joined President Sall’s party, APR. Gueye has since been appointed to several other ministerial posts -serving as Minister of Air Transportation and Tourism and more recently as Minister of Fisheries and the Maritime Economy- and was also elected as the Mayor of the commune of Sangalkam in 2014. As such, despite the continuous reconfiguration of local patronage networks in the administrative zone that had once constituted the rural community of Sangalkam, Oumar Gueye was able to form new, secure alliances that in turn helped him serve his political base in the commune of Sangalkam after Sall became president.13

This continuous reconfiguration of local patronage networks informs our current understandings of how patronage networks function in Senegal. Local political actors are thus not only working to build new networks -as described in the previous section- but to maintain control over their existing patronage networks. In order to maintain control over patronage networks, Sangalkam leaders have at times created new networks and alliances with central government authorities. Yet this section has also documented several key moments when local actors have not created alliances with central government actors, as occurred in the rural community of Sangalkam not long before the 2012 presidential elections. Instead, local actors involved in the Bertin dispute created and maintained their own patronage networks that directly competed with patronage networks organized by central state actors. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, local political leaders and farmers involved in the Bertin conflict campaigned on behalf of Macky Sall in the presidential elections that took place immediately after the rural community of Sangalkam was dissolved. In doing this, farmers described to me how they were working to create new relations with Sall in hopes that Sall’s regime would reverse decisions that

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13 After Sall became president, Sall’s government also replaced the political actors in the special commissions that Wade had instituted in Bambilor, Tivaouane Peuhl-Niaga, Bambilor and Jaxay-Parcelles-Niaouli Rab with political actors that once served under Gueye in Sangalkam’s rural community government.
Wade’s administration had made regarding the Bertin conflict. Moments such as these reflect instances when decentralized local government actors -in alliance with local populations- and central government officials struggle over who should control the patronage networks that most profit from the shifts in political and economic forces shaping the decentralization of land administration responsibilities in Senegal. Conflicts are thus centered around which government officials, political parties, and/or local actors should profit from Sangalkam’s dynamic real-estate market.

Conflict between local and central government officials thus plays a pivotal role in Senegal’s patronage networks. Disagreements over which political party should control patronage networks and land administration duties in Senegal has led to numerous protests and violent confrontations between central government actors and Sangalkam’s local population. As described in this chapter’s introduction, local protests over the dissolution of Sangalkam’s rural council and the subdivision of the rural community in Sangalkam ended in the fatal shooting of a local bystander, Malick Ba. While the Senegalese state police justified the use of force against protesters because of the “aggression” and “determination” manifest by youthful protesters (Assasinat de Malick Ba’ 2011), the opposition press described Ba’s death as a political assassination, questioning whether Senegal was governed by laws or police force. For example, Idrissa Seck -and by extension, Rewmi- blamed Abdoulaye Wade’s administration for Ba’s death, arguing that Malick Ba was just one of many “innocent citizens” that had been “savagely assassinated” since Wade was elected president (Diedhiou 2011).

Yet this was hardly the only example of how violence -or threats of violence- have reshaped who controls patronage networks and how local land rights are managed. Not long after the 2011 protests that resulted in Malick Ba’s death, Senegal’s state police and military rolled into the village of Bambilor in order to protect the bulldozers destroying the houses and fields located on land in the Bertin zone that had been allocated to a housing cooperative -COMICO- which is run by employees in Senegal’s military. Protesters described how their fields and houses were under a militarized ‘state of siege’ (état de siège). Police and military cordoned off much of the land that was to be expropriated and forbid farmers and residents from accessing their land. One farmer even explained to me how he waited in his plot with a loaded gun when state police and the military were cordoning off land to be expropriated. This farmer claimed that he was prepared to sacrifice his life to defend his land rights from being expropriated. Fortunately, housing developers did not claim rights to this farmer’s tract, and stopped bulldozing just short of his multi-storied house, vegetable crops, and poultry farm houses. Many other farmers, however, lost their landholdings and property in the urban land grab undertaken by COMICO. Coercion and threats of violence are thus central to the development of new housing estates and the maintenance of clientelism in Senegal. Recognizing -rather than downplaying- this conflict and coercion is especially important given that much of the literature on clientelism understands patronage relations in terms of reciprocity and non-coercive behavior (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1981; Fox 1994; Beck 2008).

Examining Gueye’s efforts to create -and reconfigure- patronage networks in the rural community of Sangalkam prior to its dissolution also speaks to moments in the region’s history when the political-economic forces structuring Senegal’s decentralization reforms produced governing relations that cannot be characterized by ‘top-down’ governing controlled primarily by
central government actors. The next section builds upon this argument, drawing from research in both Pikine and the rural community of Sangalkam to argue against a body of literature on political decentralization that describes how decentralization outcomes in Senegal have at best ‘recentralized’ government powers and authority that were supposed to be decentralized (Ribot et al. 2006). In doing this, I also consider questions of governmental accountability in greater detail, examining the extent to which local government actors are -and aren’t- accountable to central government officials and/or local actors when administering land rights, building new housing estates, and mediating land disputes.

**Accountability**

When decentralization reforms were implemented throughout the developing world in the late 1990s, a central component motivating these reforms was the notion that decentralized governments would be more responsive to residents needs and improve service delivery because local government actors would undertake governing projects that increased popular participation while also decreasing inequality (Blair 2000). Advocates for political decentralization thus assumed that local government would be increasingly accountable to the citizens and residents in their communities.

Yet a significant body of research on decentralization reforms in Senegal have questioned the extent to which local residents have been able to participate and benefit from the 1996 decentralization reforms. For example, Bandiaky (2008) described how decentralization reforms in one community reinforced powers held by traditional leaders. These traditional leaders were not held accountable to local residents; moreover, Bandiaky also argued that decentralization reforms also exacerbated local gendered cleavages and inequality.

A body of scholarship on decentralization has also examined how central authorities have recaptured powers that were decentralized to local authorities during decentralization reforms undertaken in the 1990s (Wunsch 2001; Awortwi 2010; Dickovick 2011). Scholars argue that this has rendered local authorities more accountable to central government government officials than local residents. For example, research that examines how decentralized authorities manage forests in Senegal’s Tambacounda Region describes how central government officials effectively control all commercial forestry decisions even though Senegal’s decentralization laws also allow local actors to undertake commercial exploitation of local forests (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Ribot 2009). In this sense, facets of government that were officially decentralized to increase local participation and control over forestry decisions were de facto ‘recentralized’ (Ribot et al. 2006) and controlled by central government -rather than local government- authorities.

Yet evidence from Pikine contradicts arguments that local governments are unequivocally accountable to central government officials. If anything, the decentralization of land administration duties in Pikine during Wade’s regime led to increased tensions and political infighting in the PDS (which was Senegal’s dominant political party when Wade served as president). One key example of land administration duties producing new struggles in the PDS began in 2006 when the district mayor of West Pikine -who was part of the PDS- started work on a project that ultimately converted eight hectares of farmland in his district into a new middle-class and elite housing project. Land for the new housing project was situated in the long-term
lease that had been provided to REPROH, the agribusiness firm that originally tried to displace farmers in the late 1990s. Local bureaucrats in Pikine informed me that the district mayor signed a *protocole d’accorde* (similar to a memorandum of understanding) with REPROH to gain access to their land claims. The district mayor also began to organize a series of secretive meetings with bureaucrats in the Ministry of Land and Taxes and the Ministry of Urbanism, private land developers, and select landowners to develop the disputed terrain.

These alliances were forged in secret because the district mayor planned to forego Pikine’s quota system (as described in Chapter 1), which would ensure that all land users with autochthonous claims -or who had bought or been gifted land from individuals and families with autochthonous claims- who had agreed to sell their land and would be compensated with 65% of serviced plots from the housing project. Instead, the district mayor attempted to take more than his allowed quota of housing plots by providing an inadequate number of housing plots as compensation to landowners whose plots had been expropriated. He also attempted to avoid providing housing plots to various governmental actors -as per quota requirements- by providing housing plots directly to government actors-in the Ministry of Urbanism, the Ministry of Land and Taxes, and various police forces- who helped secure necessary paperwork and provide coercive force to dispossess landowners resistant to the housing project. The alliance created by Pikine’s district mayor was thus formed with the expectation that they would not be held accountable -by central government officials or Pikine’s farming population- to Pikine’s quota system.

Yet in the end, key members of this alliance were somewhat held accountable for their shady land deal by local residents, other decentralized actors and central government officials. This occurred in part because farmers who had not been co-opted by the district mayor’s territorial alliance resisted the new housing project by creating a new farmers’ association. As will be described in more detail in Chapter 5, farmers formed this new association because the West Pikine farmer association folded after the leader and key members decided to sign away their land claims in exchange for housing plots in the new housing development. Members of the new association stood in front of bulldozers, filed complaints in court, voiced their concerns over the radio, and knocked on the doors of powerful politicians who had the ear of President Wade. Specifically, farmers involved in these mobilization efforts described how they wanted President Wade to dismantle the patronage network established by the district mayor and his housing alliance. When Wade sent a special commission to investigate farmers’ complaints and involved Pikine’s city-wide mayor -who was also part of the PDS- in the conflict, it appeared to farmers that their mobilization strategy was working. However, it is worth noting that these negotiations were unable to stop the housing project or fully hold the district mayor accountable to local populations, and farmers in West Pikine were ultimately displaced from their land. Pikine’s city-wide mayor ultimately was only able to help negotiate compensation for disgruntled farmers, providing them with serviced plots in another housing subdivision in Pikine’s peri-urban fringes.

This final reconfiguration of territorial alliances -in which West Pikine farmers formed an alliance with President Wade and Pikine’s city-wide mayor- ultimately proved problematic for West Pikine’s district mayor. While the housing estate was eventually built, the number of housing plots he had promised exceeded the number of plots created. One of the leaders in West Pikine’s defunct farmers association thus recalled a grim conversation when the district mayor
informed him that he would only be receiving three -instead of eight- housing plots in exchange for his land and the work he undertook to convince many other Pikine farmers to relinquish their land claims. When describing this conversation, the ex-leader of West Pikine’s farmer association noted how the district mayor remarked how he had really helped advance the housing project, but that the mayor was overwhelmed with requests for housing plots by the prefect, district mayors, and ministers who had heard about the housing project in this sector. Various individuals who had bought land at the project’s conception also took the district mayor to court when they didn’t receive the plots they were promised. Finally, the youth football team was also upset when land for the field they had been promised was instead divvied into housing plots.

These and various other actors upset about how land for the housing project was distributed complained vociferously during the 2008 local elections. Moreover, various political actors I spoke with insisted that Wade and the PDS refused to provide any financial support for the district mayor’s campaign in this election because of how the West Pikine housing project unfolded. Many residents consequently argue that the district mayor’s -and to some extent the city mayor’s- failed re-election bid was thus due to public discontent over their involvement in the West Pikine housing project.

In many ways, West Pikine’s district mayor -and by extension, the PDS- were thus held partly accountable for the shady land deal that transpired in West Pikine. Not only was West Pikine’s district mayor voted out of office, but farmers were able to successfully broker alliances with opposition politicians and Pikine’s city-wide mayor that helped ensure that they would receive at least some sort of compensation for investments they had made on farmland. Yet this downward accountability has been limited in very significant ways. As described above, central government authorities and farmers were unable to stop work on the housing estate and farmers were ultimately dispossessed of their property and landholdings. And while farmers were compensated for their land and/or investments in land that was expropriated, many argued that this compensation was less than what they would have received had the housing project followed Pikine’s quota system.

Moreover, most farmers who received plots in the new housing estate were forced to sell the serviced housing plots that they had received in exchange for their land. This was in part because most farmers did not have the financial means to build houses on the housing plots that they had received in exchange for their expropriated property. Many of these same farmers also spoke to me about how they sold their plots because they needed the money that these land sales would generate. Several farmers thus described to me how they used profits from the sale of housing plots to purchase farmland located further in Dakar’s periphery (e.g., Bambilor, Diamniadio), while others used revenue from the sale of their housing plots in fields to farm and rent fields in one of Pikine’s remaining tracts of farmland. Others were forced out of farming completely, relying on income from the sale of their housing plot to retire, finance training for a new occupation, or tide them over while they searched for new jobs. Thus while farmers mobilized to hold West Pikine’s local government accountable for the shady land deal that transpired on their farmland, they were ultimately unable to wholly hold the local government accountable. Each and every farmer I spoke with argued that the compensation they received was inadequate. Farmers who were expropriated would have preferred to have retained their fields, or at least received more housing plots in exchange for the farmland that was expropriated.
Conflicts over patronage networks in Sangalkam, as described throughout this chapter, also
highlight how local governments in Senegal’s Dakar Region are not solely upwardly-or
downwardly-accountable when administering land rights and mediating land conflicts. On
numerous occasions, Sangalkam’s local government attempted to accommodate central state
officials. This includes the rural council’s efforts to provide land for the central government
project that provided housing for residents living in Dakar’s flooded neighborhoods, or the local
government’s attempt to mediate the Bertin dispute. Yet Sangalkam’s local government did not
always focus on appeasing central government officials and the community’s local population. As
described in the previous sections, land governance served as a key way that Sangalkam’s
decentralized government worked to be downwardly-rather than upwardly-accountable. For
example, the local government has set tax rates for mapping taxes that are paid when farmers
and housing developers seek out formal land rights from local government actors. These taxes
have ultimately financed many public services for Sangalkam’s local populations. This downward
accountability was thwarted on numerous occasions by central government officials. Leaders in
Senegal’s dominant party during Wade’s regime forcefully dissolved Sangalkam’s local
government on two different occasions and eventually subdivided the rural community of
Sangalkam into multiple new administrative territories. In doing so, PDS actors replaced locally
elected officials with decentralized actors who were ultimately accountable to central state actors
rather than the local community.

It is important to note, however, that the extent to which Sangalkam’s local council was
downwardly-accountable was limited even before central government officials dissolved the
community’s local council. These limitations allowed certain sectors of Sangalkam’s population
to profit more than others from land speculation in the region. For example, while public
authorities insisted that they distributed serviced housing plots from the new housing estates
constructed by local government authorities to Sangalkam’s youth or women whose husbands
had passed away, there was no formal accounting processes that indicate how many plots were
given to widows or Sangalkam’s youth. As mentioned above, many residents thus critiqued the
allocation processes, arguing that the local government only provided housing plots to party
militants (active supporters). Rumors even circulated that serviced plots were sold to finance
Rewmi and Idrissa Seck’s 2012 presidential campaign. While I was unable to confirm these
rumors, this would suggest the possibility that the local government was more accountable to
Rewmi-and opposition politics- than the community’s entire local population when distributing
housing plots.

Local government in Pikine and Sangalkam can thus be characterized in part by upward or
downward accountability at various points in the communities’ political trajectory. My attention
to understanding decentralization as a process-rather than a singular outcome- thus questions
analyses of decentralization reforms that downplay the continuous negotiations, conflicts, and
inconsistencies in how decentralization reforms actually unfold. At key moments, the central
government has thus sought to make local government actors accountable to central government
authorities by getting involved in efforts to mediate land disputes, withdrawing financial support
from local government actors during elections, and by forcefully dissolving local councils and
subdividing territories. At the same time, farmers and local populations in Pikine and Sangalkam
have also helped local governments remain somewhat accountable for how urban land is
governed through their use of the media, protests, central government oversight, and by voting candidates in -and out- of office during elections.

This being said, there is significant room for local governments to improve their accountability to local populations and central government actors. Most notably, this could be achieved through audits of past housing projects and by providing reparations to land users whose property was unfairly expropriated. Measures also need to be undertaken to ensure that all land users who hold claims to land sites targeted for new housing estates must fully consent - without being coerced- to relinquish their land claims well before bulldozers arrive and construction begins. Governments and housing developers also need to provide transparent documentation of current projects that clearly shows which individuals have been -or were- chosen to receive housing plots. Public actors also need to ensure that serviced plots in new housing estates are allocated in a fair and equitable manner. Doing this would help make certain that local quota systems are followed, that local land users all agree to cede their land claims, and that land users are adequately compensated for land that is used in new housing projects. Following these guidelines would likely also decrease central government sanctions -e.g., withholding financial support during elections, or installation of special commissions- in communities where local government officials reputedly attempt to undertake illegal land transactions.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on how continuous efforts transform the Dakar Region’s few remaining pockets of green space and urban farmland have worked to reconfigure how local political life functions in the outskirts of Dakar. Specifically, the thrust of my analysis examines how efforts to privatize the construction of new housing developments in Senegal’s Dakar Region -as described in Chapter 1- and territorial alliances mobilized by farmer associations -which will also be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5- have worked alongside longstanding political decentralization efforts to reshape urban land governance and governing relations between -and within- various levels of government and associational life. In making this argument, this chapter begins with a brief examination of Senegal’s decentralization reforms in historical perspective. Specifically, I examine how ongoing shifts in Senegal’s political economy -such as structural adjustment reforms, political unrest, the rise of multiparty politics- have influenced various efforts to implement political decentralization reforms. This overview not only draws attention to key shifts in decentralization policies in Senegal’s history, but examines how Senegal’s dominant political party (the PS) implemented the 1996 decentralization reforms in order to increase political support for Diouf and the PS near the end of Diouf’s administration.

My brief review of Senegal’s historical entanglement with political decentralization also draws attention to how Senegal’s decentralization policies have not created a singular, discrete political outcome. Instead, I have argued that decentralization policies have continuously been embedded into a series of historically and geographically contingent struggles and negotiations. These struggles have reconfigured how decentralization politics are -or aren’t- implemented. The focus of my analysis throughout this chapter has thus examined larger processes of decentralization rather than examining discrete outcomes from Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms. In this sense, my attention to political processes of decentralization brings the literature
on decentralization in conversation with a body of literature that focuses on processes to understand and analyze politics and law in sub-Saharan Africa (Berry 1997, Moore 2000).

Furthermore, my attention to how decentralization processes have unfolded in what once was the rural community of Sangalkam sheds light on major shifts in patronage networks since Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms were implemented. Specifically, I have argued that local political leaders in Sangalkam have drawn on powers over land administration to create new patronage networks. This is significant, in that it builds on research highlighting the increasingly significant roles played by local government officials in African politics (Simone 2004a; Abdoul 2005). Moreover, research presented in this chapter also shows how local political leaders are not just intermediaries in patronage networks controlled by central government actors and religious leaders. This is because local and central government officials are increasingly involved in struggles over who should control patronage networks produced through the administration of land rights, mapping taxes, and the construction of new housing estates. Land struggles in Senegal’s Dakar Region can thus be partly read as conflicts between competing territorial alliances over patronage networks and access to land. My focus on the presence of struggle and violence -in how patronage networks are constituted, but also between patronage networks- is important given how traditional readings of clientelism argue that patronage relations are largely based on reciprocity and consent. Much more research is needed that not only examines the prevalence of conflict in clientelism, but focuses on the political work undertaken by competing territorial alliances to build, maintain, and dismantle patronage networks.

Lastly, understanding political decentralization in Senegal as a flexible, ongoing process also helps us evaluate the extent to which local government authorities are -or aren’t- accountable to local populations. Much has been written about how Senegal’s central state has worked to recentralize powers that were decentralized in the state’s 1996 reforms. This chapter, however, has described how local government actors have also frequently engaged in political negotiations and struggles that resisted such efforts to recentralize. This resistance disrupts notions that the Senegalese state has been able to present a unified strategy to recentralize natural resource management in urban settings. Yet this by no means indicates that the central government is no longer a central actor in struggles over land administration, mapping taxes, and the construction of new housing estates. Instead, this chapter examines how ongoing struggles between associational life, central government officials, and decentralized government officials produce relations that are not solely upwardly -or downwardly- accountable. In making these arguments, this chapter concludes by questioning the extent to which farmers ‘win’ or ‘lose’ when they attempt to hold government actors to be accountable for their political actions.
Chapter 3
Mapping and Re-mapping Dakar

Multiple Mappings

During the early stages of my fieldwork, I visited Dakar’s regional office for the Ministry of Land and Taxes. I had been to this office before to meet with bureaucrats who processed paperwork for long-term leases and private property rights, but on this day I had come to speak with a lead cartographer about the maps that accompanied property records. During our meeting, I watched as the cartographer I was interviewing pulled up a digital map of Pikine on his computer. This map traced city boundaries and outlined property lines separating one housing plot from the next. Areas subject to recent efforts to upgrade informal housing settlements were annotated in different colors. Yet smack dab in the center of this bright and colorful map I was confronted by a blackened, seemingly empty space. I knew this darkened and blank space on the map very well: it was the Grande Niayes of Pikine. It was land dedicated to farmland and devoid of housing. And according to the map I was looking at, there were no records of who farmed the hundred or so individualized plots that comprised this blackened, empty space on the map.

Did this omission of farmland from Pikine’s digitized cadastre mean that no land surveys or maps of this zone had been conducted? Certainly not. When I inquired about cadastral maps of this farmland I was introduced to another cartographer, who ushered me into a room lined with filing cabinets. It was in this room, I was told, that the property records and a cadastral map for the seemingly empty spot on the map I had just encountered in the digital cadastral map were stored. Much of the farmland had indeed been mapped and registered as state-owned private property in 1950. In the 1990s, agricultural entrepreneurs at REPROH were able to obtain a long-term lease on this state-owned property. By way of explaining what the paperwork for the long-term lease covering this large tract of farmland would look like, the cartographer I was speaking with pulled out an example of a typical file. This file included a map that traced plot boundaries and land titling paperwork.

Within a span of thirty minutes I had just seen two dramatically different cadastral maps that had been created by government cartographers. Yet these were not the only types of property maps that I encountered during my fieldwork. Instead, mapping projects have proliferated throughout peri/urban Senegal. Government offices frequently decorate their walls with maps that showcase their past or ongoing projects. This ranges from maps diagramming new roads to be built, work underway to upgrade and govern Dakar’s informal settlements, or maps pinpointing Senegalese mining interests. Planning dossiers frequently boast impressive pull-out maps that portray how and where economic development should unfold. Leaders of the farming organizations I worked with have all—at one point or another, and often multiple times—been included in participative mapping exercises organized by government officials and NGOs to map their farming zones. Lebu leaders and farming groups alike have also commissioned private mappings firms to map their territorial property rights.
Senegal’s current mapping tradition consequently differs quite significantly from other postcolonial contexts where the technical means to map territories and obtain statistical information is either nonexistent or deliberately concealed, falsified, or unused (Roy 2004; Corbridge et al., 2005; Hull 2008; Ghertner 2010, 2011). This mapping tradition also diverges from recent analysis by IFIs that denounces the dearth of cadastral mapping in sub-Saharan Africa (Byamugisha 2013). This chapter consequently highlights the abundance of mapping projects underway in urban Senegal. In doing so, it examines how different actors rely upon multiple-and frequently contradictory- mapping projects to represent how they plan to develop and use farmland.

In examining these overlapping and contradictory mappings of Dakar’s urban landscape, this chapter considers how maps rise to the forefront of struggles over how to see and develop peri/urban farmland. Should farmland be converted into housing estates? Used to develop urban farming practices? What is the best way to develop peri/urban Dakar? This chapter consequently adds new dimensions to arguments presented in the previous two chapters, examining how Dakar’s rising tide of land conflicts are not only linked to rapid rates of urbanization, efforts to privatize Dakar’s housing sector, rapid land speculation, competition between patronage networks, and corrupt politics. As such, I argue how land conflicts are inherently linked to differing visions and plans for Dakar’s urban development. In making this argument, I contend that maps and divergent imaginings over how to see and develop peri/urban centers consequently emerge as a crucial terrain of struggle.

This is because maps serve as a key tool that various groups employ to imagine, represent, and mobilize their territorialized vision for how to best develop Dakar’s urban spaces. In this sense, maps speak a crucial normative language that conveys different groups’ visions for how they think urban development should unfold. Each ‘right to the city’ movement—comprised of alliances arguing that farms should be converted into housing estates, and coalitions working to develop urban agriculture—thus relies upon maps to portray their urban development visions and claims to use, exchange, and manage Dakar’s urban space. This feeds into a process where landscapes are continuously mapped and remapped. Subject to multiple, contradictory mappings, these mapped territories are the subject of debates that unfold around which coalition’s map and urban vision provides the best urban development plan.

This chapter consequently examines and compares the various types of maps leveraged by various ‘right to the city’ alliances seeking to develop the remaining tracts of farmland and green space in Senegal’s Dakar Region. In comparing the various maps used by different alliances, I pay particular attention to how each alliance’s ways of seeing Dakar’s urban spaces are relatively positioned politically by examining the varying degrees to which alliances’ efforts to represent how they plan to develop—or defend—tracts of urban farmland are respected and accepted by a variety of public and private actors.

I begin by examining the construction of a dominant mapping tradition in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Reading colonial cadastres alongside urban plans and maps that have been developed after independence, I explain how this dominant mapping tradition was forged through urban cadastral mappings of private property rights. This section also hints at how this mapping tradition worked to displace autochthonous and low-income land users. Questions
relating to displacement are explored in greater detail in the following section, which explains how this dominant mapping tradition produced a simplified and ‘legible’ property system (Scott 1998) that was undergirded by efforts to distinguish between and label certain urban neighborhoods as ‘regular’ or ‘irregular.’ Specifically, I argue that urban planners, government actors, and housing developers drew from the dominant mapping tradition in the Dakar Region to target certain neighborhoods as the site for ‘urban upgrading’ projects or new middle-class and elite housing estates.

The remaining two sections of this chapter examine how Dakar residents who live and farm in these so-called ‘irregular’ spaces have relied on a variety of maps to challenge their displacement. This includes maps that highlight indigenous land claims to large urban territories, which are frequently dissimilar to the mappings and property rights systems that undergird Dakar’s mapping tradition. At the same time, my research also highlights how communities are increasingly hiring private mapping firms to create maps of farmers’ individual property rights that in many way mimic -and some cases are absorbed by- the dominant mapping tradition in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Specifically, I argue that these maps of individual property rights are not only reconfiguring dominant mapping practices in the Dakar Region, but are more likely to be accepted and used by urban planners, government actors, and international institutions.

**Colonial Base Maps**

Scholarly writing on colonialism is replete with accounts that examine how urban spatial relations were dramatically reconfigured during the colonial period. Crucial to this large body of work are arguments that explain how colonial powers strategically reshaped urban landscapes to garner social and political control over urban territories and populations (Cohn 1987; Mitchell 1988; Rabinow 1989; Prochaska 1990; Anderson 1991; Wright 1991). Research examining colonial Dakar has largely supported this literature. Various studies have described how use of military force and the colonial policies of assimilation combined with discourses on sanitation and new urban planning projects to fundamentally transform Dakar’s landscape (Betts 1971; Sinou 1993; Njoh 2007; Bigon 2012).

This monumental remaking of Dakar’s urban landscape began before Dakar was named as the capital of French West Africa. Prior to the French occupation of Dakar, French colonial presence in the peninsula was largely confined to the construction of a Catholic missionary settlement in 1846 and relatively limited trade between French merchants and Lebu inhabitants (Charpy 1958, p. 37-39). French colonial presence in Dakar was only formalized in May of 1857 after Prôtet (the Commandant de la Division Navale des Cotes Occidentals d’Afrique) ordered French troops to occupy and begin construction of a small fort (Faure 1914, p. 140; Seck 1970, p. 288).

Years after the formal colonial occupation of Dakar, the city remained in the shadow of more established colonial cities. The city of St. Louis prevailed as the center of French colonial administration in West Africa. Located just off the coast of Dakar, the nearby island of Gorée served as the regional headquarters for the French navy. In addition to this, the trading networks in Saint-Louis, Gorée and Rufisque all surpassed those found in Dakar. Colonel Canard consequently described Dakar in its early years after formal French occupation to his colleagues in Saint-Louis as “always the same calm, too calm, trade is almost nothing. Always few houses to
lodge officers and bureaucrats…. In all, life is very difficult, very expensive, and hardly pleasant” (Delcourt 1983: p. 69).

The development of Dakar from a colonial backwaters into a large urban center emerged from concerted efforts made by a group of colonial authorities who strategically sought to raise Dakar’s stature in relation to these more established French colonial cities. Key among these colonial officials was Pinet-Laprade. Pinet-Laprade is frequently hailed as the ‘founder’ of Dakar in the colonial literature because of his work drafting Dakar’s first master plan (see Bigon 2016). Final drafts of this plan were published in 1862, and bear remarkable similarity to other urban planning endeavors during the period. For example, Dakar’s first master plan was characterized by the presentation of grid-iron streets and an orthogonal division of land. Rectangular plots of land were divvied up, and neatly outlined by streets measuring between eight and ten meters wide (Charpy 1958). Many of these plots were reserved for French cultural and political institutions, including a cathedral, schools, a police station, a post office, and other administrative buildings.

Figure 8: Dakar’s First Master Plan (Source: Dione 1992)
Yet colonists’ first urban planning efforts were not merely a reflection of France’s efforts to govern Dakar through cultural assimilation policies. Colonial Dakar was also built to help extract commercial goods. Land was consequently dedicated for the construction of railway lines, which not only transported produce from Senegal’s interior but also opened up trade networks between Senegal and Mali. Planning during this period also dedicated space and resources to build a new port, various markets, and a chamber of commerce to bolster Dakar’s economy (Charpy 1958).

These maps and plans to strengthen Dakar’s economy -instead of providing colonial investments to St. Louis, Rufisque, or Gorée- were quickly enveloped in public controversy. For example, debates unfurled over the decision to construct a new port in Dakar, as various traders and public officials wondered if it wouldn’t make better sense to build a port in nearby Rufisque or Gorée. Situating the new port in Dakar not only helped Dakar rise in prominence within West Africa, but also resituated the growing city within international trade networks. Colonial actors consequently described how Dakar’s new port would not only reconfigure trade routes within Senegal, but also open up new trade relations between Dakar and Brazil (Seck 1970, p. 290). In this sense, urban planning during Senegal’s early colonial years was not only a representation of French assimilation policy -as various scholars have emphasized (e.g., Bigon 2008)- but also key to building new trade patterns and bolstering economic development.

The compilation of these maps and urban development plans promoted European architecture and urban spatial arrangements that were frequently at the expense of spatial patterns established by African populations in Dakar (Bigon 2014). Similar to the onset of the grid and cadastre in other parts of the world (Blomley 2003; Craib 2004), the act of dividing land into gridded streets and plots of land -what Lefebvre (2009) describes as a ‘rectangularized’ division of space- depended upon the displacement of indigenous populations. Thus while many African inhabitants did retain their land and houses in colonial Dakar, it is important to note that this was not the case for all African residents. Indigenous inhabitants whose housing was situated on land reserved for Dakar’s grid-iron streets were demolished; residents were frequently compensated and displaced from Dakar. Writing about the construction of roads in one Dakar sector, Pinet-Laprade consequently describes how 95 out of 130 African structures were displaced by roads. Many residents whose houses were not torn down ultimately decided to move their village to a new location where they wouldn’t be displaced again by colonial actors (Charpy 1958, p. 190). More examples of the erasure of African settlements in order to build Dakar’s roads during this period are even notated for removal on detailed maps from the 1862 plans, provided on the following page. Maps were consequently a crucial tool that helped colonists build cultural, political, and economic institutions in Dakar through the displacement of local populations.

These substantial planning efforts to transform Dakar into a major urban center were also accompanied by measures to establish Dakar’s urban cadastre. Specifically, the Code Civil -which outlined laws on private property- was established in France in 1804, and was applied in Senegalese contexts starting in 1830. These laws were subsequently supplemented and reformed throughout Senegal’s colonial period to adapt to the colonial context in West Africa. For example, shortly after Pinet-Laprade finished his plans for Dakar, French colonial administrators began implementing a variety of land policies that sought to convert land understood as ‘vacantes et sans maitres’ (so-called vacant land that colonial actors argued was not owned by any individual or
group) into private property that would be owned and used for colonial purposes (Vidrovitch 1982).

Property systems were again updated in 1900, when French colonial administrators established a new system of land registration modeled after the Real Property Act of 1858 in Australia. This land system created a centralized registry for private property rights. At the same time, the urban cadastre was a key component of this property rights system. Maps delimiting property boundaries were required to accompany all applications to register individual property rights. This new cadastral and property rights system—which was updated in 1906 and again in 1935—responded to colonial concerns that their landholdings—and consequently the myriad of public and private investments in land made in accordance with master plans—would be secure (Vidrovitch 1982; République du Senegal and Ministère de l'Agriculture 1996).

Subsequent master plans and maps that were promoted during Dakar’s colonial period highlight the important ways that cadastral maps of private property and master plans coalesced to construct Dakar by displacing local populations. For example, Betts (1971, p. 143) describes how in 1901, a Parisian sanitary commission investigating a yellow fever outbreak recommended the creation of a “hygienic village” composed solely of buildings constructed according to colonial architectural standards out of durable materials. These recommendations were largely ignored until 1914, when an outbreak of the bubonic plague in Dakar prompted the colonial administration to relocate many Africans living in Dakar to the city’s periphery. Betts notes how displaced residents were without electricity, potable water, or a sewage system in the project’s initial years; however, residents were later provided with occupancy rights for their housing plots.
Similar efforts that relied on urban planning and the construction of a legible property system to segregate urban Dakar can be read through housing policies implemented by the colonial government after the Second World War. During this period, Dakar’s population grew rapidly and the city faced a significant shortage of housing that was built according to colonial design standards. As described in Chapter 1, the colonial administration responded to this problem by creating two semi-public housing construction companies. This included the Société Immobilière du Cap-Vert (SICAP) in 1950 and the Office des Habitations à Loyers Modérés (OHLM) in 1959. SICAP and OHLM planned and built housing for rent or purchase, and provided home owners with secure freehold titles to their property. Yet in order to obtain the land used in these housing projects, the colonial -and later independent Senegalese- government displaced numerous informal settlements. In this sense, Pikine was officially formed to house some -but not all- residents displaced by OHLM housing projects (Vernière 1977).

Similar to the SICAP and OHLM communities, planners drew up maps for the new Pikine neighborhoods and provided displaced residents with new, rectangular house plots. Yet unlike the property rights provided to SICAP and OHLM residents, colonial actors only gave displaced residents use rights to their housing plots, which were non-transferrable. And while SICAP and OHLM housing was build by the government, recipients awarded with plots in Pikine were required to begin building their homes within three months in order to maintain their occupancy rights (Vernière 1977; Maack 1980). In this sense, the cartography of urban property rights, design standards, and the labor and financial relations used to build houses differed significantly throughout Dakar’s various neighborhoods.

The urban plans drawn up shortly after Senegal’s independence in many ways reflected - and reproduced- colonial legacies of differentiated and segregated landscapes in Dakar. For example, one of the key components of Dakar’s 1967 Plan Ecochard was to classify -and draw lines around- Dakar’s neighborhoods. These zoning efforts represented and categorized Dakar’s middle-class and elite neighborhoods -constructed by SICAP and OHLM- as decent, acceptable neighborhoods. These quarters were then understood in contradistinction from three other types of neighborhoods, including: 1/spaces marked as requiring renovations, 2/settlements judged to be unsanitary, and 3/neighborhoods understood in terms of informality.

Instead of summarily targeting these three types of neighborhoods for displacement as was done during colonialism, Ecochard’s plan argued that it would be better to provide public infrastructure in several key areas. This was because Ecochard believed that government efforts to constantly relocate informal settlements actually produced unsanitary housing conditions. Ecochard argued this was because residents were constantly being moved from one informal settlement to the next and were unable to continue along the gradual processes of slowly improving their houses or living standards (Maack 1980). The plan consequently called for the government to invest in large infrastructural projects in certain ‘unsanitary’ neighborhoods in Pikine, in hopes that that these neighborhood would gradually transform into a new center of economic development. Thus, while Ecochard’s plan continued to see, represent, and segregate
Dakar through understandings of class, property, and sanitation, the plan also reflected important departures from previous planning practices.

Figure 10: Ecochard’s Master Plan for Dakar (Source: Archnet n.d.)

These 1967 plans were not updated until Dakar’s most recent master plans were completed in 2006 (and formally approved -with several modifications- in 2009) (République du Senegal et. al. 2010). During this time, scores of newspaper headlines asserted that the absence of an updated master plan meant that Dakar was developing in a ‘chaotic’ manner. Government planners I spoke with confirmed that there was a significant lack of coordination between government agencies, but also pointed out that this lack of a centralized urban plan did not mean that the development of Dakar during this period was in any way unplanned. Instead, planning projects were frequently undertaken in piecemeal fashion without extensive interagency coordination. Recent planning projects include -but are not limited to- regional plans that were developed to create new centers of economic growth, vast public works projects undertaken to update and construct new roads within the Dakar metropolitan area (e.g., work on Dakar’s corniche, new feeder roads in Pikine, and the development of new tollways and highway infrastructure connecting Dakar to Senegal’s interior), plans to build a new university and international airport, and coordinated efforts to evaluate and manage Dakar’s remaining green spaces.

As described in the previous two chapters, a variety of public and private housing institutions have also built countless new middle-class and elite housing estates. Similar to the
housing projects described above, land in these neighborhoods is divided into rectangular housing plots and each plot is registered in the national land registry as private property or as a formal use right. In this sense, these neighborhoods bear the dominant mapping and planning tendencies -in other words, the key ways of seeing and representing land and property relations- that were established during colonialism. As I have also pointed out in this section, this way of seeing and planning Dakar’s urban spaces was also contingent on publicly criticizing and eradicating neighborhoods that do not conform to dominant mapping and planning norms. The next section examines these linkages between the dominant mapping tradition and how informal neighborhoods are represented in greater detail, drawing attention to how this dominant mapping tradition has helped produce contemporary understandings of ‘informality’ in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Specifically, I examine how Dakar’s neighborhoods are largely categorized as formal or informal based on whether or not they conform to dominant mapping and planning tendencies. I argue that these ways of seeing and categorizing formal and informal spaces not only helps ‘right to the city’ movements comprised and organized by urban planners, housing developers, and government actors target neighborhoods for eradication or restructuration, but also helps these same actors determine which tracts of peri/urban farmland are suitable for new housing projects.

‘Irregular’ Spaces of Intervention

Dakar’s informal settlements are often understood in contradistinction to the dominant mapping and planning norms produced during colonialism. Frequently labelled as ‘irregular’ neighborhoods, many of Dakar’s informal settlements have limited access to public services -such as access to electricity, water, or public sewage networks- that are routinely included in neighborhoods built by public housing agencies, housing cooperatives, and private real-estate developers. A good number of residents in Dakar’s informal neighborhoods also suffer flooding during the annual rainy season. This being said, not all informal neighborhoods bear distinct characteristics that make it easy for them to be distinguished from formal neighborhoods. For example, some informal neighborhoods contain roads arranged in a grid pattern and are populated by houses and apartment buildings that have been built with the uniform concrete bricks that have characterized much of Senegal’s colonial and post-colonial architecture. Because of this, when planners and government actors target ‘irregular’ neighborhoods for eradication or redevelopment, it isn’t always due to a socially produced understanding of how government actors and residents collectively see informal settlements (Ghertner 2010, 2011).

Instead, formal property rights -specifically, whether or not housing plots have been registered and drawn into Dakar’s cadastre- frequently serve as a key factor determining which places are marked for demolition or restructuration projects. Neighborhoods that are considered to be firmly entrenched in Dakar’s urban cadastre and included in the centralized land registry are thus labeled as ‘regular’- even though the cadastre may contain outdated information and many property users may hold insecure titles. For example, Vernière (1977) describes how many of the first inhabitants of ‘formal’ neighborhoods in Pikine obtained occupancy rights to their housing plots. These formal occupancy rights were non-transferrable, which means residents were only authorized to occupy house plots and that any and all land sales of house plots would be considered illegal. However, property users sold their plots en masse. These illicit sales of house plots in Pikine’s formal neighborhoods were not recorded in public records, and consequently
peppered Pikine’s formal neighborhoods with new, informal claims to housing rights. Yet even despite this gradual informalization of Pikine’s formal neighborhoods, these neighborhoods were still understood and classified -by government agencies, and in popular opinion- as formal or ‘regular’ neighborhoods.

Additional examples of more contemporary instances of the ‘informality’ or ‘irregularity’ creeping into neighborhoods categorized as ‘formal’ abound. For instance, houses may have numerous levels despite being permitted for one level. Residents also produce pockets of informality in ‘regular’ neighborhoods if they fail to obtain a construction permit during renovations. Property owners may also decide not to complete all of the steps required to register their name and property, as this expedites the land registration process if owners later decide to resell their property. Informal practices were also integrated in the Parcelles Assainies site and services project. As described in more detail in Chapter 1, many housing plot recipients illegally sold plots that -similar to the Pikine project- were registered with non-transferrable rights. Informal practices also governed how plot recipients in the Parcelles Assainies were selected and how plot recipients were expected to pay for housing construction (at least until project staff began providing some recipients with short-term loans for housing construction).

In this sense, Dakar’s formal neighborhoods do not constitute an autonomous bloc that operates outside of -or separate from- formal sectors. All of Dakar’s so-called ‘formal’ neighborhoods are peppered with informality. Informality -as reflected through Dakar’s informal housing sector- is thus deeply entangled with the ‘formal’ housing sector (Perlman 1976; Roitman 1990; Abdoul 2002; Roy and AlSayyad 2004; Davis 2006). This being said, it is also important to recognize that government actors and Senegalese residents still understand formal -or what they call ‘regular’ (régulière)- neighborhoods in contradistinction to informal -or ‘irregular’ (irrégulièrère)- neighborhoods.

This popular nomenclature and way of seeing and classifying entire neighborhoods as either formal or informal is significant, in part because it helps us distinguish a spatial logic to how various actors work to eradicate informality (Roy 2004; Yiftachel 2009a, 2009b) in Senegal’s Dakar Region. At its most basic level, this reflects how popular narratives continue to imagine and see the neighborhood as the desired scale of analysis and intervention. In this sense, the government has supported public/private partnerships that quickly build new, formal neighborhoods that effectively block the growth of informal settlements, as described in Chapter 1. This new and so-called formal housing stock continues to rely on a combination of urban plans, provision of formal property rights, and housing plots are integrated in the urban cadastre. In short: these housing estates conform to the dominant mapping tradition described in the previous section.

Given this spatial logic to informality in Dakar, individual homes in formal neighborhoods do not always need to abide by all legal channels in order to be considered ‘formal’ or ‘regular’. Instead, they only need to follow rules that the administration deems most important. In this case, this means that property must be included in urban cadastral maps, and that living conditions on the property -in terms of safety and sanitation- aren’t so egregious as to warrant government intervention on the sub-neighborhood scale.
Contrary to these so-called formal housing settlements, neighborhoods popularly labelled as informal or irregular -which do not conform to dominant mapping traditions in Dakar- are the target of intense public criticism, demolition, and/or restructuration projects. In this sense, labelling a neighborhood as ‘irregular’ or informal transforms it into a space that requires increased government regulation in the form of planning and development interventions. Interventions include ensuring that housing estates are equipped with roads (preferably in a gridded structure), that residents hold formal property rights and access to public services, and that house plots are registered in Dakar’s urban cadastre. It is expected that after these planning interventions so-called informal neighborhoods will not only conform with dominant mapping traditions but will also be seen as a formal neighborhood.

The most notable examples of this in Senegal’s Dakar Region are efforts to ‘upgrade’ informal neighborhoods. Efforts to restructure Senegalese neighborhoods were spearheaded by the Senegalese Ministry of Housing in 1987. However, administration of neighborhood restructuration projects was shifted from the Ministry of Housing to a new institution -the Foundation Right to the City (Foundation Droit a la Ville)- in 1999. This ‘right to the city’ organization receives financial backing from the Government of Senegal and the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ and KfW). During meetings I held with officials at the Foundation Right to the City, I learned that one of the key components of the urban upgrading plans were negotiations -undertaken between the organization and property users- over whose houses (or parts of houses) would be demolished to provide restructured neighborhoods with roads. Reports produced by the agency also highlight how the provision of formal land rights -which were registered in Dakar’s urban cadastre- also played an integral role in upgrading schemes. For example, frequent mention is made of “land regularisation operations” and “tenure regularisation projects” in one report that summarizes Senegalese upgrading efforts between 1987 and 2007 (Durand-Lasserve and Ndiaye 2008). It was assumed that these efforts would not only provide residents with secure property rights, but also improve the administration and management of land and increase revenues collected from land taxes. Such efforts to ‘regularize’ land rights are also key to helping residents access public services, as property users without secure titles or use rights are frequently unable to directly obtain water or electricity hook-ups in their homes. Urban upgrading projects thus conform to the property rights and mapping tradition -which combines various types of urban plans, the urban cadastre, and common sense notions of in/formal and ir/regular spaces- that dominates how urban planners and many government officials communicate and bring about changes in Dakar’s urban spaces.

Just as Dakar’s dominant mapping tradition helps planners identify which neighborhoods are targeted for destruction or restructuring projects, this tradition also serves to identify farmland that can potentially be converted into new housing projects. Specifically, government actors and private housing developers target farms that have not been integrated into urban cadastres. In some instances, this may also include land that has been integrated into Dakar’s cadastral maps, but is farmed or claimed by actors who do not have secure land rights. One Lebu elder in Pikine explained how during the 1960s and 1970s, officials in the bureau of land management would provide individuals -who were not from the Lebu community- with formal land papers to land used by Lebus:
These practices remain strong. Farmers I spoke with in Bambilor related how alliances between housing developers and government officials frequently consulted cadastral maps that are created when farmers obtain formal use rights to target ‘blank’ spots on the master cadastral map. These ‘blank’ spots reveal spaces where land users do not have formal use rights or freehold title that could potentially house new real estate developments. Aware of these practices, many farmers I spoke with indicated that one of the primary reasons they sought out formal use rights was because they wanted to protect their land from expropriation by government officials and housing developers. By obtaining formal use rights and having their farmland included in the local cadastre, Bambilor farmers have thus developed territorial strategies that counteract the measures employed by groups composed of urban planners, housing developers and government actors seeking to obtain sites for housing projects by identifying unregistered land on cadastral maps.

Housing developers and government actors in Pikine also draw on the dominant mapping tradition -which label certain spaces as ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ to find plots of land to expropriate for their new housing projects. For example, current strains of Dakar’s mapping tradition operate in tandem with the city’s regulatory stance on zoning maps and urban development plans. As will be described in more detail in Chapter 4, the lack of local zoning maps in Pikine frequently creates an opening for land to be developed and secured by housing developers rather than urban farmers. Urban development plans also indicate that land used by farmers who do not hold secure land rights has been slated for the construction of new government buildings, or other types of urban infrastructure. Groups of government actors and real-estate developers thus must consult multiple layers of maps -Dakar’s urban cadastre, zoning maps, and urban plans- in order to find locations sites suitable for new housing developments.

It was through these mapping traditions -wherein urban developers identify tracts for development through Dakar’s urban cadastre, zoning maps, and urban plans- that a horticultural cooperative worked to expropriate urban farmers holding insecure claims to land in Pikine’s Grande Niayes. Much of Pikine’s remaining farmland is situated in this tract of land, which was registered as state-owned private property when Pikine was officially formed in 1952. While the various types of property rights will be explained in more detail in the following chapter, it is important to note here that individuals can obtain long-term leases to farm or build houses on state-owned private property. Yet while many Pikine farmers and their ancestors had farmed this land prior to and after this tract was registered as state-owned private property in the early 1950s, none of these farmers had been able to obtain long-term leases. Instead, after the state’s title was originally registered, all efforts by farmers to obtain secure land rights were denied. To say that farmers were shocked to learn that a horticultural cooperative -Regroupement des Professionels Horticoles de l’Ornement, or REPROH- was able to obtain a long-term lease to their farmland would be an understatement.

Ba (2008) writes how REPROH first asserted their claims in this zone by lobbying to reactivate an old agricultural development project drawn up by the Ministry of Rural
Development. Specifically, REPROH drew attention to how their project—which focused on producing flowers, seeds, and saplings for international markets—would both develop the zone and fulfill the Ministry of Rural Development’s mission. REPROH was also able to form key alliances with then-President Abdou Diouf, the Ministry of Urbanism, and personnel in the bureau of land management who helped provide the horticultural cooperative with a long-term lease without any formal coordination with the farmers using the land REPROH intended to develop. According to farmers in this zone, this lease—and alliances—was formed without any official visits to map the zone or verify if anyone was using the land. Indeed, whether or not anyone was already using the land didn’t seem to be important to housing developers, as the determining factor was that the state had not developed infrastructure or provided any long-term leases in the tract deeded to REPROH. In this sense, farmers did not hold ‘regular’ property rights for the land under dispute according to existing property records and maps on file at the bureau of land and taxes. Farmers’ lack of formal paperwork was thus sufficient to allow REPROH to obtain a long-term lease and gain rights to land that had been used and farmed by others for generations. It was only after obtaining this lease that actors involved with REPROH first stepped foot in the zone to perform a census of farmland in 1997.

Farmers that I spoke with initially believed that REPROH was there to bring a farming project that would help them develop their zone. The executive director of PROVANIA, a local farmer association that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, described his interactions with REPROH as follows:

“They came on day and said: we have come to do a project. We have a project that will help support farmers. So we need to know the number of farmers, what they do, and the size of the farms. We thought they had good intentions.”

Three months later farmers began receiving eviction notices. This was when they realized that the census that they had helped conduct was being used to enforce the long-term lease provided to REPROH and dispossess them of their land claims.

In the next section I examine how various Pikine farmers—and their alliances with a variety of public and private actors—worked to produce alternative representations, mappings and ways of seeing this large tract of urban farmland. In doing so, I demonstrate how these mappings advanced a territorial strategy and way of representing Dakars’ urban space that differs in several key ways from the dominant mapping tradition in Senegal’s Dakar region. In making this argument I draw attention to two different maps, which I argue represent different ways of seeing and representing Lebu territoriality and property relations in Pikine’s Grande Niayes. Moreover, each of these maps was buttressed by a different composition of actors. In shining a spotlight on these differences, this next section explores the political relations that influence whether maps commissioned by local, non-governmental actors are—or aren’t—integrated into Dakar’s dominant mapping tradition.

Integrating ‘Counter’-mapping in Dominant Mapping Practices

After public protests against REPROH’s efforts to dispossess Pikine farmland had tempered, farmers were left with fields that had been razed by bulldozers. Many mature vegetable crops had
been destroyed, alongside fruit-bearing trees that had been cut and uprooted by bulldozers hired by REPROH. Fearful that REPROH had not abandoned their land claims, one of the first mobilizing tactics that Lebu farmers -most of whom had inherited traditional land rights from their parents and grandparents- from the nearby Lebu village of Thiaroye-sur-mer employed to protect their land rights after the bulldozers disappeared was to provide a new map of their territory. They argued that the government failed to conduct formal studies of the zone (état de lieu); specifically, studies which would have examined who currently used farmland that was included in the long-term lease provided to REPROH. Lebu leaders consequently decided that they would provide government authorities with their own formal study of the zone, commissioning a map that showed where Lebu territory and property rights began and ended.

The resulting map included a large tract of land that was divided into two zones that distinguished land that had historically been farmed and owned by Lebu residents of Thiaroye-sur-mer and land that had historically been used by the Lebu population in neighboring Cambérène. Contrary to maps found in the bureau of land and taxes, the map produced for the Lebu community in Thiaroye-sur-mer only emphasized the Lebu community’s autochthonous rights. In doing so, the map did not portray individual property rights. For example, it did not differentiate landholdings used by different autochthonous families. In emphasizing community land claims, the map also did not draw attention to how land claims inside the map were not held communally, but instead were divided between -and within- families in a highly individualized manner. This focus on the communal rather than individual rights also obscured land rights held by farmers -many of whom were not descendants of Lebu families- who had bought or been gifted land from Lebu families over the years.

The primary role of this map was thus to mobilize a coherent Lebu voice that represented Lebus from Thiaroye-sur-mer’s longstanding claims to land in Pikine’s Grande Niayes. The map did not focus on how the land should be developed -e.g., for farming, housing, etc.- so much as it clearly stated that the Lebu population had the authority to make decisions about who would develop this land and how. To emphasize this as a Lebu map -and link this struggle with larger Lebu struggles within Senegal- the leaders of the traditional authority structure in Thiaroye-sur-mer presented this map at a special meeting with the highest political authority for the Lebu ethnic group, the Serin Ndakaaru. As a result of their meeting with the Serin Ndakaaru, Lebu residents in Thiaroye-sur-mer were later told that the Serin Ndakaaru took their map and showed it to then-President Abdoulaye Wade.

The general consensus is unclear about the extent to which the map influenced government policy or in any way convinced the Wade administration to uphold Lebu -rather than REPROH’s- land claims. It is thus ambiguous whether the map drawn up by Lebu cartographers was a key tool in brokering any sort of territorial alliance between the Lebu of Thiaroye-sur-mer, the Serin Ndakaaru, and then-President Wade. President Wade did not issue any formal decrees or offer any pronouncements on this matter, and the Lebu leadership I spoke with was unable to provide any evidence that strong alliances had been forged during these talks. Yet while it is unclear whether Lebu leaders’ map influenced the outcome of the REPROH conflict, it is important to recognize that local leaders believed that alternative mappings -which did not conform with the dominant mapping tradition in Senegal’s Dakar region- would help defend Lebu land claims. This map thus not only served as a key means of representing Lebu farmers’
territorial claims to land, but provided a lens into how the Lebu community saw their territory and land claims differently from the cadastral maps, private property rights, and zoning regulations that figure centrally in Dakar’s dominant mapping tradition. In this sense, this map was able to communicate how Lebu farmers and leaders represented the community’s farming territory.

Since this initial map and way of representing Lebu territory in Pikine’s Grande Niayes was produced, Lebu farmers and traditional authorities in Thiaroye-sur-mer have developed new ways of mapping Lebu farming territory. Specifically, Lebu customary authorities in Thiaroye-sur-mer have started providing land users with customary papers that are tied to maps of land users’ property. Frequently referred to as ‘little papers,’ agreements, or certificats de palabre in the African land rights literature (Delville 2002, Mathieu et. al. 2002), this practice of providing customary papers for traditional land rights in Senegal’s Dakar Region is hardly a new or unique. Similarly, scholarship on land in African contexts has also documented how farmers use maps that document the distribution of plots in large agricultural schemes and lineage land registers (Edja 1997; Delville 2002). Yet little has been written about indigenous efforts to link these informal written contracts and customary land papers with indigenous map-making efforts. Instead, much of the literature on mapping in sub-Saharan Africa has focused on mapping projects similar to Lebu maps of indigenous territory described above, where indigenous actors - frequently working with NGOs- map large tracts of community land, for example land designated for wildlife purposes or forested land (Hodgson and Schroeder 2002; Klopp and Sang 2011).

Yet Lebu farmers from Thiaroye-sur-mer have increasingly been layering maps of Lebu territory - as described above- with individualized maps of farming plots that are linked to customary papers. In order to obtain customary papers, land users are required to consult with the Lebu authorities charged with managing land traditionally claimed by Lebu individuals and families in Thiaroye-sur-mer. These authorities are familiar with property rights in the Grande Niayes zone and are responsible for mediating disputes over who owns which tracts of land in the village of Thiaroye-sur-mer and for farmland located in the Grande Niayes. Traditional leaders who mediate land conflicts have a vast knowledge of which families - or even which individuals in particular families- have historically farmed or accessed given plots of land. In this sense, these customary papers complement knowledge provided through oral testimony, and are signed by Thiaroye’s Conseiller Contumier (Customary Advisor), an Imam, the President of the Conseil des Notables (Council of Notables), and the Délégué du quartier (Neighborhood Representative).

The maps that accompany these customary papers outline the perimeter of the customary land users’ fields. Given the expense of mapping, many applicants have hired dessinateurs - or draughtsmen- rather than private cartography firms. The resulting maps provide information about how large a property is and general information about where it is located. However, the perimeter of farmers’ fields are not geo-referenced. This is significant, because many of these maps were not created by farmers seeking to create maps that would be presented - along with other paperwork- to obtain formal land rights. In this sense, these maps did not conform to the dominant mapping narrative in Senegal’s Dakar region. Farmers did not commission these maps with the intention of registering their land claims or having their property rights written into Dakar’s urban cadastre.
Instead, many of these maps were quickly produced after farmers learned about a new road - financed by various state agencies and the World Bank - that would pass directly through their farmland. Most farmers agreed that this road would serve in the public’s interest, and protests from Lebu farmers whose fields were expropriated for the construction of the new road were limited. Public opinion surrounding the road project thus differed significantly from how Lebu actors reacted when REPROH originally attempted to expropriate Lebu farmland. Lebu leaders consequently met with authorities charged with building the road—not to voice concerns about whether or not the new road should be built, but instead to negotiate how much they and other Lebu farmers would be compensated for property that would be expropriated for the road project. These negotiations included discussions on how much farmers would receive for trees and planted crops and how much land users would receive for each square meter of their property that would be expropriated for the road project.

That farmers were negotiating to receive compensation for each square meter of their property that was expropriated represents a significant break from Senegalese law, which stipulates that land users without private property rights are only entitled to compensation for investments that they have made to their land. For example, when the Senegalese government expropriates a farmer’s tract of farmland, the farmer would only be compensated for investments made in building structures, wells, trees, and plants growing in the field. Government planners I spoke with indicated that the decision to compensate land users without private property rights to land stemmed from the World Bank’s involvement in the project.

This assertion is supported by documents from earlier Senegalese road projects, in which the World Bank and Senegalese actors insisted that land users receive fair and equitable payment for land before being displaced by road projects (République du Sénégal and Agence Nationale Chargée de la Promotion et de l’Investissement des Grands Travaux 2005). In the context of Pikine, many of the maps commissioned by farmers -and accompanying customary papers- were key to ensuring that expropriated farmers would be properly compensated for land used in the road project. Farmers argued that maps provided better proof of their land claims than testimonies provided by verbal witnesses, as the act of formally drawing property rights on paper helped them better represent their land claims when being dispossessed. Thus while farmers hired draughtsmen instead of formal cartographers to map their plots, the resulting maps still measured and documented the size of farmers’ plots, which helped them calculate how many square meters from each plot would be expropriated for the new road.

Both of the maps I have described in this section -including the composite maps of Lebu territory and efforts to map individual property rights- serve as important examples of the different types of mapping projects that Lebu indigenous groups have spearheaded in Senegal’s Dakar Region. As described above, the maps produced represent two different ways of seeing farmland in Pikine’s Grande Niayes. The first map served to identify a large tract of land that was claimed by REPROH as Lebu territory. In doing so, this map overlooked property rights and claims to land exercised by non-Lebu land users farming in land identified as Lebu territory. Yet it is unclear whether Lebu leaders were able to use this map to create any significant political alliances -with leaders in the Lebu traditional governance system or with President Wade- or if the map helped in any way to defend Lebu land claims in the Grande Niayes. This political
outcome differs significantly from the second series of maps spearheaded by Lebu leaders, which mapped individualized plots claimed by Lebu farmers and their families. Farmers threatened with expropriation were able to form alliances -with government leaders and international financial institutions- that relied on these maps to expropriate farmers and provide financial compensation for expropriated farmers. These maps of individualized plots thus complement and support Dakar’s mapping tradition. Moreover, they represent how Dakar’s mapping tradition is continually changing. Pikine farmers are not only paying for mapping work that was traditionally undertaken by government cartographers, but are also providing individualized maps of plots on so-called informal or irregular urban spaces. In making these maps, farmers are involved in producing the maps that lead to their displacement.

The next section builds on this analysis by examining the extent to which contemporary maps produced by private -rather than government- actors in Bambilor are also changing Dakar’s mapping traditions. In describing the multiple maps produced and used by And Samm sa Moomel -a farming collective that will be described in more detail in Chapter 5- this section examines how some maps commissioned or produced by local actors are adopted and integrated into dominant mapping traditions while others aren’t. By identifying which maps are -and aren’t- integrated in dominant mapping traditions in Senegal’s Dakar region, this section describes how maps of individualized claims to property are more likely to be integrated into the Dakar Region’s dominant mapping tradition. This being said, this section shines a spotlight on how not all maps of individualized claims to property are integrated into the dominant mapping tradition. Instead, only maps supported by key political alliances between farmers, housing developers, government actors are integrated into -and effectively change- the dominant mapping narrative in Senegal’s Dakar Region (Wood and Fels 1992; Wood 2010).

Interpreting Mapping Narratives

Similar to Lebu land users in Pikine, farmers involved in the large-scale land struggle in Bambilor that I examined for this dissertation have relied on a variety -and layering- of maps to support their territorialized land claims. Yet while the Pikine farmers that I described in the previous section drew from more recent maps -commissioned by territorial alliances headed by Lebu leaders or through alliances forged with government and IFI’s actors- to defend their land claims, farmers and their respective alliances in Bambilor have relied upon a compilation of historical colonial maps and more recent mappings of property in order to defend their land claims. The cartographic narrative that undergird this mapping tradition thus involves the production of new maps that are read alongside other mappings of disputed territory in Bambilor.

In describing colonial mapping efforts among the Asante in Ghana, Berry (2001) argues that colonists’ efforts to demarcate and codify boundaries of chiefly jurisdictions did not resolve longstanding conflicts over competing claims to land or territorial boundaries. Berry thus describes how colonial maps were subject to continual reinterpretation, and how these reinterpretations served as key points of contention in land struggles. In similar fashion, the farming collective -And Samm sa Moomel, or ASSM- that Bambilor farmers have formed to defend their land claims in the disputed Bertin territory that I studied have resurrected a map produced by the French colonial administration 1861 in order to defend their land claims. I first saw a
photocopy of this historical map hanging on the wall of the ASSM office during a preliminary meeting with a spokesperson for the farming collective, and was informed that a Senegalese historian had given it to the collective after hearing about their land conflict. The map also figured centrally in a memorandum written by leaders of ASSM (And Samma Sa Moomel n.d.). This memorandum was specifically written with the aim of distributing a wide range of information about villagers’ current and historical land claims to a variety of central government officials and media outlets with the aim of forming new alliances that would potentially help land users secure their claims to land.

Sketched by hand during Senegal’s colonial period, the map was drawn up when the French military was expanding their territory into Senegal’s interior. During this period, the French military were also involved in a variety of armed struggles with Senegalese forces resistant to colonial occupation in and around Cayar (Klein 1968). This map was consequently produced during a moment when French military leaders were searching for a direct route that would allow military troops to travel from Dakar to Cayar without raising the attention of villages -and leaders- resistant to French colonialism (And Samma Sa Moomel n.d.).

![Figure 11: 1861 Map of Diander, Annotated by ASSM Leaders (Source: Author)](image)

In many ways, this map is obsolete. Senegalese forces in Cayar have long been defeated by French forces, and generations of road maps have provided updated information for travelers seeking to make the trek from Dakar to Cayar. How, then, could a colonial map that was originally used primarily for expeditionary and military purposes be used or leveraged by a
current generation of farmers and village residents seeking to protect their land rights? Answering this question requires considering how farmers and villagers in Bambilor currently interpret and use the map quite differently from their French precursors. Specifically, ASSM members have called attention to how colonial cartographers on this initial military expedition documented the existence of the numerous villages that they encountered. This included entire villages -such as Nguendouf, Wayembaume, and Deny Birame Ndaw- whose land General Bertin and his descendants claimed as private property in the Bambilor conflict. Notably, ASSM leaders modified this colonial map by marking Ngeundouf, Wayembaume and Deny Birame Ndaw with an asterisk and providing a legend on the map that indicates that these marked data points correspond with villages that existed in the zone before the first French military expedition stepped foot in the zone.

The alterations that the farming collective made to a photocopy of the 1861 map direct readers to focus on key data points and read the map with a new purpose. It trains the reader’s attention to the presence of villages and farms -and thus longstanding land claims- that predate French colonialism. In this sense, the purpose of the 1861 map is in many ways similar to the first map that represented the Lebu community at Thiartoe-sur’mer’s territorial land claims in Pikine, which was described in the previous section. Both maps highlight ethnic territories and stake claims to land based on autochthony. Maps such as these are thus quite different from a cadastre that shows individualized property rights, as these maps represent more territories governed and occupied by specific communities that have auctochthonous land claims instead of discrete mappings of individualized property relations.

To fully understand farmers’ auctochthonous land claims necessitates reading the map alongside the written narrative presented in the memorandum produced by ASSM. For example, the authors of the memorandum have chosen to include evidence garnered from the Senegalese colonial archives on the page immediately following the 1861 map. These archives document the written Report on the Military Survey (Rapport sur la reconnaissance Militaire) that was produced in conjunction with the 1861 map. The report briefly documents the presence of palm trees and the agricultural production of millet and peanuts in the zone. It also touches on varying types of social structures in the villages, noting how both Nguendouf and Deny Birame Ndaw were Lebu villages, whereas nearby Wayembaume had only been recently created and governed by a local marabout (religious leader) (And Samma Sa Moomel n.d.).

ASSM leaders thus incorporated the 1861 map and the notes from the colonial mission to advance their argument that local residents occupied land claimed by Bertin and his descendants well before French colonists first began exploring the Dakar Region. Moreover, the narrative that ASSM leaders have produced to accompany the 1861 map in the memorandum pushes this argument further by arguing that there is no possible way that General Bertin and his heirs would have been able to legally claim land historically used and farmed by residents from the villages annotated in the 1861 map. Specifically, the text written by leaders of ASSM in the memorandum insists that “according to all accounts, not one square meter of land in these
villages was sold to a colonist” (And Samma Sa Moomel n.d., p. 4). This is followed by a detailed exposition and documentation of various accounts regarding how -and what- land was originally sold, transferred, and/or later claimed by Bertin’s descendants. In particular, the memorandum critiques one account that describes how a local sold the land currently under dispute -roughly 2,514 hectares- to a French settler for 1,500FCFA in 1914. It is in response to this supposed land sale that the memorandum writers responded as follows: “it would have been necessary that Daour Ndoye had dementia to sell the village of his ancestors and five other villages of which he himself and his ancestors could have no claim whatsoever” (And Samma Sa Moomel n.d., pp. 5-6).

In this sense, these two passages do not deny that land sales and the privatization of land existed during Senegal’s colonial period. Similar to historical accounts of land privatization in other African contexts (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006), land during Senegal’s colonial period was a commodity that was bought and sold. Farmers are instead arguing that no land was sold or gifted to colonial settlers under dispute. Moreover, the assertion that a local resident sold land to a colonist in 1914 not only runs contrary to village oral histories but also contradicts how property systems were governed during this period. Individuals would not be able to sell land belonging to extended family without the entire family’s approval. Furthermore, ASSM leaders have pointed out that it is even more unlikely that a single individual would be able to sell land used -for housing, farming, and animal husbandry- by numerous families and lineages inhabiting seven different villages.

Thinking seriously about these written narratives in conjunction with these new maps is important given that residents have historically not used maps to protect their property rights, but instead have relied on witnesses and landscaping to defend land claims. Farmers I spoke with agreed that up until recently, local property rights were maintained through the erection of boundary markers (e.g., trees, hedges, fences, etc.) and by relying on witnesses who could affirm an individual or families’ right to farm a specific field. In part, ASSM’s choice to draw upon territorial maps of villages thus hinges upon this longstanding and common sense understanding among local residents that maps -especially maps of individual property rights- have not been the key means to assert territorial claims to land or secure an individual’s property rights.

While most farms in Bambilor are still lined with boundary markers, in recent years farmers have increasingly turned to cadastral projects and efforts to map their individual property rights in order to secure their landholdings. During interviews, farmers frequently described to me how they were the first to map and seek out secure rights to land that had been used by their family for generations. Indeed, when I began conducting research on Bambilor farmers’ adoption of

14Translated by author from French to English. The original quotation reads as follows: “selon tous les témoignages, pas un mètre carre de terrain de ces villages n’a été vendu à un colon” (And Samma Sa Moomeel n.d., p.4)

15Translated by author from French to English. The original quotation reads as follows: “il aurait fallu que Daour NDOYE fût atteint de démence pour vender le village de ses aïeuls et cinq autres villages sur lesquels lui-même et ses aïeuls ne pouvaient avoir le moindre prétention” (And Samma Sa Moomeel n.d., pps. 5-6).
formal land rights in 2007, I was surprised to find that the majority of farmers that I surveyed in the rural community of Bambilor had obtained formal use rights to their property. These formal use rights were provided by the local rural government, and require that all farmers obtain maps of their property from a private mapping firm. This mapping firm houses maps of all property held as formal use rights in the rural community of Bambilor, and is able to provide crucial information -traditionally provided by the central government’s cadastral services- if conflicts arise over who owns a specific plots of land.

This recent flurry of farmers obtaining formal use rights and mapping their fields has followed in the wake of Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms. As described in the previous chapter, these reforms transferred the administration of land rights -specifically, nationalized land governed under Senegal’s National Land Law- to local governments. In the rural community of Bambilor, this means that the rural council is responsible for undertaking much of the work to provide use rights for land in its jurisdiction. For example, when an individual submits and applies for formal use rights -which includes providing required maps and information on use rights requested- the local government must not only verify that the applicant does have valid claims to use the land under question but also confirm that the applicant has paid required mapping taxes. When applications have successfully passed through these hurdles, formal use rights paperwork is drawn up that requires signatures from the president of the rural community council and the sub-prefect, who is the representative of the central state. The sub-prefect’s signature serves to confirm that the local government is following proper procedures and allocating formal use rights in conformance with state laws.

Theoretically, then, both the local and central government are required to verify that formal use rights are only provided for plots of land that do not already have existing claims. Government actors must ensure that nobody holds a use right to a given property before accepting and signing an application for a new formal use right. Similarly, authorities verify property records to ensure that they do not provide formal use rights for land that is already registered as private freehold property. Yet Bambilor farmers have documented proof that the local government -with central government approval- provided formal use rights for land currently claimed under the private land title held by General Bertin’s heirs. While this legal conundrum will be described in more detail in the following chapter, it is important to note here that ASSM leaders have drawn on the maps and formal use rights provided by local and central government authorities to emphasize how previous government actors implicitly denied the validity of General Bertin -and his descendants- claims to land in Bambilor.

Partly due to these previous governmental regimes’ unwillingness -or inability- to enforce Bertin’s land claims, farmers wholeheartedly believed President Wade when he issued a presidential decree in 2006 that declared that the villages situated inside the private freehold title that General Bertin obtained -TFnº1975/R- would not only be conserved, but that residents would be provided with the space necessary for their survival (République du Senegal 2006). Farmers interpreted this last clause guaranteeing them space needed for survival as indicating the central government would help conserve their rights to farm or raise livestock on land located inside the land title held by General Bertin and his heirs. When the central government officially bought the TFnº1975/R from Bertin’s descendants in January 2011, ASSM leaders and
members thus believed that the government was buying up the land title in order to follow through on the promises made in the 2006 presidential decree.

Shortly after President Wade decided to buy the land associated with Bertin’s land claim, President Wade held a meeting with Amadou BA, a marabout (Muslim religious leader) in Bambilor. This marabout announced that President Wade had decided to provide land titles to residents -for homes and fields- that were located within the TFnº1975/R. ASSM leaders argue that the decision was made during a private meeting composed of the heads of Senegal’s governmental ministries held on January 6, 2011. Contrary to these arguments, however, the official notes summarizing discussions from this meeting only indicate that formal land titles would be given for villages; no mention was made in the summarized notes from this meeting about providing land titles for land used for agriculture.

Following these announcements, another meeting was held on February 3, 2011 between central government authorities (Prefect for Rufisque, the sub-Prefect for Sangalkam, and the heads of various departments affiliated with the project), the village chiefs for the seven villages located in the land title, and ASSM collective members. During this meeting, the local Prefect decided that another meeting would be held in the sous-prefecture in Sangalkam to discuss issues that were not contested by anyone. This meeting was held on February 7, 2011. ASSM leaders argue that it was at this meeting that the sub-Prefect suggested that local leaders hire a cartographer to map their fields. Cartographers had already mapped local villages, but previous governmental efforts to map the entire TFnº1975/R failed because the state didn’t have the financial resources to undertake these mapping efforts. Collective leaders argued that the sub-Prefect suggested that local community members should assume the financial responsibility and hire a private cartographer to map their fields so that they would later receive land titles for their fields. Collective members assumed this responsibility, recognizing that this was a role that they could play in their new alliance with government officials. They recognized that maps were a crucial medium for not only creating relationships with key government officials, but securing their property claims.

After the collective accepted this proposition they quickly began looking to secure the cartographers needed to map the extensive territory. According to the collective leaders, representatives from ASSM and central government officials originally discussed completing the mapping project by the beginning of April so that President Wade would be able to announce his decision to protect collective members’ land rights in the annual speech that given on the eve of Senegal’s annual independence celebrations. However, the enormity of the mapping project caused delays in this timeframe. Collective leaders argue that they negotiated an extended timeframe with the sub-Prefect. In the wake of these negotiations, collective leaders hired a private mapping firm for the tune of 50 millions FCFA (roughly $81,433) and the project was completed by mid-May. The firm provided both a master plan of the entirety of land included in TFnº1975/R and maps of individual farms.

The individual and collective maps served as the first formal survey of the entire zone under dispute. It outlined the perimeters of fields and identified 1,042 land managers with claims to each tract of land in the disputed zone. Yet what is remarkable about these cadastral maps is that rather being conducted by government mapping agencies, they were commissioned and paid for
by local citizens. As described above, this is not unique. Bambilor residents and individuals throughout Senegal’s Dakar Region have increasingly resorted to engaging private mapping firms to secure use rights for the property. In this sense, it was hardly a leap of faith for collective members to pay private firms to map their property in hopes of gaining private freehold titles.

When the mapping project was completed and copies of maps were handed over to the sub-Prefect and the managing director for the Ministry of Land and Taxes, however, farmers were shocked to learn that their efforts to secure private freehold titles were summarily denied. Farmers and residents rallied to protect their land against successive waves of demolition and expropriation from various developers who had obtained authorizations required to construct new housing estates on disputed land. It was only after meeting with the managing director of the Ministry of Land and Taxes, the village chiefs, and the marabout Amadou BA (the same marabout who had met and discussed the affair earlier on with President Wade) that collective members -who had not been invited to the meeting- learned that secure land rights would only be provided for residents within village boundaries, and would not be provided for small family farms.

*Figure 12: Photograph of One Section of Map Commissioned by ASSM (Source: Author)*
Public governing authorities I spoke with insisted that they had never promised farmers secure property rights. In fact, several argued that doing so would run up against new housing developments planned in Dakar’s most recent master plan, Horizon 2025. Government officials I spoke with instead argued that they had only suggested farmers map the zone so that they would know who owned which plot of land and what improvements had been made to each plot. In other words, these officials argued that they merely suggested farmers provide their own census of the zone and map their plots in order to help government efforts to compensate and expropriate farmers whose land was located inside the TFn°1975/R.
When they heard about their imminent dispossession, farmers wondered: why had various administrative and political officials insisted that they hire private cartographers and map their land? Why were they asked to foot significant mapping expenses, if the maps would only be used to determine which farmers were expropriated? The maps also provided authorities with neat measurements of their properties - indeed, much more precise than the measurements of plot perimeters that Lebu farmers in Pikine conducted in order to receive compensation. These maps were consequently used when the first group of farmers and homeowners were dispossessed; property owners were, in part, compensated by government authorities based on the size of their plot.

Even more significantly, ASSM members lamented the incredible trust, time, and financial expenses that they invested in making these maps. ASSM leaders were under the assumption that their negotiations and alliances with various public officials were undertaken in good faith. Yet given public officials unwillingness to provide private freehold titles to farmers, collective leaders wondered: did authorities encourage the collective to focus their attention on mapping as a stalling technique? ASSM members were so sure of their alliance with government authorities that contestation over the disputed territory was put on hold during the mapping project. This effectively allowed housing developers and their alliances to continue their work without confronting public dissent. In this sense, the collective’s efforts to mobilize and protect their territorial land claims backfired. Instead of securing land users’ rights, maps -like the maps of Lebu family farm plots in Pikine- were used as a tool for their expropriation.

These most recent attempts to hire private cartographers to map all farms and village land located in the TFn°1975/R must be understood in relation to the larger mapping narrative, which I have outlined in this section consists of the various layering of maps representing property relations in Bambilor. This includes work by ASSM leaders and members to reinterpret colonial maps, the numerous land users who engaged private mapping services in order to obtain formal use rights to land located in the TFn°1975/R, and ASSM members’ decision to hire a private cartographer to map each and every farming plot in the TFn°1975/R. By reading these maps in relation to one another and the social and political efforts undertaken to embed these maps with meaning, this section explores what Wood (2010, p. 9) would describe as a “narrative thread” that ASSM leaders have pieced together to defend their land claims. Specifically, I have argued that ASSM leaders have annotated, collected, and commissioned many different types of maps to defend their members’ land claims.

Reading this collection of maps provided by ASSM leaders draws attention to how farmers in Bambilor -similar to their counterparts in Pikine- have increasingly started representing their landholdings though maps of individualized land claims that are drawn up by private mapping firms. These maps have attracted significantly more attention than maps that document large territories that represent farmers’ and residents’ autochthonous claims to land. Yet not all maps of individualized land claims have equal political standing. Maps of formal use rights to farmland in the Bertin zone -which were produced through farmers’ alliances with a private mapping firm and previous local and central government administrations- were largely dismissed from political negotiations. Instead, more political weight and authority was given to the map commissioned by ASSM leaders to document farmers’ individual landholdings on land located in the TFn°1975/
In part, this was because alliances composed of high-level central government actors and housing developers used their political weight to incorporate this map within the region's dominant mapping narrative. High-level central government actors and housing developers were thus able to use the map commissioned by ASSM farmers to expropriate and compensate a subset of farmers with land in the TF nr 1975/R. While subsequent chapters describe in more detail how these government actors and housing developers were able to form an alliance with some of the farmers in this land dispute, it is important here to highlight how a map that was initially commissioned by a large group of Bambilor farmers to defend their land claims was instead used to expropriate their landholdings. This underscores some of the challenges farmers face in building the social and political alliances that would give their mapping narrative—and thus interpretations of the maps they have cultivated—more authority than the dominant mapping narratives cultivated by housing developers and high-level government actors.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored the diversity of peri/urban mapping projects in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Contrary to accounts that describe a veritable absence of maps in postcolonial urban centers, evidence from urban Senegal suggests that maps are not only prevalent but a key tool in managing urban development. I have argued that this abundance of mapping is rooted in Senegal’s dominant mapping traditions, which were formulated during Senegal’s colonial period. This chapter consequently begins with an examination of how cadastral maps combined with property rights systems and urban plans played a crucial component in French assimilation policies and economic development plans in colonial Senegal. I have also described how this dominant mapping tradition has been instrumental in determining which of Dakar’s urban spaces are targeted for expropriation in order to construct new housing estates.

In describing how the dominant mapping tradition in Senegal’s Dakar Region targets certain spaces for expropriation, I have drawn particular attention to how maps play a key role in determining how planners and government officials see and talk about informal neighborhoods. Neighborhoods where housing plots and land have not been integrated into Dakar’s urban cadastre are labeled as ‘irregular’ and consequently marked as spaces for government/INGO intervention in order to ‘regularize’ land rights, create cadastral maps of each housing plot, and provide residents with access to public services. Similarly, housing developers and government officials frequently examine urban cadastral maps to identify large tracts of farmland containing ‘irregular’ land rights that would be suitable for urban development. These cadastral maps—housed by private mapping firms and in government offices—have served as a focal point in efforts to identify which farmland in Pikine and Bambilor should be used for new housing estates.

Farmers and indigenous leaders in both Pikine and Bambilor have worked to reframe how housing developers and government actors see and represent the so-called irregular spaces they farm that are currently targeted as potential sites for new housing developments. Specifically, I have described how farmer groups have attempted to reframe how their farmland is represented by collecting, producing, and commissioning maps that document property rights and land claims that compete against the representations of their farmland in the dominant mapping tradition. The maps that comprise mapping narratives constituted by farmers vary significantly, ranging from maps that assert autochthonous land claims to large urban territories.
and maps that document farm plots claimed by individuals and families. As I have argued above, maps that present ethnic groups’ and villages’ autochthonous claims to large blocs of territory do not appear to have largely influenced how land conflicts have unfolded. The same cannot be said for maps that document land users' individualized plots of land. Many -albeit not all- of these maps have been incorporated into Dakar's dominant mapping traditions. It is also important to note that maps paid for and produced by farmers that have been integrated into Dakar’s dominant mapping traditions frequently do not work to defend farmers’ land rights; at best, they help farmers obtain compensation for land and property expropriated by housing developers and government actors. This underscores how ‘right to the city’ movements organized to defend claims to urban farmland by Dakar’s peri/urban farmers have been unable to mobilize enough political support to fundamentally change the dominant ways of seeing, representing, and developing urban space reflected in Dakar’s mapping tradition. In this sense, housing developers have formed alliances with urban planners and key government officials to overshadow farmers’ efforts to envision new ways of using, managing, and developing Dakar’s urban spaces.

Attention to this mapping narrative also shines light on recent trends towards the increased privatization of mapping services in urban Senegal. Farmers in both Pikine and Bambilor have increasingly relied upon private mapping firms or draughstmen to map their land claims. In Bambilor, farmers applying for formal use rights provided by the local government are required to have their land mapped by a private mapping firm. This partly helps us understand why Bambilor farmers and residents believed that hiring private cartographers -at considerable expense- to map their landholdings would help secure land rights. Thus while increased use of private mapping firms has frequently helped many land users secure formal use rights in peri-urban Senegal, it is clear that the rise of private mapping firms has also been accompanied by new political relations that work to dispossess peri/urban farmers.

Taking into consideration the mapping narratives that are being produced in Pikine and Bambilor -which are marked not only by the increased privatization of mapping services, but by social and political power relations that underscore not only which maps are treated seriously but how maps are interpreted- is especially important considering recent efforts to put land registration and cadastral mapping at the forefront of the policy agenda in many sub-Saharan African contexts. Much of this policy analysis insists that property and cadastral maps don’t exist in African contexts, and wrongly assumes that technical solutions -in which new mapping technology is central- will not only resolve longstanding land disputes, increase gender equality, and decrease inequality all whilst encouraging investments in property (Byamugisha 2013). By focusing on technical solutions to land registration, as others have pointed out (Peters 2013), these policies are not paying enough attention to the politics embedded in efforts to provide -or refusing to provide- land users with secure titles to their property. Attention must not be focused solely on making new maps, but in questioning how these maps will be interpreted (and re-interpreted) and who will ultimately benefit from cadastral projects. Evidence presented in this chapter thus not only questions IFI’s assumptions about the extent of map-making traditions in sub-Saharan Africa, but sheds light on significant challenges for efforts to equitably map land users property in peri/urban centers.
Chapter 4
Legal Settlements and Limits to Negotiability

Colonial Courts

Contention over land rights in the Bertin conflict in Bambilor has lasted more than 100 years and has withstood multiple presidencies. Oral accounts of the Bertin conflict from elders in the Bambilor community attest that the land conflict originated from an inheritance dispute that was adjudicated in French colonial courts in 1897. As mentioned previously, the winner of this inheritance dispute paid his French lawyer with a small tract of land. By the 1950s, this tract of land was managed by Bruno Du Roselle, the operations manager for the Compagnie Foncière de l’AOF. Bambilor residents claim that Du Roselle attempted to extend the size of his landholdings, displacing farmers whose plots were located nearby the tract that had been exchanged during the 1897 inheritance dispute. Several farmers in Deny Birame Sud -one of the villages that is completely subsumed in the TFn’1975/R- resisted displacement. During this resistance, one farmer -Gana Ndoye- was arrested and charged with cutting down trees and crops on property claimed by Du Roselle.

After a trial in a French colonial court in 1956, all charges against Gana Ndoye were dropped. Ndoye was released from prison, continued to farm his land, and the French settler was not allowed to farm the disputed territory. Oral history and court records that I collected and reviewed indicate that the French settler who leveled charges against Ndoye was unable to present any maps or land titles that proved to colonial judges that he actually owned the land. In fact, ASSM leaders and village residents agree that the only colonial map and private land title that French colonists procured was for a small, uncontested plot of land in the village of Bambilor.

When discussing this court case with one of Gana Ndoye’s descendents, I was admittedly fascinated when I found out that French colonial courts had not only called for Ndoye’s release but denied colonists’ efforts to expropriate farmers. But I was even more surprised when I realized that the Bambilor residents whose houses and farms were currently threatened by General Bertin’s descendants were not seeking to adjudicate the land dispute in Senegalese courts. This led me to wonder: if French colonial courts had helped Ndoye defend his land claims, why wouldn’t Ndoye’s descendants -and numerous other residents and farmers affected by the Bertin conflict- also defend their landholdings through Senegal’s court system?

Bambilor residents and farmers were not alone in their decision to resolve land conflicts outside of Senegal’s court rooms. Various large-scale land conflicts that I studied in Pikine were also resolved outside of Senegalese court rooms. This is particularly significant given the scholarly literature documenting various public and private actors’ increased acceptance -and reliance- on state judicial sectors to regulate land disputes in a few sub-Saharan African contexts (Crook 2004; Byamugishja 2013). Actions taken by residents and farmers whose land was threatened in Pikine and Bambilor also stands in contrast to a vast literature that documents how actors hesitant to use federal courts in African contexts frequently rely on neo/customary courts -which may or may
not have been incorporated into state judicial systems- to defend their land claims (Moore 1986; Berry 2001; Lund 2008).

Farmer and residents’ decisions to negotiate settlements for these land conflicts outside of federal, local, and traditional courts in Pikine and Bambilor are also significant given that Senegalese courts are currently inundated with requests to adjudicate current land conflicts. Examples of land conflicts frequently heard in court include legal proceedings that settle conflicts between two individuals over plot boundaries, the resolution of claims that government actors failed to provide adequate compensation when expropriating individuals with private, freehold land titles, and suits levied against housing developers who fraudulently sold single plots of land to multiple buyers.

Given that Senegalese courts hear an astounding number of cases on land conflicts, this chapter demonstrates why farmers in large-scale land conflicts in Pikine and Bambilor overwhelmingly decide not to use the courts to adjudicate land disputes. I show that this is an explicit strategy on their part, given the many instances in which Senegalese courts not only favor elites but also help them expropriate farmers’ land. Farmers and residents are well aware of these systematic biases, and consequently choose to defend their land claims outside of Senegal’s court system. In supporting this argument, this chapter begins with a brief exposition of Senegal’s land laws. This is followed by several sections that examine how efforts to dispossess farmers and residents during colonialism have been encoded and reworked by Senegal’s current land laws in ways that discourage farmers’ and residents’ use of Senegalese courts to defend land claims in large-scale land disputes.

While actors in Bambilor and Pikine have been hesitant to adjudicate their large-scale land disputes in courts, this doesn't mean that Senegalese courts -or a system of law and order- are absent in residents’ and farmers’ struggles to retain access to and control of their homes and farmland. Farmers and residents threatened with displacement rely on extensive knowledge of Senegal’s legal structure to negotiate settlements to land conflicts. As such, this chapter contradicts popular assumptions that residents and farmers living in ‘irregular’ spaces -without formal land rights- are unruly, uneducated peasants who adhere to traditional rather than modern conceptions of law and property. In developing this argument, my analysis is divided into two key sections. The first explores how groups of farmers in Pikine filed lawsuits that not only stalled demolition of their landholdings, but encouraged the groups of actors encroaching on their farmland to enter into settlement negotiations. The second section explains how farmers in Bambilor relied on their knowledge of Senegalese laws to question the legality of how housing developers and their partners expropriated their landholdings. My research in Pikine and Bambilor consequently reflects distinct legal geographies in how courts and legal knowledge are used in Senegal’s Dakar region.

**Laws Governing Land in Senegal**

After Senegal’s independence, President Senghor’s regime placed the reform of Senegalese land laws at the top of the nation’s policy agenda. The focus of this land reform pivoted around the implementation of the National Land Law -Loi de Domaine National- in 1962, which nationalized all land that hadn’t been privatized during colonialism. In one fell swoop, the
Senegalese state effectively outlawed customary land practices and became trustee of roughly ninety-five percent of Senegal's territory. Then Minister of Finance André Peytavin described how by implementing this National Land Law the state became the new “master of the land” by effectively usurping roles held by traditional land governing authorities (Caverivière and Debène 1988, p. 71). During his speech that announced the National Land Law, President Senghor reiterated these points and also declared that the new legislation was a “return from Roman law to African law, from the bourgeois conception of private property to the socialist conception which is that of traditional black Africa” (Caverivière and Debène 1988, p. 1).

Both Peytavin and Senghor’s proclamations were highly debatable. Most importantly, the new land law did not in any way outlaw private property rights. The so-called ‘Roman’ freehold land titles that had been issued during colonialism—which constituted roughly five percent of the nation’s territory—remained valid, and the state continued to provide private titles on nationalized land.16 This included two distinct types of private property: private property that was registered to the state, and private property that was registered to individuals. Private property registered to individuals is similar to freehold property rights; land rights are officially documented in Senegal’s land register (the **livre foncier**) and integrated into the national cadastre in order to protect title-holders from expropriation by third parties. Land and improvement to the land (e.g., houses, wells, trees) can also be bought and sold.

Private property that is registered to the state is also documented in Senegal’s land register, yet this type of property rights is registered to the Senegalese government rather than an individual. Government buildings are frequently built on land held as state-owned private property. In addition to this, the Senegalese government also provides a variety of long-term leases to individuals on land that has been registered as state-owned private property. Examples of long-term leases include ‘ordinary leases’ (**baux ordinaires**) and ‘long-term leases’ (**baux emphyteotique**), which require annual rent payments and can last anywhere between eight and fifty years. These types of leases are most frequently used on agricultural land. More recently, the Senegalese government has also started providing long-term leases for housing on urban land that has been zoned for residential purposes. Known as surface rights (**droit de superficie**), these leases run between twenty-five and fifty years and provide recipients with the right to build and occupy urban housing on housing plots that are registered as state private property. None of these long-term leases provide land users with rights to sell or sublet their property (Sané 2013; Ndiaye 2015).

The administration of private property—held by individuals and the Senegalese government—thus underwent minimal changes after Senegal’s independence. Yet the same thing cannot be said for land rights on nationalized land. The National Land Law—as described above—

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16 Privatization of Senegalese land even intensified after the National Land Law reforms were enacted. For the first six months after the land reform was enacted, the legislation provided a loophole that allowed land users to apply for private title if they could prove that they had made improvements to their property. By 1965, nearly 20,000 requests for land titles under this loophole had been accommodated (Verdier, 1965). This being said, the procedures for registering private land to individuals was—and still remains—lengthy. For example, the Senegalese government was still processing land registration requests that were made when the loophole for registering nationalized land was in place more than two decades after Senegal’s National Land Law was passed (Golan 1990).
fundamentally reconfigured how land rights were administered. This was partly because government officials rather than traditional authorities were now charged with administering land rights on nationalized land. At the same time, the National Land Law expressly forbid a variety of land transactions on nationalized land, including land sales, land rentals, land pawns and even non-monetary land loans. Only individuals who productively used land—for example, through farming or construction of housing—were able to obtain formal use rights (droit d’usage).

Another key facet of the National Land Law was that it has given government officials the ability to abrogate land users’ formal use rights if certain conditions are met. For instance, governing authorities are allowed to a rescind someone’s formal use rights if the government intends to use the land for public purposes. Government officials can also withdraw a user’s formal use rights as a means of sanctioning land users who fail to abide by laws governing nationalized land. In particular, government officials are allowed to revoke use rights held by land managers who rent out their landholdings for more than two years. The same holds true for individuals who pawn or provide non-monetary loans of their landholdings for more than two years. According to the National Land Law, an individual or group only needs to productively use a plot of nationalized land for two years to qualify for formal use rights. Of course, not all farmers have fully abided by these laws, just as not all government actors have chosen to revoke formal use rights when a land user chooses defy the National Land Law. The next section describes such land users’ efforts to circumvent land laws in greater detail, followed by a short review of what government actors and NGO reports argue motivates land users to defy Senegal’s land laws.

Table 1: Senegalese Land Laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalized Land</th>
<th>Registered Land</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Land Law</strong> <em>(Loi du Domaine National)</em></td>
<td><strong>Freehold Private Property</strong> <em>(Domain Privé)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Senegalese state is trustee of all land that is not held under private title. Individuals can apply for formal use rights (droit d’usage), which are administered by local governments. Individuals or groups holding are a/ not able to sell, rent, loan, pawn, or inherit land administered under the National Land Law and b/ are required to make investments in land (e.g., building structures, farming land) within two years of obtaining use rights. Land use that does not conform to these regulations can be reallocated by local governments.</td>
<td>Land held as freehold private property has been formally been registered as private property to individuals and non-governmental entities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Property</strong> <em>(Domain Privé de l’Etat)</em></td>
<td><strong>State Property</strong> <em>(Domain Privé de l’Etat)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>State property includes land that has been registered as private property that is then administered by the central government. This includes land used for government buildings. The central government also provides individuals with long-term leases on state property for farming (e.g., baux ordinaires, baux emphyteotiques) or urban residential purposes (e.g., droit de superficie).</td>
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Circumventing Senegalese Land Laws

While many land users have stopped renting, pawning, or even loaning out landholdings since the National Land Law was implemented, many others have managed to circumvent these new regulations. For example, many land managers (a term I use to refer to farmers who manage how farmland they claim is cultivated, albeit who do not necessary perform all farm work themselves) have started limiting the duration of time that individuals or groups can productively use their landholdings. These land managers find new tenants to rent their plots on an annual basis in order to avoid allowing a single user to work on their land for the two consecutive years necessary to apply for formal use rights. Other land managers continue to rent or loan tracts of land for periods longer than two years, but only if they trust that the land user—in other words, the person actually performing the farm work—will not apply for formal use rights and expropriate their landholdings.

Land managers have also found ways to evade the National Land Law’s restrictions on land sales. In the Dakar region, individuals selling land frequently skirt around the prohibition on land sales by saying that they are only selling the improvements they have made to their land (such as structures, trees, and wells). Parties involved in land sales also rely on witnesses and informal land sale papers (known as *actes de vente*) to verify land sales.

As described in Chapter 1, government officials also frequently ignored illicit land sales undertaken in Dakar’s so-called formal neighborhoods, such as in the Parcelles Assainies sites and services project and in Pikine’s formal neighborhoods. And while many local and central government officials frequently turn a blind eye towards local actors’ efforts to circumvent Senegal’s National Land Law, this isn’t always the case. For example, government authorities have long criticized and actively discouraged illegal land sales made by indigenous Lebu leaders in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Such critiques were especially prominent in Pikine immediately after the National Land Law was implemented. During this period, many Lebu land users sold property *en masse* because they feared that they would not be able to obtain—or maintain—formal use rights. At the same time, local and government actors criticized an increase in fraudulent land sales: Lebu landholders would often sell a single plot to several different buyers, and individuals who had been allotted use rights by Lebu lineage heads sold land without obtaining approval from all of their family members.

Government officials frequently argue that land managers, farmers, and residents are solely to blame for engaging in illegal land transactions and illicit land practices. As such, public authorities characterize individuals who circumvent national land laws as backward peasants who are simply unable to understand Senegal’s land laws. This is the logic that prompted one bureaucrat in Senegal’s central government to inform me that farmers and entire villages were located on land claimed by Bertin’s descendants because they just didn’t know any better. “You

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17 Of course, it is important to note that criticism of illicit land transactions in Senegal is hardly limited to the Dakar Region. Land sales and the construction of upscale housing developments are also very prevalent in Senegal’s tourist hubs and nationalized land located near the construction site for Senegal’s new international airport.
must understand,” he elaborated: “they are illiterate.” These sentiments were echoed in many other interviews I held with public officials and NGO staff.

Overall, this logic reflects a generalized consensus among many public officials and NGO staff that Senegalese land laws were not only very complex, but too complicated for everyday land users to understand. This argument is compounded by claims that much of the legislation covering land administration in Senegal remains ambiguous on how land laws are to be implemented. For instance, multiple scholars have pointed out how the National Land Law does not adequately explain what practices lead to ‘productive’ use of land (Traore 1991; Faye 2008; Hesseling 2009). Significant work has been undertaken to counteract this perceived ambiguity - and complexity- embedded in Senegalese land laws. Many campaigns to educate (known as sensibilisation) residents and farmers on various aspects of Senegalese land laws, including programs that aim to explain to Dakar’s urban farmers how to access formal land rights (ENDA, 2006) and media campaigns that describe steps individuals buying land need take to guard against fraudulent land schemes.

Furthermore, arguments that characterize local populations as uneducated and ignorant of Senegalese land laws are frequently complemented by allegations that local populations are innately tethered to customary -or traditional- means of controlling who can access land. Tzeutschler (1999) describes how many traditional authorities retained powers over land administration through the 1970s because rural governmental authorities -charged with implementing the National Land Law- remained willfully ignorant of laws governing nationalized land and did not controvert land allocations made by traditional elite. Such accounts of residents practicing willful ignorance of Senegalese land laws remain prevalent in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Government officials I met with frequently disparaged land users’ adherence to customary land systems. In their critiques, government officials described how Lebu land users’ simply didn’t want to follow Senegalese laws, noting that formal land rights trumped ancestral or traditional claims to land.

But just how do government officials conceptualize customary laws? Descriptions of customary land rights systems in government reports usually begin by describing how the first inhabitants of a village first obtained and allocated landholdings. Much attention is consequently given to how boundaries for villages were initially drawn, and on the role played by the lamane -or traditional authority- charged with administering land rites and settling land disputes. Government reports also go on to argue that land in customary land systems is considered ‘sacred’ and that land rights are not transferable and are held in common by all -living and dead- community members (République du Sénégal 1996; République du Sénégal et. al. 2004). And in a speech describing his agenda for land reform 2005, President Wade even relegated traditional land systems to Senegal’s pre-colonial period, distancing customary laws from land regimes established during and after colonialism (‘Allocution de Maitre Abdoulaye Wade’ 2005).

18 Rural councils frequently interpret ‘productive’ use with continuous farming (for a minimum of two years) or by infrastructural improvements to land. Yet this interpretation of ‘productive’ use of nationalized land frequently discounts pastoralists use of land, and has resulted in the widespread enclosure of seasonal pastures and pathways between grazing areas used by transhumant pastoralists and their livestock (Traore 1991).
All of these accounts bear little resemblance to how traditional land rights are currently practiced in Senegal’s Dakar Region. For instance, *lamanes* surrendered their land administration duties long ago, and play little -if any- role in Dakar’s current landscape. In the Dakar Region, land rights are also increasingly held by individuals or nuclear families. Many of these individuals and families have no qualms about selling land, as I’ve described above. In this sense, how traditional land rights are administered -including who controls access to land- has changed significantly since Senegal’s pre-colonial period.

Given that government actors are well aware that land transactions are rampant and that *lamanes* no longer administer land rights in the Dakar Region, this decision to advance anachronistic -and thus incomplete- descriptions of how traditional land rights function is significant. If anything, these definitions of so-called traditional land rights bolsters government efforts to label individuals who continue to assert traditional land claims as backward peasants who -by innately clinging to customary land systems- are disconnected from Senegal’s present. The next section challenges these assumptions. Specifically, I draw from fieldwork conducted in Pikine and Bambilor to describe how Senegalese land laws have systemically excluded certain populations from receiving formal land titles.

**Colonial Land Grabs**

As described in this chapter’s introduction, Bambilor residents unanimously agree that the Bertin conflict that threatened to obliterate seven villages -including residents’ farmland- could be traced back to an inheritance dispute between two relatives that unfolded late in the 19th century. The inheritance dispute unfolded between two cousins: Diodio Diop and Daour Ddaw Ndoye. Accounts of the dispute that numerous Bambilor residents shared with me -and that have been passed down for generations- indicate that the inheritance dispute originally began because Ndoye -the eldest man in the family- wanted to claim all of the family inheritance. Yet Diop contested Ndoye’s claims. Not only was she older than Ndoye, but she argued that Wolof and Muslim inheritance practices dictated that Ndoye needed to share the inheritance among the men and the women in the family. This dispute divided the family. Men in the family backed Ndoye’s claims, and women backed Diop. Diop ultimately backed down when Ndoye hired a lawyer -Maître Leon Verdier- to defend his claims. Not only did Diop not hire a lawyer, but she bowed to family pressure and did not appear before the court to defend her inheritance. This resulted in the court’s ruling in favor of Ndoye in 1897. Women family members tried to sanction Ndoye outside of the court by publicly voicing their concerns, yet Diop and her female counterparts were not provided with their share of the inheritance. In fact, the French colonial court went so far as to order Diop to pay Ndoye for damages. Ndoye showed his gratitude for this verdict by compensating his lawyer with a small tract of land in a nearby village, Gorum 3.

The Bambilor conflict -which grew to encompass 2,411 hectares- thus emerged from gendered disputes in a single family over how to equitably divide an inheritance. Senegalese authorities, housing developers, and even many Bambilor residents dispute how this small inheritance dispute came to encompass 2,411 hectares. However, the dominant account of how this dispute unfolded -as told to me by numerous village elders and the leaders in the farming cooperative spearheading the fight to defend farmers and residents’ land- was that Ndoye’s
lawyer eventually traded the parcel he was given in Gorum 3 with another plot located in the village of Bambilor. He later secured private property rights for this Bambilor tract. These rights were later sold -and resold- to other French colonists, who sought to expand the size of their original landholdings. While Bambilor residents have never contested colonists’ ownership claims or property rights for the original tract of farmland provided to Ndoye’s lawyer in the village of Bambilor, it is important to emphasize that they have resisted French colonists’ efforts to enlarge the size of their landholdings. As indicated in this chapter’s introduction, a case tried in French colonial courts in 1956 concluded that French colonists had no legal title to land in Deny Birame Sud, a village located near the village of Bambilor (and in the rural community of Bambilor). This is significant given that the entire village of Deny Birame Sud is included in the current Bertin conflict and claimed in a freehold title -TFn“1975/R- that was provided to General Bertin several decades after Senegal’s independence. The provision of this title has led many residents in Bambilor to question: how was a white colonist able to obtain a land title to land that had been used by their families for more than three centuries?

Similarly, the Pikine land conflicts that I studied can also be traced back to the colonial period. Lebu leaders I spoke with described how the few remaining tracts of farmland located near downtown Pikine lay just beyond the firing ranges used by the French military at the now infamous Camp Thiaroye.¹⁹ Farmers were prohibited from tending to their fields several days a week because of firing practices during the Second World War, and many Lebu farmers described to me how they used to find spent bullets on visits to their parents fields when they were younger. The French later registered this farmland within their property records as privately held state property (described above, as Domaine Privé de l’État) in 1950 when the city of Pikine was founded. They did this without informing all of the landowners or displacing farmers. If fact, it was only after President Diouf’s government provided a long-term lease to this farmland to REPROH that many farmers learned that their farmland was registered as state property, and that the state and private actors had conspired to provide long-terms leases to a horticultural enterprise.

Both of the contemporary land conflicts that I studied in Pikine and Bambilor thus shared histories of colonial and racialized forms of dispossession and displacement (Hart 2002; Moore 2005). In Bambilor, these forms of displacement were also articulated with gendered dispossession when colonial courts effectively denied women family members their inheritance - and thus access to land rights- in a family inheritance dispute. The remainder of this chapter will examine how these forms of dispossession produced property regimes that have prevented current land users in both Pikine and Bambilor -land users whose families have farmed plots for generations, or who have fought farmland from autochthonous landholders- from securing formal land titles.

The next section specifically focuses in on land rights in Pikine, examining how the decision to uphold private property rights provided during colonialism -including DP50, the title that

¹⁹ The Camp de Thiaroye served as a training base for West African soldiers in World War II. It was the site of the Thiaroye Massacre in 1944, when West African soldiers were massacred by French soldiers after protesting for unpaid wages and wages comparable to what was paid to white soldiers (Fargettas 2006).
registered much of Pikine’s farmland as state-owned private property—has extended and reworked historical and racialized forms of land dispossession since Senegal’s independence. Specifically, I examine the Senegalese government’s decision to award a long-term lease to REPROH -Regroupement des Professionels Horticoles de l’Ornement, the horticultural enterprise described in the previous chapter- calls attention to how the ability to access formal property rights in Senegal’s Dakar Region is not entirely dependent on one’s educational status or knowledge of Senegalese land laws. Instead, I argue that post-colonial governments have systematically denied Pikine farmers access to formal land rights.

**Pikine Farmers’ Access to Formal Land Rights**

In Pikine, farmers were always quick to complain about their difficulties securing formal property rights. Several farmers described hiring private cartographers and real-estate brokers (known as courtiers) who are familiar with the legal steps and procedures needed to apply for formal land rights. During my research I encountered many of Pikine’s real-estate brokers, who frequently wait for clients on the steps of the building where land rights are administered in Pikine. These steps serve as brokers’ informal ‘offices’ where they can recruit clients who need help filing land administration paperwork. This privatization of Senegalese bureaucracy (Blundo 2006) has meant that farmers educational status -or knowledge of the law- has played little role in their applications for formal land rights. If anything, one of the key factors determining whether or not Pikine farmers will apply for formal land rights are the high costs associated with mapping land, hiring real-estate brokers, and paying bribes to corrupt officials processing paperwork.

Yet even those Pikine farmers who could afford these expenses watched as their applications for long-term leases fell into oblivion. Many wondered: were their applications for formal title rejected because they weren’t bribing the right government official? Given that none of the farmers I spoke with ever received official word that their applications for formal rights were rejected, other applicants wondered if their long waits for papers -a wait that for one farmer lasted more than twenty years!- resulted from a backlog of requests for formal land rights in Pikine. Indeed, farmers’ only realized that their requests had fallen to the wayside when their fields were overrun with bulldozers and they were shown evidence that the Senegalese government had provided a new horticultural firm -with no established claims to farmland in Pikine- with a long-term lease to their land.

Threatened by expropriation, Pikine farmers harshly criticized the government’s decision to provide a long-term lease to the horticultural enterprise. They argued that the government failed to undertake a formal study of the zone -known as an état de lieu- before providing the lease, which would have shown farmers’ longstanding presence in the zone. Those who had applied for leasehold rights questioned why their requests were ignored while REPROH’s request was accommodated. Farmers who saw copies of the formal lease argued that the horticultural company only obtained the lease because someone in their firm had close political connections with government officials who signed the document, which included the high-level government actors in the Ministry of Urbanism and then-President Diouf.

My own research supports farmers’ assertions that REPROH was only able to procure a long-term lease to Pikine farmland because of political connections. Bureaucrats that I
interviewed in the Ministry of Urban Renewal, Housing, and the Environment (Ministere du renouveau urbain, de l’Habitat et du cadre de Vie, or MURHE) and in the local government offices charged with managing land in Pikine (La Direction des Services Techniques) indicated that all applications for long-term leases in urban areas required approval from the MURHE. In order to provide their stamp of approval, officials in the MURHE are tasked with verifying that applicants’ use of land conforms with urban development plans and local zoning maps. Following this logic, applicants seeking leases to build new housing will only receive secure property rights if the zoning plan indicates their tract of land is zoned for housing. Farmers applying for long term leases will only obtain property right for land that is zoned for farming. Unfortunately, no zoning plans currently exist for Pikine.

Government bureaucrats in Pikine’s Technical Service department, which handles most land issues for the city, argued that this is why the MURHE uniformly denied all applications for land rights made by farmers. MURHE defends this position because land used by smallholder farmers hasn’t been zoned for farming. Yet the absence of a zoning map has not prevented the MURHE from providing long-term leases to housing developers and individuals purchasing new housing plots, just as zoning regulations did not affect the decision to provide a long-term lease to the horticultural firm REPROH that claimed land used by smallholder farmers. This suggests that the MURHE is selectively interpreting zoning regulations in Pikine. Those developing and using land in Pikine - be they housing developers, mechanics, smallholder farmers, or agribusiness investors- must be able to call upon political connections and convince bureaucrats at MURHE that their intended land use is preferable to all other possible uses for affected land.

Many farmers and real-estate brokers that I spoke with argued that the most efficient and effective way to convince various government agencies - such as the MURHE, the Ministry of Land and Taxes, etc.- to sign paperwork was by bribing key bureaucrats who worked in these ministries. Farmers I spoke with hardly hid their criticism of these practices, arguing that their income as farmers prevented them from paying the exorbitant bribes asked of them. Farmers also pointed out how larger enterprises - such as REPROH- and housing developers were better placed to pay bribes demanded by government bureaucrats.

While all of the government officials I spoke with understandably denied receiving or asking for bribes to sign paperwork, a variety of bureaucrats did admit to receiving plots of land as part of the quota system that I described in greater detail in Chapter 1. As this quota system ensures that housing plots are redistributed to loyal bureaucrats working in government agencies, it effectively works to encourage government bureaucrats to approve housing developments. Even housing developments in Pikine that attempted to evade the quota system still traded serviced housing plots for signatures on official land documents. Government officials have many ways that they attempt to hide these trades. For instance, bureaucrats and politicians frequently use a family member’s name instead of their own on paperwork for land received through such illicit negotiations. Yet farmers and residents I spoke with who live and work alongside the new housing developments see the government bureaucrats who come to supervise construction on houses deeded to immediate family members. As such, attempts to hide who owns and invests in urban property are readily uncovered by individuals living and working in Pikine.
All of this suggests that Pikine’s quota system and bribes provided to government officials play a crucial role in helping government officials decide whether the few remaining tracts of farmland in Pikine should be controlled by smallholder farmers, or deeded to large-scale agricultural enterprises and housing developers. And just as government officials systematically provide long-term leases to housing developers and other entities because of bribes and Pikine’s land quota system, bureaucrats also deny farmers’ access to secure land titles because various Senegalese government officials intend to situate their own government-sponsored projects on the farmland that remains.

In some cases, these projects would continue to allow farmers to access land. For instance, efforts are currently underway to pump stagnant water from Pikine’s flooded neighborhoods into the various lakes that punctuate the urban farmland in Pikine’s Grande Niayes, where I conducted the bulk of my research. While many farmers’ fields are flooded during rainy season, when Pikine’s neighborhoods are most affected by flooding, many farmers noted that they can still farm their land once the floodwaters have receded from their fields. Local governments have also planned housing developments and a variety of public services (such as schools, health clinics, etc.) on farmland. The central government -with funding from a variety of international partners- recently completed construction on a new road that runs through farmland. Moreover, the central government also broke ground in 2015 on a project to build a national wrestling arena on land once reserved for farmland.

Government efforts to develop urban farmland -e.g., convert farmland into housing estates, build new roads, and construct a news sports arena- have been aided by the seemingly contradictory practice of uniformly rejecting farmers applications for secure land titles while still allowing farmers’ continued use of farmland. This is because farmers have increasingly worked to prevent illegal attempts to convert farmland into commercial or residential spaces. For example, farmers have frequently called on local mayors, bureaucrats in Pikine’s prefect office, and the government agency charged with enforcing land laws (La Direction de Surveillance et de l’Occupation du Sol, DSCOS) when other farmers have attempted to sell -or build housing on- Pikine farmland. By reaching out to these government actors, farmers have on many occasions prevented Lebu land users from building new housing estates on Pikine farmland without government knowledge or authorization.

Pikine’s urban farmers have also prevented urban land from being converted into informal dump sites. In the Dakar Region, vacant tracts of land are also used as dump sites by informal trash workers. Several farmers I spoke with who were displaced by a contentious housing project in Pikine West described how they formed an agreement to secure informal access to land owned as private property by a nearby golf club in exchange for cleaning up informal trash sites on their allotted plots. Other farmers I spoke with also agreed that they prevented informal trash workers from converting their farms into dump sites, arguing that informal trash workers were unable to dump trash on their land because their farms were constantly guarded and under surveillance by farmers and paid guardians. Farmers take their role as ‘guardians’ seriously, arguing that this work helps them prevent unauthorized developments on urban farmland while also helping them build new, stronger relationships with governing authorities.
At the same time, farmers also recognize that many of these same government authorities and property owners eventually intend to displace farmers and undertake projects to develop what remains of Pikine’s urban farmland. Their role as guardians thus only provided them with impermanent land rights that could easily be taken away by government authorities. This became clear to the leader of one of Pikine’s largest farmer associations during a meeting with the prefect, who told him: “If you see that the zone [of farmland in Pikine] is underdeveloped, it is because the state wanted it that way.” If anything, the prefect’s statement confirmed farmers’ experiences: urban farmers are not given public subsidies for seeds or inputs, and only recently began working with government programs that provide technical assistance to Senegalese farmers. Farmers consequently left this meeting with an understanding that if the state had wanted to assist farmers by helping develop farming systems or by providing secure titles they would have done so already. Their alliances with various government officials were only strong when farmers served government interests.

In this sense, Pikine farmers’ recognize that they don’t have land titles or secure claims to the land that they farm, and they know that their ability to sell or rent out their landholdings is limited by their inability to obtain formal papers. For example, one Lebu farmer that I spoke with in Pikine showed excellent command of Senegalese land laws. “I wouldn’t mind selling [my plot]” he argued, “but I don’t have a paper. [My land] belongs to the state. That is what I know. You won’t come here and hear me say: me, I own the land and I can sell it.” In the same conversation, this Lebu farmer also deferred to the government’s claims to his landholdings, noting: “If you look at the land that I’ve lost, it was always the state that took it from me…. If ministers come [to take my land] I’d have to be okay with it.”

While not all Pikine farmers would acquiesce so easily to government efforts to expropriate their landholdings, this farmer’s sentiments speak to how Pikine’s farmers are hardly a homogenous group of uneducated landholders who just can’t understand Senegal’s complex land laws. In like manner, these same farmers do not uniformly advocate for ‘traditional’ or Lebu land rights systems by rejecting Senegalese land laws. As described above, many farmers have actually sought out formal land titles to secure their property rights. In fact, every single land manager I spoke with in Pikine wanted formal land titles for their farmland. Yet Pikine farmers have not been unable to secure formal land rights.

As I’ve argued throughout this section, farmers have been denied these land rights partly because property rights that were obtained through racialized forms of dispossession during colonialism were upheld and enforced by the Senegalese government after independence. What is more, I have argued that the land regime that has developed in Pikine since independence has systematically withheld formal land rights from urban farmers. This is partly because Pikine farmers lack the means and/or political connections needed to obtain support for their formal land rights applications. I have also argued that farmers’ applications for formal land rights have been denied because government actors have their own plans and visions on how to transform and develop what remains of Pikine’s farmland.

Without access to formal papers or title to their land, Pikine farmers have been reluctant to have their land conflicts adjudicated in Senegalese courts. Similarly, the land users involved in the Bertin conflict in Bambilor have not brought their grievances before Senegalese court rooms. In
the next section, I look at how Bambilor land users -like their counterparts in Pikine- have not brought current land disputes before Senegalese courts because they have been also been systematically denied access to formal land rights. In making this argument, I also focus on how land users in Bambilor have publicly criticized how General Bertin obtained his land title and the corrupt means of redistributing land in the Bertin tract during Wade’s administration.

**Questioning Legality: Illegal Titles and Corrupt Land Deals**

While Bambilor residents frequently reminded me that they have spent more than a century fighting for and defending their landholdings, land conflicts between colonists and land users were not ongoing. Instead, they only emerged intermittently when General Bertin -or his antecedents- attempted to expand the size of the plot gifted to French lawyer in the original inheritance dispute. Several villages in Bambilor have not always been able to to successfully prevent each and every attempt to seize their land, yet a couple villages were consistently able to block colonists’ expropriation of their farmland. This included the court case between Gana Ndoye and Du Roselle, mentioned in this chapter’s introduction. It also included General Bertin’s renewed efforts to expropriate farmers in the mid-1980s when he began bulldozing farmland for a new housing estate in Deny Birame Sud. Several villagers were arrested in this conflict after General Bertin was reputedly hospitalized for a severe head wound. Police never determined who injured Bertin during this conflict, and Bertin never stepped foot in Deny Birame Sud again. In the end, Bertin’s housing estate was never built.

Bambilor residents assured me that General Bertin abandoned his plans to build a new housing estate in Deny Birame Sud during the 1980s because he was unable to obtain support for his land claims from President Diouf’s regime. In this sense, they argued that Diouf was merely following the precedent set by Senghor and the colonial courts, which continually denied General Bertin’s (and his antecedents’) attempts to enlarge the size of the landholding procured during the original inheritance dispute. Yet these arguments are open to question given that Bertin allegedly obtained a private land title during President Senghor’s regime. This land title not only encompassed the plot of land that was given away during the original inheritance dispute, but also included the fields and villages currently involved in the Bertin conflict. Officially known as TFn°1975/R, this land title is the only piece of evidence that Bertin was able to expand his landholdings and claim legal ownership rights to include the farms and villages that Bambilor residents have been farming for generations.

While farmers unanimously agreed that Bertin and his descendants obtained a secure land title for the plot exchanged during the original inheritance dispute, many farmers and residents I spoke with refused to acknowledge Bertin’s land title. This was because in addition to the plot exchanged during the inheritance dispute, the title also included entire villages and residents’ farmland. Most farmers and residents whose landholdings were included in this title argued that Bertin obtained his private land rights illegally. Specifically, they claim that General Bertin and the Senegalese authorities issuing the land title did not conduct comprehensive interviews with land users, land surveys, or land studies (known as *état de lieu*) of the land that was eventually registered to General Bertin.
This is significant given that such studies are required when converting nationalized land into private property. These studies not only identify which individuals and/or groups have used land being registered, but also document the investments that these individuals and/or groups have made to nationalized land. This helps individuals and/or groups being dispossessed obtain compensation for investments they have made to nationalized land before their property is expropriated. Yet none of the farmers or residents received any such compensation when the land title was provided to General Bertin. This failure to provide compensation underscores many land users’ argument that the TFn°1975/R was obtained illegally.

In addition to this, not all farmers are convinced that the TFn°1975/R title even exists. None of the residents and farmers that I spoke with were even aware that private land title even existed until Bertin’s descendants renewed efforts to displace farmers and residents during Wade’s regime. Until they learned of the TFn°1975/R title, farmers and residents assumed that their landholdings were nationalized and governed under Senegal’s National Land Law. This was partly because the local government continued to provide land users with formal use rights throughout the 1980s. Leaders for And Saam sa Moomeel -the farmer association that has mobilized land users to protect Bambilor residents whose land rights are threatened in the most recent Bertin land conflict- have collected and photocopied large stacks of formal use rights conferred to individuals farming land situated in the TFn°1975/R title. Paperwork for these formal use rights clearly displays the signatures of local and central government authorities. Men and women who received formal use rights during this period consequently wondered: why would local and central government officials provide land users with formal use rights if the land was already held under private title?

Government officials I spoke with about this insisted that these formal use rights were only allocated because the government bureaucrats during this period didn’t have the resources to verify whether land applications for formal use rights were situated on land registered as private property. Yet many farmers remain skeptical of this explanation. This skepticism has been compounded by the fact that government bureaucrats have continued to hide and obscure relevant information about Bertin’s landholding from farmers and residents threatened with displacement. For example, when farmers asked a high-ranking bureaucrat at the Ministry of Taxes and Land -the government agency that is charged with mapping land and managing land titling initiatives- if they could see a copy of Bertin’s land title, the official refused to show them the title. Some farmers walked away from this meeting questioning whether or not the TFn°1975/R title existed, while others wondered whether the official title contained information that could prove that it was obtained illicitly. Were government officials hesitant to show them the title because they didn’t want to disclose the names of the public officials who approved the Bertin title? Were they hiding the TFn°1975/R title to protect government agencies and public officials from charges of corruption? In this sense, government officials’ refusal to show farmers and residents the TFn°1975/R title fueled farmers’ and residents concerns that the TFn°1975/R title didn’t exist, or that the title had been obtained fraudulently.

At the same time, public attention also converged on the Wade administration’s decision to purchase land included in the TFn°1975/R title from General Bertin’s descendants. Negotiations to buy land from Bertin’s descendants began in 2003, and Bambilor land users were advised that the government only entered into these negotiations in order to secure villagers’ landholdings.
Writing about these negations in that dossier that And Samm sa Moomeel compiled and distributed in order to defend their land claims, the farmers’ association even noted how President Wade issued a decree in 2006 that ensured villagers would maintain their housing and farmland when the government completed the land sale. “This was a huge relief” ASSM farmers wrote in the dossier, “even if questions were asked about such a purchase, as the land title was obtained under nebulous conditions, indeed illegal…. In any case, legally, land from the TFn°1975/R land title could only have been ceded to their occupants” (ASSM n.d., p. 12).

Yet after the land transaction was completed, the Wade administration reneged on these promises. Instead, President Wade’s administration sold and gifted much of the land that he had purchased from General Bertin’s descendants -at 300FCFA/m²- to Senegal’s political and religious elite. This included the decision in 2007 to sell more than 700 hectares -for 1,000FCFA/m²- to Oumar SY, who at that time was a personal friend to President Wade and a high-ranking deputy for the nearby Mbour Region (for the PDS-the ruling political party at the time, which was directed by President Wade). Nonetheless, SY vehemently denies that his political connections helped him broker the Bambilor land deal. He argues that he began negotiations to buy this land in the late 1980s, before Wade came into office. Moreover, SY claimed that the land transaction was not even negotiated between SY and Wade, but was worked about between SY’s business enterprise and Senegalese government officials (‘Omar Sy’ 2015).

This being said, journalists reported a variety of irregularities in the land transaction brokered by SY’s business enterprise and Senegalese government officials. Most notably, SY’s enterprise did not pay the Senegalese government for the land it had purchased until after it had resold the land in 2009 (Tendeng 2011). Perhaps even more shocking was that SY’s enterprise resold the land for 7,000FCFA/m², or seven times what SY’s enterprise had originally paid for the land. Given that SY did not make any improvements to the land between 2007 and 2009, many critics of this land deal questioned why the government had sold the land to SY at such a low price. This critique was especially prevalent among residents living in Bambilor, who were understandably infuriated by how a member of Senegal’s political elite could make such enormous profits from land speculation while displacing hardworking farmers. They questioned why SY -through his enterprise- was rewarded with enormous profits for expropriating land that their families had used for generations.

Residents looked at the limited profits that the Senegalese state made in the land deals - buying land at 300FCFA/m² from Bertin’s family and then selling to SY at 1000FCFA/m²- and wondered how the government allocated the money generated. Given that farmers were left without work and many residents were displaced from their homes, they asked: why had none of the money generated from any of this land speculation been invested back into the communities most affected by the Bertin land deal? Public critiques concerning how the government managed public funds were compounded by the results of the report compiled by a state agency, the Inspection Générale d’Etat, during President Sall’s tenure, which noted that the government failed to collect taxes from housing developers -such as SY- who profited from reselling land purchased from the Senegalese government. Government sources estimate that taxes that were not collected in this land deal totaled 30,553,456,000FCFA (or around $53 million in 2014 dollars) (République du Senegal and Inspection Générale d’Etat 2014).
Omar SY is not the only person to have profited from the Bertin land deal. Babacar KA - whose brother Djibo Leyti KA has headed up various government cabinets and agencies under Senghor, Diouf, and Wade’s regimes - received 200 hectares of land. Ndiagne Fall - a special advisor to President Wade - also secured 175 hectares. Lastly, the Grande Serigne Bassirou Diagne Mareme Diop - also known as Serin Ndakaaru, the lead authority in the Lebu community - received 50 hectares in the disputed Bertin zone.

The Senegalese government’s provision of freehold land titles to these key political actors and traditional authorities reinforces many of the arguments that I made in the previous section documenting Pikine farmers’ access to secure land rights. Just as in Pikine, farmers and residents in Bambilor have been systematically denied access to secure, formal land rights. Instead, formal land rights have been allocated to individuals and enterprises with strong connections to Senegal’s political elite. Just as in Pikine, Bambilor actors threatened with displacement have continually protested expropriation of their land by drawing attention to Senegal’s laws governing property and the illicit accumulation of wealth. This reinforces my earlier argument that farmers and residents in Bambilor and Pikine are hardly ignorant of Senegalese land laws. Neither are they clinging to so-called ‘traditional’ land systems. Many farmers in the Bambilor zone have applied for and obtained formal use rights. As described in the previous chapter, ASSM farmers also invested a significant amount of money hiring cartographers to map their landholdings so that they could obtain private land titles in the disputed Bertin zone.

Yet Bambilor farmers were not able to secure their land rights. Instead, farmers and residents have been served with eviction notices when real estate developers are ready to build on land that they occupy. The next section examines how occupants in both Pikine and Bambilor have worked to advance and publicize their interpretations of Senegalese land laws to defend their property rights outside of Senegal’s court rooms. In making this argument, I argue that occupants are doing more than merely questioning the legality of the land deals that threaten to displace them. In addition to pointing out illegal and corrupt land deals, I argue that occupants draw from their understanding of Senegalese laws to negotiate settlements to land disputes outside of Senegalese court rooms.

Legal Settlements

Without access to formal papers or title to their land, land users involved in large-scale conflicts in Pikine and Bambilor have been reluctant to have their land conflicts adjudicated in Senegalese courts. Yet this does not mean that residents and farmers threatened with displacement have not relied on courts or the rule of law to defend their land claims. This section consequently focuses on how various actors in Bambilor and Pikine rely on their understanding of Senegalese law to resolve land disputes. In developing these arguments, I aim to build on discussions concerning how land disputes in sub-Saharan Africa are mediated. While most of these accounts have focused on the role of courts run by central government officials or customary authorities, my discussion in this section shifts our attention to how actors involved in conflicts over urban land grabs largely negotiated legal settlements outside of formal or traditional courts.
I learned of one example of how farmers and residents threatened with dispossession rely on courts to mediate -but not adjudicate- land conflicts during a conversation I had with several farmers about an inheritance dispute in Bambilor. Many farmers I spoke with in Bambilor described how inheritance disputes have become increasingly common in recent years. These disputes in part stem from increasing competition over land, but are also instigated by recent spikes in land prices and Bambilor’s rapidly growing -and profitable- housing sector. In this housing dispute, two family members from one family sold the same plot of land to different housing developers. Yet unlike the Bertin conflict -where farmers ultimately decided not to hire lawyers or use Senegalese courts- both of the family members who sold a plot of land hired a lawyer to defend his land claims. At the initial hearing, the judge who oversaw the case ordered all involved parties to stop work on the new housing projects. While construction on the housing projects was paused, the value of the land under dispute increased exponentially. Both individuals involved in the inheritance dispute finally agreed to sell the land to a third housing developer, and the profits from this land sale were used to pay back debts to the two housing developers who had purchased the land from the two family members.

This use of public courts to pause land conflicts while the actors involved in the dispute reached some sort of resolution was also practiced by Pikine farmers in several large-scale land disputes. For example, when horticultural entrepreneurs first came to bulldoze Pikine farmland, farmers hired a lawyer to defend their land claims in court. And while the lawyer filed a claim in court -which was never adjudicated- the farmers’ lawyer advised the farmers that their best chances for securing their land was by making noise -known in Wolof as cho- through public protests. As such, farmers mobilized public protests, spoke on radio stations, and undertook a variety of actions to ‘make noise’ and ensure that their complaints were broadcast to high-level public officials. Farmers consequently relied on courts to initially stall development while they mobilized public support -from traditional leaders, local government actors, and high-level officials- who supported farmers’ land claims. Despite these mobilizing efforts, however, REPROH still maintained their lease to farmers’ land and farmers were still unable to secure formal land rights.

Several years after this conflict, local government leaders and housing developers negotiated with REPROH to build a new housing estate in West Pikine on a portion of the land included in the REPROH lease. Farmers who were unwilling to relinquish their claims to land and property in the disputed zone hired a lawyer and used courts as a means of stalling the housing project while they negotiated a settlement with housing developers and government leaders. Their complaint specifically focused on how they were not adequately compensated for land that was expropriated. All construction on the housing project was thus halted while the complaint was processed. Yet as described in Chapter 2, news of the land conflict reached President Wade while the construction project was paused. Wade sent out a team to investigate the West Pikine land deal, and the Mayor of Pikine ultimately stepped in to mediate a deal brokered between the farmers and the housing developers and government actors involved in building the new housing estate in West Pikine. After the deal was brokered, the Mayor of Pikine convinced farmers to drop the complaint that they had filed in court. As described to me by a farmer who was involved in these negotiations: “He [the mayor of Pikine] came to us and said: you are all my family. I want to fix this amicably. And us [the group of farmers], since we
arranged it with the mayor while waiting for the complaint in the court to work out, we… just negotiated with the mayor.”

The settlement that farmers negotiated with the Mayor of Pikine ensured that all farmers in the zone targeted for development were adequately compensated when their property was expropriated. As such, land users with autochthonous claims to land and even land renters received compensation for investments that were demolished by housing developers’ bulldozers. In some cases, this included cash payments for produce and trees that were destroyed by bulldozers. Farmers who had made significant investments -such as small structures, wells, irrigation systems, etc.- also received housing plots that were hooked up to public services in new housing developments under construction in Dakar’s periphery.

Pikine farmers have also used the mere threat of filing complaints in Senegalese courts to settle disputes that arise when housing developers attempt to expropriate land included in the REPROH lease. In one violent confrontation in 2011 that took place between approximately 100 farmers and 20 policemen, many farmers were injured by police. This included one elderly farmer, who oversaw farming done by hired laborers on several small plots that he claimed in the disputed zone. Farmers identified the police officer who hit the elderly farmer, and told his commanding officer that they intended to hire a lawyer and file a formal complaint in court. In the end, the police officer compensated the elderly farmer for his injuries. Around the same time, the police told the farmers that the police would not fight with them anymore. Farmers described how the police continued to come to their fields in the week following this confrontation, but that they were not accompanied by -or required to defend- the housing developers’ bulldozers.

It is important to recognize, however, that not all communities threatened by dispossession rely on Senegalese courts to ‘stall’ or ‘pause’ construction on housing developments. In Bambilor, farmers did not need to leverage the threat of indefinitely stalled housing projects or court cases to receive compensation. Instead, Bambilor land users drew on their knowledge of legal procedures that housing developers and state actors were required to follow when expropriating land. Specifically, farmers pointed out how housing developers began bulldozing houses and farms in one section of land included in the Bertin project without following official legal procedures. Farmers thus called attention to how no official surveys of the zone had been conducted, and that farmers and residents were not compensated for property that was bulldozed.

While many farmers and residents refused to negotiate with the housing developers, several farmers involved with ASSM (the farmers’ association that was defending land users whose land claims were threatened in the Bertin conflict) formed a splinter group that began negotiations with key government officials and housing developers. The splinter group, government officials, several village chiefs, and housing developers ultimately reached an agreement to retroactively provide compensation for farmers and residents whose land was included in the section of TFn°1975/R that was bulldozed for the new housing project. Farmers and residents were compensated based on a scale set by the Senegalese government; in this sense, residents were compensated based on the number of trees, or the size of their dwelling. Perhaps most significantly, individuals that received compensation were required to sign formal paperwork indicating that they relinquished any claims to land in the disputed zone. As such, the decision to
compensate displaced farmers and residents helped secure housing developers’ claims to land and permanently dispossessed many farmers and residents.

Not all farmers and residents I spoke with were happy about the deal that was brokered. More radical members of the farmers’ association wanted to continue protesting and resisting the housing development. Many farmers argued that they were not adequately compensated for investments they had made because no official survey had been conducted. Yet almost all of these same farmers still signed away their claims to land and accepted what compensation was given. They did this because they feared that they wouldn’t receive any compensation if they refused to sign. As it was, not all farmers and residents were compensated at the same time. Those farmers who were not amongst the first to receive compensation for their expropriated property wondered if all the funds set aside for compensating land users had been given to farmers who were the first to sign away their land and property holdings. And while most of the farmers and residents who sought out compensation for their property received their payments, this was not the case for everyone. Several farmers and residents argued that the lack of an official survey enabled several community members to claim land and buildings that they did not own. Unable to obtain adequate compensation for the property, many of these individuals have continued to play a key role in the local associations that are organizing against housing developers continued efforts to expropriate sections of land included in the Bertin conflict.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined why farmers and residents involved in large-scale land conflicts in Pikine and Bambilor have been reluctant to have their land disputes adjudicated by Senegalese courts. I have argued that this reluctance stems partially from property relations established during colonialism. Land currently under dispute in both Pikine and Bambilor was at the center of colonial land grabs. These land grabs were undergirded by racialized forms of dispossession, which limited in many ways the extent to which land users were able to access their landholdings. In Pikine, land was converted into state-owned private property and farmers could only cultivate their fields on certain weekdays. In the rural community of Bambilor, one section of land currently under dispute was registered to a French lawyer. French colonists who later bought this tract maintained the private land title while also attempting to expand the landholding by expropriating land used by nearby farmers and village residents.

After independence, the Senegalese state chose to uphold private land titles registered during colonialism. In Pikine, land registered to the French colonial state was transferred to the Senegalese state. Even though Pikine farmers repeatedly attempted to obtain long-term leases for farmland they cultivated, the Senegalese state rejected their requests. In interviews I held with high-level government officials, I was told that officials in the Ministry of Urbanism rejected these applications because they did not conform with Pikine’s non-existent zoning maps. This being said, the state eventually did provide a long-term lease to a horticultural enterprise that had no historical claims to land in Pikine.

Bambilor farmers were also denied access to formal land rights by the Senegalese state. The Senegalese government ultimately provided a private land title to a key colonial figure, General Bertin, who like his colonial antecedents repeatedly attempted to expropriate Bambilor residents’
farmland. Many farmers and residents living on and farming land included in this title were unaware that their land was deeded to General Bertin. In fact, even the local and central government officials charged with administering land in Bambilor in the 1980s were unaware of -or perhaps just unwilling to support- this title, which led local and central government officials to approve numerous applications for formal use rights to individuals on property contained in the TFn°1975/R.

Farmers and residents that I spoke with thus recognized that they were unable to access secure land rights because the Senegalese government applied land laws in ways that systematically favored the housing developers and government actors that were displacing land users. In order to defend their land claims, farmers have thus sought to settle land disputes outside of Senegalese court rooms. This being said, Senegalese courts have frequently played an integral role in farmers’ efforts to resolve land disputes. Land users have strategically filed legal complaints to pause construction work so that land disputes have been settled outside of public court rooms. Farmers have also threatened use of courts to de-escalate land conflicts and stop efforts to bulldoze farmers’ fields. Some land users have even foregone use of courts altogether, using their knowledge of the law to negotiate resolutions to land disputes.

All of this suggests that farmers can hardly be characterized as unruly, uneducated peasants that are clinging to traditional systems of land management. At the same time, it speaks to the various and distinct ways that land users in Pikine and Bambilor make use of their knowledge of Senegalese land laws. In my research, I found that farmers in Pikine were more likely to file complaints in courts in order to stall projects and negotiate settlements with groups threatening their land rights. Bambilor land users did not engage with courts, but instead relied on their legal knowledge and their participation in key negotiations to mediate some land disputes.

It is important to remember that not all conflicts in these two zones have ended in displacement. Pikine farmers continue to cultivate urban gardens in land claimed by REPROH, just as Bambilor residents and farmers still use land claimed by the TFn°1975/R land title. Yet the land struggles described in this chapter also point to an uneven geography of negotiation in Senegal’s Dakar region. Some land users have been able to resist dispossession, while their neighbors’ plots are bulldozed and transformed into new housing estates. Farmers who are unable to defend their land claims are left with little choice but to draw on their legal knowledge to negotiate the terms of their dispossession. It is thus through these land disputes -which were borne through racialized forms of exclusion and reach their conclusion when land users sign legal paperwork relinquishing their land claims- that we can read the limits to negotiability (Peters 2004) in Senegal’s Dakar region.
Chapter 5
Farmers’ Territorial Alliances

Introduction

Daouda Mbaye farms six hectares of land in Deny Birame Sud, a small village that is regrouped within the greater Bambilor rural community. As we sat together drinking Senegalese tea during one of our interviews, Mbaye spread his hands out before me, so I could see how years of farming had weathered callouses into his palms. “I’m a farmer- just look at my hands,” he argued. “I’m seventy-five years old now, but you see my hands. I still sweat for my family. I’m still farming, and I go to work everyday.”

As our conversation continued, we laughed about how my palms were decidedly void of calluses. Yet the bulk of our interview was marked by serious undertones. Mbaye described more than 100 years of conflicts over his land, but I was particularly struck by his involvement in a conflict between Bambilor farmers and General Bertin in 1986. Mbaye described how he was working in his field when he suddenly heard bulldozers nearby and wondered: what were they doing in his neighbors’ fields? Were his fields next? By the time Mbaye arrived to inquire about the bulldozers, several of his neighbors’ fields full of mature peanut plants had been destroyed. A farmer had also gravely injured General Bertin, who was rushed to a nearby hospital after a village resident delivered a significant blow to his head. By the evening, Mbaye described how nearly the entire village had regrouped in the fields near his house to mobilize and defend residents’ land rights and impede Bertin’s efforts to construct a new housing estate in Deny Birame Sud.

In many ways, Mbaye’s account of the 1986 conflict in Deny Birame Sud resonated with conversations I held with Aminata Diop about a land dispute that unfolded in West Pikine between 2006-2007. At this time, Diop rented a small plot in West Pikine, and she described to me how she watched for several days as machines bulldozed fields located close to her plot. These plots were owned by farmers who had agreed to sell their land for a new housing development. Diop only learned that her plot was also targeted for imminent destruction the day that she -and her children- stepped in front of bulldozers commanded by operators who had been ordered to demolish her farming shed, well, and tomato plants.

But Diop’s efforts to defend her land rights were not undergirded by an entire village or neighborhood bloc. Contrary to actions undertaken by farmers and residents of Deny Birame Sud in 1986, farmers in West Pikine were divided over whether the housing development was the best way to develop urban farmland. Of those farmers against the development of Pikine farmland, only Diop and one other farmer stood up to the bulldozers. Diop and this farmer subsequently created a new organization that united Pikine farmers whose land was threatened by the construction of new housing estates. They filed lawsuits, captured media attention, and created strategic alliances with various local and central government actors in order to secure members’ land rights or compensation for dispossessed property.

Exploring such examples of rupture and transformation in how farmers involved in land conflicts negotiate to protect their access to property (Berry 1989; Ribot and Peluso 2003) is the
central focus of this chapter. Specifically, my argument focuses on how contemporary actors in the Dakar Region are breaking with older forms of governing land conflicts. Farmers' resistance to housing projects does not uniformly cohere behind traditional leaders or their governing bodies. Instead, I argue that farmers and residents are increasingly relying on coalitions brokered by farmer associations to mediate land disputes. While not all farmer associations in Senegal’s Dakar Region focus on land issues, I specifically pay attention to farmer groups that were formed in direct response to efforts by alliances headed by housing developers and government leaders to expropriate farmers’ land in order to construct new housing estates. Furthermore, I describe how these farmer associations undertake territorial strategies to safeguard land they’ve claimed for farming. Specifically, I argue that farmer associations have formed what I call ‘territorial alliances’ with a variety of public and private actors. These alliances frequently employ territorial projects—for example, creating blocs of farmland claimed by migrant rather than Lebu farmers, working with international NGOs to lay down pipes that irrigate urban farms with treated wastewater from nearby water treatment facilities, and organizing as a political bloc to vote and campaign for opposition candidates in elections— in order to secure land claims. In describing territorial alliances forged by farmer associations in Pikine and Bambilor, this chapter also draws attention to important spatial variations in farmers’ territorial projects and efforts to protect their landholdings.

I ultimately argue that this reliance on farmer associations—including the alliances that farmer associations form and territorial projects that they undertake—to mediate land disputes has fundamentally transformed how urban land politics are practiced and performed. The first section of this chapter consequently describes the entrenchment of farmer associations in Dakar’s urban political life. Specifically, this section begins by examining what motivated farmers’ decisions to form farmer associations in Pikine and Bambilor. This is followed by a section that considers how the rise of these association has given new political authority to farmers without autochthonous claims to land. In particular, I examine how women, non-Lebu actors, and low-income farmers are increasingly playing a significant role in large-scale land conflicts in Senegal’s Dakar Region. This is followed by a section that explores how farmer associations are increasingly forming territorial alliances to defend their land claims. These alliances draw upon spatial strategies to defend their land rights and consolidate farmers’ political authority. Finally, this chapter concludes by examining the diverse strategies that farmer associations and their alliance partners employ to protect their land claims. In particular, I call attention to the significant diversity and differentiation in how episodes of contention unfold in the Dakar Region. By drawing attention to the diverse mobilization strategies employed by farmer associations and their alliances, this research sheds new light on ways that episodes of contention are spatially constituted. As such, it joins a growing body of research that has started integrating spatial analyses into research on contentious politics (Sewell 2001; Martin and Miller 2003; Tilly 2003).

**Origin Stories**

Farming groups and cooperatives have a long history in both Pikine and Bambilor. Much of the work conducted by these farming cooperatives in these areas has been dominated by efforts to increase farmers’ productivity and income. Yet farming cooperatives have played a more significant role in Bambilor’s agricultural landscape. Whereas the only farming cooperative
serving Pikine’s Grande Niayes dissolved sometime during the 1960s and 1970s when farmers were unable cultivate their fields due to a series of droughts, a diverse variety of farming cooperatives are still spearheading agricultural projects in Bambilor. Examples of smaller cooperatives include groups of devout talibé (disciplines) that farmed their marabout’s (Muslim religious leader) land, or cooperatives composed of two farmers that team up to share labor and farming expertise. Large farming cooperatives have also played an important role in Bambilor’s farming landscape. Several farming cooperatives I visited were composed of hundreds of dues-paying members. The majority of these larger farming cooperatives help members obtain state-allocated subsidies, help farmers market their produce internationally, or lobby government officials. However, the vast majority these farmer cooperatives have not played any significant role in mediating land disputes.

The same cannot be said for the role of associations in Pikine. The first farmers’ association in the zone where I conducted my ethnographic research was officially founded in 1991, several decades after the dissolution of Pikine’s farming cooperative. Farmers named the association PROVANIA, and filed paperwork to have it formally registered as an Economic Interest Group (Groupement d’Intérêt Économique, or GIE) in 1993. In this sense, PROVANIA was legally defined as a GIE, not as a farming cooperative. And contrary to the farming collectives described above, it was also not originally formed solely to help farmers increase production or market their produce.

Instead, one of the key reasons that farmers formed PROVANIA was to defend their land rights. PROVANIA was -and still remains- largely composed of farmers who had migrated from downtown Dakar or the surrounding regions. PROVANIA is thus composed of farmers hailing from a variety of ethnicities, including Wolof, Mandinka, Serer, Pulaar, and Lebu (including Lebu farmers with autochthonous rights and Lebu farmers without autochthonous claims to land in Pikine). These migrant farmers do not hold secure land titles. Instead, they (or their parents or grandparents) have bought land or accessed land through land gifts or loans from the Lebus with autochthonous rights in Thiaroye-sur-Mer, a nearby Lebu village. For example, several farmers whose families migrated from Dakar bidonvilles to Pikine in the 1950s -processes that I have described in more detail in Chapter 1- described how Lebus with autochthonous land rights gave their parents and grandparents land to use for farming without expecting any sort of payment. Other migrant farmers have rented land from Lebu families who live in Thiaroye-sur-Mer. While the vast majority of land loans require payment -either in cash, or through sharecropping arrangements- a very small handful of farmers still do not pay for the land loaned to them by Lebu families with autochthonous land claims.20

As I have described earlier in this dissertation, Lebus hold autochthonous claim to much of Pikine’s urban farmland, if not much of the land that currently comprises Senegal’s Dakar Region. Yet like many of their counterparts in the Dakar Region, the Lebus in Thiaroye-sur-Mer did not seek out or obtain land titles during colonialism. In fact, much of Pikine’s farmland was

20 This practice of providing land loans -without requiring monetary payment- for farmland is locally referred to as confiage. The practice of confiage has decreased significantly in recent years, in part because Lebu farmers recognize that they can now charge significant rents for land that is loaned to migrant farmers.
privatized as private state property when Pikine was formed by colonial actors in 1952, and farmers have historically been unable to obtain secure property rights —e.g., long-term leases— for their farmland, as has been described in more detail in Chapter 4. Despite not having freehold private property rights, many Lebus from Thiaroye-sur-mer began selling off their farmland *en masse* in 1952. Much of the farmland that was sold was located on higher elevations, as this land had limited access to irrigated water during drought years. Lebu families that held onto their land and continued to farm in the zone preferred lower lying land. Not only was well water more accessible on these farming tracts, but many of these fields were located alongside land that underwent seasonal flooding during non-drought years. Lebu farmers not only preferred the soil quality on the land located near Pikine’s floodplains, but many farmers I spoke with argued that this land provided them —and their ancestors— with greater flexibility in their work schedules. For example, several farmers described how they didn’t need to regularly water their fields during the annual rainy season. Instead, they could spend most of their days in other occupations —such as fishing, or in the new industrial plants that were being established in Pikine— and only periodically visit and tend to their fields.

With the return of steady rains in the 1990s, farmers without autochthonous land rights were increasingly worried that Lebu farmers from Thiaroye-sur-mer would attempt to reclaim the land on the higher elevations that had been sold —and in rare instances, gifted— to the migrant farmers. Informal housing settlements continued to pop up throughout Pikine, and the farmers without autochthonous land rights became increasingly worried that Lebus from Thiaroye-sur-mer would attempt to transform their farmland into an informal neighborhood. PROVANIA was consequently formed to prevent Lebus with autochthonous rights from selling land used by migrant farmers. And their strategy worked: after migrant farmers formed PROVANIA, migrant farmers’ conflicts with autochthonous landowners decreased.

In part, this was because the association also developed a territorial strategy to preserve land in the zone for farmland. Specifically, PROVANIA farmers began purchasing land from willing Lebu sellers in plots that were adjacent to their fields. By the early 2000s, Lebus landownership was limited to a few pockets of land and various isolated fields. This is evidenced in the map provided on the following page (which was drawn by me by the Executive Secretary for PROVANIA in 2010). This map demonstrates how Lebu farmers in urban Pikine were increasingly surrounded by landowners and farmers without autochthonous land rights.

The first major dispute that erupted in the zone after the creation of PROVANIA was thus not between Lebus and farmers without autochthonous rights. Instead, the conflict began in 1997 when agribusiness entrepreneurs used connections with elite government officials in President Abdou Diouf’s regime —including garnering the support of the Prime Minister— to obtain a long-term lease for land used by Pikine smallholder farmers for an export-oriented floriculture project. After numerous court orders were sent to expropriate Pikine farmers’ land, the farmers were able to stall their eviction in the late 1990s by organizing large protests to confront bulldozers and police; voicing their dispute over popular radio stations; engaging a leading Lebu lawyer, politician, and scholar of land rights to defend their claims in court; and mobilizing the support of various Pikine mayors, local traditional authorities, and I/NGOs.
In the wake of this conflict, PROVANIA increasingly began partnering with non-governmental organizations, multi-lateral institutions, and university researchers. When I began researching urban farming in Pikine in 2004, I found that PROVANIA was partnered with upwards of six institutions at any given moment. These institutions funded a variety of development projects. Farmers attended seminars on how to safely apply pesticides, make compost, and avoid common parasites. They were also given high-quality seeds and farming materials. One institution even donated materials and provided necessary training for farmers to maintain a composting toilet in Pikine’s urban farming zone! Various other organizations worked together to help farmers access treated wastewater.

PROVANIA also teamed up with several NGOs and ANCAR (the Agence Nationale de Conseil Agricole et Ruraux, a new public agency that was formed in 1997 to provide technical assistance to farmers throughout Senegal) to create new farmer associations in Pikine’s Grande Niayes. This led to the creation of three new farming associations: Pikine Ouest, APROMAC, and NDEKH. Membership in each of these farming associations was based on the location of members’ fields, and the formation of these farming associations ensured that all farms in
Pikine’s Grande Niayes were located within the boundaries of an active farming association. ANCAR also worked with these farming associations to create UPROVAN, a federation that united the four farmers’ associations in Pikine’s Grande Niayes. Over time, all of these GIE’s worked to defend farmers land rights, help farmers access inputs, and provide farmers with technical assistance.

As mentioned above, the vast majority of Bambilor farming collectives have focused more on marketing produce and agricultural development projects instead of efforts to help farmers secure land claims. Yet the collective And Samma Sa Moomel (ASSM) deviates from these types of associations commonly found in Bambilor. Similar to PROVANIA, the ASSM farming collective was formed by Bambilor farmers in 2010 when farmers and residents who were managing or using property claimed by Bertin’s descendants began to receive formal eviction notices. ASSM was thus formed as a direct response to farmers’ imminent dispossession, which is expressed in the name that association members chose for the group. Roughly translated, And Samma Sa Moomel means ‘together we look after what belongs to us.’

ASSM’s leaders assured me that they planned to use the cooperative to provide farmers with technical assistance and otherwise develop Bambilor’s agricultural landscape in the future, they argued that their immediate work focused on protecting farmers’ and residents’ access to land.

And Samma Sa Moomel is comprised of all the farmers and residents that are affected by the Bertin conflict, which spans 1,042 fields in seven different villages. Members include village chiefs, Lebu farmers with autochthonous rights, migrant farmers and herders, and the so-called paysans de dimanche (or ‘Sunday farmers’). Most of Bambilor’s Sunday farmers reside in Dakar and employ farmers to undertake their farming responsibilities, and locals jokingly refer to them as Sunday farmers because they can only visit their fields on weekends or when they have time off from their primary jobs (as lawyers, university professors, doctors, and other high-paid professional jobs). ASSM leaders insist that each and every farmer who owned land in the site claimed by Bertin’s descendants were dues-paying members of the cooperative when it was originally formed. Members’ fees were used to hire cartographers to map farmers’ land rights (as described in Chapter 3), fund general meetings and rent for the cooperative’s office, and finance mobilization efforts (such as transportation to meetings with officials).

Bambilor farmers’ decision to form a collective when served with eviction notices represents an important change in mobilization strategies. In previous iterations of the Bertin conflict, villages have organized against dispossession independently. This is evidenced in the chapter’s introduction, which describes how farmers in the village of Deny Birame Sud organized collectively after Bertin attempted to bulldoze farmers’ fields in the late 1980s to build a new housing estate. During my research, farmers also recounted stories—passed down by family elders—that described the different ways that villages responded when Bertin and other colonial actors attempted to expropriate their land during colonialism. Most notably, residents in Lebu

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21 It is important to note that this phrase is particularly difficult to translate into English; for example, the verb “samma” means to watch or take care of, and the verb is largely used when describing the practice of watching and tending to livestock. In this usage, however, samma applies to both livestock, farms, and villagers’ residences that are threatened with expropriation.
villages -including the villages of Deny Birame Sud, Wayembaume, and Gorom 2- frequently described how their villages had always protected their claims to property as a united bloc.

For example, during an interview I had in one of these Lebu communities, I listened as a village elder described how his village had historically organized collectively whenever colonial actors tried to plant crops or trees on village land. Yet when I asked if other nearby villages had responded in the same fashion, my informant only agreed to respond to my question after I promised to turn off the voice recorder that was capturing our conversation. When I complied, he argued that several other villages involved in the Bertin conflict had not mobilized against colonizers’ attempts to use -and expropriate- their land. I later confirmed with other actors that colonial actors had in the past expropriated and used land historically claimed by farmers and herders in several villages. But why were colonial actors successfully able to expropriate land in these villages, and not in others? Many of my informants argued that residents in these villages had been unable and/or unwilling to protect their land rights because residents did not hold autochthonous land rights. Contrary to the Lebu villages described above, both of these villages were founded by migrants -mostly herders- who had been gifted land from nearby Lebu farming villages. Property rights systems -and farmers/herders means of protecting property rights- were thus vastly different than the systems governing land rights in Lebu villages.

That one of my respondents asked that I turn off my recorder when recounting this history was also significant. It speaks to longstanding tensions that have formed between villages, and the diverse -and frequently contentious- geography of how various groups were able to mobilize against the racialized forms of dispossession described in the previous chapter. At the same time, this farmer’s request calls attention to how certain Bambilor actors are working to frame how the public discussed and understood the Bertin conflict. This acknowledgement that colonial actors had been able to expropriate land in non-Lebu villages could potentially harm land-users claims to land, and many residents -Lebu farmers especially- are reticent to have this history recorded and potentially shared with the Senegalese press or the actors seeking to expropriate farmers’ land.

The following section examines the tensions and alliances that have developed between autochthonous Lebu farmers and land managers without autochthonous rights in both Pikine and Bambilor in greater detail. Specifically, I call attention to how it is farmers’ groups -rather than Lebu organizations- that have taken the lead in mobilizing against housing developers efforts to expropriate farmland. I argue that these farmer groups have formed alliances that unite the diverse group of farmers who have a stake in current land conflicts. At the same time, this section highlights tensions between ethnic groups that affect how farmer associations mobilize to resist expropriation.

**Shifting Relations between Lebu Actors and Farmer Organizations**

Pointing to new housing construction on the edge of Pikine farmlands, Hassan Gueye singled out a multi-storied house. “You see that house there?” he asked, “That used to be farmland. One of my uncles who lives in Thiaroye, he built that house on part of his field for his family.” Like many Lebu residents born in Thiaroye-sur-mer, Gueye’s uncle built a house on land he had once farmed in Pikine because the Lebu village where he is from was no longer able to meet the
housing needs of its inhabitants. Even Gueye -who also holds a leadership position in Pikine’s
Lebu farmer association- described how he wanted to build a house on his farmland for his
family, but had been unable to obtain the required authorizations. Indeed, quite a few Lebu
houses have been built on land situated in the outskirts of the Grande Niayes farmland. Yet almost
all of these houses were built before 2005 without the required housing and constructions
permits.

That Lebu from Thiaroye-sur-mer have been unable to build housing on their own land is
significant given that Dakar’s Lebu communities have historically dominated the region’s political
sphere. Lebu villages -in Dakar, Yoff, Thiaroye-sur-mer, etc.- engaged in complex negotiations
with French colonists to secure their landholdings (Charpy 1958; Seck 1970; Ndoye 2000). Lebu
politicians have also held many prominent positions during colonialism, and continued to play a
key role in local elections in the Dakar Region after independence. For example, the current
Mayor of Pikine is Lebu, as are most of the district Mayors in the Department of Pikine. In this
sense, Lebu politicians have long been incredibly successful at obtaining key government positions
and working with Senegal’s formal political structure.

Traditional Lebu authorities also continue to play a significant role in both local and national
politics. The Serigne Ndakaaru sits at the top of hierarchical Lebu traditional governing structure,
and serves as the religious and political spokesperson for all Lebu communities and villages. Each
village also has a Chef du Village, or Village Chief, who is charged with serving and leading the
village’s Lebu community. The Village Chief is often advised by his Conseil des Notables, or council
of elders. In many densely populated Lebu villages, the Chefs du quartier (neighborhood chiefs) and
Frée (which are formal committees composed of young Lebu men) also help advise the council of
elders. In this sense, the densely populated Lebu village of Thiaroye-sur-mer has neighborhood
chiefs and a formal youth committee, whereas smaller Lebu villages in Bambilor -like Deny
Birame Sud- do not have a Frée or neighborhood chiefs.

Lebu traditional authorities have historically mediated the bulk of land disputes that unfold in
Lebu villages. Elders in both communities described how the Village Chief and the almost all of
the men serving on the council of elders knew which families had claims to each and every
housing and farming plot. In addition to this, many elders are able to recall individual plot
histories. On various interviews I conducted, elders were able to list previous owners for plots that
were not used by immediate family members, and could even explain how plots were divvied up
during inheritances during their grandparents’ generation. This reservoir of knowledge helped
resolve disputes between Lebu actors. In disputes between Lebu and non-Lebu actors, this
knowledge -combined with the Lebu community’s political clout in Dakar- would often (but not
always) help Lebu farmers and residents retain their claims to land.

While this Lebu customary government has maintained authority over land disputes in
the village of Thiaroye-sur-mer, these governing powers do not currently extend to urban
farmland located in Pikine’s Grande Niayes. The increased entrenchment of farmer associations
- frequently populated by migrant farmers- in this zone has limited farmers’ ability to decide how
they can develop their land. As Hassan Gueye described above, many Lebu farmers are currently
unable to build housing on farmland that has been passed down in their family for generations.
In part, this is because Pikine farmers are not able to obtain the proper housing and construction
permits needed to initiate new housing projects. Furthermore, while farmers were able to surreptitiously build housing without having obtained permits and authorizations prior to 2005, this is no longer the case. More recent efforts to build housing on Pikine’s urban farmland have been stopped by local farmer associations, notably farmer associations that are dominated by migrant farmers. These farmer associations are increasingly working with government authorities to stop the growth of illicit housing construction in the zone. The leader of one farmer association thus described to me how he frequently receives phone calls whenever members see any construction projects in the zone. With a few quick calls to government actors, the leader of the farmer association is usually able to marshal the support of state police (gendarmes) who put a stop to -and frequently bulldoze- housing projects backed by Lebu actors. This anecdote highlights how key class divisions -among Pikine urban farmers, or even between Lebu farming populations- have contributed to tensions within Pikine’s farming community. At the same time, it also shines a spotlight on how farmer associations are playing an increased role in governing land in Pikine’s Grande Niayes. As such, this anecdote underscores a tremendous shift in the extent to which Lebu urban farmers are able to determine how they use -or develop- their landholdings.

Similarly, Lebu community leaders have decreased their involvement in efforts to defend Pikine farmers’ land rights. As mentioned earlier, Lebu community leaders played a pivotal role in the initial conflict with REPROH (the horticultural entrepreneurs) in the late 1990s. Thiaroye-sur-mer’s traditional government leaders garnered the support of the Serigne Ndakaaru and various Lebu mayors to support their land rights. Lebu youths in Thiaroye-sur-mer also threatened to burn down houses occupied by REPROH staff. Yet Lebu leaders have not played any significant role in the successive waves of land conflicts that have reconfigured Pikine’s farming landscape. Thiaroye-sur-mer’s traditional Lebu leaders did not respond to efforts by REPROH in 2011 to convert farmland into new housing estates. In part, this was because Lebu families with autochthonous claims had largely sold off their landholdings to the land under dispute to migrant farmers (as described earlier in this chapter). Protests against this eviction were thus spearheaded by migrant farming associations, who were only able to resist expropriation after undertaking violent confrontations with local police. While several Lebu actors did participate in these protests, they participated as members of the farming association. Notably, the Lebu farmers from Thiaroye-sur-mer who participated in this protest -even though they didn’t hold autochthonous claims to land included in the 2011 dispute- were farmers who -unlike Hassan Gueye, who I described above- did not want to develop housing to farmland in the Grande Niayes where they still farm.

Moreover, when the Senegalese state joined forces with the World Bank to build a new road through Pikine farmland (as described in Chapter 3), Lebu farmers and the traditional Lebu elite in Thiaroye offered little protest. This was especially surprising given that the road disproportionately displaced Lebu farmers, who were in turn poorly compensated for their landholdings. After this road project was completed, Pikine’s Lebu farmers’ association (that was created in the wake of the initial conflict between farmers and REPROH) largely faded into obscurity. Many of the Lebu farmers in the association lost all of their farmland when the road project was implemented, or were left with farm plots that were too small to profitably farm. Others were upset by how the leader of the Lebu farmer association -whose father is the current Village Chief in Thiaroye-sur-mer- handled negotiations with the World Bank and Senegalese state actors. Indeed, several disgruntled Lebu farmers who still farm small tracts of land
alongside the new road decided to leave the Lebu association and join PROVANIA. This is ironic given that PROVANIA was originally formed to protect migrant farmers’ land from expropriation by Thiaroye-sur-mer’s Lebu population, as mentioned above. PROVANIA remains active in the zone and is still dominated by migrant farmers.

Similar to these shifts in Pikine’s local governance, farmers affected by the Bertin conflict in Bambilor are increasingly relying on a farmers’ cooperative -ASSM- to protect their land claims. And just as in Pikine, ASSM is not dominated by Lebu farmers with autochthonous rights to land. ASSM leadership is thus comprised of so-called ‘Sunday farmers’, migrant farmers, herders, and Lebus with autochthonous land rights, as described above. As such, traditional Lebu villages have joined forces with non-Lebu villages to defend land claims against housing developers.

When the Bertin conflict resurfaced in 2010, all of the traditional leaders in villages affected by this conflict were active in forging this alliance. One farmer even gave the Lebu Village Chief in the village of Bambilor -a village that was founded by Lebu migrants- a small plot of farmland because of the help he provided when the community was mapping all of the farmland affected by the Bertin conflict. And in an early interview I held in the traditional Lebu village of Deny Birame Sud, the Lebu Village Chief described to me how he held a village meeting -which regrouped all the men and women in the village- when farmers and residents first began receiving eviction notices. During this meeting, the Village Chief described to me how the village reached a consensus to protest these eviction notices by participating in a march organized by ASSM.

Roughly three years after this initial interview, I learned that the Lebu village chief in Deny Birame Sud had reversed his position on the Bertin conflict. He no longer denied that Bertin’s descendants claims to land in Deny Birame Sud, and had aligned with the housing developers seeking to develop land claimed by Bertin and his descendants. Similarly, the Lebu village chief in Bambilor had formed an agreement with a prominent local marabout, housing developers, and government officials that authorized a new construction project in the village of Bambilor. In this sense, two prominent Lebu village chiefs ultimately decided to dissolve the alliances they had formed with ASSM by joining the coalition working to transform land included in the TFnⁿ1975/R land title into middle-class and elite housing estates.

In part, these two Lebu village chiefs defected from ASSM -and their village communities- because of the territorial strategy that housing developers and government actors undertook to begin expropriating farmers and residents with land claims in the Bertin zone. Specifically, housing developers and government actors did not attempt to expropriate all land included in the TFnⁿ1975/R land title at the same time. Instead, housing developers and government actors started by only sending eviction notices to one section of land -that had been deeded to COMICO (a housing cooperative that serves employees of Senegal’s military)- that was included in the Bertin zone. Located a short distance from the administrative center of the rural community of Bambilor, much of this land deeded to COMCIO abuts the main road that runs through the village of Bambilor. This is especially significant given recent efforts to link this road with new highway infrastructure that has been built between Bambilor and Dakar. The section of land in the Bertin zone that was first targeted for development (as other parcels situated in the
TFn°1975/R title have not been developed yet) is thus much better suited for individuals who commute to Dakar for work. Indeed, many of the expropriated farmers -which included many so-called Sunday farmers- had purchased their landholdings in the mid-1980s exactly because of its accessibility.

In this sense, when COMICO bought this parcel in the disputed Bertin zone, they were not only buying up some of Bambilor’s best-situated real-estate. They were also largely expropriating some of the rural community of Bambilor’s wealthiest farmers. At the same time, they were dispossessing land from farmers without autochthonous claims to land. Many of these migrant farmers were thus vehemently upset when they learned that Bambilor’s village chief -alongside several other traditional authorities- had made a deal with government officials and land developers. As described in greater detail in Chapter 4, this deal not only expropriated farmers’ and residents’ property but effectively forced farmers’ and residents’ to sign legal settlements that foreclosed future claims to the disputed land while also providing them with compensation for land and property that had been expropriated by COMCIO. While Bambilor’s chief was a member of ASSM, he had no land in the affected zone. In fact, his father -who was Bambilor’s previous chief- had actually helped many of the migrant and Sunday farmers buy the same plots that were now being expropriated. As such, farmers questioned the Bambilor chief’s authority to negotiate a deal on their behalf.

Many of the farmers threatened with expropriation thus questioned and critiqued the deal that had been brokered. Several farmers and residents I spoke with argued that they weren’t adequately compensated for their land, whereas other land users argued that they wanted to collectively fight against all efforts to expropriate their farms and houses. Moreover, farmers and residents were hardly unanimous in how they decided to respond to the deal. Many Sunday farmers were worried that they would not receive any compensation for expropriated property if this deal was rescinded. These worries were compounded by the timing of the deal, which was negotiated in the build-up to Senegal’s 2012 presidential elections. Specifically, farmers worried that the deal -and the government’s commitment to help compensate farmers for their land and improvements they had made to their land- would be void if President Wade was not re-elected; fearing that Wade would not be re-elected, several farmers and residents signed away their land rights in order to receive compensation for expropriated property before the 2012 elections. Once the first farmers signed away their land rights, others were quick to follow.

Leaders in ASSM speak of this deal as a transformative moment for their organization. Notably, the organization lost many members who signed away their claims to land under the deal. ASSM also broke ties with traditional authorities who didn’t support farmers’ efforts to retain their land rights. During my interviews, farmers who still had land -along with many of those who had begrudgingly signed away their rights- were quick to criticize the role played by the village chiefs and local marabouts who had brokered the Bambilor deal with COMICO and government actors. For example, farmers argued that traditional authorities had only agreed to the Bambilor deal because they had received bribes.

ASSM leaders also described how they were not interested in negotiating any more deals that would expropriate farmers. In doing so, they began organizing a series of marches and meetings that were covered by major Senegalese news outlets. Yet while many of the region’s traditional
authorities were not invited to these protests and meetings, the organization was still grounded in customary practices. Leaders with autochthonous land rights still based their current land claims on their longstanding presence in the zone, arguing that their ancestors had started farming long before colonial actors started attempting to take their land. Elders I spoke with in the Lebu village Deny Birame Sud also argued that sacrifices and amulets that they and their ancestors have planted in fields will protect their land rights, bringing harm to anyone who tries to expropriate their land.

Lebu farmers in both Pikine and Bambilor thus continue to rely on many traditional means of protecting their land rights. This being said, farmer are increasingly breaking from older forms of land governance -which were traditionally dominated by Lebu authorities- and are increasingly relying on political work conducted by farmer associations. While undertaking this political work in Pikine, farmer associations have transformed who has the authority to decide how farmland should be developed. As farmer organizations become increasingly entrenched in urban land governance in Pikine and Bambilor, they have also transformed who has the authority to mediate land disputes on farmers’ behalf. All of this has elicited new tensions between Lebu and non-Lebu actors.

Yet these struggles have also created new collaborations between Lebu and non-Lebu farmers. The following section takes a closer look at the collaborations and coalitions that have formed in these farmer associations. Specifically, I examine how farmer associations are increasingly forming what I call territorial alliances to protect their land claims. In drawing attention to alliances formed within farmer associations, the next section consequently delves into the new political work that migrant, middle-class, and women farmers have undertaken alongside their Lebu partners.

Alliances and Cleavages in Farmers’ Associations

After Pikine farmers’ thwarted REPROH’s attempts to start a horticultural project on their land, REPROH leaders abandoned their horticultural project and decided to focus on developing new housing estates on the land held in their long-term lease. This led to the development of two new housing projects in West Pikine between 2006-2007, and efforts to develop land claimed by migrant farmers who belonged to PROVANIA in 2011. Yet when bulldozers started demolishing migrant farmers’ fields in 2011, local farmer associations reacted. As described in the previous chapter, UPROVAN (the federation of Pikine’s farmers’ associations) leaders visited government offices to determine who authorized the new housing project. Roughly 100 PROVANIA members regrouped to defend the plots that were being razed, forming a circle around the local police who had been called to protect REPROH staff and their bulldozers. Farmers then told police that if the bulldozers wanted to raze any more farms the tractors would have to pass over their bodies. Men and women; Lebu and non-Lebu farmers: all stood their ground and fought with police until the police -and REPROH’s bulldozers- retreated.

During this conflict, the diverse members in Pikine’s farming organizations were able to resist expropriation as a unified bloc. In many ways, this confrontation brings to mind Daouda Mbaye’s account describing how the entire village of Deny Birame Sud mobilized to confront General Bertin during a land conflict in the late 1980s, as described in this chapter’s introduction. Yet the
confrontation in Pikine took place between housing developers and a diverse farming association, whereas Mbaye described how his Lebu village provided a unified front against housing developers.

This section examines the ways that various farmers’ associations in both Pikine and Bambilor have worked to unite their diverse constituents. Specifically, I focus on associations’ concerted efforts to forge territorial alliances among members in their organizations. In the most basic sense, I argue that individuals in farmer organizations have grouped together to defend their claims to vast tracts of farmland. Yet understanding these territorial alliances only in terms of land is insufficient (Elden 2010). As I described in the previous section, farming groups in Pikine and Bambilor are producing new territories that call into question who has the authority to govern spaces and profit from land rents. These new territories are produced through spatial strategies that actors in farmer associations use to defend their land claims in Pikine and Bambilor.

In this sense, PROVANIA and ASSM have relied on spatial strategies to consolidate their authority over territories affected by large-scale land conflicts. For example, PROVANIA’s founders worked to buy up land from willing Lebu sellers; this not only increased the number of migrants farming in Pikine’s Grande Niayes, but bolstered PROVANIA’s membership roles. Farmers in Bambilor also developed territorial authority in the Bertin zone shortly after the organization was founded. One of the first acts of the cooperative included the systematic mapping of all plots included in the Bertin conflict; everyone whose land was mapped joined ASSM and helped pay the cartographer’s fees. (Chapter 3 explains what motivated farmers to undertake this mapping project and the outcome of this territorial strategy in more detail.)

These efforts to formulate farmer associations’ territorial authority were not isolated acts. Farmer associations in both communities have continued to enhance their territorial authority by increasingly focusing on political work that determines who can profit from land rents on farmland in Pikine and Bambilor. Farmers in PROVANIA have increasingly played the role of guardians (or custodians) of the region’s farmland, alerting public authorities if any farmers begin illegal construction in the zone. While this process has been described in greater detail above, I revisit it here because it provides a key example of how farmer associations such as PROVANIA have negotiated class and ethnic tensions while also working to classify land that they work on and protect as farming territory.

Contrary to their counterparts in Pikine, ASSM leaders do not prevent their members from building housing or other structures on farmland included in the Bertin conflict zone. Yet the organization also still takes pains to represent itself -and their territory- as a zone for farmers and herders. In a dossier describing the zone and their take on the Bertin land conflict, ASSM thus describes the zone as “above all a farming and agro-industrial center of excellence” (And Samma Sa Moomel n.d., p. 2). ASSM leaders have also used photographs -included at the end of their dossier’s annex and as decorations in their office- to highlight the centrality of farming in their territory. These photographs focus in on large-scale investments (such as drip irrigation systems, concrete water storage facilities, or poultry farm houses), farmers’ orchards and cultivated fields, and portraits of farmers alongside harvested produce. I have included photographs of these efforts to represent ASSM as a farming territory on the following page.
Moreover, every single individual I interviewed who had land in the Bertin conflict zone identified themselves as a farmer. Notably, this included individuals who also held profitable careers in Dakar. Like low-income farmers who also cultivated plots in the zone, these farmers were quick to stress how their farms provided most of the vegetables consumed in the Dakar Region. Farms cultivated by all farmers -regardless of their class- also employ a significant number of day laborers, produce traders, and work for local agro-industrial plants. In pointing out the work that farmers contribute to agricultural production and employment, these farmers implicitly questioned: how many many jobs did the new housing projects create? And how would these new houses contribute to feeding Bambilor families, or Dakar’s growing population? As such, notions of the Bertin conflict zone as a farming territory overlapped with understandings of the territory as an economic development zone.

In representing themselves as farmers -and farming territory as a boon to economic development- these Bambilor farmers are careful to ensure that class differences does not create divisions in their membership. Thus while low-income farmers frequently refer to the middle-class and elite farmers who have frequently made significant investments in their properties as Sunday farmers, this term is used jokingly and without menace. In addition to this, all farmers regardless of class have increasingly started referring to themselves using one of many Wolof
terms for farmer: *baadole*. This is significant, given that in the Dakar Region the term *baadole* usually holds a negative connotation and is used to refer to someone who doesn’t have much money or a good moral education. Tracing the origin of the term *baadole*, Gamble et. al. (1985) also describes how it historically represented a caste of free peasant farmers who generally lacked political power. The common use of the term during political meetings and mobilizations speaks to how Bambilor farmers are increasingly entrenched in urban political life. That poor and elite farmers are reclaiming this term also speaks to how ASSM members seek to emphasize their profession rather than class divisions within their collective- in their efforts to defend their land claims. This is especially significant given how class divisions articulated with identity -namely, through several landless village chiefs’ decision to side with COMCIO housing developers and government actors- worked to help expropriate many ASSM farmers and residents.

Just as farmers are working to build alliances across class lines in their organizations, they are also working to ensure that their organizations are inclusive and represent farmers from diverse ethnic groups. Thus when PROVANIA learned that many Lebu farmers -most of whom were involved in the Lebu association APROMAC- would be dispossessed by a new road project, representatives from PROVANIA approached APROMAC to see if they wanted help defending their land claims. While APROMAC leaders did not ultimately take PROVANIA up on this offer for help, several Lebu farmers affected by this decision left APROMAC and joined up with farmers in PROVANIA.

In Bambilor, evidence that farmers were making efforts to build alliances that included farmers from all ethnicities was displayed on signs that farmers’ held during one of many press conferences. Referencing the animal sacrifices that the military housing cooperative performed on farmers’ land before they began construction, farmers wrote the following:

To the land vampires’ potential clients: … You will lose your money and put at risk your family, who will never leave in peace on our land. The sacrifices made by the COMCIO military inspired us.

Farmers I questioned about this sign indicated that farmers had reciprocated by regrouping farmers of several different ethnicities who performed sacrifices on land claimed by COMICO, the Senegalese military’s housing cooperative. These alliances across various ethnic groups were also evidenced in another sign, which read: “COMCIO Go Away. Go Away. Your families will never live in peace on our pillaged land. The Bambaras, Soce, Peul that you have thrown into misery are waiting for [their land].”
While farmers in both groups are working to build alliances that unite farmers with different ethnic and class backgrounds, it is important to recognize that class and ethnic divisions among farmers have not disappeared. For example, several Lebu farmers I spoke with in Bambilor expressed dissatisfaction with how ASSM was mobilizing to defend their land rights. These same farmers also censored their critiques of ASSM’s work when speaking with the organization’s leaders. Given that housing developers have not started bulldozing these farmers’ land, we do not know if these Lebu farmers will continue to organize with ASSM or form alternative organizations if their land claims are imminently threatened. In Pikine, evidence of division is most notable when examining which farmers lead the various farmer associations and the federation of farmer associations. While Lebu farmers -without autochthonous rights to land in Pikine- have gained leadership positions in all associations, almost all of these associations are still led by farmers without autochthonous land claims. The only association formed and led by Lebus from Thiaroye-sur-mer was for the most part dismantled by the road project that displaced Lebu farmers.

Just as ethnic and class divisions continue to play a divisive role in farmer associations, farmer associations have faced difficulties forming alliances between men and women farmers. Men hold the majority of leadership positions in all of the farming associations working to defend farmers’ land rights in both communities. In Pikine, only one woman holds a leadership position, whereas
women in Bambilor only occupy unofficial leadership positions. This is partly because male farmers vastly outnumber their female counterparts in both communities. Women have largely been denied secure land rights in each zone, and have only recently started inheriting plots, buying land, and establishing land claims independent of land traditionally farmed and claimed by family members. In fact, the vast majority of women engaged in agricultural work in each zone work as produce traders. While women produce traders have been able to join Pikine’s farming associations, produce traders have not been admitted to Bambilor’s farming association. When I asked the ASSM leadership about this decision, they argued that produce traders’ husbands or extended family members -who held land claims- were included in the association, and that women’s voices were frequently represented when they attended protests to support their families’ land claims.

In both communities, women with claims to land were thus more likely to hold leadership roles or serve as active members in farmer organizations. Moreover, I found that women holding leadership positions were frequently more critical of gender relations in their organizations than their counterparts without leadership roles. Women in leadership positions described how their leadership roles were frequently limited to mobilizing women farmers and produce traders. As such, women held positions that headed up the women’s contingent in farmer associations and were frequently charged with recruiting other women for protests. At worst, women I spoke with argued that men only expected -or wanted- women to applaud and carry-out decisions made by their male counterparts. Attitudes such as this prompted a group of women farmers and produce traders in Pikine to begin talking about creating a women’s farmer association. Yet these plans never materialized; women not only recognized that NGO funding plummeted dramatically in the zone in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, but argued that they didn’t have the time to start a new organization. In contrast, women in Bambilor have formed a variety of women’s associations. Yet none of these associations have worked to secure land rights for their members; all mobilizing around land rights threatened in the Bertin conflict occurred in the male-dominated ASSM.

That women in leadership positions frequently argue that their political work in farmer associations merely plays a supportive role to work conducted by men is interesting, given that women holding leadership positions frequently express the most radical critiques of current efforts to expropriate farmland in Pikine and Bambilor. For example, during one meeting held by the Bambilor farming cooperative, I watched as men dominated the microphone with talk about farmers’ traditional and religious claims to land, the legality of their dispossession, and the economic benefits of farming. This discourse differed significantly from the only speech given by a woman during three-hour meeting, which built on men’s speeches by voicing how she was ready to fight housing developers and defend her field with her life. Similarly, I found that women in Pikine were often more willing to engage in violent confrontations than their male counterparts. One woman farmer and produce trader thus described to me how she was the only farmer to stand in front of bulldozers and police that razed numerous fields during farmers’ confrontation with REPROH in the late 1990s. By doing this, she described how she not only defended her land claims, but stalled bulldozing operations while her male counterparts worked to effectively mobilize against the agribusiness cooperative. Similarly, this chapter’s introduction describes how only Aminata Diop and one other male farmer -who I’ll call Ndiaye here- stood up to bulldozers that threatened to raze her field. After confronting these bulldozers, Diop and
Ndiaye formed an informal farmers’ alliance that worked to obtain compensation for land expropriated by housing developers.

In discussing how Diop and Ndiaye stood up to police and bulldozers, it is important to call attention to the divergent ways that police and local farmers reacted to Diop and Ndiaye. Neither Diop —nor any other woman who single-handedly confronted police and bulldozers— were criticized for their actions; instead, they were frequently congratulated for their bravery and how their confrontations helped farmers’ defend land rights or negotiate adequate compensation for landholdings. None of the women or their children were hurt during these confrontations, and the police did not respond to their protests with use of force. Yet the same cannot be said for Ndiaye. During one interview, Ndiaye related to me how he was beaten by four or five policemen after he confronted a policeman—who was supervising the bulldozers that were razing Ndiaye’s house and fields—who insulted his son. After this confrontation, Ndiaye was hospitalized and numerous farmers I spoke with argued that his actions only served to ‘humiliate’ him.

By and large, women are the ones who are stepping in front of bulldozers, confronting police, and conducting political work that stalls demolition of farms and houses. In part, this is because Senegalese police are less likely to harm women, children, and elderly protesters. Yet when men engage in direct confrontations with police, these confrontations frequently lead to violent confrontations. This rule is perhaps best exemplified in the 2011 Pikine confrontation where men and women farmers confronted police who were defending the bulldozers that were razing their fields (as described above). Farmers described how the police targeted male protesters. One farmer who participated even offered to show me bloodied clothes that he had saved from this confrontation. Police only ended the conflict in part because one officer committed a taboo offense of hurting an elderly protester. Several farmers also assured me that the police they spoke with also stopped the conflict because they feared that farmers would fight to the death. Given recent critiques of Senegalese police using deadly force against protesters in the Senegalese press, the police officer in charge decided to withdraw from the conflict.

Farmers have thus worked to create associations that regroup men and women farmers and a variety of individuals from different ethnicities and social classes in order to defend claims to peri/urban farmland. The alliances forged in these associations present a new way of doing political work in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Nonetheless, despite efforts to create inclusive organizations that unite diverse groups of farmers, these farmer associations are marked by divisions.

Paying attention to these divisions is important, as housing developers frequently draw on—and attempt to exacerbate—divisions when attempting to construct new housing projects. It is in this manner that government authorities and housing developers created and alliance with village chiefs in the villages of Bambilor and Deny Birame Sud, as described above. Yet it is also important to recognize how farmer associations—in some instances—also play on these divisions to defend their land claims. Most notably, when women conduct the political work of confronting police and stepping before bulldozers with their children in tow they frequently stall housing developers’ construction efforts. This provides an opportunity for men and women farmers to seek out and create new sets of territorial alliances with traditional and religious leaders, lawyers, government actors, or non-governmental organizations. The next section examines the territorial
alliances that farmer associations are building with these actors in greater detail, drawing
attention to how these coalitions are reshaping the geography of land governance in Senegal’s
Dakar Region.

Farmers’ Territorial Alliances with NGO’s and Government Actors

When the first major dispute unfolded over how to develop Pikine’s urban farmland in late 1990s, farmers in PROVANIA drew upon alliances that they had forged among farmers in their organization to create new coalitions with actors and groups that could help them defend their land interests. Lebu members thus gathered the support of local traditional authorities and various Pikine mayors, who publicly came out to support farmers’ land rights. Farmers hired lawyers, broadcast their protests on popular radio stations, and garnered support from NGOs that had provided technical assistance and conducted development projects in Pikine’s urban farmland.

Yet each land conflict forges different coalitions, and territorial alliances forged through conflicts shift over time. This is perhaps best exemplified by examining shifts in the partnerships formed by farmer associations in Pikine and Thiaroye-sur-mer’s traditional Lebu leaders. Since the initial conflict, farmers have not relied on Thiaroye-sur-mer’s Lebu leadership—or their alliances with traditional Lebu leadership in the Dakar Region—to support their land claims. Instead, when REPROH returned in 2006 to build new housing estates on farmland in West Pikine, farmers created a new farmer association that worked to defend land users’ farmland by building coalitions with a variety of public and private actors. Similar to the initial conflict in the late 1990s, farmers described to me how the new farmer organization publicized their grievances over radio stations, delivered letters and sought out support of key public officials in Senegal’s dominant and opposition parties. Yet the Mayor of West Pikine and many of the leaders for the West Pikine’s farmer association were notably absent from alliances formed by this new farming association. This was because the farmers that led the West Pikine farmers association formed a new alliance with the Mayor of West Pikine and REPROH’s housing developer that effectively helped push forward the housing project and displace farmers who were against the new housing development. Thus while the alliances formed by the new farmer association were not able to help farmers retain access to their farmland, they ultimately helped farmers negotiate compensation for the property and land that was expropriated when the West Pikine housing estate was built.

Five years after this conflict, farmers in North Pikine were relying on dramatically different territorial alliances to defend their land claims against REPROH housing developers that had formed alliances with central government officials and police. Specifically, farmers described how they relied on territorial alliances that developed from a project—undertaken by an international team of academics and Senegalese government employees (in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Health), and a NGO—to defend their property. This project originally aimed to construct several wastewater treatment basins on farmers cultivated by PROVANIA members
and determine the ‘best practices’ for wastewater use in agriculture.\textsuperscript{22} The project was then expanded -with help of the FAO, which received funding for the project from the Spanish Government- to help farmers 1/formally negotiate access to wastewater treated by Senegal’s public-private water sanitation authority and 2/provide farmers with water pumps and a vast network of PVC pipes and infrastructure to distribute treated wastewater to farmers’ fields.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure17.png}
\caption{Photographs of Pikine’s wastewater treatment projects (Source: Author)}
\end{figure}

The photograph on left shows pipes PROVANIA farmers laid on for the wastewater treatment project. The photo on the right shows difference in fields that don’t have access to irrigation networks (front field) and those fields with access to treated wastewater (green fields in background).

These wastewater projects have done more than merely help farmers irrigate their fields. PROVANIA’s farmer association used the wastewater project -forming a coalition with academics and I/NGO staff, mapping where the wastewater project’s infrastructure would be situated, and then making material changes that developed the zone’s farming landscape- as its most important territorial strategy to defend farmers’ land claims. This strategy was successful during the violent conflict between Pikine farmers and police in 2011. During this conflict, farmers argued that the housing developers’ bulldozer notably passed by fields that had been serviced by the wastewater project. Only fields that were not under cultivation -because they had not received piping infrastructure and irrigated water- were targeted by the bulldozer.

\textsuperscript{22} As mentioned above, many Lebu farmers in nearby zones farm land in lower elevations, and are able to rely on hand-dug wells to water their fields. Yet many of the fields used by PROVANIA farmers stand on higher elevations which means that they are unable to irrigate their fields unless they dig costly wells or have access to treated wastewater.
Farmers I spoke with argued that alliances brokered by housing developers are less likely to bulldoze fields involved in the wastewater project for two reasons. First, housing developers’ alliances would have to compensate farmers for wastewater infrastructure and crops that their bulldozers destroyed, which would be costly. Farmers also argued that alliances brokered by housing developers -which included government actors- did not want to risk upsetting international actors (such as the FAO or the UN) that have invested significant sums to develop urban agriculture in Pikine. On fields that were not included in the North Pikine wastewater project, farmers employed territorially regional strategies that included farmers’ participation in violent, destructive confrontations -fighting with police, threatening to destroy bulldozers- while PROVANIA leaders visited offices of key government officials -such as the Prefect, District Mayor for North Pikine, City Mayor for Pikine, and local police headquarters- to dismantle territorial alliances produced by housing developers.

While the farming cooperative in Bambilor has not developed territorial alliances with I/NGOs to defend their land rights, they have relied on strategic alliances with a variety of public and private actors to defend their land claims. For example, when the Bertin conflict reemerged in 2010, leaders paid visits to various traditional Lebu authorities and key leaders of Senegal’s religious brotherhoods. They also met with Senegal’s ombudsman and various leaders of Senegal’s opposition. ASSM leaders were able to create solid alliances with several opposition leaders, who lobbied on behalf of ASSM and land rights for the farmers embroiled in the Bertin conflict. At the same time, many ASSM leaders helped opposition leaders -including current president Macky Sall- campaign during the 2012 election after opposition candidates made campaign promises to defend farmers’ land rights.

After Sall’s election, farmers were guardedly hopeful that Sall’s regime would follow through on its campaign promises. And for many months, construction on the military housing cooperative’s project was halted. Yet construction resumed -and the first tract of houses completed- in 2013. In the Senegal Housing Bank’s (Banque de l’Habitat du Sénégal, which as described in Chapter 1 was formed as a public-private partnership to finance Senegal’s housing industry) 2013 annual report, the project was even lauded as an inspiring example of how the BHS had teamed up with housing cooperatives to construct new housing in Senegal’s Dakar Region (Banque de l’Habitat du Sénégal 2013). When farmers realized that Sall had formed alliances with the developers building new housing projects on their farmland, they held a series of protests and began forming new alliances with politicians who were not aligned with Sall’s regime.

Alliances that farmers’ organizations form when defending their land rights are thus not fixed in stone. No formal agreements are signed; instead, agreements are solidified through actions and material efforts that either help defend farmers’ land claims or secure adequate compensation for farmers displaced by new housing projects. Territorial alliances are thus characterized by their flexibility and their impermanence. Territorial alliances are frequently broken or disbanded. At the same time, farmers’ alliances are frequently negotiating new alliances -with political leaders, traditional elite, or even non-governmental organizations- to thwart the housing projects backed
by housing developers (and their alliances). Farmers building territorial alliances are thus continuously adapting and reconfiguring their alliances and territorial strategies in response to ongoing shifts in political networks and expropriation strategies advanced by housing developers’ alliances.

In studying these territorial alliances and strategies, the ethnographic examples provided in this section also draw attention to significant spatial variations in how various actors’ practice contentious politics in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Land struggles in Pikine and Bambilor are home to distinct -albeit interlinked- political, economic, and ecological geographies that have greatly influenced how contentious politics unfold. Territorial strategies employed by farmers in West Pikine included farmers’ efforts to create a new farmer association, which drew on alliances with leaders in Senegal’s dominant political party and opposition politicians in order to secure compensation for expropriated land. Meanwhile, farmers in PROVANIA have focused on building alliances with international NGOs, academics, and public-private wastewater treatment facilities to defend their land claims. Territorial strategies employed by PROVANIA farmers also included efforts to escalate tension and puncture holes in the territorial alliances created by housing developer by threatening property destruction and collective violence against local police. After traditional authorities in Bambilor negotiated a shady land deal with housing developers and President Wade’s administration, the territorial alliances produced to defend farmers’ land right in Bambilor have been characterized by alliances with key leaders in Senegal’s opposition parties.

Thus, while certain territorial strategies were present in struggles in Bambilor, West Pikine, and North Pikine (such as brokerage and mobilization of territorial alliances), there are also important differences in the ways in which various coalitions advocated to defend farmers’ land claims (e.g., territorial alliances’ ability to rely on key international actors and/or state political actors, escalate conflicts, and/or co-opt and demobilize key coalitions) (Tilly and Tarrow 2007).
Territorial alliances thus rely on spatially contingent territorial strategies to defend farmers’ land claims.

Conclusion

In Senegal, farmer organizations have long played an important role in farmers’ efforts to secure inputs, export produce, and obtain technical assistance (Cissokho 2009, McKeon n.d.). Yet little has been written describing work that farmer associations undertake to help members secure land rights or obtain adequate compensation when their land rights are expropriated. This chapter consequently focuses on the political work undertaken by farmer associations in Pikine and Bambilor when members’ land rights are threatened by new housing developments. The chapter begins by describing the specific spatial and historical conditions that led farmers to create farmer organizations that were-at least initially- primarily focused on helping farmers threatened with displacement. For example, I argue how one of the first farmer associations in Pikine was formed because migrant farmers feared that their land would be expropriated by Lebu actors. Bambilor’s ASSM was formed several decades later, when housing developers threatened to displace farmers and residents in several different villages.

Farmer associations -such as PROVANIA, or ASSM- have thus become increasingly entrenched in urban land governance. In describing the new roles undertaken by farming associations, I have also called attention to how farmer associations are taking over urban land governance roles once held by Lebu traditional authorities. Thus while Lebu traditional played a significant role in Pikine’s early land conflicts, they have not involved in the two most recent land conflicts with housing developers. Instead, Pikine’s farmer associations took the lead role in developing alliances and territorial strategies to meet members’ needs. Similarly, the formation of ASSM has reconfigured how Bambilor actors have organized to defend land claims on land included in the TFN°1975/R. Before the conflict resurfaced in 2010, villages involved in the conflict mobilized separately under their respective village chiefs. The formation of ASSM reconfigured this logic, as villages -including traditional Lebu villages and those founded by migrant populations- mobilized collectively to defend farmers and residents access to land.

These struggles have consequently created new collaborations between Lebu and non-Lebu actors. ASSM is not only comprised of residents living in Lebu and migrant villages, but also includes so-called Sunday farmers (paysans de dimanche) who usually live and work in Dakar and only visit their famers on weekends. Pikine’s primary farmer association -PROVANIA, which began as a farmer association for migrant farmers- currently serves both Lebu farmers with autochthonomous rights and much of Pikine’s migrant farming population.

Yet the increased role played by farmer associations has also created and escalated tensions between Lebu and non-Lebu actors. For instance, farmer associations in Pikine have increasingly worked to prevent Lebu efforts to built housing (or sell farming tracts to housing developers). In Bambilor, several village chiefs have also broke away from ASSM, and independently negotiated for displaced land users to receive compensation for investments they had made to property that was expropriated. On the other hand, these tensions have also been productive. Farmers who still held claim to land in the Bertin zone after the Bambilor deal remained actively involved in ASSM, even though many of their Lebu traditional leaders were not invited or welcome at
ASSM meetings and functions. In turn, ASSM’s efforts to protect their land became increasingly radicalized: farmers argued that they were not interested in negotiating or signing deals that would strip them of their land rights. Instead, their meetings and protests united behind one key goal: preventing housing developers from expropriating farmland and residents’ housing that remained in the Bertin zone.

In addition to examining how farmer associations have -or haven’t- formed alliances with Lebu actors, this chapter explores how farmer associations in Pikine and Bambilor have worked to unite their diverse memberships by forging what I call territorial alliances among members in their organizations. As such, this chapter closely examines the alliances forged between migrant, Lebu, middle-class and women farmers. For example, I examine how farmers in Bambilor have worked to emphasize common ground among farmers -arguing that the tract is a farming territory, comprised of badolee farmers- in ways that downplays class divisions. This chapter has also called attention to the ways that women are frequently excluded from leadership positions -or even membership- in many of the farmer organizations. This is significant given the important political work that women frequently play -such as confronting bulldozers, police- in large-scale land conflicts.

Farmer associations in both Pikine and Bambilor have not only started undertaking political work to unite their diverse memberships, but have also worked to forge territorial alliances with a variety of public and private actors. This includes alliances with Lebu traditional authorities, religious leaders, local and central government authorities, and I/NGOs that intervene on urban farming programs. In analyzing territorial alliances brokered by farmers associations, my research points to the ways in which territorial alliances are spatially and historically contingent. Farmers associations in Pikine and Bambilor rely on different sets of alliances to defend their land claims. Moreover, Pikine farmer associations have relied on very distinct alliances for conflicts that occurred on adjacent plots of land in 2006 and 2011. This speaks to how territorial alliances are constantly being reconfigured and adapted in farmer associations’ efforts help members secure land rights or obtain adequate compensation when their land rights are expropriated. At the same time, it speaks to a constantly shifting cartography of territorial alliances, territorial strategies, and contentious politics in Senegal’s Dakar Region.
Conclusion

The previous chapters have examined several large-scale land conflicts that are rapidly transforming Dakar’s urban farming landscapes into middle-class and elite housing estates. In particular, I have reflected on a series of land conflicts in the rural community of Bambilor and the city of Pikine. In many ways, these land conflicts exemplify contemporary land grabs underway throughout the developing world. The Pikine conflict encompasses roughly 70 hectares of farmland located in two urban districts, whereas the land claimed by General Bertin’s heirs - and later bought by the Senegalese government- encircled 2,411 hectares and seven peri-urban villages. Yet these conflicts differ in key ways from much of the mainstream writing on contemporary land grabs.

In particular, writing on contemporary land grabs emphasizes the role of new actors and the development of large-scale agricultural development projects in rural areas. Little has been written that examines land grabs underway in urban areas, or how contemporary land grabs speak to urban and agrarian questions. This dissertation has thus endeavored to illuminate key ways that we can read urban and rural land grabs together. As Peluso and Lund (2011, p. 669) describe, “there is no one grand land grab, but a series of changing contexts, emergent processes and forces, and contestations that are producing new conditions and facilitating shifts in both de jure and de facto land control. Moreover, while the ‘grab’ itself is important, it only marks the beginning of a process of gaining (or grabbing) access.” In thinking about these urban land grabs in relation to their rural counterparts, my dissertation has focused on how processes of dispossession in Dakar’s urban landscape have served as a lynchpin in larger struggles over land control, political authority, territory, and urban citizenship.

Importantly, I have described how the social, political, and economic context of neoliberalism in urban Senegal has produced Dakar’s urban land grabs. I have thus argued that Senegal’s housing and local land politics have always been firmly grounded in national and global processes. In making this argument, this dissertation describes Dakar’s distinct, historical entanglement with ‘speculative urbanism’ (Goldman 2011a, 2011b) and efforts to build a ‘world-class’ African city. We can see, for example, how longstanding efforts to privatize Dakar’s housing industry have relied on a variety of new mechanisms to expropriate individuals who claim land that is at the center of large-scale land conflicts in Pikine and Bambilor. This includes longstanding efforts to shift costs of housing construction to private actors, including recent reforms to Dakar’s housing sector that encourage housing construction undertaken by private housing developers and housing cooperatives. All of these efforts to privatize housing construction were supported by important shifts in financial relations, which included the increased role of World Bank actors, the devaluation of the FCFA during structural adjustment, and more recent efforts to help private housing developers and individuals obtain loans and mortgages to finance housing projects. The Senegalese government -with the support of international actors- also created many new institutions and agencies to support new housing construction, such as the institution created to encourage Senegal’s housing cooperative movement and agencies that helped developers secure private titles for their housing projects. In doing this, I have argued that the Senegalese government aimed to ensure that Dakar’s formal housing market grew faster than rapidly developing pockets of informal housing.
These efforts to promote the growth of Dakar’s formal housing sector developed alongside new ways of targeting land to be used for new housing estates. In recent years, government officials have increasingly steered away from employing the ‘politics of the bulldozer,’ where informal housing settlements are bulldozed to make way for new, formal housing developments. I have instead shown that alliances -largely organized by housing developers and government officials- have aimed to block the growth of informal housing settlements by situating new formal housing estates on the outskirts of rapidly growing informal settlements (Salem 1998). Housing alliances have also increasingly sited new housing estates on the few remaining tracts of peri/urban farmland in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Many of these new housing projects instigated by housing alliances target tracts of peri/urban farmland that have not been integrated into local and national cadastral maps, or where farmers and residents do not hold formal -or what Dakar residents describe as ‘regular’- claims to land.

This common sense understanding of ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ access to and rights over land are important, as they frame dominant ways of justifying urban land grabs. As we have seen, housing alliances frequently justify their land claims by arguing that farmers and residents are occupying land with ‘irregular’ -or informal- land claims. Farmers’ informal land claims are thus understood in contradistinction to claims justified through urban plans and cadastral mappings, or what I have argued is the dominant mapping tradition in Senegal’s Dakar Region. Farmers and residents have frequently created alternative maps that challenge dominant ways of seeing their land claims as irregular. The production of these maps not only illuminates recent trends towards the privatization of mapping services in urban Senegal, but also how maps commissioned and paid for by farmers are being used to justify their displacement. At the same time, my research highlights how various maps commissioned and/or produced by farmers’ alliances are positioned politically, examining the extent to which farmers’ maps and visions of urban development are accepted and respected by a variety of public and private actors.

In addition to these mapping projects, farmers have also relied on many different mechanisms to justify their land claims. As I have argued, farmers involved in large-scale land conflicts in Pikine and Bambilor have not worked to have their land claims adjudicated in court. On the whole, farmers recognize that they do not have the formal land rights needed to defend their land claims in court. Farmers have instead worked to negotiate settlements to land disputes outside of Senegalese courts. This does not mean, however, that urban land grabs operate wholly outside the rule of law. As has been noted in other African contexts (Lund 2013), farmers in Pikine and Bambilor have filed cases in Senegalese courts to stall efforts to expropriate their landholdings. Farmers in Bambilor have also questioned the legality of housing developers’ land titles, whereas farmers in both zones questioned the legality of housing alliances’ efforts to expropriate property without providing adequate compensation. Yet in farmers’ efforts to obtain adequate compensation for expropriated property, they are also confronting new mechanisms that housing alliances have developed to formally sever farmers’ claims to disputed land. Specifically, farmers seeking adequate compensation have to sign legal settlements in which they relinquish any future land claims in the disputed territory.

In considering how these large-scale land disputes are mediated outside of Senegalese courts, I have also paid significant attention to the new roles played by farmer associations. This research
thus joins literatures emphasizing the important role of associational life and farmers movements in African politics, offering insight into how new roles played by urban farmer organizations in large-scale land disputes resonates with research on the role of identity and citizenship in land conflicts. As such, I have explored how farmer associations have gradually taken on land governance roles traditionally exercised by Lebu leaders. In doing this, I have emphasized how migrant farmers and women have gained important leadership roles and created new ways of practicing urban politics. Yet in making this point, I have also documented the limits to these new leadership opportunities.

Furthermore, this dissertation points out how farmer associations are working to defend their land claims by developing territorial alliances with a variety of public and private actors. Farmers thus strategically invest in social relations (Berry 1989, Simone 2004b) -with Lebu traditional authorities, I/NGOs, religious leaders, and local and central government actors- that draw on spatial strategies to defend their farmland. This includes, but is hardly limited to, map-making efforts, defining communities as farming zones for badolee farmers, migrant farmers’ strategic efforts that prevent Lebu landowners from selling land to housing developers, or efforts to lay PVC pipes to irrigate fields with treated wastewater. These territorial strategies that farming groups deploy to defend their land claims serve as key examples of how farming territories cannot be understood as merely a backdrop for political life. Drawing from Lefebvrian (2009) readings on space and territory, the work conducted by farmer associations demonstrates how territory and urban political life are mutually constituted.

We have also seen how territorial alliances compete with alliances formed by government officials and housing developers seeking to develop new housing projects on land claimed by farmers. By studying the confrontations that unfold between these competing territorial alliances, this dissertation is also in conversation with research on political decentralization and clientelism in sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, my research has drawn attention to how local government actors are playing new roles in land governance. This includes measures undertaken by local government officials to administer land rights on nationalized land and efforts to mediate -or in some instances, produce- land conflicts. My research thus provides fresh insight into the new roles that local government actors have undertaken to administer local land rights, a field of research that has been relatively understudied by academics (Galvan 2004; Faye 2008; Lund 2008; Bruce and Knox 2009).

In researching the new roles played by local government leaders in local land governance, my dissertation looks at how local governments have relied on land administration duties to build and maintain local patronage networks. While many of these networks are integrated into patronage networks controlled by Senegal’s dominant political party, this is not always the case. For example, local government officials draw on patronage networks to build support for opposition candidates. The rise of patronage networks controlled by local government leaders -centered largely around the rents associated from land administration duties- has thus led to struggles between competing territorial alliances over who should control local patronage networks. These struggles over political authority and patronage networks disrupt notions that the Senegalese state has been able to present a unified strategy to recentralize natural resource management in urban settings, thus contradicting notions that local government actors only hold passive roles where
they at merely ‘receive’ powers that are broadcast or transferred from central state actors. At the same time, my research also points to the presence of struggle and violence in clientelist relations.

Being attuned to the fragility of patronage networks -for example, the ways in which competing territorial alliances seek to dismantle and/or appropriate patronage networks cultivated by other coalitions- reminds us that land politics in the Dakar Region are producing winners and losers. Farmers and residents in both Pikine and Bambilor have watched as their fields and homes are transformed into housing estates and populated by middle-class and elite residents. These same farmers and residents have also signed legal documents stating that they have permanently waived their claims to disputed land. Thus while many territorial alliances mobilized by farmer associations in Pikine and Bambilor are still engaged in varying forms of long, drawn-out negotiations that have produced political ‘stand-offs’ that Berry (2002) describes, my research also calls attention to the limits to negotiability in contemporary land conflicts (Peters 2004).

Thus while my dissertation does not provide a detailed accounting of how urban land grabs have redistributed wealth, it is clear that these projects have greatly benefited land speculators, housing developers, and Dakar’s middle-class and elite populations that are living in these new housing developments. Farmers and residents who occupy disputed land have been unevenly affected by these contemporary urban land grabs. In the West Pikine land conflict, farmers who brokered deals with a housing developers’ alliance early in the negotiating process received more housing plots than the farmers that they later recruited to join the housing developers’ alliance. Farmers who later mobilized a coalition against the housing developers’ alliance also received more compensation for expropriated land than most of the farmers who joined the housing developers’ alliance. In all, farmers involved in the West Pikine land dispute were unhappy with how the conflict played out. While several farmers affected by the West Pikine land conflict were able to find fields -and thus continue farming- in Pikine’s Grande Niayes, most of the farmers who were expropriated were forced to retire or find new professions. The vast majority of farmers who received housing plots in the West Pikine housing estate also promptly resold them, as they were not only unemployed but were unable to afford the high costs associated with housing construction. As described in this dissertation, farmers unanimously agreed that they would have preferred to retain their land claims—or at least have been better compensated for the land and property that housing developers and government actors expropriated.

Similarly, farmers and residents I spoke with in Bambilor described how they were essentially forced to sign away their claims to land in the disputed Bertin zone. Yet interesting enough, the first groups of farmers and residents who were expropriated included a mix of low-income farmers and Bambilor’s so-called ‘Sunday farmers’ who also held high-paying positions in the Dakar Region. As such, it is not only Dakar’s low-income farmers who are being expropriated to make space for new housing projects that serve Dakar’s middle-class and elite populations. In presenting this information, it is important to remember that not all farmers and residents who signed away their claims to land in the disputed Bertin zone were fully compensated for all of their property that was expropriated. Farmers and residents were thus unevenly affected when their property was expropriated. Even so, land users who signed away their land claims benefited more from how the land conflict was ultimately resolved than the handful of farmers and...
residents who refused to sign away their claims to land. When I completed my fieldwork, these land users remained without land rights or compensation for their property.

When talking about how to resolve ongoing disputes, farmers and residents all agree: they’d prefer to obtain secure property rights for their landholdings. This is important, given that several land reform proposals that are circulating in Senegal’s policy networks argue that Senegal’s farmers should be provided with long-term leases (which would be provided by central state actors or local governments) rather than freehold property rights (Plançon and Ndiaye 2010; ‘Situation de foncier’ 2015). Yet as I have shown, farmers in both Pikine and Bambilor have long been denied access to any type of property rights - including freehold private property rights, long-term leases, or even formal use rights to land. This is because racialized forms of dispossession (Hart 2002, Moore 2005) first implemented during colonialism were reinforced by decades of political regimes that have denied autochthonous land users and individuals who bought or were gifted land by autochthonous land users access to formal land rights.

Current land reform initiatives would thus do well to recognize and attempt to address how previous and current property regimes have worked to displace or deny land rights to Dakar’s so-called ‘irregular’ land users. In doing so, policy-makers would also have to question how previous iterations of land reform and current reforms being proposed have facilitated appropriation of land -and displacement of land users- by central and local government actors and Dakar’s growing middle-class and elite populations. Reforms would also need to consider not just how they affect competition over land and social differentiation, but recognize how these struggles over land are caught up in struggles -over patronage networks, political authority, etc.- underway within and between government actors, political parties, traditional authorities, and associational life. Of course, this would call for dramatic changes in how policy-makers currently imagine changes in local land governance and plan for land reforms. Helping Dakar’s so-called ‘irregular’ urban farmers secure formal land rights thus requires reconfiguring the social, political, and economic relations that currently dominate land governance and the administration of land rights in urban Senegal.
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