Muslim Civil Society in Urban Public Spaces: Globalization, Discursive Shifts, and Social Movements

in
J. Eade and C. Mele (eds.)

Urban Studies: Contemporary and Future Perspectives
Blackwells 2001

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CGIRS Working Paper Series
Center for Global International & Regional Studies
University of California, Santa Cruz
http://www2.ucsc.edu/cgirs

WP# 2001-6
Cities are processes, not products. The three Islamic elements that set in motion the processes that give rise to Islamic cities were: a distinction between the members of the Umma and the outsiders, which led to juridical and spatial distinction by neighborhoods; the segregation of the sexes which gave rise to a particular solution to the question of spatial organization; and a legal system which, rather than imposing general regulations over land uses of various types in various places, left the litigation of the neighbors the detailed adjudication of mutual rights over space and use (Abu-Lughod 1987: 173).

Framing: Muslim Movements in Urban Situations

We live in an intellectual moment when the complexity of the global Islamic revival renders it difficult to generalize about Muslim institutions, social movements and discursive practices. While diversity and locality remain paramount features of Muslim cities, globalization has inadvertently nurtured the extension of transnational Muslim networks into a web of interconnected cities. Quite opportunistically, urban-based Muslim networks now thrive in the interstitial spaces created by the new global communication and transportation infrastructures. What, then, are the long-term patterns for Muslims in cities?

Since the last millennium, as Janet Abu-Lughod reminds us, "the Islamic city" has been the primary site for: defining power relations between ruler and subject, specifying the rights and identities of spatial communities and regulating urban social relations between genders. Today's Muslim city remains the epicenter of a burgeoning public sphere in which informed publics debate highly contested Islamic discourses regarding social justice, urban public space, legitimate government and gender relations (Eickelman and
Anderson, 1999). Muslim urban civil society is dense, diverse and ubiquitous, encompassing Muslim-inspired charitable organizations, professional groups and cultural associations involving members of all social classes (Norton, 1995; Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, 1999). The Muslim city, therefore, creates the ambience in which Muslim discourses and civil society groups coalesce to launch a diverse stream of urban social movements united in their opposition to what they view as an illegitimate and failed post-colonial political order.

Just how urbanized Muslims are becoming is affirmed in Table I. By 2015, at least half and up to two-thirds of the populations of Muslim majority states will be living in cities with polarized income distributions and miserable living conditions (UNDP, 1999). Although increasingly integrated into a Western-dominated urban network, these urban centers stretch across a contiguous, geographical cultural zone --Islamdom-- in which most states have Muslim majorities or very large minorities (Hodgson, 1974). This growing diamond shaped zone, which Gellner calls the "Qur'an Belt", stretches from Morocco to Indonesia on the east-west axis and from Kazakhstan to Tanzania on the north-south axis. Herein live the overwhelming majority of the 1.2 billion estimated Muslims, the majority of whom reside in South and Southeast Asia, i.e. at least 650 million. (insert Table 1)

Urban Structural Processes, Discourses and Movements
Our objective is to historicize and analyze the meaning and consequences of the unexpected shift from secular national to Islamic discourses, civil society groups and social movements in Muslim majority cities since the seventies. We focus on Islamism and Islamists as distinguished from the broader and less politicized term, Islamic; that is, the modern, Western educated and highly urbanized groups rather than on traditional scholars, i.e. the ulama, or mystical brotherhoods, i.e. Sufi orders (tariqa). In brief, Islamism or political Islam is a modern, male dominated political movement seeking to reinstitutionalize their conception of Islamic laws (Sharia), institutions (zakat or tithe) and other imagined practices of the first Muslims (Esposito, 1992; Guazzzone, 1995). Not unlike 16th century Protestantism and like any other modernist, urban movement, Islamist strategies can be differentiated along a tactical spectrum: armed insurrection (Algeria, Acheh and Israel-Palestine), building a parallel civil society (everywhere), popular demonstrations (Nigeria, Morocco and Iran) or the voting booth (Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan).

Our central argument is that Islamism is a modern urban movement empowered by a profound discursive shift involving virtually all social classes, genders and status groups. Ironically, strongest in cities most integrated into the global system, the energy driving Islamism is concentrated among educated urban youth caught in the miasmic web of multiple post-colonial crises. Islamism is a palpable force manifested everywhere in urban space: cultural and media productions, daily consumption, urban civil society groups, educational institutions and social movements. As Burke (1998) shows, this change constitutes a truly global discursive shift in popular consciousness from a secular
nationalist to an Islamic narrative. Islamism operates at multiple levels: it simultaneously envisions itself as a force for the revival of global Islamic unity, a movement to reform the territorially defined national state and a creator of a moral economy in urban neighborhoods.

At a moment when the post-colonial national state has lost innumerable sovereign powers to neo-liberal global restructuring, Islamism has seized the popular imagination by capturing the mantle of anti-imperialist, populist nationalism in most Muslim majority states (Lubeck, 2000). Therefore, due to the decline of rival alternative visions, Islamism has emerged as the most powerful anti-systemic social force opposing Western-led globalization especially since the collapse of the Soviet model (1989). Viewed from the micro-level perspective of urban neighborhoods, Islamism creates a diverse network of civil society groups delivering goods and services, each sharing an appealing cultural narrative claiming "authenticity," yet one that corresponds to the meaningful every day life discursive practices of Muslim urban communities (Denoeux, 1993; Lubeck, 1998).

Organizationally in order to explain the discursive shift toward urban Islamism, we briefly review the significance of structural factors---the petroleum boom-bust cycle and the crisis of the post-colonial state--- and then evaluate the "demonstration effect" exerted by the Iranian Revolution on urban popular consciousness. Then we dissect Islamism as discourse, civil society group, and social movement in the Egyptian case in comparative perspective. And finally we conclude with an explanation of the contradictory positions
expressed by women representing themselves in urban public space and the novel
discursive practices of Muslim feminist groups.

Global Restructuring: Petrodollars and Rise of Neo-Liberal Regulation

Because 9 of 14 original OPEC states were Muslim majority states, the relative
equilibrium associated with secular nationalism and state regulation of economy and
society fractured considerably during the petroleum boom. Rather than reviving national
economic autonomy, however, the petroleum boom of 1973-4 proved to be the last gasp
of state-centered economic development and the midwife of greater regulation by global
markets and multi-lateral institutions, i.e. IMF, World Bank (Lipietz, 1987).

Three major structural changes occurred as a result of the petroleum boom-bust cycle.
First, the boom created an autonomous, corrupt, rentier state elite distributing contracts
among clients without an accompanying disciplined social structure of accumulation.
State elites invested in non-competitive construction projects and state capitalist
industries (refineries, steel, autos, agro-schemes), allowed inflation and inequality to
destroy the pre-existing urban moral economy and, most importantly, disrupted the
structure of rural food and labor markets; thus encouraging rural to urban migration in
response to the urban construction boom (Richards, 1987).

Second, the petro-boom shifted vast financial resources to the Saudi and Gulf states
thereby exposing immigrant labor to conservative (Wahabbi-Hanabali) doctrines. In turn
the Gulf states funded a global network of Islamic associations, schools, charities and mosques, all occurring at the expense of the more populated and poorer secular states. Al-Azmeh, speaking for Muslim modernists, asserts that "Petro-Islam ... has broken the secularist and nationalist cultural, mediatic and, to a lesser extent, the educational monopoly of the modern Arab state" (1993: 32).

Third, with the collapse of oil prices from a high of $41/barrel in 1981 to less than $8/barrel in 1986, the swollen cities of Islamdom, increasingly filled with new immigrants and recent graduates, descended into the austerity phase of the petro-bust (Lubeck, 1998). Global neo-liberalism forced states to implement structural adjustment polices, i.e. devaluation, privatization of industry, lowering deficits, eliminating subsidies for basic needs and state withdrawal, all of which increased urban inequality and unemployment among graduates (UNDP, 1999).

The Legitimacy Crisis of the Post-Colonial Secular State

To be sure, the petro-boom-bust cycle and global restructuring undermined the legitimacy of the secular nationalist state even before the Iranian Revolution made Islamism a viable political option. Historically, ever since the rise of Ataturk's Turkey, Pahlavi's Iran and Nasser's Egypt, the secular ethno-nationalist project spread very shallow roots in Muslim civil society. Indeed, secular nationalism never originated from below: it was almost always a top-down, authoritarian project articulated from above by national, mostly military, elites who assumed control over the authoritarian colonial state apparatus. For
military, intellectual and bureaucratic elites, therefore, the state was an instrument to transform society in the direction of a given Western model of modernity. Interestingly, Muslim royalist regimes (Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco) in addition to Pakistan are exceptions, oftentimes adjusting more readily to the Islamist discursive shift.

The combined effect of disasters like the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the generalized stagnation of the development model, state implementation of neo-liberal structural adjustment programs (SAPs) destroyed the social contract between state elites and urban dwellers. Liberalization and austerity reduced state subsidies to the most vulnerable populations, diminished employment opportunities in state industries and bureaucracies for graduates. Not only do SAPs violate Muslim prohibitions against paying interest on debt as well as the obligation for Muslim states to distribute alms or subsidies to the poor (zakat), the transparently foreign management of the SAPs rapidly evaporated any residual fig leaf of legitimacy possessed by secular political elites.

All forces funneled social tension toward cities. The crisis severely impacted the students and graduates of state sponsored, Western-origin universities, not the traditional Muslim medersa training traditional scholars for the ulama. Economic stagnation, widespread corruption and bureaucratic incompetence dashed the mobility and security aspirations of secondary schools and universities. Hence they constitute a "lumpen intelligencia" poised for recruitment (Roy, 1994). Others paint a grim picture of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. MENA is second only to Africa in rates of population growth; the region's population is expected to double in 27 years, most are less than 20 years old;
and Islam and fertility are positively correlated universally (Richards and Waterbury 1996: 80-85). Typically, state educational budgets are biased toward tertiary and secondary education, geared to the state employment of males for jobs that no longer exist. These policies generate a steady stream of recruits-- from the countryside, informal economy and educational institutions-- readily absorbed into a network of urban Islamist movements and civil society groups (Sullivan, 1994; Wickham, 1997).

Discursive Shift: The Iranian Revolution as "Demonstration Effect"

Despite their universality, structural factors alone fail to explain the tectonic discursive shift toward Islamism in the popular consciousness of Muslims living in cities. The pivotal event was the Iranian Revolution (1978-79) and its successful institutionalization as the Islamic Republic of Iran. Clearly, a classic urban insurrection directed against a corrupt, secular authoritarian regime, the revolution depended upon a multi-class coalition of nationalist, Marxist and Muslim groups led by the charismatic Khomeini with Shi'ite clergy acting as a disciplined corporate group. Most importantly, advances in global (Western) communication media televised the revolution to millions of Muslims living outside of Iran. Later, as structural adjustment penetrated Muslim cities, the Iranian Revolution demonstrated to the excluded generations facing austerity and misery that the Islamist alternative was a rational, feasible, alternative political project. Not only did the Revolution exert a "demonstration effect" on urban Muslim activists, it thoroughly transformed the global Muslim community's vision of what was politically possible to imagine, just as globalization and structural adjustment were emasculating the post-
colonial state. Zubaida captures its impact well: "For some ...Islam in its political and progressive form is more accessible to the people springing as it does from their historical cultural roots...acquir[ing] many recruits, a respectability and viability...firmly established in the mainstream" (1989: 40). For urban activists who failed to apply Western models of social transformation, the revolution constituted a unique rupture with the past. For unlike other movements, revolutionary Iran survived the onslaughts of powerful antagonists: isolation and destabilization by the United States, Saudi-funded efforts to delegitimize the revolution as an Islamic discourse, and the Iraqi invasion.

We ignore for space reasons questions whether the role of "Twelver" Shi'ite doctrines, clerical institutions and Khomeini's concept of "rule by jurists" are uniquely Iranian or partially applicable to Sunni urban contexts. To summarize what is applicable: the revolution mobilized formerly excluded groups such as women and recent urban migrants into a mass-based movement that organized demonstrations in cities like Tehran whose population increased from 3 to 9 million between 1970-90 (Roy 1994: 53). Urban civil society and the public sphere mushroomed as new committees, foundations, civil associations, and publications extended into all aspects of urban life. Constitutional innovation created an Islamic Republic with universal suffrage for women who, once mobilized by the revolution, soon demanded equal access to education, work, political office and gender rights such as a pre-nuptial contract excluding polygamy and even wages for housework when divorced (Hoodfar, 1998). Indeed, Khomeini reinforced the Islamist demand for reinterpretation (ijtihad). His final statement (1988) asserted the principle of revolutionary necessity: "the Islamic state had absolute power...to adopt such
measures as it deemed necessary for the interests of the Islamic state even when these might conflict with Islamic law or a fundamental religious obligation like the pilgrimage to Mecca" (Mayer 1993: 120). Many of these discursive innovations have diffused into Shi'ite communities like Lebanon and even into the Sunni mainstream.

Islamic Reform: The Origins of Modern Islamist Urban Movements

Historians have traced Islamic reform (islah) to 17th century reactions to imperialism and Hindu-Muslim syncretism. By the 18th century, Wahabbism, a radical, puritanical doctrine opposing rational reinterpretation of the Sharia as well as Sufi brotherhoods, unified Arabia under the Saudi family. In the 20th century the latter used petroleum revenues, their control over pilgrimage sites (1924-25) and patronage of Muslim pilgrim-scholars to spread a Wahabbi ulama vision of Islamic reform (Lapidus, 1988). Alarmed by the technical and organizational power of the European colonial state, modernist urban intellectuals tried to theorize a modern Islamic state capable of reviving or replacing the Caliphate. Islamic Modernists--Al-Afgani, Mohammed Abduh and Rashid Rida-- called for returning to "original" Islam (salaf), reviving ijtihad and embracing Islam's historical expertise in science, technology and reason, while denouncing the ulama's passive imitation of the Islamic cannon, the corruption of Sufi magical practices and the collaboration of Muslim rulers with colonialism. Intellectually and practically, however, they failed to realize their project. For, despite considerable influence among the urban intelligencia, Islamic modernists remained intellectuals, never developing a modern
organizational structure capable of mobilizing Muslim civil society toward an Islamist project.

The necessary discursive shift to a modern, civil society-based, urban organization occurred in 1928 when Hasan al-Banna, an Egyptian elementary school teacher, practicing Sufi and devoted reader of Rashid Rida's newspaper, al Manar, founded the Muslim Brotherhood. Beginning as an association for Islamic reform, serving workers in the British-controlled Suez Canal Zone, and soon Cairo (1934), the Brotherhood emerged as the first modern organized, mass-based, multi-functional Islamist organization to speak to the needs of the new urban classes now sprouting in colonial cities. Al-Banna's program proposed: a "return" to purified, Islamic principles and practices, the rejection of the corrupting influence of Western culture, recognizing Islam as a comprehensive way of life for modern urbanites and, for the first time, a strategy for seizing political power so as to establish a modern Islamic state as an alternative to the then dominant liberal, secular nationalist movement (Abu-Rabi, 1996).

What then explains the success of Al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood in Muslim cities? Most important was its modernity: innovative recruitment and membership registration strategies, disciplined organizational techniques and comprehensive social services for new migrant workers flooding into Egyptian cities. Initially, however, al Banna required Brotherhood members to follow ritual practices derived from Sufi orders (tariqa) such as swearing an oath, regular devotional exercises and daily recitations from the Quran (Voll, 1991). In global terms, while demanding an Islamic state, the Brotherhood vision is Pan-
Islamic and internationalist, currently claiming branches in over 70 countries (www.ummah.org/ikhwan). With branches in Syria, Sudan, Jordan and the Maghreb, the Brotherhood also benefited from funding from the Saudi and Gulf states during the petro-boom. Their objective is the Islamization of civil society: schools, mosques, clubs, associations and social welfare services for those employed as laborers, clerks and professionals in the Western-oriented, modern urban sector. Ramadan summarizes the organizational shift of Islamic activism:

The Brotherhood shifted the responsibility for establishing Islamic government from the religiously educated class to the Western incultured class, from the shaykhs to the lawyers, doctors, engineers, pharmacists and army and police officers. ...link[ing] pan-Islamic Egypt before the World War I to nationalist Egypt after the war, just as it linked religion to modern science...(1993: 155).

Organizationally similar to Communist and Fascist mass movements of the thirties, the Brotherhood instituted a modern, bureaucratically disciplined organizational apparatus into Muslim cities, one led by a Supreme Guide, with membership lists, specialized departments, secret units, modern media and local branches. The original organization had four types of members: "assistant member, affiliated member, working member and mujahid, or combatant member" (Auda 1994: 381). At times quasi-military athletic training and a secret militia were used to pursue objectives. At the local level, cell structures consisted of five and later ten members, bound by personal ties and an elected chief who represented the cell at branch meetings (Mitchell, 1969; Denoeux, 1993). Mitchell estimated that the Egyptian Brotherhood had 500 branches and 500,000 members by 1949. Banned a year earlier for threatening the state and later for assassinating the Egyptian prime minister, the organization went underground yet they
supported Nasser and the Free Officers' coup against the monarchy until disillusionment with his state socialist policies and his refusal to establish an Islamic state. The Brotherhood then split into radical and moderate factions. After surviving Nasser's suppression, the moderate branch eventually consolidated itself as a middle class movement committed to gradualism and non-violence.

Radical Islamist Discourses: Sayyid Qutb as Insurrectionary Theorist

Most Islamists pursue moderate, gradualist and non-insurrectionary strategies. Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), however, became the theoretician of the radical, insurrectionist, zealous tendency in Islamism. Born in Assiut, Southern Egypt to a prosperous family and educated in Cairo, he worked as an inspector of education. In 1949, courtesy of American aid, he received a scholarship to study in Washington and California. Alienated by America's liberalism, alliance with Israel and racism toward Arabs, upon his return to Egypt he joined the Brotherhood, acting as a publicist and militant activist. Imprisoned for conspiracy and tortured several times, Qutb was executed for treason in 1966, but not before making his case for an uncompromising Islamic state at his trial (Haddad, 1983). Qutb was prolific. His writings include a thirty-volume commentary on the Qur'an, written in a clear, didactic style making it popular among Islamists, the Nation of Islam and even the revolutionary Iranian students (Haddad 1983: 68). The canonical text of insurrectionary Islamism, Milestones, was written while being tortured prior to his execution.
Qutb's theoretical arguments mark a radical rupture with the Brotherhood's mainstream Islamist ideas. Because he inspires and justifies vanguardist, insurrectionist movements committed to overthrowing states ruled by practicing Muslims, Qutb is to Islamism what Lenin was for Marxism. To summarize: synthesizing ideas ranging from medievalist Ibn Taymiyya and the Pakistani Islamist Maududi, Qutb defined the contemporary situation as equivalent to the pre-Islamic condition of jahiliyya, a state of ignorance similar to Hobbes' "state of nature", the same social conditions that forced Mohammed to withdraw to Medina (Abu-Rabi', 1996). Therefore, merely observing the five pillars of Islam is insufficient if a Muslim cooperates with existing authorities; rather only a uncompromising implementation of the absolute authority of God (hakimiyya) as defined in the Sharia allows one to be defined as an observant Muslim. Hence, true Muslims are obligated to practice holy flight (hijrah) by withdrawing with the "elect" from corrupted Muslims who do not heed the call (da'wa). Corrupted Muslims are branded as atheists or apostates (kafir), thus subject to suppression and holy war (jihad) and most important for Qutb, "a vanguard must resolve to set it in motion" (Voll 1991: 371). According to Qutb:

This religion is a universal declaration of human liberation on earth from the bondage to other men or to human desires...To declare God's sovereignty means: the comprehensive revolution against human governance in all its perceptions, forms, systems and conditions...Jihad works to realize the idea of universal revolution not aimed at rule, control or booty (Haddad, quoting Qutb, 1983: 82-83).

Islam, moreover, is universal and global, not limited to the Arab man. "Its object is the world, the whole world"... "Whenever there is oppression, Islam is commissioned to eradicate it, to combat it, whether this oppression is against Muslims, against protected peoples or others with whom Muslims have no treaties" (1983: 83).
It is easy to see how Qutb's torture, martyrdom and call for global liberation provides the canonical discourse for urban insurrectionist sects defining themselves as revolutionary vanguards struggling against the inequality and misery engulfing the Muslim cities. A legion of secretive, splinter groups have drawn inspiration from Qutb's writings. Islamic Jihad assassinated Sadat; Al-Juma’a al Islamiyya wages war against tourists while its leader, al Rahman, was convicted of the World Trade Center bombing. Other groups such as Takfir wa Hijra, Islamic Jihad and the Armed Islamic Group wage insurrections in Egypt, Afghanistan, Algeria and Israel-Palestine (Esposito, 1992; Ramadan, 1994; Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, 1999).

Clearly moderate and insurrectionary Islamist groups have adopted organizational forms and borrowed mobilizing concepts like vanguardism, human liberation, anti-imperialism and urban revolution from the Marxist playbook. Studies now confirm the Marxist background of many of the leading Islamists. For instance, a survey of Hamas activists in Gaza found that 60% acknowledge prior membership in Marxist organizations (Eickelman 1997: 34). Burgat and Dowell's study of Islamists in North Africa records their former memberships and dialogue with the left: "...part of the secular intelligencia has already begun to reposition itself in a way that brings it much closer to the cultural preoccupations of the Islamist approach"(1993: 83). Willis notes Ben Bella's shift from a socialist ally of the Communist Party to an enthusiastic supporter of the Iranian revolution and the Algerian Islamists (1996: 90). And finally, Roy is more explicit: Islamists "received their political education not in religious schools but on colleges and
universities campuses where they rubbed shoulders with militant Marxists whose concepts they borrowed...and injected with Quranic terminology..." (1994: 3).

Urban Egypt: A Case Study of Islamism within Civil Society

Nowhere is the discursive shift from secular nationalism to one or another iteration of the Islamic narrative more complete or more ubiquitous than among the cities of Egypt. Ubiquity, however, comes at the cost of discursive coherence. Fragmentation of authority generates: a multitude of small, violent takfir sects, the "normalization" of the Muslim Brotherhood within the urban middle classes, a new alliance between the authoritarian state and the ulama-based Islamic establishment and, of course, the efflorescence of informal Muslim associations, mosques, clubs, study groups, and social services (Sullivan, 1994). By the end of the nineties, the discursive practices expressed in the urban public sphere were overwhelmingly Islamic, including those sponsored by state ministries and their clients from the traditional ulama. Parliamentary politics changed further in 2000. Despite persecution, intimidation, denial of legal status and widespread vote fraud, the Muslim Brotherhood won 17 seats as independent candidates, thus constituting the largest bloc of opposition members in parliament (Howeidy, 2000).

In Egypt, Nasser's premature death in 1970 marked the apogee of state-centered development, ended populist redistribution policies, and, effectively, terminated the secular, Arab nationalist developmental project. Sadat (1970-81) adjusted to global restructuring, economic stagnation, and declining popular legitimacy in contradictory
ways: by repositioning Egypt as an ally of the USA, by negotiating a peace treaty with Israel, by cautiously liberalizing the economy (infitah), by suppressing the Nasserites and leftists and, most importantly, by allying his regime with the conservative ulama at Al-Azhar University as well as the Saudis. Symbolized by the slogans "Science and Faith" and the "Believer President", he also released from prison the leadership of radical Islamist takfir groups and the Muslim Brotherhood. By the time of his assassination by a takfir group in 1981, Sadat was pressed to juggle contradictory foreign policies while balancing the conflicting demands of domestic groups.

Despite liberalization, structural adjustment and an opening to new capitalist classes, the state remained bloated, inefficient and authoritarian. "Public expenditure as a percentage of GNP climbed ...from 34.4 percent in 1975 to 43 percent in 1984" (Richards, 1991; Springborg, 1992, cited in Zubaida, 1997). Nor, sadly, did Sadat mitigate Egypt's egregious record of human rights abuses. Egypt under Sadat and Mubarak is an unreconstructed, authoritarian state ruled by emergency laws that permit the banning of any association, detention without trial, widespread torture and "disappearances" of suspects without any accountability whatsoever. (Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/egypt). The 1994 torturing to death of Abdel Harith Madani, a lawyer for the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, by state security has been documented by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the US embassy (Weaver1999: 150-52). Finally, rising income inequality, new forms of ostentatious consumption among the privileged, and a burgeoning foreign tourist industry fostered
new social cleavages, increased cultural tension and raised popular resentment toward the beneficiaries of liberalization (Weaver, 1995).

Education Policy, Urban Networks and Civil Society

Let us turn to explaining the structural source of Egypt's flourishing Muslim civil societies and urban social movements. According to Richards and Waterbury (1996) a principal cause is the oversupply of graduates--secondary, post-secondary and university-relative to the demand for their skills. Between 1970-1991, secondary school enrollments more than doubled from 35 % to 80 % (124), averaging 14 % annual increases between 1971-84. Since the era of Nasser graduates, usually as a last resort, expected to be absorbed into the poorly paid, stagnant state sector, i.e. between 1976-86, 90 % of new jobs came from either the government or from emigration abroad (1996: 119). The class and gender bias of educational expenditure also plays a role. In a society where roughly half of the population is illiterate, i.e. 60 % of the women and 34 % of the men (1997), Egypt's thirteen universities consumed 38 % of the education budget in 1984-85. Thus university enrollments roughly doubled between 1971-76 and increased another 50 % by 1984 to over 660,000 students. Not surprisingly, pay, morale and working conditions are very low in the educational sector, especially if compared to Saudi Arabia where Egyptian teachers make ten times an Egyptian salary (121). Finally, decades of populist educational policy and austerity budgets diminished standard of graduates so that few have skills demanded by the emerging private sector.
Ironically, a key factor explaining the discursive shift to Islamism originated in the state's tolerance for the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamization of educational policy. Sadat and later Mubarak's shifted toward supporting Al-Azhar and the Ministry of Religious Endowments, thus Islamizing policies affecting women's rights, family law, education and culture (Ramadan, 1991; Auda, 1993). Initially, in order to undermine the left and Nasserites, Sadat pursued a "divide and rule" policy by sponsoring Islamist groups in the universities and supporting the publications (i.e. Al-Da'wa, Al-I'tisam) of the Brotherhood. Note that the Egyptian constitution was amended to require religious education in schools as well as declaring that "Islam is the religion of the state" and that "Sharia was the main source of legislation" (Esposito 1992: 96). According to Starrett, new educational initiatives pumped resources into Al-Azhar's primary school network, increasing enrolment by 70% between 1976/7 and 1980/8 (80-81) and by 125% under Mubarak (1998: 105). When structural adjustment policies triggered a food riot in 1977 spearheaded by Islamist groups, Sadat not only retreated from cutting food subsidies, but called for greater Islamic educational content and more authority for Al-Azhar and the Ministry of Religious Endowments.

Observe the discursive shift. By 1992 Mubarak's political party, the National Democratic Party, feeling the heat from the Brotherhood's criticism of Egypt's support of the Americans in the Gulf war, declared that "Egypt was not a secular state but an Islamic one." According to Auda by: "Exploiting the Ikhwan's strategy, the state began to color
its official state ideology with Islamic terminology and pose as the representative of the
correct understanding of the Islamic religion" (1994: 394). Alarmed by the rising power
of Islamist controlled civil society located in a network of independent mosques, Muslim
Brotherhood media and missionary societies, the Mubarak government created the
Higher Committee for Islamic Da'wa under the grand shaykh of Al-Azhar. To counter the
Islamist hold on da'wa, the Ministry of Religious Endowments launched "da'wa"
caravans to dialogue with youths at local mosques. Seventy-two caravans were reported

In a crude effort to silence the independent voice of Muslim civil society, the Ministry
attempted to license independent mosques by incorporating salaried imams (prayer
leaders) and seeking to dictate the content of their Friday sermons. Besides abusing a
long standing Muslim urban spatial practice regarding community control of
neighborhood mosques, the Ministry strategy violated a widely held norm of Muslim
civil society that the imam of a neighborhood mosque remain sufficiently independent of
the state so as to guide the moral life of the community. Wickham (1997) reports that this
policy failed because of the uncanny ability of Islamist activists to obtain licenses for
prayer rooms from municipal authorities even receiving the cooperation of minor
religious officials from the Ministry. The fiscal crisis of the state plays a role, here, too,
for the Ministry administered only 30,000 of Egypt's 170,000 mosques in 1993. Hence,
the Ministry can not afford to pay, or probably recruit enough compliant religious
officials. Indeed, the government already suffered from a shortage of 40,000 imams since
Azhar only graduated "5,000 _in 1992 of whom only 3,000 showed up for work" (Wickham 1997: 125).

Starrett's invaluable study, Putting Islam to Work (1998), assiduously documents the impact the Islamists have had on educational institutions, textbooks and, ultimately, on the spirit of popular Islamic culture transmitted through universal popular education. Ironically, as the modern state extends and deepens its bureaucratic reach, it simultaneously strengthens the discursive shift to the Islamic narrative. Starrett points out that while enrollments in arts and humanities faculties of universities increased by 8.2 % between 1981-87, that of Al-Azhar increased by 70 %. Meanwhile the circulation of monthly public sector religious periodicals more than tripled from 181,000 to 558,000 between 1983-86 (1998: 90-91). Electronic media programming also became increasingly Islamic. Elsewhere Weaver reports that the Minister of Education disclosed in an interview that "the Islamists had successfully infiltrated primary, preparatory and secondary schools all over Egypt" and then confided, "I could not believe how many fundamentalist teachers we had in the schools" (Weaver 1999: 154). Public schools, therefore, have become discursive agents, contested sites where Islamists, the ulama and the state struggle over lessons and textbooks, thus inscribing their interpretative narrative into the conscious and unconscious memory of the next generation of Muslim Egyptians.

Discounting the media attention devoted to the spectacular fringe tafkir sects, Starrett stresses how the Islamist narrative is inscribed onto the deeper conscious and unconscious discursive practices regulating everyday life. "Egypt's Islamic trend, far
from being a _fringe movement, _is pervasive, persistent and normal, whose effects on individuals and society do not remain confined to _political movements and organizations." What's more important are the "changes it has created in the way Egyptians practice, apprehend and represent their religious heritage" and a key institution is "compulsory popular schooling" because it "has encouraged rather than discouraged attachment to Islamic culture_. "One of the results of mass religious instruction is thus to prepare students just enough to question the authorities of the keepers of the Muslim tradition, and to question their own exclusion from its manipulation" (1999: 187).

Globalization, liberalization and modernity, moreover, have converged so as to create a decentralized and portable array of mass media products (audiocassettes, videotapes, satellite dishes) which are impossible for Egyptian state security (SSI) to monitor effectively let alone control (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999). In addition, the fragmentation of Islamic authority coupled with the diversity of sources has reduced the authoritative religious intermediaries leading to greater individual or sectarian interpretation of the Islamic discourse. Starrett captures the dilemma of a corrupt, authoritarian state chasing the discursive shift to Islam:

_it is not the paucity of Islamic culture that accounts for the growth of the oppositional tendencies of the Islamic Trend, but rather its bounty. Each new attempt to correct mistaken ideas by furthering the penetration of Islamic discourse in public space creates an intensification of the conflict between parties seeking to control the discourse. In becoming hegemonic, Islam_is forced by necessity not only to provoke limited counterlanguages , but to become itself the language in which cultural and political battles are fought by the vast majority of interested parties (1998: 219).

Urban Civil Society: Islamist Charities and Networks
The discursive shift to Islamism, of course, is not suspended above urban civil society, rather it is deeply rooted in a diverse web of informal and formal Islamic organizations: private voluntary and charitable organizations, informal social networks, neighborhood mosques and especially, the initiatives sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood. Global neo-liberalism abrogated the pact between the citizen and the state whereby citizens "relinquished their claims to basic human and civil rights in exchange for the state undertaking to provide them with education and health care, employment and subsidies for such necessities as staples, cooking gas and transportation" (Sivan 1998: 2).

Accordingly, these changes allowed Muslim charitable and civil society groups to fill urban social spaces with a parallel social service sector. Rugh's observations illustrates how Islamic civil society operates in Cairo's neighborhoods:

Many private mosques have expanded into services that compete directly with less efficient and lower quality public services. Services may include the provision of subsidized clothing and food, health care, regular educational programs (usually at the preprimary or primary level), after-school tutoring for children, religious instruction, subsidies for students, evening courses, social group activities. In poor areas mosque representatives hand out free food, clothing, and money in exchange, as one women put it, "for wearing our Islamic dress." Money can also be borrowed through Islamic banks in the approved "profit sharing" way where a fixed interest is not required (1993: 164).

Others emphasize the higher quality of Islamist social services for nominal fees where the customers are treated with respect. "Islamist medical clinics, well-staffed and outfitted with the latest medical equipment, contrast sharply with state-run hospitals with their low sanitation standards and long delays" (Sadowski 1987: 45). A 1997 newspaper report, quoting a statistical study by Amani Qandil, estimates that Islamic charity organizations provided 14% of Egypt's health care (Negus 1997: 2). And finally, when compared to
government responses to the Cairo earthquake (1992) and floods in (1994), observers noted the superior performance of the Islamic charities.

Of course, subsidies cost money and high quality medical care requires committed professionals. New Islamic banks as well as contributions by Islamist businessmen paying their obligatory Islamic tithe (zakat) through Islamist charities supply the financial support for Islamist social services. Islamic banks, funded originally by Saudi and other Gulf states, have become significant players in the wider Muslim world (i.e. Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia). From a tiny number a quarter century ago, Islamic financial institutions have grown to 170 with assets exceeding $ 150 billion including Citibank, Dow Jones and HSBC. (The Economist, 17 February 01, 76; Islamic Index: http://indexes.dowjones.com/djimi/imhome.html).

Professional Associations and the Muslim Brothers: A State within the State?

Seventy years of Brotherhood activity has clear patterns. One is a cycle of alliance and rupture with the established regime. A second is generational tension followed by renewal through generational succession. A third is the constant formation of splinter groups, typically more radical (i.e. Jama'a, Islamic Jihad, al-Samawiyya), but recently more pragmatic and pluralist such as al-Wasat which recently received a license to establish an NGO called the Egypt Society for Culture and Dialogue (Cairo Times, 13-19 April 2000). A fourth is a gradual incorporation of global liberalism into its rhetoric and
organizational forms, if not always in its practices (Piscatori and Esposito, 1991; Esposito and Voll, 1996; Sivan, 1998, 2000).

Officially, of course, the banned Muslim Brotherhood does not exist in Egypt. Once the Sadat-Mubarak governments shifted toward the Islamic current to gain legitimacy, however, the regime has exhibited a cyclical policy toward the Brotherhood; one characterized by a cautious acknowledgement, followed by an effort to incorporate the Brotherhood's program into state institutions and then suppression, using arrests, murder, torture and detention without trial. Yet the Brotherhood has only deepened and extended its associations and networks into urban civil society. Because of the sympathy it garnered from the public, it now represents the only credible civil opposition in spite of the regime's use of military courts to imprison the leadership in 1995, 1999 and 2000. Local human rights organizations, according to the State Department, "indicate that there are approximately 15,000-16,000 political detainees; it is not clear how many among them are charged and awaiting trial, convicted and serving sentences, or detained without charge" (http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/egypt/html).

Constant suppression and imprisonment of leaders has forced the Brotherhood to develop a multi-pronged political strategy. Though banned, the Brotherhood's first strategy seeks parliamentary representation via alliances with legal political parties, first with the Wakf, subsequently Socialist Labor. The latter alliance gave them control of a muck-raking newspaper, Al-Shaab and 36 seats in the 1987 parliamentary election. Parliamentary experience, moreover, has broadened the Brotherhood's understanding of the complexity
of the modern state and the need for a legislative check on executive authority.

Notwithstanding their commitment to the full implementation of the Sharia in an Islamic state and their support for persecution of intellectuals for apostasy, a capital offense under Sharia, the Brotherhood's parliamentary leaders like Ma'mun al-Hudaybi and Al-Tilmisani have advocated shura (consultation) as a legislative institution where legislators and public can debate applications of Sharia (Auda 1994: 386).

In the late eighties, the Brotherhood pursued a new electoral strategy, that of contesting for leadership posts in modern educational and professional associations (syndicates), typically regarded as bastions of the educated middle class and urban civil society. The Brotherhood has always been strong in the educational sector. In the seventies it established Islamic associations (al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya) for university students, soon controlling most university student associations. These associations dispensed valuable educational services to students, i.e. notes, photocopied textbooks and transportation for female students "who felt their integrity endangered in packed, mixed sex lecture halls" (Denoeux 1993: 151). To be sure, the subsequent move to control professional associations follows logically as the age cohort of the seventies graduated from universities and entered professional life. Aided by small numbers of voters, the Brotherhood's control of leadership posts of professional associations was systematic and thorough: Engineers, 1987; Physicians, 1988; Pharmacists, 1989; Commerce Graduates Association, 1989; the Cairo University faculty club, 1990; and Lawyers, 1992 (Wickham, 1997; Starrett, 1998).
Austerity and liberalization explain to some degree the Brotherhood's electoral victories. Wickham cites a 1994 government survey concluding that unemployed graduates numbered 1.4 million of whom 200,000 held a university degree (1997: 122). Ismail's study of Cairo's informal sector describes university graduates in engineering and law working as day laborers and construction workers, i.e. painters, plasterers and tile layers (2000: 377). In addition, under the Brotherhood's leadership, the professional associations "have begun to provide employment and income to young doctors, teachers and other professionals, thereby reducing the share of their earnings derived from the state" (Wickham 1997: 123).

Furthermore, the leadership of the medical and engineering associations "have initiated projects in the areas of housing, health care, and insurance, established training programs and pilot small business ventures for new graduates_"(Wickham 1997: 123). Note the relationship to globalization. As the twin forces of structural adjustment and state withdrawal take their toll on urban living standards, the Islamists have seized the opportunity handed to them by global restructuring so as to employ graduates and professionals in their parallel social and economic social service sector. Quite paradoxically, neo-liberalism's privatization policy has buttressed the role of Islamist networks as providers of urban social services and charity while, at the same time, sounding the alarm against the "Islamist threat".

Cairo: Islamism and Survival Strategies among the Popular Classes
To be sure, the quality of urban life for migrants and the poor in Cairo, now approaching 14 million, generate objective conditions encouraging radical protest movements. Islamism, however, is the beneficiary. Richards and Waterbury cite a national housing deficit of over 2 million units. They describe vast districts of Cairo as "slums" where a half million live on rooftops and where "levels of lead in the air may cause brain damage and mental retardation in small children" (1996: 258). Bayat (1997) estimates that 6 million live in Cairo's illegal "spontaneous communities," often squatting in tent cities and shantytowns in cemeteries and other public lands. Liberalization and SAPs explain the widening gap: the income share of the top 10% of Egypt's urbanites increased from 26% in 1981 to 32.6% in 1991. Bayat then concludes that because more than half of Cairo and Giza are classified as "poor" or "ultra-poor" (i.e. circa 7 million), the charity of religious NGOs fails to sustain a minimal living standard for the poor.

Ismail's (2000) excellent study of militant Islamist groups living in popular quarters of Cairo documents the diffusion of militant and radical Islamist support among the migrant poor, squatters and the informal sector. For Ismail, "Islamism _is not a marginal religious or political movement_" but rather "a form of contestation that finds ground in spaces where oppositional positioning develops" (2000: 379). Instead of assuming social pathology and marginality, Ismail portrays radical Islamists as regionally-rooted actors who organize specific neighborhood spaces by provisioning parallel economic, political and welfare services to their constituents. Nor is this phenomena new to Cairo. By drawing upon historian Edmund Burke's seminal analysis of historic repertoires of urban
collective action, Ismail brilliantly explains why the protest movements rooted in neighborhoods, local leadership and dissatisfaction with the state's local representatives are deeply structural not novel. Rather they are continuous movements within a historically legitimated tradition of urban popular protest (Lubeck, 1987; Burke, 1989). Subverting essentializing explanations which assume social pathology, (i.e. anomie, moral breakdown and marginality), Ismail documents how radical Islamists like Jihad, Juma'a and Samawiyya negotiate with neighborhood residents in order to construct a social and spatial moral order for "in order to expand their popular support they [Islamists] must operate within the socio-spatial framework of the communities"(2000: 393).

Therefore the need to solve rational and objective urban problems is what explains popular support for radical Islamist movements. These include: opposition to police corruption and brutality, the regulation of craft, trade and labor activities, tensions arising from overcrowded housing where women must share common facilities with non-kin, the migrant need for morally acceptable marriage partners and attraction of Islamist educational and welfare services described above (Ismail, 2000). A pragmatic ability to negotiate a meaningful moral and social order in impoverished, immigrant slums explains the triumph of Islamism as the dominant populist, anti-imperialist nationalist discourse in Muslim cities.

Comparative Perspectives: Islamism, Democracy and Urban Insurrection
The Egyptian Brothers' gradualist, pragmatic strategy, based upon mobilizing the cautious middle class, is widely replicated in the cities of Islamdom: the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, PAS in Malaysia, Hamas in Algeria, Ghannoussi's MTI/Nahda movement in Tunisia, Virtue/Welfare in Turkey and Wahids' NI in Indonesia (Kramer, 1993, 1995; Salame, 1994; Guazzone, 1995; Hefner, 2000). There is a crude correlation between the success of moderate Islamism and the national level of development and degree of urban social cohesion. Those committed to pragmatism, moderation and of Shura (consultation) are dominant in more developed countries and with social groups that are older, better educated and more secure economically, i.e. the urban middle classes. Conversely, countries experiencing economic and political collapse and/or social disintegration--Algeria, Afghanistan and Nigeria-- are dominated by radical Islamist movements fueled by a vast reservoir of young, impoverished and disillusioned recruits (Kramer, 1995; Lubeck, 1998). In urban situations like petro-busted Nigeria, where crime, ethnic conflict and devastating poverty are normalized, Muslims disillusioned with Western models are rationally choosing a system that they know and hope will bring security, law and order, i.e. Sharia.

Algiers, of course, is the prime example of an urban tinderbox in a petro-state whose policies secured the triumph of a radical Islamist movement. Here is an ideal typical case where structural factors--global restructuring, the petro-bust, structural adjustment's austerity, high youth unemployment, brutal military repression, cautious liberalization and a state legitimacy crisis--converged to generate a powerful social base that resulted in electoral victories for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 1991. Consider Algiers under
 neo-liberal restructuring, now the apotheosis urban Islamist insurrection and civil war. A survey found that 75% of youth aged 16-29 were seeking work while, at the same time, "the educational system produced 270,000 unemployed diploma holders. Some 80% of this age group continued to live with their families, often eight persons to a room" (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 116). The authoritarian petro-state introduced structural adjustment, followed by political liberalization, at a time of high unemployment when state revenues from oil and gas exports decreased by 40% in a year (1985-86); thereby raising the foreign debt from $14.8 billion to $24.6 billion (Willis 1996: 99-100).

Earlier, like Egypt, the regime tried incorporating the Islamist current by implementing a new family law, allowing Afghani-Arab and other radicals to operate openly and pursuing an Arabization policy that strengthened the Islamists. In October 1988, however, security forces lit the match when they fired on demonstrators and rioters protesting austerity, killing hundreds in Algiers, ending any shred of legitimacy for the FLN. Led by a schoolteacher, Abassi Madani, and a mosque preacher, Ali Belhadj, the FIS mobilized a network of over 900 mosques to become the voice for a generation of disillusioned and miserable urban protestors. Correctly fearing an Islamist electoral victory in 1991, the army bumbled into a brutal civil war when they seized power, canceled elections and imprisoned the FIS leadership. By eliminating the electoral option for change, moreover, the military also eliminated even possibility of a peaceful transition to a Muslim democratic order (Roberts, 1994; Willis, 1996). Hypocritical American prevarication and French support, of course, only increased Muslim disillusionment with the pretentious claims of global neo-liberalism.
Kuala Lumpur, in contrast to Algiers, represents the opposite pattern. Malaysia is an exception. It redistributed income while reorienting its economy away from dependence on oil and other commodities and toward electronics-based, export-oriented industrialization since the eighties (Lubeck, 1992). In 1969 ethnic rioting between the Muslim Malays and the Chinese in forced the ruling coalition to implement a New Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP attempted to: abolish absolute poverty, create an indigenous Malay business and professional class, eliminate the ethnic division of labor and redistribute corporate equity among all ethnic groups. Most of these goals were achieved by the end of the nineties: poverty among Muslim Malays declined from 65% (1970) to around 13% and a diverse Muslim middle class flowered in cities.

Until recently, when Prime Minister Mahathir moved against his younger rival and designated heir, Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia was touted as a case where the ethno-nationalist party, UMNO, had successfully incorporated the youthful Islamist challenge represented by Anwar Ibrahim and the Islamist student movement ABIM. Table II presents some evidence for the positive effect exerted by NEP and electronics-based, export-oriented industrialization on the opportunity structure for young Muslims in Malaysia. By 1998 Anwar's supporters were leading demonstrations protesting Mahathir's abuse of their leader at the Friday mosque in Kuala Lumpur. Influenced by Muslim social movements in Indonesia, Islamists formed coalitions with non-Muslims for political reform (reformasi). The election of 1999 confirmed that many Malays had deserted Mahathir and UMNO in favor of Anwar's Justice Party and the ulama-led
Islamist party, PAS. The latter emerged as the leading opposition party in a wider democratic alliance with broad multi-ethnic urban support (Aliran Monthly, various). The Kuala Lumpur example illustrates just how income redistribution and export-oriented industrialization policies support civil Islam rather than authoritarian Islamism as the dominant discourse. (insert Table 11)

Muslim Women in Cities: Gender Relations and New Islamic Dress

Thus far we have argued that "rupturing" events like the Iranian Revolution, the rise of political Islam and the infusion of pragmatic Islamist institutions into civil society constitute a repositioning of Islamic discourses in the moral imagination of urban Muslims. Yet no issue is more significant than the impact of Islamism on gender relations in the public and domestic spheres. Regardless of Islamism's discursive fragmentation and obvious borrowing from Western-modernist narratives, no issue has aroused more controversy than the bodily representation of women wearing Islamic dress (hijab) in urban public space.

Of course, wearing hijab is structurally rooted in the spatial relocation of increasing proportions of Muslim women from rural to urban situations: that is, from patriarchal, rural households, policed by extended families into crowded, impoverished urban neighborhoods, impersonal modern educational institutions and the enumerated labor force. Tables I and II summarize some of these structural changes of location and activity. By 2015 half to two thirds of Muslim women will live in cities. Rising rates of
migration and urbanization have profound consequences for Muslim women: more rural-born women are living in single rooms in densely packed buildings inhabited by unrelated males; more risk being shamed and groped in crowded public transport; more must compete for access to urban education and work; and, in general, more must adjust to a barrage of global-origin commodities and consumption styles. At the same time, rising literacy and primary school attendance are exposing Muslim women to Islamist discourses and even to a new Islamist genre of popular literature (novels, romances, biographies and pamphlets) (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999) (Huq, 1999). Even more significant is the rise of female secondary school enrollments, reaching 75% in Iran, 70% in Egypt and 68% in Malaysia. Furthermore, as a consequence of rising secondary and post-secondary education, the female share of professional and technical workers has increased in rough proportion to their participation in the enumerated labor force.

Concluding Reprise

What, then, does the future portend for Muslims in cities? Islamism will remain ubiquitous in every day urban life because globalization, state withdrawal and rising urban inequality create a social milieu ideally suited for the efflorescence of Islamist civil society groups. Does irony not turn into the theater of the absurd when President "W" Bush advocates "faith-based" initiatives as solution to state withdrawal from urban social services? Islamism could hardly ask for a better midwife than the policy of global neo-
liberalism. Far more flexible and pragmatic than imagined, Islamism becomes normalized by its success in meeting the moral and material needs of urban Muslims.

Nevertheless, given the record of Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Islamist experiments, what remains problematic is the practice of Islamist democracy upon assuming power. Will Islamists tolerate difference, acknowledge the human rights of women and non-Muslims, accept pragmatic compromises and relinquish power through fair elections? If one searches for innovative responses to this question, then An-Naim's (1990) seminal work defines one view of the reform agenda for democratic, civil Islam. The brutality of the Algerian civil war constitutes the price of simplistic exclusion of Islamists from the democratic process. Recognizing the popular base of urban Islamists, civil society theorist Richard Norton draws on the democratic behavior of Turkish Islamists to argue for a policy of inclusion: "...a policy of exclusion that attempts to keep people outside of the game is a destructive policy by definition. And a policy of inclusion, structured with intelligence, is a way to stabilize and consolidate a political system" (Mahoney 1998: 32). Urban theorists and policy makers, therefore, must become far more realistic about the complex, contradictory tendencies contained within Muslim discourses. In practice, this means dialoguing with modern, civil society-based Islamist movements and including them in their policy and planning agendas. For, like it or not, Islamism will constitute a powerful social force shaping Muslim-majority cities in the 21st century.
Bibliography


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* Source is United Nations Website

** Source is the World Bank Development Report 1999/2000

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