Pragmatics as Implicitness: An Analysis of Question Particles in Solf Swedish, with Implications for the Study of Passive Clauses and the Language of Persuasion

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Pragmatics as Implicitness
An Analysis of Question Particles in Solf Swedish,
with Implications for the Study of Passive Clauses
and the Language of Persuasion

By

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M.A. (University of Reading, England) 1976
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Pragmatics as Implicitness
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Jan-Ola Ingemar Östman

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Jan-Ola Ingemar Östman

Abstract

Solf Swedish is a dialect of Swedish spoken in Finland. Although questions in Solf can be formed by the standard Swedish means of subject-predicate inversion, very few questions in the conversational material analyzed for this study relied solely on inversion. Both in WH-questions and in yes-no questions, the Solf speakers make an abundant use of a number of sentence-final pragmatic particles. The most important of these particles are tå, då, elå, and na. None of these particles can, however, be regarded as fully grammaticized question particles. Still, a question without a particle is often regarded as an unacceptable way of requesting information or confirmation in an everyday face-to-face interaction.

Question particles in Solf are also analyzed with respect to sociological variables like age and sex, and in a psychological experiment, which measured the amount of aggressiveness, friendliness, and politeness that the use of a particle communicates in a sentence. From a comparison with the use of question particles in Finnish, I suggest a typological difference between languages so that a language either tends to make use of prosodic means, or of particles to form questions. Solf is a borderline case between the two language types.

The question particles in Solf have to be given a prototype definition over their syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic behavior. I suggest the Level Analysis as a general format for the pragmatic analysis of language. Pragmatic aspects of
language are to be seen in relation to the three parameters of Coherence, P olite-
ess, and Involvement. Pragmatics is distinguished from semantics with reference
to the concepts 'implicit' and 'explicit,' respectively. An implicit (i.e. pragmatic) 
choice is one that the speaker does not have to take responsibility for.

The Level Analysis is illustrated by an analysis of the question particles in
Solf, and in brief discussions of the pragmatics of passive constructions, and of per-
suasive discourse.

Robert L. Carver
Charles J. Fillmore
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The work that has led up to the present thesis started more than ten years ago. The direction of my thinking has naturally changed several times over this period of time, but in principle it has been an attempt to find a plausible alternative to the semantics of the philosophy of language, which I came in contact with and studied in the early 1970's. The fact that the present thesis does not have the term 'semantics' in its title, but rather 'pragmatics,' is an indication of the general direction in which my interest has moved.

There are many people who at one point or another have influenced my views over this decade, and thus in effect have also influenced the contents of the final
product. I do not want to imply that I can remember everyone that has been influential for my development, but I am willing to make an attempt.

Nils Erik Enkvist, Geoffrey Phillips, and Håkan Ringbom of the English Department, and Krister Segerberg and Bengt-Olof Qvarnström of the Philosophy Department at Åbo Akademi were all in one way or another responsible for getting me into linguistics in the early 1970's. Other teachers and colleagues at Åbo Akademi that have influenced me later on include Erik Andersson, Bengt Loman, Barbro Wiik, Marketta Sundman, and Brita Wårvik. Other Finnish linguists that definitely need to be mentioned here include Fred Karlsson, Auli Hakulinen, Viljo Kohonen, and Marja Leinonen.

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*  

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*  

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Problems and aims

In the last decade or so, studies within what used to be known as the hyphenated areas of linguistics have shifted their emphasis from being language-centered to being culture-centered. Whereas the main tendency in the 1960's and early 1970's was to discuss social, psychological, anthropological, rhetorical, and textual issues from the point of view of - and with the methods of - core linguistics (in the structuralist and generative-grammar sense), the tendency today is more and more to see language as a manifestation of the social, psychological, and cultural behavior of human beings. This does not mean that the interest in core linguistics and in core-centered sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics has diminished, nor that there is any greater consensus today about the realm of linguistic science.

The recent and overwhelming interest in language use and in language function which is subsumed under the name pragmatics has focused on the points where language in the structural sense meets its context. The bridge between structure and context is already a long way towards being built, and it is therefore somewhat surprising that linguists who start out from a structural perspective often do not consider what context - or, more generally, human behavior - looks like, and what it can offer for linguistic
On a very general level, the aim of this study is to shed some further light on the way social and psychological factors influence human language, or, even more generally, how language and culture interact. To be able to study the interaction between language and culture, we need to have access both to a structural description of the language in question, and to an account of the society and the people living in that society. (Although we cannot in practice separate language from its interaction with the everyday lives of the speakers of that language, we still need to be able to separate the two theoretically and make abstractions which we can refer to at a meta-level.)

Empirically, the foremost aim of the study is to shed some light on one aspect of the grammar of Solf, a dialect of Swedish spoken in Finland. The grammatical aspect to be analyzed is that of question formation. Although I draw on whatever models that fit the data in the tentative analyses in Chapters 2 and 3, I try not to tie the discussion down to any particular linguistic theory or model. Having thus approached question formation from a wide variety of angles, I then embark on a theoretical discussion of what large-scale components, or parameters, a theory of language use would need in order to enable us to talk about all these angles and issues in a coherent manner.

The theoretical aim of the study, then, is to suggest
an approach to pragmatics which starts out from pragmatics itself, from the point of view of human behavior as it is embedded in some culture. But at the same time - from the point of view of discourse itself - the study is an investigation of the textual, interactive, and emotional factors that govern a speaker's linguistic choices in a discourse.

The study is primarily done in the empirical tradition of Malinowski – Firth – Ethnography of speaking – Conversational analysis, rather than in the more philosophically oriented speech-acts tradition. But rather than being a critical essay against more formal approaches to pragmatics, the study attempts to constitute a constructive contribution to the disciplines Levinson (1983:279,280-1) mentions in the following passage:

speech act theory is being currently undermined from the outside by the growth of disciplines concerned with the empirical study of natural language use ... For example, questions in actual usage are just too variable and situation-dependent in nature to be captured by any set (or indeed many different sets) of felicity conditions ...

The linguistic problem that will receive most attention in the present study has to do precisely with the general linguistic category of questions. Syntactically, we
generally take for granted that a question can be related to a statement in an obvious and unique manner. Semantically, questions are interrogatives as opposed to declaratives and imperatives. And pragmatically they form a subclass of directives. In principle, a tripartition into the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of questions is reasonable as long as we recognize that concepts like 'question,' 'interrogative,' and 'directive' are abstractions that the linguist uses as his/her tools in attempts to describe particular languages or to find universal linguistic rules. Problems with such analyses do, however, occur when the abstract categories themselves take on empirical status. At that point linguistic data run the risk of being adapted to the linguist's tools, rather than the other way around.

There is no lack of studies showing the potential variety in pragmatic force of a syntactically well-formed question. Questions have also been related to the semantic concepts of epistemicity and modality. It is further well-known that certain languages, like English, rely heavily on the use of certain intonation contours, for instance, in order to indicate that a sentence with statement syntax is to be understood as a question. In all these cases, however, analysts take for granted a grammatically defined category, that of 'questions,' and investigate its behavior. In this way a category can take on empirical status for the analyst.

A category like 'questions' is, however, only a
specific manifestation, or group of manifestations, of human behavior. It has received special status in language and linguistic descriptions because of what we might call 'the written language bias in linguistics,' following Linell (1982). A sentence is seen as a question if it can be so characterized on the basis of its segmental structure or on the basis of a written-down representation of it with a particular punctuation mark. (The question mark can be seen as a conventionalization of the function of intonation in languages that make use of intonation for grammatical purposes.) What such characterizations miss is the global aspect of questions in language. To achieve such a global perspective it is not enough to look at the grammatical category of questions, nor is it enough to relate questions to modality or to the general class of directives. Any particular sentence has to be related to the situation in which it occurs, to the purpose for which it is uttered, and to the effect which it achieves in that situation. Factors like these will determine whether a sentence is to be interpreted as a question or not, in relation to the speaker of that sentence. Thus, if our account of a particular language is to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, it is obvious that we also have to take the speakers of that language into consideration.

Bolinger (1981) has shown that gestures such as raising one's eye-brows and stretching one's hand forward with the palm of the hand upward is just as effective an
indicator that an utterance is a question as is a particular intonation contour. The purpose of this study is not to investigate the interrelationship of gestures and questions, but rather the interaction between questions (in a broad sense) and the behavior of a set of pragmatic particles. Like gestures, pragmatic particles are not taken to have a clearly specifiable propositional content in an utterance. Rather, they relate to aspects in the situational context.

Among the pragmatic particles to be found in Solf there is a subclass which I refer to as question particles. In my analysis of these question particles, I show that they cannot be seen as grammatical question particles, nor can they be regarded as pragmatic particles with no propositional impact. Rather, they form a prototype class of elements, which is not definable in lexical terms, but over syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic features of language. The question particles in Solf defy attempts to be placed within any of the traditional boxes of syntax, semantics, or pragmatics. Rather, they have certain syntactic features in common, features that are traditionally treated in semantic terms, and they have certain pragmatic forces in common. But they form a prototype class in the sense that none of these features are by themselves sufficient or necessary. In effect, the behavior of the question particles in Solf is a manifestation of language as a communicative system, where language is seen as a Gestalt concept,
rather than as a conglomerate of different parts interacting.

But before the analyst can accept the issue as it is described in the preceding paragraph, the question particles in Solf forces him/her to explore all other possible avenues. Such an exploration leads into the general problem of the realms of pragmatics. And this is where the second major aim of this study is to be found. Although pragmatics as a discipline within linguistics is certainly accepted at present, there is considerable disagreement as to its core and delimitation. (Cf. Östman 1985.) On the basis of the problems encountered in my analysis of the question particles in Solf, and the solutions I propose for these problems, I go on to sketch up a different approach to pragmatics, and show how this approach can deal not only with the question particles, but also with a host of other linguistic phenomena.

The global aim of the study is thus in the last resort one of delimitation. If we want to make use of the traditional tripartition into syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, we also have to discuss whether or not it is feasible to separate the manifestations of language as structure and of language as goal-oriented action with respect to these three components. The resulting picture that emerges from the different analyses in this study is presented in the concluding chapter.

*
In the rest of this chapter I set the scene for the present study with a discussion of the realm of pragmatics in more general terms. The chapter also introduces a distinction between explicit and implicit pragmatics.

In Chapters 2, 3, and 4 I give a detailed analysis of question formation in Solf. In particular, I find a division of labor between inversion, prosody, and, most interestingly, the use of a set of pragmatic particles in forming interrogative utterances. The implications of this study for the analysis of questions, and for the study of pragmatic particles is discussed. In Chapter 4 I introduce the pragmatic parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement, and the Level Analysis for analyzing discourse pragmatically. The chapter ends with an application of the Level Analysis to question particles in Solf.

In Chapter 5 I show the feasibility of the theoretical framework of Chapter 4 by applying it to two other areas. On the one hand, I show how one type of language, persuasive discourse, draws on the three parameters of pragmatics, and how each parameter gets manifested in discourse. On the other hand, I take one element of language, passive constructions, and show how they can be used to transmit pragmatic information of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement.

Chapter 6 concludes the study by summarizing my major findings, and by making a tentative suggestion of how the pragmatic parameters, and pragmatics in general, fit into
an overall theory of language.

1.2. Pragmatics

"Pragmatics prior to 1957," says Stephen Levinson (1983:xii), "... was practiced (if in an informal way) without being preached." However, the term 'pragmatics' itself - even within linguistics (or semiotics) - antedates 1957 by several decades. Charles Morris is usually regarded as the one who introduced the term into linguistics, but the connection - of both Morris and the term - to the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James cannot be overlooked.

If we take as our starting point a loose definition of pragmatics as the study of language usage, and/or the function of language in contexts and situations, we will find a great number of practitioners of pragmatics before 1957. In fact, Charles Morris immediately connects us up with the founding father of modern linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure, since it was in an attempt to make explicit de Saussure's science of semiosis that Morris introduced his now famous three-way distinction between syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics.

On the European continent we can go back at least as far as the Stoics, and their 'pre-speech-act' theory of language (cf. Kretzmann 1967, Östman 1979a). But if we keep to somewhat more recent times, we can single out
the sociological writings of Durkheim as a starting point also for sociological and anthropological investigations of language in Europe. In closer connection to modern linguistics the investigations by the members of the Prague Circle and later developments of their work have to be mentioned as forerunners to present-day pragmatics.

As for the development of theories taking into account the use of language in Great Britain, we have to mention at least two parallel approaches. One is the philosophical approach starting with Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, and continuing (although there are difficulties in proving a causal relation here) in the form of ordinary language philosophy, with representatives like Gilbert Ryle, P.F. Strawson, and, in particular, J.L. Austin and his influential *How to Do Things with Words*. The other source of inspiration for students of the functions of language in Britain came from the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, via J.R. Firth, and leading on to the research of M.A.K. Halliday, and, more recently, to discourse analysts like John Sinclair, Malcolm Coulthard, and David Brazil.

The United States is able to show a long list of empirical linguists that never lost sight of the importance of the context, the situation, even the cultural frameworks that languages always are embedded in. In particular we need to mention Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf - famous among other things for the 'Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
of Linguistic Relativity.' Other linguists that deserve mentioning in this connection include Charles Hockett, Dwight Bolinger, and the linguists at S.I.L., notably Kenneth Lee Pike and his monumental work *Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of Human Behavior*. But also outside 'linguistics proper' we find a number of people interested in how people use language. I have in mind sociologists like Gregory Bateson and Erving Goffman; and 'general semanticists' like Alfred Korzybski.

* 

During the last fifteen or so years that pragmatics has been more or less an integrated part of language studies we can distinguish two major directions or approaches to the phenomena that have been treated as belonging to the field. One approach, let us call it the 'structural approach,' can be seen as a direct continuation of recent trends in the study of syntax and semantics. This approach was to a large extent based on discussions within philosophy (cf. e.g. Austin 1962, Grice 1975, Searle 1969) and can be said to have an epitome in Gordon & Lakoff 1975. The main characteristics of the structural approach is that it attempts to treat pragmatic matters as phenomena of the same kind as we find elsewhere in the systematicity of language structures. Pragmatics is looked upon as a new box on a par with those of syntax, semantics, and phonology in classical transformational-generative grammar. The same kinds of rules are devised for the expla-
ation of pragmatic phenomena as had been devised for talking about syntactic phenomena.

The other approach, the 'behavioral approach,' starts from the speaker-hearer, from the outside, rather than from the inside of language. Instead of trying, like the structural approach, to base pragmatic investigations on some or other form of classical logic, and to this add on presuppositions and implicatures, interpreted in a logical format, the behavioral approach takes indirect speech acts, correction devices, hedges, and other speech-act qualifiers not as deviations from some underlying logic, but as manifestations of a different kind of logic, the logic of 'common sense,' that individuals follow in their daily behavior. In present-day philosophy we talk about the individual as being coherent rather than as being logical (cf. Margolis 1984, Ziff 1984).

Research in pragmatics has so far - with a few notable exceptions - mainly been carried out in accordance with the methods of the structural approach. In various places in this study (especially in Chapter 4) I will indicate what a framework for a more behavioral approach to pragmatics might look like.

* 

In terms of the three correlates (sign vehicle, designatum, interpreter) of the triadic relation of semiosis, a number of other dyadic relations may be abstracted for study. One may study the relations of
signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable. This relation will be called the semantical dimension of semiosis, ... ; the study of this dimension will be called semantics. Or the subject of study may be the relation of signs to interpreters. This relation will be called the pragmatischal dimension of semiosis, ..., and the study of this dimension will be named pragmatics.

One important relation of signs has not yet been introduced: the formal relation of signs to one another. ... This third dimension will be called the syntactical dimension of semiosis, ..., and the study of this dimension will be named syntactics.

(Morris 1938:84-5)

Based on the definition set down by Morris in the quotation above, it has been customary to talk about syntax as the relation of one sign to another, of semantics as the relation between a sign and what it stands for, an 'object,' and of pragmatics as the relation between a sign and the user of that sign. Such a characterization seems somewhat oversimplified, and it seems more profitable to say instead that syntax should indeed deal primarily with form, but it should do this in relation to meaning and use; similarly, semantics should deal primarily with meaning, but in relation to form and use; and pragmatics should deal primarily with use, but in relation to form and meaning. (Cf. also Fillmore 1974.)
That is, if there are things in human languages that can be said to have no relation to anything else than the particular form the unit (phrase, sentence, text) has, then such phenomena are part of syntax\(^1\) par excellence; but it should also be the task of syntax to account for how the particular forms relate to their 'potential' meaning(s) and 'actual' use. At least, syntax should indicate that such relations exist. The same applies to semantics: it should not only deal with propositional meanings, and their relation to form. And pragmatics cannot be seen solely as a relation between form/sign and user; the prototypical meanings associated with the forms have to be taken into account when we explicate language use.

We need to remind ourselves of the fact that these sub-areas of linguistic research that we call syntax, semantics, and pragmatics are to a large extent creations of the linguist. They are abstractions with strict borderlines, whereas in language there are no such borderlines. (Cf. also Firth 1950, 1951, Silverstein 1979.) Consequently, there are - in ordinary language - no areas that can be separated out and investigated only of and in themselves, without reference to the whole of the system of human language.

* 

Even though the quotation from Morris 1938 above is the one most often referred to in discussions of the roots of linguistic pragmatics, Morris himself clearly
had a view of pragmatics that goes beyond a straightforward interpretation of the sign–user relationship. Compare the following excerpt.

Since most, if not all, signs have as their interpreters living organisms, it is a sufficiently accurate characterization of pragmatics to say that it deals with the biotic aspects of semiosis, that is, with all the psychological, biological, and sociological phenomena which occur in the functioning of signs.

(Morris 1938:108)

And a couple of pages later—in a discussion of pragmatic and other rules—we find the following statement.

Any rule when actually in use operates as a type of behavior, and in this sense there is a pragmatical component in all rules. But in some languages there are sign vehicles governed by rules over and above any syntactical and semantical rules which may govern those sign vehicles, and such rules are pragmatical rules. Interjections such as 'Oh!,' commands such as 'Come here!,' value terms such as 'fortunately,' expressions such as 'Good morning!,' and various rhetorical and poetical devices occur only under certain definite conditions in the users of the language; ...

(Morris 1938:113)²
In other words, when Morris talks about pragmatics and the user, he does not think of the user in vacuo; he realizes that for a language user to be able to interpret language, s/he needs to make constant reference to his/her prior experience in life, and to the whole of the situation surrounding him/her at a given point in time.

Pragmatics thus becomes the study of language (form and content) in relation to the whole of the speaker-hearer; where the speaker-hearer represents not only him/herself as a person, but also as the result of a cultural development (i.e. his/her psychological, biological, and sociological background).

Levinson (1983:7) seems to imply that sociological, psychological and cultural aspects cannot be the concern of pragmatics, since these fields are already covered by sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics. Against this I would argue that we need to be able to talk about psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic phenomena in language not as epiphenomena that are half linguistic and half something else, but rather as aspects of linguistic study par excellence. That is, we need a larger framework for psychological, sociological and cultural aspects of language; and this framework is what pragmatics should be able to offer to us.

* Following Morris 1938, I define pragmatics as the study of language (form and content) in relation to
language users, where 'language users' not only stands for individuals as biological beings, but also for individuals as part of their culture (including their psychological make up, sociological background, and the specific context in which a communicative act is carried out). Pragmatics accounts for these aspects to the extent they influence language use. (In the following section (1.3.), in Chapter 4, and in the concluding Chapter of this study I will specify in more detail how I define pragmatics theoretically, what its internal characteristics are, and what its relation is to other linguistic components.)

1.3. Implicitness

The major problem for the pragmaticist is that s/he is up against the everyday things around him/her that have always been there. For sure, linguists need to be able to talk about these things in more specific terms, but it is not a matter of discovering a completely new object that can be placed under a microscope.

The first point I would like to make for the characterization of pragmatics more in detail is that we have to start from within pragmatics itself, and look at language through the features of our socio-cultural environment. The factors that characterize pragmatics do so in a pragmatic perspective. Taking Morris's large-scale view of pragmatics (cf. 1.2.) as my starting point, I
relate pragmatics to the speaker-hearer, in particular, to the individual in relation to the world of other individuals that surround him/her. In the last resort, this means that pragmatics deals with culture. (Cf. Chapter 4.)

My second major point involves drawing a distinction between what I call explicit and implicit in pragmatics. If pragmatics is viewed in general terms as making reference to context, explicit reference to context would include truth-functional aspects of pragmatics, propositionally relevant aspects of pragmatics, and spatio-temporal reference. Implicit reference to context would be references to language use that are not covered by these.

The truth-functional and propositionally relevant aspects of a message are straightforward in that they are to be dealt with in a theory of semantics, or alternatively, as lying on the borderline between semantics and pragmatics.\(^3\) The distinction in terms of spatio-temporality can best be illustrated from the area of deixis. If I say I am here now., all the elements of my utterance are obligatory from a propositional point of view. And in this respect deixis - although interpretation of deictic elements requires reference to the on-going context - deals with explicitly anchoring an utterance to a situation. And in this sense, too, deixis is just as much part of semantics as it is part of pragmatics.

If, on the other hand, I say Well, y'know, I'm here now., the initial elements of my utterance do not anchor
my utterance directly and explicitly to an on-going situational context. Rather, I have certain attitudes about the context I am in, and with particles like well and y'know I can reveal these attitudes. The spatio-temporal context becomes one step removed: the particles do not qualify the propositional content of my utterance as such, but aspects of the interaction itself. Furthermore, from a propositional point of view, well and y'know are not obligatory elements of utterances. I would thus say that such particles implicitly anchor an utterance to (attitudes and feelings about) a context of situation.

In general, some aspects of a message are explicitly communicated and accepted by addressees at face value, whereas others are implicitly transmitted, and only potentially acknowledged by addressees. Austin (1962) in fact argues that implicit performatives (expressed with intonation, particles, etc.) are primary in language, and explicit performatives (expressed with first person singular, present indicative of verb, and hereby) are secondary. But for a linguist, an implicit performative also has to be expressible in some way. In this study, the expressibility of implicit pragmatic characteristics of a message is in terms of the three parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement, which will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 4.

A useful rule of thumb for distinguishing between the explicit and the implicit in a message is the follow-
ing: if you can be held responsible for what you have said (or done) - ultimately: in a court of law - then you have said it (or done it) explicitly. So, if I use the conventional non-verbal gesture of bending my fore-finger repeatedly, preferably holding my hand in an almost upright, vertical position, and, preferably also holding the other fingers in a fist-like manner; and if I with that gesture manage to direct the attention of somebody else, then I have EXPLICITLY asked that person to approach me. And if a witness is asked in a court of law whether I asked that person to approach me, the witness can truthfully reply that I did so.

If, however, I use another non-verbal gesture, which is not as conventional (we are, of course, moving on a scale of explicit --- implicit\(^4\)), say, I move both of my eyes rapidly upward to the left, and accompany the movement with a barely noticeable head-movement in the same direction, perhaps also contracting my eye-brows slightly. With this gesture I might succeed in getting the person this is directed toward, to approach me. However, a witness in court cannot (or should not) swear that I called upon that person. The witness can, of course, infer that this is what I tried to communicate, but the IMPLICITNESS of my gesture should be obvious.

If X says to Y: *You're a s-o-b!*, Y can take X to court. X has explicitly said something mean about Y, and he can be charged with slander. However, if X says to
Y: You're just like my mother!, Y will have a great deal more problems proving to a jury that this is necessarily an offence. Of course, Y probably had every good reason for taking X to court, but if X admits in court that he said that Y was just like his mother, the tone of voice has probably changed, a witness can probably not exactly repeat the tone of voice used, and the situation in court is a very different one. (I take for granted that the mother does not have a reputation equal to that of the Boston strangler.) In this case, then, I would say that X IMPLICITLY offends Y.

*

The distinction between explicit and implicit is close to that made by Leech (1983:24-7) in terms of conventional vs. non-conventional, respectively. Roughly, conventional means arbitrary in the de Saussurean sense: the sense is deducible from the rules of grammar. The pragmatic force, however, is non-conventional and arrived at by means of motivated principles in terms of conversational goals.

However, Leech (1983:34-5) argues that pragmatic analysis should be concerned only with "the meaning that is publicly available for interpretation," and that the force and meaning of an utterance have to be recognized by the addressee. In opposition to this, my approach also takes into account the perspective of the speaker in an interaction, and argues that even meanings that are recognized
only by the analyst (and not necessarily by the addressee) should be treated by pragmatics. Thus, as I will argue in Chapter 5, often if the force of a piece of persuasive discourse is recognized as persuasive language by the addressee, its effect on the addressee will diminish—if not completely be absent.

Stressing the implicitness of pragmatics does not, however, mean that the pragmatic forces are to be seen as completely indeterminate. It is precisely the task of the pragmaticist to work out the implicit conversational principles by means of linguistic reasoning. As Grice (1975:50) argued in discussing similar issues, "the presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out." But we need to account for such implicatures in general terms. Grice's general Cooperative Principle is as valuable as ever, and his discussion of the maxims shows that conversational principles have to be taken into account, but the maxims do not circumscribe a coherent general framework of how conversation should be described. (Cf. e.g. Levinson's 1983 discussion of the Manner maxims as being different from the others, in that they are detachable (p.116-7) and refer to surface structure (p.122) rather than to the semantic representation.)

* The explicit-implicit distinction is not the same as that between intentional and unintentional. Both of these distinctions are, however, scalar. For instance,
it is difficult to say off hand whether Freudian slips are to be regarded as intentionally communicated messages, or not. Similarly, as regards implicitness, it is most probable that things (messages, behavioral patterns, etc.) that are implicit today may be explicit tomorrow. (Cf. the discussion of question particles in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.) Thus, the non-verbal, implicit gesture that I discussed above may become conventional. Or, certain pragmatic particles might for instance get the status of honorifics. Or implicit means of addressing people (e.g. address avoidance) might become conventionalized.

But whereas intention has more to do with the source (i.e. the emitter) of a message, explicit and implicit have to do with responsibility between human beings.

When Levinson (1983:11) argues that "... for a feature of the context to be linguistically encoded, (a) it must be intentionally communicated, ..." this does not mean that the feature has to be explicitly encoded. Levinson, I think, confuses intentionality and explicitness when he says (1983:11, fn.8):

Consider e.g. the French Je suis malheureuse, which encodes that the speaker is female: in what sense would this be intentionally communicated?

My answer would be: in the sense of it being intentionally, but implicitly communicated. It can be seen as to (at least) some extent intentional, because the alternative
choice, the possibility for women to use the masculine ending (*malheureux*) is also available, and, what is more, used. But since this latter choice actually results in an 'ungrammatical' sentence, it is likely that it is produced more consciously, and intentionally - perhaps precisely in order not to keep up the implied sex distinction.

I do not here want to go into a detailed discussion of the extent to which a communicative act has to be intentional in order to warrant linguistic analysis. In general, I hold that intentionality is a gradient concept, and that there are bridge-like - be they Freudian or whatever - phenomena that cannot be regarded as clearly intentional or unintentional. When we come to investigate ordinary language, and language usage, it is less clear than in semantics at what level of consciousness a particular choice is made. Especially within what I have here characterized as implicit pragmatics, intentionality is a moot point. Not only in the sense that the speakers themselves do not always know what their intentions are, but also because they would probably not be ready to accept that their intentions shine through as often as a pragmatist would have it. For instance, if a speaker uses *you know* or *anyway* in an utterance, s/he is usually not him/herself aware of this. And thus cannot either be aware that s/he is transmitting some information by uttering the particles.
As always, however, if somebody (say, a non-native speaker or a child) does not know how to use pragmatic particles like *you know* and *anyway* appropriately, it is the extent to which s/he otherwise sounds native-like that will be taken as basis for judgements as regards his/her conformity with the pragmatics of the language.

Thus, in such cases, the effect of using a construction or element - rather than the speaker's intentions - might well be decisive both for the linguist-pragmatist as analyst, and also for the speaker's addressee and audience. This also applies to a speaker whose intentions are blurred (from him/herself) by too much vodka. We still treat his/her speech as mirroring his/her intentions until we realize that s/he is drunk (in the same way as we take a foreigner's speech at face value, as being in accordance with the norm, until we realize that s/he is a foreigner).

In general, then, we have to work on the assumption that what the speaker said, or what we can infer from it, was intended - at some level of consciousness. And I see it as the goal of linguistics to explicate meaning at all levels. (For further discussions of related issues, see Chapter 4.)

*This, then, is the IMPLICITNESS of pragmatics.*

An implicit choice is defined as a linguistic choice that the speaker in principle can deny that s/he has made. The speaker is not (or does not think that s/he is) to be held
responsible for his/her choice in, say, a court of law. An utterance can be given a truth-conditional meaning only with respect to the explicit choices it manifests. Implicitness goes beyond literal meaning, and accounts for non-truth conditional aspects in language. Implicitness covers what is generally known as presuppositions and implicatures, but it goes beyond the field that these concepts denote, and it does not start from a formal definition of these concepts. In particular, implicitness also covers aspects of speakers' attitudes and emotions, as well as the (even non-intentional) effect an utterance has on the addressee.

Finally, I can see Levinson's (1983:281, fn.25) anxiety that "there is a significant danger" if appeal is "made to implicit aspects of context before the full significance of explicit aspects of context ... have been taken properly into account." It seems to me, however, that since explicit aspects might be argued to be (at least very close to) semantic in nature - especially in non-truth-conditional theories of semantics - we should precisely because of this try to develop implicit pragmatics, in order to get a clearer picture of where to draw the optimal line between semantics and pragmatics.

* 

In Chapter 4 I will deal with the parameters that I regard as constitutive of the implicit aspect of pragmatics. Before I do that, however, I will - starting with
Chapter 2 - undertake an analysis of a restricted area in one language - question formation in Solf - in order to show the kinds of problems that pragmatic research has to be able to handle. At the end of Chapter 4 I will then show how the parameters of implicit pragmatics give an adequate description of the phenomena encountered in my analysis of question formation in Solf.
Footnotes to Chapter 1.

1 In subsequent chapters I use the more general term *structure* instead of 'syntax' to refer to form in language.

2 Morris's qualification 'some languages' is probably defendable if we not only think of natural languages like English and Swedish, but also of artificial, mathematically-based languages. I assume that there are 'pragmatical rules' in all natural languages.

3 In fact, I am not sure that we need to make a distinction between explicit pragmatics and semantics. That is, if an element (for instance, a linguistic sign) is used (intentionally and) explicitly (in the sense discussed here), it automatically (providing other speakers understand it) gets the status of a cognitive abstraction, a conventional element in the language. Hence, it gets a place in the cognitive pattern of speakers; hence, it is part of semantics. (In this connection, cf. also Fillmore 1985.)

Notice that this view is in direct opposition to Carnap's suggestion that an investigation is to be assigned to the field of pragmatics if it makes explicit reference to the language user (cf. Levinson 1983:2-3). Grice's (1957) concept of communication in terms of meaning—nn also relies on explicitness: S intends to cause H to do X, by getting H to recognize that S tries to cause
that action.

4 Compare in this connection Levinson's (1983:163-5) discussion of redundancy constraints in language, and his discussion of the historical development of address terms, from conveying particularized, to conveying generalized, and in the last instance, to conveying conventional implicatures.

5 In terms of the distinction between explicit and implicit, we might argue that explicitness has to do with aspects of language that a speaker can have in focus in his/her consciousness (cf. Chafe 1980), and that implicitness has to do with aspects of language that are consciously peripheral. Even though both the structural rules and the pragmatic principles in language are unconscious, both are conventional to some extent - otherwise communication would not work (as it does not always do, due precisely to one speaker's lack of knowledge of the relevant principles). But whereas the former have been taught at school, and have thereby been made conscious, the pragmatic principles are implicitly conventional.

6 To a large extent what I have called 'implicit' in this section is what Nichols 1984 calls 'indexical.' However, whereas indexical in her trichotomy is non-volitional, I see implicitness as a more dynamic notion.

7 This does not mean that it is impossible to state one's understanding of an utterance in truth-conditional terms,
even though (part of) this understanding might derive from implicit aspects of the utterance. This, however, is a process one step removed from what is generally talked about in truth-functional semantics.
CHAPTER 2: QUESTION PARTICLES IN SOF — PRELIMINARY ANALYSES

2.1. Introduction

The typical way to think of the use or function of language in relation to its structure and meaning is to take the structure and meaning for granted as communicative means, and then investigate how these means are used in a context. Up to a certain point this is also no doubt a feasible way to approach language and language usage. However, language is, of course, not made up of components (like structure, meaning, and function) that interact, language simply is. The components are abstractions that the linguist investigates, they are parts of a whole that do not necessarily make up that whole when they — as abstractions — are put together again to depict language. The linguist knows this, but he also knows that to be able to make any progress in the field, abstractions have to be made.

The use or function of language is not merely an application to a situational context of a ready-made system. This process of application in itself creates meanings, and even structures. (A sentence with a truth-functional meaning A in one context might get a different meaning in context B; a context may require, say, a marked word order of a sentence, instead of the neutral order, for the sentence to be effective.) But context does not only
have the power to change the meaning or structure of a sentence. The very process of using a sentence in a context typically requires the speaker to use certain accompanying communication features that have no propositional or truth-functional meaning. Such features are felt to be needed for pragmatic reasons. The speaker might want to specify his/her feelings, or how s/he wants the addressee to take the message, and so on. Typical examples of this category of communicative means are to be found in the area of non-verbal communication: gestures, proxemics, tone of voice, etc. But there are also verbal elements that have the same function. The prime examples of these are the **pragmatic particles**.

Pragmatic particles like *well* and *you know* are usually argued not to have any semantic content, but only a pragmatic function. (Cf. for instance R. Lakoff 1972, Östman 1981a, 1982a, Levinson 1983-) Pragmatic particles are usually distinguished from clearly grammatical, or semantic, particles, for instance question particles, or focus particles (like *only* and *also*). However, this distinction into semantic particles and pragmatic particles has to be seen as what it is: a linguistic abstraction.

In the following I want to show how the distinction between semantics and pragmatics gets blurred in the area of question formation in Solf. (For similar arguments with respect to the area of deixis in Finnish, see Östman forthcoming b.) The exposition begins with an analysis of
the syntactic and semantic conditions under which a number of particles are used in Solf, and goes on to investigate the sociolinguistic and psychological/psycholinguistic constraints on their usage. This variety of analyses and discussions results in a number of important implications. On the basis of these implications I then suggest a format for dealing with pragmatics in general, in Chapter 4.

2.2. Preliminaries and the data

Solf is a dialect of Finland Swedish that is spoken in the village of Solf, near the west coast of central Finland (south of the town of Vasa).

Data for the present analysis consist of tape recordings (4 hrs, 10 min.) of dinner-table conversations in Solf. The conversations were taped around Christmas 1979, and in the summer of 1980. Since I am myself a native speaker of Solf, I have naturally also used introspection - especially when I have wanted to present minimal pairs of utterances.

The linguistic area that I want to investigate in Solf is that of directives in the sense of Searle 1976. In particular, I will focus on requests and questions. In general terms, directives are attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something. But such attempts can be dressed in a variety of linguistic forms. For the present
purpose it is useful to think of requests and questions not only in terms of requesting information (or action), but also in terms of different degrees (explicit and implicit) of requesting confirmation. A scale of information requesting can be seen as having as one of its end poles a category of 'Explicit Request for New Information.' The speaker wants to know something s/he does not already have knowledge of. WH-questions are closer to this Request-for-new-information pole than 'yes-no' (y/n) questions, since by using a WH-question the speaker does not give ready made options (as is the case in y/n questions).

The other end pole of this abstracted, gradient scale of requests can be seen as being close to an ordinary statement, and Request-for-Confirmation can be seen as a fairly discrete point somewhere in the middle of the scale. This set-up can be represented as in Figure 2.1., with tags exemplifying the Request-for Confirmation point, and you know being an example of a more delicate (i.e. implicit) way of requesting information without actually requesting it (cf. Östman 1981a).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implicit request for confirmation of utterance X---X---X information</th>
<th>Explicit request for new information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>you know tags y/n WH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.1.** The relation of explicit and implicit requests as displayed on a gradient scale.
By viewing all types of questions and requests from this more functional, or pragmatic, perspective, we do not have to make either-or decisions a priori of what is a question and what is not. Consequently, in this study, the term 'question formation' is interpreted interactionally. This is, of course, also the basis for languages needing a question category in the first place.

In this and the following chapter I will discuss a number of pragmatic particles in Solf whose functions can be related to each other as points on the scale of Figure 2.1... I will even show that some of these particles are almost grammatical question particles.

Question formation in standard Swedish is similar to that in English, except that it is simpler in not needing anything comparable to the English do-support. Y/n questions are formed by inversion of Subject (NP₁) and tense-carrying verb. WH-questions are formed by fronting the questioned constituent as a WH-word, and inversion of the Subject (NP₁) and the tense-carrying verb. (For details on structural aspects of question formation in standard Swedish, see Andersson 1977, Platzack 1982, and Engdahl 1985.) Furthermore, Swedish can use variations in pitch alone, to indicate that an utterance is a question rather than a statement. The general characteristic of question intonation in Swedish is higher pitch somewhere in the latter part of the sentence. (For details on intonation in standard Swedish, see Hadding-Koch 1961, Johansson 1978,
and Gårding 1979.)

The present data included 643 instances of what I refer to as requests on the scale of Figure 2.1. Of these requests, 122 were pure y/n questions, and 85 were pure WH-questions. 'Pure' here means that inversion, and WH-word plus inversion, respectively, indicated that the utterance was a question (cf., however, below). Together these 207 instances make up 32.1% of the total number of questions. Furthermore, there were 25 questions in the data which were questions by virtue of their prosody alone. Added to the 207, all these together make up 232 instances, or 36%, of the total number of questions and requests in the data. Thus, to oversimplify slightly, we can say that about one third of the questions in the data from Solf are wholly within the domain of the grammatical system of standard Swedish. In the following, I will pay little attention to the questions in my data that were formed by these 'normal' means.

2.3. Linguistic analyses and observations

The syntactic rules for the formation of y/n and WH-questions in Solf are similar to those of standard Swedish. Y/n questions are formed by inversion of subject (NP₁) and tense-carrying verb, as exemplified in (1) and (2). (The most important specific notations used in the transcriptions of the examples are given in the Appendix.)
(1) Liisa måttå in taavållo ---+ Måttå Liisa in taavållo?
Lisa painted a picture painted Lisa a picture
'Lisa painted a picture ---+ Did Lisa paint a picture?'

(2) Kalle a lejkt me possle sett
Kalle has played with puzzle his
'Kalle has played with his jigsaw puzzle'
---+ A Kalle lejkt me possle sett?
'Has Kalle played with puzzle his'

Non-Subject WH-questions are formed by fronting the questioned constituent, and inversion of subject (NP₁) and tense-carrying verb:

(3) Dö boor najnstans ---+ Vann boor dö?
you live somewhere where live you
'You live somewhere ---+ Where do you live?'

(4) Kalle a gaaji hejm (för an va åyyk)
Kalle has gone home because he was ill
'Kalle has gone home (because he was ill)'
---+ Vaför < or: Pövaa> a Kalle gaaji hejm?
why why has Kalle gone home
'Why has Kalle gone home?'

Subject WH-questions simply put vem in the place of NP₁.

(5) Najn a riita i bökren miin
someone has drawn in books mine
'Someone has written in my books'
---+ Vem a riita i bökren miin?
who has drawn in books mine
'Who has written in my books?'

Further syntactic and semantic characteristics of question formation in Solf will be dealt with in sections to come. Note in particular the discussion of Am-constructions in 3.2., and the discussion of different kinds of clefts and topicalizations in section 3.3.1.
2.3.1. The question particles

There are four particles which together seem to be covering a large area of the scale of requests and questions in Figure 2.1. These are tå, då, elå, and na. But each of these particles has its particular characteristics, and thus they cannot be used interchangeably in all contexts. For convenience, I will henceforth refer to these particles as question particles.

Since there are hardly any published linguistic discussions relating to Solf, the pragmatic particles in Solf have, of course, not been studied either. But there are some studies on particles in standard Swedish. However, in contrast to the epistemic probability particles (in Solf: no, vel and fol), the relevance particle (jo in Solf), and the emphatic particle (noo in Solf), many of the question particles have not been widely recognized as particles, especially not as question particles. One reason for this is probably that three of the question particles have homonyms with clear lexico-semantic meanings. The particle elå is - for the native speaker - definitely 'the same word' as the lexical conjunction elå, 'or,' na will no doubt be connected with na, 'something,' and tå with tå, 'when, then.'

In the following I will mention each of the question particles in turn, and discuss their syntactic and semantic peculiarities. I will also be concerned with a number of pragmatic issues when I discuss contextual restrictions.
for each particle. At this stage, however, the pragmatic analysis will not be systematic as such, but rather indicative of the direction the discussion will be moving in, in subsequent chapters.

2.3.2. Tå and då.

The particle då in Solf is cognate to the homophonous temporal conjunction då 'when, then,' the temporal adverb då 'then,' and the pragmatic particle då in standard Swedish. The temporal conjunction and adverb are realized as tå in Solf, but Solf also has a pragmatic particle tå.

Andersson (1976:34-5) notes that the particle då in standard Swedish has a 'very unclear meaning' in examples like (1).

(1) Hade du några pengar kvar, då?
had you any money left då
'So, did you have any money left?'

In his paper, Andersson briefly discusses what he regards as two particles: då and då då. My analysis of these, however, suggests that the first då of då då should be regarded as a temporal adverb. In standard Swedish, the first då of då då has a long vowel. Since vowel length and stress tend to go together in Swedish, and since pragmatic particles tend not to be stressed, the vowel length of då at least suggests the possibility that då is a lexically specifiable word. The main argument in favor of treating the first då of då då as a temporal adverb is, however,
that it can be substituted for by nu, 'now.' Thus, for past and future situations you can say (2) and (3), but for a situation in the present you would say (4), with nu då, instead of då då.

(2) Skulle du ha köpt en ny bil då då?
should you have bought a new car då då
'So, would you have bought a new car then?'

(3) Skall du köpa en ny bil då då?
shall you buy a new car då då
'So, are you going to buy a new car then?'

(4) Skall du köpa en ny bil nu då?
shall you buy a new car nu då
'So, are you going to buy a new car now (then)?'

The distribution of tå and då in Solf and standard Swedish is given below. (Note that there is no phonological rule of the form t_ --> d/V_V in Solf.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard Swedish</th>
<th>Solf</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>particle</td>
<td>då</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>temporal</td>
<td>då</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conj/adv</td>
<td>då</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combination</td>
<td>då då</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1. The distribution of the particles tå and då in Solf and the corresponding forms in standard Swedish.

Thus, we note that in Solf the stressed (or stressable) form has been lexicalized as the t-form. (A similar difference between the use of t- and d- forms can be found in the personal pronouns: we find the form tö (or even tögg) for stressed, and dö for unstressed occurrences in the second person singular.) The lexicalization of the tå-form - rather than of the då-form - is in accordance
with what has been argued to be a universal rule: pragmatic particles tend to be prosodically cliticized to some other, lexical word in a sentence. (Cf. for instance Arndt 1960, Kriwonossow 1977, Weydt 1969, Zwicky 1977.) Since it is fairly obvious that historically tå and då originate in the same form (cf. standard Swedish då, and the old Swedish (and old English) particle(s) ba and ba ba), this argument would, however, force us to conclude that tå is to be used when it itself receives some stress (i.e. when it has a clear semantic meaning), and då when the word (or words) preceding it (the word to which it is prosodically cliticized) is stressed. As we see from the situation in Solf, however, the relation between stress and particles is not one of bi-directional implication: we also find tå as a pragmatic particle. This is a clear indication that the universal rule is only a tendency. Not all prosodically cliticized elements in language are pragmatic particles, nor are all pragmatic particles necessarily subordinated to some other word prosodically. (This is even more obvious in English, where particles like well and you know can make up tone units by themselves, and carry nuclear tones.)

In the present data there were 124 request utterances which contained one or both of the particles tå and då. This figure is greater than the number of 'pure' instances of WH-questions and it is also greater than the number of 'pure' instances of y/n questions. This in itself hints at the importance of tå and då for question formation in Solf.
2.3.2.1. tå

In very general terms, the particle tå can be compared to the use of then in English in utterances like This, then, is my suggestion.

In the preceding sub-section I implied that the particle tå (as opposed to då), can receive stress. This state of affairs actually makes it extremely difficult in many cases to know whether tå is used as a pragmatic particle, or as a temporal adverb or temporal conjunction.

The temporal adverb tå specifies the time referred to as non-present. It can be used both for past and future time, and stands in opposition to nå 'now.' (Cf. the discussion of examples (2 - 4) in standard Swedish above.)

In some of its occurrences, the particle tå retains some of these temporal (i.e. non-present) characteristics. In utterances (5) and (6) tå can be interpreted as having this dual function of being a particle, but still retaining some of its temporal meaning.

(5) Paaar di bara neer ije tå å dää me jemt go they only down here tå and there with equal (+M SOL80-J08-1)
    'Do they just go down here, then, and that's it?'

(6) Ska vi let dom va ti in aaron gaang tå å gaa shall we let them be to an other time tå and go (+F SOL80-J08-1)
    'Shall we then just leave them for another time, and go?'

When tå is used utterance finally it functions as a question particle. In examples (7) and (8) tå is used utterance finally together with subject-verb inversion, and

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in examples (9 - 11), again utterance finally, we find tå as a question indicator without any accompanying subject-predicate inversion. That is, in these latter cases it is only the particle tå itself that indicates that the utterance is a question, or a request for confirmation. (As regards the use of the particle visst, cf. example (10), see 2.3.5.c.)

(7) Jer ede vyy yvi ede hejla altihoopa tå is that view over that whole everything tå (+F SOL80-J08-2) 
'Is that a view of all of it (then)?'

(8) Jaanå je int e tiide ååt he tå yes-nå is not it there to it tå (+M ORI79-J03-2) 
'So, isn't it in that direction?'

(9) E i fråån fXyyje tå it is from aeroplane tå (+F SOL80-J08-1) 
'It's from the plane (then)?'

(10) Ni va tåår fXejra dagar tå visst you were there several days tå visst (+F SOL80-J08-2) 
'You were there several days, weren't you?'

(11) Men sedan tå but later tå (+F ORI79-J03-2) 
'But what then?'

The request made in an utterance with tå is a request for further information about the topic that is being talked about. Tå cannot easily be used in a question that introduces a new topic. (Notice that in all the examples given above pronouns (di, dom), or deictic elements (ede, tiide, tåår, sedan) are used to refer to something given.)

This characteristic of tå is best illustrated by reference to its behavior with WH-words. A simple WH-word like va(a) 'what,' vann 'where,' vart 'where-to,' vadan 'where from,'
vem 'who,' etc. would be used in situations where you ask for a repetition of what the other speaker has just said (or some part of his/her utterance). If you want more information than what the speaker has already given, or if you want him/her to spell out some of the things that s/he has presupposed, you add the particle tå after the WH-word: vaa tå, vem tå, etc. Thus, in an interaction like the following, a simple Vaa? would not be enough - in fact, it would most likely result in a mere repetition of the question.

(12) A: Pösök jiss va ja a tșööft idaa
   try guess what I have bought today
   'Try to guess what I have bought today'
B: Vaa tå?
   what tå
   '(No,) what?'

2.3.2.2. Då

Då cannot easily be related to the temporal adverb and conjunction tå, nor can it directly be related to the particle tå, except in the sense that both can be used utterance finally to indicate that an utterance is a question or a request.

In one sense, tå and då are opposites, since då can be used in an utterance that introduces a new topic. The possibility of introducing a new topic is not, however, the major function of då, but a consequence of its more general function of suggesting that what is said is in some sense in opposition to, contrary to, or simply in contrast to,
the preceding verbal context or non-verbal situational context. This is a particularly prominent feature of då when it is used in y/n questions. The examples below are given short specifications about the relevant situational context. Example (13) also shows that då does not necessarily introduce a new topic.

(13) A: Laa int ja na ja
   'Didn't I put any?'
   Laa ja såkre ja
   'Did I put sugar?'
   B: Legg mejr (-M)
   'Put more'
   A: A ja lakt då
   have I put då (+M SOL80-J09-1)
   'Have I already put, then?'
   B: ëjyy (M)
   'Yes'
   /the speaker cannot remember whether he had put sugar in his coffee or not; his interlocutor suggests that he has/

(14) Jaa -- saa int vi he då
   yes said not we it då (-M SOL80-J09-1)
   'Oh yes, didn't we say that?'
   /surprised comment in response to what the previous speaker had just said/

(15) A  dö leest tejde Agaata Kristi bökren na enn
    have you read those Agatha Christie books na yet
    då (+F SOL80-J08-2)
    'So, have you read those Agatha Christie books yet?'
    /an ironic comment; S (the speaker) has lent some books to A (the addressee), and S feels that A has kept them too long/

(16) Nee -- syns ni å täär då
    no are-seen you too there då (+F SOL80-J08-2)
    'No, can you be seen there, too?'
    /a remark contrary to expectation/
(17) Språttåde då
language då
'Do you mean the language?'
/the speaker is not sure that he understood what was said. Different people were discussed; the speaker of (17) thought that he was asked about what differences there are between Americans and Englishmen, but finding that this was an irrelevant question in the particular context, he suggests - rightly - another interpretation by asking (17)/

In a y/n question, tå tends to expect a positive answer, whereas då - faithful to its implication that what is said is contrary to the context at hand - tends to be a rhetorical question that expects a negative answer. In example (18) the speaker introduces the topic of lutfisk with this question. By using då he indicates that he takes for granted that you cannot get this kind of fish in California. That is, the context that the speaker opposes by using då can even be a particular belief or view of the world that the speaker holds.

(18) Haa di lyytfiskan jeer då
have they lutfisk here då
'So do they have lutfisk here?'

If he had said

(19) Haa di lyytfiskan jeer tå.
with tå instead of då, the preceding context would have had to strongly suggest that this kind of fish is in fact available in California, and by uttering (19) as a request for confirmation, the speaker would be acknowledging his surprise at this. By using då (in (18)), the speaker makes his utterance close to a rhetorical question: he certainly does not expect 'yes' for an answer. The answer to an utterance like (19), on the other hand, is very likely to
be 'yes.'

In WH-questions the contrary-to-context function of då does not stand out so clearly. However, if B adds då instead of tå after a WH-word - cf. the discussion at the end of 2.3.2.1., example (12) - the implication is that B does not agree with what A said. For instance, vem då? 'WHO?' indicates 'You can't seriously mean that you are talking about HIM/HER!' The implication of contrast or of 'being in opposition' is, however, fairly weak in most WH-questions with då. The implication of using då might in some contexts simply be something like 'Now that X is handled, what about Y?'. An example of this is (20).

(20) Ho je e me Oola a papp då
    how is it with Ola and dad då (+F ORI79-J03-2)
    'What about Ola and dad?'
    /what about you two, are you going to join us or not?/

Då also implies more involvement on the part of the speaker than does tå. Utterance (21) says something like 'I want to know, because I have some personal interest in your answer: I might come with you although I probably won't,' where the last part of this specification supplies då's implication - however weak - of 'being in opposition.'

(21) Vart ska dö faar då
    to-where shall you go då (+F ORI79-J03-2)
    'Where are you going?'

If tå is used instead of då in (21), the utterance gets a more distanced feeling: 'I am just asking you for general information; I don't want to imply that what you answer will affect me.' This distinction might be related to the aspect of introducing new topics (då can introduce new
topics, tå can not). A question about an on-going topic is part of the relevant verbal cohesion of the discourse, and therefore does not a priori stand out in any way. A question that introduces a new topic, on the other hand, can be a question about a non-verbal act or situation at hand, and thus shows your concern - whether sincere or not - and would tend to be interpreted as being polite and involved.

The contrary-to-context meaning of då can also be simultaneously signalled by prosodic means, as in the following examples.

(22) Finns e TÄÄR då
    is it there då
    'So, it IS there, then?'

(23) Va je ejer då
    what is this då
    'So, what is THIS?'

One of the conversations included a situation where the interactants were looking at photographs. Almost every new photograph that was brought on the scene, was commented on by some utterance like the following (all examples are from (+F SOL80-J08-1).

(24) Vadan va ede då
    from-where was that då
    'And where is this one from?'

(25) Vann jer e då
    where is it då
    'And where is this?'

(26) Vann je eje teiji då
    where is this taken då
    'And where is this taken?'

What goes on here is in accordance with the weak version of
the 'being in contrast' meaning: each new photograph is 'in opposition' to the preceding one. (Cf. the discussion of (20).) If tå had been used in (26) instead of då, the meaning would be that the photograph had been talked about for some time, and the speaker cannot figure out, say, where the photographer had been standing. In this sense, then, tå and då indicate that something is situationally established, or not established, respectively.

As a further extension of indicating that something is not situationally established, då thus gets used very often in questions that function to introduce new topics into a conversation. The examples in (27 - 29) all introduce brand new topics, but there are other cases where something has been talked about earlier in the conversation and is reintroduced with a då construction. Examples of this are (30 - 32) below.

(27) Nåå ska ni börja känna hettsex då
when shall you begin cut hedge då
'(+M SOL80-J09-1)
'Now, when are you going to start cutting the hedge?'

(28) Haa dö na $lessamt $eftär Laila då
have you any sorry after Laila då
'(+F SOL80-J08-1)
'So, are you (at all) longing (to see) Laila (now)?'

(29) À Stondas då
and Stundars då
'And what's (happening with) Stundars (nowadays)_TA?

(30) Va taža dö åm na vattnas då
what talked you about any watering då
'(M SOL80-J08-1)
'So what did you say about (something needing) watering?'

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(31) Sirkko va ska vi jäärm me -- bårdin d å
Sirkku what shall we do with tablecloth? d å
(-M ORI79-J03-2)
'So, Sirkku, what shall we do with the table-cloth?'

(32) Nåår saa ni vi sko ga ti tejde tantona d å
when said you we should go to those aunties d å
(+M ORI79-J02-2)
'So when did you say we were supposed to go and see
those ladies?'

2.3.2.3. Tå, d å, tå d å, and nö

As we have seen in the preceding sections, both the
categories tå and d å occur utterance finally to indicate
that the particular idea unit (cf. Chafe 1980) is to be
taken as a question or a request for confirmation. We also
saw that although the particles have a common origin, they
have each developed specific presuppositions, which in turn
introduce restrictions on the contexts in which the
particles can be used appropriately.

Syntactically speaking, the two particles cannot be
distinguished, nor is it feasible to try to distinguish
between them propositionally: both turn a statement into an
interrogative. In fact, in grammatical terms, we could
even argue that tå and d å are the same, tå being the
stressable form, and d å the non-stressable form. Notice
for instance that in Vem d å? the WH-word gets stressed,
whereas in Vem tå? the particle would tend to get
stressed. We could then argue that grammatically the
stressable form tå is used for questioning whole sentences,
and d å is used for questioning constituents of sentences.
According to this suggestion, the particle dà, prosodically cliticized to another word, would be a focus marker which makes the element it is cliticized to the questioned element. Tå, on the other hand, can receive stress, since its function is more explicitly that of indicating that the whole of the preceding utterance is questioned. It has a status close to the major punctuation mark in writing. (This is of course an oversimplification. On punctuation in relation to the explicit - implicit distinction, see Östman in print.)

However, since both particles occur utterance finally, and the scope of dà can be a constituent phrase of any size (counting from the right; thus also that of a whole sentence) the potential meaning difference in terms of scope has been overshadowed by more pragmatically determined differences.

What makes this grammatical analysis even more questionable as a sufficient analysis is the fact that the particles tå and dà very often occur together as the sequence tå dà. Some combinations of tå and dà clearly do not make up a single pragmatic expression, but constitute a temporal adverb plus the particle dà, as in (33). The sentence is in the past tense; when it is changed into the present, the particle tå also has to be changed into nö 'now."

(33) Va ni inn tå dà så ni hinda
were you in tå dà so you had-time (+F SOL80-J09-1)
'Were you inside then, so that you had the time?'

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Other examples, however, have tå somewhere in between a temporal adverb and a particle, as in (34). Here a change of tå into nö does not necessarily have to accompany a change into the present tense, but such a change is possible. In this case the utterance is truly ambiguous, since even though we were to decide that one version (the one with nö, or the one with tå) is more acceptable than the other, we also have to take into account that nö can be used as a pragmatic particle, too (cf. below).

(34) Vila int on taa'me on na tå då
wanted not she talk with her na tå då
'(So, she didn't want to talk to her (then at all)?)'

And in other examples, still, there is hardly any temporal meaning retained in tå. Example (35) is in the present tense, but still has tå.

(35) Vem je anje tå då
who is this tå då
'So who is this (then)?'

Another clear case where tå då is used pragmatically is (36). Here the second tå is the temporal conjunction that initiates the following subordinate clause which specifies the time of the utterance. The phrase tå då in (36) does not add any propositional meaning to the utterance.

(36) Faar dö sama veeg tå då tå dö faar då
go you same road tå då when you go då
'(Do you go the same way, then, when you go?)'

The particle nö (which is homophonous with the temporal adverb nö, 'now') can also potentially be used as
a request particle in Solf. There were also a number of occurrences of the combination *nö då* in my data, but no occurrences of *nö tå*. This is understandable, since both *nö* and *tå* retain some of their temporal-adverb characteristics ('now' and 'then'), and combined they would thus seem to create an inconsistency. However, since *då* is not homophonous with the temporal adverb or the temporal conjunction *tå*, the combination *nö då* does not carry any inherent (lexical) inconsistency. As can be seen from the tense in the verb form in (37), *nö* here lacks its temporal specification in the combination *nö då*.

(37) Je e teiji me tenn kamera eje nö då is it taken with your camera this *nö då*  
(+F SOL80-J08-1)  
'Now, is this taken with your camera (then)?'

We can also note that many of the pragmatic occurrences of *tå då* are in fact preceded by *nö*, where *nö* does not have its temporal meaning. Cf. example (38).

(38) Vann va e la - vann va hedennan nö tå då where was it where was this *nö tå då*  
(+F SOL80-J08-1)  
'So, where was - where was this?'

(39) Vann saa dö eje va nö tå då where said you this was *nö tå då*  
(+F SOL80-J08-2)  
'Where did you say this was?'

In both (38) and (39) any of the particles *nö*, *tå*, *då*, or any combination of them, can be deleted, with no change in the propositional meaning of the sentences.

It seems that *tå då* has to be regarded as a single pragmatic particle, rather than as a combination of *tå* and *då*, since in examples (38) and (39) the particle *nö* can
occur together with tå då, but it cannot occur together with the particle tå only. Cf. (40) and (41).

(40) Joor dø he i gåår nö tå
did you it in yesterday nö tå
'Did you do that yesterday then?'

(41) Jäär dø he i daag nö tå
do you it in day nö tå
'Do you do that today now?'

In example (40), nö occurs together with the past tense of the verb, and if tå is added, it is tå that gets interpreted as being a temporal adverb. In (41), on the other hand, nö gets interpreted as the temporal adverb 'now,' and tå as the question particle. If (40) and (41) are said with Subject-Verb word order, as (42) and (43), respectively, the interpretation would be the same as for (40) and (41).

(42) Dø joor he i gåår nö tå
(43) Dø jäär he i daag nö tå

Also, with this word order, in (42) nö alone is a more ambiguous question marker than tå alone, and vice versa for example (43).

It is not obvious what particular function should be ascribed to the pragmatic particle tå då. As often in language, the meaning of a combination of two elements is not equivalent to an amalgamation of their individual meanings. But tå då does nevertheless to a large extent combine the meanings of tå and då, and in particular, it seems to retain the meaning of contrast of då. The combination tå då also seems to have even more of a request-for-further-information meaning than what either of tå or då
has separately. All the sentences in (44) below request confirmation, but if they are put on the scale in Figure 2.1., då would occur rightmost of the three (since it can be used to introduce a completely new topic, especially in a WH-question), tà would come in the middle, and tà då would be leftmost on the scale.

(44) a. Nåår a Kalle t스őft anđe nyy biilin siin då?  
When has Kalle bought that new car his då  
'When has Kalle bought that new car of his, then?'

b. A Kalle t스őft in nyy bill då?  
has Kalle bought a new car då  
'Has Kalle bought a new car? I don't believe you!'

c. A Kalle t스őft in nyy bill tå  
'Is that it? Is that what you've been talking about?'

d. A Kalle t스őft in nyy bill tå då?  
'Oh, so that's what you mean?!

With reference to my discussion of examples (40 - 43) above, we can further note that in a remark about the non-past, using nö då is a more neutral way of asking a question (cf. (45a)) than using tå då, whereas in a remark about the past, it would be the other way round: using tå då is more neutral (cf. (46a)) than using nö då.

(45) a. Va ska vi jåår nö då  
what shall we do nö då  
'What shall we do (now then)?'

b. Va ska vi jåår tå då

(46) a. Va sko vi a joort tå då  
what should we have done tå då  
'What should we have done?'

b. Va sko vi a joort nö då

The (b)-alternatives in both examples suggest that the situation is (or was) somewhat hopeless. And if nö tå då
is used in (45) and (46), it would indicate an even greater degree of lack of suggestions for what to do.

Notice finally that nö, tå, and då have to occur in the particular order they have in the examples above: as nö tå då. No other combinations are possible. You cannot say *då nö, *då tå, *tå nö då, or *tå då nö.

2.3.3. Elå and elå va

Elå (va) resembles the standard-Swedish tag eller hur (literally: 'or how'). The lexical meaning of the morphemes of elå (va) is 'or (what).'</td>

Like tag-questions in English, standard Swedish eller hur and Solf elå (va) are also added at the end of a sentence. However, these tags in Swedish and in Solf are more like set phrases or particles than like the varying tags in English. An English tag-question can profitably be analyzed as consisting of two clauses: what I have elsewhere called the Basic clause (cf. Östman 1981b), which contains the main propositional content in the idea unit at hand; and the tag itself, which requires tense, auxiliary, and pronoun specification on the basis of characteristics in the Basic clause. These two parts often form tone units of their own in English. In standard Swedish eller hur also typically forms a tone unit of its own. In Solf the tag elå va can - but need not - be said as a separate tone unit, whereas the abbreviated form elå typically occurs as an utterance-final particle. The particle can be stressed, and
the more it is stressed, the more it resembles the separate tone unit tags of English and standard Swedish.

Used as utterance-final particles, elå and elå va show little difference in meaning between them. Elå va is perhaps more addressee oriented, in the sense that it more explicitly yields the floor; the use of elå by itself — precisely because it retains some of the features of the conjunction elå 'or' — more explicitly indicates that the speaker leaves him/herself the option to give the 'or' alternative him/herself. Thus, in example (1), the speaker uses elå alone (suggesting that she might herself supply an alternative2). But even though she makes a pause after elå, the addressee does not take the floor. So, the speaker of (1) has to continue where she left off, and supply her own alternative. Example (2), on the other hand, is a clear case where the speaker appeals to the addressee, using elå va.

(1) Jer e na tå såm man ska bööv tejk yvi
   is it something tå which one shall need think over
   elå -- elå gaar e bara ti svaar så je?
   elå    elå goes it only to answer so this
   (+F SOL80-J011-1)
   'Is it something one needs to think about, or is it just (a matter of) answering like this (= spontaneously)?'
(2) Int hadd an vel bodd na -- leegär -- elå va --
    not had he vel lived any longer elå va
    (-M SOL80-J011-1)
    'I don't presume he had stayed there for a longer (period of time), had he?'

It is thus very typical that the word elå is followed by another syntactically complete question, as in examples (3 - 5).
(3) Finns e na braa stell ije i Årinda elå ska vi is it any good place here in Orinda elå shall we faar tide ti --
go there to (+F OR179-J02-2)
'Is there any good place here in Orinda, or shall we go to ...?'

(4) Påår man taax' dialekt i skooX elå ho - ho haar may one speak dialect in school elå how how have di e nó - nóftiidiin me dialekt they it now nowadays with dialect (-M SOL80-J011-2)
'Are you allowed to speak the dialect in school, or how is it nowadays with the dialect?'

(5) Va un faktist áyyk elå elå va hadd un na fejl was she really sick elå elå va had she any faults elå bara vila int elå only wanted not (-M SOL80-J09-1)
'Was she really ill or, or what, was there anything wrong with her, or just did (she) just not want to ...'

These examples form a gradient scale with respect to the function of elå. Elå in (3) is hardly more than a sentential conjunction. In (4) it is less of a conjunction. In English the formation of tag questions is a productive process: given a Basic clause, any native speaker of English is able to add a tag to it, or several alternative tags, which all conform to the syntactic requirements of a syntactic tag-question in English. However, as we saw, in Solf the elå (va) tag is more like a set phrase, which does not change even if the form of the Basic clause changes. Example (4) nevertheless indicates that tag-question formation as a syntactic process is not completely non-productive in Solf either. Rather, it can be called a semiproductive process. (Cf. Bolinger 1961, Dik 1967.) The speaker of (4) does not use elå va, but the frame 'elå + WH-word,' and substitutes va with ho 'how.'
Example (1) can be seen as the next point on this functional scale: here we find two occurrences of *elå*, one at the end of the first sentence, and the other *elå* introducing the second clause, which contains the alternative. In (5), finally, the form used is *elå* va: the first *elå* suggests that the speaker has an alternative at hand; but this is directly followed by *elå* va, indicating that he appeals to the addressee; still, he also supplies his own alternative, and even an alternative to that (the last two clauses being coordinated with the conjunction *elå*).

*Elå* can also be used more or less like the conjunction 'or' by the same (or another) speaker to introduce an afterthought (which is usually contrary) to what has just been said (as in (6) and (7)), or by (the same or) another speaker to give the addressee the possibility to have a different opinion (as in (8)).

(6) Kastar di tiit dom tå appelsiindren tå throw they there them tå oranges tå bara -- skazär dom å -- elå skazär int å dom only peel them and elå peel not they them heldär either (+M ORI79-J03-1)

'Do they then just throw in the oranges, peel them and - or don't they even peel them?'

(7) Dö gaav vel 350 kangī ( ) -- Elå va e 300 you gave vel 350 maybe elå was it 300 (+F SOL80-J09-1)

'You probably gave 350. ( ) Or was it 300?'

(8) Elå sko int ni vill he ni elå should not you want it you (+F SOL80-J09-2)

'Or wouldn't you like that?'

But *elå* can also be used in a more pragmatic fashion - corresponding to English 'I mean' - to introduce a phrase.
or clause as a matter of self correction, as in (9).

(9) **A** an stodeera - elå ondäiisa - han täå tä å
has he studied elå taught he there tä å
'Has he studied, I mean taught, there too, then?'

When elå is used more like a conjunction, as in (6 - 8), it is followed by V-S word order - cf. (10a). If elå is to be understood as a pragmatic correcting device, in the sense of 'I mean,' the word order is not inverted - cf. (10b).³

(10) a. Elå stigår int ni opp --
elå step not you up (±M SOL80-J09-2)
'Or don't you get up?'

(10) b. Elå ni stigår int opp
'I mean, you don't get up'

Elå can also be used to introduce lexical and sentential dummies as extended tags, either to show that the speaker is unsure about the form or term s/he has just used (as in (11 - 13)), or to show that the content of what s/he has said is not all that clear, as in (14 - 16).

(11) Komynär elå va ska ja sej
parishes elå what shall I say (+F SOL80-J011-1)
'Parishes, or whatever (they are called)'

(12) Teŋkt ni börí jeet elå na täåide nö
thought you begin eat elå some such now
(-M SOL80-J011-1)
'Did you think of starting to eat or something like that?'

(13) Int a an fändtta na tä elå na täådennan
not has he moved any then elå some such
(-M SOL80-J011-1)
'They haven't moved then, or anything?'

(14) --- elå ja veijt int ---
elå I know not
(+F ORI79-J02-1)
'Or I don't know'
(15) Kanši dö sko vill ha na $kaaka nö elå va
maybe you should want have some cake now elå what
jer e fråågan åm
is it question about ( + F SOL80-J09-1)
'Maybe you would like some cake now, or what's this
all about?'

(16) Men vem eegd onje stögon tå on voor dejla
but who owned this house when she was divided
elå vem voor on dejla me elå ho va e
elå who was she divided with elå how was it
(-M SOL80-J09-2)
'But who owned this house when it was divided (in
two), or who was it divided between, or how did it
happen?'

This kind of hedging is very frequent in the com-
municative strategies that speakers of Solf use in their
everyday interactions. It is a virtue not to sound too sure
of yourself. This is because one of the cardinal sins in
the community is to boast about yourself, your knowledge,
and your character. (It is acceptable to boast about your
achievements, especially if they relate to aspects of life
like the amount of alcohol you can drink, the taxes you
have not paid, or a bargain you have made.)

Notice that in most of the examples given above,
the Basic clause in an elå-tagged sentence is in the form
of a question. This is also the typical way to use elå
(va) in Solf. There are, however, cases that come closer
to the English tag-questions, where the Basic clause is
not in question form. An example would be (17).

(17) Kanši vodka i best elå ja fåå no sii nö
maybe vodka is best elå I may now see now
(+ M ORI79-J02-1)
'Maybe vodka is best, or, (well,) we'll see (how
things work out)'

As an utterance-final question particle elå cannot

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generally be added to a WH-question. This is intuitively understandable, since elå (like tag-questions in general) tends to be interpreted as giving alternatives, whereas WH-questions are requests for unknown information. However, if elå were to be added to a WH-question, the only way that sentence could be interpreted is that the speaker is not clear about the relevance of his question, whether it is rightly put, for instance. The particle elå alone would in this case thus function as an abbreviation of elå introducing what I characterized as lexical and sentential dummies, in connection with my discussion of examples (11 - 16) above.

As a question particle in y/n questions, elå suggests that there are alternative routes ('yes' or 'no') that the addressee can take. But at the same time the use of elå suggests that what is expressed in the Basic clause is actually the speaker's own view. Thus, elå merely asks for confirmation. This is especially the case where the Basic clause does not have S-V inversion, as in (18), and in Am 'if' questions like (19) and (20). (Am-questions are further discussed in section 3.2.)

(18) Panda e j jo finskt, - elå -- nee -- je ---
Panda is - jo Finnish elå no is (+F ORI79-J03-1)
'Panda is Finnish, isn't it, or, no, is --?'

(19) Am ni sko vill faar å skååd på na tåxi --
if you should want go and look at some such
nöög elå
now elå (-M ORI79-J03-1)
'Maybe you would like to go and look at some of those
now, or (something)'
(20) Am an a jivi na ooret nombro tâ elâ
if he has given some wrong number then elâ
'Maybe he's given (you) the wrong number then, or
(something)'

In Östman (1981b) I argued that elâ va has developed
a slight resistance towards occurring after a positive
Basic clause. Instead, int sant (lexically: 'not true')
would be used. Thus, (21) and (23) would be better than
(22) and (24), respectively.

(21) Kalle a tšööft in biil, int sant?
Kalle has bought a car not true

(22) ?Kalle a tšööft in biil, elâ va?

(23) Kalle a int tšööft najn biil, elâ va?

(24) ?Kalle a int tšööft najn biil, int sant?

However, this seems to hold only for cases where the Basic
clause has the declarative form. If the Basic clause has
an inverted (as here, question) structure, the restriction
no longer holds. Cf., for instance, (25).

(25) Hôdô papp fâå ja ta dom âå de elâ va
hear-you dad may I take them from you elâ va
'Hey, dad, can I get these from you?'

We can also note that elâ (va) is a more implicit particle
than int sant. The latter almost forces the addressee to
comply with the speaker's suggestion, or, what is worse
from the point of view of politeness, not to comply.

In general, then, the particle elâ is not as such
a grammaticized question particle, but there are cases
where the only thing that marks the clause as a question
is the particle elâ. Example (26) consists of three
clauses, preceded by the attention-getter hödö.

(26) Hödö va je e ʂəɬən elå va je e ʂøleijonen hear-you what is it seals elå what is it sea-lions elå (⁺F SOL80-J09-2)
  'Hey, what is it; seals or what; what is it; sea-lions or what?'

The first clause is va je e 'what is it?,' the second is ʂəɬən elå 'seals?,' and the third is the rest of the utterance. The second clause is the one of interest here. (An alternative analysis would be that we have the particle elå va in the second clause, rather than elå. In that case, the last clause could be translated as 'are they sea-lions or what?.' The middle clause, ʂəɬən elå (va), is still marked as a question only by virtue of the particle.)

Another example, where elå va indicates that the utterance is a question, is (27).

(27) Kanʃi e va anje bɔldærpojtsin sám bråaka memme maybe it was this wild-boy who teased with-me elå va  elå va (⁺M SOL80-J09-1)
  'So, was it this wild boy who teased me?'

If you leave out elå va from this utterance, it is no longer a question.

Elå thus mitigates the force of a straight y/n question by (seemingly) giving an option to the addressee not to comply with the propositional content of the Basic clause. By using elå at the end of a y/n question you can keep both alternatives ('yes' and 'no') plausible. A y/n question without elå forces you to formulate your question so that one alternative is presented as more likely. In English, if you want to know whether Charles has eaten or
not, and you want to express this request for information in a polite manner by using a tag-question (cf. R. Lakoff 1974a), you have a number of choices, but in each of them you indicate your own view in the Basic clause. Thus, in Charles has eaten, hasn't he? the basic reason for using the tag is to get the addressee to confirm your view as expressed in the Basic clause, whereas in Charles hasn't eaten, has he? you take the opposite stand. (Cf. also Hudson 1975.) Elå, on the other hand, gives both the 'yes' and the 'no' answer equal expectancy. Notice also that elå is not an abbreviation of an alternative question. Do you want coffee, elå is not a question of whether you want coffee, or, say, tea, but a question of whether you want coffee or not.

2.3.4. Na

Na is propositionally to be translated as 'any-(thing)' or 'some(thing).' As a particle indicating that the utterance it occurs in is a request, na also prototypically occurs last (or towards the end) in the utterance. As a question particle na cannot be stressed. It can occur as a question particle both in y/n questions and in WH-questions, and it prototypically occurs as a question particle in negative utterances. Some examples follow.

(1) Böövär inte sliipas na nö tå då -- needs not it make-even na nö tå då (-M SL080-J09-1) 'So we don't need to make it (=the surface) even, then?'

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As we see from these examples, na tends to occur together with other question particles. But example (4) indicates that this is not a necessary requirement. If na is left out of (4), the utterance is an ordinary declarative statement.

If the utterance is positive, na can still be used, but it then tends to be interpreted as a 'some/any' determiner to the following word. Thus, we can say both (5) and (6), but not (7).

(5) Jer anje nyy prestin na braa
    is this new priest na good
    'Is the new priest any good?'

(6) Jer int anje nyy prestin braa na
    not
    'Isn't the new priest good?'

(7) ?Jer anje nyy prestin braa na.

In my discussion of elå in 2.3.3. I pointed out that elå can be used to introduce lexical and sentential dummies as extended tags. A 'dummy' in this sense is a lexically vague expression that adds little or no propositionally content to the utterance in which it occurs, and it is used by the speaker to indicate his/her uncertainty or hesitancy.
as regards what s/he is saying. Such dummies are of course not unimportant from a communicative point of view. In fact, functionally they are speech act qualifiers (cf. Peters et al. forthcoming) on a par with pragmatic particles. The question particle na is often to be found as part of a lexical dummy, manifested as na tåli(dennan), 'some such.' When this combination is not an obligatory constituent in the clause, then the dummy as a whole - usually preceded by elå - functions as a kind of question particle (cf. (8a)). This construction with a lexically empty or unspecified word can also occur in positive sentences (cf. (8b)).

(8) a. A dö int vari ti Aâbo elå na tåyi
    have you not been to Åbo elå na tåyi
    'Haven't you been to Åbo, then?'

b. A dö vari ti Aâbo elå na tåyi
    'Have you been to Åbo, then?'

Actually, what I have just described might be a reflection of a more general principle that if an interrogative utterance contains optional material finally, usually optional adverbials, and if it is also marked as a question with some ordinary means, for instance with inverted word order, or with a WH-word, then the necessity of using na (or for that matter any other particle) diminishes. Cf. the examples under (9 - 11). In (9) we find the form najn, which is the form of na in attributive position before countable nouns, or when it occurs as an independent word meaning 'somebody' or 'anybody.'
(9) a. ?A dō (int) vari ti Åabo?
   have you not been to Åbo

   b. A dō int vari ti Åabo najn gaagŋ?
      have you not been to Åbo any time
      'Haven't you ever been to Åbo?'

   c. A dō vari ti Åabo najn gaagŋ?
      'Have you ever been to Åbo?'

(10) a. ?Hitta Kalle biilin?
    found Kalle the-car
    'Did Kalle find the car?'

    b. Hitta Kalle biilin na?

    c. Hitta Kalle biilin (na) igåår?
       yesterday

(11) a. ?A biilin gaaji braa?
    has the-car gone well
    'Has the car been going well?'

    b. A biilin gaaji na braa?

    c. A biilin gaaji (na) braa i hööst?
       this fall

(Notice that I am not claiming that by adding an adverbial
like 'yesterday' or 'this fall' you can make a sentence a
question. The sentence has to be marked as a question
irrespective of the adverbial. The important thing is that
question particles do not seem to be as necessary parts of
questions when these have other material finally. I will
come back to this issue in section 2.3.6.)

Finally, we can notice that na can override the need
for inversion in y/n questions, especially if the negative
morpheme int comes first in the utterance. (In Solf, the
negative int can occur either initially, or after the
tense-carrying verb, or finally, or in combinations of
initially-and-finally and medially-and-finally.)
The status of na as a question particle is even clearer if me 'me' is used as the object in utterance (12b). Example (12d) would mean that the speaker is asking him/herself whether Kalle has hit him/her, and is thus rather unacceptable because of the presuppositions it creates.

The characterization of na as a question particle in negative utterances is adequate when minimal-pair utterances are considered: na has a marked tendency to be appended to negative requests. If na is appended to positive requests, it functions merely as an addendum to y/n inversion. Cf. examples (13) and (14), which have y/n inversion and where na could be substituted for by tå.

(13) Kåmbär dö hiit opp na fören dö faar ti Amerika
come you here up na before you go to America

'Are you gonna come up here before you go to America?'

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(14) A on kona ha onde kæninjen na Sirkko
has she could have that dress na Sirkku
(+F SOL80-JO8-2)
'Has Sirkku been able to have (=wear) that dress (at
all)?'

In the same way as tå and elå retain (or take on)
some of the meanings of their lexical homonyms, na also
has some of the 'some, any' meaning when it is used as a
question particle. Thus, in the two preceding examples na
adds a meaning close to that of '(not) at all,' to the
sentences.

All examples of the use of the question particle na
have so far been y/n questions. Precisely because of its
implication of '(not) at all' it is also understandable
that na typically refers to a whole proposition and is not
often to be found in WH-questions, most of which question
particular constituents. But since 'why'-questions do not
question any particular constituent, but rather request a
(propositionally expressible) reason or cause, na can be
used in these, as example (15) shows.

(15) Ho kååm int Kalle hejm na (igåår)
how came not Kalle home na yesterday
'Why didn't Kalle come home yesterday?'

This example also shows that negative WH-questions retain
their syntactic characteristics even though na is added to
the utterance. This is so because WH-questions do not take
the negative particle int initially.
2.3.5. Other particles

As we have seen in many of the examples above, there is a marked tendency for the pragmatic particles to cluster together at the end of an utterance. And we also saw that there is a fairly strict internal order among the question particles. To what was said earlier, we can add that na usually occurs before (nö) tå då, and elå always comes last.

We have also seen that a number of other particles have occasionally occurred towards the end of some of the examples I have discussed. Other particles almost seem to come in and help the potential question particles to carry out their duty properly. In more theoretical terms, what we really seem to be faced with in Solf is not so much that one pragmatic particle functions as a grammatical question particle, but that the general strategy for forming a question is to have one or more particles at the end of an interrogative or directive utterance.

There are a number of other particles in Solf besides those I have dealt with which also frequently occur in questions. I am not claiming that these are question particles, too, but they do - in one way or another - take part in question formation in Solf. These are particles that tend to occur in questions, and especially if several of them occur together in an utterance, the utterance will be understood as a question. I will here just briefly mention some of these other particles, and give some examples where
the particular particle comes close to being a question particle.

a. The pragmatic particle å propositionally means 'and,' or 'also.' Examples:

(1) Haa ni na ti bzáand me å have you anything to mix with å (+F ORI79-J02-1) 'Do you have anything to mix with, then/(also) ?'

(2) Sko e va najn sllna å should it be any difference å (-M SOL80-J011-1) 'What difference does that make?'

Especially in (2), å cannot be interpreted as 'too.' The context for (2) was that the addressee first excused herself for the fact that things were not the way they should be, and then the speaker said 'So what ...' by means of (2).

b. The particle heldär means 'either, neither,' and is almost exclusively used in negative clauses, as a complement to int. Typically, heldär occurs last in an utterance, occasionally (if the negation is emphatic) followed by an 'extra' instance of int. As in the case of å, heldär does not either itself carry an implication of request, but it helps to enforce that interpretation.

(3) Böyär int di skaa å heldär needs not they peel heldär (+M ORI79-J03-1) 'Don't they (even) need to peel?'

(4) Ja tykkär int kan di no fol foodär at var å I think not can they no fol demand that each and een ska bori ring tiid heldär int one shall begin phone there heldär not (+F ORI79-J03-2) 'I don't think they can demand that each and every one should start to call them, can they?'
(5) Dö fee int najn kontakt me an sedan tå heldär
    you got not any contact with him afterwards tå heldär
    int
    int
'So, you didn't get any contact with him afterwards (even)?'

c. The pragmatic particle visst propositionally means 'true,' and functions almost like a tag, but can occur both utterance initially and utterance finally. (For an example of the use of visst, see 2.3.2.1., example (10), where it is used together with tå.) Other tag-like expressions in Solf include vetdö ('know you'), föstaar dö ('understand you'), mins dö ('remember you'), and je int e (he) ('isn't it').

d. The pragmatic particle nö was discussed in section 2.3.2.3..

e. The probability particles vel, kangi, and vetgä also often occur in request sentences. For examples, cf. 2.3.3.
   (7) vel; 2.3.3. (7), (15), (17) kangi; 2.3.4. (3) vetgä.

f. The negative particle int is often inserted sentence finally to give extra emphasis to a question, as we saw above in (4) and (5). In these occurrences it also functions somewhat like a tag, by which the speaker expects the addressee to agree with the negative statement made. Thus, by inserting int into an utterance, you move the utterance leftward on the scale in Figure 2.1., and ask for confirmation rather than for information. In the following example the speaker first starts out with a straight y/n
question, but then changes it into a negative question, presumably because she is fairly certain that her propositional content is, after all, true. (I think one can feel confident in interpreting the same as the beginning of same.)

(6) Va e s - Va int e sama såm anje a leest was it was not it same which this has read (SF SOL80-J011-2)
'Was it - Wasn't it the same that he had read?'

That is, 'Is this X?' implies that the speaker does not know, whereas 'Isn't this X?' says 'This is X, isn't it?' (cf. Hudson 1975), and reveals the speaker's own view.

Utterance initially, too, the function of int is to give the negation extra emphasis. If int occurs both initially and finally in the same utterance, as in (7), the utterance has to be interpreted as an emphatic negation of its propositional content.

(7) Int a Kalle joort najnihg int not has Kalle done anything not 'Kalle hasn't done anything!'

However, if int is used only utterance initially, it does not so much negate the rest of the utterance, but it is rather an indication that the speaker is not certain about the propositional content of his/her utterance. In other words, the speaker is asking for confirmation.

In addition to these particles, certain auxiliary verbs and verb forms like sko 'should,' måst 'must,' bör 'begin,' and vaar 'had better to,' especially in combination with one of the probability or relevance particles no, jo, vel, and fol also give a feeling of uncertainty and
request for information or confirmation. Even certain utterance-initial locutions like nå men ('well but'), höni 'hear you,' ja håksa på 'I suddenly remembered,' int vejt ja 'I don't know (but),' and int mejna dö 'you didn't mean' suggest that what is to follow is directed to the addressee, and thus often asks for his/her view, or confirmation, of what follows after the initial locution. This, in fact, links up to a grammatical tendency in Solf of using performative sentences like mejna dö ... 'did you mean' and va saa dö ... 'what did you say' to introduce a question. After such an initial phrase, inversion of subject and predicate in the following utterance is not obligatory.

To summarize, we can say that any request for information will tend to contain one or more particles, and also, more often than not, these will be utterance-final particles. Question particles in Solf thus differ distributionally from probability particles, which tend to occur after the tense-carrying verb, and emphatic particles, which tend to occur utterance initially.

2.3.6. Pronouns as particles?

In this section I want to show the feasibility of the remark I made in section 2.3.4., that it does not so much seem to matter which particle you use to give the impression that an utterance is to be taken as a request or a question. The main thing is that there is some
material utterance finally that is not necessary from the point of view of the propositional meaning of the utterance. Thus, there is not even any requirement that the 'unnecessary' material has to be a particle. A vocative phrase at the end of an utterance often has this function, since it explicitly directs the speaker's attention to a particular addressee; also, I mentioned earlier that other phrases, especially if they contain some indefinite pronoun like najn or najntig, make the utterance sound more like a question or a request. Here I will deal in some detail with the behavior of personal pronouns from this point of view, since these, too, can be in final position in an utterance and - as I will show - thereby partake in question formation in Solf.

The first set of examples does not require any extraordinary analysis, but is an instantiation of the typical situation in Solf that 'unnecessary' pronouns occur finally in questions. All these examples involve the third person singular neuter object pronoun he.

1. Hadd int di he
had not they it (-F SOL80-J09-1)
'So they hadn't? or: Hadn't they done it?

2. Fåå man he
may man it (-F SOL80-J09-1)
'Can one do that?'

3. Ani he
have you it (-F SOL80-J09-1)
'Have you? or: Have you done that?'

4. A ja he
have I it (-M SOL80-J011-1)
'Have I?'

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The fact that all the examples of this construction in my material have a pronoun as subject is a coincidence, and not a criterion for the possibility of using the construction. Anything can be the subject – cf. example (6).

In all the examples we find an auxiliary verb only, and examples (1 - 4) and (6) could syntactically be analyzed as having omitted the (dummy) main verb jää 'do.'

Semantically, he does not add any propositional content to the respective utterances, and the questions could be asked without the final pronoun he. The construction can also be used in assertions (for instance, corresponding to (3) we can say Nia he 'You have'). Both in directives and in assertions he gives the utterance somewhat extra force. In assertions, this implies that the speaker is convinced of what he is saying, whereas in questions, except for supporting the final-particle tendency for questions, he indicates a certain amount of surprise on the part of the speaker. Notice that it is the stressed form (cf. Table 2.2.) of the pronoun that is used finally. (Cf. example (5).) If he is left out, the utterances would have to be heavily marked with prosodic means. But, as the discussion in this chapter in general should have made clear, intonation and prosody is not something that
speakers of Solf easily rely on for forming questions and requests.

The other type of construction in Solf where an 'unnecessary' pronoun occurs utterance finally can syntactically be described as a variation of right dislocation\(^4\), since it is always the pronoun corresponding in gender and number to the subject of the utterance that is repeated. Thus, a third-person subject (pronoun or not) is repeated as han, hon, he. Some examples follow.

(7) Laa ja såkre ja
put I sugar I
'Did I put sugar?'

(Cf. the discussion of example (13) in 2.3.2.2.)

(8) Kan dō draa in å bɔ́aas tō
can you draw in and blow you
'Can you (really) inhale and blow?'

(9) Int va e sireendren he
not was it syrens it
'That wasn't the syrens, was it?'

(10) Nå int a ni sitt ede ni
nå not have you seen that you
'But you haven't seen that, have you?'

(11) Hadd Kalle tɔʊt na han
had Kalle bought anything he
'So, had Kalle bought anything?'

Table 2.2. shows the three types of pronouns used in Solf. As can be seen from examples (8) and (9), it is the strong forms of the pronouns that get repeated utterance finally. But the 'overstrong' or emphatic forms of the personal pronouns in Solf can also be used in the dislocated position. Thus, instead of ja, (7) could have had jaag finally.
Table 2.2. The personal-pronoun system in Solf.

The emphatic forms in the third person are demonstrative pronouns; the j-forms in Table 2.2. are proximal forms, the d-forms distal. Examples of demonstratives as dislocations for third person pronouns are (12 - 15).

(12) Va e för stoort ede  
  was it too large  it  
  'Was that too large (then),'#

(13) Aåt an ande  
  ate he that-one  
  'Did he (really) eat?'

(14) Je e åå våran kamera eje  
  is it of our camera this-one  
  'Is it taken with our camera (then)?'

(15) Jer e fråån onde gōön edennan  
  is it from that lake that-one  
  'Is that one from that lake (then),'#

Using weak forms of the pronouns (where these differ from the strong forms) in the final, dislocated position makes the utterance unacceptable. We cannot say, corresponding to (8):

(16) *Kann dō draa in å bÅåås dō.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.p.sg.</th>
<th>ja</th>
<th>ja(a)</th>
<th>jaag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.p.sg.</td>
<td>dō</td>
<td>tö</td>
<td>tōg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.p.sg.m.</td>
<td>an</td>
<td>han</td>
<td>anje(nnan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>on</td>
<td>hon</td>
<td>onje(nnan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>n.</td>
<td>e</td>
<td>he</td>
<td>onde(nnan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.p.pl.</td>
<td>vi</td>
<td>vi(i)</td>
<td>veeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.p.pl.</td>
<td>ni</td>
<td>n1(i)</td>
<td>(nii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.p.pl.</td>
<td>ti</td>
<td>teije(nnan)</td>
<td>tejde(nnan)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Also, the sentence-internal subject cannot have a strong or emphatic form, if it is to be followed by a dislocated pronoun. In that case, the final position will be occupied by some other particle:

(17) *Kann tô/töög draa in å bxaâs dö/tô/töög?

(18) Kann tô/töög draa in å bxaâs då/tå/elå?

The repeated pronoun can easily be followed by other question particles, as in (19) and (20).

(19) Je dö Såzvboo tô då
are you Solf-villager you då (–M SOL80-JO11-1)
'Do you regard yourself as a native from Solf?'

(20) Jaanâ je int e tiide âåt he tå
jaanâ is not it there to it tå (+M SOL80-JO8-1)
'Well, isn't it in that direction (then)?'

There are also a couple of examples in my material where the repeated pronoun is followed by some propositional element. Cf. examples (21) and (22).

(21) Va e ti bååda he sâm a bygd on
was it they both it who had built it
(-F SOL80-JO9-2)
'Was it these two, then, who built it?'

(22) Va int an tvåå gaaggor han tåår
was not he two times he there (+F SOL80-JO11-1)
'Wasn't he there twice?'

In example (21) we notice that the repetition of the pronoun comes directly after the matrix clause. It would not, however, be unacceptable to make the repetition after the relative clause, either.

Example (22) might give us some insight into how these constructions are produced. As I said above, in a generative approach, the construction could be treated as a variation of right dislocation. But a close look at (22)
reveals two things. First, the two last elements in the utterance can easily change position with little difference in meaning:

(23) Va int an tvåå gaaŋgor täär han?

Secondly, sentence (22) is also near-synonymous with (24),

(24) Va int e tvåå gaaŋgor han va täär?

was not it two times he was there

from which (22) could be generated through cleft-movement. However, if (24) is the source of (22), then the second han of (22) remains unexplained. It should have been deleted, if there was an intermediate structure like (25)

(25) ?Va int an tvåå gaaŋgor täär?

to which the principle of end-weight - or some other principle that affects the relative order of adverbials in Gof - would apply⁵, giving the acceptable (26).

(26) Va int an täär tvåå gaaŋgor?

Thus, I find it difficult to derive (22) if all its elements (and in particular the second occurrence of the third person pronoun) are assumed to be part of its propositional content. Instead, I want to suggest that there is a principle in Gof that allows you to repeat a pronominalized form of the subject noun utterance finally (excepting potential final question particles), for the pragmatic reasons discussed in this section. That is, the han of (22) is not to be seen as part of the propositional content, as a third person singular masculine pronoun, but as a marker that enforces (and adds an attitudinal element
to) the question. There are also, however, other principles at work at the same time - especially in spoken interaction. Solf, like so many other languages, also adheres to the general principle of end-focus, and tends to place new information last in a sentence. Thus, if the element täär of the proposition that is expressed in a neutral manner in sentence (26) needs to be focused upon, (25) is not a valid alternative, nor is (23), since it does not place täär finally. So, not only does (22) allow täär to come in the unmarked focus position, the 'particle' han effectively separates out täär from the rest of the sentence, and thus gives it an even clearer status of being focused upon.6

I mentioned above that the function of the pronoun-final construction is that it helps to make the utterance sound more like a question than if the repeated pronoun was lacking. This is indeed the case, but the final pronoun is not easily used as the sole question marker. In other words, the construction can also be used with other sentence types, especially with declaratives. Seen in this light, we can perhaps say that the construction reinforces the modality that is already expressed in an utterance, or that it adds the speaker's attitude to what s/he is saying. If the utterance is a question, it makes it an even clearer question, with overtones of surprise. If it is a statement, it makes the statement more forceful. And when the construction is used in combination with probability particles, it makes the force of the probability expressed
by the probability particles stronger, and thus, in effect, it makes the probability of the proposition itself weaker. And in this way the combination 'final pronoun + probability particle' will communicate that a request for information or confirmation is intended by the speaker. The probability particles in (27) and (28) are vel and vetga, respectively.

(27) E va vel vaanlit yvi hejla Amerika he it was vel usual over whole America it (+M SOL80-J011-1) 'Wasn't that usual all over America?'

(28) ... så fåår ja ta anje ja vetga so may I take this I vetga (-M SOL80-J08-1) '... then I can take this one, can't I?'

Because it is, after all, a pronominalization of the subject noun phrase that is repeated, it is clear that the repetition also gives some extra focus to the subject itself in a y/n question. Let me illustrate this with the minimal pair in (29) and (30).

(29) A dö sitt Kalle na have you seen Kalle na 'Have you seen Kalle?'

(30) A dö sitt Kalle tö 'Have YOU seen Kalle?'

Na in (29) focuses on the whole of the preceding sentence, and in particular - since dö can be taken as given from the context of situation - on the verb phrase sitt Kalle, and thus questions that constituent. Tö in (30), on the other hand, places the focus on dö, and asks more specifically whether the addressee in particular has seen Kalle. These examples also indicate why the final-pronoun construction

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is not easily used in WH-questions. WH-questions presuppose everything except the particular WH-element, and thus make it difficult to focus on or question a particular part or element in them. 7

2.4. Summary and conclusions

The discussion of the basic linguistic behavior of the particles tä, dâ, tâ dâ, na, and elâ in the preceding sections suggests the following conclusions thus far.

Question particles in Solf tend to co-occur with other means of question formation, for instance, with inverted word order. But there are clear cases where each of the particles is the only means whereby a sentence is marked as being a question. This, of course, is the basis on which I regard these as question particles in Solf.

In their function as question particles, they all occur at the end (or very close to the end) of utterances. It might therefore not be an overstatement to say that if a particle that occurs last in an utterance can have the force of changing a statement into a question, then the last position in an utterance must be of special importance for Solf speakers. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that there also exists a number of other particles and softening devices in Solf which occur finally, and reinforce the interpretation of utterances as requesting information or confirmation. Indeed, we even found that
utterance-final personal pronouns can have this force. This tendency can be expressed as a general principle: there is an utterance-final place-holder constraint for questions in Solf.

For semantic reasons and reasons of frequency of occurrence, it is particularly dâ and elâ of these particles that have a clear function of being question forming. Tâ and nö need certain restrictions on tense to be unambiguously interpreted as question particles. Na is fairly infrequent as the sole marker indicating that a sentence is a question. Also, na occurs mostly in y/n questions, and even there it tends to favor the company of other particles. Of elâ and dâ it is perhaps even possible to say that dâ is the particle that has come closest to being a grammaticized question particle in Solf. This is so primarily because dâ, unlike the other particles, does not have any lexical homonym. The fact that we can add the particle elâ to a sentence that ends in dâ, but not vice versa, might also be taken as an indication of a relatively higher grammaticization of dâ. That is, whereas dâ is more integrated with the rest of the sentence, elâ can be added on as a tag-question - especially if it has the form elâ va. However, elâ cannot be discarded as being only a tag of the same type as English tags. Except for what has already been discussed in section 2.3.3., we also have to remember that English-type tags are to be found in Solf. These characteristically have more structure than the
particle elâ. A typical tag question in Solf would consist of a phrase with the meaning 'don't you think,' as in the following example. (Cf. also the phrases mentioned under 2.3.5.c.)

(1) Sko no Oola vill lees na b¥aad, troor dö?
   should no Ola want read na newspaper think you
   'Would Ola want to read the newspaper, do you think?'

Indeed, on the basis of the discussion so far, elâ seems to be semantically more neutral than då, which carries with it certain implications of contrast, and which can be used to introduce a new topic.

Finally, we have to ask whether the question particles in Solf make up a syntactico-semantic system. There does not seem to be any straightforward answer to this problem. It is possible, of course, to neglect all the pragmatic implications that the question particles carry, and focus on their propositional content. But this would not only distort the data, it would also overlook the very basic fact that none of these particles is completely grammaticized.

The preceding analysis did, however, show some interesting syntactico-semantic characteristics of the question particles. We found that då in principle can have in its scope a constituent that is smaller than the whole of an utterance, whereas the other particles tend to have an utterance as a whole, or at least a predication, in their scope.
We also found certain differences in the behavior of the particles in different types of questions. Thus, na tends not to occur in WH-questions. Also, we found that då and na cannot be stressed, whereas tå and elå can occur stressed or unstressed.

If we compare the meanings of the question particles with each other in a set of minimal pairs like that in (2), we can try to relate their meanings to points on the scale of Figure 2.1.

(2) a. A Kalle sleiji Ville då?
   has Kalle hit Ville då
   'Has Kalle hit Ville?'

b. A Kalle sleiji Ville tå?
c. A Kalle sleiji Ville elå?
d. A Kalle sleiji Ville na?

Notice first of all that the scale of Figure 2.1. is a gradient scale, and that the question particles span everything from the far left up to the point of WH-questions. In fact, it is even possible to use the particle då cliticized to a questioned constituent, as in (3) or even as in (4), instead of a WH-word. (Finnish uses the focus particle -kin in a similar fashion; cf. Östman 1977.)

(3) A dö vari jeer leeg å?
   have you been here long å
   'How long have you been here?'

(4) A dö vari leeg å, jeer?

Instead of då, we could also use tå in (3) and (4), but whereas the preferred answer to these two questions would be something along the lines of 'Just twenty minutes,' the most likely answer to (5) - with tå instead of då - would be a simple 'yes' or 'no.' This again brings out the
scope differences of \( \text{tå} \) and \( \text{då} \).

(5) A dö vari jeer leemg tå?

I already discussed the relation between \( \text{tå} \) and \( \text{då} \) in 2.3.2.3.: utterances with \( \text{då} \) can be placed further to the right on the scale, since \( \text{då} \) can introduce a new topic. \( \text{tå} \) cannot be used in a question that introduces a new topic, and can thus only be used in order to request confirmation.

The particle \( \text{na} \) will also have to be placed towards the request-for-new-information pole of the scale, primarily because of its possible implication of '(not) at all.' In fact, since \( \text{då} \) implies a contrast with the preceding or situational context, \( \text{na} \) should even be placed to the right of \( \text{då} \).

An utterance with \( \text{elå} \) is close to a tag-question, and should probably therefore be placed somewhere in the middle on the scale of Figure 2.1., at the point of 'request-for-confirmation.' This also tallies with my general impression that \( \text{elå} \) is semantically the most neutral of the particles. \( \text{Elå} \) would probably best be placed in between \( \text{tå} \) and \( \text{då} \): it cannot as readily be used to introduce a new topic as can \( \text{då} \), although if a sentence like (6) is said in the appropriate situation, it can introduce a sub-topic.

(6) Vill dö ha kaffe \( \text{elå} \)?

want you have coffee \( \text{elå} \)

'Would you like some coffee?'

I will not further pursue this enterprise of attempting to relate the question particles to one another without
seemingly referring to their pragmatic characteristics. The discussion above shows, however, that such an approach is not impossible, and that it does give the analyst insights about the function of each particle. Nevertheless, since there is no syntactico-semantic basis on which to build such a description in detail - since none of the particles is a grammaticized question particle in Solf - I will leave this discussion as it now stands, and deal with the pragmatic behavior of the question particles in the next two chapters.
Footnotes to Chapter 2

1 Even though the emphatic particle noo has a lexico-semantic near-homonym noog 'enough,' and even though attempts have been made for standard Swedish (cf. Borgstam 1977; in standard Swedish they are complete homonyms, noog) to argue that the basic meaning of the particle is still the same as that of the adverb, namely that of 'sufficient,' this connection is not intuitive, nor readily made by native speakers.

2 Compare in this connection discussions of suspending presuppositions by adding on an adverbial clause after an otherwise completed utterance. (Levinson 1983:195; Horn 1972.) In the present case, what is hinted at as potentially being added on to the Basic clause is not only a further specification in the form of an adverbial clause, but even a completely opposite alternative to the one suggested in the Basic clause.

3 As an indication of the frequency with which speakers of Solf start their utterances with elå, I can mention that my son (age seven, with Finnish as his mother tongue), when speaking Solf, has internalized a rule of question formation according to which he always starts questions in Solf with this particle. And although he gets corrected a lot about other aspects of his Solf, I have not heard native speakers correct him in this respect. (In
3.2. I discuss the potential influence of Finnish on the use of question particles in Solf.)

These constructions are not proper instances of right dislocation in the generative sense of this term. Actually, the process in Solf is the reverse of right dislocation, since it is the pronoun and not the full noun phrase that is placed outside the sentence. Notice also that an utterance with a repeated pronoun utterance finally can also have a right-dislocated noun phrase (in the proper sense of this term).

(i) Jer di fråän Sälv ti, Mamm å Papp diin?
   are they from Solf they Mom and Dad your
   'Are they from Solf, your Mom and Dad?'

Whatever the principle, it seems not to be obligatory when a repeated pronoun follows the sentence - as we see from the acceptability of (23). I use the term 'end-weight' in the sense of Quirk & Greenbaum (1973: 410), referring to "the tendency to reserve the final position for the more complex parts of a clause or sentence."

An alternative analysis, which - from the point of view of the speaker - does not necessarily have to be in opposition to the one I have just given, simply says that täär is added as an afterthought. Notice, however, that such an analysis would imply that (i) is a fully acceptable utterance.

(i) Va int an tvåå gaamgor han?
   was not he two times he
   'Wasn't he twice? or: Wasn't he twice he?'

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I cannot argue that (i) is unacceptable in a conversation as an elliptical statement, but at least it is a clearly ambiguous utterance: it either means that he was something twice, where that something has to be specified in the preceding context; or it means that he was himself (or somebody else referred to as han) twice. In the latter case han would be an ordinary Subject Complement.

In Solf, if you simply want to ask the question 'Why?' in response to what somebody has just said, you do not normally say Vaför?, even though this word propositionally corresponds to Why, and is used as the WH-word in a why-question like (i).

(i) Vaför joor dö e?
why did you it
'Why did you do it?'

Rather, you would say Vaför he?, adding on the strong form of the third person singular neuter pronoun. Obviously, this can also be regarded as an instance of the final-place-holder constraint for questions in Solf. We can also note that instead of Vaför he?, it is possible to say Vaför tå?, with the question particle tå.
CHAPTER 3: QUESTION PARTICLES IN SOLF — PRAGMATIC ISSUES

In this chapter I will have a closer look at the behavior of question particles in Solf in relation to a number of pragmatic aspects. Although I ended the discussion in Chapter 2 with a list of both syntactically and semantically revealing characteristics of the question particles in Solf, the discussion also showed quite clearly that as it stands the syntactico-semantic analysis is not sufficient to explain all aspects of the behavior of the question particles. Not only did we find that each of the question particles has pragmatic overtones, we in fact discovered that it is primarily these overtones that make it possible for speakers to choose among the particles in a communicative situation.

Although the question particles on the one hand do have a near-grammaticized function of indicating the interrogative mood of a sentence, they also form a subgroup of the general category of pragmatic particles. This dual function is discussed briefly in the first section of this chapter. The question is raised again in section 3.5., from a more general point of view.

Section 3.2. takes up a very different aspect: we enter into diachrony, and try to find a reason for the fact that Solf has near-grammaticized question particles, although question particles are not found in standard Swedish. What starts out as a question in diachrony turns
out to be also a question relevant for linguistic typology.

In sections 3.3. and 3.4. I discuss the behavior of the question particles in relation to a number of sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic issues. Section 3.4. gives the results of a number of elicitation experiments.

The chapter ends with a section on what I see as the theoretical implications of the discussion of question formation in Solf for the study of pragmatic particles in general, and for the study of questions in general.

3.1. Particles and propositional content

So far we have discussed the question particles in Solf in terms of them being question particles. We did find, however, that such a syntactico-semantic analysis does not take us very far in this case. There is another perspective that needs to be gone through in detail: we need to look at these particles from a functional point of view. In particular, we need to look at them from the point of view of the demands that conversation itself places on language. We need to look at the particles not only as a class of near-grammaticized question particles, but also as a particular subclass of the class of pragmatic particles.

Even though requests for information and confirmation in Solf tend to contain particles, no particle has the status of being a grammat icized question particle, and
probably any question or request could be made without particles or other softening devices. We can then hypothesize that particles would be left out of utterances that do not so much have interaction itself in focus, but rather need to focus on the propositional content of the utterance. In such a communicative situation the particles would in fact hinder the transfer of information from one person to another.

Support for this hypothesis can be found in situations where a question which contains one or more particles gets repeated by the same speaker. This usually happens when the addressee is not attending properly the first time the question is asked, or in situations where the addressee is not a Solf speaker, and thus might have language problems. I will here give some examples of these phenomena.

The following excerpt is a case in point.

(1) a. Nåår a dö fått eijennan dâ -
   when have you received this dâ
   'When have you received this?'
   b. Elâ a dö tšöft e -
      elâ have you bought it
      'Or have you bought it?'
   c. A dö tšöft e
      have you bought it
      'Have you bought it?'
   d. Elâ fee dö e åå Bev
      elâ received you it from Bev (+F SOL80-J08-1)
      'Or did you get it from Bev?'

The particle dâ is used in the first idea unit. It introduces the topic, and foregrounds it. In the example, the speaker of (1a) does not get any answer to her question.

She now wants to repeat her question. But in her repetition
she cannot use då. She could, however, very well have said (1b), simply leaving out the particle då.
(1b) Når a dø fått ejennan?
If she instead of (1b) had repeated utterance (1a) as her follow-up turn, the most likely interpretation would be that she is now saying something in contrast to, or in opposition to what she said in (1a). The situational context does not, however, warrant such an interpretation, and the addressee would be rightly confused if she had repeated (1a) as is. A repetition of (1a) would also have indicate that she is introducing a new topic. But that is not the case either, since she already introduced the topic the first time she said (1a). The speaker of (1a) cannot be sure why she did not get an answer. In particular, she cannot be sure that the addressee did not hear her question. The addressee may well have simply ignored her question.

The particle då does not only introduce a topic in an abstract sense of creating coherence in the discourse, it also indicates the speaker's involvement in the issue, suggesting that the speaker has just thought of something. Therefore, because of the uncertainty as to what the addressee's lack of response to (1a) really meant, the speaker cannot again indicate (and thereby repeat) that she has just thought of something, using då. The speaker cannot imply that she has suddenly thought of the same thing twice. If a speaker wants to say a second time that s/he
has just thought of something, this cannot be done implicitly. The second time around the implication would have to be spelled out and communicated in the form of an explicit performative, for instance as Hey, I just thought of something!

The method of introducing a topic with a particle or speech act qualifier that indicates that the speaker 'just thought of something' is very commonly used in Solf. Other particles that are used with the same force include the initial Vaa and Va sko ja sej. These are implicit attention getters that can usually be used only once per topic (or subtopic) - although a combination of them in the same utterance, in the order given, is also acceptable. Example (2) is not an authentic one, but it illustrates a typical way of leaving out particles as the speaker gets more and more annoyed for not getting an answer. (Utterances a1 and a2 are alternative topic introducers.)

(2) a1. Va sko ja sej, va dö ti Åabo na
what should I say were you to Åbo na
'By the way, did you go to Åbo?'

a2. Va dö ti Åabo na dá
b. Hödö - va dö ti Åabo na igåår
   hey-you were you to Åabo na yesterday

c. VA dö ti Åabo
   were you to Åbo
   'DID you go to Åbo?'

When the speaker of (1a) gets no answer, an elå question is added, as an afterthought. The speaker does not, of course, want to lose face, and she does stand to lose face if she is not acknowledged as a worth-while
communicative partner by the other conversationalists. By making her original question (1a) into an alternative question - by adding (1b) on to it - she has saved her face for a moment longer. It would have been possible also to place elå last in her utterance: A dö tgodt e elå, but in that case the particle elå would not have been ambiguous (between conjunction and question particle), as it is in (1b), and thus not effective as part of her communicative strategy. Also, in an utterance with elå at the beginning, the speaker him/herself provides the completion, but if the particle is at the end of the utterance, the addressee is placed under greater demands to perform a completion. With no response to (1a) and without knowing why no such response was given, the speaker does not dare to place such demands.

In (1c) and (1d) the speaker again repeats the two alternatives, with a slight variation (with the alternatives in the opposite order), making it clear that she is making an alternative question, and suggesting that maybe the reason the addressee did not respond the first time was that there was too short a pause in between (1a) and (1b). (Also, since (1a) was not responded to, it was probably not correct to suggest that the addressee had been given the thing talked about - maybe the whole suggestion was ridiculous. So, by repeating the two alternatives in the opposite order in (1c) and (1d), the speaker manages to at least put them forth as alternatives of the same degree
of probability.)

Some further examples in my material include the following.

(3) a. Nåmen va ejennan å vi lokaalin elå
   well-but was this å at apartment elå
   'But was this also close to the apartment?'
   b. Je e -- vi Bråkkvodd eje å
      is it at Brookwood this å
      'Is it at Brookwood?'

The particle å is here retained in b., but elå is dropped.

(4) a. Ska Liinos haa å
    shall Linus have å
    'Does Linus want some (too)?'
   b. Ska dö int haa
    shall you not have
    'Don't you want any?'

Both utterances in example (4) are directed to the same child. The second utterance does not contain any particle. Instead it puts forth the opposite alternative to that presented in the first utterance.

Consider next example (5).

(5) a. Hadd an bodd na han tá táär å dá elå
    had he lived na he tá there å(too) dá elå
    'Had he (also) been living there?'
   b. Hadd an
   c. Int hadd an vel bodd na -- leen'går -- elå va --
      not had he vel lived na longer elå va
      'He hadn't lived there any longer, had he?'

Notice here that instead of the question particles tá and dá the probability particle vel, and the elå va form of the tag are used in the repetition. As we saw in the discussion in 2.3.3., elå va is more explicit than elå: elå va is a tag rather than a question marker.
The following two sequences (6 - 7) are directed toward speakers that do not have Solf as their mother tongue. Again, pragmatic particles are left out in the repetitions, and the propositional content is thus made more prominent and more easy to understand for a non-native speaker.

(6) a. A on kona ha onde kXeninjen na Sirko
    'Has Sirkku been able to have (=wear) that dress (at all),'

   b. A un haft $den $däär $kleninjen
    'Has she worn that dress?' (F SOL80-J08-2)

The particle *na* is dropped, and *k* in *kXeninjen* becomes 1 in the repetition. (Cf. the Appendix.)

In example (7), utterance a. is spoken by +F, and the repetition-clarification in b. is uttered by -M.

(7) a. Ho jer e me smøre ije va kástar he då
    'What about the butter here, how much is it?'

   b. Va kástar smøre jeer
    'How much is the butter here?'

Both utterances are directed to the same addressee. (Ho jer e me X is a frequent topic introducer in Solf, corresponding roughly to English as for X.)

In this connection we can note that when utterances with final pronouns are repeated, we find the same tendency as with the 'other' question particles: they all tend to be dropped. One example will have to suffice.
From the few examples discussed here, it seems clear that the question particles in Solf have very specific functions. This should be particularly obvious from my detailed discussion of the behavior of åt in repetitions (cf. especially example (1), but also (5) and (7)). And the last two examples — (6) and (7) — show that speakers of Solf are at some level aware of these particles as belonging to the dialect, and that it is felt that the particles should be avoided when speaking to somebody who does not know Solf perfectly.

We have already seen in fairly general terms that the question particles have very specific functions in addition to their syntactico-semantic meaning of requesting information or confirmation. But it is not enough to say that pragmatic aspects need to be taken into account in order to explain their behavior fully. It is also obvious, particularly from my discussion of examples (6 – 7), that the question particles in discourse obey pragmatic rules that are not totally unconscious, and therefore not a priori different from syntactic and semantic rules.

In section 3.5. I will further discuss the implications the analysis of question particles in Solf has for
the study of pragmatic particles in general.

3.2. Areal influence?

Finland-Swedish dialects are of major interest in attempts to gain insight into the cultural, social, and linguistic interaction that has taken place over the centuries between the Swedish speaking population in Finland and the Finns. There is still disagreement as regards the extent to which Finnish has influenced the dialects spoken in the Finland-Swedish rural villages. The typical statement found in the literature is that except for prosody, very few influences can be observed. Within prosody, it is noted that most Finland-Swedish dialects lack the acute-gravis accent distinction of Sweden Swedish, and that they have a much more monotonous intonation pattern than Sweden Swedish. Finnish, of course, is well-known for not making extensive use of intonation contours - particularly not for grammatical purposes.

In previous studies I have pointed to the functional similarities between aspects of prosody, and pragmatic particles - both within a language, and across languages. (Cf. Östman 1979b, 1979c, 1982a; cf. also Schubiger 1965, Kriwonossow 1977, and Halliday 1979.) In Östman forthcoming a. I have made a set of experiments in Solf, in order to get more information about the intralinguistic aspect of the interaction between pragmatic particles and prosody. In
this section I will raise some cross-linguistic issues in connection with the functional relation between prosody and pragmatic particles. For both historical and areal reasons, the situation in Solf invites such an investigation.

Applied to the field of question particles in Solf, the cross-linguistic issue can be stated in the following terms. Swedish, as we saw, forms y/n questions without particles, and can make grammatical use of intonation alone. Finnish, on the other hand, uses two clitical particles for expressing questions or requests for confirmation: the grammaticized question particle -kö (manifested as -ko or -kö, depending on the requirements of vowel harmony in the particular word; henceforth the particle will be referred to as -kö), and the relevance particle -hän (manifested as -han or -hän). (For the use of -hän in order to request information, see Hakulinen 1976.) And Finnish makes very little use of intonation for grammatical purposes (cf. below). The particular issue to be raised, then, is whether the development of question particles in Solf can be seen as an influence from Finnish, and more generally, whether the pragmatic particles in Solf are functionally more similar to those in Swedish, or to Finnish particles.

In the present section I want to challenge the traditional view that it is primarily within the area of prosody that Finnish has had a marked influence on Finland Swedish. Obviously, I will mostly be dealing with question
particles, but towards the end of this section I will also show how another type of question formation in Solf has been influenced by Finnish. (The influence of Finnish on Finland Swedish in the area of deixis is dealt with in Östman forthcoming b.)

First, a couple of words about question formation in Finnish. Finnish WH-questions are formed in a similar manner to the way Swedish WH-questions are formed, except that no inversion takes place in Finnish.

(1) Kalle tuli kotiin kello viisi.
   Kalle came home clock five
   'Kalle came home at five o'clock'
   ---> Koska Kalle tuli kotiin?
       when Kalle came home
       'When did Kalle come home?'

(2) Kalle oli juonut mehua.
   Kalle was drunk juice
   'Kalle had drunk juice'
   ---> Mitä Kalle oli juonut?
       what Kalle was drunk
       'What had Kalle drunk?'

For y/n questions, Finnish uses the question particle -kO together with fronting of the questioned constituent. That is, -kO is always attached to a word of the first constituent of the clause, marking (part of) that constituent as being the questioned element. If -kO is attached to the fronted tense-carrying verb, the whole sentence is questioned, without particular focus on any element.
As I mentioned, Finnish does not use variation in pitch for grammatical purposes. Finnish intonation is usually described as being very monotonous, usually starting slightly higher than it ends in a clause. (For details, see Hirvonen 1970, Wiik 1981.) Expressive question intonation can be communicated either by making one of the first elements of the sentence somewhat higher in pitch, or by moving the overall pitch contour some tens of hertz higher in the speaker's pitch range. Kalevi Wiik (personal communication) also argues that it might be possible to use a declarative sentence with an 'over-high' pitch range all through the utterance, together with some non-verbal feature like raised eye-brows, to indicate the interrogative (and surprised) mode of an utterance. (In connection with this, cf. Bolinger 1981.)

The first thing to note in comparing Finnish and Solf, is of course that whereas the question particle is attached to the initial element in a sentence in Finnish, in Solf the particle is a sentence-final particle. Furthermore, there are no phonetic similarities between the question particles in Finnish and those in Solf. Thus, we
can immediately exclude the possibility of a simple word-
for-word borrowing of the Finnish question particles. In
the case of elä, however, we do have a phonetic and
semantic similarity with the Finnish eli 'or.' But Finnish
eli is borrowed from Swedish eller 'or,' rather than the
other way around. (Cf. Toivonen 1955.)

There are also other similarities between question
formation in the two languages. First of all, we can note
that it is not only the grammaticized particle -kO that can
be used to form requests in Finnish. The relevance particle
-hAn can also be so used, particularly in generic and
indefinite person constructions. The following example
(including the translation of it) is from Hakulinen

(4) Poimitaanhan syksyllä marjoja?
pick-taan-hAn fall-on berries
'Berries are picked in the autumn, aren't they?'

Secondly, we can note that the grammaticized question part-
icle in Finnish does not always behave according to the
strict formal rules I gave above. Cf. the examples in (5).

(5) a. Haaveissa vainko oot mun
     in-dreams only-kO you-are mine
     'Are you mine only in (my) dreams?'

     b. Se onko hän?
        it is-kO him
        'Is it him?'

     c. Nyt se onko hän?
        now it is-kO he
        'Is it him now?'

Example (5a) is from a song, and is strictly speaking not
against the rule, since haaveissa vain can be regarded
as one constituent. The ordinary way to express the pro-
positional content of (5a) would, however, be Haaveissako vain... . Example (5b) is a fairly ordinary type of question in Finnish, even though se on 'it is' is not a constituent. Since Finnish does not ordinarily make use of formal subjects, we could, however, here argue that se is a semantic dummy that is not part of standard Finnish, and therefore does not really count. But (5c) - again from a song - is a clear example where the element to which -kO is added has not been fronted. The rule-governed formation of a question with this word order is Nytkö se on hän?, or Onko se nyt hän?. Although these examples might not be counted as part of standard Finnish, they nevertheless show that the general rule of adding -kO to the first constituent in a y/n question can be broken.

The next type of example is very common. Here we have a WH-word which takes the clitic question particle -kO, although this particle syntactico-semantically speaking is to be reserved for y/n questions.

(6) Missäkö se Kalle nyt taas on?
  where-kO it/the Kalle now again is 'Where is that Kalle now again?'

Example (7) is from a newspaper advertisement, and adds the relevance particle -hAn to -kO.

(7) Mitäköhän mummi pitäisi pienistä Micki-
what-kO-hAn grandma like small Micki-
   kangaspuista, joilla voii kutoa nukkekodin mattoja
   with-which can weave doll-house mats
   loom 'What would Grandma say about the small Micki-loom,' with which one can weave mats for the doll-house?'

Briefly, I would say that the use of the construction with a WH-word plus the particle -kO does the following. It
makes the question somewhat rhetorical: a propositional answer is not expected, although an answer would certainly be acceptable. Typical responses to (6) and (7) would be in the form of 'Well, boys will be boys,' and 'Yes, that's a good idea,' respectively. At the same time, the construction also makes the question exclamatory. In example (7) the exclamation is toned down by the use of the clitic -hAn, but in (6) it is more directly communicated: 'I don't know what to do with that boy!' In other words, the particle -kO in these examples has a pragmatic function. Thus, although -kO seems to have a strict grammatical function in Finnish, it can in certain cases (as far as I know, the situations exemplified in (6) and (7) are the only cases) function more or less in the same way as other pragmatic particles in Finnish - in particular in the same way as -hAn. (Examples (6) and (7) could also be introduced with -hAn only, as Missähän... and Mitähän..., respectively, where -hAn would communicate closeness, intimacy, and indirectness.)

The situation in Solf can be seen as similar to that in Finnish, but Solf has not grammaticized its particles to the same extent as Finnish has. That is, the use of the clitic -hAn in Finnish question formation is more or less at the same stage of grammaticization as the use of dâ or elâ in Solf. In Finnish, the grammatically conditioned -kO can be used pragmatically, too; in Solf, the pragmatically conditioned particles of request can
perform a grammatical function.

The present data do not exclude the possibility that there is, or has been, influence from Finnish in the area of information requesting, but they do not directly speak in favor of this interpretation either. Note that WH-questions in Finnish do not contain question particles (examples like (6) and (7) are still non-prototypical exceptions), whereas Solf accepts question particles in WH-questions. And, as I already mentioned, the positions of the question particles in the two languages are very distinct. These points would in fact be arguments against the hypothesis of Finnish influence on Solf.

If this is the case, we have to look in another direction for an explanation to the development of question particles in Solf. First, we can note that there is a definite quantitative similarity between the number of pragmatic particles used (even within one and the same sentence) in Solf and in Finnish. In standard Swedish, the tendency is to allow just one particle per sentence, which has the effect that the particles are closer to being modal particles, or particles with semantically definable conventional implicatures. Finnish and Solf, on the other hand, can have an abundance of particles in an utterance. Secondly, whereas Swedish makes grammatical use of prosody, Finnish does not, and Solf does so only to a limited extent. I would like to suggest, then, that there does exist some inherent similarity in function between prag-
matic particles and aspects of prosody, and that languages
tend to make use of these, either so that one language uses
predominantly prosody (Swedish and English), and another
language predominantly particles (Finnish because of a
general lack of use of prosody in the language, Chinese -
which also has an abundance of particles - because prosody
is used for other, notably lexical, purposes)\(^2\), or so that
a particular language uses both of these means in bal-
ance. The purpose of Östman forthcoming a. is to show how
this balance is achieved in Solf. In general, then, this
would suggest that the two linguistic means compensate for
each other in several respects, and we get a situation of
pragmatic complementary distribution, where this term is
used not in the structural either-or sense, but in the
pragmatic sense of preferred usage (cf. Levinson 1983).

At this point of the discussion there are two
alternatives that suggest themselves. We can either keep to
the initial hypothesis and argue that, despite the comments
in the preceding paragraph, the reason for the development
of question particles in Solf is in fact to be sought in
a fairly direct influence from Finnish. This argument would
run as follows. Finnish is directly responsible for the
loss of semantically usable prosody from Solf, and hence
indirectly - but uniquely - responsible for the rise of
various particles. This alternative sounds plausible,
except for two things: first, we do not know which came
first, the particles, or the loss of semantically relevant
prosody; and secondly, not all dialects of Sweden Swedish make as much use of prosody as standard Sweden Swedish. For instance, the acute - gravis distinction is not upheld in all dialects in Sweden.

It is thus safer to make a somewhat weaker claim, but a claim that at the same time has more general implications. It may be, as has been argued in a number of studies (cf. for instance Ahlbäck 1956), that at least part of the reason why Solf and most other Finland-Swedish dialects do not utilize prosody to the same extent as standard Swedish does, has to do with influence from Finnish. But this influence has only been indirect on the development of question particles in Solf. The direct reason for this development is a more general linguistic principle that a language has to make use of particles in an inverse proportion to the degree to which it relies on intonation. (Notice that the two alternative explanations are not necessarily in opposition. Even though we might find evidence in support of the first alternative, the second is not automatically made invalid.)

Following Halliday (1979) we could state the present issue in a rather controversial fashion. Halliday has argued that pragmatic particles and modal elements are dispersed in a sentence in a manner similar to the peaks and troughs of intonation contours displayed on an oscillogram. If we were to accept such a functional equation between verbal and non-verbal material in language, the
traditional claim about the special status of prosody as regards the areal influence between Finnish and Finland Swedish could be saved - for the moment. But this claim could only be salvaged by the suggested equation.

* 

In the rest of this section I want to discuss yet another area of question formation in Solf. With this discussion I also want to show the tenability of my original hypothesis that Finnish influence on Finland Swedish is much more wide-spread than what is traditionally recognized.

The construction to be discussed is the Åm-construction. Instead of uttering a straightforward y/n question, a Solf speaker can use an indirect locution, manifested as an if/whether clause.

(8) Åm e no ska  ga ti set yyt na neet idaa if/whether it no shall go to put out any nets today (+M SOL80-J09-1)
'Might it be possible to throw out some nets today?'

(9) Åm dö sko ha tiid -- if you should have time (+F SOL80-J09-2)
'Do you think you have the time? or simply: Do you have time (to do something)?'

Some speakers almost exclusively use this construction when they form y/n questions. Examples (8) and (9) are pure y/n questions, but some of the Åm-constructions in my data take up a position in between questions and suggestions, and thus indicate a possible way in which this construction might have come about.

Some of these examples could be translated into

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English as 'What if'-clauses. The combination of the words WHAT plus IF (Va Âm) is not permissible in Solf. Thus, instead of uttering the more elaborate Va sko dø sej Âm 'What would you say if,' Âm is felt to be enough. That is, the cognitive source for some of the Âm questions can be seen from the following examples.

(10) Ho je re me tee Oola nó dâ sâm haar sâde mytši how is it with you Ola nó dâ who has so-that much penšgar -- Âm vi sko tâân âå tee â sjikk fråän money if we should borrow of you and send from Finlands bank -- ( )? Ska e no gaa he Finland's bank shall it no go it troo? believe (+F ORI79-J03-1)

'What about you Ola, who has such a lot of money. (What) if we were to borrow money from you, and send from the Bank of Finland? Is that possible, do you think?'

(11) Je re laŋgt fråän San San Fransis sisko - Âm vi is it far from San Francisco if we sko faar han daajin vi faar tiit dâ should go the day we go there-to dâ (+F ORI79-J03-2)

'Is it far away from San Francisco? What if we were to go the same day as we go there?'

Both of these are preceded by an introductory, more general question, and the Âm sentence is added as a reason for asking the more general question, and it is put forth as a suggestion for the direction in which the topic of the conversation could continue.

Example (12) is almost like an 'if - then' clause, although a 'what if' translation would still be the most appropriate. In examples (13) and (14) we have clear repetitions by the same speaker.
(12) Äm dö sko a proova an å skååd åm an a 
if you should have tried it and see if it have 
passa -- 
suited (+F ORI79-J02-2) 
'What if you try it and see whether it fits?' (cf. 
'If you try it, then you'll see whether it will fit 
you.')

(13) A: Jer e - laågt $ifråån ede 
is it far from that (+F SOL80-J08-1) 
'Is that far away?' 
B: Va 
what 
'What?' 
A: Äm e i laågt bårtifråån 
if it is far away from 
'Is it far away?'

(14) Nåmen dehåär dehåär $smaakar int di såm $kaakår 
nåmen dehåär dehåär taste not they like cookies 
$håär 
here 
'Well, I mean, don't they taste like cookies here?' 
Äm i Äm int di $smaakar såm $kaakona $håär -- 
if if they don't taste like cookies here 
$håär i Finland 
here in Finland (+F SOL80-J08-2) 
'Don't they taste like cookies here, here in Finland?'

There are four alternative explanations to the use 
of this construction in Solf. The first alternative is 
to analyze them as due to speakers' ellipses of fully 
grammatical sentences, coupled with a performative analy­
is. The examples in (13) and (14) would be evidence for a 
performative analysis, where questions have an underlying 
performative sentence of the form 'I ask you (whether) 
(S)\(^3\), since Äm 'whether/if' could not be inserted unless 
we presume that questions have an underlying performative 
sentence, which would typically get manifested before (to 
the left of) the propositional question.
Figure 3.1. Schematic representation of a performative analysis.

(Thus, the åm-construction in Solf is similar to a situation where ordinary declarative clauses were to be preceded by at 'that,' from the underlying 'I say (that) (S).'</ Thus this construction was not instantiated in the present data, but it is not an unacceptable locution in Solf.) The principle of ellipsis simply says that you delete most of the performative sentence in a repetition. Thus, the underlying structure of the åm-construction in Solf would be '(I ask you) whether <propositional content>.'

The second explanation - which is not necessarily in opposition to the first - would be that this is due to Finnish influence. In Finnish, the question particle -kO is used both for direct questions and for subordinate, 'whether'-questions. Standard Swedish should theoretically (i.e. prescriptively) use huruvida as its indirect-question marker, but in everyday language om 'if' has almost completely taken over the function of huruvida. In this perspective, a possible explanation would be that åm in Solf has the same field of application as -kO in Finnish, and
therefore its use in Solf has been extended to direct questions.

The third explanation, or potential source, for the *âm*-construction also comes from Finnish. Consider the following example.

(15) Ja bara frååga âm ni ska -- âm ni sko vill faar å skååd på na tåxi --
go and look on some such (M ORI79-J03-2)
'I just asked whether you would like to go and see any such ...?'

This could be analyzed as a straight repetition of *âm*, where even the performative sentence is explicitly used the first time. However, in the transcript above, I wrote the second *âm* with a capital letter (indicating that I have analyzed the sequence as two sentences, or functionally, as two idea units) because the tense changes in the repetitions of the modal, from *ska* to *sko*. Notice also that other non-repetitious uses of *âm*-requests - in particular, cf. examples (8) and (9) - have either *ska* or *sko* as their tense-carrying verb. Since conditional if-clauses in Solf are formed with the modal *sko*, the change in (15) from *ska* to *sko* implies that the speaker sees the repetition as being close to a conditional if-clause. The same can perhaps be said about example (9), whereas example (8), which has *ska*, would be a clear example of an ordinary direct question using the *âm*-construction. Finnish has a particular mood form in conditional if-clauses, the conjunctive, which is marked with the affix -isi-. In Solf, as I said, conditional if-clauses contain the modal *sko*. This third
explanation involves homonymy. Finnish jos 'if' (conditional) has åm as its translation equivalent in Solf. Also, Finnish -ko in indirect questions (cf. above) is translated as åm. If there is Finnish influence on Solf, it is theoretically possible that the åm of questions could be confused with the conditional åm, and that the specific tense form associated with conditional åm could be transferred to utterances with the åm of questions. On this account, Finnish influence would thus have produced a surface structure that is not found in Finnish.

The fourth explanation is a general pragmatic one, and relates to the tendency in Solf for using indirect ways of speaking. We do not only have åm-clauses as main clauses in Solf, we also have constructions where it seems as if main clauses are embedded, but they still remain main clauses structurally. Thus, in addition to sentences like (16) and (17), we also find sentences like (18) in Solf.

(16) Dö saa vi sko ga hejm
you said we should go home
'You said we should go home'

(17) Saa dö vi sko ga hejm
said you
'Did you say we should go home?'

(18) Dö saadö vi sko ga hejm
you said-you
'You said we should go home, did(n't) you?'

That is, (18) is a sentence with declarative form, but it has the pronoun dö in two places, which allows the addressee to interpret (18) either like (16) or like (17). But since (18) is both ambiguous and indeterminate between the
two, the sentence will take on a value in between (16) and
(17): it could be placed near the 'request-for-confirmation'
point on the scale in Figure 2.1. (I have written
saadö in (18) as one word to indicate the enclitic nature
of −dö. We thus see that the similarity in function between
pragmatic particles and pronouns in Solf is not restricted
to the case of final pronouns discussed in 2.3.6. In (18)
the pronoun −dö in effect indicates the speaker's uncer
certainty.)

As should be clear from the way I presented the four
explanations above, these are not really alternatives, but
complementary sources for the development of Åm-construc-
tions in Solf. If this analysis is accepted, it is also
clear that the influence of Finnish on Solf - and on
Finland Swedish in general - goes far beyond the area of
prosody, however broadly conceived. And mutual influence is
of course a natural thing to assume as having taken place
between two people that for centuries have lived side by
side in friendship.

3.3. Sociolinguistic issues

3.3.1. Age

The village of Solf is presently in a state of flux.
The last couple of decades have seen a marked change in
the community: the younger generation sees emigration from
the village as a much stronger alternative than used to

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be the case. The traditional means of survival (in particular, farming) are not felt to be that appealing any more. On the other hand, since the village is relatively close (about twelve miles) to the town of Vasa, a number of people who work in Vasa and grew up there, have recently moved into the village, commute into town daily, and have more than ever before introduced both standard Finland Swedish and Finnish into the community. Some 25 years ago the village was still completely unilingual in the Solf dialect — not even standard Finland Swedish was properly mastered by many villagers.

It is obvious that this relatively sudden change in the community has influenced its language. But what is more interesting from the present point of view is the extent to which implicit means might have changed from one generation to another. An adequate discussion of this question would also shed some light on the diachronic development of pragmatic particles in general.

In the following I will make some tentative observations about the use of question particles by younger speakers, as opposed to speakers of the older generation. The younger generation is represented by one male and one female speaker, about the age of thirty.

Of all the requests for information or confirmation in my material, 68.3% (439) were made by older speakers, and 31.7% (204) by the younger speakers. Table 3.1. gives the distribution of the different kinds of requests for
the two groups of speakers, and Table 3.2. gives the percentages of the request types within each age group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All requests in the present material</th>
<th>YOUNGER - SPEAKERS</th>
<th>OLDER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>no.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>643</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Y/n inversion (only) | 38 | 31.1 | 84 | 68.9 |
| WH fronting (only)   | 38 | 44.7 | 47 | 55.3 |
| Prosody only         | 5  | 20   | 20 | 80   |
| American constructions| 3  | 30   | 7  | 70   |
| Generalizations, etc. | 3  | 30   | 7  | 70   |
| Na                    | 36 | 43.9 | 46 | 56.1 |
| Tā, dā                | 32 | 25.8 | 92 | 74.2 |
| Eīa                   | 15 | 32.6 | 31 | 67.4 |
| Other particles       | 22 | 22.7 | 75 | 77.3 |
| Pronoun repetitions   | 6  | 17.1 | 29 | 82.9 |
| (Not classified)      | 6  | 1    | 7  | 7    |

χ² (p < .001)

Table 3.1. The number and percentages of request types across age groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YOUNGER - SPEAKERS - OLDER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y/n inversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH fronting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American constructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalizations, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tā, dā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eīa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other particles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pronoun repetitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not classified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100 %                        100 %

Table 3.2. The percentages of request types within each age group.

Notice first of all the highly significant χ²-value, indicating the possibility that there are real, significant
differences between the younger and the older speakers' use of question forming devices.

Perhaps the most surprising figures that appear in Tables 3.1. and 3.2. are those for the category 'Prosody only.' If it is true that - over the centuries - Solf has been influenced by Finnish in the area of prosody in particular, then one would have expected the older speakers to rely less on intonation than the younger generation, which has, after all, studied other languages and been travelling (in Sweden for instance) much more than the older generation, and thus knows the importance of intonation for question formation in other languages. But it could in fact be argued that the younger speakers are hypercorrecting themselves: the distinctive aspect of Solf (and Finland Swedish in general) is that it does not make use of prosody to the same extent as Sweden Swedish; therefore, the younger speakers - in attempts to explicitly distinguish their Solf from other languages, and at the same time show their solidarity and identity with the community (cf. also Wiik & Östman 1982) - might be tempted to adopt an extreme version of monotonousness. On the other hand, it might of course also be argued that since the younger generation nowadays has a more explicit contact with the Finnish speaking population than what the older speakers have had9, not using prosodic means in Solf might be a 'renewed' influence from Finnish. At any rate, it is clear that intonation is definitely not one of the means of
question formation that the younger generation is bringing into the dialect.

One reason why older speakers would tend to rely on intonation for question formation is no doubt hypercorrection in the opposite direction. This can be seen from an analysis of questions made by older speakers to non-native speakers of Solf. Thus, the only WH-questions in the data which had a marked stress pattern were used by older (female) speakers to non-native speakers of Solf. Examples of this are (1) and (2).

(1) $Vaar$ $e$ Jän $r$ 
where is Jon 'Where is Jon?' (+F SOL80-J09-1)

(2) Vann i Sanna $r$ sám int kämbär $r$
where is Sanna who not comes (+F ORI79-J03-2)
'Where is Sanna, who doesn't come?'

(Also, as was pointed out earlier, question particles tend to be dropped from questions directed to non-native speakers of Solf.) Even though prosody is not often used alone as a question indicator, a rise in pitch very often accompanies questions - y/n questions in particular. Such utterances have been counted in the category of 'y/n inversion' in Tables 3.1. and 3.2.. I have done this because the questions would be questions also without the marked intonation patterns, and because intonation in Solf very often has an expressive, rather than a grammatical, function. Some examples follow.

(3) MååZA di altihoopa $r$ gyyZt $f$
painted they everything yellow (-M ORI79-J03-1)
'Did they paint everything yellow?'

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(4) (Je e) sant$_r$ is it true 'Is it true?' (+F SOL80-J08-2)

(5) Mejna dø vi sko faar idaa$_r$ meant you we should go today (+M ORI79-J03-2) 'Did you mean we should go today?'

Of the twenty-five pure intonation questions in the data, only four were complete sentences with subject and predicate:

(6) Aj dø joor he aj you did it 'Oh, you did that?' (+F SOL80-J09-2)

(7) (A för<or: på>) sentralbutiit$aten$ gaar e braa and for on Central-shop goes it well (-M ORI79-J03-1) 'And everything is well at the Central shop?'

(8) Dø hitta int an you found not it 'You didn't find it?' (+M SOL80-J011-1)

(9) Dø vila int taa' you wanted not speak 'So you didn't (or: don't) want to talk?' (-M SOL80-J011-2)

None of these are real questions, although they do seem to expect some kind of response. (In some cases, the reason I have considered them questions is not primarily their prosody, which is not at all marked, but the situation in which they were uttered. Thus, gestures or facial expressions might in these cases have been more determinant than variations in pitch itself. (Cf. Bolinger 1981.) The category 'Prosody only' might thus rather be seen as comprising those examples that cannot be explained with reference to any of the other categories.) Example (6) is basically a repetition, with a bit of surprised feeling attached to it, and can only receive one answer,
viz. 'Yes.' Example (7) is a method for introducing a new topic: the final stressed syllable has a level pitch. Example (8) could be prefaced with Så 'So,' and is a recapitulation or summary of what another person has just said, or implied. Example (9) is also a summary, and perhaps a request for confirmation: 'Did I get you right?, or: So that's your final word, is it?'. Notice also the particle aj and the final pronoun he in (6), the negative particle int in (7) and (8), the final pronoun an in (8), and the peculiar word order in (7), introduced with å 'and, too.' (Also, notice that (7) and (9) were spoken by one of the younger speakers.)

The rest of the 'Prosody only' questions consists of one phrase each; one example is simply hmnr. These are almost exclusively echo questions, which are either inserted for reasons of politeness, or as requests for confirmation, and most typically only expect an affirmative nod, or a 'Yes' as answer (or, in the case of a question in the negative form: a 'No'), to indicate that what the addressee heard or deduced was what the speaker had in mind. In some examples the phrase is a proper name or a pronoun, which has the same function as 'Who?,' and gives a suggestion as to the identity of what is referred to. Cf. example (10).

(10) A: Ho leega va an täär
    how long was he there  (-M SOL80-J011-1)
    'For how long was he there?'
B: Papp menn
dad mine      'Do you mean my dad?'  (+M)
Some of the examples are suggestions by the same speaker to an immediately preceding WH-question asked by him/herself (as in (11)), or a request for confirmation to a y/n question (as in (12)), also by the speaker him/herself.

(11) Høsk e va
    how shall it be   'How should it be?'
    Såde
    so-it   'Like that?'  (+F SOL80-J08-2)

(12) Va va he
    what was it   'What was that?'
    An de gyyZ vaasin
    that yellow vase   'The yellow vase?'
    (-F SOL80-J09-2)

Finally, consider examples (13) and (14) of the category 'Prosody only.' These are more complex, and have a syntactic structure.

(13) Á he vaa jo
    å it becomes jo   (+M ORI79-J03-1)
    'And that makes?'

(14) Tå ukki lagar
    tå ukki (=grandpa) mends  (+F ORI79-J03-1)
    'When Ukki makes (it)?'

Notice, however, that they are not full sentences. Utterance (13) lacks a Complement, but instead has the relevance particle jo finally. It is also a paratactic addendum (indicated by the conjunction - or particle - å) to what the previous speaker has just said. (Compare here the use of the relevance particle -hAn in Finnish used as a question particle: -hAn and jo are usually regarded as translation equivalents.) Example (14) can either be regarded as a subordination (syntactically marked by the temporal subordinator tå 'when') to a higher (performative) sentence of the form 'Do you mean (S)?,' which is left implicit in the
same way as the performative sentence preceding an am-construction can be seen as having been left out; or tâ can be seen as something in between a subordinator and a particle.

The latter suggestion might give us some insight into the diachrony of the use of tâ as a question particle as discussed in section 2.3.2. One hypothesis could run as follows. Tâ as a temporal conjunction is expected to have a clause following it that will specify the time at which the activity in the matrix clause obtains. Any specification of a propositional content will make its application (i.e. its reference, cf. Lyons 1963) narrower. Thus, in a face-to-face interaction, by uttering the matrix clause first, you can add on specifications to it if you realize (on the basis of facial expressions or grunts) that the addressee is not approving the (more general) contents of the matrix clause. Tâ at the end of an utterance will imply that there are specifications and limitations to what has just been said, which have not been spelled out explicitly, but which could be spelled out, say, in a temporal clause. By inserting tâ at the end of all statements that the speaker is not sure about, s/he leaves him/herself a way out, in case the addressee has counterarguments to his/her general point. (Cf. footnote 2 to Chapter 2.) The addressee will take this as a request for confirmation, and even for information. Also, the addressee should interpret the statement as a deferential (i.e. 'polite') way of stating something. And
at that point the conjunction has acquired a pragmatic function. It is pragmatic because it can no longer be tied down to explicit semantic rules.

My discussion of the 'Prosody only' category has been somewhat lengthy. However, as I suggested earlier, prosody is of special importance in discussions of pragmatic particles. For Solf, I have shown that the examples in the category 'Prosody only' are not clear cases, and that, in fact, intonation very seldom is used as a grammatical question marker. (Still, it is obvious that Solf does not rely on intonation as little as Finnish does.) We can add to this the fact that only about one-sixth of the requests for information in my data were formed by standard Swedish means, viz. by WH fronting only, y/n inversion only, and prosody only. Most requests thus contained particles or particle-like elements. It is now time to look at some of the age differences in Tables 3.1. and 3.2. with respect to the use of different particles.

First of all, the figure for 'WH fronting' is slightly higher for the younger speakers (44.7 as opposed to the default of 31.7 in Table 3.1.; 18.6 for the younger, 10.7 for older speakers in Table 3.2.). The category stands for cases where the speaker makes a WH-question in the standard Swedish manner, by fronting the relevant WH-word, possibly accompanied by pitch variation. In other words, these are the cases of WH-questions that do not have any particles or final pronouns. On the basis of these figures,
then, it seems that the younger speakers tend to feel that the WH-marker itself is enough to mark an utterance as a WH-question, and consequently do not feel the need to add on any other particles. Older speakers, however, tend more to treat all questions the same, and for them questions need final particles.

Older speakers seem to use instances of the categories 'Tå, då' and 'Other particles' more than younger speakers. A simple explanation for this is of course that the younger speakers have been influenced by languages like standard Swedish and English, which do not make use of particles to the same extent as Solf does. But then, one could argue, they could just as well have been influenced by Finnish, which does make extensive use of particles. (And to counterargue that claim, we would have to go into a detailed discussion of Solf speakers' attitudes to different languages; it is clear that the Finnish language creates more negative than positive attitudes among Solf speakers; for details, see Östman forthcoming c.) We can also note that the distribution of the instances of the category 'Elå' is more or less in accordance with the default expectations. And English in particular, of course, makes extensive use of tag-questions. The figure for the category 'Other particles,' might also be explainable as indicating recent language interference from closely related languages (like English and Swedish); however, a study of each of the particles in this category might give

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a more detailed picture of the issue. The figure for 'Tå, då' does suggest the importance of these particles as question particles in Solf — especially for the older speakers. And here it may be that explicit 'mother-tongue' teaching of standard Swedish at school has made the younger speakers less sensitive to the old people's use of the important question particles.

The figure for the category 'Na' is rather surprising, and I have no immediate explanation for why younger speakers use this particle so often. It may be, however, that the question-forming function of na is a secondary attribute of the particle. As we saw in section 2.3.4., na is very seldom used alone to mark an utterance as interrogative. I have not made any detailed study of non-interrogative uses of na, but it is not inconceivable that the particle is a marker of social relation, or politeness, and that it is only because of its tendency to occur in sentences that express a request of some form (a situation which presupposes a particular relation between the interactants) that it has become closely associated with questions — and maybe even reinterpreted by the younger speakers to be a question particle. If this is the case, it is a further indication that na is not a question particle to the same extent as tå, då, and elå are.

The figure for pronoun repetition (2.9 for younger speakers as against 6.6 for older speakers) fits in nicely with our expectations that older speakers would tend to
rely on sentence-final elements in general to indicate that an utterance is intended as a question (cf. the discussion of the figure for the category 'WH fronting' above). This would represent what villagers call 'real' Solf, uninfluenced by changes in the modern society. The younger speakers, on the other hand, might treat the use of final pronouns as a particular instance of right dislocation - on a par with the use of other types of right dislocations in Solf - and thus not as readily associate them with question formation. We can also note that the object-dummy construction, which was briefly mentioned in the beginning of 2.3.6., is hardly used at all by older speakers (I found one potential instance in my data). The six instances recorded for the younger speakers might indicate that the construction is borrowed from standard Swedish (where it is frequently used). From that point of view, it is possible that pronoun repetition in Solf is regarded as a special case of the standard Swedish construction (or vice versa), and younger speakers would tend to use the latter, too, as part of the stock-and-trade of Solf.

In general, then, where there are differences in the language of older and younger speakers as regards question formation, constructions with particles tend to be used more frequently by older speakers, and - for obvious reasons - the area where the younger speakers do not pay enough attention to the use of question particles is WH-formation.
The differences reported here have taken place during one generation. In effect, then, what we have found is evidence that pragmatic (and prosodic) phenomena do change rather rapidly, and are fairly easily influenced by the systems of other languages. Taken one step further, this also means that the whole idea that Finnish intonation (or lack of it) has influenced that of Solf (and Finland Swedish in general) gets some support from the present findings. However, on the one hand, the influence of Finnish is a historical issue, and its manifestations have become fairly conventionalized for native speakers of Solf. On the other hand, what seems to be happening at present is that the language of the younger speakers of Solf gets influenced (through cultural influence) by languages (like Swedish and English) that are genetically close to Solf, and this results in a different kind of interference: an interference that goes in the opposite direction, if we relate this to my earlier discussion of intonation and particles as pragmatic alternatives.

3.3.2. Sex

In this section I want briefly to mention the distribution of different means for asking questions and requesting information in relation to the speaker's sex. The most important figures are given in Table 3.3. and Table 3.4.
Table 3.3. The number and percentages of request types across sex groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Request Type</th>
<th>Female - Speakers</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All requests in the present material</td>
<td>356 55.4%</td>
<td>287 44.6%</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y/n inversion (only)</td>
<td>69 56.6%</td>
<td>53 43.4%</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH fronting (only)</td>
<td>39 45.9%</td>
<td>46 54.1%</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosody only</td>
<td>14 56%</td>
<td>11 44%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Am-constructions</td>
<td>7 70%</td>
<td>3 30%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topicalizations, etc.</td>
<td>6 60%</td>
<td>4 40%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na</td>
<td>40 48.8%</td>
<td>42 51.2%</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÅ, då</td>
<td>67 54%</td>
<td>57 46%</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ëlå</td>
<td>23 50%</td>
<td>23 50%</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other particles</td>
<td>63 64.9%</td>
<td>34 35.1%</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pronoun repetitions</td>
<td>24 68.6%</td>
<td>11 31.4%</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Not classified)</td>
<td>4 68.6%</td>
<td>3 31.4%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² (p > .2)

Table 3.4. Percentages of request types within each sex groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Request Type</th>
<th>Female - Speakers</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y/n inversion</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH fronting</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosody</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Am-constructions</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topicalizations, etc.</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÅ, då</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ëlå</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other particles</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pronoun repetitions</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not classified</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

The χ²-value is not significant. That is, whatever differences we find (in these data) in men's and women's use of question particles and other means for asking questions in Solf, these are not statistically significant.
differences. The following discussion of differences might therefore be taken as rather speculative. However, as the figures in Tables 3.3. and 3.4. indicate, there are nevertheless differences. Instead of the statistical null hypothesis we might therefore want to make a more precise hypothesis, namely that women will often use just those particles and constructions whose meanings are consistent with what is generally said about women's language.

Again, 'y/n inversion (only)' is not indicative here, as it was not either when correlated with age. What is perhaps somewhat surprising in the tables is that the category 'Prosody only' is not correlatable with the speaker's sex. In fact, before analyzing the last of my tapes, I thought I had a clear case for women using more instances of this category than men. The last tape, however, contained six occurrences of this category, five of which were by men not present in any of the other conversations. In experiments to be reported on more in detail in Östman forthcoming a. I found that women tend to use rising intonation at the end of questions more often than men. The results from those experiment are, however, based on sentences in isolation, said in a laboratory, and it may be that in such a situation, in an attempt to distinguish questions and statements clearly, the speakers added rising intonation at the end of questions.

The figure for the category 'TÅ, DÅ' is not significant - perhaps exactly because tå and då are the major
particles of request in Solf. Note, however, that in combination with the results for the 'WH fronting (only)' category, we can perhaps deduce that women tend to treat particles as being necessary in all kinds of questions (since the figure for WH-questions without any particles is 45.9 as opposed to the default 55.4), whereas men would tend to feel that the WH-word itself is enough as question marker. This interpretation would of course tally with stereotypical differences between men's and women's language: adding extra - in particular, non-propositional - material to an utterance has the effect of focusing attention on other aspects of conversation (interaction itself, or expression of attitudes, for instance) than the propositional content of the message. This would be typical of so-called women's language - especially as seen through the eyes of representatives of the speakers of male language. (Cf. R. Lakoff 1975, 1979, Östman 1981a.) The fact that women tend to use more indirect, subordinate \underline{am}-constructions than men ('indirect' is the crucial word) can also be taken as an instance of a realization of typical linguistic difference between male and female language (although the occurrences here are extremely low).

The figures for the other particles and question indicators in Tables 3.3. and 3.4. prove to be very interesting from the point of view of establishing a set of particles as the question particles in Solf. Whereas the figures for the categories 'Other particles' and 'Pronoun
repetitions' indicate that women tend to use instances of these categories more often, the figures for the categories 'Na' and 'Elâ' actually go in the opposite direction. Thus, if it is true as I have hypothesized in this study, that the particles tâ, dâ, elâ, and na are more conventionally associated with requesting information or confirmation than any other particles, we can presume that other particles would then be used for less grammaticized and conventionalized purposes - like expressing attitudes, emotions, and establishing rapport. If that is the case, the figures in Tables 3.3. and 3.4. would simply indicate that - in accordance with what is generally said about typical women's language - women (also in Solf) tend to use such markers more often than men (cf. the categories 'Other particles' and 'Pronoun repetitions').

As I pointed out above, the overall differences between male and female usage in relation to the present data are not statistically reliable, and there are issues that I have not gone into detail about: why, for instance, would men use elâ and na more often than women? Still, most of the figures do go in the direction students of 'language and sex' would predict, and there thus seems to be evidence in favor of the more precise hypothesis put forth at the beginning of this section.
3.4. Psycholinguistic aspects - results of an experiment

In an experiment to be reported more in detail in Östman forthcoming a. I asked twenty-four native speakers of Solf to give responses to different versions - containing a variety of pragmatic particles - of one and the same sentence. Since the major goal of that study is to discuss the interaction of particles and prosody in one and the same language (i.e. in Solf), I accordingly synthesized (a) sentences with and without particles, (b) sentences (with and without particles) with 'appropriate' intonation, and the same sentences with a neutral (slightly falling) intonation, and (c) different types of intonation contours without verbal material. For each prompt sentence, the subjects were asked to check off ready-made alternatives on a set of questionnaires.

Since the experiment also included prompts with the question particles elâ, dâ, and na, I will here briefly survey some of the findings relating to these. The prompts I want to discuss are those that have a neutral, slightly falling intonation all through, and the versions of the sentence I will concentrate on are given in Table 3.5. (Bulla means '(coffee-)bread,' billit means 'cheap,' and i and je are different - in free variation if unstressed - forms of the copula 'to be'.)
Table 3.5. Test sentences for a psycholinguistic experiment.

One task was to place each prompt sentence on a seven-point scale of modality. (The sentences were of course randomized in the task, and the ones I have picked out here were only some of the prompts in the experiment. Each prompt was repeated three times, followed by a beep, and three repetitions of the next prompt. Before the test sentences were encountered, the subjects were given a set of similar sentences, to make them get used to the test situation, and what alternatives there were to choose from.) The alternatives (as seven points) were given in Solf - both written down and orally by me. The seven alternatives are given in Table 3.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Bulla i billit</th>
<th>'Bread is cheap'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. Je bulla billit</td>
<td>'Is bread cheap'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Bulla i billit då</td>
<td>'Bread is cheap då'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Bulla i billit elå</td>
<td>'Bread is cheap elå'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Je bulla na billit</td>
<td>'Is bread na cheap'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6. Seven alternative responses, which are related to each other as points on a scale of modality.

1. The speaker sounds as if he is extremely certain of what he is saying
2. The speaker sounds as if he is certain about what he is saying
3. The speaker sounds as if he is fairly certain about what he is saying
4. The speaker is neutral with respect to the certainty of what he is saying
5. The speaker sounds as if he is somewhat uncertain about what he is saying
6. The speaker sounds uncertain about what he is saying
7. The speaker sounds as if he is making a question.
I take categories 5-7 to indicate different degrees of uncertainty, and the categorization by a subject of a prompt as a 5, 6, or 7 as indicating that in that subject's opinion a potential speaker of such a sentence is requesting confirmation or information from his addressee. The results of how the subjects judged prompts A-E with respect to the degree these sentences ask for confirmation or information is presented in Table 3.7. (The percentages indicate the per cent of subjects who categorized the prompts as 5-7.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prompt</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E. Je bulla na billit</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Je bulla billit</td>
<td>79.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Bulla i billit da</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Bulla i billit da</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Bulla i billit</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.7. Sentences judged for the degree of uncertainty they express. (The percentages indicate the per cent of subjects who categorized prompts A-E as 5, 6, or 7. Cf. Table 3.6.)

The figures are very much as one would expect. Nobody regarded A as expressing uncertainty. B is the ordinary y/n inverted question form, and eight out of ten subjects felt that inversion alone is enough to mark a sentence as some sort of request. But two out of ten obviously felt that something is missing: a particular kind of prosody, a particle, or a gesture, we can assume. Even adding the particle na - which we saw has a dubious status of being a question particle (by itself) - almost makes one more out of the ten classify the prompt as a request. (One
subject, i.e. 4.2% did not respond to the prompt.) D is close to a tag question, and would be expected to receive uncertainty responses. The distribution between categories 5, 6, and 7 as regards elå is as follows (here, too, one subject's response was unclear).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. 'somewhat uncertain'</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 'uncertain'</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 'question'</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.8. Responses to prompt D, with elå.

Category C in Table 3.7. does not seem to live up to our hopes, but we have to remember that the prompt has a very neutral (almost level) intonation and statement form. And despite this, almost four out of ten subjects would be ready to classify the prompt as indicating uncertainty. This is a clear indication that då is not by itself a grammaticized question particle. But the figures also indicate that many native speakers have conventionalized it as a request indicator to some extent. Also, as can be seen from the distribution of the responses to C in Table 3.9., the major clustering of responses is for category 5, 'somewhat uncertain.'
- no answer 4.2%
- multiple answers 4.2%
1. 'extremely certain' 12.5%
2. 'certain' 8.3%
3. 'fairly certain' 20.8%
4. 'neutral' 12.5%
5. 'somewhat uncertain' 33.3%
6. 'uncertain' 0.0%
7. 'question' 4.2%

Table 3.9. Responses to prompt C, with da.

* Another response sheet consisted of alternatives of a different kind: I wanted to find out to what extent particles express certain typical attitudes or feelings. In this test the subjects were allowed, and even encouraged, to check off more than one alternative for each prompt. The set-up for the experiment was the same as for the modality experiment, except that only six alternatives were given. The alternatives were those in Table 3.10.

I. The speaker ('s statement) sounds neutral, without any extra feelings or emotions (No grammatical subject was given in the characterizing statement for each slot.)
II. The speaker sounds polite
III. The speaker sounds friendly and understanding
IV. The speaker sounds angry, aggressive, critical, and impertinent
V. The speaker sounds calm and relaxed
VI. The speaker sounds impatient, irritated, uninterested, and stressed.

Table 3.10. Six alternative responses, indicating different attitudes and feelings.

Let us first have a look at the extent to which prompts A-E were characterized as 'neutral.' Cf. Table

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Table 3.11. Response I, 'neutral,' to prompts A-E.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prompt</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Bulla i billit</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Bulla i billit då</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Bulla i billit elå</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Je bulla na billit</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Je bulla billit</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is striking here is of course that it is only the straightforward statement A that a significant number of subjects feel is neutral (or at least do not place in any of the categories II-VI). The figures for the rest of the categories thus indicate that particles do indicate some kind of speaker's involvement in what s/he is saying (again, remember that the pitch contour of each prompt was constant). Even though the differences are small, it is interesting to note again that då is the particle that is 'less involved,' i.e. most grammaticized. The figure for category B, the ordinary question, is somewhat surprising, though. It actually suggests that an utterance with question form, but without the appropriate intonation, and without any supporting particles, will be taken to have a stronger affective meaning than - presumably - a question with particles (cf. E), and/or intonation. And this, if anything, shows the difference between question formation in Solf and in standard Swedish.

The next task is to see whether any (or any combination) of the choices II-VI can be associated with a partic-
ular question particle. Since these particles are, after all, particles that indicate request for information or confirmation, we should not expect any of them to be uniquely associated with communicating a particular feeling or attitude. Rather, we should look for tendencies, and see the results on a par with what we talk about as the affective meaning of words - except that in the case of pragmatic particles there is very often no definite propositional content that the affective meaning is added to.

Category II, 'polite,' is somewhat different from categories III-VI, in that it more explicitly refers to interactive characteristics, whereas the other categories have to do more with the speaker's feelings and attitudes. A speaker can be calm, friendly, angry or impatient without necessarily having these feelings towards his/her addressee. But being polite by definition means that you are polite to the addressee, or your audience. If the responses are placed on a scale according to the extent A-E prompted the subjects to check the 'polite' box, we find that no one thought A was polite, and the sentence with dÅ in it was considered to be the most polite alternative. However, since the percentage figure for dÅ was only 25%, it might not at first sight seem significant. Still, we should be content with getting figures in this percentage range, taking into account the level of conventionality we are working at: these are not propositional, semantic meanings.
of the particles, but rather 'accessory meanings.' But since a certain percentage of subjects agree to assign the same 'accessory meaning' to a particle (or a sentence containing a particular particle), in effect, to that extent, the particle is conventionalized. Since this part of the experiment did not contain sentences with the particle tá, we cannot, of course, be sure that tá does not have similar, polite functions. On the contrary, it seems that we do use tá to soften down commands, as in the following utterance.

(1) Ta hit an tá
    take here it tá
    'Give it to me, then!'

If we put together all the categories that indicate a positive response, namely 'polite' (II), 'friendly' (III), and 'calm' (V), we find that the two highest scoring prompts were sentences C (elå; 62.5%) and D (då; 45.8%). Since the high score for då might be due to its high score for the category 'polite,' we can exclude category II, and then find that it is in fact the sentence with elå that gives by far the most positive scores, as Table 3.12 shows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prompt</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D. Bulla i billit elå</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Bulla i billit då</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Je bulla na billit</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Je bulla billit</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Bulla i billit</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.12. Responses indicating the degree to which the prompts were felt to express a positive feeling (categories III and V).
If we do the opposite manoeuvre and put together the categories that express negative feelings, we get the result in Table 3.13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. Je bulla billit</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Je bulla na billit</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Bulla i billit dâ</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Bulla i billit</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Bulla i billit elå</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.13. Responses indicating the degree to which the prompts were felt to express a negative feeling (categories IV and VI).

Not only is category D the most positive, it is also the prompt that gets least negative responses. On the other hand, we again see that questions without intonation are taken to express rather negative attitudes, and even a sentence like E, with question form and the particle na, is felt to be rather negative.

If we disregard the category 'polite,' and put together all the responses to categories III-VI, we end up with figures for the extent to which speakers express their attitudes, feelings, in general, their involvement, by using A-E.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. Je bulla billit</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Je bulla na billit</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Bulla i billit elå</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Bulla i billit dâ</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Bulla i billit</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.14. Subjects' judgments of the general involvement the prompts express (categories III - VI).
The high figures here no doubt to a large extent have to do with the nature of the test. But it is interesting to note that the sentence with da is lowest on the hierarchy (excepting the neutral A). On the other hand, da was the prompt that was classified as being the most 'polite.' It thus seems that particles tend to choose to be most effective either in the area of 'involvement' - with the speaker him/herself in focus - or in the area of interaction, where the addressee (or the speaker and the addressee together) are in focus. On the basis of the results given above, we can then say that da is more of an interactive particle, whereas elâ is a particle that expresses positive involvement, and na seems to be a particle that expresses more of a negative involvement. Except for the neutral prompt A, na has the lowest score for politeness; except for B, it receives the least number of 'neutral' responses; it is low on the 'positive' hierarchy, and high on the 'negative' hierarchy, although here, of course, other factors - question form in particular - might be decisive. Note, however, that B and E receive the same overall figure for expression of involvement.

Finally, I will have a brief look at the extent to which A-E were classified as either of III-VI more than the others. The percentages in the grid below indicate the same as in the other tables: the extent to which subjects have indicated that a sentence is of a particular category.
I chose the categories III-VI on the basis, first of all, that I thought I could myself distinguish these four without too much difficulty, secondly, on the basis of research within psycholinguistics (cf. e.g. Silverman, Scherer & Ladd 1983; Ladd, Scherer & Silverman forthcoming), and thirdly, because they made up two pairs with opposite poles, and this would make it easier for the subjects to decide among the six alternatives they were given. (I also spent much time with each subject before each test situation to make sure the subjects knew what the alternatives were.) On the basis of the results in Table 3.15, it also seems fair to say that the categories 'friendly' and 'angry,' on the one hand, and 'calm' and 'impatient,' on the other hand, are opposites also with respect to the responses they got in this test: D and E were friendly, A and B (and also E!) were angry, while C was 'both'; D was calm and B and E and C were impatient.

More in detail, A was felt to sound angry more than anything else, B was felt to sound impatient by one third of the subjects, and one fourth of the subjects felt that

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>III friendly</th>
<th>IV angry</th>
<th>V calm</th>
<th>VI impatient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Bulla i billit</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Je bulla billit</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Bulla i billit då</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>Bulla i billit elå</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td>Je bulla na billit</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.15. Percentages of responses to prompts A–E with respect to the different categories III–VI of involvement.
it also sounds angry. And note that these are the ordinary, neutral ways of forming statements and questions in standard Swedish. But in this test they had a monotonous intonation, and no particles. Sentence E (with question form and na) does not fare much better. Almost one third of the subjects classified it as impatient, and 16.7% as angry, but there was still one fifth of the subjects who felt that it has some amount of friendliness in it - a friendliness that na itself adds, since B did not sound too friendly, and the sentences are otherwise the same.

Sentence D (with elå) seems to be the most friendly and calm prompt, although it also seems to have an element of impatience in it. The friendliness and calmness go well together with the general positive attitudes that elå seem to express (see above). Sentence C (with då) is hard to define with respect to the four categories. And this is of course what we can expect of a prompt that seems to be more effective on the interactive plane in language (cf. the discussion of 'polite' above). The relatively high figure for då for the category 'impatient' might be explained by what I earlier characterized as its meaning of 'being in opposition' (cf. sections 2.3.2.2. and 2.3.2.3.).

The results of the experiment discussed in this section clearly show that each of the particles are associated with particular discourse functions in addition to their use as near-grammaticized question particles. The results of this analysis will be further discussed in
Chapter 4.

3.5. Implications

My analysis of question particles in Solf has gone along a number of very different avenues. In Chapter 4 I will pull the different results together and indicate the direction in which this manifold analysis takes us. In this section I will discuss some implications for the analysis of questions and the analysis of pragmatic particles in general. The first section of Chapter 4 will take up for discussion the theoretical implications about the field of pragmatics that we can draw from the analyses in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3.

* *

In order to be able to talk about question particles in the terms I have used in this study, I started out from a cognitive-semantic perspective. Instead of making an either-or distinction in terms of syntactic characterizations, I approached questions and requests from a scalar point of view: a construction that is used in utterances whose function is to (seemingly) give the addressee more power in an interaction of information transference manifests some part of this (interactively defined) conceptual field, and can be regarded as more or less of a question. In section 2.2. I set up a tentative gradience (Figure 2.1.) to cover the conceptual field of
directives, and in my analysis of question formation in Solf I have shown not only the plausibility of such a gradience, but its necessity – especially if we see language as a dynamic process (both synchronically and diachronically), and not only as a stative product.

The fact that I have talked about a set of particles in Solf as question particles – with reference to a scale of requests for information and confirmation – does not, however, mean that I see the meaning and function of such particles as wholly determined by this conceptual field. In the analyses, it has become clear that the relevant particles have a number of 'accessory' meanings in addition to their question-forming function. I place the word 'accessory' within quotes, because it is only from the point of view of question formation that these meanings or functions are secondary. The 'accessory' meanings can themselves be defined in terms of similar conceptual fields, or gradient scales.

In fact, it has become clear from recent research in lexicology that the meaning of most lexical items should be seen in scalar terms. Even when we agree on the meaning (the 'correct' application) of a word, say, 'table,' we still have to accept that different speakers might think of different kinds of tables when confronted with the lexeme TABLE: does a table have a round or square surface; is it one-legged or four-legged; how high does a table have to be for it to be called 'a table'? In lexicology we over-
look idiolectal connotations of lexemes, simply because these connotations do not seem to be easily predictable, nor essential for getting at an overall understanding of a particular lexeme. For lexicological reasons we abstract out its PROTOTYPE (Rosch 1973, 1977, Fillmore 1975b, 1978), CORE (Putnam 1970), or PEAK (Östman 1979c, 1979d, 1981b) meaning on the basis of the frequency with which one or several meanings are ascribed to a lexeme by native speakers.

In addition to the core meaning of a lexical item, dictionaries also tend to give an inventory of a set of features over which the meanings of lexemes can range. This set can be referred to as its DOMAIN, or RANGE. (Cf. also Wittgenstein's (1967) concept of family resemblance.)

In traditional terms, the core meaning of a lexeme would be the necessary and sufficient ingredients that make up the lexicon meaning of the lexeme, and the domain would constitute the sufficient, but not necessary ingredients. Strictly idiolectal connotations would be neither necessary nor sufficient ingredients for the meaning of a particular lexeme. The distinction between the core and the range of applicability of a lexeme can also be seen in TYPE-TOKEN terms. The core meaning of a lexeme refers to the lexeme as a part of a linguistic and abstract system, whereas tokens of this type can range in their meaning and application depending on the verbal context and situational context.
In a number of articles (Östman 1979a, 1979c, 1979d, 1981b) I have shown that abstracting out conceptual frames (in terms of a multidimensionality of conceptual scales) over which a linguistic element can range, and within which it can be given a core meaning is useful not only for describing the meanings of nouns, but also for describing the behavior of pragmatic particles. Since the success of this approach rests on the efficiency and workability of the stipulated (or simply detected, on the basis of perceived human behavior) abstract arsenal of conceptual fields, it is obvious that the greatest problem here is to 'find' the empirically adequate conceptual categories (i.e. scales).

In Östman (1979c, 1981b) I illustrated how the core-domain approach could be used to characterize the semantic meaning of pragmatic particles in terms of a scale of modality. At one end this scale was Certainty (the speaker expresses certainty about the propositional content of his/her message) and the other pole was Uncertainty. Note, however, that this scale is only one of a set of similar scales, and that looking at pragmatic particles in the light of only one such scale would naturally give only one aspect of the meaning of the particles.

As an example, compare the following characterizations of (standard) Swedish ju, Finnish -kin, and English polarity tag-questions (from Östman 1979c:180).
Figure 3.2. Examples of core-domain analyses with respect to a scale of modality.

(Key to Figure 3.2.
C = speaker expressing certainty as to what his proposition says
U = speaker expressing uncertainty ...
N = speaker being neutral with regard to the truth of his proposition
---x an abstracted conceptual scale
%%%% domain; the range of applicability of an element of language with respect to a particular scale
$ core meaning within a domain; the term 'peak meaning' that I have used in earlier discussions has its basis in the representation above)

The representation of the relevance particle *ju* in Swedish in Figure 3.2. means that, on this scale, it can range in meaning from expressing that the speaker is convinced of what s/he is saying, as in (1), to expressing that s/he is neutral (or even somewhat uncertain) with respect to the propositional content of his/her message, as in (2). (These examples are from Allén et al. 1976.)

(1) Tyskarna anföll *ju* inte Sverige
   Germans attacked *ju* not Sweden
   'The Germans didn't attack Sweden (as you should know)'
(2) Och ni använde ju inte de 6000 kronorna genast
and you used ju not the 6000 crowns at-once
'And (I presume) you didn't use the 6,000 crowns at once'

The peak for ju (its core meaning) in this domain will lie quite close to the Certainty pole. This peak would stand for the meaning most frequently associated with ju on this scale. The domains and peaks for -kin and tag-questions in English could be explained in similar terms. An example of a tag expressing certainty would be (3) (cf. Östman 1981b) as opposed to the typical case of tag-questions expressing uncertainty, as in (4).

(3) You didn't know that, did you?
(4) It's raining outside, isn't it?

(For a detailed discussion of -kin, see Östman 1977.)

In Östman (1979c) I also suggested that intonation contours could be given semantic meanings with the peak-domain approach. In this way we can show the similarities of intonation contours and pragmatic particles, as well as account for what I earlier talked about as their complementary distribution. The meaning of a particle in one language and a frozen intonation contour (cf. Liberman & Sag 1974, Sag & Liberman 1975, Ladd 1978, 1980, 1983) in another language can thus be compared with respect to different scales. (Cf. Östman 1979c:188 for a suggestion of an analysis of intonation contours in these terms.)

If we see questions and requests as lying on a scale which represents a conceptual field, the next question is whether this scale is a different scale from the
modality scale.

The basic criterion for treating some pragmatic particles as question particles in Solf is not that one or two of them could be singled out as being fully grammaticized particles as such. Rather, as we saw, there is a general tendency in Solf to have (especially sentence-final) particles in an utterance which expresses a request of some sort. I also pointed out that a number of the particles that take part in this general tendency were, in fact, what I call probability particles. These can, of course, most directly be described in terms of the modality scale.

In fact, the only workable criterion for separating the probability and question particles in Solf would have to be a positional one. Probability particles tend to occur sentence internally, after the tense-carrying verb; question particles tend to occur sentence finally. On a functional basis, the two categories of particles can only be separated in very gradient terms. Probability particles express the attitudes of the speaker, whereas the question particles are more explicitly interactive and addressee-oriented. However, if X communicates to Y a statement that expresses less than complete certainty, then Y can regard this as a request for confirmation (and still be said to follow normal principles of co-operation). Conversely, of course, a request for information also shows that the speaker is to some degree uncertain about the tenability of
his utterance. This might suggest that we should see these two scales (the modality scale and the question scale) as one notional schema, going from Statement towards lesser degrees of certainty, ending up in Question.

Nevertheless, because of the positional differences in the manifestations of these scales as regards the use of particles, and because of the basic difference between probability particles as being more speaker-oriented, while particles of request are more addressee-oriented, my view is that the two scales should be kept apart. Notice also that while probability particles could possibly be seen as functioning on both of these scales, the question particles that I have discussed in this study do not have a modal function. Still, the two scales do have quite specific relationships. Schematically, the following picture emerges.10

![Schematic Diagram]

Figure 3.3. Hypothesized interaction between a scale of modality and a scale of questioning.

I think of the broken lines as necessary projections from one scale to the other, so that a choice on one scale usually entails a (more or less specific) choice on the
other scale. For instance, the probability particle vel on the modality scale suggests that the speaker has evidence for what s/he is saying only to a certain degree. But the use of vel automatically also suggests to the addressee that a potential refutation or acceptance of the speaker's statement is in place.

Tags in English constitute a case in point in this respect. On the modality scale their prototypical meaning is quite close to the uncertainty pole; on the request scale they have a prototypical peak at the Request-for-Confirmation site (cf. Figure 2.1. in section 2.2.). But one of these values can be changed - within the domain of the particle - and such a change on one scale almost necessarily affects the particle's value on the other scale. Thus, if I am quite certain about something, I can still use a tag-question (cf. example (3)) - usually with a different intonation contour (which brings in the prototypical peaks of different intonation contours, cf. above) - and then I am no longer really requesting information, but rather saying something like 'I request that you accept what I have to say,' and thus its meaning is simultaneously shifted leftward on the request scale, and downward on the modality scale.

If we did not see question-formation as a process that can change, or that can have several manifestations simultaneously - due primarily to contextual and interactional factors - our description of question-formation in
Solf would not be complete. Especially for a language like Solf with few written records, it is not enough to say, for instance, that a reanalysis is taking place, with the effect that the sentence-final particles are taking over the functions of inversion and prosody for forming questions in Solf. We need to be able to describe this state of affairs as a system in itself, not as something in between one system and the next. At present, the standard Swedish system with inversion and prosody, and the Finnish system with particles might be working together in Solf - but what we have is one system, the Solf system, where the particles do not have the same functions as inversion and prosody in standard Swedish, but they offer a vast amount of facilitating support to the addressee when s/he needs to decide whether something is a question or not.

*  

Although the discussion of particles in this chapter has mainly been concerned with one small area (particles asking for information or confirmation) of the whole field of pragmatic particles, it has nevertheless proved very informative for getting more general information about how pragmatic particles function in language.

I have already discussed a number of hypotheses and implications in this and the preceding chapter. For instance, I suggested the possibility of a close functional similarity between the use of particles and certain aspects of prosody in languages in general, such that, where - for
whenever reason - one device cannot be used, the other will be used. I have also indicated the importance of taking into account socioloinguistic and, in particular, psycho-linguistic aspects when describing the functions of pragmatic particles. Since pragmatic particles tend not to have any propositional meaning, an adequate description of their functions should naturally be sought in the realm where pragmatic particles do have an impact.

The function the members of the class of pragmatic particles perform is implicit, and they primarily have a function within what we could call the pragmatic perspective on language. Much of what has been done in the published research on particles is, however, to a large extent part of semantics. For instance, discussions of the focus and scope of particles come under this characterization, and we can also see the stress on semantic issues in the frequent use of terms like 'modal' or 'focus' particles. But we need to go on from where semantics leaves us, and try to say something general about the pragmatic particles in their natural habitat: the pragmatic component of language.

If we characterize pragmatic particles on a structural basis we can form a prototype concept of what a pragmatic particle looks like. Drawing on recent research in the field, we could come up with the following relevant parameters in such a structural word class. (Cf. for instance discussions in Arndt 1960, Weydt 1969, Kriwonossow
1977, Östman 1982a.)

a. item length: pragmatic particles are typically very short;
b. prosody: pragmatic particles are typically subordinated prosodically to another word or phrase;
c. lexicality: a pragmatic particle typically resists clear lexical specifications; it is propositionally empty; and,
d. sentential structure: a pragmatic particle typically modifies the whole of a sentence.

There are obvious problems with having this word-class characterization as a starting point for a universal characterization of pragmatic particles. Some of these (especially a) are very idiosyncratic in comparison to existing word-class criteria. There are also problems of delimitation: a formally defined class of pragmatic particles will overlap with other classes; and there are elements in language (for instance, expressions like *generally speaking*; cf. Östman 1982b) that function in the same way as pragmatic particles, but do not conform to the structural criteria given above. So, if pragmatic particles are seen as a word class on a par with other word classes, their status will become that of an ill-defined and non-intuitive category, similar to the Stoics' class of Particles (containing any word that cannot be declined). This kind of classification of pragmatic particles involves relating them to the textual PRODUCT.
The other way to get a handle on the class of pragmatic particles is to approach them from a more dynamic point of view, and see how they function in discourses seen as PROCESSES. Both of these approaches, as well as semantic characterizations of pragmatic particles, are necessary. And there is, of course, nothing strange with such a double classification and characterization of a class of elements. This is the way we always have to work: we have to take all existing perspectives on language into account simultaneously.

If we approach the issue from the point of view of how these particles function in discourse, we can distinguish two separate avenues. First there is the aspect of discourse cohesion. This lies very close to the structural way of looking at language, especially if we think of the cohesion of a product text. Pragmatic particles not only take part in the architecture of the individual sentence (cf. Östman 1979d), they also partake in building up larger textual architectures, by tying one text (or sentence) to another in some way. (Cf. Östman 1982a.) In conversational analyses, pragmatic particles are often classified on positional grounds, and thus we find subclasses like post-completers and prestarters (Sacks et al. 1974). Similarly, in structural approaches to narratology, pragmatic particles are classified as episode markers, organizers, or simply as connectives.

The second avenue we can take is to note the similar-
ities there are between the function of pragmatic particles, and the function of certain aspects of prosody (e.g. voice quality), paralinguistic features, and non-verbal behavior. What the pragmatic particles have in common with these is implicitness. Both anchor utterances to the speaker's attitudes about the situational context, and to his/her interactive behavior.

Notice incidentally that the different aspects of the pragmatic particles that I have talked about here do not constitute subclasses of pragmatic particles. All pragmatic particles potentially rely on these aspects in discourse. But even if we should not talk about clausal, textual, attitudinal, or interactional particles as separate subclasses, it is true that the pragmatic particles both can have, and do have, any one (or several) of these aspects in focus. For instance, I guess has the clausal aspect in focus (cf. its close relation to the epistemic particles I suppose, and I believe). You know, again, has the interactional aspect in focus, but it also has an important textual usage. (Cf. Östman 1981a.)

It should be obvious that both the structural and the functional information are necessary for an overall characterization of pragmatic particles. Without the functional characterization pragmatic particles would be reduced to little more than an extremely-hard-to-define word class; without the structural delimitation pragmatic particles could not be distinguished from implicit anchor-
ing performed by gestural or prosodic means, nor from any verbal element that on a particular occasion happens to have, say, an expressive function.

* 

In my discussion of the question particles in Solf I found that none of the particles could be described as completely grammaticized question particles. I also found that most of them had close connections to the proposition-al meanings that their respective homonymous forms have in Solf. Thus, there were cases where elá was used as the only question indicator in an utterance, there were other cases where elá functioned like a tag, and there were cases where elá simply meant 'or,' but there were also cases where elá had a function somewhere in-between these meanings. It was not clear from the context, say, whether elá was more like a tag, or more like a conjunction. And finally, there were instances in the data like A an stodeera - elá ondäviisa - han täär tå å 'Has he studied - I mean taught - there too?,' where elá had a clear pragmatic function, somewhat like the English I mean.

It is clear from examples like these that delimiting a class of pragmatic particles will be very difficult if every particle turns out to have this kind of shading-off and variable meaning whenever it is used. Notice also that there is no easy way to talk about different homonymous items in a case like that of elá. The problem with the particle is that it seems to retain some aspect of each
of its potential meanings/functions whenever it occurs, and thus, with respect to this particle at least, no strict dividing line can be drawn between 'conjunction,' 'tag,' and 'pragmatic particle.' The more general problem is that the same kind of argument could be made, mutatis mutandis, for tå, då, and na.

As a first attempt at tackling this problem I have made a distinction between the CENTRAL pragmatic particles in a language, and the PERIPHERAL particles of that language. (Cf. Östman 1982a, 1982b, where I use the term 'core' particles instead of 'central' particles.)

In Östman (1982a:153) I argued that the ultimate delimiting criteria for calling a linguistic unit a prototypical (i.e. a central) pragmatic particle is that (a) this unit does not directly partake in the propositional content of an utterance; and that (b) it has as its sole function to implicitly anchor the (propositional content of the) utterance to the emotions and attitudes of the speaker, and/or to a particular level of politeness, and/or to some coherence aspect of the discourse. (For a detailed account of the sense in which I use these terms, see Chapter 4.)

'Sole function' here means that for an item to be called a central pragmatic particle, it should never be able to have any other than a pragmatic-particle function. It is always an instance of the class of pragmatic particles
independent of where it occurs.

This definition of pragmatic particles will exclude from the class of central pragmatic particles such expressions as can (but need not always) have a pragmatic-particle function (for instance,aspectual particles like just, and too in English, and most of the question particles in Solf that I have discussed in this study), and whose pragmatic-particle function is not clearly delimited from its propositional meaning. These are then the peripheral members of the class of pragmatic particles.

Note, however, that the core pragmatic particles can still have homonyms which have a clear propositional content. But in these cases the pragmatic and propositional functions are clearly separate in nature, with no scalar relation between the two. This status of homonymity is what is being made use of in a joke like the following:

(5) A: You know, yesterday I really enjoyed myself!
B: No I don't, actually.

In Östman 1982b I suggested that English has, at least, the following set of central pragmatic particles:

<p>| | | | | |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-mean</td>
<td>you-know</td>
<td>why</td>
<td>oh</td>
<td>man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-guess</td>
<td>you-see</td>
<td>well</td>
<td>uh</td>
<td>blood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-say</td>
<td></td>
<td>like</td>
<td>ah</td>
<td>say</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.16. Central pragmatic particles in English.

and I also suggested a sub-classification of the peripheral pragmatic particles in English, using terms like 'aspect-
uals' (e.g. too, also, now, just), 'hedges' (e.g. kinda, sorta), 'epistemics' (e.g. I-suppose, I-think), 'supports' (e.g. yeah, uhu), and 'turn-takers' (e.g. anyway, okay).

For this tentative list and classification of pragmatic particles in English, I refer the reader to Östman 1982b.

Applying this classificatory system to the question particles in Solf would result in a classification of them as a subclass of peripheral pragmatic particles, which could be called 'information requesters' (cf. in English particles like huh?, ok?, and other tags). Thus, while in Solf the modality particles no, vel, fol, the relevance particle jo, and the emphatic particle noo would probably be classified as central pragmatic particles that are never obligatory from the point of view of truth-functionality, propositionality, or spatio-temporality (cf. 1.3.), the request particles elå, tå, and na are peripheral particles, and thus only potential implicit anchorers. Other particles extensively discussed in this chapter which would also be classified as peripheral include int and nö, whereas the particle då (and probably also tå då) would be central particles - although not necessarily with the aspect of request-making as their basic function. (Further studies are in need here.)

*  

Finally, the question particles in Solf also give information about how pragmatic particles develop diachronically in language.
The class of pragmatic particles is a pseudo-open class. The central members are relatively few, but pragmatic-particleness is peripherally dispersed in various directions (in terms of the center-periphery distinction). I would claim that there are basically two historical sources for pragmatic particles. One source is that they are related to homonymous adverbs, phrases, or other constructions. These are expressions that are most often explicit attitude anchorers, but which can in certain situations be used in a more implicit manner. And consequentially, their prototypical meaning/function might also gradually change.

For instance, the propositional meaning of Swedish säkert (Solf seekärt) is 'for sure.' But if I say (6)

(6) Han kommer säkert
    he comes for-sure

this can either mean that he is sure to come, or the opposite, viz. that I am not at all so sure that he will come. (The same can be said about varmasti in Finnish.)

Thus, in this case, an attitudinal adverbial might get additional, interactive or attitudinal, meanings that eventually overthrow their propositional meanings (or, as in most cases, we get clear homonyms).

The other source of pragmatic particles is the actual function of language itself, and can be illustrated with expressions like English wow, uhuh, and oh. It is interesting that expressions like these should get so conventionalized as to be peripheral, rather than central,
pragmatic particles. But oh, for instance, is a conventionalized representations of a kind of hesitation, and moreover, it follows fairly precise rules. (Cf. James 1972, 1973.) It is, in fact, conventionalized in the same way as any other sounds or forms mean specific things.

In this case, then, it is the context of situation itself (and the interactants within it) which supply the language with elements for expressing attitudes (usually accompanied by specific prosodies or gestures). 12

* 

In Chapter 1 I discussed the problems that this study set out to solve and in the beginning of this section I discussed some general implications for the study of questions that could be drawn on the basis of the analyses in Chapters 2 and 3.

More in particular, the analysis of question particles in Solf has shown that it might sometimes be worth while not to make one's analyses in terms of traditional linguistic abstractions, even at the abstraction level where we find concepts like syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. The analyst has to relate particular sentences to the situations in which they occur, in order to be able to decide whether speakers are making questions or not.

The question particles in Solf have to be treated as a subclass of the general class of pragmatic particles, which do not have a clearly specifiable propositional content in an utterance, but relate to aspects in the
situational context. But the question particles are not central pragmatic particles. They play a double role in language in that they are manifestations both of language seen as a structural system, and of language seen as goal-oriented action. And because neither a syntactico-semantic nor a pragmatic characterization of the question particles is necessary nor sufficient, the question particles have to be defined in prototype terms over syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic features of language. The question particles in Solf are manifestations of language as a communicative system, where language is seen as a Gestalt concept, rather than as a conglomerate of interacting abstractions.

3.6. Summary

In this chapter I have looked at the question particles in Solf in two related perspectives: from the point of view of discourse, and from the point of view of the community of Solf itself.

In section 3.1. I showed that the question particles behave in a manner similar to pragmatic particles in general in that the speaker can leave them out of his/her utterance for the purpose of making the propositional content more prominent. Support for this hypothesis was found in situations where a question which contains one or more particles get repeated by the same speaker. In Chapter
In the other sections of this chapter I discuss the question particles from the point of view of the Solf speaker in his/her communicative situations - both diachronically and synchronically. In section 3.2. I found a potential source for the occurrence of question particles in Solf: Finnish uses a grammaticized question particle. I was not, however, able to show that there was an unambiguous direct influence from Finnish in this area. But in the further discussion of *am*-constructions as questions I did find clear indications of Finnish influence. I concluded that the influence of Finnish on Solf - and on Finland Swedish in general - goes far beyond the area of prosody. As a further indication of the close relationship between the two cultures, we can note that there is a number of everyday words in Swedish, like those for 'boy,' and 'shoe' which have been borrowed from Finnish.

In the sections on sociolinguistic issues, I found that there are differences in the language of older and younger speakers as regards question formation; generally speaking, constructions with particles tend to be used more frequently by older speakers. I also found evidence of a difference in the use of question particles when correlated with the sex of the speaker.
Finally, the results of the psycholinguistic experiment discussed in section 3.4 clearly indicate that each of the question particles has particular pragmatic functions in the manner of pragmatic particles in general.
Footnotes to Chapter 3

1 Furthermore, Swedish *eller* is of Common Germanic origin, and is also found in Gothic (cf. Hellquist 1922).

Finnish has three words for 'or': *tai*, *vai*, and *eli*. Whereas *tai* and *vai* are used between alternatives, *eli* is used when the elements (words, phrases, sentences) surrounding it are synonyms. It may be, then, that the phonetic similarity between *eli* and *elä* has had an influence in the development of their meanings at some stage. And what is more, *eli* can also be used in a manner similar to the use of *elä* in Solf. Thus, we can imagine a situation where speaker A says *I've been abroad for two weeks*, and speaker B replies with (i).

(i) Eli et siis olisi pystynyt ryöstämään pankkiani or not thus should-be managed to-rob my-bank viime viikolla last week

'In other words, you would not have been able to rob my bank last week'

In the same manner as *elä* retains some of its sense of 'or,' even when it is used sentence finally, so also *eli* can be used to introduce an alternative - giving the (sometimes unjustified) implication that the alternatives are synonyms. For instance,

(ii) Onko sinulla jano, eli haluatko teetä?
    be-kO you thirst or want-you-kO tea

    'Are you thirsty, that is, would you like some tea?'

But note that *eli* cannot be used as a tag in the same way as *elä* (va). In Finnish, *vai* is used in tags:
(iii) Oletko ostanut uuden auton, vai?
be-you-kO bought new car or
'You've bought a new car, have you?'

Taking an even broader areal perspective, we can note finally that ili, 'or' in Russian is even more similar in function to elå than to eli. Ili can be used in all the senses of tai, vai, and eli, and also in tags: ili kak.

2It could then, of course, be argued that Swedish, too, since it uses the acute-gravis distinction for lexical purposes, should have an abundance of particles. However, recent studies of these issues indicate that it is primarily when they are said in isolation that words like anden 'the duck,' and anden 'the spirit' can be separated on the basis of their respective stress patterns. (Cf. Bruce 1977.)

3In Solf, the performative verb does not have to be frååga 'ask,' but can also be sej 'say.' Cf. the following utterance, where the say-verb is used explicitly.

(i) Ja segår vann vadan jer eje elå vann --
I say where from-where is this elå where
(+/F SOL80-JO9-2)
'I asked where, from where is this, then, or where..?'

4This analysis, or rather, the fact that you can have a matrix question starting with åm, is evidence against Bresnán's (1972) analysis of WH-words as belonging to the class of complementizers. One of her main arguments is precisely that whether and that do not show up in matrix clauses, and would thus be in complementary dis-
The category includes combinations of prosody plus y/n inversion. It is not perhaps quite correct to say that it is inversion only that makes these y/n questions interrogative. The constructions often contain, for instance, vocatives and other sentence-initial expressions, which help to indicate that what follows is a question. Also, several instances of y/n questions in the material are reflex-like repetitions of what another person has just said, as in the following exchange:

(i) A: Di haar . . .
    they have 'They have . . .' (-M ORI79-J02-1)
B: Haar di
    have they 'Have they?' (+F)

In Solf, such a repetition is a way of being polite and show one's interlocutor that one is attending.

The category includes combinations of prosody plus WH-fronting. A number of the constructions that have here been classified as WH-questions are one-word utterances of the form Va? 'what,' Vem? 'who,' and Vann? 'where-at?.' Some of these should no doubt be analyzed not as WH-questions, but as conventionalized markers meaning 'I'm sorry, I didn't hear that.' What makes the classification even more problematic is that va is also homophonous with the past form of the verb 'to be,' and with the weak form of the topic-introducing particle vaa.
This category refers to a set of constructions that all involve some kind of marked frontings, which are basically modifications of cleft formation. Some examples follow. Example (i) is an ordinary cleft sentence in question form.

(i) Va ede ede hyyse sām ni bodd ii
   was that that house which you lived in
   'Was that the house you lived in?'

As for the more marked cases, consider first (ii), which is not a question.

(ii) Men ho di talar he vejit ja jo int men --
   but how they speak it know I jo not but
   'But how they speak, that, of course, I don't know.'

This is not two tone units, and therefore I would not be inclined to treat Men ho di talar as a left dislocation, with he taking its place in the matrix sentence. The underlying structure is rather something like this:

\[
S_1 \text{ don't know (}C_{\text{comp}} \text{ it/that (}S_2 \text{ they speak Manner-Q)})
\]

WH-formation in \( S_2 \) gives 'How they speak'; this is fronted, to give 'How they speak I don't know it'; and, since this does not correspond to an acceptable sentence in Solf, the he 'it' is obligatorily fronted in the underlying \( S_1 \), giving 'How they speak it I don't know.'

Some examples involving question-formation follow.

(iii) Vann va e ni sāa ande lâppmarknan va
     where was it you said that flea-market was
     'Where did you say that flea-market was?'

From 'You said that flea-market was Place-Q' WH-fronting
would give Vann saa ni ande láppmarknan va?. But from this, vann 'where' is cleft into 'Where was it that ...'. In principle, the same thing happens in (iv).

(iv) Ho mytši va e e sko va ånv eje how much was it it should be of this (+M SOL80-J09-1)

'How much should it be of this?'

In (v) sentence chopping has really gone as far as it can,

(v) Teije koorten mejna dö mamm fråân Årinda these cards meant you mummy from Orinda (-M SOL80-J08-1)

'Did you mean these cards from Orinda, Mummy?'

and in (vi) something we can call 'back-inversion' has taken place.

(vi) Va saa dö je e millan what said you is it between (+M ORI79-J03-2)

'What did you say it was between?'

The sentence should have come out as Va saa dö e je millan?, but for some reason the Subject and the Verb have changed places. (We cannot treat Va saa dö as a prestarter, and the rest of the question as a direct question, because that would mean something very different, viz. 'Is it between?.' But maybe Va saa dö as a whole could be regarded as a WH-word, or maybe Va simply has two functions in the sentence: it is the Object both of Va saa dö? and of Va je e millan?.)

I am not claiming that these constructions are peculiar to the syntax of Solf, but rather that question formation in Solf is not straightforward in other areas either, and that constructions like these are frequently
used in the dialect. (For further details on the syntax of Solf, cf. Östman forthcoming c.)

The category includes requests in other languages than Solf and requests that were not easily classified, for instance, because of poor tape-recording quality.

The interactions between the Swedish- and Finnish-speaking population in Finland is a widely debated issue. It is clear that for a long time the two people lived side by side in all friendliness, the Finns being hunters and fishers, while the Swedes were mostly farmers. However, when Finland was part of Sweden (up till 1808) aristocratic Swedes immigrated from Sweden and were put to rule the land. This, of course, was bound to create dissatisfaction among both farmers, fishers, and hunters, and since the 'old,' farming Swedes were also Swedish speaking, problems between the two language groups must have ensued. During the latter part of the Russian period (1808-1917) the two language groups again became very close, which no doubt made the step toward independence (in 1917) much easier. However, up till (and somewhat beyond) the middle of this century, the two language groups have - mostly for political reasons - not been optimally intimate and friendly toward each other. But especially during the last twenty years, the attitudes toward the other group have become more positive in both quarters.
Cf. Searle's 1976 distinction between expressives, which indicate a psychological state, and directives. The former come close to my modality scale, and the latter to my request scale.

We encounter the same situation in the function of the particle you know: propositionally it indicates that the 'you' knows, but pragmatically it means just the opposite, namely that the 'you' most likely does not know (cf. Östman 1981a; and Chapter 4). But in the case of you know, the two homonyms (the propositional YOU + KNOW, and the pragmatic particle) are clearly distinct, and therefore I regard you know as a central pragmatic particle. In the case of särkert, however, it is not as easy to draw a similarly clear distinction between its two uses.

Ontogenetically, there also seem to be these two sources for pragmatic particles. As I have shown in Östman 1981a, a pragmatic particle like you know develops gradually out of a combination of the lexico-structural combination YOU + KNOW, whereas a pragmatic particle like I guess is learned as a set phrase, directly from contexts of situation, as a 'behavioral reflex.'
CHAPTER 4: QUESTION PARTICLES AND THE LEVEL ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction

In Chapter 1 I talked in very general terms about pragmatics as the study of language usage. I also indicated that I do not see any opposition between pragmatics on the one hand, and fields like sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and anthropological linguistics on the other hand. Rather, I see aspects of these latter areas of linguistic research as pertaining directly to how language is used, and they are therefore part of the general subject of pragmatics.

In my discussion of question particles in Solf I have had fairly little to say about their syntax and semantics. Syntax has come up only insofar as the data on particles have had some more general implications for syntactic research, and semantics I have tried to keep constant in terms of a general scale of requesting information. (Cf., however, section 2.4...) What I have tried to do, then, is to specify the situations under which it is acceptable to use one question particle, but not another. In other words, I have mostly dealt with the ways context influences the appropriate use of elements of language, and to that extent the discussion has also taken into account pragmatic aspects of language.

But what the discussion of the question particles and of pragmatic particles in general has lacked is a general
format. The characterizations have seemingly been done at random, where the analyst grabs anything that comes his/her way. Despite more than a decade's work on conversational implicatures, speech acts, presuppositions, and conversational analysis, there is still no general framework where all aspects of language use can be set in relation to each other.

On the basis of my discussion both of the particles as they appear in everyday conversations, and of the native speakers' responses in various experiments, it seems feasible to regard the pragmatic particles in Solf as drawing on, and relating to three basic areas of human behavior.

One of these areas emerges as a result of my finding that speakers' use of the various question particles can be related to their age and sex. A speaker has a particular role in his/her society, and s/he tends to follow the norms, or practices that other individuals with the same role behave in accordance with. This is determined by the culture of the society, where by 'culture' I do not necessarily mean large-scale cultures, but also, for instance, particular age groups. With respect to this area of human behavior, the individual speaker will tend to conform to, and be coherent with, what is expected of him/her in the community.

Another such area of human behavior has interaction in focus. At any particular point in his/her communicative
behavior, the speaker has to take his/her addressee, or audience into account. The communicative acts are most often directed to some other person(s). That being the case, the speaker has to adapt his/her acts to — among other things — the status and level of intelligence of his/her interlocutor, and to their degree of acquaintance. In the discussion of questions in Solf, I found that an ordinary question or statement without particles would tend to sound blunt and impolite, and, in general in Solf, the way to express any kind of request is in an implicit and indirect manner. With a general term, what the interlocutors in a conversation have to take into account is the aspect of politeness. The interactive aspects of language are, of course, those that in most detail have been dealt with in the pragmatic literature, in such terms as the co-operative principle, and conversational implicatures.

The third area of human behavior that has to be taken into account when we discuss aspects of the context that influence the use of language is the speaker him/herself. Depending on his/her particular attitudes and feelings, even prejudices, his/her communicative behavior will vary. We saw this in the results from my psycholinguistic experiment, when subjects were able to classify sentences as communicating friendliness, calmness, aggressiveness, or impatience, depending on what particles the sentences contained. In general, we can talk about this aspect as the extent to which the speaker communicates his/her in-
volvement in aspects of the context of situation in which s/he is when being an interlocutor.

The notion of coherence is most directly related to culture, and is structurally manifested for instance in textual cohesion. It also deals with geographical phenomena, and influences the characteristics of different discourse types: lies, word-plays, irony. The aspect of politeness is concerned with socio-interactive information and has a supermaxim of 'Avoid Confrontation!' as its most noticeable manifestation in our everyday lives. It deals not only with politeness, but also with violations of the Gricean maxims, and with the functions of social varieties of language, and to some extent also with geographical varieties. Involvement deals with emotional and attitudinal aspects of language and focuses on a speaker's psychological make up, and the speaker's preoccupation with him/herself. Together with politeness, this aspect is directly manifested for instance in planning and slips of the tongue. It is also concerned with psychological varieties of language, for instance, how, whether, and when to use a bureaucratic variant of English in a specific situation.

These three areas of human behavior are connected in three different ways. First, they are interrelated and interdependent: a certain type of involvement can show up as politeness, or vice versa, and aspects of politeness might be part of the coherence of a subculture, and coher-
ence with respect to, say, an age group may predetermine certain aspects of politeness, or involvement. Secondly, the communication of aspects of all three of them takes place in an implicit manner. In fact, if you try to communicate aspects of them explicitly, you are either talking about them by mentioning them, on a meta-level (in which case you would be using semantic propositions), or you are using manifestations of these areas (like honorifics), which have become conventionalized, and are therefore also part of semantics, in that they can be given semantic-content specifications. And thirdly, a speaker's utterances are hardly ever communicated in vacuo, but will be anchored to each of these three areas of human behavior simultaneously. Some aspect might stand out and be in focus in a particular situation, but these areas are all potentially present, for instance, in order to allow the addressee to draw necessary inferences.

I would like to suggest that these three areas of human behavior are also the primary parameters that influence language usage, and the basic categories according to which pragmatic phenomena should be classified, and through which they can be explained. In effect, in this view, (especially implicit) pragmatics as a whole can be talked about as the field of Implicit Anchoring. These three areas I regard as the most important (macro-) parameters that govern the interactive rules of communication. All of them together give reasons for how, when, and
whether to speak, and thus specify the interactive possibilities of language (cf. R. Lakoff 1981; Östman 1981a).

4.2. Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement

In this section I want to give some examples of the linguistic manifestations of the three pragmatic parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. The examples will largely be taken from areas that are closely connected with my discussion of question particles in Chapters 2 and 3. I will not in this study dwell on the theoretical aspects of the parameters. For a detailed account of these, see Östman forthcoming d.

A linguistic choice can anchor the communicative act explicitly or implicitly or both. At word level, explicit anchoring is done by means of propositional content words. A word can explicitly anchor a communicative act not only to objects, activities, qualities, but also to situations (with deictic terms), to persons (with pronouns), to points or spans of time (with tense and temporal adverbials), and to attitudes (with attitudinal adverbials). An implicitly anchored choice, on the other hand, cannot be given an explanation in propositional terms, but is to be related to (either or some of) the three parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. From the point of view of implicit pragmatics, a speaker anchors his/her utterance to a coherent context.
(and co-text), to his/her social relations to his/her addressee(s), and to his/her internal attitudes and emotions. There is always some context present beforehand for every utterance, but elements and constructions themselves also bring in new contexts. Pragmatics, then, is concerned with the anchoring of utterances along the three axes of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement.

The linguistic choices that speakers make in order to communicate (or avoid communicating) their discourse intentions can fruitfully be related to and analyzed with reference to the three parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. Linguistic choices can be made simultaneously with respect to (all or some of) the three interdependent parameters. A particular linguistic choice can highlight one (aspect of a) parameter more than the others.

4.2.1. Coherence

Coherence is defined as that principle of pragmatics which deals with how the choice of a linguistic element contributes to establishing (or maintaining, or changing) the function (in the sense of function/text of Nichols 1984) of a discourse, or part of a discourse, as a whole. Coherence is the dynamic principle, and what we see on the surface as the product is held together by cohesive manifestations of that principle.

Whereas text linguists and conversational analysts
tend to see coherence and cohesion as different sides of the same coin of textuality (cf. Östman 1978b, Enkvist 1978), Coherence in the present approach is a more general notion, of which cohesion (in the sense of Halliday & Hasan 1976) is just a particular manifestation. Utterances do not occur in vacuo, but are part of (larger-scale) discourses and contexts. The pragmatic parameter of Coherence not only gives the causes for the surface relations between utterances, but also, and in particular, it deals with the relation of an utterance to its context.

The pragmatic parameter of Coherence can be seen as accounting for the implicit, common-sensical rules in accordance with which human beings (intuitively) adjust themselves to this world - in short, according to which they live. (Cf. Margolis 1984, Ziff 1984.) In the final instance, this means that Coherence stands for what we generally refer to as culture. Note, however, that culture is not an undifferentiated whole. The large-scale concept culture that denotes a speech community with shared norms and evaluations includes a hierarchy of norms on a smaller scale: social class constraints, etiquette and tact constraints, restraints on how to tell a story, on how to partake in a conversation, and even on how to form an utterance. Speakers can invoke and implicitly refer to the pragmatic parameter of Coherence at different levels on this hierarchy. (Cf. Östman forthcoming d, and Chapter 5 below.)
As an illustration, we can have a brief look at pragmatic particles in different languages, and see how they can signal and establish the Coherence of a discourse. With respect to the pragmatic parameter of Coherence, a pragmatic particle can perform at least the following six different functions.

1. Turn-signalling. A pragmatic particle can function as a means for getting the floor, for keeping the floor, or as an indication that the speaker wants to give the floor to somebody else. In Östman 1981a I suggested that in addition to its other functions, you know also has this as one of its more prominent functions. (The turn-signalling function of pragmatic particles has been dealt with extensively by ethnomethodologists, conversational analysts, and students of narrative structure.)

   Applied to my discussion of question particles in Chapters 2 and 3, we see that all the particles have a floor-yielding function by virtue of them being question particles, and that the use of elå in particular has this pragmatic function.

2. Preparedness. A pragmatic particle can function as a hesitation phenomenon. Hardly any particle, however, has as its only function to be hesitational. Rather, what a speaker does by using a hesitational device is to create redundancy, and hedge, at the same time as s/he is planning his/her idea units, and thus indicating the amount of preparation s/he has made for the inter-
action. In my data on question particles in Solf, I found that \textit{elå} can be used with a force similar to the English \textit{I mean}, and utterance-final pronouns - when they are repetitions in the sense discussed in section 2.3.6. - can be relied on to indicate the subject of an utterance unambiguously. The particles \textit{Vaa} and \textit{Va sko ja sej} which I briefly mentioned, signal both an attempt to get the floor, and at the same time indicate that the speaker has not planned his/her utterance in detail yet.

3. Discourse or story markers. Longacre 1979 has shown that in certain languages a coherent paragraph would have certain verbal, particle-like markers - either at the beginning or at the end, or both. Particles can also be used to indicate the beginning or end of a story or discourse as a whole, in the openings and closings of the discourse. And also, particles can be used to foreground certain aspects of a text, to indicate that one part is more important than surrounding parts, which are backgrounded, or non-foregrounded, or simply digressions. (Cf. also Labov 1972, Tannen 1979, Chafe 1980, Hopper 1979, Enkvist 1972, Wårvik 1984, Östman 1982b.) With regard to my discussion of question particles, we saw that \textit{tå} and \textit{då} behaved differently with respect to introducing new topics into a discourse.

4. Dialect and identity markers. Pragmatic particles can also function to identify speakers. This function of pragmatic particles is the only one that with some
justification can be described as an 'unnecessary' use of particles. But since they are identity or dialect markers, they are not really unnecessary, after all. (Cf. Even-Zohar's 1978 discussion of the use of this strategy in one of Dostoyevsky's novels.)

5. Sociolinguistic and style markers. In my discussion of the question particles in Solf, it was obvious that the use, or kind of use, of a particular particle was - at least to some extent - indicative of the speakers age, and possibly also his/her sex. In Östman 1982b I showed how pragmatic particles could be relied on for author identification.

6. Relevance marking. The maxim of relevance is perhaps the most important of Grice's maxims. Relevance links up with foregrounding, and a particle can indicate the relative relevance of an utterance. (Cf. discussions of the relevance particle -han in Finnish by Hakulinen 1976.) In a sense the 'focus particle' -kin (propositionally 'too, also') in Finnish also pragmatically says that something (i.e. what is inside its scope) is relevant to the on-going discussion. But sometimes this pragmatic function is highlighted, and there is no 'focus' meaning associated with -kin (cf. Östman 1977). (On relevance in discourse, cf. also Holdcroft forthcoming.) As an example of this function in my data, notice that I said that the particle då questions the appropriate identification of a phrase, and thus the
relevance of the referent of that phrase. I also mentioned the relevance particle *jo* briefly, which indicates that what the speaker says is obvious, and its obviousness is relevant to the issue at hand.

The importance of Coherence is best seen when it is not adhered to, or perhaps rather, when its manifestations are not the ones we would expect. Thus, in the area of foreign-language teaching and learning, a neglect of Coherence results in difficulties for non-native speakers in everyday situations, and indicate the importance not only of communicative, but also of cultural competence. Coherence is something you grow up in, something that an outsider can only learn indirectly - through cohesion. To have complete communicative, or cultural competence in more than one language is rare. But - paradoxically perhaps - to have cultural competence in any L2 just to a certain degree is even more difficult. You can sound and be as if you knew how to behave in a different culture, but very often such behavior is - in the last instance - mimicry of the behavior displayed on the surface (i.e. cohesively) in that L2 culture.

4.2.2. Politeness

Politeness is defined as that principle of pragmatics which deals with how the choice of a linguistic element contributes to establishing (changing, maintaining) the
social relation between speaker and addressee/audience. The function of an element along this parameter is that of function/event (cf. Nichols 1984): it concerns the status and roles of interactants. 'Politeness,' then, is the term I use to refer specifically to human interaction and interactional relations.

In a conversation the speaker and the addressee (constantly interchanging roles) always have to take each other into account. They both have to keep constant track of the other. Human interaction and co-operation is governed by the two principles of face-saving and solidarity (cf. Östman 1981a, 1982a): the two counterbalancing forces that tend to restrict the behavior of a speaker to what is socially and situationally acceptable, while at the same time allowing him/her to save face in the presence of his/her interlocutor(s). The speakers have to find the appropriate balance between expressing their own needs, and taking those of the addressee into account. And they have to control their speech and communicative behavior in accordance with this.

A speaker's management of his/her interactional relations is realized as strategies of Politeness. In any situation, and at any point in that situation, a speaker has to choose what s/he considers to be the most appropriate strategy of interaction.

Dissatisfied with the Gricean Cooperative principle and its maxims as a description of actually occurring
interactional behavior, Robin Lakoff (1975) formulated the following three Rules of politeness.

------------------------
1. Keep aloof! (Formality)
2. Give options! (Deferece)
3. Show sympathy! (Camaraderie)
------------------------

**Table 4.1. Robin Lakoff's Rules of politeness.**

These are conceived of as alternative strategies of interaction (although Rule 2 can be combined with either of the other two). In later writings, Lakoff talks about these rules as 'stylistic strategies.' A speaker can choose to use any one of these at a particular point in a conversational interaction.

In Lakoff 1979 four stylistic strategies are distinguished. These strategies (with brief specifications) are given in Table 4.2.

------------------------
Clarity (Impersonal)
Distance (Formal politeness, designed to impute authority)
Deferece (Don't impose; give options!)
Camaraderie (Show sympathy!)
------------------------

**Table 4.2. Robin Lakoff's stylistic strategies.**

These strategies make up a frame of reference for Politeness. Whenever you want to talk or write to somebody, you start by choosing the strategy of Politeness you find most appropriate. The strategy of Politeness you have chosen initially for a conversation can be changed during
the interaction, but such a change almost inevitably has to be made in an explicit manner. For instance, a change from Distance to Deference Politeness can be made through a mutual agreement to switch from surnames to first names. In British English this would typically be accomplished by saying, for instance, 'By the way, I'm Bill,' or 'Do you mind if I call you Bill?,' or even 'Let's use first names!.'

The strategy of Clarity is not really part of interaction, since if a speaker chooses to follow this strategy s/he also chooses not to take the addressee into account at all. (Thus, the term Clarity itself is a misnomer from the point of view of the addressee. The clarity expressed is not a communicative clarity, but a clarity that is achieved through following the rule-governed, prescriptive norms of the language.) A speaker following the strategy of Clarity focuses on his/her message itself, with little interest as to whether that message gets rightly understood by an addressee or not. This is basically the strategy defined by H. P. Grice's (1975) maxims and co-operative principle. The co-operative principle of course has the advantage of forming a frame of reference for communication, but it is a frame of reference from which any ordinary conversation will depart - to varying degrees.² (That is, the co-operative principle is set up to have the same value for interaction as logical formulae have for the structural description of language.)
The remaining three strategies (cf. the Rules in Table 4.1.) are then the strategies of Politeness in communicative interaction. The Distance (or Formality) and the Camaraderie strategies constitute extreme end-points on this hierarchy of Politeness. Although people may often strive towards attaining relationships with other people in which they could use these strategies, such relationships are in fact very rare. In present-day Western society (which is what my discussion mostly is concerned with; cf., however, Östman forthcoming d, Silverstein 1979) any (especially unconditional and absolute) reference to power (which is what the strategy of Distance is based on) is more and more seldom met with in interpersonal relations. Similarly, to gain a complete Camaraderie relationship with another human being, you need to be psychological twins. Thus, if we want to be precise, we should rather see the strategies of Politeness as forming the following hierarchy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLARITY</th>
<th>DISTANCE</th>
<th>DISTANCE/DEFERENCE (i.e., Distance in practice)</th>
<th>FORMAL DEFERENCE</th>
<th>INFORMAL DEFERENCE</th>
<th>CAMARADERIE/DEFERENCE (i.e. conventional Camaraderie)</th>
<th>CAMARADERIE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 4.3. Strategies of Politeness.

In Table 4.3. I have also included a distinction between Formal and Informal Deference. (For discussions,
What we end up with, then, as choices of interactive Politeness are different kinds of Deference. Code switching takes place in interpersonal communication as it does with respect to dialects and soci-oelects. Thus, when a speaker needs to use two Politeness strategies simultaneously, with different people in the audience, or for specific purposes, s/he can switch between using one Politeness variant (e.g. Formal Deference) for his/her public, out-group relations, and another variant (e.g. Informal Deference or Camaraderie/Deference) for his/her home and peer-group relations. (Cf. also Gumperz 1982:84, and 5.2. below.)

What, then, are the cues that we as interlocutors rely on for our understanding of other speakers' attempts to convey interactional information to us? Again, as in the case of manifestations of the parameter of Coherence, there is no one set of devices from which we can pick out a 'Clarity-marker' or a 'Camaraderie-marker.' The markers are different in different types of discourse: sometimes the strategy of Politeness can be communicated through prosodic features (cf. Silverman, Scherer & Ladd 1983), sometimes through the use of certain particles, and sometimes through changes in word order or through other syntactic re-arrangements. This is what makes Politeness and strategy-marking implicit.

With reference to the functions of pragmatic particles we can simply say that a pragmatic particle can
indicate the strategy a speaker uses in a conversation; or, as in the case of *you know* (cf. Östman 1981a), the speaker signifies that although s/he realizes that at present the communication is carried on within Informal Deference, s/he would not mind using a Camaraderie/Deference strategy - if this is acceptable to the interlocutor.

Within a particular strategy of Politeness a particle can also indicate what aspect it highlights from the following tentative list. (This list is simultaneously a list of what I see as an inventory of the universal - as opposed to language-specific - aspects of interaction, cf. Östman forthcoming d.)

1. **Formality vs. informality**

   When you choose to be 'polite' (in the traditional sense) and show deference to your interlocutor(s), you have a further (scalar) choice of either being neutrally deferent, that is, being *informally* deferent and simply see to it that you do not create any offence; or, you can choose to follow the society's rules of etiquette more precisely, and be *formally* deferent. Formality is what the society sanctions to be the deference norm. But this norm will of course vary from one culture to another - and even within a culture. That is, the members of a society might conceive of the norm of politeness in different ways. For some groups or individuals, informality is taken to be the deference norm.
2. Impoliteness (rudeness)

This aspect is related to the first parameter in the sense that if you do not follow the norms that prevail in the society, the other members of the society will characterize you as impolite or rude. In general, speaker X will tend to characterize as 'polite' or 'impolite' the utterances of speaker Y on the basis of the extent to which speaker Y communicates in accordance with what speaker X thinks is appropriate.

3. ME-first and YOU-importance

A person's view of him/herself in this world starts out from his/her own point of view. S/he regards the surroundings from where s/he stands in terms of certain conventionalized characteristics of his/her being. Our prototypical ways of being situated and behaving in this world determines an a priori orientation, or perspective, with respect to which we view everything around us. This is the I-here-now perspective, or our zero-point (cf. Lyons 1977).

In their discussion of freezes (binomial expressions) like here and there, now and then, Cooper & Ross (1975) found that this conventional view that speakers have of themselves in the world is reflected in such freezes. The first element (noun, adjective, verb, preposition) in binomial expressions very commonly refers to EGO, here, now, upright position (cf. up and down), forward looking, etc. This state of affairs Cooper & Ross labelled the ME-
FIRST PRINCIPLE. We can relate this to the face-saving aspect of communicative interaction that I mentioned earlier.

There are, however, a number of very commonly used freezes that go against this principle, for instance you and me and ladies and gentlemen (cf. man and woman, boy and girl). To account for these I argued in Östman 1981a that there is another principle in our way of looking at the world that pulls in the opposite direction. This principle I have called the YOU-IMPORTANCE PRINCIPLE. The YOU-importance principle comes into play when we interact with other people, and take them into account.

4. Power and Solidarity

This aspect is similar to the previous one, but it relates more directly to social status on the power end of the scale, and at the other end of the scale, solidarity relates to 'you and me,' rather than to 'you' - as in the YOU-importance principle.

5. Intimacy

This aspect has to do with showing (mutual) feelings and emotions in a particular interaction - and thus connects up with the pragmatic parameter of Involvement. Intimacy forms a gradient scale of more - less, and is to some extent complementary to the power-solidarity scale.

6. Directness and indirectness

Conversational directness has to do with expressing oneself directly and to the point, more or less in accord-
ance with the Gricean maxims. In normal interactional situations, however, we tend to employ a certain degree of indirectness. Conversational indirectness is employed as a strategy to mitigate the effect of an utterance, and thus to avoid confrontation. Linguistically, such confrontation avoidance is typically realized as discourse-regulating hedges. (Cf. R. Lakoff 1980; Östman 1982a.)

Semantically speaking, a pragmatic particle like I guess looks very much like an epistemic adverb, comparable to probably, or a modal, superordinate sentence like I suppose. But to be able to use I guess, the relation between the participants has to be of a certain kind. You cannot use I guess in any odd situation. (It would not, for instance, be good policy to use I guess in an exam answer.) Thus, it seems that whereas the function of you know can primarily be related to a scale of Indirectness, I guess is an expression that primarily functions on, and highlights aspects of, a scale of Intimacy.

Now, if we want to find the meaning and functions of a pragmatic particle like you know, we can start by setting up a prototypical, of necessity rather abstract semantic characterization. In Östman 1981a (p.17) I suggested the following general meaning of you know:

a. The speaker strives towards getting the addressee to cooperate and/or to accept the propositional content of his utterance as mutual background knowledge.

Such an 'and/or' characterization is perhaps not wholly...
satisfactory (cf. Schourup 1984), so we can perhaps say that semantically

b. The speaker wants to imply that the propositional content is mutual knowledge.

and that as a pragmatic consequence on a very general level, this can be interpreted as
c. An attempt by the speaker to get cooperation from the addressee.

The basic point here is that you know does not primarily relate to any utterance, or utterance sequence. It relates to the relationship between the speaker and the hearer. It functions as an implicit indicator of the relationship among speaker and addressee, rather than as an indicator of the speaker's relationship to his utterance.

In Östman 1981a I also pointed out that you know has a number of sub-functions. The basic idea here is that if we find an occurrence of you know that we would like to describe as having a turn-taking function, this as such is not the meaning of you know: any other item could probably have been used as a turn-taker, but the fact that you know in particular is used indicates not only turn-taking but also the more general relationship between the speaker and his/her addressee, as suggested in a – c above.

Turning now to the question particles in Solf, we can note that elå is a typical Informal-Deference particle, in that it can be interpreted as giving the addressee the right to disconfirm, or even oppose, the propositional

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content (or even form) of a speaker's elå-utterance. Also, we saw that då was the particle that was judged as being 'most polite' in the experiments discussed in 3.4.. This, I suggest, can most naturally be interpreted as an indicator that the strategy of Formal Deference is used in the conversation. Informal, rather than Formal, Deference would be the norm - and neutral strategy - in Solf. Thus, if speakers indicate that an utterance containing då is 'polite,' to use that particle would seem to indicate a movement in the direction of Distance/Deferece. Notice also that då was typically associated with indications of 'opposition' or 'contrariness' (cf. 2.3.2.2. and 2.3.2.3.).

4.2.3. Involvement

Whereas Coherence and Politeness have been dealt with from several points of view in the linguistic literature, not much attention has so far been paid to what I regard as the third parameter of pragmatics, that of Involvement.

In general terms, I define Involvement as that principle of pragmatics which deals with how the choice of a linguistic element contributes to expressing the speaker's feelings, attitudes, and prejudices toward the topic of discourse, the situation, and/or the addressee.

Involvement, attitudes, and emotions include all those uses of language that in some sense or other are governed by the speaker's feelings, towards the addressee,
towards the situation, or towards some other aspect of the world outside - for whatever purpose: to manipulate or persuade somebody of something, to express prejudices, or just to create togetherness (or antipathy). Such expressions of feelings, attitudes, and prejudices are - for obvious reasons - usually expressed in an implicit manner.

Involvement is perhaps the most implicit parameter of pragmatics. This is so, because whereas aspects of Coherence and Politeness have to some extent become ritualized - and are easily recognized as rituals, the ways to express emotions and attitudes implicitly seem idiosyncratic and difficult to pin down. In fact, some linguists would even hold that the Involvement that a speaker indicates in his message is not part of the meaning of that message, but ancillary to it: Involvement aspects can be left out of an utterance without change of meaning. But this is true only if we accept as language nothing but explicitly transmitted information. What such an approach misses is the implicit information about how the speaker intends a particular message to be understood and interpreted.

Below is a tentative list of the contextual aspects that are bound to influence the speaker's relative Involvement in his communicative act.

1. **The context of situation.** Are the interactants alone? What are their respective roles? Do they have a consider-
able amount of shared background knowledge? What is the status of their verbal (and non-verbal) interaction? Are there relevant extra-linguistic objects that have to be taken into consideration? Does the particular cultural context set constraints on the amount of Involvement that is allowed?

2. The topic of the discourse. What issues are at stake? Is the settlement of the topic relevant outside the present discussion (see 'consequence' below)?

3. The medium. Written language requires more planning (which is one important manifestation of Involvement) in order to exclude potential ambiguities. Thus, as neutral (or non-neutral, if that is your purpose) words and phrases as possible tend to be chosen in written texts. (Cf. Östman in print.)

4. The time lapse. This links up with medium. The longer time lapse that is possible between a speaker's message and an addressee's response, the more planning the speaker needs to undertake, and - most likely - the more uninvolved the message will become.

5. Concern for interlocutor(s). Within this aspect we can distinguish at least the following factors (cf. Robin Lakoff MS):
   a. visibility: can the interlocutors see one another, and thus rely on, and make reference to non-verbal means of communication?
   b. reciprocity: is the relationship between the inter-
locutors of the solidarity- and camaraderie-type: can the speakers interchange roles at will, without creating offense?

c. formality: do the speakers have a (conscious) need to follow the society's rules of etiquette (Formal Deference), or is adherence to our sense of tact (Informal Deference) enough?

d. spontaneity: can the speakers be spontaneous, and know that they can rely on instant feedback to set things straight in case either participant breaks an unwritten rule of interaction?

e. empathy: can the speakers fully rely on each other? Do they see communication as what Robin Lakoff (MS) calls "a joint endeavor," or do they employ the Conduit metaphor (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980) of sending messages to one another, even struggling to get messages sent in a way to impress the interlocutor?

f. consequence: does the interaction have any potential effect beyond the immediate situation? Are there witnesses, or tape-recorders present during the conversation? Can you at a later stage be held responsible for what you have said?

6. The speaker's state of mind. The extent to which the speaker has a bad day can make him/her uninterested in expressing his/her emotions and attitudes implicitly.

Involvement as such is not affected by these factors: either you are involved with your topic, situation, inter-
locutor, or yourself, or you are not. But these factors influence the expression of Involvement.

With reference to the discussion of question particles in Solf, we saw that reference to feelings is made when we indicate whether a particle indicates calmness, aggressiveness, positive or negative attitude, etc. In the discussion in 3.4. we saw, for instance, that då came out as the 'least involved' of the particles, and that elå proved to be the one that communicates the clearest positive feelings.

On a modality scale of Certain --- Uncertain we can also indicate the pragmatic Involvement of a speaker. As we saw in the case of säkert in 3.5., the pragmatic specification does not have to be the same as the semantic specification. Cf. also the discussion in 3.4. as regards the behavior of the question particles in Solf with reference to the modality scale.

Involvement can also be expressed by prosodic means. A general finding in this area is that the more pitch variation there is in an utterance, and the wider the pitch range is, the more expressive the utterance is.

The parameter of Involvement is also needed as a reference point when, say, a speaker uses devices to imply that something is foregrounded information where there are no real Coherence reasons for this. That is, when the speaker emits his/her message as if it was worth foregrounded status.
We also see the need for having a parameter of Involvement to account for the grammaticality and acceptability of a sentence like

(1) If she says that again, I'll hit the bitch.

where she is naturally interpreted as being coreferential with the bitch. Notice that the coreferential interpretation is more natural in (1) than it is in (2).

(2) If she says that again, I'll hit the girl.

Although this is in need of further study, one reasonable hypothesis would be that it is the attitudinal feature of the word bitch that makes the coreferential interpretation the preferred one in example (1). (However, it is not clear that it is only Involvement that is at stake here. Certain words - like bitch and bastard - have this property, but other similar words - like criminal - do not.)

We also find statements in the literature to the effect that the difference in meaning between near-synonyms like (3) and (4) will be accounted for in terms of them having different implicatures.

(3) John kissed the girl.
(4) It was John who kissed the girl.

This is true as far as it goes, but the theory of implicatures does not say how to account for the difference in meaning. The reason, again, has to do with the degree to which the speaker is involved in what s/he is saying, and Involvement is not accounted for in the theory of implicatures.
We see the interrelation of Involvement with the other two parameters in the choices speakers make with respect to whether the audience is part of one's peer group or not. Thus, Gumperz (1982:83) has shown that the 'we' code is used to reflect involvement, whereas the 'they' code is used to indicate the speaker's objectification and distance in code switching among bilinguals. But such switches are not restricted to bilingual speakers. Similarly, we have to draw on Coherence together with Involvement in explaining the fact that a sentence like (5) can either be a positive statement (by an admirer), or a negative statement (by a detractor). (From Levinson 1983:110.)

(5) Queen Victoria was made of iron.

* 

In his discussion of the differences between spoken and written discourse, Chafe (1979, 1982) sets up a scale that focuses on the 'involvement' and 'detachment' of the speaker/writer in his text. (Cf. also Kay 1977, Tannen 1980.)

-----------------------------------------------

involvement ------------------- detachment

-----------------------------------------------

Figure 4.1. Chafe's scale of involvement and detachment.

(Notice that my use of the term Involvement includes reference to Chafe's scale as a whole, i.e. both to aspects of his 'involvement,' and aspects of 'detachment,' in the
same manner as my use of the term Politeness also includes reference to aspects of rudeness.)

Chafe (1981, 1982) has suggested that involvement and detachment have more or less direct, prototypical manifestations in the linguistic expression. The grammatical constructions that can be argued to be typically indicative of detachment are given in Table 4.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DETACHMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>passives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nominalizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-Agent type Subjects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>precision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past perfects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indirect quotations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>literary vocabulary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indirect questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conservative language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lack of contractions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4. Features of detachment.

These devices "serve to distance the language from specific concrete states and events." (Chafe 1982:45).

Whereas detachment from the audience is typical for a writer, involvement with the audience is typical for a speaker. The list in Table 4.5. includes the main constructions that are typical instantiations of involvement.
IN INVOLVEMENT

first-person references
reference to speaker's mental processes
- processes while talking (e.g. I can recall)
- processes in the past (e.g. I had no idea; I thought)
fuzziness (due to fuzzy knowledge or difficulty in finding appropriate words), manifested as hedges and vagueness (and so on; something like; sort of)
monitoring of information flow
- you know, I mean, well, oh, so, anyway
- evidentials
- speech-act substitution
emphasis: emphatic particles (really, just)
direct quotations
second-person reference
first name
negations
colloquial vocabulary and pronunciation
tense: historical present in narrative
empty pronouns
precision: illustration
concreteness and imageability
actions and Agents emphasized

Table 4.5. Features of involvement.

Most of these devices are implicit\(^3\) in the sense that the feelings of detachment and involvement that they express are transmitted as 'extra' information, as information about how the speaker relates to his audience, and how the addressee is supposed to understand his content message. These devices are also implicit in the sense that it would be unlikely (I do not say impossible) that somebody would be convicted of a crime simply on the basis of having used a passive construction or a nominalization instead of an active transitive clause to show his/her detachment in a situation, or from a particular person.

Labov 1972 has touched on similar issues in dis-
cussions of evaluative elements in (Black English) narratives. Whereas Labov's definition of evaluation is highly restricted to his interest in narratives ('evaluation' stands for the means used by the narrator to indicate the point of the narrative), Tannen 1980 defines evaluation more broadly, as the speaker's indication of his/her attitudes towards his/her material.

Both Labov and Tannen make a distinction between external and internal evaluation (although the concept 'internal evaluation' is not as such used by Labov). External evaluation involves an explicit metacommunication of the speaker's feelings towards his/her text, for instance, an utterance like *This was terrible!* Internal evaluation is expressed by paralinguistic features; pauses; intonation, pitch, speech rate, and loudness variations; laughter; lexical choice; etc. (Cf. my distinction between explicitness and implicitness in language use.)

No meanings are probably wholly objective, but associations and connotations, we feel, are even more subjective than lexical meanings, which can be indicated for instance as conglomerates of semantic features. It is important to note, however, that the connotative, evaluative, or affective meaning is not something that can easily (if at all) be spliced off from the objective propositional-content meaning of a word. What, for instance, would be the propositional content of words like *good* and *bad*, that could be distinguished from their
affective, evaluative meanings? Affective meaning, then, does not lie outside language proper — it is always present in some form.

Still, it is a rather typical tendency even in much of present-day linguistics to regard the emotions, attitudes, connotations, and evaluations that can be found embedded in phrases and words as idiosyncratic and constantly changing aspects of language. Consequently, it is argued that these aspects are not to be treated as part of meaning, if indeed as part of the subject matter of linguistics. Thus, Palmer (1976:64) argues as follows.

It is sometimes suggested that words become associated with certain characteristics of the items to which they refer. Thus woman has the connotation 'weak' and pig the connotation 'dirty'. . . . Strictly, however, this is not a matter of the meaning of words or even of meaning in general. It rather indicates that people (or some people) believe that women are weak and pigs dirty.

And still, a couple of sentences earlier (p. 63) Palmer argues that connotation "is not usefully distinguished from cognitive meaning." In my view, if a particular feature of a word — be it connotative or denotative — is associated with that word in the minds of native speakers, then this should suffice to make that feature count as part of the meaning of the word. (Thus, I would say that when people believed that the earth was flat, then flatness was a part of the meaning of The earth). Cf. also 6.2.)
The research that Charles Osgood and his collaborators (cf. Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum 1957, Osgood, May & Miron 1975) have done over the years should be ample evidence to indicate that affective meanings are not only idiolectal and idiosyncratic. I will not here go into any details about Osgood's SD-technique, but its usefulness for the Involvement parameter of pragmatics cannot be overlooked. (In Östman in print I show how reference to the Evaluation, Potency, and Activity values of words can help us find the locus of implicit Involvement in language.)

4.3. The Level Analysis

I see it as the task of pragmatics to specify the constraints there are on human interpretation not only of linguistic systems, but also of language as an instance of human behavior. It is also, of course, interesting if the analyst's devices can be made to predict certain aspects of language use. But this does not mean that prediction of what is (or will be) used (and how what is used will be evaluated, and what effect it will have) should be seen as the ultimate goal of pragmatics. (Cf. also Gumperz 1982:30.) The most we can, and should, hope for in this area is to come up with what conversational analysts call 'preference organization' of linguistic behavior.

Out of the extra-linguistic factors that influence
our use of language I have in this Chapter abstracted out three pragmatic parameters, those of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. As I have pointed out repeatedly, these are interdependent parameters, to which we implicitly anchor the utterances we produce.

Coherence is drawn on when the choice of a word or structure is evaluated in relation to the extent to which that word or structure fits the text or discourse at hand. A choice made with respect to the parameter of Coherence contributes to establishing the coherence, or function, of the discourse, or part of a discourse, as a whole.

Choices made with respect to the parameter of Politeness contributes to establishing the social relation between speaker and addressee and/or the speaker's audience. Politeness is the notion I use to talk about what goes on between people as individuals, in specific situations. There is a number of interactively relevant aspects that can be thought of as universally operative (although to different degrees in different cultures) due simple to the (physical) confrontation of two or more individuals: power, solidarity, intimacy, formality, and so on. (Cf. 4.2.2..) A particular culture would tend to interpret these aspects as forming a hierarchy of more or less 'politeness.' And it is with reference to our particular interpretation of Politeness as a hierarchy with Clarity and Camaraderie as end-points that linguistic manifestations of
Politeness should be seen. Politeness is closely connected to Coherence in many ways, most directly through the concept of a society's Politeness norm.

Choices made with respect to the parameter of Involvement contributes to expressing the speaker's attitudes toward the topic, the situation, or the addressee. Whereas Coherence and Politeness theoretically can be experienced more directly as being 'outside' the individual, Involvement is to be sought within people. A speaker's Involvement in his/her topic, or in the situation at hand, is also closely related to that speaker's sense of his/her Coherence and Politeness behavior. In 4.2.3. I gave a list of factors that influence whether or not you are involved: topic, situation, state of mind, and so on. In addition to the list in 4.2.3. I here want to suggest a tentative list of aspects of Involvement that specify the constraints on the direction and type of Involvement of a linguistic choice.

1. Degree of Involvement, in terms of a scale of Emotions - Attitudes - Prejudices.
2. Involvement - detachment, as discussed in 4.2.3.
3. Positive - Negative feelings, with at least the following two sub-classes: (a) Friendliness; and (b) Calmness (cf. 3.4.).
4. Affective meaning, in terms of Osgood's universal categories of Evaluation, Potency, and Activity, together with his concept of Polarity force.
5. Certainty, seen as a scale of modality, but manifested in an implicit manner.

6. Expressive meaning, with the sub-classes (a) focus; (b) contrast; and (c) emphasis. (Cf. Östman in print.)

7. Planning indicates the psychological problems the speaker has with linguistic organization, of both content and form. It is related to preparedness under Coherence, and has at least the following two sub-classes: (a) topic break; and (b) specification. (Cf. Östman in print.) Typical manifestations of planning include (filled or empty) pauses, false (or 'true') starts, anacoloutha, repetitions, slips of the tongue, (verbal, or even non-verbal) gestures, and/or pragmatic particles.

8. Sincerity. Is the speaker sincere or not in his/her expression of Involvement?

The impetus for the preceding theoretical discussion came from a desire to circumscribe functional issues in language from the 'outside,' from human behavior in general, rather than extending the apparatus of theories based on the structure of language. The three parameters I have set up are intuitive⁴ if language is seen as an aspect of human behavior in general, and the obvious claim I am making is that our linguistic choices are constrained by the workings of these parameters. These parameters I thus conceive of as jointly constituting what I have called Implicit Pragmatics.

*
In Chapters 2 and 3 I discussed the varied properties of question formation in Solf from a number of different points of view, and came to the conclusion that there is no existing framework in terms of which these properties can coherently (and in an intuitively satisfying manner) be described. In this chapter I have set up the kind of framework that a description of pragmatic phenomena require. The discussions in the three chapters now need to be brought together. We need a way to represent the pragmatic information of utterances and texts, and we need to show how the system can be applied to the description of the functions of question particles in Solf. In this section I will deal with the former of these tasks.

In section 4.2.2. I gave what I see as the basic function and sub-functions of the pragmatic particle you know (based on Östman 1981a). In that discussion I stated that the basic problem for semantic analyses is that you know does not primarily relate to any utterance, or utterance sequence, but to the relationship between the speaker and the hearer. I also argued that with respect to the sub-functions of you know, it is not just a matter of categorizing a particular occurrence of you know as having one function rather than another. Rather, the particle retains aspects of several functions wherever it occurs.

To be able to indicate all such intricacies simultaneously for each particular occurrence of a pragmatic particle, I have devised (cf. Östman 1981a) what I call the
Level Analysis method. The idea here is simply that you indicate on different levels what a pragmatic particle is doing: any pragmatic particle potentially has a function on all (pragmatic) levels, and any (usually one) of these particular functions can be highlighted in a specific situation.

The levels that I recognize are, of course, the parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. At a fourth level one could indicate the basic semantic function (cf. the specification under a for you know in 4.2.2.) of each and every particle. But this type of semantic characterization should be used with care. In the case of central pragmatic particles, for instance, a semantic characterization is little more than a trick to bring pragmatics into semantics. Such fourth-level specifications could still be used as mnemonic indications, for instance, for pragmatic particles in the form of characterizations like 'central,' 'aspectual,' and 'epistemic.' Especially for the peripheral particles, this would be informative.

In principle, any element or construction can have a pragmatic function in addition to its semantic meaning. The analyst can indicate such potential functions at the levels of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. But it is not enough just to say that, for instance, the Politeness aspect of a particular element is highlighted in a particular situation, and that the Involvement aspect is highlighted in another situation where the particle is
used. We also need to say what form such highlighting takes, what features of Politeness, or of Involvement, are in focus. It is for the sake of this more detailed information that I have given tentative lists of the various aspects that partake in circumscribing the areas of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement in 4.2.

Thus, with reference to the preceding discussions, and to the findings of Östman 1981a, we can say that you know can have turn-signalling as one of its functions at the Coherence level. Within Politeness, a pragmatic particle can for instance specify the strategy of Politeness that a speaker is using in a conversation; or, as in the case of you know: a speaker's use of the particle indicates that although the interlocutors are presently using strategies of Informal Deference, s/he would not mind changing the situation in the direction of Camaraderie/Deference. (Cf. Östman 1981a for details.) At the Politeness level one can also indicate whatever potential aspects are highlighted of the more universal phenomena of rudeness, power, intimacy, which I discussed in 4.2.2.. For instance, I argued that whereas the function of you know can primarily be related to the scale of Indirectness, I guess is primarily an expression on the scale of Intimacy. Information like 'Cooperation requested' (cf. the discussion of the semantics of you know) also belongs to the level of Politeness, and could be indicated if this aspect in particular is focused on.
A detailed analysis of the Involvement factor of *you know* might show the prevalence of aspects like 'certainty,' 'positive attitude,' 'planning,' and 'involvement.' At the level of Involvement, the Level Analysis can indicate information like plus-or-minus E, P, and A; it can indicate the point on a scale of feelings (prejudice -- attitude -- emotion) at which a speaker carries on his/her part in a conversation; or we can simply indicate whether a particle indicates, say, calmness or aggressiveness. On a modality scale of Certain --- Uncertain we can also indicate the pragmatic Involvement of a speaker. As we saw in the discussion of *säkert* in 3.5., this pragmatic specification does not have to be the same as the semantic specification. Furthermore, aspects of sincerity can be indicated, and, as a further specification of turn-taking we can also specify more detailed information in our Level Analysis, for instance that a pragmatic particle is an attention getter, or that the use of a particular particle implies foregrounded information where there are no real Coherence-reasons for this.

In a concrete analysis of specific pragmatic particles in particular situations we furthermore have to pay special attention not only to the fact that a pragmatic particle is used, but also to how that particle is used. In Östman 1981a, for instance, I have shown that the important distinction between male and female uses of *you know* is not that one group uses the particle more than the other, but
that it is used in very different ways. In particular, I found that women tend to use *you know* in order to qualify whole utterances, whereas men tend to use it to qualify shorter phrases. (For further details, see Östman 1981a.)

The Level Analysis that I have given a short presentation of above, is not, of course, restricted in its use to clarifying the pragmatics of pragmatic particles. What is more important is that it can function as a general method for indicating pragmatic information of any element in a discourse.

The particular formal representation of a Level Analysis is of course of secondary importance. In Östman 1981a I suggested that the different levels simply be put underneath the utterance or piece of text to be analyzed; in the following manner (where '+' indicates highlighting; the example is a modification of a similar representation in Östman 1981:40).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UTTERANCE:</th>
<th>-- You know -- a -- oh, I don't ...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COHERENCE</td>
<td>+ Turn-taking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITENESS</td>
<td>Inf-Def → Ca/Def</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INVOLVEMENT</td>
<td>attention-getting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SEMANTICS</td>
<td>imply shared knowledge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4.2. An example of a Level Analysis.*
At this point we need to ask why this particular model is to be favored to other models that deal with more or less the same aspects of linguistic behavior. Why, for instance, is this solution to be preferred to Halliday's systemics, which also recognizes different levels of analysis (and from whom the format of my 'level'-representation clearly is a borrowing).

The first point is not in major contrast with Halliday's systemics, although it is in opposition to the discourse approach taken in Halliday & Hasan 1976. The present approach seeks to make a synthesis of what Levinson (1983: 286ff.) labels Discourse Analysis (DA) and Conversation Analysis (CA). In particular, I have followed CA methodology in avoiding analyses based on a single text, in relying as much as possible on empirical data (cf. Chapters 2 and 3), and thus avoiding premature theory construction, and I have also emphasized the interactional and inferential consequences of the choice between alternative utterances. On the other hand, I have not based my discussions on attested observations only, but I have also relied on introspection and intuition (a linguistic technique related more to DA than to CA), and I have also at times committed the CA sin of 'guessing' what would be odd, instead of solely relying on the data. In summary, then, I have started with conversation analysis, built a theory on the basis of the findings of this analysis, and then taken a more discourse-analytic approach in predicting
beyond the data.

The second point of difference is this. The three levels that Halliday recognizes are the ideational, interpersonal, and textual levels. (Cf. for instance Halliday 1967-68, 1970, 1978, 1979.) The interpersonal and textual levels do come close to the area that my Politeness and Coherence parameters cover, respectively, although Halliday's levels are more semantically oriented. This is not, however, a major divergence between the two approaches, since for Firth and Halliday, meaning in their sense of the term also includes function. The ideational level is, however, closely connected with what we generally understand by semantics (my potential fourth level), and thus, Halliday's approach has little room for indicating aspects of Involvement.

Thirdly, systemics is a very rigid structural format for representing the linguistic choices that speakers make. That is, a choice at one level, say, within the transitivity or theme systems, automatically excludes all the potential alternatives of a route not chosen. This is clearly in opposition to what we find in natural-language interactions. We saw this in the case of the question particles in Solf, too. The use of elâ, for instance, cannot always be clearly assigned as due to one choice rather than another. Instead, what we find is that all the potential functions, or forces, of elâ are potentially there and can be drawn on - ambiguously. The same phenom-
enon is pointed out by Levinson (1983:354), in connection with his example (105) - given below as (1);

(1) Mom: Do you know who's going to that meeting?
  Kid: Who.
  Mom: I don't know!

where Mom's first turn is taken by the Kid as a pre-announcement, whereas Mom intended it as a real question. (Cf. also Levinson's (1983:330) discussion of his example (49).) Levinson convincingly shows that the ambiguity in such examples is present not only for the analyst but also for the participants themselves. In other words, a pragmatic analysis needs simultaneous access to several potential meanings, in order to be able to accurately mirror the behavior of conversationalists. (Note also in this connection my previous discussion of Va as used simultaneously as Object and as Subject in a sentence, in fn. 7, Chapter 3; and my discussion in 3.2. of constructions like DØ saadØ V as syntactically indeterminate between interrogative and declarative.)

Fourthly, and in close connection to my third point, whereas in Halliday's 'level analysis' (cf. Halliday 1979:72 for an example) an element gets picked out and characterized as indicating property X, Y, or Z on one of his three levels, my Level Analysis operates simultaneously on all levels for, in principle, all words or constructions. As I pointed out earlier, any of the relevant aspects on any one level might be highlighted, but they are all potentially there, and can be drawn on, both for the
analyst, and in particular for the native speaker and his/her understanding of the utterance and the situation at hand.

Fifthly, whereas Halliday's approach is an explicit approach in the sense that the features that are indicated on his three levels are largeley syntactico-semantic, my approach is a pragmatically-oriented one that seeks to investigate the implicitly communicated aspects of language use. And, as far as language use is concerned, I refer to Austin (1962), who, in his discussion of performatives, argued that it is the implicit performatives that are the primary ones. In terms of speech act theory, we could say that the three parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement are the devices that on a larger scale of language use can be referred to by the analyst in making the implicit features of language explicit. (Cf. in this connection Searle's (1969) Principle of Expressibility. Cf. also in this discussion Levinson's 1983:360 note that embedded, implicit, corrections in conversations are preferred to expressed corrections. In Solf, in particular, but perhaps also more generally, there seems to be a preference for avoiding making a directive altogether.)

Finally, as a summary of these points, the present approach looks at language from the point of view of the participants themselves (cf. the ethnomethodology of speaking), and thereby attempts to relate directly to human behavior in general.
I will give two further examples of the general applicability of the Level Analysis. First, consider indirect speech acts. It has often been pointed out that what a speaker means by an utterance like (1) may to some extent be indeterminate. (Cf. e.g. Leech 1983:35,39.)

(1) Cold in here, isn't it?

But if indirect speech acts are potentially indeterminate, then it would surely be wrong to characterize the force of a particular indirect speech act as unambiguously X or Y. Indeterminacy means that there is no one heuristic that will specify the force of that utterance unambiguously. The speaker him/herself does not want to make such a choice, but keeps several potential forces available. By indicating different potential forces on different levels in a Level Analysis, we can thus simulate the psychological reality behind a particular linguistic choice, and indirect speech acts turn out not to need as much special treatment as some linguists argue. As for (1), its force on the level of Politeness might be specified as an attempt to get the addressee to close the window, at the same time as it is an instance of phatic communication at the level of Coherence.

The other example is from Old English. Recently, the particles ba and bonne have been extensively discussed in the literature (cf. Enkvist 1972, forthcoming, Wårvik 1984, Östman 1982b). In a thorough discussion of the problems with these particles, and especially with successive
clauses introduced by ṣa or bonne, Mitchell (1985:para2546) argues as follows in reference to passage 1.22.10 from Ælfric's Catholic Homilies, "the second bonne clause is used apo koînou; it is in a sense a principal clause to the first and a subordinate clause to the third clause introduced by bonne." The relevant passage is given in (2), followed by Thorpe's (1844-6) translation.

(2) Ic wylle settan min wedd betwux me and eow to ðisum behate; ðæt is, bonne ic oferteo heofenas mid wolcnun, bonne bid æteowod min renboga betwux ðam wolcnun, bonne beo ic gemynidig mines weddes, ðæt ic nelle heonon-ford mancynn mid wætere adrencan.

"I will set my covenant betwixt me and you for this promise: that is, when I overspread the heavens with clouds, then shall be shown my rainbow betwixt the clouds, then will I be mindful of my covenant, that I will not henceforth drown mankind with water."

What Mitchell implies is not that the three bonne clauses are hierarchically ordered, the first bonne clause subordinated to the second, and this in turn subordinated to the third. What he wants to say is that the second clause is marked as being both a main clause and a subordinate clause simultaneously. What this boils down to is that bonne, when it is used the second time, can be interpreted as a superordinating conjunction or particle in reference to the preceding clause, but that the following (the third) bonne clause forces a reinterpretation of the second bonne as being a subordinating particle. But both these forces of the second bonne have to be kept available to the reader of passage (2). bonne is indeterminate in this passage much the same way as indirect speech acts are potentially indeterminate. Again, an adequate account of
the functions of bonne has to be able to specify this indeterminacy; in terms of the Level Analysis: bonne is simultaneously a grounding marker at the level of Coherence, and a conjunction at the semantic level. A similar conclusion is reached with respect to the related particle Ḥa by Wårvik (1984:30-1):

The division of Ḥa into a foreground-marking, sequence-marking, and consequence-marking adverbial is, of course, artificial, as all the nuances are naturally present in each occurrence of Ḥa. If such a classification is valid, the place that Ḥa occupies in a clause would then reinforce one of the nuances, and thus the variations in word-order would enable one particle to carry several nuances of meaning.

#

In the discussion above I hinted at a distinction between the actual and the potential pragmatic function of the choice of a linguistic element. This needs some elaboration. We often encounter statements to the effect that the actual context of situation is indeterminate, and that we can never achieve a full explanation of any particular context. This is true from the point of view of the analyst, but for the interlocutors in a particular situation, context - or at least some context - is always present in a quite unambiguous manner, and can be added to, through the particular linguistic choices that the
interlocutors make in the ensuing conversation. It is thus obvious that when we encounter a potential ambiguity in a situation or in an utterance, or when the interlocutors experience a difficulty in interpreting a particular utterance, then the analyst has to start from the utterance itself, its place in the discourse, and its parts, and look for the potential functions that an element or a combination of elements can have.

In the present approach, this does not, however, mean that we for a particular situation choose one of a set of alternative functions (in the way we would choose one of the meanings of an ambiguous word like bachelor). Instead, for the actual function of a linguistic element the analyst - as well as, implicitly, the participants themselves - needs to retain all the potential meanings available, and can call forth and draw on these if difficulties of interpretation occur. The Level Analysis thus purports to mirror this aspect of the linguistic behavior of conversationalists. The Level Analysis is a method for analyzing the actual function of utterances, while at the same time retaining the analyst's/interlocutor's access to other potential functions of the same utterances.

* *

In my discussion of intention in section 1.3. I argued that the linguistic effect of a message has to be considered on a par with the speaker's intention. But if this is the case, then we also need to scrutinize certain
other theoretical concepts. In particular, the distinction between symptom and symbol cannot be upheld as rigorously when doing implicit pragmatics, as is usually taken for granted in linguistic research. Let us look at four situations.
A. If speaker X blushes, that means that X is embarrassed, but speaker X does not use blushing in order to communicate that s/he is embarrassed.
B. Speaker Y speaks geographical dialect y.
C. Speaker Z speaks in accordance with his/her age and sex group.
D. Speaker W speaks English with a Finnish accent.

It is true that the manifestations of situations A, B, and C should strictly speaking be regarded as non-linguistic manifestations if the speakers do not have a choice. But in situations B and C the addressee might not know that what s/he hears is automatic. Where this is the case, the potential function of the dialect has to be kept within reach if we want to give an adequate explanation of what happens in a discourse. The same, I think, can also be argued for situations A and D. Again, then, the Level Analysis does not make an a priori choice between what is a symptom and what is a symbol, nor do speakers in ordinary conversations.
4.4. Question particles in Solf revisited

We have already seen that the question particles in Solf cannot be used interchangeably, although they tend to co-occur. In this section I want to return to the question particles, and look at them from the point of view of the system of implicit pragmatics that I have devised in this Chapter. Based on the rather informal discussion of Chapters 2 and 3, I will give what I see as the potential pragmatic functions of the basic question particles in Solf, in terms of the parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement.

A semantic characterization of the question particles in Solf would simply say that they are peripheral particles of the sub-class 'information requesters' (cf. Östman 1982b), where, in English, we also find tags, and particles like huh? and ok?. The exception to this general statement is the particle dà, which should rather be characterized as a central pragmatic particle. But its semantic meaning, as an abstraction (cf. the discussion in the preceding section), is still the same as for the other particles.

4.4.1. Tå and dà

A comparison with English would say that tå is close to the use of the English particle then, and the functions of dà are most closely conveyed by the use of interrogative intonation.
Coherence

With regard to the different aspects of Coherence dealt with in 4.2.1., we can note the following features of 타 and 다. As question particles they are the (socio-linguistic) markers of 'real' Solf in the sense that they tend to be used more frequently as question particles by older speakers than by younger speakers.

On the textual level of Coherence, we can first note that 타 and 다 - like all question particles - have a floor-yielding function. And we can note that the particle 타 다 has this function much more strongly than either of the other two, since it requests further information more eagerly than 타 or 다 taken separately. 타 and 다 also function as discourse markers in another sense - and here their respective functions are in opposition. 타 implies that what is talked about is already situationally established, and requests further information about the topic. Whereas 타 is therefore not happily used in order to introduce a new topic, 다 particularly indicates that what is talked about is not situationally established (in fact, 다 often explicitly opposes this), and it can thus happily be used in an utterance that introduces a new topic. Furthermore, as to relevance marking, we can note that since 다 can also question the appropriate identification of a phrase, it thereby marks that phrase as being irrelevant to the discussion.
Politeness

As in other cultures, the use of pragmatic particles makes the interaction more indirect in Solf, too. But in Solf a lack of pragmatic particles is apt to be a clear indicator of impoliteness.

Although då was judged as 'most polite' in the psycholinguistic experiment referred to in 3.4., and can be regarded as a typical interactive particle, this should not be taken as an indicator that the use of då is to be recommended in Solf. The situation can rather be described as the opposite. The fact that då is judged as 'polite' should most likely be considered as an indication that då marks the conversation as being at the level of Formal Deference, and even indicating movement in the direction of Distance/Deference. This is in particular suggested by the typical feature of då as indicating that what is said is in some sense in opposition to the preceding. (Cf. the discussion in Chapter 2.) Of the parameters of Politeness discussed in the present chapter, då most clearly focuses on the Power end of the Power-Solidarity scale. Whereas då thus expects a negative answer (indicating that the 'contrary' interpretation suggested by the speaker of the då utterance is not feasible), the use of tå expects a positive answer, and can be characterized as coming closer to the Solidarity end of the Power-Solidarity scale.
Involvement

Since the psycholinguistic experiment in 3.4. did not include both sentences with tå and sentences with då, it is difficult to make a comparison between the two particles with respect to this parameter. It seems, though, partly perhaps as a result of its characteristics of Formal Deference with respect to Politeness, that då indicates more Involvement in the form of negative feelings, than does tå. This is so despite - or perhaps precisely because of - the fact that då was least involved of the particles analyzed in the experiment. Note furthermore that då got quite a high score for indicating 'impatience' in the experiment. Tå would be more distanced in this sense, although, as we saw, it can be used to soften down commands, for instance.

4.4.2. E1å

E1å can most directly be compared to a tag in English.

Coherence

On a general level of Coherence, e1å is an indicator of the typical indirectness of the Solf culture and of communication in Solf. This can be compared to the use of hedges like 'or something like that' in English. The use of e1å as a hedge relates to what I called face-saving, since the speaker retains the possibility to supply the 'or' alternative him/herself. Textually speaking, e1å - and
in particular ela va - is a stronger, and more unambiguous floor-yielding device than any of the other particles.

Politeness

Ela is a typical Informal Deference particle, which gives the right to the addressee to disconfirm, or even oppose, what the speaker has just said. Its function as an 'I mean'-hesitator can introduce an afterthought either by the speaker him/herself or by his/her interlocutor. And since ela has an equal expectancy potential for a positive and a negative answer, the response from the interlocutor can happily be one contrary to the opinion of the speaker. With respect to the Politeness aspects dealt with in 4.4.2., ela highlights the YOU-importance aspect.

Involvement

Ela is the question particle in Solf that expresses the most positive feelings and attitudes. It scored high both for the category 'friendly,' and for the category 'calm.' In general terms, we can characterize ela as an 'involvement particle.' This aspect is further underlined by the function of ela as a planning device (cf. the use of I mean in English).

4.4.3. Na

It is difficult to give an appropriate characterization of na in contrastive terms. Perhaps the closest we can get is to say that it functions like a lexical hedge
in English (cf. kinda, sorta).

Coherence

Some of my findings suggest that na is more often used by younger speakers than by older speakers, but my material is not representative enough to completely warrant this conclusion. Na also has the same general hedging function that we found for elå.

Politeness and Involvement

The responses to na in the psycholinguistic experiment are somewhat difficult to explain. On the one hand, na seemed to suggest 'friendliness,' but at the same time it received high scores for the categories 'angry' and 'impatient.' I also noted that na frequently occurs in negative utterances. These findings seem to suggest the following Politeness and Involvement interpretation. Na is primarily a Politeness marker, in the sense that it presupposes a particular relation between speaker and addressee. The kind of relationship that admits both negative attitudes and positive attitudes together is that of Camaraderie - as seen from the point of view of the society's norm for Politeness. Thus, the fact that we find na in negative utterances is not because na has anything intrinsically negative about it, but that it is used in negative utterances to mitigate the negation. The aspect of Politeness that na sets in focus would then be Intimacy.
4.5. Conclusion

The analysis of the pragmatics of question particles in Solf is an analysis of their respective potential functions on the three parameters of implicit pragmatics. In addition to their syntactic and semantic characteristics, the question particles carry with them this kind of pragmatic information whenever they are used. In effect, this means that pragmatic particles cannot simply be brushed aside as merely carrying conventional implicatures, as Leech (1983:11) suggests. The purpose of the Level Analysis described in this chapter is to assign to each word, element, or construction—from an inventory of potential functions—the features on each level (of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement) that can be thought to be in focus on the basis of what the interlocutors and/or the analyst know about the particular discourse. And out of these features, it is furthermore possible to indicate whether any one or more of the features on one (or several) levels are particularly highlighted. (Cf. the plus sign in Figure 4.2.)

It has often been pointed out that the regularities in pragmatics are more of constraints, restraints, or principles, as opposed to the rules of grammar. This has precisely to do with what I earlier (4.3.) referred to as the potential indeterminacy of the force of conversational utterances. Leech (1983:23-4) discusses this issue in terms of the negotiability of pragmatic factors, whereby part of
the responsibility of the meaning is left to the addressee. I claim, then, that the functions of question particles in Solf is indeterminate in the same way as I discussed the indeterminacy of indirect speech acts and OE Donne in 4.3. And one way to account for this indeterminacy of actual function in a conversation is to perform a Level Analysis of the particular question particle.

* 

The analysis of question formation in Chapter 3 resulted in a variety of statements about the contextual restrictions that influence the final output of a request for confirmation or information in Solf. In this chapter I have suggested a general framework within which the issues raised in previous chapters could conveniently be addressed together. I also suggested that not only is this a feasible way of looking at the use of requests in Solf, but that it is the kind of system that not only systematically handles the facts, but also is required, in order for us to be able to adequately represent or simulate the native speakers' language use.
Footnotes to Chapter 4

1But we not only have to pay special attention to the fact that a pragmatic particle is used, but also to how that particle is used (cf. Östman 1981a, and 4.3. below).

2Thus, Grice's maxims do not account for the fact that people tend to read into messages much more than what that message actually says. In connection with this, cf. Levinson's (1983:3.2.4.) discussion of the necessity of having a principle of informativeness.

3The speaker's reference to his own mental processes might be an exception, and thus more of an explicit anchoring device. However, even under this category, the expressions are more or less implicit, and it is sometimes difficult to draw a sharp line in terms of explicit-implicit between, say, I guess, and I thought.

4In a sense, Searle's sincerity conditions also contain these three parameters, since they state the requisite beliefs (cf. Coherence), feelings (cf. Involvement), and intentions (cf. Politeness, especially if intention is interpreted in a goal-oriented manner, as the interactive intentions) of the speaker, as appropriate to each kind of action.

5In fact, in earlier versions of systemics (cf. Halliday 1967-8) it was possible to have 'lines' (corresponding
to choices by route) crossing one another. According to Ventola 1984 this is no longer allowed. But even in that earlier version, each choice was an explicit either-or choice, where the indeterminate aspects of language were overlooked.
CHAPTER 5: FURTHER APPLICATIONS - PASSIVE AND PERSUASION

Chapter 4 contained a theoretical discussion of the three parameters that make up what I call Pragmatics as Implicitness. In Chapter 4 I also applied the Level Analysis to the function of question particles in Solf. In this chapter I will illustrate how these parameters can be made use of on a larger scale. I will look very briefly at two areas: persuasive language and passive constructions.

The analysis of persuasive language starts out from a 'type' of language, and investigates how this type of language manifests itself. I want to show what markers of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement there are in persuasive language. In my discussion of passive constructions I take the opposite avenue of reasoning, and start with a category ('passive') that is defined structurally-semantically, and I then show how passives are made use of for pragmatic purposes: to express Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement.

In this chapter I will not so much argue for the necessity of the Coherence-Politeness-Involvement framework in order to point to some new facts that only this framework can handle. Rather, I will merely show how what we know about the functions of passive clauses and about the language of persuasion can be given a coherent frame of reference if we utilize the insights that recourse to the
pragmatic parameters can offer. The expositions in this Chapter will consequently be very brief.

5.1. Passive constructions

5.1.1. Introduction

In this section I will show very briefly how the parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement can be used as a framework for explicating the pragmatic"functions of passive constructions in Swedish. (For an extensive discussion of this topic, see Östman forthcoming e.) In Leinonen & Östman 1983 we showed that languages tend to have not only one passive construction, but a set of passive constructions. The passive constructions in a language all semantically suppress the Agent. I will here show how a linguistic choice between the use of particular passive constructions in a situation is not only semantically governed, but that it is also governed by the speaker's implicit adherence to the pragmatic parameters.

In Leinonen & Östman 1983 we distinguished between three basic passive constructions in Swedish: the Patient-oriented periphrastic passive with bli 'become' plus past participle exemplified in (2), the Activity-oriented morphological passive with the verbal suffix -s exemplified in (3), and the Agent-oriented indefinite-person passive marked with man as Subject. This construction is exemplified in (4) below.
(1) Pojken kysste flickan.
boy-the kissed girl-the
'The boy kissed the girl.'

(2) Flickan blev kysst av pojken.
girl-the became kissed of boy-the
'The girl was kissed by the boy.'

(3) Flickan kysstes (av pojken).
girl-the kissed-s of boy-the
'The girl was kissed (by the boy).' 

(4) Man kysste flickan.
man_kissed girl-the
'The girl was kissed.'

The findings of Leinonen & Östman 1983 can be summarized in the following terms. First, if we want to take into account the semantic correlates of syntactic constructions, we should not see passives as secondary constructions, as results of optional transformations. Passives have to be generated as such, based on an underlying semantic feature of Agent demotion, or Agent suppression. However, although the Agent is semantically suppressed - and syntactically often not realized at all - it is still part of the meaning of passive constructions. As Keenan (1981) argues, it is the implication of the existence of an Agent that is definitional of passives. Secondly, and closely related to the non-dependence of passives on actives, syntactic constructions are to be seen not only in terms of the parts that they contain, in terms of them being generated anew on each specific occasion. They are also to be viewed from a holistic point of view, as set (though expandable) surface configurations, as constructional types. And thirdly, most often a partic-
ular language does not simply have a passive constructional type; it has several.

When we talk about active constructions, we usually refer to a set, or even a system, of constructional types. For active constructions we can set up a constructional hierarchy, or scale, which consists of typical transitive sentences at one end point, and typical Subject + Complement constructions, or 'ascriptions' (cf. Halliday 1967-8) at the other end point. In between these we can distinguish a fairly discrete point where we find typical intransitive clauses (including different types of middle constructions, like This wine drinks well). (Halliday talks about this 'mid-point' as 'Non-directed action,' and of transitive clauses as indicating 'Directed action.') Schematically, this can be presented as in Figure 5.1. or Figure 5.2.

---

Subject + Complement --- Intransitive --- Transitive
---

**Figure 5.1.** A scale of constructional types in the active.

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Subject-Noun + Copula + NP/Adj sentences
Intransitive & Middle sentences (Subject-Noun + Predicate)
Transitive sentences (Subject-Noun + Predicate + Object)
---

**Figure 5.2.** Active constructional types displayed as a hierarchy.
(We might, of course, want to single out other constructional types, too, but I think these are the major ones that will be accepted as constructional types by most linguists.)

All of these constructional types single out a topic, which in unmarked situations often is akin to a semantic Agent, Actor, or Controller. And in all the constructional types, some activity, process, or quality is predicated of that topic. We can refer to this scale, or the corresponding hierarchy, of constructional types as the Active Pattern.

Passive constructions can also be seen as a set, or a system of constructional types. In a sense, this system parallels the active hierarchy of Figure 5.2. This is the Passive Pattern, and it has the following main constructional types.

---

Periphrastic passives (Subject-Noun + AUX + V)
Morphological passives (Subject-Noun + V-affix)
Indefinite-person passives ((Subject-dummy) + V(-affix))

---

Figure 5.3. The constructional types in the Passive Pattern.

As I am well aware, indefinite-person passives are not usually regarded as passive constructions, since syntactically they have active verbal morphology. It is clear, however, that if passive is looked at from a
semantic point of view, these constructions fill a gap in the Passive Pattern. For instance, and in particular, we usually distinguish between three kinds of verbs: those that express a state, those that characterize a process that leads to a result, and those verbs that express some on-going activity. Purely syntactically defined passive constructions in many languages have to be restricted to the latter two of these types of verbs (or a subset of these). That is, stative verbs like *have do not usually passivize: *A bicycle is had (by the landlady). Semantically, however, there seems to be no a priori reason why an Agent should not potentially be suppressable with stative verbs. Thus, if indefinite person constructions are regarded as part of the passive pattern, we can indicate suppressed-Agent meaning also with stative verbs, as in (5). (For detailed discussions of the status of indefinite-person constructions, see Leinonen & Östman 1983 and Östman forthcoming e.)

(5) Atminstone har man en fin bil
    at-least  has man a fine car
    'At least one has a fine car'

In this view of passives the relationship between active and passive is not overlooked. There is a relationship, but what are called typical active and typical passive sentences are parts of different constructional patterns (that is, sets of constructional types). It is the patterns that show relationships. In the same way as we can compare the phonemic inventory of two languages, we
can also compare constructional patterns in different languages. But if we pick out one constructional type, say, the morphological passive, from one language, and compare it to a morphological passive in another language, we are making the same mistake as if we were to pick out the phoneme /a/ from one language, and compare it to the phoneme /a/ in another language. In both cases we neglect to take into account the other members of the respective systems of which these members (the morphological passive, and the phoneme /a/) are necessary parts. (Cf. also Langacker 1982:65.)

My arguments above do not, however, mean that I want to overlook the obvious semantic similarities between prototypical active and passive sentences. Before choosing between different active and passive constructions for the verbal manifestation of his/her idea unit, a speaker has to choose whether to suppress the Agent or not. Syntactically, this choice involves, among other things, the choice of which NP to make the syntactic Subject of his/her utterance. That is, even though actives and passives are seen as belonging to separate patterns, it is still possible to acknowledge a relationship between, for instance, the syntactic Object of an active clause and the syntactic Subject of a passive clause.

The constructional types of a language form an integral part of the syntactic make-up of that language. And the reason one constructional type is used instead of an-
other in a particular text is governed by semantic factors. As Charles Fillmore, John Anderson, and others have shown, the choice of Subject-of-a-sentence, and the choice of preposition in a prepositional phrase are governed by underlying semantic factors, i.e. semantic role relations. (Cf. e.g. Fillmore 1968, 1977, Anderson 1978, 1980.) For instance, the (or at least one) difference between The house was filled with children, and The house was filled by children is that in the former sentence the children are seen as Instruments, whereas in the latter sentence they are seen as Agents.

I would like to argue that the choice of using one constructional type rather than another is in a similar way semantically governed. That is, the different passives (=Agent-suppressing constructions) in a language, say, in Swedish, do not occur in free variation. There is a semantic pattern that lies behind the choice of both active and passive constructional types. This semantic pattern may be universal, much in the same way as semantic roles may be universal. Different constructional types in the patterns of different languages are related to the factors that make up this semantic pattern, even though the syntactic, language-specific patterns may vary extensively. That is, in the same way as a particular semantic role might play a more decisive role in one language than in another, so too will different constructional-type semantic factors be highlighted in different languages. In other words, the
inventory of semantic factors may be universal. ²

In Leinonen & Östman 1983 we also suggested a format for how these semantic factors relate to the semantic roles, and how syntax can make use of them. The suggestion was simply that the verb and the predicate be indexed in the same manner as role specifications: both in the lexicon, and in specific sentence derivations. As we pointed out in that article, such indices will be useful in order to explain why, for instance, a periphrastic passive is used instead of a morphological passive in Russian; viz. through aspect restrictions in the predicate. With such a device we can also easily make available the fact that the Swedish periphrastic passive usually has its Patient fronted, and that Russian morphological passives require extra semantic restrictions on the Patient, in terms of Animacy. (A refinement of this format is suggested in Östman forthcoming e.)

5.1.2. Pragmatic potentialites of passive constructions

In this section I want to discuss a speaker's choice of a passive construction in terms of the pragmatic parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. The question is not only under what pragmatic conditions the speaker would choose to use a passive construction instead of an active one, but also under what conditions s/he would tend to use a particular type of passive - in the sense this was discussed in the previous section. The discussion
in this section will be rather abstract in the sense that I will mostly look at what I consider to be the potential communicative functions of passives. I have thus not investigated any particular style in depth, using the methods of conversation or discourse analysis, to show how passives interact with other linguistic aspects in actual use.

In the following I will mostly be dealing with passive constructions in Swedish. However, I will not necessarily argue that the Swedish passives have the pragmatic functions X, Y, and Z. Instead I will discuss how passive constructions can be seen as markers of certain social and psychological, i.e. pragmatic phenomena, and what inferences we can draw from the occurrence of a passive construction in a discourse. The issues that I raise are implicitly present in discourse in the sense that the pragmatic functions that I associate with the use of a passive construction are potential pragmatic functions: every situation and utterance will choose to highlight, or focus on, one (or more) functions, at the expense of the others.

From the point of view of Coherence I will discuss some textual aspects of passives; within Politeness I will deal with interactive strategies; and under Involvement I will briefly touch on how attitudes are expressed with passives.
5.1.2.1. Coherence

The question that the Coherence parameter of pragmatics has to deal with in relation to passives can be stated as follows. How do speakers make use of passives to (implicitly) create (or even destroy) Coherence in a culture, in a situation, or, what is more relevant in this discussion, in a discourse or text? From the point of view of the analyst investigating a product text, the same question can be stated in the following terms. Why is a (particular kind of) passive construction used at this particular point in the text?

The textual product is a manifestation of certain communicative strategies that speakers use. The speaker gives the information s/he wants to communicate particular linguistic structures in accordance with the particular goals s/he wants to achieve. Thus, a text is a manifestation of a number of simultaneous choices by a speaker or speakers. The speakers not only choose what to say, but also how they want to express themselves: what presuppositions, and foci of interest they should choose. Interactively, a speaker has to have such a grasp of his/her utterance that a listener can unambiguously deduct what the speaker is talking about, and what his/her intentions are. The information structure of an utterance thus has directly to do with how a particular utterance macro-syntactically fits the surrounding verbal context. To the extent that 'purely' textual structuring in this sense
partake (even if indirectly) in the implicit establishment of Coherence, it is part of the pragmatic perspective on language at the sentential level of Coherence.

To realize that there do exist purely co-textual reasons for using a passive construction, and that such co-textual structuring also, in a sense, create Coherence, we can think of the situation where we have a painting hanging on the wall, and underneath it we have a text in the form of either (1) or (2).

(1) Owned by James Smith.

(2) Donated by James Smith.

In other words, the painting is one element in the clause structure (with auxiliaries left out as being low in semantic information). That is, we have a situation where we simply can not imagine not to prepose the painting. (It would be strange to have a sign saying 'James Smith owns,' or 'James Smith (has) donated,' and underneath that sign a painting.) The position of the painting is given, as a theme, and after the painting (here: underneath it) follows the predication, the rheme. (I am here using the terms 'theme' and 'rheme' only in the sense of the structural opposition between the beginning and the end of a clause (cf. Halliday 1967-8).)

We can note in passing that in a language like Finnish, which has what is usually referred to as a much 'freer' word order, you do not need to use a passive construction in a case like this.
Figure 5.4. An example of obligatory fronting of a constituent for Coherence reasons.

Notice that (3) and (4) have the form and word order they have in spite of the fact that the ordinary syntax of Finnish does not permit such sequences. First, there are no purely syntactic reasons for the possibility of leaving out objects in Finnish. (A possible counterexample is the use of the predicate as 'yes' or 'no' in answer to a y/n question; cf. (5).

(5) A: Loitkö Kallea?
    hit-you-kO kalle(part.)
    'Did you hit Kalle?'
B: Loin.
    hit-I
    'Yes' or: 'Yes, I did')

Secondly, there is a word order constraint in Finnish (cf. Hakulinen 1976), which says that verb-initial sentences tend to be avoided - despite the fact that Finnish is a synthetic language that grammatically allows quite a free word order. Thirdly, the word orders of (3) and (4) are
given, and have the status of being set expressions. It would be very odd to have a plate under the painting with the inscription *James lahjoittanu* or *James omistaa*.

We find a similar phenomenon in newspaper announcements, where the place of the painting is taken up by a headline in large boldface letter type.

(6) **ENGLISH TEACHER**  
wanted at St Mary's College.  
...

(7) **EUROPEAN STAMPS**  
sold at incredible discount prices  
...

In examples (6) and (7) it is of course also the pragmatic salience (cf. Van Valin 1980) of the NP that decides its initial position, and therefore information structuring for interactive reasons. So, here we are perhaps no longer within the realms of really 'pure' textual reasons for fronting.

We can see the same process at work in sentence (8), where in the place of a painting or a boldface headline we have a left-dislocated element.

(8) Bill, he was shot.

One of the pragmatic reasons why *Bill* has been thematized here is again (as was the case in (6) and (7)) no doubt interactive, but there is also what we can call a purely textual reason why *Bill* comes first. A sentence like (8) would typically be used in a situation where another person has mentioned Bill's name, or (indirectly) referred to him - perhaps by presenting a picture of Bill. The speaker of
(8) can then relate his utterance to this previous mention-
ing.

In unmarked, neutral texts (if such objects exist), sentences tend to follow each other according to a theme-rheme pattern:

(9) Theme 1 — Rheme 1. Theme 2 — Rheme 2. ...

where Rheme 1 and Theme 2 have the same, or partly the same referent.

(10) Bill threw the ball. The ball flew through the air.

\[ T_1 \quad \text{T1} \quad \text{R1} = \text{T2} \]

In such cases T2 would ordinarily be replaced by a pronoun:

(11) Bill threw the ball, and it flew through the air.

In situations like these, the passive can thus give us an alternative structural possibility, if we for cohesive reasons necessarily want to follow a theme-rheme pattern, as in (12), instead of using (13).

(12) Bill threw the ball, and it was well received by Peter.

(13) Bill threw the ball, and Peter received it.

In English, as well as in Swedish, we have a principle of end-weight (which is of course related to that of end-focus, and the topic-comment distinction). (For a discussion of the relation of this principle to coherence, see Leech 1983.) Thus, (14) is better than (15).

(14) When they finally started to talk, they were enthusiastically listened to by the Finnish army, which had gathered on the scene of the crime.

(15) When they finally started to talk, the Finnish army, which had gathered on the scene of the crime, enthusiastically listened to them.
In this case, the by-phrase of (14) might be new (and thus has directly to do with speaker-hearer interaction) at the same time as it is a heavy element (and thus one reason for its final position in the sentence is textual). But we can also imagine the sentences in a context where the element of new-ness is all but lacking, but the passive version is still to be preferred.

(16) The robbery of the golden watch that took place in a barrack in Helsinki yesterday is rapidly being solved. Two official spokesmen for the Parliament visited the barrack where the army in its entirety had stayed for the last two weeks. Mr Virtanen's and Ms Järvinen's statements to the soldiers was some what delayed. But when they finally started to talk, they were enthusiastically listened to by the Finnish army, which had gathered on the scene of the crime.

Thus, in (16), the use of the passive form is for reasons of Coherence.

In a language like Swedish, which has to use inverted Subject-Verb word order in the main clause when a when clause precedes, the equivalent to (15) - given below as (18) - is definitely not as good as the Swedish equivalent to (14) - given below as (17). (And this is so even without the interfering non-restrictive relative clause.)

(17) När de äntligen började tala blev de entusiastiskt avlyssnade av hela den finska armén, som hade samlats på brottspatsen).

(18) När de äntligen började tala, avlyssnade hela den finska armén, som hade samlats på brottspatsen, dem entusiastiskt.

This is of course a typical situation when the subject of
the corresponding active clause is a long and heavy phrase. The passive thus gives us a possibility of placing such heavy phrases last in a sentence.

In terms of Coherence as manifested in theme-rheme ditribution the passive can thus help to create cohesion between sentences and between clauses, and by so doing also of course create a more easily noticeable and processable Coherence in the discourse as a whole.

(For other aspects of Coherence in relation to the use of passive constructions, see Östman forthcoming e.)

5.1.2.2. Politeness

I will start my discussion of the behavior of passives in relation to interactive strategies with a short application of Grice's maxims (cf. Grice 1975) to the choice of passives in Swedish.

As I have already pointed out, Grice's maxims make up a negative frame of reference for conversational interaction. The kinds of questions that can be asked within this frame are of the form, 'What maxim(s) does this utterance violate, or deviate from?.' Thus we can for instance say that an Agentless passive violates Grice's maxim of Quantity, if, say, the context of situation demands the Agent to be identified, since by using an Agentless passive in that situation, the speaker has not been as informative as s/he should have been. All passives also seem to violate Grice's maxim of Manner: passive constructions seldom make
things clear and more obvious. Instead, they create ambiguities and unclari" 

In addition to this, passives also violate Grice's maxim of interactional relevance. The speaker might indeed him/herself feel that it is relevant to use an indefinite-person (man) passive in reference to him/herself (cf. below for this use of indefinite-person passives in Swedish), and utter (1). But from the point of view of co-operation, (1) is not co-operatively relevant; rather, in its subtlety it sets up an hindrance for efficient cooperation in the situation.

(1) Man skulle nog inte ha gjort det där. 
    one should nog not have done it there 
    'One shouldn't really have done that.'

On the surface, sentence (1) consists of an indefinite pronoun followed by a predication. And thus it can be interpreted as 'Somebody (or: 'You,' 'People') should not have done that.' This is the literal meaning of the utterance. However, if the speaker intended man to refer to him/herself, and wanted to say 'I should not have done that' with (1), then the utterance can be said to violate Grice's second maxim of Quality, which says that one should not say what one does not have enough evidence for. The speaker might have 'internal' evidence for saying that s/he should not have done so-and-so, but the addressee might interpret the sentence in a more general sense (corresponding to its literal meaning), and in that interpretation (which is an interactive possibility), the speaker violates

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the maxim.

Saying that passives violate Gricean maxims does not seem to offer much insight beyond that very general statement itself. It seems to me that if we start the pragmatic investigation of a construction from the point of view of its structure and propositional content, we can in principle find instances of how any construction violates all Grice's maxims—by relating it to a variety of situational contexts. By taking a positive view of cooperation in terms of the strategies of Politeness that I discussed in Chapter 4, we can instead see the use of passives as a means to avoid violating, that is, to adhere to, what Robin Lakoff (1975) calls Rules of politeness.

When speakers use the strategy of Camaraderie, the interaction itself is in focus. The speaker and the addressee have the same status, neither one has any possibility or desire to influence the other. The conversation might seem indirect, since the speakers do not explicitly need to express everything they want to say. The interlocutors understand one another with a minimum of effort. If passives are used as manifestations of this strategy of Politeness, it is definitely not in order to conceal any important points. Either one uses a passive because one honestly does not know who or what the Agent (or Controller of an activity) is, or because it simply does not matter who the Agent is, or else it is simply obvious to both speaker and addressee who the Agent is.
A speaker who wants to communicate in accordance with the Distance strategy wants to keep the addressee at a certain distance. Adherence to aspects of social status, like address terminology, are important in Distance Politeness, whereas emotionally loaded words and expressions clearly do not fit in. This strategy is most clearly exemplified by Bureaucratese and (until a decade or two ago) Academese. It is precisely as a manifestation of speakers' use of Distance strategies that we will find an abundant use of passives, both of morphological passives (like the Swedish s-passive) and of periphrastic passives (the English be and the Swedish bli passive). Both the morphological and the periphrastic passives can keep the Agent in the background, and especially for politicians or other officials using a variety of Bureaucratese, it is often very important to give an illusion that things just happen in society (especially if things go wrong), without anyone (including those who are in charge themselves) seemingly being responsible for what has happened. A very typical instance of the use of the Distance-strategy marking s-passive can be seen in the customary phrase by which a waiter/waitress can approach his/her customers in Swedish:

(2) Vad önskas?
   what wish-s
   'What is wished?' (= What can I do for you?)

Newspaper headlines are very often in the passsive form. This is, however, usually not because the writer
does not know who is behind what has happened. The difference between an \_\_passive and a periphrastic passive in Swedish headlines can almost always be related to the semantic difference there is between them: the \_\_passive focuses on activity, and the use of the periphrastic passive concentrates the readers' attention to the Patient, and the stativity or perfectivity of the result. Man constructions are less usual in political reports. This no doubt has to do with the inherent focus on the Agent in man-passives. (Cf. Leinonen & Östman 1983, Östman forthcoming e, and 5.1.1. above.) To use an indefinite-person passive would not be consistent with the basic goals of journalism: it would imply that the writer knows who or what is the causal factor behind an activity, while at the same time refusing to tell the reader this explicitly.

Within the area of Deference, where interlocutors show (conventional) respect for one another and subordinate themselves in relation to others, most propositional information is qualified with expressions like probably, isn't that so, don't you think, strictly speaking, and other pragmatic particles. The type of indirectness that we find in Deference Politeness often carries with it negative connotations. (Cf. R. Lakoff 1980.) This is understandable, since the speakers do seem to try to push the responsibility for what is said onto their interlocutors, and each speaker works on the assumption that s/he him/herself is not part of the dominant group. I think it is within this
strategy of Politeness that man-passives in Swedish are used the most.

Andersson (1972) argues that there are two basic uses of man in Swedish.

1. A general use, where man has all individuals as its discourse universe. For instance,

(3) Man skall inte tro på allt som sägs på TV
'One/You/People shouldn't believe everything that is said on TV.'

2. The other use is what Andersson calls anaphoric. The discourse universe is here a particular group of people, as in the following example, where the discourse universe that man refers to includes all those who work for the TV company.

(4) På TV har man fått en ny chef.
'on TV have one gotten a new boss
'They've gotten a new boss on TV.'

(In example (4) the corresponding English word would be they, in example (3) one, you, and people are possible.)

But what is of more direct relevance to my discussion of the Deference strategy are the cases that Andersson takes up as special cases of man in its general function:

a. man in the sense 'you'

(5) Man kan bara inte uppföra sig så.
'One/You/People simply can/should not behave like that.'

(It seems to me that the use of one in the English version would here sound Distance-like.) According to
Andersson, *man* is here milder than *du* 'you,' it does not irritate the listener, and the use of *du* would exclude 'I,' which it should not do.

b. *man* in the sense 'I'

(6) *Man har ju i alla fall bott i Berkeley,*
one has *ju* in every case lived in Berkeley
'At least one (= 'I') has lived in Berkeley.

where, according to Andersson, *jag* 'I' would be too direct, and *man* has a more emphatic character.

c. *man* in an overgeneralized sense, "the misuse of *man,*"
where *man* includes some of the people we are talking about, but not all:

(7) *När man läst ett stycke i N.N.'s nya*
when one read(perf) a section in N.N.'s new
diktsamling, *känner man sig sömnig.*
poetry-collection feels one -self sleepy
'When one/you/we have read <or: Having read> a sec­
tion of N.N.'s new collection of poems, you/we/one
feel(s) tired.'

According to Andersson, *man* is here identical to the (critic-) 'I,' together with other educated readers. Using *man* gives the utterance a more objective feeling, especially, as in this case, when what is at issue is something that people tend to disagree on.

All these three uses of *man* can be explained in terms of strategies of Politeness in the following way. The speaker uses the strategy of Deference to take away his/her own responsibility from what s/he is actually saying. The speaker follows certain principles of social interaction, and it is really these principles that dictate his/her
utterance, and the form it eventually takes. Example (5) is an instance of 'pure' Formal Deference: one should avoid telling the addressee straight to his/her face what one thinks of him/her. The other two examples are rather alike, but especially example (6) follows the principle of not boasting about oneself: a speaker should avoid indicating that it is s/he who is the active (i.e. responsible) person behind an activity that can be boasted about. Similarly, in example (7) the object is to keep the 'I' in the background, and not unnecessarily take responsibility for attitudinally loaded utterances. (And if one has to take responsibility, one should not do so alone, but instead use we.)

All this, of course, has to do with keeping up the balance between what I called solidarity and face-saving in 4.2.2.: on the one hand one should not be impolite to one's interlocutor, but on the other hand one does not either want to come out of an argument looking awfully stupid. The co-operative goal is to find the golden mean.

5.1.2.3. Involvement

The two examples below (cf. also Bolinger 1980:86) clearly show how passive constructions - and especially the omission of the Agent - can be used to encourage, maintain, and even create general untruths and prejudices.

(1) Woman was meant for breeding.
(2) This piece of information was not meant for the public.
By leaving out the Agent in (1) the speaker tries to implicitly communicate that this is a God-sent truth, that it was in fact God who meant woman for breeding; whereas in actual fact, the appropriate Agent here would probably be 'by men.' In example (2) the speaker tries to imply that there are certain documents or information that by definition are not meant for the ordinary man in the street; whereas the real state of affairs is simply that the speaker did not want anybody to see what crooked plans s/he was making before it would have been too late to change them. If the public were to get to know about them (as it presumably did), it would not like them. The speaker knows this, and thus tries to blame it all on some abstract societal machinery, where things have to be done in a certain way.

It could be argued that examples (1) and (2) have the form they have conventionally, since the verb mean cannot happily be used in active clauses 'with the same meaning.' Cf. (3).

(3) *God meant woman for breeding.

Compare also the following pairs of examples.

(4) a. I was meant for you.
   b. *God meant me for you.

(5) a. I meant for Harry to be our new chairman.
   b. Harry was meant to be our new chairman.

In example (5), version (a) does not mean the same thing as version (b) does. Examples (1) and (2) would thus have been more to the point if I had used the verb intend instead of
The argument would be that in the case of mean, the speaker does not have a choice: the passive form is given beforehand as the only possibility. But in the case of intend, the speaker is free to choose whether s/he will use a passive or an active construction. However, this is only part of the truth. Choices can be made on different levels. By choosing the phrasings of (1) and (2), the speaker also chooses to leave the Agent unspecified. And, I would argue, by choosing mean instead of intend the speaker implicitly implies that the utterances in (1) and (2) can only be said in one way: in the passive. If the speaker of (2) is a sophisticated linguist, he can even before a court of law state that he has not been trying to mislead journalists at all, it simply is a fact of English grammar that one does not express the content of (2) in the form of (8).

(8) *I did not mean this piece of information for the public.

Yet, by choosing (2) - instead of either (7a) or (7b) - the speaker is communicating his/her own attitudes and feelings about the said piece of information and his/her relation to the ordinary man in the street.

The choice of mean as opposed to intend in (1) and
(2) can be compared to a speaker's choice of the pronouns he, she, or it in reference to a baby. It is the conventionalized pronoun, and the one that the grammar of English dictates in unmarked situations. By using he or she the speaker indicates that s/he regards the baby as an individual with a sex. By using it the speaker might well want to indicate his/her feelings towards babies in general, but since it is accepted by the grammar of English, s/he can not be accused of disliking babies. In this sense, the attitude the speaker communicates is implicit in the sense this word is used in this study.

From the point of view of the potentialities of pragmatics, we can remain neutral with respect to the alternatives (a) that there exist (unambiguous) restrictions on when and where a passive construction can be used, and (b) that whenever a passive construction is used, it carries with it certain pragmatic connotations, associations, or implications. That is, it is of course true that the use of a passive construction might have become conventionalized in certain areas of grammar. And in a restrictive sense we might then want to say that the use of such a passive construction is therefore not due to a choice by the speaker. But any meaning implies a choice by the speaker. And the communication of pragmatic meanings implies making implicit choices.
5.1.3. Conclusion

This section has focused on the pragmatics of passive constructions in Swedish. At the same time I have given the reader some idea of where I draw the line between semantics and pragmatics in my view of language. In section 5.1.1. I argued on the basis of previous research that - from a semantic point of view - the feature of Agent suppression is definitional of all passives. This led to a situation which might seem uncomfortable to some linguists, namely that indefinite-person constructions (which in English and in Swedish have active morphology) also have to be regarded as passives semantically.

There are two further points I want to stress in connection with this discussion. First, the fact that indefinite-person passives in English might have the same verbal morphology as active sentences (since they, you, and one can be used ambiguously) is a particular feature of English. In Finnish, for instance, the indefinite-person passive has a verbal morphology of its own (called 'the fourth person' in Hakulinen & Karlsson 1979). (Cf. also Östman 1981c.) Also, in English, there used to be a passive construction with the prefix a-, as in (1),

(1) The house was a-building.

which I would be inclined to characterize as an indefinite-person passive.3 When the prefix a- was eventually dropped from the construction, it is easy to understand that the verbal marker that remained (i.e. -ing) would also fall
out of use as a passive marker (because of the obvious homonymy with the progressive tense marker). In that situation, some other construction had to fill the slot of the passive pattern in English. And what we have is a construction that is marked as semantically passive by other means than through verbal morphology.\(^4\)

Secondly, there is a theoretical question involved here, too. Lyons 1963 argued that any term that is used in linguistics also has to be \textit{materially adequate}: terms, like 'passive' should also capture the 'ordinary,' every-day meanings that such terms have. Both the man-construction in Swedish, and the indefinite-person construction with the -tAAn/tiin suffix in Finnish are generally referred to as passive constructions.

With my discussion of the pragmatic potentialities of passives in section 5.1.2., I have wanted to show how the use of syntactically active and passive constructions can be used in situations to communicate implicit pragmatic information in addition to their semantic content. Also, I have wanted to show how the different types of semantically defined passives have different pragmatic implications. Since in all situations I have encountered, the three passive constructions in Swedish can be kept distinct on the basis of their different inherent Orientation, I have regarded Orientation as a semantic feature of Swedish grammar. However, it could be argued that Orientation is a pragmatic aspect because of its implicit nature. I do
not want to take a definite stand on this issue, except for what I just said, since - as I have repeatedly pointed out - I see the concepts of structure, semantics, and pragmatics as useful abstractions for the analyst, which should not force him/her to necessarily classify a borderline linguistic feature as belonging to one rather than to another of the three components of language. (Cf. the discussions in Chapter 1 and in Chapter 6 below.)

5.2. The language of persuasion

5.2.1. Introduction

The purpose of this section is to have a brief look at one type of discourse, and see how an analysis of this discourse type not only can, but needs to, refer to the pragmatic parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement, and how the analytic use of these parameters in turn can help to define that discourse. (For a more extensive analysis of the material dealt with in this section, see Östman to appear.)

I have chosen to deal with persuasive discourse for a number of reasons. First, persuasion has not been dealt with extensively in the linguistic literature, although it is probably fair to say that all interactions - except perhaps pure small-talk conversations - have some element of persuasion in them. (We can also note that pragmatics has recently been connected with aspects of rhetoric...
(cf. e.g. Leech 1983), and rhetoric of course is traditionally understood as the use of language for persuasive purposes. Even though pragmaticists today do not stress the persuasive aspect of rhetoric, the connection is still there.)

Secondly, persuasion is not a speech act on a par with, say, promising or requesting. For one thing, a persuasive sentence cannot be analyzed in terms of a performative statement of the form (1).

(1) I persuade you that S

I will argue below that this is precisely due to the inherent implicitness of prototypical persuasion and persuasive discourse.

Thirdly, one common view of persuasion is that any discourse or element of discourse can have a persuasive effect, but that there are no specific features of persuasion in language, and therefore no persuasive discourse to be treated as a separate type of discourse. There are at least two issues involved here. First, even though it is customary to think of persuasion only in terms of whether a piece of discourse has a persuasive effect or not, I will not here restrict myself to this view. Rather, I see persuasive language in the first instance as a manifestation of a speaker's persuasive intention. And secondly, as I will show below, it is true that there is no one linguistic feature that can be talked about as a particular marker of persuasion, say, in English. But the reason for
this is the implicit way a speaker's persuasive intent has
to manifest itself in persuasive language. However, if we
do not view the concept 'persuasive discourse' in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions, but instead give it a
prototype characterization, then we will also be able to
find prototypical markers of persuasive discourse. I will
argue that persuasive discourse does exist as a discourse
type, and that an adherence to the three pragmatic para-
meters can help define and characterize this discourse
type. In general, persuasion is not like metaphors and
ironies that "can acquire conventional indicators and
structural correlates" (Levinson 1983:165; Brown & Levinson
1978:267ff), but it is more like the implicitness of al-
lusions, where the communication of an allusion rests
solely on hints. (On allusions, cf. Schaar 1975, 1978,
Östman 1979a.)

Aspects of persuasion have been dealt with extensive-
ly both in rhetoric and in social psychology. Although re-
search within these areas should also be of interest to
the linguist, I have not considered it necessary to give
an overview of their century-long debates within the
limited scope of this study. (For basic overviews, see
5.2.2. The data

When a speaker wants to persuade another person openly, s/he can do this explicitly, and the analysis of such overt persuasion is consequently to be done in straightforward semantic terms. Explicit persuasion needs no markers, since both participants are aware of what is going on. But for a discourse to be an instance of explicit persuasion, both interlocutors have to agree on the persuasive means to be used. If speaker$_1$ relies solely on means of logical deduction in his/her argumentation, and speaker$_2$ uses a combination of logical and religious argumentation, then to the extent that the religious means that speaker$_2$ uses are effective (especially if speaker$_1$ is not aware that any but logical means are used), to that extent the persuasion by speaker$_2$ of speaker$_1$ is simultaneously carried out on an implicit level.

The kind of persuasive discourse that I will be concerned with in this study is implicit persuasion. The hypothesis is that there exist linguistic means (e.g. words and structures) that can be regarded as markers of implicit persuasion. As I will argue more in detail below, we cannot expect to find any particular marker, or set of markers that would always and unambiguously indicate that the speaker wants to persuade his/her addressee or audience. Such a marker - if it existed - would effectively destroy the whole enterprise of attempting to carry out implicit
persuasion. We can, however, discover bundles of markers, or combinations of words and structures that together indicate (at least to the analyst) that a piece of discourse is persuasive in nature.

Since a thorough analysis of all the potential words and constructions that might serve a persuasive purpose is probably an impossible task - and certainly outside the scope of this study - I will here illustrate implicit persuasion with an analysis of some of the linguistic aspects of a persuasive text, namely of James Clavell's *The Children's Story* (Coronet 1983; 1963/1981). In particular, I will show how the aspects of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement are drawn on for implicit persuasion in this text.

*The Children's Story* might not be considered a good representative of ordinary persuasive discourse. And, strictly speaking, my analysis is of an 'ideology' of persuasive discourse, rather than of a 'reality.' But ideologies, like prejudices, are based on some - albeit stereotypical - connection with reality. From this, there are two possible lines of argumentation. We can either say that Clavell's perception of persuasion represents people's stereotypical attitudes about what persuasive discourse looks like, and we can thus treat Clavell's perception of it as a framework in the same way as Grice's Co-operative Principle forms a frame of reference, as something that is not normally adhered to in everyday face-to-face inter-
action, but which is a norm for such behavior. The second alternative, and the one that I am inclined to follow, takes the opposite line of argumentation, and says that this story depicts the basic principles, and because it is a story about the persuasion of children (a summary of the plot is given below), the manifestations of persuasive strategies and methods are shown, and can be seen much more clearly here, than in, say, Mein Kampf, or Nixon's Checkers Speech and Watergate Speech. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that a strict separation of ideology and reality is in practice possible when doing pragmatics. (I showed in Chapter 1, however, that such a separation is important, and in principle possible.)

Another reason why a literary text like Clavell's story is to be preferred to a piece of ordinary conversation - at least at this stage of preliminary linguistic research in the field of persuasion - is that the analyst does not have to rely solely on his/her own interpretation of the text. The author - by being omniscient - not only gives the reader/analyst an insight into what the persuader intended, but also into how this intention was perceived, whether it was effective or not. The story - as a story - is a coherent piece of persuasive discourse, which ties together manifestations of persuasion from different levels. The characters of the story not only have their own ideas and attitudes, and attempt to exert their power when possible, they are also
part of a larger whole - the story - which is controlled by Clavell himself. Thus, the effects of all the three parameters can be seen clearer here than in an ordinary conversation, where the analyst him/herself might be one of the interlocutors, and might thus not have all perspectives so clearly at hand.

5.2.3. The analysis

5.2.3.1. The plot of the story

James Clavell's *The Children's Story* is a story about the 25 minutes during which a classroom of seven-year-olds is politically converted into accepting an enemy force.

A foreign power has invaded the U.S., and all over the country representatives of this power have been given the task to show how good and friendly, in fact, how much better, the state of affairs is now that the foreign power is in charge, in comparison to the situation people had been living in before.

In the school class of the story there are two main forces, on the one hand there is the New Teacher, and on the other hand there is Johnny, whose father has been very active in the resistance movement, and who is the only pupil who overtly objects to being converted. The story is ultimately about how the New Teacher manages to persuade Johnny into accepting the enemy.

At the discourse level, the story is an instance
of persuasive discourse in its most simple and straightforward fashion: the New Teacher's persuasive discourse is directed toward children of the age of seven. Although Clavell is the omniscient writer, the story is often told, and the situation experienced, from the point of view of the children.

The analysis will partly follow the temporal order of the story, but it will also move from Coherence through Politeness into Involvement. In section 5.2.4. I will take up some of the most striking aspects of the story anew, and relate them more explicitly to the pragmatic parameters.

5.2.3.2. Manifestations of Coherence-establishing strategies

Persuasion does not take place only at the verbal level. When attempting to influence somebody, it is of great help if you also look influential - where your particular looks and behavior, of course, have to be synchronized with the purpose at hand, and the group or individual toward which persuasion is directed.

When the New Teacher enters the classroom for the first time, she immediately succeeds in making a positive impression on the children. And that is the first prerequisite of effective persuasion.5
The children gasped. They had expected an ogre or giant or beast or witch or monster ... But instead of a monster, a beautiful young girl stood in the doorway. Her clothes were neat and clean, all olive green - even her shoes. But most important, she wore a lovely smile, and when she spoke, she spoke without the trace of an accent.

In the next couple of pages, the New Teacher is given even more positive attributes: her perfume was clean, fresh and young, she smelled youth and cleanliness; she spoke gently, and radiantly; she sat down on the floor "as gracefully as an angel."

In fact, not only did everything in her behavior say that she took good care of herself (clean, fresh), but also that she cared about her audience. If a person has an established authority, his/her way of dressing might not make a difference with respect to his/her credibility and power, but if - as in this case - the New Teacher had all reason to believe that her authority would be questioned, her way of dressing would at least not make them question that authority even more. We have to remember also that to a seven-year-old sparkling clothes are apt to arouse more positive feelings than what they would for adults. But in the adult world, too, dress and behavior are important for creating a positive first impression. If you come to a meeting in a shabby dress, you not only give a bad impression of yourself, your behavior is also most likely interpreted by your interlocutor as being negatively directed against him/her, i.e. as being offensive. (In this case the impression that the New Teacher's appearance
communicates of caring for her audience is not sincere. We learn that from the omniscient writer. But potential ambiguity is enough at the level of implicit pragmatics.)

In addition to her dress, cleanliness, and youth, the New Teacher had also learned everybody's names, and she had found out that it was Mary's birthday today. In other words, she (succeeds in giving the impression that she) regards the children as people and as individuals.

The New Teacher's non-verbal behavior is most effective in the initial stage of her persuasive task. It creates the important first impression. (This is also paralleled in Clavell's treatment of the subject. There is much less stress on the New Teacher's non-verbal actions in the latter part of the book.) The non-verbal dimension is also a very implicit one. You may notice that somebody is clean, but you might not directly associate your positive evaluation of that person with his/her cleanliness. This association takes place on an implicit, unconscious level.

Except for the non-verbal cues, the New Teacher also uses a number of other devices to make the children see not only the Coherence of the enemy's framework, but also its positive sides. In particular, she uses metaphorical expressions, and draws parallels between the new and the old systems.

A further efficient Coherence strategy that the New Teacher uses is to compare the new situation (manifested in herself) with the previous situation (manifested in
their old teacher, Miss Worden, and in their parents). The purpose of the New Teacher's comparisons are, of course, obvious (to the reader, but perhaps not to the children), but comparisons have to be made very implicitly if they are to serve the purposes of persuasion. Her strategy is to be as logical and common-sensical as possible - using the seven-year-old's idea of common-sense to her advantage - and lead the children into a situation where they cannot but draw the conclusions she wants them to draw. An example follows. The New Teacher says:

(2) a. Well, before we start our lesson, perhaps there are some questions you want me to answer.

Her use of well here almost says that she is not so inclined to answer them (cf. R. Lakoff 1973); i.e. she just wants them to get the principle clear.

(2) b. Ask me anything you like. That's only fair, isn't it, if I ask you questions.

'Fairness' is stressed here, as all over the story - and it is used here, as elsewhere, ambiguously between its technical and its 'children's' sense. If the New Teacher is fair, and she represents the conquerors, then they must all be 'fair,' she wants to imply.

Mary then says:

(3) We never get to ask our real teacher any questions.

Notice that Mary uses the present tense; and she talks about Miss Worden as their real teacher. So, at this point the children have not yet accepted the New Teacher completely.
(2) c. You can always ask me anything. That's the fair way. The new way. Try me.

'Fairness' and 'newness' are presented together, to implicitly indicate that they equal one another. It is also implicitly directed toward Mary's statement. This is the 'now,' and the New Teacher is their real teacher.

5.2.3.3. Manifestations of the use of different interactive strategies

The New Teacher is in an extremely dominant position. Not only is she the teacher, she is also a representative of the invaders. Thus, she could use a very power-ridden Distance strategy to convert the children. She could threaten them, she could even use physical force to make them do as she wants. To a certain extent she also uses her status as a teacher and therefore a power-ridden strategy when she makes the kind of comparisons exemplified in the previous section. However, overtly these comparisons do not appeal to feelings, but are in the format that a teacher as teacher would be expected to use to inform her pupils.

But it is not enough to make the children obey. She also wants to make them think the way she does. If they (= the invaders) manage to convert the children, then at least they will not have any problems with the next adult generation. And in order to reach this goal, she knows that she will be much more effective if she uses a strategy that is closer to Camaraderie than to Distance Politeness.
In this particular case, the use of Deference strategies would be difficult, since the children know they do not have the power. Thus, they do not have to act as if they did not have power; and for the New Teacher to pretend that they do have power would be paradoxical in the light of her status. But as we shall see below, she occasionally - and very effectively - reverts to Deference strategies, too.

However, what the New Teacher does, is not to choose to follow either the Distance or the Camaraderie/Deference strategy. Instead, she chooses to keep both these strategies within reach. In fact, part of the reason why her persuasion becomes so efficient is that she knows how to alternate between the two strategies.

Again, one example will have to suffice.

The New Teacher cannot use a Distance strategy even when she talks to Miss Worden at the beginning of the story (and Miss Worden surely knows her situation and status in relation to that of the New Teacher):

(1) a. Hello, Miss Worden.
   b. I'm taking over your class now.
   c. You are to go to the principal's office.
Miss Worden asks why, and is very upset and afraid.
(1) d. He just wants to talk to you, Miss Worden.
"The New Teacher said gently."
(1) e. You really must take better care of yourself.
   f. You shouldn't be so upset.

Here the New Teacher obviously could have used a Distance strategy. And she also does so to a certain extent: (1b)
is a direct statement, instead of something like 'Please don't feel bad, but I have to take over your class now,' or some form of 'I'm sorry, but I have to ... .' Utterance (1c) is also quite direct, but she could have said, 'Go to the principal's office straight away!' Instead she mitigates her statement and her use of the BE + to INF construction suggests that this has been decided on by somebody else: some 'unknown' entity. She, the New Teacher, is not herself responsible. It is simply something that has to happen.

A similar implicit reference to something decided on beforehand is made by using a form of shall in (1f). Palmer (1974) has suggested that one semantico-pragmatic aspect of the English modals is that will, can, must, and dare are subject-oriented: John will come means that the subject, John, has the power to decide about his comings and goings; whereas shall, may, ought, and need are discourse-oriented: John shall come implies that somebody else has decided for him, that it is predecided, and that he himself cannot influence his coming. In (1f) the New Teacher could have said 'You must not be so upset.' By using should, she does not appeal to Miss Worden, but to something like general rules of etiquette. On the other hand, the New Teacher uses the subject-oriented must in (1e), implicitly indicating that it is her own fault: Miss Worden herself has the power to take care of herself - but she has not done so.
Why, then, does the New Teacher not use a straight Distance strategy toward Miss Worden? The answer is obvious: because of the children. She cannot give them an impression of her being 'bad' or 'cruel' to anyone. Note also Clavell's masterly indication of this two-edged situation in the phrase "The New Teacher said gently."

In (1a) Hello is for the children - she does not say 'How do you do.' In (1d) she uses the pragmatic particle just to indicate to the children the unimportance of going to see the principal, but at the same time just is an indication to Miss Worden that the situation could be extremely serious for her: she knows, or should know, that the expression X just wants to ... is a standard way of indicating the seriousness of a situation. In (1e) she uses the pragmatic particle really to show Involvement. But combined with must, her way of expressing this is almost as if she spoke to a child: You really must. And in (1f) she uses the same strategy: You shouldn't be. We can imagine her raised finger, the slight horizontal back-and-forth movement of her head, and the smacking sound from her mouth.

Thus, at the same time as she talks to Miss Worden, her addressee, she simultaneously chooses her words and expressions to make an impact on the children, her audience. And this, of course, is something that we frequently see in political speeches: the person who asks an im-pertinent question can not easily be persuaded, so the best
strategy for the politician is to concentrate his/her efforts on persuading the other people in the audience, for instance by belittling or reinterpreting the questioner's point.

In general, then, we note that persuasive discourse is very different from ordinary discourse: whereas in ordinary interactions you start out at with Formal Deference strategies (cf. Scollon & Scollon 1981), and work your way toward Informal Deference, or even Camaraderie/Deference, in persuasive discourse you start out on either side - or on both sides simultaneously - of (Formal and Informal) Deference in the Politeness hierarchy (cf. Table 4.3.), and work your way towards the middle. (This principle is shown more in detail in Östman forthcoming e.)

5.2.3.4. Markers of Involvement

One very striking feature of indicating Involvement all through the story is the New Teacher's use of an abundance of pragmatic particles in her persuasive discourse. With these she mitigates and qualifies her speech acts, and indicates her (insincere?) Involvement in the situation, and in the welfare of the children. She uses just to belittle a fact, tags to appeal to her audience and create a feeling of Deference, and really to express her intense feelings. Other particles she often reverts to are well, of course, just because and after all.7

But except for the use of different pragmatic
particles, there are also other kinds of markers of Involvement in persuasive language. Here I will just deal with a small selection from Clavell's story. Clavell uses both explicit and implicit markers of Involvement.

The three examples below contain clear instances of explicit indications of attitudes:

(1) That's very good, Mary. Very, very good.
(2) Yes it is a pretty [flag].
(3) Yes, Johnny, you're quite right. You're a very, very wise boy.

The interesting thing is that all three of these are used in situations where the New Teacher simply cannot be too pleased.

Utterance (1) is a response to the fact that Mary does know what pledge means. The New Teacher wants to argue that they should not say things they do not understand. Fortunately for the New Teacher, no one knows what allegiance means. Example (2) is said in reference to the stars-and-stripes, and her statement can - at best - be taken as ironical: the flag, after all, is the sign that stands for the conquered nation. Example (3), finally, is said in a situation where the children are supposed to keep their eyes closed while they pray to Our Leader for candy, but Johnny peaks, and sees that it is not Our Leader that puts candy on everyone's desk, but the New Teacher herself.

These examples suggest quite strongly that the use of explicit expressions of (especially positive) attitudes in
persuasive discourse is a mark of insincerity. For children at age seven, however, the New Teacher's explicit expression of positive attitudes in this manner is taken as a sign of her appreciation. The explicitly expressed positive appreciation is, however, a conventional aspect of school-teaching. That is, as pupils the children need appreciation when they are right. However, for the New Teacher, the children have a dual role of being pupils and persuadees, and in their latter role, the children do not fare well when they behave in a manner that produces the New Teacher's responses in (1-3). Adults would be more alert and suspicious than children when hearing too much explicit expressions of positive Involvement from somebody they do not know very well.

Above, I mentioned the use of different pragmatic particles as implicitly marking also Involvement in persuasive discourse. I will here give some further examples of implicit markers of Involvement in the New Teacher's speeches in Clavell's story.

The use of children's vocabulary helps to enforce her 'we' relationship with the children. She communicates that even though she is a teacher, she is willing to use small kids' words like tummy. Other words with the same effect include daddy, fine (in the expression "a fine man riding a fine horse"), and fair.

Another construction typical of children's discourse is I wish as used by the New Teacher in the following ex-
ample.

(4) I wish I could have a piece of it [=the flag]. If it's so important, I think we should all have a piece of it. Don't you.

Notice again the concretization: if something is important, then one should want it. And she manages to get the children to accept cutting up their flag into little pieces. Notice also that the appeal here (the tag don't you) is not a question. In other words, she is not prosodically giving the children the option to disagree, even if verbally she seems to be doing just that.

A final example involves strengthening a phrase with words like lovely, which are part both of typical women's language and of children's discourse. And thus, since she uses it as a woman, the subtleness with which it can be interpreted as coming closer to children's language is very unconscious and implicit.

(5) Oh yes, I have a lovely surprise for you. You're all going to stay overnight with us. We have a lovely room and beds and lots of food, and we'll all tell stories and have such a lovely time.

Notice the expressions I have a ... surprise for you, We have lots of food, and We'll all tell stories, which all appeal to the kinds of things children like.

All these cases of indicating implicit Involvement are closely connected to the Politeness strategy of Camaraderie/Deference. The New Teacher uses the register of the group she wants to convert in order to show her solidarity with that group. But it is not a matter of first establishing rapport, and then trying to persuade the
victim(s). You have to do both at the same time: the more effort you need to put down in being persuasive, the more frequently you have to use indicators of rapport in your discourse.

5.2.3.5. The goal achieved

As I said in the beginning of this analysis, The Children's Story is not really about how the New Teacher persuades a whole class; it is rather the story of persuading Johnny. We do not know much about Johnny, so maybe it is too much to interpret his position as that of a leader. But it is with him the New Teacher has problems, and she also knows that when and if she manages to persuade him, that is the end of her ordeal.

The first step for Johnny toward getting persuaded comes after the New Teacher has talked about fear. Her argumentation here is in many respects similar to the argumentation that Johnny's father has previously used to him. Johnny's father had said:

(1) Don't be afraid, Johnny. If you fear too much, you'll be dead even though you're alive.

The New Teacher says:

(2) Fear is something that comes from the inside, from your tummies, and good strong children like you have to put food in your tummies. Not fear.

Clavell writes:

(3) Johnny hated her even though he knew she was right about fear.

Thus, Johnny's journey towards getting persuaded starts
with the New Teacher showing him what she has in common with his father (perhaps unconsciously; but as a Coherence strategy Clavell uses it effectively).

But Johnny is not easily persuaded, and when nothing else seems to work on him, the New Teacher resorts to the traditional method of 'if you can't beat them, join them.' Or, in this case: 'have them join you.' Johnny gets special treatment, he gets a better position than his friends - he gets promoted in society (i.e. in the classroom). The New Teacher says:

(4) And because Johnny was especially clever, I think we should make him monitor for the whole week, don't you?

"Johnny decided that he liked his teacher very much. Because she told the truth. Because she was right about fear. Because she was right about God." But we all know what the real reason was: because she made him monitor for the whole week.

In general, then, on the basis of the analysis offered in this section, we can see that there are two ways to deal with obstinate people: either - as in Johnny's case - give them special favors, and they will let themselves be persuaded; or - as in the case of Johnny's father - put them to 'school' and use more direct and explicit means of persuasion.
5.2.4. Conclusion

My analysis of Clavell's *The Children's Story* is, of course, only a partial analysis. (A more extensive analysis is given in Östman to appear.) Because of the medium in which the text is transmitted, I have been forced to leave prosody out of my account; there are also, of course, grammatical constructions and turns of phrases that should have been dealt with more in detail. As an example, note the implication of the use of *allow* in the following sentence: "the New Teacher opened the window and allowed them to throw it [=the flagpole] into the playground."

In 5.2.1. I justified using this kind of story as it is a prime example of how persuasion works in a simplified context. Relatively speaking (and I have indicate in my analysis what this means), however, the strategies used in the story by the New Teacher to the children are the same as those that would be used in ordinary persuasive discourse, and the type of linguistic manifestations of persuasive discourse directed toward adults will also turn out to be very similar to those we have found in this story.

Persuasive language can to a certain extent be characterized as a psychological dialect. It is a register of speaking that the speaker is in command of; and by using the persuasive register, s/he associates him/herself with a particular role in society. However, persuasive discourse differs from a psychological dialect in that everyone has
access to it, and everyone uses it only under certain conditions, and not necessarily in particular, recurring contexts of situation, like at work, or at home.

What, then, are the markers of this psychological dialect? What are the verbal devices we use in persuasion, and what are the cues that the addressee should be aware of in order to realize that s/he is the target of an effort at persuasion? As I argued in 5.2.1., in more explicit instances of persuasion this is not a problem. As a manifestation of a Distance strategy, even the use of direct commands by the persuader is permissible - not to mention physical power.

In general, as we saw, there is no one marker of persuasion, nor does there exist a predetermined set of markers that are by definition persuasive. In fact, such a situation would be counter to the whole essence of persuasion. If, as I have argued, persuasion - especially Deference persuasion - is implicit, then the unmarked situation would be an avoidance of markers - especially explicit markers - that might indicate that you are in the process of persuading somebody.

Markers of psychological dialects tend in general to be implicit, since by choosing to communicate in accordance with a particular psychological dialect, you do so for a purpose. And if you make your purpose too obvious and explicit, your actions and yourself might well get interpreted as being pretentious, which might easily lead to an
interpretation of you as somebody not to be taken seriously.

But, as this analysis has shown, even though we might not be able to separate out any specific markers of persuasion, there are still verbal features in persuasive discourse that implicitly indicate the persuasive purpose of a persuader. And because no such persuasive marker can be extracted, the analysis I have presented, and the framework within which the analysis is presented, is crucial for an understanding of how persuasive discourse works.

5.2.4.1. Coherence

Coherence shows up in the general purpose of persuasive discourse. Persuasion involves an attempt by Speaker A to alter the coherent framework in which Speaker B lives and acts, into becoming more like the coherent framework that Speaker A lives in. Naturally, as in all communication, Speaker A might not be sincere about his/her framework, or s/he might be able to persuade B that framework would be good for him/her, although A does not live in accordance with it him/herself. (For instance, A and B might be smokers, but A is older, and can try to persuade B that s/he should stop before s/he completely destroys his/her lungs; for Speaker A him/herself this might already be too late.)

Political, moral, and religious persuasion is often
directed not to one person at a time, but to the whole of a society, a particular group in the society, or a culture as a whole, against a prevailing tradition. The goal is to introduce new, or simply different, values as being more rewarding than those that the people in that culture live by today. In this very broad sense, persuasion draws on the implicit aspect of Coherence. As we saw in the analysis in 5.2.3., a very effective way to persuade someone is to (insincerely) adopt the persuadee's frame of reference in a number of important respects, search for a(n insincere) common ground, and on that basis, little by little, change that framework - using (pseudo-)logical arguments.

In this connection we can note Gumperz's (1982:49) argument that conventions of code switching are especially frequent in appeals, arguments, and any discussions where the speaker wants to persuade others. But code switching does not necessarily have to involve two or more clearly distinct languages: it is even more implicit (and perhaps even more effective) if dialects, or even registers of the same language are used for this purpose.

5.2.4.2. Politeness

The use of different Politeness strategies turned out to be very significant. Persuasive discourse seems to use the whole scale of interactive strategies, and what is particularly significant for persuasion is the shift
of strategies in one and the same persuasion. R. Lakoff's (1975) argument that Distance and Camaraderie strategies can never be adhered to simultaneously, will not hold for persuasive discourse. In persuasive discourse these strategies not only can be used simultaneously, they have to be used in that manner: the switch from one to the other is typical of this type of discourse. (The reason being, of course, that as persuader you do not always have to be sincere on all levels: the end justifies the means.)

In general, persuasive discourse draws a lot on aspects of Politeness. Persuasion functions in an interaction, and as we have seen, Politeness is always involved when people interact. But who is allowed to persuade whom, who is able to persuade whom, and what happens in persuasive discourse in relation to the use of different strategies of Politeness?

Intuitively, having power seems to be an important factor for the persuader. But again, we can distinguish between, on the one hand, more explicit attempts at persuasion, which usually are successful either if the persuader is the more powerful - i.e. if s/he uses Distance or Distance/Deference strategies - or, if the relationship between persuader and persuadee is one of Camaraderie. In the latter case, too, power seems to be important, since communication is here ideally supposed to be direct. However, the interactants in a Camaraderie relationship would not accept that persuasion is taking place, or that

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persuasion even exists as a potential strategy between them: if the relationship is really a Camaraderie relationship, then the interactants do in fact live according to the same frame of Coherence.

Within Deference Politeness, on the other hand, persuasion takes place in a more implicit manner. If, in accordance with how I characterized Deference earlier, the interactants (both !) act as if the other person was in charge, persuasion cannot use power, but must use 'anti-power.'

Indirectness is acceptable in society as a manifestation of a Distance or Distance/Deference strategy (cf. political speeches, for instance), but indirectness is not highly valued as a Deference strategy (cf. women's language). (Cf. R. Lakoff 1980.) If persuasive discourse is used in Distance or Distance/Deference Politeness, it will be more explicit (though potentially indirect) - and that seems to be fairly acceptable, since - in principle, at least - one can always decide not to be persuaded. However, indirectness in the persuasive discourse of Deference Politeness might easily give the potential persuadee a sense of insecurity. Not only is the persuasion indirect, it is also implicit. And that may be the reason why speakers of women's language are not taken to sound trustworthy. The conclusion that especially male-language speakers draw, then, is that women (as prototypical speakers of women's language) are not only irresponsible
(cf. the quasi-transitive hierarchy discussed in Östman 1981a), they are also constantly making up schemes to get others (usually men) to do as they want. Again, all this is of course an interpretation by the speakers of male language, who use a different norm of Politeness than speakers of the female register. That is, the Coherence of their respective cultures is not identical. (And this state of affairs contributes to creating and maintaining negative connotations for women's language.)

5.2.4.3. Involvement

Within the realms of the parameter of Involvement you show sympathy, and that you care for the persuadee. Attitudes are typically communicated via pragmatic markers: pragmatic particles, the use of particular words and phrases, and the appeal to what the persuader implies is common sense. One interesting result here is that the explicit use of attitudinal expressions in persuasive discourse tends to be a sign of insincerity.

Thus, persuasion also draws on the parameter of Involvement. If you attempt to change somebody's beliefs and values, you best succeed by appealing to that person's feelings: his/her emotions, attitudes, even prejudices. Or, if that person has no prejudices (!), you can attempt to create prejudices for him/her, in order to persuade him/her of the opposite.

Not only do we refer to feelings and Involvement
when we appeal to stereotypical qualities, say, of a people: "Jews are X," "Italians are Y," "Americans are Z," and "Scandinavians are Ø"; we also use similar methods in ordinary conversation, in a more implicit manner. One well-known way that has often been discussed within lexical semantics of how to create a positive or negative attitude toward something - and thereby to persuade somebody into liking or disliking that something - is to use a synonym with the suitable connotation. We all know how we can make use of 'synonyms' like statesman vs. politician, or thrifty vs. economical vs. stingy, for persuasive purposes, and, in general, how we can use 'referent honorifics' (Levinson 1983:92) like lady, steed (for 'horse'), residence (for 'home') and dine (for 'eat') to show our appreciation of, or our relation to, the referents of these words.
Footnotes to Chapter 5.

1These specifications (as well as those given in the Active Pattern in Figure 5.2.) of the elements that a constructional type consists of are very rough specifications. The order of the elements, for instance, vary typologically, and some languages can incorporate Subjects into Predicates, whereas others can not. The characterizations within parentheses are only given in order to bring forth the intended associations in the reader.

2But, of course, saying that, really means that there is very little universality at all in the factors, and perhaps in semantics in general. Thus, if, as I think, semantics should be directly correlated with cognition and thinking, the alleged universality of these factors, of course, depends on how one thinks cognition works.

There are at least three reasons why I personally feel that semantics is not something that should be talked about in universal terms, but rather as a language-specific phenomenon:
- linguistic relativity (cf. Whorf 1941, Silverstein 1979),
- thinking can take place in terms of (conventionalized) images, and semantic structure is partly at least based on conventional imagery, rather than on universal logic (cf. G. Lakoff 1981, Lakoff & Johnson 1980),
- the relation between semantics (meaning) and knowledge
structure: semantic structure is partly at least characterized relative to one's knowledge structure (cf. Langacker 1983). This suggests that semantics is even to some extent speaker-specific.

In this way of seeing language, the constructional types are (largely conventional) symbolizations of human cognitive structures.

3I am grateful to Jeanne van Oosten for reminding me of this construction.

4Compare the development of the T/V address system in English. The fact that thou fell out of use did not have the result that another pronoun was created to take its place. The whole system of address terminology had to be changed, so that, for instance, avoidance of address term became a prominent alternative.

5The Coronet edition has no page numbers. In fact, the graphic channel is very dominant, and well done, in the sense that it parallels the development of, and activities in, the story. It has blank pages, and half-filled pages, where this is called for - to give the appropriate effect.

6Cf. e.g. Quirk et al. 1973. Levinson 1983:72-3 also notes that the expression You are to X encodes that the source of the instruction is not equivalent to the speaker, and it gives the speaker authority.
Some other important particles for persuasive discourse include
- **why** to suggest something obvious (cf. R. Lakoff 1973);
- **anyway** to suggest that what has just preceded is of little importance, a digression: let us now get on to the important issues (or back to the main line of the story; cf. Östman 1981a);
- **you know** to imply that something is settled and accepted although it is not (cf. Östman 1981a).
- introductory **so** and **then** to indicate that the speaker is allowed to draw the inference that follows: **so** because of what s/he hears or perceives, **then** because of what the interlocutor has just said. (cf. Levinson 1983).

Some further important devices include
- the switch from **this** to **that** to indicate emotional distance, and from **that** to **this** to show empathy (cf. Levinson 1983:81, R. Lakoff 1974, Fillmore 1975a, Lyons 1977); and
- the use of nominalized constituents to introduce an (unwarranted) presupposition (cf. 4.2.3.).

My definition of a psychological dialect follows Robin Lakoff 1981. Briefly, a social dialect is something that you learn as a child and that has a solidarity function, but generally, you tend to have to give it up if you want to get somewhere in this world. A psychological dialect, on the other hand, shows a certain personality and does not have to be given up. An example of a psychological
dialect would be the language of politicians. It is a dialect that is consciously learnt for a particular purpose, as a second dialect, and it is fairly easy to code-switch between this dialect, and, say, the language a politician speaks at home to his/her spouse and children. By using a particular psychological dialect you want to present yourself as a certain kind of person.

9Cf. in this connection Allen 1983.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS

6.1. Summary of results

6.1.1. Theoretical issues

6.1.1.1. General

I started the investigations in this study by looking at a set of pragmatic particles in Solf. It is common knowledge in linguistics that for an element of language to receive the characterization 'pragmatic particle,' it should lack semantic meaning, and only have a pragmatic function in language. (Cf. e.g. Levinson 1983; Östman 1982a.) Usually, also, what we potentially find in languages is, on the one hand, a set of grammaticized particles with a clear function (like the question particle -k0 in Finnish), and, on the other hand, there are particles that cannot be given semantic specifications (like sitä in Finnish; cf. Hakulinen 1975). However, in my analysis of question particles in Solf, I found that there is a number of particles that are indeterminate with respect to having a semantic meaning and a pragmatic function. These particles potentially have both - simultaneously. On the basis of this state of affairs, a number of theoretical issues have to be seen in a new light, both in the area of pragmatics, and in language in general (cf. below, 6.2.).

My analysis of question particles in Solf showed that
it is not possible to give them a definition in terms of necessity and sufficiency. For instance, I showed in 4.4. that in pragmatic terms none of the functions ascribed to a particular question particle can be seen as a necessary functional characteristic of that particle. Instead, I suggested that a particle has a number of potential functions that a speaker can draw on in a particular situation. In this sense, the Level Analysis gives each particle a prototype definition in functional terms. I also showed that the very concept 'question particle' itself has to be seen as a prototype, and that the prototype definition of question particles even has to be given over the traditional components Syntax, Semantics, and Pragmatics. Not even the semantic meaning of a particular question particle is a necessary characteristic of that particle.

The further implication of this result is even more serious in that it questions the traditional attempts to delimit linguistic features as being primarily either structural, semantic, or pragmatic. In fact, my analysis of question formation in Solf even suggests that such theoretical delimitations may turn out to be a hindrance for an appropriate description of a linguistic phenomenon.

I have also stressed the importance of the effect of a linguistic message in this study. And I would like to conclude this part of the discussion with what I think can be seen as a general result from my investigation, namely that it is in practice hardly possible (nor desirable) to
draw up any stringent borderline between (i) linguistic phenomena proper, (ii) linguistically relevant extralinguistic factors, and (iii) linguistically irrelevant factors.

6.1.1.2. Parameters and levels

From the point of view of linguistic theory, I have in this study worked on the assumption that it is feasible to discuss language with reference to the three 'components' of Structure (or, Syntax), Semantics, and Pragmatics. (Cf. further 6.2..) On this basis I have argued for a view of pragmatics that is very general in that it also deals with issues that are generally regarded as belonging to the spheres of areas like sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics. In taking such a view, I have attempted to remain close to Morris's original definition of pragmatics.

From the point of view of the meaning and function of a linguistic message, the speaker of that message performs an act of anchoring. An act of anchoring can either be performed explicitly or implicitly. Instances of explicit anchoring are dealt with in semantics terms, those of implicit anchoring are to be dealt with in pragmatics. In this study I have only dealt with the pragmatic (i.e. implicit) aspects of anchoring.

In Chapters 2 and 3 I analyzed question formation in Solf in many different perspectives. In this analysis, and especially in my attempt to deal with the particles that
partake in question formation, I did not only look at the syntax and semantics of questions. I also wanted to show in general under what conditions one type of question, for instance with one particle rather than with another, could be used. To be able to give such a varied analysis I found that the only reasonable way of approaching the issue is to look at pragmatics from its own point of view. I looked at language use from the point of view of how people use language, rather than from the point of view of how ready-made structures fit situations. (Naturally, these two perspectives cannot be separated, and such a separation is the last thing I would be in favor of.)

The three parameters that I deal with in detail in Chapter 4 are set up on a prima facie basis. The parameter of Involvement has its seat within each and every speaker: everyone has attitudes, feelings, even prejudices, and these are either communicated, or suppressed. In either case, the analyst can find their manifestations. The parameter of Politeness has interaction in focus: the relationship between a speaker and his/her addressee or audience gets expressed implicitly in the communicative acts that the speakers use. The parameter of Coherence has its seat in the society and culture in which we live and that we have been brought up in. The society has rules and constraints that have to be followed, if one is to be regarded as a full party of that society.

These three parameters are interdependent, but all
have prototypical manifestations in language. Since the manifestations of Coherence and Politeness have been dealt with extensively in the literature of pragmatics during the last decade or so, I focus on the parameter of Involvement in Chapter 4. I argue that this parameter is as important as the other two. In Chapter 4 I also suggest a method for analyzing linguistic aspects pragmatically in a way that the speakers' intuitive competence can be accounted for. This method I call the Level Analysis.

* 

The final question that is always lurking in the background is of course whether this approach, or theory, is falsifiable. One way of falsifying it would be to argue that there is no way to keep the three parameters separate, and therefore there are no three parameters. This is in fact what Leech (1983) and Halliday (1978) argue as regards the attitudinal aspect of language. They both subsume it under the interpersonal aspect. (Note that this decision not to give the attitudinal aspect of language a parameter of its own is in direct opposition to the linguistic theories of, say, Bühler and Jakobson.) This decision is based on the assumption that there is no need to make a distinction between the speaker's and the hearer's meaning (cf. Leech 1983:56-7). Since I have in this study stressed the importance of the linguistic effect of a message, I cannot agree with this assumption.
6.1.1.3. Principles and maxims

It is commonplace in pragmatics to express rules and constraints in the form of principles and maxims. Grice's (1975) Co-operative Principle and its set of Maxims are of course the prime example of this tradition, but there have of course been many extensions - in different directions - of this idea of seeing language use as governed by principles. Leech (1983) devotes a whole book to searching for principles in addition to those discussed by Grice himself and those developed in the Gricean tradition.

Drawing on Halliday's distinction between the textual and interpersonal level of communication, Leech organizes his principles and maxims in these terms, as Principles of the Interpersonal Rhetoric, and Principles of the Textual Rhetoric. The principles and maxims that Leech sets up as corresponding to the textual and interpersonal levels could well be taken over by the machinery that I have set up in the theoretical discussion of this study. In fact, my three parameters themselves could be expressed as a superprinciple of the following form:

**General pragmatic principle**

In relation to the situation in which you are, be appropriately Coherent, Polite, and Involved!

In the Interpersonal Rhetoric, Leech has Principles like the Cooperative Principle (taken over from Grice), the
Politeness Principle (with Maxims of Tact, Generosity, Approbation, and Modesty), and the Irony Principle. And in the Textual Rhetoric we find the Processibility Principle (with an End-focus Maxim and an End-weight Maxim), the Clarity Principle, the Economy Principle, and the Expressivity Principle. Leech does not, however, have any principles or maxims for what I have called the Involvement parameter. In an attempt to translate the results of my discussion of Involvement in this study into a principle, I suggest the following.

**General Involvement Principle**

Know the attitudinal values that the particular (i.e. your) culture ascribes to various concepts, and express (or suppress the expression of) your feelings, attitudes, and prejudices in those terms!

We all follow this principle in our daily routines, but the foreign language learner will also need to learn how to apply it as part of gaining communicative competence in a foreign language. Below are five Maxims under this general principle. The three first come under a supermaxim that could be stated bluntly as: Do not be honest!

**Maxims**

1. Do not be too certain!

   Avoid expressing your certainty about the content of a proposition too overtly if you know (or have reason to believe) that your interlocutor is of a
different opinion. Not only will you by so doing
be more polite, you will also be more successful
in getting your addressee to accept your view. (Cf.
the results in 3.4. and in 5.2.)

2. Do not be negative!

Avoid expressing negative feelings overtly and ex-
plicitly (unless you know for a fact that your ad-
dressee shares these negative feelings). In particu-
lar, avoid expressing your possible negative feelings
about your interlocutor (unless specifically asked
to do so). (Cf. 3.4.)

3. Do not be too positive!

Avoid expressing positive feelings too overtly, since
this might be taken as an indication of insincerity.
(Cf. 5.2.3.4.)

Maxims 4 and 5 can together be expressed as a supermaxim
with the force: Plan your Involvement!

4. Evaluate the purpose of your utterance!

Plan (or refrain from planning) your utterance in
accordance with your purpose of the interaction. De-
cide whether to manifest an attitude, emotion, or
prejudice or not in your discourse. For instance, use
pragmatic particles in certain situations, and avoid
using them in others. (Cf. also 5.1.2.3..)

5. Use appropriate linguistic means!

This is a further specification of the General
Involvement Principle, and it says that you should use the pragmatic particles, vocabulary, and syntax whose implicit values correspond to the feelings you want to communicate (implicitly). Plan the verbal manifestation of the emotions, attitudes, and prejudices you want to communicate to your addressee!

6.1.2. Empirical findings

Apart from a number of shorter discussions of various linguistic features in different languages, I have in this study primarily dealt with three areas of language: the behavior of question particles in Solf, the structure and behavior of passive constructions in Swedish, and the manifestations of persuasive discourse in the light of an analysis of a literary text. I shall here repeat the major findings in each of these areas.

6.1.2.1. Question particles

In my analysis of questions and requests for confirmation in Solf I found that one third of the examples I had gathered from spontaneous conversations did not utilize the same means for requesting information or confirmation that standard Swedish uses. Furthermore, I found that only one sixth of the cases were such that they did not contain any particles. This quantitative fact in itself suggests
the importance of certain pragmatic particles for the formation of questions and requests in Solf.

In my analysis of the syntax and semantics of question formation in Solf I found that it was in particular the particles tå, då, tå då, elå, and na that occurred in such questions. Even more interesting was the finding that each of these could be used as the only means for indicating that an utterance is interrogative rather than declarative. In my further analyses of the behavior of these particles I came to the conclusion that the particles då and elå have indeed become partly grammaticized in the language.

Seen from a pragmatic point of view, it is important to approach question formation in Solf in relation to the general pragmatics of the society. In particular, I noted, and showed, that interpersonal relations are carried on in a very indirect manner in the village. Linguistically this is manifested not only in an abundant use of pragmatic particles to hedge whatever is communicated, but also in a number of other syntactic constructions, like the åm-construction, which structurally is an indirect question used by itself, and the dö saa dö construction, which syntactically is a combination of a a statement and a question. Because none of the question particles are completely grammaticized in Solf, I also found it useful to give a pragmatic account of their meanings and functions in terms of the three parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and
Involvement. In fact, I argue that such an analysis is needed in order to be able to give a realistic account of the indeterminate functions of question particles in Solf.

Further important findings in my discussion of question particles in Solf include the result that age was an important factor in the use of different kinds of question particles, and that psychological states like friendliness and aggressiveness can be communicated by the use (or non-use) of these particles. I also argued that a certain influence from Finnish can be noticed, but that it is more likely to be an indirect influence, in part due to a universal restriction of languages tending to grammaticize either particles or prosody for question formation.

6.1.2.2. Passive and persuasion

In Chapter 5 I illustrated the workings of the parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement on two other linguistic areas. The purpose of these analyses was not primarily to give some new information about how passives and persuasive discourse function, but rather to show how already well-established findings can be given a clear framework with reference to the pragmatic parameters discussed in Chapter 4, which - as we saw in the discussion of question particles - are needed anyway to give an intuitive account of pragmatic matters in language.

In my brief discussion of the semantics of passive
constructions in Swedish I argued that the semantic feature of Agent suppression is definitional of all passives. This forced me to regard also indefinite-person constructions as passives - although they have active morphology in languages like English.

With my discussion of the pragmatic potentialities of passives I showed how the use of syntactically active and passive constructions can be used in situations to communicate implicit pragmatic information in addition to their semantic content. Also, I showed how the different types of semantically defined passives have different pragmatic implications. Since in all situations I have encountered, the three passive constructions in Swedish (the morphological, the periphrastic, and the indefinite-person construction) can be kept distinct on the basis of their different inherent Orientation, I have come to regard Orientation as a semantic feature of Swedish grammar.

* In my analysis of persuasion I based my discussion on a text that was by definition persuasive. The question I asked was whether there are particular means in language by which a speaker achieves a persuasive effect in verbal (or even non-verbal) interactions. I argued that persuasive discourse cannot be fully understood unless persuasion is seen as an implicit communicative act.

More in particular, I argued that one of the main features of persuasion is the avoidance of conventionalized
markers that would mark a piece of discourse as persuasive. In my analysis of James Clavell's *The Children's Story* I pointed to a number of uses of particular linguistic manifestations of choices that the writer/character had made, and by which they communicated more on an implicit level than what the surface structure of the story might at first indicate. I also analyzed the implicit markers of persuasion in terms of the three parameters of pragmatics, and showed how reference to them creates a neat framework for the understanding of the story as a whole.

6.2. The overall picture

In this study I have mainly been concerned with giving an overview of the aspect of pragmatics in linguistics. I have, however, indicated that I accept the customary three-way division of labor in linguistics in terms of Structure (or Syntax), Semantics, and Pragmatics. In this final section I will elaborate a little on how my component of pragmatics fits into a general theory of language. In particular, I want to say something about where to draw the line between semantics and pragmatics, in addition to the line between explicitness and implicitness that I have discussed earlier. Of necessity, the exposition will be very brief and preliminary.
6.2.1. Background

In Chapter 1 I briefly mentioned that the predominant way in which linguistic theory has been discussed in the twentieth century is in terms of boxes. Good examples of language interpreted as the interaction between a number of various boxes or components are the structuralist view and the transformational-generative view. What these views have in common is that you start from the inside, almost literally, and work yourself outwards. In principle, both structuralism and transformational grammar furthermore tried to use the same kinds of rules for explaining different kinds of linguistic phenomena.

Recently, a number of functionalist theories and analyses have been suggested, where another avenue of reasoning is taken: it is argued that one should start with the functions of language, and show how different functions get manifested in linguistic form. Whereas functionalists working in the structural tradition take a form-to-function approach to language, recent functionalist work attempts to take a function-to-form approach. (For an excellent overview, and a long list of references, see Nichols 1984.)

It seems to be tacitly assumed, however, that you have to choose either of these strategies, and consequently show that the alternative strategy is untenable.

Now, if you operate with only these two points of view of, or perspectives on, language - as, again, most functionalists seem to do, you also have to divide up the
labor of accounting-for-language between these two. But there seems to be a tacit assumption that language is a product, something that exists 'out there,' and has both form and function as intrinsic characteristics. In this view it is fairly easy to see form in terms of phenomena that can be tied down to one kind of 'rules,' and function as being tied down by some other kind of rules, or 'tendencies.' In effect, the approaches become deterministic.

No matter how we see the diachronic development of form and function in a language, no one would argue that we can do without either of these two components of language. Linguistic form has a function, otherwise it would not be communicative, nor language; linguistic function needs to be manifested in some way - verbally or nonverbally. If it is not manifested, it will not communicate anything.

In such a bipartite view of language, meaning is generally in some sense taken for granted: either as being embedded in form from the outset (cf. the base component in transformational-generative grammar), or as being function, or as being part of function (cf. the Firthian and neo-Firthian views), or as being partly form (as lexicology) and partly function (as semantics)¹. And this is a reasonable way of viewing things as long as you restrict yourself to treating language as a product.

But once we bring in individual, flexible human beings into linguistics, we are looking at language from
the point of view of its function. And if we also want to see language as a dynamic process, we have to see language users not only as concrete individuals, but also as constructors of an abstract langue.

In the rest of this section, I want to suggest a particular division of labor, a view of language that is dynamic and that takes the individual into account.

6.2.2. The Perspectives - Filter View of language

The form-function theories are no doubt an improvement over the box view of language in the sense that a form-function view explicitly indicates that there is a qualitative distinction to be made. The 'form' takes care of the structural aspects of language, and the 'function' takes care of the use of language in context. But even though we here take into account the individual in relation to his/her society and to other individuals, we do not find the individual him/herself there at all, at least not directly. That is, the COGNITIVE component is missing: the individual's MIND has not been taken enough into account explicitly. Or rather, it has been taken into account, but only in relation to other minds.

In the present theory I therefore keep to a tri-partition of the conglomerate called 'language.' The three parts are STRUCTURE, SEMANTICS, and PRAGMATICS. Roughly, structure is language specific and refers to the form, the means, the tool; semantics is (in the last resort) in-
individual specific, and refers to the cognitive, psychological make up of a speaker; and pragmatics is culture specific, and refers to the social and the cultural.

I talk about the **Syntactic perspective** and the **Pragmatic perspective** on language: you enter language from two different perspectives, simultaneously; and the **Semantic filter**, through which you abstract and conceptualize both the information from the two perspectives, and from the world around you. Thus, the theory of linguistic behavior that I am here advancing I call **The Perspectives - Filter View of Language**.

When you describe a linguistic phenomenon, you have to approach that phenomenon simultaneously from two points of view:

1) from the internal, structural perspective, which accounts for the existing linguistic means (phonemes, morphemes, clauses) that we can use in a given situation — that we even have to use if we want to communicate verbally. In this perspective, we see language as a formal, autonomous system.

2) The other perspective starts out from language as part of human behavior, with special stress on social interaction and culture. This is what I call the pragmatic perspective.

A linguistic theory constantly needs to keep these two perspectives within reach — as does every speaker of that language. This is little more than stating that syntax
is influenced by pragmatic aspects, and vice versa.

What is a mistake in structural theories is to try to explain pragmatic aspects with structural means. The pragmatic perspective needs its own tools. (Cf. also Levinson 1983:294.) To add a new box with the label 'Pragmatics' on it, or put all the 'smaller' boxes into a larger pragmatics box, is doing pragmatics from within the structure of language. The pragmatics of this study is a perspective from the outside. (The structural perspective on language deals with and explicates the more-or-less autonomous means - usually verbal means - that we have to use in speaking and communicating.)

'Meaning' in this view is perhaps diachronically a secondary phenomenon (cf. below), but for each speaker-hearer in each given situation, meaning is the primary aspect of language. Meaning is a particularization, an abstraction of the 'inputs' from the structural and pragmatic perspectives. Semantics can be seen as a buffer zone between the structural and the pragmatic perspectives, between language structure, and the process that the use of language implies. It has its direct correlates in psycholinguistic aspects: perception, cognition, understanding, and memory. Semantics is, in short, the cognitive aspect on language, which tries to satisfy the demands of both the other perspectives.

As an illustration, let me take an example from frame semantics and case grammar, and the distinction between
semantic roles like Agent, Patient, and Instrument on the one hand, and situational roles on the other. The situational make up of a commercial transaction includes - in our culture - the potential reference to the Buyer, the Seller, the Money (the means), and the Goods (the object, or more abstract phenomena that will move from one person to another as a result of a commercial transaction). This situational make up I regard as part of the pragmatic perspective on language: the socio-cultural definition of a prototypically coherent situation. When we want to say something about this state of affairs, we assign semantic roles to the participants (or, participating parts) of the prototypical situation. This is what happens in the semantic filter. For instance, we assign the semantic role of Agent to the Buyer, and the semantic role of Instrument to the Money.

Despite my terminology, the semantic filter is not to be seen as a filter between pragmatics and structure. The semantic filter is in another dimension: it takes input from the pragmatic and structural perspectives, but at any given point in time it has an essence of its own, which is the cognitive make up of the speaker.

A schematic representation of the Perspectives - Filter View of language is given in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1. A schematic representation of the Perspectives - Filter View of language.

The ST circle contains the linguistic choices that are structurally constrained; the PR circle contains the linguistic choices that are pragmatically motivated. And both of these types of choices are called upon in a specific situation, and made use of in constructing meaning. The PR circle, as I have shown in this study, contains the three parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement.

The circles contain different linguistic skills, and input from both perspectives is seen as entering the semantic filter. The filter gets its input both during an individual's specific act of communication, and in the act of the individual learning a language.

The arrows in Figure 6.1 capture the fact that it is through specific use that language in general may change, and that a language exists as a constantly changing process. It only exists as a product at any given time, for any given human being, and at that given point in time the
human being possesses a particular cognitive make up. At a
subsequent point in time, s/he might - and no doubt will -
change that make up.

A linguistic skill or entity in one circle usually
remains in the same perspective, and backloops to its own
circle. But a linguistic entity can also 'jump over' into
the other circle (through its loop). For instance, the
fact that a third person singular verb requires an -s
suffix is an aspect of language that normally remains in
ST. However, if the head noun of the Subject is abstract,
and it has a long postmodifier with a more concrete noun,
the verb can - especially in everyday speech - agree with
the number of the postmodifying, more concrete noun, as in
(1a). In example (1b) the finite verb has to stand in the
plural form, although formally the Subject is in the third
person singular. Here, the Subject-Predicate concord is
not determined by syntactic factors.

(1a) A large number of elks running around in the woods
of Finland, which do not seem to mind the cold
winters, have been spotted by certain long-tailed
trolls.

(1b) A great number of elk running around in the woods
of Finland, which do not seem to mind the cold
winters, have been spotted by certain long-tailed
trolls.

In both examples, the pragmatic influence on the verb is
stronger than the structural requirement. We see the same
thing in the Subject-Predicate concord of (2) and (3).

(2) The faculty were not unanimous.

(3) The faculty was unanimous.

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Similarly, there are elements of language that are, and usually remain in PR, like pragmatic particles. But a pragmatic particle can also become so conventionally associated with a way of expressing something structurally that it eventually gets grammaticized. This is what seems to have happened in Solf with respect to question formation.

The discussion in this section has been very hypothetical and contentious. It is not my intention to suggest this view of language as a necessarily better view than other theories. It is, however, an attempt to show how pragmatics as I see it fit in with syntax and semantics, and also, how these latter have to be reinterpreted if the idea of Pragmatics as Implicitness is taken seriously, and its implications are worked out in detail.
Footnotes to Chapter 6

1 For an explicit suggestion of how this last kind of form-function theory could look like, see Östman 1978a, 1979a.

2 All the three components in the Perspectives-Filter View are in the mind of the speaker-hearer. But the structural and pragmatic perspectives are more unconscious than the more consciously existing semantico-cognitive filter. However, as I discussed earlier, we have to accept some degree of conventionalization of pragmatic information, too, otherwise implicitly communicated information would never have its (intended) purpose. If we compare the situation in PR to that of ST, we notice that although we can assume that at a fairly early stage (but cf. Östman 1981a) of our language development we know, or have access to both— in Hockett's (1968) sense of 'know how.' But we have been taught about language structures at school, and have thus been made consciously aware of them. We can speculate that if schools also decided to start teaching the appropriate use of pragmatic particles like you know, these would also become more (explicitly) conventional.
APPENDIX

Notations for transcribing Solf

In Wiik & Östman 1982 we drew up guidelines for how to represent the Finland Swedish dialects in writing. These guidelines have also been followed here: for a more detailed account of the phonology, grammar, and the writing system of Solf, I refer the reader to my forthcoming grammar of Solf (Östman forthcoming c).

Below are some of the most important features to note in reading the transcription I have used in examples from Solf.

- The writing system is based on the phonological system of Solf. The default value of a symbol is close to its IPA value. Thus, <y> stands for a close front rounded vowel, and <j> stands for a palatal approximant. Some important exceptions to this general rule are given below.
- Long vowels and consonants are represented as <oo>, <ll>, <ss>, etc. Although most long vowels get diphthongized this has not been indicated in the transcription, since the diphthongization is not phonologically significant.
- <x> stands for [j]. /x/ is a separate phoneme in Solf. The sound is not part of standard Swedish.
- <ö> stands for a vowel in between [o] and [œ], with more lip-rounding than either of these.
- <o> stands for [u].
- <u> stands for [u], which is only used in loan-pronuncia-
tions, for instance when a Solf speaker uses (or tries to use) standard Finland Swedish to somebody who is not a native speaker of Solf.
- \(<\phi>\) stands for \([\phi]\), \(<t\phi>\) stands for \([t\phi]\).
- \(<\eta>\) stands for \([\eta]\).
- \(<\hat{a}>\) stands for \([\ae]\), \(<\hat{a}>\) stands for \([\o]\).
- \(<a>\) stands for a vowel neutral with respect to back and front. (The vowel diagram for Swedish is usually not depicted as a quadrilateral, but as a triangle, with the corners \(\hat{i}\), \(\hat{u}\), and \(\hat{a}\).)
- Direction of pitch movement is given as a subscript after the word on which the nuclear stress falls. Thus, 'table\(r\)' means rising, 'table\(l\)' means level, and 'table\(f\)' falling pitch on the word table.
- A dash (\(-\)) indicates a short pause, two dashes (\(--\)) indicate a longer pause. (msec. have not been indicated.)
- Parentheses inside authentic example sentences indicate that the tape-recording at this point is unclear. If something is put inside such parentheses, that something is to be taken as a guess or an approximation. Sometimes alternative suggestions have been given within pointed brackets, in the following manner:
  
  ... word X ( word1 <or: word2> word3 ) word Y ...

(Material given within parentheses in constructed sentences is optional.)

- Hesitational sounds, false starts, and other verbal material that lack propositional content are retained in
the transcriptions as they occurred, but they are not translated. Pragmatic particles and other speech act qualifiers that cannot be given a satisfactory word-for-word translation are underlined and given in their Solf form.

- $ preceding a word indicates that the pronunciation of the word is non-Solf, i.e. usually that it is (somewhat closer to) standard Finland Swedish.
- £ preceding a word indicates that the word was pronounced with ingressive airstream.
- Numbers and letters in parentheses after an example refer to the code number of the tape, preceded by 'M' for male, and 'F' for female speaker, again preceded by '-' for relatively young speakers (in these data, under 30), and '+' for relatively older speakers (over 50). The sequence (+M SOL81-J011-2) thus means 'Male speaker over 50; recorded in Solf in 1981; own recording (JO), tape number 11, side 2.'

The transcription is thus fairly broad. The writing system I have created for Solf is phonological, and thus does not rely on any established writing system. However, for reasons discussed in Wiik & Östman 1982, the symbols å, ä, ö, and the values of o and u have been taken over from the writing system of standard Swedish.
REFERENCES

(In this alphabetically ordered list of references, the letters å, ä/æ, and ö/ø have, in accordance with normal English convention, been interpreted as aa, ae, and oe, respectively.)


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