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Antilogophoricity: In Conspiracy with the Binding Theory

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Linguistics

by

Jun Yashima

2015
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Antilogophoricity: In Conspiracy with the Binding Theory

by

Jun Yashima

Doctor of Philosophy in Linguistics

University of California, Los Angeles, 2015

Professor Dominique L. Sportiche, Chair

The central goal of this dissertation is to bring to light the nature and role of antilogophoricity in the interpretation of anaphora. Unlike logophoric phenomena, which have generated a sizable literature since the mid-1970s, antilogophoric phenomena have gone largely unnoticed for a long time. This is by no means accidental because under normal circumstances the effects of antilogophoricity restrictions tend to be concealed by or masquerade as other independent phenomena.

The dissertation presents two case studies that are aimed at unveiling the fundamental properties of antilogophoricity. The first case study submits overt third-person pronouns in Japanese to close scrutiny. It has been claimed for quite some time that unlike their English counterparts, Japanese third-person pronouns cannot function as bound variables. However, some studies have reported that there are certain cases in which they can receive bound-variable interpretations. I argue that these seemingly contradictory observations stem from the fact that antilogophoric effects are at work behind the scenes. Specifically, I claim that overt third-person pronouns in Japanese are, in fact, epithets (i.e., antilogophoric pronouns) so that they can function as bound variables only when Condition B of the Binding Theory and the relevant antilogophoricity constraint are simultaneously satisfied. I further propose that the apparent
insensitivity of the referential use of Japanese third-person pronouns to antilogophoricity restrictions is attributed to the fact that Japanese, but not English, allows a structure in which a null pronoun is juxtaposed with an appositive epithet phrase.

The second case study examines the antilogophoric properties of names in English vis-à-vis Condition C of the Binding Theory. It has been widely assumed that names (or more broadly, R-expressions) are subject to Binding Condition C; that is, they must be disjoint in reference from a c-commanding pronoun. For years this condition has been used as a diagnostic test for probing syntactic structures, but the results of this test must be treated with caution. This is because Condition C is not the only disjointness condition that is claimed to apply to names. It has been sporadically reported that names in English have antilogophoric properties; namely, they must be disjoint in reference from logophoric centers. If these two disjointness conditions are independently motivated and coexist, what one identifies as Condition C effects might be due not to Condition C but to antilogophoricity restrictions. This potential confound has often been grossly neglected in the literature, but a detailed examination points to the possibility that surprisingly many cases of what we call Condition C effects stem from antilogophoricity restrictions alone. The results of our investigation have significant consequences for the Binding Theory; that is, although Condition C and antilogophoricity restrictions are presumably independent conditions on coreference, they do not operate independently of each other. Rather, there is a division of labor between the two disjointness conditions.
The dissertation of Jun Yashima is approved.

Vincent Homer
Nina Hyams
Hilda Koopman
Mamoru Saito

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University of California, Los Angeles
2015
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACC = accusative case
ADES = adessive postposition
ASP = aspect
AUX = auxiliary
BEN = benefactive postposition
CL = classifier
COMIT = comitative
COMP = complementizer
COP = copula
DAT = dative case
DEF = definite
DUR = durative
EMP = empathy marker
EMPH = emphatics
F1 = future today
GEN = genitive case
HAB = habitual aspect
HON = honorific marker
IMPF = imperfective
IND = indicative mood
LDA = long-distance anaphora
LOC = locative
LOG = logophoric form/pronoun
NEG = negation
NOM = nominative case
O = object
PART = particle
PASS = passive
PAST = past tense
PERF = perfective
PFAT = perfective absolute transitive
Pl = plural
POSS = possessive
PRES = present tense
Pro = pronoun
PROG = progressive
Q = question particle
RED = reduplication
REL = relative clause marker
SBJ = subjective mood
SBRD = subordinator
SG = singular
SGM = singular male
SP = speaker
STAT = stative aspect
TOP = topic
1 = first person
3 = third person
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PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS


Chapter 1 Overview of the Dissertation

One of the recurring issues in the formulation of the Binding Theory is concerned with variation in anaphoric patterns.\(^1\) Since the very inception of the theory it has been observed that within and across languages, nominal expressions that seemingly belong to the same class do not always behave in exactly the same manner. For years attempts have been made to make the theory flexible enough to accommodate the attested patterns, while at the same time keeping it sufficiently restrictive to prevent overgeneration.

Within the framework of generative grammar, three approaches have figured prominently in the discussion of variation in binding systems. One approach that crystallized in the Principles-and-Parameters era is to hypothesize that certain components of the Binding Theory (in particular, the way locality is computed) allow for parametric variation (Anderson 1986; Manzini and Wexler 1987, \textit{inter alia}). For example, Aoun and Hornstein (1992) propose that Condition B is composed of two separate disjoint-reference requirements: one that disallows A-binding of a pronoun in some specified domain, and one that disallows A'-binding in some

\(^1\) The interested reader is referred to Freidin (1992), who offers a concise overview of crosslinguistic differences in binding domains.
specified domain. They claim that in English, these two disjointness conditions happen to apply in the same domain, but some languages impose them on separate domains. In a similar vein, Lasnik (1989) argues that Condition C splits into two conditions, one of which is subject to parametric variation (see also Narahara 1991).

Another line of approach is to attribute superficial differences to movement operations, instead of parameterizing the binding domain per se (Pica 1987; Battistella 1989, inter alia). For instance, Pica (1987) argues that morphologically simplex anaphors undergo LF movement to INFL, where they can get locally bound by their antecedent. On this view, certain properties of long-distance anaphoric dependencies are claimed to follow from general constraints on movement.

Still another approach is to claim that prima facie violations of the Binding Theory are somehow “exempt” from the relevant conditions (Reinhart and Reuland 1991, 1993; Pollard and Sag 1992, inter alia). Long-distance anaphors are a case in point. For example, it has been claimed by some researchers that long-distance anaphors such as the Japanese reflexive zibun are, in fact, logophoric pronouns, which are not subject to structural conditions in the syntax but are presumably regulated by certain discourse conditions (Kuno 1978; Kameyama 1985; Sells 1987a, among others). On this view, long-distance anaphors do not fall under Condition A, and as such do not constitute a counterexample to the Binding Theory.

There is substantial empirical support for the third approach. Again, take long-distance anaphors for example. It has been reported that unlike local anaphors, long-distance anaphors can take a non-c-commanding antecedent. (Here I gloss a long-distance anaphor as LDA.)

(1) Icelandic
    Skoðun Siggu₁ er að sig₁ vanti hæfileika.
opinion Sigga’s is that LDA lacks talent
    ‘Sigga₁’s opinion is that she₁ lacks talent.’

    (Maling 1984: 222)
In (1)-(2), the antecedent of the long-distance anaphor does not appear to sit in a position commanding the anaphor, but binding is nevertheless possible.

It is also crosslinguistically observed that like logophoric pronouns in African languages, long-distance anaphors generally (albeit perhaps not always) come with point-of-view (or consciousness/awareness) effects. For example, the contrast between (3a) and (3b) below indicates that the referent of the antecedent for Icelandic sig “must have an intention to communicate” (Sells 1987a: 451).

(3)  Icelandic

a. Barnið₁ lét ekki í ljós að það hefði verið hugsað vel um the.child put not in light that there had been thought well about sig₁
LDA
‘The child₁ didn’t reveal that it₁ had been taken good care of.’ (Sells 1987a: 451)

b. *Barnið₁ bar þess ekki merki að það hefði verið hugsað vel um the.child bore it not signs that there had been thought well about sig₁
LDA
‘The child₁ didn’t look as if it₁ had been taken good care of.’ (Sells 1987a: 451)

Similarly, the deviance of (4b) is attributed to the fact that John could not have been conscious that he was killed, unlike in the situation of (4a), where John may have been aware that Mary tried to kill him.
There are other properties that make long-distance anaphors distinct from local anaphors. For example, given appropriate contexts, Japanese *zibun* can refer to the speaker of the utterance instead of being bound by a linguistic antecedent in the sentence. Similarly, Icelandic *sig* can be licensed across sentence boundaries (see, for example, Sells 1987a: 452-453).

All these observations lend empirical support to the claim that certain anaphoric patterns are not governed by structural Binding Conditions. Note, however, that the validity of this claim does not entail that Binding Conditions are unnecessary. Rather, proponents of the third approach generally share the view that a distinction is needed between those anaphoric expressions that are subject to Binding Conditions and those that are constrained by discourse-pragmatic conditions.\(^2\)

Given that there are two distinct mechanisms that pertain to the licensing of anaphoric expressions, one must always make sure which mechanism is involved in the phenomenon under investigation. It must be kept in mind here that just because a given anaphoric expression can be licensed by one mechanism does not necessarily exclude the possibility that it can be licensed by the other in the same environment. This is a point emphasized by Charnavel and Sportiche (to appear). For example, it has been claimed in the literature that English reflexives have an anaphoric and a logophoric use. Picture-noun reflexives are often cited as the quintessential example of the latter use (because they allow split antecedents, can be discourse-bound, etc.)

\(^2\) It should be noted that no consensus has been reached among researchers as to whether logophoric binding is a purely discourse-pragmatic phenomenon or it involves a structural mechanism. See Koopman and Sportiche (1989) and Sundaresan (2012).

(5) John showed Bill pictures of themselves.

True, this example shows that the reflexive *themselves* in (5), which takes a split antecedent, behaves like a pronoun rather than a true local anaphor, thereby lending credibility to the claim that a reflexive embedded inside a picture noun phrase is a logophor or, in more neutral terms, an exempt anaphor (so-named because it is exceptionally exempt from standard Binding Conditions). Crucially, however, what this example tells us is that picture-noun reflexives can be exempt anaphors, and it does not warrant the conclusion that they must be exempt anaphors. This means, then, that we cannot take it for granted that Condition A is irrelevant to the licensing of the reflexive in (6), for instance.

(6) John likes pictures of himself.

One might be tempted to conclude, based on (5), that *himself* in (6) is not a true anaphor but an exempt anaphor so that it does not fall under Condition A. This is an invalid argument, however, because evidence like (5) does not necessarily rule out the possibility that picture-noun reflexives behave ambiguously — either as exempt anaphors (subject to discourse-pragmatic conditions) or as plain (non-exempt) anaphors (subject to syntactic conditions). What is at issue here is whether the scope of Condition A intersects with the domain in which exempt anaphors are licensed. If they do intersect, sentences like (5) are not informative with respect to the jurisdiction of Condition A. Thus, without taking this possibility into account, one might possibly draw a false descriptive generalization, although, as Charnavel and Sportiche (to appear) point out, this has often been overlooked in the literature. (This issue will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.)
By the same logic, then, we need to be cautious about what we can conclude when we investigate disjoint-reference effects in natural language. The standard Binding Theory posits two disjointness conditions: Conditions B and C. These conditions are structural in the sense that they operate just in case a c-command relation holds between two relevant DPs. Because of its perceived success, the Binding Theory has assumed so great an authority that upon encountering disjointness effects in c-command configurations, one might well be tempted to conclude that they must be due to Binding Conditions. However, it has been sporadically reported in the literature that natural languages exhibit a phenomenon called antilogophoricity, which gives rise to disjoint-reference effects under certain conditions. To the extent that antilogophoricity and structural Binding Conditions coexist, it is not always a straightforward question whether the observed disjoint-reference effects are due to one or the other or both. This means that what have been treated as the consequences of Binding Conditions may turn out to be antilogophoricity effects. It should be kept in mind that even if Binding Conditions are actually responsible for the disjointness under investigation, it does not necessarily exclude the possibility that antilogophoricity restrictions may also give rise to the same effect.

The central goal of this dissertation is to bring to light the nature and role of antilogophoricity in the interpretation of anaphora. Unlike logophoric phenomena, which have generated a sizable literature since the mid-1970s, antilogophoric phenomena have scarcely been documented or investigated, and it is not an overstatement to say that the true nature of antilogophoricity is still shrouded in darkness.

That antilogophoricity has not received due attention is by no means accidental; for under

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3 Note that even if Condition C and (part of) Condition B are subsumed under Rule I (Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993; Reinhart 2006; Reinhart 1983), c-command is still relevant because Rule I only applies in a configuration where variable binding is in principle possible.

normal circumstances the effects of antilogophoricity restrictions tend to be concealed by or masquerade as other independent phenomena, as we will witness in the chapters that follow. It is precisely for this reason that antilogophoric phenomena have gone largely unnoticed for a long time.

The task of elucidating antilogophoricity, however, must not be evaded; in fact, it is of significant relevance to any attempt to formulate an adequate theory of anaphora. This is because, without precisely locating the sources of disjointness, one cannot even describe the conditions governing disjoint-reference phenomena in natural language. If antilogophoricity restrictions and the Binding Theory are independently motivated, it behooves us to, first and foremost, establish in what ways these two types of conditions operate.

With this aim in mind, this dissertation presents two case studies, — one on overt third-person pronouns in Japanese and one on R-expressions (in particular, names) in English — which I believe will pave the way for a better understanding of the nature and role of antilogophoricity in natural language anaphora. The phenomena featured in these case studies underscore the fact antilogophoricity may clandestinely play vital roles in determining anaphoric relations.

The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the Binding Theory and (anti)logophoricity, and clarifies the overarching goal of this work. Since the chapter is intended to provide background and set the stage for the discussion in subsequent chapters, I focus mainly on those theoretical concepts and subject matters that are germane to the present study. In particular, I explain why the phenomenon of antilogophoricity needs to be closely investigated. The fundamental issue raised in this chapter concerns not only the present study but any theoretical approach to anaphora.

Chapter 3 submits overt third-person pronouns in Japanese (kare ‘he’ and kanozyo ‘she’) to close scrutiny. It has been known for quite some time that so-called third-person pronouns in Japanese do not pattern with English third-person pronouns in terms of binding-theoretic properties. In particular, Japanese third-person pronouns persistently resist variable binding, although they permit coreference in much the same way as English third-person pronouns do.
The prevailing view until quite recently was that overt third-person pronouns in Japanese cannot function as bound variables, and various proposals were put forward to provide a principled account of their alleged unbindability (Montalbetti 1984; Sportiche 1986; Hoji 1990, 1991; Katada 1991; Aoun and Hornstein 1992; Noguchi 1995, 1997; Déchaine and Wiltschko 2002). However, it has been sporadically reported in the literature (Hoji et al. 2000; Hara 2002; see also Hoji 1991, 1997) that there are certain cases in which kare and kanozyo can be interpreted as bound variables. Chapter 3, therefore, attempts to provide an answer to the question of why Japanese third-person pronouns can be construed as bound variables only in a subset of the contexts in which bound pronouns in English can occur. I argue that the seemingly recalcitrant behavior of Japanese third-person pronouns is due to the fact that antilogophoric effects are at work behind the scenes. Specifically, I claim that overt third-person pronouns in Japanese are, in fact, epithets (i.e., antilogophoric pronouns) so that they can function as bound variables only when Condition B of the Binding Theory and the relevant antilogophoricity constraint are simultaneously satisfied. I further propose that the apparent insensitivity of the referential use of kare/kanozyo to the antilogophoricity constraint is attributed to the fact that Japanese, but not English, allows a structure in which a null pronoun is juxtaposed with an appositive epithet phrase.

Chapter 4 discusses the antilogophoric properties of names in English vis-à-vis Condition C of the Binding Theory. It has been widely assumed that names (or more broadly, R-expressions) are subject to Binding Condition C; that is, they must be disjoint in reference from a c-commanding pronoun. For years this condition has been used as a diagnostic test for probing syntactic structures, but the results of this test must be interpreted judiciously. This is because Condition C is not the only disjointness condition that is claimed to apply to names. It has been noted (or hinted) by some researchers (Kuno 1986, 1987, 2004; Sells 1987b; Narahara 1991; Dubinsky and Hamilton 1998; cf. Kuno 1972) that not only epithets but also non-epithetic R-expressions have antilogophoric properties. This means, then, that what one identifies as Condition C effects might be attributed not to Condition C but to antilogophoricity restrictions. This potential
confound has often been grossly neglected in the literature but it should not be underestimated given that the two types of disjointness conditions coexist and potentially operate in overlapping environments. It is therefore worthwhile to scrupulously reexamine what have been diagnosed as Condition C violations, and verify whether their putative ungrammaticality actually comes from Condition C. I show that while Condition C and antilogophoric restrictions are independently well-motivated, there is a division of labor between these two constraints in the production of disjoint-reference effects. The findings reported in Chapter 4 point to the necessity of a radical rethink of the way in which Condition C is computed.

Chapter 5 summarizes the major theoretical and empirical findings of the present study and discusses their theoretical implications.
Chapter 2 Between the Binding Theory and Logophoricity

2.1 Binding Theory

The Binding Theory is concerned with the ways in which referential dependencies are established in natural language. To a first approximation, we may assume that a linguistic expression is bound by another linguistic expression if the value of the former is determined by that of the latter. When it is not bound, it is said to be free. In the following sentence, for instance, the expression himself is bound by John.

(1) John hates himself.

In (1), the expression himself is and must be dependent on John for its interpretation, and it cannot have any other value (such as Max, Bill, etc.). In this case, John, which determines the value of himself, is said to be the antecedent of himself.

Expressions like himself, which we call anaphors, are referentially defective in the sense that they must be bound; that is, they must depend on a linguistic antecedent for their interpretation.
The defective nature of anaphors is manifested in the fact that they cannot directly refer, which entails, for example, that they cannot be used deictically. Due to this property, an anaphor requires the presence of an appropriate antecedent that binds it, and if there is no such antecedent in the same sentence, the sentence becomes ungrammatical.

(2) (John watched a sad movie.) *Himself cried.

In (2), although it is pragmatically plausible to consider John to be the intended antecedent for the anaphor himself, the sentence is ungrammatical. This suggests that pragmatic considerations alone are not sufficient to explain how referential dependencies can be established. Similarly, the sentences in (3) are ruled out due to the absence of an appropriate antecedent for the anaphor.

(3) a. *I praise himself.
   b. *People praise himself.
   c. *Mary praises himself.

In English, an anaphor must agree with its antecedent in person, number, and gender. In (3a-c), I, people, and Mary do not agree with the anaphor himself in person, number, and gender, respectively, and hence they do not qualify as an appropriate antecedent for himself. Thus, lacking an appropriate binder for the anaphor, these sentences are ruled out as ungrammatical.

Unlike anaphors, (referential) pronouns do not require the presence of a linguistic antecedent in the same sentence, as demonstrated by the following example, where the antecedent for the pronoun is not present in the same sentence.

(4) He cried.

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5 So-called “imposters” constitute a class of exceptions to this. See Collins and Postal (2012).
To be more precise, pronouns may or may not be referentially dependent on an antecedent, in a sense to be made clear later. For now it suffices to note that a pronoun may have the same referent as some other noun phrase in the same sentence, as exemplified below.

(5) John\textsubscript{1} thinks that he\textsubscript{1} will win.

The shared index on John and he is meant to represent that the two expressions form a referential dependency. Thus, (5) indicates that the sentence is grammatical with John and he having an anaphoric relation.

Note that the grammaticality in question is relative to the indexing. For example, (6) represents that the sentence is ungrammatical if John and him are intended to have the same value. In other words, in (6), John and him cannot refer to the same person.

(6) *John\textsubscript{1} hates him\textsubscript{1}.

If him and John are assigned different referential values, the sentence is grammatical, as in (7).\(^6\)

(Notice here that the sentence is not starred.)

(7) John\textsubscript{1} likes him\textsubscript{3}.

What is represented here is that the sentence is grammatical if the pronoun him does not depend on John for its interpretation but rather refers to some male individual whose reference is contextually understood. To be more technical, him\textsubscript{3} represents that the pronoun him receives the

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\(^6\) The tacit assumption here is that two noun phrases carrying different indices must refer to different entities, but nothing in our indexing system actually excludes the possibility that the same referential value is assigned to different indices. I defer the discussion of (accidental) coreference until Section 2.4.
value that a contextual assignment function assigns to the index 3.\(^7\)

Let us now turn to non-pronominal expressions such as *John, the student* and *this man*. Expressions like these, which we call *R-expressions*, are referentially independent. The referential values of R-expressions are determined on the basis of their lexical content and they have fixed reference (in a given context).

Names such as *John* are known as “rigid designators” in the sense that they always pick out the same entity, whereas definite descriptions such as *the teacher* may refer to different individuals depending on the context. It is widely believed that R-expressions must not be bound at all.

We have thus far seen three types of nominal expressions: (i) anaphors, which cannot be interpreted independently, (ii) pronouns, which may or may not be referentially dependent on a linguistic antecedent, and (iii) R-expressions, which are referentially independent.

(8) *Anaphors*

himself, herself, itself, myself, yourself, ourselves, yourselves, themselves, each other, one another

(9) *Pronouns*

he, she, it, I, you, we, him, her, me, us, them, his, her, my, your, our, their

(10) *R-Expressions*

John, that girl, the computer company, the idiot …

Since the early days of generative grammar, it has been recognized that the ways in which these expressions can be referentially dependent on (or anaphorically related to) other nominal expressions are not determined by context alone but are restricted by certain structural conditions. The standard Binding Theory offers a fairly good approximation of the conditions under which these three types of expressions can/cannot be anaphorically linked to antecedents.

\(^7\) An assignment function is a function from the set of natural numbers to individuals.
(11)  
*Binding Theory*

a. *Condition A*
   An anaphor must be bound in its domain.

b. *Condition B*
   A pronoun must not be bound in its domain.

c. *Condition C*
   An R-expression must not be bound by a pronoun.

The standard Binding Theory is composed of three conditions: Conditions A, B, and C. While Condition A is a licensing condition for anaphors (reflexives and reciprocals), Conditions B and C can be viewed as anti-licensing conditions that restrict the distributions and interpretations of pronouns and R-expressions, respectively.

There are two technical notions that play central roles here: *c-command* and *local domains*. C-command is a relation between two nodes in a tree that is defined as follows.

(12)  
*C-Command*

\[ \alpha \text{ c-command } \beta \text{ iff } \alpha \text{'s sister either} \]

(i) is \( \beta \), or

(ii) contains \( \beta \).

Under the classical Binding Theory, binding is defined in terms of c-command and coindexation (i.e., identity of indices).

(13)  
*Binding*

\[ \alpha \text{ binds } \beta \text{ iff } \alpha \text{ c-commands } \beta, \text{ and } \alpha \text{ and } \beta \text{ are coindexed.} \]

Strictly speaking, indices as we use them are not the best theoretical device to represent those relations in which one expression is dependent on another. This is because such relations are
asymmetric, but indices represent a symmetric relation. The interested reader is referred to Higginbotham (1983) for an alternative notation called *linking* where headed arrows are used to represent referential dependencies.

It should also be noted that throughout this dissertation, indices are used merely as descriptive devices. Chomsky (1995) states that a “perfect language” should meet the Inclusiveness Condition — a minimalist guideline that permits neither the addition nor removal of non-lexical properties in the course of syntactic computation. The Inclusiveness Condition, therefore, entails that purely theory-internal, non-lexical constructs such as indices should be eschewed since they are not present in the lexicon. Indeed, Chomsky (1995: 228) explicitly states:

\[(14)\] Any structure formed by the computation […] is constituted of elements already present in the lexical items selected for N [= the numeration]; no new objects are added in the course of the computation apart from rearrangement of lexical properties (in particular, **no indices**, bar levels in the sense of X-bar theory, etc. […]).  [emphasis mine]

Obviously, the question is how indices can be expunged from narrow syntax. One possible approach suggested by Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) is to subsume indexing and interpretive procedures under Binding Conditions themselves. To wit:

\[(15)\]  *Binding Theory (Chomsky and Lasnik’s 1993 version)*

a. *Condition A*
   
   If \(\alpha\) is an anaphor, interpret it as coreferential with a c-commanding phrase in its domain.

b. *Condition B*
   
   If \(\alpha\) is a pronoun, interpret it as disjoint from every c-commanding phrase in its domain.

c. *Condition C*
   
   If \(\alpha\) is an R-expression, interpret it as disjoint from every c-commanding phrase.
The Binding Theory thus formulated can enforce Binding Conditions without employing indices (qua syntactic primitives). Chomsky thus proposes that Binding Conditions apply at the conceptual-intentional (C-I) interface.

While I am not committed to the view that indices are genuine syntactic objects, I will use them to indicate intended referential dependencies because they are not only useful for expository purposes but also the most commonly used notation in the generative literature.

Turning now to the notion of local domain, let us assume that the local domain for \( \alpha \) is the minimal complete functional complex (CFC) that contains \( \alpha \) and in which \( \alpha \)’s binding condition could, in principle, be satisfied (cf. Chomsky and Lasnik 1993). A CFC is a projection containing all grammatical functions compatible with its head.

With this much in place, let us first take a look at how Condition A accounts for the distribution of anaphors.

(16) **Condition A**
    An anaphor must be bound in its local domain.

(17) a. Fred\(_1\) likes himself\(_1\).
    b. *Fred\(_1\)’s sister likes himself\(_1\).
    c. *Fred\(_1\) thinks that Maria\(_2\) likes himself\(_1\).
    d. *Fred\(_1\) likes Bill\(_2\)’s stories about himself\(_1\).
    e. Fred\(_1\) likes stories about himself\(_1\).

In (17a) and (17b), the local domain for the anaphor *himself* is the entire sentence. Sentence (17a) is well-formed because *himself* has a c-commanding antecedent (namely, *Fred*) in its local domain. By contrast, sentence (17b) is ill-formed under the given coindexation because *Fred* does not c-command *himself*, and hence cannot satisfy Condition A, as illustrated below. (For expository purposes, irrelevant details are omitted.)
In (17c), the local domain for the anaphor is the embedded clause, as illustrated below.

Since the intended antecedent *Fred* is situated outside of the local domain of *himself*, Condition A is not satisfied, hence ungrammaticality. Sentences (17d) and (17e) are quite similar but exhibit different binding possibilities. In (17d), the minimal CFC that contains the anaphor is the DP *Bill’s stories about himself*, which contains a potential binder (i.e., *Bill*) for the anaphor. Thanks to the presence of a potential binder, this CFC is one in which the binding condition for an anaphor could, in principle, be satisfied, and hence counts as the local domain where Condition A applies, as illustrated below.
Here, Fred lies outside of the local domain of the anaphor himself, and it thus cannot be taken as antecedent of himself. In (17e), by contrast, there is no potential binder for the anaphor within the DP stories about himself, and hence this DP does not count as the local domain for himself (precisely because Condition A could not even in principle be satisfied). The local domain is, therefore, the entire sentence, as shown below.

Hence, Fred can bind himself, satisfying Condition A.

Let us now consider Condition B.

(22) **Condition B**
A pronoun must not be bound in its local domain.

(23) a. *Fred1 likes him1.
    b. Fred1’s sister likes him1.
    c. Fred1 thinks that Maria2 likes him1.
    d. Fred1 likes Bill2’s stories about him1.
e. Fred\textsubscript{1} likes stories about him\textsubscript{1}.

In (23a) and (23b), the local domain for the pronoun *him* is the entire sentence. Condition B is violated in (23a) because the pronoun *him* is bound by *Fred* in its domain. In (23b), the pronoun is free in its domain because it is not c-commanded by the antecedent *Fred*. Condition B is thus satisfied. In (23c), the local domain for the pronoun is the embedded clause, as illustrated below.

The pronoun *him* is free in its local domain (i.e., the embedded clause), and hence Condition B is satisfied. The examples in (23d) and (23e) show that the local domain for a pronoun is computed in a slightly different way than that for an anaphor. Recall that pronouns do not need a binder. Then the presence or absence of a potential binder does not affect the size of the local domain for a pronoun.

Thus, in (23d), the local domain for *him* is *Bill’s stories about him*.
Likewise, in (23e), the local domain for *him* is *stories about him*.

\[(26)\]

![Diagram of “Minimal CFC in which Condition B could, in principle, be satisfied”]

Since the pronoun is free in its local domain in both (23d) and (23e), *Fred* can be taken as antecedent of *him* in both cases.

Finally, let us consider Condition C. Condition C is defined as follows.\(^8\)

\[(27)\] **Condition C**

An R-expression must not be bound by a pronoun.

\[(28)\] a. *He\(_1\) likes Fred\(_1\).*
   b. *He\(_1\) thinks that Maria\(_2\) likes Fred\(_1\).*
   c. His\(_1\) mother likes Fred\(_1\).*
   d. [Those who know him\(_1\)] like Fred\(_1\).*

The sentences in (28a)-(28b) demonstrate that *Fred*, an R-expression, cannot take a c-commanding pronoun — whether local or remote — as its antecedent. Condition C, as formulated in (27), amounts to saying that an R-expression cannot be anaphorically linked to any c-commanding pronoun. This is schematically represented in the following diagram.

---

\(^8\) While there are several extant versions of Condition C, this one is commonly accepted as descriptively adequate.
Note that the ill-formedness of (28a) and (28b) has nothing to do with the linear order between the R-expression and the pronoun that it corefers with. This is demonstrated by the well-formedness of (28c) and (28d), where the pronoun is followed by a name that it corefers with, just as in (28a) and (28b).

2.2 Challenges to the Binding Theory

We have looked at how the standard Binding Theory captures the distribution and interpretation of nominal expressions (anaphors, pronouns, and R-expressions). At least at the descriptive level, the standard Binding Theory appears to be a successful attempt that nicely accounts for the interpretive dependencies between nominal expressions. However, ever since the advent of Chomsky’s (1981, 1986) Binding Theory, a myriad of empirical challenges within English and across languages have been reported, suggesting that anaphoric patterns in natural languages may well be constrained in more complex and nuanced ways.

For example, it has been reported that certain types of anaphors may be discourse-bound, contradicting the fundamental assumption that an anaphor is grammatically required to have a local antecedent. As shown below, picture-noun reflexives are allowed to have a discourse antecedent under appropriate contexts.
(30) a. John\textsubscript{1} was furious. The picture of himself\textsubscript{1} in the museum had been mutilated.
    b. Mary\textsubscript{1} was extremely upset. That picture of herself\textsubscript{1} on the front page of the *Times* would circulate all over the world. (Pollard and Sag 1992: 268)

Despite the fact that *himself* in (30a) and *herself* (30b) do not have an antecedent within the same sentence, both examples are acceptable.

Another challenge to the standard Binding Theory comes from the fact that in certain cases, anaphors may take a non-c-commanding antecedent.

(31) The fact that there is a picture of himself\textsubscript{1} hanging in the post office is believed (by Mary) to be disturbing Tom\textsubscript{1}. (Jackendoff 1972: 137)
(32) The agreement that [Iran and Iraq], reached guaranteed each other’s trading rights in the disputed waters until the year 2010. (Pollard and Sag 1992: 264)

In (31) and (32), the reflexive *himself* and the reciprocal *each other* are anteceded by a non-c-commanding DP, contrary to the prediction of the standard Binding Theory.

Furthermore, there are cases in which anaphors can take a split antecedent (Lebeaux 1984: 345-346, among others).

(33) John told Mary that there were some pictures of themselves inside. (Lebeaux 1984: 346)

The facts shown in (30)-(33) are not immediately amenable to the standard Binding Theory. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it is not the case that just any kind of anaphor can behave this way.

(34) (Mary\textsubscript{1} was furious.) *The article criticized herself\textsubscript{1}.
(35) *The fact that Sue likes himself\textsubscript{1} is believed (by Mary) to be disturbing Tom\textsubscript{1}. (Pollard and Sag 1992: 265)
(36) %John showed Mary themselves (in the mirror).
When an anaphor is a direct argument of a verb, as in (34)-(36), discourse binding, non-c-commanding binding, and split antecedence are consistently disallowed.

These observations suggest that it is necessary to distinguish between anaphors that are regulated by a grammatical condition and anaphors that are exempt from it. The question that immediately arises is: On what basis are these two types to be separated?

A widely held view is that a plain (i.e., non-exempt) anaphor is one whose antecedent is a coargument of the same predicate (Pollard and Sag 1992; Reinhart and Reuland 1993, among others; cf. Safir 2004a). The idea, roughly, is that an anaphor must be bound by a syntactic coargument antecedent if there is one, and it is exempt otherwise.

Recall at this point that under the standard Binding Theory, the domain of Condition A is assumed to be flexible such that in the absence of a potential binder, an anaphor extends its binding domain to seek one. Thus, the coargument-based theory and the standard Binding Theory have different slants on the anaphoric pattern exemplified below.

(37) Bill remembered that Tom saw [a picture of himself] in the post office.

(Pollard and Sag 1992: 271)

In this case, the given coindexing is obligatory. Condition A of the standard Binding Theory correctly predicts that himself must be bound by Tom (and not Bill) because the minimal CFC that has a potential binder for the anaphor is the embedded clause.

Under the coargument-based theory, by contrast, the reflexive here must be exempt, as it has no coargument antecedent. Hence the fact that himself cannot take Bill as its antecedent must be explained not in terms of grammatical constraints but in some other ways.

It is worth noting at this point that exempt anaphors are widely viewed as falling under the phenomenon of logophoricity. The reason is that they exhibit characteristic properties of logophoric pronouns. For example, it has been reported that the antecedent of an exempt anaphor
must refer to the individual whose perspective (or point of view) is presented in the context. The following contrast illustrates this.

(38) John$_1$ was going to get even with Mary. That picture of himself$_1$ in the paper would really annoy her, as would the other stunts he had planned. (Pollard and Sag 1992: 274)

(39) *Mary was quite taken aback by the publicity John$_1$ was receiving. That picture of himself$_1$ in the paper had really annoyed her, and there was not much she could do about it.

(Pollard and Sag 1992: 274)

The sentences in (38) are narrated from John’s perspective; in other words, John is an internal protagonist in this context. This contrasts with (39), where Mary is presented as an internal protagonist (or a perspective holder). In the former case, John can be taken as antecedent of the picture-noun reflexive *himself, while in the latter case, the picture-noun reflexive cannot be anaphoric to John, suggesting that exempt anaphors must refer to the individual from whose perspective the relevant report is made.

Another characteristic of exempt anaphors is that they show intervention effects in much the same way as the Super Equi phenomenon, a phenomenon wherein PRO is controlled by an argument of a predicate sitting in a superordinate clause (Grinder 1970). For example, in the following sentence, PRO is controlled by a remote antecedent.

(40) Roxanne$_1$ knew that it would be difficult PRO$_1$ to criticize herself/*himself.

Of particular relevance to our discussion is that Super Equi is blocked in the presence of a potential controller (Grinder 1970; Clements 1974, among others).

(41) *Eric$_1$ said that Roxanne knew that it would be difficult PRO$_1$ to criticize himself.

(adapted from Grinder 1970: 303)
(42) Eric said that Roxanne₁ knew that it would be difficult PRO₁ to criticize herself₁.

(adapted from Grinder 1970: 303)

Note, however, that inanimate or expletive subjects do not prevent Super Equi precisely because they do not qualify as potential controllers.

(43) John thought [that Proposition 91 made [PRO undressing himself] illegal].

(Pollard and Sag 1992: 273)

(44) John thought [that it was likely to be illegal [PRO to undress himself]].

(Pollard and Sag 1992: 273)

Returning to the sentence in (37), repeated below as (45), the fact that Bill cannot antecede the picture noun reflexive is seen as an intervention effect under the coargument-based theory.

(45) Bill₁ remembered that Tom₂ saw [a picture of himself₁₁₂] in the post office.

That is, it is the presence of the potential intervening antecedent Tom that makes it impossible for himself to be anteceded by Bill. Evidence in support of this account comes from the fact that replacing Tom with an inanimate (or expletive) DP makes it possible for the picture-noun reflexive to be anaphoric to Bill.

(46) Bill₁ remembered that the Times had printed [a picture of himself₁₁₂] in the Sunday edition.

(Pollard and Sag 1992: 272)

These facts indicate that picture-noun reflexives (or more generally, reflexives in non-coargument domains) can behave as exempt anaphors, unlike reflexives in coargument position.

One might therefore be tempted to conclude that the standard Binding Theory should be
jettisoned in favor of the coargument-based theory. While it is plausible to assume that a distinction exists between plain and exempt anaphors, the data we have observed above do not necessarily undermine the standard Binding Theory. We have seen, for example, various examples where picture-noun reflexives are exempt from Condition A, but the conclusion we can draw from them is that they can be exempt anaphors, and not that they must be. There is no a priori reason to reject the possibility that the domain in which exempt anaphors are licensed intersects with the domain in which non-exempt anaphors are licensed by Condition A. This means that we cannot assume gratuitously that Condition A is irrelevant to the licensing of the reflexive in (47), for example.

(47) Tom₁ saw [a picture of himself₁].

It is often assumed (explicitly or implicitly) that the two types of anaphors can be distinguished in terms of coargumenthood, but Charnavel and Sportiche (to appear) point out that previous studies reached this conclusion without taking into account the possibility that anaphors may behave ambiguously either as plain or as exempt anaphors. They caution that it is only when this potential confounding factor is controlled for that we can precisely delineate the domain of Condition A.

Charnavel and Sportiche employed French anaphors son propre “his/its own” and elle-même “herself/itself” to shed light on the scope of Condition A. Capitalizing on the fact that son propre and elle-même can take inanimate antecedents, they closely investigated the anaphoric patterns these anaphors display with inanimate antecedents. The idea is that if the antecedent of an anaphor is inanimate, it is guaranteed that that anaphor must be plain (and cannot be exempt) because inanimate entities do not qualify as a perspective/point-of-view holder (or the center of consciousness, an empathic target, etc.). Their investigation of inanimate (therefore unambiguously plain) anaphors revealed, contrary to the assumption of the coargument-based theory, that the domain of Condition A is, in fact, essentially identical to what is assumed under
the standard Binding Theory.

It is by now widely acknowledged that the structural binding condition licensing a plain anaphor should be distinguished from the conditions whereby logophors are licensed, but the lesson that Charnavel and Sportiche’s findings teach us is that these two types of conditions may conspire to obscure the true nature of the phenomenon under investigation. Most importantly, they show that just because an anaphor can be licensed by one mechanism in a given environment, it does not necessarily follow that it cannot be licensed in some other way in the same environment.

By the same logic, then, just because a given anaphoric dependency is disallowed by one mechanism in a given environment, there is no reason to exclude the possibility that it can be blocked by some other mechanism in the same context. This is the very reason that antilogophoricity must be closely investigated.

If antilogophoricity and Binding Conditions are independently motivated constraints, the question arises as to whether the observed disjoint-reference effects are due to one or the other or both (or possibly neither). Then, without knowing what exactly antilogophoricity restrictions cover, one might mistakenly diagnose antilogophoricity effects as the consequences of Binding Conditions. Note that even if Binding Conditions are actually relevant to the disjoint-reference effect under investigation, it does not necessarily exclude the possibility that antilogophoricity restrictions may also bring about the same effect. Therefore, to fully understand the mechanisms of disjoint-reference phenomena in natural language, it is important to study the nature and role of antilogophoricity, and without undertaking this task, one cannot even provide adequate descriptions of disjointness conditions.

2.3 Logophoricity

Since our investigation capitalizes on insights from the wealth of research on logophoricity, it is worthwhile to take a close look at the basic properties of logophoricity before we embark on the
journey of antilogophoricity.

The term “logophoric pronoun” (pronom logophorique) was coined by Hagège (1974) and has been widely used since. Clements (1975: 141) states that logophoric pronouns are used “to distinguish reference to the individual whose speech, thoughts, or feelings are reported or reflected in a given context, from reference to other individuals”. Logophoricity is characterized mainly along two dimensions: (i) logophoric domains, by which I mean those contexts in which logophors can occur, and (ii) logocentric antecedents, i.e., possible antecedents for logophoric pronouns.

According to Clements, the following characteristics are typically observed for logophoric pronouns across languages:

(48)  a. logophoric pronouns are restricted to reportive contexts transmitting the words or thoughts of an individual or individuals other than the speaker or narrator;
b. the antecedent does not occur in the same reportive context as the logophoric pronoun;
c. the antecedent designates the individual or individuals whose words or thoughts are transmitted in the reported context in which the logophoric pronoun occurs.

(Clements 1975: 171-172)

Clements himself admits that it is hard to define “reportive contexts” in a way relevant to logophoricity. This becomes even more evident when we look at crosslinguistic variation in logophoric domains.

2.3.1 Logophoric Domains

2.3.1.1 Logophoric Domain 1: Complement Clauses of Verbs of Speech

Since the primary function of logophors is to indicate coreference with the source of reported
speech, logophors across languages can occur in complement clauses of verbs of saying, whether
they are realized as logophoric pronouns, affixes, clitics, or long-distance reflexives.

(49) Mundang
à rí ʒÌ Iwà fän sā:
Pro say LOG find thing beauty
‘He₁ said that he₁ had found something beautiful.’ (Hagège 1974: 291)

(50) Gokana
aè ko æ dɔ-è
he said he fell-LOG
‘He₁ said that he₁ fell.’ (Hyman and Comrie 1981: 20)

(51) Ewe
Kofi be yè-dzo
Kofi say LOG-leave
‘Kofi₁ said that he₁ left’ (Clements: 1975: 142)

(52) Japanese
Taroo-wa zibun-ga sono hon-o mituketa to itta
Taro-TOP self-NOM that book-ACC found COMP said
‘Taro₁ said that he₁ had found that book.’

2.3.1.2 Logophoric Domain 2: Complements of Verbs of Thought, Psychological State and Perception

In many languages, logophoric forms can be found not only in complement clauses of verbs of
saying but also in clauses embedded under other classes of verbs such as verbs of thought or
cognition. Stirling (1993: 259) suggests that there is an implicational universal hierarchy (shown
below) according to which languages restrict the set of domains in which logophoric forms can
be employed.
Likewise, Culy (2002: 202), building on Culy (1994), proposes the following implicational hierarchy.

(54) speech > thought > non-factive perception > knowledge > direct perception

The idea is that if verbs in one category can introduce logophoric contexts, then so too can verbs in all the higher categories.

The psych verb construction is another well-attested logophoric domain. In examples (55)-(58), the antecedent of the logophoric pronoun is the experiencer, whose mental state is being reported.

(55) Ewe
dyi dzɔ Ama be yè-dyi vi
heart straighten Ama that LOG-bear child
‘Ama₁ was happy that she₁ bore a child.’ (Clements 1975: 162)

(56) Gokana
pɔ sìi lébàrè kɔ aè dɔ-è
fear catches Lebare that he fell-LOG
‘Lebare₁ is afraid that he₁ fell.’ (Hyman and Comrie 1981: 21)

(57) Eleme
è-wáá kɔ è-dɔ-è
he-be.angry that 3-fall-LOG
‘He₁ was angry that he₁ fell.’ (Bond 2006: 239)

(58) Japanese
Zibun-ga baka-na koto-ga Taroo-o kanasimaseta.
self-NOM fool-COP COMP-NOM Taro-ACC saddened
‘That he₁ was a fool saddened Taro₁.’ (Kuno 1978: 194)
Direct perception predicates are at the lowest in the implicational hierarchy proposed by Culy (1994, 2002), but this does not mean that no languages allow them to introduce a logophoric domain. In Boko, for instance, the complement clause of a direct perception verb constitutes a logophoric domain.

(59) Boko
\[\begin{align*}
\text{ä} & \quad \text{'è} & \quad \text{álé} & \quad \text{lélè} \\
3SG.PFAT & \quad \text{see.PERF} & \quad 3SG.PROG.LOG & \quad \text{fall.PROG} \\
\end{align*}\]
‘He saw himself falling.’

(59) Boko
\[\begin{align*}
\text{ñió} & \quad \text{'è} & \quad \text{álé} & \quad \text{lélè} \\
3SG.PFAT & \quad \text{see.PERF} & \quad 3SG.PROG.LOG & \quad \text{fall.PROG} \\
\end{align*}\]
‘He saw himself falling.’

2.3.1.3 Logophoric Domain 3: Adverbial Clauses

The distribution of logophors extends far beyond the context of what is normally conceived of as reported speech. It is not always the case that logophoric domains are introduced by particular embedding verbs; some languages allow adverbial clauses, relative clauses, and simple (non-embedded) clauses to form logophoric domains.

For example, it is not crosslinguistically uncommon for purpose clauses to form logophoric domains.

(60) Ewe
Kofi \[\text{wɔ-wo-}m \quad \text{be Koku va yè gbɔ}\]
Kofi RED-do that Koku come LOG side
‘Kofi\text{\textsubscript{i}} is arranging for Koku to come to him\text{\textsubscript{i}}’

(60) Ewe
Kofi \[\text{wɔ-wo-}m \quad \text{be Koku va yè gbɔ}\]
Kofi RED-do that Koku come LOG side
‘Kofi\text{\textsubscript{i}} is arranging for Koku to come to him\text{\textsubscript{i}}’

(61) Gokana
\[\begin{align*}
\text{lébàrè} & \quad \text{dù kɔ baá mɔn-ɛɛ} & \quad \varepsilon \\
\text{Lebare} & \quad \text{came that they see-LOG him} \\
\end{align*}\]
‘Lebare\text{\textsubscript{i}} came for them to see him\text{\textsubscript{i}}.’

(61) Gokana
\[\begin{align*}
\text{lébàrè} & \quad \text{dù kɔ baá mɔn-ɛɛ} & \quad \varepsilon \\
\text{Lebare} & \quad \text{came that they see-LOG him} \\
\end{align*}\]
‘Lebare\text{\textsubscript{i}} came for them to see him\text{\textsubscript{i}}.’

(61) Gokana
\[\begin{align*}
\text{lébàrè} & \quad \text{dù kɔ baá mɔn-ɛɛ} & \quad \varepsilon \\
\text{Lebare} & \quad \text{came that they see-LOG him} \\
\end{align*}\]
‘Lebare\text{\textsubscript{i}} came for them to see him\text{\textsubscript{i}}.’
In (60), the event of Koku’s coming has not taken place, so that it is “not yet a matter of objective fact, but remains in the sphere of Kofi’s intention” (Clements 1975: 155-156), which, according to Clements, makes it possible for the external speaker to take on the viewpoint of Kofi to report the event. The following minimal pair (taken from Clements 1975: 160-161) further shows that purpose clauses can serve as a domain that is associated with the point of view of an internal protagonist.

(63) Ewe
\[
\text{ɖɛvi-a xo tohehe be yɛ-agada alakpa ake o}
\]
\[
\text{child-DEF receive punishment so that LOG-tell lie again NEG}
\]
‘The child_1 received punishment so that he_1 wouldn’t tell lies again.’

(64) Ewe
\[
\text{ɖɛvi-a xo tohehe be wɔ-agada alakpa ake o}
\]
\[
\text{child-DEF receive punishment so that Pro-tell lie again NEG}
\]
‘The child_1 received punishment so that he_{1/2} wouldn’t tell lies again.’

The two sentences in (63) and (64) above are identical except that the former involves a logophoric pronoun, whereas the latter an ordinary third-person pronoun. In both cases, the embedded pronoun can be interpreted as coreferential with the matrix subject, but there is a subtle difference in meaning. The sentence in (63) is interpreted as conveying that the child voluntarily received punishment (for his own purpose of preventing himself from lying), while the sentence in (64) is most naturally interpreted as expressing that the child received punishment against his will (and someone else has an intention of stopping his habit of lying) (Clements 1975: 161). Thus, Clements notes that some speakers find (63) anomalous on the grounds that
such a situation is unlikely to happen.

The same observation can be made for the Japanese reflexive *zibun* when it is used in a purpose clause. That is, the occurrence of *zibun* in such a context implies that the purpose in question is being narrated from the perspective of the internal speaker rather than that of the external speaker. In (65) below, for example, the child is understood to have voluntarily received punishment for his own sake of not telling lies again (and thus the situation described by the sentence is somewhat unlikely to occur).

(65) **Japanese**

\[
\text{Sono ko-wa \ [nidoto zibun-ga uso-o tuk-anai yooni]} \\
\text{that child-TOP ever.again self-NOM lie-ACC tell-NEG AUX} \\
\text{batu-o uketa.} \\
\text{punishment-ACC received} \\
\text{‘The child received punishment in order not to tell lies again.’}
\]

If *zibun* in (65) is replaced with a null pronoun, it does not necessarily mean that the child voluntarily received punishment.

(66) **Japanese**

\[
\text{Sono ko-wa \ [nidoto uso-o tuk-anai yooni] batu-o} \\
\text{that child-TOP ever.again lie-ACC tell-NEG AUX punishment-ACC} \\
\text{uketa.} \\
\text{received} \\
\text{‘The child received punishment in order not to tell lies again.’}
\]

In certain languages, logophoric domains extend even further to other types of adverbial clauses. Some examples are given below.
(67) Gokana
lébàreè div im bòò beè kọọ mìn de-è a ğià
Lebare hit me because that I ate-LOG his yams
‘Lebare₁ hit me because I ate his₁ yams.’ (Hyman and Comrie 1981: 30)

(68) Boko
a. aalé kël lá wá ye kúlá-ọ gbaé wà
3Pl.PROG act as 3Pl.STAT.LOG want anchor-Pl release like
‘They₁ were acting as if they₁ wanted to release anchors.’ (Jones 1998: 158)
b. Bíọ záá dò Sàbí wà ké à ‘i
Bio noise emit.PERF Sabi DAT because 3SG.PERF water
kọlẹ wa yái.
spill.PERF.3SG 3SG.DAT.LOG reason
‘Bio₁ rebuked Sabi because he spilt water on him₁.’ (Jones 1998: 158)
c. à züşe ‘e à mọ à kíi
3SG.PERF sit.PERF until 3SG.PERF come.PERF 3SG.POSS.LOG place
‘He₁ sat down until he came to him₁.’ (Jones 2000: 148)

(69) Japanese
a. John-wa [Mary-ga zibun-o hihansite iru toki] tonari no
John-TOP Mary-NOM self-ACC criticizing is when next GEN
heya-ni ita.
room-LOC was
‘John₁ was in the next room when Mary was criticizing him₁.’ (Kuno 1973: 312)
b. Takasí-wa [Yosiko-ga mizu-o zibun-no ue-ni kobosita node]
Takasi-TOP Yoshiko-NOM water-ACC self-GEN on-LOC spilled because
nuretesimatta.
got.wet
‘Takashi₁ got wet because Yoshiko spilled water on him₁.’ (Sells 1987a: 455)
c. Taroo-wa [Hanako-ga zibun-o hihansita noni] nanimo
Taro-TOP Hanako-NOM self-ACC criticized though anything
iw-anakat-ta.
say-NEG-PAST
‘Taro₁ said nothing though Hanako criticized him₁.’ (Iida 1996: 62)
In each of these cases, the logophoric form is licensed even though the embedded clause does not seem, in any obvious sense, to be reporting on the speech, thoughts or perceptions of the referent of the logocentric antecedent.

2.3.1.4 Logophoric Domain 4: Relative Clauses

In some languages, relative clauses constitute a logophoric domain but there are some complications with the licensing of logophoric forms in this construction.

In Ewe, relative clauses themselves do not serve as logophoric domains, as evidenced by the fact that the logophoric pronoun \( yè \) is not licensed.

\[ \text{(70) Ewe} \]
\[
\begin{align*}
* &\text{Ama} \; ðò \; ñku \; ñyɔnuvi \; hi \; dze \; yè \; gbɔ \; dyi \\
&\text{Ama set eye girl REL stay LOG side on} \\
&\text{‘Ama₁ remembered the girl who stayed with her₁.’} \quad \text{(Clements 1975: 156)}
\end{align*}
\]

However, the otherwise disallowed occurrence of a logophoric pronoun in a relative clause is permitted if the sentence containing the relative clause is embedded under a predicate that is capable of introducing a logophoric domain.

\[ \text{(71) Ewe} \]
\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{Ama₁ gblo be yè-ðò ñku ñyɔnuvi hi dze yè₁ gbɔ dyi} \\
&\text{Ama say that LOG-set eye girl REL stay LOG side on} \\
&\text{‘Ama₁ said that she₁ remembered the girl who stayed with her₁.’} \quad \text{(Clements 1975: 156)}
\end{align*}
\]

A similar observation can be made for Mundani, where a relative clause is not in itself a logophoric domain. In this language, a logophoric pronoun can be used in a relative clause if the
relative clause occurs with a particular nominal (such as àghī ‘thing’) that expresses the content of what is said, thought or felt.

(72)  Mundani
tà kó àghī yū yé à l'b'5 ghī lá
he know thing that LOG IMPF F1 do SBRD
‘He₁ knows what he₁ will do.’ (Parker 1986: 155)

The “domino effect” (i.e., a phenomenon wherein non-logophoric domains are rendered transparent to logophor licensing when contained within a superordinate logophoric domain) is a fairly robust phenomenon but is not universal. For example, Mundang disallows the use of a logophoric pronoun in a relative clause even if a logocentric predicate is present in the preceding clause (Hagège 1974: 294; Stirling 1993: 262). In other words, relative clauses in this language are completely opaque to logophoric effects.

Still other languages allow logophoric pronouns to appear in relative clauses rather freely, irrespective of the type of the predicate in a higher clause. One such language is Tuburi (Hagège 1974). In this language, the complementizer gā has incorporated into the relative clause marker ma:gā, by virtue of which logophoric pronouns can be systematically licensed in relative clauses. Note, however, that in Boko, where the complementizer and the relative pronoun are unrelated, logophoric pronouns nevertheless can readily occur in relative clauses (Jones 1998, 2000).

(73)  Boko
a. à 'ikō kpà kíá pó á kpà wà
   3SG.PERF authority give.PERF king REL 3SG.PFAT.LOG give.PERF DAT
   ‘He₁ gave authority to the king that he₁ installed.’ (Jones 1998: 157)
b. à wé pâ gbè pó liaa a zi-ɔ la
   3SG.PERF eye cross.PERF person REL surround 3SG.O.LOG ADES-Pl over
   ‘He₁ cast his eye over those who were around him₁.’ (Jones 1998: 157)
Likewise, Japanese, which lacks overt relative pronouns, is quite liberal in the use of *zibun* within relative clauses (though there are some constraints, as we will see in Chapter 4).

(74) **Japanese**

   Taro-TOP self-NOM bought magazine-ACC read
   ‘Taro1 read the book that he1 had bought.’

   Taro-TOP self-ACC criticize article-ACC read
   ‘Taro1 read the article that criticized him1.’

2.3.1.5 Logophoric Domain 5: Simple Clauses

In some languages, logophoric forms can occur not only in subordinate clauses but also in simple clauses, as exemplified below.

(75) **Boko**

à bā fīa a zi
he.PERF rope wind.PERF 3SG.O.LOG ADES
‘He1 wound a rope around him1.’ (Jones 1998: 159)

It is also worth noting that logophoric pronouns are often found in the possessor position of a possessive noun phrase. Jones (2000: 147) points out that this has often been overlooked in the
literature presumably because it does not fit the classic definition of logophoricity.

Ngiti is among those languages that have a set of logophoric possessive pronouns. As the following contrast demonstrates, the use of a non-logophoric possessive pronoun instead of a logophoric possessive indicates that the possessor is disjoint in reference from the subject.

(76)  Ngiti  

    a. k-û’â    kà-pf5  
       3SG-cut.PERF.PRES  3SG-foot  
       ‘He₁ has cut his₂ foot.’ (Kutsch Lojenga 1994: 212) 
    b. k-û’â    pf5-na  
       3SG-cut.PERF.PRES  foot-3SG.LOG.POSS  
       ‘He₁ has cut his₁ (own) foot.’ (Kutsch Lojenga 1994: 212)

Logophoric possessive pronouns should not simply be viewed as a means to indicate coreference between the possessor and the subject. The Boko examples in (77) demonstrate that there are cases in which non-subjects can antecede logophoric possessive pronouns. 9

(77)  Boko  

    a. à    né    kù    a    'ò    wà  
       3SG.PERF  child  catch.PERF  3SG.POSS.LOG  hand  DAT  
       ‘He₁ caught the child₂ by his₂ hand.’ (Jones 1998: 163) 
    b. à    yâ    'ò-è    a    kpé-ú  
       1SG.PERF  word  speak.PERF-3SG.BEN  3SG.POSS.LOG  house-in  
       ‘I spoke to him₁ in his₁ house.’ (Jones 1998: 163)

In Ngiti and Japanese, a logophoric pronoun and its antecedent can be coarguments of the same

9 If there is more than one potential antecedent for a logophoric possessive pronoun, the logophoric pronoun is interpreted as coreferential with the subject. I assume that this is due to an independent constraint disfavoring ambiguity.
predicate.

(78) Ngiti
k’-ala ndi
3SG-see:PERF.PRES 3SG.LOG
‘He has seen himself.’

(Kutsch Lojenga 1994: 211)

(79) Japanese
Taro-wa zibun-o mita.
Taro-TOP self-ACC saw
‘Taro saw himself.’

In regard to Japanese zibun, there is a view that locally bound zibun, though homophonous with its long-distance counterpart, is governed by structural binding (Sells 1987a: 450, fn. 6; Abe 1997; cf. Oshima 2004, 2007; Kishida 2011 for a three-way classification of zibun). I will come back to this point in Chapter 4, where zibun is used as a diagnostic tool for identifying potential logocentric antecedents.

2.3.2 Logocentric Antecedents

We have seen a variety of contexts where logophoric forms are licensed. Although languages display a diverse array of patterns in logophoric domains, it seems that variation is restricted to a limited range of options, and there are certain implicational universals with respect to the way languages circumscribe the range of possible logophoric domains (see Hyman and Comrie (1981), Stirling (1993), Culy (1994, 2002), Huang (2000) for further details).

To understand logophoric phenomena, it is also important to consider what qualifies as a possible antecedent for a logophor.

There is a marked tendency for logocentric antecedents to be grammatical subjects. However, it should be emphasized that despite the fact that subject orientation is quite pervasive across
languages, being a grammatical subject is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for qualifying as a logocentric antecedent, as stressed by Clements (1975) and many others. In the following Ewe sentence, for instance, either Ama or Kofi can be an antecedent for the logophoric pronoun yè, suggesting that it is not subjecthood that determines the possible antecedents for the logophor.

(80) Ewe
Ama se tso Kofi gbɔ be yè-xɔ nunana
Ama hear from Kofi side that LOG-receive gift
‘Ama$_1$ heard from Kofi$_2$ that she$_1$/he$_2$ received a gift.’ (Clements 1975: 159)

Here, what makes it possible for Kofi to antecede the logophor is the fact that Kofi is the source of the report.

Likewise, it is widely assumed that the Japanese reflexive zibun must be anteceded by a structural subject (Inoue 1976; Shibatani 1978; Katada 1991, among many others), but it is not difficult to find cases in which non-subjects can be taken as antecedents for zibun.

(81) Sono keiken-wa Mary$_1$-ni zibun$_1$-ga baka dearu koto-o osieta.
that experience-TOP Mary-to self-NOM fool is COMP-ACC taught
‘That experience taught Mary$_1$ that she$_1$ was a fool.’ (Kuno 1972: 190)

(82) John-no zisatu-wa Mary$_1$-nitotte zibun$_1$-ga kare-ni uragir-are-ta
John-GEN suicide-TOP Mary-to self-NOM he-by betray-PASS-PAST
koto-o imisita.
COMP-ACC meant
‘John’s suicide meant to Mary$_1$ that she$_1$ had been betrayed by him.’ (Kuno 1972: 190)

(83) Ken$_1$-wa Naomi$_2$-o zibun$_{1/2}$-no uti-e kaesi-ta.
Ken-TOP Naomi-ACC self-GEN house-to return-PAST
‘Ken$_1$ sent Naomi$_2$ back to his$_1$/her$_2$ house.’ (Kitagawa 1981: 62)\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\) Kitagawa (1981) reports that the sentence is ungrammatical if the subject Ken is taken as antecedent of
Given that subjecthood is not crucial, what exactly determines the antecedent of a logophor? Sells (1987a) offers a taxonomy of discourse roles that is useful in characterizing logocentric antecedents.

In Sells’s theory, each of these discourse roles is assigned to either the “external” speaker (i.e., the current speaker of the utterance) or some “internal” protagonist in the discourse. Sells claims that logophoric phenomena are classified into three types (listed below), depending on the assignment of these three roles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>&quot;Logophoric&quot; verb</th>
<th>Psych-verb</th>
<th>3POV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOURCE</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>external</td>
<td>external</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>external</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIVOT</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>internal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1 Types of Logophoricity

*zibun*, but for many speakers it is just as grammatical as when the object *Naomi* is intended to be the antecedent of *zibun*. 
In the logophoric-verb (or “fully logophoric”) environment, all three roles are linked to an internal protagonist. This is instantiated by indirect discourse contexts, as in (87) below.

(87) Japanese

[Taroo1-wa [Yosiko-ga zibun1-o aisiteiru to] itta.
Taro-TOP Yoshiko-NOM self-ACC love COMP said
‘Taroo1 said that Yoshiko loved him1.’

(Sells 1987a: 461)

In (87), *Taroo*, being the subject of the verb *say*, is understood as the SOURCE (as well as the SELF and the PIVOT) with respect to the embedded proposition.

In the psych-verb environment, where the external speaker reports the mental state or attitude of an internal referent, the speaker of the utterance carries the SOURCE role, while the other two roles are associated with the internal protagonist. An example is given below.

(88) Japanese

[Yosiko-ga zibun1-o musisita koto]-ga Taroo1-o yuuutunisita.
Yoshiko-NOM self-ACC ignored COMP-NOM Taro-ACC distressed
‘That Yoshiko ignored him1 distressed Taro1.’

(Sells 1987a: 461)

In this case, *Taroo* acts as the SELF (and also as the PIVOT).

The 3POV environment is not defined on the basis of the choice of a predicate. It refers to a context where the external speaker chooses to adopt the perspective of an internal protagonist and describes the state of affairs from that protagonist’s point of view. In this case, the external speaker bears the SOURCE and SELF roles, while the internal protagonist is the PIVOT.
(89) Japanese
Takashi-wa [Yosiko-ga zibun-o tazunete-kita node]
Takashi-TOP Yoshiko-NOM self-ACC visit-came because
kanasigar-anakat-ta.
become.sad-NEG-PAST
‘Takashi was not sad because Yoshiko came to visit him.’
(Sells 1987a: 472)

Notice that not all logically possible combinations of role specifications are claimed to exist, as is clear from Table 4.1. Rather, it can be seen that there is an implicational hierarchy; that is, if SOURCE is internal, then so are SELF and PIVOT, and if SELF is internal, then so is PIVOT (Sells 1987a: 456). Incidentally, in direct speech contexts (or non-logophoric contexts), all roles are associated with the external speaker.

According to Sells, languages differ with respect to which role is allowed to antecede a logophoric expression. For example, PIVOT qualifies as an antecedent for Japanese zibun but not for Icelandic sig. The following Icelandic sentence is not acceptable precisely because the intended antecedent for sig is understood as the PIVOT.

(90) Icelandic
*Jón er hér enn þó að María kyssi sig.
Jon is here still although Maria kisses.SBJ self

(Sells 1987a: 473)

We have seen that discourse factors play important roles in determining the antecedence of logophors, and the interaction of these factors gives rise to variation in logophoric phenomena. Sells’s taxonomy of logocentric antecedents makes it clear that just as languages restrict the range of possible logophoric domains in accordance with certain implicational hierarchies, the range of logocentric antecedents permitted in a given language is determined in some similar fashion. For example, Japanese allows binding of zibun by a PIVOT, which in turn predicts that
it also allows *zibun*-binding by a SOURCE or a SELF.

2.4 Antilogophoricity

At the opposite end of the spectrum from logophoricity lies antilogophoricity, but unlike the former, little is known about the latter for reasons that will become clear as our investigation unfolds.

As the name implies, antilogophoricity refers to a phenomenon wherein an expression is forced to be disjoint from the logophoric center in a given context. Thus, in normal cases, the referent of the antecedent of an antilogophor needs to be distinct from the individual whose speech, thoughts, or feelings are being reported.

To give an example, it has been claimed that English epithets have antilogophoric properties (Narahara 1991; Dubinsky and Hamilton 1998). They exhibit disjoint-reference effects when their antecedent is the one whose speech, thoughts, or feelings are being reported.

(91)  *John\textsubscript{1} thinks that the idiot\textsubscript{1} will win.
(92)  *He\textsubscript{1} told Naomi that the bastard\textsubscript{1} was going to visit his grandfather.

For example, in (91), *the idiot* cannot refer to *John* because it is John’s perspective in terms of which the embedded report is made. Similarly, in (92) *he* and *the bastard* cannot be coreferent because *he* is the individual from whose point of view the embedded proposition is reported.

The idea that epithets are antilogophoric is supported by the fact that they can refer to an individual who is not understood as the agent of reported speech or thought. Some examples are given below.

(93)  My brother\textsubscript{1} invests in many projects that the idiot\textsubscript{1} thinks will make him rich.

(Haïk 1984: 204, fn21)
(94) The teenager\textsubscript{1} rode the motorcycle which the brat\textsubscript{1} got as a birthday gift. 

(Narahara 1991: 48)

(95) John\textsubscript{1} has proven by this incident that I cannot trust the idiot\textsubscript{1}. 

(Narahara 1991: 66)

(96) I introduced John\textsubscript{1} to a woman whom the idiot\textsubscript{1} had been wanting to meet. 

(Narahara 1991: 66)

(97) John\textsubscript{1} has no idea how much trouble the bastard\textsubscript{1} caused me. 

(Narahara 1991: 77)

(98) John\textsubscript{1} ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idiot\textsubscript{1} directions. 

(Dubinsky and Hamilton 1998: 688)

(99) Through an accumulation of slipups, John\textsubscript{1} (inaudvertently) led his students to conclude that the idiot\textsubscript{1} couldn’t teach. 

(Dubinsky and Hamilton 1998: 688)

As we will discuss in more detail in subsequent chapters, it is usually very difficult to detect antilogophoricity because the effects of antilogophoricity restrictions tend to be concealed by or masquerade as other independent phenomena. This is why antilogophoricity is far less documented or discussed than logophoricity, despite the fact that its existence was hinted at as early as Kuno (1972).

2.5 Binding vs. Coreference (Covaluation)

Before moving on, it is perhaps appropriate to discuss two distinct mechanisms of establishing anaphoric relations. A widely accepted view is that a pronoun can be anaphorically linked to its antecedent in at least two ways. On this view, intrasentential anaphora can be obtained either via a process called coreference (or more broadly, covaluation) or via variable binding (or binding for short). That is, a pronoun may corefer with a DP by picking up the same reference as that DP, or alternatively, it can function as a variable bound by some operator. The former type of anaphoric relation is called coreference, whereas the latter type is called binding. In the following sentence, for instance, he can be anaphoric to John in two different ways, as roughly
represented in (101).\textsuperscript{11}

(100) John thinks he is smart.

(101)  a. Coreference
       John (\(\lambda x (x \text{ thinks he}_1 \text{ is smart})\))  \(g(1) = \text{John}\)

       b. Binding
       John (\(\lambda x (x \text{ thinks } x \text{ is smart})\))

In the case of (101a), the pronoun, as a free variable, picks up the referential value \textit{John} from the relevant inventory of discourse entities, whereas in the case of (101b), the pronoun is bound by the lambda operator.\textsuperscript{12} While there are apparently no discernible differences in meaning between (101a) and (101b), it has been reported that the two construals are empirically distinguished under ellipsis contexts (Keenan 1971; Sag 1976; Williams 1977, among others).

(102) John thinks he is smart, and Bill does too.

The second conjunct in the above sentence, which involves an elided VP, can be interpreted in two ways. Under the so-called strict reading, it means that Bill thinks John is smart, whereas under the so-called sloppy reading, it means that Bill thinks Bill himself is smart. The ambiguity here is straightforwardly explained in terms of the difference between coreference and binding. That is, if the elided VP contains a coreferential pronoun (as in (103a)), it receives a strict interpretation because the referential value of the pronoun is fixed once and for all in the first conjunct, whereas if the elided VP contains a variable, the pronoun must be linked to the relevant binder, which gives rise to a sloppy interpretation, as in (103b).

\textsuperscript{11} An assignment \(g\) is a function from the set of natural numbers to individuals.

\textsuperscript{12} On this view, binding is seen as the procedure of closing a property.
(103) a. Bill ($\lambda x$ (x thinks $he_1$ is smart))  $g(1) = John$
    b. Bill ($\lambda x$ (x thinks x is smart))

The two types of anaphoric interpretation can also be distinguished by using the focus particle *only*. For example, the following sentence carries different entailments, depending on whether the pronoun is interpreted as a coreferential pronoun or a bound variable.

(104) (Of all the women) only Sally thinks that Bill trusts her.
(105) a. Sally is the only person who thinks Bill trusts Sally
    b. Sally is the only person x such that x thinks Bill trusts x

If the pronoun *her* in (104) corefers with *Sally*, the sentence is interpreted as in (105a), which entails that the other women do not think that Bill trusts Sally. By contrast, if the pronoun *her* in (104) is interpreted as a bound variable, the sentence is interpreted as in (105b) so that it entails that the other women do not think that they are trusted by Bill.

While a pronoun can be anaphorically linked to a referential DP either via coreference or binding, it is only a binding relation that can hold between a pronoun and a quantificational antecedent. This is because quantificational expressions do not have reference and therefore cannot enter into a coreference relation with anything.

It is also widely assumed that semantic binding of a pronoun is possible only when the pronoun is c-commanded by its antecedent, whereas such a structural requirement is not necessary for coreference, as exemplified by the contrast between (106c-d), on the one hand, and (107c-d), on the other. (The examples in (106) and (107) are taken from Grodzinsky & Reinhart (1993: 72))

(106) a. Lucie$_1$ adores her$_1$ friends.
    b. Alfred$_1$ thinks he$_1$ is a great cook.
    c. Most of her$_1$ friends adore Lucie$_1$.
d. A party without Lucie annoys her.

(107)  a. Every actress adores her friends.
       b. Every scholar thinks he is a great cook.
       c. *Most of her friends adore every actress.
       d. *A party without every actress annoys her.

Under Reinhart’s (1983) version of the Binding Theory, Condition B is seen as a restriction on variable binding, and on this view, coreference is not restricted by any of the Binding Conditions. In other words, pronouns are subject to Condition B only when they are interpreted as bound variables.

One might wonder, then, why the pronoun in (108) is not able to corefer with a local referential DP given that coreference (as opposed to variable binding) lies outside the purview of Condition B.

(108) Bill adores him.

Building on Reinhart (1983), Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993) propose that what blocks intrasentential coreference in cases like (108) is not a syntactic principle but an economy condition called Rule I.

(109) Rule I: Intrasentential Coreference

   NP A cannot corefer with NP B if replacing A with C, C a variable A-bound by B, yields an indistinguishable interpretation.  

   (Grodzinsky & Reinhart 1993: 79)

Rule I ensures that accidental coreference is possible just in case the coreference construal is not equivalent to the interpretation that would be obtained by binding. While there are several versions of Rule I that have been proposed in the literature (see, for example, Reinhart (2006) and Roelofsen (2010) for extensive discussion), the precise formulation of this principle is not
important for our purposes here. The point is that in (108), replacing *him*, at LF, with an A-bound variable results in the representation *Bill* \( \lambda x (x \text{ adores } x) \), which is indistinguishable from the coreference interpretation where *Bill* and *him* are assigned the same value. Rule I thus precludes the coreference option in (108).

In normal contexts, then, Rule I basically achieves the same results as can be obtained by Chomsky’s (1981, 1986) version of the Binding Theory, where binding and coreference are uniformly regulated in the syntax. However, there are cases in which coreference is allowed even in Condition B environments (namely, where a pronoun has a local antecedent). For instance, the sentence in (110) below allows the pronoun *him* to corefer with the local referential DP *Bill*.

(110) I know what Bill and Mary have in common. Mary adores Bill and Bill adores him too.

(adapted from Reinhart 1983: 169)

Contrary to what is predicted by Chomsky’s version of the Binding Theory, the pronoun *him* can be coreferential with the local subject *Bill* in this sentence. Under Reinhart’s version, by contrast, the well-formedness of the sentence receives a straightforward explanation; in this context, the bound-variable interpretation of *him* is not identical to the intended coreference reading. To be more specific, what the speaker intends to assert in (110) is that both Mary and Bill have the property of adoring Bill, rather than the property of being a self-adorer. Since the coreference interpretation (i.e., (111a) below) is not equivalent to the reading that would be obtained by variable binding (i.e., (111b)), Rule I does not preempt intrasentential coreference here.

(111) a. Coreference

\[ \text{Bill} \ (\lambda x \ (x \text{ adores } \text{him}_6)) \quad g(6) = \text{Bill} \]

b. Binding

\[ \text{Bill} \ (\lambda x \ (x \text{ adores } x)) \]

Importantly, this is in stark contrast with a bound (as opposed to referential) pronoun, which is
not allowed to have a local antecedent regardless of context. For example, under no circumstances does the following sentence allow the pronoun to take the local subject every boy as its antecedent.

(112) Every boy adores him.

Since, in this case, coreference is not an option to start with (precisely because quantified expressions do not refer), the sentence is outright ungrammatical due to Condition B, and Rule I is simply irrelevant here.

It may incidentally be noted that in some restricted cases, the bound-variable/coreference ambiguity shows up even when the antecedent of the pronoun is quantificational. It has therefore been suggested that coreference is subsumed under a more general mechanism called coevaluation (see Reinhart 2000, 2006; Roelofsen 2010; cf. Heim 1998 for relevant discussion).

To avoid unnecessary confusion and complication, I will use the traditional term “coreference” because the distinction between coreference and covaluation is orthogonal to the discussion in the present study.

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13 For example, Every wife thinks that only she respects her husband may entail either that every wife thinks that the other wives do not respect their own husband, or that every wife thinks that the other wives do not respect her husband (see Heim 1998; Reinhart 2000, 2006; Roelofsen 2010).
Chapter 3 Concealed Antilogophoricity: A Case Study of Japanese Pronominal Binding

3.1 Overt third-person pronouns in Japanese

This chapter presents a case study of the Japanese overt third-person pronouns *kare* ‘he’ and *kanozyo* ‘she’, which pose difficult challenges for the Binding Theory. At first sight, it seems that they are constrained in the same way as English pronouns. As demonstrated below, local binding and coreference are prohibited.

(1) a. *?Taroo*-wa *kare*1-o hometa.
   Taro-TOP he-ACC praised
   ‘Taro praised him.’

   b. *?Hanako*-wa *kanozyo*1-o hometa.
   Hanako-TOP she-ACC praised
   ‘Hanako praised her.’

(2) *Dono-gakusei*-mo *kare*1/*kanozyo*1-o hometa.
   every-student-PART he/she-ACC praised
   ‘Every student praised him/her.’
If we look at non-local binding/coreference possibilities, however, a peculiar pattern emerges. It has been reported that *kare* and *kanozyo* can be anaphorically linked to an antecedent via coreference but not via binding (Kitagawa 1981; Saito and Hoji 1983; Sportiche 1986; Hoji, 1990, 1991; Noguchi 1995, 1997; Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002, among others).\(^{14}\) In other words, they can refer but cannot function as bound variables, as the contrast between (3) and (4) demonstrates.

(3) Taroo\(_1\)-wa \(\text{kare}_{1/2}\)-ga katu to omotteiru.
   Taro-TOP he-NOM win COMP think
   ‘Taro thinks that he will win.’

(4) Dono-gakusei\(_1\)-mo \(\text{kare}_{1/2}\)-ga katu to omotteiru.
   every-student-PART he-NOM win COMP think
   ‘Taro thinks that he will win.’

What this suggests is that modulating the definition of locality alone does not seem sufficient to capture the patterns in Japanese pronominal binding under the standard Binding Theory, where binding and coreference are both defined in terms of coindexation (i.e., identity of indices) and are regulated in the same fashion.

Also, the data pose a learnability problem if we suppose that children initially entertain the hypothesis that pronouns can be used as either free or bound variables. In other words, if pronouns of the English type are the default option, the unbindability of Japanese third-person pronouns could not be learned on the basis of positive evidence directly available to Japanese-speaking children.

There are several ways to address this learnability issue. One possible line of approach is to claim that children come equipped with the knowledge that pronouns of the Japanese type are the default (see Sportiche 1986: 374 for discussion). Note that this is not a logically forced move.

\(^{14}\) As we will see later, these pronouns can in fact be bound in certain restricted contexts.
Such an approach is based on the tacit assumption that children are only attentive to direct evidence to acquire relevant linguistic knowledge. This assumption, which Pearl and Mis (2012) call the *direct evidence assumption*, is by no means self-evident.

Another conceivable way to solve this puzzle, therefore, is to hypothesize that children use indirect evidence to converge on the correct knowledge of these pronouns. For instance, learners may employ a probabilistic learning strategy drawing indirect evidence from, say, the properties of other pronominal elements in the same language. In the case of Japanese, it is not implausible that Japanese-speaking children learn the relevant anaphoric properties of *kare/kanozyo* indirectly from the distributional data of the anaphor *zibun* ‘self’.

Still another possibility is that there is evidence, whether direct or indirect, that suggests that these putative pronouns are characterized as something other than genuine pronouns and are therefore not constrained in the same way as pronouns.

In order to answer the question of how Japanese-speaking children come to know the anaphoric patterns of overt third-person pronouns, it is crucial to address the question of what determines the binding-theoretic properties of these elements because the answer to the first question hinges ultimately on the answer to the second.15

In what follows, we will first take a look at the basic properties of overt third-person pronouns in Japanese, and review previous approaches to the putative unbindability of third-person pronouns in Japanese. We will then look at the recent observations made by Hoji et al. (2000) and Hara (2002), which, contrary to the widely held assumption, suggest that Japanese third-person pronouns can actually function as bound variables under certain restricted environments. The central question that will be addressed, therefore, is why third-person pronouns in Japanese can be bound only in a subset of the contexts in which third-person

15 There are other important issues pertaining to children’s pronoun interpretation. One issue, known as the delay of Principle B effect (DPBE), is concerned with the well-known observation that children apparently fail to show knowledge of Condition B. For an in-depth overview of previous studies on the DPBE, see Conroy et al. (2009). Another issue is concerned with children’s apparent inability to compute the Avoid Pronoun Principle. See Shibata and Yashima (2014) for discussion.
pronouns in languages like English can be bound. I will show that antilogophoricity is operative behind the scenes in determining the distribution and interpretation of kare/kanozyo.

3.2 Basic Facts

Let us begin by looking at the basic properties of third-person pronouns in Japanese. It seems safe to say that overt third-person pronouns in Japanese (such as kare ‘he’ and kanozyo ‘she’) display a full range of properties that are typically associated with referential (as opposed to bound) pronouns.

First of all, kare and kanozyo can take a non-local referential antecedent regardless of whether they are c-commanded by the antecedent (Kanzaki 1994: 125 and references therein), as the following examples demonstrate.

(5) a. Taro-wa Hanako-ga kare-o nikundeiru to omotteiru.
   Taro-TOP Hanako-NOM he-ACC hate COMP think
   ‘Taro thinks that Hanako hates him.’

b. Hanako-wa Taro-ga kanozyo-o nikundeiru to omotteiru.
   Hanako-TOP Taro-NOM she-ACC hate COMP think
   ‘Hanako thinks that Taro hates her.’

(6) a. Izen kare-o nikundeita hito-ga Taro-o tasuketa.
   before he-ACC hated person-NOM Taro-ACC helped
   ‘The person who used to hate him helped Taro.’

b. Izen kanozyo-o nikundeita hito-ga Hanako-o tasuketa.
   before she-ACC hated person-NOM Hanako-ACC helped
   ‘The person who used to hate her helped Hanako.’

Secondly, just like English referential pronouns, Japanese overt third-person pronouns normally resist having a local referential antecedent but are allowed to have one under appropriate contexts (Hoji 1995; cf. Reinhart 1983), while they cannot have local quantified
antecedents under any circumstances.\(^{16}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
(7) \quad & \text{a. } #\text{Taro}_{1}\text{-}ga \text{ kare}_{1}\text{-}o \text{ nikundeiru.} \\
& \quad \text{Taro-NOM he-ACC hate} \\
& \quad \text{‘Taro hates him.’} \\
& \text{b. } *\text{Dono gakusei}_{1}\text{-}mo \text{ kare}_{1}\text{-}o \text{ nikundeiru.} \\
& \quad \text{every student-PART he-ACC hate} \\
& \quad \text{‘Every student hates him.’}
\end{align*}
\]

Thirdly, as reported by Saito and Hoji (1983: 257), no sloppy reading is available in sentences of the following sort.

\[
(8) \quad (\text{Subeteno dansi gakusei nonakade}) \text{ Taro-} \text{dake}-\text{ga Hanako-} \text{ga kare}-\text{o} \\
\quad \text{all male student among Taro-only-NOM Hanako-NOM he-ACC} \\
\quad \text{uttaeru to omotteiru.} \\
\quad \text{sue COMP think} \\
\quad \text{‘(Of all male students) only Taro thinks Hanako will sue him.’}
\]

Disregarding any readings where the pronoun refers to someone other than Taro, the above sentence has only one interpretation. Crucially, it has the reading (9a), but (9b) is not a possible interpretation for (8).

\[
(9) \quad \text{a. } [\text{Only } x: x = \text{Taro}] x \text{ thinks Hanako will sue him}_{2} \quad g(2) = \text{Taro} \\
\quad \text{b. } [\text{Only } x: x = \text{Taro}] x \text{ thinks Hanako will sue } x
\]

This means that sentence (8) entails that the other male students do not think that Hanako will

\(^{16}\) As mentioned in Chapter 2, the underlying idea here is that as opposed to variable binding, which is regulated by Binding Conditions, coreference is governed by an economy condition called Rule I (Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993; Reinhart 2006; Reinhart 1983), which blocks accidental coreference if the coreference interpretation is equivalent to what would be obtained by binding.
sue Taro, but does not entail that the other male students do not think that they will be sued by Hanako. This is confirmed by the fact that the statement in (8) can be denied by uttering the sentence in (10a), whereas the sentence in (10b) is not a felicitous denial of the statement.

(10)  a. Iya, boku-mo Hanako-ga Taroo/kare-o uttaeru to omotteiru.
     No I-also Hanako-NOM Taro/he-ACC sue COMP think
     ‘No, I also think Hanako will sue Taro/him.’

   b. Iya, boku-mo Hanako-ga boku-o uttaeru to omotteiru.
     No I-also Hanako-NOM I-ACC sue COMP think
     ‘No, I also think Hanako will sue me.’

These observations indicate that like English referential pronouns, Japanese overt third-person pronouns can at least enter into coreference relations with referential antecedents.

However, the absence of a sloppy interpretation for (8) seems puzzling in view of the fact that the English counterpart to (8), given below as (11), allows both strict and sloppy readings.

(11)  Only Taro thinks that Hanako will sue him.

Not only the absence of sloppy readings but also other facts suggest that Japanese overt third-person pronouns do not pattern with English bound pronouns. For example, overt third-person pronouns in Japanese fail to give rise to bound-variable readings even in those environments where they are c-commanded by a non-local quantificational DP.

(12)  a. ?*Dono gakusei₁-mo kare₁-ga isya-ni naru to sinziteiru.
      every student-PART he-NOM doctor-as become COMP believe
      ‘Every student believes that he will become a doctor.’

    b. ?*Dono gakusei₁-mo Hanako-ga kare₁-o tasukeru to omotteiru.
      every student-PART Hanako-NOM he-ACC help COMP think
      ‘Every student thinks that Hanako will help him.’
Thus, it has often been claimed that unlike their English counterparts, Japanese overt third-person pronouns such as kare ‘he’ and kanozyo ‘she’ cannot be interpreted as bound variables (Kitagawa 1981; Saito and Hoji 1983; Sportiche 1986; Hoji, 1990, 1991; Noguchi 1995, 1997, Déchaine and Wiltschko 2002, among others). For example, the sentence in (13) has an interpretation in which the third-person pronoun kare refers to some individual whose reference is understood in the context, but does not have an interpretation in which the pronoun is bound by the quantificational DP dono gakusei(-mo) ‘every student’ (as represented in (14)).

(13) Dono gakusei-mo kare-ga katu to omotteiru.
    every student-PART he-NOM win COMP think
    ‘Every student thinks that he will win.’

(14) every student (λx (x thinks x will win))

In order to express the interpretation given in (14), zibun ‘self’ or a null pronoun needs to be used instead of kare.

(15) Dono gakusei₁-mo {zibun₁-ga/ø₁} katu to omotteiru.
    every student-PART self-NOM win COMP think
    ‘Every student thinks that he will win.’

These observations led many researchers to the following generalization:

(16) Overt third-person pronouns in Japanese can only refer.
In the last few decades, various analyses have been proposed to account for this seemingly peculiar property of Japanese overt third-person pronouns (Montalbetti 1984; Sportiche 1986; Hoji 1990, 1991; Katada 1991; Aoun and Hornstein 1992; Noguchi 1995, 1997; Déchaine and Wiltschko 2002). As we will see, however, the generalization stated in (16) is only apparent; there are cases in which kare and kanozyo can be construed as bound variables. This means that the previous analyses just cited are inadequate to capture the true nature of Japanese personal pronouns, as they rest on the false premise that overt third-person pronouns in Japanese cannot be bound. That said, since all these analyses offer some insightful ideas, it is worthwhile to review them first.

3.3 The (Putative) “Unbindability” of Overt Third-Person Pronouns: Previous Studies

3.3.1 Sportiche (1986)

This section reviews Sportiche (1986), who attempts to capture the properties of the Japanese third-person pronoun kare in association with the properties of the reflexive zibun.

Sportiche’s analysis is based on the idea that pronouns (including anaphors) are characterized along two dimensions, namely whether they require a c-commanding antecedent (i.e., binder) and whether they are subject to a locality condition or an anti-locality condition. In English, an anaphor requires a binder in the same sentence, and it is also subject to a locality constraint. Pronouns, on the other hand, are divided into two types. One type, which we call him[-R] for convenience, functions as a bound variable and as such requires a c-commanding antecedent. The other type, which we call him[+R], is a pronoun used referentially, and it does not require a binder. Both types of pronouns are subject to an anti-locality constraint, meaning that pronouns, either free or bound variables, must be disjoint from c-commanding DPs in the same domain. The English pronominal system is therefore summarized as follows.
Let us now turn to the Japanese pronominal system. Just like English reflexives, the Japanese reflexive *zibun* must be bound. However, it differs from English anaphors in that it can be bound either locally or non-locally.

(18) Taroo₁-wa zibun₁-o suisensita.
    Taro-TOP self-ACC recommended
    ‘Taro recommended himself.’

(19) Taroo₁-wa Hanako₂-ga zibun₁/₂-o suisensuru koto-o sitteiru.
    Taro-TOP Hanako-NOM self-ACC recommend COMP-ACC know
    ‘Taro knows that Hanako will recommend him/herself.’

In a sense, then, *zibun* acts as either a local anaphor or a bound pronoun. For convenience, we call the former use of *zibun* [zibun₁⁺₁⁺] and the latter use *zibun* [zibun₁⁻⁻].

In contrast to *zibun*, third-person pronouns in Japanese can only be used referentially and cannot be bound (so it was believed by a number of researchers including, among others, Kitagawa (1981) and Saito and Hoji (1983)).

(20) Taroo₁-wa kare₁-ga yuusyoosuru to omotteiru.
    Taro-TOP he-NOM win.first.prize COMP think
    ‘Taro thinks that he will win first prize.’

(21) Dono gakusei₁-mo kare₁/zibun₁-ga yuusyoosuru to omotteiru.
    every student-PART he/self-NOM win.first.prize COMP think
    ‘Every student thinks that he will win first prize.’
In other words, the third-person pronoun *kare* corresponds to a referential pronoun (i.e., *him*\(_{[+R]}\)) in English. The Japanese pronominal system is summarized as follows.

(22) **Japanese Pronominal System**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>lexical item</th>
<th>requires a binder</th>
<th>subject to a locality [+]</th>
<th>antilocality [-] constraint</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>zibun</em> [+L]</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>zibun</em> [-L]</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>kare</em></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These observations suggest that English and Japanese have essentially the same pronominal system, and the superficial differences are attributed to the differences in the way pronominal elements are lexicalized. To be more specific, English lexically distinguishes between those which must be locally bound and those which must be locally free, whereas Japanese lexically distinguishes between referentially defective pronouns (i.e., bound variables) and referentially independent pronouns. If so, the seemingly peculiar properties of *kare* are not so surprising when viewed from the overall system of anaphoric reference in Japanese.

Under Sportiche’s analysis, the binding-theoretic differences between English and Japanese pronouns are, in effect, accidental. On this view, the reason that *kare* resists variable binding is that it is lexicalized as an exclusively referential pronoun by virtue of the fact that *zibun* happens to be lexicalized in such a way that it acts either as a local anaphor or as a bound pronoun. While this analysis can be seen as a restrictive theory of parametric variation in possible pronoun/anaphor types, it does not resolve the fundamental question of why *kare* must be lexicalized the way it is.

3.3.2 Aoun and Hornstein (1992) and Katada (1991)
Aoun and Hornstein’s (1992) point of departure is the idea that there are two distinct anti-locality conditions that pronouns must obey. They argue that one condition requires that a pronoun be A-free in the relevant domain, and the other requires that a pronoun be A'-free in the relevant domain. In the case of English, the domain in which pronouns must be A-free happens to be the same as the domain in which they must be A'-free, and this masks the fact that there are two distinct anti-locality conditions.

In Japanese, on the other hand, pronouns must be A-free in the minimal CFC and A'-free anywhere. Hence the contrast between (23) and (24).

(23) Taroo1-wa kare1-ga yuusyoosuru to omotteiru.
    Taro-TOP he-NOM win.first.prize COMP think
    ‘Taro thinks that he will win first prize.’
(24) Dono gakusei1-mo kare1/2-ga yuusyoosuru to omotteiru.
    every student-PART he-NOM win.first.prize COMP think
    ‘Every student thinks that he will win first prize.’

In (23), the antecedent of kare is Taroo, which is in A-position. Since kare is A-free in the minimal CFC, the sentence is grammatical. In (24), however, the antecedent of kare is the quantificational expression dono gakusei(-mo) “every student”, which undergoes QR to A'-position. The LF representation of (24) is given as follows:

(25) [TP Dono-gakusei-mo_i [TP t_i [CP kare-ga yuusyoosuru to] omotteiru]]

Thus, at LF, dono gakusei(-mo) A'-binds kare, in violation of the anti-locality requirement.

A caveat is in order here. Aoun and Hornstein (1992) assume that the c-command requirement for pronominal binding “must hold between the QP and the pronoun and not necessarily between the variable and the pronoun” (p.3), unlike the standard view that a pronoun can be interpreted as bound by a quantificational phrase only if it is c-commanded by the variable bound by that QP.
Under Aoun and Hornstein’s approach, then, weak crossover effects must be accounted for independently. Also, Noguchi (1995, 1997) argues against Aoun and Hornstein’s analysis, based on the observation that kare can be anteceded by a scrambled phrase. The following example is taken from Noguchi (1997: 773, fn.3).

    John-ACC he-GEN mother-NOM police-NOM arrest-do will COMP think

    ‘John, his mother thinks that the police will arrest him.’

Given that (long-distance) scrambling involves A'-movement, it is predicted that in (26), John-o cannot antecede kare, but the sentence is fine even when the pronoun is coreferential with the scrambled antecedent. Noguchi takes this fact as evidence suggesting that Aoun and Hornstein’s analysis is too strong.

To be fair, though, the grammaticality of (26) does not necessarily undermine Aoun and Hornstein’s account. It is true that long-distance scrambling shows A'-movement properties, but given that long-distance scrambling is subject to obligatory LF reconstruction (Saito 1992), kare in (26) is, after all, A'-free at LF, where the relevant anti-locality requirement is supposed to hold. Perhaps a more compelling piece of evidence against Aoun and Hornstein’s claim comes from Abe’s (1992) observation, to which we will return shortly.

We have so far looked at two approaches that attempt to capture the binding-theoretic properties of third-person pronouns in Japanese. The two proposals differ in that under Sportiche’s approach, the putative unbindability of kare follows from the intrinsic lexical properties of kare, whereas under Aoun and Hornstein’s approach, it follows from the antilocality condition on A'-binding.

An advantage, so it is claimed, of Aoun and Hornstein’s analysis is that it can provide a
principled account of the observation that *kare* must be free not only from quantifiers but also from the reflexive *zibun* (Lasnik 1989).

(27)  
\[\text{John-wa} \quad [\text{zibun-ga} \quad \text{kare-no} \quad \text{hahaoya-o} \quad \text{semeta to}] \quad \text{itta.}\]
\[\text{John-TOP} \quad \text{self-NOM} \quad \text{he-GEN} \quad \text{mother-ACC} \quad \text{blamed} \quad \text{COMP} \quad \text{said}\]
\[\text{‘John said that he blamed his mother.’}\]
\[(*\text{kare} = \text{John})\]

In this sentence, *kare* must be disjoint in reference from *John*. Replacing *zibun* with a null pronoun or the overt third-person pronoun *kare* makes coreference between *John* and *kare* possible.\(^{17}\) (To make sure that the subject *John* in (28a) resides in the matrix clause, it is marked with the topic marker *-wa*, which can occur only in a root clause.)

(28)  
\[\text{a. John-wa} \quad [\phi \quad \text{kare-no} \quad \text{hahaoya-o} \quad \text{semeta to}] \quad \text{itta.}\]
\[\text{John-TOP} \quad \text{he-GEN} \quad \text{mother-ACC} \quad \text{blamed} \quad \text{COMP} \quad \text{said}\]
\[\text{‘John said that he killed his mother.’}\]
\[\text{b. John-wa} \quad [\text{kare-ga} \quad \text{kare-no} \quad \text{hahaoya-o} \quad \text{semeta to}] \quad \text{itta.}\]
\[\text{John-TOP} \quad \text{he-NOM} \quad \text{he-GEN} \quad \text{mother-ACC} \quad \text{blamed} \quad \text{COMP} \quad \text{said}\]
\[\text{‘John said that he killed his mother.’}\]

The grammaticality of (28a-b) above suggests that it is the presence of *zibun* that is responsible for the disjoint-reference effect. Yet it is not immediately obvious why *kare* must be disjoint from *zibun*, given that *zibun* is not a quantifier.

At this point, it is perhaps instructive to touch on Katada’s (1991) analysis of *zibun*. Katada proposes that *zibun* should be analyzed as what she dubs an *operator anaphor*. Operator anaphors share certain semantic characteristics with standard operators such as quantifiers (including *wh*-phrases) and null operators (see Katada 1991 for details). She claims that just like

\(^{17}\) The sentence in (28b) sounds less natural than (28a) presumably due to an independent economy/pragmatic principle favoring a more attenuated anaphoric form over a less attenuated one. See Section 3.3.6.
standard operators, the operator anaphor zibun undergoes raising to an A'-position at LF.\textsuperscript{18} If Katada is right in claiming that zibun moves to an A'-position at LF, the fact that kare cannot be bound in (27) follows directly from Aoun and Hornstein’s idea that kare must be A'-free. Note that as expected, the following sentence (taken from Katada (1991: ex. 54)) allows kare and zibun to have the same referential value.

(29) John\textsubscript{1}-ga [kare\textsubscript{1}-ga Bill\textsubscript{2}-ni zibun\textsubscript{1}\textasciitilde2-no koto-o hanasita to]  
John-NOM he-NOM Bill-DAT self-GEN matter-ACC told COMP  
omotteiru.  
think \‘John thinks that he told Bill about him.’

At LF, zibun adjoins to the embedded VP to take kare as its antecedent. The antecedent of kare is John, which stays in A-position throughout the derivation. Since kare is A'-free, the sentence is grammatical.

The supposed appeal of Aoun and Hornstein’s analysis shrivels upon closer scrutiny, however. As pointed out by Abe (1992), it incorrectly predicts that the following sentence is ruled out as ungrammatical.

(30) Masao\textsubscript{1}-wa [[kare\textsubscript{1}-ga sukidatta sensei]-ga zibun\textsubscript{1}-o nikundeiru to]  
Masao-TOP he-NOM liked teacher-NOM self-ACC hate COMP  
itta.  
said \‘Masao said that the teacher he liked hated him.’

If, as Aoun and Hornstein (1992) and Katada (1991) assume, zibun raises to an A'-position in order to get locally bound by its antecedent, the above sentence should have the following LF

\textsuperscript{18} The idea of raising anaphors at LF itself is reminiscent of Lebeaux (1983) and Chomsky (1986).
Since, in this case, *zibun* moves all the way to the matrix VP, it ends up in an A'-position c-commanding *kare*. The sentence is predicted to be ungrammatical, as *kare* is not A'-free, but it is actually grammatical.

Then it must be concluded that either Aoun and Hornstein’s (1992) analysis of *kare* or the A'-movement analysis of *zibun* is false. At any rate, the sentence in (27), repeated here as (32), do not lend any additional support to Aoun and Hornstein’s proposal.

    John-NOM self-NOM he-GEN mother-ACC blamed COMP said
    ‘John said that he blamed his mother.’
    (*kare* = John)

3.3.3 Montalbetti (1984)

Montalbetti (1984) attempts to derive the unbindability of Japanese personal pronouns from the Overt Pronoun Constraint (OPC), which is claimed to be operative at LF.

(33) *Overt Pronoun Constraint (OPC)*
    Overt pronouns cannot link to formal variables iff the alternation overt/empty obtains.
    (Montalbetti 1984: 94)

A “formal variable” here is defined as follows (see Higginbotham 1983).
Formal Variable

A formal variable $v$ is a formal variable iff (i) $v$ is an empty category in an argument position; and (ii) $v$ is linked to a lexical operator in a non-argument position.

For our purposes here, it is safe to assume that a formal variable is a trace left by wh-movement or QR.

Under Montalbetti’s analysis, the following contrast is nicely captured.

\[(35) \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{*Dono gakusei}_1\text{-mo kare}_1\text{-ga katu to omotteiru.} \\
& \text{every student-PART he-NOM win COMP think} \\
& \text{‘Every student thinks that he will win.’} \\
\text{b. } & \text{Dono gakusei}_1\text{-mo } \emptyset_1 \text{ katu to omotteiru.} \\
& \text{every student-PART win COMP think} \\
& \text{‘Every student thinks that he will win.’}
\end{align*}\]

The OPC-based account correctly predicts that the overt pronoun kare in (35) cannot be linked to (the trace of) the wh-phrase dono gakusei(-mo) ‘every student’ while the empty pronoun $\emptyset$ in the same position can.

Upon closer scrutiny, however, there are disparities in the behavior of overt pronouns in Japanese and Spanish, the latter of which originally motivated the postulation of the OPC. Specifically, Japanese displays stronger OPC effects than Spanish in the sense that in the latter, the OPC can be circumvented in the presence of an intervening silent pronoun, whereas in the former, it cannot. In languages like Spanish, it is observed that in those configurations where an intermediate bound null pronoun intervenes between a formal variable and an overt pronoun, the binding of the overt pronoun to the formal variable becomes possible. In such syntactic contexts, the intermediate bound pro acts as a mediator between the formal variable and the overt pronoun, which is schematically represented as follows.
However, the same does not apply to Japanese, as Montalbetti observes. Consider the following example.

\[(37) \quad \text{*Dono gakusei}_1\text{-mo } [\text{CP } \varnothing ] [\text{CP kanarazu kare}_1\text{-ga katu to} ] \text{ itta to} ]
\]
"every student-PART definitely he-NOM win COMP said COMP omotteiru.
\`
think
‘Every student thinks that he said that he would definitely win.’"

At LF, the sentence in (37) creates the following configuration, but the overt pronoun *kare cannot be interpreted as a bound variable.

\[(38) \quad \text{Dono gakusei-mo}_i [t_i \ldots [\varnothing \ldots [\text{kare} \ldots ] \ldots ] \ldots ]]
\]

To account for this difference, Montalbetti (1984) postulates the following version of the OPC for Japanese.

\[\text{OPC-2} \]
Overt pronouns cannot have formal variables as antecedents.

(Montalbetti 1984: 187)

According to Montalbetti, languages like Japanese are subject to the OPC-2, which prohibits binding of overt pronouns even more stringently than the OPC. However, the OPC-2 is not
merely a stipulation but also a restatement of the problem rather than an explanation, as pointed out by Elbourne (2005) (see also Noguchi 1995, 1997 for arguments against the OPC-based account). As such, Montalbetti’s idea does not provide a deep analysis of why Japanese overt pronouns are constrained the way they are.

So far we have looked into the properties of Japanese third-person pronouns based on the tacit assumption that *kare* and *kanozyo* are personal pronouns (of the kind found in English). However, some scholars have challenged this assumption, claiming instead that they are something else. Then the question is: What are they?

3.3.4 Japanese Third-Person Pronouns as NPs (Kuroda 1965)

Greenberg’s (1963: 96) linguistic universal 42 states that “[a]ll languages have pronominal categories involving at least three persons and two numbers”. The assumption that lies behind this generalization is that all languages have pronouns. However, this is not self-evident when we consider languages like Japanese, namely, languages in which the demarcation between what we label as pronouns and common nouns is not as clear as in Western languages. That is to say, unlike in English, where the three types of nominal expressions (i.e., anaphors, non-reflexive pronouns, and R-expressions) are normally distinguishable based on morphosyntactic criteria, it is not so easy to identify the type of nominal expression in languages like Japanese. Thus, in discussing binding-theoretic phenomena in such languages, it is important to ask whether pronouns constitute a class of forms that should be distinguished from the category of nouns. This issue is indeed a matter of much debate in Japanese linguistics, and no solid consensus has yet been reached.

It should be noted that Japanese does have words that are semantically analogous to English personal pronouns. Some examples are given below.
These forms are commonly used when English personal pronouns are translated into Japanese, but the question being addressed here is whether they are distinct from nouns in syntactically/morphologically relevant ways. The purpose of this section is to evaluate the hypothesis that Japanese third-person pronouns are characterized as NPs. We will first take a look at the evidence that has been cited in support of the claim that Japanese third-person pronouns pattern with common nouns rather than bona fide pronouns. Then it will be shown that although Japanese pronouns exhibit apparently noun-like properties, they should nevertheless be separated from common nouns.

Let us first review some of the arguments that have been put forward in favor of the view that Japanese personal pronouns are equivalent to nouns. Kuroda (1965: 105) observes that in Japanese, so-called pronouns can be modified by adjectives, unlike English personal pronouns, which are usually incompatible with adjectival modification. The contrast between (41a-b), on the one hand, and (42a-b), on the other, shows that English pronouns cannot be modified by adjectives directly, whereas Japanese readily allows adjectives to modify pronouns that follow them, suggesting that Japanese personal pronouns pattern with noun phrases.

(40) watasi ‘I/me’
anata ‘you’
kare ‘he/him’
kanozyo ‘she/her’
watasitati ‘we/us’
anatatati ‘you (plural)’
karera ‘they/them’

(41) a. the short man
    b. *the short he
(42) a. tiisai hito
    short man
Similarly, it is possible to attach a relative clause to a pronoun in Japanese.

\[(43) \quad [_{RC} \text{kinoo Taroo-ga paatii-ni turetekita}] \text{ kanozyo} \]
\[
yesterday \ Taro-NOM \ party-to \ brought \ she \]
\[(\text{Lit.}) \ ‘she, \ who \ Taro \ brought \ to \ the \ party \ yesterday’\]

Another piece of evidence for the noun-like nature of Japanese personal pronouns is that first- and second-person pronouns come in many varieties (Kuroda 1965: 123).

\[(44) \quad a. \ First \ person \ singular:\]
\[
\text{watasi, watakusi, ore, temae, boku, etc.} \]
\[(44) \quad b. \ Second \ person \ singular:\]
\[
\text{anata, kimi, omae, temae, etc.} \]

This suggests that they are open-class elements, and in this respect, they pattern with common nouns, not with pronouns.

Furthermore, in modern standard Japanese, \textit{kare} and \textit{kanozyo} can mean ‘boyfriend’ and ‘girlfriend,’ respectively. Noguchi (1997) takes this fact as evidence suggesting that Japanese personal pronouns are lexical (as opposed to functional) categories on a par with common nouns. The underlying idea is that only lexical categories can undergo semantic drift.

Kuroda (1965: 106) further points out that the repetition of so-called pronouns in Japanese is more constrained than that of English pronouns. For example, the following English sentence is perfectly grammatical.

\[(45) \quad \text{He does his work when he feels like doing it.} \]
The literal Japanese translation of (45), as given below, sounds unnatural if not utterly ungrammatical (under the reading where all instances of kare refer to the same person).

(46) %Kare-wa kare-ga kare-no sigoto-o si-tai toki-ni kare-no
    he-TOP he-NOM he-GEN work-ACC do-want.to when-PART he-GEN
    sigoto-o suru.
    work-ACC do
    ‘He does his work when he feels like doing it.’

Interestingly, this is just as unnatural as the following sentence, where all the instances of kare are replaced with a name.

(47) %George-wa George-ga George-no sigoto-o si-tai toki-ni
    George-TOP George-NOM George-GEN work-ACC do-want.to when-PART
    George-no sigoto-o suru.
    George-GEN work-ACC do
    (Lit.) ‘George does George’s work when George feels like doing George’s work.’

Sentences (46) and (47) become most natural if all but the first instance of kare/George are unexpressed.

(48) George/Kare-wa sigoto-o si-tai toki-ni sigoto-o suru.
    George/he-TOP work-ACC do-want.to when-PART work-ACC do
    ‘George/He does his work when he feels like doing it.’

These observations seem to indicate that Japanese personal pronouns pattern with common nouns rather than pronouns. Kuroda (1965) therefore concludes that what we have hitherto referred to as Japanese personal pronouns should be treated as nouns rather than pronouns.
Such an analysis is far from implausible, in light of the fact that (the precursors of) third-person pronouns in earlier varieties of English also behaved as nouns. For instance, they did occur with adjectival modifiers just as Japanese third-person pronouns do.\textsuperscript{19} Below are some examples from the \textit{OED} collected by Kanzaki (1994: 14) and from Shakespeare’s English collected by Abbott (1869: 149).

\begin{enumerate}
\item \begin{flushleft} a. He has shewed as much honesty and bravery of spirit as any \textit{he} in Mansoul. —Bunyan, \textit{Holy War}, 275
\item b. He—that great \textit{he}—covers all. —G. Meredith, \textit{The Tragic Comedians}, 230
\item c. Her vertues many compare with the proudest \textit{she} that waits vpon your Queen. —Greene, \textit{The Scottish Historie of James the Fourth}, I. iii. 679
\item d. For every he has got him a \textit{she}. —\textit{Westminster Drollery}, II. 80
\item e. Those are not \textit{shes}—they’re both men. —Fenn, \textit{Real Gold}, 40\end{flushleft}
\end{enumerate}

(50) a. Lady, you are the cruellest \textit{she} alive. —Shakespeare, \textit{Twelfth Night}, i. 5. 259
b. Betwixt two such \textit{shes}. Shakespeare, \textit{Cymbeline}, i. 6. 40; ib. i. 3. 29

In these examples, \textit{he} and \textit{she} simply seem to mean “man” and “woman”, respectively. Both are used as ordinary nouns and are distinct from pronouns, as evidenced by the fact that they can follow an indefinite article (as in (49d)), can bear regular plural morphology (as in (49e) and (50b)), and fail to show case inflection.\textsuperscript{20}

To recap, Kuroda (1965) claims that so-called pronouns in Japanese are equivalent to nouns. On this view, modern standard Japanese does not have overt personal pronouns, and the closest Japanese counterparts to personal pronouns in Western languages are null pronouns (see also Martin 1975: 1075).

\textsuperscript{19} It should be noted that in Present-day English, too, pronouns can occur with certain adjectival modifiers (Jespersen 1949: 134; Kanzaki 1994: 13-14; Noguchi 1997: 778), as in \textit{poor me, little you, the real you}, and \textit{another you}. However, expressions of this sort are not productive, and behave rather differently from full-fledged personal pronouns (see Noguchi 1997 for discussion).

\textsuperscript{20} A relic of this usage is still found in Present-day English (e.g., \textit{Is it a he or a she?}).
3.3.5 Japanese Pronouns as N-Pronouns (Noguchi 1995, 1997; Déchaine and Wiltschko 2002)

Building mainly on Kuroda’s observations, Noguchi (1995, 1997) develops an idea that there are two types of pronouns: D-pronouns (i.e., pronouns that fall under the category of D) and N-pronouns (i.e., pronouns that are morphosyntactically equivalent to nouns). He further claims that only functional items can serve as bound variables, which entails that nouns cannot be bound since they are lexical. Thus, while both D- and N-pronouns can be used as referential pronouns, only the former can be construed as bound variables.

Under Noguchi’s classification, English third-person pronouns correspond to D-pronouns, while Japanese third-person pronouns are analyzed as N-pronouns. This morphosyntactic difference, he argues, is responsible for the binding-theoretic differences between the pronouns in these languages. That is, the unbindability of Japanese third-person pronouns is reduced to the general prohibition against binding of lexical categories.

Déchaine and Wiltschko (2002) propose a finer-grained typology of pronouns, according to which pronouns are divided into three types (i.e., pro-DP, pro-ϕP, and pro-NP), each of which is associated with a syntactically distinct projection, as illustrated below.

![Diagram of pro-DP, pro-ϕP, and pro-NP]

(51) A pro-DP is composed of three layers of projection. It is syntactically a DP and internally
contains a $\phi$P and an NP. A $\phi$P is a functional projection that is smaller than a DP and larger than an NP. The $\phi$ head is considered to be the locus of $\phi$-features. A pro-NP syntactically constitutes an NP.

Just like Noguchi, Déchaine and Wiltschko claim that the morphosyntactic makeup of a given pronoun determines its syntactic distribution and inherent semantics, which in turn determines its binding-theoretic properties. Below is a summary of the properties of each pronoun type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pro-DP</th>
<th>Pro-$\phi$P</th>
<th>Pro-NP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal syntax</td>
<td>D syntax; morphologically complex</td>
<td>neither D syntax nor N syntax</td>
<td>N syntax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>argument</td>
<td>argument or predicate</td>
<td>predicate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semantics</td>
<td>definite</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binding-theoretic status</td>
<td>R-expression</td>
<td>variable</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1 Nominal Proform Typology (Déchaine and Wiltschko 2002: 410)

A pro-DP only occurs in argument position. It is classified as an R-expression, thereby falling under Condition C of the Binding Theory. A $\phi$P is simply a spell-out of $\phi$-features, and is subject to Condition B. It can function either as an argument or as a predicate. A pro-NP occurs in predicate position. It is semantically a constant and is “undefined with respect to binding theory”, which means that its binding-theoretic properties “follow from its inherent semantics” (Déchaine and Wiltschko 2002: 411), a point on which I will elaborate below.

Déchaine and Wiltschko (2002) classify Japanese third-person pronouns as pro-NPs (on the basis of the evidence reported by Kuroda (1965) and Noguchi (1997), which we saw earlier). They attempt to derive the unbindability of these pronouns from the inherent semantics of pro-NPs. That is, since pro-NPs are constants, and since constants cannot function as bound variables, it follows that Japanese third-person pronouns, being pro-NPs, cannot be bound.

While Déchaine and Wiltschko’s study has important theoretical implications for the (crosslinguistic) study of pronouns, it has some empirical problems as well. One problem is that their analysis incorrectly predicts that the distribution of third-person pronouns in Japanese is
restricted to predicate positions. The following sentences demonstrate that Japanese third-person pronouns can actually show up either in predicate position or in argument position.21

(52)  a. Sore-wa kare/kanozyo-da.
    that-TOP he/she-COP
    ‘That is him/her.’

   b. Kare-ga kanozyo-o mita
      he-NOM she-ACC saw
      ‘He saw her.’

If we follow Déchaine and Wiltschko’s taxonomy, the fact that kare and kanozyo can appear not only in predicate position but also in argument position forces us to conclude that they are ϕPs. However, analyzing these pronouns as ϕPs would undermine the very point of Déchaine and Wiltschko’s analysis because their major claim is that the morphosyntactic organization of a given pronoun can be used as a predictor of its binding-theoretic properties. It is also hard to see how their analysis accounts for the fact that in Condition B environments, Japanese third-person pronouns behave in the same way as pronouns of the English type. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, kare and kanozyo resist local binding and coreference alike.

(53)  a. ?*Taro1-wa kare1-o hometa.
     Taro-TOP he-ACC praised
     ‘Taro praised him.’

   b. ?*Hanako1-wa kanozyo1-o hometa.
      Hanako-TOP she-ACC praised
      ‘Hanako praised her.’

21 Note that it is not entirely clear whether kare/kanozyo in (52a) is in predicate position because kare/kanozyo does not predicate a property of sore. In other words, the copular sentence here is not predicational but identificational. That said, what is crucial here is the fact that kare and kanozyo can occur in argument position.
Déchaine and Wiltschko (2002: 418) touch on the question of why Japanese personal pronouns are not subject to Condition C, but they fail to discuss why they behave like Condition B pronouns in the local domain.

3.3.6 Japanese Personal Pronouns Are Not NPs

Above we saw a number of facts which purportedly reveal certain commonalities between Japanese personal pronouns and lexical nouns. While it is true that Japanese person pronouns have properties that are not observed for English personal pronouns, I will now argue that Japanese pronouns are not NPs.

The first piece of evidence against the NP analysis of Japanese personal pronouns comes from the feature specification of the pronouns. The pronoun *kare,* for instance, is specified for gender (i.e., [**MALE**]) and number (i.e., [**SINGULAR**]) as well as for person if [**3RD PERSON**] is assumed to be a linguistically relevant person feature. Déchaine and Wiltschko (2002: fn.10) note that gender is not necessarily a ϕ-feature, claiming that the [**MALE**] feature associated with *kare* is lexical (as opposed to grammatical) gender. However, the number specification of *kare* still remains to be explained. Notice that in this respect, *kare* contrasts sharply with lexical nouns in the same language; that is, in Japanese, common nouns are generally underspecified with respect to number. Take the lexical noun *hito* ‘human/person’ for example. It can mean a singular individual or a group of people, depending on the context. Thus, the following sentence can mean either ‘There is a person in the garden,’ or ‘There are people in the garden.’
(55) Niwa-ni hito-ga i-ru.
   garden-LOC person-NOM be-PRES
   ‘There is a person in the garden/There are people in the garden.’

The ambiguity can be resolved by using a numeral quantifier, which again confirms the fact that nouns in Japanese are underspecified with respect to number.

    garden-LOC one-CL-GEN person-NOM be-PRES
    ‘There is one person in the garden.’

    garden-LOC two-CL-GEN person-NOM be-PRES
    ‘There are two people in the garden.’

c. Niwa-ni takusan-no hito-ga i-ru.
    garden-LOC many-GEN person-NOM be-PRES
    ‘There are many people in the garden.’

If, as Déchaine and Wiltschko argue, ϕ-features are encoded by ϕPs, it follows that kare must involve a ϕP, which contradicts their own claim that Japanese third-person pronouns are composed solely of NPs.

The second piece of evidence against the NP status of Japanese third-person pronouns comes from the definiteness of these pronouns (cf. Elbourne 2005). Unlike common nouns, which normally receive an indefinite interpretation, kare and kanozyo obligatorily receive a definite interpretation. Thus, *dono-kare, which literally means ‘which he,’ is not a possible expression. This contrasts with, say, dono-hito ‘which person,’ which is a perfectly

22 Elbourne (2005) reports that judgments differ sharply among speakers as to the well-formedness of dono-kare. Presumably, for those speakers who find dono-kare grammatical, it is coerced into meaning ‘which male person’ in much the same way as in English sentences like Is it a he or a she?, as Elbourne suggests. Note that the well-formedness of dono-hito ‘which person’ is uncontroversial.
well-formed phrase. In a similar vein, common nouns, like indefinites, cannot be anaphoric (across sentences) in the absence of a demonstrative determiner, while *kare* and *kanozyo* can. This difference makes sense if we suppose that unlike common nouns, *kare* and *kanozyo* involve a projection that encodes definiteness.

The third piece of counterevidence actually comes from the prima facie evidence cited by Kuroda (1965) and Noguchi (1995, 1997) in support of the claim that Japanese personal pronouns are nouns (or N-pronouns). Recall that Japanese personal pronouns can be modified by prenominal adjectives or relative clauses — a fact that Kuroda (1965) and Noguchi (1995, 1997) take as evidence for the NP status of these elements. As mentioned by Elbourne (2005), however, what is overlooked here is the fact that these modifiers, when attached to *kare* or *kanozyo*, are obligatorily interpreted as non-restrictive modifiers. Thus, the most accurate translation of *tiisai kanozyo* would be ‘she, who is short.’ Given that non-restrictive modification (or apposition) relations hold between two DPs, it follows that *kare* and *kanozyo* cannot be NPs.\(^{23}\)

If overt third-person pronouns are not NPs, one might wonder why Japanese imposes more stringent restrictions on the repetition of personal pronouns than English. Recall (46), repeated here as (57).

(57) "Kare-wa kare-ga kare-no sigoto-o si-tai toki-ni kare-no
he-TOP he-NOM he-GEN work-ACC do-want.to when-PART he-GEN
sigoto-o suru.
work-ACC do
‘He does his work when he feels like doing it.’

As mentioned, to make the sentence sound natural, all but the first instance of *kare* need to be

\(^{23}\) It should be noted that there are cases in which restrictive modification is possible with *kare* and *kanozyo*. In such cases, however, *kare* and *kanozyo* are interpreted as ‘boyfriend’ and ‘girlfriend,’ respectively (e.g., *watasi-no kare* ‘my boyfriend’). Also, it seems that judgments differ among speakers as to whether *kare* and *kanozyo* can co-occur with (definite) demonstrative determiners. Indeed, Hinds (1971: 151) and Noguchi (1997: 777) report opposite judgments on this.
I speculate that this is due to an independent principle favoring a more attenuated anaphoric form over a less attenuated one where appropriate (i.e., a pragmatic/economy principle implemented in different ways by different authors (Levinson 1987, cf. Givón 1983; Ariel 1990, among others)). If this is right, the difference in acceptability between the Japanese sentence in (57) and its English counterpart is reduced to the fact that English does not have the option of using pro.

Then the observed restriction on the repetition of pronouns does not necessarily buttress the argument that Japanese pronouns are syntactically NPs.

I have so far provided ample evidence against the NP analysis of overt third-person pronouns in Japanese, and have shown that it has serious empirical problems and lacks substantial supporting evidence. The question still remains, however, as to what kare and kanozyo actually are. Analyzing them as regular Condition B pronouns would bring us back to square one. So it is not a viable option. In what follows, we will consider the possibility that they are neither common nouns nor ordinary pronouns.

3.3.7 Japanese Third-Person Pronouns as Demonstratives (Kitagawa 1981; Hoji 1990, 1991)

Based on historical considerations, Kitagawa (1981) suggests that kare is pronominal in some respects while also being associated with a specific demonstrative/deictic function. To quote Kitagawa:

(59) A historically more accurate rendering of kare may be ‘that one in question’ rather than ‘he.’ Its present day use, although popularized in this day of global
communication as a form that corresponds to English *he* (and its counterparts in other Germanic, Romance, and Slavic languages), seems to retain yet a strong demonstrative /deictic sense, with predilection for a specific reference.

(Kitagawa 1981: 71)

Under this approach, the peculiar binding-theoretic behavior of *kare* is attributed to its demonstrative/deictic character. In fact, there is a relatively broad consensus that Japanese third-person pronouns historically derive from deictic demonstrative expressions (Sansom 1928, among others).

Hoji (1990, 1991) brings this idea to the fore and attempts to derive the binding-theoretic properties of *kare* from its demonstrativity. The idea is that *kare* is a deictic demonstrative, which means that it can only refer.

In this connection, let us observe the paradigm of deictic demonstratives in Japanese. The *ka*-series, *so*-series, and *a*-series express different degrees of distance from the speaker. The following table, adapted from Martin (1975: 1066), is a list of deictic demonstratives in Japanese.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>proximal</th>
<th>mesial</th>
<th>distal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>individual</td>
<td>kore &quot;this thing&quot;</td>
<td>sore &quot;that thing&quot;</td>
<td>are &quot;that thing&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>place</td>
<td>koko &quot;this place&quot;</td>
<td>soko &quot;that place&quot;</td>
<td>asoko &quot;that place&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>direction; alternative</td>
<td>kotira &quot;this way&quot;</td>
<td>sotira &quot;that way&quot;</td>
<td>atira &quot;that way&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adnominal</td>
<td>kono &quot;this&quot;</td>
<td>sono &quot;that&quot;</td>
<td>ano &quot;that&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adverbial (of manner)</td>
<td>koo &quot;in this manner&quot;</td>
<td>soo &quot;in that manner&quot;</td>
<td>aa &quot;in that manner&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2 Deictic Demonstratives in Japanese

The *ko*-series demonstratives indicate that the thing referred to is close to the speaker, while the *so*-series indicate proximity to the hearer. The *a*-series express that the entity in question is
distant from both the speaker and the hearer. Hoji claims that *kare and *kanozyo fall into the
category of the *a-series (see Hoji 1991 for philological references).

However, as Hoji (1991: 288) himself is aware, this claim is undermined by the fact that *kare
does not belong to any paradigm despite the fact that true demonstratives systematically form a
morphological paradigm, as we just witnessed.

(60)  
  a. *ka(so)ko (intended as: a(so)ko ‘that place’)
  b. *katira (intended as: atira ‘that way’)
  c. *kaa (intended as: aa ‘in that way’)
  d. *kannani (intended as: annani ‘that much’)

Furthermore, *kare seems to be constrained differently than the *a-series demonstratives in
terms of coreference, as the following contrast shows (examples taken from Noguchi 1995: 29).

(61)  
  a. John₁-wa *kare₁-no titioya-ga kirai-da.
      John-TOP he-GEN father-NOM dislike-COP
      ‘John dislikes his father.’
  b. #John₁-wa ano-hito₁-no titioya-ga kirai-da.
      John-TOP that-person-GEN father-NOM dislike-COP
      ‘John dislikes that person’s father.’

It should also be pointed out here that being demonstrative does not necessarily entail being
exclusively deictic. It is not uncommon for demonstratives to have non-deictic usages. Indeed,
there are cases in which demonstratives function as bound variables, as Hoji himself reports.
Following are some attested examples of demonstratives used as bound variables.

(62)  Every logician₁ was walking with a boy near that logician₁’s house.  (Evans 1977: 491)
(63)  Every boy₁ dates a girl who adores that boy₁.  (Noguchi 1997: 785)
(64)  Mary talked to no senator₁ before that senator₁ was lobbied.  (Elbourne 2005)
In Japanese, it has been reported in the literature (Nishigauchi 1986; Hoji 1991; Ueyama 1998, among others) that the so-series demonstratives can receive bound-variable interpretations. In (65a) and (65b), *sono kaisya* ‘that company’ is bound by the quantificational subject *dono kaisya(-mo)* ‘every company’ (examples taken from Noguchi 1995:73).

(65) a. *Dono kaisya*-mo *sono kaisya*-ga itiban-da to omotteiru.
    every company-PART that company-NOM best-COPCOMP think
    ‘Every company thinks that that company is the best.’

b. *Dono kaisya*-mo *sono kaisya*-no seihin-o homeru.
    every company-PART that company-GEN product-ACC praise
    ‘Every company praises that company’s products.’

Thus, even if *kare* and *kanozyo* are genuine demonstratives, it does not necessarily follow that they cannot be bound. Since demonstrativity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for unbindability, Hoji’s (1990, 1991) analysis is vulnerable to criticism.

That said, this problem turns out to be only apparent once we take into account the recent observations made by Hoji et al. (2000) and Hara (2002). Contrary to the widely-held view that Japanese overt third-person pronouns cannot function as bound variables, these authors report that there are cases in which *kare* and *kanozyo* can be construed as bound variables under certain restricted environments. For example, *kare* can be bound by the quantificational subject in (66a) and (66b).

(66) a. *Dono gakusei*-mo sensyuu *kare*-o suisensita sensei-ni
    every student-PART last.week he-ACC recommended teacher-DAT
    orei-o okutta.
    present-ACC sent
    ‘Every student sent a present to the teacher who recommended him last week.’

(Hoji et al. 2000: 142)
b. [Dono nooberusyoo zyusyoo sakka]₁-mo kare₁-no hisyo-o turetekita.
   every Nobel.Prize winning author-PART he-GEN secretary-ACC brought
   ‘Every Nobel Prize winning author₁ brought his₁ secretary.’    (Hoji et al. 2000: 142)

The two sentences in (66) have the following interpretations, respectively.

(67) a. For every x, x a student, x sent a present to the teacher who recommended x last week.
b. For every x, x a Nobel Prize winning author, x brought x’s secretary.

This means that the generalization stated in (16), repeated here as (68), is not accurate.

(68) Overt third-person pronouns in Japanese can only refer.

Hoji et al.’s and Hara’s observations suggest that the question that needs to be asked is not why Japanese overt third-person pronouns cannot be bound but why Japanese third-person pronouns can receive bound-variable interpretations only in a subset of the contexts where bound pronouns in other languages (such as English) can occur. In what follows, we will take a closer look at the observations made by Hoji et al. (2000) and Hara (2002) and their analyses. Then I will present my own analysis.

3.4 The “Bindability” of Overt Third-Person Pronouns: Previous Studies

3.4.1 Hoji et al. (2000)

Hoji et al. (2000) present the data in (66), repeated here as (69), to show that it is not entirely impossible for kare to function as a bound variable.
Building on Ueyama’s (1998) theory, Hoji et al. (2000) attempt to answer the question of why binding of kare is highly restricted compared to binding of the English pronoun he.

According to Ueyama, individual-denoting NPs (or DPs) in natural language are classified into three categories.

(70) a. D-indexed NPs (e.g. John_D,3)
    b. 0-indexed NPs (e.g. he)
    c. I-indexed NPs (e.g. [that student]_I,5)

What makes D-indexed NPs distinct from 0- and I-indexed NPs is that the former, being referentially independent, do not require a linguistic antecedent whereas the latter do require a linguistic antecedent. D-indexed NPs are interpreted by being connected to an individual “that the speaker knows by his direct experience” (Ueyama 1998: 182). This connection, Hoji et al. (2000: 147) state, “is established independently of other NPs. From this it immediately follows that a D-indexed NP cannot be a bound variable”.

Unlike D-indexed NPs, both 0-indexed NPs and I-index NPs can be interpreted as bound variables, but the mechanisms whereby they receive bound-variable readings are different. A 0-indexed NP is referentially defective so that it must enter into a Formal Dependency (FD) in order to be interpreted, whereas an I-indexed NP, whose classic example is an E-type pronoun, is
“a free variable whose ultimate referent is determined by making reference to its co-I-indexed antecedent” (Hoji et al. 2000: 149). The latter forms an Indexical Dependency (ID) with a co-indexed NP antecedent.

Ueyama further argues that FD and ID are subject to distinct conditions. FD is subject to the following conditions.

\[(71) \quad \text{Formal Dependency (FD)}\]
\[\text{a. Structural condition:} \]
\[*FD(\alpha, \beta) \text{ if } \alpha \text{ does not c-command } \beta \text{ at LF.}\]
\[\text{b. Lexical condition:} \]
\[*FD(\alpha, \beta) \text{ if } \beta \text{ is a } \text{large} \text{ NP.}\]

A \text{large} \text{ NP (as opposed to } \text{small} \text{ NP) refers to an informationally heavy NP. When } \beta \text{ is interpreted as a pure bound variable, the semantic content of } \beta \text{ will be ignored. Since a } \text{large} \text{ NP carries too much semantic content to be ignored, it cannot qualify as } \beta \text{ in } FD(\alpha, \beta) \text{ owing to the principle of recoverability. Hence the lexical condition on FD, given in (71b).} \]

ID is subject to the following conditions.

\[(72) \quad \text{Indexical Dependency (ID)}\]
\[\text{a. Structural condition:} \]
\[*ID(\alpha, \beta) \text{ if } \alpha \text{ does not precede } \beta \text{ at PF.}\]
\[\text{b. Lexical condition:} \]
\[*ID(\alpha, \beta) \text{ if } \alpha \text{ is an A-type QP}\textsuperscript{24}.\]

The condition in (72a) has the effect of blocking reconstruction. Thus, unlike 0-indexed NPs, I-indexed NPs fail to show reconstruction effects.

\textsuperscript{24} Examples of A-type QPs include NP-sae ‘even NP,’ kanarinokazu-no NP ‘most of the NPs,’ 10 izyoo-no NP ‘ten or more NPs,’ 55%-no NP ‘55% of the NPs,’ NP1 to NP2 (to) ‘NP1 and NP2,’ NP1 ka NP2 (ka) ‘either NP1 or NP2.’ See Ueyama (1998) for details.
Based on Ueyama’s classification, Hoji et al. (2000) argue that English third-person pronouns such as *he* can be used as any of the three types of NP.

\[ (73) \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D-index</th>
<th>I-index</th>
<th>0-index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>he</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As such, *he* can be used as a referential pronoun, as an E-type pronoun, and as a pure bound variable.

Japanese third-person pronouns, on the other hand, can be used either as D- or I-indexed NPs but not as 0-indexed NPs.

\[ (74) \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D-index</th>
<th>I-index</th>
<th>0-index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This means that the bound-variable construal of *kare* obtains via ID but not via FD. It thus follows that third-person pronouns in Japanese can be interpreted as bound variables in a subset of the contexts in which bound third-person pronouns in English are licensed. Hoji et al. (2000) further report that there is a certain degree of inter-speaker variation with respect to whether *kare* can be 0-indexed. They argue that the unstable nature of Japanese third-person pronouns is due to the fact that these pronouns were coined only about a hundred years ago (for the purpose of translating foreign texts into Japanese), and as such their use has not been completely stabilized.

The claimed advantage of Hoji et al.’s (2000) analysis is that it captures the correlation between binding and reconstruction. As mentioned above, according to Ueyama’s theory, I-indexed NPs (as opposed to 0-indexed NPs) do not undergo reconstruction. Then, it is expected that (for most speakers) *kare* does not show reconstruction effects. Indeed, fronting the indirect object together with the relative clause in (75) makes binding of *kare* impossible.
Every student sent a present to the teacher who recommended him last week.

(Hoji et al. 2000: 142)

Hoji et al. (2000) also report that those speakers who allow *kare* to be interpreted as a pure bound variable (i.e., those who allow *kare* to be 0-indexed) also allow the covariant interpretation of *kare* to be reconstructed, as predicted by their analysis.

To sum up, Hoji et al.’s (2000) point is that there are three types of NP (or DP) that exhibit distinct binding and reconstruction patterns, as summarized below.

(77)  
a. NPs that can be bound (by any type of QP) and can show reconstruction effects.  
b. NPs that can be bound (by certain types of QP) and do not show reconstruction effects.  
c. NPs that cannot be bound at all.

These three categories bear different types of indices and follow distinct ways to form referential dependencies with their antecedents. The English pronoun *he* may be used as any of the three in (77), whereas *kare* can be used as (77b) or (77c) but not as (77a) (aside from some inter-speaker variation).

Hoji et al.’s (2000) observations are of considerable importance in that they bring to light the fact that the premise almost all previous studies were based on is actually false. As mentioned
earlier, the true question that needs to be asked, therefore, is not why Japanese overt third-person pronouns cannot be bound but why Japanese third-person pronouns can receive bound-variable interpretations only in a subset of the contexts where bound pronouns in other languages (such as English) can occur.

Although Hoji et al. address the “right” question, the answer they offer does not seem sufficiently explanatory. As far as the binding properties of kare are concerned, their analysis is essentially a restatement of the observed facts rather than an explanation. Under their analysis, it is arbitrarily assumed that the pronoun he can be 0-indexed but kare cannot (for many speakers). The question thus remains as to why this should be the case. As such, Hoji et al.’s account does not offer a fundamental answer to the question of why binding of kare is not constrained in the same way as the English pronoun he.25

3.4.2 Hara (2002)

Let us next review Hara (2002), who extends Ariel’s (1990) Accessibility Theory to the availability of bound-variable readings for kare and kanozyo. According to Accessibility Theory, the choice of referential forms is determined on the basis of the degree to which their referents are accessible to the addressee’s memory.26 Ariel claims that anaphoric expressions are accessibility markers in the sense that different anaphoric forms are used to mark different degrees of mental accessibility in order to guide addressees’ retrievals of the intended referents.

There are several factors that play significant roles in determining the degree of accessibility. Some entities (e.g., speaker and addressee, sentence and discourse topics, etc.) are inherently more easily retrievable so that they have higher accessibility. Also, the degree of accessibility is

---

25 This is not to say Hoji et al.’s analysis is wrong. In fact, their account and my proposal are not incompatible, and to that extent, it might be possible to integrate the two approaches.

26 See also Tomlin (1987) and Tomlin and Pu (1991), who offer experimental evidence in support of the claim that the selection of referential forms is tied to cognitive processes of attention.
affected by the number of potential antecedents for a given anaphoric form in a given context; in a context where an anaphoric expression has more than one potential antecedent, it is less easy for the addressee to retrieve the intended referent. Thus, the more competing antecedents there are, the less accessible the intended antecedent is. Another factor that affects the degree of accessibility is the distance between an anaphoric expression and its intended antecedent. Hara (2002) argues that the notion of distance here should be defined in structural terms; that is, the more maximal projections there are between a given anaphoric form and its antecedent, the less accessible the antecedent is.

Different degrees of accessibility, Ariel argues, are marked by different linguistic forms in accordance with the following accessibility marking scale (Ariel 1994: 30).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{The Accessibility Marking Scale} \\
\text{zero} < \text{reflexives} < \text{agreement markers} < \text{cliticized pronouns} < \text{unstressed pronouns} \\
< \text{stressed pronouns} < \text{stressed pronouns} + \text{gesture} < \text{proximal demonstrative (+NP)} \\
< \text{distal demonstrative (+NP)} < \text{proximal demonstrative (+NP) + modifier} < \text{distal demonstrative (+NP) + modifier} < \text{first name} < \text{last name} < \text{short definite description} < \text{long definite description} < \text{full name} < \text{full name + modifier}
\end{align*}
\]

Zero anaphors (i.e., null pronouns) are the highest accessibility markers, and full names with modifiers are the lowest accessibility markers on the scale. The idea is that the higher the accessibility of a given referent, the higher the accessibility marker used to retrieve it. Hara (2002: 86) slightly modifies Ariel’s accessibility marking scale, and proposes the following (partial) scale for Japanese anaphoric expressions.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Accessibility Marking Scale in Japanese} \\
zibun \text{ (self)} < \text{zero pronouns} < \text{third person pronouns} < \text{sono NP (that NP)}
\end{align*}
\]

\[27\] See Prince (1981) and Givón (1983) for similar ideas.
The highest on this scale is the anaphor zibun, followed by zero pronouns, third person pronouns and then sono NP “that NP”. Let us consider how the contrast in grammaticality between (80a) and (80b) is explained under the accessibility-based account.

(80) a. Dono gakusei₁-mo \{zibun₁-ga/ø₁\} katu to omotteiru.
    every student-PART self-NOM win COMP think
    ‘Every student thinks that he will win.’

b. *Dono gakusei₁-mo kare₁-ga katu to omotteiru.
    every student-PART he-NOM win COMP think
    ‘Every student thinks that he will win.’

In (80a-b), the antecedent dono gakusei-mo ‘every student’ is close to the dependent term, and is therefore highly accessible. Thus, zibun or a null pronoun can be used as an appropriate anaphoric form that can take dono gakusei-mo as antecedent, whereas kare, being a low accessibility marker, is not a suitable anaphoric form here. In other words, the antecedent is “too prominent for kare to be anaphoric to” (Hara 2002: 88). Hence the contrast.

Let us now consider the following example, where kanozyo can be construed as a variable bound by a quantificational expression.

---

'Every one of the female students who entered that music college was able to meet a teacher who could bring out her talent to the full extent.' (Hara 2002: 83)

In this case, although the dependent term is linearly adjacent to the antecedent QP, the two expressions are structurally sufficiently distant from each other so that the use of the low accessibility marker *kanozyo* is justified.

The point of Hara’s analysis is that the degree of the bindability of a dependent term correlates with the degree of the accessibility of an antecedent. It is therefore not surprising that a null pronoun does not pattern with *kare* in terms of binding because the former is a higher accessibility marker, whereas the latter is a lower accessibility marker.

While Hara’s analysis offers a possible rationale for why binding of overt third-person pronouns in Japanese is constrained differently from binding of null pronouns in the same language, it does not offer any clear predictions as to the specific way the binding-theoretic properties of overt and null pronouns should or should not differ. It is not clear, for instance, how his analysis accounts for the fact that there are cases in which *kare/kanozyo* can be replaced with *zibun* or a null pronoun without affecting the availability of bound-variable readings. By way of illustration, the grammaticality of (81) remains intact even if *kanozyo* is replaced with *zibun* or a null pronoun.
‘Every one of the female students who entered that music college was able to meet a teacher who could bring out her talent to the full extent.’

Still another problem is that there are cases in which increasing the structural distance between a third-person pronoun and its antecedent QP does not improve but rather detracts from the bindability of the pronoun. Consider the following sentences.

(83) ?Dono zyosi gakusei1-ga kanozyo1-no kimono-o minna-ni
    which female student-NOM she-GEN kimono-ACC everyone-DAT
    miseta no?
    showed Q
    ‘Which female student showed everyone her kimono?’

(84) *?Dono zyosi gakusei1-ga [CP [TP kanozyo1-no kimono-ga kirei-da]
    which female student-NOM she-GEN kimono-NOM win beautiful-COP
to] omotteiru no?
    COMP think Q
    ‘Which female student thinks that her kimono is beautiful?’

In (83), kanozyo sits in the possessor position of the object in the matrix clause, whereas in (84), it is in the possessor position of the subject in the embedded clause. Thus, it is expected under Hara’s account that (84) should be better than (83) because the former has a greater number of maximal projections intervening between kanozyo and its antecedent. (Recall that Hara claims that the more maximal projections there are between a given anaphoric form and its antecedent, the less accessible the antecedent is.) However, the reality is otherwise. Sentence (84) is, in fact, worse than (83), though admittedly the judgments are subtle.
It is most likely that memory and accessibility play an important role in anaphora resolution in discourse (a view with which I concur), but it is highly unlikely that the constraints on the binding of overt third-person pronouns in Japanese can be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of mental accessibility alone.

3.5 The Antilogophoricity Account

In what follows, I will propose that Japanese third-person pronouns should be characterized as epithets, and as such they can function as bound variables only when they satisfy both Condition B and the so-called antilogophoricity constraint.

3.5.1 Epithets and Antilogophoricity

Before we proceed, let us first look into the properties of epithets in English. Epithets are generally characterized as DPs (typically consisting of either a definite article or a demonstrative with an NP) that behave in much the same way as pronouns. Semantically, they have descriptive content and typically carry evaluative (often negative) connotations. Jackendoff (1972: 110) observes that epithets are pronoun-like in that they can take a non-local antecedent within the same sentence, as shown below.

(85)  I wanted Charlie_{1} to help me, but the bastard_{1} wouldn’t do it.
(86)  Irving_{1} was besieged by a horde of bills and the poor guy_{1} couldn’t pay them.
(87)  Although the bum_{1} tried to hit me, I can’t really get too mad at Harry_{1}.

Moreover, Hornstein and Weinberg (1990) note that epithets can be construed as bound variables just like pronouns, as exemplified below (see also example (98)).

(88)  John criticized every senator in private while praising the bastard in public.
(89) John will buy no wine before the damn thing is ready to drink.

In the sentences above, the epithets *the bastard* and *the damn thing* are bound by *every senator* and *no wine*, respectively. Thus, sentence (89), for instance, means much the same as ‘No wine is such that John will buy it before it is ready to drink.’ Hornstein and Weinberg argue that the quantificational DPs *every senator* and *no wine* undergo Quantifier Raising at LF, which makes A'-binding of the epithets possible. The LF representations of (88) and (89) are roughly illustrated as follows. (Irrelevant details are omitted.)

(90) \[
[TP \{\{QP \text{every senator}\} \} \quad \{TP \text{John criticized} \{\{QP \text{every senator}\} \} \text{in private} \{\{\text{while praising the bastard}\} \text{in public}\}]]
\]

(91) \[
[TP \{\{QP \text{no wine}\} \} \quad \{TP \text{John will buy} \{\{QP \text{no wine}\} \} \{\text{before the damn thing} \text{is ready to drink}\}]]
\]

Hornstein and Weinberg claim that given that variable binding requires a c-command relation between an operator and the variable that it binds, the availability of bound-variable interpretations for the epithets in these sentences suggests that they are A'-bound at LF. However, while the epithets in (88) and (89) are no doubt interpreted as bound variables, it is not evident whether they are actually bound from an operator position. This is because much evidence has been accumulated since Postal (1974) and Lasnik and Saito (1991) that suggests that accusative case is licensed in an A-position c-commanding into a VP adjunct. Consider the following sentence.

(92) The DA cross-examined none of the witnesses during any of the trials.

(Lasnik 2001: 104)

The example in (92) demonstrates that the NPI *any* in the adjunct phrase is licensed by the direct object *none of the witnesses*, indicating that the former is c-commanded by the latter. Lasnik and
Saito (1991) also show that Condition C effects provide further evidence that accusative case is licensed in an A-position c-commanding into a VP adjunct. The contrast in grammaticality between (93a) and (93b) below is most naturally explained if we suppose that the accusative pronoun him in (93a) has moved to an A-position c-commanding Bob (thereby triggering a Condition C violation), whereas the nominative subject he in (93b) is licensed within the embedded clause.29

(93)  a. ?*Joan believes him₁ [t₁ to be a genius] even more fervently than Bob₁’s mother does.
      b. Joan believes [he₁ is a genius] even more fervently than Bob₁’s mother does.

Given that an accusative-marked argument sits in an A-position c-commanding into an adjunct, the only conclusion that can be drawn from sentences (88) and (89) is that epithets can be bound by a quantificational antecedent. Crucially, the data do not necessarily warrant the conclusion that bound epithets must be A'-bound anaphora. The null hypothesis, then, is that epithets can be A-bound (as in the case of typical bound anaphora).30

The reason that Hornstein and Weinburg do not regard bound epithets as A-bound anaphora is that epithets are generally analyzed as R-expressions (Lasnik 1976, 1989, among others). The main argument for this view is based on the observation that epithets seem to exhibit Condition C effects. As exemplified below, it appears that they cannot occur in a position which is c-commanded by a co-valued argument in A-position (Lasnik 1976, 1989).

(94)  a. *John₁ realizes that the sissy₁ is going to lose.

---

29 As we will see in the next chapter, Condition C effects need to be treated with caution. That being said, the contrast here is telling.

30 Since the issue of whether A'-binding of epithets is possible is orthogonal to the purposes of this dissertation, I will not address it here. For epithets in resumptive contexts, see, among others, Aoun and Choueiri (2000), Aoun, Choueiri, and Hornstein (2001), and Safir (2004b: 63). Also, the jury is still out as to how sentences like Every boy₁’s mother thinks that the bastard₁ is crazy should be analyzed. See Kayne (1994: 23-24).
b. *He$_1$ realizes that the sissy$_1$ is going to lose.

c. *The sissy$_1$ realizes that the sissy$_1$ is going to lose.

(95) a. *John$_1$ thinks that I admire the idiot$_1$.

b. *He$_1$ thinks that I admire the idiot$_1$.

If epithets are R-expressions, the ungrammaticality of these sentences straightforwardly follows because Condition C requires that R-expressions be A-free. What is interesting is that in languages like Thai, where R-expressions need not be (completely) free, epithets still cannot take a local antecedent, suggesting that they are subject to Condition B. On the basis of these observations, Lasnik (1989) proposes that epithets are “pronominal R-expressions”, meaning that they concurrently act as pronouns and R-expressions. That is, they are subject to both Condition B and Condition C, which in turn means that epithets cannot be A-bound.

Narahara (1991) and Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998) independently argue, however, that the apparent Condition C effects are, in fact, attributed not to Condition C but to the antilogophoric properties of epithets (see also Pica 1994). These authors claim that the interpretation of epithets is constrained by Condition B and antilogophoricity restrictions. $^{31}$ Narahara’s (1991) antilogophoricity constraint is based on Kuno’s (1986: 62) disjointness condition on R-expressions, i.e., a condition that forces an R-expression in a logophoric complement to be disjoint in reference from logocentric NPs. Logophoric complements here refer to complement clauses embedded by predicates of speech, thought, psychological state and perception such as say, think, believe, see, worry, bother claim, and belief. (Narahara 1991: 71; Kuno 1987: 108) Logocentric NPs here refer to “the agent, source or experiencer argument of a logophoric verb” (Narahara 1991: 71).

Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998), on the other hand, claim that epithets are antilogophoric pronouns rather than R-expressions, and that they are subject to Condition B as well as the

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$^{31}$ Given that coreference (as opposed to variable binding) is governed by Rule I rather than Binding Conditions (Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993), it is more accurate to state that epithets are subject to (i) either Condition B or Rule I and (ii) the antilogophoricity constraint. For brevity’s sake, Rule I is ignored here.
(96) *Antilogophoricity Constraint for Epithets*
An epithet must not be anteceded by an individual from whose perspective the attributive content of the epithet is evaluated. (Dubinsky and Hamilton 1998: 689)

Let us take a look at the two proposals in more detail. Both accounts assume that epithets must conform to (some version of) Condition B, though Narahara maintains the idea that epithets are R-expressions. Under her approach, R-expressions are subject not to Condition C but to generalized Condition B, which requires that a non-anaphor (either a pronoun or an R-expression) must be free from a coargument of the same predicate. Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998), on the other hand, assume that epithets are pronouns, which is why they fall under Condition B. Both analyses correctly rule out sentences like the following.

(97) *John₁ admires the idiot₁.*

It should be noted in this connection that epithets can function as dependent terms. For instance, they can function as a variable bound by a non-local antecedent when the antilogophoricity constraint is respected, as evidenced by the following example (recall also (88) and (89); see also Patel-Grosz 2012 for crosslinguistic data).

(98) Every stupid driver₁ ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idiot₁ directions.

This further supports the view that the structural disjointness condition relevant to epithets is not Condition C, which applies to referentially independent expressions, but rather is Condition B, which restricts the interpretation of (potentially) dependent expressions.

That said, since there is no a priori reason to assume that the antilogophoricity constraint does
not apply in local contexts, let us assure ourselves that it is Condition B (and not antilogophoricity) that is responsible for the disjoint-reference effect in (97). The idea that epithets are subject to Condition B is supported by the fact that an epithet cannot take a local antecedent regardless of the type of the predicate it is an argument of.

(99)  
\begin{itemize}
  \item a. *John₁ admires the idiot₁.
  \item b. *John₁ hit the idiot₁.
  \item c. *John₁ inadvertently exposed the idiot₁ while dancing.
  \item d. *John₁ introduced the idiot₁ to the woman. (cf. I introduced John₁ to a woman who the idiot₁ had been dying to meet.)
\end{itemize}

Consider also the contrast between (100a-b). The antecedent John is the subject of introduced in both cases, but unlike (100a), the sentence in (100b), where the epithet the son of a bitch has a local antecedent, is ruled out.

(100)  
\begin{itemize}
  \item a. John₁ introduced Mary to the actress that [the son of a bitch]₁ used to hang out with.
  \item b. *John₁ introduced [the son of a bitch]₁ to the actress that Mary used to hang out with.
\end{itemize}

These observations justify the claim that epithets are subject to Condition B.

Let us now turn to the proposed antilogophoricity restrictions. Dubinsky and Hamilton’s definition of the antilogophoricity constraint predicts that sentence like (101) and (102) below are ruled out insofar as the epithets are read de dicto, but it incorrectly predicts that the same sentences are grammatical as long as the evaluation of the epithet is due exclusively to the current speaker’s perspective (as opposed to the reported speaker’s).
(101)  *John\textsubscript{1} thinks that the fool\textsubscript{1} is going to lose.

(102)  *Every student\textsubscript{1} thinks that the fool\textsubscript{1} is going to lose.

However, these sentences are unacceptable to many speakers with the given coindexation even if
the ascription of foolishness to John/every student is due to the external speaker (i.e., the current
speaker of the utterance), which suggests that the definition in (96) is too weak.\textsuperscript{32} Note, though,
that Dubinsky and Hamilton also state that an epithet must be disjoint in reference from
SOURCE and SELF in Sells’s (1987a) sense, which is essentially in line with Narahara’s
antilogophoricity constraint.\textsuperscript{33} Since this definition does not suffer from the problem above, I
assume that the relevant antilogophoricity constraint is such that it precludes epithets from being
anteceded by SOURCE and SELF.

With this in mind, let us reconsider the sentences in (94) and (95). If the ungrammaticality of
these sentences is due to antilogophoric effects rather than Condition C violations, then it is
expected that epithets can take a (non-local) c-commanding antecedent, provided that their
antecedent is not understood as the SOURCE or the SELF in the context. This expectation is
borne out. Consider the following examples.

(103)  John\textsubscript{1} ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idiot\textsubscript{1} directions.

(Dubinsky and Hamilton 1998: 688)

(104)  Through an accumulation of slipups, John\textsubscript{1} (inadvertently) led his students to conclude
that the idiot\textsubscript{1} couldn’t teach.

(Dubinsky and Hamilton 1998: 688)

(105)  My brother\textsubscript{1} invests in many projects that the idiot\textsubscript{1} thinks will make him rich.

(Haïk 1984: 204, fn21)

\textsuperscript{32} For some speakers, sentences like John\textsubscript{1} thinks that Mary believes that the fool\textsubscript{1} is going to lose are better
than (101) so long as the epithetic evaluation is due to Mary, which is actually compatible with Dubinsky and
Hamilton’s account. Since there is a fair amount of inter-speaker variation with respect to the acceptability of
such sentences, I leave this issue for further research. See Aoun and Choueiri (2000) and Patel-Grosz (2012)
for more on antilocality effects.

\textsuperscript{33} To be more precise, Dubinsky and Hamilton state that epithets must be disjoint in reference from SELF,
which entails that they must also be disjoint from SOURCE.
All the sentences in (103)-(105) are grammatical with the given coindexation even though the epithet is anteceded by a c-commanding argument. This is because in all these cases, the antecedent of the epithet is neither a SOURCE nor a SELF, thereby satisfying the antilogophoricity constraint. The grammaticality of these sentences is correctly predicted by the antilogophoricity accounts proposed by Narahara (1991) and Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998). At the same time, these observations cast doubt on the view that epithets are subject to Condition C; if they were, sentences (103)-(105) should be ruled out, contrary to fact.

To recap, English epithets are best analyzed as pronouns with antilogophoric properties, and as such they fall under Condition B and the antilogophoricity constraint, the latter of which prohibits epithets from being anaphoric to SOURCE and SELF antecedents.

3.5.2 Japanese Overt Third-Person Pronouns as Epithets

Let us now return to Japanese overt-third person pronouns. I will first argue that Japanese third-person pronouns such as *kare* and *kanozyo* are in fact epithets, claiming that they can function as bound variables just in case they satisfy both Condition B and the antilogophoricity constraint outlined above.

One might wonder, in the first place, whether, aside from their distributional properties, there is good reason to believe that Japanese third-person pronouns should be characterized as epithets. The answer is affirmative. As noted by Hinds (1975: 155), “there are a number of presuppositions, constraints, or prohibitions that prevent the free occurrence of *kare*”. Among the restrictions on the use of *kare* is the prohibition against referring to social superiors. Hinds (1975) reports that the use of *kare* is avoided when referring to a social superior, especially if the speaker has some kind of relationship with the social superior (see also Noguchi 1995: 58, fn. 36; 1997: 778).\(^{34}\) The oddity of the following sentence confirms his observation.

\(^{34}\) The use of the feminine form *kanozyo* is also avoided when referring to someone socially superior to the
Here the verb *mati* ‘wait’ bears the honorific marking *o-X-ni-nar*, which implies that the speaker evaluates the referent of *kare* as socially superior to him/her, while the use of *kare* implies that the speaker does not evaluate its referent as socially superior to him/her. Thus the sentence in (106) sounds bizarre because of this contradiction. This squares nicely with the claim that Japanese third-person pronouns are epithets rather than garden-variety personal pronouns, considering that epithets generally carry evaluative connotations.\(^{35}\)

Another piece of support for the present account comes from Takubo’s (1990) observation. In his study of crosslinguistic differences in the use of deictic/demonstrative expressions, Takubo (1990) notes an interesting restriction on the use of *kare*. Consider the following contrast between (107) and (108).

\[(107)\quad \text{A: I met Mr. Tanaka.} \]
\[\text{B: a. Who is that?} \]
\[\text{b. Who is he?} \]

\[(108)\quad \text{A: Tanaka-san-ni atta-yo.} \]
\[\text{Tanaka-Mr.-DAT met-PART} \]
\[\text{‘I met Mr. Tanaka.’} \]
\[\text{B: a. Sore-wa/Sono hito-wa dare?} \]
\[\text{that-TOP/that person-TOP who} \]
\[\text{‘Who is that/that person?’} \]

\(^{35}\text{While the evaluative connotations of *kare/kanozyo* seem to be very subtle for some speakers (especially those in the younger generation), all the speakers I consulted confirmed, regardless of age, that they would avoid using *kare/kanozyo* to refer to their superiors. I take this to indicate that *kare* and *kanozyo* come with certain expressive content associated with the speaker’s evaluation.} \]
b. #Kare-wa dare?
   he-TOP who
   ‘Who is he?’  (adapted from Takubo 1990: 141)

In English, under contexts like (107), it is possible to felicitously ask about the identity of Mr. Tanaka by using either a demonstrative pronoun or a third-person pronoun. In Japanese, by contrast, it is not appropriate to use *kare if the identity of the referent is not known to the utterer. This restriction is readily explained in the analysis proposed here. That is, in (108), B is not in a position to evaluate the person called Mr. Tanaka, and is therefore not in a position to use an epithet to refer to him. Thus, the infelicity of the use of *kare in the context of (108) provides further support for the claim that Japanese third-person pronouns are characterized as epithets.

Having independently justified the treatment of Japanese third-person pronouns as epithets, we now look at how the present proposal captures the binding properties of Japanese overt third-person pronouns. Consider the following sentences.

(109) a. *Dono gakusei(-mo) kare(-o) semeta.
   every student-PART he-ACC blamed
   ‘Every student blamed him.’

b. ?*Dono gakusei(-mo) kare(-ga) isya-ni naru to sinziteiru.
   every student-PART he-NOM doctor-as become COMP believe
   ‘Every student believes that he will become a doctor.’

Under the analysis proposed here, the unbindability of *kare in the above sentences stems from different sources. In (109a), it is Condition B that makes it impossible for *kare to be bound by the quantificational antecedent *dono gakusei(-mo) ‘every student’. In (109b), on the other hand, it is due to the antilogophoricity constraint that *kare cannot be bound by *dono gakusei(-mo); that is to say, since *dono gakusei(-mo), being the subject of a world-creating verb (sinziteiru...
‘believe’), is the agent of the attitude report, it cannot be taken as antecedent of *kare*.

With this in mind, we are now in a position to reconsider the attested cases where overt third-person pronouns can be construed as bound variables. As we have seen, Hoji et al. (2000) and Hara (2002) are among the very few studies that recognize the availability of bound-variable interpretations for overt third-person pronouns in Japanese and address the question of why these pronouns can be bound only in certain restricted environments, though observations to the same effect were made even earlier. Below I list some representative instances reported in the literature where overt third-person pronouns can receive bound-variable readings.

(110) Dono nooberusyoo zyusyoo sakka₁-ga kare₁-no kuruma-de kita-no? which Nobel.Prize winning author-NOM he-GEN car-in came-Q
   ‘Which Nobel Prize winning author came in his car?’ (Hoji 1991: 298)

(111) ??Dono hito₁-ga kare₁-no saihu-o nakusita ka-ga which person-NOM he-GEN wallet-ACC lost Q-NOM
   issue-DAT became
   ‘Which person lost his wallet became an issue.’ (Hoji 1991: 295)

   suisens-ase-ta. recommend-CAUS-PAST
   ‘Mary made Bill recommend his book earlier than (she made) John (recommend his book.)’ (Hoji 1997: 218)

(113) ?Dono gakusei₁-mo sensyuu kare₁-o suisensita sensei-ni every student-PART last.week he-ACC recommended teacher-DAT
   orei-o okutta. present-ACC sent
   ‘Every student sent a present to the teacher who recommended him last week.’ (Hoji et al. 2000: 142)
Every one of the female students who entered that music college was able to meet a teacher who could bring out her talent to the full extent.’

(114) [Sono ondai-ni haitta] zyosi gakusei-no daremo₁-ga [kanozyo₁-no that music.college-to entered female student-GEN everyone-NOM she-GEN sainoo-o mottomo yoku hikidasi-te kureru] sensei-ni dea-e-ta. talent-ACC most fully bring.out do.the.favor teacher-DAT meet-can-PAST

‘Every one of the female students who entered that music college was able to meet a teacher who could bring out her talent to the full extent.’

(Hara 2002: 83)

What has gone unnoticed in the literature is that the distribution of bound-variable occurrences of kare/kanozyo is markedly skewed to non-attitude contexts. In fact, none of these sentences involves indirect discourse, so that the antecedents of kare/kanozyo cannot be taken as the SOURCE (i.e., the one who makes the report) or as the SELF (i.e., the one whose mental state or attitude the content of the proposition describes). As a result, the antilogophoricity constraint is satisfied.36 Because both Condition B and the antilogophoricity constraint are simultaneously satisfied, kare and kanozyo can be bound by a c-commanding antecedent.

If the analysis outlined here is on the right track, it is predicted that a sloppy reading (in addition to a strict reading) obtains if kare and kanozyo are placed in those contexts where Condition B and the relevant antilogophoricity constraint are respected. This prediction is, in fact, borne out.

(115) (Subeteno dansi gakusei nonakade) Taro-dake-ga kare-no all male student among Taro-only-NOM he-GEN sainoo-o takaku hyookasuru sensei-ni deatta. talent-ACC highly admire teacher-DAT met

‘(Of all male students) only Taro met a teacher who thought highly of his talent.’

Ignoring any irrelevant readings where kare refers to someone other than Taro, the sentence in

36 A few potential counterexamples are found in Hoji (1991: e.g., (31a,b)). Note also that Hoji acknowledges that there is variation among speakers with respect to the acceptability of those data.
(115) has two possible interpretations. It entails either that the other male students did not meet a teacher who thought highly of Taro’s talent, or that the other male students did not meet a teacher who thought highly of their talent. This is confirmed by the fact that the statement in (115) can be felicitously denied by uttering either (116a) or (116b).

(116) a. Iya, boku-mo Taro-no sainoo-o takaku hyookasuru sensei-ni deatta.  
    No I-also Taro-GEN talent-ACC highly admire teacher-DAT met  
    ‘No, I also met a teacher who thought highly of Taro’s talent.’  

b. Iya, boku-mo boku-no sainoo-o takaku hyookasuru sensei-ni deatta.  
    No I-also I-GEN talent-ACC highly admire teacher-DAT met  
    ‘No, I also met a teacher who thought highly of my talent.’

The possible entailments for (115) can be taken to indicate that Japanese overt third-person pronouns can not merely corefer but also serve as bound variables so long as Condition B and the antilogophoricity constraint are simultaneously satisfied. As expected, quantificational binding is likewise possible in the same context.

(117) Dono dansi gakusei1-mo kare1-no sainoo-o takaku hyookasuru  
    any male student-PART he-NOM talent-ACC highly admire  
    sensei-ni dea-e-nakat-ta.  
    teacher-DAT meet-can-NEG-PAST  
    ‘No male student could meet a teacher who thought highly of his talent.’

3.5.3 The Apparent Absence of Antilogophoric Effects

We have thus far seen that the distribution of bound pronouns in Japanese can be nicely captured if they are analyzed as epithets, i.e., antilogophoric pronouns. However, the present analysis as it stands seems to be too strong. For example, it fails to explain why sentences like the following do not display antilogophoric effects (see also examples (5a) and (5b)).
In both of these sentences, *kare* refers to the person whose thought is being reported. Under the analysis presented here, this should be ruled out by the antilogophoricity constraint, contrary to fact.

Recall also in this connection that a strict reading is readily available when an overt third-person pronoun is embedded in the complement clause of an attitude verb, as we saw in (8) repeated here as (119).

(119) (Subeteno dansi gakusei nonakade) Taroo-dake-ga Hanako-ga kare-o
  all   male  student among  Taro-only-NOM Hanako-NOM he-ACC
  uttaeru to omotteiru.
  sue   COMP    think

  ‘(Of all male students) only Taro thinks Hanako will sue him.’

As mentioned earlier, the sentence in (119) entails that the other male students do not think that Hanako will sue Taro though it does not entail that the other male students do not think that they will be sued by Hanako. This suggests that even though *kare* cannot be bound by *Taroo*, coreference between them is still possible. However, the antilogophoricity constraint as it stands would incorrectly rule out this possibility. The question is, therefore, why only semantic binding (but not coreference) of Japanese overt third-pronouns seems to be subject to the antilogophoricity constraint. The contrast between the following two sentences illustrates this
I argue that the apparent insensitivity of the referential use of kare and kanozyo to the antilogophoricity constraint is accounted for if we suppose that they can be realized not only as a full epithet phrase (as represented in (121a)) but also as an appositive epithet phrase that adjoins to a null pronoun (as represented in (121b)).

This is reminiscent of Postal’s (1972) idea that anaphoric epithets underlyingly consist of a pronoun and an appositive relative clause. What lies behind this idea is Jackendoff’s observation (see (85)-(87)) that the distribution of anaphoric (or coreferential) epithets significantly overlaps with that of coreferential pronouns. Postal claims that Jackendoff’s observation can be captured if we assume that epithets such as the bastard are derived from underlying structures like he, who is a bastard. While Postal’s original analysis is not consonant with current theoretical assumptions, it is easy to recast it in terms of current syntactic theory by postulating a structure like (121b), where an appositive epithet phrase adjoins to a null pronominal anchor. Indeed, researchers like Patel-Grosz (2012) analyze English epithets as having such a structure (see also
Collins and Postal 2012: Chapter 11; cf. Potts 2005). However, unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary, I assume that a covert pronominal structure like (121b) is possible in languages where pro is independently available. This means that while Japanese epithet phrases are in principle structurally ambiguous between full DPs and appositive phrases with a null pronominal anchor, English epithet phrases are unambiguously full DPs unless they occur with an overt anchor. An advantage of this analysis is that it can provide a straightforward explanation of why only variable binding seems to be subject to the antilogophoricity constraint. In the case of (121a), kare (or kanozyo) behaves the same way as English epithets; thus, it can be bound by or corefer with its antecedent so long as Condition B and the antilogophoricity constraint are simultaneously satisfied. On the other hand, if kare (or kanozyo) is composed of a null pronoun with an appositive modifier (= (121b)), it is constrained in the same way as ordinary null pronouns except that it cannot receive a bound-variable interpretation. The underlying idea here is that nonrestrictive modifiers can only be linked to referring expressions (Potts 2005 and references therein), which means that the host of a nominal appositive cannot function as a bound variable. Thus, although pro can in principle be bound, binding of pro is disallowed under the configuration in (121b). To obtain a good idea of what is responsible for the contrast between (120a) and (120b), it is perhaps best to look at English (overt) analogues to the two sentences.

(122) a. John thinks that the bastard will be selected as a representative. (\*John = the bastard)
   b. John thinks that he, the bastard, will be selected as a representative. (\*k John = he)

(123) a. Every boy thinks that the bastard will be selected as a representative.
   (\*every boy = the bastard)
   b. Every boy thinks that he, the bastard, will be selected as a representative.
   (\*every boy = he)

Patel-Grosz (2012) takes the fact that epithets can be bound by a quantificational antecedent as evidence for postulating a null pronominal anchor. As we will see, however, this claim runs counter to the well-established observation that the host of an appositive phrase must be a referring expression. Cf. Potts (2005: 173ff.)
The Japanese sentence in (120a) can be assigned two distinct structures, one on a par with (122a) and the other with (122b). In (122a), the bastard cannot be anteceded by John due to the antilogophoricity constraint, whereas in (122b), he can be coreferential with John. In the latter case, the antilogophoricity constraint is irrelevant because he is not an antilogophoric pronoun. The reason that the presence of the bastard in (122b) does not run afoul of the antilogophoricity constraint is that a non-restrictive modifier is essentially an inserted comment by the speaker of the utterance (rather than the reported speaker), and as such it lies completely outside the purview of the logophoric center John in (122b). Given that appositive (non-restrictive) relatives behave as though they were coordinated root clauses (Ross 1967; Emonds 1979, among others), it is not surprising that the antilogophoric effect is circumvented here. The crucial point is, though, that whatever is responsible for the contrast between (122a, b) and (123a,b) is also responsible for the contrast between (120a) and (120b). Let us now consider (120b), which corresponds to (123a) and (123b). In (123a), the bastard cannot be anteceded by every boy due to the antilogophoricity constraint (just as in (122a) above). In (123b), since the pronoun he is the host for an appositive phrase, it can only be used as a referential pronoun. However, since every boy is a quantificational expression and thus lacks reference, coreference is not an option here. Therefore, there is no way that every boy is anaphorically related to the pronoun he in this sentence.

In sum, the structural ambiguity of kare/kanozyo gives the false impression that their referential use does not fall under the scope of the antilogophoricity constraint. The present analysis nicely captures the fact that if kare or kanozyo is anteceded by a logocentric subject, it must have a structure in (121b) and thus can only have a referential interpretation; hence the contrast in grammaticality between (120a) and (120b). Importantly, the anaphoric patterns we have seen justify the covert pronominal analysis of Japanese epithets, while at the same time casting doubt on the validity of the postulation of a covert pronominal structure for English epithets (à la Patel-Grosz (2012)).
Finally, given that epithet phrases can adjoin to a null pronoun, it is expected that antilogophoric effects are also not visible in the referential use of bona fide epithets in Japanese. This prediction is indeed borne out by the following examples,

(124) a. Taroo₁-wa yatu₁-ga katu to omotteiru.
    Taro-TOP dude-NOM win COMP think
    ‘Taro thinks that the dude will win.’
b. Taroo₁-wa yatu₁-o sizisita hito-o uragitta.
    Taro-TOP dude-ACC support person-ACC betrayed
    ‘Taro betrayed a person who supported the dude.’

In (124a), the antecedent of the epithet yatu — a derogatory term that roughly means ‘dude’ — is understood as the source of the embedded proposition, while in (124b), the antecedent is not understood as the SOURCE/SELF. Since the two sentences are equally fine, the antilogophoricity constraint seems, at first sight, not to be at work. As expected, however, only-modification reveals the hidden antilogophoric effects.

(125) a. Taroo-dake-ga yatu-ga katu to omotteiru.
    Taro-only-NOM dude-NOM win COMP think
    ‘Only Taro thinks that the dude will win.’
b. Taroo-dake-ga yatu-o sizisita hito-o uragitta.
    Taro-only-NOM dude-ACC support person-ACC betrayed
    ‘Only Taro betrayed a person who supported the dude.’

Ignoring any interpretations where yatu refers to an individual other than Taro, (125a) only

38 Note that here the evaluation of the epithet is due to the discourse speaker’s perspective (not Taro’s).

39 Here I intentionally avoid using those epithets that involve (incorporated) demonstratives (e.g., aitu ‘that guy’) because the anaphoric use of Japanese demonstratives is known to be subject to some idiosynthetic constraints. See, among others, Kuno (1973) for discussion on the anaphoric use of demonstratives.
allows a strict reading, while (125b) allows both strict and sloppy readings. (Under the sloppy interpretation of (125b), the sentence is false if, say, Jiro also betrayed a person who supported him (= Jiro.) The absence of a sloppy reading for (125a) is straightforwardly accounted for in the analysis presented here. That is, if the epithet yatu is syntactically realized as an epithet phrase alone (as in (121a)), it is interpreted as disjoint in reference from Taroo because of the antilogophoricity constraint. If it is realized as an appositive modifier attached to pro (as in (121b)), then the pro can corefer with Taroo, but cannot be interpreted as a bound variable because the host of an appositive must be a referring expression. Hence no sloppy reading is possible for (125a).

3.6. Summary of the Chapter and Remaining Issues

To sum up the discussion in this chapter, the most striking result of the present analysis is that it has uncovered the concealed antilogophoric properties of overt third-person pronouns in Japanese. I have proposed that Japanese third-person pronouns are in fact epithets, thereby functioning as bound variables only when they abide by both Condition B and the antilogophoricity constraint. I have also argued that the antilogophoric effects in the referential use of Japanese pronouns are masked by the fact that unlike English, Japanese allows a structure where a silent pronoun is juxtaposed with an appositive epithet phrase.

Note that the structural ambiguity account proposed here is not simply reducible to Noguchi’s (1995, 1997) D/N distinction or Déchaine and Wiltschko’s (2002) D/φ/N taxonomy. Recall that Noguchi (1995, 1997) and Déchaine and Wiltschko (2002) argue that the binding-theoretic properties of a pronoun are derived from its morphosyntactic makeup. Under Noguchi’s approach, for example, pronouns are classified into D-pronouns (i.e., pronouns that belong to the category of D) and N-pronouns (i.e., pronouns that are morphosyntactically equivalent to nouns), only the former of which can function as bound variables. If we attempt to explain the binding properties of kare/kanozyo along the lines of Noguchi’s approach, it must be concluded that
so-called third-person pronouns in Japanese are ambiguous between D- and N-pronouns. But this leaves us with the question of why they behave as D-pronouns only in certain restricted contexts. Thus, the present analysis fares better in that it provides a principled account of where and why these pronouns can be interpreted as bound variables.

It should be emphasized that the proposed conditions on the binding of kare/kanozyo are presumably necessary rather than sufficient conditions; for there seem to be some other restrictions that constrain the bound-variable use of these pronouns. For one, Hoji (1991) reports that the more restricted the range of the variable bound by a wh-phrase is, the more readily kare can be bound by the wh-phrase, as demonstrated by the following set of sentences (examples (126b-d) taken from Hoji 1991: 297-98).

Likewise, it seems that quantificational expressions like daremo ‘everyone’ cannot bind kare/kanozyo unless the domain of quantification is explicitly restricted (cf. Hara 2002). Thus, straightforward sentences like (127a-b) below are unacceptable for many speakers. (Compare (127b) with (81).)
(127) a. *Daremo1-ga kare1-no hahaoya-o aisiteiru.
   everyone-NOM he-GEN mother-ACC love
   ‘Everyone loves his mother.’
b. *Daremo1-ga [kanozyo1-no sainoo-o mottomo yoku hikidasi-te kureru]
   everyone-NOM she-GEN talent-ACC most fully bring.out do.the.favor
   sensei-ni dea-e-ta.
   teacher-DAT meet-can-PAST
   ‘Everyone was able to meet a teacher who could bring out her talent to the full extent.’

These facts, of course, raise the following questions: What exactly qualifies as an antecedent of kare/kanozyo, and why? It might be noteworthy that the domain of quantification must be restricted to (contextually relevant) male individuals in the case of kare and to female individuals in the case of kanozyo. Then the observed restrictions might be due to the presuppositions of daremo and kare/kanozyo. Having said that, I leave these issues for future research. (See Hara 2002 for an accessibility-based account.)

Another property of Japanese third-person pronouns that remains to be accounted for is Lasnik’s (1989: 161) observation that the reflexive zibun cannot bind them, as discussed in Section 3.3.2.

   John-NOM he-NOM self-NOM genius COP that think COMP said
   (Lit.) ‘John said that he thinks that self is a genius.’
   John-NOM self-NOM he-NOM genius COP that think COMP said
   (Lit.) ‘John said that self thinks that he is a genius.’

Lasnik attributes the contrast between (128) and (129) to the general prohibition against the binding of a more referential expression by a less referential expression.

Closer scrutiny suggests, however, that the observed restriction is not a matter of structural
binding. In fact, \textit{zibun} generally cannot precede \textit{kare} when they share the same antecedent.

(130) John\textsubscript{1}-wa [kare\textsubscript{1}-no yuuzin to zibun\textsubscript{1}-ga itiban da to] omotteiru.
John\-TOP he-GEN friend CONJ self-NOM best COP that think
(Lit.) ‘John thinks that his friend and self are the best.’

(131) ?*John\textsubscript{1}-wa [zibun\textsubscript{1}-no yuuzin to kare\textsubscript{1}-ga itiban da to] omotteiru.
John\-TOP self-GEN friend CONJ he-NOM best COP that think
(Lit.) ‘John thinks that self’s friend and he are the best.’

Under the present account, it is tempting to derive this co-occurrence restriction from the ban on conflicting empathy foci, which prohibits a sentence from containing logical conflicts in empathy relationships (Kuno 1987: 207, 2004: 316).\textsuperscript{40} To be more specific, it has been claimed that the referent of \textit{zibun} needs to be the target of the speaker’s empathy (Kuno 1987: 254), while the referent of an epithet normally cannot be the target of the speaker’s empathy (Corazza 2013). It has also been argued that word order is closely related to empathy (Kuno 1987: 232, 2004: 323). Then the observed co-occurrence restriction might possibly stem from some kind of empathy-related constraint. Certainly, further investigation is required to fully understand this phenomenon.

To conclude this chapter, it is now evident that many of the previous studies were, in part, on the wrong track in seeking properties that render Japanese third-person pronouns exclusively referential. We have seen that once confounding factors are appropriately controlled for, it becomes evident that antilogophoiricy plays a crucial role in determining the distribution and interpretation of \textit{kare} and \textit{kanozyo}. The findings reported here underscore the fact that the study of anaphora requires careful consideration of various factors that may conspire to obscure the true nature of the phenomenon under investigation.

\textsuperscript{40} I thank Dominique Sportiche (p.c.) and Yuhi Inoue (p.c.) for suggesting this analytical possibility to me.
Chapter 4 Antilogophoricity and the Scope of Condition C

4.1 Condition C and Antilogophoricity

In generative grammar, names, (definite) descriptions, and epithets have often been classified together under the same rubric; they are called R-expressions, and are assumed to be subject to the same binding condition — Condition C of the Binding Theory. There are several versions of Condition C that have been proposed in the literature, but the following is commonly accepted as descriptively adequate.

(1)  
Condition C  
An R-expression must be pronoun-free.

The term “free” is used here in a technical sense, which is to say, the condition comes into play just in case an R-expression and a coreferential pronoun stand in a particular geometric relation in the syntax,\(^{41}\) namely, an R-expression must not be coreferential with a pronoun that

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\(^{41}\) This is not to say that Condition C is computed within narrow syntax. Note also that even if Condition C is subsumed under Rule I (Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993; Reinhart 2006; Reinhart 1983), c-command is still relevant because Rule I only applies in a configuration where variable binding is in principle possible.
c-commands it. Since the disjoint-reference effects in Condition C configurations are empirically well-attested across languages, Condition C has been widely used as a diagnostic for probing syntactic structures.

Let us here pause and reflect on the lesson learned in the previous chapter. Recall that Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998) convincingly argued that English epithets should be characterized as antilogophoric pronouns, challenging the commonly-held view that they are R-expressions (cf. Narahara 1991). The reason that epithets were, until then, generally regarded as R-expressions was that the antilogophoric effects of epithets were wrongly diagnosed as Condition C effects.

Now that we are aware of this pitfall, Condition C is ripe for critical reexamination. It is worthwhile to scrupulously inspect other prima facie cases that have been identified as Condition C violations, and verify whether their putative ungrammaticality actually stems from Condition C. This is in fact not a trivial matter, considering, in particular, that it has been noted (or hinted) by some researchers (Kuno 1972, 1986, 1987, 2004; Sells 1987b; Narahara 1991; Dubinsky and Hamilton 1998) that non-epithetic R-expressions likewise have antilogophoric properties, as exemplified below. (Example (2a) is taken from Lakoff (1968: 55), (2b) from Kuno (1972: 162), (2c) from Kuno (1987: 105) and (2d)-(2e) from van Hoek (1995: 312.).)

(2)  
   a. *The knowledge that John₁ had cancer bothered him₁.
   b. *That John₁ will be elected is expected by him₁.
   c. ??That Ali₁ was the best boxer in the world was claimed by him₁ repeatedly.
   d. *His₁ fear is that John₁ might have cancer.
   e. *Her₁ wish is that Sally₁’s daughter will become a physicist.

See Bruening (2014) for a recent proposal that the relevant syntactic relation is not c-command but what is called phase-command.

For some speakers, some of these examples are not utterly unacceptable. This is not surprising in view of the fact that violations of discourse constraints often elicit less pronounced effects on acceptability than violations of grammatical conditions.
Let us start by assessing whether the deviance of these examples stems not from Condition C but from antilogophoricity restrictions. Consider first (2a). In this sentence, the relevant pronoun fails to c-command the R-expression that it is intended to corefer with. Moreover, the acceptability of the sentence fluctuates depending on the choice of the head noun in the subject. For example, replacing the head noun knowledge with rumor enhances the acceptability of the sentence even though the basic structure is kept intact.

(3) The rumor that John had cancer bothered him.

The difference in acceptability between (2a) and (3) is straightforwardly accounted for if we suppose that R-expressions are antilogophoric; that is, they must be disjoint in reference from the logophoric center. In (3), John is not the author of the rumor, which means that the “the rumor that” clause in this sentence is not reporting on John’s internal feeling. By contrast, the most natural interpretation of (2a) is that the “knowledge” is ascribed to John. Thus, the sentence violates antilogophoricity restrictions because John is not disjoint from the individual whose mental state the content of the proposition describes.44

One might nevertheless argue, along the lines suggested by Chomsky (1986: 167-168), that (2a) involves a structure analogous to (4) below.

(4) *[PRO knowing that John had cancer] bothered him.

On this view, (2a) contains a silent pronoun that acts as the subject of knowledge. If the PRO and John are interpreted as having the same referent, a Condition C violation ensues because John is no longer free from a c-commanding pronoun. That said, there seems no independent

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44 As predicted, the sentence becomes acceptable if it is some unattributed general knowledge that is under discussion.
justification anywhere else that we need to postulate a PRO in (2a), and to that extent, the
Condition C analysis of this sentence, though not implausible, is vulnerable to criticism.

Let us next look into (2b) and (2c). In neither of these cases does the pronoun seem to
c-command the R-expression it corefers with. However, one might still argue that these cases are
also ruled out by Condition C by assuming that the sentential subject undergoes LF
reconstruction and that the pronoun is actually in a specifier position rather than forming a
constituent with by (see Collins 2005). On this view, John and Ali are c-commanded by a
coindexed pronoun at LF, thereby violating Condition C, as schematically represented below.

(5)  [ … [ … [by [him₁ [ … [that John₁ will be elected]]]]]]
(6)  [ … [ … [by [him₁ [ … [that Ali₁ was the best boxer in the world]]]]]]

However, this argument does not go through. First, it has been observed that A-movement
generally bleeds Condition C, as demonstrated by the following contrast.⁴⁵

(7)  *It seems to him₁ that the claim that John₁ was asleep is correct.
(8)  The claim that John₁ was asleep seems to him₁ to be correct.  (Chomsky 1993: 37)

This indicates that a reconstruction analysis of (2b) and (2c) seems to lack strong empirical
support.

Second, the choice of the matrix verb affects the acceptability of these sentences. For instance,
the following sentence is significantly better than (2c).

(9)  That Ali₁ was the best boxer in the world was proven by him₁ repeatedly.

This fact comports well with the antilogophoricity account. That is, unlike in (2c), him in (9) is

⁴⁵ Note that the name John resides in the complement clause of the noun claim, so that one cannot resort to a
late adjunction analysis à la Lebeaux (1988).
not construed as an intentional agent of the report, which means that it is not understood as the logophoric center. Hence comes the ameliorating effect.

Finally, let us scrutinize (2d) and (2e). Like the cases we have considered above, these sentences presumably fail to meet the structural description for Condition C. However, it is not a quixotic idea to claim that the possessors *his* and *her* c-command *John* and *Sally*, respectively. Prima facie support for such an analysis comes from the fact that sentences like those below allow for variable binding.

\[(10) \quad \text{Everyone}_1 \text{’s mother thinks he}_1 \text{’s a genius.} \quad \text{(Reinhart 1983: 177)}
\]
\[(11) \quad \text{Nobody}_1 \text{’s students should respect him}_1. \quad \text{(Reinhart 1983: 177)}
\]

Given that variable binding requires c-command, the above data suggests that a possessor argument c-commands out of the possessive DP that it is a specifier of (see Kayne 1994). However, the well-formedness of the following sentence poses a problem for such an approach.\(^{46}\)

\[(12) \quad \text{His}_1 \text{’s fear led me to believe that John}_1 \text{ might have cancer.}
\]

Under the antilogophoricity account, the contrast between (2d) and (12) is predicted. In the former, the *that*-clause expresses the content of John’s fear whereas in the latter, the *that*-clause expresses the speaker’s belief. The latter case is not ruled out because the embedded proposition is not narrated from John’s perspective.

All in all, it is reasonable to assume that some kind of antilogophoricity restriction for R-expressions is necessary, independently of Condition C.

Let us turn to Condition C. It is important to ask, first, whether Condition C has its own raison d’être, because it might turn out that Condition C is subsumed under antilogophoricity

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\(^{46}\) Admittedly, this is not a strong piece of evidence against the Condition C analysis of (2d-e) because (2d-e) and (12) may have fundamentally different structures. See Schlenker (2003).
restrictions.

There is good reason to believe that Condition C is needed independently of antilogophoricity restrictions; that is, disjoint-reference effects do arise in those Condition C environments where antilogophoricity restrictions are plainly not applicable. Consider the following examples.

(13) a. *It\textsubscript{1} is more famous than the designer of Royce Hall\textsubscript{1}.
    b. Royce Hall\textsubscript{1} is more famous than its\textsubscript{1} designer.
    c. Its\textsubscript{1} designer is more famous than Royce Hall\textsubscript{1}.
(14) a. *In 2002, they relocated it\textsubscript{1} to Myers Inc.\textsubscript{1}’s current location
    b. In 2002, they relocated Myers Inc.\textsubscript{1} to its\textsubscript{1} current location.
(15) a. *It\textsubscript{1} was closed because a snow storm hit UCLA\textsubscript{1}.
    b. Its\textsubscript{1} library was closed because a snow storm hit UCLA\textsubscript{1}.

The pronouns in these examples refer to inanimate objects, which, metaphorical cases aside, cannot be taken as logophoric centers. Thus, the illicitness of the a-sentences in (13)-(15) cannot be chalked up to antilogophoric effects. Notice that disjoint-reference effects emerge just in case a pronoun c-commands an R-expression that it is anaphoric to. This suggests that, aside from the question of how it is implemented, Condition C is needed independently of antilogophoricity restrictions, and that the former is not simply reducible to the latter.

Considering that Condition C and antilogophoricity restrictions are independently motivated and coexist, it is an interesting thought experiment to ask what makes sentences like the following illicit.

(16) *He\textsubscript{1} knows that John\textsubscript{1} has cancer.

There are at least three logical possibilities: sentences like (16) are ruled out by (i) Condition C alone; (ii) the relevant antilogophoricity constraint alone; (iii) both Condition C and the relevant antilogophoricity constraint. At first sight, the safest bet seems to be that (16) is in violation of
both conditions because the offending pronoun c-commands the R-expression John, while at the same time its referent is the center of consciousness. Contrary to this expectation, however, I will suggest that the illicitness of sentences like (16) is in all likelihood due not to Condition C but to the antilogophoricity constraint alone.

I will further argue that cases like the following are ruled out not by Condition C but by antilogophoricity restrictions.

(17) *He₁ talked to Melba just before the police arrested Joseph₁. (Safir 2004b: 79)

Notice that in this case, replacing the name Joseph with an epithet results in a grammatical sentence.

(18) He₁ talked to Melba just before the police arrested the poor bastard₁. (Safir 2004b: 79)

The grammaticality of (18) is not surprising, given that epithets are antilogophoric pronouns subject to antilogophoricity restrictions as well as Condition B. Since the epithet the poor bastard is free in its local domain, and since the referent of he is (presumably) not a perspective holder (because (18) does not involve indirect discourse), it is predicted that the coindexation given in (18) is licit, and in fact it is. One might conclude from the contrast between (17) and (18) that (17) is ruled out by Condition C because the grammaticality of (18) indicates that antilogophoricity requirements are satisfied.

Plausible though it may seem, this reasoning is not foolproof as it rests on a potentially mistaken assumption — namely, that antilogophoric effects occur in a uniform way. This may not be an innocuous assumption in view of the fact that a growing body of research suggests that logophoricity is not a uniform phenomenon but comes in different, albeit similar, varieties. It is an unquestionable fact that logophoric phenomena are real, as testified by the very existence of logophoric pronouns, but, as Sells (1987a: 477) correctly points out, “there is no unified notion
of logophoricity in the way that (presumably) there is for other features proposed to be relevant for anaphora, such as the presence of a subject”.

That logophoricity defies a unified description is ipso facto an indication that it is not a primitive but is merely a cover term for a family of related phenomena. Indeed, this view is defended by Sells (1987a), and as we witnessed in Chapter 2, logophoric effects in fact come in varying patterns. Given this fact, there is no compelling reason a priori to assume that antilogophoricity is a primitive notion or a single homogeneous phenomenon. The new picture that emerges is, then, that just as logophoricity comes in different varieties, so too does antilogophoricity.

With all this in mind, the central thesis to be explored in this chapter is that names in English are “maximally” antilogophoric in the sense that they must be disjoint from all potential logocentric antecedents (SOURCE, SELF, and PIVOT), whereas epithets are not as antilogophoric as names in the sense that they must be disjoint from a subset of logocentric antecedents (SOURCE and SELF). To the extent that this hypothesis is tenable, the difference between (17) and (18) is not a telling piece of evidence that (17) must be a Condition C violation. Indeed, essentially the same idea has been put forward by Sells (1987b) and Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998), although I adopt a rather different angle to verify the hypothesis, as will be shown shortly.

I will also attempt to clarify the scope of Condition C and that of antilogophoricity, by taking a close look at those cases where both disjointness conditions are in principle applicable. I will suggest the possibility that surprisingly many cases of what we call Condition C effects are, in fact, spurious; they are not attributed to Condition C but to antilogophoricity restrictions. The results of our investigation have significant consequences for the Binding Theory. That is, although Condition C and antilogophoricity restrictions are presumably independent conditions regulating coreference, they do not operate independently of each other. Rather, there is a division of labor between Condition C and antilogophoricity restrictions.

Two caveats are in order before we proceed. First, throughout, I restrict my attention to names
in English and ignore other types of R-expressions. Second, I am only concerned with intended (or presupposed) coreference. It has been known for quite some time that Condition C effects consistently fail to arise in unknown (unestablished) or mistaken identity cases.

(19)  (I think they gave my paper to Zelda Jones for review.) She praises Zelda to high heavens (and totally ignores my stuff.)

(Büring 2005: 153)

Sentence (19) is fine even if she, the reviewer, is in fact Zelda Jones. In this case, the identity of Zelda Jones and the reviewer has not been established among the discourse participants in the context, which has the effect of suspending Condition C. See Higginbotham (1985), Safir (2004a: 28), Büring (2005: 151ff.) for relevant discussion (see also Heim (1998) for discussion of “guises” and Schlenker (2005) for other exceptions to Condition C).

4.2 Names as Maximal Antilogophors

In Chapter 2, we observed patterns of logophoricity across languages. To recapitulate the point, logophoricity is characterized along two dimensions: (i) logophoric domains and (ii) logocentric antecedents. Although languages superficially exhibit a bewildering variety of logophoric domains and logocentric antecedents, there are certain implicational universals with respect to the way the range of possible logophoric domains and that of possible logocentric antecedents are restricted.

Of particular relevance to our investigation is Sells’s (1987a) taxonomy of discourse roles. Recall that logocentric antecedents are classified into the following three types.

(20) a. SOURCE: the one who makes the report; the intentional agent of the communication
b. SELF: the one whose mental state or attitude the content of the proposition describes
c. PIVOT: the one from whose point of view the report is made; the one with respect to whose (space-time) location the content of the proposition is evaluated
According to Sells, languages differ with respect to which role qualifies as an antecedent of a logophoric expression. What is important here is that being a SOURCE entails being also a SELF as well as a PIVOT, and being a SELF entails being also a PIVOT. Thus, the fact that Japanese allows binding of *zibun* by a PIVOT predicts that it also allows *zibun*-binding by a SOURCE or a SELF. This is in fact the case.

(21)  
\[
\text{Taro\textsubscript{0}}-\text{wa} \ [\text{Yosiko-ga} \ zibun\textsubscript{1}-o \ aisiteiru \ to] \ \text{itta.} \\
\begin{array}{l}
\text{Taro-TOP} \ \text{Yoshiko-NOM} \ \text{self-ACC} \ \text{love} \ \text{COMP} \ \text{said} \\
\text{\quad \quad ‘Taro}\textsubscript{1} \ \text{said that Yoshiko loved him}\textsubscript{1}.’
\end{array} \quad \text{(Sells 1987a: 461)}
\]

(22)  
\[
[\text{Yosiko-ga} \ zibun\textsubscript{1}-o \ musisita \ koto]-\text{ga} \ \text{Taro\textsubscript{0}}-\text{o} \ \text{yuuutunisita.} \\
\begin{array}{l}
\text{Yoshiko-NOM} \ \text{self-ACC} \ \text{ignored} \ \text{COMP-NOM} \ \text{Taro-ACC} \ \text{distressed} \\
\text{\quad \quad ‘That Yoshiko ignored him}\textsubscript{1} \ \text{distressed Taro}\textsubscript{1}.’
\end{array} \quad \text{(Sells 1987a: 461)}
\]

(23)  
\[
\text{Takashi\textsubscript{1}}-\text{wa} \ [\text{Yosiko-ga} \ zibun\textsubscript{1}-o \ tazunete-kita} \ \text{node} \\
\begin{array}{l}
\text{Takashi-TOP} \ \text{Yoshiko-NOM} \ \text{self-ACC} \ \text{visit-came} \ \text{because} \\
\text{kanasigar-anakat-ta.} \ \text{become.sad-NEG-PAST} \\
\text{‘Takashi}\textsubscript{1} \ \text{was not sad because Yoshiko came to visit him}\textsubscript{1}.’
\end{array} \quad \text{(Sells 1987a: 472)}
\]

The sentences in (21), (22) and (23) demonstrate that *zibun* can be bound by SOURCE, SELF, or PIVOT antecedents.

With this much in place, let us now explore the hypothesis that names are maximally antilogophoric; namely, that they must be disjoint from all potential logocentric antecedents. I first clarify the logic of this hypothesis. Let us observe that there is independent evidence that R-expressions resist coreference with a PIVOT. Bolinger (1979: 302) reports that (24a) is degraded compared to (24b).\(^{47}\)

\(^{47}\) In Sells (1987b), the status of (24a) is reported as “??”, while Bolinger’s original judgment on the same sentence is “?”. Hence I report it as “?/??” to do justice to their judgments.
(24)   a. ??I answered him as soon as John spoke.  
       b. I recognized him as soon as John spoke.

Sells (1987b) suggests that the contrast is due to the fact that in (24a), John (= him) can possibly be interpreted as the PIVOT (presumably because the action of answering may imply some kind of communication to him), whereas in (24b) John (= him) cannot be so interpreted because “one cannot recognize someone whose point of view one is already taking” (p.19). Sells further points out that a similar contrast is observed in the following pair.

(25)   a. I got nothing from him before John left.  
       b. ??I gave nothing to him before John left.  
          (Sells 1987b: 19)

He speculates that the deviance of sentence (25b) is tied to the fact that John (= him) is the target of empathy (and hence is the PIVOT) in the sentence.

   Given that being a SOURCE or a SELF entails being also a PIVOT, and given that names resist coreference with a PIVOT, it follows that names should also resist coreference with a SOURCE and a SELF. Therefore, it is expected that names must be disjoint from all potential logophoric centers.

The idea put forward here is not new. Sells (1987b), inspired by Kuno (1972), proposes the following constraint, which is essentially in line with the hypothesis being explored here.

(26)   Any reference to an individual bearing a discourse role must be syntactically expressed by a pronominal.  
          (Sells 1987b: 14)

What this means is that only pronominal forms may (though need not) be anaphoric to an individual that a discourse role is predicated of. In the case of a logophoric pronoun, association between the pronoun and a role-bearing individual is obligatory, while an ordinary pronoun may or may not be associated with a role-bearing individual.
Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998) restate (26) as a condition that prohibits R-expressions from bearing discourse roles. However, this is a potentially misleading statement because, if taken at face value, it would incorrectly predict that straightforward cases such as *Bill says that he is innocent* and *According to John, Bill was in Italy* should be ruled out.48

It is also important to note that the antilogophoricity constraint for R-expressions should not be interpreted as a requirement that R-expressions be disjoint from any DPs that bear discourse roles. For example, the following sentence is perfectly fine although *John and he* bear the SOURCE roles and refer to the same person.

*(27) John₁ thought that he₁ said that I would win.*

What is important here is that *John* does not lie within the logophoric domain relative to which *he* is the SOURCE, which means that *he* cannot be construed as a logophoric center for *John*. This contrasts with (28), where *John* is within the purview of the logophoric domain with respect to which *he* is the SOURCE.

*(28) *He₁ thought that John₁ said that I would win.*

The sentence in (28), therefore, runs afoul of antilogophoricity restrictions.

If this analysis is on the right track, Condition C effects need to be handled with caution. As suggested at the outset of this chapter, it is no longer self-evident whether sentences like the following are actually ruled out by Condition C, given that the referent of the pronoun is understood as the PIVOT.

*(29) *He₁ talked to Melba just before the police arrested Joseph₁.* (Safir 2004b: 79)

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48 In fact, Sells (1987b: 5) explicitly states that the proposed constraint does not mean that roles may not be initiated by non-pronouns.
A few remarks on the notion of PIVOT are in order here. The idea underlying Sells’s approach is that logophoricity is not a simple phenomenon but a cluster of related phenomena, and the common thread unifying these phenomena is the notion of “point of view” or “perspective”.

It should be noted that while it is generally agreed that logophoric phenomena are closely related to point of view, there have been widely divergent views on this notion and its relevance to logophoricity (see Oshima 2006). Reinhart and Reuland (1993: 673, fn. 17) warn that “the attempt to reduce all actual occurrences of logophors to the same point-of-view mechanism, as in Sells 1987, renders the concept “point of view” rather vacuous”. In particular, they state that the notion of PIVOT “has nothing to do with any familiar tests for point of view orientation” (ibid.) (see also Reinhart and Reuland 1991: 316).

Indeed, Sells’s idea of PIVOT is rather vague. Sells (1987a: 456, fn.15) states that SELF represents a point-of-view holder in a mental sense, while PIVOT represents a point-of-view holder in a physical sense, or “the center of deixis”. He also notes in passing that PIVOT corresponds to the notion of “empathy” (p.455, fn.14). At the very least, it seems that the concept of PIVOT as envisaged by Sells is, by itself, a complex notion that encompasses multiple facets of logophoricity (see Oshima 2007; Charnavel 2014 for relevant discussion).

It is also worth mentioning in this connection that Culy (1997) argues, based on a crosslinguistic survey, that “logophoricity proper is distinct from point of view” (p.846), citing cases in which logophoric pronouns do not represent points of view. He claims that logophoric pronouns and indirect (or long-distance) reflexives may indicate points of view but do so only secondarily, and the effect of this secondary function becomes visible in those contexts where the use of a logophoric form is optional. In such contexts, the use of a logophoric form in place of an ordinary pronoun is interpreted as representing the reported speaker’s point of view. This means, then, that the presence of point-of-view effects is not a necessary condition for logophoricity, and, conversely, that the absence of point-of-view effects does not immediately exclude the possibility that a given expression is a logophor.
Hence, without committing myself to the view that all instances of logophoricity are reducible to point-of-view considerations, I use the term PIVOT only as a descriptive term to refer to a logocentric antecedent that is neither SOURCE nor SELF. But if there is no clear definition of PIVOT besides being neither SOURCE nor SELF, how can we identify logophoric environments in English to explore the hypothesis that names in English are maximally antilogophoric?

Instead of giving an elusive definition of PIVOT, I would like to adopt a heuristic approach here. Let us assume that logophoric pronouns in languages like Japanese, Ngiti, and Boko are maximally logophoric in the sense that they can take the widest range of logocentric antecedents (see Chapter 2). Let us assume then that if, in a given configuration, \( x \) can antecede a logophoric pronoun \( y \) in these languages, then \( x \) is identified as a potential logocentric antecedent for \( y \) in that configuration. If \( x \) is neither SOURCE nor SELF, it is PIVOT.

In what follows, I draw primarily from Japanese logophoric binding data to investigate the antilogophoric properties of names in English, and simply assume that essentially the same results can be replicated by using Ngiti and Boko logophoric pronouns. It should be emphasized, however, that I do not intend to claim that logophors in these languages pick out exactly the same set of logocentric antecedents in all contexts. Presumably there are independent (perhaps language-specific) restrictions on the selection of logocentric antecedents that are yet to be understood.

4.3 Zibun as a Tool for Locating Potential Logocentric Antecedents

This section is intended to provide justification for the use of Japanese zibun as a diagnostic tool for identifying potential logocentric antecedents.

As mentioned above, there is a view that locally bound zibun is a pure anaphor regulated in the syntax whereas long-distance bound zibun is a logophor subject to discourse-pragmatic constraints (Sells 1987a: 450, fn. 6; Abe 1997; cf. Oshima 2004, 2007; Kishida 2011 for a three-way classification of zibun). A rationale cited by Abe (1997) in support of this dichotomy
is that, as observed by Kuno (1972, 1973), long-distance bound zibun generally exhibits “awareness” effects, while zibun in simplex sentences does not have to obey the awareness requirement.\(^{49}\)

The notion of “awareness” (or “consciousness”) is similar to point of view and is often invoked in the discussion of logophoricity. It has been recognized since Kuno (1972, 1973) that the use of Japanese zibun is subject to the so-called awareness requirement, and the same constraint has proven to be relevant to Mandarin ziji as well (Huang and Liu 2001). The basic idea is as follows.

\[(30) \quad \text{Zibun in a constituent clause [=} an embedded clause\text{]} (A) \text{ is coreferential with a noun phrase (B) of the matrix sentence only if A represents an action or state that the referent of B is aware of at the time it takes place or has come to be aware of at some later time. In other words, zibun appears in subordinate clauses only when the clauses represent the internal feeling of the referent of zibun and the first pronoun appears in its place in the direct representation of the internal feeling. (Kuno 1973: 322)}\]

By way of illustration, compare the a-sentences with the b-sentences in (31) and (32) below.

(Examples are taken from Kuno (1973: 309-310).)

\[(31) \quad \text{a. John}_1\text{-wa [Mary-ga zibun}_1\text{-o korositosita toki] Jane-to nete ita. John-TOP Mary-NOM self-ACC tried.to.kill when Jane-with sleeping was 'John}_1\text{ was in bed with Jane when Mary tried to kill him}_1\text{.'}\]

\text{b. *John}_1\text{-wa [Mary-ga zibun}_1\text{-o korosita toki] Jane-to nete ita. John-TOP Mary-NOM self-ACC killed when Jane-with sleeping was 'John}_1\text{ was in bed with Jane when Mary killed him}_1\text{.'}\]

\[(32) \quad \text{a. John}_1\text{-wa [RC zibun}_1\text{-o korosootosita] sono okoto-to maeni atta koto-ga-atta. John-TOP self-ACC tried.to.kill the man-with before met ASP 'John}_1\text{ had met before the man who tried to kill him}_1\text{.'}\]

\(^{49}\) The same argument is employed by Huang and Liu (2001) in their analysis of Mandarin ziji.
According to Kuno (1972, 1973), the unacceptability of the b-sentences in (31) and (32) follows from the fact that they fail to abide by the awareness requirement; that is, John could not have been aware that he was killed.

The awareness requirement seems to follow directly from the nature of logophoricity, but here again, opinions seem to diverge among researchers on how to interpret this notion. On Sells’s account, awareness is distinguished from the notion of “point of view” (Sells 1987: 471), whereas on Abe’s (1997) account, awareness is subsumed under point of view. In Huang and Liu (2001) and Oshima (2004), the awareness requirement is reinterpreted as de se interpretation requirements.

Aside from the question of where the awareness requirement comes from, an interesting fact is that locally bound zibun generally fails to show awareness effects. For example, in (33), Mary can bind zibun, and the sentence does not mean that Mary was aware that she was killed in her own house.

(33) Mary1-ga John-ni zibun1-no uti-de koros-are-ta.
    Mary-NOM John-by self-GEN house-LOC kill-PASS-PAST
    ‘Mary1 was killed by John in her1 house.’

The absence of awareness effects has sometimes been taken as evidence for the claim that zibun taking a local antecedent is not a logophor but an anaphor subject to syntactic conditions. However, the presence/absence of awareness effects does not consistently correlate with the (non-)locality of the antecedent of zibun. As observed by Kuroda (1973), not all occurrences of long-distance bound zibun invariably display awareness effects. He points out that the following example, due to Kuno (1972: 184), is acceptable even in a context where John has a desire to
marry someone who the speaker knows is his student, but who John does not realize is his own student (perhaps because he has so many students in his class).

(34) John₁-wa [RC zibun₁-ga osie-teiru] gakusei to kekkonsi-tagatteiru-yo.  
     John-TOP self-NOM teach-ASP student with marry-want  
     ‘John₁ wants to marry a student who he₁ teaches.’

In a similar vein, for many speakers, the sentence in (35) below is felicitous in the following scenario: Mary does not know that she was abandoned immediately after birth, nor that the person who she works with is her natural parent, but the speaker knows that they are a parent and a child and that the colleague is the one who abandoned her.

(35) Mary₁-wa [RC zibun₁-o suteta] oya-to issyoni hatarai-teiru.  
     Mary-TOP self-ACC abandoned parent-with together work-ASP  
     ‘Mary works with her parent who abandoned her.’

It should also be mentioned that unlike in the case of English local anaphors, certain predicates disallow local binding of zibun (Oshima 1979: 426).

(36) *Taro₁-wa zibun₁-o korosita.  
     Taro-TOP self-ACC killed  
     ‘Taro killed himself.’

In view of the fact that the correlation between the remoteness of the antecedent of zibun and the occurrence of awareness effects breaks down in non-trivial ways, the absence of awareness effects does not immediately justify the claim that locally bound zibun is subject to a local binding condition. Note also that it might be possible to modulate the notion of locality in order to maintain the correlation (see Abe 1997), but even if the alleged correlation is real, we cannot
hastily conclude that locally bound \textit{zibun} must (unambiguously) be an anaphor. The fact that \textit{zibun} “does not have to” adhere to the awareness requirement allows us to merely conclude that it \textit{can} be an anaphor (and possibly ambiguous between an anaphor and a logophor), and to that extent, the jury is still out on whether it cannot be a logophor.\footnote{The difficulty in adjudicating on this issue comes in part from the fact that the antecedent of \textit{zibun} must always denote a sentient individual. The same kind of complication can be avoided by using an inanimate antecedent in the case of, say, English \textit{each other}, which is claimed to have an anaphoric and a logophoric use (Pollard and Sag 1992). Hence the contrast between (i) and (ii) below.}

Thus, absent evidence to the contrary, let us assume that Japanese \textit{zibun} (as well as Mandarin \textit{ziji}) is always a logophor regardless of the distance of the antecedent (and may also be an anaphor in some restricted environments). This might strike one as a radical departure from the prevailing orthodoxy, but to claim that \textit{zibun} (or \textit{ziji}) must not be a logophor in a certain domain requires additional justification. The onus of proof is, therefore, on those who wish to make such a claim and draw a demarcation line between the domain in which \textit{zibun} must behave as an anaphor and the domain in which \textit{zibun} must behave as a logophor.\footnote{My position is in part in line with Reinhart and Reuland’s (1993) view. They state that:}

4.4 The Scope of Condition C

\footnote{The terms \textit{local anaphor} and \textit{long-distance anaphor} are highly misleading. Both kinds of anaphor can occur at all kinds of distances when they are used logophorically. (Reinhart and Reuland 1993: 660)}
4.4.1 Condition C Revisited

We are now in a position to reconsider Condition C effects. Classic examples of Condition C effects are given below.

(37)  a. *He$_{1}$ loves John$_{1}$’s mother.
    b. *He$_{1}$ told Mary that John$_{1}$ was going to see Bill.
    c. *He$_{1}$ told Mary that John was going to see Bill$_{1}$.
    d. *She$_{1}$ was told that Bill was looking for Mary$_{1}$.
    e. *We asked her$_{1}$ to bring Rosa$_{1}$’s pictures.
    f. *She$_{1}$ saw a man who approached Maria$_{1}$’s mother.
    g. *She$_{1}$ got mad because Frank criticized Rosa$_{1}$.

If the hypothesis outlined above is correct, all these examples fall under antilogophoricity restrictions because the relevant names are situated within the domain with respect to which the coreferential pronoun can be construed as the logophoric center. This is confirmed by the fact that Japanese allows binding of zibun in these configurations.

(38)  a. Kare$_{1}$-wa zibun$_{1}$-no hahaoya-o aisiteiru.
       he-TOP self-GEN mother-ACC love
       (Lit.) ‘He loves self’s mother.’
    b. Kare$_{1}$-wa Mary-ni [zibun$_{1}$-ga Bill-ni au koto]-o tutaeta.
       he-TOP Mary-DAT self-NOM Bill-DAT meet COMP-ACC told
       (Lit.) ‘He told Mary that self was going to see Bill.’
    c. Kare$_{1}$-wa Mary-ni [John-ga zibun$_{1}$-ni au koto]-o tutaeta.
       he-TOP Mary-DAT John-NOM self-DAT meet COMP-ACC told
       (Lit.) ‘He told Mary that John was going to see self.’
d. Kanozyō₁-wa [Bill-ga zibun₁-o sagasite ru koto]-o
she-TOP Bill-NOM self-ACC was.looking for COMP-ACC
tutae-rare-ta.
tell-PASS-PAST
(Lit.) ‘She was told that Bill was looking for self.’
e. Watasitati-wa kanozyō₁-ni [zibun₁-no syasin-o mottekuru yooni] tanonda.
we-TOP she-DAT self-GEN picture-ACC bring AUX asked
(Lit.) ‘We asked her to bring self’s pictures.’
she-TOP self-GEN mother-to approached man-ACC saw
(Lit.) ‘She saw a man who approached self’ mother.’
g. Kanozyō₁-wa [Frank-ga zibun₁-o hihansita kara] okotta.
she-TOP Frank-NOM self-ACC criticized because got.mad
(Lit.) ‘She got mad because Frank criticized self.’

The following contrast may likewise be due to the proposed antilogophoricity constraint.

(39)  a. *Near Dan₁, he₁ saw a snake.
   b. Near him₁, Dan₁ saw a snake.

In (39a), he serves as the logophoric center of Dan, whereas in (39b), him is presumably not a
potential logophoric center for Dan. Again, support comes from logophoric binding data (from
Japanese).

(40)  a. Zibun₁-no tikaku-ni kare₁-wa hebi-o mituketa.
self-GEN proximity-LOC he-TOP snake-ACC found
(Lit.) ‘In self’s proximity, he saw a snake.

b. *Kare₁-no tikaku-ni zibun₁-wa hebi-o mituketa.
he-GEN proximity-LOC self-TOP snake-ACC found
(Lit.) ‘In his proximity, self saw a snake.’
The contrast above shows that logocentric antecedence is not determined by linear order. By definition, Condition C is also not imposed on the linear relation between a pronoun and its antecedent. Thus, Condition C assumes no jurisdiction over coreference in sentences like those below, where the pronoun linearly precedes but does not c-command the R-expression that it corefers with.

(41)  
   a. His\textsubscript{1} mother loves John\textsubscript{1}.  
   b. Those who know him\textsubscript{1} hate Bill\textsubscript{1}.

Note that antilogophoricity restrictions are also not applicable to sentences (41a-b) above. The pronouns *his and him are not potential logophoric centers relative to John and Bill, as can be surmised from the fact that zibun-binding fails in these configurations.

(42)  
   a. *Kare\textsubscript{1}-no hahaoya-wa zibun\textsubscript{1}-o aisiteiru.  
       he-GEN mother-TOP self-ACC love  
       (Lit.) ‘His mother loves self.’  
   b. *[Kare\textsubscript{1}-ositteiru] hito-wa zibun\textsubscript{1}-o nikundeiru.  
       he-ACC know people-TOP self-ACC hate  
       (Lit.) ‘People who know him hate self.’

Antilogophoric effects might well be operative in cases like the following, where a pronoun apparently c-commands out of the PP in which it is embedded.

(43)  
   a. *We have heard from him\textsubscript{1} that Walter\textsubscript{1} will never be allowed to enter the Lodge.  
       (Sells 1987b: 6)  
   b. *I spoke to him\textsubscript{1} in Ben\textsubscript{1}’s office.  
       (Reinhart 1983: 53)
Under the antilogophoricity account, the deviance of (43a) is attributed to the fact that him is interpreted as the SOURCE of the embedded proposition; thus, the name Walter, which resides within the embedded report, cannot be linked to him. Logophoric binding is possible in such contexts, as exemplified below.

(44) Taroo-wa Takasi₁-kara [Yosiko-ga zibun₁-o nikundeiru to] kiita.
    Taro-TOP Takashi-from Yoshiko-NOM self-ACC hate COMP heard
    (Lit.) ‘Taro heard from Takashi that Yoshiko hated self.’ (Sells 1987: 454)

Sentences like (43b) may also be ruled out by antilogophoricity restrictions because logophoric binding is possible in such configurations in Boko.

(45) Boko
    à yâ 'ò-è a kpé-ú
    1SG.PERF word speak.PERF-3SG.BEN 3SG.POSS.LOG house-in
    ‘I spoke to him₁ in his₁ house.’ (Jones 1998: 163)

This indicates that him in (43b) is a potential logophoric center relative to Bill. Note that in Japanese, logophoric binding fails in the same context.

(46) *Watasi-wa kare₁-ni zibun₁-no heya-de hanasikaketa.
    I-TOP him-to self-GEN room-LOC spoke.to
    (Lit.) ‘I spoke to him in self’s room.’

I can only speculate that there is an independent constraint that blocks the intended coreference here.
4.4.2 Intervention Effects

We have seen that Condition C and antilogophoricity restrictions are supposed to operate in significantly overlapping environments. This seems to mean that the question always remains as to whether observed Condition C effects are due to either Condition C or antilogophoricity restrictions or both.

However, there is a peculiar property of logophoric binding that helps adjudicate on this question. As we observed earlier, languages like Japanese impose far more lenient restrictions on logophoric binding than other languages. A point worth noting here is that not only is logophoric binding in such languages possible in a wide variety of contexts, but it is also (apparently) unbounded even in the presence of an intervener. Observe the following sentences.

(47)  Taroo₁-wa [Hanako-ga [zibun₁-ga wairo-o moratta koto]-o
     Taro-TOP Hanako-NOM self-NOM bribe-ACC receive COMP-ACC
     Ziroo-ni tugeta to] omotteiru.
     Jiro-DAT told COMP think
     ‘Taro₁ thinks that Hanako told Jiro that he₁ had received a bribe.’

(48)  [[Zibun₁-ga wairo-o moratta to] Hanako-ga sinziteiru
     self-NOM bribe-ACC receive COMP Hanako-NOM believe
     koto]-ga Taroo₁-o nayamaseta.
     COMP-NOM Taro-ACC distressed
     ‘The fact that Hanako believes that he₁ had received a bribe distressed Taro₁.’

In (47), zibun can be bound not only by the intermediate potential logocentric antecedent Hanako but also by the remote subject Taroo. Likewise, in (48), zibun can be bound not only by the subject of the immediately dominating clause (i.e., Hanako) but also by the experiencer object in the matrix clause (i.e., Taroo).

However, even in Japanese, where logophoric binding is apparently unbounded and free from
intervention effects, there is a specific kind of configuration in which long-distance binding surrenders to intervention — a type of intervention which, to my knowledge, has gone unnoticed in the literature. Consider the following examples.

(49) a. ?*Taroo₁-wa [RC Ziroo-ga [zibun₁-ga wairo-o moratta koto]-o
   Taro-TOP Jiro-NOM self-NOM bribe-ACC received COMP-ACC
tugeta] hito-ni atta.
told person-to meet
   ‘Taro₁ met the person to whom Jiro said that he₁ received a bribe.’

b. ?*Taroo₁-wa [RC [zibun₁-ga makeru to] itta] gakusei-o sikatta.
   Taro-TOP self-NOM lose COMP said student-ACC scolded
   ‘Taro₁ scolded a student who said that he₁ would lose.’

c. ?*Takasi₁-wa [Taroo-ga iuniwa Yosiko-ga mizu-o zibun₁-no ue-ni
   Takasi-TOP Taro-according.to Yoshiko-NOM water-ACC self-GEN on-LOC
   kobosita node] nuretesimatta.
   spilled because got.wet
   ‘Takashi₁ got wet because according to Taro, Yoshiko spilled water on him₁.’

These sentences are unacceptable (or at best marginal) with the given coindexation. Note that long-distance binding into a relative clause or an adverbial itself is permitted in Japanese, as we witnessed earlier. The relevant examples are repeated here.

(50) Taroo₁-wa [RC zibun₁-ga moratta] okane-o tukatta.
   Taro-TOP self-NOM received money-ACC used
   ‘Taro₁ used the money that he₁ had received.’

(51) Takasi₁-wa [Yosiko-ga mizu-o zibun₁-no ue-ni kobosita node]
   Takasi-TOP Yoshiko-NOM water-ACC self-GEN on-LOC spilled because
   nuretesimatta.
   got.wet
   ‘Takashi₁ got wet because Yoshiko spilled water on him₁.’ (Sells 1987a: 455)
Then what is it that makes the sentences in (49a-c) significantly degraded compared to (47) and (48)? The answer presumably lies in the fact that in the deviant cases, the remote antecedent is understood as the PIVOT, whereas in the good cases, the remote antecedent is understood as either the SOURCE or the SELF.

Note that for intervention to occur, it is not sufficient that the remote antecedent acts as the PIVOT. It is also required that the intervener be a SOURCE; otherwise, no intervention effects come about, as shown below.

(52)  PIVOT > SELF > zibun
Taroo1-wa [[zibun1-ga wairo-o moratta koto]-ga Hanako-o nayamaseta
Taro-TOP self-NOM bribe-ACC received COMP-NOM Hanako-ACC distressed
node] kaisya-o satta.
because company-ACC left
‘Tarō1 left the company because the fact that he had received a bribe distressed Hanako.’

(53)  PIVOT > PIVOT > zibun
Taroo1-wa [Hanako-ga [RC zibun1-ga moratta] okane-o tukattesimatta
Taro-TOP Hanako-NOM self-NOM received money-ACC used
node] ryokoo-ni ik-e-nakat-ta
because travel-to go-can-NEG-PAST
‘Tarō1 couldn’t go traveling because Hanako used the money he had received.’

In (52) and (53), zibun can be bound by the remote PIVOT antecedent without being at the mercy of the intervening potential logocentric antecedent. The fact that no intervention effects occur in these cases suggests that it is only SOURCE that can thwart the binding of zibun to a remote PIVOT antecedent.

So far we have examined the following cases.
To confirm whether there is any other intervention configuration than (54c), let us examine all the other logically possible configurations.\footnote{Some of the examples presented here are not perfectly natural presumably for processing reasons, but crucially, all the examples are significantly better than those in (49).}

(54) \begin{enumerate}
\item a. OK \textsc{source} > \textsc{source} > \textsc{zibun} \quad (e.g., (47))
\item b. OK \textsc{self} > \textsc{source} > \textsc{zibun} \quad (e.g., (48))
\item c. * \textsc{pivot} > \textsc{source} > \textsc{zibun} \quad (e.g., (49))
\item d. OK \textsc{pivot} > \textsc{self} > \textsc{zibun} \quad (e.g., (52))
\item e. OK \textsc{pivot} > \textsc{pivot} > \textsc{zibun} \quad (e.g., (53))
\end{enumerate}

(55) \textsc{source} > \textsc{self} > \textsc{zibun}
\begin{quote}
Taroo\textsubscript{1-wa} [[\textsc{zibun}\textsubscript{1-ga} \textsc{wairo-o} \textsc{moratta koto}-ga] \textsc{Hanako-o} \textsc{nayamaseta} \\
Taroo-\textsc{TOP} \textsc{self-NOM} \textsc{bribe-ACC} \textsc{receive} \textsc{COMP-NOM} \textsc{Hanako-ACC} \textsc{distressed} to] \textsc{Ziroo-ni tugeta}.
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
\textsc{COMP Jiro-DAT} told
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
‘Taroo\textsubscript{1} told Jiro that the fact that he\textsubscript{1} had received a bribe distressed Hanako.’
\end{quote}

(56) \textsc{source} > \textsc{pivot} > \textsc{zibun}
\begin{quote}
Taroo\textsubscript{1-wa} [\textsc{Hanako-ga} \textsc{RC zibun}\textsubscript{1-ga} \textsc{moratta} \textsc{okane-o} \textsc{tukattesimatta} \\
Taroo-\textsc{TOP} \textsc{Hanako-NOM} \textsc{self-NOM} \textsc{received} \textsc{money-ACC} \textsc{used} koto]-o \textsc{Ziroo-ni tugeta}.
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
\textsc{COMP-ACC Jiro-DAT} told
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
‘Taroo\textsubscript{1} told Jiro that Hanako used the money that he\textsubscript{1} had received.’
\end{quote}

(57) \textsc{self} > \textsc{self} > \textsc{zibun}
\begin{quote}
[[\textsc{Zibun}\textsubscript{1-ga} \textsc{wairo-o} \textsc{moratta koto}-ga] \textsc{Hanako-o} \textsc{kanasimaseta} \\
\textsc{self-NOM} \textsc{bribe-ACC} \textsc{received} \textsc{COMP-NOM} \textsc{Hanako-ACC} \textsc{saddened} koto]-ga \textsc{Taroo\textsubscript{1-o} nayamaseta}.
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
\textsc{COMP-NOM Taroo-ACC} \textsc{distressed}
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
‘The fact that the fact that he\textsubscript{1} had received a bribe saddened Hanako distressed Taroo\textsubscript{1}.’
\end{quote}
(58) SELF > PIVOT > zibun

\[
\begin{array}{l}
[[RC \text{Zibun}_1\text{-ga} \text{moratta}] \text{okane-o Hanako-ga tukottesimatta koto-ga} \\
\text{self-NOM received money-ACC Hanako-NOM used} \text{COMP-NOM} \\
\text{Taroo}_1\text{-o nayamasetta.} \\
\text{Taro-ACC distressed}
\end{array}
\]

‘The fact that Hanako used the money that he\textsubscript{1} had received distressed Taro\textsubscript{1}.’

The sentences in (55)-(58) contrast sharply with (49a-c) in terms of acceptability.

To sum up, Japanese logophoric binding is quite permissible but is not always unbounded; binding by a PIVOT antecedent fails in the presence of an intervening SOURCE. Let us call this particular intervention context the *supreme intervention configuration*.

(59) *Supreme Intervention Configuration*

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{PIVOT} \cdots \text{SOURCE} \cdots \text{zibun} \cdots \text{source} \cdots
\end{array}
\]

Now, given that *zibun* is maximally logophoric, and given that names in English are at the opposite end of the spectrum, it is expected that antilogophoric restrictions are suspended in the following configuration (provided that other confounding factors are appropriately controlled for).

(60)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{PIVOT} \cdots \text{SOURCE} \cdots \text{name} \cdots \text{source} \cdots
\end{array}
\]

The underlying idea here is that since the supreme intervention configuration creates a context
maximally immune to logophoric effects, such a context is expected to serve as a sanctuary for antilogophoric expressions. If putative Condition C effects disappear in the above configuration, there is good reason to believe that the observed disjoint-reference effects are attributed not to Condition C but to antilogophoricity restrictions alone because Condition C is supposed to apply irrespective of the presence or absence of an intervening SOURCE.

If we look at actual data, we see Condition C effects vanish (or significantly diminish) in the configuration above. O’Grady (2005) presents some naturally occurring examples from spoken and written discourse in which Condition C is apparently violated. Some of his examples are given below.

(61)  a. He\textsubscript{1} was shot in the arm when, police say, Sua\textsubscript{1} lunged at them.


b. President Boris Yeltsin today canceled all meetings for this week because of medical tests for his upcoming heart surgery. He\textsubscript{1} also punished a former bodyguard who said Yeltsin\textsubscript{1} was too sick to govern.


c. He\textsubscript{1} reserved special scorn for a critic who wrote that Balthus\textsubscript{1} had been deeply influenced by the art of Germany, during a youthful period spent in that country.

[‘The Balthus Enigma’ by Nicholas Weber, The New Yorker, Sept. 6, 1999, p. 36]

Casting doubt on the existence of Condition C as a grammatical principle, O’Grady argues that so-called Condition C effects are attributed to pragmatic and processing factors. Under his approach, the well-formedness of the examples cited above is attributed to the fact that the c-commanding pronoun and the relevant R-expression are separated by certain distance. To quote O’Grady:

(62)  [T]he sentences are so long that at the point where the pronoun is used, the speaker cannot anticipate the need for a nominal later in the utterance to reactivate the referent. Or, alternatively, by the time the speaker reaches the part of the
sentence where the nominal is used, he or she can no longer recall having used a pronoun earlier in the utterance. (O’Grady 2005: 53)

It is true that the absence of Condition C effects in the sentences in (61) poses a serious problem for any approach that posits Condition C as an absolute structural condition disallowing coreference between an R-expression and a c-commanding pronoun. However, the claim that Condition C effects can be traced to processing considerations is highly suspect; for it is not the case that just any kind of “long” intervening material will remove disjoint-reference effects. The following sentence, for instance, does not improve at all even though the c-commanding pronoun and its antecedent are separated by a series of intervening phrases.

(63)  *He has told me in a very sad tone that as soon as the semester began John was kicked out of school.

In my view, the key to the mysterious ameliorating effects in (61) lies in the fact that in all those examples, there is a SOURCE that intervenes between a pronoun that is understood as the PIVOT and a name that the pronoun is coreferential with. In (61a), he is understood as the PIVOT, and police acts an intervening SOURCE. In (61b), he is understood as the PIVOT, and a former bodyguard acts as an intervening SOURCE. In (61c), he is understood as the PIVOT, and a critic is an intervening SOURCE. Thus, the examples in (61) can be schematically represented in the following way.

(61a)’ [He … [ police SOURCE … [ Sua … ]]]

(61b)’ [He … [ a former bodyguard SOURCE … [ Yeltsin … ]]]

(61c)’ [He … [ a critic SOURCE … [ Balthus … ]]]
The intervention account outlined above offers a unified explanation of the otherwise unexpected acceptability of these sentences. That is, due to the presence of the intervening SOURCE, the PIVOT pronoun is hindered from searching into the logophoric domain that falls under the scope of the intervener. This is why antilogophoric effects fail to surface here.

O’Grady gives two more examples (given below).

(64)  a. Lawrence crammed for Miami as if it were a final exam: he hired a Spanish tutor, who placed new words on little note cards around Lawrence’s house...

   [‘The Herald’s Cuban Revolution’ by Mimi Swartz, The New Yorker, June 1, 1999, p. 40]

b. He’s far enough ahead that, if everything fell just right, Jarret could be the champion when the checkered flag waves at the end of the 500-kilometer, 312-lap race.


Apparently, there is no intervening SOURCE in these cases, but I argue that these examples are also compatible with the antilogophoricity account. In (64a), Lawrence is placed within a non-restrictive relative clause. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a non-restrictive phrase is essentially an inserted comment by the speaker of the utterance, which means that Lawrence is outside the logophoric domain of the pronoun he. Thus, the antilogophoricity constraint can be circumvented here. In (64b), the parenthetical if-clause intervenes between the e-commanding pronoun and Jarret. Since parentheticals are used to add the speaker’s comment or judgment on the described event, it is plausible to assume that in this sentence, the speaker is presented as a “secondary ego”, i.e., a secondary internal SOURCE. Notice that the coreferring pronoun here is the PIVOT. This suggests, then, that the acceptability of the sentence in (64b) can also be viewed as owing to intervention.

The intervention account receives further empirical support from the fact that Condition C effects disappear (or diminish) precisely in the configuration represented in (60). In other words, disjointness persists when the sentence does not match the configuration. The following sentences, for example, are reported to be unacceptable even though there is an intervening
(65) *The claim that John said that Bill was a spy was made by him.  (Kuno 2004: 332)
(66) *That John was in love with her, he claimed that Mary believed.  (Kuno 1987: 108)

In (65), the offending pronoun is the SOURCE with respect to the content of the complement clause of *claim. Similarly, in (66), the pronoun *he is understood as the SOURCE relative to the propositional complement of *claimed. In these cases, the antilogophoricity constraint comes into play, forcing an R-expression to be disjoint in reference from logocentric arguments.

These facts are quite telling because they at once vindicate the antilogophoricity hypothesis under consideration and disconfirm the relevance of Condition C to what have normally been conceived as Condition C effects. Were Condition C at work in the intervention configuration, disjoint-reference effects should persist irrespective of the presence of an intervening SOURCE.

Since a similar conclusion has already been suggested by Sells (1987b), let us now take a look at his data and analysis. Based primarily on McCray’s (1980) observations, Sells attempts to shed light on the discourse factors responsible for the “unexpected” acceptability of backward anaphora. McCray observed that Condition C effects can be mitigated under certain conditions. Some of her examples are given below.

(67) a. ?*It was pointed out to him that Walter was unsuccessful.
    b. It was rather indelicately pointed out to him that Walter would never become a successful accountant.  (McCray 1980: 331)

(68) She was told that under no circumstances would Mary have to compromise herself.  (McCray 1980: 334)

(69) It was pointed out to him that sitting directly to the right of Walter was the man he had just maligned.  (McCray 1980: 334)

Let us first examine (67a) and (67b). Sells (1987b: 14) claims that what is responsible for the
contrast between (67a) and (67b) is the fact that in the former, “the reference time in the embedded clause is the ‘current’ reference time for Walter” (p.14). By contrast, in the latter, the event described in the embedded clause is “not yet realized relative to the time of the pointing out, and thus will not be from Walter’s point of view” (pp.14-15), which, according to Sells, has the effect of drawing a discourse-role off Walter. What is more important in my view, however, is the presence of the phrase “rather indelicately” in (67b). This phrase is used here to express the speaker’s judgment on the event, which suggests that the speaker is internalized as a secondary SOURCE. Since the pronoun him in this sentence is understood as the PIVOT relative to the embedded proposition, and since the internalized SOURCE acts as an intervener, (67b) involves an environment opaque to logophoric effects. Hence the name Walter survives even though the preceding pronoun is anaphoric to it.

Let us next consider (68) and (69). Sells observes that there is a contrast between (70a-b), on the one hand, and (71a-b), on the other, and suggests that the unexpected ameliorating effect can only occur when the pronoun is a non-SOURCE argument.

(70)  a. *He₁ has heard from us that Walter₁ will be allowed to enter the Lodge.
    b. He₁ has heard from us that under no circumstances will Walter₁ be allowed to enter the Lodge.

(71)  a. *We have heard from him₁ that Walter₁ will be allowed to enter the Lodge.
    b. *We have heard from him₁ that under no circumstances will Walter₁ be allowed to enter the Lodge.

The fact that (71b) does not improve is expected under the intervention account, too, because intervention occurs only when the relevant pronoun is understood as a PIVOT. What might at first sight seem puzzling is that in (68), (69), and (70b), there are no explicit intervening SOURCES. I argue, however, that there is more than meets the eye here.

Before presenting my own analysis of these sentences, let us look at Sells’s (1987b) account. Regarding (70b), Sells claims that under no circumstances is a SOURCE-oriented phrase, so that
it “confirms us as the SOURCE in the embedded clause” (p.12). Since being a SOURCE entails being also a SELF as well as a PIVOT, “the explicit marking of the presence of a SOURCE that is distinct from the ‘target’ referent” reconfirms that “Walter cannot be understood as linked to any of the potential role-predicates” (ibid.). As for (69), Sells states that the sentence is acceptable because “[t]he specification of Walter’s location relative to the man is not taken from the sentence-internal viewpoint” (p.16).

Unlike Sells, I argue that the crucial factor for the acceptability of (68), (69), and (70b) has bearing on the fact that they involve embedded inversion. Specifically, I claim that inversion in embedded contexts also serves to internalize the current speaker as a secondary SOURCE of the report. Evidence in support of this claim comes from Green’s (1976) observation that inversion in embedded clauses is possible just in case the speaker agrees with or endorses the embedded proposition. The following contrasts convincingly illustrate this point.

(72)  
   a. John says that never before have prices been so high, and I agree.  
   b. *John says that never before have prices been so high, and I disagree/but he’s wrong.  
   (Green 1976: 386)

(73)  
   a. John says that standing in the corner is a man with a camera, and I think he’s right.  
   b. *John says that standing in the corner is a man with a camera, but he’s wrong.  
   (Green 1976: 386)

The facts shown here provide independent justification for the claim that embedded inversion introduces the current speaker as a secondary SOURCE in the discourse. This is also supported by Dorgeloh’s (1997) view that inversion in embedded contexts “makes it evident to the hearer or reader that the speaker himself, though not overtly the subject of the discourse reported, does at least not dissociate himself from the content expressed” (p.100). If so, McCray’s examples in (68) and (69) are also subsumed under the intervention account. That is, both (68) and (69) involve an implicit SOURCE that intervenes between the PIVOT pronoun and the R-expression
it is anaphoric to.\(^\text{53}\) Hence \textit{Mary} and \textit{Walter} escape antilogophoricity restrictions. In the same vein, the data in (70) and (71) receive a straightforward explanation; that is, of the four sentences in (70a-b) and (71a-b), only (70b) meets the supreme intervention configuration. All the other examples, by contrast, do not involve intervention, thereby coming under the control of the antilogophoricity constraint.

McCray also presents sentences of the following sort.

(74) \begin{itemize} 
\item a. *He\(_{1}\) didn’t give her a diamond ring because Walter\(_{1}\) isn’t ready.
\item b. He\(_{1}\) didn’t give her a diamond ring because, although he’s madly in love with her, Walter\(_{1}\)’s just not ready to tie the knot. \end{itemize} \hfill (McCray 1980: 331)

Here again, certain intervening material renders otherwise illicit backward coreference possible. The contrast is no longer puzzling, however. The crucial difference between (74a) and (74b) is that the latter contains a parenthetical adverbial. As I argued earlier, parentheticals serve to introduce the current speaker of the utterance as a secondary internal SOURCE. If so, the acceptability of (74b) comes as no surprise because the intervening SOURCE makes the domain that contains \textit{Walter} opaque to the PIVOT \textit{he}. This is why no antilogophoric effects ensue.

Summing up, we focused on those contexts where both Condition C and antilogophoricity restrictions may in principle apply, and examined whether Condition C effects persist if antilogophoric effects are suspended. We found that Condition C effects are voided when the effects of antilogophoricity restrictions are suppressed, which cannot be accounted for if we assume that Condition C and antilogophoricity restrictions apply simultaneously. What this suggests is that where the two disjointness conditions are both in principle applicable, only antilogophoricity restrictions are at work.

One might be tempted to leap to the conclusion that Condition C does not exist or that it is

\(^{53}\) Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998) analyze the subject of the verb \textit{hear} and the indirect object of \textit{tell} as falling under the category of SELF. However, they are considered to be PIVOTs if we follow Sells (1987a: 465, fn.24) and Sells (1987b: 5).
reducible to antilogophoricity restrictions. However, as we observed at the beginning of this chapter, there is good reason to believe that a disjointness condition like Condition C is necessary, independently of antilogophoricity restrictions. Recall the following examples.

(75)  a. *It is more famous than the designer of Royce Hall.
     b. Royce Hall is more famous than its designer.
     c. Its designer is more famous than Royce Hall.

(76)  a. *In 2002, they relocated it to Myers Inc.‘s current location
     b. In 2002, they relocated Myers Inc. to its current location.

(77)  a. *It was closed because a snow storm hit UCLA.
     b. Its library was closed because a snow storm hit UCLA.

Given the standard assumption that inanimate DPs do not qualify as logocentric antecedents, the fact that disjointness effects arise in these cases indicates that we need Condition C (or some disjointness condition that does essentially the same job).

To reconcile the need for Condition C (or the like) with the intervention facts we observed, it seems necessary to postulate a division of labor between antilogophoricity restrictions and Condition C in the production of so-called Condition C effects. Certainly, this requires a radical rethink of the way Condition C is computed, and the question is how the division of labor between the two conditions should be implemented. At this stage, I can only speculate that there is an independent principle such that if the two disjointness conditions are both in principle applicable, antilogophoricity restrictions must be invoked. Further investigation is required to address this issue.

4.5 Summary

In this chapter, we closely reexamined what we normally regard as Condition C violations, with a view to confirming whether their ungrammaticality stems from Condition C or
antilogophoricity restrictions. Close inspection revealed that so-called Condition C effects can be Voided precisely in those contexts where logophoric binding in Japanese is preempted by intervention.

The findings reported here make a striking case for the hypothesis that names are maximally antilogophoric, while at the same time suggesting that in at least some and possibly many cases, Condition C is not responsible for what we call Condition C effects.

Although Condition C and antilogophoricity restrictions are presumably independent constraints on coreference, the two disjointness conditions complement each other to give rise to disjoint-reference effects.
Chapter 5  Conclusion

Through the two case studies presented in this dissertation, I have uncovered some of the core properties of antilogophoricity in natural language, and, by so doing, have delineated the sources of certain disjoint-reference phenomena that have not been properly investigated.

Below I summarize the major findings of the present study. First, I have shown that just as logophoricity comes in different types, antilogophoricity comes in different types, confirming Sells’s (1987b) and Dubinsky and Hamilton’s (1998) hypotheses from a new perspective. Specifically, names and epithets exhibit different degrees of antilogophoricity, which can be characterized as follows.

(1)  Types of Antilogophoricity
    a. Names are maximally antilogophoric in the sense that they must be disjoint in reference from all potential logocentric antecedents (SOURCE, SELF, and PIVOT).
    b. Epithets are moderately antilogophoric in the sense that they must be disjoint in reference from a subset of logocentric antecedents (SOURCE and SELF).

Second, I have shown that there are two ways to escape antilogophoric effects.
Antilogophoric restrictions can be circumvented by:

(a) placing an antilogophor in an appositive phrase, or

(b) placing an antilogophor in intervention contexts.

I have also shown that the apposition strategy in (2a) is hard to detect if the language being investigated has the option of adjoining an appositive phrase to a null pronominal. As for the intervention strategy in (2b), I have unveiled the existence of a (to my knowledge) previously undocumented type of intervention by capitalizing on maximally logophoric pronouns. The intervention configuration discovered is schematically represented as follows.

(3) Supreme Intervention Configuration

In the above configuration, the intervening SOURCE renders its logophoric domain opaque to the remote PIVOT, thereby voiding otherwise expected antilogophoric effects.

Third, I have shown that antilogophoricity and Binding Conditions conspire to obscure the sources of disjointness. As previously reported in the literature, epithets are subject to a type of antilogophoricity restriction and Binding Condition B, whose combined forces give the false impression that they obey Condition C. I have shown that this conspiracy is further obscured in a language like Japanese, where a null pronoun can be juxtaposed with an appositive epithet phrase.

As for names, we first observed that antilogophoricity restrictions and Condition C are independently motivated. Then, with a view to clarifying the scope of each condition, we looked into those cases where both Condition C and antilogophoricity restrictions may in principle
The picture that has emerged from the results of the present study is far from what one would normally envision. I have presented evidence suggesting the possibility that there is a division of labor between the two disjointness conditions, although they are presumably independent constraints on coreference.
The findings of the present study indicate that the domain of Condition C must be smaller than standardly assumed. This conclusion itself raises perplexing questions. If the disjointness conditions actually operate in a way suggested here, the question that immediately arises as to how this knowledge, which does not seem inductively inferable from experience, can be acquired. I have suggested that there seems to be an independent principle such that if the two disjointness conditions are both in principle applicable, antilogophoricity restrictions must be invoked. But the question remains — why should there be such a principle?

I would not dare to claim that this dissertation has unlocked all the mysteries of disjointness phenomena. Evidently, there are loose ends that need to be tied up, and, aside from the question raised above, there are intriguing questions that have arisen. Some of the remaining issues and open questions that are of particular importance are as follows.

(6)  a. Why are epithets and names antilogophoric?
    b. Why are there different kinds of (anti)logophoricity? And how many kinds are there?
    c. How many kinds of intervention effects are there? Why should intervention effects exist?

Question (6a) is directly related to the fundamental question of why antilogophoricity should exist in natural language. It seems plausible to speculate that the antilogophoric nature of epithets is tied to the fact that they carry evaluative meanings, but then the question arises as to why names are also antilogophoric. As for (6b), it is worthwhile to investigate whether there is crosslinguistic variation in antilogophoricity. Likewise, it is also worth examining whether all types of R-expressions (including definite descriptions and demonstratives) are equally antilogophoric. As for (6c), it has been reported that exempt anaphors exhibit intervention effects of the kind different from what we saw. In Pollard and Sag (1992), intervention effects are viewed as processing-related phenomena, but whether (all) intervention effects are actually reduced to processing-based factors is still an open question. I leave all these questions for future
While there is still a long way to go, it is hoped that this dissertation contributes to the task of unraveling the tangled skein of factors behind the formidable variety of anaphoric patterns in natural languages.
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