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Debating Death: Discourse and Legitimacy in the Northern Irish victims’ rights movement

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Anthropology

by

Francis Candler Hallman

Committee in charge:

Professor John Haviland, Chair
Professor Edwin Hutchins
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2014
The Dissertation of Francis Candler Hallman is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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Chair

University of California, San Diego
2014
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VITA

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Debating Death: Discourse and Legitimacy in the Northern Irish victims’ rights movement

by

Francis Candler Hallman

Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology

University of California, San Diego, 2014

Professor John Haviland, Chair

In the wake of nearly forty years of armed conflict, the Northern Irish Assembly announced the Victims’ and Survivors’ Order of 2006. This order categorized all victims, civilian and paramilitary members, as beneficiaries of compensatory schemes and social services developed to assist victims of political violence. The order sparked a
debate about the Northern Irish Troubles and the morality of terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts. The debate also attracted significant international attention as victims’ advocates from foreign countries, particularly Israel-Palestine, traveled to Ireland to discuss the politics of victimhood. This dissertation argues that Irish and foreign activists use spatiotemporal emplotment devices—or “chronotopes” (Bakhtin 1981)—to produce competing visions of victimhood in the province. Peace workers, aiming to create social services for victims of political violence, use chronotopes to problematize and suggest solutions for what has been termed the “Long Peace”, a period of sustained debate about transitional justice. This work contributes to the recent analysis of chronotopes in talk-in-interaction, as well as anthropological studies on the circulation of human rights and War on Terrorism discourses.


*Introduction: The Long War and the Long Peace*

In January 2009, The Consultative Group for the Past released its findings to the Northern Irish public. The Group was a consultant body set up by the Secretary of State to converse with the private citizens and civil bodies on what policies should be implemented to help, to use a common metaphor in Northern Irish political discourse, "heal the wounds" incurred by a civil conflict that raged in Northern Ireland from 1969 until 1998. I stood with members of a unionist victims’ rights organization, which I will refer to as CARE, who were protesting outside of the location of the release, the Europa Hotel in central Belfast. CARE consists of former security personnel (British Army and Royal Ulster Constabulary) and the family members of killed security personnel. Enraged by a provision of the report that suggested an *ex gratia* payment to all individuals wounded or bereaved during the conflict, they held posters reading, “No to Blood Money.” The *ex gratia* payment amounted to a moral equivocation between their loved ones, who served in the security forces of the United Kingdom, and republican paramilitary members, who fought to unify the Irish island under a socialist republic. As the time for the meeting grew closer, the CARE protesters disappeared into the building, presumably to attend the meeting and ask questions of the Consultative Group. The report presentation occurred in the ballroom of the hotel with the Group members sitting on a stage in front of the audience, which included representatives of various victims' groups, politicians, and members of the media. Just before the Consultative Group entered, the CARE activists took over the stage, shouting loudly at the audience. They then entered the audience and berated prominent Irish republicans in front of the media, including the President of the leading Irish republican party, Gerry Adams.
The *Dealing with the Past Report* was only the latest event that angered unionist victims’ advocates in the years since the Belfast Agreement of 1998, the first in a series of treaty agreements that would build a relatively stable government and peaceful political climate in the province. Unionist victims’ rights groups—or what one activist described as “pro-state” victims’ rights groups—felt betrayed by government actions they deemed to be preferential to Irish republicans. The Agreement recognized the right of Sinn Fein to participate in government. As the political wing of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, CARE activists believed that this allowed “terrorists” to rule their victims. Worse, from their point of view, the Agreement sought to equalize victims of political violence, a dead Provisional IRA member was as much a “victim” as a Protestant civilian. They also objected to the reconciliatory institutions created by the Belfast and other agreements, such as the establishment of a cross-community Victims’ Commission and amnesty granted to paramilitaries.

During my research stay, I also worked with republican victims’ rights organizations, who advocated for their relatives killed by the state. They were satisfied with the findings of the Consultative Group on the Past. This paralleled their general acceptance of many of the aspirations, if not the practical achievements, of the public policy aimed at helping victims. For republicans, paramilitary combatants were not debased and immoral individuals, as the unionist view would have it, but victims of structural oppression. One bereaved person broke into tears at what she called a hurtful display by the unionist advocates at the Dealing with the Past Report release. To claim her husband, a Provisional IRA member, was not a victim of British oppression was to
strip him of his political and social identity; it cast him not as a defender of his Catholic community but as an unsavory murderer.

This dissertation studies how victims’ advocates create different identities and authorize political action through discourse. I show how advocates linguistically contest the political and social category of “victim” and vie for its socio-political capital. For a bereaved or wounded person to identify as a victim, and to have that status recognized politically, grants moral validity to their demands for compensation and justice. In the early stages of research, I focused exclusively on person reference in talk. I was interested in how interlocutors and speechwriters refer to and categorize friends, enemies, and bystanders in their narratives of rights abuse and resistance. It became apparent, however, that the categories used to refer to different individuals and groups were embedded in narrative worlds. Past actions were described in different settings and these settings were linked to one another in different ways. The analysis shifted to include the narrative worlds within which categories of personhood were animated. Activists based their representations of personhood, as well as their rights demands, on different spatiotemporal representations of the Northern Irish conflict. For some unionist advocates, the conflict had not yet ended and the specter of victimization still threatened them. For many republican advocates, peace had been achieved, and thus the pursuit of justice would not threaten the new democratic Northern Ireland. Still further, for many advocates, the conflict in Northern Ireland was part of a larger conflict of opposing moralities; indeed, the Northern Irish insurgency was both a precursor and part of the "Global War on Terror."
This dissertation argues that a primary means for contesting the category of victim is in the construction of “chronotopes” (Bakhtin 1981), the spatiotemporal alignment of events in narrative. Representations of time, place, and person reinforce the sense of textual coherence of narratives and lend political demands the appearance of necessity, such as the demand for criminal prosecution or “truth-telling” mechanisms. Studying chronotopes shows how narratives of victimization take on persuasive power in public debates over post-conflict reconciliation and democratic transformation. This analysis also has practical implications, as it shows how narratives authorize and constrain political action.

**The Long War**

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Ireland was part of the British Empire, and was considered by many in the British government to be the most volatile colony due to a constant series of conflicts and rebellions beginning in the 1600’s. Norman colonization of the Irish mainland began a few decades after William the Conqueror took power in England in 1066. Following a plantation period, instituted by Queen Elizabeth I, the socio-economic structure of Ireland consisted of a landed Irish Catholic peasantry controlled by Protestant landowners, many of whom emigrated from Scotland. It was not until the mid-seventeenth century, however, that the English moved beyond what is commonly referred to as the Pale, the eastern coast of Ireland running from present day Dublin to Belfast. The motivation for further incursion was an attempt, led by Oliver Cromwell during the English Civil War, to defeat the English Royalists who went to Ireland to build alliances with the powerful Irish clan leaders. Constant warfare and the
impoverished status of Irish Catholics fomented a long series of rebellions and class-warfare on the island.

In 1798, a small group of Irish Nationalists led by Wolfe Tone, rebelled against British colonial rule. This insurgency lacked organization, manpower, and munitions, and was defeated easily by the formidable British Army. During the Irish famine in the mid-nineteenth century, the risk of revolution increased as bands of desperate and starving Irishmen formed paramilitary groups to protect peasants from eviction. To combat this threat, Protestant landowners encouraged the formation of their own paramilitaries (often referred to as “brotherhoods”) to combat the Irish Catholic threat. These local power struggles never developed into widespread rebellion against British rule, but in the midst of World War I, a small group of Irish nationalists launched a revolutionary effort that would eventually lead to war with the British (McCartney 2001).

On Easter Day 1916, a small band of nationalist revolutionaries took over the General Post Office building in central Dublin and proclaimed the creation of an Irish Republic. The nationalist leaders wrote a constitution and declared themselves the army of this Irish Republic, or the “Irish Republican Army”. Several days of bloody fighting ensued as the British army attempted to wrest control of the General Post Office and several other government buildings from the insurgents. When the revolutionaries surrendered several days later, the city-center of Dublin was in ruins. The thirteen leaders of the revolution were taken to Kilmainham Jail in Dublin where they were tried and summarily executed by firing squad. Public opinion that had been at best ambivalent towards the revolution began to favor Irish independence, and the executions of the rebel
leaders sparked resentment against heavy-handed British rule in Ireland. Within four years, an organized and widespread armed rebellion against the British presence in Ireland ensued, orchestrated by a better-equipped and well-organized Irish Republican Army (McCartney 2001).

After three years of fighting, the IRA emissary Michael Collins signed the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 in London. The treaty, however, only granted Ireland the status of a “free state,” defined as a largely autonomous province still under the rule of Great Britain. This Irish Free State would exclude the nine counties of the North, which were inhabited by Protestants and a large Catholic minority. The Anglo-Irish Treaty was unacceptable to many of those IRA members who fought against the British. Civil war soon tore apart the island as the newly formed political party Fianna Fail demanded that all of Ireland be freed from British rule with immediate effect. Despite the assassination of Michael Collins, the pro-government forces prevailed in 1922; in 1949, the Irish parliament and the British government agreed that a new and independent Irish Republic would form out of the former province (McCartney 2001). At this point, violence in the Republic largely subsided, and Irish nationalists now took up arms to drive the British out of the Northern Irish counties.

For the next forty years, violence in the North remained localized and limited to IRA attacks on the border with the Republic. In 1966, Northern Ireland was in a state of relative military and political calm, and the IRA operation against government officials and British Army outposts from 1956-1962 (referred to as the Border War) had ended, and the IRA was in decline (Whyte 2001: 289). In 1965, the Irish Prime Minister Sean
Lemass visited the government center in Belfast—usually referred to as Stormont—in an act of reconciliation between the Republic and the North. Nevertheless, there remained a significant disparity in economic wealth between Protestants and Catholics in the North, and there was significant discrimination against Catholics in the major cities. Further, the Stormont government appeared apathetic to legislation for equal treatment of Catholics and Protestants. In 1967, the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association (NICRA) organized major protests and rallies against the discriminatory policies of Stormont. Unlike previous organizations, NICRA was not nationalist in its official aims, and was dedicated to the change of the Northern Irish state, not its integration into the southern Republic of Ireland (Whyte 2001: 289).

The Protestant right wing, lead by the Reverend Ian Paisley, and the primarily Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary, saw these demonstrations as an attempt to undermine Protestant power rule in the province, and abolish the Stormont government (Whyte 2001: 289). Portions of the Protestant right wing began to form into paramilitaries, who broke up some of the NICRA protests. There is some suggestion that factions within the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) assisted the rise of these Protestant paramilitaries (Sluka 2000). Parallel to the development of these Protestant paramilitaries, a new instantiation of the Irish Republican Army—the Provisionals (PIRA)—arose after a split between those republicans who wanted to pursue political means of unification and those that wanted to reignite the armed rebellion. The other main faction, the Marxist Official IRA, would pursue politics in the Republic and to a lesser degree in the North beginning in 1972. Armed conflicts erupted between the
Provisional IRA, the police, and the early forms of the loyalist paramilitaries the Ulster Defense Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force.

By 1969, the Stormont government called for assistance from the British military, as the well-armed and organized PIRA overwhelmed the RUC. The PIRA bombed military and civilian targets in Northern Ireland and England. During this period, republican and loyalist paramilitaries began to evict minority residents of Catholic and Protestant enclaves. This ethnic cleansing resulted in the creation of ghettos in Belfast and Londonderry. Violence escalated throughout the 1970’s as PIRA members, loyalist paramilitary members, and the security forces engaged in open gun battles on the streets of Belfast and the counties of South Armagh and Tyrone. The PIRA bombed military installations, and attacked RUC police officers. The British military, which Catholics once hailed as their protector, was deemed the enemy, particularly after civilian deaths during a NICRA march through Derry in 1972, otherwise known as “Bloody Sunday.”

Violence continued until 1994, when the British and Irish governments announced the Downing Street Declaration. The Declaration proclaimed, among other things, that the British government had no economic or political interest in the province, and that democratic means should determine the establishment of a united Ireland. The Declaration encouraged Sinn Fein—the political wing of the PIRA—to engage in further talks with the British government. These talks continued through the early-to-mid 1990’s, facilitated by the Clinton administration. The PIRA announced a ceasefire in April 1994 that would last approximately eighteen months. Despite this return to violence, Sinn Fein re-entered talks with the British government. George Mitchell,
Clinton’s Special Envoy to Northern Ireland, developed a plan for simultaneous
decommissioning of arms and talks between the major nationalist and unionist political
parties. Private talks between Sinn Fein and the largest Nationalist party in Northern
Ireland, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, resulted in Adams’ call for the PIRA to
renew the ceasefire in 1997. The ceasefire allowed Sinn Fein to enter into peace talks at
Stormont.

Talks between unionist and nationalist parties resumed under the supervision of
Mitchell and culminated in a draft of the Belfast Agreement, which the populations of the
Republic and Northern Ireland ratified. This document ushered in a period often termed
the “Long Peace”, as the peace process stalled and restarted a number of times
throughout the 2000’s.

**The Long Peace**

In the opening preamble, the Belfast Agreement established a new Northern Irish
government that:

> with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of
> their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full
> respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of
> freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and
> of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both
> communities (Belfast Agreement 1998: Section 1V).

The legislature consists of political parties elected under the Parliamentary
system, but special votes—those cast under the dispensation of “Special
Consideration”—would require a majority of both nationalist and unionist representatives
to ratify them. Legislation proposed under Special Consideration relates to issues
regarding the conflict, sectarianism, and political demonstration. A First Minister and
Deputy First Minister from unionist and nationalist communities share power in the Executive (percentage membership in the Assembly determines which party will occupy these roles). The Agreement also created a Human Rights Commission, which reviews and advises on human rights law in the province and a Police Ombudsman that acts as an independent investigator of the newly formed Police Service of Northern Ireland.

The Northern Irish Assembly was officially established in 1999, but lasted only two months before unionist parties walked out in protest of the PIRA’s lack of arms decommissioning. Gradually, the PIRA started decommissioning and curtailed continuing paramilitary activity. Decommissioning lead to further negotiations in 2005, this resulted in the St. Andrew’s Agreement. In the buildup to the St. Andrew’s Agreement, the PIRA announced in unequivocal terms that the “armed struggle” was over. The declaration read, “All IRA units have been ordered to dump arms”. All Volunteers have been instructed to assist the development of purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means” (Irish Republican Army Bureau, 2005).

The Ulster Unionist Party, which had been the primary unionist negotiator for the Belfast Agreement, had been voted out of power in favor of the Democratic Unionist Party, which was chaired by the virulently anti-agreement Ian Paisley. In negotiating the St. Andrew’s Agreement, however, Paisley agreed to endorse the peace process and allow the restoration of the Northern Irish Assembly. As a result, Paisley became First Minister of Northern Ireland with former IRA commander and now MLP Martin McGuinness standing as Deputy First Minister. Sinn Fein also declared support for the
Police Service of Northern Ireland, asking its constituency to report all criminal activity to the state police. This ushered in a period of high stability, and what many pundits, politicians, and academics refer to as the relative success of the peacemaking project in Northern Ireland. Despite this relative peace, political and human rights activists argued over how to deal with outstanding judicial issues and sought to develop policy for an increasingly vocal victims’ lobby.

*Transitional justice and the centralization of peacemaking institutions in Northern Ireland*

The Belfast Accords did not implement a plan for dealing with past political crimes, nor did it create a policy to assist victims of political violence. The result is a two-tier system in which the state judicial system attempts to prosecute outstanding and historical crimes. Community organizations—regulated and funded by the state—try to develop restorative mechanisms. This two-tier approach to transitional justice in Northern Ireland reflects a wider tension in human rights discourse about justice and victimhood since the Cold War, which questions whether retributive, restorative, or hybrid models of transitional justice are most effective.

Transitional justice is a broad term that refers to any combination of judicial and non-judicial measures aimed at dealing with the legacy of armed conflict and human rights abuse. The measures may include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations, and institutional reforms (“Transitional Justice”, ICTJ). Before the Cold War, liberal notions of justice informed human rights that focused on the culpability of individuals, and sought to prosecute as many individuals as possible. Activists before
the Cold War showed a great interest in not only the direct perpetrators of actions, but also the beneficiaries of violence: businesses, states, and organizations that profited from violence (Meister 2011). This kind of justice is “retributive justice”, which hinges on applying punitive damages to perpetrators and beneficiaries. Retributive justice is organized around the principle of *Lex talonis*, or an equal punishment for a wrongdoing (Mika and Zehr 2005). Liberal justice systems work with this model as the state meters out punishment against an offender proportional, in theory at least, to the crime committed. Scholars refer to this model as the “Nuremburg Model” after the trials of Nazi leaders in the wake of World War II (Hirsch 2009). Critics of liberal justice describe this as “victor’s justice”: the victor in a conflict decides what kinds of laws are violated and punishes offenders accordingly. This kind of justice results in fines, imprisonment, national-level sanctions, and in some cases, the death penalty.

Increasingly, the use of punitive punishments has been delegated to supra-national bodies, such as the International Criminal Court at The Hague, that measure actions against human rights conventions.

The exclusive use of retribution shifted to hybrid models after the Cold War, which include both retributive and restorative mechanisms. While the Nuremburg Model worked in the context of World War II—after the Allies decimated the military and economic infrastructures of the Axis countries—many activists feared that a focus on retribution would upset the often-delicate peace deals that ended intra-state violence in the Balkans, South Africa, and Northern Ireland. This led to an advocacy for “restorative justice”. Restorative justice is a model of criminal justice that seeks to engage the victim, the wrongdoer, and the affected community in repairing the harm caused by a crime.
Restorative justice has evolved into a global social movement focused on building long-lasting peace in communities torn apart by violence. It aims to shift the control of criminal or violent actions away from the retributive mechanisms of state judicial systems to the community, thus enabling the victim to participate in the judicial process, the offender to reconcile the offence, and the community to manage criminal or violent actions instead of, or in addition to, the state. Returning this aggregate of individuals to a supposed pre-violence state is achieved by bringing offenders into voluntary dialogue with victims (Mika and Zehr 2003). Restorative justice mediation programs have been implemented throughout the world in recent decades by minority and indigenous groups in an effort to gain some control over their communities to protect themselves from state judicial systems they typically consider unfairly biased (Christie 1977, Dickson-Gilmore and La Prairie 2005). Officials and community workers in post conflict settings use the theory to “heal” national communities damaged by political conflict. In Northern Ireland, politicians and community workers argue over whether transitional justice mechanisms—truth commissions and judicial processes aimed at resolving past political crime and conflict—should be a restorative, retributive, or a hybrid model.

The British state has established a number of mechanisms for dealing with justice issues, such as *ad hoc* inquiries, the Historical Inquiries Team (HET), and the Police Ombudsman. The government has launched several inquiries or tribunals into individual acts of violence, such as the events of "Bloody Sunday" and the killing of the solicitor Rosemary Nelson. These tribunals are aimed at uncovering the perpetrators of events, but their legal implications are murky. The Inquiries Act of 2005, passed by the British Parliament, has created the confusion over the role of tribunals. This Act replaced the
Tribunals of Inquiry Act of 1921, which gave special tribunals all the powers of the High Court, meaning that criminal prosecutions could result from the proceedings. The Inquiries Act of 2005 defanged the 1921 act, suggesting public inquiries be aimed at giving "recommendations" on outstanding crimes. To date, no criminal prosecutions have resulted from inquiries in Northern Ireland. Other than these tribunals, the British government has established institutions under supervision of the Northern Irish Assembly and Executive that affect victims of political violence. In 2005, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland established the Historical Enquiries Team (HET) under the authority of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The HET pursues outstanding crimes with the ultimate goal of prosecuting offenders. Prosecutions are extremely rare, however, and the HET functions mainly as a liaison with family members of the dead in an effort to uncover the facts about the past (Boyd and Doyle 2006). State institutions are thus set up to target perpetrators of past crime. Many policy makers, politicians, and community workers argued that restorative methods could be effective as a means for dealing with past conflict. As a result, the state, the European Union, the United States, and private donors, supported civil groups engaged in reconciliation programs as the Troubles ended. Gradually, the state exerted financial and regulatory control over these small “peace and reconciliation” community organizations.

Since the early 1990's, civil society organizations attempted to assist the needs and political demands of victims of political violence, as well as deal with the many complicated socio-political issues created by the conflict such as: ethno-nationalist discrimination and segregation, high unemployment, the reintegration of former prisoners, and youth violence. Organizations within the civil society that work towards
social integration and conflict resolution, which I will refer to as peacemaking organizations, are highly cooperative with the European Union and the British and Irish governments (Ganiel 2009). The regulation of peacemaking in the Long Peace changed after the European Union and British altered how funds are allocated to peacemaking groups.

In 1995, the EU created a funding program, PEACE I, which gave grants to local peacemaking organizations until 1999. These funds were granted to peacemakers for work that would assist in the peace process, broadly defined (Acheson and Milovsky 2005). Cochrane and Dunn (2002) credit these organizations sponsored by PEACE I funds with significant advances in the peace process. PEACE I was developed by officials in the European Commission, and dispensed directly to District Partnerships controlled by the local organization leaders. Under the PEACE I program, the District Partnerships discovered groups with potential, dispensed funds, and assisted their efforts. Local representatives controlled at least half of the committees in these Partnerships. This led to several highly effective and coordinated campaigns, such as the push to get the Belfast Agreement ratified. These groups also focused on social inclusion practices, aimed at integrating former paramilitaries into their local communities. They worked independently from state regulation.

The second funding program, PEACE II, redefined the District Partnerships and placed them largely in governmental and business control. Whereas the previous peacemaking organizations were able to pursue relatively independent community service agendas, they now were consigned to government-sanctioned tasks. These tasks
were not aimed directly at social inclusion, but saw such inclusion as the by-product of “regeneration and development” strategies (Acheson and Milofsky 2007: 75). Efforts were made to fund groups that would help people build marketable skills and encourage British, Irish, and foreign investment in the country. A corollary to this business-oriented program was a focus on the institutional bases of peace building, particularly dealing with the grievances of those victimized by the Troubles.

In order to manage these community organizations, the British government gave an existing NGO oversight powers. In the late 1980’s, the British government established several working groups to develop overarching NGOs that would funnel funding to grassroots groups and generally set and synchronize the peace building agenda. One such working group, the Advisory Committee for Human Rights, set up the Community Relations Council (CRC) in 1990 (CRC, “About Us”). This organization—an independent group with the overarching goal of encouraging better relations between Catholic and Protestants in Northern Ireland—became a gatekeeper organization in the province that distributes most of the funding since PEACE II. Because of this institutional coordination, the efforts in the civil sphere shifted from autonomous civil organizations to a coordinated effort that pursues cross-community cooperation in accordance with the restorative justice and reconciliatory policies of such groups as the CRC (see Chapter 4 for details of the programs instituted by the CRC).

**The victims’ rights debate**

The centralization of peacemaking work occurred at the same time that a debate over the definition of victimhood was brewing in the Northern Irish Assembly. The
victims’ rights debate of the late 2000’s is a disagreement over to what degree retributive or restorative mechanisms should be used to deal with past political crimes. Community peace workers, working under the stewardship of the CRC, wish to implement restorative mechanisms. Partisan activists wish to see the state and supra-state organizations, such as the European Court of Human Rights, prosecute offenders. It is a clash of different ideals of justice: formed both by local experience and political philosophies, and in reaction to the recent institutional focus on victims as subjects of state intervention.

The wounded and bereaved formed victims’ organizations in the late 1990’s, and took advantage of PEACE II funding. The groups recruited their membership from bereaved and wounded who share a common political identity and perspective on the peace process. As we will see in Chapter 2, CARE formed in resistance to the peace process, and especially the granting of amnesty to paramilitary members under the Good Friday Agreement. Groups such as Relatives for Justice—a republican rights organization—had been in operation since the early 1990’s, but more funding allowed them to increase membership and public campaigns. This public advocacy increased as the Assembly debated the Victims and Survivors Order of 2006, which institutionalized a definition of victimhood. The CRC mediates between the state—which now controls funding and policy agendas—and the victims’ groups. The Order created further controversy rather than fostering agreement between victims of state and non-state violence (Acheson and Milovsky 2007: 75).
The Victims and Survivors' Order gives all objects of violence equal acknowledgement under the law, no matter their institutional or ethnic background. The 2006 Order stipulates that a victim be defined as:

(a) someone who is or has been physically or psychologically injured as a result of or in consequence of a conflict-related incident;
(b) someone who provides a substantial amount of care on a regular basis for an individual mentioned in paragraph (a); or
(c) someone who has been bereaved as a result of or in consequence of a conflict-related incident.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), an individual may be psychologically injured as a result of or in consequence of
(a) witnessing a conflict-related incident; or
(b) providing medical or other emergency assistance to an individual in connection with a conflict-related incident (Statutory Instrument 2006 No. 2593 N.I. 17, section 3).

The Order creates a new political category, the “victim of the conflict”. It classifies victims as deserving special rights that would be legislated later, and standardizes the definition of victimhood in order to create state-sponsored mechanisms, such as the Victims and Survivors Commission, to delegate those rights. This definition of victimhood has caused consternation among many victims' advocates, but predominantly among unionist victims' groups. They do not reject the institutionalization of a definition of victimhood; instead, they reject the equalization of state and non-state combatants. These activists argue that loyalty to the past Stormont state should be the metric for inclusion within the victim category. The phrase, "someone who has been bereaved as a result of or in consequence of a conflict-related incident” (ibid, section 3.2.C), could, as unionist victims' advocates point out, equally apply to a PIRA bomber as well as the victims of a bombing attack. Some complaints about the definition have
arisen from republicans, who often perceive members of the British Army or the Royal Ulster Constabulary as less victims than agents of the oppressive British state in Ireland.

The Victims’ and Survivors’ Order, and the centralizing institutions created under PEACE II, made it necessary to coordinate between victims’ rights groups in order to reach a consensus on policy for victims. The CRC has sought to align these groups by emphasizing restorative justice practices, such as victim story-telling research projects, and compensatory schemes. These objectives clash with the demands of partisan victims’ rights groups, who dispute the Victims and Survivors’ Order, demand to know who killed their loved ones, and demand to know what role state and non-state actors played in those killings. Peace activists with the CRC and other organizations cast themselves as the impartial arbiters of this victims’ rights debate; they bring transnational theories of restorative justice to assist victims. These activists work within a framework that sees their own efforts as bridging ethno-nationalist difference in the province and contributing to the formation of a liberal democratic state in which democratic belonging encourages cooperation between the formerly antagonistic ethnic factions.

The victims’ rights debate attracted the attention of transnational human rights advocates as well. Human rights advocates from Palestine, Israel, South Africa, Spain, and the United States went to Northern Ireland to compare their experiences and definitions of victimhood. For example, a South African reverend gave a speech on the benefits of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission to peacemakers during a CRC sponsored conference in 2009. Israeli and Palestinian activists spoke at peacemaking or partisan conferences depending upon their political perspectives. These foreign activists
play a role in challenging and validating the claims of republican, unionist, and peace activists. The victims’ rights debate in Northern Ireland became as much a discussion about the domestic construction victimhood as it is about transnational norms for dealing with those affected by political violence, and the perpetrators who act on them.

The following is a linguistic ethnography of the Long Peace in Northern Ireland, focusing on the victims’ rights debate that raged between the creation of the Victims’ and Survivor’s Order in 2006, and the release of the Consultative Group for the Past Report in 2009. It also examines discourse from 2010, as activists continued to argue over the validity of the Report’s recommendations. Using Bakhtin's (1981) theory of the "chronotope", I argue that peace, republican, unionist, and foreign activists use different chronotopes, and representations of the person, to define victimhood and authorize different judicial mechanisms. Different chronotopes legitimate demands by making particular representations of temporal progression and character development appear coherent, logical, and undeniable. This analysis also shows how local chronotopes align with transnational debates and how they are affected by transnational discourse on rights, terrorism, and transitional justice.
Chapter 1: Chronotopes in victims’ rights discourse

This chapter defines the terms of analysis, specifically the central concept of the chronotope, and describes the chronotopes used by republican, unionist, peace, and transnational activists in Northern Ireland. I argue that chronotopes encourage certain representations of personhood, which legitimate calls for the implementation of different types of transitional justice. These chronotopes are products of the interaction between transnational discourses of restorative justice, liberal human rights discourse, debates on the “War on Terror”, and local conceptualizations of ethnic identity.

Scholars use the chronotope as a unit of analysis in literature, media, and cultural studies (Todorov 1984, Channan 2000). Recently, linguistic anthropologists use the term to identify the relationships between time and space in written and oral discourse. The Russian literary theorist, Mikhail Bakhtin (1981) introduced the term “chronotope”. He borrows the term from Einstein’s theory of relativity to indicate the interconnectedness of time and space in different genres of literature. It is the way in which “time, as it were thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsible to the movements of time, plot, and history” (Bakhtin 1981: 84). Holquist and Emerson (1981) describe it as:

A unit of analysis for studying texts according to the ratio and nature of the temporal and spatial categories represented. The distinctiveness of this concept as opposed to most other uses of time and space in literary analysis lies in the fact that neither category is privileged; they are utterly interdependent (Holquist and Emerson 1981: 426).
Chronotopes define genres. For example, in the ancient Greek romance genre, travel between regions in the story is unelaborated and signaled by simple terms such as “pursuit” or “abduction” (Bakhtin 1981: 99). Geographical space drives the challenges undergone by the protagonists, “... size and diversity is utterly abstract. For a shipwreck one must have a sea, but which particular sea (in the geographical and historical sense) makes no difference at all” (Bakhtin 1981:100). The journey of protagonists from one region to another, the “itinerary”, organizes the temporal succession of the genre (Bakhtin 1981: 104), which is in this case characterized by the appearance of characters in different Greek city-states, without reference to the time span needed to travel to each place. One can contrast this with other genres, in which the temporal succession organizes changes in characters’ psyches. The temporal and spatial characteristics encourage particular ways of portraying characters in the novel. In the Greek romance genre, “...an individual can be nothing other than completely passive, completely unchanging...to such an individual things can merely happen...he is merely the physical subject of the action” (Bakhtin 1981: 105, original emphasis). This is a result of the lack of biographical time in the genre, as the characters move across space without any changes in personal development. Linguistic anthropologists use the chronotope to define written and spoken genres, as well as an analytical heuristic for studying the relationship between time and space in talk.

Representations of space and time grant insight into the moral and political perspectives of authors and speakers. Anthropologists use Bakhtin’s concept to show the relationships between time and space in Russian drama (Lemon 2009), travel writing on Papua New Guinea (Stasch 2011), Tibetan narratives of emigration (Lempert 2007),
ethnographic interviewing (Perrino 2010), and narratives of sociolinguistic identity (Woolard 2012). They use different definitions for the term “chronotope”, but they share a general analytic interest in the representation of movement through time, across space, and the effect of spatiotemporal representations on character development. Lempert (2007) and Perrino (2010) use the term exclusively to describe the relationship between the narrating event—the time of speaking—and the narrated events—the events described in a sequence of talk-in-interaction. The roles of speakers and listeners result from this relationship. Stasch (2011), Woolard (2012), and Lemon (2009) use the term to describe the thematic connections between different events within narratives, as well as how these thematic connections affect character development.

My definition is a synthesis of Stash’s (2011) and Woolard’s (2012) use of the term. Stasch defines the chronotope as a “scale of spatial and temporal horizons within which some events are understood as meaningfully occurring. It is also a set of understandings about how space and time are ordered” (2011: 3). Stasch studies how travel writers describe their movement from the West to visit the Korowai people of Papua New Guinea, which they describe as movement across space and through time, as the Korowai represent a primitive past. This mythic chronotope is a “constant background” in travel narratives, evidenced by a series of contrastive adjectives and nouns that refer to different periods of technological and cultural “advancement” (Stasch 2011: 6). It situates Western civilization as a more temporally advanced version of the “primitive” Korowai. The Korowai are “people who know little or nothing of modern civilization” or “primitive gatherers” (Stasch 2011: 6). These “primitives” contrast with the Western visitors who begin their narrations under such bylines as “Post Expedition—
11 am—Civilization” (Stasch 2011: 6). The “explorers” not only journey across physical space, but as they move from the West to Papua New Guinea, they travel back through time as well. In the Northern Irish victims’ rights debate, speakers link past victimization events with one another depending upon their political ideology and goals. These events are linked using models of history—how society has progressed from some previous state to a potential future—and/or by equating the kinds of people that act as the victims, perpetrators, and bystanders in these narratives of rights abuse. Like the primitivist vision of travel narratives, these chronotopes are always in the background, and influence how people talk about the transition from conflict to peace and who should be subject to different forms of transitional justice.

I analyze how chronotopes affect the development of victims, perpetrators, and categories of ethnic and political membership. Focusing on how chronotopes affect the construction of *dramatis personae*—the characters in a drama or narrative—Woolard (2012) shows how three Castilians create narratives about their acquisition of Catalan in Barcelona. Some of the Castilians use autobiographical and cosmopolitan spatiotemporal frames to emphasize their individual life courses and experiences. They focus how language competency has a positive effect on their lives in Barcelona. One speaker who identifies strongly as Castilian Spanish frames his response in terms of socio-historical and political forces that have affected him. He cites political changes such as immigration, and political liberalism as affecting his treatment as a Castilian in Barcelona. These wider political forces determine his personal and linguistic development. Discussing the past twenty years in terms of individual psychological development allows two of the speakers to cast themselves as having developmental
potential in terms of their language proficiency and identities. The political forces trap the subject who identifies more strongly with his Castilian heritage, and he insists that he must move from Catalonia in order to become more satisfied with his life (Woolard 2012: 13). These attributes and behaviors may change across the span of time and place, or as is often the case, they may not change at all. Northern Irish activists do not discuss personal linguistic development, but they similarly use chronotopes for character development. To this end, speakers use membership categories, and animate them across different episodes.

Membership categories are nouns that class a group of individuals based upon ethnic, religious, institutional, national, or other forms of membership. Alternatively termed "categories of personhood", membership categories organize the ways we commonly think about, and use, terms used to refer to a collection of individuals (Schegloff 2007). These categories often occur in culturally constituted pairs, which inhabit wider, often unspoken, categories of membership (e.g. husband and wife inhabit the category of family) (Sacks 1992). Scholars interested in political talk use membership category analysis to show how speeches, news media, and other forms of political talk take on persuasive power (Leudar 1988, Eglin and Hester 2003). In the victims’ rights debate, the extent to which characters, as categories or individuals, are allowed to develop morally across space and time has important implications for how victims will participate (or not) in the peace process. Casting perpetrators as morally static, as consistently aiming to kill, maim, and discriminatory across space and time, affects the willingness of some victims to engage with them as democratic equals in the post-conflict government. The moral development of characters also justifies support for
different forms of transitional justice, as the violent actor who can change may be a potential participant in restorative justice mechanisms, whereas states should punish the unrepentant terrorists, or even assign them new categories such as an “enemy combatant”. This is why a chronotopic analysis is so important in contexts of violence and peacemaking: different chronotopes justify different visions of the person, with different capabilities, and thus justifies the inclusion or exclusion of certain people from full participation in the post-conflict state.

The chronotope is the scale of spatial and temporal horizons that arrange instances of victimization with other narrated episodes. Speakers signal to listeners how they should interpret an event as representative, or not, of other events at different times and places. For example, a speaker might embed her autobiographical narrative of victimization in a wider history of discrimination across Northern Ireland, the killing of her family as representative of the killing of Protestants across the country, or as the victim of terrorism, cast as a global phenomenon that touches all citizens of Western nations. In this dissertation, I analyze how advocates and victims describe different stories of victimization at varying levels of detail, and how they thematically link them to other described or alluded to events. Following Woolard, this analysis also studies how chronotopes affect the construction of individuals and categories that play the roles of victims, perpetrators, and bystanders in dramas of state and non-state violence.

Advocacy Narratives

This analysis focuses, minimally, on several components of advocacy narratives: organizing chronotopes, a description of characters, and the political demands of the
activists that these representations justify. The analysis may also include other events such as hypothetical events, potential future victimization, and alternate narratives of political progress, insofar as speakers use them to dramatize the effects of victimization and justify political demands.

**Chronotopes:** The chronotope is the scale of spatial and temporal horizons that arrange instances of victimization with other narrated episodes. Speakers arrange events—victimization, historical epochs, the present moment of advocacy, potential futures—in different ways and at different spatiotemporal scales. Instances of victimization are projected as representative, or not, of other events at different times and places. These chronotopes are socio-cognitive; they are always in the background, informing the organization of events. Some speakers explicitly describe different epochs of history, focusing on the transition from war to peace as part of the political narrative. Speakers may talk more about an individual victimization event or explicitly about the chronotope depending upon their demands for justice and political transformation. The chronotope may also include hypothetical future states towards which some social aggregate evolves.

**Characters:** The characters include individual persons and categorical reference to aggregates of individuals, who act as victims and perpetrators. Other actors, such as nation-states and institutions may have a role. I am interested in the action ascribed to these characters, how (or whether) they change across events separated by space and time.

**Demands:** The demands of activists vary depending upon the chronotope used. They may include requests for compensation for individuals or groups, retribution against an attacker or the political party of attackers, the implementation of reconciliatory programs, or the exclusion of a political group from participation in the post-conflict government.

In the following section, I will describe the political ideology of the activists, representations of victimization episodes, the themes that bridge these episodes into meaningful narratives, and the present political demands that these chronotopes validate. I have named the chronotopes according to the goals of the activists. At the end of each section, I present a summary review of republican, peace activist, and unionist speech.
components. Finally, I briefly discuss Palestinian and Israeli discourse in Northern Ireland, and state how chronotopes used by these transnational actors relate to those used in Ireland.

**Republican advocacy and the re-vindication chronotope**

Irish republicans arrange different victimization events according the altruism and individuality of the victims. This reflects ideologies of justice in the tradition of liberal individualism, and for this reason, republicans have gained a wide and receptive audience for their claims against the British State. This kind of chronotopic representation, which hinges on the individuality of victims, has a long tradition in republican political ideology.

**Republican political ideology**

Republicanism in Northern Ireland has a long tradition of advocating not only for victims’ rights, but also for civil and political rights more broadly. Throughout the history of Ireland, however, republican political ideology has changed significantly. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, opposition to monarchism defined Irish republicanism. Led by a well-educated elite, republicans viewed new democratic ideals based upon individual rights as a means to stop British oppression (Dickson 2010). The rise of socialism influenced the IRA and other groups, and they called for the establishment of a socialist republic on the island. This corresponded with a demand that Ireland be an ethnically Catholic state. But this shift in republican ideology occurred in tandem with the Northern Irish Civil Rights Movement in the late 1960’s, which did not advocate for the establishment of a Catholic state but rather the protection against
discrimination and violence in Northern Ireland. Influenced by the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, Catholics sought to end the discriminatory policies of the Stormont government (Maney 2000). This included an end to gerrymandering, job discrimination, and inequity in the justice system (including treatment by the police and the ability to make legal claims against the state).

As the Troubles progressed, Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA began to describe their demands in the terms of human rights, thus re-adopting the tenets of liberal individualism that had originally driven the Irish republican movement in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Sullivan 2000). Republicans now see appeals to these negative rights—the right to freedom from discrimination, violence, unlawful imprisonment—as highly effective means for challenging the authority of the British State. Republican victims’ advocates avoid claims about the establishment of a national state, and make their demands for justice and recognition based upon rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (1953). The European Convention upholds liberal values of the right to a fair trial, the right not to be ill treated, freedom from discrimination, the right to life, and freedom of expression, belief, and assembly. Republican victims’ groups cite the Convention, particularly the “right to life” clause that constrains state use of lethal force. As a result, republicans conceive international inquiries, as well as civil and criminal actions at the European Court of Human Rights as a means to gain recognition that their loved ones were innocent. Republicans are not against the establishment of truth commissions; they have been successful in lobbying for ad hoc inquests in the past. They do not voice opposition to the reconciliatory efforts of peace workers in the province, but republicans demand that any inquest or commission
established require perpetrators to reveal the details of violent attacks, such as military and political orders that lead to civilian deaths.

*The re-vindication chronotope*

Republican advocates use a chronotope that vindicates the actions of past actors in an attempt to humanize them, and thereby exonerate their actions before they died. Republican victimization episodes are biographical and event-specific. In Chapter 3, which details a commemoration of the 1971 “Internment Massacre”, speakers describe the actions of their family members just before their deaths. Victims are motivated to move out of their homes into the streets by altruism for other civilians. The domestic peace of the home contrasts with the violence of public spaces as they are shot and beaten in the streets. They cease action when the military kills them; their efforts to help their fellow community members end with violence, so they were not involved in paramilitary activity as the original British Army inquests suggest. These themes implicitly link the different instances of victimization. Republican victims’ advocates rarely link events separated by historical space and time; they do not use broad historical frames to link the past and the present. The chronotope used by republicans emphasizes the altruism of the dead, and the bereavement of their relatives, and is not a grand historical narrative of the Troubles.

Implicitly, the victimization events share descriptions of biographies and the altruistic action of the protagonists. This pattern of representing the *dramatis personae* implicitly ties disparate events to one another. In evaluating past victimization episodes, republicans cite the current period of (relative) peace as being reason for their pursuit of
justice: the war is over, and so the truth should be publically recognized. But the emphasis is on the victims, and the perpetrators play only a peripheral role in the narratives. They do not wish to further or halt the peace process; instead, they wish to highlight single instances of rights abuse. By not explicitly embedding victimization episodes into political and historical narratives, they reinforce the notion that they are seeking justice based upon universal rights. Casting the victimization of Catholics as rights violations intertextually aligns republican discourse with other minority movements that use the language of human rights as a wedge against abusive state regimes (Abdullah 2002, Goodale 2002). A fundamental difference between republican victims’ advocacy and other contexts is, however, that republicans make claims exclusively based upon the victimization of individuals, and not their whole ethnic community. Many republican activists may believe that the British government victimized the community as a whole, and that it was a colonial oppressor, but such discourse is not the basis for their claims for retribution against the state. They vindicate the dead as individuals during a specific historical event. This reflects liberal notions of justice that focus on individual victims and individual perpetrators. Republican victims’ advocates have gained significant domestic and international support for their cause because it appeals to a discourse that is ostensibly apolitical in its aims and universal in its application.

The characters

The protagonists—the victims—are identified in republican advocacy using familial categories and predications. Advocates and other speakers link themselves to the
dead using familial categories and often-poetic narratives about their personal lives. This reinforces the legal claims that republicans make, as nuclear family members are the normative claimants against states for the deaths of their loved ones in liberal rights adjudication and Western judicial practice. The antagonists inhabit institutional categories, usually the British Army or the British Government. Advocates do not name individual antagonists. Often, the antagonists are passive agents only referenced indirectly by their actions or detailed descriptions of the flight of bullets as they hit the victims. This is because it is established fact that the Army killed the individuals, the point of contention is whether the dead were paramilitary members and acting violently before their deaths.

In Chapter 3, speakers at a commemorative ceremony categorize the dead as ‘local’ in contrast to the British Army. The contrast between “local” and the ethnopolitical adjective ‘British’ creates a distinction between the native Irish and the invading military force. Interestingly, the notion that the British were an invading force, a foreign occupier, does not act as justification for republican demands for the truth. They do not take up the anti-colonial discourse that is common in other contexts of republican political advocacy (Howe 2000). Victims’ advocates avoid anti-colonial discourse because it would associate the dead with the paramilitary fighters who challenged the British in Ireland making their dead guilty by association and playing into British characterizations of the dead as terrorists. In the Post-Cold war era, the language of human rights is a far more powerful means for prosecuting states, especially as discourses of the “War on Terror” threaten the legitimacy of republican claims against the state.
Summary

Chronotope: Victimization events are highly detailed and biographical. The similarity of protagonists and their biographical and altruistic qualities link the different events to one another. Occasionally, speakers cite the present state of peace in Northern Ireland as the justification for their pursuit of justice, but the emphasis is on the exoneration of the individual dead.

Characters: Victims are altruistic and “local” in contrast to the British Army.

Political demands: International inquiries into the deaths of relatives. They also pursue the prosecution of the British state and individuals at the European Court of Human Rights.

Peace work and the reconciliation chronotope

Peacemakers in Northern Ireland aim to reconcile the formerly warring communities in Northern Ireland. They want to eradicate sectarianism, and discourage demands for extrajudicial and judicial retribution. These demands reflect a recent trope in transitional justice discourse, which sees punitive measures as having a limited use in transitional justice programs.

Peacemaking ideology

If republicans draw on the tradition in human rights that emphasizes the individual as the rights bearer, peace workers in the province emphasize the effects of violence on whole communities. But instead of making claims for ethnic aggregates, they create a vague social aggregate—Northern Irish society—and focus their efforts on the improvement of that aggregate by drawing on a logic derived from what I will call the “reconciliation” chronotope. As noted in the introduction, programs aimed at peace and reconciliation have come under the control of the Northern Irish state after years of
activism funded by private and international donors. This centralization coincides with the rise of the post-conflict and multicultural state. This “state-led multiculturalism” (Postero 2004: 191) includes policies aimed at fashioning a new sense of community that will bind the Northern Irish polity. These peace workers face a difficult challenge: How do they support multiple ethnic identities and cultures, each with their experiences of past victimization, while simultaneously developing a shared sense of citizenship? To do so, they adopt a political ideology that casts suspicion on state-led judicial practices. Consistent with Post-Cold war restorative justice discourses, they emphasize reconciliation and “truth-telling”: programs aimed at allowing victims to speak about their pain, and thus come to terms with their suffering.

Restorative justice theory has influenced recent transitional justice models. Restorative justice is a form of justice that attempts to protect and restore the rights of the victim as well as restore harm to the community caused by some type of criminal act at the local and national level. The emphases of restorative justice are a promotion of non-retributive punitive measures, a concern for the so-called restorative of harm perpetrated upon the community, and especially a concern for victim’s rights. As such, restorative justice is a conglomeration of alternative dispute resolution (from which restorative justice gleans methodology), civil rights movements, and social movements emphasizing the rights of victims (Mika and Zehr 2003, Daly and Immarigeon 1998). This discourse leads to certain temporal representations of conflict, which influences policy recommendations.
Peace workers’ victim-centered policy echoes what Meister (2011) calls “transitology”: the desire to make a clear distinction between a past evil, such as a war, human rights abuse, or genocide, and the present. As an example, he describes the intellectual interest in the Nuremburg trials before the end of the Cold War. Before the Cold War, philosophers and social scientists engaged the questions of complicity and existential choice: Should Nazi soldiers and collaborators be able to argue that they were following orders? Is this a valid defense? Should the Allies have prosecuted more individuals? After the rise of restorative justice theory in 1990’s, scholars and practitioners started to regard the Nuremburg trials as a success because the trials achieved cultural effects with so few prosecutions. Extensive prosecution may have turned German regret about the Holocaust into anger against the victor’s justice of the Allies. The aim of such “transitologists”—scholars and activists who use this discourse—is to make a clean break with the past, such that social aggregates can look back on it with regret, but with a sense that the evil is over.

Peace workers in Northern Ireland are transitologists: they aim to make a clear distinction between the past and the present, and bring society into what they often call a “shared future”. They view retributive justice with caution because demands for prosecution have become a way to re-fight old battles. This view of victims, and the policy that they wish to implement, are a direct result of a chronotopic vision of conflict that sets as its goal the separation of past evil from the present, any effort to demand that the past be revisited challenges this imperative. This leads to the pathologization of Northern Irish society generally and victims specifically as they refuse to adopt the
teleology of peace discourse. As a result, peace workers and victims’ have become antagonists, rather than collaborators, in the quest for justice and recognition for victims.

**The reconciliation chronotope: Spatiotemporal arrangement of narratives**

Peace activists rarely describe victimization episodes in biographical terms or refer to discrete instances of victimization. For peace workers, people of both ethnonationalist backgrounds experienced victimization; it was feature of the past historical epoch known as the “Troubles.” Unlike republicans, they emphasize the historical progression from war to peace. Peacemakers narrate a series of broad events: past war, present transition, and future peace. Revenge cycles between social aggregates continue human conflict and drove that conflict in the past. Peacemakers rarely discuss the starting point for this cyclical revenge. Discussing the beginnings of political conflict would challenge their desired position as neutral arbiters in the victims’ rights debate because unionists and republicans contest the origins of the conflict. As a result, reconciliation discourse abstracts “place”. Northern Ireland, as the site of the Troubles, exemplifies all human conflict. Much of their talk focuses on a grand historical narrative of the human species, in which cycles of revenge fuel conflict across the globe. Speakers might refer to different places in time and space—South Africa, Papua New Guinea, Nazi Germany—to cast violence as driven by this motivation.

**The characters in reconciliation narratives**

Within restorative justice theory, the concept of community is the principle entity to which restoration must occur; the meaning of the term is contextual in the theoretical literature. A concept of community may encompass a geographical area, a shared set of
cultural traits, or a network of sociality (Dickson-Gilmore and La Prairie 2005). For this reason, many theorists suggest that in order for reconciliation to be successful, practitioners must develop the concept in partnership with their interlocutors; indeed, the community is precisely that group of people that a given conflict affects (McCold 1995).

Unlike many restorative justice programs, which use the notion of an indigenous or minority community in contrast to the state, peace workers in Northern Ireland focus on the whole of the Northern Irish polity, conflating the ethnic differences into a unified social body that will, they hope, encourage ethnic aggregates to view one another as equally engaged in the post-conflict democratic project.

Peace workers anthropomorphize society (e.g. "society needs to heal"). Public policy assigns victims the duty of moving society to move away from the conflict of the past into a state of peace. Society is an agent in peacemaking speeches: society injured and killed civilians. Placing blame on society erases the culpability of individual perpetrators. This dispersal of blame helps to legitimate public policy that focuses on the narratives and financial needs of victims, but does not pursue offenders. It also reduces the need for retributive practices, as individuals, institutions, and states rarely inhabit the narratives, and obviously, cannot play a role in what peacemakers figuratively describe as “moving society forward”. The reconciliation chronotope legitimates the peace process and the work of peace workers, validates restorative practices for conflict resolution, and constructs a shared democratic identity that will unify different political identities and reduce animosity in the province.
When advocates use ethno-nationalist categories, they often equate those categories using similar category-bound activities or descriptions. For example, an advocate might state, “Catholics and Protestants are human.” This blurs ethno-nationalist distinctions based upon a shared category of the person. We see this balanced description played out at the structural level of victims’ rights meetings as well. A Protestant victim speaks with, or just following, a Catholic victim. In these cases, common themes and tropes link the two narratives based upon shared membership categories, which blurs ethno-nationalist distinctions. Often, ethno-nationalist categories are completely absent and other categories of the person commensurate categories of people from disparate economic, social, and ethno-nationalist backgrounds. Such verbal representations parallel the Victims and Survivors Order of 2006, which defines a “victim” as any person wounded or bereaved by the conflict.

Peace activists ask Northern Irish society to change radically. Not only do they want to end violence, but they also want to discard the ethnic identifications that supposedly fueled violence. Thus, they call for victims to view perpetrators as human, to see them as individuals with lives, home lives, wants, and desires, and therefore understand them not as representatives of Protestantism or Catholicism. To achieve this they call for legacy commissions that will allow people to tell their stories of victimization and for panels of experts to find similarities in those stories between Catholics and Protestants, which will achieve the goal of equating the experience of victimhood across ethnic categories. These activists also call for the limitation of the use of the state judicial system and international tribunals for the prosecution of perpetrators. This follows from their chronotopic representation of human conflict and peace.
Retributive justice is a form of revenge, and thus peacemakers advocate for its limited use. For peace activists, prosecution of past crimes merely drags the past into the present, instead of creating a clear division between past war by reconciling the formerly warring parties, and helping victims to overcome their losses.

**Summary**

*Chronotope:* Speakers talk about the transition from conflict to a state of peace. The present is a period of transition that threatens to return to a time of cyclical revenge. This chronotope describes all human conflict as well as the Northern Irish Troubles. The aim is to make a clean break with the past, to end prosecutions, and develop reconciliation programs that will propel society towards peace. Through the course of my stay in Northern Ireland, public rejection of victim-focused reconciliatory methods and thematic examinations of the conflict led many activists to cast society as pathologically “stuck” in the past.

*Characters:* Peace workers do not refer to perpetrators by name or by institutional or ethnic category. Society is both the perpetrator and subject of intervention. In order to help society progress, the victims must be encouraged to give up on their dreams of vengeance. The category of the victim is ethnically and politically ambiguous.

*Demands:* Peace workers seek the limitation of prosecutions in Northern Ireland and in supra-national organizations. They wish to help victims by encouraging them to identify as “survivors” of violence.

**Unionist advocacy and the ressentiment chronotope**

Unionist victims’ advocates discuss victimization as a series of ongoing attacks against the Protestant people, and in so doing, produce an identity that equates victimization with ethnicity. They demand that the post-conflict government recognize the righteousness of Protestants, who were allied with the pre-Troubles Stormont State, and exclusively prosecute republicans for illegal crimes.

**Unionist political ideology**
Unionist victims’ rights discourse challenges the inclusive language of peace workers. It demands that victimhood is the exclusive status of Protestants, and erases state abuse of Catholics during the Troubles. Scholars of unionism in Northern Ireland often describe Protestants as having a “siege mentality” (Donnan and Simpson 2007, Walker 1989). In the midst of the Troubles, Walker (1989) notes that unionists conceptualize the Troubles as an age-old problem stemming from the romantic nationalism of Irish republicanism. This romantic nationalism casts Catholics as the descendants of Gaelic Irish, and justifies unification on this shared ethnic history. Unionists fear unification because it would ostensibly discriminate against the descendants of Scottish and English settlers. This fear of discrimination morphed into a vision of antagonistic republicans to the south surrounding Ulster Protestants; the north was the last bastion of Protestantism (and loyalism) against the Irish nationalist threat. It also validated unionist efforts to disenfranchise Catholics during the Stormont Era in Northern Ireland (1922-1972). Catholics are not be loyal to the British Monarchy, and the state should promote a Protestant identity.

The “siege mentality” description highlights two key features of unionist discourse: (1) their orientation towards the Irish Republic as an enemy that surrounds them and (2) the repetitive efforts of republicans to unify the island since 1916. The figurative language of the siege has motivated violent and political backlashes against the Catholic population. Unionist discourse in the victims’ rights movement is slightly different from general unionist political discourse. Past victimization is emphasized, and indeed wedded to the protagonists and antagonists in narratives of rights abuse. In addition, the Stormont Era is over, Protestants no longer control the government in
Northern Ireland. Much more so than declaring the Republic the enemy, present-day unionist advocates proclaim the enemy to be the liberal and multi-cultural Northern Irish state. They rail against the dangers of republicanism, but even more so they rail against equality between republicanism and unionism in this new multi-cultural state. For unionists, the Stormont government was worth preserving because it served as the bastion against republicanism and popery; the current government has failed to do this. They are less under siege than defeated. In order to find their identity they have to look to their own past, a time before the peace process marginalized unionists. This sense of defeat has given rise to a political ideology of “ressentiment” among victims’ advocates.10

Wendy Brown (1995) argues that ressentiment forms the basis for marginalized identity in modern liberal democracies. Focusing on the United States, she explains how marginalized groups challenge the ideal white male property owner that served as the model for democratic individualism. This model pervades discourses of citizenship to this day as minorities and immigrants are postmodern “others.” White male voters historically marginalized these others: African-Americans were enslaved, women were held to rigid social roles, and Native Americans were subject to ethnic cleansing. Experiences of victimization inform the identities of these groups. But it is not only this historical victimization that drives identities of ressentiment; rather, it is the paradoxical effect that “as the margins assert themselves as margins, the denaturalizing assault they perform on coherent collective identity in the center turns back on them to trouble their own identities” (1995: 53). Asserting identity as an African American upon the collective identity of the center forces the minority to reify their identity as a marginalized and victimized. Thus, the psychological experience of victimization
becomes dislocated from real or perceived victimization events (such as slavery or specific instances of discrimination). Victimization becomes a deeply held aspect of that identity and efforts to alleviate that victimization aggravate the feelings of hurt:

...this past cannot be redeemed *unless* the identity ceases to be invested in it, and it cannot cease to be invested in it without giving up its identity as such, thus giving up its economy of avenging and at the same time perpetuating its hurt—‘when he then stills the pain of the wound *he at the same time infects the wound*’ (Brown 1995: 73).

For Brown, *ressentiment* is both a psychological experience and a cultural discourse in “Foucault’s usage¹¹.” Unionists rail against the parity of esteem offered to Catholics and republicans in the Northern Irish government. They also implicitly undermine the liberal project that values a democratic “everyman” as the subject of the state. Instead, they equate ethnic belonging with victimization, and demand “states of exception” (Agamben 2003) that will limit the rights of other citizens based upon political and ethnic categorical belonging. States of exception are cases in powerful elites exclude certain categories of people from full citizenship within a society¹². Advocates for CARE, the unionist organization discussed in this thesis, construct worlds that idealize the past as time in which righteousness was synonymous with loyal citizenship, and loyal citizenship was synonymous with Protestantism. Unionists have adopted the discourse of an embattled minority. Protestants were, until the end of the Stormont Period in 1972, the powerful majority in Northern Ireland, and full membership in the state was a *de facto* consequence of belonging to this ethno-nationalist group. Since the fall of the Stormont government, and the rise of Northern Irish peace process, they have lost their monopoly on power. They use representations of time, place, and personhood to demand
a return to Northern Ireland to its original construction as a “Protestant state for a Protestant People”\(^{13}\).

**The ressentiment chronotope**

Like peace workers, Unionist victims’ advocates pay less attention to the gritty detail of the killing and maiming of civilians than the broad socio-historical process of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Unionists cast events as paradigmatic of the victimization of the Protestant people that spans time and space. Speakers use place names to allude to events. They tend to focus on the Northern Irish Troubles, and this is a historical period characterized by the continued suffering of Protestants at the hands of the republicans, and continued betrayal of the Protestant people by the British and post-conflict Northern Irish governments.

Unionists gloss over the passage of time between separated events occurring throughout Northern Ireland. The present time is a time of continued victimization; there is little difference between the past and the present. Unionists do not describe the Troubles as over; instead, victimization against Protestants continues. This present includes non-violent attacks, such as intimidation conducted against Protestants by politicians and those they consider still to be members of the IRA. Unionists move so fluidly between individual events because each one, to them, represents a larger pattern of victimization, one that is embedded in the territorial distinctions between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic to the south.

**Characters in unionist victims’ discourse**

The characters in unionist discourse are a product of the aforementioned siege
mentality, and the vision of Protestantism as always under threat of victimization. Protestants inhabit the category of the victim. They were the victims and remain the targets of republicans, who seek to kill, maim, disenfranchise, or otherwise victimize Protestants. Interventionists of all sorts also populate Unionist narratives: peacemakers and government ministers that have failed to exclude republicans from participation in the state, and this failure corrupts them. The result is a Manichean world composed of the righteous victims and those that either actively attack them or fail to stop such attacks. This justifies their absolute opposition to the peace process.

**Summary**

*Chronotope:* The theme of unionist discourse is past and present victimization at the hands of Irish republicans. The rest of the world has turned against Protestants as the peace process has affirmed the participation of republicans in the post-conflict state.

*Characters:* Protestants, as a category, are the victims of Irish republicanism across space and time. Republicans are unchanging in their sectarian desire to eliminate and disenfranchise Protestants. Other members of civil society and the government become immoral by their unwillingness to recognize the relentless evil of republicans.

*Demands:* The constant victimization of the Protestant ethnicity authorizes the exception of republicans from participation in this state, and the exclusive criminal prosecution of republicans.

**Palestinian and Israeli Transnational Advocacy**

The final two chapters of the thesis show how transnational human rights discourses of restorative justice and retributive justice, as well as discourses of the “Global War on Terror” reproduce and change in the Northern Irish context. I am concerned with processes of “vernacularization,” which is the translation of human rights
discourse into “local” contexts (Merry 2006). Anthropological work in this area considers how practitioners re-frame so deemed universal human rights in light of local cultural and institutional norms. For example, scholars have conducted work on how rights activists’ attempts to reconcile transnational ideals of gender equality with local cultural values of masculinity and femininity (Griffiths 2001, Merry 2006). Theorists also examine how indigenous groups and other victims attempt through judicial means to gain equal rights and attain compensation for past and present victimization (Borneman 1997, Postero and Zamosc 2004). These studies share an interest in how local understandings of personhood clash and otherwise interface with definitions of rights and peacemaking practice developed in legal forums such as the United Nations and other transnational spaces.

This analysis of chronotopes, and the actors animated within them, gives insight into the dialogic relationship between discourse as a product of local socio-political ideologies and interactions, and discourse as a transnational phenomenon (Steiner 1996: 140). Ultimately, I hope to answer how activists calibrate rights discourse—both restorative and retributive models—to the Irish context and on what grounds victims’ advocates and peacemakers deem them to contribute to the success or failure of a stable post-conflict Northern Ireland. Reflecting general concerns in the anthropology of human rights, I aim to understand how rights claims are embedded in local political and cultural practices, and “how various social actors understand the various claims, immunities, privileges, and liberties articulated in the language of human rights” (Wilson 2006: 4). The last two chapters directly address how discourses of terrorism are adapted
to Northern Ireland, and the effects that they have had on the practices and language of victims’ organizations.

I analyze two Palestinian speeches given to an Irish republican audience in order to compare and contrast the chronotopes used by these activists with the Irish ones. I also analyze Israeli speakers as they talk with peace activists and unionists. The political ideologies of the two Palestinians are different, as are the ideologies of the Israeli speakers. In Chapter 7, two Palestinians offer different visions of the historical relationship between Ireland and Palestine. The second speaker uses a chronotope and categorical characters that reflect a political ideology crafted by resement. In Chapter 8, an Israeli likewise uses this Manichean worldview to advocate for the legality of the “enemy combatant” category, while the other speaker advocates for peace and reconciliation. These comparative chapters show that chronotopes have cross-cultural meaning, and they align with the political aims of victims’ rights advocates across political and cultural contexts. Understanding these processes of commensuration—the comparison of two different narratives based upon a common chronotope—reveals the tensions between different culturally constituted understandings of what it means to be a victim of political violence.

Advocacy participation frameworks and the construction of imagined audiences

In this dissertation, “victims’ advocacy” refers to discourse aimed at influencing public policy for victims, this includes medical, financial, and psychological programs for victims, such as compensation, funding for memorials, and prosecutions15. Victims’ advocacy is different other kinds of activities aimed at assisting targets of political
violence, such as therapy or counseling sessions. These types of activities are not under the purview of this dissertation.

Public advocacy in Northern Ireland occurs in several contexts: commemorations, public meetings, and conferences. Each of these contexts of talk-in-interaction are highly structured and constitutes what Goffman refers to as \textit{platform events}. These events are usually planned, formal, and often include a program or agenda. Goffman lists them as:

- a talk, a contest, a formal meeting a play, a movie, a musical offering, a display of dexterity or trickery, a round of oratory, a ceremony, a combination thereof. The presenters will either be on a raised platform or encircled by watchers (Goffman 1983: 7).

The interaction between the speakers and hearers in these contexts is vicarious. The speaker speaks to an audience as if they are in a face-to-face conversation and the audience listens as if they are engaged in such a conversation. However, the use of modern technology has expanded this “interaction institution” to “include vast distal audiences” (Goffman 1983: 7). At each of the commemorations as well as the public meetings, numerous journalists and cameras were present, and speakers would often orient themselves towards the cameras instead of the crowds. The participant framework in these platform events thus includes the physical space of the event, the speakers, immediate participants, and extended participants.

In her analysis of interaction in the South African Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) hearings, Verdoolaege (2009) uses the categories of \textit{immediate audience}—those who were physically present at the event—and \textit{extended audiences}—those who participated
through media. In the case of the TRC, the distinction between these two audiences is often hard to maintain. Speakers address the audience directly at the beginning of the address, but proceed as if to speak to the immediate and extended audiences as one. We will see a similar process in Northern Irish victims’ advocacy events as speakers blur the distinction between the immediate and extended audiences. The immediate and extended audience might be characterized using familial terms, ethno-nationalist membership categories, or general references to the Northern Irish polity. Alternatively, the focus may be a more non-descript audience, a public that does not figure as an actor in the narrated event. More often than not, however, the speaker will incorporate the immediate audience into the narrative. The construction of these audiences is a way to link the “there and then” or the “if and when”—in the case of future constructions—to the “here and now” of the platform event.

Commemorations

Commemorative practices are a central activity of victims’ advocacy organizations. They are key sites for construction of social memories of past events and identities of victimhood. The commemorations under scrutiny in this dissertation are “local” in contrast to “national” commemorations. Victims’ advocacy organizations sponsor local commemorations, which concentrate upon victims from one ethno-nationalist community. Members of the same ethno-nationalist community as the dead attend these commemorations. Rarely would members of another ethno-nationalist community attend a local commemoration. Thus, speakers would usually characterize
the physically present audience as having the same ethno-nationalist and political identities as the dead and their family members.

**Public Meetings and Conferences**

Government and advocacy organizations held meetings with the public. The type of organization running the event determines the attendance and length of the meetings. The Consultative Group for the Past—a government-sponsored consultancy panel—held seven meetings in different cities in Northern Ireland during 2008-2009. These meetings were advertised in national and local papers. They were also advertised on television and radio news programs. This lead to a wide public exposure and over 500 individuals attended the meetings during the winter of 2008. The other public meetings under discussion in this dissertation were not as public. For example, the Socialist Workers Party sponsored a meeting between Palestinian victims’ advocates and Irish advocates in 2010. The advertisement for this meeting was comparatively limited.

Regardless of the scale of the meeting, they all follow a similar interactive pattern. One or perhaps two keynote speakers give an uninterrupted speech to the crowd. The speaker speaks to the audience as if in interaction with them, but the audience remains largely “unratified”; that is, participants to conversation that have aural and visual access to the talk but are not expected to participate in it (Goffman 1964). After the speech(es), a question and answer (Q&A) session follows. On a few occasions, this rigid interactive framework would transform into an argument between the speaker and one or more audience members. These antagonistic exchanges were more likely to occur
at large-scale public meetings with different political perspectives and ethno-nationalist
groups present.

Unlike public meetings, conferences are “invitation only” events. This usually
required audience members to request permission to attend and to pay a fee. Conferences
were thus usually limited to professionals engaged in the victims’ rights sector,
government, or other non-governmental organizations. They usually included activists
with the same political goals.

Dissertation overview and discussion of transcription

The data was selected from a corpus recorded from 2008-2010. During this research
period, I recorded several commemorations, and public meetings, and I conducted
interviews with rights activists. Focus on public speech events allows us to understand
how activists choose to represent the Troubles, the Global War on Terrorism, and peace
processes to media, their political opponents, and domestic and international publics. My
interviews with victims’ advocates were extensive, and may form the basis for future
work. I conducted participant observation primarily with two victims’ rights
organizations: CARE and the Lakewood Research Group. I was also able to conduct
interviews with the leaders of victims’ organizations that were avowedly non-partisan.
These non-partisan groups work across ethnic lines, and advocate mainly for increased
medical and compensatory benefits for victims of the Troubles. Non-partisan groups do
not normatively engage in discussions about Northern Irish politics, truth commissions,
or demand justice for the wounded and the dead. These groups are protective of their
membership, and would not allow me to conduct participant observation or interviews
with their members. Due to this lack of ethnographic data, I have not included these groups in the present analysis. As part of the largest republican and unionist victims’ advocacy networks, CARE and the Lakewood Research Group provide a representative view into the discourse of victims’ rights. CARE is the most publicized unionist victims’ organization in Northern Ireland, and their leader, Walter, is a constant interviewee and discussant on Northern Irish politics. The Lakewood Research Group was a member organization of a large republican victims’ rights organization that caters to victims of state violence. My research corpus on Israeli and Palestinian activists is more limited, and I have selected for analysis the only public meetings held during my research stay. Since my departure, more Israeli and Palestinian activists have held public talks in Belfast, and I would like eventually to add to this corpus.

In the following chapters, I will analyze speeches and conversations. I use modified Jefferson transcription conventions (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974). Each stanza in the transcript represents a single utterance. This visual organization of the data depicts the poetics of speech, as new lines signal pauses (Gee 1986), and allows the reader to efficiently isolate references to place, person, and time. Numbering utterances allows for linking discussions of language in-text to the transcripts. I focus on the content of spoken language, but the transcription method visualizes many of the paralinguistic cues speakers use to evaluate what they are saying, such as rising and falling intonation, emphasis on certain words, speech pace, and vowel extension. See the end of this section for a transcription key.
I have also attempted to replicate the dialects used by the speakers. Most of the speakers, when otherwise not identified, use an Irish-English dialect. I include the hesitations, stutters, and ungrammaticalities used by the speakers as well, to give the reader a sense of how the speakers actually talk. In each chapter, I select excerpts taken from longer transcripts of the speeches. I have organized these excerpts to show how speakers construct victimization episodes, chronotopes, and characters. In the written discussion, I will describe the chronotopes used by speakers, their political demands, and contextualize the speech or interaction.

**Chapters 2 and 3**

These two chapters focus on the social construction of place and personhood at unionist and republican commemorations. I analyze a 2009 speech at a commemoration near Kingsmills village held by CARE in Chapter 2. The families of those killed at Kingsmills are members of CARE, and the commemoration was a primary organizational focus in addition to its victims’ rights conference (Chapter 8), and lobbying efforts.

In Chapter 3, I analyze a commemoration held by the Lakewood Research Group (LRG) in 2009. The “Walk of Truth” commemorates those killed by the British Army in 1971. Organizing and conducting this commemoration was the primary activity of the LRG.

**Chapter 4**

Chapter 4 shows how peace workers abstract from sub-national geographical places, and create general conclusions about the Northern Irish conflict drawing on teleological visions of the transition from war to peace. I analyze a speech given by the
President of the Community Relations Council in 2009. The Community Relations Council (CRC) is an oversight organization that sets out the funding agendas for non-profit groups working in areas such as prisoner rehabilitation, youth work, employment training, and victims’ rights. I chose this speech for analysis because it focuses on victims’ rights and not these other areas of operation.

**Chapters 5 and 6**

Chapters 5 and 6 analyze a series of meetings held by the Consultative Group on the Past, a consultancy panel appointed by the Northern Irish Secretary of State to provide recommendations for helping Northern Irish society cope with problems caused by the Troubles. The victims’ groups I worked with discussed the meetings, and the final report published by the Group, extensively. Talk about the meetings and the report dominated much of the discussion within CARE and the LRG, as well as in the popular press and the government. The Consultative Group’s meetings and report thus offer us insight into discourse regarding the Northern Irish Troubles in the late 2000’s.

**Chapters 7 and 8**

During my research stay, republican and unionist activists sought to establish networks with other human rights activists across the globe. While many foreign activists worked in Northern Ireland, political discourse in victims’ rights circles focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is due, in part, the long historical connections between politicians and paramilitary members in Northern Ireland and those in Israel and Palestine. Additionally, global discourses on terrorism, which were dominating much of the discourse in human rights during the term of US President George Bush, became a
catalyst for revisiting the past conflict. Local activists were also debating the Gaza War fought between Israel and Hamas in 2008-2009. The conflict on the Mavi Marmara—a Turkish ship trying to run the blockade of Gaza in 2010—also drew the ire of republican activists in Northern Ireland; they viewed it as analogous to British attacks on protesters in Northern Ireland. Chapter 7 compares Palestinian discourse just before the Gaza War and after the events on the Mavi Marmara.

Chapter 8 compares the discourse of two Israeli activists. One, speaking in 2009, is a peace activist, who advocates for non-violent means to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This speech occurs just after the Gaza War. The second speaker is an Israeli victims’ advocate who lost a family member to a bombing in the early 2000’s. He speaks at a conference held by CARE, and I use his case to show the intertextual linkages between the discourse of CARE and that of Israeli activists.

Transcription Key

. (period) Falling intonation
^ (up arrow) Rising intonation.
, (comma) Continuing intonation
- (hyphen) Marks an abrupt cutoff
:: (colon[s]) Prolonging of sound
never (underlining) Stressed syllable or word
WORD (all caps) Loud speech
(Single capital letter) Proper noun
* (Apostrophe) Possessive or contraction
°word° (degree symbols) Quiet speech
>word< (more than & less than) Quicker speech
<word> (less than & more than) Slowed speech
[ ] (brackets) Simultaneous or overlapping speech
= (equals sign) Contiguous utterances
() (empty parentheses) Non-transcribable segment of talk
(…) (parentheses with three periods) Indicates excised speech, usually a personal name removed to protect
Bold-faced changes indicate my additions to the Jefferson transcription method.

*Italics* in the text are quoted from excerpts when accompanied with a line number.

Transcripts and discussion also include acronyms. These are indicated using all caps, but should not be confused with loud speech. The following acronyms are used:

- **RUC** Royal Ulster Constabulary
- **UDR** Ulster Defense Regiment (British Army)
- **IRA** Irish Republican Army
- **PIRA** Provisional Irish Republican Army
- **UK** United Kingdom
- **UN** United Nations
- **EU** European Union
Chapter 2: Ressentiment and commemoration in the unionist victims’ rights movement

This chapter studies discourse at the thirty-third Kingsmills commemoration. Commemoration is a site not only for the construction of social memory and political identity, but also for the legitimization of political action. The reverend of CARE constructs a chronotope of Protestant victimization that spans time and the whole of Northern Ireland. He also creates an antagonist category, ‘republican’, and systematically casts it as conducting violence across space and time. In so doing, he develops a category of republicanism that is irredeemably evil and morally unchanging. The speaker embeds this ongoing war between Protestants and unionists into Christian narratives of retribution. This makes negotiation with republican politicians, and participation in the peace process, impossible.

During the 1970’s, the violence of the Troubles peaked. In 1971, the Provisional Irish Republican Army emerged out of the old IRA to fight a campaign against what they perceived to be the British occupation of Northern Ireland. With the rise of the Provisional IRA, the British Army intensified its campaign in the province. Both republican and loyalist paramilitaries began to assassinate civilians depending upon their ethnic identity and political affiliations. Republicans bombed civilian areas in Belfast, targeted Protestant civilians, and loyalists responded by targeting Catholic civilians. Assassinations and abductions were also common in the rural areas outside of Belfast and Derry. In South Armagh, the PIRA targeted members of the security forces. Many of those killed were soft targets, including part-time policemen that often lived at their
homes unarmed and unprotected by Army barracks. Loyalist paramilitaries responded to these attacks by killing perceived republican sympathizers and members of the IRA.

On January 4, 1976, members of the Ulster Volunteer Force entered a home in Whitecross, County Armagh, and shot three Catholic brothers. About an hour later, they entered another house and fired upon sixteen family members gathered there. In total, five people were killed and several more wounded (Sutton 1994). Families of the dead, as well as rights organizations, claim that the shooters were composed of paramilitary members and off-duty Ulster Defense Regiment personnel, which cast the attacks as an instance of state collusion with loyalist paramilitaries (Pat Finucane Center 2007). On the next night, a group of masked men stopped a mini-bus with a group of workers from a linen mill near Kingsmills village. The linen mill workers were asked to step out and line up alongside the van. The masked men asked if anyone was a Roman Catholic. Against the pleas of his fellow workers—they suspected that the masked men were members of the Ulster Defense Force—one man stated that he was a Roman Catholic. To his astonishment, the gunmen ordered him to run down the road and not to look back. The gunmen, members of the “South Armagh Republican Action Force,” widely understood to be a cover name for members of the South Armagh brigade of the Provisional IRA, shot each of the remaining eleven men. Ten of the eleven died at the scene, but one man survived sustaining eighteen bullet wounds. The command of the Provisional IRA denied responsibility for the killings and the attack was likely carried out by members of the paramilitary without approval from the command structure (Harnden 2000).

Commemorative ritual in Northern Ireland
Thirty-three years later, I stood with family members, clergy, and victims’ rights activists on a road between Bessbrooke and Whitecross. They assembled to commemorate the dead mill workers, a ceremony that had been repeated since the late 1990’s. For these participants, the roadside, marked only by a small metal cross, was a sacred space. Much like our own more recent sites of pilgrimage to the victims of political violence—“ground zero” in New York may spring to mind for an American—the land holds a certain aura. As I waited for the ceremony to begin, the son of one of CARE’s members said to me, “this is where they did it. Our brothers died here.” Even before the ceremony began, that “spot” between Whitecross and Bessbrooke had an indexical link to the past for the attendees. The landscape was not merely a reminder of the killings, but was the physical location onto which blood had been spilt.

There is a long tradition of research on political ritual and identity in Northern Ireland (Bryan 2000). This research is largely based upon Anderson’s theory of the “imagined community” (1983). Anthropologists have used his theory to suggest that modern nation-states use ritual to fashion national identities that paper over class and ethnic differences. Political ritual has antecedents in the economic and social changes that occurred during the transition from feudal states to modern nation states, which require the fostering of bonds between geographically disparate individuals. Whereas individuals once sought their identity in close-knit groups—such as family or clan—they now identify with millions of strangers. For Anderson, mass media mediates the construction of nationalist identities across these vast geographical spaces. Through newspapers, for instance, a Texan can construct opinions and viewpoints about the same subjects as a Bostonian. The two individuals may not agree, but the common subject
matter and knowledge of the goings on of the American polity allow for a common national identification. The reproduction and circulation of objects and images, such as the American flag, allow individuals to pledge allegiance to common symbols and sustain an imagined sense of belonging.

Connerton (1989) examines ritual in more detail, and shows how the construction of social memory is achieved through political ritual. Rituals are more than mere narratives; they enact stories. Participants recognize that the commemorated events occurred in the past, but the rituals themselves are framed using what Connerton calls a “metaphysical present”. They re-present the events in a mythic style. Speakers describe past acts of political violence and struggle framed in terms of epic struggles between the righteous and their opponents. Past events become emblematic of general socio-historical or even religious processes. The mundane passage of time is substituted for a sense of time that is more authentic and never-changing. Commemoration thus reaffirms political identity by giving it a timeless quality. This leads Connorton to suggest that commemorations are ritualized emotional displays. As such, they are not instrumental: they do not have a specific goal or political end. They are instead moments in which societies construct identity and train members to develop emotive memories of the past.

We will see this temporal aesthetic in unionist commemoration: they cast forty-year-old events as representative of events that continue to this day. The specificity of events is lost as speakers construct a mythic vision of how unionist and republicans have been, and forever will be, in conflict. Rituals construct victimized identities, and in so doing, legitimate unionist non-participation in the peace process. They support political
demands that would see republicans excluded from the democratic process and a return to the old Protestant state. However, it is incorrect to suggest that all Irish political ritual takes on what we might call a “mythic” chronotope. In the next chapter, republicans refrain from framing their commemoration in terms of timeless values and struggles between the righteous and the depraved. Their ritual reaffirms Catholic and republican identity in contrast to the invading British Army, but more importantly, it supports the characterization of the dead as innocent civilians. This forms the basis for their use of international norms against state abuse of power, and legitimates republican prosecutorial efforts against the British state. Both unionist and republican commemorations build social memories, but they also legitimate present-day political action, which is a point underemphasized in Connerton’s work.

Research on Northern Irish political ritual focuses on Orange Parades. On the 12th of July, Northern Irish Protestants gather to celebrate the Protestant William of Orange’s victory over the Catholic James II at the Battle of the Boyne near the current border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. The Orange Order is a fraternal organization originating in the nineteenth century that boasts a strong unionist identity. Bryan (2000) describes the first instantiations of Orange Order parades as upper class-run commemorations. The parading tradition was taken up by the lower classes as they developed a more robust unionist identity, which was followed by a back and forth contestation between the classes as they struggled for control over the symbolic medium. Many parades occur in majority Protestant villages and as such, evoke little contestation from republicans or nationalist Catholics. However, many of these parades occur in the large urban centers of Northern Ireland, such as Belfast and Londonderry and march
through Catholic areas. During the late 1990’s, the parade at Drumcree lead to violence when Catholic residents of the Gravaghy road challenged the passage of the Orange Order from Drumcree Church towards the city center.

Scholars have also studied republican parades, particularly the "Bloody Sunday" commemoration in Londonderry. Sullivan (2002) shows that the aims of the parades have changed from the recognition of the human and civil rights of dead protestors in the early 1970's, to the advancement of Irish nationalism, and back to an emphasis on the violation of the rights of the dead in the 1990’s. This shift in commemorative content maps onto the changing conflict: the civil rights movement in the late 1960’s, to the armed conflict of the 70’s, 80’s, and 90’s, and finally to the re-adoption of rights based politics by Sinn Fein in the late 1990’s.

Another, albeit understudied, strain of research in commemorative ritual has been the analysis of mortuary practices, specifically Provisional IRA and INLA (Irish National Liberation Army) funerals. Taylor (1989) argues that the funeral practices of the PIRA fit into a long discourse of martyrdom in Northern Ireland (cf. Sullivan 2002, Feldman 1991). He shows how the various instantiations of the IRA have been associated with the suffering of Christ: republicans liken the suffering body of Christ as victim of the Roman Empire to the victims of the British. This was particularly salient for the leaders and volunteers of the 1916 “Easter Rising” when Irish republicans attacked and took control of several key institutional buildings in Dublin in an attempt to cast off British rule in the province. The rebels knew the potential for success was low, and thus offered themselves in sacrifice to the Irish Republic.
Studies of Orange Parades and funeral practices focus primarily on material symbolism and show how different class and political factions contest symbols. These studies also focus on the material construction of space and place. The political power of an Orange parade is not only crafted out of ornate flags and “blood and thunder” drums, but also the fact that they move through Catholic neighborhoods, an act which, to these Catholics, reeks of triumphalism and intimidation. Irish funerals often taken place in cemeteries and neighborhoods adorned with republican iconography. These investigations have not focused upon the verbal construction of time, space, and person in Irish commemorative ritual. This chapter, and Chapter 3, contribute to the study of Irish political ritual through a micro-ethnographic analysis of language use in order to show how history is modeled in public discourse and interaction. The chronotopic alignment of antagonists and victims in the past, with actors in the present, has political consequences. The seemingly evanescent ways of talking about time, place, and person in commemorative ritual helps to produce and reaffirm political and ethno-religious identity. In this way, commemoration orients its audience to the future, through a vision of the past, and this orientation has implications for participation in the post-conflict state.

**CARE**

In this chapter, I show how a Unionist speaker describes the scene of a republican attack on Protestant civilians in 1976 near the village of Kingsmills. The organization that conducts the commemoration, CARE, is engaged in a ten-year-old debate about the place of victims of non-state and state-sponsored terrorism in Northern Ireland. In the
mid 1990’s, the primary republican paramilitary, the Provisional IRA, engaged in peace
talks with the British Government. These talks culminated in the Belfast Agreement of
1998, in which the Provisional IRA agreed to pursue Irish unification through democratic
means, decommission their substantial arsenal, and cease attacks against state security
forces. Several agreements—the St. Andrews Agreement of 2005 and the Hillsborough
Castle Agreement of 2010—achieved what appears to be a stable provincial government
characterized by power sharing between Protestants and Catholics.

Unionist participation in the victims’ rights debate began during the push for the
ratification of the Belfast Agreement in 1998. Unionist victims protested the general
amnesty offered to all paramilitary members incarcerated before 1998. Unionist victims’
organized recently compared to republican victims’ groups, which began in the early
1990’s. This relatively recent organization of unionist victims, particularly those in the
South Armagh region, has led many scholars to suggest that victims feared making their
stories public until the peace process. They were able to do so as the growth in social
concern and the safety of those speaking out about their experiences increased (Donnan
and Simpson 2009, Simpson 2009). The institutionalization of the peace process, the
movement of discourses of victimhood from the civil sphere into the Assembly and
Westminster, made victims’ rights a focus of public and political debate in the late
2000’s. The unionist organization studied here, CARE, has developed into a multi-
faceted organization that hosts a wide range of therapeutic activities for victims, but it
also lobbies government and local officials for rights and recognition of victims of
terrorism in Northern Ireland. CARE has spawned numerous organizations in other
counties that publicize republican paramilitary violence. In addition to its lobbying
efforts, the organization conducts numerous commemorations and protests to advance their position for the prosecution of terrorists, the repeal of the general amnesty, and the cancellation of reconciliation programs.

In early 2008, I met with the president of CARE, who I will call “Walter”, at the organization’s headquarters in a small village near the Irish border. I had contacted Walter previously to query about the possibility of conducting ethnographic research. Walter was happy to speak with me, but was somewhat reticent to allow for research with the rest of the organization’s members. Understandably, he wanted to protect the members of his organization from unsolicited attention. My experience with CARE changed when a mutual friend offered to speak to Walter on my behalf, and to assure him that I would not meet with his membership without permission. Because of this personal relationship, Walter gave me expansive access to CARE, as well as its constituent members. For the next year and a half, I spent several days a week at the CAIR headquarters, and following Walter to various protests, speeches, and conferences.

In public, CARE advocated for the rights of victims of IRA violence. They sought funding, and demanded the prosecution of republicans in the domestic courts. In addition to this public advocacy, they offered classes on various hobbies, such as picture framing and painting, and held fieldtrips for their elderly members. They also trained counselors who worked with the injured and bereaved and offered group therapy sessions. But Walter, and other individuals, spent most of their time meeting with government ministers, holding commemorations and protests, and publically speaking out against what they deeply felt to be the evils of Irish republicanism. My first
experience of a CARE protest occurred at Narrow Water in 2008. In 1976, the Provisional IRA conducted a guerilla attack on the British Army next to a causeway between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. The IRA detonated two bombs, killing eighteen soldiers. In 2008, a youth group associated with Sinn Fein held what they called an “educational tour” of the Narrow Water site. Walter, and other CARE members felt that this denigrated the memory of the soldiers who died there. I arrived with CARE members, who held up photographs of the cadavers of the dead soldiers and chanted at the group of young adults. A minor fight broke out between the adult supervisors of the Sinn Fein trip, Walter, and other CARE protestors. This brought home to me the deeply felt anger of many CARE members and their ongoing sense of aggrievement against what they viewed as continuing republican aggression against Protestants.

Most of my research with CARE was less dramatic. I was allowed to sit in on meetings between CARE and other institutions, such as the Orange Order, as CARE tried to increase its support among the Protestant community. I also attended meetings between CARE and government ministers at Stormont. I spent a great deal of time on tours with CARE members through the provinces of South Armagh and Tyrone as they told me stories about their past experiences of violence, and took me to sites of recent fire bombings, such as a Freemason lodge that had been burned the previous week by, in the tour guide’s words, “republican vandals”. This practice of giving tours to researchers and journalists is common in Northern Ireland. These tours were expeditions into the past: they took me to police stations, old British Army bases, and other areas to retell stories of IRA attacks on these institutions. One tour guide cried as he described his experience as an Ulster Defense Regiment member. In the late 1970’s, his barrack was
the object of an IRA mortar attack, and he wept as he recalled having to put his best friends’ body parts into a plastic garbage bag because they had run out of body bags. It struck me how the guides repeatedly tried to emphasize that they were still under threat of violence. They recounted stories of masked men stopping them on country roads, who threatened them with violence if they did not stop their advocacy for Protestant victims of IRA violence. They told me how they received threatening letters, and that republicans continued to intimidate them in other ways in the province. I do not know the truthfulness of these anecdotes, but at every moment, the CARE members sought to connect their past experiences of violence to continuing experiences of victimization. Violence was not part of a bygone era, eliminated by the peace process, but merely earlier events in a long history of suffering by the Protestant people.

Beyond giving educational tours to journalists and researchers, CARE pursued legal cases against the Northern Irish Victims’ Commission and General Ghaddafi, the then leader of Libya. The Victims and Survivors’ Order of 2006 established the Northern Irish Victims’ Commission. The Order created the commission to act as a liaison between victims’ rights groups and the British and Northern Irish governments. A single commissioner was assigned to head the agency, but in 2008, the Northern Irish Office of the First Minister voted to assign four commissioners that would be representative of the different ethnic communities. One of the new commissioners, Patricia McBride, was the sister of an IRA operative killed in 1984. CARE rejected the inclusion of Ms. McBride, and launched a lawsuit to overturn her appointment. This lawsuit ultimately failed as the courts reaffirmed the action of the First Minister’s Office.
In 2008, CARE also hired an English-based law firm to try the Libyan state under the American Torts and Claims Act. The Act allows foreign nationals to try other foreign nationals (or entities) for violations of international law. Walter spoke to me about this trial and argued that Ghaddafí had funded the Provisional IRA and supplied them with guns. Indeed, Ghaddafí had sent armaments and money to the IRA in the 1970’s (Bowyer 1997), and is rumored to have supplied money to dissident republicans before his death (Ridgeway 2011). Walter traveled to the United States and met with several Congressmen, who he related as sympathetic to his cause. In late 2008, the US State Department brokered a deal, in which the Libyan Government agreed to give 1.5 billion USD to American victims of Libyan attacks (Washington Post 2011). This deal excluded foreign victims, and incensed Walter and other members of CARE. I then accompanied them on a trip to the American Embassy in Dublin, where they held a protest claiming that the US had brokered the deal in exchange for access to Libyan oil reserves.

Beyond these legal efforts, CARE participated in conferences organized by the Community Relations Council and the Victims’ Commission held throughout Northern Ireland (see Chapter 6). At these meetings, Walter would often stand and reiterate his disgruntlement with the treatment of the victims of the IRA and call for the prosecution of IRA operatives. CARE also developed transnational networks with other victims of non-state terrorism (see Chapter 8). Beyond these political efforts, the main public advocacy activity of CARE was commemoration. Commemorations offered them the chance to describe their worldview and political actions, and to link these political actions to past victimization events. In these contexts, the close association between a religious worldview, national identity, and the valorization of the past was evident.
The CARE offices offered evidence of nationalism and support for the British Army. Pictures of Queen Elizabeth II adorned most of the rooms. Two paintings idealized the work of the British Army in South Armagh. Several paintings glorified the service of Ulster regiments who participated in the Battle of the Somme during World War I. The summer before I arrived, CARE acquired a de-commissioned British Army Saracen to give tours to journalists, foreign researchers, and other interested parties. They hoped to drive the heavily armored vehicles to different sites of Protestant victimization to help the journalists and researchers understand what it was like to be a soldier in the region during the Troubles. They yearned for the past when the Army was a significant presence in the area. But driving the Saracen throughout South Armagh was also an act of intimidation. It would have the unstated effect of reminding the local Catholic population of past times in which the Army victimized them. As far as I know, these plans for Saracen tours never came to fruition.

CARE activists use Christian terminology, narratives, and iconography. Religious discourse informed Walter’s identity and the characterizations of their political foes. A small plaque that quotes Matthew 5:8: “blessed are the pure of heart, because it is they who will see God”, adorns the entrance to the CARE offices. While having coffee with Walter, I asked about the quote. He said that it was aimed at republicans: they could be redeemed but they must admit and repent for their sins. CARE also employed an evangelical reverend, who presided over all of their commemorative activities. He offered prayers before meals shared at the offices. Several of the officers of CARE self-identified as born-again Christians. The religious affiliations of the rest of the membership varied, although all of the members I spoke with expressed their
involvement in a denomination of Protestantism.

The ethno-religious identity of the CARE hierarchy, and much of its membership, informs the chronotope they use in discourse. They construct event-worlds that frame the Northern Irish conflict in biblical terms: the Troubles, and the role of justice in deciding who was right and wrong, is pinned not only to concepts of legality, but also to a more universal justice that casts right and wrong in biblical terms. Judgment against Irish republicanism is not only based upon its use of bloodshed to achieve its political goals, but on their perceived lack of religiosity. In 2010, I stood behind the CARE offices speaking with two research assistants who worked for the organization. I asked one of the researchers what they were currently working on. He gave me a shrewd glance, as if to tell me a secret that would no doubt open my view of the world, and stated that he was conducting research on the “evils of Catholicism”. He stamped out his cigarette and leaned close to me to state, “do you know what the problem with the world is?” I responded that I did not, to which he declared “Catholicism!” “It’s the devil!” His fellow research assistant quickly mentioned that they needed to leave for an appointment, but I was too interested and pursued him for further questioning.

Unionism includes a broad range of opinions about Catholicism and the Northern Irish peace process. The researcher’s sectarian view of Catholics reflects one strain of unionism that closely ties religious ideology to political identity. Many in this group often describe the Good Friday Agreement as a sign of the apocalypse, for example (Mitchell 2006: 143). Over the next few minutes, the researcher further elucidated this worldview that that cast the Catholic Church as the primary agent of evil in the world.
The practices of Catholics included the ruining of public education in Northern Ireland, and more generally, the damaging of the relationship between God and man. He again reiterated that Catholics were misguided and evil. Unable to resist, I told him that I was raised Catholic. He stepped back, offered a small apology, and then stated, “but that doesn’t matter, you’re an American”. His statement positioned me as an outsider: I could not understand his opinions, and nor could I be “evil” because my Catholicism was not an ethnic identifier. But the researcher’s rhetoric points to the blending of ethnic and religious identities. The worldview of this researcher represents only one view within CARE. His fellow researcher later expressed dismay at what his co-worker had stated. “All Catholics”, he opined, “are not evil”. The anti-Catholic researcher expressed what I believe to be an extreme version of the identity politics evident at CARE. His statements would perhaps be more at home in the 1960’s and 1970’s in Northern Ireland, when Protestant leaders such as Ian Paisley openly denigrated Catholics and the role of the Catholic Church on the island. Present-day discourse in the CARE offices revealed a tension between the desire to equate victimization with Protestantism, and the imperative to project the organization as helping victims of non-state terrorism, no matter their religious affiliation.

On many occasions, Walter assured me that there were Catholic members of CARE. These Catholics were, however, reticent to be seen in public with the group fearing that their own community would shun them. Walter was also careful to state that Catholics were as much victims of republican violence as Protestants were, the IRA used brutal methods to control its “own” population as well as that of the enemy. Walter and others often attempted to direct their anger at the political movement of republicanism
and not the ethno-religious group of Catholics. These efforts to include Catholics in the
category of the “victim” stood in uneasy relationship with their desire to equate
victimhood with Protestantism. They rarely (if ever, in my presence) admitted that the
British Army and/or loyalist factions committed crimes against the Catholic population.
To do so would complicate their deep associations of national belonging and ethno-
religious identity, and challenge the notion that the past Protestant state was a benevolent
caretaker for all ethno-nationalist groups. Their religious condemnation of republicanism
and their victimized ethno-religious identity constrains their ability to participate in the
peace process; indeed, who would cooperate with the devil? The close ties between
religious and political ideology in the organization would became apparent during their
commemorative activities. In late 2008, Walter told me that CARE would be focusing on
their annual Kingsmills commemoration for the next January. The Kingsmills
commemoration was the focal point of CARE practices towards the end of the year.

Unionist commemoration

CARE has conducted commemorations at the Kingsmills site since at least 2001.
The Kingsmills commemoration was the only event over which CARE exerted full
organizational control, and they spent months planning for it. The bereaved relatives of
the Kingsmills massacre formed the core of the original founders of the organization.
The commemoration offers a chance for the organization to produce an identity, and to
justify their efforts to derail certain features of the Northern Irish peace process, such as
the amnesty for republican prisoners and the Victims’ Commission. The other reason
that the Kingsmills commemoration is important to CARE is that by conducting the
commemoration, on the site of the massacre, they brand the event as the symbolic property of the organization. Holding the event boosts the media exposure of the organization. CARE also commemorates what is one of the clearest instances of the IRA targeting civilians for sectarian reasons. This gives them symbolic capital in the victims’ rights debate: they not only represent victims of IRA violence, but they represent some of the most aggrieved, most innocent, and unsuspecting victims of the Troubles. By standing on the site, making speeches, and even labeling the memorial wreaths with the organization’s acronym, they cast themselves as the moral victors in the long-standing debate over the definition of victimhood. To deny the political goals of CARE, would be to deny the rights of the family members of eleven mill workers killed as they carried out the banal activities of their daily lives.

The commemoration is presided over by an evangelical minister, here named the “Reverend”, who has acted as the chaplain for CARE for the past several years. He uses a socio-historical chronotope to frame his discussion of the Troubles as well as the present political moment. He continually aligns past Protestant victims with the audience, connecting them to the dead of the past through their shared ethno-nationalist category. In so doing, he builds a narrative in which Protestants are the protagonists in both the past and the present, as they try to cease their victimization at the hands of Irish republicans. I describe this chronotope as rensentiment: the Protestants cast themselves as marginalized but righteous victims, political elites as morally corrupt, and republicans are irredeemably evil. As the commemoration proceeds, the Reverend increases his use of religious terminology and anecdotes. At the end of the speech, he maps biblical allusions onto the socio-historical chronotope to authorize disproportionate attacks on the
IRA as just. Thus, the contest between republicanism and Protestantism takes on the quality of a war between the righteous and the morally depraved. Opportunities for negotiation do not exist within this broad chronotope, with its unchangingly evil antagonists. The constant unchanging nature of events—time passes but the characters continue to act out the same behaviors—excludes republicans from participation in the civil, political, and social life of Northern Ireland. The republican is not a partner in democratic dialogue; how could they continue to maim and kill innocents? Removing republicans from participation in governance will lead to peace.

The Reverend begins by linking the commemorative space with the events at Kingsmills. A small iron cross demarcates the site. A farmland surrounds the iron cross on both sides of the road, and a few eighteenth century houses are visible in the distance. The highway had substantial traffic as it did in the past as it remains a linking roadway between the M1—the main artery connecting Belfast to Dublin—and the A6, which runs east/west across Northern Ireland.

**Long suffering protagonists and the unchanging evil of republicans**

The Reverend characterizes the time between the Kingsmills massacre and the moment of commemoration as a period of unsuccessful activism and continued suffering on the part of the families of the dead. He then describes a romantic vision of a united Ireland attributed to Irish republicans. The juxtaposition of his chronotope of unending suffering with republican dreams of hypothetical national unification typecasts republicans as politically naive, and willing to pursue a romantic vision through vicious means.
The reverend begins:

**Kingsmills (KM) Excerpt 1**

1. good morning everybody
2. a very warm welcome to Kingsmills.
3. this thirty third anniversary
4. I’ll just sing the first verse of what a friend we have in Jesus.
5. ((inaudible))
6. (…) ((audience sings))
7. bow our heads
8. (... ((reverend prays))
9. this thirty third anniversary^v
10. seems every year we meet^v
11. the political landscape and so forth darkens^v
12. and uh
13. thoughts of families and friends and victims ((inaudible))
14. our answers are no nearer
15. becoming clear
16. no matter how many times we meet eminent people
17. and victims and families and those who are left weep
18. tell their story^v
19. work hard to try and make somebody explain
20. what happened

The reverend first marks the present commemoration using a calendrical adjective (line 3). This aligns the current day commemoration with the succession of years that have passed since the original event. This temporal representation acts as a foil for other deictic references that occur later in the commemoration. Whereas calendrical time emphasizes the extent of the temporal distance between the occurrence and the commemoration, deictic references telescope that length of time, and bring the audience into imagined approximation with the events at Kingsmills. In the event-world of the commemoration, the audience comes into close semiotic proximity with the dead at the same time the past is used to color the intervening thirty-three years. Suffering is both
raw and long lasting. This scene of suffering and unsuccessful activism contrasts with a hypothetical world—projected from the perspective of republicans—that casts the unification of Ireland as a romantic solution to the ethnic strife caused in the province.

After he characterizes the protagonists, he casts republicans in the role of the antagonist.

**KM 2**

1. on the other side of course our enemies
2. see the armed struggle as they call it
3. the greeting of Ireland’s fourth field we see it portrayed
4. as a great romantic myth
5. politicians talk
6. but all the the famous men that took up arms
7. fought for their country
8. and we are totally amazed and bewildered
9. to what the republican mindset to what they think and how they work
10. cause Kingsmills
11. and other sorts atrocities
12. show us the true nature of Irish republicanism
13. (...)
14. without Kingsmills and these atrocities we might’ve been nearer
15. having a friendly and happy island.
16. north and south
17. our own state our own constitution.
18. but because of Kingsmills
19. and other such happenins.
20. we are farther away than we’ve ever been
21. ((inaudible))
22. you might say Ireland would happily and peaceful with Irish nationalists

At line 3, the Reverend mentions “Ireland’s Fourth Field”. This is an allusion to Tommy Mackem’s folk song about the struggle of the Irish against the partition of Northern Ireland. In the song, an old Irish woman believes that her children will see “[her] fourth green field bloom once again”21. The four fields refers to each of Ireland’s four historical provinces, the fourth being Ulster, which is largely included in modern
Northern Ireland. The “armed struggle” (line 2) is a term used by Irish republicans to suggest that the fight against the British was a just war, born of the inability to create political and social change through democratic means. For example, in 2005, when calling for the Provisional IRA to end violence against the British state, the then President of Sinn Fein noted that, "in the past I have defended the right of the IRA to engage in armed struggle... now there is an alternative"22.

At line 10, reverend introduces the place name, Kingsmills, alluding to the event, and using that event as a stark contrast to the romantic vision of Irish unification. Linguistic anthropologists and conversation analysts study the use of proper names in conversation (Schegloff 1972, 1996, Kuipers 1984, Allerton 1996). Conventional understandings of proper names see them as denoting an object, without cultural or sociological information. Emanuel Schegloff (1996) argues that proper names are the canonical “reference simpliciter”; that is, a referential device that picks out an object but does not characterize it. Proper names ostensibly have a fixed referent, but the use here plays on that presupposition, and therein lies its rhetorical power. When one alludes to “Kingsmills,” in particular contexts, and using certain kinds of modifiers and verb constructions (e.g. “what happened at Kingsmills”), it metonymically refers to the past event, populated with the dead, dying, and the murderous. In this context, the reverend refers not merely to a place, but to an event closely associated with the village of Kingsmills. He includes Kingsmills in an alluded to litany of and other such atrocities23 (line 14). Kingsmills is a paradigmatic case of victimization of Protestants in South Armagh. The action and roles of the event--the killing of Protestant civilians by republican paramilitary members--offers the perfect dramatization of the suffering
endured by all Protestants throughout the Troubles, particularly when contrasted with the
romantic vision of Irish unification.

At line 14, he further decries the bloodshed that romantic views of Irish
unification have caused. The romanticism of Irish republicanism has destroyed any hope
for a common constitutional government. The killing of civilians has damaged the
potential reality of Irish unification. By constructing and juxtaposing different models of
history, the reverend projects potential spatiotemporal worlds and then manipulates them
to reaffirm the divisions caused by violence. In so doing, he damns the peacemaking
project in Northern Ireland as a lost opportunity: the democratic “we” of constitutional
unification will never come to fruition due to past and ongoing victimization of the
Protestant people. The Reverend also conflates historical figures of republicanism with
present-day politicians. In so doing, he re-characterizes republicans as not only dupes to
a romantic vision of unification, but also as blood thirsty murderers who have not
changed since the early twentieth century.

**KM 3**

1. we talk about
2. all the speeches made down through the years^a
3. we talk ab—maybe think the likes of De Valera
4. what a rascal
5. who done nothing but spill blood all his life
6. he talks about Ireland
7. he talks about the wonderful
8. ideas he had for Ireland and setting her free
9. and there’d be happiness and laughter in the streets
10. young maidens would be happy in the house
11. everybody be workin together
12. and there’d just be laughter
13. and nothing but sunshine every day.
14. we stand at Kingsmills this morning we say to De Valera
what went wrong.
we say to Gerry Adams^ and Martin McGuiness^ and all those other rascals our local mp Connor Murphy how do you explain Kingsmills and the other atrocities.

To dramatize the contrast between this romantic narrative and the pain of the bereaved, he constructs an imagined interaction between himself, the audience, and several historical Irish republicans. He transposes them onto the participation frame of the commemoration in order to denounce their vision of Irish politics. He names Eamon DeValera, who was the first Taosieach (Prime Minister) of the Irish Republic in 1937, and a leading republican leader of the original Irish rebels at the Easter rebellion in 1916. The Reverend animates DeValera by expressing his ideal of a united Ireland. The lexical choice of maidens indexes romance narrative genres (line 10). Attributing this romantic and archaic narrative to republican politicians, the Reverend juxtaposes it with the events that transpired at Kingsmills. At lines 14-15, the Reverend speaks to the historical figure of De Valera as if present at the commemoration. The protagonists become the audience standing with the Reverend at the commemoration site (line 14). They speak as a unified voice against the dead republican. DeValera stands with the audience as a representative of the crimes of republicans. The crimes of DeValera are the same as modern republican crimes despite the significant differences between his actions during the Anglo-Irish War and the Irish Civil War. This erases the temporal and contextual differences between the past and the present, and creates a mythic temporal aesthetic that casts history as a long series of attacks conducted by republicans.
The construction of righteous victims

To this point, the Reverend has indirectly characterized the protagonists—both the dead and the living audience members—using contrasts between the audience and Irish republicans. Here, he casts the demands of the bereaved as based upon Christian belief by shifting from the two competing historical models of the Troubles to a trans-temporal and trans-spatial narrative of biblical revenge. The timeless claims of the Old Testament support the prosecution of war. This biblical vision, authored by the highest authority, maps onto the space-time of the Northern Irish Troubles. The authority of God fully invalidates the vision that republicans have of the “armed conflict” and grants Protestants the right to demand republican exclusion from the post-conflict state.

KM 3

1. thi-this isn’t a political sermon
2. its not in anyway meant to be uh uh
3. time to say things that might enflame a situation
4. but in the truth of God’s word and as Christian people this morning
5. there comes a time whenever we have to say no
6. that is not the way we remember
7. the so called armed struggle.
8. today friends as we stand on this hillside
9. we read that lovely psalm.
10. psalm was David tellin you all about the feelings we had
11. he was continually troubled by enemies on every side
12. ((inaudible))
13. as we stand here today the psalm was David of course
14. and the psalm was to Israel
15. Israel’s most famous king
16. and I couldn’t help thinkin this morning is it is an awful pity that we hadn’t
17. the Israelis’ government instead of our British government.
18. the Israelis’ government King David’s
19. government of his country are the only government in the world
20. that knows how to truthfully look after its citizens.
21. and if you fire a rocket at me
I’ll fire two back
and kill one of me and I’ll kill ten of yous.
and that is totally scriptural and right
this morning friends
the idea is just to gather here every year.
just to remember what happened.
in picking Kingsmills for the service every year
it does not put Kingsmills as it were above other UDR men and police men and
protestants who were shot.
but Kingsmills to me is very reflective
of the status that the protestants had in South Armagh.
and the mindset of republicans toward us.

The use of the membership category *Christian people* distinguishes between those who agree and disagree with the Reverend (and the audience for whom he speaks). The religious description of the audience combines with an axiomatic representation of their view of history (line 4). The noun *truth*, when used in religious discourse, may also project temporal and spatial transcendence to the political demands it describes (line 4). "Truth" gives his demands more timeless authority than the historically particular demands of Irish republicanism. Whereas the necessity of a unified Ireland is debatable and historically contingent, the “Word of God” is not. The religious law of the Old Testament, which governs all of the actions of men, justifies past and future use of violence against republicans. The religious reference embeds the previous contrast between victims and republicans into new categories of the righteous and the morally depraved, and justifies the use of extreme force against the latter category based upon their implied exclusion from the category of *Christian people*.

The Reverend integrates the audience into these categories, *as we stand here today* (line 13). Using the proper name *Israel*, he compares the government of Britain
and Israel using the plural and possessive pronouns, we, and our (lines 13, 17). In this excerpt the proper name Israel serves as an allusory device similar to the use of Kingsmills; he alludes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel evokes the state of the Old Testament as well as the modern nation-state without distinction between the two entities. This axiomatic statement suggests that religious meanings of conflict that were true thousands of years ago remain true today. The Irish English second-person plural yous does not have an explicit referent (line 23). The maxim refers to the enemies of modern day Israel (Palestinian militant groups) as well as Irish Catholics (Irish republicans). The biblical allusion, mapped onto his narrative of the Troubles, justifies vengeance against republicans. This discursive construct is common in political and religious discourse in many contexts, and it serves to legitimate political and cultural policies aimed as cultural and political maintenance vis-a-vis these real or imagined threats. The “siege mentality” is also a feature of Nietzsche’s ressentiment as the righteous use spatial metaphors to cast the “external” world in dichotomous and morally stark terms.

To conclude the ceremony, the Reverend shifts back to the here-and-now of the commemoration. He has to this point focused on pinning the crimes at Kingsmills on not only the individual perpetrators, but also the ideology of Irish republicanism. In this excerpt, he constructs all Protestants—civilian, police officers, and British Army personnel—as the righteous victims of political violence. He extends the category of victimhood to the wider category of Protestants using the action of being shot (line 30). UDR men were members of the Ulster Defense Regiment, a majority Protestant infantry regiment founded in 1970.
The proper names index individuality, these were people with desires, hopes, fears, loved ones, and friends. In a similar manner to other memorials, such as the Vietnam Memorial in Washington DC, or the reading of personal names at Holocaust commemorations, the personal names bring home to the people listening that these were individuals like themselves that suffered, and that the dead were not only social
categories. Personal names also carry social information. The last names of individuals may index ethnic belonging. In this case, the names have taken on an iconic status over time; they represent all of the Protestant dead. From the original newspaper reports that listed the dead in 1976, to the small wooden crosses with last names hand-written onto them that posted to the fence that runs along the road to Bessbrooke, the names have been used since 1976 to refer back to the massacre, and to cast it as a sectarian attack. The names are also on a plaque in the CARE office. They refer to the individual dead, but extend this sense of individuality—with all of the emotions that come with the loss of a known person—to all of the Protestant dead. At the commemoration, the listing of the names gives a textual feel of expansive bereavement. As the names continue, the audience may feel a sense of immense loss as each name represents an individual. For the bereaved, the proper names call up memories of their individual life histories: their families, work, and social lives. By the time he lists the names they are already part of an ethnic membership category that includes the audience and all Ulster Protestants. This juxtaposition produces a deeply personal and ethnicized identity of victimhood.

**Conclusion**

The Reverend describes several episodes all arranged within or in contrast to a chronotope of unending suffering and victimization. The socio-historical frame, which I have described as the *ressentiment chronotope*, includes the commemorative event and a litany of atrocities conducted by republicans. This chronotope of *ressentiment* contrasts with the romantic vision of the world offered by Irish republicans. This great “romantic myth” of both the armed struggle and the unification of the island stand in stark contrast
to the actions of republicans against Protestants. The reverend is not describing two equally valid visions of the course of Irish history and the potentials of unification. The romanticism of republicans is a façade; it covers up their dirty deeds. The litany of republican atrocities against Protestants legitimates his depiction of them as morally degraded murderers. In the *ressentiment* chronotope, republicans can do nothing but victimize the righteous. He compounds the moral degradation of republicans when he maps biblical battles between King David and his unnamed enemies onto the Irish conflict with the Protestants fitting into David’s role and republicans filling the role of God’s enemies. There can be no negotiation between the enemies of God, particularly the God of the Old Testament, and the righteous. The reverend’s depiction of the Troubles, and the layering of timeless righteous just war onto that depiction, fully legitimates violence and other retributive actions against republicans.

This spatiotemporal framing of the Irish conflict does not address those instances in which the British Army, and loyalist paramilitaries, victimized Catholic civilians. He casts republicans as evil not only because they killed Protestants but also because they fought against the Northern Irish and British states. This becomes evident in his Israel analogy: the state is the legitimate arbiter of force and may retaliate against threats. In Chapter 6, I will describe unionist narratives given at a public meeting in Ballymena. These unionists further elaborate the Reverend’s argument: that republicans were engaged in illegal acts of war. This argument equates legality and ethno-religious identity with the state, and thus excepts the state from accusations of illegal acts of violence. Just as unionists argue for a state of exception for republicans. Protestants should not be subject to prosecution for actions that violate international or domestic law,
such as the killing of unarmed civilians. Justice after the Troubles should be selective and determined by ethnic identification.

The next chapter will study a republican commemoration of a British Army attack on Catholic civilians in an area I have called “Lakewood” in west Belfast. In CARE’s case, we see the construction of a victimized identity that demands vengeance and the exclusion of the enemy, we see at Lakewood a set of more specific demands embedded in a chronotope that focuses on the detailed movements of protagonists and their biographical histories.
Chapter 3: Republican commemoration and the exoneration of the dead

This chapter will analyze a commemoration held in West Belfast in 2008 by the Lakewood Research Group (LRG). Unlike the commemoration at Kingsmills, this commemoration focuses solely on the short histories of individuals before they die. Speakers portray these individuals as engaged in altruistic behaviors. They then link themselves to the victims using familial categories. This creates an aesthetic of victimhood that emphasizes personal loss and not ethno-religious identity as depicted at Kingsmills. The motives of the antagonist British Army soldiers are unclear. Instead of describing motivation, the speakers cast the Army as repeatedly killing innocents no matter their political or national affiliation. Thus, their claims against the state, based upon specific instances of personal grievance and unlawful killing, only implicitly connect to wider socio-political processes. This legitimates their prosecutory efforts against the British state.

Activists first conceptualized the LRG in 1998. The republican victims’ rights organization Relatives for Justice held a conference focusing on “The Forgotten Victims.” The conference discussed victims of state violence in Northern Ireland that were not, at that time, subjects of inquiries or well known to the general public. Family members of what would soon be known as the “Lakewood Eleven” met, some for the first time, at the conference and decided to pursue recognition and an internationally sponsored tribunal for their family members. The “Lakewood Eleven” refers to a group of eleven men and women killed by the British Army between August 9th and 11th, 1971.

In 1971, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner, introduced
internment into the province. This policy allowed the British government to detain suspected terrorists for up to seven days without charge. On August 9th, the British Army launched Operation Demetrius to detain suspects. Riots ensued when the army moved into housing estates in north-west Belfast. During two days of rioting, the army killed 11 individuals (10 during those two days and one who died two weeks after). The Army imposed a curfew on Lakewood in West Belfast, and tried to stop people from moving through the streets. This often stopped the civilians from getting vital supplies such as bread and milk, and nearly 7,000 people left West Belfast, roughly 2,300 fled to refugee camps in the Irish Republic. Many of those arrested had no paramilitary affiliation, but were instead non-political civilians or civil rights activists. The European Commission of Human Rights and the later European Court of Human Rights criticized internment policy. Much of this criticism focused on the fact that authorities only targeted suspected republican paramilitary members, and did not arrest any loyalist paramilitary members.

After Operation Demetrius, the British government held an inquest under the chairmanship of Edmund Compton, a Parliamentary Commissioner. The Report did not describe the killing of the eleven civilians, and absolved the Security forces of all wrongdoing. As the report states:

The record of events reflects great credit on the security forces, who carried out a difficult and dangerous operation in adverse circumstances with commendable restraint and discipline (Compton 1971, Section 13).

The British held individual inquests on the killings, but they have not publicized them. The individual inquests, as well as the Compton Report, indicate that the actions of the British Army were justified due to the brutality of IRA sanctioned violence in
Northern Ireland during 1971. LRG members have limited access to the individual inquests on each death. The LRG members suggest that the inquest reports indicate, if not explicitly declare, that the killings were justified due to the activities of the victims. The re-classification of the dead as innocent remains the primary goal of the LRG, and the “Walk of Truth” aims to establish this.

The LRG is also engaged in a wider public campaign to gain recognition of the innocence of their loved ones, and to demand compensation from the British Government. In 2012, they presented their case to the United States House of Representatives, and have met with numerous other domestic and foreign politicians. In 2011, the Attorney General of Northern Ireland authorized a new inquest into the killings, but in early 2013, the Coroner’s Office—that authorizes inquests into past killings—suspended the declaration of the Attorney General. The Head Coroner indicated that the Attorney General did not have the legal power to launch the inquest. Several member families of the LRG have launched a lawsuit to challenge the Coroner’s ruling.

Beyond their specific efforts related to the events in 1971, LRG activists attended numerous public meetings relating to victims’ rights in Northern Ireland. At these meetings, and in my own interviews with them, they expressed support for the Northern Irish peace process. They readily engaged in conferences and programs to tell their stories of loss and to gain publicity for their campaign. But they also expressed dissatisfaction with how past crimes were being handled by the government, included the seeming lack of willingness and ability on the part of legislature, Historical Enquiries Team, and the Attorney General’s office, to force the British government to release
materials related to the killings. Many of the LRG activists participated in cross-community conferences, in which supporters of the Security Forces and republicans engaged in discussions about how to help victims of violence from all sides of the conflict. For the LRG activists, the demands of unionist and British bereaved and wounded did not impinge on their own demands, and as one activist stated to me in an interview, “justice should prevail, and we should have full access to justice as should others.”

In 2008, the founders of the LRG held an annual “Walk of Truth” in which they walked through Lakewood stopping at the various places in which their family members were killed by the British Army. The Walk of Truth wound through the streets of Lakewood and stopped at the locations where the British killed individuals. Once stopped, a relative, friend, or witness of the killings gave a short talk on the context in which the person was killed and often other information, such as vignettes about their personal lives. About 60 people attended this meeting, including the President of Sinn Fein, Gerry Adams. At each location, the LRG laid a small wooden cross. By 2010, the LRG replaced the crosses with small plaques with the name, age, and date of the individuals.

The Walk of Truth is a commemorative event like that of Kingsmills. Both events publicize the deaths of individuals killed during the Troubles. Both events characterize the dead as innocent civilians and they achieve the goals of commemoration as elucidated by Connerton (1989): they help the audience experience history in an embodied way. By standing on the sites of past victimization events, the audience feels
themselves to be part of history, and they imagine the ground upon which the past occurred. Similar to Kingsmills, the LRG uses the Walk of Truth to publicize their political goals and actions. They reproduce some of the same tropes: as activists, they have worked long and hard to gain recognition from the public and justice for their dead loved ones with little success. But beyond this basic trope, the two commemorations differ markedly. The Kingsmills commemoration produces an identity that equates victimization with Protestantism. At Lakewood, the activists make only indirect references to ethno-nationalist identity. At Kingsmills, we see Protestants as continually under threat by republicans, and much of the emphasis of that speech goes towards condemning republicans. At Lakewood, we will see very little discussion of the perpetrators of the crimes and no descriptions of the present as a time of continued persecution.

The following excerpts are from the 2008 commemoration ceremony. The ceremony consisted of about 60 attendees, most of whom were locals in ages ranging from the very young to the elderly. I will present several of the speeches below, which I have deemed representative of the rest of the speeches given on that day. The master of ceremonies, referred to here as Robert, gives many of the speeches and/or asks family members to offer a few words about the individuals that died. The commemoration proceeds to different locations in Lakewood based upon the locations of the deaths. For example, the first scene occurred on August 9th whereas the second occurred on the 11th. This is due to geographical necessity. Participants (many of whom were elderly) could not walk across Lakewood, and back, to keep the linear temporal sequence of the events similar to how they actually occurred. Instead, the commemoration proceeds up the
Springfield Road towards the Northwest, and then cuts down into a housing project where other deaths occurred. At each location, Robert or another LRG member, describes the scene of the deaths, and then narrates the action. They focus on still existent or verbally reconstructed features of the built environment to pinpoint the physical location of the action. They then describe the protagonists using proper names and predications that emphasize their altruism.

The first excerpt is taken from a speech focusing on the deaths Joan Connolly, Noel Phillips, Danny Taggart, and Josie Murphy were killed by the British Army on August 9th. Joan Connolly was the only woman killed in Lakewood between the 9th and 11th of August. These deaths occurred after the British Army had cordoned off Lakewood with barbed wire, and inhabitants gathered at British Army barricades to riot or to protest peacefully. The protagonists in these narratives mill about undertaking daily activities. First, I will show how the speakers construct the scenes of the murders. Then I will show the characterizations of victims and perpetrators.

*Death and altruism by the Henry Taggart Army Base*

On August 9th, the British Army launched a dawn raid in Lakewood. They forcibly dragged men from their homes in the early hours. This caused civilians to move out into the street to protest the raid. Many young men started to pelt the British Army Saracens (a type of armored vehicle) with rocks and petrol bombs. The Army drew barbed wire across the Whiterock road and other roads into Lakewood, effectively cutting it off from the rest of Belfast. That morning, four individuals died from British Army gunfire. The Army claimed that those killed were firing at the Army installations.
In this first narrative, Robert describes the deaths of four individuals. It is unclear what Noel Phillips was doing when he was shot, but in the ensuing minutes, a mother of eight, Joan Connolly, rushed to help him. The British Army on the Whiterock Road killed her and two other individuals as they tried to assist Phillips.

*Lakewood Walk of Truth (LWT) (Robert) Excerpt 1*

1. hello
2. could we all come together again please
3. we now
4. at the spot
5. where Joe Donnolly Noel Phillips Danny Taggert Josie Murphy were murdered.
6. in case people don’t know
7. right facing the Henry Taggert British Army base
8. people was yards away
9. at exactly the same time
10. local people were standing on at the top a ((Lakewood)).
11. when the British army opened fire
12. Noel Phillips
13. a young man of nineteen was shot and wounded
14. as he lay cryin for help
15. a mother of eight children Joan Connolly went to his aid?
16. she was heard to say^
17. it’s alright son
18. I’m coming to you
19. Joan was shot in the face.
20. and as she lay on the ground a local man tried to get to her^ which resulted in them also bein shot
21. when this atrocity was over
22. Daniel Taggert a father of thirteen children
23. was shot fourteen times
24. and Joan Connolly lay dead.

The Kingsmills ceremony, and of course the original massacre, occurred on the side of a country highway. The Reverend does not describe the place in any detail as it is taken for granted that the physical landscape has not changed radically since 1976. The
LRG speaker is speaking in an urban environment that has changed radically since the events of 1971. At line 8, Robert refers to a British Army base that stood across the road from his location; a nursing home now stands in its place. The Henry Taggart Army Base will become increasingly important in the retelling of the events of 1971. Several victims of the Lakewood killings died en-route or in British custody at the base. Because of this, the speakers during the Walk of Truth often orient themselves towards its past location.

In the Walk of Truth, speakers use familial categories extensively (mother, father, brother, sister). At line 1 Robert introduces one of the characters, Noel Phillips, who is immediately shot and wounded. Joan Connolly engages in a heroic act when she enters the scene, she is also a mother. At line 18, Robert voices Joan in the narrative, transporting the audience to the scene of the attack. The use of the familial noun “son” is common in Irish English and indexes generational differences between the addressee and the addressee. It may also index affinity on the part of the speaker for the addressee. The use of this noun in the voicing of Joan amplifies her depiction as a mother of eight; her maternal nature is extended to the wounded young man she attempts to save. Robert drops this voicing, and the perspective from Joan to the narrator, Joan was shot in the face (line 20). This sudden shift in perspective reproduces the experience of sudden loss for the audience. Her voice will no longer be heard.

The dead and the dying continue to populate the narrative. At line 21, a local man attempts to save Joan. The descriptor local is used in Irish English to signal familiarity with individuals and characterize them as a member of a proximal “community.” It can
be used to contrast any group rooted to some geographical metric, such as one street in Catholic West Belfast from another. In this context, the descriptor *local* distinguishes the residents of Lakewood from the foreign British Army personnel. At line 24, Daniel Taggert, the local man, is named and characterized as a father of thirteen children. This characterization echoes that of Joan Connolly: he is a family man and many individuals suffered his loss. This episode of the narrative has concluded, and ends with finality as *Joan Connolly lay dead* (line 26). The striking contrasts presented in this short episode repeat throughout the Walk of Truth. Robert and other family members describe the victims using terms of familiarity and family, and then violence ends their movement through space.

The commemoration moves northwest to the Whiterock Road. There is no linguistic description of the transition between the death of Joan Connolly and the next episode, instead, the two events share altruistic and biographical characterizations.

*The deaths of Joe Corr and John Laverty*

In the next excerpt, LRG activists further humanize victims of the Internment Massacre. A sister describes her home life with her brother. Her image of the home, filled with laughter and then made silent by her brother’s death, casts him as a caring individual connected to others via strong familial bonds. The second sister describes the heartache caused by the British Army cover up of her brother’s death. Each of the following excerpts occur in locations, a home and an army barrack, far away in space and time from the built environment of Lakewood. This expands the sense of grief felt by those who loved the victims beyond the specific times and place of 1971 Lakewood. The
feeling of grief extends into their homes, into their personal lives, and remains with them.

The most intensive raids occurred on the 9th and 10th of August, but on the 11th of August, the British Army again moved from their fortified positions on Black Mountain and the Springfield Road into Lakewood. In the early hours of the morning, the British shot two men, Joe Corr and John Laverty. They were arrested after they were shot, and died in custody. The families of Corr and Laverty allege that they died due to willful negligence on the part of British Army medical personnel. The British Government has released the coroners’ reports on these two individuals, which the family believe falsely indicate that the gunshots were immediately fatal.

To narrate the deaths of Joe Corr and John Laverty, the LRG picked a spot near where witnesses believe the events occurred. They opt to have the sisters of Corr and Laverty discuss the emotional impact of their deaths instead of narrating them in any detail (as the details are unknown).

\textit{LWT 2 (Rita)}

1. everyone whose lost a loved one will know it’s all the little things you miss when they’re gone
2. when I think of our John
3. I remember having to run to keep up with him
4. with his big long legs
5. I remember his big hearty laugh
6. the glint in his brown eyes especially when his Beth came up
7. John loved to sing
8. and his voice echoed through our home as did the banter and the laughter from the boys room.
9. but after the eleventh of August
10. our home family home fell silent.
11. the singing stopped.
12. the banter and the laughter from the boys room had gone.
13. John was dead
Terry was in prison and our Martin was alone. Like countless other family’s of our community we have lost a loved one. We will never forget them. Thank you very much.

In this excerpt John’s sister, who we will call “Rita”, describes him in terms of his physical presence (line 5), and psychological characteristics indexed metonymically by physical actions (line 7). This figurative characterization of his personality emphasizes the physicality of John as well as his large personality. She animates a picture of John, with his hearty laugh and singing, thus giving the audience a visual and aural vision of his personality. The scene occurs in a different place from that of the commemoration, the domestic home. In contrast with the violence of public space, the home is a place of familial bonding and positive emotions. The list, and parallel use of was, poetically compounds the sense of loss experienced by the family members (lines 15-16). The death shatters the positive valence of the home. This was a common experience of those in the community, as Rita likens her loss to that of others (line 18). She uses the vague category in the same way that Robert does, with the deictic our she links the dead of the past to an unstated social aggregate. This aggregate shares in her grief as others share in hers. The description of community only comes after a description of the individual loss suffered by the family. Therefore, unlike Kingsmills, reference to ethno-nationalist identity is indirect and perfunctory. The emphasis is on the individual dead and their unwarranted suffering.

The cover-up exacerbates the suffering caused by Joe Corr and John Laverty's
John Laverty’s sister, here named “Janet”, argues that Corr and Laverty were innocent civilians, and not members of a paramilitary organization.

*LWT 3(Janet)*

1. John could he have been here today
2. but for
3. you know it’s just circumstances that happened
4. the British Army comin over the mountain loney and just anybody was a target
5. but the thing that really hurts really hurts us as a family more than anything
6. is the cover-ups surroundin these two deaths especially
7. all the deaths have been covered up put down ((inaudible))
8. these people have been provin in courts that no there was no guns ever found
9. these were innocent civilians
10. so:
11. there’s nothing else I can say thank you

Janet, similar to the other speakers during the Walk of Truth, does not elaborate on the psychological or moral natures of the British perpetrators. The antagonist nouns lack qualifying adjectives or other descriptions. Unlike the murderous republicans described at Kingsmills, the speakers merely reference the well-known fact that the Army killed the individuals. Her focus is not on the motives of the Army, but rather on establishing the dead as innocent civilians (line 9). Hence, the temporal scale of the scene is very narrow (focusing only on the events between August 9th and August 11th in Lakewood).

*The death of Paddy McCarthy*

In 1971, an English Quaker, Paddy McCarthy, moved to Lakewood to work for
the Tenant’s Association. As a community worker, he sought to alleviate some of the socio-economic problems faced by the residents of Lakewood. On August 11th, he loaded a dolly with bread and milk. He tried to leave a community center on the Whiterock Road while waiving a white flag. He was shot in the hand and had to retreat back into the center. After waiting a few hours, he walked with the dolly into an adjacent housing estate in order to deliver bread and milk to families. Residents found him on the sidewalk several hours later. The LRG claims that British soldiers subjected him to a mock execution, which resulted in a heart attack.

The scene is similar to that described in the death of Joan Connolly and others, in its description of the specific actions of the victims and the British. In this case, the British soldiers are vindictive and teasing mock executioners. This is perhaps due to their close proximity to McCarthy before his death (they held an empty gun to his head). This episode belies the claims of the Army—that they were targeting paramilitary members from a distance—and casts them as sadistic bullies.

McCarthy serves an important semiotic role in the Lakewood commemoration as his death focuses the audience on the illegality of state-sponsored violence and the innocence of the dead: the Army killed Catholics, but they also victimized English nationals. This reinforces the notion that the political demands of the LRG activists hinge not upon ethno-nationalist difference, but upon the illegal killing of civilians by a culpable state.

*LWT* 4(Robert)

1. it was at this spot that Paddy McCarthy
2. despite his name an Englishman
3. died as a result of treatment by the uh paratroopers
4. paddy was a youth worker who came into Lakewood in November 1970
5. and he was actually workin in the Lakewood community center out on the Whiterock road
6. on the eleven—well he he wasn’t workin it was in like a refugee center
7. whenever paddy received a supply of bread and milk
8. on the night of the tenth of august 1971
9. and he was determined that he would deliver that bread and milk on the morning of the eleventh of August

In his ethnography on Catholic and Protestant relations in 1970’s Belfast, the sociologist Frank Burton identifies a phenomenon which he labels “telling” (1979). Telling refers to the interactive moments in which strangers try to figure out the ethnic category of their interlocutor. One means for telling a Catholic from a Protestant (and vice versa) are first and last names. In some cases, individuals use proper names to index ethnicity. For example, the first name ‘Patrick’ indicates that one comes from a Catholic background. Certain surnames may also carry this information. Patronymic surnames indicate a person’s paternal relationships. For example, the Anglicized form of the Gaelic ‘O’ (Ua in Gaelic) in O’Sullivan indicates that the individual is the grandson of Sullivan. ‘Mac’, or the shortened form ‘Me’ in MacDonnell or McDonnell indicates that the person is the son of Donnell. This is why the speaker notes that Paddy was an Englishman despite his name. He inhabits the same national category as many of the soldiers but shares an ethnic lineage with the local community. This blurs the local/British dichotomy set up earlier in the speech. Paddy’s death, and the liminal ethnic category that he inhabits, show that the British Army indiscriminately killed civilians no matter their ethnicity or national belonging. Robert’s activity was altruistic like Joan
Connolly. He was a community worker that habitually delivered milk and bread to the local residents. Paddy was willing to deliver the bread and milk in spite of the violent situation in the streets of Lakewood. The category of “victim” bridges ethno-nationalist difference due to the category-specific activities of having a family and conducting altruistic actions.

The rest of the narrative of Paddy follows his repeated attempts to leave a community center that was under siege by the British Army. Despite his wounds, he is determined to deliver his cache of milk and bread to the local community. The British Army then stops him in the alleyway where the audience stands.

*LWT 5(Robert)*

1. and ended up in a confrontation here
2. with the British Army
3. they stopped em
4. they harassed em
5. they gave em verbal abuse
6. they gave em physical abuse
7. and he says to em look
8. do whatever it is you’re gonna do
9. they’d threatened to shoot ‘em in the back
10. do whatever it is you’re gonna do cause I’m goin to deliver this bread and milk
11. and as he walked away from the confrontation with two of the paratroopers
12. he actually took a heart attack and died.

This conclusion to the narrative of Paddy’s death is similar in structure to the other victimization events described at the Walk of Truth. Robert voices Paddy’s altruistic determination to save others (line 10). Like Joan Connolly before him, his stubborn desire to help others gets him killed. The semantic meaning of the verbs—*shot,*
died—and the simple past tense silences the altruistic actions of the protagonists. The personae are dramatized, brought to life as altruistic protagonists, and then killed. This sequence of action in Roberts' narratives heightens the experience of loss felt by the audience.

At the conclusion of the Walk of Truth, Robert outlines the demands of the LRG:

**LWT 6(Robert)**

1. these families
2. these families
3. have survived without public recognition
4. or legal redress for all of this time
5. with the process of transition
6. from war to peace
7. now underway
8. the families demand
9. an independent international investigation
10. examining all of the circumstances
11. surroundin all of the deaths
12. the British government to issue a statement of innocence
13. and public apology
14. as individuals.

Robert finishes the ceremony with a common trope in victims’ advocacy: that the bereaved have long sought recompense for crimes committed against their loved ones. This trope was evident at Kingsmills as well, as the Reverend describes victims as long-suffering because they have no answers as to who killed the eleven mill workers. This trope is perhaps quite common in other contexts, as activists use the dead as the basis for making political demands. The dead were innocent, and the British government should exonerate them.

**Conclusion**
Activists at Kingsmills and Lakewood link the present to past crimes using different tropes that link the past dead with the present audience. The deaths at Kingsmills fit into a socio-historical chronotope. By linking different attacks on Protestants together, the activists equate victimhood, not just at Kingsmills but also throughout the Troubles and even into the present, with being Protestant. The unionist activists legitimate their victimized identities, their refusal to accept that republicans were victims of violence, and their continued demands and political efforts against parity of esteem as evidenced in the Victims’ Commission and other institutions in the post-conflict government. Institutions of the peace process are corrupt because the officials running them fail to recognize that republicans—across space and time—only aim to kill, murder, and maim. The state should kill or prosecute republicans, and disqualify them from participation in government. Martin McGuinness, a former Provisional IRA commander, should not be the Deputy First Minister because he is a republican, and republicans cannot change or give up violent means. The moral victors, the true victims, are Protestants who suffered at the hands of the IRA. The state should also deny republicans the cultural and political prestige that may come with belonging to the category of victimhood: Protestants are the moral victors, and republicans are morally corrupt. The ceremony at Kingsmills legitimates their calls for what Agamben (2003) calls a “state of exception”, the exclusion of a category of individuals from participation in the full rights of democratic citizenship.

CARE continues to push for criminal investigations against the killers at Kingsmills. However, the ways in which they use place, time, and categories of personhood to frame these claims leaves them with little success for gaining public
support in Northern Ireland. This also may explain, in part, the failure of their civil suits against the Northern Irish state, such as their suit against republican participation on the Victims’ Commission. No domestic or international court will conduct investigations based upon guilt by association. Hence, the chronotopic representations evident at Kingsmills facilitate unionist non-participation and challenge the new post-conflict government because the post-conflict state will not recognize ethno-nationalist identity as a metric for calculating moral and political victory.

The LRG arranges events based upon the qualities of the dead individuals. They describe the minutiae of the deaths of individuals killed by the British Army. The events at Lakewood do not occur in a broad socio-historical chronotope, they are not representative of all Army action in the province during the Troubles, nor are they examples of the treatment of Catholics in the present-day. The LRG contrasts British Army personnel and the audience/victims using a local/foreign dichotomy. This indirectly characterizes the “locals” as Irish natives and the Army as a “foreign” force. Otherwise, they do not explicitly demarcate the ethnic differences between the Army and the Catholic Irish. Moreover, Robert uses the death of Paddy McCarthy to show that the British Army indiscriminately killed its own citizens, and that the definition of victimhood depends upon the rights violating behavior of the state and not ethno-nationalist membership. This allows LRG activists to make arguments against the state that are based in established law not only in Great Britain, but in Europe as well. If they can show that the Army abused and murdered citizens in this particular instance, then they will potentially gain some compensation and documents relating to the deaths that would shed further light on the events. They may also be able to prosecute the
individuals responsible for the killings, both political and military personnel. This is the reason they do not use ethno-nationalist categories to refer to the victims. Such categories might imply—as they do at Kingsmills—that sectarian motivations led the British Army to kill. Proving that the British Army was sectarian is much more difficult than showing that they, at the very least, unlawfully killed non-combatants. Their implicit chronotopic framing of the events at Lakewood thus legitimize their challenge to the past British state based upon laws that protect civilians from undue force.

It is important to note that discourse during the Lakewood Walk of Truth does not describe the context as a colonial situation, which is common in republican political discourse about the Troubles (i.e. The Catholics as minority victims of a colonial power). Anti-colonial discourses persist in other kinds of political talk among republicans in Northern Ireland, but victims’ advocates carefully avoid casting the deaths of their loved ones as the result of a colonizing power killing an oppressed minority, although we do see implicit local/foreign distinctions throughout the Walk of Truth. Anti-colonial discourses appeal to networks of activists to the left of the political spectrum. LRG activists want to gain international recognition for their loved ones on the international stage. Using the anti-colonial trope would risk alienating them from these potential allies. Casting the dead as victims of a colonial power would also risk associating the dead with republican paramilitary members, which is antithetical to their key goals.

The next three chapters will describe the chronotope used by peace activists. Peace workers project scenes of victimization that occur at a province-wide scale. The violence of Northern Ireland is also part of a universal course of human conflict fueled by
revenge. This chronotope, and the categories of personhood animated therein, legitimates restorative justice methods.
Chapter 4: Lex talonis and the discourse of reconciliation

Thus far, we have seen republican and unionist victims’ rights groups demand to know what happened to their loved ones. These victims’ groups, organized along politically ideological lines, are not the only actors in the debates about victims’ rights. There are also numerous charitable and government affiliated organizations that distribute funding, organize conferences, and liaison with victims’ rights groups. These “peace and reconciliation groups” are composed of peace activists that genuinely believe that they work for the welfare of the population and seek to improve its condition by reducing the causes of violence. Peace activists aim to reduce the causes of conflict, and in the socio-political logic of peacemaking, this means reducing the chance that the victimized will become victimizers.

This vision of violence and peace in Northern Ireland is the result of activists’ attempts to implement restorative justice theory into a domestic political context. Activists use the model of victim/offender reconciliation derived from restorative justice and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1996-1998), but because of the 1998 general amnesty and the British state’s reticence to release information on past deaths, the ability of activists to compel offenders to participate in the process is limited. These political impediments to offender accountability have given rise to a discourse that devalues state and supra-state prosecution of offenders, and asks victims to draw a line under the past, to “move on”, by telling their stories and coping with the violence that affected them. To legitimate these peace building tactics, peace activists frame their discussion of the Troubles—and all human violence—in a mythic chronotope that posits
a series of developmental stages for society. Societies move from a state of primitive violence fueled by revenge to a future state characterized by reconciliation and sharing. The end of retributive demands is the catalyst for this forward progression.

Peace workers have operated in Northern Ireland since the beginning of the Troubles. These early peacemakers were concerned civilians, members of religions with traditions of peacemaking (such as the Quakers), and public sector workers. One of my research informants—a woman now in her late 60’s—worked for the Housing Authority on the Gravaghy Road in Portadown, Northern Ireland. Portadown is a majority Protestant city, but the Gravaghy road became a Catholic enclave after the start of the Troubles. She worked tirelessly to negotiate agreements between the Catholics on the Gravaghy Road and the neighboring Protestants during strikes and the parading season. There are numerous stories similar to this one across Northern Ireland as citizens, religious workers, and public sector workers tried to mediate between the communities. This low-level activism characterized the peace movement in the early days of the Troubles.

Beginning in the 1990’s, the British, Irish, and American governments started supporting non-profit organizations in the province. These groups created community centers, tried to dissuade youths from joining paramilitaries, and rehabilitated ex-convicts. This surge of funding, particularly the PEACE programs funded by the European Council and then the European Union, changed the nature of these activities in Northern Ireland. The donors and the surfeit of funds that they produced demanded that these organizations be subject to oversight. This oversight, in the form of regional and
sub-regional District Partnership committees, homogenized the discourse of peacemaking. It became increasingly rare for concerned civilians, such as the informant referenced above, to become engaged in local-level mediation as non-governmental agencies took the lead in negotiating disputes. The work of reconciliation became a profession with its own expert discourse.

By 2007, the Community Relations Council (CRC) regulated peacemaking organizations; it distributes funds and holds conferences for peacemaking organizations. A statement of intent by the 1986 Standing Advisory on Human Rights established the council in 1990. The CRC funds many of the victims’ rights organizations studied in this dissertation. As such, it acts as a mediating organization between civil society and the government. It also tries to bring republicans and unionists into conversation with one another regarding many issues such as parading, policing, and victims’ rights. It differs from these partisan groups in that it claims no special interest aside from its organizational mantra to “promote a peaceful and fair society based on mutual trust” (CRC, “About Us”).

Because of its funding power and its relationship to other granting agencies, such as the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister, the CRC wields a great deal of clout over civil society.

The CRC also monitors non-profit organizations for what is termed “political activities”. These activities include the explicit support of a political party or the explicit support of one ethnic group over another. Non-profits may work for a specific community, such as CARE’s work with South Armagh Protestants, but they cannot explicitly support a political stance (see the conclusion for the fate of CARE after they
repeatedly supported stanch unionist policy)\textsuperscript{28}. This pressure from above has created a particular kind of spatiotemporal framing of the Troubles and the peace process. Most groups that receive CRC funds use this framing to legitimate their work. This “reconciliation chronotope” reflects peacemaking discourses used in other contexts.

Human rights activists and politicians developed peace-building programs, often categorized as “transitional justice programs”, as a means to resolve conflict in the post-Cold War Era. Documents such as *The Agenda for Peace*—written in 1992 by the Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros-Ghali—called for the synchronization of nascent international judicial institutions with local practices in countries damaged by civil war (Lundy and McGovern 2008). The UN recommendations call for a combination of traditional liberal justice and local restorative justice practices. Restorative justice theory stipulates that retributive justice—the use of punitive measures against offenders—does not “heal” the communities hurt by crime and violence. State prosecutions, or even supra-state prosecutions, do not give the victim a voice in the process, and by banning the offender from further participation in social and political life, a given community does not recover from the harm caused by crime and violence. Peace activists argue that the restorative approach is more suited towards the unique difficulties presented in post-conflict societies: it would unburden the criminal justice system by allowing offenders to ask for forgiveness from victims, and these acts of forgiveness and truth-telling would help victims’ come to grips with past violence. Restorative justice theorists advocate for voluntary victim/offender mediations, which give allow participants to discuss their experiences, and allow the victim to offer forgiveness (Mika and Zehr 2003, Dickson-Gilmore and La-Prairie 2005). Restorative justice programs
occur at community-wide levels as well, as groups of victims tell their stories of past human rights abuse, and offenders offer to share their experiences, and take steps to social and political divisions caused by long-term violence. Some scholars argue that the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) exemplified restorative justice at the national level (Bell 2002).

In the early-to-mid 1990’s, Irish peace activists lauded the reconciliatory efforts of the nascent South African government as they tried to overcome the history of Apartheid in the country. Desmond Tutu and others established the South African TRC, which allowed for limited amnesty granted to perpetrators who admitted their crimes to a panel of experts, and allowed the victims to describe human rights abuses during Apartheid. From 1996-1998, news audiences in South Africa listened to a litany of gross human rights violations. Government and anti-apartheid partisans related how they used “necklacing”—placing a tire on a victims neck and setting it alight—and other forms of torture against their enemies. Victims also gave their accounts, such as stories of family members being “disappeared”, tortured, and murdered by rival factions. The offenders offered their narratives as well, and in some cases, asked for forgiveness from those that they had harmed. In some cases, the Commission offered offenders amnesty. The lure of amnesty no doubt encouraged many offenders to present their rational and ask for forgiveness from victims (Gobodo-Madeakazela 2003).

The ethnic composition of offenders and victims influenced the language used during the TRC. Offenders that presented to the Commission represented the political factions that fought during the Apartheid years and during the Anti-Apartheid movement.
Additionally, victims included Africans and the descendents of Dutch settlers, the Afrikaans. The commission resorted to what Moon (2008) calls a “de-contextualized taxonomy” to describe victims and offenders. Violence and victimization (and victims and offenders) were cast as the same regardless of their positions as violent actors, government-sponsored paramilitary members, or civilians (2008: 92). The category of the victim extends to all of those killed during the conflict, for example, a government paramilitary member inhabited the same category as a civilian. This de-contextualized taxonomy populated the narratives of peacemaking; in de-contextualizing the victims and offenders the TRC cast victimization and the committing of violent acts as society wide problem, and healing relationships between victims and offenders would allow for healing and the beginning of a new South Africa. One of the main goals of the South African TRC was to construct a new national identity that challenged past ethnic requirements for full de facto participation in the state. The new identity would erase the pain inflicted on the African population in the past (Yousaf 2001). The language used by the experts on the Commission was one way of trying to construct this identity. Irish peacemakers adopted the discourse of restorative justice and the de-contextualized dichotomies used in South Africa.

While South Africa was going through this transformative process, there were early signs in Northern Ireland that the conflict was ending. In 1994, the PIRA signed a major ceasefire agreement that would presage the 1998 peace accords. In this context, peace activists were concerned about victims of the Troubles and viewed the problem of victimhood through the prism of restorative justice. Mediation Northern Ireland and the Community Relations Council, founded in 1991 and 1990 respectively, encouraged the
use of Restorative justice theory. John Paul Lederach and Henry Mika, prominent foundational scholars of peace studies and restorative justice, worked with these charitable organizations. With the political settlement moving towards resolution, Irish activists began to call for victims to “tell their stories”—just as Tutu had in South Africa—in order to help society heal. A series of reports compiled victims’ narratives and published them for public consumption. In 2004, several academics and journalists published *Lost Lives*, which was an extensive compilation of stories of those killed during the Troubles. The Victims and Survivors’ Commission—established in 2007—acts, at least in theory, as a champion of victims-centered causes. All of these efforts focused on the narratives of victims and gave them forums for expressing their grievances.

While South Africa was able to entice offenders to participate in the hearings, Northern Ireland lacked the political institutions to encourage voluntary offender story telling. The peace agreement and the 1998 amnesty made it highly unlikely that offenders would offer their stories for risk of further incrimination. This combination of transnational restorative justice discourse, and domestic political constraints led to a *sole* focus on victims in Northern Ireland as the key to peace building. Over the next ten years, peace activists came to see demands for truth and retribution as anathema to the peace process. This is because victims were not satisfied telling their own stories; they demanded that offenders offer themselves up to prosecution should the courts deem it appropriate. The category of the victim in peace discourse has become a threat and hence *the* subject of intervention in the Long Peace. They are “stuck” in the past and risk become perpetuators of violence themselves.
The category of the victim in reconciliation discourse is embedded in a particular chronotope of the Troubles, which itself is cast as representative of human conflict throughout history. Peace activists represent the Troubles as one example of the basic human tendency for violent revenge. The scene of the Troubles is an abstract landscape of constant tit-for-tat killings of inhabitants of an enemy ethno-nationalist group. This basic human drive for *lex talonis*—the payment of like for like—is the driving force for violence. The aesthetic of instinctual violence and counter-violence papers over the myriad motivations and goals of political violence. The peace process, however, helped cultivate another basic human drive for community and relationship building and ceasing violent behavior. The specter of revenge always haunts this present, and peacemakers see their role as dissuading individuals from dwelling too much on the pain of the past. The catalyst for moving people away from the “bad old days”—as many peacemakers and politicians describe the conflict—is to institute truth telling programs and reconciliation programs.

This broad chronotope encourages a set of agents with particular characteristics. First, is “society”, a catchall phrase for the population of Northern Ireland or in some instances a wider aggregate of humankind. The second is the victims of political violence, and the third is the perpetrators of violence. Finally, the peacemakers have a role in facilitating the move away from revenge towards reconciliation. Society shares much of the guilt for the Troubles; indeed, it takes the place of more specific categories of perpetrators (e.g. the IRA, the British Army, or the UDA). The victims are the subjects of the Northern Irish peace process; reconciliation must heal them in order to achieve peace. Peacemakers help this healing process by dissuading them from pursuing
retribution in the courts of the United Kingdom or in international bodies. These truth-telling mechanisms only engage with victims; they offer forums for the bereaved and wounded to speak about their loss, and cannot force or entice offenders to participate.

In this section, I will analyze a speech given by a representative of the CRC, “Hugh”. Hugh is speaking at a “Victims’ Empowerment” Conference hosted by the CRC in Belfast in 2009. He is the keynote speaker at the conference. He describes, in broad terms, what he believes will be the solutions to the grievances voiced by the bereaved in Northern Ireland. Hugh deploys the reconciliation chronotope to legitimate these solutions. The conference includes members of at least two dozen non-profit organizations that worked with victims of the Troubles.

Hugh introduces himself and thanks the conference organizers. He then introduces several key themes that he will discuss later in the speech: the need to move to a “shared future” and the precarious state of the present political moment in Northern Ireland. In the rest of the speech, he creates a series of nested spatiotemporal representations, which ultimately cast the Northern Irish Troubles and the Long Peace—as well as the threat of lex talonis—as representative of the progression of human conflict. This universalizes his devaluation of retribution in favor of reconciliation.

**The problem of Northern Ireland: A precarious present**

In the following excerpt, Hugh represents the problem facing Northern Ireland as a present moment defined by the specter of the violent past.

**Hugh 1**

1. and the rest of the work that we're about is
2. how do you build any kind of shared future.
3. if the past
4. was leaving that kind of
5. legacy
6. and that kind of
7. uh if you like littered
8. littered literally littered with dead bodies and
9. body parts
10. er uh in the background°

Hugh outlines the problem facing Northern Ireland using a broad temporal distinction between the violent past and a “shared future” (line 2). The reconciliation chronotope not only characterizes the past and future, but also implicitly characterizes the present as a moment of transition from this violent past to the shared future. The present is a time of hope, but the shadow of violence metaphorically stands over the activists as they try to work out better ways to help victims: activists are seeking “a way forward” with ghosts of the dead in their presence (line 8). The application of the chronotope to the Troubles discursively constructs the problem as one of societal transit through historical epochs, and offers solutions for forward progression.

His reference to a “shared future” alludes to a text, the Shared Future document produced by the CRC. The document outlines the NGO’s vision for future free from conflict in Northern Ireland, and recommends steps to achieve a peaceful society. Ganiel (2008) notes that the document uses Kymlicka’s concept of “single identity”, which states that before previously antagonistic groups can form a common identity of citizenship within a nation state, they first must become “confident” in their local identity (1995). The pursuit of shared identity has led community workers to run workshops and meetings aimed at divorcing negative connotations associated with community identities such as loyalist, republican, or otherwise. These strong identities will gather together to
participate, with equal representation and mutual respect, in a future shared democracy.

Many organizations use the phrase “shared future” to symbolize this desired future state, the endpoint of the peace project. Yet throughout his speech, Hugh will avoid using political membership categories to describe victims or offenders. Instead, he will repeatedly use non-specific categories (such as “people”) to de-contextualize his discussion of the Troubles.

**The victims: sacrifices to peace**

Hugh characterizes victims as the sacrifices of the Troubles, and suggests that they must further sacrifice their demands for retribution for the sake of peace.

**Hugh 2**

1. and whether
2. to make peace with the **people**
3. or with the **organizations**
4. or with the **states**
5. that you hold responsible for that.
6. is actually justice^`
7. and it’s a question underpinning uh alot of this work is what is justice mean after that kind of experience
8. the question of what truth means and ultimately suddenly becomes very very complicated especially with victims.
9. first of all I suppose to be a victim has always had some whiff of the unspeakable
10. of watching something that goes beyond the rest of ordinary human experience
11. and to therefore try to social servicize it
12. doesn't do justice to it.
13. just looking it up >for the sake of (something to do)
14. and literally at what it means<
15. well actually it comes from the notion of
16. uh
17. living creature offered in sacrifice
18. it actually comes from the root of the victim in sacrificial
19. uh
20. in a sacrificial context
21. it has somethin’ to do with that notion of people's lives and people being
Hugh has constructed a problem—how to move society forward through the chronotope—and has placed the demand of victims for retribution in direct conflict with this forward progression. This hinges on his theory about ethnic violence in Northern Ireland: humans are violent because of categorical rage directed at other individuals. Violence occurs because aggressors do not recognize the humanity of their targets and see them only as representatives of an ethnic group. This fuels a cycle of revenge. As we will see in excerpts below, this behavior extends back into the mists of time. In order to circumvent these ancient hatreds, peace workers must use certain spatiotemporal frames
and associated inclusive categories of personhood. Hugh uses non-specific categories to describe those that victims need to make peace with (lines 2-4). Perpetrators are varied and cross community and institutional boundaries. Blame is also relative. The generalized you casts blame as subject to personal opinion (line 5). This characterization of blame is a way of performing “impartiality,” which is a central tenant of many conflict resolution programs (Jones and Hughes 2003: 485). It also creates a socio-political reality in which society shares the blame for the Troubles. Republicans blame the British State and unionists blame republicans for the Troubles, but these are considerations given from particular perspectives and not objective truths about who is at fault. This is the implicit justification for the use of restorative methods in contrast to retributive ones: retribution does not help a society heal. Justice aimed at specific institutions and individuals risks reigniting the revenge cycles that once plagued the country, as an act of retribution against an individual or institution will be viewed as an attack on the entire ethnic group which that individual or institutions metonymically represents.

Hugh cannot support victims’ calls for retribution for this reason. Instead of justice, victims are the “moral beacons” (Smyth 2000), those who have paid the ultimate sacrifice and must be asked to pay again, by giving up their claims for justice, in order to propel Northern Ireland to a future state of peace. Hugh juxtaposes relativized truth with statements characterizing the experience of victims as unspeakable (line 11). This indicates that peacemakers grant reverence to the embodied experience of victims, but critically analyze the demands that followed from their embodied victimization. As the sacred subject of the Northern Irish peace process, the victim is to both admired and sacrificed to the greater good of peace. We see the sacredness of the victim as Hugh
discusses the etymological definition of “victim.” Hugh refers to the Latin *victima*,
which is the etymological ancestor of the English term victim, and denotes a living being
offered in sacrifice. This is the discourse of sacrificial violence popularized by Van
Gennep and often used by theorists to understand political violence (cf. Feldman 1991).
The scapegoat dies because they represent a larger social formation.

The instigators of these revenge cycles are not evident in the narrative, however.
Just as the victim bears the psychological and physical marks of violence, he or she
becomes the sole object of civil and political intervention. And just as the perpetrators
walk away from violence, perhaps never to be found or prosecuted, so too they fade from
the narrative. The inability to support these claims for recompense has to do with striking
a balance between the suffering of victims and the desire for citizens of Northern Ireland
to move into a “shared future.” Ultimately, victims will have to make a further sacrifice,
not to sectarianism or one of the other motivating factors during the Troubles, but to the
peace process.

*The Troubles as representative of human history*

Using the indexical qualities of Papua New Guinea, Hugh casts cycles of *lex
talonis* as representative of all human conflict, thereby casting the Troubles not as a war
fueled by myriad motivations—such as political claims and assertions of state power—
but by a psychological compulsion to kill one’s ancient ethnic enemies.

*Hugh 3*

1. and so we live
2. in a sense always in death
3. with the potential
4. in search of some kind of answer for this
5. revenge is the outcome
as a huge chain of violence and victimhood
I was reading in the New York uh review of books
an article
uh
which looked into the New Guinea highlands?
and the rules of revenge and reciprocity
which attach to people who
uh
who com--
who are killed their family members
and the outcome in the New Guinea highlands is endless and perpetual war
endless and perpetual war
and at best
if we get into that kind of circle if its calibrated for fear of crisis
for fear of injustices
at worst it becomes undifferentiated
because anger
potentially doesn't measure its response
it turns us all into perpetrators
first of all I think for me
in terms of change
the critical issue
which an eh eh eh
>it becomes difficult to ((inaudible)) people as objects
(rather than people and all that language becomes very important)<
people who went through an experience
but the first thing that's important now
((inaudible)) these are people
who exist on acknowledgement
actually on acknowledgement
and
by that I don't necessarily necessarily mean to be on >(facts but at some level or another that an important element)<
but we've never be able to know them but we need to know certain truths about what happened
and the truth about violence and the truth about where (it left us)
and I think if we're talkin creatively about change
that contribution of speaking the truth about what happened to people
is a critical contribution
to any change in society

Hugh expands his reconciliation chronotope from Northern Ireland to the rest of
the world. At line 10, Hugh alludes to *the New Guinea highlands, and the rules of revenge and reciprocity* (lines 10-11). This allusion places the cycle of violence in Northern Ireland into a deep timeline of human history. Violence, more specifically retribution, is a natural human condition. The New Guinea highlands and their populations index a past time before civilization (Stasch 2011). What happens in New Guinea offers an insight into what happened in the mists of human history. War in the country has not changed since time immemorial because of ethics of revenge. The axiomatic construction of this narrative casts victims as the key to societal progression along the linear timeline towards peace; if they are encouraged not to undertake violence then society will proceed to a state of peace, but should they give into anger, all personae in the chronotope—victims, outsiders, peace workers—may become *perpetrators* (line 24). The reconciliation chronotope is clearly teleological in this instance, the aim is to move from a primitive past fueled by revenge to a future state of peace, which is associated with civilization. Northern Ireland has been plagued by this primordial violence, and it is the work of peacemakers to drag society—all societies—into a period in which violence is no longer the method for resolving political disputes.

An endless cycle of revenge perpetrated against scapegoats is the cause for violence across time and space. This validates the actions of peacemakers, as they attempt to map reconciliatory practices developed in other parts of the world onto Northern Ireland. This is possible because conflict is revenge-driven across space and time. This problem requires a set of solutions that are applicable in all cases of violence. He suggests that we find the *truth, the truth of what happened to people* (line 43). The truth, in this case, is only the stories and experiences of the victims. Republican and
unionist discourse does not reflect this representation of truth: these victims demand the prosecution of perpetrators and the release of state documents. This is the reason for much of the consternation directed at peacemakers. Peacemakers can only ask victims to tell their own stories, and peacemakers are unable to compel or entice offenders to describe what happened. Many peacemakers in Northern Ireland have forgotten, or even ignored, the necessity for perpetrators to engage in reconciliatory programs. As Desmond Tutu asserts, there may indeed be “no future without forgiveness” (2000), but forgiveness requires a contrite offender. Peace and reconciliation rhetoric in Northern Ireland is disconnected from international programs for post-conflict peace building that have been developed in the post Cold War, which implement both retributive and restorative justice systems. Peace workers in Northern Ireland attempt to devalue the role of retributive justice, and they also ignore the necessary inclusion of offender narratives in restorative justice programs. The effect is that the only voices evident in reconciliatory programs are those of the victims; they keep asking for the “truth”, and perpetrators remain largely silent. Hugh’s etymological discussion of the victim category is doubly apt: once sacrificed by violence, victims’ dreams of truth and justice must be sacrificed again for the sake of the peace process.

Conclusion

Peacemakers continue to grapple with victims’ rights organizations. They operate in a well-intentioned manner to improve people’s lives in Northern Ireland. The spatiotemporal world that they construct, however, limits their ability to cope with victims’ demands. Many peace activists I spoke with could not understand why the bereaved and wounded could not “move on” after making their stories public. The
reason is that, despite the claims of many peacemakers, these narratives only tell part of the story of political violence in Northern Ireland.

The next two chapters show how different representations of the socio-political world clash in interaction. In 2008, a government sponsored committee held a series of meetings on “Dealing with the Past” in an attempt to understand how they could help victims and society in general recover from the violence. These meetings show how different chronotopes construct the problems facing Northern Ireland, and specify solutions. The analysis will also show how activists use the reconciliation chronotope to re-code the narratives of victims, attempt to define the socio-political reality of the peace process, and thereby justify restorative justice practices. This discourse has led many peacemakers to pathologize victims and Northern Irish society as the Northern Irish public resists the devaluation of retributive transitional justice mechanisms. Peacemakers diagnose society with a kind of developmental sickness: the trauma of the past is too painful for the public to accept reconciliatory measures. The different spatiotemporal worlds used by victims challenge the peacemakers’ teleological vision, which leads to further estrangement between the work of peace building and victims’ advocates.
Chapter 5: Coding victims’ statements at Armagh City

In 2008, the Consultative Group for Dealing with the Past launched a series of public meetings. In these meetings, members of the public give statements to a panel of expert peace activists and former conflict negotiators. The members of the public cast their demands as political; they were victimized because of their religious or political identities. Peace workers de-contextualize these statements by stripping them of their original spatiotemporal framings. They also change the categories of personhood to non-specific categories and strip the narratives of offenders. In this way, peace workers “transform the world into the categories and events that are relevant to the work of a profession” (Cicourel 1964, 1968 paraphrased in Goodwin 1994: 608). By transforming categories and events, peacemakers depict themselves as the trustees for Northern Irish society: with the good of the populace in mind, they will make the important recommendations that will heal victims and release Northern Ireland from its temporal stagnancy.

In the previous chapter, I argued that discourse of peace and reconciliation developed in Northern Ireland in reaction to the perceived successes of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Unlike South Africa, Northern Ireland’s ability to entice perpetrators to participate in reconciliatory efforts is constrained by political contingencies. The general amnesty released paramilitary members and the British Army is reticent to release information about civilian deaths. Irish peace activists took up a narrative of peace and reconciliation that emphasized victim-centered “story-telling” with no mechanism for ensuring that perpetrators tell their stories as well. Increasingly,
peace activists use a primordialist vision of human violence: it stems from revenge based upon ancient hatreds. They then see victims, who demand retributive justice, as feeding these ancient hatreds. This vision of victims, and frustration of the bereaved towards the lack of support for justice, has lead to a fraught relationship between victims’ rights advocates and peace activists in the province.

In her historical and cultural analysis of colonial administrations and NGOs in Indonesia, Li (2007) demonstrates that these institutions act as trustees for civilian populations viewed as damaged, immoral, or otherwise not fulfilling their full capacity (5). Institutions act as trustees when they view a situation, or population, as problematic, and subject to intervention. This trusteeship has driven much missionary, colonial, human rights, and other interventions throughout history (Li 2007). The Consultative Group for the Past (hereafter referred to as the Group) describes Northern Irish society as having stalled in its progression towards peace. This gives them a remit to intervene, and make suggestions in order to improve the capacity of Northern Ireland to become peaceful. Intervention requires that peacemakers cast themselves as working for a greater good that the subjects of the intervention often cannot see for themselves. They act as neutral listeners and take trusteeship of victims’ narratives, and the public must trust the Group to make the right recommendations based upon these statements.

If political and ethnic demands crippled society in the past, then peace activists try to “de-historicize” victims’ statements: they strip victims' narratives of the representations of personhood and/or action that cast one group as more victimized than another, or a grievance as political, rather than personal. All instances of victimization are equal across class and ethnic divides, which represents the conflict as a distinctly human
one as if to say, “we all suffered, and we are all human, so let us move on”. This focus on the humanitarian effect of the conflict erases the role of perpetrators of violence.

Some transitional justice scholars actively support this vision. In his brief analysis of the Consultative Group Report, Ryan (2010) argues that the Group “de-historicizes” the Irish conflict, and this is necessary to end the violence and counter-violence cycles that plague the society. The necessity of de-contextualization is justified by the chronotope used within peacemaking and transitional justice scholarship. In this chapter, we will see how Lord Eames and other members of the Group establish themselves as experts and trustees for victims of the conflict. In the next chapter, I will describe how the final report casts Northern Irish society as sick. It pathologizes victims’ calls for justice, because they reject the policy recommendations of the report. Demands for retribution become the anguished cries of the psychologically broken, and not legitimate demands that the courts or international bodies address past crimes.

The coding of victims’ statements is an interactive process. Victims acquiesce, or not, to the representations produced by the Group members. Anthropology and sociology have long studied professional coding practices in interactional settings. Drawing on work in sociology, linguistics, and anthropology, ethnomethodologists study how people categorize and negotiate categories about the world. Much of that focus has concentrated upon professional coding; that is, how experts take data—such as a linguistic phrase, photograph, or geographical formations—and characterize them in such a way that it may be documented and compared with other features. Cicourel (1981) studies the diagnostic practices between patients and doctors. Diagnosis is not only the product of the physician’s cognitive processes and ability to link diseases to a set of symptoms. It is
also an interactive process in which question and answer sessions evolve to the point that the physician is asking the right questions, and the questions are matching up to the patient’s memory. As the doctor enters the examination room, he or she constructs hypotheses regarding the nature of the patient’s illness. Cicourel paraphrases this process:

Each hypothesis leads to one or more subroutines requiring information retrieval from the doctor’s and the patient’s memory. Question-answer sequences evolve, changing their course and content sometimes abruptly…The physician obviously believes that the patient can help her [diagnose the illness] if her questions are put properly. Considerable negotiation may be required before the patient connects the doctor to her (his) own experiences (1981: 94).

The doctor continually checks the patient’s statements against hypotheses and asks a series of more specific questions, targeting a particular response. The patient statements are thus coded in the terms of particular diagnostic criteria. Another level of professional coding occurs when the doctor writes the patient report. The chain of inferences from the question and answer session become the written diagnosis, and the inferential process whereby the doctor arrived at that diagnosis is often unclear in the written artifact.

Cicourel notes how the “context”—the physical and cognitive background of the diagnostic session—affects the coding process. Often, the patient is asked to change into a hospital gown and sit on a bed or lie in a prone position. The doctor, dressed in a white jacket that indexes the medical profession, enters and offers the form of address, “I am Dr. Snitzer.” These material and verbal cues, along with their cognitive inferences, clue the patient and doctor to how the turn taking ritual will occur. The doctor will ask the
questions, and the patient will provide answers. This coding process, and its relationship to context, “may generate [for the sociologist] patterns and information control analogues to those found in larger organizational and institutional settings” (Cicourel 1981: 94).

Coding practices are evident in other institutional environments, such as FBI data collection (Bucholz 2009), airline cockpits (Goodwin and Goodwin 1996), and ship navigation (Hutchins 1995). Perhaps most germane to the present study is Goodwin’s analysis of coding practices during the 1992 Rodney King trial in Los Angeles. Goodwin argues that defense lawyers—representing police officers accused of beating Rodney King—focused the trial on the perceptions of the police officers as they attacked the suspect. “The defense contended that if the police officers could legitimately see King’s actions as aggressive and a threat to them, then the police were entitled to use force to protect themselves and take him into custody” (Goodwin 1994: 616). The trial became a debate over what the officers perceived as they were beating Mr. King. These perceptions are not individual cognitive process but “perceptual frameworks shared within the police profession” (Goodwin 1994: 616).

Lawyers used expert testimony to frame the jury’s perception of the videotaped beating of Mr. King. The video graphically depicted the repeated kicking and hitting of King with batons. The defense’s expert, however, cast this event as “ten distinct uses of force” (Goodwin 1994: 617).

Expert: There were,
Ten distinct (1.0) uses of force.
Rather than one single use of force.
…”
In each of those, uses of force
There was an escalation and a de escalation, (0.8)
An assessment period, (1.5)
And then an escalation and a de-escalation again. (0.7)
And another assessment period.

The attack is framed as a study in the effectiveness of physical force by the police officers as they systematically “escalate and deescalate” the efforts to make King cease resistance. “Thus when King is hit yet another blow, this is transformed from a moment of visible violence—what the prosecution in the second trial will instruct the jury to see as “beating a suspect into submission”—into a demonstration that the “period of de-escalation has ceased…” (Goodwin 1994: 617). There are differences in the emplotment of events in between the two trials. In the first case, we have “ten distinct” moments of “escalation and de-escalation.” These discrete moments of evaluation encourage a representation of the police officers as quasi-scientists, carefully testing the effectiveness of different violent acts. The second characterization—offered in the civil trial on the case—uses the continuous aspect, “beating a suspect into submission.” The attack is one drawn out event. Such a characterization puts the emphasis not on the perceptions and motivations of the police officers as they continue the attack (as professionals engaged in submission), but rather on their perceptions preceding the attack (which might include racist motives). At the Dealing with the Past meetings, the peacemakers omit political and ethnic categories from their responses to victim statements and try to equate the experiences of the different types of victims (republicans, unionists, and security personnel).

The meetings were the culmination of a consultancy period that began in 2007.
In that year, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Hain, established the Consultative Group on the Past, which would:

...consult across the community on how Northern Ireland society can best approach the legacy of the events of the past 40 years; make recommendations, as appropriate, on any steps that might be taken to support Northern Ireland society in building a shared future that is not overshadowed by the events of the past; present a report, which will be published, setting out conclusions to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, by summer 2008 (Consultative Group on the Past 2009: 22).

The group was chaired by The Right Reverend Lord Eames33, the former archbishop of Armagh (Church of Ireland) and Denis Bradley34, a former Vice-Chairman of the Policing Board. The group conducted research with the public for nearly two years. The majority of these consultations were private. In the winter of 2007-2008, the Group held a series of public consultations. These meetings were open to the public, and each one attracted about 200 individuals. The Group presented their final report to the Secretary of State six months after the due date outlined in the remit in January 2009.

This section analyses discourse in two public meetings held by the Consultative Group for the Past in Armagh City and Ballymena. I chose these two sites for comparison because they have different demographics: Armagh City is majority Catholic and Ballymena is majority Protestant. This clean comparison did not play out in practice, however. At the Armagh meeting republicans, unionists, Catholics, and Protestants gave statements. At Ballymena, most of the respondents were unionist/Protestant.

The first meeting occurs in Armagh City, which borders the Irish Republic to the southeast. At each meeting, Lord Eames gives a brief introduction, and then opens the floor to the public. The public consisted of interested individuals, victims of the
Troubles, politicians, and media personnel. I will begin with an analysis of Lord Eames's opening statement. In his introductory remarks, Eames uses the reconciliation chronotope and he constructs categories of personhood as articulated by Hugh in Chapter 4.

*The reconciliation chronotope at Armagh City*

The first task of the chairman of the Group, Lord Eames, is to construct the authority of the Group: they are neutral arbiters that will help society move forward. Eames will then describe the protagonists and antagonists using the broad spatiotemporal frame deployed by Hugh and other peace activists. First, he characterizes a category of “peace activist”, which will play a central role in the arbitration of conflicts over the past. He constructs his own authority to speak for victims, to frame the debate using the reconciliation chronotope, and to prescribe recommendations for “dealing with the past.”

*Eames excerpt 1*

1. good evening ladies and gentleman
2. thank you for coming
3. I simply want to set the scene
4. of why we're here
5. and what we hope we can achieve with you this evening.
6. none of us dreamt in any way
7. that the job we we're given as a panel would be easy.
8. in fact
9. many of us were reluctant to take on the task when we were asked
10. but speaking entirely for myself?
11. the reason I accepted a place on the panel.
12. was that having been through so much of the troubles
13. and being so close to so many who suffered
14. I felt it was almost a moral duty to say
15. if there is one more thing I can do
16. I can't refuse to do it
17. I have with me tonight
18. two of my colleagues.
the reason you have not got the full panel
is that by sheer logistics
we have had to cover
Northern Ireland to the best of our ability
with these public meetings.
last night we were in Ballymena
we've been together as a group in Belfast
and we're covering Enniskillen
Londonderry
Omagh
and Omagh as well as here
as we were in Bangor at the beginning of the week.
with me tonight is Leslie Carroll^ sitting next to me here at the moment.
Presbyterian minister from Belfast
beyond there Charles Burns who's a school teacher in South Armagh.
I said at the beginning that none of us
had any idea
that it was going to be easy.
but we have attempted already in the work that we have done
in meeting hundreds of people in delegations as individuals or in meetings like this.
to listen and go on listening

In this opening excerpt, Lord Eames set[s] the scene for the public meeting in Armagh City. He creates a distinction between the panel and the audience, ...why we’re here, that the job we’re given as a panel (lines 4, 7). In the previous chapter, Hugh cast himself as part of the audience; they were all activists trying to move Northern Ireland to a state of peace. Here, the Group has a different task from the audience. The Group will listen as members of the public give their statements. Eames must therefore provide evidence of his expertise in dealing with victims, so he casts himself in metaphorical proximity to their suffering (line 13). He then shifts from a discussion of the Troubles in the past, to the interaction at hand by voicing his decision making process in the past moment of decision-making at lines 15-16. Despite his age and war-
weariness, he must continue to work for peace.

Using a list of city names, Eames explains the geographical area the Group must cover. This, gives a textual feel not only to the amount of space the group has covered, but indirectly, to the amount of consultative work that the group has undertaken, *we’ve been together as a group in Belfast, and we’re covering Enniskillen, Londondery, Omagh, as we were in Bangor at the beginning of the week* (lines 25-30). Peace and reconciliation workers often discuss accomplished work to preface to discussions of reconciliation. It is my hunch that this preface stands in dialogue with a common critique of peace workers heard repeatedly from victims: that these groups do very little “real” work. Instead, victims perceive them as mouthpieces of the government, a sentiment that we will hear stated several times in this meeting.

Eames names the individuals sitting with him on the panel. Workers for the Consultative Group for the Past made efforts to have representatives of Protestant and Catholic communities present at each of the public meetings. The naming of the individuals, and perhaps more informatively the descriptions of their vocations and geographical origins, indexes the impartiality of the panel. He describes a *Presbyterian minister from Belfast* (line 33). The religious membership category "Presbyterian" marks the individual as Protestant. The place name of South Armagh by itself does not indicate ethno-nationalist identity. The county is majority Catholic, but has a sizable Protestant population. Burns is a relatively well-known former headmaster and priest; thus, by using his proper name and his geographical origin Eames indirectly characterizes the panel as representing both religious affiliations (line 33-34). His description of Burns as
a *schoolteacher* and not a "headmaster" may be an attempt to cast Burns as more of a peer to the audience and not an authority figure. The panel is representative of the audience both in ethno-nationalist and socio-economic membership.

Eames also describes the task of the panel: to listen to the public. The roles of the Panel and the audience are speakers and listeners. This indicates the presence of an ideology of communication operating at the public meetings. Peace workers used the conversation analogy--equating peace work to a conversation between individuals--pervasively during my interactions with them. They characterized themselves as passive listeners to the complaints and problems faced by victims. The analogy is an apt one, at least superficially. Peace activists work with and through talk: mediation, conversation, speeches, and other speech events. They certainly listen to complaints and concerns, but the conversation analogy also obscures the role of peace activists in managing conversations between antagonistic individuals, or as we seen in this chapter, re-coding the statements of speakers. This is important to the ideology of peacemaking in the province, by casting themselves as merely listening to victims, they obfuscate the re-framing practices evident in peacemaking discourse. It also reconfirms the desire of peacemakers to be impartial, to stand as observers of anger, anxieties, and demands.

Once he has established the authority of peace workers to mediate disputes, he characterizes the protagonists, the victims.

**Eames excerpt 2**

1. we've heard heart wrenching stories.
2. from widows from little children that've grown up
3. from *people* who have still been *devastated* by their memories of the past
and what happened to a loved one
we've been concerned by the work
of the victims' support groupings
>and I want to say something about that later on if I have the opportunity<
we've listened to the security forces
and those who have retired from the security forces
as well as their survivors
and their disabled.
we've listened to those whose families have been wrenched apart
through the loss of a loved one
either because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time
or because of those with whom they were associated.
we've listened also to those who have said
don't do anything
don't recommend anything
we've got some sort of political settlement and we're moving forward with our lives
let that gradually go on.
we've listened to the churches
and we've talked to them about vision and looking ahead into the future.
but chiefly we are searching our own hearts and our own minds
because all of us
in our ways have been part of those past dark years.
and in my own case
I will take many of those heart wrenching stories to my own grave.
they're now part of me
and under the banner heading
that it will not happen again
is I believe a real way forward for all of us.
now I said just now we have heard some heart wrenching stories
because victims
of the troubles
whatever way you define that
victims are people
people with hearts minds
and from my point of view spirits
people who have memories
that keep tugging them back into the past
and making them wonder what it was all about.

Eames presents the most complete instance of what I term ”balanced description”
when discussing victims. The membership categories deployed are: *children* (line 2), *people who have still been devastated* (line 3), *victims’ support groupings* (line 6), and *those who have retired from the security forces* (line 9). The first three membership categories do not demarcate the institutional or ethno-religious factions of the Northern Irish conflict, but the fourth, *security forces*, does. At first glance, Eames does not balance this category with a complementary one from the republican or Catholic community, instead he uses predication to create a category that might include these individuals as *those whose families have been wrenched apart, through the loss of a loved one, either because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time, or because of those with whom they were associated* (line 12-15). *Those with whom they are associated*, refers to Sinn Fein’s association with the Provisional Irish Republican Army during political debates. The phrase is an indirect means to suggest that a specific politician or political party is involved with a paramilitary. Such phrases may include “your associations,” “the associations of your party,” and the like. The common lexeme in these phrases is “association,” which is useful in that it indirectly proposes a relationship between a direct object (usually an individual or political party) and an unnamed paramilitary. The relationship the verb proposes is ambiguous; it gives very little data as to the nature of the relationship between the politician and the group with whom he is associated. The use of this phrase may have developed during the peace process when direct accusation of paramilitary involvement could jeopardize the then-tenuous negotiations. Eames, the ex-Archbishop of the Church of Ireland (a part of the Anglican Communion, but independent from the Church of England), deploys this indirect reference in order to construct a narrative that is inclusive of all of the objects of
political violence during the Troubles. But reference to each group is not equally direct. This could be a consequence of Eames' own Protestant identity. Republican paramilitary members are only implicitly included in the category of victimhood. This begrudging inclusion may also be an effort to allow the audience to imagine that their loved ones fit the category of "victim" without causing a debate on the relative innocence of security force members versus paramilitary members.

Eames shifts from this begrudging balanced description to the classification of all victims using a species-wide category, people (line 36). This category is necessary because of the imperative of "looking forward," which is an allusion to the spatiotemporal model used by peace activists: victims must “heal” in order for society to progress towards a future state of peace. Society must recognize all victims as members of the human species. Peace workers in Northern Ireland, and possibly around the globe, aim much of their efforts towards teaching people to recognize that perpetrators of horrible crimes are human. As Eames describes, the human category includes victims and perpetrators. The human category opens an immense range of motives and behaviors that may challenge the victim/perpetrator dichotomy. Including victims and perpetrators in the category of human, Eames verbally constructs the possibility for other behaviors, specifically forgiveness.

It will become apparent, however, that members of the public often do not deploy the same categories as peace workers. This is not to say that unionist or republican activists do not recognize perpetrators as "human." Instead, they frame their narratives with different chronotopes and representations of personhood. At Armagh, speakers tend
to use autobiographical narratives loosely framed by socio-political time. The notion that victims are human has very little purchase for these victims; of course, all victims are human, but they feel that state and non-state actors targeted them because of ethno-nationalist and political identity. The work of Eames and the rest of the Group to re-cast victims as human thus has the effect of de-contextualizing victims’ narratives.

These differences in representation were apparent before the meeting began in Armagh City, as Eames responds to media reports that the Panel would suggest legal amnesty for paramilitary members fearing prosecution of unsolved crimes. Under the Belfast Accord of 1998, all individuals convicted of paramilitary related crimes were released from prison, but this release did not apply to those who were still "on the run" as outstanding paramilitary members or that that were accused of past crimes. Additionally, should later investigations uncover an individual's involvement in a crime, then that person would be subject to prosecution. Amnesty in this case would absolve all on the run paramilitary members of guilt. This suggestion angered many victims of political violence, who understood this to be a sacrifice of justice for political expediency. The leaked reports also indicated that the Group would characterize the past as a "war". This suggestion angered unionist victims and politicians as it would conceivably reclassify the acts of paramilitaries as "acts of war" and not illegal acts of terrorism. Eames's comments in the next section stand in dialogic relationship with these recent rumors.

_Eames excerpt 3_

1. now we haven't got an agenda
2. you
3. and people like you
Eames has tried to establish the Group’s authority. The cross-community composition of the Group justifies their trusteeship over society and victims. The accusation that the Group has a political agenda is particularly disturbing, as evidenced by Eames ‘raised voice at line 15 as he defends the neutrality of the Group. Peace activists diagnose society as suffering from temporal stagnation; society will not advance to a final state of reconciliation and peace. The underlying ideological assumption of the appeal to common humanity is that any claim based upon group identity will necessarily evoke the deep passions of rival ethnic groups. Thus, we will see below how the Group re-casts victims’ statements not as claims of embittered minorities, but demands born of different individual perspectives equal to demands made by rival political and ethnic factions.

De-historicizing victims’ statements at Armagh City
Following Eames's introduction, audience members speak to the Group. The statements included anecdotes and allusions to victimized individuals. Eames and other panel members occasionally interrupt the audience member to clarify points or to rephrase the statement for the victim. They will also give a short response after the audience member has finished talking. These responses focus on points of clarification or challenge an audience members’ statement.

Each speaker approached one of two microphones at the front of the audience seating in the auditorium. On one or two occasions, an assistant brought a wireless microphone to disabled or elderly audience members. The first speaker in Armagh City is a republican sympathizer who suggests that the RUC framed him for an attack on the Newry Corey Square police station in 1985 in which nine police officers died. This first case presents one of the fundamental difficulties of legally defining victimhood in Northern Ireland (and the problems facing criminal tribunals in all post-conflict societies): how are convicted individuals—who maintain their innocence—to be labeled and interacted with by the government bodies of the peace process?

**Armagh speaker 1 excerpt 1**

1. uh hi how yous doin^  
2. my name’s (...)  
3. I just wondered  
4. given the this new era that we're all in of hopin there's transparency within police and justice in Northern Ireland  
5. who will be held accountable for mis-- miscarriages of justice  
6. I myself was a victim of mis-- miscarriage of justice  
7. when I was arrested  
8. and imprisoned ba-- based upon a false confession  
9. ah for the Newry mortar bomb attack  
10. >to date I'm the only person every convicted of it<
11. I was completely innocent
12. and I maintain that
13. to this day
14. I was just wonderin' who-- who's in the RUC
15. DPD and Northern Ireland diplock court system
16. is gonna be held accountable for the devastation I've had

The speaker initially describes the present moment as a *new era* (line 4). This new era is one in which judicial, policing, and state-level decision-making are more open to the inspection of the citizenry. This new era will also be one in which individuals who break the laws of Northern Ireland will be held accountable. For Speaker 1, the present is a period of relative improvement when compared with the past. He wants the courts to hold accountable those judges, police officers, and government officials that forced his false confession and subsequent punishment. Unlike Eames’ depiction of the conflict, the present political moment in his talk does not require figurative movement towards a future state of peace.

Eames then asks a point of clarification:

**Eames reply 1**

1. in other words
2. is this on
3. in other words
4. you're looking for what you would call *justice*
5. is that right sir

**Speaker 1 excerpt 2**

1. yeah that’s correct

Speaker 1 casts his demand as reflective of an institutional fault, but for Eames, it
becomes the complaint of one individual about his own experience, as he describes the speaker as looking for what you would call justice (line 4). The conditional would relativizes and abstracts the claim of the speaker. Eames also strips the spatiotemporal frame from Speaker 1’s statement. Eames does not repeat that the Speaker’s chronotopic framing of a new era of transparency, nor does Eames repeat that the speaker suffered discriminatory practices in the past; instead, he changes the statement into a generic call for justice. By omitting Speaker 1’s biographical narrative embedded in a socio-historical chronotope, he strips it of legitimacy, and may equate it with all of the other demands for “justice” that the panel collects.

In the next case, a widow describes how loyalist paramilitary members killed her husband. The government denied compensation to her because she was Catholic. A Group member equates her experience with the experiences of the widows of security force personnel. He states that all of the bereaved often felt under-compensated by the government. This coding of her statement strips it of the implicit accusations against the British government, and casts her suffering as a cross-community experience of many victims, not a complaint about discriminatory practices.

**Armagh speaker 2 excerpt 1**

2. my name's (...) I'm from Moira  
3. um my husband was murdered by loyalists in 1975.  
4. a:nd  
5. I received very little compensation  
6. because in those days  
7. the injustice that even was meant to  
8. eh the Northern Ireland Office  
9. and their senior council  
10. were (sided on against) people who were involved
11. either in politics or come from a certain religion
12. so they decided what we got
13. I know there're a lot of issues around this
14. and it's going to cost somethin'
15. <but we have peace now>
16. we have relative peace
17. and the assembly members have worked very hard to get that
18. some of those risked their own political life in fact
19. and um have lost quite a lot
20. but I think now that we have an assembly
21. and up the line
22. surely it's as little as they can do
23. is prioritize
24. eh
25. those issues
26. and put the victims
27. next on the agenda
28. then people who have suffered
29. they're the people
30. because of their lives being lost
31. that brought investment into Northern Ireland
32. but they didn't benefit from that investment
33. there were those who eh did benefit
34. but maybe now this consultative group
35. will eh
36. put that into their report
37. as a priority.
38. I think we have peace
39. and peace came first
40. but the eh-- victims
41. certainly should come in a very good second
42. thank you

This speaker makes claims about institutional discrimination that will require revision by the Group, in order to retain the balance between the victimization of Protestants and Catholics. Similar to the Lakewood Research Group activists, this speaker refers to her own ethnicity using indirect descriptions. The use of the category loyalists in the role of the perpetrator implicitly casts her as Catholic (line 2). This
abstracts the discrimination conducted by the Northern Ireland Office from a specific event, the low-compensation of Speaker 2, to a general practice, institutional bias against particular religious groups. This threatens the vision of victimization as the experience of individuals. Speaker 2 also characterizes the present as peaceful, *peace now* (line 14). She modifies the noun in the next utterance with the adjective *relative*, in we have *relative peace now* (line 15). This is in contrast to the reconciliation chronotope that places the state of "peace" as the final stage of linear progression away from the conflict of the past. Despite Speaker 2's reference to assembly members using the institutional category, Burns reframes Speaker 2's vision of past injustice as perpetrated against the Catholic and republican communities.

**Burns excerpt 1**

1. please if you don't mind uh eh
2. just let me pick up on that point particularly the compensation
3. that somethin’ that you know we've had eh eh eh
4. Brendan said in his opening he spoke to a hundred groups
5. virtually all of them have mentioned compensation.
6. and all of them from all sides
7. and i know that people from the nationalist side would have always thought that maybe the RUC UDR British Army were very very well looked after
8. we met those people and we me th the the RUC widows association parents association of the UDR they were all behind the idea
9. ((inaudible))
10. they all feel equally shafted by the diabolical eccentricity of the equation that was used to give people eh
11. eh compensation
12. where widows and mothers and fathers we expected to go up in court
13. eh we
14. short weeks after the burial of their loved one
15. and try and justify how much they would have had handed on their their child or whatever
16. and they were state ta ta ta ta to reveal that
17. and that's somethin that definitely will be reflected
18. it’s one of the headin’s that will be in our report the whole issue a compensation

Burns compares the victims’ statement with the dearth of compensation given to British security forces. This is first achieved through the transposition of the implicit ethnic category in Speaker 2's statement into an explicit category: *people from the nationalist side* feel that compensation was perpetuated only on their community (line 7). The security forces (the RUC and British Army) have suffered an equal lack of compensation (line 12-14). The Group member has taken Speaker 2’s testimony of discrimination and fit it into a cross ethnic category of un-compensated victims. The security forces’ families do not make claims of discrimination; rather, the compensatory scheme for the families of dead security force members was inadequate. He erases the discriminatory actions of the Northern Ireland Office making the claim merely a demand for compensation. Stripping the socio-political context of demands de-politicizes victims’ statements, and further justifies victim-centered truth telling as mechanisms to help the bereaved cope psychologically with their loss. The problem facing Northern Ireland is not past and present structural malpractice, but rather personal loss and grief.

The next speaker is a former police officer. I knew “Will” from my work with CARE. He was a kindly man, who often offered a perspective on the violence that challenged the more practiced and patterned representations of skilled unionist advocates. He did not speak often at public events, but I spent many hours with him in his frame construction shop listening to his stories of the "bad old days". Despite his forced use of a cane—the result of an IRA attack—he seemed to bear little ill will towards his former adversaries. He was, however, avowedly mistrustful of both the old Stormont
Government and the new Northern Irish Assembly. He extends this distrust of the
government to the Consultative Group for the Past. Our interactions may affect my
interpretation of his statement, but his representation of the Group is common in victims’
advocacy discourse: The Group is a new instantiation of a long series of programs and
institutions that only waste resources producing reports that do not tangibly benefit the
victims of political violence.

**Will excerpt 1**

1. cause I it’s been thirty years I met more government ministers
2. in fact
3. I've come to resent the government maybe more now than the IRA who shot me
4. we knew where we stood with each other
5. but the government we don't
6. for years I've fought and struggled for all the benefits and all the entitlements
7. and up until the present
8. it’s still an ongoing fight
9. for allowances and on benefits.

He reiterates the long time in which he has struggled for benefits and entitlements
from government ministers. Unlike the language of *ressentiment* seen at Kingsmills, he
does not create a stark contrast of the righteous vs. the morally depraved; instead, Will
expresses a kind of world-weariness, as his past resentment towards the IRA gives way
to a growing anger towards the government because they have failed to give him benefits
and recognition. His respect for the IRA is shocking in contrast to the stark moral world
of *ressentiment*, and this adds to the indignation he professes against the government. He
finishes his statement by introducing a new cast of characters, the caregivers of victims.
He states at line 7, *that victims cannot be compensated properly*. This echoes Hugh’s reconciliation chronotope from the previous chapter, which stipulates that movement through time from war to peace depends upon victims giving up the right to justice. The temporal elements and patterns of person reference in the Panel member’s answer to Will’s statement share several similarities with Hugh’s speech in Chapter 4. Hugh suggests that victims can *never be repaid*. He also uses broad descriptions of victimization events using non-specific verb clauses such as, *what happened*. This reflects the wariness peace activists show towards any claims for restitution, as such, claims often come in the form of demands for retribution against those who wronged them.

Burns’ response also obscures the many efforts made by the government and civil society bodies during the Long Peace. The textual arrangement of his answer gives the impression of temporal proximity between the victimization event, and the speaker’s suggestion that victim cannot be compensated. The victims’ suffering was recent, and
the efforts to alleviate that suffering are new. Peace activists often talk as if the conflict and the present are in close temporal proximity. This effectively washes out the near sixteen years of the Long Peace in Northern Ireland. During this period, civil society organizations and the government launched many programs to assist victims, but these attempts to do not exist in Burn’s statement, and thus explanations of the failures and successes of these programs are not necessary. This temporal representation also helps to cast all efforts at peace and reconciliation as novel, and not as repetitions of past programs. The Group member thus evades Will’s critique, that the government (and by association the Group) has failed and perhaps will fail to assist victims in Northern Ireland.

**Conclusion**

The victims at the Armagh City meeting—most of whom are Catholic—do not challenge the de-contextualization of their narratives. The reason for this is that the public meetings are only one forum in which republicans air their grievances. It is advantageous for them to have their claims heard in all contexts available, and to ratify their status as equal participants in forums such as the Dealing with the Past meetings. This is a political triumph for republicans; unlike their denigrated position during the Stormont Era, the state and civil society engage with them and try to assist them. They may also potentially gain compensation or other forms of recognition suggested by the Group. The de-contextualizing effects of peace talk allows them to further distance themselves (and their loved ones) from the possible paramilitary associations that could, in other contexts, limit their ability to receive compensation and participate in the post-
conflict government. But republicans I spoke with expressed frustration at the unwillingness of the British government to release documents and otherwise participate in truth-telling processes (see Chapter 3). They know that efforts such as the Dealing with the Past meetings will not likely compel the British government to release information on their dead loved ones. Because republicans frame past victimization events as discriminatory acts perpetuated by a state against its citizens, they can pursue their goals in other forums such as international commissions on discrimination and victimization conducted by state forces during the Troubles.

In the next chapter, we see unionists interact with the Group in a different manner. They challenge the authority of the Group and devalue the peace process because it does not extend justice and recognition based upon ethnic difference.
Chapter 6: The failure of de-contextualization at Ballymena

This chapter explains the inability of peace activists to increase unionist participation in the institutions of the peace process. The Consultative Group for the Past attempts to de-politicize victims’ statements. The audience, however, attacks the legitimacy of the Group by embedding them in a spatiotemporal world that casts them as collaborating with Irish republicanism. Having lost their authority to “listen” neutrally to the victims, Eames—the chair of the panel—shifts to personhood categories deployed by unionists. The Dealing with the Past Report is also discussed in this chapter. It shows how peace activists increasingly pathologize unionists and Northern Irish society as unable to change.

This meeting occurs in a majority Protestant town, and this affects Eames’ introductory remarks. His introductory remarks are identical to those he states to the audience in Armagh City, aside from the removal of republican paramilitary members from the category of the victim. He attempts to imbue the Group with authority based upon their personal experiences of the Troubles, and their role as “listeners” for the public. At Armagh City, he constructs a scene in which human victims attacked for various reasons populate the political present. He also describes the effects of violence on families. As I noted in Excerpt 2 in Chapter 5, he includes both security force members and paramilitary members in this category of victimhood. The excerpt from Chapter 5 is reproduced below:

From Eames excerpt 2 beginning line 8 (Chapter 5)

1. we've listened to the security forces
2. and those who have retired from the security forces
3. as well as their survivors
4. and their disabled
5. we’ve listened to those whose families have been wrenched apart
6. through the loss of a loved one
7. either because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time
8. or because of those with whom they were associated
9. we’ve listened also to those who have said.

In the previous chapter, I argue that this is an instance of reluctant balanced description. The phrase *those with whom they were associated* indirectly acknowledges the inclusion of IRA members in the victim category (line 15). This indirectness signals a kind of begrudging acknowledgement of the classification of paramilitary members as victims. At Ballymena however, Eames excludes this phrase altogether even though the introductory comments are otherwise identical. He only includes security forces and civilians in his category of victimhood. This suggests that he is aware of the unionist political sympathies of the audience in the majority Protestant town of Ballymena. In the following excerpt, Eames is again trying to validate the experiences of the Group members by listing the victims to whom they have spoken. This categorical construction foreshadows Eames’s shift away from using the humanistic categories of the reconciliation chronotope to adopting some of the categories of unionist victims’ discourse.

At Ballymena, he states that:

_Eames Ballymena Excerpt 1_

1. we’ve also spent considerable time
2. with those who paid the supreme sacrifice
3. serving with the security forces
throughout the period of the troubles.
widows
young people
particularly widows who feel
that it’s very hard for them to move on
because
there are a lot of raw nerves in our society tonight
those nerves do not respect
religion or political outlook
they’re human
and they are human reactions.

The first speaker immediately dismisses Eames’s affinity for Protestant victims during the Troubles. Unionists were suspicious of the Consultative Group for the Past because of its link to the post-conflict government. Two days before the Ballymena meeting, the Daily Telegraph published a story indicating that the Consultative Group for the Past would classify the Troubles as a “war”, and recommend amnesty for outstanding perpetrators (Perkins 2008). Neither of these recommendations were put in the final report. These leaked recommendations, authentic or not, confirmed for many Protestants that the Group would continue to, in their view, acquiesce to the worldview of Irish republicans. As he did at Armagh, Eames attempts to dispel these rumors. He also dismisses the rumors that the Group will suggest a general amnesty for all outstanding crimes and “on-the-run” paramilitary members. The Armagh City audience did not argue with the Group on these points, but the Ballymena audience will address them repeatedly, beginning with the first speaker. In so doing, the audience members challenge the Group’s status as the trustees of Northern Irish society.

*Category shift at Ballymena*

The first Speaker strips the Group of its legitimacy as a neutral arbiter by
disregarding Eames’s plea to withhold judgment.

**Ballymena Speaker 1 excerpt 1**

1. good evenin I'm (...) from Ballymena
2. um I've been over the reports (on dealin with the past) recently on the reclassification of the troubles
3. no way
4. this was not a war this was a dirty
5. terrorist campaign carried out against life and unity
6. by people whose main intention was to bomb us back into the stone age
7. many many people livin here have suffered from terrorist atrocities
8. at my family home I've had relatives killed
9. if this was a war
10. than those people responsible (from primarily the IRA)
11. should be brought
12. to the Hague
13. and tried as war criminals
14. they completely ignored the Geneva Convention ((inaudible))
15. and their behavior over forty years has been despicable
16. the attempt to reclassify our past and my past
17. as a war
18. is an insult
19. to my family
20. to my community
21. and to those dead
22. and injured
23. and still sufferin
24. um
25. one more thing I would like to say
26. is that
27. there has been a mentality of victimhood
28. perceived amongst republicans and republicanism
29. and yet I see
30. victims of terrorism here tonight who have always behaved with dignity and humility
31. and the sec sec Secretaries of State for the British government have refused to recognize
32. what they've sacrificed for their community and for their country
33. (...) and I also feel
34. this is a purely personal opinion
35. that
36. the members of the panel
Unlike the speakers at Armagh City, this speaker does not describe her grievances in terms of biographical history, but a debased terrorist campaign. In so framing her statements, Speaker 1 attacks the neutrality of the Group. She takes the leaked reports as truth, and argues that a re-classification (line 2)—as if the Troubles had ever been conclusively “classified”—would insult her community. The compliance of the Group with such a framing of history projects them as a corrupt entity conspiring with the government (and republican politicians). The speaker threatens to derail Eames’ carefully constructed trusteeship over society and victims. The Group has failed to recognize the righteousness of the victims, indirectly cast as victimized Protestants and relatives of the speaker using the deictic here in many many people livin here have suffered from terrorist atrocities (line 8) and at my family home I’ve had relatives killed (line 9). They also fail to recognize the evilness of the perpetrators, republicans, indirectly predicated as carrying out a terrorist campaign against life and unity (line 6). She concludes by attacking the Group again, but this time on more personal terms. The government selected the Group based upon their unwillingness to rock the boat (line 42). They will not challenge the status quo in Northern Ireland, which for this speaker means a government corrupted by the involvement of republican war criminals. The present political moment in Northern Ireland is thus a moment of contest between republican
aggressors, a corrupt peace process that support republicans, and the Protestant protagonists. She wants exclusive recognition of Protestants as victims, and demands that republicans be exclusively subject to justice in supra-national courts.

So we begin to see how the subtle manipulation of time and not so subtle use of membership categories colors Speaker 1’s representation of the Northern Irish peace process; indeed, the conflict is past, but because republicanism continues its crimes, she must stand as vanguard against those that directly or indirectly support its methods. Thus, Speaker 1 challenges the Group and devalues their authority at the beginning of the meeting. Eames must act to regain this authority. Eames subtly allies himself with unionist characterizations of the conflict as a “terrorist campaign” and then reasserts the value of the humanistic membership categories used in the reconciliation chronotope.

**Eames reply**

1. so the final thing I'd say is
2. all of us conceivably come from a different experience and background.
3. I can assure you
4. if you'd been beside me
5. for the last thirty years
6. there's no one needs to tell me what it means to be a victim
7. of the terrorist campaign.
8. so
9. thank you for your contribution
10. °I'm sorry for just what you said°.

Eames’ vacillation between the reconciliation chronotope and categories of membership used by unionists shows how difficult it is, even for experienced peace activists, to continue to use a chronotope that erases ethnic identity. Eames aligns himself with the security forces, and casts them as the victims of a terrorist campaign
(line 7). He knows what it is like to suffer at the hands of Irish republicanism. But in taking this stance towards the conflict—and the interlocutors in the room—he shifts from his tactic from defending himself as a neutral “listener” to an individual who has the same sympathies as they do. He hedges this role-shift, noting that people come from different experiences (line 2). Despite his political sympathies for the unionist perspective, Eames regrets the partisan rhetoric of Speaker 1 (line 10). The roles of the interlocutors have changed from those outlined by Eames at the beginning: the Group is no longer a neutral listener of statements, but part of a government system that has unequivocally failed to support unionist victims. Eames is on the defensive.

The ways that peace activists represent history, and the protagonists and antagonists in that history, does not convince those who demand recognition based upon ethnic difference. Ressentiment—the demand for retribution and the recognition of ethnic difference in the face of victimization—directly challenges the utopian view of reconciliation at Ballymena. Instead of asserting the necessity of recognizing the humanity of all actors, and insisting upon reconciliation over retribution, Eames allies himself with categories that assign moral righteousness to the security forces. This shows the central weakness of the spatiotemporal worldview proffered by peace activists: in depoliticizing the Troubles, they divorce it from the political aims and goals that in part drove that conflict. The reconciliation chronotope—as constructed by peace activists—cannot incorporate ethnic difference, and as such, it offers no recourse to those driven by political demands based upon ethnic identity, even by those such as Eames who deeply believe in the discourse of reconciliation.
Spatiotemporal positioning of Protestant protagonists

In Chapters 4 and 5, we see how peace workers cast victims as the key to society’s progression towards a future state of peace. The mechanism for changing victims’ mindsets is storytelling and other acts of “reconciliation”. Unionists reflexively embed the category of Protestants in the spatiotemporal frame used by Eames and others. They are “stuck” in the past. This is because the past is the same as the present, they are still victims, and the peace process continues to exclude their demands. Reconciliation will not achieve future peace, but exclusive retribution against republicans might.

The initial speaker is the acting director of CARE, the organization that held the Kingsmills commemoration. “Walter” casts his community as living in the past until they find retribution:

Walter excerpt 1

1. the other one ah um
2. (...) mentioned there about dealin with uh
3. the third issue
4. well I think that
5. is one that you you need to deal with
6. and I think the way forward is for whoever helps the situation in Northern is to know what happened

Walter uses the trope of linear movement towards peace. Below, he shifts to the discussion of a specific case, which builds discursive evidence for his condemnation of republicans. Similar to the Reverend’s rejection of a republican “happy island” narrative in Chapter 2, the immutability of republicans derail any hope for peace.

Walter excerpt 2
1. and they still withhold the right for them to have
2. to use violence
3. let's look at the the Loughhalls, the Kingsmills, the (inaudible), the Darkley's
4. all these incidents and the the (Greysteele)
5. none of those people was convicted by the British state
6. what about all these instances where there's nobody prosecuted
7. the the quay bomb as well
8. there's nobody prosecuted
9. let's look at the people in the jail who're responsible for that
10. cause even if you do say call it a war^2
11. they're all war criminals.

Walter reiterates his vision of the necessity for retributive justice. Using temporal adverbs that cast actions as ongoing, he states, *and still they withhold the right for them to have, to use violence* (lines 1-2). They hold the threat of victimization over those who have already suffered at the hands of republicans. Walter then lists several prominent events in which republicans killed Protestant civilians, *let's look at the Loughgalls, the Kingsmills, the (inaudible), the Darkleys* (line 3). As noted previously, listing events creates a textual feel of expansion; the number of events reinforces the amount of violence republicans conducted in the province. The plural suffixes of these proper names, the *Kingsmills, the Loughgalls*, further a qualitative feel of expansion. Grievance expands across these temporally and spatially separate events. The only way “forward” in this environment of extensive victimization is the recognition of Irish republicans as *war criminals* (line 11).

The chronotopic framing of discourse shifts from the encouragement of reconciliation by devaluing revenge, to one that demands revenge as the only means for societal progression. By accepting that they “are stuck” in the past, Protestants like
Walter at once validate the need for society to move forward, but deny that the peace process has given them institutional support for this progression. This is a similar argument structure to that used by the Reverend at Kingsmills in Chapter 2. There, the Reverend presents the romantic nationalist vision of a unified and peaceful Irish Republic, only to point out that the crimes of republicanism have made this impossible. Similarly, Walter suggests that goals of peacemakers are valid, however, the fault once again lies with republicans (and the inability of peacemakers to recognize them as immoral terrorists). The world could have been a better place, unfortunately, it is one of constant victimization of the Protestant people. Eames has given up the discursive fight against ressentiment; he stays silent after Walter finishes his statements. An audience member tries to reassert the value of reconciliation as the mechanism for moving forward.

**Speaker 3 excerpt 1**

1. the question we have to be asking today is.
2. what kind of future do we want to live in^a
3. uh what kind of society do we want to be part of^a
4. if that's the case
5. then I think the question is
6. you know what do we need to do with the past in order to take us there.
7. and
8. it's my fear if we go down of road of inquiry
9. and trial
10. and sentencin folk
11. um
12. that
13. we'll never get that kind of society
14. so I I could maybe just ask you
15. what I'm thinkin about this question
16. can you address the third point over then-- is we
17. how can you effectively deal with the past
18. that actually leads in to a better restored future.
This speaker challenges the unionist worldview by asserting that they refuse to draw a line under the past because they demand revenge. He has subtly shifted the agent who stagnates forward progression from the republicans, to those victims who demand retribution. He does not indicate whether this is a certain ethnic or political category of victims; instead, all claims for retribution will keep society pathologically stuck in the past. The teleological end point of reconciliation is a kind of discursive anecdote to the stark moral world of ressentiment. It does not shift republican or unionist victims to his position, however. It also does not garner support from the Group, whose authority has been so eroded by the unionist attacks that they choose not to defend it. Instead, another prominent unionist advocate, “Brian”, reasserts the fact that Protestant victims cannot participate in the political present because there are no mechanisms for prosecuting republicans.

**Brian excerpt 8**

1. this (here) is about dealin with the past
2. >yes we've got to deal with the past<
3. I think that's (*quite*) important
4. but **victims** today sir
5. are finding it very very difficult dealing with the **present**
6. and part of that **present**
7. comes to them with **tremendous force**
8. when they see a known **terrorist killer**
9. as one of the two joint first ministers of our country
10. that is utterly appalling and **utterly repulsive**
11. if you get this wrong
12. you will be remembered as the people
13. **who**
14. have **intensified**
15. the suffering of **every innocent victim**
16. in this country
and I know the task that you have is a very difficult task it’s very complex and there’re many ways you can handle that poisoned chalice (I think) but if you get this wrong >so far as the innocent victims are concerned< you will go down in their history as not their friends but (in bad faith)

The logic of temporal succession in the ressentiment chronotope is quite clear in this section. Like many others who deploy the ressentiment chronotope, Brian makes a nominal distinction between the past and the present (line 5). He uses person reference, known terrorist killer (line 8), to gloss over this distinction. When Protestant victims see Martin McGuinness, they do not see what many in Northern Ireland do: a former IRA commander who has pledged to engage in democratic politics. Unionists see only a terrorist. That a terrorist could participate in democratic politics galls Brian and the group for whom he speaks because the behaviors of the republican category are unchanging. For the peace worker, republicans are capable of democratic participation; the human is capable of change. For Brian, they will always be terrorists. Despite the fact that they may refer to the same objects in the world--the politicians, places, and possibly the same groups--these objects exist in very different chronotopes.

This debate reveals the basic distinctions between unionist and peace worker discourse about victims' rights. Unionists use a representation of the person that does not change through time. The narrative time of their statements usually casts the past as a conflict and the present as a continuation of violence against victims. The membership categories and their category-bound activities do not change across the past and present.
The figurative movement towards the future is constrained by the unchanging nature of these categories. Republicans will always attempt to use violence, and Protestants will always be the object of that violence. Peace workers figure victims as needing to "move forward." By describing their experiences, they will be able, as the title of the meeting series suggests, to "deal with the past." The victims will change not through the prosecution of perpetrators, but through self-expression and a society-wide acceptance of their suffering. This representation casts categories of personhood as mutable.

For Brian, Walter, and other unionist advocates, assertion of victimhood is also a demand for the recognition of the morality of Protestant actions during the Troubles; they are the righteous of the past. This righteousness is the product of the implicit association of Protestantism with the past Stormont state. Unionists use legality to cloak the fact that the *de facto* citizens and allies of this state were Protestant. Since Protestants were the legal arbiters of justice, they are the morally righteous. Just as republican victims’ advocates careful dissociate themselves from republican paramilitaries, unionist advocates also erase the role of state-security forces in perpetuating violence. Instead of challenging the unionist advocates, the Group grows increasingly silent over the course of the interaction. Yet they maintain a righteous tolerance of allowing the public to speak. The discourse of reconciliation is devalued, but they have no other recourse to challenge the unionist advocates. They cannot challenge the unionist statements. To do so would recognize the deep inextricability of politics and victimhood, which would challenge their aim of de-contextualizing and depoliticizing the victims’ rights debate.

With the publication of the Dealing with the Past Report, however, the Group
reasserts its trusteeship over the problems facing Northern Irish society. In the next section, I will briefly describe portions of the Report, which the Group published in 2009 after the public consultation period. The Group uses the reconciliation chronotope to authorize their call for the reduction of individual prosecutions and truth-tribunals, and devalues the statements made at the public meetings. They also recommend programs that would give experts, such as the Dealing with the Past Group members, authority over the narratives of violence disseminated to the public, thus reaffirming their role as trustees for Northern Irish society, which is pathologically “stuck” in the past.

*Prescriptions for Peace: The Dealing with the Past Report*

At Ballymena, unionists challenge the authority of the Consultative Group for Dealing with the Past. The Group’s Report reasserts the worldview of peacemakers, and reaffirms the restorative justice model of transitional justice. The Group creates implicit distinctions between Northern Irish society and peacemakers, casting the former as pathologically rooted in the past, and the latter as the knowledgeable experts that will help society. The Northern Irish and British legislatures rejected the recommendations in the Report, which leads the peacemakers to redouble their position as the trustees and healers for this “temporal” sickness afflicting society.

The Dealing with the Past Report is extensive in its scope and recommendations. It outlines the work of the Group, its guiding principles, and the impacts of the conflict on Northern Ireland. These impacts define the chapter headings of the Report: “Socio-economic Consequences of the Conflict, Victims and Survivors, Social Commemoration Practices, and Legal Processes and Recommendations”. Because of the focus of this
dissertation on victims' rights advocacy I will focus on the sections pertaining to "Victims and Survivors." As much of the discourse in victims' rights advocacy addresses issues of justice, I will focus on sections pertaining to Legal Processes and Recommendations as well.

In the introduction to this dissertation, I describe transitional justice in Northern Ireland as a two-tier system. Victims may submit cases to the Historical Enquiries Team (HET), the Police Ombudsman, or the Police Service of Northern Ireland, with the aim to prosecute those who killed civilians. In response to recommendations by the HET, the Northern Irish state has operated several Inquiries. These inquiries operate like a court—prosecutors cross-examine witnesses and those that might have been responsible. The Inquiries do not have prosecutorial powers, but can make recommendations to the HET or court system directly as to whether prosecutions should occur. There are also restorative mechanisms, mainly developed by public sector organizations such as the Community Relations Council, which aim to help victims “tell their stories”, encourage inter-community cooperation, and run a host of other programs aimed at alleviating the consequences of the conflict. I have focused on the process whereby these peace and reconciliation programs try to develop policy regarding the victims of political violence. I have criticized the public policy and the rhetoric that motivates it: peace workers reduce the conflict to a human instinct for retribution that does not incorporate the complexities of past political violence. As a result, they cannot address the complexities and political implications of victimhood. They also have no ability to entice or coerce offenders into reconciliatory programs. The result is a victims’-centered approach that discourages victims from pursuing their goals, and then pathologizes them for not cooperating with
recommended reconciliatory measures.

The *Dealing with the Past Report* shows the consequences of the reconciliation chronotope for public policy. With regard to victims’ rights, the Consultative Group recommends the establishment of a “Legacy Commission”. This Commission will take over the work of the HET and Police Ombudsman’s Office with regard to deaths during the Troubles. It will also set a five-year limit on prosecutions. Finally, the commission will conduct private meetings with victims and offenders (at least in theory) and disseminate a series of thematic reports that will address past injustices, and the present-day problems faced by victims of political violence. The commission will avowedly avoid incriminating individuals. What the Group proposes is a dismantling of the two-tier system of transitional justice in favor of a single approach, which will phase out retributive mechanisms and exclusively institute restorative measures.

In the Dealing with the Past Report, the authors initially outline the problem facing Northern Ireland:

The Past should be dealt with in a manner which enables society to become more defined by its desire for true and lasting reconciliation, rather than by division and mistrust, seeking to promote a shared and reconciled future for all (Consultative Group on the Past 2009: 49).

The Group, the authors of the Report, describes the taken-for-granted problem facing Northern Ireland: the establishment of a future state of reconciled peace. As if diagnosing a sick patient, the authors identify a problem and prescribe a set of remedies to heal society. Northern Irish society is fractured, ill, and dysfunctional. The framing of Northern Ireland as in a state of division and mistrust implicitly constitutes a boundary
between those who continue to divide and mistrust one another (society), and those who can diagnose and help to fix this problem (the peace workers). As with most claims about the “ossified future” in transitional justice theory, the future state remains undefined (McCracken 2008). In transitional justice narratives, this ossified future contrasts with a violent past (Meister 2011), but these authors also contrast the future with a damaged present. This temporal construct erases the distinctions made between the Troubles and the present peace process, validating the actions of the Consultative Group as necessary to heal the damaged social aggregate, and failing to note the political and social changes since 1998. Having diagnosed the problem as one of societal division, and the necessary remedy to be reconciliation, the authors will dismiss those suggestions that would, given the logic of the reconciliation chronotope, sow division and discord.

The fear of lex talonis motivates their recommendations for healing Northern Irish society. Retributive justice will challenge the peace process, particularly ad hoc Inquiries and the justice system. They begin their legal recommendations by stating, "there is a tendency to re-fight the conflict through the courts; to pursue truth through litigation; to deal with the past without a perspective for the future" (2009: 124). The authors subtly describe the unnamed category of those who pursue litigation as seeking truth. This activity—the demand for truth—can stop society from moving forward if those demands are not met, the "desire for truth...prevents Northern Ireland moving fully to the future" (2009: 125). This erases the demands made by victims, stated several times at the Armagh City and Ballymena meetings, that they want truth and justice. This erasure of the demand for justice leads the authors to suggest an examination of the past based upon “thematic issues”, instead of ad hoc inquiries and criminal investigations. They propose
a Legacy Commission, which would subsume the work of criminal prosecutory bodies, such as the Police Ombudsman and the Historical Enquiries Team.

The proposal for a new Legacy Commission reads:

The Commission would examine themes arising from the conflict which remain of public concern, such as specific areas of paramilitary activity, or alleged collusion. This thematic examination would take place without public hearings. This would facilitate more open and frank disclosure and avoid the constant publicity of present inquiry proceedings (Consultative Group on the Past 2009: 125).

The erasure of victims’ demands for justice makes this thematic approach logical: victims’ may hear about what happened to their loved ones, but not in such a way that would allow them to pursue criminal prosecutions. The Legacy Commission recommendation also reinforces the trusteeship of peace workers over Northern Irish society. In her work on colonial and NGO development schemes in Indonesia, Li (2007) argues that organizations cast problems in such a way that they become the solution; they “make expert” a situation facing a society and prescribe solutions dependent upon the organization’s capabilities. What is often an altruistic “will to improve” masks the construction of power differentials between a society and a group of (usually) non-native experts. In this case, the experts are Catholic and Protestant Irish, but like developmental NGO’s, they create a distinction between society, as the subject of intervention, and experts, those who will intervene. These experts will become trustees for society. The Legacy Commission is an attempt to construct trusteeship, it will allow experts to take information from individuals in private, and then dose it out in a manner they believe the public will accept. They are essentially suggesting a continuation of the Dealing with the
Past meetings, except the Legacy Commission will now hold meetings in private. This gives the experts power to censor information that will, in their estimation, exacerbate the pain of society. Most notably, they will remove narratives that indicate individual responsibility.

*But the Group does not see the outcome of the information recovery process or thematic examination as blaming or naming individuals.* In the process of information recovery, the aim is to resolve unanswered questions. In thematic examination, the purpose is to look at overall accountability, not individual accountability; to identify areas where things went wrong and why they went wrong; to gain greater understanding; to encourage apology where appropriate; and to build a shared and reconciled future (Consultative Group on the Past 2009: 129 *emphases mine*).

In the last three chapters of this dissertation, peace workers emphasize societal guilt over individual guilt, which is a central tenet of restorative justice. Restorative justice discourse requires, however, the participation of perpetrators in the reconciliatory process. Apologies are necessary in restorative justice. In this case, the Legacy Commission will decide when and from whom these apologies will come. This implies that the victims of human rights abuse are not able to designate when an apology should and should not be offered. The panel of experts will take statements, judge them on the metric outlined here and in the previous three chapters: Does the statement promote reconciliation? Will an apology promote reconciliation? This is the implicit division between peacemaking experts and those affected by the Troubles, showing the rhetorical construction of trusteeship over Northern Irish victims of political violence. The victims
are too wounded, too tied up in their feelings of hurt, to make decisions that will create a shared future.

In making recommendations for future reconciliation, the report characterizes victims as demanding truth. The authors do, however, acknowledge a desire for penal justice among victims, but only do so in order to recommend the curtailment of penal justice. They state, "the Group understands this desire for penal justice and wishes to keep this avenue open. It therefore proposes that the process of reviewing and investigating historical cases should continue" (Consultative Group on the Past 2009: 127). But this recommendation comes with an important stipulation: that these reviews and investigations will be incorporated into the newly established Legacy Commission that will take over the work of the Historical Enquiries Team—which investigates killings during the Troubles—and the Police Ombudsman—which oversees, and investigates the actions of the Royal Ulster Constabulary during the Troubles. But the Legacy Commission will only last for five years, and at that moment, the Commission will dissolve and “make recommendations on how a line might be drawn at the end of its five-year mandate so that Northern Ireland may best move to a shared future” (Consultative Group on the Past 2009: 132). The five-year limit will prevent what the Group fears: an endless cycle of revenge, this time played out in the court system.

This vision of the Northern Irish public as prone to revenge is more a product of the chronotopic view of the peace process than a reflection of what has happened, to date, when the public does hear statements by perpetrators given to inquiries and at trials. A loyalist paramilitary assassinated a human rights lawyer, Rosemary Nelson, in South
Armagh in 1999. After an Inquiry, the British state published a report in 2011. The Report found no direct links between the British Government and security forces, and the paramilitary members that killed Ms. Nelson. This challenged arguments that there was collusion between the state security forces and paramilitaries. Amnesty International challenged the findings of the Report, arguing that state agencies had withheld information during the inquiry (Amnesty International 2011). The inquiry has fueled, rather than quelled, republican mistrust of the government and may harden their demands for international tribunals. Any inquest, public or private hearing, will draw the ire of the some or all of the Northern Irish public, maybe with justifiable reason. Instead of causing violence, the Nelson Inquiry inspired an important debate about the reluctance of the British state to release classified information. This challenges the notion that the unfiltered release of information to the public will, in the view of the Dealing with the Past authors, further damage a society already crippled by conflict.

**Conclusion**

The Committee for Northern Ireland Affairs in the House of Commons rejected the Dealing with the Past Report. Ministers voiced concerns about the Legacy Commission. They expressed skepticism that former paramilitary members would be willing to participate in such a commission without the promise of amnesty for unprosecuted crimes, and amnesty will not be accepted by Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom (they have little to say about whether security forces personnel would participate). They also note that any truth telling commissions launched by the Legacy Commission will duplicate existing efforts that focus on victims’ stories and experiences,
without offering more information about how they were wounded or how their loved ones died (House of Commons 2009: 37). Overall, the criticism focuses upon one central point: that the Report makes recommendations that would set up new institutions for truth and storytelling, and substantially limit the extent to which individuals can pursue justice through the court system and its related institutions, such as the Historical Enquiries Team. The Legacy Commission would reduce the two-tier system of transitional justice in Northern Ireland, which allows victims to pursue both restorative and retributive justice, to restorative mechanisms only.

For some peace activists, however, the Dealing with the Past Report offered recommendations to a damaged society. Society is still “stuck in the past” and this is why the government and members of the public rejected the report. Recently, the Bridge of Hope, a peace and reconciliation group located in Belfast, held a conference. At this meeting, Lord Eames—the co-chairman of the Dealing with the Past Report—stated that Northern Irish society was “not ready” for the recommendations in the report. Many speakers agreed and adopted language that described Northern Irish society, and victims implicitly, as so traumatized that it could not change. As Victims Commissioner Kathryn Stone stated, “we have to help people heal their future. They must not be scarred by the past, they have to marked by hope” (Bridge of Hope 2013). This is a pathology of temporal stagnation: society resists moving forward to peace because of their allegiance to ethic identities and political agendas. The Dealing with the Past Report, as the above quote suggests, inspired peace activists to reaffirm their roles as the trustees over those who refuse to “heal their future”. In much the same way that a missionary might pray for the native resistant to conversion, the activists refuse to give up hope for the populace.
This problem, this inability to “move forward”, is not a problem for many victims and their advocates because they use different chronotopes to represent the Troubles and the Long Peace. We have seen victims and their advocates demand justice because the past is separate from the present: Northern Ireland is in a state of peace, and therefore they demand justice. However, peace activists cannot see these as legitimate political demands. The trustees of Northern Ireland, exemplified in the Consultative Group for Dealing with the Past, will continue to wait for Northern Irish society to see the light.

The Dealing with the Past Report shows the power that chronotopic visions of war and peace have for shaping public policy recommendations. Peace workers aspire to great changes, but the chronotope that underpins their recommendations constrains their ability to make more nuanced suggestions for dealing with the demands of victims of political violence. They use a model of restorative justice that requires offender participation, but in the Long Peace, there are no mechanisms for offender participation. This leads to an erasure of perpetrators from their narratives, and the denigration of retribution based upon a fear of cyclical revenge that takes its logic and coherence from the reconciliation chronotope. Peace workers certainly make positive changes in people’s lives and operate valuable programs in Northern Ireland, but their attempts to gain the support of victims for their proposals will fail because they cannot adapt their chronotopic vision of reconciliation to the demands for retributive justice.
Chapter 7: Transnational advocacy and commensuration in the Palestinian and republican victims’ rights movement

This dissertation has examined the ways in which Northern Irish victims' rights advocates use "chronotopes"—Bahktin's (1981) gloss for the spatiotemporal matrices that underpin narratives—to legitimate their demands for justice. In this section, I take on the final context for public advocacy in this dissertation; namely, the formation of transnational victims' rights discourses in Northern Ireland. I focus on how activists intertextually link the conflict in Ireland with the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Activists link the different geographical and historical spaces to one another using narrative and lexical representations of time, place, and person. Understanding how person, place, and time are articulated with one another underscores the tension between transnational theories of human rights and democratic action, on the one hand, and the politics of peace building and victimhood in specific cultural and political contexts.

In the first section of this chapter, a Palestinian activist casts Ireland as a past instantiation of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. She argues that lobbying efforts will push the Israeli-Palestinian conflict along a path towards a peace. The motivating force for figurative movement through time is the protection of human rights and the implementation of democratic practice. The Irish case serves as an example for the Israeli/Palestinian case. The recognition of the once oppressed Catholics as equal members of a democratic nation-state is an ideal for Palestinians. In the second case, an American-born Irish national casts victimization as ongoing in both Ireland and Palestine. Victimization will stop once the Israeli state acquiesces to a viable Palestinian state. He
links ethnicity to notions of "place": Catholics have an inherent right to the Irish island just as Palestinians have an inherent right to Palestine. The liberal democratic peace project, propagated by the United Nations and the European Union, fails because it does not recognize the priority of ethno-nationalist difference. The audience challenges his demand for violent action, showing that the representations used by republicans have changed such that violence no longer appeals; it is better to pursue victims’ rights through international democratic processes.

In the next chapter, I analyze the commensuration practices of two Israeli activists. The first is an Israeli member of the “Family Circle,” an Israeli and Palestinian support group for the bereaved from both communities. She demands that people stop making political demands against or for Israel, politics kills. Following this, I show how an Israeli activist who links the Irish and Israeli experiences of victimization based upon globalized discourses of the “Global War on Terror.” He differentiates between state (lawful) and non-state (unlawful) actors. The unlawful actors continually threaten the righteous. This continuous threat demands the development of special categories, such as “enemy combatant”, that challenge the humanist conceit of the liberal democratic peace process. This has similarities to the discourse used by CARE activists, and thus legitimates their worldview. This has the effect of reinforcing their beliefs and pulling them further from participation in the Northern Irish peace process.

These chapters compare the chronotopes used by Irish and Middle Eastern rights activists, and contribute to the anthropological study of transnational human rights. In the last decade, anthropological interest in human rights has shifted from activism,

Following Merry’s (2006) synthesis of the field, anthropologists of human rights focus on the concept of “frame alignment.” Frames are ways of organizing an array of “events and experiences together in a meaningful fashion” (Snow and Benford 1992: 138), which prescribe actions and reactions in political and civil society (Merry 2006). Merry uses the concept and asks anthropologists to “map the middle” by following activists as they move between international and transnational institutions and local sites of human rights abuse. These studies share an interest in how local understandings of gendered, economic, social, and political relationships clash and otherwise interface with definitions of cultural and individual human rights suggested in legal forums such as the United Nations and other transnational spaces. The next two chapters show how international discourses of human rights and the “War on Terrorism” affect discourse in Northern Ireland.
The presentations under analysis in the next few chapters differ in content from the preceding ones not only because they focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In Northern Ireland, victims’ advocates debate the category of the victim in the context of the new multicultural Northern Irish state. The speakers make implicit and explicit ethno-religious distinctions, but they do not debate unification. Republicans take advantage of their inclusive status in the state whereas unionists rail against republican inclusion. The pro-Palestinian speakers below discuss the establishment of a Palestinian state as a remedy to their victimization. The first pro-Palestinian speaker, Lina, and the first Israeli speaker, Ana, argue for humanist inclusion in the future state(s) of Israel-Palestine as a means to eliminate victimization. The second Palestinian speaker, Ben, and the second Israeli speaker, Mike, focus not on pluralism, but on the exclusion of other ethnicities (or national members) from the nation-state by virtue of that ethnicity’s perpetration of political violence. The different cross-chrono Tope alignments deployed by these activists may be similar to Irish discourse pre-1998 as the question of national unification still dominated political debate.

**Republican and Palestinian rights debates**

On June 1st, 2010, over two-hundred citizens and human rights activists gathered in front of the Belfast City Hall in Northern Ireland to protest events that transpired the previous day off the coast of the Gaza Strip. The events—colloquially described as the “flotilla raid”—refer to the attack of the Mavi Marmara vessel by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The Mavi Marmara was one of six vessels comprising the “Freedom Flotilla” supported by the Free Gaza Movement. Since 2008 the Free Gaza Movement has
endeavored to break the blockade instituted by the Israelis after Hamas won elections in the Gaza Strip in 2006 (Free Gaza Movement 2009). In May, the Freedom Flotilla attempted to run the Israeli blockade. On the morning of May the 31st Israeli navy ships surrounded the Mavi Marmara and announced instructions for its surrender. The IDF then boarded the ship and in the ensuing melee nine activists were killed and scores were wounded.

The flotilla raid caused particular consternation in Northern Ireland, and sparked a series of public meetings on the subject. Many activists argued that the Israel government was abandoning efforts to resolve the Palestinian situation peacefully. Indeed, the flotilla raid increased belief, especially among Irish republicans—those that desire a united Ireland—that the Israel treatment of the Palestinians was analogous to the British treatment of the Irish in the years of the “Troubles.” Activists made comparisons between the raid and the killing of fourteen civil rights marchers by the British Army in the Bogside area of Londonderry in 1972; indeed, the flotilla raid is a Palestinian “Bloody Sunday.”

The circumstances leading to the deaths on board the Mavi Marmara are disputed in Northern Ireland, Palestine, and internationally: The IDF claims that the passengers were “terrorists” intent on aiding the militant activities of Hamas, but activists claim that they used “active resistance” and that the Israeli security forces used disproportionate violence in response. Active resistance is a form of “direct action,” which is the pursuance of political goals through non-normative means, such as protest, boycotts, and sit-ins. Active resistance describes the use of defensive, non-lethal violence directed at a
state’s security forces. The purpose of active resistance is to encourage security forces to use disproportionate violence, thus garnering international attention for victims of that violence. This tactic differs from “non-violence” as advocated by Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and others, which stipulates that activists should not use violence against antagonists in any way. Instead, non-violent activists engage in protests, boycotts, and more extreme passive methods such as the use of human shields and hunger strikes\textsuperscript{41}.

Using active resistance, the Mavi Marmara activists achieved much media attention as many outlets criticized the IDF and the blockade. Some of the most scathing rebukes of IDF tactics came from independent and mainstream sources in the United Kingdom, which focused on the rights violations perpetuated by the Israeli government against what they understood as humanitarian workers engaged in legitimate self-defense (McGreal 2010). In the United States attention focused on the legality of the Israeli actions as well as the intentions of the activists (Kershner and MacFarquahar 2010). These debates were stoked by a United Nations mission that found evidence that passengers were killed at close range (United Nations General Assembly A/HRC/15/1). The self-expressed intentions of the activists to provoke the IDF with active resistance de-legitimated their identification as humanitarians for some commentators, however, including the Israeli ambassador to the United States (Oren 2010). These debates were replicated and intensified in Northern Ireland during the summer of 2010, as they re-awakened fundamental questions about resistance to human rights abuse: What are the morally superior and most effective means for activists to respond to human rights abuse perpetrated by a state?
This chapter studies the impact of the flotilla raid, and other events during the Gaza blockade, on commensuration between Irish and Palestinian victims’ rights groups. Commensuration is a common polemic used by advocates to map the abuses in one territory onto another. In order to study this commensuration process, I analyze language use in two public meetings, one from 2008 and another from 2010, in Belfast, Northern Ireland. This chapter shows how temporalization effects, specifically the discursive construction of time, produce certain depictions of human rights advocates, and encourage participation in the Palestinian rights movement. In the 2008 meeting, a Palestinian advocate casts Irish and Palestinian narratives of rights abuse and resistance as temporally distinct. In the 2010 meeting, an activist portrays the struggle and victimization of the Irish and Palestinians as concurrent. I suggest that this representation of the two conflicts is similar to representations of *ressentiment*, Nietzsche’s psychosocial basis for modern morality and the “force” that Wendy Brown (1995) asserts forms the basis for victimized identity in modern liberal democracies as outlined in Chapter 2. Brown argues that minority and counter-culture groups in the United States fashion their identity based upon an unending sense of victimhood. This second commensuration tactic, based on victimization and the corruption of those who do not explicitly condemn the Israeli government, fails to gain the support of the republican audience because it does not align with Irish representations of the Troubles. Both speakers ask their Irish audiences to perceive and empathize with the Palestinian conflict through two different chronotopes of human rights abuse and resistance, one in which they are concurrent sufferers of oppression with the Palestinians in a universe populated by either the good or the morally corrupt, and one in which the Irish offer a model for the Palestinians as
transitional figures, moving from a state of victimization to participation in democratic structures.

The two Palestinian rights meetings analyzed here were recorded in 2008 and 2010. The first meeting was organized in partnership with Sinn Fein, the leading republican political party in Northern Ireland, for the August West Belfast “Feile an Phobail” (community festival). The Feile is a registered charity that runs events year-round, with a large festival in August. The city council started the festival in 1988 to cast the community of West Belfast in a positive light in response to the Troubles in Northern Ireland (Feile Belfast 2010). Many international activists, tourists, and republicans attended the Feile, and it was sponsored by the Belfast City Council, Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure, and the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation.

During the 2008 festival, organizers held a “Palestinian Day” that included panel meetings, photographic exhibitions, and films on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. For the most part, speakers focused on the historical circumstances that gave rise to the state of Israel, and traced the roots of Zionism in the nineteenth century to the present day. Many of the speeches focused on the similarities between the Irish and Palestinian conflicts. The public meeting under analysis here consisted of five speakers and a short question and answer period with the audience, which numbered about seventy-five and consisted of Irish republican activists, politicians, and members of the public. The speakers consisted of two Palestinian nationals who write and advocate for Palestinian rights, a Sinn Fein minister of the European Parliament, and a trade union activist. I will focus on “Lina,” a naturalized British Palestinian.
In her speech, Lina traces out the origins of Zionism, the foundation of the state of Israel, and then cajoles the audience to engage in peaceful efforts at establishing a “one-state” solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. At the beginning of her talk, Lina aligns narratives of victimhood between Ireland and Palestine.

**Excerpt 1 (Lina)**

1. the Irish have struggled
2. have a history of struggle
3. for rights for their rights
4. a struggle that the Palestinians are waging every day

Lina describes projects the temporal span of the Irish struggle deep into the past (although not into the present). The two cases are on a linear timeline with the Irish resistance as a past instantiation of the Palestinian struggle. Consider another example in which Lina aligns the Irish and Palestinian narratives of rights abuse:

**Lina 2**

1. and of course the fact that
2. Britain has a very great deal to do
3. with the tragedy that overtook your country and mine
4. and of course not least because of the peacemaking efforts have really begun to bear fruit in in Ireland
5. there are lessons I think here for the situation in uh Palestine.

The audience is therefore asked to examine Palestine through the lens of their own past, and perhaps even understand their present as a potential future for Palestine. Lina compares Palestine and Ireland based upon their colonial experiences. Great Britain ruled Palestine from 1923 until the establishment of Israel in 1948. The English Monarchy established control over the whole of Ireland in 1603. The complex different histories of these colonial circumstances are obscured in favor of linking the two areas
based their colonial situations. Britain, as a colonial power in Palestine, helped to cause the tragedy there, but we do not know whether she would regard Israeli as a colonial government. Implicitly, Ireland is post-colonial and a colonial power still controls Palestine. Yet her comparison does not fully adopt the language of anti-colonialism. She never labels Israel as a colonial power, but this form of commensuration between the two circumstances no doubt resonates with an Irish audience that regards their experiences as a colonial one.

By the third excerpt, Lina transitions to an analysis of the Palestinian case with a discussion of how the establishment of Israeli has affected the Palestinian people.

**Excerpt 3 (Lina)**

1. and I- it would be very nice for me to be able to say to you  
2. that was something that happened sixty years ago  
3. it was terrible but it’s in the past  
4. and uh we all have to move on.  
5. of course it isn’t like that  
6. in the Palestinian case this catastrophe has been ongoing since that time  
7. there has really not been a let up  
8. in the Israeli attempt to empty the land of Palestine

Lina begins with the conditional *would be* to describe a hypothetical case in which she could temporalize the Palestinian conflict as a past event (line 1). For added effect and to emphasize the expanse of time over which the conflict has occurred, she anchors her hypothetical wish to calendrical time (line 2), referencing the establishment of Israel. She wishes that, like her description of the Irish case, she could frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a past event.

To summarize, Lina characterizes the Irish anti-colonial fight as a past
instantiation of Palestine. She is asking the audience to view the Palestinian case in light of their own history of rights abuse. The two narratives fit onto the same linear timeline, and have the same logic of temporal succession. The Palestinian case (potentially) can progress towards peace. In order to facilitate this progression, she implores the audience to agitate for the Palestinian cause using peaceful means:

**Excerpt 4 (Lina)**

1. it can have a very small action can have a very dramatic effect on Israel
2. and it could be the start of more of these uh groups arise
3. around the world in terms of (inaudible)
4. academic wor- cultural work sports work every single work that we can think of
5. the more we do that
6. the more we build an international movement
7. along the lines of the anti-apartheid movement
8. the more I think we’ll have the sort of success that we saw in South Africa.

In this excerpt, Lina prescribes certain kinds of action for securing a Palestinian state and ceasing rights abuse perpetuated by Israel. She calls for the establishment of academic, cultural, and sports networks between foreign and Palestinian activists. This kind of transnational advocacy dovetails with the projects promoted at the Feile Palestinian Day, such as a photographic exhibition of Palestinian cultural life, and the “Anti-racism World Cup,” which is an international amateur soccer tournament sponsored by Irish republican groups. In concluding her statements, Lina compares this type of activism to the anti-apartheid movement that organized consumer boycotts, economic sanctions, and academic boycotts of Apartheid South Africa. She represents the success of transnational activism against the apartheid state as a historical success, much like her portrayal of the Irish case as a relatively successful peace process (line 8).
Lina casts effective advocacy as peaceful efforts aimed at expanding the awareness not only of the Palestinian plight, but also their culture, arts, and sports. The international community should punish Israel for rights abuse through peaceful activities aimed at damaging their economy and global reputation. At line 8, she has mapped South Africa onto this temporal succession from a state of conflict to a state of peace. This three-way comparison of Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Israel/Palestine is common both as a polemic and as an academic comparison in Northern Ireland (Guelke 2008). In all three cases, there is the potential for linear progression from a state of violent conflict to a state of peace.

Until this point, her use of membership categories has been limited to nation-state/geographical groupings. It is relatively austere and lacks specific characterizations (until she mentions South Africa). The catalyst for movement through the chronotope is social action and peaceful direct action, which we can infer from her analogy with the South African case. While the comparison is not explicit, African apartheid is a common analogy in Palestinian rights discourse. This comparison places Israel/Palestine on the same linear path towards peace and implicitly aligns native Africans with the Palestinians and Afrikaans with the Israelis. It also makes her advocacy methods logical: if Apartheid crumbled under international pressure, Israel might do the same.

The audience responded to Lina’s call for peaceful direct action. Most of the Q&A session that followed her talk concentrated on the effective types and times for protests, boycotts, and lobbying politicians. The linear temporal frame ratified their own grassroots advocacy efforts, and thus empowered the audience to speak to the subject of
where, when, and how to conduct peaceful direct action.

Two years after the 2008 Palestinian Day meeting, the conflict in Palestine had worsened: In the winter of 2008, the IDF launched an attack on the Hamas controlled Gaza Strip and further tightened their naval blockade of the region. Pro-Palestinian activists staged a number of rallies in Belfast, including a rally for peace in which a number of activists spoke in the Belfast city center (Strain 2009). In May of 2010, the IDF attacked activists on the Turkish ship, the Mavi Marmara, during its attempt to run the blockade and deliver supplies to the Palestinians. One of the activists on board the ship, an American born Irish national, spoke at a public meeting in Belfast in August 2010. The Socialist Worker’s Party of Ireland43 and the Irish Palestinian Solidarity Campaign44 sponsored the meeting. The meeting was in a Gaelic Athletic Association club in West Belfast. These clubs support Gaelic athletics, such as Gaelic football, and usually house a pub and meeting hall. The membership of the clubs, and hence many of those present at the panel have republican political perspectives.

The keynote speaker, here named “Ben,” is an American born Irish national who has advocated for Palestinian rights over the past decade. Like many of those present, he advocates for direct action against the Israeli government and the IDF in order to attain Palestinian statehood and the protection of Palestinian rights. He also advocates for “active resistance,” which is direct action characterized by non-lethal defensive violence. Unlike the non-violent movements of Gandhi or Martin Luther King, these activists resist arrest with low-level violence. Thus, when the IDF commandos boarded the Mavi Marmara, many of the activists responded by attacking the soldiers in an attempt to
disarm them. For example, during the raid, Ben asserts that he disarmed a commando and held him prisoner, but never threatened the life of the soldier and released him at the end of the attack.

Transnational activists who condone active resistance see it as a morally superior tactic than that of “terrorist” or other forms of offensive violence because of its emphasis on defensive and non-lethal force. The emphasis on the non-lethality of the tactic also lends to its moral superiority and potentially highlights the immorality of security forces, as active resistance often tempts security forces to respond with disproportionate force, injuring and killing civilians. In the passages below, Ben contrasts passive and active resistance. Passive resistance is another way of describing non-violent direct action. Activists challenge security and government forces by staging non-violent protests, such as sit-ins or boycotts, but do not in any way violently attack security forces, even if physically harmed themselves. In order to justify his support for active resistance, Ben portrays the Irish as conducting present-day resistance against their British oppressors. The Irish are like the Israelis, because they still suffer under the yoke of state oppression. By emphasizing the immediacy of victimization, he seeks to compel his mostly Irish audience to join him in active resistance tactics.

During the meeting, Ben gave an informal twenty-minute speech about his experiences during the flotilla raid, as well as his general efforts advocating for victims of Israeli violence. In addition, an Irish activist describes his efforts advocating for the Palestinian cause in Ireland. I will focus on Ben’s talk because he, unlike the Irish speaker, attempts to commensurate narratives of violence in Ireland and Palestine. After
the speeches, a moderator selected audience members to ask the speakers questions about their experiences and political positions. The majority of these responses were directed at Ben. As an American-born Irish national, Ben begins by associating himself with the Palestinians and the Irish in terms of their common struggle against oppression:

**Excerpt 5 (Ben)**

1. my wife is Palestinian born and raised in the UK.
2. these people are
3. remarkable
4. absolutely remarkable
5. they're amongst the most generous hospitable patient overwhelmingly nonviolent.
6. the vast majority of them
7. but of course like the Irish
8. like any people who are occupied
9. when you reach a certain point
10. you fight
11. and
12. I relate to that so much
13. I know that if I were born and raised here in Ireland
14. that I would've been part of the resistance.
15. I don't have any doubt of that
16. if I were born and raised in Palestine
17. yeah I have no doubt at all
18. that I would be involved in violent resistance
19. I simply could not sit by and watch my family be murdered my land stolen my rights trampled on
20. by people who quite frankly look at you like you're subhuman
21. like a dog

At line 1, the speaker states that his wife is Palestinian. This association—stated at the outset of the speech—lends legitimacy to his advocacy efforts on behalf of Palestinians, a warm and peaceful people (lines 3-5). With this characterization of the protagonists, the Ben deploys a rhetorical device that will be repeated throughout his talk; namely, that a given victimized nationality will only resist violently when given no other
choice by oppressive governments. He uses the Irish case to highlight the universal applicability of this maxim (lines 9-10). The Palestinians and Irish are examples of a general evolution of resistance movements, indexed by the use of the indefinite you, as the process is not only specific to the nationalities involved, but cast as a basic causal process (line 9). This rhetorical move legitimates violence by shifting the responsibility for the instigation of violence to the oppressors. This is common in political talk as actors wish to cast their violent activities as morally superior, and portray the other side as being the instigators of violence.

He then aligns the Irish and Palestinian cases saying based upon his own hypothetical involvement in both conflicts. This casts him as a protagonist as well, who resorts to resistance because of the actions of the nation-state (line 14-15, 18, 19). The parallel syntax of these two conditional statements and the interchangeability of the two geographical references (Ireland and Palestine) reinforce the similarities between rights abuse and resistance in the two contexts. He continues:

*Excerpt 6 (Ben)*

1. but definitely in their treatment of the Palestinians which
2. I think is very similar to the treatment of the Irish
3. under the British
4. as if you are *dogs*
5. even worse than *dogs* to be despised and *beaten*

With the protagonists qualified as a peaceful and friendly people, who only resort to violence as a last resort, he then projects British and Israeli views of these minorities. The contrast between the positive evaluation of the Irish and Palestinians, and the viewpoint of the British and Israelis, increases the feeling of injustice. The Irish and
Palestinians are both hypothetically, but concurrently, *dogs* (lines 4-5). The auxiliary *to be* and the verbs *despised* and *beaten* project the hypothetical future treatment of the Irish and Palestinians based upon this concurrent metaphorical status (line 5). If no action is taken, the ill-treatment will continue in the present and future. Consider another example:

**Excerpt 7 (Ben)**

1. and let us recognize the Palestinian people for what they are  
2. and I think if any one can see them for what they are  
3. the Irish people surely can see them because they are *you*  
4. they are *you*  
5. and they are fighting the same battle that you’ve been  
6. fighting for centuries  
7. and which continues even.

Ben casts the two narratives of rights abuse and resistance as concurrent in order to portray violent activism (albeit defensive violence) as the *only* effective means for protecting Palestinian rights. By casting the audience as present-day victims and resistors, he seeks to legitimize his claim that active resistance is the most effective way to protect the Palestinian people. The Irish as “present-day” victims and resistors of abuses mimics *ressentiment*, the Nietzschan basis for vengeful morality.

In Chapter 2, I describe Brown’s (1995) analysis of political identity in Western liberal democracies. She argues that many identities of minorities and other marginalized groups are fashioned through a process of *ressentiment*: the repetitive experience of harm and the inability to stop this progressive victimization. The theory of *ressentiment* is the basis of Nietzsche’s concept of “slave morality,” which is cast from the perspective of the oppressed, against a powerful entity that continually victimizes them. The pain caused
by a victimization event or events persists in the person or is persistently enacted upon the person; in fact, continuing pain is one of the very bases for that person’s vision of power as a source of degradation. In this framework, all power is morally corrupt and the victimized are, by virtue of their victimization, the “good.” As Brown (1995) states, “morality emerges from the powerless to avenge their incapacity for action; it enacts their resentment of strengths that they cannot match or overthrow” (44). This frustration leads to representations of the moral universe in stark terms characterizing personae and institutions as the oppressed "good" or the “morally corrupt” powerful.

If we apply Nietzsche’s theory of resement to these examples, the victimization of the Irish imbues them with a superior moral valence. The present-day Irish, like the Palestinians, are “good” because they are victims. Another feature of resement is that the experience of consistent victimization motivates feelings of disgust and anger even at those that are not direct antagonists, “[the victims] tear open their oldest wounds...they make evildoers out of their friends...” (Nietzsche 1956 cited in Brown 1995: 73). This continuing victimization would, in the moral framework constructed by Nietzsche, characterize actors in the world—even those who are not direct antagonists or protagonists—in pejorative terms in so far as they are not seen to help the victims' cause. Moreover, his positive description of Palestinians and Irish heightens this sense of victimization: these are fundamentally good people that are tortured under these state regimes. Implicitly, this casts the Israelis and British as sadistically vindictive. This situation cannot stand. The situation is so dire, and such an extreme violation of human dignity, that those who do not stand with the oppressed stand with the oppressors.
Excerpt 8 (Ben)

1. the EU disgusts me as much if not more than the United States
2. quite frankly
3. at least you can look at the United States and say what a
4. bunch of wankers
5. and look how violent they are
6. but with the EU you try and maintain this sense of civility
7. and human rights respect
8. bollocks to that

I do not mean to suggest that the United States should be considered a "friend" or "ally" of Palestinian activists in any objective sense, but I do suggest that this representation of morality entails a depiction of the actors in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in dichotomous moral terms. The generalized "you" at line 3 combined with the British English lexical choice at line 4 may indicate that he is voicing the perspective of the audience. He has mapped the combative worldview--produced by ressentiment--onto the audience; indeed, the stage upon which advocacy will play out might be said to be populated by the good, the bad, and the ‘wankers’.

Excerpt 9 (Ben)

1. listen
2. keep lobbying the politicians
3. keep writing letters
4. keep going on the protests
5. keep doin all that but please
6. but let us make this clear
7. what will make the biggest difference
8. which we can change things more quickly than anything
9. less than a thousand people on six ships did more
10. in an instant
11. than all this work huge amounts of energy and resources being put into all sorts of things
12. let us not ignore that
Here, Ben pleads with the audience to recognize the effectiveness of active resistance. Throughout the meeting, he has promoted the use of active resistance as a means to force the IDF into confrontations with civilians. Such confrontations, even if they entail loss of civilian life, portray the IDF as morally corrupt. The phrase at line 9 is an indirect reference to this method. Thus, not only is active resistance similar to the resistance of the Irish against the British, but it is also the most effective method for changing world opinion against Israel\textsuperscript{45}.

As we shall see in the question and answer session, this legitimization tactic has limited success. Audience members express concern about Irish combatants engaging in active resistance and suggest that peaceful means are effective as well. When the question and answer session begins, Sean, one of the audience members, responds to a request by Ben that former Irish combatants join the flotilla in 2011 to assist with active resistance efforts.

*Excerpt 9 (Sean)*

1. regarding the u::h
2. combatants from here takin’ part in the
3. flotilla
4. do you not think that that would make the
5. flotilla more susceptible to attack\textsuperscript{^}\n6. by the Israelis and do you not think the
7. pro-Zionist media would dance all over that\textsuperscript{^}\textsuperscript{46}

Sean worries that combatants’ participation will be a public relations problem, as they would play into Israeli characterization of flotilla participants as militants. In line 2, he uses the membership category of *combatants*. This category is distinctive in that most Northern Irish rights activists refer to themselves or others as “ex-combatants” to signal
their past participation in paramilitary activities. In choosing not to use the prefix “ex” he takes up the characterization of the Irish conflict as ongoing. This audience member has taken up the inspiring language of resistance, but he was the only one to do so.

In the next two examples, audience members express dismay at the speaker’s dismissal of peaceful activism and note that many activists will not support direct or violent action against the Palestinians. Consider the following:

**Excerpt 10 (Brenda)**

1. I'm just a wee bit concerned when Ben was speakin’
2. I just want to put clarity with Ben
3. um because Ben you you seemed to be sort of you know UN EU are all a waste of time
4. um but the example
5. the European Union has a statute trade agreement with Israel euro agreement
6. and the thing is we've been calling for that to be suspended after Israel breaks international law.
7. um but I'm just afraid that people might think that what you were saying was that we sh-- shouldn't waste our time calling for the suspension of that agreement
8. I think it’s important for us from an agitational point of view

In this excerpt, Brenda, expresses concern at Ben’s dismissal of peaceful activism, such as calling for the suspension of the trade agreement between Israel and the European Union. Her concern is evident at lines 3-4 as she rephrases Ben’s dismissal of democratic pressure in supra-state institutions. Her use of the non-specific membership category *people* in line 9 *people might think that what you were saying was*, is a face-saving tactic, which postulates that some people (though not her) might not understand that he is also in favor of peaceful activism. She is challenging the speaker’s vision of the inefficacy of
peaceful tactics, based upon the chronotopic equivalence of the two narratives. The evidence does not suggest that Brenda directly challenges Ben’s temporal equation of Irish and Palestinian resistance, but she does challenge his Manichean worldview of the actors. Her disagreement suggests that the temporal equation—meant to legitimize violent resistance—fails to convince the Irish audience.

Brenda presents a worldview that populated by institutions that have effective mechanisms for prosecuting rights abuse conducted by Israel. The European Union and United Nations are effective mechanisms for instituting sanctions and otherwise legislating for the protection of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, Brenda uses membership categories and nation-state lexical terms that cast the Israeli/Palestinian conflict at a far remove from the Northern Irish conflict, which she does not mention. The spatial frame of reference is dislocated from the context of talk-in-interaction and supports the effectiveness of supra-state organizations in the abstract. These institutions do not seem as corrupt when viewed separately from the deeply emotional and troublesome depiction of the colonial conflicts in the regions discussed.

As the meeting proceeds, additional audience members express dismay at Ben’s dismissal of peaceful activism. At the end of the meeting, one of the meeting organizers, Billy, characterizes both passive and active resistance as advancing the rights of the oppressed in an attempt to create a renewed sense of solidarity between the activists in the room.

Excerpt 11 (Billy)

1. I think there's an awful lot of
2. **people** out there
3. who
4. are just not in that position
5. where they would support
6. for example
7. Palestinian armed resistance
8. or even active resistance on a
9. flotilla
10. but they would support the
11. Palestinian case and the
12. Palestinian cause

Similar to the audience member’s statement in excerpt 9, Billy uses the general membership category of *people* to protect the face of individuals in the room who criticize Ben and support peaceful activism (line 2). He indicates that these hypothetical people would have reservations supporting armed resistance or even active resistance. These people would, however, support the Palestinian case. He continues:

*Excerpt 12 (Billy)*

1. and I think there's an awful
2. lot a people out there who'd
3. be prepared to engage in *people*
4. power
5. but we have to remember where
6. they are at this point in time
7. they're not all necessarily where
8. other people are
9. and
10. you know there's uh there there
11. there's a guy from this part of
12. the world who once said
13. *everyone* has their own *particular* part to play.

At line 12, he alludes to Bobby Sands who was a Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) volunteer in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and was convicted in 1977 of firearms possession and sent to prison in Northern Ireland. The paraphrase is borrowed from
Sands’ prison notebooks: “I have always taken a lesson from something that was told me by a sound man, that is, that everyone, republican or otherwise, has his own particular part to play. No part is too great or too small; no one is too old or too young to do something” (Sands 1989: 169). In 1981, Sands died while on hunger strike aimed at gaining political status in the jails. His death resulted in widespread publicity for the republican cause in Northern Ireland. Riots occurred throughout the province and Europe as well. Sand’s death fit into a long tradition of self-sacrifice in Ireland, which values self-destruction as a means to demonstrate the truth and legitimacy of a political perspective (Sullivan 1993: 433). He is a powerful symbol in the current context of debate over human rights in post-conflict Northern Ireland because he took his own life, and was not engaged in offensive Provisional Irish Republican military actions at the time of his death. Though opponents to republicanism often brand him a “terrorist,” he is associated with popular figures of resistance such as Nelson Mandela, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King. He has become a secular saint for the cause and carries associations of non-violent self-sacrifice for many republicans.

Sands’s quote, “everyone has a particular role to play,” has become increasingly popular in political discourse in Northern Ireland over the past decade as well. The quote even adorns a mural of Sands on the headquarters of the Sinn Fein office on the Falls Road in Belfast. Danny Devenny—a former combatant and mural artist—describes the meaning that republicans ascribe to the quote in an interview in the late 1990’s:

It’s very important what Bobby Sands said, that “everyone has a role to play, no matter how great or how small.” We understood that to mean that it didn’t have to only be an armed struggle. Bobby’s point was correct. If you believed that as an individual you couldn’t be involved in that sort of
struggle, it didn’t mean that you had to walk away or just stay behind your door. There were other avenues, other ways that you could assist the struggle. That was the most important development of the hunger strike (Conway 2010: 166).

The quote has become particularly important in republican discourse after the signing of the peace accords in Northern Ireland, as it legitimates both violent resistance and non-violent democratic means for protecting minority rights and establishing a united Ireland. Republican politicians use the term to suggest that there was a time when violence was necessary, but that time has passed as democratic avenues have become available to republicans and Catholics in Northern Ireland.

The quote serves a similar purpose in the 2010 Palestinian rights meeting: it legitimates violent and non-violent resistance in both the Irish and Palestinian contexts. As stated in the Palestinian rights meeting, everyone has their particular part to play, is axiomatic. The organizer, Billy, is making no claims about the temporal relationship of the Palestinian and Irish cases. He also avoids spatial reference and the national membership categories deployed by Ben and the audience members, such as Irish and Palestinian. The application of this moral canon—from the prison diaries of the most revered Irish republican—further aligns Palestinian and Irish activism in the pursuit of a common goal. The main speaker, Ben’s, alignment of Irish and Palestinian narratives of rights abuse and resistance is motivated towards depicting effective activism, and the effective activist, as engaged in active resistance against oppressors. After the meeting finished and in conversation over drinks, I noted that many of the participants repeated the phrase, “everyone has their own particular part to play.” Anecdotally, at least, it
seems this tactic of commensuration was successful where Ben’s temporal alignment was not: it produced a representation of activism (and the activist) based upon common political goals and not on the methods for achieving that goal. The voicing of Bobby Sands, as well as the proposed methods for protecting human rights in Palestine, are not based on the politics of reSENTIMENT.

Ben’s use of reSENTIMENT rails against the humanistic category of belonging in liberal peace process discourse. But unlike the discourse of many CARE advocates, and one of the Israeli advocates we shall see below, we hear Ben struggle with the concept, at one later point in his speech, he finds “it almost hard to see them as human”, referring to the Israelis. He struggles with the discursive imperative of rights discourses that validate the shared humanness of all characters in the drama of conflict. For Ben, this is a laudable value, but one that has failed to protect the Palestinians. Israelis have failed to recognize the humanity of Palestinians, and thus any claims of extending democratic rights to them are laughable. In the eyes of Israelis, [the Palestinians] are no better than dogs. International norms, based upon liberal and inclusive categories, have failed. On the other hand, it is so hard to see the Israeli soldiers as human because of the repetitive nature of their aggression. They are the enemies, they continue to victimize, and this makes to application of inclusive categories to both victims and perpetrators unlikely, as this would equate them. The humanistic category does not align with the stark moral world created by victimization targeting ethnic groups. If an ethnic group is the victim, then another ethnic group must be the perpetrator. Ben pines for a world in which a narrative of inclusive peace fits, when reconciliation “works” and the metaphor of the human family is applied equally to all peoples. Thus, it is in the layering of chronotopes
that we see the dramatic tragedy of Ben’s use of *resentment*. He aspires for peace, but victimization demands violent, if “defensive”, resistance.

Republican victims’ advocates believe that they have entered a period of peace, which allows them to seek justice against the state that victimized their loved ones in the past. The peace process has validated their membership in the Northern Irish state, and they use this newfound category of belonging as fulcrum against the past crimes of the British state. This is why they are uneasy with the prospect of supporting violence, to do so would threaten their position within Northern Ireland. It would also de-legitimate their claims that the past dead were innocent civilians deserving of the rights that present-day republicans enjoy. Due to the analogies formed about the conflict in Northern Ireland and Palestine, the support of violence in Palestine would risk their newfound status as citizens and become what unionists believe they are, violent insurgents that attack civilians in order to further misguided political goals.

**Conclusion**

In the meetings discussed in this chapter, speakers align the Palestinian and Irish narrative of rights abuse and resistance using different discursive constructions of time and place, or “chronotopes.” In the case of the pre-blockade meeting, the Irish and Palestinian cases are aligned upon a linear temporal metric; Ireland is a past instantiation of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The Irish case, characterized as a peace process, represents a potential future for the Palestinian conflict. The speaker asks her audience to empathize with the Palestinian cause, to gaze through the lens of their history, and agree that Israel has wronged the Palestinians in ways similar to past Irish abuse. In the second
case, the speaker projects the Irish and Palestinian narratives of rights abuse as concurrent. The Irish are victims and they should map the moral outrage born of ressentiment onto the Israeli government. As Brown (1995) notes of ressentiment, the progressive or repetitive aspect of victimization leads to an increased perception that those entities and actors which do not share the pain of the oppressed and fail to alleviate the pain become tainted with the corruption of the perceived perpetrators. The Irish and the Palestinians are in the moral right, and the rest of the actors in the drama of minority rights abuse are, at the least, morally corrupt.

One could argue that the Gaza Blockade has caused some Palestinian activists to demand violent responses to Israeli rule in Palestine. But one should be careful about suggesting a causal relationship between the Gaza Blockade, and the shifting temporal markers evident in the practice of commensuration, and different representations of the activist that they produce and legitimate. The world of transnational human rights advocacy is one of circulation as local activists travel to other regions and transnational organizations to distribute their messages. The personnel of local organizations change and individuals who have participated previously in an international exchange may not do so again for some time. This said, the comparison of these two meetings, one occurring at the beginning of the blockade and one in the discursively chaotic aftermath of the flotilla raid, shows interrelationships between the production of spatiotemporal frames, personae, and morality in rights advocacy and the real-time development of conflicts on the ground. The flotilla attacks brought critical attention on Israel, and piggybacking on this, activists may increasingly call for direct action around the world. Moreover, mass civilian deaths, as occurred during the Gaza War and flotilla attacks, may lend a sense of
immediacy to advocacy as well. This changed the nature of international advocacy for some practitioners; it is no longer sufficient merely to educate foreign audiences, but one must also compel them, by casting them as current day victims, to “man the barricades.”

Thus, the 2010 meeting is framed not only as a didactic session in which the audience learns about the conflict, but also as an attempt to draw the audience members into active engagement for Palestinian rights.

These examples grant a microscopic view of the successes and pitfalls that occur when activists attempt to construct common identities across different narratives of rights abuse. The comparison of narratives of resistance in Palestine and Ireland potentially reinforce the legitimacy of both when they are cast as efforts to stop the violation of minority human rights by a more powerful state apparatus. Successful commensuration is vital for human rights advocacy as it reinforces perceptions that events are not just historically specific grievances, but also standard forms of rights violation subject to international intervention. In this way, it may foster a sense of shared identity that bridges significant geographical divides. The association of "active resistance" to the Irish insurgency may have been more effective as an advocacy tactic in the Northern Ireland of fifteen years ago, but in the current context of a relatively successful peace process, audiences may be less than enthusiastic about supporting resistance that is associated with the insurgent violence suffered in the province for over thirty years.
Chapter 8: Commensuration between Unionists and Israelis

This chapter shows how Israeli victims’ rights advocates align Israeli and Irish narratives of victimization and resistance. The first speaker, an Israeli peace activist speaking at a Community Relations Council (CRC) event, argues that individual psychological change will lead to peace. Similar to the reconciliation chronotope in Ireland, this representation of conflict and peace obscures the political motivations and structural inequalities that often give rise to violence. The second speaker, speaking at a CARE conference, uses a version of the chronotope, which I have labeled ressentiment in the Northern Irish context. He lauds Western democracies, but implicitly links victimhood and citizenship to ethnic identity. This serves as the basis for the exclusion of rival ethnic groups from the rights entitled to them under human rights law. The Israeli speeches reinforce the chronotopes deployed by Irish activists, which reveals the connections between local Irish discourse and transnational political ideologies.

The attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, and continuing debates over Israeli occupation of Palestine have resulted in a recent increase in networking between Israeli and Irish unionist victims’ advocates. Some of these recent networks operate along the same ideological lines as ones previously established during the Troubles. As the Troubles continued through the 1970’s, both unionist and republican politicians sought to make connections with like-minded political actors in other conflict regions. Paramilitary leaders attempted to establish arms networks with militant and state groups in the Middle East. These networks grew along ideological lines, with left-wing Irish republicans seeking Palestinian assistance and right-wing
unionists seeking Israeli and South African assistance. In 1986, several leading unionists helped to establish the Ulster Resistance, a paramilitary aimed at destabilizing the nascent peace process in Northern Ireland. Unionists established weapons networks with South African weapons dealers that funneled Israeli-confiscated Palestinian armaments to unionists (Taylor 1999). Peter Robinson—the current first minister of Northern Ireland—was famously photographed firing an AK-47 rifle that the Israeli Defense Force had confiscated from Palestinian paramilitaries. The Ulster Resistance called a ceasefire during the peace process and later disbanded.

After the success of the peace process, victims’ rights advocates began to make overtures towards victims’ rights groups in Israel. The Global War on Terror once again highlighted the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle East as one of the reasons for the use of violence against fundamentalist Islam. The terrorist attacks on the United States had an important effect on the peace process in Northern Ireland. After the signing of the Belfast Accords in 1998, the peace process stalled in part because of the Provisional IRA’s unwillingness to decommission its arsenal. After the attack on the World Trade Center, many scholars and media commentators speculated that American popular opinion against terrorism increased Irish-American support for IRA arms decommissioning. This may have been the case as the PIRA submitted to initial decommissioning processes on October 23rd of 2001. But tangible effects on the Northern Irish peace process of the September 11 attacks have been difficult to identify (Guelke 2002). I suggest, however, that we may view some of the effects of September 11th in the intertextual uses of temporal representations and membership categories between unionist, Israeli, and American victims’ rights activists.
The “Global War on Terror,” brought the threat of radical Islam back to the forefront of public discussion about terrorism in many Western democracies. This increased media saturation and combined with the Al-Aqsa Intifada that began in 2000, prompted many left-leaning activists and republicans to form public advocacy groups for Palestinian rights in Northern Ireland (see previous chapter). Unionists gradually began to seek out interactions with Israeli rights organizations because they believed that the media represented Israeli unfairly. CARE, for example, sought out Israeli victims’ rights organizations beginning in 2007. This was spurred on by the formation of Project Monnet, a website based network for the monitoring of terrorism around the world. CARE activists sought out victims’ rights groups in other regions that had not only vested interest in the victims of political violence, but also the pursuit of justice against terrorist networks.

As noted in Chapter 7, many republicans understand the Palestinians as occupying a similar structural position to Catholics in Northern Ireland: they were fighting for freedom from colonial oppression. Beginning in 2005, many unionists became disaffected with the leading unionist political party, the Democratic Unionist Party. This was due to the party’s willingness to share governmental responsibility with the political wing of the PIRA, Sinn Fein. Many members of CARE expressed to me their feelings of abandonment by Ian Paisley and other politicians, and their feeling that the British government had abandoned them as well. The actions of the Israeli government, particularly under the stewardship of Netanyahu, demonstrated the proper reaction to terrorism. On many occasions, CARE activists compared Netanyahu and Margaret Thatcher in glowing terms. Thus, long-standing debates of legitimacy, human rights,
victimhood, and political violence in Northern Ireland were projected onto the Israeli/Palestinian context.

Peace workers in Northern Ireland have also formed networks with Israeli peace activists. Irish peace activists invite foreign activists to speak about their own experiences of restorative justice practices. All of the peacemaking conferences I attended included at least two foreign speakers. These speakers usually came from other conflict areas: South Africa, the Balkans, and Israel-Palestine. Networking among peace building organizations helps both domestic and foreign activists learn about tactics used in other contexts. Networking also universalizes restorative justice practices: by citing the successes of reconciliatory measures in diverse countries, activists legitimate the view that retributive measures induce war and violence and restorative measures alleviate it. These narratives of peace building are embedded in similar chronotopes that cast ethnic revenge as a driving force in all human conflict.

By aligning their narratives of violence and victimization with Israelis and Palestinians, both peacemaking and more explicitly partisan Irish activists can make their concerns more germane to geo-political events. Northern Ireland is—if it is even mentioned at all—a footnote in recent discussions of terrorism, which have concentrated upon Israel, Iraq, and Afghanistan since the September 11 attacks⁵⁰. The association of victims’ rights and debates about terrorism in Northern Ireland with that in Israel/Palestine is a chance for activists to gain international exposure for their movements. This is true for partisan organizations and government-sponsored organizations. In 2008, the Community Relations Council held a conference on the status
of victims in Northern Ireland. Half of the speakers at the conference were foreign activists from Serbia, South Africa, France, and Israel/Palestine. These activists would, in the words of one conference organizer, “shed light on the experience of victims worldwide.”

At the CRC meeting, the Israeli peace activist uses standard relational pairs and category bound activities to equate the suffering of Israeli state security forces with the suffering of non-state insurgents. The Israeli speech deploys the same chronotopic vision of conflict evident in Irish peacemaking discourse: conflicts will change to peace as combating ethnic groups mutually recognize one another based upon their shared species and intimate knowledge of the other. This will end the cycles of revenge that motivate all human conflict.

Intimacy and humanity as the remedies for violence

The following speaker, whom I will call “Ana”, is an Israeli peace activist. Her son was an Israeli Defense Force soldier who was killed by a sniper during the Second Intifada. Ana, like the peace activists in the Group for Dealing with the Past, aims to recast the experience of victims of political violence in a temporal timeline that casts peace and not justice as an ultimate goal. Her rhetorical tactic is to use the human category to depict psychological change as the key to ending political violence: if only perpetrators recognize their victims as human, as fellow humans with which they have, or could have intimate knowledge, they would not inflict pain on them. Victims must also embrace the category of common humanity, and try to work with their victimizers to build personal relationships that will transcend politics.
She begins:

*Ana Excerpt 1*

1. I just wanted to say that I feel very strange
2. because normally
3. I speak as one voice to people
4. Palestinian and Israeli
5. and so today^  
6. I will speak with my speaking partner (…)
7. I will speak for Ameena
8. from Nablus
9. who lost two sons
10. I will speak for Rachel
11. who lost two brothers on the same day.
12. she's an Israeli
13. and I will try to tell you of the work that we're doing
14. and perhaps bring some hope
15. which is a very strange thing to say to an Irish audience
16. of
17. explaining what it is to actually give up
18. being a victim.

She speaks as a unified voice to both Israelis and Palestinians. This establishes her authority as an expert on advocacy for victims across ethnic boundaries. Once Ana has established herself as an advocate for both Israelis and Palestinians, she argues that those subjected to political violence must give up thinking of themselves as victims. This is similar to representations of victims in the Irish reconciliation chronotope in which victims are the key to society’s advancement to a state of peace. Blame will lead to antagonism, which will continue the cycle of revenge.

She proceeds to read a letter that she wrote to the Palestinian family of the young man who killed her son, an Israeli soldier. This rhetorical device was poignant because the audience is transposed into a deeply emotional exchange between the family of the
victim and the family of the offender. In reciting the letter, she makes political violence, and its effects, personal.

**Ana Excerpt 2**

1. and I am the mother of Benjamin
2. who was killed by your son.
3. I know that he did not kill Benjamin because he was Benjamin
4. if he had known him
5. he'd never have done such a thing.
6. to prevent other families both Israeli and Palestinian
7. from suffering this dreadful loss.
8. I was looking for a way to stop the cycle of violence.
9. nothing for me is more sacred than human life
10. not revenge
11. or hatred can ever bring my child back.

Ana uses her son’s personal name to both index her intimacy with him and to index his incumbency in a category of “human” (line 1,3). The personal name indexes his specific life history, family, motivations, and fears, and the fact that he had has a life history, family, and loved ones; he was not merely a member of an ethnic category. This is a common trope in peacemaking discourse: that recognizing shared humanity will prevent violence. The individuality of the dead—their basic humanity—is sacred for Ana. To cast these characters as political, or motivated by political ideology, is profane. This superimposes her vision of personhood onto the violent event, or at least superimposes her vision of an alternate reality in which her son lives when the Palestinian recognizes his humanity.

**The potential for moral development**

The threat of cyclical violence has one remedy: the recognition of common
humanity and intimate fellow feeling. Political motivations cloud the ability of individuals to recognize the humanity of the other, and so she cajoles all political actors to abandon their political aims in favor of mutual recognition. Unlike the unionist depiction of republicans—as immutable criminals—Ana depicts Palestinians and Israelis as both capable of achieving this higher form of intimate knowing, based upon a mutual concern for future generations.

*Ana Excerpt 3*

1. I **understand** that your son is considered by many of the Palestinian people  
2. to be a hero  
3. a freedom fighter  
4. fighting for justice  
5. and for an independent viable Palestinian state.  
6. but I also feel?  
7. that if he understood  
8. that taking the life of another  
9. is not the way  
10. and if he understood the consequences of his act.  
11. he could see that a non-violence solution  
12. is the only way for both nations to live together in peace and dignity  
13. our lives as two nations are so intertwined  
14. each of us will have to give up on the dreams  
15. for the future of the children  
16. who are our responsibility.  
17. let us put an end to the killing  
18. and look for a way  
19. through mutual understanding and empathy  
20. to live a normal life  
21. free of violence.

Ana describes the Palestinian people as motivated by political causes. She critiques this political motivation by arguing that mutual recognition will stop violence (line 7,8,10). In order to move towards a future state of peace, all parties to the conflict
must recognize this commonality, and all parties have the ability to recognize one another. The need to move towards this intimate relationship with one’s enemies is amplified by the use of the familial category of ‘children’ (lines 14-15). She uses inclusive pronouns, *us, our, us,* (lines 13, 14, 17), to represent the relevant actors as engaged in a common project of peace building based upon mutual recognition (line 19). These inclusive pronouns bridge the ethno-nationalist categories into a shared category of “we-ness” that is capable of recognizing shared humanity even after one side commits horrific acts of violence.

**Beyond victimhood?: The perils of politics in Ireland and the Middle East**

Ana asserts that political aspirations breed violence *because* they create victims. She disavows any political support of the conflicting parties in Israel-Palestine, as this will only increase strife. She reasserts her vision of a world without victimhood, in which a common category of humanity will lead to peace.

**Ana Excerpt 4**

1. so you see
2. everybody has a concept
3. who are Israeli and who are Palestinians
4. you all know you all take sides
5. even my little experience in Belfast yesterday of having um
6. a Catholic guy
7. tell me that actually
8. what should have happened to the Jews after Germany
9. was to give them a little piece of Germany.

She accuses the audience of taking sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Anna had a Catholic guy relate a phrase that is a common argument used by individuals with
pro-Palestinian perspectives: that the Jewish people should have been given part of Germany, as the Nazis were the primary instigators of the horrors of the Holocaust. The term Catholic (line 6) differentiates her interlocutor from the Jewish membership category used at line 8. Individuals not directly involved in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict take sides and consequently make peace harder to achieve. The Catholic category puts the man at a remove from the conflict; he does not have the experience of the conflict, nor does he have as much at stake, when he voices his pro-Palestinian opinion. The Catholic man has a political interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and this will inevitably lead to further conflict as Palestinians get support for violence from abroad. Politics is the enemy to peace and reconciliation, a sentiment that she reinforces below:

**Ana Excerpt 5**

1. so maybe
2. just maybe
3. if the world would stop taking sides
4. you're not helping us by being pro Israel
5. or by being pro Palestine
6. you'll just feel good about yourselves and in general
7. cause another conflict in the country you live in.
8. this has actually happened to me
9. all around the world
10. and everybody feels very good about being pro-Israel
11. or pro-Palestine.
12. you see
13. it's so easy not to compromise if your children are not standing at a roadblock

Ana deploys time and personhood categories to underpin a radical de-politicized and de-contextualized argument for peacemaking; that is, political and ethnic difference
breeds violence. The balanced geo-political predication of being for or against Palestine/Israel once again reinforces her claim that taking sides, that claiming difference, is detrimental to peace (lines 4-5). The conditional state of having one’s children, one’s future, threatened, so her contention goes, would force people to cease their politicized vision of Israel-Palestine (line 13).

The reduction of violent motivations to ethnic *lex talonis* reflects the discourse used by the Irish peacemaker at the Community Relations Council conference in Chapter 4. Irish activists harbor the same fears that she does: politicized victimhood may lead to further violence. Just as Hugh, in Chapter 4, posits cyclic revenge as driving violence in Papua New Guinea as an index for the ancient mists of human history, revenge drives violence across the world. This is revenge based upon social and political identification. New Guineans seek revenge because of tribal affiliation, just as the Irish or Palestinians seek revenge because of identification with a social aggregate. This compels peace activists to seek reconciliation through an idealized vision of human nature: peace will come from mutual recognition of the humanity of the other, and not as representative members of an ethnic group. The *coda* of Ana’s narrative is also similar to Eames’s speeches at the Dealing with the Past meetings in Armagh City and Ballymena discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Eames concludes his talk by asserting that the Irish must deal with the past or risk continuing conflict in future generations; indeed, we must think about children, a symbol of future generations. Her aim, like that of Irish peacemakers, is to devalue political claims in favor of abstract visions of harmony based upon shared humanity.
Like Irish peacemaking discourse, Ana’s speech also erases the role of perpetrators during conflict, and places the onus for change on the victims of political violence. Ana fervently wishes for a world in which victims cast off their desire for revenge and recognize that non-violence is the best way forward. This is a wonderful sentiment, but it also puts most, if not all, of the reconciliatory work on those who have suffered violence. They must help society move forward by casting off the shackles of anger and resentment against ethnic aggregates. In de-politicizing the conflict in the Middle East, she may discourage victims from expressing their very real demands that those who have perpetrated crimes should pay for those crimes. Her speech also creates a victim-subject that should not make political claims based upon the wounds, both physical and psychological, that they or their loved ones have received. Politics and justice are not legitimate avenues for ending a conflict.

Her depiction of violence as motivated by ethnic hatred also disproportionately colors the Palestinians who fight against Israel. Her son, and Israeli soldier, may have been pacifist, but he acted as a soldier who, due to nationalist impulse, orders from superiors, or any other myriad of reasons, may have engaged in violence. The Palestinian who shot her son may similarly have been motivated to shoot based upon a whole host of psychological and structural reasons. Ethnic hatred motivates the Palestinian. The reduction of motivation to ethnic hatred obscures both psychological and political complexities of violent action. An appeal to mutual recognition is an idealistic starting point, but it cannot possibly stop political violence. Such conclusions are difficult, however, when the chronotope that governs reconciliatory efforts demands that we draw a line under the “evil” past of cyclical revenge, and move forward into a better future in
which ethnicity and politics do not divide people.

**The linguistic construction of righteous victimhood in Israeli discourse**

This section studies an alternate vision of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by showing how speakers discursively construct what Brown (1995) calls the “humanistic conceit” of liberal democracies: the idea that citizens share a sense of belonging to the state that trumps ethnic, class, gender, and other distinctions. This conceit often masks exclusionary practices: casting one or more groups as not belonging because of ethnic and political difference. In this case, the speaker bases exclusion upon a temporal representation of unending conflict, which characterizes the terrorist as non-human and incapable of moral development. This section will focus on a unionist victims’ group’s conference held in 2008. I show how American and Israeli speakers align the conflict in the Middle East with the Irish one using personhood categories and temporal representations gleaned from Global War on Terror discourse. The speakers simultaneously laud the rights bestowed by liberal democracies and exclude certain categories of the person from those entitlements.

The Israeli activist uses adjectives and predications that cast the dead as the righteous and the perpetrator as inhumanly evil. He will use discourses deployed in the wake of the September 11th, 2001 attacks against the United States. The Patriot Act, passed through the American Congress on 26, 2001, authorized the indefinite detention of any non-citizen taken into custody while engaged in terrorist activity. This Act created a “state of exception” (Agamben 2003). States of exception are laws that exclude classes of individuals from the entitlements granted them through national membership. For
Agamben, liberal nation-states lurch from one state of exception to another as they classify different classes of people as exempt from citizenship rights. We see this from the beginning of the American state, when women, slaves, poor whites, and certain groups of immigrants were disqualified from full citizenship. Agamben compares the “enemy combatant” classification to the status of Jews in the Nazi concentration camps: they were incarcerated without charge, held indefinitely, and treated as sub-human. War on Terror discourse legitimates indefinite detention with a chronotopic vision of conflict: it casts conflict as unending and terrorists as incapable of moral development (Meister 2011, Hodges 2011). This temporal aesthetic and the personhood categories that fill the roles of antagonist and protagonist echoes the discourse of CARE activists, as they see republicans as undeserving of participation in the Northern Irish state, while ignoring the crimes conducted by pro-state forces during the Troubles. The Israeli activist, “Mike”, uses a chronotope that legitimates this exclusion: Israeli Jews are constantly under threat of victimization, and thus the perpetrators must be wholly excluded from democratic participation. This spatiotemporal frame validates the victims, and equates them with the state, while obscuring the associations of ethnic identity with belonging to that state. His narrative shares themes of the unending evilness of perpetrators and the implicit calculation of citizenship based upon ethnic identity with unionist depictions of the Troubles.

The following is organized according to how Mike—an Australian-born Israeli national—and two Americans, categorize the key roles in their dramas of victimization. These roles are the protagonists (the victims), the corrupted bystanders (individuals and institutions that do not refute terrorism), and antagonists (the terrorists). I organize the
section in this way to show how each category is developed and embedded in a spatiotemporal world that erases differences between the Irish and Israeli cases, and highlights similarities based upon the personal experience of terrorism and religious identity.

The CARE victims’ conference was the culmination of work conducted between 2006 and 2007 by CARE advocates. CARE invited numerous speakers representing organizations from Spain, Colombia, the United States, Israel, France, and Northern Ireland to speak at the conference. The invited organizations represented two categories of victims of political violence. Most of the foreign organizations represent civilian victims of terrorist violence, such as the Madrid bombing of 2002, the Pan-Am bombing of 1988, and suicide bombing attacks in Israel. The organizations from Northern Ireland represented former security-force and Protestant victims of republican violence.

Mike runs a charity organization named after a relative who was killed in a suicide bombing attack in Jerusalem in the early 2000’s. He travels around the world at speaking venues and victims’ rights conferences. Like the other foreign speakers we have heard, Mike begins by including himself and the audience in the role of the protagonist (Note: The transcript lacks many paralinguistic cues as Mike speaks in monotone, and uses emphasis sparingly).

**Mike Excerpt 1**

1. thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to this group
2. it's not the first time I'm speaking to people like myself
3. people who've experienced terrorism
The theme of this introductory statement is the constant threat of terrorism. He first makes the threat of terrorism highly personal (line 26) and then a global threat (28). The victims, which includes Mike as well as the audience (lines 3-5), are part of an ongoing battle against this global threat. In his recent work on the Global War on Terror narrative of the Bush Presidency, Hodges (2011) identifies several key “episodes” in the President’s speeches on the subject. The episodes include descriptions of the threat against the United States, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a description of the war on terror as ongoing and occurring on many fronts (this puts the “global” in the War on Terrorism). Mike’s initial statement reflects this scalar division of Bush’s speeches in
that he moves from a personal to global threats. This global scale of war on terrorism narratives justifies the universal categorization of innocent victims and terrorists. He dramatizes the protagonists when he characterizes them as defenseless (line 15), but determined to fight the evil of terrorism. This is also a common trope in War on Terror discourse, particularly in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when Bush and other politicians cast America as wounded but determined to hunt and kill the terrorists that attacked the World Trade Centers and Pentagon. Thus, we have a narrative being set up with wounded victims determined to fight an insidious, expansive, and ever-present threat.

He continues by pointing out his own relative ignorance of political violence in Northern Ireland.

**Mike Excerpt 2**

1. it takes a not small act of **courage** on my part to be talkin’ to an Irish group given practically everything I know about this country I learned from Angela’s Ashes
2. which is only
3. probably
4. hardly accurate to begin with
5. and my guess is that most of you
6. know what you know about the country in which I live
7. mostly from reading
8. Exodus
9. the two versions
10. one by Leon Uris
11. and one by the **almighty**
12. nevertheless
13. we've got to try to figure out
14. how to build bridges to one another's experiences.
15. now if you weren't raised
16. as i was in Melbourne
17. t-- family who came from Poland
18. via the concentration camps of Germany
and then moved to Israel
which is of course not what most people in the world have done
at least that how it feels to me cause that's my personal experience
if you haven't had that personal experience you may assume that people who
have grown up in Belfast
or any of the other cities where there are victims
would have nothing in common with one another but as
any one of us who's engaged in
listening and conversation with other victims of terrorism knows
we have great deal in common
there are some threads which run through our experience
which are absolutely shared and independent of culture
the language certainly the religion
of the societies and families wh-- from which we come

There is a tension in Mike’s characterization of the protagonists in the “War on Terror”. This tension is visible in his tactics of “erasure” and “focalization”. Erasure is a common feature of analogy formation, as “facts that are inconsistent with the ideological scheme either go unnoticed or explained away” (Irvine and Gal 2000: 38). Victims of terrorism include those that experienced the horror of the Holocaust, as well as those that have experienced terrorism in Belfast and other cities. The substantial differences between the Holocaust and non-state terrorism in the early twenty-first century are not evident. Erasure is accompanied by what Hodges terms “focalization” (2008: 493), which highlights similarities. The main similarity evident in this excerpt is based upon religious identity. The protagonists share belief in Christianity. This is achieved by Mike’s allusion to Leon Uris’s (1958) well-known story of Jewish immigration into Palestine and the Book of Exodus. His assumption that the audience has read the biblical version casts them as incumbents of the same category of Judeo-Christians. His use of the noun *almighty* to refer to the Judeo-Christian God indexes indexes his stance as
believing in the deity, as well as his interpretation of the audience as having the same belief (line 12). This qualifies his use of the sociological category religion at line 32. The experience of victimization transcends differences between Judeo-Christian belief and, potentially, not other system of religious belief. This characterization of the protagonists will become important later when he contrasts innocent victimization with the ethno-religious category of Muslims52.

This rhetorical tension between defining victims as Judeo-Christian and as those affected by non-state terrorism explicitly justifies the exclusion of “terrorists” from human rights conventions, and implicitly ties this exclusion to ethno-nationalist identity. Throughout the speech, Mike erases the differences between victims based upon their common experience of terrorism. He will also highlight similarities between victims based upon loyalty to Western ideals and Judeo-Christian belief. These latter similarities based upon ethno-religious and political identity will justify the exception of due process for Muslims as well as the categorization of Muslim terrorists as “enemy combatants”.

The morally confused bystanders

Below, Mike begins to describe those institutions and individuals that occupy that space between the victims and antagonists, what we might call the “bystanders”. In some strands of victims’ rights discourse, the “bystander” serves as focal point for ire. Many believe that without the support, or non-vocal acceptance, of individuals and institutions, rights violations could not occur (Meister 2011: 26, Shklar 1990). Mike casts these bystanders—the UN, the general public, and others—as experiencing “moral confusion”.

Mike Excerpt 4
1. and yet
2. when we look at the way the world has dealt with it
3. the United Nations is a good proxy
4. for the world
5. you see things that just cause you heartache

Institutions are not the only bystanders. Mike describes a photograph projected onto a screen behind him the auditorium. It depicts a Palestinian child wearing a mock suicide vest with a crowd of smiling adults standing around her.

**Mike Excerpt 5**

1. the audience that looks at this sweet faced child
2. is not wearing a fashion belt
3. but rather
4. a mocked up
5. suicide bombers belt around her waist
6. to the admiration of people around her
7. and
8. to the evident pleasure
9. of the news agency photographer who snapped the picture and then had it published all over the world
10. is reflecting
11. a total misunderstanding of the unambiguous awfulness as Professor (...) described it yesterday

The image was certainly striking: a young Palestinian girl stands in the middle of circle of ostensibly admiring onlookers with a fake suicide vest attached to her torso. The onlookers in the photograph may be idolizing suicide terrorism, but their motives are unclear. The reporter who photographed the child is also lumped into this category of the morally confused. By publicizing the image, the photographer risks valorizing suicide terrorism. He or she is as culpable as the adults who dressed the child. Individuals must denounce terrorism if they are to stand with the victims, with the protagonists, and with
those who oppose evil.

Other speakers at the conference include human rights activists in the category of the corrupt bystander. At the *Dealing with the Past* meetings we heard unionist advocates besmirch the Group for not clearly denouncing, and even working in league with, republicans. Similarly, an American lawyer at the CARE conference lambasts those who would extend consideration to perpetrators.

**American Speaker 1**

1. those so called human rights experts
2. those so called people
3. who claim to advocate for the rights of people are frauds
4. that they don't represent human rights
5. that they deny the most fundamental right
6. everyone in our society has
7. through the gift of god is the right to life
8. and they deny that.
9. and they ignore that.
10. and they try to hide that.

Here, the speaker is discussing the lawsuits pending against the United States for its classification of suspected Al Qaeda and other individuals as "enemy combatants." Human rights advocacy for the extension of rights non-state combatants classes them as in league with terrorists. Like Mike’s representation of the UN and other institutions, these bystanders are corrupt because they do not accept a Manichean vision of the world. The lawyer casts the “right to life” (given under the Judeo-Christian God) as a right that trumps those rights established by human rights conventions, such as the right to due process. This once again reveals the tension between the recognition of liberal human rights law—that theoretically applies to all humans—and the delegation and exclusion of
rights from particular classes of people based upon religious identity. Again, we hear echoes of Bush-era “War on Terror” discourse, as the values of liberal democracies are lauded, and then denied to certain classes due to their immorality, ethnicity, and religious identity.

The timeless evil of terrorists

In Mike’s speech, he has classed victims as the religious righteous, and bystanders as morally corrupt as they refuse to acknowledge the difference between right and wrong. Below, he embeds antagonists—terrorists—into a time-space that is unchanging. Terrorists will always seek to destroy innocent life, they are seeking to destroy it in the present, and this disqualifies them from normative conventions that designate the treatment of criminals and prisoners of war. The category of the “terrorist” will also become further specified using ethnic and religious terminology, as the ethno-nationalist category of Palestinian comes to be equated with support for terrorist activities.

Preceding this excerpt, Mike describes the 2001 Durban Conference on Racism sponsored by the United Nations, held in Durban, South Africa in the weeks before September 11th, 2001. The Israeli and US governments boycotted the meeting, and many European countries walked out on the proceedings. The point of contention was a draft proclamation by the Arab League that described Israeli actions against the Palestinians as racist. For Mike, any discussions that challenge the moral righteousness of the Israeli state indicate moral corruption. He first uses a description of Jerusalem to make an ethnic distinction between those who accept one of the “great lies” of terrorism: that terrorists are soldiers in a revolution. He then describes a march at Durban, in which
individuals show support for terrorism.

**Mike Excerpt 6**

1. my friend (...)
2. in reciting of the great lies of terrorism
3. the great lies that are said about terrorism
4. mentioned one of them being
5. terrorists are soldiers
6. in a revolution
7. now this is a slide that I have on the wall of mine office back in Israel
8. the liberation of Quds
9. Quds is
10. one of the names that is given to the city
11. in which I live
12. but not by the people who live on my street
13. Quds means holy in Arabic and its one of the names given to Jerusalem
14. to the minds of the people carrying these slogans

Some of the signs carried by the protestors read, “for the liberation of Quds, machine-guns based upon faith and Islam must be used” (Bayevski 2010). He uses an image of possessive place, *my street*, to refer indirectly to Israeli Jews (line 12). The Arabic place name is devalued because it is not used by the people who *live* in his neighborhood. The ability to name Jerusalem is further devalued by the prepositional phrase, *to the minds*, as it relativizes the Arabic name (line 14). Jerusalem is the true name of the area, named such by its true citizens (Israeli Jews) and Quds is the incorrect name, given to it by people who do not live in the area (Palestinians).

He then links this broad category—*those who name Jerusalem Quds* (line 13)—to supporters of militant Palestinian nationalism. The *people carrying these slogans* refers to another photo displayed on his power point.
Scholars argue that politicians implicit cast the War on Terror in religious terms. Leundar, Marsland, and Nekvapil (2004) argue that George Bush and Tony Blair usually characterize “us” versus “them” in moral and political terms (versus the more overtly religious distinctions made by Osama bin Laden). Mike makes contrastive distinctions between Muslims and Jewish residents of Israel using the indexical qualities of linguistic identification and place. Place names indexically link protagonists and antagonists to ethno-religious identity. The act of using the name Quds may indicate the aspirations of the speaker for a Palestinian state, regardless of whether they advocate for violent means to achieve that state. It may also index their ethno-linguistic identity. Those who advocate for violence against Israeli citizens also use it. The support of terrorism thus extends to an entire ethno-linguistic community. His narrative of victimization is one that not only contrasts individuals based upon their support of democracy, but also on contrasts Judeo-Christians and Muslims.

While Mike creates a subtle ethno-religious contrast, he has not yet described the role of the perpetrators in detail. He does so in the next excerpt. He abstracts away from the context of the Middle East to generalized scenes of public transportation: airplanes and buses. In these scenes, the terrorist endeavors to kill as many innocents as possible—and hopefully himself as well. Terrorism is specifically suicide terrorism, which indexes fundamentalist Islam. He then makes a case for the exclusion of these individuals from liberal democratic justice systems. They are simply too evil and too unchanging in their pursuit of terror to be entitled to rights to due process and trial by jury.

*Mike Excerpt 7*
1. in the mean time it’s going to cost millions of dollars
2. and create enormous confusion
3. and delay
4. and problematics
5. in the legal process involving other people who at this very moment
6. are preparing bombs dirty clean and otherwise
7. the united states declares that the people in that prison are
8. enemy agents combatants
9. people using the law are saying no they're not?
10. they’re at best
11. unconvicted criminals and need to be dealt with in that way.
12. how do we resolve those two viewpoints
13. is not easy
14. but getting it right affects the lives and welfare of almost everyone sitting
   in this room and on the planet
15. because
16. if you try
17. to apply concepts
18. of criminal justice
19. old fashioned notions
20. that stem from a time when
21. >the bad guys were either criminals or wearing uniforms of an enemy country<
22. life was a heck of a lot easier
23. today we’re dealing with a much more complicated confused world
24. in which the people sitting next to you
25. >on the bus or the tram or the subway or the airplane<
26. might not only be bad
27. they might be so: bad that they will die happy just knowing
28. that they brought your airplane or your train
29. down in a flame in a ball of flames
30. this requires an entirely different legal system.

In November of 2001, then-President George W. Bush declared terrorists captured in Iraq and Afghanistan to be “enemy combatants.” The distinction pertains to two sets of rules governing the detainment of prisoners. In peacetime, governments use an evidential based legal process wherein suspects are held only if there is sufficient evidence to detain them. They are then subjected to trial by jury. In wartime, as
stipulated by the various Geneva Conventions, suspects, uniformed enemy soldiers, may be held for the length of the war. For example, German POW’s were held in British camps for the duration of World War II, the majority of whom were released upon conclusion of hostilities. The problem for legal scholars is deciding which set of rules apply to the Global War on Terror, the principle question being whether Al Qaeda and similar organizations are criminal or militaristic rebellions. The former would trigger criminal law and the latter would require the use of the Geneva Conventions. The “enemy combatant” designation circumvents the Geneva Conventions and because it is a “war”, it avoids the application of peacetime law. States will incarcerate enemy combatants until the war is over. Many human rights experts see this as a fundamental violation of human rights as the indefinite time span of the War on Terror will potentially lead to indefinite imprisonment of enemy combatants with no or reduced legal recourse (Roth 2004).

To justify the enemy combatant category, Mike creates two orders of "badness" that dramatize the relative moral corruption of suicide bombers. The first order of badness at line 27 remains unelaborated; we do not know why the people sitting next to us are bad. Regardless, Mike uses the second order of badness to amplify the dangerousness of suicide bombers (line 28). This rhetorical device gives the impression that suicide bombers are more dangerous than other categories of persons intent on political violence. This impression acts as a warrant for the "enemy combatant" designation; according to Mike, suicide bombers require an entirely different legal system (line 31).

The terrorist cannot be prosecuted using the traditional judicial systems of the
state based upon criminal law. At the CARE conference, other speakers also insisted that international conventions do not protect the terrorist. An American victims’ advocate expressed an example of this shared worldview during this conference. This advocate worked for the US government in Washington. He recounts how he got into an argument with a Canadian clergyman while discussing the killing of synagogue attendees and bystanders in Istanbul in 2003.

*American Speaker 2*

1. he described the terrorists how the
2. they’d killed themselves and noted that one was probably no more than a teenager.
3. what happened to that boy^?
4. what did he suffer^?
5. he asked
6. to make such a horrible thing
7. him do such a horrible thing^?
8. to destroy himself
9. in such a horrible manner.
10. a decade’s experience of diplomacy was insufficient to keep my temper in check
11. and I asked him WHAT THE HELL IS WRONG WITH YOU^?
12. >you are worried about him?
13. he murdered twenty two people while they were praying
14. he burned some of them alive I don’t give a damn about em
15. and neither should you I hope he is rotting in hell right now.<

Religious devotion and damnation differentiates the perpetrators and victims. He casts the victims--the twenty-two dead in his estimation--using the activity *praying* (line 13), and the perpetrator is cast as diametrically opposed to the worshippers with the expressed desire that he is *rotting in hell right now* (line 15). The clergyman humanizes the terrorist by wondering aloud about his motives and life experiences, but the terrorist
does not deserve psychological analysis. The act of questioning the bomber’s motives casts the clergyman as morally suspect bystander. Questions about the suicide bomber’s life experiences challenge the dichotomy between the righteous victims and the immutably evil perpetrator. It threatens to include both victims and terrorists in a category of humanity that will threaten the stark moral terms of ressentiment. The speaker’s model of the perpetrator is similar to that of Irish unionists who assert that republicans are unchangingly evil; there is no hope for their moral redemption, and thus they must be excised from civilized society.

In addition to the characterization of protagonists, antagonists, and bystanders, the speakers at the CARE conference also used temporal representations that I have classified as reflecting ressentiment. Ressentiment rhetoric casts socio-political reality as the constant victimization of a marginalized group. Mike has cast victims as a defenseless and marginal group, surrounded by enemies and corrupt bystanders. In the following excerpt, victimization is an ever-present threat.

**Mike Excerpt 8**

1. *every night>*
2. I'm the one who locks the door of our apartment at home
3. and uh
4. and when I do it very consciously
5. have the state of mind of
6. everything good and important is inside.
7. and everything else is now locked
8. and away
9. I learned that that's actually nonsense
10. and that as a father
11. there is a certain point at which
12. you've gotta say
13. I've failed my mission was to protect my children.
14. none of my children and >thank god I I think I mentioned I have seven
children whom six are alive today<
15. none of them are under any illusion that if I were to every say there there
16. that it meant anything
17. they will know
18. really bad things happen
19. and that
20. the there's nothing that their father can do about it
21. we're all resource poor maybe even resourceless
22. but we're not defenseless
23. as victims we are focused on preserving and honoring
24. our own dignity and the dignity of the communities which we live.
25. preserving and enhancing the moral authority that we try to sum up in our
26. lives
27. and preserving and perpetuating the passionate will to live constructive
28. lives
29. which is I think behind the fact that all of us have turned up here
30. yesterday and today
31. it’s been a privilege to be among you
32. and to listen
33. and to speak
34. and a privilege to receive the hospitality of (...) 
35. and I wanna thank you very much for your joining me and the rest of us
36. here
37. yesterday and today thank you
38. ((applause))

Mike uses the repetitive adverb/noun combination every night (line 1) to construct
the threats against his family as temporally endless as the quantity adjective indicates that
he must always check his doors. This picture of home life acts as symbol of Israel, and
the homes and states of victims worldwide, as they realize that they cannot keep out the
threat of terrorism. Terrorists lurk in public places, on public transportation, and they
may even seek one out at home. The home is a symbol of all that is righteous, all that is
good (line 6). He is powerless to stop bad things from happening to his children. This
short excerpt casts the threat of terrorism, the "enemies at the gate", as a continuous
threat. Nevertheless, the fight is not lost, as the victims, by virtue of their righteousness,
will continue the fight. This trope of unrelenting danger authorizes the use of force and excepts terrorists from human rights protections. It also implicitly equates Islam with terrorism. The “West”—and the protections that come with living in Western countries—is ultimately the place of residence for the Judeo-Christian righteous.

**Conclusion**

In the previous chapter on commensuration between the Irish and Palestinian rights movements, I argue that the Irish activists in the audience do not take up the advocacy tactics of the passenger on the Mavi Marmara. This is because the narrative world that he constructs does not fit very well with that of Irish activists engaged in a relatively successful peace process. At the CARE conference, audience feedback was minimal and there were no institutional mechanisms--Q and A sessions or otherwise--for audience members to respond to the speakers on the day that the Israeli activist spoke. Additionally, I was not allowed to record "naturally" occurring conversation during tea and lunch breaks do to human research protections. But the excerpts from the American lawyers show consistency of the construction of the categories of terrorists and corrupt bystanders.

State-affiliated actors cannot be enemy combatants. Israeli Jews are not subject to the enemy combatant classification. When Mike compares different terrorism-affected regions, he casts terrorists as targeting innocents affiliated with the state. The targets of terrorism are loyal citizens. In the case of Israel, and his classification of victimhood more generally, he defines loyalty to the state using an ethno-religious identity. He has constructed what Agamben (2003) calls a “state of exception”: the classification of a
group of individuals as not deserving of the rights bestowed on its citizens. This shows the uneasy relationship between liberal individualism and the *de facto* equation of belonging and ethnicity. The righteous are those who protect traditional “Western” values, but those who protect such values belong to the Judeo-Christian category. This is the fundamental tension of the “humanistic conceit” of liberal democracies for victims of violence: they at once laud liberal individualism but are uneasy with its inability to recognize religious and ethnic difference. The state of exception provides a useful political tool for balancing these contradictory values and identities.

This chapter also highlights the similarities and differences between *ressentiment* chronotopes deployed by transnational victims' advocates and unionists. Both groups use quasi-legal definitions to distinguish between the categories of victims and perpetrators. Both groups also characterize victims and perpetrators along ethno-nationalist or ethno-religious lines. In so doing, unionists and transnational actors use *ressentiment* to legitimate the exclusion of one group from rights entitlements such as habeas corpus and the right to pursue retributive justice. The unionist characterization of republicans as illegal, as “war criminals”, complicates unionist engagement with *ressentiment* as constructed in the discursive world of the War on Terror. The American and Israeli activists discussed in this section cast terrorists as beyond the purview of traditional liberal definitions of legality. Unionists also cast republicans as immutable and morally degraded, but they seek to penalize them under criminal law. For decades, the British government characterized republican paramilitary members as criminals to deprive them of the "political prisoner" or "prisoner of war" status republicans sought, in order to legitimate the IRA’s resistance as a “war”. The problem for many unionists is that
criminalizing political violence could legitimate the prosecution of British security forces for criminal activity. Their insistence that alliance with the past Protestant state be the metric for calculating who acted illegally and who did not, alleviates this concern because it indirectly equates legality with ethnic belonging. Violence conducted by the Protestant state was legal, Catholic violence against that state was not. The transnational activists in this section dispense tension between ethnic-belonging and liberal justice by creating a new classification based upon the inherent evilness of terrorists. This form of exclusion not only strips the terrorist of rights bestowed under domestic and international law, but it also gives the allies of the state (defined indirectly by ethno-nationalist membership) immunity by classing their acts of violence as legal.
Conclusion: Chronotopes, personhood, and the future of justice

This dissertation shows that victims of political violence, and peace workers who attempt to help them, use chronotopes to construct victimized identities and legitimate demands for justice. They describe scenes of violence at different levels of scale: republicans describe the deaths of their loved ones in intimate detail, unionists cast the dead as victims of ethnic-violence across the province, and peace activists abstract from place, describing violence in terms of the course of human history. These scenes define who can be victims, who can be perpetrators, and who has the potential to develop morally and participate in the peace process. This chapter summarizes the findings of this dissertation, and I suggest some ways in which victims’ advocates might critically assess their rhetoric of victimhood.

This dissertation focuses on the Northern Irish victims’ rights debate from 2007-2010. Victims' rights movements began in the mid-to-late 1990's. In the late 1990’s, the Lakewood Research Group (LRG) started lobbying the British government to release documents pertaining to the killing of 11 Irish Catholics in 1971. CARE began in 1998 in reaction to the amnesty offered to convicted paramilitary members as part of the peace deal. By 2005, the Provisional Irish Republican Army had ceased its armed insurgency against the British in Northern Ireland. A series of agreements--St. Andrew's (2005) and Hillsborough (2010)--re-established and then sustained the Northern Irish Assembly. By the late 2000's, there was a general sense among many politicians and members of the public that the peace process was gaining traction in Northern Ireland. Reconciliation programs had been operating in Northern Ireland since the 1970’s, but became
increasingly institutionalized and centralized as the Community Relations Council (CRC) and other umbrella organizations dispensed funding to groups supportive of the peace process. CARE and the LRG were both assigned voluntary charity status, and began work in cooperation with the Northern Irish Assembly and other institutions set up during what has often been referred to as the “Long Peace”.

Victims’ rights advocacy groups became embroiled in a political debate in 2006, after the passing of the Victims and Survivors' Order. This Order specified victims of the conflict as any individual wounded or bereaved due to violence. Unionists railed against this definition, as they understood it to equate IRA fighters with the legitimate security forces of the British state. In 2006, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland commissioned a Consultative Group for Dealing with the Past, which consulted with victims' and other organizations, as well as the general public, to recommend ways in which Northern Irish society could end sectarianism, help victims of political violence, and otherwise "move forward" from the conflict. At these meetings, advocates, politicians, and members of the public deploy different kinds of chronotopes, or thematic "spatiotemporal" worlds. These worlds, and the socio-political realities they help to create, authorize certain kinds of political action.

Irish republicans focus on specific events in specific places, and try to vindicate their lost loved ones as innocent victims of state violence. The war was a series of discrete events with specific and well-known protagonists. The present is a moment in which mechanisms for justice exist, and that is discontinuous with that bad past. They use the judicial mechanisms of the liberal state (and international bodies) that were not
available to Irish Catholics in the 1970's. They make no claims about the entitlement of
the British State, unionists, or other individuals to pursue justice against republican
paramilitary members. They only endeavor to exonerate the people who were most
likely innocent civilians trapped in a violent context. The state killed innocent subjects,
who are protected by international conventions based upon liberal rights.

The discourse of the Ulster Protestants, particularly the victims’ rights group
CARE, frames victims’ rights in a chronotope that is more spatially and temporally broad
than that of republicans. Their demands are justified not by discrete events, but by the
historical victimization of Protestants across Northern Ireland. The righteous and
innocent victims seek justice against republicans, the category of generalized evil, who
should be excluded from participation in the post-conflict government. This vision of the
world demands that the moral victory of being the innocent victims be bestowed on the
Protestant majority. This victimized identity is the basis for an ideology of ressentiment,
which views the political world in Manichean terms. This representation obscures the
historical role of unionists in discriminating and victimizing Catholics.

Peace workers attempt to mediate between victims and the state. They consult
victims’ advocacy groups, and attempt to create public policy that will help them. How
peace workers define “help” is central to their proposed solutions. They will help victims
to make a clean break with the past, to recognize the other as a democratic actor, and to
“move forward” to an ill-defined future state of peace. This chronotopic representation
of the conflict and the Long Peace leads peace activists to pathologize victims as they
refuse to give up on their demands for justice. Victims want perpetrators to pay. Such a
sentiment is, for peace activists, a symptom not of legitimate grievance, but an expression of a psychological hurt: society is so sick, and so damaged by the trauma of the Troubles that they cannot leave the past behind. This inability to break with the past, may breed future generations of violent actors, who will continue the cycles of *lex talonis*.

In the final two chapters, we see how Palestinian and Israeli activists construct spatiotemporal scenes to frame their demands for a Palestinian state, the prosecution of terrorists, and an end to violence in the Middle East. These activists use more or less broad scenes to link the events in Israel-Palestine to those in Northern Ireland. Palestinian and Israeli activists characterize Northern Ireland as progressively moving towards peace, and an example for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Republicans react uneasily to Ben’s call for violent resistance against Israel. As new participants in the Northern Irish state, republicans are unwilling to continue violence and to cast themselves as an oppressed minority. At the CARE conference, unionists and foreign activists approve of the exclusion of “terrorists” from the rights and entitlements traditionally granted citizens in liberal democracies.

The chronotopes and personhood categories used by activists try resolve the tension between victimhood based upon ethnic identity and the violation of rights under liberal jurisprudence. Unionists explicitly equate victimization with Protestantism. Peace workers alleviate this tension by erasing ethnicity all together. Republicans subtly link their experiences of victimization to their Catholic and native Irish identity, but use liberal norms to pursue their claims for justice. The transnational activists cope with this tension as well. The Palestinian Lina advocates for democratic action to alleviate the
suffering of the Palestinian people. Ben, the American-born activist, laments the failure of liberal justice and supra-national organizations, and demands that activists circumvent traditionally democratic means for political change. Ana, the Israeli peacemaker, rejects all political claims based upon ethnicity; she wants a utopian future in people recognize common humanity. Mike demands the exclusion of Muslim extremists from international conventions based upon liberal jurisprudence.

The present state of affairs

Since my research concluded in 2010, I have followed the work of victims’ rights organizations (and the individual activists) through blogs, websites, and occasional email correspondence.

The Lakewood Research Group continues to work for an independent international investigation of the 1971 killings of eleven Catholics in West Belfast. They have met with the British Prime Minister, the American Congress, and numerous other individuals and representatives regarding their demands. Thus far, the British government has not agreed to cooperate with an international investigation. The Solicitor General announced in 2011 that there would be an inquest into the killings, but the Coroners’ Office disputed the authority of the Solicitor General to make such a ruling. The LRG has since launched several lawsuits to allow an inquest. Otherwise, they continue to engage with institutions such as the Community Relations Council and receive funding from the government.

Mike, the Israeli who spoke at the CARE victims’ rights conference in Chapter 9, continues to live in Israel, and works part-time traveling to victims’ rights conferences.
He continues to pursue legal cases against organizations and individuals he views as funding and supporting Islamic terrorist organizations.

I have not been able to contact Ana, but assume that she is still active with the Family Circle group in Israel and Palestine.

Ben, the American born Irish citizen who advocated for direct action against Israel, has had a tumultuous few years. He spent several months in Palestine trying to raise public awareness for a family who lost members to an Israeli Defense Force incursion into the Gaza Strip. Fellow activists accused Ben of stealing and mismanaging donated funds for the Palestinian family in 2010. After stating that Jewish theology legitimates violence, Ben was accused of anti-Semitism and barred from speaking to several British pro-Palestinian groups. As a result, his standing in the international solidarity movement seems to have decreased.

Unionists and some republicans criticized the Eames-Bradley commission report heavily. Lord Eames continues to advocate for the adoptions of the suggestions in the Dealing with the Past Report, but he has largely retired from public service.

CARE has changing dramatically over the last three years. When I was conducting research with them in 2010, they were under police investigation for fraudulent use of funding supplied by the European Union. Many of the office staff were working for free or on half pay as the EU suspended funding. In the end, the PSNI did not charge the organization with fraudulent activity, but the Special European Union Programmes Body—the oversight committee for funding allocated by the EU—rewarded its support of the organization as did the Northern Irish Assembly (totaling about 800,000
pounds over 3 years). To date, the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) (which oversees the EU Programmes Body), has not made public its specific allegations. In 2011, CARE ceased operations due to financial difficulty. Many unionists believe the government pulled the funding from CARE because of its stance against Irish republicanism and its opposition to the peace process.

_No future without justice_

In the 1990’s, peace activists introduced language derived from the transnational restorative justice movement into Northern Ireland. Inspired by the perceived success of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, they introduced concepts of “truth-telling” and victim/offender mediation into the nascent peace process. Political realities in Northern Ireland, however, stymied their ability to encourage offenders to participate. The general amnesty offered in 1998, and the inability to force the British to release information about state sponsored killings, curtailed the ability of peace workers to entice or compel offenders to engage in reconciliatory programs, such as residential meetings, individual victims/offender mediations, or even a proposed national truth telling commission. Instead of demanding that offenders tell their versions of the “truth” and that the British open their archives, peace workers focused on victims as the key to Northern Ireland’s future. The predisposition against extended criminal prosecutions in post-cold war human rights discourses reinforced this view and led them to view victims as “stuck in the past”, as a group that was unwilling to forgive in order to decrease the chances of more violence.
In his monograph on contemporary human rights discourse, Meister (2011) argues that one of the key goals of post-Cold War rights discourse is to compartmentalize the “evil” past. He states that:

In the Human Rights Discourse that has become dominant since the cold war the meaning of "evil" itself has changed. It is no longer widely understood to be a system of social injustice that can have ongoing structural effects, even after the structure is dismantled. Rather, evil is described as a time of cyclical violence that is past—or can be put in the past by defining the present as another time in which the evil is remembered rather than repeated (2011: 25).

The attempt to compartmentalize the past is achieved through token prosecution of perpetrators and state (and intra-state) focus on the physical and psychological suffering of victims. These actions become political theatre: society recognizes the guilt of some (usually very few) and the suffering of many. Everyone then agrees to remember the evil past, and move towards a better political future. Justice is not evaluated by how many people it holds accountable, but instead on how few it holds accountable with the most cultural and political effect on a “amorphous social whole” (Meister 2011: 265). Since the Cold War, human rights advocates judged the Nuremberg Trials a success not because of expansive prosecution of Nazis, but because Germans agreed to repudiate the past with such limited prosecution (Meister 2011: 265). Further prosecutions would have threatened those bystanders who shared the sentiments of the Nazis, and made a clean break with the past more difficult. In Northern Ireland, the prosecution of perpetrators is similarly treated as an impediment to the peace process for fear that it will reignite the vengeful passions of the ethnic aggregates that once fought with one another. It is this fear that justice and truth may breed violence—a return to the
evil past—that has largely influenced the intervention with victims conducted by civil society organizations. Reconciliation is less about asking offenders to repent, than it is about asking victims to deal with their pasts and move on. They should tell their stories, society will laud them, and everyone would agree to move into a “shared future”.

However, by creating the victim as the sole subject of intervention, peace workers do not challenge the continuing unaccountability of the British state and non-state actors, the very issues that victims are interested in addressing. This ideology led to several policy recommendations, in particular, the Consultative Group for Dealing with the Past, argued for placing a five-year limit on the prosecution of former combatants. A little justice, but no more than five years’ worth, should be enough for Northern Irish society to move on.

If peace workers intend to continue to work with victims, however, I suggest that they critically reassess their perspectives on retribution and judicial practice. Victims should be encouraged and assisted in their pursuit of prosecutions. The pursuit of justice may reinforce a sense of belonging in the new Northern Irish state. Insisting that violence is revenge-driven, and that calls for justice in the present are part of those cycles of revenge, will further ostracize victims' advocates as they are blocked from this important kind of political participation. That is not to say that peace activists no longer have a role to play in Northern Ireland, but I suggest that they cease their determination to be trustees over victims, and instead work for improvement of the transitional justice system in Northern Ireland. Thus far, their rhetoric and political actions are influenced more by a fear of lex talonis than a genuine engagement with the demands of the wounded and bereaved in the present. Peace workers should ask themselves, how can we help victims attain, or at least attempt to attain, justice? What steps may be taken to help
those who identify as victims to feel more engaged with civil and political life in Northern Ireland? The demand for justice need not threaten a return to violence, in fact, the role of peace activists might be to act as intermediaries with the British government, trying to get them to release documents regarding past killings. Other activists could put pressure on Sinn Fein, setting up mechanisms whereby they could release information about past atrocities. These actions would give peace workers an important role as agents that challenge the state and non-state institutions that once dominated others through discrimination and violence.

This change in political action requires that activists critically assess transnational discourses of restorative justice, and understand how taken-for-granted representations of war and peace constrain public policy recommendations. Northern Ireland is a unique political environment and is very different from peace processes in other countries, such as South Africa. Restorative justice has failed to deliver its promises of truth and justice to victims in Northern Ireland. The temporal imperative to move society to an ossified future encourages the belief that mere psychological recognition of the pain of the other is enough. We can, as observers, look back on a past tragedy, express our sorrow, and move on. This is not adequate for victims, and it should not be adequate for observers and Northern Irish society in general. Such blind acceptance of temporal representations of conflict devalues important mechanisms for helping victims of political violence. Activists must accept that the specter of violent conflict may loom over societies for decades, and the way to frame policy is to create programs that alleviate the individual, social, and economic injustices caused by war. They must also work to alleviate structural problems that continue in the present that may make the use of violence seem a
viable option. Any violence that might occur now would not be a mere repetition of the past, but a product of the economic, social, and political problems that face Northern Ireland in the present.

Accepting that the demands of victims are valid requires a greater sensitivity to local context. Northern Irish victims demand liberal justice as well as truth commissions. But in other contexts, local communities might demand compensation or reparations for ethnic minorities or other social aggregates. What this suggests is that peace activists—to echo a common anthropological critique of human rights activism—should become sensitive to the political and social contexts in which they work. The discourse of restorative justice, meant to challenge structures of power, has instead come to support them. This is because instead of helping victims and turning their gaze on the perpetrators of crimes, peace activists in Northern Ireland only focus on the victims, and built them up as the key to a reconciled future. The de-politicized category of victimhood does not reflect the Irish experience. Victimhood is certainly human and heartbreaking, but it is also fundamentally political in that people were killed because of ethnic membership and political affiliation; they were also killed by political entities that used the destruction of life as a means to advance Irish unification or oppress Catholics. The idea of a time after evil is a fiction of restorative justice discourse, there is no time after evil for the victims. Peace workers should play a more hands on role in managing those calls for justice that do not exclude groups from the post-conflict state. This is the lesson of the Long Peace in Northern Ireland for peace activists the world over: insistence upon discourses of transition may exacerbate and even antagonize victims of political violence such that the aim that peacemakers seek, to make a “better future”, risks becoming less a
realistic vision of the reduction of violence and discrimination, and more a cliché that supports the status quo\textsuperscript{54}.

I have hope that unionist victims' advocates will begin to change their discourse about victims' rights. As it stands, these activists use the past to demand the exclusion of republicans from political life. Unionists will not participate in victims' forums as long as republicans are present, unionists use such public events as the Dealing with the Past meetings to cast all actors as corrupt, gain little access to government personnel, and fail repeatedly in their law suits aimed at republicans in government. The unionists are what peace activists most fear and with good reason: they seek revenge based upon ethnoreligious belonging, and construct their own identity out of a deeply felt sense of victimhood to justify this revenge. The discourse of unionist victims' rights is exclusionary, it demands justice for some and not everyone, and it entwines national identity with sectarian ideology. Unionist discourse is a justification for a return to the past, when they wielded political power at the expense of the Catholic population. I worked with these individuals for two years, they fervently want justice and the truth about who killed their loved ones at places such as Kingsmills. Despite their politics of ethnic exclusion, peacemakers and politicians should attempt to find out what happened. However, unionists will not gain the support of policy makers and peace activists until they stop idealizing the past discriminatory practices of the Stormont government, and categorically condemning republican sympathizers and politicians.

The discourse of the Global War on Terror also threatens to alienate unionists from participation in the peace process. The discourse contrasts the civilized West and
Muslims, and describes these Muslim terrorists as lacking the fundamental human ability for character change. In the same way that restorative justice discourse does not quite align Northern Irish discourses, War on Terror discourse will not gain traction in Northern Ireland because of the political situation. Former members of the IRA are now ministers in government. Demands for the exclusion of republicans, for the unleashing of state-violence against them, will only make funding organizations and the governments ask whether unionist groups such as CARE are advocating for victims' rights or using that discourse as a cover for discriminatory practices and the use of state violence.

To this end, I would suggest that unionist advocates take a close look at how republican activists, like the Lakewood Research Group, frame their demands for justice. Republican activists use the language of liberal human rights: the state violated its contractual obligation not to harm individual citizens without just cause. Liberal justice discourse fits into the political history and culture of republicanism; indeed, the origins of the movement lie in the recognition of the individual as the bearer of rights to prevent the abuse of monarchical power. This is the discourse is also well accepted by domestic and international politicians. It has not yet paid off for activist groups like the LRG, but this discourse, more so than any other justification for rights and recognition for victims discussed in this dissertation, has the best chance of moderate success. Unionists could mimic this approach: make the commemoration of Kingsmills more about the demand for justice in a specific instance than a categorical condemnation of republicans. But victimhood and ethnic identity in unionist discourse may be too intertwined for them to use the ostensibly neutral rhetoric of liberal justice.
This analysis, based upon Bakhtin’s chronotope, shows how certain rights norms clash with domestic socio-political realities in discourse, and denaturalizes the demands of victims and the imperatives of justice in relation to far reaching issues, such as terrorism, transitional justice, and post-conflict citizenship. Victims’ rights narratives, and the demands that they justify, are in tension with the post-Cold War imperative that societies wreaked by conflict “move on” from past cycles of violence. Whether activists equate victimization with an ethnic category, or make demands for the prosecution of perpetrators, they run into resistance from peace activists who see these as attempts to undermine the progress of the Long Peace in Northern Ireland. The categories of personhood animated within these socio-political realities, and the chronotopic visions of the movement from violence to peace, curtail the formation of public policy that would actually assist the bereaved and wounded achieve their aims of justice against state and non-state actors. These representations of socio-political reality draw on transnational rights discourses and war on terrorism discourses. These universalizing discourses grant Irish activism universalistic authority and legitimacy. If restorative justice worked in South Africa or Israel-Palestine, then it should work in Northern Ireland. If innocent victims suffer under the evils of terrorism in one context, then they are the same in all contexts. This globalized character of the victims’ rights debate in Northern Ireland has made the different political perspectives even more contrastive and incompatible. Until peace activists recognize that the categories of retribution and reconciliation are not incongruent, and unionists cease defining legal categories of victimization by ethnic identity, the victims’ rights debate in the Long Peace will limp on with little consensus regarding public policy for the bereaved and wounded.
Endnotes

1 Understanding the rhetorical implications of narratives of victimization does not preclude the recognition that victims’ narratives have deep emotional associations. For many survivors of violence, their identities as victims is closely tied to their roles as mothers, fathers, wives, husbands, and friends. In all of the narratives in this dissertation, speakers describe the deep loss felt by the bereaved. This analysis does not intend to denigrate this loss but to suggest that it is through language and interaction that the emotional trauma of the past is made to have political purpose. The study of the linguistic construction of chronotopes in advocacy talk shows how past traumas take on a semiotic life of their own and legitimate political activity in the present.

2 McKay (2000) argues that Northern Ireland is a “liberal-lite” system of peace-building. Northern Ireland never suffered a governmental collapse. Northern Ireland is considered a liberal success in that it has regular elections, free media, a robust civil society, and human rights legislation. “In this respect Northern Ireland has achieved one of the central aims of many internationally supported peace interventions in deeply divided societies; a political system in which centripetal institutions are structured to outweigh or balance natural centrifugal forces” (McKay 2000: 700). Still there are several features of the Northern Irish peace process that are il-liberal. Single-identity groups have also been reinforced during the peace process (McKay 2000, Ganiel 2009). It institutionalizes power-sharing between nationalist and unionist factions in the Assembly. Civil society groups, such as the Peace and Conflict Resolution groups studied in this work, also reinforce single identities based on the Kymlickian theory that “only groups confident in themselves can reach an accord with opposing groups” (McKay 2000: 700). These features differ the Northern Irish peace process from more conservative liberal democratic peace processes. Free market capitalism had also been operating in Northern Ireland since long before the most recent conflict. That said, there is a robust Keynesian public sector that is larger than that of Scotland or Wales (McKay 2000). This is due to increased spending accompanying the peace process to create a robust safety net in areas, particularly urban Belfast and Derry, that have suffered significant violence over the past forty years. Although in most peace process discourses free market capitalism and stability are touted as bedfellows, this is not as much the case in Northern Ireland. This is probably because Northern Ireland has had a free market since before the peace process began.

3 Human rights discourse is, of course, still tied deeply to concepts of liberal individualism and retributive justice. But the rise of restorative justice theory has tempered this approach, as most peacemaking programs now favor a hybrid approach that seeks to punish leaders of violent regimes and organizations, and reintegrate common soldiers into society (Boutros-Ghali 1992).

4 As a unit of analysis, the chronotope is more than reference to the past, present, or future. It also takes into account how writers, speakers, or actors link different times and places together to form scenes of action. Following Chanan (2000), consider the “Western” film genre. Westerns occur in small frontier towns, and the mode of movement across these towns is usually by horse or locomotive. This grants a particular temporal aesthetic to the films as compared to other genres, such as Science Fiction where the characters can zip between locations often at the blink of an eye. In Westerns, much of the action occurs in the long walking or horse-riding journeys between locations. The comparably slow development of time limits the kind of psychological changes available for the characters. Any such changes usually come as the result of a violent event, which shifts a character, for example, from a nervous young gun slinger into a hardened fighter. These grueling journeys between rustic settings place emphasis on the heartiness (or lack thereof) of the characters. Bakhtin also argues that the chronotope reflects cultural ideologies, and accordingly the Western genre of American films does not just delineate certain kinds of characters, specific locations, and plot conventions, but it also “inscribes a certain set of morals and mores, which first
crystallized into a mythos about the origins of modern US values around the turn of the nineteenth century, and thereby came to constitute an identifiable ethos and ideology” (Chanan 2000).

In his lectures, Sacks (1992) presents an example: “The baby cried. The mommy picked it up.” There are two embedded and one cognitive categories in these sentences that assist with comprehension. The first, "baby", refers to a class of individuals of a certain age and social status. The second membership category, "mommy," refers to a set of individuals of the female gender that have undergone an activity, childbirth. The MCD that organizes our common sense thinking about the sentences is unspoken, "family." The baby and the mommy are social roles within this category. This leads us to assume that the mommy in question is, in fact, the mommy of the crying child. Collections of membership categories are organized according to more inclusive and often unspoken categorization devices. These collections are included in the same category according to category-bound activities. These are types of conduct taken by a community to be characteristic of category members. We can thus also allude to the category membership of a person by describing their conduct, behaviors, or actions that are category-bound. "The doing of a category-bound action can introduce into a scene...the category to which that action is bound, and with that category, the MCD which is its locus, and thereby its other categories as potential ways of grasping other in that scene" (Schegloff 2007: 467). Sacks (1992) also notes that the use of many membership categories create "standardized relational pairs." The term "mother", for example, constitutes one half of the "mother-father" pairing. The term "husband" constitutes one half of the "husband-wife" pairing. In the Northern Irish political context, there exist several standardized relational pairs, such as "republican-unionist" and "Protestant-Catholic." What is striking in the case of victims' rights advocacy is that advocates often do not use these pairs when describing victims and perpetrators of political violence. Speakers often claim victimhood status for an ethno-nationalist category, but ascribe guilt to an institution or political party. By not ascribing guilt to an ethno-nationalist category, speakers avoid accusations of sectarianism.

For example, Eglin and Hester (2003) show how representations of the "Montreal Massacre" were co-opted by politicians to talk about gender rights. In 1989, a French-Canadian, Marc Lepine, murdered fourteen women at the Ecole Polytechnique in Montreal. Politicians and the news media engaged in a debate about the motives for the killings that hinged on several "taken-for-granted" social categories such as "women" and "feminists." Commentators accused the feminist movement of appropriating the killings to support their ideology. This critique was based upon a predication of the perpetrator as not representative of “Western” men. His behavior was anomalous and not traditionally masculine. The feminist argument that the killings were motivated in part by gender ideology was thereby discredited.

The ways in which speakers and authors represent time and space affect how they represent themselves and other actors in narrative. Speakers can also make actions and actors go unnoticed, or underemphasize the roles of some parties in narratives. Processes of emplotment and character development involve a degree of “erasure” and “focalization”. Erasure is the process whereby “facts that are inconsistent with the ideological scheme either go unnoticed or get explained away” (Irvine and Gal 2000: 38). Erasure often occurs when two events, or “domains”, are mapped onto one another. Erasure is accompanied by focalization, which highlights similarities ( Hodges 2011: 32). Hodges (2011) explains the analogies formed by President George Bush’s narrative construction of the “War on Terror”. Just after 9/11, Bush often compared the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor with the attack on the World Trade Center. He highlighted the shared nationality of the victims, but erased the vast historical differences (Pearl Harbor was an attack by a sovereign nation and 9/11 was an attack by non-state actors against civilians). Erasure and focalization also occurs in the victims’ rights debate. Unionist victims’ advocates often argue that republicans continue to victimize innocent civilians. To this end they may compare a killing forty years ago with a more recent event. By using the republican category to refer to the perpetrators, they erase the fact that the organizations who perpetrated the acts may have been entirely different. This characterizes the enemy in the political present as the same as in the past. In this analysis, I will focus not only on how movement through time and space affect character development, but also how spatiotemporal representations erase certain actors and actions. Erasure and focalization make certain claims for justice, for political participation, or violence justifiable.
Labov and Waletsky (1997) define narrative according to its event structure. Describing elicited oral narratives, they indicate that there are several clause-level features characteristic of the genre, such as orientation—the exposition of the actors, time, and place of events to be described, a complicating action—the central conflict of the narrative, an evaluation—which juxtaposes the complicating action with real or hypothetical events that indicates the speaker’s valuation of the protagonist’s action, and validation—reference to witnesses that can collaborate the story. But depending upon the political ideology of the speaker, these narratives have different spatio-temporal scales. In unionist and peacemaking discourse, complicating actions are usually descriptions or allusions to victimization episodes, set within grand socio-historical narratives of war and peace, the chronotope. In republican advocacy, the victimization episodes take on the formal structure of narratives in Labov and Waletsky’s definition. The chronotope that organizes the different victimization episodes is implicit, and is left up to the listener to compare the different events based upon their similarities in character development.

It must be noted that republican victims’ advocacy—advocacy aimed at exonerating the dead—is at times quite different from republican political discourse in other contexts. Republican politicians certainly make use of broad historical frames to cast Catholics or “native Irish” as a victimized minority. This makes the narrow chronotopic framing of republican victims’ advocacy all the more striking. Republican discourse frames the deaths of their loved ones as a violation of law; the dead were not engaged in a heroic struggle against an oppressive colonial power.

Nietzsche argues that ressentiment is the psycho-social foundation of morality in modern civilization; it is the basis of his “slave morality.” As human civilization developed, power disparities increased between the lower class—and slaves—and the upper ruling classes. This disparity built up great resentment among the lower classes directed at the ruling classes. This resentment gradually built into a vindictive hatred of those in power, and gradually, power came to equal moral depravity, and powerlessness came to equal moral righteousness. This, for Nietzsche, was the basis of the general dislike and fear of the powerful, which is disparaged in his work; ressentiment held the supermen from achieving their full potential. While these supermen looked forward towards progress, those captive by ressentiment always looks back, to their own disempowerment and victimization. The powerless reproduce their victimization and this drives an ever building desire for vengeance against those in power who, directly or indirectly, contributed to their victimization. As Tracy Strong notes of his theory, “the will to power of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave: the pain he suffers by being in the world” (Strong 1988: 242 cited in Brown 1995: 69).

In this usage, a discourse is the patterned relationship between a series of subjects and objects. Discourse thus “frames” knowledge and experience in the world.

Agamben (2003) argues that liberal democracies lurch from one state of exception to another, belying the tenets of liberal individualism.

This phrase is an entextualized form of Lord Craigavon’s characterization of the Stormont government as a “Protestant parliament for a Protestant people”. The generalized form “A Protestant state for a Protestant people” became a rallying cry for loyalist and unionists during the Troubles.

Merry notes that the term “local” in contrast with “global” rights language is problematic. “Local” evokes a cluster of ideas relating to immobility, poverty, and a lack of cosmopolitanism on the one hand, and “global” evokes ideas relating to the opposite. The distinction is ultimately false, and is particularly muddled in the case of Northern Ireland as much of the transnational discourse about human rights and terrorism was, in part, fashioned during the Northern Irish Troubles.

In sociolinguistics, scholars distinguish between discourse referring simply to language use, or stretches of talk that occur in interaction and macro-level discourse in Foucault’s (1972) definition of the term. In this conceptualization, discourse is a “way of representing the knowledge about...a particular topic at a particular historical moment” (Hall 1997: 44). The chronotopes studied in this dissertation are token
instances of these macro-discourses. The chronotopes are repeated across different contexts, and provide a common language to frame visions of conflict, human rights, and peace. The chronotopes constitute knowledge about domestic and international victims’ rights, and thus constrain how different actors can talk about past events, and the types of transitional justice for which they advocate.

16 The vast majority of killing events during the Troubles were perpetuated against one ethno-nationalist group (or institution such as the British Army). There are a few incidents in which bombs were aimed at civilians irrespective of ethno-nationalist background. The Omagh bombing in 1998 is one example of such a situation.

17 CARE works with victims in South Armagh, but organizes a network of victims’ rights groups across Northern Ireland. The Lakewood Research group is a sub-division of a larger republican advocacy network, which organizes all of the smaller republican groups.

18 While Anderson focused on the homogenizing power of print media, recent anthropological research characterizes ritual as a site of contestation. Kerzer (1988) notes that political rituals can help to gloss over intra-group differences. Rituals can serve to create community cohesion, but this cohesion is constructed by a particular class or political strata of the society. The competing interests take advantage of cultural and symbolic “capital”; that is, symbols draw on, or index, a value from another context. For example, a group protesting government taxes in America might use the American flag and wave copies of the constitution in an attempt to draw legitimacy from the associations of those symbols with patriotism, a sense of common history, and legality.

19 Commemorative rituals have particular import for the unionist and republican victims’ rights movements in Northern Ireland. Commemorative events are rituals that memorialize past events for present day political purposes and are as diverse as carnivals, parades, or funerals (Bryan 2000: 21). Public commemorative rituals developed in Western societies relatively recently. Hobsbawm and Ranger (1992) argue that the social and political upheavals beginning in the late eighteenth century and culminating in the middle of the nineteenth lead to the development of “traditional rituals.” In this period, absolute monarchies gave way to representative democracies. Moreover, the industrial revolution challenged pre-industrial social bonds, and replaced them with predominantly capitalist relationships. In this period of flux, a more “stable” image of the community was developed by referencing and drawing on the images of an imagined idealized past.

20 During my research stay in Northern Ireland, I attended several meetings with the victims’ commission. Unfortunately, the commission would not allow me to record the meetings. I also held interviews with two of the four then acting commissioners. Both commissioners later asked that I not use these interviews in my dissertation.

21 The lyrics to the song are as follows:

“What did I have?” said the fine old woman
“What did I have?” this proud old woman did say
“I had four green fields, each one was a jewel
But strangers came and tried to take them from me
I had fine strong sons, they fought to save my jewels
They fought and died, and that was my grief” said she
“Long time ago” said the fine old woman
“Long time ago” this proud old woman did say
“There was war and death, plundering and pillage
My children starved by mountain valley and sea
And their wailing cries, they shook the very heavens
My four green fields ran red with their blood" said she
"What have I now?" said the fine old woman
"What have I now?" this proud old woman did say
"I have four green fields, one of them's in bondage
In stranger's hands, that tried to take it from me
But my sons have sons, as brave as were their fathers
My fourth green field will bloom once again” said she
(http://lyrics.wikia.com/Tommy_Makem:Four_GreenFIELDS)


23 This is actually an extremely common practice in Northern Irish political discourse. I have been at meetings where representatives of unionism and republicanism begin a competition in which they yell place names off trying to be the one who can name the most atrocities against one’s respective side.

24 This is, of course, a common rhetorical usage of the proper noun in some types of Christian as well as political discourse both in the United States as well as in Israel. The two entities, separated by thousands of years, are cast as the same.

25 The association of Protestants with legal state violence also obscures the colonial history of Anglo-Irish relations, and the past history of discrimination against Catholics in the Stormont era. The Reverend mockingly presents the nationalist myths held by republicans like Eamonn DeValera. Casting Irish nationalism as mythical obscures the colonial history of England (and later Great Britain) in Ireland. Protestant loyalty to the British and Stormont-era nations is the right kind of allegiance: Republicans kill for a myth and Protestants protect law and the nation-state. This hides the fact that the Stormont Government operated in a discriminatory fashion against Catholics. For many republicans, it was a thinly veiled extension of British colonial policy in Ireland.

26 \( \text{Right facin} \) is a reduced form of an Irish English phrase “we’re right facing”. The \text{right} is not a directional term; instead, it refers to proximity. The location of the commemoration is across the street from the former army base.

26 The Henry Taggert Army Base holds an important place in the historical “mental maps” of many of the older residents of Belfast. In fact on numerous occasions friends would base directions on the past location of the base. For many the physical location still has an emotional hold on many in the area.

27 Some individuals opt for the gaelic spelling of their name, such as Padraig instead of Patrick. This also indicates that the individual comes from a Catholic background. In some cases, individuals change their names from the Anglicized version to the Gaelic version, to index their strong nationalist identity. But the use of family names to “tell” the ethno-nationalist identity of an individual is not always straightforward. Many English surnames were introduced into Ireland as Catholic English and Irish intermingled before the Reformation. This has resulted in many individuals identifying as Catholic yet not having a Gaelic surname.

28 I disagree with the political rhetoric of CARE. That said, the notion that groups should not be engaged in political activities is at best naïve, and at worst an attempt to force public sector organizations to take up the discourse of the peace process. The vague characterization of “political activities” seems to only apply to groups that do not align themselves with such institutions as the CRC. This is thus a means for cutting dissenting voices (no matter how disagreeable) from the victims’ rights debate by cutting off their funding.

29 Restorative justice activists in South Africa, and in other contexts, make a distinction between war and peace. The definition of peace then depends upon this binary contrast. “Peace” comes to be defined by the non-presence of “war” (Hodges 2013). This dichotomy is common in restorative justice theory, and many
struggle to decouple the definition of peace from war by emphasizing the difference between so-called negative peace—the absence of war—and positive peace—the establishment of institutions and interpersonal interactions that promote non-violence (Lederach 1995). But the activists at the TRC, and as we shall in Northern Ireland, problematizes the situation by contrasting the violent past with a potential future, and thus "success" at the TRC would mean the reduction of violence and state-led oppression of Africans. Critics of the South African TRC maintain that the ill-defined nature of "peace", and the inability of politicians to address severe economic inequalities, has led to little more than the death of Apartheid in name only: the majority of Africans remain deeply impoverished while the descendents of the European colonists continue to control politics through economic power (Wilson 2001).

During my fieldwork I was not allowed to record any of these meetings. In speaking with community workers, however, a neo-whorfian ideology seems prevalent in this type of work. Workers see the words and their meanings as a direct reflection of thought content. In some cases, workers expressed the idea that language can also have a transformative power in that it shapes cognition, such as the attempts to “divorce” negative connotations from working class identity.

This quote is the title of Tutu’s treatise on peacemaking published after the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. He uses a religious discourse throughout, arguing that humanity was initially bound together with God, but through sin we have been separated from him and one another. He begs both aggrieved parties and the injured to meet with one another. But he does note that the culprits must ask for forgiveness, which he believes that the leaders in South Africa did, “our leaders were ready in South Africa to say they were willing to walk the path of confession, forgiveness and reconciliation...and it seems their gamble might be paying off, since our land has not been overwhelmed by the catastrophe that had seemed so inevitable” (Tutu 2000: 269). The role of the culprit in the interactive process of forgiveness seems to have been forgotten in Northern Ireland, or at the very least, deemed impossible to discuss.

Cicourel’s work suggests that coding in this circumstance is a cognitive process collaboratively achieved by doctor and patient.

Robert Eames was a leading figure in the negotiations during the Drumcree dispute beginning in 1995. As a local reverend in Belfast, he has been credited with inter-community work and trying to established strong inter-relationships between the Church of Ireland and the Catholic Church in Ireland.

Denis Bradley is a former Catholic priest who has a long history of community organization in Northern Ireland, particularly in Catholic communities in Derry. He was appointed as the first vice-chairman of the Northern Irish policing board, an oversight committee for the new Police Service of Northern Ireland.

On the part of peace and reconciliation workers, a short discussion of the work that one has undertaken is a common preface to discussions of reconciliation. It is my hunch that this preface stands in intertextual relationship with a common critique of the peacemaking organizations that I heard time and time again from victims; that is, these groups do very little “real” work and just make money off the pain of others.

One could read the phrase ‘new era’ as an ironic quote. I do not read it as ironic because it lacks qualifying adjectives that would indicate sarcasm, such as ‘so-called’ or ‘supposed’ new era.

Scattered throughout the report are many statements regarding the controversial aspects of political discourse in Northern Ireland. Although not organized as such, the statements offer one of the most comprehensive documents detailing these controversies.

At the time of writing, the Coroner’s Office of Northern Ireland was holding a tribunal on the death of the human rights lawyer Rosemary Nelson. She was killed by a targeted car bombing in 1999. This followed other ad hoc public inquires, such as one focusing on the killing of Billy Wright—a loyalist paramilitary leader killed in the Maze Prison in 1997—that sought to uncover the circumstances of deaths,
and deem whether individuals should be prosecuted in the criminal courts. Additionally, the police service continued to pursue “on the run” paramilitary members, who are paramilitary members that committed crimes, but were not convicted of those crimes before the 1998 amnesty. For the authors of the Report, these inquiries and trials do not contribute to the improvement of Northern Irish society or reconciliation.

39 The textual “distance” (one page, divided by a discussion of the Legacy Commission) between the discussion of truth-telling and retributive justice textually separates these two forms of justice. This textual separation further legitimizes the theory—often promoted in forgiveness or restorative justice literature—that retribution and restorative justice are mutually exclusive (cf. Mika and Zehr). Truth-telling provides a mechanism for a reconciled future, and while penal justice may alleviate the emotional concerns of the bereaved, it potentially foments conflict. This contrasts with the statements of many advocates and victims, which often assert that retribution will make people more likely to participate in reconciliatory practices and institutions. Peace activists attempt to discursively pry and keep apart retributive and restorative justice practices. The textual separation is iconic of this desire to draw a hard division between restoration and retribution.

40 “Text” is understood by sociolinguists to refer to the product of any spoken or written discursive act that has coherence for a particular audience (Hanks 1989: 95-96). “Intertextuality”, then is the process whereby texts are reproduced and recalibrated to different contexts (Hodges 2011: 8). This process is both iterative and constitutive. It is iterative because certain features of one text—a speech, an article, a conversation—are repeated in another context. It is constitutive because in repeating these features, they are often changed to suit the new context.

41 Pro-Palestinian groups use non-violent tactics as well. A notable example is Rachel Corrie, who died acting as a human shield for Palestinian homes designated for demolition in the Gaza Strip. Both active resistance and non-violent tactics attempt to provoke security forces into violence which will highlight the immorality of their position.

42 The one-state solution entails the establishment of a single democratic state that encompasses Israel and the Palestinian territories with equal rights shared by Jewish and Palestinian peoples.

43 The Socialist Worker’s Party of Ireland aims to establish a socialist republic in Ireland (Socialist Worker’s Party 2011). Although not explicitly republican in perspective, members often express an affinity with the republican cause, and suggest that a united socialist republic is the most desired future for the island.

44 The Irish Palestinian Solidarity Campaign was established in the early 2000’s to raise awareness for the plight of Palestinians and advocate for their cause in Ireland. The Campaign claims no political affiliation, but generally speaking, co-hosts many meetings also supported by republican organizations and political parties.

45 Throughout the Northern Irish conflict, several organizations used only non-violent tactics, the quintessential example being the “Peace People” founded by Mairead Corrigan and Betty Williams. For the most part, however, violent groups received the most attention during the Irish Troubles. These include, on the republican side, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Official Irish Republican Army, the Irish National Liberation Army among others. By the “resistance of the Irish against the British,” it may be inferred that the speaker is alluding to republican paramilitary groups in general.

46 Sean’s phrase the “pro-Zionist” media is perhaps instructive of his political philosophy. It also serves as a departure point for the discussion of different uses of the term “Zionist”. Zionism describes the philosophical and political ideology that demands a Jewish homeland in Israel. The term also has more expansive meaning, and has connotations of a world-wide Jewish conspiracy. Sean may be referring to
pro-Israeli media sources, but his statement could be read to indicate that many other media sources are “Zionist”. This reading of his statement is closer to the notion of a world-wide Jewish conspiracy that underpins much anti-Semitic discourse.

47 See Martin McGuinness’ paper on the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement for associations between Sands, other republicans, and these international figures (Arthur and McGuinness 2005).

48 Like many insurgent movements, Irish republicanism has several ideological divisions. The Provisional IRA split from the Official IRA in 1969 as they determined that armed struggle was an appropriate mechanism for unifying Ireland. The Provisional and Official paramilitaries fought several feuds during the 1970’s, and thus, Provisional figures such as Bobby Sands are not as revered in some camps of republicanism.

49 The South African arms dealer Armscor dealt directly with the loyalists, and it is unclear whether Israel knew of the final destination of a shipment of former PLO weaponry sent to the Ulster resistance.

50 In the early hours of the tube and bus bombings in London on July 7th, 2005, a few commentators on the BBC speculated about the possibility that the attacks were orchestrated by dissident Irish republicans, but this hypothesis was quickly discarded after evidence indicated the work of Al Qaeda.

51 This vague noun probably refers to the various political road blocks to Israeli/Palestinian peace, such as the “right of return”, the division of Jerusalem, and settlements in the Palestinian territories.

52 Note his use of the geographical noun of cities to indicate the presence of victims of terrorism. Earlier in his presentation Mike lists a series of terrorist attacks when discussing the naming practices of those events 9/11, 7/7, 11/11 to indicate recent attacks by militant Muslims against Western targets. Each of these attacks occurred in an urban environment. Placing victims of terrorism in cities creates a particular geographical space for the narrative of victimization, Western urban environments. It may be stretching this geographical construction too far, but one can envision semiotic associations with urban living: cosmopolitanism, middle class, and a Western identity, implicitly tied to ethnic identity.

53 The bombings in 2003 killed a total of 27 people, six of whom were Jewish attendees at the synagogue. The speaker states below that the death total was twenty-two.

54 This case study reverses the trend in anthropological studies of human rights discourse. Anthropologists have focused on the movement of human rights discourse into societies that may have more sociocentric or other values that clash with the liberal individualism of human rights discourse. Restorative justice has been informed by studies of transitional justice in other contexts, and thus highly values community-oriented approaches to resolving the pain of past crimes. The interventionists, the peace activists, have imported discourses that emphasize the effect of violence on communities. In this case, the politics and culture of Northern Ireland, particularly within the republican movement, has been shaped by a long history of using liberal justice to challenge the state. This clash between the “local” and the “global” is the opposite of what we see in other contexts, where supranational and development organizations introduce liberal norms that challenge local social structures and models of the person. The potential effect of restorative justice discourse as implemented in Northern Ireland may be to disempower the historically victimized by cutting off their access to domestic and international courts.
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