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One Hundred and One Nights: Plato and the Metaphysical Feminine

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One Hundred and One Nights:
Plato and the Metaphysical Feminine

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Classics

by

Irene Han

2017
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

One Hundred and One Nights:
Plato and the Metaphysical Feminine

by

Irene Han

Doctor of Philosophy in Classics
University of California, Los Angeles, 2017
Professor Giulia Sissa, Chair

The twentieth-century has been dubbed the century of anti-Platonism by Badiou, a contemporary French philosopher. He identifies six strains of anti-Platonism: the vitalist, analytic, Marxist, existentialist, Heideggerian and “ordinary political philosophy.” My research responds to these interpretations: in order to illustrate the dialectic between the past and present, I situate my work within the “affective turn,” one of the currents in critical theory. In my dissertation “One Hundred and One Nights: Plato and the Metaphysical Feminine,” I reassess Plato’s stance towards the realm of becoming and see it as a feminine space, for the female body resides in his politics as the materialization of desire and the embodying of aspirations. It is with this approach that I make an intervention in the scholarly debate known as “Plato’s Feminism:”¹

¹ This debate started gaining attention with the feminist scholarship of the 1970’s. See eg. Annas, Okin, Wender and Vlastos.
I elucidate gendered spaces in the utopian paradigm and demonstrate that political discourses are gendered discourses.

I look at the points of contact and disagreement among Plato’s utopian dialogues, *Republic*, *Laws* and *Timaeus*, and, in my examination of the different textures of the ideal city, trace his gendered line of thought in the images, metaphors and analogies of the narrative. I use Deleuze’s theory of cinema in *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* as a hermeneutic model to locate the vital feminine principle of becoming, which I believe to be operative in the ancient texts. My work thus combines theoretical, literary and philological methodologies and is interested in an issue of enhancement: I proceed to show, by periodic demonstrations, that my philological answers verify the theoretical questions and categories that I pose as initiating them, that each depends upon and enhances the other.

Ultimately what I try to magnify in Plato’s thought is a double dichotomy, the bones and structure of binary oppositions: on the one hand, a set of neat micro-definitions, exemplified by the realm of the forms and the neutral, *to kalon*, for instance, and, on the other, the cacophony of *muthoi*, in other words, the realm of flux, language and meta-language. Because language is not pure—it is structured and manipulated, put under great stress since it expresses the world of appearance, and produces gendered bridges and divisions—Plato has to revert to fiction, noble lies and bodily metaphors to describe any reality, phenomenal or ideal. I focus on this vulnerability in Plato in his utopian dialogues and argue that he offers a theory of politics based on *mimēsis* and an aesthetics of politics, made tangible by what I identify to be a cinematic narrative, which gives impressions of movement, time, fluidity and psychic contortions of all kinds. I take an interdisciplinary approach in order to show Plato not as a negative-polarity to the contemporary period but as a rather modern thinker, more than relevant to the present day.
The dissertation of Irene Han is approved.

Kathryn Anne Morgan

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PRESENTATIONS


« Ce n’est pas une image juste, c’est juste une image ». – J.L. Godard
Introduction

I. Mirrors

In *Republic* Book X, Plato defines *mimēsis* and describes a craftsman, who engages in mimetic production, by producing all plants and animals (τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα ἀπαντα ποιεῖ καὶ ζῷα πάντα ἐργάζεται), including himself (τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ ἑαυτόν), and heaven and earth and the gods and all things in heaven and in Hades under the earth (καὶ πρὸς τούτους γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἁιδοῦ ὑπὸ γῆς ἀπαντα ἐργαζέται) (Pl. Resp. 596c). Socrates raises the possibility of the existence of this kind of person, a “creator of all these things” (τούτων ἁπάντων ποιητής), or, rather, that in one way he could and in another he couldn’t (ἢ τινὶ μὲν τρόπῳ γενέσθαι ἄν...τινὶ δὲ οὐκ ἄν) (Pl. Resp. 596d). All he would have to do is to take a mirror and to carry it about everywhere (λαβὼν κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν πανταχῇ) to produce the sun and all things in sky, and speedily the earth, animals and plants and all other implements (ἡλιο...τά ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ταχὺ δὲ γῆν...τάλλα ζῷα καὶ σκεῦη καὶ φυτὰ) (Pl. Resp. 596d-e), but the craftsman, including the painter, makes only the appearance of them (φαινόµενα), not the reality and the truth (οὐ μέντοι ὄντα γέ ποι ὑπ’ ἄληθεία) (Pl. Resp. 596e). These creations are not real and true (οὐκ ἄληθῆ) (Pl. Resp. 596e).

It is my view that the *Republic* acts precisely in this way, as a mirror that provides a reflection of heaven and specifically of the pattern that lies in heaven (ἐν οὐρανῷ...παράδειγμα ἄνακεται) (Pl. Resp. 592b), offered up by the ideal city or kallipolis, and that Plato, as the author, is a sort of painter, a “maker of all things,” of entire utopian worlds that include plants and animals, heaven and earth, and even Hell, and, finally, reflections of subjects and the self. In my dissertation, I focus on Plato’s political dialogues, the *Republic*, *Laws* and *Timaeus*, where we find models of the best possible state, and argue that he advances a normative theory of
politics based on mimēsis. What particularly interests me about these utopian paradigms is how they make room for and incorporate the female body, where women enter the public sphere and take their place as political subjects. Therefore, I reassess Plato’s stance towards the realm of appearances, the phenomenal world and the sphere of becoming and see it as a feminine space, for the female body resides in his politics as the materialization of desire and the embodying of aspirations. It is with this approach that I hope to elucidate gendered spaces in the utopian paradigm and to demonstrate that political discourses are gendered discourses.

My research works at the intersection between Classics and Political Science and combines theoretical, literary and philological methodologies. In the dissertation, I make an intervention, primarily in two scholarly debates, first, “Plato’s feminism” and, second, the question of unitarianism versus that of developmentalism. As the title suggests, it would come as no surprise that the former point of dispute centers on the question of whether Plato is a feminist or not, since in two of his major dialogues, the Republic and the Laws, we find that, remarkably, he introduces a series of arguments that uphold the rights and status of guardian women.¹ The second controversy rests on the issue of whether change takes place over the course of his career, or quite the opposite case, which is maintained by unitarians: that little or no change in Plato’s views occurs. Whereas developmentalists divide the Platonic corpus into early, middle and late stages, where certain stylistic tendencies define each period,

¹ Vlastos has asked the very question, “Is Plato a feminist?”, and argued that Plato gives equality to only certain women and discriminates against all other women. In “Supposing Truth Were a Woman,” Brown takes a more positive and lenient position in the debate, by arguing that Plato engages in a critique of the socially male modes of thinking, speaking and acting prevalent in his epoch and milieu, because both philosopher kings and queens rule the kallipolis. She believes that the structure of the ideal city is effeminate “…in its replacement of political faction and public assembly with relations of familial hierarchy and accord” (612). Annas, on the other hand, has pointed out that Plato advances a utilitarian argument and that his proposals about women are justified entirely by the resulting benefit to the state and not at all by women’s needs or rights: “Even if women are inferior to men, it will still be of advantage to the state to have women do what men do if it is of public benefit. The argument in the Republic does not need, or claim, more than this” (1976: 316).
for example, and former aspects of his thought evolve and are revised, unitarians, such as Shorey and Annas (1999), reaffirm a constant unity of doctrine throughout and a continuity of purpose.

I respond to these disagreements in my work, and, in Chapter 1, I align myself with those scholars, who have previously argued that Plato is not a feminist, such as Annas (1976) and Saxonhouse (1994), and with the developmentalist mode of interpreting the texts. I do believe that marked shifts are noticeable from the middle to the late period and that, in comparison to the Republic, the Laws displays remarkable changes, in terms of both style and content, especially if we consider the disappearance of Socrates altogether in Plato’s last work. Some scholars, who belong to this school of thought and with whom I tend to agree, are Bobonich and Laks. Bobonich argues that the different arrangements of the Laws can be explained by Plato's more optimistic views of the capacity for non-philosophers to achieve virtue and happiness: “If Plato is more optimistic about the ethical capacities of non-philosophers in Laws, then his psychology and epistemology must have changed in some important respects” (2002: 294). Laks also prefers the more common view that there is a fundamental change in Plato's thought between the Republic and the Laws but sees the two works as complementary: “The two works are complementary, not because the ‘laws’ are expected to follow the ‘constitution,’ but because the possible follows upon the ideal model” (1990: 213).

While I do engage with these strands of scholarly debate, the primary project that I undertake in my dissertation is to respond to a wide range of contemporary criticism that Plato has met in his afterlife, particularly in the twentieth century, in order to show how the past is always present. Badiou, a living French philosopher, who has translated the Republic into French, exposes six strains of anti-Platonism in his recent seminars « Platon aujourd’hui ! »: the vitalist, analytic, Marxist, existentialist, Heideggerian and “ordinary political philosophy.” In
what follows, I will provide a brief exposition of each critique, in order to demonstrate Plato’s wide-ranging and extensive influence, before moving on to clarify and to explicate my approach and methodology. The aim of my work is similar to that of Badiou, who tries to recuperate Plato from these attacks and argues that the most audacious rehabilitations of Plato are issues of May 1968: « L’événement mai 68 produit à contre-temps et à contre-courant une nouvelle figure assumée et affirmative de Platon. Dans le cadre de cette réhabilitation, le platonisme se définit comme ce qui propose la mathématique / mystique d’une disposition de pensée » (Sém. 2007-2008) (“The event of May 68 produced against the current and against the tide a new assumed and affirmative figure of Plato. Within the framework of this rehabilitation, Platonism defined itself as that which proposes the mystical mathematics of a disposition of thought”).

First of all, the vitalists are represented by Nietzsche, Bergson and Deleuze, and they charge Plato with a hostility towards the realm of becoming. These thinkers depict Plato as the founder and the first to pose the primacy of immobility, and “becoming,” in this case, would amount to being a stigma or a mere trace of appearance, whereas, for the vitalists, it is in becoming that the singular essence of life is given (Sém. 2007-2008). The analytics (Russell, the second Wittgenstein, Carnap…), on the other hand, attack the status of mathematical objects, Plato’s assumption of a separate existence and supra-sensible mathematical identities. Badiou identifies Aristotle as an ancient forerunner of this school, the original “traitor of opera,” who plays the role of one who has betrayed his teacher. According to Aristotle, it is clearly impossible for mathematical things to have a separate existence from the sensibles (Sém. 2007-2008). Kant would later take on a similar critique, that if the realm of the forms should exist, there would be a native intelligible intuition, of which there is no evidence (« que rien n’atteste ».)
Marxists have seen Plato as the quintessential idealist philosopher, as the champion of discontinuity and the separation of sensible and intelligible worlds. Badiou cites the definition that the dictionary of the USSR provides under the heading “Plato:” "idéologue de la classe des propriétaires d’esclaves". The existentialists (Kierkegaard, Sartre) find fault with the primacy of essence over existence. Sartre famously asserts, « l’existence précède l’essence ». What was before existence? According to Sartre, originally there was nothing, and the major criticism is that Plato subsumes under realm of being that of non-being (Sém. 2007-2008).

I will move briefly through the last two critiques. Heidegger charges Plato with submitting the outbreak of being to “the cutting of the idea:” “…impute quant à lui à Platon c’est d’avoir soumis l’éclosion de l’être à la découpe de l’idée” (Sém. 2007-2008). The Platonic figure of the idea makes it possible that thought installs itself in “the oblivion of being” (la pensée s’installe dans l’oubli de l’être) (Sém. 2007-2008). There is something irremediably lost as soon as one elides the ontological difference between being and becoming, « ce qui apparaît dans un horizon et l’horizon lui-même comme ouverture qui rend possible l’apparaître en lui de l’étant » (Sém. 2007-2008). To put it more simply, with the concept and presence of these forms, Plato’s thought is too abstract and theoretical, for Heidegger: the categorization of Western metaphysics is problematic, and the form is too static. We forget our emergence in the world. Finally, political theorists such as Karl Popper and Hannah Arendt, in their “democratic” critique of Platonism, have attributed totalitarianism to Plato’s thought. Politics is not mediated by the idea of truth. Instead, the political sphere concerns a system of “being together,” that is accomplished in the free play between opinions and interests, and Arendt, specifically, argues that the major faculty in politics is directed towards democratic judgment: « La politique, pour elle, n’est nullement une pratique d’incorporation au vrai, mais un jugement par lequel on se fait
What is made clear by Badiou’s survey is precisely the broad range of critiques and Plato’s extensive and substantial impact on the Western philosophical tradition. In my readings of Plato, I am primarily interested in responding to these strains of discourse and particularly to the vitalist school of thought, where Deleuze, in fact, presents his philosophy as an “inverted Platonism” and, in this way, follows Nietzsche, by embarking on a quest to overturn Platonism. I will revisit vitalism and “the affective turn” in Chapter 1, but, for now, I will define what is meant by the term and explain the significance of the theory, which I will use as a conceptual apparatus with which to read the dialogues, and, ultimately, what is at stake in my project.

This is the approach that I take: I perform a vitalist reading of the Platonic texts and set out to read Plato against the grain. As their critique suggests, the vitalists affirm and privilege the sphere of becoming, rather than being. Colebrook, in her primer to Deleuze, explains the primacy of this concept in the vitalist framework and what relationship it has to being:

…there is no longer an origin or being that then becomes or goes through a process of simulation. In a reversal of Platonism, we do away with the foundation of being, acknowledging the immanence of becoming (becoming as all there is without ground or foundation). This does not just mean valuing becoming over being. It means doing away with the opposition altogether. The supposed real world that would lie behind the flux of becoming is not, Deleuze insists, a stable world of being; there ‘is’ nothing other than the flow of becoming. All ‘beings’ are just relatively stable moments in a flow of becoming-life (2002: 125).

I will focus on this principle, the principle of becoming, and the way in which it works in the utopian dialogues. It is my view, furthermore, that the feminine maps itself onto the phenomenal domain, associated with vitalist themes such as movement, generation, materiality and change (metabolē). I will argue that, even though Plato strives towards the realm of the forms, being itself and permanence, and it is very true that he opposes Socrates, the philosopher, who pursues
truth and that which is, to someone like Protagoras, the sophist and relativist, nonetheless, he builds his philosophical project with feminine blocks of becoming. As a result, I will place the accent on the constructed aspect and mimetic facets of the ideal city, which is an aesthetic production, and these political models are themselves embedded in mimetic representation: writing, language and the lively, animated format of the philosophical dialogue.

I situate my work in the vitalist or “affective turn,” which I will continue to elaborate in my chapters, because it is one of the predominant modes of thought that is prevalent today and expressive of our intellectual zeitgeist. I apply vitalist concepts to the ancient source material and use the theoretical framework as a heuristic model with which to interpret the texts because it is my belief that a critical theory is originally operative in the Platonic dialogues: namely, vitalist conceptions of the Deleuzian assemblage, subjectivity, cinematic aesthetics and becoming. Not to worry, I will be very precise about these terms and include a thorough exposition of the critical vocabulary at the beginning of each chapter, in order to ensure that we are on the same page and have at our disposal and a common language with which to contextualize the primary texts. I will use these theoretical concepts to trace vitalist principles and streams of becoming that obscure categories and boundaries between binary oppositions, through metaphors, analogies and language. What the theoretical model enhances is the interchangeability between two separate sets, the movement and temporality of thoughts and concepts and, finally, the impermanence and displacing activity of the metaphysical structure that Plato himself creates.

This is where the gendered question comes into question and plays a crucial role. The terms that compose a set of oppositions and a series of relationships are gendered, and they exist in a hierarchy. Let us take the famous example from the *Timaeus*, where the source wherefrom the coming to be is copied is compared to the figure of the father, and the maternal *chōra*, the
space or room in which copies come to be, is characterized as the “receiving thing” (τὸ μὲν δὲχόμενον) (Pl. Ti. 50c-d). I find it a source of fascination that Plato uses these gendered metaphors in order to describe and to delineate his metaphysical project, and, if we focus on the metaphorization of language, the twists and turns of metaphor in the dialogues, it is my belief that we start to notice the great extent to which he relies on what is bodily, corporeal, material and feminine and, ultimately, the reversal and displacement of the original hierarchy between being and becoming, form and matter and, finally, masculine and feminine. Western metaphysics never takes off, and Plato is always embedded in the phenomenal domain as long as he adheres to the practice of writing, which is “[j]ust like painting…like optical illusions and the techniques of mimēsis in general” (Derrida 1981: 97).

It is not my intention to confuse the reader and to lead us astray from Plato, when I mention various theorists and theories. On the contrary, I am interested in these strands of anti-Platonism and specifically in recuperating strands of materialist thought through a combination of feminism and affect theory in order to position Plato not as a negative-polarity to the contemporary period but as a rather modern thinker, more than relevant to the present day. In this way, I agree with Badiou and the overall ambition of his project in «Platon aujourd’hui!» because I too believe that Plato is a thinker for us, in the current era, and find his ancient works very fresh, as a reader today. I should also add that these modern critiques are picking up on a theoretical trend that Aristotle initiates in antiquity, when he revises, in his treatment, the concept of the Platonic forms (Arist. Metaph. 1028b) and contributes his own touch, as it were, by interrogating the relationship that they have to participant sensibles in Metaphysics VII:

φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν αἰτία, ὡς εἰώθασί τινες λέγειν τὰ εἰδή, εἰ ἐστιν ἄττα παρὰ τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστὰ, πρὸς γε τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς οὐσίας οὐθέν χρησίμη· οὐδ’ ἂν εἶν διὰ γε ταῦτα οὐσίαι καθ’ αὐτὰς. ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ
tions and the interaction between them. The compound of form and matter and the interaction between the two.

In this book, the primary question that Aristotle asks is, “What is substance?”, and defines it as form or essence, as opposed to matter. His conception of the forms (tà eîōn) differs from that of Plato, for Aristotle seems to deny their separability and status as paradigms: they should be regarded as self-subsistent substances (oûdê ἄν εἶχεν διά ταῦτα οὐσίας καθ' αὐτάς).

The Aristotelian model suggests that the primary substance or form is not separable from all matter. It is anti-Platonic and included in Badiou’s list because it seems as though Aristotle stresses the compound of form and matter and the interaction between the two. That is, the

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2 Translations have been adapted from Reeve’s.
Aristotelian form is a function from matter to compound material substances and a unity of matter and form: there is no need to “construct” a Form as a paradigm (οὐθὲν δεὶ ὡς παράδειγμα εἶδος κατασκευάζειν), he explains in the quoted passage. Matter gives structure or form to individual substances: the completed whole, such-and-such sort of form induced in this flesh and bones, is Callias or Socrates (τὸ δ’ ἄπαν ἡδη, τὸ τοιόνδε εἶδος ἐν ταῖς σαρξὶ καὶ ὀστοῖς, Καλλίας καὶ Σωκράτης). And they are distinct because of their matter (for that is distinct), but the same in form (because the form is indivisible) (καὶ ἐκεῖνον μὲν διὰ τὴν ὅλην (ἔτερα γάρ), ταύτα δὲ τῷ εἰδαί (ἄτομον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος)). The form is not a “thing” in the manner of a Platonic form but, rather, the way something is, the way the matter composing an individual compound is organized into a functioning whole.

In Aristotle’s contextualization of matter and form, I think what we see is the mechanism by which substances change their patterns and configurations from one to another, and it is through coming to be or generation. While he decreases the importance of the presence of the form, Aristotle notices that the thing, which generates, is sufficient to produce and to be the “cause of the form in matter” (ικανὸν τὸ γεννών ποιῆσαι καὶ τὸν εἶδος αίτιον ἐνὶ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ). There is no need to set up the model of what would be a Platonic form, but substances themselves and what we naturally find in the world give structure and form to other compounds, by coming to be:
 productos (movement and sensuality: the primary and independent cause of “making” is a part of the product (όπου ἢττου τοῦ ποιεῖται πρῶτον καθ’ αὐτὸ μέρος), as heat in the motion produces heat.

Essence or substance is the starting-point of everything (πάντων ἁρχή ἡ οὐσία), and generations proceed from it, “and from there too the generations” (ἐνταῦθα δὲ αἱ γενέσεις). I choose this passage because it is striking in the way that it sets up the matter/form relation, in terms of movement and sensuality: the primary and independent cause of “making” is a part of the product.
in the body (θερμότης γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῇ κινήσει θερμότητα ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐποίησεν); and either this is health or a part of health (αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ ὕγιεια ἢ μέρος), or a part of health, or health accompanies it (ἡ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῇ μέρος τὸ τῆς ὕγιειας ἢ αὐτῇ ἢ ὕγιεια). His description of the process shows us how the sensation of heat, a product of movement, in turn, produces heat in the body and leads to a larger totality, which is health, and it portrays a series that we might encounter in the process of deductions or syllogisms.

Aristotle also uses the language of procreation, drawing on corporeal metaphors, to characterize ousia and its movements. Already in the previous passage (Arist. Metaph. 1033b-1034a), he tells us that, in some cases, the “begetter” is of the same sort as the “begotten” (τὸ γεννὸν τοιοῦτον μὲν ὁιὸν τὸ γεννώμενον) and that they share one “form” (ἐν…τῷ έιδε) (Arist. Metaph. 1033b). In the most recent passage, which is quoted above, Aristotle continues with the analogy and argues that the seed “makes” (σπέρμα ποιεῖ) and is the producer, just as do those things, which function by art (ὡςπερ τὰ ἀπὸ τέχνης), since it potentially has form (εξ…τῷ έιδε). He turns to an example using humans and advises that we should not look for all offspring to come to be in the same way as human does from human, since even woman is also produced by man (οὐ γὰρ πάντα οὕτω δέι ζητεῖν ὡς ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἐνθρωπος· καὶ γὰρ γυνὴ ἐξ ἀνδρὸς). He then moves on to locate seed in those natural things that come to be by chance (ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου ὁσπερ ἑκεῖ γίγνεται), in which matter can be moved by itself with the same movement, as the seed moves it (ὅσων ἡ ὑλή δύναται καὶ ὡς’ αὕτης κινεῖσθαι ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν ἢν τὸ σπέρμα κινεῖ).

In his conception of form and being, Aristotle suggests that it is the thing that persists through change and genders substance, by aligning it with the masculine seed (σπέρμα). As the producer, it potentially has the form (ἐξει γὰρ δυνάμει τὸ εἴδος), and the derivative, degenerate
version of the male is what is female: “since even woman comes from man” (καὶ γὰρ γυνὴ ἡ ἀνδρός). In the Generation of Animals, he espouses a similar view:

καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνον περιττοῦμα, καὶ πάντα τὰ μόρια ἔχει δυνάμει, ἐνεργεία δ’ οὐθέν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτ’ ἔχει μόρια δυνάμει ἣ διαφέρει τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος. ὅσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἕκ πεπηρομένον ὅτε μὲν γίγνεται πεπηρομένα ὅτε δ’ οὖ, οὕτω καὶ ἕκ θῆλεος ὅτε μὲν θῆλυ ὅτε δ’ οὗ ἄλλῳ ἄρρεν. τὸ γὰρ θῆλυ ὅσπερ ἄρρεν ἔστι πεπηρομένον καὶ τὰ καταμήνια σπέρμα, οὕ τα καθαρὸν δὲ. ἐν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει μόνον· τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχήν. (Arist. Gen. an. 737a.)

[For the [female] menses is also a residue and contains all the parts of the body potentially, though none actually. It even has in it potentially those parts that differentiate female from male. And just as offspring from parents with a disability are sometimes born with a disability and sometimes not, so offspring from a female are sometimes female and sometimes not female but male. For the female is like a male with a disability, and the menses is seed, only not pure. For it does not have one thing in it, namely, the starting-point of the soul.]³

There are biological reasons for why the female version is a deviation from the male original: the female anatomy essentially differs from the male, born out of the menses, as opposed to the seed. Aristotle is quite categorical in his treatment of the sexes that woman is inferior: the female is like a male with a disability (τὸ γὰρ θῆλυ ὅσπερ ἄρρεν ἔστι πεπηρομένον), and the menses is seed (καὶ τὰ καταμήνια σπέρμα), but an impure version (οὐ καθαρὸν δὲ). The outcome seems to be that there is purity lost in the generation of woman, who lacks the starting-point of the soul (τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχήν).

I move to the biological treatise because it sheds light on the gendered dynamics of Aristotle’s metaphysical project. The substance is the starting-point of all and has seed, and, therefore, it is the male imbued with soul (τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχήν) (Arist. Gen. an. 737a). This is the substance that manifests and repeats and changes its material composition, as it cycles through generations. As things are generated and gain temporal distance from the moment of

³ My translation follows Reeve’s.
original production, on the other hand, the feminine is involved, in the coming to be. From these initial observations, we may draw the larger conclusion that what Aristotle depicts is a process of repetition and differentiation and that the feminine is associated with and drives a method of predication. The being of a house or human subject, for instance, is differentiated, predicated and defined by parts or elements that belong to it and comprise a material structure:

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\text{ἐπεὶ δὲ δὲὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ υπάρχειν τὸ εἰναι, δήλον δὴ ὅτι τὴν ὕλην ζητεῖ διὰ τί <τί> ἐστιν· οἶον
οἰκία ταῦτα διὰ τί; ὅτι υπάρχει δὴ ἣν οἰκία εἶναι. καὶ ἂν-
θρωπος τοῦτο, ἢ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τοῦτο ἔχον. ὡστε τὸ αἴτιον
ζητεῖται τῆς ὕλης (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ εἴδος) ὃ τι ἐστίν. (Arist. Metaph. 1041b.)
\]

[But since the existence [of the subject] and also the belonging [of the predicate to it] must be the case, it is clear, accordingly, that what we are inquiring into is why the matter is something. For example, why are these things a house? Because the being for house belongs to them. Why is this—or rather this body in this state—a human? Thus what is being looked for is the cause in virtue of which the matter is something—and this is the form.]

Following this logic, we might say that the feminine is predicated of the masculine, which is not predicated of anything else since it is the archē and soul. In this way, the female is like a male with a deformity (πεπηρωμένον) since the second sex is derived and loses soul. It cannot be being or form (τὸ εἴδος), and the feminine would signals change itself, the progress of time from a pure, original starting-point.

I dwell on these moments in Aristotle because they provide examples of correspondences that set us up for a closer examination of Plato, and the *Metaphysics*, in its critique, begins what will become almost a convention in the Western philosophical tradition, namely, a mode of speaking anti-Platonism. In a difficult passage, Aristotle, again, questions the separability of the Platonic forms:

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\text{Ἀλλ᾽ οἱ τὰ εἴδη λέγουσας τῇ μὲν ὥρθος λέγουσα χωρίζοντες αὐτὰ, εἰπερ
οὔσια εἰσὶ, τῇ δ᾽ οὐκ ὥρθος, ὅτι τὸ ἐν ἐπὶ πολλὸν εἴδος}
λέγουσιν. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἀποδοῦναι τίνες αἱ
Aristotelian model supports, rather than the notion of one over
ones (opposition between the imperishable ones (it's in. According to his point of view, form is not separable, on the other hand, because the λέγουσιν since by "form," they mean the one over many (χωρίζοντες αὐτά), if the forms are substances (ἐπερ οὐσία εἰσι). But they are also partly wrong, since by “form,” they mean the one over many (τῇ δ’ οὐκ ὁρθῶς, ὅτι τὸ ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἐδος λέγουσιν). It is hard to decipher the discussion exactly, but Aristotle suggests that the form is separable, in the sense that it is non-parasitic, the first cause: it is not composed of other substances (ἐστὶν οὐσία οὐδεμία ἐξ οὐσιῶν) and does not depend for its existence on the matter it’s in. According to his point of view, form is not separable, on the other hand, because the opposition between the imperishable ones (οὐσία αἱ ἄφθαρτοι) and the particular perceptible ones (τὰς καθ’ ἐκαστα καὶ αἰσθητάς), between the one and the many, is artificial. The Aristotelian model supports, rather than the notion of one over over many, that of one out of
many, where form is the way the matter composing an individual compound is organized into a functioning whole.

I will turn now to the Platonic conception of the form in order to draw comparisons and contrasts. In Plato’s *Republic*, we see to what Aristotle alludes, when he says that proponents of the form attach the word “itself” to the names of sensible things (προστιθέντες τοῖς αἴσθητοῖς τὸ ρῆμα τὸ “αὐτό”), such as “man-itself” and “house-itself” (αὐτοάνθρωπον καὶ αὐτότπον). In Book V, Plato has Socrates make a distinction between lovers of material objects and true philosophers:

> Οἱ μὲν ποι, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, φιλήκοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες τὰς τε καλὰς φονᾶς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χρόας καὶ σχήματα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἢ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι. (Pl. Resp. 476b.)

[Soc.: ‘The lovers of sights and sounds like beautiful sounds, colors, shapes, and everything fashioned out of them, but their thought is unable to see and embrace the nature of the beautiful itself.’]⁴

I will return to this passage in Chapter 2, but we can see the phenomenon that Aristotle describes and why he would attribute separability to the Platonic form and categorize it as an ideal universal. In Book VI, Plato, again, considers the thing in and of itself, the form of beauty, and has Socrates pose the question: “Can the majority in any way tolerate or accept the reality of the beautiful itself, as opposed to the many beautiful things, or the reality of each thing itself, as opposed to the corresponding many?” (αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ μη τὰ πολλὰ καλὰ, ἢ αὐτὸ τί ἐκαστὸν καὶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἐκαστά, ἢσθ’ ὅπως πλήθος ἀνέξεται ἢ ἡγήσεις εἰναι;) (Pl. Resp. 493e-494a). Finally, he equates beauty itself with the good itself, for that which is or being resides in each: “And beauty itself and good itself and all the things that we thereby set down as many, reversing ourselves, we set down according to a single form of each, believing that there is but

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⁴ My translations of the *Republic* have been adapted from Grube’s.
one, and call it ‘the being’ of each” (Καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ οὔτω περὶ πάντων ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐπιθῆμεν, πάλιν αὖ κατ’ ἱδέαν μίαν ἐκάστου ὡς μιᾶς οὕσης τιθέντες, “ὁ ἔστι” ἐκαστὸν προσαγορεύομεν) (Pl. Resp. 507b).

My position does not entail the denial of the existence of the forms altogether in Plato’s thought nor their significance, but, rather, what I am trying to show in my project is the vital interaction between what constitute two ontological domains, being and becoming, and the phenomenal experience of being in the Platonic dialogues. What Aristotle proposes as a revision and correction of the Platonic form—form as being a compound, predicated of the matter of which it is composed—this mechanism is set up by the Platonic framework, despite the binary oppositions, between forms and appearances, immateriality and materiality, stability and change, that we typically attribute to Plato. Therefore, my chapters are dedicated to those places in the dialogue, which are illustrative of the ways in which Plato assembles and disassembles his metaphysical project, and, in my opinion, this fluid process that defines the narrative arc consists in gendered change (metabolē). The feminine principle of becoming leads to a process of individuation, a series of predications, and, in this sort of chain, expresses being itself: the phenomenal world, encompassed by feminine generational and reproductive cycles, initiates and prepares us for metaphysical transcendence. The Platonic forms are not distant and separate, as Aristotle suggests, but they ever exert their presence in the physical world, in the appearance of light (φῶς) (Pl. Resp. 507d), for instance, in the case of the good.

II. Methodology

In my project, I have written on those places and themes, which, in my view, escape and complicate dualistic tensions. For this reason, I deeply disagree with Blair’s position in \textit{Plato’s}
Dialectic on Woman, in which she tries to locate and to build a coherent conception of woman along the Platonic corpus, and align myself with someone like Pelosi, who has recently shown the privileged position that music has in Plato’s philosophy, where music elides Plato’s dualism of body and soul. In regards to the Timaeus, he draws the conclusion that “…the ontological and moral hierarchy between the elements of the soul is projected within the body space, which presents itself as a physical system conceived to take in a complex psychic structure” (86). In the study that I provide, I want to continue to press the tension and paradox, the area of intersection between psychic and physical and, particularly, how phenomenal experiences, intimacy with the corporeal, cultivates mastery over the senses. It is my aim, in this project, to show that achieving this state of perfection or transcendence is only momentary, and that it is comprised by a series of stages or sequential steps in what amounts to a physical and psychic climb.

With this target in mind, I have organized my chapters in such a way as to enhance Plato’s dynamic project and to foreground the vitalism of his thought, the aesthetics of politics. In the first chapter, I focus on the utopian paradigms that we find in the Republic and the Laws, kallipolis and Magnesia, respectively. I provide a reading of Republic Book V, specifically, where Plato has Socrates enter into the feminine or “womanly drama” (Pl. Resp. 451c) of the performance and advances controversial arguments in three waves, for granting the same education for guardian men and women and the incorporation of philosopher-queens into the

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5 Blair pushes back against “…the widespread reaction of commentaries judging his work on woman as contradictory, inconsistent, or erratic” and advances a consistent vision rooted in Platonic dualism:

The analysis above shows clearly what handicaps Plato’s conception of woman by revealing her as the temporary situation of a soul on a pilgrimage to a better life where sexual differentiation, identified with the body, is left behind. Thus, Plato’s anthropological dualism of body and soul becomes fundamental in understanding and evaluating his conception of woman, and should be the starting point for any criticism.

The principal effect of anthropological dualism is to split woman into a soul, equal to man’s soul and asexual, and a body, dismissed as inferior and merely a sign of her moral inferiority, a view arrived at by using as a standard man’s body and virtues, Plato’s only ideal of the human being (202).
ideal city. It is in this chapter that I evaluate “Plato’s feminism,” views towards female nature and how they shift from the *Republic* to the *Laws*. In Magnesia, too, we will see the participation of women in politics, but marriage is retained as a public institution, and the primary interlocutor, who is not Socrates, but called the Athenian Stranger, makes concessions for the existence of sexual difference. In Plato’s construction of these political models, I locate the feminine principle of becoming in liquid matter, waves and the sea and argue that the seascape interacts with the landscape, mother earth, in the utopian community, which fosters particular ways of living and being.

My second chapter, “In the Realm of the Senses,” centers on the phenomenon of *metabolē* or change in *Republic* Book VIII. It is interesting to me that the previous books of the dialogue are dedicated to building the ideal city, what is a “beautiful city” (*kallipolis*), but Socrates tells us that even such a constitution is subject to fade away and degeneration (Pl. *Resp.* 546a-d). In order to explain the process of change, Socrates relies on a feminine presence and invokes the Muses, who oversee what becomes of the *kallipolis*, as it declines into other forms, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and, finally, tyranny. I have asked why the feminine frame is brought into play at this particular moment and the female voice, as Diotima is in the *Symposium* and Aspasia in the *Menexenus*. With regards to the latter presence, Loraux has argued that Plato, by attributing the funeral oration to the woman Aspasia, is “…using the resources of comedy” and that “[t]here can be no doubt that the introduction of a feminine element into an eminently male procedure is yet another way of discrediting the funeral oration” (1986: 323). A parallel movement occurs in Socrates’ tale of decline, that is, an injection of the feminine into the narrative, and I argue that it is a necessary move because *metabolē* consists in a ladder of becoming, reproductive cycles, and portrays generational change, which depends on and is
driven by the quintessential feminine task: pregnancy, maternity and childbirth.

In the third chapter, “Untitled,” I locate a similar trajectory in Laws Book III, where the Athenian Stranger embarks on a historical survey, by providing a history of various cities and political systems that risen and fallen, in other words, have undergone metabolē. In what amounts to both an overarching and selective review, he starts from the primitive era, after the event of a deluge, which washes away and destroys human civilizations, and moves to the more recent past, in his treatment of the Persian monarchy and Athenian democracy. In this way, Plato has the Athenian provide lessons from history and takes an inductive approach to constructing the second-best city, known as Magnesia, second-best because it is not inhabited by gods or a number of the children of gods, but still ideal because the city’s laws impose the greatest possible unity in the state (Pl. Leg. 739d-e). I argue that, in contrast to Republic Book VIII, the Athenian’s account is not a decline narrative but, rather, portrays the generation of politics, in the interactions that take place between man and the world, the matter of his surroundings. This process of association defines what Deleuze calls “dialectical difference,” a term on which I will elaborate in the chapter.

Finally, in the last chapter, “Goodbye to Language,” I turn to the chōra in the Timaeus, a concept that has continued to intrigue numerous modern theorists such as Levinas, Derrida and Kristeva. As opposed to passive space, I reconceptualize the chōra and recast it in the vitalist framework. Through this lens, we might better understand why it is a “third type” (Pl. Tī. 52a), an intensive space that acts as the container for active and passive objects and provides the medium for change, eluding the active/passive binary opposition. As the nurse of the generated world (Pl. Tī. 51a-b), the maternal chōra is directly associated with the realm of becoming and generates new ontological realities, political backgrounds. I zoom into the language that Plato uses to describe the chōra and trace other choratic apparatuses that persist into the temporal,
political period. It is my view that the *chōra* serves as the principal cause of *metabolē* and deposes, by flattening out, the metaphysical hierarchy that Platonic dualism supports.

My project thus has it in view to put the spotlight on an immense tension and on a certain vulnerability in Plato’s thought: despite the privileging of being over becoming, forms over appearances, the masculine over the feminine, the dialogues themselves and the utopian paradigms that they contain constitute mimetic productions, rendered by language. I use the theoretical apparatus to highlight this paradox and to understand the complex becomings, which are fostered by the third type, understood to be choratic processes. In my opinion, this approach allows us to keep track of two streams of discourse that are alive in the political dialogues: ironic blame of the degraded member that composes the set of the binary opposition, namely, the feminine, and, simultaneously, paradoxical praise of the feminine that ensues. It is my belief that theoretical applications illuminate new shades of Plato’s thinking, and I respond to the vitalist critique, in particular, because it is my aim to illustrate the dialectic between the past and the present. For this reason, the work of Ober and Lane resonates with my own; they probe ancient theoretical concepts and show how they have informed and departed from modern and contemporary treatments.⁶

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I. The Affective Turn

In his seminars, « Platon aujourd’hui ! », Badiou dubs the twentieth century the century of “anti-Platonism:” « ce siècle a été le siècle de l’antiplatonisme » (Sém. 2007-2008). He identifies six strains of anti-Platonism: the vitalist, analytic, Marxist, existentialist, Heideggerian and “ordinary political philosophy.” Nietzsche, Bergson and Deleuze are representatives of the first camp: they impute to Plato a hostility towards “becoming,” the sensible domain. He is presented as a “priest” who poses the primacy of the immobile, the realm of the forms and intelligible. Such a position is problematic because, for the vitalists, the realm of becoming coincides with the real itself. Nietzsche is particularly hostile; il faut « guérir de la maladie-Platon ».

I focus on this critique in particular because, in my examination of Plato, I turn away from the “Derridean/linguistic turn” and situate my work within the “affective turn,” one of the currents in critical theory. By “Derridean,” I mean the post-structuralist impulse to reverse Platonistic hierarchies: the hierarchies between the intelligible and the sensible, between being and becoming, between subject and object and, finally, between male and female. Affect, on the other hand, eludes binary distinctions and “…marks a body’s belonging to a world of encounters or; a world’s belonging to a body of encounters but also, in non-belonging, through those far sadder (de)compositions of mutual in-compossibilities” (Seigworth and Gregg 2010b: 2). Vitalism is the theoretical apparatus through which I explore gender, the body and the feminine in Plato’s thought. A vitalist ontology, and by “ontology,” I mean the study of essence or
existence, infuses being with a living force or energy—what Bergson calls élan vital—so that being’s fundamental nature is found in becoming. New-Materialism is one of the expressions of the “affective turn.” In Vibrant Matter, a classic book on the subject, Bennett turns her attention to “thing power” and argues for a vital materialism. Her object-oriented ontology reframes the subject/object question by challenging the humanist view of this relation; through relationality, one object senses the specific parts of another object’s “allure” germane for the first object’s purposes and contexts.

In this chapter, I will demonstrate that major elements of the Deleuzian critical assemblage are already present in two of major dialogues, the Republic and the Laws. In order to begin this discussion, I will first introduce and define the critical vocabulary that I will use in my examination of Platonic subjectivity, the female body and the political relation. It is my view that the application of these various theoretical concepts proves being both a fruitful and constructive exercise because they act like a magnifying glass and offer various lenses and prisms with which to look at the primary material. That is, Deleuze’s vitalism provides a good model for the utopian paradigms that we find in Plato’s political dialogues and has a heuristic power: we better understand the texts, if we read them through this prism. What will then be illuminated, through this heuristic model, is a vital network of collective becoming and a series of experiences.

The central term for my reading will be the Deleuzian agencement or “assemblage,” which evolves from and gains predominance over an earlier concept that is deployed in his work, the simulacrum, after the publication of Difference and Repetition, and I will expand on the simulacrum next. Drawing on his thought, Bennett sees assemblages as aggregates of interacting bodies and forces, which interact with other assemblages to form larger networks of agency: “In emphasizing the ensemble nature of action and the interconnections between persons and things,
a theory of vibrant matter presents individuals as simply incapable of bearing full responsibility for their effects” (37). Agency becomes a social phenomenon, where the limits of sociality are expanded to include all material bodies participating in the relevant assemblage, “…in a dense network of relations” (Bennett 13). The self, as an assemblage, has a much broader set of interests than previously thought because there is no clear demarcation of what constitutes one’s “own” body and, furthermore, encounters the world as a swarm of vibrant materials entering and leaving agentic assemblages. A vital theory of politics would then seek to transform the divide between speaking subjects and mute objects into a set of differential tendencies and variable capacities (Bennett 108).

Within what I identify to be the Platonic assemblage, we will find the presence of simulacra. Following Nietzsche, Deleuze presents his philosophy as an “inverted Platonism” and develops the problem of the simulacrum to maintain this. The simulacrum is an imitation or copy and, in the Platonic sense, an appearance, which differs from the original form, model or its essence. In “Plato and the Simulacrum,” Deleuze raises the status of these reproductions or phantoms:

So ‘to reverse Platonism’ means to make the simulacra rise and to affirm their rights among icons and copies. The problem no longer has to do with the distinction Essence-Appearance or Model-Copy. This distinction operates completely within the world of representation. Rather, it has to do with undertaking the subversion of this world—the ‘twilight of the idols.’ The simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbors a positive power which denies the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction. At least two divergent series are internalized in the simulacrum—neither can be assigned as the original, neither as the copy. It is not even enough to invoke a model of the Other, for no model can resist the vertigo of the simulacrum. There is no longer any privileged point of view except that of the object common to all points of view. There is no possible hierarchy, no second, no third…The non-hierarchized work is a condensation of coexistences and a simultaneity of events. It is the triumph of the false pretender. It simulates at once the father, thepretender, and the fiancé in a superimposition of masks (1990: 262).

Instead of dividing the world between an actual reality and its unreal virtual copy, Deleuze argues for a world of simulacra. There is not an original life that is then varied or copied in
different versions; each event of life is already other than itself and not original: it is a simulation, creation becoming and difference.

We can also conceive of these simulacra as bodies, understood in the broadest possible sense, including all living and non-living things—bodies that are merely copies of copies (Poxon and Stivale 68)—and thus their existence in the utopian model would mean that they participate in a certain kind of subjectivity. The subject, first of all, is a modern concept, which follows on from the “death of God.” If we no longer assume a level of transcendence, where God, Being and Truth reside, then we have to explain how our world presents itself as a meaningful, lawful and ordered unity (Colebrook 2002: 72). In the words of Sartre, if God does not exist, man is condemned to be free because he “…carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders; he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being” (553). In contrast to the Cartesian view of subjectivity, expressed by his famous ‘cogito—’ I think, therefore I am—where experience is given to a subject (Colebrook 2002: 72), Deleuze takes after the existentialist school when he argues that there just ‘is’ experience, without subjects or objects, inside or outside. This is a plane of material “immanence,” a pure flow of life and perception without any distinct perceivers. We do not begin as subjects who then have to know a world; there is experience and from this experience we form an image of ourselves as distinct subjects (Colebrook 2002: 74). In other words, existence precedes essence. Vitalism in general appeals to a life force or spirit that infuses otherwise inert matter (Colebrook 2010: 152), so, within this framework, the subject disappears; subject and object tend to coincide, and they exist in a system of change and in created territories that bring elements together.

What these concepts stress is the fundamental idea of vitalist thought that the body affects and is affected by its environment, impersonal experience and perception. It participates in
“…the iterative intra-activity of the world in its becoming” (Barad 823) and exists “…in a messy, complicated, resistant, brute world of materiality, a world regulated by the exigencies, the forces, of space and time” (Grosz 2). In the face of these dynamic processes, multiplicities and affects, which constitute matter itself, we can think of all life as a series of “foldings,” with each cell or organism being produced by creating an interior and exterior from the flow or milieu of life (Colebrook 2002: 75). Deleuze locates the invention of the fold to the Baroque period and sets it against the hierarchical, unidirectional metaphysical structure of Platonic forms:

…the Baroque world, as Wölfflin has shown, is organized according to two vectors: a sinking downward and an upward pull. It is Leibniz who permits the coexistence of the heavy system’s tendency to find its equilibrium at the lowest possible point, there where the sum of masses can descend no farther, with the tendency to rise, the highest aspiration of a weightless system, to that place where souls are destined to become reasonable, as in a painting by Tintoretto. The fact that one is metaphysical and concerns the soul, and that the other is physical and concerns bodies, does not prevent the two vectors from composing one and the same world, one and the same house. And not only are they separated off as functions of an ideal line actualized in one story and realized in the other, but a higher correspondence ceaselessly relates them to each other. This kind of house architecture is not a constant of art or thought. What is specifically Baroque is this distinction, this partitioning into two stories. The Platonic tradition knew a distinction between two worlds. It knew the world of innumerable stories, tracing a descent and a climb that confronted each other on every step of a stairway which lost itself in the eminence of the One and fell apart into the sea of the multiple—the stairway-universe of the neo-Platonic tradition. But the world of only two stories, separated by a fold which reverberates on both sides in accordance with different orders, is the preeminent Baroque innovation. It expresses the transformation of the cosmos into ‘mundus’ (1991: 234-235).

What the “fold” suggests is a materialist metaphysics, as opposed to the immaterial one, which is traditionally attributed to Plato: in this context, all matter, living and non-living, is composed of matter that is variously folded, even the soul. That is, folds assure a strange but indeed physical communication between matter and soul: they take the form of veins in marble that resemble an “undulating lake full of fish” (Deleuze 1991: 229). The veins are innate ideas in the soul, like folded figures or virtual statues that can be extracted from a block of veined stone. Body and soul are marbled in different ways (Conley 2011: 176), but they are co-extensive and coexist in their co-presence. The fold allows the world to be placed within the subject (as monad) so that the subject can be in and of the world at large: “It is the torsion that constitutes the fold of the world
and of the soul” (Deleuze 2006: 26). The fold thus grants a decisive opening for the subject and its subjectivation: the soul, the elusive object of modern philosophy, now becomes “the expression of the world” because “the world is what is expressed by the soul” (Conley 2011: 177).

Finally, I will now turn to Deleuze’s aesthetic works and, particularly, to his theory of cinema in *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, where we notice that the conception of art forms that is advanced also refutes the Western philosophical pedigree of Platonic debates of *mimēsis* (Colman 142). More generally, we come to the realization that cinema, as an art form, gives rise to a philosophy: according to Deleuze, it provides passageways of thought, showing itself to be a profound and sometimes rigorous surface that covers the visible world (Colman 2011: 141). In *Cinema 1*, Deleuze treats a specific type of image that is imbued with movement, a defining characteristic among the four fundamental interrelational concepts (movement, image, recognition and time) that he uses to chart a philosophy of cinema: “Movement is a translation in space,” he notes (1986: 8). Colman expands on the significance of this concept in her survey of Deleuze’s cinematic philosophy:

For Deleuze, movement in the cinema is inextricably linked to semiotic technique, habit, creativity and generative creation. He questions how the cinema communicates the movement of abstract qualities (such as thought, perception, knowledge, time and space), without assuming that the audience has a vocabulary of abstract aesthetics with which to translate. Film occupies a hyperbolic space, a ‘cinematographic network’ (C2: 237) for the assemblage and dispersal of fragments, and the creation and depiction of whole realms of experience and knowledge. Movement in the cinema is an interactive translation of complex cognitive processes, voyages of activity that can be association machines for power, flows of desire, disruption of learned cognitive processes. ‘Movement in space’, as Deleuze describes it, ‘expresses a whole which changes, rather as the migration of birds expresses a seasonal variation’ (C2: 237) (144).

The cinematic apparatus functions as a translator of the movements of images and consciousness of perception within temporal modalities of worlds (real, imagined, past, present and future) (Colman 144) and, in this way, conveys what is conceptualized to be the movement-image.
The final scene of Godard’s *Pierrot le fou* perfectly illustrates Deleuze’s movement-image and one of its subsets, the perception-image, when the film’s protagonist Ferdinand puts matches to the dynamite in which he is wrapped and dissipates into oblivion. The camera, subsequently, pans from left to right, in the panoramic shot, and captures the vast expanse that looks onto nowhere and, at the same time, eternity: the sea. The movement-image consists of three types, the perception-image, action-image and affection-image: these are realized as montage, which is the cutting and editing of a series of movements, or the linking of images within shots, and interassemblage. Deleuze starts to extrapolate Bergson’s theory of the image in *Creative Evolution* and *Matter and Memory* by explaining that the image is the equivalent of movement. IMAGE = MOVEMENT: “The image exists in itself, on this plane. This in-itself of the image is matter: not something hidden behind the image, but on the contrary the absolute identity of the image and movement. The identity of the image and movement leads us to conclude immediately that the movement-image and matter are identical” (Deleuze 1986: 59). If image is defined as the set of what appears, then there is no distinct moving thing from movement itself. All things are images, in the sense that the movements of all matter can be understood best from the perspective of imagery. The universe is thus conceived of as a network of flowing matter, which constitutes one immense picture machine. In the domain of perception or the perception-image, the set of elements acts on a center: the subjective is the way in which images in the film are organized around a distinct center (a character), while the objective disperses the center, all images being more-or-less equal.

I clarify Deleuze’s terms, “assemblage,” “simulacrum,” “fold” and “movement-image,” because I will be applying them to Plato in order to shed light on an affinity between the two thinkers. That is, I will show that these concepts already exist in Plato’s thought and, at the same
time, enhance what is suggested by the original ancient texts. Deleuze’s works on cinema, in particular, will have a profound influence on my readings, throughout the dissertation: it is my belief that a “cinematic narrative” is at work in the Platonic dialogues, and I will focus, in this chapter, on the presence of the sea, which sets the movement-image into motion. One of the three levels of the perception-image, “liquid perception,” where images flow together in a fluid dynamic, will illuminate the pivotal role that the sea plays in creating the utopian aesthetic: proximity to the sea mediates the “utopian experience” and, by extension, a cinematic existence. To continue unpacking this last statement, I mean that the liquid medium, being that it completes and refines the political paradigm, puts into question normative ideas about cities as being discretely bounded and closed and, rather, demonstrates the fluidity of these Platonic models, as systems of flows.

The application of the movement-image, then, intensifies the sensuousness of the sea, and I will argue that it is also a feminine space of mobility, change and becoming and one working component among other forces: namely, male and female bodies, which establish the “political relation,” between self and world, in a proto-Deleuzian assemblage. In terms of the Republic and the Laws, the political relation is that relation necessitated by utopian conditions and the framework, in which women are incorporated into the public sphere and the desire, which they bring, is severely managed and harnessed. In other words, these cities are ideal precisely because they assemble masses of movement, speeds and flows to meet harmonious proportions and manage that dangerous element of instability posed by the female body in order to compose a common sensibility and to achieve a beautiful political aesthetic. Thus by honing in on the feminine principle in these dialogues, we can make out vitalist notions of porous bodies and discover that the concept of the disappearing subject, formulated by various theorists as a
departure from Platonic norms and ontology, is already operative in the Platonic dialogues. To illustrate these points, I will first look at Plato’s three waves in Republic V, where Socrates presents his arguments for the creation of philosopher-queens, and move onto the Athenian Stranger’s treatment of Magnesia’s texture in the Laws. In my examination of these texts, I will also adopt a methodology, whereby grammatical gender is very significant, in the belief that in some sense it embodies the feminine.\footnote{There was considerable discussion among the sophists about the significance of grammatical gender, particularly Protagoras. Aristotle says that Protagoras classified grammatical genders (Arist. Rh. 1407b6–7) and believed that gender should be modified to fit the sense, so that “wrath” (mēnis) in the same line of Homer, which is a grammatical feminine, should be masculine, since wrath is characteristic of males rather than females (Arist. Soph. el. 173b19–20).}

II. Three Waves

In this section, I will focus on Socrates’ three controversial proposals that we find in Republic Book V and argue that, in the mobile process of constituting and assembling the utopian assemblage, Plato portrays a cinematic sequence, but first I will review the contents of Book V and how they relate to the dialogue as a whole. This specific book delves into the living conditions and lifestyle choices of the guardians in the ideal city, and the kallipolis is a perfect embodiment of justice, for the Republic centers on this very question, “What is justice?” (Pl. Resp. 331c). In order to define justice, Socrates describes justice in the city to find out about the soul because the city is bigger and easier to see (Pl. Resp. 368e) and, at first, builds a just city in speech that satisfies only basic human necessities, a “city of pigs” (Pl. Resp. 372d). This model, however, fails to provide a realistic conception of the polis, so Socrates turns to the feverish or luxurious city (τρυφῶσαν πόλιν) (Pl. Resp. 372e), the healthy city on steroids; it overflows with luxuries that gratify unnecessary appetites: delicacies such as perfume, incense, prostitutes and
cakes (ὄψα ὅν καὶ μύρα καὶ θυμάματα καὶ ἐταῖραι καὶ πέμματα) (Pl. Resp. 372e-373a). Socrates proceeds to elaborate on the consequences of such luxury—war from seizing their neighbors’ land (Pl. Resp. 373d) and the need for an army (Pl. Resp. 373e) and philosophical guardians (Pl. Resp. 376c)—and realizes at a certain point that he is “purifying” the city (Pl. Resp. 399e). The act of purifying sets the origin of the ideal city, which is a beautiful city (kallipolis), because it exemplifies justice, defined as the consensus of all the three groups of people in the city – rulers, warriors and farmers/craftsmen – about their respective roles (Pl. Resp. 433a-b).

This definition of justice, in turn, necessitates a strict division of tasks: rulers must rule; warriors must fight and obey the rulers; farmers and craftsmen must serve the others and submit to the orders of the rulers. Categories remain fixed, and they are set from birth, reinforced by the Noble Lie (Pl. Resp. 415a-c), which states that people are born with a certain metal in their soul – gold, silver, bronze/iron – that determines the rest of their existence and also by a rigorous system of education, which is a lifelong process. Books III and IV describe in detail the guardians’ curriculum, based on training in poetry (Pl. Resp. 377b), music (Pl. Resp. 398b-399c), gymnastics (Pl. Resp. 403c-405b) in their early formative years and mathematics (Pl. Resp. 525d) and dialectic in their later ones (Pl. Resp. 532b). Education acts as a filter that separates those guardians, who are to remain warriors, and others, who will take their place as rulers of the city.

All these preliminary steps and maneuvers, garnered from moments of aporia that puncture the philosophical dialectic, set the stage for Book V, which will complete the process

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8 The Socratic method is based on elenchus, cross-examination and a question and answer format, and it thrives on a clash between two opposing points of view. The dynamics of this tension define the dialectical process, which usually results in moments of embarrassment, inconclusion, in other words, aporia or, to use Hegelian terms, “sublation” (Aufhebung). One such occurrence in the Republic is 350d, Thrasymachus’ blushing, after he advances a preliminary definition of justice as “the advantage of the stronger” (Pl. Resp. 338c), which is then strongly disproven and rejected by Socrates.
of perfecting this exemplary political form, by developing the “female drama” (Pl. Resp. 451c) of the performance. It follows from the conclusion of the male one (Pl. Resp. 451c), which refers to the argument presented in Books II-Book IV, namely, to the education of males as guardians and their cultivation of excellence, and, at this time, Socrates will expand on a previous comment that he makes about the common possession of wives and children (Pl. Resp. 423e-424a). In fact, he is pulled into this discussion, though he resists, prepared to take the conversation in another direction, towards a closer examination of another political constitution (Pl. Resp. 449d). It is my view that the moment captures the liveliness of the living conversation to which the dialogue format gives rise and illustrates the significance of contingency inherent to a particular narrative dynamic, the cinematic narrative, which is fluid, mobile and emotive. In the discussion that follows I will argue that the big central “digression” of the Republic, developed in Book V, is a kind of close-up and that it is demonstrative of cinematic cycles.

Book V of the Republic, which unfolds in three waves, presents a series of the movement-image, and I will show how this is the case in my analysis of the text. κόμα works as a signpost that marks the transition from one image to the next; Plato divides the narrative into three waves when Socrates makes the following proposals: 1. Same education for men and women (Pl. Resp. 453e-454e). 2. Community of women and children (Pl. Resp. 457b-c). 3. The philosopher-king (Pl. Resp. 472c-e). Encountering a sea of argument, Socrates and his interlocutor Glaucon, also one of Plato’s brothers, come face to face with the deep:

τοιαύτα, ἃ ἔγω πάλαι προορῶν ἐφοβούμην τε καὶ ὄκνουν ἀπέτεθαι τοῦ νόμου τοῦ περὶ τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παιδίων κτήσιν καὶ τροφήν.
Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη· οὕ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν.
Οὐ γὰρ, εἶπον. ἄλλα δὴ ὅδ’ ἔει: ἀντε τις εἰς κολυμ-βήθραν μικράν ἐμπέση ἀντε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσου, ὄμως γε νεὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον.
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
The “womanly” drama (τὸ γυναικεῖον) (Pl. Resp. 451c) introduces difference and produces aporia in the logos or dialectical process, the law concerning the possession and upbringing of women and children (τοῦ νόμου τοῦ περὶ τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παιδῶν κτῆσιν καὶ τροφήν) confuses Socrates and his interlocutor and casts them into an ocean. These two men are shipwrecked sailors; fallen into some kind of expanse, whether into a small diving pool (εἰς κολυβήθραν μικρὰν) or into the middle of the biggest sea (εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον), they must swim (ἡ ἴση νευστέον). Their only hope for an exit or “way out” (τὴν ἔξοδον) is a dolphin.
that might take them up (δελφινά τινα ἐλπίζοντας ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν) or some other difficult means of safety (τινα ἄλλην ἄπορον σωτηρίαν). The feminine component complicates what has been accomplished in the “male” or “manly drama” (ἀνδρεῖον δρᾶμα) (Pl. Resp. 451c), in which the nature of justice, education and duties of the guardians have already been discussed, and Socrates describes the quality of courage they are to have.

The juxtaposition of these two dramas, male and female, demonstrates the motions of the narrative arc, and each section comprises an image, which connects and is connected by a series. What takes place in this scene is essentially the perception-image deployed in Godard: the “I” that initially speaks and represents the distinct center, Socrates in this case who “foresees” and “fears” (προορῶν ἐφοβού μην), evolves into an impersonal “someone” (τις) and, after falling (ἐμπέσῃ), is dis-centered, by dissipating into and fusing, or entering into a relation, with what surrounds him, his environment: it is necessary “for us” to swim (ἡμῖν νευστέον) and to try “to be saved” (πειρατέον σῴζεσθαι). In this way, Plato creates a sequence that portrays the transition from the subjective point of view of Socrates to the external world of his metaphorical surroundings: a little swimming-bath (κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν) or the biggest ocean (μέγιστος πέλαγος), in which he would hope to find a passing dolphin (δελφῖν). By making these kinds of abrupt shifts, from the masculine section to the feminine one, and from inner to outer, Plato, in effect, deploys a cinematic technique: such gaps that are produced between two scenes or “shots” comprise what Deleuze calls the movement-image in *Cinema 1* or the “image of movement” that links up with others. I find this theoretical concept both relevant and useful because it brings into focus a certain animation at play and elucidates how different elements and things in the world assemble or disassemble and create territories or deterritorialize.

In addition, the application of Deleuze’s perception-image sheds light on the kind of
subjectivity that is portrayed in the Republic, first by Socrates and, subsequently, by his
description of guardian women in the kallipolis. Once we locate the cinematic sequence in Plato,
disparate elements represented by each image start to appear together and to combine into a flow.
Socrates, as he falls (ἐμπέσῃ) into a pool of loss and searches for an outlet (τὴν ἔξοδον) from the
impasse, moves into the external environment: boundaries between self and other, within and
without, collapse, and the small (man-made) pool and the ocean (of nature), in effect, merge in
this passage, as he looks for some desperate means of safety (τινα ἄλλην ἄπορον σωτηρίαν).
While the position of the subject gets diminished, and the mind perceives and configures the
borders and limits of the mimetic structure of the text, this fading out accentuates the presence of
the simulacrum, a copy of a copy whose relation to the model has become so attenuated that it
loses its origin. That is, the dematerialization of Socrates makes us realize his phantom status,
inherent to the images or pseudo-photographs with which Plato composes his dialogue, and,
consequently, the phantom Socrates himself turns out to be merely a fold in the Platonic
assemblage. The simulacrum and movement-image are thus variations of each other because
they both reduce the world to subjective images and the perception of objects.

Deleuze’s simulacrum will give insight into the radical idea that Socrates introduces in
Book V, that men and women must follow the same way of life (τὰ αὐτά...δεῖν ἐπιτηδεύσαι) (Pl.
Resp. 453e); it lends a new angle and provides another avenue for approaching the scholarly
debate known as “Plato’s feminism.” I will first lay out the groundwork of this discussion before
moving on to unpack the relevancy of this theoretical concept. The paradigm for the body seems
always to be male and its inferior replica, female, a model of imperfection. All the more
surprising, then, is Socrates’ controversial proposal when he suggests that male and female
guardians must share their entire way of life in the kallipolis. “Plato’s feminism” started gaining
attention with the feminist scholarship of the 1970’s. Some scholars have located the origins of “feminism” in his thought. Wender, for example, tries to reconcile his misogyny, on the one hand, and “scattered feminist seed,” on the other (86). She concludes in “Plato: Misogynist, Paedophile, and Feminist,” “He did not like or admire us [women]. But he felt it would be just and expedient to give us a chance” (90). Scholars (Fortenbaugh, Brown and Lesser) have continued to defend his “feminist” stance, while still yet others (Annas, Vlastos and Okin) have denied that Plato has a feminist stance.

Other scholars such as Cohen and Saunders have focused on women in the Laws, and Calvert, Osborne, Lange and Levin have traced Plato’s evolving attitude towards women from the Republic to the Laws (Calvert 52). The latter issue is embedded within a larger point of contention in Plato scholarship—developmentalism, represented by Klosko, Morrow, Bobonich, Laks and Brisson vs. unitarianism, propounded by Shorey, Annas and Pradeau—to which I will return in my discussion of Magnesia later on in this chapter. The latter camp reaffirms the constant unity of Plato’s thought throughout his career, yet if we consider the shift in Plato’s view of women from the Republic to the Laws, it would support the position that development takes place in his corpus. In the same way that Plato moves from the best city to the second-best city between these two dialogues, from Socrates as the primary interlocutor to the Athenian Stranger, his opinions about female nature similarly change and subscribe to more mainstream ancient conceptions of the female. When the Athenian blames nurses and mothers for the loss of ambidexterity, lame-handedness (χωλοί), though the natural potential of each arm is about the same (Pl. Leg. 794e), such a remark would seem to suggest that Plato is not a feminist.

I will revisit this debate, “Plato’s feminism,” and make an intervention, by first providing a close reading of Socrates’ arguments in Republic Book V. With respect to the portrayal of
guardian women of the *kallipolis*, Saxonhouse has pointed out that they are “de-sexed females:”

“The women who enter the rank of the guardian class in Book V of the *Republic* are almost without body and, more important, free from eros. They are neither the desired nor the desiring” (1994: 68). The female’s reproductive role—her individual *physis*—is minimized, and she is destroyed as woman in order to participate in politics (Saxonhouse 1994: 75). In his consideration of sex roles, Socrates turns to an argument from nature—*for one has to consider every form of difference and sameness in nature* (πάντως τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἕτεραν φύσιν) (Pl. Resp. 454c)—and reaches the following conclusion:

"Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν γένος, ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς τέχνην τινὰ ἢ ἄλλο ἐπιτήδευμα διαφέρον φαίνηται, τούτῳ δὴ φήσομεν ἐκατέρω δεῖν ἀποδιδόναι· ἐὰν δ’ αὐτῷ τούτῳ φαίνηται διαφέρειν, τῷ τὸ μὲν θήλυ τίκτειν, τῷ δὲ ἄρρεν ὀρφεῖν, οὐδὲν τί παραφήσωμεν μᾶλλον ἀποδε- δεῖχθαι ὡς πρὸς θ’ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν διαφέρειν γυνὴ ἀνδρός, ἄλλ’ ἐτὶ οἰσάμεθα δεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τοὺς τε φύλακας ἡμῖν καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν. (Pl. Resp. 454d-e.)"

[Soc.: ‘Therefore,’ I said, ‘if the male sex is seen to be different from the female with regard to a particular craft or any other pursuit, we will say that the relevant one must be assigned to it. But if it is clear that they differ in this very respect, that the female bears children while the male begets them, we will say that no kind of proof has been shown that women are different from men with respect to what we discuss, but we will believe that our guardians and their wives must have the same way of life.’]

Guardian men and women must share the same pursuits (δεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τοὺς τε φύλακας ἡμῖν καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν), Socrates says; their souls resemble one another (Pl. Resp. 454c-d). These women are akin to the men in nature (γυναῖκες ἃρα αἱ τοιαῦται…συγγενεῖς αὐτοῖς τὴν φόσιν) (Pl. Resp. 456b) and should receive the same education in music, poetry and physical training. As guardians, male and female groups, indistinguishable, overlap into one category. In depth, intrinsically, the two are grounded in difference: they differ in this very respect, that the female bears children, while the male begets them and “mounts” (ἐὰν δ’ αὐτῷ
τούτῳ φαίνεται διαφέρειν, τῷ τὸ μὲν θῆλυ τίκτειν, τῷ δὲ ἄρρεν ὑφεῖν). I will continue to respond to Saxonhouse’s view and argue that the principle of gendered difference, “becoming-other,” and the desire with which it is associated play a greater role in Socrates’ discussion and pose a serious threat to the permanence of the ideal city.

It follows from the way that guardian women are portrayed that they are made into replicas of their male counterparts and work like carbon copies. At the same time, we know that they are doubles, which introduce sexual difference into the city. Socrates wavers between two views: on the one hand, philosopher kings and queens share the same nature, yet, on the other, females, he admits, are weaker:

Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν πόλιν διοικοῦσιν γυναικῶς διότι γυνὴ, οὐδὲ ἄνδρός διότι ἄνήρ, ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως διεσπάρμεναι αἱ φύσεις ἐν ἀμφότεροι καὶ πάντων μὲν μετέχει γυνὴ ἐπιτηδευμάτων κατὰ φύσιν, πάντων δὲ ἄνήρ, ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ἀσθενέστερον γυνὴ ἄνδρός. (Pl. Resp. 455d-e.)

[Soc.: ‘Then there is no way of life, dear one, concerned with the management of the city that belongs to a woman because she’s a woman or to a man because he’s a man, but the various natures are distributed in the same way in both creatures, and women share by nature in every way of life just as men do, but in all of them women are weaker than men.’]

The statement betrays a loose end in Plato’s argument: women share by nature in every way of life just as men do (πάντων μὲν μετέχει γυνὴ ἐπιτηδευμάτων κατὰ φύσιν, πάντων δὲ ἄνήρ), yet they are still weaker (ἀσθενέστεροι). Socrates makes the same move when he considers their philosophical nature: men and women are by nature the same with respect to guarding the kallipolis, except to the extent that one is weaker and the other stronger (Pl. Resp. 456a). It would seem, at first blush, that Plato expresses a feminist sentiment when he allocates equal tasks for both sexes, but, because they stand in a certain relation, which is defined by masked difference, he cannot be an advocate for women, in and of themselves. That is, due to their status
as simulacra, as mere shadows, philosopher-queens, like Socrates earlier (Pl. Resp. 453d-e),
recede into their surroundings, implemented by Plato like a tool to arrange the scenery of his
utopian set-up. Precisely the recognition of their difference, that one is stronger and the other,
weaker, attests to his “non-feminism.”

In this way, Plato builds a world with simulacra, and what we start to witness is a method
of construction and an operation of assembling the ideal blueprint, which would promote a
certain kind of subjectivity. In this model, a counter-example to the organization of Greek
society (Ernoult 173), because it is an inversion, Socrates emphasizes nature and what is
“natural” in order to incorporate women into the public sphere:

Καὶ γυναίκες ἄρα αἱ τοιαῦται τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδράσιν ἐκλεκτέαι συνοικεῖν τε καὶ συμφιλάττειν, ἐπείπερ εἰσιν ἰκαναὶ καὶ συγγενεῖς αὐτοῖς τὴν φύσιν.
Πάνυ γε.
Τὰ δ’ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποδοτέα ταῖς αὐταῖς φύσεσιν:
Τὰ αὐτά.

"Ἡκομεν ἄρα εἰς τὰ πρότερα περιφερόμενοι, καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξὶ μουσικῆν τε καὶ γυμναστικῆν ἀποδίδοναι.
Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.
Οὐκ ἄρα ἀδύνατα γε οὐδὲ εὐχαῖς ὁμοιὰ ἐνομοθετοῦμεν,
ἐπείπερ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπίθεμεν τὸν νόμον· ἄλλα τὰ νῦν παρὰ ταῦτα γιγνόμενα παρὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔοικε, γίγνεται.
"Εοίκεν. (Pl. Resp. 456a-c.)

[Soc.: ‘Then women of this sort must be chosen along with men of the same sort
to live with them and share their guardianship, since they are adequate for the task
and akin to the men in nature.’
Gl.: ‘Certainly.’
Soc.: ‘And mustn’t we assign the same way of life to the same natures?’
Gl.: ‘The same.’
Soc.: ‘We’ve come round, then, to what we said before and have agreed that it
isn’t against nature to assign an education in music, poetry, and physical training
to the wives of the guardians.’
Gl.: ‘Absolutely.’
Soc.: ‘Then we’re not legislating impossibilities or indulging in mere wishful
thinking, since the law we established is in accord with nature. But it’s rather the
way things are at present that seems to be against nature.’
Gl.: ‘So it seems.’

In the first wave, Socrates basically engages in an exercise of producing woman, and she is the utopian woman: herself an assemblage of impersonal and political intensities informed by an education in music, poetry and physical training (μουσικὴν τὲ καὶ γυμναστικήν) and based on a specific way of life, which includes military training and the cultivation of virtue, namely, courage. Thus by having women enter into politics, Plato, redefines femininity in terms of masculinity and reshapes or sculpts the female body: becoming other than itself, it simulates, copies and offers a doubled image of the male body, and they live together and share their guardianship (συνοικεῖν τὲ καὶ συμφυλάττειν). In a place of cohabitation, male and female bodies, which constitute individual blocks of becoming, with their flowing sensations and perceptions, then merge to form a collection of bodies and to organize themselves into a network of political experience.

This is to say that feminine physis matches up to the ways things are in the greater world.

In order to maintain his position, Socrates first argues that women displaying the qualities of a guardian are akin to the men in nature (συγγενεῖς αὐτοῖς τὴν φύσιν). From this premise, he concludes that the same natures (ταῖς αὐταῖς φύσεις) merit the same tasks (ἐπιτηδεύματα…τὰ αὐτὰ), and Socrates critiques his contemporary context: “But it’s rather the way things are at present that seems to be against nature” (ἄλλα τὰ νῦν παρὰ ταῦτα γιγνόμενα παρὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔοικε, γίγνεται). At it is now, their way of life, always “becoming” (γίγνεται), contradicts nature (παρὰ φύσιν). As a way of resolving this tension, Socrates, consequently, establishes a natural law that will display the perfect coincidence between nature and culture, a law that accords with nature (κατὰ φύσιν…τὸν νόμον). By receiving the same education as guardian men, women of this type, are accommodated by a dynamic system, one that would seem to facilitate...
the complex interplay between biology and culture.

That it has this capacity to combine and to harmonize various components suggests that the *kallipolis* is already a Deleuzian assemblage. I explicitly mention this term because it allows us to perceive what is at stake in Plato’s utopian project: the vital processes at play in this ideal political form, which has integrated the female body into its network, and how these material forces meet in a series of experiences. Socrates describes what this world would look like when he rounds off the first wave with an image of guardian women exercising in the nude:

Ἀποδυτέον δὴ ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν, ἐπειπέρ ἀρετήν ἀντὶ ιματίων ἀμφιέσονται, καὶ κοινωνητέον πολέμου τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης φυλακῆς τῆς περὶ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα πρακτέον· τούτοις δ’ αὐτῶν τὰ ἐλαφρότερα ταῖς γυναιξίν ἢ τοῖς ἀνδράσι πολέμου διὰ τὴν γένους ἀσθένειαν. ὃ δὲ γελῶν ἀνήρ ἐπὶ γυμναίς γυναιξί, τοῦ βελτίστου ἕνεκα γυμναῖμαινας, ἀπελή τοῦ γελοῖου σοφίας δρέπων καρπῶν, οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφ’ ὃ γελάτων αὐτῶν ὁ πρᾶττει· κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὑφέλιμον καλὸν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρὸν. (Pl. Resp. 457a-b.)

[Soc.: ‘Then the guardian women must strip for physical training, since they will wear virtue instead of clothes. They must share in war and the other guardians’ duties in the city and do nothing else. But in these very duties the lighter parts must be assigned to women rather than to men because of the weakness of their sex. And the man, who laughs at naked women during physical training for the sake of what is best is ‘plucking the unripe fruit’ of laughter and does not know, it seems, what he’s laughing at or what he’s doing. For it is and always will be the finest saying that the beneficial is beautiful, while the harmful is ugly.’]

This is a telling passage for evaluating “Plato’s feminism:” guardian women are implicated in this model, but the impersonal passive structure (Ἀποδυτέον… ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν) and verbal adjectives, κοινωνητέον and πρακτέον, imply that they lose their agency. They exercise, train and shape their bodies in order to prepare for war (πολέμου), yet, at the same time, Socrates admits that their duties should be “lighter” (τὰ ἐλαφρότερα), due to their frailty “as a class” (διὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀσθένειαν). He thus lays out the structure of an intensive, inclusive system, which makes concessions for human physiology, but it will continue to place limitations on the
female body; a theory of gender does not necessarily support a feminist stance.

In fact, a fourth-century spectator would laugh (γελῶν) at the sight of naked women training in public because it is ridiculous and counterintuitive. This sort of man presumably lacks the mental facilities to understand what he sees: he does not know what he laughs at or what he is doing (οὔδὲν οἶδεν... ἔφ᾽ ὅ γελᾷ οὐδὲ ὅτι πρᾶττει). But this kind of response is very interesting because it conveys an emotion, feeling or affect, which is initially provoked by a woman’s presence. The situation, in effect, casts him into the position of an observer, as if he were a spectator in the theater, and he is watching a particular genre of drama—comedy—for he is laughing. In my opinion, there is a strong association between the comic theater and the female, and I will expand on this observation in my discussion of Aristophanes’ *Ecclesiasuzae*, and thus between laughter as a sensation and the feminine: the female body, as it evokes laughter, prompts emanations, sounds and waves of laughter. The affective experience of laughter is another place where we can locate the feminine principle of becoming other and change that moves towards the beauty of the *kallipolis*, which incorporates the female body so as for it to melt away and to contribute to a common aesthetic. By stripping, these women wear virtue (ἀρετήν... ὁμοφυλόσωνται) and, by imparting their utility to the city, maximize the city’s aesthetic appeal; Plato has Socrates explain that what is beneficial is also beautiful (ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀφέλιμον καλόν).

Such provocative proposals concerning guardian women are made in waves, what comprise a cinematic movement, a gendered movement, and they drive the process of Plato’s construction. I am drawing attention to the significance of this liquid imagery because it heightens the various material phenomena that work in concert with one another to compose what will be a multiplicity of heterogeneous objects, that is, the utopian assemblage. More
exactly, the principle of vibrant liquidity functions together with the feminine space of the earth, most often assimilated with the female in Greek thought,\footnote{Cf. Bergren 2008b.} as it is in Plato, explicitly in the Noble Lie (Pl. Resp. 414c-415c), where “mother earth” delivers her children, who are first-born male citizens (Pl. Resp. 414e). The combination of these separate parts creates fluid and dynamic systems, and there is a specific effect that results from the interaction between these two landscapes: the wave, as it passes, refines the matter of the earth and land, and this is another way in which binary oppositions and distinctions, between sea and land collapse, in the category of the feminine. In fact, these boundaries dissipate for the very reason that they always turn other. By tracing the movements of the feminine principle in the dialogue, we make out the borders and delineations of the vital framework and simultaneously perceive how these discrete entities collaborate with one another and unite.

*Republic* Book V, in particular, puts the liquid clarifying procedure on display—the principle of becoming other, the process of transforming and feminine flow—where we start to notice a correspondence between women and waves. In the second wave, Socrates describes the community of women and children and illustrates how this fluid and flexible mass will reformulate constructions of the land and human relationships:

\begin{verbatim}
Τοῦτο μὲν τοῖνυν ἐν ὡσπερ κῦμα φόμεν διαφεύγειν τοῦ γυναικείου πέρι νόμου λέγοντες, ὡστε μὴ παντάπασι κατα-
κλυσθῆναι τιθέντας ὡς δὲι κοινὴ πάντα ἐπιτηδεύειν τοὺς τε
φύλακας ἡμῖν καὶ τὰς φυλακίδας, ἄλλα πη τὸν λόγον αὐτόν
αὐτῷ ὑμολογεῖσθαι ὡς δυνατὰ τε καὶ ὑφέλιμα λέγει;
Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὐ σημικρὸν κῦμα διαφεύγεις.
Φήσεις γε, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, οὐ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὅταν τὸ μετὰ
τοῦτο ἴδῃς.
Λέγε δὴ, ἐδώ, ἔφη.
Τούτῳ, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἔπεται νόμος καὶ τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν τοῖς
ἀλλοις, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ὅδε.
Τίς;
Τὰς γυναῖκας ταύτας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων πάντων πάσας
\end{verbatim}
εἶναι κοινὰς, ιδία δὲ μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν συνοικεῖν· καὶ τοὺς παῖδας αὐ κοινοὺς, καὶ μήτε γονέα ἐκγονον εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτὸν μήτε παῖδα γονέα.

Πολὺ, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἐκείνου μεῖξον πρὸς ἀπιστίαν καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ πέρι καὶ τοῦ ωφελίμου.

Ὅκ οἶμαι, ἥν δ’ ἐγώ, περί γε τοῦ ωφελίμου ἀμφισβήτησθαι ἢν, ὡς οὐ μεγίστον ἀγαθὸν κοινὰς μὲν τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι, κοινοὺς δὲ τοὺς παῖδας, εἰπερ οἶδον τε· ἄλλ’ οἶμαι περὶ τοῦ εἰ δυνατὸν ἢ μὴ πλείστην ἃν ἀμφισβήτησιν γενέσθαι. (Pl. Resp. 457b-d.)

[Soc.: ‘Can we say, then, that we’ve escaped one wave of criticism in our discussion of the law about women, that we haven’t been altogether overwhelmed by laying it down that our male and female guardians must share their entire way of life, and that our argument is consistent when it states that this is both possible and beneficial?’

Gl.: ‘And it’s certainly no small wave,’ he said, ‘that you’ve escaped.’

Soc.: ‘You won’t think that it’s so big,’ I replied, ‘when you get a look at the next one.’

Gl.: ‘Tell me about it, and I’ll decide.’

Soc.: ‘I suppose that the following law goes along with the last one and the others that preceded it.’

Gl.: ‘Which one?’

Soc.: ‘That all these women are to belong in common to all the men, that none are to live privately with any man, and that the children, too, are to be possessed in common, so that no parent will know his own offspring or any child his parent.’

Gl.: ‘This wave is far bigger than the other, for there’s doubt both about its possibility and about whether or not it’s beneficial.’

Soc.: ‘I don’t think that its being beneficial would be disputed or that it would be denied that the common possession of women and children would be the greatest good, if indeed it is possible. But I think that there would be the greatest disagreement about whether or not it is possible.’]

As it washes over the previous discourse, the κόμα in this section works as a close-up because Plato moves from depicting physis to a very specific koinónia, and this frame, as it were, gives insight into the lifestyle of the guardians— their ἐπιτηδεύματα. In other words, it provides a zoom and signals the transition from the perception-image to the affection-image: “[t]he affection-image is the close-up, and the close-up is the face…” (Deleuze 1986: 87). I apply the concept of the affection-image because it allows us to make sense of these waves, which drive the narrative development, while they simultaneously generate confusion: Socrates suggests all
these women are to belong in common to all the men, that none are to live privately with any man, and that children, too, are to be possessed in common. After making this claim, Socrates anticipates the birth of a very large dispute: he imagines that the greatest disagreement about whether such a city is possible or not would subsequently “come into being” (περὶ τοῦ εἰ δύνατὸν ἢ μὴ πλείστην ἢν ἀμφισβήτησιν γενέσθαι). This is the product of a wave far bigger than the last (Πολύ…τοῦτο ἐκείνου μεῖζον).

A sheer mass of material, the wave represents an intense reflective surface and takes on a force of its own. First of all, the surf is not gentle, so that Socrates and his interlocutor must flee these surges of water in order to avoid being washed away, though they are not altogether inundated (μὴ παντάπασι κατακλυσθῆναι) nor defeated by the first. The second is even greater than the previous one, and Glaucon will see this for himself in the encounter; Socrates simply explains, “You will see” (ἴδῃς). With this gesture, Socrates invites him to look into a face and, by entering, to come into contact with the raw contents of sensation, the genesis of the greatest dispute born from this portrayal of the community of women and children. What makes the affection-image applicable to this moment is the idea of the zoom, for Socrates will provide a more detailed account of how arrangements are laid out in the kallipolis, the sensations and perceptions that are found here. The zoom, furthermore, closes the gap between subjective and objective points of view: the face of the wave, an object of perception, in turn offers a reflection of the observer’s own facial expression, which is one of disbelief or doubt (ἀπιστίαν), and, in this way, embodies both positions, as a third type or category.

This theoretical concept is useful because it carries the capacity to elide binary poles and illuminates the process of lyrical altering that is taking place in Book V. Namely, the affection-image brings out and helps us notice the aesthetic function of these waves: more than just
another literary trope, they exert a cathartic presence because they move and purify, at the same time that they create a disturbance, and contribute to the city’s refinement. They refine, in fact, by upsetting, in other words, by way of flux or “becoming” (γενέσθαι). Finally, what the wave as an affection-image permits us to realize is an inner experience of the subject, the change that is taking place in the philosopher as he builds the ideal city: it is a reflection of his own imagination, a product of the mind, which, in turn, will have some kind of internal, external impact on his own self. These waves, as they give birth, then open up into further space and seem to delineate the boundaries of a female body, by having the same role as a maternal womb.

If we continue to explore the second wave as an affection-image, what we see in its contours is impulsions, ripples and visceral responses, namely, corporeal agitation. While Socrates elaborates on the laws that the guardians will have to prescribe at some times and to obey at others, he brings Glaucon into the position of an imaginary lawgiver:

Σὺ μὲν τοίνυν, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς, ὀσπερ τοὺς ἀνδρὰς ἔξελεξας, οὕτω καὶ τὰς γυναίκας ἐκλέξας παραδώσεις καθ’ ὅσον οἶδον τε ὁμοφυεῖς· οἱ δὲ, ἀτε οἰκίας τε καὶ συσ-σίτια κοινὰ ἔχοντες, ἵδια δὲ οὐδένος οὐδέν τοιοῦτον κεκτη-μένου, ὡμοί δὴ ἔσονται, ὡμοί δὲ ἀναμεμειγμένοι καὶ ἐν γυμνασίῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀλλῃ τροφῇ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης οἴμαι τῆς ἐμφύτου ἄξονται πρός τὴν ἀλλήλων μείζην. ἢ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα σοι δοκῶ λέγειν;

Οὐ γεωμετρικαὶς γε, ἢ δ’ ὥσ, ἀλλ.’ ἔρωτικαὶς ἀνάγκαις, αἱ κινδυνεύουσιν ἐκεῖνων δριμύτεραι εἰναι πρός το πεῖθειν τε καὶ ἔλεικαν τὸν πολύν λεών.

Καὶ μάλα, εἶπον. ἄλλα μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα, ὁ Γλαῦκων, ἀτάκτως μὲν μείγνυσθαί ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἄλλο ὄτιον ποιεῖν οὔτε ὄσον ἐν εὐδαιμόνισι πολέι ὡστ’ ἐὰςουσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες.

Οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ἐφη. Ἀλλον δὴ ὅτι γάμους τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ποιήσομεν ἱεροὺς εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα: ἐξεν δ’ ἂν ἵειροι οἱ ὀψεληψότατοι. (Pl. Resp. 458c-e.)

[Soc.: ‘Then you, as their lawgiver,’ I said, ‘just as you have picked the men, will select to hand over to them women as nearly as possible of the same nature. And since they have common dwellings and meals, rather than private ones, and live together and mix together both in physical training and in the rest of their
upbringing, they will, I suppose, be driven by innate necessity to have sex with one another. Or do I not seem to you to be talking about necessities here?’

Gl.: ‘The necessities aren’t geometrical but erotic, and they’re probably sharper than the others at persuading and compelling the majority of people.’

Soc.: ‘That’s right. But the next point, Glaucơ, is that mixing with one another casually or doing anything whatsoever is impious in a city of happy people, and the rulers won’t allow it.’

Gl.: ‘No, for it isn’t right.’

Soc.: ‘Then it’s clear that our next task must be to make marriage as sacred as possible. And the sacred marriages will be those that are most beneficial.’

At this stage, Socrates faces the challenge of coping with those erotic necessities (ἐρωτικαῖς ἀνάγκαις) that naturally transpire in associations, where men and women live together (ὁμοῦ δὴ ἔσονται) and mix together (ὁμοῦ δὲ ἀναμεμειγμένων), in their physical training and the rest of their way of life (ἐν γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ ἔλλην ἁπροφή), which is entirely predicated on commonality: guardians have their houses and meals in common (ἀτε οἰκίας τε καὶ συσσίτια κοινὰ ἔχοντες). I think what this passage demonstrates is the very power of desire—for these necessities are sharper than others (ἐκείνων δριμύτεραι), at persuading and prodding the majority of the people (τὸ πείθειν τε καὶ ἔλκειν τὸν πολὺν λεών)—and also the problem of the body: the presence of the female body, in particular, puts desire into play. That is, in this wave, the lawgiver must deal with the natural flow of human drives, once he selects male guardians (τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξέλεξας) and then female ones (τὰς γυναῖκας ἐκλέξας) in the phase that follows, by manipulating the production of intense intensities and the paths that they take.

As a result, I disagree with Saxonhouse’s argument that women, in order to participate in politics, they relinquish their sexuality, as “de-sexed females.” Insofar as the city legislator chooses men and women “of the same nature” (ὁμοφυεῖς), this nature includes and is defined by desire, the innate necessity to have sex with one another (ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης…τῆς ἐμφύτου…πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων μείζην). Human beings, even guardians, are “driven” (ἀξονται) by these forces, and, in the paradigm, Plato is showing us how he is organizing and reorganizing desires that stem from
the mutual attraction between male and female bodies to form a particular kind of political formation, the utopian political formation, exemplified by the *kallipolis*. Essentially Plato has Socrates practice what Deleuze calls the “transcendental method,” which shows how persons and interests are produced from the chaotic flows of desire, that is, the dynamics of “micropolitics” explored in Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus*, and how the extended and individual categories of persons, classes or interests are “coded” from affects (Colebrook 2002: 92-93). In this instance, Socrates frames a politics that does not so much repress desire as code the connection of male and female bodies, where desire becomes an interest, in the vitalist sense, interest coded as sacred marriage, that far from being the effect of desire, appears as a law that ought to govern desire. As he fits and places everything in its right place, Socrates puts Deleuze into practice and codes desire very deliberately, by instituting these holy marriages (γάμους… ἱερῶς), invented to prevent marital mismatches, mixing with one another casually or doing anything whatsoever (μὲν μείγνυσθαι ἄλληλοις ἢ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν ποιεῖν). Starting from this primary and foundational building block, namely, the program of eugenics, Socrates reformulates the flows of experience, which are to be promoted by this model, with the aim of maximizing aesthetic pleasure, to create a city of happy people (ἐν εὐδαιμόνων πόλει).

What this wave reflects is then the image of a sensational city. That is to say, sensations, pleasures and pains, lie at the heart of the *kallipolis*, which has been designed in such a way so as for it to manage and to master the corporeal problem, by redirecting desire through appropriate channels. The target is reached, to a large extent, by the implementation of a very special kind of tool, which is the *pharmakon*, equivalent to falsehood and deception, “useful as a form of drug” (ἐν φαρµάκων εἰδέα…χρήσιµα) (Pl. *Resp*. 459c-d), or the city’s sacred marriages, on which Socrates elaborates:
[Soc.: ‘Therefore certain festivals and sacrifices will be established by law at which we’ll bring the brides and grooms together, and hymns fitting for the marriages that take place must be made by our poets. We’ll leave the number of marriages for the rulers to decide, but their aim will be to keep the number of males as stable as they can, taking into account war, disease, and similar factors, so that the city will, as far as possible, become neither too big nor too small.’]

The selection of mates and regimentation of the body exert biopolitical control over the city, where individual bodies are made, trained and used. In this set-up, everything is public: sacred marriages will take place at festivals and sacrifices, established by law (νομοθετητέαι).

Lawgivers will lead, “we will lead” (συνάξοµεν), together brides and bridegrooms (τὰς τε νύφας καὶ τοὺς νυµφίους). That they are embedded in a relative clause (ἐν αἷς συνάξοµεν τὰς τε νύφας καὶ τοὺς νυµφίους), encircled by ἑορταί and θυσίαι in chiastic structure, emphasizes their status as objects; the two parties, subject to the public eye, are shaped and changed by the event.

Guardians only receive their identity as brides and grooms after the marriages take place or, more literally, “come to be” (τοῖς γιγνοµένοις γάµοις), and exist in a medium that is also transforming; the city (ἡ πόλις) “becomes” (γίγνηται), at times, large (µεγάλη) and, at others, small (σµικρὰ). This is why rulers implement the sex lottery in the first place, where they decide the number of marriages (τὸ δὲ πλήθος τῶν γάµων), in order to maintain the number of males as stable as they can (ἂν’ ὡς µάλιστα διασώζωσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθµὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν). The emphasis on quantity and geometrical proportion turns the spotlight on the borders of a strictly delineated system, which the kallipolis inhabits: it is a city of bodies, and they are erotic bodies, but
intelligent political mechanisms have been developed to shape the kinds of interactions they are
to have with one another—with whom, how many, how—and to constrain their movements in
the world to compose a certain size, the perfect size.

The manifestation of this wave is thus constituted by a synthesis or blending that takes
place among separate parts and elements, and the beauty of this city lies precisely in its ability to
achieve a balance and harmony between male and female, pleasure and pain, and to produce
coded interests from desire. In this sense, the kallipolis works like Deleuze’s abstract machine of
society, a social machine, the site of desiring production, and couples together binary machines.

In his conception of the body politic, for example, Plato imposes the human sex on the
nonhuman sex; Socrates explains that the city most like an individual is best:

Καὶ ἦτις δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἔχει; οἶον ὅταν ποι ἡμῶν δάκτυλος τοῦ πληγῆ, πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἡ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα
πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν τὴν τοῦ ἄρ-
χοντος ἐν αὐτῇ ἡσθετό τε καὶ πᾶσα ἁμα συνήληγησεν μέρους
πονῆσαντος ὅλη, καὶ οὗτο δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν
δάκτυλον ἄγει· καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ὑπούν τῶν τοῦ ἄνθρωπο
ὁ ἑνῶς λόγος, περὶ τῷ λύπης πονοῦντος μέρους καὶ περὶ
ἡδονῆς ρᾳζοῦντος:
Ο αὐτός γὰρ, ἔφη· καὶ τοῦτο ὁ ἐρωτᾶς, τοῦ τοιοῦτο
ἐγγύτατα ἡ ἄριστα πολιτευμένη πόλις οἰκεῖ.
Ἐνὸς δὴ ὅιμαι πάσχοντος τῶν πολιτῶν ὑποῦν ἢ ἐγαθὸν
ἢ κακὸν ἡ τοιοῦτο πόλις μᾶλλον ἐφεσε ἑαυτῆς εἶναι τὸ
πάσχον, καὶ ἡ συνησθησάται ἄπασα ἢ συλλυπήσεται. (Pl. Resp. 462c-e.)

[Soc.: ‘And what about the city that is most like a single person? For example,
when the finger of one of us is wounded, the entire community that binds the body
and soul together into a single system under the ruling part within it perceives this
and feels the pain as a whole with the part that suffers, and so we say that the
person has a pain in his finger. And is it not the same argument concerning any
other part of a human being, when part of the body is suffering pain and finding
relief through pleasure?’]

Gl.: ‘For it is the same,’ he said. ‘And to what you ask, the best governed city
resembles most closely such a person.’

Soc.: ‘Then I presume that, when anyone of the citizens suffers good or evil,
such a city will be most likely to speak of the part that suffers as its own and will
share the pleasure or pain as a whole.’]
The best form of government resembles the integrated sort of person, characterized as a machine of connections and vital productions. The wounded finger (δάκτυλός), when it is struck (πληγῇ), is connected to the ruling part (τὴν τοῦ ἀρχοντος) of the person, who suffers from this sensation. Plato’s analogy continues to display a series of interconnections: the human constitution is an entire community (πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία), stretching along the body to the soul (κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη) into a single system (εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν). The whole (ὅλη) feels pain (συνήλγησεν) along with the part that suffers (μέρους πονήσαντος).

By depicting the community as a human body, illustrated as a network of flows and (electric) currents, the second wave is revealed as a space of feelings, and these affections circulate through singular bodies, which, in turn, participate in the greater political assemblage. Borders grow faint in this blueprint, as city is coupled with man; the best-governed city resembles most closely such a person (τοῦ τοιούτου ἐγγύτατα ἡ ἀριστα πολιτευόμενη πόλις οἰκεῖ), that is, the person that is complete and whole (ἐνὸς ἄνθρωπος), and, finding himself in a state of pain, he seeks relief through pleasure (περὶ ἡδονῆς ῥαῖζοντος). Gosling and Taylor suggest that Plato advances a theory of pleasure:

…Plato is trying to extend the physiologically inspired replenishment model of pleasure beyond the physiological sphere. This is done by looking upon the soul/person as a quasi-organism…by seeing any disproportion between the elements as a lack requiring replenishment; and by seeing the various desires as themselves lacks or felt lacks with their own replenishments (Gosling and Taylor 105).

In Book IX of the Republic, Socrates offers a proof of pleasure and makes a distinction between false and genuine pleasures: the former fill a lack and thereby replace a pain, while the latter do not fill a lack and thereby replace a pain (Pl. Resp. 584e-586a). Read alongside what we find in Book V, this later passage illuminates the movements, dynamics and operations of pleasure: first

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12 Plato uses the word ὁ ἄνθρωπος both with and without the article to denote man generically.

13 Gosling and Taylor trace the development of Plato’s views on pleasure along his oeuvre.
of all, it is a material force, “firm” or “durable” (βεβαιου), and has aesthetic value, “pure” (καθαρᾶς) (Pl. Resp. 586a). It is also animate and engages in a process of territorialization and deterritorialization: replenishing and replenished, excessive in the case of impure pleasure and moderate in the case of what is real, pleasure provides the means for citizens and the city to find themselves again (Deleuze 1997), as they periodically recover from pains.

Pleasures and pains form the roots of the political relation that the kallipolis nurtures, fosters and on which the city is built. By political relation, I mean that relation between self and the other and between man and the world, and it consists in a sensory-motor link or circuit, whereby the action of human bodies follows from perception. In terms of the Republic and Book V, in particular, Plato portrays the creation of this schema: the ability to feel pleasures and pains “together” (συνησθήσεται…συλλυπήσετα): when one part is affected, there are reverberations for the utopian assemblage, for “the entire community of bodily connections stretching to the soul for integration with the dominant part is made aware” (πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἡ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ ἡσθετό). All of it feels pain as a whole, though it is a part that suffers (πᾶσα ἂμα συνήλγησεν μέρους πονήσαντος ὀλη). To compose the kallipolis, then, Socrates aims at a unified system and unites body and soul, by arranging them into a certain relation, where the part that ought to rule actually rules, namely, the soul and the golden rational principle that commands the soul. Finally, to maximize the uniformity of feelings and to maintain utopian sensibilities articulated by the sensory-motor link, Socrates abolishes private property, at least among the guardians; this measure would prevent dividing the city with private pleasures and pains at private things (Pl. Resp. 464d).

14 Aristotle is the first to critique Plato’s sloppiness, that is, his silence on the way that producers live in the kallipolis (Aris. Pol. 1264a).
I hope we start to see by now that the media of these waves extend and display material reflective surfaces, and they are sensual, aesthetic waves of emotion. The last wave is the greatest, and it opens up into a sea of laughter. The expression of laughter mimics the rise and fall of this wave, which might drown Socrates in ridicule and contempt:

Ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δή, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, εἰμὶ ὃ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσηκάζομεν κυματι. εἰρήσεται δ’ οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωτι τε ἀτεχνῶς ὅσπερ κύμα ἐκγελών καὶ ἀδοξία κατακλύσειν. σκόπει δὲ ὃ μέλλω λέγειν.

Λέγε, ἐφη.

Ἐὰν μὴ, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐὰς ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλῆς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ικανῶς, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταύτων συμπέσῃ, δύναμις τε πολιτική καὶ φιλοσοφία, τὸν δὲ νῦν πορευομένον χαρίς ἐρ’ ἐκάτερον αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀποκλειθότωσιν, οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα, ὁ φίλε Πλαῦκων, ταῖς πόλεσι, δοκῶ δ’ οὔδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, οὔδε αὕτη ἢ πολιτεία μὴ ποτὲ πρότερον φυὴ τε εἰς τὸ δυνατόν καὶ ρός ἦλιον ἢ, ἢν νῦν λόγῳ διελθήθησαν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό εἶναι ὃ ἐμοὶ πάλαι ὄνομα ἐντιθήμησε λέγειν, ὁρῶντι ὡς πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν ῥηθήσεται· χαλεπῶν γὰρ ἰδεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλη τις εὐδαιμονήσειν ὡστε ἰδίᾳ ὀστε δημοσίᾳ. (Pl. Resp. 473c-e.)

[Soc.: ‘Well, I’ve now come,’ I said, ‘to what we likened to the greatest wave. But I shall say what I have to say, even if the wave is a wave of laughter that will simply drown me in ridicule and contempt. So listen to what I’m going to say.’

Gl.: ‘Speak on.’

Soc.: ‘Until philosophers rule as kings in cities or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no rest from evils, dear Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race. And, until this happens, the constitution we’ve been describing in theory will never be born to the fullest extent possible or see the light of the sun. It’s because I saw how very paradoxical this statement would be that I hesitated to make it for so long, for it’s hard to face up to the fact that there can be no happiness, either public or private, in any other city.’]

The repeated references to laughter (Pl. Resp. 452a-e) resonate with Aristophanes’ *Ecclesiazusae*, and the organization of the *kallipolis*, with Praxagora’s gynocracy, in which women will institute a common fund and practice sexual equality. Providing an extensive list of...
the ideological parallels in Socrates and Praxagora’s plans for their respective cities, Nails has argued for the existence of the “proto-Republic,” an earlier version of the dialogue (Books II, III, V and VII) that was circulating among Athenian intellectuals (117-119). The circulation of a half-baked version, as it were, would suggest that an exchange was taking place and that Aristophanes and Plato were responding to each other in their works. It is very true that both of these authors are interested in a gendered line of thinking and launch into a “female drama;” in the play, the protagonist Praxagora turns the polis into one big oikos. When Blepyrus asks her what kind of life she proposes to set up, she responds: Πρ. κοινὴν πᾶσιν. τὸ γὰρ ἀστυ/ μίαν οἰκησίν φημι ποιήσειν συρρήξασ’ εἰς ἐν ἀπαντα, ὡστε βαδίζειν εἰς ἄλληλον. (Ar. Eccl. 673-675.) [Pr.: ‘The life in common. For I say that I will make the city into a single house, by dashing together all things into one, so that everybody will be able to go from one house to the other.’] Praxagora enacts a “constructive undoing” of the city: “Once the ecclesia, packed by the disguised women, votes in Praxagora’s new regime, Athens becomes, in effect, a naked female body (in Greek thought, as in many cultures, the earth is understood as female) stripped of all fetishes, all the pseudo-phallic supports of the father-ruled polis: private property, marriage, political and judicial institutions, along with the oppositions and hierarchies upon which they stand” (Bergren 2008b: 330).

The correspondences between Praxagora’s city of women and Plato’s are far too similar to be merely coincidental, and they transcend the superficial. He is clearly giving a nod to his comic friend as he mentions laughter, ridicule and jokes (Pl. Resp. 452b), and Socrates, of course, makes arguments for the abolition of the private family and property (Pl. Resp. 458c-d, advanced by the previous wave.\footnote{For a further discussion of parallels with Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae, see Halliwell 1993: 9-16, 224-225, Adam 1979: 350-351, Tordoff 261, Thesleff and Parker.} The Ecclesiazusae, then, as an intertext allows us to recognize
Socrates’ “constructive undoing” of the city and the way that he turns the *polis* into an *oikos*, as he builds the *kallipolis*, where the possibility of having a private life and even private emotions is eliminated. Because everything is public, no private space exists. But it also places us in the context of the theater and comedy. We should be thinking about this play in a reading of *Republic* V because Plato has Socrates make “dramatic” proposals, in the sense that they most literally pertain to the body.

The comic frame then calls attention to the centrality of bodily processes or, rather, the absolute necessity of regulating corporeal excess in Socrates’ model. His measures, furthermore, will have a real and transformative impact on the listener, who, after experiencing laughter, undergoes some kind of catharsis, digestion or release; Iamblichus claims, “…both in tragedy and comedy, by looking at the emotions of others we are able to appease our own emotions and make them more moderate and clear them away” (*ἀποκαθαίρομεν*) (Iamb. *Myst.* 1.11). This is the purifying effect of the wave: by producing laughter, it will clear away any impurities that remain from the previous two cycles in the city that is a house and also a body. Laughter is a political emotion and becomes a particularly utopian one, at this moment: it will not lead to collective irony and self-minimization, as it would in the context of the theater in fifth-fourth century Athenian democracy. Through the genre of comedy, the people laugh at themselves, and the entire city derides itself. This is how it works as a democratic practice, a manifestation of liberty. Plato sets this emotion, instead, in the service of his new political project: laughter will give rise to perfection and beauty in the *kallipolis*, for it cleanses various bodies. People will laugh in order, ultimately, not to laugh at these “ridiculous” suggestions.

A discussion of the *Ecclesiazusae* in this context also proves illuminating because this is exactly the “womanly drama,” upon which Plato expands, in these three waves. While the first
two proposals directly concern women, their lifestyles and roles in the *kallipolis*, in the third wave, the philosopher-king assumes the feminine position; he acts as the midwife, who delivers truth into the world. The framework of the *kallipolis* promotes the interchangeability between philosopher and king; philosophy and political power entirely coincide (τοῦτο εἰς ταύτων συμπέση, δύναμίς τε πολιτική καὶ φιλοσοφία), and the coupling of identities, “philosopher-king,” moreover, is understood in terms of the feminine grammatical gender, “philosophy” (φιλοσοφία) and “political power” (δύναμις τε πολιτική). Again, Plato pushes back against the conventional norm when he separates out natures of the many (αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις) from those of philosopher-kings; the “many natures,” who pursue either activity to the exclusion of the other, as they do in the present (τῶν δὲ νῦν πορευομένων χωρὶς ἑπ’ ἑκάτερον), ought to stand aside (ἀποκλεισθῶσιν). Therefore the utopian model is achieved after it makes foundational revisions, and it finds itself in a state of flux, during this process, while it is being founded: it facilitates the migration of suitable natures to the center of political life, which includes women (Pl. *Resp.* 456b), and the emigration of the unqualified to the peripheral outskirts.

In this way, as rulers “philosophize” (φιλοσοφήσωσι), the constitution is “born” (φυῇ) into the light of the sun (φῶς ἡλίου). In other words, as they practice maieutics, philosopher-kings assist parturition and bring theory into light. ἦν νῦν λόγῳ διεληλύθωμεν, additionally, is working as a metapoetic statement, for Plato, the “philosopher,” has elucidated the *politeia* in speech. These are the various levels on which change occurs: channels of movement in the city represent vital streams, and as expressions play themselves out over the surface of a body, everyone exists in a state of alteration. By the third-wave, we see the different ways in which the affection-image applies, for it emphasizes this process of being altered. This concept is helpful for pinning down and contextualizing affections at play in the text, laughter, for instance, their
impact on the body and, ultimately, boundaries, which eventually vanish; in the figure of the philosopher-king, male and female combine, and, representing a constituent part of the *kallipolis*, he is the person that gives form to the city and realizes it with his soul.

More specifically, Plato uses metaphors of male pregnancy, and I agree with Leitao “…that reproductive imagery helps Plato to characterize the metaphysical instability of perception in a world characterized by total flux” (251). The experience of the philosopher contributes to the *kallipolis*’ state of flux, as he himself becomes; the philosopher carries a pregnant soul, afflicted by the pangs of delivery. After the purging forces of the waves take effect in Book V, they continue to fill fluid spaces of variation and oscillation and destabilize, for intellectual clarification disconcerts and, more often than not, results in further confusion. The feminized philosopher, who is also a lover, engages in a laborious process in order to acquire knowledge:

\[
\text{Ἅρ’ οὖν δὴ οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὅν πεφυκὼς ἐιὴ ἀμιλλάσθαι ὅ γε ὄντως φιλομαθῆς, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμένοι ἐπὶ τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοίς ἐκάστοις, ἀλλ’ ἵνα καὶ οὐκ ἁμβλύνοιτο οὐδ’ ἀπολήγῃ τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρίν αὐτὸν ὁ ἐκτός ἐν τῇς φύσεως ἄγασθαι ὡς προσήκει 
\text{

\text{ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου—προσήκει δὲ συγγενεῖ—

\text{ὡς πλησίασας καὶ μιγεῖς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννῆσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοῖν τε καὶ ἁληθῶς ζῷη καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὕτω λήγῃ ἡ ἐκείνος, πρὶν δ’ οὖ; (Pl. Resp. 490a-b.)}

[Soc.: ‘Then, won’t it be reasonable for us to plead in his defense that it is the nature of the real lover of learning to struggle toward what is, not to remain with any of the many things that are believed to be, that, as he moves on, he neither loses nor leaves off his erotic love, until he grasps the being of each nature itself with the part of his soul that is fitted to grasp it—because of its kinship with it—and that, once getting near what really is and having intercourse with it and having begotten understanding and truth, he knows, truly lives, is nourished, and, at that point, but not before, is relieved from the pains of giving birth?’]

The metaphor of spiritual pregnancy captures the difficulty of knowledge; the lover of learning is

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16 In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates is portrayed as a midwife, who, with the maieutic art, tends to the souls of young men and helps them give birth to their theories and ideas (Pl. *Tht.* 150a-c).
born to struggle toward what is (περικούς εἴη ἁμιλλάσθαι ὃ γε ὁντος φιλομαθῆς). His nature, while receptive to the practice, at the same time requires constant upkeep; dissatisfied with the many things believed to be (ὥκ ἐπιμένοι ἐπὶ τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς), he moves on (Ιοί) and holds fast to love (τοῦ ἔρωτος). His soul touches the being of each nature itself (αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἐκάστου τῆς φύσεως), for the two share an affinity (συγγενεῖ), and this union produces children. The philosopher has intercourse with what really is (μιγεῖς τῷ ὁντὶ ὁντως) and begets (γεννήσας) offspring, reason and truth (νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν). The soul is a pregnant womb:

« Déplacer la fonction génératrice de soma à psyché signifie donc féminiser le désir de savoir d’une manière cohérente et concrète. Le corps féminin est à l’âme comme l’accouchement est à la production de logoi, comme l’allaitement est à la réflexion qui les nourrit » (Sissa 2000 : 95). By knowing and truly (ἀληθῶς) living, he is nourished (τρέφοιτο) and relieved from the throes of childbirth (ὠδίνος).

The pregnancy of the philosopher suggests that he turns into a woman, where this transformation makes it more difficult to distinguish the model from the copy. In other words, by taking on feminine qualities and roles, the philosopher simulates and confuses the male/female distinction. He constitutes another simulacrum, which functions in a dynamic system; this type of person “hastens eagerly” (ἁμιλλάσθαι), “moves forward” (Ιοί), “does not cease from desire” (ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος), grasps (ἀψασθαι) and touches (ἐφάπτεσθαι). While distinctions between masculine and feminine elide, so does the opposition between the soul (microcosm) and body (macrocosm); the soul behaves like a female body. These gendered metaphors express a desire to remap the use of any feminine connotation, and, by gendering the philosophic pursuit, Plato illustrates the capacity of language to divide and to bridge divisions.

What we ultimately see here is the attempt to rearrange language; the utopian blueprint
superimposes new categories onto conventional ones: Ἐν ἦπινι δὴ πόλει πλεῖστοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταύτα τοῦτο λέγουσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμὸν, αὐτὴ ἁριστα διουκεῖται; (Pl. Resp. 462c.) [Soc.: ‘Then, is the best-governed city the one in which most people say ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ about the same things in the same way?’] Language, intimately bound to the senses because it is produced by bodies and has the potential to affect another, and affects, in general, are rechanneled in this model to perfect human nature and to refashion a new kind of human being. Deleuze’s notion of the simulacrum is then pertinent because it shows us how the kallipolis is composed of disparate images and draws attention to the various components that are involved in the collective process of becoming, from where intelligible being emerges. That is, oppositions between male/female, inner/outer and subject/object collapse to form a collective assemblage, the city, which is itself a product of mimetic reproduction. The opening and potential for a vitalist reading of the Republic are offered up by Plato himself, for the text is a production, a constant work of midwivery, for the sake of generating truth (ἀλήθειαν). Since language is not pure—it is structured and manipulated, put under great stress since it expresses the world of appearance, and produces gendered bridges and divisions—Plato has to revert to fiction, noble lies and bodily metaphors to describe any reality, phenomenal or ideal.

III. The Beach

Magnesia is a city on the island of Crete, surrounded by the sea. In the Laws, the Athenian Stranger, along with his interlocutors Cleinias and Megillus, endeavor to construct an imaginary community, “the city in speech” (λόγῳ…πόλιν), and establish laws for their future state (εἰς τὴν μέλλουσαν πόλιν) (Pl. Leg. 702d). It is the second-best city whose laws approximate the ideal, yet constitute a paradeigma (Pl. Leg. 739e). This is one of several details
that supports the developmental shift in Plato’s thought; he moves away from the absolute ideal, where the notion of private property has been eliminated and the old saying ‘friends have all things really in common’ (ὀντως ἐστὶ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων) is put into practice as widely as possible throughout the entire state (ἂν γίγνηται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν ὅτι μάλιστα) (Pl. Leg. 739b-c). For this reason, I will argue, in this section, that Magnesia departs from the model of the *kallipolis* and that it has its own unique political aesthetic, determined by its position to the sea. That is, Plato’s theoretical waves of the *Republic* are set closer towards the shore in the *Laws*, for they are brought down to earth and surround the terrestrial mass of the island, on which the city is set.

What is depicted in the *Laws*, then, is another political assemblage, which is shaped by the sea—a seascape—and it promotes new political affinities, relations and subjective experiences.

Namely, Magnesia affirms difference, in the form of sexual difference, embodied by the sea; a conflation takes place between the sea and the female body, which also comes out of the sea. It is my view that the feminine liquid principle will illuminate the movements, flows and interrelationships that characterize the Platonic assemblage.

The discussion of Magnesia is set against a marine background; the Athenian Stranger advises that their new city lie approximately eighty stades from the sea:

νῦν δὲ παραμύθησεν ἐχει τὸ τῶν ὀγδοηκοντα στα- δίων. ἐγγύτερον μέντοι τοῦ δέοντος κεῖται τῆς θάλαττής, σχεδὸν ὅσον εὐλυμνωτέραν αὐτὴν φῆς εἶναι, ὁμως δὲ ἀγα- πήτον καὶ τοῦτο. πρόσοικος γὰρ ἡ ὄλαττα χώρα τὸ μὲν παρ’ έκάστην ἡμέραν ἡδύ, μάλα γε μὴν ἄντως ἁλυρόν καὶ πικρόν γειτόνημα ἐμπορίας γὰρ καὶ χρηματισμοῦ διὰ κατη- λειάς ἐμπιστλάσσα αὐτὴν, ἠθη παλιμβολα καὶ ἀπίστα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντίκτουσα, αὐτὴν τε πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν ἀπίστων καὶ ἄψυλόν ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ΄ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ὀσαύτως. παραμύθησεν δὲ δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ τὸ πάμφορος εἶναι κέκτηται, τραχεία δὲ οὐσα δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν πολύφορος τε εὕη καὶ

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17 Homeric Hymn 6 to Aphrodite describes her birth over “the waves of the loud-roaring sea” (κατὰ κόμα πολυφλοίσβοι θαλάσσης) (*Hymn. Hom. Ven.* 4).
The imperative question of location frames the image and introduces an opposition between land and sea: the city is ἐπιθαλαττίδιος, “bordering the coast” or “marine” (Pl. Leg. 704b), and lies nearer the sea than it should (ἐγγύτερον ἐντὸς τοῦ δέοντος κεῖται τῆς θαλάττης). The word εὐλιμενωτέραν orients our perspective and lends a pathway and opens to “the sea of generation,” to use the language of Proclus in his commentary on the *Timaeus* (Procl. 3, 352), in his descriptions about the movements of the human soul. Interestingly, Proclus characterizes the soul as a feminine organism that has the potential to “…[excite] herself to intellect…shaking off from herself, the briny waters of the sea of generation” (Procl. 3, 352). A symbol of external flux, the sea brings change to the land, and, therefore, it has a destabilizing, disorienting affect. The harbor, meanwhile, provides a seat of safety and acts as a point of reconciliation between outside and inside, a safe haven. Again, in the *Timaeus*, we are able to locate safe spaces or, at least,
hope for their discovery, when the title character calls upon god to be their savior, “…to give us safe passage through a strange and unusual exposition” (ἐξ ἀτόπου καὶ ἁήθους διηγήσεως…διασώζειν ἡμᾶς) (Pl. Ti. 48d). Commentators have been interested in the use of the seafaring metaphor to contextualize the intellectual impasse, as Archer-Hind explains: “The metaphor is evidently taken from mariners embarking on a voyage of discovery in some new and unexplored ocean. Plato prays to be delivered from the perils of the voyage and brought safe to the haven of probability” (169-170). The architecture of good harbors reduces the threat of violent waves, and surges find their resolution in this alliance, what constitutes the first assemblage: a manmade passage between land and sea.

This is one of the ways in which Magnesia organizes, collects and arranges various material textures and consistencies and negotiates earthly and liquid perceptions, feminine sensations. As a well-harbored city, Magnesia is protected from oceanic dangers, for it is about ten miles away from the sea, but to have the sea nearby is “pleasant” (ἡδύ) enough for the purpose of everyday life. In other words, access to the sea affords aesthetic, island pleasures, as a feminine space (θάλαττα). The feminine principle is locatable in the sea because, an expanse of salt water, it is dynamic and unsettling and introduces change into the city, where liquid space represents another medium of generation. Proximity to the sea, in fact, exacerbates and contributes to the vital movements and cycles of mother earth: the sea, neighboring the land

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19 See also Taylor (311).

20 In the Black Hunter, Vidal-Naquet diagrams the monthly movement of the twelve troops of young men in the city (1986: 225):
fills it (ἐμπιμπλάσα αὐτήν) with undesirable pursuits, commerce and money-making for personal gain (ἐμπορίας...καὶ χρηματισμοῦ διὰ καπηλείας), and “breeds” untrustworthy and shifty habits in souls (ἡθο παλὴμβολα καὶ ἁπίστα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντίκτουσα). As water then serves as a conduit and carrier for outside forces, this liquid element dynamizes the city (τὴν πόλιν) in a pure mosaic of present states, a montage of commerce, metals and characters.

Land, in turn, has the capacity to conceive: all-bearing (πάμφορος), it is not, however, prolific (οὐκ...πολύφορός) and limits the output of production (ἐξαγωγήν). Fluidity of water displaces the center of gravity; it lays open the possibility for exchange, for the city to be flooded or swamped (πάλιν ἀντεμπίπλαττ’ ἄν) by resources brought by the sea, gold and silver money (νομίσματος ἀργυροῦ καὶ χρυσοῦ). Brine, in its stream, translates to cashflow or argent en liquide, the very material make-up of the oikos, where women manage household property. This is one of the basic “feminine” duties, as explained by Socrates to Critobulus in the *Oeconomicus*, which lays out a basic template for gender: “…expenditures are controlled mostly by the wife’s dispensation” (δαπανᾶται δὲ διὰ τῶν τῆς γυναικὸς ταμιευμάτων τὰ πλεῖστα). Woman, in other words, is responsible for the economic well-being of the oikos (Xen. *Oec*. 3. 14-16). The various
ways in which water works and the symbolic meaning of the medium reinforce its status as a redistributive force because it rearranges mobile objects and enhances the motion picture.

The sea in the *Laws* also offers up a reflection, like a mirror, and, for this reason, we might apply Deleuze’s notion of “liquid perception,” which describes the movement from subjectivity to objectivity, by way of images of water. I find this idea is relevant, for the Athenian describes the sea as a reflective surface where self and other converge, and, as we most recently saw, people and objects get pushed around in and by water. Different dimensions of time—past, present and future—meet when the Athenian reminds us of the dangers of the sea:

τὴν δὲ δὴ
μίμησιν ἔλεγον τὴν τῶν πολεμίων τὴν κακὴν τοιάνδε γίγαντες, ὅταν οἰκῆ μὲν τὶς πρὸς θαλάττῃ, λυπήται δ’ ὑπὸ πολεμίων, οἱὸν—φράσω γὰρ οὕτι μνησικακεῖν βουλόμενος ὑμῖν—Μίνως γὰρ δὴ ποτὲ τοὺς οἰκοῦντας τὴν Ἀττικὴν παρεστήσατο εἰς χαλεπὴν τινα φοράν δασμοῦ, δύναμιν πωλῆν κατὰ θάλατταν κεκτημένος, οἱ δ’ οὕτε πω πλοία ἐκέκτην τοῖς οἰκοῦνται, καθάπερ οἶνος, πολεμικὰ, οὕτ’ αὐτὴ τὴν χώραν πλήρη ναυπηγήσιμον ἔχων οὕτ’ εὐμαρῶς ναυτικὴν παρασχέσθαι δύναμιν· οὐκ’ αὐτοὶ τ’ ἐγένοντο διὰ μιμήσεως ναυτικῆς αὐτοὶ ναῦται γενομένοι εἰσὶ τότε τοὺς πολεμίους ἀμυνοῦσι. Εἰτ’ ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ πλεονάκις ἐπὶ ἀπολέσαι παῖδας αὐτοῖς συνήνεγκεν, πρὶν ἀντὶ πεζῶν ὀπλωτῶν μονὶμων ναυτικοὺς γενομένους ἐθισθῆναι… (Pl. Leg. 706a-706c)

[Ath.: ‘This ‘disgraceful copying of enemies’ to which I was referring occurs when people live by the sea and are plagued by foes, for I shall point this out, not at all wishing to recall to you past injuries, such as Minos, who once forced the inhabitants of Attica to pay an onerous tribute, having acquired tremendous power at sea, whereas the Athenians had not yet acquired the fighting ships they have today, nor was their country so rich in supplies of timber useful in shipbuilding so that they could easily supply themselves with a naval force. Therefore they could not turn themselves into sailors at a moment’s notice and repel the enemy by copying the Cretan use of the sea. For it would have profited them to lose seven boys over and over again rather than get into bad habits by forming themselves into a navy instead of staunch foot-soldiers.’]

In the past, the Cretan lawgiver compelled residents of Attica to pay an onerous tribute (παρεστήσατο εἰς χαλεπὴν τινα φοράν δασμοῦ) to his kingdom; he acquired tremendous power
at sea (δύναμιν πολλῆν κατὰ θάλατταν κεκτημένος). The Athenians, on the other hand, lived modestly and lacked the warships that they have now (ο_insn πλοία ἐκέκτηντο, καθάπερ νῦν, πολεμικά). The story reverberates with other tales of loss: the degradation of Crete foreshadows Athens’ own demise in the fourth century. With access to the sea (πρὸς θαλάττη), interacting with the enemy (τῶν πολεμίων), landpeople start acquiring bad habits: harmful imitation (τὴν…μίμησιν… τὴν κακὴν) “comes into being” (γίγνεσθαι). The city of Athens, after coming into contact with Crete, reduplicates what they see abroad, and self and other mirror each other. The dynamic is one of self-reflection: the great power that Minos has in the sea (δύναμιν πολλὴν κατὰ θάλατταν κεκτημένος) anticipates the naval force (ναυτικὴν…δύναμιν) that the Athenians will subsequently build. They evade copying the Cretan use of the sea (διὰ μιμήσεως ναυτικῆς) and forming themselves into a navy (ναυτικοὺς γενοῦς) at this point, but the underlying sentiment expresses doom and looks forward to the victory of the Athenian fleet at the Battle of Salamis (Pl. Leg. 707b).

The theoretical concept of a liquid mode of perception is useful because it allows us to track the ocean’s mobility and to see it as a transformative space: it provides a medium for men to come into being as seamen, by way of imitating the naval methods of their enemies (ἐγένοντο διὰ μιμήσεως ναυτικῆς αὐτοὶ ναῦται γενόμενοι). That is, like the land, which gives birth to the first generation of warriors, as the Noble Lie of the Republic relates, in the narrative of autochthonous birth (Pl. Resp. 414c-415c), the sea serves as a generating container that transforms the elements that enter into it: while first these men are “unable to turn into sailors at a moment’s notice” (ο_insn τ’ ἐγένοντο…αὐτοὶ ναῦται γενόμενοι εὐθὺς), after they come into contact with sea, they grow accustomed to becoming marines (ναυτικοὺς γενομένους ἐθισθῆναι). I apply this idea of liquid perception, also because it helps us probe the intricacies and
implications of Magnesia’s utopian paradigm: by having the sea at a certain distance, it determines citizen subjectivity and political relations, which is determined the city. More specifically, in contrast to Plato’s three waves in Republic V, which purify and act metaphorically in the name of beauty, in the Laws, the city is set on an island that exists in reality, close to an actual body of water, and dilutes and mixes the soil of the earth. This shift, because it breeds a new environment and defines the framework of the “second-best” paradigm, will make inhabitants of Magnesia blend into their greater surroundings in a different way.

Deleuze’s theory of cinema in Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 offers an account of how human beings experience the world, and, if we apply his concepts to Plato, they illustrate the particular kind of experience of each world, the sensory and aesthetic experience of each.

The liquid metaphor carries over into the description of Magnesia’s texture, which is mixed and translucent. In the preamble to marriage laws, which are the first laws that are ordained for the new city, the Athenian Stranger compares the state to a mixing bowl of wine:

οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πόλιν εἶναι
dei dikhn kráthros kekraménhn, oũ maínômenos mèn õnôs
e kêkhaménos zêi, kolazômenos de úpo nêfostos etérou theou
callhn koivovían lábhôn agathôn pómã kai métroin ápêrgá-
ζetai. toût' oûn gagnômenon ên tē tôn païdôn meîzêi diorân
ôs ἐπος eîpeîn dûnastôs oudeîc tōtôwn dê ñárîn ãn mên
vómo tâ toiaûta ánagkaiôn, épàdonâ de peîthên peîrásai
tēn tôn païdôn ômalôtítata autôn autôc tēc tôn gámwn
ísôtîtac apîlóston chrîmátow ouûc peri plêíonoc ekâ-
ston pouêsai, kai di' onêidous apôtrêpeîc tîn peri tâ
chrîmata ên toîc gâmous ãspondakáta, âllâ mi grapîc nóâ
bîazômenon. (Pl. Leg. 773c-e.)

[Ath.: ‘For people do not find it easy to perceive that a state should be like a bowl of mixed wine, where the wine when first poured in seethes madly, but as soon as it is chastened by the sober deity of water, it forms a splendid combination, and produces a potion that is good and moderate. That this is precisely what happens in the blending of children is a thing, which hardly anyone is capable of perceiving. For these reasons, we are forced to omit such topics from our actual laws and merely try by the spell of words to persuade each one to value the
equality of his children more highly than the equality of a marriage with
inordinate wealth, and by means of reproaches to turn him away who is eagerly
set on enriching himself by marriage, rather than being compelled by a written
law.’]

Magnesia is explicitly characterized as a mixture of fluid matter, where the metaphor of the bowl
presents a microcosm of the macrocosm, the sea. The city is like a “mixing vessel” (κρατήρος
κεκραμένην), in which wine, once it is poured in, boils “furiously” (μανόμενος μὲν οἶνος
ἐγκεχυμένος ζεῖ). The metaphor suggests that the kratēr is a feminine hollow or womb, a space
and an incubator for offspring: this is precisely what “comes into being,” in the blending of
children (τοῦτ’ ὁν γιγνόμενον ἐν τῇ τῶν παιδῶν μείξει). Mixing, in turn, produces a “fine
community” (καλὴ κοινωνίαν) and a drink that is “noble” and “moderate” (ἀγαθὸν πῶς καὶ
μέτριον), along with children, who are citizens of the city. Like the sea, then, the crater gives
birth: this is what eventually “comes to be” (γιγνόμενον), a certain evenness (ὁμαλότητα), rather
than the “equality of marriage” (τῆς τῶν γάμων ἰσότητος). Deleuze’s liquid perception lets us
follow the channels of water that come together to form the structure of the constitution and
identify how these various components interact. That is, separate forces, such as the headstrong
personality versus the phlegmatic one, the rich and the less fortunate (Pl. Leg. 773c), which are
injected into the city, constitute the polis itself, and, as they mingle, they are re-ordered in an
ever-present unfolding of a relation of simultaneity.

The preamble (paramuthia) or persuasion, in addition, works in conjunction with the law
(nomos) in order for these laws to gain acceptance from the listener (Pl. Leg. 723a) and forms
another alliance with a counterpart. These are several of the coalitions or “marriages” that exist
in Magnesia, and they, in turn, create political folds, in the Deleuzian sense of the word. It is my
belief that this concept sheds light on the process and significance of mixing in the Magnesian
constitution: combinations facilitate points of contact and connection, and they result in folds—
creases or boundaries that makes other boundaries disappear—which incorporate the citizen of Magnesia into its pleated fabric. The overall and final effect is aesthetic, for an “evenness of surface” (ὁµαλότητα) transpires, a “beautiful community” (καλὴν κοινωνίαν), “good” (ἀγαθὸν) and “within measure” (µέτριον).

Magnesia promotes musical harmony, emphasized by the double meaning of nomos “law” and “melody.” It presents a series of magnetized rings: “…in the Laws the Lawgiver’s creative performance in framing the constitution has been ‘magnetised’ by his contact with divine goodness, which he attempts to spread through the city… The sequence of rings will, in fact, be unending, as citizens become inspired by the force of civic performance and attempt, for so they must, to pass the ‘inspiration’ on while remaining aware of a hierarchy of absolute value” (Morgan 2013: 288). The city is shaped by vibrant fabric: it is a matter of the fold; Magnesia’s textile combines male and female elements:

ΑΘ. 'Ετι δὲ θηλείαις τε πρεποῦσας φόδας ἄρρεσί τε χορίσαι ποὺ δέον ἄν εἰῇ τύπῳ τινὶ διορισάμενον, καὶ ἄρµονίαισιν δὴ καὶ ρυθµοὶς προσαρµόττειν ἀναγκαῖον· δεινὸν γὰρ ὅλη γε ἄρµονία ἀπάδειν ἢ ρυθµῳ ἄρρυθµειν, µηδὲν προσήκοντα τούτων ἑκάστους ἀποδιδόντα τοῖς µέλεσιν. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ τούτων τὰ σχήµατα γε νοµοθετείν. ἑστὶν δὲ ἀµφότεροις µὲν ἀµφότερα ἀνάγκη κατεχόµενα ἀποδιδόναι, τὰ δὲ τῶν θηλείων αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς φύσεως ἐκατέρων διαφέροντι, τούτῳ δὲ καὶ διασαφεῖν. τὸ δὴ µεγαλοπρεπὲς σὺν καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἄνδρειαν ρέτων ἁρρενοπότων φατέων εἶναι, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κόσµιον καὶ σώφρον µᾶλλον ἀποκλίνων θηλυγενέστερον ὡς ὃν παραδοτέον ἐν τε τῷ νόµῳ καὶ λόγῳ. (Pl. Leg. 802d-e.)

[Ath.: ‘In addition, it will be right for the lawgiver to set apart songs suitable for males and females by making a rough division of them, and give each its proper mode and rhythm. It would be terrible if the words failed to fit the mode, or if their meter were at odds with the beat of the music, which is what will happen if we don’t match properly the songs to each of the other elements in the performance—elements which must therefore be dealt with, at any rate in outline, 21

Pelosi argues that music presents an exception to Platonic dualism and escapes the mind-body dichotomy, which is attributed to Plato: it presents itself as an experience in which sensible and intelligible content reaches the soul by means of the body (6-7).
in our legal code. One possibility is simply to ensure that the songs men and women sing are accompanied by the rhythms and modes imposed by the words in either case; but our regulations about female performances must be more precise than this and be based on the natural difference between the sexes. Then magnificent and courageous instincts must be regarded as masculine-looking, while a tendency to modesty and restraint must be presented as a rather feminine trait both in law and discourse.’

In providing a sketch of Magnesia’s legal framework, the Athenian Stranger describes the shapes (τὰ σχήματά) of the city’s songs (τοῖς μέλεσιν), harmony or more literally, “limbs.” The lawgiver leaves an “impression” (τύπῳ) and sets a boundary (διορισάμενον) between songs suitable for men and those suitable for women ( timeval τε πρεποῦσας ᾠδὰς ἄρρεσί). His task requires great artistic skill, as he divides (χωρίσα) certain components and subsequently attaches them to modes and beats ( ἄρμονιασιν δή καὶ ρυθμοῖς προσαρμόττειν). By fine-tuning musical vibrations, the lawgiver makes these strains fall into one harmonious arrangement.

These songs, whose materiality is emphasized, move between inner and outer, and comprise a canvas of interlaced textures. The presence of such harmonies in Magnesia is another place where we can apply Deleuze’s liquid mode of perception or the movement-image, more generally, because music can be seen to represent flowing matter and expresses rhythmic design, in the way that it is described by the Athenian Stranger. It has the capacity to penetrate body and soul and to unify these disparate parts; in fact, this is the very function of the nomos, to facilitate an individual’s integration, so that he/she is not pulled in two separate directions, like a puppet on strings (Pl. Leg. 644d-e), and to make this person accountable to the political sphere, by connecting him/her to the polis. The application of this theoretical concept, furthermore, suggests that the Magnesian citizen is implicated in a larger, dynamic network of laws or musical strains, which, in turn, affirm difference, facilitate communication and negotiate human relationships. The Athenian explains that it is necessary for the lawgiver to assign both words and music for
both types of song, as defined by the natural difference of the two sexes (τῆς φύσεως ἑκατέρου διαφέροντι).

The city’s fabric inherently differs from that of the *kallipolis*, as Canto and Goldhammer conclude: “But the civic ‘compound’ of the *Laws* is different in composition from the ‘political identity’ of the *Republic*. The main difference is that the former compound makes sense only thanks to the persistence of ‘otherness’ within it, rather like ‘a web or other piece of women work (in which) woof and warp cannot be fashioned of the same threads’ (*Laws* V, 734-735a).

The meaning of marriage depends on the difference between the men and women who enter into it” (282). This last sentence in their analysis alludes to the existence of private marriages in Magnesia and, therefore, to that of the individual household. In other words, the *polis* is not made into an extended *oikos*, as it is in the *Republic*, and, because the city is not arranged so as to exemplify complete and total unity, the Athenian thus makes concessions for contrasts, dissimilarities and, namely, sexual difference: he separates (χωρίσαι) men and women into two separate categories and assigns a proper mode and rhythm to each.

A further developmental shift is made clear in Plato’s treatment of gender in this late, in fact, the last Platonic dialogue. Whereas, in the *Republic*, Socrates maintains that guardian men and women share the same *physis* (Pl. *Resp*. 456a), for they are different from each other only in one respect (Pl. *Resp*. 454d-e), in the *Laws*, Plato recasts the argument; the two sexes differ from each other by nature (τῆς φύσεως ἑκατέρου διαφέροντι). To speak in Deleuzian terms, men and women do not simulate one another, as philosopher-kings and queens do in the *kallipolis*, where the simulacrum is at work, but they maintain their difference and make folds. Magnificent and courageous instincts, the Athenian continues, must be regarded as “masculine-looking” (ἀρρενωπὸν), while a tendency to modesty and restraint (ο δὲ πρὸς τὸ κόσμιον καὶ σῶφρον
must be presented as a rather feminine trait (θηλυγενέστερον). The use of the comparative here is really notable: it suggests that the masculine and feminine exist in relation to each other and that one can move along a spectrum of masculinity/femininity. Male and female elements, by collaborating and joining forces, thus constitute Magnesia’s inner sense of motion, articulated by the image of a scale that tends (ῥέπον) towards one side and slides back (ἀποκλῖνον) to the other. ἄρρενωπόν, in addition, implies that one adopts the traits of a man by looking or appearing manly, and a male can and should exhibit feminine traits; if we remember from the Statesman, the statesman is a weaver (τοῦ γὰρ ἐν καὶ ὀλον ἔστι βασιλικῆς ξυνωφάνσεως ἕργον), who weaves together (ξυγκερκίζον) self-restrained characters (σῷφρονα…ήθη) with the courageous or “manly” (τὸν ἀνδρείων ήθη) and draws together a smooth and well-woven fabric (λεῖον καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον εὐήτριον ὑφασμα ξυνάγοντα) (Pl. Plt. 310e-311a).

What the fold then enables us to recognize is that the Magnesian citizen is wholly enmeshed and involved in the political structure or assemblage and in such a way as to negotiate the hard and the soft. Plato revisits the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy of Republic Book X (παλαιὰ μὲν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφία τε καὶ ποιητική) (Pl. Resp. 607b) in Laws Book VII: the Athenian Stranger rejects comedy because it showcases “shameful bodies and thoughts” (τῶν αἰσχρῶν σωμάτων καὶ διανοημάτων) (Pl. Leg. 816d), but he considers the possibility of admitting serious poets, tragedians into Magnesia, provided that the performances do not differ ethically from what the lawgiver says and turn to representing truth:

ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ τάδε: “Ω ἀριστοί,” φάναι, “τῶν ξένων, ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν τραγῳδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλιστῆς ἁμα καὶ ἄριστης· πᾶσα οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἄριστου βίου, ὅ ὁ δὴ φαμεν ἡμεῖς ἃντως εἶναι τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην. ποιηταὶ μὲν οὖν ὑμεῖς, ποιηταὶ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν τῶν
αὐτῶν, ὑμῖν ἀντίτεχνοι τε καὶ ἀνταγωνισταὶ τοῦ καλλίστου δράματος, ὅ δ' ὡς νόμος ἀληθῆς μόνος ἀποτελεῖν πέρφυκεν, ὥς ἢ παρ’ ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἔλλογος· μὴ δὴ δόξητε ἡμᾶς ῥάδιος γε οὕτως ὑμᾶς ποτὲ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐάσον σκηνᾶς τε πῆξαντάς κατ’ ἀγοράν καὶ καλλιψόσους ὑποκρίτας εἰςαγαγομένους, μεῖζον φθεγγομένους ἡμῶν, ἐπιτρέψαν ὑμῖν δημιουργεῖν πρὸς παίδας τε καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τόν πάντα ὁχλον, τόν αὐτῶν λέγοντας ἐπιτηδευμάτων πέρι μὴ τα αὐτὰ ἀπέρ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ’ ὅς τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἑναντία τὰ πλείστα. σχεδὸν γὰρ τοι κἂν μανοὶ-μεθα τελέως ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἀπασα ἡ πόλις, ἠτιθοῦν ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέποι δράν τά νῦν λεγόμενα, πρίν κρίνα τάς ἀρχάς εἰτε ὅπῃ καὶ ἐπιτήδεια πεποίηκατε λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον εἰτε μή, νῦν οὖν, ὦ παίδες μαλακῶν Μουσών ἐκγονοὶ, ἐπιδειξάντες τοῖς ἄρχουσι πρότον τάς ὑμετέρας παρὰ τάς ἡμετέρας ὄδος, ἂν μὲν τα αὐτὰ γε ἡ καὶ βελτίο τὰ παρ’ ὑμῶν φαίνηται λεγόμενα, δώσομεν ὑμῖν χορόν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὦ φίλοι, οὐκ ἂν ποτε δυνάμεθα.” (Pl. Leg. 817b-d.)

[Ath.: ‘It seems good to me to say these things: ‘Most honored guests, we are creators of tragedy ourselves, and our tragedy is the finest and best according to our ability. At any rate, our entire state has been constructed so as to be a ‘representation’ of the finest and noblest life, the very thing we say is most genuinely the truest tragedy. Then we are poets, and we are poets of the same things, and your competitors as artists and actors of the finest drama, which true law alone has the natural power to accomplish, as it is our hope. So do not think that we will ever easily let you to set up stage in the marketplace and bring on your actors whose fine voices sound greater than ours, nor that we will let you declaim to women and children and the general public, and say not the same things as we say about the same institutions, but, on the contrary, things that are, for the most part, just the opposite. For we would be absolutely mad, and the entire city, to let you to do as we have now described before the authorities had decided whether your work was fit to be recited and suitable for public performance or not. So then, O sons of the soft Muses, first show your songs to the authorities for comparison with ours, and if your doctrines seem the same as or better than our own, we will let you produce your plays, but if not, O friends, that we could never do.’]}

This passage reinforces Magnesia’s choral performance: life in this city is defined by constant upkeep of the body, where citizens participate in age-specific choruses. Children present themselves “at the center” (es meson, 664c), inspired by the Muses, while those under thirty sing under the aegis of the god Paean, and the choral group of mature individuals between the ages of thirty and sixty years old is consecrated to Dionysus (Calame 92). The Athenian, at this place in
the text, explicitly describes Magnesia as a tragic performance and redefines tragedy as the life of his city: the entire state (πᾶσα...ἡ πολιτεία) has been composed so as to be a ‘representation’ of the most beautiful and noblest life (συνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου), the very thing that makes it the truest tragedy (τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην). The lawgiver writes the score to his tragedy, “true melody” or law (νόμος ἀληθῆς), which engages everyone, man and child, male and female, and his/her senses in the “finest drama” (τοῦ καλλίστου δράματος).

At this moment, Plato introduces the space of the theater, a feminine space, to his utopian paradigm. In his piece, “The Fold,” Deleuze writes against the Platonic model: “…the Platonic paradigm of weaving as a mesh remains on the level of textures but does not draw out the formal elements of the fold. For the Greek fold, as the Politics and the Timaeus demonstrate, presupposes a common measure between two terms that mix and therefore operates by means of circular movements which correspond to the repetition of the proportion” (1991: 246). I would point out, however, that a common measure is absent from Platonic descriptions of compounding and that, because mixing operates, not by means of repeating proportion or the same in Magnesia, but by repeating difference, folding and unfolding occur as an endless process in this dialogue. In other words, Magnesia, the entire city (ἀπασα ἡ πόλις), is arranged into folds, where the presence of the theater is one kind of fold: the folding inside of the forces of the outside. Imitation or acting that takes place inside the theater is reproduced on the outside, for, in the public sphere, citizens take part in their civic performance and tune their bodies to the laws of the city. The constitution itself represents mimēsis, a “representation of the most beautiful and the best life” (μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου), and truly “the truest tragedy” (ὅντως...τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην).

22 Laks also distinguishes the mimēsis of Laws Book VII from the triadic structure Form/product/reproduction illustrated in the Republic Book X with its three beds: “…the mimēsis of the Laws Book 7 is representation, while in the Republic Book 3 it is performance or enactment, in the Republic Book 10 reproduction” (2010: 222).
Lawgivers, in addition, are the competitors of tragedians, as artists and actors (ἀντίτεχνοι τε καὶ ἀνταγωνισταί), and essentially act as “super-poets;” the Athenian equates his line of profession with that of the poets: “we are poets” (ποιηταί μὲν οὖν ύμεῖς) and poets of the “same things” (ποιηταὶ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν τῶν αὐτῶν). For this reason, I would argue that although these more traditional tragedians would be prevented from declaiming to women and children and the general public (ὁμηγορεῖν πρὸς παῖδας τε καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὸν πάντα ὀχλον), “sons of the soft Muses” (παιδεύς μαλακῶν Μούσων ἔχονοι), the theater, as it would be practiced in Magnesia, would still encapsulate the notion of inversion and femininity. As a cavern in and of the greater world, which accommodates natural differences between the two sexes and feminine strains, “the fold” of the theater doubles the political sphere: citizens will receive a “musical education,” training in the feminine Muses (τὴν περὶ τὰς Μούσας παιδείαν) (Pl. Leg. 656c). The presence of the Muses in Magnesia’s curriculum suggests that they are not completely eradicated from the city, nor is their softness. By assuming the position of poets, then, lawgivers, to a certain degree, will become mild or gentle because they necessarily have to mix opposite elements in order to concoct a good and moderate potion. In this way, the interior space of the theater opens up to the outside and invites others into its soft tactile space, where these females serve as the point of connection between separate spheres.

Because Plato acknowledges the existence of a feminine nature in the Laws, women change the texture of the city: what is light plunges ceaselessly into shadow; the female sex (τὸ θῆλυ), born “secretive” (λαθραίωτερον) and “crafty” (ἐπικλοπώτερον) because of their “weakness” (διὰ τὸ ἀσθενὲς), lives in darkness, accustomed to crouching (εἰθισμένον γὰρ δεδυκὸς καὶ σκοτεινὸν ζῆν). We know that the female nature is inferior in goodness to the male (ἡ θῆλεια…φύσις ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν χείρων τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων) (Pl. Leg. 781a-c), and such
depravity, the Athenian Stranger argues, affects the entirety of the community:

ΑΘ. Τίνα οὖν ἐμπροσθὲν τὸν νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένων θείμεν ἂν τῆς κοινωνίας ταύτης ἢ νῦν αὐταῖς ἡμεῖς προστάττομεν; πότερον ἢ Θράκης ταῖς γυναιξίν χρύνται καὶ πολλὰ ἔτερα γένη, γεωργεῖν τε καὶ βουκολεῖν καὶ ποιμαίνειν καὶ διακονεῖν μὴδὲν διαφερόντως τῶν δοῦλων; ή καθάπερ ἡμεῖς ἀπαντές τε οἱ περὶ τὸν τόπον ἐκείνον; νῦν γὰρ δὴ τὸ γε παρ’ ἡμῖν ὃδε ἐστὶν περὶ τοῦτον γιγνόμενον: εἰς τινὰ μίαν ὀίκησιν συμφορήσαντες, τὸ λεγόμενον, πάντα χρήματα, παρέδομεν ταῖς γυναιξίν διαταμιεύειν τε καὶ κερκίδων ἄρχειν καὶ πάσης ταλασίας, ἢ τὸ τοῦτον δὴ διὰ μέσον φῶμεν, ὁ Μέγιλλε, τὸ Λακωνικόν; κόρας μὲν γυναιξικὸν μετόχους οὐσας ἁμα καὶ μουσικῆς ἥν δεῖν, γυναῖκας δὲ ἁργοῦς μὲν ταλασίας, ἀσκητικὸν δὲ τινὰ βιοῖν καὶ οὐδαμῶς φαύλον οὐδ’ εὐτελῆ διαπλέκειν, θεραπεῖας δὲ καὶ ταμείας αὐτῷ καὶ παιδοτροφίας εἰς τι μέσον ἀφίκνεσθαι, τοῦ δ’ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον μὴ κοινωνούσας, δέστε οὖν’ εἰ τί ποτε διαμάχεσθαι περὶ πόλεως τε καὶ παίδων ἀναγκαία τύχη γίγνοιτο, οὔτ’ ἂν τόξον, ὡς τινες Ἀμαζόνες, οὔτ’ ἂλλης κοινωνῆσαι ποτε βολής μετὰ τέχνης δύναμαι, οὐδὲ ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ λαβοῦσαι μιμήσασθαι τὴν θεόν, ὡς πορθομένης αὐταῖς τῆς πατρίδος γενναίως ἀντιστάσαις, φόβον γε, εἰ μηδὲν μείζον, πολεμίσσι δύνασθαι παρασχεῖν ἐν τάξει τινυ κατοφθεῖςας; Σαυρομάτιδας δὲ οὖν’ ἂν τὸ παράπαν τολμήσειν μιμήσασθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαμιᾶσαι, παρὰ γυναίκας δὲ αὐτάς ἀνδρεῖς ἂν αἱ εἰκεῖν γυναῖκες φανείειν. ταῦτ’ οὖν ὑμῶν τοὺς νομοθέτας ὁ μὲν βουλόμενος ἐπανεῖν ἐπανεῖτο, τὸ δ’ ἐμὸν οὐκ ἄλλως ἀν λεχθεῖν· τέλεσον γάρ καὶ οὐ διήμερον δεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην εἶναι, τὸ θήλο μὲν ἄφιντα τρυφᾶν καὶ ἀναλίσκειν διαίταις ἀτάκτως χρώμενον, τοῦ δὲ ἄρρενος ἐπιμεληθέντα, τελέως σχεῦν εὐδαίμονος ἡμεῖς βιοῦ καταλείπειν ἀντὶ διπλασίου τῇ πόλει. (Pl. Leg. 805d-806c.)

[Ath.: ‘Then which of the systems now in vogue shall we prescribe in preference to that fellowship which we are now imposing upon them? Shall it be that of the Thracians, and many other tribes, who employ their women in tilling the ground and minding oxen and sheep and toiling just like slaves? Or that which obtains with us and all the people of our district? The way women are treated with us at present is this—we huddle all our goods together, as the saying goes, within four walls, and then hand over the dispensing of them to the women, together with the control of the shuttles and all kinds of wool-work. Or again, shall we prescribe for them, Megillus, that midway system, the Laconian? Must the girls share in gymnastics and music, and the women abstain from wool-work, but weave themselves instead a life that is not trivial at all nor useless, but arduous, advancing as it were halfway in the path of domestic tendance and management...']
and child-nurture, but taking no share in military service, so that, even if it should chance to be necessary for them to fight in the defense of their city and their children, they will be unable to handle with skill either a bow, like the Amazons, nor could they join the men in deploying any other missile. They would not be able to take up the shield and copy Athena, so as to terrify the enemy, if nothing more, by being seen in some kind of battle-array gallantly resisting the destruction threatening their native land. If they lived in this manner, they certainly would not dare to adopt the fashion of the Sauromatides, whose women would seem like men beside them. So in regard to this matter, let who will commend your Laconian lawgivers: as to my view, it must stand as it is. The lawgiver ought to be whole-hearted, not half-hearted,—letting the female sex indulge in luxury and expense and disorderly ways of life, while supervising the male sex; for thus he is actually bequeathing to the state the half only, instead of the whole, of a life of complete prosperity.’]

In his defense of the view that the female sex should share with the male in education and everything else (Pl. Leg. 805c-d), the Athenian provides a description of various practices and cultural contexts that women inhabit. In this way, he composes a pseudo-ethnography, as he gathers a record of the different ways in which women are treated and the roles that they adopt. In his review, the Athenian shows us how the habits of people change, as contexts and environments differ, and draws attention to the experimental nature of his project, in which he constructs and puts together sea/liquid/body/theater movement: the Magnesian assemblage.

A citizen of this city navigates multiple transformations, folds of the world. That is, because this person is woven into the fabric of Magnesia, which rests on sexual difference, he/she, in turn, expresses this difference; the world is sifted through the subject. Women, in fact, and their different natures are necessary to this structure, for they make mixing possible and weave (διαπλέκειν) future paths, a life that is not trivial at all nor useless but laborious (ἀσκητικὸν δὲ τινα βίον καὶ οὐδαμώς φαινον οὐδ’ εὕτελη). The repetition of μιμήσασθαι, furthermore, emphasizes the staged performance and, again, links up the feminine to the theater: the Athenian critiques the Spartan system, where women, who take no share in military service
(εἰς τὸν πόλεμον μὴ κοινωνούσας), would not be able to take up the shield and “copy” the goddess (μιμήσασθαι τὴν θεόν).

Since “reproduction” (mimēsis) increases diversity and leads to a further number of possibilities, the presence of women and their contribution are absolutely crucial to maintain the composition of this city. It is a mixed constitution between two “mother” forms of government (πολιτείων οἶνον μητέρες δύο), monarchy and democracy; a city without share of both would not be governed well (οὐκ ἂν ποτε τούτων πόλεις ἁμοιρος γενομένη πολιτευθῇ δύναιτ’ ἂν καλῶς) (Pl. Leg. 693d-e). This is another way in which the Magnesian subject expresses and is expressed by the world, for, by mixing with another, he/she perpetuates the mixture of the city. For this reason, then, women must be incorporated into the public sphere: by taking care of the male sex (τοῦ δὲ ἄρρενος ἐπεληθέντα), the lawgiver leaves to the state only half of prosperity instead of the whole (εὐδαιμονος ἡμισώ καταλαείπειν ἄντι διπλασίου τῇ πόλει). In other words, the natural difference of the female sex affirms multiplicity, which defines Magnesia’s inherent texture. Women comprise one-half of the koinōnia, and, therefore, the inclusion of the sea of their vital energy maximizes the state’s happiness. This is the common sense or aesthetic towards which Magnesia is geared, which is, at heart, a feeling or sense-perception (aisthēsis), and it is, at the same time, transcendent or metaphysical: happiness.

What I hope to have made clear in my discussion of the Laws is that a version of the Deleuzian critical assemblage is already present in Magnesia. In this paradigm, we find a collection of heterogeneous elements, diverse things brought together in a series of particular relations: the connection between sea and land and the subsequent conflation that occurs between these two terrains, the association between preambles and laws, the partnership between male and female bodies, maintained by marriages, and, finally, the co-existence of private and public
spheres. These components exist in a relation of mixing and participate in political folds, which define the political relation that is found in Magnesia. Whereas, in the Republic, the entire city feels pleasures and pains as one, for the kallipolis is a perfectly unified structure, in the Laws, citizens exist in a relation, whereby they retain their unique qualities, intersect in a fold and repeat their difference, such as in the institution of marriage. This is how citizens live in the political community: by engaging with one another’s senses and sensibilities, intermingling, ruling and being ruled, for, fundamentally, Magnesia is a mixed constitution between monarchy and democracy, and I will expand on the notion of ruling and being ruled in my discussion of the creation of the political relation in Chapter 3. Also it is my belief, that by tracing Plato’s gendered line of thinking in the dialogues, we get to the heart of his political projects: in each case, in both the Republic and the Laws, the treatment of women and the topic of marriage is expressive of the greater world, contained by these utopian models, which he builds and assembles.
Ch. 2

In the Realm of the Senses: Political Affects

“Only the physical self can be tied.” – N. Araki

I. The Time-Image

The conclusion at which we arrived in the last chapter, that the metaphysical feminine corresponds to sensation, perhaps even (feminine) intuition, will be further explored in the following discussion. In this chapter, I will focus on the chain of degeneration portrayed in Republic Book VIII and show how the political relation that Socrates established in his construction of the kallipolis dissolves, where each new political formation is determined by the reorganization of the senses. I will apply Deleuze’s concept of the time-image to my reading of Book VIII, so, first, I will define this term of the theoretical framework through which I view the work. The time-image is a type of cinematic image that moves beyond motion, by freeing itself of the “sensory-motor” link to a “pure optical and sound” (tactile) image: “In everyday banality, the action-image and even the movement-image tend to disappear in favour of pure optical situations, but these reveal connections of a new type, which are no longer sensory-motor and which bring the emancipated senses into direct relation with time and thought” (Deleuze 1989: 17). By “sensory-motor,” Deleuze means the apparatus whereby action follows from the sensory act of perception—we see and act, we see in order to act—namely, actions and activities of the body. More generally, the rupture between these two components comes back to a break in the link between man and the world.

Because of this very loosening of the sensory-motor linkage, characters cease to have the ability to perform the actions necessary to solve a problem (Rushton 64) in the time-image, which evolves from the movement-image. The two types of images are related because both are
of the same genre and no longer depict action in a narrative sequence. To clarify what I mean, I will use the example of a road trip. Instead of seeing each step and every stage of a road trip as linked up through time, where the entirety of the route is constituted by a collection of mile markers, we could, on the other hand, see a flowing movement—a continuous passage from one point to another—which we then cut up into distinct measurements or stops on the road. The movement-image destroys the position of a fixed observer, who synthesizes time into a static whole, and, therefore, we get an indirect sense of a whole composed of different durations, an indirect sense of time. Instead of there being things in space which then move, with time being the totality within which movement takes place, there are multiple movements (Colebrook 2002: 48). With the time-image, the unified whole of the journey is a process of change and duration, that is, a direct presentation of time or intensive flow: cinema, as a medium, has the possibility of reducing this depiction to perceptions, concepts and affects, disengaged from immediate action, producing a domain of thought that can bear a relation to time, that can think time (Colebrook 2002: 41). There is a flow of time, which produces worlds or durations.

In my analysis of Book VIII, I will argue that Plato’s account of the kallipolis’ decline is driven by the Deleuzian time-image. This theoretical concept is relevant because of what the time-image accomplishes, which is pure becoming: if we really confront time or duration, we see a single flow of becoming; time is a becoming without ground, without foundation (Colebrook 2002: 50). What makes the time-image particularly germane and interesting for our conversation, furthermore, is that it expresses positive becoming, which has a different political orientation: “[t]he direct time-image here does not appear in an order of coexistences or simultaneities, but in a becoming as potentialization, as series of powers” (Deleuze 1989: 275). That is to say, it does not just free us from fixed images by indicating the flow of history from which we have
emerged; it presents the creative flow of time as becoming or the opening to the future
(Colebrook 2002: 50). The application of the time-image will illuminate the path that the
kallipolis takes, where the gendered body acts as the motor of change (metabolē). At the most
fundamental level, the decline of the ideal city is a generational process and portrays the very
power of becoming through bodies that decay, grow and transform. The time-image, as a flow of
images or perceptions, will thus enhance the sensible intensities of every city, what we can call
“political affects,” and shed light on the affective force of sensation. By “affect,” I mean
intensities or the becoming of qualities: say, “…the burning and wavering infra-red light that we
eventually see as red” (Colebrook 2002: 39). The feminine principle is eternal or metaphysical
precisely because it generates or becomes: sense presents an opening to the future and leads us to
worlds within other worlds.

II. Muses

In Book VIII of the Republic, when the kallipolis is undone, the feminine inspires this
trajectory. In order to explain the process of change, Plato has Socrates invoke the Muses,
“…these females with their transcendent knowledge in the sphere of reproduction who know the
ἀρχή ‘origin’ of why the ideal state will fall” (Bergren 2008a: 252):

Φέρε τοίνυν, ἣν δ’ ἑγώ, πειρώμεθα λέγειν τίνα τρόπον
tιμοκρατία γένοιτ’ ἂν ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας. ἂ τόδε μὲν ἀπλοῦν,
ὅτι πάσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει εξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τάς
ἀρχὰς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται ὑμνοούντος
δὲ, κἂν πάνω ὀλίγον ἤ, ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι;
"Εστι γάρ οὕτω.
Πώς οὖν δή, εἶπον, ὁ Γλαύκων, ἢ πόλις ἢμιν κινηθή-
ζεται, καὶ πὴ στασιάσουσιν οἱ ἐπίκουροι καὶ οἱ ἀρχοντες
πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτούς; ἢ βούλει, ὡσπερ
Ὀμηρος, εὐχώμεθα ταῖς Μούσαις εἰπεῖν ἢμιν ὡς ὅπως ἥ
πρῶτον στάσις ἐμπέσε, καὶ φῶνεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς ὡς
πρὸς παιδάς ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἔρεσχηλούσας, ᾧς δή
σπουδὴ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν; (Pl. Resp. 545c-e.)

[Soc: ‘Well, then, let’s try to explain how timocracy emerges from aristocracy. Or is it a simple principle that the cause of change in any constitution is civil war breaking out within the ruling group itself, but so long as it is at one with itself, however small it be, the constitution cannot be changed?’
Gl.: ‘Yes, that is so.’
Soc.: ‘How, then,’ I said, ‘Glaucón, will our city be changed, and how will civil war arise, either between the auxiliaries and the rulers, and the rulers or within either group? Or do you want us to be like Homer and pray to the Muses to tell us ‘how civil war first broke out?’ And shall we say that they speak to us proudly in tragic tones, as if they were speaking zealously, playing and jesting with us as if we were children?’]

Socrates’ performative gesture introduces the time-image into the narrative: first of all, he encounters a blockage of sensory-motor ability and faces the limitations of his own rational capacity. That is, he has difficulty explaining “in what way timocracy emerges from aristocracy” (λέγειν τίνα τρόπον τιμοκρατία γένοιτ’ ἂν εὖ ἄριστοκρατίας) and presses his audience to try: “let us try” (πειρώθη). There is a sort of failure, on his part, to speak and to react to what the situation demands. Socrates, therefore, has to search outside of himself in order to find inspiration and turns to the Muses for guidance: as authoritative sources, these goddesses have access to the cause of civil war, how it first broke out (ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον στάσις ἔμεσε); they understand fluctuation, experienced in the characters that tip the scales of balance and drag the rest along with them (…ἐκ τῶν ἡθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἂν ὀσπερ ῥεγαντα τάλλα ἐφελκύσηται) (Pl. Resp. 544e). With this speech-act, Socrates steps outside the realm of the actual—the world as it is—and enters into the cinematic world of the virtual, which presents the imaging and connection processes from which any world could be perceived (Colebrook 2002: 53). In this case, as the city changes (πολιτεία μεταβάλλει), it will open onto various backdrops and scenes, which become their own image. This is the time-image in the Republic: the city’s metabolē.
Plato has Socrates appeal to the Muses because his tale of decline, essentially, portrays the production of *logoi*; the change that takes place in the ideal city is actually the product of the philosopher’s becoming and pregnant soul. Cities that constitute the narrative thus illustrate the notion of flux in more sense than one, for they are squeezed out of the brain and body and portray the process of spiritual birth. This is why Socrates has to speak a feminine language, which makes itself available to a “cinema of the senses:” he is giving birth, as he strives to locate the cause of civil war and decay, and makes the passage of time perceptible by the senses, as he recalibrates the sensory experience of his own body. That is to say, Plato has Socrates make time felt by deploying a cinematic technique, more specifically, a pure sound situation, once the sensory-motor action gives way: he has his character revert to another system of signs, mode of being or way of navigating his environs, one that belongs to the Muses.

Socrates punctuates his speech with questions and asks Glaucon to consider, “Or do you want us to be like Homer and pray to the Muses to tell us ‘how civil war first broke out?’” The conjunction “or” (ἦ) indicates a shift in their approach, suspended by additional intervals introduced by “as if” (ὡς…ὡς), which produce music, incorporated as poetry into philosophical dialectic; the Muses speak a sublime language (ὑψηλολογουμένας) “in tragic style” (τραγικῶς), simultaneously vigorous or “serious” (σπουδῇ) and playful (παιζούσας). At this time, we notice that the account of *metabolē* moves beyond motion, though “our city will be moved” (ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν κινηθήσεται), because it transports and carries the scene into a different world, which has its own layers of intensities, affects and (sublime) expressions. Every new city, furthermore, will be achieved, as a consequence of *stasis*, an indication that the city is no longer one (ὥμοοο徇ντος) and what exacerbates the impossibility of a normal sensory-motor response. In terms of the *Republic*, the “correct” or proper sensory-motor response is that which is determined by pleasure
and pain and by the ability to experience these sensations in unison (Pl. Resp. 462c-e). What the application of Deleuze’s time-image then exposes is the silhouette or shades of a less than ideal or imperfect world, both in the greater surroundings of Socrates himself and in the perimeters of his thought experiment, after the kallipolis sets off on its course of degeneration. For this reason, metabolē, at heart, is a tragedy: a feminine and feminizing register, where mousikē works as a true other and “foreign body,” it encapsulates the “pathetic” and painful experience of the philosopher in labor and expresses his delivery, which is another passing of generations or vital strain of pure becoming.

In Melville’s Bartleby the Scrivener, the narrator imagines the sheer vacancy of downtown Manhattan on Sundays: “Think of it. Of a Sunday, Wall Street is deserted as Petra, and every night of every day it is an emptiness” (29). In the Republic, the city itself is portrayed as a cavity, which undergoes periods and cycles of revolution:

’Ωδὲ πως. χαλεπὸν μὲν κινηθήναι πόλιν οὕτω συστάσαν· ἀλλὰ ἐπεὶ γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορὰ ἐστίν, οὐδ’ ἢ τοιαύτη σύστασις τὸν ἀπαντὰ μενεῖ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ λυθήσεται. λύσις δὲ ἤδη· οὐ μόνον φυτῶς ἐγγείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζῷοις φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγονται, ὅταν περιτροπαὶ ἐκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς συνάπτωσι, βραχυβίοις μὲν βραχυπόρους, ἐναντίοις δὲ ἐναντίας. γένους δὲ ὑπερένων εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἀφορίας, καίπερ ὅτες σοφοὶ, οὕς ἠγεμόνας πόλεως ἔπαιδεύσασθε, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λογισμὸν μετ’ αἰσθήσεως τεῦξονται, ἀλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτοῦς καὶ γεννήσουσι παῖδας ποτε οὐ δέον. ἔτσι δὲ θείῳ μὲν γεννητῇ περίοδος ἦν ἄριθμος περιλαμβάνει τέλειος…

σύμπας δὲ οὕτως ἄριθμος γεω-μετρικός, τοιοῦτοι κύριοι, ἀμεινόνων τε καὶ χειρόνων γενέσεων, ὡς ὅταν ἀγνοήσαντες ὑμῖν οἱ φύλακες συνοικίσαντι, νύμφας νυμφίοις παρὰ καιρόν, οὐκ εὕφυεῖς οὖδ’ εὔφυεῖς παῖδες ἔσονται· (Pl. Resp. 546a-d.)

[‘Something like this. It is difficult for a city composed in this way to be disturbed, but since everything that comes into being must perish, not even such a constitution will last forever, but it too will be dissolved. And this will be the dissolution. All plants that grow in the earth and also all animals that grow upon it
have periods of fruitfulness and barrenness of soul and body, whenever the revolutions complete the circumferences of their circles, short for the short-lived and the opposite for their opposites. And the people whom you have educated to be leaders in your city, although they are wise, will not, through calculation together with sense-perception, hit upon fertility and barrenness of your species, but it will escape them, and so at some time they will beget children when they ought not to. For the birth of a divine creature, there is a cycle which a perfect number comprehends…This whole geometrical number controls better and worse births. When your rulers, through ignorance of these births, join brides and grooms at the wrong time, the children will be neither good natured nor fortunate.’

Socrates assumes his position as the mouthpiece of these goddesses, and we hear the Muses’ song in free indirect speech; they tell us “something like this” (Ὅδε πως): nothing lasts forever, and love exists among the ruins (φθορά). As we saw in Book VI, Plato draws on the feminine perspective as a frame for discussion and constructs a female voice, which casts the course of decline as a path of regeneration and reproduction. As Diotima in the Symposium embodies the female experience, so the Muses here play a similar role: they provide a spring of procreative metaphors and gendered-polarized vocabulary to exploit and to amplify pregnant imagery.23

Plants and animals are embedded in the earth (φυτοῖς ἐγγείοις…ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζῴοις), described as a womb that also contains death. If we remember the noble lie, in this “Phoenician tale” (Pl. Resp. 414d-415c), men dwell in the earth: they are “molded” and “nursed” inside the earth (γῆς ἐντὸς πλαττομένοι καὶ τρεφόμενοι); the earth is their “mother” (μήτηρ) and sends them up (ἀνήκεν) to the land above. Men are warriors, who defend the land (χώρας) as their mother (μητρός) and nurse (τροφοῦ) and comprise the citizen body as “earthborn brothers” (ἀδελφῶν…γηγενῶν). Socrates’ muthos also echoes the discourse of the Kerameikos, where Pericles describes the entire earth as a tomb for glorious men (ἀνδρῶν γὰρ ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα γῆ τάφος) (Thuc. 2. 43).

Drawing on the familiar language of the Muses, Socrates enters into a passage, where the

23 Halperin asks, “Why is Diotima a woman?” and argues that Socrates’ male voice at once embodies and disembodies Diotima’s female presence, turning ‘pregnancy’ into a mere image of (male) spiritual labor (117).
speech act passes from the direct to the indirect style that obscures its origin and does not allow itself to be fixed with the first person. Ὑδὲ πῶς, echoing Glaucon’s question, “In what way?” (πῶς;), introduces the narration and the act of storytelling, which produces a new subjectivity and reinforces the simulacrum of Socrates, as a man who wears the mask of woman. The indiscernibility of the character voice and the blurring of his identity, created by the *trompe l’oeil* effect of the simulacrum, because they remove a sense of reference, suggest, in turn, the emancipation of viewpoint. What the posture implies is a sort of “camera consciousness,” defined by Deleuze as a “new conception of the frame and reframings” (1989: 23). That is, the theoretical concept “camera consciousness” is applicable to the narrative development of the passage, for it opens with Ὑδὲ πῶς, which acts, in a way, like the lens of camera that serves as a bridge between outside and inside worlds and works like a frame. This is to say that the account of *metabolē* is cinematic because, by opening up ecphrastically, it breaks experience down into irrational singularities and displays these kinds of cuts, between juxtaposed images that form a multiplicity. According to Deleuze in *Cinema 2*, irrational cuts show us the limits of our own historical time and present inhuman durations.

I mention the idea of “camera consciousness” because *metabolē* captures duration and time beyond which is our own and Socrates’; it is change, time and duration, and, even more than this, gendered time. What I mean exactly is that the free indirect style develops the self-consciousness of the “camera,” the mind’s eye that sees, and fuses the representing and the represented in Socrates, who is the narrator and, at the same time, the narrated, in his state of flux. Ὑδὲ πῶς then presents a window into another domain, into his inner psyche, and shows us the processes of his mind, in its course as it becomes. What we look into is a beyond, once Socrates lifts the frame, as it were; in his account, he describes circles of time, and every phase is
periodic, whenever revolutions complete the circumferences of their circles (περιτροπαὶ ἐκάστοις κύκλων περιφοράς συνάπτωσι), defined by intervals of fertility and barrenness of soul and body that “come into being” (φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνονται), for both plants and animals living on earth (φυτοῖς ἐγγείοις…ἐπιγείοις ζῴοις). These stages are short for the short-lived (βραχυβίοις…βραχυπόρους) and the opposite for their opposites (ἐναντίοις δὲ ἐναντίας).

The rhythms of the philosopher’s body produce the delineations of this cycle and portray a kind of ecosystem, in which both plants and animals constitute the living. What this description suggests, then, is a parallel experience between two composite parts—city and soul, body and soul, inner and outer—because each has periods of fruitfulness and barrenness of soul and body, what entails “gendered time.” Time consists in intervals of generative cycles, dictated by the nuptial number, which also determines the fruitfulness and sterility of the human race, “your species” (γένους…ὕμετέρου εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἁφορίας). Time consists in reproduction, and it is feminine. As pure becoming, because time becomes, this is the time of sensation. What the time-image allows us to grasp is the very becoming of life, which originates from the pregnant philosopher.

The collapse of the *kallipolis* is traceable to a lapse in a certain kind of judgment, which is grounded in sensation; Plato’s cosmological system consists in the harmony between reason and sense-perception (λογισμῷ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως). This tension is expressed by the presence of the perfect number (ἀριθμὸς τέλειος), where considerations about a cosmic cycle (περίοδος) of divine engendering (θείῳ…γεννητῷ) are placed next to considerations about a biological life cycle of human engendering. In a complicated formula, Socrates computes the human geometrical number:

\[24\]

With regard ἑῖῳ γεννητῷ, there was an ancient dispute about what exactly Plato thought was being engendered (McNamee and Jacovides 33).
...ἄνθρωπείῳ δὲ ἐν ὧν πρῶτῳ αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναι τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λαβοῦσαι ὁμοιοῦντον τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦντον καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν· ὃν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεῖς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται τρις αὐξηθεῖς, τὴν μὲν ἴσην ἴσαίκες, ἐκατόν τοσσατάκες, τὴν δὲ ἴσομῆκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δὲ, ἐκατόν μὲν ἁρμῷδον ἀπὸ διαμέτρου ῥητῶν πεμπάδος, δεομένων ἐνὸς ἐκάστων, ἄρρητον δὲ δυοῖν, ἐκατόν δὲ κύβων τριάδος. σύμπας δὲ ὅτους ἁρμῷδος γεωμετρικός, τοιῶν τοῦ κύριος, ἀμεινόνοιν τε καὶ χειρόνοιν γενέσεων... (Pl. Resp. 546b-d.)

[Soc.: ‘...for a human being, it is the first number in which are found root and square increases, comprehending three lengths and four terms, of elements that make things like and unlike, that cause them to wax and wane, and that render all things mutually agreeable and rational in their relations to one another. Of these elements, four and three, married with five, give two harmonies at the third augmentation. One of them is a square, so many times a hundred. The other is of equal length one way but oblong. One of its sides is one hundred squares of the rational diameter of five diminished by one each or one hundred squares of the irrational diameter diminished by two each. The other side is a hundred cubes of three. This whole geometrical number controls better and worse births...’]
The complexity of the geometric number enhances its aesthetic significance and the aesthetic experience of the *kallipolis*. We know that the *arithmos geometrikos* somehow expresses the inexpressible, built on a mobile succession of numbers: drawn by augmentations dominating and dominated (*αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναι τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι*), it has a life of its own, apprehending three distances and four limits (*τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λαβοῦσαι*), of the assimilating and the dissimilating (*ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων*), waxing and waning (*αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων*). These are the elements that make all things conversable and commensurable with one another (*πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλα*). At the same time, the number produces combinations, where four-thirds “paired” with five (*πεμπάδι συζυγεῖς*) generates two harmonies (*δύο ἁρμίνιας*).

After numbers enter into a union of their own, man (*ὁ ἐπίτριτος*) and woman (*ἡ πεπάς*), make children: the one the product of equal factors, so many times a hundred (*τὴν μὲν ἵσην ἱσάκις, ἐκατὸν τοσαυτάκις*), and the other of equal length one way but oblong (*τὴν δὲ ἱσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δὲ*). The latter is further developed and diminished into three sides, rational (*ῥητῶν*) and irrational (*ἀρρήτων*) diameters (*διαμέτρων*), and a hundred cubes of three (*ἐκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος*), the nuptial number. It behaves like a luminous source and exercises authority over better and worse births (*τοιούτου κύριος, ἠμεινόνων τε καὶ χειρόνων γενέσεων*), yet the point becomes point of view: these “becomings” (*γενέσεων*) constitute a series of projections of the perfect number, which is simultaneously what is projected onto each plane and the commanding point of view.

That is, the absence of the *arithmos teleios* represents a void, and its indeterminacy removes the center, which becomes almost optical, where such an effect is amplified by the intricacies of the nuptial number. What Plato accomplishes with this complicated formula is the
creation of reliefs, perspectives and projections, which articulate the bones of the utopian arrangement, along which the *kallipolis* will travel. This is to say that the *kallipolis* promotes a mathematical existence, where every root and square, addition and subtraction are made to fit and to agree with one another for the sake of the end product, which is harmony. Numbers involved in the calculation, furthermore, are gendered, for certain elements are male and female, “yoked” or “married” (συζυγεῖς) to others, and this is the very factor that contributes to the city’s change and exacerbates its groundless center: marriages will lead to reproductions, becomeings and, ultimately, to shifts in the levels of affect. This is why the geometric number is also known as the “nuptial number:” it presides over better and worse births, constituted by modulations of its own.

The feminine principle will continue to be omnipresent in the account of *metabolē*, as it guides the unraveling of the chain; the human geometrical number makes clear that the degeneration of the *kallipolis* rests on generational cycles, which are brought to light by the female body. Gender, in fact, is highly thematized in Socrates’ description, for Plato has the Muses speak through the medium of someone else’s body:

…ἀς ὑπάνει ἁγνησαντες υμῖν οἱ φυλακές συνοικίζωσιν νύμφας νυμφίοις παρὰ καιρόν, οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ’ εὐτυχεῖς παῖδες ἔσονται· ἀν καταστήσουσι μὲν τοὺς ἀρίστους οἱ πρότεροι, ὅμως δὲ ὄντες ἀνάξιοι, εἰς τὰς τῶν πατέρων αὐτῶν δυνάμεις ἐλθόντες, ἤμων πρῶτον ἄρξονται ἀμελεῖν φύλακες ὄντες, παρ’ ἐλαττὼν τοῦ θεοῦ ζώσανοι τὰ μουσικῆς, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς, ὃθεν ἀμουσότεροι γενήσονται ὑμῖν οἱ νέοι. ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἄρχοντες οὐ πάνυ φυλακικοὶ καταστήσονται πρὸς τὸ δοκιμάζειν τὰ Ἡσιόδου τε καὶ τὰ παρ’ ὑμῖν γένη, χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν καὶ σίδηροννόμος δὲ μιγέντος σιδηροῦ ἀργυροῦ καὶ χαλκοῦ χρυσοῦ ἀνομίας ἐγγενήσεται καὶ ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος, ἂ γενόμενα, οὐ ἐν ἑγγένηται, αἰεί τίκτει πόλεμον καὶ ἐχθραν. ταύτης τοις γενεής χρή φάναι εἰναι στάσιν, ὑπὸ ἄν γίγνηται αἰεί. (Pl. Resp. 546d-547a.)
To a certain extent, Socrates enacts a “beautiful death,” described by Vernant as “…a photographic developer that reveals in the person of the fallen warrior the eminent quality of the anēr agathos” (51), in the sense that he departs from his body, by acting as the mouthpiece of these goddesses, and leaves behind a corpse in the physical domain, as he approaches the divine.

With respect to the Homeric tradition, Vernant understands the experience of the kalos thanatos to be a metaphysical one: “The fatal blow that strikes the hero liberates his psuchē, which flees the limbs, leaving behind its strength and youth. Yet for all that, it has not passed through the gates of death. Death is not a simple demise, a privation of life; it is a transformation of which the corpse is both the instrument and the object, a transmutation of the subject that functions in and through the body…The hero survives in the permanence of his name and the luster of his renown…” (68). What I am trying to suggest is that metaphysical change, as it is portrayed in the Republic, is embedded in and occurs in the phenomenal realm: Socrates achieves his splendor by impersonating the Muses; he achieves the beautiful death in the performance of logoi.

The philosopher’s affects generate other affects: the two are linked and form an image of time. That is, each segment of the narrative of metabolē constitutes a “becoming-image,” a world which becomes its own image, and breaks experience down into irrational singularities by
removing a sense of reference. In this case, the Plato has the Muses reveal their knowledge in their song, but truly it is Socrates who speaks, to create the effect of multiple voices, an internal dialogue, a voice in another voice. One way in which the subjective dissociation of the voice and the body is achieved is illustrated by the prepositional phrase παρ’ ὑμῖν, which echoes Ἦμων, but, outside of the frame, “us” refers to the other, namely, the Muses, and “you,” to the self, Socrates and his interlocutors. Subject/object confusion, more precisely, the obliteration between self and other, works to elide any borders between the two and illuminates both the intersection and fusion of two separate entities. The emotional remapping of the philosopher thus filters down into the redistribution of sensations in the *kallipolis*: mismatches lead to the waning of affect; rulers “fail to perceive” (ἀγνοήσαντες) and, when the nuptial number turns elusive, they join brides and grooms at inappropriate times (συνοικίζωσιν νύμφας νυμφίους παρὰ καιρόν). At this critical juncture, they fail “to understand” and “to feel,” for the dual meaning of ἀγνοέω introduces this tension; the alliance between mind and body falls into disarray. Their children subsequently neglect the Muses, “neglect us” (ἡµῶν… ἀµελεῖν), music (tà µουσικῆς) and gymnastics (tà γυµναστικῆς) and lose their refined qualities (ἀµουσότεροι γενῆσονται).

The vital strain in Plato’s thought, furthermore, is emphasized by the presence of metals in the city. Already the beauty of this ideal city starts to disappear when leaders grow careless and remiss about testing (tà δοκιµάζειν) the golden, silver, bronze and iron races (χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν καὶ σιδηροῦν), which are Hesiod’s and “your own” (tà Ἡσιόδου τε καὶ tà παρ’ ὑµῖν γένη). This is a reference to the Myth of the Ages in Hesiod’s *Works and Days*, where the Golden Age degenerates in sequential races, which are brought to a complete stop, and then a new “race” is introduced (Hes. *Op.* 106-201). I draw attention to the Hesiodic leitmotif because the metals bring us into another a world within a world, namely, into the domain of
myth and poetry, both of which, from the Platonic viewpoint, represent more unstable media than theoretical and logical exegesis. These other genres, unreliable, flimsy and insubstantial in comparison, are nevertheless incorporated into the exposition: as Nightingale argues, Plato explicitly defines the mode of discourse used by the philosopher in opposition to the seductive language of poetry and rhetoric, but “…his dialogues confine themselves to dialectic” (2000: 3). Plato uses the natural quality of other genres, vehicles for the realm of flux, to portray the fluctuations that spring from civil war: the confusion of metals generates dissimilarity and disproportionate unevenness (ἐγγενήσεται καὶ ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος), which “come into being” (ἂν γενόμενα). These elements, in turn, always “give birth to” hostility and war (ἄει τίκτει πόλεμον καὶ ἐχθραν), wherever they “come into being” (ὅπου ἄν ἔγενηται). Poetry, overseen by the Muses, provides the preliminary training for higher reasoning, as well as the answers to philosophical problems, and furnishes a way out of the initial state of aporia, for Socrates finds the cause of change: civil war is always of this lineage (ταύτης τοι γενεῆς… εἶναι στάσιν), “wherever it arises” (ὅπου ἄν γίγνηται ἄει). Poetic material strands thus constitute the material matter of Socrates’ speech or discourse and intensify the notion of transformations; changes in the city ultimately are the philosopher’s own, products of his pregnant soul, and create a cinematic flow of becoming, illustrated by the proliferation of gignomai.

What we then witness in the philosopher’s production is a kind of dynamic round-trip journey: Socrates appeals to poetry and the Muses in order to come back out, that is, in order to expand his philosophical project, and, in fine, he puts the poetic genre in the service of philosophy. The narration continues as free-indirect style, when Socrates and Glaucon engage in a short exchange and turn again to their original source of inspiration: Καὶ ὃρθος γ’, ἔφη, αὐτὰς ἀποκρίνεσθαι φήσομεν./ Καὶ γάρ, ἥν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη Μούσας γε σοῦσας. (Pl. Resp. 547a.) [Gl.:
‘And we’ll declare that what the Muses say is right.’ Soc.: ‘It must be, since they’re Muses.’] It is a literary frame. In response to the question, Τί οὖν, ἢ δ’ ὄς, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν αἱ Μοῦσαι; (Pl. Resp. 547b) [Gl.: ‘What do the Muses say after that?’], Socrates reassumes his feminine mask:

Στάσεως, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, γενομένης εἰλκέτην ἅρα ἐκατέρω τῷ γένει, τὸ μὲν σιδηροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν ἐπὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ γῆς κτήσιν καὶ οἰκίας χρυσίου τε καὶ ἀργύρου, τὸ δ’ αὐ’hui, τὸ χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν, ἄτε οὐ πενομένω ἄλλα φύσει ὁντε πλουσίω, τὰς ψυχὰς ἔπι τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν ἡγέτην· βιαζομένουν δὲ καὶ ἀντιπεινόντων ἁλ-λήλοις, εἰς μέσον ὀμολόγησαν γῆν μὲν καὶ οἰκίας κατα-νειμαμένους ἰδιόστισθι, τοὺς δὲ πρὶν φυλαττομένους ὑπ’ αὐτὸν ὡς ἑλευθέρους φίλους τε καὶ τροφέας, δουλωσάμενοι τότε περιόικους τε καὶ οἰκέτας ἔχοντες, αὐτοὶ πολέμου τε καὶ φυλακῆς αὐτὸν ἐπιμελείσθαι. (Pl. Resp. 547b-c.)

[Soc.: ‘Once civil war breaks out,’ I said, ‘both the iron and bronze types were pulling against each other, towards money-making and the acquisition of land and houses, gold and silver, while, again, both the gold and silver types—not being poor, but by nature rich or rich in their souls—lead the constitution toward virtue and the old order. And thus striving and struggling with one another, they compromise on a middle way: they distribute the land and houses as private property, enslave and hold as serfs and servants those whom they previously guarded as free friends and providers of upkeep, and occupy themselves with war and with guarding against their subjects.’]

A decisive moment occurs once civil war “is born” (Στάσεως…γενομένης): wealth, together with fluid metals—for the bronze and iron groups lean towards money-making and acquiring land and houses (τὸ μὲν σιδηροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν ἐπὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ γῆς κτήσιν καὶ οἰκίας)—infiltrate the city, moving through its vessels as liquid streams; this is the movement-image. At the same time, gold and silver types, rich by nature or “rich in their souls” (φύσει ὁντε πλουσίω, τὰς ψυχὰς), lead the constitution toward virtue and the old system (ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν ἡγέτην). The growing presence of the dual—εἰλκέτην, ἐκατέρω τῷ γένει, πενομένω, πλουσίῳ, ἡγέτην—underscores the duality of the monadic kallipolis, now turning
Now I will take a moment to contextualize the opening stages of this exchange and tale of decline, which provides significant insight into the way that Plato does philosophy. That is, the juxtaposition of poetry and philosophy, which he sets up as two competing schools, reveals a certain vulnerability in his method, perhaps what we can take to be a “double dichotomy.” It is clear from the previous description of the *kallipolis*’ collapse that there is a kind of materialism to Plato’s thought; *stasis*, for example, floods the city as magnetic metals, attracting and attracted by one another, each towards its kind: bronze and iron towards other metallics, currency and their precious doubles, gold and silver. These, on the other hand, lean towards the goods in their souls (τὰς ψυχὰς), naturally packed with excellence (τὴν ἀρετὴν). Imagery of the pregnant soul, here and elsewhere, illustrates a practice and the struggle that accompanies the philosophical task, goals and aims of the philosopher: Plato relies on gendered analogies, metaphors and the realm of becoming, more generally, to reveal truth, in order to step away from these unstable vehicles and to gesture towards what truly is.

Plato has to use language to negotiate and to build the anatomy of philosophical discourse and, for this reason, falls back on common ways of speaking, understanding and conventional poetic tropes, for the sake of achieving something greater. This is what I mean by “double dichotomy:” on the one hand, a set of neat micro-definitions, exemplified by the realm of the forms and the neutral, *to kalon*, for instance, and, on the other, the cacophony of *muthoi*, in other words, the realm of flux, language and meta-language. I view the philosophical dialogue to be what Stanley Rosen describes in an interview as a “living conversation” or speech, a discussion in “real-time” or “happening,” where the philosopher engages in a constant exercise of defining and redefining; he reverts to analogies, metaphors and myths, in order to generate *logoi,* from
where truth may fall out. This is the round-trip passage that Plato has Socrates make: he engages with the Muses and the feminine and disembodies himself in order to express the idea of a mathematical form. Plato is not a relativist because he strives towards the ideal, but, at the same time, he is heavily invested and involved in the domain of change and fluctuation. The steps that define the mediation of this tension, between being and becoming, that he makes this kind of dynamic trip in the Republic and, more specifically, at the beginning of Book VIII, formulate the very vital strands and processes of Platonic philosophy.

Change in the kallipolis thus denotes change in more sense than one. While Socrates describes the shift to a timocracy and the sensational component of this experience is emphasized, the presentation of becoming works towards what Deleuze will call the “Idea:” a concept pushed beyond any possible experience (Colebrook 2002: 43), and it is not far from, even corresponds to, the concept of the Platonic form. That is, the cinematic presentation of the degeneration of the kallipolis goes beyond the actually given to the Idea of the image and opens up another possible reality, defined by truth:

Οὐκοῦν καὶ φειδωλοὶ χρηµάτων, ἂτε τιµῶν τας καὶ οὕ τοι φανερῶς κτώμενοι, φιλαναλωται δὲ ἄλλοτρίων δι’ ἐπιθυµίαν, καὶ λάθρᾳ τὰς ἡδονὰς καρποῦμενοι, ὡσπερ παῖδες πατέρα τὸν νόµον ἀποδιδράσκοντες, οὕτῳ πειθοῦς ἄλλ’ ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευμένοι διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς µετὰ λόγον τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἡµεληµέναι καὶ πρεσβυτέρως γοµµαστικῆν µουσικῆς τετµηµέναι. (Pl. Resp. 548b-c.)

[Soc.: ‘They will be stingy about money, since they value it and are not allowed to acquire it openly, but they’ll love to spend other people’s because of their appetites. They’ll enjoy their pleasures in secret, running away from the law like boys from their father, for since they’ve neglected the true Muse—that of discussion and philosophy—and have valued physical training more than music and poetry, they’ve haven’t been educated by persuasion but by force.’]

In the state of transition, lifelines of the city form themselves anew and redistribute. As money (χρηµάτων) and wealth drain civic morale—“…the acquisition of wealth, and indeed the failure
to acquire it, is chief among the social conditions which foment hatred and fear between classes and weaken their commitment both to their own social functions and to the social order which is built on the proper division of those functions” (Schofield 1993: 195)—people develop changing attitudes towards material goods and property. They are thrifty with their money (φειδωλοὶ χρηµάτων), since they start valuing it (τιµῶντες), not acquiring it openly (φανερῶς κτώµενοι), and grow fond of spending others’ because of their “desire” (φιλαναλωταὶ δὲ ἄλλοτρίων δι’ ἐπιθυµίαν). In turn, they enjoy their pleasures secretly (λάθρᾳ τὰς ἡδονὰς καρποῦµενοι) and flee the law, as sons do from their father (ὡσπερ παῖδες πατέρα τὸν νόµον ἀποδιδράσκοντες).

Contact with metals on the outside changes the direction of inward energy; appetites (ἡ ἐπιθυµία) and pleasures (αἱ ἡδοναί) flow through human veins, creating new angles and reshaping pre-existing relations.

The dissolution of the political relation that was established in the kallipolis, as it unfolds in divergent and differentiating becoming, portrays temporal distance. Channels of metals, pleasures and appetites enhance the intensities of change and carve their routes along the human body. The new generation, at this turning point, deems gymnastics more important than music (πρεσβυτέρως γυµναστικῆς µουσικῆς τετιµηκέναι), educated not by persuasion, but by violence (οὐχ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευµένοι). As a result, it neglects the “true Muse,” dialectic and philosophy (τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς µετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἠµεληκέναι). Plato grounds the experience of metabolê precisely in experience, processes of perception, in the city’s growth and decay. In other words, the decline of the kallipolis demonstrates systems and communities of moving things, which, in turn, present a vital flow of life, with the generation of new affects, and indicate the passage of time. That is, the becoming of these various elements constitutes duration because they anticipate the future and propel us from a past, defined by the
true Muse, *logoi*, philosophy and persuasion, which might also be a future. The simile, ὡσπερ παῖδες πατέρα, furthermore, suggests a generational gap between the older and the younger, as children escape (ἀποδιδράσκοντες) their fathers and forget their aristocratic backgrounds. In short, the feminine principle at work in this account, as it gives birth to new bodies and realities, manifests time. It is the true Muse that guides and informs this very process of evolution: she sits at the border among past, present and future times and represents that virtual point beyond what is actually given in the world. She represents that point of difference, sensation as persuasion and even life itself: being is generated from her becoming and continues to become. In this instance, we have a particular case where Platonic philosophy is comparable to the Deleuzian Idea, understood as the power for any series to extend itself beyond the actual and transcendental: Plato’s Muse creates new possibilities, ways of seeing and opens up various worlds.

III. In Passing

The theoretical framework allows us to follow strains of becoming in Plato’s thought and to revisit the structural dichotomy between *muthos* and *logos*, a topic which has long interested scholars. In his study, Frutiger argues that Plato uses diachronic quasi-mythological narrative to present a synchronic reality and, with respect to the *Timaeus*, notably observes, « …mythe et dialectique s’enchevêtrent d’une manière à peu près inextricable » (5). Edelstein and Schul pick up on this thread and also express the view that the philosopher interweaves two genres, the artistic raiment of poetry and dialectical argumentation: “The myths express in concrete terms abstract reasoning inaccessible to the vulgar” (Edelstein 21). Brisson in *Plato the Myth Maker* further situates Plato in the context of an oral tradition and writes: “By contrasting *muthos* to *logos* as non-falsifiable discourse to falsifiable discourse and as story to argumentative discourse,
Plato reorganizes, in an original and decisive way, the vocabulary of ‘speech’ in ancient Greek, in accordance with his principal objective: that of making the philosopher’s discourse the measure by which the validity of all other discourses, including and especially that of the poet, can be determined” (2000: 90). Plato is thus creative in reconstructing the formative and paradigmatic myths as ideas, which convey a system of values and inherited explanations.

In the same way that he uses myth, Socrates relies on other mimetic branches of creative activity to elucidate theory and clarifies his methodological approach:

Οὐκοὖν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, αὕτη μὲν ἡ πολιτεία οὔτω γεγονυῖα καὶ τοιαύτη ἄν τις εἶ, ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξαρκεῖν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς τὸν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, ἀμήχανον δὲ μήκει ἔργον εἶναι πάσας μὲν πολιτείας, πάντα δὲ ἣτοι μηδὲν παραλιπόντα διελθεῖν. (Pl. Resp. 548c-d.)

[Soc.: ‘This, then,’ I said, ‘is the way this constitution would come into being and what it would be like, for, after all, we’re only sketching the shape of the constitution in theory, not elaborating it precisely, since even the sketch will suffice to show the most just and the most unjust person. And, besides, it would be an intolerably long task to describe every constitution and every character without omitting any detail.’]

Plato has Socrates contextualize the exercise as a work of art or literature: he says that he is “tracing” (ὑπογράψαντα) the figure and not “filling it up with color” very precisely (μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι); it is enough to see the most just and unjust man from their “contour” (τὸ ἐξαρκεῖν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς τὸν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον). Socrates draws attention to the process of aesthetic production and the gestural strokes that make up his composition: he will manipulate the length (μήκει) of his project and omit (παραλιπόντα) some details in order to provide a general schema of the constitution in “word” or theory (λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας), conflated with the individual’s soul.

From the beginning, Socrates’ project is analogical; he compares the city and soul to big
and small letters, respectively, and describes justice in the city to find out about the soul because the city is bigger and easier to see (Pl. Resp. 368c-d). This analogy has generated much discussion in past scholarship. Williams, for instance, draws attention to the limitations of the analogy (53), while Lear has argued, “The Republic is a study in the health and pathologies of cities and psyches. And the conditions of city and psyche are interdependent” (188), a view subsequently critiqued by Ferrari. Burnyeat suggests that the psuche is even a kind of city: “…city and soul are increasingly fused. The city side of the analogy takes over. The soul is depicted in ever more vividly political terms, as if it were a city in which the three parts struggle for dominance over each other” (Burnyeat 1999: 226). Most recently, Brill has argued for the interdependence between city and soul—city and soul are co-constitutive—and said: “the role of the city is to provide prosthetic limits to the human soul by means of its laws, customs, institutions, etc. In doing so, it translates or applies orderly cosmic motion to human affairs and thus assures the flourishing of the whole” (204). To examine just and unjust figures under the condition of stasis, furthermore, one must consider their development, “imagistic character” and becomings: “Whatever giving an account of the power of justice and injustice in the soul means, it must include an account of the various forms of becoming just and unjust, as well as the contexts in which these possibilities arise. It is these processes of becoming that Glaucon overlooks when he presents for judgment two men who go unchanged to death” (Brill 104).

Soul and city, microcosm and macrocosm, this is a universe of its own, within another universe, and the conflation that exists between the two, which previous scholars have already noticed, sets the stage, in my view, for a Deleuzian reading of the analogy. While the philosopher displays the range of his toolkit—mythical, fabulous, symbolic and painterly—he creates textures of generational metamorphosis and throws the disappearance of their boundaries into
relief; his task is to illuminate how this constitution “would come into being,” for accomplishing this would somehow shed light on how it would exist and what it would be (τοιαύτη ἂν τις εἴη).

This is what I mean by Plato’s “cinematic narrative:” the description of metabolē conveys both motion and emotion, and it is a mobile, dynamic project. It presents both a theory of politics and a theory of cinema: the chain of political change is a cinematic one because it merges becoming realities into sensible intensities, affective forces and disorganized perceptions of the life that pulses through bodies, all of which have political ramifications.

The juxtaposition between city and soul in Book VIII establishes a cinematic sequence and operates by irrational and discontinuous cuts. That is, the metabolē of kallipolis breaks experience down into sections and effective components, from where the political emerges. This is why the feminine principle drives the articulation of this cycle: we see the way that feminine space also molds the individual, as it alters dispositions and reorients attitudes, a harbinger of flux. In a timocracy, money attracts, and people begin to adore gold and silver passionately in secret and keep private treasures (Pl. Resp. 548a). At the same time, the timocratic youth falls sway to the influence of his mother:

‘Ὅταν, ἣν δ’ ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τῆς μητρὸς ἄκουσιν ἀχθομένης ὁ δ’ ἄνηρ ἑστιν, καὶ ἐλαττομένης διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις γυναιξίν, ἐπειτα ὀρώσης μὴ σφόδρα περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζοντα μηδὲ μαχόμενον καὶ λοιδορούμενον ἴδια τε ἐν δικαστηρίωσι καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἄλλα ῥαθύμως πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα φέροντα, καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα ἀεὶ αἰσθάνεται, ἑαυτὴν δὲ μὴ πάντα τιμῶντα μὴτε ἀτιμᾶζοντα, ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων ἀχθομένης τε καὶ λεγούσης ὡς ἀνανδρός τε αὐτῷ ὁ πατήρ καὶ λίαν ἀνεμένος, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ ὅσα καὶ οἷα φιλούσιν αἱ γυναικὲς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑμεῖν. (Pl. Resp. 549c-e.)

[‘When he listens, first,’ I said, ‘to his mother complaining that her husband is not one of the rulers and that, because of this, she is at a disadvantage among the other women. Then she sees that he is not very concerned about money and that he does not fight back when he is insulted, whether in private or in public in the courts, but is indifferent to all such things, and she sees him concentrating his mind on his own thoughts, neither honoring nor dishonoring her overmuch. When she is
angered by all this and says to her son that his father is unmanly and far too easy-going, and all other things too that women tend to repeat in such cases.’)

The moment opens up ecphrastically and offers a snapshot of how the timocratic man comes to be (γίγνεται) (Pl. Resp. 549c), after listening to his mother, grieved by her husband, excluded from being one of the rulers (τῆς μητρὸς ἀκούῃ ἄχθομένης διτί οὐ τῶν ἄρχόντων αὐτῇ ὁ ἀνήρ ἔστιν). γίγνεται signals the dissipation and death of the subject, whose dissection is later exhibited; he is pulled in opposite directions (ἐλκόμενος ὑπ’ ἀμφότερον), towards reason in the soul (τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ), on the one hand, and the seat of desires (τὸ τε ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές), on the other (Pl. Resp. 550a-b). His own self disintegrates, while it is born anew; he lives in a badly-governed state (ἐν πόλει οἰκοῦντος οὐκ εὖ πολιτεύμενῃ) (Pl. Resp. 549c) and soaks up his mother’s concerns at home.

The presence of the mother and her influence in the oikos determine a new character and foster a certain kind of person, who differs from the aristocrat, formerly inhabiting the kallipolis. As the father figure retreats from political life, and the private family develops from the former polis, the young man grows up listening to his mother’s grievances. She complains that she is slighted among the other women (ἐλαττομένης διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις γυναικῶι), and seeing that her husband is not very concerned with money (ὁ ῥώσης μή σφόδρα περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζοντα) and flees the public courts (ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ), accuses him of being cowardly (ἄνανδρός) and growing careless (λίαν ἀνειμένος). These are the sorts of things that women tend to “sing” in such cases (οἶα φιλοῦσιν αἰ γυναῖκες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ύμνεύν). The narrative of free indirect style reinforces the instability of her point of view: ὃς acts as a marker of her mental attitude and removes her judgments from another plane of reality; she claims that her husband is lazy (ῥᾳθύμως), “unmanly” (ἄνανδρός) and loose (λίαν ἀνειμένος), though the phrase ἐαυτὸ…τὸν νόην προσέχοντα ἄει suggests that he leads a philosophical life; he looks
inward and “always turns his mind towards himself” (ἐαυτῷ μὲν τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα ἀεί). His behavior is what she “feels” (αἰσθάνηται). Her experience and the very shift in the domestic ambience portray an alteration in relationality and relations: in the form of a mother, who shapes the nexus of triangulation, while she changes, the female body draws her son towards the spirited elements in his soul. The female body gives birth to a new political body.

What I will illustrate in the following analysis is metabolē’s positive becoming, which also presents a creative flow of time and an amalgamation of temporal spans. In fact, it is my belief that the application of Deleuze’s time-image is useful because the concept brings out and enhances the various durations that are portrayed in the cycle of decline and the temporal hinge: liminality among past, present and future periods. The dialogue looks to the future, with the invention of the utopian paradigm in the kallipolis; as Socrates describes the city’s dissolution, the decline narrative is presented in the future tense: “it will be released” (λυθήσεται) (Pl. Resp. 546a). Yet, from this hypothetical future time, Plato subsequently moves into the present, when he compares Glaucon to the timocratic youth, on account of his “love of victory” (φιλονικίας) (Pl. Resp. 548d-e). The modulation from future to present is sustained, as Socrates describes the transition from timocracy to oligarchy:

Οὐκοῦν ὡς μεταβαίνει πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς τιμαρχίας εἰς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ῥητέον;
Ναί.
Καὶ μὴν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, καὶ τυφλῷ γε δὴλον ὡς μεταβαίνει.
Πῶς;
Τὸ ταμεῖον, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἔκεῖνον ἐκάστῳ χρυσίου πληροῦμενον ἀπόλλυσι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δαπάνας αὐτοῖς ἐξευρίσκουσιν, καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐπὶ τοῦτο παράγουσιν, ἀπειθοῦντες αὐτοὶ τε καὶ γυναίκες αὐτῶν.
Εἰκός, ἕρη.
Ἔπειτα γε οἶμαι ἄλλος ἄλλον ὅρον καὶ εἰς ζῆλον ἰὸν τὸ πλῆθος τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν ἀπηργάσαντο.
Εἰκός.
Τούντευθεν τοίνυν, εἶπον, προίόντες εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τοῦ χρηματίζοντες, άσω ἵνα τοῦτο τιμώτερον ἦγονται, τοσοῦτο ἁρετὴν ἀτιμοτέραν. ἢ οὔτε οὐχὶ πλοῦτον ἁρετῇ διέστηκεν, διοπτῇ ἐν πλάστιγγι ζυγοῦ κειμένου ἐκατέρω, ἀεὶ τούναντίον ἰέποντε; Ἐσπερέν, ἐὰν πλοῦτου ἐν πόλει καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἁρετῆρα ἁρετῇ τε καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ. (Pl. Resp. 550d-551a.)

[Soc.: ‘So mustn’t we first explain how timarchy is transformed into oligarchy?’
Ad.: ‘Yes.’
Soc.: ‘And surely the manner of this transformation is clear even to the blind.’
Ad.: ‘What is it like?’
Soc.: ‘The treasure house, which each possesses filled with gold, destroys the constitution. First, they invent ways of spending money for themselves, and they pervert the laws to this end, then they and their wives disobey the laws altogether.’
Ad.: ‘That is likely.’
Soc.: ‘And as one person sees another doing this and emulates him, they make the majority of the others like themselves.’
Ad.: ‘That is likely.’
Soc.: ‘From there they proceed further into money-making, and the more they value it, the less they value virtue. Or aren’t virtue and wealth so opposed, as if each lay in the scale of balance, they’d always incline in opposite directions?’
Ad.: ‘That’s right.’
Soc.: ‘So, when wealth and the wealthy are valued or honored in a city, virtue and good people are valued less.’]

The shift to the present tense suggests that Socrates’ context is closer to timocracy than to any possibility afforded by utopia. Or perhaps it might be more accurate to say that Socrates, by descending into the Piraeus and visiting the private home of Cephalus, has entered into a semi-aristocratic, timocratic enclave against a democratic Athenian backdrop. Topics such as honor, war, reputation and wealth might be more present and relatable to this audience. That is, this might be the reality of their world and already experienced rather than the visionary conditions that define kallipolis, which invites the audience to look ahead and to reconfigure conventions, usual ways of thinking and habits. When the noble lie is elaborated, for instance, Socrates speaks of a possible future: “I will try” (ἐπιχειρήσω), he explains, to persuade the rulers (ἄρχοντας
πείθειν) (Pl. Resp. 414d). “We will say to them in telling our story” (φήσομεν πρὸς αὑτοὺς μοθόλογοντες), he continues (Pl. Resp. 415a). The noble lie represents a keyhole to the future and belongs to this temporal domain, in which everyone will play his/her part and adhere to a particular role, as things ought to be. The golden part of the city is superior and most fit to rule because these people are the most valuable (τιμιώτατοι) (Pl. Resp. 415a).

The recycling of metals in the narrative of the city’s decay and the fluctuation of gold, silver, bronze and iron metals convey the passage of time. When timocracy starts to change (μεταβάινει), it is a space we have already visited before. Metallic aesthetics contribute to the city’s beauty, but, in time, they dim and expire. Stratified layers of gold, silver and bronze mix and confuse its own aesthetic of expression; in oligarchy, gold, as it makes its way into private storehouses, draws new lines of attraction and fosters a certain mentality; as one person sees another living for gain and vies (ἄλλος ἄλλον ὤρον καὶ εἰς ζῆλον ἱὼν), they make the majority of others like themselves (τὸ πλῆθος τοιοῦτον αὑτῶν ἀπηργάσαντο). The downward spiral continues when people move toward money-making (προϊόντες εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τοῦ χρηµατίζεσθαι) and value wealth over virtue. Virtue is so separate from wealth (οὕτω πλούτου ἀρετὴ διέστηκεν), Socrates insists, that if each lay in the scale of balance (ὥσπερ ἐν πλάστιγγι ζυγοῦ κειµένου ἐκατέρου), the two would always sink towards opposite ends (ὥς τι τούναντιον ὁπότε). All of these are allusive markers—metals, shapes and scales of balance—or rather, signs that interact with other signs.

I am interested in the metals and the way in which they move because their motions and redistribution are significant for the city’s state of being. What I mean by this exactly is that these metals have a power of their own and, with their vibratory vitality, infiltrate both city and body. They rearrange borders and delineations, for they have the ability to penetrate boundaries.
and obscure any distinctions between two separate parties or bodies. That is, their fluid quality pulls others towards them, unites them and rearranges relationships and attitudes: as timocracy transforms, the prevailing attitude is jealousy (ζῆλον) and strays even further from utopian virtue. Evanescent metals thus generate sensation and ways of feeling, as they alter sensibilities, and shape and determine political aesthetics, which change, as time elapses. Gold, for example, in this scene, stored away in a treasure trove, reverberates with what we already know, and it speaks, the noble lie and the myth of the metals, which exists in the civic imaginary, the founding story of the kallipolis (Pl. Resp. 415a). Subsequent visions of golden valence look back to this point, evoking another dimension of time, the dream (ὄνείρατα) (Pl. Resp. 414d), into which we enter, with the narrative of metabolē. It is a reciprocal dialogue: gold in oligarchy and the meaning on which it takes—decay—foregrounds the illusion of the noble lie, which, in turn, reinforces the distance of the future. In my reading of Book VIII, each stage of the cycle represents an image and, more specifically, the time-image, which is suffused with past/future, time, context, relation and difference: each image that is rendered of the political form is virtual, in the sense that it is only partly there and a phantom. Every city will eventually pass away and expresses a different time, the difference of time.

In the midst of this instability, oligarchy establishes itself and consists in a fundamental gap, and the city, by necessity, is not one but two (Τὸ μὴ μίαν ἄλλα δόο ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν): one of the poor and one of the rich—living in the same place and always plotting against one another (τὴν μὲν πενήτων, τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, οἴκοιντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀεὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἄλλληλοις) (Pl. Resp. 551d). The harmony of the kallipolis has melted away and slides now down the slope, into a different gradation; Socrates elaborates the oligarchic condition, defined by fragmentations:
Ὅρα δή, τούτων πάντων τῶν κακῶν εἰ τόδε μέγιστον αὕτη πρότη παραδέχεται.
Τὸ ποῖον;
Τὸ ἐξείλημα πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀποδόσθαι, καὶ ἄλλω κτήσασθαι τὰ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποδόμενον οἶκείν ἐν τῇ πόλει μηδὲν ὄντα τὸν τῆς πόλεως μερὸν, μήτε χρηματιστήν μήτε δημιουργόν μήτε ἵππα μήτε ὀπλίτην, ἄλλα πένητα καὶ ἄριστον κεκλημένον.
Πρώτη, ἔφη.
Οὕκουν διακαλύπται γε ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις τὸ τοιοῦτον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἱ μὲν ὑπέρπλουτοι ἦσαν, οἱ δὲ παντάπασι πένητες.
Ὁρθῶς.
Τόδε δὲ ἀθρεῖ· ἂρα ὡς ἐπλούσιος ὄν ἀνήλισκεν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ὅτι ἄρα ἄρθρει· ἂρα ὁ ῥήσῃ τῶν ἀρχοντῶν εἶναι, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ ὁ ἅπαν ἄρχων ὑπερηφάνες ἦν αὐτῆς, ἄλλα τῶν ἔτοιμων ἀναλωτῆς;
Οὕτως, ἔφη· ἐδόκει, ἂρα ὡς ἐπλούσιος ἦν ἄλλο ἦν ἀναλωτῆς. 
Βούλει ὡς, ἂρα ἐγὼ ἄρθρον ὑπερηφάνον ὑπερηφάνες ἦν κηρίῳ κηφῆνες, ἅπαν ὡς ἀναλωτής ἦν κῆφην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἅπαν ὡς ἀναλωτής ἦν κηφῆνες, νόσημα πόλεως;
Pάνω μὲν ὡς ἴχνη, ἔφη, ὅ Σώκρατες. (Pl. Resp. 552a-c.)

[Soc.: ‘Now, let’s see whether this constitution is the first to admit the greatest of all evils.’
Ad.: ‘Which one is that?’
Soc.: ‘Allowing someone to sell all his possessions and someone else to buy them and then allowing the one who has sold them to go on living in the city, while belonging to none of its parts, for he’s neither a money-maker, a craftsman, a member of the cavalry, or a hoplite, but classified only as a poor person without means.’
Ad.: ‘It is the first to allow that.’
Soc.: ‘At any rate, this sort of thing is not forbidden in oligarchies. If it were, some of their citizens would not be excessively rich, while others are totally impoverished.’
Ad.: ‘Right.’
Soc.: ‘Now, observe this. When such a fellow was spending his wealth, was he of any greater use to the city in the matters of which we’ve just mentioned? Or did he merely seem to be one of the rulers of the city, while in truth he was neither ruler nor subject there, but only a consumer of goods?’
Ad.: ‘That’s right,’ he said. ‘He seemed to be part of the city, but he was nothing but a squanderer.’
Soc.: ‘Should we say, then, that, as a drone exists in a cell and is a disease in the hive, so this person is a drone in the house and a disease in the city?’
Ad.: ‘That’s certainly right, Socrates.’]

This constitution displays perforations, the first to admit the greatest of all evils (τούτων πάντων
τῶν κακῶν...μέγιστον αὐτή πρώτη παραδέχεται). With the new wealth qualification (νόμον) imposed as a “boundary” (ὅρον) (Pl. Resp. 551a), which proclaims that those whose property fails to reach the stated amount are not qualified to rule (προειπόντες ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχειν ὃ ὁν μὴ ὑσία εἰς τὸ ταχθὲν τίμημα) (Pl. Resp. 551b), individuals fall into isolated pockets, which oligarchy creates. Someone may, for example, carry on living (οἰκεῖν) in the city while belonging to none of its parts (ἐν τῇ πόλει μηδὲν ὄντα τῶν τῆς πόλεως μερῶν), neither a money-maker, a craftsman, a member of the cavalry or a hoplite (μήτε χρηματιστήν μήτε δημιουργόν μήτε ἰππέα μήτε ὀπλίτην), but only a poor man “without passage” (πένητα καὶ ἀπορόν). In this state, he seems to return to his original home, enveloped by placenta that will never release him.

I use this metaphor in order to shed light on the proliferation of intensities in this constitution. On one level, the city is a female body (αὐτή) that surrenders to the siege assailing it. Holes on the oligarchic surface, on the edges of boundaries, form the black and white substratum of the photographic negative, of an illusory photo, in the manner of a simulacrum: the external and colored layers of the beautiful city (kallipolis), simulated and reproduced in subsequent manifestations. Now it has turned into an oligarchy, a thing that has emerged from the process of doubling, a product of the ideal city’s intrinsic potential or power to become. The verb ἐγγίγνεσθαι emphasizes the sense of transformation that occurs in every layer of the city, as genes continue to copy and to repeat in the creation of a new individual, who embodies the political. As wealth moves in the city— it circulates and swaps parties—oligarchy makes it possible for someone to give away all his possessions (Τὸ ἐξεῖναι πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀποδόσθαι) and for another to buy them (ἄλλῳ κτήσασθαι τὰ τούτου). Some citizens are excessively rich (ὑπέρπλουτοι), and others are wholly destitute (παντάπασι πένητες). The disparity that defines the oligarchic constitution or “body” is also seen in the experience of the individual, who
liquidates (ἀνήλισκεν) his property, neither ruler nor subject (οὔτε ἄρχων οὔτε ὑπηρέτης), only a “consumer of goods” or a “spender” (τῶν ἐτοίμων ἀναλωτής). The body of the oligarchic man, in other words, contracts disease (νόσημα): it simulates and stimulates, while it is stimulated by metal waves of the city, and his soul develops into a leaky jar. He changes himself and is changed, at the same time, due to fluctuations that are taking place in his greater environment; he desires certain affects produced by the flow of wealth and material goods. The metals that fill the city penetrate his body and make their way into his inner self, for they also dwell in the soul. His metals are also the city’s metals, and he lives as a drone in the house (ἐν οἰκίᾳ κηφῆνα), a part of the whole, a disease in the city (νόσημα πόλεως).

Plato’s use of the city-soul analogy is not consistent in every instance, and the theoretical framework permits us to make sense of this inconsistency in the soul’s animated quality, which displays a vital power of its own. When we apply a theory of vitalism to Plato, what we encounter is the dissipation of boundaries, the conflation that exists among city, soul and body, the city as a body, the soul as a city, but also the cacophony of matter and spirit, the materialization of immateriality. We perceive a certain discrepancy, for example, in the oligarchic man’s experience, when Socrates’ description displays an incongruity between city and soul:

Ὁταν αὐτοῦ παῖς γενόμενος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ζήλοι τε τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖνον ἵππον διώκει, ἔπειτα αὐτὸν ἵδε ἔξαιφνης πταίσαντα ὑπὲρ πρὸς ἐρματι πρὸς τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐκχέαντα τὰ τε αὐτὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸν, ἢ στρατηγήσαντα ἢ τὴν ἄλλην μεγάλην ἄρχην ἀρξαντα, εἶτα εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα [βλαπτόμενον] ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ ἐκπεσόντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπασάν ἀποβαλόντα.

Εἰκός γ’, ἔφη.

Ἰδὼν δέ γε, ὃ φίλε, ταῦτα καὶ παθὼν καὶ ἀπολέσας τὰ ὄντα, δείχασε οἶμαι εὐθὺς ἐπὶ κεφαλήν ὤθει ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ φιλοτιμημένον καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ταπεινωθεῖς ὑπὸ πενίας πρὸς χρηματισμῷ τραπό-
The oligarchic son is born (παῖς γενόμενος), in a period of turmoil: he sees his father suddenly crashing against the city like a ship against a reef (ἐπειτα αὐτὸν ἴδη ἐξαίφνης πταίσαντα ὡσπερ πρὸς ἐρματὶ πρὸς τῇ πόλει), spilling out all his possessions and even himself (ἐκχέαντα τὰ τῇ πόλει). This kind of person, in fact, seems to drift against a democratic background; the environment strongly reverberates with Aristophanes’ portrayal of Athenian democracy. In comedy, the experience of democracy is chaotic: Pisthetaerus in the Birds, for instance, expresses discontent and dissatisfaction with the manner in which affairs are conducted in the city—Athens is a big and prosperous city (μεγάλην ἔναντι φύσει κεύσει ἐπικεφαλίδαι) (Ar. Av. 37), where bundles of money fly away (κοινὴν ἐναποτεῖσαι χρήματα) (Ar. Av. 38). Likewise, the Athenians spend their whole lives chanting forth judgments from the law-courts (Ἀθηναῖοι δ’ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δικῶν ἄδουσι πάντα τὸν βίον) (Ar. Av. 40-41), while, in the Wasps, the plot hinges on a man named Philocleon, an Athenian citizen, who becomes addicted to jury service. Simply put, from the point of view of the utopian founders in the Birds, life is not very pleasurable in Athens.
Therefore, they search elsewhere and establish a city of birds in the sky. In a similar vein, in Plato’s *Republic*, the father of the oligarchic man, in this phase of the decline narrative, is lashed by the vicissitudes of life: once a general or ruling in some other important office (ἤ στρατηγήσαντα ἤ τιν’ ἄλλην μεγάλην ἄρχην ἄρξαντα), he is dragged into court by sycophants (εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα ύπὸ συκοφαντῶν), put to death, thrown into exile or disenfranchised, throwing away all his property (ἡ ἀποθανόντα ἢ ἐκπεσόντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπασαν ἀποβαλόντα).

The incompatibility between city and soul, and this moment, in particular, would support Williams’ view that there is a tension or contradiction “…powerfully at work under the surface of the *Republic*” (52), exemplified by the city-soul analogy:

The use of the analogy is supposed in the upshot to justify the supreme rule of a logistic element in the city, where this element is identified as a class of persons; and it justifies it by reference to the evident superiority of a soul in which the logistic element controls the wayward and chaotic desires. But this will work only if the persons being ruled bear a sufficient resemblance to wayward and chaotic desires—for instance, by being persons themselves controlled by wayward and chaotic desires. And if they are enough like that, the outcome of Plato’s arrangements will be less appealing than first appears (53).

It is my view that Deleuze’s vitalism further illuminates the divergence between city and soul, which makes itself evident at this time. It would mean that we would be prevented from making the perfect equation between the two components: the soul is not necessarily a city, nor the city, a soul, though they might display shared qualities and match up to each other. The discrepancy, all the same, draws attention to the non-linear cycle and unraveling of time portrayed by *metabolē*. That is, each section or description works as a frame to comprise a flow of differing difference. To use the language of Deleuze, such a discrepancy between city and soul fits into a framework, where differences and contradictions remain in tension, and the mismatch, in turn, produces pockets of difference and messy becoming. From a cinematic perspective, the account achieves “deterritorialization” or becoming other than itself because Book VIII is not presented.
in logical sequence, chopped by the singularities of time. That a democracy engenders an oligarchic soul would sustain a concept of time that is not a simple linear progression from one point to another but divergent change.

Perhaps it is not incompatible, at the same time, that democracy harbors the oligarchic man because this is a constitution with a great wealth disparity, where the poor come into power, as Plato will later tell us in his description of the revolutionary turn (Pl. Resp. 557a), and money circulates and exchanges hands. From the oligarchic point of view, democracy presents a strange kind of universe, the inverse of what ought to be, as the Old Oligarch opens a window onto his mentality in the Constitution of the Athenians: “…the poor and the people generally are right to have more than the highborn and wealthy” (Ath. pol. 2). In addition, in the course of the fifth-century BCE, Athens itself will undergo two oligarchic coups, in 411 and 403 BCE, events that would corroborate strands of political dissent in Athenian society, which Ober identifies with the intellectual elite (1998: 50-51). In this way, the moment, again, confuses the parameters of time and brings the past into the present. From less than ideal circumstances, recently imprinted in the Athenian cultural memory, the oligarchic man is born: the son transforms by assuming the feminine position—he “becomes” (γενόμενος)—and by recalibrating his emotional compass; at first, he is “jealous” of his father (ζηλοῖ τε τὸν πατέρα) and follows in his footsteps (τὰ ἐκείνου ἵχνη διώκῃ). It is interesting because the mother does not take part in this scenario, as she did with the timocratic youth. It is as if the oligarchic man is a surrogate for the mother and, like the philosopher, embodies the pregnant male: witnessing the losses of his father, who is also in the midst of losing all his “being” (τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπασαν ἀποβαλόντα), the child reprioritizes his principles and shifts the elements in his soul. When he no longer has his own property (ἀπολέσας τὰ ὅντα), he fears for his “head” (δείσας…ἐπὶ κεφαλῆν) and thrusts the honor-loving and spirited
part from the throne in his own soul (فنادق εκ του θρόνου τον ἐν τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ψυχῇ φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές). The soul now engenders false logoi, tiaras, collars and Persian swords (τιάρας…στρεπτούς καὶ ἀκινάκας), since metals have mixed and gone astray, and the appetitive and money-loving part sits on the throne (τὸν θρόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν τε καὶ φιλοχρήματον ἐγκαθίζειν). These gleaming objects produce a garish aesthetic and prevent the individual from seeing clearly.

Metabolē portrays the degradation of the soul, a feminine body that keeps reproducing and, in doing so, propels time’s passing. In other words, that the son establishes the appetitive and money-making part on the throne (εἰς μὲν τὸν θρόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν τε καὶ φιλοχρήματον ἐγκαθίζειν) and cherishes the activity of decorating this region with pliable tiaras and Persian swords (τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτούς καὶ ἀκινάκας), is an indication that we have moved away from the temporal framework of the kallipolis. Not so precious metals, namely, money (χρήματα) and material goods, dominate the oligarchic man’s existence, and, just as the city contains liquid channels of gold, silver, bronze metals, these streams infiltrate and dwell in the soul. In fact, psychic metallic parts constitute, as they carve out, streams in the city, though Williams is right to point out the difficulties associated with Plato’s use of the tripartite analogy: in what way exactly parts of the soul correspond to and inform the organization of the city’s hierarchy is not entirely clear. But what a vital reading allows for us to do is to understand the city-soul analogy in terms of relationality: the city and soul exist in close relation to each other, and the two may even be conflated, though not in every case. A part that acts in a spirited or appetitive way, moreover, affects the spirit of the whole. That is, the individual, as he/she moves and navigates space and time, contributes to a prevailing aesthetic or zeitgeist, intentionally or not, and has the potential to represent a generation, a part of that generation. The form of the
soul, furthermore, expresses and is expressed by matter: whereas Aristotle associates form with the masculine and matter with the feminine in the *Generation of Animals* (Arist. *Gen. an.* 729a)—the form that the father is said to provide is the offspring’s soul, while the mother is said to provide its body (Arist. *Gen. an.* 738b)—the feminine principle in Plato works as both matter and form. The soul is a female body: it generates the matter of generations.

The soul that abounds in other objects determines the nature and experience of the city, as the lyric poet Theognis would also say, “Our city is pregnant, and I fear she may give birth…” (κύει πόλις ήδε, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ τέκηι) (Thgn. 38). The anatomy of the female body is so grotesque that the male point of view no longer knows how to describe her space. An event of pregnancy has an impact on the landscape and remolds both the topography and political aesthetic. The process of generation, in short, creates new political perceptions. In the transition from oligarchy to democracy, the feminine principle diminishes her fullness with insatiability (ἀπληστία) (Pl. *Resp.* 555b), and the conflict that transpires separates the citizen-body in love and hate; some people sit idle in the city with their stings and weapons—some in debt, some disenfranchised, some both—hating those with property, plotting against them and others, and longing for a revolution (Κάθηται...ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκεντρωμένοι τε καὶ ἐξωπλισμένοι, οἱ μὲν όφείλοντες χρέα, οἱ δὲ ἄτιμοι γεγονότες, οἱ δὲ ἀμφότερα, μισοῦντες τε καὶ ἑπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς κτησαμένοις τὰ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοίς, νεωτερισμοῦ ἐρῶντες) (Pl. *Resp.* 555d-e). As the poor grow resentful, they turn desirous, “lovers” of revolution, and hungry, while rulers, for their part, indulge in excess and relax:

> Νῦν δὲ γ’, ἔφην ἐγώ, διὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς μὲν δὴ ἀρχιμένους οὕτω διαπεθάνην ἐν τῇ πόλει οἱ ἄρχοντες· σφᾶς δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν—ἀρ’ οὐ τρυφῶντας μὲν τοὺς νέους καὶ ἀπόνους καὶ πρός τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, μαλακοὺς δὲ καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύσας καὶ ἀργούς; (Pl. *Resp.* 556b-c.)
[Soc.: ‘But as it is,’ I said, ‘for all these reasons, the rulers in the city treat their subjects in the way we described. But as for themselves and their children, don’t they make their young fond of luxury incapable of effort either in the body and mind, and too soft to stand up to pleasures or pains, and idle besides?’]  

In the same way that the soul has the capacity to engender true and fallacious logoi, the city transforms itself by giving birth. Rulers, as money-makers (χρηματισταί), absorb the properties of what they consume, like sponges, and make themselves and their children delicate or “effeminate” (τρυφῶντας), lazy in body and soul (ἀπόνους καὶ πρός τα τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρός τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς), too loose to withstand pleasures and pains (καρτερεῖν πρός ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας) and, ultimately, “fruitless” (ἀργούς). The equilibrium achieved in the kallipolis, between pleasures (ἡδονάς) and pains (λύπας), has vanished by this time: the sensory-motor schema of the kallipolis no longer applies and has broken, because members of the city fail to feel both pleasures and pains, as one. The crisis of the city thus culminates in the redistribution of sensations and casts everyone else into a state of crisis.

IV. After Hours

Every subsequent image will show different stages of the revolution as scenes, and, in the series, capture a point in time. More specifically, it will portray degradations of relations through the regeneration of affects, through what we can understand as a “cinema of the body.” Deleuze identifies this specific genre of film in experimental cinema, where “…the process mounts the camera on the everyday body” (1989: 191). Why I think this concept is relevant is because metabolê, as we have already seen, presents a diversity of moving images, and they focus, in particular, on postures and packets of the body, which articulate the individual’s condition, background and status; after Socrates picks up the narrative and explains the origin of inequality
between rulers and subjects, he asks his audience, “Or rather isn’t it often the case that a poor man, lean and suntanned, is placed in battle next to a rich man, bred in the shade and carrying a lot of excess flesh, and sees him panting and helpless?” (ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἰσχυός ἀνήρ πένης, ἠλιωμένος, παραταχθεὶς ἐν μάχῃ πλουσίῳ ἐσκιατροφηκότι πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας, ἰδὴ ἀσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν…) (Pl. Resp. 556d). In this description, an association of images, replaced by formal linkage of attitudes, occurs and unfolds: all the components of the image come together on the body.

First the comparison between dark and light is made by the color of skin, where warmth is conveyed by the poor democratic man, turned brown by the sun (ἡλιωμένος), and coolness, by his neighbor, who grew up in the shade (ἐσκιατροφηκότι). The modulation of color recreates a properly haptic function culminating in close vision; the eye holds onto the superfluous weight (σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας) of the wealthy man, who is, at the same time, “full of lack” (ἀπορίας μεστόν). The contrast made by the color of his skin composes the tonality of the picture, which is imbued with breathlessness (ἀσθατός), a play between excess and lack. In other words, we recognize and know these men by the positions of their bodies, and the difference between them is expressed by corporeal attitudes: whereas the poor man is deprived and “lean” (ἰσχύως), the wealthy man experiences shortness of breath, “replete with difficulty” (ἀπορίας μεστόν). In this way, the state of his body embodies the female body, that is, the soul, which, in a state of flux, has oriented and reoriented what contains it. The pregnancy of the body, “full of aporia,” because it is also a receptable, will engender the next political phase. A generation will produce a generation.

I hone in on the feminine principle because it makes us see bodies within other bodies and worlds within worlds and the vital implications of these spaces. While the soul displays a
proliferation of intensities, the city, also like a body, contains divergent affects and disorganized perceptions of life. After the previous picture that is offered up by Plato, where two figures stand, taken at the intersection of two axes and placed in tension to each other, the eye then moves to fix its attention on the condition of an agitated city:

Οὐκοὖν ὡςπερ σῶμα νοσῶδες μικρὰς ῥοπῆς ἔξωθεν δεῖται προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ κάμινειν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἀνευ τὸν ἔξω στασιάζει αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἢ κατὰ ταύτα ἐκεῖνῳ διακειμένη πόλις ἀπὸ σμικρὰς προφάσεως, ἔξωθεν ἐπαγομένον ἢ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐξ ὀλιγαρχουμένης πόλεως συμμαχίαν ἢ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐκ δημοκρατουμένης, νοσεῖ τε καὶ αὐτῇ αὐτῇ μάχεται, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἀνευ τὸν ἔξω στασιάζει; (Pl. Resp. 556e.)

[Soc.: ‘Then, as a sick body needs only a slight shock from outside to fall into illness and is sometimes at civil war with itself even without this, so a city in the same condition needs only a small pretext—such as one side bringing in allies from an oligarchy or the other from a democracy—to fall ill and to fight with itself and is sometimes in a state of civil war even without any external influence.’]

The body is bio-vital, metaphysical and aesthetic; Plato deliberately has Socrates turn to the body-politic metaphor in this place: when the city undergoes upheaval, it is a “sick body” (σῶμα νοσῶδες) and “suffers” (νοσεῖ), self-conflicted (αὐτῇ αὐτῇ μάχεται), as civil war breaks out (στασιάζει). In one light, the divided city (ἡ πόλις) is like a female nude, “being disposed” or “affected” (διακειμένη), in a certain way. Delicate suspense (μικρὰς ῥοπῆς), furthermore, throws the neutral body (τὸ σῶμα), which is already sensitive to internal discord, into shock and falls as a “slight pretext” (σμικρὰς προφάσεως). The pretence of bringing in allies from an oligarchy or the other from a democracy (ἐπαγομένων ἢ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐξ ὀλιγαρχουμένης πόλεως συμμαχίαν ἢ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐκ δημοκρατουμένης) leads to civil war, apart from any external impulse (ἀνευ τὸν ἔξω). As the transformation happens, what is feminine enhances this very cycle and intensifies the pulses, rhythms and powers of becoming; it represents sensation itself and causes change, the source of change. That is, while the city moves to sow the seeds of its own destruction, for it
enters into a state of conflict, “without any external factors” (ἀνευ τῶν ἐξω στασιάζει), the feminine principle works to make and to scatter bodies from a set of coherent bodies. The diseased polis, in the end, produces disruptive affect in its “downward momentum” (ῥοπῆς), where intensities skew and scramble the faculties.

Though new bodies are born in each generation, nonhuman things equally contribute to this process, what I take to be a “motion picture.” Times of transition constitute a narrative of false continuity and bring about aberrant movements, and, from these intervals, democracy springs; this type of constitution seems to be established, in the aftermath of an earthquake:

Δημοκρατία δή οἶμαι γίγνεται ὅταν οἱ πένητες νικήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀποκτείνωσι τὸν ἑτέρων, τοὺς δὲ ἐκβάλωσι, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἔξ ἴσου μεταδόσι πολιτείας τε καὶ ἀρχῶν, καὶ ώς τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ κλήρων αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν αὐτῇ γίγνονται.

‘Εστι γὰρ, ἐφε, αὕτη ἡ κατάστασις δημοκρατίας, ἐάντε καὶ ὅπλων γένηται ἔάντε καὶ διὰ φόβον ὑπεξελθόντων τῶν ἑτέρων.

Τίνα δὴ οὖν, ἂν δ’ ἐγώ, οὗτοι τρόπον οἰκοῦσι; καὶ ποία τις ἡ τοιαύτη αὐτὶ πολιτεία; δήλον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνὴρ δημοκρατικός τις ἀναφανήσεται.

Δήλον, ἐφε.

Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δὴ ἔλευθεροι, καὶ ἔλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστή καὶ παρηγορίας γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὅτι τις βούλεται;

Λέγεται γε δή, ἐφε.

‘Οσοῦ δὲ γε ἐξουσία, δήλον ὅτι ἰδίαν ἐκκατασκευήν τοῦ αὐτοῦ βίου κατασκευάζοιτο ἐν αὐτῇ, ἢτις ἐκκατον ἄρεσκοι.

Δήλον.

Παντὸς ἀνθρώπου δὴ ἂν οἶμαι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ μάλιστ’ ἐγγίγνοντο ἀνθρώποι. (Pl. Resp. 557a-c.)

[Soc.: ‘And I suppose that democracy comes about when the poor are victorious, killing some of their opponents and expelling others, and giving the rest an equal share in ruling under the constitution, and for the most part assigning people to positions of rule by lot.’

Ad.: ‘Yes, that’s how democracy is established, whether by force of arms or because those on the opposing side are frightened into exile.’

Soc.: ‘Then how do these people live? And what sort of constitution do they have? For it’s clear that a man who is like it will be democratic.’
Ad.: ‘That is clear.’
Soc.: ‘First of all, then, aren’t they free? And isn’t the city full of freedom and freedom of speech? And doesn’t everyone in it have the license to do what he wants?’
Ad.: ‘So it is said,’ he replied.
Soc.: ‘And where people have this license, it is clear that each of them will arrange his own life in whatever manner pleases him.’
Ad.: ‘Obvious.’
Soc.: ‘All sorts of men, then, would arise in this constitution more than in any other?’

Democracy is born (Δημοκρατία…γίγνεται), when the prevailing poor put to death some of the other party (ὅταν οἱ πένητες νικήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀποκτείνωσι τῶν ἐτέρων) and send others into exile (τοὺς δὲ ἐκβάλωσι). The rest of the population engages in an exercise of political bodybuilding, while they rearrange the city’s institutions: they give the rest of the citizens an equal share (τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἕξ ἵσου μεταδῶσι), and, for the most part, these offices are assigned by lot (ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ κλήρων αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν αὐτῇ γίγνονται). The advent of democracy is a “settlement” or “institution” but also a “construction” and “restoration” (ἡ κατάστασις).

Interestingly, Plato describes a moment of reconstruction that “is” (Ἔστι), after it “comes into being” (γένηται): the constitution occupies a momentary position of permanence, once it is established, but it is built on instability and exhibits continuous channels of flux; it originates from warfare (δι’ ὅπλων) and follows from the migration of political enemies, driven by fear (διὰ φόβον ὑπεξελθόντων τῶν ἐτέρων).

I draw attention to the tension between being and becoming because this is the conceptual thread that guides the narrative of metabolē and Plato’s thought, more generally. Most memorably, in the Protagoras, Plato has Socrates analyze and, essentially, deconstruct Simonides’ ode to Scopas. In this dialogue, Socrates contextualizes what Pittacus truly intended to say in the poem: according to his reading, it is difficult, not “to become” good, but “to be” and to remain good (τὸ χαλεπόν, γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν…ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμεναι): being and becoming are not
the same thing (ἔστιν δὲ οὐ ταύτόν…τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι) (Pl. Prt. 340c). The trajectory of the kallipolis exemplifies this very path: it represents a paradigm that embodies beauty but fails to stay beautiful and “becomes” by changing. This is, essentially, the ultimate sensory-motor failure in the Republic and in the Platonic framework as a whole: the inability to persist in beauty and in the good, that is, to be, and this impossibility is portrayed by waves of flux and various other media.

Ralph Rosen, in “Plato, Beauty and ‘Philosophical Synaesthesia,” notices a paradoxical move in the Symposium, which also occurs in the Republic: in Socrates’ speech, Diotima articulates askēsis “…that presses the sensory experiences of the everyday world into the service of, finally, transcending them” (Rosen 90). In addition, Rosen briefly treats Republic Book V when Socrates distinguishes lovers of sights (philotheamones) from true philosophers (475d-480) as an intertextual moment that sets the stage for the elaborate discussion of beauty and desire in the Symposium. Aesthetic meaning is created from the movement up the latter from aesthēsis to synaesthesia: “…the ability to locate meaning in the things we perceive and to which we are drawn by virtue of their beauty, helps to lead the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’ out of that nebulous space between not-being and being where Plato imagines them to be constantly ‘rolling around’” (Rosen 91). The realm of becoming prepares the individual for the space of being by cultivating and habituating his or her senses and has political relevance and significance: as a degenerate political form, democracy is a constitution that thrives on sensory experience.

Lovers of sights (φιλοθεάμονες) and sounds (φιλήκοοι) inhabit and dominate the democratic constitution. These are people, as Socrates explains in Book V, who are “like philosophers” (όμοιους μὲν φιλοσόφοις) (Pl. Resp. 475d). They like beautiful sounds, colors, shapes (καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χρῶς καὶ σχῆματα) and everything fashioned out of them
(πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα), but, set in opposition to philosophers, these people lack clarity: their thought is unable to see and to embrace the nature of the beautiful itself (αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἢ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι) (Pl. Resp. 476b).

One could say that the lovers of sights and sounds strive to stimulate their senses by attaching themselves physically to beautiful sounds, colors and shapes: aspazomai can mean either to “embrace” or to “kiss.” From a theoretical point of view, they seem to be stimulating their bodies and responding positively to pre-personal investments or “affects,” at the same time that they are generating them. This kind of experience, in fact, takes place at every level of the decline narrative: in the kallipolis, philosopher kings and queens have conditioned their bodies to think and to feel as one, for they rigorously practice a care of the self for the sake of the public self. This is what makes their existence beautiful.

In a democracy, in contrast, the majority, the dēmos, confronts an overload of intensities. Their existence is defined by specific sounds, colors and shapes, and they lead a democratic life of sensation. The city becomes bloated, “full of freedom” (ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστή… γίγνεται), and “liberty of speech” (παρρησίας), and upholds the ideological principle of freedom by way of aesthetic expression. What I mean by this exactly is that the people participate in a flow of events, and they are immersed, more specifically, in the sensible reality of freedom, which, in turn, dictates behavioral patterns and fosters “the democratic body.” This is a body quintessentially free, a status that is acquired ever since the reforms of Solon, which eliminate debt slavery: Solon, quoted in Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens, tells us in his own words that he makes those who suffered from slavery (δουλίην) liberated or “free” (ἐλευθέρους). The sense of freedom is extended to the region of Attica as a whole, described by the poet/lawgiver as “the black earth” (Γῆ μέλαινα): previously she was “enslaved,” but now is “free” (πρόσθεσεν δὲ
δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρα) (Arist. *Ath. pol.* XII. 4). From this early example, we see how a gendered line of thinking, as it traces its way back to the time of Solon, is imbued in the civic ethos, and the earth, a female body, passes down her qualities, namely, freedom to the children, who occupy her space: they are citizen-soldiers, masculine men, democratic bodies.

Now I will elaborate on the term “the democratic body” and the significance of the concept. Scholars have previously noticed that it is a particular kind of body, infused, influenced, embodied by the political form, which it inhabits. Halperin, for example, in “The Democratic Body: Prostitution and Citizenship in Classical Athens,” in his analysis of Aeschines’ *Against Timarchus*, has written that the body of the Athenian citizen is meant to be a dignified one, socially and politically dominant, “free, autonomous and inviolable” (Halperin 1990a: 105). Against this milieu, Timarchus commits a sin because, by engaging in the practice of prostitution, he forfeits his autonomy or personal freedom: “For a male of citizen status, then, prostitution signified a refusal of the constitutional safeguards of his bodily integrity provided by the Athenian democracy” (Halperin 1990a: 104). Winkler expands on this line of thinking in his consideration of ancient sexuality and shows how the Greeks divided sexual acts and people on the axis of active versus passive, a binary, which is inherently gendered: “…not to display bravery (*andreia*, literally ‘manliness’) lays a man open to symbolic demotion from the ranks of the brave/manly to the opposite class of woman” (59). The sexual is political, and the political, sexual, and Wohl explores the collective unconscious of the Athenians and “the erotics of democracy” in fifth-fourth century literature through the lens of psychoanalysis: “To the extent that democracy is the collective decisions of the citizen body, and those decisions are driven by desires—whether rational or irrational—then democratic politics can be described as the movement of desire” (2). Her observation suggests that the body of the citizen is heavily
implicated in “the citizen body” because it represents and is represented by the dēmos. Since the individual body pulses with micropereceptions, the body-politic would also seem to pulse and to move with desire and other compelling affects.

Desire, in my reading, is vigorous and active. This is the force that draws people to certain affects. That is, the democratic city and democratic man (δημοκρατικός τις) desire this political form to feel certain things, to stimulate their bodies in certain ways and, consequently, they sculpt a “democratic body.” More specifically, this sort of body thrives on the sensation of freedom and the multiplicity of intensities. It is an excessive and indulgent body, swollen (μεστή) with sounds, most notably, free speech (παρρησίας) and manifold shapes: it has the ability to take on various forms, for all kinds of men “are born in this constitution” (Παντοδαποὶ…ταύτη τῇ πολιτείᾳ μάλιστ’ ἐγγίγνοιτο ἄνθρωποι). Like an oligarchy, democracy is a city that is not one but two, one of the poor and one of the rich, but, because it continues to reproduce, this constitution, in fact, is more than two and “miscellaneous” (Παντοδαποὶ). The conclusion, to which Socrates comes, with the language that he uses, depicts feminine space that engenders human beings with multiple lifestyles, customs or mores. I would argue that the female body, the space of the constitution, the earth, is no longer passive, as it is described by Plato; it pulls its inhabitants to pursue the feelings and perceptions that fill and are generated by the body. As a result, within the affective framework, the “masculine body” is rendered passive by the active “feminine body,” since it produces “pre-personal investments,” namely, the powers of affect.

The metaphors that are employed would then suggest that the constitution itself is another “democratic body,” in which there is license to do whatever one wishes (ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὅτι τις βούλεται). And where this license (ἐξουσία) exists, Socrates agrees, everyone
would arrange a plan for leading his own life “in her,” in whatever manner satisfies him (ιδίαν ἔκαστος ἂν κατασκευήν τοῦ αὐτοῦ βίου κατασκευάζοιτο ἐν αὐτῇ, ἦτις ἔκαστον ἀρέσκοι). The active masculine body, what normally constitutes the “democratic body,” loses its agency and cognitive judgment, for it responds to pleasure, while it lives as it pleases (ὅτι τις βούλεται), and fits out for itself private geometrical “constructions,” as it were (ιδίαν...κατασκευήν).

Democratic individualism, the ability and the autonomy to lead individual lives, fostered by freedom, is a sign of degradation from the Platonic perspective.

Though democracy is a deformed political form, it is enchanting for the very reason that it promotes a certain kind of aesthetic existence. As Plato has Socrates describe in the famous passage, this type of constitution, compared to a multi-colored garment, would seem (φαίνοιτο) most beautiful (καλλίστη) to the eyes:

Κινδυνεύει, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι. ὡσπερ ἰμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλμένον, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλμένη καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο. και ἵσως μὲν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, καὶ ταύτην, ὡσπερ οἱ παῖδες τε καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ ποικίλα θεώμενοι, καλλίστην ἂν πολλοὶ κρίνειαι. (Pl. Resp. 557c.)

[Soc.: ‘Then it looks,’ I said, ‘as though this is the most beautiful of the constitutions. Just as a multi-colored garment is embroidered with every kind of flower, so this city, embroidered with every kind of character type, would seem most beautiful. And perhaps,’ I said, ‘many people would judge it most beautiful, as women and children do when they see something multicolored.’]

The constitution, adorned with all kinds of flowers (πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλμένον), though it appears to be quite fine, shows itself empty, when laid open, and unrefined; Platonic aesthetics is an aesthetics of purity, unvarnished and untainted (Porter 2010: 87). Democracy is like a tapestry, variegated with every type of character (πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλμένη), and mesmerizing to most, especially to women and children; many people would judge it most beautiful (καλλίστην ἂν πολλοὶ κρίνειαι), as women and children do when they reflect, looking at bright-colored things.
(οἱ παιδές τε καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ ποικίλα θεώμενοι).

The majority, of course, cannot be philosophical (Φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα…πλήθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι) (Pl. Resp. 494a), though Monoson follows the revisionist trend in scholarship that tries to recuperate Plato from the view that he is anti-democratic (205). The simile suggests that women and children, when they “theorize” (οἱ παιδές τε καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες…τὰ θεώμενοι), as spectators in the theater, fail to see what really is beautiful because they only have the capacity for doxa, the intermediate stage between what purely is and what in every way is not (Pl. Resp. 478d). In her study of théoria in the ancient cultural context, Nightingale argues that, in the intellectual climate of fourth century, when the discipline of philosophy was still emerging, philosophic théoria interrupts and supplants the théoria at the festival (2004: 75). In Plato’s allegory of the cave, she shows how théoria consists in a journey and return and notices a tension, the same paradoxical move mentioned by Rosen, between sense-perception and non-sensory intellectual inquiry: “Plato first borrows the notion of visibility and substantiality from the physical world, and then denies that the things in this lowly realm are fully real” (2004: 71). I will unpack the theoretical underpinnings and implications of the terms “visibility” and “substantiality” and illustrate how they apply to this moment in Book VIII.

What Plato’s characterization of democracy demonstrates is that bodies are drawn to this political form, even though it is not in their best interest, because they desire the affects that are associated with this constitution. The problem with democracy is that it is mimetic, formless (Saxonhouse 274) and appetitive (Panagia 127), and it exists in complicity with tyranny; “…both constitutions bestow illusory mastery. Both make the rulers the slaves of their pleasures and dispose them to associate with flatterers” (Morgan 2003: 199). At the same time, compared to an intricate piece of cloth (ὁσπερ ἰμάτιον ποικίλον), the constitution appears (φαίνοιτο), almost in
an epiphanic light, most beautiful (καλλίστη). The female form captivates and allures,
embroidered with every character type (αὕτη πᾶσιν ἠθεσιν πεποικιλμένη). The word poikilos
emphasizes the chameleon-like character of the constitution: “…whatever is poikilon ‘multiple’
can never be the ‘same’ (as we see from the phrasing in Republic 8.568d), πολύ καὶ ποικίλον καὶ
οὐδέποτε ταὐτόν ‘manifold and varied [poikilon] and never the same thing’). In other words,
each time you speak of something that is poikilon, it will be something different, not the same
thing as before, each time it recurs” (Nagy 305). The success of democracy rests on its ability to
excite and to cater to the senses: with its dappled texture, “embroidered with every character
(πᾶσιν ἠθεσιν πεποικιλμένη),” it appeals to the sense of sight, as an intricate garment piece
(ἱµάτιον ποικίλον) would “appear most beautiful” (καλλίστη ἄν φαίνοιτο) and generates other
invigorating sensory experiences, as we previously saw. Democracy produces rhythms, colors,
shapes and patterns, all of which comprise the democratic “political relation,” where everyone
lives as he or she pleases, a relation that is defined by overstimulation and the confusion of
vibratory intensities.

The wild experience of the city is mirrored in the universe of the individual’s soul. It is
my belief that we can better understand the correspondence between city and soul and in what
way the two are linked if we treat the city-soul analogy as a relation. That is, because city and
soul are situated in relation to each other, they interact with and respond to each other. I am
arguing that the cinematic contraption or engine in Book VIII is particularly locatable in the
interface and interaction between the two; the nature (physis) of the soul, in fact, drives the body
into certain situations, to act in a certain way, and, ultimately, to acquire democratic mannerisms.
The soul, in other words, is the vital locus of the body of the individual and of the city and opens
up into a world of its own, with inhuman flows and duration. In the case of the democratic man,
for instance, while he is busy being born, he develops a new interior after a civil war (στάσις) and counterrevolution (ἀντίστασις) take place within him (Pl. Resp. 559e-560a), between internal and external desires (ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔξωθεν) (Pl. Resp. 559e). In the moment of transition, there is a confrontation of an outside and an inside, between city and man, but epithumia facilitates the absolute contact between non-totalizable, asymmetrical outside and inside. By penetrating boundaries, desire transcends them: as affect and emotion, it appears as an autonomous outside, necessarily providing itself with an inside.

Described as a territorial region, occupied by separate parties of appetites and desires, the soul of the democratic man continues in a state of internal strife. This sort of soul is consumed by democratic affects, that is to say, by sensuous and unsettling desires: “These desires draw him into the same bad company and in secret intercourse breed a multitude of others” (Οὐκοῦν ἐἵλκυσάν τε πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ὁµιλίαις, καὶ λάθρᾳ/ συγγιγνόµεναι πλῆθος ἐνέτεκον) (Pl. Resp. 560b). These desires are dynamic forces: sometimes they fall out (ἐκπεσουσῶν ἐπιθυµιῶν) (Pl. Resp. 560a), but, in this context, they tend to come into existence (ἐγένοντο) (Pl. Resp. 560b) and to multiply, many and powerful (πολλαί τε καὶ ἰσχυραί). They act like bodies and create new bodies, by “breeding” (ἐνέτεκον) a new family, a “multitude” (πλῆθος), after coming into contact (συγγιγνόµεναι) with the same company (πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ὁµιλίαις). In Plato’s description, desires behave like people: they are active agents and populate the soul, which is compared to a city or, more specifically, to a “citadel” (τὴν…ἄκροπολιν) (Pl. Resp. 560b). They enter into a position of power by “perceiving” (αἰσθόµεναι) that the soul is empty of knowledge (κενὴν μαθηµάτων) and words of truth (λόγων ἀληθῶν) (Pl. Resp. 560b). As a result, false and boastful words and beliefs (Ψευδεῖς δὴ καὶ ἀλαζόνες…λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι), after they “charge up” (ἀναδραµόντες), end up occupying that “region” of such a person (κατέσχον τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦ τοιοῦτού) (Pl. Resp.
The reign of desire has real material and affective consequences because, as a sense itself, desire senses to generate disorganized perceptions and to give rise to false knowledge and *doxa*. It achieves duration, precisely by producing life, a new world of its own, the world of democratic time.

The democratic man’s existence is determined by flux and the appetitive upheaval of his soul, which leads him to live his time in a sort of rambling, thoughtless and careless way. He lives on (διαζῇ), for instance, without discretion, yielding day by day to whichever desire at hand (διαζῇ τὸ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν οὖτω χαριζόμενος τῇ προσπιπτούσῃ ἐπιθυμίᾳ). Sometimes he drinks heavily while listening to the flute (τοτὲ μὲν μεθόων καὶ καταυλούμενος); at other times, he drinks only water and is on a diet (αὖθις δὲ ὑδροποτῶν καὶ κατισχναινόμενος); sometimes he goes in for physical training (τοτὲ δ’ αὖ γυμναζόμενος); at other times, he remains idle and neglects everything (ἔστιν δ’ ὅτε ἀργῶν καὶ πάντων ἀμελῶν); and sometimes he even occupies himself with what he takes to be philosophy (τοτὲ δ’ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβων). He often engages in politics, leaping up from his seat and saying and doing whatever comes into his mind (πολλάκις δὲ πολιτεύεται, καὶ ἀναπηδῶν ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει) (Pl. *Resp*. 561d). What Plato offers us here is a series of poses and different portraits of a man, and, in effect, his democratic quality is constructed on these bodily attitudes, going as far as being drunk (μεθόων), wasting away (κατισχναινόμενος), physical exertion (γυμναζόμενος), inactivity (ἀργῶν) and utter neglect (ἀμελῶν). Sketches of this man, at various points throughout the day, on different days, break his experience down into disparate and irrational singularities: at one moment, he engages in heavy indulgence, while, at another, he swings towards the other extreme, deprivation and restraint. These fluctuations, in turn, present imaging and connection processes and thus constitute a flow of time, which produces the world of the democratic man, into which the reader
subsequently enters.

Another point at which Deleuze’s time-image makes itself manifest in the decline narrative is when Plato further elaborates on the status of the democratic man’s soul. It is portrayed as another messy, composite structure, which contains a plethora of objects for contemplation:

Οἶμαι δὲ γε, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ παντοδαπόν τε καὶ πλείστων ἠθῶν μεστόν, καὶ τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ ποικίλον, ὅπερ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν, τούτων τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι· ὅν πολλοὶ ἦν καὶ πολλαὶ ζηλόσειαν τοῦ βίου, παραδείγματα πολιτειῶν τε καὶ τρόπων πλείστα ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχοντα. (Pl. Resp. 561e.)

[Soc.: ‘I also imagine,’ I said, ‘that he is a complex man, full of all sorts of characters, fine and multicolored, just like the city, and that many men and women might envy his life, since it contains the most models constitutions and ways of living.’]

The soul is a city and, more specifically, a democratic city: it displays the surface of a beautiful and intricate (τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ ποικίλον) tapestry, “stuffed with many characters” (πλείστων ἠθῶν μεστόν). He possesses inside of himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities (παραδείγματα πολιτειῶν τε καὶ τρόπων πλείστα ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχοντα), what makes him a “complex” (παντοδαπόν) type of man: like the city of which he is a part, he assumes every shape, a mimetic creature. In this sort of vignette, then, Plato magnifies the inhuman duration of a miniature world, the growth and becoming of the soul, which is alive and animated: it is “packed” with (μεστόν) characters and the greatest number of paradigms and ways of life (παραδείγματα πολιτειῶν τε καὶ τρόπων πλείστα). In the process of degeneration, the soul remains generative, a female body, but the motor capacity of the democratic soul ultimately proves unreliable. That is, the reproductive function of the female body, in this context, meets with failure. Since it is complicated and contains the greatest variety of models, this kind of soul has the potential to create logoi—and it is true that the democratic man passes the time with
philosophy (Pl. Resp. 561d)—but such an outcome constitutes a rarity: dialectic is one activity among many others, which have the effect of rendering him versatile and sophistic. His soul, at the base, is empty of knowledge (κενὴν μαθημάτων) and true words (λόγων ἀληθῶν) (Pl. Resp. 560b) and often fails to perform; it tends to engender false beliefs (Pl. Resp. 560bc), as it becomes, and, in this way, supplies, while it confuses the city’s sensations.

In these degenerate forms, which account for the final stages of metabolē, extreme affects cycle into one another and produce new political realities. This process is illustrated by the transformation of democracy, as it moves towards tyranny: the height of excessive freedom (Τὸ…ἐσχατον…τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῦ πλήθους) shapes and reshapes collective attitudes, as Socrates reminds us in his description of the climate, “…when bought slaves, both male and female, are no less free than those who bought them” (ὅταν δὴ οἱ ἐωνημένοι καὶ αἱ ἐωνημέναι μηδὲν ἢττον ἐλεύθεροι ὠσὶ τῶν/ πριαμένων) (Pl. Resp. 563b). He almost forgets to mention (ὁλίγου ἐπελαθόμεθ’ εἰπεῖν), afterwards, the extent of the legal equality of men and women and of the freedom in the relations between them (ἐν γυναιξὶ δὲ πρὸς ἄνδρας καὶ ἄνδρασι πρὸς/ γυναῖκας ὡσὶ ἡ ἱσονομία καὶ ἐλευθερία γίγνεται) (Pl. Resp. 563b), possibly for several reasons. First of all, it might be too obvious for Socrates to state that equality before the law (isonomia) would extend to relationships between men and women since democracy upholds this concept as a principle to the utmost degree. Or he might be reluctant to make this statement precisely because it is not true: Athenian women were disenfranchised and excluded from the public sphere. Pericles explains to his audience in the Funeral Oration, for instance, that feminine excellence consists in silence (Thuc. II.45), and Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae evokes laughter because the very idea of a city of women, such a gynococracy, is a ridiculous proposal. Lastly, the equal status that men and women would have in this version of democracy reverberates with
the (almost) equal footing on which philosopher kings and queens are placed in the *kallipolis*. The similarity might suggest that democracy is a healthy form of government.

Yet the ideal city and democracy are driven by different kinds of relationality and, therefore, by divergent interests and intensities. The equality (*ἡ ἰσονομία*) and freedom (*ἐλευθερία*) that prevail in a democracy, these are products of the appetites and irrationality and represent shreds of the community of women and children (*ἡ κοινωνία...παιδών τε πέρι καὶ γυναικῶν*) (Pl. *Resp*. 450c), where all things are held in common among friends (*κοινὰ τὰ φίλων*) (Pl. *Resp*. 449c). Whereas philosopher kings and queens share the same position due to their *nous*, democratic men and women exist in a state of equality because they lack any kind of internal regulation and live as they please. In a democracy, the principle of what is *ta koina* permeates into every sphere of the *polis*, where it should not be, and such a lack of any critical judgment, the misperception, facilitates a migration; Socrates explains, the excess that defines democracy, in particular, its extreme freedom, cannot be expected to lead to anything but a change to extreme slavery, whether for a private individual or for a city (*Ἡ γὰρ ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἔοικεν οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι ἢ εἰς ἄγαν/ δουλείαν καὶ ἰδιώτη καὶ πόλει*) (Pl. *Resp*. 564a).

The paradox of this transition, from severe liberty to severe servitude, leads to another paradox, the tyrant’s existence and his reign. Tyranny, which springs from civil discord (Pl. *Resp*. 566a), is the worst form of government, a complete inversion of the *kallipolis*. The poor install this kind of leader in the first place because they are lured by magnetic wealth, described by Plato as “honey” in the comb (*μέλιτός τι*) (Pl. *Resp*. 565a). That is, the people submit to his leadership, in their pursuit, again, of certain affects, tyrannical affects: in particular, the fine, big, persuasive voices (*καλὰς φωνὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ πιθανὰς*) (Pl. *Resp*. 568c), songs and vision of tragic poets, who praise tyranny (*τυραννίδος ὑμνητάς*) (Pl. *Resp*. 568b) in their hymns. In other
words, as lovers of sights and sounds, their bodies match, respond positively to and desire the tyrant’s desire, or erotic love (ἐρωτά) (Pl. Resp. 572e), the savage part of his soul that dominates the rest of his soul. In Book IX, Plato offers a vivid account of the tyrant’s psychology and lets the reader enter into a world of corporeality, filled with incense, myrrh, wreaths, wine and other pleasures (θυμαμάτων τε γέμουσαι καὶ μύρον καὶ στεφάνων καὶ οίνων καὶ...ἡδονῶν) (Pl. Resp. 573a). This is the soul that has no capacity at all for reason because it teems with boundless servility and illiberality (καὶ πολλῆς μὲν δουλείας τε καὶ ἀνελευθερίας γέμειν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ) (Pl. Resp. 577d). The tyrannical soul, while it generates, leads us into a space of pleasures and, for this reason, undergoes a more serious form of sensory-motor failure. This is a female body, whose mode of becoming is solely defined by injustice, and it feminizes his physical body; the tyrant lives like a woman because he “mostly lies hidden in his own house” (καταδεδυκὼς δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς γυνὴ ζῇ) (Pl. Resp. 579b). In the last stage of metabolē, the female soul resides in a female body; the city is no longer one but many, reduced to matter and channels of erotic desire.
I. Mobile Sections

Book III of Plato’s *Laws* presents a task similar to that of *Republic* VIII, but the Athenian Stranger provides a history of mankind, from pre-historical time to his current day, and attempts to construct a more realistic vision of human development. In this chapter, I will continue to explore this initial observation, while I clarify what I mean exactly by the term “realistic,” and show in what ways *Laws* Book III acts as a counterpart, almost like a mirror image, to *Republic* Book VIII. It is my view that Deleuze’s concept of the montage will shed light on the process illustrated by the Athenian’s narrative: first, it will be necessary to define the cinematic “montage,” before I then move on to explain the relevancy and utility of the theoretical work.

While the time-image expresses a direct image of time, the montage is the indirect image of time, of duration: “Not a homogeneous time or a spatialised duration…but an effective duration and time which flow from the articulation of the movement-images” (Deleuze 1986: 29). In *Cinema 1*, Deleuze specifically describes a mode of dialectical cinema that is achieved through montage: “the connection of different and divergent historical movement such that there is not a uniform flow of time so much as different durations, each with their own power” (Colebrook 2002: 49). The montage is thus comprised of “mobile sections,” singular images or becomings from a constituted whole, and collects points of movement as change or alteration: presenting a body that goes through decay, a body in growth and another body in transformation, for example. Time, furthermore, as the force of movement, is always open and becoming in
different ways. Movement does not just shift a body from one point to another (translation); in each block of movement, bodies transform and become (variation) (Colebrook 2002: 44).

What I will argue in the following discussion is that precisely this version of the cinematic montage is at work in the Athenian’s chronicle of history in *Laws* Book III. It is my view that the Athenian’s review of states that have risen and fallen, from the beginning of time, is constituted by mobile sections and displays the juxtaposition of movements, which then yield a sense of time as a whole of differing series of becomings, beyond an organizing point of view. Previous scholarship on this particular book has focused on the trajectory of the narrative and interrogated the accuracy or legitimacy of understanding it to be a “decline narrative.” Nightingale, for example, has argued that Plato does not idealize early humans in the Golden Age or offer a regressive account of history: “Plato’s historical narrative suggests that humans can alter their environment—can intervene in history—in two key ways: by technical expertise and by ethical/political *praxis*” (1999: 306). More recently, in her examination, Morgan builds on this observation and has shown the close connection between myth and history, the way in which it works in Book III and what the purpose or impact of this approach is:

…Plato makes his characters theorise the slow growth of historical sensibility but dooms accounts so produced to future destruction. This approach has its irritations, but at the same time it allows an interestingly experimental approach to the development of historical thinking, one that repeatedly presents an intellectual blank slate and its concomitant opportunities. It lets Plato meditate on the uses of history and the emotional and political value of deploying a past that is or is not cut off from the present (2012: 252).

Plato combines these two genres, as a rhetorical strategy, in order to lend verisimilitude to the ethical and political trajectories portrayed in his dialogues and, in this way, manipulates the past by “…[carving] the past of the cosmos into predictable chunks” (Morgan 2012: 251).

Another way in which to move away from the position that Book III depicts a decline narrative is achieved through contextualizing the Athenian’s account as a sort of dialectical

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25 See also Naddaf, pp. 200-203.
politics. That is, I will argue that what the various stages of such a reconstruction of the past portray is quintessentially a cinematic process and movement: it is my belief that the Athenian’s narrative works as a montage and, therefore, allows the inhuman durations of matter to be perceived. For Deleuze, the emphasis on matter and material associations illustrate a “superior dialectic,” where differences and contradictions remain in tension to disclose difference and becoming. The various periods of human history that the Athenian treats, in turn, rest on these tensions and constitute what I see as divergent historical movement. From my point of view, Plato, by creating a dynamic mode of narration, essentially presents cuts of cinema, which lend themselves, in turn, to profound discontinuity. These are the mobile sections that give us history—histories of processes of matter outside thinking and ordinary perception—a history of the body. While the time-image offers a direct image of time, the montage as a movement-image yields an indirect image of time as a constantly differing whole, open to variation and multiple durations. I am locating the montage in Laws Book III because the Athenian’s construction of a genealogy amounts to a construction of time and follows the different rhythms that make up the whole of time.

What makes the movement-image relevant to the Athenian Stranger’s project in the Laws, as opposed to the time-image at play in Republic Book VIII, is the simple reality that the sensory-motor link remains intact in these mobile sections, or, rather, the Athenian depicts the creation and evolution of this connection, namely, the political relation. To elaborate on what I mean, I will add that the Athenian, in his survey, provides a materialistic version of history, the very motion of matter, and delineates the relation and dialectic between man and matter: dialectical difference begins from an opposition between human life and the material forces that shape it. In Book III, time is presented as the limit of different durations, which define various
political forms: we get particular moments of history and come to the conclusion, by the Athenian’s manipulation of the past, that history is just the unity of these conflicts. The flow of time is sensed as that which lies above and beyond any of the divergent movements—it is derived from movement—whereas we encounter duration directly, in the flow of positive becoming, embodied by the destiny and cycle of Socrates’ *kallipolis*, which is, in fact, a decline narrative. The application of Deleuze’s conception of the montage will thus illuminate points of movement as change or alteration and draw attention to the affective and aesthetic experience of cinematic history. What I will also argue is that the feminine principle, particularly, propels the process of historical change in the Athenian’s project, as the representative of the “other” and difference itself, and, as a critical member of this exchange, in the political relation, it compels the dialectical approach, where we see the limits of each thing’s duration in relation to other durations.

II. The State of Nature

*Laws* Book III displays change (*metabolē*) that takes place over the course of history, as the Athenian Stranger constructs a pseudo-history of time. Whereas, in the *Republic*, Plato has Socrates build the *kallipolis*, which he subsequently unravels, in the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger first reviews the states that have come into being and subsequently fallen. It is my view that we can notice another developmental shift in the Athenian’s methodology; where the *kallipolis* is even more theoretical than Magnesia and belongs to a more distant plane of becoming, specifically, to the domain of the time-image, in the *Laws*, the Athenian proposes to study the changes (τῶν μεταβολῶν) that occur in an indefinitely long period of time:

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ΑΘ. Ταύτα μὲν οὖν δὴ ταύτη· πολιτείας δὲ ποτὲ φῶμεν γεγονέναι· μῶν οὐκ ἐνθένδε τις ἄν αὐτήν ρᾴστα
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τε καὶ κάλλιστα κατίδοι;
Κ.Λ. Πόθεν;
ΑΘ. Ὅθεν περ καὶ τὴν τῶν πόλεων ἐπίδοσιν εἰς ἀρετήν
μεταβάινουσαν ἁμα καὶ κακίαν ἑκάστοτε θεατέον.
Κ.Λ. Λέγεις δὲ πόθεν;
ΑΘ. Οἶμαι μὲν ἀπὸ χρόνου μήκους τε καὶ ἀπειρίας καὶ
τῶν μεταβολῶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ.
Κ.Λ. Πώς λέγεις;
ΑΘ. Φέρε, ἄρ’ οὐ πόλεις τ’ εἰσίν καὶ ἄνθρωποι πολι-
τευόμενοι, δοκεῖς ἃν ποτε κατανοήσαι χρόνου πλήθος ὅσον
γέγονεν;
Κ.Λ. Οὐκον ἡμῖν γέγονεν ἡμῖν γέγονεν ἡμῖν γέγονεν;
ΑΘ. Τὸ δὲ γε ὡς ἀπλέτων τι καὶ ἀμήχανον δὲ ἐπὶ
Κ.Λ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε.
ΑΘ. Μῶν οὖν οὐ μυρία μὲν ἐπὶ μυρίας ἡμῖν γεγόνασι
πόλεις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ πλῆθος
λόγον οὐκ ἔλλατον ἐφθαρμέναι; πεπολιτευόμεναι δ’ αὐτός
καὶ τὸτὲ μὲν ἐλλαττῶν
μείζονος, τοτὲ δ’ ἐκ μειζόνων ἐλλάττους, καὶ χείρους τὸ
βελτιώνων γεγόνασι καὶ βελτίους ἐκ χειρόνων;
Κ.Λ. Αναγκαίον. (Pl. Leg. 676a-c.)

[Ath.: ‘So much for that, then! But what about political systems? How are we to
suppose they first came into existence? Would not someone best and most easily
discern their origins from this standpoint?’ I feel sure that the best and easiest way
to see their origins is this.’
Cl.: ‘What standpoint?’
Ath.: ‘That from which one should always observe the progress of states as they
move towards either goodness or badness.’
Cl.: ‘What point is that?’
Ath.: ‘The observation, I imagine, of an infinitely long period of time and of the
changes that occur in it.’
Cl.: ‘How do you mean?’
Ath.: ‘Look, do you think you could ever grasp the space of time that has passed
since cities came into existence and men have lived under some sort of political
organization?’
Cl.: ‘No, not very easily.’
Ath.: ‘But at any rate you realize it must be an enormously long time?’
Cl.: ‘Yes, I see that, of course.’
Ath.: ‘So surely, during this period, thousands upon thousands of states have
come into being, while at least as many, in equally vast numbers, have been
destroyed? Time and again each one of them has adopted every state of political
system. And sometimes small states have become bigger, and big ones have
grown smaller; superior states have deteriorated, and bad ones have improved.’
Cl. ‘Necessarily.’]
The Athenian Stranger enters into a thought experiment and intellectual exercise, in the same vein that Socrates of the Republic creates a just city in speech (Pl. Resp. 368e-369a), yet, in this instance, Plato has his interlocutor take an inductive approach reminiscent of Thucydidean Realpolitik. This is to say that the Athenian, in the manner of a historian, starts from particulars in order to draw a general conclusion and invites his interlocutor, Cleinias, to readjust his stance, “to consider their topic at hand from another position, “from this standpoint” (ἐνθένδε). With this initial gesture, Plato places a certain lens on the eye of the camera, as it were, and introduces cinematic motion into Book III.

Now it will be necessary to define what I mean by “cinematic motion” and to elaborate on why I find it pertinent to this instance. First of all, the Athenian’s portrayal of political history is, at heart, an aesthetic endeavor because it engages the senses, from the point of view of both the speaker and listener, of all parties involved. The Athenian, for example, readjusts his frame of reference so that someone might most finely discern or “see” the origins of states (αὐτὴν ῥᾴστα/τε καὶ κάλλιστα κατίδοι), how political systems first “came into existence” (πολιτείας…γεγονέναι). The narrative then depicts a vital process, from a certain vantage point, where “one should always observe the progress of states as they pass over towards either goodness or badness” (ὁθὲνπερ καὶ τὴν τῶν πόλεων ἑπίδοσιν εἰς ἀρετὴν/ ἡμα καὶ κακίαν ἐκάστοτε θεατέον). The cinematic perspective, “from this point” (ὁθὲνπερ), captures the progress or “relaxation” (ἑπίδοσιν) that takes place over the course of time, and brings, in other words, the Deleuzian movement-image into play. That is, it provides a frame, which will organize sets of images, where the movement-image rests on the premise that each movement, in turn, transforms the whole of time by producing new becomings.
The mobility and liberation of viewpoint convey the movement-image in Plato and thus create an indirect portrayal of time. The new standpoint, the Athenian explains, will give insight into “an infinitely long period of time and into the variations therein occurring” (ἀπὸ χρόνου μήκους τε καὶ ἀπειρίας καὶ/ τῶν μεταβολῶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ). With his description of the changes (τῶν μεταβολῶν) that occur over a span or duration, “in such a length of time” (ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ), the Athenian’s account, essentially, presents the moving of movement, an image, which continues to unfold, when he asks Cleinias to consider, “Do you suppose you could ever ascertain the space of time that has passed since cities came into existence?” (δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε κατανοῆσαι χρόνου πλήθος ὅσον/γέγονεν). The sense of becoming, encapsulated by the verb γέγονεν, contributes to the force of movement and to the overall aesthetic experience of the Athenian’s task: the space or “extent of time” (χρόνου πλήθος) that has “come into being,” measured since the birth of the first cities, is boundless (ἄπλετόν) and extraordinary (ἀµήχανον).

Such a rendering of historical time exemplifies what Deleuze describes in *Cinema 1*, with respect to the “Third thesis: movement and change:” “Movement always relates to a change, migration to a seasonal variation. And this is equally true of bodies: the fall of a body presupposes another one which attracts it, and expresses a change in the whole which governs them both” (1986: 8).

What the opening of Book III then shows us is this very idea of change in the “mobile section” because Plato provides a collection of frames and singular blocks of movement, wherein bodies transform. The delineations of an aesthetic project are made clear when he has the Athenian review thousands upon thousands (μυρίαι… ἐπὶ μυρίαις) of states; they have come into being, while at least as many, in equally vast numbers, have been destroyed (γεγόνασι/ πόλεις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν πλήθους/λόγον οὐκ ἐλάττους ἑφθαρμέναι). The instability of this process is underscored by variety; time and again, each one of them has
adopted every state of political system (πεπολιτευμέναι δ’ αὖ πάσας/ πολιτείας πολλάκις ἐκασταχοῦ). And, sometimes, small states have become bigger, and big ones have grown smaller; superior states have deteriorated, and bad ones have improved (καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων/ μείζους, τοτὲ δ’ ἐκ μειζόνων ἐλάττους, καὶ χείρους ἐκ/ βελτιώνων γεγόνασι καὶ βελτίους ἐκ χειρόνων). These are motion pictures moving through space, the way that myriads of cities have come into being during this period (μυρίαι μὲν ἐπὶ μυρίαις ἡμῖν γεγόνασι/ πόλεις ἐν τῷ τῷ τοῦτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ), and the repetition of gignomai enhances the dynamism of this process. That is, every city and constitution that the Athenian depicts will have their own duration, as they make their own cuts and movements, which amount to differing series of becomings and, in this way, compose a sense of time.

What I understand to be a cinematic montage of mobile sections, the duration of various cities, in terms of Book III, which exemplify the stages of pre-history and history, also has a political function, most importantly, for our discussion. Again, Deleuze defines the montage as “…the indirect image of time, of duration. Not a homogeneous time or a spatialised duration…but an effective duration and time which flow from the articulation of the movement-image” (1986: 29). Locating the montage in the narrative enables us to realize the coincidence between two seemingly distinct domains: the aesthetic is political and the political, aesthetic because politics stems from what is “pre-personal” or micro-perceptions. In other words, it involves affective participation. As a result, when the Athenian sets out to determine the aitia or cause of change (τῆς μεταβολῆς τῆν αἰτίαν) (Pl. Leg. 676c), he basically shows how politics emerges from the very form or synthesis of experience, which is, in turn, “de-formed” from ordered wholes to its effective components (Colebrook 2002: 48). As a sort of historiographer, then, the Athenian gives us history in the form of a montage, as he illustrates the larger material
forces that have constituted human space and time. As he strives to indicate the origin of constitutions, as well as transformation (δείξειν ἡµῖν τὴν πρώτην τῶν πολιτειῶν γένεσιν καὶ μετάβασιν) (Pl. Leg. 676c), for instance, the Athenian considers the many acts and events of destruction that have beset the world of men, floods, plagues and “numerous other things” (Τὸ πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γεγονέναι κατακλυ-/σµοῖς τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς) (Pl. Leg. 677a). After which point, he stops at one of the many catastrophes, which occurred “once upon a time” through the deluge (μίαν τῶν πολλῶν ταύτην τὴν/ τῷ κατακλυσµῷ ποτε γενοµένην) (Pl. Leg. 677a).

Now I will review and demarcate the various components of the montage and demonstrate the significant role that movement plays in and across each, where, in the first phase, the Athenian sets the starting point for time and describes the creation of duration. After the primary cataclysm passes, Plato makes us move to the mountains, which are able to preserve traces of humanity:

ΑΘ. Οὐς οἱ τότε περιφυγόντες τὴν φθορὰν σχεδὸν ὀρειοὶ τινες ἄν εἶεν νοµῆς, ἐν κορυφαῖς που σµικρὰ ζώπυρα τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διασεσωµένα γένους.
ΚΛ. Δήλον.
ΑΘ. Καί δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους ἀνάγκη ποι τῶν ἄλλων ἀπείρους εἶναι τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀστέσις πρὸς ἄλλη-λοις μηχανῶν εἰς τε πλεονεξίας καὶ φιλονικίας καὶ ὁπόσα’ ἄλλα κακουργήµατα πρὸς ἄλληλους ἐπινοοῦσιν. (Pl. Leg. 677b.)

[Ath.: ‘That the men who then escaped destruction must have been mostly herdsmen of the hills, a few embers of the human race preserved somewhere on the tops of mountains.’
Cl.: ‘Obviously.’
Ath.: ‘Moreover, men of this kind must necessarily have been unskilled in the arts generally, and especially in such contrivances as men use against one another in cities for purposes of greed and rivalry and all the other dirty tricks which they devise one against another.’]
The passage of water from the flood, after it washes over, plays a cathartic role, as it reveals noble savages, those described by Rousseau in the *Discours sur l’inégalité*, who are by nature independent, innocent and content. In the same way that waves in the *Republic* Book V contribute movement, as they produce revolutionary surges, the deluge creates a blank slate and purges mankind of its impurities. These primitive men are simple, inexperienced in the arts (ἀπείρους…τεχνῶν), ignorant of crafty devices (μηχανῶν), which city-dwellers, in contrast, will use to their own advantage, in their love of victory (εἰς τε πλεονεξίας καὶ φιλονικίας). After the flood, men exist as embers, in a state of nature, which Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Marx and Engels and Arendt in the *Human Condition* will later identify in their own frameworks of thought.

I refer to these social contract theorists because it is my belief that a continuity is palpable between Plato and the more modern thinkers I mention. The move that Rousseau, in particular, makes, between the state of nature and civil society in the Second Discourse is relevant to our

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26 For Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war: “…during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against man” (1.13.8). His pessimistic view of the nature of man necessitates a monarchy after the social contract. The state of nature is more benign for Locke. For Locke, the law of reason is the law of nature: “Men living according to reason, without a common superior on earth, to judge between them, is properly the state of nature.” (2.19) The state of nature may represent the idyllic past. Rousseau sets up a sharp delineation between the state of nature and civil society, where noble savages, who exist in the former, possess a healthier constitution because they do not engage in reflection, meditation and philosophy. Rousseau claims that one could, in fact, easily follow the history of human diseases by tracking the trajectory of civil societies (146).

Frederich Engels in the *Origin of the Family, Private Property and State* traces the origin of the family to “a primitive stage” when unrestricted sexual freedom prevailed within the tribe, every woman belonging equally to every man and every man to every woman (97). Finally, Arendt in the *Human Condition* suggests that, in entering the public realm, women seem to be bringing with them a principle of reality into this sphere, namely the necessities which originate with having a body:

The fact that the modern age emancipated the working classes and women at nearly the same historical moment must certainly be counted among the characteristics of an age which no longer believes that bodily functions and material concerns should be hidden. It is all the more symptomatic of the nature of these phenomena that the few remnants of strict privacy even in our own civilization relate to the ‘necessities’ in the original sense of being necessitated by having a body (Arendt, 1973 [1958]: 73).
discussion because it is also locatable in the Athenian’s narrative. The move to which I refer concerns the concession that Rousseau makes, with respect to the state of nature. That is, though the state of nature represents a more idyllic time, the “Golden Age,” as it were, it is impossible to return to this previous period, due to the vast span of distance that exists between now and then. Once men have entered society, there is no way back to nature, and such a return is not even desirable, from Rousseau’s point of view: « …l’on ne désire point ce qu’on n’est pas en état de connaître. D’où il suit que l’homme sauvage ne désirant que les choses qu’il connaît et ne connaissant que celles dont la possession est en son pouvoir ou facile à acquérir, rien ne doit être si tranquille que son âme et rien si borné que son esprit » (213). The simplicity of nature places a limitation on the capacity of the mind, and this stands in stark contrast to civic man, who, in the course of his evolution, has developed into a more complex being. This type of man, whose desires extend beyond satisfaction and internal fluctuations create suffering, achieves morality, his full moral goodness, in the context of society, an outcome that Rousseau’s theory of the social contract intends to render.

The mini-digression on Rousseau provides a parallel case and illuminates a similar move that Plato makes in both the Republic and Laws. With respect to the first dialogue, there is a particular instance when Socrates injects luxuries and pleasures into the city of pigs (Pl. Resp. 369b-372e), in order to depict a more realistic conception of a city, the “feverish city” (Pl. Resp. 372e), which he then cleanses and refines in Book V. In addition, in the ideal city (kallipolis), philosopher kings and queens are the most superior moral beings, not because their souls do not contain pleasures and desires, but because they know how to regulate these sensations: these people have undergone the training necessary to gain mastery over themselves. What I am trying to illustrate, by calling attention to these two examples, are the various steps and stages that are
involved in Plato’s moral and political philosophy. That is, what is considered primitive, whether it be a primitive city, like the city of pigs, or the noble savage, may be healthier, but such portraits are incomplete precisely because they are simpler: they fail to offer realistic depictions of the contemporary period and of the individual. The paradigm of the best possible state incorporates these complications and reaches a state of perfection because it puts everything into place and portrays the world, both as it is and how it ought to be.

In the dialogue the *Statesman*, Plato introduces a space of cosmic machinery and shows how separate periods engage with each other, in terms of motion and movement. More specifically, the Eleatic Stranger describes two rotations or consecutive states of the world (Pl. *Plt.* 271c-272b), separated by a reverse movement, *metabolē* (Vidal-Naquet 1986: 137). Vidal-Naquet further suggests: “…one of the states of the cosmos, the one placed under God's immediate direction, is an anti-world, a world in reverse, and that this reverse state corresponds exactly to an obverse right state, to a world in which the temporal order is the one we know” (1978: 139). Other scholars have maintained that the myth consists of three phases, and Kahn sees it “…as a device for removing the ideal Statesman from the human world and relocating him in the mythical space of an alternative cosmic cycle” (160). In the age of Cronus, God himself goes with the universe as guide in its revolving course (αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς συµποδηγεῖ πορευόµενον καὶ συµµυκεῖ), but, at another epoch (τοτέ), when the cycles have at length

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28 Kahn’s argument works within a developmentalist framework: “…to the extent that the divine ruler of the myth parallels the true Statesman, he remains relevant to the constitutions of our world, since they must imitate the wisdom of his rule as best they can. These human constitutions can only be a second best, since no actual ruler has the wisdom of true politikē, and the best compromise can only be the rule of law. Law is the deuterōs plous (300c2; cf. 297e4). On this point the political philosophy of the *Statesman* prefigures that of the *Laws*. The city of the *Laws*, in which the rulers must be servants of the law, is repeatedly described as second best (739a, e, 807b, 875d). If a human being with the appropriate knowledge could be trusted with absolute power, there would be no reason to limit his power by law: nothing deserves to be supreme over knowledge (874e-875d). Thus the testimony of the *Laws* endorses the central thesis argued in the *Statesman*” (160). He sees the *Statesman* as a transitional dialogue, “… in which Plato is moving from the position of the *Republic* to the position of the *Laws*” (161).
reached the measure of his allotted time (ὅταν αἱ περίοδοι τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτῷ µέτρον εἰλήφωσιν ἡδὴ χρόνου), he lets it go (ἀνήκεν), and, of its own accord, it turns backward in the opposite direction (τὸ δὲ πάλιν αὐτόµατον εἰς τάναντια περιάγεται) (Pl. Plt. 269c). In this way, spinning imagery, for wheels (αἱ περίοδοι) turn in motion as they roll (περιάγεται) and snap “automatically” (αὐτόµατον) towards another direction (εἰς τάναντια), leaves a trace of the measure of time (χρόνου) and, in passing, “now and then” (τοτὲ), fixes a fleeting moment in the textual reel.

The myth of the Statesman is interesting for my examination for reasons, on which I will now go on to expand. First of all, the way in which the Age of Cronos is characterized in this dialogue reverberates with the Athenian’s account of the world after the flood in the Laws, the idea of a primitive past and the state of nature. The comparison between Plato and Rousseau then allows us to understand the state of nature to be a sort of mythical space since it is so distant from the present period and exists more as a concept and temporal marker than any kind of fact, which describes reality. In view of this observation, when the Eleatic Stranger describes the previous cycle (τῆς ἐµπροσθεν), which defines the Golden Age, he presents us, in a sense, with a cinematic vision of the world by opening up another world. It makes us encounter not the present cycle (τῆς νῦν ἐστὶ καθεστηκυίας φορᾶς) but a more idyllic time, when all the fruits of the earth sprang up of their own accord for men (πάντα αὐτόµατα γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις) (Pl. Plt. 271d). The image unwinds itself, as everything “comes into being” (γίγνεσθαι) “spontaneously” (αὐτόµατα), what triggers the growth of bounteous fruit (καρποὺς… ἀφθόνους), which the earth yields “of its own accord” (αὐτοµάτης ἀναδιδούσης τῆς γῆς); it provides material in plenty (πολλῆς υλῆς) (Pl. Plt. 272a). Fruits, trees, abundant grass and soft couches (µαλακᾶς…εὐνας) comprise the material threads of this age, as opposed to the constitutions (πολιτείαι) and the
possession of women and children (κτήσεις γυναικῶν καὶ παιδῶν) that belong to the Age of Zeus and the present (Pl. Plt. 271e-272b).

When we look at these accounts, we notice that these separate cycles are gendered, mythical and historical time. To put it another way, a gendered way of thinking maps itself onto these temporal periods and enables us to make the distinction in the first place. In the space of myth, it is particularly striking that women and their bodies are absent, and the feminine, instead, is found in the land. In mythical time, it is the land that assumes the generative function of the female body and that acts as a womb: in time past, all men were coming to life again, out of the earth as her children, with no recollection of their former lives (ἐκ γῆς γὰρ ἀνεβιώσκοντο πάντες/ οὐδὲν μεμημένοι τῶν πρόσθεν) (Pl. Plt. 272a). This is a repetition of the narrative that we find in the Republic, specifically, of the noble lie, in which “mother earth” molds (πλαττόμενοι) and nurtures (τρεφόμενοι) her children inside of her and delivers them up to the light of day (ἡ γῆ αὐτοὺς μήτηρ οὖσα ἀνήκεν) (Pl. Resp. 414d-e), also a muthos. The correspondence suggests that, across Plato’s thought, the female body has the potential to be displaced onto other domains and inanimate surfaces, which determine subjectivity in mythic space, “mythical subjectivity.” When the female body exists as a myth in the genre of myth and has yet to materialize in the shape of a woman, male bodies are attached to the land and, for this reason, they are scattered and spread across the earth.

I will now move onto another dialogue in order to show Platonic patterns and to emphasize the contrast between nature and civilization because what I am arguing is that Laws Book III portrays the development of these stages and, ultimately, the production of politics. In the Protagoras, for example, the sophist gives a Great Speech, where the myth explains the birth of the city: « En effet, le mythe de Protagoras se présente essentiellement comme un mythe
d’origine de la cité » (Brisson 1975: 22). There once was a time, he explains, when the gods existed, but the mortal races did not (’Ἡν γὰρ ποτε χρόνος ὅτε θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, θνητὰ δὲ γένη/ οὐκ ἦν). When the time came for their appointed “genesis” (ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τούτοις χρόνος ἠλθεν εἰμαρμένος/ γενέσεως), the gods shaped them inside the earth, blending together earth and fire and various compounds of earth and fire (τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἐνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς/ μείξαντες καὶ τὸν ὁσσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆ κεράννυται). When they were ready to bring them to light (ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγεῖν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἔμελλον), Prometheus and Epimetheus were put in charge of assigning to each its appropriate powers and abilities (προσέταξαν Προμηθεῖ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεῖ κοσμῆσαι τε καὶ νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἐκάστοις ὡς/ πρέπει) (Pl. Prt. 320c-d). From this origin, the resources that human beings needed to stay alive “came into being” (γίγνεται) (Pl. Prt. 322a), including politikē technē, necessarily:

’Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας, πρὸτὸν μὲν διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν ζώων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισεν, καὶ ἐπεκεύετο βωμοὺς τε ιδρύεσθαι καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν· ἔπειτα φωνήν καὶ ὀνόματα ταχὺ δημιουργικόν τῇ τέχνῃ, καὶ οἰκήσεις καὶ ἔσθητος καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ στρωματῖα καὶ τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς ἠρέντο. οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἄνθρωποι ἄκουσαν σποράνθηκαν, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν· ἀπόλλυτο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχὺ αὐτῶν ἄσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφῆν ἰκανὴ· ἄγεσθαι δὴ τοῖς ἀρχαῖοι ἀνθρώποι· ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωποι ἰδακτοὶ ἀλλὰ συνοικισμένοι καὶ σποράνθηκαν πόλεις· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἑνέδειξαν—πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὕτω εἶχον, ᾧ μέρος πολεμικῆ— ἐξήτουν δὴ ἀθροίζεσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις· ἄττ’ ἄρα ἄθροισθεῖν, ἡδίκουν ἀλλήλους ἀτε οὐκ ἤρθοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην, ὧστε πάλιν σκεδασμόνων διεφθείροντο. (Pl. Prt. 322a-b.)

[‘It is because man had a share of the divine dispensation that he alone among animals worshipped the gods, with whom he had a kind of kinship, and set himself to erect altars and sacred images. It wasn’t long before they were articulating speech and words and had invented houses, clothes, shoes, and blankets, and were nourished by food from the earth. Thus equipped, human beings at first lived in scattered isolation; there were no cities. They were being destroyed by wild beasts because they were weaker in every way, and although their technology was adequate to obtain food, it was deficient when it came to fighting wild animals. This was because they did not yet possess the art of
politics, of which the art of war is a part. They did indeed try to band together and survive by founding cities. The outcome when they did so was that they wronged each other, because they did not possess the art of politics, and so they would scatter and again be destroyed."

This story that Protagoras expresses illustrates the distinction between two periods and worlds: one, which is distinguished by skill in handiwork (ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη) and the other, by the art of politics. In the former, humans find nourishment from the earth (τὰς ἐκ γῆς/ τροφὰς ηὔρετο) and at first live in scattered isolation; there were no cities (κατ’ ἀρχὰς/ ἀνθρωποι ὁκουν σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν) during this phase, when their destined time to be created came to these (ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τούτοις χρόνος ἦλθεν εἵμαρμένος/ γενέσεως).

What the tale portrays is a certain dynamism between two temporal frameworks and, more generally, the fragility of existence. That is, although in a state of nature, human beings, because they have access to speech, articulate their voice (φωνὴν), with which to express their morality, their settlements fail to last: they keep falling into extinction. They do seek to band together and to secure their lives by founding cities (ἐζήτουν δὴ ἁθροίζεσθαι καὶ σῴζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις), but the attempt is a futile one: as often as they would band together, they would continue committing injustices against one another, through the lack of civic art (ὅτ’/ οὖν ἁθροισθεῖεν, ἥδικουν ἀλλήλους ἢτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν/ πολιτικὴν τέχνην). Their initial formations disintegrate, as people would scatter and again be destroyed (ὡςτε πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο).

In other words, the skills that they have at their disposal, at this point, are limited, and what truly makes the community cohesive is politikē technē because it serves as a pivot, which anchors humanity and civilization. The emergence and presence of politikē technē thus take place, not in the original, but in a secondary cycle; it marks a level of sophistication and rearranges relationships, as it shapes and reshapes the interactions that human beings have with
one another. Primarily, this particular craft tears men away from the nourishment of the earth, whose force of attraction, in the beginning, makes them forage like wild animals, and pulls bodies to itself. In my view, the feminine principle is locatable in *politikē technē* because it makes and completes bonds and relationships and, in doing so, preserves the future of mankind. The manifestation of this tool, furthermore, runs parallel to the birth of woman, who also comes into being in another, later generation and Pandora, specifically.\(^{29}\) Politics depends on the reproduction of bodies, which the female body ensures, and the production, migration and refinement of sensations that stem from association.

Comparison with these other texts emphasizes the general point that statesmanship and political science are a craft and human invention, also made in the *Laws*. Though the Athenian Stranger describes the hill-shepherds, who escaped the flood, as being quite “inexperienced in the crafty devices” that city-dwellers have in their possession (τὸν ἄλλον ἄπείρους εἶναι τεχνόν καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀστεσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους μηχανῶν) (Pl. Leg. 677b), he admits, at the same time, that these people lack special skills, which, actually, improve the human condition:

\[\text{ΑΘ. Θόδην δὴ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πεδίοις πόλεις καὶ πρὸς \thetaαλάττῃ κατοικούσας ἀρόνην ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ διαφθείρεσθαι;} \]
\[\text{ΚΛ. Θόδην.} \]
\[\text{ΑΘ. Ὑποκοῦν ὀργανὰ τε πάντα ἀπόλλυσθαι, καὶ εἰ τι τέχνης ἦν ἐχόμενον σπουδαῖος ἡμιμένον ἢ πολιτικής ἢ καὶ σοφίας τινὸς ἐτέρας, πάντα ἔρρειν ταῦτα ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ φήσομεν; πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ ἀριστε, εἴ γε ἔμενεν τάδε οὔτω τὸν πάντα χρόνον ὡς νῦν διακεκόσμηται, καίνον ἀνηρίσκετό ποτε καὶ ὁτιοῦν; } \]
\[\text{ΚΛ. Τοῦτο ὅτι μὲν μυριάκις μύρια ἐτή διελάνθανεν ἄρα τοὺς τότε, χίλια δὲ ἀρ’ οὗ γέγονεν ἢ δῆς τοσάτα ἐτή, τὰ μὲν Δαιδάλῳ καταφανῆ γέγονεν, τὰ δὲ Ὀρφεῖ, τὰ δὲ Παλαμήδῃ, τὰ δὲ περὶ μουσικῆς Μαρσύα καὶ Ὁλύμπῳ, περὶ λύραν δὲ Ἀμφίνοι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις πάμπολλα, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν χθῆς καὶ πρώθην γεγονότα.} \]

\(^{29}\) To punish Prometheus’ theft of fire, Zeus creates Pandora, the first woman and a “beautiful evil” for men, as Hesiod describes in the *Works and Days* (Hes. Op. 70-82).
ἈΘ. Ἀριστ’, ὦ Κλεινία, τὸν φίλον ὅτι παρέλιπες, τὸν ἄτεχνως χθές γενόµενον. (Pl. Leg. 677c-d.)

[Ath.: ‘And we can take it, can’t we, that the cities that had been built on the plains and near the sea were totally destroyed at the time?’
Cl.: ‘Yes, we can.’
Ath.: ‘So all their tools were destroyed, and any worthwhile discovery they had made in politics, or any other field was entirely lost at the time? You see, my friend, if their discoveries had survived throughout at the same level of development as they have attained today, how could anything new have ever been invented?’
Cl.: ‘The upshot of all this, I suppose, is that for millions of years these techniques remained unknown to primitive man. Then, a thousand or two thousand years ago, Daedalus and Orpheus and Palamedes made their various discoveries, Marsyas and Olympus pioneered the art of music, Amphion invented the lyre, and many other discoveries were made by other people. All this happened only yesterday or the day before, so to speak.’
Ath.: ‘How tactful of you, Cleinias, to leave out your friend, who really was born ‘yesterday’!’

What the Athenian’s narrative reveals is that the deluge, a moment of destruction, is actually necessary for the development of the future. Plains and sea cities that were, at one time, inhabited on the plains and near the sea, are ruined, at another (τὰς ἐν τοῖς πεδίοις πόλεις καὶ πρὸς/ θαλάττη κατοικοῦσας ἁρδὴν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ διαφθείρεσθαι). The hole that is subsequently created by the loss of tools opens up room for creativity: the Athenian concludes that if human discoveries, whether concerned with politics or other sciences (ἡὑρηµένον ἢ πολιτικῆς ἢ/ καὶ σοφίας τινὸς ἐτέρας), had remained all that time ordered just as they are now (εἴ γε ἐµενεν τάδε/ οὕτω τόν πάντα χρόνον ὡς νῦν διακεκόσµηται), innovations would have ceased to come into being; nothing new would ever have been invented (καὶ νῦν/ ἀνηυρίσκετό ποτὲ καὶ ὀτιοῦν). The juxtaposition between destruction and duration, made evident by the repetition of chronos and verbs meaning “to destroy” (διαφθείρεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἔρρειν), displays, in turn, a temporal transition, from mythical time to historical.
In this way, the Athenian Stranger delineates the progression of time. χθὲς, in fact, sets a marker, so to speak, and indicates a more recent past and the birth of a modern period. Cleinias, in response to the Athenian’s observation, recalls the rise of modern inventions, which for millions of years escaped the notice of those who lived in a bygone era (µυριάκις µύρια ἔτη διελάνθανεν ἄρα τοὺς τότε). Some of these arts were revealed to Daedalus (τὰ µὲν Δαιδάλῳ καταφανῆ γέγονεν), some to Orpheus (τὰ δὲ Ὄρφεϊ), some to Palamedes (τὰ δὲ Παλαµήδει), music to Marsyas and Olympus (τὰ δὲ περὶ µουσικὴν Μαρσύᾳ καὶ Ὅλυµπῳ), lyric to Amphion (περὶ λύραν δὲ Ἀµφίονι), and a vast number of others to other persons (τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις)—all dating, as it were, from yesterday or the day before (ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν χθὲς καὶ πρῴην γεγονότα).

The Athenian agrees and points out that Epimenides is absent from the list, a dear one (τὸν φίλον), who really “was born yesterday” (χθὲς γενὸς εἶναι).

The cosmic upheaval that takes place denotes one cycle or interval, which moves forward by forces of flux. As various innovations are made, they “become” (γέγονεν), delivered from the male body, whether it be Daedalus, Orpheus or Palamedes. These figures are pregnant males, who introduce and deliver creations into the world. Although the description of tumid souls, which Socrates lays out in detail, in a dialogue like the Symposium, is less explicit in the Laws and the Athenian’s survey, we know that the same metaphysical process is at work.30 It is my belief that the event of change itself, emphasized by the repetition of gignomai in this particular

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30 In the Symposium, Socrates describes the ladder of love and the journey of a young man, a lover of beautiful bodies (τῶν καλῶν σοµάτων ἐραστήν), who eventually lets this passion go (χαλάσαι); his next advance will be to set a higher value on the beauty of souls than on that of the body (µετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος τιµῶσερον ἤγησασθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώµατι). So that when someone has an attractive soul (ἐπιστηµῶν κάλλος), though not necessarily the flower of youth (ἄνθος), this will suffice for him to love, to care and “to give birth to” logoi (ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ κήδεσθαι καὶ τίκτειν λόγους). At which point, he is compelled to contemplate beauty in ways of living and laws (ἐπιστηµῶν κάλλος), this person will continue to theorize (θεωρῶν) in his position, face to face with the mass of the sea (τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τετραµµένος). The encounter then comes to its natural end: pregnancy and delivery; the lover begets many fair fruits of discourse and meditation in full-scale philosophy (πολ-/λοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους καὶ µεγαλοπρεπεῖς τίτκη καὶ διανοή-/µατα ἐν µυθοφορίᾳ αφθόνῳ) (Pl. Symp. 210b-d). The philosopher, as a midwife, assists the pregnant soul and brings logoi into the world (τίκτειν λόγους).
exchange, attests to a feminine presence. That is, Cleinias’ remark about these discoveries, which recently made themselves “manifest” (καταφανῆ γέγονεν) to these men and come into existence, reinforce the fact that these figures are engaging in and practice creative activities. Epimenides, for instance, is described as bringing into completion “by deed” (ἔργῳ ἐκεῖνος ἀπετέλεσεν) what Hesiod predicted “by word” (ὁ λόγῳ μὲν Ἡσίοδος ἐμαντεύετο) (Pl. Leg. 677e). These very acts of productivity indicate the ways of the world, in the most literal sense: human bodies, and, in this particular case, male bodies, are interacting with forces of the world in such a way that not only are they being penetrated by matter but they are also, at the same time, producing material change. This is why I believe that Deleuze’s concept of the montage is both relevant and illuminating to the moment because it allows us to track and to locate in what way historical change is taking place: through the vehicle of present and absent, male and female, human and nonhuman bodies, which comprise fluid and cinematic images, what we can understand to be a mobile section of the literary narrative.

What I mean to say is that Plato, in Laws Book III, has the Athenian depict a particular kind of existence, and that is a cinematic existence. With this book, specifically, the narrative is cinematic because it is historical and simultaneously aesthetic and by “aesthetic,” I mean that it is sensational. To unpack my point of view, in this chapter, I am drawing attention to the distinct frames into which the Athenian divides his account, and the state of nature is one of the first:

ΑΘ. Οὔκοιν εἴπωμεν ὅτι γενεῖ διαβιοῦσαι πολλαί τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῶν πρὸ κατακλυσμοῦ γεγονότων καὶ τῶν νῦν ἀτεχνότεροι μέν καὶ ἀμαθέστεροι πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μέλλουσιν εἰναι τέχνας καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς, ὅσαι τε πεζαὶ καὶ ὅσαι κατὰ θάλατταν γίγνονται τὰ νῦν, καὶ ὅσαι δὴ κατὰ πόλιν μόνον αὐτοῦ, δίκαι καὶ στάσιςς λεγόμεναι, λόγοις ἔργος τε μειμηνήσας πάσας μηχανὰς εἰς τὸ κακουργεῖν τε ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀδίκους, εὐθέστεροι δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείότεροι καὶ ἀμαθοῦς σφυροκόπτεροι καὶ σύμπαντα δικαιότεροι; τὸ δὲ τοῖτων αἴτιον ἡδὴ διεληλύθαμεν. (Pl. Leg. 679d-e.)
[Ath.: ‘And shall we not say that the many generations which lived in that way were bound to be unskilled, as compared with the era before the flood and with the modern world, and ignorant of arts in general and especially of the arts of war as now practiced in by land and sea, including those warlike arts, which, disguised under the name of law-suits and factions, are peculiar to cities, contrived as they are with every device of word and deed to inflict mutual hurt and injury. Weren’ t our primitive men simpler and manlier and at the same time more temperate and upright in every way? And the cause of this state of things we have already explained.’]

The description provides a singular image of movement: as liquid spills over the surface, many generations come out (γενεαὶ… πολλαὶ) into view, new revolutions, which lived in that way (διαβιοῦσαι… τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον). They seem to be generally superior to antediluvian races, which came into being before the flood or the men of today (τῶν πρὸ κατακλυσμοῦ γεγονότων καὶ τῶν νῦν), because they lived without trade (ἀτεχνότεροι) and without knowledge (ἀµαθέστεροι) of those crafts, especially of the arts of war (πρὸς τὰς πολεµικὰς).

What Plato evokes in these books that portray generational change is both the Homeric and lyric account of human leaves. In Mimnermus fragment 2, for example, the lyric poet compares human life and the period of youth, in particular, to the duration of leaves, while, in Iliad Book VI, Homer has Glaucus make the original connection. 31 I mention these intertexts in

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31 The first two lines of Mimnermus fr. 2 open with a statement about the brevity of youth: ἡµεῖς δ’, οίᾳ τε φύλλα φύει πολυάνθεσις ὀρθ/ ἔαρος, ὃτ’, αὐὴν αὐὴν αὔξεται ἡµέλιον/ τοῖς ἱκέλοι πήχιον ἐπὶ χρόνον ἀνθείν/ ἠβῆς/ τερπόµεθα… (Mimnermus. fr. 2. 1-4.) [But we, such as the leaves the much-blossoming season of spring puts forth, when they grow quickly under the rays of the sun, like them we enjoy the blossoms of youth for a time but a span…]. They resemble the language of that in the Iliad where Glauce meets Diomedes in battle and compares the generations of men to the passing away and regeneration of leaves. Glaucus recites his ancestry to Diomedes:

Τὸν δ’ αὖθ’ Ἰππολόχοιο προσῆµα φαιδίµος νῖος·
Τοιδέθοι μεγάθυμε τ’ ἤ γενεήν ἐρεείνεις;
οὐ̂ν περ φύλλον γενεῆ τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.
φύλλα τὰ µὲν τ’ ἀνέµος χαµάδες χέει, ἄλλα δὲ θ’ ὦλη
τηλεβόθεσα φύει, ἐφαρος δ’ ἐπηγίνεται ὀρθή·
ὡς ἀνδρῶν γενεῆ ὢν µὲν φυέω ὢ δ’ ἀπολήγειν.
εῖ δ’ ἐθέλεις καὶ τοῦτα διαήμεναι ὀρφ’ εὗ εἰδῆς
ἡµετέρην γενεήν, πολλοὶ δὲ µὲν ἀνδρὲς ἰσασιν· (Hom. ll. 6. 144-151.)
order to elucidate the similar dynamic at work in *Laws* Book III: the constant changeover and passing away of generations, exemplified by the participle γεγονότων, portray the revolution of leaves and draw into focus the insignificance and brevity of each span. That is, the Athenian’s historical survey shows us the delicate status of man and his place in the world: such a figure faces the threat of forces outside of his control, the flood, primarily, which engulfs in the previous era, and of ‘lawsuits’ and ‘party-strife’ (δίκαι καὶ στάσεις), in the current, which belong to city-life alone (κατὰ πόλιν μόνον). What the comparison with previous literature makes us realize is that men, from the Platonic point of view, are reduced to the status of leaves, inanimate objects, and they compose but one component of their environment: like everything else, they shape and are shaped by the environment.

In addition to this idea of “human leaves,” the Mimnermus fragment as an intertext brings to light the momentary nature of certain states or qualities that characterize each generation, in the Platonic account. When the Athenian describes the character of primitive men, at a time when they lacked access to every possible “device” to injure one another and to commit injustices (πᾶσας μηχανὰς εἰς τὸ κακουργεῖν/ τε ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀδικεῖν), by word or deed (λόγοις/ ἔργοις τε), these types of men were rather inclined to display easy virtue in their character, “simple” or “guileless” (εὐηθέστεροι), and a greater degree of “manliness” (ἀνδρειότεροι). Their characteristics are qualities, like the flowers of youth (ἄνθεσιν ἥβης) (Mimnermus. fr. 2. 3), which the lyric poet describes, because they fade and pass away. The sense of the comparative adjectives— “simpler” (εὐηθέστεροι), “manlier” (ἀνδρειότεροι), “more moderate”

[Then the glorious son of Hippolochus spoke to him: ‘Great-souled son of Tydeus, why do you ask about my lineage? Even as the generation of leaves is such, so also is that of men. As for the leaves, the wind pours some on the ground, but the forest, as it blooms, brings forth others when the season of spring comes; even so of men one generation puts forth, and another leaves off. But if you wish to learn this also, that you may know well my lineage, and many men know it.’]
(σωφρονέστεροι) and “more just” (δικαιότεροι)—displays a transition from one period to another and attests to relative dispositions between these transitions. Precisely due to the comparison. These qualities, moreover, what we can understand to be affects—simplicity, courage, temperance and justice—define and compose the human body, and their transformation, in turn, illustrates the impact of time: by diminishing or increasing, such swings create movement and duration, indirectly. Human beings themselves live cinematically in the communities that Plato depicts: they are what they feel. That is, they live in affective states, which decompose and change with the passage of time. They are prone to the pressures of their surroundings and have bodies that act like filters.

Since Plato’s bodies are portrayed in this way, malleable and magnetic as they are, they are also necessarily gendered. What the theoretical framework then accomplishes is the enhancement of these lines of attraction, which are drawn by male and female bodies. It is remarkable because the Athenian Stranger’s historical account is hyper-gendered, and we notice this already when he characterizes early men, who exist in a state of nature, as being “more manly” (ἄνδρειότεροι) (Pl. Leg. 679e). The role of father also drives the first political arrangement, which is an autocracy and the most basic form of government. Men born at that stage of the world cycle or “at that time” (τούτους τῶς χρόνους) adhere to ancestral laws or to the laws of the father (πατρίοις νόµοις), and the male element, furthermore, is tempered by the female:
... 

ΑΘ. Μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ τούτων τῶν κατὰ μίαν οἶκησιν καὶ κατὰ γένος διεσπαρμένων ὑπὸ ἀπορίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς φθοραῖς, ἐν αἷς τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἀρχεῖ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγονέναι, οἷς ἐπόμενοι καθάπερ ὄρνιθες ἀγέλην μίαν ποιῆσον, πατρονομομένοι καὶ βασιλεῖαν πασῶν δικαιοτάτην βασιλεύσων; (Pl. Leg. 680b-e.)

[Ath.: ‘Autocracy—the name which everyone, I believe, uses for the political system of that age. And it still continues to exist today among Greeks and non-Greeks in many quarters. And Homer, I suppose, mentions that it came into being in connection with the household system of the Cyclops, where he says:

‘No laws, no councils for debate have they:  
They live on the heights of lofty mountains  
In hollow caves; each man lays down the law  
To wife and children, with no regard for neighbor.’

... 

Ath.: ‘And they arise among these people who live scattered in separate households and individual families in the confusion that follows the cataclysms. For amongst these, the eldest rules by virtue of having inherited power from his father or mother; the others follow his lead and make one flock like birds. They live under a patriarchal government and are governed, in effect, by the most justifiable of all forms of kingship.’]

The Homeric quotation is particularly fascinating, for the Athenian describes the birth of the political constitution (πολιτείαν), as it is “born” (γεγονέναι), which coincides with that of the household. In the oikos, we naturally find the patriarchal figure, in addition to his wife (ἄλόχων) and child (παίδων). This is the first explicit mention of woman in her actual form, and, actually, it may very well be that the materialization and presence of the female body have a real palpable effect: it changes energy levels and contributes to the depletion of the level of manliness, which had existed in the previous era.

From a metapoetic standpoint, the quotation from Homer also adds richness and material texture to the text. This is another way in which Plato incorporates poetic strands into his philosophical discourse, as he previously does in the Republic, where Socrates relies on myth
and fables to advance his political program. The citation, in this case, works like an ecphrasis and, more specifically, provides a zoom or close-up: it shows us the household and, therefore, the figure of the woman. Whereas in the primitive age, the public/private divide is left undefined, a domestic space makes itself known in civil society. These categories come into existence in conjunction with the form of the law and government, represented by the constitution. The law that each man lays down to wife and children (\(\text{θεμιστεύει δὲ ἐκαστὸς παίδων ήδ’ ἀλόχων}\)) echoes and amplifies the ancestral laws (\(\text{πατρίοις νόμοις}\)) that the Athenian mentions and anticipates the role of preambles in Magnesia’s law code. That is, it supplies an element of persuasion, and the voice of Homer is, in fact, the voice of the Athenian Stranger. The juxtaposition between these two components thus creates a mixture between differing temporal frameworks, genres and worlds and promotes dialectical difference.

To flesh out what is meant by the term “dialectical difference,” I will now show how this phenomenon is on display, in the case of an autocracy and at this moment in the text. First of all, in the citation of Homer, the Athenian Stranger illustrates the process of legislation, which takes place in this basic kind of political formation: each man “declares law and right” to wife and children (\(\text{θεμιστεύει δὲ ἐκαστὸς/ παίδων ήδ’ ἀλόχων}\)). What takes place in the Cyclop’s household mirrors and is expanded by what happens in the political sphere: the head of the family establishes the law, as the leader of the polis would. In this particular instance, however, the domain of the patriarch includes the political sphere because his oikos is a single polis: the constitution “comes into being in connection with the household of the Cyclops” (\(\text{γεγονέναι περὶ τὴν τῶν Κυκλώπων οίκησιν}\)). In both content and form, separate components, such as oikos and polis, interact with each other to produce movement and, in their interactions, contribute to a historical narrative.
This political form that Plato has the Athenian Stranger describe is a significant landmark because, as we said already, it reveals the existence and presence of the female body. In this portion, the Athenian continues to explain the origin of such a constitution, which is a dynastic system: in the aftermath of the catastrophe, from their state of aporia or confusion (ὑπὸ ἀπορίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς φθοραῖς), people, though they are scattered (ὁις ἐπόμενοι καθάπερ ὀρνιθες/ἀγέλην μίαν ποιήσουσι). A natural hierarchy develops, as the eldest holds rule (τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἀρχεῖ), owing to the fact that the rule proceeds from one’s father and mother (διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγονέναι), while the rest follow and make a single flock, like birds (ὁις ἐπόμενοι καθάπερ ὀρνιθες/ἀγέλην μίαν ποιήσουσι).

I find this description, about how the leader of the family comes into power, very interesting: his rule or power is “born” from both the father and mother (διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγονέναι). At this stage of the primitive city, we encounter the figure of the wife (ἀλόχων) (Pl. Resp. 680c) and mother (μητρὸς), and these female figures complete the picture, as it were. They fulfill and make the creation of the family and political community possible by bringing people together and tying them to one another. The relationship between the father and mother, furthermore, produces the figure of the sovereign leader and the period of his rule. From this example, we see that the introduction of the feminine, to a great extent, introduces and creates the presence of politics, and we subsequently enter into a period of gendered time and civilization—laws, language and metaphors. In other words, the presence of the feminine other delimits the category of the masculine. This is to say, we only know something to be male if something other than masculine also exists. Thus, it is my view that the feminine and the difference that it represents make these delineations, distinctions and
categories, which we can understand to be what Deleuze identifies as mobile sections. The first segment after the state of nature exhibits the autocratic constitution, which, in turn, facilitates a gendered experience: people live under a patriarchal government and are governed, in effect, by the most justifiable of all forms of kingship (πατρονομούμενοι καὶ βασιλεῖαι/ πασῶν δικαιοτάτην βασιλευόμενοι).

The feminine principle, in addition, leads to the expansion of the primitive city and brings forth further variations. After the first political formation, several families amalgamate and build larger communities:

ΑΘ. Τῶν οἰκήσεων τούτων μειζόνων αὐξανομένων ἐκ τῶν ἐλαττόνων καὶ πρότων, ἑκάστην τῶν σμικρῶν παρεῖναι κατὰ γένος ἔχουσαν τὸν τε πρεσβύτατον ἄρχοντα καὶ αὐτῆς ἐθῆ ἄττα ἰδιαὶ διὰ τὸ χωρίς ἀλλήλων οἰκεῖαν, ἔτερα ἀφ’ ἑτέρων ὄντων τῶν γεννητόρων τε καὶ θερψάντων, ἃ εἰθι-σήθησαν περὶ θεοῦς τε καὶ έαυτούς, κοσμιωτέρων μὲν κοσμώτερα καὶ ἀνδρικῶν ἀνδρικότερα, καὶ κατὰ τρόπον ὄντως ἑκάστους τὰς αὐτῶν ἄν αἱρέσεις εἰς τούς παῖδας ἀποτυπομένους καὶ παῖδων παῖδας, ὃ λέγων, ἤκειν ἔχοντας ἑδίους νόμους εἰς τὴν μεῖζονα συνοικίαν. (Pl. Leg. 681a-b.)

[Ath.: ‘As these original relatively tiny communities grew bigger, each of the small constituent families continued to retain, clan by clan, both the rule of the eldest and also some customs derived from its isolated condition and peculiar to itself. As those who begot and reared them were different, so these customs of theirs, relating to the gods and to themselves, different, being more orderly where their forefathers had been orderly, and more brave where they had been brave; consequently, as I say, the members of each group entered the larger community with laws peculiar to themselves, and were ready to impress their own inclinations on their children and their children’s children.’]

The original foundation of the polis is the oikos, established once families turn their attention to agriculture, initially in the foothills. The Athenian Stranger adds that they build rings of dry stones to serve as walls to protect themselves against wild animals (ἐπὶ γεωργίας τὰς ἐν ταῖς ύπωρείαις τρέπονται πρώτας, περιβόλους τε αἰμασιώδεις τινὰς/ τειχῶν ἐρύματα τῶν θηρίων ἔνεκα ποιοῦνται, μίαν οἰκίαν αὖ κοινῆν καὶ μεγάλην ἀποτελοῦντες) (Pl. Leg. 680e-681a).
construct boundaries from natural matter, the soil of the earth, to set themselves off against beasts, bringing to completion a single large unit, a common homestead (μίαν οἰκίαν ἀὖ κοινὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἀποτελοῦντες) (Pl. Leg. 681a).

This moment in the Athenian Stranger’s account provides a perfect example of feminine motion and emotion. In her discussion on the “urban fabric,” Bruno probes the dual meaning of the ancient word: “After all, cinema was named after the ancient Greek word kinema. It is interesting to note that kinema means both motion and emotion. Film is therefore a modern means of ‘transport’ in the full range of that word’s meaning” (2008: 26). It is my view that this observation and the application of the montage, in particular, elucidate the historical process that the Athenian depicts for us and for his audience. That is, the cinematic narrative creates a modern image of the city, and what it depends on is precisely the feminine principle: sensation and reproduction; it leads to movement and supplies what we can identify to be the aesthetic component. These dwellings increase in size (Tῶν οἰκήσεων τούτων μειζόνων αὐξάνομένων), for example, due to the very reason that women are bearing children. The principle of generation, furthermore, results in diversity: parents (τῶν γεννητόρων), who rear and nurture (θρεψάντων) their young, while they exist in a state of disagreement and variation (ἔτερα ἄφ’ ἔτέρων ὄντων) with respect to one another, accustomed to various social and religious standards (ἔθη…ἀ εἰθί-σθησαν περὶ θεούς τε καὶ ἑαυτούς), pass down certain of these traits to future offspring: the more restrained or adventurous the ancestor, the more restrained or adventurous would be the character of his descendants (κοσµιωτέρων μὲν κοσµιώ-/τερα καὶ ἄνδρικον ἄνδρικωτερα).

What makes itself apparent, in the description, is the dynamic coincidence between motion and emotion, and such points of contact are brought into being by flux and change. This is to say that certain elements or qualities are set into motion by the growth of families, and they
are contained, particularly, by the body of the mother. I come to this conclusion because the Athenian portrays a hereditary process, whereby each clan, which has its own particular customs (ἔθη ἄττα ἰδια), passes down their defining characteristics, rather like psychic states: what is rather “moderate” (κοσμιώτερα), for instance, and brave or “manly” (ἀνδρικώτερα). These qualities have a physicality of their own, as the Athenian admits that parents leave impressions on or “stamp” (ἀποτυπωμένους) their children and their children’s children (παίδων παιδας). The proliferation of offspring, for the word pais is repeated three times in the passage, attests to the changeover between generations and emphasizes the growing, expanding community, interestingly understood as a magnified version of the household (συνοικίαν). As bodies are moving, then, multiplying and undergoing decay, they also carry with them certain affective states and levels of emotion. This is what I mean when I say that motion and emotion meet and connect: the intensities that define every single body are fluid, because they move, while the city is being created, and the ethereal, in effect, amounts to the textural. Bodies and the feelings they produce lend themselves to the city’s material sensations and contribute, in this way, to political aesthetics.

In this preliminary stage, the Athenian depicts both the evolution and growing complexity of the primitive city. The feminine principle exacerbates the growth of certain features, but it is also a sign of refinement, that is, a sign of this very complexity. After the amalgamation of households, these families turn to utilizing the art of politics (politikē technē), and they appoint men as leaders and lawmakers:
ἀριστοκρατίαν τινὰ ἢ καὶ τινὰ βασιλείαν, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μεταβολῇ τῆς πολιτείας οἰκήσουσιν. (Pl. Leg. 681c-d.)

[Ath.: 'The next step necessary is that these people should come together and choose out some members of each clan who, after a survey of the legal usages of all the clans, shall notify publicly to the tribal leaders and chiefs (who may be termed their ‘kings’) which of those usages please them best, and shall recommend their adoption. These men will themselves be called ‘legislators,’ and when they have established the chiefs as ‘magistrates,’ and have framed an aristocracy, or possibly even a monarchy, from the existing plurality of ‘headships,’ they will live in this transformation of the constitution."

These people, as they set foot on the starting-point of legislation (Ἀρχῇ δὴ νομοθεσίας οἴνοι ἐμβάντες ἐλάθομεν, ὡς/ἐφικεν) (Pl. Leg. 681c), survey the trail before them, “taking sight” of the legal usages of all the clans (οἳ δὴ τὰ πάντων/ιδόντες νόμιμα). They wait for the approval of other members, after they come together (τοὺς/συνελθόντας τούτους) and make signals, bringing to light in the public sphere what is already plain (φανερὰ δείξαντες) and suggesting (ἐλέσθαι τε δόντες) certain strains. Their position is established once they are called legislators (νομοθέται κληθήσονται), who lay the foundations of the city-state; they frame an aristocracy or possibly even a monarchy, from the existing plurality of ‘headships’ (καταστήσαντες/ἀριστοκρατίαν τινὰ ἢ καὶ/τινὰ βασιλείαν). Transitioning out of the primitive stage, they inhabit this “change” of the constitution (ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μεταβολῇ τῆς πολιτείας οἰκήσουσιν).

This is the nature of the cinematic experience: after one mobile section presents itself, it is effaced by a subsequent picture. While people, initially, band together and adopt a primitive form of legislation, as they make gestural movements (δείξαντες), presumably with their hands, they evolve into lawgivers and are given this formal nomination, “called” (κληθήσονται), as they are. Tribal leaders and chiefs, in addition, are eventually called “kings” (βασιλεῖς) or “rulers” (τοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας). The constitution at one time may be an aristocracy (ἀριστοκρατίαν) or a monarchy (τινὰ βασιλείαν), from the original tribal “lordships” (ἐκ τῶν δυναστειῶν). Such a
moment of transformation marks a pivotal moment; as people make their entrance into civil society, the surface of the female earth is reshaped into a constitution and assumes various other forms, by supporting the structure of an aristocracy (ἀριστοκρατίαν), at one time, or a monarchy (βασιλείαν), at another. The presence of these constitutions is an indication of the development that has taken place, from the state of nature to more modern times, and also attests to the interaction, in which humans would have engaged in order for change, in the first place, to have happened. That is, as human beings mix and “come together” (συνελθόντας), the formation of these communities has an impact on the land. Thus, they will dwell “in this transformation of the constitution” (ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μεταβολῇ τῆς πολιτείας οἰκῆ-σουσιν). The use of the future tense emphasizes the continuity of this process, whereby man engages with the rhythms of nature and, in doing so, carves out a future course in space.

III. Post-Truths

What has made itself clear from the Athenian’s description of the profound shift that takes place is the constant motion of matter and, ultimately, the elision between form and content. The dissolution of each constitution shows and substantiates its material makeup, in other words, materiality, and, in what will consist of a series of numerous states and cities, other shapes and figures develop from the primitive city. The Athenian Stranger describes the third cycle to the founding of Troy:

ΑΘ. Τρίτων τοίνυν εἶπομεν ἐτι πολιτείας σχῆμα γιγνό-μενον, ἐν ὦ δὴ πάντα εἴδη καὶ παθήματα πολιτειῶν καὶ ἀμα πόλεων συμπίπτει γίγνεσθαι.
ΚΛ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ τοῦτο;
ΑΘ. Ὅ μετὰ τὸ δεύτερον καὶ Ὄμηρος ἐπεσημήνυτο,
λέγον τὸ τρίτον οὕτω γεγονέναι. “κτίσσε δὲ Δαρδανὴν”
γὰρ ποὺ φῆσιν, “ἐπεὶ οὕτω Ἰλιος ἱρή

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In the portrayal of the third form of government, which “comes into being” (Τρίτον...πολιτείας σχῆμα γιγνόμενον), Plato has the Athenian illustrate an affective environment and, for this reason, the worlds that are created necessitate an aesthetic experience, a cinematic experience. This third type of government that is born, in fact, acts as a sort of container for all kinds of shapes (πάντα εἴδη) and changes, or, more literally, “sufferings” (παθήματα) of polities and cities, which “dash together” (πολιτειῶν καὶ ἀμα/πόλεων συμπίπτει γίγνεσθαι). This political form has a figure that is composed of other fluid, dynamic figures and feelings.

The quotation from Homer continues to reveal the interactions that human beings have with their surroundings and the products of such encounters. The masculine force is, on the one hand, active, represented by Dardanus, for example, who founded Dardania or “brought it into being” (κτίσσε δὲ Δαρδανήν). Interestingly, the city of Ilium had not yet been built on the plain (Ἴλιος ἱρή/ἐν πεδίῳ πεπόλιστο), as a city of “articulate men” (πόλις μερόπων ἀνθρώπων), but these people, at the time, were living at the skirts of a mountain range, of “many-fountained Ida”
The feminine gender of Ilium, “holy Ilium” (Ἥλιος ἱρὴ) and “many-fountained Ida” (“many-fountained Ida”), and of the word for city (πόλις) reminds us of the memorable myth of autochthonous birth, which plays to the Athenian civic imaginary, revised by Socrates in the noble lie, in the *Republic*. In the *Laws*, as he lends insight into history, the Athenian hones in on the topography of the land and, more specifically, at this moment, depicts the transformation of the terrestrial terrain, which bears the footprints of its inhabitants: Ilium is a city of articulate men (πόλις µερόπων ἀνθρώπων), who inhabit the space of the city, originally generated by the womb of the earth. The city, as a more complex version of the earth, harbors male bodies and keeps them as children.

In quintessential Platonic fashion, the use of Homer and poetry is subordinated to a greater philosophical and historical project, and the Athenian’s account portrays, at heart, the vital, gendered production of *logoi*. In this regard, the feminine principle plays an active role because it has the potential to shape and actually penetrates vulnerable bodies. First of all, within the framework of the Homeric citation itself, the land of Ida is rendered as a fluid and malleable territory: its inhabitants are changing the physical features of space, while they lay out the foundations of their constitution and refashion their surroundings. The adjective πολυπιδάκου, moreover, gives us an image of liquid movement, which paints a certain picture and contributes to the city’s aesthetic, just as the presence of a mountain range (ὑπωρέιας) provides another striking addition to the landscape.

What I am arguing is that these are feminine components, and they are not static and passive, but, rather as matter, energized. Where the quotation of Homer establishes a cinematic sketch and constitutes a mobile section, by opening a window onto a historical civilization, as the Athenian moves out and pulls aways, these landmarks decompose into words and verses (ταῦτα
τὰ ἔπη), which have infiltrated the mind of the poet, in a metalinguistic moment; the poetic tribe is divinely inspired in its songs of praise (ὅ ποιητικον ἐνθεαστικον ὁν γένος ὑμνωδοῦν). These people form a category of their own, for, on each occasion, they touch upon many things, which come into being, “according to truth,” with the Graces and Muses (πολλῶν τῶν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν γιγνομένων σῶν τισιν Χάρισιν καὶ Μούσαις ἐφάπτεται ἐκάστοτε). These are the same goddesses invoked in Book VIII of the Republic, as Socrates embarks on his tale of the kallipolis’ decline, when civil war (stasis) first breaks out (Pl. Resp. 545d-e). In both instances, the primary interlocutor seeks the aid of these females, for they preside over the realm of things that become, with their feminine knowledge. The admission that the Athenian Stranger makes is similar to Socrates’: he turns to conventional language, poetry and music, in order to grasp truth and starts from the realm of flux.

Once the Muses are mentioned, the Athenian prolongs the plot, for “our story proceeds” (ἐπελθόντος ἡ μῖν μύθου) (Pl. Leg. 682a). The narrative, he tells us, may betray some indication of “purpose” or “meaning” (βουλήσεως) (Pl. Leg. 682a):

ΑΘ. Κατωκίσθη δή, φαμέν, ἐκ τῶν ψηλῶν εἰς μέγα τε καὶ καλὸν πεδίον Ἄλιον, ἐπὶ λόφον τινά ὑψηλόν καὶ ἔχοντα ποταμούς πολλοὺς ἄνωθεν ἐκ τῆς Ἰδης ὑμη-μένους.
ΚΛ. Φασί γοῦν.
ΑΘ. Ἄρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς τις χρόνοις τοῖς μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν τοῦτο οἴμεθα γεγονέναι;
ΚΛ. Πῶς δ’ οὖκ ἐν πολλοῖς;
ΑΘ. Δεινὴ γοῦν ὄνταν αὐτοῖς λήθῃ τότε παρεῖσαι τῆς νῦν λεγομένης φθορᾶς, δόθ’ οὕτως ὑπὸ ποταμοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ ἐκ τῶν ψηλῶν ἐκάστοτε πόλιν ὑπέθεσαν, πιστεύσαντες οὐ σφόδρα ψηλοῖς τισιν λόφοις.
ΚΛ. Δῆλον οὖν ὡς παντάπασι τι<να> μακρον ἀπείχον χρόνον τοῦ τοιοῦτον πάθους.
ΑΘ. Καὶ ἄλλα γε οἶμαι πόλεις τότε κατόκουν ἢδη πολλαὶ, πληθυνόντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων. (Pl. Leg. 682b-c.)
After establishing the authority of the Muses, the Athenian Stranger extends the plot and elaborates on the words of Homer. That is, he goes on to describe the founding of Ilium, which is settled, after a great migration takes place: people move their settlements from the heights to a wide and beautiful plain (ἐκ τῶν ὑψηλῶν εἰς μέγα τε καὶ καλὸν πεδίον), which has “many rivers rushing headlong from Ida above” (ἔχοντα ποταμοὺς πολλοὺς ἀνωθεν ἀκτής Ἴδης ὑμημένους). The settlement happens or “is born” many years after the flood (ἐν πολλοῖς τισὶ χρόνοις τοῖς μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν).

The expansion that the Athenian Stranger provides is a continuation of what Homer describes in his epic. It is as if the Athenian embodies and replaces the role that the Graces and Muses have because he acts as the mouthpiece of the things, which are “coming into being” and attempts to hit upon these matters, “according to truth” (τῶν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν γεγονόμενον… ἐφάπτεται) (Pl. Leg. 682a); in other words, these media have a potential to reveal truth. The movement that the settlers make, in effect, shows us the second chapter of the story, as it were. That is, as the Athenian describes the founding of Ilium, after Dardanus builds Dardania, he paints a certain picture, of the slope that connects the hills to a large and beautiful plain (ἐκ τῶν ὑψηλῶν εἰς μέγα τε καὶ καλὸν πεδίον), and of flowing rivers, which echoes the Homeric
portrayal in the citation, “many-fountained Ida” (πολυπιδάκου Ἴδης) (Pl. Leg. 681c). These sights actually illustrate ways of becoming since such images that Plato has the Athenian make constitute mimetic activity, like the poetry of the Muses, but he develops the poetic tradition and rewrites it, to an extent, by adhering to philosophical inquiry. In this case, in the Platonic framework, the Athenian has set his sights on moments of truth, which are made evident with the progression of time.

To expand on this claim, I will argue that the feminine principle makes both the presence and motion of time palpable. That is, the feminine principle engages in a constant practice of doing and undoing, of creating and destroying, in turn. On the one hand, it drives the migration of the early inhabitants, for the movements that they make lead to change and exemplify the principle of flux, that which becomes. In this sense, what is feminine amounts to a fluid force and lends vitality to what we can identify to be a vital experience. For this very reason, because it is dynamic and elusive, the principle of the feminine also works in conjunction with time by fostering the connection of different and divergent durations. This point is evident in the section, when the Athenian remarks that a strange sort of forgetfulness of the disaster seemed to be present among these early people (Δεινὴ γοῦν ἔοικεν αὐτοῖς λήθη τότε παρεῖναι τῆς/νῦν λεγομένης φθορᾶς).

In response, Cleinias points out that a great interval of time must separate the settlement of Ilium from “such a catastrophe” (παντάπασι τι<να> μακρὸν ἀπείχον χρόνον τοῦ τοιούτου πάθους), and the Athenian adds, “by this time” (ἡδη), the population of men increased or “multiplied” (πληθυόντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων). The number of cities, as a result, undergoes an increase as well: many other cities were settled at that time (ἄλλαι… πόλεις τότε κατῴκουν).

Feminine amnesia (λήθη) first loosens, and this factor is strange, clever and terrible (Δεινή), but,
in doing so, it creates a space for new families, homes and cities and multiplies the number of bodies. What the moment illustrates is that the act of forgetting sets a temporal marker by which to measure time and thus launches us into historical time, as bodies proliferate and city-states are born. In this way, something that is deconstructive (λήθη) is simultaneously inventive and embodies incoherent facets of the feminine.

The generation of bodies also implies their deterioriation, and such “corporeal images” that the Athenian presents prepare us for Deleuze’s cinematic montage, for they constitute mobile sections. The Athenian Stranger’s survey provides a review of various cities that have risen and fallen and rests on an empirical approach; he casts himself into the role and position of an observer:

ἈΘ. Ὅθεν δὴ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἐξετασάμεθα περὶ νόμων διαλεγόμενων, περιπεσόντες μουσικῇ τε καὶ ταῖς μέθαις, νῦν ἔπι τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν ἀφίγμεθα ὅσπερ κατὰ θεόν, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν οἶον λαβήν ἀποδίδοσιν· ἤκει γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν εἰς Λακεδαιμονικὸν κατοίκισιν αὐτὴν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ὀρθῶς ἐφάτε κατοικεῖσθαι καὶ Κρήτῃν ὡς ἀδελφοῖς νόμοις, νῦν οὐν δὴ τοσόνδε πλεονεκτοῦμεν τῇ πλάνῃ τοῦ λόγου, διὰ πολιτείων τινῶν καὶ κατοικισμῶν διεξελθόντες· ἐθεασάμεθα πρὸς τὴν τε καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην πόλιν, ἀλλήλων, ὡς οἰόμεθα, ταῖς κατοικίσεως ἐξουσιών ἐν χρόνῳ τινὸς μήκεσιν ἀπλέτους, νῦν δὲ δὴ τετάρτῃ τις ἡμῖν αὐτῇ πόλις, εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε, ἢν εἰ κατοικεῖσθεν τῇ ποτε καὶ νῦν κατοικισμὸν. ἐξ ὧν ἀπάντων εἰ τι συνεῖναι δυνάμεθα τὶ τε καλὸς ἢ μὴ κατοικίσθη, καὶ ποίοι νόμοι σώζουσιν αὐτῶν τὰ σωζόμενα καὶ ποίοι φθείρουσι τὰ φθερόμενα, καὶ ἀντὶ ποίων ποῖα μετατεθέντα εὐδαιμόνα πόλιν ἀπεργάζοιτ’ ἃν, ὁ Μέγιλλὲ τε καὶ Κλεινία, ταῦτα δὴ πάλιν οἶον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν λεκτέων, εἰ μὴ τι τοὺς εἰρημένους ἐγκαλοῦμεν λόγοις. (Pl. Leg. 682e–683b.)

[Ath.: ‘When we were starting to discuss legislation, the question of the arts and drinking cropped up, and we made a digression. But now we really do have a chance to come to grips with our subject. As it were by divine direction, we’ve come back to the very point from which we digressed: the actual foundation of Sparta. You maintained that Sparta was established on the right lines, and you said the same of Crete, because it has laws that bear a family resemblance to Sparta’s. From the wandering course of our argument and our excursion through
various polities and settlements, we have now gained this much: we have watched the first, second and third type of state being founded in succession over a vast period of time, and now we discover this fourth state (or ‘nation’, if you like), which was once upon a time in course of establishment and is now established. Now, if we can gather from all this, which of these settlements was right and which wrong, and which laws keep safe what is kept safe, and which laws ruin what is mined, and what changes in what particulars would effect happiness of the state, Cleinias and Megillus, we ought to describe these things again, making a fresh start from the beginning, unless we have some fault to find with our previous statements.’

The Athenian takes a step back and reflects on the nature of his project. He notices distractions and how the conversation has gone off-course, when he makes the remark that “we plunged into the subject of music and drinking-parties” (περιπεσόντες μουσικῇ τε καὶ ταῖς μέθαις). They, subsequently, make their way back from the digression to the original point, that is, to the settlement of Lacedaemon (ἐπὶ τὴν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα κατοίκισιν). The kind of city-state that Sparta is was established in the same vein as Crete, for they share “kindred laws” (ἀδελφοῖς νόμοις).

The characterization of the laws as “brotherly” or “kindred” suggests that these strains are living and that the political experience is, at heart, a gendered one. “Masculine” laws, which have the potential either to preserve (σῴζουσιν) or to ruin (φθείρουσι), frame the female space of the city and have a direct impact on the city’s condition: the Athenian encourages Cleinias and Megillus to start their task anew in order to discern which of these foundations was right and which wrong (τί τε καλῶς ἢ μὴ κατωκίσθη), and what kinds of laws are responsible for continued preservation of the features that survive and the ruin of those that collapse (ποῖοι νόμοι σῴζουσιν αὐτὸν τὰ σωζόμενα καὶ ποῖοι φθείρουσι τὰ φθειρόμενα), and, finally, what changes in what particulars would bring about happiness in the state (καὶ ἀντὶ ποῖων ποῖα μετατεθέντα εὐδαιμόνα πόλιν ἀπεργάζοιτ’ ἄν). This is the goal of their enterprise, to locate that specific constitution, which would facilitate and nurture a state of flourishing, because the city, like a
person, is affected and affects inner and outer conditions. The association that is made between *polis* and *eudaimonia* (εὐδαιμονα πόλιν) lays out the foundations for the metaphor of the body-politic: depending on which laws are in place, the city can feel happiness and cultivates emotions.

Where the fourth city constitutes the fourth mobile section in the montage, this image displays various moving objects or components, which undergo change. Even the form, that is, the delineation of what is being depicted, is subject to alteration, as the Athenian admits that they have made a detour and must come back to the sequence—one, two, three (πρώτην τε καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην)—and now Sparta is the fourth state in order (νῦν δὲ δὴ τετάρτη τις ἤμιν αὐτῇ πόλις). What Plato has the Athenian achieve, with this digression, is an aesthetic construction, for the narrator builds by creating a sequence and organizing the order of things, and each city, in a sense, comprises a building block. At the same time, what enhances the succession of periods and contributes to the historical chronology are precisely the moments of interruptions and chops of nonlinearity. In other words, the Athenian’s deviation, namely, the topics of music and drinking (μουσικῇ τε καὶ τὰ ἡμέθαις), compels him to reflect on the nature of his exercise: the sense of disarray that is caused by the temporary excursus inspires a certain motivation to strive for symmetry or, rather, a level of “correctness” (ὀρθῶς), which the Spartan constitution exemplifies, and to arrange a boundless period of time (ἐν χρόνῳ τινὸς μήκεσιν ἀπλέτοις) into political borders.

The divergence, in this instance, acts as a metapoetic marker and draws attention to recognizable “cinematic” cuts, which, in effect, express movement and time indirectly. That is, it throws various hinges into relief, as well as points of connection, and, as one frame in a series of frames, opens up possibilities for point of view. To elaborate on this last point, I will now show
how not only the form but also the content of the image itself portrays alteration. While, on the
one hand, Plato makes a presentation of imaging itself, with the use of mobile sections, this
particular image, on the other hand, captures a certain change that has taken place in the world;
the foundation of Sparta marks a stage of development, a point of departure from the last, with
its set of laws “kindred” to those of Crete (Κρήτην ὡς ἀδελφοῖς νόμοις). It is my view that the
language of kinship and the use of this specific metaphor work as testaments to the principle of
the feminine, i.e. to that of feeling, reproduction and change. In his description, Plato has the
Athenian draw out the delineations of a genealogy, which the constitutions of Sparta and Crete,
in fact, share.

The city, moreover, at the center of this intellectual task, is growing, changing and, in
fine, coming to be: Sparta was “once upon a time” settled or planted and is now settled
(κατοικιζόμενόν τέ ποτε καὶ νῦν κατωκισμένον). The Athenian looks at this scenario and adopts
an empirical method, more generally, because it is his belief that such an approach will help him
and his interlocutors determine which of these settlements has been “beautifully” arranged or not
(καλῶς ἢ μὴ κατωκίσθη), and what changing factors produce and contribute to a flourishing city-
state (ποῖα μετατεθέντα εὐδαίμονα πόλιν ἀπεργάζοιτ’ ὃν). That the Athenian, in this instance,
recognizes alternative paths and routes to happiness and outcomes and that, in doing so, he
expresses a certain degree of hope, this kind of acknowledgement itself attests to the move away
from a narrative of decline; the cinematic component, which is driven by the feminine principle
of becoming, ultimately occupies the space and time of the future: it looks ahead to potential,
possibilities and, most importantly, to the best possible state.

As we concluded with respect to the Republic in the last chapter, it might be more
accurate to say that, as much as utopia looks to the past, it also represents a sort of political
revelation that looks, equally as much, to the future. As a model for their charter city, the Athenian encourages Cleinias and Megillus to examine Sparta; the mixed constitution uniquely survives the Dorian League, which, at first glance, looked like a marvelous institution because legislators could redistribute (διανέμεσθαι) land without resentment (ἀνεμεσήτως), for the purpose of establishing a certain equality of property (ἰσότητα...τῆς οὐσίας) (Pl. Leg. 684d-e).

The texture of this particular type of constitution is of a divine quality, the Athenian remarks, because it remarkably proves to endure:

[Ath.: ‘Some god who was concerned on your behalf and saw what was going to happen. He took your single line of kings and split it into two, so as to reduce its powers to more reasonable proportions. And after that, a man who combined human nature with some of the powers of a god observed that your leadership was still in a feverish state, so he blended the obstinacy and vigour of the Spartans with the prudent influence of age by giving the twenty-eight elders the same authority in making important decisions as the kings. Your ‘third savior’ saw that your government was still full to bursting and fuming with restless energy, so he put a kind of bridle on it in the shape of the power of the ephors—a power which came very close to being held by lot. This is the formula that turned your kingship into a mixture of the right elements, so that thanks to its own stability it ensured the stability of the rest of the state.’]
The Athenian focuses on the Spartan constitution because it demonstrates durability, the sole to display an ability to outlive its partners, Argos and Messene in the Dorian league. At the same time, its state of being is characterized by a sense of restlessness and, in short, by a sense of becoming; some god, having foresight of what is to come (τὰ μέλλοντα/ προορῶν), takes care on its citizens (κηδόμενος) and plants or “begets a double generation of kings from one” (δίδυμον ύμιν φυτεύσας τὴν τῶν βασιλέων γένεσιν/ ἐκ μονογενοῦς).

Sparta continues being born and developing after it is first engendered by some divine force, defined by the process of mixing and being mixed. The original lawgiver, Lycurgus, for his part, who mixes human nature with some of the powers of a god (φύσις τις ἀνθρωπίνη μεμειγμένη θείᾳ τινὶ δύναμι), notices that Sparta’s sovereignty was still agitated and “seething” (κατιδοῦσα ύμιν ἄρχὴν φλεγάινουσαν ἐτη) and, consequently, adds further ingredients to his recipe for an ideal state. This mortal man then blends the self-willed force of the royal strain with the temperate potency of age (μείγνυσιν τὴν/ κατὰ γῆρας σώφρων δύναμιν τῇ κατὰ γένος αὐθάδει ρώμῃ), by making the power of the twenty-eight elders of equal weight with that of the kings in the greatest matters (τὴν τῶν ὁκτὼ καὶ εἴκοσι γερόντων ἱσόψηφον εἰς τὰ μέγιστα/ τῇ τῶν βασιλέων ποιήσασα δυνάμει). In addition, a third savior (ὁ δὲ τρίτος σωτήρ), most likely referring to Theopompus, a king of Sparta in the eighth century, seeing that the body of its rule was still “swelling with passion” and provoked (ἔτι σπαργῶσαν καὶ θυμομεμένη τὴν ἄρχῃν ὑρόν), places another layer of restraint on what is in danger of going astray and curbs it, by the power of the ephors (ψάλιον ἐνέβαλεν αὐτῇ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων δύναμιν), approaching government by lot (ἐγγὺς τῆς/ κληρωτῆς ἁγαγών δυνάμεως). According to this account (κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον), the kingship was saved (σωθεῖσα), and the reason for its survival “came into being” for
all else (αὐτὴ σωτηρίας τοῖς ἄλλοις γέγονεν/αἰτία), owing to a harmonious formula: it was born “mixed” with the appropriate elements and displaying due measure (ἐξ ὧν ἔδει σύμμεικτος γενομένη καὶ/ μέτρον ἔχουσα). Cleinias, afterwards, agrees that the Athenian speaks the truth: “You speak the truth” (Ἀληθῆ λέγεις).

I dwell on the language that the Athenian Stranger uses because his metaphors essentially portray the Spartan constitution as a living thing, being and becoming, and again reinforce the concept of the body-politic. The city-state has a malleable nature (φύσις) and undergoes a genesis and “coming into being” (τὴν…γένεσιν), which is repeated and persists in its subsequent manifestations. Various types of hands, both mortal and immortal, that go into shaping this constitution, as it continually strives towards proportion (τὸ µέτριον), achieves an aesthetic end through mixture and combination. A feverish city or, rather, “command” (τὴν ἄρχην φλεγµαίνουσαν), Lycurgus proceeds to temper the fury of its “kind” (κατὰ γένος) with another virtue, moderation (σώφρονα δύναµιν), which translates to equal voting power (ἰσόψηφον) to kings, on the part of the twenty-eight elders, to speak in terms of politics. Persevering in its restlessness, “swelling with passion” and raging wild (σπαργῶσαν καὶ θυµουµένην), Sparta benefits from the influence of Theopompus, who curbs the city with a chain (ψάλιον), as if it were a wild animal. “Becoming commingled” with all the right elements (ἐξ ὧν ἔδει σύµµεικτος γενοµένη), then, the kingship possesses due measure (µέτρον ἔχουσα), and the cause of stability (σωτηρίας…αἰτία), namely, that it proves to be more lasting than others, finally appears and comes to light (γέγονεν).

From these descriptions, it becomes clear that the Athenian Stranger conceives of the Spartan constitution as a vital organism, which displays versatility, that is, the capacity to adapt and to modify itself, while it lives by transforming. The emphasis on agitation and the use of
medical analogies, the swollen (φλεγμαίνουσαν) city, the bursting and seething city (σπαργῶσαν καὶ θυμουμένην), would suggest that it is a body and, particularly, a female body. In the first place, the divine inventor of the constitution, some god who cares for “your” people (Θεὸς εἶναι κηδόμενος ὑμῶν τις), sows a seed by “planting” and engendering (φυτεύσας) a double generation of kings (δίδυμον…τὴν τῶν βασιλέων γένεσιν), making two out of one (ἐκ μονογενοῦς). Constant evolutions, propelled by a motor of mixing and a blender, as it were, then define Spartan space, feminine monarchy (ἡ βασιλεία), and are exemplified and proven by the repetition of births and becomings. What the Athenian’s account illustrates, as he explores each layer of the Spartan constitution, is the interaction that each component has with the members, who are involved—kings with their kingship, twenty-eight elders with their equal power (τὴν τῶν ὀκτὼ καὶ ἐκατοστῶν ἱσόψηφων) and ephors with their own power, which comes close to government by lot (ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς ἀγαγὼν δυνάμεως), in other words, democracy. Sparta is the product of these material dynamics and the pregnancy of the Dorian League, as a political container that is itself pregnant with future bodies of all sorts.

To show how Sparta fits into the chronology and participates in a genealogy, I will now move back to the creation of the Dorian League, as it is related to us by the Athenian Stranger. The Achaeans grow into Dorians, and when the Athenian turns to the Dorian League, he marks the transition from fanciful prehistory to real history. He declares that he will now be pursuing the investigation on the basis of what actually happened and what is true (περὶ γεγονός τε καὶ ἔχον ἀλήθειαν) (Pl. Leg. 684a):

AΘ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν ἐκ μᾶλλον βεβαιωσόμεθα τὸ τοιοῦτον· περιτυχόντες γὰρ ἐργοὶς γενομένοις, ὡς ἔσοικεν, ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐληλύθαμεν, ὡστε οὐ περὶ κενὸν τι ζητήσομεν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ περὶ γεγονός τε καὶ ἔχον ἀλήθειαν. γέγονεν ὡς τάδε· βασιλεία τρεῖς βασιλευομέναις πόλεσιν τριτταῖς ὁμοσαν ἀλλήλαιας ἑκάτεραι, κατὰ νόμους ὁς ἔθεντο
What the Athenian considers the facts of history to be are deeds that “come into being” (ἔργοις γενομένοις). These phenomenal events appear to the interlocutors, who actually “fall into” them (περιτυχόντες), so it seems (ὡς ἐοικεν). They are reliable, from their point of view, for they differ from what is empty (κενόν) or hollow and amount to what takes place (περὶ γεγονός), which has truth (ἐχον ἄλθειαν). These are the things that have already happened (γέγονεν δὴ τάδε), and thus they count as facts and true events.

Throughout Book III, Plato draws on the principle of becoming, tantamount to historical reality, interconnected, as well, with families, lineage and heritage, as the situation of the Dorian League makes clear. When the Athenian moves or “stumbles into” (περιτυχόντες) these facts, he reveals lines of kin, their practices and traditions. More specifically, each of the three city-states—Argos, Messene and Lacedaemon—are ruled by royal families (βασιλεῖαι), and they swear to one another (δόμοσαν ἀλλήλαις), according to the laws, binding alike on ruler and subject, which they had made (κατὰ νόμους οὗς ἔθεντο τοῦ τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι κοινοῦς).
onset of change and the passage of time, “as time advanced” (προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου), induce, in turn, and set up a binding agreement and the political relation, as it were; the three royal houses essentially enter into a social contract, whereby the kings would refrain from making their rule more severe (οἱ μὲν μὴ βιαιοτέραν τὴν ἄρχην ποιῆσεσθαι), and the subjects would never upset the monarchy themselves (μήτε αὕτοι τάς βασιλείας ποτὲ καταλύσειν). Each component of this relation coexists with each other and benefits from the association: kings would aid the kings and peoples if they were wronged (βοηθήσειν δὲ βασιλῆς τε βασιλεύσιν ἀδικουμένοις καὶ δήμοις), and the peoples would aid both the peoples and kings (δῆμοι δήμως καὶ βασιλεύσιν ἀδικουμένοις).

What is then revealed by the things that have come to be (γέγονεν δὴ τάδε) and the facts of history (ἔργοις γενομένοις) is precisely the political element, and, furthermore, the movement of history, reduced to a flow of matter, portrays politics at work. As the Athenian Stranger describes the birth and terms of the Dorian League, the alliance illustrates the combination between oikos and polis, private and public, or, more precisely, the incorporation of politikē technē into families and human associations, preserved by a set of laws, which members in a community have already determined (κατὰ νόμους οὖς ἔθεντο). That is, what creates these relationships and renders them durable is, paradoxically, the feminine principle, the principle of change and generation, which gives birth to a framework of laws and continues to make both combinations and demarcations. Feminine space, formerly the land, is converted into political power (τὴν ἄρχην), contributing to and contributed by a lineage of races (προϊόντος...γένους).

Laws, in turn, provide the borders and delineations of this space, and leaders and subjects, “peoples” (δῆμοι), inhabit and dwell inside the womb-like container. While a separation exists between these two categories, ruler vs. ruled, in this case, nonetheless, they interact and engage
with each other. A part of their greater surroundings and nature, bodies, individuals and citizens communicate with and are attracted to one another, out of necessity, for the sake of preserving their command (τὴν ἀρχὴν).

The terms and nature of this agreement raise the question of ruling and being ruled and, therefore, necessitate the topic of “the seven titles to authority” in the Athenian’s account. In other words, the Athenian delves into this excursus in order to elucidate the various ranks and layers of political forms, as societies develop and gain textural complexity. The seven titles to authority make clear that the binary opposition between leader and subject, subject and object, composes a fundamental tension inherent to city-states; states must contain some people who govern and others who are governed (Ἀρχοντας δὲ δὴ καὶ ἄρχομένους ἀναγκαίον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναι ποιοῦ) (Pl. Leg. 689e) and various other forms of this relationship:

\[\textit{AΘ.} \] Εἴσην ἀξιώματα δὲ δὴ τοῦ τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ποιά ἐστι καὶ πόσα, ἐν τῇ πόλεσιν μεγάλας καὶ σμικρὰς ἐν τῇ ὁικίᾳ ὡσαντως; ἂρ’ οὐχ ἐν μὲν τῷ τε πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς καὶ ὅλως γονέας ἐκχύνων ἄρχειν ἀξίωμα ὅρθον πανταχοῦ ἄν εἰ; 

\[\textit{ΚΛ.} \] Καὶ μάλα. 

\[\textit{ΑΘ.} \] Τοῦτῳ δὲ γε ἐπόμενον γενναίους ἄγεννον ἄρχειν· καὶ τρίτον ἐπὶ τούτοις συνέπεται τὸ πρεσβυτέρους μὲν ἄρχειν δὲν, νεωτέρους δὲ ἄρχεσθαι. 

\[\textit{ΚΛ.} \] Τί μήν; 

\[\textit{ΑΘ.} \] Τέταρτον δ’ ἀυ δούλους μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, δεσπότας δὲ ἄρχειν. 

\[\textit{ΚΛ.} \] Πῶς γάρ οὖ; 

\[\textit{ΑΘ.} \] Πέμπτον γε οἶμαι τὸ κρείττονα μὲν ἄρχειν, τὸν ἥττο δὲ ἄρχεσθαι. 

\[\textit{ΚΛ.} \] Μάλα γε ἀναγκαῖον ἀρχὴν εἰρήκας. 

\[\textit{ΑΘ.} \] Καὶ πλείοτην γε ἐν σύμπασιν τοῖς ζῷοις σοῦ σαν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς ὁ Θηβαῖος ἔρη ποτὲ Πινδάρος, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὡς ἑαυτοῖς, ἀξίωμα ἕκτον ἀν γίγνοιτο, ἐπεσάθαι μὲν τὸν ἀνεπιστήμονα κελευνον, τὸν δὲ φρονοῦντα ἤγεισθαι τε καὶ ἄρχεν. κατεις τούτῳ γε, ὁ Πινδάρας σοφότατε, σχεδον οὐκ ἂν παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγειρθαί φαίνει γίγνεσθαι, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ, τὴν τοῦ νόμου ἐκόντον ἄρχην ἀλλ’ οὐ βίαιον πεφυκυῖν. 

\[\textit{ΚΛ.} \] Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. 

\[\textit{ΑΘ.} \] Θεοφιλὴ δὲ γε καὶ εὐτυχὴ τίνα λέγοντες ἐβδόμην
The seven ranks that the Athenian lists differentiate what is *arkhe*, the principle that identifies the rulers and ruled and that designates who will take up which of the two categories. While the first four concern titles of birth—parents over children (γονέας ἐκγόνων), old over young (πρεσβυτέρους...νεωτέρους), masters over slaves (δούλους...δεσπότας), nobles over commoners (γενναίους ἀγεννῶν)—the next two titles express and have to do with nature—strong over weak (κρείττονα...ἤττω), intelligent over ignorant (ἀνεπιστήμονα...φρονοῦντα)—as the Athenian expressly quotes Pindar in his justification for this relationship, being, as it is, “according to
nature “κατὰ φύσιν,” found also among all kinds of animals (ἐν σύμπασιν τοῖς ζῴους).

It seems as though the seventh title upsets and throws the rest into confusion. What I mean by this is that the seventh title concerns the casting of lots (εἰς κληρόν τινα), where the winning person exercises authority most justly (λαχόντα μὲν ἄρχειν… τὸ δικαίωταν), “dear to the gods” and “fortunate” (Θεοφιλῆς γε καὶ εὐτυχῆ), and the loser takes his place among the ruled (δυσκληροῦντα δὲ ἀπιόντα ἄρχεσθαι). Cleinias, once again, agrees that the Athenian speaks the “truest things” (Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις). In the piece Hatred of Democracy, Rancière notices that, whereas the former titles base the order of the city on the law of kinship, the latter assert that this order has a superior principle: “…those who govern are not at all those who are born first or highborn, but those who are best. That is effectively when politics commences: when the principle of government is separated from the law of kinship, all the while claiming to be representative of nature” (40). So we see that the Dorian League sets the stage for this point of transition, from the time of the patriarch, as we saw in the first political formation after the Age of Cronos, the divine father, to the start of “true politics,” where it attempts the separate out the excellence specific to it from the sole right of birth (Rancière 40).

The seventh title marks a further stage of development in history, and Rancière, in fact, calls it a “strange object” (40), a title that is not a title, wherein lies a scandal: “The scandal is simply the following: among the titles for governing there is one that breaks the chain, a title that refutes itself: the seventh title is the absence of title. Such is the most profound trouble signified by the word democracy” (41). I am reviewing Rancière’s reading of the seven titles because it is my view that it sheds additional light on my application of Deleuze to the Laws. That is, what I believe these seven titles to portray is the Deleuzian notion of a “superior dialectic,” a theoretical concept, which would allow differences and contradictions to remain in tension and disclose
difference and becoming. This is precisely the mechanism at work in the Athenian’s excursus on
the seven titles: as a set of categories and series of classification, very much after the manner of
Aristotle, the list illustrates a process of differentiation with a sort of cinematic arc. For instance,
the first title of ruling and being ruled (ἀρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι) pertains to kinship and, more
specifically, to the claim of both the father and mother (πατρὸς καὶ μητρός), in other words, of
parents over their children (γονέας ἔκγόνων). What leads to the distinction between these two
sets of the opposition is the very principle of being born, generated by the coupling between
mother and father.

The feminine principle, understood to be the source of generation and reproduction,
compels even the sequence of these seven titles. What I want to argue and to demonstrate at this
moment is that what I take to be “feminine becoming” supplies the aesthetic component and
creates and maintains a chain and series of change. This is to say that it fosters these binary
oppositions but effaces the delineation between them, at the same time. The feminine principle
accomplishes this because it continues to build by moving on: it lies at the existence of the first
title and produces further layers of categories, the title of those of high birth to govern those of
low birth (γενναίους ἀγεννῶν ἄρχειν), followed by other claims based on the law of kinship. As
Rancière notices, the sixth title to authority designates a shift, when the Athenian Stranger quotes
Pindar and the natural rule of law: the sixth claim, as it “comes into being” (ἀξίωμα ἐκτον ἄν
gίγνοιτο), establishes the authority of the wise (τὸν δὲ φρονοῦντα) over the ignorant (τὸν
ἀνεπιστήμονα). The Athenian would admit that it is scarcely born “against nature” (παρὰ φύσιν
ἐγωγε φαίην γίγνεσθαι) but, rather, “according to nature” (κατὰ φύσιν δέ), and it is a “decree of
nature,” the natural rule of law or the rule of law, as it “engenders” (τὴν τοῦ νόμου…πεφυκῦν),
over willing subjects (ἐκόντων), also “spontaneous” (οὐ βίων).
The language that Plato has the Athenian use reveals the process of change that the seven titles to authority portray. It is a process driven by the feminine, the influence of becoming and *gignomai*, which demarcates the boundary between ruler and ruled, subject and object, in its various manifestations, and, subsequently, rearranges and, to a great extent, dismantles an established hierarchy, in the seventh title. The seventh, the Athenian explains, refers to that claim of drawing lots (εἰς κληρόν), the principle of randomness as the principle of rule. The person, who is successful at obtaining by lot, takes his place as ruler (λαχόντα μὲν ἄρχειν), and, on the contrary, the loser, unlucky in his lot (δυσκληροῦντα), takes his place among the ruled (ἀπιόντα ἄρχεσθαι). Whereas the sixth title is the “greatest” (τὸ δὲ μέγιστον), this one is the “fairest” (τὸ δικαιότατον). I dwell on the transition from the sixth to the seventh because it is my view that it embodies a cinematic move: that is, the shift produces a moment of discontinuity, in the sense that it breaks what seemed to be a linear progression, from claims based on kinship to the next, which express nature. The seventh title shows how these hierarchical relationships can be negated, reversed, depending on the outcome of the lots, and reordered, setting up a new social contract among those who agree and reconstructing the political relation, one, which is based on equality, in other words, the democratic principle. It is an aesthetic move in a very true sense because, by capping off the titles and completing the numerical list, the seventh claim to authority displays the potential to reshape and to mix relationships, ties among citizens.

The variety of these seven titles and, particularly, the force of paradoxical negation that the seventh claim represents demonstrates Deleuze’s concept of the superior dialectic because this frame, in addition to the other images that compose Book III, works in a montage, in a connection of divergent historical movement. Even the Athenian Stranger recognizes the contradictions inherent to the list:
Aθ. “Oracles δή,” φαίμεν ἃν, “ὡ νομοθέτα,” πρὸς τινα παίζοντες τὸν ἐπὶ νόμον θέσαι ἰόντων ράδιώς, “ὅσα ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρχοντας ἀξιώματα, καὶ ὅτι περιφυκότα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἕναντίως; νῦν γὰρ δὴ στάσεων πηγὴν τινα ἀνηρηκαμεν ἁμεῖς, ἢν δεῖ σε συνεργάσην. πρῶτον δὲ μεθ’ ἡμῶν ἀνάσκεψαι πῦς τε καὶ τί παρὰ ταῦτα ἀμαρτόντες οἱ περὶ τε Ἀργος καὶ Μεσσήνην βασιλῆς αὐτοὺς ἁμὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων δύναμιν, οὕσαν θαυμασθὲν ἕν τό τότε χρόνο, διέφθειραν… Οὕκοντι δήλον ὡς πρῶτον τοῦτο οἱ τότε βασιλῆς ἑσσον, τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν τεθέντων νόμων, καὶ ὃ λόγῳ τε καὶ ὅρκῳ ἑπήνεσαν, οὐ συνεργάσησαν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἢ διατριβονία, ὡς ἁμεῖς φαίμεν, οὕσα ἁμαθία μεγίστη, δοκοῦσα δὲ σοφία, πάντα ἐκεῖνα διὰ πλημμέλειαν καὶ ἁμοιοῦσιν τὴν πικρὰν διέφθειραν; (Pl. Leg. 690e-691a.)

[Αθ.: ‘So you see, O legislator’ (as we might playfully address one of those who lightly sets about legislation), ‘you see how many titles to authority there are, and how they naturally conflict with each other. Now here’s a source of civil strife we’ve discovered for you, which you must remedy. First, though, join us in trying to find out how the kings of Argos and Messene went astray and broke these rules, and so destroyed themselves and the power of Greece, for all its splendor at that time…So is it not clear that what those kings strove for first was to get the better of the established laws, and that they were not in accord with one another about the pledge, which they had approved both by word and by oath, and this lack of harmony (which is, in our view, the ‘crassest’ stupidity, though it looks like wisdom) put the whole arrangement jarringly off key and out of tune: hence its destruction?’]

To an imaginary addressee, the Athenian points out the obvious, “You see how many titles to authority there are” (ὅσα ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρχοντας ἀξιώματα), and “how they are essentially opposed to one another” (ὅτι περιφυκότα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἕναντίως). Tensions produced by the incompatible facets of the seven titles lie at the heart and constitute the cause of civil war, for discussion about these claims seems to have facilitated an important discovery for the group: “Now here’s a source of civil strife we have found for you, which you must allay or ‘treat medically’ (νῦν γὰρ δὴ στάσεων πηγὴν τινα ἀνηρηκαμεν ἁμεῖς, ἢν δεῖ σε συνεργάσην). The seven titles themselves might have caused the demise of the Dorian League or the misapplication of these principles, when the kings of Argos and Messene went astray (ἀμαρτόντες οἱ περὶ τε Ἀργος καὶ Μεσσήνην βασιλῆς) and destroyed themselves and the power of Greece (αὐτοὺς ἁμὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν
Ἑλλήνων δύναμιν... διέφθειραν), though it was “marvelous at that time” (οὖσαν θαυμαστὴν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ). The lack of agreement among the leaders leads to discord (ἡ διαφωνία), where the aesthetic arrangement is one characterized by “bitter dissonance,” in addition to a “lack of refinement” (διὰ πλημμέλειαν καὶ ἀμοιβίαν τὴν πικράν).

The seven titles to authority prove an interesting case because, to a certain extent, the Athenian’s temporary departure from his historical survey acts as an ecphrasis, in the sense that it opens up onto a microscopic world of the macroscopic universe, and goes so far as to affect and to make an impression on the outside world. That is, with the seven titles, Plato lays out the basis and locates the source of differences and civil wars (στάσεων πηγήν). In some way, each title, as a material object, works as an image and provides a brief and concise summary of a historical and political situation or event, of ruling and being ruled, whether it be the authority of parents over children, stronger over weaker, superior over inferior, etc., and moves in sequential order. Since it encapsulates some of the previous political formations that have already been mentioned, such as the first that arises after the flood, autocracy, for example, the sequence of titles is a mini-montage of the larger montage comprised by Book III.

In addition, the titles, producing and begetting (πεφυκότα), as they do, in contradictory ways (πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐναντίως), with respect to one another, while they display tensions, which define the superior dialectic, at the same time create friction and are responsible for any future conflicts that might transpire. In other words, they provide reason as to why city-states rise and fall and why political change occurs, by accounting for the variety of relationships, which may be overturned: undergoing a progression, from rules based on kinship to the concept of natural law, the titles themselves compel the cycle of becoming and growing (πεφυκότα). The last title, in particular, shows itself to have the most disruptive impact and would seem to play the largest
part in driving the dialectic; inherently tied to a notion of mixing and rotation, if not to that of
destruction, it might also perhaps lead to a momentary state of *amousia*.

What these interesting images thus make clear is that the Athenian Stranger’s historical
review amounts to an aesthetic project, embodied by the creation of Magnesia as a whole and,
particularly, by the city’s laws or *nomoi*. Just as he explicitly draws on musical metaphors in his
explanation for the demise of the Dorian League, so the Athenian again lays the accent on
proportionality and measurement when he explores the reasons for the success of Sparta, the
only city-state to survive out of the alliance:

> ΑΘ᾽Εάν τις μείζονα διδῷ τοῖς ἑλάττοσιν [δύναμιν]
pαρεῖς τὸ μέτριον, πλοίοις τε ἑστία καὶ σώμασιν τροφῆν
καὶ ψυχῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀνατρέπεται ποιοῦ πάντα, καὶ ἐξυβρίζοντα
τά μὲν εἰς νόσους θεὶ, τὰ δὲ ἐκ γιγαντον ὄμοιως ἀδικίαν.
τί οὖν ἂν ποτὲ λέγομεν; ἄρα γε τὸ τοιοῦτο, ὡς Ὁυκ ἔστ’,
ὁ φίλοι ἀνήρες, θνητής ψυχῆς φύσις ἡτίς ποτὲ δυνήσεται
τὴν μεγίστην ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρχῆν φέρειν νέᾳ καὶ ἀνυπεύ-
θυνος, ὡστε μὴ τῆς μεγίστης νόσου ἀνοίας πληρωθείσα
αὐτῆς τὴν διάνοιαν, μίσος ἔχειν πρὸς τῶν ἐγγύτατα φίλων,
ὁ γενόμενον ταχὺ διέφθειρεν αὐτὴν καὶ πάσαν τὴν δύναμιν
ἡφάνισεν αὐτῆς, τοῦτ’ ὑπελαβήθη ἡ γνώντας τὸ μέτριον
μεγάλων νομοθέτων, ὡς ὁμοίον δὴ τότε γενόμενον, νῦν ἔστιν
μετριώτατα τοπάσαι· τὸ δὲ ἐσεὶ κεκληθέται— (Pl. Leg. 691c-d.)

[Ath.: ‘If one neglects the rule of proportion and gives things too great in power to
things too small—sails to ships, foods to bodies, offices of rule to souls—the
result is always disastrous. And they run, through excess of insolence, some to
bodily disorders, others, to that offspring of insolence, injustice. Now, what are
we getting at? Simply this: the mortal soul simply does not exist, my friends,
whose nature, when young and irresponsible, will ever be able to stand being in
the highest ruling position among men without getting satiated in mind with that
greatest of disorders, folly, and earning the detestation of its nearest friends. And
when this occurs, it quickly ruins the soul itself and annihilates the whole of its
power. A first-class lawgiver’s job is to have a sense of proportion and to guard
against this danger. So the most duly reasonable conjecture we can now frame as
to what took place at that epoch appears to be this…’]

This passage is significant for our discussion because the Athenian shows us how to arrive at

“the rule of proportion” (τὸ μέτριον) in government, by cultivating an immortal soul. To prove
his point, he uses analogies, a quintessentially Platonic method, such as that of fitting large sails to small ships (πλοίοις τε ἑστία) or giving too much food to a small body (σώμασιν τροφήν).

When great authority is given to the soul (ψυχαίς ἀρχαῖς), specifically, it has the potential to run to “that offspring of insolence, injustice” (εἰς ἔκγονον ὑβρεως ἀδικίαν). The language of the Athenian here emphasizes the plasticity of the soul, which has a nature (φύσις) and may be made full or “impregnated” by folly (ἀνοίας πληρωθεῖσα), the greatest of diseases (τῆς μεγίστης νόσου). In order to prevent against this from “taking place” (ὁ γενόμενον), the great lawgiver must “perceive due measure” (γνόντας τὸ μέτριον).

Unlike the mortal body, the soul persists after death, and yet Plato treats it as if it were a body capable of catching disease. If we understand the narrative to be a composition of mobile sections, the cinematic enhancement magnifies the vital capacity of the soul, which, as a gendered and, more specifically, a female body, goes through growth and transformation: displaying the same function as the feminine womb, it can be made full and “impregnated” (πληρωθεῖσα). The soul, furthermore, has a generative role, and the unhealthy, excessive one “runs over” (θεῖ) to the offspring of lust, namely, injustice (εἰς ἔκγονον ὑβρεως ἀδικίαν), one of false logos. The soul has a female nature (φύσις), animating and animated like a person, who incurs the hatred of its nearest friends (μῖσος ἔχειν πρὸς τῶν ἐγγύτατα φίλων). It associates with others, and, with its associations, in its interactions, the soul not only partakes in but also produces new becomings (ὁ γενόμενον): the corrupted version of the soul quickly ruins itself (ταχὺ διέφθειρεν αὐτήν) and destroys the entirety of its power (πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν ἡράνισεν αὐτῆς). This is the kind of mechanism, the reproductive capacity of the soul, the organism’s vibratory intensities and movement in itself, ultimately responsible for change and the presentation and passage of time: what takes place at some point in time “speedily” (ὁ γενόμενον
ταχί), versus that which has occurred “in that era” (τότε ἕνόμενον).

Now we may be at a point at which to identify the source of these temporal, historical and political transformations, and it is my view that it is traceable to some kind of feminine presence. In the previous example, we see how the Athenian Stranger takes care to preserve moderation and to achieve a certain harmony, in his composition of musical strains or a set of laws that will mold the best kind of citizen, who displays balance in the soul, already malleable. The Athenian later explains that, after the ideal city, a community of wives and children and all property, laws in force impose the greatest possible unity on the state and make it “one” (νόμοι μίαν…πόλιν ἀπεργάζονται) (Pl. Leg. 739d).32 This is the second-best city that will be Magnesia. In this political structure, the city, soul and laws are all interconnected and codepend on one another: “The laws and conventions of Magnesia are intended to yield a consistent supply of virtuous/excellent souls—and we may surmise, a regular if somewhat smaller number of ‘Births in Beauty’” (Moore 106). If we understand the description of the soul at this moment in Book III to be a mobile section in a series of others, the cinematic model lets us in to view the singular movement of this immaterial feminine force, which provides and sustains the pulse of the body-politic. Namely, it lets us see the soul as corporeal, which has the capacity to produce both true and false logoi, vibrant things that take their part in the world and is, in turn, impacted by its greater surroundings and structures, like the laws. This is to say that the application of the mobile section to this particular place in the text materializes the soul, by reducing it to matter, and illustrates inhuman durations and processes, which partake in the dialectic of history.

After the Athenian Stranger moves on from the Spartan constitution, which provides a successful example from history (Pl. Leg. 692c), he engages with a more recent past, by treating

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32 Laks has pointed out to us that, in this way, that Plato’s politeia in the Republic leads to the Laws: “The two works are complementary, not because the ‘laws’ are expected to follow the ‘constitution,’ but because the possible follows upon the ideal model” (1990: 213).
the Persian and Athenian constitutions, and, in this way, enters into another mobile section. That is, the case of the Persians and Athenians marks a new historical stage and even looks ahead to the future:

[Ath.: ‘Listen to me then. There are two mother-forms of constitutions, so to speak, from which one may truly say all the rest are born. Monarchy is the proper name for the first, and democracy for the second. The former has been taken to extreme lengths by the Persians, the latter by my country; virtually all the others, as I said, are modifications of these two. It is absolutely vital for a political system to combine them, if it is to enjoy freedom and friendship allied with good judgment. And that is what our argument intends to enjoin, when it declares that a state, which does not partake of these, can never be properly constituted.’]

[Cl.: ‘Of course.’]

Ath.: ‘One state was over-eager in embracing only the principle of monarchy, the other in embracing only the ideal of liberty; neither has achieved a balance between the two. Your Laconian and Cretan states have done better, as were the Athenian and Persian in old times, in contrast to their present condition. Shall we expound the reasons for this?’

This is truly the key passage that shows us what political space is understood to be: feminine space, for the Athenian explicitly states that two mother forms of constitutions exist (εἰσίν πολιτειῶν ὁιον μητέρες δύο), from which one would rightly say that “the others have come into being” (ἐς ὅν τάς ἄλλας γεγονέναι λέγων ἂν τις ὅρθῳς λέγοι); the rest are practically all varieties
of the two (ἐκ τούτων εἰσὶ διαπεποικιλμέναι). In this particular place, the express connection is made between the politeia and the female body, and what would normally seem to be an inanimate entity, this sort of political container, is animated and, consequently, brings offspring into the world, other kinds of bodies and city-states. Monarchy is one of these pure political forms, a race or “offspring” exemplified by the Persians (τῆς μὲν τὸ Περσῶν γένος), in addition to democracy, taken to extreme lengths by “us” (ἡμᾶς), the Athenians. They form the basis of the mixed constitution, which “partakes of both of these” (μεταλαβεῖν ἄμφοῖν τούτοιν), and the city-state that “is born without share of these” (τούτων πόλις ἀμοιρός γενομένη), could never be “beautifully” governed (οὐκ ἂν ποτε...πολιτευθῆναι δύνατ’ ἂν καλῶς).

The move into the not so distant past demonstrates and caps a crown on what I have been arguing and aiming to convey in this chapter, namely that Book III fails to present a decline narrative. Instead, what we witness in the Athenian’s account is a growing intricacy and complexity, from the Age of Cronos and state of nature to the interlocutors’ present day, and even a certain degree of progression, from principles of arkhe and claims based on kinship to those on based on nature, where the Athenian Stranger introduces the concept of natural law by quoting Pindar in the sixth title to authority, and, finally, to the democratic principle, in the seventh. The contradictions and tensions produced by these titles are ameliorated and achieve their resolution in the Spartan constitution, which proves to last to the present period, stable and durable, and serves as a model for Magnesia, Plato’s second-best city. It is my belief that the Athenian’s language at this point reveals and substantiates what is the cause of change and actually constitutes this evolution, the maternal figure of space or the container, through which metabolē takes place and activates processes of flux. By facilitating these movements, the feminine principle of becoming produces layers of complications, differentiations and shapes the
material components that it contains. It fuels the engine of dialectic and, because conflict occurs in and originates from feminine space, it is the force that is responsible for providing the material matter of politics, and, in this way, generates politics, a field, art or technē that goes beyond family ties and the household, such primitive communities.

Deleuze’s concept of the mobile section, furthermore, allows us to zoom in onto each temporal period, juxtaposed to the next, in a sequence and lends a sense of time as a whole of differing series of becoming. The Platonic image that is deployed in this instance delineates the tensions that are given rise, either resolved, as they are in the case of Sparta, or exacerbated, which leads to additional change and imbalances. The Persians, for example, excessively “embrace” the principle of monarchy (ἡ δὲ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀγαπήσασα μειζόνως), and the medium through which this transformation takes place, interestingly enough, is the actual female body: women, who rear the children of Cyrus, in the absence of men (ἐν ἀνδρῶν ἔρημῳ), give these infants a “womanish” education (Γυναικείαν), conducted as it is by the royal harem (Pl. Leg. 694e). Remarkably, these women themselves are becoming, “lately grown rich” (γυναικῶν νεωστὶ γεγονυιῶν πλουσίων) (Pl. Leg. 694e).

By understanding these various scenarios to be effective components and singularities, which produce meaning, we can focus on and interrogate the idea of difference in the differences that are set as borders along each of the images. The feminine principle negotiates this very principle of difference, for it is the other, and supplies the matter with which to engage in dialectic. The mobile section is relevant for my examination of Book III, rather than the time-image discussed in the previous chapter, because Plato has the Athenian Stranger portray a dialectical politics and history, not as the inevitable unfolding of some unchanging human essence, but history as materialist. As we know, Deleuze’s montage is composed of mobile
sections, which present the moving of movement and both the decomposition and recomposition of matter, and, thereby, creates an indirect image of time. What I hope to have suggested is that the cinematic montage is already found in the Athenian’s account; at the most fundamental level, it depicts historical movement and yields an indirect sense of time, in other words, history.
Ch. 4

Goodbye to Language: the chōra in the Timaeus

“What’s difficult is to fit flatness into depth.” – J.-L. Godard

I. Space

In this chapter, I will be elucidating the apparatus that makes the explicit association between the feminine and the sphere of becoming, and that is the chōra in Plato’s Timaeus. It is a concept that has sparked much interest and discussion among modern theorists: Levinas, for instance, defines it as “…an irrecoverable, pre-ontological past” (78), a sort of fantasy space, prior to meaning and difference, as it, especially, is for Derrida, who sees the chōra as an abyss between the sensible and the intelligible, being and nothingness, being and the lesser being, “…the opening of a place ‘in’ which everything would come both to take place and to be reflected,” a mise en abyme (1997: 21) and site of différance. Among feminist critics, in particular, Kristeva borrows the term chōra from the Timaeus “…to denote an essentially mobile and extremely provisional articulation constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases” (25)—a maternal pre-semiotic space—while Irigaray makes the comparison between the chōra and the cave, a passive receptacle, into which the Ideas or forms are constantly passing (173). I mention various treatments of Plato’s chōra, in passing, in order to illustrate both the significance and legacy of this mysterious notion, and now, in the following discussion, I will turn to the original source material to determine how and why these modern authors might have drawn and extracted such interpretations of the ancient concept.

33 Différance is understood to be “…the marginal and differential meaning that undercuts and destabilizes Plato’s metaphysical dualism” (Giannopoulou 166).

34 For a recent treatment of the influence of Plato’s thought on feminist intellectual life in post-modern France and even on Anglo-American thought, see Miller: “The ancient world, in general, and Plato, in particular, function as our theoretical unconscious” (viii).
In the *Timaeus*, Plato uses such language and similar terms, on which subsequent authors will expand, to describe his conception of the *chōra*. It is described by Timaeus as the “mother” and “receptacle” of what has come to be:

\[\text{ταύτὸν οὖν καὶ τῷ τὰ τῶν πάντων ἀεὶ τε ὄντων κατὰ πᾶν ἐαυτοῦ πολλάκις ἀφομοιώματα καλῶς μέλλοντι δέχεσθαι πάντων ἐκτὸς αὐτὸ προσήκει πεφυκέναι τῶν εἰδῶν. διὸ δὴ τὴν γεγονότος ὀρατοῦ καὶ πάντως αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν μήτε γῆν μήτε ἀέρα μήτε πῦρ μήτε ὕδωρ λέγωμεν, μήτε δόσα ἐκ τούτων μήτε ἕξ ὦν ταῦτα γέγονεν ἀλλὰ ἀνόρατον εἰδός τι καὶ ἀμορφον, πανδεχέξες, μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατα πι τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσαλωτότατον αὐτὸ λέγοντες οὐ ψευσόμεθα. (Pl. Ti. 51a-b.)\]

[‘In the same way, then, it is appropriate that the thing which is to be fitted to receive frequently throughout its whole self the likenesses of all intelligible objects, the things which always are, be void of all forms. Wherefore, let us not speak of her that is the Mother and Receptacle of this generated world, which is perceptible by sight and all the senses, by the name of earth or air or fire or water, or any of their aggregates or constituents. But if we describe her as an invisible and shapeless sort of thing, all-receptive, and in some most perplexing and incomprehensible way partaking of the intelligible, we shall not lie.’]^{35}

It would seem that the *chōra* functions as a pseudo-womb, that is, a container for images and copies (ἀφομοιώματα) that pass through it. Joubaud in her section « Qu’est-ce que la *chōra* » says that it is not a body, although bodies are formed in it: « Cette absence de forme, outre le fait de l’invisibilité, laisse par ailleurs supposer que la *chōra* n’est pas un corps, bien qu’ayant en elle des corps qui se forment » (26). She also argues that Plato insists on the association of passivity with the feminine: « Elle recouvre les notions de « porte-empreintes », « réceptacle », « nourrice » ; elle est également dite « mère » ; il y a la répétition de verbes comme « recevoir », l’emploi de tours grammaticaux passifs, mettant en œuvre une mythologie sexuelle » (29).

After looking more closely at the passage, we might begin to understand why the *chōra* would be received and interpreted as a passive object by these readers and why the feminine

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^{35} Translations have been adapted from Zeyl’s.
would be mapped onto this passivity; Plato himself has Timaeus describe it as a mother
(μητέρα), as some kind of unseen and shapeless shape (ἀνόρατον εἰδός τι καὶ ἄμορφον). The
chōra properly “receives” (καλῶς...δέχεσθαι) all the likenesses of the intelligible and eternal
things (tà τῶν πάντων ἀεὶ τε ὄντων), and yet it itself is devoid of all forms (ἐκτὸς αὐτῶ...τῶν
eidōn). Timaeus will, furthermore, categorize it as a “third type,” the space, which always exists
and cannot be destroyed, a fixed site for all things that come to be (τρίτον δὲ ἀὖ γένος ὁν τὸ τῆς
χώρας ἀεὶ, φθοράν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, ἔδραν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν) (Pl. Ti. 52a-b).
We are “dreaming” (ὄνειροπολοῦμεν) when we say that everything that exists must necessarily
be somewhere in some place and occupying some space (χώραν τινά) and that that which is
neither on earth nor anywhere in heaven is nothing (Pl. Ti. 52b). As a “third type,” “tangible”
(ἀπτόν) in a dream state (Pl. Ti. 52b), in this way, the chōra makes itself available for the
Derridean reading, as “…the opening of a place ‘in’ which everything would…come to take
place and be reflected” (1995: 104).

The Platonic chōra escapes the classic pitfall of dualism and binary distinctions precisely
because it introduces and works as the third element in this metaphysical structure. Though
Derrida and these feminist critics place the accent, in their treatment of the chōra, as a sort of
irrecoverable remainder belonging to the fantastic past, on the static nature of space, it is my
belief that such an understanding fails to grasp the full potential and power of the concept.\(^{36}\)
Interestingly enough, in her interpretation of the essay included in the Festschrift dedicated to
Vernant, Hernandez suggests that Derrida emphasizes the ideological and political aspects of the
chōra and that the concept of différance is inherently political:

\(^{36}\) Though it is important to take into consideration how Derrida’s position on the chōra evolves in his various
returns and, as Miller tells us, in the chapter entitled Khôra, he understands the third element to be “…that moment
in which the Platonic system acknowledges its own outside as always already internal to the system and hence self-
deconstructive” (146).
La khôra est pour Derrida un lieu de résistance : elle résiste aussi bien à la maîtrise démiurgique qu’aux appropriations anthropomorphiques et symboliques auxquelles elle donne lieu sans pour autant s’y réduire. Elle est un espace d’exclusion et de sélection qui indique à la fois la nécessité de la limite et le caractère fictionnel de toute limite. Elle est le lieu où s’inscrit et se construit une structure supplémentaire d’exclusions (le bon/le mauvais, l’homme/l’animal, etc.) qui décide de l’appartenance et de la non appartenance à un « nous », à une « communauté » ou une « collectivité » (4).

Bianchi also moves away from previous readings that stress impassivity, when she traces the genealogical significance of the chôra in feminist theory and argues that the receptacle/chôra, as an irreducibly feminine errant cause of cosmic motion, as a site of figural and ontic/ontological generativity and as a revelatory originary chiasmus of appropriation and dispersal “…may be a potent theoretical locus through which to reread and perhaps displace a metaphysical architecture handed down to us by the Greeks” (135-136). What has already been suggested by my analyses of metabolê in both the Republic and the Laws is that the choratic apparatus is set into motion in the process of change, and, as the nurse of becoming, produces a new ontological existence, in every stage of the cycle. This is to say that the chôra, operative in the Timaeus, provides a potent theoretical locus through which to reread and to displace Plato’s own metaphysical architecture.

What we lose in these other treatments of the chôra is the very vibrancy and dynamism of inhabited space, as it is portrayed by Plato. Within the framework of vital materialism, in her description of the chôra, Sheldon equates it with Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the “body without organs:” an “…autonomous, dynamic, temporalized space through which subindividual matters, vibratory intensities, and affects might cross and be altered through that crossing” (212). It is a vitalizing engine and introduces, with its motions, a double articulation: “As a tertium quid, the ‘third thing’ that transmits and transforms dynamic form, the chora both enables and distorts the autopoiesis of apparently incorporeal matters like thought” (Sheldon 213). In other words, virtual speeds and intensities that define the chôra coincide with, cause and are caused by the object itself: “…dualism…between the actual object and its virtualities creates a
separation between the background of speeds and intensities that get captured by the drag of organization and sedimented into an actual object whose constrained vibratory intensity then ripples back across the field of force relations” (Sheldon 213).

This is how I will conceive of the Platonic chōra and, to clarify and to illustrate the affective relevance of this concept, I will add that it facilitates a lively and porous experience and, particularly, what we can understand to be a cinematic experience. By “cinematic,” I mean that element of flux and becoming, which takes place in space, from place to place, and creates, in turn, an itinerant narrative. In “A Geography of the Moving Image,” Bruno identifies a feminine and maternal space in the eight decorations produced by Gian Lorenzo Bernini in the interior of Saint Peter’s in Rome, and they depict different facial expressions:

Connected by the mobile spectator and associated by way of peripatetics, the apparently unrelated faces produce a story—a woman’s story. The change of facial expressions, once placed in the gendered realm, becomes readable: the decorations depict the contractions and final release of a woman’s face, suggesting the different stages of her labor and delivery. Ultimately, this architectural tour tells the story of the inside of a woman’s body. Walking inside an architectural space, we have actually walked into an ‘interior.’ The sequence of views has unleashed an intimate story. The walk has created a montage of gender viewed (2007: 63).

In this chapter, I will be showing the connection between corpus and space through my reading of Plato’s chōra, as a mobile address for gender’s dwelling, “…and the house moves” (Bruno 2007: 64). This is to say that the original chōra in the Timaeus works exactly in this way, as Bruno describes it: negotiating the boundary between exterior and interior, an anatomy of gender lays out the terrain for cinematic space.

Such an alliance between film and architecture will act as the heuristic model and prism through which to view the ancient text and the chōra in the Timaeus. Bruno, in her meditations on these media and, in particular, on the intersection between cinematic and architectural paths, draws on Eisenstein’s observations of embodied territory and spatial inhabitation: “An architectural ensemble…is a montage from the point of view of a moving
Cinematographic montage is, too, a means to ‘link’ in one point—the screen—various elements (fragments) of a phenomenon filmed in diverse dimensions, from diverse points of view and sides” (16-17). Deleuze in his books on cinema attributes the highest form of the montage to Eisenstein, who “…sought an image of shock or of ecstatic intensity that would move the spectator from percept to concept, or from image to thought” (Rodowick 182). Simply put, cinema has a real tangible impact, and we are now at a point to notice the coincidence between what is aesthetic and what is political: “At the most fundamental level, cinematic movement, whose essence is montage, produces a shock in thought communicated directly, physiologically and mentally, to the spectator. Thought is conceived here not as a power or a potential, but rather as a material force, ‘as if the cinema were telling us: with me, with the movement-image, you can’t escape the shock which arouses the thinker in you (Time-Image 156)” (Rodowick 182).

Taking these various approaches into consideration, I will recuperate the chōra from previous treatments that focus on its passivity and demonstrate, instead, its vitality and animation, how it comprises and is comprised by the affects it generates. It is my view, moreover, that it serves as a medium for change, in the manner of a floating container and female womb, a feminine space that opens up possibilities for the future. By thinking of the chōra architecturally and cinematically, we can thus enhance the aesthetic expressions of space and the interactions to which it gives rise. I will argue that the feminine chōra in the Timaeus acts as the bridge between the pre-cosmic past and the time of the polis or political period, as the center and locus of becoming, which proves constant between these two temporal phases and promotes movement from one to the other. Whereas Sallis remarks that, in the Platonic texts, the general orientation to production may be accompanied by a critique of production, that is, “…a marking
of its limits” (51), as he identifies a moment of subversion of the metaphysical determination of being in the abysmal chōra,\(^{37}\) in my reading of the dialogue, I will privilege the productive and generative aspects of this theoretical concept and set it up as a space of construction and reconstruction since it plays the role of a female body. The experience of residing in space, in this womb, is both cinematic and political because one moves in it and encounters material forces, phenomenal shocks and episodic violence.

II. Hysteron proteron

In his descriptions of the creation of the world, Plato expressly genders the pre-cosmic chōra. As Bergren notices, the title character of the dialogue, Timaeus, tells the story in three phrases and employs the figure of speech hysteron-proteron ‘later before earlier’ order:

In the first phase, Timaeus explains how the dēmiourgos ‘builds’ (tektoinō) and ‘constructs’ (synistēmi) the kosmos as an eikōn ‘likeness, copy’ using a Form as paradeigma ‘model’ in chōra ‘place, space’ (48e2-52d1). He then moves back in time to describe the characteristics of pre-cosmic chōra—how chōra was before the building of the kosmos (52d1-53a7). And then he returns in time to complete his account of the cosmic construction, stressing the features that form its surpassing beauty (53b1-69a5) (2010: 346).

In the middle sequence, in a sort of “flashback,” as Bergren calls it (2010: 348), Timaeus explains how the chōra works:

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In the middle sequence, in a sort of “flashback,” as Bergren calls it (2010: 348), Timaeus explains how the chōra works:

\[ \text{ὁ αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος} \]
\[ \text{καὶ περὶ τῆς τὰ πάντα δεχομένης σώματα φύσεως, ταύτων} \]
\[ \text{αὐτὴν ἢ} \] προσφητεύον· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἐαυτῆς τὸ παράπαν οὐκ} \]
\[ \text{ἐξισταται δυνάμεως—δέχεται τε γὰρ ἢ} \] πάντα, καὶ \]
\[ \text{μορφῆν οὐδεμίαν πὸτε οὐδενὶ τῶν εἰσιόντων ὁμοίαν ἐηληφὲν} \]
\[ \text{οὐδαμὴ οὐδαμῶς· ἐκμαγεῖον γὰρ φόροι παντὶ κεῖται, κινοῦ} \]
\[ \text{μένον τε καὶ διασχηματίζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν εἰσιόντων, φαί} \]
\[ \text{νεται δὲ δὲ· ἐκείνα ἅλλοτε ἅλλοιον—τὰ δὲ εἰσιόντα καὶ} \]

\[ \text{Sallis, in his examination of the Timaeus, advances a discourse of chorology, which consists in Derridean deconstruction: “If one were to take metaphysics to be constituted precisely by the governance of the twofold, then the chorology could be said to bring both the founding of metaphysics and its displacement, both at once. Originating metaphysics would have been exposing it to the abyss, to the abysmal χώρα which is both origin and abyss, both at the same time. Then one could say—with the requisite reservations—that the beginning of metaphysics will have been already the end of metaphysics” (123).} \]
characterized as a nature or “origin that receives all the bodies” (τῆς τὰ πάντα δεχόμενης σώματα φύσεως), though the receptacle “nowhere” (οὐδόμη) and “in no way” (οὐδαμῶς) takes on any
shape similar to any of the things that enter into it (μορφήν οὐδεμίαν ποτὲ οὐδένι τῶν εἰσιόντων ὀμοίαν ἐίληφεν). For this reason, a “recipient of impressions” (ἐκμαγεῖον), it has a chameleon-like character, for it appears different at different times (φαίνεται…ἄλλοτε ἄλλοιον), and displays a certain emptiness, totally devoid of all characteristics and shapes of its own (πάντων ἐκτὸς εἰδῶν).

Different metaphysical components correspond to individual members of the oikos: Timaeus, for instance, compares the recipient to the mother (δεχόμενον μητρὶ), in other words, the chōra, the source to a father (τὸ δ’ ὀθὲν πατρὶ) and what is engendered between these two to the offspring (τὴν δὲ μεταξῷ τοῦτων φύσιν ἐκγόνῳ), and they compose “three kinds” (γένη…τριττά). The set of metaphors that are deployed serves as a key moment for my reading and treatment of the chōra; Plato equates “that in which it comes to be” (τὸ δ’ ἐν ὧν γίγνεται) with the figure of the mother, for it constitutes maternal space, while “that which comes to be” (τὸ μὲν γενόμενον) and “the source from which becoming is born” (τὸ δ’ ὀθὲν ἀφομοιούμενον φύεται τὸ γενόμενον) correspond to the offspring and father, respectively. By making these associations, Plato genders separate ontological categories and, specifically, at this time when he has Timaeus recount the origin of the kosmos, he reverts to the language of becoming, kinship and maternity and, in doing so, lays stress on the process of procreation and creation. What we see is that feminine space, the three-dimensional field of the chōra (Pl. Ti. 32b), is necessary in order to receive, a quality that is made clear by the repetition of the verb dechomai in this passage, and to contain a copy of the Eternal model and Living Thing.

The presence of the receptacle facilitates the creation of the universe because it literally provides the space and makes room for images of the eternal model, containing what becomes of these imitations. In addition, it explains why certain elements transform, such as why water, at
one point, condenses to stones and earth, which, in turn, dissolves and turns to wind and air, at another (Pl. Ti. 49b-c). Timaeus, in his observations of how these four primary elements—water, earth, air and fire—undergo flux, sees them passing on to one another, “as it would seem,” in a “cycle” the gift of birth or “coming to be” (κύκλον τε οὕτω διαδιδόντα εἰς ἄλληλα, ώς φαίνεται, τὴν γένεσιν) (Pl. Ti. 49c). Though the chōra may be shapeless (ἀμορφον), without partaking of all of those characters that it is to receive from elsewhere (ἀμορφον ὁν ἐκείνων ἀπασῶν τῶν ἵδεων ὅσας μέλλοι δέχεσθαι ποθεν), the movements of these elements comprise a journey of flux and, with their motions, energize the space in which they are held. Finally, the emphasis on cycles and generation is another way in which the feminine experience, that is, the experience of pregnancy and giving birth, is invoked.

We already looked at the crucial passage where the chōra is described as the “mother of that which becomes” (τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος... μητέρα), and “in some most perplexing way” it also partakes in the intelligible (μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατα πη τοῦ νοητοῦ) (Pl. Ti. 51a-b), but now I would like to continue exploring the female anatomy and probe what takes place in the feminine contraption, the womb. The chōra finds a parallel in the ancient conception of the wandering womb since, Timaeus explains, this sort of space oscillates and moves, filled and agitated by sensations:

...ὅν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι,
τρία τριχῆ, καὶ πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι· τὴν δὲ δὴ γενέσθως
tιθήνην ὑγραινομένην καὶ πυρουμένην καὶ τὰς γῆς τε καὶ
ἄρος μορφὰς δεχομένην, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτως πάθη συν-
ἐπεται πάσχουσαν, παντοδαπήν μὲν ἰδεῶν φαίνεσθαι, διὰ δὲ
tὸ μὴ οἷοίοις δυνάμεων μὴ τε ἵσορρόπων ἐμπιπλασθαι κατ᾽ ὁδὸν αὐτῆς ἵσορροπείν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνομμάλῳς πάντῃ ταλαντο-
μένην σειέσθαι μὲν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων αὐτῆς, κινούμενην δ᾽ αὐ
pάλιν ἐκείνα σειέντ᾽· τὰ δέ κινούμενα ἄλλα ἄλλοστε ἄρι
φέρεσθαι διακρινόμενα, ὡςπερ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν πλοκάνων τε καὶ
ὀργάνων τῶν περὶ την τοῦ σίτου κάθαρσιν σείμενα καὶ
ἀνικμώμενα τὰ μὲν πυκνά καὶ βαρέα ἄλλη, τὰ δὲ μανά

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καὶ κοὐφα εἰς ἑτέραν ἵζει φερόμενα ἐδραν’. (Pl. Ti. 52d-53a.)

[Ti.: ‘...there are being, space and becoming, three distinct things that existed even before the heavens came to be. Now as the wetnurse of becoming turns watery and fiery and receives the shapes of earth and air, and as it acquires all the properties that come with these characters, it exhibits every variety of appearance, but because it is filled with powers that are neither similar nor evenly balanced, no part of it is in balance. It sways unevenly in every direction as it is shaken by those things, and being set in motion it in turn shakes them. And as they are moved, they drift continually, some in one direction and others in others, separating from one another; just as the particles that are shaken and winnowed by the sieves and other instruments used for the cleansing of corn fall into one place if they are solid and heavy, but fly off and settle elsewhere if they are spongy and light.’]

In a state of primitive chaos, three distinct realities exist, being, space and becoming (ὅν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι), before the heavens “came into being” (πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι). The chōra, in fact, combines these separate ingredients, characterized as the “nurse of becoming” (τὴν δὲ δὴ γενέσεως τιθήνην), and momentarily soaks up the properties that enter into it, turning wet and burning with fire (ὕγραινομένην καὶ πυρομένην), as it receives the shapes of earth and air (τὰς γῆς τε καὶ ἀέρος μορφὰς δεχομένην). At the same time that it comes into these states or “properties” (πάθη...πάσχουσαν), the receptacle assumes a variety of visible aspects (παντοδαπὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν φαίνεσθαι) and is “filled” with powers that are neither similar nor evenly balanced (μὴ γὰρ ὁμοίων δυνάμεων μήτε ἱσορρόπων ἐμπίπτασθαι). As a result, it sways irregularly, in every direction, as it is shaken by those things (ἀνωμάλως πάντη ταλαντομένην σεῖσθαι μὲν ὑπ’ ἑκείνων ἀυτὴν), and, being moved (κινομένην), it in turn shakes them (ἀὖ πάλιν ἑκεῖνα σεῖειν).

In the way that it works, the chōra truly embodies the “third type,” defined by the properties that it itself engenders, as it temporarily takes on various characterizations. In other words, the chōra is at once both inside and outside, for, as space and a “seat” (Pl. Ti. 52b), it provides a spatial location for the elements that pass into it and subsequently depart from it. It
seems to have more than one function, as it occupies space as a material substratum, as a sort of
ointment, for example, which serves as a neutral base for fragrances (Pl. Ti. 50e), and
simultaneously constitutes space or the very room in which it subsists. The level of ambiguity
surrounding its identity is heightened by the motions that the *chōra* undergoes and also causes: it
shakes and is shaken by the particles that it filters, and they fly continually in various directions
(τὰ δὲ κινούμενα ἄλλα ἄλλοσε ἀεὶ φέρεσθαι) and are separated or “dissipated” (διακρινόμενα).
Timaeus makes the comparison to a sieve or some other kind of instrument by which these
particles are shaken and sifted out (σειόμενα καὶ ἀνικμόμενα), as in the case of cleansing corn
(περὶ τὴν τοῦ σίτου κάθαρσιν). A porous entity, malleable, the *chōra*, in the act of filtering,
creates and is created by its movements and the matter of what becomes, by its offspring.

The obscurity of the *chōra* is demystified if we understand it to work as a womb of the
kosmos, and the parallel between these two feminine spaces is made clear if we look at the
Hippocratic treatment of the wandering womb. In On the diseases of women, when a woman
does not have intercourse, her womb becomes dry and is liable to be displaced (Hippoc. Mul.
1.7). It may move towards the bladder, causing strangury, and towards the head, causing
suffocation, sleepiness and foaming at the mouth:

"Ἡν δὲ πνίς προστῇ ἐξαπίνης, γίνεται δὲ μάλιστα τῇσι μὴ
ζυνιούσην ἀνδράσι καὶ τῆσι γερατέρησην μᾶλλον ἢ τῆσι νεωτέρησιν·
kouφότεραι γὰρ αἱ μῆτραι σφέων εἰσὶ· γίνεται δὲ μάλιστα διὰ τόδε·
ἐπὶ τὴν κενεαγγήσην καὶ ταλαιπωρήσην πλέον τῆς μαθήσιος, αὐσάνθεσαι
αἱ μῆτραι ὑπὸ τῆς ταλαιπωρίης στρέφονται, ἢτε κενεῖς έουσαι καὶ
κοῦφαι· εὐρυχωρὴ γὰρ σφὶν ἐστὶν ὡστε στρέφεσθαι, ἢτε τῆς κοιλίης
κενεῖς έουσῆς· στρεφόμεναι δὲ ἐπιβάλλουσι τῷ ἡπατι, καὶ ὦμοι γίνον-
tαι, καὶ ἐς ταῦ ὑποχόνδρια ἐμβάλλουσι· θέουσι γὰρ καὶ ἔρχονται
ἀνὴ πρὸς τὴν ἱκμάδα, ἢτε ὑπὸ τῆς ταλαιπωρίης εξανθεῖσαι μᾶλλον
τοῦ καρυοῦ· τὸ δὲ ἦπαρ ἰκμαλέν ἐστὶν· ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπιβάλλουσι τῷ
ἡπατι, πνίγα ποιεῖσθαι ἐξαπίνης ἐπιαμβάνουσα τὸν διάπνοον τοῦ
περὶ τὴν κοιλίην. Καὶ ᾧ μα τῇ ἔρχονται ἐστὶν ὑπὸ προσβάλλειν πρὸς
τὸ ἦπαρ, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς φλέγμας καταφές ἐς τὰ ὑποχόνδριά
ἐὰν πνιγομένης, καὶ ἐστὶν ὑπὸ ᾧ μα τῇ καταβρύσει τοῦ φλέγματος

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Sometimes recovery is even spontaneous. In some women the womb falls toward the neck of her bladder and produces strangury, but no other malady seizes her. When such a woman is treated, she speedily becomes healthy; sometimes, if a woman is empty and she overworks, her womb turns and falls toward the neck of her bladder and produces strangury, but no other malady seizes her. When such a woman is treated, she speedily becomes healthy; sometimes recovery is even spontaneous. In some women the womb falls toward the neck of her bladder and produces strangury, but no other malady seizes her. When such a woman is treated, she speedily becomes healthy; sometimes recovery is even spontaneous. In some women the womb falls toward the neck of her bladder and produces strangury, but no other malady seizes her. When such a woman is treated, she speedily becomes healthy; sometimes recovery is even spontaneous. In some women the womb falls toward the neck of her bladder and produces strangury, but no other malady seizes her. When such a woman is treated, she speedily becomes healthy; sometimes recovery is even spontaneous. In some women the womb falls toward the neck of her bladder and produces strangury, but no other malady seizes her. When such a woman is treated, she speedily becomes healthy; sometimes recovery is even spontaneous. In some women the womb falls toward the neck of her bladder and produces strangury, but no other malady seizes her. When such a woman is treated, she speedily becomes healthy; sometimes recovery is even spontaneous. In some women the womb falls toward the neck of her bladder and produces strangury, but no other malady seizes her. When such a woman is treated, she speedily becomes healthy; sometimes recovery is even spontaneous. In some women the womb falls toward
the lower back or toward the hips because of hard work or lack of food, and produces pain.]38

The Hippocratic conception of the uterus makes it roam in the female body: in one instance, the womb has the capability of becoming overheated from hard labor (αὐανθέσαι αἱ μὴ τῷ τῇ ταλαπωρίης), and, as a result, it “turns” (στρέφονται). As the energized womb makes its journey, it hits the liver and has a real impact on the overall constitution of the individual: it produces sudden suffocation (πνίγα ποιέουσιν ἔξαπινης). Simultaneously, with the flow of phlegm (ὅτε ἀμα τῇ καταρφύσει τοῦ φλέγματος), the womb can also make its way back from the liver to its “place” or “space” (ἐρχονται ἐς χώρην ἀπὸ τοῦ ἣπατος). There is a habitual place for the womb, and, from the point of view of the writer, once it is dislodged from its χώρα or “seat” (ἐδρης), the woman experiences various pains in the body and can even encounter a fit of epilepsy.

The comparison to this extract from the Hippocratic corpus shows that Plato’s χώρα and the wandering womb work in similar ways, and we may see that the author of the medical text lays out the framework of a basic vocabulary with which to describe the feminine matrix, as a χώρα and seat. This is to say that, by drawing connections and noticing the parallels between these two texts, we realize that the Platonic χώρα is the Hippocratic womb: unambiguously feminized and gendered, the “wetnurse” of becoming (γενέσεως τιθήνης) moves around in space and shudders (σείειν), momentarily taking on the properties, which enter into it, because it acts like a sieve and separates particles from one another, as it “winnows” (ἀνικμῶμενα) (Pl. Ti. 52d-53a). Likewise, the wandering womb, needless to say, moves around in the body and changes properties while it travels: it can “rush” (θέοσαι) and turn dry (αὐανθέσαι) or, in other cases, take on moisture and become heavy (καθελκύσασαι ἰκμάδα καὶ βαρυνθέσαι).

38 This translation follows Hanson’s.
Meanwhile, the individual in whom the womb resides makes this organ behave in specific ways depending on her “lifestyle choices,” whether they involve sexual abstinence, hard labor or starvation, and is, in turn, affected by the movements that it produces: she can suffocate, depending on the location of the womb, experience general pains in the body and even epilepsy. Adair has argued that Plato, well aware of such contemporary treatments of the uterus, living and writing during the medical enlightenment, surpasses the Hippocratic theory of physiology: “These theories, physiologically absurd, Plato insightfully and tactfully revised into a plausible psychological explanation. Hysterical misery, which others attributed to a wandering womb, Plato attributed to a moving psychological force which arises from the womb: sexual desire perverted by frustration” (153-154). I agree with Adair to the extent that what we see in Plato’s treatment of the chōra is the displacement of a medical discourse that surrounds the wandering womb onto inanimate space, which has a profoundly philosophical function; it cuts into the binary opposition between being and becoming, by serving as the medium through which change can take place, and adds a third component to the metaphysical configuration that he initiates. The analogy to the Hippocratic womb illuminates the role of the chōra, how it fits into a larger anatomy, the corporeal cosmic system, in which each part shapes and is shaped by another, and, finally, makes us see it as a generative space and, in this way, vital space.

The chōra as a wandering womb, furthermore, maximizes the cinematic potential of the narrative that is laid out for us in the Timaeus. First of all, we should take note of how both sequencing and ordering play a significant role in this dialogue; we can understand Plato’s creation story to compose a series, which is mirrored by the summary description of the three factors, Form, Copy and Receptacle:

.onesi\nu\ntep\ns\n\n
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It comes to account: that as long as the one is distinct from the other, neither of them ever nothing at all. But that which really is receives support from the accurate, true come into existence in some other thing, somehow clinging to being, or else be which it came into being, but fleets ever as a phantom of something else...

We prove unable to draw all these distinctions and others related to them—even in the case of that unsleeping, truly existing substance—because our dreaming state renders us incapable of waking up and stating the truth, which is this: how that it belongs to a copy—seeing that it has not for its own even that substance for which it came into being, but fleets ever as a phantom of something else—to come into existence in some other thing, somehow clinging to being, or else be nothing at all. But that which really is receives support from the accurate, true account: that as long as the one is distinct from the other, neither of them ever comes to be in the other in such a way that they at the same time become one and...
In describing the formation of the universe, Timaeus essentially relates the birth of a family and gives us insight into this (meta)physical process. First, Plato has Timaeus tell us about the Form (εἴδος) that is one (ἓν), that which always is (εἶναι), invisible (ἀόρατον) because it is immaterial, and it has not been brought into being (ἀγέννητον). Next, Timaeus moves onto the second thing (δεύτερον), which shares the name (ὁµώνυµον) of the former (father), perceptible by the senses (αἰσθητόν), and it has been begotten (γεννητόν), “becoming in some place” (γιγνόµεν τε ἐν τινι τόπῳ) and, again, passing away (ἀπολλύµενον). The ontological structure gets further complicated when Plato introduces the third type (τρίτον…γένος), which always exists (ὅν τὸ τῆς χώρας ἀεί), the chōra, apprehensible by some kind of curious reasoning (λογισµῷ τινι νόθῳ), and we dream when we look into it (όνειροπολοῦµεν βλέποντες).

It would come as no surprise as to why certain French philosophers would conceive of the chōra as a fantasy of space, given the language that Plato uses to describe it: that we “dream” the receptacle, and, in a dreaming state (ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὀνειρώξεως), we are unable to wake up (οὐ δυνατοὶ γιγνόµεθα ἐγερθέντες) and to distinguish the sleepless and truly subsisting nature (περὶ τῆν ἁυπνον καὶ ἁληθὸς φύσιν ὕπάρχουσαν). Surrounded by a cloudy haze, the chōra embodies a tension, as it simultaneously must, of necessity, be somewhere, in some place and occupying some space (ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι που…ἐν τινι τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά), and yet, barely an object of conviction (μόγις πιστόν), it may amount to nothing; that that which is neither on earth nor anywhere in heaven is nothing (τὸ δὲ μὴτ ἐν γῇ μήτε που κατ’ οUITableViewCell τοῦ ἐν εἰναι). In the psychoanalytic tradition, the chōra would provide a perfect locus for the transposition of a theory of the unconscious, as it did for Kristeva. In addition, Irigaray, in her essay “Plato’s Hystera” in Speculum of the Other Woman, would lift the repressed domain from
its depths and bring it into the light, the space of the feminine cave and womb, another *chōra*, by providing a critique of Western metaphysics and the “phallocentric language” that it propagates: a philosophical discourse that displaces woman in a subordinate position to the masculine by primarily and inherently devaluing the feminine in favor of the masculine.

I revisit these theorists in order not to confuse the reader, but to locate specific places in Plato’s dialogue that might have planted the seed of inspiration for their own works of reflection and meditations. By looking at what these thinkers have to say, alongside the original source material, I intend to reveal a blind spot in their use and misuse of Plato, and it is my belief that they have failed to grasp what is actually taking place in the text and what is at stake in the *chōra*. Namely, if we follow the sequence that Timaeus provides—being, becoming and space—the opposition between Form (ἐἶδος), which, on the one hand, always exists and remains unchangeable, and appearance, which, on the other, is always borne along (πεφορημένον ἀεὶ) and comes to be (γεγομένον), is confused by the presence of the *chōra*.

The *chōra*, like the Platonic Form of being, exists eternally (ὅν τὸ τῆς χώρας ἀεὶ), but it offers a fixed site for everything that comes into being (ἐξαραν δὲ παρέχων διὰ ἕξει γένεσιν πᾶσιν), apprehended by a bastard kind of reasoning (ἀπτὸν λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ). It combines properties from both ontological domains and may barely exist at all (οὐδὲν εἶναι), projected onto an oneiric plane of its own. In this way, as a “third kind” (τρίτον... γένος), it at once levels out the vertical hierarchy that Plato sets up between the sensible and intelligible domains, precisely because the *chōra*, which is characterized as a receptacle and container, mixes and compounds the distinction and situates various parts in space, and expands two-dimensional spatial dimensions, by reorganizing them into three-dimensional ones. My conception of the *chōra* suggests that Plato has already found a way out of the cave and leads us through a passage
between “the world outside” and “the world inside,” between “the world above” and “the world below,” to use the language of Irigaray (246), and this is the womb of the chôra itself, which is subject to delivery and birth and bound to release and to open up.

What the vitalist framework allows us to see and to experience is the cinematic space of the chôra. That is, we travel along and inside the female anatomy, when Plato launches into the time and space of the pre-cosmic chôra and, essentially, into the story of another world, as in the manner of the shrunken hero in Almodovar’s Talk to Her, who enters the mysterious cave of the female vagina. What we find in this cavern, the “world of the chôra,” as it were, illustrates the state of apprehension or level of cognitive awareness amidst dreams, when we are unable, on waking up, to separate (οὐ δυνατοὶ γνώμεθα ἐγερθέντες διοριζόμενοι) clearly the unsleeping and truly subsisting substance (περὶ τὴν ἁπνὸν καὶ ἀληθῶς φύσιν ὑπάρχουσαν). The emphasis laid on dreaming recalls that place in Republic Book V, when Socrates makes a distinction between someone, who believes and can see the beautiful itself, and someone else, who mistakes beautiful appearances (καλὰ…πράγματα) for the Form of Beauty (κάλλος) itself. This kind of person is living in a dream, whether asleep or awake (ἐάντε ἐν ἁπνῷ τις ἐάντ’ ἐγρηγορῶς), for he thinks that a likeness is not a likeness but rather the thing itself that it resembles (τὸ ὁμοίον τῷ μὴ ὁμοίον ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ ἢγηται ἐναὶ ὁ ἑοίκεν) (Pl. Resp. 476c).

The connection with the Republic clarifies the ontological value of the medium, which the chôra inhabits, and of the thing itself: the chôra belongs to the domain of flux because it provides the spatial milieu for change, in which metabolê may occur, and, in this way, embodies change. In a state of semi-consciousness, though it normally evades sense-perception (μετ’ όνασθησίας), the chôra makes itself known to us: “In the dream the χώρα appears as a place in which all that is must be. In this oneiric vision the χώρα—or rather its dream-image—hovers
before us as a place so all-encompassing that whatever is set apart from it can only be nothing” (Sallis: 120). That is, what Sallis notices is a merging of the image of the chōra with the chōra itself that takes place, in this dreaming state, where one finds a collapse of the difference, which originally sets chōra apart from sensible things (Mikuriya 45). Due to this merging that happens, equivalent to the production of movement and mobility, the role of the chōra is fundamentally cinematic: descriptions of the chōra do, in fact, work as close-ups, for they provide insight into the inner workings of space and grant an entrance into the womb, and, in doing so, in this sort of cinema house, the reader is led to confront and to explore the mechanism of becoming, which occurs in the female body. This is what constitutes fantasy, in the vitalist sense: the encounter with a counterfactual situation portrayed only by dreams and unknown lands, and the medium of cinema facilitates such a direct, perhaps even invasive, kind of sensory experience.

The experience of the chōra, moreover, necessarily comprises a montage and connects disparate fragments in a series while propelling them to unfold. We already took note of the significance and repetition of order, a tendency that manifests itself straight from the beginning of the dialogue: one, two, three…four (Εἷς, δύο, τρεῖς…τέταρτος) (Pl. Tū. 17a), as Socrates counts the number of guests in his party. It is the force of the chōra that makes these kinds of discriminations in the first place and transforms things that pass into it, from one to two, for example. In his examination of different ontological categories, Timaeus distinguishes the Image that is always borne along (ἀεὶ φέρεται φάντασμα) from Being itself, “that which always is” (τὸ παράπαν αὐτήν εἶναι), which never undergoes change: so long as one thing is one thing (ἔως ὁν τὸ μὲν ἄλλο ἦ), and another something different (τὸ δὲ ἄλλο), neither of the two will ever come to exist in the other, so that the same thing becomes simultaneously both one and two (οὐδέτερον ἐν οὐδέτερῳ ποτὲ γενόμενον ἐν ᾧμα ταύτων καὶ δύο γενήσεσθον). Yet, as we stated
earlier, the chōra seems to escape this binary opposition by combining properties of each, static like a Form, a “fixed site” (ἔδραν) but also scarcely believable (μόγις πιστόν), tangible by some sort of “supposititious reasoning” (ἀπτόν λογισμὸν τινα νόθο). Nothos is an interesting choice of word, defined as “bastard,” “child of a citizen father and an alien mother,” and, therefore, spurious or counterfeit. Whatever the exact method of calculation is, it is not philosophical dialectic but not necessarily a form of inquiry guided by the senses either—Timaeus explains that this kind of reasoning does not involve sense perception (μετ’ ἀνασθησίας). For this reason, the genre of logismos falls short and is “baseborn.” I draw attention to the use of this metaphor because the language of birth, race and lineage is brought into play, yet again, in connection to the chōra. The method of reckoning to take notice of it is “bastard” precisely because the outcome of this mode of inquiry is not the logoi of the philosopher, produced from his soul, but that which is the product of dreams, errant beliefs in the Image, mistaken for the thing itself, where the chōra resides. This is to say that the chōra is a space of generation, which finds its engine in false maieutics, and sets up the architectural field for reproducing things one and two. Simultaneously material and spatial, remarked by Brisson as « extension spatiale et élément constitutif » (1974: 220), and it is worth noting that such a contextualization sets the stage for a vitalist treatment of the concept, the chōra is defined by the hydraulic principle of liminality: by constantly mixing, as it shakes, it breeds change, by effacing a former reality and creating a new one. It lays out the terrain of the moving image and portrays a process of quintessential feminine labor, namely, pregnancy.

I began with a close analysis of the chōra to identify the locus of genesis, and now, through this choratic lens, I will look at other places in the text, where it plays a part and exerts its influence. It is my view that, in the Demiurge’s creation, the world’s soul overlaps with the
chôra, for both are feminine spaces and function like the womb. To begin, the psyche that is implanted into the body of the universe is, once again, gendered in this discussion, described as a female “mistress:”

As Timaeus embarks on his account, he offers a bird’s-eye view of the cosmological organization of the universe and explores the terrain of this landscape. In this section, it makes itself apparent that Plato writes with the movement-image, for, at the base, a story of
construction or creation is a story of movement: he has Timaeus show us the smooth and level (λεῖον καὶ ὀμαλὸν) surface of the world, compared to a “whole and complete body” made up of other complete bodies (ὅλον καὶ τέλεον ἐκ τελέων σωμάτων σῶμα). The corporeality of the world is emphasized, also known as a “living animal” (ζῷον) (Pl. Tī. 31b), and because it is guided by a model of intelligence, the eternal god implants a soul (ψυχήν) into the mass of the world and extends (ἔτεινεν) it throughout, using it to cover the body from outside (ἐξωθεν τὸ σῶμα αὐτῆς περιεκάλυψεν). The living being of the universe is comprehended by the intelligible model, on the one hand, but also connected to the various parts that subsist in it, on the other, where every part is disposed to harmonize with the whole. In this way, the system that the Demiurge has “begotten” (ἔγεννησατο) portrays the presence of the Deleuzian assemblage, in which separate components and parts, especially body parts, become working parts and “…connect with the world in terms of their capacities to affect and be affected” (Lorraine 62).

The significant use of the verb genaō, meaning to “beget,” “engender” and “bring forth,” anticipates and reinforces the feminine body of the soul. Timaeus draws a distinction between the body of the world and soul, which is older and prior in birth and excellence to the body (γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῆ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχήν σώματος), and yet the eternal god fastens these disparate building blocks, body and soul, and “unites” (συνέρξας) them in such a way so as for one to rule and the other to be ruled. Because it is the soul that proves the superior party, it is the ruler (ἀρχουσαν) and, therefore, “queen” (δεσπότιν) or, in the words of Proclus, in his commentary on the Timaeus, “vivific Goddess:” “For there is an intellect in us which is in energy, and a rational soul proceeding from the same father, and the same vivific Goddess, as the soul of the universe; also an ethereal vehicle analogous to the heavens, and a terrestrial body derived from the four elements, and with which likewise it is co-ordinate” (Procl. 1,5). The Neo-
Platonist, in his treatment of the dialogue, calls attention to the gendered corporeality of Plato’s language. What Proclus’ observation also reveals is a certain ambiguity and tension at play between body and soul, when he conflates the universe, which is ruled by the soul, with a “terrestrial body.”

The conflation takes place because Plato treats the soul as if it were a body. In the first place, the soul is clearly feminized, and, secondly, it constantly undergoes change, prior (προτέραν) to the body in its “coming to be” (γενέσει). In this passage, where we find the world-soul, we move cinematically across verbal images, from the macrocosm, the single spherical universe (οὐρανὸν ἕνα μόνον), which spins in a circle (κύκλον στρεφόμενον), to the microcosm, the soul set in the center (ψυχὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον) of this body. The Demiurge, in fact, stretches the soul throughout the whole (διὰ παντὸς τε ἔτεινεν) and encloses the body in it (τὸ σῶμα ὁτῆ περιεκάλυψεν). This is a fascinating gesture that Plato makes because what would seem to be smaller, singular and individual envelops the larger mass of bodies that comprise the kosmos. This is to say that the soul is greater, since it is immaterial, and the immaterial soul, in turn, acts in material and corporeal ways. Though body and soul are set in a hierarchical opposition, in relation to each other, where the former fulfills the role of the subject and the latter, the ruler, the Demiurge’s gendered creative exercise suggests that they are interdependent and “co-ordinate,” in Proclus’ terms. The feminine body that is lodged inside and outside by the eternal god, namely, the divine soul, ultimately generates the heavenly body and world-soul. Thus the genesis of the universe is the product of his male pregnancy.

The soul in the Timaeus lays out and contains the triadic ontological structure that we find in the rest of the dialogue. This is the structure defined by distinctions among three different but interrelated categories, Being, Same and Different:
The components from which he made the soul and the way in which he made it were as follows: In between the Being that is indivisible and always changeless, and the one that is divisible and comes to be in the corporeal realm, he blended a third intermediate form of Being, derived from the two other. Similarly, he made a mixture of the Same, and then one of the Different, in between their indivisible and their corporeal, divisible counterparts. And he took the three mixtures and mixed them together to make a uniform mixture, forcing the Different, which was hard to mix, into conformity with the Same. Now when he had mixed these two together with Being, and from the three had made a single mixture, he redivided the whole mixture into as many parts as his task required, each part remaining a mixture of the Same, the Different, and of Being. This is how he began the division: First he took one portion away from the whole, and then he took another, twice as large, followed by a third, one and a half times as large as the second and three times as large as the first. The fourth portion he took was twice as large as the second, the fifth three times as large as the third, the sixth eight times that of the first, and the seventh twenty-seven times that of the first.”

The world’s soul is composed of a mixture of both divisible and indivisible Sameness,

Difference and Being, and each ingredient is added with degree to proportion, where a “third form of being” (τρίτον...οὐσίας εἶδος) is compounded from both (ἐξ ἁμφοῖν), out of the Same and the Other. The interest in the nature of being is also explored in the Sophist, where Plato interrogates an apparent tension, inherent to the verb “to be:” « être » signifiant aussi bien « être une substance » qu’ « être identique à » (Brisson 1974: 18). There the Eleatic Stranger tries to
clarify Being, Not-Being, Sameness (identity), difference, motion (change) and rest and is forced into the concession that motion and that which is moved exist and “are” (τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν...όντα) (Pl. Soph. 249b), while not-being is difference, not the opposite of Being (Pl. Soph. 255b). The ontological value of not-being as difference might elucidate what the chōra is in the Timaeus because it would seem that it is not, as it exists on a plane of dreams.

Timaeus describes the process of mixing, which takes place in the act of manufacturing the soul; it is a central hub or engine, where Sameness and Difference intermingle, to make a uniform mixture, semblance or “form” (εἰς μίαν...ιδέαν). The ambiguity of the word idea, at this place, captures the complexity of these ontological domains, which the Demiurge blurs and obscures by compounding them with repetitive measurements and proportions. As a result, there are actually four different kinds of ingredients that are at stake in the composition of the world-soul: Being, Becoming, Same and Different, and Lisi is actually able to discern five steps that the Demiurge takes to execute his invention:

- Union of Indivisible Existence with the Divisible one and creation of an intermediate Existence.
- Union of the nature of the Indivisible Sameness and the nature of Divisible Sameness and creation of an intermediate nature of Sameness.
- Union of the nature of the Indivisible Difference with the nature of the Divisible Difference and creation of an intermediate Difference.
- Union of the intermediate nature of the Difference with the nature of the intermediate Sameness, and
- Union of this last nature with the intermediate Existence (2007: 110).

My interest in this creative affair has less to do with whether Indivisible Existence and Divisible Existence correspond to the Forms and the sensible beings, respectively,39 that is, with the precise ontological identity of these substances. What I would like to emphasize in my reading of the passage is the complexity of the process, exemplified by the proliferation of geometrical ratios: he takes one portion away from the whole (τὸ πρῶτον ἀπὸ παντὸς μοῖραν), then another,

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which is twice as large (διπλασίαν ταύτης), and the increase continues to the fourth portion, sixth and seventh, which is twenty-seven times that of the first (ἐπτακαιεικοσιπλασίαν τῆς πρώτης).

By adding, the Demiurge combines and divides and, by having him work these textures into the mixture of the world-soul, Plato shows us that this is, at heart, an aesthetic creation and consists in creative production.

The world-soul, moreover, an aesthetic achievement of the Demiurge, is understood by its sense of becoming. Plato shows how the eternal creator engages in what is an exemplary artisanal project, which necessitates the division of mixtures and the filling of intervals, and these quantities circulate in proportional movements and create harmony:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν τῷ συνιστάντι πᾶσα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς σύστασις ἐγεγένητο, μετὰ τοῦτο πᾶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς ἐντὸς αὐτῆς ἐπεκταίνετο καὶ μέσον μέση συναγαγόν προσήμορτεν· ἢ δ’ ἐκ μέσου πρός τὸν ἐσχατὸν οὐρανὸν πάντη διαπλακείσα κύκλῳ τε αὐτὸν ἔξωθεν περικαλύψασα, αὐτὴ ἐν αὐτῇ στρεφόμενη, θείαν ἁρχήν ἠρξατο ἁπαστοῦ καὶ ἐμφρονος βίου πρός τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον. καὶ τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ὀρατόν οὐρανὸν γέγονεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀόρατος μὲν, λογισμοῦ δὲ μετέχουσα καὶ ἁρμονίας ψυχή, τὸν νοητὸν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀρίστῳ ἀρίστη γενομένη τὸν γεννηθέντως. (Pl. Ti. 36d-37a.)

[Ti.: ‘And when the construction of the Soul had all been completed to the satisfaction of its Constructor, then he fabricated within it all the corporeal, and, uniting them center, he fitted the two together. The soul was woven together with the body from the center on out in every direction to the outermost limit of the heavens and covered it all around on the outside. And, revolving within itself, it initiated a divine beginning of unceasing, intelligent life lasting throughout all time. Now while the body of the heavens had come to be as a visible thing, the soul was invisible. But even so, because it shares in reason and harmony, the soul came to be as the most excellent of all the things begotten by him who is himself most excellent of all that is intelligible and eternal.’]

The immaterial and invisible soul (αὐτὴ δὲ ἀόρατος...ψυχή), though it overwhelms the body of the universe that it directs, is still a product of the Demiurge’s becoming: the entire composition of it “comes into being” (πᾶσα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς σύστασις ἐγεγένητο). It is also interesting to consider
the kind of role that the Demiurge plays: he “frames” within the soul everything that is bodily and corporeal (πᾶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς ἐντὸς αὐτῆς) and, as he brings these parts together (συναγαγὼν), fits (προσήρμοστεν) them to each other. Subsequently, the soul is interwoven together with the body, from the center on out, in every direction (ἡ δ’ ἐκ μέσου…πάντῃ διαπλακεῖσα) and “covered all around” on the outside (ἐξωθεν περικαλύψασα).

The metaphors, which are put into play in this description, portray the materiality of the universe, even if it is the divine soul that is under consideration. To begin, the world-soul is fabricated, and, for this reason, it must have a texture, as it is plaited together (διαπλακεῖσα) with another textile that the Demiurge keeps in his kit of tools, a more truly corporeal fabric (τὸ σωματοειδὲς). The soul, in addition, “covers it all around” (περικαλύψασα), as if it were a blanket, and “revolves” within itself (αὐτῇ ἐν αὐτῇ στρεφομένη), a divine starting point (θείαν ἀρχήν) for “unceasing, intelligent life lasting throughout all time” (ἀπαύστου καὶ ἐμφρονὸς βίου πρὸς τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον). The feminine activity of weaving, in which the Demiurge engages, recalls the figure of the Statesman, who unites opposing elements and designs a well-woven fabric (εὐητριον ὕφασμα) (Pl. Plt. 310e-311a). In both instances, weaving encapsulates the complexity of the project and illustrates the various layers and textures that compose the final product and in what way they are involved. The comparison also suggests that the Statesman plays the role of the Demiurge, in the sphere of the political, and exhibits divine-like qualities because he is a creator too, to the extent that he is responsible for the status of the state and, to a large part, generates it, while harmonizing different and divergent elements that compose its fabric.

In a similar way, the weaving metaphor enhances the significance of mixing and separation, and this process is only made possible by the presence of feminine difference. That
is, the Platonic soul assumes the capacities of the female body, which is illustrated by its corporeality, and, since it has this particularly gendered function, it engenders and, with reproductions, leads to future difference and repetition, both of which define the trajectory of change and flux. In essence, the Demiurge weaves with his soul, which exerts its influence and brings to light, in turn, the world-soul, “becoming the most excellent” of all things begotten (ἀρίστη γενομένη τῶν γεννηθέντων) by him, who is himself most excellent of all that is intelligible and eternal (τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου). The description of the birth of the world-soul and, specifically, the language on which Plato draws at the end of the passage display and embody what, in my view, seems to be a tension, the strained relationship between being and becoming: the soul, which is best, because it shares in reason and harmony (λογισμὸς ἀρίστου μετέχουσα καὶ ἀρμονίας ψυχῆ), is also, nonetheless, subject to phenomenal and material activity and compels aesthetic cycles. In fact, it acts as a filter or sieve that combines and strains and, because the soul makes life and new lives, in this way, it partakes in immortality, as a divine beginning of unceasing life for eternity (πρὸς τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον).

If we understand the Platonic soul to be a female body and, more specifically, the womb, we can also see it as a choratic space: first of all, it comprises and occupies space, while absorbing both the qualities and function of the pre-cosmic chōra. As a cinematic space, furthermore, the world-soul contains vibrant interactions and, at the same time, wanders:

άτε οὖν ἐκ τῆς ταύτης
καὶ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως ἐκ τε σύσιας τριῶν τούτων συγκρα-
θείσα μοιρών, καὶ ἀνὰ λόγον μερισθείσα καὶ συνδεθείσα,
αὐτὴ τε ἀνακυκλωμένη πρὸς αὐτὴν, ὅταν σύσιαν σκεδάστην
ἐχοντὸς τινος ἐφάπτεται καὶ ὅταν ἀμέριστον, λέγει κινου-
μένη διὰ πάσης έαυτῆς ὅτε τ’ ἄν τι ταὐτόν ἢ καὶ ὅτου ἂν
ἔτερον, πρὸς ὅτι τε μάλιστα καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως καὶ ὅποτε
συμβαινει κατὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα τε πρὸς ἐκαστὸν ἐκαστα εἶναι
καὶ πάσχει καὶ πρὸς τα κατὰ ταύτα ἐχοντα ἀεί. λόγος δὲ
ὁ κατὰ ταύτων ἁληθῆς γιγνόμενος περὶ τε θάτερον ὅν καὶ

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The cinematic lens makes the movements and operations of the soul not only present but also immediate: it allows us to step into and to experience the various textures of the world-soul, “mixed of the natures of the Same and the Other and Being” (τῆς θατέρου φύσεως ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας…συγκραθεῖσα). The description works like a film image and the affection-image, to be more exact, in that it provides a more detailed and intimate view for the reader and shows us the history and origin of the soul, namely, how it came into being: “divided” (μερισθεῖσα) and “bound together” (συνδεθεῖσα), proportionately (ἂνά λόγον), it comes around in a circle upon itself or “herself,” if we take into consideration the feminine gender of the personal pronoun (αὐτή τε ἄνακυκλουμένη πρὸς αὐτήν). This moment stresses the world-soul’s animation, moved
throughout her whole being (κινούμενη διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς), whenever she touches anything, which has its substance dispersed (ὅταν οὐσίαιν σκεδαστὴν ἔχοντός τινος ἑφάπτοται), or anything, which has its substance undivided (ὅταν ἀμέριστον).

The female voice also seems to speak (λέγει), and sounds, then, are even audible in the hollow space of the womb. One way in which the world-soul would seem to articulate speech is that it has the capacity to express judgment, that is, to decide what the object with which it comes into contact is identical with and from what it is different (ὅτῳ τῷ ἄντι ταὐτόν ἦς καὶ ὅτου ἄν ἔτερον). It declares, as well, in what relation, where and how and when (πρὸς ὅτι τε μάλιστα καὶ ὁπὶ καὶ ὁπως καὶ ὁπότε), it comes about that each thing exists and is acted upon by others both in the sphere of becoming (συμβαίνει κατὰ τὰ γιγνόμενά τε πρὸς ἐκαστὸν ἐκαστα εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν) and in that of those, always changeless (καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα ἄει). There is an effect that occurs in the soul, which distinguishes and moves between these two ontological domains: whenever it is concerned with the sensible, the circle of the Different, moving in straight course, proclaims it to the entire soul (ὁ τοῦ θατέρου κύκλος ὀρθὸς ἱδώ εἰς πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν διαγγείλῃ), and opinions and beliefs, which are firm and true, “arise” (δόξαι καὶ πίστεις γίγνονται βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς). Again, whenever it is concerned with the rational (ὅταν δὲ αὐ̱ περὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἦ), and the circle of the Same, spinning truly, declares the facts (ὁ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ κόκλος εὐτροχος ὃν αὐτὰ μηνύσῃ), reason and knowledge are, necessarily, produced or “perfected” (νοῦς ἐπιστήμης τε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποτελεῖται).

The application of the affection-image zeroes in on the topography of the world-soul and reveals the various faces of this terrain. What makes itself evident from this description is that the soul is not a static entity but quite the opposite: it drives and is driven by a turbine force, by two intersecting circles of the Same and the Different. The Deleuzian affection-image is relevant
because Plato’s portrayal of the world-soul is, essentially, a close-up and shows us the inner workings of this fundamental creation. We see the body of the soul, for example, in the process of being altered, as it is mixed and measured by portions of Sameness, Difference and Being and changes from these singular natures to a combination of them, which ultimately meets in harmony. We hear, furthermore, the sounds of the revolutions that take place in the world-soul since it “revolves upon itself” (αὐτή τε ἀνακυκλουμένη πρὸς αὐτήν), as it “speaks” (λέγει) the language of Sameness and Difference. Yet these movements are interrupted by intervals of silence, or, rather, it seems as though the world-soul speaks without sound, for it gives an account, a true account “is born” concerning both the Other and the Same (λόγος δὲ ὁ κατὰ ταύτον ἀληθής γιγνόμενος περὶ τε θάτερον ὁν καὶ περὶ τὸ ταύτον), and this is carried along without voice or sound within the self-moving thing (ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ ὑφ’ αὑτοῦ φερόμενος ἂνευ φθόγγου καὶ ηχῆς). And lastly, we feel the world-soul, immersed inside its layers, since it is concerned with the sensible or “comes into being” with regards to what is perceptible, in other words, affection (περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν γίγνεται).

The focus on the creation of the world-soul is revelatory and magnifies the mechanism that takes place in the philosopher’s soul (Pl. Resp. 490a-b); the final product of the world-soul, which envelops the body of the universe, is true logoi: a true account is born (λόγος...ἀληθής γιγνόμενος) from contact. These accounts act as judgments and, thereby, fall into two different categories: on the one hand, opinions and beliefs “come into being” (δόξαι καὶ πίστεῖς γίγνονται), though they are firm and true, and, on the other hand, accounts concerning reasoning (περὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν), which involves understanding and reasoning (νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε). What these various dynamics demonstrate is a process of intelligent selection: the world-soul activates circles of the Same or those of the Other, depending on the particular type of account, whether it
has to do with the sensible realm or with a more transcendent level.

It is my view that these processes and the factors, which they encompass, echo the movements and duties of the *chōra*, which also combines distinct ingredients, that which is and that which becomes, to formulate new entities. Both the world-soul and the *chōra* engage with the sensibles, while they partake in the intelligible, and mix, without necessarily taking on the properties with which they come into contact. Reydams-Schils, interested in the use of the phrase περὶ τὸ ἄισθητὸν, comes to the conclusion: “…just as the World Soul’s relation to bodies does not necessarily turn it into something corporeal, so its relation with sensibles does not lead it to the pitfalls of sense-perception. And in both cases the preposition signals and separates” (263).

The world-soul and the *chōra* maintain space as a third type, their autonomy, to put it another way, and constitute definitive female spaces, for the very reason that they contain, generate and embody difference. In the matter of reproduction, the element of the other, that which is different, is an essential ingredient, and any new creation is a result of combination in addition to separation and differentiation. The world-soul, however, further specifies and lays out the skeletal framework of distinct ontological domains and, in this way, creates a language with which to describe entities that exist in the universe.

III. Eden

Now, in this section, I will move into the temporal period, after time is established as a marking point, and show different manifestations of the *chōra* once the *kosmos* comes into being. To begin, what Plato has the Demiurge practice and create is an aesthetic project, and the outcome is, specifically, in my view, a cinematic universe. In a sense, the Demiurge, characterized as the father, watches the movie that is his creation and resides in a super-theater:
The father, who has “begotten” (ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ) the universe, looks at his product and apprehends it in motion and alive (κινηθέν αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνόησεν), a “statue” or more generally, an “image born” for the immortal gods (τῶν ἁίδων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἀγάλμα). The kosmos is not only like a statue, but it is also an animated plastic work of art. The cinematic aesthetic, moreover, is enhanced by the birth of time: in an effort to make it resemble his model, still yet to a greater degree (ἔτι δὴ μᾶλλον ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα…ἀπεργάσασθαι), the Demiurge thinks of making a “moving image of eternity” (εἰκὼς δ’ ἔπενόει κινητὸν τινα ἁίδωνος ποιῆσαι). He continues to bring order to the heavens (διακοσμῶν ἀμα οὐρανόν), as he makes this eternal image, “moving according to number” (κατ’ ἀριθμόν ιοῦσαν ἁίδωνον εἰκόνα), “of eternity remaining in unity” (μένοντος ἁίδωνος ἐν ἐνί). This is what we, in the present day, call “time” (χρόνον ὀνομάκαμεν): time is, therefore, presented as an invention, which provides a copy of the Eternal model, and, in this case, the moment of innovation yields an image of time or what
Deleuze will identify as cinema’s time-image.

The invention of time marks a serious development for Plato’s project and a turning point for the future of the universe and for that of man as well. Time, in the first place, is created in order to represent eternity: time strives after eternity and, for this reason, makes the *agalma* truer to form, that is, closer to the model of the Living Thing, since the *kosmos* will exist in and through a moving image of eternal time (*eikōν...κινητόν τινα αἰόνος*). Yet, there is a strong tension at work exemplified by this stage of the creation story because temporal movement depends on flux and becoming, and, ironically, the attempt on the part of the Demiurge to make his statue more faithful to Being, that which is changeless, results in the opposite effect: this move actually increases and maximizes the universe’s generational processes, portrayed by the repetition of the word *eikōn*. 40 To unpack this position, I will add that the Demiurge, in order to make the universe more eternal, reverts to constructing time, which is, at once, a mobile image (*eikōν...κινητόν*) and an everlasting image (*αἰώνιον εἰκόνα*) but a “likeness” nonetheless. The outcome, in a very large sense, is futile and almost counterproductive because Timaeus concedes that it is not possible to attach eternity fully upon anything that is begotten (*τῷ γεννητῷ παντελῶς προσάπτειν οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν*). At the same time, it seems as though that it is only through *genesis* that we can reach that which is more enduring, in other words, eternity, and thus the Demiurge practices the female art of begetting (*γεννήσας*).

Time has a specific ontological value, and it is that of becoming. In other words, the principle of becoming is inherently tied to temporality because it creates motion and, in this way, makes the present past or the past present, for instance. Timaeus, after he establishes time, which

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40 *Eikōn* is the noun form of the participial adjective *eikos* meaning “likely,” which is used to describe Timaeus’ cosmology, an *eikos muthos* (Pl. *Ti*. 29d) and *eikos logos* (Pl. *Ti*. 30b). The use of these terms has sparked the interests of scholars such as Cornford, Brisson 1998, Taylor, Rowe (2003), Vlastos (1939) and Burnyeat (2009). Rowe shifts the focus of the debate and argues that the emphasis is not on the word *muthos* but on *eikos*, and I would add that it intensifies the mimetic project of Timaeus’ discourse.
simply amounts to an eternal image (αἰώνιον εἰκόνα), clarifies the correct terminology with
which to speak of being, as opposed to that which accompanies becoming:

"Here we frame (ἐκείνῳ συνισταμένῳ) the heavens, he also constructs the genesis of
days, nights, months and years (τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανάται), all these intervals of time. Plato

[Ti.: ‘For before the heavens came to be, there were no days or nights, no months or years. But now, at the same time as he framed the heavens, he devised their coming to be. These all are parts of time, and was and will be are forms of time that have come to be. Such notions we unthinkingly but incorrectly apply to everlasting being. For we say that it was and is and will be, whereas, in truth of speech, “is” alone is the appropriate term. Was and will be are properly said about the becoming that passes in time, for these two are motions. But that which is always changeless and motionless cannot become either older or younger in the course of time—it neither ever became so, nor is it now such that it has become so, nor will it ever be so in the future. And all in all, none of the characteristics that becoming has bestowed upon the things that are borne about in the realm of perception are appropriate to it. These, rather, are forms of time that have come to be—time that imitates eternity and circles according to number. And what is more, we also say things like these: that what has come to be is what has come to be, that what is coming to be is what is coming to be, and also that what will come to be is what will come to be, and that what is not is what is not. None of these expressions of ours is accurate. But I don’t suppose this is a good time right now to be too meticulous about these matters.’"]
calls them the parts or “portions of time” (ταῦτα δὲ πάντα μέρη χρόνου), and they necessitate and lay out a semantic network or language: “was” and “will be” are forms of time that have come to be (τὸ τ’ ἦν τὸ τ’ ἔσται χρόνου γεγονότα εἰδὴ). These terms, “was” and “will be,” are properly applied to becoming, “which proceeds in time” (τὸ δὲ ἦν τὸ τ’ ἔσται περὶ τὴν ἐν χρόνῳ γένεσιν ιόῦσαι πρέπει λέγεσθαι), for both of these are motions (κινήσεις γὰρ ἔστον). Being, on the other hand, cannot be expressed by these temporal markers because it always remains and “is” (ἔστιν): changeless (τὸ δὲ ἄει κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχον) and motionless (ἀκινήτως), it never experiences nor undergoes time.

The emphasis that Timaeus puts on precision demonstrates that time, very literally, is a generation. In one sense, time encompasses a generation, that is, of a period expressed by days, nights, months and years, and, in another, the consistency of time is defined by a coming to be. Whereas Being eludes sense-perception, for it is not subject to any of the conditions, which becoming has attached to things that move in the world of sense (οὐδὲν ὅσα γένεσις τοῖς ἐν αἰσθήσει φερομένοις προσήψειν), “the shapes of time” have come to be (χρόνου…γέγονεν εἰδή), time that imitates eternity and circles around, according to number (ταῦτα αἰῶνα μιμομένου καὶ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν κυκλομένου). The word κυκλομένου supports the notion that mimetic temporal movement consists in revolutions, which are demarcated by mathematical proportions or measurements, “according to number” (κατ’ ἀριθμὸν).

What is interesting about this discussion is that Timaeus, in considering what the proper use of terms would be, shows us the confusion that takes place between these realms: in everyday language, “is” is attributed to that which becomes, and “was” or “will,” both of which belong to the sphere of becoming, are attached to that which is. While he makes the distinction, Plato has Timaeus concede that it is not exactly a timely moment to scrutinize these matters, “at
present" (οὖν τούτων τάχ’ ἂν οὐκ ἐξή καὶρός πρέπων ἐν τῷ παρόντι διακριβολογεῖσθαι). The
termoment of hairsplitting provides a clear instance of where language works to confuse the
boundaries between being and becoming and illustrates the potential for being to become and for
becoming to be. There is a constant transfer that is happening between delimitations, columns of
opposition, and thus one is able to trace a self-effacing movement, which is at play in the
Platonic dialogue. The use of language, therefore, naturally gives rise to metaphors,
misrecognition and a certain excess, and it would seem that Plato is very much aware of the
paradoxical outcome.

It is for this reason that I find Deleuze’s theory of cinema both relevant and useful for
reading the original text: it provides a heuristic model with which to locate strands of vitalist
thinking and to trace the feminine principle of becoming. It is my view, as well, that an interplay
between the movement-image and time-image is operative in the narrative, and what I hope has
already been made clear is the cinematic world(s) that Plato creates. First of all, there is the
element of time, which is introduced, and, as we noticed earlier, it is an “image of eternity”
(αἰώνιον εἰκόνα) (Pl. Τι. 37d). With this development, I think a crucial event happens, and it is
that we enter into the idea and possibility of the time-image:

Unanimity (1) is lost, and so also the bird’s eye view of the city; no longer ‘seen from on high, the
city standing and erect with skyscrapers in counter-tilt, becomes the ‘flattened city, the horizontal
city at the height of any person’ (Deleuze 1983). The end of the global or synthetic situation gives
way (2) to haphazard arrangements of events that proliferate, no longer in a narrative webbing,
and that merely happen to take place. The cinema (3) begins to wander on its own, passively
inscribing action at the centre and peripheries of the frame, in ‘any –spaces-whatever’ (Conley
136).

The image of time, which imitates eternity, as it is described by Timaeus, casts us into a spiritual
and temporal universe and raises the potential for mixing streams of associations relating present
to past and future. This is precisely the becoming facet of time, for, modeled after eternity, it
drives and is driven by change.
As a result, Timaeus’ creation story is fundamentally a montage because we can make out a series or connection of images, but they are also edited, cut and spliced. I would also argue that this dialogue contains a montage of aberrant movements, in contrast to a rational association of images, and expressly opens with an image of time, when Socrates makes an allusion to a conversation that he was having with his guests “yesterday” (χθές) (Pl. Ti. 17a). The structure of the *hysteron proteron*, furthermore, is quintessentially cinematic, for this literary device is the splitting achieved in the cutting-room, to use the language of Godard (39), in action, “later first,” an inversion of the natural order. Interestingly enough, what we find in the second main section, when Timaeus treats the pre-cosmic state and the *chōra*, Plato brings us back to a period of preexistent chaos, before the emergence of time.

The *chōra*, in fact, constitutes the locus of the more classical montage, defined by the movement-image, because, by producing, creating and building, it unifies binaries in a rhythmic alteration and yields indirect temporal impressions, in a stage of zero time. Just as the primitive *chōra* lays out the foundations of space, a receptacle and container for change, it also anticipates the more revolutionary kind of montage, which is composed by the time-image. To apply, then, the concept of the montage associated with the *chōra* is to notice the cutting, which is “…to bring out the soul under the spirit, the passion behind the intrigue, to make the heart prevail over the intelligence by destroying the notion of space in favour of that of time” (Godard 39). According to Godard, montage is a heart-beat (39), and it is my belief that the *chōra* provides this beat and exerts its disruptive and creative presence in the soul and land, after the materialization of time. It is the soul that the cutting of montage reveals.

The cinematic aesthetic, namely, the montage, carries over into the experience of the individual, into whose body the soul is implanted. The *psyche* is the universe that resides in man,
a space of generation and what we can view to be a mini- chôra:

συστήσας δὲ τὸ πάν διείλεεν ψυχὰς ἵσαρίθμους τοῖς ἀστροῖς, ἐνεμέν ὃ’ ἐκάστην πρὸς ἐκαστον, καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ώς ἐς ὅρμα τὴν τοῦ παντός φύσιν ἐδείξεν, νόμους τε τοὺς εἰμαρ-

μένους εἶπεν αὐταῖς, ὅτι γένεσις πρώτη μὲν ἐσοιτο τεταγμένη μιὰ πάσιν, ἴνα μῆτης ἐλαττοῖτο ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, δέοι δὲ σπαρέσας αὐτὰς εἰς τὰ προσῆκοντα ἐκάστας ἐκαστα ὅργανα χρόνων

φύναι ξόων τὸ θεοσεβέστατον, διπλῆς δὲ οὐσῆς τῆς ἀνθρω-

πίνης φύσεως, τὸ κρεῖττον τοιοῦτον εἰ ἡ γένος ὅ καὶ ἕπειτα

κεκλῆσοιτο ἀνήρ. ὁπότε δὴ σώμασιν ἐμφυτευθεῖν εξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ τὸ μὲν προσίοι, τὸ δ’ ἀπίοι τοῦ σῶμάτος αὐτῶν, πρώτον μὲν αὐτήσιν ἀναγκαῖον εἰ ὡς μὲν πάσιν ἐκ ὑδαίων

παθημάτων σύμφωνον γένεσθαι, δεῦτερον δὲ ἡδονή καὶ λύπη

μεμειγμένων ἐρωτα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φόβον καὶ θυμὸν διὰ τε ἑπόμενα αὐτοῖς καὶ ὧρα αὐναντίας πέρυκα διεστηκότα· ἃν εἰ μὲν κρατήσωμεν, δίκη βιώσιντο, κρατήθηντες δὲ ἀδικία.

καὶ ὃ μὲν εὑ τὸν προσήκοντα χρόνον βιώς, πάλιν εἰς τὴν
tοῦ συννόμου πορευθεὶς οἴκησιν ἄστρου, βίον ενδαίμονα καὶ

συνήθη ἔξοι, σφαλεῖς δὲ τούτων εἰς γυναικός φύσιν ἐν τῇ
dευτέρα γενέσει μεταβαλοί· μὴ παυόμενος τε ἐν τούτοις ἐτὶ

κακίας, τρόπον ὁν κακύνοιτο, κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς τοῦ

τρόπου γενέσεως εἰς τινα τοιαύτην ἂει μεταβαλοί θήρειον

φύσιν, ἂλλαττὸν τε ὡς πρότερον πόρον λήξοι, πρὶν τῇ ταύτῳ
cαι ὁμοίου περίοδῷ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ συνεπιστώμονος τὸν πολὺν

ὄχλον καὶ ὑστερον προσφύντα ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ὑδατος καὶ ἀέρος
cαι ἴχνη, θορυβώδη καὶ ἄλογον ὄντα, λόγῳ κρατήσας εἰς τὸ

tῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο εἰδος ἔξεως. (Pl. Ti. 41d- 42d.)

[Ti.: ‘And when he had compounded it all, he divided the mixture into a number

of souls equal to the number of the stars and assigned each soul to a star. He

mounted each soul in a carriage, as it were, and showed it the nature of the

universe. He declared to them the laws that had been foredained: They would all

be assigned one and the same initial birth, so that none would be less well treated

by him than any other. Then he would sow each of the souls into that instrument

time suitable to it, where they were to acquire the nature of being the most god-
fearing of living things, and, since human nature is twofold, the superior kind

should be such as would from then on be called ‘man.’ And when, by virtue of

necessity, souls were implanted in bodies, and these bodies had things coming to

them and leaving them, these results would necessarily follow: firstly, sense-

perception that is innate and common to all proceeding from violent affections.
The second would be desire, mingled with pleasure and pain; and besides these,

fear and anger, plus whatever goes with having these emotions, as well as their

natural opposites. And if they could master these emotions, their lives would be

just, whereas if they were mastered by them, they would be unjust. And if a

person lived a good life throughout the due course of his time, he would at the end

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return to his dwelling place in his native star, to live a life of happiness that agreed with his character. But if he failed in this, he would be born a second time, now as a woman. And if even then he still could not refrain from wickedness, he would be changed every time, according to the nature of his wickedness, into some wild animal that resembled the wicked character he had acquired. And he would have no rest from these toilsome transformations until he had dragged that massive accretion of fire-water-air-earth into conformity with the revolution of the Same and uniform within him, and so subdued that turbulent, irrational mass by means of reason. This would return him to his original condition of excellence.

The process follows that of making the world-soul, where the Demiurge compounds and mixes ingredients in order to generate human souls, which are then “engrafted” into bodies (σώμασίν ἐμφυτευθέν). The task of fabricating these souls, however, is reserved for other “spiritual beings” (daimones): creatures made by the hands of the Demiurge would rival the gods, and thus, in order to complete heaven, he turns to these spirits, who would assure the mortality of living things (Pl. Ti. 41b-c). There is a degree of distance gained at this stage of the production, and it would seem that the question of mortality or imperfection hinges on sense-perception, which is “innate,” born from forceful disturbances (ἐκ βιαιών παθημάτων σώματον γίγνεσθαι). Reydams-Schils makes the observation that the world-soul produces true and firm opinions and beliefs (Pl. Ti. 37b) and does not get this information through the mediation of the sense organs, whereas human souls are connected to bodies and, for this reason, lack pure cognitive self-awareness: “…there is an ontological gap between the universe as a whole and fragmented human beings who are compelled to interact and negotiate with an outside: our body is a demanding mediator, an inside/outside entity which requires sustenance, and because we need to rely on sense organs to get to sensible reality, that information cannot only feed into our cognitive awareness, but can also fuel spirit and appetite, the mortal soul companions of a mortal body” (265).
These are Plato’s porous bodies in the *Timaeus*, and they filter, with their skin, *pathēmata*—emotions, affections, perhaps even physical shocks—to the soul. This is the seat and center where various feelings are processed: first, sense-perception, as we mentioned; second, erotic passion, mingled with pleasure and pain (δεύτερον δὲ ἡδονῆ καὶ λύπη μεμειγμένον ἔρωτα); next, fear and anger, all such emotions that naturally accompany them (φόβον καὶ θυμόν ὅσα τε ἐπόμενα αὐτοῖς), and all such as are of a different and opposite character (ὅπόσα ἐναντίως πέφυκε διεστηκότα). The soul, like the soul of the world, practices judgment and possesses cognitive abilities, for competing circles of Sameness and Different are also found in the individual: man will continue to undergo cycles of transformations, “changing” (ἀλλάττων), until he yields himself to the revolution of the Same and Similar that is within him (πρὶν τῇ ταύτῳ καὶ ὀμοίου περιόδῳ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ συνεπισπόμενος). To come to this point, this person, and, significantly, his sex is male, has to master his emotions (ὥν…κρατήσοιε) and to conquer by force of reason (λόγῳ κρατήσας) “the mass of fire, water, air and earth, which later grew, being turbulent and irrational” (τὸν πολύν χόλον καὶ ὤστερον προσφύντα ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ οὐδατος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς, θορυβώδη καὶ ἄλογον ὄντα). When this is achieved, he returns again to the semblance of his first and best state (εἰς τὸ τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο εἴδος ἡξεως), but, otherwise, he goes down the path of difference and would change “into a woman’s nature” at the second birth (εἰς γυναικὸς φύσιν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ γενέσει μεταβολοῖ). There are many remarks to make about this loaded passage, but I will begin with the Platonic conception of the soul. It is true that the human soul is immaterial; every one of them is assigned a star in heaven. Disembodied, they travel and even have a means of (public) transportation, in the chariot (ὄχημα), but souls are also embodied and, therefore, experience the *pathēmata* that befall the body, “things coming to the body, and things that depart from it” (τὸ
μὲν προσίοι, τὸ δ’ ἄπιοι τοῦ σῶματος αὐτῶν). The soul implanted in the individual is the home of these conflicting sensations and states of awareness, which are described as an unruly material mass, or one could say even “populace” (ὄχλον). Finding their bases in the four basic elements, the multitude of emotions is tamed and put to order by the application of the logos, which brings him back to his “original condition of excellence” (τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο εἴδος ἔξεως). What we can recognize here is a variety of outcomes, contingent on self-mastery or the lack thereof, and the fact that there are different types of soul and numerous possibilities reinforces the generative capacity of this organ, which acts “chorically;” fire, water, air and earth, which funnel in and out of the soul, also travel through the chōra and transform.

The parallel scenario leads us closer to the conclusion that a version of the chōra can be found in the human soul, which acts as a sifter of emotions and harbors, at the same time, the divine component, namely, rational capacity. If we think of the soul as a space or chōra, we notice the kinetic activity and operations that take place within it: how there are windings, for example, as the troublesome mass of fire, water, earth and air (τὸν πολὺν ὀχλὸν...ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ὑδατος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς) has the potential to move in conformity with the circle of the Same and uniform (τῇ ταύτῳ καὶ ὁμοίου περιόδῳ). We see, from this description, that the soul is a refiner and, with the application of a vitalist lens, it comes to light as a hydraulic engine and maintains a sort of complex industrial refinery, where turbines blend, mix and organize streams of perceptions and cognitive measures. That is, the human soul negotiates the problem of the body since borders dissipate: the soul is metaphorized as a body, while the body lends its disturbances, the pathēmata, to the psychic, inner experience, which amounts to sensation, desire, pleasure, pain, fear and anger. Change and the process of becoming, in turn, depend on the order of these feelings, and we have already made the observation that numerical sequence is
significant for the dialogue. This significance translates to the microcosm of the individual soul, where aesthetic order, in a very literal sense, resides or, in the opposite case, aesthetic disorder.

The creation of these human souls also illustrates the impact of time, and, since accents of timing drive the story, it is my view that the cinematic component is essential for understanding the dynamics of the plot. On the one hand, it seems that distance, portrayed by the passage of time, contributes to a degree of being flawed. The Demiurge, for his part, leaves the task of fashioning human souls to the demigods or *daimones*, for if other creatures, which are to inhabit the earth, come into existence by his hands, by “my hand” (δι’ ἐμοῦ δὲ ταῦτα γενόμενα), “sharing in life by my hand” (βίου μετασχόντα), they would rival the gods (θεοῖς ἰσάζοιτ’ ἄν) (Pl. *Ti*. 41c). The clarity grade of his mixture, therefore, is less pure at this secondary stage: as he sets out on his task, the Demiurge begins to pour into the same mixing bowl that fostered the growth of the world-soul (κρατῆρα, ἐν ὧ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆν κεραννὸς ἔμισγεν) what remains of the previous ingredients (τὰ τῶν πρόσθεν ύπόλουσα), that is, Being, Sameness and Difference, no longer invariably and constantly pure, but of a second and third grade of purity (ἀκήρατα δὲ οὐκέτι κατὰ ταῦτα ὦσαύτως, ἄλλα δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα) (Pl. *Ti*. 41d). These human souls, then, originate at a later time, and they are more remote, removed from direct association with divinity. But, on the other hand, though immediacy is taken away and remoteness is gained, the universe is made more complete and acquires necessary layers: the Demiurge recognizes that as long as mortal beings have not come to be, heaven will be incomplete (τούτων δὲ μὴ γενομένων οὐρανὸς ἁπελῆς ἔσται) (Pl. *Ti*. 41b). Time, as it makes by mimicking eternity, raises the possibility for both positive and negative change, and the soul expresses, reflects and produces temporal becoming, “sown each into his own proper organ of time” (σπαρείσας αὐτὰς εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάσταις ἑκαστα ὄργανα χρόνων).
As the Demiurge erects the structures of the *kosmos*, the soul is one of these places that retain the function of the *chōra*, which works as a specter and provides the subtext for spaces, containers, craters and the production of time. That is, as the *kosmos* comes into being, the soul, after the choratic receptacle, acts as the backdrop against which change and flux occur and thus proves the central locus, wherefrom becoming stems. It is true that the human soul remains in touch with god and, by extension, reason, which allows for the observance of laws, “decreed by fate” (νόμους τε τοῦ εἰμαρμένους), but it also faces the peril of succumbing to the corporeal passions. How these elements are mixed and ordered within the soul, in turn, determine the fate of the individual: whether he returns to that original condition of excellence (εἰς τὸ τῆς πρῶτης καὶ ἀρίστης) or, instead, assumes a “woman’s nature in the second generation” (εἰς γυναικὸς φύσιν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ γενέσει).

As we saw earlier, there is a sense that immediacy, what is original and first are superior and purest, and this genealogy traces itself to the masculine, while what is subject to transformation and, thereby, more distant and alloyed or adulterated aligns itself with the feminine; the person who fails to live the good life is born again as a woman, in the second cycle, and, even worse, as a wild beast, in the third. Yet it is interesting that we also find the feminine in the soul, which takes on the capacity of the wandering womb and structures the integrity of the individual and sets up the architecture of the body, as it were, by activating the cinematic cycle of Sameness. This discrepancy that we encounter, between the degradation of what is female, on the one hand, and Plato’s paradoxical recuperation of this principle, on the other, because he depends very much on feminine becoming, what we can understand to be the obscuring of strict dichotomies, encapsulates those shocks and moments of profound discontinuity, which are precisely tied to the Deleuzian time-image, and makes time palpable in
this way, in the absence of what was formerly present. A cinematic treatment of the dialogue, because it amplifies these intervals, gaps and aesthetic tensions, spotlights the mechanism of the *chōra* to which the maternal figure gives rise: displacement, erasure and generation.

Another way in which we know that the *chōra* remains active up through the time of the *kosmos* and beyond is by the cycles and periods of cinematic revolution drawing their circular paths. As Timaeus explains how the body is fabricated, he moves to describe the birth of sex and explores the human anatomy:

[Ti.: ‘According to our probable account, all male-born humans who lived their lives as cowards and unjustly were reborn in the second generation as women. And
it was for this reason that at that time the gods contrived the love of sexual intercourse by constructing an animate creature of one kind in us men, and of another kind in women, in this way they made each. There is a passage by which fluids exit from the body, where it receives the liquid that has passed through the lungs down into the kidneys and on into the bladder and expels it under pressure of air. From this passage, they bored a connecting one into the compacted marrow that runs from the head along the neck through the spine, which we have previously called the seed. And now, because it is vivid and had found an air-hole, this marrow instilled a life-giving desire for emission in the very place it vented, and produced the love of procreation. For this reason, indeed, the male genitals are unruly and self-willed, like an animal that will not be obedient to reason, and driven crazy by its desires, seeks to overpower everything else. By these same causes a woman’s womb or uterus, as it is called, is a living thing within her with a desire for making children. When this becomes unfruitful for an unseasonably long period of time, it feels a violent irritation and travels everywhere up and down her body, it blocks up the passages of her lungs, and, by not allowing her to breathe, it casts her into extreme discomfort and produces diseases of every other sort, until finally the desire of the woman and the love of the man bring them together, and, like plucking the fruit from trees, they sow the seed into the ploughed field of her womb, living things invisible because of their smallness and still without form. And again when they have separated them, they nourish these great things inside the womb and, after this, they bring them to birth, introducing them into the light of day. Then in this way women and females in general came to be.’

As Timaeus traces the history of the universe, down to the emergence of humankind, he ultimately portrays the delineations of a universal assemblage, of which human beings are a part. That is, each part or component is made to fit with another and participates in various combinations, modes of expression and whole regimes of signs, where human subjects, for their part, enter into polyvocal and multiple relations with the world. The focus that Plato has Timaeus put on anatomical regions, in this passage, is particularly fascinating because even the individual body is shown to be an amalgamation of working parts, formulated as a complex machine, in which heterogeneous elements consist and cohere. What the dissection of the human body then reveals is a world of its own, and, subsequently, we enter into a land of cinema, which provides a close-up of intricate and intimate tubes and vessels. Through this prism, we also explore movement, by following the cyclical path of generation, in what appears to be a process of
territorialization, to use another one of Deleuze’s terms, which refers to the ordering of material bodies in assemblages or emerging unities.

From the space of feminine obscurity, the actual female form is born, an aesthetic work, and this momentous event takes place in a later scene: in the second generation (ἐν τῇ δεύτερᾳ γένεσι), men, who in their previous lifetimes were cowardly and lived unjust lives (τῶν γενομένων ἄνδρῶν ὅσοι δειλοὶ καὶ τῶν βίων ἄδικως διῆλθον), change form (μετεφύοντο) into women. The genesis of women, which defines the second stage of creation, epitomizes cinematic change: the emergence of the female sex sets into motion a reversal of the previous rotation and ushers in a new period, of sexual difference, desire and procreation. The narrative follows Hesiod’s in the *Works and Days* and echoes the birth of Pandora, the first woman, who establishes the analogy “…between the female body, the ceramic jar, and the form of the *oikos*” (Bergren 2008b: 309-310). In the *Works and Days*, we see how Hephaestus moulds a modest maiden’s shape, from the earth, while Athena, the goddesses Graces and lady Persuasion put their finishing touches on this figure and adorn her with jewelry, for example (Hes. *Op.* 70-82). Manufactured in this way, Pandora opens the jar of misery and sends sorrow and mischief to men (Hes. *Op.* 90-105).

The intertext reinforces the sense of degradation that ensues from the presence of women.

With respect to the status of Pandora, Bergren argues:

The analogy posed by the myth of Pandora is not a simple assimilation of separate and equal male-molded containers. Within their relation of mutual likeness is the hierarchy of original over copy and container over contained with the jar as mediator. The female is modeled upon the jar, being herself ceramic only in metaphor, and she is subordinated to the house that encloses her, molding her as an image of itself, a domestic container like the jar. What the woman (as contained by the house) is supposed to contain is the female’s architectural power, the capacity the Greeks call *mētis* (2008b: 311).

There is a hierarchy in play in the *Timaeus* too, of original over copy, for women, as simulacra, find their origin in those cowardly men (δειλοὶ), who have passed through their lives unjustly
Plato invokes the myth of Pandora and, furthermore, describes the invention of woman, in a cycle of philosophical regeneration, precisely in the way that the poet does, as a *kalon kakon* (Hes. *Theog.* 585). In both cases, an *aition* is provided for sexual desire, which is expressly introduced by the anomaly of the female body; at this time, the gods contrive the love of sexual intercourse (τῆς συνουσίας ἔρωτα ἐτεκτήναντο) and construct one kind of animal in men, “in us,” and another in women (ζῴου τὸ μὲν ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δ’ ἐν ταῖς γυναιξίν συστήσαντες).

The cinematic lens, like a magnifying glass, allows us to look beyond this one gendered line of thinking and to notice another discourse that is working on a parallel plane. From the “likely account” or account that is “like the truth” (κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα), so, again, Plato uses this marker that signals the mimetic significance of rational discourse, we notice how the feminine provides a space for release and new life and the *chōra* that exists within the female body, that is, the womb. In the first place, Plato has Timaeus bring into focus male genitals, unruly (ἀπειθές) and self-willed (αὐτοκρατές), compared to a wild animal, disobedient to reason (ζῴου ἄνυπήκοον τοῦ λόγου), and the female, the womb or uterus (μητραί τε καὶ ύστέραι), also a living thing within her, desirous of producing children (ζῷου ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἐνὸν τής παιδοποιίας). By coming together, for the desire of the woman and the love of the man bring them together (ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ ἔρως συναγαγόντες), male and female bodies form another Deleuzian assemblage, through the connection of parts, as these objects hang together at one time and disassemble or deterritorialize, separating (διακρίναντες), at another.

The exploration of the human anatomy makes the explicit association between the *chōra* and the wandering womb, which travels everywhere up and down the body (πλανώμενον πάντη κατὰ τὸ σῶμα) and has the power to cause violent irritations (χαλεπῶς ἄγανακτοῦν) and other
major health problems, if it becomes infertile for a long period of time (ἄκαρπον παρὰ τὴν ὁρὰν χρόνον πολὺν γίγνηται). Sexual intercourse furnishes the remedy by stabilizing or fixing the womb inside the female interior and lays the course for generation: they sow upon the womb, as upon the earth, living things that are invisible and unshapen (εἰς ἄρουραν τὴν μήτραν ἄφρατα… ἀδιάπλαστα ζῶα κατασπείραντες). These, again, they nourish to a great size within the body (μεγάλα ἐντὸς ἐκθρέψωνται), and, after this, they bring them forth into the light and complete the generation of the living creature (μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς φῶς ἀγαγόντες ζῶων ἀποτελέσωσι γένεσιν).

The womb makes space for the seed that is sown by the male, and, in this way, we perceive the jar that floats and exists inside the female body. In the narrative, in classic Platonic fashion, he has his interlocutor move from the immense to the microscopic, from the pre-cosmic chôra that will contain the body and soul of the universe to the tiny chôra, found in the interior of a woman. At the same time, the uterus is portrayed as an inhabited land, and Plato draws on agricultural metaphors to describe the experience: the hystera is conceived of as a ploughed field or earth (ἄρουραν), wherein animals (ζῶα) reside, and the act of procreation, moreover, is characterized in terms of cultivation, “plucking fruit from the trees” (ἀπὸ δένδρων καρπὸν καταδρέψαντες) and “sowing the seed” (κατασπείραντες). The female body is a land, and I should add that the use of this metaphor is not new to my discussion since I started, in Chapter 1, with an examination of the narrative of autochthonous birth (Pl. Resp. 414c-415c). Feminine space represents, embodies and is embodied by a territory, and this analogy is plucked from the anatomy of the individual body: once it is fertilized, the womb contains an ecosystem of animate organisms, which grow in their own world, and acts as an incubator for planted seeds.

The feminine principle, identified with the chôra, also drives the cinematic and aesthetic experience of existence created and maintained by the Platonic universe. What a close reading of
the passage illuminates is the precise mechanism that takes place in the *chōra* and the generative capacity of space: it contains animalcules turning visible from their former invisibility, as they start to take shape, and provides the medium, as well, for the materialization of light. That is, after the desire and love of the two sexes unite them (ἐκατέρων ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ ἔρως συναγαγόντες), the living thing develops inside the womb: the parents bring it forth into the light of day (εἰς φῶς ἄγαγόντες) and complete the generation of animate creatures (ζώων ἀποτελέσωσι γένεσιν). That a passage happens—a coming out—is made evident, and the beginning of this journey finds its way back to the womb, the *chōra*: a land, space, home and locus of the cinematic engine, where the projector spins and movements churn. Like the figure of the father, who represents the source and the model, the maternal *chōra* fulfills the role of another origin, and it may, perhaps, be the truer origin: some kind of place, disorderly mass before the *kosmos* comes to be. To go back to Eisenstein, with whom we started this chapter, I believe that what we see Timaeus depicting in his account is genesis, in a very literal sense: it portrays the different stages of female labor and delivery, a woman’s story, as women and females themselves, in this way, “come to be” (γυναῖκες μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ πᾶν οὕτω γέγονεν).

At first blush, it may seem as though Timaeus’ cosmogony is tangential to the political question, but the dialogue opens with a reference to a conversation about politics that took place just “yesterday” (Pl. *Ti*. 17c), i.e., to what is discussed in the *Republic*, though it is clear that the conversation summarized by Socrates cannot be identical with that of the *Republic* (Morgan 2010: 268). It is, in fact, the very interest in the best political framework and arrangements that invites the excursus into the nature of the universe, and Socrates reviews for his interlocuters the strange and novel features of the utopian paradigm previously delineated:

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ περὶ γυναικῶν ἐπεμνήσθημεν, ώς τὰς φύσεις τοῖς ἀνδράσιν παραπλησίας εἴη συναρμοστέον, καὶ τὰ
TI. Taûta καὶ ταῦτα ἐλέγετο.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ τὸ περὶ τῆς παιδοποιίας; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν διὰ τὴν ἀθέταν τῶν λεγόντων εὐμνημόνευτον, ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ τῶν γάμων καὶ τὰ τῶν παῖδων πᾶσιν ἀπάντων ἐπίθεμεν, μηχανομένους ὅπως μηδεῖς ποτὲ τὸ γεγονόσεν αὐτῶν ἵδια γνώσιτο, νομοῦσιν δὲ πάντες πάντας αὐτοὺς ὁμογενεῖς, ἀδελφὰς μὲν καὶ ἀδελφοὺς δοσιπερ ἃν τῆς προποίησις ἐντὸς ἕλκις γίγνονται, τοὺς δ' ἐμπροσθεν καὶ ἀνωθὲν γονέας τε καὶ γονέων προγόνους, τοὺς δ' εἰς τὸ κάτωθεν ἐκγόνους παῖδάς τε ἐκγόνοιν;

TI. Ναί, καὶ ταῦτα εὐμνημόνευτα ἢ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὅπως δὲ δὴ κατὰ δύναμιν εὔθυς γίγνοντο ὡς ἀριστοὶ τὰς φύσεις, ἢρ' οὐ μεμνήμεθα ὡς τοὺς ἀρχόντας ἔφαμεν καὶ τὰς ἀρχώσας δεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν γάμων σύνερξιν λάβρα μηχανόνοσα κληρονομισάς τισιν ὅπως οἱ κακοί χωρίς οἱ τ' ἁγιαί ταῖς ὑμοιαῖς ἐκάτεροι συλληξόνται, καὶ μὴ τις αὐτοῖς ἔχρα διὰ ταῦτα γίγνηται, τύχην ἡγομένους αἰτίαν τῆς συλλήξεως;

TI. Μεμνήμεθα. (Pl. Ti. 18c-e.)

[Soc.: ‘And in fact we even made mention of women. We said that their natures should be made to correspond with those of men, and that all occupations, whether having to do with war or with the other aspects of life, should be common to both men and women.’

Tim.: ‘This matter also was stated exactly so.’

Soc.: ‘And what did we say about the procreation of children? Or was this a thing easy to recollect because of the strangeness of our proposals? We decided that they should all have spouses and children in common and that schemes should be devised to prevent any one of them from recognizing his or her own particular child. Every one of them would believe that they all make up a single family, and that all who fall within their own age bracket are their sisters and brothers, that those who are older, who fall in an earlier bracket, are their parents or grandparents, while those who fall in a later one are their children or grandchildren.’

Tim.: ‘Yes, this also, as you say, is easy to recollect.’

Soc.: ‘And surely we also remember saying, don’t we, that to make their natures as excellent as possible right from the start, the rulers, male and female, in dealing with marriage-unions must contrive to secure, by some secret method of allotment, that the two classes of bad men and good shall each be mated by lot women of a like nature, and that no hatred shall transpire amongst them of this, because they’d believe that the matching was due to chance?’

Ti.: ‘We remember.’]

This is a description of the kallipolis, in which a strict program of eugenics is established, and
women enter into the political sphere: one must fit together female natures, so that they are made “about equal” to men (τὰς φύσες τοῖς ἀνδράσιν παραπλησίας εἶς συναρμοστέον), and both groups share the same pursuits, so that all occupations are held in common, whether having to do with war or with the other aspects of life (καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πάντα κοινὰ κατὰ τε πόλεμον καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην διάπαντα). Socrates, in addition, reminds us of the repercussions of the noble lie, which promotes a sex lottery intended to maintain a rigid hierarchy based on the division of tasks: male and female rulers contrive a secret method of allotment (λάθρᾳ μηχανᾶσθαι κλήροις τισὶν), in order for each group to meet their own kind and to match “similar natures” (ταῖς ὁμοίαις). This kind of city works, runs and functions because it would inculcate the belief that all are of the same race (πάντας αὐτοὺς ὁμογενὲῖς), and citizens, consequently, reside in a political oikos; everyone has spouses and children in common (κοινὰ τὰ τῶν γάμων καὶ τὰ τῶν παιδῶν πᾶσιν ἀπάντων) and consider one another as siblings, sisters and brothers (ἀδελφὰς μὲν καὶ ἀδελφοὺς).

A survey of the utopian model is not anything new, and to re-examine its dynamics seems almost banal at this point. But what is striking about this discussion is that it is juxtaposed to the extensive cosmological account that follows, and, read alongside the Republic and even the Laws, the Timaeus proves illuminating: it illustrates the origin of human beings (εἰς ἀνθρώπων φύσιν) (Pl. Ti. 27a), and, by extension, that of the best political arrangements. That is, the cosmogony illustrates why utopian policies are the most ideal and have the closest reverberations with the divine: they follow a natural harmony and order and accord with the way things have come to be, in order to formulate what ought to be. In the realm of the polis, for example, women undergo the same education as men, modeled after their counterparts, because this move parallels their birth in the second generation: as a species, they are born into the world to
complete the universe; their absence would leave the Demiurge’s project unfinished and render it fragmentary, just as the invisibility of women from the public domain would lead to a grave failure on the part of the Magnesian lawgiver, whose goal and mission it is to maximize happiness in the ideal state (Pl. *Leg.* 805e-806c). With these points in mind, the word παραπλησίας is quite pointed: female natures are “about equal” to and “nearly resembling” male ones, for they are derived from original men and, thereby, share lines of affinity, but, at the same time, they are always secondary and inferior.

If we are convinced by the premise that Timaeus’ cosmogony lays the groundwork for a larger political project and aids in advancing a theory of politics, we might also accept the point of view that the polis is both a product and manifestation of the archaic chōra. An easy observation to make is that, just as there are four fundamental elements, which travel through the chōra—earth, air, fire and water—four divisions and property classes are also found in the utopian paradigm, specifically demarcated in the case of Magnesia: the Athenian Stranger has the lawgiver fix a base limit or minimum, and he would let it accrue twice the amount, thrice, up to four times (διπλάσιον ἐάσει τούτου κτάσθαι καὶ τριπλάσιονκαὶ μέχρι τετραπλασίου) (Pl. *Leg.* 744d-745a). These are the properties that move and interact in the city and contribute to the transformations of their surroundings, and, since they are easily given over to fluctuations, these categories are, in turn, calibrated by man-made contraptions, such as the lottery, installed by public marriage festivals.

Plato’s ideal cities, then, devise normative ways to redirect human energies and vibrations, and the policies that they advocate, so speak, are determined by specific understandings of human nature, which Timaeus’ creation story probes and elaborates. From his astronomical account, for instance, we learn that the birth of the female race introduces and fuels
sexual desire, but these developments are necessary, for they bring completion to the task of making the universe. A state of true perfection is achieved when the reasonable individual has learned how to reign in the passions that plague his or her soul, while the best possible political model recognizes these pleasures and pains and the power of erōs and subdues their influence. This is precisely the reason why eugenics is practiced in the utopian city, to regulate irrational emotions and to sublimate corporeal *pathēmata* for healthy ends: for the purpose of making children (*περὶ τῆς παιδοποιίας*), since *polis* would not exist, in the first place, without bodies. The production of babies, attested by the use of the word *paidopoia* alone, shows and confirms that the *chōra* is still active and present in the space of utopia, but the architecture of the city changes and sets up a new space, by manipulating the quality and genre of births. The best city has institutional structures put in place that would control what elements enter into, connect and emerge from the *chōra*.

Atlantis is one of these cities that achieve greatness at a certain point in time because it maintains contact with the divine and embodies the utopian tension, between being a good place and, at once, the place that is nowhere. In the *Critias*, the origin of the island is explored, and we learn that it traces its genealogy back to the god Poseidon:

Καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέξθη περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν λήξεως, ὅτι κατενείμαντο γην πάσαν ἑνθα μὲν μείζους λήξεις, ἑνθα δὲ καὶ ἑλάττους, ιερὰ θυσίας τε αὐτοῖς κατασκευάζοντες, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὴν νῆσον Ποσειδῶν τὴν Ἀτλαντίδα λαχῶν ἐκγόνους αὐτοῦ κατήφκισεν ἐκ θυμίας γυναικὸς γεννήσας ἐν τινὶ τόπῳ τοιῷδε τῆς νῆσου. πρὸς θαλάττης μέν, κατὰ δὲ μέσον πάσης πεδίων ἦν, ὁ δὴ πάντων πεδίων καύλλιστον ἀρετὴν τε ἱκανὸν γενέσθαι λέγεται, πρὸς τοῦ πεδίω δὲ αὐτὰ κατὰ μέσον σταδίους ὡς πεντῆκοντα ἀρεστὸς ἦν ὅρος βραχὺ πάντη, τούτῳ δ’ ἦν ἐνοικὸς τὸν ἐκεῖ κατὰ ἄρχας ἐκ γῆς ἀνδρῶν γεγονότων Εὐήνωρ μὲν ὄνομα, γυναικὶ δὲ συνοικῶν Λευκίππῃ. Κλειτῷ δὲ μονογενή θυγατέρα ἐγεννησάθην. ἠδή δ’ εἰς ἄνθρωπον ἠκούσες τῆς κόρης ἢ τε μήτηρ τελευτά καὶ ὁ πατήρ, αὐτῆς δὲ εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν Ποσειδῶν

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The gods rearrange the texture of the land, as they divide among themselves the entire earth in larger or smaller shares (κατενείμαντο γῆν πάσαν ἑνθα μὲν μεῖζους λήξεις, ἑνθα δὲ καὶ ἐλάττους) and construct for themselves shrines and sacrifices (ἱερὰ θυσίας τε αὐτῶς κατασκευάζοντες).

After Poseidon gains the island of Atlantis, he starts to populate the territory, together with the mortal woman that he takes for his wife, Cleito, and continues to refine and to build the community: he makes circular belts of sea and land, enclosing one another alternately (θαλάττης γῆς τε ἐναλλάξ... περὶ ἀλλῆλους ποιῶν τροχοῦς), two being of land and three of sea, which he “carved,” as it were, out of the center of the island (δύο μὲν γῆς, θαλάττης δὲ τρεῖς οἶον

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41 Translations have been adapted from Lee’s.
Changes happen in the land, and they continue to occur, as more people are generated. Critias, in many ways, carries on Timaeus’ cosmogony, but what the future member of the Thirty Tyrants portrays, rather, is the birth of the political city. The presence of the nearby sea and most beautiful (κάλλιστον) land, these qualities signal to us that we have been placed in the utopian context, and, among the island’s inhabitants, is Evenor, one of the natives originally sprung from the earth (ἔνοικος...κατὰ ἀρχάς ἐκ γῆς ἄνδρῶν γεγονότων). The close proximity to divinity and to that first generation of men, who have the land as mother earth, shows that Atlantis is in its purest state, but, as the city grows, it becomes mixed with elements of difference: after Poseidon comes into desire for a mortal woman (θνητῆς γυναικὸς), and has intercourse with the girl (αὐτῆς δὲ εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν Ποσειδῶν ἐλθὼν συμμείγνυται), he settles districts of the island with these offspring (ἐκγόνους), having “begotten” (γεννήσας) them.

Critias’ historical account reinforces Timaeus’ astronomy, for we find, in this work as well, that epithumia is born out of aesthetic pleasure, deeply attached to the female body, and induces further cycles of generations. The Critias then elaborates on the composition of the island, and it would seem that what takes place in the terrestrial sphere mirrors heavenly patterns.

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42 Brisson provides a diagram of the central island, which contains the Acropolis or the upper city and the Temple of Poseidon, and another of the surrounding plain (1999: 398-399):
That is, the tale of Atlantis illustrates how the city expands and transforms and, specifically, the
gendered course of *metabolē*. To unpack this position, I will add that, across these dialogues that
treat the best possible state, in the Platonic framework, more generally, we can locate feminine
presence in land and sea, in other words, in space or the *chōra*, which is at first manipulated by
immortal hands, as Poseidon uses his chisel to carve out concentric paths and, subsequently, by
mortal ones, as reproduction leads to a population of natives, who proceed to build temples,
palaces, harbors and docks and to organize the “country as a whole” (σῦμπασαν τὴν ἄλλην
χώραν, τοῦτο νὰ τάξει διακοσμοῦντες) (Pl. *Criti.* 115c). These inventions are pseudo-phallic
structures that penetrate and leave their mark on the texture of the soil and constitute, by
reconstituting, the architecture of maternal space and country (*χώραν*), which, in turn, contains
and is contained by the becomings of her interior. The *chōra*, in short, which is continually
running, in these engendering cycles, furnishes the people, with whom to bring about change, as
they shape and settle into their surroundings.

I think what is shown is a continuity between Timaeus’ cosmology and political past,
present and future, and choratic processes manifest themselves at all times. It is in the ideal state
that they achieve a balance because the Statesman, like the Demiurge, brings aesthetic order to
natural disorder and chaos. What makes these utopian paradigms paradigmatic is their rapport
and correspondence with the divine Eternal model, but Plato, yet again, in this dialogue,
illustrates the futility of their durability, with the example of Atlantis:
Τὰ μὲν δὴ ρηθέντα, ὃς Σῶκρατες, ὑπὸ τοῦ παλαιοῦ Κριτίου κατ’ ἁκοὴν τὴν Σόλωνος, ὡς συντόμως εἶπεῖν, ἀκήκοας· λέγοντος δὲ ἡ χθές σοῦ περὶ πολιτείας τε καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὡς ἐλέεις, ἑθαύμαζον ἀναμμηνησκόμενος αὐτὰ ἀ νόν λέγω, κατανοοῦν ὡς δαιμονίως ἐκ τινος τύχης ὡς ὁ πο σκοποῦ διηνέχεσθαι τὰ πόλλα οἷς Σόλων εἶπεν. (Pl. Ti. 25c-e.)

[Cr.: ‘Sometime later, excessively violent earthquakes and floods happened, and after the onset of an unbearable day and a night, your entire warrior force sank below the earth all at once, and the island of Atlantis likewise sank below the sea and disappeared. That is how the ocean in that region has come to be even now unnavigable and unexploorable, obstructed as it is by a later of mud at a shallow depth, the residue of the island as it settled.’

What I’ve just related, Socrates, is a concise version of old Critias’ story, of what he heard from Solon. While you were speaking yesterday about the constitution and the men you were describing, I was reminded of what I’ve just told you and was quite amazed as I realized how by some supernatural chance your ideas are on the mark, in substantial agreement with what Solon said.’]

The fate of Atlantis is a story of heresay, reported down to posterity by the legendary poet/lawgiver Solon and the elder Critias to his grandson. It describes the trajectory of a formidable maritime kingdom and establishes a philosophically informed charter-myth for Athens: Morgan argues “…that the narrative set-up of the Atlantis myth corresponds to the conditions specified in the Republic for the successful creation of a charter myth (the ‘Noble Lie’) for the ideal city” (1998: 101). In “Narrative Orders in the Timaeus and Critias,” she continues:

…in the Timaeus Solon receives from the Egyptians a charter myth/history for Athens and the tale is passed down with the stamp of Solon’s authoritative truth on it. This tale persuades Socrates, Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates, (the last three of whom are politically important in their cities) to believe that the state described by Socrates on the previous day has already been realized. They have entered a compact to receive the narrative as history (2010: 283).

Embedded in larger fourth-century political and historiographical concerns, the case of Atlantis represents paradigmatic history and portrays how history has been punctuated by frequent destructions, the contingency of the physical world.

I mentioned continuity but now I would like to explore and to expand on the notion of
discontinuity, raised by the sequence of events that Atlantis undergoes, namely, the island’s
demise and the “narrative cataclysm,” as the narrative breaks off in mid-sentence (Pl. Criti.
121c). As we know, in the Critias, we are exposed to the island’s history and features and learn
that Atlantis in inevitably sinks to the bottom of the ocean, when its divine portion begins to fade
away (ἐπεὶ δ’ ἦ τοῦ θεοῦ μὲν μοῖρα ἑξῆπελος ἑγάμνετο ἐν αὐτῷ…) (Pl. Criti. 121a). The
disappearance of this civilization, in my view, captures the quintessential cinematic turn, the
sudden crisis of the island, which amounts to a crisis of time. That is, when the inhabitants of this
city lose touch with their rational sensibilities, their hubristic attitude interrupts the rhythms and
modalities of cosmological harmony and sits at odds with beauty and natural order. As a result,
what Plato depicts for us is, essentially, an image that makes horizontal and flattening out,
enscapsulated by cosmic destruction: extraordinary earthquakes and floods “come into being”
(σεισμῶν ἕξωσίων καὶ κατακλυσμῶν γενομένων), while the entire warrior force returns to their
original birthplace and “sink below the earth all at once” (τὸ τε παρ’ ὑμῖν μάχιμον πᾶν ἀθρόον
ἐδω κατὰ γῆς). Instead of a bird’s eye view of the city, we encounter a two-dimensional expanse,
haphazard arrangements of events that proliferate and merely happen to take place, in other
words, aspects that define the time-image.

This is to say that the problem of time is foregrounded in the moment of sinking. On the
one hand, it marks the end of this civilization, and, on the other, it hearkens back to the
beginning, when the first generation of men, who are warriors, come out of the womb of the
earth. Furthermore, the image expresses change or metabolê, for what once was no longer is, and
transformation is emphasized by the confusion of temporal boundaries: citizens of Atlantis
experience day for night, as one grievous day and night befall them (μᾶς ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς
χαλεπῆς ἐπελθούσης). The conceptual apparatus of the time-image, then, enhances the
suddenness, disjointedness and violence of the event and the final ellipsis, embodied and mirrored by collapse of this island. What I believe that we can see, in this place, is the choratic process, coming to be, exemplified by both birth and death, that makes time felt. The sinking of the island signals that the *chōra* has been activated and displaces a former ontological reality, with change that takes place in a series of becomings. This is one of the ways in which Plato reverts to feminine becoming and displaces his own metaphysical architecture that he hands down to us: with the *chōra*, which, paradoxically, turns out to be eternal, lives through her various guises and leads to the disappearance of paradise.
If we understand light to be a metaphor for mental vision, “perceiving,” “discerning” (κατιδεῖν) and, therefore, reason and knowledge, I think we can take this passage to be a metapoetic

Conclusion

We started our discussion with the mirror in the Republic, and I wish to return to this image in the Timaeus, which describes the device’s functions:

τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν κατόπτρων εἰδωλοποιίαν καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἐμφανῆ καὶ λεῖά, κατιδεῖν οὐδὲν ἐτί χαλεπόν. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἐντὸς ἐκτὸς τε τοῦ πυρὸς ἑκατέρου κοινωνίας ἀλλήλας, ἐνὸς τε αὖ περὶ τὴν λειτουργίαν ἐκάστοτε γενομένων καὶ πολλαχίᾳ μεταρρυθμισθέντος, πάντα τὰ τοιούτα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐμφαίνεται, τοῦ περὶ τὸ πρόσωπον πυρὸς τὸ περὶ τὴν ὅψιν πυρὶ περὶ τὸ λεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν συμπαγοῦς γιγνομένου. δεξιὰ δὲ φαντάζεται τὰ ἀριστερά, ὃτι τοῖς ἐναντίοις μέρεσιν τῆς ὅψεως περὶ τὰναντία μέρη γίγνεται ἐπαφή παρὰ τὸ καθεστώς ἐὸς τῆς προσβολῆς: δεξιὰ δὲ τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ τὰ ἀριστερὰ ἀριστερὰ τοὐναντίον, ὅταν μεταπέσῃ συμπηγμόνων ὃς συμπήγινοι φῶς, τούτῳ δὲ, ὅταν ἡ τῶν κατόπτρων λειτοτής, ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν ὑπὸ λαβοῦσα, τὸ δεξίον εἰς τὸ ἀριστερόν μέρος ἀπώσῃ τῆς ὅψεως καὶ ἔλεγχον ἐπὶ ἔλεγχον. κατὰ δὲ τὸ μήκος στραφέν τοῦ προσώπου ταύτων τούτο ὑπίσχον ἐποίησεν πάντα φανερεῖαι, τὸ κάτω πρὸς τὸ ἄνω τῆς αὐγῆς τὸ τ’ ἄνω πρὸς τὸ κάτω πάλιν ἀπώσαν. (Pl. Ti. 46a-c.)

[Τι.: ‘And it is no longer difficult to understand how images are produced in mirrors or in any other smooth reflecting surfaces. On such occasions the internal fire joins forces with the external fire, to form on the smooth surface a single fire that is reshaped in a multitude of ways. So once the fire from the face comes to coalesce with the fire from sight on the smooth and bright surface, you have the inevitable appearance of all images of this sort. Left appears as right, because the parts of the fire from sight connect with the opposite parts of the fire from the face, contrary to the usual manner of encounter. But, on the other hand, right appears as right, and left as left whenever light switches sides in the process of coalescing with the light with which it coalesces. And this happens whenever the smooth surface of the mirrors, being elevated on this side and that, bends the right part of the fire from sight toward the left, and the left part toward the right. And when this same smooth surface is turned along the length of the face, it makes the whole object appear upside down, because it bends the lower part of the ray toward the top and the upper part toward the bottom.’]
statement about the activity and experience of reading. In this excerpt, Plato has Timaeus explain that, depending on the angle of the light, the point of convergence between internal and external fire (ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἔντος ἐκτὸς τε τοῦ πυρός), what is left appears as right (δεξιὰ δὲ φαντάζεται τὰ ἄριστερά), or what is right appears as right (δεξιὰ δὲ τὰ δεξιὰ) and left as left (τὰ ἄριστερὰ ἄριστερὰ). What seems to be suggested is that the images that are produced and manifest in the mirror or in all other bright and smooth surfaces (πάντα ὅσα ἐμφανῆ καὶ λεῖα) shift and change, depending on the mind’s orientation and clarity of rational vision. What is seen on the specular surface is a reduplication of the object in question, but it also has the potential to present distortions, a danger posed by any mimetic creation.

I am intrigued by Plato’s use of the mirror because I think it serves as the perfect symbol for what is achieved in the dialogues that I have examined. They offer up images and reflections of something higher, namely, the divine, as the Athenian also explains in the Laws: he refers specifically to unfortunate events, the rise of wicked or impious people, from humble position to high estate, and these actions are like a mirror, which reflected the gods’ total lack of concern (κἂν ὡς ἐν κατόπτροις αὐτῶν ταῖς πράξεσιν...καθεωρακέναι τὴν πάντων ἁμέλειαν θεῶν) (Pl. Leg. 905b). The mirror, in this way, reveals blind spots and another world, and, with simple movements and gestures, one is able to create a motion picture with this evident utensil. That is, the mirror is like the surface of a tactile screen and displays a series of images, which compose the montage of cinema and look beyond towards the virtual: not the world as it is, but exterior worlds, which, in the Platonic case, find their equivalents in utopian paradigms, and they are models that are set up in heaven (Pl. Resp. 592b). In my dissertation, I have looked at those places in the texts, which, in my opinion, are particularly cinematic—Plato’s three waves and metabolē—and what I hope to have suggested is that the female body and woman, as the mirror,
define and compel the aesthetic experience.
Bibliography


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