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Economics of Development
and the Development of Economics

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Abstract

In this paper we go over several ideas originating in the area of development economics which have enriched the general body of economic theory, to an extent unappreciated by many economic theorists.

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Economics of Development and the Development of Economics

by

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I.

In his ethnographic account of the Econ tribe Axel Leijonhufvud (1973) comments on how the status relationships in this tribe are determined by skills in manufacturing certain types of implements, called "modls".

The priestly caste (the Math-Econ), for example, is a higher "field" than either Micro or Macro, while the Develops just as definitely rank lower.... The low rank of the Develops is due to the fact that this caste, in recent times, has not strictly enforced the taboos against association with the Polscis, Sociogs and other tribes. Other Econ look upon this with considerable apprehension as endangering the moral fiber of the tribe and suspect the Develops even of relinquishing modl-making.

Twenty years since then one can say that the situation has not basically changed, except that "modl-making" has increased even among the "Develops" and that intermixing with other tribes is now also common in some other, growing, fields (like Institutional or Industrial Economics) which have moved away from pristine Walrasian Economics (the latter described by Leijonhufvud as the making of "exquisite modls finely carved from bones of walrus"). Leijonhufvud ends his story with a sad account of the decay of the Econ culture, marked particularly by the loss of a sense of history among the younger generations.

The vain purpose of this short paper is to try to restore some historical perspective with respect to the many contributions of Development Economics to the rest of economics, and to point to the younger generations, if they care to listen, how at least some of the glittering ideas they currently play with originally came from that now-neglected field.
Classical economists were, of course, all development economists, as they were writing about a developing country (in most cases, Britain) going through a process of industrial transformation. Then in the hundred years before World War II development economics primarily took the form of protectionist arguments for industrialization (List in Germany, Manoilescu in Eastern Europe, Ranade in India and the like); and in the third decade of this century it briefly flourished in Soviet Union, dwelling on the problems of capital accumulation in a dual economy and of surplus mobilization from agriculture, and on the characteristics of the equilibrium of the family farm: The best products of this period, the dual economy model of Preobrazhenski (1926), the two-sector planning model of Feldman (1928) and the peasant economy model of Chayanov (1925) came to be regarded as landmarks in the post-World War II literature, after these works were translated into English. But it is only after 1940 that the subject really "took off", beginning with the famous paper of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and the book by Mandelbaum (1945) -- both, incidentally, written about the development problems of southeastern Europe -- and then the works of Nurkse, Lewis, Hirschman, Scitovsky, Kuznets, Chenery and others. Much of this literature originated in a clear perception of the limited usefulness, in understanding underdevelopment, of orthodox economics, particularly its standard Walrasian form with constant returns to scale, pure competition, perfect information, insignificant transaction costs and externalities, supposed institution-neutrality, price-sensitive adjustments in resource allocation and so on. For many years development economics carried on its lonely and difficult struggle to escape the well-worn grooves of mainstream economics and got marginalized in the process. As is not uncommon in isolated marginal groups, some members turned to iconoclastic excesses (for example, indiscriminate state interventionism
or autarkism and preoccupation with blanket market failure). As the news of the failures and disasters of regulatory and autarkic states in developing countries reached academia and demoralization in this group set in, orthodox economists made successful inroads in partially recapturing this rebel territory and many a premature obituary of development economics was written. It is an irony of the recent history of economic thought that while this process of taming the unruly heretics and bringing them back to the orthodox faith was going on, the pillars of orthodox Walrasian economics were themselves crumbling at the onslaught of a whole generation of mainstream economists armed with their models of informational asymmetry, imperfect and incomplete markets, dynamic externalities and increasing returns to scale, multiple equilibria and self-reinforcing mechanisms of path dependence, models which development economists of yesteryear would have been comfortable with, even though some of these were beyond their own model-making capacity. While under the sponsorship of international agencies market fundamentalism was being rammed down the throat of the hapless debt-ridden countries in the so-called third (and now also the second) world, faith in it was being considerably shaken among mainstream economic theorists.

In this Reformation that economic theory has been undergoing I believe the contributions of the main concerns of development economics, those faint rumblings from the periphery, have not been insignificant. Stiglitz (1989) reminds us:

A study of LDC's is to economics what the study of pathology is to medicine; by understanding what happens when things do not work well, we gain insight into how they work when they do function as designed. The difference is that in economics, pathology is the rule: less than a quarter of mankind lives in the developed economies.

One may add that orthodox Walrasian economics has not fared very well in the diagnosis
and treatment of even relatively healthy economies, and in the current revamping of the main body of economic analysis insights garnered over the years from the pathological cases have turned out to be quite useful. In the following discussion I shall, somewhat schematically, refer to several of these insights.

(a) **Efficiency Wage Theory**

When in recent years high and persistent unemployment in developed countries became a focus of serious attention, macro and labor economists in search of microfoundations of this disturbing phenomenon turned to issues which exercised many development economists in the 1950's and 1960's: how to explain the coexistence of a significant positive wage and massive unemployment and (particularly) underemployment in situations (especially in densely populated agriculture) where trade unions are weak or non-existent and minimum wage legislation is hardly enforced. One of the theories -- developed independently by Leibenstein (1957) and Mazumdar (1959) -- built on the link between nutrition intake and work efficiency and explored the effects of this link on wages and involuntary unemployment. This is the now-famous efficiency wage theory, although its current interpretations have generalized the link between wage and efficiency in terms of incentives, morale and effort-intensity\(^1\). The models of Leibenstein and Mazumdar are, I believe, the first to illustrate the general principle that if price of a factor or a good has functions other than simply the usual market-clearing one (for example, indicating something about the quality of the factor or the good), one essentially gets beyond the confines of the market-clearing Walrasian equilibrium, and, as Stiglitz has shown in several papers, many

\(^{1}\)See Akerlof and Yellen (1986).
real-world phenomena like involuntary unemployment or credit rationing become analytically tractable as examples of this general principle. Another important corollary of the same models is that the usual separability of equity and efficiency of orthodox economics breaks down: a more egalitarian distribution of land, for example, by reducing the malnourishment of the currently unemployed, may lead to a rise in aggregate output in the economy\(^2\). The general principle involved here is now recognized in the literature on imperfect information and transaction costs: the terms and conditions of contracts in various transactions, which directly affect the efficiency of resource allocation, crucially depend on ownership structures and property relations.

(b) Dynamic Externalities

Apart from non-clearing labor markets, the other major preoccupation of early development theory was the large impact of positive externalities on the development process. Three or four decades later the so-called new growth theory is trying to formalize this idea of how externalities generated by investment can explain divergence in growth outcomes across countries or regions. The old literature classified two major types of such externalities: (i) technological and (ii) pecuniary (this distinction is originally due to Viner).

(i) Technological externalities relate to the spillovers from one firm's investment on the productivity of other firms in the same or other sectors. The recent growth literature has increased the consciousness of the profession about the importance of these external effects (particularly those flowing from investment in human capital). The earlier

\(^2\)See Dasgupta and Ray (1986).
development literature abounds with many examples of these effects through learning, skill-formation, machine user-supplier interaction, networks of technology diffusion, etc. Formalization in the earlier literature was largely in the context of learning by doing, following Arrow's (1962) model. For example, the infant-industry argument\(^3\), the most popular argument for protection in developing countries, was modelled on those lines by Bardhan (1970) and Clemhout and Wan (1970). The acquired and sometimes policy-driven nature of dynamic comparative advantage, which the East Asian challenge has made many developed-country trade theorists wake up to, has been a persistent theme in the trade and development literature for decades. The learning literature as well as the old vintage-capital growth literature, had also considerably blurred the distinction between factor accumulation and technical change as sources of growth, which the new growth theorists like Romer (1986) emphasize in their work.

Where the earlier development literature went astray -- and in this respect the new aggregate endogenous growth models are not decidedly more careful -- is overgeneralizing about the pervasiveness of externalities and underestimating the difficulty of identifying the

\(^3\)For many years one major critique of the infant-industry argument has been that the "infant", once protected, often refuses to grow into an adult and keeps on lobbying for prolongation of the "temporary" protection. This is an early example in development economics of the issues of time consistency and credibility of policy, which now form the subject of a rapidly growing macro-economic literature in the context of monetary and fiscal policy and business and electoral cycles. For a review of the latter literature, see Persson and Tabellini (1990).
few sectors and locations where the spill-over effects may be large. Learning is often highly localized and project-specific. Unique, gigantic, capital-intensive projects sometimes do not generate enough of diffuse externalities. The extent of spill-overs also depends crucially on the nature of competition that the policy environment promotes and the level of education in the general population.

(ii) Development economists of the 1940's and 1950's made a particularly impressive contribution in the case of "pecuniary" external economies (I personally prefer calling them economies of market coordination). The insight is originally due to Young (1928) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and developed by many others, particularly Nurkse (1953), Scitovsky (1954) and Fleming (1955). When domestic markets are small (and foreign trade is not costless), simultaneous expansion of many sectors can be self-sustaining through mutual demand support, even if no sector by itself can break even. A formalization of the idea of gains from coordination in the process of industrialization drawing upon Rosenstein-Rodan and Nurkse is presented in the development textbook of Basu (1984) in terms of conjectural demand on the lines of non-Walrasian equilibrium analysis. But to capture the full flavor of the problem of strategic complementarity of industries in terms of market size, one needs a full-scale model of plant-level economies of scale in production which can be tapped with large demand spill-overs. This formalization was done in a recent model by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989).

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4For a brief but balanced account of this issue see Shleifer (1991).
The Rosenstein-Rodan idea must be one of the early examples in the flowering of the general literature on coordination failures in economics\(^5\). As Krugman (1992) has pointed out the basic idea has also been fruitful in generating examples of multiple equilibria in international trade, and in regional economics and economic geography. Related ideas have been used in the growth theory of Kaldor (1966) and Shleifer (1986), and in the macroeconomics of unemployment in the models of Cooper and John (1988), Hart (1982), Kiyotaki (1988) and Weitzman (1982), based essentially on coordination failures in the face of demand interlinkages.

The idea of how plant-level economies of scale get translated into increasing returns at the aggregate level through "pecuniary" external economies, which was so central to the development economics of the 1950's, lost much of its intellectual force in the subsequent decades, not so much because it lacked, until recently, a firm anchoring in a formal model using tools of imperfect-markets equilibrium analysis, as Krugman (1992) suggests, but more because at the policy level the difficulties of aggregative coordination were underestimated (particularly at the existing levels of administrative capacity and political coherence in the developing countries) and the incentive and organizational issues of micro-management of capital were underappreciated. The resulting government failures diverted the profession's attention from what remains an important source of market failure discovered by early development economics.

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\(^5\)Another relatively early example of a coordination failure in development economics is what Sen (1961) calls the "isolation paradox" in generating sub-optimal savings.
Multiple equilibria and Hysteresis

Growth models with increasing returns, macroeconomic models of unemployment equilibrium with imperfect competition, as well as game-theoretic models have generated a plethora of cases of multiple equilibria in the recent literature in economics. The 1950's development theory started with a presumption of multiple equilibria and posed the essential problem as one of escaping a "low-level equilibrium trap" to a better higher-income equilibrium. There were two quite distinct mechanisms involved in the models of that decade, one worked through the economic-demographic interactions of income, savings and endogenous population growth, so the problem was to escape a Malthusian trap with a "critical minimum effort" -- as in the models of Buttrick (1958), Nelson (1956) and Leibenstein (1957); the other was based on increasing returns which generate strategic complementarities among sectors, through a process of "cumulative causation" (Myrdal), requiring a coordinated "big push" (Rosenstein-Rodan) for industrialization.

In the literature on multiple equilibria with underdevelopment traps one can discuss two different dynamic processes of how a particular equilibrium actually gets established. The economic-demographic models as well as models of learning and international specialization (where a poor country gets trapped in a historical pattern of specialization) or of unequalizing spirals in North-South interaction\(^6\) focus on the decisive role of history or initial conditions. The task of development policy here is to compensate for a historical handicap. On the other hand, big-push models like that of Rosenstein-Rodan emphasize the role of expectations (about investment by other firms) and self-fulfilling prophecy. The task of development policy is to coordinate expectations around high investment. This "history

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versus expectations" dichotomy has been further analyzed by Krugman (1991) and Matsuyama (1991), and the relative importance of the past and expected future is shown to depend on some parameters of the economy (like the discount rate and the speed of adjustment).

The importance of hysteresis in a model of multiple equilibria with increasing returns has now been highlighted in the work on path-dependence in technological development and industrial location (see Arthur (1989) and David (1985)) in developed countries and in models of unemployment as in Blanchard and Summers (1987). Expectation-driven multiple equilibria are now a prominent feature in models of network externalities in technology adoption as in Farrell and Saloner (1986) and in macroeconomic models of search, as in Diamond and Fudenberg (1987) and Howitt and McAfee (1988). In all these models the desirability of adopting a particular course depends on how many others are expected to do the same, a general point which Rosenstein-Rodan, Scitovsky and others have tried to drive home in development economics decades back.

Multiplicity of equilibria also creates more intellectual space for cultural, sociological and political factors in influencing the process of economic adjustment to an equilibrium. Early recognition of this may partly explain why the "Develops" in Leijonhufvud's Econ tribe were among the first to break the taboo against association with "Polscis", "Sociogs" and other tribes.
(d) Persistence of Dysfunctional Institutions

The self-reinforcing mechanisms which bring about hysteresis and "lock-in" can also be used to explain the persistence of socially suboptimal institutions. Development economists, particularly those among them with a radical orientation, have never tired of pointing to many long-lasting institutions in poor countries which block economic progress. The property-rights school and the "new" institutional economists often implicitly or explicitly deny this: their account of how more efficient institutions and governance structures evolve in response to new benefit-cost possibilities often displays a certain ahistorical functionalism and even a kind of vulgar Darwinism about the survival of the fittest institution. The more recent literature on institutional economics, however, validates the insight of development economists about suboptimal institutions. Transaction costs, which form the base of the new institutional economics, themselves can reduce pressures from any social selection process by raising barriers to entry and exit. Then there are the self-reinforcing forces, like increasing returns from adopting a particular institution locking in what may turn out to be an inferior institution in the long run or like a mutually sustaining network of social sanctions on deviants. These equilibria are difficult to disturb by small shocks.

(e) Principal-Agent Models and Missing Markets

Many of the existing suboptimal institutions may, nevertheless, by serving some real

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Akerlof (1984), drawing partly upon the example of the Indian caste system, has built models to show how economically unprofitable or socially unpleasant customs may persist as Nash equilibria when each individual conforms out of fear of loss of reputation from disobedience.
economic function under a set of informational constraints and missing markets (particularly of credit and insurance). In the 1970's and 1980's when economic theory was going through a major overhaul to accommodate imperfect and asymmetric information and incomplete markets, jettisoning some of its fundamental theorems on the way, development economics was often at the forefront in this change-over, since those information problems are particularly acute in the context of development. Stiglitz provided the leadership to a whole group of development economists probing the micro-economic rationale of the formation of agrarian institutions in poor countries in an environment of pervasive risks, information asymmetry and moral hazard\textsuperscript{8}. Stiglitz's (1974) model of share-cropping\textsuperscript{9} -- viewing this ancient institution as a compromise between risk and work incentive effects -- is one of the first fully worked out principal-agent models in economics.

Development economists have always emphasized the crushing effects of capital market imperfections (or even non-existence), in terms of dictating smaller scale in production and risk-taking and of adoption of myopic policies. These problems are now better appreciated in the literature on credit rationing under imperfect information and imperfect enforcement, particularly as the agency costs in the credit market rise when the

\textsuperscript{8}For an overview of this literature, see Bardhan (1984), Bardhan (1989) and Stiglitz (1988).

\textsuperscript{9}Even ignoring risk and incentive effects, the idea of share-cropping, where the marginal cost of employing labor is less than the average cost, thus lending an inherent bias toward expanding employment and output, influenced Weitzman's famous work on the share-economy (1984) in the context of macroeconomic stagflation.
borrowers are poorer. The development literature has also pointed our attention to the conflict between the risk-pooling advantages of a large formal credit market and the monitoring advantages of local, informal, sometimes non-market, lending. Studies of successful schemes of traditional rotating credit associations and also group loans (as in the widely noted case of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh) in poor countries have focussed attention on the important idea of peer monitoring, which, as Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) have argued, can be an important mechanism for controlling moral hazard in credit markets, labor markets and insurance markets in both developed and less-developed countries.

(f) Targeting in the Theory of Economic Policy

Various arguments indiscriminately used in support of protection in developing countries gave rise, in reaction, to the theory of economic policy under what are called "domestic distortions" in the literature on international trade theory. For example, popular arguments for protection (or even banning of some imports) with a view to curbing luxury consumption of the rich in poor countries, were countered quite early in the trade and development literature by the argument that a trade restriction is not the first-best policy for achieving this or other purely domestic objectives. In several papers in the 1960's by Ramaswami, Bhagwati, Srinivasan and Johnson, all synthesized later in a paper by Bhagwati (1971), the general principle of targeting in economic policy was developed: "distortions" or departures from the usual marginal conditions of Pareto-efficiency are best tackled by using policy instruments that act most directly on the relevant margin. Not merely is this the most general result available to this day in the theory of trade policy, it allowed liberal economists the leeway, in departure from the practice of classical economists, to be an interventionist
on matters of domestic policy and at the same time to be a free-trader in the international arena.

In a sense an extension of this literature originating in the concerns of development policy came in the form of the well-known Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) result in the theory of public finance on the desirability of aggregate production efficiency, under certain conditions, even when the first-best optimum is not achievable (in the absence of lump-sum taxes to adjust consumer incomes). Again, intervention is to be directed as closely as possible to the source of the distortion, to be applied to the prices the consumers (not the producers) face.

(g) Cost-Benefit Analysis

This part of applied welfare economics, which dates back to Dupuit (1844), received a major impetus from the project evaluation literature in development economics in the 1960's and early 1970's. The most influential works in this field have been those of Tinbergen (1967), Little and Mirrlees (1974), and Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen for the UNIDO (1972). The analytical insights of this literature, particularly on the key shadow prices of labor, investment and foreign exchange -- which combine ideas from trade theory, general-equilibrium public finance theory and development planning -- have now become part of mainstream economics on the general principles of evaluation of public investment.

(h) The Enforcement Problem in International Loan Contracts

The debt crisis of the developing countries in the 1980's has given rise to a burgeoning literature on an analysis of the implications and consequences of "sovereign risk", 
the various deterrents to default and the credibility of sanctions -- the leading references here are those of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986), Kletzer (1984), and Bulow and Rogoff (1989). This has filled a major lacunae in the field of international finance.

(i) Beyond Utilitarianism

The literature on the economics of destitution and deprivation and peoples' ways of coping with such severe misfortunes and inequities made development economists more aware of the limitations of the metric of utilities. To quote Sen (1984): "Judging importance by the mental metric of happiness or desire-fulfilment can take a deeply biased form due to the fact that the mental reactions often reflect defeatist compromises with harsh reality induced by hopelessness. The insecure sharecropper, the exploited landless laborer, the overworked domestic servant, the subordinate housewife, may all come to terms with their respective predicaments in such a way that grievance and discontent are submerged in cheerful endurance by the necessity of uneventful survival." This, among other things, has induced a whole group of economists and economic philosophers led by Sen to challenge the foundations of welfare economics and to suggest new measures of well-being, for example in terms of basic capabilities and functionings in human life. See Sen (1985, 1987).

We can think of many other examples of how the results of the study of developing countries has spilled over the confines of its own field and enriched the general body of economics. For example, (i) the study of rent-seeking -- as in Krueger (1974) -- in connection with trade restrictions in developing countries has contributed to the general
theory of public choice; (ii) new indices constructed to measure poverty in developing countries have improved our understanding of the axiomatic basis of such measurements as well as the ways of decomposing them to quantify relative contributions of different effects - see, for example, Sen (1976), Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984); (iii) the dual economy models of development, based on the traditional-modern or formal-informal distinction, have been extended to the case of dualism between "primary" and "secondary" job markets in the labor economics of developed countries; (iv) the theory of interlinked contracts in land, labor, credit or output markets between the same parties in poor countries -- see Bardhan (1989) for an overview of this literature -- has added new dimensions to the general industrial economics literature on non-linear pricing and tie-in sales.

Over the years development economics has benefitted a great deal from the concepts and tools pioneered in other fields. But it has not been a one-way traffic. While the problems of the world's poor remain as overwhelming as ever, studying them has generated enough analytical ideas and thrown up enough challenges to the dominant paradigm to make all of us in the profession somewhat wiser, at least somewhat more conscious of the possibilities and limitations of our existing methods of analysis.
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