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Publishing Words to Prevent Them from Becoming True: The Radical Praxis of Günther Anders

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Publishing Words to Prevent Them from Becoming True: The Radical Praxis of Günther Anders

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Comparative Literature

by

Daniel C. Costello

Dissertation Committee:
Professor Jane O. Newman, Chair
Professor Emeritus Alexander Gelley
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2014
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FIELD OF STUDY

Post-war German and American literatures, collective memory, and movement formation.
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Publishing Words to Prevent Them from Becoming True: The Radical Praxis of Günther Anders

By

Daniel C. Costello

Doctor of Philosophy in Comparative Literature

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Professor Jane O. Newman, Chair

The German-Jewish philosopher and anti-nuclear activist Günther Anders (1902-1992) had an extremely long and prolific career as a public intellectual. Foremost among his concerns was understanding the implications of the nuclear age. Though he was immersed in a vibrant and influential circle of 20th-century intellectuals including Hannah Arendt and Theodore Adorno, he is little known in the English-speaking world. Previous work in English has surveyed and situated Anders in his philosophical milieu and undertaken investigations of his arc as a post-Marxist critic of technology; more broadly, Anders is generally viewed as an anti-nuclear theoretician. This dissertation views Anders first and foremost as an organizer and activist, one who pursued writerly attempts to grapple with a movement mobilization problem across three eras of anti-nuclear protest. I argue that Anders’ philosophy is best viewed as a series of imaginative interventions intended to enable people to undertake resistance within the confines of the nuclear security state. I approach the argument in four chapters. In the first, I show how
Anders reacted to crises of competence and authority by recruiting a network of prestigious scientific correspondents. The second chapter examines his epistolary exchange with the former bomber pilot Claude Eatherly in order to see how the philosopher attempted to frame and deploy Eatherly as a moral exemplar and unifying activist symbol. The third examines the tensions between Anders’ exacting literary standards and the global demands of translation for a multilingual, international activist audience. The final chapter follows Anders to the limits of writerly language and analyzes the philosopher’s eventual endorsement of violence. Ultimately, I show that Anders’ concrete, occasional methods for philosophy were overwhelmed by his inability to maintain contact with rapidly fragmenting, highly changeable arrays of affiliation and identification within the activist milieus of the late Cold War.
INTRODUCTION

I. A Writerly Life

a. Beginnings

This dissertation examines the life and work of philosopher and anti-nuclear activist Günther Anders (1902-1992). Born in Breslau to the name Günther Stern, he was the German-Jewish son of Clara and William Stern, both influential pioneers in the science of child psychology. Anders’ work as a philosopher, activist, and writer opened new avenues of investigation for understanding humanity in the technological age and was foundational to anti-nuclear and pacifist campaigns throughout Europe. My research endeavors to understand how Anders translated his philosophical stance on technology into praxis by examining how he positioned himself as an advocate of a combative anti-nuclear narrative, how he advanced his narrative through multiple genres, and how his narrative was received by his intellectual and activist fellow-travelers. Much of the scholarly writing on Anders focuses on his intellectual and philosophical contributions. I consider him foremost as an activist, one whose writings were intended to facilitate his efforts to participate in the construction of the narratives—imaginative interventions—which make up our collective understanding of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the meanings assigned to those bombings by politicians, activists, and citizens in a European cold-war context.

Using Anders as a central case study, this dissertation examines the relationships between literature, activism, and discursive structures. It is a genealogy, one that traces the growth of Anders’ thinking as a transnational, multilingual anti-nuclear activist and which situates him in
his historical era—the atomic era. My work furthers English-language scholarship on Anders, which at present is relatively limited, constituted of Paul van Dijk’s critical overview of Anders’ life and work, and Jason Dawsey’s recent historical inquiry. As its central goal, this dissertation sheds light on the ways politicians and activist groups employ the threat of nuclear weapons as discursive arguments, as well as how those arguments are received by the public. This topic is significant because it bears strongly on present attitudes towards emergent nuclear states and the role allotted civilian nuclear power, and because it addresses the question of why the continued existence of the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals are largely absent from the public consciousness in debates on nuclear proliferation.

Early in his career, Anders worked closely with Heidegger and Husserl during his doctoral and post-doctoral work; however, in the late 1920s he turned his focus from academic philosophy to combating the rising tide of fascism (Bahr 173). Anders began to understand philosophy as a tool to be directed toward the analysis of tangible concerns and the production of social change. This he called his “occasional philosophy,” occasional in the sense of immediate situational relevance (Antiquiertheit 1: 16). Anders thus found himself concerned with political power, the “anthropological” consideration of humanity in industrial modernity, and, beginning in 1940s, the relationship of humanity to its technological products. Anders' interests overlapped with those of his contemporaries, and in fact the closeness of his connections to many of the major cultural theorists and critics of the 20th century makes it difficult to concisely describe how he is situated in their company. As one of Heidegger's students, he was part of a pre-war group of intellectuals so intertwined with one another that they have come to be called, as in
Richard Wolin's book by the same title, "Heidegger's Children." But as many Anders scholars have noted, he broke emphatically away over both political and philosophical matters. He was loosely associated with the Frankfurt School, and during Anders' exile years, he was invited to speak at their seminars. As we will see in (3.IVb), however, he would maintain his distance from the Frankfurt crowd even at risk to his professional and financial well-being. Like his former spouse Hannah Arendt, after the Second World War Anders produced theories of industrial killing and immersed himself in the Eichmann problem. Like Adorno, he developed a mass media critique. What distinguished Anders from his contemporaries, however, was his willingness to push the conclusions of his philosophical systems to their utmost. This tendency emerges most clearly in his engagement with the atomic bomb. For Anders, August 6th of 1945 saw the birth of a new age. The atomic bomb was simultaneously a product of human technology, a coercive tool in the hands of the political elite, and the marker of a new era in human history. Every moment in this age is one of postponement; the basic moral question, claims Anders, is not “How should we live?” but rather, “Will we live?” Consequently, he believed it was every man and woman’s duty to become “Anti-Apocalyptics” who “do everything in our power to make The End Time endless” (“Theses” 494).

Anders’ authorial life after Hiroshima constituted an attempt to analyze the nuclear era, and to forestall nuclear annihilation through literary activism. He summarized the purpose of his life and writing in this way: “I have published these words in order to keep them from becoming true. If we do not stubbornly keep in mind the strong possibility of the disaster, we will be unable to find a way out” (“Theses” 505). He believed that it was necessary to create a “productive fear”
in order for the possibility of disaster to remain salient in the public imagination. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, it seemed that activists in the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), and West Germany (BRD) had been successful in creating that fear. Opinion polling in the BRD during the late 1950s, as historian Michael Geyer notes, showed that the majority of West Germans rejected nuclear armaments. When speaking to researchers, respondents made comments such as “atomic rearmament means war and annihilation,” “atomic weapons mean death,” and “[atomic weapons are] the greatest danger that ever existed” (398). The apparent success was short-lived in the BRD—and as we shall see in chapter one—in the UK and the US as well. Nuclear fears receded, and though anti-nuclear activism would have its successes, no watershed of disarmament was ever crossed. For Anders, the cause of this was an essential blindness and paucity of imagination. At the core of this blindness is a condition Anders called the “Promethean discrepancy,” or, the gulf between the ability of human technology to produce incredibly powerful tools and the capacity of humans to imagine the effects of their creations (*Antiquiertheit* 1: 16). Throughout the remainder of his life, Anders remained fixated on revealing and amending that discrepancy so that humanity might confront the nuclear menace. Practically all of his writings, he declared, “are variations on this fundamental theme” (*Hiroshima* ix). As a genealogy of Anders’ work, then, this dissertation is an investigation of his writerly attempts to grapple with an activist problem.

I characterize his efforts as a writerly attempt. As I argue in chapters one and three, Anders’ life was from its outset writerly and written. Of the extant biographical texts on Anders, Raimund Bahr’s 2010 study is the most authoritative. This dissertation does not attempt to
provide a comprehensive view of the philosopher’s life, but will make necessary reference to biographical details throughout. This is, in a sense, appropriate to Anders. One of the most influential inheritances from his parents was the practice and habit of observing himself, the world, and then writing his own life. In her work as an observational psychologist, Clara Stern maintained extensive observational diaries of her children’s development; Bahr notes that Anders was immersed in the world and form of the diary from birth (36). For all that his life is extensively documented, Anders maintained that it in no sense was susceptible to conventional biographical narrative. He emphatically asserted that he had not lived one life, but many, not vita, but vitae (“Vitae”). Moreover, he regarded his lives as having been fundamentally fractured, shot through by breaking-points separating one from the other.

I take the concept of breaking points together with Anders’ writerly, activist attempts to grapple with his fundamental themes of the Promethean discrepancy and nuclear annihilation as the organizing principle for this study. Consequently, my dissertation includes four chapters arranged in rough chronological order and divided by major breaking-points in Anders’ life as an organizer and an activist. In short, each chapter highlights connections between his literary and activist work, and traces out an Andersian attempt to resolve a difficulty or contradiction that emerged in his project of creating and enacting an activist philosophy. These challenges occur along a spectrum ranging from the individual-idiosyncratic to broad and structural: I have taken it as my method to develop the study of Anders’ activism alongside and within a wider movement history. In order to mediate between the two, I try wherever possible to read Anders’ work through encounters with intermediate formations such as activist networks and historically
bounded controversies. Anders’ philosophy was occasional and concrete, concerned with specific occasions and audiences. It emerged reciprocally through those interactions, and I believe it should be studied through them. In taking this approach, I am aided by Anders’ self-defined and defining existence as a literary, writerly person. He left not only a vast array of published work in numerous genres but also a deep record of his existence as a thinker and organizer through his diaries, correspondence, and unpublished manuscripts in various stages of completion.

Maintaining a current bibliography of Anders’ work, translations, and secondary scholarship dedicated to the philosopher is a demanding project in and of itself. Presently, the most complete such list is maintained by Anders scholar Heinz Scheffelmeier, and a shorter overview is curated by the historian Harold Marcuse. In order to give some sense of the sprawling nature of his life’s work, an extremely condensed list of his writings as drawn from Scheffelmeier’s bibliography would include two major philosophical volumes under the title Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen (The Obsolescence of Humanity), the first volume appearing in 1956 and the second in 1980, his travel diary encompassing his time as a delegate to the Fourth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, Der Mann auf der Brücke (The Man on the Bridge), published in 1959, and the epistolary collection Off limits für das Gewissen, which appeared in German during 1961, and in English under the title Burning Conscience that same year. Shorter works would include a reflection on Bertolt Brecht (1962), a volume on Kafka (1951), an open letter to Klaus Eichmann (son of the notorious Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann) under the title Wir Eichmannsöhne (We Sons of Eichmann) in 1964, a collection of speeches dedicated to the First, Second, and the Third global wars (1965), followed by an abridged selection of his diaries from

Much of Anders’ material, and a substantial amount of his unpublished letters, poems, songs, and other writings are held in the Günther Anders Nachlass, and have been made recently available for study by the Literary Archives of the Austrian National Library. Though certain of Anders’ writings have been translated into more than a dozen languages by himself and by
others, a substantial portion of his writing, including his flagship philosophical works, has never been published in English. For Anders and the other authors cited in this dissertation, I use the published English translations unless otherwise noted. Where none exist, the translations are mine.

Approaching a body of work as wide and diverse as Anders’ is challenging. Throughout this thesis, I will offer a number of different ways of seeing and reading him as a philosopher and an activist. He is, in a sense, self-theorizing, and the gravity of his analysis invites his readers to utilize his own terms. This dissertation looks for opportunities to resist that invitation. I believe that Anders’ self-description of having pursued a philosophical anthropology provides the chance for a felicitous literal reading of the disciplinary label, one which provides a departure point to make connections between Anders’ work and contemporary stances on social protest movements, developing with each chapter a diverse but interlocking toolbox of theoretical perspectives in order to encompass varying scales of analysis.

The first three chapters give their attention to particular problems Anders identified in his attempts to rectify the blindness which allowed the publics in the Eastern and Western blocs, as well as in the non-aligned countries, to tolerate the existence of nuclear weapons. Briefly captioned, these chapters deal with questions of authority and competence, his philosophical reliance on concrete examples for idealized exemplars, and problems in the realm of language and translation. Chapter one examines the first and second waves of disarmament activism: the “scientists’ movement” of the late 1940s, and the resurgence of activism after the fallout scares of the mid-1950s. This chapter highlights an essential paradox of these two movements, namely
that on the one hand, the public relied on prestigious, highly-credentialed scientists such as Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard—men who had helped create the atomic bomb—to instruct them on its implications and dangers. On the other hand, in order for a mass disarmament movement to succeed, laypersons needed to seize atomic weapons as a democratic, rather than specialized technical issue. This paradox was highly relevant to Anders, who was faced with the task of presenting non-scientists (including philosophers such as himself) as competent to speak on matters related to atomic armaments. Tracking Anders’ efforts to first create that competence and authority as an activist and public intellectual, reinforce it through the use of contacts and networks, and then enact it through practical organizational work is the task of chapter one. In this chapter, and throughout, there will be a juxtaposition of analytical focus between Anders’ efforts as an individual struggling to think and act morally in the atomic age, and his appearance as one person of many embedded within a wider historical process. This juxtaposition is a consequence of attempting to follow Anders as an activist employing literary, writerly tools to confront an activist problem: to do so requires a dual image of an object—the atomic bomb—becoming larger than itself, in tandem with one person’s efforts to envision and disseminate resources for struggle against that menace via the creation of a network of “Anti-Apocalyptics”.

Chapter two studies the implication of Anders’ insistence that philosophy be grounded in concrete, contemporary events and be directed towards the production of social change—his “occasional philosophy.” Because Anders believed that useful philosophy must be drawn from life and applied to life, his analysis of the nuclear era is wholly dependent on tangible, relevant examples. His most pressing need was for an undeniable example of the “Promethean
discrepancy.” Anders believed he had found this example in the figure of Claude Eatherly. Eatherly had been the pilot of the reconnaissance plane *Straight Flush*, and as its commander he had been the one to clear the *Enola Gay* to carry out its attack on Hiroshima. After the war, he became mentally ill and was institutionalized. Anders argued that Eatherly’s mental illness was the consequence of his struggle to confront what he had done, a symptom of his attempt to take responsibility for the deaths of countless thousands of Japanese men, women, and children. Through his correspondence with the pilot, Eatherly became a crucial martyr-figure in Anders’ philosophical activism. He was, said Anders, the anti-Eichmann, “his great hope-inspiring antipode”; “the first one to translate the character of our epoch into the language of individual life” (*Burning* 108). This creation and defense of Eatherly as the “Anti-Eichmann” as a motivating symbol is the focus of chapter two. Where chapter one undertook to produce a dual image of the bomb becoming not a thing, but a condition, and Anders’ attempts to match that equipping activist organizations with imaginative tools for disarmament struggle, the approach of chapter two is to read the Eatherly affair in a way that facilitates examining the prerequisites for the uptake of such tools by activist networks and broader publics.

Anders intended his “Anti-Eichmann” to serve as one step in the creation of a “moral common denominator” for the nuclear era. He saw the nuclear menace as universal; so too were its remedies. Thus, in responding to a universal threat, Anders was challenged by the task of articulating that danger across linguistic and cultural boundaries. The problem, at a basic level, is one of translation. Translation and language are the focus of chapter three. Throughout his work, Anders would struggle with the problem in diverse ways. These included understanding the
bizarre effects of simultaneous translation, the translation of metaphorical speech, cultural implications of linguistic turns, and the drawbacks of academic philosophical language. Anders concluded that activists had a pressing need for translatable, portable language; “we must learn from the outset,” he wrote, “to deliberately speak our own language in a translatable way, practically for the purposes of translation, so that we damage the machinery of translation as little as possible with our speech” (*Der Mann* 59). Chapter three also explores the personal importance of translation and language for Anders. Anders was a German-Jewish exile who had spent many years in the US speaking and writing in a second language. Upon his return to Europe after the war, he was startled to find himself speaking a “dialect” of German that was fifteen years “out of date”—language and translation were, for him, not merely a problem in production of an efficient activist rhetoric, but were deeply tied to his own experience of displacement and exile (*Tagebücher und Gedichte* 108). Finally, I argue in chapter three that his pursuit of a translatable speech for transnational activism led Anders towards a pair of concepts which I term the “pre-linguistic” activist solidarity and the “global good-enough,” ideas which I suggest established for him the practical limits of protest-language and protest-forms. Furthermore, I claim that his encounter with these limits together with his struggle to synthesize the rapidly fracturing movement dynamics throughout the late 1950s and 1960s laid the foundation for a radical turn in his thinking which came about in the early 1980s in the context of the third wave of disarmament activism and environmental protest. Chapter one aimed to produce a dual image of the bomb as world-condition in tandem with organizational and activist attempts to meet that condition through imaginative, symbolic tools. Chapter two extended that
dual image to delve into the prerequisites for the uptake of such tools. The procedure of the third chapter is to read a trio of instances demonstrating Anders’ struggles with language in order to see the practical cultural and linguistic limits to pursuing universally comprehensible symbols alongside his attempts to exceed those restrictions.

The fourth chapter explores the consequences of Anders’ encounters with linguistic limits of protest-language and protest-forms. I argue that these limits were partially formed by his separation from the mundane practicalities of organizational action, and that his encounter with personal limits worked in conjunction with his evolving analysis of political, social, and economic conditions in the aftermath of the Vietnam War to bring him to a point of philosophical extremity. In the last decade of his life, Anders responded to the end of détente and the catastrophe at Chernobyl by declaring a “state of emergency” on behalf of the citizenry of the world, an emergency which he argued justified measures of violent self-defense. However, even as Anders came to the point he believed marked the end of linguistic struggle, he still maintained that the capacity to imagine the possibility of human self-extinction was the paramount requirement and most pressing task. The latter part of chapter four provides an analysis of Anders’ positions regarding what constitutes an effective imaginative intervention in the context of violent direct action, and in so doing lays the foundation for a retrospective consideration of the relative successes, failures, and unforeseen outcomes achieved by disarmament groups.

The four chapters of this dissertation complete the comparative historical presentation of a transnational social protest movement across its macroscopic lifecycle, along with a specific genealogy of Anders’ writerly efforts as a participant. In so doing, it traces Anders’ attempts to
intervene in cross-cultural imaginaries and discursive matrices of public language through the creation and dissemination of powerful motivating symbols in tandem with narrative frames to guide their use. With the end of the Cold War, Anders’ final call to direct action and political violence took on the character of a historical curiosity; however, I argue in conclusion that the imaginative interventions pursued by Anders and his contemporaries in the disarmament movement laid foundations that shape contemporary conflicts over technical and industrial systems. The work done by men and women like Anders has a powerful afterlife in international struggles to achieve a timely realization of climate change action in the face of sophisticated attacks on the authority of science. It also has a powerful afterlife in the legacy of nuclear fear; the reinscription of atomic weapons and radioactive fallout as the ultimate objects of fear achieved by disarmament activists effectively hindered the expansion of civilian nuclear power—but then came to serve as a powerful justification for American imperial projects in the post-Cold War era.

b. A Note on Style

The entire span of this dissertation will make reference to Anders’ handling and refinement of text as a tool, locus of control, seat of identity, method of investigation, and as part of a moral-ethical system for living. Some observers, such as Paul van Dijk, note that his writing is intended to invite or produce confrontation. Citing the introduction to Anders’ *Ketzereien* (*Heresies*), van Dijk writes that Anders came to describe himself as a creator and carrier of “militant theses” that if nothing else “deserve to be attacked” (*Ketzereien* 5; Van Dijk 22). Van Dijk asserts that a large portion of the philosopher’s work can be considered “razor-sharp, one
sided, even crude attacks on the social structure of thinking and acting” which in their 
vehemence sometimes rise to the level of “moral blackmail” (23, 162). To a certain extent, I 
concur with this evaluation, but what is especially important to note is that where it appears as 
such, Anders’ tenor of militancy or crudeness is deliberately chosen and carefully applied. 
Whether sharp or blunt, Anders shaped his words carefully to their purpose. Furthermore, this 
was an authorial tendency that remained stable across his anti-nuclear writings, which as noted 
above, form a sprawling body of work. The attitude of attack is in a sense what unifies his 
disarmament texts: in them, his words are “protest-actions” aimed at what his analysis revealed 
as the fundamental disorder of the atomic situation, the central “breakdown” of the nuclear era 
(Der Blick 16). He claimed of his own work that its apparent sense of order emerged from 
contrast against the background of the nuclear situation; I argue that the effect of contrast was 
frequently produced through a stance of opposition. Within and between themselves, Anders’ 
disarmament writings are modular; his arguments interpenetrate one another. Episodes, 
arguments, and aphorisms appear reshaped and reformed to be more-or-less direct or elliptical as 
needed. As an example, consider the following four excerpts of Anders’ anti-nuclear writings, 
each of which appeared during latter half of the 1950s. They are drawn from his essays 
“Reflections on the H-Bomb” (published in a 1956 issue of Dissent),1 “Gebote des 
Atomzeitalters” (“Commandments in the Atomic Age,”2 appearing in summer 1957 in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung), “Thesen zum Atomzeitalter” (“Theses for the Atomic Age,”3 

1 Translated for Dissent by Norbert Guterman.
2 In this passage and hereafter I refer to the English version translated by Anders and Charlotte Zelka for the 
volume Burning Conscience.
3 Here and in subsequent citations I make use of Anders’ own translation, published in 1962 by the Massachusetts
prepared in 1959 for a seminar at the Freie Universität Berlin) and from a draft of his speech prepared for the 1959 London anti-nuclear congress.  

The formal titles of the three essays speak exactly to their purpose; “Reflections,” “Commandments,” and “Theses” each deal with the same central material, and each passage approaches the same topic—the incapacity for fear—but are framed and directed to different ends. From “Reflections”:

We have good reason to think that our fear is by far too small: it should paralyze us or keep us in a continual state of alarm. It does not because we are psychically unequal to the danger confronting us, because we are incapable of producing a fear commensurate with it, let alone of constantly maintaining it in the midst of our still normal everyday life.

Just like our reason, our psyche is limited in the Kantian sense: our emotions have only a limited capacity and elasticity. We have scruples about murdering one man: we have less scruples about shooting a hundred men: and no scruples at all about bombing a city out existence. A city full of dead people is a mere word to us.

All this should be investigated by a Critique of Pure Feeling, not for the purpose of reaching a moral verdict, but in order to determine the boundaries of our moral capacity. What disturbs us today is not the fact that we are not omnipotent and omniscient, but the reverse, namely that our emotional capacities are too small as measured against our knowledge and our power, that imaginatively and emotionally we are so to speak smaller than ourselves. Each of us moderns is an inverted Faust. . . (162)

From the inverted Faust, Anders turned the remainder of the section to contemplation of the fundamental unfreedom and impoverishment imposed by the discrepancy. What is at stake in the essay are the foundations and terms of the investigation that must be conducted; the subsequent section sets up the expansion of the moral imagination and capacity to fear as “the crucial task.”

Anders admitted that this could well turn out to be impossible, and that in such an event “we would have to give up all hope” (153). However, he followed this admission with a demand: even if it appears to be theoretically impossible to widen the limits of human imagination to the work demanded of it, a righteous and moral person would “still have to demand they be

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4 Prepared in English by Anders.
transcended in practice” (153). In short, he proposed an investigation but warns that action cannot wait or submit to the philosophical investigation’s results.

“Commandments” endeavors to serve as text for wisdom and guidance, one which will enable the project of individuals undertaking to expand their capacity to fear. As will be discussed in chapter four, the historian and Anders scholar Jason Dawsey believes that Andersian texts like the “Commandments” can be considered as aides to meditation in a manner not unlike monastic contemplation (459-461). Published in a major newspaper and circulated for laypersons, “Commandments” is self-limited to an essential program of daily thought which is to be adopted as ritual:

Your next thought after awakening should run: don’t be a coward. Have the courage to be afraid. Force yourself to produce the amount of fear that corresponds to the magnitude of the apocalyptic danger. For also fear, fear above all, belongs to those feelings which we are unable or unwilling to realize; and the thesis according to which we are living in fear anyhow, much too much so, even in the ‘age of fear’, is a mere cliché, which, even if not fraudulently propagandized, is at least ideally suited to suppress the breaking out of a fear commensurate with the threat, and thus to make us indolent. The truth is rather the contrary that we live in the ‘Age of inability to fear’, and that we confine ourselves to allowing the development to take its course. For which fact, not considering the ‘limited nature of our feelings’, there is a whole series of reasons impossible to enumerate here. (**Burning** 14; emphasis and punctuation as in the original)

In this passage, the reader can see the wider philosophical investigation hovering around the edges of Anders’ text. His analysis provides opportunities for diversion into examination of the self and the nuclear era, but they are summoned as rebuttals—we are not to believe we live in an age of anxiety—or postponed as an excess of didacticism not central to the immediate task. The task at hand is to do the imaginative work necessary for “saturating the soul of mankind” with the essential insights required for the eternal postponement of the apocalypse (**Burning** 20).

The “Theses” are a product of an invitational seminar given by Anders for university students; in his telling, the attendees requested a compact text which might “serve as a basis for
further discussion” (493). As such, it does much the same wisdom-work as the “Commandments” but instead of postponing the array of possible tangents, the text resituates the components of the paragraph as a cumulative argumentative construction.

13. The Courage to Fear: When speaking of the “imagining of nothingness,” the act meant is not identical with what psychology imagines to be imagination, for I speak of fear, which is the imagining of nothingness “in concreto.” Therefore we can improve the formulations of the last paragraphs by saying: it is our capacity to fear which is too small and which does not correspond to the magnitude of today’s danger. As a matter of fact, nothing is more deceitful than to say, “We live in the Age of Anxiety anyway.” This slogan is not a statement, but a tool manufactured by the fellow travelers of those who wish to prevent us from becoming really afraid, of those who are afraid that we once may produce the fear commensurate to the magnitude of the real danger. On the contrary, we are living in the Age of Inability to Fear. Our imperative: “Expand the capacity of your imagination,” means, in concreto “Increase your capacity of fear.” Therefore, don’t fear fear, have the courage to be frightened, and to frighten others, too. Frighten thy neighbor as thyself. (498; emphasis in the original)

As a text intended for discussion, points of variance with normative psychological understandings of the imaginative act and the nature of the opposition of their fellow-travelers are investigative channels to be pursued, but not at expense of the demand to “frighten thy neighbor as thyself.” Overall, then, while the “Commandments” and “Theses” both contain why and how, the former prioritizes the how over the why, the latter makes room for following the chain of whys that demand the how.

The last excerpt is drawn from a draft of an address prepared for an audience of pacifists and disarmament activists gathered for the 1959 London anti-nuclear congress. The language is simplified, and the draft is blocked out with stops and emphases; it might be said to be one example of the theme reduced to its didactic minimum:

Let me conclude with one last rule | which, | at least in continental Europe, | can’t be repeated often enough. | Those | who in order not to be hampered in increasing the danger | seek to belittle it, | call us scaremongers. And time and again it happens | that people who are afraid of being called cowards | do not know | how to answer this charge. |

There is only one answer; | we have to accept the name as a title of honour. | Yes, we are promoting a scare, | the scare that is necessary today. | There is no statement more untrue today |
than that we live in the age of anxiety. We live rather in an age of insufficient anxiety; we simply cannot find enough anxiety to match the danger, partly because people are afraid of anxiety, and partly because most of the most powerful institutions are doing all that is in their power to prevent the rise of this necessary anxiety. Therefore I conclude by asking you: have the courage to fear… (4; emphasis and punctuation in the original)

After it has been reduced to the didactic minimum, we can see that if Anders’ anti-nuclear work as a whole is united by that which it contrasts against and that which it undertakes to oppose—so also might it also be said his process of argument and instruction frequently operates by opposition at its most fundamental level. As a stylist, Anders makes wide use of serial, repetitive deployments of not-this-but-thats, on-the-contraries, and double-negatives. Many of his sentences are rhythmic contradictions aided by the punctuated production of emphasis. The oppositional components act to clear out space for the imagination to undertake the work of positive contemplation or investigation. His texts share forms, formulations, and titles that are self-consciously religious in tone—but as a scripture, what they hope to inspire is not comforting orthodoxy, but the terrors of heresy.

“Commandments” is one of Anders’ signal didactic works. In the paragraphs above, we have seen the second commandment. The opening of the text provides the first commandment with these plain instructions:

Your first thought upon awakening be: ‘Atom’. For you should not begin your day with the illusion that what surrounds you is a stable world. Already tomorrow it can be something that only ‘has been’… we, as mankind, are ‘killable’. And ‘mankind’ doesn’t mean only today’s mankind, not only mankind spread over all the provinces of the globe; but also mankind spread over all the provinces of time. For if the mankind of to-day is killed, then that which has been, dies with it; and the mankind to come too. (11; emphasis in the original)

The second commandment closes by adding to this that we must know and remember the following, that “‘The possibility of the Apocalypse is our work. But we know not what we are doing’. We really don’t know, nor do they who control the Apocalypse” (Burning 11-12). With
that, Anders invokes the question of competency.

In the spirit of fulfilling Anders’ commandments, this study now turns to a prelude.

**c. Prelude**

In his 2013 book *Command and Control*, journalist Eric Schlosser provides a detailed accident analysis of the 1980 “Damascus Incident,” which involved the in-silo explosion of a Titan-II ballistic missile at an Air Force base outside Little Rock, Arkansas. Schlosser’s book is painstaking in its attention to its central case study, but he established the larger import of his book through contextualizing the Damascus Incident in a long and disturbing series of nuclear mishaps and dangerous departures from safe handling procedures. The litany of errors reveals that weapons crews began to take hair-raising chances with nuclear weapons in the first days of the atomic age, even as the US dropped its first atomic bombs in anger. Schlosser recounts that as the “Fat Man” plutonium bomb was being prepared for deployment to the B-29 *Bockscar*, the weaponeers discovered that the atomic bomb—a unique, handmade instrument of death that was the product of a years-long multibillion dollar emergency effort—had been assembled incorrectly. The primary firing cable had been installed the wrong way around. The weapons crew were holding an electrical cord with two female connectors, a scene worthy of high comedy. Rather than laboriously disassemble the bomb, lead technician Bernard O’Keefe simply severed the plug and soldered on the correct one. “It was,” Schlosser observes dryly, “risky to melt solder in a room with five thousand pounds of explosives” (57). The weaponeers decided that discretion was the best course, and told no-one. This act of improvised electrical problem-solving would prove representative of nuclear weapons-handling errors in the years to come,
involving ridiculously small technical mistakes with potentially outsized consequences, departures from procedure, and improvisations whether well-reasoned or hasty, all coupled to a reluctance to communicate the mishap up the chain of command or to the public.

These mistakes are played out in Schlosser’s book over and over again, and it becomes clear that during the Cold War, the title phrase—Command and Control—reflects what was more an aspirational conceit about the ability to master the weapons than a reality. As Schlosser narrates incident after incident, such discrepancies take on a tinge of dark comedy. Shortcuts and departures from procedure existed in the policymaking realm as well, and these folded together with technical practice to create dangerous and illegal situations justified via Jesuitical niceties. NATO nuclear sharing is a signal example. By the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (AEA), US law required that the control of nuclear weapons remain in civilian hands and in no wise be transferred to foreign parties. Meanwhile, by the terms of its NATO accession treaty (1954), the BRD was not allowed to manufacture nuclear weapons or the means of their delivery anywhere in its territory (Lall 42; Kelleher 11). The terms “civilian control” and “no foreign transfer” in the context of US military deployments came to mean “under the control of a US military liaison officer additionally designated as an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) representative and assigned to a foreign military unit.” For the BRD, because the clause “prohibited to manufacture” was carefully crafted not preclude transfer of nuclear bombs from other powers, the Bundeswehr was able to train and prepare to deliver American atomic weapons (Francheschini and Müller 46). This careful parsing of the legal language went largely unnoticed at first but caused controversy in the aftermath of the 1955 NATO Carte Blanche exercises
(Kelleher 38). Even so, the fiction of effective American control of American atomic weapons mated to German delivery systems eventually came to be accepted to some extent as both true and a political success, a positive step towards re-inclusion of the former Nazi state as a full partner in the liberal democratic alliance (see e.g. Large 215).

Thus, the BRD became a de facto nuclear power. Schlosser illustrates this reality in his retelling of former Manhattan project physicist Harold Agnew’s 1960 visit to a German fighter-bomber wing at a joint NATO forward airbase. The planes were fully fueled, armed with atomic bombs, and sitting on the tarmac at full ready alert. One teenaged American soldier served the symbolic role of strict American control of its nuclear weapons:

Agnew walked over and asked the young enlisted man, who carried an old-fashioned, bolt-action rifle, what he’d do if somebody jumped into one of the planes and tried to take off. Would he shoot at the pilot—or the bomb? The soldier had never been told what to do. The wings of the fighters were decorated with the Iron Cross, a symbol that powerfully evoked two world wars. Agnew realized there was little to prevent a German pilot from taking a plane, flying it to the Soviet Union, and dropping an atomic bomb. (25)

The same lax attitude towards preventing unauthorized access to, sabotage, or theft of nuclear weapons was widespread throughout the NATO nuclear partnership. To Agnew, this was a situation that had the reek of insanity. Other actors within the nuclear and military-industrial complex came to the same conclusion and attempted to rectify the situation.

These men and women ranged from low-ranking enlisted soldiers, to secretaries of defense, and presidents. One such person who is given a central role in Schlosser’s account is electrical engineer Bob Peurifoy, who spent nearly forty years as a weapons worker and who contributed to the design of more than half of the atomic weapons in the current US arsenal. In the aftermath of two weapons loss mishaps in 1960 and 1961—the Palomares and Goldsboro
incidents—Peurifoy became acutely concerned with the possibility that an atomic weapon might detonate during an aircraft crash or even through simple rough handling (Schlosser 275).

American nuclear weapons of the 1960s required only a simple, weak, direct-current signal to become fully armed. Peurifoy determined through analysis of ordnance and aircraft circuitry that producing the arming signal was easier than hot-wiring a car. The signal could be easily mimicked during a crash through simple short circuits; multi-megaton hydrogen bombs could arm themselves with the aid of a loose wire or nut (Lapp 127, Pilkington).\(^5\) For the remainder of his career with Sandia, as a department head and later as a vice president, Peurifoy sought to have robust interlocks installed on all American weapons to prevent their unauthorized or accidental detonation.

The military leadership fought him at every turn; their rejoinder to his arguments were similar to the one given by Air Force General Alfred Starbird during a 1969 hearing on proposals to site nuclear-tipped Sentinel anti-ballistic missiles (ABM)s on the outskirts of Chicago.\(^6\)

Pressed on the Goldsboro accident and others, Starbird brushed off the claim that all but one safety interlock on the bomb had failed and dismissed the possibility that the weapon could have detonated: “There cannot,” he said, “be an accidental nuclear explosion.” In an article for the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Illinois Congressman Sidney Yates observed that he was dissatisfied with Starbird’s testimony, and requested clarification from the Air Force. “[They] gave me this answer,” Yates wrote, “that instead of only one safety device remaining intact, two

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\(^5\) This is disputed by James Oskins and Michael Maggelet in their authoritative survey of weapons mishaps. Historian of science and scholar of nuclear affairs Alex Wellerstein credits Schlosser’s interpretation in light of the journalist’s acquisition and analysis of internal analyses produced by Sandia at the time.

\(^6\) As Berhow and Morgan discuss in *Rings of Supersonic Steel*, the Chicago area had hosted nuclear-armed missiles since the late 1950s, with the deployment of the Nike Zeus system. The network included nearly two dozen installations, including three on the Chicago waterfront (at Montrose, Burnham, and Jackson Park).
remained untriggered” (29-30). For the Air Force, Army, and Navy, that was entirely satisfactory. The procedures that already existed worked. After all, the bomb had not exploded. As far as the armed services were concerned, adding additional arming steps might make them less reliable in combat, and worse, insult the competence of their officers. When the Kennedy administration ordered that combination locks be installed on nuclear warheads to prevent their unauthorized use, the Strategic Air Command complied. They installed the locks, but did not use them. Former missileer, security scholar, and disarmament activist Bruce Blair noted in a well-known editorial that during his tour as a Minuteman launch officer, “the ‘secret unlock code’” for the missiles was in fact not a secret and “remained constant at 00000000” until 1977. No-one had told the civilian leadership. They, in turn, had simply assumed that the locks were in proper use.

Bob Peurifoy retired from Sandia labs in 1991 after more than 20 years of battling for better nuclear security; as Schlosser notes, it was not until the very eve of his retirement and the close of the Cold War that Peurifoy’s recommendations for robust, redundant safety features and handling procedures for nuclear warheads were accepted as a paramount policy goal within the US military establishment (392). In 1992, Günther Anders died in Vienna at the age of 90. Where Peurifoy embarked on his campaign from the analysis of nuclear weapons’ most delicate and secret inner workings, Anders arrived at the atom bomb from observing its effects. He came to understand it as the manifestation of a new era of human existence, one marked by the possibility of our own self-extinction. Anders argued that in this, the atomic era, it is “not our extinction which would be miraculous, but our survival” (Der Mann 8; emphasis in the original). The miracle of survival is perpetual, and Anders was adamant that it is folly to view atomic weapons
as discrete entities or tools which exist in a wider political situation. Rather, the opposite is true: atomic bombs define the situation in which all human endeavor takes place. The atomic bomb is a condition. Our survival is a struggle with that condition ("Theses" 494). Anders’s goal was the understanding and description of that condition. From an Andersian viewpoint, the salient questions emerging from the history like the one narrated by Schlosser in *Command and Control* are: How could such a thing come to be? Why does the atomic bomb possess such gravity? What are the means by which it acquired such immense power to multiply itself in size and kind, distribute itself, and resist attempts to check its proliferation? Why did it take a career’s worth of work for Peurifoy to convince others of the urgent necessity of altering that which he himself had built? If the atomic bomb’s nominal creators faced setbacks at every turn, how should laypersons resist the specter of our extermination? How is it that we are still alive today? And most importantly: what must we do to ensure that we live to see tomorrow? Anders demands that we are to “have the courage to be frightened, and to frighten others, too.” The task at hand is to “Frighten thy neighbor as thyself” ("Theses" 498). This dissertation follows Anders’ attempts to fulfill his own commandments.
CHAPTER ONE: COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY

I. Introductions

a. The Promethean Discrepancy

This chapter analyzes post-war atomic weapons development and public commentary on the developing arms race as a cultural history, a genealogy that examines the growth of Anders’ thinking as an anti-nuclear activist and which situates him in his historical era: the atomic era. In this respect, this chapter takes Anders’ assertion that the atomic bomb is the fundamental and defining feature of our age seriously, and explores the processes by which this epoch was created. Such an investigation is in the tradition of cultural historians, such as John Boyer and Paul Brians. In the 1980s, these scholars began to assess the impact nuclear weapons had on political, literary, and other discourses within the United States and its Western European allies, tracing its effect on our “collective experience,” as Boyer puts it (Bomb xvii). However, placing Anders’ concerns at the center of this history changes the focus from inquiry into collective experience to an investigation of an activist problem. For Anders, that problem was best signified through the concept of discrepancy, which served as both an anchor and as a unifying motif in his work as writer and activist. One of Anders’ crucial formulations of discrepancy for the analysis of technology was the “Promethean discrepancy,” a concept which Anders assigned a fundamental role as an interpretive lens. Through the Promethean discrepancy, Anders aimed to highlight an accelerating “asynchronicity” between human capacities and the world created through their products (Antiquiertheit 1: 16). Anders regarded this discrepancy as a general and manifold phenomenon for which atomic weapons were emblematic. Applied to atomic weapons,
a focus on the Promethean discrepancy might first highlight the gulf between the generational labor required to build a city as opposed to the ease with which a nuclear strike could erase it and its inhabitants. The discrepancy repeats itself when directed to other aspects of the phenomenon, in Anders’ words,

> We can indeed make the hydrogen bomb; but to envision for ourselves the consequences of that which we have made we are not adequate—in the same manner, our capacity to feel hobbles along behind our capacity to do: we can indeed rain bombs on hundreds of thousands; to regret or weep for them we cannot. (*Antiquiertheit* 1: 17)

For Anders, finding a way to avoid our own self-extinction meant amending the inadequacy of our capacities of imagination and feeling. It was a matter of forcing recognition of what the atomic bomb was. That, in turn, required participation in the cultural, discursive struggle over how the atomic bomb would be received into collective experience. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to initiate a specific intellectual history of Anders’ imaginative intervention in the emergent understanding of nuclear weapons in the immediate postwar era. Situated more broadly within this work, this chapter serves to establish that Anders’ thought was a product of his era, just as subsequent chapters will demonstrate that ours is the era of his product.

Approached through the manifold concept of the Promethean discrepancy, it quickly becomes apparent that the atomic bomb itself is manifold. Pursued via the gap between tempo of building vs. destruction, capacity to create vs. capacity to imagine, or to do vs. to feel, the atomic bomb entrains whole swathes of the human social and cultural self. Trying to locate the atomic bomb as an object of the imagination becomes like trying to fix quicksilver. Anders recognized this and likened the project of trying to grasp the nature of the atomic bomb to traversing a new philosophical terrain, characterizing the position of those confronting the atomic era as that of
persons thrown ashore on terra incognita. In his view, it is not possible to arrive quickly at a complete vision of the atomic situation. Instead, at the outset we have to “allow ourselves to wander about, and must content ourselves with the observation and marking of those particulars which stand out to the eye” (Antiquierheit 1: 235) without knowing whether they will assemble themselves into a coherent cartographic whole. Anders chose a difficult, many-sided approach to an urgent task; following him to create historical account of his work as a surveyor of new philosophical territory results in an oblique approach to the discovery of Anders. It is for this reason that the Prelude to this dissertation arrived at the Austrian philosopher via a story of an American bomb designer. The remainder of this chapter follows this same multifaceted method of encountering the philosopher and his work. A short guide to the avenues pursued follows.

Anders’ public attempts to intervene in the atomic era began in the mid-1950s, where he found himself a relative latecomer to an effective terra incognita crisscrossed by numerous previous explorers. His metaphor was in earnest. The men and women most influential in the disarmament project to that point had been Anglo-American physical scientists, many of whom had contributed to the Manhattan Project. Their efforts on behalf of and in resistance to the program of international nuclear control profoundly shaped the environment from which Anders embarked. Therefore, in section (1.11) this chapter delves into the first wave of anti-nuclear activism (1945-1949), widely referred to as the “scientists’ movement.” Additionally, (1.11) focuses on the changing role of science, as well as the rapidly evolving demotic and governmental perception of scientists in the North Atlantic sphere during the postwar years. As I will demonstrate, science experienced an intense crisis at the very historical moment it achieved
its greatest prestige in the public eye. This process was intimately linked to the growth of the military-industrial security state during the Second World War and its expansion during the early years of the Cold War.

Though Anders appeared as a relative latecomer in his commentary on the nuclear era, he came to the conversation well-prepared for engagement by a long career as a public intellectual and critic of industrial progress. That career provided the foundation for his anti-nuclear thought. Section (1.III) elaborates Anders’ nascent views on technology and details his stances on the role of philosophy and how the work of philosophical scholarship should be conducted. However, Anders’ professional and personal circumstances during the mid-1950s were extremely precarious; in (1.III) I argue that, though arising from different circumstances than those which confronted the activist researchers in the “scientists’ movement,” Anders’ crisis was similarly one of uncertain disciplinary competence, diminished public recognition, attenuated authority, and isolation.

The mid-1950s form a point of confluence. These years marked the beginning of the second wave of nuclear disarmament just as Anders published his first scholarly works on the atomic situation. In (1.IV), I join the themes discussed in (1.II) and (1.III) in order to describe how Anders applied his philosophical, authorial, and activist work to the rapidly changing international situation while at the same time struggling to establish the competence and authority of his discipline to intervene in world events. I show that although Anders argued forcefully for a democratic approach to social protest which emphasized the right and duty of laypersons and non-scientists to make authoritative pronouncements about technical, political,
and military matters, in practice he relied on scientific and technical experts as resources within his activist work.

Finally, this chapter examines Anders’ work as a practical activist organizer and founding member of the European Federation against Nuclear Arms and the Austrian Easter March Committee. Section (1.V) details Anders’ use of epistolary writing and its role in his entry into—and subsequent maintenance of—an international anti-nuclear activist network. I demonstrate how Anders’ organizing tactics and rhetoric both reflect and depart from his philosophical analysis of the atomic situation, and I discuss how this prepared him for his campaign on behalf of the American bomber pilot Claude Eatherly—the subject of chapter two.

Before turning to the scientists’ movement, the latter part of this section offers a note on the theory, sources, and methods used in this chapter.

b. Network and Actor-Network Theories

As we have seen in the Prelude and in this section so far, Anders himself proposed an oblique philosophical approach to the bomb; one that could deal with disparate phenomena as they appeared and which was appropriate given the weapon’s newness and complexity. Anders’ analysis of the atomic era brings in branching, oblique, and obscured causalities. It entrains multiple and interlocking levels of actors in broad sociopolitical contexts. The modern theoretical suite most adapted to such a terrain lies in actor-network theory (ANT) within the constructionist tradition in history and philosophy of science. This tradition, attributed in part to Latour and Woolgar and the groundbreaking 1979 work Laboratory Life, views technological products not as single entities but rather as complex assemblages, systems of meaning incorporating both
human and material agents. Sociologist John Law, a significant contributor to this tradition, advises that this approach is not intended to take social structures or phenomena as given, but instead might be better seen as a set of tools for understanding the mechanics of power and the production of organizations and artifacts as effects rather than stable objects. To do this, he emphasizes that

it is a good idea not to take it for granted that there is a macrosocial system on the one hand, and bits and pieces of derivative microsocial detail on the other. If we do this we close off most of the interesting questions about the origins of power and organization. Instead we should start with a clean slate. For instance, we might start with interaction and assume that interaction is all that there is. Then we might ask how some kinds of interactions more or less succeed in stabilising and reproducing themselves: how it is that they overcome resistance and seem to become “macrosocial”; how it is that they seem to generate the effects such as power, fame, size, scope or organization. (380)

ANT is a theoretical suite well suited to supplement Anders’ analysis of the atomic bomb, that unstable object which—as we saw in the Prelude—possesses an uncanny tendency to escape. Consequently, per Anders biographer Paul van Dijk, I consider Anders a forerunner to and contestant in the creation of this social constructionist tradition (141). For Anders the territory of the atomic era and atomic weapons was obscure not merely because of its newness, or because it had been deliberately obscured (Antiquiertheit 1: 236), but also because apparent objects like bombs and reactors were inherently deceitful. Anders declared that manifestations of technology such as nuclear power plants reveal themselves only in fragments and glimpses; we will return to this topic at length in chapter 4. Overall, such assemblages “simulate an appearance, one which has nothing to do with their true nature, they appear smaller than they are” (Antiquiertheit 2: 34; emphasis in the original). In addition to a utilization of ANT intended to grasp assemblages of human and nonhuman actors, this chapter also invokes a social network theory specifically geared to address recruitment and maintenance of social movements, such as that advanced by
David Snow and Robert Benford. This chapter maintains these two areas as separate because although ANT is interested in relations between human actors, it accords them “no privilege nor prominence,” preferring instead to understand how persons are initiated into or create the social roles and relations at hand (“On Actor-Network” 2). Lastly, this chapter also pays attention to the work of sociologist Donald MacKenzie and anthropologist Hugh Gusterson, who provide examples of scholars conducting specific case studies of the development of weapons systems and explorations of how human actors “learn the languages” of fear and commitment that drive their participation in, or resistance to, these emerging systems. Accounts provided by Gusterson’s *Nuclear Rites* and memoirs such as activist physicist Millicent Dillon’s essay “In the Atomic City” are particularly important for illuminating Anders’ work, not only because they operated in a milieu to which Anders did not have access (weapons labs and weapons workers), but also because they gathered data at a sociocultural level of analysis that Anders himself regarded as critical to understanding the atomic era.

**c. Archives and the Occasional Philosophy**

As we saw above in (1.Ia-b), Anders argued that phenomena such as the Promethean discrepancy and technological assemblages could only be approached obliquely and seen in glimpses. Consequently, he considered himself as occupied with specific, concrete occasions. That is, he was concerned with the pressing situations, lived experiences, and practical problems that jump to the eye; those things which in the anthropological mode of Clifford Geertz might be considered culturally significant. This approach shaped the form and genre of the work Anders produced; in his introduction to *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen* Anders gave his readers a
warning and an explanation: the essays in his volume would not conform to the generic conventions of either philosophical writing or literary essays. Rather, they are examples of what one might call, using an old term, ‘occasionalism,’ or, ‘occasional philosophy.’ Under this heading I intend something which at first glance must appear to be nothing, something like a hybrid mixture of philosophy and journalism; a philosophy that has the situation of the contemporary world in mind, and which has as its subject characteristic elements of the world in which we live. (Antiquiertheit 1: 8)

Additionally, the conclusions of his work were not fixed or permanent, because he held that humanity and its world were in flux. He regarded his project as a “philosophical anthropology” attempting to describe a humanity which “lacks a definitive nature” and which is engaged in an “unceasing self-creation” and “unbroken historical transformation,” a result of the fact that what it is to be human emerges from and is discerned by reference to an ephemeral, reciprocal cultural interplay juxtaposed against the world of our material products (Antiquiertheit 1: 309).

Reflecting his view of human nature, Anders frequently referred to the philosophical record he produced as akin to a collection of sketches and treatments.

Viewed as a phenomenon, then, Anders’ anti-nuclear philosophy and activist praxis were literary, essayistic, and epistolary in nature; studying their traces implies a close reading of Anders’ published writings on technology, coupled with close attention to his diaries and correspondence in order to develop an understanding of the specific personalities and specific writings, speeches, and other documents Anders judged worthy of or requiring his attention and critique.

This chapter is concerned with three general groups of Anders’ writings, arranged by time and genre. The first of these, appearing in (1.III), are essays he drafted during his exile. These texts dwelt on the uses and potentialities of philosophical and poetic language and I refer to them
in order to discuss Anders’ nascent views on technology and his emerging stances on the social task of philosophy. First published in part during 1943, the essays were variously redrafted and reissued. This chapter uses manuscript versions from the Günther Anders Archive of the Austrian National Library, and includes “Dichten heute” (“Poetry Today,” 1948), “Über den philosophischen Stil” (“On Philosophical Style,” 1946) and “zu Poetik” (“On Poetics,” 1950). In addition to these, I refer to diary entries from the 1940s and 1950s which were collected in the published volume Tagebücher und Gedichte (Diaries and Poems, 1985), the importance of which Anders reflected on in his essay “Warnbilder” (“Warning Figures”). The second group includes his major published works of the mid- to late 1950s. These are his first volume of his philosophical treatise Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen (1956), his didactic manifesto “Thesen zum Atomzeitalter” (1959) and his Hiroshima travel diary Der Mann auf der Brücke (1959). I refer to these works in sections (1.III-V) in order to describe the summation and formalization of ideas into carefully-arranged philosophical works, an intellectual watershed which facilitated his public debut as a disarmament activist. The third selection of Anders’ texts is comprised of his correspondence with other anti-nuclear activists, including scientists such as Linus Pauling and Max Born, as well as movement figures such as Bertrand Russell and Hans Werner Richter. The dates of the correspondence examined in this chapter span between 1958 and 1964, and are used in sections (1.IV-V) to analyze his practical organizational work.

In order to assemble a historical context for understanding Anders, this chapter makes use of a number of historical surveys and monographs. Notably, these include Paul Boyer’s groundbreaking cultural history By the Bomb’s Early Light, Lawrence Wittner’s exhaustive and
authoritative multi-volume work *The Struggle Against the Bomb*, as well as Richard Rhodes’ award winning texts *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* and *Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb*. For more detailed treatments of the disarmament movement’s history in the UK and BRD I refer to assorted articles by Cold War scholar Holger Nehring and Milton Katz’s influential history *Ban the Bomb*. Two major published biographical sources on Anders exist, Paul van Dijk’s *Anthropology in the Age of Technology* and Raimund Bahr’s recent *Günther Anders: Leben und Denken im Wort*. Ultimately, I use these primary and secondary sources to develop a view of Anders that positions him as embedded within a network of contemporary activists and correspondents. In accordance with the plan given in (1.Ia), we now turn to the first wave of anti-nuclear activism (1945-1949), which came to be known as the “scientists’ movement.”

**II. Historical Contexts: The Scientists’ Movement**

**a. Genesis**

From the Introduction to the dissertation and in the sections above, we have already encountered several themes and concepts crucial to Anders’ work, and crucial to our understanding of it. These include the radically new and unstable nature of the atomic bomb and the atomic era, the manifold discrepancy between our mental and emotional capacities and the power of our tools, the necessity of a fear commensurate to the nuclear menace, the apparent problematic of which persons are competent to handle nuclear matters, the duty of all responsible persons to be “Anti-Apocalyptics,” and the importance of using concrete, occasional, anthropological methods for apprehending the atomic epoch. I argued at the outset of this chapter
and in the Prelude that it is imperative to understand Anders in his historical situation before we can follow his attempts to conduct an activist imaginative intervention. Throughout the following section, we will see each of the aforementioned themes and concepts emerge at the dawn of the atomic era: it is the process of the bomb’s becoming not an object, but a system and a world-condition.

In 1943, president of the National Academy of Sciences Frank Jewett described the political position of American scientists: “in an extreme case their scientific opinion might be the most authoritative in the world and yet their opinion on matters of public policy have no more value than that of any similar group of intelligent laymen” (qtd. in Marks 103). Though this position highlights a democratic strain that has persisted in American attitudes toward scientific authority (Wellock 21), Jewett’s view was soon to be rendered moot by events. In the US and around the world, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki produced, as Lawrence Wittner writes in his massive study of the nuclear disarmament movement, “a sensation that was unsurpassed” (One World xix), both in quality and quantity of coverage (Meyer 461). Paul Boyer, in his groundbreaking text on the cultural impact of the atomic bomb on American society, adds vivid support to this claim. He found that not only was the reaction to the bomb widespread and powerful, the men and women of the time “understood that a profoundly unsettling new cultural factor had been introduced—”

that the bomb had transformed the fundamental ground of culture and consciousness. Anne O’Hare McCormick’s comment in the New York Times on August 8, 1945, that the atomic bomb had caused ‘an explosion in men’s minds as shattering as the obliteration of Hiroshima’ was echoed by literally scores of observers in these earliest moments of the atomic age. (Boyer, Bomb xxi)

The shattering newness and unprecedented power of the atomic bomb had been recognized by
many weapons researchers, even as they worked to create it. Hungarian-American physicist Leo Szilard wrote in 1942 that, “what the existence of these bombs will mean we all know … we cannot have peace in a world in which various sovereign nations have atomic bombs in the possession of their armies and any of these armies could win a war within twenty-four hours” (qtd. in Wittner, One World 20). Szilard, his fellow physicists Niels Bohr, Eugene Rabi, and others reacted to the realization of the bomb’s transformative power by advocating a number of paths that might restrict its arbitrary use on civilian targets, subject atomic weapons to international control, prevent an arms race, and promote peace through the establishment of powerful intergovernmental organizations. One significant document in this vein is the Franck Report, a recommendation authored in June of 1945 by a committee from the University of Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory, with James Franck filling the role of chairperson, and signed by several prominent physicists including Eugene Rabinowitch, Leo Szilard, and Glenn Seaborg. Writing to Secretary of War Henry Stimson, the scientists urged against using the bomb on Japan. They also argued that nuclear weapons were qualitatively different from previous inventions of destruction. Where before scientists may have been able to offer a defense against new weapons, the atomic bomb was unlikely to permit such a dialectic of offense and defense. Scientists, they wrote,

> cannot promise such efficient protection against the destructive use of nuclear power. This protection can only come from the political organization of the world. Among all arguments calling for an efficient international organization for peace, the existence of nuclear weapons is the most compelling one. (“Report”)

The report was prevented from reaching Stimson in a timely fashion and, as Wittner comments, was in the end “irrelevant to the policy adopted” (One World 26). However, for the scientists
themselves, the Franck report indicates that at least some technical workers had come to view the bomb not as a single object, but as part of a larger system, the implications of which stretched into political and military realms. This set the stage for conflict with those other authorities. Additionally, it is significant that many of the activist scientists who contributed to the Manhattan Project were internationalist in their approach to science. These men and women found themselves in the United States as wartime emigrants and refugees—Robert Batchelder called the atomic project “the campaign of the exiled scientists” (9)—and it is notable that they insisted the new world of the atomic bomb be an international one. On top of this international aspect, within the UK and USA the fusion of scientific and military affairs under the heading of operations research was inflected by the outset by specifically socialist notions of economic planning.

Because of the prominent and pioneering role that the scientists of the Manhattan Project played in shaping the first wave of nuclear disarmament activism, it has become widely known as the “scientists’ movement” (see Wittner, One World 20; Meyer 459; Boyer iv) and it lent later movements an orientation towards internationalist cooperation in the management and supervision of nuclear industries. Here at the very beginning are core themes of the atomic bomb as a fundamentally new and radically different political, scientific, and industrial system. And as we will see in later sections, this internationalist angle appeared as a central topic in Anders’ philosophical analysis of the atomic era and his approach to activist work.

b. One World Government

The nuclear scientists and engineers were not alone. Indeed, Paul Boyer observes that

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7 See, for instance the study of Nobel Prize winning physicist Patrick Blackett edited by Peter Hore, Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist, Socialist.
practically every academic discipline and sector of society rushed to assert the relevance of their expertise in the atomic age. “Could it have been otherwise?” he asks. “The atomic bomb may have ushered in a new era, but people confronted that new era with ideas and professional identities formed over many years in the old, pre-atomic age” (Bomb 151). However, out of the multitude of voices, the aim of creating a world government became especially salient in the immediate post-war years, organized around a number of common themes: the radical newness of the bomb, the appropriateness of fear (Harold Urey declared in Collier’s “I’m a frightened man”), and the simultaneous moral and political inadequacy of extant social institutions and modes of thinking. A defining example was that of Norman Cousins, then-editor of the Saturday Review, who proclaimed in 1945 that “modern man is obsolete.” Prior to the close of World War Two, the stumbling block hindering popular acceptance of world government was the apparent implausibility of the project. In the aftermath of the war, its appeal was bolstered by the drafting and ratification of the United Nations charter by the permanent members of the Security Council, and the support of influential nuclear scientists, all of which made an apparently far-fetched idea seem more feasible. Thus, the United World Federalists was founded in 1947, and at its height grew to claim 200 local branches and 17,000 dues-paying members (Boyer, Bomb 33; Wittner, One World 68). Their relative success can be explained by the fact that world government advocates had the advantage of being an extant movement with its own highly developed rhetoric and institutional framework (see also Nehring, “National” 570) at an opportune historical moment.

The goal of world government dominated activist discourse in the United States in the
wake of the atomic bombings. However, even more important for the future course of disarmament activism in the latter half of the 20th century are enduring structural changes which took place in the meaning and conduct of science. During the Second World War and its aftermath, science (envisioned as an institution) and scientists (as representatives of that institution) acquired immense authority to shape the opinions of governments and the perceptions of the public. Axis and Allied belligerents relied on their scientists and engineers not simply to refine and produce existing weapons, but to imagine new ones. In no realm was this more evident than in the highly specialized and arcane field of nuclear physics and weapons design. Indeed, it is Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard’s 1939 letter to Franklin Delano Roosevelt advising “that it may become possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium … [which] would also lead to the construction of bombs, and it is conceivable—though much less certain—that extremely powerful bombs of a new type may thus be constructed” which gave the initial impetus to the US atomic bomb project. However, that project eventually required a sprawling industrial infrastructure spread across dozens of installations and thousands of miles. Within that industrial system, elite atomic scientists were only one part of the massive effort. The Manhattan Project was a vast endeavor overseen by the Army Corps of Engineers and encompassed within the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). Governments and militaries may have had to rely on the technical expertise of their scientists and engineers, but they were not inclined to wholly trust these men and women who may previously been rarefied and obscure academics. The lack of trust was bidirectional. Szilard, who had first argued that the Allies must pursue the atomic bomb in order to forestall a possible Nazi atomic weapon,
began to agitate against the arbitrary atomic bombing of Japan once it became clear that the war could be won with conventional means. Although he acknowledged the vital importance of the civilian and military leadership in the project, he declared that “we cannot accept them as spokesmen.” In July 1945, Szilard circulated a petition to that effect among his colleagues at the University of Chicago. Lawrence Wittner describes the result: “Angered by the petition drive, Manhattan Project officials did their best to suppress it. The Army was ‘violently opposed,’ Szilard recalled, and accused me of having violated secrecy by disclosing in the petition that such a thing as a bomb existed” (One World 30). Thus, while many of the scientists and engineers involved in weapons production recognized that their work demanded an acceptance of political and moral responsibility for its outcomes, they struggled with civilian and military officials for the recognition of that responsibility and their right to exercise it both within the framework of government and as private citizens. The movement of atomic physics from a benchtop, laboratory scale process to an industrial one marked the point at which the academic researchers began to realize that their leadership role threatened to become symbolic: the bomb appeared to take on its own logic, the qualities of an assemblage opaque to analysis and resistant to influence. In Science in Action, Latour notes the tendency of scientific products towards mobility and reification into representations, and that this mobility implies diffusion and centralization. The documentary products of science “end up at a scale that a few men and women can dominate them by sight” and further development is guided by the a kind of selective pressure of the center: “Everything that might enhance either the mobility, or the stability, or the combinability of the elements will be welcomed if it accelerates the accumulation cycle” (227-
In ANT terms, the atomic scientists discovered that as they rendered their knowledge products concrete, they attained mobility and began to escape the narrow limitations of production in order to engage in new relationships. Displaced from the central position of industrial management, the forms arising from those new relationships became intractable and even resistant to their influence; they sensed both the potential attenuation of their authority alongside a duty to assert responsibility for their actions. The proliferating, distributed nature of the nuclear-industrial system would make that progressively more difficult.

It had been the fear of an irresistible, devastating Axis-held atomic weapon that provided the original urgency to the scientists to initiate Allied nuclear weapons research (Batchelder 15-27). It had been fear which prompted Allied leaders to endorse the project. Richard Rhodes illustrates this point emphatically when he cites Alexander Sachs’ presentation and explanation of the Einstein-Szilard letter to Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt cuts the economist’s lengthy explanation short, saying “Alex, what you are after is to see that the Nazis don’t blow us up” (qtd. In Rhodes, Making 314). Fear of the bomb as a new, shattering presence was transitory. It did not persist among the Allied civil and military leadership once they had the bomb in their hands (Wittner, One World 22). Churchill, for example was adamant that the atomic bomb was no different in kind, that it belonged in the same technical category as other aerial bombs. US Secretary of War Henry Stimson, meanwhile, described the bomb “as legitimate as any of the other of the deadly explosive weapons of the war,” a statement which implies that he placed it in the same moral and legal category as conventional explosives (qtd in Batchelder 37). Truman himself had no doubt or regret, as he explained in 1963 in a nonconfidential letter to Irv Kupcinet
of the Chicago Sun-Times “I knew what I was doing when I stopped the war that would have killed half a million youngsters on both sides … I have no regrets and, under the same circumstances, I would do it again.” In the Introduction’s Note on Style we encountered four iterations of Anders grappling with those parties in whose interest it was to prevent persons from cultivating the necessary fear. By observing who executed a rapid shift from the fear of a Nazi nuclear bomb to the insistence that the atom bomb was the same as any other weapon of war, we can clearly identify such persons and their interests.

Many of the leading scientists involved in the Manhattan Project such as Szilard, Eugene Rabinowitch, and Einstein (who told Robert Jungk that had he “known that the Germans would not succeed in building an atom bomb, I never would have lifted a finger” (qtd in Batchelder 38) were dismayed that they had not been able to prevail in the discussions held by the Truman cabinet on whether and/or how to use atomic weapons. Nonetheless, politically active scientists were able to create institutional instruments through which to exercise their influence. For instance, through the creation of the AEC in 1946, the US Congress also created a General Advisory Committee (GAC) to in turn advise the AEC. According to Robert Gilpin, it was “the prestige of the atomic scientists … the generally prevailing ignorance concerning atomic energy and the cloud of secrecy [which] combined to give the GAC a large part in determining AEC policy in the early postwar years” (12). As military strategy during this era was linked to the availability and capability of nuclear weapons, the GAC exerted significant influence on US military doctrine as well. For a brief period, at least, governments and militaries were, of a necessity, still forced to rely on their scientists and engineers in shaping nuclear policy. At the
close of the 1940s, the US atomic arsenal still retained some of the character of a laboratory-built, arcane instrument (Schlosser 95-96, Loeber 205).

Paralleling Gilpin’s claim in the realm of government affairs, Boyer argues that ignorance on the part of the broader public contributed to the aura of authority that nuclear scientists possessed in the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Boyer conducts an extensive review of public opinion polling from the postwar years in *By the Bomb’s Early Light*; in his analysis he notes that while surveys showed practically every American had heard of the atomic bomb, the opinion researchers were much less certain that the public had any deep knowledge of the bomb’s true power or its implications. Two researchers for Gallup concluded that,

> what stands out in any detailed survey of public opinion is that much of the business that so deeply preoccupies their leaders goes on above people’s heads. . . . The government [and] its problems . . . are remote and shadowy, not only among the poor and uneducated but also to a large extent among those who according to socio-economic norms must be classed as at least average Americans. (qtd in Boyer, *Bomb* 57)

As a result, Boyer argues that the public stature of nuclear scientists attained “gargantuan proportions” by virtue of their ability to interpret events. He vividly illustrates this point with a contemporary editorial cartoon “pictur[ing] two dwarflike ‘statesmen’ staggering under the weight of an atomic bomb given them by ‘The Scientists,’ represented by a figure of such towering height that only his lower legs are visible” (Boyer, *Bomb* 59-60). Those scientists with an interest in arms control moved quickly to capitalize on this influence. In late 1945, scientists from the University of Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory, the Oak Ridge Laboratory, Los Alamos, and Columbia combined their advocacy groups into the Federation of American Scientists, which quickly grew to claim 2,000 members. Its publication, the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (*Bulletin*), was and remains a preeminent publication in the field. (FAS; Batchelder
Meanwhile, Albert Einstein, Leo Szilard, Linus Pauling, Harold Urey and four others founded the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists. The mission of these groups can be summarized through the editorial preface to the inaugural issue of the *Bulletin*. Their aim was to educate and politicize scientists and technical workers and to “help the public understand what nuclear energy and its application to war meant for mankind” (Grodzins and Rabinowitch v). The stature of scientists as public intellectuals was indeed impressive, but as the Cold War developed, that position proved precarious. At the same time, and as part of the same process, their ability to grasp the whole of their creation, to take responsibility for it, or to act against it became attenuated as well.

**c. The Changing Role of Science**

Developments in international politics, such as the successful Soviet atomic test, meant that members of the public in the US and UK became more interested in the apparent surety of retaliation, as opposed to the uncertain guarantees of international control and world government (Wittner, *One World* 312). In this changing political climate prominent scientists who spoke out against developing retaliatory capability could be constrained by the threat of harassment by the national security apparatus, as was the case with Robert Oppenheimer, targeted for his opposition to the hydrogen bomb. In 1954, Oppenheimer’s personal life was examined before Congress in excruciating detail, specifically because AEC chairman Lewis Strauss feared that if Oppenheimer’s reputation and security clearance were to remain intact, the American atomic weapons establishment might become dominated by “‘left wingers’ and scientists” (Rhodes, *Dark Sun* 535; Wittner, *Resisting* 135). Linus Pauling, too, was later to be targeted for his
contributions to the petition drive in support of a test ban treaty, and only had his passport restored after he received the Nobel Prize (Wittner, Resisting 138-139).

Oppenheimer and Pauling were both highly prominent figures, and government-led investigations into their patriotic commitment did much to damage their credibility in public eyes. Historian Paul Rubinson notes that Oppenheimer’s disgrace stripped away scientists’ “aura of invincibility” (287). Rubinson also argues that while public shaming damaged their image with the public, conflict between scientists on technical matters in highly public testimony, such as that between Hans Bethe and Edward Teller on the feasibility of nuclear test monitoring, did additional damage by shattering the credibility of scientific consensus (286, Gilpin 262-263).

Even as the giants of nuclear physics suffered blows to their image, hence authority, and hence apparent competence, an even more significant change was taking place that had great effect among the rank-and-file scientists and engineers of the Manhattan Project.

Much historical attention is paid to the elite scientists of the Manhattan Project, but the vast majority of persons employed as technicians or engineers during the war were young men and women, civilian and military; for instance, Los Alamos employed 5,000 people whose average age was 25 (Frosch). This generation of younger technicians would in many cases remain in nuclear weapons development or science after the war, and some became prominent figures. At the time, however, they lacked the institutional support and reputation that men like Szilard and Oppenheimer had used to preserve their civilian status and assert their civil liberties in wartime. Additionally, these junior scientists lacked the extant networks of personal scientific and academic acquaintances which enabled senior nuclear scientists to communicate with one
another despite the compartmentalization of their work (Rhodes, *Making* 454). To act morally required that one act socially within the confines of the nuclear military-industrial system. These men and women may well have been apolitical, or viewed themselves as such—Linus Pauling and Max Born were themselves largely apolitical before the war—and even in the University of Chicago’s Met Lab, where Leo Szilard was a vocal activist, it is difficult if not impossible to judge whether Szilard’s stance against using the atomic bomb on Japan was widespread (Wittner, *One World* 31). Indeed, a poll conducted among Met Lab scientists by physicist and prominent OSRD member Arthur Compton in the wake of the Szilard petition found that “there were a few who preferred not to use the bomb at all, but 87 percent voted for its military use, at least if after other means were tried this was found necessary to bring surrender” (qtd in Batchelder 66).  

Both Batchelder and Wittner suggest strong reservations about the Compton poll; Wittner notes that “scientists later complained that the few minutes given them to respond were inadequate for them to think through an issue of such gravity” let alone to discuss it with one another or the personnel at other Manhattan Project sites such as Los Alamos (*One World* 32). The opportunity to discuss and test their beliefs in debate with one another was crucial to developing an understanding of nuclear weapons that included those weapons’ social ramifications, and crucial in turn to utilizing that understanding in a politically conscious manner. Not only to act morally, but to think and imagine morally, was a socially situated deed. By undermining that fundamental

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8 Further, Batchelder and Wittner observe that the poll results themselves are ambiguous given that most of the responses (83%) envision some kind of restraint and moral reservations about the use of the bomb, such as use of the bomb against an exclusively military target, international demonstration with Japanese representatives present followed by the provision of an opportunity to surrender, etc. Only 15% of the respondents advocated the use of the bomb in the manner judged to be “most effective at bringing about prompt Japanese surrender at minimum human cost to our armed forces” (Batchelder 65-66). That all reasonable means had not been pursued to secure a Japanese surrender is the situation that many historians judge to have been the case.
sociality, it becomes possible to undo the moral individual and to collapse the associative networks through which that morality is experienced and expressed. We will watch this unfold in the following paragraphs, and thereby see the complex matrix of social and psychological barriers against which Anders had to contend in his project of expanding the human capacity for imagination. This is a necessary precursor to grasping Anders’ organizational work in the latter half of this chapter, and for understanding his attraction to Claude Eatherly, which will be explored in chapter two.

During the postwar years, military and civil officials continued the policy of compartmentalization and secrecy. In addition to being a security measure, this reorganization was a rationalization of mass scientific and engineering projects along a highly controlled Taylorist model (Ndiaye 146), a reflection of earlier parallel design processes coupled to the redesign of nuclear weapons and nuclear military doctrine to accommodate mass production and continual maintenance of aircraft and crews at war readiness (Schlosser 90, 97). In effect, this reorganization meant that many more persons became what might be called technical workers in the scientific assembly line. This often meant that these scientists only a hazy idea (if they had any idea at all) as to what larger end their work was being put, and hence, almost no inclination or ability to take responsibility for its results. They had little opportunity to discuss it with the public, and it became much more difficult to discuss it among themselves should the terms of their security clearance even permit it.

Millicent Dillon was a young, low-level physicist worked in arms development at Oak Ridge beginning in January of 1947. In her biographical essay “In the Atomic City,” she
describes her experience of the effects of compartmentalization and secrecy. The racial and gender segregation, isolation, and hierarchical structure of the facility meant that there were few opportunities to socialize. There was little to do but work. But she found the work itself was strangely abstract; for one of her assignments, producing a detailed report on theoretical advances in physics, she admits that she was never sure whether anyone else had read it—ever. She experienced disorientation not only in terms of what her work was for, but indeed whether it had any point at all:

Secrecy and a concomitant vagueness were the rules of the day, but as this was a secret project, why should I have expected anything different? We were part of a structure, of a hierarchy. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation was the prime contractor, its detailed functioning was not for us to inquire into.

Dillon recalls that in her working group, she seemed to be the only one troubled by this state of affairs. Few people seemed to worry about the end goal of their efforts, and nobody discussed it. Among those who did, they did so in an atmosphere of generalized anxiety:

As for those scientists I was observing [of the Association of Oak Ridge Engineers and Scientists (AORES)], the eleven men and the one woman who made up the executive committee, for three or four years they had been isolated in Oak Ridge as they worked obsessively on their secret assignments. During that time all of their activities had been scrutinized by the military, and there was a pervasive sense that one had better be careful what one said, especially on political subjects.

Nonetheless, some tried, participating earnestly in numerous discussion groups and informational meetings, trying to find some way to direct public opinion towards peace. They may have been naïve in Dillon’s later assessment as a seasoned activist, but at time the men and women of the AORES had the committee and the professional organization as familiar structures for civic action. They were the model of first resort, venerable expressions of the voluntary association which, as Robert Putnam observes, had been noted even by early observers such as Alexis de Tocqueville as being a particularly American habit. It was not just nuclear scientists who relied
on formal organization membership for civic expression. For middle-class Americans in general, official membership in these formally constituted voluntary associations reached its peak in the 1950s and 1960s (Putnam 49). Membership in voluntary associations and dues received were treated as primary indicators of strength for the activist organizations of the era, and treated as an indication of the potential influence of a given movement. Mailings, circulars, and membership lists constituted one of the primary avenues for organization and coordination of action. The decisions of local and national chapters were important, and the members of executive committees were crucial for maintaining the association as a coherent entity and for undertaking coordinated action with other like-minded groups. The centralized, public, and democratic nature of these voluntary associations meant that small and isolated groups such as AORES were particularly vulnerable to interference. AORES and similar organizations came under Congressional scrutiny; Oak Ridge scientists in general and the “scientific associations” were in particular singled out as sources of disturbing disloyalty. Fear set among the Oak Ridge staff. Some scientists were suspended, confronted with charges that they were not allowed to know. Dillon herself found that she was spending much of her time formulating policy that would bring AORES into compliance with the AEC’s loyalty program.

One consequence of such attacks is a phenomenon Latour noted as characteristic of the politics of dissent in laboratory settings; he noted that a central tactic in scientific conflict was to isolate opponents from their potential constituencies and subject them and their knowledge to what he calls a “trial of strength.” The outcome might result in transformation into “subjective individuals or objective representatives,” and the former carriers with it a reduction in status.
“Being subjective,” Latour concludes, “means that when you talk *in the name* of people or things, the listeners understand that you speak only for yourself.” (*Science* 78, emphases in the original). Charges such as disloyalty sever the accused from the technical and social architecture required to make intelligible claims; they fundamentally undermine the accused’s competence to speak on the matter of their (former) expertise. For the AORES members, the overall effect of being subjected to this trial of strength was poisonous. As a new arrival at Oak Ridge, Dillon’s initial spur to activism was her revulsion at racial segregation within the research facility. When she presented herself at the local civil rights organization as a volunteer, the staff quickly discovered she was from Oak Ridge, and asked her to leave: “Please, do us a favor and go away.” The government scrutiny brought to bear on nuclear workers like Dillon made her too dangerous an ally for any sane group of citizen activists. This is one way in which the moral individual can be neutralized. It also is utterly destructive to participation in civic and professional associational life, whether formal or informal.

Dillon’s experiences at Oak Ridge demonstrate how the rationalization and reorganization of scientific research into highly compartmentalized units overseen by a state security apparatus was inimical to the manner of social protest and civic action most commonly practiced and widely understood by middle-class American professionals in the post-war years. Though other factors were at work, the imposition of close controls on scientific and technical workers contributed to the rapid decline of organizations such as the FAS and the ECAS. Wittner writes that by 1949, the FAS could claim only 1,000 participants. Overall, only about 100 members could be counted as truly “activist” members (*One World* 326). The cause of world government
in general also suffered a near collapse: in 1949 the membership rolls of the United World Federalists entered irreversible decline (Boyer, *Bomb* 43). This would be the beginning of the end of the scientists’ movement. Later waves of nuclear activism would often treat weapons laboratories as sites of protest rather than locations for recruitment. For internationalist activists in the West, the utopian dream of world government would, as Nehring records, be superseded by the much more pragmatic reality of national movements struggling to act internationally (“National” 582). Social scientists and cultural historians have observed that social protest movements grow and decline cyclically (Meyer and Putnam are two examples from this chapter). That movements are cyclical does not mean that they return in the same form, even if there is institutional continuity among activist groups; the process forms a dialectic. Each wave finds that it must synthesize new modes of protest and new languages of dissent that are consonant with their material and cultural realities. We will explore these points below, but they will become particularly salient in chapters three and four.

d. Generational Outcomes

The process of compartmentalization and hierarchization within the nuclear laboratory began early; Dillon’s experiences date back to the very beginning of the Cold War. Its effects were enduring, and came to present a new challenge to disarmament activists. By the 1980s, the structures of isolation within weapons development workplaces had hardened. Hugh Gusterson documented the outcome in his fascinating ethnography of a nuclear weapons laboratory, *Nuclear Rites*. His research was conducted during the resurgence of anti-nuclear and disarmament activism in the United States and Western Europe during the early 1980s (referred
to as “the third wave”). The scientists he worked with at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) could not easily avoid acknowledging the ethical and political nature of their labor, for the LLNL was often besieged from without by picket lines of sign-waving protestors. Gusterson discovered first that while a significant number of researchers either did not contemplate the ethics of their work, or thought it to be “self-evidently appropriate.” Many of the employees there had, in fact, considered the ethics of their work. Furthermore, Gusterson emphasized that “[a common], and startling experience I had was finding scientist after scientist telling me I was lucky to be interviewing them because, unlike their colleagues, they had really thought about the issues” (52). Gusterson’s informants not only considered themselves well versed in the implications of their research but in many cases resented the protesters as naïve moralizers: the scientists viewed themselves as being on the front line of the Cold War and claimed that their technical expertise and the knowledge attained through their research gave them a nuanced, realist ethics that were not bankrupt or ignorant (as the disarmament activists asserted) but different. What is especially surprising is the prevalence of that particular viewpoint given the isolated nature of the scientists’ intra-office relationships. The protests outside the laboratory notwithstanding, writes Gusterson,

laboratory culture mainly deals with the issue by privatizing it: ‘I sometimes have the sense we’re not supposed to discuss it,’ said one engineer. Instead, employees pick up hints from what they hear others say, but they largely work through the issue alone. There is a collective process here, but it is a process based on socialized individualism and collective privatization—a collective understanding that this issue is largely, though not entirely, to be confronted alone. (52)

Finally, Gusterson concludes that this apparent individualism strongly resembles middle-class American attitudes that valorize individual free will and uncoerced choice in matters of conscience and political identity, but whose result is “a remarkable uniformity of behavior and
Immersion within the weapons laboratory environment, the right to handle sensitive information, and the ability to interact with expensive and highly guarded equipment are crucial components of the identity-formation process for these scientists: much of this process is tied to one’s security clearance. The public disgrace of the hearings that finished Oppenheimer centered on the revocation of his security credentials, hence, his access to power and knowledge. This included loss of access to work he had himself performed, and the professional relationships embedded in the research institutions he had once led. Clearance is a kind of belonging; revocation is a kind of casting-out. The need for clearance and all it entails placed activist scientists in a peculiar bind: in order to claim authoritative knowledge, some measure of complicity with the military-industrial complex appeared unavoidable. The goals of the scientists’ movement frequently encompassed the international control of nuclear weapons. Pro-disarmament scientists needed to be able to speak fluently on questions such as the technical feasibility of nuclear test monitoring, the industrial and scientific capacities of the Soviet Union, and the strategic disposition of the Eastern Bloc. Even a single capable opponent could destroy the appearance of a scientific consensus, as activist scientists discovered in their continual duels with the “omnipresent” Edward Teller. Disarmament advocates outside the realm of nuclear physics and weapons development were aware of this predicament. The clergyman and peace activist A.J. Muste, for instance, struck at the contradiction of “necessary access” in a 1946 open

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9 Gusterson also notes that American disarmament activists became similarly attentive to individualist rhetoric during the “third wave” of anti-nuclear protest, a point also made by Benford (“Hundredth”).

10 Teller was a dedicated anticommunist and a staunch ally to the US military and the hawks within the AEC. He in turn received their full support. Through his advocacy of the hydrogen bomb and opposition to the nuclear test ban he became, as Paul Rubinson notes, “the real Dr. Strangelove” (300).
letter to Albert Einstein. The American public, he wrote, needed to see elite scientists such as Einstein and umbrella organizations like the FAS reject weapons work entirely. Americans, he said, needed to “behold the spectacle of men who do not try to shift the responsibility for their actions to the military or the state, who refuse to make conscience subservient to them.” Muste enjoined scientists to be an example of social healing; “there is a deep cleavage in our souls and our society because our moral and social development has not kept pace with technological advance,”

that cleavage must be healed within the morally responsible human being. It will be healed by the scientist who becomes a prophet … [our destiny] is being decided by the scientists who take, or fail to take, the awful responsibility of being prophets, conscientious objectors, persons, whole human beings, and not technicians or slaves of a war-making state. (195)

The echoes with what we have seen in Anders should be clear. Scientists as disarmament activists faced high demands from fellow-activists and harsh pressures from their governments. Their perceived public authority as objective interpreters of the truth was both qualified and precarious, and the production of their perceived objective knowledge often required compromises that were by no means neutral. Maintaining that authority and competence would become vital work for disarmament advocates.

These challenges notwithstanding, international scientific communities and their spokespersons acquired rhetorical and practical power—the cultural capital of expertise—within the post-war technocratic states. They would be called on to characterize reality, to interpret the advantages, possibilities, and dangers of that reality to the public, and to design public policy in light of their findings—especially when discussing matters related to nuclear weapons, power, and waste. First, because the questions are seen as being of a technical nature (Gilpin 29) and
further, because the knowledge-product of science still retained an aura of objectivity and non-ideological neutrality.

Although contemporary North Americans and Europeans have to some extent come to distrust scientific authority in matters of nuclear policy and become aware that they are enmeshed in a carefully managed public-relations propaganda landscape, recent struggles over the meaning of Fukushima in Japan, North America, and Europe demonstrate that publics still look to (now-competing) blocs of scientifically-accredited elites, or those with the appearance of expertise, to understand the meaning of nuclear accidents, radiation, and the dangers of nuclear waste. The afterlives of scientific authority will return in the latter half of chapter four. For the present, these issues are particularly important because they ground the reasons by which Günther Anders would come to devote much of his time and correspondence to recruiting nuclear scientists and enfolding them in his projects during the second wave of anti-nuclear activism. As we will see in sections (1.IV-V), Anders would aim to both exploit and defend their authority. In doing so, he participated in the redefinition of the political role of science.

III. Anders and the Bomb

a. Wars and Exile

The preceding section offered a narrative about intellectual, cultural, and social trends which together redefined the political role of science and scientists in the years following the Second World War as well as a summary of the first wave of disarmament activism. The early years of the atomic era were characterized by rapidly changing, complex arrays of persons, institutions, and events. The tumult of the era is important to keep in mind as we turn to Günther
Anders, as there was a surprisingly long span of time between Anders’ immediate, vivid personal reactions to the dawn of the atomic era, his first forays into formal analysis that era, and his eventual activism. Though the relative sparsity of his published work between 1945 and 1955 might imply a period of inactivity, the early years of the Cold War were in fact a time of intense intellectual growth for Anders.

Anders, who was at the time in exile in the United States, was profoundly affected by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He recognized that it was the first day of a new age, one in which humanity had become capable of eradicating itself. “I can see it before me even now,” he wrote later, “I was in New York, sitting at the table with the family of my then-wife, and then came the news on the radio that an atomic bomb had been dropped” (Gewalt 42). Anders biographer Raimund Bahr claims that beyond simply creating a lasting impression, the events of 1945—culminating in the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—formed the greatest turning point in Anders’ life (199). Though it was a turning point in his life, Anders’ reaction to the bombings nonetheless represented a continuation of Anders’ previous thinking on war and technology, a body of thought that began during the Great War. He had been a committed pacifist since his teenage years; in the latter part of the First World War he had been sent as an agricultural laborer to German-occupied France, and his experiences of barracks brutality and his encounters with grievously wounded soldiers staggering back amid truckloads of the dead caused him to reject war and to recognize that behind apparent peace lies the threat of atrocity (Bahr 99-100). Returning to his parents’ home, the teenage Anders took to poetry. In one poem, he depicted a peaceful wood, but then the tone of the poem changes: “A fearful trembling rises up in
me / This shocking peace shakes me / I cry out to my self: It is war! It is war! / Peace lies forever
in fragments” (qtd in Bahr 101). Anders’ pessimistic attitude towards the prospect of
international peace and stability had deep roots, and profoundly affected his career as an
academic philosopher.

In the Weimar years, Anders had been a promising student of Heidegger and Husserl, and
between their and his renowned father’s influence, it was well within Anders’ resources to pursue
an academic post. As the 1920s came to a close, however, Anders became aware of Adolf
Hitler’s growing power—and unlike many of his academic contemporaries, decided to take him
seriously. He organized a seminar on *Mein Kampf*, which, to that point, had not been a text of
interest in intellectual circles. In fellow philosopher and longtime friend Hans Jonas’
recollection, Anders was the first of their circle to consider Hitler the greatest danger of the time
(Anders, “Gespräch” 4; Bahr 173). Paul van Dijk observes that Anders was not content to merely
analyze the growing threat of fascism, but felt that he—and other academics—had a
responsibility to do what they could to combat it. Thus, Anders began a separation from
academic philosophy proper, pursuing instead a varied career as a journalist, novelist, and
essayist, writing on political and philosophical topics for lay audiences in diverse genres and
styles (7). The struggle against fascism was the foundation of Anders’ insistence on a concrete,
occasional philosophy.

Simultaneously, Anders began to consider the task of writing a philosophical
anthropology, which, as we saw in (1.1c), was project that hoped to describe how individuals
situate themselves in a mutable self- and other-constructed world. In the late 1920s and early
1930s, then, Anders had already embarked on two topics that would remain significant in his postwar writings. During his exile in the United States, Anders would incorporate an analysis of technology and the capacity for human beings to become “products of their own products,” into his anthropology. In a diary entry from 1942, Anders narrated his first formulation of the idea—and the experience—of what he calls the “Promethean shame,” a prerequisite component to the Promethean discrepancy defined in (1.Ia), namely, that human beings are imperfect and faulty when viewed in comparison with the created products of their own industry (Antiquiertheit 1: 23). At this historical point, Bahr argues that Anders’ development as a philosopher was largely complete, and that it awaited an opportunity to be put into use. That opportunity, he says, was the bomb (183). Anders was, to a certain extent, one of those persons who “confronted that new era with ideas and professional identities formed over many years in the old, pre-atomic age” as we saw in the discussion (1.IIa-b) of Boyer’s analysis of the challenge posed by the dawn of the atomic era. One can add a caveat that, as a philosophical anthropology oriented towards observation and analysis of specific circumstances within contemporary culture and society, Anders’ ideas were fortuitously situated for imagining and describing the new era as it came into being. Equally important, his ideas could contain the tools for critiquing reified ideas inappropriate to the pre-atomic age.

That serendipity notwithstanding, it would be ten years before Anders’ first major statement on the atomic era (“Reflections on the H-Bomb”) saw print. Two reasons might be offered as an explanation for Anders’ late entry into the field of anti-nuclear activism. The first concerns language; the second involves his professional and civic isolation.
In an interview with Konrad Paul Liessman, Anders claimed that he understood the implications of the atom bomb almost immediately, but that he held back from writing about it because his attempts to encompass the magnitude of the situation in writing fell short (4-5). In his introduction to *Hiroshima ist Überall*, written about the same time, Anders recalled with exaggerated effect that the announcement of the bombings threw him into a kind of stupor and speechlessness, a condition which did not relent until the early 1950s:

It was then that I forced myself, while sitting under a tree in a Leipzig summer garden—for I had set myself an ultimatum—to set down at least a few sentences about this ‘subject’ on paper … But what I wrote there, not with any great fluency, but with every letter drawn with hesitancy, was hardly more than the recognition of my incapability, no, our incapability to imagine that which ‘we’ have created or produced … in fact, practically all of my later writings are variations on this fundamental theme of discrepancy. (xi-xii; emphasis in the original)

Anders had certainly considered discrepancy before this, having lectured on it in the early 1940s, and he prefigured it in his unpublished 1931 novel *Die molussische Katakome*. At any rate, amongst his miscellaneous papers and drafts encompassing material from the 40s and early 50s is a hastily written list of notes setting down his reactions to the bombings. Among the points is this:

9. we are larger than ourselves—the consequence of this, of what we built and invent, exceeds not only the what the inventor had intended to create, but indeed all that to which we could morally claim responsibility (“das bombengedicht”; lowercase in the original).

Taken in its entirety, this early draft closely resembles what would later become his “Theses” and the latter half to volume one of *Antiquiertheit*. The list does indeed reflect the functional core of his disarmament writings: the Promethean discrepancy, that gulf between the human ability to produce objects and the capacity to imagine their effects. It displays no acknowledgment of the work of other contemporary disarmament thinkers, though many such persons wrote on similar themes. What is additionally interesting is the ultimatum that he sets for himself. This ultimatum
reflects his description of a larger struggle for attaining an appropriate language within his philosophical discipline. In the mid-1940s, Anders was laying out the critique of philosophical language which he would incorporate into *Antiquiertheit* as a justification for his choice of style and generic form:

In philosophy, language serves the same role that lenses do in optics: it is the mediating element placed between the eye and the object whose purpose it is to render the object visible. The glass-grinding Spinoza knew what it was he was doing. The belief that the [truth-revealing] task of language can be accomplished simply through the replacement of dull everyday words with specialized academic or esoteric terminology is simply laughable. (“Über den philosophischen Stil”)

In 1949, Anders identified similar difficulties as an author of poetry, in determining who—if anyone—would listen. “To whom are you speaking? Who is going to hear what you produce … In what kind of place? Do you envision a lecture hall? … you should write no piece without asking these questions and answering them firmly, at least during the act of writing” (“Dichten” 2). The revelatory task of poetry, too, was hindered by the dual risks of wandering into “over-educated” or “dull and folksy” vocabulary—taken as a project, Anders would come to classify poetry as the most arcane of language groups, restricted to a highly local audience, and he reiterated in *Der Mann* that “poetry is poetry only in its own language (58). Further, Anders faced especial difficulties because of his determination to write in multiple genres. “Quite often,” he says, “I have found that my poems have constrained my ability to write prose. . .”

Over many years, I have tried—something which many are able to do without difficulty—to switch between the two or to write both simultaneously. To me it seems impossible to do both at the same time … should a piece of prose come through, then it happens only and always in conflict with rhythm, which has slipped out of the poem and into the prose, and always has to be thrown out again. (“zu Poetik”)

For Anders, who strongly identified as a writer, these passages about working through the difficulties of language are an ultimatum of their own. Writing was his living; his first two
spouses were themselves prominent intellectuals and writers (Hannah Arendt and Elisabeth Freundlich) whom he had met in intellectual and scholarly contexts. In his later years, he characterized his role in the anti-nuclear struggle of the 1950s and 1960s in authorial terms. “In the first phase, during the ‘Struggle against Atomic Death,’ I was only one of many thousands. If there was any special task that fell to me, there is only one thing that this could consist of, that is to say, to overcome the widespread speechlessness” (Hiroshima ix; emphasis in the original). He was by his own account uneducated in scientific matters (“Dichten” 4); literary and philosophical language were his necessary tools for undertaking the world-revealing task of knowledge-production, writerly work which he likened to a kind of “cognitive cartography” (Antiquiertheit 1: 235).

Struggles to find an appropriate vocabulary were not the only difficulties Anders faced during the decade following the war. Throughout his years of exile, from 1933 to 1950, he consistently found himself relatively marginalized within his intellectual and professional milieux. His decision to pursue his concrete, “occasional” philosophy rather than a university post in the late 1920s had in a sense been a gamble. He had placed great hopes on his anti-fascist novel Die molussische Katakombe, which was completed and sent off to the presses just in time for Hitler’s seizure of power (van Dijk 7). It was not to be published for almost 60 years, and Anders spoke about it with regret for the rest of his life. Some of his friends and colleagues would become annoyed by Anders’ constant reference to it; Hannah Arendt complained to Hans Jonas that, “In his book on the atomic bomb, Günther cited his never-published Molussia first as if it were the Bible and second as if it had been through a print run of several million. It was, in
the truest sense, crazy” (qtd in Bahr 178). Absent a university position or a significant notable published text to establish his reputation as a freelance writer and intellectual, Anders found it difficult to acquire significant work in Paris, and in the United States as well. Bahr recounts that when Anders arrived in New York in 1936, he found it difficult to connect with the extant emigrant groups; Anders was in effect “fully separated from his original social support network” (180). Where other exiles of Anders’ cohort from Nazi-occupied Europe found secure teaching positions, or work as screenwriters in Hollywood, Anders found himself scraping by on tutoring gigs, occasional lectures, and as a laborer in a Hollywood scene shop. This is, says Bahr, somewhat of an oddity, given the strength and influence of the European intellectual emigrant community in Hollywood (181). As we saw in (1.II) above, isolation and separation from networks of acting and thinking is one of the avenues through which the moral person can be enervated; this point is developed below, but it will additionally ground much of chapter three.

b. Return to Vienna

Anders’ professional isolation continued in the post-war years and persisted after he and second wife Elisabeth Freundlich left the US for Austria. Rejecting East and West Germany both, Anders followed the Viennese Freundlich back to her home city, Vienna. In 1950, this was for an intellectual like Anders a move from exile to exile; post-war Vienna was on the periphery of nascent Cold War Europe. Moreover, his worsening arthritis left him at times practically immobile and housebound, a situation which he construed as an opportunity to establish his reputation through doing more writing “something which I have not yet managed to do” (van Dijk 17; Bahr 247). During this time, Anders had occasional painful encounters with his
intellectual contemporaries. One such encounter, a misunderstanding which would become part of a storied decade-long period of general bad feeling, took place between Anders and Theodor Adorno. Raimund Bahr provides a comprehensive summary and analysis of the incident. Immediately after his arrival from the US, Anders approached Adorno at his office and was mistakenly sent away. Anders was furious, writing to Adorno years later that,

I found your conduct to be an insult, no, practically a complete rejection, of a self-evident solidarity. I came back to Frankfurt for the first time since returning to Europe, to greet you, another returned emigrant; but you had your secretary show me off like a troublesome beggar with the words, ‘Herr Professor really has no time’ (qtd in Bahr 128).

Altogether, these difficulties took their toll. Even as he completed Antiquiertheit, Anders and Freundlich divorced. During this period, Hans Jonas met his old friend Anders after many years of separation. It was, as he wrote to Hannah Arendt, “a gruesome disappointment”

His soul has been shrunk into that of a hateful and hated dwarf; his mind has become foolish, fatuous, and purposeless. A savior of humanity, who no longer can no longer see the human—in anyone—let alone love them; a prophet, leering after the Nobel Peace Prize (this is not my assumption, but something I have heard put forward as an expectation, with my own unbelieving ears!) (qtd in Bahr 141).

This, then, was the situation Anders found himself in during the early and middle 1950s. He was a Jew returning from exile to a country complicit in the Holocaust, a country that was still under military occupation, one which found itself in many ways on the margins of Europe. He was a relatively obscure philosopher in ill health, who held no academic position, and who was committed to an insecure path as a freelance writer. The atomic bombings of Japan had convinced him that urgent collective action was necessary if humanity was to survive. He was engaged in earnest struggles as a philosopher and a poet to create a new language which could simultaneously be rigorous and specific, which would function to describe contemporary and pressing issues, and yet retain the ability to have a world-revealing effect on lay readers. He
was aware—and insisted to himself—that literary forms such as poetry must be created for a definite audience; but for his most pressing anti-nuclear message, there was practically no audience in the German-speaking world. The disarmament movement was at a nadir worldwide, and in Austria, for all intents and purposes, the movement did not exist. The cause of nuclear disarmament in Austria was especially dire (Nehring, “Cold War” 153).\textsuperscript{11} Though arising from different circumstances than those which confronted the activist researchers in the “scientists’ movement,” Anders’ crisis is similarly one of changing disciplinary competence, uncertain public recognition and authority, and isolation.

As discussed in the Note on Style, scholars including Paul van Dijk and Konrad Paul Liessmann have observed that Anders’ writing is frequently aggressive, indeed angry, in its tone and content. Liessmann proposes that in light of its aggression Anders’ philosophy, “probably more than any other, places every reader’s mode of living into radical question” (3). Moreover, these scholars—and Anders himself—readily admit that Anders intentionally pursued this kind of reception, and that he wished to be known as iconoclastic cultural critic for whom caricature, opposition, contradiction, and exaggeration were not just legitimate, but necessary rhetorical interventions. As we saw in (1.Ib) and which will be further discussed in (1.V), he considered the atomic era to be a difficult philosophical terrain made still more difficult to apprehend by deliberate obfuscation. Consequently, to effectively reach his audience, he believed it necessary that speech and writing be “honed to as sharp a point as possible” (\textit{Antiquiertheit} 1: 237). As discussed in the Note on Style, van Dijk’s and

\textsuperscript{11} Though opinion polling showed a promising level of unspoken public sentiment which was skeptical of the bomb.
Liessmann’s claims that forceful and indiscriminate interventions constitute much of Anders’ work are to some extent true. Bahr, however, claims that the reasoning behind Anders’ vitriol is more complex, and also personal. In his view, Anders’ radical rhetoric, which he deployed in not just his published writings, but in his correspondence and personal interactions, may well have a strategy adopted by Anders to deal with his feelings of personal powerlessness and the physical infirmities that hindered his movement; by forcing the world to react to the anger in his writings, Anders had a way to take part in it (132). Throughout, Anders retained the capacity to write no matter how difficult or painful it may have been. By 1956, as Antiquiertheit was going to press, events in the middle of the Pacific Ocean and in St. Louis, Missouri, would transform Anders’ prolific habits as a writer into a powerful organizational asset. And his fervent passion would prove to be a powerful tool for civic interaction.

IV. Historical Contexts: The Second Wave

a. Fallout

On the first day of March, 1954, at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific Ocean, the US detonated a new model of hydrogen bomb as part of the “Castle Bravo” series of nuclear tests. A calculation error on the part of the weapons designers caused the bomb to explode with twice the planned yield. The fallout from the weapon traveled farther than had been anticipated, and drifted beyond the zone of clearance which the AEC had established around the test site. The United States was forced to evacuate more than 200 native Marshall Islanders. The radioactive cloud also contaminated the Japanese fishing vessel Lucky Dragon, causing acute radiation sickness in all 23 of its crew. One, the radio operator Aikichi Kuboyama, died after months of suffering
Japanese citizens responded with both anger and fear; the US ambassador
cabled that “the government and people cracked” and had entered “a period of uncontrolled
masochism … aided by [an] unscrupulous press which seemed to revel in its martyrdom” (qtd. in
Wittner, Resisting 146-147). In the aftermath of the disaster, opinion polling showed that 78
percent of Japanese people opposed all nuclear testing, and a petition campaign condemning
atomic testing gathered signatures from a full third of all citizens, some 32 million persons. The
surge of fury gained institutional coherence in the First World Conference Against Atomic and
Hydrogen Bombs, which first met in August 1955 at Hiroshima. Participants at the conference
later founded a dedicated activist organization called Gensuikyo, also known as the Japan
Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Ellis 141-142, Wittner, Resisting, 8).

US politicians and the AEC were not impressed. They derided Japanese concerns and
belittled Japanese physicians. AEC chairman Leo Strauss went as far as to claim that the Lucky
Dragon was a covert Russian vessel, and that its contamination was a deliberate propaganda ploy
(Rhodes, Dark Sun 542). The Soviets did in fact capitalize on the Lucky Dragon disaster as a
propaganda tool, using it as part of the justification for their proposed 1955 nuclear test ban. But
their concerns about the dangers of fallout were genuine. An internal intelligence report
composed by Soviet nuclear scientists in late March of 1954 highlighted the Castle Bravo
disaster and concluded that “The world community is concerned … such concern is entirely
understandable … we cannot but admit that humanity faces an enormous threat of the end of all
life on Earth” (Evangelista 52). The world community was indeed concerned. The Federation of
American Scientists, SANE, Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru, Pope Pius XII, and
Albert Schweitzer, among others, all condemned nuclear testing and warned of the dangers of fallout. The *Lucky Dragon*’s fate featured prominently in the 1955 Russell-Einstein Manifesto, which argued that

> [A] bomb can now be manufactured which will be 2,500 times as powerful as that which destroyed Hiroshima. Such a bomb, if exploded near the ground or under water, sends radio-active particles into the upper air. They sink gradually and reach the surface of the earth in the form of a deadly dust or rain. It was this dust which infected the Japanese fishermen and their catch of fish. No one knows how widely such lethal radio-active particles might be diffused, but the best authorities are unanimous in saying that a war with H-bombs might possibly put an end to the human race. It is feared that if many H-bombs are used there will be universal death, sudden only for a minority, but for the majority a slow torture of disease and disintegration.

The Manifesto called for a structured international effort to pursue peace and disarmament and ultimately proved to be the catalyst for the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Beginning in 1957, the Pugwash Conferences brought together scientists from Eastern and Western blocs alike for informal discussion of pressing scientific issues. Overall, the public response to the *Lucky Dragon* incident was vocal and international; it was a pivotal moment in disarmament activism and the birth of the “second wave” of anti-nuclear activism (Evangelista 47; Katz 14; Wittner, *Resisting* 9).

Japanese anger and fear over the irradiation of their citizens contributed to a worldwide wave of disquiet about the long-term effects of fallout; between 1955 and 1957 polling in the United States showed that the proportion of persons who believed atomic tests posed “a real danger” increased from 17 to 52 percent (Winkler 101). This growing unease prompted citizens and scientists to push for wider study of the issue. One of the most influential investigations was sponsored by the Greater St. Louis Citizen’s Committee for Nuclear Information. Under the guidance of Louise Reiss, a joint university study showed that the fallout product strontium-90
could be detected in milk, and that in turn, strontium had a propensity to replace calcium in the bones and teeth of children, which meant that children drinking contaminated milk might face long-term (strontium-90 has a half-life of approximately 30 years) and irreversible exposure to radiation. The process of contamination Reiss and her colleagues described was complex, and involved biological mechanisms unfamiliar to laypersons. It largely fell to scientists and physicians to explain the dangers in a succinct yet nuanced manner. In a 1957 radio address, Linus Pauling explained genetic mutation and distinguished between background environmental radiation and the (relatively) low levels of radioactive release from civilian use of atomic energy. These, he said, have the potential to be dangerous if handled incorrectly. But, he said, these were not so dangerous as the military uses, the bomb tests. Because if you work carefully in a carefully planned building you can take steps to control the radioactivity that is being released. If you explode a bomb in the upper atmosphere, you can’t control it. The fallout radiation, Strontium-90, and similar things, spread over the world, drop down. Everybody in the world now has Strontium-90 in his bones, radioactive material, and nobody had it 15 years ago, 10 years ago. Strontium-90 did not exist. This is a new hazard to the human race, a new hazard to the health of people, and scientists need to talk about it.

The efforts of Pauling and others were effective. By 1959, the magazine Consumer Reports could publish a grim article titled “The Milk We Drink” which certified a possible hazard and advocated for an end to above-ground nuclear testing (Winkler 101). The Lucky Dragon incident was crucial in convincing the broader public that the effects of nuclear weapons were not those of normal weapons, but were unpredictable and not locally containable. The nascent suspicion that fallout might mean unavoidable, long-term exposure to contaminated food, air, and water transformed the outrage spurred by the Lucky Dragon into an expansion of the imagination, one which would open the way to an enduring, intimate, and generational fear.
b. Forms: Diary, fable, dialog, and commandment

As the “second wave” of disarmament activism began to take shape, the central components of Anders’ anti-nuclear thinking began to see print. Although the first volume of his Antiquiertheit would not appear until 1956, portions of the book appeared in 1955 in Merkur. 1956 additionally saw the publication of his essay “Reflections on the H-Bomb” in the iconoclastic New York magazine Dissent. 1957 saw the appearance of his “Commandments” in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Although the literary forms Anders utilized in this period were diverse—among them fable, dialog, diary, essay, and poetry—his central theme of the discrepancy was omnipresent. Each work was additionally targeted at one or more of the crucial philosophical tasks Anders had identified as necessary for understanding the nuclear age: to know what the Bomb is, to recognize what it implies for humanity, and to accomplish the imaginative work necessary to confront it. Though directed to different tasks, these texts—as we saw in the Note on Style—built off a common foundation. Anders was, then, committed to the multifaceted approach to societally relevant, activist philosophy he had undertaken in the late 1920s; he was intent on fulfilling the concrete, occasional philosophy he had promised in the introduction to his Antiquiertheit, that “hybrid mixture of philosophy and journalism; a philosophy that has the situation of the contemporary world in mind, and which has as its subject characteristic elements of the world in which we live” (1: 8; emphasis in the original). Beyond coherence of theme and programmatic intent, Anders returned again and again to his characteristic pointed rhetorical style, a style marked by the use of contradiction, confrontation, and paradox.
Anders claimed a particular set of purposes for these genres, a revelatory task that each might help accomplish. It will be useful to explore how these genres complement one another in light of Anders’ aims. In his 1965 essay “Warnbilder,” he laid out the importance of his diary (having selected a dialog as best suited for explicating the diary, so that he might better contradict himself through his interlocutor). “You, you keep a diary?” his interlocutor demands, “And here I’ve been telling myself that you’re the epitome of the extrovert. Who lives for one thing: for the struggle against the atomic menace … Today you chase off to Japan, tomorrow to Mexico. That’s what I thought you lived for. That you most certainly would have neither the time nor the interest to get involved in your so-called inner life” (71; emphasis in the original). No indeed, wrote Anders. For him, the exploration of his own interiority was not the goal. Neither did he intend to memorialize and treasure the past. Rather, he claimed that his purpose was to attend to “those experiences which, though they are mine, are not mine alone”—that is, those shared experiences which characterize the contemporary world in which he and his fellow men and women live (74; emphasis in the original). In this sense, the diary served Anders as a methodological tool for conducting his philosophical anthropology, and for including himself in it. Human nature was not constant for Anders, but variable. It shapes and is shaped by its material, technical, and cultural processes; we explored some of the processes active in his historical context in (1.II). From Anders’ perspective, this meant that determined observation was necessary to understand the changing world in which we are immersed. The past, as well, required a paradoxical kind of observation. Rather than glorifying or preserving the treasures of the past through his writing, Anders saw the scenes set down in his diaries in the same light as
those billboards put up along the highway which memorialize terrible car accidents as warnings. “Warnings,” he explained, “are what my pictures are as well” (76).

In the opening chapter of _Antiquiertheit_, Anders turned to his diary to explain the origins of his concept of the Promethean shame. As he recounted, during his wartime exile to California he and a friend took an afternoon to attend a technical exposition. There, he said, his friend behaved in the strangest way; so strangely, that in the end it was him I was observing rather than the machines. As soon as one of these highly-complex apparatuses began to work, he cast down his eyes and fell silent. Even more striking was that he hid his hands behind his back, as if he were ashamed of himself to have brought these crude, clumsy tools of his into the rarefied society of these devices which functioned with the utmost accuracy and refinement. (1: 23)

Following the immediate impressions given in the first diary entry, Anders returned to reflect on the situation in entries from two subsequent days, refining, self-critiquing, and expanding on the central observation each time until such point as he could sit down to conduct a more thorough and explicitly structured philosophical analysis. By beginning with the specific situation that triggered his train of thought, Anders aimed to persuade his audience that his argument was based in a special kind of fact, one which could serve as a special kind of data: he was not simply trying to show that the scene occurred in life, but that the social drama enacted in the anecdote was culturally significant. That the event described was not idiosyncratic, but was instead one of those experiences which he called ‘mine, but not mine alone,’ experiences which characterize the world and which are deeply tied to other shared systems of meaning and behavior. Some two decades after Anders published _Antiquiertheit_, the influential American anthropologist Clifford Geertz laid out his interpretive approach to culture. “What an ethnographer is faced with,” he wrote, “is a multiplicity of complex conceptual structures … which are at once strange, irregular, and inexplicit, and which he must contrive somehow first to grasp and then to render.” Writing
ethnography, he said, “is like trying to read a manuscript … written not in conventionalized
graphs of sound but in transient examples of shaped behavior” (10). The parallels between the
two are striking. Viewed in the wake of Geertz, Anders’ attention to the diary as a form must be
considered as crucial in enabling him to conduct his philosophy as an anthropology that is
concerned with grasping, rendering, and interpreting human behavior. Further, because he insists
on describing his process of reflection and interpretation, Anders’ use of the diary goes beyond
suasion. He is, in effect, attempting to teach his readers new practices of observation and
thinking. In addition to its role as a knowledge-producing tool, it is also one that seeks to
produce its own kind of authority by opening a transaction between concrete, occasional
observation and introspection.12

In addition to new ways of observation, Anders sought to create new mythic and
symbolic vocabularies for his readers. In the opening of Antiquiertheit, Anders did not rely on his
diary alone, but coupled it to other literary forms. After using the diary to lay out the Promethean
shame, Anders paused before moving from the relatively informal journal style to more
structured analysis in order to give his audience lines from an old Molussian workers’-song. The
Molussian lyrics and aphorisms were fragments of the literary fable-world Anders could never
abandon, his unpublished imaginative realm which Hannah Arendt said he was crazy to expect
anyone to know. “Ach,” sing the fable-workers, “In the realm of the exact / It’s not befitting, an
upright back / Only things may stand up straight / Machines alone have noble traits” (1: 26).
These scattered traces, the fragmentary songs of a never-realized world are mysterious remnants

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12 Chapter two will dwell more at length on the uses of his Hiroshima diary Der Mann for knowing and
knowledge-making.
as they appeared in *Antiquiertheit*; they are not as deeply elaborated as those of other literary attempts at founding mythic-symbolic systems for a political project, like that undertaken by Novalis. Nonetheless, Anders used these remnants to hint at productive ways of thinking. It was one of his principles that fable could explain fable. In Anders’ tale “Die Umdrehung,” two listeners exclaim to Aesop their amazement: “How can it ever be,” they cry, “that you always have such success translating your insights into metaphorical language!” Not so, says Aesop. They have it the wrong way around. He does not begin with insight and proceed to translation, as allegorists do. Rather, the work is to turn imagery to insight. “What you call fables,” he concludes, “are allegories in reverse” (*Blick* 101). Fables and poems, too, are modular and portable forms within Anders’ work.

**c. Groundwork to Praxis**

Anders’ philosophical and diary-dialogs are carefully constructed rhetorical and philosophical episodes. Even those that aimed for—or at the very least claimed—a high level of biographical veracity were frequently written or edited with the intention of presenting a complete narrative arc. Thus, as a general guideline, instead of becoming preoccupied with the factuality of Anders’ “hybrid of journalism and philosophy” this and subsequent chapters read his texts in light of the disclaimer given in the introduction to *Der Mann* “As regards the editing of the source text,” he wrote,

> The original was no more than a draft, full of redundancies and personal details whose revelation would be indiscreet. I have filled out the incomplete sections and elided the redundancies. Where discretion demanded, I have made names, dates and places unrecognizable. Furthermore, I have taken arguments (in reported speech or conversation) that were not concise and brought them more quickly to their point; likewise, I have condensed discussions which took place across many days and meetings while accelerating their tempo. Although hardly a sentence remains unchanged from the original text, I believe that in no place have I done injustice to the truth. (16)
Anders did not always depict himself as the victor in every argumentative encounter he recounted in his works. However, his editing for concision and conclusion mean that even his argumentative retreats are usually shown being carried out in good order. His verbal opponents, as it were, were kinder on the page than in person. His letters suggest that some of the conflicts he condensed into (for instance) *Der Mann* were actually quite painful, and were continued in other activist venues. In a 28 January 1959 letter to Hajo Schedlich and intended also for Hans Werner Richter and Peggy Duff (organizing secretary for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)), Anders offered up “something discreet” about de Bock, founder of the Dutch group Anti-Atombomb Action:

> De Bock’s capacity as an organizer, particularly as a propagandist, is undeniable … however … His politics are at best infantile, he seeks the approval of opponents, he is eager for publicity, and he is even conniving: as I was preparing my section ‘On Moral Obligations in the Atomic Age’ at the Fourth Congress (a section which I naturally comported myself as religiously neutral), he denounced me to the Japanese as an atheist propagandist, and even went behind my back to say that I had been speaking badly [about my fellow participants]

As Anders gained increasing recognition both as writer and as activist, the gap between the argumentative ideal of his writings and the day-to-day reality of his political work grew larger.  

After his burst of publications during the mid-50s, in 1958 Anders was invited to serve as a delegate at the Fourth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (4th World Conference). Anders’ experiences in attempting to convene the section on moral obligations during the 4th World Conference, which led to the confrontation with de Bock described above, are additionally interesting because of the glimpses it allows into his interaction with a learned circle of disarmament activists, as well as to points of insight into what he believed the potential

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13 Secretary to Hans Werner Richter (see the following paragraph).
14 A close reading of this gap as it appears in his correspondence with Claude Eatherly is given in chapter two.
utility of literary-philosophical efforts such as the “Commandments” to be. In Der Mann, Anders recounted that the reaction of his fellow-delegates to the suggestion of a “Moral Codex for the Atomic Age” alternated between the two extremes of distrust and wonderment. The others in the seminar were, he reported, perplexed by his claims to be unattached to a partisan agenda, and uninterested in advancing any other agenda other than an anti-atomic one. In Anders’ view, the suspicion and skepticism, the seeming refusal to take Anders’ moral program seriously was not the result of any lack of intelligence. On the contrary, he rated the intelligence and level of education as “exceptionally high” (Der Mann 72). Three specific objections Anders received from his interlocutors at the 4th World Conference when he presented portions of his “Commandments” as an example were rooted in plausibility, relation to extant systems of religion and morality, and the basis of authority he proposed for his moral system. In his retelling, the first objection he received was ironizing and dismissive. Did he expect, he counterparts asked, that the atomic powers would “naturally, immediately comply with your postulates?” Anders’ reply is presented as one of his characteristic reversals. “Naturally not,” he said, but when the political and military elites in their turn offered moral defenses for their actions, what they would then find would be difficult reception in “a changed moral climate” (73). As to the relationship with existing systems of morality, Anders asserted that “Commandments and proscriptions must be formulated such that they blend in naturally with existing morality” without resort to “linguistic tricks” (Der Mann 73). The last question struck at the authoritative basis for his proposed moral code. By what power or absolute, he was asked, would such a code achieve binding force. Anders’ reply was an aphoristic default to urgency:
“when there’s a fire,” he said, “it doesn’t do to question the legitimacy of the fire department.” Writing in retrospect, Anders remarked on the oddity that it was this “not exactly academic, let alone profound, answer that earned me their first sincere sympathy. Probably it sounded like some kind of folksy saying or Buddhist maxim” (*Der Mann* 73-74). In addition to showing one potential effect Anders envisioned for his writerly interventions—a changed moral climate, this passage also illustrates that the religious tone remarked on in the Note on Style was deliberate, but self-limited by Anders to avoid taking on a deceptive or manipulative character. Further, we see some of the grounds by which Anders came to endorse fable, aphorism, and saying as useful components of directed philosophical argument. Not least, Anders’ interactions with a learned audience will be a useful contrast to his account of attempting to organize laypersons in other venues.

Additionally, he was a member of the Munich-based Komitee gegen Atomrüstung (Committee against Atomic Armaments, or Munich Committee) under the leadership of Hans Werner Richter, which was a local iteration of the SPD program Kampf dem Atomtod (Struggle against Atomic Death), as well as a flagship member of the European Federation (Federation) against Nuclear Arms, a pan-European umbrella organization whose 1959 creation was guided by the British CND and their German counterparts, notably the Munich Committee. In time, he would be a founding member of the Austrian Easter March Committee (Easter March Committee). This work meant a staggering amount of travel and letter writing, to which Anders added dozens of personal and literary correspondences. It also resulted in Anders becoming a public speaker, speechwriter, and interview subject, as well as an outspoken debate and
committee partisan. This was not an easy change for a formerly shut-in, middle-aged philosopher of poor health. Anders’ letters and unpublished notes provide a glimpse into this time of transition. As discussed in the overview of political action at Met Lab at Chicago and in Millicent Dillon’s account of her time at Oak Ridge (presented above in (1.IIc)) the presence or lack of personal and organizational networks, in conjunction with the relative ability of persons to associate strongly affects the efficacy—even the possibility—of organized dissent. In Anders’ case, the late 1950s and early 1960s were a period when he was rapidly establishing necessary networks of contacts within the activist world. The kind of allies he approached and his interactions with those allies are a crucial intersection of his philosophical and activist praxis.

Historian Holger Nehring emphasizes the importance of contacts among and between activists in his study of transnational interactions between second-wave anti-nuclear participants in the UK and BRD. These contacts encompass a number of audiences, from specifically targeted elements of the government and the public, to expressions of solidarity or conflict with other movement organizations. Nehring observes that there is an apparent contradiction that goes along with the central role played by communication. On the one hand, he notes that regional and international efforts by activist organizations achieved definite successes during the 1950s (“National” 562). In the postwar era, German and Austrian pacifists had to recover from their near-total destruction at the hands of the Nazi government. These men and women had to practically reinvent forms of protest and claim a public sphere for political action. Pacifists in the UK, meanwhile, possessed a continuity of institutional knowledge in groups like the War Resisters’ International which buttressed the formation of disarmament groups like the CND and
the Direct Action Committee (DAC). These groups were able to provide extant models for their West German contemporaries. The example of the Aldermaston marchers was adopted in 1960 by the Hamburg Quakers and became the Easter Marches of Atomic Weapons Opponents (“National” 564). Outside England, the Easter marches became a widespread and powerful method of protest throughout Europe that continued into the 1980s, and the movement experienced a revival in 2011 following the Fukushima nuclear disaster.\textsuperscript{15}

The success of the Easter Marches notwithstanding, Nehring also concludes that successful coordination among activist groups is to some extent “improbable”—he finds that interpersonal correspondence among staff and the creation of venues organized for communicative work such as international exchanges and flagship conferences by and large proved less successful and less important for activist organizations than concrete, collective endeavor. Speaking to this issue, Nehring cites New Left activist-historian E.P. Thompson’s retrospective acknowledgement that the internationalization of the anti-nuclear movement carried, to some extent, the risk of transforming the work of activism into that of a “translation agency” (“National” 561, 576, 178). One important aspect of this is that the relative importance of structures of communication, as opposed to structures of mass action, varies over time within a protest movement. During the immediate aftermath of an incident (like the \textit{Lucky Dragon}), there may be no elite consensus as to the import of the event. Moderates within the social movement during this phase may view their roles as being primarily one of education. Activists pursuing a non-confrontational, informational approach have a rhetorical interest in highlighting

\textsuperscript{15} The Aldermaston marches also mark the beginning of the weapons research facility serving as a powerful symbolic site of protest, see (1.IId)
their own respectability as authoritative sources, and an interest in ensuring that they can recruit sympathetic figures within the scientific, media, or government elite. In the case of the Aldermaston marches, Nehring records that there were efforts to ensure “the dignity and unity” of the march by requesting “less shouting of slogans” (“Politics” 5). As the consensus solidifies, there becomes less discursive space, as it were, for education to be effective. Moderates may then find themselves in conflict with movement participants who advocate direct action and civil disobedience. The respective roles of public figures in each stage of this sequence are demonstrative. At the stage where activist organizations view themselves as educational, as with the early years in the CND, the goal is to recruit public figures and bolster their authority in order to secure an audience for the activist content. In a radicalized movement, such as Bertrand Russell’s Committee of 100, the goal with public figures is to have them arrested as sensational as possible (“Politics” 13). Put explicitly in collective-action framing terms, across the lifetime of a movement, factionalization appears when participants no longer share a common, compelling rationale that describes the efficacy and propriety of participation of the action to be taken (Benford 195).

Anders eventually came into correspondence with a great many activist leaders within Europe, including Anglican priest and pacifist Canon John Collins, polymath and peace activist Bertrand Russell, literary notable, Munich Committee leader, and “Gruppe 47” founder Hans Werner Richter, and Peace News editor Hugh Brock. These activists and the groups they represented sometimes differed in sharp terms about which tactics would prove efficacious or appropriate. Austria, meanwhile, was a country with little in the way of organized anti-nuclear
dissent. It needed models. In organizational terms, what kind of groups might form there was an open question. Out of this growing network of resources, it is important to determine the persons and resources Anders drew on in his early efforts at activist organization. Ultimately, Anders began with the model of the Munich Committee through the framework of the Federation and attempted to recruit physical scientists into this framework.

Anders’ emphasis on the importance of physical scientists is slightly surprising. Anders’ anti-nuclear writing as discussed so far has been simultaneously extremely interested in technological and scientific matters but uninterested in the specific details. This was sensible for Anders from a practical and phenomenological perspective. The ability to disengage from technical detail and still conduct useful analysis was important to him from a political standpoint, because central to his thinking on the danger of the atomic age is the idea that nuclear weapons threaten the existence of everyone, in every country, and for all time. He believed that the danger and the responsibilities implied by the atomic era are inherently democratic, and cannot be delegated to technocrats:

on what grounds, then, do we claim the right to speak as “experts” about this matter which, you say, “is the provenance of scientists and policymakers.” The answer is simple: the question is falsely put. If we were to speak as if the question of humanity’s survival was an issue that could be left to technocrats and specialists (and that our survival is in question is not a fantasy put forward by professional panic mongers, but by responsible scientists describing a publicly acknowledged possibility), then we would do nothing but demonstrate our own incompetence. We considered ourselves “competent” insofar as we understood where the present state of affairs is headed: towards existence or non-existence. (Der Mann 10)

In this passage, we see the full implications of the question of competence raised in the Introduction and pursued throughout this chapter. It is clear that Anders asserted a necessary moral independence from technocratic experts and amoral scientistic reasoning, neither did he
reject science, or scientists, out of hand. The necessity that all persons become experts in their understanding of the atomic situation, however, implies skepticism towards scientific and technocratic elites, and towards the language employed by those elites. Anders argued that statistical and scientific analyses of catastrophic events, such as the destruction of Hiroshima, are a form of manipulation. Orderly bureaucratic language “makes the smoking rubble hygienic and disinfects the radioactively poisoned corpses … the tone of scientific speech can be counted not, indeed, as belittlement, but as ‘illusionment’ … nothing calms us so thoroughly as that which is presented in the foreign idiom of the experts” (*Der Mann* 170-171). Statistics, objective observation, dispassionate disinterest, bureaucratese; reports, tables, diagrams, charts: these forms of language stand in contrast to fables, poems, dialog, diary, and strategic hyperbole: the forms advocated and adopted by Anders. In the preface to *Der Mann*, Anders warned his readers not expect “data in the statistical sense.” That information, he explained, could be better had elsewhere. In any case, Anders was himself fully occupied by his special area of expertise: moral duties in the atomic age (15-16).

V. Organizational Work

a. Pursuing Scientists

Anders’ position was in part a reaction to philosophical contemporaries like Karl Jaspers, who conceded a measure of special competence to those in power. Anders vociferously rejected this idea, arguing in his “Theses” that it was a mark of moral incompetence to believe that “those in power are better able to imagine the immensity of the danger … better than we ordinary ‘morituri’” and this folly was evident in politicians such as Konrad Adenauer who denounced the
Göttingen Eighteen\textsuperscript{16} as being “[incompetent in] field of atomic armaments and atomic weapons questions” (Anders 499-500)\textsuperscript{17}. Ultimately, according to Anders, “there is no more final and no more fatal proof of moral blindness than to deal with the Apocalypse as if it were a ‘special field’” (“Theses” 500). This is a point Anders returned to repeatedly, and in different forms, much in the manner described in the Note on Style. It is reenacted, for example, again in Der Mann as a diary-dialog between Anders and a German engineer (133). In his critique of Adenauer, Anders recognized the changing relationship between science as institution and the Cold War security state (described above in (1.IIb)). Throughout the early months of his attempt to found a disarmament organization in Vienna, Anders spent a great deal of effort attempting to recruit and gain assistance from prominent scientists. In essence, he required their aura of authority, but could not concede to the hyper-specialization of knowledge claimed by advocates of the nuclear security apparatus. As we saw in the Prelude, it was one of Anders’ basic axioms that atomic weapons are not located within a particular political or scientific-technical situation, but vice versa:

Atomic weapons cannot be used to accomplish any political goal, whether strategic or tactical. Conversely, the existence of atomic weapons confronts the world with its own ‘to be or not to be.’ Our world is defined by the reality of atomic weapons. Politics does not control or shape atomic policy: politics is beholden to the atomic situation. (Der Mann 11)

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\textsuperscript{16} Prominent German physicists who signed a manifesto condemning the devolution of nuclear weapons to practical Bundeswehr control.

\textsuperscript{17} Although Jaspers is ultimately as skeptical as Anders is of the technocratic centralization of decision-making or hyper-specialization. In The Future of Mankind, Jaspers takes a stance quite similar to Anders, writing that,

This book … belongs to no ‘department’ and does not claim to be authorized by one. In the atom bomb question today, the typical procedure is for each expert in turn to state his case – physicist, biologist, military man, politician, theologian – and then to declare himself incompetent outside his special field … We are too ready today to accede to such disclaimers as, ‘I am not competent here’ or ‘this is not my field.’ This may be true in regard to specialized knowledge and skills … but they become untrue if applied to [decisions] that concern the issue as a whole and thus the whole human being … [the bomb] is not one question among others; it is the one vital question: to be or not to be. (10)
That the atomic bomb is a *condition* and that politics and science take place within the atomic situation was a theme present in all his major published works in the latter part of the 1950s (see also *Antiquierheit* 1: 243; “Theses” 494).

Anders acted on this conviction by participating in attempts to orient politics toward the atomic problem. After the Federation was established, Anders agreed to assist in establishing a local disarmament committee in Vienna, modeled after the Munich Committee. Ultimately, the Federation would prove to be an inadequate sponsor for nascent groups like the Vienna branch. One primary cause was that it raised no funds of its own and had to rely on its nationally-based membership to remain solvent (Wittner, *Resisting*, 301); this put immense pressure on nascent groups in states like Austria.

Anders’ concerns about the viability of mirroring the Munich Committee began before the Vienna group had even had its first meeting. He had practically no funds; the Munich office had in fact resorted to lobbying the Red Cross to support the Vienna group. On February 3rd 1959, Anders wrote to Hajo Schedlich. He complained that their publications contained a noticeable lack of informational material and relevant news. Of the news they did receive, a large portion dealt with research in the physical sciences—but the articles were edited by non-scientists. Consequently, Anders found it difficult to circulate useful introductory educational materials—to even hand out accurate brochures. “What I hope to achieve here in Vienna,” he explained, “is that future issues will be reviewed by a local nuclear physicist, and OK’d or expanded.” In effect, Anders found it difficult to even distribute leaflets.

Things did not improve with the first meeting. On 20 March, Anders sent a report to
Schedlich that described the initial convocation of the Vienna committee in grim terms: “The first meeting of the local ‘committee’ has taken place. Outside of two women from the trade union, no one of importance came. No doctors, no physicists. The report from Herr S. was not impressive, and after that I improvised a talk about Japan … I don’t feel well about our start.” The following day, Anders was irritated to read that the Federation had reported proudly on the formation of the Austrian Committee for Disarmament. This committee, Anders emphasized in a letter to Hans Werner Richter dispatched on 21 March, “indeed, in fact, does not exist.” The first meeting was instead taken up almost entirely by “basic school lessons … through which I attempted to explain why a disarmament movement was necessary in countries such as Austria where the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the military was not perceived as an acute problem.” As to his cofounder Herr Schwarcz, Anders acknowledged that he was “well meaning” but that his thinking was “wholly undeveloped” and “his good-intentioned sentimentalities” were unpractical and ludicrous in a person required to lead a mass movement. Schwarcz also lacked substance and authority with what Anders believed to be a key audience. “It would simply be unthinkable,” Anders concluded, “that any scientists who heard him speak could take an organization that had him as leader seriously and desire to join it.” His concerns in these letters hint that his declarations of the essential competence of laypersons to imagine and analyze the atomic situation was aspirational, a reaction to a lack of recognized authority, rather than a reflection of an activist vanguard prepared to undertake that work or an audience prepared to receive it. Indeed, it is telling that Anders fixated on how a hypothetical professional scientist would have reacted to Herr Schwarcz’ speech.
Several weeks later, on May 12, things had not improved. Reporting again to Schedlich, Anders admitted that,

It has really not been so easy establishing a group in Austria … I pushed quite hard to invite a few recognized academics to the executive meeting … not to mention that we’ve yet to secure ourselves any of the local noted nuclear physicists … I have the following proposal: Mightn’t we look to getting the interest of the public—and ensuring a full house—by asking a union to invite us to a gathering where we provide our own speakers (something like a physicist, Jungk, and myself)?

Anders’ next suggestion was to arrange a graphic public exhibition demonstrating the potential consequences of a nuclear war in Europe. On 22 May, Anders wrote again to Schedlich with a proposed amendment to the Federation’s constitution. The Federation, he said, needed to

Keep the possibility in mind of taking on individuals from countries which have no local committee (or which might be for political or other reasons hard to organize), that is persons who on the basis of a special competence (e.g., nuclear scientist) might be able to make a worthwhile contribution in one capacity or another (such as ‘consultant’). It would be well to remain open to such possibilities, in order to increase the prestige of the Federation through the membership of noted experts.

Throughout 1959 and 1960, the efforts of Anders and Jungk to invigorate the Austrian local committee had little effect. To explain the weakness of the Austrian groups, Wittner speculates that Austria’s neutral status and rejection of nuclear weapons meant that there was little concern, regardless of attempts by the disarmament activists to drive them to a state of productive fear (Wittner, Resisting, 227). With his contacts in the Federation constrained by their own finances, Anders needed to gain access to the visibility and prestige that established scientists would be able to provide the Vienna committee, and he was alert to the practical, informational role that such a man or woman could fulfill, even as an editor or fact-checker. In a sense, he was hoping for both a local reprise of the scientists’ movement, a campaign in which recognized authorities on nuclear matters would take on the task of interpreting new and difficult ideas, as Linus Pauling had done in the United States with his explanation of how fallout products such as
strontium-90 enter our food chain. As we saw in (1.IVa), public education campaigns
emphasizing the mobility of fallout as an invisible poison had been crucial to initiating the
second wave of disarmament protest, and along with it, the generational fear of fallout.

b. A Pugwash for the Humanities

Nonetheless, Anders was not immediately discouraged by the poor showing of the
disarmament movement in Vienna; on 21 March 1959 (the day after his first, depressing report to
Hajo Schedlich), Anders wrote to noted physicist and pacifist Max Born.

I find it entirely shameful, that the non-physical-sciences scholars of the world, that is to say,
philosophers, writers, and divines, have to this point failed in courage and independence; at that
very task which physical scientists have fulfilled through the Pugwash conferences: not simply
that they have come together unencumbered by borders and walls, but that they have done so in
order to address the atomic menace. I have before me now the thought, that one might propose a
Pugwash Conference analog of non-physical scientists.

The project that Anders had in mind was a reprise of his Moral Codex for the Atomic Age, which
he had tried to advance as a member of the Preparatory Committee of the 4th Conference and as
participant in the special commission for exploring “moral duties in the atomic age”—his area of
expertise. That he compared his proposed seminar to the Pugwash Conferences indicates that
Anders sensed that the human sciences had lost a measure of their prestige, and that he believed
associating themselves with the physical sciences might have been one way to regain that
influence. In 1958, he wrote to Linus Pauling, whom he had previously met at the Vienna
Pugwash reception, and asked for a message in support of a seminar on “Moral Requirements in
the Atomic Age” to be held at the Freie Universität Berlin. “The Congress needs,” said Anders,
“in order to increase its prestige and to show it is not an esoteric affair, the backing of
personalities whose qualities are beyond doubt.” Anders also recognized the prestige of the
physical sciences and that its events like Pugwash had direct material effects beyond those attributed to meetings of scholars in the human sciences.

However, a massive international conference was not something his financially constrained local committee or the Federation could have paid for; Anders himself had had to approach the Federation for travel stipends. An international undertaking on the scale of Pugwash would require a benefactor; to obtain one, Anders went straight for the top and asked Born for an introduction to the philanthropist Cyrus Eaton, the man whose resources had provided backing to the Pugwash conferences to begin with:

Do you believe it might be possible, to interest Cyrus Eaton? I’m (quite in passing, among many others) acquainted with him from having been introduced to him at the Mayor’s Gala in Vienna which closed out the last Pugwash conference there. I’m sure he doesn’t recall my name. To write him directly would be inopportune. Perhaps there might be a small chance, or not so small, if a renowned scientist were to write to him on my behalf, that my hopes might not be ruined in advance.

Born’s reply showed he was interested in the idea and even thought it feasible, but he later pointed out to Anders that it undermined itself in advance by effectively admitting the primacy of the sciences. Born argued that if the Moral Codex was going to be convincing as a project, it must be achieved “without the help or interference of the natural sciences” and carried out in such a way that it is the work of humanist cooperation, “not done as the imitators of physical science.”

In retrospect, the Federation may have been a case of what Nehring referred to as “internationalization serving as translation agency” rather than as a catalyst to widespread movement action; although it facilitated the contact among its members, it had a difficult time bringing them together for the purposes of protest or lending them significant material
support. In any case, Anders’ first effort to establish a local disarmament committee in Vienna was unsuccessful. For the immediate term little came of his attempts to capitalize on the prestige and authority of scientists or to recruit them as informational resources.

VI. Conclusions

The Austrian disarmament movement did not take on a popular character until 1962, when an Easter March through Vienna was initiated via the organization of socialist secondary school students. Historian Wilhelm Svoboda’s assessment traces the idea to an origin point with Bertrand Russell and the CND, and claims that it was the British example combined with a call to action by “notable Austrian scientists” which served as the “programmatic foundation of the Easter March movement in Austria” (103). Although he cites Anders as a motivating participant, the philosopher is not assigned a prime causal position in Svoboda’s historical explanation, though he is in Wittner’s account (Resisting, 228). Anders had been correct to recognize the crucial role scientists played in interpreting the danger of the atomic era to laypersons by validating the fear of atomic annihilation as a possible outcome. Producing an appropriate fear required, in practice, scientific authority to move audiences to interpret sharply-drawn visions of apocalypse as being descriptions of potential realities, to make such harrowing accounts useful tools in the imaginative struggle to define the atomic situation.

In 1964, the Austrian Easter March Committee published an informational overview of the type Anders had asked for in the early days in 1959. The Committee assembled a booklet titled Könnte Österreich überleben? (Could Austria Survive?), drawing on books by Pauling
and other scientists, UN reports, the AEC, and testimony before the US Congress.

Extrapolating from AEC reports, the authors imagine a hypothetical strike on Bratislava with nuclear weapons in the megaton range. In such an event, the neutral neighboring Austria could look forward to “all Vienna, the Marchfeld, the larger part of the Vienna basin, and northern Burgenland” being transformed into “a desolation of flame” (8). The booklet also explains the danger of fallout products such as strontium-90 contaminating milk and other foodstuffs. “The famous German cancer research and Nobel Laureate Prof. Dr. G. Dogmack” is quoted as saying, “It is not mere speculation that there would be an increase in cancers. Presently, only inexperienced laypersons seek to trivialize the earnestness of the situation.”

On this point the authors conclude, “All the specialists in the field are united” (30). Though Anders argued at length against the use of scientific, technical language to characterize the atomic situation, his own organization made heavy use of that language and the expert aura of credentialed scientists in Könnte Österreich überleben in order to convince neutral Austrians that they were potential victims of the Cold War whether they liked it or not. In the concluding section of the booklet, devoted to “New Ethics in the Atomic Age,” the final word is given to Nobel Prize-winning physicist C.F. von Weizsäcker18 rather than to Anders. Anders’ perception of a disciplinary crisis within philosophy was apt.

Anders resigned from the Easter March committee in November of 1965 following disagreements over the group’s stance on conflicts between India and China. “For a while now,” he wrote in his resignation letter, “I’ve had it in my thoughts to leave the ‘Aktion’

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18 In May 1958 after the second Pugwash conference, Weizsäcker penned a serial editorial in Die Zeit under the title “Mit der Bombe leben”. Anders objected strongly to this formulation in Der Mann, calling it an “appalling, appallingly ambiguous formula” for its implication that we can live with the bomb.
because it has never been possible to execute real ‘actions’ and to call out directly and by name those who carry the guilt for instigating crisis and war.” Anders’ desire for “real action” would shape his later disarmament endeavors to the very end. He remained a long-term correspondent, literary discussant, and friend with Max and Hedwig Born, as well as Linus and Ava Pauling. His interaction with Max Born was one small piece of a massive network of personal and professional contacts that he would utilize in later projects. Among the most important of these was his correspondence with former bomber pilot Claude Eatherly, which is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER TWO: THE CASE OF CLAUDE EATHERLY

I. Introductions

a. Exemplars and Knowledge-Work

The first chapter developed an intellectual genealogy of Anders’ technological critique in the years preceding the Second World War, and identified how that critique evolved into a forceful anti-nuclear stance, while situating his outlook in comparison to that of his activist contemporaries. As we saw in (1.IIIb), an important part of Anders’ developing anti-nuclear stance was the assertion of the authority of humanists to speak on highly technical matters in defiance of the loss of those disciplines’ perceived authority to make objective, informed statements on political and scientific endeavors. The preceding chapter adopted a dual perspective, and developed a historical picture of the processes by which the atomic bomb took on the character of world-condition, and then followed Anders as he created and extended his “concrete philosophy” in his early disarmament writings, and traced the compromises he made in attempting to realize that philosophy as praxis during his efforts to found the Vienna affiliate of the European Federation against Nuclear Arms. This chapter expands on the importance of occasion and example in Anders’ philosophy. It then turns to an examination of the role former bomber pilot Claude Eatherly filled for Anders as philosophical exemplar, and of the activist networks Anders mobilized to support, disseminate and frame the story of Eatherly as a representative of the altered moral landscape in the nuclear era. The nuclear era is a “condition” in more than one sense; Anders would seek to present Eatherly as its palliative.

This chapter proceeds through three stages. In (2.II), I conduct a reading of Anders’
encounter with family of the fallout-martyr Aikichi Kuboyama, radioman of the *Lucky Dragon*, as told in his 1959 Hiroshima travel diary *Der Mann*. Through a close reading of passages from *Der Mann*, I show how Anders used his experiences meeting and speaking to the townspeople of Yaizu, the *Lucky Dragon*’s home port, to comprehend a chain of consequences arising from the Promethean discrepancy as it manifested in the atomic era. Anders’ tenure at Yaizu exemplifies how persons can acknowledge the Promethean discrepancy and confront the Promethean shame as a precursor to other forms of productive solidarity-creating knowledge-work. Furthermore, (2.II) will describe how Anders anticipated the emergence of a kind of “schizophrenia” arising from the fundamental alienation engendered by the Promethean discrepancy, and why he was compelled to seek an example who could serve as a visible victim of “atom-shock.”

(2.III) provides a diverse theoretical array for understanding the processes by which effective activist symbols are created, rhetorically situated, narrativized, and disseminated. I provide parallel examples from the American abolitionist movement and the post-Second World War effort undertaken by the Society of Friends to provide reconstructive surgery to the “Hiroshima Maidens.” I use the theoretical tools and examples introduced at the beginning of this section to illustrate the vital role of visibility in creating effective martyr narratives. I then turn more fully to the case of Claude Eatherly through a study of his published and unpublished correspondence with Anders. This correspondence takes its most prominent form in the 1961 collection *Off limits für das Gewissen*, which appeared the following year in English under the title *Burning Conscience*. *Burning Conscience* unleashed a flurry of journalistic and literary writing in its wake as writers took one position or the other on whether Eatherly was sane, a
fraud, or a dupe. Some of the texts in this chapter that are relevant to the “Eatherly affair” include Eatherly’s unpublished memoir, J. Bradford Huie’s highly critical 1964 work *The Hiroshima Pilot*, and journalist Ronnie Dugger’s sympathetic (albeit belated) 1967 book *Dark Star*. Anders’ task with the epistolary collection *Burning Conscience* would be to make the pilot’s mental wounds visible, establish those wounds as honorable, and lend them a propriety that would make Eatherly a worthy focus of sympathy and outrage. Via the application of his philosophical anthropology to the Eatherly case, Anders arrived at the required example of “atom-shock” demanded by his occasional philosophy. However, the conclusion of this section also shows how the process of using the philosophical anthropology to reveal the true nature of Eatherly and his actions was both uncomfortably close to a process of construction and tied to an inescapable measure of risk.

The final division of this chapter develops the consequences of Anders’ self-appointed task of making Eatherly and his mental wounds the visible and plausible result of “atom-shock.” Visibility and making-visible were projects that extended beyond the exchange with Eatherly himself. This section describes how as an extension of Anders’ cultural work in pursuit of effective imaginative interventions, he became over-committed to an exhausting regime of defending Eatherly as a unifying, motivating symbol. Through viewing Anders’ increasingly fraught attempts to mobilize his network of fellow-activists and publishers, I show how the personal and reputational costs Anders incurred indicate the limits of individual action. Furthermore, the difficulties experienced by Anders became symptomatic of wider problems in the “second wave” of the disarmament movement. During the era of the Limited Test Ban treaty,
Anders and his movement allies encountered near insuperable personal and organizational limits. Arriving at those limits sets the stage for chapters three and four. Overall, this chapter seeks to read the Eatherly affair with the aid of external theories of social movement dynamics in order to facilitate an examination of the material and cultural prerequisites for the uptake of such literary-symbolic tools by activist networks and broader publics.

b. “Kuboyamas”

One crucial piece of Anders’ understanding of the nuclear era, as explained in his Antiquiertheit and his “Theses,” is that this era is wholly new; the nuclear bomb represents a revolution which fundamentally alters the material conditions in which humanity exists. The magnitude of the nuclear threat is tied, of course, to size of the bomb’s effects on its ostensible target, but he also emphasizes the ability of those effects to defy the limitations of a single test site or target. The nuclear powers characterized the above-ground explosions as peaceful tests; Anders’ work attempts to refute this claim. In the first volume of Antiquiertheit he observed that words like ‘experiment’ and ‘test’ imply a kind of isolation, a laboratory in which effects can be contained, in which actions can be undone. He began from a particular example, citing the Lucky Dragon as the specific occasion for his concrete philosophical claim. In the case of the Bikini tests, “the effects are so monstrous that in the moment of the experiment, the ‘laboratory’ became co-extensive with the world. That can mean nothing other than that there is no longer any sense in distinguishing between ‘test’ and ‘deployment’” (1: 260). The peaceful tests are, in fact, a form of war. Two years after the publication of Antiquiertheit and four years after the Bikini explosion which contaminated the Lucky Dragon and caused the death of radioman Aikichi
Kuboyama, Anders visited the fishing town of Yaizu, the ship’s home port, as a delegate with the Fourth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (4th World Conference). Along with the other foreign guests of the reverend Nishimoto’s peace procession, Anders was invited to speak. He recounted the event in *Der Mann*. Anders opened his speech by telling the crowd that the roles of speaker and hearer should be reversed. “We have come here,” he explained, “not to instruct you. On the contrary: full of respect and as students. What we, coming from distant lands, can barely be said to ‘know’ (to only know, in the sense that one knows things which one reads in the newspapers)—you know truly” (49; emphasis in the original). Anders’ opening was in one respect a rhetorical tactic used to indicate respect to the audience and accord them status. Within the context of *Der Mann* as a book, Anders’ choice to narrate the speech as event encourages the reader to see the events in a participatory oral context rather than in a passive, literary setting. Anders also aimed to present his audience at Yaizu as dutiful executors entrusted with the inheritance left by Kuboyama. Carrying his memory forward was their task. In his own role as student, he detailed the tasks given to the foreign delegates of the 4th World Conference, tasks embodied in the things they have come to gain “true knowledge” of. The things that he pointed to as having come to gain true knowledge of were in fact expansions of points made in *Antiquiertheit*: the destruction of distance and borders, and the reality of test explosions as a form of war. The rhetorical occasion of Yaizu permitted Anders to reiterate the claims he’d made two years previously in *Antiquiertheit*, to make them new and current again.

Viewed uncharitably, Anders’ claim to come before the people of Yaizu and Kuboyama’s family as a student was a simple rhetorical gesture. Given that he had previously described the
things he claimed to be there to learn from the *Lucky Dragon* disaster, it appeared as if he would learn nothing at all, and instead intended re-frame the experience of the Kuboyama family and the residents of Yaizu in his terms, and for his purposes. However, enclosing the set piece of his speech are two other passages relevant to Anders’ understanding of knowledge and lived experience. At the opening of the diary entry in question, he writes that,

> Four years previously I had sat on a park bench in Vienna and jotted down a few strophes about Kuboyama’s death. But how little about him I had actually known. Hardly that which the first news reports, which had described him as a ‘fisherman’ had conveyed. Consequently I’d seen him before me as a smalltime shrimper in a tiny sailboat. Wholly false. In no wise was he a ‘villager’. Far more was he a trained radioman, a counselor among the crew of the ship, a man full of humor, a comrade; and a man who in his dying knew the reason. (47-48)

Anders’ personal revelation in this passage supports the statement he made in his speech—that there is a deep gap between “knowing” from news reports and anecdote and “truly knowing” or “comprehending”. It is a manifestation of the Promethean discrepancy that Anders described in *Antiquiertheit* (1: 270), the gulf between the effects our technologies unleash on the world and our capacity to imagine them. This gulf is not unitary, but has stages. Between Anders’ impressions formed in Vienna and the painful knowledge inflicted on the people of Yaizu, there is one gap. Between the knowledge of the Yaizu citizenry and the experiences of the radioman Kuboyama there is another gap. And between the experience of Kuboyama and the reality of the catastrophe which caused his death, there is yet another gap. Later, speaking with the survivors of Hiroshima, Anders postulated that,

> the victims (as bizarre as this might sound) did not actually “experience” the catastrophe as such. Rather, they were only aware of the life that preceded it, and the life or dying that followed. Not, in contrast, the flash in between. That was too monstrous, and too short as well, for them to have fully understood the catastrophe as it occurred. This incomprehensibility remains even now: because they were unable to record or label the experience in words, they presently paraphrase the event as an “it” (“Then it happened”). (109)
His opening declaration that he came to Yaizu as a student rather than a teacher was not a mere rhetorical gesture, but a description of the imaginative work necessary to comprehend the Promethean discrepancy and its effects. He was frank about this in the introduction to Der Mann:

this is the reason that I recall the evening in Hiroshima during which we spoke with the survivors before all other evenings, the evening when they attempted to describe for us the second in which ‘it’ happened … The first reaction was one of denial: the refusal of each to acknowledge within the self and within the other the ability to carry out such a deed. Do not misunderstand. The crucial factor was not the element of isolation brought on by the feeling of shame, but rather a new solidarity in the isolation which had become reality in that instant … I have never felt what it means to be ‘human’ with more agony or power than in that moment of ‘alienation’. (14-15)

The aim of Anders’ endeavor was to acknowledge the Promethean discrepancy and to confront the Promethean shame as an exercise, a precursor to other forms of productive solidarity-creating knowledge-work—this pursuit of solidarity will be one of the central topics of chapter three. One of those forms of knowledge-work is to explore the question of responsibility and action. As we will see, Anders’ desire to address that question was the foundation of the Eatherly affair. A final, retrospective note on the Yaizu speech: at the conclusion of his diary entry in Der Mann, Anders reflected that the process of working around that knowledge gap is easy enough to recognize in theory, but a challenge in practice:

When we arrived in the main square, despite the smallness of the city, we counted more demonstrators than in Kyoto with its millions. Some estimated 15,000. But this number did not make me happy. This city is Kuboyama’s hometown. How then should we set into movement those cities in which no Kuboyamas have been born? (53)

As detailed in section four of chapter one, this question plagued his efforts to mobilize the disarmament group in Vienna. Yaizu and was certainly on his mind at the time; Anders was finalizing Der Mann for press and giving readings both before seminars and on the radio just as those efforts got underway in late 1958 and early 1959 (Anders to Schedlich 25.11.58 and
28.1.59 e.g.). The tragic necessity of “Kuboyamas” for giving impetus to a social protest movement was another lesson Anders learned as a student at Yaizu.

II. Seeking an Exemplar

a. There Is no There There

The knowledge-work Anders undertook at Yaizu and Hiroshima and later depicted in Der Mann was akin to a pilgrimage: traveling from without, coming nearer to the place of occurrence, and finally arriving at the site itself. When he arrived at that center, however, there was no “there” there. It had been erased; it was gone. For Anders, Hiroshima seemed more than anything strikingly like the Los Angeles of his exile. The similarity, he wrote, was not a matter of first impressions, “on the contrary: from moment to moment it became more unbearable. And it reached its height at the symbolic center of Hiroshima, that is to say the square, where it happened, ‘it’. And where there now stands a monument” (Der Mann 83). The monument is an abstract and apparently functionless, symbolic ‘bridge’. While acknowledging that the bridge had not been designed by an American architect, but a Japanese one, Anders nevertheless saw in it the influence of a co-opted American tradition of non-representational art that destroys legible signification. To him it was appropriate that this destruction of meaning in art emerged contemporaneously in history with the potential destruction of the world. That the Hiroshima memorial should appear as a “non-objective object” is, he wrote, “no coincidence.” As a monument, it is an effective ‘nothing’ ” (Der Mann 84). Anders discerned the same emptiness in the very stories of the men and women who had been victims of the atomic strikes—the same lack of hate or other intense emotion. Here again, Anders speculated that the influence of the
American occupiers may have been responsible. The Japanese survivors may, in the aftermath of the war, have had to “contrive what appeared to them to be an acceptable mode of speech, which on the one hand would satisfy their audience, and which on the other would not require them to cut into the flesh of their own experiences” (*Der Mann* 109). Thus, while there is a gap between what one can know through news reports and other secondhand information that makes the attempt to come closer to the site of experience a pressing one, that pilgrimage itself arrives at its own nothing: it is a necessary disappointment. Anders offered a third hypothesis for the final, traumatic gap between the victims and their own histories, an explanation that on the one hand accounts for why the victims apparently “… did not actually ‘experience’ the catastrophe as such” (*Der Mann* 109) and on the other makes that experiential center into the fulcrum between victim and perpetrator. It may be, he said, that…

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the strike was not experienced as the deed of a perpetrator. And it is comprehensible that this should be so, as there was no visible enemy. The characterization that is presently and endlessly repeated, that the enemy is become anonymous, is insufficient and already outmoded. It is true, though, that there is today no enemy that can actually be seen, and that this was already the case in Hiroshima. The congruency, then, between the attacker and the attack could not occur; therefore such a congruency was not sought. (*Der Mann* 110)
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The experiential center is where there should be some kind of congruency, a mirroring where perpetrator and victim confront one another. The experiential center should also serve as moral center point. But the sheer perfection of the weapons interrupts this. Their power, immediacy, totality, range, and speed make attacker and victim alike invisible. Therefore, in the atomic era, he concluded that:

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Everything will take place with its own “alibi.” That is to say: he who carries out an act will always remain “elsewhere,” not in the place of the perpetrator, not in the place of the deed, which because it was unleashed with the push of a button, occurs someplace else … [the perpetrator] is in an especially pronounced sense also accompanied by an “alibi,” because in his case the “alibi” takes on a moral (or as the case may be: immoral) sense as well as its spatial meaning. Just as does the victim, he himself
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remains in the place of the deed that is not the same as the place of suffering, and he remains incapable of apprehending his own action. He cannot recognize it as his deed and as his deed, his own strike as his strike and as his strike. He is therefore the twin of his victim: similarly rendered unable to act morally. (Der Mann 110; emphasis in the original)

Behind this alibi is a phenomenon Anders refers to as the “abolition of action”. The abolition of action has two main components, both of which are familiar to us from chapter one. First, the contemporary character of modern technology and industrial organization transforms “action” into morally neutral, hyperspecialized “work” in which the participants are mutually estranged and for whom the end-goal of the work is invisible. Second, within the work itself, qualities such as effort, diligence, conscious choice, and agency are replaced by discrete, check-listed operations achieved through the manipulation of controls. “Work” is reduced to “triggering” in which the mere flip of a switch may result in millions of deaths (Antiquiertheit 1: 286-294; “Theses” 501). The bomb, then, cannot be reduced to a mere explosive device, a singular object. It is a distributed, complex, multiply-redundant system whose parts and participants are (from the singular human viewpoint) isolated from or even unrelated to one another. Overall, these disparate parts comprise a vast machine: one whose only possible use is the mass production of mass destruction.

Within that machine, moral responsibility and agency appear to the worker-participants to be strongly diluted or absent: every man and woman has his or her alibi. Both Adam Smith and Marx recognized that the alienation produced by the division of labor and its rationalization had a moral component. For Smith, the essential difference was one of opportunity and training; the working classes were deprived of the opportunity for education and self-improvement and consigned to work “so simple and uniform as to give little exercise to the understanding, while,
at the same time, their labor is both so constant and so severe, that it leaves them little leisure and less inclination to apply to, or even to think of, anything else.” Smith identified this as one of the characteristics of modern civilization which seem to “benumb the understandings of all the inferior ranks of people. A man, without the proper use of the intellectual faculties of a man … seems to be mutilated and deformed” (329). Consequently, in Smith’s assessment, modern states deprived free persons of the requisite moral judgment to comprehend and undertake the defense of liberty through arms. Marx, of course, had a far more elaborate analysis of the alienated labor but in short, for him the alienation of labor transformed work into something undertaken for the fulfillment of raw physical need, under compulsion, and under conditions which strip workers of active agency—including moral agency. They are dehumanized. Thus, the alienation of labor transforms...

both [the worker’s] nature and his spiritual species-property into a being alien to him, into a means of his individual existence. It estranges from man his own body, as well as external nature and his spiritual aspect, his human aspect … free, conscious activity is man’s species-character (XXIV).

Anders also recognized that the reduction of ‘action’ to ‘work’ and ‘work’ to ‘triggering’ is a process of alienation. But he emphasizes that this is not mere alienation; it is camouflage. The ultimate end of that which is unleashed by the ‘triggering’ is camouflaged in advance; other methods (such as the repressive influence of governments or the obscurantist language of technical reportese) may try to camouflage the aftermath. All these influences contrive to strip away the potential for moral action; all serve to separate perpetrator and victim from one another in physical space and awareness. Thus, wrote Anders, accompanying our blindness to the apocalypse is a kind of schizophrenia:
In earlier times, the place of the perpetrator was the same as that of the victim, so also the place of action and the place of passion. The two will henceforth be divided, splintered into two distant places. This disintegration is one of the ‘conditions of being’ attendant to present-day humanity’s splitting of consciousness. It is not only humanity’s psyche that is presently become ‘schizoid’, but events themselves (Der Mann 110).

Before his visit to Hiroshima as a delegate with the Fourth World Conference, Anders had formulated this crucial point about the splitting of deed and effect, and detailed its implication that even the atomic pilots become “guiltlessly guilty” in both Antiquiertheit and his “Theses” (1: 292, 501-502). But, as discussed in (1.Ic), Anders set himself the requirement of conducting his philosophical anthropology as an example-bound endeavor; one which requires demonstration to be useful and urgent. As discussed in (1.IVc), when questioned as to which absolute—which authority—grounded the commandments contained in his Moral Codex and lent them a binding character, Anders gave an intensely pragmatic response. The force of his commandments arises from the danger inherent to atomic situation. Their legitimacy is derived from their urgency: “when there’s a fire, it doesn’t do to question the legitimacy of the fire department” (Der Mann 73). In order to demonstrate that urgency, he required a concrete occasion to delve into the “schizoid” character of the atomic age.

b. “Atom-Shock”

In Antiquiertheit, Der Mann, and elsewhere, Anders made reference to the bomb in comparison to the Nazi extermination program. There are important similarities between the two: in explaining how the apocalyptic blindness is maintained, for instance, he gave the examples of the thousands of Germans who might, should, or did know about the liquidation camps. Interrogating whether they knew about the camps is beside the point, he argued, for they also
knew that if they valued their own lives, doing something about it was out of consideration. “And so they went on living, as if they knew nothing. Exactly as we do, although we ‘know’ about the bomb” (Antiquiertheit 1: 285). Additionally, Anders placed the Bomb and the camps in the category of “wars” which are not “wars” but—because the perpetrator expects no defense and no defense is possible on the part of the victims—are better described as “extermination actions” which “belong to the same class of atrocity” (Der Mann 143; Antiquiertheit 1: 346). Despite the similarities, Anders was convinced that the bomb and the Holocaust were fundamentally different events. The latter was the most terrifying extermination war ever waged against particular peoples. But to Anders, it was also the last such, the conclusion of an era which retained the vestiges of a distinction between civilian and military, friend and enemy, where despite the mechanization of death in the camps, there could be seen shadows of hate, passion, fear, and regret. The former, meanwhile, presaged a war in which it would be impossible to have even the liquidation of a people as its goal. A “war” even more senseless and pointless than the extermination actions in the death camps because there could be no distinction between friend and enemy in any sense: an atomic war would necessarily bring about the liquidation of all humankind (“Die Toten” 365). Because of this difference, Anders’ concrete approach required an example from the atomic era itself of a perpetrator who had been mutilated in the manner described in his philosophical declarations.

Smith, Marx, and Anders all characterize the human result of being estranged from one’s labor as a deeply traumatic: in being consumed by the system of production, workers are mutilated, deformed, and dehumanized. For Anders, the characteristic effect of the atomic era
was that the human psyche is made *schizophrenic*; as an exemplar he needed someone who was
maimed in the way that his theoretical reflections had predicted. The war produced a tragic
number of men and women who were “mentally maimed” by traumatic experience. As discussed
in (1.IIa), there were also many participants in the atomic bomb project who had agitated against
its use in advance, who condemned the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki afterwards, and
who were deeply troubled at what they had done. However, it proved very difficult to find a
person among the American servicemen who deployed and dropped the bombs who both
displayed signs of mental trauma and who also reflected on their role in the attacks in a way that
linked the trauma to the act. This was an era in which “battle fatigue” and “shell shock” had only
recently been accepted as valid diagnoses for war trauma in place of the euphemistic term “lack
of moral fiber”, or more shortly, “cowardice”. Anders was in effect trying to identify a trauma
beyond shell shock: “atom-shock”.

Among Allied servicemen, there was an incredibly powerful emotional framework
militating against that particular critically-oriented interpretation of wartime experience. The best
articulation of this framework comes from literary scholar Paul Fussell. Fussell himself was
deeply skeptical of war and distrustful of its advocates, but nonetheless recalled in his frankly
titled essay “Thank God for the Atom Bomb” that his main reaction to the bombings was
profound relief. For himself and other infantrymen in the Allied armies, the bombings meant that
they would not have to invade Japan. That prospect, seen after the horror of the Okinawa
invasion—in which 123,000 Americans and Japanese murdered one another—was one of numb
terror. Planners estimated that perhaps 500,000 Allied soldiers would be killed or wounded. They
expected one million Japanese soldiers and civilians to die. Fussell pointed to the young Marine E.B. Sledge’s experience as typical. The Marines, his superiors assured him, would almost definitely be expected to lead the assault on the Japanese home islands. Their regiment was likely to have one of the most difficult objectives, the important naval base at Yokosuka. “Due to the strong beach defenses, caves, tunnels, and numerous Jap suicide torpedo boats, and manned mines,” he recalled being told,

few Marines in the first five assault waves would get ashore alive—my company was scheduled to be in the first and second waves. The veterans in the outfit felt we had already run out of luck anyway. . . . We viewed the invasion with complete resignation that we would be killed—either on the beach or inland. (19)

For Sledge and his fellow Marines, the bombings came as an unexpected, last-minute reprieve from a death sentence, and that reprieve colored their feelings on the matter accordingly: relief that they would not be expected to martyr themselves by the thousands, and gratitude toward their fellows in the Air Force for making it possible. Fussell rejected the criticism of atomic bombs that emerged with the broad American critical historical reappraisal of the Second World War in the 1980s. In his assessment it was a debate permitted by historical asynchronicity and distance. One main thread of the debate challenged whether the bombings were truly necessary to end the war or whether the Allies could have achieved a Japanese surrender through other means. This was a strain of argument deeply concerned with the diplomatic and strategic information possessed by the Truman administration, when the actors in the administration gained that knowledge, and how they weighed the relative risks of each option at the time. Fussell argued that for all the attention given to remaining in step with state of knowledge among the decision makers far behind the front lines, these critics are totally and entirely out of step
with the state of knowledge and experience of risk faced by common soldiers. “What’s at stake in an infantry assault,” said Fussell, “is so entirely unthinkable to those without the experience of one, or several, or many, even if they possess very wide-ranging imaginations and warm sympathies, that experience is crucial in this case. In general, the principle is, the farther from the scene of horror, the easier the talk” (19). For Fussell, much of the criticism of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks was (entirely justified) criticism of an essentially insane cold war situation rife with “stupidity, parochialism, and greed” reflected back anachronistically on the situation of 1945. This later political and moral ineptitude, he said, “should not tempt us to misimagine the circumstances of the bomb’s first ‘use’” (36). Essentially, for men like Fussell, the bombings were a powerful, liberating intervention that prevented their own gruesome deaths, and which also removed the direct prospect of having to continue to be butchers and killers.

Within the smaller, more elite circles of the B-29 crews, the same framework prevailed. The most widely recognized member of the atomic strike force, pilot Paul Tibbets of the Enola Gay (the aircraft which dropped the Hiroshima bomb), is a good example. He outspokenly defended his participation in the atomic strike throughout his life. In a 2002 interview with Studs Terkel, he denied having any later regrets: “Second thoughts? No … I knew we did the right thing because when I knew we’d be doing that I thought, yes, we’re going to kill a lot of people, but by God we’re going to save a lot of lives. We won’t have to invade [Japan]” (“One Hell”). Later commentators speculated whether or not Tibbets may have been atypical, or particularly remorseless, as a consequence of his personal character. Historian of nuclear issues Peter Kuznick points out that many of Tibbets’ statements led later commentators to describe him as
unfeeling, and made much of Tibbets’ own comment that he was a “cold fish”. At times, he was uninterested in issues of morality. “It wasn’t my decision to make,” he said. “One way or another…I did what I was told—I didn’t invent the bomb, I just dropped the damn thing.”

Tibbets insisted that what he had done was necessary, justified in a utilitarian sense, and legally correct. He was forthright about pushing aside doubt: “If I decide I don’t want to think about something, I turn it off.” These statements and others led psychiatrist and scholar of war trauma Robert Lifton and journalist Greg Mitchell to speculate that Tibbets was actively repressing feelings of compassion and guilt (231). Other participants were not so blunt as Tibbets in defending their role in the bombings, and some were even forthright about the horror of the task and the pernicious post-war role of atomic weapons. But defense of the attacks as necessary work to be undertaken was the rule. Radarman Joe Stiborik summed up the bombings as a “dirty job” (qtd. in Kuznick). Just as we saw with the changing role of science and scientific work in (1.II), these rationalizations did not emerge unaided, but were shaped by the aircrews’ cultural context. From a specifically Andersian point of view, it was part of the process by which they were unmade as moral persons.

It is certainly true, as Anders theorized about the victims of the atomic bombing, that the men who executed the attack were pressured to make their utterances conform to the patriotic expectations of the commanders as well as the American public. In the case of Eatherly, as we will see, he noted that the role of the military doctors at the Waco V.A. hospital is to facilitate the normalization. “That is exactly what your doctors are trying to do. After all, these men are employees of a military hospital to whom the moral condemnation of a generally respected, even
glorified action, would not be beneficial … who, under all circumstances, must defend the purity of the deed which you so rightly feel as guilt” (Burning 2). It is also the case that their commanders knew that their subordinates had done something far out of the ordinary in military, historic, and moral terms and acted to direct the aircrews’ responses accordingly. In his interview with Terkel, Tibbets recalled being brought to meet President Truman. After readily congratulating generals Spaatz and Doolittle, Truman turned to Tibbets and simply looked at him in silence before saying without preamble: “‘What do you think?’ I said, ‘Mr. President, I think I did what I was told.’ He slapped his hand on the table and said: ‘You’re damn right you did, and I’m the guy who sent you. If anybody gives you a hard time about it, refer them to me’” (“One Hell”). The president knew that the bombings, so clear a decision to him, would not appear so to others or even to history. Through his question he offered Tibbets a simultaneous reminder of where his loyalties should lie as well as a defense for his actions in highlighting the chain of command to which Tibbets was beholden. Mission members did indeed, as Truman predicted, encounter pressure to reconsider and question their roles in the attacks. In an interview with the Associated Press, Van Kirk said, “Everybody keeps trying to get me down on my knees and cry about it and say I am sorry and everything. None of us ever have.” Part of this pressure derived from the fact that the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were events so terrifying in the magnitude of death and misery that they caused it seemed someone should feel regret for the act. In the foreword to Burning Conscience, Robert Jungk wrote that in the mid-1950s, rumors went around that one of the pilots of the atomic bombers had entered a monastery in expiation for his deed. This, said Jungk, proved to be myth—but a necessary myth, one where “the rumor turned
out to be ‘more true than reality’” (xiv). In the end, Van Kirk was not quite right. There was at least one member of the Hiroshima strike team who did just that, and his appearance filled a deep need in the public consciousness.

**c. A Properly Mutilated Man**

That man was Claude Eatherly. Eatherly had been the pilot of the weather reconnaissance plane *Straight Flush*, whose mission was to clear the *Enola Gay* to carry out its attack on Hiroshima. In the ensuing tumult of the “Eatherly affair” the importance of the *Straight Flush* to the mission would come into question; although Eatherly’s aircraft did not drop the bomb, their report had a yes-no power over whether the bombing could proceed. Even more significant was the dramatic, symbolic role Eatherly’s aircraft played as harbinger. In popular retellings, the *Straight Flush* is portrayed as discovering the fortuitous (disastrous!) “hole in the clouds” over Hiroshima at a moment of great narrative tension when poor weather might have caused the mission to be aborted. It is also portrayed as the lone bomber which first caused air-raid sirens to sound over the city, startling the residents of Hiroshima and making them look at the sky with apprehension, until after its passage they sink back into a fatal quiescence (Coonts 283). The Hiroshima mission was Eatherly’s eventual claim to fame (or infamy). The nature of his role in the attack was crucial to later conflict over his credibility. Whether he had “dropped” the bomb or “merely” enabled the attack was seen as relevant to the degree of responsibility he was allowed to accept. This is paradoxical, as seen in Tibbets’ comments (“I didn’t invent the bomb, I just dropped the damn thing”). Here, the “abolition of action” Anders identifies in which the partial, limited role of any one actor provides an alibi: a defense. In the case of Eatherly, the
partial, limited role is an opportunity for attack on his credibility and authority—an avenue through which to prevent an actor from taking responsibility. Beyond the Hiroshima mission, Eatherly flew sampling missions during the 1946 “Operation Crossroads” atomic tests at Bikini atoll. As a consequence of one of these missions his aircraft was contaminated with fallout, causing him and his crew to suffer radiation exposure. After a smattering of other postings, he was released from his commission by the Air Force in 1947. Following his departure from the Air Force, Eatherly’s life rapidly fell apart. He experienced emotional disturbances, was arrested for assorted, escalating petty crimes, was institutionalized and released several times, attempted suicide, and in 1954 was sent for electroshock therapy. This timeline gives an outline of Eatherly’s life course, but its details were extensively contested in later years (see Dugger, Huie, Chamberlin-Anders e.g.). At any rate, Eatherly came to national prominence in April of 1957 when, following his arrest for the burglary of two post offices, Dallas reporter Jim Vachule’s story on Eatherly was recirculated by Newsweek under the title “Hero in Handcuffs” (Dugger 152). He was acquitted on grounds of insanity. In March of 1959, Eatherly robbed a 7-11 convenience store and was again arrested. This time, Newsweek quoted a psychiatrist sympathetic to Eatherly, who said that the pilot had “tried to punish himself for a self-imagined ‘wrong’—Eatherly twice attempted suicide—and failing that ‘has sought the punishment of society by … which would bring down its wrath’” (qtd in Dugger 174). It was this article that brought Eatherly to Anders’ attention and, just as when he had heard of the Lucky Dragon catastrophe and the death of Kuboyama, he was moved to action.

The philosopher-activist fired off a letter to Eatherly introducing himself as one of
many who was “anxiously watching the way you are trying to manage your condition” though none of them were “medical men nor psychologists.” Instead, he and his allies were “full of burning concern […] we have made it our daily task to confront the moral problems which are blocking the road of mankind today.” Foremost among these was Anders’ primary concern with “the ‘technification’ of our being [through which] we can become ‘guiltlessly guilty’.”

“You understand,” Anders continued, “what this has to do with you” (Burning 1). In his letter, Anders was not surprised that Eatherly has struggled without success to adapt to life in the aftermath of Hiroshima: “You happen to have left 200,000 dead behind you. And how should one be able to mobilize a pain which embraces 200,000? How should we repent 200,000? Not only you cannot do it, not only we cannot do it, no-one can do it.” In fact, Anders said, such attempts were in any case inadequate. But, he added, “the frustration of your efforts is not your fault. It is a consequence of … the decisive newness of our situation” (Burning 3). And with that, Anders introduced and recruited Eatherly to his philosophical project. Even as Der Mann approached completion, he attached a footnote to his discussion of “guiltless guilt” directing the reader to an appendix which reproduced Anders’ opening letter to Eatherly and the pilot’s reply (Der Mann 189, 243). Anders dedicated himself to the idea that Eatherly was “the first one to translate the character of our epoch into the language of individual life” and “the Anti-Eichmann” (Burning 108)—a perpetrator-twin to the victims at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the radioman Aikichi Kuboyama, “the son of your city, [who] was the first to demonstrate, through his death, the ‘destruction of distance’” which is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the nuclear age (Der Mann 49). As in the case of Kuboyama,
Anders would be reminded in his correspondence with Eatherly and in the emerging “Eatherly affair” of the inadequacy of “knowing” from news reports and anecdote. Unlike that first, powerful emotional reaction he had upon reading of Kuboyama’s death, his immediate impressions were not confined to a few private lines of poetry, but were instead a public, definitive commitment to Eatherly’s cause. Fulfilling that commitment required that his writerly intervention on Eatherly’s behalf respond to the countervailing pressures in a way that would allow the imagination-expanding example of Eatherly to circulate with activist networks and broader publics. The following section examines external theories of framing and parallel case studies in order to highlight how Anders, as a philosopher and a writer, undertook the literary and philosophical work of symbol-creation.

III. Living Symbols

a. Theories of Framing

In the discussion of Kuboyama and Eatherly to this point, this chapter has emphasized their necessary evidentiary role within Anders’ philosophical project. This viewpoint treats them as existing within Anders’ published works: literary-philosophical creations who, like characters in a novel, are static. Anders, though, sought out Eatherly to be more than that. He was to be a living symbol, the Anti-Eichmann. As Nehring observed in his overview of symbolic politics within disarmament groups, such an achievement is necessarily an ongoing process of co-creation: “symbols do not just form a passive reservoir for protest action which can be tapped or transcended. Rather, protesters actively create them (“Politics” 1). Creating Eatherly as a useful symbol for protest politics meant, on the one hand, having to surrender “authorial control,” but
on the other required engaging in struggle to frame and guide audience interpretation to the favored conclusion against determined opposition—a more indirect form of control.

Anders’ efforts on Eatherly’s behalf can be fruitfully analyzed through the lens of New Social Movement (NSM) theorizing of social protest groups. In short, NSM approaches to social movements do not presuppose an individual’s participation in a given movement based exclusively on externally defined identities such as social class, or through cost-benefit evaluations undertaken by rational actors. Instead, NSM theorists argue that participation relies on the construction of powerful collective identities (Hunt and Bedford 437). Further, according to the construction of these collective identities is advanced through the creation of interpretative frames. Social movement scholars build their idea of frames and framing from Goffman’s work on frame analysis, in which frames serve individuals as guidelines to the interpretation and understanding of events (21). Frames allow for a shared perception of reality, but they also serve a rhetorical function in that they persuade activists to a particular cause or faction within that cause, and move those members to action (Benford 678). Further, NSM theorists acknowledge that taking frames and framing as a basis opens an interest in examining narrative, though as simple frames take on narrative characteristics differences emerge in how they work to engage audiences, and the degree to which they are intelligible (Polletta 421). Recalling (1.IVc), adaptive framing was the process Anders endorsed when he noted that the prospective moral codex should be formulated to mesh naturally with existing systems of morality.

Anders’ promotion of Eatherly as a unifying symbol for the nuclear era was a “reality construction process” that took in the first of what Snow and Benford identify as one of the “...
three core framing tasks. The first task, diagnostic framing, involves the diagnosis of some situation or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of change. It entails problem identification as well as the attribution of blame or causality” (Benford 198-199). However, the conception of the atomic age as borderless and universal that Anders sought, and his identification of the Promethean discrepancy that lies between humans and their technological products opens a tendency for the threat of nuclear annihilation to be perceived as diffuse, and the chain of responsibility for their use to be attenuated. These two features—there being no clear “site” for the threat, and there being no readily identifiable agents responsible for the threat—place Anders’ imagination of the atomic age in a family of threat types that activists find difficult to deal with. In response to threats of this category, “fear and resignation are more likely than outrage … the more clearly defined the source of the threat, the more likely there is to be outrage or indignation—and hence opposition” (Jasper 411). Anders’ framing of Eatherly contains responses to these challenges.

As a motivating symbol, Anders believed the case of Claude Eatherly offered a way to avoid activists sinking into resignation; presented as unjustly imprisoned martyr, he concretized Anders’ attempts to frame the atomic era, but did so within a familiar plot. Within an injustice frame, he served as a positive model for how to act in terms of Anders’ novel understanding of the constraints on human behavior implied by the schizophrenic nature of modern weapons systems, and his imprisonment allowed identifiable institutions and authorities as a “natural target” (Jasper 414) for outrage. Additionally, Eatherly’s imprisonment set up a limited, achievable goal for activists which could be tackled without risking activist burnout, the
“difficulty maintaining a sense of efficacy over the long haul” that Benford identifies (208). Anders had anticipated this in his “Theses”, writing that “it is even possible that our efforts will make no progress whatsoever. But even this failure should not intimidate us; repeated frustration does not refute the need for repeating the effort” (498). It was his belief that even failure would be productive; the Eatherly affair would be his chance to test one of his theses.

Notably, framing theorists share a narratological language for the discourse of analysis of contemporary social movements that is similar to that employed by collective memory theorists; because social protest movements are concerned with “memory work” including the creation of stories of origin, heritages of struggle, commemoration, and memorialization, framing theory as employed by NSM scholars offers an area of intersection (Polletta 438, Wertsch 99) where the creation of collective memory is visible. This linkage undergirds chapter four, with the introduction of matrices for public language; shared memory and imagination-work are the processes by which those matrices are created and adopted. Framing theory as defined by Benford is a theoretical language with therapeutic connotations; its terms of diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation to pursue amelioration liken protest activities to curative interventions applied to an ailing society. In the case of Claude Eatherly, this is a fortunate congruency. The remainder of this chapter pursues the creation of Eatherly as a curative symbol alongside framing conflicts that contest the meaning of Eatherly’s own illness, its diagnosis, prognosis, and potential for cure.

b. The Shirt and the Veil

In framing-theoretical terms, Anders’ pursuit of the case of Eatherly as a condensing, diagnostic symbol to frame and advance a narrative of the nuclear era as one of injustice and
martyrdom offers a number of complexities alongside its advantages. Narratives of martyrdom have a long pedigree; in the United States, the rhetorics of martyrdom and wounding have a history that is in no small part tainted by the historical crimes of slavery and segregation. Confronting audiences with the bodily wounds inflicted by slavemasters upon their slaves was one rhetorical method pursued by abolitionists to create the necessary “moral shock”—as Jasper and Poulsen call it (498)—to provoke those neither directly affected by nor knowledgeable to the real nature and effects of slavery into assent with abolitionist ideals and so open them to recruitment for abolitionist activism. Additionally, the visible mutilations inflicted on Black bodies were also deployed to counter apologists’ portrayals of slavery as a benign, paternal institution. Theodore Weld’s 1839 abolitionist work *American Slavery As It Is* is a good example of this strategy. In his book, Weld was concerned with portraying wounded bodies as veracious testaments, establishing both the truth and prevalence of the abuses through both the indelible scar tissue and the sheer weight of the “cloud of witnesses” (9). Weld aimed to create a compact symbol of the wounded body in bondage. He was aware, as James Wertsch would later note, that in order to create a “well-configured story, one is forced to neglect other information that is clearly available … the construction of an account of historical events is inherently constrained by ‘radically selective narrativizations of events’ ” (58). Weld aimed to preempt an attack on the necessary omissions of the condensed narrative by ensuring that though there may be one guiding symbol, the symbol itself is manifold. Jasper and Poulsen observe that the efficacy of a condensing symbol is determined in the first by its capacity to inflict moral shock, but in the second by that symbol’s plausibility, which in the language of framing theorists is consequent to
its resonance with an underlying “plausibility structure” or “experiential commensurability” and “narrative fidelity” (498). In short, the new narrative offered by activists must be startling enough to produce an experience of shock, but must also be familiar enough to be credible. Effective protest symbols are revelatory and persuasive to the extent that they inspire memory-work on a more personal level: inspiring people to rearrange and recategorize knowledge that they already possess, forms to which they have already assigned meaning.

Abolitionists and later supporters of reconstruction who had relied on the symbol of the wounded Black body as a symptom through which to diagnose the United States as diseased, its laws and institutions, as fundamentally sick. Then, as now, this process is not static but is contested. In the Southern rhetoric of the “bloody shirt,” radical Republicans and reconstructionists were hysterics who obsessed over these symbols of martyrdom, fetishizing the wounded Black and abolitionist bodies upon which the South had been built and against which it was now, again, rebelling—if more quietly than it had in the decade previous. Stephen Budiansky summarizes the situation by noting it became “the standard expression of dismissive Southern contempt” (3). Via that contempt, white supremacist terror is normalized, and the pathology is displaced from the segregated south onto its critics. The diagnosis is redirected. One of the legacies of the bloody shirt is that while the visible wound has remained a powerful symbol, the plausibility structure underlying the rhetorical use of the martyr or wounded body is undermined because narratives of martyrdom and wounding provoke an immediate examination of the veracity of the martyr’s suffering and the motivations of their advocates.

US Disarmament activists in the 1950s experienced this suspicion of the martyr-narrative
firsthand with the arrival of the “Hiroshima Maidens”—twenty-five young atomic bomb survivors (hibakusha) who had been maimed in the attacks. In 1955, these young women were invited to the United States for reconstructive surgery, paid for by activists and physicians who donated both time and money. The project was initiated by the activist editor of the Saturday Review of Literature Norman Cousins in collaboration with hibakusha and peace worker Rev. Kiyoshi Tanimoto. This was, ostensibly, a humanitarian effort and was presented as such by Cousins and his allies; they sought to help the girls because he “happened to be in a position where we could offer some help and we were attempting to respond as best we could, because we wanted to” (Cousins 22). The altruistic and conciliatory framing, as well as the visible and heart-wrenching disfigurements suffered by the girls, gained the project extensive media coverage. Nonetheless, the mere visibility of the atomic victims was itself a political statement, one which caused a great deal of panic in the State Department. Wittner writes that the US embassy in Japan was deeply worried about Tanimoto’s project and its implications, and instigated an investigation of Tanimoto, Cousins, and their associates. Staffers at the US embassy grudgingly admitted that while they “did not believe he is [a] Red or Red-Sympathizer”, Tanimoto and the Maidens could nonetheless “… easily become [a] source of mischievous publicity.” The consul at Kobe conceded that Tanimoto was “probably sincere in his efforts to assist the girls”, but his assessment and that of others in the American intelligence establishment concluded that he was still “at least a liberal” whose actions might purposefully or incidentally support “the leftist line” (Resisting 158).

The same skepticism reigned among the New York Society of Friends. The Quakers had
been asked to host the girls during their surgery and post-operative recovery. Many of the Friends were suspicious that they might be roped into a Communist plot in the guise of Christian charity. To combat this fear, the Friends’ coordinating office sent a circular letter warning that if the Quakers would not help, the girls might be “offered free medical treatment in Russia, with the apparent intent of exhibiting their unfortunate disfigurement to the world as sort of chamber of horrors of ‘imperialist atomic aggression’” (qtd. in Shibusawa 231-232). The letter also emphasized the innocent, non-combative status of the girls and promised that “the Quakers would be free of any underlying motive other than a desire to help and reconcile with former enemies” (Shibusawa 232). Helping the hibakusha was not just Christian duty; by preventing a Soviet propaganda coup—stopping the Communists from waving the Red shirt, as it were—it became a patriotic duty as well.

Others in the American security apparatus pursued a different line of objection to the Maidens’ reconstructive surgery. Historian Susan Lindee examines one such example within the AEC. After a fact-finding trip to Japan, Merril Eisenbud of the New York operations office of the AEC wrote that not only should the United States not support treatment for the girls because it might facilitate Communist propaganda, treatment was to be opposed because of how it would create “misconceptions” about the nature of the atomic bomb. Eisenbud claimed that activists like Cousins were mistaken in diagnosing the origin of the girls’ mutilations; “delayed radiation effects,” he wrote, “are limited to a handful of leukemias and to perhaps one hundred cases of cataract for whom very little need be done” (qtd in Lindee 134). Lindee goes on to note that in Eisenbud’s estimation, while there were “thousands of survivors [who] suffered with keloids—
painful, overgrown scar tissue—these were not a specific response to radiation exposure but rather a common consequence of skin injury in some racial groups. Keloids, therefore, did not qualify as radiation effects” (134). To alter the criteria for radiation injuries would greatly increase the statistical account of civilian casualties caused by the bombings and, in Eisenbud’s assessment, exaggerate the United States’ culpability for Japanese suffering to an unacceptable extent.

The cause of the Hiroshima Maidens drew its legitimacy from the undeniable, highly visible mutilations that the bomb inflicted on the girls. The campaign reinforced its authority and sought a way around the racial antipathy created by the war through emphasizing the Maidens’ wholly innocent, non-combatant status. One American host admitted to “a strong anti-Japanese residue” but was persuaded that opening his home would be “a way to test his prejudice” (Shibusawa 231). Beyond legitimacy, the Maidens’ advocates also heightened the pathos of the girls’ plight by highlighting the gendered, devastating social exclusion suffered by the young women. The campaign sought to use strictly humanitarian, conciliatory language throughout, concealing the implicit diagnostic anti-nuclear message behind an explicit narrative of Christian, American generosity. In the face of all this rhetorical maneuvering, government critics and private citizens still found avenues to undermine and attack the motivations of the sponsors, to cast doubt on the literal (medical!) and political-figurative diagnosis for the origin girls’ suffering: to accuse Cousins, Tanimoto, and the Quakers of waving the bloody shirt.

The wounds borne by the Hiroshima Maidens were undeniably visible; the mental

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19 In fact, the mutilations were so prominent that they had to be hidden behind veils.
wounds ascribed to Claude Eatherly were invisible. Establishing the credibility of Eatherly as a wound-bearing martyr displaying genuine symptoms of trauma was Anders’ first task. During his meeting with the *hibakusha* at the Fourth World Conference, Anders had struggled with the issue of the credibility of victims and victim narratives. The critical eye expects so-called legitimate martyrs and victims to conform to specific behavioral norms of reticence and shame, to display not just mutilations of body, but of behavior. Even for those inclined to sympathy, such as Anders, departure from the norm is a startling disturbance of the plausibility structure to which victims are expected to conform. “The first speaker,” wrote Anders, “… monopolized the beginning of the meeting.”

Afterwards, I came to learn that he is essentially the ‘ceremonial victim’ of Hiroshima. One might accuse him, to be sure, of transforming his condition into a role and effectively making a living as a “Hiroshima-profiteer.” It could be true … In fact, the man is famous world-wide, however peculiar the manner of his fame might be: he has survived with some of the largest area of his body covered by burns, and subsequently by keloid scars, that has ever been seen. And indeed, his oft-photographed back can be found in medical publications the world over. However, I do not believe that he has been an exhibitionist in any way; in any case he carries himself with much less vanity than your average medal-swinging Joe. (*Der Mann* 104)

In this instance, Anders pointed to several different ways in which the speaker cast doubt on his victim status by departing from expectation: first by being unabashedly outspoken, second by embracing the role of *hibakusha* rather than trying to reject and overcome his situation, by seeking financial gain, and by seeking fame. Anders neatly handed these criticisms back to the hypothetical scold by pointing to the source of the man’s world-wide fame, asking, in effect, if this is a fame that anyone would choose willingly. In the case of Eatherly, his first step in *Burning Conscience*—the first step in creating a viable injustice frame—would be to make the pilot’s mental wounds visible.
c. Diagnoses and Visible Wounds

In his opening letter to Eatherly on 3 June 1959, Anders approached the work of making the mental wounds visible for both the reader and the pilot by drawing attention to the cultural and social mechanisms which normally serve to reconcile and conceal the deviations from the normal and the healthy when one is placed in the social role of having a sickness. For Anders, the atomic era requires a painful, uncomfortable path. “Nothing,” he told Eatherly,

lies further from my mind than to console you. The consoler … always tries to belittle the pain or guilt or to talk it away. That is exactly what your doctors are trying to do … who, under all circumstances must defend the purity of the deed which you so rightly feel as guilt … Therefore they find it necessary to call your sufferings and expectations of punishment an illness (‘classical guilt complex’), and therefore they must treat your act as a ‘self-imagined wrong’. (Burning 2; emphasis in the original)

To console Eatherly was an act Anders believed belittled his pain; the psychiatrists, as both consolers and diagnosticians, belittle the pain and hide its true source. They defended the deed, reinforced its military necessity, and gave support to the valorization of war deeds as glorifiable and respectable. They confined themselves to the rectification of, as Anders told Eatherly, “your reaction to the deed,” when what was necessary for a correct diagnosis is criticism “of the deed itself (or the world condition in which such a deed is possible)” (Burning 2). Anders’ making-visible of Eatherly’s mental trauma depended on highlighting Eatherly’s reaction, his feelings of guilt, his abrogation of social mores, his petty crimes, against the backdrop of destroyed Hiroshima instead of contextualizing them as the result of personal moral failings.

In so doing, the acts become not crimes, but extraordinary moral deeds for which Eatherly deserved respect. They made him unlike those other members of the atomic missions who avoided Eatherly’s fate and maintained their appearance of normality through, as Anders
wrote to the judge presiding over Eatherly’s case, a resort to “escapism, through not trying to master it, through the public opinion and praise of their mission” (Burning 64). The litany of the pilot’s pathetic and rather incompetent crimes was thus transformed. “I am referring to your forgery, robbery, breaking and entering, and God knows what other irregularities there may have been,” Anders told the pilot; “in your case these offences have another meaning than ordinarily. They are acts of despair” (Burning 5). The ordinariness and incompetence of Eatherly’s law-breaking also served the cause of reinterpreting his acts as moral acts. On the one hand, Anders wrote to Eatherly, “You had to attempt to speak and to act in the language that was understandable there, in the idiom of petty or big larceny, in the terms of the society itself. Thus you have tried to prove your guilt by committing acts which are at least recognized as crimes” (Burning 5). On the other, it was important that the acts be both nonviolent and absent a conventional motive for monetary gain. After Eatherly’s spate of check forgery, as Robert Jungk noted in the introduction, his next crime was “… a hold up. But the peculiar bandit took nothing!” Jungk insisted that these were “futile acts of rebellion by an amateur gangster, who held up cashiers without robbing them, who burst into post offices without taking the till” (Burning xviii-xix). Eatherly’s crimes were the sign of the traumatic wound, but it was crucial for the reception of Eatherly as a martyr figure that the visible sign of trauma be simultaneously serious enough yet nonviolent and resistant to explanation via conventional motive. That is, if it were to serve as an effective contrast to the crime of Hiroshima. In short, Anders, Jungk, and Russell were aiming for the combination of war hero and perpetrator of victimless crime. Through his criminal acts, Anders wrote in an open letter to President John F. Kennedy,
“[Eatherly] has proven his abnormality in the medical sense. The acts as such, of course, cannot be disputed, but in the light of interpretation they assume another sense, they assume sense” (106). Anders stepped in to provide that sense for Eatherly, for the readers, and for the representatives of the government from the president down to the local judge. The sense-making scheme is taken from his earlier writings such as the *Antiquiertheit*. Eatherly’s compulsions, Anders explained, are

… a consequence of what I had described as the decisive newness of our situation. That we can produce more than we can mentally reproduce; that we are not made for the effects which we can make by means of our man-made machines; that the effects are too big for our imagination and the emotional forces at our disposal. Don’t reproach yourself for this discrepancy. (*Burning* 4)

Once again, we encounter the Promethean discrepancy. Thus, through the application of his philosophical anthropology to the Eatherly case, Anders arrives at his necessary concrete example demanded by his occasional philosophy. It is a single case but, writing to judge Haley, Anders insists that it “… should not be regarded as isolated or unique, but rather as a prophetic example … the decision about the Eatherly case will not be the decision about an individual crank, but about ‘man in the technical age’” (*Burning* 65). As in his essay “Warnbilder”, Anders places Eatherly’s experience in the class of singular-but-generalizable human events which “*though they are mine, are not mine alone*” (74; emphasis in the original).

Anders’ efforts to generalize Eatherly’s conscience-struggle also extended to efforts to create solidarity and publicity through association other extant forms of struggle against recognized injustice. The groups and persons Anders and Eatherly approached were both pragmatic choices in terms of their prominence, but also fitted to Anders’ analysis of the nuclear era as well a sensitivity to his understanding of Eatherly’s affliction. One example is the
Hiroshima maidens; in his first letter to Eatherly, Anders suggested to the pilot that

Next August 6th, as every as every year, the population of Japan will celebrate the day on which ‘it’ happened. Why don’t you send a message to these people … if you would tell them: ‘At that time I knew not what I did, but now I do know, and I know that this must never happen again … And: ‘Your fight is my fight, your no more Hiroshima is my no more Hiroshima’ … you can be sure that with such a message you would make this day of mourning a day of rejoicing. (Burning 5-6)

The Hiroshima maidens, as we saw above, were a particularly advantageous choice due to the extensive coverage extended to the women, as well as American public’s relatively clear decision that the young women could be considered truly innocent victims of atomic warfare, and that to help them was a humanitarian act of conscience. By suggesting that Eatherly approach them, he in a sense convinced the young women to adopt Eatherly in the same way that the women themselves had been adopted by the New York Quakers. Too, beyond the reconciliation possible through forgiveness, the move offered Eatherly a way to close the schizophrenic gap that Anders had identified as existing between perpetrator and victim. And the Hiroshima maidens did, in fact respond to his approach. On 24 July of 1959, they wrote to Eatherly that “we, the undersigned, girls of Hiroshima send you our warm greetings … this letter comes to you to convey our sincere sympathy with you.” Citing their experience as guests of the Quakers, they said that “We have learned to feel towards you a fellow-feeling, thinking that you are a victim of war like us” (Burning 25). Their letter, in a sense, served to make Eatherly’s hidden, psychic trauma as real and as visible as their disfigurements, and to encourage his readers to understand Eatherly as a wounded victim whose plight was not merely that of a political prisoner—Anders made repeated comparisons to the Dreyfus case—but humanitarian as well, in the sense that the aid given to the Hiroshima maidens could claim to be apolitical and non-ideological.
In presenting the political nature of Eatherly’s imprisonment, Anders also classed the pilot as a martyr of conscience. Praising Eatherly’s stoicism, Anders told him that prison, exile, or even death was the frequent fate of philosophers and religious leaders—but that in so doing found themselves “in the most respectable company [of] Socrates.” In a footnote he justified his self-inclusion, writing that “I am saying ‘we’ because I, too, was persecuted … for Hitler’s people considered me a piece of dirt … particularly because in the years preceding the brutal dictatorship I had warned against it in the same way that I am now warning against the atomic danger” (Burning 39). By so doing, Anders presented a social diagnosis of the atomic danger as being of similar magnitude to the Hitler regime, and reaffirmed his designation of Eatherly as the anti-Eichmann via the pilot’s insistence on recognizing and accounting for individual moral responsibilities within a system of death constructed in such a way as to eliminate that personal accountability.

d. Prognoses and potential cures

In addition to creating rhetorical equivalence, describing Eatherly in the same terms as those who resisted the Hitler regime served a philosophical, political, and activist end; for Anders, the making-visible of deeds such as the Holocaust or the atomic bombings was an ongoing search for those-that-did and those-that-hid, who took on responsibility and who refused. In discussing with Eatherly the prospect of disarmament, the pilot asked whether nuclear scientists could be expected to, “delay their work and paralyze the political and military organizations?” (Burning 21). Anders answered pessimistically; he doubted that physicists would give up their “first love.” Instead, he said, to deter them from weapons work they “must feel
surrounded by a hostile world” and live in “fear of violating a generally accepted taboo and of being ostracized by the community” (Burning 23). This should recall the discussion of A.J. Muste from (1.IIc) and Anders’ explanation of the “moral climate” from (1.IVc). For Anders, the atmosphere of disgust and hostility towards atomic weapons must be eternally and continually renewed. Even if all nuclear testing were halted, the warheads destroyed, and the facilities dismantled, it would still be necessary to be continually committed to never turn to atomic arms though it would always be possible. “The apocalyptic danger,” he claimed, “is not abolished by one act, once and for all, but only by daily repeated acts” (Burning 20). The abolition of the atomic menace is a kind of ongoing cultural work.

Similarly, for Anders the abolition of future fascist regimes and future Holocausts was a related kind of ongoing cultural work. As we will see in chapter three, Anders experienced this deeply as a former exiled Jew living in Vienna. Anders’ varieties of cultural work were an extension of his praxis: daily, practical tasks for public and private activism. In a letter to British Nobel Prize winning physicist and disarmament advocate P.M.S. Blackett, Anders described himself as a fellow anti-nuclear activist and as one who was trying to “fight the re-nazification of the German-speaking countries.” He informed Blackett that he has seen an announcement of a lecture that the Briton will be presenting in Vienna. “Unfortunately,” he wrote, “the selection of scholars invited is, to put it mildly, most negligent … you will find yourself in the society of a man like Prof. H.C. who … belonged to the most furious and most bombastic trumpeters for Hitler.” He urged Blackett to protest H.C.’s inclusion, to not further the blindness that allowed a notorious anti-Semite to move invisibly through Viennese intellectual society and to deliver
speeches on a prominent Jewish author such as Arthur Schnitzler. Combating the atomic menace and making the crimes of the Nazi regime visible were two aspects of the same kind of work. As Anders explained in *Der Mann*, one of the things he found most bizarre was the extent to which the victims of the Hiroshima bombing saw it as an agentless catastrophe, “as an earthquake, as a flood, or as an exploding sun” (108) and as one hypothesis to explain this, he theorized that this may have been because it was not experienced as the deed of a perpetrator—the schizophrenic gap. Juxtaposing Eatherly with the Hiroshima maidens served to close the gap between the perpetrators and victims; but additionally for Anders himself, the making-visible of perpetrators reinforced the reality of the Holocaust and the atomic menace alike, and guided them back to the realm of catastrophes brought about by human agents, rather than appearing as natural disasters. This imaginative intervention is palliative; it prevented victims such as Eatherly and Anders from being immersed in a false reality that denied the existence of the crimes done to them.

That the Hitler regime and the atomic menace were inextricably tied together in Anders’ assessment is apparent in a letter he wrote to his old acquaintance, the pioneering American psychologist and Harvard professor Gordon Allport. On 24 February 1961, Anders conveyed his worries across the Atlantic to Allport:

> Here in Europe, particularly in Adenauer’s Bundesrepublik, the situation is worsening so rapidly that one feels oneself thrown back into the year preceding Hitler’s rise to power. Two illustrations: In Munich an Eichmann exhibition has been opened. The day before yesterday, four men wearing swastikas entered the exhibition … Today I expect a Hiroshima victim to arrive here in Vienna. This man was refused permission to step into a German plane because in the Bundesrepublik the mere mentioning of Hiroshima is considered equal with Communism … The present ambassador of Germany to the U.S. was a high ranking Nazi … Austria is incomparably better, the other day I talked to the President Schärf, who had been in Hiroshima himself … In Germany he would be considered ‘a fool or a sinner’ (als ein Narr der sich versündigt—as Adenauer characterized all opponents of nuclear armament on Sept. 27 last year) … This is a sad letter, I am sorry to stir you up, but the dangers ahead are too great to bury one’s head in the sand.
The Adenauer government’s condemnation and harassment of anti-nuclear activists was a symptom that Germany had in no wise been de-Nazified, a sign of disease as clear as the appearance of men daring to wear the swastika in public.

Much of the preceding section has concerned itself with the rhetorical and literary methods Anders pursued in order to create a viable, complex injustice frame that presented Eatherly as a valid martyr-figure who was simultaneously acceptable to public expectations and explicable within the terms of his philosophical analysis of the atomic situation. Anders’ insistence on comparing the nuclear situation with the days before the Hitler regime seized power underlined his earnest, highly personal sense of urgency: his diagnosis was one that demanded immediate action. That urgency also prompted him to move from creating the Eatherly injustice frame to recruiting allies for the immediate, achievable goal of protecting Eatherly and securing his release. As discussed in chapter one, Anders—like the scientist-activists of the first wave of nuclear disarmament—relied on personal networks of professional acquaintance to pursue his activist work. Gordon Allport was one person to whom Anders looked: he had been a student of Anders’ father, William Stern, and Allport had supported Anders during his exile in the United States. In an earlier letter of 12 February, Anders had asked Allport’s help in the Eatherly affair in a general way. He sought participants in his suggestion that the Eatherly case be reviewed by an independent board of psychiatrists, mentioning to Allport that his European colleagues have already weighed in “and I feel it would only be natural if American psychiatrists would support the suggestion too”; and cajoling Allport to broader circulation of the whole Eatherly affair: “I am certain you are in contact with colleagues who …
would not remain indifferent in front of the case that really threatens to become a sort of Dreyfus Case.” The letter of the 24th is much more explicit, and Anders’ litany of fear comparing Adenauer’s Germany to the last days of Weimar was earnest, but its desperate urgency was also a form of suasion.

Anders’ search for persons who could challenge Eatherly’s detention was becoming protracted. His previous efforts to navigate the V.A. and legal systems had been frustrating. In late 1959 he appealed to Linus and Ava Pauling for a guide, someone “to whom one could turn … without being provided only evasive replies.” The Paulings had forwarded Anders’ letter to the ACLU, with little result. By the middle of 1960, Ava Pauling had become skeptical that Anders could bring the Eatherly case to the attention of persons of real influence. By 1961 Eatherly remained under V.A. supervision. Seeking a wider set of allies, in January 1961 Anders secured a letter of introduction to the philosopher and antiwar activist Bertrand Russell, who agreed that the Eatherly case was of interest to him, and though he had no time for other actions, he would sign a letter if Anders wrote it. Anders replied on 18 February that he would write the letter and circulate it, “to have it signed by persons whose moral authority is unquestioned,” such as Russell. That same day, he turned again to the Paulings, canvassing them for signatures for the open letter requesting review of Eatherly’s mental status by an unbiased authority. Not only does he ask for theirs, he investigates other necessary references: “I should be very grateful,” Anders wrote, “if you could suggest at least one more American, preferably the American psychiatrist with the greatest reputation.” Anders’ hope was to recruit a medical authority who could contest the V.A.’s diagnosis of Eatherly and pronounce him sane.
Anders’ moral framing-work had not been enough on its own—his diagnosis of Eatherly required the support of medical science. With no answer forthcoming from the Paulings, he would have to turn again to Allport. The letter of 24 February asked the psychologist explicitly rather than indirectly for his assistance amid a cushion of impressive names as supporting authorities. After mentioning that J.B. Priestly had been forwarding him Russell’s Eatherly editorials, and that he “immediately wrote to Schweitzer” Anders came to what he declared was “… the main point. Do you know any psychiatrist or psychologist (Gordon Allport included) who would be willing to apply at the Public Relations Office of Waco in order to be granted an interview with Eatherly?” Allport agreed to write the V.A. at Waco, but declined to make any pronouncements about the pilot’s sanity.

In this moment in the philosopher’s history, Anders’ letters to Allport are an excellent example of how he built upon acquaintances and singular allies to construct a broader movement of Eatherly supporters: having already dropped the names of Russell, Pauling, Schweitzer, and Priestly, Anders wrote Allport again in a letter of the 17th of April, trying to edge around his reservations.

And now to the one page public letter (which I may have written to you previously has already been signed by Russell, Max Born, and Robert Jungk). You feel you cannot make a decision as to whether Claude is insane or not … As you feel it would contradict your responsibility as a psychologist to sign the one page Open Letter to the Editors, wouldn’t it be an idea worth while considering if you would write a letter in which you mention my Open Letter to Pres. Kennedy…

Anders was adept at using chains of referral and implicit support to recruit new allies to his activist network, and to provide the most convincing view of its efficacy, dissent notwithstanding: even as he was writing to Allport extolling the wide support his open letter to
Kennedy to received, Max Born was writing Ava Pauling to concur with her that he believed Anders’ open letter may have done Eatherly more harm than good. Activist networks are living things, the product of a web of relationships between and among persons. Anders’ use of Eatherly had its own costs, and the following section uses social movement theories to understand the nature and consequences of those costs.

IV. Efficacy and Consequences

a. Textual Control

Using the terms of framing theorists, one of the advantages of deploying a figure like Eatherly as a unifying symbol is that securing his release provides an immediate, achievable goal. Anders himself had doubts that his open-letter campaign could achieve that goal, and admitted to Eatherly and Allport that he fully expected his letter to “expire in the wastebasket of a secretary’s secretary” but was confident nonetheless that it would have some effect from having been published and circulated. He told Eatherly that “already today the letter has produced a new situation (in your country too: for mimeographed by Harvard professors, this letter is now circulating in the United States)” and as a result Eatherly was “now present in the thoughts and feelings of more people … surrounded by more friends than ever before, even by more than in that glamour period in which you were celebrated as a ‘Victory Boy’ by the press of your country” (Burning Conscience 124). In speaking publicly to Eatherly and the audience of Burning Conscience, Anders emphasized the efficacy of the actions he instigated, and situated his pessimism quite carefully. Hiding that pessimism is, according to Benford, one of the necessary tasks of motivational framing, and it is a rhetorical move he himself observed among
disarmament activists. For antinuclear organizers, Benford emphasizes that public pessimism “would have violated one of the movement’s fundamental implicit norms. As one activist related, ‘Regardless of how we feel personally, we have to try to make people feel they can have an effect on this.’ Controlling the public expression of pessimism can be crucial to action mobilization” (208).

In addition to a generally optimistic tone, Anders argued that—metaphorically speaking at least—the effects of the letter achieve had already achieved a kind of freedom for Eatherly. Having been liberated into the thoughts and feelings of so many, he told the pilot, the walls of his ward became “sham walls” and “in this sense one could say you are not shut in” (Burning 124). The metaphorical liberation of Eatherly served as a backstop to preempt a sense of failure. Doing so avoided one of the framing hazards that Benford identifies, namely, the dissipation of a movement when their goals prove impossible to achieve. However, Benford adds that “while activists were observed redefining failures as successes, there may be limits to the effectiveness of such linguistic tactics” (209). During the Eatherly affair, Anders reached some of those limits, and was forced to pay a variety of personal and reputational costs.

This analysis so far has concentrated on Anders’ writings to and about Eatherly; Eatherly’s own words seldom appear. This is in part because Anders in no small measure spoke on Eatherly’s behalf, guiding his correspondence or even writing it—over Eatherly’s signature as it were. Some of the personal consequences that Anders suffered in the Eatherly affair stemmed from the philosopher’s need to retain control of the narrative frame surrounding the pilot, as well
as from genuine concerns on Eatherly’s behalf. One prime example is the case of the planned missive to the Hiroshima maidens, during which Anders wrote to Eatherly with the concern that the pilot was prevented from corresponding freely. “We are living in an epoch in which detours are morally required,” Anders wrote, “This means in our case: if you should be prevented from personally sending the telegram to the victims … there is still a second best way open: that I do it in your name. Of course, you know that I would never do anything behind your back. Therefore again I would need your authorization.” Indeed, Eatherly then refers to the missive as “our message to the people of Hiroshima” (Burning 24; emphasis in the original). There are other examples: for the Eatherly-Anders interview that took place in Mexico City, the pre-scripted talking points for Eatherly are written in Anders’ philosophical terms and edited in Anders’ hand. Too, Anders went to great lengths to guide and control Eatherly’s contacts with other correspondents, journalists, and media entities, warning him to have very limited contact with filmmakers and journalists and to be highly cautious in any release of his story to others. “I lived

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20 As in Der Mann, in Burning Conscience Anders tried to be scrupulous about disclosing his influence as an editor. As regards Eatherly’s letters, Anders insisted that “the editing corresponded to that of a composition which originally was lacking in dynamic markings, in an arrangement made to make the meaning of the text more apparent … Although the changes concern only non-essentials, it is necessary to draw attention to them because, in a way, they have modified the picture of Eatherly as a letter writer” (8). However, Anders’ private letters to Eatherly revealed that he feared that the picture of the pilot as a letter writer was quite fragile. On the 25th of February 1961, Anders wrote to Eatherly after he had heard that the pilot was planning a collaboration with another author:

Incidentally I heard from Americans that visited me that you are working together with R.D. on your autobiography, that D. has even given up his newspaper job in order to devote himself exclusively to this work, and that he is trying to have it published as fast as possible by the publishing house which offers the most money. I can only hope that this book will not be an anti-climax, ruining the picture of Claude as it appears in the correspondence. You know that this book has already become the basis for a kind of Eatherly myth: For many thousands of people, you have become the incarnation of courage ... It would be very regrettable if a second book would contrast with the first one and if your image and your function would be blurred by this fact.
in Hollywood for years,” Anders told Eatherly, “and I know their principles, better: the utter lack of principles, of movie producers” (27). Here, too, Anders offered to be Eatherly’s guide and collaborator in dealing with film producers and potential co-writers of the Eatherly autobiography.

Anders’ advocacy on Eatherly’s behalf through private letter-writing was extensive, as seen in the Pauling-Russell-Born-Allport letter-chain. Open and private letters were the fabric from which the book *Burning Conscience* was created. Private letters were the means through which the open letter was circulated and the Eatherly cause promoted: to private individuals such as Graham Greene, tabloids like the *Daily Mirror*, to his ally and acquaintance Kingsley Martin at *The New Statesman*, to Hugh Brock at the dedicated pacifist publication *Peace News*. Anders even approached diverse organizations for whom the cause of Claude Eatherly might not have fallen within their remit, such as the prominent civil rights group the Congress of Racial Equality. “I feel that his case should be one of your causes,” he wrote. “… In a few weeks the complete correspondence between him and myself will appear as a book in several languages. It’s [sic] title will be: ‘CONSCIENCE—OFF LIMITS’ … It would not be a bad idea to picket the place where he is confined … with posters: ‘Conscience—off limits’.” Such approaches served as publicity for the Eatherly case and advertising for his book. But they also became a liability when critics challenged the Eatherly narrative. Having placed himself at the center of the Eatherly affair in the role of primary information broker, it was to him that journalists and allies turned for clarification and comment when Eatherly was attacked, and he who was held responsible by his allies who had suffered damage to reputations for factual errors and
discrepancies that appeared in the Eatherly story.

The errors could be as simple as confusion over the role Eatherly had played in the atomic missions: whether he had dropped the bomb on Hiroshima, or whether he had given the go-ahead to the plane which in turn dropped the bomb. This distinction was not clear in the first news accounts of the Eatherly case and were perpetuated by the necessary simplification of and stripping away of detail, the resort to archetype and familiar structure that Wertsch encapsulates as the “radically selective narrativizations” that accompany the transformation of complex historical events into useful symbolic resources (58). In 1963, the formulation of Eatherly as lead pilot was still being used in media about Eatherly, one example being a German play titled “The Man Who Dropped the Atom Bomb.” As with the radioman Kuboyama, who had proved more complex than “that which the first news reports, which had described him as a ‘fisherman’ had conveyed,” Eatherly and his situation also proved to be more complex than the first news reports had anticipated. In fact, throughout his correspondence with Eatherly, Anders faced some difficulty in convincing his friend to clarify his medical and legal status: “I cannot even start trying to do something for you without knowing the fundamentals of your situation,” Anders wrote, “… please—a technical advice for your whole life—keep my letter in front of you when you answer it in order not to forget important points” (Burning 49; emphasis in the original). If Anders himself was sometimes unclear on the details, it was not surprising that Russell—who relied on Anders for his information—mistook the precise nature of Eatherly’s role in the Hiroshima attack, writing in The New Statesman that “An extraordinarily interesting case which illustrates the power of the Establishment, at any rate in America, is that of Claude Eatherly, who
dropped the bomb on Hiroshima.” Shortly thereafter, a reader by the name of G. Soar wrote an irritated and dismayed letter to the editor, saying “I don’t mind the Daily Telegraph or even the Guardian, helping to perpetuate the myth that the pilot of the bomber which attacked Hiroshima was Claude Eatherly, which they did in their reports of the recent court case. But please, not Lord Russell!” On 16 March 1961, Russell passed to Anders both a copy of the article as well as “a short critical letter which it evoked and to which I hope you will write an answer to the New Statesman.” Replying personally to Russell, Anders admitted that the reader had been correct in spotting the factual mistake, but that “I don’t think, morally speaking it makes any difference whatsoever whether Eatherly pushed the button which told Col. Tibbets to push the release button himself. For Eatherly, at least—and just this proves his moral greatness—this difference amounts to zero.” And for Anders, as well, the difference was nil. In fact, the establishment of concomitant moral responsibility for all the dispersed actors who had contrived to imagine, build, deploy, and drop the weapon was one of his goals. For Russell, however, the factual error undermined his credibility and required response. Anders was the one who would have to provide it.

Critics such as the author J. Bradford Huie took such factual errors as an opportunity to illustrate the naiveté of Eatherly advocates, portraying them as persons who “had not bothered to examine any record, either military, medical, or criminal” (20) before taking up the aviator’s cause. This was the central claim of his highly critical 1964 book The Hiroshima Pilot. Further, they played into Huie’s own diagnosis of Eatherly’s mental status and motives. For Huie, the conflation of roles contributed to his assessment that Eatherly may have acted as he did not out
of regret for the attack on Hiroshima, but because it was Tibbets and the crew of the *Enola Gay* who had been recognized as having the key role, whereas Eatherly and his *Straight Flush* were hardly mentioned at all. It may have been the case, Huie wrote, that Eatherly “regretted, perhaps resented being overlooked in the publicity … that the American people had not known that Eatherly had been at Hiroshima … [that] he had never been called a hero” (41). Huie sought out and interviewed many of Eatherly’s acquaintances, and some of these interviewees gave statements which supported Huie’s interpretation. One of these included a Mrs. Frels who had been a nurse at the V.A. hospital in Waco. Concerning Eatherly, Frels told Huie that, “He’s just a man who can’t endure an ordinary existence. If only you or somebody could write a big book about him, or make a big picture about him … there is absolutely nothing wrong with Claude Eatherly that some oil wells and a million dollars wouldn’t cure in a minute” (301). The factual error concerning the nature Eatherly’s participation in the mission, ambiguity over the precise legal nature of Eatherly’s detention, and ignorance of the conditions under which he was held, all drove counter-narratives such as Huie’s which re-affirmed the primacy of the archetype of the “medal-swinging Joe.” Huie’s formula was simple: denied the role of hero, under the influence of writers and pacifists such as Anders, Eatherly took on the role of martyr. The symbolic transformation Anders attempted in *Burning Conscience* was, Huie wrote, “extremely distasteful. I find the idea of exploiting this unhappy, middle aged man exceedingly cruel” (238). This simple formula helped block Anders’ new archetype of the anti-Eichmann and its injustice frame from taking hold.
b. Exhaustion

Simultaneously, Anders’ efforts to promote the Eatherly affair began to suffer from the vagaries of the news cycle, wandering public attention, and activist weariness. Injustice frames, like all activist narratives, benefit from a conclusive outcome. Lacking a tangible end, movement activists are given cause to doubt the efficacy and worth of their actions. Bedford and Hunt note that this weariness is so prevalent among protest groups that it forms its own genre of “burnout tales” which appear when activists recount their involvement in movements; one of their informants from the disarmament group Nebraskans for Peace said that eventually, she had to drop out of the group: “I’ve lost energy. I’m not energized like I was. The meetings, the sacrifices I’ve made, no evidence of progress, all that—it adds up. It wears on you until you’re burned out” (509). By the close of *Burning Conscience*, the need for some kind of resolution becomes apparent in Anders’ own letters. Eatherly had lapsed into silence, so in December of 1960 and on February 17th of 1961, Anders wrote Roland Watts of the ACLU that his primary concern was “to prevent Eatherly from becoming ‘the forgotten man’” and, lacking further communication from the pilot or tangible legal developments, was forced to close the first German edition of the book with the promise of Eatherly’s metaphorical freedom discussed above (*Burning* 116). However, when Eatherly began writing again Anders added a postscript, claiming that although the pilot remained imprisoned, “a situation is developing which entitles us to more hope” although “it is still impossible to give an account of this new phase. The Eatherly case goes on…” (*Burning* 128). In fact, the new development was that Eatherly had decided to stop fighting his case in court and work with the V.A. doctors to secure his release through
treatment. This was good news for Eatherly; “I feel wonderful,” he wrote Anders, “and only a little anxious about leaving the hospital” (Burning 134). Though it was a positive development for the aviator, it potentially derailed the injustice frame that Anders had meticulously assembled because it removed the V.A. doctors and Texas legal authorities from their role as the clear target of activist opposition. It obviated Anders’ agitation on his behalf—including the complex Pauling-Russell-Born-Allport letter-chain of spring 1961 discussed above. “I had already prepared a public declaration,” Anders wrote Eatherly, “but now after this marvelous new development, its publication has of course become superfluous and the signatures may now peacefully sleep in my files” (Burning 134). Anders and his allies had been prepared for their petitions to be received by the authorities and promptly dustbinned, knowing that any effect would have to come from the open publication of their declarations. This turn of events, however, caused Anders to have to dustbin the letters himself, denying him and his allies any opportunity to test the efficacy of their actions.

The continual opening and closing of the Eatherly narrative went yet further: with the appearance of the 1962 American edition of the Burning Conscience, Anders added yet another postscript in which he was able to announce that “the Eatherly case has assumed a new face. For Claude is now free…” (136). Indeed, the pilot had absconded from the V.A. and was hiding in Galveston. Like Eatherly’s decision to work with the V.A. doctors, this was a conclusion that avoided a climactic conflict with the medical and legal powers-that-be. Anders recognized this, and admitted to his readers that, “it would of course console me if I could say that the American authorities, having at last understood the issues at stake, were the authors of this happy ending”
(Burning 136). But they were not—Eatherly had chosen his own course of action, and so departed from the script Anders had been building in 1960 and 1961. Nonetheless, Anders went out of his way to emphasize for his readers that “the Eatherly case is not obsolete. On the contrary, it is so new that it hasn’t even been understood yet” (Burning 138). Not just new, but radically new, and Anders reiterated that through his conscience and persecution, Eatherly embodied an entirely new epoch, the atomic era. One quality of this epoch—as Anders made clear in Antiquiertheit, in his “Theses,” “Commandments,” and in Der Mann—is that the atomic era is a permanent condition. “From now on,” Anders explained, “we are sentenced to live in a situation whose character cannot change any more” because with the possession of the atomic bomb, we will forever after be able to put an end to all human history (Burning 137). Anders claimed that every person’s task in this era is to keep this fact always before us. The inconclusive, unending, nature of the Eatherly affair and the permanent, unchanging quality of the atomic era as threateningly unstable were a combination which offset the advantages Eatherly had as an organizing, framing symbol discussed in (2.IIIa) above: that he provided a limited, achievable goal for activists and an opportunity for disarmament workers to see the efficacy of their actions (Benford 204, 208). Recall as well that framing within activist movements serves a diagnostic function in identifying the source and nature of the injustice as well as a prognostic function in describing possible outcomes; in the case of Eatherly, that social diagnosis arose from the interpretation of the diagnosis of Eatherly’s mental status. With the conclusion to Burning Conscience, Anders put forward a social diagnosis arrived at through interminable progression of the Eatherly case that was chronic, and offered only a tenuous prognosis for the most marginal of
positive outcomes. The narrative frame he achieved was a formula for activist frustration.

In Benford’s analysis, achievable goals and visible efficacy for protest actions are a check against movement dissipation, burnout, and pessimism. But there were further risks in developing an injustice frame centered around a martyr figure: when the task at hand is framed as an urgent moral duty activists pursuing that cause can become overcommitted; as Benford puts it, the “vocabulary of propriety can be so amplified that the adherent devotes all of his/her energies to the movement” (208). As the Eatherly affair progressed, Anders reached the point of overcommitment. As discussed above in (2.IVa-b), this was to a certain extent Anders’ own doing. He had warned Eatherly at length about the dangers of dealing with unscrupulous filmmakers and journalists, and yet, at the same time, he was fully convinced of the importance of Eatherly’s story and its telling. Writing to Eatherly when the pilot had considered traveling to Japan to lead the movement there, Anders told him that, “now you are being prevented from rushing to the ‘sick beds’ [of the atomic victims in Japan]. But not from fulfilling your other task. I think we agree that your story must be written” (Burning 40). That story, Eatherly’s autobiography, Anders declared would be “if he succeeds, [a] document of the frightful difficulties into which man can fall today as master-slave and slave-master of his technical world” (Burning 65). Anders thus made his collaboration with Eatherly into a pressing moral duty which only he could fulfill. After the pilot absconded from the Waco V.A., Eatherly wrote to Anders asking his help and Anders took it upon himself to assist him in that task. As he had before, he turned to Russell, writing the venerable philosopher on the 23rd of August 1961 that,

Eatherly admits for the first time that he has to go abroad in order to find his peace of mind and to continue with, respectively begin with his anti-atomic activities. What I would need is a reliable
American who just picks him up and brings him over the Mexican border … I couldn’t do it, because I have been forbidden to enter American territory (because after my emigration I gave up my American citizenship). I would be ready to fly to Mexico in order to receive Eatherly there and to take care of him.

Russell replied that regretfully, he knew of no such person who would be suitable for assisting a fugitive in crossing an international border. In the spring of 1962, Anders and Eatherly, however, made the trip regardless. Recall from (1.IIIb) that Anders was by this time in his late middle age and in relatively poor health; undertaking the Mexico journey was a huge effort for him. It may well have been the case that in addition to his moral duty to act as Eatherly’s scribal and filmic collaborator, his own experience as an exile redoubled his sense of duty. During the Mexican sojourn, Anders’ tendency towards editorial control reappeared in full force. Writing to Eatherly before the trip on the 10th of March, the philosopher suggested that

> It might be a good idea to sketch a few paragraphs which you would like to read before the camera. I will do so, too. I think it might be good to combine the two texts. We will have plenty of time to do it together at the Hilton. Then we will rehearse your reading and call the crew only when you have the feeling you are mastering your ‘part’.

In fact, the notes and paragraphs prepared for the CBS interview bear heavy evidence of Anders’ editing. Ultimately, meeting with Eatherly to work with one another on the interview and film did not go as smoothly as Anders had hoped; the filmmaker they had engaged managed to minimize Anders’ credit for the project and the philosopher came to feel he had been used unfairly to gain access to Eatherly. After their parting, their correspondence lapsed for some time.\(^{21}\)

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\(^{21}\) On the 11th of May, he wrote a peevish letter to Eatherly: “It makes me sad to see that you apparently do not wish to continue our correspondence. I am at a loss to understand why you have broken off our relation. I will not write another letter until I receive one from you.” On the 3rd of August Charlotte Anders took it upon herself to write the pilot, saying “I have the feeling that the man to whom I am writing has nothing to do with the Claude I knew through his letters to Günther and the Claude whom I met in Mexico … since our return from Mexico you have hardly written to Günther, the last letter—let’s be honest about it—was written only in order to request money
But the Eatherly affair was not done. If anything, Anders’ commitment of time and energy to managing Eatherly’s public image and media presence intensified with the 1964 appearance of Huie’s highly critical *The Hiroshima Pilot* and became critical when Eatherly was arrested once more, a situation which Anders discovered via urgent trans-Atlantic telegram.\(^{22}\) Anders blamed Huie’s book for Claude’s relapse, claiming in a letter to Ann Eatherly that the “criminal act” was a way of begging for internment: “a desperate attempt to flee from the world in front of which he was represented as a cheap swindler.” On the 18th of May he wrote to the Paulings complaining that the Eatherly affair had become interminable and seemingly without end; in August he lamented to Russell that compiling a rebuttal volume to *The Hiroshima Pilot*\(^{23}\) had “forced me into a detective activity” to which he was unsuited, activity which ranged from attempting to extract precise information from Eatherly, to correspondence with other journalists such as Hope Chamberlain in order to gain access to military and legal records, and tracking down Eatherly’s first contacts in the pacifist movement during 1957 in order to dispute the chronology offered by Huie that claimed Eatherly had based his martyr persona on a sensationalized movie script developed from the first news articles about his arrest (211-212). That same May, his press agent in Germany had informed him that new volumes of *Burning*...
Conscience would be contingent on the appearance of a defensible Eatherly autobiography and an independent evaluation of Eatherly’s mental state. It was beyond Anders’ resources. In August, he complained to Russell that he was facing great difficulty placing “… any of my anti-Huie texts in a British paper or magazine” and those letters that did see print were “cruelly emasculated.” His attempts to publicize his anti-Huie rebuttals in the Guardian as well as the New Statesman—where his old acquaintance and longtime disarmament advocate Kingsley Martin held sway—but had to admit that “the echo was zero.” Even reliable pacifist publications would not take Eatherly’s part: “I wonder if you have seen the article in Peace News,” he queried Russell, “which I have been told, is infra dignitatem. If I am correctly informed, they have apologized to Huie for having been taken in by Eatherly and his promoters.—Weidenfeld [an ally of Anders’ in the UK] fails utterly: despite his promise to spread my material, he is afraid of lifting his little finger.” Russell tried to offer helpful suggestions for newspapers and publishers who might be willing to print Anders’ latest campaign of Eatherly advocacy, but while Anders himself may not have reached the stage of weariness or burnout, his network of activist collaborators and sympathetic media allies largely had. It was a movement-wide problem. Lawrence Wittner writes that “by the early 1960s, veterans of the antinuclear campaign were increasingly overcome by fatigue” and he cites a 1962 letter from the activist mainstay Norman Cousins to Albert Schweitzer in which Cousins admits that “I know I can do more than I am doing … but I confess that it is increasingly difficult to mobilize myself constantly” (Resisting 450). Wittner further notes that cycles of resurgence and ebb are common in protest movements but that in their recollections, the activists of the early 60s repeatedly cited the numbing nature of
the anti-nuclear struggle as being particularly severe. One New Zealand CND member wrote that “to go on living constructively, people cannot dwell constantly … on the possibility of doom and destruction.” Another activist cited by Wittner was more concise, saying “if we lived in fear of the bomb we couldn’t function” (Resisting 451). In some cases, the inability to function quite literal and physical: Anders himself had a heart attack. Norman Cousins was so exhausted by his movement activities that he experienced a near-fatal physical breakdown. He recovered, and according to Wittner, one key component of his return to health was a self-treatment plan based around laughter (Resisting 451).

V. Conclusions

Wittner further notes that the widespread sense of exhaustion was exacerbated by a pervasive sense of futility. Within movements, the sense of inefficacy caused infighting and turned members against their leaders; some younger and more zealous members turned to splinter groups pursuing direct action. But the most significant amplifying effect of the feeling of frustration was not a defeat, but a partial success: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 which put a halt to the above-ground testing of nuclear weapons. Wittner observes that most disarmament organizations cautiously welcomed the treaty, citing the Canadian CND which called it “an important first step, a step which the insistent activities of the peace movement had helped prepare the way for … [but] only a small first step” (Wittner, Resisting 453). But rather than emboldening activists of the disarmament movements, in the aftermath of the treaty “support for nuclear disarmament agitation melted away rapidly” in Western Europe, North America, the Pacific, and in the Soviet Union (Wittner, Resisting 454). In addition to sheer exhaustion,
historians of the Cold War cite a number of contributing factors for the decline of the anti-nuclear movement. Paul Boyer argues that the continual, protracted negotiations between the superpowers created (in the eyes of the activists) a cosmetic sense among the public that something was being done about the problem; the test ban treaty was the culmination of this. Consequently, there was a widespread sense of reduced risk and immediacy that Boyer writes was “self-reinforcing” (“Apathy” 831). The test ban treaty ameliorated the fallout scare, and banished the powerful visual image of the mushroom cloud. “With nuclear weapons literally moved underground, the torrent of novels, movies, and television programs that had both fed and reflected the culture’s nuclear fears slowed to a trickle … Remote and largely invisible, the nuclear weapons issue was particularly ill-suited to the insatiable demands of television.” As one Jesuit activist recounted, visual media could not seem to encompass what had become “a kind of abstract preparation for the end of the world” (“Apathy” 831). A parallel process was the coming to fruition of the “Atoms for Peace” program, which according to Boyer provided an optimistic counterweight to the threat of atomic death, and which will be further explored in chapter four (832). Taken together, and in terms of a conflict-based macro view of social protest cycles, the “Atoms for Peace” program and the test ban treaty were an elite response and institutional accommodation that served to co-opt and reconcile dissidents (Meyer 458); recall from the discussion of framing theory in (2.IIIa) that the one of the functions of activist discourse is motivational and that one of the key methods of motivation is to create a sense of moral shock and disorder that splits potential recruits from the acceptance of the status quo. “Atoms for Peace” and the test ban treaty acted to heal the split that activist agitation had generated.
In this chapter we have seen how Anders pursued the Eatherly affair in search of a concrete, living symbol of the nuclear age, one which fulfilled the requirements of his example-directed “occasional” philosophy: the anti-Eichmann. Anders carefully developed an interpretation of Eatherly as a traumatized, wounded war victim and political prisoner of the atomic age within a narrative frame of injustice. Consequent to our discussion of framing theories, we saw that this frame offered practical and philosophical advantages, not the least of which being that securing his release presented disarmament activists with an immediate, achievable goal. Anders relied on transnational correspondence with his networks of fellow disarmament activists to create, advance and publicize this frame: the epistolary collection *Burning Conscience* is the visible, public product of his interaction with that network. Nonetheless, the interminable, complex nature of the Eatherly case laid the groundwork for the failure of the injustice frame because its lack of closure promoted a fatal sense of frustration and inefficacy during a period when those same emotions were contributing to the collapse of the broader anti-nuclear movement. Additionally, Anders’ presentation of the era which Eatherly was to symbolize did not help in this respect: propagating continual knowledge of deadly, eternal, world-ending nature of atomic weapons was a primary imaginative goal of Anders’ program. Eatherly was to have been the inspiring, invigorating example who demonstrated that this mental burden could be borne. In the end, that symbol was not strong enough. Furthermore, continual attacks from critics such as Huie caused Anders to invest large amounts of his time in rebuttal, and damaged his credibility among his activist allies.

The anti-nuclear movement had moved on. Eventually, so did Anders. As his
correspondence with Eatherly lapsed and the pilot took up a relatively normal life, Anders wrote to him with news of his latest activities. In his Christmas message of 1965, Anders wished the whole Eatherly family a happy holiday and best wishes for the New Year. But then he turned to other topics: “Maybe it will interest you,” Anders wrote, “that millions of and millions of Europeans and of Asians, too, are just flabbergasted when reading every day about the ruthless killing of thousands of civilians, women, and children in Vietnam by American bombers…” Anders had found his new cause. Claude Eatherly died on 1 July 1978, in relative obscurity. Although Anders had moved on, the linguistic limits discussed in (2.IVa) and the constricted ability of symbolic action to mitigate against exhaustion remained powerful barriers for Anders’ project of pursuing an activist philosophy. Those limits will be the subject of the next two chapters.
CHAPTER THREE: EXILE, TRANSLATION, AND PRE-LINGUISTIC SOLIDARITY

I. Introductions

a. An Account of Oneself

One of the themes of the preceding chapter was the tension arising from Anders’ sincere belief that the Hiroshima pilot Claude Eatherly’s writing of his own autobiography was a necessary political and personal task of the utmost urgency. “Giving an account of oneself,” Anders wrote, “represents an act of self healing” (Burning 44). Against Anders’ exhortations to the pilot that he should write his life-story in a directed, reflective way, there is a contradiction in Anders’ willingness to write on behalf of Eatherly, and in his emphatic warnings against trusting writers and film producers whose motives are unclear. Additionally, the Eatherly-Anders correspondence reveals on the part of Anders a deep suspicion about the limits of language and translatability:

‘Time and again you are being urged by the Japanese to come to Japan and ‘lead the atomic movement’ there. Let me be frank. This is complete nonsense. It will be hard enough for you to succeed in rebuilding your life outside an institution. You can succeed in doing that only within a world, the language of which is yours … and even then, despite the common language, you will often have the feeling of not being understood by your fellow men and of not understanding them.

In Japan, I am sure, you would be welcomed warmly [but] you would be forced to rely on people for every tiny everyday step … Furthermore it goes without saying that no-one can lead a movement within a country or civilization with which he is not familiar. (43)

Within these paragraphs, one can see a reflection of Anders’ own discomfort with attempting to manage the Eatherly affair from afar. It is not only language (recall from (1.IV.c) the difficulty Anders encountered in trying to develop an appropriate idiom for the atomic era), but the utter dependence on other persons to conduct simple tasks—let alone complex legal maneuvering—
with no local knowledge that makes the prospect of activism from afar an impossible one. Of course, even as he warned Eatherly of these dangers, that is to some extent what Anders found himself doing. In his advice to Eatherly, Anders revealed his own fears and frustrations with language, translation, professional identity, and place—with exile. Chapters one and two have touched on these issues, first developing a dual image of the developing atomic world condition and Anders’ placement within it, followed by an exploration of Anders’ attempts frame the Eatherly affair in such a way to satisfy the material and cultural prerequisites attached to the creation and dissemination of unifying, motivating symbols. This chapter has three sections that together summarize, extend, and synthesize the theme of Anders’ struggles with exile, identity, and translation.

In the first division of this chapter (3.I) I describe Anders’ attempt to articulate a “pre-linguistic” activist solidarity and a “global good-enough” as the basis of his approach to translation in an activist setting. He took it to be a necessary aspect of his philosophical praxis that he develop not only an appropriate idiom for accomplishing the imaginative work necessary for characterizing the atomic era, but a universal one. The second section (3.II) discusses the tension that exists between the solutions of the “pre-linguistic solidarity” / “global good-enough” and the high literary standards of his own prose, as well as his deeply personal need to maintain control of his own authorship, and hence, his own identity as an author. Next, in (3.III) I show how these diverse, sometimes contradictory currents in his approach to translation are related to and developed from his tenure as an exile in the United States and his experiences as former exile in post-war Austria.
Because the subject matter of (3.I) is concerned with the practical, performative, rhetorical possibilities of language across cultural boundaries I theorize Anders’ efforts in terms drawn from anthropology and allied social-scientific thinking on performance, reception, and the interpretation of cultural situation. In section (3.II) I provide a descriptive bridge that folds into (3.III). In the final section I show that putative cultural fluency is deeply entwined with access to and inclusion in the spatially-, temporally- and culturally-specific situation; denial or expulsion is a deeply wounding experience. Therefore, for the latter two sections I view Anders’ need to control his authorial self and his exile/return through a directed application of trauma theory. Altogether, the examples and theoretical outlooks deployed in this chapter give three different views of the practical cultural and linguistic limits to pursuing universally comprehensible symbols for a transnational audience.

As we will see, Anders does not resolve these linguistic tensions in a wholly productive way. Ultimately, his struggles to analyze language and movement dynamics throughout the late 1950s and 1960s laid the foundation for a radical turn in his thinking, one which came about in the early 1980s in the context of the third wave of disarmament activism and environmental protest. This turn will be the topic of chapter four, which assesses the arc of Anders’ activist work as a series of imaginative interventions in a rapidly developing activist situation.

II. Pre-linguistic Solidarities and Possibilities

a. “Pre-linguistic Solidarity” and “Global Good-enough”

Chapter one opened with a discussion of Anders’ declaration in his 1956 philosophical
opus *Antiquiertheit*, with a particular focus on his claim that he would proceed with his philosophical project from the standpoint of an occasional philosopher concerned with pressing situations, an investigator interested in elaborating quotidian experience which “has as its subject characteristic elements of the world in which we live” (1: 8). The preceding chapters have also highlighted Anders’ interest in using hyperbole, fable, aphorism, and other stylistic strategies as tools to overcome the imaginative failure—the Promethean discrepancy—which prevents men and women from fully comprehending the power of the social and technical systems they have created and in which they are embedded. The purpose of the present section is to describe Anders’ interest in a phenomenon of social protest he called “pre-linguistic solidarity” and a related translation strategy he proposed as a result of his encounters with that phenomenon. I refer to this related strategy in shorthand as “the global good-enough.” By the former he means a cooperative attitude derived from shared experience and common goals enacted through the work of protest. The latter refers to a strategy of translation for activist purposes that is radically simplified for portability across different linguistic and cultural contexts.

To arrive at these concepts, I conduct an examination of Anders’ proposals for a portable good-enough language of global activism and the importance of the pre-linguistic solidarity through a reading of examples drawn from his 1959 Hiroshima travel diary *Der Mann*. I analyze his description of this phenomenon as it appears in *Der Mann*, and I discuss how it relates to principles of rhetoric and translation which appear in his public speeches, especially his speech to the 1959 London anti-nuclear congress. I also examine his correspondence with fellow activists, and his theoretical reflections on academic writing which appear in the later 1960s—in
particular the 1968 draft of his essay “Dialektik des Esoterischen” (“Dialektik”) which later appeared as part of a larger essay in the Marxist periodical *Das Argument*. These texts are well-suited for this investigation because they allow his approach to activist writing to be considered across a continuum of audiences. *Der Mann* provides a reflective, contextualized interpretation of his thinking oriented towards a lay audience; his correspondence with fellow-activists and his publishers provide insight into the practical details his attempts to put his ideas into practice and an overview of his colleagues’ reactions. Lastly, his essays—published in literary, leftist, and disarmament venues—display his presentation and defense of his rhetorical and translation strategies for a more specific, critical audience of activist and intellectual peers.

As we will see, the pre-linguistic solidarity and the global good-enough operate in conjunction with one another, representing a balancing act between his literary goals and the demands of political speech. From previous chapters we have seen that Anders considered his work to be a kind of philosophical anthropology; in fact, many of the concerns about the efficacy of language which he attempted to analyze through an aesthetic, philosophical approach were also of contemporary interest to the social sciences more generally during an era disciplines set out to explore highly situated aspects of culture and the linguistic implications of occasion. Therefore, this section will theorize Anders’ efforts through the parallel observations from the social sciences, drawing first on Clifford Geertz—perhaps the most distinguished figure in modern American anthropology—via his writings on art and the performance of culture. In light of the discussions pursued in chapters one and two, I choose Geertz specifically because of his insistence on the importance of symbolic structures of meaning which are co-created and
contested publicly, which in turn guide human self-knowledge and ordering of the world. That, combined with his insistence on explaining cultural phenomena via “thick description”—a focus on specific instances that exceeds simple fact and pursues structures of meaning—place his methods near to many of those valued by Anders, though in a field that is somewhat distanced from the philosopher’s work (Interpretation 27). By making such a comparison we see that Anders’ concerns were not idiosyncratic, but are compatible with the human sciences in the Anglo-American tradition. Together with Geertz’ attention of adoption of philosophical frames into anthropology, we are offered a bridge for connecting Anders’ writing on the tasks of translation with a broad range of tools for social and cultural analysis (Local 4).

In the late 1960s, Anders reflected on his approach to translation in his draft essay “Dialektik.” He recalled that since the early 1930s, he had taken it as his task to conceptualize those issues which he judged to have universal import and “find an unacademic, unesoteric, unhermetic language; and to translate those theses … which first occurred to me in an academic idiom” (23). Like much of Anders’ work, his analysis of the manifold tasks of translation was an ongoing process spanning decades. In this he began from conversations he had with Bertolt Brecht in the last days of the Weimar era. Via Brecht—who was a mentor and near-publisher of Anders’ beloved Molussian Catacombs—he came to view this translation process as a purposeful, political art form in pursuit of “a language which might be understood by the widest possible readership; not so much to ‘popularize’, but moreso to translate, in order that the exactitude of academic language would not go lost in the more generally understandable text” (“Dialektik” 23). In the 1930s, these threats had appeared in the form of Nazi fascism and
approaching world war; from 1945 forward that threat was the omnipresent and inescapable menace of the atomic bomb. In response to this universal threat and in pursuit of the widest possible readership, Anders enunciated a philosophy of activist translation designed for that purpose: his “global good-enough”—an approach to language tailored to the pressing needs of an international activist milieu.

It is clear that Anders considered the creation of a “global good-enough” an extremely delicate task. He was highly skeptical of the cross-cultural applicability of many of his preferred literary resources such as poetry and aphorism. As we saw in (1.IIIa), he concluded in his 1948 essay “Dichten Heute” that poetry cannot be written without a firm grasp of not only the specific audience, but also the specific place of telling. Anders asserted that poetry should not be written in one’s mother tongue without definite answers to these questions; in translation these problems are redoubled such that verse has the potential to appear wholly arcane to its audience, and as such remains poetry only in its own language. In Anders’ view, poetry, properly written, entrains a whole world.

In the theoretical terms popularized in 1960 by philosopher W.V. Quine (writing on translation of English academic texts into Arunta) and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn in 1966 (in regards to scientific paradigms) and then contested in the social sciences and literature generally (Povinelli 320), Anders’ is a view of language that borders on being “radically incommensurate” across cultures, in that a useful, shared meaning or interpretation of the text is extremely difficult to establish or to relate outside its original context. In his 1976 essay “Art as a Cultural System”, Clifford Geertz acknowledged this central difficulty and developed it in a
fieldwork context. He observed that that forms of art such as poetry were derived from and contributed to a universe of shared meanings and allusions, and that the poetic universe is one that appears when it is performed as a “collective speech act … an archetype of talk” and then reappears in turn as ordinary lay speech through shared vocabularies of trope and allusion (1493). However, Geertz remediated the poetic, noting that difficult does not mean impossible: meaning arises from use, and to make commensurate in ways that extend beyond exoticism demands the representation of art at work “in its natural habitat” notwithstanding the hazard of so doing (1499). This is a step Anders was reluctant to take, and the pre-linguistic solidarity and global good-enough provided potential alternative routes around the barrier of incommensurability.

The prospect of incommensurability has remained a topic of inquiry, but the question was of acute concern for some of those whose work is affected by the implications; Geertz’ fieldwork was one such. Anders’ activist milieu was another. For Anders, the urgency of disarmament work demanded an immediate rather than a perfect solution. When he proposed a turning-away from the necessity of writerly, literary language for activist work, and instead suggested the pursuit of a language optimized for portable mutual understanding—the “global good-enough”—he was making a sacrifice of necessity. Anders presented this move and its cooperative reliance on the pre-linguistic solidarity as derived from a specific problem. It is for this reason that although he enunciated many of the attitudes which would ground his approach to the “global good-enough” in essayistic reflections on the status of poetic and philosophical language, his most powerful argument for the provincialized status of poetry is given in an episode he sketches in *Der Mann.*
Presented in the context of *Der Mann*, his argument for a “global-good enough” is an act of “occasional” philosophy derived from a concrete, meaning-laden situation thickly described. The anecdote revolves around the awkward consequences of one “Delegate L.’s” attempts at lyric recitation.

b. “Delegate L.”

This tale of abject failure begins like so: in fallout-martyr Aikichi Kuboyama’s hometown of Yaizu (see 2.I), the Japanese hosts invite the foreign delegates to the 4th World Congress to a formal dinner. A city official asks L. to offer a few words as an after dinner speech. L. agrees, and requests the opportunity recite a poem that he himself had written. In the scene, Anders portrays himself as astounded by the magnitude of the blunder: “the very idea of standing up to declaim poetry in front of these immaculately dressed Japanese gathered to absolve their ceremonial duties, and to do this in a language that no-one there understands, demonstrates to me a near-breathtaking blindness to the atmosphere” (55). Anders’ argument for the futility of poetry is rooted in the inability of the foreigner L. to correctly assess the audience and occasion; the Yaizu dinner anecdote is tuned throughout to emphasize L.’s lack of fluency and his inability to assess the sociolinguistic context.

In Anders’ account, he is the only one present at the ceremony who understands L.’s language and who also speaks English. As such, the dignitaries of Yaizu ask him translate L.’s speech into English in order that one of the Yaizu delegates may translate in turn to Japanese. Embarrassment ensues. The philosopher begins to sweat as he tries to rearrange the “torrent” of L.’s words into something which will be translatable into Japanese without, as he says, having
the time to pay any attention to whether his reproduction was itself worthy verse, or even whether he accurately captured the literal content—but to Anders the degree of his own success or failure hardly matters. Had it been a masterpiece, he writes, it still would have been bad: “One of Hölderlin’s hymns would have been no better. What matters is the situation” (56). In short, the criteria for success in the situation had been failed from the outset. In the resulting farce of telephone translation, L.’s ten-minute poem is reduced by Anders’ translation to five; Anders’ English facsimile is compressed by the Japanese translator to a mere three. In the end, the philosopher writes with regret, “out of the torrent which flowed from L.’s mouth, all that was left was a pitiful and short-lived trickle” (58). In the poetic sense, the recitation is a failure in all possible ways except for comedy. But then, to Anders’ professed surprise, thunderous applause comes forth from the audience. The situation was retrieved by grace of the hosts’ politeness. Summarizing the moral of this anecdote, Anders concludes that he was grateful for this highly uncomfortable incident because it served as a reminder of the gap between L.’s lofty artistic aim and the limited means available to him: L.’s sentiment was well meant, uplifting, and intended as an appeal to all, but the effect was ridiculous: “One cannot call out to a thousand people in a language that only three understand ‘Come all! We are one!’” (59). This is, however, a case where Anders’ thought brings his readers to an intractable problem, but where he also refuses to give up. The stakes are too high. Geertz theorized the problem in a similar way, noting after a long fight to bring the world to recognition of human diversity, the response has been to look at the array of historical contingency, values, and linguistic modes from which none can be disentangled and use that as cause to retreat to a “relax-and-enjoy-it ethnocentrism” (“Uses”
Geertz chose to take the intractability of cross-cultural translation and treat it as the anvil through which moral reasoning is achieved. In his 1977 essay “Found in Translation”, he wrote that “Anthropologists have a number of advantages when addressing the general public, one of them being that hardly anyone in their audience has much in the way of independent knowledge of the supposed facts being retailed. This allows one to get away with a good deal. But it is, as most such things, also something of a disadvantage…” The disadvantage is that other experts or academics can assume that their audience shares at least some of the necessary context, whereas he, instead was “…faced with the unattractive choice of boring his audience with a great deal of exotic information or attempting to make his argument in an empirical vacuum (“Found” 788). This was, Geertz wrote, a choice he preferred to avoid, and his method of so doing was to throw his audience into deep and densely described accounts “superbly observed” and to challenge them to recognize the sense of interference these tangents produced when contrasted against their expectations. He then urged them to acknowledge that they have become lost in that interference, and he hoped that they would look through the sense interference rather than search for what is behind it (“Found” 799).

Anders, in contrast, found his solution by proposing an international language for activist work. Because no viable candidate for such a dialect exists—he derided constructed languages such as Esperanto and its lofty claims to serve as an antidote to nationalism—he observed that in the interim activists would be compelled to conduct their work via emergency measures.

“Namely,” wrote Anders “we must learn from the outset to deliberately speak our own language in a translatable way; practically for the purpose translation, so that we damage the machinery of
translation as little as possible with our speech” (Der Mann 59). In this particularly Andersian turn of phrase, unwieldy language is not all that comes out mangled. The spikes and indigestible thorns of poorly conceived speech threaten to damage the whole delicate social apparatus of translation. Consequently, it is necessary for the speaker to consider translation as a process, a kind of cooperative work that relies on others. In terms of practical guidance for achieving a translatable way of speech, Anders emphasized the shared nature of the task within the Yaizu anecdote by presenting his advice through the voice of one of his interpreters: “if you want a dense and fluent translated text, then please do not give me a dense and fluent text in the original, but rather single sentences which appear to follow one another only in juxtaposition: these I can weave together easily enough” (65). With this conclusion, the “global good-enough” is fully explained. As we first saw in the Note on Style, it is a technique that Anders himself practiced; simplified claims given stepwise in juxtaposition or via numbered theses is one mark of Anders’ voice as a writer and speaker. The complexity of his argument relies on the incredible density contained within the simplified version. Today we might say that this method runs the risk of transforming artful suasion into something akin to computer scientist’s Peter Norvig’s infamous PowerPoint translation of the Gettysburg Address. Anders acknowledged this risk and spoke freely of the potential for the “global good-enough” to appear as an impoverishment of language, but he held out the possibility that learning the necessary discipline to “speak laconically” could come to enrich the native languages of those who mastered the new international anti-nuclear Latin.
c. Kyoto, Solidarity, and Charity

The preceding paragraphs examined Delegate L.’s blunder in Yaizu in detail to allow the portable, laconic, and translatable language I have called “global good-enough” to appear in this chapter with some semblance of the thickness of description with which Anders told it. Within the story, the fulcrum of the anecdote is the consummate politeness and generosity displayed by the Japanese hosts. The evening in Yaizu was saved from the embarrassing incomprehensibility of L.’s poetry entirely on the strength of the hosts’ good will. That good will forms the basis to the other half of Anders’ activist answer to the specter of radical incommensurability: the pre-linguistic solidarity.

In the philosopher of science Donald Davidson’s formulation, the willingness of the Japanese hosts to retrieve the situation is the principle of charity at work, the principle by which persons contribute to the act of communication by choosing to make the maximum sense from the actions, thoughts, and words of others when by interpreting them in the sense most likely to produce agreement. In his 1974 essay “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Davidson sums his argument with the simple statement that “if we want to understand others, we must count them right in most matters” (19). The reverse is as easily imagined, wherein other participants deliberately interpret others’ actions in the most risible way in order to sabotage understanding. The positive communicative principle of charity requires a specific set of circumstances, a contact between persons which is structured both physically and relationally. To describe this point of contact, the physician and developmental psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott proposed a potential, relational “third space” encompassing the internal reality experienced by
individuals and the external, shared reality. It is in that potential space, founded on experiences of trust beginning in childhood, where cultural work takes place (5). The principle of charity is the manifestation of the third space—a relational space established in such a way as to permit and recover from failure. Pulling in these ideas from Davidson and Winnicott allows us to conduct an analysis of the pre-linguistic solidarity on broad terms: following the principle of charity, in an international activist context even the attempt to speak to another or to find a common ground for communication is more important in the first instance than that the simple attempt succeeds in the transfer of aesthetic turn or literal content. In Geertz’ terms, such an act summons up his push towards looking to use-in-context, the going-and-doing, and the willingness to confront gaps in that process. The primary communicative act is the creation of that open relational space where other participants can retrieve a humiliating stumble like L’s grotesque recitation from utter failure. That third space is where Anders’ pre-linguistic solidarity occurs. The dinner at Yaizu—L.’s blunder notwithstanding—was an occasion structured in favor of the generosity implied in the principle of charity. Both its solemnity and stated purpose of welcoming an international delegation centered that charity as a priority; to have sabotaged the occasion would have been an obviously anti-social act. Another episode from Der Mann shows that certain kinds of negative experiences, deeply uncomfortable situations where it might be better not to understand, can also produce the pre-linguistic solidarity. The scene takes place at the beginning of the 4th Conference, and Anders relates it in his diary to explain how the members of the various international activist delegations moved towards realization of common purpose:

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Far be it from me to simply deny the differences in ways of life that arise from differences in origin. But those who would mark such differences as utterly definitive in order to claim that communication is impossible “from shore to shore” speak either from ignorance or malice. Shared human experience is a resounding truth, which would be apparent to any who has spent time in a group composed of people from around the world. The universality of shared experience does not exist, as some might like to say, in some lowest common denominator, in the universality of reason or rationality, but rather in a “universality of the heart.”(13-14)

In this case, the common, shared experience is one of shame and sadness, for the reason the delegates were assembled was to hear victims of the atomic bombings relate their ordeals.

Anders noted that this is not an occasion for Durkheimian effervescence: the stories of terror related by the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were on the contrary, profoundly alienating.

Nonetheless, Anders saw

... a new solidarity in the isolation which had become reality in that instant. Any outrage about this shame (which I have often felt after returning from Japan) is unwarranted. In any case, I have never felt what it means to be “human” with more agony or power than in that moment of “alienation.” If your companions fall silent, one after the other, African, American, Russian, German, Burmese, or Japanese, each for the same reasons and feelings that have taken your voice, then the humanity within us is not denigrated, but renewed: perhaps even awakened for the first time. (15)

Though united via their alienation, it is crucial to the pre-linguistic solidarity in this instance that the delegates share a time and a place to be voiceless in the presence of one another. Later in the chapter, we will see that this distinction is important.

In Anders’ recounting given in Der Mann, he experienced the importance of the relational space third space most intensely and personally as a participant during an anti-nuclear march to Kyoto. The foreign delegates to the 4th World Conference undertook this march in solidarity with their Japanese hosts. When Anders arrived to join the procession, he discovered that there were no other English speakers there. He was surprised to learn that this did not matter: he was overwhelmed with handshakes and claps on the shoulder. In that moment, he found that spoken
language was unnecessary. “But we just speak to one another,” Anders wrote later. “Just means that we don’t need to be concerned about the differences in language. A Babel of cordiality. *Solidarity is prelinguistic;* what we have to say to one another is clear in any case” (*Der Mann* 38; emphasis added). The feeling of solidarity stayed with him throughout the march, and its power carried Anders through an impromptu speech the crowd demanded from him in the marketplace. Here, too, it was the principle of charity which saved his speech from disaster. In his reflection on the march, Anders considered the extent to which his experience of that relational space differed from his experiences with academic philosophy:

Three and a half decades ago, in a study on the Lorettostraße in Freiburg … sitting there at his desk, humane and fatherly, unyielding scholar, the old Husserl who called me in for a reprimand. For the unsettling tale had come to his ears that I, disguised as a ghost for Carneval night, had danced on the Kaiserstraße … by God, what would the grand old man have said today had someone carried the tale back to him that I had ‘philosophized’ in the Kyoto marketplace, in front of Buddhist priests sitting on the pavement and blind people from Hiroshima? And what would his answer have been had I tried to explain to him that to stand there and teach not only does not contradict the task of the philosopher today, but represents one of the main tasks of philosophy? And that not only what is communicated must be true, but also the moment and place of communication? (43-44)

In this passage, Anders integrates his discovery of a pre-linguistic solidarity into the work of philosophy as part of its essential praxis. Recall from (1.IV.b) that Anders claimed to be pursuing a philosophical anthropology that was concerned with “those experiences which, *though they are mine, are not mine alone*”—to be a diarist was not for self-gratification but as a fieldworker of the self, struggling to identify occasions which typify the creating, created world in which he and his fellow men and women live (“Warnbilder” 74; emphasis in the original). Anders’ anecdote is a comment on both the activist situation and his own struggles as an “occasional” philosopher concerned with concrete, pressing problems of the everyday and on the phenomenological efforts of his contemporaries to comprehend them. Working from anthropological philosophy rather
than philosophical anthropology, Anders passes near an observation later offered by Geertz in his 1975 essay “Common Sense as a Cultural System” that academic philosophy claims to be concerned with or to start its investigations from the position of down-to-earth, everyday thought. These protestations notwithstanding, Geertz wrote, the ordinary and commonsensical itself remained “… more an assumed phenomenon than an analyzed one. Husserl, and following him Schutz, have dealt with the conceptual foundations of everyday experience, how we construe the world we biologically inhabit, but without much recognition of the difference between that and what Dr. Johnson was doing when he kicked the stone to refute Berkeley” (“Common Sense” 78). In other words, the commonsensical, ordinary, and self-evident are neither ordinary nor self-evident, and Geertz commented that to describe common sense as “what anyone clothed and in his right mind knows” (“Common Sense” 75) relocates and hides a historically contingent and highly organized system of thought.

d. The London Congress

Anders’ activist work of reimagining the world and envisioning its self-evident right order was a project that relied on gaining access to that contingent system of highly organized thought in not just one, but many radically different situations. The translatable activist language—the global good-enough—was one part of Anders’ attempt to get himself out of the bind both he and anthropologists in the tradition of Geertz recognized: To speak fluently and artfully means being bound to the specificity of culture, its symbolic vocabulary, its hidden but highly organized commonsensicality, and its temporally unique placeness. This dissertation has from the outset
described Anders’ self-appointed activist philosophical and activist task as imaginative work, an expansion of the imagination designed to overcome as best as possible the Promethean discrepancy. This work demanded comprehending, destroying and then replacing the commonsensical patterns of thought and symbol which normalized the existence of nuclear weapons. One example of Anders’ attempts to both speak laconically in the global good-enough and to utilize the power of the pre-linguistic solidarity in his work is provided by the address he gave at the 1959 London anti-nuclear congress. In his opening words he described the global good-enough to his audience by reference to his sojourn in Japan:

Six months ago I was standing in front of another meeting. It did not take place in a hall but on a market place under a pitiless July sun. The language was English, yet deliberately simplified in order to facilitate its instant translation. For the meeting took place in Kyoto, and those I addressed were thousands and thousands of Japanese who were marching on the thousand mile long antinuclear procession from Hiroshima to Tokyo (“London”).

This message is itself an example of that highly simplified English, intended to be translatable not only between languages, but also as an “unacademic, unesoteric, unhermetic language” (“Dialektik”). It displays the concise, stepwise logical progress Anders’ translator at the Yaizu ceremonial dinner recommended. With that unesoteric language, Anders set out to destroy the commonsensicality of a constrained, local, national concept of neighborliness and replace it with a new one more appropriate to the atomic era:

So you may say that I have come from the “Far East” but that is not true. I went there precisely for the reason that there is no such thing as a “Far East,” no, there is no “far” any longer.

Our whole situation can be put in the nutshell of the last sentence. Since we can reach everybody by the range of our weapons, everybody has become our neighbor … whoever thinks that the narrow horizon of his perception also defines the horizon of his obligations, is escaping into the laziness and stupidity of pseudo-sensualism. Today we have to use our imagination, our fantasy, in order to reach the truth. We should never stop visualizing everybody as our actual neighbor. (“London”)

Addressing the London crowd was a moment in which Anders judged both the content being
communicated to be true, but also the time and place. It was an opening of the relational space third space in which solidarity occurs. That moment of protest—all moments of protest—are a space where the “Babel of cordiality” offers a chance to make the new concept of neighborliness he is describing in into something that is tangible and universal through the experience of solidarity. It is the space where cultural work—the public, shared co-creation of meaning—can get done. This is crucially different from the globalized, borderless universality of mass media images Anders critiqued in his reflections on television (Antiquiertheit 1: 134). Television, he argued, offered a mode of universality that was fundamentally passive, infantilizing, and alienating in a way that was distinct from the productive, obligation-imposing alienation discussed in (3.IIb). Television allowed events to be delivered to one’s home, and transformed the watcher into a voyeur, a hermit who was freed of any requirement to participate in the world. Anders believed that men and women understood viscerally the substitute-nature of television as entertainment, and attempted to cure its effects through the search for authenticity in artisanal, hands-on hobbies and clubs (Antiquiertheit 1: 190). The visualization of fellow-protestor as neighbor, and the pursuit of a prelinguistic solidarity within the shared experience of protest in effect served multiple roles of political necessity, resistance, and antidote.

Thus, one aspect of his answer to the task of producing an effective, translatable language for activism is to link that language to the New Left activist-historian E.P. Thompson’s conclusion about the lessons learned during the second wave of anti-nuclear activism: the proper work of protesters is to protest. The “global good-enough” is made fluent and convincing because protest creates and maintains a shared, public, open relational space in which
translational difficulties and otherwise insuperable conflicts in worldview can be reconciled through the prelinguistic solidarity derived from shared experience.

During his 1959 London speech, Anders recognized that no matter how simplified and translatable his language, or how bound that language might be to the context of protest work, much of what he claimed strayed into the abstract. For this, he apologized to his audience, “I’m sorry to take up your time with such theoretical considerations. However, as pseudo-theoretical formulas are being widely used in the discussion, we have to unmask them in order to prevent ourselves from falling prey to them.” The need to apologize points to a recognition that straying too far into the realm of the philosophical threatens to strain the moment of solidarity: no matter how laconically spoken, many sections of Anders’ London speech are technical, nuanced theses condensed to their limits—a limit referred to in the Note on Style as the didactic minimum. Still, after the close of the conference he had some confidence that his speech had had achieved some of its goals. It was covered in the left-leaning pacifist periodical Peace News (“‘Accept the title of cowards as a title of honor,’ challenged Guenther Anders, writer, of Vienna. ‘We are scaremongers! We live in an age of insufficient anxiety; no anxiety can match the danger’”). The wide-ranging social activist and Anglican priest John Collins wrote afterwards to thank him; Anders, in turn replied that he was pleased, and that he felt it had gone some way to fostering a needed solidarity.

However, in hindsight it may be that Anders’ apology to the London crowd was an indication that he had missed something important about his audience and the demographic composition of the anti-nuclear movement. It is important to stress the findings from (3.II) that
the prelinguistic solidarity Anders relied on is one that occurs within and requires an organized and pre-prepared location and relational space for doing protest work. Recall as well the discussion in (1.IVc) of Anders’ and his colleagues’ strenuous efforts as organizers and their struggle to recruit persons to the Vienna anti-nuclear group in the late 1950s, and the sojourn in (1.II) which took us through vulnerability the American physicist Millicent Dillon and her Oak Ridge fellow technicians experienced in simple work of convening a discussion group. The practical work of organizing creates the civic institutions which delineate the physical location in which protest can take place. Organizing is what lays the foundation for the unspoken, hidden logic—the cultural norms—that provide the relational and physical third space in which pre-linguistic solidarity and the principle of charity can operate; Dillon’s case shows how fragile that space can be. Anders’ case shows how difficult it can be to create. In (2.III), we saw in movement sociologist Robert Benford’s discussion of framing theory that one key element in movement formation and recruiting is the establishment of a “vocabulary of propriety” (208) that allows the adherent to justify his or her participation in dissent. As historian and scholar of Cold War culture Holger Nehring has demonstrated (see 1.IVc), during the second wave of the disarmament movement from 1955 to 1963, “propriety” in fact often meant a specific white-collar moral uprightness and self-conception attached to an identity that prioritized being seen as a concerned, educated, and civically involved person. For British participants in the CND, there was a premium on appearing to one’s family, peers, and the press as a “responsible” person, one of theorist of social class Frank Parkin’s “middle class radicals” (Nehring, Politics 82). Creating a space for protest and pre-linguistic solidarity required movement organizers to address these
matters of identity, which were in no small part derived from the class interests of those same participants. These men and women were workers, but they did not necessarily consider themselves members of a working class. At the close of chapter two, we examined the collapse of the second wave of disarmament protest in the aftermath of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty and widespread activist exhaustion. That collapse required reflection and explanation; for Anders, part of the process of coming to grips with end of the second wave, the rise of the New Left, and the student movements was a revision of his class analysis.

So it was in 1968 while reflecting on his efforts to translate his thinking into an “unacademic, unesoteric, unhermetic language” that Anders concluded his work had to a large extent failed. “My effort has been futile,” he wrote, “futile not because my translations miscarried, but because they were superfluous … I mean to say that the opposition which today has an ear for critical theses and critical theories is almost entirely made up of academics, namely students” (“Dialektik” 24). Prior to the war, he wrote, he had held out hope that his translations would find a readership among a politically aware working class. In the miracle years of post-war prosperity, Anders concluded that such a class “today, at least in the German-speaking world, no longer exists. There is no longer and in no case any interest in the development of class consciousness or for revolutionary theory, to say nothing of radical praxis” (“Dialektik” 24). Anders came to believe that his stripped-down, laconic global good-enough was not a language that could validate the interests of technical workers or an educated, middle-class elite. Furthermore, the young men and women of the new student movements—though they may have rejected the middle-class sensibilities of their second-
wave predecessors—were themselves trained in the language of the academic social sciences. Consequently, he concluded that for such young persons “texts which are not recognizably formulated in a learned manner are alienating and indeed difficult to understand” (“Dialektik” 25). Though he had come to believe a militant working class no longer existed in Germany, it was also the case that the entire activist milieu of the late 1960s was changing as it became increasingly international.

**e. Changes**

In (1.11) we considered historian Holger Nehring’s observation that transnationalism and multigenerationalism played a crucial role in shaping the anti-nuclear movements in West Germany and Austria; because the socialist left and pacifist war resisters’ movements had been almost entirely exterminated by the Nazi regime, British methods of movement organization and extra-parliamentary activism provided the working models for their German-speaking contemporaries (“National” 564). In the latter half of the 1960s, student and grassroots social protest groups throughout Europe continued the tradition and began to seek out other movements as exemplars. They looked to the American civil rights movement, and explored the methods, goals, and ideologies of anti-colonial and liberation movements. Anders was confronted by the need to recognize this shift in focus. Not only the shift in focus, but also the fact that groups allied to the German-speaking left, such as the Black Panthers, did not conform to his conception of workers in need of an analytical language struggling to achieve class-consciousness. Instead, the Black Power movements had their own body of Marxist, post-colonial resistance theory for the analysis of race, class, and gender. Nonetheless, Anders attempted to engage with these
international activist leaders from the same standpoint of pre-linguistic solidarity he had
developed during the late 1950s. One such instance was his abortive attempt at dialogue with the
American civil rights and Black Power activist Stokely Carmichael. Both from a personal and
political-theoretical standpoint, Anders expressed concern about perceived anti-Semitism among
Black nationalist groups. In February of 1969, he wrote to Dave Dellinger, the pacifist editor of
_Liberation_ magazine, asking his advice. Typically for Anders, he envisioned an epistolary
approach. “I feel the urge,” he wrote, “to write an open letter to one of the representatives of the
Afro-Americans in the U.S.,”

… I have the feeling that if I would address such an open letter to Carmichael the moment of the
letter could be greatly increased because I could appeal to the fact that he and I have sat next to
each other in Copenhagen, and that there was no difference between the hopes and aims which he
and I had for the Vietnamese people. I could further remind him that we happened to stand next to
each other when Pick’s film was being shown and that in the darkness of the blacked out room we
exchanged our common anguish and revolt in a whispering tone.

Just as in his travels to Japan and London, Anders believed that a simultaneous congruence of
goals and a foundation of shared experience—the pre-linguistic solidarity—would achieve
concordance of perspective. Dellinger persuaded Anders otherwise. In March of 1969, Anders
wrote back with some disappointment, but refused to be dissuaded. He would, instead, have to
“invent another literary form which would reach both Jews and Afro-Americans.” At the same
time, he criticized Carmichael’s solidarity efforts with university students in Tanzania, writing
Dellinger that he suspected Carmichael’s attempt foundered because “the difference of
vocabularies and of the perspectives were simply unsurmountable.” Although Anders was willing
to revise his conceptions of class and adapt to a rapidly changing activist situation, at the close of
the 1960s he retained his belief in the potential for the creation of new languages and literary
forms, and he still credited the unifying power of the pre-linguistic solidarity, even as he criticized other radicals for failing to realize its limits.

There is a measure of defensiveness and jealousy at work in Anders’ actions because—as described in chapter one—his professional and personal identity was a writerly one; he had made deliberate choices to enact that identity as a freelance writer embedded in a literary and activist network that was more ephemeral than one derived from institutional affiliation. As seen in (1.III), he had rejected the security and influence university affiliation granted prominent peer colleagues such as Theodor Adorno, and instead made a case for the ethical and political advantages of retaining independence from academic institutions. So it was with a touch of bitterness that Anders concluded in 1968 that the number of students “has grown so enormous in practically every country, that the widest influence can only be achieved by those theoreticians of the opposition who, like e.g. Marcuse, speaks to the student body as an academic instructor to academic students” (“Dialektik” 24). By arguing that he had made a misreading of social conditions rather than method, Anders tried to preserve both his writerly tactics and the validity of his choice to remain outside the academy.

He was, however, faced with the challenge of deciding how to resist his own potential obsolescence and go forward as a relevant figure on the activist stage. Anders was now in his seventh decade and, in addition to his arthritis, in 1965 he had had a heart attack which left him debilitated for some time afterwards, limited in his ability to participate in marches and demonstrations (Bahr 277). Too, as the second wave (1955-1963) of disarmament activism had ebbed and was superseded by the student movements, the character of the demonstrations
changed, becoming more violent and involving clashes with state security. Anders turned again
to his network of activist correspondents in order to participate—and show solidarity—from a
distance. In his correspondence with his onetime seminar student Wolfgang Haug, the activist
sociologist and editor of the leftist periodical Das Argument (to which Anders was a frequent
contributor), the aging philosopher solicited the younger man for details of their protest actions.
Haug kept Anders up to date, and noted in a letter sent on 7 March 1968 that these student
actions were perhaps “not for persons of an advanced age (over 30).” The exchange between the
two was not one-sided; in turn, Haug pressed the older man for his advice and commentary. In a
note dispatched on 26 April 1968, Haug commented that he felt the student movement to be at a
tipping point, and he could not see where it might be going: would it be crushed by the right, or
would there be an upwelling of left resistance? “What do you think,” he asked Anders, “Do you
believe that revolution is possible?” Three days later, Anders replied bluntly. “No,” he wrote, “I
do not consider a revolution possible … but I believe a counterrevolution is not merely possible,
but underway.” As mentioned above, social movements rely on persistent organizations and
multigenerational leadership as models and for survival in times of quiescence. For members of
the New Left such as Haug, Anders took on the role of grand old man, a radical voice from the
previous generation, but one who staunchly maintained the position of outsider and critic. At the
close of the 1960s, he was being transformed into part of the disarmament movement’s emeritus
leadership.

In his 1968 version of “Dialektik” we saw that Anders claimed his approaches to
translation and political rhetoric had their origin in a particular class analysis that he had
formulated in the late 1920s and early 1930s. However, his attitudes towards the role and possibilities of language were fluid and changed over time. Indeed, the pre-linguistic solidarity and the requirement of speaking with exactitude within the laconic language of the global good-enough were developed in no small part from his experiences of exile and return in the 1930s through the 1950s. In section (3.II), we will see that exactitude often meant a need to maintain textual and authorial control.

The beginning of this chapter quotes Anders’ missives to Claude Eatherly from autumn of 1959. In those passages, the author preached the need for caution and emphasized the practical impossibility of Eatherly traveling to Japan to “lead a movement within a country or civilization with which he is not familiar.” Anders’ warning was not simply because the language gap left open the continual possibility of misunderstanding in deliberate acts of suasion, but because linguistic dependence leaves one reliant on others for “every tiny everyday step” (Burning 43). His warning marks the limits of the “global good-enough” and the “pre-linguistic solidarity”. Activists and travelers can use them as opportune tools, but they cannot rely on those tools outside the activist space of protest or structured sites of contact. Attempting to conduct one’s daily life in the expectation that others will work to facilitate the needs of the traveler leaves one open not only to being misunderstood, but to being misused. For a stranger abroad, that kind of dependence puts one at risk of a profound surrender of self-identity and self-determination.

II. Translation and Textual Control

a. “I am not its author”

As we saw in (2.VII), Anders’ advice to Eatherly was highly detailed and included
attempts to manage the pilot’s contacts with publishers and film producers. There was both a
philosophical and a practical basis for Anders’ interference and his recommendation to caution.
During his exile years in the U.S. the work he performed as a laborer in the prop-rooms and
scene shops simultaneously founded his later critiques on representation, history, and mass
media; it also hardened his freelance writer’s sense of just how willing publishers and producers
are to steal from writers and actors. It is for this reason that Anders first cautioned Eatherly on
the subject in 1959. Nonetheless, three years later, Anders and Eatherly went forward with the
initial stages of a collaborative film project. On the 26th July of 1962, after his journey to
Mexico to meet the escaped pilot, Anders found himself writing again to admit “I have been
deceived by [film producer] Leiser … you see, even philosophers can be taken in by efficient
businessmen.” Disentangling themselves from Leiser required threats of legal action: the unwary
do indeed risk having their work and their public selves first stolen from them, then falsified into
untruth. The failed script for the Eatherly film project was an intermediate form between what
Anders viewed as two kinds of creative work to which different rules applied.

We saw in section (3.1) that responding to the omnipresent, universal threat of nuclear
disaster was the “special task” Anders had set himself as a philosopher and activist, and that he
was challenged by the duty of articulating that threat across linguistic and cultural boundaries. To
accomplish this, he proposed a portable, translatable language of the global good-enough
operating in tandem with the pre-linguistic solidarity. Both of these tools were most applicable to
the performative, shared work of collective protest and public speech. Anders did not hold that
they were adequate principles of translation for literary or essayistic writing, or for shepherding
that writing into print or film. These were genres he believed required delicacy, extreme precision, and vigilance. In this section, I will examine Anders’ correspondence with his publishers, editors, and would-be biographers and provide examples of his dedication to clear language as it was enacted, in order to offer a sense of what sacrifices he was willing to make in order to preserve the integrity of his texts. In short, this section will illustrate where Anders placed the boundaries for literary theft and falsification.

Anders was adamant about the use of precise language and apt style. He himself had worked as a translator, had struggled to produce an exact rendition of Heidegger’s terminology in English in the late 1940s, and as a consequence he was impatient with translation work he viewed as being sub-par (“Pseudo”). One humorous example comes from Anders’ 1954 comedic dialogue “Die Übersetzungsstunde oder Hamburgisch ist Hamburgisch / Aber Deutsch ist nicht Deutsch” (The Translation Hour or Hamburgisch is Hamburgisch / But German is not German”). Published in the German literary magazine Merkur, the sketch relates the story of the translator “Herr A.” who has been asked to bring a French play into German. There is a catch. The publicist “Dr. L.” wants the language to sound authentic. “The Marseilles dialect roles,” he says, “you will of course carry over into one or the other of the German harbor dialects. Perhaps in Hamburgisch.” The translator replies shortly: “I’d rather not” (“Übersetzungsstunde” 294). The crux of the matter is that Dr. L wants above all to preserve the sense of difference, authenticity, and color that is entrained with the argot. Herr A., however, rejects this: to do so is wholly unauthentic. A skilled literary translator can no more swap the local color of one dialect for another than he or she could swap colors within a painting. Rather, the better approach is to think
about what a dialect or sociolect really is. “There are peculiarities,” says Herr A., “that all local dialects have in common. Through these commonalities they resemble one other more than any of them does its standard form” (“Übersetzungsstunde” 298) Among these commonalities, the translator includes the lack of subjunctive forms and the relative absence of dependent clauses or indirect speech. He cites tense changes from past forms to present, as well as particular characterizations of the discursive context. Dr. L asks for an example. Herr A. gives him the sentence “Dr. L found that I was a peculiar person” (“Übersetzungsstunde” 298). To make the phrase “palatable” for the character’s dialect-tongue, says Herr A., the sentence will need some modification. The first thing to go will be “Dr. L”—too formal. The past tense also goes overboard, as does the high-toned word peculiar. The final version of the sentence comes out like so: “And then the professor—you know, the one from the theater—he says to me, ‘you’re a funny one.’” This is a statement with which Dr. L. is prepared to agree. “You are at that,” he says (“Übersetzungsstunde” 299).

“The Translation Hour” is a lighthearted statement of Anders’ outlook on the artistry of literary translation, but his occasional conflicts with the influential British publisher Victor Gollancz provide a thorough example of Anders’ insistence on exactitude whether in academic or literary prose, as well as the gravity of his position; in the late 1950s he had arranged with Gollancz for his flagship philosophical work Antiquiertheit to be printed in English. This enterprise came to an ignominious end, which Anders described to New Statesman editor and fellow-activist Kingsley Martin as a “comical tragedy.” Anders provided a detailed summation of his complaints to Gollancz in a series of letters between 1957 and 1959, and in the course of the
exchange rejected two different translations. In 1957 he rejected a first draft, objecting that the
translator has not devoted any energy to the “philosophical and technical problems” of
translation. Instead,

the finesses and the poetical elements have been ignored throughout, the formulas in which I tried
to condense the quintessence of insights and to coin gnomic maxims have been dissolved into
shapeless and foggy sentences so that the paradoxical situation results in which the allegedly
verbose German language turns out to be far more laconic than the allegedly telegram English.

By the close of 1958, another translator has been procured to revise the first translation but the
effect was no better:

With the exception of the non-theoretical passages, in which concrete situations are being
depicted, the text is pure nonsense. The logical bridges which lead from sentence to sentence have
been ignored altogether … mere associations which, in my text appear between dashes or
brackets, are turned into clumsy sentences which presume the importance of main statements and
which render it impossible to see at what I am driving.

…

Whenever I had to make translations into German, I, of course, regularly asked for the advice of
the author about doubtful passages. Not once did Mr. Cleugh or Mrs. Stern avail themselves of
that easy possibility. When they didn’t find an equivalent in their dictionaries (no wonder, for
many of the words I had newly coined to characterize new phenomena) they innocently picked up
the first best or first worst trivial term. There is, for instance, the “Verbiederung”, which word I
coined because the phenomenon at which it points: the pendant to “alienation”, is new. The
equivalent English word would be something like “cozification”; by no means is the trivial word
“trivialization”, used by the translators, sufficient.

…

In short, the English text, which has been sent to me, is not the text of my book. I am not its author
(emphasis in the original).

Anders still had faith that the project could be accomplished, but further disappointments
followed. In 1959 he informed Gollancz that he saw no hope for the draft translation and
withdrew from the collaboration. His critique of the translation is an insight into Anders’
understanding of how the revelatory task of writing is to be conducted. It is on the one hand
delicate—the unearthing and characterization of new phenomena is alternately the work of a
jeweler, an alchemist, or a dancer: where the precision of the neologism is required to expose
the phenomenon into the world intact, to strike the coin of aphorism, to distill out quintessence, or accomplish a hard turn by finesse. The letter also highlights his standards for exactitude in terms of what constitutes a holistic work: a logical chain that has an inevitability of destination but which also requires frequent changes in the pace of the text and redirection into apparent subtlety to be fulfilled (readers of Anders will be well familiar with his deployment of punctuation to create parentheticals, pauses, and asides).

b. “Neither English nor American but Andersian”

Most striking is Anders’ readiness to disavow the Gollancz translation as an abomination, a creation that is emphatically not-his. The rejection is a kind of ethical egoism that takes a severe responsibility for the creation and circulation of text that bears his name. It was not an isolated single instance. He proved equally ready to admit failure or withdraw his participation from other publishing projects. In a 1962 letter to activist and editor Dan Daniels, he stated his position succinctly:

I am sure that those texts which I send out in English do not fall in line with the ordinary philosophical or scientific idioms of the English speaking world, nor do my originals with the usual German philosophical idioms. Please do all in your power to prevent the editors from making changes in the text. I prefer non-publication to falsified publication.

This was his general rule, even though the stakes were high. In an exchange of letters that same year with Mike Campus (another prospective collaborator on an Eatherly film) Anders laid out stringent conditions attached to the “role” Eatherly was to play in the film in order to guarantee that his “true” role was not undermined or falsified. He admitted that he was convinced that “all mass media, film included, must be used to help this symbol to become effective, but not without taking the points which I expressed above [the conditions] into
consideration.” Anders’ dedication to the principle of authorial integrity may have been driven in portion by ego, but even in the desperate context of the anti-nuclear struggle he was committed that it be done correctly or not at all. In his letter to Campus, he allowed that his insistence on fidelity might sound odd, and suggested that he read his philosophical analyses of the atomic situation in order to determine what kind, if any, collaboration he wished to pursue. To familiarize the filmmaker with the philosopher, Anders sent him his self-translated copy of the 1957 essay “Theses for the Atomic Age” with the caveat that they were written “in an English which maybe is neither English nor American but Andersian.” In this category of authorial production, Anders had an understanding of the correct use of the word as praxis—effective, apt, and targeted at a definite audience in a definite place. His standards were high enough that neither Der Mann or a complete version of Antiquiertheit has appeared in English. His exactitude was thus a barrier to the wider circulation of his anti-nuclear writing, and is a stark contrast to the “global good-enough”, which is deliberately intended from the outset to be offered up to the machinery of translation.

Anders was willing to admit the failure of a translation project when necessary, but his high literary standards were less open to the kind of productive confrontation with an incompletely translated or insufficiently situated text that we saw Geertz propose as a resource in (3.I). The same inclination to maintain control of the narrative that Anders displayed throughout the Eatherly affair (2.III) was even more pronounced in his attitude towards literary and philosophical projects.\(^\text{24}\) The reason for this is closely linked to his

\(^{24}\) He did, however, allow the publication of the English version of Kafka – Pro und Kontra (1960), which the translators assessed as more-or-less a complete failure: “Disappointingly, it proved impossible to translate
conception of writing and language as integral to and inextricable from the self—a constituent part of one’s being. The texts are Anders. His warning to Liberation magazine editor Dave Dellinger that suggestions would be considered but “my texts cannot be changed behind my back” is of a kind with the falling-out letter he sent the New Zealand theologian and disarmament activist Grover Foley, in which he castigated the younger man for taking liberties both philosophical and biographical in his Anders-related writing. In an angry letter sent in 1985, he rejected Foley’s biographical sketch entirely:

You would make yourself the laughing-stock of Europe if you published the pages about a person whom thousands know more intimately than you do. Moreover, your literary style can hardly be harmonized with the person whom you are describing. You should leave it to me to write about myself.

Anders had come to believe that the act of having his life written in a conventional way risked the possibility falling into absurdity and hypocritical falsification; he had defined his life through writing and declared writing to be the special task that had fallen to him. They were not tasks he could hand over lightly to a biographer or a translator. In section (3.III), we will see that both his insistence on exactitude and hard knowledge of the limits to the global good-enough and pre-linguistic solidarity have their origins in his experiences in wartime exile.

III. Exile

a. Working with Trauma

The preceding sections have given an examination of two competing tendencies in Anders’ relationship to translation; (3.I) discussed his employment of a portable global good-

accurately into English. There were too many passages where a faithful rendering would either have introduced false and confusing overtones, or else preserved no more than a feeble echo of Anders’ idiom. The only solution was to try and think out the author’s ideas again in English.” The authors had his permission as well as his consultation on the text.
enough designed for instantaneous translation in an international activist milieu, operating in tandem with the pre-linguistic solidarity. (3.II) offered a contrasting statement of Anders’ insistence on precise, highly refined prose for literary and philosophical work. In order to theorize these two approaches to translation, (3.I) drew on the work of Clifford Geertz in order to join with Anders’ reflections on the situated nature of textual performance and bring them into a framework that views art as an extensive cultural system. Furthermore, (3.I) employed Donald Davidson’s thinking on the principle of charity and D.W. Winnicott’s third space in order to emphasize the spatial and relational precursors necessary for the cultural work of symbol-making. Section (3.II) followed Anders through his correspondence with publishers and editors to arrive at the final, bitter exchange between the philosopher and his one-time mentee Grover Foley, which clarified that Anders’ insistence on precision was also a matter of maintaining control of his biographical and authorial sense of self. This section adds to these theoretical movements by using paired socially- and psychologically-oriented implementations of trauma theory in order to characterize how exile damages the relational space, individual sense of self, and shared sense of trust necessary to conduct shared symbol-making. I draw from Anders’ diaries and his chain of essays on the exile experience to argue that many of the idiosyncrasies of Anders’ approaches to language were a complex response to that damage. Anders’ attempts to characterize his own exile and return have also been the subject of commentary by scholars such as his recent biographer Raimund Bahr and the Germanist Katja Garloff. Towards the end of this section I situate my observations in relation to theirs.

The last three decades have seen the concept of trauma become a widely employed tool
for the analysis of displacement and exile within cultural and literary studies. Generally speaking, there are two broad approaches within trauma theory, both of which apply pre-war frameworks of collective and individual memory to experiences of violence: what might be called “Halbwachsian” and “Freudian” approaches (McCormack 121). These pre-war theories were strengthened by an increased interest in social memory during the late 1960s and 1970s that stressed the “working-through” the past as explicated by philosophers such as Theodor Adorno. Additionally, according to historian Ruth Leys, these intellectual trends became powerful tools for social struggle and socio-cultural analysis.

The “Halbwachsian” and “Freudian” approaches facilitate two different modes of cultural analysis. According to the former, which has its eponymous roots in the work of French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, individual memory is created in the context of, negotiated in, and both reinforced and fundamentally altered by one’s community. That process of interpersonal negotiation and influence is what allows individual memory to contribute to a shared narrative that can be called collective memory (Halbwachs chh. 1-3). His conception of remembering as a shared act favors the conception of collective memory as relatively simple through the necessary rejection of idiosyncrasy, and also positions collective memory as something which can be shaped and publicly contested at identifiable sites of cultural memory. It is ultimately a social-constructivist approach to memory and history, and as such lends itself to understanding of how social groups utilize the past, as in the deployment of “trauma scripts” which guide the performance of loss (Alexander 164). It does not, however, do well at articulating the meaning

25 Also notable in this context is Leys’ qualification regarding the narrative of PTSD’s discovery as a diagnostic category. In her introduction, she cites recent work by the anthropologist Allan Young. In her summary of
of “dreamlike” or traumatic memories—fragmented, entombed, cryptic, unspeakable memories which resist signification and emplotment in usable narrative.

It is at the point where models in the Freudian tradition, such as that of the Hungarian psychoanalysts Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok or influential contemporary trauma theorists such as the comparativist Cathy Caruth, are applied. The Freudian approach is attentive to *inabilities* to speak: sudden silences, interrupted speech, avoidance, or sudden changes in affect at the mention of certain topics. These two broad theoretical approaches to trauma and exile study have the potential to conflict, given the emphasis of social-constructivist approaches on the collective or the gestalt. The sociologist Jeffrey Alexander acknowledges that individuals may react to their trauma through repression and denial, but argues that the consideration of trauma as a collective matter necessitates a different perspective. “Collectivities,” he writes, do not rely on “denial, repression, and ‘working-through’” but instead engage in the processes of “symbolic construction and framing, of creating stories and characters” in what amounts to “cultural work”

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Young’s argument she writes that rather than being an objective psychiatric category, PTSD is a historical construct that has been ‘glued together by the practices, technologies, and narratives with which it is diagnosed, studied, treated, and represented and by the various interests, institutions, and moral arguments that mobilized these efforts and resources.’ And in fact a scrutiny of the pre-1980 psychiatric literature on survivors of the concentration camps and victims of military combat, civilian disasters, and other traumas reveals a wide diversity of opinion about the nature of trauma, a diversity that has been obscured by the post-Vietnam effort to integrate the field. Young rightly observes that PTSD is no less ‘real’ on that account, in the sense suggested by Ian Hacking: in Hacking’s phrase, PTSD is a way of ‘making up’ a certain type of person that individuals can conceive themselves as being and on the basis of which they can become eligible for insurance-reimbursed therapy, or compensation, or can plead diminished responsibility in courts of law. (6-7)

This is a particularly interesting conception of wartime trauma to consider when reflecting on the Eatherly affair, in that it sets aside the medical-biological controversy over the pilot’s sanity and acknowledges the importance and legitimacy of seeking a legible social role which affords medical care and legal protection. With the diagnostic tool of PTSD, veteran advocates and clinicians integrated the symbol of the traumatized warrior of an unjust war into broader American culture in a way that Anders could not.
that “depends on speeches, rituals, marches … and storytelling of all kinds.” Traumatized individuals are able to contribute to this process when “their psychic defenses are overcome, bringing pain into consciousness so they are able to mourn” (3-4). Abraham and Torok offer a more complex and difficult understanding of the psychic disposition of traumatic events. These are experiences which cannot be disavowed, or fully realized, or be acknowledged in one’s life—and so the sufferer creates psychic, linguistic, and behavioral barriers to the object’s signification. Their work draws attention to traumas and persons which might otherwise be excluded from the participating in the public “cultural work” of symbol-creation on the basis of gender, race, class, age, sexual orientation, or disability—recall the resistance to Eatherly’s unorthodox presentation of his war experiences as discussed in (2.II).

In fact, the theoretical bases of these traditions deal with two different scales of human behavior—the collective and the internal-individual—and sidestep the point of collision between the two. It is at Winnicott’s potential, relational third space between the internal reality experienced by individuals and the external reality of the environment and society that this interaction, and the work of culture and symbol-making takes place. Working forward from this third space gives room to consider some of the paradoxical features of exile experienced by Anders and his contemporaries, and allows a situationally guided application of trauma theories in navigating Anders’ own emotionally intense struggles with language and place.

b. “License to Live”

The potential, relational third space is fragile one; for the exiles of Anders’ generation, the experience of exile damaged it in almost every possible way. Historian and philosopher Jean-
Michel Palmier observed in his thoroughgoing history of émigrés from the Nazi state that exile was an exceedingly intimate tragedy which “affects all aspects of existence: relationship to time—past, present, future, childhood memories—as well as space, language, ties to others and to oneself” (228). But because of its intimacy, the trauma of exile was not a singular, temporally closed event, though particular tragic events could be extremely close and immediate in the pain they caused and their weight in memory. It was an inescapable part of mundane life, an “everyday tragedy” that poisoned attempts to live normally.

There were, of course, a broad spectrum of exile experiences. During his years in the US, Anders fell somewhere between the extremities of privilege. As discussed in (1.II), Anders biographer Raimund Bahr noted that the philosopher had found it difficult to connect with the extant emigrant support groups. He was in effect “fully separated from his original social support network” (180) and had to assemble a living from tutoring gigs, occasional lectures, and as mentioned in (3.II), as a laborer in a Hollywood scene shop. Bahr also noted that Anders’ difficulty in building a support network was somewhat of an oddity given the strength and influence of the European intellectual emigrant communities in Hollywood and New York and Anders’ contacts therein, as well as the relative prominence of his parents William and Clara Stern within the field of psychology (181). It is likely Anders’ seeming bad luck can be partially attributed to the fact that aid organizations and financially secure patrons like the International PEN and the Thomas Mann Fund were already stretched to their limit giving small disbursements, and even those émigrés with institutional clout such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (who had negotiated an affiliation between the Frankfurt School’s Institute for
Social Research and Columbia University) were operating from a precarious financial situation (Ross 102, Müller-Doohm 270). Nonetheless, Anders’ colleagues in the Frankfurt School group made efforts to secure Anders lecture, seminar, and publishing opportunities. They were certainly aware of their onetime colleague’s situation and his relatively unsettled existence, and they included him in their lecture programs even if they were often acid about one another in private, as in this 1941 letter from Friedrich Pollock to Horkheimer during conflict over the Institute for Social Research’s independence: “It is interesting to observe how our colleagues behave. Marcuse is terrified that after five years he will be running around like Günther Stern [Anders] and so wants to keep up the links with Columbia at all costs. Teddic only has one interest: to become a small rentier in California as soon as possible, and he could not care less what happens to the others” (qtd. in Müller-Doohm 271). His colleagues, then, found Anders’ relative vagrancy to be a contrarian Andersian statement. Anders himself was emphatic that compared to those of the Frankfurt School, he was a peripheral figure living in privation and isolation, but it may have been the case that he had a hand in separating himself from this support network. He might have held such self-isolation as a necessary alienation and a productive place from which to conduct his work.

As tenuous as it may have been, any kind of social tie or avenue of support helped émigrés persist, whether it was as a simple as having one’s spouse nearby, or participation in political or activist organization. In the absence of such a support network, suicide was one way of possible death, but deportation carried that threat as well. In Anders’ thinking, the array of competing pressures made life in exile Kafkaesque, a hunt for a room, money, permit to work,
undocumented work. But first and foremost was the hunt for one’s “‘residence permit’, so-called,” an item which Anders emphasized (in the 1962 essay by the same name) would be better called one’s “license to live” (“Lebenserlaubnis” 174). The quest for this permit to exist was enforced by the threat of deportation, and in order to comply with the law, one had to break that same law by working illegally to pay the fees demanded by the law. Around and around it goes. Meanwhile, the pressure on exiles to retain a paying job carried with it the implication that, as refugees, they would need to be ready to relocate, change professions, start and stop work at the whims of any who would employ them. In his 1962 essay “Vitae,” Anders recalled that this turned every stopping place into an inevitable preparation for the next move, a condition which was traumatic in the dual sense of making every collectivity and array of social relationships ephemeral, and undermining the sense of personal identity derived from access to a stable social role. In Halbwachsian terms, this is an attack on the foundations on which the edifice of memory is constructed.

In addition to these pressures, there was also the matter of language. Palmier claims that of all the difficulties the exiles faced, “language was one of the most debilitating” notwithstanding the liberal education many of the émigrés had received (255). Although this was not an insuperable barrier for émigrés who found employment as scientific and technical workers, it was devastating for men and women of letters who relied on the use of language for income and self-identity. Palmier cites the German-Jewish philosopher Ludwig Marcuse as saying that few literary emigrants over the age of thirty even dared to try using their language of exile as their language of artistic expression, and that of those who did, few succeeded (256). As
we have seen throughout this chapter, the issue of foreignness in language is one that Anders was sensitive to; the Dutch philosopher Paul van Dijk claims that later in life Anders had admitted he was more comfortable with German than English (24), notwithstanding his many years in American exile, although Raimund Bahr claims this is not the case. In light of the importance of maintaining—or at least being able to offer for inspection—a discernible social function, the loss of the opportunity to be and live as a writer was devastating. Anders wrote emphatically on this topic. To him, maintaining a connection to one’s native language was the “the sole instrument” to fend off total degradation and humiliation, the lone “inalienable property,” and the “one piece of home” that remained (“Vitae”). However, though he recognized the critical role of speaking and writing in a grounded, fluent way, he also saw a perverse paradox in this. Exiles were faced with utter necessity of trying to navigate everyday tasks and official interactions in a

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26 In my assessment I would note that Anders was quite willing to converse in English, perform as a public speaker, translate his own speeches and political documents, exchange letters, and critique translations of his writing. He declared himself an expert in translation. He did however, rely on to others to translate his longer works due to the effort required. In a letter to Liberation editor Dave Dellinger, he explained that, “I would like to write more frequently in Liberation, there is only the question of translation: Charlotte and I losing so unproportionally much time with the translations that we gave it up ourselves.” In other of his letters there are indications that this was a matter also of having a preference for the idiomatic advantage of supervising the translation work of a native speaker of English. As will be seen below, this is consistent with his wider linguistic concerns.

27 Recall from chapter one Hannah Arendt’s commentary on Anders’ obsession with his unpublished novel The Molussian Catacombs and his sense of loss at never having seen it in print. Anders’ experience was widely shared. Palmier notes that among exiles, opportunities to publish, let alone publish translated works were rare: “translation, unfortunately, was possible only for the most famous authors” (243). He counts no more than thirty such authors, virtually all of whom had been widely published before 1933.

28 At a very practical level the language barrier made dealing with state authorities difficult and exposed the émigrés to instant identification as foreigners; cultural differences can attract attention as well. Raimund Bahr writes that Anders was particularly proud of one of his anecdotes from his exile years in California. In the story Anders, who was a great lover of the outdoors, decides to take a walk on the streets of Los Angeles. A curious police officer stops and offers to give him a ride, so that he can get his car fixed. The officer is astounded and doubts Anders’ sanity when he insists he has and needs no car. Bahr points out that Anders cherished this story because it illustrated his willingness to persist in the unconventional. Residents of the Anaheim area will not be surprised to know that Disney’s private security is known to offer pedestrians a lift on the assumption that anyone on the streets near the park must be a stranded motorist.
second or third language while trying to return to the language of home among their fellow-exiles. In Anders’ assessment this produced a kind of linguistic schizophrenia which carried with it “the danger that we might sink to a debased level of speech and become stammerers. And truly, many of us did become stammerers, stammerers in both languages” (“Verbannung” 175). He characterized the loss of access to language as a theft of grand proportions, an impoverishment of language that represented the impoverishment of personhood and of life itself. Writing on interiority, he claimed that “its richness and subtlety has no existence without the richness and subtlety of speech” (Antiquiertheit 1: 109). The conditions Anders records are a total devastation of the ability of exiled persons to contribute to the shared cultural work of symbol-making; it is an erosion of the foundations of memory. It is also a destruction of linguistic capacity that exceeds the global good-enough, and it is also a destruction of the relational capacity that would allow for a prelinguistic solidarity which relies on the cooperative application of the principle of charity. These linguistic strategies are not powerful enough to sustain a person in exile. Anders was writing in earnest to Eatherly when he warned of the perils of total dependence in a culture not one’s own.

The devastation was of a kind that persisted after the war. Anders’ reflection on becoming part of a diaspora community of “stammerers” forms the preface to one of the more widely quoted passages by Anders. The passage is widely cited in part because it was quoted in turn by the Austrian essayist Jean Améry, who fled Austria for France and eventually Belgium, where he was arrested and tortured by the Gestapo for resistance activities. In his essay on placelessness “How Much Home Does a Person Need,” Améry equates physical homelessness with linguistic
displacement. “Our relationship to our homeland was akin to that toward our mother tongue … [in] a collection of exile documents of German writers, I read notes by the philosopher Günther Anders, in which he says: ‘No-one can move about for years exclusively in languages which he has not mastered and at best parrots poorly, without falling victim to his inferior speech … While we had not yet learned our English, French, or Spanish, our German began to crumble away piece by piece” (52). Améry amends Anders’ assessment, saying that in his experience, it was not so much a “crumbling away” as a “shrinking,” for when he and his fellow refugees turned to German, it was in “the narrowing confines of a vocabulary that constantly repeated itself … conversations with our comrades in misfortune revolved around the same topics” of visas, finances, employment, papers, and arrests (Améry 52). In addition to the “crumbling” of his native language, Anders recalled after the war that the immersion in exile-German entailed a similar kind of linguistic “shrinking” to that experienced by Améry and his fellow fugitives that only became plain during the return from exile. In his diaries, Anders depicted his re-encounter with the German language as a “language of the everyday” on the streets of Basel as a severe shock. His first reaction was one of surprise. His second was wonderment at the sheer brazenness of it, for the Swiss were using German to speak of the most mundane things, whereas for Anders and his fellow exiles, German had been a special, almost sacred language: “In the seventeen years of absence, the German language had become for us a kind of private idiom: a writerly language, and the idiom of intimate acquaintance” (Tagebücher und Gedichte 105). Not only was the mundane use of German brazen, Anders also found it singularly perverse, for Nazi idiom had infiltrated Switzerland. The Nazi euphemisms and turns of phrase had joined with other
linguistic changes to render Anders’ language obsolete. “Our language, that of the homecomers,” he wrote, “must have seemed truly quaint. Twice already I’ve been stared at as if I had started declaiming in verse. We have missed seventeen years of linguistic change. And as we were once more ‘advanced’ than the others, so today we are damned to sound old-fashioned” (*Tagebücher und Gedichte* 106). Here again, the quality of the trauma arising from exile is manifold. Beyond the undermining of the interior self, the change in the dialect of the everyday serves as a constant reminder of that loss. Anders retained the fear of speaking an old-fashioned, idiosyncratic exile-German during the first years of his residency in Vienna. He was faced with the task of confronting and taking in a “living, spoken language” (*Tagebücher und Gedichte* 108) and moreover, not just any language, but Viennese dialect—a local idiom with which Anders was wholly unfamiliar and which has a deep cultural history. Not only was he unfamiliar with its history, it was a linguistic and cultural system from which he was excluded.

c. “The exile heart”

The unreflective use of the Nazi institutional dialect—Victor Klemperer’s *Lingua Tertii Imperii*—by persons in the street that Anders remarked on during his journey out of exile was an additional reminder that the relational, potential space between ordinary persons necessary to participate in a shared culture had been distorted. Austrian professor of literature Adi Wimmer argues that for exiles returning to Austria after the war, especially those who held Austrian citizenship before they were forced to flee, it was the partially-restored normality of the mundane that was especially distressing due to the omnipresence of Nazi catchwords and casual comments, which emphasized in turn the exculpatory postwar Allied orthodoxy which held
Austria to be the first victim of Nazi aggression, rather than perpetrators. More than state-directed violence, many Austrian exiles or survivors recalled and resented the informal, popular, community-led attacks on Jews and other enemies of the Nazi state carried out in a festival atmosphere by persons who mere days before might have been social democrats or opponents of fascism. One of Wimmer’s informants remembered that after the Anschluss, “it was as though we had been thrown in an impenetrable jungle together with wild animals, and we had no weapons with which to defend ourselves” (7). To return after the war and be greeted by those same persons with the compliment that they had been clever to flee—with the spoken or unspoken implication that Jews are always clever—was a repetitive confrontation with trauma and the same feelings of difference they had had to contend with in exile, made all the more acute by their having thought themselves home again29. We saw in (1.IVc) that Anders brought himself to that confrontation by denouncing Nazi academics who still held posts at the University; leading American Anders scholar Jason Dawsey also writes in his study of Anders’ first decade in Austria that Anders undertook the application of his philosophical anthropology to recording the daily life of post-Nazi Vienna. Anders’ ethnographic sketches noted the persistence of the Hitler ideology, and his oral histories of encounters between the persecuted and persecutors recorded a literary and personalized analog of Wimmer’s findings (220). For the

29 Améry, in his essay “Torture,” writes that “I don’t know what that is: human dignity. One person thinks he loses it when he finds himself in circumstances that make it impossible for him to take a daily bath. Another believes he loses it when he must speak to an official in something other than his native language … I don’t know if the person who is beaten by police loses human dignity. Yet I am certain that with the very first blow that descends on him he loses something we will perhaps temporarily call ‘trust in the world’” (27-28). That trust in the world is akin to the third space described by Winnicott, the relational space founded in trust; the experience described by Wimmer’s Austrian-Jewish informant is a massive, collective destruction of the relational space and the trust it required to function. The reconfrontation with unthinking disregard is both a reminder and a continued undermining of the possibility for a shared cultural space.
returning exiles, the fundamental trust that contributes to the relational, potential space of culture-making had been distorted beyond recognition, and that distortion was cemented by the repetitive confrontation with trauma. Dawsey concludes that Anders took it as his task to identify the linguistic strategies used to pardon, minimize, normalize, and forget—and destroy them. Exile had eroded all the positive bases for solidarity, leaving for “the exile heart” an enduring hate as the source of strength and common ground (237). In this context, Anders’ insistence on precision and exactitude reflects his intent to use it as a weapon to reclaim the authority to speak and act in the post-war world.

It is clear that Anders’ views on language were profoundly and traumatically affected by his years in exile. Given the multifaceted, complex nature of exile trauma, other Anders scholars have provided different approaches to his linguistic displacement and experience of trauma. Two such recent efforts come from Katja Garloff and Raimund Bahr, and they illuminate Anders’ situation via his relationship to history and biography.

In her book *Words from Abroad*, scholar of German literature Katja Garloff attempts to provide a focus to the issue. She points out that Anders was highly involved in analyzing the psychological effects of his exile and return in his diaries, and that in those writings, Anders does not refer to intermission, as many other exiles do, but to a splitting-off into multiple lives described in his diaries: “That means,” she quotes Anders as writing, “that the second life stands off from the first at an angle, and so does the third from the second. It means that a ‘bend’ occurred each time, a kink that makes it impossible—I would almost say physically impossible—to look back” (*Schrift* 62; Garloff 42; emphasis in the original). Garloff uses this passage and
Anders’ account of his return to Breslau as an opening to explore the philosopher’s attempts to reconcile the disruptions of his past. She does so firmly in the Freudian tradition of trauma analysis, arguing that

Anders’ description of his return to Europe as an uncanny visit to the land of the dead suggests that this perception derives from an inability to establish a dynamic, mournful relationship to the lost home and self. This ‘inability to mourn’ means, of course, not the narcissistic longing for a lost grandeur described by the Mitscherlichs but the traumatic fixation on an experience so extreme it cannot be integrated into a life story (42).

She posits that Anders’ pervasive sense of the uncanny and his failure to unlock a process of productive mourning is the consequence of an “absence of symbolic forms to delineate past and present” and that taken in summary, “the quintessential experience of catastrophic exile, that is, according to Anders, the absence of any kind of mnemonic or imaginative mediation between past and present, thus entails a reification and spatialization of the past, rendering it alternately inaccessible and all-consuming” (43). Anders himself validated the practical impossibility of presenting his life as an integrated story, recalling in his “Vitae” a powerful memory a childhood trip to the circus. During the show, he was impressed by the gymnastics performed by one of the clowns, who tripped and tumbled through the arena as if unaware of his own movements. “How often,” he recalled, “have I in these last few years had to think on this fundamentally polyrhythmic, indeed schizophrenic performance” (“Vitae” 3). The clown served him as a model for the correct way to live an absurd life. In his estimation, it would have been as absurd for him to try and reconstruct his life through writing as it would to try and reconstruct in a logical fashion the clown’s passage across the arena. Further, we see in Garloff’s analysis that Anders was deeply concerned with the collapse between past and present via the erasure of the past from physical locations much to the same extent as he is
concerned with the writerly struggle to give his own life history. This might explain his refusal to open his biography to Grover Foley.

Raimund Bahr’s investigation goes further than Garloff’s analysis, citing another passage from Anders’ Breslau journey in which the philosopher describes the loss of his father’s pocketknife, which he had taken from his desk in 1938 as his father passed away. He selected the knife not only to have a tangible object by which to remember the elder Stern, but because the knife was “a countryman of mine, namely, that like myself it was in Breslau that it had seen the light of day.” During his 1966 visit to Breslau, Anders lost the knife and he speculated that, were he a psychoanalyst, he would suspect himself of having unconsciously dropped the penknife himself as a sacrifice to conscience, a reminder that he had escaped to exile rather than died in the camps (Besuch 179; Bahr 160).

Bahr argues that Anders’ experience of radical wordlessness is not entirely the consequence of exile but a continuation of the philosophical anthropology he had embarked on in 1929 in with his lectures on “die Weltfremdheit der Menschen” (“Humanity’s Estrangement from the World”). In Bahr’s reading, the loss of the penknife was the final fulfillment of Anders’ placelessness. That dislocation in the world and the experience of living multiple lives in one life, he adds, is not in Anders’ thinking exclusive to himself or other exiles, but is increasingly a feature of modern existence itself (Bahr 162-4). It is a symptom, not the sole cause. In another description of the “bend” attendant to living a multiplicity of lives, Anders cited the aspects of exile which give force to the bend. “The cause of my embarrassment,” he began, is that “already with the singular ‘life’ there is a false premise. …
Vitae; not vita. Those who, like us, have lived every three or five years in another city, in another language, in another milieu, that person has had multiple lives: New starts in life, multiple roles, multiple professions, multiple individualities; yes, and many deaths” ("Vitae" 1). Exile is an assemblage of these distorting forces; it is a unique experience, but it is also a concatenation and concentration many of the other social forces which arose in the 20th century which Anders struggled to understand through his typologies of schizophrenia and alienation. Bahr insists that Anders’ exile be understood through the lens of his writing on “Weltfremdheit” because to do so applies the fact of his experience to his philosophical attempt to explicate the tension between humans as individual and collective beings (163), and increases the explanatory power of that philosophy.

V. Conclusions

At the beginning of (3.IV) I resorted to two different strands of trauma theory encompassing individual and social scales of analysis, and I did so as a response to Bahr’s insistence that Anders’ exile years be understood at the junction between the individual and the collective. Anders’ adamant demand for control of his biographical representation, and his insistence on its bent, schizophrenic nature reflects the fact that trauma is inflicted on the individual level and at the level of the social. Anders’ struggles with language take place at that intersection. Sections (3.I) and (3.II) examined Anders’ approaches to language in public activist settings and in writerly, philosophical work. The two stand in opposition to one another; one rejects specificity and demands surrender of language to translation and the principle of charity, while the other is emphatic about the need highly specific language and
strict authorial control. The former is a reflection of Anders’ optimism born from necessity, a
determination to make language work in situations where it is highly limited. The latter
reflects the two decades he spent in exile, a period wherein the entire shared, cultural system
that supports the symbol-making work of the artist and author—the third, relational space—
was systematically destroyed, its foundations of trust shaken, and all that was left to him was
constituent of the self was the slowly eroding core of language.

Following the distortion of language through Anders’ writing on his journey into exile
is to a certain extent pessimistic and raises the question of what might remain. Anders himself
was intensely concerned with this feeling of left-overness, of being one of the not-killed. He
insisted for himself and for others that life must continue, that it is both necessary and worthy
to try. In his essay “Lebenserlaubnis”, he stated with bitter gratitude that one may as well be
thankful for the cruel opportunities that come with the stripping-down of a writerly life:
“What an enviable fortune,” he wrote, “to ask oneself whether what one wrote was really
necessary, and for whom one was writing!” (177). Exile could be their teacher, the
opportunity to learn to write the correct words for the correct audience and nothing more.
However, we have seen in (3.1) that Anders was capable of misapprehending his audience,
was insensitive to potential flaws in his analyses of class, and that his relative infirmity kept
him increasingly apart from the public settings of protest that would otherwise have placed
him in immediate contact with an activist audience. By the end of the 1960s, he had begun to
reach the practical cultural and linguistic limits of language. In time, when his strategies of
pre-linguistic solidarity and global good-enough appeared inadequate to a renewed Cold War,
he would come to take an increasingly radical view of how social protest should be conducted. His journey to extremity is the subject of chapter four.
CHAPTER FOUR: IMAGINATIVE INTERVENTIONS

I. Introductions

a. “Imaginative power is the utmost necessity”

We saw in the preceding chapter that, as the 1960s came to a close, Anders began to reach what he believed were the limits of language as a tool of suasion, recruitment, and mobilization for anti-nuclear protest. In this chapter, I discuss how Anders’ perception of linguistic limits worked in conjunction with his evolving analysis of political, social, and economic conditions to bring him to a point of philosophical extremity. In the last decade of his life, Anders responded to the end of détente and the catastrophe at Chernobyl by declaring a “state of emergency” on behalf of the citizenry of the world, an emergency which justified measures of violent self-defense. Even as Anders came to the point he believed marked the end of linguistic struggle, he still maintained that the capacity to imagine the possibility of human self-extinction was the paramount requirement and most pressing task. However, during the course of this chapter I argue that Anders’ analysis of the 1960s-era student movements and later environmental movements was limited by lack of immersion in the crucial mundaneities of practical activist work—the universal pre-linguistic solidarity described in the preceding chapter. Consequently, even as Anders received wide public recognition as a leading figure in the disarmament movement, he underestimated the impact of the imaginative interventions produced by the anti-nuclear community while discounting the efficacy of new protest-forms and political alignments arising from the environmental turn taken by countercultures in Western Europe and North America.
As we will see in section (4.V), evaluating and critically examining Anders’ eventual advocacy of violent direct action requires drawing on the developments in his thinking that led to his conclusions about what constituted an effective imaginative intervention. This chapter, then, not only builds on the last but also brings together the central themes of all of the preceding chapters.

In the first section I conduct a reading of Anders’ 1968 book Visit Beautiful Vietnam and his 1969 essay “Über Happenings” (“On Happenings”) in order to discuss how Anders’ engagement with the American war in Vietnam caused him to reappraise the nature of modern conflict and the effect of spectacle as an imaginative intervention. In crucial ways, the former would influence his diagnosis of military-industrial-nuclear infrastructure and lead him to shift his call for violent direct action from infrastructure to persons, while the latter built on his reservations about class formations as discussed in chapter three to steer his evaluation of the protest-forms and counterculture lifestyles which arose in the 1970s.

In the second section I discuss Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program and describe how the nuclear diplomacy measures undertaken by the US in the 1950s prefigured the confluence of nuclear disarmament and opposition to nuclear power generation. Through a consideration of Californian anti-nuclear movements of the late 1950s and 1960s together with the emergence of environmental and Green movements in the USA and Europe, I argue that as a result of the imaginative interventions and organizational strategies pursued by nuclear opponents as described in chapter one, atomic weapons and atomic power became inextricable via the unifying symbol of fallout.
Section three then initiates a discussion of Anders’ 1970s-era reflections on spaceflight in *Der Blick vom Mond* as an extension of his changing conceptions of modern capitalist, military-industrial production, the cultural interpretations that publics produced in reaction to rapid technological change, and the countercultural reactions posited as alternatives. Using his 1977 essay “Jedes Kraftwerk ist eine Bombe” (“Every Nuclear Power Plant is a Bomb”), his colleague Robert Jungk’s 1977 book *Der Atomstaat* (*The Nuclear State*), and Anders’ post-Chernobyl text “Die strahlenden Salatköpfe” (“The Radiating Lettuce Heads”) I show how these trends flow into Anders’ initial assessments of civilian nuclear power generation via the concepts of consumption, spectacle, masked systems, and perception and risk assessment of invisible threats.

In section four I show that while Anders’ analysis of techno-social systems had undergone significant change, he had failed to fully recognize the link forged between nuclear power and nuclear weapons, or the significance of that link to both lay and motivated activist citizens. I argue that this failure shaped his pessimistic evaluation of the cultural reaction to the Chernobyl disaster, and worked to neutralize his expectations of the possibility for effective resistance to the social and political situation of the late Cold War. Through a reading of his 1986 notional interview “Notstand und Notwehr,” I examine what Anders meant by “state of emergency” and “self-defense” and I show how this was presaged in his condemnations of traditional nonviolent protest forms in his 1983 essay “Si vis pacem para pacem” and the pair of open letters “Kerzenmarsch und Weihespiel” (“Candlelight Marches and Vigils”). Working in conjunction with three other scholars focused on Anders’ theories of violence, I show that Anders’ thinking from the 1950s forward tended to the systematic exclusion of both traditional activist methods
and emergent ones. As such, the taboo tactics of violence appeared as the only remaining avenue for effective imaginative intervention.

Ultimately, in the conclusion of this chapter I examine the debate over violence and nonviolence as it emerged during Anders’ final years and describe its afterlives in the present.

II. Vietnam and the Appraisal of Spectacle

a. A-B-C

As we saw at the close of chapter 3, the late 1960s brought Anders to a period in which he reappraised the possibilities of linguistic and protest forms. His struggles with these themes underwent further development as he participated in the opposition to the American war in Vietnam. Simultaneously, the conflict in Vietnam caused Anders to expand his thinking on the nature of modern war. This process appears most clearly in his 1968 book *Visit Beautiful Vietnam*, dedicated to his readers on the eve of the Tet offensive.

*Visit Beautiful Vietnam* follows Anders’ pattern of publishing thematically arranged short texts, the juxtaposition of which produces a coherent whole. From the arrangement in *Visit Beautiful Vietnam*, Anders produced an analysis of what have since come to be called long, or asymmetrical insurgent wars. As a social phenomenon and activist problem, he held that the Vietnam War was complex, and so offered a starting point drawn from the previous decade: as he stated in *Antiquiertheit*, his “Theses,” and other works of the 1950s, the key was to realize that the Vietnam War was taking place in the atomic situation. “If we—and the danger exists, e.g. in the anti-nuclear movement—confine ourselves to the struggle against ‘nuclear weapons,’ then we embarrass ourselves as ABC-pupils of our epoch, as pupils who are stuck on A” (17). The atomic
situation, Anders argued, acted as a shield under which other weapons—seemingly less total in their effects—could be developed, tested, and employed on humans under the excuse that they were not as horrible as a total atomic war. Not only did atomic weapons reproduce and distribute themselves, as we saw in the Prelude, they gave rise to offspring. Anders concluded that the offspring were to be “combatted exactly as energetically as the nuclear weapons themselves” (Visit 18).

Fundamentally, Anders offered an analysis of Vietnam that saw the region and the conflict as a location of production and consumption, a death-colony of the United States from which death-products could be exported back to the metropole. So it was that in Visit Beautiful Vietnam Anders identified the conflict as a laboratory for weapons testing and model for coming wars (105), as an instance of consumer society that transmitted back images of destruction and corpses to the U.S. population (98-99), created from genocidal processing of the Vietnamese people as a material resource (62), or, as Anders observed from close analysis of the bureaucratic vocabulary which the Kennedy and Johnson administrations justified their crimes, like water. He noted that the American response to the fundamental guerilla principle “the people are the water and the guerilla is the fish, and without the water the fish will die” was to, simply, through the power of industrialized warfare, “dry up the water” (37). Therefore, wrote Anders, “In the eyes of the military, the obliteration of the country and the people is nothing other than the militarily necessary obliteration of the tactical advantage of the guerilla” (37). Anders concluded that this situation required not just the attention of activists generally, but unstinting and committed resistance. However, Anders found that in demanding the attention of a broad front, the target of
protest—the American war of extermination in Vietnam—tended to become what might be called both “sticky” and diffuse. That is, it tended to pull other issues in and attach them to the motivating symbols of the movement, while dispersing activist attention to other injustices (such as Soviet human rights violations) that Anders judged meaningful but not equivalent (142-143). This tendency generated a fundamental tension in the activist work of the era.

b. “Happenings”

During the same period in which he wrote Visit Beautiful Vietnam, Anders continued his analysis of the efficacy and nature of protest-forms in a 1969 essay titled “Über Happenings,” later collected in the second volume of Antiquiertheit. “Über Happenings” was Anders’ response to the provocative, absurd, taboo-breaking protest tactics of theater and spectacle adopted in particular by student and counterculture activists. Anders defined these tactics as “Happenings,” or, “acts whose sense exists in that they, through their senselessness, make the reality in which they take place likewise meaningless, or better: unmask or denounce it as senseless or absurd.” Almost without exception, he considered these to be acts focused on appearance and undertaken out of necessity, the “emergency- or substitute-performances” of the powerless (“Happenings” 356) which are resorted to only in historical moments—as in his grim evaluation given to Haug in (3.IIe) where the possibilities for meaningful or revolutionary change are foreclosed (“Happenings” 357). Happenings were hybrid acts, ones which straddled the line between political act and artistic work.

Anders did not consider these acts to be totally ineffectual or useless; he noted that through the dialectic of their performance, the appearance of their being a political act could be
transformed into an actuality. That is, because riot police react violently to the ambiguity of resistance and disrespect of state authority under the banner of performance and speech, protest acts such as throwing red paint in imitation of blood could well result in anti-war protesters “left lying severely wounded on the ground,” bleeding in earnest for the crime of having mocked the police rather than fighting them in a straightforward manner (“Happenings” 360). Anders acknowledged that this could be an effective provocation tactic to publicly appear to have not been the first to resort to violence, but he held that all such acts have the potential to be transformed yet again into spectacle via media and audience reception. Thus, happenings could become strict political deed, and be transformed again into happenings. The value in these substitute-acts, Anders decided, was their utility in sustaining minimal opposition in cycles of protest quiescence. This, he said, had previously been the role of poets and philosophers, and he kept it as an open question as to whether happenings could fulfill the same function: “In any case it is better that ideas which cannot be realized, at least be ‘performed’ rather than wholly and totally forsaken. The more serious the circumstances, that much more serious can the function of the unserious be” (“Happenings” 361; emphasis in the original). We will see in (4.V) that the tensions of the broad front and the ambiguity of “happenings” would play a crucial role in how Anders would come to engage with the modern environmental movement and the “nuclear freeze”—the third wave of anti-nuclear protest.

III. The Legacy of Atoms for Peace

a. Atoms for Peace … or for War?

As physicist and historian of science Spencer Weart shows in his polemical cultural
history *The Rise of Nuclear Fear*, survey results from the late 1940s and early 1950s generally showed that the American public had come to identify atomic energy with the atomic bomb, and that supporting interest in fission for power generation was confined to an intellectual elite (83). Negative or lukewarm public attitudes posed a problem for US and allied policymakers; it endangered funding for nuclear research efforts, put scrutiny on NATO nuclear-use strategy, and drew critical attention to the pervasive secrecy surrounding the nuclear-industrial establishment. Military and political leaders reacted by attempting to defuse what they saw as a dangerous, hysterical fear of the atomic bomb. Historian Paul Boyer records that the primary public-relations strategy adopted by the security establishment was to promote a “practical attitude” towards nuclear dangers, one that treated atomic warfare as one of the “hazards of contemporary living” (327). In Anders’ terms, the path taken was the domestication and “cozification”—Verbiedung—of the atomic menace (*Antiquiertheit* 1: 124). One of Boyer’s most compelling examples cites a focus group conducted among citizens in which participants concluded the best way to mute atomic fears was to normalize it as an everyday technology. “Show them a train run by atomic power,” one participant said, “and they won’t worry about the atomic bomb” (310). Struggling to check nuclear fears among the public eventually became a central goal of the Eisenhower administration.

Rhetorician and religious scholar Ira Chernus analyses Eisenhower’s efforts in this arena as being an attempt to conduct “apocalypse management” through intervention in the matrix of American public language, which for our purposes we might treat as an imaginative intervention. Chernus argues that Eisenhower’s rhetorical approach to the nuclear situation underwent a
dramatic shift in 1953, a change which can be traced in the “Chance for Peace” and “Atoms for Peace” speeches. In Chernus’ estimation, the 16 April, 1953 “Chance for Peace” speech advanced diplomatic and military policies that were impossible to fulfill; Eisenhower’s address outlined a program for security that treated the Soviets as an intractable enemy and which required “Soviet capitulation on every cold war issue” (10-12). Given overwhelming Eastern Bloc superiority in conventional forces and the nascent Soviet nuclear arsenal, this was a non-starter. By December 1953, Eisenhower and his advisors had found a new way forward through the framework of “Atoms for Peace.” The theme of the peaceful atom originated with AEC chairman David Lilienthal, but made its most widely recognized debut in Eisenhower’s eponymous 8 December, 1953 speech before the UN General Assembly. Chernus observes that the “Atoms for Peace” speech embodied a fundamental rhetorical shift. In that speech, Eisenhower confirmed the potentially apocalyptic nature of nuclear warfare. The president and former general admitted that he was speaking in “a language that in a sense is new … That language is the language of atomic warfare.” The new atomic language, he claimed, represented “a danger shared by all, the probability of civilization destroyed” (2). Here, Chernus notes that Eisenhower included the Soviet Union and the United States together as potential victims of atomic war and, therefore, as partners in the project of survival (103). Chernus’ overarching point is that the outcome Eisenhower offered was a long-term project of “apocalypse management” in which victory was equivalent to the long-term preservation of a stable military and economic system, rather than defeat of the Soviet Union or disarmament (107). Central to the project of apocalypse management was the promise of civilian nuclear power.
In his address, Eisenhower characterized the atomic era as offering “a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind” through the potential for power generation, medical imaging, and research. The promise of “Atoms for Peace” was a detour around the military deadlock between the superpowers through cooperation in technological advance and economic development. As a concrete method for achieving this, Eisenhower proposed that the powers put part of their nuclear materials stockpiles at the disposal of a UN agency, which would guide and inspect the development of civilian nuclear facilities. “Atoms for Peace,” then, became the foundation of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Chernus argues that the “Atoms for Peace” speech constituted an act of policy which condensed the entire discursive structure of the Cold War into the task of maintaining stability to avoid apocalypse. As an act of international policy, Historian Elisabeth Röhrlich argues that “Atoms for Peace” was a diplomatic and propaganda victory that established a framework of nuclear governance that persists today. It also had the additional effect of transforming Anders’ Vienna—which as we saw in (1.3b) appeared in the early Cold War as a state on the periphery of world affairs—into an atomic world capital in its role as host to the first IAEA general conference and continued status as the third UN city (3-4). Weart notes that the diplomatic success of “Atoms for Peace” was reflected in tangible financial and economic terms. By the end of 1957, the US had achieved bilateral nuclear sharing agreements with 49 countries, and US firms had sold 23 research reactors abroad (Weart 84). As domestic policy, he argues that “Atoms for Peace” was similarly successful. It served as the framework for massive print, broadcast, and film media-relations campaign, and drove the distribution of informational, educational, and technical materials, many of which were
previously embargoed as sensitive information. By the mid-1950s, Weart notes, religious organizations such as the Council of Churches were calling for investment in nuclear power, while labor groups like the American Federation of Labor pushed atomic energy as a source of jobs—and with good cause; by 1957, GE’s nuclear industries division encompassed some 14,000 employees (86-87).

For the purposes of this chapter, Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” raises two important points of note. The first is that through the theme of “Atoms for Peace” and the structure of the IAEA, US policymakers used the prospect of civilian nuclear power to achieve a highly effective domestic and international imaginative intervention. It was, in short, a propaganda coup. However, as we will see in (4.Vd), Anders did not recognize this at the time even though, as Röhrlich notes and as seen in (1.Vb), the IAEA conference and 1958 Pugwash meeting had made Vienna a world center for atomic policymaking and diplomacy. The second point arises from the attempt undertaken in “Atoms for Peace” to delineate two realms of the nuclear—military and civilian, warlike and peaceable, dangerous and safe. “Atoms for Peace” initiated a rapid, international proliferation of reactor technology and nuclear-industrial installations that were not veiled from the public eye by the exigencies of secrecy, but which were the focus of extensive media campaigns aimed at normalizing the nuclear as both a symbol of progress and domesticated aspect of daily life. In the next section, I will show that in the aftermath of the Lucky Dragon incident (discussed in 1.4a), “Atoms for Peace” in fact accomplished a permanent fusion of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy as subjects of the public imagination.
b. From California...

The Californian anti-nuclear movement of the 1960s, and the crisis precipitated by its resistance to Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) nuclear power plants at Bodega Bay and Diablo Canyon is a historical topic that is often taken as representative of the origins of the modern environmental movement. Thomas Wellock and John Wills are two historians who advance this argument in their respective books *Critical Masses* and *Conservation Fallout*. Wellock grounds his argument in the observation that Bodega Bay and Diablo Canyon protests mark a shift from the preservationist tradition of environmentalism, which found its clearest expression in the National Park system. The preservationist tradition maintains a dichotomy between human civilization and wild nature; the goal of environmentalism in this view is to conserve, to maintain special areas of wilderness demarcated as a refuge from the pressures of urban existence for transcendent aesthetic experience or as reservoir for the cultivation of masculine virtues. Thus, Wellock notes that the Sierra Club of the late 1950s and early 1960s could participate in the promise of nuclear power on the grounds that it would reduce air pollution; activists could thereby act as responsible conservationists by negotiating with utilities to make decisions about what parcels of land required preservation on account of their scenic views, and which could be sacrificed for development (125). This was the tack that the Sierra Club leadership adopted when PG&E undertook in 1963 to expand its portfolio of nuclear power plants; among its proposed sites were 1,100 acres the company owned along the Nipomo Dunes, a stretch of undeveloped beach in San Luis Obispo County. Because the utility hoped to avoid the debacle they had unleashed in 1958 with the siting of the proposed Bodega Bay plant, and because the Sierra Club...
wished to preserve Nipomo on account of its scenic value, the two entered into negotiations: this, Wellock argues, was a mistake (75-76), because during the Bodega Bay movement, a significant number of the Sierra Club’s California membership had undergone a process of radicalization.

The Bodega Bay PG&E station was to have been the country’s first commercial nuclear power plant, the first fruit of the “Atoms for Peace” program. In 1958 PG&E proudly announced its purchase of land for the reactor’s construction at Bodega Bay, 40 miles north of San Francisco. Wellock notes that while PG&E preempted Sierra Club objections to the plant with promises of a “Bodega Bay Atomic Park,” resistance soon formed as the result of consultation between skeptical San Franciscans and local fishermen who feared that development would endanger their livelihoods and way of life (32-34). The dissenting coalition highlighted two particular dangers: risk to the integrity of the reactor due to its proposed location along a fault line, and the danger of radiological release. The specter of a leak or fallout from a core breach proved to be an effective motivating theme; resistance to the PG&E plant soon grew to include local dairy ranchers concerned about the potential effect radioactive contamination would have on their business. Moreover, Wellock notes that the Bodega Bay activists’ fallout argument was aided by the 1962 appearance of Rachel Carson’s groundbreaking and influential book *Silent Spring*; in 1963 the campaigners circulated a paper that highlighted the ability of radioactive isotopes to move through the food chain (46-47). The addition of the food chain concept mobilized the fear of fallout first raised in the aftermath of the 1954 Castle Bravo mishap and the subsequent studies which showed the ability for radioactive strontium-90 to replace calcium in children’s teeth and bones (as discussed in 1.IVa).
The resistance to the Bodega plant became markedly gendered as women in particular responded to what was positioned as a highly personal threat to familial and—via the specter of contaminated breast milk—generational health (Wellock 47). In summary, Wellock points out that the Bodega Bay campaign created an activist core which had moved from working cooperatively with developers to preserve “scenic and outdoor amenities” for recreation to the moral, visceral task of “protecting the ecosphere and human life from the depredations of modern life,” including and especially averting the potential contamination of food and drink by radioactive fallout (69). Wellock notes that for some activists, the specter of nuclear power represented the “ultimate brutality,” a kind of “antilife” exceeded only by nuclear weapons themselves (48). Spencer Weart considers the mobilization of the fallout threat via the food chain concept to be a displacement of the disarmament argument onto nuclear power generation, achieved partially by intent by activists like Pauling, who Weart notes admitted that “although his agitation against bombs stressed fallout, it was the weapons themselves that most worried him” (120). Furthermore, as noted at the close of chapter two, this displacement occurred just as weapons were disappearing underground and under the ocean. As we saw in (2.I), Anders was a participant in this process through his valorization of the fallout-martyr Kuboyama, radioman aboard the _Lucky Dragon_. Through the symbol of Kuboyama, Anders had found an anchor for his arguments that the atomic menace was borderless, and that the state of apparent peace maintained via Eisenhower’s program of “apocalypse management” in fact disguised a state of war waged against civilians worldwide through the border-crossing effects of nuclear testing. Ultimately, Weart concludes that the displacement via fallout created a motivating symbol that
was practically unsurpassable: the contamination of milk, a “sacred food,” constituted an act of poisoning which entrained “old ideas going back to the accusations of witchcraft” (121). For many, the specter of fallout was an imaginative intervention that departed the logic of negotiable risks. Instead, the danger of fallout entered the class of pollutants treated by Mary Douglas in her work *Purity and Danger*, those whose dangers are so visceral and threatening as to require strict taboo.

Consequently, Wellock observes that when the radicalized core of the Sierra Club departed in disgust over the leadership’s willingness to trade away Diablo Canyon, the single-issue environmental organizations they created—such as the Friends of the Earth (FOE)—were notable in their willingness to depart from the classic committee model (discussed in (1.IIc-d)), and remarkable in their militant, morally-oriented outlook; they know were akin to religious sects, led by prophets (68). The new green organizations were paradigmatic of the new social movements that (as we saw in (3.III)) confronted Anders and others on the Left with analytical challenges. As John Wills notes, environmental issues in particular seemed to have a surprising ability to absorb other concerns, as in the Diablo Canyon campaign which became the eventual focus of the anti-Vietnam group Mothers for Peace (70). This was facilitated in part by the power of the environmental movement’s motivating symbols, but also because it represented a new activist terrain not limited by reified political frameworks or entrenched Cold War positions.

c. … and Internationally

It is for this reason that Holger Nehring argues that the origins of the modern European environmental movement should not be located in the 1970s, but rather in the British and West
German disarmament movements of the 1950s and 1960s. In his view, these movements constituted an open imaginative space in which, “discussions of environmental dangers served to externalize experiences and fears of destruction in a period of heightened Cold War tensions” (“Atom” 159). In the BRD, those discussions bequeathed a legacy of atomic apocalypticism closely aligned with metaphors of plague which later proved influential in the formative stages of European Green movements. Nehring counts Anders among the contributors to this process (“Atom” 150). The emergence of environmental movements and parties in Europe during the late 1960s and early 1970s is frequently explained as a confluence of generational effects, values shifts and opportunity structure, which we are familiar with from (2.IV) as well as the disintegration of Marxist organizations beginning after 1968 (Frankland 18). As noted above, the environmental movement offered the advantage of being new activist terrain, and its members quickly developed a flexible set of core texts and motivating images in addition to Silent Spring, among which scholar of international relations and environmental history Peter Dauvergne includes The Limits to Growth (1972), Small is Beautiful (1973) and to which might be added the Whole Earth Catalog (1968 xlvi-xlvii). The celebration of “Earth Day,” first in the US during 1970 and worldwide in 1971 helped widen the reach of the metaphor of a borderless Earth viewed from space as a unifying symbol (Dauvergne 164). The array of texts and symbols built into the foundation of the environmental movement thus included themes of the interconnectedness of all life, skepticism towards industrial development, acknowledgement of resource limits, and a yearning for holism in contrast to a dissatisfaction with modernity and highly regimented workplace experiences. These acted in turn as the basis for the continuation of
1960s counter-culture through lifestyle movements, including an interest in organic foods, DIY and hacker culture, both of which would become mainstream by the 2000s.

Nuclear power plants, whose global spread had been aided by the “Atoms for Peace” program, thus became a unifying, internationally available network of sites for environmentalists to realize the apocalyptic legacy described by Nehring via anti-nuclear protest. Indeed, anti-nuclear protest facilitated the genesis of the environmental movement in Anders’ Austria, first with the protests in Vorarlberg against Swiss plans to build a reactor just across the border at Rüthi, then in nationwide protests to plans for an Austrian entry to nuclear power with the Zwenterford plant, and culminating in the 1978 referendum against nuclear power. As Dieter Pesendorfer notes in his study of Austrian environmental politics, objections to nuclear power began (as in the US) from a relatively conservative and local basis but took on a movement character through the assembly of a broad organizational front. In Austria, this front included conservative Catholic mothers and radical elements of the socialist youth (88). In Germany and Austria alike, the movement maintained an international, multi-dimensional character that mixed old models of Left politics, student, women’s, environmental and alternative movements while retaining contacts with local citizens’ groups that were conservative and religious in composition (Grüning and Faragallah 16-18). These factors contributed to the structural factors influencing the “third wave” of anti-nuclear activism and the “nuclear freeze” of the 1980s, and help explain a mass movement that, in addition to legal and regulatory maneuvering, displayed its strength by unifying disparate groups with sometimes contradictory politics via highly visible protest at sites of nuclear industry (as discussed with reference to Gusterson in (1.IIc-d)). In short, the process of
change that Anders noted when he revised his class analysis in the late 1960s continued, and, as we will see in coming sections, his anti-nuclear philosophy would struggle to keep pace.

IV. Anders in the shadow of Chernobyl

a. Warlike Acts

As discussed in the preceding section, disarmament and environmental activists in Europe and the USA largely came to reject initiatives to present civilian nuclear power—the peaceful atom—as distinct from nuclear weapons. Rather, peace activists and environmentalists came to interpret nuclear reactors as bomb-like. They viewed reactors as integral to the production of weapons-grade fissile material, and propagated the view of radiological waste products and particulates as potential and actual fallout.

As we will see in this section, Anders’ writing on the subject followed a similar arc to the broader activist discourse on nuclear power, but remained rooted in thinking he had done on technology before and during the Second World War. Recall from (1.I), that he had elaborated the core idea of the Promethean discrepancy—the observation that humanity’s technological products exceed the human capacity to imagine their effects—in the early 1940s. Thus, by the time of Eisenhower’s 1953 “Atoms for Peace” speech, Anders’ philosophy already contained as one of its central tenets an extreme skepticism of the human capacity to control its creations. We also saw in (2.Ia) that Anders, in response to the 1954 *Lucky Dragon* incident, came to view nuclear weapons tests as equivalent to purposeful, murderous experimentation on living human subjects (e.g. the fallout martyr Kuboyama). In fact, he held that the weapons tests and the bombing of and Nagasaki were experiments undertaken at the expense of all generations of
humans yet to come (2.Ia). In his 1959 travel diary *Der Mann*, he emphatically labeled these injections of radioactive materials into the air and water as criminal, warlike acts for which the term “peaceful tests” was the most cynical of propaganda (*Antiquiertheit* 1: 260). Moreover, he viewed the deployment and testing of ancillary technologies and delivery systems as another kind of unconscionable act. Though the principal Cold War powers freely conducted test and reconnaissance flights of warplanes and missiles, Anders refused to accept them as either tests or experiments. Because such deployments served to raise the tensions between the powers and offered the opportunity for accident, Anders classified them as structural violence, real uses of real weapons against non-combatants. They constituted a form of propaganda and political blackmail intended to coerce civilian populations, satellite states, and non-aligned nations.

Anders came to apply these same standards to nuclear power plants on the basis of their role in weapons manufacture, the opportunity for proliferation, and, later, the inherent risk of radiological release they posed. They, too, were not peaceful installations, but the embodiment of warlike acts. This section examines a series of Anders’ writings on the topic of nuclear power generation in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, in tandem with interviews he gave on the topic. In this section I argue that while Anders’ engagement with civilian nuclear power and environmental concerns did not become explicit until the late 1970s, his approach to the issue is nonetheless a development of core ideas gathered in the first volume of *Antiquiertheit*, and refined and expanded in light of his observations and analysis of the Apollo program. However, Anders’ belated expansion of these ideas to environmental concerns and lack of contemporary interest in programs such as “Atoms for Peace” reveals limitations in his application of that
His environmentalist critique has its origins in what would otherwise appear as a hiatus in Anders’ writerly production. As discussed in (3.I), events of the latter half of the 1960s confronted Anders with a number of philosophical challenges that (among other things) required him to revise his conceptions of class formation, language, and protest. For observers and biographers such as Werner Fuld and Paul van Dijk, the period between the end of the Eatherly affair and his later notoriety in the 1980s is viewed as a relative blank. This period was not one of inactivity for Anders, as seen in (4.II) above. In the words of Wolfgang Fritz Haug, what these commentators neglected was Anders’ extensive thinking and opposition to the American war in Vietnam. However, Haug also notes that in the decade following the end of the 1960s Anders also drifted away from his association with Haug’s periodical Das Argument. He ascribes the break to Anders’ discomfort with an over-reaching Marxist critical framework coupled with disappointment over the Warsaw Pact’s 1969 invasion of Czechoslovakia (“Denkend”). In the Anders special issue of Text + Kritik, scholar Eckhard Wittulski echoed this sentiment, noting that Anders came to frame his work of the 1970s as “bridge books” between anti-nuclear movements (40). In any case, these years were a period of breaking-away and distancing for Anders, and also marked the beginning of an era of general disappointments for the anti-nuclear Left. Anders completed the collection Der Blick vom Mond in 1970, the beginning of this hiatus; distance and transformation is an appropriate motif for his work during this time.

b. Apocalypse from 384,000 Kilometers Above

In explanation for the wide-ranging character of Der Blick, Anders used the foreword to

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offer a summary of where the volume stands in relation to his other writing. As discussed in (1.IVb), Anders consciously undertook the task of writing in a variety of genres, producing hybrid texts functioning as a kind of portfolio for occasional sketches that corresponded to his conception of “occasional philosophy.” He acknowledged that *Der Blick* takes this form. Though he claimed not to have “planned my diverse work as part of a philosophical system,” he observes that they comprise a systematically coherent text,

not because their contrasts were carefully arranged by me to form a stable harmonic whole; instead it is only because they stand out together against a contrasting systematic background—because all the threats and dangers with which my individual investigations concern themselves are parts of and variations on a singular systemic breakdown. Or, morally expressed: because the various protest-positions and -actions aimed at in my individual writings are all variations of a single Protest, and thus, in this moral sense, part of a single “System” (16).

Although similar remarks apply to Anders’ philosophical writing in general, it is particularly important in *Der Blick* as a temporal marker of both change and continuity in Anders’ thought after the late 1960s. The argumentative bedrock of his treatise on space flight is firmly that which he laid out in the first volume of *Antiquiertheit*: it rests on the investigation of the Promethean discrepancy. However, one advantage *Der Blick* has over *Antiquiertheit*’s reflection on atomic weapons is that the contemporary and highly public nature of the space race meant that Anders was immersed in the Apollo program and confronted its circulation in numerous media as it unfolded. That contemporary access to representational excess allowed Anders to examine the space race as an emergent, contingent phenomenon rather than one which appeared with the lightning suddenness of the atomic bombnings.

Embedded in the middle of Anders’ text is the fundamental and simple question: why?
Why undertake the Apollo program? He took this question as seriously as did its Congressional opponents and, supposedly, President Kennedy himself, who Anders quotes as having asked his science advisors “Can’t you fellows invent some other race here on earth that will do some good?” (Der Blick 160). One feature that struck Anders was the belated way in which the justifications and rationalizations assembled themselves around the Apollo program—out of positive interest in lunar science, to renew the American spirit of endeavor and exploration of the unknown, to reinforce the interest of the public in science and develop the technical capacity of the nation—all of these were second to its potential as a prestige project. “The distant,” he wrote, “was means to ends that were near. Not the other way around” (162). At its origins in policy circles, the Apollo program began to obscure its own mundane reasons for being behind a veil of elevated purpose.

Anders argued the same paradox of mundanity tied to mythic endeavor was attached to the cosmonauts and astronauts themselves. The public was to take them as heaven-striding supermen, but the means by which the missions were pronounced a success—and the status of hero conferred on them—was by their return as cargo to the safety of the earth. For Anders, it was an absurdity to give high praise to persons who were functionally employed as passive payload in an elaborate weapons system. Considering astronaut and eventual beloved U.S. Senator John Glenn, Anders described it as fundamentally twisted that: “because he proved his worth as payload; then was celebrated and photographed a thousand times over; and for an accomplishment which was not his; no, which on account of his not being a scientist he could not in fact understand” he would be seriously considered as a candidate for high political office (Der
To Anders, the transformation of John Glenn was not Glenn the man being honored, but Glenn the man being employed as a decoration: as décor. As in the case of Eatherly, Anders is particularly sensitive to such uses of men and women. The making of heroes was a process akin to the refashioning of work in the industrial era. Hero-making simultaneously exaggerated the importance of the actor and disguised their responsibility: an act of alienation and deception.

If John Glenn and the other spacefaring men and women were falsified in our perception, Anders insisted that our perception of the Earth and humanity was fundamentally altered as well. He held that the views of the earth from the moon transmitted back by the Apollo astronauts constituted a visceral completion of the Copernican revolution—the demotion of the Earth from a central position in the universe of our thinking—broadcast worldwide on live TV. It was, therefore, not the moon but the experience of Earth “not as our Earth, but as a celestial object, belonging to no-one, flotsam on the tide of the universe” (*Der Blick* 59) which was central to the lunar missions. The Copernican revolution was a degradation of the Earth, and also of our selves because it revealed us as castaways on that Earth. As an addition to the Promethean discrepancy, Anders used *Der Blick* to describe what he called the “telescopic discrepancy”: the principle that every advance in our natural-scientific knowledge and our technical methods for apprehending the universe at larger and smaller scales in turn reduces the importance of our place and function in that universe (*Der Blick* 62). Accompanying the telescopic discrepancy is its inverse, an additional falsification resulting from the mediation of experience through television. Following his early writing on television (as discussed in (3.I)), Anders argued that the tendency of audiences is to reduce the magnitude of televised experience or event to the size and significance
of the screen. Although he allowed that extreme novelty or cinematic art on epic scale could mitigate this shrinking-down of events, he maintained that television audiences for the most part “forget that we reside, room, house, city, and Earth, together in the universe, no, often we even have the feeling that it is the universe which resides in our room: to the right then stands the hi-fi, to the left the cocktail bar, and in the middle there floats the universe as a third piece of furniture” (*Der Blick* 66). These distortions of space and extension allow the Earth, moon, and heavens to appear and be received as objects. As objects the audience can in turn treat them a consumer goods, “which can be enjoyed exactly as every other luxury item with which we are continually bombarded” (*Der Blick* 97). The overall consequence of this cascade of encounters is a shrinking-down of the Earth and our human selves in size and significance.

In contrast to the discussion in (4.IIIb), this is a particularly negative formulation of the influence and significance ascribed to the famous Apollo images of the Earth by environmentalist and peace activists: the Apollo earthrise reduced to tote bag decoration rather than motivating symbol. Whether as entertainment or as consumer good, Anders saw the conquest of the moon as precursor to an inevitable second conquest of space via commercialization: that which can be employed to move products off the shelves must be so employed. As a project, Anders emphasized that the lunar missions fulfilled the deep implications of Kennedy’s casual designation of the endeavor as a race: a sports contest with the life-and-death stakes, a circus on an unprecedented scale with countless opportunities for the audience to participate as voyeur or consumer. He himself admitted that he watched the return of the Apollo astronauts with suspense, for all that he was a hardened media and propaganda critic.
possessed of an intimate knowledge of the ability film and television to falsify. It was, he said, a superbly effective form of escapism. For the lay public, the architecture of mythic, epoch-defining scientific triumph around the Apollo missions allowed that escapism to become what Anders called a pseudo-transcendental experience, which he affirmed by echoing Der Spiegel’s critical assessment of the spectacle as a triumph for the conventional, clean-cut, anti-intellectual white American middle class (Der Blick 152). Anders simultaneously condemned the counter-culture of hippies and flower children for rejecting the spectacle of the Apollo missions in favor of other, chemical methods of voyage and exploration. “It is no coincidence,” he wrote, “that these two forms of pseudo-transcendence: the chemical and the technical, have appeared in one and the same historical moment. Both are attempts to escape the boredom, mechanization, alienation, and the difficulties posed by social problems” (Der Blick 152). While the moon landings represented a comfortable affirmation of middle-class ideals through spectacle, Anders maintained that the counter-culture’s chemical escapism was an imitation of rebellion: certainly not an act of direct or violent resistance, and in fact one he considered not worthy of the designation “action” at all. His critical view of action in service of pseudo-transcendental escape had implications for his relationship to environmental politics.

The pseudo-transcendentalisms of the Apollo era thus acquired the status of folk religions; in Anders’ analysis the moon landings were a rich conquest of new territory, a horn of plenty pouring out material advantage and appropriable symbols for the military, industry, the scientific establishment, advertisers, and the public. It was an undertaking so vast as to recreate the industrial age in an idealized, miniature form. Anders observed that it achieved a
certain kind of perfection. “Research dividends” notwithstanding, the spacecraft, rockets, and infrastructure of the space program was pure waste, of no conceivable earthly use. The disposable nature of these creations allowed the forces of production and consumption to fulfill a kind of death-drive, an acceleration and intensification of industry “that conceives of products in the interest of the immortality of production” (Der Blick 156) which values products precisely for their inability to satiate need. Moreover, the undertaking of the space race became so large, entrained so much industrial capacity, encompassed so many meanings, served so many interests, and offered up such spectacle that its size and momentum obscured the very reasons for its existence. The Apollo project was rapidly naturalized as a thing self-evident. That fact, more than the potential military uses of the rocket and guidance technologies, was what disturbed Anders: “when we consider things or institutions to be legitimate solely on account of their mass, then not only do we then renounce inquiry into their meaning … but also [the possibility] of changing or discontinuing them” (Der Blick 167). Moreover, he took it as an exemplar of the process by which we relinquish the responsibility of asking why, or to what end, we act. Ultimately, Anders understood the view from the moon as a paradigm of how humans create technological and industrial systems

The insistence on treating astronauts as heroes rather than animal cargo and the later consequences of that decision for manned spaceflight were popularized as a result of Tom Wolfe’s classic The Right Stuff. Latterly, computer scientist and travel writer Maciej Ceglowski summarized the beautiful wastefulness of the space shuttle in his essay “Rocket to Nowhere”. In his description the shuttle is a Frankenstein monster assembled from individual elements executed with ingenious perfection. Ceglowski argues the very existence of the shuttle cries out: Why? “This primitive space plane must have been a sacred artifact, used in religious rituals to deliver sacrifice to a sky god … As tempting as it is to picture a blood-spattered Canadarm flinging goat carcasses into the void, we know that the Shuttle is the fruit of what was supposed to be a rational decision making process.”
which exceed their ability to comprehend the consequences. Unsurprisingly, Anders saw in this process a harbinger of apocalypses to come: in his closing to *Der Blick*, he observed Hitler’s death camps were horror enough, but considered as an industrial method of producing death they were finite. Persons could, and did, survive the camps through chance or error. The Apollo missions were yet more horrifying to Anders because they demonstrated a far greater refinement, in comparison with which the level of quality assurance achieved by the Nazi death engineers was “sloppy and incomplete” (*Der Blick* 181). Understood as a “test run” of the American military-industrial complex, Anders concluded in light of the perfection achieved in the lunar missions, hope for human survival in the interstices was unjustified in the event of “earnest” use of modern industrial capacity for total war.

**c. Aftermath of the Return to Earth**

*Der Blick vom Mond* was a work that developed several themes that added complexity to the range of Anders’ thinking, expanding it from the basis established in the first 1950s volume of *Antiquiertheit*, and warranting his claim in the foreword of having created an implicit philosophical system. Although still anchored in his foundational theme of the Promethean discrepancy, the ideas gathered in *Der Blick* employed an analysis of technology that corresponded to the concerns of the third wave of disarmament and anti-nuclear activism which took shape in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As the preceding section showed, these elements included the Copernican degradation which reduced the Earth in significance and size to that of a consumer good; the relentless and accelerating intensification of manufacture of disposable items in service of perpetuating systems of production and consumption; the accretion of symbols and
material interests around those systems which naturalizes the industrial death-drive and renders it exempt from examination; the forms of self-deception and pseudo-transcendence in which persons participate in lending meaning to their incorporation into those systems; their role as folk religion; and the role of media technologies in tandem with propaganda in creating, affirming, and reinforcing those meanings.

The publication of *Der Blick* laid the intellectual groundwork for Anders’ points of alliance with and his departures from Green and environmental politics as they emerged in the following decade. Such a line of thinking appeared in a more programmatically arranged form with the 1980 publication of the second volume of *Antiquiertheit*. As might be expected in light of Anders’ commitment to tangible resistance work, the manifold implications of these stances became clear as he attempted to bring his philosophy into action with the “third wave” of anti-nuclear protest. Many of the interviews collected in the 1987 volume *Günther Anders antwortet* provide insight into the productive friction Anders encountered in what he called the revival of the anti-atomic crusade.

One widely applicable example through which to interpret the central themes of *Der Blick* is a 1982 interview he gave for the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, anthologized under the title “Den Tod der Welt vor Augen” (“The World, Dying in Plain Sight”). Pressed by the interviewer on his assessment of the environmental movement’s potential, Anders responded that “through it alone we are not to be saved. Without it, certainly also not. If we humans are to survive in the first place, I consider it absolutely necessary to at least moderate the concreting-over of the world, to keep drinking water drinkable and the air breathable. The environmental movement is
indispensable. But I resist making a ‘Weltanschauung’ out of it” (65). In other words, he accepted
the principles explicated in the seminal work Limits to Growth (per 4.III). Envisioned in his
terms, he understood that the industrial death drive would put humanity hard up against those
limits. Simultaneously, he recognized that the products of technological advance and efficiency
in production are not wholly negative: for those living in poverty in developing and formerly
colonized countries, Anders granted that concern with the atomic problem and the Promethean
discrepancy is a luxury. In another interview that same year, he asserted that anyone with direct
experience of profound, widespread poverty and lack of basic access to food shelter and
medicine knows that it is inappropriate to demand those persons to participate in struggle against
threats which stand at a remove from immediate starvation. “In order to belong to an anti-nuclear
movement,” he concluded, “a certain level of non-destitution must be established”
(“Vorstellungskraft” 60). To Anders it was a practical and moral fact that technological progress
should not be universally undone. He considered those persons dwelling in the wealthy West so
changed as human beings by their relationship to technology that such a reversal was in any case
not possible.

Furthermore, Anders acknowledged in “Den Tod” that the interviewer correctly
distinguished the third wave of anti-nuclear protest from earlier movements by virtue of its
essentially catholic nature: it engaged a broad front of social groups within western Europe,
crossed Cold War boundaries, interlocked with liberation struggles in the developing world, and
was diverse in the issues it brought into play. Anders judged this to be a positive strength. In his
assessment, this change repositioned the atomic danger to be “one aspect among many others”
but expanded the potential power of the movement to achieve an intervention in the human relationship to technology while amplifying its reach as a mass, global phenomenon (68). This made Anders into a fellow-traveler with groups ranging from evangelical pacifists, feminists, radical Greens, and old-fashioned Communists. This was difficult for him in no small part because of Anders’ tendency to conceive of thought, writing, and action as interrelated parts of an activist whole. Anders resisted adopting the worldview of environmentalists—or for that matter the worldview of his Christian allies in an era of religious revival—and this resistance was presaged in the disdain he expressed in Der Blick for the psychonaut hippies and flower-children of the late 1960s. His resistance to their worldview constituted a potential point of fracture with many implementations of environmentalist politics; he scorned primitivism, rejected lifestyle activism, and critiqued artisanal bourgeois forms of production. Woven throughout “Den Tod” and his other interviews and writings of the 1980s is an Andersian refrain: “I am not one of those who believes that problems of global importance can be solved through spinach or ‘organic vegetables’” (68). In other words, Anders subscribed to the principles stated in Limits to Growth and rejected the social efficacy of subscribing to the Whole Earth Catalog.

Overall, though the themes gathered in juxtaposition in Der Blick expanded the reach of his philosophical system to issues of environmental concern, his refusal to credit an ecological worldview meant the expansion of his ideas at times had the sense of being an accommodation to contemporary trends rather than an embrace of new challenges. Anders did not surrender his focus on nuclear weapons as the paradigmatic technological assemblage of primary philosophical concern. Indeed, with few exceptions his strategy was to understand nuclear power
stations first and foremost as static weapons. This tendency appears front and center in his 1977 essay “Jedes Kraftwerk ist eine Bombe”, which was among the first of his direct reflections on nuclear power.

**d. “Every Nuclear Reactor is a Bomb”**

That it should only have been in 1977 that Anders began to write specifically and publish directly about nuclear power is remarkable, given that he had begun commenting on the issue in the late 1950s, even writing in *Der Mann* that it was common knowledge that an atomic industry is not an isolated or arcane achievement; that “whoever can build peaceful reactors is at any time in the position to manufacture the destructive atomic material” (32). At the time of *Der Mann*, Anders considered atomic reactors another part of the technical and industrial system constituting the atomic era, but gave no particular distinction to it. In 1986 interview with a journalist from the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, he was challenged on this issue. The interviewer pointed out that for thirty years, Anders had exclusively concerned himself with nuclear war and asked why he had not dedicated a text to the risks of nuclear energy. Anders responded, “this absence has its cause in that, when I began with the ‘nuclear theme,’ the problem of reactors did not exist, or in any case was not yet acute” (“Besudelung” 140).

However, as we saw in section (4.IIa), during the era in which Anders embarked on his engagement with the nuclear theme, Vienna had in fact come to serve as a capital of nuclear diplomacy, as location of the 1958 Third Pugwash Conference—the concluding meeting of which Anders attended—and as headquarters of the IAEA, location of its first general conference in 1957. The diplomatic and regulatory consequences of the “Atoms for Peace”
program discussed in (4.IIIa) had apparently escaped his lengthy critical consideration.

The remarks in “Jedes” appeared first in a speech Anders gave in February 1977 at Marburg and were then reprinted in a special atomic energy section of the April/May 1977 issue of the Viennese magazine Neues Forum. With “Jedes,” Anders took up the “Atoms for Peace” program as an obvious and prominent example for thinking through the relationship of nuclear weapons to nuclear reactors. In the opening paragraph, he declared “the good old times of the Eisenhowerean slogan ‘Atoms for Peace’ (if that should mean ‘only for peace’) never did exist and never will” (17). Anders’ argument then moves straight to the central point he had touched on in Der Mann, “… now that all those of us who read the newspaper and listen to the radio know that it has long been possible, with the help of additional enrichment and reprocessing equipment, to transform every nuclear reactor into a nuclear weapons factory in shortest order” and continues on to the conclusion that what is of common knowledge to citizens should be no surprise to politicians (17). The opening paragraph to “Jedes” contains two points about the “Atoms for Peace” program which Anders focused on in more extensive writings. The first point, which is expanded in the second volume of Antiquiertheit is that the phrase “Atoms for Peace” contains a deadly lie, because in offering the choice “for peace” as opposed to an unspoken “for war,” the formulation pretends as if such a choice exists, “as if the determination of our fate lay in our hands, and not in that of technology” (1: 287). By pushing the discrepancy between human and technical abilities to the stark elimination of fantasy of choice, Anders completed the reversal of which agent—human or technical—stands as the subject of history. In Anders’ thinking, just as there is no single atomic weapon separate from its associated delivery systems,
there can be no disentangling nuclear power from its integral role in weapons production. His analysis unequivocally repudiates the possibility of civilian, peaceful nuclear power and conforms to the weapons-focused apocalypticism described by Nehring (4.IIc).

The second crucial point from Anders’ comes from the consideration of nuclear reactors as inextricable parts of the weapons production complex. Reactors are a necessary part of the nuclear weapons industry. The remainder of “Jedes” is dedicated to carrying forward the issue of nuclear power as a proliferation problem in which crucial technologies and materials might come into the hands of what would now be called “rogue states,” those which he termed “politically-morally dubious.” Anders condemned those politicians who facilitated the proliferation of nuclear technology as accomplices in a potential genocide, or even “globocide.” Such persons, Anders declared, are the equivalents to those who supplied and installed the equipment for the concentration camps, and he went on to conclude with the imposition of a moral duty on citizens of industrially advanced countries to empower only those persons with the capacity to think through the “consequences of the consequences of the consequences” of their actions (“Jedes” 17). Anders explained that he issued this condemnation on behalf of the victims of Hiroshima, and for all potential nuclear victims to come. With “Jedes,” Anders reiterated the process of locating responsibility in workers participating in the military-industrial complex that we explored in (2.II) with the case of Claude Eatherly. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Anders extended his thinking on the character of work and the relationship of persons to their work, showing again the reversal of position whereby persons become tools of their tools, whose work is functionally without purpose (Antiquiertheit 2: 71). Although Anders maintained that this
was true of work generally, he specified the consequences for technical workers in particular. In a 1979 interview, Anders dealt with divisions of intellectual labor and social responsibility by pointing out that towards the close of the war “... it was not intellectuals who had the courage to do something about the war, but workers, a few thousand German munitions workers” who had chosen to strike (“Wenn” 52). Anders explained that he doubted such persons could be found today, even and especially among the most educated. He argued that like every worker, members of the scientific and engineering elite were “‘telos-blind’” (“Wenn” 52-53). The character of modern work, he concluded, produced irrationality and morally insane outcomes through its own exquisite rationalization (*Antiquiertheit* 2: 401). Though it is a short text, “Jedes” is dense in its implications; the aspects of Anders’ analysis of nuclear reactors highlighted above—repudiation of their civilian use, inextricability from weapons production, potential for proliferation, and relationship to a matrix of shaded responsibility—are the key elements which would come to undergird his reaction to Chernobyl.

As we saw in (4.III), Anders’ entry into the public struggle over nuclear power took place in the context of a nascent, world-wide third wave of anti-nuclear protest that fused disarmament and anti-nuclear-power concerns, a fusion that was particularly salient in Austria in the context of the 1978 referendum on the Zwentendorf station. Not only was Anders’ turn to thinking about civilian nuclear power surprisingly belated, the depth of his published work in the late 1970s as represented by “Jedes” trailed that of his contemporaries, and was less complete even than many of the essays alongside which it appeared in the April/May 1977 *Neues Forum* nuclear energy roundtable. I argued in (1.IV) that the originality of the first, 1956 volume of *Antiquiertheit* was
not located in any of its specific diagnoses of the atomic era, but that through Anders’ application of the occasional philosophy and the manifold analytical device of the Promethean discrepancy his sketches fulfilled his long-standing methodological claim to the production of a coherent, summarizing, and comprehensive analysis. In the case of civilian nuclear power, it was his longtime friend and ally Robert Jungk’s 1977 pamphlet Der Atomstaat which filled that philosophical and intellectual function for German and Austrian anti-nuclear activists. Jungk wrote that the titular unifying idea of Der Atomstaat—published shortly thereafter as The Nuclear State—was the product of an insight he experienced during demonstration against the Brokdorf reactor in Germany, wherein the protesters were met with extreme police violence. Jungk observed that broad sectors of society—engineers, scientists, politicians, militaries, intellectuals, and the public generally—in fact recognized the many and varied dangers posed by nuclear materials and technologies. States comprehended these dangers so well, Jungk argued, that the presence of a nuclear industry created its own logic of pervasive security and surveillance, to the point that it was beyond him to determine whether an editorial in the Bulletin proposing “a new Inquisition”—which could lend nuclear engineering “the care and devotion of a religious ceremony” and function “outside the present socioeconomic reward structure” to enforce rigid compliance with regulations and best practices—was intended as satire (Jungk 144; Saperstein 10). The apparatus of security and surveillance constituted what Jungk called “an internal armament” intended for use against the state’s own citizenry. “My thesis,” he wrote,

is simply this, that the ‘internal armament’ I have been describing and the police and industrial institutions that go with it which will soon employ such a large number of people, can only have

\[\text{31}\quad \text{And as per the discussion of Der Blick in (4.IIib) above.}\]
Moreover, Jungk crucially identifies that the extreme power of fission weapons and the extreme hazard posed by radiological release via accident or intentional breach means that the fear on the part of states and citizens alike in controlling nuclear infrastructure or opposing its construction is in fact justified. Jungk and Anders achieved the same point in their arguments—that nuclear technology preempts the choice of a peaceful or warlike use—but Jungk does so through a detailed exploration of the submerged, hidden institutions and technologies that join reactors and bombs and cause each to appear, in Anders’ terms “less than they are” (4.IVa above).

Jungk’s *Der Atomstaat* does this through its own journalistic occasionalism: the exploration of nuclear scenarios that might be classified as handling accident, industrial accident, proliferation, or terrorist attack. Anders’ “Jedes” leans heavily on the abstract potential for proliferation, but makes no reference to historical precedents or specific nuclear accidents. The crucial element missing from “Jedes” is an elaboration of the manifold bomb-nature of reactors, including the risk of core breach. Anders neglected the opportunity to conduct his analysis using the terms of nuclear fallout and its attendant generational fear.

The shortcomings of “Jedes” are interesting in light of Anders’ participation in the campaign against the Zwentendorf power station, which remains practically unique in its status as a victory for the anti-nuclear movement. As discussed in (4.III), the outcome of the Austrian referendum on nuclear power was the result of a broad front of dedicated activist action in confluence with political opportunity. Moreover, as recorded by Helga Nowotny and Helmut Hirsch, this activist front was largely successful at seizing internal and external control of the
government-sponsored informational meetings, and was so determined that officials canceled the final, March 1977 informational meeting scheduled to be held in Vienna due to fears of popular violence (317). Jungk took heart in the Zwentendorf and other anti-nuclear campaigns and remarked at its wholly new character which he claimed united “varied views, social classes, and personalities” and which was to be thought of as “not the monolithic block, but the river that absorbs many tributaries and flows round, washes away and overflows obstacles in its path” (147-8). In Der Atomstaat, Jungk expressed the optimistic belief that this broad front was held together by an essential recognition among its participants that they were trying to preserve an old way of life or undertake new ones not subject to the antidemocratic impulses and effective blackmail of the nuclear state; Anders, for all he was a contributor and noteworthy figure in the Zwentendorf campaign, was far less optimistic about the broad front, and did not recognize the imaginative capacity of the public at large in determining the referendum’s success.

**e. Lettuce**

Between the 1977 publication of “Jedes” and Anders’ reactions to Chernobyl, there were significant changes in the sophistication of his consideration of the essential nature of nuclear power plants and his historical awareness of reactor accidents. In a 1986 interview, he noted that Chernobyl was not the first such accident, that “the first took place 30 years ago, at Windscale, in Great Britain” and he challenged his audience to name those who could remember it or had heard of it at the time (“Atomkraft” 129). With his mention of the lineage of radioactive releases beginning at Windscale and continuing through the Detroit fast-breeder accident (1968) and Three Mile Island (1979), Anders brought an awareness of the history of nuclear accidents
explicitly into his analysis of the atomic era. Along with that analysis, he developed a working theory for the public understanding of radiation and the perception of contamination risks. His contamination theory is best illustrated in his essay manuscript “Die strahlenden Salatköpfe,” prepared in 1986 after the Chernobyl meltdown. Central to the essay is his description of lay empiricism. “We average persons,” Anders wrote, “99% of us, who do not live as specialists of a specific science—and I include myself—we are ‘trivial empiricists’”

… With that, I mean that in the everyday we hold to the following two epistemological-theoretical idiot-axioms:

What is, is visible, must be visible.
What is not visible, is not, and cannot be.

Alternatively: There is nothing—sit venia verbo—“subsensible.”

We adhere to these two idiot-axioms despite our nearly centuries-long familiarity with the “invisible” (i; emphasis in the original).

First among the invisible forces is radiation. Two additional invisible phenomena Anders included as being practically unreal due to their unavailability to the senses are bacteria and electrical current. From this basis, Anders continued on to describe a general attitude of disbelief among his fellow Viennese in the extent and danger of the radioactive fallout released by the Chernobyl meltdown. Employing the occasionalism—the examination of culturally significant occurrences—that had been the mainstay of his philosophical method, Anders recounted the reactions he overheard on the streets and shops in the mouths of persons rejecting food safety measures and insisting on buying fresh vegetables. Rather than believe that the produce they hoped to buy might be contaminated, they responded with indignation: “Strontium or something? Show me!” (“Strahlenden” ii; emphasis in the original). “Thus,” Anders wrote, “spake someone or the other shortly after the 30th of April. ‘Where are they supposed to be coming from then,"
really, your famous radioactive rays? Eh? From the Ukraine? That’s where Father died an eternity ago. That’s far away’” (“Strahlenden” ii; emphasis in the original). He judged the refusal to credit the reality of fallout to be widespread; in his estimation, buyer and seller were allied as never before in their own ignorance.

Anders further explained that upon further consideration, the widespread ignorance should not have come as a surprise, in particular in light of his lay theory of perception via the idiot-axioms: “… with what right should we demand from our fellow-men (and also from ourselves), a reaction to the total rupture of the everyday world, let alone the possible downfall of the world, that is ‘measured?’ What would ‘measured’ be in such a case? Is there then a ‘measurement’ on the possible end to begin with?” (“Strahlenden” iii). However, Anders need not have bootstrapped his theory independently out of the phenomenology of the 1920s, but could have turned to well-established developments in environmental sociology, psychology, and anthropology dealing with the perceptual salience, preconditions to recognition of, and interactions with pollutants. One thread of thinking in environmental sociology supports Anders’ basic assertion that perception of environmental concerns is governed by the familiar issue-attention cycle or by measure of its perceptual salience to the affected population; certain classes of hazards can be reduced in perceived importance by habituation or relative unnoticeability (Evans and Cohen, 574). However, radioactive pollution is a different class of contaminant; as discussed in (1.IVa) and above in (4.III), anti-nuclear activists had succeeded in creating nuclear fallout as a visceral, intimate type of danger. Though it may be practically invisible, the fear of radiation as contaminant was made salient and tangible via symbol and ritual, those methods
which “focu[s] attention by framing” and “permit knowledge of what might otherwise not be known at all” (Douglas, 65). In other words, anti-nuclear activists had to some extent succeeded in diagnosing and framing fallout as an especially pernicious poison. The imaginative intervention had had a significant impact on our capacity to fear, and Chernobyl amplified the effect of that intervention.

During a 1986 conversation with Heiko Ernst, Ernst challenged Anders on the public’s understanding of Chernobyl, noting that “the entire scale of emotions reactions” was apparent. Anders issued a forceful retort by giving a narrative version of his claims in “Strahlenden” (“Atomkraft” 129-130). Crucial, however, was Ernst’s emphasis that the public reaction fell along a spectrum; Anders’ occasionalism, as he deployed to support his claim of widespread ignorance had become limited by its focus on the singular, and ceased to reflect broader modes of experience. This might be a simple case of confirmation bias on Anders’ part, but it is also true that by the 1980s, Anders’ age and infirmity meant that he was even more disconnected from the everyday work of activism; indeed, he had taken to giving speeches through recordings and telepresence links. As we saw in the discussion of the pre-linguistic solidarity, he had found it possible to enact shared experience even in situations that invited alienation and silence. However, we also saw that the pre-linguistic solidarity required sharing some kind of commonality of space. This could well be what Anders lacked, and his comparative isolation and concomitant lack of diversity of outlook that would have come from interacting with the broad front of groups that constituted the third wave may have enervated the observational power of his philosophical anthropology to apprehend experiences “not his alone.” Indeed, retrospective
studies on the impact of the 1986 disaster came to conclusions quite different from Anders’; researchers found that that Chernobyl effected a lasting swing in public opinion that exceeded local concern and achieved international scope. It endured beyond an issue-cycle time frame. Beyond driving Europeans to take simple measures of food protection, fears of fallout were reflected in a statistically prominent spike in abortions—this latter in Catholic Austria (Renn 156-159). In 1979, he had expressed doubts that he would be able to arrive at an activist language of the common denominator, “a language that could be employed in common not only by we theoretically-trained leftists but also, for example, by the wine growers of Kaiserstuhl” (“Wenn” 50). In truth, that unifying language had been extant since 1955, and Anders had helped create it through his reflections on the Lucky Dragon fallout-martyr Kuboyama. As we saw in (4.II), the fear of insidious, border-crossing radioactive contamination and industrial pollution had motivated the Vorarlbergers’ protests against the Swiss Rüthi project in the early 1970s, and undergirded the nexus of concerns about pollution, siting, waste storage, proliferation, and alterations to way of life that unified the broad-fronted pan-Austrian protests against the Zwentendorf plant.

f. False Modesties

However, Anders’ pessimistic analysis in “Strahlenden” indicates that he was unconvinced by the anti-nuclear movement’s partial successes, even a success as complete as the Austrian referendum against nuclear power. In the aftermath of Chernobyl, his occasionalism highlighted the fact that the issue was still contested, which he interpreted as equivalent to a flat loss. His analysis of the nuclear peril admitted no degree in the measurement or assessment of
risk. Those Viennese who refused to believe that their salad greens might be dangerous provided a total summary of his project to create a courageous, motivating fear and what he had come to see as its limited outcome. People remained, as he claimed in the first volume of Antiquiertheit, apocalypse-blind victims of cozification. That blindness was assisted by nuclear power plants’ “hideous lack of hideousness” and their capacity to remain smaller than they seem. In the era of Chernobyl, he declared, there was “nothing more dishonest than false modesty of nuclear reactors” (Antiquiertheit 1: iv). They were devices of mass-murder masquerading, like the concentration camps, under the appearance of any other factory or industrial plant. Because Anders did not acknowledge the powerful effect that fallout had as an imaginative intervention, and because he had ceased to credit the symbolic protest forms and lifestyle dissent of the third wave of anti-nuclear activism, he had reached the limits of his decades-long effort to achieve an effective activist philosophical language. The sharpest polemic and exquisite exaggerations had, he believed, failed. His turn to the advocacy of violent direct action was the next method through which he would attempt to achieve emphasis.

V. Out of Time in the End Times

a. Transitions

“Jedes” and “Strahlenden” can together be taken as an interim summary of Anders’ attitude towards civilian nuclear power in the years leading to and immediately after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Though Anders had noted, as we saw in (4.IId), as early as 1959 that nuclear power generation was an inextricable part of the weapons complex, masked by the ingenious
deployment of its civilian uses as a propaganda of progress (Der Mann 32, 85), he did not at the time combine these observations with his systematic reflection on the nature of military-industrial-technical complexes. His denunciation of the nuclear power plants’ “hideous lack of hideousness” as it appeared in the 1979 introduction to the first volume of Antiquiertheit served not least as an explanation of how he had been deceived (also “Wenn” 50). As we saw in (2.I) and (4.IIIb), Anders was apt and timely in describing the capacity of nuclear systems to appear and disappear, with power generation emerging from its false modesty to become a prominent symbol while, as Boyer argued in his 1984 essay in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists “From Activism to Apathy,” with the advent of highly publicized arms control summits and the cessation of above-ground testing, warheads and military reactor technology were able to disappear underground, under the ocean, and into submarine pens (16). The editorial introduction to Boyer’s essay noted that the piece served as a retrospective, and that the Bulletin itself had, on the cusp of its 40th year, acquired a rich history; part of that history was a widening of scope and diversification of the issues to which it turned its attention, from nuclear weapons to industrial pollution, and climate change.

At first glance, Anders followed this same arc, though he emphasized the limits of his scientific literacy; but as we have seen above, he in fact never gave industrial pollution or other issues such as biotechnology the central role he accorded nuclear weapons. Indeed, by the mid-1980s he admitted to experiencing the temptations of atom-exhaustion. In an interview with Heiko Ernst, Anders noted that “Even I, who have to some extent been a professional anti-nuclear man, and for more than 33 years struggled with this ‘issue’, cannot keep the enormity of
the present situation continually in view. Even I backslide and then find out that I am no longer
‘up to date’ on the facts and practically have to yank myself out of the swamp of ignorance by my own hair” (“Atomkraft” 130). From (1.V) and (2.IV) we saw the necessary role of networks for achieving the mental and emotional division of activist labor. Anders continued on to tell Ernst that,

And even I—and I would rather be writing about Coreggio or Beethoven’s later string quartets instead of over and over about the end times and the end of time—even I have to continually make myself conscious of the danger in its whole scope. The task is psychologically too large. Above all the perpetuity plays a large, even a double role. One cannot perpetually imagine the danger. (“Atomkraft” 130)

In this passage, one cannot help but feel that Anders himself is tired. He is aware that he is running out of time in the end times. The desire to do something else, and to think of something else, adds another dimension to the discussion presented in (4.IV) above describing Anders’ concerns that Green politics might ultimately be a distraction. Anders’ anti-nuclear program relied strongly on maintaining the atomic menace as an absolute; defending its status as an absolute required in turn that Anders push aside anything that appeared as a potential diversion from the central task. Recall also that from the 1950s forward, Anders had approached the anti-nuclear task in terms of commandments, commands, and duty. For Anders, quitting the task of pursuing a productive fear, a fear which was capable of “driving us into the streets instead of under cover” as he put it at the close of the 1950s (“Theses” 498) would have been a dereliction of duty. Indeed, by 1986, that task had become heavier. “The fear that I mean,” he said, had become one which “should incite action, enable resistance” (“Atomkraft” 130; emphasis in the original). The core of Anders’ endorsement of violent direct action rested on the fundamental
foundation of three decades of his anti-nuclear thought and protest, redirected by a new emphasis that the desired measure of the imaginative intervention was to be efficacy, to be effective.

b. Emergency Self-defense

This section attempts to outline what Anders understood it to mean for the language of action to be effective; an answer to that question emerges only via contrast with how Anders viewed the nuclear threat in its totality from the early 1980s through Chernobyl. The preceding sections of this chapter have laid out in detail the ways in which Anders built out his philosophy to encompass a rapidly changing geopolitical, technical, and social situation: Anders’ post-Chernobyl imaginary interview “Notstand und Notwehr” was an act of summation, in which his sketches achieve coherency against the background of nuclear disaster. This section summarizes the central argumentative pillars of that interview in a brief contrasting examination of the scholarly commentary on Anders’ theory of violence, and uses that commentary to discern distinct stages in that theory. I then illustrate how Anders judged effective interventions through a reading of two of his short works: the 1983 essay “Si vis pacem para pacem,” and the open letters “Kerzenmarsch und Weihespiel” published that same year. I conclude with an evaluation of his criteria for efficacy in scholarly commentary and contemporary reception.

As reviewed in (4.IIIc), the international third wave of anti-nuclear protest which took shape during the early 1980s in reaction to the end of détente and re-intensification of the Cold War was marked by structural and demographic features which distinguished it from the earlier efforts such as the scientists’ movement (1945-49) and the fallout campaign (1955-1963). Wittner notes that the third wave was perhaps the largest international civic mass movement of
the 20th century; it was oriented by basic principles, organized via constituencies of affiliation and identity across political spectra, invoked traditions of Green and feminist politics, and was driven by loose international networks supplemented by regional interaction (Toward 227-223).

We saw in (1.IIc-d) in the exploration of Putnam and Gusterson that the social protest movements in the era of the third wave in a sense coordinated their activities by designating highly visible locations such as nuclear power plants as sites for confrontational protest at which the organizations and individuals of the broad front could assemble themselves. Comparative political scholar Roger Karapin observes that perennial questions over protest tactics became, for the third wave of the anti-nuclear movement in the BRD, a complex negotiation of international, national, regional, and local relations coupled by an attempt to discern and advance the type of protest actions likely to secure the most influential constellation of radical, institutional, elite political, and media alliances while sustaining movement membership and retaining participants (132). The same complexity held, even more so, for the anti-nuclear movement in Austria (Wittner, Toward 166). Karapin argues that in the BRD, conflicts over proposed reactors at Brokdorf and Wyhl (beginning in the 1970s and extending into the third wave of anti-nuclear protest) can be seen in retrospect as influential and emblematic campaigns in terms of their dynamics and composition; the campaign at Wyhl was characterized by effective nonviolent disruption consequent to an enduring alliance between local organizations and outside groups. At Brokdorf, organizers initially interpreted direct action as most effective at extracting concessions from the state, and the protest was marked by short but highly visible deployments of militant tactics met with police violence. Farmers and local rural residents were, as Karapin summarizes,
“aghast” at the chaos and engaged in counter-protests of their own, even “spreading manure on their fields” to prevent them from being used by protesters (150-151). Brokdorf and Wyhl were in their own senses successful campaigns: the generating station at Wyhl was never built, and while the Brokdorf plant was eventually completed, the activist campaign spurred a limitation of nuclear power’s role in West German energy policy (Karapin 117).

These outcomes were not clear at the time. Anders was highly attentive to the West German anti-nuclear campaign and drew on Brokdorf in his theses on violence. The messiness, apparent disorganization, and tactical compromises implied in this process ran afoul of Anders’ conclusions from the aftermath of Vietnam regarding the potential of language, spectacle, changing formations of social class, “Happenings,” and modern lifestyle movements in the context late capitalist systems of production and consumption (4.II). These disparate themes, sketched out across dozens of Anders’ essays and books, culminate in his imaginary interview.

I have argued to this point that Anders’ anti-nuclear thought and endorsement of violence in the 1980s rests on a fundamental rhetorical-philosophical foundation stretching back to the 1950s: three other scholars of Anders share variations of this interpretation in their analyses of his theory of violence. Anders’ “Notstand und Notwehr” opens with his rejection of the label “pacifist” because to deploy the term implies some kind of choice or alternative; he points out, as he had claimed in the 1955 volume of Antiquierheit that in the atomic era the tools of war can no longer be used to achieve war aims. War is no means because every conflict carries with it the threat of atomic extermination, hence the extermination of all possible ends (“Notstand” 154). Anders continues by arguing that the label pacifist is obsolete. Given that, he states, a reanalysis
of the atomic situation in the renewed cold war reveals it as a state of emergency (Notstand) in which emergency measures of self-defense (Notwehr) are justified (“Notstand” 154-5). Anders then works through the logic of the state monopoly of violence and the inversion resulting from repression of civil resistance, where by violent police action against protesters, a situation akin to undeclared civil war is attained (“Notstand” 159). As in the discussion of “Happenings” in (4.Ib), this inversion enmeshes citizens in the dialectic of violence, a point Anders emphasizes with reference to BRD Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann’s 1983 denunciation of an anti-nuclear sit-in outside the American base at Mutlangen. “Nonviolent resistance is violence,” Anders’ notional interviewer cites Zimmermann as saying, “indeed because it is resistance” (“Notstand” 163). In such context, nonviolent contemporary protest forms are mere spectacle, “Happenings” with symbolic effect only. Anders’ reply was to reason that the negation of dialectic of violence demanded counterattack on the part of the citizenry.

Anders scholar Christian Dries observes in his analysis of this argument that Anders was not a systematic theorist of violence or state power (175); the philosopher himself emphasized this in “Notstand” through the familiar claim that he had not arrived at his conclusion as part of a systematic project. Once again, he claimed his conclusions were the simply a reflection of the state of affairs (161). Dries notes that it then becomes crucial to remember that while the ideas summarized in “Notstand” reveal a relationship to contemporary theories of structural violence, Anders’ declarations must be understood through his concepts of a technified world in which people, things, and systems co-act (as per the discussion of the actor-network theoretical outlook in (1.Ib)) and in which technology has displaced the human as the agent of history. Both Dries
and Eckhard Wittulski draw attention to the fact that Anders’ move to violence in the era of the third wave followed distinct stages, from the first stage of disrupting access to nuclear installations, to a second stage enjoining sabotage of the installations themselves. In the third and final stage—in recognition of the his conclusions in *Visit Beautiful Vietnam* and *Der Blick* that single instances of equipment are easily replaced and that that replacement is to the benefit of capital (4.IIa)—Anders proceeded to advocate to direct action against the representatives and operators of the atomic devices themselves (Dries 194; Wittulski 40-41). Additionally important is that Anders’ argument implied a re-personalization, a walk-back from systemic analysis of macro-level violence, and a return to the direct assignation of responsibility (Wittulski 44-45). Furthermore, and as always, the capacity to imagine is central to Anders’ purpose in the turn to violence; in his 1982 interview with Hans-Horst Skupy, he reiterated that “imagination is the perspicacity of today; only when we can imagine the possible can we perceive the truth of the present situation. And only then can we preserve our world” (“Vorstellungskraft” 56; emphasis in the original). And incapacity as well: a particular perversity of the renewed Cold War in Anders’ writings during the 1980s was the role played by Ronald Reagan, a figure familiar to the philosopher from his work as a laborer in Hollywood (1.IIIa). Anders claimed that even in the 1940s, he had counted the actor as “one of the most trivial and incapable” men he had ever encountered. Reagan’s presidency lent a disturbing tinge to his explorations of “Happenings” and the conclusions he had earlier drawn in *Der Blick* (4.IVb): to be a statesman was transformed into a role to be acted. The people were no longer a citizenry, but a captive audience in a dictatorship of the imaginationless (“Vorstellungskraft” 56-57). Anders’ turn to violence was
aimed at inflicting fear and danger on those who could or would not take on the responsibility of imagining it for themselves. It was, as he put it, intended to serve notice that those who refused to undertake the task of broadening their thinking were “fair game” (“Reicht”). Anders had come to believe that it was not sufficient to attempt to engender a hostile moral climate; to affect the dictatorship of the imaginationless, efficacious imaginative interventions would necessarily involve creating a hostile physical climate.

**c. Candlelight**

From the Introduction forward, this dissertation has emphasized Anders’ aim of undertaking imaginative interventions which would allow persons to “have the courage to be frightened, and to frighten others, too.” The maxim demanded that men and women “frighten thy neighbor as thyself” (“Theses” 498) in pursuit of a courageous, loving, stirring fear capable of “driving us into the streets instead of under cover” (“Theses” 498). As we saw in (4.IIIc), Anders was strongly critical of countercultural or lifestyle activist aspects of Green politics, including those centered around organic food, and suspicious of “Happenings.” His distaste for such ineffectual and symbolic non-acts intensified between 1979 and 1983, and culminated in outright condemnation (“Notstand” 160). In a 1979 interview with Mathias Greffrath, Anders had mentioned that he once attempted to set texts from the German anti-nuclear movement to the melodies of Hiroshima hymns, but had held back because—in an echo of his experiences of the 1960s—his believed audience would be strongly limited to those who were already interested. The Hiroshima hymns were tied to a different movement context, one in which he had had “the feeling of participating in the birth of a new religion,” a context which readily produced
occasions for the intense experience of the pre-linguistic solidarity discussed in (3.1) (“Wenn” 49-50). Anders admitted to the interviewer that at the dawn of the third wave, he had no sense of an emerging movement with the same unity and vibrancy as he had experienced during the second wave of anti-nuclear protest. In 1979, he was withholding judgment on the nascent third wave.

By 1983, his judgment was clear. His change in stance is apparent in a pair of open letters titled “Kerzenmarsch und Weihespiel.” In the letters, he responded forcefully to two young activists’ proposal for solemn march and vigil, telling his correspondents, “So it’s a candlelight march you are planning. The transformation of rebellion into a procession. Outrage into devotions. Without me. Ceremony in our present situation is delusion or sabotage of our goals” (“Zwei” i). Beyond sabotage, he declared that a mass candlelight march would, “advance the affairs of our opponents, who will find your procession just as picturesque as yourselves.” It was, he said “Counterrevolutionary” (“Zwei” 1). In a radical change from the era of the Easter marches, Anders began rejecting protest via solemnity and procession as inadequate on the basis of futility, and also because of what he came to see as an essential self-deception involved in the act. He now believed that solemnity, ceremony, and singing were activities directed to the mobilization of symbols and emotions disconnected from reality by the atomic situation. Anders elaborated on this theme in the essay “Si vis pacem para pacem” published the same year, and he categorized all such symbolic acts as having an effect “only in the satisfaction of one’s own good deed” (10). Here again, his benchmark was the demand, “Let us be effective!” (11). He presented efficacy as the shift from symbolic to direct action against nuclear sites: “So that we—humanity
are not destroyed, we must constantly sabotage the roads that lead to these installations. Constantly” with the ultimate aim of destroying “the possibility of reaching these devices. We must sabotage the saboteurs of peace.” (“Pacem” 11; emphasis in the original). As we have seen throughout this chapter, Anders’ had at this point systematically examined and rejected both traditional activist methods and emergent ones. Direct action, and sabotage—the taboo tactics of violence—appeared to him to be the only avenue left unexplored. Efficacious was that which would sabotage the ability of power elites to utilize or perpetuate the nuclear menace. It was the only standard that mattered. As seen above, he expanded the scope of sabotage from access routes, to the sites themselves, to the men and women implicated in the nuclear system. Chernobyl and the prospect of what he termed “globocide” demanded that new avenues, languages, and ways of acting be found; in “Notstand” he granted that he did not know “... which new types of revolution must be invented and inaugurated” but insisted nonetheless that “the hindrance of struggle by no means extinguishes its necessity” (161). From now on, the new symbolic palette would be that of violence, and the experimental canvas would be infrastructure and people.

VI. Conclusion

Historian Jason Dawsey’s reflection on Anders’ turn to violent direct action illustrates a crucial point via his recognition that the call to direct action falls back on the formulation of the Promethean discrepancy. Dawsey considers the move through working out the implications of the discrepancy for the individual; he argues that Anders’ system is based on a moral agent who is required to act (458). An aspect of moral action in this context is self-transformation through
reflective means, described by Anders as “moral stretching exercises” (*Antiquierheit* 1: 274). Dawsey points out that while not given explicit reference, “moral stretching” is akin to monastic practices undertaken by Ignatius of Loyola. In his view, Andersian texts like the “Commandments in the Atomic Age” are designed in part to lead the audience through such exercises through the contemplation of “terror images.” He concludes that “Anders was deadly serious when he insisted that people must reorient their lives around the meditation on the death of the human species” in order that they may discern and emulate right action in the tradition of conscientious objectors or other exemplars (459-461, 467). Anders’ measure of what it meant to be courageous was calibrated against the deeds of those who acted best they could in desperate situations to the best effect they could manage. This was a standard set by the armaments workers of the 1918 Berlin munitions strike or, as we saw in (2.IIc), persons such as Claude Eatherly, Anders’ “Anti-Eichmann.” The act of reorientation and meditation as integral to undertaking the work of imaginative intervention is a necessary part of understanding Anders’ turn to violence. “Notstand” and his other discourses on violence repeatedly liken the power elite, those with access to the nuclear apparatus, to war criminals overseeing an imminent horror exceeding that of the Nazi state. His essays on direct action frame the situation of the world citizenry as akin to that of inmates in a global concentration camp. The condemnations he issued, however, were rhetorically constrained in the sense that they are intended strictly as judgment of the military and political elite. As Wittulski points out, Anders’ depiction of a state of emergency is given in terms of the pressing duty of persons to become “Resistance fighters,” exactly in the sense of the French resistance to Nazi occupation (42). Dries, meanwhile, further emphasizes
that Anders’ call to violence is an exercise designed to facilitate recognizing the *infrastructure* that affords the enemy its capacity for violence (197). Viewed in this way, Anders’ unapologetic emphasis on the duty to resist is transformed into a lever that radically changes the call to direct action and the role of the imaginative intervention: if we imagine ourselves as the population of an occupied country, what must we disentangle, reveal, and unmask about our enemy in order to destroy the complex co-acting machines, agents, and institutions by which they accomplish their violence? How should we act towards others to enjoin them to the cause, what behavior should we praise or condemn? What constitutes collaboration? What action against the occupier should be deemed sufficient? What action or non-action is worth the possibility of failure, imprisonment, or immediate and untimely death? What aids or hinders the cause? Imagined in this way, it becomes clearer what Anders aimed at when he insisted on that peace is not the means but the end (“Notstand” 167).

If efficacy is to be the measure, that measurement must be directed in equal measure to Anders’ “Notstand” and the other works that constitute his turn to violence. What effect did his imaginative intervention achieve? Many of the public reactions were collected in the 1987 volume *Gewalt: ja oder nein*. Wittulski points out that the reception of Anders’ imaginary interview among his contemporaries “can only be termed ‘Pavlovian,’” that is, whether they agreed with his claim to a state of emergency or not, “however diametrically opposed these two lines of argument appear in relation to one another, their point of contact remains nonetheless the same: the fixation on the isolated concept of (counter-) violence” (43-44). Wittulski notes that in addition to running against liberal norms that opposed political violence, Anders’ declarations
had violated a taboo that was particularly intense in the BRD and Austria, with the result that the complex argumentative chain the philosopher offered had little chance of considered reception.

Wittulski concludes that rather than take Anders seriously, his interlocutors instead took him literally in the most naïve way possible. This, he wrote, was a powerful indicator of the discussion’s necessity and importance (47). Dries as well recognizes that the Anders’ call to violence foundered on its transgression of an ultimate taboo, offers the observation that what was missed was the essential point contained in the dialectic of violence—that the aim was not to rearrange the distribution of power within a conventional sociopolitical framework, but to reveal and dismantle infrastructures of violence in order to provide conditions of possibility “for sociality as such” to exist in the future (197). That was the endpoint at which Anders arrived and where he held fast, as indicated in the plainly titled 1992 interview published shortly before his death, “Ich nehme nichts zurück!”—“I take nothing back!”

In order to arrive at Anders’ endpoint, this last chapter has drawn together the themes and arguments developed from the Introduction of this dissertation forward. In order to follow and critically evaluate Anders’ lines of argument, this thesis has examined the development of organizational and personal networks for anti-nuclear activism, practical and theoretical bases for the creation and dissemination of motivating symbols for resistance, Anders’ relationship to language and its influence on his views for the possibilities of solidarity and efficacy in protest action, changing class formations in the era of Cold War late capitalism, the role of scientific knowledge and disciplinary authority, as well as the development and dynamics of transnational social protest movements across the three cycles of anti-nuclear resistance.
Anders’ endpoint leaves us with the same emphatic commands to pursue interventions which expand the fearful imagination coupled to a duty to wield that fear such that it can “[drive] us into the streets” and negate the perpetual blackmail of extinction embodied in the atomic era, to “make the end times endless” (“Theses” 498). But the discussion ignited by “Notstand und Notwehr” has by no means been resolved. Dawsey observes that after Anders’ death, the matter was effectively dropped, writing that “Thankfully, just when he defined a path of armed struggle and left wing-terrorism” the Cold War came to an end with the fall of the Berlin wall and dissolution of the Soviet Union, a historical turn that “undermined the urgency of Anders’ pleas for violent action” (454-455). There has been a resurgence of interest in Anders since the mid-2000s, which has redoubled in the wake of the 2011 disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear generating station. Chernobyl—and Hiroshima—are once again omnipresent. In this time of Anders revival, Dawsey sees the central question of the philosopher’s continued relevance in whether Andersian critiques, developed in the context of and “tied to a now bygone Golden Age of capital” (497) are capable of facilitating resistance in an era dominated by a crisis-riven highly globalized neoliberal capitalism. On this point, I depart from his assessment: the crises of climate change and rapidly accelerating inequality have returned activists to Anders’ endpoint of contemplating violence.
CONCLUSION

I. Legacies

a. Continued Life and the Afterlife of Fear

In many ways, the imaginative interventions pursued by Anders and his disarmament contemporaries via the symbol of fallout set the agenda for anti-nuclear protest for the remainder of the 20th century and shaped the outcome of the Cold War. In the 1993 preface to *One World or None*, the first in his multi-volume, authoritative history of the nuclear disarmament movement, Lawrence Wittner begins with the admission that “this may seem like an odd time to examine the struggle against the Bomb. Popular fears of a nuclear holocaust, so widespread only a decade ago that they sent millions of people into the streets in angry protest, have ebbed dramatically” (ix). Recalling his participation in the movement as a young man, Wittner describes entering into one picketing or letter-writing campaign after another, with seemingly zero result. In a passage reminiscent of activist exhaustion discussed in (2.IVb), Wittner writes that “I grew accustomed to this phenomenon” of effort spent to no apparent effect. However, he then points to a paradox: the disarmament movement refused to die, and eventually grew into “a seemingly irresistible force” with the caveat that, “the only thing it could not do, it seemed, was end the nuclear menace” (*One World* x-xi). The fundamental question of his study is: Why?

Wittner posits that, in fact, the disarmament movement was more successful than has hitherto been recognized—not least because we remain alive. Moreover, he argues that disarmament protest did influence policymakers and that “there is considerable reason to believe that government officials have been painfully conscious of—and responsive to—public criticism of
nuclear weapons” (One World xii). The apparent inefficacy of disarmament protest in historical retrospect reflects a multiplicity of factors, but Wittner emphasizes that not least among them is the simple fact that “leaders of nation-states, of course, rarely admit that they are responding to public pressure” because to do so would be to grant that they had been compelled by a sector of society they had largely derided as irrational and emotional. In short, to admit they were “‘weak’ rather than wise, unwavering guardians of national security” (xii). It would mean an admission of fear.

Fear was from the start and has remained a crucial component of the anti-nuclear arsenal, a powerful but ambiguous weapon, as Eugene Rabinowitch argued in his 1951 editorial critiquing the post-war scientists’ movement’s attempts to “frighten men into rationality” (12). In response to the “third wave” of anti-nuclear protest, Cold War historian Paul Boyer reflected on Rabinowitch’s warning when he wrote in 1986 that he experienced a “strong sense of deja vu,” and could not help but notice the “fear tactics similar to those of Helen Caldicott and other present-day activists figured prominently in the strategy of their counterparts 40 years ago” (“Historical” 17). With the perspective of four decades, he concluded that the tactic of fear “seems their principal legacy,” a tainted legacy that contributed to the hysteria and paranoia of Western anti-communism and imperialism (“Historical” 18). The strategy of fear persisted in the anti-nuclear arsenal after the close of the Cold War. One planning document on “Antinuclear Strategies for the 1990s” included among first bullet points: “Don’t let the American people forget about Chernobyl,” and “Develop a strategy now to take advantage of the next severe nuclear accident to kill nuclear power” (Weber 1). Fear as a weapon is a sword with two sharp
edges, and the gravity of Rabinowitch’s warning would become particularly apparent in the following decade.

Historian of science Gabrielle Hecht counts the tendency of technological systems to appear as monstrous, Manichean phenomena as a kind of “technopolitical rupture-talk” aimed at reordering the world (2). However, she emphasizes that, although persons wielding the rhetoric of rupture invoke a wholly new world, the old does not disappear. This is apparent, she argues, in the oscillating, schizophrenic, shifting suite of justifications for the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was balanced on a combination nuclear fear and colonial state building: “Some days Iraq’s potential possession of nuclear weapons gets trotted out. When the imminence of Iraqi nuclearity is contested, the need for ‘regime change’ is invoked” (6). Hecht also notes that while the invasion of Iraq was “plan A,” one of the early-2000s alternatives to ground invasion for containing the “Axis of Evil” that went largely undiscussed was “plan B,” namely, to strike at the existentially threatening arsenals of nuclear weapons in the hands of rogue actors with tactical ground penetrating nuclear weapons. She locates the fundamental incoherency of these plans and their justifications in the insistence on rupture contained within the idea of a post-Cold War, post-9/11, or post-colonial era. In fact, she concludes, “the infrastructures and discourses of Cold War technopolitics continue to shape the parameters of global and local action, just as the infrastructures and discourses of colonialism do. We ignore those roots—and the contradictions they produce—at our peril” (7). Writing in 2003, Hecht did not know what would come of plans A, B, or the “Axis of Evil.” Plan A was the action of choice for Iraq. North Korea attained nuclear weapons and the status of a nuclear state. As of this writing, open multi-state civil wars
in Iraq and Syria potentially have placed the US in the bizarre position of becoming an ally of convenience to Iran. Prominent within this process is the capacity for nuclear arsenals to appear, or disappear, alter their nature, and be coupled or uncoupled to the language of fear within the discourse according to the political needs of the time.

b. Too Cheap to Meter and Carbon Free

Meanwhile, for a brief moment in the 2000s, it seemed that civilian atomic power generation would experience a liberation from the aura of nuclear fear. This was to be the “nuclear renaissance,” an era when new designs along with separation from Cold War politics and distance from the shadow of Chernobyl would permit a new generation of clean, safe, affordable reactors which would offer post-carbon energy independence from fossil fuels. In the US, participation in the nuclear renaissance was inaugurated with the 2002 Nuclear 2010 Program, which was intended to demonstrate the advantages of “Generation III+” reactor technology through construction and completion of a new plant—the first construction start on a civilian nuclear power station since 1977—within the decade (Thomas 10). Notwithstanding the burst of enthusiasm for modern nuclear power, results have been limited. In the US, of more than two dozen permit applications for new reactors, only five are under construction. Importantly, all five projects are expansions or completions of already extant generating stations, and did not require a lengthy and conflict-prone site-selection process. Hopes for a nuclear renaissance in Europe and North America were largely dashed by the March 2011 disaster at the Fukushima nuclear power plant; the rhetoric of the nuclear renaissance was predicated on the idea of progress towards safety expressed through engineering advances and a culture of conscientious
safety set against the image of careless and technically incompetent Soviet industry (Thomas 11). Although the effect of Fukushima and nuclear accidents in general on peoples’ surveyed opinions on nuclear power has been shown to be strongly reliant on prevailing policies and attitudes within one’s own country in combination with pre-existing positions on the matter, nuclear power is still interpreted by the public through strong, concrete affective associations of risk, as a “rather dreadful and unknown hazard” (Siegrist and Visschers 112-3). The question of which way citizen reception goes lies in whether or not they believe the risk can be managed. One of the primary strategies for attacking the concept of manageable risk that has emerged from the Fukushima disaster leverages national stereotypes to displace the rhetoric of nuclear renaissance proponents, claiming in effect that Japan is not the Soviet Union—if modern Japanese industry cannot safely manage nuclear power through precise engineering and a conscientious culture of safety, then no-one can.

For anti-nuclear activists such as the physician Helen Caldicott, the disaster at Fukushima makes it possible to argue that Chernobyl and Hiroshima are omnipresent, and to do so from the position of prophecy. In December 2011, she wrote in the New York Times that “the world was warned of the dangers of nuclear accidents 25 years ago, when Chernobyl exploded ... Now, Fukushima has been called the second-worst disaster after Chernobyl. Much is still uncertain about the long-term consequences. Fukushima may well be on par with or even far exceed Chernobyl.” Particularly interesting are those who count themselves among Caldicott’s opponents, including environmental journalist and activist George Monbiot, who has argued that commitment to nuclear energy is a moral demand in the context of imminent catastrophic climate
change. As Monbiot explained in 2011, the crux of the issue is aims, and the most pressing aim is rapid decarbonization and stabilization of atmospheric carbon dioxide levels. By categorically rejecting nuclear energy, he claims that “it seems to me that the greens are putting renewables first, climate change second,” hence failing at the pressing duty of our era. Climate change as a political and environmental issue has partially reversed the confluence of Green and anti-nuclear politics which was described in (4.III). The commitment to technical solutions has also reversed aspects of the counter-culture it engendered. One striking example of this is Stewart Brand, author-founder of the *Whole Earth Catalog*, one of the seminal texts of environmentalist counterculture. Brand now vocally endorses the famous climate scientist James Hansen’s statement on nuclear power, that “one of the greatest dangers the world faces is the possibility that a vocal minority of antinuclear activists could prevent phase-out of coal emissions” (qtd in Brand, 82). Brand’s endorsement is an aspect of a deep shift from the DIY decentralizing ethos of the *Whole Earth Catalog*. As he wrote in 2010, “the *Whole Earth Catalog* encouraged individual power,” and continued on to explain that his new book “is more about aggregate power. The scale of climate change is so vast that it cannot be met solely by grassroots groups and corporations, no matter how Green. The situation requires government fiat to set rules and enforce them” (34). The title of Brand’s 2010 work is *Whole Earth Discipline*. That it should be so is particularly relevant in light of Anders’ and Jungk’s analyses of the nuclear industry and the nuclear state, as discussed in (4.IVe). To run a nuclear power plant requires constant vigilance, eternal discipline, and a certain kind of state possessed of the freedom of action to enforce that discipline while remaining unencumbered by citizen interference. Australian climate researcher
and nuclear power advocate Tom Wigley hinted at this in passing in a 2014 interview with the *Bulletin*. Queried on the lengthy nature of the reactor construction process, Wigley answered that “regulations do slow things down, and especially when you have the options for other organizations or individuals to step in and slow down that authorization process. That’s particularly so in the United States. Obviously it’s not the case in China” (12). The subtext is clear. Returning to the question of what the anti-nuclear movement achieved, one answer is that regulatory apparatus arising from activist intervention removed a fundamental freedom of action and imposed a slowness on civilian nuclear power construction that opens avenues towards the possibility of consent.

Climate change and nuclear power operate together to produce a particular kind of “wicked” problem within public debate and policymaking. These are, as environmental policy scholar Dan Sarewitz has put it, problems that suffer from “an excess of objectivity” driven by “the apparently self-evident idea that scientific research can provide the basis for political action” (90, 81). For this class of problems, Sarewitz and others within science and technology studies have noted that the role served by scientific evidence and argument can serve as an attempt to escape addressing “the interests and values that underlie the controversy” (91). In the terms employed throughout chapter two for the discussion of Claude Eatherly as a motivating symbol, they are issues in which cultural positions have become reified and from which persons can be dislodged only by powerful interventions such as confrontations with moral shock. Over time, the problem can intensify, becoming (as environmental policy scholar Roger Pielke, Jr. puts it in a 2008 interview) a kind of “Christmas tree” on which individuals and groups hang their
own interests. In the context of “Christmas trees,” scientific evidence, expertise, and authority in the political arena serve conflicting purposes deeply attached to the discussion of the changing role of science given in (1.IIc). Occasions such as legislative hearings can take on a highly performative aspect that simultaneously sharpens and blurs the boundaries between the idealized objective self-image of science and the demands of policy, becoming arenas in which issues are formalized and framed for public consumption. Ann Keller notes that legislators sometimes use such occasions to push scientific and technical witnesses towards committing themselves to policy positions, and that witnesses in turn have “coping strategies” for maintaining the aura of neutrality, including deliberately discarding the professional identity to answer as “citizens” (86). As we saw in (1.IIc), this is a risky process for witnesses in that it opens them to charges of subjectivity, emotionalism, and politicization directed against their disciplinary identity and competence. Keller uses as her example a 1997 hearing on climate change as an illustration, with the researchers John Christy and Stephen Schneider filling familiar oppositional roles (85). It is an example particularly salient for illustrating that Christy and Schneider effectively re-enacted the same argument until Schneider’s untimely death in 2010.

c. “Is Earth F**ked?”

The story of this dissertation has been one of following Anders’ attempts to employ literary and philosophical means to stage an intervention through motivating symbols and imaginative exercises, in order to reveal the atomic menace as an omnipresent, inescapable enemy whose freedom of action was to be constrained as best as possible, and then abolished. As noted above, antinuclear activists succeeded in reducing the freedom of action allowed to the
technology of civilian nuclear power, and imposed a slowness on its use that makes it,
effectively, too costly to build. The effective invisibility of nuclear weapons, however, has
ensured their continued existence. Arms control specialist Lucien Crowder, writing for the
Bulletin, elaborates on this point in his satirical essay “A modest proposal on climate: Public
disengagement.”

... how can ordinary people speed disarmament? It’s a mighty short list of action items. Joseph
Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, observes that “[t]here is almost nothing an
individual can do. There’s no equivalent to using a more efficient light bulb. The closest thing is
for localities to declare themselves nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Crowder argues that from the perspective of arms control, the invisibility of nuclear weapons has
proved beneficial, allowing negotiators and other specialists to carry out their work; in the
context of climate change, he postulates that perhaps if environmentalists lowered the stakes of
the issue, progress might become possible, that “if granted the obscurity and freedom of action
that disarmament bureaucrats enjoy, the pallid technocratic elites who work to arrest climate
change might just manage to save the planet.” But Crowder mistakes the activist parties at work
and the distribution of power between them.

In 2010, historians of science Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway published Merchants of
Doubt, their masterful account of conservative resistance to proactive climate change policy.
Building on years of research conducted throughout the 2000s, Merchants can be seen as a
record of the imaginative intervention which rendered climate change an intractable, “wicked”
problem. They argue that the “problem” of climate change is the result of a highly effective
deconstruction of scientific knowledge carried out by influential, conservative American
scientist-administrators, many of whom were physicists veterans of Cold War weapons research,
including and especially Fred Singer, Robert Jastrow, William Nierenberg and Frederick Seitz ("Deconstruction" 117). In attempting to disentangle the motives of these men, Oreskes and her colleagues consider a number of explanations, including anthropologist Myanna Lahsen’s argument that their actions were “driven in large part by the downfall of physics as America’s ‘prestige science.’ The reduction of funding and opportunity in physics, and its succession by biological and Earth sciences, led them to challenge climate science in a kind of turf war” ("Challenging" 77). They grant some credit to Lahsen’s thesis, but place more weight on her observation that Nierenberg and his network of associates were strongly anti-communist pro-capitalist pro-nuclear “market fundamentalists” inclined to view anything that impinges on freedom of action granted business as a conspiracy to undermine American liberty ("Challenging" 78). This is the axis of argument Oreskes and her fellow researchers adopt. I would point out here that, viewed in terms of the discussion of changing roles for science and disciplinary crisis throughout chapter one, and in tandem with Anders’ understanding of technology, Lahsen’s two points are not divergent, but complementary aspects of a struggle to maintain a particular system of power. Nonetheless, Oreskes and her team here agree with the points made by Hecht given above, that the phenomenon described in their study reflects the persistence and maintenance of Cold War discourses, ideologies, and infrastructures.

In addition to constituting an academic study, Merchants of Doubt might be said to serve as an effective example of revealing and describing infrastructures and personal networks of the Cold War military-scientific complex in the era of climate change. Some climate action advocates have made good use of social-network analysis as part of their campaign to identify,
isolate, and discredit their opponents, struggling—as computational researcher John Mashey puts it—against a multi-decade conspiracy of “anti-science” (15). In the context of such documents as the 2006 Wegman report, a tailor-made study which purported to discredit prominent claims of the UN IPCC’s Third Assessment, climate action advocates used social network analysis to uncover unethical or fraudulent chains of self-citation or plagiarism, identify the authors responsible, encourage that they be ostracized within their professional communities, and initiate formal legal or disciplinary proceedings where applicable (Mashey, 27). The ultimate aim of these climate action advocates is to carry out an attack on the persons and organizations of the opposition, hinder the legal and financial status of the relevant group, and reduce the freedom of their representatives to appear and act as experts. This is matched by parallel efforts on the part of climate environmentalists to quantify, emphasize, and repeat the framing device of a “97%” percent consensus on the facticity of anthropogenic global warming, most recently through a 2013 paper lead authored by science communicator and physicist John Cook (“Quantifying” 1-2). The “97%” campaign is a strike against a type of actor that fills a specific role—that of the oppositional expert—within public science controversies, as described in (1.IIc) The oppositional expert was also a central figure in Hirsch and Nowotny’s study of pro-nuclear public information meetings during the era of the Zwentendorf controversy in Austria (4.IIIc). There, the oppositional expert acted to “attack points of doubt” and deny the “monopolistic claims of proponents to certain sources of information and knowledge” while themselves appearing as dedicated advocates acting on behalf of laypersons (329). In the modern climate change context, the “97%” campaign runs up against a phenomenon Hirsch and Nowotny encountered when
informational meetings were held where the role of opposition defaulted to laypersons. In these debates, pro-nuclear advocates easily dismantled amateur experts who were hindered by their reliance on “a limited number of publications” which were employed as “a sort of sacred text which is extensively and repetitiously invoked” (“Fixing” 333). As legal and communications scholar Dan Kahan notes generally, and especially in his critique of the “97%” campaign, inflicting a disputational defeat does not sway committed persons in culturally-inflected conflicts; in the terms of framing theory, it does not provide an adequate moral shock—on the contrary, it entrenches them in highly polarized positions (“Fixing” 296; “Consensus”). Rhetoric and science communication scholars are themselves grappling with an Andersian problem: what is the correct language for conducting an imaginative intervention in the context of climate change? The problem is well studied and poorly answered; a recent publication by the Commission on the Communication of Climate Science at University College London asserts in its summary of conclusions that what is needed is a new “‘meta-narrative’” on climate change achieved through “accurate, engaging, coherent, relevant” writing in the shape of “multiple narrative threads” that is tailored to the diverse values and needs of varying contexts but which still remains “consistent and harmonious” (8). This is a tall order, reflecting the imperatives that communications be specifically broad and broadly specific: it may be well here to recall here the challenge Anders foresaw in arriving at a linguistic common denominator for a broad front (4.IVe) and the necessity of local support for the maintenance of enduring dissent at Wyhl (4.Vb). Not only a tall order, but a painful one.

Scholar and activist Gar Alperovitz examines this pain in his recent book *What then*
must we do? He notes that the continual and hopeless sense that civil society does not work is an emotional reflection of the relative ill health of politics, movements, and institutions such as organized labor. He emphasizes, as we saw with Anders’ reassessment of class structures in chapter three, that analysis cannot proceed without stopping to “get your mind around” the stark decline of labor and facing the fact that “any serious future politics will have to find some other way—if it can—to do what labor once did” (14). Things will get worse, he advises “unless we come up with something different” (16). The solutions he offers is pain; change will be “pain-driven” and local. It will proceed in step-by-step through a fragile coalition of fractured alliances engaging in a politics of rebuilding, reshaping, and inventing their institutions and communities. “The pain will continue,” he writes, “until a new way is found” (92). Among environmentalists and climate advocates, that admonition is set against a growing panic that we are out of time. There is, in the words of environmental writer Derrick Jensen, widespread and private pessimist admission among conservationists that “we’re fucked.” Climate change activists are themselves now repeating the arc taken by Anders, as illustrated in Naomi Klein’s polemical cry to action in the New Statesman, “How science is telling us to revolt,” which cites complex systems researcher Brad Werner’s December 2012 address to the American Geophysical Union—titled “Is Earth F**ked?”—a presentation which culminated in contemplation of alliances of anti-capitalist movements undertaking “direct action” and “resistance taken from outside the dominant culture.” We have arrived again at the situation of imagining and then inventing the impossible forms of resistance that necessity demands. This dissertation has reflected at length on manifold aspects of social
protest and movement mobilization, but it has refrained from providing an assessment of
whether or not the prospects for meaningful activist intervention in entrenched techno-social
systems should be viewed pessimistically or optimistically, or even whether Anders’ career as
an organizer and activist should itself be thought of as a narrative of success or failure. We
have seen that in trying to drive people “into the streets instead of under cover,” Anders, and
activists more generally, were and are confronted by steep barriers at every level from the
individual-psychological to the macro-social. Achieving the kind of result Anders demanded,
may, in fact, be impossible. But even if this were the case, the passage from “Reflections on
the H-Bomb” given at the beginning of this thesis provides the reply, which is that we do not
and cannot know the answer yet, because we still live. And, Anders tells us, even if the
expanding our imaginative capacity to meet the task of ensuring our continued existence
appears to be theoretically impossible, this does not relieve us of the duty to try regardless.
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