Title
Partisan Pathways to Racial Realignment: The Gradual Realignment of Race and Party in the Twentieth Century

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Partisan Pathways to Racial Realignment:
The Gradual Realignment of Race and Party in the Twentieth Century

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

Sara Marie Butler

2015
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Partisan Pathways to Racial Realignment: The Gradual Realignment of Race and Party in the Twentieth Century

by

Sara Marie Butler

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Los Angeles, 2015

Professor Scott James, Chair

In the twentieth century, the Democratic and Republican Parties shifted their race views and adopted polarizing positions on civil rights. This phenomenon—the racial realignment of the parties—has been a topic of recent debate. The assumption has been that the parties followed similar paths and realigned at the same time. Further, recent work has investigated the realignment at either the national or state level. This one-pathway/one-site focus has narrowed the lens through which researchers have explained the realignment of race and party. This project takes a more comprehensive view by examining mass, state, and national actors, in addition to policy demanders, through the use of election returns, survey and roll call data, and archival materials. Considering multiple sources and different party actors allows me to determine how racial realignment unfolded across the state and federal governments. I use California as my state of interest because the narrative of racial realignment at the national level is so intimately tied to the political history of California. I argue that war mobilization and rapid demographic changes led to a push for economic civil rights by policy demanders in the 1940s. It was on these economic civil rights issues that the parties began to exhibit different pathways to realignment. I find that California and national Democrats were active in pushing race liberal
policies in the 1940s, with only tepid backing from the party’s rank-and-file supporters. On the Republican side, it was the voters who united on race conservative principles in the 1940s, only to be joined by California and national leaders in later decades. It would not be until the Republican Party was purged of race moderates—beginning with the state parties in the 1950s and then the national parties in the 1960s—that race conservative voters would become Republicans, leaving behind a much more race liberal Democratic Party by the early 1970s. This study reveals that the voters and elected officials were responding not only to changing dynamics within their own parties, but also to developments within the opposing party.
The dissertation of Sara Marie Butler is approved.

Karen Orren
John Zaller
Scot Brown

Scott James, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles
2015
Dedicated in loving memory to a warrior

—my mother—

Margaret Butler Langworthy
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<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP 14</td>
<td>Californians Against Proposition 14</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAUSE</td>
<td>Californians Against Unequal Schools and Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRA</td>
<td>California Republican Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>CREA</td>
<td>California Real Estate Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOP</td>
<td>Executive Office of the President</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEPC</td>
<td>Fair Employment Practices Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>JBS</td>
<td>John Birch Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, Bisexual</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOWM</td>
<td>March on Washington Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAACP</td>
<td>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCADH</td>
<td>National Committee against Discrimination in</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDAC</td>
<td>National Defense Advisory Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLRB</td>
<td>National Labor Relations Board</td>
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<td>OEM</td>
<td>Office for Emergency Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of Production Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNC</td>
<td>Republican National Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USES</td>
<td>United States Employment Services</td>
</tr>
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<td>WMC</td>
<td>War Manpower Commission</td>
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To my family—Kevin, Harry, and Rockford Dolan—Insert sentimental saying and inside joke here.
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Introduction: Racial Realignment in the Twentieth Century

For almost a century after the Civil War, race liberals supported the Republican Party, while those most hostile toward civil rights were Democrats. Today, these positions are reversed: race liberals have made their home in the Democratic Party, while race conservatives have effectively used the resources of the Republican Party to scale back federal programs that provide assistance to African Americans and other racial minorities.¹ My research is focused on this transformation—when, how, and why the parties shifted their views on civil rights in the twentieth century. A thorough investigation of this topic affords me the opportunity to assess how realignment occurs, not just at the state or national level, but in a federal system where forces from both sites converge to produce partisan change. Moreover, examining the partisan transformation on race furthers our understanding of the complex relationship between voters and their representatives. Through my analyses, I seek to uncover whether voters are dependent on elite cues, or if voters can unify without clear messages from their party leaders.

This research is grounded in the literature on civil rights, as well as the current political science debate on partisan change. Recent historical studies have provided detailed accounts on the civil rights movement and white backlash outside of the South, with a focus on the West and California. In the political science field, the literature on the contemporary alignment of race and party has roots in older works on realignment. Scholars have come to a consensus that the parties’ shift on race in the twentieth century was truly transformative—reorganizing the parties and the policies they support. In order to explain the parties’ shift on race, political scientists

¹ Two of the most cited examples are affirmative action and welfare. For an extensive overview of the historical and recent debate over affirmative action, see Curry, The Affirmative Action Debate and Chen, The Fifth Freedom, pp. 251-252. For a discussion of affirmative action in California, see HoSang, Racial Propositions, chapter 7. For an overview of the Republican push for welfare reform, see Haskins, Work Over Welfare.
have focused their attention on party elites, activists and interest groups, and mass partisans and voters to explore how and when the parties switched their views on race.

The realignment on race has received much attention from political scientists; however, individual works have been narrowly focused one explaining change at either the state or national level. Further, scholars have positioned party leaders, policy demanders, or voters as the driving force behind both parties’ transformation on race. These approaches have confined observations to one level of government (one site) and one model of change (one pathway) that is assumed to be generalizable across the two parties. To expand the study beyond the one-pathway/one-site focus, I examine the interplay among various partisan actors, including administrative bureaucrats, voters, state and national legislators and party leaders, and policy demanders (activists and interest groups). I use survey data, election returns, roll call votes, newspaper articles, and other archival materials to provide an explanation that focuses on the inter- and intra-party dynamics across both the national and state levels that structured the realignment on race—a transformation that continues to inform party allegiances and interactions today.

In the following sections, I present a review of the literature that has provided the foundation for this dissertation. I first focus on the historical works that have used California to gain a better understanding of the racial, social, and political changes that were occurring in the twentieth century. I then turn the works of V.O. Key, Walter Dean Burnham, and E.E. Schattschneider, whose writings were pivotal in establishing the concept of realignment, which has been used to explain how and why parties change their policy views. I show how later works, like Edward Carmines and James Stimson’s *Issue Evolution*, adapted classical realignment theory. I review Carmines and Stimson’s emphasis on party leaders, particularly the
1964 presidential candidates Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater, as the driving force behind the parties’ shift on race. I segue into two of the more recent contributions that have posed contrasting explanations. The parties’ switch can be seen as the result of the demands interest groups and activists place on politicians (Bawn et al., 2012) or the outcome of a partisan electorate (Chen et al., 2008). Throughout the literature review, I demonstrate how my evidence and narrative, particularly how partisan dynamics in California influenced and were influenced by national trends, adds to the theoretical understanding of how and why parties change their policy positions. I state the limitations of the key theories and how I will address these issues. I then provide an overview of my argument and preview upcoming chapters.

**Literature Review**

This study of the realignment on race begins by examining the historical works that have moved the focal point of race studies from the South to the North and West. Conventional civil rights histories that focused on the South centered on the moral tension between northerners and southerners. These histories depicted southern white racists as morally deplorable and northern whites as innocent and untouched by the disgraceful institution of slavery. Historians also portrayed liberal and black activists as the victors in this morality struggle when the Civil Rights Act was signed into law in 1964. Thomas Sugrue claims that the attention on southern exceptionalism implies that the North was free of racial tension, giving “northerners a badge of honor, a sense that they were not part of America’s troubled racial history.”

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3 Sugrue, *Sweet Land of Liberty*, p. xiv. The concept of this badge of honor among northern whites can be traced back to Gunnar Myrdal’s 1944 bestseller, *An American Dilemma*. In his book, Myrdal claimed that there was a sense of “innocence” among northern whites since they did not have a personal connection to slavery.
have placed the southern experience in a national context, historians like Sugrue (2008) have just recently emphasized the significance of the civil rights movement in the North. In his book, *Sweet Land of Liberty*, Sugrue observes states with a large black population, like New York, Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana. Within these states, Sugrue narrows his study to cities and neighborhoods, such as Harlem, New Rochelle, Gary, and Cincinnati. Sugrue and other historians have also suggested that we need to look back to the 1930s and 1940s to show that the familiar events of the 1950s and 1960s—like *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) and the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act—were the culmination of a “long civil rights movement” that started in the 1930s.

Like Sugrue, Mark Brilliant (2010) reaches farther back into history to examine civil rights before the 1950s. In *The Color of America Has Changed*, Brilliant narrows the study of the civil rights movement to California, engaging with a burgeoning literature that focuses on “the new racial frontier”—the West—that became home not only to African Americans but also to Asians and Mexicans in the 1940s. Whereas many studies have focused on cities like Los Angeles or San Francisco, Brilliant examines statewide ballot initiatives and legislative battles to examine how Blacks, Mexicans, and Asians throughout the state worked together or against

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4 The following southern histories discuss the commonalities between the North and the South: Kruse, *White Flight*; Lassiter, *The Silent Majority*; Gregory, “Southernizing the American Working Class.”

5 In another book, Sugrue’s (2005) *The Origins of the Urban Crisis* looks at postwar Detroit to explore racial conflict between blacks and whites.


one another to advance their own civil rights agenda. Scholars like Brilliant have stressed the importance of focusing on California, not only to enhance our understanding of the civil rights movement that extended beyond just white and black Americans, but also to advance our knowledge and analysis of contemporary racial and social struggles.

Other historians have also turned to California to explore the response to the civil rights movement. California served as the site of renewed conservatism and liberalism in the mid-twentieth century. The decline in support for the New Deal, and the rise of the California conservative movement is well documented by contemporary historians. Kurt Schuparra (1998) highlights 1958 as pivotal in the rise of California conservatism. Running under the banner of “freedom versus tyranny,” Republican candidates positioned themselves as ardent opponents of the New Deal’s repressive policies. These Republican politicians, most notably the party’s candidate for governor in 1958—William Knowland—railed against unions and supported making California a right-to-work state that would effectively destroy the unions’ influence. Knowland, though he only received 40% of the vote in 1958, energized grassroots conservative organizations, particularly in southern California. These activists would rally behind presidential nominees Barry Goldwater in 1964, and eventually Ronald Reagan in 1976 and 1980. Lisa McGirr (2002) focuses on the conservative grassroots movements in Los Angeles and Orange Counties. She credits the rugged individual ethos in postwar southern California for the emergence of the anti-tax, anti-Communist movement that abhorred eastern liberalism and

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9 Other studies of how the civil rights movement unfolded in a multi-racial context in California, see Brooks, Alien Neighbors, Foreign Friends; Varzally, Making a Non-White America; Camarillo, “Cities of Color;” HoSang, Racial Propositions.

10 A thorough understanding of the civil rights movement has implications for more recent issues in which the parties’ positions have shifted. Political scientists have used the shift on civil rights to help explain the partisan change on social issues like abortion. See Adams, “Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution;” Layman, The Great Divide; Sanbonmatsu, Democrats, Republicans and the Politics of Women’s Place; Wolbrecht, The Politics of Women’s Rights; Karol, Party Position Change in American Politics.

11 Schuparra, Triumph of the Right, p. 40.
recoiled from federal intervention in the free market. This conservatism would manifest itself not only on economic and labor issues but also on civil rights.

While conservatism was enjoying renewed support in California, so too was post-New Deal liberalism. Still espousing their traditional belief in social welfare programs and the use of the government to alleviate hardship, this form of liberalism would include groups that the New Deal had left behind. Liberals looked to gay rights activists, women, African Americans, and Mexican-Americans who, though they might have benefited marginally by job and relief programs, were not the main beneficiaries of the New Deal legislation. California became the first site of this transformed brand of liberalism and saw the rise of a new, more diverse liberal coalition in the 1950s and 1960s.

Serving as the location of renewed conservative and liberal movements, a study of California provides insight into how partisanship on race issues created more than just a transient shift in opinion. The emergence and growth of these ideological movements reveal that the shift in partisan attitudes was transformative. The conflict over economic civil rights and the role of the Federal Government in advancing equality became central issues on which the parties would realign, laying the foundation of arguably a new party system defined by civil rights preferences.

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13 McGirr, Suburban Warriors, p. 182.
14 Bell, California Crucible, p. 4.
15 Scholars have contended that, despite the fact that there was no realigning election, there was a shift in the salient issues that divided party allegiances. They point to the formation of a Sixth Party system that began in the 1960s. Economic ideology was no longer the driving force dividing politics and partisanship; rather, cultural issues that emerged in the 1960s and 70s are the divisive policies splitting the parties today. See Paulson, Electoral Realignment and the Outlook for American Democracy, p. 7. Aldrich and Niemi (1999), while not calling the 1964 election “realigning,” still points to the critical era of the 1960s that established a Sixth Party system that changed the issues, the leadership, and policy agenda of the two parties. Aldrich and Niemi, “Political Parties in a Critical Era,” p. 9.
The historical literature on the civil rights movement has provided me with invaluable insight on how to conduct my research on the partisan realignment on race. Rather than focus on the nation or on one region, this study focuses on how partisan change unfolded in California. As Brilliant and other historians have suggested, examining California (a state that exemplified the demographic changes that many northern states experienced) can help us better understand the realignment on race. Moreover, an investigation of California—home of renewed conservative and liberal efforts in the twentieth century—allows for the examination of white backlash, which emerged in the late 1960s. As I will demonstrate, white race conservatives are pivotal in the unfolding of the realignment. They refused to accept their party’s race liberal policies, and thus kept the Democratic base divided on civil rights issues for decades.

A drawback to a single-state study, however, is that it isolates that particular state from what is occurring at the national level. Such an analysis, therefore, can lead the reader to assume that the results are idiosyncratic and not representative of national patterns. Studying the exception rather than the rule can be an illuminating exercise, however, a one-state analysis does not further our understanding of how the transformation on race unfolded within a federal structure of government. Using California allows me to delve into underutilized resources, such as state legislative journals, ballot proposition data, and other archival materials to develop an explanation for the parties’ switch on race issues. By comparing and contrasting the shift on race in California to the transformation that unfolded nationally, I can glean a better understanding of how partisan change occurs in a federal system. Thus, I use California not only as a microcosm of national party change, but also as a way to explore how California voters and legislators influenced, and were influenced by, the national parties. This provides insight as to how the
transformation unfolded in a federal system in which party actors at the state and national levels worked together, and against one another at times, to realign the parties’ views on race.

**Critical Elections, Critical and Secular Realignment, and Issue Evolution**

In addition to using the historical literature as a guide for my analysis, I engage with a body of political science work—the realignment literature—that had been widely accepted for decades.\(^{16}\) Realignment studies date back to the 1950s when V.O. Key articulated the concept of critical elections in a 1955 article, “A Theory of Critical Elections.” Key espoused a theory of critical realignment that resulted from a critical election. Critical realignment is marked by an abrupt coalitional change among the mass electorate that “seems to persist for several succeeding elections.” Key used data from townships in New England states and identified the 1896 and 1928 elections as critical elections, which resulted in enduring changes in voting patterns.\(^{17}\) The drawback to Key’s study is that it did not acknowledge any critical elections before 1896, and did not suggest any periodicity in the occurrence of such elections. Further, Key did not discuss the policies that resulted from the coalitional change. Despite these criticisms, Key is credited for introducing the idea of critical elections.\(^{18}\) His contemporaries and successive generations of political scientists, however, would develop a more comprehensive explanation of realignment.

E.E. Schattschneider (1960) expanded on Key’s work by focusing on the 1896 presidential election between Republican William McKinley and Democrat William Jennings Bryan. Unlike Key, Schattschneider did not provide specific findings in his book *The


\(^{17}\) Key, “A Theory of Critical Elections.”

Semisovereign People. His contribution to the realignment literature, however, should not be overlooked. He asserted that the 1896 election brought on a party coalitional alignment “powerful enough to determine the nature of American politics for more than thirty years.” Most importantly, he stated that the realignment of 1896 was “perhaps the best example in American history of the successful substitution of one conflict [that is, one cleavage between opposing clusters of interests] for another.”

Schattschneider, thus, introduced the idea that interest group conflict played a significant role in bringing about a critical election, and subsequently, realignment.

Of his works on realignment, Burnham’s most comprehensive contribution to the literature was in 1970 with Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. In this book, Burnham used aggregate election outcomes data to demonstrate the existence of critical realignments. He put forth a four-step model that explained how critical realignments occur. First, constituencies coalesce behind salient issues, creating societal tension. Second, a “third party revolt” demonstrates the inability of the two parties to integrate the salient issue within their platforms, which results in ideological polarization among and within the parties. Third, the two parties are forced to move in order to resolve this tension by adopting disparate ideological positions on the issue. Finally, realignment occurs as the result of a critical election,

19 Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, pp. 81-82.
21 James Sundquist also elaborated on Key and Schattschneider’s works. In Dynamics of the Party System (1983), Sundquist addressed realigning periods or eras, not just single elections. He stated that realignment “reaches its climax in one or more critical elections.” Whereas Schattschneider emphasized the role of interest groups, Sundquist shifted the focus to issues. Sundquist suggested that a new dominant voter cleavage emerges over a specific issue conflict. Sundquist used three case studies that embodied such eras and their respective realigning issues. The first era occurred in the 1850s, with its sectional crisis and Republican rise to power in 1860. The second era was in the 1890s when the Populist movement and the election of 1896 raised issues of wealth distribution and class inequality. Finally, the Depression era resulted in realignment during the 1930s when questions of government intervention in the economy dominated the political discourse. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, pp. 35-37.
22 Burnham (1970) used the examples of the Free Soil Party in 1848 and the Socialist Party in 1912 to demonstrate that, when third parties receive 5% of the popular vote in a presidential contest, realignment is likely to follow in a subsequent election. Burnham, Critical Elections, pp. 28-29.
or a “flash point.” Critical realignments are transformations in policy that redefine and shape voter and elite allegiances for decades. In an earlier piece, Burnham emphasized that American history can be organized into successive party systems, bracketed by critical realignments.

Taken together, Key, Schattschneider, and Burnham put forth a theory of realignment in which critical elections played a significant role. Elections are either realigning or they are not. The result of a critical election is electoral realignment that is identified as a distinct party system from those that came before and after. Critical realignment would be the primary lens through which political scientists studied party transformation in the 1960s and 1970s. However, secular realignment, articulated by V.O. Key four years after he published “A Theory of Critical Elections” would also shape how some scholars conceived of partisan change. In 1959, Key wrote “Secular Realignment and the Party System,” in which he put forth a more gradual approach to party transformation—known as secular realignment. In this article, Key argued that elections are “periodic readings of…streams…that are undergoing steady expansion or contractions.” Elections are, thus, “steps in a more or less continuous creation of new loyalties and decay of old.” Key, therefore, differentiated this type of partisan change from critical realignment, which resulted from intense issue conflict and a critical election.

Edward Carmines and James Stimson (1989) would adopt elements of both critical and secular realignment in their book, *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*. Carmines and Stimson placed critical realignment and secular realignment into a broader category of “issue evolutions.” Issue evolutions are identified by issues that can alter the

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25 Burnham, “Party Systems and the Political Process.”
26 According to Rosenof (2003), Key’s piece on secular realignment was not as celebrated as the critical realignment literature likely because the latter focused on “sharp, dramatic breaks [that] took attention away from the less exciting and more gradual changes” of secular realignment. Rosenof, *Realignment*, p. 56.
political environment. These issues come out of the old environment but once they emerge, they introduce deep tensions into the party system that are inconsistent with the old patterns. These tensional issues are also salient and enduring. In essence, “only issues of this type have the capacity to reshape the party system, replacing one dominant alignment with another and transforming the character of the parties themselves.”28 Borrowing from biology, the authors identified three models of issue evolution: cataclysmic adaptation (critical realignment), Darwinian gradualism (secular realignment), and punctuated equilibrium (dynamic growth).

*Issue Evolution*, like Key’s articles, would spur a body of literature that engaged with critical realignment’s core assertions.

Whereas their predecessors focused on realignments that hinged on broader ideological and economic conflicts, Carmines and Stimson adopted a dynamic growth model of issue evolution to analyze the partisan shift on race issues in the twentieth century. The authors rejected realignment theory because of the “is it or is it not” nature of critical elections. The problem with the dichotomous nature of the realignment literature is that the evidence in the case of the transformation on race does not support a critical realignment. The party’s change on race cannot be narrowed down to one election and, therefore, it does not fit into the critical realignment framework. Because of this limitation, Carmines and Stimson avoided this “intellectual trap” by proposing an alternative to both critical and secular realignment.29

Even though Carmines and Stimson moved away from using the word “realignment,” their model of issue evolution shares similarities with the realignment literature. Dynamic growth, like critical realignment, emphasizes a “critical moment—a point where change is large enough to be visible and, perhaps, the origin of a dynamic process.” However, unlike critical

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realignment in which the critical moment results in a new level of stability, issue evolution supposes that “the change—the dynamic growth—does not end with the critical moment; instead it continues over an extended period, albeit at a much slower pace.” Thus, as with secular realignment, issue evolution continues to produce change at a gradual pace; however, issue evolution is less incremental than secular realignment, since the former presumes that “at some point the system moves from a fairly stationary steady state to a fairly dramatic rapid change.”

The authors distinguished “critical moment” from “critical election” by stating that the latter is thought to be “the whole of realigning change.” In contrast, the “critical moment” is an important event for the evolutionary change that follows; it is not the change itself.

Carmines and Stimson used this model of issue evolution to explore the partisan transformation on race in the twentieth century. They analyzed national party platforms, roll call votes, and public opinion surveys to show that race was not a salient, or a polarizing, issue in the 1940s and 1950s. This time of relative calm on civil rights would be disrupted by the critical moment—the 1964 presidential election between Republican Barry Goldwater and Democrat Lyndon Johnson. According to the authors, “presidents and presidential contenders are figures of central importance” in issue evolution. The 1964 race and the actions taken by the parties’ presidential nominees was, thus, the defining critical moment in the process of issue evolution since it laid the foundation for the realignment on race that both parties would undergo in the late 1960s and 1970s.

Several scholars have called into question the concepts of critical elections and critical realignment. David Mayhew (2002) explored several claims that the realignment literature articulated, particularly Burnham. In tackling each of these assertions, Mayhew effectively weakened the appeal of critical elections as the driving force behind realignment. Mayhew stated that dichotomizing elections between critical and non-critical is a flawed way to analyze realignment. Moreover, critical elections as an explanation for realignment is less satisfying when considering short-term variables, like war and economic recession, that are just as, if not more, influential than critical elections. The core argument against critical elections is that realignment is a gradual process and, thus, one election cannot realign the parties. However, Mayhew stopped short of advocating for secular realignment, claiming that the study of realignments—whether critical or secular—since the term has been amended several times, is difficult to credit as one concise explanation.

I agree with Mayhew’s assessment that it is nearly impossible to synthesize all the definitions of realignment, while attempting to remain true to Key’s early conception of critical elections. Therefore, my use of “realignment” refers not to this original meaning but rather to the transformation of the two parties’ policies on race in the twentieth century. A realignment on race occurred—in what I call the “racial realignment;” it is just not a realignment that early scholars, constrained by critical elections and elite leadership, would have acknowledged.

36 Mayhew’s Electoral Realignments has been the leading critique of realignment since its publication in 2002. Paulson, Electoral Realignment and the Outlook for American Democracy, p. 9. For an overview of the criticisms laid out by Silbey, Ladd, and Mayhew, see Mack, When Political Parties Die.
37 Mayhew, Electoral Realignments.
38 Mayhew (2002) stated, “At today’s stage of scholarship, no conceptual or theoretical utility is added by use of the terms secular or realignment.” Mayhew, Electoral Realignments, p. 163. He goes on to say, “…even stripped back to its secular connotation…the realignments way of thinking adds little or no illumination.” Mayhew, Electoral Realignments, p. 165.
39 While I use “racial realignment” more for brevity and less as a theoretical construct, others have adopted the term to explore the partisan switch on race in the mid-twentieth century. See Schickler, “New Deal Liberalism and Racial Liberalism;” Glaser, Race, Campaign Politics, and the Realignment in the South; Hajnal, Changing White Attitudes;
In addition to Mayhew’s criticisms of realignment, other scholars have recently engaged with and provided several critiques of Carmines and Stimson’s work on issue evolution—in particular, the authors’ claim that party leaders—1964 presidential candidates Goldwater and Johnson—drove the transformation on race. Below, I explore Carmines and Stimson’s explanation of how the parties switched their views on race. I then use the revisionists’ key arguments to further my analysis of this twentieth century phenomenon, articulating my main contentions with this stream of literature, and discussing how I attempt to further the understanding of the contemporary alignment of race and party.

*The Party Leader-Driven Explanation of Racial Realignment: Laying the Foundation for Debate*

A discussion of the twentieth century partisan transformation on race cannot begin without consideration of Edward Carmines and James Stimson’s 1989 book, *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*. Carmines and Stimson argued that the transformation on race was the result of two key moments of dynamic change that interrupted a period of stability and bipartisanship on race. These two moments were the 1958 midterm elections and the 1964 presidential election. According to the authors, the 1958 midterm elections served as a precursor for the parties’ change on race that came to fruition in the 1964 presidential contest. The authors used racial voting scales in the Senate to show that Republicans

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40 Proponents of both critical and secular realignment would also advocate for a top-down approach to partisan transformation. In Burnham’s book, he focused on the power of party leaders and activists who break from the norm and “flout” the traditional rules in presidential nominating conventions. Like Carmines and Stimson (1989), Burnham (1970) paid close attention the presidents and presidential candidates. For example, he discussed the “inflexible leadership of a James Buchanan in 1857-61, which effectively foreclosed a middle-of-the-road northern Democratic alternative to the Republicans.” Thus, it was Buchanan, as president, who shaped the path to realignment during this era. Burnham, *Critical Elections,* p. 7. In his discussion of secular realignment, Key (1959) also ascribed the power to change partisan policies to elites. He argued that demographic changes (like the rise of an industrial working class in urban cities) are not enough to transform the parties’ policy positions. Rather, such changes at the mass level create “opportunities for exploitation by political leadership.” Key, “Secular Realignment,” p. 204.
and Democrats displayed similar voting patterns (with Republicans slightly more liberal) on race up until the 1958 elections. After the 1958 midterms, interparty differences in Congress became pronounced. The loss of eleven Senate seats effectively stripped the Republican Party of its most ardent race liberals—ten of whom were replaced by race liberal Democrats. Similar party changes also occurred in the House of Representatives. The shifting party dynamics in both houses laid the groundwork that allowed the 1964 presidential candidates to take opposing positions on race that would be supported by their parties in Congress.

Carmines and Stimson highlighted the 1964 presidential race as the “critical moment” that set the parties on separate paths with regard to race policy. The authors argued that, without Johnson and Goldwater’s leadership, the parties in Congress might not have sorted so unambiguously on race policy in the early 1970s and beyond. On the Republican side, Barry Goldwater’s ideological opposition to federal civil rights policy was embodied in the new doctrine of “racial conservatism”—a constitutional argument that opposed activist Federal Government involvement to ameliorate the effects of racism. Racial conservatism was an expression of the Republican Party’s emerging “southern strategy,” a way for the party to attract southern whites away from the Democrats, while using a constitutional argument that would

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41 Scholars have overused the term “racial conservatism” to the point where I believe it is currently unusable, or at least unhelpful and too confusing to be employed as a concept. To some, racial conservatism is understood as a constitutionalist, limited-government, states’ rights argument against the use of federal power to alleviate the effects of racism (Carmines and Stimson, *Issue Evolution*). To others, it is the application of contemporary conservative principles to question race policy such as affirmative action or busing (Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, and Kendrick, “The New Racism;” Sniderman and Piazza, *The Scar of Race*). To others still, it refers to a conservative racial ideology (Chen et al., “Explaining the Contemporary Alignment of Race and Party”). Further, racial conservatism has been used interchangeably with scientific racism (Scott, *Contempt and Pity*). Finally, some have used it as synonymous with racism, a way by which Republican politicians could easily appeal to the southern white racist. These studies overlook Carmines and Stimson’s original definition and/or claim that, even if Goldwater’s doctrine of racial conservatism was not explicitly racist, its intent to garner the votes of white racists make it inherently racist (Hobson, “A South Too Busy to Hate?” Roemer, Lee, and van der Straeten, *Racism, Xenophobia, and Distribution*). Scholars have not established along what lines the term ought to be defined and delimited, creating confusion and a lack of coherence in the literature. I therefore avoid use of the term outside of Carmines and Stimson’s preferred usage (as it is not necessary for my literature review). When I move into my own analysis, I use the term “race conservatism” to denote that some voters held prejudicial views against African Americans since they did not represent traditional white American values.
alienate as few race liberal Republicans as possible.\textsuperscript{42} For his part, Johnson led the Democratic Party to the left. Johnson chose to align with the party’s race liberal northern constituency and thus antagonized southern Democrats, who had long been opposed to civil rights.\textsuperscript{43} Once the presidential candidates declared their positions and the national party platforms adopted divergent race views,\textsuperscript{44} party activists helped communicate the new race positions to voters. Voters could then either adopt these new stances, or convert to the party that best reflected their existing race views.\textsuperscript{45} Voters did not have the ability to act independent of elite action.

In Carmines and Stimson’s account, voters are afforded a secondary and reactive role—they can adopt or reject elite issue positions but they cannot initiate partisan change. It was national party leaders who were the strategic first movers who determined policy change on civil rights. Even though several scholars have recently sought to debunk this account of presidential leadership, I argue in support of restoring the 1964 election to prominence in the realignment narrative. I suggest that, while the 1964 contest between Goldwater and Johnson was not the sole critical moment, the presidential race had a significant impact on the unfolding of racial realignment. It was indeed a “critical moment.” Without Johnson and Goldwater’s leadership, the parties might not have sorted so clearly on race, leaving many race conservative voters without a party to support. Without a race conservative party, these voters would have remained 

\textsuperscript{42}Carmines and Stimson, \textit{Issue Evolution}, p. 45. “The Republican platform did not endorse racism. Nor did it call for segregation. But it embodied a racial conservatism that had great appeal to southern whites. The Republican Party was to go ‘hunting where the ducks are’—a strategy that sent them right to the heart of Dixie.”

\textsuperscript{43}Carmines and Stimson, \textit{Issue Evolution}, p. 44. Several scholars have contributed to and supported this traditional narrative, including Carmines and Stimson, \textit{Issue Evolution}; Parmet, \textit{The Democrats}; Sundquist, \textit{Dynamics of the Party System}; Fauntroy, \textit{Republicans and the Black Vote}; Philpot, \textit{Race, Republicans, & The Return of The Party of Lincoln}.

\textsuperscript{44}Using a content analysis of national party platforms from 1932 to 1980, Carmines and Stimson show that, prior to 1964, the Republican platforms devoted more space and placed a higher priority on race than the Democratic platforms. The 1964 presidential election was the critical moment in which the national parties switched their positions on race and Democrats began to discuss the subject and assign it a higher priority than Republicans. The authors count the number of paragraphs devoted to racial concerns and define a priority index for race from 0 to 1. If race appears at the beginning of the platform, it receives a 1. The further down it appears in the platform, the closer it is to 0 and if there is no mention of race, the platform receives a 0. Carmines and Stimson, \textit{Issue Evolution}, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{45}Carmines and Stimson, \textit{Issue Evolution}, chapters 4 and 5.
disgruntled Democrats and the process of racial realignment would have remained incomplete. Since voters are important players in my narrative, as they choose to leave the Democratic fold when given a race conservative option by the Republicans, I also build on recent findings that assign a larger role to partisans in the public and, more specifically, the voters.

*The Voter-Driven Explanation of Racial Realignment: Can the Voters Lead?*

Schickler (2013) makes impressive strides in moving the discussion away from elites and to mass partisans. He reconstructed Gallup polls from the late 1930s and 1940s, and used them to identify a connection between public opinion and congressional voting on civil rights. During the 75th Congress (1937-1939), a conservative coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans emerged that would stymie the liberal agenda for years thereafter. Schickler shows that this shift in congressional voting coincided with a split in public opinion, with northern white Republicans displaying less support for civil rights than northern white Democrats. Thus, non-southern whites were already exhibiting partisan views on race, moving jointly with congressional representatives and well ahead of the parties’ presidential candidates. Schickler concludes that early public opinion polls reveal that the 1964 presidential candidates “followed, rather than led, change at the mass level,”*46* positioning mass partisans as potential first movers or, at least, co-movers with partisans in Congress.

Chen, Mickey, and Van Houweling (2008) ascribe first mover status to partisans in the voting public. Whereas Schickler’s study probes *mass attitudes*, Chen and colleagues examine revealed preferences through *voter behavior* at election time. Using Proposition 11—a 1946 California ballot initiative that called for the creation of a State fair employment practices commission (FEPC)—the authors find that Republicans exhibited much higher levels of

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conservatism on this issue than Democrats. Chen et al. conclude that Republican conservatism on race issues not only emerged earlier than Carmines and Stimson suggest, but also that partisan change on race was driven by partisans in the electorate, not party elites.\footnote{Chen et al., “Contemporary Alignment of Race and Party,” p. 226.}

Chen et al. determine that race liberalism would not have thrived in the Republican Party after World War II. Based on overwhelming conservatism among Republican voters on Proposition 11, the authors state that a race liberal strategy would have alienated a significant portion of the party’s base. Further, they claim that Republican voters exhibited a conservative racial ideology and any race liberal policies would not have been accepted. Chen et al. declare the following:

To the extent that GOP elites had any strategic choice at all, it was not a choice about whether but how and when to pursue a racially conservative strategy. This conclusion obviously challenges the conventional wisdom. Perhaps the origins of today’s alignment of race and party are rooted less in the strategic choices of political elites than in the reassertion of deep, structural cleavages in the mass electorate. Maybe Goldwater did not so much lead his voters as much as he recognized—earlier than any other Republican politician—where his voters were trying to lead him.\footnote{Chen et al., “Contemporary Alignment of Race and Party,” p. 225.}

Chen et al.’s view calls into question the party leader-driven model put forth by Carmines and Stimson. Their account of Proposition 11 on California’s 1946 ballot is limited, however, since the authors take into account just one proposition. The authors acknowledge the need to expand the scope of their study.\footnote{Chen et al., “Contemporary Alignment of Race and Party,” p. 228.} Therefore, I seek to add to their analysis by placing Proposition 11 in the context of a demographically and politically changing state and nation.

I examine the partisan results of other racialized propositions that appeared on the California ballot after World War II. My findings show a pattern of race conservatism within the Republican base and a consistently divided Democratic Party, suggesting that there was a significant race conservative faction within the California Democratic base. In my explanation

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\end{itemize}
of racial realignment, these findings suggest that voters are capable of ideological constraint across time. Further, Republicans’ conservatism on racialized propositions remains stable, despite the changing nature of civil rights over time. A regularly split Democratic base reveals not a confused group of voters, but rather two factions within the party: race liberals and race conservatives. Race conservatives’ refusal to accept race liberal policies would keep the base divided until after the 1964 election. It is not until Johnson and Goldwater declare the national parties as holding distinct views on civil rights that race conservatives begin to leave the Democratic Party, leaving the Democratic base much more liberal. Thus, in my narrative of racial realignment, Democratic voters responded to the national parties’ leaders, changing the dynamics of the party system.

Recent scholarship, however, has questioned the voters’ role in parties, ascribing them little agency. They lack the acuity necessary to influence party decisions. Moreover, party politicians are not the independent actors that Carmines and Stimson’s model would suggest. An alternative to both the voter-driven and elite-driven explanations—the Theory of Parties—suggests that it is not the voters or the politicians, but rather the policy demanders, who are the key actors behind party transformation.

The Group-Driven Explanation of Racial Realignment: The Theory of Parties

Carmines and Stimson emphasize the importance of activists in relaying elites’ policy positions to the voters. However, the activists are not the key figures who propel partisan change; they are the messengers. A recent stream of the literature has elevated the role of policy demanders (activists and interest groups), making them the pivotal players in partisan

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51 The authors refer to activists as the “carriers of new themes.” Carmines and Stimson, Issue Evolution, p. 90.
transformation. According to Bawn et al. (2012), policy demanders come together to promote a common agenda. Most significantly, they control the parties’ nomination processes, ensuring that the nominees are sympathetic to their goals. This theory contrasts to the elite-driven theory of partisan change, which positions the national parties’ leaders in 1964—Johnson and Goldwater—as the driving force behind the realignment on race. Bawn et al. have demonstrated that activists and interest groups were clamoring for change on race issues, beginning in the 1940s—well before the 1964 “critical moment.” The authors provide a theoretical framework to explain how activists and interest groups force politicians to change their positions.

The Theory of Parties debunks the elite-driven model of party change by suggesting that politicians are “managerial—facilitating efforts by policy demanding groups, often groups the politician already represents.” Furthermore,

Once a policy-demanding group, such as civil rights or anti-abortion activists, becomes part of the party, the normal operation of nomination processes produces candidates committed to the group’s cause. Any “good Democrat” or “good Republican” can be counted on, even at real risk to their own careers.\(^{52}\)

Bawn et al. reach several conclusions based on their Theory of Parties. The two claims that raise significant questions about the elite-driven model of partisan change are the following. First, policy demanders outside of government form new party coalitions and force change in established ones (which was the case with regard to racial realignment). It is thus these policy demanders—activists and interest groups, not politicians, who determine the parties’ conflict agendas. Second, while in some cases, interest groups and activists have determined which individuals received their respective party’s nomination, it is more common that “ideological conformity is imposed on party nominees through routine operation of the nomination

process.”\textsuperscript{53} Therefore, control of the nomination process affords activists and interest groups the ability to push their desired outcome onto party politicians.

In addition to debunking the elite-driven model, Bawn et al. challenge the voter-driven explanation of partisan change. The authors take a pessimistic view of voters. Voters have an “electoral blind spot,” making them “unable to reliably ascertain policy positions or evaluate party performance.”\textsuperscript{54} Policy demanders take advantage of this electoral blind spot and push their agendas onto politicians, while trying to get voters to simply “go along.”\textsuperscript{55} If the Theory of Parties’ view of voters is accurate, then politicians care more about pleasing policy demanders than the voters, which has implications for the policies they support and reject.

Bawn et al. provide the Theory of Parties to help better conceptualize recent research that has emphasized the role of activists and interest groups. Through roll call analyses of proposed civil rights bills, particularly a thorough case study for the push for a federal fair employment practices commission (FEPC), Karol demonstrates that congressional Republicans were less supportive of a strong national role in combating employment discrimination than their Democratic counterparts as early as the 1940s.\textsuperscript{56} They were motivated to do so by their coalition partners, namely small business groups, such as the National Association of Manufacturers, who

\textsuperscript{54} Bawn et al., “Theory of Political Parties,” p. 571.
\textsuperscript{56} By the early 1940s, Karol (2009) finds a slight shift on race, with northern Democrats demonstrating more support for civil rights than northern Republicans. He constructed civil rights scales to calculate the parties’ mean scores on racial issues. He looks at the interparty difference of means on racial liberalism for all members of Congress (MCs) and for northern MCs. Contrasting these two statistics shows how much the gap between the parties is a function of southern Democrats. The difference in means for northern members of Congress turns negative beginning in the 1940s, which is indicative of a racial realignment outside of the South. This negative trend persists gradually; it is only in the 1960s and beyond that there is a decrease in the difference of means not only among northern members of Congress but all MCs. Support among northern Democratic MCs for civil rights in the 1940s gets obscured when looking to simple patterns in roll call votes because, on most civil rights votes, the more striking divide was between northerners and southerners, who were still largely Democrats. In addition, Carmines and Stimson’s analysis of roll call votes does not account for the composition of the Democratic Party. When Democrats held many northern seats, there was a reduced gap between the two parties on race issues, which accounts for Carmines and Stimson’s finding that the two parties were nearly indistinguishable on civil rights in the years leading up to the 1964 election. Karol, \textit{Party Position Change in American Politics}, chapter 4.
wanted to keep the Federal Government from infringing on their rights. Therefore, Republican congressmen decried “the prospect of federal interference with business,” but once these commissions were stripped of enforcement powers, thereby making them less threatening to business interests, many of the same Republicans supported FEPC.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, their business-minded coalition partners prodded Republicans in Congress to embrace race conservative policies on issues that blended race and New Deal commitments.

On the other side of the aisle, Noel provides the earliest evidence of liberal intellectuals and pundits allying with a pro-civil rights agenda. In his book, \textit{Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America} (2014), Noel reveals that leftist intellectuals and pundits underwent a shift in racial attitudes between 1910 and 1930. In 1910, these intellectuals and pundits were unsympathetic toward the plight of African Americans, just like their conservative counterparts. By 1930, however, thinkers on the left were clearly more favorable than conservatives with regard to civil rights. Using an original dataset of the opinions expressed by political pundits and intellectuals in leading newspapers and magazines, Noel finds that racial and economic ideologies aligned, emerging among political intellectuals at least twenty years before the realignment in Congress. Thus, he concludes that ideology shapes partisan politics and coalitions, not the other way around.\textsuperscript{58}

Shortly after thinkers on the left shifted their ideology, liberal activists and unionists began to pressure Democratic elites to align with race liberalism. Schickler, Pearson, and Feinstein (2010) use alternatives to roll call votes to determine if, according to the Carmines and Stimson narrative, partisans in Congress held indistinguishable racial views in the 1940s and 1950s. By using measures, such as signatures on discharge petitions, bill sponsorship, and

\textsuperscript{57} Karol, \textit{Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management}, p. 115.
\textsuperscript{58} Noel, \textit{Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America}. 
speeches on the House floor, the authors argue that they could more accurately gauge active participation in the legislative process, which provides insight into the intensity of member preferences and priorities.\(^5^9\) Using these alternative sources, they study of anti-lynching bills and demonstrate that northern Democrats replaced Republicans as the leading advocates of civil rights in the House in the mid-1940s, and that the divide gradually increased thereafter. The authors emphasize the role of coalition partners (unions and liberal activists) in motivating northern Democratic congressmen to sort on civil rights.\(^6^0\) Schickler, Pearson, and Feinstein found that the Democratic legislators that were most supportive of civil rights in the 1940s were from districts with high concentrations of union members, not necessarily from districts with a large black presence,\(^6^1\) suggesting that it was union leaders and other liberal coalition partners that were driving Democratic representatives to adopt race liberal preferences.

Part of the revisionist literature moves beyond the national narrative and considers the role state actors had in moving the national parties on race. Feinstein and Schickler (2008) look to the parties’ state-level coalitional partners and activists.\(^6^2\) By conducting content analyses on an original dataset of state party platforms from 1920-1968,\(^6^3\) the authors conclude that state Democratic parties moved to the left of the Republican parties on civil rights, beginning in the 1940s and increased thereafter. Feinstein and Schickler suggest that business coalition partners and state party activists pressured state Republican leaders to adopt a conservative position on civil rights policies, demonstrating that state parties changed their views on civil rights long

\(^{59}\) See Hall, *Participation in Congress* for an overview on why and how legislators choose to actively participate on certain issues and not others.

\(^{60}\) Schickler, Pearson, and Feinstein, “Congressional Parties and Civil Rights Politics from 1933 to 1972.”

\(^{61}\) Schickler, Pearson, and Feinstein, “Congressional Parties and Civil Rights Politics from 1933 to 1972.”

\(^{62}\) Feinstein and Schickler, “Platforms and Partners.”

\(^{63}\) The authors mirrored Carmines and Stimson’s content analysis of national party platforms and applied it to their state-level dataset. They also looked at five specific civil rights issue areas: fair employment practices, fair housing, desegregation of public schools, desegregation of public accommodations, and voting rights. See Feinstein and Schickler, “Platforms and Partners,” pp. 8-9 for a complete overview of their methods.
before national party politicians. Thus, according to Feinstein and Schickler, national politicians were “significantly constrained [by these state-level coalitions] in their actions and were not first movers” on racial realignment.64

Baylor (2013) emphasizes the role of interest groups in the partisan transformation. He demonstrates that the NAACP and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) worked together to transform the Democratic Party into the home of race liberalism. Through extensive archival research, Baylor shows that the NAACP needed the CIO’s political clout to move the Democratic Party to the left on civil rights. The CIO aligned itself with the NAACP because it wanted to form a coalition within the Democratic Party that would work to maintain the Wagner Act. Thus, according to the author, this symbiotic relationship between two of the party’s main coalition partners laid the groundwork for the adoption of race liberal policies. The CIO and NAACP were able to influence the platform planks and candidate selection.65

Taken together, the scholarship that lends evidence to the Theory of Parties has significantly advanced our understanding of how interest groups and activists influenced racial realignment. Below, I discuss how my evidence supports the party leader, voter, and group-driven explanations. Though many may see these theories as conflicting, I seek to bring their key elements together in my narrative of racial realignment.

The Party Leader, Voter, and Group-Driven Explanations: A Synthesis

The Theory of Parties literature establishes policy demanders as driving the parties’ change on civil rights. For the Democratic Party, interest groups began pressuring Democratic politicians in the 1940s, shortly after political pundits and thinkers started to link economically

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65 Baylor, “First to the Party.”
liberal proposals with racially liberal causes. On the left, Noel suggests that the origins of a cohesive liberal ideology that brought economic justice and racial justice together can be seen as early as the 1930s. While some conservative newspapers like the Los Angeles Times opposed lynching in the 1930s, many more liberal publications take anti-lynching, pro-civil rights stances. According to Noel, “Economically liberal intellectuals are all pro-black by 1930.”

Taken together with Baylor, Feinstein and Schickler, and Karol’s evidence, we can see the intellectual movement on the left as laying the foundation for civil rights, unions, and other liberal groups to start to pressure Democratic legislators at the state and national levels to support race liberal policies. In accordance with this group-driven view, I find that, because of interest group prodding, California Democrats in the state Assembly adopted race liberal policies despite a divided party base.

On the right, this new brand of economic and racial liberalism was not challenged until the 1950s. Karol demonstrates that business interests pressured Republican legislators to vote against FEPC. However, when economic considerations were removed from civil rights policy, the party’s coalition partners did not pressure Republican politicians to adopt conservative positions on civil rights legislation since conservatism had yet to encompass race. According to Noel, this entanglement can first be seen among thinkers on the right (in such publications like the National Review that began publication in 1957), who were linking conservative economic policy with race conservatism. I show that Republicans started to feel the pressure of conservative activists, first in California, and then nationally, starting in the 1950s when race and economics become intertwined.

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67 Noel, Political Ideologies and Parties in America, p. 6.
In accordance to the Theory of Parties view, I suggest that the method of acquiring party control was through the nomination processes. In California, party takeover in this manner can most clearly be seen on the right, as it is the Republican activists who united in the late 1950s and 1960s to wrest control of the party away from moderates like Earl Warren and Goodwin Knight. On the left, many of the revisionist works have shown that race liberal activists, particularly unions and African American groups, had an impact on moving the party to the left on race by controlling which candidates received the Democratic nomination.

The key points of departure with the Theory of Parties are twofold. First, I argue that voters play a larger role in the realignment process than is currently assumed. Second, Carmines and Stimson’s emphasis on the 1964 presidential election should have a more prominent role in the revisionist literature. Activists and interest groups took the liberal and conservative ideas put forth by intellectuals and pushed state, then national, politicians to accept their agendas that now blended economic and race commitments. Politicians are loyal to their party’s policy demanders, for sure, however, in the case of race, policy demanders were not successful in trying to get the parties’ voters to follow the politicians who supported their agendas. In the case of the Republican base, I show that voters were consistently conservative on civil rights issues, long before the state and national Republican parties were pushed to the right by conservative activists and interests. In the Democratic base, half of the party’s supporters refused to support race liberal policies, despite Democratic leaders’ steadfast support of their coalitional partners’ agenda. The policy demanders would never get these race conservative Democrats to “go along” with their race liberal agenda. Race conservative Democrats started to leave the party when the national parties’ leaders—Johnson and Goldwater—took decisive positions on civil rights in
1964. Without their leadership, race conservatives likely would have remained part of the Democratic fold since the national Republican Party would have provided no clear alternative.

My assertion that race conservative Democrats switched parties and were thus pivotal in finalizing the realignment of race and party is supported by numerous works. Scholars have suggested that citizens can change their party loyalties in response to their attitudes on policy issues.68 This argument is contrary to Campbell et al.’s social-psychological model, which suggests that party identification is a deeply held psychological attachment that does not change over time and is a filter through which citizens view and interpret new political information.69 Carsey and Layman (2006) support a revision of Campbell et al.’s model, arguing for both party-based issue change and issue-based party change among individuals.70 Both types of change occur when people are aware that the parties have taken divergent stances on an issue. Of these individuals who are cognizant of the parties’ stances on an issue, the ones who do not find the issue salient will likely align their views with their party’s position. Those who find the issue salient are more likely to change parties, not their attitudes.71

Race issues tend to be salient for a large segment of the population since they are easily understood.72 Often tied to race issues, especially since the 1960s, is the level of government spending for services and government intervention to ensure a good standard of living. In a panel study that examined respondents’ attitudes toward various issues, Carsey and Layman uncovered that a majority of those surveyed—53%—were aware of the parties’ positions on

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69 Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 121.
government spending on services and found this issue salient. Some 23% of respondents knew where the parties stood on government spending but did not find this issue salient. When questions addressed government assistance for African Americans, specifically, 30% of the panel respondents were aware but did not find the issue salient, while 35% were both aware of the parties’ stances and assigned salience to the issue. Those who changed their partisan identification to align with the party that represented their views on government assistance in general and for African American in particular were in the aware/salient group.\(^7\) These findings support one of my central claims that voters played a larger role in the realignment of the parties in the twentieth century. Since race policies tend to be salient and since voters are quite aware of the parties’ positions on race, voters are capable of acting independent of party elites when it comes to race issues. In the case of racial realignment, it is the race conservative Democrats who choose not to support their party’s race liberal policies. When conservative activists succeed in pushing the Republican Party elite to unite behind a race conservative agenda, race conservative Democrats were finally presented with a clear alternative and began to leave the Democratic Party. In Carsey and Layman’s terms, it can be said that these race conservatives changed sides, not minds.

In the following sections, I further differentiate my research and findings from the recent literature. With regard to approach, I focus both on national developments and an examination of California. California serves not just as a microcosm of national realignment, but also allows for a more thorough understanding of the transformation on race in a federal system of government. This study reveals how voters, state and national party actors interact to bring about or stall partisan change. I then discuss the under-utilized sources used in this study. I also bring attention to the substantive differences across civil rights proposals to show that party

\(^7\) Carsey and Layman, “Changing Sides or Changing Minds,” p. 468.
actors responded differently to non-economic issues than they did to economic and forced integration issues. Finally, I provide an overview of upcoming chapters, which presents my explanation of how racial realignment unfolded in both parties and across the state and national levels of government.

**How to Study Racial Realignment**

Taken together, the revisionist literature has greatly advanced the study of racial realignment and contributed to our understanding to the civil rights movement. I have several contentions, however, with the authors’ key arguments and sources. I argue against the one-pathway/one-site focus, the sources used, and the inattention to the substantive differences among civil rights issues.

*Using California to Understand National Party Change and Intra/Interparty Dynamics*

Many scholars like Sugrue (2008), Schickler (2013), Schickler et al. (2010), Feinstein and Schickler (2008), and Karol (2009) use either a national or regional lens to understand the partisan change on race. However, such an approach precludes an analysis of state-level actors, who laid the foundation for national party change. By studying the interaction between one state government and the national government, I have discovered that racial realignment did not occur in a vacuum. That is, voters as well as state and national politicians influenced one another to produce unified partisan positions on race. This is significant, for political change is not the province of just the rank-and-file supporters, or state actors, or national party leaders. Realignment can only occur when all partisans align their position on a given issue. In the case of racial realignment, California and national Democrats shifted their views on civil rights, and
adopted liberal positions well before presidential party candidates and the Democratic base. Republican voters realigned early on economic civil rights in the 1940s. Republican legislators, however, were divided between race conservative and moderate factions—a conflict that would only resolve when the party was purged of moderates. Thus, racial realignment was not complete, as both parties took different pathways to realignment. The parties would remain divided on civil rights until the 1970s when all party actors adopted polarizing positions, completing the realignment process.

California is relevant to the study of racial realignment for several reasons. Particularly in the case of the Republican Party, California is representative of intra-party dynamics that prevented party elites from fully realigning on race. California served as the breeding ground for conservative party leaders like William Knowland and Ronald Reagan. These conservatives had to vie for the heart of the Republican Party. But in order to succeed in the national party, they first had to win over California Republicans and move the state party to the right. Observing California allows me to examine the internal struggle within the Republican Party evident not only in California but also in the national party. Thus, California must be at the center of any comprehensive discussion of racial realignment since the national party realignment is intimately intertwined with the partisan pathways California elites and voters take throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.

Historians like Jeremy Mayer (2002) have discussed the shift from moderate to conservative within the Republican Party at the national level. The 1960 presidential election marked the last time that the Republican Party nominated a race moderate—Richard Nixon. Thereafter, Barry Goldwater, Nixon (after having moved to the right on race in 1968), and

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Ronald Reagan solidified the national party’s race conservative bona fides. While George Romney and Nelson Rockefeller attempted to keep the Republican Party moderate, conservatives succeeded in transforming the party on race in the late 1960s and 1970s.

An examination of California suggests that state-level trends informed the national movement in the Republican Party, thus making it an ideal case study to examine racial realignment. Graph A provides a view of Republican realignment in which the party shifts the focus of its ideological beliefs. The graph shows the adjusted R-square for a bivariate weighted regression of a policy variable on a candidate election. As the R-square increases, a greater percentage of the variance is explained by the policy in question. Policy variables were determined by using various California ballot initiatives across time. From 1940 to 1964, labor issues were at the center of the Republican Party. However, a shift happens in 1964, when race issues became salient. Thereafter, race would continue to influence Republican policy. As an issue, labor declined in significance in the early 1970s, so that by 1980, race and social issues dominated the Republican Party in California. This timeline of transformation within the California Republican Party aligned with national change. Political historians have detailed the shift from the party of business and anti-labor to the racially and socially conservative party at the national level. In the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, Republicans opposed civil rights that had a strong economic component—like fair employment practices—not because of race conservative preferences, but rather due to conservative economic beliefs. However, when the dominant ideological focus of the Republican Party shifted from economic to racial and social, Republicans began to oppose civil rights independent of economic concerns.

75 Lichtman, White Protestant Nation. See also Self, American Babylon; Swartz, Moral Minority; Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism.
Graph A. Bivariate Weighted Regressions: Issues and Republican vote choice in California

Labor, Race, Anti-Communism, and Social Conservatism in the Republican Vote, 1940-1980

Furthermore, the California Republican Party became increasingly important beginning in the 1950s. Since its inception in 1856, the Republican Party had held its convention in cities in the Northeast/Mid-Atlantic and Midwest, where it had received much of its support. Between 1856 and 1952, twenty-two of the twenty-five national conventions were held in these regions, with three held in the border states of Maryland and Missouri. The party had not ventured into the West for any of its conventions during this almost 100-year period. However, in 1956 and 1964, Republicans held their national convention in San Francisco’s Cow Palace. Not only did Republicans move westward but they also took their convention into the South six times between 1960 and 2012. Table A reveals a shift from the Midwest and Northeast to the South and the West, symbolizing the Republican Party’s change from the party of eastern business interests to the party of western individualism and southern conservatism.

Sources

While Carmines and Stimson (1989), Schickler (2013), Schickler et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2008), Karol (2009), and Jenkins et al. (2010) have collectively relied on a variety of sources including, but not limited to, roll call votes, survey responses, election returns, and archival materials, none have used these sources to explain how racial realignment evolved in a federal system. They explore the behavior or attitudes of actors at one-level of government. These studies have significantly contributed to our understanding of how a specific group of actors switched its race views. But by using a wider range of sources and broadening the analysis to include national and state actors, we can better understand how these actors responded to one another and the evolving political and racial climate to bring about the partisan shift on race in both parties.
Table A. Republican National Convention (RNC) Locations, 1856–1952 and 1956–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Number of Conventions</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Conventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Northeast/Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Border</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Number of Conventions</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Conventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Northeast/Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Border</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To undertake a comprehensive study of racial realignment, I expand on some of the sources used in the literature. I use survey questions on FEPC to extend the analysis back to 1940. The patterns revealed on these questions complements my analysis of voter behavior. In my study of voter behavior, I look at more than one racialized proposition to determine if voters are consistent in their behavior on civil rights across time. Between 1946 and 1972, four racialized initiatives appeared on the California ballot. I also use roll call votes in the California Assembly. Studying the behavior of California legislators allows me to contrast elected officials’ behavior across the state and national levels. I add to previous studies that relied on congressional roll call votes to determine partisan support for civil rights among national legislators, by utilizing bill introduction data.

I also employ archival sources, such as articles from California and national newspapers, internal FEPC memos, politicians’ paper collections, oral histories, congressional reports, and California Assembly journals. Many of these sources have been underutilized and thus shed new light on how racial realignment unfolded across California and the nation. This mixed-method approach helps provide a thorough analysis that, in my opinion, a qualitative or quantitative study alone could not accomplish.

*The Changing Nature of Civil Rights Issues*

The revisionist literature suggests that, prodded by their coalition partners, both parties’ congressmen were induced to realign on civil rights well before Johnson and Goldwater in 1964. I present evidence, however, that when taking into account more than just one civil rights issue, legislators at both the state and national levels were largely bipartisan in their support until the late 1960s. I find that the varying substantive nature of civil rights issues impacted levels of
partisanship in Congress. That is, civil rights issues without a strong economic component, like anti-lynching proposals, elicited much less partisanship than economic issues, namely FEPC. This partisan trend increases on the late 1960s and 1970s civil rights issues, such as affirmative action and busing, which were racialized more than earlier civil rights policies. These forced integration issues engendered a white conservative backlash previously absent from race issues. Thus, lacking in the revisionist literature is an exploration of how the changing nature of civil rights issues affected partisanship among Republicans and Democrats.

Upon examination of my survey findings, it became evident that partisanship varied based on the particular issue under observation. Therefore, to gain analytic leverage on how racial realignment unfolded, I make distinctions among three categories of civil rights issues that were the salient race questions at various points before, during, and after World War II. The three categories are: 1) non-economic issues, 2) economic issues, and 3) forced integration issues.

Non-economic civil rights sought to combat formal statutes in the South that disenfranchised African Americans. Disenfranchisement was most often accomplished through literacy tests and poll taxes. Taken together with entrenched practices of mob violence (lynching), these were the most salient civil rights issues up until World War II. Abolishing the poll tax and establishing anti-lynching laws were southern-directed civil rights battles that received more bipartisan support than economic civil rights and forced integration issues.

Economic civil rights became a part of the political landscape during World War II. The first time that an economic civil rights issue appeared on the national scene was in 1941 when President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802, creating a national Fair Employment Practices Committee. After the war, states, with New York leading the movement, began to experiment
with state-level FEPCs. The other key economic civil rights issue in the 1940s dealt with fair housing laws that sought to ban discrimination against prospective tenants because of their race, religion, or color. These two issues—fair employment practices and fair housing—were blended issues that invoked the powers of the State and Federal Governments. Many conservatives recoiled at the prospect of having the Federal Government interfere with business and housing. Some on the right called these policies “outright socialism.”76 Conservative journalists stated that, “Bills like the FEPC and the anti-discrimination laws are of communist origin,” and that FEPC was of “a new national disease that has grown of New Deal Marxism.”77 Others, like Republican Governor of California Earl Warren, understood that the government should have a role in attempting to lessen racial discrimination, but believed that the government could not speed up the process.78

Finally, forced integration issues emerged in the 1960s, as fair housing became increasingly controversial. Fair housing proposals in the 1940s concerned public housing. However, liberals attempted to extend fair housing legislation to private property owners. Thus, many white Americans began to view fair housing as forced integration. That is, by requiring private property owners to sell or rent to minorities, all-white neighborhoods would be subject to racial integration. In addition to concerns over integrated housing, white Americans were growing hostile toward liberal policies like busing and affirmative action. The changing tide in the nature of, and the support for, civil rights issues was quite evident in the case of public school integration. While the majority of white Americans outside of the South supported the decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), which desegregated public schools, many northerners

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78 On FEPC, Warren often took a moderate position, stating, “You can’t legislate change, but must educate the people…you can’t move too far ahead of the people.” Cray, *Chief Justice*, p. 166.
viewed busing as *forcing* integration on whites, and affirmative action in the school admissions process as reverse discrimination.\(^7^9\)

Distinguishing among civil rights has helped me determine that politicians and voters responded differently to these three sets of issues. In the following chapters, I will show that, on non-economic civil rights, voters and elected officials exhibited lower levels of partisanship. On forced integration issues and, to a lesser extent, economic civil rights, elected representatives in both the California and national legislatures exhibited a greater level of polarization than on non-economic civil rights issues. Thus, these distinctions must be made among civil rights issues to develop an explanation of racial realignment that does not hinge on all race issues, but rather those that directly impacted northerners and westerners.

**How to Explain Racial Realignment (Chapter Outlines)**

Moving beyond the one-pathway/one-site focus and utilizing a variety of sources, I posit an explanation of racial realignment that decenters the notion of a “first mover.” Scholars have focused on which actor moved first—state elites, national elites, or voters. Further, Carmines and Stimson (1989), Chen et al. (2008), Karol (2009), Jenkins et al. (2010), Schickler et al. (2010), and Schickler (2013) have focused on only one level of government and have assumed that both parties realigned in a similar fashion, thus limiting the explanation of racial realignment as a whole. While some accounts have suggested why sets of actors might have switched their race views—as a reaction to pressure from interest groups and coalition partners—they cannot explain why racial realignment occurred across levels of government and how it unfolded over time.

The search for a first mover is an unsatisfactory approach to analyzing racial realignment, as discovering who moved first is nearly impossible. Therefore, I argue for an explanation that considers the interplay among different sets of party actors over time. These actors—political intellectuals, policy demanders, administrative officials, voters, and state and national elected officials—had different motivations for either approving or disapproving of civil rights. Contrary to a single party and level of government analysis, I explore both inter- and intra-party movement to provide an alternative explanation of the realignment of race and party.

In Chapter 1, I explore the context within which racial realignment began to unfold. Acting on the growing discontent of African American leaders and race liberal advocates, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802 on June 25, 1941, and later Executive Order 9346 on May 27, 1943. These executive orders called for a national Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) in defense industries (E.O. 8802) and companies with government contracts, regardless of whether or not they were involved in the war effort (E.O. 9346).80 With these orders, the President, who was typically reticent on civil rights, signaled to the nation that he would use the Federal Government to carry out fair employment practices and advance racial equality in the workplace. In this chapter, I focus on the actions of the administrative officials who oversaw the Federal FEPC. This committee sought to eradicate race discrimination in the workplace and unions. Members of the Roosevelt administration responded to civil rights groups and the wartime climate of shifting demographics and racial discord with an increasing push for economic civil rights, which established the context in which other actors would realign on race. I also explore how the California electorate was particularly vulnerable to FEPC, and the court decisions to enforce non-discrimination in the workplace and housing market. Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco were industrial hubs for the war

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effort and thus were directly affected by the national FEPC. It is in this racialized environment that economic civil rights come to a vote in California.

In Chapter 2, I undertake an analysis of voter behavior in 1946 and 1948. Republican voters would express their disapproval of FEPC by overwhelmingly rejecting Proposition 11. They would continue to oppose economic civil rights policies at high rates every time racialized initiatives appeared on the ballot. I argue that Republican voters opposed FEPC and fair housing proposals not because of racial animosity, but because their conservative ideology constrained their support for such measures that would interfere with private initiatives. Thus, my narrative of racial realignment affords voters a more significant role than the Theory of Parties or Carmines and Stimson’s party leader-driven explanation.

Chapter 3 shows that California Democratic Assemblymen responded quickly to the race liberal policies implemented by the Roosevelt administration. When Congress cut funding for the Federal FEPC, effectively ending its operations, Democrats in the Assembly proposed and supported a bill for a state-level FEPC in early 1945. Since it failed to pass through the legislature, its main advocate—Augustus Hawkins—and liberal groups across the state succeeded in placing Proposition 11 on the 1946 general election ballot. Further, as Republican voters were making their conservatism clear on these ballot initiatives, Republican Assemblymen displayed less partisanship on FEPC and fair housing proposals in the 1940s and 1950s. Several Republicans in the Assembly supported FEPC legislation in 1945, 1946, 1955, and 1957. But by 1959, Republicans unified against FEPC, and subsequent fair housing legislation in the 1960s.

While this shift might partly be explained by acquiescing to their constituents’ preferences, I explore the group-driven alternative. In Chapter 4, I turn attention to the California gubernatorial election of 1958. It is in the Republican primary for this contest that
conservative activists gain control of the nomination process. The conservative nominee—William Knowland—helped move both the California and national parties to the right. His ideals rallied conservatives across the country. Further, his ultimate defeat left a void in the party leadership that would be filled by Barry Goldwater in 1964. In California, Knowland’s defeat resulted in a Democratic sweep. Democrats took over the governorship and won several seats in the state legislature, allowing for liberal legislation to be enacted, namely, FEPC in 1959 and fair housing legislation in 1963. In order to combat the liberal government in Sacramento, conservative Republicans began the process of ousting moderates in the state party so that by 1966, the California Republican Party nominated a conservative candidate for governor—Ronald Reagan. Reagan was much farther to the right than previous Republican governors (Earl Warren and Goodwin Knight), demonstrating the realignment of the party in California. The realignment at the state level is pivotal, since it allowed for the national parties to take divergent stances on race during the 1964 presidential campaign. Four years earlier, the parties placed race moderate candidates (John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon) on the ballot. During the 1964 contest, the polarization of the national parties first becomes evident. Following the lead of the state parties and of the persistent conservatism among Republican voters, Barry Goldwater and Lyndon B. Johnson took the national parties in two divergent directions on civil rights. Future presidential candidates would continue on the pathways set by the 1964 contenders, increasing the distance between the two national parties on race issues.

In Chapter 5, I look back to Carmines and Stimson’s critical moment of the 1964 presidential race and argue that it was indeed a pivotal point in the parties’ realignment. Without the national parties’ clear and unified cues, Democratic supporters, who up until the 1960s were a mix of race conservatives and race liberals, would not have been given the option to sort based
on their race views. I examine the downfall of liberalism and the rise of white backlash in California and nationally. White backlash (the resentment of race liberal policies that were perceived to give an undeserved advantage and opportunity to minorities) was a necessary component of racial realignment. Faced with the changing racial makeup of their towns, cities, counties, and states, race conservative white voters were ripe for the picking by the late 1960s and 1970s. I examine how Republican politicians, like Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan, capitalized on white backlash to attract race conservative whites from the Democratic Party, which in turn, left the Democratic base much more race liberal. This shift of race conservatives to the Republican Party completed the partisan transformation on race.

Finally, in the concluding chapter, I end with a discussion of the impact of Ronald Reagan. Reagan would pick up the mantle of conservatism, and use coded rhetoric to appeal to backlash voters. Reagan’s actions during his first run for the presidency in 1976 reveal the impact of racial realignment. Though he did not win the Republican nomination, Reagan gained much of his support in the primaries from white race conservatives. He was able to build a strategy that hinged on cementing race conservative votes through speeches against busing and affirmative action. In conclusion, I also reconsider the representative-voter relationship, and point out areas for future research.
Chapter 1: A Shock to the Status Quo: The Federal FEPC Comes to California, 1941–1945

A study of the twentieth century racial realignment must begin during the wartime period. World War II brought about several changes to northern and western cities that precipitated a shift away from bipartisan support that marked southern-directed civil rights, like anti-lynching laws. In this chapter, I discuss the push for FEPC by civil rights advocates and race liberal allies. I focus on the initial response to the Federal Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC)—the salient economic civil rights issue during the war. I then present and analyze the reaction to the federal committee in California using survey data, newspaper articles, and archival material, such as FEPC memoranda and correspondence between the FEPC and California employers.

Understanding the response to the most prominent postwar civil rights issue sheds light on just how much information Californians were receiving on FEPC, and whether or not it was portrayed in a partisan manner. If FEPC was perceived as a partisan issue, then I can assess whether or not partisans in the public were aligning their views with elite messages. On the other hand, if FEPC was not presented as an issue on which the parties had two distinct policies, then mass partisans and voters were left to develop their own views. Thus, recognizing the nature of, and response to, the Federal FEPC in California is pivotal to this study not only because FEPC was the first race issue to elicit partisan attitudes among Republican voters and Democratic legislators, but also because it allows me to determine whether or not these partisan attitudes in the public were the result of elite cues.

Urban areas like Los Angeles and San Francisco, which received large numbers of black migrants between 1940 and 1950 (see Table 1.1), were sites of racial conflict during the war. The sudden increase in the black population spurred racial conflict since many whites now had to
Table 1.1. *African American Population in California and Select Counties, 1930, 1940, and 1950*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>1% (81,048)</td>
<td>1% (124,306)</td>
<td>4% (462,172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alameda</td>
<td>2% (10,150)</td>
<td>2% (12,335)</td>
<td>10% (69,442)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contra Costa</td>
<td>0% (355)</td>
<td>0% (582)</td>
<td>7% (22,023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>2% (46,425)</td>
<td>3% (75,209)</td>
<td>6% (217,881)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>0% (3,803)</td>
<td>0% (4,846)</td>
<td>6% (43,502)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solano</td>
<td>0% (376)</td>
<td>1% (691)</td>
<td>6% (6,604)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresno</td>
<td>1% (1,363)</td>
<td>2% (2,812)</td>
<td>4% (11,492)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial</td>
<td>3% (1,954)</td>
<td>4% (2,356)</td>
<td>4% (2,605)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merced</td>
<td>1% (443)</td>
<td>2% (884)</td>
<td>4% (2,886)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpine</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Dorado</td>
<td>0% (24)</td>
<td>0% (34)</td>
<td>0% (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inyo</td>
<td>0% (14)</td>
<td>0% (15)</td>
<td>0% (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake</td>
<td>0% (5)</td>
<td>0% (5)</td>
<td>0% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariposa</td>
<td>0% (9)</td>
<td>0% (18)</td>
<td>0% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modoc</td>
<td>0% (11)</td>
<td>0% (12)</td>
<td>0% (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mono</td>
<td>0% (3)</td>
<td>0% (6)</td>
<td>0% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinity</td>
<td>0% (6)</td>
<td>0% (6)</td>
<td>0% (17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Note: The first number is the percentage of African Americans, taken by dividing the county’s total population by the number of African Americans. The number in parentheses is the raw total of African Americans in each county.*
face the reality of working with, and living in close proximity to, African Americans. The rapid demographic changes and racial discord provided the context for the fair employment battles that would unfold at the national, then the state, level in the 1940s.

This research reveals a conservative reaction on the part of Republicans, and a split Democratic response to fair employment practices in the public. I argue that Republican voters were unified in their opposition to economic civil rights, not because of racial animosity but rather that an anti-statist and conservative economic ideology constrained their views on blended race issues that necessitated federal intervention in the job market. Rank-and-file Democrats were divided in their reaction to fair employment because a sizeable number of Democrats in the mass public, particularly in California where many southern Democrats migrated to before the war, held race conservative views that prevented them from supporting race liberal legislation backed by the Democratic elite. I argue that the shifting racial makeup of the state and the push for race liberal policies by African American and liberal leaders tapped into race conservative attitudes that became apparent among white, working class workers who, at this time, held strong allegiances to the Democratic Party.

**Shifting Demographics, Racial Tension, and the Need for FEPC**

Like northern cities with war industries, California received a large number of southern black migrants who were looking for work in the early 1940s. Some counties, including Alameda, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, saw up to a four-fold increase in their African American population from 1930 to 1950 (see Table 1.1). The large number of black migrants

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82 Even as state and national Democratic elites were attempting to integrate African Americans into the New Deal coalition by endorsing economic civil rights like FEPC, the Democratic Party remained the party of the white working class. White working class voters continued to put Democrats in Congress and support the expansion of the welfare state into the 1950s. Teixeira and Abramowitz, “Decline of the White Working Class,” p. 7.
forced many white Californians to adapt to a new reality in which they had to live and work alongside African Americans. This inevitably brought racial discord into neighborhoods and workplaces.

Several instances in the early 1940s reveal how much racial tension permeated through California cities. The shooting of two black sailors by white marine military police sparked rioting among servicemen in Vallejo, California in 1942. The 1943 zoot suit riots saw days of violence between Latino and black youths and white marines in Los Angeles. Four hundred African Americans refused to join the black auxiliary of the AFL Boilermakers Union, Local 6 in San Francisco, which offered inferior benefits, and walked off the job in protest in 1943.

In addition to the incidents of racial violence reported in the newspapers, a House subcommittee examined the impact of black migrants streaming into California. The subcommittee provided in-depth studies of Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego—cities that were home to war industries. In Los Angeles, legislators and community activists acknowledged the problems posed by the influx of southern blacks into the city, particularly with regard to racial integration. Members of the subcommittee in charge of investigating congested areas (as part of the Committee on Naval Affairs) shed light on the race problem by revealing, “The trouble comes about of bringing into your community Negroes you are not used to and Negroes you do not want…And it is aggravated by putting them in the same community next to white people.”

In addition to workplace tension, African Americans came to Los Angeles in such large numbers that their crowded presence posed a health hazard due to the overuse of

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sewage and garbage disposal facilities. Race riots were of particular concern. The overpopulated living quarters of newly arrived southern blacks were hotbeds of violence. California legislators called for federal funds for recreational spaces, such as gymnasiums and swimming pools, to help keep young people off the streets.

San Francisco had similar problems. Acknowledging that the city had no “Negro problem” before the war, a physician reported to the subcommittee that African American migrants posed a health concern, as it was claimed that they had higher incidences of malaria and tuberculosis. This problem was compounded by substandard and congested living spaces. The city did not maintain racial segregation among wartime housing units, causing racial friction in the area. Like in Los Angeles, reports revealed that racial violence and delinquency was prevalent. On the other hand, San Diego did not have any reported incidences of riots or violence between white and black servicemen. Representative Edouard Izac (D-CA) suggested that the city’s segregated living quarters prevented race riots. The most pressing concern for San Diego was the lack of recreational spaces for black troops, who were starting to come to the area in increasing numbers in 1943.

The subcommittee’s findings revealed that the most pressing problems caused by the great increase in African American presence in non-southern cities were mainly social—race

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riots, health, and housing concerns. These cities were ill-prepared, both financially and socially, to deal with the arrival of African Americans who came in search of work. Rather than a gradual process during which whites could learn to work and live alongside blacks, the war brought about a rapid change to the racial makeup of northern and western cities. The war and the shifting demographics in these cities laid the foundation for federal legislation that would bring a fair employment practices commission to California to mitigate discrimination in the workforce.

It is important to note that the racial tension in California did not occur in a vacuum. That is, hostility toward African Americans in the 1940s can be seen as an extension of racial prejudice against Chinese, and later Japanese-Americans. Chinese immigrants began arriving in California in large numbers in the 1850s, and would continue to come until the 1880s, when national legislation was passed to restrict Chinese immigration. In the 1850s, many Chinese immigrants came to work in the gold mines. They would also find work in agriculture, factories, and labor on the railroads. The Chinese population in California, according to the U.S. Census, jumped from 34,933 in 1860 (the first year they were listed as a racial category) to 49,277 in 1970. By 1880, the population rose to 75,132. This influx of Chinese settlers helped to unify a white, anti-immigrant workers’ movement, which was grounded in racist attitudes. These anti-Chinese attitudes stem back to before the immigrants came to the country in large numbers. The emergence of a negative image of the Chinese people can be seen in the 1840s, when traders, diplomats, and missionaries reported their impressions of their interaction with the Chinese migrants. Newspapers contributed to spreading the negative idea that the Chinese were uncivilized and carriers of disease.

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95 See Saxton, *The Indispensable Enemy*; Daniels, *Asian America*.
96 See Miller, *The Unwelcome Immigrant*. 
Racist attitudes against the Japanese would emerge in California in the first half of the twentieth century. In 1913, the California Legislature passed the Alien Land Law. This law, strengthened by the success of Proposition 1 in 1920, prevented Japanese immigrants—the Issei ("first-generation" in Japanese)—from acquiring and keeping the land they already possessed. It also forbade the transfer of their land to their children, the second-generation, or Nisei. Proposition 1 was endorsed by Governor Hiram Johnson and passed with three-quarters of the vote. Many rural farmers, who were also Democrats, backed the Alien Land Law as a way to prevent Japanese immigrants from acquiring land that would make them competitive in the agricultural sector. As early as 1908, the national Democratic Party had adopted the Japanese issue as its own. During that year’s presidential election, the slogan of many in the party was, “Labor’s choice [is] Bryan—Japs’ choice [is] Taft.”

Japanese hostility would continue to have a prominent presence in the Democratic Party up until World War II when President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9906, which interned over 100,000 Japanese on the West Coast. Roosevelt had the support of key Democrats, including California’s Governor, Culbert Olsen, to take this action to quell anxiety during the war. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) also endorsed internment, regarding the Japanese as “disloyal aliens.” When the government began to release internees for work assignments in the Midwest and East, AFL locals in California rallied to show their opposition. Historian Dana Frank found that, in May 1943, members of Carpenters’ Local No. 266 in Stockton “voted unanimously to protest the releasing of the Japanese” from internment camps. As some Japanese began to return to the state, in December 1944, the Stanislaus County

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99 Robinson, By Order of the President, p. 127.
100 Robinson, By Order of the President, pp. 96 and 126; Kurashige, The Shifting Grounds of Race, p. 120.
Central Labor Council also “voted unanimously to protest the return of the Japanese to the State of California until after the War.”¹01 A union secretary in Boston, John Kearney, provided a summary of white hostility toward the Japanese:

Kearney linked his own 1944 hostility toward Japanese Americans with prewar anti-Asian hostility among West Coast white workers. Since well before the war, he noted, the trade unions of California “have witnessed the destruction of their work standards and wage structures by the Japanese, and they have seen the scheming designs of the Japanese…No war hysteria has caused this condition, as it has been one of steady growth for years.”¹02

Kearney’s explanation of white workers’ attitudes toward the Japanese speaks to the racist impulse within the Democratic Party during the mid-twentieth century.

This history of racist sentiment toward Asians is significant, as it is likely that many Democrats rejected FEPC and black civil rights because of the vein of racial prejudice that ran through the party since the Chinese arrived in large numbers in the mid-nineteenth century.

During World War II, the leadership and the members of the AFL held racist views toward African Americans, believing that they were “not sufficiently skilled,” they were “not sufficiently educated, intelligent, and healthy,” and they showed a “tendency to shirk responsibility and be lazy.” Just as unions and companies would keep black workers segregated from white employees, industries in the San Francisco Bay area, including Western Pipe and Steel, Marinship, and Kaiser, organized their Chinese workers into separate, all-Chinese crews.

According to Charlotte Brooks, who has studied the history of Asian-Americans in California:

Foremen, many of them longtime members of historically anti-Asian AFL unions, justified this segregation in ways that revealed nativism’s perseverance in area labor markets. At Moore Dry Dock, managers blamed segregation on Chinese American language difficulties, even though almost eighty percent of the Chinese Americans at the company spoke English. In reality, the system of segregation both paralleled the isolation of Chinese Americans in the prewar Bay Area and perpetuated it; black and

¹01 Frank, *Buy American*, p. 120.
¹02 Frank, *Buy American*, pp. 120-121.
white employees in the same crews at least interacted, while Chinese American men had far less contact with people of other backgrounds.\textsuperscript{103}

These nativist attitudes, grounded in stereotypes that stem back to the mid-nineteenth century,\textsuperscript{104} would persist and only start to fade after the Sino-American alliance and the repeal of Chinese exclusion laws in 1943.\textsuperscript{105}

In the next chapter, I argue that a significant portion of the Democratic base in California harbored race conservative attitudes. In 1946, anti-Japanese sentiment could be seen in the partisan results of Proposition 16—a ballot initiative that sought to ban the alien poll tax that targeted Japanese-Americans. Republicans overwhelmingly supported the measure, while almost half of the Democratic voters rejected it. Similarly, about half of the Democratic base rejected FEPC, which appeared on the same ballot as Proposition 16. Based on this evidence, I suggest that the Democratic Party was home to race conservatives, who would only leave the party when the Republican elite unified on a race conservative message in the 1960s.

\section*{The President’s Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC): Authority and Structure}

Because of the demographic changes and racial hostility in states like California, civil rights leaders began to shift their focus from the South and onto the North and West.\textsuperscript{106} The battle over employment discrimination would be paramount for civil rights advocates during and after World War II.\textsuperscript{107} African Americans were often denied jobs outright since many employment applications required applicants to state his or her race. When they were hired, blacks were relegated to the lowest-ranking jobs and, because of union discrimination, were the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[103] Brooks, \textit{Alien Neighbors, Foreign Friends}, p. 145.
\item[104] A prominent and pervasive stereotype about the Chinese that would emerge when they first arrived in large numbers in the last half of the nineteenth century was that they were disease carriers. Brooks, \textit{Alien Neighbors, Foreign Friends}, p. 100.
\item[107] Ruchames, \textit{Race, Jobs, and Politics}, p. 4; Sugrue, \textit{Sweet Land of Liberty}, p. 70.
\end{footnotes}
first to be fired. Discrimination was not isolated to the private sector; it was common in
government agencies as well.\textsuperscript{108} Thus, the influx of African Americans into the North and West
necessitated federal recognition of, and action against, discrimination in the workplace.

Prior to the establishment of the Federal Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC)
in 1941, the National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC) sought to limit racial
discrimination. On August 31, 1940, the NDAC issued instructions that “workers should not be
discriminated against because of age, sex, race, or color.” The NDAC established the Office of
Production Management (OPM), which consisted of the Negro Employment and Training and
the Minority Groups branches. These offices facilitated minority employment and put pressure
on a few government contract holders to eliminate workplace discrimination. Still, race
discrimination was the norm in government and in private industries. Local chapters of the
United States Employment Services (USES), which was established during the Great Depression
to provide employment, discriminated against African Americans by placing them in menial
jobs, even when they were highly skilled.\textsuperscript{109} Further, local officials would import white labor
from nearby cities, despite having qualified blacks in their municipalities.\textsuperscript{110}

Both Democrats and Republicans introduced bills to remedy racial discrimination in
defense industries. An early proposal to ban racial discrimination in employment was introduced
by Thomas Ford (D-CA) on February 5, 1941. H.R. 3096 sought to bar discrimination against
persons “employed or seeking employment on national defense or other Government contracts

\textsuperscript{109} African Americans also faced job insecurity relative to white workers. In a summary statement released by the
War Manpower Commission, it was warned, “unless safeguards are established, minority group workers may be
faced with greater economic insecurity than majority groups, because of discriminatory lay-off or cut-back
patterns.” Lawrence Oxley (Senior Technician—Minority Groups Service, Bureau of Placement, War Manpower
San Francisco, Box 7, Folder Title “Reports, Analysis, Correspondence, Richmond.”
\textsuperscript{110} Kesselman, \textit{Social Politics of FEPC}, pp. 11-12
because of the age, sex, race, or color of such persons.” On March 13, 1941, Vito Marcantonio (AL-NY), a former Republican who became a member of the American Labor Party in the late 1930s, introduced H.R. 3994 in the 77th Congress. This bill sought to “prohibit discrimination by any agency supported in whole or in part with funds appropriated by the Congress of the United States of America, and to prohibit discrimination against persons employed or seeking employment on Government contracts because of race, color, or creed.”

A few months later, on May 2, Ulysses Guyer (R-KS) introduced H.R. 4612, which would prevent “discrimination against persons on account of race, color, or creed in the distribution and enjoyment of employment opportunities made possible by national defense contracts.” All of these bills were referred to, and ultimately died in, the Committee on the Judiciary.

These failed attempts led to more frustration among African American workers over the hypocritical treatment they received by the government. Even before the United States entered the war, the government used democratic symbols in an effort to unify Americans against the Axis powers. Such symbolism rang hollow for African Americans. Because of the mounting grievances against the government, the time was ripe for action. Taking up the cause, A. Philip Randolph, a prominent black civil rights leader, called a conference of top African American leaders in February 1941 to discuss how to secure a more equitable share of defense jobs for

114 Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty, p. 58.
115 Randolph gained prominence in the 1920s and 30s as the founder of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, the first labor organization for African Americans to receive a charter in the AFL. Bynum, A. Philip Randolph, p. 23.
black workers. Out of this conference emerged the March on Washington Movement (MOWM). Randolph used the black press to rally African Americans together to force the Federal Government to take action. Through the press, he called for a national march on Washington to take place on July 1, 1941. Though many thought it was unlikely that Randolph could produce a massive crowd of protestors, President Roosevelt did not want to risk the international embarrassment and domestic strife that a march could cause. The president realized the need for internal unity during the war, and feared “possible international reaction to the proposed march in a period of delicate foreign relations” and thus yielded to the pressure. The president authorized Fiorello LaGuardia—New York City Mayor and Director of Civilian Defense, which was a federal war agency—and Eleanor Roosevelt to draft an executive order that resembled the bills proposed by Congressmen Ford, Marcantonio, and Guyer.

Executive Order 8802 was issued on June 25, 1941. It read:

Whereas it is the policy of the United States to encourage full participation in the national defense program by all citizens of the United States, regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin, in the firm belief that the democratic way of life within the Nation can be defended successfully only with the help and support of all groups within its borders.

In addition to this declaration in support of nondiscrimination in defense industries, it also established a Committee on Fair Employment Practice (commonly referred to as the Fair

\[\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{116} Kesselman, Social Politics of FEPC, p. 14.}}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{117} Eleanor Roosevelt reported back to her husband that Randolph’s plans were firm. She urged the president to act for both moral and political reasons. He agreed, but would only go so far as to prohibit discrimination in defense plants. He refused to address the issue of segregation in the armed forces, which was another one of Randolph’s concerns. “Fair Employment Practices Committee,” The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project website, George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teaching/glossary/fepc.cfm. Accessed February 1, 2014. Eleanor Roosevelt and Fiorello LaGuardia would also fight to keep FEPC alive after the war. They met with Randolph once again at Madison Square Garden in February 1946 to attend the Rally to Save the FEPC when Congress threatened to abolish it. Black, Casting Her Own Shadow: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Shaping of Postwar Liberalism, pp. 54-55.}}\]

Employment Practices Committee, or FEPC) in the Office of Production Management. The Committee consisted of five members and a chairman that was appointed by the president.

According to the Executive Order, the Committee was “to receive and investigate complaints of discrimination in violation of the provisions of this order” and to take “appropriate steps” to remedy valid grievances. It could also “recommend further measures to the government and the President necessary to carry out the order.” The Committee was obliged to delegate investigations to the Negro Employment and Minority Groups branches of OPM. Furthermore, the Committee’s jurisdiction was limited to industries under government contract, and to government agencies concerned with vocational and training programs.

The procedures of the Committee were as follows. When a citizen filed a complaint, the Committee would engage in informal negotiations with the parties to secure voluntary compliance with the non-discrimination principle. The Committee would hold hearings where widespread discrimination was reported, and allow employers the opportunity to defend themselves at these hearings. If biases were found, the Committee would issue orders instructing the guilty party to take “appropriate steps to obtain elimination of such discrimination.”¹¹⁹ The Executive Order, however, did not grant judicial enforcement powers so the FEPC could not force intransigent employers to comply with its orders. Rather, the Committee would issue press releases to inform the public on which companies and unions complied with or refused FEPC directives. In one press release, for example, the FEPC highlighted organizations, such as the Kaiser Company and the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation, which complied with its orders. The press release also revealed that the International Brotherhood of Boilermaker, Iron Ship Builders and Helpers of America, an AFL affiliate, refused to grant African Americans full membership.

¹¹⁹ “FEPC Proceedings,” Records of the Fair Employment Practice Commission, Region XII San Francisco, The National Archives at San Francisco, Box 1, Folder: C [Administration Files], pp. 3-5.
and was under FEPC orders to accept blacks into their ranks.\textsuperscript{120} Thus, the FEPC attempted to pressure employers and unions to adopt non-discrimination policies by bringing public attention to these organizations.

FEPC ran into a roadblock when, in January 1942, the OPM was abolished and the Committee was transferred first to the War Production Board, and later to the War Manpower Commission (WMC). Proponents of civil rights protested the move to the WMC, as they were fully aware that the WMC’s chairman, Paul McNutt, was not friendly toward the FEPC’s mission. McNutt essentially weakened FEPC, as the Committee had to rely on the WMC to report all discrimination cases, which the WMC often did not do. The WMC ignored many of the Committee’s policies, and McNutt canceled public hearings in late 1942 and early 1943. The battle between the WMC and FEPC would continue until the Committee was transferred in 1943, with the WMC effectively undermining FEPC’s influence and weakening its effectiveness.

On May 27\textsuperscript{th}, 1943, President Roosevelt resurrected FEPC when he signed Executive Order 9346, which strengthened the committee by removing it from the hostile WMC and placing it in the Office for Emergency Management (OEM) in the Executive Office of the President (EOP).\textsuperscript{121} Though its functions remained similar to the previous committee—it was authorized to make recommendations to federal agencies and the President for full utilization of manpower, and hold hearings to uncover discriminatory practices—one key addition was a clause that extended anti-bias clauses to include all government contracts and subcontracts:

All contracting agencies of the Government of the United States shall include in all contracts hereafter negotiated or renegotiated by them a provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{120} Press Release, March 28, 1945, President’s Committee on Fair Employment Practice, Region XII San Francisco, The National Archives at San Francisco, Box 7, Folder: FEPC George Johnson [Deputy Chairman].

\end{footnotesize}
of race, creed, color, or national origin and requiring him to include a similar provision in all subcontracts.\textsuperscript{122}

Thus, any company that entered into a government contract had to abide by non-discriminatory practices, as did any company that was hired by the contracting partner.

The second Committee organized by Executive Order 9346 included six part-time members and a full-time chairman to be appointed by the president. The Committee was reorganized into four divisions: administration, field operations, review and analysis, and the legal or hearing division. Under the division of field operations, twelve regional offices and many sub-offices were eventually created to handle local complaints more effectively. For the fiscal year ending in June 1944, FEPC’s expenditures reached $431,609 ($5,842,662 in today’s dollars\textsuperscript{123}). While small compared to other government agencies, it was three times more than FEPC had to work with during the previous year.\textsuperscript{124}

Once established, the Federal FEPC was the most salient civil rights issue during the war. It would receive widespread attention in mainstream and ethnic newspapers. Its presence had an impact in California, as the state was home to shipyards and industries critical to the war effort. FEPC hearings would be held in Los Angeles, where there were thousands of complaints against discriminatory employers and unions. The attitudes toward FEPC, revealed in surveys and primary sources, suggest possible motivations for each of the parties’ bases. I argue that Republican supporters were opposed to economic civil rights, like FEPC, because of ideological


\textsuperscript{124} Ruchames, \textit{Race, Jobs, and Politics}, p. 57.
concerns; they did not support legislation that would use Federal Government power to interfere with private initiatives. A sizeable number of Democrats, however, were not responding in accordance with their economic liberal beliefs but rather opposed FEPC because of race conservative attitudes.

Analyzing Mass Attitudes on FEPC

In 1945, Gallup polls began asking questions about fair employment practices. The questions and wording varied, which allows me to draw conclusions about why California partisans responded differently to the FEPC issue. A study of Republican survey respondents suggests an ideological, not a racial, motivation against FEPC. In 1945, only 41% of white Republican respondents (those who voted for Thomas Dewey for president) stated that they supported a law that would prohibit employers from discriminating against potential employees based on race. However, when questions were stripped of economic implications, 79% of Republican respondents revealed in a 1947 survey that they would work with someone of a different race.

The majority of white Democrats supported an abstract FEPC law in which employers could not discriminate against applicants based on race. In 1945, 60% of Roosevelt’s voters

126 I did not include black respondents since I am primarily interested in white voters’ attitudes toward race issues. Further, I look to all northern and western respondents. In addition, since the California sample size was small (less than 140 respondents for each survey), I included all non-southern respondents (between 1,200-1,525 respondents for each survey) to better gauge white attitudes to FEPC.
127 In 1945, Gallup asked “Do you favor or oppose a law in this state which would require employers to hire a person if he is qualified for the job, regardless of his race or color?” “Gallup Poll #349,” The Gallup Organization, June 14-20, 1945, Form K, Question 7.
128 The 1947 survey asked, “Would you, yourself, be willing to work at your job along side someone of a different religion, race, or color?” “Gallup Poll #407,” The Gallup Organization, November 7-12, 1947, Form T, Question 13.
stated that they support such a law.¹²⁹ In a 1947 survey, the percentage of Democratic support in the masses jumped to 72%.¹３⁰ However, Democratic support for FEPC lessened when the question shifted focus from employers to employees. When asked whether or not they would support a law that would “require employees to work along side persons of any race or color,” only 47% of Roosevelt’s supporters answered in the affirmative.¹³¹ These percentages reveal that a majority of mass Democrats supported a fair employment law in principle, perhaps because they recognized that such legislation was in alignment with their economic liberal views. However, there was a hesitance within the Democratic base to accept a law that would require employees to work with African American co-workers, suggesting that they, themselves, would not want to work in an integrated workplace.

While it is nearly impossible to know whether attitudes on FEPC were motivated by racial animosity, since survey respondents were not asked any questions that would clearly reveal their race attitudes, I argue that a large segment of the Democratic Party at this time, even outside of the South, was comprised of race conservative whites. Therefore, these race conservative Democrats prevented the mass party from aligning their economic liberalism with racially progressive policies. The alternative explanation—some Democrats were unwilling to accept FEPC legislation and/or work with someone of a different race because they feared increased job competition—does not hold. If fear of heightened job competition was driving the decline in support for FEPC among Democrats, then support for FEPC should have remained

¹²⁹ “Gallup Poll #349,” Form K, Question 7.
¹３⁰ The survey was split in 1947. The percentage reported is the average rate of support for the FEPC law. On Form K, Question 12B asked, “Would you favor or oppose such a law for all the states (in which an employer could not refuse to hire any person for a job because of his religion, race, or color)”? Seventy-four percent of FDR voters said they favored the law. On Form T, Question 12 asked, “Do you favor or oppose a Federal law (for all the states) which would require employers to hire a person if he is qualified for the job—regardless of his nationality, religion, race, or color?” In this case, 69% of FDR voters supported the law. “Gallup Poll #407,” Form K, Question 12B and Form T, Question 12.
¹³¹ The question asked, “Would you favor or oppose a state law which would require employees to work along side persons of any race or color?” “Gallup Poll #349,” Form T, Question 7.
constant, despite the differences in the wording of the questions. A federal or state FEPC law would, by its nature, integrate the work place and increase competition for white workers and thus should generate similar results as the question that poses FEPC as a personal issue that would impact the respondent. I will elaborate on this argument in the next chapter, by demonstrating that voters in precincts with a miniscule number of African Americans (in which job competition would be non-existent because these precincts had a very small—less than 1%—black population) still supported Proposition 11—the 1946 FEPC ballot initiative—in strikingly similar numbers as precincts with a large number of African Americans. In precincts with a larger black population—over 5%—job competition would be greater and, thus, I should have observed an overall increase in opposition to the FEPC ballot initiative. Taken together with the mixed level of Democratic support for workplace integration evident in the 1947 Gallup survey, I move away from job competition, and pose an argument grounded in race conservatism to explain the divided response to economic civil rights on the part of Democratic supporters.

Another conclusion that can be drawn from the change in wording from the abstract to the personal is that Republican opposition to FEPC was likely not rooted in racial animosity. In the 1947 survey, the percentage of white Republicans who responded that they would work alongside someone of a different color increased to 79% (up from only 41% who supported FEPC in the abstract in 1945). This survey revealed a 38-percentage point increase in Republican supporters’ willingness to work in an integrated workplace, compared to support for FEPC legislation. This suggests that opposition to FEPC had more to do with ideology, and less about interest or racial animosity. This suggests that Republicans, unlike many Democrats, were

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132 In 1945, Gallup asked “Do you favor or oppose a law in this state which would require employers to hire a person if he is qualified for the job, regardless of his race or color?” “Gallup Poll #349,” The Gallup Organization, June 14-20, 1945, Form K, Question 7. The 1947 survey asked, “Would you, yourself, be willing to work at your job alongside someone of a different religion, race, or color?” “Gallup Poll #407,” The Gallup Organization, November 7-12, 1947, Form T, Question 13.
less concerned about workplace integration and the possibility of having to work alongside African Americans, and were more hostile toward government intervention in their business affairs—an ideological motivation. Clearly, there was still a portion of the Republican rank-and-file supporters that were exhibiting race conservative attitudes. However, the focus on the Republican Party must be on the majority who opposed FEPC legislation, yet displayed an overwhelming willingness to work with people of a different color. These Republicans were not motivated by race conservative attitudes but rather ideological opposition to laws that would limit the free market.

The Democratic Base Divided on FEPC: A Case of Racial Prejudice?

In addition to court decisions, such as *James v. Marinship* (1944), in which the California Supreme Court unanimously ruled that if an employer entered into a closed-shop contract, the union must be open to every worker, regardless of race, the Federal FEPC was not well received by white workers in the Democratic Party. The white working class Democrat was particularly affected by the *Marinship* decision, and the FEPC’s orders to companies to hire

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133 The Marinship Corporation operated various shipyards in California and was involved in the building of ships and vessels during the war. An African American welder, Joseph James, led a protest of the African American Boilermakers auxiliary. This auxiliary to the Boilermakers Local 6 union—Auxiliary A 41—was created to meet the requirements of a closed shop agreement that mandated that all shipyard workers join a union. However, A 41 was a non-voting membership, despite the fact that A 41’s members paid the same union dues as white workers. Further, its members were often discriminated against because of their race. They were among the first fired and frequently passed over for promotion in favor of their white counterparts. James, along with 200 other African Americans, was fired for walking out on the job in November 1943. Wollenberg, “James vs. Marinship.” James filed a lawsuit against Marinship and the case went before the California Supreme Court in 1944. Thurgood Marshall, who would later become the first black justice on the Supreme Court bench, argued the case against Marinship. The Marinship Corporation and the Boilermakers argued that the union contract required the segregated local union and mandated that African Americans pay dues to the auxiliary. The court rejected that argument stating in its ruling, “The foregoing illustrations drawn from the complaint and the union rules clearly establish substantial discrimination against Negro workers who accept membership in the auxiliary local. Since they are denied union membership on terms of equality with other workers, the case is the same as if they were wholly denied the privilege of membership.” The unanimous decision in favor of James and the other workers held that, if a closed-shop contract was in place and that workers must be union members in order to work, then unions could not be closed to any members based on their race or any other arbitrary conditions. “Primary Documents,” *James v. Marinship* (1944), University of Washington faculty website—Dr. Quintard Taylor, http://faculty.washington.edu/qtaylor/documents_us/james_v_marinship.htm. Accessed September 7, 2013.
African Americans. To California Democrats, the FEPC’s presence meant that race conservative Democrats would have to work in an integrated workforce. As a result, many white workers were hostile toward the Federal FEPC.

Minorities in the state, however, found FEPC to be an outlet for their frustrations. Once the western regional office of the FEPC opened on July 1, 1943, it received numerous complaints. In a February 1944 report, Committee Chairman Malcolm Ross stated that there were “a progressively mounting number of new cases, averaging more than 300 a month.” There were 1,016 cases on the FEPC docket when regional offices were established on July 1, 1943. In the following six months and by the beginning of 1944, the committee had received 1,930 more cases of alleged discrimination on the part of employers. The majority of these cases involved complaints about war industries and their affiliated unions. While many of these cases were dismissed because of lack of merit and/or insufficient evidence (464 cases) and some were withdrawn by the complainant (123 cases), still 359 of the 989 closed cases were satisfactorily adjusted, while about half of the cases remained open at the time of the report. Racial discrimination was the basis of most complaints, with 72% of cases involving African Americans. Jewish workers filed 13% of complaints, with the Japanese and other “alien groups” issuing the remaining 15% of complaints. Among the most aggrieved were African American women. Field examinations revealed that there was “considerable reluctance to hire Negro women…even in some firms which already employ Negro males. The Negro women have been the last hired in most industries and are already being laid off in large numbers.”

white employment is either 0 or possibly 1 or 2.” For example, the Union Oil Company in Richmond, California employed 247 white women and 1 black woman as of May 1, 1944.136

The overwhelming presence of race discrimination in companies and industries across the western part of the country was clear. Less apparent, however, was the response of white workers to the FEPC and its orders. Assessing the response of white workers reveals why the Democratic Party’s rank-and-file supporters were divided on the issue of FEPC and economic civil rights in general. How did the core of the Democratic Party—working class whites—react to the possibility of an integrated workforce? Letters, internal memos of the FEPC, and newspaper coverage reveal that white workers were hesitant to accept African Americans because of anti-black attitudes.

Anti-black sentiment was so prevalent in California that, in a study of the ninety-eight most important war industries, “nine establishments employed 89% of the Negroes, with forty-nine employing only a few Negroes in custodial and janitorial positions, while forty of the large establishments employed no non-whites.”137 When they were hired, African Americans were routinely relegated to menial jobs. In a March 28, 1945 memo, FEPC examiner Edward Rutledge noted that the bulk of the black working population (40,000) employed in military depots, shipyards, and naval establishments worked as janitors or laborers. Because unions would refuse to refer black workers for employment or accept them as members, blacks could not receive the training necessary to advance to crafts, like machinists, electricians, pipefitters,

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136 Letter to Mr. Edward Rutledge, From Mr. A.L. Sharee, Liaison Officer of the Manpower Utilization Division of the War Manpower Commission, June 9, 1944, Region XII San Francisco, The National Archives at San Francisco, Box 7, Folder Title “Reports, Analysis, Correspondence, Richmond,” p. 1.  
137 Memorandum to Mr. Will Maslow, Director of Field Operations, From Mr. Edward Rutledge, Examiner-in-Charge, March 17, 1945, Region XII San Francisco, The National Archives at San Francisco, Box 7, Folder: “FEPC Will Maslow Policy,” p. 2. See also letter to Mr. Sam Kagel, State Manpower Director of the War Manpower Commission, From Mr. Edward Rutledge, Examiner-in-Charge, June 19, 1944, Region XII San Francisco, The National Archives at San Francisco, Box 7, Folder: “Reports, Analysis, Correspondence, Oakland,” p. 1. Rutledge found similar statistics in Oakland specifically. He stated that of seventy-nine employers, seven employed 90% of the total non-whites.
and steamfitters.\textsuperscript{138} African Americans who were able to secure work were often passed up for a promotion, as companies had a “tendency...to retain some of the higher paying jobs for white workers.”\textsuperscript{139}

Those working for the FEPC attributed such discrimination against African American workers to racial animus. In a letter to the Los Angeles Railway Company, it was noted that the company rejected minority workers “not because they were unqualified, but solely because they were women, or were of Mexican origin or were Negroes.” It was also stated that the company claimed that it did not hire minorities because whites objected to the presence of non-white workers.\textsuperscript{140}

An internal memo between the chairman of the Washington DC central office and the regional director of the FEPC in charge of promoting anti-discrimination policies in California also implied that racial tensions were motivating discriminatory job practices. Regional Director Harry Kingman proposed a pamphlet that would be distributed to companies in an attempt to promote FEPC policies. The pamphlet would help management transition from an all-white to an integrated workforce. It included suggestions, such as “Choose the first minority workers carefully...Sometimes place them in a department where there is a high turnover, so that the white workers feel no vested interest.” Other advice included, “Try to avoid situations which might lead to trouble, as for example when Northern Negroes are placed in close proximity to

\textsuperscript{138} Interestingly, the memo points out that the FEPC examiners did not find “discrimination to exist in Northern California with respect to wages and hours. Equal pay for equal work appears to be an established fact in this area.” However, the main point is soon repeated: “We have observed, however, that Negroes and Mexicans are employed in a number of establishments at the most arduous labor and some of the dirtiest jobs. This has resulted largely from the prejudices of the supervisorial staff of private and Government establishments.” Memorandum to Mr. Will Maslow, Director of Field Operations, From Mr. Edward Rutledge, Examiner-in-Charge, March 17, 1945, Region XII San Francisco, The National Archives at San Francisco, Box 7, Folder: “FEPC Will Maslow Policy,” p. 2.

\textsuperscript{139} Memorandum to Mr. Will Maslow, Director of Field Operations, From Mr. Edward Rutledge, Examiner-in-Charge, March 17, 1945, Region XII San Francisco, The National Archives at San Francisco, Box 7, Folder: “FEPC Will Maslow Policy,” p. 3.

\textsuperscript{140} Letter to Mr. P.B. Harris, President of the Los Angeles Railway Company, From Mr. Clarence Johnson, Field Representative, Minorities Division, War Manpower Commission, Region XII San Francisco, The National Archives at San Francisco, Box 1, Folder: “Los Angeles Railway,” p. 1.
Southern whites.” Perhaps the most telling suggestion that points toward racial hostility and fear of minorities was the recommendation to keep restrooms clean, and to bring in a physician to explain to the workers the “relative unlikeliness of an infection.” The pamphlet did not include any statements on job competition or loss, thus suggesting that economic interests were not as salient in white workers’ minds as was racial animosity.

The early hearings held in Los Angeles also shed light on how the FEPC’s orders to hire or promote more African Americans were received by the unions that represented working class whites. On November 19-20, 1943, the committee, headed by Malcolm Ross, who served as a press agent for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), ordered the appearance of the AFL International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers, Iron Ship Builders and Helpers, and of AFL Metal Trades Council Union (also referred to as the AFL Boiler Makers’ Union), among other unions and companies at the FEPC hearings held in the Embassy Auditorium in downtown Los Angeles. Complaints suggested that companies refused to employ blacks in higher skilled jobs, or to promote them after training and experience, and the demotion of blacks within the organization. With regard to unions, African American complainants alleged that they were denied membership in some AFL unions and were thus told that they would be fired if they did not join the union, forcing some of them into “Jim Crow” auxiliaries in which they paid dues but had no voting rights or privileges. FEPC officials notified thirteen officials of the AFL Boiler Makers’ Union to attend the hearings. None of them responded nor attended the hearing, and refused to comply with the committee’s orders. Representative argued that the FEPC could not dictate a union’s internal policy, and that it could only be altered by a national convention of

141 Letter to Mr. George Johnson, Deputy Chairman, From Mr. Harry Kingman, Regional Director, November 12, 1943, Region XII San Francisco, The National Archives at San Francisco, Box 7, Folder: “FEPC George Johnson,” p. 1.
143 “FEPC Hearings Ignored by Unions, Cos.,” Afro-American, November 27, 1943, p. 1.
union leaders. While these early hearings reveal an aversion to the FEPC based on its interference with union activities, the sessions held a few months later suggest that this disdain for federal intervention stemmed not from an ideological, anti-statist belief but rather from a refusal of many whites to work alongside African Americans.

On August 9, 1944, the Fair Employment Practices Committee ordered the Los Angeles Railway Corporation to “cease and desist from refraining to hire Negroes as streetcar conductors, motormen and bus drivers or to promote present Negro employees, when qualified, to such jobs.” The order came after over a dozen African Americans had filed a grievance with the FEPC against the Railway Corporation between 1943, when the regional office was established, and 1944. Complainants charged that the corporation had refused to hire them despite their qualifications. Further, some of the complaints suggested that company officials riled up racial tension by “recruiting” nearly 200 women employees to quit if blacks were hired.

In an unofficial statement issued to the Los Angeles Times a week before the hearings, a representative of the company stated that the Railway Corporation “made a concentrated drive for Negro employees more than a year ago and failed to fill any vacancies.” Further, when white employees learned of the company’s efforts, several threatened to walk off the job in protest. In the Los Angeles hearings, held over August 8th and 9th, the corporation did not outright deny the charge, however, representatives stated that the Railway Corporation would comply with the national policy of nondiscrimination, as articulated in Executive Order 9346. Despite this statement, representatives of both the corporation and the affiliated AFL Amalgamated

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Association of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees\textsuperscript{148} warned that enforcement of the FEPC order to hire black conductors, motormen, and bus drivers “would result in a grave disruption of streetcar and bus transportation in this war-vital area.”\textsuperscript{149}

The president of the union, D.D. McClurg, in addition to lawyers for the Los Angeles Railway Corporation maintained that white employees would not tolerate working with African Americans. McClurg said,

I believe there will be a work stoppage but the union will do everything it can to prevent it and it will not be condoned. If there is not a work stoppage, men will quit and go to other jobs...Tension over this thing at the present time is very high.\textsuperscript{150}

J. Stuart Neary, one of the corporations’ lawyers and representatives shared that sentiment by stating,

Our employees with very few exceptions have indicated a firm intention to quit work if we engage Negroes for platform service…[the hiring of Negroes] would precipitate a complete disruption of transportation.\textsuperscript{151}

Neary then introduced a statement by the president of the Railway Corporation, P.B. Harris, which stated that the company “did not wish to accept the responsibility for tying up traffic.” He followed by stating that the federal authorities “who have the power to enforce such an order” should assume the responsibility.\textsuperscript{152}

These statements indicate that racial strife and animosity was high in Los Angeles among many of the workers that would be directly affected by the FEPC’s orders.\textsuperscript{153} Despite their willingness to work with the Federal FEPC, the presidents of both the Railway Corporation and

\textsuperscript{148} According to the news article, “Negro Hiring Order Given in Trolley Case,” the union was not charged with race discrimination. \textit{Los Angeles Times}, August 10, 1944, p. A1.
\textsuperscript{153} Tensions were high across cities in the United States because of the FEPC’s presence and orders. In Philadelphia, when the FEPC demanded that black operatives be promoted and given motormen’s jobs that had been previously held by whites, threats of strikes and violence occurred. “Discrimination,” \textit{San Mateo Times}, August 9, 1944, p. 1.
the affiliated AFL union expressed serious concern over how black hires would be integrated into an all-white workforce. Additionally, members of the Los Angeles community expressed uneasiness with the FEPC’s order to hire black conductors and bus drivers. At the hearing, Auxiliary Bishop of Los Angeles Joseph P. McGucken mentioned that “racial tension in this community” was being “dangerously agitated” by the prospect of hiring black railway operators. McGucken later elaborated on his statement in a newspaper article published a week after the hearings. While he supported anti-discrimination in employment, he speculated that “dangerous opposition might be encountered from other employees of the street railway.”

White workers in San Francisco were also unwilling to work with African Americans. In December 1943, the chairman of the western office in San Francisco, Harry Kingman ordered that a radio tube manufacturer—Heintz Kaufman LTD.—respond to allegations that they were discriminating against potential hires because of their race. In a letter addressed to Kingman, the company’s personnel manager, Clyde Cook, gave the reasons as to why Heintz Kaufman did not employ more African Americans. The company wanted to avoid racial strife and discontent among its white workers. Cook stated,

Certain negroes expect racial prejudice: they expect discrimination toward themselves. Some develop an over-compensating, defensive attitude that brings on discriminations, and develops prejudices against them. In the interview it is necessary to watch for this

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156 In the event that a white worker tried to help a black co-worker, he was met with resistance by the company and the union. In late 1943, the FEPC received a complaint by Audrey Cole, a black employee in the Transportation Division in the Municipal Railway. Cole claimed that the Carmen’s Union imposed a $100 fine on any of the members “who would agree to instruct a negro in the duties of Motorman.” Because of this fine, Cole could not receive proper training and thus he could not advance to the position of Motorman. The Public Utilities Commission of San Francisco intervened and appointed one of its own instructors to teach Mr. Cole, who was then appointed to Motorman in the Municipal Railway service. Since the incident with Cole, the Municipal Railway and the Carmen’s Union took action to ensure equitable treatment of African American workers, suspending white workers who refused to teach black workers under their supervision. Letter to Mr. Harry Kingman, November 4, 1943, Records of the Fair Employment Practice Commission, Region XII San Francisco, The National Archives at San Francisco, Box 2, Folder: “S.F. Municipal Railways;” p. 1.
over-compensating, defensive attitude, and to try to avoid employing any person who has a maladjustment along this line, regardless of race.  

Cook went on to point out that, in order to avoid “the sudden realization by the other workers of the total number, or the comparatively large percentage, of non-white workers in the plant,” he only puts a maximum of two African American workers on a shift.

The hostility of white workers toward African Americans and the Federal FEPC is significant because it suggests an explanation as to why the Democratic base was divided in their support for FEPC in the 1945 and 1947 Gallup surveys. Democratic voters would also be split in their response to fair employment and fair housing initiatives in the 1940s and 1960s. The Democratic Party, comprised mainly of these white working class individuals, thus would not fully realign for decades, despite state and national leaders pushing for race liberal policies, which I will explore in subsequent chapters. These race conservative whites would remain part of the Democratic rank-and-file for decades, up until the early 1970s, when the white working class joined the Republican Party in large numbers.

### The Republicans’ Ideological Argument Against FEPC

The Republican response to the FEPC issue was tied less to racial animosity, and more to an ideological argument. That is, economic conservatism prevented many Republican politicians and the rank-and-file from supporting economic civil rights. Economic conservatives were wary of any legislation, particularly federal laws that would interfere with the “prerogative of employers to hire, promote, and fire whomever they pleased, based on what they thought was

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158 Letter to Mr. Harry Kingman, December 17, 1943, Records of the Fair Employment Practice Commission, Region XII San Francisco, The National Archives at San Francisco, Box 1, Folder: H [Administration Files], p. 1.
best for their business.”\textsuperscript{159} Chen (2009) refers to this belief as the “freedom of enterprise.”\textsuperscript{160} The concern over federal intervention in the economic sector is grounded in a belief in individual freedom\textsuperscript{161}—in this case, freedom to run one’s business as he or she sees fit. Therefore, principled conservatives would recoil at a federal fair employment law that would interfere with the market and their freedom of enterprise.

In this section, I argue that Republicans, both elites and in the masses, opposed FEPC due primarily to the belief in freedom of enterprise, not because of racist attitudes. Recall that the results from the 1947 survey revealed that only 41% of Republicans supported FEPC legislation, yet 79% of Republicans responded that they would work alongside someone of a different race. This 38-percentage point gap suggests that economic conservatism, not racial hostility, was driving a sizeable number of Republicans in the general public to oppose FEPC.

In addition to the survey findings, Republicans made statements against economic civil rights—FEPC, and as I will discuss in later chapters, fair housing legislation—that grounded the party’s opposition in economic, not race, conservatism. How could the party that railed against the New Deal and its intervention in the economy lend support to FEPC, which established a role for the government in the market? Even the most sympathetic Republicans could not forego their economic beliefs to support civil rights when the issues necessitated government intervention in the economy. When President Harry S. Truman put forth a civil rights plan, the keystone of which was a permanent Federal FEPC, Republicans thought it was a mistake for the president to push an enforceable FEPC through Congress. Senate Republican Leader Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska argued that the President should have focused more on anti-lynching or poll tax bills. According to Wherry, these bills would have passed “easily with Republican support

\textsuperscript{159} Chen, \textit{The Fifth Freedom}, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{160} Chen, \textit{The Fifth Freedom}, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{161} Demuth, “Contemporary Conservatism and Government Regulation,” p. 309.
but picked FEPC, which some Republicans oppose, for political reasons.”¹⁶² The willingness of Republicans to support civil rights legislation that would combat Jim Crow in the South demonstrates that their hesitation on FEPC stemmed mainly from economic beliefs in a market free from Federal Government intervention.

At a hearing for the Republican Party Subcommittee on Civil Rights, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio who had consistently supported laws to end lynching and poll taxes said, “I have always been opposed to the F.E.P.C. because it would impose a complete government regulation on all employment…the fundamental issue between the Parties is whether more and more totalitarian control shall be centered in Washington, or whether liberty shall be restored the individual and his local government.”¹⁶³ He was joined by Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota, who, in the same hearing, said, “I am in favor of working toward the elimination of racial discrimination but I am not in favor of the particular bill for an F.E.P.C. That was a sly New Deal trick to set up a new political bureau and give it control over every employer in America.”¹⁶⁴

Many Republican politicians used more forceful rhetoric when expressing their disdain for FEPC by linking it to socialism and communism. While FEPC advocates viewed fair employment legislation as a matter of equality of opportunity,¹⁶⁵ opponents rooted their opposition in broad ideological terms. To many Republicans in the 1940s, FEPC was nothing more than a socialist endeavor. While some of the leaders in the party used FEPC as a lightning rod when giving speeches in order to incite their audience, warning that FEPC would be the beginning of a communist takeover of the United States’ government, most Republican

¹⁶⁵ Wolfinger, Philadelphia Divided, p. 212.
opponents spoke in softer tones. Republican leaders couched their disapproval of FEPC in terms such as, “government intervention,” “freedom of association,” and “free market economy.”

Opponents of FEPC also claimed that the head of the Committee, Malcolm Ross, had “Communist sympathies.” As reported by the *Afro American*, Ross stated, “I have never joined the Communist party, I have no Communist sympathies, and I think the whole thing was designed to discredit the FEPC, as I was never attacked as a Communist until I began to head this organization.”

According to Allan Lichtman (2008) who has studied the rise of the conservative movement, northern conservatives argued that, in addition to imposing “burdens on business,” an enforceable FEPC “helped the reads by intensifying racial tension in the United States.” Prominent African American conservatives, like journalist George Schuyler, also used economic arguments to speak against FEPC. Free-market conservatives, like Schuyler, would refuse to accept civil rights since they strongly believed that African Americans could progress in the market economy and the nation’s traditions “of individual initiative and decentralized authority.” Schuyler also spoke against coercive civil rights laws that “played into the hands of communists.” These concerns over communism, freedom of enterprise, and individual liberty would also manifest within the Republican base.

Now, I turn to a discussion of how Republican supporters responded to FEPC, calling on polls and newspapers, specifically the conservative *Los Angeles Times*. I use these sources to demonstrate that the Republican base’s response to FEPC was grounded in ideological concerns. Like their party’s representatives, the base was concerned with individual liberty, which is tied to the belief in freedom of enterprise, and the increasing size and scope of the national government.

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In a poll conducted by the National Federation of Small Business, Inc., 90% of members polled objected to FEPC legislation. The main reason provided for FEPC opposition was that “it may deprive them of their freedom to choose employees of their own selection.”\footnote{Small Business Group Opposes FEPC in Poll,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, March 21, 1949, p. 10.} This statement demonstrates a unity within the Republican Party base that opposed FEPC on economic grounds. Though the Republican Party’s base was not exclusively comprised of small business owners or professionals who belonged to this organization, opponents in the general public used similar ideological arguments when voicing their opposition to FEPC. In addition to the ideological dimension, there were also concerns over federalism. Republican supporters were more wary of a national law “requiring employers to hire people without regard to color or race” than they were of a similar law passed by their states. The August 18, 1952 Gallup poll reveals that 25% of Republican identifiers supported a national law, while 50% endorsed a state law.\footnote{Thirty-four percent of Democrats said they were in favor of a national law and 45% said they would support a state law. “States’ FEPC Favored Over Federal Law,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, August 18, 1952, p. 15.} This indicates that half of the party’s supporters were willing to accept a state FEPC that would still be intolerable to staunch economic conservatives. The acceptance of a state FEPC suggests that the base was motivated by a conservative ideology rooted in states’ rights and economic conservatism—that is, the right to free enterprise.

The theme of free enterprise and individual liberty, which had been and continue to be at the core of the Republican Party, can be seen throughout the 1940s and 1950s, as Californians grapple with the FEPC issue. One Los Angeles reader wrote to the \textit{Los Angeles Times}, “Does Farmer Jones have to hire, at the command of a political commission, some newly arrived Texas Negroes or Sonora Mexicans in preference to the sons of his neighbor farmers?”\footnote{“Who Has the Right to Hire and Fire?,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, July 12, 1948, p. A5.} In another editorial published in the \textit{Los Angeles Times}, an anonymous author acknowledges the evils of
racism yet states that imposing penalties on a prejudiced person would only reinforce his biases. The author then argues that, since prejudice is emotional and not logical, there is no way that a government committee “can possibly tell, in most cases, whether a man is refused employment because of unfair discrimination or because he is not considered adapted to the job.” Furthermore, in some cases, “it is not the prejudice of the employer that causes discrimination but that of his employees; it would be unfair to punish a man because all his workers are not broad-minded.” FEPC rulings would be based on conjecture and thus unfair.174

In a letter to the Los Angeles Times editor, a reader from Los Angeles who identified as a supporter of free enterprise, claimed that any “boss should have the right to discharge any of the hired help without calling in a political commission to pass upon the matter.”175 In another letter to the editor, a Los Angeles resident, W.E. Lawson, spoke stridently against economic civil rights. Lawson warned of events to come “if the Socialist-New Deal party wins in November.” He mentioned the “federal attempt to force socialized housing on States in direct opposition of the people of Los Angeles.” He then attacked the “federal attempt to force FEPC on Southern States to pay for Northern States’ Negro votes.” This letter indicates a clear disdain against the Democratic Party for its use of federal housing and employment programs that would override the public will.176

Other letters to the Los Angeles Times echoed similar tones. Another reader reflected on his initial impressions of FEPC in a 1959 letter:

It [FEPC] was widely endorsed by people whom I knew were Communists. I figured it must be one of their many roads to socialism or they wouldn’t bother to endorse it. In fact, I think they were the ones to start the ball rolling.177

As with the majority of statements made by Republican politicians, coalition partners, and supporters, the author expresses no racist attitudes or an unwillingness to work with or live alongside African Americans. Unlike blue-collar workers who threatened to quit if blacks were hired, and Democratic survey respondents who indicated that they would not want to work with someone of a different race, there is scant evidence of opponents resisting FEPC because of preexisting race preferences. The lack of racialized language in these letters suggests that anti-FEPC attitudes were largely a reflection of Republican voters’ economic, not racial, conservatism.

In an editorial urging its readers to vote against Proposition 11, the 1946 FEPC ballot initiative, the Los Angeles Times emphasizes employer prerogatives to hire whomever he or she wants by comparing the enforceable FEPC proposed by Proposition 11 to the President’s Committee on Fair Employment Practice:

The wartime Federal Fair Employment Practices Commission does not furnish a good analogy or precedent for this proposed State legislation. The commission was concerned only with war contracts where the Federal government was the purchaser, and hence could properly dictate conditions of employment. The commission made no attempt to poke into purely private business or the production of civilian goods. This proposed State commission would be empowered—and expected—to do so.178

The editorial proceeds to explain how an enforceable FEPC, because of its imposition on individual liberty, would not align with the 1st, 14th and 15th Amendments:

Nor is there any true analogy with the principles of the 14th and 15th Amendments, which establish the equality of all persons before the law. They apply to public matters; this act would apply to private matters. Analogy with the First Amendment which establishes religious freedom is also lacking; it does not impose upon anybody the obligation to hire anybody whose religious faith is the same as or different from his own.179

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Like many of its readers, the *Los Angeles Times*’ argument against FEPC is grounded in freedom and liberty, not racial bias.

Concerns over freedom can also be seen in those who opposed FEPC because it would impose beliefs and practices on private citizens, who should be able to hold any views and prejudices they want without government interference. Moreover, employers should not have to worry that a decision not to hire or promote a person would result in a hearing before the committee. An editor for the *Los Angeles Times* wrote:

> It is unfortunate that persons are discriminated against in obtaining employment because of their race, color or creed. Such discrimination is the result of unreasoning prejudice; it is illogical and wrong. But prejudice cannot be removed either by force or by attempts to legislate it out of existence. ‘A man convinced against his will is of the same opinion still’ is a very old and a very true saying.\(^{180}\)

The *Los Angeles Times* adds to its argument by saying that “the door would be opened to racketeering; an employer, threatened with being summoned before a F.E.P. Committee, could be ‘shaken down’ easily in many cases.”\(^{181}\) The question, then, for many conservatives would be: Who would protect the employer in such a case?

In his comprehensive study of the politics of FEPC, Chen (2009) studied FEPC legislation in non-southern states and looked to newspapers and constituent letters to determine that a key factor driving the opposition in parts of the West, Midwest and East was ideologically motivated. Unlike in the South, where “fire-breathing, southern demagogues hoping to preserve white supremacy” stood in the way of national FEPC legislation, the opposition to FEPC in the rest of the country took the form “of a powerful though loosely organized bloc of conservatives—voters, interest groups, and office-holders—who were committed in varying

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degrees to the principle of equal treatment.” However, “they were united in their antipathy to
government intervention in social and economic life.” Furthermore, as Chen notes,

Few legislative proposals sparked their ire as readily. Wary of the social-democratic
resonance of the Four Freedoms and resentful of the New Deal, conservatives balked at
the notion of extending government authority, not just federal authority, any further into
the industrial relations system. In response to liberal demands for fair employment
practices, conservatives juxtaposed a different ideal, one they considered equally ‘sacred
and fundamental.’ Instead of ‘freedom from discrimination,’ they defended something
they called ‘freedom of enterprise.’ This was their fifth freedom.\textsuperscript{182}

Businessmen, after falling out of favor during the Great Depression and the early days of the
New Deal, were the most outspoken against FEPC and reestablished the legitimacy of the free
enterprise system. To them, such legislation was a “rank infringement on traditional managerial
prerogatives over hiring, promotion, and firing.”\textsuperscript{183} And while businesses were perhaps the most
unified in their opposition to FEPC, ordinary Republican supporters would also rally behind the
principles of free enterprise, anti-communism, and individual liberty. As I will show in the next
chapter, on two ballot propositions that sought to bring FEPC and fair housing to California, the
Republican rank-and-file overwhelmingly voted against both measures.

**Conclusion: Two Parties, Two Different Motivations**

FEPC was not welcomed by a large number of white California workers or Republican
officials. White workers found the prospect of integrating the workforce to be so threatening that
they were ready to protest or quit. Since the reasons white workers were willing to walk off the
job were not revealed in surveys or newspaper articles, the reader may wonder whether some
white workers responded to FEPC negatively, not because of racial animosity but rather due to
fear of job competition. Combined with results presented in the following chapter, I conclude

\textsuperscript{182} Chen, *The Fifth Freedom*, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{183} Chen, *The Fifth Freedom*, p. 20.
that a large portion of the Democratic Party and white workers did not support FEPC because of their race conservative attitudes.

This is an integral finding since I will argue in subsequent chapters that these race conservatives were the driving force behind the Democratic rank-and-file’s consistent ambiguity on economic civil rights issues. Whereas Republican supporters were unified on a conservative position on these blended race and economic issues, the Democratic Party’s base would remain divided until the 1960s because they did not have a party that fully represented their race conservative attitudes. It would not be until the presidential election of 1964, and the decisive action on civil rights taken by Barry Goldwater and Lyndon B. Johnson, that race conservative Democrats would begin to move en masse to the Republican Party. Beginning with the 1964 contest, and continuing throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s when polarizing policies like busing and affirmative action became the salient civil rights issues, race conservatives sorted into the Republican fold, leaving the Democratic rank-and-file more liberal on civil rights.

The presence of the Federal FEPC in states like California began to reshape partisan attitudes on civil rights. The new, economic race issues, like FEPC and, as I will explore in later chapters, fair housing, required Republican supporters to forego support of civil rights in order to remain true to their core anti-statist and economic beliefs. Thus, Republicans in the general public began polarizing on civil rights during and shortly after World War II when FEPC came to California. On the other hand, Democrats were ambiguous in their support for FEPC because the committee’s goal of desegregating the workforce and unions was a threat to many race conservatives who were resistant to opening their workplaces and neighborhoods to African Americans.
In the next two chapters, I show that this pattern of growing Republican conservatism and Democratic ambivalence in the public did not correspond with what was happening at the state level. In Chapter 2, I call on analyses of ballot proposition data to add to the conclusions drawn from the survey data. I find that, as indicated by the Gallup surveys, Republican voters were largely opposed to issues like FEPC. Democrats, on the other hand, were almost evenly split on economic civil rights. In Chapter 3, I utilize roll call data for both the California Assembly and Congress to demonstrate that Republican elites were divided on civil rights while Democratic legislators were united behind a race liberal agenda. In accordance with the Theory of Parties, I suggest that Democratic representatives were not responsive to their race conservative supporters because they were instead concerned with pleasing their coalition of African American and liberal activists. Republican lawmakers, on the other hand, had yet to receive pressure from conservative policy demanders, leaving them without a unified position on civil rights legislation throughout the 1940s and 1950s.

Shortly after fair employment legislation failed in the California Assembly, civil rights advocates pushed to bring the issue to the voters. A broad range of groups, such as the NAACP, the Urban League, the CIO, and various women’s and religious groups endorsed the passage of a fair employment initiative. Proposition 11 (1946), which would establish a state fair employment practices commission (FEPC), was the first of many racialized initiatives to appear on the California ballot after World War II. Two years later, Proposition 14 (1948) sought to implement fair housing practices in the state. Two other racialized initiatives—Proposition 14 in 1964 (an initiative to overturn what many conservatives viewed as a “forced integration” housing law) and Proposition 21 in 1972 (an anti-busing proposal)—will be discussed in Chapter 5.

In this chapter, I discuss Propositions 11 (1946) and 14 (1948), in addition to Proposition 3, a New Deal initiative (which provides a baseline level of partisanship in the California electorate). How did the results of the racialized initiatives compare to the partisanship exhibited by voters on a classic New Deal issue? If partisan voters displayed similar results across all three initiatives, then race was likely a non-issue in the cases of Propositions 11 and 14. If voters did not respond in a similar fashion on the New Deal proposition as they did on the racialized initiatives, then they were reacting to the latter, in part, because of their racial attitudes. In order to answer this question, I use statistical analyses to infer individual rates of partisanship from precinct-level election returns.

I find that Republican voters were consistently conservative on both racialized propositions, in addition to the New Deal proposition. Democrats, on the other hand, were ambiguous in their support for civil rights across time, yet displayed strong liberal preferences on the New Deal initiative. As I will show in Chapter 3, this was in contrast to the pattern of
bipartisanship on FEPC bills in 1945 and 1946 that emerged in the California Assembly. Bipartisan support in the Assembly would continue into the 1950s when subsequent civil rights bills came to a vote. The patterns of behavior in the electorate also differed from the universal support of the California congressional delegation on a fair employment bill in 1950. Thus, racial realignment was not a linear process in which a set of actors, in this case, party legislators, influenced or was influenced by another set of actors—the voters. Rather, partisans in the electorate and legislators were responding to civil rights independent of one another in the 1940s—a trend that persisted until the late 1950s. This finding helps shed light on the relationship between voters and their elected officials.

For almost two decades, beginning after World War II, there was a disconnect between representatives and their constituents in both parties. In the Democratic Party, legislators at both levels of government were more concerned with appealing to race liberal activists and interest groups than placating their race conservative base. Republican lawmakers, on the other hand, would remain divided on civil rights until conservatives effectively moved the state and national Republican parties to the right on a host of issues, including race, in the late 1950s. At this time, California Republicans in the California Assembly began to polarize on economic civil rights issues in response to the increased influence of conservative activists. In addition to the growing conservatism within the California Republican Party, conservatives would eventually take over control of the national party, beginning in 1964. As for the Democrats, the rank-and-file would be split on economic civil rights issues, even though elites were unified at both the state and national levels. The tensions within the parties would only be resolved when a new set of civil rights issues emerge in the 1960s. As I will explore in Chapter 5, these new policies—
affirmative action and busing—resulted in unity within each party and polarization between the parties on race, thus completing the realignment.

**Economic Civil Rights and New Deal Propositions in California, 1946 and 1948**

On the salient civil rights issues in the postwar era—FEPC and fair housing legislation—Republican voters were highly conservative. Their conservative preferences were also evident on the labor issue of “featherbedding,” a union practice that employers did not support. The Republican rank-and-file displayed anti-New Deal, conservative preferences when they voted to approve a featherbedding ban in California. Democratic voters were mixed in their support of the racialized initiatives, yet liberal on this traditional New Deal issue, as they voted against the proposal to ban featherbedding.

This pattern suggests that Republicans were ideologically constrained when they went to the polls to vote on FEPC and fair housing. Across both labor and economic civil rights issues, Republican voters did not waver in their conservatism, revealing that race was of secondary concern (if was a concern at all) when they decided on issues that blended race and economics. Conversely, Democrats adhered to their New Deal beliefs by voting against the featherbedding ban. Their liberalism, however, was muted on FEPC and fair housing. I argue that the divided nature of the Democratic base was driven by a sizeable number of Democrats who held race conservative views, leading them to vote against liberal policies that would ban race discrimination.

In the following sections, I briefly summarize the New Deal and racialized propositions that appeared on the California ballot in 1946 and 1948: Proposition 3 (1948), Proposition 11 (1946) and Proposition 14 (1948). After providing the background of the propositions, I then
explain my dataset. I use various methods of ecological inference to assess a precise level of partisan support for, and opposition against, the propositions under examination. I then analyze and compare these estimates to the partisan estimates on Proposition 3—the New Deal labor issue to see if ideology constrained the vote on racialized proposals. Finally, I compare the results of the 1940s racialized initiatives to the partisan breakdown of the vote on Proposition 16—an “alien” ballot proposal that sought to ban the poll tax in the state. Proposition 16 allows me to gain leverage on whether or not voters were responding to the racial component of Propositions 11 and 14. I find that Democratic voters responded similarly on Proposition 16 as they did on Propositions 11 and 14, while Republicans were much more liberal on Proposition 16. I suggest that the persistent Democratic ambiguity across Propositions 11, 14, and 16 reveals that half of the party’s base was comprised of race conservatives. Republican voters, however, were not responding to the racial aspect of Propositions 11 and 14 but rather the economic component. This becomes evident in their rejection of Proposition 16—a racialized initiative that was devoid of economic implications.

**Overview of New Deal and Economic Civil Rights Ballot Propositions**

The first postwar labor initiative was Proposition 3 (1948), which asked Californians to vote on a classic New Deal cleavage issue. Proposition 3 proposed a ban on featherbedding practices in the employment of railroad brakemen.\(^{184}\) “Featherbedding,” as management called it, was the bane of employers who wanted to hire the minimal number of workers required for a specific task. Unions fought to keep this practice as a way to find employees work.\(^{185}\) Thus,

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\(^{185}\) Lipowski, “Featherbedding on the Railroads,” p. 141.
Republicans should have supported the measure, and Democrats should have opposed it. Proposition 3 passed by a margin of 51% to 49%.

The question of featherbedding provides a context for which I can compare two postwar racialized initiatives—Propositions 11 and 14. Proposition 11 (1946) was the first economic civil rights initiative in California, and directly affected the growing population of African Americans. It called for the establishment of a state Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC). This proposition explicitly outlawed discrimination in employment on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, or ancestry. Like the proposal to ban featherbedding practices, the debate surrounding FEPC also raised issues regarding employer control of the workplace. The compulsory nature of the proposed FEPC law, many Republicans argued, would add to the already cumbersome restrictions on business and to the growing regimentation of employers. Proposition 11 overlaid this partisan New Deal labor issue onto civil rights, and the push for ending discrimination in the workplace. It was defeated by a margin of 70% to 30%. If partisan voters were adhering to a conservative ideology more than their racial preferences, Republicans should not have supported the passage of Proposition 11. On the Democratic side, if ideological considerations were the primary voting dimension, then Democratic voters should have supported FEPC at a similar rate as they voted against the featherbedding ban. If, however, Democrats were motivated by concerns over race, then we would observe a more divided Democratic base on these blended race and New Deal issues.

On the same ballot as Proposition 3 was Proposition 14 in 1948, which was California’s first fair housing initiative. It would establish a State Housing Agency with the authority to issue

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state bonds to finance low-cost public housing in California. The language of the proposition also mandated that housing constructed under the program be open to all Americans without discrimination or segregation, and forbid discrimination in the employment of persons hired to build any project so financed.\textsuperscript{188} By the 1940s, the provision of low-cost housing in California was widely perceived to be a “Negro” issue.\textsuperscript{189} Proposition 14 also tapped into another salient New Deal era concern—the role of the state in the provision of public goods for the market. The proposed law called for state intervention in the economy, and placed restrictions on the employer-hiring prerogative in the construction industry. Proposition 14 was defeated by the same margin as Proposition 11—70% to 30%. As with Proposition 11, Republicans should have overwhelmingly opposed Proposition 14, \textit{if they are being constrained by a New Deal/economic ideology}. If economic ideology was driving Democratic voters, even those who might not have fully supported racial equality, then they should not have abandoned their party on Proposition 14. That is, most Democrats should have supported Proposition 14, \textit{if they were being constrained by New Deal ideology}, as it would have created low-cost public housing and jobs for blue-collar workers.


\textsuperscript{189} Public housing was widely perceived as a race issue. Elites saw it as such: “...today it is a matter of great concern because in our dealing with the housing problem...we find that the greatest part of our problem relates to the condition of the Negroes.” Robert Taft, “Congressional Record,” 79th Congress, 2nd session, Vol. 92, Pt. 1, February 9, 1946, p. 1194; Voters also saw the connection between race and public housing: San Mateo County hosted a conference on civil rights—public housing included—prior to the 1948 election. Further, “the question of public housing was to be located closely connected with the question of whether the residential segregation of Negroes was to be maintained. Race appeared again and again in the deliberations of those who supported public housing and of those who opposed it.” From “Jim Crow Army Scored Here,” \textit{San Mateo Times}, April 5, 1948, p. 2; See also Banfield and Meyerson, \textit{Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest}. 
Ballot Proposition Dataset, 1946 and 1948

To compile a dataset, I contacted the California State Archives in Sacramento to request rolls of microfilm from each of the November elections under observation. I then transferred the handwritten precinct returns from microfilm to paper so I could hand-enter the proposition returns and candidate races into a spreadsheet. I used statewide candidate races as my measure of partisanship in the electorate, since the partisan composition for precincts was not published. Using candidate races was imperative, since they allowed me to assess a percentage of Democrats and Republicans who were supporting and opposing the ballot propositions.

In 1946, there were two competitive statewide candidate races—the lieutenant governor race between Goodwin Knight (R) and John Shelley (D), and the attorney general race between Fred Howser (R) and Pat Brown (D). There were 2,578,313 individual ballots cast in the lieutenant governor’s race, and 2,466,253 individual ballots cast for attorney general. Both Republicans won with 56% of the vote.

In 1948, there was only one competitive race available—the presidential race between Harry S. Truman (D) and Thomas Dewey (R). President Truman won 50.4% of the vote while Dewey received 49.6%. I collected and entered the precinct-level returns (there were 16,950 precincts in 1948) for president and the yes and no votes for Proposition 3 and Proposition 14. There were 3,792,557 ballots cast for president in California, not including the 188,742 cast for third-party candidate Strom Thurmond. My analysis was not altered by the Thurmond votes, so I omitted them from the discussion. There were 3,420,125 individual ballots cast for Proposition 3. The featherbedding ban passed with 51% of the vote. There were 3,400,741 cast for

\[190\] While using a presidential election as my proxy for partisanship is not ideal because presidential contests tend to attract weaker partisans and independents to the polls, it is the only available measure of partisanship. Since the results for the 1948 racialized initiative were similar to the 1946 and later the 1964 racialized propositions, the larger electorate in 1948 did not seem to influence partisan rates of support for, and opposition to, economic civil rights proposals.
Proposition 14, which was overwhelmingly defeated—only 30% of Californian voters supported public housing in the state.

In the upcoming sections, I elaborate on three possible methods for deriving the individual partisan rates of support for the above precinct-level data. These three methods are: deterministic bounds, in which the exact estimate falls between a lower and upper bound, Goodman’s regression estimates that do not account for varying levels of $n$—in my case, turnout in each precinct, and finally, King’s estimates that use this information to derive more accurate estimates than the other two methods. I provide an overview of, and findings for, the other methods to show how, for the purposes of my analysis, King’s estimates are the most reliable.

**Ballot Proposition Election Returns and Ecological Inference Methodology**

In order to derive results from the data, I need to find an alternative to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression since OLS regressions produce averages, not exact measures. Thus, I turn to ecological inference analysis, which allowed me to make inferences about the aggregate data to determine the partisan rates of support for each race. Ecological inference methodology has improved significantly since the discovery of ecological fallacy in 1950, which maintains that we cannot assume that statistics that apply to a group are representative of individuals within that group.\(^{191}\) To remedy ecological fallacy, I use one of the more recent methods of ecological inference—Gary King’s methodology—that makes use of subunit ($n$), or in my case, precinct turnout. To establish that King’s ecological inference is reliable, I briefly discuss the

deterministic bounds for Democrats and Republicans, and Goodman’s regression estimates for the propositions\textsuperscript{192} to demonstrate the robustness of King’s method.

**Deterministic Bounds**

One way to draw more concrete inferences about individual behavior with aggregate data is to examine the deterministic bounds—the minimum and maximum possible rates at which Democratic and Republican voters in the state could have supported the propositions. The maximum bound on the rate at which Republican voters in California voted in favor of the conservative position on each proposition is

\[
\text{MIN}(Y/T_r, 1),
\]

where \( Y \) is the proportion of voters that voted conservative on the proposition and \( T_r \) is the proportion of the electorate that voted for the Republican candidate. The minimum bound is

\[
\text{MAX}(0, (Y-(1-T_r))/T_r),
\]

where \( (1-T_r) \) is the proportion that voted for the Republican candidates. The minimum and maximum bound equations are identical when looking at Democratic support for the conservative positions. Using *EI: A(n R) Program for Ecological Inference,*\textsuperscript{193} I was able to determine the bounds for each proposition.

Table 2.1 displays the bounds for the full dataset, showing that, at most, the maximum level of Republican support for the conservative vote choice on all three propositions ranged from 90.8\% to 99.4\%. The minimum level of support for the conservative vote choice among those who voted for the Republican candidate was over 15\% for all propositions, indicating that

\[\text{MIN}(Y/T_r, 1),\]

\[\text{MAX}(0, (Y-(1-T_r))/T_r),\]

\[\text{MIN}(Y/T_r, 1),\]

\[\text{MAX}(0, (Y-(1-T_r))/T_r),\]

\textsuperscript{192} Since I am trying to demonstrate robustness and not find results on which to base my analysis, I decided to limit the number of propositions presented here to avoid a cumbersome discussion.

Table 2.1. Deterministic Bounds for Conservative Support on Propositions 3, 11, and 14, 1946—1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 3 (1948)</th>
<th>All Precincts</th>
<th>Homogenous White Precincts*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
<td>Upper Bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Voters</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Voters</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 11 (1946)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Voters</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>93.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Voters</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>97.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 14 (1948)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Voters</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Voters</td>
<td>60.5%</td>
<td>99.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Precincts in counties with less than .01% of African Americans, according the most recent U.S. Census.
conservatism was at least greater than 24% in all cases. Democratic support for the conservative vote choice ranged from 48.4% to 93.6%. At minimum, Democratic conservatism on the racialized ballot propositions ranged from 6.2% to 40%, with the lowest level of conservatism displayed on the New Deal proposition.

Since the bounds indicate a wide range of support for conservatism among both Republicans and Democrats with no discernible patterns, one way to gain more insight into these bounds would be to examine precincts with very few African Americans. It is possible that if interest, not New Deal ideology, was the key factor driving partisan responses to racialized propositions, then homogenous white precincts should be less conservative, and likely the bounds would be more narrow than the population as a whole. Their interests, in these cases, job competition and loss of property value whether African Americans moving into their neighborhoods, would not be threatened due to the absence of blacks in their precincts. Thus, I would expect to see lower levels of conservatism for the upper bounds and thus narrower bounds for both parties’ voters since, in homogenous precincts, neither Democratic nor Republican partisans should have felt their interests were being threatened.

When looking at the economic civil rights initiatives—Propositions 11 and 14—the upper bounds for both parties were greater in homogenous precincts than across all precincts. This is contrary to what the interest-driven explanation of racial realignment would suggest. In precincts where whites had very little to no contact with African Americans, why would these voters exhibit more conservatism than the electorate as a whole? I cannot answer this question yet, as deterministic bounds only reveal a possible range—the lower and upper limits—of partisan support. The actual rate of partisan support could have fallen anywhere within these ranges. I again investigate the interest and ideological theories of racial realignment when using
King’s method of ecological inference to show, in fact, there was not much difference in voting patterns on racialized initiatives across homogenous and heterogeneous precincts, weakening any explanation of racial realignment that would be grounded in voters’ interests. I pose dual explanations: the majority of Republican voters were ideologically motivated, and some Democratic voters were racially motivated when voting on racialized ballot propositions.

**Goodman’s Regression Analysis**

To determine where within the deterministic bounds the actual level of partisan support for the propositions falls, I now turn to Goodman’s (1953) regression, which serves as the basis of most ecological inference approaches. Goodman’s regression is based on the following accounting identity:

\[ Y = \beta_d T_d + \beta_r (1 - T_d), \]

where \( Y \) is the votes in favor of a proposition as a proportion of the total votes, \( \beta_d \) is the rate which Democratic voters support the proposition, \( \beta_r \) is the rate at which Republicans support it, \( T_d \) is the Democratic share of the total turnout, and \( (1 - T_d) \) is the Republican share of the vote.

Rearranging the terms gives a more workable function:

\[ Y = \beta_r + (\beta_d - \beta_r)T_d. \]

If the parameters \( \beta_d \) and \( \beta_r \) are constant across precincts, I can estimate them via a Goodman’s regression of \( Y \) on \( T_d \) and a constant term.\(^{194}\) Using the statistical package, *EI: A(n R) Program for Ecological Inference*,\(^ {195} \) I was able to easily derive Goodman’s estimates.

Table 2.2 reports Goodman’s estimates alongside King’s estimates for comparison. Most notable are the high levels of conservatism among Republicans for all three propositions.

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Table 2.2. Goodman’s Regression Coefficients and King’s Ecological Inference Estimates for Conservative Support for Propositions 3, 11, and 14, 1946—1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republican Voters</th>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic Voters</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proposition 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1948)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman’s Coef.</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
<td>(68.3-85.0)</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>(1.3-27.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological Est.</td>
<td>84.5%</td>
<td>(78.9-99.0)</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>(0-15.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proposition 11</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1946)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman’s Coef.</td>
<td>90.7%</td>
<td>(80.5-97.5)</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
<td>(32.5-59.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological Est.</td>
<td>88.1%</td>
<td>(89.7-96.1)</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>(31.1-48.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proposition 14</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1948)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman’s Coef.</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(87.5-100)</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>(28.1-41.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological Est.</td>
<td>94.0%</td>
<td>(90.7-99.7)</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>(39.1-48.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to Goodman’s estimates, Republicans opposed the California FEPC at a rate of 91%. The highest level of conservatism, according to Goodman’s estimates, is revealed on Proposition 14. Republicans chose the conservative position at a rate of 100%—that is, every Republican voter also opposed the establishment of fair housing in California.

Democratic voters exhibited less conservatism than their Republican counterparts, but were less unified on a liberal position. They were, however, consistent in their ambiguity on the civil rights propositions, relative to Proposition 3, in which Democratic support for union practices is evident. On Propositions 11 and 14, 46% and 39% of Democrats voted against FEPC and fair housing in 1948, respectively. Conservatism among Democrats dropped to 15% for Proposition 3. These estimates should be viewed with caution, however, because problematic in Goodman’s analysis are the constant parameters, which cannot vary based on the precincts’ partisan turnout rates for the Democratic or Republican candidate. Because Goodman’s regression does not allow for this variation and is thus subject to aggregation bias, the estimates it produces tend to overestimate support. To mitigate this aggregation bias, I lastly turn to King’s method of ecological inference. Since King’s analysis gives more concrete estimates of voter support and opposition, I can report more accurate partisan rates of support and opposition for these ballot initiatives.

**King’s Ecological Inference**

Gary King (1997) introduced a method for ecological inference that incorporates information about precinct-level bounds to estimate aggregate quantities of interest. Because it systematically uses this information, it is more robust to aggregation bias than the previous
methods. Because they account for each precinct’s voter turnout, King’s estimates are more accurate estimates of possible rates of support for each proposition. In comparing King’s estimates to Goodman’s, Goodman’s analysis both over- and under-estimated partisan levels of conservative support for the racialized and New Deal initiatives (see Table 2.2).

King’s ecological inference model consists of assumptions built on the basic accounting identity in which $T_i$ and $X_i$ are observed. $\beta_i^b$ and $\beta_i^w$ are the quantities of interest, for $i=1,\ldots,p$ precincts:

$$T_i = \beta_i^b X_i + \beta_i^w (1 - X_i).$$

$\beta_i^b$ and $\beta_i^w$ are not constant over precincts. They are at least partly dependent upon one another. Despite this dependency, the two can vary and often do, as together they do not have to sum up to 1. In my case, $\beta_i^b$ gives the percentage of Republican support or opposition to a given proposition, and $\beta_i^w$ reveal the Democratic support or opposition. Independently, each can take on any percentage between 0 and 1. So, in the case of Proposition 11, 88% of Republicans and 50% of Democrats opposed the measure. $\beta_i^b$ and $\beta_i^w$ can each fall between 0 and 100 percent.

In the case of the ballot proposition data, $T_i$ is the independent variable—percent support for the conservative position in each precinct and $X_i$ is the dependent variable—percent Republican support for the ballot propositions in each precinct. The probability density model includes $N_i$, where $N$ accounts for each precinct’s turnout in the election. To estimate the parameters, I used Gary King’s program, *EI: A(n R) Program for Ecological Inference*, to estimate levels of support for each initiative among Democratic and Republican voters. I also used the program to derive 80% confidence intervals for both the Goodman and King estimates. King proposes 80% confidence intervals over the commonplace 95% when using ecological

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inference. Since the normal posterior (or sampling) distribution does not apply in most cases when using ecological inference, because the number of Democratic and Republican turnout can vary dramatically from precinct-to-precinct, producing a wide variance in which the +2 standard errors would no longer be approximately the 95% confidence interval. It is much more common for the estimates to fall within the 80% confidence interval,198 which is why King’s R program for ecological inference only employs 80% confidence intervals, and why I used them in my tables. In the following sections, I discuss and analyze King’s estimates in the context of state and national events to establish a comprehensive narrative of voter behavior in the California electorate shortly after World War II.

Proposition 3 (1948) Analysis – A Proposal to Ban Railroad Featherbedding

To lay a baseline of partisanship to which I can compare the racialized ballot propositions, I begin my analysis with an examination of Proposition 3 (1948), which sought to prohibit featherbedding practices in hiring railroad brakemen. According to King’s methodology for ecological inference displayed in Table 2.2, 85% of Republican voters and 13% of Democratic supporters approved Proposition 3. This wide, 72-percentage point gap indicates that, when it came to a classic New Deal cleavage issue—featherbedding—in which pro-business Republicans should align to support Proposition 3 and pro-labor Democrats should oppose it, the voters sorted based on core New Deal principles in 1948.

This high level of partisanship on the featherbedding issue is striking, especially since there were no newspaper ads that mentioned which interest groups or politicians endorsed or

198 King, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem, pp. 148-149.
opposed Proposition 3.\textsuperscript{199} Party elites did not take a clear stand on this issue nor did interest
groups, namely the AFL and CIO. According to John Allswang, who studied initiatives in
California form 1898-1998, individual unions were not “persuaded of the importance of this
initiative.”\textsuperscript{200} Of the 54 Proposition 3 ads that appeared in local California newspapers, found
via the Newspaper Archive search engine, the only groups named in advertisements were ad-hoc
groups that were formed in response to Proposition 3. The California Committee for Railroad
Safety argued that the passage of Proposition 3 would put train passengers in danger by
eliminating the 37-year old safety measure—the Full Crew Law—passed in 1911 under the
leadership of Governor Hiram Johnson. The ad, which appeared in several California
newspapers, had the tagline, “Vote NO on 3 and save a life—it may be yours.”\textsuperscript{201} The California
Committee Against Featherbedding called on Whitaker & Baxter Campaigns, Inc. to run the pro-
Proposition 3 campaign. The committee used direct mailings, billboards, and campaign
literature to encourage voters to support Proposition 3,\textsuperscript{202} claiming that featherbedding caused
inflation and added “20\% to the cost of everything you buy.”\textsuperscript{203} Furthermore, proponents of
Proposition 3 argued against the opposing claims by stating that large crews were not necessary
to operate modern trains.\textsuperscript{204}

Even though Whitaker & Baxter was able to use their resources to publicize and spend
more than the opposition ($625,000 to $114,000),\textsuperscript{205} Democratic voters in the California
electorate largely opposed Proposition 3, while a majority of Republicans supported it. The large

\textsuperscript{199} I searched three newspaper archives online: \textit{Los Angeles Times} (through ProQuest.com), \textit{NewspaperArchive.com}, and \textit{Newspapers.com}. Accessed March 10, 2013.
\textsuperscript{200} Allswang, \textit{The Initiative and Referendum in California}, p. 83.
\textsuperscript{201} Advertisement, \textit{The Oakland Tribune}, October 9, 1948, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{202} Whitaker & Baxter Campaigns, Inc., Records. Campaign Files. California State Archives, Box 6, Folder 37 and
Box 7, Folder 8.
\textsuperscript{203} Advertisement, \textit{Hayward Daily Review}, November 1, 1948, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{204} Allswang, \textit{The Initiative and Referendum in California}, p. 83.
\textsuperscript{205} Allswang, \textit{The Initiative and Referendum in California}, p. 83.
72-percentage point separation between partisans in the electorate was driven, not by elites, but by a level of political awareness and sophistication not usually attributed to voters. Ideologically-minded Republican voters in 1948 were able to determine that they should vote “yes,” while Democrats realized that they should vote “no,” without much elite cueing from liberal interest groups. This is significant because it indicates that voters were able to make partisan policy decisions on New Deal issues and, therefore, should know the liberal and conservative position on racialized ballot propositions. Thus, if the voters did not align properly on racialized issues, it was not because they were unaware of how they should vote but rather it indicates a conscious break from ideological constraint that could be explained in large part by deeply rooted racial beliefs.

**Proposition 11 (1946) Analysis – A Proposal for a California FEPC**

Proposition 11, an initiative statute for fair employment practices that would forbid discrimination in employment on the basis of “color, national origin, or ancestry.” A state commission would enforce this law. Liberal Democrats and African American leaders endorsed Proposition 11, however, many believed that the measure did not go far enough—that is, civil rights advocates wanted a more comprehensive law that would combine FEPC with fair housing. Supporters also believed that allowing the people to vote on such a basic right inherently undermined the proposition’s legality. African American leaders and activists, in particular, wanted the legislature, not the people, to decide the fate of FEPC.²⁰⁶

Opposition to Proposition 11 was prevalent across the state. While many claimed to support the initiative’s goal, they did not believe that racial tolerance and morality could be legislated. The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and Town Hall (Los Angeles) were

concerned that the passage of Proposition 11 would attract African Americans to California in “ever-increasing numbers.” The San Francisco Chronicle stated that the law would punish employers. According to Allswang, farm interests also joined the Proposition 11 campaign, believing the law would threaten their own use of minority workers. These opposition groups raised more money than the proposition’s supporters.  

Proposition 11 (1946) did not appear on the ballot at the same time as the New Deal proposition. Thus, I must use the partisan results on Proposition 3 (1948) to glean any comparison between preferences on FEPC and the New Deal. There are drawbacks to this inference, namely that more partisan voters tend to turn out at the midterm than at the presidential election. Despite the drawbacks, a comparison between Proposition 11 and Proposition 3 is not unwarranted, as the partisan results on Proposition 11 were similar to the results of Proposition 14 in 1948. Furthermore, comparing the Proposition 3 results to Proposition 11, which was on the ballot two years prior, allowed me to extend my timeframe of racial realignment in the electorate to 1946.

In 1946, when Proposition 11 asked voters whether or not they wanted to establish a state fair employment practices commission, akin to New York’s FEPC that also had enforcement powers to fine employers found in violation of policy, Californians overwhelmingly rejected the proposal by a margin of 3-to-1. Eighty-eight percent of Republicans and 50% of Democrats voted ‘no’ on Proposition 11, a 38-percentage point gap. On the Republican side, voters appeared to be aligning their conservatism on FEPC with their New Deal conservatism, as displayed by their high rate of support for Proposition 3. On Proposition 11, 88% of Republicans chose the conservative position. Similarly, on Proposition 3, 85% of Republicans chose the

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207 Allswang, The Initiative and Referendum in California, p. 72.
conservative position. Democratic voters, however, deviated from their economic liberalism—only 13% supported the featherbedding ban—and were split on FEPC. This increase in conservatism across the two issues suggests that some Democrats broke with their economic beliefs. Were the Democrats who opposed FEPC driven to protect their own economic and job interests?

To gain some insight into whether or not partisan attitudes on Proposition 11 were interest-driven, I looked at a subset of the data. I studied precincts with voters who should have had a vested interest in voting against FEPC—that is, those who lived in closer proximity to African Americans. These voters were more likely to lose job opportunities if a commission was established. To test the interest-driven argument, I looked separately at precincts in counties that had a 5% or more African American population. Table 2.3 shows that there was virtually no difference among Republicans and a small, 5%-percentage point difference among Democrats.

Regardless of whether or not we are observing precincts in counties with a considerable African American population or homogenous white precincts, there was still a large partisan separation between the voters, suggesting that voters were not entirely driven to vote against FEPC for fear of job competition. I argue that the Democrats who opposed FEPC were race conservatives who opposed FEPC because of a racial ideology. Thus, it can be inferred that, regardless if FEPC would directly impact them or not, race conservative Democrats wanted to prevent FEPC from coming to California, since they did not believe in using government to help advance racial equality.

This conservative racial ideology was apparent at the national level in 1948, which was a pivotal year in the Democrats’ history. Opposition within the party to President Truman’s push for civil rights policy, and his executive order to desegregate the armed forces reached a boiling
Table 2.3. Ecological Inference Results for Proposition 11 (1946)—African American Population. Rates of support for the conservative position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 11 – All Precincts</th>
<th>≥ 5% Black Precincts*</th>
<th>≤ 0.01% Black Precincts**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GOP Voters</td>
<td>Dem Voters</td>
<td>GOP Voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88.1%</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The above results use the lieutenant governor’s race between Knight (R) and Shelley (D). I also ran the analysis on the attorney general’s race between Howser (R) and Brown (D). There were very few substantive differences. In homogenous precincts, when using the attorney general race as my gauge of partisanship, 89.9% of Howser supporters voted against the fair employment practices commission and 45% of Brown supporters—presumably Democrats—opposed Proposition 11. In communities with relatively higher numbers of African Americans, changing the partisan race in my analysis has no impact, as 87.8% of Republicans and 50% of Democrats oppose the commission.


*Kern (5%), Los Angeles (5%), Madera (7%), San Francisco, (6%), Solano (6%) Contra Costa (7%), Alameda (9%), for a total of 10,359 precincts.

**Alpine, Del Norte, El Dorado, Glenn, Humboldt, Inyo, Lake, Mariposa, Mendocino, Modoc, Mono, Nevada, Orange, San Benito, Santa Cruz, Sonoma, Stanislaus, Sutter, Tehama, Trinity, Tuolumne (0%); Amador, Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Napa, Placer, San Luis Obispo, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Shasta, Sierra, Yolo, Yuba (0.01%), for a total of 3,049 precincts.
point at the 1948 Democratic National Convention. Leader of the States’ Rights Party (Dixiecrats), Strom Thurmond, joined by three-dozen southern Democrats, led a walkout of the convention hall in Pennsylvania. While usually discussed in terms of a North-South regional divide on race within the Democratic Party, this fallout likely influenced, and was influenced by, Democrats all over the country. Though still in support of New Deal principles and possibly President Truman, many, or in this case half, of the Democrats in California did not support FEPC in 1946—foreshadowing the national party struggle in 1948. What is particularly illuminating is that this ambiguity among California Democrats persisted across time.

**Proposition 14 (1948) Analysis – A Proposal to Establish Fair Housing Practices in California**

In 1948, Proposition 14 called for a constitutional amendment that would commit the state to raise up to $100 million as part of an effort to provide public housing to California residents. Business groups and business trades fought against Proposition 14 by claiming that it would result in state competition with private business, a tax increase, and the reduction in local agency. As was the case with Proposition 11 in 1946, opponents raised more than Proposition 14’s supporters. Liberal, African American, and labor groups were its main supporters but were unable to match the opposition’s resources and found little public support.  

While the policy in question in 1948 dealt primarily with fair housing, Proposition 14 contained an anti-discrimination clause in the hiring of workers and renting to tenants of public housing. Thus, the core tension remained in 1948 as it did in 1946 with Proposition 11. Did the voters see Proposition 14 as a race issue or as a New Deal issue? I can assess this in 1948, as both a New Deal proposal (Proposition 3) and a racialized initiative appeared on the same ballot.

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210 Allswang, *The Initiative and Referendum in California*, p. 73.
If voters were responding to Proposition 14, an economic civil rights initiative with two key components—New Deal and race—in the same partisan fashion as they voted on Proposition 3, then they were reacting to Proposition 14 as a New Deal issue. If levels of support and partisanship were significantly different on these two initiatives, then voters were not constrained by their New Deal beliefs.

As mentioned earlier, Republicans demonstrated consistency in their anti-New Deal beliefs, supporting Proposition 3 at a rate of 85%, and their attitudes on racialized propositions. Ninety-four percent of Republicans opposed a housing commission, preventing the state government from establishing new public housing units. On the other side of the aisle, 46% of Democrats opposed Proposition 14, which was similar to their opposition to a FEPC in 1946 but quite different from the low level of conservatism exhibited on Proposition 3 (13%).

In 1948, Republicans were 9-percentage points more conservative on Proposition 14 than on Proposition 3. While this might appear large, it was much smaller relative to the large difference in conservatism exhibited by Democrats. On Proposition 3, only 13% of Democrats responded in a conservative manner. However, on Proposition 14, 46% of Democrats chose to vote “no,” the conservative answer to the public and fair housing proposal—a 33-point rise in conservatism. Thus, for the Republicans, I can say that, for the most part, they were being constrained in their response to Proposition 14 by their pre-existing New Deal preferences. However, many Democrats exhibited no such ideological constraint.

Once again, I wanted to address the interest-based explanation of racial realignment by separating homogenous white precincts and heterogeneous precincts, and comparing the partisan results. As was the case with Proposition 11, if interests were driving voting patterns on racialized issues, then precincts in counties with a greater black population should have been less
partisan, and on the whole, more conservative, as they faced a real possibility of seeing public housing in their communities if Proposition 14 were to pass. Not only would public housing be constructed but it would also be likely that these units would be filled with more African Americans than in counties comprised of homogenous white precincts. This is not the case with Proposition 14. While Republican opposition remained constant, in counties that contained precincts with a larger black population, Democratic opposition declined to 39%. Opposition was higher in homogenous white precincts—see Table 2.4—suggesting that many voters were not necessarily acting out of fear of immediate racial integration but rather responding to their broader beliefs about race and integrated public housing. There may have also been some concern that if the state were to establish a fair housing agency, it would only be a matter of time until public housing construction would begin in their precincts, thus attracting racial minorities into their communities.

Since Republican opposition was steady in both sets of precincts—above 90%—this suggests an ideological, not an interest, motivation on the part of Republican voters. An alternative to the interest-based explanation is also necessary for Democratic voters since opposition to fair housing legislation increases in homogenous precincts, relative to mixed-population precincts. Unlike Republican voters, however, an ideological explanation does not hold for Democrats. If Democrats were ideological in nature, then they should have supported fair housing across all precincts. I posit a racial argument to account for the lack of ideological constraint and interest-based motivation on the part of Democratic voters. After World War II, a sizeable faction within the Democratic Party held race conservative views. These economic liberal and race conservative Democrats would remain in the Democratic fold until the Republican Party fully
Table 2.4. Ecological Inference Results for Proposition 14 (1948)—African American Population. Rates of support for the conservative position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 14 – All Precincts</th>
<th>≥ 5% Black Precincts</th>
<th>≤ 0.01% Black Precincts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GOP Voters</td>
<td>Dem Voters</td>
<td>GOP Voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94.0%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>94.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Kern (5%), Los Angeles (5%), Madera (7%), San Francisco, (6%), Solano (6%) Contra Costa (7%), Alameda (9%), for a total of 10,359 precincts.

**Alpine, Del Norte, El Dorado, Glenn, Humboldt, Inyo, Lake, Mariposa, Mendocino, Modoc, Mono, Nevada, Orange, San Benito, Santa Cruz, Sonoma, Stanislaus, Sutter, Tehama, Trinity, Tuolumne (0%); Amador, Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Napa, Placer, San Luis Obispo, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Shasta, Sierra, Yolo, Yuba (0.01%), for a total of 3,049 precincts.
realigned on race in the 1960s—giving disaffected Democrats a reason to depart from their race liberal party.

**Economics or Race—Explaining the Patterns in the Electorate**

The 1946 California general election provides a context in which we can determine whether or not partisan voters viewed Proposition 11—the proposal to establish a Fair Employment Practices Commission in the state—as economic or racial. On the same ballot as Proposition 11 was Proposition 16, a proposal to repeal the state’s poll tax. This measure was less controversial than any of the propositions discussed here, as it was mostly symbolic—the state legislature did not levy the tax since the law’s passage and thus the passage of Proposition 16 would not affect any Japanese residents. However, Proposition 16 was a gesture to Japanese Americans, as it removed a state law that kept them from being fully accepted into the American political system. Since it did not have real-life implications, it is a good measure to gauge whether or not voters were hostile toward the Japanese simply because of their race. Voters would have very little reason to oppose repealing the poll tax since it had never been collected. The only reason to vote against Proposition 16 would be a disdain for the Japanese as a race of people, suggesting a racial animus that would also likely influence the voters’ views of Proposition 11 that would mostly benefit African Americans.

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211 In 1920, the California electorate passed Proposition 11. It was proposed by the state Assembly and required the Legislature “to provide for the levy of an annual poll tax, and the collection thereof by assessors of not less than four dollars on every alien male inhabitant of the state over twenty-one...such tax to be paid into county school fund in county where collected.” 1920 General Election Ballot, UC Hastings Law Library website, [http://library.uchastings.edu/research/ballots/ballot-pamphlets.php](http://library.uchastings.edu/research/ballots/ballot-pamphlets.php), Accessed January 31, 2013.

212 In the argument in favor of repealing the poll tax, Assemblymen Albert Dekker and Edward Carey stated “Fortunately, the Legislature has wisely refrained from levying the tax but so long as this provision remains in the Constitution it looks like a directive from the people of this State telling the Legislature to levy the tax.” 1946 General Election Ballot, UC Hastings Law Library website, [http://library.uchastings.edu/research/ballots/ballot-pamphlets.php](http://library.uchastings.edu/research/ballots/ballot-pamphlets.php), Accessed January 31, 2013.
To determine the partisan rates of support for Proposition 16, I followed the same procedure as I had previously for the other ballot initiatives. Of the 2,059,113 individual ballots cast on Proposition 16, 70% supported repealing the poll tax. I found that 20% of Republicans opposed Proposition 16, while 43% of Democrats opposed repealing the alien poll tax. Compared to the more partisan patterns observed on the economic civil rights proposals like the FEPC initiative, there was a lack of connection between partisanship and vote choice on Proposition 16. That is, Republicans did not vote in a race conservative manner against Japanese rights, while Democrats were divided on the issue and clearly not displaying a strong race liberal preference. Why were Republican voters more supportive of Proposition 16 than Democratic voters, particularly when it was these same Republican voters that also opposed Proposition 11 and the establishment of a state FEPC?

In 1946, Republican voters were able to distinguish between race and economics. They rejected Proposition 16, a measure that did not have any economic implications and that was purely racial. When confronted, however, with Proposition 11, Republican voters chose to adopt a conservative position, suggesting an economical motivation. Though it is nearly impossible to disentangle the race and economic factors in Proposition 11, it seems as though the main impetus driving Republican voters’ preferences on economic civil rights was their conservative ideology that constrained their ability to support government programs that would assist minorities by

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213 In 1946, there were close to 15,336 precincts for which I entered the county and precinct name, along with the yes and no votes for Proposition 16. Then, to gauge partisanship within the electorate, I entered the results for every statewide candidate contest. There are no precinct-level registration numbers so using support for Republican and Democratic candidates on the same ballot as the initiatives was the best available proxy for partisanship. In 1946, there were two, competitive statewide candidate races—the lieutenant governor race between Goodwin Knight (R) and John Shelley (D) and the attorney general race between Fred Howser (R) and Pat Brown (D). There were 2,578,313 individual ballots cast in the lieutenant governor’s race and 2,466,253 individual ballots cast for attorney general. Both Republicans won with 56% of the vote. I used Gary King’s method of ecological inference for R to infer individual rates of support from the precinct-level data.

214 There was little difference when varying the candidate race as my gauge of partisanship. When using the lieutenant governor race between Knight and Shelley, Republicans opposed Proposition 16 at a rate of 19.7% and Democrats at a rate of 43.3%. Using the alternative attorney general race between Howser and Brown revealed that 21.1% of Howser voters and 41.2% of Brown voters opposed repealing the alien poll tax.
intervening in the work and housing markets. When these economic implications were removed, they displayed race liberal preferences and were, thus, the party should not be viewed as a party of bigots when they vote against FEPC.

Examining Proposition 16 also revealed a divided Democratic base—a pattern that was also apparent in the results for Propositions 11 and 14. I have argued that the mixed support for these proposed ballot propositions was due to a sizeable number of race conservatives in the Democratic Party in the 1940s. I also provided evidence, which refuted an interest-based explanation that half of the party opposed economic civil rights, such as FEPC, because they were afraid of increased job and housing competition. According to an interest-based argument, Democrats who opposed FEPC and fair housing were not racist; they simply did not want to compete with African Americans for jobs or for housing. In my analysis, I compared partisan trends in homogenous white and heterogeneous precincts, and discovered that there was almost no difference across these sets of precincts. This finding suggested that, even in more rural areas where whites would not be affected by FEPC or fair housing since they lived in counties with an all-white population, a sizeable number of Democrats still opposed economic civil rights.

The Proposition 16 study further strengthens the argument that the driving force behind the split Democratic response to civil rights was the presence of race conservatives in the base. Almost half of the party’s supporters voted against repealing a law that marginalized a minority race. Since there was no discernible interest that would influence Democrats to vote against Proposition 16, those who did oppose the repeal of the poll tax were responding in a prejudiced manner toward the Japanese, which likely carried over when tasked to vote on Proposition 11.

some may argue that, since the Japanese were farmers and involved in agrarian business, they were a source of competition for white Democrats, many of whom made a similar living. Thus, perhaps some Democrats’ vote to keep the poll tax can be attributed to a desire to weaken job competition by imposing a monetary fine that would financially weaken Japanese farmers. However, since, the legislature never levied the tax, this argument does not hold.
Conclusion: Republican Elites and the Conservative Base

Figure 2.1 provides scatter plots of the data for Propositions 3, 16, 11, and 14. The main pattern across the results for Propositions 3, 11, and 14 is the positive relationship between the Republican proportion of precincts and their level of opposition against civil rights. In the case of Propositions 11 and 14, the higher percentage of support for the Republican candidate, the higher the likelihood that those voters would oppose FEPC and fair housing, respectively. Conversely, for Proposition 3, as the percentage of support for the Republican candidate increases, so does support to ban featherbedding. The difference between these issues and Proposition 16, which was devoid of economic concerns, is quite stark. As support for conservative candidates increase, the likelihood that the voter will oppose repealing the poll tax decreases, relative to Democratic supporters, suggesting that Republicans were not responding to the racial component of economic civil rights. A sizeable number of Democrats, on the other hand, rejected Proposition 16, revealing that the base contained a faction that likely rejected economic civil rights because of racially conservative attitudes.

I will demonstrate in Chapter 5 that the pattern of strong Republican conservatism and Democratic ambiguity on civil rights re-emerged in 1964, which highlights the consistency of partisanship on race in the electorate. Though no economic civil rights measure would appear on the ballot in the 1950s, it was a pivotal decade in which California Republicans would realign on race. Whereas Democratic legislators were unified on a race liberal position as early as 1945 and would continue to support race liberal policies into the 1950s, the Republican Party in California underwent dramatic changes. Because of William Knowland’s 1958 gubernatorial campaign, moderate Republicans disappeared from the state party as a result of conservative policy
Figure 2.1. Scatter Plots of Conservative Support—Propositions 3, 16, 11 and 14

Note: Scatter plots were created using R.
demanders gaining control of the California Republican Party apparatus. These moderate Republicans were replaced by race conservatives who would unite the party against the incoming tide of race liberal legislation. After a Democratic takeover in 1958, Republicans in California, for the first time, universally opposed civil rights measures in 1959—a trend that would continue into subsequent decades. Understanding the Republican shift in the Assembly is critical to understanding racial realignment. When activists prodded Republican representatives to adopt more conservative policy positions, Republican lawmakers would finally align with their constituents on civil rights. This alignment between Republican state-level actors and voters would then lay the foundation for Barry Goldwater to take the national party to the right on race issues.

Fair employment legislation would be a contentious issue on which California state representatives would vote, and ultimately reject, throughout the 1940s and 1950s. In 1945 and 1946, the first FEPC battles occurred in the California Assembly. Three bills were introduced, two of which came up for consideration concurrently in the first half of 1945; the third came under consideration early in 1946. FEPC would continue to appear on the legislative agenda until it was made law in 1959. The three 1940’s bills would make it to a floor vote, yet telling patterns of partisanship emerge within committees, and on motions to force the bill to a final vote. I find that, while obstructionist Republicans on two key legislative committees prevented FEPC from coming to a vote, race moderate Republicans joined a majority of Democrats, and consistently supported motions to force a final vote on the two 1945 proposals.

The following study on legislative action reveals a distinct partisan pattern separate from what was happening in the electorate. Democratic legislators consistently rallied behind FEPC, while their Republican counterparts were divided in their support in the California Assembly. Though the Republican Party elite in the California Assembly was divided on FEPC, national Republicans in the House of Representatives joined their Democratic colleagues and, as a delegation, congressional representatives from California were unified in support for FEPC in the late 1940s. Taken together, the split Republican response in the California Assembly and the race liberal response on the part of Republicans in Congress demonstrated a lack of unity on race conservative ideals in the party, which contrasted with the strong unified conservative response on FEPC among Republican voters.

These disparate preferences suggest that elites are not always ahead of their constituents on policy preferences, and that voters are capable of ideological constraint, absent unity among
their party’s leaders. Further, it reveals the gradual nature of racial realignment. Since Republican elites would remain divided on race, the Republican Party did not fully realign on civil rights, despite strong conservative preferences among Republican supporters. Conversely, the Democratic realignment stalled because of a divided base, even while the party’s legislators at the state and national levels coalesced behind race liberal policies.

In this chapter, I briefly review how FEPC came to California by discussing the troubles encountered by the federal committee in 1945. I then analyze elite behavior, primarily in the California Assembly. I study the response to the 1945 and 1946 FEPC bills by using roll call data taken from California’s legislative journals. I then show the partisan continuity in the Assembly up until 1959 when, for the first time, Republicans unified on a race conservative position on FEPC. This pattern of partisanship would continue on fair housing, another economic civil rights issue, in 1961 and 1963. In addition, I explore whether or not cross-filing was a necessary precursor for race liberalism within the Republican Party in California. I then focus on the support for and opposition to civil rights in the U.S. House of Representatives to place state behavior in a national context. I study the most salient national battle over FEPC in 1950 to show that similar patterns of partisanship existed in the House and in the California Assembly. Finally, I turn to an ideological argument to explain why Republican elites, at the state and national levels, were divided in their support for FEPC.

To compare partisanship in the electorate, as seen in Chapter 2, and the lack of partisanship in the legislatures, I provide newspaper evidence, which reveals that, at the time, the Republican Party was viewed as a divided party with regard to civil rights. This is important since Republican supporters were unified in their race conservatism, despite receiving mixed messages from the Republic elite. I examine and discuss findings that reveal the heightened
inter-party polarization between Republicans and Democrats, and intra-party cohesion among Republicans in Congress. Using a dataset that spans from the 1920s to 1980, I find that Republican support for civil rights, as gauged by bill sponsorship, declined over time. I argue that this decrease in support is not only a function of changing party dynamics, but also the changing nature of civil rights issues from non-economic to economic to forced integration.

The Demise of the President’s Committee and the Need for a State FEPC in California

The Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) enacted via Executive Order by President Franklin D. Roosevelt had a significant impact on Californians. African American workers who faced discrimination in employment were able to voice their grievances against employers and unions that refused to hire, promote, and integrate black workers. Thousands of minorities, predominantly African Americans but some Jewish and Japanese workers as well, made use of the Federal FEPC in California. FEPC also had an effect on white workers who had to adjust to an integrated workforce. As discussed in Chapter 1, white workers resented African Americans’ presence in their unions and workplaces, and would refuse to work alongside minority workers.

While prominent liberals and many in the African American community\(^{216}\) supported the Federal FEPC, it inevitably came under attack by race conservative Democrats and some northern Republicans. The fight against the Federal FEPC was particularly strong as the end of World War II approached. Its opponents, both race conservative Democrats and business-

\(^{216}\) These core supporters of FEPC were also among the most vocal critics. When the president transferred the FEPC to the WMC, under the supervision of FEPC adversary Paul McNutt at the end of 1942, the liberal publication, *New Republic*, assailed President Roosevelt for yielding to opposition pressures, stating, “Back of the transfer, as everybody knew, was reactionary Southern pressure. Also involved were top government officials who had been annoyed by FEPC insistence that they put an end to discrimination in their own departments and agencies. Northern industrial interests and ‘lily-white’ trade unions took a surreptitious hand in the deal,” John Beecher, “8802 Blues,” *New Republic*, February 22, 1943, p. 250.
minded Republicans, likened FEPC with communism and socialism. This coalition also tried repeatedly to cut off the committee’s funding. In one of its more publicized attempts on June 20, 1944, a coalition in the Senate—comprised of 13 southern Democrats, 7 Republicans, and 1 western Democrat—attempted to stop funding the Federal FEPC. Sixteen Republicans and 23 Democrats successfully overrode their objections. After this failure, southern Senators Bilbo and George, both Democrats from Georgia, exclaimed that, “approving FEPC is moving our economic system into a Communistic or national socialistic system.” Opponents of FEPC would continue to use the fear of communism not only in their fight against FEPC but also during debates on a subsequent economic civil rights proposal—fair housing—with much success in the late 1940s and 1950s.

Finally, in 1945, the beginning of the end neared for the Federal FEPC. The committee became subject to several rounds of funding disputes, which ultimately led to its demise by the end of the year. The House had intended to kill FEPC by providing it none of the $752,000,000 ($9.6 billion in today’s dollars), which the war agency bill recommended. On June 24, the House appropriations committee approved a $125,000 ($1.6 million in today’s dollars) fund for liquidation of the FEPC. Members of the appropriations committee said that the amount would allow the FEPC to wind up its affairs in three months, as it was one-quarter of the $599,000 ($7.9 million in today’s dollars) that President Truman had requested to permit the agency to operate for one full year. In a surprise move, the appropriations committee then reversed its

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220 “$125,000 Approved for FEPC Liquidation,” *San Mateo Times*, June 25, 1945, p. 2.
decision to allow FEPC operations to continue for a longer period of time, approving a $250,000 ($3.3 million in today’s dollars) provision to the war agency bill. The provision did not last long, however. On November 16, the chairman of the San Francisco regional office announced that activities would have to end on December 15, 1945 due to lack of congressional appropriations. In a press statement, it was noted that the office was being closed, “despite a mounting load of employment discrimination complaints.” The San Francisco office opened in September 1943 and had heard more than 1,300 complaints from California, Oregon, Washington, and Nevada.

The Federal FEPC struggled to survive in the 1940s. However, the committee’s impact in California—particularly in Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay area—is undeniable. The Los Angeles Times, in addition to local papers like the Sentinel, published details about the hearings and the arguments for and against nondiscrimination in the workplace. Newspapers publicized which employers and unions were present at the hearings and complied with FEPC’s orders, such as the Los Angeles Railway Corporation, and which ones did not, like the AFL Boiler Makers’ Union. These articles shed light on the extent of employment discrimination and brought awareness to FEPC and its mission so that when FEPC became a state issue, citizens had already been exposed to fair employment legislation.

Studying the battles over a California FEPC allows me to unpack the racial realignment phenomenon, as the bipartisan behavior in the Assembly reveals a departure from the partisan

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221 “Reversal Vote Provides Fund for F.E.P.C.,” Los Angeles Times, July 12, 1945, p. 4.
trends exhibited in the public. The lack of unity between voters and legislators indicates that partisan supporters and legislators were not responding to one another on the salient race issue that emerged as a result of war mobilization and shifting demographics. Despite the Republican rank-and-file rejecting FEPC in the 1945 Gallup survey discussed in Chapter 1, many Republican lawmakers in both the California Assembly and the House of Representatives supported FEPC. On the Democratic side, legislators were united in their support of FEPC bills, ignoring a sizeable portion of party supporters who were hesitant to support FEPC when the question wording revealed that such legislation would require employees to work with African Americans. The lack of coherence on FEPC policy within both parties suggests that racial realignment was not the result of one group’s shift in attitudes or behavior on civil rights. That is, no one set of partisan actors in either party clearly compelled other party members to realign on race.

The voters and legislators did not align their preferences on FEPC in the 1940s and 50s, creating a tension within each of the parties that would not alleviate at the state level until the late 1950s, and at the national level in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1959, Republican assemblymen would align their race views with the party’s rank-and-file. National party leaders and members of the House would join the California Republican Party after the 1964 election and move to the right, forming a unified position on race for the first time. On the Democratic side, the party’s base would match the elite’s race liberal views only after the Republican Party fully realigned on civil rights. In the late 1960s, once it became clear to race conservative Democrats that the Republican Party represented their views on race issues, they moved en masse into the Republican fold—leaving behind a much more race liberal Democratic Party.
FEPC in the California Legislature—Unified Democrats and Divided Republicans

In the following sections, I discuss the dataset I compiled to study partisanship on civil rights in the California Assembly. I then examine the legislative action and roll call votes taken on FEPC bills between 1945 and 1957 to demonstrate the key finding of this chapter—Republicans, and not just the more moderate, cross-filing Republicans, were supportive of FEPC in the 1940s and for most of the 1950s. This is contrary to the narrative that Republican opposition in state legislatures precluded FEPC legislation. While it is true, as Chen (2009) points out, that Republicans in two key Assembly committees—the Committee on Governmental Efficiency and the Committee on Ways and Means—refused to take action on FEPC bills,226 there was significant Republican support when the authors of the bills moved to supersede the committees and bring the bills to the floor for a final vote. I argue that, because of the overlooked Republican support in bringing the bill to final consideration, recent scholarship has misconceived the actions of state legislators, thus perpetuating the misleading explanation that state elites were displaying clear partisan behavior on civil rights before the rank-and-file.

Absent from this narrative is the role of race moderates in the Republican Party. The central tension for moderate Republicans like Governor Earl Warren was the ideological need for minimal government intervention in the market, and the concern for minorities who faced discrimination in the workforce. Warren’s mixed actions on FEPC—in 1945, he supported the educational, non-enforceable commission and in 1946, he decided to back an enforceable FEPC—highlights and corresponds with the conflict within the California Republican Party.

Though the majority of Republicans who were supportive of civil rights were cross-fliers, cross-filing was not a prerequisite for Republicans to adopt race liberal views. There were some non-cross-filing Republicans in the Assembly who supported motions to force FEPC to a floor

vote. It is important to note that fewer Republicans were cross-filing in the 1950s, due in large part to the decline in popularity of the cross-filing mechanism, as demonstrated by Proposition 13 (1952), on which voters almost overturned the practice (by a margin of 50.5% to 49.5%, a difference of just over 2,000 votes across the state).\textsuperscript{227} However, despite the decrease in the number of cross-filing Republicans in the Assembly, FEPC measures received bipartisan support in 1955 and 1957. Republican support of FEPC is pivotal in these years since, for the first time, FEPC bills passed in the Assembly (and would later die in the Senate). Therefore, cross-filing did not strongly influence Republicans’ positions on race issues since, even when the number of cross-filing Republicans dwindled to less than 5 in 1955 and 1957, Republicans still supported FEPC. As I will detail in Chapter 4, the shift from race moderate to race conservative in the California Republican Party was more a consequence of the 1958 statewide elections and the defeat of the conservative candidate for governor, William Knowland.

\textit{Roll Call Data for the California Assembly}

Examining the behavior of partisans in the California Assembly adds another dimension to the study of racial realignment. Previous studies that examined racial realignment have had a broad regional focus. Carmines and Stimson (1989) and Karol (2009) explored national party behavior by observing northern members of Congress and their actions on civil rights legislation. Feinstein and Schickler (2008) compiled and analyzed state party platforms across the northern United States. Schickler (2013) observed civil rights attitudes of all non-southern survey respondents. A more focused approach on one state, however, allows for a more critical evaluation of \textit{why} actors were responding in a partisan or non-partisan fashion on civil rights.

Which members of the Republican and Democratic Parties in California were supporting FEPC?

Were they from urban or rural areas? Were they cross-filers? How did the partisan behavior at the state level compare and contrast to the behavior in Congress, and what do the similarities and differences suggest about party unity at the elite level? By studying one state’s legislature, I can answer these questions and thus develop a more nuanced explanation of race realignment not only at the state-level but also at the national-level.

To compile an original dataset of the California Assembly, I accessed the state historical archives website that allow researchers to view scanned copies of the Assembly Journals that contain roll call votes.228 These journals were thousands of pages in length; in order to find civil rights bills, I browsed through the indices for race topics and their corresponding page numbers. Oftentimes, there were a dozen or more page numbers, as several actions were taken on these bills, so I sifted through the material to find any debates, speeches, or roll calls. Once I found the roll call votes for a specific bill, I entered the representative’s name, the county in which the representative’s district was located, and their party identification into a spreadsheet, along with whether or not they voted “aye” or “noe” on the proposed action for the bills.229

Assembly Bill 3, 1945

On January 12, 1945, a bipartisan group led by Democrat Augustus Hawkins, introduced Assembly Bill 3. In addition to Hawkins, the other co-signers were Democrat William Rosenthal, Republican Kathryn Niehouse, and Edward Carey—a cross-filing Republican.

Assembly Bill 3 (A.B. 3) sought to prevent and eliminate practices of employment

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229 Since the journal did not list the members’ party identification, I had to look through appendices for the list of members and their party identification. Some readers might wonder if cross-filing impacted this analysis, as perhaps successful cross-filers were listed as both Democrats and Republicans. While many of the Assembly members were cross-filers, the appendices listed the members’ primary party identification first. So, in the case of Democrat Augustus Hawkins, he was listed as Hawkins (D-R). Republicans like Speaker of the Assembly Charles Lyon was listed as (R-D).
discrimination because of “race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry.” It would have created a State Commission on Fair Employment Practices, and set aside appropriations for the execution of its duties and compensation of employees and officers. It would define unlawful employment practices, such as the refusal of an employer to hire or promote an applicant based on race, religion, color, and/or national origin.\(^{230}\) It also sought to prohibit segregation in unions, and protect prospective and current employees who filed complaints. Hawkins’ bill would give FEPC the authority to issue orders, directing the guilty party to cease discrimination, and take steps to rectify the situation and eradicate discrimination, including but not limited to re-hiring or promoting the individual who initiated the complaint. These orders were enforceable through the courts, and violation of an order would result in a misdemeanor for the guilty party.\(^{231}\)

A.B. 3 would face a series of legislative challenges, including hostile committees, several revisions and amendments, two votes for withdrawal from committee, and two votes for final consideration.\(^{232}\)

Hawkins’ first hurdle was to vote A.B. 3 out of the Committee on Governmental Efficiency and Economy, and re-refer it to the Committee on Ways and Means. On April 19, 1945, he finally succeeded and the motion carried with support from some Republicans by a margin of 40 to 31.\(^{233}\) Eleven Republicans joined 29 Democrats to re-refer the bill. Of the 11 Republicans, 7 were cross-filers. Only 3 Democratic Assemblymen voted no (see Table 3.1). Of the Republicans who voted on the measure, 28% voted yes; of the Democrats who voted, 91% voted yes. On June 7, Hawkins cleared the second obstacle—removing A.B. 3 from the

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Table 3.1. Support and Opposition in the California Assembly on A.B. 3 (1945): Motion to remove from Committee on Governmental Efficiency and Economy and re-refer to Committee on Ways and Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Republican-Democrats</th>
<th><strong>Republican Total</strong></th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Democrat-Republicans</th>
<th><strong>Democratic Total</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aye</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>11 (28%)</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>29 (91%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noe</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>28 (72%)</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>3 (9%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The columns titled “Republican Total” and “Democratic Total” report the absolute number of Republicans (adding together “Republicans” and “Republican-Democrats”) and Democrats (adding together “Democrats” and “Democratic-Republicans”). The percentages report the percent of the party (of the members who recorded a vote) that supported/opposed the motion.
Committee on Ways and Means (by a margin of 42-25) and having it placed upon the file for possible future floor consideration.\textsuperscript{234} Table 3.2 shows that 10 Republicans and 32 Democrats voted to remove A.B. 3 from the Committee on Ways and Means. Again, only 3 Democrats voted against the motion. Thirty-one percent of the Republican Party voted yes, as did 91\% of the Democrats.

Hawkins moved quickly to push A.B. 3 onto the floor for a final vote on June 9\textsuperscript{th}. A simple majority, however, would not be sufficient as it was for the previous motions. Since a three-fourths vote was required to take the bill up for a final roll call, Hawkins needed 60 of 80 votes in the Assembly to succeed.\textsuperscript{235} Hawkins tried twice to garner the necessary votes before the close of the legislative session. He failed both times and the bill died without further action. He came closest with his first attempt—within 15 votes of the 60 necessary votes (a margin of 45 to 13). Table 3.3 reveals that 21 Republicans (66\% of the voting Republican Assemblymen) and 24 Democrats (92\% of the voting Democratic Assemblymen) voted in support, while 11 Republicans and 2 Democrats voted in opposition.

Though it ultimately failed, the roll call votes to have the bill removed from committee and brought to the floor for a final vote are significant, as they reveal three key facts. First, support for A.B. 3 was almost universal among Democrats in the Assembly, signaling unified party support for FEPC. Second, despite some hostile Republicans in both the Committee on Governmental Efficiency and Economy and the Committee on Ways and Means that refused to take action on the FEPC bills, the entire California Republican Party should not be faulted for halting progress on FEPC. As demonstrated, on all actions in which a roll call was taken on A.B. 3, there was significant Republican support. Third, of the Republicans who supported actions

\textsuperscript{235} “GOP Advocates FEPC Which Members Fought In Session,” The Fresno Bee, November 17, 1945, p. 2.
Table 3.2. Support and Opposition in the California Assembly on A.B. 3 (1945): Motion to remove from Committee on Ways and Means and placed upon file for future consideration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Republican-Democrats</th>
<th>Republican Total</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Democrat-Republicans</th>
<th>Democratic Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aye</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10 (31%)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32 (91%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noe</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22 (69%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The columns titled “Republican Total” and “Democratic Total” report the absolute number of Republicans (adding together “Republicans” and “Republican-Democrats”) and Democrats (adding together “Democrats” and “Democratic-Republicans”). The percentages report the percent of the party (of the members who recorded a vote) that supported/opposed the motion.
Table 3.3. Support and Opposition in the California Assembly on A.B. 3 (1945): Motion for final vote, needed 60 votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Republican-Democrats</th>
<th><strong>Republican Total</strong></th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Democrat-Republicans</th>
<th><strong>Democratic Total</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aye</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21 (66%)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24 (92%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Noe</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11 (34%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The columns titled “Republican Total” and “Democratic Total” report the absolute number of Republicans (adding together “Republicans” and “Republican-Democrats”) and Democrats (adding together “Democrats” and “Democratic-Republicans”). The percentages report the percent of the party (of the members who recorded a vote) that supported/opposed the motion.
that would either remove FEPC from hostile committees, most of them were cross-filing, moderate Republicans. These “Republican-Democrats” reached across the aisle not only in the case of A.B. 3 but also on subsequent civil rights bills until the end of cross-filing in 1959.

Assembly Bill 1399—1945

In 1945, Governor Warren endorsed an educational committee to study the prevalence and effects of employment discrimination in California. Assembly Bill 1399 (A.B. 1399) proposed the establishment of a “Commission on Political and Economic Equality” for the “purpose of research and education in this field.” A.B. 1399 was considered at the same time that Hawkins’ more aggressive, enforceable FEPC bill (A.B. 3) was proposed. Thus, on this more tepid bill, there were mixed feelings. Race moderates supported it as a more practical alternative, while those who supported A.B. 3 viewed the Warren-backed bill as too weak. Therefore, A.B. 3 could not acquire enough votes to make it out of committee.

On January 26th, Samuel Collins, a Republican-Democrat, introduced A.B. 1399. It was co-sponsored by Republican-Democrat Frank Waters and Republicans Thomas Maloney and Walter Fourt. Because of its more moderate proposal for an educational commission, A.B. 1399 enjoyed more Republican support than Hawkins’ bill but did not receive the votes necessary to bring it to the floor for final consideration. Collins, like Hawkins, tried twice before the close of the legislative session to gather the necessary 60 votes for the final vote, but to no avail.

On June 8, a motion for a final vote was held but did not receive the necessary 60 votes, failing by a margin of 50 to 18. Fifty-seven percent of Republicans and 94% of Democrats, who were present for the vote, supported bringing A.B. 1399 in favor of the motion. Twenty-one

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Republicans and 29 Democrats voted yes, while 16 Republicans and 2 Democrats voted against the measure (see Table 3.4).\textsuperscript{238} Had it not been for the anti-majoritarian rule that required three-quarters of the Assembly to force a bill out of committee and ensure passage, Assembly Bills 3 and 1399 would have passed with a simple majority. A.B. 3 received 45 of the 80 votes required when Hawkins first called for the final vote. Collins’ A.B. 1399 had received 50 ‘aye’ votes. Though these bills would have likely died in the Senate, as FEPC bills did in 1955 and 1957, it is important to note that Republicans were not the driving force preventing FEPC from passing through the Assembly.

\textit{Assembly Bill 97—1946}

Supporters for FEPC tried once again in 1946. On January 17, 1946, Assembly Bill 97 (A.B. 97) was introduced. It was supported by Governor Warren, various labor unions and civic groups, and primarily opposed by manufacturers’ associations and other employer groups.\textsuperscript{239} Republican-Democrat Raup Miller was the bill’s principal author, joined in support by Kathryn Niehouse (R-D), Carey (R-D), Republican Bernard Sheridan and Democrats Don Allen, Julian Beck, and S.L. Heisinger. The proposed legislation was similar to Hawkins’ bill proposed a year earlier. It contained similar language, calling for the creation of a State Commission on Fair Employment Practices that would make appropriations for the execution of duties and

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{238} On June 13, a second attempt to bring the bill to a final vote failed by a margin of 32 to 21, with 63\% of Republicans and 56\% of Democrats—22 Republicans and 10 Democrats voting to bring A.B. 1399 to a final vote. Eight Democrats and 13 Republicans voted no. When the second vote was held, fewer Democrats voted to act than on any other FEPC bill. Some Democrats would rather not vote for a non-enforceable bill in the hopes that a proposal for a stronger committee would come to fruition. “Warren Renews Efforts,” \textit{San Mateo Times}, August 1, 1945, p. 3; Neal, \textit{HST}, p. 247.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{239} “Vet Housing Bill, FEPC Law; Session to End Tuesday,” \textit{San Mateo Times}, February 16, 1946, p. 2.
Table 3.4. Support and Opposition in the California Assembly on A.B. 1399 (1945): Motion for final vote, needed 60 votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Republican-Democrats</th>
<th>Republican Total</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Democrat-Republicans</th>
<th>Democratic Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aye</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>21 (57%)</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>29 (94%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noe</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>16 (43%)</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>2 (6%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The columns titled “Republican Total” and “Democratic Total” report the absolute number of Republicans (adding together “Republicans” and “Republican-Democrats”) and Democrats (adding together “Democrats” and “Democratic-Republicans”). The percentages report the percent of the party (of the members who recorded a vote) that supported/opposed the motion.
compensation of employees and officers, with the purpose of combating employment
discrimination based on “race, creed, color, or national origin.”

Assembly Bill 97 first had to pass through the Assembly’s Committee on Governmental
Efficiency and Economy. This committee refused to vote on Miller’s bill. Miller moved to
withdraw his bill from the committee on February 12, 1946—no coincidence, as Miller
specifically chose Lincoln’s birthday to gain momentum for the non-discrimination bill. The
motion passed by a margin of 41 to 27. Thirty-three percent of voting Republicans and 91% of
voting Democrats supported the motion (see Table 3.5). Unfortunately, for Miller and FEPC
advocates, the bill would die in the Committee on Ways and Means.

The motion to withdraw A.B. 97 from the Committee on Governmental Efficiency and
Economy succeeded, with Republican support. Since the bill carried an appropriation, it had to
go through the Committee on Ways and Means before it could be brought to a floor vote. The
Committee on Ways and Means rejected the bill, on February 19th, by a vote of 10 to 6 that
called for a commission without enforcement powers. It died when Miller declared he would not
again attempt to have it reconsidered due to the session’s imminent adjournment. Though Miller’s bill did not make it to a floor vote, a telling story unfolds when observing who
supported and opposed the FEPC bill in committee. Only 16 members of the 25-person
committee were present for the vote, which concerned Miller. Of the 9 members missing, 7
were Democrats (or listed as Democrat-Republicans), and perhaps more sympathetic toward
FEPC than the majority of Republican/Republican-Democrats that were present for the vote.

After all, only one Democrat-Republican, Lowrey, rejected the bill. The other nine members

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240 “Assembly Daily Journal,” 1946 California Assembly Journal, California State Assembly, Office of the Chief
Table 3.5. Support and Opposition in the California Assembly on A.B. 97 (1946): Motion to remove from Committee on Governmental Efficiency and Economy and re-refer to Committee on Ways and Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Republican-Democrats</th>
<th>Republican Total</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Democrat-Republicans</th>
<th>Democratic Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aye</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>12 (33%)</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>29 (91%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noe</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>24 (67%)</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>3 (9%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The columns titled “Republican Total” and “Democratic Total” report the absolute number of Republicans (adding together “Republicans” and “Republican-Democrats”) and Democrats (adding together “Democrats” and “Democratic-Republicans”). The percentages report the percent of the party (of the members who recorded a vote) that supported/opposed the motion.
who voted against FEPC were mostly Republican-Democrats—Clarke, Erwin, Gannon, Knight, Kraft, Thurman, and Watson. There were two Republicans—Davis and Johnson—who also rejected the proposal. Assemblyman Chester Gannon warned that, “there is nothing to prevent three million more non-whites from coming into California if we pass this law.” Thomas Erwin noted that “most of our businessmen would go to jail under this law,” condemning the law but not the discriminatory actions of the employers. The sole Democrat-Republican, Lloyd Lowrey, was concerned about “trouble in agriculture if whites and non-white farm gangs were forced to work together,”\(^\text{244}\) which echoes the sentiment, explored in Chapter 1, of many of the Democratic Party’s rank-and-file, who were concerned about workplace integration.

Previous work has focused on the Republican opposition in the Committee on Ways and Means, suggesting that FEPC-averse Republicans used their power on this committee as a veto point over any civil rights legislation.\(^\text{245}\) While a plausible argument, I focus less on the success or failure of the FEPC bill and the Republican opposition in the Committee on Ways and Means and instead emphasize the bipartisan support within the committee to support the bill. Thus, even though the opposition was comprised mostly of Republican-Democrats and Republicans, the more significant aspect of the vote was that 3 Democrats (Crichton, Crowley, and O’Day) and 2 Republican-Democrats (Miller and Wollenberg) and 1 Republican (Sheridan) in the Committee on Ways and Means supported Miller’s FEPC bill. While we will never know how the missing members would have voted, it is possible that this trend of bipartisan support would have persisted had the full committee been present.

This bipartisan pattern is significant, for it not only foreshadows the bipartisan action on later FEPC bills but also counters the discourse that Republican state legislators were unified

\(^{244}\) "State F.E.P.C. Killed by 10-6 Committee Vote," \textit{San Bernardino Daily Sun}, February 16, 1946, p. 2.

\(^{245}\) Chen, \textit{The Fifth Freedom}, p. 155
against the new, economic civil rights that emerged after World War II. Not all Republicans were obstructionists. Just as southern Democrats did not speak for all Democrats in the House of Representatives when the former attempted to kill the 1964 Civil Rights Act in committee, 246 a handful of racially conservative Republicans on the Committee on Ways and Means were not representative of the whole Republican Party in the California Assembly. It is possible, therefore, that race conservative Republicans in the Assembly sought appointments on Ways and Means because they wanted to prevent civil rights bills from coming to a vote. 247 Since Republicans enjoyed a 42-37 majority in 1946, 248 the party benefited from the partisan allocation of chairmanships and assignments. Speaker Charles Lyon, thus, had the authority to distribute committee assignments as he desired, considering such factors as Republican Party loyalty and seniority. 249 Despite these obstructionist Republicans, there were vocal Republicans, like Miller, who supported FEPC and came to the defense of “thousands [of Negroes]…living in economic slavery in our state today.” Miller would plead with his fellow Republicans by appealing to the legacy of Abraham Lincoln, calling on them to support A.B. 97. 250

246 King, *Turf Wars*, p. 16. Also, see Mayhew for a discussion of how southern legislators were able to capitalize on their seniority to sit on key committees that had the potential to stall civil rights legislation. Mayhew, *America’s Congress*, pp. 181-184.

247 In both the state and national legislatures, committee appointments are crucial in the success and failure of bills. King has detailed the “turf war” in Congress—the fight over committee appointments. According to King, “Committee jurisdictions are akin to property rights, and few things in Washington are more closely guarded or as fervently pursued…no single policy dispute…ignited the kinds of passions among members that turf wars could inflame.” King, *Turf Wars*, p. 11.


249 In the California Assembly, Speakers decide how to divvy up committee appointments. During the “Hiram Johnson era” in the early 1900s, for example, membership to committees was largely non-partisan. However, after the Democrats gained control of the Assembly for the first time in the twentieth century (in 1937), they implemented a more partisan structure and began to reward party members with desired committee assignments. This partisan trend in the allocation of committee seats would persist throughout the twentieth century. Buchanan, *Legislative Partisanship: The Deviant Case of California*, pp. 12-13. See also, Sokolow and Brandsma, “Partisanship and Seniority in Legislative Committee Assignments.”

In addition to unified Democratic unity and mixed Republican support, there was no discernible pattern with regard to how representatives voted or the city he or she represented. Within the Democratic Party, almost all Assemblymen voted in favor of each of the above motions, suggesting ideological unity despite any local interests that might have led Democrats to vote against FEPC.\textsuperscript{251} Across all of the motions, Republicans who voted with the majority of Democrats were not only from urban areas with a larger African American population (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Alameda) but also from more rural areas with a smaller black population (i.e., Santa Clara, Sonoma, San Joaquin, Trinity). There were also many Republicans from Los Angeles and Alameda who did not move to take any action on the bills (Knight, Burke, Erwin, Field, Johnson, Stewart), even on the non-enforceable FEPC proposal, A.B. 1399. If representatives were responding to the interests of their constituents, then Assemblymen from urban areas should all have voted against action on FEPC since job competition and racial tension would have been more inclined to happen in more heterogeneous populations. The lack of division between rural and urban Republicans, however, suggests that members of the Assembly were divided, not because of interest, but because of ideology.

Race moderates in the Republican Party, both cross-filers and non-cross-filers created a stalemate; that is, representatives did not align with their constituency’s preferences and attitudes. Since there was no party for race conservatives—with the Democratic Party displaying unity on race liberalism and the Republican Party internally divided—many of them would remain Democrats, which created the division within the Democratic rank-and-file. This division within the Democratic Party would only be resolved in the late 1960s and 1970s when Republican Party elites make clear advances for the racially conservative vote.

\textsuperscript{251} An example of a local interest that might have influenced some Democratic legislators was mentioned by the cross-filing Democrat Lloyd Lowrey who warned of racial conflict in agricultural jobs should FEPC pass into law. “State F.E.P.C. Killed by 10-6 Committee Vote,” \textit{San Bernardino Daily Sun}, February 16, 1946, p. 2.
A Persistent Pattern of Behavior in the California Assembly—1955 and 1957

On January 13, 1955, William Rumford introduced the first Fair Employment Practices bill that would pass through the Assembly. In addition to Rumford, 18 Democrats, 1 cross-filing Republican and 1 Republican introduced Assembly Bill 971 (A.B. 971). This Act related “to the prevention and elimination of practices of discrimination in employment and otherwise against persons because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, or ancestry.” It would create the “State Commission on Fair Employment Practices.” Table 3.6 shows the partisan breakdown of the vote for A.B. 971, taken on May 17th. It received bipartisan support and passed through the Assembly by a vote margin of 32-27, with 17 Democrats (89% of present Democrats) and 15 Republicans (38% of present Republicans) voting yes on the bill.253

Unfortunately, for its supporters, A.B. 971, the Senate Committee on Labor would table it.254

On January 19, 1957, Augustus Hawkins, in addition to 32 other Democrats and 10 Republicans255 co-introduced yet another FEPC bill: Assembly Bill 2000 (A.B. 2000).256 This proposal contained similar wording as previous FEPC bills.257 More Democrats and Republicans supported A.B. 2000 than did A.B. 971 two years earlier, by a margin of 54-15. On April 15th, 31 Democrats (97% of voting Democrats) and 23 Republicans (62% of voting Republicans)

252 The Republicans who introduced A.B. 971 were Doyle and McCollister. Democrats who introduced this bill were Rumford, Hawkins, McMillan, Sankary, Bee, Cunningham, Dills, Donahue, Elliot, Gaffney, Geddes, Henderson, Kilpatrick, Masterson, Miller, O’Connell, Thomas, Unruh, and Wilson.
255 The Republicans who introduced A.B. 2000 were Weinberger, Allen (Bruce), Beaver, Bursterud, Caldecott, Coolidge, Doyle (Donald), Geddes (Eric), McCollister, and Pattee. The Democrats who introduced it were Hawkins, Rumford, O’Connell, Allen (Donald), Bee, Biddick, Brown, Burton, Crown, Cunningham, Davis, Dills, Donahue, Doyle (Thomas), Elliot, Frew, Gaffney, Geddes (Samuel), Henderson, Kilpatrick, MacBride, Masterson, McMillan, Meyers, Miller, Munnell, Nisbet, Porter, Rees, Thomas, Unruh, Wilson, and Winton.
Table 3.6. Support and Opposition in the California Assembly on A.B. 971 (1955) and A.B. 2000 (1957)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Assembly Bill 971</th>
<th>Assembly Bill 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>Republican-Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aye</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noe</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Republican-Democrats</th>
<th>Republican Total</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Democrat-Republicans</th>
<th>Democratic Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aye</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>23 (62%)</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td><strong>31 (97%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noe</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>14 (38%)</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>1 (3%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The columns titled “Republican Total” and “Democratic Total” report the absolute number of Republicans (adding together “Republicans” and “Republican-Democrats”) and Democrats (adding together “Democrats” and “Democratic-Republicans”). The percentages report the percent of the party (of the members who recorded a vote) that supported/opposed the bill.
supported A.B. 2000, while 1 Democrat and 14 Republicans voted against it (Table 3.6). As with A.B. 971, the Committee on Labor would not take any action on A.B. 2000 when it moved to the Senate.

As was the case with A.B. 971, and the previous FEPC bills in 1945 and 1946, the Assemblyman’s district did not determine how he or she would vote. There was no consistent pattern of support across urban areas with larger numbers of African Americans and rural districts with virtually no black residents. If, according to an interest-based explanation of realignment, Assemblymen were concerned about job competition and potential race riots that would ensue if FEPC passed into law, then we should see that legislators from urban areas were less likely to support FEPC, regardless of whether or not they were Democratic or Republican. Another way to conceive an interest-based explanation is to consider not the constituents’ interests but rather the representatives’ electoral interests. Perhaps, Assemblymen were less concerned about how FEPC would be received by white voters, but instead wanted to appeal to the growing black population in their districts by supporting FEPC. Thus, it is possible that representatives from counties, like Los Angeles and Alameda—Democrat or Republican—were more supportive than Assemblymen from Kern, Placer, or Plumas, which had virtually no black population. Since I find no clear pattern, however, neither the interest-based nor electoral interest explanation holds. The lack of a pattern across districts, urban or rural, suggests an ideological motivation.

Establishing a New Pattern of Partisan Behavior —1959-1963

Unlike the votes on previously proposed bills in the California Assembly, the votes on Assembly Bills 1223 (1959), 801 (1961), and 1240 (1963) were highly partisan. Very few
Republicans supported the new civil rights measures, while fewer Democrats opposed them.

This new pattern of partisanship, I will argue in Chapter 4, was the result of two key factors—the highly charged, highly partisan William Knowland gubernatorial campaign in 1958 and the end of cross-filing in mid-1959. Though he did not win the election, Knowland succeeded in ending support within the Republican Party for moderate conservatism, which dominated the state and national parties throughout the 1940s and 1950s. His campaign galvanized hard-line conservatives, who had long been overshadowed by the more moderate faction of the party, and laid the foundation for the later success of Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan.

In addition to the party’s internal struggle exposed by the Knowland campaign, the end of cross-filing was the death knell for moderate Republicans in California. No longer could Republicans register to run for office in the Democratic and Republican primaries, and find electoral success by running on a moderate platform to appeal to members of both parties. Thus, Republicans had to move to the right to appeal to Republican primary voters. We can see the shift away from the center when observing the 1955 and 1957 legislative sessions, when the number of cross-filing Republicans dwindled down to 5 and 4, respectively—down from a high of 40 “Republican-Democrats” in the 1953 session. This decrease could be attributed in part to Proposition 13, which appeared on the 1952 ballot. Proposition 13 sought to end the practice of cross-filing in the state. Its narrow defeat likely led many Republicans to forego cross-filing in subsequent elections, in anticipation of the end of cross-filing. Comparing the 1953 and 1955 sessions reveals why cross-filing declined dramatically in just a few years. Of the 19 Assemblymen who were present for both sessions, 17 did not cross-file and became Republicans. 258 Thus, it is probable that these 17 legislators were aware of the inevitable end of

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cross-filing and decided to seek out only the Republican nomination in 1954. This is a telling finding, as it suggests a story of conversion, not replacement. Former moderate, Republican-Democrats converted to Republicans, and as we will see in the roll call vote analysis, adopted race conservative views.

The battle for fair employment practices in the California Legislature would finally succeed in 1959. Introduced by Hawkins and a group of 16 other Democrats on February 5, Assembly Bill 1223 (A.B. 1223) was also endorsed by Democratic Governor Pat Brown, who had come into office, along with a Democratic majority in both chambers in 1958. A.B. 1223 made its way through Democratic-controlled committees and was approved by a margin of 42-35 on April 8th. Thirty-eight Democrats (85% of voting Democrats) and 4 Republicans (12% of voting Republicans) supported the bill, and 29 Republicans and 7 Democrats opposed it (see Table 3.7). The Senate quickly approved it the following day without adding any amendments. With FEPC secured, the debate over economic civil rights in California then turned to fair housing laws with the introduction of A.B. 801 (1961) and A.B. 1240 (1963). Assembly Bill 801 (A.B. 801), introduced by 16 Democrats including Hawkins and Rumford on January 25, 1961, was a measure that passed in the Assembly by a margin of 44-31 votes. Thirty-seven Democrats (88% of voting Democrats) and 7 Republicans (21% of voting

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260 The Democrats who sponsored the bill were Hawkins, O’Connell, Burton, McMillan, Brown, Crown, Elliot, Gaffney, Kennick, Kilpatrick, Masterson, Meyers, Nisbet, Porter, Thomas, Unruh, Wilson.
262 “Senate Approves FEPC,” The Oakland Tribune, April 9, 1959, p. 1.
263 The Democrats that introduced the bill were Hawkins, Rumford, Brown, Kilpatrick, Allen, Burton, Elliot, Gaffney, McMillan, Mills, Munnell, O’Connell, Porter, Thomas, Unruh, and Waldie.
Table 3.7. Support and Opposition in the California Assembly on A.B. 1223 (1959), A.B. 801 (1961), and A.B. 1240 (1963)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assembly Bill 1223</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Republican-Democrats</th>
<th>Republican Total</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Democrat-Republicans</th>
<th>Democratic Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aye</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38 (84%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noe</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29 (88%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7 (16%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assembly Bill 801</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Republican-Democrats</th>
<th>Republican Total</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Democrat-Republicans</th>
<th>Democratic Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aye</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7 (21%)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37 (88%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noe</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26 (79%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5 (12%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assembly Bill 1240</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Republican-Democrats</th>
<th>Republican Total</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Democrat-Republicans</th>
<th>Democratic Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aye</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noe</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25 (89%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The columns titled “Republican Total” and “Democratic Total” report the absolute number of Republicans (adding together “Republicans” and “Republican-Democrats”) and Democrats (adding together “Democrats” and “Democratic-Republicans”). The percentages report the percent of the party (of the members who recorded a vote) that supported/opposed the bill.
Republicans) approved A.B. 801, while 26 Republicans and 5 Democrats rejected it (see Table 3.7). A.B. 801 was passed to the Senate on May 16, where it was ultimately rejected. This bill was the precursor to Assembly Bill 1240 (A.B. 1240), otherwise known as the Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1963, which would place enforcement of housing discrimination within the FEPC, while banning racial discrimination “in the sale, lease, rental or financing of all housing accommodations.”264

Assembly Bill 1240 was introduced on February 14, 1963. This bill was similar to the previous fair housing bill, A.B. 801. A.B. 1240 sought to prohibit discrimination in the sale or rental of property by owners of any housing accommodation except for a “single unit dwelling occupied in whole or in part by the owner as his residence.” It would also allow alleged victims of housing discrimination to bring their grievances to the Fair Employment Practices Commission, which—if the bill passed—would be renamed Fair Practices Commission. The commission would then investigate. If the commission found the owner or renter guilty of discrimination, the unit or house would be put on public record and the sale or rental of the unit in question would be prohibited until the issue was solved.265 Introduced by Rumford and 21 other Democrats,266 A.B. 1240 passed by a margin of 39-25 in the Assembly on April 25th, with 36 Democrats and 3 Republicans voting yes, and 25 Republicans voting no (see Table 3.7). Unlike other votes and motions on previous bills, A.B. 1240 marks the first time in which 100% of the Democrats in the Assembly supported economic civil rights. Eighty-nine percent of Republicans opposed the Rumford bill, which created the largest partisan divide in the Assembly

266 The Democrats that introduced A.B. 1240 were Rumford, Dymally, Ferrell, Knox, Alquist, Burton, Casey, Crown, Elliot, Foran, Gaffney, Kennick, McMillan, Mills, Moreno, Petris, Song, Soto, Stanton, Warren, and Zenovich.
on either FEPC or fair housing legislation. A.B. 1240 made its way through the Senate and was signed into law by Governor Brown on July 18, 1963. Liberals in California had finally succeeded, after several legislative battles, in passing both FEPC and fair housing bills into law.

The Democrats’ success on economic civil rights in California would not have happened without their victories in the 1958 state elections. Due, in large part, to the failed William Knowland gubernatorial campaign that exposed the internal strife between conservatives and moderates within the Republican Party, Democrats won the governorship and majorities in both chambers of the legislature. In Chapter 4, I will examine the Knowland campaign, which is essential to understanding the Republican Party’s realignment on race at both the state and national level. The ideological conflict within the party became apparent during Knowland’s run for governor but it was also emerging in the national party. Knowland’s disappearance from the national party created an opening for Senator Barry Goldwater to move the national party to the right. Goldwater’s actions made it possible for Ronald Reagan to rise to power and cement the party’s position as the race conservative party.

Support for FEPC in the California Congressional Delegation in 1950

In the 81st Congress (1949-1951), legislation for a permanent FEPC came to a vote in the House of Representatives. H.R. 4453 came to a vote on February 22, 1950. It was a proposal similar to the Collins’ A.B. 1399 in that it would establish an educational committee that would investigate discrimination complaints, and hold hearings with the intent of exposing unacceptable employment practices, and working with employers to eradicate race discrimination in the workforce. An example of the commission’s tactics would be the posting of notices in conspicuous locations in the workplace so that employees and employers alike
would understand what constitutes a discriminatory act.\footnote{Federal Fair Employment Practice Act,” Hearings before a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor in the House of Representatives, Eighty-First Congress, First Session on H.R. 4453 and Companion Bills, Washington D.C., May 1949, pp. 3-5.}

H.R. 4453 was not well received by liberals or President Truman. Truman began to push for FEPC in 1949, but ultimately decided to put off the congressional battle until 1950. Senate leaders met with the president and agreed that prolonged debate on FEPC would only widen the schism between President Truman and southern Democrats. The division became apparent during the presidential election of 1948 when southern Democrats, furious with Truman for his support of civil rights, formed the Dixiecrat Party and nominated Strom Thurmond to challenge Truman for the presidency. Truman and his supporters in Congress believed it was best to avoid ending the year on a filibuster that would only highlight the regional conflict within the Democratic Party. They vowed to bring up FEPC the following year.\footnote{“Truman’s Civil Rights Fight Put Off to 1950,” Los Angeles Times, October 4, 1949, p. 1.}

In his 1950 State of the Union address, President Truman once again urged Congress to consider civil rights bills that were left on the table in previous years. He encouraged action, stating that regardless of whether or not members of Congress supported or opposed civil rights, it is the “duty of the elected representatives of the people to let these proposals come to a vote.”\footnote{Harry Truman, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” January 4, 1950, The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13567, Accessed December 31, 2013.} Truman proposed an enforceable FEPC with police powers. His bill would establish a Fair Employment Practices Commission to investigate and prosecute cases of job discrimination against minorities.\footnote{“FEPC Foes Block Calling Up of Bill,” Los Angeles Times, January 24, 1950, p. 1.} However, the president’s bill did not make it out of the House Rules Committee to come to a vote. After passing through the Labor Committee, Republicans in the Rules Committee joined with southern Democrats to kill the bill.\footnote{“Democrat Says GOP Holds Reins on FEPC,” Los Angeles Times, January 23, 1950, p. 8.}

Supporters of Truman’s enforceable FEPC bill tried to circumvent the Rules Committee
but were unsuccessful. Under House rules, the Speaker could have cleared the way for debate on the bill by recognizing a committee chairman to call it up. However, the Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX) used dilatory, filibuster-like tactics to thwart FEPC advocates. He prevented the calling up of the bill twice by giving priority to measures aimed at statehood for Alaska and Hawaii. Rayburn believed it would be best to keep the “touchy subject” off the table. The Speaker and congressional opponents of the president’s FEPC also succeeded in adjourning so that the next chance for FEPC to come up for debate would be the following month.\footnote{FEPC Foes Block Calling Up of Bill,\textit{ Los Angeles Times}, January 24, 1950, p. 1.}

The FEPC issue reemerged in February 1950. Given the previous failure, in order for a FEPC bill to come to a vote, it would have to be significantly altered to remove any enforcement powers to which the coalition of Democratic southerners and Republicans objected. The product of compromise was the H.R. 4453, which provided for a voluntary commission with no enforcement powers. H.R. 4453 would have established a five-person Federal Commission to study and make recommendations in the field of employment in an attempt to curb racial, religious, and other types of discrimination through education and persuasion. The bill was sponsored by Representative Samuel McConnell (R-PA), and enjoyed some support from southerners and most Republicans in the House. It did lose some support of race liberal Democrats who were offended by the proposed powerless committee.\footnote{Voluntary FEPC Bill OK’d in House,\textit{ Los Angeles Times}, February 23, 1950, p. 1.} H.R. 4453 was approved by a roll call vote of 240 to 177. Critics of the bill referred to it as a “toothless” alternative to the FEPC bill that President Truman had requested. Representative Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY) said that H.R. 4453 was “worthless,” providing “nothing but good advice.”\footnote{Toothless FEPC Bill Adopted by Weary House,\textit{ Los Angeles Times}, February 24, 1950, p. 1.}

Despite some optimism among northern Democrats in the Senate, such as Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), who believed that the weakened version of the FEPC bill would break a
Senate filibuster, southern Democrats vowed to prevent H.R. 4453 from coming to the floor for a vote. Southern Democrats, in particularly Senator Johnston (D-SC), believed that FEPC was catastrophic for the South and declared war against the bill. Johnston stated, “We are thoroughly convinced that the passage of this monstrosity will mean a ‘Pearl Harbor for the South.’” He tabled other hearings over which he was to preside so he could devote his full time to filibustering the FEPC bill. “No future hearings will be scheduled until the FEPC bill has been defeated or otherwise disposed of.” Before resorting to their filibuster, southern Democrats and Republicans were able to delay action on FEPC by voting to lay the bill aside, and take up the president’s plan for reorganization of the National Labor Relations Board. Finally, in July 1950, the filibuster plan worked. A vote on a petition for cloture to end debate on the FEPC bill was 55 to 33, nine less than the 64 votes required.

Just as it is critical to uncover the partisan composition of votes on FEPC in the California Assembly, it is important to find the partisan patterns that emerged on the FEPC vote in Congress. Did representatives at the state level and in the California delegation align in support of FEPC in the 1940s? Or, were the parties’ elites in disarray on civil rights, with no consistency in voting patterns across levels of government? My findings suggest that national and state Democrats were in agreement, thus reinforcing the argument that there was a disconnect between elite and constituent preferences. Further, there was a lack of unity among Republican elites at the national and state levels, revealing an internal struggle over race issues in the party.

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278 The reorganization bill for the NLRB proposed abolishing the semi-independent office of general counsel. The move to table FEPC in favor of the reorganization plan was proposed by Republican Senator Robert Taft. The motion to vote on the NLRB reorganization act over FEPC succeeded by a 2 to 1 vote. The reorganization plan was ultimately defeated. “Senate Delays FEPC, Debates NLRB Change,” Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1950, p. 22.
The roll call votes for H.R. 4453 reveal that the California delegation supported the FEPC measure. Of the 24-member delegation (two members did not vote), 11 Democrats and 11 Republicans, including Representative Richard Nixon, voted to pass the FEPC bill.\textsuperscript{280} The unanimous support among Democrats was to be expected, as almost all California Assemblymen voted in favor of FEPC in all its forms in 1945 and 1946. The key difference between the Assembly and the House votes on FEPC was that all of the Republicans supported H.R. 4453, whereas Republicans in the Assembly were divided on a state FEPC. The unified support among congressional Republicans, taken together with the considerable support of FEPC in the Assembly, is significant because it reveals an internally divided Republican Party. Republicans were divided both in the state and national legislatures, which is in contrast to the unified Republican rank-and-file. Democrats, on the other hand, were universally united on a race liberal position, despite a divided mass party. Within both parties, there was an apparent difference in the attitudes of mass partisans and the behavior of elected representatives.

At the national level, FEPC faced the same fate that it did in California and many other states.\textsuperscript{281} FEPC bills rarely made it out of committee and onto the floor for a final vote. The California Senate used similar dilatory tactics as the U.S. Senate to put an end to FEPC legislation that made it out of the Assembly in the 1950s. It would not be until Democrats took over the California legislature and Congress in 1958 that FEPC and another economic civil rights measure, fair housing, would become law.


\textsuperscript{281} Chen reveals that business-minded Republicans and some race conservative Democrats in committees killed off FEPC legislation in several states, like Pennsylvania and Illinois. FEPC advocates would only be successful when liberals succeeded in winning control of the legislatures. Chen, \textit{The Fifth Freedom}, pp. 168-169.
The Divided Republican Party in the 1940s and 1950s

Not only were Republican legislators divided on FEPC but so too were party executives. At the national level, the Republican Party’s leader—presidential nominee Thomas Dewey—was supportive of FEPC legislation and civil rights in general. As Governor, Dewey publicly endorsed the state’s fair employment practices commission in 1945—the first time a state-level FEPC was passed into law. The Ives-Quinn bill mandated the equal treatment in both public and private employment, and established a powerful enforcement agency.282

In California, Dewey’s vice presidential running mate in the 1948 election, Earl Warren, was more ambiguous in his support for FEPC than Dewey. Warren’s wavering support during the 1945 and 1946 FEPC battles, including the 1946 proposition that brought FEPC to a vote, embodied the internal conflicts among Republicans at the elite level. Warren was in favor of fair employment practices, but initially took a gradualist approach that would educate, not punish, employers. While his liberal bona fides were well-established once he became a member of the Supreme Court in the 1950s, his liberal record in California is more muted. Economically, Warren was a hard-line conservative. In his keynote address before the National Republican Convention in 1944, Warren demonstrates hostility toward “bureaucrats [that] encumber the small business man with a multitude of rules, regulations, orders and decrees which entangle him, stifle his business and darken his future. They move in—like political commissars—to watch over the shoulders of our industrialists—to say what, where and how industry can produce…They have bypassed the governments of the states in an effort to compel the people to rely solely upon the New Deal clique at Washington for the solution of all their problems.” These strong conservative views constrained Warren’s views on race—ideologically, he could not advocate for a stronger role for the government with regard to civil rights.

282 Chen, The Fifth Freedom, p. 89.
Interestingly, however, Warren’s position on race was, at first, more conservative than on a range of other issues—from public housing to compulsory health insurance. Despite his economic conservatism, he advocated for a compulsory health insurance bill that shocked and alienated many of his conservative supporters. Some accused him as being a socialist—far to the left of even the former progressive Democratic governor, Culbert Olson. Opponents claimed that a vote against the bill would be a “vote against Stalin.” Warren also called for the state to alleviate the dire housing situation that resulted from the mass migration of southerners to California during and after the war. In 1946, he called upon the legislature to pass bills to address the state’s most pressing problems—housing, urban redevelopment, public health, conservation, and education. He warned that these issues had to be resolved by the state, lest the Federal Government ‘move into these fields.’ Thus, while the governor did not support federal intervention on behalf of these social issues, he did acknowledge and press for a state role, which many conservatives would find just as distasteful.

To his supporters, Warren was an enlightened man. According to then Attorney General Robert Kenny, he was exceptional. “As his experience increased, his mind absorbed new concepts.” Notable author and California historian, Carey McWilliams—a critic of Warren—was more cynical about his liberal positions. To McWilliams, Warren was merely positioning himself as a moderate candidate for president, hoping to widen his base of support. Regardless of why Warren advocated for liberal policies in the mid-1940s, his stance on certain issues was a bold move, setting him apart from traditional Republicans.

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283 Warren’s proposed legislative agenda was viewed by Democrats and Republicans alike as progressive. Among the most scrutinized proposal was his endorsement of prepaid medical care through a system of compulsory health insurance. Warren’s program was likened to those of progressive Governor Hiram Johnson (1911) and Democratic Governor Culbert Olson (1939). “Wide Variety of Bills Is Introduced in First Week’s Session of State Legislature,” Sacramento Bee, January 18, 1945, p. 1.


286 Cray, Chief Justice, p. 166.
When it came to FEPC, however, Warren was more reserved in breaking with his conservative ideology. He remained silent on Hawkins’ A.B. 3 because, at the time, he firmly believed that “you can’t legislate change, but must educate the people…you can’t move too far ahead of the people.” Rather than support A.B. 3, Warren would try to convince, unsuccessfully, the legislature for an educational FEPC when he endorsed A.B. 1399 in the same legislative session. Reflecting back, Warren bemoaned that he “got nowhere with either side. The extremists wanted to give an FEPC unprecedented powers,” while conservatives were steadfastly against any form of FEPC.

The unprecedented powers to which Warren was referring included the ability of the Commission to define unlawful employment practices, such as the refusal of an employer to hire or promote an applicant based on race, religion, color, and/or national origin. It also sought to prohibit segregation in unions, and protect prospective and current employees who filed complaints. While some conservatives recoiled from such interference in business, most had the biggest qualms with the enforcement powers of the commission. Unlike the education commissions proposed by Warren, Hawkins’ bill would give FEPC the authority to issue orders, directing the guilty party to cease discrimination, and take steps to rectify the situation and eradicate discrimination, including but not limited to re-hiring or promoting the individual who initiated the complaint. These orders were enforceable through the courts, and violation of an order would result in a misdemeanor for the guilty party. In 1945, Warren could not bring himself to support such a commission. In an interview a few decades later, civil rights activist Tarea Hall Pittman was interviewed about Warren’s position on FEPC and A.B. 3.

Governor Warren did not make the statement that he would not sign it. But he would not take any leadership in getting it passed. He simply turned his back on the legislative powers of the commission.

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287 Cray, *Chief Justice*, p. 166.
288 Cray, *Chief Justice*, p. 166.
conferences we had and we could not confront him with anything publicly…As far as him coming out and ever confronting, or saying anything, he simply stood aloof. He would not take up any leadership role in this. You see, it [FEPC] was so (emphasis original) unpopular at the time that it was sort of a hot potato and a political issue and the people wanted to sidestep it if they could.289

Both Hawkins’ enforceable FEPC legislation and Warren’s proposed educational commission did not stand a strong chance of passing through both houses in the legislature.

Just a year later, however, Warren would change his mind. His legislative aide, Beach Vasey, encouraged him to take up a fair employment bill similar to the one recently passed in New York—the Ives-Quinn law, which contained provisions for enforcement powers.290 While Warren still believed in an educational committee, he had come to terms with the reality that the Republican Party would lose many African American votes if they did not adopt a more liberal stance on FEPC. While Vasey pushed for the adoption of an enforceable commission, another advisor, Thomas Coakley, warned against it, stating that such a commission would “aggravate rather than solve problems.” Forcing employers to comply with the commission’s recommendation would only breed hostility and discontent, leading to heightened racial tension.291 Ultimately, Warren decided to back a stronger FEPC bill than he had previously.

Warren’s shift on FEPC is representative of the Republican Party’s divided nature in the 1940s and 1950s. While he supported A.B. 97 in early 1946, which proposed an enforceable commission similar to the one established by Ives-Quinn, Warren would not blindly follow FEPC advocates. After the failure of A.B. 97, Hawkins and other liberals put Proposition 11 on the 1946 ballot, and Warren refused to endorse it because of the proposed committee’s lack of

290 Beach Vasey to Earl Warren, December 18, 1945, Earl Warren Papers, California State Archives, F3640: 8452.
Without a proper role for the courts, there would be nothing to prevent the state government from infringing on the rights of employers by denying them the necessary legal channels to appeal a decision made by the commission. The governor’s mixed support for FEPC legislation reveals the internal conflicts that many Republican officials had when considering such laws. At the national level, stringent FEPC laws never made it to a vote. However, on an educational FEPC bill, the entire California congressional delegation voted in support—again, revealing that there were many race moderates in the party who, especially when enforcement powers were removed, displayed support for FEPC. Moderates in the Republican Party were not opposed to FEPC, per se; rather, they were critical of the “New Deal character of FEPC.” They opposed the government interference with an employer’s hiring policies and were alarmed by the prospect of another bureaucratic agency. Thus, their opposition was not grounded in racial animosity but rather economic ideological beliefs.

Communicating the Message: Did Voters Know the Parties’ Positions on FEPC?

In order to assess whether or not partisans in the public were given messages as to where the parties’ stood on race, I searched local California newspapers. What were Californians reading with regard to elite partisanship on FEPC? Was the press acknowledging the unified Democratic support, signaling to voters that the Democratic Party was clearly the home of race liberalism? Was the public given stories on the split nature of the Republican Party, both at the state and national level? These are important questions to answer since partisans in the masses need to be aware—even on the most basic level—of the parties’ views on civil rights before they can evaluate the parties, and align with the party that best represents their beliefs.

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It may be argued that, since voters are not attuned to politics,\footnote{According to Carmines and Stimson (1989), it may not matter if voters are receiving cues on FEPC or other race issues since these are easy issues. Voters respond to easy issues without much elite influence or knowledge of where the parties stand. Even if this is the case and voters were ill informed on the parties’ positions on race, the evidence suggests that partisans in the masses, and as I will demonstrate in the next chapter—voters, were coherent in their support for and opposition to FEPC. Clear elite messages were therefore not a prerequisite for unified mass attitudes and behavior. “Easy” issues are responded to and understood at the “gut” level. They require almost no supporting context of factual knowledge, no strong reasoning abilities, and no political sophistication. In contrast, “hard” issues—the more common type—demand much more of the voter, as they involve issues that require strong interest and knowledge to make an informed decision. Carmines and Stimson, Issue Evolution, p. 11.} especially state politics, they will not receive elite messages, even if newspapers write about them. While I do not try to debunk this notion, observing how newspapers reported the parties’ response to race issues is necessary since newspaper articles inevitably reached a large portion of the public. Assessing newspaper coverage of the parties’ race views also allows me to observe how the parties’ legislators were shifting their behavior on FEPC over time. Does the commentary on the parties and FEPC align with my analysis that the Republican Party shifted from divided to unified on FEPC in the late 1950s? Thus, studying newspaper articles adds another dimension to this chapter’s findings, going beyond legislative roll call votes.

Both mainstream newspapers like the \textit{Los Angeles Times} published articles that revealed both the state and national parties’ stances on FEPC. In 1950, as the Republican Party convened in Sacramento to put forth the state party’s plank, the platform committee advocated for an “FEPC act with ‘teeth in it.’” In a \textit{Los Angeles Times} article dated August 6, 1950, it was claimed that the Republican Party adopted a neutral “nonexplosive attitude” on the issue.\footnote{“State Republicans Set Victory Course,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, August 6, 1950, p. 18.} A couple of years later, the \textit{Los Angeles Times} published an article that acknowledged the progressive nature of the national Republican Party. The article “16 Officials Predict FEPC With Teeth if GOP Wins” acknowledged that an Eisenhower victory would result in an enforceable FEPC. Prominent progressive Republicans including Governor Alfred Driscoll of New Jersey, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. of Massachusetts, and Senator Irving Ives of New
York issued a joint statement in which they interpreted the 1952 civil rights plank in the Republican platform to mean that “FEPC with enforcement powers and similar laws will be accelerated by a Republican victory.” The article recognized the internal struggles over civil rights issues. Specifically, the article discussed the divide in the Republican Party between those who support FEPC with enforcement powers (like those who signed the aforementioned joint statement), and those who prefer a non-enforceable educational committee, such as Senator Robert Taft of Ohio.296

Local papers like the *Los Angeles Sentinel* provide insight into how the parties’ race positions were perceived in the 1940s and 1950s. As with the *Los Angeles Times*, this paper portrayed the Republican Party as split on FEPC at both the state and national levels. The *Sentinel* published an article in early 1946 that tied California and national Republican parties together on the FEPC issue. While African American leaders were optimistic and expressed that the party was “spot on” in this matter, they acknowledged that if neither the state nor national party took action, black voters would leave the party en masse.297 The *Sentinel* later acknowledged that “there are many good fighters for FEPC in the Senate, some of them Democrats and some Republicans.”298 In an article published a few months later, it is stated that promises made by national Republicans on FEPC “smacks of politics,” as Republicans were likely promising FEPC action in order to win African American votes. The *Sentinel* concluded, however, that African Americans should not “look a gift horse in the mouth” and accept Republicans’ actions at face value.299 The paper also pointed out that both Democratic Senator Downey and Republican Senator Knowland were supportive and would vote in the affirmative

for such a bill.\textsuperscript{300}

A shift in how the Republican Party was perceived can be seen in newspaper coverage from 1957 to 1959, as my study of roll call votes suggests. In 1957, the \textit{Sentinel} stated that “some of the Republicans are friendly to [FEPC] as a matter of policy.”\textsuperscript{301} However, in 1959, the published details of the partisan breakdown of the Assembly vote revealed that only two Republicans voted in favor of FEPC legislation.\textsuperscript{302} This qualitative evidence of the shift in Republican support for FEPC reveals that, if voters were receptive to elite messages, they had opportunities to understand the divided nature of the Republican Party. Republican voters, however, acted contrary to what was happening within their party on race. As I will demonstrate in the following chapter, Republican supporters displayed a level of unity against civil rights that their representatives would not adopt until the late 1950s and 1960s.

\section*{The Republicans Move to the Right on Race: A Study of Bill Sponsorship in Congress}

Building off of Schickler et al.’s (2010) article that used alternative measures to gauge congressmen’s dedication to civil rights, I compiled a dataset of bill sponsorship data, extending the authors’ timeframe (1947 to 1972) to look at different sets of substantive issues that emerged over a longer period of time. I used ProQuest Congressional\textsuperscript{303} to search for civil rights bills proposed in the twentieth century. Specifically, I used the search terms “lynch,” “fair employment,” and “busing.” I used these terms to find bills that address three distinct issue areas within civil rights: non-economic, economic, and forced integration. Anti-lynching bills are considered non-economic, since there was no strong economic argument for or against the

\textsuperscript{303} ProQuest Congressional website, \url{www.congressional.proquest.com/congressional/serach/basic/basicsearch}, Accessed July 29, 2014.
implementation of such laws. FEPC laws are economic civil rights issues—that is, they involve a significant economic dimension. Should individuals be compelled, by law, to sell their property to or hire racial minorities? Forced integration bills included busing proposals. These issues were viewed by many whites as imposing racial integration on neighborhoods, which was a step too far. By expanding the timeframe, I am able to increase the number of bills for each subset, and develop a more exhaustive study of partisanship in Congress.

Based on an analysis of bill sponsorship in Congress between 1920, when the first anti-lynching bill was proposed, to 1971 when the last FEPC bill was proposed, I found a growing divide between northern Republicans and Democrats over time, which resulted from a shift in the nature of civil rights. Over the course of these 51 years, Republicans and Democrats, mostly from the North, sponsored 247 anti-lynching bills (2 of these bills were proposed by southern Democrats). Of these, Republicans sponsored 97 measures (39% of the proposed anti-lynching bills), while northern Democrats sponsored 150 of the bills (61%). While non-economic civil rights would continue to appear on the legislative agenda, they would eventually be replaced by economic civil rights proposals during and after World War II.

In 1941, the first fair employment bill was proposed. From 1941 to 1971, 147 fair employment bills were sponsored by 106 Democrats and 41 Republicans—all from the North. Based on these numbers, 72% of the FEPC bills were proposed by Democrats, and 28% were sponsored by Republicans. Comparing sponsorship by civil rights type, while we see decreased enthusiasm for economic civil rights, there is an overall measure of bipartisanship across both non-economic and economic issues (see Graph 3.1). The majority of Republican support for FEPC occurred before the 82nd Congress (1951-1953). Graph 3.2 disaggregates FEPC proposals in the House by Congress, from the 77th Congress (1941-1943) to the 92nd Congress (1971-1973)
Graph 3.1. Sponsorship of Non-Economic and Economic Civil Rights in the U.S. House of Representatives (1920—1971) by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-economic</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outside South</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sponsorship of Non-Economic and Economic Civil Rights, 1920-1971
Graph 3.2. FEPC Sponsorship in the U.S. House of Representatives (1941—1971) by Party

FEPC Sponsorship (1941-1971)

Outside South  South

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>77th</th>
<th>79th</th>
<th>80th</th>
<th>81st</th>
<th>82nd</th>
<th>83rd</th>
<th>84th</th>
<th>85th</th>
<th>86th</th>
<th>87th</th>
<th>88th</th>
<th>89th</th>
<th>90th</th>
<th>91st</th>
<th>92nd</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>6</td>
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</table>
to show that after the 81st Congress (1949-1951), Republican sponsorship of FEPC proposals dwindled significantly. A possible explanation for this decline in Republican support for economic civil rights in the 1950s could be the result of shifting party dynamics in the states. As we saw in California, inter- and intra-party dynamics caused a shift from race moderate to conservative in the state Assembly. These state-level changes likely affected partisanship in the House delegations.

The vast majority of Republican and Democratic sponsors for non-economic and economic civil rights bills came from outside of the South. Interestingly, it would also be northern Republicans, with southern Democrats, leading the charge against forced integration issues, beginning in the early 1970s (see Graph 3.3). Republicans would introduce 37 anti-busing bills and Democrats would introduce 34. Within the Republican Party, an almost even split occurred—20 non-southerners and 17 southerners sought to push anti-busing legislation through the House. In the Democratic Party, however, a more distinct regional divide emerged: only 7 non-southerners proposed anti-busing measures, while 27 southern Democrats introduced anti-busing proposals. When Congress took considerable action against employment discrimination with the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, economic civil rights gave way to forced integration issues like busing in the 1970s and 1980s. These issues were not well received by white Americans, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 5. When an anti-busing proposal appeared on the California ballot in 1972, an overwhelming majority of voters rejected it. It is on these forced integration issues that elites finally aligned with their constituents. While some Republican congressmen displayed support for economic civil rights in the 1940s through the 1960s, by the 1970s, Republicans in Congress became more likely to sponsor anti-busing legislation than their Democratic counterparts. The Republican elite was now in line with the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Outside South</th>
<th>South</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Republican base, which had seen an influx of race conservative white Democrats who were disillusioned with race liberal policies put forth by the Democratic elite. In later chapters, I will further explore the impact of forced integration issues on the realignment of the parties.

**Conclusion: Two Pathways to Racial Realignment**

Recall from Chapter 1 that, in 1945, only 41% of white Republicans supported a FEPC law that would require employers to practice non-discrimination in hiring. Comparing this result to the bipartisan pattern on fair employment and fair housing in the Assembly, it appears that some Republican representatives went against the majority of Republican survey respondents. Further, as a party in the Assembly, Democrats did not mirror the divided support apparent in the rank-and-file. While a majority of Democratic supporters—60% in 1945 and 72% in 1947—favored a law that would make racial discrimination illegal on the part of employers, only 47% of Democrats endorsed a law that would “require employees to work along side persons of any race or color.”

Thus, Democratic Assemblymen’s consistent support of an enforceable FEPC ran counter to their constituents’ mixed support since a powerful commission would ultimately require employees to work with people of a different race.

While it is unlikely that Assemblymen paid close attention to poll results, it is quite possible that they were attuned to partisan voting trends on racialized ballot propositions. Though the vote for FEPC (Proposition 11) occurred almost a decade before the 1957 Assembly vote on a similar commission, Republican legislators were still using the landslide defeat of Proposition 11 to justify their anti-FEPC stance. The message was clear: “No compulsory FEPC for California!”

However, on the two FEPC proposals that came to a vote (A.B.’s 971 and

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in 1955 and 1957, many Republican members of the Assembly supported FEPC. Some Republican members were not basing their decisions on the rank-and-file’s opposition to FEPC, as seen in the results of Proposition 11 in 1946. Assembly Democrats, likewise, in their support for all FEPC proposals, were not acting on the mixed results for FEPC, and ignored a large part of their base that displayed race conservative preferences on Proposition 11.

The evidence suggests that Assemblymen were not mirroring the partisan behavior of the electorate in their bipartisan support for FEPC bills, which would continue into the 1950s. Thus, a causal argument that suggests that partisans in the general public were leading state legislators on civil rights does not hold. Furthermore, the evidence does not support an explanation that partisans in the masses and in the electorate were moving after or even in tandem with state legislators—or with congressional representatives and the party leaders. The Republican and Democratic bases were not polarizing on civil rights at the same time, as Republican supporters were moving well before any of these elite actors. On the other hand, the Democratic base would remain divided on civil rights for decades. Therefore, it cannot be said that the rank-and-file were moving before, after, or together with elites.

In the next chapter, I will turn to a study of William Knowland’s 1958 gubernatorial campaign to help explain the shift that occurred within the Republican Party. Knowland’s failed bid for governor set into motion a series of events that encouraged both the state and national Republican Party to move from the center to the right on race issues. This shift was necessary for the parties to complete the realignment process. It would not be until Republican elites at both the state and national levels espoused unambiguous race conservative policies that race conservatives would leave the Democratic Party en masse in the late 1960s and 1970s. Only when the parties’ bases sorted on race attitudes was realignment complete.
Chapter 4: William Knowland’s Role in Racial Realignment

If you had to choose a single individual to typify the Republican Party, the best choice nowadays would surely be William F. Knowland. Knowland’s situation in California beautifully typifies the situations of all the Republicans who are running for election this year. Joseph Alsop, syndicated newspaper columnist, April 21, 1958.\(^{306}\)

...labor is so aroused against him, and his party is so angry with his intervention into an almost surely victorious situation that most experts think he will soon join...the ranks of the able Republicans whose ambition overwhelmed their judgment. James Reston, New York Times writer, October 17, 1958.\(^{307}\)

United States Senator from California and 1958 gubernatorial candidate, William “Bill” Knowland, is an often forgotten figure in the narrative of the parties’ realignment on race issues. Historians and political scientists have focused on Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign as the watershed moment for conservatism within the Republican Party. However, I argue that Knowland’s capture of the Republican nomination played a pivotal role in the realignment of the Republican Party, both in California and nationally. While Knowland’s campaign made little mention of race issues, his economic conservatism and influence within the Republican Party created opportunities for Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan to rise to power within the Republican ranks, and package their conservative principles with their anti-civil rights views. The movement of the Republican elite from the center to the right on race would then, in turn, attract race conservatives away from the Democratic Party in the late 1960s and 1970s, thus completing the realignment on race.

When reviewing his family history, it is unsurprising that Knowland would emerge as a pivotal figure in the conservative movement within the Republican Party. His father, Joseph R. (J.R.) Knowland, who had served in the House of Representatives for five terms, was politically

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active through The Oakland Tribune. In 1915, the elder Knowland purchased and became editor of the Tribune, turning it into an ideologically conservative publication. The Tribune exerted its influence through endorsements of desired candidates for local and state offices. One beneficiary of Knowland’s Tribune endorsements was Earl Warren. When Warren was vying to become District Attorney of Alameda County, Knowland used his influence on Warren’s behalf, helping him secure the appointment by a three to two vote of the Alameda County Board of Supervisors in 1925. Warren would remain in Knowland’s favor throughout the years. In 1932, Knowland supported Warren as the California Republican Party’s new chairman. In a statement, Knowland said, “Earl represents the younger group and is a man of splendid character and the kind of leader we could well put to the front this year.” McNab withdrew from the contest, ensuring Warren’s election as chairman.308 Knowland would also back Warren when he ran for Attorney General in 1938, and later for the governorship in 1942. According to William Knowland’s biographers, Warren consulted J.R. Knowland before running for governor:

“Warren certainly respected the elder Knowland’s power and would not have taken such a step without his approval.”309 Warren would soon repay J.R. for his support.

In 1945, J.R.’s son, William, was considering a run for the U.S. Senate, even though incumbent Senator Hiram Johnson already announced that he would seek re-election. However, on August 6, 1945, Johnson died, ending a 37-year career in the Senate. Just a week after Johnson’s passing, Warren appointed his friend and benefactor’s son, William Knowland, to the vacant seat.310 Though Knowland would win election to the Senate in 1946 and re-election in 1952, he thought of running for president in 1956 but withdrew from consideration when

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308 Montgomery and Johnson, One Step from the White House, p. 25.
309 Montgomery and Johnson, One Step from the White House, p. 30.
310 Montgomery and Johnson, One Step from the White House, p. 49. According to the authors, Warren denied discussing the appointment with J.R. Knowland. However, Warren would later acknowledge the Tribune’s role in helping advance his career, particularly in his bid for district attorney. Thus, while Warren never stated outright that he appointed Bill Knowland as a favor to J.R., the authors contend that Warren’s deeds spoke louder than words.
President Eisenhower decided to run again.\textsuperscript{311} In 1957, however, Knowland made a fateful decision that altered the trajectory of partisan politics not only in California but nationally as well. Knowland believed that the easiest path to the White House was through the Governor’s Mansion.\textsuperscript{312} Thus, Knowland decided to run for governor in the 1958 contest, ousting the more moderate Republican—and incumbent governor—Goodwin Knight.

Knowland’s decision to run for governor of California and his ultra-conservative platform had three important outcomes. First, the dramatic loss forced Knowland—the prominent conservative in the 1950s—out of politics, leaving the Republican Party without a leader. Barry Goldwater would fill this void in the early 1960s and energize the party’s conservative wing with his 1964 presidential campaign, setting the stage for the national Republican Party to become the home of “white backlash”—that is, race conservative voters. Second, Knowland’s failed bid for the governorship allowed Democrats to take over the California government, which emboldened conservative activists to take action against the increase in liberal policies coming out of Sacramento. The Republican defeat in 1958 left the party more homogenous and more conservative. For the first time, Republican legislators in California were now aligned with their constituents, who had long been displaying conservative preferences. Third, Knowland’s failed candidacy and the landslide victory for California Democrats helped engender feelings of racial resentment among many white Democrats. In

\textsuperscript{311} “Knowland Remains Mum on Plans and Awaits Decision of President,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, February 1956, p. 7; “Knight, Knowland, Nixon Close Ranks: Californians Agree to Form United Delegation if President Runs Again,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, February 24, 1956, p. 1. For an examination of Knowland’s personal and political career, see Montgomery and Johnson, \textit{Rise and Fall of Senator William F. Knowland}.

\textsuperscript{312} As recalled by Assemblyman Thomas J. MacBride, “…Knowland was the [U.S.] Senate majority leader, but the rumor was that he wanted to be president of the United States, and he felt that being governor of California would be a better platform for him to spring from into a presidential campaign than would be by just being a Senate majority leader. That was his belief, whether it worked or not…nevertheless, that was Knowland’s feeling, that the governorship of California was the way to go.” Oral History Interview with Hon. Thomas J. MacBride, April 21, 1987, State Government Oral History Program, p. 51. MacBride served as a California State Assemblyman from 1956-1960; Lou Cannon, who chronicled Ronald Reagan’s career as governor, stated outright, “Knowland wanted to be president. Governors in those days controlled state delegations at national conventions, and Knowland reasoned that Sacramento was his biggest route to the White House.” Cannon, \textit{Governor Reagan}, p. 130.
response to the liberal policies enacted by both the California Legislature and Congress, and the late 1960s and the growing violence in urban areas, working class whites became increasingly disillusioned with the Democratic Party and its support of civil rights. In addition to the rejection of race liberal policies, white backlash would manifest itself in the election of Ronald Reagan to the California governorship in 1966, and the support of his presidential candidacy in 1976 and 1980.

Knowland’s decision to run for governor was also significant because the 1958 election in California paralleled the 1964 election. Both created environments in which liberals were able to ascend to power, enact race liberal policies, and, in turn, stir up white backlash. Like Knowland’s failed bid for the governorship, Senator Barry Goldwater’s unsuccessful run for president strengthened the Democratic hold on power, incensing conservative Republicans. Conservatives would begin to take over the national party and its nominating conventions so that, by 1976, Ronald Reagan was able to gain the support of white backlash voters when he first ran for the Republican nomination. Reagan would maintain the support of white backlash voters when he succeeded in winning the nomination, and subsequently the presidency, in 1980.313

Thus, in the aftermath of Knowland’s 1958 loss, Republican elites in California finally aligned with their conservative base, which had long been demonstrating race conservative preferences at the polls. After 1964, national Republicans similarly shifted from the center to the right on a host of issues, particularly race policies. The move to the right of the Republican elite at both the state and national levels allowed conservative Republicans to rise to power by capitalizing on racially resentful voters in the Democratic Party.

313 White backlash can be traced back to the 1964 presidential election. In an article in the Los Angeles Times, it was declared, “the phenomenon of the white backlashers is that members of the white minority ethnic groups, normally steadfast Democrats, are so exercised about the Negro revolution that they will vote for Goldwater.” According to the article, the Republican Party in 1964 did not deny, but did not actively court the white backlash vote. “Current Tactics May Transform GOP,” Los Angeles Times, August 17, 1964, p. 2.
In this chapter, I argue that Knowland is a critical part of the unfolding story of the partisan transformation on race policies. I demonstrate that conservative leaders and pundits, viewing him as the heir to Mr. Republican (Senator Robert Taft of Ohio), were influential in Knowland’s nomination. I explore Knowland’s impact as conservative leader in the late 1950s, and how his ambitions created an opportunity for Democratic liberalism to take hold. I discuss how critical Knowland’s decision to run for governor was—a decision that a more prudent, calculating politician would not have made, given the dismal outlook for Republicans across the nation in 1958. Knowland also ignored trends in his own state by refusing to concede to a popular incumbent who was all but assured re-election, thus creating an easy victory for the Democrats. I end the chapter on the consequences of Knowland’s decision—the ascendancy of Pat Brown to the governorship—and the impact that Brown’s liberal policies had on racial realignment. Brown’s persistent support of fair housing—an issue, which by the 1960s, had grown increasingly racialized—engendered feelings of racial resentment among Democratic voters, laying the groundwork for the movement of race conservative Democrats into the Republican Party.

William F. Knowland: The New “Mr. Republican”

While some scholars have emphasized Barry Goldwater’s contribution to the conservative movement within the Republican Party—first with his book, *The Conscience of a Conservative* in 1960 and later his 1964 presidential run, William Knowland was pivotal in the conservative movement both in California and nationally in the 1950s. Knowland was viewed as

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314 Brennan, *Turning Right in the Sixties*; Bjerre-Poulsen, *Right-Face: Organizing the American Conservative Movement*. 

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the new conservative leader within the Republican Party, inheriting the legacy left by his friend and colleague Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, who died unexpectedly in 1953.315

Knowland stood apart from the typical moderate Republican in California. Within the party, Governor Earl Warren was the Republican that was farthest to the left on a host of issues.316 Warren was supportive of fair employment practices, anti-McCarthy, and worked across the aisle to do what he believed was best, which was often not aligned with conservatives’ preferences. He accepted the main tenets of the New Deal and did not seek to balance the state budget,317 opting instead to request more money from the legislature to accommodate the growing population with more housing, health care, and education opportunities.318 Warren’s lieutenant governor (who would become governor in 1953), Goodwin Knight, was more moderate. He held strong anti-communist beliefs and was often critical of Warren’s more liberal leanings. Knight criticized Warren for being “nothing but a New Dealer.”319 Knight, however, would also clash with the more conservative Knowland, who pushed for the anti-labor right-to-work proposition in 1958. By the late 1950s, Knowland was the most conservative leader of the

315 Taft himself wanted Knowland to succeed him as the party’s conservative leader. According to Montgomery and Johnson, Taft “saw promise in the brash Californian. He also knew that the Republicans had to develop new leadership and naturally was predisposed to favor Knowland, who really had been a Taft man during the 1952 Republican convention.” Montgomery and Johnson, One Step From the White House, p. 124.
316 In 1945, Warren’s legislative agenda, in particular his compulsory healthcare proposal, drew the ire of conservative Republicans who were “perturbed over the governor’s legislative message on the ground it went too far in the liberal direction.” He was also criticized by Democrats as trying to “out New Deal the New Deal,” revealing just how liberal some of his policies were. “Wide Variety of Bills Is Introduced in First Week’s Session of State Legislature,” Sacramento Bee, January 18, 1945, p. 1.
317 In 1945, Warren’s budget was declared—by the governor himself—as “the largest since the admission of our state to the Union.” “Warren’s State Budget of $683,710,643 for 1945-47 Sets Record,” Sacramento Bee, January 22, 1945, p. 1. For a thorough account of Warren’s health care plan, see Mitchell, “Earl Warren’s California Health Insurance Plan: What Might Have Been.”
318 The supportive sentiment toward the New Deal can best be summarized by Warren’s defense of Roosevelt’s programs. In 1951, Warren stated, “We do not propose to deny the progress that has been made during the last decade…Neither do we aim to repeal it.” He proceeded to condemn “those who would freeze our nation in the status-quo, with whatever inequalities go with it, and…have our country return to what they look back to nostalgically and affectionately as the good old days.” Quoted in Henderson, “Earl Warren and California Politics,” p. 357.
319 Worthen, The Young Nixon and His Rivals, p. 83.
Republican Party, not only in California but also in the country, allowing his economic conservative principles to preclude support for the New Deal and civil rights.

Knowland was able to come to power as Senate majority leader when Taft passed away in 1953. In the Senate, Knowland built a solidly conservative record, and was viewed by many as the heir to Taft’s status as “Mr. Republican.” In an article published on April 21, 1948, Joseph Alsop, a syndicated newspaper columnist, informed readers across the country that Knowland was indeed the new “Mr. Republican.” Like Taft, Knowland was a steadfast critic of big labor and corruption. Taft pushed the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act through Congress, which curtailed union strength and resources. Taking a cue from Taft, Knowland would center his gubernatorial campaign on labor reform and the right-to-work, or voluntary unionism, issue. Another syndicated columnist, George Sokolsky, also acknowledged Knowland’s critical role in his party.

The Republican Party needs the kind of leadership that Senator Knowland has given it. It is responsible leadership which some men call conservative, but which, in fact, is a revolt against opportunism, against the betrayal of the American tradition of personal freedom and freedom of opportunity by those who advocate statism in any guise. Senator Knowland was quite young when Senator Robert A. Taft selected Knowland as his successor to the leadership. As the years passed, it was obvious that Taft’s insight into the man’s character was indeed precise. Knowland made such an impact in just a few years in the Senate that some conservatives within the national party even wanted him to be the Republican nominee for president as early as 1956. One prominent conservative who supported Knowland was Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI).

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320 Rarick, California Rising, p. 88.
McCarthy urged Knowland to run for president. McCarthy wanted to rally conservative support so he could help Knowland defeat the moderate Eisenhower for the nomination.\textsuperscript{323}

Besides McCarthy, Knowland received support from conservative pundits and intellectuals who desperately wanted to move the party to the right of Eisenhower moderatism.\textsuperscript{324} Many members of conservative groups also encouraged Knowland to run for president against Eisenhower in 1956.\textsuperscript{325} The group, For America, the precursor to the John Birch Society, supported a Knowland bid. R.B. Snowden of Arkansas, a member of For America, wrote to Knowland, “It is now time to get all the right-wingers on one side, and all the left wingers on the other, and you are the man the right-wingers want, and I hope and pray for your success.”\textsuperscript{326}

Editors of \textit{The National Review} also viewed Knowland as the conservative leader of the Republican Party in 1956. For its first issue in November 1955, the editors were debating whether or not to include an article that would endorse Knowland for president. Ultimately, they decided against the endorsement—not because they had another candidate in mind—but because founder William Buckley Jr. and co-editor William Schlamm agreed that the first issue should steer clear of any endorsements so that the publication would not be seen “simply [as] a journalistic tool of one among several factions in the Republican Party.” The editors claimed they would eventually support Knowland, just not in the first issue.\textsuperscript{327} Despite the calculation not to endorse a Knowland candidacy, chief editor William Buckley Jr. encouraged Knowland to run when it appeared as though Eisenhower would not seek re-election due to a heart attack in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[323] Herman, \textit{Joseph McCarthy}, p. 298.
\item[324] Bowen, “Getting to Goldwater,” p. 105.
\item[326] Bowen, “Getting to Goldwater,” p. 106.
\item[327] Bogus, \textit{William F. Buckley, Jr.}, p. 131.
\end{footnotes}
late 1955. Buckley also convinced Knowland to write an article for the first issue. This article gave Knowland a national platform to criticize the Eisenhower administration for negotiating with the Soviet Union.

Knowland’s reputation as the heir to Taft and leader of the conservative faction within the Republican Party is significant because, though he gave up his dark horse candidacy in 1956, he did have aspirations for higher office that he would act on in 1958. His failed candidacy for governor had long-term effects on California and national partisan politics. His humiliating defeat caused him to fade into the background, creating an opening for Barry Goldwater to seize control of the national party and move it closer to the right with his 1964 presidential bid.

Further, Knowland’s loss allowed Democrats to sweep into the California Legislature in 1958. These Democrats would not hesitate in enacting race liberal legislation, like FEPC and fair housing. The failed Knowland run also strengthened California conservatives within the Republican Party, who coalesced behind conservative principles to counter the growing liberal administration. The movement of conservatives to the right not only aligned California elites with Republican voters, who had been displaying conservative preferences since the 1940s, but also afforded racially resentful Democratic voters—those who believed that African Americans were asking for “too much too fast”—an alternative to the increasingly liberal Democratic Party. Thus, in the aftermath of the Knowland campaign, a critical component of racial

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330 Knowland left the Senate because he wanted to run for president in 1960. Governors, not senators, tended to be successful in recent presidential elections, thus winning the governorship of a populous state would position him nicely for a presidential run. Worthen, *The Young Nixon and His Rivals*, p. 170. Schiesl concurs with this view of Knowland’s ambitions, stating: “Knowland believed that state leadership would do more to improve his presidential prospects than a senatorial seat.” Schiesl, *Pat Brown*, p. 5.

realignment occurs: the move from the center to the right of the Republican elite—a necessary precursor for the realignment of the Democratic base, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.

**1958: An Inauspicious Time for Republicans Across the Nation**

William Knowland became the Republican nominee for governor with support from the party’s right and “kingmaker” newspaper publishers in California, including his own father and the *Los Angeles Times*’ Kyle Palmer. Due to the progressive-era reforms that weakened the party system in California, policy demanders and others external to the formal party structure were influential in determining the parties’ nominees. According to James Q. Wilson, in the absence of party strength,

…any number of persons, groups, and community organizations seek to fill the void and that in the effort to establish themselves, these forces endeavor not so much to wrest power from those who hold it as to create power where none has existed before. The search for power in this fluid situation, in which the formal party apparatus is both incomplete and fragmented, is an extraordinarily difficult and taxing enterprise. But it offers great rewards to skillful men who have the ability to manipulate large groups of people and the energy to struggle for intangible ends in a highly uncertain situation.

Seth Masket’s comprehensive study of informal party organizations (IPOs) adds to the understanding that actors outside of the formal party structure are the “heart, soul, and backbone” of contemporary political parties. Activists are the main players in these IPOs and they seek the most ideologically extreme candidate who can also appeal to voters in the general election.

Despite having the backing of conservative activists, Knowland could not have picked a less propitious time to run as a Republican for any state or national office. Republicans would be voted out of, and denied, power across the board in 1958. In keeping with political trends, the

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332 Palmer, in particular, has been referred to as a political “kingmaker.” With his endorsement in the *Los Angeles Times*, candidates were almost assured victory. Montgomery and Johnson, *One Step from the White House*, p. 25.
president’s party lost seats in both the Senate and the House of Representatives at the midterm election in 1958.\textsuperscript{335} However, the Republican Party lost a larger number of seats in Congress than usual, allowing the Democrats to gain the greatest congressional majority since the 1930s.\textsuperscript{336} The Republicans lost 48 seats in the House, giving the Democrats a commanding majority: 283-153. The Republicans also lost 15 Senate seats, resulting in a 65-35 Democratic majority.\textsuperscript{337} Furthermore, in 34 of the gubernatorial elections held in 1958 (28 of which were held outside of the Democratic South), only 8 Republicans won. With the exception of Paul Fannin (AZ), seven of those Republican victors were moderates or progressives, such as Nelson Rockefeller (NY), Mark Hatfield (OR), and Robert T. Stafford (VT).\textsuperscript{338}

Of the more immediate reasons why Republicans suffered at the polls was the economic recession that preceded the midterm election. Graph 4.1 reveals just how severe the economic recession was at its nadir. Relative to other recessions over the past half century, the decline in gross domestic product (GDP) experienced in the first quarter of 1958 was worse than any other recession—even more drastic than the most recent downturn in the fourth quarter of 2008. The dire economic situation contributed to the national party’s electoral misfortune in 1958, helping to expose internal weaknesses and ideological divisions that had plagued the party for decades.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{335} Louis Bean argued that the loss from presidential to midterm elections could be attributed to presidential coattails. Congressional candidates ride a presidential candidate’s coattails to victory. When these coattails are not present at the midterm, the president’s party loses seats. Bean, \textit{How To Predict Elections}. Angus Campbell offered an explanation as to why the president’s party loses seats at the midterm. Campbell suggested that the higher number of independents in the electorate during presidential elections causes a surge in support for congressional candidates of the president’s party. When those independents lose interest at the midterm, the president’s party suffers. See James E. Campbell for a refined surge and decline theory that also accounts for the pivotal role of independents but distinguished between “advantaged” and “disadvantaged” partisans. Campbell, “Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change.”
\end{itemize}
Graph 4.1. Quarterly GDP Percent Change based on Chained 2009 Dollars, 1947—2014

The main source of division separating conservatives from moderates and progressives in the national Republican Party was the power of the Federal Government. Eisenhower espoused a “middle way” or “Modern Republicanism” that sought to redefine the party’s anti-government principles by accepting a larger role for the Federal Government in the social and economic realms. Conservatives criticized Modern Republicanism as indistinguishable from liberal Democratic policies. Even though moderates tried to differentiate themselves from the Democrats by claiming that they were more conscious of balanced budgets and would encourage state and local solutions to problems before turning to the Federal Government, conservatives lamented the leftward tilt of their party.

By the late 1940s and 1950s, conservative activists in the Republican Party were growing tired of passively accepting the core tenets of the New Deal. The wedge between conservative and the more moderate and progressive factions first became evident in 1944 when Thomas Dewey and Robert Taft were fighting for control over the party machinery that controlled the presidential nominations. Taft, leader of the conservative wing, and Dewey, a popular progressive Republican, would come into conflict up until Taft’s unexpected death in 1953. Lacking a strong leader, the conservative faction was sidelined after Taft’s death, and had to watch Dwight Eisenhower’s middle way take over the party. However, Dewey’s progressive and Eisenhower’s moderate approaches only angered conservatives, who would take over the party machinery in 1964 and nominate Barry Goldwater for president in 1964.

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339 According to Robert Mason (2012), Eisenhower “privately harbored beliefs that often aligned him more closely with conservative Republicans.” While serving as president of Columbia University after WWII, Eisenhower warned of the “constant drift toward centralized government” that would lead to a “swarming of bureaucrats over the land.” Mason suggests that Eisenhower moderated his views because they were not popular with the American voters. Mason, The Republican Party and American Politics from Hoover to Reagan, p. 155


341 Bowen, The Roots of Modern Conservatism, p. 2; Donaldson, The First Modern Campaign, p. 3. For discussions and overviews of Eisenhower’s middle way, or “Modern Republicanism,” see Wagner, Eisenhower Republicanism;
The split between the two factions was perhaps most apparent in the aftermath of the 1948 presidential election between Democrat and incumbent President Harry Truman and Republican Thomas Dewey, the progressive governor of New York. Truman won by a slim margin but Republicans still took the loss hard. Now having lost five consecutive presidential contests, conservative Republicans put the blame on the party’s progressives and moderates, who strayed away from “Old Guard” principles of economic conservatism to advance FEPC and fair housing legislation. In their view, middle-of-the-road Republicans did not provide voters with a clear alternative to the Democrats. Dewey, himself, endorsed New York’s enforceable FEPC, and espoused a “forward-looking” strategy for the Republican Party and the country. On the other hand, Dewey’s advisors blamed conservatives for the loss in 1948. According to their argument, congressional conservatives ruined the party’s chances when they passed the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act a year earlier.  

Conservatives’ discontent would continue throughout President Eisenhower’s administration. For example, future presidential candidate and conservative leader Barry Goldwater criticized President Eisenhower for being lured by “the siren song of socialism.” Goldwater, following in the tradition of Senator Taft, was critical of President Eisenhower’s acceptance of the New Deal, and attempted to position himself as a possible presidential nominee once Eisenhower’s tenure was over. By 1960, Goldwater had succeeded in becoming an “icon for the Republican Right.” Despite Goldwater’s emergence as the conservative leader, the more moderate wing of the Republican Party would overtake both Goldwater and the


342 According to the more moderate Republicans, Taft-Hartley turned away working-class voters that may have supported Dewey otherwise. According to Wayne Morse, Republican Senator from Oregon, “No extended comment needs to be made about the loss of the labor vote. Everyone knows that the Taft-Hartley Act was a terrific liability to the Republican Party.” Quoted in Bowen, The Roots of Modern Conservatism, p. 76


344 Mayer, Running on Race, p. 23.
eventual nominee, Richard Nixon, in a contentious debate over the inclusion of a civil rights plank in the Republican platform. Nelson Rockefeller threatened a floor fight at the party’s convention unless a strong, pro-civil rights plank was included in the 1960 platform. Nixon conceded, and the 1960 Republican platform was just as supportive of civil rights as the Democrats’ platform. The Republican platform stated that “civil rights is a responsibility not only of states and localities; it is a national problem and a national responsibility.” Goldwater would later chastise the party, claiming that the insertion of “radical pro-civil rights language” caused Nixon to lose conservative support. Goldwater’s criticism of the 1960 platform helped propel him to the nomination in 1964.

In addition to the economic differences and the division over how to handle civil rights, foreign policy differences also drove a wedge between moderate and conservative Republicans. Members of the party conflicted over appeasement and the United Nations (U.N.). Conservatives viewed Eisenhower and the moderates’ internationalist, multi-lateral beliefs as ineffectual and weak. After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, conservative Republicans abandoned their isolationist views, and adopted a unilateral position in which the U.S. would “go it alone.” Because of this view, they recoiled at Eisenhower’s willingness to compromise U.S. foreign policy in order to work with the U.N. Eisenhower believed that the U.S. could not act without the help of other countries or the U.N., which further drove a wedge between himself and Taft. Furthermore, conservatives viewed the 1953 armistice with the North Koreans and Chinese Communists as the worst kind of appeasement. It portrayed Americans as weak and non-confrontational. Conservatives also rebuked Eisenhower’s

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346 White, The Making of the President 1960, p. 203.
nomination of Charles Bohlen as ambassador to Moscow. They were angered that the president would nominate the man who accompanied President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the 1945 Yalta Conference. To the conservatives, Yalta had become the “Great Betrayal,” as they believed that FDR conceded Eastern Europe and parts of Asia to the Soviets in exchange for help in fighting the war. Conservative Republicans were frustrated with Bohlen’s statements that the problem at Yalta was not President Roosevelt, but that Stalin betrayed the agreement.347

Perhaps one of the defining issues that separated Republican conservatives and moderates was how to deal with the potential of communist infiltration in America. Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy and a few other congressmen from the party’s right wing conducted hearings and investigations to find communists and communist sympathizers in the Federal Government, specifically the State Department. McCarthy began his crusade during Harry Truman’s presidency, and continued when Eisenhower became president. McCarthy did not trust Eisenhower, as he believed that the president was too weak to deal with the communist threat.348 The McCarthy investigations made the internal division within the party clear, especially to the President. Eisenhower wrote, “[T]he Republican Party has got for once and for all to make up its mind whether to follow the ludicrous partnership of the Old Guarders and the McCarthyites (one of my friends had called it a ‘marriage of convenience’), or whether it is going to stand behind the program of the Administration and the middle-of-the-road philosophy in which we firmly believe.”349 The “marriage of convenience” between the conservative Old Guarders and the

347 For a discussion of the foreign policy differences between moderate and conservative Republicans, see Donaldson, The First Modern Campaign, pp. 10-12.
348 The conservatives’ belief that Eisenhower was weak stemmed from the 1952 Republican Convention. The conservatives forced a plank into the platform that called the Democratic Party’s foreign policy of containment “negative, futile and immoral,” because it “abandons countless human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism.” They called instead for “liberation,” which Eisenhower believed was nothing more than invasion. Eisenhower angered conservatives by refusing to adopt the aggressive policy of liberation. Donaldson, The First Modern Campaign, p. 6.
349 Quoted in Donaldson, The First Modern Campaign, p. 7.
McCarthyites would doom the former when the Senate censured McCarthy in 1954, effectively ending his crusade. Eisenhower, having stayed above the fray—not publicly denouncing McCarthy but working behind the scenes to prevent his committee from gaining access to the executive branch’s records and people—remained popular, while the congressional conservatives that supported McCarthy suffered at the polls in the 1958 and 1960 elections.\footnote{Donaldson, \textit{The First Modern Campaign}, p. 7.}

Among the conservatives who supported McCarthy were Senators Barry Goldwater and William Knowland.\footnote{McCarthy biographer, Arthur Herman, details some of McCarthy’s most ardent supporters—Knowland being one of them. Herman, \textit{Joseph McCarthy}, p. 50.} Knowland fought against McCarthy’s censure in 1954, arguing that there was no formal basis for proceeding since McCarthy’s investigations took place during the previous Congress.\footnote{Herman, \textit{Joseph McCarthy}, pp. 289-290.} McCarthy and Knowland were so close that McCarthy thought he should run for president in 1956 to rally conservative support so that he could help Knowland defeat Eisenhower for the nomination.\footnote{Herman, \textit{Joseph McCarthy}, p. 298.} Knowland would be a pivotal conservative figure in California in 1958 when he decided to leave the Senate to run for governor. With the presidency in mind, Knowland wanted to position himself for a 1960 run to wrest power away from the moderate wing of the party.\footnote{Knowland had personal and political reasons for leaving the Senate. According to rumors, his wife was growing tired of Washington and threatened Knowland with divorce if they did not return to California. Knowland also left the Senate because he wanted to run for president in 1960. Governors, not senators, tended to be successful in recent presidential elections, thus winning the governorship of a populous state would position him nicely for a presidential run. Worthen, \textit{The Young Nixon and His Rivals}, p. 170.} Though he would ultimately lose his bid for governor, along with his presidential hopes, Knowland succeeded in moving the California Republican Party to the right.

A study of Knowland’s campaign for governor, therefore, is necessary to understand the party’s shift from moderate to conservative, not only in California but also within the national party. Knowland’s loss in 1958 left a void in the Republican Party that Barry Goldwater would
soon fill. Goldwater would cultivate the white backlash vote, making it ripe for the picking for Richard Nixon in 1968 and Ronald Reagan in 1980. Studying Knowland’s impact on the California Republican Party is also essential since California became an increasingly valuable state for aspiring presidential candidates. With California Republicans now on the right in the aftermath of Knowland’s loss, the national party would inevitably move from Eisenhower’s middle way to Knowland and Goldwater’s conservative vision, which sought to remove government intervention not only in the economy but also in the realm of civil rights.

The 1958 Election: Knowland’s Potential and Uphill Battle in California

Despite national trends that put Republican candidates across the country at a disadvantage, Knowland decided to throw his hat into the gubernatorial race in 1958. However, a popular, moderate Republican akin to Eisenhower—Goodwin Knight—already occupied the governor’s chair. Leading up to the 1958 election, Knight and Knowland would engage in an ideological battle that would redefine the Republican Party. As a moderate, Knight accommodated the state’s union leaders, and believed in the progressive tradition that the Republican Party had historically displayed. As lieutenant governor in 1947, Knight proclaimed, “Our party in this State has always been the party of the people. The Republican party was in control of California for 40 years and its initiative was the most progressive program any State could boast of. We as Republicans in California have a most liberal and progressive history.” Knight, a beneficiary of cross-filing, which allowed Republicans to quell Democratic opposition

355 The growing importance of the West can be seen in the shift in locations of the Republican National Convention. See discussion in introductory chapter (Table A).

by running on a moderate platform in both parties’ primaries had thus stayed away from campaigning against labor interests. In 1954, Knight, who had become governor a year earlier when Earl Warren was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, stated outright that he “shall never approve a law designed to punish labor or to discriminate against labor.” Therefore, when Knowland adopted a right-to-work platform in 1958, he alienated the moderate and progressives in the party since right-to-work broke with pragmatic policies that had, with one exception, kept Republicans in control of the governorship since 1910.

Knowland was able to rise to the nomination with the support of conservative activists and influential “kingmakers” in the state, who disliked Knight’s position on labor. These conservatives were also wary of the growing power of the Federal Government. Newspaper columnist, George Sokolsky, in his support of Knowland in 1958, expressed the sentiment of many conservatives regarding the growing power of the Federal Government at the expense of the states. He wrote, “The encroachment of the Federal Government upon the states since 1933 has been beyond belief. The current Supreme Court presided over by Chief Justice Earl Warren, seems bent upon destroying the authority of the states altogether. Utilizing its taxing power, the Federal Government takes so much of the earned income of the people out of each state as to

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357 Cross-filing also prevented conservatives from succeeding in Republican primaries, despite attempts to pool resources for conservatives by the California Republican Assembly (CRA). In a state in which Democrats had a 2-to-1 advantage among registered voters, moderate Republicans wanted to keep conservatives out of the running since they would likely lose to Democrats. Thus, the incentive to moderate was quite attractive. Masket, No Middle Ground, p. 71.


359 Culbert Olson was the only Democratic governor between 1910 and 1959. He served one term (1939-1943) before being defeated by Earl Warren. The California Republican Party had a long history of progressivism within the party, which began with Hiram Johnson who first ran as a Republican in 1910 and then later as a Progressive in 1914. This legacy would carry across decades and into Warren’s administration in the 1940s. Warren advocated progressive policies like public health, conservation, and education, in addition to also supporting FEPC legislation in the state legislature. Schuparra, Triumph of the Right, p. 30; Putnam, “The Pattern of Modern California Politics,” pp. 23-24.
leave the states without adequate revenue to perform their proper local functions.”

In response to increased federal authority, a more vocal conservative faction began to emerge in California. These conservatives wanted Knight out of Sacramento, and they helped Knowland wrest the nomination away from the incumbent Knight. Knight drew conservatives’ ire since he did not support making California a right-to-work state, and claimed that Knowland’s political views were “rooted in antiquated nineteenth-century ideas.” Knight also called right-to-work an “un-Republican” issue.

Conservatives successfully pressured Governor Knight to withdraw his name from consideration in the upcoming election. Kyle Palmer warned Knight that he would not gain the Los Angeles Times’ support if he ran for reelection. Other conservative editors also claimed that they would not endorse Knight for governor. Without the support of the “triumvirate” of conservative California newspapers—the Los Angeles Times, the Oakland Tribune, and the San Francisco Chronicle—and the increasingly powerful conservative faction, Knight bowed out of the race. He decided, however, to run for Knowland’s Senate seat—interestingly, with the

361 Knight came into office when Governor Warren resigned to become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1953; as lieutenant governor, Knight was the first in the line of succession. Knight would easily win his own term as governor in 1954. “Goodwill Knight’s Life of Service,” Los Angeles Times, May 25, 1970, p. A6.
362 Schuparra, Triumph of the Right, p. xvi.
364 In an interview with Clement Whitaker, he recalled that “Kyle was all for Knowland and all for Goodie getting the hell out of the race…Goodwin never was considered a part of the Los Angeles Republican establishment; he was always a little bit of an outsider. Goodwin was a little too moderate in some of his positions for the Times at that time…I think that when Knowland surfaced, Kyle figured that if he could elect Knowland, then the governor would be more responsive to him…” Oral History Interview with Clement Sherman Whitaker, Jr., September 27, 1988, State Government Oral History Program. pp. 54-55. Whitaker was a public relations specialist, who began his career in 1944, Vice-President, and former U.S. Senator from California, Richard Nixon, also threw his endorsement behind Knowland. Perhaps Nixon’s support for Knowland was his retribution against Knight who, in 1956, refused to issue an endorsement of Nixon for vice-president. And even though Knowland initially held a third of California’s delegation (23 delegates) in his name, as did Nixon and Knight, Knowland finally agreed to release his delegates to Nixon, resulting in Nixon’s guaranteed nomination as Eisenhower’s running mate. It would only be when Eisenhower formally declared Nixon as his running mate that Knight begrudgingly agreed to release his delegates to Nixon. Montgomery and Johnson, One Step from the White House, pp. 199-200.
support of those who pushed him out of the governorship. Throughout his campaign for the Senate, Knight would maintain his distance from the Knowland campaign. Two weeks prior to the election, Knight said that he did not know whether he would vote for Knowland because of Knowland’s staunch support of right-to-work.

After forcing Knight out of the race, Knowland filed his candidacy and formally began his campaign for governor on March 22, 1958. Right-wing conservatives coalesced behind Knowland because of his strong anti-New Deal beliefs. Key in Knowland’s campaign was his advocacy of what he referred to as “voluntary unionism” but his opponents called “right-to-work,” legislation, which would make union membership voluntary in California. Knowland would refer to Proposition 18, the ballot proposal that would make union membership voluntary, as the “voluntary unionism initiative.” He accused his Democratic opponent, Pat Brown, and labor leaders of “manipulating the title of the initiative” for their benefit. By stressing “voluntary unionism,” Knowland hoped that voters would subscribe to the belief that he was not anti-union, per se, but rather wanted to prevent union leaders from amassing too much power through mandatory union membership. Knowland believed that union leaders were akin to corrupt political bosses. To break free from the tyranny of unions, citizens should have the “basic civil right” of deciding for themselves whether or not to join a union.

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366 For a description of Nixon and Palmer’s roles in the “big switch,” see Halberstam, *The Powers That Be*. It should also be noted that Eisenhower remained silent on this state election. Personally, Eisenhower is said to have regarded Knowland as a “dolt” and “stupid.” Eisenhower, however, would praise his service in an open letter when Knowland left the Senate to run for governor. Schuparra, *Triumph of the Right*, p. 29.


his allies would frame this issue as ensuring freedom from tyranny, which conservatives,
particularly in Los Angeles and Orange Counties, would adopt and adapt in subsequent years.371

The time seemed ripe for an anti-labor movement in 1958. In a poll published by the Los Angeles Times in 1957, a national sample of Americans favored a right-to-work law372 by an almost 2-1 margin.373 In an April poll, a slight majority (51%) of Californians claimed they were in favor of right-to-work laws. The results were highly partisan—with 68% of Republicans and only 38% of Democrats—backing right-to-work.374 Furthermore, support was particularly strong in southern California. In a May poll, 49% of Californians polled believed that workers should not be forced to join a union, while 45% supported mandatory union membership for workers hired for a job covered by that union’s contract. Respondents from the ten southernmost counties supported “right-to-work” at a rate of 55%.375 In fact, some Democratic leaders in southern California organized to support Knowland, citing his “broad knowledge of the problems

371 Schuparra, Triumph of the Right; McGirr, Suburban Warriors.
372 Since commentators, historians, and political scientists refer to this issue as “right-to-work,” I too will adopt this term. For examples of scholarship that uses this phrase instead of “voluntary unionism,” see Schuparra, Triumph of the Right; Bell, California Crucible; Bjerre-Poulsen, Right Face; Dallek, The Right Moment.
of the people, his realistic approach to problems…his courage, honesty, dignity, and forthrightness,” which would appeal to southland Democrats.

Based on mass support, conservatives felt that Knowland could run on the right-to-work issue, which was to appear on the 1958 ballot as Proposition 18. Conservative politicians wanted a right-to-work platform because of their fear of “big labor” and union power. At a Republican luncheon in Los Angeles, Representative Ralph W. Gwinn of New York cautioned California Republicans that the state had been “marked as next in line for capture by labor leaders of the CIO-AFL and the Americans for Democratic Action.” He reasoned that the CIO-AFL would accomplish this by electing a sympathetic governor and Democratic majority to the legislature. Since California would gain seats in the House of Representatives after the 1960 U.S. Census was taken, Gwinn was afraid that these Democrats would have the power to reapportion the state and “add 10 more members to the “labor-Socialist” bloc in the House of Representatives.

Newspaper articles also indicated that Knowland would succeed on the right-to-work issue. Palmer published a series of articles in the Los Angeles Times that equated the right to choose or decline union membership was “as fundamental a right as is the right to worship God without forced affiliation with a religious group.” The Times also echoed Gwinn’s fears by describing Pat Brown, the Democratic candidate, as an “obsequious yes-man of union political bosses.” In addition to the Times, the Santa Ana Register served as another source for Knowland’s message. The Santa Ana Register, owned by libertarian Raymond Cyrus Holies, did not cover Brown and shed only a favorable light on Knowland’s efforts and ideas.

376 “Democrats Organizing to Support Knowland,” Los Angeles Times, April 25, 1958, p. 11. According to the article, Earl Adams, who was the Los Angeles County Chairman of the Knowland-for-Governor Committee, claimed: “more than 25% of registered Democrats in Southern California will vote for Bill Knowland.”
378 Schuparra, Triumph of the Right, p. 47.
Knowland attacked Brown for “importing Chicago machine type political organization” to run his campaign. In an address to more than seven hundred members of the Republican state central committee in the Capitol in Sacramento, he called out “Buster Brown,” who has “busted the historic Democratic party and has been the instrumentality by which CIO-COPE [Committee on Political Education] is gaining control over his party. Their ultimate hope is to take over his state, Michigan fashion.” Knowland’s reference to Walter Reuther, United Auto Workers leader, and Michigan’s Democratic Governor G. Mennen Williams did not go unnoticed and he received a thunderous applause. In the same speech, he would take exception to his opponents labeling him as anti-union. He stated, “Mr. Brown and his labor boss supporters charge me with attempting to foster voluntary, as against compulsory, unionism for the objective of curtailing union membership in California. This is the same charge they used against me for supporting the Taft-Hartley act, which they called a ‘slave labor law.’ But the record shows union membership has increased throughout the nation by 17 per cent since the Taft-Hartley law was passed in 1947.”

Throughout his campaign, Knowland would not waver from his right-to-work stance.

While the majority of Knowland’s campaign centered on right-to-work, and not civil rights, some of his campaign speeches and literature alluded to welfare and crime, two issues which would become prominent and racialized when Ronald Reagan ran for the governorship in 1966. One of Knowland’s campaign leaflets focused on labor corruption and abuse of welfare. Titled “The Worker and Bill Knowland,” the leaflet showed graphics that depicted a union leader purchasing a car with welfare funds. Knowland used these images to combat union corruption and not welfare programs outright. However, their presence in the 1958 campaign likely stirred negative emotions toward federal welfare programs. Knowland also called on a law and order

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theme, not in a racialized context, but to convince voters that Brown was ineffective as Attorney General. Knowland asserted that under Brown, the state’s chief law enforcement official, California’s crime rate had risen 76% and narcotics control had deteriorated.³⁸¹ Again, Knowland’s discussion of crime was not racialized, as crime would be in Reagan’s 1966 campaign. Thus, while he confronted issues that could have been racialized, Knowland avoided race issues. While Brown called for FEPC “legislation with enforcement powers” to eliminate job discrimination, Knowland refused to declare his position on this issue. Brown challenged Knowland to come out “with a clear cut statement of exactly where he stands with respect to California’s need for a fair employment practices law—together with his reasons for his stand.”³⁸² According to my investigation of speeches and newspaper articles, Knowland never accepted the challenge.

Despite Knowland’s silence on race issues, particularly on economic civil rights, his position can be inferred by considering conservatives’ view of the limited role for the government in the enforcement of civil rights. Knowland was supportive of non-economic civil rights while in the U.S. Senate, voting in favor of anti-lynching legislation in 1952.³⁸³ As Senate minority leader, he served as floor manager for the 1957 Civil Rights Act, which was primarily a voting rights bill.³⁸⁴ Knowland embodied the conservative sentiment, which was not against all civil rights. Rather, many conservative Republicans were not supportive of civil rights that would infringe on the free market and employer rights. Later, as a leader of the Goldwater

³⁸⁴ “Knowland Says Rights Measure Is Still Good,” Los Angeles Times, July 26, 1957, p. 1; For an overview of Knowland’s role in the passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act, see Montgomery and Johnson, One Step From the White House, pp. 213-219.
campaign for president, Knowland’s conservative ideology would constrain his support for the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which contained fair housing and fair employment provisions and gave the Federal Government the power to enforce anti-discrimination laws. And while Knowland called to break the filibuster against a 1946 FEPC bill, he did so because it was “preventing the Senate from conducting the public’s business,” not because he supported FEPC. Throughout his career, Knowland would avoid discussing FEPC since such law ran counter to his conservative ideals. The African American publication, the Los Angeles Sentinel, reflecting on the possibility of a Knowland victory in 1958, confirmed that Knowland would not have supported FEPC as governor.

If Knowland had been elected I’m sure I’d disagree with EVERYTHING he did and I’d be unhappy with him ALL the time! So would a lot of other people, particularly in our community. Governor Brown has taken a positive stand on FEPC. He has lent an intelligent and sympathetic ear to the de facto school segregation situation. He stands squarely in support of the Rumford Fair Housing Measure. He is actively opposed to capital punishment…Imagine what Knowland’s position would have been on these issues!!

Knowland’s ambivalence toward FEPC was just one of the many problems of his campaign. As a dedicated Senator, he was often out of California in the months before the campaign.

According to a New York Times article, Knowland put his “strategic eggs in just two baskets: 1) His personal prestige and impetus as a national figure; 2) Labor union reform, including, on the state level, advocacy of a ‘right-to-work’ law making union membership voluntary under all circumstances.” He rarely addressed the state’s other problems, including educational policies, crime prevention, and resolution of a conflict over the state’s division of water resources.

385 “We Need More Than That,” Los Angeles Sentinel, April 11, 1946, p. 7.
Given the problems with his campaign, it is unsurprising that Knowland lost to Brown by a landslide in 1958 (nearly 20 percentage points).\textsuperscript{388} This makes it easy to overlook his contribution to racial realignment. His choice to run for governor, however, had ramifications at both the national and state levels. Knowland’s loss created an opening for Barry Goldwater as the new conservative spokesperson.\textsuperscript{389} Goldwater and the conservative wing were outraged with Eisenhower for remaining silent on the right-to-work issue in 1958, and Goldwater would challenge President Eisenhower for the remainder of his presidency.\textsuperscript{390} A virtual unknown in the 1956 and 1960 campaigns,\textsuperscript{391} Goldwater would take the national party down a similar path as Knowland did the California Republican Party. Goldwater’s failed candidacy in 1964 allowed Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson to espouse race liberal legislation that would push race conservative white voters out of the Democratic fold. Once these race conservatives joined the Republican ranks, the remaining Democratic base was left more liberal, finally aligning with their national and state representatives who had long supported race liberal policies.

In California, Knowland’s decision to push out the moderate Knight created an opening for the liberal Democrat Pat Brown to run, and ultimately succeed not only in winning the governorship but also in ushering in a host of liberal policies. Legislators who had served during the Knowland-Knight switch have provided valuable insights into that fateful decision:

If the Republican party had not elected to run Good E. Knight for congress and picked Senator Knowland to run for governor, the Republican domination of the office of

\textsuperscript{388} In the first \textit{Los Angeles Times} article printed after Knowland’s concession just before midnight on November 4, 1958, Brown’s lead was 120,000 votes. The article stated that Brown had estimated he would win by 500,000 votes. “Brown Elected!: Knowland Concedes; Democrats Predict Legislature Control,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, November 5, 1958, p. 1. In actuality, when all the numbers were in, Brown trounced Knowland by more than 1 million votes. Rarick, \textit{California Rising}, p. 109.

\textsuperscript{389} After his loss in 1958, Knowland would still be involved in politics, most notably by serving as the head of the 1964 California delegation to the Republican National Convention. However, he was a private citizen. He returned to northern California to run his family’s newspaper, \textit{The Oakland Tribune}. According to Montgomery and Johnson, Knowland “took up model trains, golf, boating, duck hunting…” and tried to make up for lost time with his family. Montgomery and Johnson, \textit{One Step From the White House}, pp. 260-262.


\textsuperscript{391} Schoenwald, \textit{A Time for Choosing}, p. 124.
governor would probably have continued. However, as it turned out, Pat Brown beat Knowland during the “right-to-work” issue and Good E. Knight was defeated as senator. Pat Brown, Democrat, who was elected in that campaign, would probably not have run against Goodwin Knight.392

The sentiment among the California elite at the time was that Knowland’s decision was a selfish one, borne out of his desire to be president. It was an unwise decision, since Knight would have likely won reelection.

Knight, at the time, in my opinion, was secure in his position as governor. He had the full support of labor even though he was a Republican…Their lobbyist up here supported him tooth and toenail…I think the consensus was that Knight would have won the governorship.”393

However, once Knowland decided to run for governor, the party fell in line. According to Assemblyman MacBride, “Knowland…had Republican party power, and he had the power over the Republican finances, too, and so they decided that they wanted Knowland as president…” The best way to get Knowland to the White House was for him replace Knight as governor.394

The Knowland-Knight switch was also imprudent because it convinced Pat Brown, an unabashed liberal, that he could defeat Knowland, who was running on the controversial right-to-work issue. Brown was serving as Attorney General, an office he held since 1946. He was the only Democrat holding a statewide office, and many in his party viewed him as the strongest

392 Oral History Interview with Hon. James D. Garibaldi, January 11 and 16, 1989, State Government Oral History Program, 49. Garibaldi served as a California State Assemblyman from 1935-1938 and later as a legislative advocate from 1946. He was still active at the time of the interview. Lou Cannon has also supported the idea that Brown would not have entered the race if he were running against Knight. He stated that the switch between Knowland and Knight “brought Brown, who had been leery of opposing Knight, into the governor’s race as the champion of the union shop.” Cannon, Governor Reagan, p. 130.
395 In addition to Knight, many other Republicans stayed away from right-to-work since many of them represented union members. Republican David Mulford recalled that Knowland’s “erroneous position…caused a lot of damage…I didn’t like what I saw, as a legislator. We were on the firing line up there, the assemblymen and the senators of the Republican party.” Oral History Interview with David Donald Mulford, April 11 1988, State Government Oral History Program, pp. 11-12. Mulford served as an Assemblyman from 1957-1970.
candidate to win the governorship in 1958. Brown, however, was wary of entering the race against Knight who, it was assumed, would coast to victory. Knowland’s entry into the race, thus, gave the Democrats a “golden opportunity” to win the governorship. Brown labeled Knowland as “a right-wing extremist,” who was engaging in “a ruthless drive to take over the Republican party in California, and after that, the nation.” He warned Democratic delegates at the biennial Democratic state convention that the Democrats had to unite against the “last great charge of American reaction” mounted by the Knowland campaign.

Knowland’s decision, however, had long-term effects. The fight between Knowland and Knight allowed Democrats to capitalize on a fractured Republican Party. In 1958, Democrats won all but one statewide elective offices, including the governorship, control over the State Senate and Assembly, a majority of the congressional delegation, a U.S. Senate seat, and the five-man State Board of Equalization. Furthermore, despite the criticism that blamed Knowland for the “demise of Republican power in the state capital,” Knowland’s campaign helped mobilize conservative organizations. His anti-labor stance rallied conservatives who were looking for a leader. Conservatives grew tired of the “moderate Eisenhower ilk” and wanted to challenge what they perceived as a threat to freedom and an abuse of power in unions. They railed against the legacy of Republican moderatism and acceptance of the Federal

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397 Schiesl, “Pat Brown,” p. 5. Brown was “bubbling over with enthusiasm” once he learned that Knowland was running as the Republican candidate for governor, likely because he knew that, if he entered the race, he would easily win. Rarick, California Rising, p. 98.
401 One of the main activist groups that conservatives gained control of was the California Republican Assembly (CRA). According to Republican Marks, when the CRA began, it was “sort of the Warren-Knight-[U.S. Senator Thomas H.] Kuchel Republicans who we would regard as moderate, progressive Republicans.” After 1958, however, it became much more conservative. Oral History Interview with Milton Marks, January 24, 1996. State Government Oral History Program, p. 66.
Government in both economics and civil rights. Conservatives would blend their traditional views with a clear message of race conservatism to appeal to white Democrats, who were discontent with race liberal legislation coming out of both Sacramento and Washington D.C. Conservatives’ appeal to racially resentful white Democrats proved successful nationally, and in a state where Democratic registrants outnumbered Republican registrants. Graph 4.2 shows the commanding lead in registration that Democrats have enjoyed in California after 1936. Despite the large percentage of Democrats in the state, Ronald Reagan would find electoral success in a Democratic state, first as governor in 1966 and later as president in 1980 and 1984.

Regardless of whether or not fellow Republicans agreed with his style—challenging a popular and moderate incumbent governor—or his beliefs—running on the unpopular right-to-work law, Republicans seeking statewide office adopted Knowland’s conservative views. The electorate rejected Proposition 18 with roughly the same percentage in which they voted for Brown and against Knowland for governor: 59.6% against Proposition 18 and 59.8% for Brown; 40.4% in support of Proposition 18 and 40.2% for Knowland. The Knowland campaign was the first step in moving the California Republican Party to the right. Knowland’s ousting of the moderate Knight and the end of the cross-filing system encouraged California Republicans to adopt more conservative policy views, ensuring that conservatives would have a much stronger say in the direction of the Republican Party.

404 Masket finds that there was a shift from bipartisanship to partisan polarization before and after the end of cross-filing in the California Assembly. Using fist dimension nominate scores that measure the distance between the parties on economic issues, Masket found significant overlap in how the two parties voted in 1953. Several Democrats voted more conservatively than moderate Republicans at times. He concluded that “the political center was a legitimate place for politicians to reside, and many chose to reside there.” After the end of cross-filing, however, the Assembly became highly polarized, “with virtually all Republicans to the far right, virtually all Democrats to the far left, and only a few legislators in the center. Masket, No Middle Ground, pp. 91-93. Using Masket’s dataset of nominate scores for the California Assembly, I did not find any discernible partisan pattern with second dimension scores before and after the end of cross-filing. Seth Masket, “Datasets,” http://mysite.du.edu/~smasket/Data.html, Accessed June 22, 2014.
Graph 4.2. Partisan Registration in California, 1922—1984
The shift to the right in the California Republican Party was only strengthened by the Brown administration and the Democratic legislature. With the Republicans now on the defensive after the Democrats’ overwhelming victory in 1958, conservatives were able to take control of the party apparatus,\textsuperscript{405} which in turn created a more partisan tone on all issues, from the economic to the racial. Though Knowland’s campaign did not focus on race, Knowland helped usher in a new type of Republican. This Republican was conservative on \textit{all} issues because of staunch opposition to government intervention, and would not be swayed to support a race issue that was in conflict with their economic ideology.

\textbf{Conclusion: The Liberal Takeover and the Foundation for White Backlash}

With the support of conservative policy demanders, Knowland’s decision to run for the Republican nomination prevented the popular Republican Goodwin Knight from winning reelection (thereby keeping the governorship under Republican control), and thus allowed Democrats across the state to ride into office on Pat Brown’s coattails.\textsuperscript{406} Knowland’s unwavering support for right-to-work\textsuperscript{407} energized union and liberal voters to overwhelmingly rejected both Knowland and Proposition 18.\textsuperscript{408} According to Milton Marks, the only new Republican elected in 1958,\textsuperscript{409} “the Democrats should have erected a monument to Knowland

\textsuperscript{405} Cummings and Reddy, \textit{California After Arnold}, p. 113; Schuparra, “Freedom vs. Tyranny,” p. 538.
\textsuperscript{407} According to Assemblyman Mulford, Knowland was told “by his own father to get off that right-to-work issue. But he was a very stubborn man, and he rode that issue.” Oral History Interview with David Donald Mulford, April 11 1988, State Government Oral History Program, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{408} Clouatre, \textit{Presidential Upsets}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{409} Marks asserted this during an interview. Oral History Interview with Milton Marks, January 24, 1996. State Government Oral History Program, p. 61. Marks served in the California Assembly from 1958-1966 and then the California Senate from 1967-1996.
because he did more to help the Democrats than any man in the history of the state of California.\textsuperscript{410} by alienating voters with the right-to-work platform.

Governor Brown came into office with FEPC legislation at the top of his agenda.\textsuperscript{411} Unlike his Republican predecessors Warren and Knight, whom black leaders viewed as indifferent to FEPC, Brown maintained the support of the black community by acting quickly on the issue.\textsuperscript{412} Furthermore, Brown declared that his administration would stand behind the original bill—not a weakened version that would require a formal complaint before any action was taken, taking away the commission’s initiative.\textsuperscript{413} After the Democrats succeeded with the passage of FEPC in 1959, they would see other civil rights victories during Brown’s first term, such as urban renewal projects, the Hawkins Act to prohibit discrimination in public housing, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, which banned discrimination in all business establishments and established the legal principle that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal.”\textsuperscript{414} In his second term, Brown and his liberal allies won another victory with the passage of the Rumford Act, which barred racial discrimination in housing. Brown was elated with the bill’s passage. He would later refer to it as “one of the greatest victories” of his career.\textsuperscript{415}

In addition to FEPC and fair housing, a key goal for Brown upon entering office was the abolition of cross-filing.\textsuperscript{416} Cross-filing had almost been abolished by Proposition 13 (1952) and was essentially rendered ineffective with the passage of Proposition 7 (1952). Proposition 7 required that cross-filers state their party identification in the primary elections, and eliminated

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\item\textsuperscript{410} Oral History Interview with Milton Marks, January 24, 1996. State Government Oral History Program, p. 62.
\item\textsuperscript{411} “Brown Signs Bill Ending Cross-Filing,” Los Angeles Times, May 6, 1959, p. 1.
\item\textsuperscript{412} Brilliant, The Color of American Has Changed, p. 157.
\item\textsuperscript{413} For a discussion over Brown’s battle for FEPC see Rarick, California Rising, pp. 123-125; Brilliant, The Color of America Has Changed, pp. 160-161.
\item\textsuperscript{414} HoSang, Racial Propositions, p. 61.
\item\textsuperscript{416} “Brown Signs Bill Ending Cross-Filing,” Los Angeles Times, May 6, 1959, p. 1.
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the incentive Republicans had to cross-file. The media coverage of this bill emphasized that cross-filing widely favored Republicans. Newspaper articles pointed out, “California’s Republicans, outnumbered [in registration] for the last twenty-seven years, capitalized on cross-filing to maintain a half century’s domination of state politics.”\(^{417}\) Furthermore, incumbents had been able to maximize support by running on both primary tickets, keeping Republicans in power until 1959, which saw the first Democratic Legislature since 1898.\(^{418}\)

The abolition of cross-filing in 1959 was the final nail in the coffin that ended the tradition of nonpartisanship in California government since the beginning of the twentieth century. Even though the Republican Party enjoyed a majority of registered voters and therefore dominated state offices, Republican governors and legislators tended to adopt nonpartisan policies. When, in 1934, Democrats began to lead in voter registration, the Republican Party—both cross-filers and non-cross-filers—forced Republican officials to be more moderate both in the primaries, and in general elections to gain a share of the growing population of Democrats in the state, perpetuating a nonpartisan spirit from the 1930s until the 1950s. Evidence of Republican moderatism could be seen in legislators’ support of Warren’s middle-of-the-road policies. When, for example, Governor Warren proposed the largest budget in the history of the state of California in 1945, Republican legislators supported him. Republican Albert C. Wollenberg (San Francisco) stated that the governor’s budget “shows the important increases in appropriations are all in departments with definite social significance—agencies which provide direct service to the people, such as public health, industrial welfare, institutions, corrections and

\(^{418}\) “Cross-Filing System In California Is Abolished,” *Ocala Star-Banner*, April 24, 1959, p. 6. The roll call votes confirm the partisan nature of the 1959 vote to end cross-filing. Forty-five Democrats and 4 Republicans voted in favor of A.B. 118, while 1 Democrat and 28 Republicans voted against the bill. In the Senate, the bill passed 22-15, 21 Democrats and 1 Republican supported the bill and 4 Democrats and 11 Republicans voted against it. Gaines and Cho, “Crossover Voting Before the Blanket,” p. 33.
the schools, colleges and universities.”

However, when cross-filing ended, candidates stopped appealing to the median voter and instead had to please their policy demanders since they needed activists’ approval and resources to win their party’s nomination.

In addition to the abolition of cross-filing, the primary force driving Republicans to the right was a series of events that sparked the emergence of white backlash. The defeat of Knowland and the rise of Goldwater allowed unabashed liberal administrations to impose civil rights and integration policies, incensing and galvanizing conservative activists who were able to shift the Republican Party to the right. Liberal policies and the racial tensions of the 1960s also alienated working class race conservatives. Republican politicians, who were shifting away from the center, were able to win the support of white backlash voters by packing their conservative principles with opposition to civil rights in the late 1960s and 1970s. When backlash voters left the Democratic Party, the Democrats’ base of support became much more liberal, having been purged of the race conservative faction. The Republican Party welcomed these former Democrats and thus transformed into the race conservative party. As I will show in the next chapter, this movement of race conservative voters was the final step in the parties’ realignment on race.

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420 Masket, No Middle Ground, p. 81.
Chapter 5: White Backlash and the Completion of Racial Realignment, 1964—1980

The Republican party is, at the moment, without leadership or direction. Its chances of reemerging as a major force in California life depend largely on how well you succeed or fail in the next four years. It is only fitting that a Californian should make a successful bid for the Presidency in the next decade or so. Who that individual will be no one can say, but it is important that a political climate be created so that he can be developed and nourished. – Richard Kline, Pat Brown’s executive secretary

...by the time Pat Brown was being kicked out of office, the state had washed its hands, politically, of liberalism. It was dead...Liberalism died in ’64, if you want to pick a date.
– Lu Haas, Pat Brown’s press assistant

Richard Kline, who served as Governor Pat Brown’s executive secretary, made two accurate predictions. A Californian did make it to the White House AND that man succeeded in large part due to Brown’s actions as governor between 1962 and 1966. However, that person was not Governor Brown but rather the charismatic conservative Republican, Ronald Reagan, from California’s central coast. Reagan would capitalize on the discontent felt by many white voters whom Brown alienated with his race liberal policies. The governor’s press assistant, Lucien “Lu” Haas, identified 1964 as the year in which “liberalism died” in California, under Pat Brown’s watch. Liberalism’s death, in large part, was brought on by Brown’s strident defense of fair housing laws. In 1963, the Rumford Fair Housing law sparked white backlash that conservative groups and politicians would rally against via a ballot initiative—Proposition 14—that sought to overturn fair housing in the state.

In addition to the fair housing debate in California, the national Republican Party took a sharp turn to the right with the nomination of Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential contest. Republicans, backed by conservative activists and groups, would craft their rhetoric to appeal to
working and middle-class whites, who were resentful toward the demands of civil rights groups and the Federal Government’s policies that whites believed disproportionately benefited African Americans. Conservatives, like Goldwater and Reagan, would also play on whites’ fears of African Americans, and increased violence in urban areas in order to gain their support after 1964.

This attempt by conservative activists to move the Republican Party to the right on race is critical to understanding the transformation on race in the twentieth century. While Knowland attempted to take the California Republican Party rightward on economic issues in 1958, conservatives in the 1960s, at both the state and at the national levels, would craft campaigns that hinged on support from racially resentful, white “backlash” voters. As I will show, many of these backlash voters were Democrats, who turned against their party on civil rights issues. Thus, when Republican elites began to adopt racially-coded rhetoric in 1964, the result would be the eventual shift of these backlash voters into the Republican Party, which in turn, would leave behind a more race liberal Democratic Party. It would only be when the Republican Party rejects civil rights outright, thus pulling race conservative Democrats into the fold, that racial realignment in both parties was complete. The shift of white backlash voters would begin in 1964, and by 1972, I demonstrate that the majority of racially resentful white voters left the Democratic Party.

In this chapter, I start with an analysis of white backlash in California. I discuss the aftermath of the failed Knowland campaign and the shift to the right that occurred in the California Republican Party between 1958 and 1964. I then focus on two ballot propositions—Proposition 14 that overturned the Rumford Fair Housing law in 1964 and Proposition 21 in 1972 that banned busing in California—to demonstrate the contentious nature of civil rights in
the 1960s and 70s. Unlike previous propositions that appeared on the ballot in the 1940s, these proposition campaigns adopted a racialized tone. Through a discussion of these campaigns and a study of voter returns, I show that the Democratic base was divided into race liberal and race conservative factions in 1964 but that by 1972, race conservatives left the Democrats and found a new home with the Republican Party, which more closely aligned with their views on race. I then turn to an exploration of Goldwater’s southern strategy in 1964, which would be adapted by Ronald Reagan in his 1966 gubernatorial bid. Reagan would make the southern strategy more inclusive, and use his personal appeal and conservative rhetoric to appeal to voters outside of the South. I discuss how Goldwater at the national level and Reagan in California appealed to disaffected white Democrats so that by 1972, the Republican Party became the new home of race conservatives, effectively rewriting the party’s history from the Party of Lincoln to the Party of Reagan.

**Republican Elites Move to the Right in California**

After the 1958 defeat of their gubernatorial candidate, William Knowland, conservatives sought to overtake the state party and push out economic and race moderates and progressives. They had achieved what one scholar calls a “stunning political coup” by “oust[ing] moderates from their positions of power within the grassroots organizations” that dominated the state’s party politics. “Relying on a dense network of activists, immersing themselves in arcane bylaws and sundry parliamentary procedures, conservatives descended in droves on political conventions,” succeeding in the election of conservatives to leadership posts in the California Young Republicans, the California Republican Assembly (CRA), and the party’s state Central
Committee.\textsuperscript{423} Conservatives were angry with Eisenhower for refusing to take a stand on right-to-work during the 1958 campaign. They saw his ambivalence as an attempt to undermine the conservative faction of the party and, in the aftermath of Knowland’s defeat, conservatives became increasingly hostile toward the president.\textsuperscript{424} Furthermore, as a result of the Knowland loss, Republicans unified to combat the new, forceful liberal government, headed by Governor Brown whose agenda centered on FEPC and fair housing. In the face of a strong opposition party, “…the Republicans began to respond…creating a much more partisan tone on the Republican side.”\textsuperscript{425}

In addition to conservatives’ hostility toward the moderate Eisenhower and the liberal government in Sacramento, Republican legislators were far less likely to adopt centrist proposals, as cross-filing was declining in popularity in the 1950s. Democrats in the state had long sought to end this mechanism that helped Republicans win and remain in office. Republicans, like Earl Warren, would run in both parties’ primaries—on a moderate platform—in order to appeal to a wide range of voters. This was necessary for Republicans to win, since the majority of registered voters in the state were Democrats. Advocates who wanted to end cross-filing in California almost succeeded in 1952 with Proposition 13. Its narrow defeat likely led many Republicans to forego cross-filing and their middle-of-the-way policies in subsequent elections, in anticipation of the end of cross-filing. That is, they realized that once liberals came into power, they would likely abolish this practice that kept Democrats out of office for decades.\textsuperscript{426} This hypothesis was supported by evidence in Chapter 3. The number of cross-filing

\textsuperscript{423} Dallek, \textit{The Right Moment}, p. 62.
\textsuperscript{425} Cummings and Reddy, \textit{California After Arnold}, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{426} While the demise of cross-filing in 1959 likely influenced some Republicans to take a more conservative, hard-line stance, the moderate Republican began to disappear before A.B. 118 was passed. After the 1952 election revealed that almost 50\% of the electorate supported abolishing cross-filing, it appears that Republicans had stopped attempting to run in both parties’ primaries. They had the foresight that once Democrats came into power, they
Republicans declined significantly after Proposition 13 appeared on the ballot. Of the 19 Assemblymen who were present for both the 1953 and 1955 legislative sessions, 17 did not cross-file and identified as Republicans in the 1955 session.427

The 1958 Knowland campaign was a crucial event that hastened the realignment of the Republican Party. Republican voters had already revealed their conservatism on economic civil rights in the 1940s, both through their attitudes and behavior on Proposition 11 (1946) and Proposition 14 (1948). After years of tension between the voters and the elected officials in which moderate Republicans in the Assembly and in the governor’s office supported economic civil rights, state Republicans finally aligned with their constituents on economic race issues in the late 1950s. This convergence can be attributed to Pat Brown’s victory—which was a direct result of Knowland’s fateful decision to push the popular moderate Republican Goodwin Knight out of the governor’s chair. Brown would spend eight years endorsing race liberal policies, allowing Republicans to unify behind a conservative message.

Brown spent his first term focused on pushing FEPC through the legislature; however, he would refrain from backing any controversial race liberal legislation until his reelection in 1962. Brown did not want to risk white votes by endorsing a race liberal agenda. However, he felt liberated after he won his second term. Brown believed that the voters supported him and

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liberalism in general. The Legislature remained under Democratic control, the California economy was prosperous, and racial tension was low, creating a climate conducive to bold reform experiments. President Kennedy and Democrats across the country lauded Brown, who was celebrated as a “political titan.” Brown’s popularity and vision stemmed from the belief that the government could solve the major social problems of the day, including creating a host of new social services to meet the growing needs of the lower classes, the unemployed, and the elderly. He therefore wanted to strengthen the FPEC, outlaw housing discrimination, invest more money into the state’s public schools, and “assault…the problems of the big cities.” The only way, according to Brown, to accomplish these goals was by bringing in the government.

In his first term, Brown embraced the FEPC issue during his first campaign, stating that he would make it a priority upon taking office. Furthermore, he appointed several African American and Hispanic staffers and had positive relations with minority leaders and groups. In addition to FEPC, Brown threw his support behind the Unruh Civil Rights Act, which outlawed discrimination in public accommodations and businesses, and a Hawkins bill banning discrimination in publicly funded housing. In 1960, midway through his first term, he appeared before a civil rights commission and denounced California realtors of “hid[ing] behind the reactionary and discredited folk tale that segregation and discrimination are natural and tolerable because minorities prefer to be restricted to the ghetto.” For the most part, however, Brown, worried about his political standing and reelection prospects, avoided a contentious battle on behalf of fair housing. He followed the advice of his executive secretary, Richard Kline, who wrote: “It would be unsound to initiate any major specific housing legislation at this time. We

429 Dallek, The Right Moment, p. 43.
are simply not prepared for it…Housing is such an explosive social subject…The question is not what has to be done in this field but what can be done from a politically realistic standpoint." Thus, Brown’s full vision for a liberal California would have to wait until his reelection.

When Brown won reelection, the time was ripe to attack the housing issue. The national struggle for civil rights was in full gear. Massive civil rights marches occurred in the South, sparking backlash in white communities and the political establishment, including police chiefs, governors, and city council members who were committed to protecting Jim Crow. The clash between peaceful civil rights protestors, both white and black, and the establishment was viewed on television sets across America. Brown, like many other liberals, was outraged by the events unfolding in the South. Thus, he became much more vocal in his support of race liberalism during his second term. Brown applauded Martin Luther King, Jr. for leading the fight for equality. He appointed William Becker, a civil rights leader, to run a new state agency for human rights in California. Brown believed that as long as African Americans were relegated to subpar neighborhoods, animosity would continue to grow. Brown decided to take on housing discrimination to prevent California from devolving into a hotbed of racial violence.

Conservatives would attack Brown’s liberal record throughout his administration, and in the 1966 gubernatorial campaign. Conservatives criticized Brown’s use of the government to intervene on behalf of minorities, at the expense of white businessmen and homeowners. He was also identified as a weak-on-crime, out-of-touch liberal. Conservatives denounced him because of his numerous pardons of individuals on death row. Further, Brown’s lack of credibility when it came to resolving racial tension in the state—he was flying over Greece when the Watts

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432 Dallek, The Right Moment, p. 47.
433 Dallek, The Right Moment, p. 19; Rarick, California Rising, p. 172.
riots broke out—did little to win him white support in a post-Watts California. As stated by one historian, “Governor Edmund ‘Pat’ Brown was ripe to be plucked out of Sacramento.”

Strengthened by Brown’s liberalism and the perception that he could not handle the state’s growing race problem, Republicans would nominate the conservative Ronald Reagan to “pluck” Brown out of office in 1966.

Brown’s support of one issue in particular—the Rumford Fair Housing Act and his subsequent opposition to Proposition 14, which was placed on the ballot by conservatives seeking to overturn the 1963 Rumford law—drew the ire of many white Democrats. Brown and the California Democrats’ support of fair housing, and Republicans’ opposition to it, clarified, perhaps for the first time, the parties’ positions on race. The Republican Party’s conservative position on civil rights encouraged race conservatives to abandon the Democrats, who never aligned their policies with the race conservative faction within the party’s base.

Propositions 14 and 21: Evidence of the Collapse of the Race Liberal Dream in California

In addition to choosing between Johnson and Goldwater in the 1964 presidential race, Californians had to decide whether or not to overturn the Rumford Fair Housing Act, which was passed by a partisan vote in the Legislature in 1963. Proposition 14 was a highly salient and contentious issue. Conservatives, adopting a page from Goldwater’s book, spoke against fair housing laws by using the rhetorical theme of freedom: the freedom of property owners to decide to whom they wanted to sell their property. In a letter written to Governor Brown, who came out against Proposition 14, one Californian summed up the sentiments that several property owners

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434 Cannon, Governor Reagan, p. 144; Rarick, California Rising, p. 338. In addition to the criticism received for the Watts riots, Brown was viewed as ineffectual in his handling of the student protests at the University of California, Berkeley. Rarick, California Rising, p. 313; Cannon, Governor Reagan, p. 159.

435 Schoenwald, A Time for Choosing, p. 191.

Another related theme among Proposition 14 supporters was anti-communism. Though not affiliated with the central campaign group—the Committee for Yes on Proposition 14—some organizations sent out alarmist literature to voters that called the Rumford law “a Nazi-type, Commie-type law because it is just such a coercive edict.”\footnote{438}{“Prop. 14 Backers Claim Red Plot, Foes Charge,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, October 30, 1964, p. 14.} While most on the pro-Proposition 14 side avoided blatantly racist language, one group called the California Committee for Equal Rights for the White Race, stated that the election of Goldwater and the passage of Proposition 14 would put an end to the trend of “forcing the white man to accede to the Negroes’ wish.”\footnote{439}{“Prop. 14 Backers Claim Red Plot, Foes Charge,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, October 30, 1964, p. 14.} Opponents of Proposition 14 criticized these tactics, and claimed that the defeat of Proposition 14 was necessary to guarantee equality in the housing market.

Despite the polarizing nature of the Proposition 14 campaign, partisanship remained muted among Democratic voters, as it had been on Proposition 11 (1946) and Proposition 14 (1948). Republicans voted overwhelmingly in favor of Proposition 14 in 1964, as they had on the two previous racialized proposals. These results are significant for two key reasons. First, they reveal a continuous pattern of Republican conservatism and Democratic ambivalence on civil rights that had been present in the 1940s. This stability suggests that voters are not solely dependent on elite cues, as they were able to vote in consistent patterns across time, despite mixed signals within the state and national parties. Second, when comparing this pattern of partisanship in the electorate to the partisan breakdown of votes on Proposition 21 (1972), the state’s anti-busing initiative, I observe that the Democratic base shifted to the left from 1964 to 1972. I argue that the increase in liberalism apparent in the Proposition 21 results can be

\footnote{437}{Tom Saunders to Pat Brown, April 20, 1964, Box 706, Folder: “Housing Discrimination April 15-April 31,” Edmund G. (Pat) Brown Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California-Berkeley.}
explained by the influx of race conservatives into the Republican Party after 1964. The Proposition 14 campaign to end fair housing in California, Goldwater’s presidential campaign, and the subsequent conservative campaigns run by Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, revealed that the national party was now the party of race conservatism. This transformation attracted race conservative Democrats to the Republican Party in the late 1960s and 1970s.

In the following sections, I summarize the Propositions 14 and 21 campaigns. I then describe my dataset and methods, and provide an analysis of my results. The main focus of this ballot proposition study is to demonstrate the decreased conservative presence in the Democratic base from 1964 to 1972. I argue that the decline in conservatism in the Democratic Party’s electoral coalition was the result of the shift of white backlash voters to the Republican Party over this time period.

**Proposition 14 (1964)**

*Liberalism…assumed people in the goodness of their hearts would vote no on 14…I say the great miscalculation was that we felt if we could educate the people they’d vote our way. Well, the point was that we did educate them and they voted against us two to one.*

– Richard Kline, Pat Brown’s executive secretary

Richard Kline concisely summarized the anti-Proposition 14 campaign spearheaded by Brown and liberal Democrats, and the outcome of the vote. Brown and his supporters were convinced that Californians would see Proposition 14 as a battle of “good vs. evil.” Brown viewed himself on the side of good. He wanted to defend the Rumford Fair Housing Act, A.B. 1240, which was signed into law the previous year. This law prohibited owners and landlords from discriminating against prospective tenants or buyers because of their race. According to Brown, the supporters of Proposition 14, which sought to prohibit the state from “abridging right

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of any person to decline to sell, lease, or rent residential real property to any person he chooses was clearly on the wrong side of this issue. Brown’s failed strategy was grounded in the fact that he did not realize the extent of white backlash in the California electorate. One critical mistake was Brown’s vilification of his opponents and anyone who would support Proposition 14. Leading up to the vote, he made public statements, claiming that Proposition 14 was a “vicious” measure—a “blow to decency” and a victory for “prejudice and bigotry.” Such straight talk only worked to strengthen voters’ resolve to support Proposition 14 since, according to Brown’s press secretary, “…most of the people we are talking to don’t regard themselves as bigots, even if they do discriminate against Negroes.” By the fall, most of Brown’s advisors urged him to jettison any talk of racism with regard to Proposition 14.

Brown desperately hoped to prevent Proposition 14 from making it onto the ballot in the first place. He feared that a repeal effort would exacerbate racial tensions and, at worst, spark a race riot. In late 1963, he tried to urge realtors to abandon their efforts to gather the signatures necessary to put the proposition on the ballot. Brown tried to assuage their fears by stating that the Rumford Act “in no way threatens property values or individual rights.” He promised realtors that the FEPC—the agency in charge of enforcing the act—would “err on the side of caution” when investigating housing complaints. Brown also tried to appeal to realtors’ conscience to stop their signature drive. He called on the recent “terrible killings in Birmingham,” which served as a “solemn reminder of our duty as citizens to uphold the law and to achieve what we know is right in our hearts—decent, fair treatment of all citizens.” He also

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441 For text of all ballot initiatives, see the UC Hastings Law Library website, [http://library.uchastings.edu/library/guides/california-research/ca-ballot-pamphlets.html](http://library.uchastings.edu/library/guides/california-research/ca-ballot-pamphlets.html), Accessed August 9, 2012.
stated that a repeal campaign would “divide the people of California,” thereby “leaving a lasting scar on our communities.” Furthermore, Brown warned realtors that the Federal Government would likely stop housing subsidies to the state as a result of their actions to overturn an anti-discrimination law. Members of the FEPC also offered to appear before local real estate boards to discuss the new fair housing law to ease concerns. Brown’s aides, like William Becker, distributed pamphlets that praised the fair housing law and urged traditional Brown allies—union and religious leaders—to endorse the Rumford Act.

The Brown administration’s attempt to discourage backers of the repeal proposition fell on deaf ears. In March 1964, the California Real Estate Association (CREA) formed the Committee for Home Protection (CHP) to collect signatures to place a repeal proposition on the 1964 ballot. CHP would also run the pro-Proposition 14 campaign with the help of other conservative groups, including the John Birch Society (JBS) and the California Republican Assembly (CRA). Both the Republican presidential nominee Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan, the co-chairman of Goldwater’s California campaign, endorsed Proposition 14. While Goldwater would not make it a central part of his California campaign, Reagan’s view of Proposition 14 can be summarized by his declaration that “the right of an individual to ownership and disposition of property is inseparable from his right to freedom itself.”

Proponents of Proposition 14 would also use rhetoric that revolved around individual rights. Leaders of CHP spoke out against the Rumford Act as “forced housing.” In an advertisement for canvassers in the Oakland Tribune, CHP stated that “The Rumford Act makes a man’s home subject to the whims of a politically appointed State Board…The politically

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448 Self, American Babylon, p. 102.
appointed Commission can force you to sell or rent your home to an individual not of your choice. Most people believe that a man has the right to sell, rent or lease his property to whomever he wishes; consequently, they oppose the Rumford Act." The advertisement worked and head of CHP and former CREA president, L.H. Wilson, submitted 633,206 valid signatures to the Secretary of State, reportedly the largest number ever certified for an initiative measure.451

Californians Against Proposition 14 (CAP 14) formed a loose organization of groups, including labor, civic, religious, and civil rights, to combat CHP. However, their message lacked a clear, unifying message in support of fair housing laws. Some, following the governor’s lead, attacked the opposition as extremist and racist. For the most part, however, CAP 14’s message was a conciliatory one: opponents of Proposition 14 sought to ease white voters’ fears by emphasizing that the Rumford Act would not upset the “character of their neighborhoods” or violate their property rights in any significant way. In a memo sent to church leaders in Los Angeles, CAP 14 stated that the “Rumford law is not a ‘special privilege’ law for minorities. It does not give minorities any special claim on housing in any way, shape, or form. It merely attempts to give them an equal chance for housing if they are fully qualified."452 CAP 14 thus avoided portraying fair housing as a minority rights issue in an attempt to gain white support.

The decision to stay away from a strong defense of the Rumford Act and fair housing in general was strategic. In April 1964, William Becker, one of Brown’s key aides, worked with CAP 14 to deliver a message that white voters might accept. Becker and other CAP 14 leaders believed that white voters would not respond to a direct appeal to defend the Rumford Act and the protections it provided. Thus, Rumford was never defended on its own merits. Rather,

450 Quoted in Casstevens, Politics, Housing and Race Relations, p. 49.
451 HoSang, Racial Propositions, p. 66.
452 Quoted in HoSang, Racial Propositions, p. 81.
public educational materials sought to reassure whites that the Rumford Act would not cause their neighborhood to “deteriorate” or lower the “standards of teaching and discipline” in neighborhood schools. To the extent that CAP 14 defended the Rumford Act, it was to support it as a moderate option that would alleviate anger and frustration among minorities. The governor picked up this argument in a speech when he warned, “the ancient problems of segregation and discrimination would “be settled in the streets, with blood and violence” if Proposition 14 passed. Opponents also tried to quell white voters’ fears of the Rumford Act by stating that, during its first year of implementation, no fines had been issued and that only one of the complaints filed has led to an administrative hearing.⁴⁵³ Therefore, when CAP 14 and its affiliates discussed the Rumford Act, it was to either emphasize its “toothless” provisions, or to argue that its repeal would incite riots in minority neighborhoods that might spill into white neighborhoods.

The majority of minority rights groups in the state did not support CAP 14’s strategy. Rather than apologize for Rumford, civil rights groups sought to link Proposition 14 to a longer history of minority oppression. CAP 14’s leaders chose to marginalize these concerns, and accepted the premise of white privilege put forth by Proposition 14 supporters. That is, white homeowners would not have to worry about significant neighborhood integration, or loss of property rights if they maintain the moderate Rumford law.⁴⁵⁴ By rejecting minorities’ concerns, CAP 14 further validated the fears of white homeowners.

Sixty-five percent of the California electorate approved Proposition 14. According to members of the Brown administration, this commanding victory was the result of racism on the part of white voters. After the election, Brown’s press assistant, Lu Haas, expressed his shock,

⁴⁵³ HoSang, Racial Propositions, p. 82.
⁴⁵⁴ HoSang, Racial Propositions, p. 83.
stating that before the vote, “we had Mexicans, we had blacks, everything like that and we were all mixing it up and getting along fine.” Proposition 14, according to Haas, “shattered [the myth] for me,” as he realized, “My God, we’re facing racism in the state of California.”  Edward Rutledge, head of the National Committee against Discrimination in Housing (NCADH), claimed that “the overriding reason for the impressive YES vote for Proposition 14 can be attributed to latent and overt anti-Negro racial prejudice of most of the white California voters.” These unambiguous statements that credit Proposition 14’s victory to racial bigotry laid the groundwork for an even more racialized battle waged in 1972—a fight over busing.

**Proposition 21 (1972)**

In addition to examining Proposition 14 (1964) to determine changes in partisanship on racialized issues over time, I also analyze the results of a 1972 initiative that proposed banning busing in the state—Proposition 21. By the early 1970s, busing had become a national issue. On March 14, 1972, Florida voters supported a resolution in support of a constitutional amendment prohibiting “forced busing.” Two days later, President Nixon asked Congress to place a moratorium on busing. Busing would be a major issue in the 1972 presidential election between Nixon and George McGovern. It also dominated local politics in Detroit, Michigan, Boston, Massachusetts and Charlotte, North Carolina.

Proposition 21 would add a section to the California Education Code that would state:

“No public school student shall, because of his race, creed, or color, be assigned to or be required

455 Quoted in HoSang, Racial Propositions, p. 85.
456 Quoted in HoSang, Racial Propositions, p. 86.
to attend a particular school.” Further, it would repeal the Bagley Act, which provided that school districts must prevent and eliminate “racial and ethnic imbalance in pupil enrollment in public schools.” The Bagley Act (1971) was named for its sponsor—William Bagley—a moderate Republican from Marin County. Bagley and moderates in both parties supported this act in large part because of the perception that providing local school districts with the power to address racial imbalance was preferable to the alternative—a more far-reaching court order to desegregate schools across the state.

Floyd Wakefield, a conservative Republican Assemblyman from South Gate, saw the Bagley Act as an invitation to “massive busing.” Wakefield thus proposed the anti-busing initiative, which would be called the Wakefield Amendment, to appear on the ballot in the November general election in 1972. Wakefield’s campaign used racialized rhetoric similar to the Proposition 14 campaign in 1964. The Wakefield campaign asserted that whites should not be “forced” to integrate. The ballot argument in favor of Proposition 21, written by Wakefield, used the phrase “forced integration” nine times to drive the message home: segregation was natural and a matter of choice, while integration was “artificial and required coercion.”

To capitalize on white backlash, Wakefield’s campaign blamed liberals for forcing busing onto the state, in addition to the “pro-busing news-media.” He sent supporters a ten-panel photo storyboard for a television commercial, depicting a terrified white student being forced to board a school bus as her mother explained, “The government says you and your little friends can’t go to school anymore in the neighborhood, honey.” The girl then asked, “Aren’t we people too?” This advertisement “implicitly set the rights of white viewers—the ‘we’—against a racialized other

461 HoSang, Racial Propositions, p. 100.
463 HoSang, Racial Propositions, pp. 100-101.
receiving unwarranted advantages from, as the ad described, ‘that old government.’” This ad epitomized the tone of the Proposition 21 campaign—whites had the right, the “Freedom of Choice,” according to Wakefield’s storyboard to attend schools in their own neighborhoods and minority students had to remain in subpar settings.464

This ballot initiative is significant because, like Proposition 14, it allows me to determine partisan behavior on an issue substantively different from the previous racialized propositions that appeared on the ballot in the 1940s. Whereas the 1940s initiatives had strong economic components that precluded Republicans from supporting civil rights, Proposition 21 was predominantly a race issue—an attempt to avoid forced integration via busing.

Forced integration posed a new type of civil rights issues to the public. Compared to economic civil rights, forced integration issues were marked by the growing disenchantment with what many white Americans believed to be aggressive demands on the part of militant civil rights advocates. An overwhelming majority of white Californians supported the Brown decision and school integration in general.465 However, many viewed court-mandated, “forced integration” via busing as going too far, requiring homogenous white communities, like Pasadena, California, to integrate when these communities had almost no minority population.

This bred resentment among whites and created a hotbed for African American students, who

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464 HoSang, Racial Propositions, p 100.
465 To assess white Californians’ response to the Brown decision, I used the iPoll Search on the Roper Center website. There were no questions asked on school integration before 1954, when the Brown decision had declared that separate but equal public schools were unconstitutional. Therefore, I look at questions asked between 1954 and 1968. There were 35 questions asked about school integration. I looked separately at questions that asked specifically about the Brown decision and whether or not respondents agreed with the Supreme Court (7 questions) and questions that did not refer to Brown (28 questions). There was a difference in partisan responses to the two sets of school integration questions. When looking at the questions that referred specifically to Brown, a small minority in both parties—only 22% of Democrats and 27% of Republicans—disapproved of the Court’s decision, a 5-percentage point difference. Removing Brown from the questions, there was an increase in conservatism on questions that asked about school integration in general. Thirty-three percent of Democrats and 39% of Republicans reported that they opposed school integration between 1954 and 1968. Despite the increase in absolute conservatism, partisanship still remains low—6-percentage points, as do the absolute levels of conservatism on school integration. “iPoll Search,” Roper Center website, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/CFIDE/cf/action/ipoll/index.cfm. Accessed January 21, 2014.
would often face not only disgruntled parents but also a hostile student body. The Pasadena Star-News claimed that, because of racial tension minority students faced at white schools, “black, white, Chicano and others…are asking for a return to neighborhood schools” and that they “are pleading for an end to forced busing as much as is legally permissible.” Most Proposition 21 supporters stayed away from overtly racial language. Rather than forcing school integration via busing, some advocates espoused a gradualist view that school integration would come in time, when employment and housing becomes more integrated over time.

Opponents called Proposition 21 a “segregation amendment” to the California Education Code and deemed it unconstitutional. Californians Against Unequal Schools and Education (CAUSE) coordinated efforts against Proposition 21. The broad-based coalition included many of the same groups that opposed Proposition 14: the NAACP, the California Teachers Association, the State Federation of Labor, the League of Women Voters, and several faith-based groups. CAUSE was unable to raise the funds necessary to run a well-organized campaign. It raised only seventeen thousand dollars, a fraction of the money raised by Wakefield. CAUSE also suffered from an incoherent message. Some of the rhetoric centered on pinning the pro-Proposition 21 camp as racist, saying that the initiative claimed to be “absolutely color-blind, but its consequence would be to freeze hundreds of thousands of black, Mexican-American and other minority children in the inferior segregated schools to which they are now assigned.” Others were more forthright with their accusations, saying that supporters of peddling a “hate/segregation” amendment that would make California like Mississippi.

471 Quoted in Brilliant, The Color of America Has Changed, p. 195.
Perhaps the primary problem with CAUSE’s message was that it was an almost apologetic defense in support of the moderate Bagley Act, not a moral argument that supported school integration through busing. CAUSE repeatedly warned that without the “calm and deliberative progress” provided for by the Bagley Act’s requirements, the courts would intervene and mandate a more widespread busing agenda. The first line of the ballot argument against Proposition 21 read, “Passage of this proposition will encourage Court-ordered ‘busing in California! Please vote ‘no.’” Similar to the opposition’s argument against Proposition 14 that claimed that the Rumford Act was a modest proposal that, if overturned, would unleash the “anger of the ghetto,” critics of Proposition 21 framed their argument to appeal to moderate white voters, not minorities.

*Ballot Proposition Dataset, 1964 and 1972*

To determine partisan rates of behavior in the electorate on the 1964 and 1972 racialized propositions, I used precinct-level election returns for the proposition races, and candidate contests to determine a baseline of partisanship within each precinct. I also looked at the partisan rates of support for New Deal initiatives that appeared on the ballot to determine whether or not voters’ racial preferences aligned with their economic ideologies.

In 1964, there were two candidate races—the contest for president between Lyndon B. Johnson (D) and Barry Goldwater (R), and the race for senator between Pierre Salinger (D) and George Murphy (R). There were 6,248,545 individual ballots cast for president that year. President Johnson was elected with 59% of the vote to Goldwater’s 41%. George Murphy defeated Pierre Salinger for Senate by a margin of 51% to 49%, with 6,177,482 ballots cast for

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that race. I ran my analyses twice—once using the presidential race as my gauge of partisanship and then using the Senate race. Since the results were similar and for continuity, I report the results generated using the presidential race since, in 1972, there were no statewide races. There were 6,054,452 ballots cast for Proposition 14—the initiative that sought to overturn the Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1963. Proposition 14 passed by a wide margin—65% to 35%. There were 5,861,851 individual ballots cast for Proposition 17—an anti-featherbedding initiative, which passed with 60% of the vote.

In 1972, there were no statewide races. Thus, my gauge for partisanship in the California electorate in 1972 is the presidential contest between Richard Nixon (R) and George McGovern (D). There were 7,763,906 ballots cast for president. President Nixon won California with 55.8% of the popular vote to McGovern’s 44.2%. In 1972, there were two ballot propositions of interest. The first was the anti-busing proposal that would ban busing in the state (Proposition 21). There were 7,541,312 ballots cast for Proposition 21. Proposition 21 passed by a margin of 61% to 39%. The second was a New Deal initiative that would make certain types of worker activity, namely, strikes and picketing, illegal. There were 7,693,356 ballots cast for Proposition 22. Proposition 22 was defeated by a wide margin of 58% to 42%. I created a dataset with the precinct-level vote totals for all of the above races in order to determine the partisan rates of support for the ballot propositions in the California electorate.

Analysis of Findings: Republican Consistency and Democratic Realignment

When examining the partisan composition of the Proposition 14 vote, a familiar pattern emerges—Republicans overwhelmingly supported repealing the Rumford fair housing law, while Democrats were divided in their vote. Ninety-two percent of Republicans and 47% of
Democrats approved of Proposition 14 (see Table 5.1). The absolute levels of conservatism and thus the partisan divide on Proposition 14 (1964) looked identical to the economic civil rights propositions—Proposition 11 (1946) and 14 (1948). In all three cases, Republican conservatism was over 88% and Democratic opposition was between 46% and 50%.

To gain insight into whether or not the partisan divide on these propositions was interest-based, I compared the rates of conservatism in precincts in counties with a larger black presence to those precincts with virtually no African Americans. As Table 5.2 shows, there was little difference across the two sets of precincts. While conservatism increased slightly (3-percentage points for both parties) in precincts with higher levels of African Americans, there was no strong evidence to suggest an interest-driven racial realignment. To pose such an argument, I should have observed a much larger difference. That is, voters in homogenous precincts, unlikely to face the prospect of a potential African American neighbor, should have been significantly less conservative than those who lived in closer proximity to blacks. For the latter set of precincts, an increase in conservatism on fair housing would be expected if Californians were voting based on their self-interest. Voters in precincts with a higher percentage of African Americans should have been more conservative than their counterparts in homogenous precincts since they would be more likely to face neighborhood integration if fair housing was maintained in the state.

On Proposition 17, the 1964 New Deal proposal, 92% of Republicans and 38% of Democrats voted in support of banning featherbedding (see Table 5.1). Proposition 17 would strengthen the state’s anti-featherbedding law first approved by voters in 1948 (Proposition 3).
Table 5.1. *Goodman’s Regression Coefficients and King’s Ecological Inference Estimates for Conservative Support for Propositions 14 and 17, 1964*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Republican Voters</th>
<th>Democratic Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>14 (1964)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman’s Coef.</td>
<td>100% (82.3-98.7)</td>
<td>38.8% (28.5-46.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological Est.</td>
<td>91.9% (91.0-99.4)</td>
<td>47.2% (39.1-51.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>17 (1964)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman’s Coef.</td>
<td>93.4% (84.1-99.4)</td>
<td>28.1% (0-49.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological Est.</td>
<td>92.1% (90.4-95.1)</td>
<td>37.5% (0-45.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This table also includes Goodman’s coefficients as a measure of robustness.
Table 5.2. Ecological inference results for Proposition 14 (1964)—African American Population. Rates of support for the conservative position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 14 – All Precincts</th>
<th>≥ 5% Black Precincts*</th>
<th>≤ 0.01% Black Precincts**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GOP Voters</td>
<td>Dem Voters</td>
<td>GOP Voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91.9%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>95.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The above results use the presidential race between Goldwater (R) and Johnson (D). I also ran the analysis for the Senate race between Murphy (R) and Salinger (D). In more heterogeneous counties, 93.3% of Murphy voters and 38.5% of Salinger supporters voted in favor of Proposition 14. In less heterogeneous counties, 97.6% of Murphy and 48.7% of Salinger voters supported Proposition 14.


*Fresno (5%), Kings (5%), San Joaquin (5%), Kern (6%), Contra Costa (6%) Merced (6%), Madera (7%), Los Angeles (8%), Solano (9%), San Francisco (10%), Alameda (12%), for a total of 17,596 precincts

**Del Norte, El Dorado, Glenn, Humboldt, Inyo, Lake, Mendocino, Mono, Nevada, Orange, San Benito, Sierra, (0%); Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Mariposa, Modoc, Napa, Placer, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Shasta, Sonoma, Stanislaus, Sutter, Tuolumne, Yolo (0.01%), for a total of 5,712 precincts.
Whereas Proposition 3 only sought to ban featherbedding in the hiring of railroad brakemen, Proposition 17 was more comprehensive. It would abolish provisions on crews required for freight, mixed, or work trains. It also prevented featherbedding with regard to firemen on trains.\textsuperscript{474} As with Proposition 3, if adhering to a New Deal ideology, Republicans should have supported Proposition 17 and Democrats should have opposed it.

The battle lines on Proposition 17 were clearly drawn: the Republican Central Committee endorsed Proposition 17, claiming that it would eliminate “wasteful featherbedding, which needlessly adds millions of dollars annually to the cost of goods and food purchased by our people.”\textsuperscript{475} Furthermore, proponents of Proposition 17 argued that firemen should be removed from trains because their jobs were “superfluous,” given the arrival of diesel engines.\textsuperscript{476} Unlike in 1948, when unions and Democratic politicians were ambiguous on the featherbedding ban (Proposition 3), there was a strong response on the left. Democratic leaders, such as Paul Posner, the Chairman of the Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee, denounced Proposition 17 as “inequitable and undesirable legislation.”\textsuperscript{477} Railroad workers claimed that the minimum crew laws were necessary in California, with “more miles of mountainous terrain” than smaller states. Given the expanse of the state, railroad crews needed to be manned by more workers to divide the work.\textsuperscript{478} Railroad unions, in particular, were vocal opponents of Proposition 17, as they were determined to protect their jobs.\textsuperscript{479}

The key finding in the 1964 analysis is that the electorate was, as it had been in 1948, still largely divided on New Deal issues, with a 54-percentage point gap separating the parties’

\textsuperscript{476} Allswang, The Initiative and Referendum in California, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{477} “Democratic Chief Hits Proposition 17,” Los Angeles Times, October 22, 1964, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{479} Allswang, The Initiative and Referendum in California, p. 84.
voters. Republican voters remained consistently conservative across New Deal and race issues. The rate of support for Propositions 14 and 17 in 1964 for Republicans was identical at 92%. However, Democratic voters saw a jump in conservatism from New Deal to civil rights issues, revealing the tension between economic and racial ideology within the Democratic base. Only 37.5% of Democrats voted in favor of Proposition 17. The percentage of conservative support among Democrats jumps to 47.2% on Proposition 14. Another key finding is that the Democratic base was almost evenly divided on Proposition 14 in 1964, as it had been on Proposition 11 (1946) and Proposition 14 (1948). The pattern of division among Democratic voters is important because it reveals that the 1964 presidential election, while a critical moment, was not enough to break the Democratic coalition. That is, many race conservatives were still liberal on labor issues, as indicated by the low level of support for Proposition 17.

Eight years after the vote on Proposition 14, the anti-busing initiative (Proposition 21) appeared on the California ballot. In addition to Proposition 21, Proposition 22 was also on the 1972 ballot. Examining Proposition 22 allows me to compare behavior on a racialized initiative to a New Deal proposal to assess if preferences on busing aligned with economic beliefs. Proposition 22 sought to ban certain union practices, like secondary boycotts. Unlike the anti-featherbedding initiatives—Proposition 3 (1948) and Proposition 17 (1964)—Proposition 22 was struck down by California voters. With Propositions 3 and 17, voters were ready to approve bans on featherbedding, as many saw it as an abuse of union power at the expense of the employer who, because of union-negotiated contracts, had to hire more workers than was necessary to complete a task. However, while some voters perceived unions as overreaching at times, they could not bring themselves to outlaw common labor practices, including secondary boycotting and picketing, as they were viewed by many as fundamental worker rights.
While some Californians reasoned that, by outlawing certain union activities, produce and meat prices would stay low, the more compelling argument came from the opposition that effectively framed the issue not only as a workers’ rights issue but a human rights issue. One farm worker wrote that the passage of Proposition 22 would allow ranchers to exploit farm workers. He rightly predicted that voters would not stand for this “flagrant violation of human rights.” Even conservatives reasoned that, while some clauses of Proposition 22 were “tempting,” it should nevertheless be defeated. The conservative Pasadena Star-News claimed that while it strongly backed the main philosophy of Proposition 22—including banning secondary boycotts—Proposition 22 was “too all-encompassing and too tight a measure.” It thus urged readers to vote no.

Proposition 22 provides an interesting comparison for the antibusing initiative. It cannot be classified as a traditional New Deal cleavage issue, as even conservatives saw it as too anti-labor. Therefore, I expected the partisan division on this economic issue to be more muted than on previous featherbedding initiatives.

Not much changed in 1972 with regard to Republican conservatism on the racialized proposition. As with the previous civil rights ballot initiatives, California Republicans overwhelmingly supported the antibusing ban, at a rate of 85%. Democrats, however, compared to their split responses to the previous racialized initiatives—Proposition 11 (1946), Proposition 14 (1948), and Proposition 14 (1964)—were more liberal on Proposition 21, with only 29% of Democrats supporting the antibusing measure (see Table 5.3). This is a particularly curious finding—why were Democrats less conservative on an antibusing measure that, unlike the previous racialized initiatives—removed New Deal considerations? We would expect that on a race issue, like busing that did not have a New Deal component, conservatism would increase.

Table 5.3. *Goodman’s Regression Coefficients and King’s Ecological Inference Estimates for Conservative Support for Propositions 21 and 22*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 21 (1972)</th>
<th>Republican Voters</th>
<th>Democratic Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Yes</td>
<td>(80% c.i.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman’s Coef.</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
<td>(79.7-97.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological Est.</td>
<td>84.8%</td>
<td>(86.1-98.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 22 (1972)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Yes</td>
<td>(80% c.i.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman’s Coef.</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>(48.7-63.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological Est.</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>(50.5-66.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* This table also includes Goodman’s coefficients as a measure of robustness.
relative to the economic civil rights propositions that might have constrained some race
conservative Democrats to vote in line with elected officials who were supporting issues like
FEPC and fair housing in previous decades.

Proposition 21, unlike previous integration battles waged during the *Brown* era in the
1950s, was not simply a school integration issue. It sought to stop court-ordered busing that
brought black students into neighborhoods with a small or non-existent minority population. It
was the issue that epitomized the post-1964 civil rights era. On such issues that forced
integration on white Americans, the electorate displayed an increased level of partisanship,
relative to other civil rights proposals. It was the last proposition examined here—Proposition
21—that revealed the largest partisan divide in the California electorate—56-percentage points.

Was this partisanship isolated to those voters with an interest in the issue? In the case of
Proposition 21, it was harder to distinguish who would have a vested interest in seeing the ballot
measure pass, as voters in both homogenous and heterogeneous precincts could see minority
students bused into their local public schools. However, if the measure failed, those who would
be the most affected by court-mandated busing would be communities that had a small African
American population and thus not highly integrated. Voters in racially diverse precincts should
be less conservative since they were more accustomed to interacting with minorities.
Observing partisan behavior on Proposition 21 across racially diverse and racially homogenous
precincts reveals very little variation. Table 5.4 shows that precincts with a larger number of
black residents were identical in their partisan pattern of support—85% of Republicans and 29%
of Democrats in heterogeneous precincts opposed Proposition 21. In homogenous white
precincts, Republicans opposed busing at a rate of 84%, and Democrats voted against
Proposition 21 at a rate of 33%. The lack of difference in partisanship across the two sets of
Table 5.4. Ecological Inference Results for Proposition 21 (1972)—African American Population. Rates of support for the conservative position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 21 – All Precincts</th>
<th>≥ 5% Black Precincts*</th>
<th>≤ 0.01% Black Precincts**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GOP Voters</td>
<td>Dem Voters</td>
<td>GOP Voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84.8%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Fresno (5%), Kings (5%), San Joaquin (5%), Kern (6%), Contra Costa (6%) Merced (6%), Madera (7%), Los Angeles (8%), Solano (9%), San Francisco (10%), Alameda (12%) for a total of 12,589 precincts.

**Del Norte, El Dorado, Glenn, Humboldt, Inyo, Lake, Mendocino, Mono, Nevada, Orange, San Benito, Sierra, (0%); Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Mariposa, Modoc, Napa, Placer, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Shasta, Sonoma, Stanislaus, Sutter, Tuolumne, Yolo (0.01%), for a total of 5,437 precincts.
precincts suggests that busing was not entirely an interest-based issue. Regardless of whether or not voters would be forced to adapt to a changing racial composition in their children’s schools, the partisan division on busing remained constant. I argue that, rather than voting on interests, Californians were aligning with the national parties’ newly formed ideologies on race that had emerged in 1964. Thus, by the 1970s, race had become the primary dimension, replacing New Deal issues, on which voters would consider policy.

The ballot proposition findings also suggest that voters were responding separately to Propositions 21 and 22 in 1972. For the first time, Republicans did not vote similarly on New Deal and racialized propositions. On the previous racialized propositions, Republican conservatism ranged between 88% and 94%. On the previous two New Deal propositions, 3 (1948) and 17 (1964), Republican conservatism was 85% and 92%, respectively. However, in 1972, conservatism was significantly lower on Proposition 22—63% than on Proposition 21—85%. While the lower rate of conservatism on Proposition 22 might be attributed to the lack of traditional conservative support for outlawing secondary boycotts and picketing, it also suggests that Republican voters were no longer defined or constrained by anti-New Deal beliefs when voting on race issues.

By the time forced integration issues emerged in the late 1960s, the Republican Party transitioned from the party opposing economic civil rights based on ideological considerations to the party that accepted and openly adopted a strategy that would attract race conservative Democrats into the party fold. These race conservatives, who were former Democrats, also likely contributed to the decline in conservatism on Proposition 22. Their qualms with the Democratic Party were driven by the party’s increased race liberalism, not the party’s economic
beliefs and support of labor. Thus, when these race conservatives leave the Democratic Party, they would temper the Republican Party’s economic conservatism significantly.

In 1972, Democrats, for the first time, displayed liberalism on both a New Deal and a racialized issue. On Proposition 22, Democratic conservatism was low—just 15%—revealing that the party was still the home of economic liberalism in the 1970s. Thus, even with a decline in Republican conservatism on this labor issue, partisanship still remained high on the New Deal initiative—48-percentage points. In addition to a strong display of liberalism on the labor proposition, Democratic voters portrayed liberal preferences on race—a noticeable break from the divided support for FEPC and fair housing in the 1940s and 1960s. On these issues, Democratic conservatism averaged 47-percentage points. In 1972, however, Democratic conservatism dropped to 29%, while Republican conservatism remained high at 85%. This created the largest partisan divide on all racialized initiatives—56-percentage points. The difference in partisanship can be seen in Figure 5.1, which depicts scatter plots for the 1964 and 1972 ballot propositions. By comparing Propositions 14 and 21—the racialized initiatives—there is less of a concentration in the middle of the plot, and a more even distribution on the 1972 initiatives, demonstrating a more polarized electorate than was evident in 1964. The final ballot proposition in this analysis thus reveals the largest partisan separation on all civil rights initiatives but more importantly, it shows California Democrats decreasing in their conservatism on race issues—a break from the previous pattern of a divided Democratic base established on the 1940s racialized initiatives.
Figure 5.1. Scatter Plots of Conservative Support—Propositions 14 and 17 (1964) and Propositions 21 and 22 (1972)

Note: Scatter plots were created using R.
The movement of race conservative Democrats into the Republican Party was not isolated to California. Nationally, this trend revealed itself beginning with the 1964 Goldwater campaign. Richard Nixon in 1968 and Ronald Reagan in 1976 (more so than in 1980) would adopt and strengthen Goldwater’s racialized rhetoric. These appeals to race conservatives across the country cemented the Republican Party elites’ turn to the right, attracting the remaining race conservatives into the Republican fold.

Barry Goldwater, California Conservatives, and the Cultivation of White Backlash

*The Goldwaterites argue with passion that only Barry Goldwater could defeat [the Democrats]. Their reasoning is simple. The industrial East is lost anyway...so is the northern Negro vote, overwhelmingly Democratic. Therefore, in Goldwater’s words, the Republicans should “stop trying to outbid the Democrats for the Negro vote.” Again in his words, the Republicans should “go hunting where the ducks are.” The ducks are in the electoral votes of the West, the Middle West, and the South. — Columnist Stewart Alsop*

United States Senator from Arizona, Barry Goldwater, became the darling of conservatives after his 1964 presidential bid. He was the “first free-market, antistatist politician to win that post since Calvin Coolidge in 1924.” Goldwater was also opposed to civil rights when government intervention was involved. Unlike Strom Thurmond in 1948 and George Wallace in 1964—both of whom pushed a segregationist platform—Goldwater’s rhetoric against civil rights was not segregationist or blatantly racist, but rather, Goldwater used coded language to appeal to both white bigots and economic conservatives. Goldwater spoke about the overreaching Federal Government, and the need to preserve American values in order to appeal to the white backlash vote. In a speech given in Columbus, Georgia during the primary,

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483 In 1980, Reagan was silent on civil rights. In 1984, Reagan relegated race as just another social issue, which was less important than his three goals: cutting taxes, increasing military spending, and reducing the size of government expenditures. Mayer, *Running on Race*, p. 175.
Goldwater warned of the dangers of “centralization,” which has caused a “distinct cultural loss.” He stated, “…the structure of the federal system, with its fifty separate state units, has long permitted this nation to nourish local differences, even local cultures.” Goldwater also spoke to whites’ fear of African Americans. In a speech at Madison Square Garden in New York City, he declared:

Where are the states which today are witnessing the most violence? I sadly remind you that they are the very states where there is the most talk about brotherhood and the very least opportunity for achieving it. I sadly remind you that we are seeing violence today in those very states which are proving that new laws alone are not the answer. There are too many of the old laws which aren’t even working.486

Goldwater’s appeal to whites in and out of the South helped him win key primaries. His strong showing in the Ohio Primary convinced the state’s Governor, John Rhodes, that the backlash strategy would work in the North. Rhodes then became an avid Goldwater supporter.487

Goldwater’s appeal was strong not only in the South but also in the West, particularly in California. Goldwater appealed to California conservatives for two key reasons: his strong anti-communist, anti-containment views and his “rugged individualism,” which manifested itself as a disdain for New Deal regulation and costly social programs. He gained the support of former gubernatorial candidate William Knowland, who became his campaign manager in California, and the conservatives within the state party that pushed for a Knowland victory in 1958.488

According to Schoenwald, Goldwater’s popularity in California “created grave problems for Republicans of the Eisenhower tradition.” After the “step-by-step capture of the state GOP organizations,” moderates became increasingly marginalized in 1964 and thereafter.489

487 Mayer, Running on Race, p. 55.
489 Schoenwald, A Time for Choosing, pp. 139-140.
Because of the dedicated work of conservatives at the grassroots, Goldwater won over 50% of the California primary vote in June, which was enough momentum for him to win the nomination.\textsuperscript{490} Goldwater, well aware of the need to win California’s 86 delegates to ensure the party’s nomination, made a concerted effort to appeal to California Republicans. He focused particularly on southern California, where 40% of the state’s Republicans lived. Goldwater found widespread support among the party’s rank-and-file in Orange and Los Angeles counties, and was thus able to win the Republican nomination because of the “volunteer army” of conservatives that had mobilized in the southland.\textsuperscript{491} Conservative activists played a pivotal role in Goldwater’s California win by “working long hours for weeks on end, distributing campaign pamphlets and registering new voters, sponsoring boisterous campaign rallies and raising money, walking precincts, and manning phone banks, crucial political activity that helped the candidate eke out a narrow three percentage point victory” over his main opponent, the progressive Governor from New York—Nelson Rockefeller.\textsuperscript{492} For the first time since Knowland’s campaign, California conservatives found a kindred spirit in Goldwater, and actively worked at the grassroots to secure the nomination for him.

\textit{The Critical Moment of 1964}

In order to understand the impact of the 1964 presidential election on racial realignment, I briefly discuss Johnson and Goldwater, and how they came to lead their party in divergent directions on civil rights. Their positions were controversial within their own parties, which makes their leadership all the more significant, since racial realignment was not entirely the

\textsuperscript{491} McGirr, \textit{Suburban Warriors}, p. 112.
\textsuperscript{492} Dallek, \textit{The Right Moment}, p. 62.
product of a gradual process. Goldwater and Johnson helped to hasten the shift on race that had been evolving within the state parties and in the electorate.

Lyndon B. Johnson, though he signed the most sweeping civil rights legislation into law, was not always a consistent supporter of civil rights. Johnson’s race views shifted throughout his tenure in the Senate from conservative to liberal. Early in his career, he made anti-integration comments to his constituents. Once he became Senate Majority Leader, however, his segregationist position began to change. In 1956, he was one of two southern senators to refuse to sign the Southern Manifesto against desegregation. In 1957, he stewarded the Civil Rights Act through Congress, doing what no northerner could do—work with southern representatives to garner enough votes to pass the bill. Johnson’s shift was strategic—he believed that the Republican Party would make strides with African American voters if Democrats did not move on the voting issue. Further, with national aspirations, Johnson reasoned that if he wanted to become the head of the national party, he must move away from the segregationist views that he was able to hold while serving his constituency in Texas. Therefore, his changing opinion on civil rights was a risky calculation and not widely accepted, particularly in the South.

Barry Goldwater, a Senate colleague of Johnson’s in the 1950s, saw an opening to “go hunting where the ducks are” in the early 1960s. With Johnson and Democrats outside of the South pushing for a more encompassing civil rights bill, Goldwater capitalized on the opportunity to appeal to disaffected southern white Democrats, who loathed the new direction their party was taking with regard to race. Though, early in his career, Goldwater showed signs

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493 Mayer, Running on Race, p. 53.
494 Mayer, Running on Race, p. 44.
of progressivism on race issues, he would make a conscientious move for the southern vote by appealing to their racist views. As noted by one biographer, “Throughout his life, he would accommodate the bigotry of others while personally distancing himself from it.” Goldwater was thereby able to proffer policies that would appeal to racist sentiments in the South, though he, himself, did not necessarily subscribe to the same racist attitudes.

After Richard Nixon’s defeat in the 1960 presidential race, Goldwater began to endorse a presidential campaign strategy that would appeal to southern white Democrats. He believed that Nixon lost the race because he was too moderate on civil rights. In a speech given in Georgia, Goldwater suggested that the party abandon the black vote, stating, “We ought to forget the big cities. We can’t out-promise the Democrats…I would like to see our party back up on school integration. The Supreme Court decision is not the supreme law of the land.” Goldwater began planting the seeds of race conservatism that would be the foundation of his 1964 presidential bid. His rhetoric throughout the campaign made appeals to white racism. The Goldwater campaign combined a law and order theme in an attempt to undermine the Civil

495 As a businessman leader and National Guard pilot, Goldwater attempted to integrate those institutions. He worked throughout Arizona, his home state, for better race relations and was a member of the local NAACP chapter for four years. Edwards, Goldwater, p. 246.
496 Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, p. 34.
497 In his book, Goldwater (1960) stated that he believed “we are all equal in the eyes of God.” Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative, p. 33.
498 The Nixon campaign sent mixed messages on race issues. His vice presidential candidate, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., was outspoken in favor of integration. Nixon agreed to include a strong, 10-paragraph civil rights plank in the Republican platform that supported integration. It also pointed out that as, Vice President, Nixon chaired the President’s Committee on Government Contracts that had become “an impressive force for the elimination of discriminatory employment practices of private companies that do business with the government.” This statement was an endorsement of economic civil rights—FEPC—demonstrating Nixon’s support for race liberal policies. Despite a pro-civil rights vice presidential running mate and a race liberal platform, Nixon straddled the race line by making some appeals to disaffected white Democrats. During a trip to Georgia in which he received an overwhelming amount of white support, Nixon decided that he had a chance to steal southern electoral votes away from the Democrats. Nixon would then include states’ rights rhetoric that spoke to race conservatives in his speeches in the South. Even though Nixon would move away from civil rights when in the South, many in the African American community saw the Republicans as more attractive than Democrats in 1960. One black publisher in Detroit compared the tickets by stating, “The Nixon-Lodge ticket is the more attractive one on civil rights than the Republicans have ever put up and many Negroes feel that Lyndon Johnson is weak on civil rights.” Mayer, Running on Race, pp. 31-32.
499 Mayer, Running on Race, pp. 45-46.
Rights Act. In a speech given on the campaign trail, Goldwater stated, “The moral fiber of the American people is beset by rot and decay…It is on our streets that we see the final, terrible proof of a sickness which not all the social theories of a thousand social experiments has even begun to touch. Crime grows faster than population, while those who break the law are accorded more consideration than those who try to enforce the law.”Future Republican presidential candidates Nixon and Reagan would also adopt the law and order theme over the next two decades to attract racially and socially conservative white support.

At times, Goldwater would be more direct in his attempts to win southern votes. When discussing the Civil Rights Act and his reasons for rejecting it, he said, “The fundamental issue of our day—the new area into which the act of 1964 dangerously treads—is the issue of unfair discrimination in the private affairs of men…Our aim, as I understand it, is neither to establish a segregated society nor an integrated society. Our aim is to preserve freedom.” He gained the approval of one of the first notable Democratic leaders to turn Republican—Strom Thurmond. Thurmond affirmed these views and spoke for white southern Democrats when he claimed, “The Democratic Party has rammed through Congress unconstitutional, impractical, unworkable, and oppressive legislation which invades inalienable personal and property rights and has encouraged lawless, civil unrest, and mob actions.” Goldwater’s racially charged speeches rallied race conservative Democrats who found the Civil Rights Act an affront to their way of life and therefore would not support Johnson in the election.

At the same time that Goldwater was appealing to the southern white vote, he was also speaking directly to traditional conservatives who, though not racist, could not support economic civil rights, like FEPC, because of their disdain for federal intervention in the private sector.

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During the Senate debate on the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Goldwater took specific aim at Titles II and VII of the proposed bill. Title II outlawed discrimination in any public accommodations involved in interstate commerce even if privately owned, like hotels, restaurants, and theaters. Title VII prohibited employer discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin. In his opposition, Goldwater declared,

I am unalterably opposed to discrimination of any sort. I believe that, though the problem is fundamentally one of the heart, some law can help’ but not law that embodies features like these, provisions which fly in the face of the Constitution…If my vote is misconstrued, let it be, and let me suffer the consequences. My concern extends beyond any single group in our society. My concern is for the entire nation, for the freedom of all who live in it, and for all who were born in it.

He claimed that the debate over the bill went beyond race. By casting his vote against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Goldwater did not consider himself a racist, but rather a defender of the people from the “central power of Washington” and the Tenth Amendment. According to Goldwater, states should be left to decide to what extent civil rights should be implemented, not the national government.\(^{503}\)

Prior to the general election, both Johnson and Goldwater faced primary challengers that called their respective race views into question. Johnson was confronted by George Wallace, Governor of Alabama, whose promise of “segregation today, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever” rallied southern Democrats in 1964. Wallace entered several primaries, not with the intent of winning, since primary victories were not yet a prerequisite to win the nomination,\(^{504}\) but rather to push Johnson away from race liberalism. Despite skepticism that he would not perform well in the North, Wallace was able to win over 30% of the party’s primary voters in


\(^{504}\) After the 1968 Democratic Convention in which party insiders nominated Hubert Humphrey who had not entered a single primary election over Eugene McCarthy who appealed to voters in several primaries, the McGovern-Fraser Commission recommended that presidential candidates be selected by voters, not party leaders. For the significance of the McGovern-Fraser reforms, see Cohen et al. *The Party Decides*. 233
Indiana and Wisconsin. He did even better in Maryland, with 43% of the Democratic primary vote.\(^{505}\) Despite the momentum received from his showing in Maryland—some even claimed that his loss was the result of “creative vote totals” from Baltimore,\(^{506}\)—Wallace soon dropped out of the Democratic race when Barry Goldwater emerged as the Republican Party’s frontrunner.\(^{507}\)

Despite support for Wallace in the rank-and-file, Johnson did not balk on his position on civil rights. Rather, he appeared emboldened by Wallace’s challenge; he went to Georgia and spoke against southern racism and during the primaries, Johnson announced his plans for a “Great Society” of equality and opportunity. The president continued to pressure Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act, and refused to compromise to appease southern Democrats.\(^{508}\) In the end, he did not need to moderate—a coalition of non-southern Democrats and almost all Republicans defeated a filibuster by southern Democrats in the Senate on June 10, 1964. In July, President Johnson signed the bill into law.

The Civil Rights Act sharpened Goldwater’s stance on civil rights, and defined the internal battle between Republican conservatives and moderates. Goldwater opposed the bill, going against the majority of his party in Congress and the advice of top Republican Party leaders. The moderates seeking the Republican nomination in 1964—Nelson Rockefeller, George Romney, and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.—sought to unseat Goldwater by using the vote against the popular bill against him. Rockefeller, in particular, was the most ardent of supporters

\(^{505}\) President Johnson did not run in every primary election. Rather, “favorite sons” in some states would run in his place upon his request. Matthew Welsh of Indiana, John Reynolds of Wisconsin, and Daniel Brewster ran against Wallace in their respective state’s primary. In Maryland, Brewster beat Wallace by a margin of 53% to 43%. Wallace won 15 of 23 counties and blamed the loss on “the nigger bloc vote,” since an unusually high number of African Americans turned out to vote for Brewster. Carter, *The Politics of Rage*, p. 215; Lesher, *George Wallace*, pp. 303-304.


\(^{507}\) Wallace claimed that he achieved his goal of bringing states’ rights issues to the attention of both parties. Mayer, *Running on Race*, p. 56.

for civil rights in either party and even gave financial support to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Rockefeller deemed that Goldwater’s strategy to appeal to southern whites represented bad morals and unwise politics. Yet, he and his competitors could not unite behind one candidate, thus dividing moderate support and effectively giving the nomination to Goldwater. The lack of one central competitor and his sweep of southern delegates allowed Goldwater to enter the Republican National Convention as the likely nominee.

By fighting off opponents in their parties—Wallace representing race conservatives in the Democratic Party and race moderates in the Republican Party like Rockefeller and Romney—Johnson and Goldwater pushed their parties to adopt polarizing race positions in 1964. The signing of the Civil Rights Act, in addition to Johnson’s refusal to cater to race conservative Democrats during the campaign, and Goldwater’s strategy that was predicated on winning these disaffected voters, prodded the national parties to switch their longstanding race views. Goldwater’s success in overcoming the moderate wing ensured that the Republican Party would adopt a racially conservative platform that would further his goals of attracting Democrats in the South. For his part, Johnson’s actions in favor of civil rights alienated many white voters across the country, sparking discontent that would eventually force race conservatives out of the Democratic Party. Thus, in 1964, we see the beginning of a push-pull dynamic: Democratic elites—by adopting race liberal policies—pushed race conservatives away while Republican elites, in their move to the right on race, pulled those race conservatives into their party.

Johnson and Goldwater’s leadership was pivotal in polarizing the national parties on race issues. One way to examine this switch in the Democratic Party could be seen through the shift to the left on race in the national party platforms over time. In 1948, both parties made similar

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510 Mayer, Running on Race, p. 54.
statements on civil rights, but the Republican Party reiterated its commitment to a national FEPC, whereas the Democrats gave no specific policy proposals. Republicans continued to include FEPC in their 1952 platform, as did the Democrats for the first time. Both parties referred to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) in 1956, proclaiming that the courts should ensure desegregation but force should not be used.\textsuperscript{511} Once again, in 1960, the parties’ declarations were quite similar. The parties included statements on non-discriminatory public housing, fair employment, and school desegregation.\textsuperscript{512} It was in 1964 that the party platforms adopted divergent policies. The Democrats reaffirmed their commitment to the Civil Rights Act, which was signed into law a month before the Democratic National Convention. More importantly, however, was their support for the administration of “federally-assisted programs.” Thus, even though Republicans committed themselves to the principles of the Civil Rights Act in the 1964 platform, they made sure to state that the “elimination of any such discrimination is a matter of heart, conscience, and education,” implying that federal intervention to eradicate racial discrimination was misguided.\textsuperscript{513} This statement was very much in line with Goldwater’s anti-statist conservatism that required Republicans to move away from the center on race. Goldwater and his principles were the


\textsuperscript{513} Despite attempts by Rockefeller and other Republican moderates to include a strong civil rights plank in the party’s platform, the platform committee, comprised of conservatives, aligned with the Goldwater campaign. Originally, as seen in one of the last drafts of the platform, conservatives wanted to outright state their opposition to the emerging issues of affirmative action and busing. In this draft, it was stated that a Republican administration “would oppose the shifting of jobs on the basis of arbitrary racial quotas, and also would oppose the abandonment of neighborhood schools, to meet racial quotas, or Federal pressure to force local authorities to bar children from attending the school nearest their home.” Mayer, Running on Race, p. 56. Though it did not make it into the final draft of the platform, the acknowledgement of affirmative action and busing by conservatives in 1964 foreshadowed the subsequent civil rights battles that would be fought in the late 1960s and 1970s.
The year 1964 was a standout year in twentieth century American history because of the Civil Rights Act, which was passed with bipartisan support in Congress. When signing the bill into law, which liberals at the state level had been clamoring for since the end of World War II, President Lyndon B. Johnson, though “euphoric” about its passage, acknowledged, “…we just delivered the South to the Republican party for a long time to come.” He signed the Civil Rights Act in July of an election year—a decision that would cost him five of the deep southern states in the Electoral College, which had voted for Democratic candidates in every presidential election since Reconstruction.

Johnson’s opponent, Republican nominee Barry Goldwater, U.S. Senator from Arizona, derided the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Though he supported voting rights and voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Goldwater would secure the Republican nomination by appealing to a states’ rights argument that opposed integration. While Goldwater believed in equality for all men and thus could justify federal intervention to ensure that African Americans were not denied

514 Another important theme that emerged in the 1964 Republican Party platform was that of law and order. In 1968, lengthy discussions of lawlessness and cities in crisis replaced civil rights, which was not mentioned in the Republican platform, the first time in over three decades. The Democrats reaffirmed their commitment to Federal programs, including welfare, school lunch and food stamp programs. In 1972 and in 1976, the Democrats added to their liberal agenda on civil rights by supporting affirmative action at the university-level for minorities and women. And while Republicans proclaimed their support for affirmative action for women, no mention was made to extend it to minorities. Furthermore, Republicans irrevocably denounced busing as detrimental and unnecessary, which would be repeated again in the 1976 platform. While the Republican Party was the first to allude to civil rights in 1932, it would be the Democratic Party that would demonstrate a stronger commitment to civil rights by 1964. The distinct civil rights planks in 1964 could be easily attributed to the presidential candidates—Barry Goldwater and Lyndon B. Johnson—as Carmines and Stimson (1989) originally posited. Using party platforms as a measure of elite partisanship strongly suggests that partisans in the general public acted on civil rights well before the national parties and the presidential candidates who represented their parties’ platforms. “Presidential Party Platforms,” The American Presidency Project website, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php, Accessed January 18, 2014.

515 Moyers, Moyers on America, p. 167.

516 Mayer, Jeremy, Running on Race, p. 56.

the essential right to vote, he proffered a segregationist argument that hinged on allowing the states to determine to what extent, if any, they would enforce integration in public life, particularly in public schools. Goldwater wrote that there was no civil right for a student to attend the same school as white students, and that the Federal Government had no justification for which it could intervene in education. He then implored Congress to “help clarify the problem by proposing to the states a Constitutional amendment that would reaffirm the States’ exclusive jurisdiction in the field of education.” This amendment would “assert what is already provided unmistakably in the Constitution; but it would put the matter beyond any further question,” according to Goldwater.

Goldwater would engage not only with Johnson on civil rights, but would also take on the moderate members in his own party. Like William Knowland did in California six years previously, Goldwater would stage a conservative takeover of the Republican Party at the national level. Like Knowland, he would personally fail and not win his election. However, both succeeded in moving the party to the right. By capturing the Republican nominations for their respective races, Knowland and Goldwater opened up the party to Americans “who had never thought the GOP would welcome anyone except a Rockefeller.” Conservatism would permeate through the Republican Party at both the state and national levels, compelling legislators to adopt a unified party line against civil rights (See Figure 5.2).

518 In his book, Barry Goldwater (1960) states, “In the field of racial relations, there are some rights that are clearly protected by valid laws and are therefore “civil” rights. One of them is the right to vote. The Fifteenth Amendment provides that no one shall be denied the franchise on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.” Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative, p. 18.
519 At the same time Goldwater began to offer a race conservative strategy in 1960, he also criticized Robert Kennedy’s Justice Department for not prosecuting voting rights violations in the South. “At least up until the campaign season began, Goldwater ‘vehemently’ supported the electoral rights of blacks, as well as the constitutional amendment to eliminate the poll tax.” Mayer, Running on Race, p. 46.
520 Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative, p. 19.
521 Schoenwald, A Time for Choosing, p. 264.
Figure 5.2. The Role of William Knowland in the Rise of Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan

Rise of William Knowland as national Republican leader and presidential prospect

Relationship to factional politics within CA Republican Party (Prog/Mod/Cons)

Relationship to Taft wing of Republican Party and burgeoning national conservative movement

Decision to contest 1958 CA gubernatorial race

Decision to embrace right-to-work Proposition (Prop 18)

National white backlash to Dem civil rights/poverty programs

Democratic landslide in 1964 presidential election

1. Shattering defeat for Knowland (out of politics)

2. Shattering defeat for CA Republicans

3. Sweeping statewide victory for Democrats

Leaves CA Republican Party smaller and more homogeneous; On the defensive while Democrats pass liberal legislation

With unified control of CA gov’t, Dems pass sweeping civil rights laws in late 50s/early 60s (FEPC/Unruh and Hawkins Acts)

By 1970s, Reagan is positioned to ride white backlash against national Dem civil rights program

Republican elites and rank-and-file unified on civil rights issues by 1954

A party capable of nominating a conservative like Ronald Reagan in 1966

Democratic civil rights program sow seeds of white backlash in CA

Fuels rise of Ronald Reagan to CA governorship
The central figure that would elevate conservatism, both in California and nationally, would be Ronald Reagan. Reagan would be more successful than both Knowland and Goldwater for two primary reasons: 1) his charismatic personality, which both Knowland and Goldwater lacked, and 2) the context in which he was seeking election. Reagan was able to capitalize on the heightened discontent over a liberal administration’s policies, in particular, welfare spending. Further, voters perceived that the Democrats in office could no longer be trusted to handle the growing racial tension and crime that pervaded the cities. Taken together, Reagan was able to package anti-civil rights rhetoric with traditional conservative principles of limited government intervention to appeal to racially conservative white voters.

**Ronald Reagan Emerges: The Result of White Backlash in California**

The common actor across both California and national politics who played a pivotal role in transforming the Republican Party into the home of race conservatism was Ronald Reagan. Reagan’s impact on history and partisan politics has been well documented. He was the epitome of the new conservatism that elevated racial and social conservatism to prominence within the party. He also attracted “Reagan Democrats”—blue-collar whites—into the Republican fold in large numbers. Reagan’s success nationally replicated his success in California when he ran for governor in 1966. In both instances, Reagan, despite being the conservative candidate to the right of his primary challengers, was able to enjoy electoral success by reaching across the aisle to disaffected white Democrats. These Democrats were having

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522 Wallison, Ronald Reagan; Hayward, The Age of Reagan; Troy, Morning in America; Diggins, Ronald Reagan; Cannon, President Reagan; Busch, Reagan’s Victory; Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make, chapter 8.
“second thoughts” about civil rights in the wake of urban riots that occurred between 1965 and 1968.\textsuperscript{523}

Reagan’s appeal reached a core part of the New Deal coalition, white workers, who had been decidedly Democratic since 1932. Many remained loyal Democrats while the party’s leaders advocated for race liberal policies. President Truman’s civil rights agenda and his executive order to desegregate the armed forces in 1948 did much to antagonize white southerners but were not as threatening to northern whites. The latter also supported President Johnson’s 1964 Civil Rights Act, as did many Republican elites and voters.\textsuperscript{524} Color-blind policies—like FEPC, in addition to desegregation of public spaces and the army—were non-threatening to northern whites whom did not live in the rigidly hierarchical Jim Crow South. Thus, allowing African Americans freedom of opportunity to enter a white workforce was not an action that broke northern whites’ allegiance to the Democratic Party.

However, a shift in the nature of civil rights issues—from the color-blind policies of the 1940s and 1950s to the more militant and forceful policies of the late 1960s and 1970s—would alter the composition of the Democratic base. These more color-conscious policies would include affirmative action and busing, which many white northerners refused to accept. While they could support equality of opportunity measures like FEPC, they would not endorse proposals that would force integration of northern schools via overreaching busing proposals or that would implement racial quotas that could take jobs away from qualified white Americans.

In addition to the changing nature of civil rights, white northerners grew increasingly fearful and distrustful of African Americans. Urban riots in cities like Los Angeles, Newark, and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{523} Cannon, \textit{Governor Reagan}, p. 150.
\item \textsuperscript{524} According to Karol, the Republican Party’s movement to the right on race was gradual. “…for a time after Goldwater’s failed candidacy many prominent moderate Republican politicians continued to strongly support civil rights…Examples included both Nelson Rockefeller and his brother, Arkansas Governor Winthrop Rockefeller, Senator Charles Percy of Illinois, Senator Jacob Javits of New York, and New York City Mayor John Lindsay.” Karol, \textit{Party Position Change}, p. 121.
\end{itemize}
Detroit allowed politicians to capitalize on this fear by running campaigns that heightened racial tension and white backlash against President Johnson’s Great Society.\textsuperscript{525} According to Mayer (2002),

The riots and the new black power movement changed minds about the Great Society. Democratic mayors complained to LBJ that tax money was going to groups that harassed the police and worked against the party…white Americans were sick of paying for new social programs…Many believed the vast increases in social spending had produced only crime and riots. Rational discussion of crime was impossible: ‘…a white, lower-middle-class citizen of Brooklyn or Chicago…doesn’t give a damn about statistics—he is afraid, and more significantly, his womenfolk are afraid.’\textsuperscript{526}

Nationally, Richard Nixon was the first to implement a backlash strategy that played on this fear of white voters in 1968.\textsuperscript{527} Running on a “law and order” platform, Nixon won against Democrat Hubert Humphrey, who was seen as soft on crime and the rioters.\textsuperscript{528}

In California, the embodiment of white backlash came in the person of Ronald Reagan. Reagan first found his political footing during his 1966 run for governor. The 1960s was an ideal time for a candidate to capitalize on white backlash in California. According to the U.S. Census, several California counties saw an increase from 1950 to 1960. Among the counties that saw the largest increase in African Americans were Alameda, Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Francisco, San Diego, and Solano counties (Table 5.5). Los Angeles and San Francisco saw the largest percentage-point increase in the African American population, from 5% to 8% and 5% to 10%, respectively. In Los Angeles, the African American population more

\textsuperscript{525} Mayer, \textit{Running on Race}, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{526} Mayer cites a White House memo from John P. Roche to President Johnson in 1967 that describes the animosity and fear that northern whites felt regarding African Americans. Mayer, \textit{Running on Race}, p. 72.
\textsuperscript{527} For a discussion of the role of race in the 1968 presidential campaign, see Mayer, \textit{Running on Race}, chapter 4. Mayer notes that backlash was born in the 1964 election and exploited by some in the Goldwater campaign. However, Goldwater himself did not exploit urban unrest and racial tension. Mayer, \textit{Running on Race}, p. 57. Rus Walton, Goldwater’s public relations director, tried to encourage the candidate to embrace white backlash by embracing a film titled \textit{Choice}. In the film, African Americans were depicted as happy to work on plantations and were portrayed as violent aggressors on city streets. Goldwater spoke against the film after watching it by stating “I’m not going to be made out to be a racist.” Schuparra, \textit{Triumph of the Right}, p. 107.
\textsuperscript{528} Humphrey made a big misstep when he called for more police training, suggesting that the police bore part of the responsibility for the race riots. According to Mayer, this was not a message that helped him win votes among whites who were concerned about law and order. Mayer, \textit{Running on Race}, p. 87.
Table 5.5. African American Population in California and Select Counties, 1950 and 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>4% (462,172)</td>
<td>6% (883,861)</td>
<td>2% (421,689)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alameda</td>
<td>10% (69,442)</td>
<td>12% (111,420)</td>
<td>2% (41,978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresno</td>
<td>4% (11,492)</td>
<td>5% (17,392)</td>
<td>1% (5,900)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kern</td>
<td>5% (12,530)</td>
<td>6% (16,740)</td>
<td>1% (4,210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>5% (217,881)</td>
<td>8% (461,546)</td>
<td>3% (243,665)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merced</td>
<td>4% (2,886)</td>
<td>6% (5,056)</td>
<td>2% (2,170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monterey</td>
<td>2% (2,721)</td>
<td>4% (7,918)</td>
<td>2% (5,197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside</td>
<td>3% (5,939)</td>
<td>4% (12,486)</td>
<td>1% (6,547)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento</td>
<td>3% (7,499)</td>
<td>4% (19,805)</td>
<td>1% (12,306)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Bernardino</td>
<td>2% (7,048)</td>
<td>3% (17,234)</td>
<td>1% (10,186)</td>
</tr>
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<td>San Diego</td>
<td>3% (17,030)</td>
<td>4% (39,397)</td>
<td>1% (22,367)</td>
</tr>
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<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>5% (43,502)</td>
<td>10% (74,383)</td>
<td>5% (30,881)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Joaquin</td>
<td>4% (7,565)</td>
<td>5% (11,684)</td>
<td>1% (4,119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Luis Obispo</td>
<td>0.01% (335)</td>
<td>2% (1,431)</td>
<td>2% (1,096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Mateo</td>
<td>1% (2,395)</td>
<td>2% (10,846)</td>
<td>1% (8,451)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>0% (196)</td>
<td>1% (520)</td>
<td>1% (324)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solano</td>
<td>6% (6,604)</td>
<td>9% (12,741)</td>
<td>3% (6,137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanislaus</td>
<td>0% (624)</td>
<td>1% (1,141)</td>
<td>1% (517)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutter</td>
<td>0% (91)</td>
<td>1% (193)</td>
<td>1% (102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuba</td>
<td>1% (222)</td>
<td>3% (967)</td>
<td>2% (745)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The first number in each of the rows in the 1950 and 1960 columns is the percentage of African Americans, taken by dividing the county’s total population by the number of African Americans. The number in parentheses is the raw total of African Americans in each county. The percentage-point increase is listed in the last column, in addition to the absolute increase in the African American population from 1950 to 1960.
than doubled from 217,881 in 1950 to 461,546 in 1960. In San Francisco, the population increased from 43,502 to 74,383. While the total population increased in all of the counties reported in Table 5.5, and thus there was a small percentage-point change from 1950 to 1960, the absolute increase in the African American population was substantial. In small counties like Merced, Stanislaus, and Sutter, the African American population doubled. Sacramento’s African American population more than doubled (7,499 to 19,805), as did San Diego’s (17,030 to 39,397). Alameda County also saw a substantial increase from 69,442 African Americans in 1950 to 111,420 in 1960. Finally, counties like San Luis Obispo, San Mateo, Santa Cruz, and Yuba had close to or more than a threefold increase in the African American population. The growing numbers of African Americans in California would allow Reagan to appeal to white voters who were growing uneasy with the changing racial makeup of their town, city, county, and state.

Against the backdrop of the 1965 Watts riots in Los Angeles, whites, even those who supported open housing in 1964, began to turn against the Democrats. In the aftermath of Watts, “the mood had changed…that bloody episode had claimed thirty-four lives and left many white Californians more concerned about racial violence.”\(^\text{529}\) When the former actor announced his candidacy, he addressed the fears of white Californians who saw crime and racial unrest rise in their state. Reagan stated, “Our city streets are jungle paths after dark, with more crimes of violence than New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania combined.”\(^\text{530}\) I used the U.S. Department of Justice’s website to corroborate this statement. When taking into account violent crimes per every 100,000 people, the statement is not wholly accurate. I found that, in fact,

\(^\text{529}\) Cannon, \textit{Governor Reagan}, p. 143.
\(^\text{530}\) Cannon, \textit{Governor Reagan}, p. 144; Schoenwald states that “his emphasis on law and order echoed much of Goldwater’s race-coded language, especially after the Watts riots of 1965.” Schoenwald, \textit{A Time for Choosing}, p. 209.
California’s violent crime rate (305.1 per every 100,000 people) in 1966 was less than the violent crime rate in New York (342.6 per every 100,000 people). However, as Graph 5.1 shows, California had a higher violent crime rate than Massachusetts and Pennsylvania combined (115.2 per every 100,000 people in Massachusetts and 131 per every 100,000 people in Pennsylvania). Furthermore, California residents saw a steady rise in crime from 1960 to 1966, making it a propitious time for a tough-on-crime conservative to run for the state’s highest office.

While running for governor, Reagan would run on a states’ rights platform, which was “code for resistance to racial integration.” Reagan’s conception of states’ rights adapted the southern usage to a northern, white backlash electorate. He spoke against President Johnson’s Great Society and federal intervention in civil rights. In a speech given in June 1966 to a National Press Club luncheon, Reagan stated that the Federal Government was trying to reach civil rights goals with “too much legislation” and too many “rules and regulations” that have not “accomplished what we’re trying to accomplish.” The belief in Federal Government overreach translated into opposition of FEPC and fair housing legislation. When asked about his position on economic civil rights, Reagan stated that he would not patronize a business that practiced discrimination but that he, and implicitly the government, could not tell that man “he can’t feel that way.” Once in office, Reagan also attacked the national government for using grants that dictated how states could use federal dollars. At the Lafayette Hotel in Long Beach,

531 Cannon, Governor Reagan, p. 139.

Violent Crime Rates From 1960-1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>PA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>232.7</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>97.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>234.8</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>104.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>241.2</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>265.6</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>123.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>282.2</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>142.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>305.1</td>
<td>115.2</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CA on April 1, 1967, Reagan said,

We will work…to make the state an effective bulwark between the people and an ever-encroaching Federal government. That government is best which remains closest to the people, but almost daily the Goliath that is the Federal government moves to gather more power unto itself and to minimize the functions of both the Congress and the States. [Two weeks ago] the President called the governors together to tell them that the Federal government wished to work more closely with the states in distributing Federal monies and Federal programs. This was obviously an attempt to minimize efforts in Congress to provide string-free money to the states. It is not enough for our Senators and Representatives to seek to pass legislation involving the several states, they must also work to insure that legislation does not infringe on the rights of the individual states and they must be wary lest they trade those rights for the Federal dollar, which after all, is merely what is left of the citizen’s dollar after it has been strained through the Washington bureaucracy.535

While Reagan himself recoiled at being labeled a racist,536 his states’ rights rhetoric was viewed as similar to southern segregationists who opposed the 1964 Civil Rights Act. According to the Los Angeles Sentinel, Reagan’s comments against federal laws that protected racial minorities were called into question. The Sentinel stated, “wherever laws are lacking, discrimination against Negroes is rampant and racial segregation is widespread. Is that what Mr. Reagan is trying to accomplish?”537

Reagan also emphasized a key theme present in the 1964 Proposition 14 campaign. In his argument against fair housing laws, Reagan insisted that housing discrimination did not exist, telling an audience, “There is no law saying the Negro has to live in Harlem or Watts…We all have the responsibility to work to end discrimination and insure equal opportunities for all…But I am opposed to trying to get this with legislation that violates basic tenets of individual

536 On March 6, 1966, at the National Negro Republican Assembly’s convention in Santa Monica, Reagan stated, “I resent the implication that there is any bigotry in my nature.” Cannon, Governor Reagan, p. 142.
freedom.” Using the theme of individual freedom, Reagan denounced fair housing and similar laws that would necessitate a role for the government in remediying racial and social injustices.

In addition to his states’ rights beliefs, Reagan also built a reputation that sought to end government assistance for those who sought to use it as a crutch. Reagan spoke to many Democrats’ disillusionment with Johnson’s Great Society. Support for programs like welfare was waning, as many white Americans believed that African Americans were taking an unfair share. In an article written for The National Review on December 1, 1964, Reagan declared, “We represent the forgotten American—that simple soul who goes to work, bucks for a raise, takes out insurance, pays for his kids’ schooling, contributes to his church and charity and knows that there’s just ‘ain’t no such thing as a free lunch.” In a speech given at the University of Southern California on April 19, 1966, gubernatorial candidate Reagan spoke against “free federal handouts,” as welfare perpetuates poverty. He stated, “We see today a second generation, and even a third generation of citizens, growing up, marrying, having children, accepting public welfare for three generations as a way of life.” In the same speech, Reagan called for a welfare rehabilitation program that would put welfare recipients to work.

Taken together with his tough on crime and states’ rights stances, Reagan’s disdain for government assistance programs rallied conservatives and attracted many working class white Democrats in 1966. The increase in the number of disgruntled white Democrats can be seen in Gallup polls across time. In May 1962, only 41 of 221 (19%) white California Democrats

538 Quoted in Boyarsky, Rise of Ronald Reagan, p. 205.
539 Mayer, Running on Race, p. 72.
540 “The Republican Party and the Conservative Movement,” National Review, December 1, 1964. Italics were part of Reagan’s writing.
claimed that President Kennedy was moving too fast on racial integration.\textsuperscript{542} In October 1966, however, the percentage of Democrats in California that grew wary of civil rights rose to 34%, with 64 of 191 white Californian Democrats stating that President Johnson was moving too fast.\textsuperscript{543} Reagan was thus in an ideal position to reach across the aisle to the increased number of disenchanted white Democrats in his run for governor in 1966.\textsuperscript{544} The results of the November election revealed that Reagan’s strategy was successful. He beat Brown by nearly one million votes and carried traditionally Democratic working-class precincts, like many in Los Angeles, where Brown had handily won in 1958 and 1962.\textsuperscript{545} In the following chapter, I will discuss how Reagan capitalized on white backlash on the national level, beginning in 1976 when he attempted to wrest the Republican nomination away from incumbent Gerald Ford.

\textsuperscript{542} Gallup asked, “Do you think the Kennedy administration is pushing integration too fast, or not fast enough?” “Gallup Poll #658,” The Gallup Organization, May 3-8, 1962, Question 3.
\textsuperscript{543} Gallup asked, “Do you think the Johnson administration is pushing integration too fast, or not fast enough?” “Gallup Poll #0736,” The Gallup Organization, October 21-26, 1966, Question 15.
\textsuperscript{544} During the gubernatorial campaign, Pat Brown attempted to put Reagan on the defensive, accusing him of “riding the backlash and perhaps even subtly contributing to it.” Brown failed with this strategy, as Reagan vehemently denied he was a racist. Further, Brown did little to quell the anxieties of race conservative whites. “Reagan Denies He’s Riding Backlash,” \textit{San Francisco Examiner}, October 29, 1966, p. 4.
Discussion and Conclusion

In this concluding chapter, I briefly summarize my key arguments and discuss how racial realignment was fully realized in both parties. Party activists, voters, and party representatives and leaders were all pivotal in moving the parties on civil rights. The main impetus behind the completion of racial realignment was Ronald Reagan, who was able to attract the last race conservatives from the Democratic Party. Though his first attempt at the presidency failed in 1976, this election was pivotal for Reagan, as it cemented him as the conservative leader of the Republican Party. Reagan was able to use his personal appeal to deliver a Goldwater-esque, states’ rights argument against civil rights. Unlike Goldwater who ran in 1964 (when civil rights were generally accepted), Reagan was the beneficiary of white backlash, which was at its height in the mid-1970s. I also reconsider the representative-voter relationship, which has been a theme throughout this dissertation. Finally, I explore questions for future research.

The Completion of Racial Realignment

In this dissertation, I argued for a more comprehensive examination of racial realignment. Rather than focus on one level of government and one pathway in which both parties realigned at the same time, I examined how different party actors interacted at both the state and national levels to produce the transformation on race. In the introductory chapter, I laid out my contentions with the literature, namely, the one-pathway/one-site focus, the sources used, and the inattention to the substantive differences across civil rights issues. With regard to differentiating between the parties’ paths toward realignment, I suggest that, in the Republican Party, it was the voters who displayed clear conservative preferences on economic civil rights, while Republican politicians were largely divided. In the Democratic Party, the base was split on issues like FEPC, while Democratic leaders were united in their support of such race liberal policies, which
were backed by their coalition partners. Eventually, in the late 1950s, conservative activists succeeded in capturing the party and Republican legislators in California aligned with their constituents and began to oppose economic civil rights. In the late 1960s and 1970s, national Republican politicians would also move to the right, and would make conscious efforts to appeal to race conservative Democrats. It is when these race conservatives become Republicans that racial realignment in both parties is complete.

In the subsequent chapters, I elaborated on my argument by calling on survey data, election returns for racialized propositions, roll call votes in the California Assembly and Congress, in addition to archival materials, such as FEPC reports and memos, newspaper articles, and politicians’ paper collections. In Chapter 1, I relied on early Gallup surveys and primary documents related to the Federal FEPC to suggest that working class Californians, the majority of whom were likely Democrats, resented FEPC’s presence, not because of fear of job competition but because of racial animosity against African Americans. Mass Republicans, on the other hand, responded in a conservative manner on FEPC because of economic concerns.

I then turned to a study of voting behavior in Chapter 2. I discovered that Republican voters were conservative on economic civil rights initiatives, while Democrats were split in 1946 and 1948. These results can be viewed as an extension of mass attitudes. Republican voters were principled in their conservative position on economic civil rights, while Democrats showed a clear divide on economic civil rights issues, like FEPC and fair housing. This split within the Democratic base can be attributed to the large portion of race conservatives who had yet to be offered a true race conservative option by Republicans.

In Chapter 3, I turned to a study of the California Assembly and the House of Representatives and found that—contrary to voter preferences—Democratic lawmakers were
united behind race liberalism when voting on and proposing FEPC legislation, while Republicans were divided in their support. It was not until 1959 when conservatives succeeded in overtaking the California Republican Party that California Republicans unified on a race conservative position. By striking down a FEPC bill, representatives finally aligned with their constituents’ preferences on civil rights. However, congressional Republicans would not shift their views until the emergence of forced integration issues, particularly busing, in the late 1960s. The findings in Chapters 1-3 suggest that voters can act independent of their party representatives and leaders and thus should be afforded a larger role in the process of racial realignment.

Chapter 4 focused on explaining the realignment in California, with a study of William Knowland’s gubernatorial campaign. Knowland’s failed candidacy resulted in a Democratic sweep of statewide offices, which in turn, established a strong liberal administration headed by Governor Pat Brown. Liberalism would also prevail nationally with Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society. Taken together, Brown and Johnson’s liberalism alienated many white Democrats, as they saw their party shifting further to the left on race.

Chapter 5 revealed the response to Brown and Johnson’s liberalism—conservatives coalesced and strengthened their power within the Republican Party—and helped Barry Goldwater ascend to the top of the national party by 1964. California conservatives also succeeded in 1966, with the election of Ronald Reagan to the governorship. This conservative takeover is pivotal, as it signaled that, after years of division on race, the Republican Party was now the home of race conservatism. For the first time, race conservative voters were presented with an attractive option, allowing many of them to abandon their ties to the Rooseveltian Democratic Party. In Chapter 5, I show that, by the time an anti-busing initiative appeared on
the 1972 California ballot, race conservative voters had switched to the Republican Party, leaving behind a much more race liberal Democratic Party, completing racial realignment in both parties.

*Ronald Reagan: The Link Between California and the National Cases*

The “Reagan Revolution”—an overstatement that I prefer to call the “Reagan Redirection”—that came to power in Washington was rooted in the Reagan governorship. – Lou Cannon, Ronald Reagan biographer

In Chapter 5, I explored how Ronald Reagan successfully attacked the liberal administration of Governor Pat Brown in 1966. Brown was a perfect foil for Reagan, as Brown was seen as weak on crime and a tax-and-spend liberal. Reagan, on the other hand, campaigned on law and order and curbing government spending. Reagan was able to portray Brown as ineffectual and out-of-touch with Californians, who were growing fearful of growing race conflict in the aftermath of the Watts riots. White voters also turned increasingly hostile toward a welfare system supported by a large government bureaucracy, at both the state and national levels. Ronald Reagan was the solution to many of the problems of the late 1960s and 1970s.

Even before Reagan left office in 1975 after two terms as California governor, rumors circulated that he was going to seek the Republican nomination for president in 1976. After he declared his candidacy in the fall of 1975, Reagan would repeat racialized themes originally used in his 1966 run for governor, proving the success of a white backlash campaign strategy on the national level, and the lasting impact racial realignment had on the parties. The Republican Party, in its appeal to white backlash, transitioned from the party of abolitionism to the party of

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race conservatism, while the Democratic Party—the party that had a solid hold on the South since the Civil War—became the home of race liberalism.

In 1976, Reagan had no chance of winning the support of black Republicans, who threw their support behind the moderate President Gerald Ford who, unlike Reagan, endorsed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Ford came from the moderate wing of the Republican Party, while Reagan was cast out of the Goldwater mold. As such, Reagan attracted many conservative Democrats. These Democrats were growing more and more disenchanted with the Democratic elite. Perhaps the only reason many of them did not officially leave the party was because of George Wallace, the race conservative stalwart who ran for the Democratic nomination in 1972 and 1976. In 1976, a Ford pollster found that Wallace and Reagan supporters were almost indistinguishable in attitudes. According to Mayer (2002), “As Wallace’s candidacy was throttled by the Carter juggernaut, Reagan relied on former Wallace backers in Republican primaries in states like Michigan and Texas.” In fact, Mayer claims that the 1976 Republican primaries are significant because it was the first contest “in which former Wallace voters were crucial.”

Reagan was successful with Wallace voters in large part because of his anti-busing rhetoric. He went so far as to endorse a constitutional amendment to ban busing. Reagan used the busing issue to appeal to race conservatives. Reagan linked declines in education achievement to forced busing. He also alleged that busing only inflamed racial tensions and animosity. Ford, in contrast, initially spoke of busing in moderate terms, even discussing how his own children had been bused with no problems. The busing issue became so salient during the 1976 Republican primaries that Ford eventually moved to the right, proposing new

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548 Mayer, Running on Race, p. 134.
549 Mayer, Running on Race, p. 136.
550 Mayer, Running on Race, p. 135.
legislation against busing. Though not a constitutional ban, Ford’s proposed law would make it difficult for judges to mandate busing. In a speech delivered in Indiana on June 22, 1976, Ford claimed that federal courts were “practically running our school boards.” Because Reagan’s anti-busing message was so popular, Ford had to adopt a more conservative message to win some of the white backlash vote.

In his campaign, Reagan also raised the affirmative action issue as a way to appeal to disgruntled white voters. In a national telecast, he played on the theme of white victimization:

…we have adopted legislation to guarantee civil rights and eliminate discrimination of all kinds. Certainly no one of us would challenge government’s right and responsibility to eliminate discrimination in hiring or education. But in its zeal to accomplish this worthy purpose, government orders what is in effect a quota system both in hiring and education. They don’t call it a quota system. It is an affirmative action program…if you happen to belong to an ethnic group not recognized by the federal government as entitled to special treatment, you are a victim of reverse discrimination…if your ancestry…is Czechoslovakian, Polish, Italian, or if you are of the Jewish faith, you may find yourself the victim of discrimination…

Reagan’s mention of “Czechoslovakian, Polish, Italian” was, by far, no accident.

Though the term “Reagan Democrat” had not been coined yet, Reagan began his search for conservative Democrats in 1976. He went to white ethnic cities and towns, like Milwaukee which was, according to Reagan biographer Craig Shirley (2011), “100 percent Democrat, 100 percent Catholic.” According to Shirley,

The white pages of the Milwaukee phone book were jammed with listings of people whose last names looked as if they’d gone through a Mixmaster. These were immigrants and first- and second- generation Serbs, Poles, Czechs, Russians, Ukrainians, Hungarians, and others who had escaped Stalin or Hitler and consequently were intensely anti-Communist and antisocialist. They were not the least bit interested in being dependent upon government…They loved America and had already proven it in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam…

551 Mayer, Running on Race, p. 136.
552 Quoted in Mayer, Running on Race, p. 135. Mayer points out that Reagan did in fact challenge the government’s right and responsibility to eliminate discrimination in hiring and education in speeches throughout the 1960s when he spoke against the Civil Rights Act.
553 Shirley, Rendezvous with Destiny, p. 233.
These proud Americans were initially turned away from the Republican elite, who “didn’t want these people with funny last names traipsing around their country clubs.” Thus, they became Democrats. They supported Adlai Stevenson, Lyndon B. Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, and George McGovern. Needless to say, they were enthusiastic over John F. Kennedy. Shirley states, “In many of those Slavic Catholic homes, in a place of honor over the mantel were photos of their two heroes: John F. Kennedy and the pope.” However, as seen in Chapter 5, their support for the Democratic Party would wane significantly in the 1960s and 1970s, as the party’s elite began to push busing and affirmative action on white ethnics who believed in individualism and the ability to succeed without government support.

Reagan recognized that “restless Democrats…were ripe for the picking.” In fact, almost all the states Reagan won over Ford in 1976 were with the help of Democrats voting in states holding open primaries. Reagan’s appeal would also be apparent in his 1980 run, as according to contemporary journalists, Reagan was “no Goldwater. He could not only keep his base of motivated Republicans, he could invade…the base of traditional Democrats as well.” First in California, and then nationally, Reagan attracted a large number of voters away from the Democratic Party, revealing the success of a white backlash strategy.

The rise of Ronald Reagan—first to the California governorship and then to the presidency—can be attributed to Reagan’s ability to appeal to white backlash voters. Unlike the rough-around-the-edges Barry Goldwater, who attempted to deliver a states’ rights message in 1964, Reagan repackaged conservative ideas and used his populist appeal to reach out to

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554 Shirley, Rendezvous with Destiny, p. 234.
555 Shirley writes of the discontent among white ethnics: “…the upheavals of the 1960s had left many traditional blue-collar Democrats alienated from society and from the party’s intellectual elite.” Shirley, Rendezvous with Destiny, p. 235.
556 Shirley, Rendezvous with Destiny, p. 235.
557 Shirley, Rendezvous with Destiny, pp. 234-235.
558 Shirley, Rendezvous with Destiny, p. 236.
disaffected white Democrats. Reagan has been widely recognized as the leader of the modern conservative movement.\textsuperscript{559} And, while it is true that Reagan was a pivotal figure in moving the Republican Party to the right, not only on race but economics and social issues as well, his contribution to the parties’ shift on race must be considered in a broader context of changes within the electoral bases, state parties, and national parties. Reagan did not take the Republican Party into unchartered territory, when he spoke of individual initiative and smaller government in order to appeal to white race conservatives. Rather, his success can be viewed as the culmination of inter- and intra-party changes that began in the late 1930s. Reagan listened to white voters and designed a message that would resonate with them.

Reexamining the Elite-Voter Relationship: Are Voters More than Spectators?

The evidence provided in this dissertation calls for a re-examination of the relationship between elected representatives—and the parties more broadly—and the voters. It also necessitates a reconsideration of voter behavior. Are voters simply bystanders or do they vote on the issues? Do they take the time to learn about issues or are they swayed by superficial factors, such as candidate likeability? Furthermore, do they act in accordance with their ideological beliefs or are they unconstrained by ideology? By using my findings to answer these questions, in addition to re-evaluating the relationship between voters and representatives, I add to the understanding of the voters’ role in the American political process.

My findings can be viewed in the context of the voting behavior literature. The earliest of these studies, put forth by Berelson et al. (1954), proposed a sociological argument, suggesting that voting decisions were made within a social context. According to this school of

\textsuperscript{559} Tygiel, Ronald Reagan and the Triumph of Conservatism; Darman, Landslide: LBJ and Ronald Reagan at the Dawn of a New America; Perlstein, The Invisible Bridge; Shirley, Rendezvous with Destiny; Cannon, President Reagan.
thought, the family is the main source of an individual’s partisanship. Other factors that influence vote choice are friends and co-workers. Further, since people tend to pick homogenous and like-minded social groups and media outlets that confirm their predispositions, partisan identification remains stable over our lifetimes. In this view, partisan voters are merely products of their environment. Groups, like unions and parties, do not matter. The sociological argument, therefore, allows no room for politicians to influence voters, suggesting that voters adopt the views of their family and social groups. While it does not paint voters in the most flattering light, since they are not voting on issues, it does provide some agency to voters, as they can choose which groups to belong to and thus reinforce, or possibly cause conflict with, their partisan views. Furthermore, interest groups, the media, or politicians do not sway voters, which debunks an elite-driven model of party change.

A psychological view espoused by The American Voter by Campbell et al. (1960) suggested a deeper connection voters have to their party identification. Through socialization, a strong psychological attachment is formed to a specific party. As a result, voters conform to a party’s views, rather than identifying with the party that best fits their views. Moreover, issues do not matter, according to the psychological explanation of voter behavior. Voters do not have a core ideology and do not display consistent attitudes across issues. They are thus easily influenced by their party identification and not the content of issues.

560 Berelson et al., Voting, chapter 6.
561 “…the open-minded voters who make a sincere attempt to weight the issues and the candidates dispassionately for the good for the country as a whole—exist mainly in deferential campaign propaganda, in textbooks on civics, in the movies, and in the minds of some political idealists. In real life, they are few indeed.” Lazarsfeld et al., The People’s Choice, pp. 99-100.
562 “In general, public officials and people involved in public relations tend to overestimate the impact that contemporary issues have on the public. The fact seems to be…that the human perceptorn is highly selective…the message transmitted over that wavelength will be received only as noise. Increasing its amplitude does not always make the message more intelligible, nor does it impel the listener to pay closer attention rather than flicking the ‘off’ switch.” Campbell et al., The American Voter, pp. 171-172.
In both the sociological and psychological explanations of voter behavior, the voters are not operating as the ideal democratic citizen. According to Berelson et al. (1954), this ideal citizen should exhibit an interest and knowledge in political affairs, vote with the public good in mind, and come to his decision based on reason. Since the American voter is held captive by sociological and psychological factors, party elites have very little influence over the electorate. Particularly in the psychological model, since partisan allegiances are formed early and tend to endure over time, there is very little connection between party members and leaders. Since voters cannot often identify the party’s consensus on any given issue, politicians can presumably adopt any position on a policy and not influence the inattentive electorate.

Subsequent works redeemed voters, affording them a more consequential role in the political process. In the first rebuttal of *The American Voter*, V.O. Key (1968) found that voters who supported one party in an election, and later became dissatisfied with that party after the election, switched their votes at the next election. He claimed, “voters are not fools.” Rather, they are concerned with policy outcomes, and are capable of judging the parties and politicians based on their performances while in office—known as retrospective voting. In *The Changing American Voter* (1979), Nie et al. found an increase of citizen interest in major issues. They found that voters were becoming more responsive to issues after 1964. That is, voters paid closer attention to the parties’ positions on issues, using issues as the main criterion for vote choice. This is in contrast to party voting, which was espoused by Campbell et al. Voters do not simply choose to adopt their preferred party’s preferences; rather, when given an issue choice by

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565 According to Campbell et al., only 40-60% of the “informed” segment of the population—those who hold an opinion on an issue, which is just a small subset of the entire population, were able to discern party differences and can thus locate on or the other party as closer to their “own” position. Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 180.
566 Key, *The Responsible Electorate*, p. 7.
the candidates, they can use these choices to make voting decisions.\textsuperscript{567} Both Nie et al. and Key’s accounts suggest that there is a relationship between voters and politicians. Voters hold politicians and parties accountable for past actions and their issue preferences, making them more responsive to the voters.

More recent works on voting behavior have focused on the political sophistication of the American public. One stream of thought suggests that voters are unsophisticated, and even simple-minded, since they vote based on superficial characteristics, like candidate appearance. Once voters choose a candidate based off of trivial evaluations, they do not attempt to influence their candidate’s policy preferences; rather, they often adopt that candidate’s policy views. Thus, it is the politician who leads the voters to change their views, or even their ideology. For example, when supporters of a Republican president learn that the Republican Party is on the ideological right, they will change their own reported ideology to the right.\textsuperscript{568} According to this line of thought, voters are puppets controlled by politicians, without much independent thought or any political awareness.

The pessimistic view of voters is moderated when considering the differences in political awareness apparent in the mass public. In his book, \textit{The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion} (1992), Zaller differentiates the population based on their attentiveness and knowledge of politics. The more knowledgeable citizens in the population have greater exposure to elite sources of political information through the media. These people follow politics—they read the newspaper, watch the nightly news, and discuss politics with their friends and co-workers. These politically aware citizens tend to have a consistent ideology. They turn to their party’s

\textsuperscript{567} Nie et al., \textit{The Changing American Voter}, pp. 172-173.
\textsuperscript{568} Lenz, \textit{Follow the Leader?}, p. 17.
leaders to find out “what goes with what.”\textsuperscript{569} Thus, elites are pivotal in transmitting ideologically consistent messages to their party’s followers, and only those who are aware and look for the message will receive it. Elites’ political messages, however, do not reach the majority of people in the masses.\textsuperscript{570} Politically unaware citizens rarely have fixed attitudes on specific issues. Instead, they construct preference statements when they are confronted with an issue. When a pollster, for example, asks survey respondents how they feel about an issue, the person will respond with a “top of the head” answer.\textsuperscript{571} In other words, people report on the first piece of information that comes into their minds—perhaps from the last news article they read, not a longstanding, fixed belief on an issue.

In a follow-up to his book, Zaller (1998) adds to his argument by stating that voters evaluate politics based on real issues, not just what the media reports. He focuses on the Monica Lewinsky scandal to demonstrate that, despite media attacks and reports of impeachment, President Clinton’s approval rating improved during the scandal. Since, as declared in the State of the Union a week after the scandal broke, the economy was good, Bosnia was going well, and he was reaching across the aisle to work with Republicans on policy, Clinton’s popularity recovered. Thus, citizens can look beyond the messages in the media and form opinions based, to an extent, on issues. Zaller points out that, even though the “public stays focused on a bottom line consisting of peace, prosperity, and moderation is not to say that the public is either wise or virtuous.”\textsuperscript{572} Voters are still unsophisticated, as they are in most of the works reviewed here.

\textsuperscript{570} According to Zaller, people vary significantly in their attentiveness to politics and the average overall levels of information are low. “More succinctly, there is a high variance in political awareness around a generally low mean.” Zaller, \textit{The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion}, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{571} Zaller, \textit{The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion}, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{572} Zaller states that the public is operating along the lines of “what have you done for me lately” rather than “social justice.” He questions whether or not Richard Nixon would have been forced to resign if Watergate happened during a booming economy. What if Bill Clinton’s scandal broke when economic times were hard and we were in the midst of a losing war? Zaller, “Monica Lewinsky’s Contribution to Political Science,” p. 186.
Are voters as unaware as the literature indicates? Are they incapable of forming stable preferences? Are they retrospective voters only—that is, do they only care about what politicians have done for them lately? Or worse—are they superficial and vote based on a candidate’s features, like his looks or his posture? If the answer to these questions is “yes,” then there would seem to be no connection between voter and elite preferences. If voters cannot correctly identify where the parties stand on an issue due to their lack of awareness and knowledge, then it does not matter what positions the candidates take on issues. If people do not have stable attitudes, then their preferences are shaped by whimsy, and not the content of issues espoused by candidates. If retrospective voting is prevalent, then partisan identification does not matter as much as the incumbent’s performance since these voters will select their candidate based on economic indicators and not policy preferences. If citizens care more about the physical characteristics of a politician and not his or her issue stances, then politicians can adopt any position without having to worry about the electoral consequences. Therefore, voters will blindly follow their candidates, and the candidates do not have to acknowledge voters’ preferences since they are not stable.

Through analyses of partisan behavior on ballot propositions and survey data, I have concluded that voters can display stable preferences on policy. I provided evidence that rank-and-file supporters displayed consistent attitude patterns beginning in the early 1940s. Republicans were united in their conservatism on economic civil rights, despite a divided elite that was split into race conservative and race progressive factions. Democratic elites outside of the South, on the other hand, demonstrated unity on race liberal policies shortly after World War II. Despite strong support for federal fair employment practices and fair housing legislation among Democratic lawmakers, and state and national leaders, the race conservative faction of
the Democratic base would consistently reject race liberal proposals. Race conservatives thus acted independent of their party’s representatives, suggesting that, like Republican partisans who united despite mixed messages from their elites, voters can be important party actors.

**Considering Avenues for Future Research**

There are several ways to expand on the study of racial realignment, and clarify whether or not voters had a more significant role in the realignment process. With this study of mass and elite behavior on a variety of black civil rights issues, I hope to expand the discussion of racial realignment to include two key aspects currently lacking in the literature. First, it would behoove scholars to consider the different nature of civil rights between the 1930s and the 1970s. Whether focusing on elite or mass behavior, scholars have not seriously considered this distinction. It is critical, however, as my findings provided strong evidence that the type of civil rights in question impacted absolute levels of conservatism and partisanship. I found that non-economic civil rights were bipartisan issues, with voters and elites in both parties in favor of ending Jim Crow oppression. Partisan preferences began to form, particularly among Republican voters and Democratic elites, on economic civil rights. Finally, Republican politicians and the Democratic base, both of which were divided on economic civil rights, would sort on forced integration issues in the late 1960s and 1970s.

Second, I want to encourage scholars to take seriously the possibility that partisans in the masses and/or in the electorate could be the driving forces behind the twentieth century realignment of race and party. In this project, I am not claiming that the voters caused elites to switch their views on race. However, while I am not arguing that partisans in the general public forced party elites to adopt their respective civil rights views, I did demonstrate that Republican
voters moved on economic civil rights, well before their representatives. The evidence provided here should motivate researchers to treat the voters as legitimate party actors, who can move first on issues, and not just as passive receptors of party and candidate messaging and cues.

One of the clearest paths to future research on racial realignment would be to expand this analysis beyond California. Conducting an exhaustive study in which the focus is not just on California, but on different non-southern regions (Northeast, Mideast, Midwest, Rocky Mountain, and West) may glean different partisan results in both the masses and in the state legislatures. Another option would be to use ecological inference analyses to infer partisan rates of support on other states’ racialized ballot initiatives. Were California voters unique in their response to black civil rights? Oregon, Arizona, and Massachusetts are among some of the states that had racialized propositions appear on the ballot.\textsuperscript{573} Further, expanding the analysis beyond civil rights that primarily affected African Americans would allow for a complete analysis of voting behavior on all racialized ballot initiatives. In California alone, Latinos faced discriminatory measures, such as Proposition 63 (1986), which was an English Only measure and Proposition 187 (1994) that made it illegal for undocumented individuals to obtain public services. Future research could explore the similarities and differences between black civil rights and Latino civil rights measures in California and/or other states. Scholars could also turn to a

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\textsuperscript{573} In the early 1900s, a few propositions in Oregon appeared on the ballot that would remove discriminatory language from the state’s constitution and allow “Negroes, Chinamen, and Mulattoes” the right to vote. In 1950, Arizona’s Proposition 13, which was rejected by voters, sought to ban racially segregated schools. In May 1966, Oklahomans approved the “Integrated Schools Amendment,” which repealed a section of the constitution that required the legislature to provide separate schools for different races. In 1976, Missourians also repealed language in their constitution that mandated that students of different races attend separate schools. Maryland voters, in 1968, rejected Question 4, which would have barred racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing property. In 1978, Massachusetts voters supported Question 6, which prohibited the assigning of students to public schools based on race. In 2000, voters rejected a proposed amendment that would have removed restrictions on interracial marriage. For more examples of racialized propositions over time, see the Ballotpedia website, http://ballotpedia.org/Civil_rights_on_the_ballot, Accessed November 7, 2014.
\end{flushright}
study of social propositions, such as those dealing Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, Bisexual (LGBT) issues.\textsuperscript{574}

Traditionally, we assume that politicians lead and the voters follow. However, the evidence presented here suggests that voters can be more ideologically principled and disciplined than many believe them to be. Examining other states and issues will lead to a more precise understanding of how partisan change unfolds. Do the partisan trends observed in California manifest across other states and regions of the country? Is the case of black civil rights unique, or do other racial and social issues elicit similar patterns of partisan behavior? In which context do the voters lead, and the politicians follow? Answering these questions will shed light on what was once believed to be a settled debate.

The realignment of race and party in the twentieth century has had long-term implications for each of the parties. Republicans and Democrats at the state and national levels of government have to address and confront race issues not only in their campaigns but also when they are in office. The shift in race positions has had a long-term impact, constricting the positions that Democrats and Republicans can take on contemporary race issues, such as drug laws, stand-your-ground, and stop-and-frisk legislation. Further, since racial inequality is linked to a difference in the educational resources available to white and minority neighborhoods, education has remained racialized, just as it had been when busing was introduced in the early 1970s. Similarly, affirmative action in higher education has also been an enduring race issue on

\textsuperscript{574} In 1978, California’s Proposition 6 became the first Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, Bisexual proposition in the nation. Known as the “Briggs Initiative,” Proposition 6 was defeated by voters. If passed, it would have banned homosexuals from working in public schools in the state. In 2008, Californians passed Proposition 8, which sought to ban same-sex marriage in the state. Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Oregon, South Dakota, and Washington also had propositions that sought to restrict the rights of the LGBT community. For more examples of LGBT propositions over time, see the Ballotpedia website, http://ballotpedia.org/LGBT_issues_on_the_ballot, Accessed November 7, 2014. Another salient social issue that has come to a vote in several states is abortion. Voters in several states have voted on propositions and referenda that attempted to restrict abortion from 1970 to 2014. See the Ballotpedia website, http://ballotpedia.org/Abortion_on_the_ballot.
which members of the two parties often take polarizing views. Given the longevity of these issues and the salience of race in American society, it is probable that the two parties will remain polarized on race well into the twenty-first century.
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