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“Not Laughing Now”: Nigel Farage, European Identity, and Euroscepticism in the EU

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"We were told that when we had a president, we'd see a giant global political
figure...Well, I'm afraid what we got was you...you have the charisma of a damp rag and the
appearance of a low-grade bank clerk." European Council president Herman Van Rompuy sat
stunned as Nigel Farage, the newly elected eurosceptic British Member of European Parliament,
insulted him on the Parliament floor (Association 2010). The audience jeered in response,
outraged at this open display of contempt. Little did they know that in six years, the eurosceptic
chorus of discontent would become a new normal, and Europe’s second largest economy would
be exiting the European Union. Due to economic, political, and cultural disparities between
member states, the European Union (EU) has been unable to form a pan-European political and
cultural identity. This has resulted in a long-term vote capturing opportunity for far-right political
parties, which have brought Euroscepticism to the EU’s doorstep through election to the
European Parliament (EP). Furthermore, because of their ability to emphasize these deeply
rooted economic, political, and cultural disparities, far-right eurosceptic Members of European
Parliament (MEPs) exacerbate Euroscepticism in a self-sustaining cycle that both internally and
externally threatens EU legitimacy and, if left unaddressed, the very future of European
integration.

Economic Disparities Across the EU

The EU was originally conceived as an institution that would herald uniform economic
prosperity for all member states (Ash 2012). However, coordinating between the unique
economic conditions of member states has proven to be no simple task. The institutional union of
these disparate economies is the result of decades of repeated compromise that economically
weaker member states have struggled to reach and economically stronger states have had to settle
for accepting.

These economic differences are rooted in the conditions for accession to the EU. In order to apply for membership, states must meet the Copenhagen Criteria, a set of guidelines that requires entering states to have a full free-market economy, a stable democracy, and accept all EU legislation, including rules surrounding the adoption of the Euro (The European Parliament: Powers 2017). While these guidelines are intended to ensure the economic stability of the EU, they pose a burden on states transitioning out of command market systems to convert as quickly as possible to a free-market system. This externally imposed “one size fits all” process of economic transformation has in several Eastern European states provided a political scapegoat onto which local politicians can project domestic economic woes, planting the seeds for future Euroscepticism (Grzymala-Busse and Innes 2003). The inflation and economic pain associated with transition to a free-market economy has often been projected onto an external actor: the European Union.

These fundamental economic differences have continued to define the economic development of member states within the EU, and became amplified when the American financial crisis became a European sovereign debt crisis in 2009. In response to the crisis, the European Commission expanded its mandate and began to “codetermine national budgetary policies,” in order to reign in state level spending (Otjes and van der Veer 2016). Representatives of states less severely impacted by the crisis, such as Germany, expressed frustration with having to allocate their state resources towards a European institution that was allegedly bailing out irresponsible governments. These states felt their resources threatened, while those struggling to remain afloat, such as Greece, believed that EU restrictions on national spending threatened crucial fiscal sovereignty during a time of economic crisis. Put more bluntly, “The creditors have
a sense of victimhood that mirrors that of the debtors”; in other words, both sides feel economically exploited by the EU (Leonard and Torreblanca 2013). The EU cannot simply “balance out” economic differences between member states that have such diverse economies without being perceived as taking too much from economically strong states and providing too little to stimulate economically weaker states. The sovereign debt crisis has served as the ultimate test for the economic potential of redistributive EU policies, which can rarely, if ever, satisfy each and every economically diverse member state at the negotiation table (Scharpf 2002). In such tough economic times, EU infringement upon fiscal autonomy and the threat that supporting struggling nations poses to the resources of wealthy states fuels public economic insecurity, bringing Euroscepticism with it. EP voting analysis indicates that the EU response to the crisis, “…increased the European integration division in the EP, at the expense of the left-right conflict line” (Otjes and van der Veer 2016). This research indicates that the economic differences between states and the challenges they pose for integration play a driving role in shifting debate in the EP away from traditional cross-state ideological lines and towards questioning the institution itself.

**Political Disparities Across the EU**

In addition to these unique economic conditions, each EU member state brings with it a distinct social welfare system, forming an array of different social policies and the necessary fiscal structures that fund them. The liberal market economies of Western European states such as Britain and Ireland tend to follow a minimalistic, market-driven “Anglo-Saxon” welfare model. Other EU states, such as Sweden and Finland, follow a “Nordic” model, driven by high social support and tax-redistribution. Finally, states such as France and Germany offer a “Bismarckian” model that provides labor-driven social insurance, falling somewhere in the
middle (Scharpf 2002). This makes an EU-level welfare regime difficult to establish, as any supranationally imposed plan would threaten the unique benefits offered to domestic constituencies of each member state (Fligstein 2009). Because MEPs rely on domestic rather than pan-European voting constituencies, compromise becomes a political third rail. Once politicians succeed at framing EU policies as zero-sum games, any vote for an EU-wide compromise can be framed by political opposition as a vote for the EU and against the state.

At the most basic level, these political policy differences prevent the EU from expanding beyond its purely economic and diplomatic roles. However, they also cause larger political conflicts, exacerbating the aforementioned economic divide between member states. In other words, EU member states do not simply have different economic capacities; they also have unique social policies that influence how they spend and respond to crises. Because the European Central Bank (ECB) can set monetary policy but has no reign over the fiscal policies of individual states, states with costly welfare systems are criticized for over-spending and fueling inflation that the ECB then has to adjust for at the international level, pinching the pockets of states that do not spend as much on welfare to begin with (Krugman 2015). This is the primary contention that western EU states such as Germany and the U.K. cite with regards to the Greek sovereign debt crisis: if Greece has a social welfare model that is expensive and irresponsible, why should states with more stringent social policies spend the money they have been responsibly saving to bail Greece out? Alternatively, why should Greece, which guarantees its people a comprehensive social welfare system, be required to slash spending by the ECB?

Greece feels its welfare system threatened by ECB spending limits, and in turn, countries such as Germany and France feel their sound economies threatened by Greek spending. These fundamental differences in social policy amplify the conflict originally sparked by differences in
economic wealth amongst EU states.

**Cultural Disparities Across the EU**

If the preceding economic and political differences between states feed Euroscepticism, cultural differences drive and sustain it. With membership in the EU comes a commitment to the free movement of people and ideas (Ziegler 2015). The natural consequence of this movement is an influx of foreign languages and customs, which in turn threatens cultural autonomy. The EU thus poses a threat not just to economic sovereignty, but the cultural and national identity of millions of Europeans. This is best demonstrated by the backlash that tends to follow EU attempts to socially integrate Europe. France, for example, is concerned about the steady decline of the French language brought about by integrated European higher education systems (McCormick and Olsen 2013). In another example, EU-wide agricultural trade policies have led Dutch farming companies to grow and export mass-produced tomatoes that are viewed as “cube-like” and unacceptable to those who continue to prefer local produce (Tello 2000).

There are other, more historically rooted cultural differences that also define the way that member nations approach social issues. Several scholars have studied these cultural factors that contribute to Euroscepticism. A cross-country survey analysis by Hobolt finds that, “religious intolerance is a strong predictor of Euroscepticism,” as are education levels (Hobolt et al. 2011). General cultural differences also play a role: as McLaren finds, “…attitudes towards the European Union tend to be based in great part on a general hostility towards other cultures” (McLaren 2002). These sociocultural drivers of Euroscepticism, when contextualized by the differences along these factors across Europe, become quite relevant. One particular case study comes from the French concept of *laïcité*, the uniquely French brand of strict secularism and separation of religious and public life. This stands in contrast with the historical development of
German political life, which incorporates religious institutions “…both as co-contributors to the public good and as public policy actors”. These cultural differences amongst the states are not always compatible. Even in the formative years of the EU, for example, France took a strong stance in opposing “…the mention of the Christian heritage of Europe” in the Lisbon Treaty (Foret 2014).

The current European migrant crisis highlights this social divide quite noticeably. Some member states, faced with a surge of refugees from the Middle East, have been more open to immigration than others, making it difficult for EU members to agree upon a cohesive migrant policy. These varying attitudes towards immigration are shaped not only by domestic politics and geographic configurations, but also by the unique cultural makeup and history of each member state, shaping their strategies to integrate Muslim immigrants. France, for example, again due to its culture of laïcité, does not allow for any religious courses to be organized during the school day at public schools, including Islamic education. On the other hand, countries such as Denmark go as far as to allow for, “up to the 85 % of the budget” of private Islamic schools to be met using public funds given that the Islamic education meets government standards (Dassetto, Ferrari, and Maréchal 2007). Cultural differences such as these have largely shaped debates in the European Parliament on how to handle the more recent migrant crisis that the continent continues to face (EP Press Service 2015).

These cultural differences do not merely influence supranational decisions regarding language, food quality, or migrant policy. When aggregated, these ostensibly isolated issues demonstrate the cultural fear that further integration will lead to a loss of national cultural identity. To many Europeans, the EU poses a threat not just to economic sovereignty, but to the cultural and national identity of millions of Europeans. Survey results and the rhetoric of
eurosceptic party members demonstrate that while Euroscepticism may be sparked by economic insecurities, these cultural and national identity issues provide a vehicle to extend that eurosceptic sentiment throughout multiple political and economic cycles. Rather than economic factors, the best predictors of an individual’s disapproval of the EU are “…a general hostility toward other cultures” (McLaren 2002:564). Similarly, the Institute for Public Policy Research finds that the former positive correlation between economic growth rates and support for the EU has been, “…significantly outweighed by concerns about immigration and distrust of mainstream political parties” (Gottfried 2014). Survey data suggests that concern about the EU on economic grounds “…equates to a 47 per cent chance of being Eurosceptic, while concern on cultural grounds raises this likelihood to 57 per cent” (Gottfried 2014:20). Thus, while Euroscepticism may have initially fluctuated with the ebbs and flows of the economy, by the 1990s, Euroscepticism had established itself independent of transient economic conditions, rooted in more long-term cultural insecurities that have the potential to fester indefinitely.

While economic insecurity may fluctuate with economic cycles, rising and falling with employment and inflation levels, social and cultural insecurities are rooted to a sense of national identity and cultural belonging that can be traced back to the inception of statehood itself. These are more deeply rooted issues that, if exploited, have the potential to normalize Euroscepticism. Far-right eurosceptic parties do not need to have a political agenda beyond opposing integration in order to distinguish themselves; if Hungarians believe that their fundamental national identity is threatened by immigrants from Croatia, and if politicians are able to exploit that insecurity, they will be able to mobilize Euroscepticism during both good and bad economic times — and that is exactly what parties such as UKIP have been able to do.
The Eurosceptic Cycle

The mobilization of cultural insecurities by far-right wing candidates works in a cyclical loop to ultimately erode EU legitimacy. The cycle that Euroscepticism in the EP creates for the EU structurally parallels the cycle that Anna Grzymala-Busse and Abby Innes argue EU accession creates for candidate states. In that model, the strict requirements of the acquis communautaire on EU candidate states feed populism in those states, which leads to the election of politicians and institutions that in turn incite further populism. In the cycle proposed here, it is instead the integration related demands of the EU that mobilize far-right parties to campaign for election to the EP on eurosceptic platforms, which in turn erodes EU legitimacy and fuels further Euroscepticism both internally from within the EP and externally via shifting domestic politics.

I. Eurosceptic MEP Candidates Exploit Disparities

The cycle begins when far-right political parties discover and exploit the economic, political, and cultural differences among states as vote capturing opportunities. For example, Nordensvard and Ketola have found that in order to exploit interstate political differences, both Finnish and Swedish far-right parties “refram[e] the welfare state as being linked to a sovereign and exclusive Swedish and Finnish political community with distinct national boundaries.” Finland’s True Finns, for example, frame the EU, “…as presenting an external threat to Finnish culture and sovereignty” (Nordensvard and Ketola 2015). By categorizing social welfare as an issue of national sovereignty, these parties are able to tap into the deeper political insecurities that lie behind the more transient economic issues that the EU poses, thereby securing their political power. Similarly, these politicians also mobilize cultural complaints, often resorting to the use of inflammatory rhetoric to reinforce the connection between perceived domestic woes and specific EU policies. UKIP MEPs such as Steven Woolfe, for example, have branded the
phenomenon of Eastern European immigration to Britain as a, “…national scandal…caused by our open-door migration policy with the EU” (Webb 2014). In this way, eurosceptic party members ensure that any anti-immigrant sentiment is refocused on the EU rather than geographic, economic, or social circumstances.

Rather than focusing on economic grievances, Far-right eurosceptic parties champion “…the defence of ’national sovereignty’” (De Vries and Edwards 2009). Economic grievances are easily exploited on either end of Europe’s economic spectrum, and oxymoronically enough, cultural and social insecurities are uniformly divisive across member states. Parties such as the National Front and UKIP capitalize on the social issues driving Euroscepticism in order to take advantage of these “…cross-cutting cleavages based on territorial or cultural identity” (Sitter 2002). Nearly every aspect of European integration, from immigration to agricultural policy to social welfare, picks at the underlying cultural insecurity created by the integration of such culturally and socially diverse states. Due to their mass appeal, these cultural and political disparities are easy for Eurosceptic politicians to exploit across the voter base. By utilizing eurosceptic rhetoric, far-right wing politicians have been able to distinguish themselves from mainstream parties and gain widespread, cross-cutting public support in uniting voters against a common economic, political, and cultural enemy: the EU.

The strategy has been quite effective. The 2014 EP elections resulted in the largest share of eurosceptic seats in the history of the institution, with about one-third of seats won by eurosceptic parties (BBC 2014). In many large states, emerging far-right wing eurosceptic parties were able to win more seats than their mainstream party counterparts. Nigel Farage’s United Kingdom Independence Party, or UKIP, a traditionally eurosceptic party, won 27.5% of the UK vote — up from 16.5% in the previous year. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Front, or FN,
which is similarly eurosceptic, was able to win 25% of the French vote, a dramatic jump from 6% in the 2009 elections. Even Germany, which has been an avid advocate for European integration since the creation of the original European Coal and Steel Community, has seen its first eurosceptic party, Alternative for Germany, or AfD, gain seven seats (Europa n.d.).

II. Eurosceptic MEPs pose an internal parliamentary threat to the EU

Once elected to the EP, these eurosceptic candidates become part of the very establishment they campaign against. Trapped in this electoral paradox, far-right eurosceptic parties continue their anti-EU rhetoric in spite of their unwillingness to form coalitions to make any concrete institutional changes. Because these nationally based, eurosceptic far-right parties rise to power on distinct national identity and cultural platforms, it becomes difficult for them to form coalitions with one another once in office. The domestic economic and policy issues that UKIP advocates for are very different from those the French National Front emphasizes, for example, which is why UKIP has repeatedly rejected a coalition with the National Front (Dean 2014).¹ Thus, one does not see many far-right eurosceptic coalitions in the EP, and the future of such coalitions remains uncertain (Kietz and Ondarza 2014). Far-right eurosceptic parties are unable to form the coalitions they need to pass legislation that would decrease EU power, but also cannot support wider EU-building initiatives because of their anti-EU platforms. In fact, “Since 2009 [eurosceptic parties in the EP] have voted less than all other groups. They have also drafted fewer reports and opinions” (Gergely and Gautier n.d.). Even if the share of far-right Eurosceptics in the EP increases, one is still unlikely to see concrete policy changes not only because the parties are unwilling to form coalitions with one another, but also because their incentive is not in improving the EU, but in destroying it. Because they run on populist

¹ UKIP, for example, focuses on protectionism and corporate tax reductions, while the National Front has advocated for the nationalization of certain sectors (Dean 2014).
platforms, these parties have no real incentive to pass EU legislation — the further they cripple the EU, the more effectively they can rally against it. This paralysis allows anti-EU public sentiment to continue to fester. Eurosceptic parties can then continue to do what they do best: accuse opponents of inaction in the face of cultural and sociopolitical threats posted by the EU. They do so rather aggressively: despite their legislative inactivity, these MEPs “…have made more than 700 speeches and asked 1,000 questions” on the floor of the EP (Kietz and Ondarza 2014). Eurosceptic MEPs such as Farage and Marine Le Pen successfully participate in and publicize their role in these debates, further eroding the legitimacy of the EU. The cycle begins again: public Euroscepticism rises, and far-right eurosceptic parties take advantage of that sentiment to dismantle the EP and exacerbate its ineffectiveness instead of collaborating with other MEPs to improve it.

Of course, some might argue that the EP is meant to be a forum for healthy debate, and that Euroscepticism in this institution may not have much bearing on the future of the EU other than fostering a healthy level of political debate. And yet the presence of Eurosceptics in the EP has eliminated a center-left or center-right majority in the EP, which “force[s] the mainstream groups to form a grand coalition” in order to approve legislation (von Ondarza 2016). Euroscepticism compels both sides of the traditional political aisle to come together in opposition to the eurosceptic platform in the closed-door negotiations that characterize grand coalitions. As a result, debates on the merits of the EU take center stage while substantive debate on specific EP legislation is moved to closed-door grand coalition negotiations. This “…torpedoes the Parliament’s long-standing goal of more strongly polarising EU politics on the leftright spectrum” and instead focuses political debate in the parliament around the merits of the EU itself. It also adds fuel to the fire by significantly damaging EP transparency, the lack of
which is a commonly cited eurosceptic grievance.

Even though it is one component of a multi-layered European government, the EP is the most democratically elected body of the EU and often serves as the public face of the institution. At the very least, the erosion of its legitimacy directly damages the EU’s public image. In addition, the EP conducts the first reading and approval of all legislation during the Ordinary Legislative Procedure and holds a myriad of budgetary powers that touch areas from environmental policy to European security. The codecision procedure, an expansion of EP power implemented with the Treaty of Nice, ensures that legislation proposed by the European Commission must secure approval of or compromise with the EP. The EP also has the power to bring member states to the European Court of Justice in cases of alleged violations of EU treaties (The European Parliament: Powers 2017). These powers are significant, making the EP a primary, if not the most significant, legislative body in the EU. Euroscepticism in such a crucial legislative body erodes the very institution that allocates EU funds and can halt the approval of much EU-wide legislation. While the impact of Euroscepticism in the EP is currently small, it infects a body that holds significant policymaking power, thereby posing a threat to the European project that is not to be overlooked.

III. Eurosceptic MEPs pose an external domestic threat to the EU

In addition to the internal threat these MEPs pose as they erode EP legitimacy, their election also creates an external threat to the EU by exacerbating Euroscepticism in domestic politics across Europe. While eurosceptic MEPs may not have much influence in the EP due to their inability to build effective coalitions, they increasingly influence the political environments of their respective states by pushing domestic politics further right on the eurosceptic scale. As mentioned in Part I of the cycle above, this surge in eurosceptic public opinion is often a result of
Eurosceptic MEPs exploiting disparities in order to gain political power rather than a grassroots demonstration of specific grievances. When far-right eurosceptic MEPs defeat mainstream political parties in European elections, as both UKIP and the National Front have done, mainstream right wing and conservative political parties from those states begin to see the legitimacy of the threat such parties pose back home, even if the eurosceptic sentiment they are responding to has been amplified through this top-down process led by far-right parties rather than grassroots concerns. In response, these mainstream political parties are forced to absorb the eurosceptic agenda themselves (Kietz and Ondarza 2014). This political realignment is to be expected in any healthy representative democracy: mainstream parties have a responsibility to realign their platforms to address the emerging grievances of their constituencies, even when, in this case, much of it has been politically manufactured. Unfortunately, however, as the EU becomes “…the basis for a new cleavage” in electoral politics across Europe, anti-EU platforms subsume more nuanced national policy debate (Gower 2013).

The most prominent example of this phenomenon has been in the U.K., where UKIP has been widely identified as the driving force that pushed David Cameron to promise a referendum on a potential exit from the EU. The result of this “Brexit” vote shocked Europe and has led to the exit of the second largest economic power from the EU, severely damaging the legitimacy of the institution and triggering a cascade of additional threats of exit from countries such as Italy (Caney 2016). As national parties begin to oppose integration in order to prevent losing votes to these emerging far-right eurosceptic parties, Euroscepticism becomes mainstream in the domestic arena, as well. In this way, the self-sustaining cycle slowly erodes EU authority both internally through the EP and externally through state-level politics.
Conclusion

This rise of Euroscepticism is not a fringe phenomenon to be ignored. Economic, political, and cultural differences amongst member states have greatly undermined the pan-European identity that one would expect from the EU. When tapped into by far-right parties, these disparities contribute to a cycle of Euroscepticism that poses a sustained threat to EU legitimacy created both internally from within the EP and externally through shifting domestic politics. Left to fester, these disparities can and are being capitalized by Euroskeptics to erode the legitimacy of EU institutions. However, it is important to note that the natural consequence of these unique economic, political, and cultural needs of member states does not necessarily lie in the destruction of the European project. In fact, reevaluating and addressing these underlying state-level disparities provides an opportunity for EU representatives to build a more responsive, flexible institution. Hence, continued research on these fundamental forces can play a crucial role in shaping the future of the EU.

Six years after his “damp rag” speech, a beaming Farage spoke to a very different European Parliament. “When I came here 17 years ago and I said that I wanted to lead a campaign to get Britain to leave the European Union, you all laughed at me…you’re not laughing now, are you?” Once again, Farage was greeted with outrage — but this time, the jeers were joined by friendly eurosceptic applause from his newly elected companions (Stone 2016). Euroscepticism is here to stay, and to Farage’s credit, it is certainly no laughing matter.
Baronia 16

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