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Race-Class Intersections as Interactional Resources in Post-Apartheid South Africa

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Introduction
Since being coined by Crenshaw (1989), intersectionality has become an influential concept in social scientific theory and research (Davis, 2008; McCall, 2005). The central focus of intersectionality is “the interaction between gender, race, and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power” (Davis, 2008:68). One prominent line of research within the paradigm of intersectionality has focused on relationships of inequality among categorically-based social groups, examining in particular the ways in which these relationships are changing over time and across contexts (McCall, 2005). South Africa represents an important site for the investigation of such changes, as the collapse of the apartheid1 system gave rise to a dynamic period with respect to the country’s previously rigidly racialized class structure. This is reflected in a substantial body of post-apartheid research that has investigated post-apartheid race-class intersections as they are conceptualized in official policies and realized in aggregate societal patterns. However, everyday understandings of these phenomena, and the ways in which ordinary people engage with them in interactional contexts, have been under-examined (cf. Winant, 2001).

In this chapter, I examine how common-sense knowledge – that is, taken-for-granted, “socially sanctioned grounds of inference and action that people use in everyday life, and which they assume that other members of the group use in the same way” (Garfinkel, 1956:185) – with respect to South Africa’s complex post-apartheid race-class intersections is displayed and

1 This Afrikaans term, meaning “separateness”, is commonly used to describe the white supremacist racial system implemented in South Africa by the National Party from 1948 to 1994. See, for e.g., Clark and Worger (2004), Guelke (2005), and Louw (2004), for historical overviews of the apartheid system.
mobilized in ordinary episodes of interaction. I begin by providing a brief overview of the historical origins and current patterns of these race-class intersections, describing some ways in which they can be seen as both legacies of and departures from those of the apartheid system. I then present some findings from an ethnomethodologically-informed, conversation analytic investigation of audio-recorded data drawn from interactional South African radio broadcasts (cf. West and Fenstermaker’s, 1995 ethnomethodological approach to intersections between race, class and gender). In the first part of my analysis I demonstrate some ways in which taken-for-granted, common-sense knowledge about race-class intersections can be produced and resisted in interactions. I then turn to an examination of some ways in which speakers may actively draw on these common-sense understandings, deploying them to do things in the course of everyday interactions. This analysis reveals some ways in which continuities and discontinuities in common-sense knowledge of race and class between the apartheid and post-apartheid periods are both reflected and reproduced at the level of everyday interactions.

Race-Class Intersections in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Under the apartheid system, race and class in South Africa almost completely overlapped with one another. This was a result of the efforts of the architects of apartheid to establish a rigid and totalizing system that affected every aspect of people’s lives and prevented any form of interracial interaction under potentially egalitarian circumstances (Clark & Worger, 2004; Frederickson, 1981; Posel, 2001). This system was implemented through the passage of literally

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2 A debate over the question of whether apartheid was primarily a system of class exploitation or one of racial domination was prominent in the social scientific literature of the time (see, for e.g., Wolpe, 1990). This debate, however, is largely beyond the scope of this chapter.
hundreds of laws, which were enforced by state-sanctioned violence on a broad scale. These laws included those designed to implement “grand apartheid” policies such as “separate development,” “Bantu Education,” and “job reservation,” which ensured that whites had privileged access to the most desirable land, educational qualifications, and professions, while reducing blacks to a ready supply of cheap semi-skilled and unskilled labor (Clark & Worger, 2004). In addition, a range of “petty apartheid” laws were designed to institutionalize racial segregation and privilege in informal everyday settings by mandating superior “whites only” amenities including buses, railway cars, ambulances, libraries, swimming pools and beaches (Guelke, 2005).

This white supremacist system was interrupted when, following decades of resistance from both within and outside of South Africa, the apartheid government agreed to enter into negotiations with opposition movements (led by the African Nation Congress, or ANC) to bring an end to apartheid. At the time that they entered into these negotiations, the ANC had long avowed a socialist program (outlined in the 1954 Freedom Charter) based on redistribution of wealth from those who had gained it illegitimately under apartheid to those who had been

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3 A note on terminology: Following the convention established in the South African liberation struggle, I use the term “black” synonymously with “people of color,” to inclusively refer to all groups not defined as “white” by apartheid legislation. However, on occasions when it is relevant to differentiate between the groups codified by apartheid legislation, I use the distinct terms “African” (those classified as “Native,” “Bantu,” or “black” under apartheid), “Indian” (a term that generally included all individuals of Asian descent), and “Coloured” (individuals, usually of mixed race, who were not classified as members of any of the other official race groups). Of course, like all racial categories, these categories are historically contingent social constructions, and I use them for the purposes of addressing how they came to be treated as “social facts,” rather than to suggest that race is an essential, natural or intrinsically consequential human characteristic.
oppressed by the system. It soon became clear, however, that they would have to make substantial compromises if they were to achieve their primary aim of political rights for all South Africans without significant conflict (Adam & Moodley, 1993; Winant, 2001). While some opponents of a negotiated settlement were mobilizing for the eventuality of a civil war, the possibility of a mass skills exodus due to white emigration presented a concern for the ANC even in the absence of an armed conflict (Louw, 2004). In addition, local and global capitalist interests had a significant stake in South Africa’s economy, and (after belatedly abandoning white supremacy) had been among the most effective advocates for ending apartheid, in the interests of stabilizing South Africa’s capitalist economy (Louw, 2004). This made it difficult to repudiate the demands of capital without risking the economic collapse that threatened to result from the adoption of a primarily socialist and redistributive system (Winant, 2001).

The most significant outcome of these opposing pressures for the negotiated transition to democracy was that whites and capitalist interests would be assured of retaining their property rights and the wealth they had accumulated with the help of apartheid, while the ANC achieved their aim of securing political and civil rights for all South Africans, and won political control of the country in the 1994 elections (Louw, 2004; Winant, 2001). As a consequence, post-apartheid South Africa has been characterized as a country with an economic system largely controlled by a white capitalist elite, and a political system controlled by a black nationalist elite (Louw, 2004).

Following their election, the ANC government made high profile attempts to alleviate white fears, and largely acceded to the demands of capitalist interests, taking on a corporatist and neo-liberal economic approach involving compromises with the largely white business sector, and privatization of formerly state-owned industries (see, for e.g., Bond, 2000; Louw, 2004). With respect to the demands of the majority of its constituents for the delivery of a better life, the
government has made significant achievements, providing running water, electricity, housing, land, education and medical care to millions who were denied these basic rights under apartheid (Clark & Worger, 2004). However, the neo-liberal economic approach has also resulted in millions of people having their newly-acquired access to services such as running water and electricity cut off as a result of their inability to pay the fees charged for them by privatized service providers (Desai, 2002). Moreover, having chosen to adopt a pro-business approach rather than risk engaging in more radical redistribution of wealth, the government lacks the resources to adequately compensate blacks for the 350 years of oppression they have suffered, to the extent required to make them the economic equals of whites (Frederickson, 2002). This has resulted in the government’s attempts to alleviate poverty and unemployment being too slow and not effective enough, and South Africa remaining starkly racially stratified in numerous respects (Louw, 2004; Seekings & Nattrass, 2005).

The South African economy still relies heavily on exploiting under-educated, cheap, and predominantly black labor (Clark & Worger, 2004; Winant, 2001). Unemployment poses a massive challenge, with an overall rate estimated at 25 percent (as of early 2011), but the estimated rates for different racial groups – 29 percent of Africans, 22.6 percent of Coloureds, 11.7 percent of Indians, and only 5.9 percent of whites – demonstrate the strong racial dimension of the problem (Statistics, 2011). Poor black families have generally lacked the economic resources to move into the more desirable (formerly white) residential areas, resulting in continuing de facto urban segregation, with predominantly white suburbs surrounded by all-black townships and shack settlements located on the edges of cities (Christopher, 2001).

Although it has extended South Africa’s social welfare system considerably, a primary feature of the ANC government’s approach to reducing racial inequality has been the adoption of
market-based policies designed to facilitate the entry of blacks into the middle and wealthy classes. Affirmative action hiring, particularly in public service, and the program of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) have been centerpieces of this approach (Bond, 2000; Franchi, 2003). These policies have had a substantial impact on inequality between blacks and whites, contributing to the growth of black wealthy and middle-classes comprising a total of approximately ten million people (close to 20 percent of the population), and thus to the rapid deracialization of the wealthier sectors of the population (Louw, 2004; Seekings & Nattrass, 2005). However, their primary beneficiaries have generally been those already in a position to take advantage of them, while approximately 70 percent of the population, almost all black, remain systematically exploited and excluded in much the same way as they were under apartheid (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005; Terreblanche, 2003). As a result, inequality among blacks (and Africans in particular) has increased dramatically, while whites (although their share of wealth has been reduced somewhat) remain predominantly in the top 30 percent in terms of wealth, and continue to disproportionately own and manage the economy (Bhorat & Kanbur, 2007; Terreblanche, 2003).

There is thus both substantial post-apartheid continuity and discontinuity of the racial economic order that operated under apartheid, as significant changes have occurred with respect to the substantial emerging black middle class, while poverty, wealth and inequality remain significantly racialized. This has led Louw (2004:178) to refer to the post-apartheid economic system as one of “blurred racial capitalism” (as opposed to the racial capitalism of apartheid), referring to the way in which the apartheid-era racial cleavage is now somewhat obscured or blurred, but remains largely intact in many respects.
In the following sections, I turn to an examination of how people in South Africa (re)produce and use these complex race-class dynamics in ordinary episodes of interaction. I turn first to an examination of the content of common-sense connections between race and class, and the ways in which these connections are recurrently oriented to and taken for granted, often collaboratively, by speakers in my data. I then explore in more detail some ways in which these common-sense connections can constitute interactional resources that speakers can deploy in the course of producing ordinary actions-in-interaction (cf., for e.g., Hansen, 2005; Kitzinger, 2005a; Whitehead & Lerner, 2009). First, however, I provide a brief description of the data and method drawn upon in the analysis that follows.

Data

The data set consisted of approximately 115 hours of interactional radio shows broadcasted on three different South African radio stations. This includes several hours of pilot data that were recorded in May 2006 and May to June 2007, in order to assess the feasibility of using radio broadcasts as a data source, with the remainder of the data recorded over a three-month period from March to June 2008. The data collection was designed to include 1) broadcasts with a high degree of interactivity (e.g., interviews with guests and calls from listeners), 2) both government-operated and independent radio stations, 3) radio stations that broadcast to a wide audience, either through conventional radio or streaming online, and 4) shows broadcasted at various times throughout the day. On this basis, and based on the geographical and other self-identifications

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4 It is important to note that, while I separate these two aspects of race-class common-sense (their content and their use as interactional resources) for analytic purposes, in practice (and as my analysis demonstrates) they are inextricably bound together in the ways in which they are mobilized in interactional episodes.
provided by callers in the data, it is likely that the recordings that make up the data corpus were heard or participated in by people from a broad cross-section of South African society. However, the data corpus is by no means intended or claimed to constitute a random or nationally representative sample, either of South African speakers or of interactions in post-apartheid South Africa. The data were analyzed using conversation analytic techniques (see, for e.g., Sacks, 1995; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, 2007), informed by ethnomethodological perspectives (see, for e.g., Garfinkel, 1967; Sacks, 1995), and aided by detailed transcripts\(^5\) (see Whitehead, 2011a, for further discussion of the data and methodological approach used in this study).

The Post-Apartheid Racial Common-Sense of Wealth and Poverty

Three broad aspects of common-sense linkages between race and class were recurrent in the data, namely connections between 1) the racial category “black” and poverty or lack of wealth, 2) the racial category “white” and wealth or class privilege, and 3) the racial category “black” and wealth, particularly newly-emerging (post-apartheid) wealth.\(^6\) In the discussion that follows,

\(^5\) A list of the transcription symbols utilized is provided by Jefferson (2004), and can be accessed at: http://www.liso.ucsb.edu/Jefferson/Transcript.pdf. In addition, a “Transcription Module” on Conversation Analytic transcription (which includes links to sound files exemplifying the features of speech production that the various transcription symbols are used to represent) can be accessed at: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/schegloff/TranscriptionProject/index.html

\(^6\) It is worth noting that, while white poverty has been treated as an issue of concern for well over 100 years in South Africa (Terreblanche, 2003), I have as yet not located any instances of white poverty being treated as a taken-for-granted, common-sense reality. Instead, poor white people, on the rare occasions on which they are mentioned, tend to be treated either as an historical problem or a contemporary anomaly.
I examine some illustrative cases in which these race-class intersections were (re)produced as taken-for-granted realities in contemporary South Africa.

Excerpt 1 shows an instance of speakers orienting to and collaboratively (re)producing common-sense links between blackness and poverty. In this case a caller, in the course of criticizing people who he claims have not been vocal enough in complaining about an “electricity crisis,” moves smoothly between using a racial category (“black”) and a class category (“poor”) to refer to those he is criticizing. In doing so, and with the collaboration of his recipient (the host of the show), the caller treats as taken-for-granted an association between the categories “black” and “poor,” such that they can be used as proxies for one another.

Excerpt 1:

[172 – SAfm 4-28-08]

1 C: .hhh I was disappointed not to hear from- from- from our black friends um: about the electricity crisis, uh- I-
2 I- I: think they suffer the most and it was just white people phoning in to your station, .hh[h
3 H: [I’ll tell you why:, uh=well sorry no le- I’m interrupting, sorry.
4 (.)
5 C: No I- I would just encourage them to share: (. ) to share the crisis that they have cause I think .hhh we all suffer but I think the poor people in: in the- in the-
6 outlying areas who can’t afford other forms of- of- of-

7 The caller is apparently referring to a period during which demands for electricity in South Africa were exceeding supply capacity, resulting in regular interruptions of electricity supply to substantial numbers of households.
The caller begins by expressing his disappointment that “our black friends” have failed to call in to the radio station during a discussion of the “electricity crisis” to share their experiences, claiming that “they suffer the most,” but that “it was just white people phoning in to your station” (see lines 1-4). This raises a potential puzzle regarding the basis for the caller’s claim that black people “suffer” more than white people as a result of events such as this. Following a foreclosed response from the host (which I return to shortly), the caller explicitly reveals the basis of this claim by referring to the same group of people he had previously formulated racially, as “our black friends,” but this time using a class category, “poor people” (line 10). In doing so, he treats “black friends” as effectively synonymous and interchangeable with “poor people.” Moreover, the connection between these two formulations of the same group of people is further strengthened by the caller’s repetition of the word “suffer(ing)” shortly following both formulations (see lines 3, 9 and 12). In addition, his use of the term “outlying areas” (line 11) invokes the spatial arrangements legislated by the apartheid regime (see

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8 This reference to “our black friends” is an instance of an affiliative racial categorization that appears to be designed to manage the potential delicacy of complaining about “racial others” (i.e., members of racial categories other than that of which a speaker is an incumbent). See Whitehead (2010, 2011) for further analysis of this practice. It is also worth noting the caller’s apparent assumption that he can accurately racially identify other callers based on the on-air voice samples they provide during their calls. I examine both of these phenomena in more detail in forthcoming reports.
Christopher, 1997), thereby further reinforcing the race-class intersections the caller has drawn upon, and implicitly linking them to the apartheid era.

The host’s responses to the caller demonstrate his collaboration with the common-sense race-class links the caller is drawing on. He initially begins to respond in line 5 (even though the caller has projected, by taking a long in-breath in line 4, that he is going to continue), but then cuts himself off and apologizes for interrupting, thereby tacitly inviting the caller to continue (lines 5-6). Although he does not at this time complete the response he began, it is noteworthy that before cutting himself off he was projectably headed towards producing an account for why the people referred to by the caller have not called the radio station to complain (“I’ll tell you why,” lines 5-6). It is thus apparent that the host was not about to treat the caller’s claim as a puzzle, instead showing his understanding of the caller’s claims to the degree that he was prepared to address the matter of why the “black friends” mentioned by the caller were not inclined to share their experiences on-air. Furthermore, in his next response (see line 15), the Host displays agreement with the caller (line 15), thereby tacitly aligning (cf. Sacks, 1995; Schegloff, 1992) with the caller’s common-sense equation of “black” with “poor.” Common-sense links between race and class (specifically blackness and poverty) are thus treated as unproblematic, and collaboratively produced as taken-for-granted, by both the caller and host.

Excerpt 2 shows another instance of the taken-for-granted association between blackness and poverty, as well as the converse links between whiteness and wealth or privilege. Prior to this excerpt, a caller has raised the issue of the high rates of violent crime in South Africa, and has questioned why government officials are not more outraged or willing to talk about the issue. In responding to her, the host constructs a narrative of “hypocrisy” in South Africa’s justice system, drawing on these common-sense links between race and class in the course of arguing
that some criminals are treated differently than others as a result of poverty being largely a legacy of apartheid.

Excerpt 2:
[156 - Safm 4-25-08]
1 H: You know what it is?
2 (,)
3 H: We are in that conundrum, (0.2) where there’s a bit of hypocrisy >you see?< .hh We have a lot of poor people in this country, .hh
4 C: [Unfortunatel[y (it’s still there.)
5 H: [Ja- we- eh uh lu- le- hear me out here. .hh They’re poor, .hh and that poverty came
6 C: [Mm.
7 H: supposedly, .hh or definitely:, (.m- for most of us, .hh from this apartheid thing, you see? [.hhh
8 C: [Which was evil,
9 H: Okay, which was wrong, .hh and then (.m- now we’ve got (.m- crime. (.m- Now guess what? .hh White people (.m- are getting hurt, right? .hh So, the hypocrisy says .hh "well, it’s a poor guy:, .hh and that’s a white guy, .hh you know, .hh just don’t (.m- be too hard about it.” [.hh That’s where the
10 C: [(hh)
11 H: problem is. .hh The integrity should say (0.2) "I do not care.
12 C: (Yeah.)
13 H: How you became poor, where you got poor, .hh as a country,
(0.2) it is not allowed for you to steal. (.) Okay? [h

C:

[No.

H: That’s what we’ve got in our constitution. [hh Let alone

murder somebody. [h So we gonna klap you. ([“klap” is an Afrikaans

word meaning “hit” that is frequently employed in colloquial South

African English.])

Of particular significance in the host’s account is his production of an asymmetrical reference (see Whitehead & Lerner, 2009), constructing a contrast between “a poor guy” and “a white guy” (line 16). This reference is asymmetrical in the sense that it involves contrastive references to members of categories from two distinct collections, namely class (“poor”) and race (“white”). By producing a reference in this form, the host implicitly connects the two collections of categories, thereby tacitly racialising the category “poor” and tacitly treating the category “white” as class-relevant (cf. Whitehead & Lerner, 2009). In this way, the host orients to and reproduces common-sense connections between black poverty and white wealth, while using these taken-for-granted connections as resources for producing an account in response to the caller.

The host also mobilizes, in the course of his account, other common-sense connections between race and class. The first of these appears in the connection he draws between the current prevalence of poverty in South Africa and the previous system of apartheid (see lines 4-5, 8, and 10-11). By suggesting that contemporary poverty is a direct result of apartheid, the host implicitly racializes those experiencing poverty, drawing on common-sense knowledge of the ways in which the apartheid system was designed to privilege white South Africans at the expense of their black counterparts. A second apparent link between race and class is evident in
the host’s suggestion that “white people (. ) are getting hurt” (lines 14-15). In making this claim, the host appears to be drawing on a narrative of white people becoming crime victims at the hands of poor (black) people as a result of being perceived as beneficiaries of the privileged class status conferred upon them under the apartheid system.

Despite the complex nature of the common-sense linkages the host appears to be deploying, and despite the fact that a lot of his apparent reasoning remains taken-for-granted and unspoken, his recipient (the caller) shows no evidence of having difficulty in understanding his account. On the contrary, she displays agreement or understanding in several places throughout the host’s account (see lines 6, 9, 12, 21, 24). As in case of Excerpt 1, this attests to both the collaborative treatment of the common-sense knowledge and reasoning the host is drawing upon as being commonly understood, and to the collaborative process of its reproduction in interactions such as this one (cf. Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984).

Excerpt 3 illustrates the third aspect of common-sense links between race and class mentioned above, namely speakers’ orientations to an association between blackness and wealth – and more specifically, in contrast to the links between black poverty and the apartheid system shown in the previous excerpts, newly-emerging black wealth. This excerpt is drawn from an interview with a guest who works as a guide for a range of outdoor and adventure sports and activities. In responding to a question from the host about the cost of these activities (line 1), the guest describes the increasing numbers of people who are coming to see them as good value for money, using as an illustrative example his observations of a recent increase in the number of “black people doing caravanning” (lines 16-17). This use of black people as an illustrative example appears to be designed to dispel the common-sense view that activities such as these are the domain of white people – a view that the host and guest have already discussed previously in
the interview. However, it also rests on the unspoken assumption that substantial numbers of black South Africans are not only developing an interest in participating in these activities, but have the kind of middle class lifestyles and resources required to enable them to do so.

Excerpt 3:
[132 - SAfm 4-23-08]
1 H: Is it quite expensive, Jeff?
2 G: Um, (.) I think more and more people- (.) in- in the beginning people found it to be: ex- expensive especially:
3 u:m our local tourists, South African tourists. .h[hh
5 H: [("Ja.")]
6 G: U:m, but increasingly people are finding that it’s- .hh
7 (0.2) it’s (.) it’s more (.) exciting and mor- and- and-
8 and fun .hh to spend that amount of money, an- (.) something that you really (0.6) enjoy, .hh instead of spending: .hh
9 six to seven hundred rand just (n-) (.) sitting: hh next to
10 a pool at a- at a- at a .hh (.). fairly mediocre hotel. hh
12 .h[hh So:
13 H: [O- or drinking it away [at some uh cocktail bar I guess.
14 G: [Or drinking it away you know. .hh
15 So: (0.2) more and more people are- are: I mean I’ve seen
16 now, over the last year, an increase in: for example .hh u:m
17 (.). uh: black people doing caravanning for example you know
18 because .hh it is becoming: (0.2) a better option: (.) for-
19 for holidaying you know where .hh you really: where you
20 really feel (.). hh the country around you. h So: .h[hh
21 H: [O- If
The temporal formulations the guest uses in his response to the host’s question contribute
to the production of common-sense black wealth as newly-emerging. That is, the guest initially
formulates a period (“in the beginning,” lines 2-3) during which “South African tourists” found
these types of activities “expensive.” He then contrasts this with a more recent period (“now,
over the last year,” line 16) during which “black people” are participating in increasing numbers.
In light of his apparent use of common-sense race-class links in constructing this example, this
temporal contrast appears to allude to the relatively recent emergence of the middle class black
people the guest is tacitly referring to. In this way, black wealth, and newly-emerging black
wealth in particular, serves as an unspoken backdrop underpinning the guest’s claims.

Unlike the previous two excerpts, the host does not actively collaborate in the common-
sense the caller is apparently drawing on by showing agreement or understanding. However,
following the guest’s possible completion of his response at line 20, the host produces his next
question (lines 21-23). In doing so he treats the guest’s prior answer as adequate, thereby
indicating no difficulties in understanding or accepting the answer and the common-sense
knowledge underpinning it, and contributing to the production of the common-sense as unspoken
Using Race-Class Common-Sense

While I have focused primarily in the previous section on the common-sense race-class connections mobilized by speakers, it is clear that this common-sense is not produced independently of the actions during whose production it is deployed, but instead is being *used to do things* in interactions. That is, in Excerpt 1, the caller uses it in the course of producing a complaint; in Excerpt 2, the host uses it in the course of accounting for the behavior of government officials, as observed by a caller; and in Excerpt 3, the guest uses it to answer a question and, more specifically, to illustrate a claim he is making in favor of the types of activities in which he makes a living. In this section I take up these features of speakers’ use of common-sense race-class intersections in more detail, examining additional data that further illustrate their mobilization as interactional resources.

A first case is shown in Excerpt 4, which is drawn from later in the same call shown in Excerpt 1 above. In this part of the call, the host responds to the caller’s complaint, challenging his claim that poor black people “suffer the most” when electricity supplies are interrupted. Although the host disagrees with the caller, he deploys in the course of disagreeing the self-same common-sense race-class linkages that emerged from the caller’s complaint. Specifically, he uses taken-for-granted assumptions about race and poverty as resources in accounting for why it should be expected that those about whom the caller has complained would not be more vocal about the “electricity crisis.”

Excerpt 4:

[172 - SAfm 4-28-08]

1  H:  But the- you know what the joke is Dwayne? .hh When *your*
2     *you- you* (.) *have* electricity (.) .hh *coming* to your *house*,


but [you constantly get cut off because you can’t afford

C: ((Ja, I know.))

H: to pay for it, .hh because the economy is not really working

with you. .hh [When you come to power cuts, you are more

C: [Ja (but look the-)

H: used to it than the guy in Sandton, .hh who’s got the

generator going a lot of food [in the fridge, .hh da da

C:  

H: da, .h that’s gonna rot, if it’s- it’s not gonna happen.

. hh So you will get that those who are hit the most .h are

the ones who are gonna complain the most.

In his account, the host claims that those whose silence the caller has complained about are actually affected the least by power cuts, rather than being affected the most as the caller has claimed. In doing so, he resists the logic of the caller’s assumptions regarding which types of people “suffer the most,” while leaving intact the common-sense category of “poor black” that the caller has implicitly constructed. Moreover, the host reinforces the race-class common-sense the caller has produced, describing what he treats as common experiences of the “black friends”/“poor people” the caller identified as the targets of his criticism (lines 1-3 and 5-6), and using this description as a resource for claiming that such people are “used to” (line 8) living without electricity.

The host also draws a contrast between the type of people the caller has complained about and a “guy in Sandton” who he suggests would be more affected by power cuts, and therefore would be more vocal about the situation (see lines 8-9 and 11-13). This may serve to further reinforce race-class common-sense by allusively (particularly through his reference to
Sandton, an affluent Johannesburg suburb that was reserved for white people under apartheid) setting up a hypothetical wealthy white person in contrast to the poor black people he and the caller have been talking about (cf. Whitehead’s, 2007, 2009 analyses of allusions to race, and geographical locations as proxies for race in particular).

A more explicit use of white wealth as an interactional resource is shown in Excerpt 5, in which a speaker uses it as a resource for joking. Prior to the stretch of interaction shown in the excerpt, the host and caller have discussed a study that reported substantial racial inequalities in income levels in South Africa. Following this discussion, the caller questions how such inequalities can “after fourteen years of democracy, still exist” (lines 2-3). In responding to the caller, the host uses common-sense knowledge of white wealth as a basis for a joking suggestion that the caller’s “short term solution…is to find a white girlfriend” (lines 9 and 11).

Excerpt 5:
[606 – 702 Talk Radio 5-9-08]

1 C: Ja so now I- I need somebody that is clued up hheh .hh with
2  
3 after fourteen years of democracy, still exist, (and-)
4 H: [.hhh This is the
5  
6 affirmative action and all the rest of it because if you look
7 at the reality if you look at where the money is, and who’s
8 got the power, obviously that need to change, or it needs to
9 be leveled out at least, .hh but I th[ink your short term
10 C: [Mm.
11 H: solution Zakele, .hh is to find a white girlfriend. ((smile
The host’s response initially acknowledges the importance of the issue, and its relationship to affirmative action policies (lines 4–6), before linking the issue to the overall distribution of money and power (lines 7–9). Although he does not mention race explicitly, it is clear in the context of the foregoing discussion of racial inequalities in income that these distributional claims are references to racialized patterns of wealth and status. These implicitly-produced, race-class intersections then serve as the basis for the host to joke that finding a “white girlfriend” is a favorable “short-term solution” available to the caller in the face of such patterns of inequality. That is, the host jokingly suggests that the caller could be understood as being in a disadvantaged class position by virtue of being black, and that he could improve his position by sharing in the taken-for-granted wealth of a hypothetical white partner.9

In response, the caller first initiates “repair” (see, for e.g., Schegloff, 1992) in line 15, and then (just after the host has begun to repeat the joke), displays his appreciation of the joke, and

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9 Two other features of the common-sense knowledge deployed by the host in this joke are worth noting. Firstly, he treats racial identification of the caller as an unproblematic matter, even though the caller has not explicitly racially self-identified (cf. Excerpt 1 above). Secondly, he is apparently oriented to normative heterosexuality by virtue of suggesting that a potential partner for the caller would necessarily be female (cf. Kitzinger, 2005b).
his understanding of the common-sense knowledge it was based on, by laughing along with the host (lines 16-17). In this way, consistent with the cases discussed above, the caller collaborates with the host in producing as taken-for-granted the race-class common-sense underpinning the joke.

A final case, shown in Excerpt 6, illustrates a caller’s use of taken-for-granted black wealth as a resource for complaining about the policy of racial quotas (a particularly controversial aspect of post-apartheid affirmative action policies) in elite sports teams. In his complaint, the caller argues that the quota system focuses solely on race at the expense of recognizing the importance of class, and that as a result it unfairly advantages black athletes from wealthy backgrounds at the expense of less wealthy white athletes.

Excerpt 6:

[401 - 702 Talk Radio 3-26-08]

((Caller addressing the issue of racial quotas in sports))

1  C:  I- I just think we need to distinguish subtly between .hh
2       development of young players and the quota system.
3  H:  Okay.
4  C:  Um:: (.) I'm looking specifically let's say .h my son is
5       in uh (. ) standard six at a government school, .h born in
6       nineteen ninety four, the new South Africa, (0.2) .hh I mean
7       (in) four years' time he'(ll) be the same age as: Francois
8       Steyn wa[s when he was selected for Springboks or super
9  H:  [Mm.
10  C:  fourteen.
11  H:  Ja.
12  C:  Now they- under the quota system a black guy who went to
Michaelhouse, or (. ) Hilton, or one of those schools, .hh
will get preference (0.2) then the su- my son who's been at
a government school or other white kids who've been at
government school[s.
H: [Mm.
(0.7)
C: So I think (i- i-) you know the difference needs to
be on development of the under com- u- (. ) the under
privileged communities.
H: Yes. I [agree with you.
C: [Ra-
C: Rather than (0.5) putting a- a- a- a- a person of
color into a side just because he’s (a/of) color
irrespective of whe[ther he’s got a degree, and
H: [Ja.
C: . h[ how rich his parents are. (E-) [Cause nobody’s
H: [Sure. [Mm.
C: looking at the richness of the parents they’re
just looking at the color of the skin.
H: [Sure.

The caller produces his complaint by contrasting a hypothetical “black guy who went to
Michaelhouse, or (. ) Hilton” (both exclusive and highly-resourced private high schools) with
“my son who's been at a government school or other white kids who've been at government
schools” (lines 12-16). He thus draws on common-sense knowledge of the disparities in
resources between private and government high schools, and the accompanying advantages for
young athletes resulting from attending private schools. This in turn is based on the taken-for-
granted assumption that there are significant numbers of black families with sufficient wealth to pay the fees required for their children to attend schools like these, such that a policy that fails to take account of their existence could be seen as unfair. The caller thus treats the quota system as assuming taken-for-granted black poverty, and challenges it by drawing on taken-for-granted black wealth. The caller concludes his complaint by making this common-sense more explicit, suggesting that the quota system erroneously treats race as a proxy for class, “looking at the color of the skin” (line 13) at the expense of considering “the richness of the parents” (line 12).

Once again (as in many of the previous cases), the recipient (the host) collaborates with the speaker’s use of common-sense race-class intersections, agreeing with the caller on several occasions (lines 4, 9, 11 and 14). He thereby displays his recognition of, and alignment with, the common-sense knowledge the caller is drawing on.

Conclusions
The data I have presented provide evidence of continuities and discontinuities between the apartheid and post-apartheid periods with respect to common-sense knowledge about race-class intersections in South Africa. The content of this common-sense knowledge points to the enduring nature of the legacies of apartheid, not just in the material structures of the society described in the Introduction to this chapter, but also in the ways in which ordinary people make sense of the patterns of wealth, poverty and inequality they observe around them. However, common-sense knowledge about race and wealth not always overlapping is also emerging, in contrast with otherwise taken-for-granted assumptions of black poverty and white privilege resulting from apartheid policies and their legacy. This demonstrates some ways in which the post-apartheid changes in the relative material conditions of people of different racial categories
described above have come to be reflected in everyday common-sense. These findings suggest that the category systems that were centrally important during apartheid have retained their significance in the post-apartheid period, but the content of the common-sense knowledge associated with the categories, and the relationships between them, appears to be more malleable (cf. Tilly, 1998; Whitehead & Lerner, 2009). In this sense, they provide evidence of the observable impacts of social changes, such as those that have occurred in South Africa, at the level of everyday interactional practices.

This analysis also points to a mechanism through which common-sense associations between race and class are produced and reproduced. That is, each time such common-sense knowledge is oriented to or deployed, and particularly when this occurs collaboratively, it is reinforced as being relevant or consequential. Moreover, as the data demonstrate, the utility of this common-sense knowledge as a resource for the production of ordinary actions (such as complaining, accounting, answering, disagreeing, joking, and so on) provides a basis for its ongoing production and reproduction in the course of everyday interactions. In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that, although matters of both race and class are topicalized in various ways in the interactions I have examined, the common-sense links between them are recurrently not examined or interrogated, instead remaining largely taken-for-granted even as they are deployed as interactional resources. Thus, in using this common-sense knowledge, speakers and recipients recurrently leave much unspoken, treating its relevance as self-evident rather than specifying or interrogating precisely why or how it is relevant. That this does not recurrently (if ever) result in difficulties in understanding among co-participants points to the interactional accomplishments involved in producing this type of common-sense knowledge as an unproblematic backdrop to the matters they are discussing.
Finally, and in light of the above points, these findings demonstrate the significance of everyday talk-in-interaction as a site at which social structures (for example, those related to race and class) are both reflected and reproduced. Thus, on the one hand, common-sense knowledge about South Africa’s race and class structures (both historical and contemporary), and the ongoing links between them, is mobilized as an interpretive resource whenever speakers mention or orient to race-class intersections in the course of their interactions. At the same time, everyday interactions provide an ever-present set of places in which race-class common-sense can be made relevant, and thereby get renewed and reproduced, but also resisted and challenged.

References


