Literary Criticism after the Revolution, or How to Read a Polemical Postmodern Literary Text

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My paper will formulate a model for reading literary texts written either at the inception or as a continuation of the politics of subjectivity that came into existence in the United States in the nineteen-fifties and sixties, a politics organized around racial, gender and sexual identities to advocate rights, representation and, in some instances, revolution. Like many literary texts and theories of language of the postmodern era, these texts treat politics and language as inextricably intertwined, though their primary aim is not so much to dismantle the dominant discourse as to generate "minor" political subjectivities.

From a poststructuralist critical perspective, these texts often appear unreadable because they approach the intersection of politics, identity and textuality differently than other literary—or for that matter, philosophical—texts. The language of these texts is the language of force, polemic and struggle, rather than the *langue* of domination, structure and empire. It is also the language of the body, not as text, but as vehicle for transforming individual subjectivity into group subjectivity. With their construction of the felt or lived body as the vital link between language and materiality, individual and collective, politics and literature, these writers create a discourse of the other-as-other which not merely subverts but in certain instances defies the sociolinguistic rules of the dominant discourse.

The "revolution" I am "reading after" must also refer to the revolution in our understanding of subjectivity wrought by the poststructuralists, whose critique of the Western metaphysical tradition connected politics, philosophy and literature in unprecedented ways. Vincent Pecora summarizes the subversive legacy of poststructuralism in terms of its critique of essentialism, the argument that stable identities are in effect linguistic fictions or historical constructions; its critique of representation, the insistence that language is not neutral or fixed but slanted and unstable; and its critique of utilitarianism and instrumental thinking (64).
He suggests, however, that despite its obvious relevance to oppositional political discourses concerning issues of race, gender and sexuality, post-structuralism itself cannot be considered an oppositional political discourse.

Pecora contends that the poststructuralist critique of "the West" stepped in to fill the political vacuum left behind in the nineteen-fifties by Marxism's failure to deal with questions of empire and third-world revolution. It is this circumstance, Pecora maintains, that accounts for the "political aura" which has surrounded poststructuralism since its inception. His argument suggests that if there had been a competing materialist, anti-imperialist discourse at that particular historical moment, poststructuralism might not have inherited the Marxist mantle of political engagement—or at least, it would have had to work a little harder for it.

Is poststructuralism structurally incapable of generating a material politics or is this merely a side-effect of its original incarnation as a "philosophical response to philosophical problems" (Pecora 75)? Pecora points out that poststructuralism's project of "dismantling Western habits of thought from the inside out" (60), has ironically precluded its consideration of any discourse other than Western philosophy. In the same vein, it is my contention that poststructuralism—particularly deconstruction—despite its emphasis on the unknowability of language and despite its subversive trafficking of difference, has paradoxically followed the trajectory of Western idealism in upholding the mind/body split in its critique of the subject. It is the failure to adequately theorize the body in relation to subjectivity that accounts for the peculiar apoliticism of such a seemingly revolutionary theoretical practice.

My assertion that poststructuralist thought has avoided theorizing the body may come as a surprise to anyone acquainted with the work of Michel Foucault, but I would argue that Foucault essentially eluded the debate over subjectivity when he moved to "dispense with the constituent subject, and to get rid of the subject itself... to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework" (Foucault 117). To replace the subject with the socio-historical constitution of the subject is not to materialize and politicize the metaphorical subject, but to embody hegemonic practices in the subject. The subject thus comes to occupy the position traditionally assigned to the body by
idealistic philosophers from Plato to Kant, i.e. the position of object. Foucault has theorized the body as object and equated it with the (death of the) subject.

In his critique of poststructuralism, Perry Anderson makes the argument that "the only cognitive bases for structures of knowledge are the subjects who produce and are in turn shaped by them" (qtd. in Pecora 70). Derrida’s and Foucault’s failure to deconstruct the mind/body split necessarily results in an inadequate theorization of the tension between subject and structure because they cannot really envision a resistant subjectivity. Certainly the humanist subject, the avatar of Western imperialism, comes apart in language and is pulled apart by rhetoric; deconstructed, it loses its illusionary unity and originary power and collapses back into the system that produces it. But is that the end of subjectivity?

For the writers I consider here, Kathy Acker and Amiri Baraka/Leroi Jones, it is only the beginning and it is necessarily the beginning of any meaningful criticism of their work as well. Acker and Baraka/Jones extend the critique of the unified subject to encompass the mind/body split, treating the deconstruction of this opposition not merely as a function of language but as an ontological principle. For these writers, subjectivity is formed through interaction with the felt body, the body as it is lived, as it contributes to thought—the body-subject, not the body-object. Their goal in representing this subjectivity is to construct a particularized body politic—a female body politic and black body politic, respectively—to mediate between subject and structure, preventing the collapse of subject into structure by creating a locus of resistance in between.

How is this felt body, this body-subject, produced? Emmanuel Levinas suggests that it is called forth in speech: until the body-subject speaks it can only be understood by the other as an "insensate body-thing" (Stone 42). Marked by the particulars of race and gender, the black man and the white woman, when juxtaposed to the universal subject of metaphysics, are prevented from speaking and forcibly equated with the untranscendent, the "insensate body-thing." In order to speak at all, they must in turn force their speech upon a hostile other, insisting upon their own body-subjectivity.

In other words, they must deliver a polemic. Speaking from within an always already deconstructed mind/body split, they
must challenge the separation of language from materiality, pronouncing those words which come too close to the experience of the lived body and are suppressed as “obscene.” Conversely, they must highlight the materiality of language through experimental textual practices, linking their metaphysical critique to stylistic innovation. Their characters must function as subjects of collective enunciation, rather than as individuals, if they are to create a particularized body politic, a locus from which the body-subject may speak freely. This is to say, they must aspire to a kind of “hyperrealism” which does not allow language to function as a closed system but requires that it be open to its other, the body-subject.

Any critic working on Leroi Jones/Amiri Baraka is faced from the outset with the absence of an even nominally unified subject. Until 1967, he published as Leroi Jones and, after 1967, as Imamu (Spiritual Leader) Amiri Baraka (Blessed Prince). Most critics choose one or the other name in the interest of clarity and in doing so tend to construct Baraka/Jones as an evolving subject—evolving from hypocritical literary “whiteness” to sincere revolutionary “blackness”—rather than as a subjectivity constituted by oppositions, tensions, confrontations, sudden breaks and inextricable ties. By representing Baraka/Jones with a slash construction, I hope to allow one part of his body of work to exist in concert and in contradiction with the other, without imposing an overarching evolutionary—or indeed, revolutionary—narrative on the whole.

Baraka/Jones’s literary career began with his association with the Beat poets in Greenwich Village from 1961 to 1965. As he explained at the time: “the reason I always associate with the people thought of as beats is that they’re outside the mainstream of American vulgarity” (Stone 42). Like Allen Ginsburg and William Burroughs, Baraka/Jones sought in his early writing to counter the vulgarity of nineteen-fifties conformism with a certain non-conformist vulgarity. He stipulates in a later interview, however, that even in his Beat period, his focus was always on “blackness”: “The writing from the earliest published work is always a concern with the identity of black—my identity of black and what is blackness and just the whole style of being black people.” (Baraka/Jones qtd. in Hudson 20).
"Hymn for Lanie Poo," published in 1961, attacks the hypocrisy of a black community which misidentifies with "whiteness" and seeks to expel the other, which is "blackness":

my sister is a school teacher
my sister took ballet lessons
my sister has a fine figure: never diets
my sister doesn't like to teach in Newark
because there are too many colored
in her classes
my sister hates loud shades
my sister's boy friend is a faggot music teacher
who digs Tschaikovsky
my sister digs Tschaikovsky also
it is because of this similarity of interests
that they will probably get married.
Smiling & glad/in
the huge & loveless
white-anglo sun/of
benevolent step
mother America. (10)

The speaker describes his sister as being both mentally and physically schooled in whiteness: she takes ballet lessons, she doesn't diet—but the implication is she would if she had to, she "digs" Tschaikovsky. She is not only well-schooled in whiteness, she is also a schoolteacher, teaching an inferredly Eurocentric curriculum to "coloreds" in Newark, object-things with whom she does not identify.

At the same time Baraka/Jones makes it clear that generating an African-American consciousness requires more than simply replacing Eurocentrism with Afrocentrism. The speaker's ironic description of his typical week as an African-American man underscores the fact that the conflict between European and African culture is, in fact, constitutive of African-American identity:

Monday, I spent most of the day hunting.
Knocked off about six, gulped down a couple of monkey forskins, then took in a flick. Got to bed early.
Tuesday, same thing all day. (Caught a mangy lioness with one tit.) Ate. Watched television for awhile. Read the paper, then hit the sack. (6)

Though in his “Beat” period, Baraka/Jones can be seen to critique the black bourgeoisie’s schizophrenic adherence to Eurocentric values, he stops short of attempting to transform the black body-object into a body-subject. While concerned with black identity, his work from this period is very “beat” in its sense of despair and alienation. It is interesting, however—particularly in light of Baraka/Jones’s use of the epithet “faggot” here—to note that two of his plays from this period, The Baptism and The Toilet, employ the figure of the gay male to critique social conformism and the denigration of the body, themes he later explores in a specifically African-American context. In The Baptism this parallel is particularly strong; the character of the Homosexual is martyred for challenging the mind/body split perpetuated and exploited by the Church:

The pride of life is life. And flesh must make its move. I am the sinister lover of love. The mysterious villain of thought. I love my mind, my asshole too. I love all things. As they are issued from you know who. God. God. God. God. Go-od. The great insouciant dilettante. My lovers, priests, immolated queers, how many other worlds are there, less happy, less sorrowful than ours? (15)

Though in The Baptism the gay man is considered the champion of body-subjectivity, Baraka later comes to associate homosexuality almost exclusively with a certain literariness divorced from material concerns. The body-subjectivity which in his Beat period Baraka/Jones attributes to the homosexual he later situates in African-American culture, particularly in the blues and jazz. He says of the blues: “The blues was conceived by freedmen and ex-slaves—if not as the result of a personal or intellectual experience, at least as an emotional confirmation of, and reaction to, the way in which most Negroes were still forced to exist in the United States” (“Swing” 33). Blues constitutes for Baraka/Jones a shared body-subjectivity, “autonomous and inviolable” by whites be-
cause tied to the "peculiar social, cultural, economic, and emotional experience of a black man in America" (37).

It is only with the blues' mutation into jazz that this shared body-subjectivity speaks to whites; blues always remains for Baraka/Jones an "ethno-historic rite as basic as blood" (ibid.). By contrast, Baraka/Jones maintains, jazz was "a music capable of reflecting not only the Negro and a black America but a white America as well" (38). This was the case because jazz "offered such a profound reflection of America that it could attract white Americans to want to play it or listen to it for exactly that reason" (38). Baraka/Jones cautions, however, that "the reaction of young white musicians to jazz was not always connected to an understanding of the Negro," since jazz was not as directly tied to the social, cultural, economic and emotional experience of black Americans as was the blues.

One could describe the civil rights movement from the nineteen-fifties up until the mid-sixties in terms analogous to those Baraka/Jones uses to describe jazz, as offering such a profound reflection of America that it could attract white Americans to want to play along. Using the African-American experience of oppression as the foundation for a discourse on universal equality, Martin Luther King, Jr., for instance, could put forth his vision of a just America to the nation as a whole (Chafe 135). One would have to note as well that black Americans' particular experience of oppression continued and continues outside the courts and in the streets on the more fundamental level of body-subjectivity, a specific experience the intensity of which a universalized civil rights discourse could not convey. Hence the turn to polemic in African-American political discourse in general in the late sixties, and in Baraka/Jones's writing in particular, a return to a body-subjectivity that would now be made heard.

Thus in 1968, at the height of what is termed his black nationalist period, Baraka/Jones publishes "Jazz and the White Critic," which takes the white critic to task for complaining of "bad taste" in jazz and in the blues. Baraka/Jones retorts: "'bad taste’ was kept extant in the music, blues or jazz, because the Negroes who were responsible for the best of the music were always aware of their identities as black Americans and really did not, themselves, desire to become vague, featureless, Americans" (180). In "Black
Art" he calls for “live words of the hip world live flesh & coursing blood. Hearts Brains Souls splintering fire” (219). He concludes:

> We want a black poem. And a Black World. 
> Let the world be a Black Poem
> And Let All Black People Speak This Poem
> Silently
> or LOUD. (220)

Any reading of Baraka/Jones’s polemical black nationalist texts requires the awareness of his commitment to creating a black body politic or political consciousness. It is necessary as well to understand the complex critique of subjectivity manifested in his deceptively simple polemical style. The writing of this period both is and is not open to the white other: Baraka/Jones is constructing a polemical “otherness” which makes itself heard without asking for understanding. This polemical otherness manipulates its own body-objectivity, calling up the stereotypes whites do possess only to exceed these stereotypes with a body-subjectivity that is inviolable—less violable, in effect, than the body-object. Formed in relation to the stereotype, this otherness registers not merely as body-subjectivity, but as a marked body-subjectivity, a black body-subjectivity.

You would be better off if you’d at least admit that you think women aren’t human and men are. You believe that women are wet washcloths you can use to wash the grime off different parts of your body or to fling into the face of another person (a male). Every time I talk to one of you, I feel like I’m taking layers of my own epidermis, which are layers of still freshly bloody scar tissue, black brown and red, and tearing each one of them off so more and more of my blood shoots into your face. This is what writing is to me a woman. (Acker Empire 209)

Like Baraka/Jones, Kathy Acker takes on the mind/body split in order to generate a viable political subjectivity—in her case, for women. The extraordinary language that results from the dissolution of this particular dichotomy has garnered Acker’s writing the label “experimental” which many writers perceive as the critical kiss of death. Ellen Friedman notes that “defined as the products of the devil or madness, or at least eccentricity, her books - as far
as the public is concerned—have no authority and are thus disarmed” (Friedman Now 40).

It is my contention that literary critics share the responsibility for this disarming of Acker, because we have not developed ways of reading her texts, despite the obvious feminist implications of her exploration of the body as an essential component of female subjectivity. This critical impasse is perhaps generated by the fact that Acker’s writing not only breaks the codes of accepted literary practice, but of accepted feminist practice as well. Acker’s writing has been dismissed as “obscene” or even “misogynist,” rather than understood as such. Acker herself insists that “an attack on the institutions of prison via language... demand(s) the use of a language or languages which aren’t acceptable, which are forbidden. Nonsense doesn’t per se break down the codes; speaking precisely what the codes forbid breaks the codes” (Empire 134).

Like Baraka/Jones, Acker incorporates into her critique of the unified metaphysical subject a deconstruction of the notion of authorial subjectivity. Where Baraka/Jones attaches one name to his early work, the other to writing published after 1966, Acker often constructs her titles in such a way as to make it seem that her text has two authors simultaneously, as in: The Childlike Life of the Black Tarantula by the Black Tarantula and My Death My Life by Pier Paolo Pasolini. Similarly, when she gives her other novels the titles and plots of classic texts, such as Don Quixote and Great Expectations, Acker, in her own words, challenges “the incredible egotism that resulted from a belief in phallic centrism” and is responsible for the notion of creativity (“A Few Notes” 34). In carrying out this critique she even goes so far as to transpose the characters and passages from other texts into her own narratives, depriving those texts and their creators of their singularity, their fixed position in the Western literary canon.

Acker’s assault on the unified authorial subject and the Western literary canon underscores the fact that, like her female protagonists, she must mediate her existence through texts already written, texts which figure her as an insensate body-thing. The dilemma of the female protagonist of Don Quixote, Don Quixote, is one which Acker, as a woman writer, shares: “BEING DEAD, DON QUIXOTE COULD NO LONGER SPEAK. BEING BORN INTO AND PART OF A MALE WORLD, SHE HAD NO SPEECH
OF HER OWN. ALL SHE COULD DO WAS READ MALE TEXTS WHICH WEREN'T HERS" (39).

In later works, Acker goes beyond deconstruction to attempt a kind of "realism" which emphasizes the material aspects of language. As she explains, "I have to use other texts when I write, that's just how I am, but now I don't have irony towards them. The irony is gone. I'm not interested in pulling them apart" ("Devoured by Myths" 24). Instead, Acker observes, "what I'm doing is simply taking text to be the same as world, to be equal to non-text" (13). In taking text to be "the same" as world, Acker does not convert world into text, but opens up text, or language, to materiality, to the body. She observes: "a sign is signifying something, but it also has its own aspects of sound, sight—its own materiality. It's always negotiating between its materiality and what it signifies" ("Kathy Acker Interviewed" 280).

The same can be said of Acker's female protagonists; they are always negotiating between their materiality and what it signifies in patriarchal culture, between the woman body-subject and the woman body-thing. Acker challenges the traditional alignment of women with nature and men with culture, not through references to a naturalized female body excluded from patriarchal discourse, but through a discourse generated by the female body as it is lived under patriarchy. One aspect of this body is that it in fact has no unity, it is not distinct from the mind in any way:

I didn’t have to cry, because, inside, my stomach and intestines were crying themselves into shreds as my blood, crying, dripped through its arteries and veins into the places it wasn’t supposed to go. My body bloated with the winds." (Empire 113)

Acker's use of affect similarly goes beyond the individual experiences of her characters to saturate her texts. As Douglas Dix observes, "her affects—expressions of anger, grief, suffering and pleasure—are nomadic weapons that reach beyond her own introspective feelings; they explode out of her interior onto the plane of exteriority" (58-9). I would add that they emphasize the pain and the pleasure that accompany any transgression of the mind/body divide.

Acker's use of obscenity can be understood as another means of keeping the body in pieces, pushing the reader toward that divide where "mind" and "body" no longer exist as discrete
concepts. It is interesting to note that the English language has no obscenity for "the body," but only for body parts and functions. The taboo falls upon the part, not the whole, because the part resists translation. The part must be fiercely objectified and denigrated, because it is a partial subjectivity that threatens.

Acker's brand of realism is elucidated perhaps most clearly in her 1988 novel, *Empire of the Senseless*. *Empire* is the result of Acker's brief but fertile flirtation with the genre of cyberpunk, a genre characterized by

its overwhelming fascination, at once celebratory and anxious, with technology and its immediate... effects upon human being-in-the-world, a fascination which sometimes spills over into the problematizing of reality itself. (Hollinger 205)

In many ways, *Empire* functions as an allegory for the process of coming-to-speech as a woman body-subject in patriarchal society. Abhor, the female protagonist of *Empire*, is a cyborg, "part black, part construct," from the start constituted as both body and not-body. Her monstrous ontology enables her to resist the mind/body split which plagues another female character in the novel:

Even though her IQ was high, she couldn’t understand how a high IQ and the desire to be loved as a female could exist together in one body. Since her body thus had to be monstrous, she refused to go out...” (31).

The novel’s first section, “Elegy for the Fathers,” in which Abhor undertakes to “kill the father on every level,” begins with her being raped by her father/stepfather (the confusion is intentional), the first of many rapes which occur throughout the narrative to Abhor and other female characters. Painful as it is, the breaking of the incest taboo results in the disappearance of the despotic figure of the Oedipal Father, who can exist only as law and language.

Released from her Oedipal identity as daughter, Abhor is free to wander the streets of Paris, discovering that materiality and language come together in her desire, a desire “which, endless, was limited neither by a solely material nor by a solely mental reality” (65). Everywhere Abhor looks, she sees some combination of physicality and mentality, or body and language. In the voodoo
practices of the Haitian revolutionaries plotting to take over the city, she realizes, "the physical (in reference to a human, the body), an axis; crosses the other axis, mentality (in a human, the mind). A cross; a crossroads; the problem of human identity" (64-5). The Haitians eventually kill their colonizers, the French, with poison, from which there is no escape. Abhor observes: "Poison entered the apartments of the bourgeoisie. There is a way to stop guns and bombs. There’s no way to stop poison which runs like water" (77).

In the second part of the novel, entitled “Alone,” Acker attempts to construct a society that "isn’t defined by Oedipal considerations," in which "taboos are no longer taboo" (Friedman “Conversation” 17). Abhor gravitates toward the pirate-sailor section of town, a marginal realm whose inhabitants resist and usurp the law in one and the same gesture, where “the knife of the hand will slice off the knife of the law” (Empire 114). This is the realm of (criminal) homosexuality and the tattoo, both practices which underscore that the path to body-subjectivity lies in “un-natural,” indeed guilty, uses of “the body.” The narrative leaves Abhor to follow the adventures of her mirror image, a male sailor named Agone, and the focus from the horror (Abhor) of the older order to the struggle (Agone), to live differently. This translation is made via Agone’s first tattoo.

The tattooer was drawing the outlines of a sailing ship. Reminiscence of that dreamtime when humans were free. Historically, criminality is the only freedom humans have had. Like the edges of a dream during the waking state, tattooing showed the sailor that dreams are made actual through pain. Humans make themselves and ‘re made through pain plus dreams. (138)

In the tattoo, Acker locates once more the coming together of “the material and not material.” For her, the tattoo is the most positive thing in Empire, because it “concerns taking over, doing your own sign-making” (Friedman “Conversation” 17).

In the third and final section of the novel, “Pirate Night,” Abhor realizes that even her criminal body-subjectivity is subject to reappropriation by the dominant discourse. In a scene borrowed from Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Abhor’s boyfriend Thivai and his gay friend Mark, standing in for Tom and Huck, concoct an elaborate plan to rescue Abhor (who unwittingly occupies the position of Twain’s Jim, the fugitive
slave), from jail. True to the spirit of Tom and Huck, they decide she’ll be a more romantic figure if she remains a prisoner. They decide to “make Abhor, though she was uneducated, or because she was uneducated, into a great writer so that she’s have a reason being in jail for the rest of her life. At that time,” Acker adds ironically, “society needed a great woman writer” (203).

Thivai and Mark cut Abhor’s thumb and show her how to write in her own blood, because, they insist, “writers need disability or madness they can overcome in order to write” (ibid.). When Abhor writes independently of her tutors, “FUCKFACES ALL MEN” and “THIS SHIP IS SINKING,” she is ridiculed as “a baby falling flat on her or his face” (204). When she writes her supposed liberators a note accusing them of collaborating to keep her in jail “by planning escapes so elaborate they had nothing to do with escape... [and] always fucking deciding what reality is and collaborating about these decisions,” Thivai and Mark merely giggle (210).

Abhor finally finds a motorcycle with which to make her own escape, but Thivai informs her that she cannot ride it unless she learns the rules of behavior written down in “The Highway Code.” When she attempts to drive using the Highway Code she gets in a series of absurd accidents and decides that “the problem with the following rules is that, if you follow rules, you don’t follow yourself” (219). Abhor then parks by the side of the road and begins to inscribe signs she has seen along the road onto the Code, alongside her own words. At the end of this palimpsest, Abhor places her own “sign,” a picture of a sword piercing a rose and the words “Discipline and Anarchy.” While this ostensible “new” sign at first appears to uphold the opposition between masculine technology (denoted) and feminine nature (denoted by the rose), Acker realizes that that division, too, is untenable:

Then I thought about how a sword pierces a cunt. Only my cunt is also me. The sword pierces me and my blood comes out.
It doesn’t matter who has handled and shoved in this sword. Once this sword is in me, it’s me. I’m the piercer and the pierced. (224)

Possessed of this “new sign,” Abhor begins to imagine “a world which is beautiful, a society which isn’t just disgust” (227).
In order to generate a critical response to Acker’s writing which isn’t itself “just disgust,” we as literary critics must also develop a new sign, or a new understanding of the sign might focus on the interplay between its signifying and its material properties, generating a critical practice that combines disciplined attention to the “rules” of language with the anarchic impulse not merely to subvert, but to defy them.

The most significant of these anarchic critical impulses, as it concerns both the authors I have considered here today, would be to take up the notion of body-subjectivity, not in place of deconstructive analyses of the body-object, but as a means of pushing beyond the mind/body divide. Much has been made of Nietzsche’s influence on the poststructuralists; it has been said that Nietzsche is in fact the one who put us in the prison-house of language by exposing truth to be a function of language. But Nietzsche also made war on the primacy of “consciousness” in Western thought and described the entire evolution of the spirit as “the history of the development of a higher body that emerges into our sensibility” (Nietzsche 358). What better place to look for the development of this “higher body” than the work of writers like Baraka/Jones and Acker, whose political commitment to representing the body-subjectivity of those known to dominant discourse only as body-objects is accompanied by a complex critique of the unified subject and a fundamental optimism concerning the possibilities of language.

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Special Issue
Paroles Gelées 14.2 1996

Selected Proceedings from UCLA's French Department Graduate Students' Interdisciplinary Conference
Ce serait le moment de philosopher et de rechercher si, par hasard, se trouverait ici l'endroit où de telles paroles dégèlent.

Rabelais, *Le Quart Livre*
Paroles Gelées was established in 1983 by its founding editor, Kathryn Bailey. The journal is managed and edited by the French Graduate Students' Association and published annually under the auspices of the Department of French at UCLA. Information regarding the submission of articles and subscriptions is available from the journal office:

Paroles Gelées
UCLA Department of French
2326 Murphy Hall
Box 951550
Los Angeles, California 90095-1550
(310) 825-1145
gelees@humnet.ucla.edu

Subscription price (per issue):
$10 for individuals
$12 for institutions
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