Hedgehogs and Foxes at the Crossroads: Leadership and Diversity at the University of California

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Abstract

Following Clark Kerr’s distinction between hedgehogs, or visionary leaders who know “one big thing,” and foxes, or shrewd leaders who know “many things,” this paper studies Kerr, an archetypical hedgehog, and David Gardner, a quintessential fox, as models for these two types of leaders. The paper also analyzes the hedgehog concept of systemic excellence, which was articulated during Kerr’s presidency and underpins the California Master Plan for Higher Education, and the rise of fox culture, with its focus on the pursuit of resources, which coincided with Gardner’s tenure as president. In addition, the paper examines diversity as an element that never became incorporated into the University of California’s (U.C.) hedgehog concept of systemic excellence, but rather has been dealt with in an ad-hoc, fox-like manner. The paper calls for a new hedgehog concept of systemic excellence for the University of California as the premier multicultural and international institution of higher learning in the 21st century.

Keywords: Leadership, Diversity, Hedgehog Concept, Fox Culture, Clark Kerr, David Gardner, University of California

While other countries are preparing their citizens for the demands of the knowledge-based global economy, the United States is privatizing its public institutions of higher learning, including the University of California (U.C.), which is facing the greatest crisis in its history.

Drastic budget cuts are reducing students' ability to obtain a university education at a time when more people, including more women and minorities, require access to the highest levels of learning. The university must have diverse leadership in order to articulate and implement a new vision for a state that is at the crossroads of history. In this paper, I will examine the administrative contributions of some key past U.C. presidents with the purpose of conceptualizing what is needed today. Reviewing the

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history of the U.C. from the point of view of leadership and diversity is necessary to begin to reflect about its future. How well we understand what has happened to us will determine how well we are able to meet the immense challenges we are facing. Business as usual will not do in this period of deep transformation. We need vision to imagine a future that will be very different indeed.

Hedgehogs and Foxes

The seventh century B.C. Greek poet Archilochus wrote: “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing” (Kerr, 2001a, p. 207). In his famous work The Hedgehog and the Fox, Berlin (1953) used this metaphor to distinguish between writers who “relate everything to a single central vision,” and those who “pursue many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory” (p. 1). While Berlin used this concept to shed light on Tolstoy, whom he saw as a fox trying to be a hedgehog, Kerr (2001a) employed it to distinguish between two different kinds of leaders: the shrewd fox and the visionary hedgehog. “The hedgehog tends to ‘preach’—‘passionate, almost obsessive,’ while the fox is ‘cunning’—clever, even sly. Order versus chaos, unity versus multiplicity, the big vision versus adjusting to miscellaneous unanticipated events, certainty versus uncertainty” (Kerr, 2001a, p. 208).

Other terms have been used to express the same distinction. For example Burns (1978) distinguished between transformational leaders and transactional leaders, a very successful terminology that has been explained and expanded by Bass (1985), who pointed out that the best leaders are both transformational and transactional and the worst are neither. Hedgehogs are transformational leaders, while foxes are transactional ones.

Clark Kerr, president of the University of California (1958-1967) and a major force in higher education, was an archetypical hedgehog, as can be seen in his memoirs, which are very different from those of another important public figure, David Gardner, president of the University of California (1983-1992), who was a quintessential fox. These two memoirs (Gardner, 2005; Kerr, 2001b, 2003) provide a great deal of information about their respective leadership styles. Although Gardner and Kerr were presidents of the same institution, knew each other quite well, and shared many values, they were strikingly different types of people. Kerr’s focus was primarily intellectual, while Gardner’s was intuitive.

This is not to say, of course, that Kerr did not have feelings or that Gardner lacked ideas. On the contrary, both were complex and sophisticated human beings; Kerr had many fox qualities, and Gardner had considerable hedgehog attributes, which is why they were both so successful. Great leaders combine hedgehog and fox traits, with one of them often dominant. Some, like Kerr, are primarily hedgehogs and, thus, more intellectual in outlook while others, such as Gardner, are essentially foxes and, therefore, more apt to seek solutions through human interactions.

Kerr (2001b), by his own admission, was not sociable. He said that he did not like to play golf. In other words, he was not “one of the boys.” Sometimes, he was not well attuned to people’s feelings. For example, he confessed that he failed to understand that student activists in the 1960s were moved by passion instead of being guided by a rational cost-benefit analysis. It was a romantic movement, not one seeking compromise, but Kerr (2003) did not understand that at the time. According to Padilla (2005), Kerr’s
management style was somewhat distant and aloof, which was a major factor in his problems during the Free Speech Movement, as he failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation. It seems that the qualities and conditions that allowed him to articulate and communicate his vision of the multiversity—his ability to collect concepts, which are the building blocks of vision; time to read, write, and think; and opportunities for public speaking—weakened his political position.

Gardner (2005), on the other hand, did not have that problem. People found him very personable. He was certainly one of the boys. In his memoirs, he constantly discussed the people he knew. Whenever he introduced a new character into the narrative, he explained when and how they had met—and he seemed to have met a lot of the players previously. He was very good at collecting people, constantly enlarging his network of useful contacts. Gardner was a master in the art of avoiding conflict (Smelser, 2005). Accordingly, he was very focused on emotions, including his own, which he mentioned often, noting the impact of his mood on events and vice versa. More focused on politics than on policy, Gardner had a sixth sense that told him when to jump and what to grab. At a time when his U.C. advisors would have been happy to accept an incremental increase to the budget, he sensed that a much more ambitious request might be granted, and he audaciously pursued it, obtaining a 32% budget increase for the U.C. system during his first year as president.

Hedgehogs have tunnel vision, a long-range view connecting the past and the future. Imagination is about memory. Visions are built by projecting the past onto the future. Tunnel vision, by definition, has blind spots, and hedgehogs can miss things that are happening in their immediate surroundings. Foxes, on the other hand, have a short-range, circular view. Foxes are not blind. On the contrary, they can see everything that happens around them very well. They just cannot see very far ahead. They also are less aware of what came before. What they have is an exceptional awareness of the terrain they inhabit, along with the shrewdness to navigate it safely. If hedgehogs are good at history and prophecy, foxes excel at geography and survival. Accordingly, Kerr was very proud of his ability to make accurate predictions about the future, which he usually connected with the past in meaningful ways, while Gardner prided himself on his ability to read present events.

As one might expect, the two leaders’ achievements reflect this fundamental difference in attitude. Kerr’s principal accomplishments, the California Master Plan for Higher Education, which combined access with selectivity, and the building of the U.C. system as an elite public research university in which all campuses were expected to reach the highest levels of excellence, was the result of his tunnel vision. Gardner’s main contribution was his ability to convince the legislature and members of the public to provide generous funding for the institutions he represented. His most spectacular success—a 32% budget increase during his first year as president—flowed from his short-range, circular view, as well as from his shrewdness.

**Vision and Blindness: Kerr and the Articulation of the Hedgehog Concept**

In their book *Built to Last*, Collins and Porras (2004) compared a set of highly successful companies with a set of similar businesses that had not done as well and found that the former had a small number of core values that guided them through thick and thin
and a collective vision that sustained them over time. Most of these visionary companies chose their leaders internally and had a strong sense of purpose. Their achievements came after much branching and pruning, and their struggles were ongoing.

In *Good to Great*, which he considered a prequel to *Built to Last*, Collins (2001) examined companies that made the leap and sustained their success for at least fifteen years. All of these companies went through the same stages. First, at crucial moments of their development, the companies had what he called “level 5 leadership” (p. 17), that is, leaders who combined personal humility with professional will. These leaders started by getting “the right people on the bus” (p. 41) before they confronted “the brutal facts” (p. 65) and developed a hedgehog concept, which Collins defined as “a simple, crystalline concept that flows from deep understanding about the intersection of the following three circles: what you can be the best in the world at . . . what drives your economic engine . . . what you are deeply passionate about” (pp. 95-96).

According to Collins (2001), the companies that failed to go from good to great showed a desire to grow for the sake of growth that was lacking in the successful companies. The latter were focused on a vision and had a culture of discipline allowing them to stop doing things that were not relevant to their purposes. They were completely focused on their vision, which did not come to them suddenly but developed in an iterative process that took years. In other words, after a process of buildup and breakthrough, the enduring companies understood what was unique about their contributions and stayed faithful to their essence. Their focus was not merely on making money but on rendering a service to society. This is what Collins called the flywheel of success, as opposed to the doom loop of failure.

In *How the Mighty Fall*, Collins (2009) examined the five stages of decline, namely, “hubris born of success,” “undisciplined pursuit of more,” “denial of risk and peril,” “grasping for salvation,” and “capitulation to irrelevance or death” (p. 27), pointing out that most of the fallen companies he studied had external chief executive officers, while most of the successful ones had internal ones. For Collins, “leaders who fail the process of succession set their enterprises on a path to decline” (p. 60). To build an enduring company of iconic stature requires strong homegrown leadership together with core values and a sense of purpose beyond economic profit.

These principles apply to all kinds of institutions, not just to business corporations. Collins (2005) addressed this issue in detail in a book titled, *Good to Great and the Social Sectors*. His intention was not to suggest that the social sector should be run like a business, but that all institutions, whether businesses, churches, hospitals, or schools, follow the same rules when it comes to what separates good organizations from great ones. These principles also apply to universities, as can be seen in the case of the University of California system, whose extraordinary rise stands out as the most spectacular academic success story of the 20th century. With ten campuses of top quality, six of which are members of the prestigious Association of American Universities (AAU), the U.C. is a unique institution, which many consider the best university system in the world.

How did the University of California achieve such high status? Obviously, the size and wealth of California have contributed to U.C.’s success. Indeed, according to Kerr (2001b), its history consists of a series of “gold rushes”: gold, produce like oranges and
grapes, motion pictures, military-industrial development, electronics, and biotechnology (pp. 416-417). The conditions were certainly right for the creation of a great institution of higher learning, but this did not necessarily have to happen.

Other large and prosperous states developed good institutions of higher learning but not the kind of top-of-the-line university system that the U.C. did. New York, perhaps because of its proximity to the Ivy League institutions, did not fund its public universities well and therefore could not develop a comparable system, nor has Texas developed a similar system, in spite of its prosperity and location. Texas can be considered California’s twin state, the closest in many respects, including size, wealth, and distance from the private universities of the East Coast. California might just as easily have created universities the same way Texas did. It could have built a few excellent state universities, but not a top-level public university system with across-the-board quality.

The U.C.’s success has to be attributed to extraordinary insight and commitment on the part of its leaders, members, and supporters over an extended period of time. The U.C. has been a visionary institution that has followed the same set of core values throughout its history. In particular, it has brought together democratic goals and aristocratic ideals. These were enunciated at the time of its founding in 1868, when the private College of California became a land grant university, combining the characteristics of both types of institutions, public and private.

These principles were affirmed when the California Master Plan for Higher Education, which provided a formula for the state’s public institutions of higher learning to combine selectivity and access, allowed the U.C. to develop and implement its hedgehog concept of an elite public university system. Kerr decentralized functions and gave independence to the campuses, while maintaining the idea of “one university” by setting the same high standards of quality for all of its member campuses. Thus, the current system was born. The idea of systemic excellence, as opposed to campus excellence, was a breakthrough, the moment when the institutional core value of excellence morphed into a hedgehog concept. This hedgehog concept was articulated in the California Master Plan for Higher Education, which assigned a uniformly high level of academic quality to the entire U.C. system in order to differentiate it from the other state institutions of higher learning. Kerr was instrumental in making this happen with his considerable fox skills as a negotiator, together with his formidable hedgehog vision.

Kerr could see the big picture when everyone else was stuck on details. As Pelfrey (2004) argued, he “had a singular ability to look at mountains of information and discern patterns and trends where others saw only a jumble of unrelated facts and statistics” (p. 39). Kerr was able to connect the pieces into a workable whole, and to craft a narrative that made sense to the people of the Golden State. All the elements of the Master Plan were in place: the three systems of higher education—the U.C., California State University (C.S.U.), and the community colleges—each with its distinct mission. He did not create them. He simply articulated them into a vision, transforming confusing and unstable political arrangements into clear and solid policy.

This could have been the end of the story, but it was not. As Taylor (1998) noted, the Master Plan made the single university idea possible, but the academic senate was instrumental in shaping the institution. The U.C. could have failed to benefit from the funds provided by the state by distributing them across the board, but it did not. With the
culture of discipline it had developed earlier, the U.C. used the money it received from
the state to reward faculty performance and to enhance institutional competitiveness. The
administration did not have to tell the faculty what to do. Faculty members had a
tremendous amount of motivation, which they used to implement the hedgehog concept
of becoming the best university system in the world, a goal about which both faculty and
administration have been passionate.

What has driven the academic engine is that both faculty and students are subject to
common standards, which is unusual. Today, people talk about U.C. quality faculty or
U.C. quality students. The students must be among the best high school graduates in the
state, and the faculty must meet the exacting requirements of a system-wide tenure,
promotion, and merit system with periodic pre- and post-tenure evaluations. In addition
to common standards for faculty and students, the U.C. has a highly coordinated
administration, which speaks with one voice. The chancellors of the individual campuses
cannot interact directly with the legislature. Only the president of the system can do that.
Thus, the president really represents the entire U.C., which is a true system. The three
circles of the hedgehog concept—what you can be the best in the world at, what drives
your economic engine, and what you are deeply passionate about—intersected to produce
the institution of iconic stature that is the University of California.

Douglass (2000) reflected on the accomplishments and limitations of the Master
Plan, which, he believes, balanced the goals of selectivity and access. Due to the division
of labor among the U.C., C.S.U., and community colleges, the state’s cost per
undergraduate student has remained low, while the quality of research and graduate
education has reached new heights, as shown by national rankings and the international
reputations of Ph.D. programs. As Douglass (2000) pointed out, however, the Master
Plan did not envision the growing diversity of California’s population and the consequent
fact that the three-tiered system, drawing applicants from schools of varied circumstances
and uneven resources, would organize students along the color line: the higher the level,
the whiter the student body.

While the institution was growing at a fast pace, there was room for people from a
variety of backgrounds, but problems arose when space became tight and choices had to
be made. As Pusser (2004) has noted, the zero-sum admission process is a relatively
recent phenomenon. Until the early 1970s, U.C. Berkeley and U.C. Los Angeles accepted
many of the eligible students who applied. Tensions developed when access to the elite
campuses became difficult. The Master Plan did not anticipate this problem. Access was
not a polemical issue at that time (Rothblatt, 1992).

Delgado and Stefancic (2000) believed that the Master Plan was a deliberate attempt
to create a caste-based system. This belief echoes Touraine’s (1997) idea that education
reproduces the existing social order. For him, the American academic system “puts
everybody in his place” by making leaders out of students from the “upper strata” and
employees out of students “from a lower background” while maintaining the majority of
ethnic minorities “in a limited and subalternate vocational and social existence” (p. 109).
Touraine considered the community colleges “a safety valve releasing pressures that
might otherwise disrupt the dominant system” (p. 107). According to this view, the
Master Plan helped society to rid itself of the problems posed by minority groups by
sending them to the less selective institutions. While I do not think that Kerr, who was
probably more sensitive to the plight of the economically disadvantaged than most of his contemporaries were, intended to exclude or marginalize any group, I do believe that his devotion to advancing the core value of excellence made him overlook the importance of diversity—his tunnel vision had a blind spot.

**Shrewdness and Insight: Gardner and the Rise of Fox Culture**

Kerr’s successors were immediately confronted with the issue that he had missed—the importance of diversity—which they addressed in an ad hoc, fox-like manner, while protecting the hedgehog concept of systemic excellence that he had articulated. His immediate successor was Harry Wellman, a respected member of Kerr’s senior management team, who agreed to serve for one year until a permanent president was chosen. The position went to another member of Kerr’s senior management team, his Vice President for Finance, Charles Johnson Hitch, an administrator of significant creativity who focused on defending the U.C.’s hedgehog concept while responding to various pressures. According to Pusser (2004), the U.C. started affirmative action programs at that time “with considerable prodding” from the influential African-American politician Willie Brown (p. 27). Douglass (2007) noted the importance of the pressure exerted by another politician, John Vasconcellos, on Hitch and his successor, David S. Saxon, an academic of independent spirit who was also devoted to the U.C.’s hedgehog concept. Saxon concentrated on improving academic preparation in the schools through the U.C. Partnership Program, so that more minorities could enter the university.

Both Hitch and Saxon worked hard to preserve systemic excellence, but they had to deal with difficult political circumstances and bad budgets, so when David P. Gardner was appointed president in 1983, he decided that the best thing he could do for the university would be to get a large budget increase to compensate for the financial losses of the previous three presidencies. He made friends with important players, including Governor George Deukmejian, who, unlike his predecessors, had made education a top priority. Gardner was able to obtain a spectacular 32% budget increase during his first year on the job. Gardner, who “was low-key in manner, precise in speech, analytical in his approach to problems, and impeccably prepared” (Pelfrey 2004, p. 63), restored confidence in the university and negotiated a series of strong budgets with which he proceeded to improve the university, following the hedgehog concept of systemic excellence that had been developed in the Kerr era. Thus, Gardner put his fox qualities at the service of the vision articulated by a hedgehog. Foxes do their best work when they have a hedgehog vision to follow, and Gardner, who, in addition to being a very good fox, had a strong personal commitment to Kerr’s vision of systemic excellence, was able to make a great deal of progress. During his tenure, endowments and research funding increased tremendously, and the U.C. became an academic superpower.

Other elite research universities also grew a great deal during that period, when institutions of higher learning acquired more corporate characteristics than in the past, including an increasing compensation gap between those at the top and those at the bottom of the academic pyramid. This gap reflected American society’s growing difference between rich and poor, which started to widen in the 1980s. Since universities reflect the societies that house them, this gap has continued to expand. At present, the United States, which enjoyed increasing economic equality and a large middle class
during the first three quarters of the 20th century, is the “country with the most unequal income and wage distribution of any high-income nation” (Goldin & Katz, 2008, p. 45), and American universities reflect this inequality.

In addition, as Slaughter and Leslie (1997) noted, American universities mirror the characteristics of their resource providers, which are becoming more corporate. As universities lost state funding, they were compelled to seek more money from other sources, and their leaders, who were forced to engage aggressively in the pursuit of resources, adopted corporate lifestyles. They became fundraisers, and the culture of fundraising, by definition, is a fox culture. In the free-for-all atmosphere that developed in the 1980s, university leaders became foxes “looking around every bush, avoiding every trap, eating everything that happens to come along that can’t eat them. No great visions to lure them on, only the needs of survival for themselves and their institutions” (Kerr, 2001a, p. 209).

As Kirp (2003) noted, higher education has always been connected to the economy. The importance of money is not new: “What is new, and troubling, is the raw power that money directly exerts over so many aspect of higher education” (p. 3). What used to be considered a necessary evil has become a valued virtue, and universities have adopted corporate ways. Presidents proudly talk about customers and stakeholders, niche marketing and branding. Thus, Gardner, whose tenure coincided with the rise of fox culture in the country, presented himself as a president who understood how business was done, which made the governor and other decision-makers feel very comfortable with him and grant him large budget increases.

In addition to his phenomenal fundraising abilities, Gardner was very sensitive to diversity considerations. Under his watch, enrollments expanded and the student body became more diverse. According to Johnson (1996), in eight years, enrollments increased by 38.8% for African-American students, by 108% for Latino students, and by 65% for Asian students. What is more, three of the seven chancellors Gardner appointed came from non-traditional backgrounds: the first two women and the first Asian-American to lead U.C. campuses. In addition, Gardner convened an all-University Faculty conference in 1990 to discuss affirmative action issues. Johnson said that, although efforts to diversify other areas of the university came slowly, “Gardner’s commitment to encompass the changing face of California within the entire UC Community was unqualified and consistent” (1996, p. 18). Johnson also praised Gardner’s leadership in international education, noting that he fostered the expansion of the Education Abroad program to include more countries outside of Europe. In particular, Gardner understood the potential of the Pacific Rim and sought to position the university, the state, and the country as leaders in that part of the world.

I do not think that there is any question that Gardner made a considerable effort to diversify the U.C. system at all levels. Anti-affirmative action Regent Ward Connerly understood this very well when he declared that “the Regents fell asleep at the wheel during the Gardner era” (Douglass, 2007, p. 162). As Gardner said, he addressed diversity issues in his inaugural address and in many of his speeches and worked on them consistently throughout his tenure, explaining that he was “well aware of the history and the issues” and did the best he could, “which was thought by some to be quite enough, others not enough, and others too much” (Gardner, 2005, p. 258-259).
Just as Kerr, who was primarily a hedgehog, had considerable fox skills, Gardner, who was principally a fox, had significant hedgehog insights. In one of his most important hedgehog moments, Gardner warned that the 1974 legislature’s resolution to establish a goal for the student body to approximate the diversity of the state’s population was on a collision course with the University of California’s restrictive admission policies as defined by the Master Plan. Gardner believed that the Master Plan had to be modified to accommodate new demographic realities and was in favor of creating three new campuses, in addition to the nine that were in existence at the time (Douglas, 2007). This vision was not well received. Money was drying up, and people were not in the mood for visions. Of the three new campuses proposed by Gardner, only one, U.C. Merced, came into existence many years after Gardner’s departure and after many struggles. What people wanted from Gardner was a fox-like solution, which he provided. Thus, the U.C. did not update its hedgehog concept. With his fox’s short-range circular vision, Gardner saw what Kerr missed with his hedgehog’s long-range tunnel vision: that diversity needed to be integrated into the university’s hedgehog concept of systemic excellence, but, being primarily a fox, he was not the best person to articulate a new vision. In addition, fox culture was in full bloom, and fox solutions were preferred by the decision-makers. So women and minorities were let into the university through the back door of special admissions. Pelfrey (2004) pointed out that Gardner understood that this admissions policy was a problem when he stated that he could not think of any policy more sensitive, more complicated, and “more important in the long run to the University of California and, in fact, to the relationships among and between the citizens of our state,” which was “a prescient remark” (p. 74). Indeed, during his successor’s term, in the midst of the severe economic crisis affecting the state and making it lose its optimistic and generous outlook, there was a revolt against affirmative action (Pusser, 2004).

**Fox Fatigue and the Return of the Hedgehogs**

Gardner’s fox qualities, which he used for the advancement of the university, were not appreciated by the public. In particular his ability to obtain money caused him and the university much trouble when he was perceived as using that talent to secure a lucrative retirement package for himself. This caused a furor, particularly because it came during a period of cutbacks, when university employees and citizens of the state were hurting. Months of press attacks greatly damaged the U.C.’s image. Public anger was focused on two topics: executive compensation and concessions to women and minorities. These two emotional issues have continued to agitate the public up to the present time.

President Jack W. Peltason, Gardner’s successor, faced an enormous budget crisis, which was due, in part, to the decline of California’s defense-related industries at the conclusion of the Cold War. Peltason, whom Pelfrey (2008a) described as “a man of unshakable civility” (p. 9), voluntarily forfeited several hundred thousand dollars in compensation benefits, which he asked to be used for student scholarships. Peltason managed to appease the public somewhat about executive compensation, but he was less successful in dealing with another problem that affected the university during this period of great stress: the attack on affirmative action.

The U.C. seemed to have become the focus of anger and frustration for the many who were suffering around the state. They blamed their problems upward, on the university
leadership, and downward, on minority students. Peltason did not do a good job of explaining the University of California’s position, perhaps because he did not have a clear idea about it himself:

At a moment when the University of California was called upon to rethink its mission, the nature of its constituency, and the efficacy of its organization in a time of crisis, it turned for the most part to a time-tested strategy of relying on appeals to shared governance, faculty expertise, and a history of success. (Pusser, 2004, p. 83)

The University not only did not appear to have a compelling hedgehog concept about diversity and inclusiveness, but it also seemed to lack competent fox tactics.

Peltason was replaced by Richard C. Atkinson, Chancellor of U.C. San Diego, who did a good job at fending off attacks on the U.C., due in part to his political skills and in some measure to the prosperity of the economy during most of his tenure, which was a period of great growth in California. As Kerr (2001b) said, Atkinson, Gardner, and himself, rode “the rising trends,” while Hitch, Saxon, and Peltason rode the “declining trends” (p. 414). Atkinson increased the connections between academia and the corporate world, emphasizing the economic advantages that the U.C. provided to the citizens of the state. Atkinson also intensified fund-raising efforts, bringing a great deal more money to the university.

While enhancing the U.C.’s extramural funding, Atkinson aggressively tried a variety of tactics to repair the damage caused by Proposition 209, an amendment to the state constitution that prohibited public institutions from considering race, sex and ethnicity in admissions and hiring. Fundamentally, Atkinson’s presidency could be defined as an exploration and testing of limits. First, he greatly expanded and improved U.C.’s outreach activities, in order to prepare promising underprivileged students for admission to U.C., which was a huge enterprise given the low funding and poor quality of the California public schools that once were the envy of the rest of the country. Among other things, this move sent the message that the University of California welcomed minorities. Atkinson also established a plan to accept the top 4% of each high school graduating class. In addition, he drew on his expertise as a psychologist to question the value of some of the standardized tests, which caused a media sensation and forced the Educational Testing Services to revise them. He also pushed for comprehensive review of undergraduate applications, as opposed to one based on a few numerical indicators such as grades and test scores. At the end of his tenure, the university was preparing to institute a more holistic approach to admissions.

After a relatively stable and upbeat presidency, in which he extricated the U.C. from the thick of the affirmative action struggles, Atkinson retired. His profile is that of an energetic and enthusiastic, perhaps even hyperactive, fox, who tried as many tactics as possible to help the institution he represented traverse a politically difficult period while profiting from the economic bonanza of the late 1990s. Atkinson used his fox qualities to protect the U.C.’s hedgehog concept, but he was not able to offer a new vision. That vision has remained elusive, as bad economic times and a new wave of attacks on the U.C. prevented his successor, Robert C. Dynes, from focusing on developing one.
Like Atkinson, Dynes was Chancellor of the San Diego campus, where he was also very involved in enhancing relationships between academia and industry. Indeed Dynes, a physicist, came from industry, having worked at AT&T Bell Laboratories for many years before joining the San Diego campus. Dynes walked into a very difficult situation as president. After one year of disclosures about the problems at the federal laboratories managed by the U.C., this institution’s image had been profoundly tarnished. Public perception was that the administration was incompetent and corrupt. As the investigation of the federal laboratories continued under his watch, there were further revelations of improprieties involving both security violations and loss or theft of government property. The most disturbing finding was that the improprieties were not isolated events, but rather part of an arrogant and careless culture. People projected their frustrations on the university and started to look for questionable practices at U.C., which they thought shared the arrogant and careless culture that had been uncovered at the national labs.

What they found was a public research university involved in a prestige race with private research laboratories and elite public universities, with all that entailed in terms of good working conditions for faculty members, high salaries, and abundant perks for administrators. In other words, they found a fox culture in which leaders worked around the rules in order to be able to compete with other top research universities. The U.C. was doing what it thought necessary to stay in the prestige race, which the state expected of it. But the state did not want to know how this was accomplished, so the U.C. did not disclose its methods until it was forced to do so by the media storm that started in Los Alamos and moved to Oakland, Santa Cruz, and Davis, and to a much lesser degree, the rest of the U.C. system in the fall of 2005.

The San Francisco Chronicle played a major role in creating this media storm, which focused on the Northern California facilities. In particular, the media storm focused on the perks received by some women and/or minority administrators in the U.C. system. The public seems to react with particular fury when executives from non-traditional backgrounds receive financial benefits enjoyed by other executives at their levels but not by the majority of the population. The same can be said about student admissions. Indeed, during the crisis of the 1990s, public criticism concentrated more on the student admissions process than on executive compensation. Proposition 209 can be interpreted as an expression of hostility—an attempt to send minorities away from U.C. and into less prestigious institutions. By contrast, the feelings of frustration in the middle years of the first decade of the 21st century focused more on executive compensation for women and minorities than on the admissions process. In both cases, however, women and minorities—students or executives—bore the brunt of the attacks. As Newfield (2008) noted, as the middle class was losing ground and the gap between rich and poor was increasing, women and minorities became targets for popular anger and frustration.

The final casualty of the media storm was Dynes himself. Although he held on to power for a while longer, he did not survive the events of the fall of 2005 and was not allowed to complete his five-year term. I believe that Dynes’s problem was that he was neither a good fox nor a good hedgehog. He was neither shrewd enough nor visionary enough, and he rode what Kerr calls “a declining trend,” that is, a period of diminished resources. In addition, his tenure coincided with a moment of profound malaise in the country, with a disappointed and dispirited public, tired of the wars and the dislocations
caused by the global economy, including the increasing gap between rich and poor that affected how the U.C. was perceived and treated. Although he made mistakes, he was also a victim of circumstances beyond his control. He was not the best person for the job, and the job had become impossible. A good fox would have defended the U.C.’s practices, as did Gardner, who, according to Freedberg (2006), dismissed criticism of U.C. compensation practices, calling it “overly simplistic” and “conceptually weak.” Gardner’s argument was that unless U.C. was able to offer faculty and administrators competitive compensation, its world-class status would decline. Gardner got away with this explanation in part because of his skill and in part because of the times. Fox culture was then in full bloom.

Dynes became president in a period of extreme fox-fatigue, and he was not a very good fox to begin with. So he conceded that there was a problem. The facts were hard to deny. U.C. had failed to implement its own policies. In 2004 and 2005, the U.C. Office of the President did not submit the annual report on executive compensation to the Regents, as it was required to do and had done until that moment. Technically, there were not many other violations of the principles regarding executive compensation approved during the 1990s crisis, as Pelfrey (2008b) has shown. But Dynes said that he had inherited an office culture of “trying to get away with as much as possible and disclose as little as possible” (Schevitz, 2007, p. 2, para. 1). Why did he say that? Was he attempting to deflect the blame onto previous presidents, or was he simply trying to say that the problem was larger than he was? The salaries that the U.C. paid to its top executives were not as high as those offered by similar institutions of higher learning. As a result, compensation had to be given through other means, such as increasingly creative perquisites. As the market for academic administrators continued to bubble up, Dynes found himself offering more and more unusual deals. The culture of compensation was bigger than he was and bigger than U.C.: It was the fox culture of higher education, which reflected the fox culture of the country. Dynes could not change that.

In a statement about his resignation, after reviewing what the U.C. had accomplished under his watch, Dynes expressed dissatisfaction that he had not been able to accomplish more in terms of transforming the University into a more diverse and inclusive institution, stating that this should be an area of “utmost importance” to his successor “and the overall leadership of the University of California” (Hayward, 2007, para. 13). Even though he was less focused on the admissions debate than Atkinson, Dynes seemed more attuned to women and minority issues in other areas. For example, he became involved in such initiatives as the work-life balance project, where he showed more insight into this issue than previous presidents had. He also held retreats for upper-level administrators to discuss issues relating to diversity and inclusiveness. He was interested in succession planning and started conversations about this issue with the campuses’ top leaders. He was looking for a new vision for the U.C. system. His farewell statement showed that he lamented not having the opportunity to articulate and implement a new vision of diversity and inclusiveness for the university, that is, not his failure as a fox, but that he had not been a good enough hedgehog.

After Dynes’s demise, the Regents, eager to repair the university’s image, focused on procedural changes in order to increase accountability. Emphasizing accountability is a good way to “deflect public unrest” (Callan & Immerwahr, 2008, p. A56), since
“accountability is an alternative to trust” (Trow, 1998, p. 16). Accountability can make transactions more transparent, but it will not result in transformational change. The kind of soul searching the University needs to do now is far more profound than a shrewd review of the transactions of fox culture. The University needs to effect a real transformation, which can only be done through the articulation of a new vision, a new hedgehog concept for the 21st century.

**Conclusion**

When, in 1910, Edwin E. Slosson ranked the University of California among the top universities in the country, he urged it to keep itself free of discrimination in order to fulfill its destiny as a great cosmopolitan university, stating that, due to the many nationalities of its members, the U.C. was in the best position to lead internationally. Indeed, he thought that the U.C. was a preview of things to come. According to Slosson, “there is a new form of university coming, which is foreshadowed in the University of California. Greater and more influential than a State or a national university will be the international university of the future” (1910, p. 180). Slosson obviously was very taken with the U.C., which was more welcoming to women and people of color than other institutions of higher learning at that moment. Yet the rate of progress has not been as great as Slosson anticipated. The University has not truly transformed its vision of systemic excellence to include diversity, which remains in the outskirts of the institution. I believe that updating its hedgehog concept is the biggest challenge facing the U.C. at the present time. The problem is that, as presently constituted, its leadership is not diverse enough to be able to articulate a new vision.

As Smith (1995) indicated, insufficient diversity at the top places institutional decision-making at risk, due to a lack of multiple perspectives. The only way to change the level of consciousness of the U.C. is to diversify its leadership. I do not think that it was a coincidence that Kerr, who grew up in a rural community, was so focused on access to higher education for people of modest economic means, and that Gardner, who as a Mormon experienced a significant amount of discrimination, was so sensitive to the plight of women and minorities. Their contributions were linked to their personal experiences. The U.C. needs to start by getting “the right people on the bus” before it can confront “the brutal facts” and develop a new hedgehog concept. This will require “level 5 leadership,” that is, leaders who combine personal humility with professional will. What we need now is a team of leaders with that level of determination and foresight, and these leaders should be sufficiently heterogeneous to be able to develop and implement a new hedgehog concept which embraces diversity and inclusiveness and is responsive to current societal needs.

Higher education in the United States still has much to contribute to the world. One area where this country is well ahead of others is inclusiveness. With all of the problems it faces in this area—and it faces many—the United States still has more experience and expertise dealing with diverse populations than any other country in the world. As the extensive bibliography on this topic shows, the United States has been unusually self-reflective. As the first decade of the 21st century draws to a close, it is becoming clear that some of the most important problems facing the world in this new era will be related to the color line or, rather, to the multiple color lines separating marginal groups from
dominant ones in various countries around the globe. Most new entrants to the workforce in the United States will be women, minorities, and immigrants. As other countries engage the knowledge-based, global economy, and experience an increase in interactions among people from different backgrounds, they will need a model for inclusiveness, and this nation can offer such a model. So this is an area where the United States has a competitive advantage. Within the United States, the U.C., with its multicultural and international orientation, is ideally situated to lead in this area, as Slosson saw so clearly one hundred years ago. It is now time to realize that vision.

References


