LATIN AMERICA'S EMERGING LOCAL POLITICS

Jonathan Fox

Jonathan Fox is associate professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This essay expands on presentations made to the Ford Foundation's Latin America and Caribbean Program (April 1993) and the Inter-American Dialogue (September 1993).

Does local democratization really matter for national politics? For those who value accountable government and civic participation, democracy at the local level is obviously important in and of itself. This essay makes a different point, however—that the degree of democratization of local government affects the prospects for national democratic governance.

Most Latin American nations made the delicate transition from authoritarian to elected civilian regimes in the 1980s, but in the 1990s many still have not firmly consolidated their democratic gains. The wave of regime transitions in the 1980s created opportunities for experimentation with more honest and effective styles of governance, but so far most of the new regimes have failed to produce successful results at the national level.

Traditional centralized, top-down approaches dominated national governance throughout the region during the 1980s. Key characteristics included centralized and militarized police powers, appointed rather than elected mayors and governors, and extreme fiscal and bureaucratic centralization. These problems of top-down governance were compounded by systemic defects such as the lack of independent judicial authority and highly opaque, discretionary policy processes. Remarkably, most of these practices could be found across the entire political spectrum, from the moderate civilian governments of Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia to revolutionary Nicaragua and Cuba on the left and military-dominated El Salvador, Guatemala, and pre-1989 Chile on the right.

The view that policy solutions should necessarily be national is now
LATIN AMERICA’S EMERGING LOCAL POLITICS

Jonathan Fox

Jonathan Fox is associate professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This essay expands on presentations made to the Ford Foundation’s Latin America and Caribbean Program (April 1993) and the Inter-American Dialogue (September 1993).

Does local democratization really matter for national politics? For those who value accountable government and civic participation, democracy at the local level is obviously important in and of itself. This essay makes a different point, however—that the degree of democratization of local government affects the prospects for national democratic governance.

Most Latin American nations made the delicate transition from authoritarian to elected civilian regimes in the 1980s, but in the 1990s many still have not firmly consolidated their democratic gains. The wave of regime transitions in the 1980s created opportunities for experimentation with more honest and effective styles of governance, but so far most of the new regimes have failed to produce successful results at the national level.

Traditional centralized, top-down approaches dominated national governance throughout the region during the 1980s. Key characteristics included centralized and militarized police powers, appointed rather than elected mayors and governors, and extreme fiscal and bureaucratic centralization. These problems of top-down governance were compounded by systemic defects such as the lack of independent judicial authority and highly opaque, discretionary policy processes. Remarkably, most of these practices could be found across the entire political spectrum, from the moderate civilian governments of Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia to revolutionary Nicaragua and Cuba on the left and military-dominated El Salvador, Guatemala, and pre-1989 Chile on the right.

The view that policy solutions should necessarily be national is now
widely questioned throughout Latin America. The role of national
governments is changing in two ways: international economic integration
is limiting the scope for market regulation, while on the domestic front
national authorities have begun to devolve major responsibilities to local
governments. For example, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela,
Nicaragua, and Colombia all began decentralization programs in the
1980s. Many of these decentralization plans were enshrined in new or
recently reformed constitutions, though the actual resources and
autonomy ceded to local authorities varied greatly. Decentralization does
not necessarily involve the democratization of local government,
however. In Chile, for example, General Augusto Pinochet’s military
dictatorship gave huge policy responsibilities to appointed mayors.

Local democratization has two dimensions. First, it involves opening
up territorially based subnational governments to electoral competition
(mayors and governors had traditionally been chosen by the president in
many Latin American countries). Second, it entails the elimination of
exclusionary political practices, including fraud, unfair limits on voter
registration, the lack of ballot secrecy, voter intimidation, and vote
buying. These are issues of electoral freedoms, as distinct from issues
of electoral fairness (e.g., media access, campaign financing, etc.). This
essay focuses on exclusionary political practices in “local” politics
because that is where most citizens either gain access to or find
themselves excluded from the state more generally. But authoritarian
local politicians—especially those challenged from below—usually need
national allies to survive.

Local democratization affects the prospects for national democratic
governance in four interrelated respects. First, elected civilian regimes
cannot be considered democratic until authoritarian enclaves are
eliminated and the entire citizenry is effectively enfranchised. Second,
pluralist politics must be learned, and subnational governments make a
good school. Third, rising democratic leaders can most credibly
challenge the corrupt old ways if they are forewarned with successful
records in local government. Fourth, the widespread transition from
traditionally paternalistic social policies to more efficient and targeted
programs depends on balanced partnerships among national governments,
local governments, and new social and civic actors.

**Eliminating Authoritarian Enclaves**

National political conditions certainly shape the possibilities for local
democratization, but the reverse is true as well. If enough authoritarian
enclaves persist, democracy's consolidation at the national level may be
jeopardized. Longstanding exclusionary practices will not disappear
because of the signing of decrees or the transfer of the presidential sash
in national capitals.
The persistence of authoritarian enclaves under civilian rule prevents the effective extension of basic political rights to the entire population. The proliferation of seemingly small free spaces within civil society greatly helped to weaken centralized authoritarian rule in many a Latin American dictatorship. Now one encounters a mirror image of that situation—elected civilian regimes rule nationally, but the societies over which they preside are honeycombed with local authoritarian enclaves.

Such enclaves are most likely to persist in regions where democratic political parties are weak or absent. Most Latin American parties still fail to represent the poorest, especially the rural poor and indigenous peoples, often leaving them subject to local bosses. Those citizens who live outside the reach of effective party competition often lack access to such basic rights as freedom of assembly, places on the electorate rolls, the secret ballot, or the elimination of vote buying (not to mention the free circulation of political information). Universal suffrage—a minimum condition for democracy—may thus be undermined.

Exclusionary political practices—whether manipulative, coercive, or both—can affect national politics because their cumulative effects can tip the national balance, especially in close races. This holds beyond Latin America: subnational authoritarian enclaves also greatly influenced national politics in the United States, where coercive disenfranchisement of blacks in the South undergirded one-party dominance in the region and heavily affected national political outcomes until the implementation of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

Apparently marginal electoral “flaws” are important for national politics because margins matter in most elections. Electoral processes are most widely questioned in Mexico, but they also face serious credibility problems in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and El Salvador. In some countries the charges of fraud are limited to certain regions, while in others they are national, as in Mexico and the Dominican Republic. Since the actual magnitude of fraud is hidden by definition, it is inherently difficult to know its true scope. Therefore, as long as fraud persists anywhere, even if it is merely “local,” an electoral system’s overall credibility is at risk. Authoritarian enclaves tend to be found mainly in rural areas, beyond the reach of most “national” civic movements and news media. But rural politics can affect national outcomes even in predominantly urban societies. In Mexico’s 1988 presidential race, for example, rural districts gave Carlos Salinas de Gortari of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) his official majority. These have been called “Soviet-style” districts because they regularly produce tallies of 90 percent or more for the ruling party. According to the official 1988 returns, Salinas won 34 percent of the “very urban” areas, but tallied 77 percent in “very rural” areas. While the rural and semirural districts accounted for 43 percent of the electorate, they produced 57 percent of Salinas’s vote total. One study
found that the voter rolls registered more than 105 percent of the estimated voting-age population in 35 federal election districts, mainly in rural areas. In the state of Chiapas’s remote Ocoseni electoral district (the same region that later exploded in armed rebellion), 1988 voter turnout was reportedly 81.5 percent, in contrast to the national average of 50.3 percent. Salinas won the district with 95.6 percent of the votes counted. Many Mexican rural voters are still denied most basic political freedoms and access to political information.

Brazil’s close 1989 presidential race offers a more subtle example of how authoritarian enclaves can affect the national balance. Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva, the union leader and Workers’ Party (PT) candidate, won the large cities, but the hinterland gave conservative Fernando Collor de Mello his narrow national margin. In Brazil’s largely rural Northeast, West, and Amazon regions, clientelism and other exclusionary political practices are still pervasive. These regions are also radically over represented in Brazil’s national legislature: only 9,000 votes are needed to elect a federal congressman from remote Roraima State, while over 300,000 are needed in the state of São Paulo. This system is a legacy of the military regime.

Authoritarian enclaves need the threat of coercion for their other control mechanisms to work. The human rights debate in most postauthoritarian regimes has focused on the issues of civilian control over the military and legal accountability for past crimes. For many democratic activists trying to defend the exercise of political rights at local levels, however, the main dangers are not in the past; instead, they usually come from the police and their private allies rather than the army. Impunity continues in most of Latin America, though it is generally unclear whether elected national authorities are genuinely unable or merely unwilling to hold local security forces accountable.

Some police forces are under military rather than civilian control, as in Colombia, Guatemala, or Haiti. Others are militarized like Brazil’s state police and Chile’s carabineros, or under the control of “elected” but authoritarian local governments, as in much of Mexico. El Salvador’s current effort to launch its first civilian police force, as part of its “pacted” transition to full democracy, is a crucial test case for the region. Overall, however, Latin American police forces are rarely held directly accountable to elected local governments.

The ability of human rights violators to act with impunity does not necessarily evaporate because an elected government is in power. When the internationally renowned environmentalist and leader of the Amazon rubber-tappers Chico Mendes was murdered in 1988, Brazil’s President Collor recognized that the highly publicized case could jeopardize his country’s reputation for concern about environmental problems. There ensued an investigation that led to some of the first convictions ever secured after more than 1,600 such political murders in rural Brazil. But
human rights activists raised questions about whether those jailed were really guilty, and they were soon allowed to escape. Colombia offers another dramatic example of how persistent impunity undermines democratization. Direct mayoral elections were held for the first time in that country as part of the political opening of the late 1980s, but leftist candidates who won local office were frequently assassinated.

While national transitions to electorally competitive regimes are usually analyzed in terms of movement back and forth along two dimensions, subnational movements for democratization can evolve in several directions at once. For example, Mexico’s regime now combines semiauthoritarian rule at the national level with several different “subnational regimes,” ranging from the two democratically elected state governments in the northern states of Baja California and Chihuahua to militarized authoritarianism in the southern state of Chiapas, with many shades of gray in between.

A promising trend working toward the elimination of authoritarian enclaves is the growing capacity of indigenous rights movements to participate in national politics, as in Ecuador’s 1990 nationwide civil rights protest, the influential indigenous representation in Colombia’s constitutional assembly, Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchu’s role in defeating Guatemalan president Serrano’s attempt at a Peruvian-style autogolpe, and the unprecedented political mobilization of indigenous civil society throughout rural Mexico in the aftermath of the Zapatista uprising of early 1994.

The Zapatista revolt was a response to Mexico’s most authoritarian subnational regime—one, moreover, that had the full backing of the PRI-dominated federal government. Amazingly, this regional movement seems to have fundamentally shifted the national center of political gravity. By deeply dividing the ruling coalition and generating broad sympathy in civil society, the uprising obliged the regime to promise new electoral reforms that, if implemented, should make the August 1994 presidential election relatively democratic.

Analysts of national politics tend to treat authoritarian enclaves as exceptions, while analysts of local politics rarely put them in national context. To better understand how authoritarian enclaves can be dismantled, more systematic analysis of the interaction between local and national politics is needed.\(^5\) Authoritarian local elites often need national allies to retain power, while local democratic movements often need national (and international) allies to break authoritarian rule. Indeed, one of the ironies of local democratization is that it often requires the intervention of a strong central government. For local anti-authoritarian civic movements to grow and spread, they often need national allies to offset the effects of violent retribution, as was the case with the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s in the American South.

Dismantling authoritarian enclaves often requires mutually reinforcing
local and national efforts; neither can do it alone. When these efforts do come together, one can speak of a "sandwich strategy" for rural democratization. So far, however, few national politicians in Latin America have invested their political capital to support those on the front lines of local democratization. Most often, the key allies come from civil society, including human rights, development, religious, and environmental groups, both national and international.

**Learning to Share Power**

Democratic government requires that contending forces transcend "winner-take-all" politics and learn how to share power. This happens to some degree in national legislatures, but much less within national executive governments (clearly the strongest branch in all Latin American countries, where presidentialism predominates). So far, the main power-sharing experiences at the national level have occurred in Colombia, where the M-19 insurgency gained a cabinet post as part of the government's peace negotiations with leftist guerrilla groups; in Chile, where the Christian Democratic government includes important social democratic partners; in Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas lost the 1990 election but retained control of the security forces; and perhaps in Brazil since the fall of Collor, where the new centrist president, Itamar Franco, has placed social democrats in key economic posts.

One of the most noteworthy trends of the late 1980s and early 1990s has been the coexistence between competing political parties that run different levels of government. This permits the national opposition to learn how to govern locally, while obliging the national government to share a measure of power with its opponents, who may govern entire states or provinces. This process has a long history in Europe, but is new in Latin America. In Brazil, for example, the return to municipal elections in the major cities was an important part of the gradual "decompression" during the transition from military to civilian rule. Until the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, mayors were not even elected in Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, Nicaragua, or Paraguay. The mayors of Mexico City and Buenos Aires are still presidentially appointed. Until recently, state governors were also named by the executive in Colombia and Venezuela, and they still are, de facto, in most of Mexico.

Chilean municipal politics has gone through an especially dramatic transformation. Chile enjoyed a vibrant political life until the 1973 coup, but municipalities lacked resources and autonomy. During the dictatorship, Pinochet transferred responsibility for many key services to municipalities, where his appointees continued in power for three years after the reinstallation of democratic governance in Santiago. After a constitutional amendment permitted municipal elections, however, Chilean local government combined both decentralization and democratization.
Subnational governments also provide opportunities for political parties that are competitors at the national level to learn how to work together in local coalitions. In Mexico, for example, the movement to democratize the state of San Luis Potosí showed that rightist and leftist opposition parties could come together in a broad nonpartisan civic movement. While nonpartisan civic movements have been more common in smaller towns, a broad coalition also managed to put the democratization of the Mexico City municipal government on the agenda by carrying out a citywide plebiscite on the issue. Broad nonpartisan civic coalitions have also been particularly widespread in the provinces of Colombia, where the “civic strike” movement of the 1980s helped to put municipal democratization on the agenda.

Since the mid-1980s, left-wing parties and coalitions have promised greater accountability, transparency, and citizen participation to win key elections in the largest cities of Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela. This record of success stands in sharp contrast to their consistent losses in national elections in the region. As part of a broader process of post-Leninist and postpopulist rethinking on the left, alternative parties were challenged to move from critique to practice. Many had criticized the limitations of representative democracy, calling for more direct citizen participation. While the reformist municipal governments that these parties ran tended to be more responsive than conventional parties to grassroots constituencies, their theoretical radicalism was usually overwhelmed by the practical realities of running major cities and frustrated by the lack of well-developed institutional mechanisms for mass citizen involvement.

The PT in Brazil pursued perhaps the most ambitious experiments, especially between 1988 and 1992, when they were winning mayoral races in cities that together accounted for 40 percent of the country’s GDP. The PT called for the creation of community-based Popular Councils to participate in municipal policy making. In practice, however, the Popular Councils did not do much to represent those outside the minority of citizens who were already organized. In 1992, the PT failed to gain reelection in the larger cities except Pôrto Alegre and Santos. Nonetheless, the PT administration of São Paulo, Latin America’s largest city, succeeded in making public finances more accountable and encouraging community participation and decentralization—most notably in public health and self-managed housing.

Testing Innovations

Before the recent wave of transitions to elected civilian rule, contending ideological camps offered competing centralist approaches. Since the late 1980s, however, there has been a dramatic weakening of both party structures and ideological appeals throughout the region.
Various new trends are emerging. One involves the increasing electoral success of mass media stars. Another, less noted development has seen voters paying greater attention to the practical performance of subnational governments. This does not necessarily guarantee well-informed political decisions. Recall that Collor’s claim to be the “good government” candidate for president of Brazil was based on his prior experience as governor of Alagoas state. He campaigned strongly against parasitic bureaucrats—his supporters in the media called him “the maharajah hunter”—yet his actual tenure as governor was marred by serious corruption. As president he proved at least as centralist as (though more corrupt than) any of his predecessors until a broad civic movement coalesced and made history by successfully campaigning for his impeachment and legal ouster.

In Mexico, democracy’s national prospects hinge unsteadily on the ability of opposition parties to show that they can govern cities and states cleanly and effectively. Even though the regime maintains a tight hold on national politics, more than 10 percent of Mexico’s 90 million people now live under city or state governments controlled by opposition parties, especially the center-right National Action Party (PAN). In spite of its strong base in several northern states as well as Yucatán and Puebla, the PAN lacks a nationally popular contender who could challenge the ruling PRI for the presidency.

State-level democratization in Mexico has been uneven. The PRI has allowed voter preferences to rule in some (though not all) PAN strongholds, but not in areas where the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) is strong. In contrast to the PAN, the PRD does have a national leader who could mount a credible run for the presidency, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Most observers agree that President Salinas and Cárdenas ran at most only a few points apart in the 1988 race (the highly implausible official tally was 51 percent to 31 percent). While Salinas has recovered a lot of ground since then, the PRI still sees Cárdenas as a serious threat, and has gone to great lengths to stop the PRD from becoming a viable alternative at local levels.

This pattern was most notable in Michoacán, the only state where the PRD had a serious chance of winning a governorship. Most of the state’s several dozen opposition-run municipal governments, including the PRD’s only state capital, found themselves undermined by the state and federal governments, which spent vast sums on media control and patronage programs. Protests against vote fraud in the July 1989 gubernatorial election continued into 1990, and the federal government eventually sent in tanks to quell them. Political violence against the opposition went unpunished. 9 In Michoacán’s next gubernatorial race, in July 1992, numerous exclusionary electoral practices, including the widespread manipulation of the voter rolls, were deployed. The PRI regime’s use of these practices does not necessarily mean that the PRD
would have won a free and fair election, but that is beside the point, which is that control over the election's outcome was taken out of the voters' hands before the polls even opened. The opposition's governance experience in Mexico affects political process as well as public policy, since governments control the whole business of voting, from registration to final tallying. In 1992, the PAN state government of Baja California Norte carried out what may have been Mexico's first certifiably clean elections, even inviting independent Mexican observers.

Brazil's experience with subnational "good government" has also had national implications. The PT's local experience has led to important changes in the party's rhetoric; in the run-up to the 1994 presidential campaign, Lula shifted away from the radical wish list of 1989 toward more feasible policy proposals and broader alliance building. The accomplishments of the reformist Social Democratic Party of Brazil (PSDB) at the state and local level have also influenced the national agenda, especially in the areas of health and environmental policy. Curitiba, a large city in Brazil's developed south, is famed in environmental circles for pioneering innovations in public transit and waste recycling. At Brazil's other extreme, in the northeast, two successive PSDB governors of the state of Ceará have shown that efficient and honest stewardship is indeed possible in that poverty-stricken region. Most notably, they promoted a community-based rural health program that managed to reduce the state's infant mortality rate by almost a third in just three years.

More generally, if innovative approaches to the promotion of accountable governance are to become serious national alternatives in the 1990s, they will need to be tried out at the subnational level. Only through such "pilot" programs can innovations be tested and streamlined. Moreover, aspiring reformist leaders can gain national credibility by showing that their ideas work in practice. Overall, however, it is easier to cite examples of innovative service delivery by local governments than of new institutional mechanisms for boosting official accountability or citizen participation.

**Reforming Social Policy**

The primary responsibility for fighting poverty remains with national governments. The debt crises and structural adjustment programs of the 1980s left Latin America with a huge social debt. In the early and mid-1980s, national governments appeared to abandon their responsibility to fight poverty, shifting the burden to local governments without providing them with the necessary means. But by the late 1980s, many Latin governments were turning to "social emergency funds" of various kinds to make economic restructuring more politically viable.
All over the region, national governments have been trying to reweave their societies' tattered safety nets by launching new, ostensibly more carefully targeted antipoverty programs. These new social funds—currently found in Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Mexico, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, and Argentina—feature various combinations of activity by national and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, and local communities. The results so far have varied widely as well.

Traditional Latin American social policies were widely known for their clientelism, corruption, and failure to reach the poorest. Today's better-aimed programs are supposed to maximize their impact by bypassing the old-fashioned bureaucracies. Many of these national initiatives rely heavily on local governments for implementation. This means that the degree to which these programs actually help the poor depends on the accountability and competence of local governments. At the same time that national antipoverty policies have become less centralized, grassroots movements for social justice have turned increasingly from confrontation to more pragmatic approaches, and they have been increasingly willing and able to form constructive partnerships with both local and national governments.

The new generation of antipoverty programs is supposed to be "demand-driven," but the question of whose demands get heard depends on the balance of forces within civil society. Social policy reform can bolster democratic pluralism when autonomous social organizations convince the government to accept them as legitimate partners in social policy. This can enable poor people to gain access to whatever antipoverty resources the state has to offer without having to give up their right to articulate their own interests freely.

The history of relations between the Mexican state and indigenous peoples, however, warns us that authoritarian clientelism need not give way neatly and simply to wholehearted respect for the rights of citizens. Clever officials can create "semiclientelist" inducements instead, although social movements nevertheless often occupy small cracks in the system and try to open them further. In parts of Mexico, for example, indigenous smallholder movements have managed to increase their bargaining leverage with the state without surrendering too much autonomy, forming new partnerships with reformist officials. They often faced an exclusionary backlash, however—in Chiapas, for example, the PRI governor jailed some federal development officials for being too willing to cooperate with such movements.

Thus Mexico has undergone a gradual and highly uneven transition whose landscape features redoubts of authoritarianism standing amidst broad swaths of "modernized" semiclientelism and narrower zones of free space in which autonomous social organizations can flourish. The transition from clientelism to citizenship is a process in which these
three different systems live alongside one another under the same formal regime.

The new generation of demand-driven partnership programs nevertheless holds great promise for the inclusion of the organized poor in their design and implementation. Channels of representation for low-income citizens may thus be created that could help to compensate for the underrepresentation of the poor by political parties. The best results will likely come where local governments are democratic, adequately funded, and sincerely willing to work with both nongovernmental development organizations and autonomous groups of low-income citizens. So far, Chile’s social-fund experiment has probably come closest to this ideal in Latin America.16

The challenge of eliminating exclusionary political practices takes on more importance than usual in 1994. Chile, Venezuela, and Honduras chose new presidents at the end of 1993, and 1994 will bring presidential elections in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic. These will not be ordinary elections; more than ever before, voters will be able to choose among alternative candidates who each claim to represent a “new politics” of clean, accountable government. Perhaps the lessons of what has worked or not worked at local levels will help voters to make the most informed decisions possible.

The combination of national government failures and new local responsibilities challenges subnational governments to become laboratories of innovation. They are under rising pressure to develop more efficient and accountable forms of governance that can be expanded and multiplied throughout each country and the region as a whole. Yet even as new ways of governing have begun to emerge, the old ways of politics show no sign of being ready to “go gentle into that good night.” Authoritarian, centralized solutions are still a live possibility in many countries, as indicated by recent instances of instability in Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Haiti. If local governments fail to help national governments to consolidate democratic gains, the stability of some of the region’s still-fragile democracies may be in doubt.

NOTES


2. See Arturo López, Geografía de las elecciones presidenciales (Mexico City: Fundación Arturo Rosenblueth, 1989), 31-33.
3. In the runoff, the 104 largest cities—those with more than 90,000 inhabitants each—containing 44 percent of the electorate, gave 54 percent of the vote to Lula and 41 percent to Collor. In rural areas, meaning those with urban centers containing less than 20,000 people, Collor beat Lula 59 to 36 percent. See Fernando da Silveira Corrêa, *A geografia do voto no Brasil, eleições 1989* (Rio de Janeiro: IBASE, 1990), 25.

4. Chile’s well-institutionalized criminal justice system is a notable exception. See Tina Rosenberg, “Beyond Elections,” *Foreign Policy* 84 (Fall 1991), 72-91. For one of the very few overviews of these issues, see Luis Salas and José Ma. Rico, *Administración de Justicia en Latin America* (Miami: Florida International University, Center for the Administration of Justice, 1993).

5. This issue is raised in “Establishing Democratic Rule: The Reemergence of Local Governments in Post-Authoritarian Systems,” a special issue of *In Depth 3* (Winter 1993).


10. See also Lawrence Graham, “Rethinking the Relationship between the Strength of Local Institutions and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Case of Brazil,” *In Depth 3* (Winter 1993): 177-94.


14. For examples, see Reilly, op. cit.; as well as Julie Fisher, *The Road from Rio: Sustainable Development and the Nongovernmental Movement in the Third World* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993); and the regular reports in the Inter-American Foundation’s publication *Grassroots Development*.
