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WHAT IS A WORK?: PART 4, CATALOGING THEORISTS AND A DEFINITION

In this fourth article in a series, the general concept of work, regardless of format will be discussed based on the writings of cataloging theorists. Since few cataloging theorists defined work explicitly, the extrapolation of such definitions from definitions of authorship will be necessary, as well as from discussions of the treatment of works such as adaptations that have changed so much from the works on which they are based that they are entered differently, i.e., treated as new works. Examination of the writings of cataloging theorists reveals a number of different criteria used in defining the concept of work.

Definition using criteria of creativity and/or single personal authorship

Some cataloging theorists seem to offer a definition of work that implies something created by a single person. Domanovszky points out that in everyday speech, the term work is usually applied only to those works that are "brought into existence by some kind of creative mental activity, usually that of an author."¹ Hoffman seems to use a definition of work that is limited to the creative act of a single person: "Whether you write, or compose music, or paint, if your dreams result in an actual creation, you must write down some words on paper, or hum a tune, or put paint on a surface. At that moment you have begun to produce an intellectual unit, a bibliographic item, a work."² When it is considered that the phenomena of multiple manifestation and relatedness are not limited to creative works of single personal authorship, this definition would seem a somewhat narrow one for cataloging purposes.

Lubetzky seems to point to a somewhat broader definition of work, but still one that
assumes a single person, when he writes "The writer of a book, the compiler of a bibliography, the composer of a musical work, the artist who paints a picture, the photographer who takes a photograph"--all these suggest that the author is simply the person who produces a work, whatever the character of the work, whether or not it has any 'intellectual or artistic content,' and whoever may actually be 'chiefly responsible for the creation' of that content." According to Lubetzky's perception of the concept of work, a work need not necessarily have "intellectual or artistic content," nor need it be created--it needs merely to be produced.

The issue here is essentially whether or not the second object of the catalog to display all the editions of a work is limited to works produced by creative acts, or whether it applies to all multiple manifestation works regardless of their nature or content, including serials and other works often entered under title because the creativity involved in their making is diffuse. It should be noted here that the only mention of the word work in the context of something like a definition in AACR1 or AACR2 is in a footnote to the chapter on uniform titles which reads (in AACR2): "Unless otherwise indicated, the word work used in this chapter includes collections and compilations catalogued as a unit."

In the passage quoted above, Lubetzky was attempting to define authorship rather than work. However, in order to find definitions of work by Anglo-American theorists, one often has to look at definitions of authorship. The codes have never contained definitions of work in their glossaries, although the definitions of authorship can sometimes be instructive about operating concepts of work. This fact probably has its origin in the emphasis on uniform forms of name for authors compared to the relatively infrequent use of uniform forms of name for works. While Lubetzky attempted to point to the need for both, most of his work had to do with conditions of authorship, rather than the nature of the work independent of authorship.
Related to the issue raised above is the following issue: does a work necessarily have to have an author? Lubetzky did a great deal to point out the need for bringing together editions of what used to be called anonymous works, that is, works entered under title, when he recommended the use of uniform titles for all multiple manifestation works. However, with regard to what he called works of changing authorship, he considered "a change of name to be a change of identity," and in effect, held that change in title of such works created a new work. In other words, works that do not have authors, cannot maintain their identity through a title change. He thereby confers a kind of second-class citizenship on works without single authors, the manifestations of which can be scattered throughout the catalog under different titles. In his attempts to define work in the context of nonbook materials, again, a possibly unconscious assumption that works have single authors seems to creep in, or perhaps a desire to confer authorship on as many works as possible. For example, in 1960, he wrote, "It is recognized in the revision from the outset that a book, phonorecord, motion picture, or other material is only a medium through which the work of an author, the product of his mind or skill, is presented; that the same work may be presented through different media, and in each medium by different editions; and that, consequently, the material and the work presented by it are not, and should not be treated as one and the same thing." Again revealing the probably unconscious assumption of single authorship of a work, in 1969, he wrote, "The book, it should be noted, comes into being as a dichotomic product—as a material object or medium used to convey the intellectual work of an author."5

There are times when a concentration on conditions of authorship can scatter various manifestations of a work in the catalog. For example, the Anglo-American codes treat revised editions as new works to be entered under their reviser. Domanovszky showed his definition of work was broader than Lubetzky's when he wrote, "even the person(s) of
the author(s) may change--without the work losing [sic] its identity, without its becoming a different, a new work." 

Definition using criterion of content

Many definitions of work employ the concept of content, usually with an adjective such as intellectual, creative, verbal, artistic, or scholarly. For example, Verona's annotations to the ICCP contain the following definition of work: "The term work [is used] for the literary, verbal or artistic content, which may appear in various forms (e.g. in different editions or impressions, in different translations, or even in a non-book form)." 

The concept of work as content originated in attempts to refine definitions of authorship, in order to move away from the first definition of authorship developed by Cutter, which defined author (partially) as "the person or body who is the cause of the book's existence." This was incorporated into the first Anglo-American code, the 1908 rules, as "the maker of the book or the person or body immediately responsible for its existence." Such a concept of authorship would apply to a person responsible only for a particular manifestation of a work, rather than for the work itself. It could also apply to a mere publisher. In an attempt to deal with this problem, the 1949 rules modified the definition of author to read "the person or body chiefly responsible for the intellectual content of the book, literary, artistic or musical." This was further modified in AACR1 to read "the person or corporate body chiefly responsible for the creation of the intellectual or artistic content of the work." The introduction of the concept of work here, rather than book, is an improvement over the ambiguity of the previous definition which limits the person responsible to a particular manifestation only; however, as Lubetzky points out, a new ambiguity is introduced: "The phrase `intellectual or artistic content of the work' suggests a meaning like `the intellectual substance, or the ideas, of the work.' Does it mean, then, that the author is to be considered to be the person
responsible for the ideas embodied in the work? The thought is not without interest or value and, indeed, may be traced in some of the former rules--such as those prescribing that epitomes, adaptations, and similar works should generally be entered under the name of the original author; but is it a plausible objective of practical day-to-day cataloging?"\textsuperscript{12}

Carpenter developed the term ideational content to refer to this particular concept of work. Using the example of "numerous hack paraphrases of Isaac Newton's theories of physics written in the years after Newton had published his work," he develops Lubetzky's thought further as follows:

For the purposes of the argument, one might claim that such a paraphrase contained not a single original idea, that it contained only Newton's ideas. Newton might be said to be intellectually responsible for its ideational content. Yet treating the paraphrase as Newton's work seems absurd, if for no other reason than the fact that Newton might have been dead at the time of the paraphrase's appearance. The only person normally to be treated as an author of the paraphrase would be the hack. This restriction is necessary if for no other reason than to avoid infinite regress. Some of Newton's ideas presented in the paraphrase may not be Newton's; they would have originated with his predecessors, and so on. This would lead to an indefinitely large number of authors.\textsuperscript{13}

In the context of attempting to define work, rather than authorship as Lubetzky and Carpenter were doing, the implication of these arguments is that the criterion of ideational content is not a good one for determining whether two items are manifestations of the same work. The fact that two items advance the same ideas does not necessarily mean that they represent the same work.

The objections raised above would apply to Ranganathan's definition of work as expressed thought, as well; or at least to the word thought. When qualified by expressed, the phrase perhaps could be taken to refer to thought expressed in a particular way. The criterion of style of expression will be considered in the next section.

**Definition using criterion of text or symbol strings**
Several theorists introduce concepts of work that seem to hinge on the similarities of symbol strings, e.g., the sequence of textual characters, musical notes, visual images, etc. Rule 4 of Lubetzky's Code of Cataloging Rules, 1958 draft, suggested that a work which has been rewritten or reconstructed should be treated as a new work rather than a manifestation of the original work.\textsuperscript{14} Ten years or so later, Lubetzky, in considering the problem of whether an adaptation is a new work or a manifestation of a previously existing one, wrote the following argument in defense of the former position:

In the case of adaptations, ... there are tangible literary criteria. A work that is rewritten (as for children) or reconstructed (as for performance on the stage) should be entered under the adapter, with an added entry under the original author to relate it to the original work. The idea of `le style est l'homme' is a more tangible and meaningful criterion for determining primary authorship than the vague notion implicit in the definition that the author is the one responsible for `the intellectual content of the work'--a notion undoubtedly responsible for much of the vagueness and confusion in the former rules.\textsuperscript{15}

Once again, a discussion concerning the nature of authorship must be examined for its implication regarding the question of what is a work. This passage suggests that the essence of a work, that which is present in two items which are manifestations of the same work, and absent in two items which are two different works, lies in the style in which the intellectual or artistic content of the work is expressed. A change in form (e.g. dramatization of a novel) or in approach (e.g. a children's manifestation) alters the style of expression to the degree that an adaptation is no longer considered the same work as the work it is based on.

The approach to a definition of work using the concept of style of expression presents problems when the condition of translation is considered. Can an author's style of expression in one language be retained in a translation to another language by another
writer, the translator? Yet most translations exist for the purpose of standing as a surrogate, a type of manifestation, of a work which would be inaccessible to many readers if it were available only in its original language; thus, since the beginnings of Anglo-American cataloging, a translation has always been treated as a manifestation of the original work. If a criterion of style of expression were to be applied in determining when two items are manifestations of the same work, it might not be possible to treat translations in this manner any longer.

The concept of style of expression is at least related to the concept of the string of alphabetic characters or other symbols which make up a text or other document as a criterion for determining when two items represent manifestations of the same work. In 1968, Patrick Wilson suggested that the act of a person creating a linguistic object can be described in three ways: "He has composed or invented a work, a poem or letter or report; he has ordered certain words into a certain sequence and so produced a text; he has produced marks or inscriptions on some material that constitute an exemplar of the text." He went on to point out that work and text must be distinguished, since different texts of the same work are produced through translation, printing errors, editing, revision, etc. In 1968, then, Wilson seemed to be using the concept of text to mean a particular manifestation of a work. In 1983, he rejected his earlier position and moved toward replacing the concept of work, which he despaired of defining, with that of text:

I prefer to talk about texts and related texts: versions and derivatives, than to talk of works or literary units. I know how to tell if two publications contain the same text or not--they do if they contain the same sequence of words--but I'm not sure I know how to tell if two publications contain the same work or not. . . . How much can a text be revised before it becomes a different work? How exact does a translation have to be to count as a translation of the same work? I think there is no general way of answering such questions, and thus doubt the possibility of clarifying the notion of a work.
In 1986, Wilson went back to trying to define *work*, still using the concept of text strings, defining "work or text as a string or ordered array of symbols fixed in a tangible medium for expression."\(^{18}\) By 1989, he had decided to accept again his original 1968 position that "the text that we identify with a work need not be simple or fixed,"\(^{19}\) and argued that revised texts can be the same work; however, he now argued that "a translation of a work is a different work."\(^{20}\) In another article of the same year, he seems to think still that a translation of a work is a different work, but states that "no criterion of identity for works or rule for recognizing editions as editions of the 'same' work is needed,"\(^{21}\) as a justification for continuing to enter translations as they are currently entered.

If the criterion of text strings were to be employed, a translation could not be treated as a manifestation of the translated work. This would undoubtedly go against user expectations, since the purpose of a translation is usually to serve as a surrogate for a text which is otherwise inaccessible to a user who doesn't know its original language. Also, in contrast with Lubetzky's approach, which rests on the assumption that a cataloger can determine from the way a work represents itself whether or not the condition of adaptation exists, Wilson's approach would seem to assume that the cataloger could perform comparison of texts to determine whether two items contain the same "sequence of words," or the same "string of symbols". While this suggestion might have some theoretical interest, it could hardly have any practical application in the usual cataloging situation in which the cataloger has access only to the item to be cataloged, and to cataloging records which serve as surrogates for other items which might potentially be manifestations of the same work. Even if these other items are held by the cataloging library, the act of retrieving and comparing all potential manifestations of a work held by the library would be prohibitively costly in valuable catalogers' time. Full text databases already exist for textual materials; perhaps some day the computer could be set the task of comparing texts, and
even digital images and sounds. For now, however, such an approach would be impracticable.

The definition of work included in the ALA glossary for the first time in the 1983 edition is most akin to those already considered in this section. It reads as follows: "Bibliographically defined, a specific body of recorded information in the form of words, numerals, sounds, images or any other symbols, as distinct from the substance on which it is recorded." The attempt to extend the idea of textual or linguistic strings to nontextual materials is interesting, but the basic problems of application of the criterion still apply.

Svenonius and O'Neill tackled the problems of translation and revision head-on in their definition of work, which reads as follows: "the set of all manifestations of an original text and all manifestations derived from that original by translation or revision." Definition using criterion of medium

The issue to be considered here is: when the medium of a work changes, does a new work result? For example, is a sound recording of Beethoven's Fifth the same work as the written music for it? In 1961, Lubetzky wrote:

In considering the materials of a library--books, manuscripts, microfilms, music, phonorecords, and similar materials--it must be realized at the outset that they are only media used to transmit communications, not the communications themselves; that they are editions or representations of works of men, not the works themselves.

Verona echoed Lubetzky when she suggested in her annotations to the ICCP that the work "may appear in various forms (e.g. in different editions or impressions, in different translations, or even in a non-book form)." In contrast to the position taken by Lubetzky and Verona is the position taken by Ravilious, who wrote that "A work presented in a changed medium--a performance of a sonata, a reading of a
poem--is in effect a new work." As may already be clear from Ravilious' statement, a key subissue to the main issue of when change of medium causes change of work, is the issue of the nature of performance: Is performance akin to subsidiary authorship, something like translation? Or is performance a kind of authorship in its own right, such that a performance of a work written by another is a new work, something like an adaptation?

AACR2 contains a general rule for deciding when a modification of a previously existing work is a new work; this rule reads as follows: "Enter a work that is a modification of another under the heading appropriate to the new work if the modification has substantially changed the nature and content of the original or if the medium of expression has been changed." The phrase medium of expression is somewhat ambiguous. It could refer to something like the concept of style of expression discussed in section c. above; on the other hand, the use of the term medium might represent an attempt to deal with the modifications connected with some changes of physical medium, such as making a book or a play into a movie.

First, let us consider the issue of when a change of medium could produce a new work. Later, the narrower issue of the nature of performance will be discussed further. Certainly there are some kinds of transfer from one medium to another that are mere copying. Presumably no one would care to argue that the copying of a sound recording onto an audiocassette, the copying of a motion picture onto a videorecording, or the copying of a monograph onto microfiche created a new work. There are some who would argue that such copying does not even create a new manifestation of the work.

When consideration is given to the reproduction of an original work of art, an oil painting, say, as a slide, a still image on videodisc, or a photograph, some interesting questions begin to emerge. Certainly it is easy to see that with a work that is essentially visual and purposefully unique, rather than designed to be reproduced in multiple copies,
some essence of that work is certain to be lost in the course of reproduction. The question is whether the loss is so extensive that the reproduction should be considered a new work. In a public library, photomechanical reproductions of Picasso's works may represent the only form in which many patrons are able to study them. For them, the essential purpose of the reproductions may be to serve as surrogates of Picasso's works. Art historians, museum curators, and the librarians who serve them, may find it less useful to treat a photomechanical reproduction as the work of the artist responsible for the work reproduced. However, Pearman, a slide librarian, argues in favor of cataloging a slide as a surrogate for the thing reproduced. Sara Shatford Layne has developed the concept of represented work to deal with the phenomenon of, for example, a photograph (the work of a photographer) which portrays or represents a painting (the work of a painter).

One might consider a map to be a kind of visual rather than textual material; however, presumably most would consider three items to be the same map work, if they represented the same map content, one on a sheet of paper, one on a slide and one in book form (an atlas). The map which is in itself a work of art will be ignored for the purposes of this analysis. In summary, reproduction in a different physical medium seems not to have the effect of creating new works when the original work (and the reproduction) represent works which are appreciated by means of hearing (audio) or reading (textual), but may be argued to have that effect when the original work (and the reproduction) represent works which are appreciated by means of seeing (visual).

Now let us come back to the issue of the nature of performance. Once the modification of a textual work into an audio or an audiovisual work is considered, changes occur which are no longer simply reproduction, but rather kinds of either translation, creating a new manifestation, or adaptation, creating a new work. Here is where performance becomes a factor. First, textual works that were designed for performance,
such as musical scores and plays, will be considered. From the beginning of the cataloging of sound recordings, the various sets of rules employed have called for the treatment of the performance of a particular musical score as the same work as the score itself. Lubetzky, and then AACR2, following Lubetzky, began to explore the treatment of performance as authorship in its own right, causing the creation of new works, once improvisation enters the picture, most notably in jazz performances. If one considers that improvisation is really a kind of composition, however, it becomes apparent that what is being discussed is not performance per se as authorship, but improvisation as a kind of authorship. The other condition in which performer main entry was recommended by both Lubetzky and AACR2 was that in which the work of multiple composers was performed by a single performer; again, this recommended practice could not have been based on a pure theory of performance as authorship, for the performer of the work of a single composer is still not a candidate for main entry; rather it is a kind of return to the broader theory of authorship of Cutter's time which justified the entry of collections and works produced under editorial direction under editor or compiler.  

Except for these special cases, then, the tradition has been to consider the performance of a piece of music to be the same work as the music itself, both entered under the composer of the music. The reading of a particular text (a poem, an essay, a speech) on a sound recording has also been considered the same work as the text itself, both entered under the writer of the text. The performance of a play on a sound recording has been considered the same work as the play in published form. In other words, the conversion of text to an audio format, i.e., the audio performance of a text, has not traditionally been held to cause the creation of a new work without other changes also taking place (see the second article in this series, section f.).

The situation has been quite different, however, with the performance of text in an audiovisual format (a motion picture or videorecording). From the beginning of the
cataloging of motion pictures and videorecordings, there has been a tendency to enter a
musical performance or the performance of a play under title; in other words, there has been
a tendency to treat as new works these performances of works meant to be performed, once
they appear in an audiovisual format rather than an audio format. The reason for this
disparity in treatment is that the production of a motion picture or videorecording is felt to
involve intellectual and artistic effort which is equivalent to authorship. Scholars study the
work of directors, producers, cinematographers, screenwriters and film editors. Therefore,
the functions performed by these people must be considered kinds of authorship, and
audiovisual works must be considered works produced by diffuse or mixed authorship, and
entered under title. The work involved in producing a sound recording apparently is not so
interesting to scholars. At any rate, while the music librarians do make added entries for
conductors and performers, they do not even provide access points in the catalog for the
sound engineers who produce the recording of a particular performance. The issue here is
whether the presentation of a work in an audiovisual format can ever be considered to be a
manifestation of that work, or whether the conversion from text to audiovisual format
necessarily involves sufficient additional intellectual and artistic work as to inevitably
produce something akin to an adaptation.

The consideration of music and plays, works designed for performance, above,
places the issue of whether performance creates a new work in the clearest light, since the
text itself does not change, and the only new factor is that of performance. The more
general question of whether change from a textual medium to an audiovisual medium
creates a new work should not be left, however, without mentioning the ways other kinds of
textual works may be converted to audiovisual works. Many films, perhaps the majority of
feature films, are based on what were originally literary works; filmed plays have been
considered above, but it is also very common for novels to be made into films. In the latter
case, the form novel requires conversion into the form screenplay before it can be performed, since the novel form was never designed for performance. This kind of conversion is generally held to be a kind of adaptation even without the addition of audiovisual production functions to the creation of the work. The treatment of a dramatization as an adaptation goes back to the 1941 rules.

Ed O'Neill is probably responsible for suggesting the concept of a superwork to mean the pre-existing work from which other subsequent works have been derived by means of major changes such as performance or adaptation. This seems to be a useful concept, and I propose to adopt it here. According to this conception, Polanski's film of Macbeth (1971) and Orson Welles' film of Macbeth (1948) are two different works, both derived from the superwork, Shakespeare's original play, Macbeth.

Definition of work as product

Lubetzky introduced the concept of work as product in 1960, when he defined the work of an author as "the product of his mind or skill." He has already been quoted above as saying that "the author is simply the person who produces a work, whatever the character of the work, whether or not it has any `intellectual or artistic content,' and whoever may actually be `chiefly responsible for the creation' of that content." Here again, it is impossible to avoid discussing the nature of authorship, but if authorship is production, the work is a product. Perhaps the most appealing thing about the concept of product is that it occupies a middle ground between the concept of the physical document created by the publisher (i.e. the manifestation of the work), and the idea of a work as the actual creation of a particular person, which carries with it the dangerous idea that perhaps librarians might be under some obligation to usurp from the scholars in any particular field the duty to determine the actual circumstances of creation of any given work. The concept of product also carries with it some sense of the possibility of the condition of collective authorship.
which is so common in the modern world, as opposed to the solitude and singleness which are part of the connotation of the concept of creation. Finally, product can easily apply to audio, audiovisual and visual works, as well as textual ones.

Definition using criteria of identity and representation

A number of writers use terms for the concept of work which express the ideas of coherence, unity and identity. Among these are literary unit, entity, as in spiritual, intellectual, or abstract entity, and specific body of recorded information. Three corollaries of the coherence, unity and identity of a work will be discussed in this section: the fact that a work has a name; the fact that a work can have an independent bibliographic existence; and the fact that an item can be represented as being a manifestation of a particular work.

1) A name

Lubetzky points out that "extrinsically, a work is identified by its author and title." Wilson also refers to the criterion of "an established individual title." Presumably, a work of diffuse or indeterminate authorship can be identified by means of its title alone. After pointing out that a work has a means of identification, a kind of name, Lubetzky is quick to point out, "Some works may appear in different editions under different author's names or under different titles." Nevertheless, for Lubetzky, a work has a name, albeit a name, like most names that are dealt with in cataloging, subject to variation. If the existence of a name were to be accepted as a qualification for something to be considered a work, any entity which did not have at least a title could be rejected from consideration as a work. While this has a certain appeal for textual materials, it would not work for some visual materials, such as photographs, which commonly do not have titles, so that catalogers must assign titles; even some textual materials, notably manuscripts, essentially lack titles. Perhaps,
then, the best approach would be to argue that having a name is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for something to be considered a work.

One of the issues relevant to the criterion of having a name is: when does a change in the name of a work constitute a change in the identity of the work, thereby creating a new work? Under current cataloging rules, a change in the title of a serial causes the issues of the serial under the new title to be treated as a different work from the issues of the serial under the old title. A change of title in a new revised or updated edition of a work causes the new edition to be entered as a new work, since the uniform title rules in AACR2R specifically forbid their application to revised or updated editions, even when the option of using the uniform title rule in AACR2R is applied. An interesting theoretical question not yet addressed in the literature is the following: why is it that a change in title in these particular kinds of works causes them to become new works, when a change in title between editions of other kinds of work would simply be considered title variations?

2) Independent bibliographic existence

An item with independent bibliographic existence is an item which has been or could be separately published over and over in various different places. For example, a single poem could be considered to have independent bibliographic existence since it could be republished in various anthologies, periodicals, collections, etc. Hoffman suggests that independent bibliographic existence is part of the nature of a work: "Only units that had an independent bibliographic existence were counted as works. Thus stories, poems, essays, articles, speeches and similar units were counted. But mere chapters in books, illustrations, forewords, introductions and the like were not counted as works."\(^{43}\)

Wilson discusses the "criterion of literary warrant,\(^{44}\) having to do with whether or not a work has in fact been separately published, but he rejects the criterion unless used in
conjunction with the criterion of "established individual title," on the grounds that he feels that separate publication of parts of a work should not lead to their being considered several works rather than parts of one. It seems, however, that it ought to be possible to devise means to apply this criterion without that result, if, for example, one treats the part-whole problem as a separate problem with other criteria to be applied to its solution.

Wilson seems to suggest a somewhat tautological criterion related to that of independent bibliographic existence, that is, a criterion based on whether the work would be given a cataloging record under current cataloging practice. He is referring to works contained within other works, such as poems or essays in collections, which used to be cataloged, but rarely are any more due to lack of cataloging resources. This criterion has little logical value, implying, as it does, that a work is not a work until it has been cataloged, and thus a work represented only by a book in a cataloging backlog is not a work, either.

3) Representation

Lubetzky was able to solve some relatively intractable problems connected with authorship by means of the criterion of representation, notably problems of corporate authorship. It may be less well known that, at least in the earliest drafts of Code of Cataloging Rules, he attempted to apply this criterion to the problem of determining when two items are manifestations of the same work as well. In the 1956 draft of CCR, rule 4 reads: "If the work is intended as a representation of another work--an edition, translation, arrangement, transcription, or adaptation--it is entered under the author or the title of the original work; but if it is intended as one based on or otherwise related to another work, it is entered under its own author." In all Anglo-American codes, including AACR2, the criterion of representation has been applied to the determination of when revised editions are the same work as the original, and when they are different works, the work of the reviser.
The criterion of representation has certain great advantages. For one thing, the title page of a book or other item which has a title page can provide a solid link between the way users will eventually perceive and cite a particular work, and the way catalogers catalog it. As Lubetzky puts it,

The most important characteristic of the book, for the purposes of cataloging, is the fact that it is provided with a prominent identification tag in the form of a title page. The cataloger can thus anticipate how a particular book will normally be cited and looked for and provide for it accordingly.\textsuperscript{47}

For another thing, the criterion of representation is workable in the normal cataloging environment, in which the cataloger has a particular item in front of him or her, has access to records which act as surrogates for items which may be manifestations of the same work, and must determine whether the item being cataloged is a manifestation of the same work as the other items. Information in the particular item being cataloged may very well provide clues as to the relationship of that item to other items. Perusing and using such information in decision making consumes much less cataloging time than would textual analysis or extensive research of other kinds. The danger in the conduct of research in cataloging is not just the loss of time, but the possibility that the user will need to do the same research in order to know where to look for the item cataloged. To the extent that an item represents itself accurately, representation can be a very powerful tool for user and cataloger alike. Of course, if it is known that an item misrepresents itself, the cataloger must indicate this fact in the record, but for the most part one assumes it is in the interest of publishers to clearly indicate to users the relationship of a new item to existing items, particularly when the new item is a new manifestation of a previously existing work which may already be known to the user.

Wilson's concept of a work as a "group or family of texts" is probably most closely
related to the criterion of representation being discussed here; although he does not suggest ways to recognize when a text belongs to a particular "group" or "family," presumably he is assuming some sort of representation as such. He seems to have returned to this concept in 1989. O'Neill and Vizine-Goetz's definition of work, "a set of related texts with a common source," is more explicitly based on representation; they suggest the following four "practical guidelines for determining when a book should be treated as a manifestation of a work":

1. The book has the same author(s) and title as at least one other manifestation of the work, or
2. The book has the same title and content as at least one other manifestation of the work, or
3. The book has the same author(s) and content as at least one other manifestation of the work, or
4. The book carries some indication that it was derived either directly or indirectly from another manifestation of the work.

**Definition using criterion of interchangeability or preferability**

Domanovszky suggests a most interesting criterion for determining when two items are manifestations of the same work in the following definition of work: "a particular original text or other document content, or else its intellectual descendants insofar as they are likely to be considered interchangeable by a reasonable number of readers." This is a most appealing criterion in that it directly addresses the question of use. The problematic aspect to it is the fact, often noted, that there is no single kind of "reader." Lamb's Shakespeare may be considered interchangeable with the works of Shakespeare by a child, who might even consider it preferable, while it certainly would not be considered interchangeable by a Shakespearean scholar. Nevertheless, catalogers must often make decisions on behalf of "a reasonable number of readers," as Domanovszky puts it, since the decisions must be made one way or another, and it is better to benefit a "reasonable number" than none at all. This criterion could make for a useful rule of thumb. It should
probably be modified to include the criterion of preferability, however. Consider, for example, the user who comes to the catalog seeking the 1980 edition of a scientific text and discovers there that a new 1989 edition has just come out. For this user, the 1989 edition is not simply interchangeable, it is actually preferable.

**Summary**

To reiterate, some of the functions that ought to be carried out by the ideal definition of work are as follows:

1) It should include more than just works of single personal authorship, encompassing works of changing authorship, multiple authorship and mixed authorship.

2) It should recognize that a work can change in either title or authorship without necessarily becoming a new work.

3) It should recognize that a work can be created by a group, whether named or unnamed and whether its name changes or not.

4) It should recognize that a work can be translated into a language other than its original language without becoming a new work.

With these functions in mind, the following definition is proposed:

**Work**: product of the intellectual or artistic activity of a person or persons or of a named or unnamed group expressed in a particular way. A work has a name and can stand alone as a publication; however, its name can change without its necessarily becoming a new work. The person(s) or group responsible can change without the work necessarily becoming a new work. The work can be translated into another language without necessarily becoming a new work. If two items are represented as the same work, consider them to be so unless there is some overriding reason not to do so.
As a rule of thumb, consider two items to be the same work if they would be considered interchangeable by most users, or if a user seeking one would actually find the other preferable (as in the case of a later revised edition.)

Do not consider two items to be the same work if the particular way in which the intellectual or artistic activity is expressed has changed in order to adapt it to a new medium of expression. Examples would be the novelization of a film, or the dramatization of a novel.
FOOTNOTES

1. A. Domanovszky, Functions and Objects of Author and Title Cataloguing (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1974), 90.
5. Lubetzky, Principles of Cataloging, 11.
6. Domanovszky, Functions and Objects of Author and Title Cataloguing, 90.
15. Lubetzky, Principles of Cataloging, 45.
19. Patrick Wilson, "The Objectives of the Catalog and the Means to Reach
20. Ibid., 10.
34. Lubetzky, Principles of Cataloging, 26.
American Library Association, Division of Cataloging and Classification,
A.L.A. Cataloging Rules for Author and Title Entries, 2nd ed. ed. by Clara Beetle (Chicago: ALA, 1949)
Eva Verona, "The Function of the Main Entry in the Alphabetical Catalog," in International Conference on Cataloguing Principles (1961: Paris),
42. Lubetzky, Code, 1956, 2.
46. Lubetzky, Code, 1956, 8.
50. Domanovszky, Functions and Objects of Author and Title Cataloguing, 99.