Building Toward Middle East Peace:
Working Group Reports from
“Cooperative Security in the Middle East”

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ABOUT THE INSTITUTE
ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

The University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation was founded in 1983 as a multi-campus research unit serving the entire UC system. The purpose of IGCC is to study the causes of international conflict and the opportunities to resolve conflict through international cooperation. During its first five years, the research program of the institute focused largely on the issue of nuclear war avoidance through arms control and confidence building measures between the superpowers. Reflecting ongoing changes in international systems, IGCC’s research focus has diversified to include international security consequences of such common enemy problems as global ecological change and international economic imbalances, as well as regional security issues. In addition to research projects undertaken by the central office, IGCC supports research, instructional programs, and public education throughout the UC system. The institute is supported financially by the Regents of the University of California, as well as by the state of California, and it has been awarded grants by such foundations as Ford, MacArthur, Rockefeller, Sloan, the Carnegie Corporation, the United States Institute of Peace, W. Alton Jones, and Ploughshares.

Susan Shirk, a professor in UCSD’s Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies and in the Department of Political Science, was appointed director of IGCC in the summer of 1992 after serving for a year as acting director. Former directors of the institute include John Gerard Ruggie, who served from 1989 to June 1991, and Herbert F. York, who served from the institute’s founding in 1983 until 1989 and now serves as director emeritus.
OVERVIEW

Thomas W. Graham

Historical Background

The University of California has extensive experience with cooperative and multinational research on the Middle East. University of California, Los Angeles’ Middle East specialist Professor Steven L. Spiegel, working with the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and the Center for International and Strategic Affairs (CISA), has sponsored four international academic and policy conferences over the past six years. The first two conferences were held in July and September 1986 at Tel Aviv University and University of California, Los Angeles respectively. They produced a frank exchange of ideas primarily between American and Israeli experts and resulted in the highly successful book *The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East* (Lexington Books, 1988). The third conference—held in August, 1990—considerably expanded the focus by including Soviets and Arabs. Discussion focused primarily on the competitive elements of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This event was one of the first of its kind worldwide to bring together American, Soviet, Arab, and Israeli policy analysts to examine possibilities for conflict limitation, the prevention and management of crises, and the potential for cooperation in the post-Cold War era. The meeting demonstrated a high degree of camaraderie and agreement among the Soviet and American representatives. The atmosphere of cooperation forced Arab and Israeli participants to talk with each other since they could no longer merely play off one superpower against the other.1

Moscow 1991

The Conference on Cooperative Security in the Middle East, the fourth event in this series, focused exclusively on policy issues and was held in post-coup Moscow on 21–24 October 1991. It was co-sponsored by IGCC and the Institute of U.S.A.—Canadian Studies (ISKAN).2 The event gave experts from many countries a chance to debate substantive policy proposals rather than dwell on the procedural issues that have dominated the first rounds of the government-to-government talks which began in Madrid the week following IGCC’s conference. On many levels, the conference was an outstanding success. This policy paper summarizes the results of this conference and discusses its implications for the “real world.”

1The papers that were presented at this conference will be published in Spiegel, Steven L. ed., *Conflict Management in the Middle East* (Westview Press, 1992).

2Sessions were held at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and at the staff building of the Supreme Soviet. Financial support for the conference was received from the following organizations: the W. Alton Jones Foundation, Inc., the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ploughshares Fund, the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Mr. Albert Friedman and several anonymous donors.
Accomplishments

Participants in the Moscow conference took part in three working groups focusing on security and arms control, economic cooperation, and the negotiating process. The issues addressed in the first two working groups correspond to those which will be discussed in the proposed multilateral government-to-government negotiations, while the third working group addressed ways in which the process may assist in achieving peace. These groups met for two days of formal and informal sessions and discussed prepared papers. Because each working group included academics, policy specialists and government officials from all parties, the discussions of each group were informative and focused. Each working group prepared a report which was then presented in a final plenary session. The working group reports are reproduced in Part II, Part III and Part IV of this publication. The draft reports were prepared by Paul Boeker for the negotiations working group, Patrick Clawson for the economic cooperation working group, and Thomas Graham for the arms control working group. The material included here has been edited by the IGCC staff in conjunction with Mr. David Pervin, a graduate student in political science at University of California, Los Angeles.

Reaching agreement on the contentious subjects of arms control, regional economic cooperation, and the negotiating process was an important accomplishment. This was facilitated because all of the parties had an opportunity to present their “set-piece” speeches in an initial plenary session which was as stormy as the first government session in Madrid. However, after the initial discussion in Moscow, participants broke up into smaller working groups which were focused on specific issues and the dynamics changed dramatically. Arabs and Israelis would reach an impasse, then turn to the American-Soviet co-chairs and ask for advice. When it became clear that the conference co-chairs did not have a specific agenda but were there to facilitate discussion among the parties, participants from the region really got down to business. The common theme that runs through all of the working group reports is that all parties agreed to raise issues on a step-by-step basis. All refrained from pushing divisive issues at the beginning, and all realized that no final agreement would be reached unless a complex package of issues was settled. If the IGCC conference is any guide, the peace process may be more successful than reflected by the pre-conference and initial sessions conventional wisdom.

Other factors helped facilitate conference discussion and are listed here to provide a perspective on the intellectual electricity and emotional force of this unique international conference:

- the conference worked because it included all of the relevant actors: Arabs from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, Palestine, and Jordan; Israeli; Americans; Soviets (from 10 institutes, ministries, and press organizations); Europeans; and Canadians. The only actor of potential consequence not included was Japan;
- the conference included a mix of “active duty” and former government officials, policy experts, and academic specialists to ensure that discussions were both relevant and intellectually rigorous;
- substantial staff time was devoted to identifying and encouraging the participation of influential Arab scholars and policy analysts from all the major Arab states, rather than relying on American-based academic experts for participants. This resulted in an Arab delegation that was comparable to the Israeli delegation in terms of numbers, diversity, and stature; • many conference attendees had an important stake in the discussion because they were informally encouraged by their governments to attend the meeting. Several went on to Madrid and Washington, D.C. to participate as formal or informal advisors to their governments, or to report on the talks as members of the press. Immediately after the conference, many participants were asked to brief their governments;
- the agenda and structure of the conference facilitated listening and frank discussion. An innovative feature of the agenda during the plenary session required a member from each delegation to present the current position of the “opposing” party, i.e. an Arab participant described the current Israeli position on the negotiating process.

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3 A list of conference participants and biographical information on most participants is included in Appendix 1.
4 The following participants from the IGCC/ISKAN conference have subsequently served as formal or informal advisors to their governments or reported on the talks as members of the press: Dr. Hussein Agha (Lebanon); Dr. Jawad Al-Anani (Jordan); Dr. Robert Einhorn (U.S.); Major General Ahmed Fakhr, ret. (Egypt); Dr. Dore Gold (Israel); Ambassador Samuel Lewis (U.S.); Dr. Vitaliy Naumkin (Soviet Union/Russia); Mr. Zeev Schiff (Israel: press); General Aharon Yariv (Israel).
5 A copy of the agenda is in Appendix 2.
Implications for the Real World

The conference demonstrated two lessons for negotiating peace in the Middle East. The most important is that peace is possible. This message is described in more detail in a New York Times op. ed. piece written by Steven L. Spiegel and Andre Shoumikhin, co-organizers of the conference.

The second lesson is that despite the formidable obstacles to negotiating peace, the current multilateral discussions present an important opportunity for an international group of non-governmental experts who would like to “push the system.” The current government-to-government negotiations are unusual in that, while no participant has demonstrated a willingness to advance innovative proposals to break deadlocks, no participating government wants to be blamed for the failure of the negotiations. As a result, an international negotiating network of non-governmental experts who know how various issues are being handled by their governments can develop alternative positions, debate them with all the relevant parties, and reach informed compromises which can then be introduced into the formal negotiations. If a consensus of non-government network participants believes a particular position is obstructing the negotiations, international public pressure can be mobilized by “going public” with compromise positions. If such ideas are produced and presented as the product of a multinational effort, they will carry substantial weight with an international public that is growing tired of procedural delays.

Because the University of California’s research in this area is continuing, we hope that this process of interchange of ideas will continue. We invite the reader to send any reactions and comments to Steven L. Spiegel; The Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (0518); University of California, San Diego; 9500 Gilman Drive; La Jolla, CA 92093-0518
WORKING GROUP REPORT ON
MIDDLE EAST SECURITY AND
ARMS CONTROL

Introduction

Complex historical, ideological, political, and military factors have created a vicious circle of mutual threat perception in the Middle East, so that every action, whether political or military, by the protagonists contributes to a process that generates increased fear and suspicion among them. Is there a way to break this vicious circle? Guardedly, the short answer is yes.¹ There are now historic opportunities, created both by the Gulf War in 1991, and by the end of the Cold War which have minimized, if not actually eliminated, the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East. The new detente heralds an era of superpower cooperation that seeks to reduce and resolve regional conflicts.² The prospects for controlling the Arab-Israeli conflict are now much better than at any time in its history. It would be a tragic error on the part of any country, regional or not, to miss this opportunity to move away from conflict and toward cooperation.³

Arms control, including confidence-building measures (CBMs) can play an important role in reinforcing the peace process provided that specific issues are discussed at appropriate stages of the more general political negotiations. There is a danger, however, that if certain security issues are raised too early in the process, before the parties have established sufficient trust in each other’s intentions and actions, the whole peace process could be set back or destroyed. Nevertheless, many important arms control issues can be discussed from the very beginning of the multilateral talks without compromising national positions on important political issues.

Conceptually, it is important to think of four stages of the multilateral talks on confidence building and arms control. The first stage could last for several weeks or months and would be devoted to discussions concerning the procedures to be followed, the organization of the talks, and a process of familiarization with cases from the Middle East, Latin America and Europe of previous arms control and confidence building measures. The second stage could last months or longer and would focus on steps that could be taken to reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation and war; this stage could precede an agreement on major political issues and even facilitate such an agreement. By the third stage, the regional parties will have made progress in reaching agreements on political issues, so this stage will focus on the reduction and/or elimination of those weapons systems that pose the greatest potential threat

to regional stability. The fourth and final stage will deal with the most controversial arms control issues, including force structures and nuclear weapons. It is recognized by all parties that while some of these “hard” issues are being reserved for last, questions in this final category must be resolved before the whole package of agreements can be implemented.4

Participants of the arms control working group concluded that non-government experts interested in the creation of lasting peace and security and the long-range development of a cooperative security regime bear an important responsibility to help assure that the negotiations do not hit any “land mines.” Such non-government experts could assist by conducting non-governmental working groups in which alternative ideas can be explored and “trial balloons” floated should the official talks hit a snag. It may be that innovative initiatives can be fruitfully debated and considered outside of the often-rigid government-to-government setting. Should parallel unofficial discussions take place, it is imperative that they include respected representatives of all of the parties involved. The participants also agreed that in both the official and any unofficial talks, extreme caution should be taken in the selection of language used in public and private discussions of these issues so as not to exaggerate differences and increase tensions.

More importantly, working group participants agreed that negotiations between the parties are most likely to succeed if both the world’s major arms exporters and the Middle Eastern states demonstrate restraint in the supply and demand for weapons in order to forestall a destabilizing new round of arms competition. As conference co-chairs, the U.S. and the USSR should call upon the other three permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to implement a moratorium on all arms transfers to the Middle East for the duration of the negotiating process. The five permanent UNSC members would then proceed to exert all possible pressure on other arms exporters to participate in this moratorium.

A Discussion of the Stages

Stage 1: Laying the Groundwork

Initial discussions should emphasize the establishment of expert working groups on conventional and unconventional weapons, the organization of the conference, discussion of the agenda, and scheduling of future meetings. It is anticipated that not all bilateral working groups would proceed at the same pace.

The essence of the first stage will be the development of “mutual familiarity,” both in terms of face-to-face meetings between the parties and of the issues involved. Over the past 20 years, the world has learned a great deal about the process by which antagonistic states have slowly established confidence in each other and laid the groundwork for further arms control.5 Discussions during Stage 1 should involve two types of activities. The first would include detailed briefings on past CBMs and arms control efforts which, theoretically, might be relevant to the current multilateral negotiations in the Middle East. The briefings should be conducted by internationally recognized experts who have actually participated in previous efforts to negotiate CBMs. The United States, Soviet Union and the regional states could take an active part in this process. The following illustrative list, while not complete, suggests the range of issues that could be put on the table during this opening stage:

- previous experiences in the disengagement of forces, the creation of demilitarized zones, the use of early warning systems and notification procedures, including the involvement of the UN in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty;6
- European experience with negotiations in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE);7
- the current status of verification technology used in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks agreements (START);
- briefing from the co-chairs concerning discussions that have taken place among the five powers regarding possible restraints on arms sales to the Middle East;
- briefings on the development of a UN Registry of Arsenals and Arms Transfers;
- U.S.-Soviet experience with notification procedures involving missile flight tests;
- the current status of international negotiations over a chemical weapons treaty and unilateral reductions made by certain countries;
- previous reduction of nuclear weapons—both through treaty obligations and by unilateral actions—by the United States and the Soviet Union.

7Diab, in Spiegel 1992, op. cit.

Since not all countries in the world are participating in the multilateral phase of the Middle East negotiation process, the actual parties to various CBM and arms control agreements will not always be able to make presentations. However, whenever possible, the summary of past efforts should be made by internationally recognized experts who actually participated in the process.
• U.S.-Soviet experience with the incidents at sea agreement and the current discussions over creating a similar regime in the Pacific region.

After familiarization briefings have been presented, representatives of states in the region might discuss what aspects of past CBM and arms control efforts seem relevant to the current situation in the Middle East.

Stage 2: Prior to Major Political Agreement
If the first stage of the multilateral and bilateral discussions are productive, more ambitious CBM discussions can be held. These could involve two tracks. In the first track, parties in the region could form an experts’ working group on confidence building and arms control. Substantively, the discussions could emphasize the prevention of an inadvertent war which neither side wants nor expects. To be productive, such discussion should not focus on a nation’s abstract minimum deterrent needs, but on specific steps that could be taken, given existing military forces, which would increase warning time and reduce the chance of inadvertent war. The following ideas are only illustrative of the categories of issues that states in the region might want to discuss:

• procedures for the notification of military exercises;
• the creation of hot lines;
• the creation of risk reduction and crisis management centers;
• the establishment of provisions to enable surveillance so as to guard against the threat of accidental war;
• military to military discussions of doctrine and training procedures;
• the notification of missile flight tests.

In the second track, supplier states could take a number of steps, separate from the Middle East multilateral negotiations, to help “bound” the military problem in the region. Two types of supplier initiatives should be taken. The first would involve an agreement among relevant suppliers not to introduce into the Middle East military systems at the high-end of the technology scale that are either not currently deployed in the region or are present only in limited quantities. An illustrative list includes stealth aircraft, advanced land and sea based cruise missiles, and new generation man-portable air defense systems.

The second supplier initiative involves strengthening the various multilateral regimes for the non-proliferation of unconventional weapons. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) should be expanded, and a supplemental agreement should be reached that specific systems and component technologies will not be sold to the region. Nations that are party to the Nuclear Supplier Guidelines (NSG) should use its provisions for special consultation concerning the export of relevant technologies or components to the Middle East. This consultation provision should be triggered upon notification by any member of the NSG group or by any country that is currently negotiating in the multilateral Middle East process.

Stage 3: Post Preliminary Agreement on and Implementation of the Peace Process
Once substantial progress has been made on core political issues, the issue of unconventional weapons in the region should be put on the arms control negotiating table. It is recognized that discussion of this issue is not tantamount to immediate destruction of these weapons. Implementation of a nuclear weapons free zone in the region, ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by states in the region that are not party to it, and destruction of chemical and biological weapons stocks will have to wait both until the fourth stage and until the relevant international regimes have been strengthened. However, states in the region could discuss preliminary steps to be taken to instill confidence in their neighbors.

Several initiatives could be considered in these third-phase discussions:

• the termination of the production of weapons grade nuclear material (enriched uranium and separated plutonium);
• the commitment of nations in the region to become charter members of a Chemical Weapons convention;
• the adoption of regional biological weapons confidence building measures;
• the initiation of a freeze on the acquisition, production, and testing of surface- to-surface missiles by states in the region with a view to the ultimate elimination of such missiles from their arsenals;
• the creation of an expert group on the experience of the Latin American Nuclear Weapons Free Zone negotiations and implementation.

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13With respect to nuclear proliferation, current proposals to strengthen the IAEA with regard to challenge inspections would be particularly important. In addition, other efforts would have to be made by major countries to insure that technology is not transferred into the region by states such as Pakistan and South Africa.
**Stage 4: End of the Process**

Having made progress both on negotiating and implementing the more limited CBMs and on the political and economic discussions, the final stage would seek to create an environment of reduced threat in the region. Two types of activities could be discussed at this stage. The first involves the actual reduction and restructuring of conventional forces in the region and a movement toward defensive deployments. The second activity during this stage would involve the negotiation and implementation of a nuclear weapons free zone in the region.
WORKING GROUP REPORT
ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC
COOPERATION

Introduction

The problems that currently beset the Middle East are not only political and military, but also economic and social. Indeed, these problems are deeply intertwined. The political antagonisms create an environment in which all the states in the region perceive the need for high levels of military spending, at the cost of economic development and social programs. Given the long history of conflict and vilification, political and social inertia may stand in the way of progress toward peace. Cognizant of these connections, the participants of the working group on regional economic cooperation discussed ways in which these barriers can be overcome. The participants were acutely aware that peace, which all hoped for, not only has potential benefits, but also potential costs for many who benefit from the current stalemate. Recognizing that such groups have an incentive to undermine the peace process, the participants in particular sought to discuss possible means to ameliorate the perceived costs of peace.

Interaction of Peace and Cooperation

The participants of the working group agreed that, conceptually, peace and economic cooperation are relatively independent. While economic cooperation would reinforce peace, there could be peace without economic cooperation; likewise, there could be economic cooperation of various sorts prior to peace.

The discussions of the impact of peace on Middle Eastern economies, however, revealed differing prognoses, at least for the short term. Some participants argued that in the short term peace will reduce growth because of the costs of adjustment, whether or not there is increased cooperation; however, growth would clearly be higher in the medium term with peace. On the other hand, it was pointed out that even in the absence of economic cooperation, many of the benefits of peace would accrue to each country as military spending falls, the security environment for tourism improves, and internal economic reforms become more acceptable to populations no longer carrying a heavy security burden. Points on which there was general agreement were that the peace process is not driven by economics, that proposals for economic cooperation must take account of the political realities rather than simply analyzing cost/benefit relationships, and that in the long term, countries in the region are likely to increase cooperation because of the powerful economic forces that drive them together.
Joint Projects

Some participants presented a variety of proposed investment projects, such as pipelines to carry natural gas from Egypt or oil from Saudi Arabia to Gaza, fertilizer and/or energy complexes on the Dead Sea, and a joint seaport and airport for Aqaba and Eilat. It was pointed out that the issues such as water and projects that symbolize national sovereignty are not necessarily amenable to simple economic cost/benefit calculations.

On water, participants agreed that rational policy is difficult to achieve on this emotional issue, though some noted progress toward efficient pricing in Jordan and Israel. Some argued that while from the purely economic standpoint it might be inefficient to subsidize projects that would expand water supplies, the inefficiencies were a price worth paying in order to reduce political tensions. They further suggested that the world community should subsidize water for the region, preferably through an international authority that owned the water facilities. Such an international authority would include technical experts, and perhaps political representatives, from outside the region who would help determine the least costly ways to use the limited water resources of the area. The involvement of international representatives would help reduce fears that water could be held hostage by one country against another, thereby allowing investments to proceed on the basis of cost rather than being hampered by political risk and uncertainty. On projects that symbolize national sovereignty, there was vigorous debate about the relative importance of economics of scale, in which cooperation reduces costs, and national pride, which argues in favor of separate facilities. A particular problem is that the Palestinians are being asked to accept a variety of limits on their sovereignty which would leave them without many of the symbols of statehood; to further deprive them of such symbols as an international airport, a port, or national utilities—telephone, electricity, water—may make an agreement less likely or, if achieved, more fragile.

Policy Reform

The working group discussed not only joint projects, but also steps each country should take to remove barriers to the development of relations. The participants agreed that the economic reforms desirable in each country, such as reducing excessive regulation and other barriers to trade and investment, would have the positive impact of facilitating cooperation. In particular, regional trade and investment would expand if barriers designed to protect local high-cost industries were relaxed. One participant noted that the Palestinians would particularly benefit from policy reform in Israel and Jordan, because those countries discriminate against Palestinian products.

Peace Bribe

There was vigorous debate about the desirability and likelihood of increased aid from the international community, be it American, European, Japanese, or Arab. Some argued that the funds would be available and/or that they would provide an important lubricant for both peace and increased economic cooperation. Others were skeptical about the availability of funds and/or were concerned that the aid would undercut economic cooperation by providing the funds to create separate competing and redundant infrastructure for each territory (Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the West Bank/Gaza Strip).

Social Issues

Economic growth and peace will lead to growth of middle classes and thereby to democracy in place of the authoritarian governments that have held back Arab development. However, these social developments may have negative effects on some of the government officials who are responsible for negotiating peace and cooperation, which may make those officials less interested in peace than are their peoples.

In the wake of the discussion of possible actions, be they cooperative or unilateral, the working group participants proposed four areas of concern that merit further study:

Winners and Losers

Peace and cooperation will impose economic costs, at least initially, on some groups in each state. Some clear losers will be residents of Israeli development towns dependent upon high- cost textile firms, who would be thrown out of work were Israel to permit more Arab textile imports, and farmers in Jordan and Israel who will be forced to pay higher prices for water and/or reduce the areas they plant in order to free up water for returning refugees (i.e. from Lebanon). One participant was concerned that the economy of the West Bank and Gaza may decline further during the interim period. During the transitional period, the uncertainty as to who will ultimately set the tax policies, decide on tariff rates, and other key economic policies will create an environment of limited attraction to investors. There was general concern that policymakers may not be aware of the negative impact their decisions will cause for some groups and that opposition from the losers could imperil the implementation of a peace accord. It was agreed there is a need for more precise identification of winners and losers and the design of mechanisms to compensate losers.

Interim Arrangements

The working group participants reviewed the many complex economic problems that could undermine the transi-
tional autonomous Palestinian authority. The limited sovereignty and transitional character of the authority will complicate economic policymaking and could endanger business confidence. The concern was that an economic crisis could undermine the peace and could lead to calls for a more closed economy in the vain hope that a more nationalistic economic policy would benefit Palestinians. In particular, inappropriate, fiscal and monetary policy could lead to high inflation and/or credit shortages that could strangle local industry. The participants were concerned that politicians may not realize the economic implications of policies they decide upon for political reasons, i.e., which currency will be used by the Palestinian authority. The participants urged that economists be consulted by negotiators setting up the Palestinian authority. The participants also urged that further study be done of the costs and advantages of different political setups during the transition period, as well as ways to promote growth during this time.

Environmental Issues
The working group agreed that the water issue is complex and is being studied in a variety of forms. There are a number of other environmental issues that Israel and Jordan could address to mutual benefit. The working group proposed further study of environmental issues concerning the Red Sea and the Dead Sea. Jordan is already spending significant sums on environmental control at Aqaba; since much of the benefit of the controls accrue to Israel, it may be appropriate for Israel to subsidize additional efforts to reduce the damage to the tourist industry. On the Dead Sea, the Israeli and Jordanian sides appear to be lowering the sea level, which is clearly unsustainable over the long run and could threaten the valuable mineral industries in each country.

Soviet Economic Role in the Mideast
The working group agreed that the USSR retains political credibility among Arab nations, which will make Soviet participation in the Middle East beneficial, especially as a counterweight to Israel’s 9 to 1 advantage in GNP compared to Jordan and the West Bank/Gaza combined. Several participants suggested that it would be useful to provide an aid triangle, in which aid from the West finances Soviet exports to the Mideast. Examples of such cooperation include Soviet-built infrastructure projects or Soviet machinery.

There was vigorous discussion about the Soviet role in the future of the Mideast economy, especially in light of its past ties to the region. Notwithstanding the current economic malaise of the Soviet Union, some participants emphasized that Russia will likely return to play an important economic role in the area, including as a major investor (that is, by Russian private firms). Another participant stressed the limitations on Russia (i.e., Russia has no ports on the Black Sea). It was also noted that in the past the economic advantages that accrued to the USSR in its relationship with Mideast states were at best, limited. While the USSR exported $54 billion in arms to the Arab world from 1982 through 1990 (of which $23 billion went to Syria) and built massive projects like the Aswan dam, the Euphrates dam in Syria, and the Ramallah oil field in Iraq, the debts of the various Arab states—$12 billion by Iraq, $8 billion by Syria, $5 billion by Algeria—are six times the value of Soviet-Arab trade per annum. This raises doubt about how much benefit the USSR received from past ties. Without the repayment of these debts, the Soviet Union, or its successor states, will be unlikely to extend further credits or invest in the Middle East.
Introduction

Meeting just prior to the Madrid Peace Conference, the participants of the working group on the negotiating process were acutely conscious of the historic event about to take place. After more than forty years of conflict between the Arab states and Israel, perhaps for the first time there is the real chance that a negotiating process may actually lead to peace agreements between these long-time antagonists. These hopes were tempered by a realistic appraisal of the difficulties involved; indeed, it was suggested that the tasks for and structure of the negotiations may be the most complex and ambitious since the Versailles Conference.

The Versailles Conference may in fact be an apt analogy, for the upcoming conference takes place in the aftermath of two wars: the Cold War and the Gulf War. The end of the Cold War has led to a re-evaluation on the part of both superpowers of their roles in regional conflicts and the need for their containment, if not amelioration. Similarly, in the wake of the Intifada and Gulf War, the regional parties have begun a re-evaluation and are focused more on the core agenda of the immediate need for security and less on the long-term hopes for a comprehensive peace that includes trade, tourism, and the free movement of people. The opening conference in Madrid will merely be the first step of what is hoped will be a process leading toward peace. While full, contractual, and “real” peace remains the goal, it is recognized that, as American Secretary of State James Baker III has put it, the parties must crawl before they can walk. Because the “means” can either facilitate or impede the achievement of the “ends,” and indeed the process itself may change how the parties conceive acceptable “ends,” discussions in the working group concentrated on the framework of negotiations. It is hoped that a properly framed process will help create an environment conducive to peace.

Recommendations

Recognizing the difficulties that lie in wait for the states embarking on the peace process, the participants of the working group recommended that all states involved should issue a general statement on the spirit and purpose of the negotiations to set a positive tone for the first stage. Such a statement would indicate the agreement of all the parties involved:

- to negotiate in good faith;
- to encourage a positive atmosphere by not taking any antagonistic actions during the duration of the peace process;
- to negotiate continually;

This report records the general views expressed during group discussion. Individual members are not necessarily committed to each precise formulation. Members included the following: Dr. Hussein Agha (Syria), Mr. Joseph Alpher (Israel), Dr. Ziad Abu Amr (Palestinian), Ambassador Paul Boeker (U.S.A.), Dr. Shaheeq Ghabrat (Kuwait), Professor Galia Golan (Israel), Dr. Dore Gold (Israel), Dr. Tatiana Karasova (USSR), Dr. Alexander Kislov (USSR), Professor Samir Khalaf (Lebanese), Prof. Aharon Klieman (Israel), Dr. Hans Heino Kopietz (Britain), Ambassador Samuel Lewis (U.S.A.), Mr. John Marks (U.S.A.), Mr. Mathias Mossberg (Sweden), Dr. Vitalii Naumkin (USSR), Dr. Vladimir Nosenko (USSR), Professor Richard Rosecrance (U.S.A.), Mr. Stanley Sheinbaum (U.S.A.), Professor Susan Shirk (U.S.A.), Dr. Andrei Shoumikhin (USSR), Dr. Nodari Simonia (USSR), Professor Shibley Telhami (Palestinian), Dr. Oleg Vostrukhov (USSR), General Aharon Yariv (Israel), Ms. Valerie Yorke (Britain) and Dr. Irina Zvigelskaia (USSR).
• to aim for a peaceful resolution of the region’s conflicts and peaceful relations among its peoples;
• to these ends, to try to overcome all obstacles to agreement.

In recognition of the possibly deleterious effects of posturing for public opinion, both domestic and international, the participants recommended that the parties agree that the official working groups proceed in a business-like atmosphere and, after the opening statements, be closed. It was also recommended that members agree not to re-play discussions and differences in public statements.

Potential Problems
The participants of the working group realized that the issues to be addressed in the peace process are extremely difficult, as they involve the most profound interests and fears of the parties involved. It was recognized that the negotiations are likely to be protracted, perhaps lasting five years or more before reaching a successful outcome. However, it was felt that the longer the negotiations go on, the greater the chance of success. The participants also recognized that the risk of a breakdown is great at the very early stages because the incentives and commitments of the parties are weak going into the conference; the hopes of both Israel and Arabs are low; and key bottlenecks, such as Israeli settlements, and the territorial limits of a transitional, autonomy regime for the West Bank and Gaza, will be reached soon.

There was less agreement concerning the potential role of the U.S. and the Soviet co-chairs. While the co-chairs, and especially the U.S., will need to play an important role in keeping negotiations going, the U.S. will want to hang back to let direct negotiations prove how much they can do. In the event of a breakdown of bilateral negotiations, the parties may want to invite the U.S. and the USSR to mediate, but the co-chairs should only do so if both sides give their consent to such involvement. However, participants expected that such a role for the co-chairs would be needed at some critical points to keep the negotiations moving.

The Importance of Negotiating in Stages
The negotiating process that will start at Madrid has two tracks: separate bilateral talks between representatives of Israel and Lebanon, Syria, and a joint Jordanian/Palestinian team; and multilateral talks which would include representatives of both an expanded group of regional and extra-regional parties.

Working group participants discussed the likelihood that some parties would perceive substantive linkages between the various bilateral talks and between them and the multilateral negotiations. While it was not agreed that the separate talks should be linked, the participants noted that the anticipated stages of the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza (first a transitional regime, then some years later permanent status talks) could raise the issue of staged agreements for other bilateral negotiations. Participants suggested ways to assure that initial agreements would be lead to additional ones, both within and across tracks. It was suggested that agreements at each stage should be forward-leaning so that each sets in train actions to favorably influence public opinion and that each include a politically-enticing agenda for the following phase. For example, the implementation of each stage should bring benefits to both sides and the agenda for the subsequent negotiations should be specified and include the desiderata of both sides.

Recognizing that the peace process will face many problems, not only because of the differences between the parties involved but also because of the domestic political dynamics of each, working group participants discussed methods to keep negotiations going successfully through the early stage, and proposed:

• that each working group establish a staff-level group which would continue discussions during the inevitable lulls for elections or political regrouping;
• that some issues unresolved now, such as those relating to Jerusalem and the role of the PLO, should not be injected into the first stage of the negotiations.

Negotiations Between Israel
and the Joint Jordanian/
Palestinian Delegation
Of the bilateral talks, those between Israel and the joint Jordanian/Palestinian team are perhaps the most complicated. Because of the profound differences between the parties involved, and thus the real potential that their talks could quickly become deadlocked over the issues of settlements and the use of public land, working group participants considered various methods to address them, including:

• a joint Israel-Palestinian Commission be formed to decide by consensus, i.e. with each side having a veto, any new use of public land;
• alternatively, that Israel agree to consider a freeze of settlements in, say 90 days, if substantial progress is reached in the same time period on the content of autonomy.

Palestinian participants expressed concern that any autonomy agreement will become the permanent status,
rather than an interim situation. It was suggested that a final agreement with Jordan and the Palestinians may not be perceived by Israel as bringing sufficient benefits. They therefore suggested that there be a link between the final status of Palestinian national rights and the negotiations between Israel and Syria. This suggestion was not accepted by the Israeli participants.

Negotiations Between Israel and Syria

Given the Israeli and Syrian mutual perception of acute threat, the large armies of both states, the importance of the Golan Heights to both sides, and each’s mutual vilification of the other, the negotiations between Israel and Syria are likely to be very difficult. Yet for the same reasons that the negotiations likely will be difficult, their success is critical to the success of the peace process. The participants of the working group therefore discussed ways to facilitate progress toward an initial Syrian-Israeli agreement, including:

- the establishment a sub-committee to negotiate on core issues of the Golan and the security of Israel and Syria;
- the establishment of a second sub-committee for ongoing negotiations on political issues—such as the contractual nature of peace, Lebanon, Syrian Jews—that may not be amenable to immediate agreement and would thus have to await a final peace agreement.

Negotiations Between Israel and Lebanon

If a peace agreement can be reached between Israel and Syria, an agreement between Israel and Lebanon should not be difficult.

The Multilateral Negotiations

In addition to the bilateral negotiations, the process that will start in Madrid is expected to include multilateral working groups. These groups would not only include those parties engaged in bilateral negotiations, but also other regional and extra-regional parties. The working group participants agreed that progress in the multilateral negotiations will be very important in building a stable and lasting peace. They therefore urged that the multilateral negotiations commence as soon as possible after the Madrid meeting, even if some parties, for example Syria, regretfully decide not to take part.

The working group participants suggested that the multilateral negotiations be broken down to sub-committees with flexible issue agendas to discuss political relations, arms control, water and the environment, and economic development and cooperation. Because the multilateral negotiations will have broad Arab participation, and the issues are of a continuing nature, these regional committees should become permanent as part of the successful conclusion of the process to begin at Madrid. They thus can continue to play an active role in facilitating peace and security in the Middle East. A role similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is envisaged.
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**Joseph Alpher** is deputy head of center at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University. Mr. Alpher joined JCSS in 1981, after 16 years service as an officer in the IDF Intelligence Directorate and as a senior official in the prime minister’s office. In 1986 he became deputy head of center. He was coordinator and co-editor of the JCSS study group publications *The West Bank and Gaza: Israel’s Options for Peace and Israel, the West Bank and Gaza: Toward a Solution* (1989). He is editor of *The Middle East Military Balance 1989–90*.

**Abdel Moneim Said Aly** is the deputy director for research and publishing at the Al- Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. In Arabic, he has published books and articles on the Arab relations with the regional and global orders, European integration, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In English, he has published articles and chapters in the U.S., France, and Sweden on Egypt’s political system, national security and arms control policies.

**Ziad Abu Amr** is a professor of political science at Bir Zeit University on the West Bank. He received his Ph.D. in Comparative Politics from the Department of Government at Georgetown University. Amr specializes in Palestinian affairs, particularly the PLO and Islamic movements and the West Bank and Gaza. He has participated in numerous conferences, seminars and working groups focusing on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Presently, Amr is a visiting scholar at the Center...
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**Alexei G. Arbatov** holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Academy of Sciences, USSR. He is the head of the Department for Disarmament Studies in IMEMO and advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR. He has studied arms control for 20 years and has written extensively on strategic issues and U.S.-Soviet negotiations. In 1990, he served as an adviser for the Soviet delegation at the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva. He recently worked in the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington on offense-defense interactions and their implications for follow-on START negotiations.

**Hisham Arwartani** is a specialist in the economy of the occupied Palestinian territories. He earned his B.S. and M.S. at the American University of Beirut and his Ph.D. at Bradford University in England. He has written a reference book on the Palestinian territories and more than 25 academic papers and reports on related fields. Presently he is involved in a variety of international efforts aimed at initiating and promoting Palestinian-Israeli cooperation within a regional context involving other countries in the Middle East.

**Paul Boeker** is president of the Institute of the Americas at the University of California, San Diego. He graduated *magna cum laude* from Dartmouth College and received his M.A. in Economics from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He has authored the book *Lost Illusions: Latin America’s Struggle for Democracy*, which was published in 1990. He was the United States’ Ambassador to Bolivia from 1977 until 1980 after which he became director of the Foreign Services Institute. In 1984, he was appointed to serve as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Jordan where he served for three years, after which time he joined the U.S. delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. In 1985, he received the Presidential Distinguished Service Award from Ronald Reagan. Ambassador Boeker is a member on the Council on Foreign Relations and in 1990 was elected to the American Academy of Diplomacy.

**Patrick Clawson** is a resident scholar at the Foreign Policy Institute (FPRI) and editor of *Orbis*, a quarterly journal of foreign affairs. He serves as the director of research for the Middle East Council of FPRI and as a consultant to the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and various U.S. government agencies on economics of Middle Eastern and African nations. He previously served as a senior economist at the World Bank, leading missions to analyze financial systems, governmental expenditures and taxation systems. He has served as a consultant on Middle East economics to the State Department on Syria (1991), the Middle East Institute on the post-war Gulf (1991) and for the Carter Center on regional economic cooperation (1990). His publications include various op-ed articles in the *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Washington Post*, among others, and *Economic Consequences of Peace for Israel, Palestinians and Jordan* (with Howard Rosen, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 1991).

**Karen Dawisha** is a professor of Government at the University of Maryland, College Park, and director of its Soviet and East European Archive project. She received her degrees in Russian and Politics from the University of London School of Economics and in 1975 received her Ph.D. from the same institution. From 1973-83, she taught at universities in London. In 1983, she returned to the United States, spending one year at the Brookings Institution, and one year at Princeton University. She has received fellowships from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the MacArthur Foundation. Since 1985, she has taught at the University of Maryland. Her publications include *Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Egypt* (Macmillan, 1979), *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring* (University of California Press, 1984) and *Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, and Reform: The Great Challenge* (Cambridge University Press, 1989, 2nd ed. 1990). She has also been the editor and contributor to several books, and the author of numerous articles. She spent the 1990-91 academic year on sabbatical in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

**M. Zuhair Diab** is a Syrian political analyst for BBC Radio and Television and for the Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies in London. He previously served with the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as a strategic analyst at the Syrian National Security Bureau in Damascus. He served an assistant editor of *Yearbooks on Palestine: 1970, 1971, 1972* (in Arabic) in which he contributed chapters on U.S. and Soviet policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Israeli nuclear program. He received his M.A. in Political Science from the American University of Beirut.

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Gideon Fishelson is the dean of students at Tel Aviv University and the scientific coordinator of the Armand Hammer Fund for research on Economic Cooperation in the Middle East. He received a M.S. in Agricultural Economics from the School of Agriculture at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He received his Ph.D. from North Carolina State University, Raleigh in 1968 in Economics. Since 1967, Professor Fishelson has been a faculty member of the Economics department at Tel Aviv University, Israel. He has visited several United States universities including Chicago, Iowa, Brown, Virginia, and Michigan. He has served as a consultant for both the government and private companies. He is the author of several books and articles including Economic Cooperation and Middle East Peace (with H. Ben-Shahar and S. Hirsh, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, England, 1989). He serves on various governmental committees in Israel and been a member of several boards of international research institutions that study the issue of “Peace in the Middle East.”

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Samuel W. Lewis is president of the United States Institute of Peace, an independent government institution established by Congress to strengthen the nation’s capacity to promote peaceful resolution of international conflicts. A cum laude graduate of Yale University, with a Master’s degree in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins University, Ambassador Lewis has been a foreign service officer for 31 years. In his last post, he served for eight years as United States Ambassador to Israel, first appointed by President Carter and then reaffirmed by President Reagan. He was a prominent actor in Arab-Israeli negotiations, including participation in the 1978 Camp David Conference. He has also served as assistant secretary of state for international organizations, deputy director of the Policy Planning Staff, senior staff member of the National Security Council, member of the
APPENDIX I

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Aaron David Miller is a member of the U.S. Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff where he helps formulate U.S. policy on the Middle East and the Arab-Israel peace process. Before joining the Policy Planning Staff, Dr. Miller served in the State Department’s Office of the Historian and in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He has received the Department’s Superior Honor Award and has been presented with a Meritorious Honor Award. Miller received his Ph.D. in American Diplomatic and Middle East History from the University of Michigan in 1977. He has written three books on the Middle East and lectured widely at universities and Middle East symposia across the country. His articles have appeared in the New York Times, Washington Post, Orbis, Washington Quarterly, Middle East Journal, and numerous other publications.

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Alan A. Platt currently serves as a consultant on International and Security Affairs and a visiting lecturer at Georgetown University. Dr. Platt previously served as chief of the Arms Transfer Division of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as a senior staff member at The RAND Corporation. His has published various articles and books including Arms Control in the Middle East (forthcoming); “U.S. Must Lead in Restraining Mideast Arms Buildup” (Christian Science Monitor, May 3, 1991); and “European Arms Transfers to the Middle East,” in Steven Spiegel and Mark Heller (eds.), The U.S.-Soviet Competition in the Middle East (D.C. Heath, Lexington, 1988). He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Sergei M. Rogov is head of the department of Military and Political Studies of the Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies, Academy of Sciences of the USSR. He has been there since 1971, when he graduated from the Institute of Foreign Relations in Moscow. Between 1984 and 1987, he represented the Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.

Richard Rosecrance is a professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles and acting director of the Center for International and Strategic Affairs (CISA). He is the author of many works on international and economic affairs including America’s Economic Resurgence: A Bold New Strategy (Harper and Row, 1989) and his highly acclaimed The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986) which was published on three continents. Before joining UCLA’s faculty, Rosecrance was Carpenter Professor of International and Comparative Politics at Cornell University.

Zeev Schiff is the defense editor of Ha’aretz, Israel’s leading daily newspaper. Previously he was a senior research associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. and worked at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy where he published “Israel’s Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations with the Palestinians.” His publications, which have earned him Israel’s most distinguished awards for journalism, include Israel’s Lebanon War, which became
an international best seller and *October Earthquake* on the Yom Kippur War, which was awarded the Sokolov Prize (the Israeli equivalent of the Pulitzer Prize) in 1974.

**Aryeh Shalev** is a senior research fellow at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at the Tel Aviv University. He has been head of the Israeli Delegations to the Mixed Armistice Commissions with Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. He was appointed IDF spokesman in 1963 and served in that post until after the Six-Day War. From 1974 to 1976 he served as military governor of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). General Shalev retired from the IDF in 1977 and joined the staff of the Jaffee Center, where he served as deputy head from 1981 to 1984. General Shalev has written *The West Bank: Line of Defense, Cooperation Under the Shadow of Conflict: The Israeli-Syrian Armistice Regime, 1949-1955*, and *The Intifada: Causes and Effects*. He is currently examining the strategic importance of the Golan Heights area.

**Stanley Sheinbaum** is the publisher of *New Perspectives Quarterly*. He received his A.B. in Far East History and International Relations from Stanford University. He has held teaching positions in Economics at Stanford University, Michigan State University and the University of California, Santa Barbara. Mr. Sheinbaum has also served as a consultant on economic issues for the State of California. From 1977 to 1989 he was a regent of the University of California. Currently he is the president of the Los Angeles Police Commission. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of IGCC’s International Advisory Board.

**Susan L. Shirk** is the acting director of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), a professor in the University of California San Diego’s Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, and in the Department of Political Science. Shirk received her B.A. from Mount Holyoke College and her Ph.D. in Political Science from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her current research examines the politics of economic reform in the People’s Republic of China. She has just completed a book manuscript, *The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China* (University of California Press, forthcoming). Professor Shirk’s previous publications include her book, *Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China*; her edited book, *The Challenge of China and Japan*; and articles in *The China Quarterly, Foreign Policy, and Comparative Education*. She formerly was on the board of directors for the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

**Steven Spiegel** is a professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, where he has been a member of the political science department since 1966. He has twice been named as “best teacher” of the year by UCLA students. Professor Spiegel completed his M.A. and Ph.D. at Harvard University. He has authored many books including: *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan* (1985), *Middle East and the Western Alliance* (editor), *Dominance and Diversity: The International Hierarchy, The International Politics of Regions* (with Louis Cantori), *The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East* (co-editor), and the forthcoming *Superpower Conflict Management in the Middle East*. Professor Spiegel had also been published in *The New Republic, The National Interest, Commentary, Orbis, Middle East Review, and International Studies Quarterly*.

**Joyce Starr** is founder and chairman of the multi-year Global Water Summit Initiative which galvanizes international cooperation on water resource sharing and management. A noted authority on the politics of water security. Dr. Starr convened and chaired the first Africa Water Summit in June 1990, hosted by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. She also founded the Global Policy Group, a group of foreign policy experts spearheading diplomatic initiatives in response to emerging international conflict resulting from regional resource constraints. Dr. Starr is co-chairman of the U.S. Global Strategy Council and is a senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She founded the Near East Studies program of CSIS in 1979 and remained its director through 1988. She coordinated the Middle East Task Force for Presidential Candidate George Bush, was appointed by the Reagan Administration to head the Commission on the Reconstruction of Lebanon, and served in the Carter White House, participating on the Inter-Agency Task Force on the Economic Consequences of the Middle East Peace Process. Her publications include “Water Wars” (*Foreign Policy*, Number 82, Spring 1991) and “Nature’s Own Agenda: A War for Water in the Mideast” (*The Washington Post*, March 3, 1991).

**Shibley Telhami** is an associate professor of Government at Cornell University. He has taught at Ohio State University, the University of Southern California, Swarthmore College, Princeton University and University of California, Berkeley, where he received his doctorate in Political Science. He was a 1988-1989 international fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of *Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accord* (Columbia University Press, 1990) and numerous articles on international relations and Middle East politics.

**Aharon Yariv** is head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. General Yariv served with the Israel Defense Forces from 1948 until 1972. Prior to that he served in the British army during World War II. He was director of military intelligence in the Israeli military from 1964 to 1972. He is a graduate of the French Army Staff College, and he organized and commanded the Israel Command
and Staff College. Director Yariv was elected to the Knesset on the Labor Party ticket, remaining a member until May 1977, and was the minister of transport (1974) and minister of information (1974-1975). He organized the establishment of the Center for Strategic Studies (renamed the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies), and has headed it since its opening in 1977.

Valerie Yorke is an associate editor, Middle East at the Economist Intelligence Unit, and a writer and broadcaster on Middle East affairs. She is a former research associate of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). She is the author of a number of books and monographs on Middle East affairs. Her writing on the subject of the search for Middle East peace includes Peace in the Middle East: Superpowers and Security Guarantees (with David Astor), “Palestinian Self-Determination and Israel’s Security” in Journal of Palestinian Studies (1971) and “Imagining a Palestinian State: An International Security Plan,” in International Affairs (1990). Her most recent book, written for the IISS, is Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel (London, 1988). Ms. Yorke takes a special interest in the domestic politics and foreign policy of Jordan and Syria.

I. William Zartman is Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organization and Conflict Resolution, and director of the African Studies and Conflict Management programs at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. Professor Zartman has taught abroad and has written several works on Africa and the Near East. On the subject of negotiation, he has edited, authored, or co-authored The 50 Percent Solution; The Practical Negotiator; The Negotiation Process; Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Resolution in Africa, and International Mediation in Theory and Practice. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
APPENDIX II

University of California
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
and
Institute of USA and Canada Studies*

Cooperative Security in the Middle East
21–24 October 1991
Moscow, USSR

Final Agenda

Monday, October 21, 1991
8:00–9:00 AM Breakfast at Hotel Salyut
9:15 AM Depart from Salyut to IMEMO (meet in the lobby)
10:00 AM Greetings Georgii Arbatov and Susan L. Shirk
The Plan of the Conference Steven L. Spiegel and Andrei Shoumikhin

The Plan of the Conference
Morning Chairs: Steven L. Spiegel, Andrei Shoumikhin

10:30-12:00 PM Possibilities for Regional Cooperation after the Gulf War and Cold War
1. Current Soviet thinking on the Middle East Karen Dawisha
2. Current American thinking on the Middle East Nodari Simonia
3. Current Israeli thinking on the Middle East Shibley Telhami
4. Current Arab thinking on the Middle East Joseph Alpher, Shlomo Gazit

Since the papers will be prepared and distributed in advance, each author will have a maximum of 10 minutes to present 3 ideas from his/her paper that each author wants to frame the conference discussion.

General Discussion
(Chairs will be instructed to limit individual comments to 3 minutes)

12:00-12:15 PM Break and Corridor Conversations
12:15-1:30 PM Formal Responses to the Papers and Morning Discussion
1. An Arab Perspective Hussein Agha
2. An Israeli Perspective Aharon Yariv
3. A Soviet Perspective Irina Zviagelskaia
4. An American Perspective Paul Boeker

General Discussion
(Chairs will be instructed to limit individual comments to 3 minutes)

The sponsors of this conference would like to thank the following organizations and individuals for their financial and programmatic assistance with this conference: W. Alton Jones Foundation, Inc., The Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ploughshares Fund, the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, the Center for International and Strategic Affairs (CISA) at UCLA, Mr. Albert Friedman and other anonymous donors. The funding organizations and individuals, including The Carnegie Corporation of New York do not take responsibility for any statements or views expressed at this conference.
1:30 PM  Depart from IMEMO to Salyut
1:45–2:45 PM  Lunch at Salyut Hotel
3:00 PM  Depart from Salyut to IMEMO

3:15–3:30 PM  Speaker: His Excellency, Ambassador Ahmed Maher El Sayid, Egyptian Ambassador to the Soviet Union
              Chair: Stanley Sheinbaum

3:30–3:45 PM  The Conceptual Basis for the Policy Workshops
              Chair: Samuel Lewis

This session will give all conference participants a chance to preview discussion that will take place in detail in each individual workshop.

3:45–4:30 PM  Middle East Security and Arms Control

Security considerations in the post Gulf War and post–Cold War era; conventional and unconventional weapons, and arms control; impact of domestic politics on arms control.

Papers: Mark Heller, Vitali Naumkin

4:30–5:15 PM  Regional Economic and Social Cooperation

State to State Cooperation: Regional, Economic, Water
Private Cooperation: Social, Scientific, Cultural, Religious

Papers: Patrick Clawson, Vladimir Isaev

5:15–6:00 PM  The Negotiating Process

Mechanisms
CSCE; UN; Direct Negotiations; Non-Governmental; Regional Conference

The impact of domestic politics on the negotiating process.

Papers: John Marks, Victor Kremenyuk

6:15 PM  Depart from IMEMO to the Salyut Hotel
7:00 PM  Dinner at the Salyut Hotel

Tuesday, October 22, 1991

8:00–8:45 AM  Breakfast at the Hotel Salyut
9:00 AM  Depart from the Salyut Hotel for The Supreme Soviet of the USSR (meet in the lobby at 9:00 AM)
9:30 AM–1:30 PM  Three workshops will meet simultaneously

Middle East Security and Arms Control

Chairs: Thomas W. Graham & Ahmed Fakhr
Papers: Alan Platt, Abdel Moneim and Said Aly, Alexander Frolov
Informal memos to be discussed.

Regional Economic and Social Cooperation

Chair: Joyce Starr
Papers: Gideon Fishelson, Jawad Al-Anani, Vyacheslav Belokrenitsky
Informal memos to be discussed.

The Negotiating Process

Chair: I. William Zartman
Papers: Galia Golan, Ziad Abu Amr, Pavel Palazhchenko
Informal memos to be discussed.

1:45–2:30 PM  Lunch at the Supreme Soviet
2:30–5:00 PM  Presentation at the Azerbaijanian Consulate
7:00 PM  Dinner. Program will be determined by Andrei Shoumikhin
Wednesday, October 23, 1991
8:00–8:45 AM  Breakfast at the Hotel Salyut
9:00 AM  Depart from the Salyut Hotel for The Supreme Soviet of the USSR (meet in the lobby at 9:00 AM)
9:30 AM–12:30 PM  Three workshops will continue to meet simultaneously

**Middle East Security and Arms Control**
**Regional Economic and Social Cooperation**
**The Negotiating Process**
The focus will be on preparation of a report on the workshop’s proceedings which will be presented to the plenary session in the afternoon.

12:15-1:30 PM  Lunch at the Supreme Soviet
1:30 PM  Departure from Supreme Soviet to IMEMO (by bus)
2:00-2:15 PM  Address by Ambassador Arye Levin, Israeli Ambassador to the Soviet Union
2:15-2:30 PM  Address by Boris Pyadishev, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2:30-4:00 PM  Reports to the Plenary
  Chair: Samuel Lewis
  Each workshop will select a representative who will report the workshop’s areas of agreement and disagreement.

4:00–4:15 PM  Coffee break
4:15–6:15 PM  General discussion among all conference participants
6:15 PM  Depart from IMEMO to Hotel Salyut (by bus)
7:00 PM  Depart from Hotel Salyut to Uzbek Restaurant (by bus)

Thursday, October 24, 1991
A press conference will be held at the Institute of USA and Canada Studies
Don’t Give Up Hope Yet

By Andrei Shoumikhin and Steven L. Spiegel

Imagine a Mideast peace conference in which tough proponents of the Arab and Israeli causes find themselves transformed by meetings with one another. What if they are soon enjoying cordial dinners and kissing each other on the cheek—developing ties they did not think were possible?

Picture a conference where a former radical Palestinian says at a closing dinners: “I have learned so much. I need to learn much more.” And an Israeli right-winger comments, with tears in his eyes, “The Arabs and Israelis understand the Middle East, not you Americans and Soviets.”

You don’t believe it? Well, this did not happen in Madrid, but it did occur in Moscow a week ago when Arab, Israeli, Western and Soviet experts met for four days under the auspices of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation of the University of California and the U.S.A.-Canada Institute in Moscow to discuss Middle East initiatives. We were the meeting’s co-chairmen. There were no idealists at these sessions, which consisted not of official negotiators but of scholars simulating peace talks. In Palestinian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli dialogues, the disagreements sounded like debates of government officials.

Despite these differences, the chemistry worked and incredible events followed. Because the Soviet and American sponsors were in complete agreement, their cooperation was contagious for both Arabs and Israelis. The Mideast players were forced to communicate in ways impossible during the cold war when it was tempting to play Washington and Moscow against each other.

The experts in Moscow agreed that the new Arab-Israeli peace process should begin with a declaration of principles on procedures, covering matters like the commitment to negotiate continuously and to deal in good faith with the aim of resolving outstanding issues. The participants stressed that once agreement was reached on procedures, it could create a precedent for later accords, averting the need to start all over again. An Arab delegate argued: “Don’t insult us. Don’t just deal as Americans and Israelis always do with only technicalities or tactics.”

To take advantage of the early positive atmosphere, participants were encouraged to take on difficult issues such as arms control, economic cooperation and negotiating procedures.

Then the shocks began. The Arabs and Israelis took a common approach on specific issues and opposed the stands of the great powers. For example, the Mideast participant argues that foreign aid was critical to the peace process and that economic reforms could not be pressed too strongly during the delicate adjustment period—positions at odds with the U.S., European and Soviet view.

Mideast players also voiced support for a moratorium on arms shipments and new arms sales to their region for the duration of the talks.

All participants agreed that talks could succeed only if difficult issues like nuclear weapons, the status of Jerusalem and the P.L.O.’s role were deferred until agreements had been reached on other matters.

Are these meetings relevant to Madrid? Yes, because they were attended by former generals and diplomats, well-placed academics and journalists with close ties the their governments. The Moscow sessions demonstrated that good faith, good cheer, goodwill and work on practical issues can make a difference under the right circumstances. With all the acrimony in Madrid, our experience suggests that away from the limelight, compromise is possible.

Most participants entered the Moscow meeting skeptical about the success of the Madrid conference. Despite their continued disagreement, most left Moscow at least somewhat more optimistic. An Arab admitted that he had never previously understood the variety of Israeli views; he had always thought simply of one Israel. And an Israeli hardliner commented: “This is a scary conference; the Arabs are so likable.”

Andrei Shoumikhin is director of regional studies for the U.S.-Canada Institute in Moscow. Steven L. Spiegel is professor of political science at U.C.L.A.