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A Postnational Double-Displacement: The Blurring of Anti-Roma Violence from Romania to Northern Ireland

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I. From Romania to Belfast and Back: A Double-Displacement of Roma in a Postnational Europe

_I don't mind the Poles and the Slovakiants who come here. They work hard, harder than indigenous people from here, but all you see now are these Romanians begging and mooching about. We'd all be better off - them and us - if they went back to Romania or somewhere else in Europe._

Loyalist from South Belfast, quoted in MacDonald, 2009

_And so one has to wonder: are the Gypsies really nomadic by “nature,” or have they become so because they have never been allowed to stay?_

Isabel Fonseca, _Bury Me Standing: The Gypsies and Their Journey_, 1995

On June 11, 2009, a gang of Loyalist\(^1\) youth smashed the windows and damaged the cars of members of South Belfast’s Romanian Roma\(^2\) community in an area known as the Holylands. The Holylands borders a space called the Village, a Loyalist stronghold infamous during the height of the Troubles\(^3\) for sectarian and paramilitary violence. \(^4\) Like other members of the

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\(^1\) Although not all Catholics in Northern Ireland are Republicans, and although not all Protestants in the North are Loyalists, largely, Republicans come from Catholic legacies and all Loyalists from Protestant ones. The discursive difference between each group's sovereignty is stark, painting a topography of incommensurability. Many Republicans still labor for a North freed from British governance, while Loyalists elicit that they too have existed in the North for centuries now. Both groups' struggles for sovereignty have little to do with religious differences, and instead with different historicity religionized.

\(^2\) The 2012 European Commissioner for Human Rights defines Roma as Europe’s largest and “most vulnerable minority” community (Commissioner 2012: 31). Today there are between 10 and 12 million Roma living in Europe. Their ancestors left northern India around the 10th century, most likely as slave attachments to Ottoman armies. Culturally Roma are heterogeneous, varying in terms of language, religion, occupation, and way of life. Romania's 2011 census found Roma to number 619,007, or 3.2% of the total population (see CCPRPL 2012). The Council of Europe estimates the number to actually be between 1,500,000 and 2,500,000 (see CoE 2002).

\(^3\) The Troubles signify the period of state, paramilitary, and sectarian violence in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1999, concluding with the signing of the power sharing 1999 Belfast “Good Friday” Agreement. The Troubles resulted in 3,627 deaths (see McKeown 2009). Many people contest the effectiveness of Northern Ireland's transitional justice model, as sectarian and paramilitary violence continues to this day.

\(^4\) _The Troubles_ signify the period of state, paramilitary, and sectarian violence between Republicans and Loyalists in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1999 in which 3,627 people died (McKeown 2009). There are still active
Village, the Loyalists chided the crowded nature of homes newly occupied by Roma families, at the garbage littered about their houses, and at their begging on the streets. In response to the attacks, over two hundred anti-racist allies held a rally nearby on Lisburn Road. The rally was raided by a handful of Loyalists who lobbed bottles at the crowd and enacted Nazi solutes. The next day, the Loyalists attacked and burned the homes of 114 Roma, throwing petrol bombs, smashing windows, and hurling threats to “get the Pakis out” (pers. comm. July 11, 2011). One Roma family in East Belfast was targeted as well, and even a white anti-racist organizer, Paddy Meehan, received a death threat (pers. comm. July 13, 2011). Copies of Mein Kampf were stapled to Roma homes, and as one man reported, “They wanted to kill us” (quoted in Associated Press 2009a). He described how “they made signs like they wanted to cut my brother’s baby’s throat” (quoted in Associated Press 2009a). Maria, also Roma, explained, “We want to go home now because right now we are not safe here” (quoted in Associated Press 2009a). The police helped relocate the Roma to a safe temporary accommodation site, but nevertheless, as Assistant Chief Constable Alistair Finlay reported, the Roma “are still determined that they are going to return to Romania” (quoted in McCreary and Smyth 2009).

After the attack, members of the British neo-Nazi micro-group Combat 18 (C18) broadcasted support for the Loyalist youth over email and text message. Their hate-filled message menaced:

“Romanian gypsies beware beware, / Loyalist C18 are coming to beat you like a baiting

Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups, though not necessarily the same ones that were primarily active during the Troubles, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provos or IRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). Today, active Republican paramilitaries include the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓnahÉ), the Real Continuity Irish Republican Army (RCIRA), and the Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD). Contemporary Loyalist paramilitaries include the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF), the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), the Orange Volunteers (OV), the Ulster Young Militants (UYM), the Real Ulster Freedom Fighters (RUFF), the Ulster Resistance, the Red Hand Commandos (RHC), and the Red Hand Defenders (RDH). None of these paramilitaries are to be mistaken for Nationalist/Republican and Unionist/Loyalist political parties, although often there are linkages. Active Nationalist/Republican parties include Sinn Féin, Fianna Fáil, the Workers Party, the 32 County Sovereignty Movement (32s or 32CSM), the Republican Network for Unity (RNU), Republican Sinn Féin, the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRPS), and Éirígí. Active Loyalist parties include the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the United Unionist Coalition (UUC), Families Acting for Innocent Relatives (FAIR), and the Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG, formerly known as the Ulster Democratic Party, or UDP).

5 The organization C18 emerged in the UK in 1989. The “18” in the name is derived from the Latinized initials of Adolf Hitler. It is associated with white supremacist groups including the British National Party (BNP), Blood and Honour, and the National Front. It has disseminated into numerous countries, and many of its members have incited violence against immigrant communities.
bear, / Stay out of South Belfast and stay out of sight, / And then youse will be alright, / Get on the boat and don’t come back, / There is no black in the Union Jack, / Loyalist C18 ‘whatever it takes’” (quoted in McDonald 2009a).

Another text message sent from C18 members in England to Loyalists in Belfast read, “English C18 thanks all true Loyalists fore forcing Romanian Muslims out of Belfast. . . ! These foreign nationals are a threat to Britain’s Britishness” (quoted in Shilton 2009). Not only did the message presume Northern Ireland’s British nationality, but elided that most of the Roma in Belfast from Romania are Orthodox Christian, and instead reified them with Muslims into the Islamaphobic imaginary of infinite evil: immigrant-enemy-terrorist. Much to the neo-Nazi's desires, 100 of the 114 Roma who were attacked opted to return to Romania, with assistance from Northern Ireland's government (see McDonald 2009b).

Conflations of the Roma into majoritarian discourses of contaminant are hardly contemporary. A Bucharest-based civil rights activist, Alexandru Alexe, likened the situation in Belfast to early post-Communist Romania: “What I saw in Belfast reminded me of Romania in the early 1990s, when the Roma parts of villages were burnt by other villagers” (quoted in Sharrock 2009). As he explained, “It starts with neo-Nazis but it doesn’t take a lot to take it mainstream. Maybe Belfast is just the beginning.”

The 2009 acts of violence are hardly the beginning. There are myriad of beginnings that preceded it across kaleidoscopic spheres, in both Romania and the West. Alexe was right to invoke post-Communist anti-Roma village burning however, as in many ways, the recent waves of Roma migration from Romania to Western spaces like Northern Ireland are resultant of a series of spatial and political transformations that have transpired in Romania since the 1989 collapse of Nicolae Ceauşescu's communist dictatorship. While anti-Roma mob violence did break out in Romania after the hanging of Ceauşescu – an estimated thirty anti-Roma pogroms displaced thousands of Roma throughout the early 1900s (see ERRC 1996, 1997; Hall 2010: 4) – other forms of state violence have continued to lead to the internal displacement of Roma communities since then, most notably in the forms of forced eviction and forced ghettoization, from and within urban spaces. Today, as Romanian cities attempt assimilation into the whitened Western imaginary of modern urbanity, local municipalities sanction the ejection and containment of their “internal Others” – most predominantly Roma communities. Such
mechanisms precipitate not only internal dispossession, but also destitution, the effects of environmental racism in relocation sites, increased susceptibility to police incursions and human trafficking rings, and conditions of rightlessness. From Cluj-Napoca to Baia Mare, we can see an increasing number of Roma living in makeshift housing within garbage dumps, toxic waste sites, and former factory buildings, or physically ghettoized within walled urban spaces. We also see an increasing number of Roma (in)voluntarily migrating to Western Europe.

Whether in the West by choice or not, Romanian Roma encounter processions of xenophobia with geneses that preceded – and with formations responsively fashioned to meet – their arrival. Across the West, Roma immigrants are subjected to different performances of violence. In Northern Ireland, neo-Nazi attacks and state policies of exception have led to voluntary returns. Repatriation then incites the affect of double displacement within Romania.

Drawing on ethnographic work conducted in Romania and Northern Ireland between 2010 and 2012, as well as archival research, this paper constructs a counter-narrative to neoliberal discourses of European expansion, securitization, and multiculturalism. First, I explore the history of anti-Roma racism in Romania to situate post-Communist formations of anti-Roma dispossession today. I focus upon a 2010 forced eviction of a Roma community from Coastei Street in Cluj-Napoca to the city’s municipal garbage dump, where different communities of Roma were already living due to a theater of prior forced evictions and displacements. I question how such scenarios of displacement engender members of Roma communities to seek better conditions in the West. I then examine historical formations of xenophobia in Northern Ireland that shift with the arrival of Romanian Roma into urban spaces, such as South Belfast. I explore the conditions that led to the 2009 anti-Roma violence in South Belfast, which incited a number of Roma to return to Romania, engendering the affect of double-displacement. I disinter settler colonial histories and historiographies that have rendered, and that continue to portray, non-sedentary people a threat to the territoriality of the settler state. Linkages between sedentarism, settler colonialism, and racism are disaggregated and then re-entangled in an attempt to conceive of the particular histories that have constellated the systems of oppression targeting Roma in the North. Lastly, this paper contextualizes contemporary anti-Roma violence within postnational contexts, preferring that as postnational European states garner anxieties of waning sovereignties to the European body, nationalistic anti-Roma fervor within them augments, blurring borders between state, non-state, and transnational actors.
II. Histories of Dis-placement: Romania

There is a vast archive that bears witness to Romania’s anti-Roma racism. Since their medieval emergence into the current space of Romania, Roma have been victims of systemic abuses ranging from forced slavery, forced sterilization, forced ghettoization and expulsion, as well as genocide. They were enslaved in Romania until 1856, upon which reparations were forsaken. Roma were targeted by eugenics movements into the twentieth century, and then by racist state policy (see Achim 1998; Commissioner 2012). In 1939 the Romanian Constitution went as far as to distinguish between “blood Romanians” and “Romanian citizens” (see Achim 1998: 163). In January 1941, the Iron Guard published a declaration that tackling “the Gypsy Problem” was a priority for the National-Legionary State (ibid.: 163). During the Second World War, the Antonescu Regime sought to solve this along with the “Jewish Problem” by deporting members of both groups to camps in Transnistria, the borderland between today's Moldova and Ukraine (ibid.: 166). Roughly half of the 25,000 deported Roma were massacred (ibid.: 166).

In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt (1968) describes how expelling a human from the political community results in her dehumanization, reducing her existence to the zoological realm. The juridical laws that protect a human in a political community, or a nation, are made null with ejection. Arendt suggests that it was the breakdown of European nation-state systems during the inter-war era that led conditions of rightlessness. The expulsion of Romania's internal Others to Transnistrian camps delineates the state's attempt to purify itself by purifying its Others of their rights. We see this project continued after the Holocaust, through both Communist and neoliberal regimes.

After the Second World War, the Roma that survived were made the object of a secretive Communist policy aimed to obliterate Roma cultural difference and tradition. Beginning in the 1960s, the “systematization” program sought to sedentarize all nomadic Roma (see Achim 1998: 192; Madure 2007). Historians and scholars remind us that despite its attempts to obliterate Roma culture, at least Communism did provide some social support, particularly around access to social services, employment, and housing (see Achim 1998; Barany 2002; Fostzó et al. 2001; Guy 2001; Mizsei 2012; Smith 2006). These provisions were thrown into the wind after 1989, resulting in increased impecuniousness, homelessness, and impoverished health, as well as increased susceptibility to mob and police violence (see Barany 2000, 2002; ERRC 1996, 1997; Fostzó et al. 2001; Guy 2001). As well, after the dismantling of the collectivized farms that had
been the source of many Romas’ incomes during Communism, countless Roma were left unemployed (see Achim 1998; Madure 2007). Maryaan Kalo, a Roma man fluent in over ten languages but forced to beg on Bucharest streets by day, describes:

“There was more support for all the people of Romania under Communism, without discrimination. Now, when I go to a hospital nobody sees me. I am black. A black man without money is like dead. I haven’t a job” (pers. comm., June 12, 2011).

One might imagine such an analysis to be rendered through nostalgia, or largely unreflective of other Roma’s experiences. When first talking to Maryaan, I imagined this to be the case. However, the more that I researched post-Communist integration conditions for Roma in Romania, the more that I began to better understand the veracity of his claims.

Marilyn Strathern (1977) writes, “Ownership gathers things momentarily to a point by locating them in the owner, halting endless dissemination, effecting an identity” (177). The shift from a socialist to a capitalist political economy is not one to undermine, as its neoliberal impetus imposed new notions of entitlement, obligations, and individualism. In exploring the ideological aspects of the postsocialist and neoliberal project of transforming public into private property, Katherine Verdery (1999) writes, “If we see transition as a project of cultural engineering in which fundamental social ideas are resignified—including not only ‘markets, ‘democracy,’ and ‘private property’ but also ideas about entitlement, accountability, and responsibility—then the (re)creation of private property is evidently a critical locus for this cultural project” (54). The privatization of collectivized life affected Roma populations differently than that of non-Roma. Indeed it was, one could venture, a cultural project.

During Communism, the market largely operated outside the sphere of public life. The price of goods was centrally determined, and their flow was inwardly directed towards the center for redistribution. The Communist work ethic compelled a morality in which statist paternalism was rewarded for state work (Kaneff 2002: 35). After 1989, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) took on the paternalistic role of the “benevolent hegemon,” conspiring with Romanian elites to foment a “second Europe” out of the ruins of the “second world” (Arfire 2011: 854). Democratization and Europeanization were introduced as a shock therapy to eradicate the past as rapidly as possible (Burawoy and Verdery
Sue Bridger and Francis Pine (1998) write about how although the language and symbolism of socialism were superseded by that of capitalism, a stable free-market economy was not simply generated; instead the market was suspended in limbo. The logical transition of lineal development, they write, is rooted in the age of Fordism; the advanced capitalism of the later twentieth century does not fit such a model, and instead belongs to an order of post-modernity, in which fragmentation and cultural specificity muddy the assumed coherence of economic transition. As I will go on to elaborate, such impossibility sheltered uncertainty, and instigated increased xenophobia.

Transitioned imposed what Ramona Arfire (2011) calls a natural logic, in which historical time was interpreted as culturally remote, “so that in the social imaginary of western Europe, post-communism was ‘pre-political’ and its citizens considered an underdeveloped other, if not outright barbarians” (854). Romanians were relegated pejorative identity ascriptions, which in different ways they accepted as the cost of second-class EU membership. Such oppression was magnified by the EU’s “iconic acts of differentiation,” in which the EU periodically refused to invite both Bulgaria and Romania to key supranational gatherings (such as the Berlin Agenda of 2000 and the Luxemburg European council) (ibid.: 859). Such acts compelled increased internalized oppression in which Romanians saw themselves as laggard compared to the more westernized Europeans. Such liminal status was nothing new for Romania in the context of assumed inferiority to the European body, which we can see when looking at formations of otherness during the Enlightenment, and during modernity (see Arfire 2011; Chirot 1991). What remains significant is that such subalternity shifted in post-transitional contexts in ways that engendered heightened formations of nationalism.

Similar to those of the collaborator class in colonial projects, Romanian elites sought to rid themselves of laggard status by reinterpreting old power structures through a new semiotics. Reliant on increased internal Othering, they began amplifying the gap between those already structurally privileged and oppressed. Many white Romanians, attempting to escape despotic ascription by assimilating into this elite Europeanized class, proceeded to endeavor the obliteration of local knowledges, legacies, and cultural heterogeneity, or “the difference which makes no difference” (Arfire 2011: 860). Romanians seeking to emigrate to the West to forsake such the uncertainties imposed by impossible economic transition at home were confronted with a transnational panic about the “Romanian folk-devils” infiltrating Western Europe (ibid.: 860).
This was particularly magnified in the United Kingdom, Italy, and France. These panics, Arfire writes, “created a space of articulation of post-national identities in the new Europe, and anchored the identity of Romanians as hyphenated Europeans” (ibid.: 863).

Bridger and Pine (1998) proffer that in the anxiety-saturated limbo of an impossible economic transition, “the losses and uncertainties generated by changing economic and social conditions are projected on to a scapegoat or ‘other’” (8). However, as Hannah Arendt (1968) reminds us, scapegoat theories are dangerous in that they imply that the scapegoat could have been someone else – that the victim was victimized through randomized proximity (6). It was not random that anti-Roma racism would augment through transition into a European democracy. As Enikő Vincze writes, “Seen in the wider Romanian context of post-socialist transformations, Roma racialization is a particular technology that racializes processes of de-proletarianization and de-universalizes Romanian citizens of Roma origins” (2012: 1). Roma, foiled against white Romanians attempting assimilation, were seen as an impediment to Westernization.

In this increased political economy of anti-Roma racism, it makes sense that Roma nostalgia for the Communist past would crystallize. As Bridger and Pine suggest, “In a context of growing privation, people understandably re-evaluate their past, emphasizing positive aspects of experiences which formerly they may have taken for granted or even opposed” (1998: 6). In such a context, Maryaan’s pining for Communist dictatorship becomes coherent.

In post-Communist Romania, it is arguable that anti-Roma racism has in fact become a significant building block of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism interprets differences between Roma and non-Roma relations as inherent, rather than as resultant of histories of structural oppression (see Vincze 2012). It deciphers segregation as a repercussion of biological and cultural difference, rather than as genealogically rooted. Offering an imaginary band-aide to individual Roma capable and willing to assimilate, it simultaneously thrusts possibilities of assimilation further into unobtainable realms as segregation’s effects and affect continue to stretch, enfleshing Roma communities into necropolitical and nonexistent spaces.

In some ways, unsuccessful transitional justice directly effectuated increased statist anti-Roma violence. Romania’s model, like others of the Eastern bloc, sought to circumscribe Communism as an aberration to be buried and forgotten, while strategically failing to implement successful lustration or exhumation of inflammatory archives (see Stan 2009). This allowed for former members of the Securitate – one of the most violent police forces throughout history – to
maintain key positions in the decommunized government, including members that had targeted Roma communities. It was assumed that with the hanging of Ceaușescu, the violence associated with Communism would be expurgated from the political apparatuses of the state. Politically, and psychosocially, this was far from the case (see Smith 2006). Laszló Fosztó and Marian Viorel Anăstăsoaie (2001: 351) write about the quotidian militarization into the 1990s of Roma targeting. In 1999, for instance, the mayor of Piatra Neamț recruited guerilla warfare specialists that had previously served in Chechnya and Afghanistan to evict the Roma residents in the Dărmănești neighborhood to “safeguard public order” (ibid.: 351). In 2012, the EU Commissioner on Human Rights noted that since Communism, cases of arbitrary detention, arbitrary seizure of property, and police incursion all have augmented in Romania, largely with impunity from EU human rights laws and international adjudication (Commissioner 2012: 14). Arguably, the choreography of decommunization was entrenched with a pre-Communist and Communist racism that saw Roma as non-human, as animal. The politics of memory are a contentious battleground. This battleground saw the project of assimilating into post-Communism calcified with pre-existent anti-Roma racism.

It has not only been state forces that have subjugated Roma since 1989. Mob and extrajudicial violence have internally displaced and killed countless people, often with support from state or local forces (see Fosztó et al. 2001). Into the mid-1990s, a collective wave of anti-Roma mob violence broke out across the country. Hundreds of houses were burned, and numerous people were lynched and murdered (see ERRC 1996; 1997; 2001). Thirty pogroms were reported in localities such as Turulun, Bolintin Deal, Hădăreni, Plăieșii de Sus (see ERRC 1996; 1997; 2001). Fosztó and Anăstăsoaie (2001: 358) write that such outbursts of violence were not only normalized in the early 1990s, especially in rural areas, but that they often followed a typical scenario. In the scenario, first often tension broke out between Roma and non-Roma. Then, non-Roma would violently react, and the police would either stand by and do nothing, or abet in mob-violence (ibid.: 359). For instance, in Hădăreni in 1993, three Roma men were murdered and nineteen houses were burned or demolished. Witnesses later testified in court that members of the local police had incited the mob to incinerate the Roma houses, and that they even promised to cover up the event. One witness later testified in court, “The policeman with dark hair took out a gun and said: ‘I do not help the Gypsies, come and set fire to them’” (quoted in ERRC 2001). He continued, “Two police cars were driving around Hădăreni, announcing
through their loud-speakers: ‘Only the houses of the Gypsies should be set on fire, the houses of the Romanian people should not be burned!’” Those responsible for such scenarios of violence have rarely been effectively prosecuted, largely due to slow and inefficient judicial processes, leaving many Roma wary of the state’s capacity to protect them (see Fosztó et al. 2001: 359).

In The Archive and the Repertoire, Diana Taylor (2003: 54) writes about ways that when an act of violence becomes normalized as scenario, the atrocity of its outcome becomes transferred through its purported banality into a realm of invisibility or distance. Indeed, when speaking with non-Roma in Romania, I have found that not only are people unfazed by the extremity of post-Communist scenarios of anti-Roma mob violence, but also largely people appear unruffled by the nature of contemporary anti-Roma manifestations – what I refer to as scenarios of ghettoization and eviction. Since the 1990s, the pogroms that attempted to enact an ethnic cleansing of Roma have arguably been supplanted with practices of forced eviction, often yoked with police incursions. These practices render thousands of Roma displaced and endangered. From the effects of homelessness, hazardous toxins prevalent in relocation sites, and continued police and gendarmerie raids, the apparatuses for suppressing the Roma population are poignant. The undesirability of relocation sites often results in increased ghettoization and marginalization. Displacement also increases susceptibility to human trafficking networks (see ERRC 2012a).

III. Scenarios of Dis-placement: Romania

Within the last decade, evictions of Roma communities to remote localities outside city centers have occurred throughout the country, in areas such as Piatra-Neamț, Tîrgu-Mureș, Miercurea Ciuc, Deva, Bacău, Baia-Mare, and Cluj-Napoca. Often the local authorities responsible for these evictions are overt in plans of cleansing and ghettoization. In October 2001, for instance, the mayor of Piatra-Neamț publicly announced his plans to build a “ghetto” for the Roma outside of the city center (see Rughinis 2004). In July 2011, the mayor of Baia-Mare, Catalin Chereches, began building a wall to isolate three blocks of Roma flats in the Horea neighborhood to “clean” the city (see Lacatus 2011). In 2012, after threatening nearly 2,000 Roma from the areas of Craica, Pirita and Garii with eviction notices, Chereches relocated seventy families to a toxic former industrial site, Cuprom, after which people many began to experience symptoms of exposure to toxic waste (see Lacatus 2011). Two adults and twenty-two children were
hospitalized. Shortly after the ghettoization and relocation began, Chereches received an overwhelming 86 percent of the city’s vote in a local election, a result reflective of his “cleaning” (see Gladdis 2013). As Michael Szinn, a seventy-four-year-old white pensioner from the center of town lauded, “He’s done a great job by putting up the wall. . . Gypsy kids were on the streets before and threw stones at cars. Moving others to Cuprom is an even better thing for our city” (quoted in Lacatus 2011). Radu, a white Romanian who lives several blocks from the ghetto in Horea confirmed, “People from the outside think this is so bad. Not true. We, and them, are better off now” (pers. comm. July 8, 2012).

Cosmin, a twelve-year-old Roma boy who lives in the newly constructed ghetto, explained to me during the height of a Transylvanian heat wave, that while he doesn’t really care about the wall, it makes it harder to get to school, and to a nearby swimming hole, and it seems like a waste of materials. As he was telling me this, an elderly Hungarian woman wearing nothing but a sagging bathing suit began to yell at him from across the street, calling him a “dirty Gypsy thief,” and demanding he return to the walled in area surrounding his building. He just laughed and proceeded to do his best “Donald Duck impression” (pers. comm. July 8, 2012).

Relocated and ghettoized Roma are often left without access to basic utilities, and sometimes housing all together. Romanian law, as well as national policy, collectively fails to regulate how local authorities conduct forced evictions. While human rights protocols, such as Article 11 of the International Convention for Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, require that alternative adequate housing be provided for victims of forced evictions, Romanian national law does not (see ERRC 2012b: 3).

In Cluj-Napoca, there are now over 1,500 Roma living in the local garbage dump, Pata-Rât, eighteen kilometers from the city-center, due to a series of forced evictions that have transpired since 1989 (see Hall 2010: 5). In addition to violating international law, the most recent 2010 eviction from Coastei Street in Cluj’s city center contravened the state’s winter moratorium on forced evictions (the eviction took place during temperatures of negative ten degrees Celsius), and led to the displacement of 356 Roma, many of which were relocated to Pata-Rât (see Amnesty 2011). They had been equivocally warned of an eviction two days before the eviction transpired, when they were told to register with the city as homeless persons (see ERRC 2012c: 7). Many reported that this order confused them, as the majority of the evicted families had been living in public housing rented from the city and did not consider themselves
homeless (ibid.: 7). On the morning of the December 17, 2010, the utilities were cut from Coastei Street homes, and for several hours, in freezing temperatures, local authority representatives, gendarmerie, and masked police officers surrounded Coastei Street (see Harbula 2011: 171). A twenty-five-year-old woman describes, “They evicted us in the middle of the winter. I was in the cold for seven hours with my three-week-old daughter” (quoted in ERRC 2012c: 7). The evictees were not even told where they were going to until the bulldozers came on site to demolish their homes. The demolition occurred without court order and/or a public decision of the local council, and without any compensation (pers. comm. June 2011). It was reported that during the razing of their homes, furniture, windows, and personal possessions were also wrecked (see ERRC 2011). Afterwards, the land was given to the Metropolitan Church of Transylvania to construct an ecclesiastical education center (pers. comm. June 2011).

Once evicted, 185 persons (ninety-four children and ninety-one adults) were allocated social housing at Pata-Rât. At least fifty-six people from thirty-six families (including fifteen children) were left homeless (see Amnesty 2012b). Roma were not consulted about the nature of their new living spaces, nor the conditions at Pata-Rât. Prior to the eviction, studies have revealed that Pata-Rât was an unsafe living environment for the Roma already living there in the areas of Dallas, Cantonului Street, and Rampa (see Hall 2010: 142-156). Accumulation of solid waste in the area results in toxic chemical exposures through air, soil, and water contamination (ibid.: 7). Roma already living at Pata-Rât had been shown to commonly suffer from digestive, lung, and circulatory system diseases, as well as from malnutrition and vitamin deficiency disorders such as anemia and rickets. Additionally, water sources were reported to often be broken or improperly managed. It had been documented that there were visual signs of contamination in water supplies, including solid waste and human and animal feces (ibid.: 7).

When brought to Pata-Rât from Coastei Street, forty families were compelled to sign lease agreements for housing at Pata-Rât without being given a chance to read about their new accommodations, nor verify the habitability of the apartments (see ERRC 2012c: 7). While their contracts claimed that they would be allocated two-room apartments of fifteen or eighteen square meters, as they soon discovered, the apartments contained only one room each. Four apartments composed one module and shared one bathroom, meaning that up to forty people were to share a single bathroom. There were no kitchens, and the bathrooms were not heated. Most of the

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6 Fourteen of the families had been living in makeshift housing (see ERRC 2012c: 7)
apartments had electricity, but no hot water or gas (ibid.: 7). The walls and ceilings were damp
upon their arrival (see Asociatia Amare Prhala et al. 2011). Collectively these conditions violate
the minimum requirements of a home as prescribed by the Romanian Housing Law (see GLOC
2011). Twenty-nine of the thirty-six families left homeless attempted to build makeshift homes
near the other housing units. Lia, who attempted to do so by gathering materials from the
garbage “froze all winter long” because she could not properly insulate (pers. comm. June 24,
2012).

One month upon relocation to the new “social housing” in the site named by authorities
as “Colina Verde,” it was reported that walls had gathered more mold, that ceilings had
developed cracks, and that there was fungi growing on the roofs. Participatory research
conducted by the ERRC between September 2011 and December 2012 found that approximately
92 percent of the dispossessed Coastei residents reported mold in their new homes, and 89
percent reported a lack of adequate cooking facilities (ERRC 2012c). None of the homes had
water connections, and eleven of them lacked electricity.

Furthermore, numerous Roma upon relocation reported detriment to economic well-being
since relocation, with average income falling by 30 percent and transportation costs to the city-
center increasing for all (see ERRC 2012c). Up to 28 percent of adults reported losing their
source of employment, and the average unemployment rate amongst those relocated had risen 20
percent, making 49 percent of adults from Coastei Street unemployed as of 2012 (ERRC 2012c).
Access to education had been negatively impacted as well, as stigmatization of being associated
with Pata-Rât is severe in the city school system. While only 5.7 percent of students reported
being subjected to racist remarks prior to eviction, 25 percent reported subjection post eviction
(ERRC 2012c). Fourteen children (nearly 20 percent) were refused admission to school post
 eviction, and 10 percent were placed in special education classes for children with disabilities
(ERRC 2012c.). Lastly, it was found that the heath of relocated Roma severely suffered post
relocation. Reports of physical illness rose 14 percent, so that as of 2012, 30 percent relocated
Roma were physically ill (ERRC 2012c). While the Roma once had to have to wait on average
eleven to twelve minutes for an ambulance to arrive when they lived on Coastei Street, at Pata-
Rât, they now have to wait roughly ninety-two minutes. It was reported that at times ambulances
have refused to dispatch, and in some cases, it has taken ambulances two to three hours to
respond to residents’ calls (ERRC 2012c.). Monica, who now lives on Cantonlui Street,
corroborates: “Ambulances, they don’t come here. Police, they do. They don’t come after us here, but they do come after my neighbors who steal” (pers. comm. June 24, 2012).

Claudia, a forty-year-old woman who had been living on Coastei Street for twenty years articulates her frustrations. Before, she describes, “we paid rent, we paid electricity, we didn't steal anything. We had jobs and we found work. Our kids went to school, they went to internet cafes or down to the library” (Taylor 2013). But now, “We live on top of garbage. Where we are now, we can't do anything” (ibid.). She now lives in a tiny shack no larger than the size of a caravan, on top of waste. I met Claudia returning with her children from a long journey to the center of town. As we were crossing the railroad track on a precarious footpath – the easiest way into Pata-Rât from the bus station – she told me of how she had been lobbying members of the city council all day long, as she has been doing consistently since the eviction. She looked frustrated, and fatigued. Nevertheless, she remains determined to continue trying, “because there is nothing else to do” (pers. comm. June 27, 2012). She feels mortified imagining living the rest of her life at the dump.

Monica, who has been living in Pata-Rât since 2005 when evacuated from an unfinished building in the Gheorgheni area of Cluj sees little prospect for the Roma from Coastei Street (pers. comm. June 29, 2012). She despises Pata-Rât, but can’t afford to leave it. It is imbued with sorrow for her, especially as shortly after she relocated with her husband Simon, their four-year-old son died due to exposure to the horrid living conditions. For years Monica and Simon have been collecting iron from the garbage and selling it to a nearby company. Simon had been working for the garbage company Brantner-Vereș up until two years ago when was fired to due anti-Roma discrimination. Such discrimination has impeded him from securing another job. Monica has diabetes, and cannot afford food. “I have to eat before each injection,” she tells me, looking both dejected and desperate at once. She turns to pull out a photo-album. Flipping through the pages, I see a different person than the one sitting before me on a broken chair in a makeshift shack with holes in the roof, flies buzzing about, and the smell of mold saturating the air. In the photographs, Monica looks alive. In the photographs, her son was alive. Neither Monica nor Simon feel that the Roma from Coastei Street will fare better than they have. Monica peered into my eyes with a sharpened intensity. “You know,” she says, “if I die tomorrow, I won’t feel sorry. I have nothing left to feel sorry about. This is a place without dreams. Without hope. For me, dreams are like… I don’t know. I don’t have any” (pers. comm. July 2012).
The NGOs ERRC and Romani CRISS are currently litigating against authorities responsible for the eviction from Coastei Street. Although cases are lodged in the European Court of Human Rights and Romanian courts, history provides little hope that effective judgments will be implemented. While the Court has at times indicated general measures designed to ameliorate systemic problems and to reduce the probability of reoccurrence, the measures are rarely specific and often ignored. Historically this has disproportionately affected Roma claimants (see Kushen 2010). In Romania, numerous “friendly settlement” cases have yet to be implemented due to failures of political will, funding, and administration. If some indemnification is implemented through either court system, people on the ground at Pata-Rât have little faith that it will be enough to effectively mitigate damages, or to provide adequate housing (pers. comm. July 2012).

Once relocated to Pata-Rât, many Roma have expressed their fear of increased raids and state violence (pers. comm. July 2012). This fear is far from unwarranted, as can be seen by the violence enacted upon Roma already living in the dump's areas of Rampa, Cantonului, and Dallas. In November 2005, for instance, two incursions into Pata-Rât, involving over eighty police and members of Troop of Protection and Rapid Intervention, resulted in the burning of fifteen homes belonging to Roma families, and five reported cases of brutality. The raid left small children “under the open sky, in cold conditions” (Hall 2010: 4). In August 2006, community police and representatives from the City Hall burned ten Roma homes and physically abused at least two women with electrical devices (see Hall 2010: 4). In July 2008, approximately 100 Roma at Rampa were raided by representatives from the police, city hall, and the Prefect Board, accompanied by thirty-five peace officers and three dogs. Dozens of people were forced to evacuate without assistance. Local news sources reported that ten homes were set on fire, though sources blamed the Roma themselves for the burnings (see Hall 2010: 4).

Roma at Dallas are currently being supported by a neo-Protestant Dutch foundation, ProRroma. As of 2012, it had managed to buy the terrain of old Dallas and mutate into a private neighborhood. In its salvific mission and with the assistance of international Christian missions from as far as South Africa, ProRroma has coordinated some healthcare and educational services, and has constructed new houses for some families. Priority, however, has funneled into building Christian prayer spaces and into teaching Roma children to correctly pray. Bert Loijii, the Danish man leading the mission, has with his wife dedicated his life to saving the Dallas
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Roma, “because they don’t know better” and thus need his help to “find the Lord’s shelter” (pers. comm. June 26, 2012). His assistance, however, has created resentment from Roma at Rampa and Cantonului, not because the Dallas Roma are receiving proselytization, but because such proselytizing measures are accompanied by the construction of helpful physical infrastructure and the raising of religious funds. Many Roma at Cantonului do receive charity from the Speranța Church in Cluj, but those that don't hold contempt for those that do (pers. comm. June 27, 2012). The economy of Christian salvation is effective in its age-old mechanisms of division and colonization. Ironically, the Roma at Coastei were originally evicted so that an Orthodox church could construct a school where their homes had been.

In Franz Kafka's The Metamorphosis (1915), the protagonist, Gregor, is transformed into a giant insect. Upon his mutation, Gregor's family takes pity upon him, and offers him care and support, provided he remains within the confines of his room. This care is transformed into vilification as soon as he transgresses his room's borderlines. Gregor's family proceeds to brutally murder him. The Roma at Pata-Rât and similar ghettos throughout the state become dehumanized, or animalized, through processes of eviction and ghettoization. Not only are they deprived of a place in the political community, a place that Arendt (1968) posits as necessary for one's remaining human, but they are deprived of basic human necessities. Once animalized, economies of Christian salvation are directed upon those deemed worthy of redemption. This creates dependency, and prevents formations of solidarity from fomenting between groups, collectively facilitating the project of Roma subjugation.

In Society Must be Defended, Michel Foucault (2003) links this form of subjugation to biopolitics – a technology of power that does not exclude disciplinary power, but that integrates and modifies it through new instruments. Unlike discipline, which is directed towards individual bodies through surveillance, training, and punishment, biopower is directed towards populations, towards “man-as-species” (2003: 243). Foucault traces the emersion of this new “biopolitics of the human race” establishing itself in the end of the eighteenth century. It depended upon “introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (ibid.: 254). Inscribed into the politics of state sovereignty, biopolitical control fragments societies on the basis of a biological domain. Biopolitical regulation of housing in Cluj suggests that Roma are not deemed worthy of life.

In January of 2012, an elderly woman, Ioana, who members of Dallas guessed to be in
her 80s, took me into the tiny barrack of her home. Despite the lack of heating in her 8 foot by 10 foot home, a humidity circulated a stench throughout its atmosphere, one that reeked somewhere between human decay and animal feces. Three flea-ridden kittens encircled me upon entering, while Io, fully blind for over a decade now, motioned for me to sit down on a heap of rotting cornhusks. “I am going to die soon,” she asserted matter-of-factly (pers. comm. January 7, 2012). “I am going to die soon, and when I do, I don’t want to be buried in the garbage.” I could not tell if this was a story that she had been reciting for decades, or if it was of a new anxiety. “But tell me?” she questioned with a tinge of anger. “Who will bury me elsewhere?” I sat on the cornhusks wishing to come up with an answer. “No one!” she shouted. “No one!” Just then, the missionary Bert walked in. “Is she bothering you?” he asked me in English, apologetically. “Pay her no mind. She’s been at this for years. Crazy one, she is.” Looking in his direction and changing her tone, she began to grovel, “Please Sir Reverend, please God, five lei, only five.” Fumbling, he took out a five, handed it to her hastily, and ushered me out of her shed of a home. Later that summer when I visited her, she had no story to vocalize, only a vacant gaze to tell it all.

Over the last decade, numerous Roma at Pata-Rât, including a number of children, have been killed by garbage trucks. Ten such deaths were reported between 2005 and 2010 (see Associated Press 2010a). An eleven-year-old girl, A. L., was run over by a truck and killed during July 2012 (see UNDP 2012). Because she lacked proper identification, she was not properly buried (pers. comm. July 15, 2012). Two weeks later, a man collecting metal during the night to avoid day heat was struck by lightning and killed (ibid.). Two years earlier, Viorica Eliza Ungur, a twenty-three year old woman and mother of two, was trampled by a garbage truck and killed (Associated Press 2010a). These deaths, like those resulting from exposure to environmental pollutants, are not often considered the effects of state violence. As Judith Butler offers in Frames of War (2010: 1), “If certain lives do not qualify as lives or are, from the start, not conceivable as lives within certain epistemological frames, then these lives are never lived nor lost in the full sense.”

Throughout history, Romas’ lives have not been framed as lived or lost. Nor have they been framed as human. Today’s Roma ghettos are, to invoke Achille Mbembe (2003: 7), necropolitical spaces, or spaces of death, spaces invariably linked to the “phantomlike world of race.” Romas’ racial difference catapults them into worlds where, as Arendt (1968: 157)
describes, the politics of race are intimately linked to the politics of death. Racism functions as an apparatus to enact biopolitical governance, effectively exercising the old sovereign right to kill by unevenly delimiting the boundaries of livability. Povinelli (2006) describes *carnality* as “the socially built space between flesh and environment” in which such uneven delineation is not simply reducible to liberal biopolitics and its discourses, but is also an unruly vector that can “direct and frame physicalities, fabricate habitudes, habituate vision, and leave behind new material habitats that will be called on to replicate, justify, defy, and interfere with given sense making and with the distribution of life and death, wealth and poverty, that this sense-making makes possible” (7). The carnality of ghettoization and eviction create material habitats that are inhabitable, and that enflesh Roma into necropolitical or nonexistent spatialities.

Today, far-right violence is less extreme in Romania than in neighboring countries, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic (see ERRC 2012d). When asked about his speculations as to why this might be, Marian Mendache of Romani CRISS explained, “There isn't really much need for extreme-right groups because you find racism and stereotyping in all the mainstream parties... Roma face hardship, exclusion and discrimination in almost all fields of public life” (quoted in Taylor 2013). There are, of course, still active far-right groups. On May 31, 2009, for instance, 400 people of Hungarian ethnicity from Sanmartin attacked forty Roma homes, breaking windows and doors, killing dogs, and even setting fire to one house (see ERRC 2012b). Two months later, fifty of the 170 Roma who fled their homes had not returned (see ERRC 2012b). In January 2013, a small far-right Romanian group proposed paying any Roma women 300 Euro who came forward for sterilization (see Taylor 2013). In February 2013, the head of the youth wing of the National Liberal Party publicly supported the idea on Facebook (see Taylor 2013).

Maryaan Kalo, a Roma linguist who begs on the streets of Bucharest by day, described to me during the summer of 2012 how far-right and police violence led to his own dispossession. Because Maryaan, his wife, and his son had been the only Roma in their village, they had been repeatedly harassed by non-Roma and police. After neighbors began throwing rocks through into the windows and threatening his child, his wife and child moved back in with her father. Maryaan describes: “I sold my house for a small quantity of money, because I was very afraid of police. I am here now. The Romanian people attack me. I have a child of 7 months. I sent my child and my wife to her parents, because I am very afraid for their lives” (pers. comm. July
2012). Now Maryaan begs for days at a time in Bucharest, and then occasionally travels to his wife’s parents’ home two hours out of the city to visit his family. He is now considering migrating to France for a small period of time, as he has done before, just to make some more money for his child, who has health problems. He worries about his child being attacked by white Romanians and far-right groups, and wonders if his child’s life would be better in France, despite lack of stability there.

Since Romania integrated into the in 2007, many Roma have fled the state’s political economy to Western states. Other Roma, particularly after internal displacement from city centers, have been trafficked to West where they are forced to engage in begging, labor, or sex work, often to support their families in paying off various debts. Predominantly such debts are incurred to pay for large expenses, such as surgeries and funerals. Marian Mendache of Romani CRISS describes that Roma are largely denied government granted bank loans, and so connections to the mafia with connections to trafficking rings regularly transpire (pers. comm. July 23, 2012). Roma at Pata-Rat and in Belfast have recounted stories of local police and border police colluding in maintaining this cycle (pers. comm. July 15, 2011). According to 2010 research conducted by the ERRC, Roma are over-represented among victims of human trafficking (see ERRC 2012b: 4). Nevertheless, the government refuses to collect ethnic data on Romanian victims, and instead focuses on the number of Roma reportedly responsible for trafficking. Romulus Nicolae Ungureanu, director of Romania’s human trafficking agency of the Ministry of the Interior, explained to me that while much energy is going into curbing human trafficking and in holding perpetrators accountable, collecting ethnic census data on peoples being trafficked is not a priority, and that he could not speculate on the ethnic makeup of trafficking victims (pers. comm. July 16, 2012). Upon stumbling a suited man standing alone seeming out of joint in the middle of the Baia Mare ghetto in 2012, I asked a resident who he might be. “Trafficker, mafia,” one boy ventured. The polished new car next to the tall, eerie figure had Italian plates. Later, as I walked by the car, I couldn’t help but notice bags of candy in the backseat, and couldn’t help but feel as if I had happened upon the scene of an anachronistic horror film.

Not all Roma internally displaced in Romania feel that it is best to leave the state. Claudia from Coastei Street, for instance, wishes to stay. She asks, “If we are not even accepted in our own country, what is the chance somewhere else will accept us?” (quoted in Taylor 2013). She
explains, “My children are here, my mother is here. This is where I was born. All we want is to be able to live and work. We want to stay in Romania.” Her sister Elena, on the other hand, who lives up the road in a tiny shack with eight family members, is willing to emigrate: “If I could provide a better life and condition for my children, I would think about getting away. If there was a way to escape this discrimination, then of course I would go. But no one wants to leave” (quoted in Taylor 2013). She continued, “I have thought about political asylum in the UK. Some people from Spain, Brazil and Great Britain promised to help after the eviction. But no one did anything.” Similarly, Romeo Greta Petra says is planning on leaving during the summer of 2013: “Everyone here just thinks we’re garbage. If I could have the possibility, I would go with my whole family” (quoted in Taylor).

Montana, a thirteen-year-old on Cantonului Steet who engages in sex work to support herself, as does her older sister of one year and her mother, explains that some of her friends have been offered financial incentive to go abroad (pers. comm. July 17, 2012). She has seen some of her friends disappear from the community, most likely to Italy or possibly France. She however does not wish to join trafficking rings, and prefers to continue supporting herself via local clients who she normally finds at the local bus stop. Sitting on a chair in front of her neighbor’s house, she nervously tells her story while playing with her lip piercing, which seems, like her clothes, too big for her small frail body. She tells me that she once attended school, but dropped out after the first year when her family moved to the dump. She seems ashamed, and nervous. Her sparkly blue eyeliner makes her eyes pop out into a crystalline dimension, one seemingly incongruous with the grimness and stench of the barracks of dump life. A cart of topless boys being pulled by an emaciated horse with ribs popping out adorned in red traditional ribbon passes by us, startling her, inciting her to tug more frequently at her lip ring. “Do you write girls?” she asks me, abruptly, as if she had been wanting to for hours. I explain that I am only trying to better understand the conditions that lead to people being trafficked to the West. “Oh,” she says, scanning the space around her, as if it spoke for itself. To break the silence, I ask her what she wants to be when she grows up. She looked at me as if it was the first time in her life that anyone had posed the question. She doesn’t answer. Vandana, her neighbor overhears us, approaches, and in a supportive nudge asks her if she wants to become a ballerina or a singer. Montana laugh like it is a good joke, and yanks her blighted lip ring even more fiercely.

Felician, Vandana’s partner, a thirty-six year old religious man covered from head to toe
with tattoos of different people’s names, approaches us. He did try working abroad in Spain, he explains to us. However, he was tricked by a trafficker there and left alone, without language skills, knowing no one. If his experience there had been better, if he had not “lost his trust,” he might try to return. He had a factory job in Cluj, but was fired in 2009, and has been unable to find one since, he believes due to racism. He has been living in Pata-Rât with thirty-two year-old Vandana for nearly a decade. Vandana too has tattoos, and other forms of scarring, perhaps from an accident, covering her body. “There is a tattoo artist in the community,” Vandana later elaborates. “He makes whatever you want if you give him cigarettes” (pers. comm. July 17, 2012). This economy of barter only goes so far, however. Unlike their neighbors, Vandana and Felician have no electricity, so when the night falls, they are confined by the limits of candlelight. “Hot water would be a luxury,” Vandana tells me longingly. “No one here has that, even if they have electricity.” She laments, “Before we moved here, we lived in caravans in the city-center. We were not nomads though. We were not the Roma with the colorful dresses who talk Romanes. We do not speak the Gypsy language.” Looking in the direction of her children, she goes on, “All we want is a better future for our three children. We want them to be able to go to school. They can’t here.” I look at their children – Lena, Felicia, and Argentina. They look back, as if frozen in a nineteenth century photograph. “We do not want our children to. . . .” Vandana looks at Montana. “But it is so common here,” her voice trails off, as she looks down at the dust on the dry Romanian ground, and then to the left in the direction of Montana’s house, and then to Montana again. “You should become a ballerina,” she suggests. “Just don’t go to Italy, or Spain.” She pauses. “Don’t go to France either” (pers. comm. July 17, 2012). Montana pulls on her piercing as if involuntarily.

IV. Double Dis-placement

Upon entering the West, whether by choice or not, Roma are often forced to contend with a tapestry of far-right violence, racist state policies, and sometimes state-sanctioned repatriation. Whether repatriated, or whether returning to Romania to escape Western violence, many face what I characterize as a postcolonial-like double-displacement, in which going back is never simply going back. Postcolonial theorists often describe the predicament of “unbelonging” in postcolonial realities, in which the rupture of colonialism has laid an indelible mark upon those formerly colonized, so that reasserting precolonial identity is rendered impossible. Roma
returned from places such as Belfast are not former colonial subjects; they are, however, caught between a series of forces that, in different ways, resemble those that formally colonized subjects contend with during and after colonization. Not only were they subjected to formations of xenophobia systemic to the emergence of Northern Ireland and Romania as European entities post colonization and Communism respectively, but they were also displaced from each space as they sought reprieve in the other. They have been forced to situate themselves in what Homi Bhabha (1994: 2) calls “in-between spaces,” spaces that simultaneously contest and define different notions of nation-space.

From this dis-placed interstitial subjectivity, the idea of a homeland, or of a nation, also becomes impugned. Homeland becomes, in a messianic way, deferred, always situated beyond the horizon. Jacques Derrida (1978: 65) writes about land that “is always elsewhere,” beyond the “empirical and national Here of territory.” Jewish messianic thought maintains space for a future encountering of the promised-land. The same hospitality is maintained for the Other, who might at any moment arrive. This is Derrida’s hospitality of visitation (1994: 58). Such hospitality characterizes his “dream of a democracy that is not simply tied to a nation-state and to citizenship” (quoted in Chérif 2008: 43). It is antithetical to the secular Christian state, in which, as Talal Asad (2003: 5) suggests, citizenship defines identity and transcends “different identities built on class, gender, and religion, replacing conflicting perspectives by unifying experience.”

The secular state is rooted in Christian epistemological reversals of hospitality. It does not bode well for those without a nation. Like Jews, Roma have existed nationlessly within the confines of continental Europe for centuries. Like foreigners, their differences have haunted those whose identities depend on the imago of the nation.

Roma migration has, throughout history, been characterized by a dialectic of forced dislocation and resultant non-sedentary tradition. These entwine today to create myriad relationships to territory and home, relationships further entangled through post-Communist and post-integration scenarios of internal dislocation, external migration, and then internal displacement upon repatriation. Sitting in an air-conditioned McDonalds to escape the roasting heat of a Bucharest summer, Maryaan genealogizes dislocation upon repatriation from France:

“Nothing and nobody will change the situation. Because the Gypsies haven’t a country. If a nation – you are Jew – you understand me better than others. If a nation haven’t a
country, they have nothing. This is my point of view. We need a country, first of all. If we haven’t a country, we cannot change ourselves. But who will give us a country? Who? We are from India, once upon a time. But the Indian government will never give us a country. Romania doesn’t want us. France sends us back here. There they call me Muslim. I am Orthodox Christian, yet in France they think I am terrorist. I just want to not be in terror. My heart cries for a country. But no one will give us one. No one” (pers. comm. July 20, 2012).

There are tears in his eyes. Or maybe it is sweat. He is wearing the same blue basketball jersey that he has worn every time that I have met with him over the last two years. He is covered in crud, and there is an open and infected wound on his left thumb. I can smell the fetor of decaying flesh, but I ignore it. His India seems to vacillate between a Derridean promised-land to come and, what Lauren Berlant (2011) describes as cruel optimism, or an impossible imaginary that allows one to function through a quotidian existence, even if prohibitive to transgressing current confines. The baristas in the McDonalds café look at us nervously. A manager approaches us from behind the counter and asks me if Maryann is bothering me. “He is my friend,” I reply feeling a deep-seated indignation. The manager looks at us curiously, and then indignantly retreats behind the plastic counter. Maryaan shakes his head and shrugs. “Things like this happen many times,” he tells me. “In each day, it’s something normal for me.” Another scenario, normalized through its performativity.

The entwining of scenarios of displacement and resultant non-sedentary tradition perhaps informed many Romas’ decisions return to their hometown of Batar, Romania after the Belfast attacks. However, only weeks after repatriation, many Roma felt compelled to once again make their way to Belfast. One young man, described:

“There is no room here for all of us, my wife will not sleep on the floor so she has gone back to her parents with our son. . . . I cry often now because I want a better life, the life I saw people in Belfast living. But I was threatened by a man, who said he was going to kill me. . . . But there is nothing here for us. . . . You see how we live here — I feel so ashamed. That’s why I want to go back” (quoted in Sharrok 2009).

Another man, Florin Fekete, who returned to Batar with his wife and two sons, explicated:
“There is no work here. Life in Belfast was good, we had really good times but I could not risk my family’s lives. I asked some of the ones who were attacking us, “What do you have against us?” The reply was, “We hate you because you are gypsies.” But even though I am afraid, I want to go back. Is it safe now, do you think?” (ibid.).

And indeed, many repatriated Roma in Batar have returned to Belfast despite threats of far-right violence. It becomes difficult, after escaping certain formations of xenophobia in Romania, and after experiencing certain formations of hope abroad, to settle back into the hopelessness of Romania’s anti-Roma political economy. Perhaps one could venture that witnessing different political economies abroad, even if saturated with white supremacist constructs, facilitates a cruel optimism upon repatriation.

Roma have returned to Belfast at this point, and not without fresh encounters with neo-Nazi extremism. In early March 2011, for instance, swastika signs were found painted on South Belfast walls outside of Roma homes. One Roma man described how local youth recently attacked his place of employment: “I was attacked at work ... they were throwing stones ... we got everything in and closed the doors” (quoted in Allamby et al. 2011: 46). Another person reported:

“They pass by and hit the windows. . . . They are knocking continuously at the back of the house, they are shouting to get us out of the house and we don’t know what to expect. . . three to four times and there’s nothing much we can do. . . there’s no other place for us to go” (quoted in Allamby et al. 2011: 46.).

A Catholic woman from Derry delineated a similarly performative moment in which she witnessed

“a young man standing across the street pointing his hand (as if it was a gun) in the direction of a Roma woman, while keeping eye contact with her, then spitting on the street. She was very nervous and stood frozen until the man had walked away. I also was nervous and waited alongside her until he went away, then walked with her a short distance” (pers. comm. February 2, 2011).
A woman, Maria, described to me that she is afraid to send her children to school, as she fears them being assailed there (pers. comm. July 5, 2011). A young man, Radu, explained that he is now thinking of returning to Romania once again, but is growing weary of feeling that “no country wants me” (pers. comm. July 7, 2011). As Isabel Fonseca (1995: 178) questions, “And so one has to wonder: are the Gypsies really nomadic by “nature,” or have they become so because they have never been allowed to stay?”

In a postnational Europe, where we see nation-state borders increasingly softened for those deemed white enough, secular enough, or European enough, the borders of racism only grow bolder upon the body of the Other, in this case upon the body of the Roma – Europe’s largest ethnic minority. To meld into the Supranation and transgress the geopolitical boundaries that integration privileges is only to face new forms of racism. Some states, like France, have expelled tens of thousands of Roma back to Romania annually, effectively autoimmune to humanitarian law (see ERRC 2010). In spaces like Northern Ireland, it is both state and non-state racism that triggers Romas’ repatriation. This racism is enacted heterogeneously, but also interconnectedly. Its constellation becomes embedded within a larger one, collaboratively feeding and being fed by what Ayhan Kaya (2009) calls “the securitization of migration,” a discursive formation that renders any immigrant as a threat to the receiving country. This structuration supports the reification of Roma into the conflation of immigrant-terrorist-enemy. Intimated by anxieties of the postnational state, this discourse promotes national majoritarianism as it simultaneously enacts a homogenization of the ever-expanding Europe. A genealogical approach is required to deconstruct this discourse, one attentive to relationships of state racism and postnationalism. Attentiveness is also required to longstanding formations of settler violence in Northern Ireland that preceded the arrival of Romanian Roma, formations long enacted through colonial settler performativities of territorialization and sedentarism.

V. Performing Territoriality: In The North of Ireland
Both Irish Loyalism and Republicanism are rife with territorial ideology. Allen Feldman (1991) writes about how topography in Northern Ireland has become a mnemonic artifact that stores a repository of historical narratives. Violence emerges from this mnemonic – violence that spatializes history and lays claims to different narratives of origin and legitimation. The 2009 South Belfast Holylands attacks upon the Roma came during marching season, the time
surrounding the Twelfth of July, when Loyalists – those still ideologically loyal to the imaginary of the British Queen – processually march through working class Catholic neighborhoods, clothed in seventeenth-century garb, playing flutes and drums, memorializing the Protestant William of Orange’s 1690 victory over Catholic King James II. Each year they attempt to incorporate a new Catholic neighborhood into their route, as if to retrace and reproduce the Plantation of Ulster through parade. This demarcation of space serves as a violent reminder for Catholics of continual unfreedom. Often they are barricaded into their neighborhoods, and the tunnels between “peace lines” – walls implanted throughout Belfast that segregate Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods – are closed, ghettoizing Catholic dissent. Over a decade after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement – the power-sharing treatise said to conclude the Troubles – the troubles are still ongoing. Weeks surrounding the Twelfth are historically the most violent in the North, when heightened sectarianism and paramilitarism become inscribed into quotidian routine.

It has only been within recent years that we have seen such violence directed towards non-Catholic and non-Protestant bodies. It has only been within recent years that British-based neo-Nazi groups have marched with Loyalists factions, engendering the formation of Loyalist neo-Nazi microgroups, such as the Ulster British People’s Party (UBPP). The UBPP went as far as to brag about the 2009 attacks upon the Roma:

“The latest attack on Romanian immigrants in Belfast serves as evidence that the previous incidents were not isolated ones. . . . It remains clear that the local population of Belfast are deeply disconcerted by the mass influx of immigrants, and by the looks of things, there will be more attacks to come unless something is done about the situation” (quoted in McDonald 2009).

In other words, if the British-influenced government does not legislate increased policies and sanctions against immigration in Northern Ireland, the British-influenced paramilitary will continue to support Belfast Loyalist gangs who take matters into their own hands.

Many people attribute the rise in racism in Northern Ireland to the collapsing economy. Davy McAuley, spokesperson for the political party People Before Profit in Derry, explains that

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7 The organized seventeenth century British colonization of Northern Ireland is often referred to as the Plantation of Ulster.
“it is easy to stoke communal rioting when the situation economically is so bad. Here in Derry you have three out of four generations on unemployment with some of the lowest rates of benefits anywhere in Europe (pers. comm. November 10, 2010). In such economic conditions, he suggests, people are always looking for someone to blame. Such an economy engenders violence. Such an economy both produces and maintains xenophobic ideology. Fra Halligan, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRPS) theorizes that such economic conditions are fertile grounds for the rise of neo-Nazi and other xenophobic groups, such as the British National Party (BNP). He describes,

“There has been a rise here in racist attacks and attitudes, with some touting the possibility that “Racism is the new Sectarianism!” As the recession created by the greedy bankers tightens, one can see the rise of fascist groups like the BNP in Northern England, where their war cry is: “Foreigners are taking our jobs, homes, etc.” We know this is total nonsense, but as the BNP’s recent electoral success proves there are plenty ready to listen to this vile rhetoric” (pers. comm. November 19, 2010).

Not only has the overtly racist and anti-immigrant BNP expanded its membership in the UK, but it also has grown an offshoot party in Northern Ireland called the White National Party (WNP) (see Taylor 2011; NICEM 2004). The WNP uses the same tactics as the BNP, circulating inflammatory leaflets and polemics that highlight the increase of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees, and that delineate how these foreigners will take citizens’ jobs, receive the public housing, and ruin the masqueraded purity of national identity. The party is also known for its anti-Semitic and homophobic rhetoric.

Recent reports have linked the BNP and WNP to local Loyalist paramilitaries. A 2004 NICEM submission to the CERD suggested, “Both the WNP and the BNP have strong link with Loyalist paramilitary who are actively in the local [Belfast] area. Since the proliferation of this propaganda, vicious and orchestrated attacks have been carried out” (NICEM 2004: 5). As the report reveals, not only are Roma being attacked in the North, but also so are Chinese, African, and Polish communities. It attributes as series of pipe bombs and racist assaults upon immigrant communities to Belfast Loyalist paramilitaries that base their attacks on their victims’ nationality as non-British. Compared to the rest of Western Europe, the report ventures that the situation in Northern Ireland is particularly “uncommon” (ibid.: 5).
Derrida (1997: 84) writes, “Where the principle enemy, the ‘structuring’ enemy, seems nowhere to be found, where it ceases it to be identifiable and thus reliable – that is, where the same phobia projects a mobile multiplicity of potential interchangeable metonymic enemies, in secret alliance with one another: conjuration.” Eradicating the enemy does not mean embracing an era of peace or progress; it means replacement by caricature and simulacra, by what Feldman (2009: 1705) names as “figures of the enemy, metaphors, doubles, typifications, traces, apparitions, place holders. . . .” Diasporic Roma, escaping rising xenophobia in Romania, find themselves subjected to a process of transference that bolsters Loyalist identity.

This transference uncloaked itself when, on that on June 19, 2009, after members of C18 performed neo-Nazi salutes condoning the Loyalist attack upon the Roma, members of C18 went on to desecrate Provisional IRA graves, including that of Bobby Sands, who died of hunger in Maze prison in 1981 (see Associated Press 2009c). Condemning the incident, Sinn Fein West Belfast MLA Paul Maskey responded,

“A considerable amount of damage has been done to the graves. This attack comes in the aftermath of a series of racist attacks on Romanian families in the city. The English fascist group Combat 18 has well-established links with unionist paramilitaries in Belfast for many years. The racist attacks on the Romanian families all emanated from within unionist areas” (quoted in Associated Press 2009c).

As far back as 2000, in fact, members of C18 have marched with Loyalists during the annual Twelfth of July marches, muddying the differences between indigenous and immigrant Others (see McDonald 2000). As Neil Jarman from the Institute for Conflict Research in Belfast, describes, Northern Ireland’s legacy of sectarianism has created a subculture where “anyone slightly different becomes a target for intimidation” (quoted in Booth 2009).

Attacks against foreign nationals in Northern Ireland have been steadily rising since 2005. Between 2004 and 2005, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) reported 634 race-related hate crimes; between 2009 and 2010, there were a total of 712 reported crimes (see PSNI 2011: 9). Similarly, while there were a reported 813 racist incidents in the North between 2004 and 2005, there were there were a total of 1,038 incidents between 2009 and 2010 (ibid.: 9). A 2009 Equality Commission report found that nearly one quarter of the people in the region would object to having an immigrant as a neighbor (see Edwards 2011). One businessman from the
Village elucidated the pervasive sentiment, “I don't mind the Poles and the Slovaks who come here. They work hard, harder than indigenous people from here, but all you see now are these Romanians begging and mooching about. We'd all be better off - them and us - if they went back to Romania or somewhere else in Europe” (quoted in McDonald 2009). A woman from the Village articulated that although she found the attacks upon the Roma condemnable, she believes that Roma still should not be permitted into the country, because “they don't want to work” (quoted in McDonald 2009). She failed to mention the exceptional state restrictions placed upon A2 nationals (Romanians and Bulgarians), often preventing them from securing employment. Where the employment restrictions placed upon A8 nationals expired after two years as per state policy, the restrictions placed upon Romanians and Bulgarians has been ongoing since 2007, normalizing the state policy of exception.8 This has been justified by what the government has called a “serious disturbance to the labour market” (quoted in MRN 2011). It is now expected to continue at least until the end of December 2013 (see Taylor 2013). Towards the same end, in May 2010, the new UK Coalition Government announced an immigration cap policy, and instituted an interim limit on non-EEA migrants (see NISRA 2010: 5). On a wider scale, Romania and Bulgaria have yet to enter the Schengen Area, despite now having been a part of the EU for five years. This is widely believed to be due fears of Roma immigrants, who the German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich recently referred to as “unwanted guests” in relationship to Schengen (quoted in Wingard et al. 2013).

In the 1970s and 1980s, emigration from the Irish island exceeded immigration. This flipped in 2004 when A8 nations joined the EU (see Leyden 2009). The growth also reflects the impact of the Troubles having ended, as well as Irish economic growth. Immigration has decreased in recent years, however, due to anti-immigration policies, entrenched racism, and the failing economy (see Leyden 2009). In 2011, Ireland and the UK signed an agreement solidifying their commitments decrease immigration by targeting people from “particularly from ‘high risk’ countries” by the use of biometrical and biographical data exchange (see INIS 2011).

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8 Prospective employers of A2 nationals are required to get a Letter of Approval from the UK Border Agency, while concurrently the prospective employee must be approved to acquire an Accession Worker Card, unless they are, for some reason, exempt (Allamby et al. 2011: 45). Employers can get Letters of Approval only if the position is a skilled job for which there is an existent shortage of workers, or for low-skilled jobs in the food processing industry sheltered through the Sector Based Scheme. It becomes difficult for employees to alter jobs as the Accession Worker Card is specific to particular positions and new cards must be attained for alternate jobs. Employees must legally work in the UK for twelve consecutive months to access free movement rights (ibid.: 45).
In February 2011, a group of NGOs addressed the UN, upbraiding increased racial profiling on the island. Practices of racial profiling were reported even more intense in Northern Ireland. Until 2010, Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 allowed British police and government forces to stop and search anyone in the United Kingdom, regardless of suspicion. Although this Section is no longer employed, Sections 21 and 24 of the Justice and Security Act 2007 now are, allocating authorities similar authority. Acting Deputy Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland claimed that Section 21 is “extremely useful, in particular because no reasonable grounds are required for it to be exercised” (quoted in Whalley 2009).

Although Chinese, Irish Travellers, South Asians, and Black Africans comprise the four largest ethnic minorities in Northern Ireland (see Connolly et al. 2001), there is a growth of Roma from Romania. There are currently between 2,500 and 6,000 Roma in the Republic, and approximately 1000 in Northern Ireland (see Leyden 2009; Van Hout 2010). Upon surveying twenty Roma and community members in South Belfast in 2010 and 2011, I found that most Romanian Roma have been in Belfast for five years or less. Belfast landlords complain of overcrowded Roma homes in which sometimes up to twenty-five people live, but as Victoria Vasey of the ERRC reminds us, because largely the Roma are without benefits and employment, many have no choice but to live in overcrowded conditions (see Collins 2011). A 2011 report submitted to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) found that Roma in the North suffer more from infant mortality, lack of health care, lack of education, unemployment, and suicide than other ethnic minorities (see Runnymede et al. 2011).

A 2011 study by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation found that Roma in the North are particularly vulnerable to forced labor practices as well (Allamby et al. 2011). In a multi-gender focus group of thirteen adults, it was found that all participants had left Romania to escape the atmosphere of “no job and no hope” where there is “no future really” for Roma (ibid: 45). All had some prior established connection to family or employers on the island. Two individuals who paid travel expenses to migrate for specific work found that upon arrival, the nature of the promised job and accommodation were reneged. Most employment opportunities offered to Roma are confined to car washing, catering, and newspaper/magazine and flower selling, and high levels of abuse were reported in these arenas. One Roma man described that his employer had threatened murder when he asked to leave his job. Other Roma described fears of deportation if they complained about poor working conditions. Someone else described being
threatened with termination when they called in sick due to kidney stones (ibid.: 48). Stories were recounted about lack of protective clothing offered in cold wet winters, long hours, as well as severe underpayment. Women discussed asymmetrical payment in relation to men doing the same jobs, and some reported proclivities from bosses favoring “good-looking girls” (ibid.: 49).

Increased anti-Roma violence in the North cannot be rendered as a simple transference of violence. It is not a warfare being enacted in a psychological theatre of normative relationships. It is not a simple as an age-old narrative blindly resurfacing upon the scapegoat of the historical present, a scapegoat often referred to along with Jews as Europe’s internal Others. However, again harkening Arendt’s warning (1968: 6), scapegoatism overlooks particular histories that have architected specific forms of xenophobic violence. It also fails to address ways in which such violence solidifies the imaginary of both Loyalist identity and the legitimacy of the settler state.

In his “Defeatism and the Northern Protestant Identity”, Andrew Finlay (2001) studies ways in which Protestants in the North feel an increasing sense of alienation from the British government. As early back as the beginnings of the Troubles, Loyalists have articulated feelings of estrangement from Britain. A 1972 statement from the UDA self attributes Protestants as “second-class English men and half-caste Irishmen” who are “betrayed and maligned,” who are facing extinction (Finlay 2001: 7). During the summer of 2010, several Loyalists articulated to me recent realizations that, when traveling in Britain, they are treated as Irish, not as Loyalists. The British government, from whom they have, for generations, assumed reciprocity, is not there to defend them. Desmond Bell (1987) suggests that that the Twelfth of July Loyalist parades are not simply processions of victory made mnemonic, but also “set of practices. . . a symbolic habitus” where the fracturing of Northern Protestant identity is attempted reparation (1966). Formulations of the new enemy attempt to unify a Loyalist identity currently suffering from both alienation and disaggregation.

It is not only Loyalist identity suffering from a sense of defeatism. Republicans largely suggest that the signing of the Good Friday Agreement was more symbolic than real in the granting of sovereignty to Northern Ireland, engendering the affect of defeatism in Republican factions as well. Displays of paramilitary infighting on both sides reveal attempts of endogenous
purification and legitimation, perhaps to counter political demoralization. After Republican infighting in which RIRA member Ciaran Doherty was murdered by the RAAD, a Catholic youth contextualized to me, “Nationalism ceases to have meaning when troops no longer roam the streets. . . . There is no war. . . . This is useless” (pers. comm. June 2010). Both British Loyalism and Irish Nationalism have shifted meanings in the current political economy of the North. Both are struggling to redefine themselves, as can be seen in their continued infighting. Both are looking for the common enemy.

However, it remains largely Loyalists that are taking out their frustration upon exogenous Others. Anderson and Shuttleworth (1994) attribute Loyalist sectarianism and racism to a pathological mentality linked to a colonial past, where supremacism is crucial to Protestant identity, and where defeatism implies means a deflated superiority complex. Similarly, D. Lowry (1996) describes homologies in mentality between Northern Protestants and other colonial settler communities in which descendants of colonizers claim victim identity. Finlay (2001), however, warns us about overly fixating on the concept of a Protestant identity, as in recent years the identity has become increasingly fragmented, made progressively complex through a generalized collapsing faith in the progress of modernity. He also suggests that Protestant defeatism is less the product of a pre-existing identity and more “symptomatic of the absence of a Northern Protestant cultural identity and, perhaps, and ongoing attempt to get one” (ibid.: 4). While I agree that homogenizing Loyalist psychological identity is ineffective in contextualizing racism in the North’s historical present, it seems impossible to deconstruct the hate crimes as of late without also further unraveling the history and affect of settler colonization of the North, a colonization genealogically tethered to contemporary Loyalism.

VI. Sedentarism and the Nation-State

Allen Feldman (1991) writes about how history is used to repress historicity in the North, about how such repression has been a pivotal ideological mechanism in the formulation of political

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9 In May 2010, Bobby Moffett, a known leader of the Loyalist Red Hand Commandos (RHC), was assassinated in broad daylight on Shankill Road by members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a more mainstream Loyalist paramilitary group with historic ties to the RHC. Also in 2010, a Republican vigilante group Republicans Action Against Drugs (RAAD) known to weed out Republican anti-socals assassinated Ciaran Doherty, a known member of the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA). He was targeted due to alleged drug affiliations, ones that to this day his family denies. When a poster of Doherty was placed on the back of the symbolic Free Derry Wall in June 2010 in memorialization, members of the RIRA threw paint bombs at it, effacing remembrance.
culture. He describes the “recursive character of the historical” that both legitimates and delineates geographical metaphor (18). Interfaces of difference have a long history of imploding into political theatres of violence in Northern Ireland, arguable since the beginnings of colonization, a colonization linked to Protestantism and nation-state formation.

Foucault (2003) traces the emergence of the nation-state as inextricably linked to the formation of state racism and the institutionalization of warfare, both systems of delineating and defending the borders that divide difference, that create national subjects. During the Middle Ages, the statist definition of the nation became understood as a great multitude of men who obey the same laws, who are circumscribed by the very borders carved out in battles (Foucault 2003: 142). The interfaces between nations, that engendered nation-states, became the borders that subjects were a priori on one side of or the other. Thus to claim one’s rights meant to exert the legitimacy of one’s national position. Relations of legitimacy became linked to relations of force. Both became physico-biological. This precipitated what Foucault describes as state racism.

With this sixteenth century expulsion of war to the boundaries of the population, a discourse arose that witnessed the State shift from a feudal to capitalist economy. This shift, based upon a Protestant ethic, effectively sacralized the rights of private property, abolishing feudal tenures and arbitrary taxation, giving political power to the sovereignty of Parliament and common law (see Hill 1991). This signaled the emergence of what Karl Marx (1894 [1981: 756]) calls “landed property,” whereby topography became divided and economically valorized. As this transpired, parliamentary enclosures became off limits, impinging upon non-sedentary peoples’ abilities to move and settle freely (see Orta 2010: 40). Significantly, anti-trespassing legislature emerged in the UK, targeting early Roma minorities and Irish Travellers.

Looking back upon colonial plantation history of Ireland, we can see how as the British systematically went about employing Cartesian methodologies of mapping the ‘wild’ terrain to make it palpable to Elizabethan standards of comprehension, they also began mapping the ‘untamed’ people who inhabited it, those who lived ‘beyond the Pale’.10 As late as the

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10 The term “the Pale” has been used to designate two different historical enclosures, the first to keep the Irish out of a British colonist stronghold in Ireland, the second to keep Jews out of Imperial Russian society. Initially called the English Pale by the British during the Middle Ages, it designated the part of Ireland directly occupied and ruled by the British government. The word ‘pale’ was derived from the Latin term palus – a stake used to support a fence. It was in the pale that local laws were valid, and thus outside of the pale, or “beyond the pale,” were regions of lawlessness and transgression, regions where the Irish still had sovereignty of their land (Leerssen 1995). Effectively the Pale consisted of a fortified ditch and ten to twelve-foot rampart built around parts of the medieval counties of
seventeenth century, Irish society was based not upon allegiance to the Church, but to *tuaths*, or tribal units of land. Authority of leadership was always seen as temporary, and inheritance of land was determined by elections within a four-generation family group (see Foster 1989: 9). Land itself was rarely mapped in ways familiar to Elizabethan cartographic standards. Instead, the Irish embraced the singing of mythical landscapes, where places reflected complex family structures rather than geographic borderlines. Poetic topography identified places through *dindsenchas*, or the bardic celebration of place-names (ibid.: 5). One can only imagine how utterly untranslatable such cartography was to British colonizers in the seventeenth century, or how frustrating the landscape became for them as the Irish attempted to resist colonization through hiding in woods, mountains, bogs, and lakes. According to Fredrick Engels (1948: 210-211), “The English knew how to reconcile people of the most diverse races with their rule. . . . Only with the Irish the English could not cope. The reason for this is the enormous resilience of the Irish race.”

This “race” is that which London-born colonist Edmund Spenser wrote of in 1596 in his polemical prose, *A View of the Present State of Ireland*. Previously, serving English forces, Spenser had defeated the Irish during the Second Desmond Rebellion in 1583, and wrote the piece advocating for the British to continue genocidal practices. Arguing that Ireland would never be fully tamed by the British until Irish indigenous language and culture were fully obliterated, he recommended that the British implement scorched earth tactics, like those he had witnessed in the Desmond Rebellions, to create famine. He explained that the Irish were descended from Scythian barbarians, and that therefore a bloodbath was perfectly tenable. Casting the Irish culture as inferior, Spenser particularly noted the unwritten nature of Brehon law, the itinerant system of land tenure, and that the Irish were descendants of Scythians and other “barbarous nations that overran the world” (1596 [1970: 8]). Mark Netzloff (1996) notes how Spenser’s myths of Irish origin and identity circumscribe Ireland as both “the embodiment of alterity and a degenerated version of England” (239). Such paradoxical manifestation is illustrative of a fundamental ambivalence central to the emergence of colonial ethnography. Colonial ethnography functioned to construct a fictional sense of a homogenous self, but at the same time it revealed the bipolar nature of colonial identity. This is what Homi Bhabha (1994:

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Louth, Meath, Dublin and Kildare. Rhonda Knight (1999) describes how the pale became an expression of British colonial identity, as well as a means with which to represent the ‘savageness’ of the ‘wild Irish’. 
characterizes as an articulation of difference sheltered within “the fantasy of origin and identity.”

It was common for early modern ethnography to explain the difference of other cultures through fantasizing origin myths. It was also rife in such writings to retrace the civilizing process, to prove the West’s ability to replicate itself in other settings, and in other people. Reflecting Edward Said’s (1979) conception of Orientalism as a Western institution for “dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (3), early British ethnography of Ireland sought to dominate, restructure, and have authority over Ireland. In The View, the English representative Eudoxus ridicules the oral nature of Irish Bards as “most fabulous and forged. . . as that no monument remaineth of her [such as the Irish nation’s] beginning and inhabiting there” (1596 [1970: 39]). Spenser’s Anglo-Irish spokesperson, Irenius, defends Ireland’s ancient written chronicles, but in his inability to locate them, he reinforces cultural infantilization. As the colonial subject asserts his own lack of history, history becomes unwritten. And then rewritten. Discourses from the seventeenth century onwards continued to portray the Irish as inferior, incomprehensible, and barbaric.

During the time of colonization, bourgeois domesticity often foiled itself against both local poor people, and those indigenous in settled colonies. Edmund Morgon (1975: 325-326) explains that in seventeenth century Britain, the poor were “the vile and brutish part of mankind . . . in the eyes of unpoor Englishmen, [they] bore many of the marks of an alien race.” In Society Must be Defended (2003), Foucault looks at the language of class being linked to the rhetoric of racialization of those internal to Europe. Hayden White (1978) takes the analysis one step further, studying how the discursive entwining of European racism and classism was also incited by colonial expansion. He writes: “Like the ‘wild men’ of the New World, the ‘dangerous classes’ of the Old World define the limitations of the general notion of ‘humanity’ which informed and justified the European’s spoliation of any human group standing in the way of their expansion, and their need to destroy that which they could not consume (ibid.: 193). Eric Hobsbawm (1975: 247) fleshes out this analysis, suggesting that “the bourgeois was, if not a different species, then at least a member of a superior race, a higher stage in human evolution.” Colonization sought to eliminate the “wild men” of Ireland. While extermination was not successful, dispossession was, resulting in the ossification of intense impoverishment. Discourses emergent both during and after colonization racialized the Irish both through colonial and classist tropes.
While such discourses solidified in the seventeenth century, by the eighteenth century, and even more intensely in the nineteenth century, fanatical linkages were made between the immoral lives of Irish peasants, the British underclass, and Africans (see Lebow 1976: 41; Lees 1979: 15; Stoler 1995: 125). By the early nineteenth century, increased Irish migration to urban centers was portrayed as Irish urban invasion (see Morgen 1975: 325-326). Discourses of the Victorian era conflated urban poverty with darkness, whereby the poor were described as “people of the abyss,” and their children as “street Arabs” (ibid.: 20). This is the background upon which in 1862, the British magazine *Punch* published an article suggesting that if scientists were to look for the transitional animal to bridge the evolutionary gap between “the Gorilla and the Negro,” they would have to look no further than the “Irish race” (quoted in Conroy 1995: 14). Over one hundred years later, in 1982, the Reverend Ian Paisley publicly referred to Catholics as “Irish negroes” (ibid.: 14).

While Irish Catholics have been subjugated in Ireland since colonization, and are still in many ways contesting with formations of anti-Irish sentiment in the North, they are not the only indigenous group from the island to have suffered such violence. Irish Travellers, or Pavees, have been discriminated against because of their cultural differences and non-sedentary ways for centuries. Irish Travellers are a heterogeneous people indigenous to Ireland, and they have been living a nomadic lifestyle since at least the fifth century, though they vary in original myth from group to group (see Redmond 2008: 59). They speak Gammon or Cant, travel with large families, and have historically been employed in horse-trading, rural crafts, seasonal farm-work, and as tinsmiths and tradesmen (see Meredith 2011). There were also early Roma migrants from Eastern Europe that made their ways to the British Isles as early as the sixteenth century, now largely known as the English Romanichals and Welsh Kale, and since their migration they have been historically conflated with Irish Travellers by sedentary groups. This in part informs the reification today of new Romanian Roma immigrants and Traveller communities (see Beier 1985: 62; McVeigh 1997: 16).

Travellers’ and early Roma migratory ways have been pathologized for centuries in the North, particularly since colonization, as sedentarism is antithetical to the imperatives of the settled colonial state (McVeigh 1997; Redmond 1998: 62). Robbie McVeigh (1997: 9) describes sedentarism as “as that system of ideas and practices which serves to normalise and reproduce sedentary modes of existence and pathologise and repress nomadic modes of existence.”
Nomadism threatens the territorialization that nation-state borders circumscribe, and the power, political economy, and surveillance that such circumscription enables. Sedentarism informed the emergence of the modern nation-state, colonization, and capitalism. “Sedentary colonization,” McVeigh writes, “ends up with nomads criminalised not for their acts but for their existence” (1997: 24).

As we unravel legal histories on the island, we see Traveller culture long criminalized by the settler state. While indigenous sedentary Irish were dispossessed from their land during Ireland’s colonization, Travellers and Romanichals were dispossessed from nomadic shared spaces and caravan sites. As such, their culture was also criminalized. We can see this enacted in the 1824 by the Vagrancy Act, and then in 1847 by the Famine, the Vagrancy (Ireland) Act. Historically “vagrancy” included a wide range of subversive identities, including, as A. L. Beier (1985) describes, “the young. . . beggars. . . peddlers and tinkers, soldiers and mariners, many entertainers, students, unlicensed healers and even fortune tellers. . . . Gypsies and the Irish were also treated as vagrants” (10). Not only were nomads discursively characterized as vagrants, but also as pre-modern, precipitating infantilization in representation. Settlers dialectically entwined such representation with politico-economic impositions of land tenure and property rights. This dialectic was utilized to counter the threat that nomadism had to settler identity (McVeigh 1997: 21). Travellers’ political and cultural resistances to exploiting land in individualizing and privatizing methods rendered them a symbolic threat to the hegemony of capitalistic value. The semiotics of their difference destabilized the normality of sedentary society in its entirety.

Sedentary pathologization of nomadism spread into the twentieth century. In 1948 a pamphlet was disseminated recommending that as a “practical solution” for the “tinker classes,” a concentration camp for the males be fortified (quoted in Noonan 1994: 97, 155). Also that year, a Stormont Committee on Gypsies and Itinerants convened to discuss Traveller nomadism. Not only did the committee characterize Travellers as problematic due to their non-sedentary ways, but also they were accused of “spreading of vermin and disease” (quoted in Redmond 1998: 62). It was recommended that a system of registration be enacted, that severe fines be imposed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and that provisional powers of summary arrest be granted (ibid.). The 1950 the Gypsies Bill (NI) codified these recommendations, resulting in many families fleeing to England (see Noonan 1998: 157).

Traveller communities were also adversely affected in the years following the Second
World War due to economic shifts (ie. farm mechanization, improved rural transport, rural depopulation, and the mass production of plastic goods) rendered many of their skills and services superfluous. Urbanization and industrialization of the 1960s required many Travellers find new means of employment, and as anti-Traveller racism and discrimination augmented in Ireland, many Travellers migrated to the peripheries of UK cities (see Power 2010: 103; Redmond 2008: 60). The Thatcherite government of the 1980s and 1990s further criminalized nomadism in the UK. For instance, while the Caravan Sites Act was passed in 1968 to safeguard Traveller rights to camp in designated areas, under Tory leadership in 1994, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act was passed, repealing the second part of the Caravan Sites Act, revoking the duty of local authorities to provide sites for Travellers (Power 2010). Furthermore it gave authorities the power to close down existing sites. Then, the Casual Trading Act was passed in 1995, curtailing Travellers’ trading opportunities (see Meredith 2011). While Travellers have officially been recognized as an ethnic group in England since 2000 through the Race Relation Act and the Race Relations Amendment Act, nomadism, as well as their cultural practices, have remained criminalized (see Power 2010: 105). Dominant media continually depicts them as petty thieves and as dangerous, and many settled people continue to discriminate against them (see Bermingham 2007).

There are roughly 36,000 Travellers across the Republic of Ireland, making them just over one percent of the island’s population, and about 15,000 Travellers in mainland England (Pavee Point 2006; Redmond 1998: 59). There are between 1,400 and 1,700 Travellers in Northern Ireland, making them the second largest ethnic minority (see Meredith 2011; Redmond 2008: 59). Currently 30 to 40 percent of Travellers in Northern Ireland live in the Belfast area (see Meredith 2011). In a study, Mary McMahon (2005: 65) found that 37 percent of Traveller respondents in the greater Belfast area live by the roadside, a reflection of the continued criminalization of caravan sites. Others were found moving into houses to escape criminalization. In such structures, they reported feeling isolated, culturally deracinated, and “housebound” (ibid.: 65). This has engendered high levels of depression, anger, and increased cases of violence and substance misuse. Such effects and affect also results from the material conditions of indigence. Travellers in the North are eight times more likely to live in overcrowded conditions that lack basic amenities (including running water, electricity, and sanitation) than the general population (Meredith 2011). Only 11 percent of Travellers in the
North are employed, the mortality rate for Traveller children up to the age of ten has been found to be ten times higher than the region’s average. Life expectancy of Travellers is roughly 20 percent lower than that of the general population, with only 10 percent of the Traveller population over 40 years of age and only 1 percent over sixty-five (Meredith 2011). Female Travellers are largely invisibilized today, and their struggles have remained liminal within anti-racist and feminist movements. Andrea Redmond (2008: 69-70) writes of how Traveller women have historically been forced to traverse spatially construed racist and sexist boundaries to procure resources, resultant in heightened prejudice from the gatekeepers of such assets. They have also been targeted by discourses that purport that their emancipation lies in their settling into sedentarism, eliding the cultural dispossession that such anti-nomadic sentiment hinges upon.

Danny, a working-class Traveller working with the Traveller support organization An Munia Tober, recounted story after story to me in 2010 of clients being harassed by sedentary people. “They think that we’re scum,” he explained with frustration. “We’re just a bunch of ordinary families, trying to live our lives and preserve our culture. They make it so impossible for us. We’re forced to live in poverty. And even forced to settle” (pers. comm. July 4, 2010). Contact between the settled community and Travellers is minimal, he explained, as the settled community continually infantilizes non-sedentary people and sees them as a contaminant to the psyche of the settled state. Irish Travellers and Roma don’t have much contact, he explained, even though they are similarly ascribed as degenerate nomads.11 “Even though we’re indigenous, and they’re newly arrived, we’re both still called Gypsies. And we’re both harassed by the sedentary community” (pers. comm. July 4, 2010). He imagines that ingrained histories of Traveller racism in Ireland to become conflated upon the bodies of Romanian Roma and other “New Travellers.” McVeigh (1997) elaborates upon this train of thought, describing how the conflation of the two groups hinges upon not simply racism and classism, but specifically sedentarism (9).

There have been small Jewish communities in Ireland and Northern Ireland throughout history, and they too have been forced to bear the brunt of sedentary xenophobia. One of the first recorded cases occurred in 1896 in County Clare, when an anti-Semitic sermon incited violent attacks upon a group of Jewish peddlers from Limerick (see Fanning 2002: 43). Most

11 Even though there is little affinity between Travellers and Roma in Belfast, there are some sites, such as Dale Farm in Essex, where both groups have lived together. Together, they both faced forced eviction in October of 2011.
infamously, a 1904 pogrom destroyed Limerick’s small Jewish community, the same pogrom referenced in James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922), in which the Jewish character Bloom is threatened for having claimed Irish nationality, even though he was born on the island. When Joyce was questioned why he chose to write about a Jewish character, he replied: “Because only a foreigner would do. The Jews were foreigners at that time in Dublin. There was . . . the contempt people always show for the unknown” (quoted in Tracy 1999).

As a historically nomadic group entering a space that, since colonization, has enacted brutal displays of violence upon indigenous and specifically non-sedentary people, Romanian Roma are forced to contend with formations of xenophobia that preceded their arrival. This transpires despite that many of the Roma moving to Northern Ireland from Romania are in fact endeavoring to live sedentary lives, and that they largely have been living sedentary lives in Romania since intimations of assimilation by twentieth century Communist policy (see Achim 1998). As Northern Ireland has until recent times seen only a small amount of immigrants, particularly immigrants that lack white skin privilege, Roma encounter an entanglement of racism and sedentarism upon arrival, as well as the classism imbricated in both. And, as we see from extremist discourse emerging from C-18, they are even further conflated into the transnational Islamaphobic security threat of “Paki” and “Romanian Muslim.” We see the majority of these projections being enacted from within settler groups.

VII. Anxieties of the Morphing State
In the Origins of Totalitarianism (1968) Hannah Arendt writes of how, with the rise of imperialism in the end of the nineteenth century, racism became the main ideological weapon of politics. Backed by centuries of epistemic, institutional, and corporeal hatred directed towards Jews, Roma, and other non-national peoples, modern formations of xenophobia solidified. As societal structures continued to disintegrate, it became a xenophobic trope to blame the Jews and the Roma for national and socio-economic problems. The application of racial psychologization to “the Jewish question” and the “Gypsy question” sought to ameliorate damaged society by hunting out its degenerates. This, coupled with politico-economic circumstances, effectively birthed Nazi ideology (see McVeigh 1997).

In the late nineteenth century, xenophobic nationalist movements shifted towards supranationalism, endeavoring not only political rule over the nation, but also rule of an inter-
European government, one that would be “above all nations” (see Arendt 1968: 39). Ironically, stateless peoples without a party – Jews and Roma – became the ideological adversary for the party above all parties – the Nazis. With Nazism, the concept of ideologies, what Arendt described as “isms which to the satisfaction of their adherents can explain everything and every occurrence by deducing it form a single premise,” emerged (ibid.: 468).

As the Second World War ended, as the Cold War Era began, and as the eras of Nazism and colonialism came to purported closes, a new supranationalism can be seen materializing in the formation of international governing bodies. Human rights bodies emerged to account for the millions killed during the Holocaust, while transnational economic, developmental agencies, and the backbones of the EU fomented. Collectively these solidified to institute new formations of supranational sovereignty to allegedly prevent national abuses of power. Some of these transnational bodies maintained the characteristics of a state. The EU, for instance, is replete with its own flag, currency, anthem, legislative branch, court system, and security force. Like a state, it too endeavors to define itself through its borders.

Today, as states continue to accede portions of their sovereignties to expanding transnational actors from the World Bank to the OSCE, majoritarian nationalisms only augment. This structuration is being contoured by what I characterize as a new dialectic of forces being enacted within the theatre of an increasingly frantic continent: on one hand there are anxieties emerging from nation-states and their nationalistic actors of a waning sovereignty in relationship to a growing globalized neoliberal governance; on the other there is an embracement by European nation-states and non-state actors of contemporary transnational practices of securitization, as long as such practices protect the imagined purity of the nation-state. By naming internal fears of contamination, states appeal to wider systems of governance to assuage their anxieties. The state becomes the subject that seeks an epistemic authority figure, perhaps like a psychiatrist or a priest, to know it, to treat it, to mitigate its fears. As transnational governance heeds states’ calls, either by strategic action or inaction, statist imaginations begin to tremble upon the feet of these supra-sovereign forces. Wendy Brown (2010: 26) writes that “the detachment of sovereign powers from nation-states . . . threatens an imaginary of individual and national identity dependent upon perceivable horizons and the containment they offer.” The state is thus effectively contained within a double-bind, fearful of both its internal Others and external governance.
As states garner anxiety about the supersession of its sovereign powers to transnational bodies, and arguably to capital itself, they ameliorate their fears by enacting the one power that remains exclusively their own: the sovereign right to ascribe who can, and who cannot, effectively live within its boundaries. Trinh Minh-ha (2011: 5) writes:

“At a time when the rhetoric of blurred boundaries and of boundless access is at its most impressive flourish, the most regressive walls of separation and racial discrimination, of hatred and fear, of humiliation and powerlessness continue to be erected around the world to divide and conquer, exacerbating existing conflicts as one world, one nation, one community, one group continue to be dramatically raised against the other.”

Today, we are witness to an era in which states enact expansive walls to limn their borders, not as much to prevent a real invasion or attack, but more to ensure its own citizens of their singular identity against the threat of immigration discoursed as invasion. These walls do not have to be physical boundaries; they also can be immigration policies of exception. As well, they can be the violent actions taken by non-state groups acting on behalf of the state’s anxieties. Such walls, Brown argues, depict the waning of national sovereignty – the detachment of sovereignty from the state (2010: 23).

As the body of the EU grows, integrating peripheral states into its purview, it endeavors to whiten, secularize, and Westernize its newest entities, into the order of the same. Within this theatre, the body of the EU acts as a sovereign state, enacting the age-old performative of state racism through its assimilative policies and protocols. States not sufficiently white enough, for instance, Romania, are encouraged to self-whiten through practices of cleansing their cities of Roma. While physical walls are enacted to contain Roma within undesirable locations in Romania, or to incite them to emigrate, and while Western state policies and vigilante groups enact a symbolic wall to prevent permeation of their imagined state-sovereignties, the boundaries between state, non-state, and supra-state actors disintegrate. The blurring of these boundaries between groups bolsters their collective imagination of purity, and of sovereignty. Both localized and transnationalized praxes of securitization reify the Roma with the collective enemy-Other, conflating them with the Islamaphobic imaginary of the terrorist. The securitization of migration counters this threat, a threat continually conflated with any thing that might lead to the state’s
insecurity. As Jacques Ranciere (2010: 108) writes, “Insecurity is not a set of facts. It is a mode of management of collective life.” This collectiveness of life is symbolized by a cohered relationship to what attacks it – a cohesion bound between what Ranciere calls “the principle of security and that of infinite justice” (ibid.: 101). Because the threat is so ever expansive, encompassing the bodies of the terrorist, the immigrant, the Jew, the Muslim, and the Roma, or infinite Evil, only “infinite justice” can sufficiently securitize. This securitization depends upon elimination of the reified threat.

We can see how contemporary discourses emerging from groups like C18 follow enact Nazi ideology to mitigate anxieties of the detachment of the state from the sovereign, effectively reattaching the present to the era before supranationalism. Conflating the targets of sedentarism, racism, and Islamaphobia, they admonish Roma “Pakis” and Romanian “Muslims” to return to Romania, “or somewhere else in Europe.”

In neoliberal Europe, the state of exception that Carl Schmitt's once nominated in his Political Theology (1922) is no longer the exception; it has become, as Walter Benjamin (1969: 257) later suggested in his “Theses on the Philosophy of History”, the norm. It becomes normalized through a complex interplay of non-state, state, and transnational actors, each collaboratively endeavoring to uphold the imaginary of sovereignty and securitization. As Roma difference has long haunted the borderlines of nation-states, and of those who define themselves through such borders, Roma now haunt the body of the state-like European Union. Derrida (1994: 83) writes that “all national rootedness... is rooted first of all in the memory or anxiety of a displaced—or displaceable—population.” Transnational rootedness is similarly rooted. Indeed, as he once conjectured, “haunting would mark the very existence of Europe” (ibid.: 5).

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12 In his Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (1922), Schmitt famously defined the sovereign as he who determines the state of exception. If there is an institution or person in a particular polity that can institute a total suspension of the law, and that can use extra-legal force in normalizing the situation, then that institution or person is that particular polity’s sovereign power.

13 In his “Theses on the Philosophy of History”, Walter (1969: 257) wrote that the “tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of exception’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule.”
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