Title
In the mirror: The legitimation work of globalization

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6511s8fx

Journal
Law and Social Inquiry, 27(4)

ISSN
0897-6546

Authors
Coutin, SB
Maurer, B
Yngvesson, B

Publication Date
2002

DOI

Peer reviewed
In the Mirror: The Legitimation Work of Globalization

Susan Bibler Coutin, Bill Maurer, and Barbara Yngvesson

This essay examines the legitimation work of globalization by bringing into dialogue the authors' research on immigration, finance, and intercountry adoption. It is concerned with the practices that produce, define, and preclude both movement and connection, such as "naturalizing" some border crossings while criminalizing others; denying the histories and policies that allow some parents to "choose" babies while others must abandon them; and challenging the practices through which small states tweak transnational financial systems while allowing multinational corporations privileges denied small states. Legitimation work (re)configures jurisdictionality, transparency, and sovereignty—the constructs on which debates over globalization's consequences hinge. Examining how these constructs order, include,
and exclude persons, goods, and practices sheds light on the boundaries, slip-pages, and connections between the legitimate and the illegitimate within global processes.

Sarah is a 19-year-old girl in southern California. She was born in Mexico and adopted at the age of 4. English is her primary language. She lives at home with her family. She is adored by her parents and her five older siblings. She is also an illegal immigrant. Why is she an illegal immigrant? It turns out that Sarah's parents made a crucial mistake at the time of adoption. They didn't apply for citizenship. . . . It was only last year when they decided to take a trip to Mexico and asked for a passport that they realized Sarah is here illegally. Is this someone who managed to sneak across the border and is living in violation of the law? There are thousands of Sarahs who are, frankly, looking for relief in Congress and who can make a contribution to the United States. (Senator Durbin, speaking on the floor of the U.S. Senate, 29 Oct. 2000)

The case of Sarah Marie Caro draws attention to the disturbing possibilities that haunt seemingly legitimate social realities. The senator's account of Sarah's life begins by citing conventional markers of belonging. Sarah lives in the United States, can be located in the social and geographic landscape, speaks English, grew up in this country, has a home, and is loved by her family members. Yet, beyond these conventional markers lies the ugly and surprising truth that she is an illegal alien, not entitled to the home, social location, and familial interaction that otherwise seem so normal and so rightfully hers. The incommensurable yet interconnected truths that Sarah is a beloved sister and daughter and that Sarah is an alien are difficult to grasp simultaneously. These truths are interconnected in that Sarah became a sister and daughter by being adopted from abroad and that her illegality was exposed when the family that had been constructed through this initial movement attempted to take a trip to Mexico. These realities are incommensurable in that Sarah (who was only a child at the time) became illegal not by intentionally "sneak[ing] across the border" but rather less justifiably, through a "mistake." Crucially, Sarah did not become an illegal alien when she applied for a passport; rather, the denial of the passport revealed that she had been illegal all along. According to Senator Durbin, this is not an isolated case. Rather, "there are thousands of Sarahs" whose legal status does not conform to their social positions. Through the incorporation of such erroneously illegal individuals, the senator suggests, the nation can prosper.

As this example indicates, law and illegality, movement and immobility, choice and unintentionality, and the nation and that which defies national sovereignty are interconnected in complex ways. Movement can take
the form of immobility (Sarah’s legal self remained in Mexico instead of coming to the United States), choice can become not choice (Sarah’s parents chose to adopt her but unintentionally made her into an undocumented immigrant), and aliens who “live in violation of the law” can be de facto citizens. The known and straightforward world, in which legal status is awarded according to merit, in which clear origins and known histories produce legitimate persons, and in which both families and nations are made whole through the incorporation of an “available” child is connected to other worlds in which people erroneously obtain or are denied documents, in which origins and histories are obscure, and in which nations and families are produced through illegal transactions. Furthermore, there are ways in which these worlds are mutually constituting and interdependent. They are mutually constituting in that, as Judith Butler (1993, 3) notes, the process through which “subjects are formed . . . requires the simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet ‘subjects.’” They are interdependent in that those who are not yet subjects “form the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject” (Butler 1993, 3), an “outside” which is also “inside the subject as its own founding repudiation” (1993, 3). In this essay, we draw attention to the multiple forms of subjectivity, legality, and nationhood that are produced as movements, choices, persons, and states are officially constituted. We examine the relationships and tensions between these multiple forms, focusing on moments (like that in the Senate hearing described above) when the conventional “order of things” suddenly appears unconventional. Ultimately, our inquiry leads us to consider, with Butler, the illegitimate and abjected “insides” of the privileged persons and of the supposedly legitimate practices of “globalization.”

Analyzing the relationships and slippages between legitimate and illegitimate forms of movement, personhood, and statehood is key to understanding the processes that have been characterized as globalization. Globalization in its many manifestations, ranging from mass migrations, to international marketing, to the importation and exportation of legal forms of movement, personhood, and statehood is key to understanding the processes that have been characterized as globalization. Globalization in its many manifestations, ranging from mass migrations, to international marketing, to the importation and exportation of legal forms

---

1. As both inside and outside the sovereign worlds of subjects, families and nations, the domain of abject beings constitutes a site of both dread and desire, of what Butler (1993, 3) terms “dreaded identification” and Slavoj Žižek describes as a place of unbearable confrontation, “the theatre in which your truth was performed before you took cognizance of it” (1989, 19). The conventional world is “defined by its blindness to this place: it cannot take it into consideration without dissolving itself, without losing its consistency” (1989, 19–20, emphasis in original). Butler describes the abject as “those ‘unlivable’ and ‘uninhabitable’ zones of social life which are nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of subject” (1993, 3). See also Mouffe 1996, 247: “In coming to terms with pluralism, what is really at stake is power and antagonism and their ineradicable character. This can only be grasped from a perspective that puts into question that objectivism and essentialism that is dominant in democratic theory. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, we delineated an approach that asserts that any social objectivity is constituted through acts of power. This means that any social objectivity is ultimately political and has to show the traces of the acts of exclusion that govern its constitution—what, following Derrida, can be referred to as its ‘constitutive outside.’”
both produces and undermines conventional accounts of the world. This may be why scholars have debated whether globalization represses or liberates people, increases or decreases choice, and destroys or opens up the local, the particular, the national, and the sovereign. Our contribution to these debates is to point out that the very categories—jurisdictionality, transparency, and sovereignty—on which the debates hinge are themselves fractured. Thus, jurisdictions produce “offshore spaces,” transparency manufactures origins, and sovereignty makes and is made by dependency. In order for the world to assume its conventional form, scholarly debates about globalization and the movements on which analyses of globalization focus must take place “as if” (Žižek 1989, 18) these fractures do not exist. These debates assume that there is a coherent field (of subjects, nations and so forth) that “flows” of people, capital and images threaten to destroy or to open up. And yet this field is inherently fractured and is always in jeopardy. It takes work to stitch it together, and abject figures such as the illegal alien or the money-laundering tax haven have a key ideological place in this process (see Žižek 1989, 48). We call the everyday work of constituting coherent worlds “legitimation work.” Legitimation work includes issuing and denying documents, sealing and opening records, regulating and criminalizing transactions, and repudiating and claiming countries and persons. Through such legitimization work, “the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject” is produced. Constituting this exclusionary yet integral domain in persons and social relations is part of the power relations intrinsic to globalization.

Our analysis of legitimization work is based on our on-going research regarding three phenomena that are often cited as examples of globalization; namely, international migration, the transnationalization of families, and the capital flows created through the development of global finance. These three phenomena are facets of broader processes (i.e., globalization) and each is intimately linked to the other. International finance and economic restructuring dislocate workers, contributing to social conflict and to migration. Individuals who have been dislocated and who are in desperate financial straits may be more inclined to “abandon” children, making them “available” for adoption. Transnational adoptees are referred to as immigrants (in Sweden), and as in the quote with which this essay opens, have been cited in the United States in debates over immigration policy. Adoption is made possible by capital flows in the form of donations to children’s homes, and adoptive families send money and other goods to the regions from which their children came. Immigration also produces capital flows, namely, remittances from migrants to their home countries. Immigrants are sometimes said to have adopted their new countries of residence. Not sur-

2. See Žižek’s discussion of dream work (1989, 12).
prisingly, immigration, adoption, and international finance are often used as analogies for each other.

Not only are immigration, adoption, and the globalization of finance interconnected as social phenomena, in addition, each of these processes raises issues that we wish to explore in this paper. First, each entails legitimate and illegitimate practices. Immigration takes legal and illegal forms, adoption can occur through legally relinquishing a child or through baby selling, and international financial practices include direct foreign investment and incorporating a business offshore in order to evade regulatory practices. How is the line between these legitimate and illegitimate activities drawn, and how are some actions simultaneously legitimate and illegitimate? Second, in each of these cases, illegitimate practices are relegated to clandestine realms "outside . . . the domain of the subject." Undocumented immigrants are said to live an underground existence, illicit financial transactions occur offshore, and the exchanges that render babies adoptable often occur outside the purview of the law or of official, accessible records. How are these clandestine spaces created, who inhabits them, how are they governed, and what is their relationship to the above ground, the onshore, and the official? Third, to the degree that they obscure origins and create opaque histories, immigration, adoption, and international financial transactions are rendered suspect. The roots and loyalties of both immigrants and transnational adoptees are sometimes unclear, adoptees in particular often have unknown origins, and money whose origin cannot be traced may have been laundered. What notions of mobility are key to such assessments, what renders people and accounts mobile, and what sorts of histories cannot be narrated? Finally, immigration, transnational adoption, and international financial transactions give certain less powerful states access to persons, resources, and legal forms in certain more powerful states. Such access can be deemed negative or positive. Thus immigrating in order to obtain welfare benefits, selling one's baby, and laundering drug money are seen as illegitimate forms of agency, but immigrating for a better life, choosing a better life for one's baby, and seeking a good home for one's investment are legitimate actions. What alternative forms of sovereignty and of subjectivity are produced through such relationships and actions?

Our analysis of the legitimation work of globalization derives from our fieldwork regarding immigration from El Salvador to the United States (Coutin 1993, 2000), intercountry adoption in Sweden (Yngvesson 1998, 2000), and capital mobility in the Caribbean (Maurer 1995, 1997, 1998). We each spent years independently conducting research regarding these phenomena and only later discovered their interconnections. Our analyti-

---

cal strategy in this paper is to put these cases in conversation with each other, and thus to uncover the ways that similarities and differences between, for example, the underground existences of undocumented immigrants and the offshore location of financial transactions expose the ongoing fracturing, restoration, and reformulation of legitimacy within global processes. Rather than having a section on immigration, a section on adoption, and a section on capital mobility, we have chosen to write these cases together. Interweaving our accounts of these phenomena forced us to become conversant in each other's material and uncovered parallels, differences, and insights that we might not otherwise have noted. Our paper is therefore organized around the key constructs on which the legitimacy of immigration, adoption, and capital mobility rest. These constructs are jurisdictionality (i.e., the boundaries of the offshore, the distinction between being above ground and underground), transparency (i.e., the clarity or opaqueness of origins and histories), and sovereignty (i.e., the ability to act as an agent, the ability to be a person or entity that has agency). Examining how these constructs order, include, and exclude persons, goods, and practices sheds light on the boundaries, slippages, and connections between the legitimate and the illegitimate within global processes.

**JURISDICTIONALITY**

A hypothetical wealthy British businessman is planning his estate with his lawyer. He is worried that the equity in his multimillion-dollar home will impose a tax burden on his children after he dies, and he wants to ensure that the home will stay in the family. His lawyer tele-

work included attending deportation hearings, observing and participating in the legal services programs at three Central American community organizations, and interviewing approximately 100 legal service providers, immigrant advocates, and Central Americans with pending legalization claims. Between 1992 and 1993, Bill Maurer conducted 12 months of fieldwork in the British Virgin Islands, a destination for intra-Caribbean migrants and a tax haven. Since 1999, he has been conducting research on alternative financial practices (such as Islamic finance and alternative currency experiments) that often make use of Caribbean offshore services. Fieldwork in the offshore sector has included interviews with lawyers, fund managers, legislators, regulatory officials, archivists, academics, economists and others in the British Virgin Islands and St. Lucia as well as professionals based in the United Kingdom and the United States. Between 1995 and 2000, Barbara Yngvesson conducted fieldwork on transnational adoption that was based in Sweden and that involved field research in India, Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Hong Kong. Fieldwork included archival research and interviews with senior staff at the Adoption Centre (AC) in Stockholm, Sweden, participation in workshops and conferences organized by AC and by child welfare organizations in Asia and South America, and participant observation on trips carried out by AC in India and South America to arrange for the adoption of children and to administer aid projects. During these trips, she also interviewed government officials, judges, social workers, and administrators of children's homes. Finally, she interviewed selected adoptive parents and adoptees in Sweden, attended workshops organized by Swedish adoptees on racism and roots, and accompanied a group of adoptive parents and AC staff on a two-week roots trip to Chile.
In the Mirror

In the Mirror

phones the client's private banker and the two decide to set up an asset-protection trust (APT) offshore. The lawyer draws up some forms on his word processor and faxes them to the private banker, who files them, enters a few strokes on a keyboard at his terminal, and sends an e-mail to a trust fund manager in the British Virgin Islands. Digits change; a new corporate entity comes into being; and the house is now "custodied" in the British Virgin Islands as a legal asset of a trust company whose connection to the owner of the house is probably impossible to discern. The property and, more important, the equity built up in it, have all but disappeared from the view of British revenue collectors, as it will now be taxed at the corporate rate for foreign businesses. The private banker calls the lawyer back, that same afternoon. "I've taken care of it," he says. "I've set up an APT in the BVI. Tell your client his equity will be held by the trust, and that it won't be taxed. He can now set up a perpetuity for his heirs if he'd like. And if he ever gets sued, his assets are protected." Capital has moved.

The legitimacy and motivating force of numerous global transactions rest in part on jurisdictionality, the idea that particular sets of laws govern geographically disparate areas. Jurisdictionality is linked to the version of geographic and political space described by Gupta and Ferguson: "the representation of the world as a collection of 'countries' as in most world maps, sees it as an inherently fragmented space, divided by different colors into diverse national societies, each 'rooted' in its proper place" (1992, 6; see also Malkki 1992). The British businessman in our example recustodies his house in order to remove the house's value from the jurisdiction of Great Britain and British tax laws and place this asset in the jurisdiction of the British Virgin Islands, where the house escapes taxation. Because the house-qua-trust fund is outside of Great Britain, it would be illegitimate for British tax collectors to seek revenues from the businessman's heirs when he dies. After all, they do not own the house; a foreign corporation does. At the same time, the ambiguity of the movement through which this property is relocated makes the legitimacy of this transaction questionable. The house, after all, continues to exist physically in the jurisdiction of England, even if on paper it exists elsewhere. To some British regulators, the house's dual existence might make it suspect, and call for an investigation into possible tax fraud.4 Debates over the political implications of globalization hinge on

4. There would be two ways to set up such an APT, one more "legal" than the other. The more legal option would be for the APT to act as a foreign corporate entity with business dealings and properties in the United Kingdom and to file corporate income tax with British revenue collectors. The less legal way would be for it not to do so and for the fund's manager to take the risk that the fund's U.K. holdings would escape notice, which, especially if the APT was majority owned by another APT (and another, and another . . . ), it very well might. Nested corporate structures like this were common as a means for corporations and individuals to get around the international embargo against the apartheid regime in South Africa (see Maurer 1995). In general, however, both then and at the time of this writing, such arrangements seem to be more common for assets other than real property, and for managing the
such competing readings of jurisdictionality. Is jurisdictionality key to national sovereignty? Or has jurisdictionality become useful to polluters, criminals, and corporations that wish to evade national legal protections? To examine why jurisdictionality is key to assessments of globalization, this section analyzes the ways that space, movement, and law are configured within immigration, international adoption, and capital mobility.

Legal forms of immigration, international adoption, and capital mobility are linked to particular understandings of movement between jurisdictions. The legal way to immigrate to the United States, for example, is to leave one’s country of origin, enter the United States through a formally recognized channel, subject oneself to the authority of U.S. law, and acquire a legal persona in the United States. The physical movement of the immigrant is to be accompanied by a social and legal transformation in which the immigrant joins U.S. society, capitalizes on opportunities to develop, and becomes American (see Chock 1991; Coutin and Chock 1995). At a 1996 naturalization ceremony (at which this legal transformation is finalized), a judge celebrated this notion, telling some 3,000 naturalizing citizens, “No one in America is going to tell you artificially what your utmost achievement can be. We are empowered to defeat nay-sayers who say we can’t do it. Because we can. We can, because we are Americans” (see also Coutin 1999). Similarly, intercountry adoptions transfer children who have been “abandoned” from a jurisdiction where they do not fit to one that can provide them with homes. Internet exchanges between Western adoptive parents of children from Indian orphanages refer to the expected date of “their” child’s “coming home,” and thus implicitly displace the “failed” origin. Such exchanges map the “internal” development (progress) of the child onto a (proper) movement from South to North. Likewise, ideally, international financial transactions move investments from jurisdictions in which they are languishing to those in which they will prosper. Small nations appropriate international business discourse that blames languishing on overtaxation and overregulation and ties profit growth to unfettered (i.e., unregulated) business environments in order to try to sell themselves as just such a place. In promotional material and financial crime interdiction literature alike, Caribbean offshore financial service centers are described not merely as tax havens or shelters, but as “sanctuaries,” “paradises,” and “nice niches” (see Maurer 1995). As one lawyer put it, speaking of what he saw as the maze of regulations and controls involved in onshore investment, “You go in a pig and come out a sausage” (quoted in Lohr 1992, 52), while offshore, one imagines, the pigs are allowed to roam free.

Banalities of heteronormativity and patriarchy: wealthy men use APTs in the BVI to hide the extent of their assets from their wives in the event of divorce or death (when the man has a mistress, a former wife, or children by another woman to whom he wishes his assets to devolve).
Movements between jurisdictions are facilitated by state practices that render people and property mobile. States, for example, give capital its mobility by crafting legislation that enables particular sorts of investment entities to exist. Most significant here are laws governing the securitization of objects of property into partible shares, which can be moved independently of the properties they represent (Maurer 1999). Offshore finance relies on the legal creation of corporate entities that are more flexible and less regulated than their counterparts onshore. Similarly, adoptable babies do not simply appear in hospitals, orphanages, and adoption agencies. In Korea, the "abandonment" of children in parks, hospitals, and elsewhere was propelled largely by the fact that unmarried motherhood was considered "immoral" (Chun 1989, 256) and children who were born out of wedlock were stigmatized (Register 1991, 11). The replacement of physical abandonment with legal procedures for "relinquishment" of a child to state adoption agencies simply transformed the nonmovement of the "found" (illegally abandoned) baby into the movement of a "relinquished" baby. Likewise, immigrants do not simply choose from the array of possible citizenships that exist around the world; rather, they move due to political repression, economic necessity, familial relationships, and so forth (Hamilton and Chinchilla 1991; Kearney 1986). Salvadoran immigrants interviewed in Los Angeles, for example, depicted themselves as reluctant immigrants who did not choose the United States over their countries of origin but rather were driven out and needed somewhere to go (Coutin 2000). Clearly, the depiction of a receiving jurisdiction as "home" and of travel between jurisdictions as "progress" can only be achieved by not narrating the conditions that make mobility possible or necessary (Yngvesson 1998).

In addition to moving between jurisdictions, immigration, transnational adoptions, and capital mobility can be accomplished by evading jurisdictions altogether. Through policies that deny rights and services to the undocumented, illegal aliens are situated outside of the national spaces where they reside. Individuals who are not permitted to cross borders must hire smugglers, travel through deserts, assume false identities, and enter


6. In the Caribbean, one particular corporate form, the international business company, has had great success in attracting corporate capital seeking secrecy, freedom from taxation, or, more commonly, a stopping-off place nearby a foreign onshore financial center to facilitate round-the-clock business transactions (Ginsberg 1991). Furthermore, changes in production and distribution glossed as “flexible accumulation” (Harvey 1989) require offshore centers, since just-in-time production demands flexible and fast financing. Offshore finance centers serve as necessary stepping-stones for capital to jump onto as it traverses the globe in a 24-hour trading day and production cycle (Roberts 1994).
clandestinely. The danger of clandestine crossings is evidenced by mounting death tolls along the U.S.-Mexican border (Andreas 2000; Ellingwood 1998). Swedish intercountry adoptees “don’t belong,” in the sense that they are seen neither as fully Swedish nor as really Korean, Chilean, Colombian, Indian, and so forth (Yngvesson and Mahoney 2000). Laws that construct adoptees as adopted also propel a constant search for “roots,” sometimes in clandestine ways. Offshore transactions originate, precisely, offshore, somewhere else, a space imagined to lie outside of powerful sovereign states. Investors involved in shady financial dealings hide their accounts in unscrutinized locations. The poor who are excluded from financial institutions devise their own sources of credit and means of exchange, and these are often criminalized or at least tarred with the same brush as illegitimate activity (see Savona and De Feo 1997, 21). Undocumented immigrants, transnational adoptees, and offshore financial accounts are liminal entities. They are located outside of or between jurisdictions, but, in that the outside of a jurisdiction is another type of jurisdiction (the offshore or the underground), there can be no nonjurisdictional space. As Agamben writes, the “sovereign exception” produces

the very space in which the juridico-political order can have validity. [It] . . . does not limit itself to distinguishing what is inside from what is outside but instead traces a threshold (the state of exception) between the two, on the basis of which inside and outside, the normal situation and chaos, enter into those complex topological relations that make the validity of the juridical order possible. (1998, 19)

The existence or nonexistence of undocumented immigrants, transnational adoptees, and offshore financial accounts therefore exposes the power and limitations of jurisdiction as an organizing frame.

The impossibility yet necessity of nonjurisdictional spaces draws attention to the ways that one jurisdiction can seep into another, rendering neither jurisdiction disparate. The house that was recustodied in the British Virgin Islands, for example, became a legal entity—an asset protection fund—in the BVI but remained a physical presence in the United Kingdom. Thus, as the British businessman “moved” his property beyond British revenue collectors’ jurisdiction, the BVI, in a sense, seeped into the United Kingdom. The house in this example is similar to an undocumented immigrant or a transnational adoptee. Like the house, undocumented immigrants exist legally in their countries of origin but physically in the United States. Similarly, Sarah Marie Caro, the adoptee discussed at the outset of this essay, was legally adopted and physically present in the United States but remained a citizen of Mexico. Other adoptees, who do not encounter the immigration problems that Sarah experienced, are conceptualized as continuing to have “roots” in their countries of origin even if they are legally
incorporated in their country of adoption. In the cases of immigration, adoption, and capital mobility that we have studied, such seepage is thought to be of questionable legitimacy. Immigrants who argued that they had to be in the United States to provide financial support for relatives in their home countries—a common reason for immigrating—had difficulties in U.S. immigration court. If their narratives of separation from their country of birth were seen as unconvincing, immigrants' legalization claims would be denied (Coutin 2000, n.d.).

Undocumented immigration, transnational adoption, and offshore finance entail two sorts of seepage. Not only does one nation (El Salvador, Korea, the BVI) seep into another (the United States, Sweden, the United Kingdom), in addition, the underground, the Third World, and the offshore seep into the above ground, the First World, and the onshore. Jurisdictions are therefore never fully jurisdictional to begin with, an idea to which we return below.

Such jurisdictional seepage makes existence multidimensional. This notion of multiple existences is clear in a Salvadoran activist's comment that after fleeing to the United States during the civil war, he was still "living elsewhere emotionally." In other words, this activist did not completely arrive at his destination. The hypothetical example of the offshore asset-protection trust provides another case of seemingly incomplete movement—as property, the house relocated to the BVI, but as material entity, the house continued to exist in England. Transnational adoptees describe powerful feelings of connection (identification) with their countries of birth or birth parents, even as they feel themselves to be full members of their adoptive families and nations. This duality of belonging is sometimes expressed by adoptees' adding their birth name (when known) to the name they were given at adoption, or switching between the two (Aronson 1997).

People and properties whose existences do not coincide, that relocate without moving, and that don't arrive at their destinations are considered to be tainted and of questionable legitimacy. Persons engaged in offshore fi-

7. To qualify for a remedy known as suspension of deportation (a remedy that conferred legal permanent residency), immigrants who were in deportation proceedings had to demonstrate seven years of continuous presence in the United States, good moral character, and that deportation would pose a hardship to themselves or to a close relative with legal status in the United States. One way to argue hardship was to provide evidence that the applicant had adapted to the United States and could no longer acclimate to life in his or her country of origin. For instance, young people who were raised in the United States, had attended U.S. schools, and were monolingual English speakers could claim that they would face an extreme hardship if they were sent to a non-English-based educational system. Suspension applicants who could not demonstrate strong separations from their countries of origin (for instance, applicants who had close family members in their home countries; spoke, read, and wrote their native language fluently; had traveled repeatedly to their countries of origin; and owned property in or had business ties to their home country) had weaker suspension claims. Suspension of deportation was eliminated in 1996 by the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act.
nance, for example, are often seen as morally suspect, corrupt, and dangerous. Such persons—and their properties—are represented as hard to pin down. Their citizenships, too, are multiple and changeable, a commodity like any other, delineating no particular loyalty to state or sovereign. These rootless people and unstable states may become sites of renewal through which new blood can create global markets, global kinship, and nations. But, this new financial blood is always suspect or marginal. In the case of offshore finance, the lack of “separation between nations and their own economies” (Newman 1995, 30) generates official concern. The Caribbean island nation state of St. Lucia introduced legislation in 1999 and 2000 that brought a new kind of offshore financial service into being: international business companies that, while incorporated in St. Lucia, can be listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Developed in tandem with a free port for Chinese goods, the Vieux Fort Goods Distribution Free Zone on the southern end of the island, and a housing development on the northern tip for wealthy Chinese and European businesspeople, this new corporate possibility came into existence just as international organizations representing the interests of powerful northern countries attempted to clamp down on offshore activities in the name of eliminating “unfair tax competition” (FATF 2000; FSF 2000). It is ironic that northern countries, which have been engaged in competition with each other over corporate tax rates in an effort to lure industry, which have scaled back social services to citizens through tax cuts, and which have promoted internationally a neoliberal regime based on free trade low taxes, have come to view jurisdictions like St. Lucia as introducing too much tax reduction. From the point of view of Caribbean legislators, Caribbean countries are simply taking to its logical ends the neoliberal philosophy of borderless world and frictionless, that is, tax-free, markets.

Ideas about currency as suspect or marginal have come to the fore in countries that have “dollarized” their economies. As with the corporate accounts in offshore finance, the paper dollars in circulation in dollarized economies become a site of concern over jurisdictional origins. In El Salvador, shortly after dollarization was implemented, all dollar bills were considered suspect and were scrutinized carefully. Shopkeepers only accepted new bills, not dirty or crumpled ones. Because the Salvadoran government had just purchased brand new U.S. currency from the Federal Reserve, the origin of the crumpled currency was suspect. People said that since banks wouldn’t accept it, they wouldn’t accept it.

There is a sense in which offshore, underground, clandestine spaces are antijurisdictional. In contrast to jurisdictions, in which law radiates equally throughout a bounded territory, the underground is represented as limitless and lawless. For example, offshore finance analyst and proselytizer Adam Starchild promotes an identity he calls “PT.” “The PT arranges his or her ‘paperwork’ in such a way that all governments consider him a tourist—a
person who is just 'passing through.' . . . [A] PT can be a 'prior taxpayer,' 'perpetual tourist,' 'practically transparent,' 'privacy trained,' or 'permanent traveler'" (Starchild 1998; see Maurer 1998, 504). The PT of the financial offshore is viewed with suspicion by players in mainstream markets. Rather than being praised for freedom from cultural loyalties and petty localisms, the imagined nomads of cyberspace are too free. What distinguishes a St. Lucian company that has been set up to facilitate the importation of Chinese goods in the Caribbean through the Vieux Fort free port from a company in the Dominican Republic set up to facilitate tax-free export of Dominican-made goods into the United States? The former is an object of northern countries' regulatory concern; the latter is simply good business, a way for a U.S. manufacturer to increase profit margins by setting up shop in a country with low wages and low taxes on exports. The former is shady, therefore, because the offshore where they reside is a space defined as somewhere beyond the regulatory and revenue authority of powerful, northern sovereign states. Like unauthorized migrants and adoptees whose real papers must be sealed to insure their attachment to legally created families, Caribbean microstates that encourage investment offshore independently from the authority of powerful northern states lack the proper credentials to really belong to the community of civilized nations. These unauthored actors end up on "blacklists" (e.g., FATF 2000), not simply because they may facilitate criminal activities, but because they threaten the notion of lawful jurisdictions and instead seem to be governed by an antijurisdictionality, in which the space of the underground makes law itself nebulous. Instead of being legal subjects, residents of such spaces are defined as unpredictable nonpersons (or nonstates) whose wants may disrupt the nations, families, and markets in which they are allowed to participate as only marginal players.

8. Offshore is also imagined as outside the halls of multinational banks like Citicorp and computer software giants like Microsoft and Intuit. Yet these same companies may operate offshore and their corporate leaders embrace a personhood that is depicted by advocates as beyond culture and above localisms (in other words, not rooted, parked temporarily). When offshore banks fail, as did the European Union Bank in 1997, no one comes to their rescue. Rather, the directors of EUB were reported to have links with Russian mobsters and the drug world, and its hapless investors received no compensation (Miles 1997, 14). By contrast, when onshore investment heroes such as John W. Meriwether fall, causing the loss of billions upon billions, it is reported in the media as a stumble and a consortium of international banks and brokerage houses is assembled to take possession of the faltering firm and to prevent a disorderly collapse. Why is one of these falls viewed as a scandal linked to suspect individuals, while the other is about the fault lines of risk buried in today's global financial landscape?

9. Again, this is not to deny that drug money laundering or other illegal activities occur in offshore financial service centers. What is interesting, however, is the different moral (and legal) valence placed on certain activities defined as offshore and others, like export processing zones, IMF structural adjustment programs that erode corporate taxation regimes, or attempts to eliminate certain estate or capital gains taxes in northern countries, that are not defined as harmful tax competition, even if they are structurally identical to offshore operations.
Jurisdictional seepage, the multiplicity of existences (in which individuals both are and are not legal subjects), and the antijurisdictionality of pockets of nonsovereignty make questionable the claim that jurisdictions are ordered by law. In the United States, for example, there is a shadowy area on the fringes of formal immigration law that is populated by notary publics posing as immigration lawyers, counterfeitters who forge documents, and illegal immigrants desperate for work permits (Coutin 2000; Mahler 1995). The papers that these operators produce are made critical to both existence and legality by practices that enforce distinctions between authorized and unauthorized residents. From the perspective of at least some undocumented immigrants, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, along with document forgers and unlicensed immigration “consultants,” is part of a quasi-legitimate paper-producing scheme (Hagan 1994). Similarly, although international adoption conventions were devised to prevent what is officially viewed as baby selling, it can be difficult to distinguish creativity and commitment in working the adoption system for a child’s “best interest” from what is described officially as scam and illegality. Many legal adoptions take place in an uneasy borderland of legality and illegality. For example, an adoption lawyer in Peru stated in a Los Angeles Times article in 1994 that “he has routinely bribed officials as a necessary means of making paperwork move” (Long 1994, A20). This is a common practice, even (and perhaps especially) in countries where government regulations strictly control which babies are available for foreign adoption, how adoption decisions are made, and who makes these decisions. State-authorized Western agencies routinely include unauthorized “gifts” of money to orphanage directors who move children in their direction. Likewise, in the case of capital mobility, it is difficult to discern the real difference between creativity and commitment in serving a financial client, on the one hand, from scam and illegality in laundering money. The recent Enron debacle, which involved hundreds of offshore entities in the Caribbean and elsewhere, makes this abundantly clear. The money laundering interdiction community relies on the idea that financial managers will be able to tell, just by looking, whether or not funds are tainted or clean. If they cannot distinguish the legitimate from the illegitimate, and go about doing their jobs of moving money, they

10. The enterprise involved in making one’s way through this scheme is rejected by deportation officials as evidence of commitment to becoming a U.S. citizen. Unlike about-to-be citizens at the naturalization services described above, the ingenuity and inventiveness of undocumented immigrants who attempt to survive in social and legal spaces where they officially do not exist is not praised. Crossing borders under dangerous and clandestine circumstances, accepting public assistance, attempting to fix papers, and operating businesses that cannot be licensed due to immigrants’ undocumented status are not celebrated as making an active choice for the United States or as “taking advantage of opportunity” but rather condemned as “uncontrolled movement,” “dependency,” and “fraud” (see Perea 1997).

11. The Peruvian lawyer “denied paying mothers for babies, but he acknowledged that he often gave women ‘gifts’ after they gave up their children” (Long 1994, A20-21).
may unwittingly participate in financial fraud. The practices of capital mobility and the practices of money laundering are, in effect, identical. The cash-and-carry citizenship schemes of Caribbean states, meanwhile, are also indistinguishable from economic citizenship policies of places like the United States, Australia, and Canada, where large investments entitle a person to residency and even citizenship. Money and membership are conjoined in ways that the legitimation work of globalization denies. Elites can shop for citizenships; non-elites are excluded from shopping for citizenships on the basis that they are not commodities; and small states that offer citizenships like many Caribbean countries become suspected of scams. They are selling tainted origins.

If legal immigration, adoption, and capital mobility in some ways resemble illegal immigration, baby selling, and money laundering, then how are legitimate and illegitimate forms of globalization to be distinguished? Regarding bona fide and fraudulent financial practices, one observer notes that the only difference seems to be in “the tainted nature of the funds in which [financial managers] are being asked to deal” (Levi 1997, 275). How do funds become tainted, how do such origins continue to sully transactions, and what types of accounts are untainted? We turn now to a second construct that is central to the legitimation work of globalization: transparency.

TRANSPARENCY

A 27-year-old woman adopted by Swedish parents from Ethiopia when she was one-and-a-half describes her experience walking by a mirror: “I see something exotic that I barely recognize from TV, newspapers and books. Sometimes I am happy, sometimes sad and sometimes astonished. But most often the reflection in the mirror evokes questions that have no simple answers. I have tried to absorb the ‘black’ but then I have difficulty holding onto the Swedish. I have tried to absorb the ‘Swedish’ but then I haven’t understood what I see in the mirror” (Sara Nordin 1996, 4–5, freely translated by Barbara Yngvesson). This adoptee, who would seem to be no less Swedish than others born in that country, is proclaimed by her skin color not to be “100%.” Like undocumented immigrants who are less than full citizens in the United States and Caribbean microstates that seem to be less than full nations, the adoptee reveals the constructedness of any 100%, which is “a pact between two—where the one is a hundred per cent visible and the other invisible” (Tranströmer 1995, 20).

We use the concept of transparency to explore the idea of a complete (sovereign) person or nation as a “pact between two” in which the “one” is apparently 100% and the “other” is invisible. A transparent medium—like a
mirror that reflects an undistorted image—must be permeable to light "so that objects or images can be seen as though there were no intervening material" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary). But this very permeability—an object or person that is transparent can be seen through—connects the openness of transparency to the opaqueness of the clandestine. A transparent narrative is one that is too clear, hinting at a hidden story that has not been told. Transparency is contingent on that which "must be forgotten at least momentarily for a clear statement to be produced" (Massumi as quoted in Grosz 1995, 239 n. 14).

In this sense, transparency is double-edged. For example, a Chilean adoption official used the concept of transparency in an interview in 1998 to describe what she viewed as the legitimate but disturbing movement of babies from Chile to Sweden during the Pinochet dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s. The process was carefully documented: each step was recorded in files that could be produced decades later for adoptees and their families. The Swedish agency involved "always guaranteed excellent care for the children, seriousness, transparency." At the same time, the official suggested, the movement of children was too easy: "The babies came to Santiago—almost all were from Temuco—and were entered in the civil register in Santiago with the names of the adoptive parents, with Swedish surnames. So everything was very easy for them."

The ease (and speed) of the process with which Chilean babies were unmade in the courts of southern Chile (and the Swedish child made simply by entering it into the civil registry in Santiago with the surname of its new parents) implied something illicit to this official, a baby business. Like dollars or euros that "glide without a trace across . . . newly borderless" regions (Schmid 2001, 1)—the European Union, a dollarized American "Union"—the ease with which babies could be converted from Chilean to Swedish suggested that the Chilean babies were rootless, lacking a point of "fundamental immobility . . . beyond the reach of play" (Derrida 1978, 279). Like national currencies that can be abolished in favor of transnational ones "at the stroke of midnight" on "E-day" (January 1, 2002, when the 12 Euro-zone nations converted to a single currency), the Chilean, too, could be abolished "without a trace."

What does this concern with the fluidity of roots suggest about the significance of movement, the need to regulate it, and the relationship of movement to "counterfeit" currencies, persons and nations? Indeed, in a world where "everyone is changing money," where money, babies, and citizenships circulate freely, what constitutes a "suspicious transaction," and why! (Schmid 2001, 5, quoting Mark Tantam, head of fraud management in London at the Deloitte and Touche consulting firm). Answering this question requires examining the connections between notions of legitimacy, on the one hand, and movements through time and space, on the other. To be
legitimate, such movements must be transparent, that is, they must be cohesive accounts with clear origins, histories, destinations, and trajectories. Movements that lack such characteristics are considered nontransparent and illegitimate. It is possible, however, that these distinctions are in reality quite difficult to make.

The significance of origin in narratives of personhood makes movement problematic in three ways. First, the stasis of origin can make movement a form of alienation, as the self is removed from roots to which it is inextricably linked and that are a source of its identity. Because adoption, immigration, and offshore finance each appear to entail alienation, the circulations of children, migrants and money on which each depends are suspect. Adoption is seen as alienating an individual from his or her roots, origin, and parents, a separation that has been interpreted in a broad range of literature as productive of pathology. Adoptees are said to be more heavily represented in criminal statistics, mental health statistics, and so forth (Martens 1997; Cederblad et al. 1994). Immigration literally makes individuals into "aliens," a status that, particularly in the case of refugees, is considered almost pathological (Malkki, 1992). Offshore finance violates the financial norm that requires transparent accounts and knowable financial histories.

Second, the need for an origin makes movements that do not first originate (or lack a clear point of origin) questionable and shady. By definition, funds that lack a clear source are suspect. The U.S. Department of Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network assumes, as a matter of course, that wherever the origin of an account is uncertain, there are undoubtedly "webs of intricate transactions . . . mask[ing] the origin of criminally derived funds and . . . concealing the identities of the parties and beneficiaries" (U.S. Dept. of the Treasury 1996, 5). Similarly, the 1990 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs defines money laundering as the "concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from an offense" established under the convention (Savona and De Feo 1997, 37). We are not denying that concealed origin may be linked to criminality, whether in people or in funds. At the same time, the wording of the UN definition itself implies that there are legitimate forms of concealment of origin, to protect trade secrets, for instance, or to hide investing

---

12. As Marilyn Strathern notes, in the West, circulation is only considered to be legitimate if it does not entail alienation. "The thesis of market exchange," according to Strathern is that "a product can be separated from the producer with no loss to the self" (1988, 157). Critics of this thesis argue that market exchange is illegitimate because it "in fact alienates the producer from part of him or herself, namely his or her labor" (Strathern 1988, 157). Strathern points out that both advocates and critics of market exchange support their positions by appealing to the liberal legal notion that individuals are proprietors of their own selves.
plans from competitors. Indeed, the day-to-day operations of international finance entail hidden or obscured origins. As a criminologist who is an expert on financial fraud put it, "the difference between 'money movement facilities' and 'money laundering' is often a fine one, particularly when viewed from the perspective of the banker who wants to 'do the deal' because ultimately, performing services for paying customers is the source of banking profitability" (Levi 1997, 263–64).

Third, like the subterfuge that made the Chilean adoption official wonder whether adoption transactions really were transparent, official discourses that criminalize certain circulations also define nonmovements as movements. When individuals enter the United States illegally and then subsequently legalize through a family visa petition, an amnesty, or other means, their legalization is described as immigrating. For instance, during one deportation hearing a U.S. immigration judge summarized a legal permanent resident's immigration history: "You have been a resident of the United States since 1978, right?" The man—who was 13 years old in 1978—corrected him, saying, "Yes, but I've been in the United States since I was 6." The judge repeated, "But you immigrated with a green card in seventy-eight." What "immigrated" to the United States in 1978 was not the man, who was already present, but rather a legal construct that corresponded to this man's physical existence. There is also a sense in which intercountry adoption constitutes a nonmovement as a movement. If adoption is analogous to birth, then it is an origin in the same way that birth is defined as an origin. It is for this reason that it does not make sense to ask an intercountry adoptee whether or not he or she has been back. One Swedish adoptee from Korea said that she was constantly asked if she had been back to Korea. Once she went, she was asked how many times she had been back (von Mehlen 1998, 116). If adoptees originate (legally) through adoption, then there is no back for them to go to. Until recently, however, intercountry adoptees in Sweden were defined officially as immigrants rather than Swedish nationals. This designation defines their adoption as a movement across borders and locates their origins outside of national space.

Perhaps the clearest instances of nonmovements being defined as movements are the financial transactions that are cited as examples of capital mobility. Like the legal construct that immigrates to rejoin its physical body and the physical body that must cross national borders before it can be born, the capital that supposedly moves freely about the globe can de- and rematerialize. Paradoxically, rules governing the creation of security interests in property have required that the physical piece of paper representing the share be immobilized and held in a central depository, while computer images or virtual ledger-ticks record their movement from one owner to another (Maurer 1999). When it moves, capital is simply an account, words and numbers that appear in print-outs and computer screens—or that don't
appear when transactions are opaque. And yet this dematerialized substance can take form in currency, deeds, and documents. Mobility, materiality, and immateriality are interconnected.

The immobility of origin can also make movements incomplete, creating a sense that a seemingly transparent history is problematic. Those who move may have the sense of having left something behind and as continuing to exist in some sense where they originate. A Swedish adoptee who was born in Chile, lived for the next 19 years in Sweden, and returned to Chile on a roots trip in 1998, described her feeling when she first arrived: “I myself was left in Sweden although my body was in Chile and so one was somewhere in between, where one didn’t know where one was.” Here, the problems surrounding this adoptee’s movement were intensified by the material fact of her birth in Chile, her involuntary removal from that country as an infant, and her (voluntary) return as an adult. As in the examples of jurisdictional seepage above, people and houses may continue to exist legally in their countries of origin, while physically they exist elsewhere.

The policies that produce mobility also render certain movements—and thus accounts of these movements—illicit or questionable. Alienation from roots deprives accounts and persons of pedigrees, and thus confers a stain of illicitness. Without pedigrees, things are unlocalizable and out of place (Douglas 1966). Adoptees’ relatives don’t know where to put them in family trees, unauthorized immigrants’ histories are sometimes legally non-narratable (Coutin 2001), and money whose history is not transparent needs to be laundered. The Joint Money Laundering Guidelines of the Financial Action Task Force, in the words of one expert, “essentially involve the same sort of judgment made by police on the street: that a person seems ‘out of place’” (Levi 1997, 275).13 Alienation of funds from their national origins also deprives states of tax revenue, and allows transactions to occur outside of the field of vision of national regulators, even as other agents within a state bureaucracy claim to be in the business of keeping markets free from state intervention or oversight. Here, notions of a national economy are linked to notions of the national family, and the national responsibility to pay taxes—or, more precisely, to be known to the nation state, to be rendered up for the state’s gaze. Laundering money, from the point of view of state regulators, obscures its origin. But from the point of view of offshore finance specialists, laundering merely gives money a new origin story and possibly a new pedigree—sometimes literally, as individuals use offshore accounts to hide their assets from their spouses or other relatives in order to circumvent their home countries’ inheritance laws. The use of false

---

13. Money flowing from the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Caribbean—even where “authorities have not been able to confirm that the funds were of illegal origin”—nevertheless contain the possibility of being “tainted funds entering the legitimate financial stream” (U.S. Department of Treasury 1996, 3).
documents parallels such practices. Like laundered money, migrants who purchase green cards acquire new identities and origins. Moreover, undocumented immigrants whose legal narratives are unclear or contain gaps have difficulty obtaining legal status (Coutin 2000). In a similar way, the provision of a new birth certificate for adoptees and the sealing of adoption records in countries such as the United States and Colombia might be interpreted as a form of laundering that gives adoptees a new origin story. In each of these cases, the producers of that which circulates are made unknown and potentially unknowable.

The apparent similarity of laundering money that has an offshore origin and laundering adoptees and immigrants from offshore places brings us back to the concerns of the head of fraud management at Deloitte and Touche in London regarding the difficulties of identifying a "suspicious transaction" (that is, a transaction which originates offshore) when "everyone is changing money." The official approach to this is to work even harder at devising strategies for tracking the inauthentic. For example, in preparation for conversion of national currencies to the euro in January 2002, a "top-secret weapon in the European Central Bank's strategy to combat counterfeiting of euro banknotes" was developed in Paris—"a printing plate for embedding a high-security hologram into the new euro bills"—and delivered under armed guard to Charles de Gaulle Airport for transport to Munich in 1998. The disappearance of the plate en route—"a heist which had the scent of an organized crime job"—led to a redesign of the hologram and a higher level of security for the currency, including banknote printing specifications that are "guarded under maximum safety conditions at the central bank" (Schmid 2001, 1, 5). In spite of these precautions, officials note that "three of every four counterfeits are printed on sophisticated offset presses with copies good enough to fool most people," a technology that "is liable to entice the innocent into crime" (2001, 5). Similarly, the "human smuggling" industry has become increasingly sophisticated, with "computer-generated fake documents or stolen valid visas and passports . . . [that] help people waltz through U.S. entry gates without having to attempt dangerous desert crossings" (Andreas 2000; Jordan 2001, A19).

In adoption practice, the problem of identifying a counterfeit is complicated by the visibility of official laundering and the idea, widely discussed in popular and academic reports on adoption, that the adopted child, the family she constitutes, and the nation she completes, is simply "as if" (Grossberg 1985; Modell 1994; Shanley 2001). Indeed, the experience of being laundered—of being "inauthentic" or "nonexistent" (Lifton 1994, 16, 46; and see Yngvesson and Mahoney 2000, 91)—is a central theme in the memoirs of adoptees, birth mothers, and adoptive mothers (Lifton 1994; Waldron 1995; Yngvesson 1997; Saffian 1998). Betty Jean Lifton connects this sense of nonexistence to the absence of a "narrative point of origin" and
suggests that without such a starting point the adopted child inevitably becomes "stuck in the life cycle" (she cannot move forward, develop in the way a "normal" person would (1994, 65).

But what, indeed, is a legitimate "starting point" and what does it mean to arrive, eventually, where one belongs? Our discussion of jurisdictionality notes the assumption underpinning official narratives of mobility in so-called "receiving nations" for adoptive children, or in nations of immigrants such as the United States (and increasingly, Sweden), that the movement from South to North constitutes a homecoming. "Progress" (for the person, for the nation) is contingent on the displacement of tainted origins and on movement to places where people and funds can prosper. The adoptable child must be made adoptable (she must first be "undocumented" and her "origins" denied), then provided with a new origin, confirmed by an official paper trail. One might assume that finding a child who had no papers would facilitate the adoption process, since in such cases there would be no paper trail to undo. Yet such findings simply underscore the impossibility of not having papers if one is to have a starting point. In countries such as Korea, for example, the physically abandoned child is transformed into a "family head" (by inventing a name for her and entering her in the civil registry in Seoul), a requisite first step establishing her as a person who can be adopted (Trotzig 1996). In a suggestive variation on this theme, a Swedish woman who adopted her daughter from an orphanage in Delhi in 1965 was asked to write, over and over again, an explanation of why she and her husband wanted to adopt this particular child, before the adoption would be approved by Indian officials. Twelve years later, when the mother and daughter returned to search for the child's "roots," the only record of the child's existence in India was the paper trail provided by her adoptive parents—the stories they told Indian officials of why they wanted a destitute child. Here, the being of the child was validated by an account of her adoptive parents' desire, which became her narrative point of origin and allowed her to travel across space and through time to arrive at an elsewhere where she really belonged.

If the documentation of origins is the official version of illicit laundering practices, what does this suggest about the way that origins get made and who is authorized to make them? How is laundering (documentation and the implied forgetting this requires) related to being "100%" (to being complete, a full person or nation) and in what sense then can it be said that the transparency of an account (of currency, a person, a nation) depends on laundering? The idea that laundering is a condition of transparency seems counterintuitive: it suggests that an account which is clear, in which all the

---

14. This practice has gradually disappeared since the 1980s, when Korea established policies encouraging relinquishment rather than anonymous abandonment of children by their mothers.
loose ends have been cleared up, is an account with holes in it. Transparency, then, is dependent on porosity and on omissions (intentional or unintentional) that might unsettle the lines of a narrative by making it too dense, contradictory, and difficult to follow. Moments of unexpected confrontation with what is normally invisible break through the clarity of official narratives of wholeness and the forgetting they demand, providing the possibility for histories that can’t be narrated (that are “outside” official stories and the boundaries they establish) to be pieced together. These moments suggest that laundering is never “complete,” any more than the narratives of wholeness that laundering makes possible.

Movements in the United States and elsewhere to open sealed records or to search for documents and connections other than those provided by agencies and orphanages might work not so much to uncover more authentic truths (which is a goal of many adoptees and birth parents) but to discover origins that provide a more complex account of desire. For example, roots trips by adoptees and their families complicate the idea of roots by juxtaposing it to the movement of the trip, in this way destabilizing both. Roots trips activate “surface belongings” that “refuse to stand still” (Probyn 1996, 35). By traversing (touching, embracing, walking on, smelling, tasting) surfaces that once connected them to a person or a place, adoptees re(create) the templates of their own desire. Immigrants sometimes have similar experiences. A Salvadoran man related that his organization had brought a woman who had left El Salvador at age eight back to her homeland as an adult. When she bathed in the river where she had bathed as a child, he said, she started crying. Such recreations could be seen as a kind of reversal of laundering, not in the sense of piecing together a true story, but by connecting fragments (felt, intuited, seen, smelled) so as to produce a virtual one. If laundering is a condition of transparency, as we suggested above, then search movements or the opening of records should produce a more dense narrative, a trail that twists and turns rather than a linear account that originates at a particular point, moves through time and across space and ultimately arrives at a destination. If a complete (transparent) narrative is like a straight line, the undocumented (clandestine) one is more like a labyrinth: “if you press close to the wall at the right place you can hear the hurrying steps and voices, you can hear yourself walking past there on the other side” (Tranströmer 1987, 163).

The impossibility of constructing a “straight” narrative is central to the ambiguity surrounding adoptees, immigrants, and capital flows. Each is positioned simultaneously inside and outside national boundaries, which are in

---

15. Another Swedish adoptee, Clara K., who was adopted from Chile when she was an infant, describes the unease she feels when people mistake her for an immigrant. She notes, “Sometimes I forget that I am dark-skinned. When I sit with friends and chat. And then when I look in the mirror: ‘Aha! That’s how it is!’”
turn produced in and through their passage. Located on a threshold where “everyone is changing,” each becomes a “suspicious transaction” requiring new papers, new pedigree, a new origin story in order to be permitted inside (Agamben 1998). Like immigrants who are transformed into new citizens in naturalization ceremonies, laundering accomplishes a kind of performative magic for capital that is tainted by its offshore connections. It naturalizes an origin story about a fantasy world populated by natives who do not require making into citizens, families that do not require making by law, and funds which circulate freely with no danger of counterfeiting. Forgetting is central to this fantasy of a natural world. Like the adoption decree which displaces the origins of an adoptee in order to produce an “as if” (natural) family (Modell 1994) and the paperwork that transforms a “prior taxpayer” into a “practically transparent” tourist in offshore finance havens, papers and the ceremonies that may accompany their issuance are at the same time forms of legitimation and dangerous ground. Naturalization certificates, like PT (passing through) for the nomad of cyberspace, or altered birth certificates that transform an “illegitimate” child into a licit one, all constitute “protective fictions” (Freud, cited in Rose 1996, 5), which, in turn, constitute the state as both natural and an as if “phenomenon” (Rose 1996, 9; Žižek 1989, 18).

Documents, then, constitute, authorize, and conceal movements. As Žižek would say, they “are the theater where your truth was performed before you took cognizance of it” (Žižek 1989, 19). The performative truth of documents is taken, however, as revealing or concealing a truth that lies beyond the documents themselves. The discomfort expressed by the Chilean adoption official at the ease with which Chilean babies were transformed into Swedish ones by simply entering their adoptive parents’ names into the civil registry in Santiago (as though the Chilean child had never existed) is a dimension of this performative truth, its witness to the power of documents to constitute (or to dissolve) persons, and the uncanniness this produces for the occupants of a world that we believe to be grounded in something other than paper, to be beyond the reach of play.

At the same time, as we suggested above, the power of documents and the truths they produce is incomplete. There is always a “something”—the discomfort produced for a transracial adoptee by the image she sees in the mirror, the anxiety of adoption professionals to “cover the painful feelings of all parties,” (Duckham 1998: A28) the sense that adoption speak is “deadly” (Waldron 1995, 132). This something materializes as well in the fascination that compels strangers toward that which is experienced as out of place: an adoptee from Ethiopia who is hiking with her completely Swedish family in Lapland or standing with her Swedish-American host on a Saturday morning at a farmer’s market in Amherst, Massachusetts. “Where are you from?” these strangers inquire, exclaiming about the beauty of the woman. The
draw in these situations is the "charged strangeness" (Avery Gordon 1997, 63) imparted by the ghost of a tainted past that unexpectedly intrudes into a present that is otherwise experienced as seamless, undivided, protected from an outside. As Sara Nordin suggested in the quote with which we opened this section, it is the bewildering connection of the black to the Swedish that is charged, a connection in which the Swedish is (temporarily) rendered invisible, becomes mysterious.

The curiosity of well-meaning strangers, like the assumption of friends that adoptees must long to go back, hints at the power of the adoptee, the undocumented, and suspect spaces or funds offshore to figure the desire of those who imagine that they do not need "naturalizing"—they are not adopted, do not need to be documented, they are safely onshore and do not need to go back to be grounded. This investment of desire both secures the conventional order and reveals its contingency on that which is outside for its completion, an outside which no amount of transparency can pin down. This outside is embodied in ideological figures such as the adopted child, the undocumented alien, the tax cheat, or the corrupt Caribbean politician. These figures represent the "quilting point" that holds together the conventional social order, but their refusal to be unambiguously this or that and the apparent ease with which they may materialize (in mirrors, dreams, and official policies) as alien or adored reveal the status of legitimating documents as "just paper," the fundamental opaqueness of transparency, and the instability of an order that claims to be selfsame but is traversed by an antagonism which can only be represented in dreams.

If the conventional order is sustained (and the work of legitimation accomplished) through the investment of desire in figures such as the undocumented or the adopted, the very work in which the three of us are engaged appears as a dimension of the processes of legitimation that we seek to open up. If we cannot claim to be the "non-duped" but are "doing it," however much we claim to know about it (Žižek 1989, 31), is there any sense in which the narrative of our article itself contributes to a different kind of doing, one that contributes to the spectral dimensions of the orders we inhabit, making them "shimmer" (Coutin 2000) and open up to virtual realities? We return to this question in the conclusion.

SOVEREIGNTY

At a mass naturalization ceremony in Los Angeles shortly before the 1996 U.S. presidential elections, a federal judge administered the oath of allegiance to 5,000 cheering immigrants from 125 nations. After quieting the crowd, the judge instructed the new citizens and their guests in the meaning of naturalization. "I compare [naturalization] to,
perhaps, a child born in a family, a child by birthright is within the family. Then there are those children who are as a matter of course outside the family, but adopted into the family. . . . To that extent, that’s what you have done. You are the adoptees of this country, and this country has adopted you. You really have adopted this country. You chose to come here.”

Despite the judge’s celebration of choosing, choice, like mobility, is not a self-evident category. The choices that the new citizens made were only recognized as valid as the decision to grant them citizenship was made. Many other immigrants have chosen to come to the United States without the authorization of the U.S. government and have been deported rather than adopted. Still others remain within U.S. borders but are ineligible for legal status and therefore unable to choose citizenship. And the naturalization applicants who listened to the judge’s words may well have adopted the United States out of necessity rather than choice (Hagan 1994; Paral 1995; Sanchez 1997). As one Salvadoran immigrant stated during an interview, applying for legal status “was not a matter of choosing or not choosing, it was something that one had to do. Because one could not go on being hidden.” Clearly, nonchoices can be construed as choices, active choices can be delegitimized, and some subjects cannot choose. Each of these alternatives to the sorts of choices that liberal subjects are supposed to make is associated with a corresponding but not mutually exclusive version of illiberal subjectivity: (1) nonpersonhood, (2) nonautonomy, and (3) illegitimacy. These three illiberal subjectivities arise outside of the legitimate sovereign spaces in which choices have meaning. Understanding sovereignty therefore requires examining situatedness; particularly the practices that make roots optional.

Choice is part of the morality tale that animates Western stories of self and of nation. These stories of self and nation are measured against liberal legalities, yet at the same time these legalities depend on illiberal subjectivities. Liberal law assumes the existence of subjects who choose according to their wants and needs, and who are self-owned, self-authored, and self-regulated (Radin 1996; Collier, Maurer and Suarez-Navaz, 1995; Comaroff and Comaroff 1997). These subjects are by definition individuals (Strathern 1988), whose coherence is grounded in the presumption that they have roots in places—that is, sovereign spaces—to which they are native (Featherstone 1995, 142–43, and 18, citing Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Biolsi 2001; Malkki 1992). In liberal views of personhood, rooting is integral to freedom, defined as the power to choose for oneself. Rooting is also the basis for individuation, continuity, and self-integration (Radin 1996, 76–77). Persons who are not rooted are, in effect, nonpersons whose “choices” cannot be considered “free.”
In addition to nonpersons located outside of sovereign spaces, illiberal subjects take the form of nonsovereign beings whose coerced actions are defined as active choices. This transformation of coercion into choice is accomplished by decontextualizations of action and erasures of history (Matooesian 1997; Coutin and Chock 1995; Shapiro 1988). In the example that began this section, the judge’s suggestion that adopted citizens “really have adopted this country,” just as the country “has adopted you” implies that grafting, adopting, and naturalizing are a two-way process of active choice. The difficulties with this idea are hinted at in the statement of another Los Angeles judge, who compared “we” (citizens by birth) who “do not have to do anything” and “you [who] have made a choice.” Indeed, this is a difficulty with the more general assumption underpinning the liberal narrative of personhood, that becoming a person, like becoming a citizen or member of a family, is a process of “active proprietorship” (Strathern 1988, 135). The judge’s statement valorized choice, specifically the choice to be naturalized. Ironically, those who are naturally citizens do not have to make a choice (one does not have to do anything).

The concept of not having to make a choice illuminates power, being compelled to choose, and being chosen rather than (or in tension with) choosing. These issues are elided in stories of mutuality, the mingling of old and new blood, and the growth of new and enriched plants. In such stories, the choosing nation, adoptive parents, and enriched receiving countries are privileged at the expense of people whose choices are rarely experienced as free. For these people, enclosure into the sovereign families and nations that receive them can be experienced as a cut-off rather than connection, as division rather than wholeness, and as being perpetually in between or in transit rather than on a journey toward home (see Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Yngvesson and Mahoney 2000). The experiences of adoptees and new citizens gesture toward an economy of desire (for this particular country, for parents who can choose) that makes certain choices compelling not only for those who are choosing but also for those who are chosen. This economy of desire speaks to the interconnections, interdependencies, and inequalities that shape free choices and illuminates the contingencies that allow some people to be rooted (permitting them to choose freely) while others must choose to flee, shop for citizenship, or to give up their children for foreign adoption.

States and state policies are critical to constructing the field of power relations in which choices are necessitated and prevented. For example, state-issued papers secure identity but cannot be chosen by ordinary citizens. Papers thus capture the simultaneous power and emptiness of choice. Papers
authorize such entries as birth, immigration, and adoption and such exits as death, emigration, and adoption. (Moveover, exiting one place is not always construed as entering another—and vice versa. Such inconsistencies can create both dual citizenships and stateless persons.) In this way, papers narrate, in however condensed a form, the terms that govern both the belonging of citizens and the relations between sovereign states. Papers also record legitimate movements of capital and authorize onshore transactions: as discussed in the previous section, financial accounts must have pedigrees. Choices, such as the consent to relinquish a child or freely choosing to renounce a nation, are both requisites and products of papers. At the same time, papers are just paper, as adoptees involved in the Search movement in the United States have argued about their rewritten birth certificates. Like the language of voluntarism in adoption literature, they are “adoptionspeak” (Waldron 1995, 131), both “frivolous” and “deadly.” Papers’ frivolity derives from their being “tragically, hilariously estranged from the actual experience” (Waldron 1995, 132), while their deadliness comes from their power to bestow or deny both the capacity to freely choose and the identity that free choice presupposes. Papers, by insisting on identity, also produce split subjects with roots that are left behind and that continue to pull people back. Papers represent the power of someone else to choose one’s existence or nonexistence, the power to define as choices actions that were not chosen, the power to bestow or deny legitimacy and legality.17

In Western narratives of self and nation, illiberal subjects are not only nonpersons who cannot choose and persons whose actions are construed as choices but also illicit beings whose only choices are illegitimate. The intrinsic illegality of the undocumented is thought to pervade these immigrants’ actions as well. Denied the ability to choose papers, unauthorized immigrants sometimes purchase fraudulent documents, operate unlicensed businesses, work without authorization, and entrust their legalization cases to individuals who are not permitted to practice law (see Coutin 2000). In court, these choices are not defined as evidence of the immigrant spirit, but rather as signs of poor moral character. Mainstream media represent adoptees who travel to visit their birth country or birth parent as “completing themselves” in a mystical “quest for wholeness” (Lifton 1994), not as making choices about identities and histories. Money-laundering-interdiction officials interpret the efforts of Caribbean microstates to become tax

17. In a report about the situation in Kosovo, Serbians were described as depriving ethnic Albanians of identity documents to prevent them from proving that they had ever lived in southern Serbia. Without this proof, the article noted, Kosovars would have difficulty being integrated into “more regulated” societies in Europe, because with no proof that they ever lived in Kosovo, it would be difficult for them to return home (Kifner 1999, 10). Paradoxically, then, papers produce and disrupt identity while enabling and preventing choice. Calavita (2000) also discusses the relationship between papers and authenticity—with the authentic being that which doesn’t require documentation and anything that is documented as being potentially fraudulent.
havens as "scams" rather than as legitimate, rationally chosen efforts to raise their revenue base and provide employment. In response to an international crackdown against offshore finance in 1999 and 2000, an exasperated Caribbean politician stated at the 1999 meeting of the World Bank, "What would developed countries have us do for a living" (Fonseca 1999)? The Caribbean has only one choice, it would seem: the poverty and dependency to which it has been relegated by the developed nations. At the same time, however, making its own choices "to exercise [its] very limited diversification options and develop an international business sector," as the Caribbean official put it, is still not the path to development and the completion of the national project of sovereign autonomy. Even making their own choices would place Caribbean countries at the mercy of their powerful northern neighbors, both through increased policing of their activities and more blacklists and through dependence on fickle and footloose movements of money.

Since dominant visions of choice link available options to commodity options, choosing things that cannot be chosen smacks of illicit commodification. People making these nonchoices must therefore engage, subvert, contest, or embrace commodity logics to validate their choices. This attempt at validation often fails, unless the people making these nonchoices are perceived to start from a legitimate origin, a sovereign space of legitimate choice making. For instance, adoptive parents who "shop" on the Internet for children, may be praised for their involvement in an "international grapevine of newsletters, mimeographed sheets and phone networks" (Serrill 1991, 43). In this particular case, adoptive parents escape the specter of commodification by depicting their choice as having been compelled by the child. A recent post on PAC (Post-Adopt-China), an Internet discussion group of adoptive parents, states, “After 3 o’clock this afternoon there will be new Asian children listed on RainbowKids Waiting Children of the World. I’ve seen two of the girls pictures . . . so special. As a matter of fact, AA166 is staring a hole thru me as I write this” (PAC 9/9/18. Similarly, the birth mothers of adopted children are viewed as either insufficiently separated from their children (and thus a permanent threat to adoptive families) or as morally undeserving because they have given their children away (Yngvesson 1997). Because of this permanent taint, birth mothers are implicitly viewed as part of the black market area of adoption and epitomize illegitimacy, illegitimacy, and marginality. Like undocumented immigrants, they reside in a space of nonexistence (Coutin 2000), at least as mothers. Many such women must hide the fact that they have borne a child. The only way to choose a future for their child is to abandon it. In other cases, legal records of their child's birth and adoption are sealed for decades, and the child's fate is hidden from everyone but state authorities. Birth mothers who attempt to place, sell, or find temporary care for their children in state-run orphanages are viewed as perpetrators of scams and deals, insufficiently distanced from their children to know their best interest, and too unstable to know their own. In the United States and in most other nations that promote domestic adoption or that are involved in intercountry transactions, birth mothers who seek to place their own children are prosecuted as criminals.

---

18. Similarly, the birth mothers of adopted children are viewed as either insufficiently separated from their children (and thus a permanent threat to adoptive families) or as morally undeserving because they have given their children away (Yngvesson 1997). Because of this permanent taint, birth mothers are implicitly viewed as part of the black market area of adoption and epitomize illegitimacy, illegitimacy, and marginality. Like undocumented immigrants, they reside in a space of nonexistence (Coutin 2000), at least as mothers. Many such women must hide the fact that they have borne a child. The only way to choose a future for their child is to abandon it. In other cases, legal records of their child's birth and adoption are sealed for decades, and the child's fate is hidden from everyone but state authorities. Birth mothers who attempt to place, sell, or find temporary care for their children in state-run orphanages are viewed as perpetrators of scams and deals, insufficiently distanced from their children to know their best interest, and too unstable to know their own. In the United States and in most other nations that promote domestic adoption or that are involved in intercountry transactions, birth mothers who seek to place their own children are prosecuted as criminals.
In the Mirror 829

Like the Ethiopian adoptee, those who exist between sovereign and nonsovereign states are not 100%. Being a complete (100%) person is contingent on the capacity to author one's own life by choosing a trajectory that will lead to progress, improvement, and self-realization. At the same time, deeply embedded in the concept of self-realization is the contradictory notion that what is to be realized (the invisible) was there all along and must unfold rather than be chosen. In this sense, the capacity for reasonable self-authoring is understood (in the liberal narrative of personhood) to be innate. Yet some people, such as the Ethiopian adoptee, the British Virgin Islander legislator who must open his deliberations to the gaze of United States's antinarcotic-trafficking agencies, and the undocumented migrants who wait in the United States to accumulate enough time to officially "migrate," depend on states in order to realize themselves. The adoptee who cannot recover her roots remains ungrounded. The immigrant who does not craft the appropriate success story remains in the shadows, in a space of nonexistence, legally unrecognizable. The Caribbean country that offers offshore financial services, dollarizes its economy, and sells its jurisdiction remains a place offshore, an entity that is not on a path toward true political sovereignty with true citizens, currencies, or capacities for a global market. Their dependency on the sovereign seems to justify locating such incomplete people and nations outside of dominant narratives and spaces.

This notion of full personhood is fundamental to liberal understandings of the sovereign state, governance, political community and citizenship. Sovereign citizens bequeath authority to the state, and the state, in turn creates opportunities for citizens, guarantees citizens' rights to make choices, and allows them to freely pursue self-realization. States that can provide opportunity to their citizens are presumed to be superior to those that cannot. This notion of sovereignty relies on a distinction between states and markets. States are supposed to be moral orders that enable persons-selves, whereas markets deal in commodities-as-options. Yet, both the state-market distinction and the presumption that some states are sovereign are produced in a relationship with illicit beings and shadowy spaces that belies sovereignty. In reality, Western nations need Third World adoptees in order to construct families, the United States needs migrant labor (Sassen 1989, 1996), and international finance needs financial centers distributed around the globe to facilitate round-the-clock trading and money movements (Hampton 1996; Roberts 1994). The legitimation work of globalization masks sovereign nations' dependence on the nonsovereign by depicting the latter as having bad origins, making illegitimate choices, and

---

19. As Hayden White has argued, a life, like "a" history, is contingent on a narrativizing discourse that can reveal it as having "had a plot all along" (1981, 20, emphasis in original).
being failed persons. This debate over legitimacy and illegitimacy gives these supposedly separate states the inherently unstable structures and forms that are being hailed as hallmarks of globalization. Critical accounts that try to assess the effects of globalization on sovereignty fail to note that it is impossible to distinguish sovereignty from its very negation.

The state-market, person-commodity distinction also shapes discussions of the legitimacy of transnational adoption. As this discussion suggests, consent to adoption—in essence, choice—is central to whether a global (or national) flow of children is interpreted in a positive way, as wrapping the earth in family ties, or negatively, as a market or traffic in children. Enterprising First World parents are seen not only as determined, as “meeting a need,” and as “saving children from dreary and painful lives,” but also as desperate (“We tried everything from fertility treatments to laser surgery. Nothing worked”) (Serrill 1991, 41). Thus while they may be viewed as deserving some kind of child, they are also regarded as needing at least minimal monitoring by the state. Birth mothers, as suggested above, are seen as even less reliable. If these subjects were allowed to freely transact for children, a baby market could bypass and threaten nation states. In the same way, a market in which the key players are not agents of major corporations or authorized by “real” states is criminalized. The movements of illegal aliens can be seen as an uncontrolled flood or torrent rather than as desirable circulation. In the case of markets in children, the good or real market is defined as not a market at all. It is a “gratuitous transfer” of children (Hollinger 1993, 49). Like moral concerns about cash-and-carry citizenships in offshore banking, in which citizenship is imagined to become a commodity rather than inextricable from the rootedness of established nation states, cash-and-carry children are also widely regarded as an oxymoron, contradicting the very essence of liberal, western personhood as “a unique individual identity” that is self-authored (Radin 1996, 55). In contrast to fears about sold babies who thereby become commodities, given babies (as long as they are freely given) guarantee personhood and secure (indeed, establish) rather than threaten the identities of the states, agencies, and orphanages that transact through them. These transfers of babies thus create giving and receiving nations (Yngvesson 1998).

Though delegitimized by the dominant narrative of sovereignty, those who are not sovereign sometimes practice reverse colonization instead of striving for sovereignty. Reverse colonization entails mutual and hierarchical interdependence rather than autonomy. It demands pores rather than borders. And it requires infiltration instead of control. Reverse colonization is not necessarily an openly acknowledged strategy. In the case of international adoption and immigration, children and citizens who emigrate have increasingly come to be viewed as a key national resource for sending nations. Thus a supreme court judgment in India in 1984 regulated the flow of
children in adoption to the West on grounds that “children are a supremely important national asset and the future well being of the nation depends on how its children grow and develop” (Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India 1985, 4). This judgment was intended to encourage domestic over international adoption of Indian children—that is, it was aimed at protecting children as national assets or resources. At the same time, it hinted at the potential of the Indian child to become an asset as international adoptee. Current government policy in India encourages close ties between India and its diaspora. For example, the recently established “Persons of Indian Origin card” is intended to “make it easier for people of Indian descent sprinkled around the globe to travel to their familial homeland and invest in it” in ways that are “hassle-free” (Dugger 1999, 4). The card is described as “part of a broader recognition by a growing number of countries that people who move abroad remain potentially valuable contributors in an economically interdependent world” (1999, 4). While not directed specifically at adoptees, moves such as these are potentially inclusive of them, particularly in conjunction with recent proposals in receiving countries (such as Sweden) that adoptees be permitted to have dual citizenship.

As this suggests, the concern voiced by sending nations that children sent abroad in adoption constitute a threat to their sovereignty and laws that are set in place to regulate international adoption must be viewed in the broader context of policies that not only permit but encourage international adoption, in effect undermining the sovereignties that regulatory practices seek to secure. Thus in 1997, Nanuli Shevardnadze argued in a front-page article in the New York Times that “I am categorically against foreign adoption. Our nation’s gene pool is being depleted. No more children should leave Georgia” (Stanley 1997, 1). Worried because Georgia’s adoption process was “uncharted and poorly regulated,” officials there cast foreign adoptions “as a murky business perpetrated by rich foreigners and corrupt bureaucrats” (Stanley 1997, 12). In 1998 however, Russia outstripped China as the principal source of children adopted to the United States from abroad (Pertman 1998, A34). The history of Korean adoptions to the West reveals a similar ambivalence: on the one hand, adoptions to the West are “definitely a shame” and the nation must “wipe out the disgrace” (Serrill 1991, 42, quoting the Korea Herald); on the other, Korean adoption law continues to facilitate international adoption, and Korea is beginning to welcome these adoptees home. Thus President Kim Dae Jung recently invited Korean adoptees from eight different Western nations on an all-expense-paid visit to Korea. In a ceremony at the Blue House held in their honor, the president apologized for the adoptions, describing Korea as “filled with shame” over the practice; but he also pointed out that “no nation can live by itself” and urged them to “nurture your cultural roots” because “globalization is the trend of the times” (Kim 1998). Adoptable children,
then, need not be considered lost or as depleting the gene pool of a nation but as a kind of jurisdictional seepage that both connects and separates nations from (to) one another. Roots are crucial to this concept of connection.20

By contrast to the dilemmas of sovereignty faced by the governments of countries that supply adoptable children, for Caribbean leaders involved in promoting their territories as offshore financial service centers, sovereignty in its liberal sense is neither the goal nor even on the screen. For many, such as leaders in the British Virgin Islands, sovereignty, which would entail political independence from the United Kingdom, is perceived to have the ability to destroy the financial services business. The territory's links to Britain, given local legislative autonomy, are only formalities at this point. Yet these are deemed central to the jurisdiction's "reputation" on the market of international financial services. Furthermore, in a region where free trade has meant the decimation of export agriculture, where grants from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office are rarer and smaller because of Britain's desire (and United Nations' directives) to shuck off its remaining colonies, and where tourism can no longer bring in the revenues it once did, marketing a jurisdiction to offshore investors seems a reasonable route to economic health. As a new "native" of St. Kitts-Nevis, an offshore finance specialist who purchased his citizenship, explains, "Our governments need the income... The time when you could go and beg for money from England or the United States is gone. We've got to get some kind of income to live on" (quoted in Fineman 1997, A5). Similarly, the Salvadoran government has lobbied U.S. officials to grant legal residency to Salvadorans living in the United States. One rationale for granting residency is that remittances from Salvadoran immigrants have become the mainstay of the Salvadoran economy (Menjivar et al. 1998). Mass deportations, Salvadoran activists and politicians argue, would be economically devastating for El Salvador.

Latin American leaders who are weighing the dollarization of their economies—by backing their national currency with the U.S. dollar, or adopting the dollar outright as the sole legal tender of their countries—are caught in the bind that characterizes nonsovereign choice. As a reporter for the Los Angeles Times put it, the dollarization debate is "an example of the agonizing choices that sovereign nations confront in an era when they often bounce around like the loose change in the pocket of a giant global economy" (Peterson 1999, A12). The potential dollarization of Latin American

---

20. Similarly, El Salvador has considered creating "culture camps," in which youth who left El Salvador at young ages could return to El Salvador and rediscover their culture. These camps would include classes in Spanish, archaeology, geography, history, and so forth, as well as trips to key tourist sites and even visits with political leaders. A purpose of these camps would be to reconnect expatriate Salvadoran youth with El Salvador and thus encourage these young people to bring their intellectual and financial resources and connections to bear on problems in El Salvador.
economies represents a case of the illegitimate becoming legitimate, the hidden becoming the official, for the U.S. dollar has served as a shadow currency in the informal economy for decades.\textsuperscript{21} People have bought the U.S. dollar on the black market, they have set up unofficial exchange rates, and so on. Remittances that migrants send home may travel through official or unofficial channels, like the California-based Wells Fargo Bank’s remittance accounts set up specifically for this purpose or like banks and casas de cambio (places to change money) that send remittances and may evade certain taxes and fees. Extremely wealthy individuals, too, have dollarized their accounts for years and, through private banking facilities, have made use of offshore dollar accounts to evade taxes, nationalizations, and unhappy former spouses (Bicker 1996). Such strategies are threatening to nations that seek legitimacy through sovereignty. Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, is quoted in the Los Angeles Times article on dollarization as stating “We have to be particularly careful to remember that our monetary policy is first and always for the United States” (Peterson 1999, A12). Control over currency is analogous to control over borders—both are supposedly efforts to contain the sovereign state, to hinder movements and restrict choices that might bleed into (or drip out of) it (Gibson-Graham 1996).

The difficulty of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate actions reveals the nonsovereignty of the sovereign. The uneasy coexistence of a rhetoric of true (i.e., liberal, agency-exercising, self-authoring) personhood with a rhetoric portraying the subjects of not-sovereignty as dependent, needy, transient, and incomplete points to the complex cultural, economic, and political fields in which transactions that constitute the fiction of sovereignty take place. The determined parent, the chosen child, and, occasionally, the mature birth mother constitute and are constituted by the “overly needy” adoptive parents who “buy” and birth parents who “sell” babies, as well as the “bought” child. The protagonist in the immigrant success story is at times indistinguishable from the greedy and grasping migrant pursuing self-gain. Both conscientious but unlicensed legal service providers and notaries who defraud immigrants could be charged with violating consumer protection law. Finally, to many, there is no difference between beneficent capitalists, graft-free governments, and trustworthy financial managers, on the one hand, and crafty businessmen, corrupt governments, shifty citizenship-seekers hiding assets offshore, on the other. There is an uncanny slippage between deals and donations, and between private, extra-legal traffic and public, officially approved, transit. Deals are represented as

\textsuperscript{21} This is not happening in Latin America only. At the time of this writing (2001), the newly independent nation of East Timor has dollarized its economy and is on the verge of being caught up in offshore financial transactions of Australian businessmen interested in developing oil resources and pipelines in a dollarized but tax-free jurisdiction arguably created by Australia and its allies for just that purpose.
finding children for parents, while donations are part of a system of giving: as Mercedes Rosario de Martinez, founder of one of Colombia's most prestigious adoption homes suggested, "We don't give a child to a family; we give a family to a child" (as quoted in Serrill 1991, 46). Martinez added, "This is not a business; it's total devotion to the children. And because of that, the world is a better place" (Serrill 1991, 46). Deals are represented as buying papers; while donations demonstrate that one is contributing to the society that provides the material means to fulfill one's dreams. Private, extralegal traffic is represented as hiding the origins of ill-gotten gains, and of purchasing a citizenship to avoid regulatory scrutiny; while public, officially approved transits are part of a system of providing financial services to clients and rewarding large investors with rights to reside in the country toward whose economic benefit they have "donated."

If the sovereign is also not sovereign, then how is the appearance of sovereignty produced? Margaret Jane Radin has suggested that "babygiving is unobjectionable . . . because we do not fear relinquishment of children unless it is accompanied by—understood in terms of, structured by—market rhetoric" (1996, 139). The "we" in this quotation refers not to those who give but rather to those who choose and receive adoptable babies. These adoptive parents' capacity to receive the gift of a child and to view the child as a gift can only exist in a particular global configuration of power in which children move in one direction (euphemized as gifts) and choice moves in the other (euphemized as love) (Yngvesson 1998). These gifts are only imaginable as part of a relationship, one in which the parties to the exchange are "reciprocally dependent upon one another" (Strathern 1988, 145). So-called receiving countries (developed nations) are dependent on sending or giving countries (underdeveloped nations) for adoptable children in a world in which developed Western nations are experiencing a crisis in replacement fertility, while developing nations are desperately trying to reduce their rate of population growth (Specter 1998, Al, A6). This dependence however is rhetorically cut away and in effect forgotten with the entry of adopted gift children into the Kingdom of Sweden and other Western nations that absorb them as citizens. Similarly, mass naturalization ceremonies such as the one described at the beginning of this section, officially cut away the dependence of the U.S. economy on new citizens adopted from Third World nations, and efforts to legally cut off tax havens in Caribbean microstates deny the reciprocal dependence of sovereign, onshore states and the offshores that inevitably haunt them.

As this discussion suggests, the sovereign is dependent on the flows, seepages, movements, and choices it simultaneously restricts, blocks, and denies. Recognizing the dependencies linking sovereignty to not-sovereignty does not simply expose the fallacy of sovereignty as autonomy, of borders as stable, and of control as maintaining the integrity of the national
body. It also exposes the work that goes on to render the not-sovereign illegitimate in order to preserve the fiction of the sovereign. If the politics of citizenship and currency were recognized as being about the same thing, for instance, then neither would make sense anymore. Citizenship is not supposed to be a commodity. Currencies are supposed to be tied to nations. The state and the market are supposed to be separate, objective entities. Immigrants are supposed to come to the United States to fulfill their dreams, realize themselves, develop their full potential and improve the country as they better themselves. Adoptees are supposed to come to Sweden to create kinship, form indivisible bonds of love, and be links in a worldwide family connecting Sweden to the globe. Money is supposed to move in order to enhance business and trade, increase profitability, provide returns for investors, “grow” the economy, and thereby raise the standard of living of the world’s peoples.

What happens if immigrants’ vision of the opportunities held by the United States are only economic, if they come to get hard currency only to send it back home into a black market, and if they achieve naturalization based not on their desire to fulfill the American dream, but on their desire just to earn valuable cash? What happens if adoptees realize that they are never 100%, and if sending countries come to view adoptees as exportable resources in themselves, forging not ties of love or kinship but potential ties of money and symbolic capital? What happens if countries adopt the U.S. dollar as their official currency—as most tax havens, like the British Virgin Islands, have already done—in order to provide a jurisdiction for capital to slosh into, outside the regulatory and revenue apparatuses that people like the chairman of the Federal Reserve see as central to the maintenance of the dollar’s stability? What happens if a jurisdiction, a currency, a citizenship, an identity, becomes a commodity for sale? Black markets and shadowy states constitute themselves in these moments as the mirror of official markets and sovereign states. The interrelationships between the legitimate and illegitimate must be written in terms of interdiction, control, limit, and restriction of the former over the latter, even as such constraints, in the end, themselves define the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate, sovereign and not-sovereign. As a mirror image, the black markets and not-sovereign states reflect the illegitimacy and not-sovereignty of the legitimate sovereign itself.
Imagine the following scenario. A British businessman who is vacationing in the British Virgin Islands (where his house is custodied) catches a glimpse of himself in the mirror. Looking more closely, he sees something that he does not recognize—a privileged middle-aged white male tax evader who has participated in Caribbean microstates' quasi-fraudulent strategies for attracting revenue. He tries to see himself as merely British, but finds he cannot erase the sense that he is illegitimate. Giving in, he tries to acknowledge the exploitativeness that accompanies privilege, but when he does so, his sense of self disappears. Once British is redefined in relationship to the Caribbean, he cannot be both himself and British. He is no longer 100%.

In this paper, we have tried to create mirrors that reflect the legitimation work that accompanies globalization. That legitimation work occurs along three axes, of jurisdiction, transparency, and sovereignty, which in turn structure discourses of mobility, choice, and subjectivity. We have seen that to gloss the present as an era of mobility ignores the barriers that prevent movement, the policies that set persons and objects in motion, and the assumptions that construe nonmovements as movement. We have noted that debating whether globalization bolsters or erodes sovereignty, or increases or decreases choice, presumes an ability to choose—an ability that those located in illegitimate spaces lack. We have discerned the outlines of the not-sovereign, the model of subjectivity, agency, and interdependency that is created through illicit entities' survival strategies. And our mirroring has revealed the not-sovereignty in the sovereign. Dependent sovereignty and reverse colonization produce that which is currently recognized as globalization.

In reaching these conclusions, we do not mean to suggest that we have somehow avoided participating in the systems that produce adoptees, illegal immigrants, laundered money, nonsovereignty, and globalization. On the contrary, by interrogating notions of movement (is there a “back” to which to go?), choice (what form of subjectivity is ascribed to those who cannot choose?), and sovereignty (how does nonsovereignty seep into the sovereign?), this essay has displayed a fascination with illicit beings. Rather than debunking, we have sought to multiply truths. Our analytical strategy has been to take up moments (a Swedish adoptee gazing—at her reflection?—in a mirror; a judge praising new citizens for a “choice” they may not have made) when multiple realities and the incommensurable truth of each be-
come apparent. Such moments are made possible through the *double-edgedness* of transparency and of opaqueness. In order to be transparent, an account (much like a mirror) must be *permeable*; it must hide nothing, becoming an invisible and insubstantial means to a pre-existing truth (of origin, roots, traces, trajectories). Yet, to accomplish this feat, an account must *be there*, it must be complete, with no gaps, holes or silences. The *completeness* of accounts makes them both apparitional and all too real. Thus, when the hypothetical British businessman who is vacationing in the British Virgin Islands catches sight of himself in the mirror, he cannot ascertain whether he is the privileged tax evader who is looking out of the mirror, or the suddenly race- and class-conscious person looking in. In a similar fashion, desire is double-edged. A desire for the illicit reaffirms the legitimacy of the above board and substantiates and reproduces the boundary between them. At the same time, desire permits an identification between the legitimate and the illegitimate, an identification that makes such a boundary itself illicit. As a result, orders shimmer. They are and are not.

We conclude by offering more mirrors. Our first mirror takes the form of papers. Because papers are frivolous and deadly, they simultaneously constitute persons and reveal the façade of personhood. Papers both reveal and mask experiences. One woman discovered that she was adopted when she sought her birth certificate, only to be told that this record was sealed. The sealed record erased her early history while also leading her to reconstruct her own identity. Papers make histories discontinuous and produce belongings that are not part of one genealogical tree. These discontinuities and belongings push against the boundaries and identities imposed by papers. Sedimented histories emerge in dreams (or nightmares) and appear suddenly, triggered by some unexpected event (such as a glance in the mirror). One Salvadoran paralegal who was asked to sort through a community organization's case files found that reading asylum applications and court transcripts revived her own experiences fleeing Salvadoran death squads. Nightmares forced her to abandon this task, though her legal expertise led her to conclude that she would be unable to demonstrate a "well-founded fear of persecution" and that her pending asylum application would be denied. Like mirrors, papers have the uncanny ability to expose the assumptions on which privilege is based.

Our second mirror takes the form of the shadow selves that haunt people's reflections. These "shadow selves" are the alterities of that which is recognizable. Liberal law is uncomfortable with transitional states like that of the PT in which loyalties and one-to-one relationships of proprietor and product are unclear. Green card holders are in a precarious state, and too many entries and exits speak to other loyalties, other pulls, and insufficient grounding in a native soil. Yet it is not clear that those who are defined as being in transition or as not existing see themselves exclusively in this way.
There may be a state of not-belonging (a shadow self) that is not transitional. New citizens speak of complex belongings (see Probyn 1996), adoptees speak of trying to hold two subjectivities in tension at once, and when not related during a court hearing, immigrants' narratives do not seem illegitimate. That which is offshore or outside legally recognizable boundaries of legitimacy is only not there (Coombe 1997) when it is viewed from onshore. Yet, the existence of such shadow selves haunts legitimate subjects by exposing their own dualities.

Our third and final mirror is to note that metaphors have flip sides. The cases that we have analyzed in this paper are often used by judges, officials, attorneys, and experts as metaphors for each other. Judges use images of family and of adoption to talk about immigration, foreign adoptees are officially defined as immigrants by the Swedish government, and images of shopping in illicit markets emerge in discussions of immigration (immigrants both are and are not supposed to shop for citizenships) and of adoption (baby bazaars). The flip sides of these metaphors are exposed when they are used by illegitimate persons. Thus a judge at a naturalization ceremony may speak of immigration as providing new blood for the nation, but immigrants themselves speak of remaining Salvadoran at heart. When a judge characterized new citizens as adoptees during a naturalization ceremony, the judge referred to a choice to belong. In contrast, a Salvadoran immigrant used the same image ("[It's] like I'm an adopted child") to explain that she was in a perpetual state of not-belonging. Their lack of papers makes undocumented immigrants not belong, whereas in the case of Swedish adoptees, the fact that they have papers sets them apart from those who are Swedish by birth rather than by adoption.

The mirror metaphor that we have been using in this conclusion also has a flip side. When the privileged look at their mirror images, they discover their shadow selves, the not-sovereignty that lies within their privilege, the constitutive outside intrinsic to the stability of their being. Because the mirror image is a reflection, seeing the mirror image means becoming those shadow selves. And suddenly, instead of looking into a mirror, one is in the mirror looking out. Like birth mothers, unauthorized immigrants, adoptees, and British Virgin Islanders, one becomes not real. One is located offshore, in the shadows, in a mirror. And from this vantage point, globalization becomes a shadowy process indeed.

REFERENCES


