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More than One Mother: Determining Maternity for the Biological Child of a Female Same-Sex Couple - The Israeli View

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MORE THAN ONE MOTHER: 
DETERMINING MATERNITY FOR THE BIOLOGICAL CHILD OF A FEMALE SAME-SEX COUPLE—THE ISRAELI VIEW

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Introduction

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Introduction

The Israeli media recently reported that the Health Ministry had permitted a woman to be impregnated with an ovum donated by her female partner of ten years’ standing. The ovum was harvested from the partner in the course of fertility treatments and was fertilized in vitro by sperm from an anonymous donor.¹ The couple decided to

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¹ Meital Yasur-Beit Or, Precedent: Lesbian Surrogacy Approved 9.07.2006, at
undergo this procedure not for any medical reason; rather, they wished to share in the process of bringing their child into the world: one would provide the ovum and the other would carry the pregnancy and give birth. They did so with the intention of jointly raising their child as equal parents.

This procedure was made possible as a result of the confluence of two sets of circumstances: the technological developments that, for three or more decades, have made it possible for childbirth to occur without sexual relations;\(^2\) and the growing openness in Israeli society to gay and lesbian family units. This case and its possible future permutations in Israel and elsewhere are the subject of this article\(^3\).

Among the questions raised by childbirth under the foregoing circumstances is the legal determination of parenthood. From a biological point of view three persons participate in the process: the genetic mother, who, through her ovum, contributes one-half of the child’s genetic make-up; the genetic father, who contributes, through his

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\(^2\) Artificial insemination (with or without a sperm donor) is an established technology. The literature shows its first use to have been no later than 1884, and it has been a common practice since the middle of the twentieth century. In vitro fertilization was successfully employed in humans for the first time in 1978, and it, too, has become quite widespread. See infra notes 14, 27.

sperm, the other half of the genetic make-up; and the mother who bears the child, carrying her in her womb for nine months (sometimes referred to in this article as the "gestational mother"). Yet is biology the decisive factor as a legal matter? Is choice? Is dual motherhood a possibility? Could three people be recognized as joint parents? This article is centered on those questions.

There is surprisingly little comparative literature on these questions. While the issues are similar in the United States and elsewhere, American legal scholarship, to the extent that it addresses the determination of parenthood in cases of joint biological motherhood, tends to center on American cases. An important dimension of legal cross-

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4 For reasons of gender neutrality I refer to the child as "she" or "he" alternatively.

5 The more familiar term “birth mother” seems inappropriate here, since it most often is used in contradistinction to “adoptive mother” and connotes the woman who conceived and gave birth to the child in the usual manner and then put it up for adoption. As used here, “gestational mother” connotes the woman who carries the pregnancy and gives birth to the child, but provides none of her genetic material; she is to be distinguished from the “genetic mother” who provides the ovum but does not carry the pregnancy.

6 This article, it should be clear, does not deal with the fundamental questions of whether the Health Ministry’s decision was lawful under current Israeli law or whether it represents sound social policy. My starting point is that the procedure has become possible and that similar cases may be expected in the future, either in the context of existing law or of future modifications. On the underlying issue of whether the process should be permitted, see Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147 (2000); John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. 323 (2004); Wald Michael S., Adults' Sexual Orientation and State Determinations Regarding Placement of Children, (July 2006). Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 920670 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=920670.

7 See supra note 3.
pollination and critique is thus not realized.\(^8\) This article will provide an opportunity to transcend jurisdictional boundaries by detailing the legal state of affairs in Israel. Normatively, I here propose a conceptual mode of analysis that may be brought to bear on the determination of parenthood. This approach, while developed in the Israeli context and with Israeli legal norms and procedures in mind, invites non-jurisdiction-specific discussion and analysis. Put more ambitiously, the proposed solution to the challenges faced by the Israeli legal system could be applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to other common law jurisdictions facing similar challenges.

In considering how parenthood should be determined in the case described above—currently unusual but capable of becoming commonplace among lesbian couples—the article describes, in Part I, the existing Israeli legal arrangements regarding the formation of parental relations that are likely to be relevant in these circumstances and clarifies which of them—if any—can be reasonably applied to this case. In this context the article examines the regulation of various assisted reproductive technologies—artificial insemination with donated sperm, in vitro fertilization with a donated egg, and surrogacy—all of which have a bearing on our situation. It also considers adoption as alternative means for establishing a parental relationship. As will become clear in the course of the analysis, existing law in Israel—as in many other jurisdictions—cannot provide an adequate response to the question of how parenthood should be determined in a case of birth participated in by two women.

Part II of the article turns to the proposed solution. After developing the normative approach to the case at hand and the criteria that should guide the determination of parenthood in similar cases, the article returns to the existing law and seeks support for the conclusion in constitutional provisions, particularly in the rights that protect family life (as part of the right to human dignity). Mindful of the aforementioned advantages of comparative law, support will also be gleaned from the law in California, where a series of court decisions handed down in 2005 dealt with similar questions of determining legal motherhood of same-sex couples.

Having formulated the desired resolution of the problem – the recognition of both women as legal mothers – and having considered its grounding in Israeli and comparative law, the article turns, in Part III, to an analysis of the legal procedures for recognizing joint motherhood. It examines the tools available to the administrative agency authorized to register parenthood and suggests some necessary amendments to the enabling legislation. The article also considers the various judicial venues for establishing parenthood—a court decree pursuant to the Adoption Law; a parenthood order pursuant to the Surrogacy Law; and a maternity declaration pursuant to a suit filed under the Family Court Act. Recognizing the need to amend the law but realizing it might take some time, this final part considers which of the possible judicial measures constitutes a suitable mid-range solution pending legislative resolution. Although referring specifically to Israeli law, the analysis, as mentioned, will be relevant as well to other legal systems confronted with the need to establish legal mechanisms and procedures for dealing with the question at hand.
I. Determining Legal Parenthood in the Israeli System

In the case at issue, the birth was accomplished through in vitro fertilization and with the participation of three parties: the provider of the sperm, the provider of the egg, and the carrier of the pregnancy. To clarify the legal status of the resulting child and his connection to each of the three aforementioned parties, we will examine four arenas within which a parental relationship may be established and assess which of them is the most pertinent to our case. Three of them—sperm donation, egg donation, and surrogacy—are within the overall rubric of artificially assisted birth; the fourth is the traditional one of adoption. It is evident that, notwithstanding the routine use here of sperm donation, the in vitro fertilization in this case was not of a sort typically in use. On the one hand, the egg that was fertilized was provided not by the woman wanting to bear the child but by another. On the other hand, that other woman was not some anonymous, disinterested egg donor; on the contrary, she wanted to serve as mother to the child. Nor are we dealing here with straightforward surrogacy, for the woman carrying the pregnancy has no intention of giving up her connection to the child once he is born; rather, she, too, wants to have life-long involvement with him. Because of these differences between our case and the more typical sorts of artificially assisted pregnancies, and given the desire of the two women to be recognized as joint mothers, we will consider as well the use of adoption to establish a parental relationship. We will consider whether the Adoption Law, particularly given recent decisions allowing adoptions that result in two women sharing parenthood, provides a suitable response to the situation at hand.
Before examining the four categories noted above, we should first mention the basic rule for establishing parenthood under Israeli law. The law’s point of departure, though nowhere codified, is that legal parenthood is based on “natural” parenthood. When the birth results from sexual union between a man and a woman known to each other, the man, who provides the sperm, is by definition the father and the woman, who bears the child, is by definition the mother.  

This fundamental rule, which establishes a “natural” test for defining parenthood and provides the background for various statutes and judicial determinations over the years, draws on concepts of Jewish law (halakhah).  

As explained more fully below, halakhah does not directly govern the determination of parenthood under Israeli law but courts have often relied on it when confronted with these questions.  

Without going into great detail, it may be noted that Israeli law—in contrast to other legal systems—never drew a necessary connection between parenthood

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10 Aspects of Israeli family law, particularly those related to marriage and divorce, remain subject to the personal status (religious) law of the parties. In other words, Jewish couples are subject, with respect to marriage and divorce, to Jewish personal status law, part of the halakhah; Muslim couples are subject to shari`a law. The Israeli legislator defers to these legal systems and adopts their pertinent provisions as binding Israeli law. The determination of parenthood is not subject directly to regulation by personal status (religious) law; it is, rather, a civil matter. Nevertheless, it has not been the subject of comprehensive civil legislation; accordingly, the courts have tended to find guidance in religious law analogies and interpretations. As a practical matter, the determination of parenthood is conceptually related to questions of marriage; the nexus involves the need to determine descent in order to know which marriages are forbidden by reason of consanguinity.

and marital status. Even a child born to an unmarried mother and a father with whom she had had a casual sexual liaison is considered the joint (legitimate) child of both parents.\(^\text{12}\)

The foregoing rules, tied in principle to the biological link between parent and child, apply in circumstances of coital reproduction. Where new technologies that allow for other sorts of birth are used, the legal results may differ. Here, too, we shall see that Israeli law is for the most part silent, and, with the exception of surrogacy, the applicable rules have not been codified by the Knesset (the Israeli parliament). In the absence of any such legal underpinning, courts have tended to look to religious law with regard to these issues as well; they have also taken account of comparative law. We turn now to the particulars.

\(^{12}\) An exception to the exclusively biological definition of parenthood may arise when the mother is married to another man. In such a case, the presumption that her husband is the father comes into play, and efforts are made to avoid identifying another man as the father, lest the child be deemed a *mamzer* under the *halakhah*. (A *mamzer* is the offspring of a union that is forbidden as adulterous or incestuous; *halakhah* forbids the *mamzer* to marry any Jew other than another *mamzer*. The category differs from the “illegitimate” child or “bastard” of Anglo-American law in that it does not include the offspring of a non-marital union that is neither adulterous nor incestuous.) Only when it is absolutely clear that the husband is not and cannot be the father (where, for example, he was away from his wife for an extended period or there are conclusive medical findings that he is incapable of fathering children), or when he denies his fatherhood at the time of the child’s birth, will there be a finding that he is not the father. It is important to note that declaring the child to be a *mamzer* does not diminish his legal status as the child of his biological parents or detract from his rights as that child. For further elaboration, see Pinhas Shifman, *The Status of Unmarried Parent in Israel Law*, 12 ISR. L. REV. 194-195 (1977); Pinhas Shifman, *First Encounter of Israel Law with Artificial Insemination*, 16 ISR. L. REV. 250, 252 (1981); Halperin-Kaddari, *supra* note 11, at 316-317.
1. Birth Facilitated By Sperm Donation

a) Sperm Donation—Background and Legal Foundation

In the past, sperm donation was used as a means for enabling certain heterosexual couples to bear children. Now, in Israel and throughout the world, it has become a procedure often used by women who want to establish single-parent or same-sex families, without the presence and future involvement of a father. Most often, the donated sperm is employed through artificial insemination—a long-established, widely used, and simple technique. In the instant case, the egg of one member of the couple was to be fertilized by donated sperm in vitro—a separate matter to be considered later.

As yet, no act of the Knesset governs the use of artificial insemination and sperm donation. They are regulated by Rules on Sperm Bank Administration And Guidelines for Artificial Insemination (henceforth: “the Rules”) issued by the Director-General of the Health Ministry. The Rules are periodically updated by the Health Ministry and distributed to the relevant clinics and medical centers. Despite the relatively low status of the Rules in the hierarchy of legal norms – technically speaking, they rank below secondary (subordinate) legislation – they nonetheless form the applicable body of law in this area. Through the Rules, the Health Ministry dictates all aspects of how a sperm

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13 They might use it in cases where the father was infertile or where he had genetic defects that the couple wished to avoid transmitting to their children.
15 See infra Part I.2.
16 Rules as to the Administration of a Sperm Bank and Guidelines for Performing Artificial Insemination (1979). First issued in 1979, these rules have been updated several times since then. They may be viewed at the Health Ministry’s website, www.health.gov.il.
bank is to be operated and how artificial insemination is to be carried out. Among other things, the Rules specify how sperm donations are to be collected, how the sperm are to be preserved and their quality ensured, and how donors and donees are to be registered and their identities protected. The Rules were issued in 1979, shortly after the Health Minister declared sperm banks and artificial insemination subject to governmental oversight.\(^\text{17}\) The Rules’ force was called into question (with respect both to their content and the way in which they had been issued) and one of them was overturned by the Israeli Supreme Court.\(^\text{18}\) Nevertheless, most of the rules remained in place and they govern this field to this day.

According to media reports, the instant case involved an anonymous sperm donor. It may be assumed, consistent with the Rules, that the donor transfers his sperm (in exchange for a fixed, modest sum of money), to the sperm bank, which serves as a center for collecting, examining, preserving, and distributing sperm donations. The anonymity implies that the donor transfers his sperm to the bank without knowing who, if anyone, will receive it or when. The recipient, for her part, receives some general information regarding the donor (such as data regarding his age, education, and appearance—factors

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\(^\text{17}\) Declaration of Oversight with respect to Goods and Services (Sperm Banks and Artificial Insemination), 5759-1979, K.T. 3996, 5739, 1448-1449; Public Health (Sperm Bank) Regulations, 1979, K.T. 3996, 1448.

\(^\text{18}\) Directive 19(b) of the Rules was invalidated on the grounds that it denied equality before the law. It required unmarried women wishing to receive sperm donation to first undergo psycho-social testing that was not required of married women. See H.C. 2078/96, Weitz et al. v. The Minister of Health (not published) (Feb. 11, 1997).
that she may consider in choosing among a range of donors), but she is not told his identity. As we shall see, the anonymity affects the matter of paternity.

b) Establishing Paternity in Cases of Sperm Donation—The Existing Law

As noted, Israeli law assigns legal paternity to the biological father. Application of that rule in cases of artificial insemination would imply that the sperm donor is the father. The question, then, is how that result is changed (if at all) by the absence of sexual relations and the use of assisted reproductive technologies.

When artificial insemination is performed with sperm from the male partner in a couple, with the expectation that he and the mother will serve together as parents to the resulting child, the use of artificial insemination in no way changes his status as parent. The “begetting” test—or, in modern terms, the genetic link—indicates here, no less than in the case of unassisted pregnancy, that he is the father. The circumstances under which the child is conceived do not alter the fact of the child’s paternity. As both the biological father and the father who intends to raise the child, he embodies all paternal functions, and he can be expected to be considered the legal father. The same rule applies when the sperm is received from an acquaintance of the woman. When the inseminated sperm comes from a man whose identity is known, (which is possible in Israel only on the basis

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19 See Rules 13, 14, 15(c), 21, and 25 of the Rules with respect to sperm bank operation, as amended in 1989; Section 1 and 15(a) of the Public Health (In Vitro Fertilization) Regulation 1987, K.T. 5035, 978. It should be noted that sperm donation often involves identified sperm transferred among people who know each other, and in those cases, the “donor” is considered to be the child’s legal father. In Israel today there is no mechanism through which the offspring may be provided identified information about the donor in cases of impersonal donation.
of “personal recruitment”), the provider of the sperm will be considered the father in all respects, even in the absence of any marital bond between him and the mother.

Where the sperm donor is anonymous, however, establishing paternity requires taking account of two players: on the one hand, the sperm donor; on the other hand, the mother’s partner, if any, who wants to serve as the child’s father. Note that what gives rise to the uncertainty is not the technique used for fertilization but the origin of the sperm in a donor who is not going to serve as the child’s father.

In considering the status of the anonymous sperm donor, we must distinguish between the legal situation and the practical one. From the legal perspective, the donor’s status under Israeli law remains indeterminate to this day. The statutes do not treat the full range of situations in which parenthood may need to be established, nor has the question been exhaustively treated in the case law. Invocation of general legal principles, which draw inspiration from Jewish law—halakhah, would suggest that the sperm donor be regarded as the legal father, for Jewish law links the father to his genetic offspring even where he and the mother are not a couple. Therefore, if it became clear that a particular man was a child’s genetic father, he would be declared the legal father as well. But this somewhat simplistic application of halakhah does not exhaust all possible solutions under it. The fact that the donor “renounced ownership” of his sperm by selling it to a third party, and the absence of any tie between him and the mother, might be taken

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into consideration according to Jewish law and might lead to the conclusion that the donor should not be deemed the legal father.  

Israeli courts to date have been asked to consider only a small number of cases regarding the offspring resulting from artificial insemination. In each of them, the court chose to focus on narrow issues and declined to examine the question of paternity in depth. If one reads between the lines, however, one can discern hints that the courts’ inclination, in principle, is to regard the sperm donor as the father and to deny full paternal status to the mother’s husband or partner who had agreed to the procedure. Nevertheless, the latter could perform the role of father and assume specific parental obligations (such as child support) by reason of having agreed to the insemination. It should be noted that according to the rules in effect since 1989, the mother’s husband must agree to the procedure and declare that he is assuming paternal status. One might say, paradoxically enough, that the signing of that document makes it harder to regard the

23 The decision that dealt with the proposed adoption of a woman’s children, born to her through anonymous sperm donation, by her female partner (see infra Part I.4.b)), proceeded on the premise that the donor should be regarded as an unknown father. In this connection see Fam. A. 10/99 (T.A.), Anon. v. Atty. Gen’l, P.M. [District Court Decisions] 2000 (1) 835, 855, 879; C.A. 10280/01, Yaros-Hakak v. Atty. Gen., P.D. 59(5) 64, Opinion of Judge Mazza, sec. 12; Opinion of Chief Justice Barak, sec. 1.
25 The physician is required to have the man and the woman sign a statement of agreement “that the child born as a result of the insemination will bear my/our name(s) and be considered my/our child in all respects, including support and inheritance.” For this declaration see, e.g., http://www.clalit.org.il/meir/Media/Images/SCM/Category/135_2_17.pdf.
husband as the legal father of the child, for under Jewish law, the absence of conclusive proof that artificial insemination had been used would have allowed for his paternity to be established on the basis of the marital paternity presumption. Against that legal background, the absence of a man carrying out the role of father (as in the case of a single woman or a lesbian couple) makes it even harder for the donor to avoid the status of legal father.

As a practical matter, the difficulties caused by the donor’s ambiguous legal status are tempered by the mechanism for ensuring his anonymity. In Israel, as noted, donations through a sperm bank must be anonymous; sperm acquired by the bank from a donor is provided to the woman without divulging either party’s identity to the other. It follows that even if Israeli law as presently structured implies the possibility of regarding the donor as the legal father, the anonymity mechanism ensures his de facto absence from the picture and negates any realistic chance that he will be declared a parent. Sperm donation as practiced in Israel thus embodies the intention of all involved that the link between donor and resulting child be severed and denies them the ability to change their minds in that regard.

It follows that the existing law regarding parenthood in the context of sperm donation has no bearing on the situation we are considering. At best, this law highlights the difficulty in establishing that the child has a known father; at worst, it indicates that the sperm donor is the legal father. Either way, it says nothing about the status of the second mother.

2. Birth Facilitated By Egg Donation

a) In Vitro Fertilization—Background and Legal Regulation
In vitro fertilization, which came into use toward the end of the 1970s with the birth of the first test-tube baby in England,\textsuperscript{26} led to a range of reproductive technologies that have developed over the past two decades.\textsuperscript{27} Use of these technologies has made it possible for a pregnancy to result from the donation of an ovum by one woman to another. Egg donation was a natural next step to in vitro fertilization; the first instance of a pregnancy resulting from it was reported in 1984.\textsuperscript{28} Egg donation involves the same procedure as in vitro fertilization; it differs only in that the implanted fertilized egg comes from a woman other than the one in whom it is implanted.

As yet, the Knesset has not enacted legislation governing in vitro fertilization, with or without ovum donation. The medical procedures are conducted in accord with Public Health (In Vitro Fertilization) Regulation 1987\textsuperscript{29} (hereafter: IVF Regulations) and

\textsuperscript{26} Lawrence J. Kaplan & Rosemarie Tong, \textit{Controlling Our Reproductive Destiny: A Technological and Philosophical Perspective} 255 (1994).

\textsuperscript{27} In simple terms, in vitro fertilization refers to a process for bringing egg and sperm together outside the mother’s body, following which the fertilized egg is retuned to the mother’s body for implantation in the uterus and gestation. See \textit{id}. at 256-266; Inmaculada de Melo-Martín, \textit{Making Babies: Biomedical Technologies, Reproductive Ethics, and Public Policy} (1998); Francois Baylis, \textit{Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Informed Choice}, in \textit{New Reproductive Technologies: Ethical Aspects – Research Studies of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies} 47, 66, 100 (1993); Marvin F. Milich, \textit{In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Medical Technology + Social Values = Legislative Solutions}, 30 J. Fam. L. 875, 877-880 (1991).


\textsuperscript{29} The Public Health (In Vitro Fertilization) Regulation 1987, K.T. 5035, 978.
guidelines promulgated from time to time by the Health Ministry. Scholars have questioned the legal force of the IVF Regulations, and a small number of these regulations have been invalidated through the years by decisions of the Supreme Court. But in the absence of any other legal framework, practitioners have regarded these regulations as governing their activity.

The IVF Regulations sought to deal with two modes of assisted conception: (1) in vitro fertilization that makes use of the mother’s ovum, and (2) in vitro fertilization combined with egg donation. In the latter case, an egg harvested from one woman is placed into the body of another, who carries the pregnancy and plans to raise the resulting child as her own in all respects. Surrogacy—in which the woman who carries the pregnancy does not intend to keep the child—is subject to legislation that will be considered separately.

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30 The IVF Regulations state that they were adopted under the authority of §§ 33 and 65(c) of the Public Health decree of 1940, together with § 32 of the Basic Law: The Government, 2001, S.H. 158, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic14_eng.htm
32 In one case, the Court invalidated, with the State’s assent, the regulations that prevented the use of a surrogate mother’s services; it reasoned that the regulations should be grounded in statute (H.C. 5087/94, Zabro v. Minister of Health (not published)). In another case, the court invalidated, again with the State’s assent, the regulations that limited the right of unmarried women to use in vitro fertilization measures; it found them contrary to the principle of equality. In that connection, see H.C. 2078/96, Weitz et al. v. The Minister of Health (not published).
33 See infra Part I.3.
The case before us raises several questions with respect to the identity of the egg donor. The IVF regulations provide that only a woman who is herself undergoing in vitro fertilization treatment may be a donor.\textsuperscript{34} Under those arrangements, the donor is a woman who has agreed to transfer, for another woman’s use, some of the ova harvested from her ovaries in the course of her own efforts to become pregnant. That condition substantially limits the ability of members of a same-sex couple to pursue a birth in the manner described. In the case under consideration, it was reported that the woman from whom the eggs were drawn wanted to become pregnant through fertility treatments. She thereby satisfied the condition that the “donor” be a woman herself undergoing fertility treatment. Another issue relates to knowing the identity of the egg donor. Under customary Israeli practice, egg donation is anonymous.\textsuperscript{35} The case before us departed from that accepted practice by allowing for the transfer of genetic material between intimate partners.\textsuperscript{36} The provision of genetic material on a personal basis, between two women who know each other and who intend to form a parental relationship with the

\textsuperscript{34} IVF Regulations, §4.


\textsuperscript{36} In principle, egg donation need not be anonymous. Under some legal systems, it takes place between relatives or friends. Under other systems, as in the United States, the couple or the woman acquires the ovum through direct negotiation with the donor or through the intervention of a third party in a manner that discloses the donor’s identity to them. Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REV. 265, 270 (1995); Mark V. Sauer & Richard J. Paulson, Oocyte Donors: A Demographic Analysis of Women at the University of Southern California, 7 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 726 (1992).
resulting offspring, raises serious questions about the lawfulness of the authorization issued by the Ministry of Health. Without resolving the matter, it should be noted that the law may be interpreted so as not to forbid an identified egg transfer. Israeli law in principle protects the identity of the egg donor, stating that “a clinic conducting in vitro fertilization activities shall not provide information related to the identity of a sperm donor or an egg donor” (IVF Regulations, §15(a)). Moreover, the law does not outline a process for obtaining a donation from an acquaintance—or any sort of identified donation—and, as noted, that sort of donation is not characteristic of Israeli practice. Nevertheless, the IVF Regulations do not explicitly rule out the possibility of a personal donation by an identified donor. In that sense, the current regime, as set by the Regulations, may be interpreted as one that allows for a parallel track of identified donation by a “personal” donor.

Two other aspects of the case at issue ought to be noted, one pertaining to the underlying reasons for the donation and the other to the fact that we are dealing with the donation of two gametes (i.e., sperm and egg). Regarding the first, we do not know whether, in the case at hand, the recipient suffered any medical condition warranting the donation or whether the sole reason for the donation was the desire to bear a biologically shared offspring. In that connection, we should note that the IVF Regulations do not specify that the use of egg donation is limited to cases of medical need. It is fair to

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37 It should be recalled that the starting point for this analysis is that the birth was, in fact, lawfully permitted. See supra note 6.

38 Physicians who administer fertility clinics in Israel have told me that confidentiality is routinely maintained. If any information is provided to the recipient, it is general information about the donor’s age, origin, and appearance.
assume, of course, that a heterosexual couple would turn to egg or sperm donation only where there was a medical justification;\textsuperscript{39} but donation for other reasons is not forbidden.

The second issue, as noted, pertains to the donation of dual gametes. In vitro fertilization of one woman’s egg by donated sperm and implantation of the resulting embryo in the uterus of the woman’s partner means that we are dealing here, in effect with “double donation”—donation of both sperm and egg. In the past, Israeli regulations precluded double donation, meaning that a single woman in need of a donated egg could not make use of that technology.\textsuperscript{40} The IVF Regulations provided that “A donated egg shall not be implanted in a woman unless it was fertilized by sperm of the woman’s husband.”\textsuperscript{41} The requirement was intended not only to make it more difficult for unmarried women to bear children but also, it seems, to ensure that the offspring would be born into a family in which at least one parent was the child’s biological parent. That requirement was struck down by the Supreme Court, however, with the government’s assent.\textsuperscript{42} In the case before us, the concern about an offspring lacking genetic connection

\textsuperscript{39} Conventional practice uses egg donation in either of two circumstances: where there is concern about transmitting a genetic defect through one’s own gamete or where other defects in the recipient’s own ova—whether related to her age or to other fertility-impairing conditions—preclude her becoming pregnant without egg donation. John A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood: Legal and Ethical Issues in Human Egg Donation, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1989).

\textsuperscript{40} Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 11, at 332-333.

\textsuperscript{41} IVF Regulations §13.

\textsuperscript{42} H.C. 5087/94, Zabro v. Minister of Health (not published); H.C. 2078/96, Weitz et al. v. The Minister of Health (not published).
to her parents is obviated by the fact that the gamete is taken from a woman planning to
act as the offspring’s mother, even if she chooses not to carry her in her womb.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{b) Establishing Motherhood in Cases of Egg Donation—The Existing Law}

Like artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization per se does not affect the
determination of parenthood. When the fertilized egg is that of the woman who intends
to carry the pregnancy and care for the resulting child, the applicable law is the usual one,
which sees the biological mother as the legal mother as well.\textsuperscript{44} The “unnaturalness” of
the fertilization—its taking place outside the body and with the intervention of a medical
staff—has no bearing on who is regarded as the parent. The three maternal functions—
genetics, pregnancy, and care for the child—continue to be embodied in one woman who
sees herself as the mother and is entitled to be recognized as such.

In vitro fertilization with a donated egg is a different matter. Here, medical
intervention fragments the maternal functions such that two women take part,
biologically, in the offspring’s birth. One donates the egg, thereby providing half of the
future child’s genetic make-up. The other bears the pregnancy, thereby serving as the
gestational mother who carries the fetus in her womb and brings him or her to birth.
Each woman contributes substantively to the birth of the child; in the absence of either,
the child would not be born.

\textsuperscript{43} An offspring lacking genetic connection to his or her parents will likely experience
“genealogical bewilderment.” On that concept in the context of adoption, see Arthur D. Sorosky,
\textsuperscript{44} See supra text accompanying note 9.
Although the IVF Regulations say nothing about parenthood in a case of an egg donation, their underlying premise is that the woman who gives birth is the mother. That premise also underlies accepted practice: following the birth, the gestational mother is registered as a matter of course as the child’s mother. The Population Registry official relies on the report generated by the delivery room, and has no practical way of inquiring into the use of gamete donation in a given case. Even though in vitro fertilization can only take place in a regulated clinic,\footnote{IVF Regulations, §§ 1, 2(a).} no central registry of egg donation exists. Fertility clinic data are separate from delivery room data, and mothers are registered at the time of birth on the basis of the birth having taken place.\footnote{That situation is not free of problems. Not only does the lack of a registry impair the ability of the offspring to seek out her genetic mother, the egg donor; it may sometimes even keep the offspring in the dark about being the result of an artificially assisted conception. It also makes it harder to obtain statistical information and to conduct long-run medical studies. Some of these problems have been alleviated in part by the independent registration mechanism instituted no later than 2005 with implementation of the Health Ministry’s Executive Director Circular 56/2004, which establishes guidelines for in vitro fertilization laboratories and requires documentation of each fertilization. The registration, it should be clear, takes place on the individual laboratory level, not the national level. The Circular is available at \url{http://www.health.gov.il/download/forms/a2636_mr56_04.pdf}}

As a matter of law, while the gestational mother’s status as legal mother has not been conclusively determined by statute, the premise underlying the various legislative instruments\footnote{Population Registry Law, 1965, S.H. 270 § 6; The IVF Regulations; Surrogacy Law.} regards her as the “natural mother” and therefore accords her the status of legal mother as well.\footnote{\textit{See supra} text accompanying note 9.} This result reflects the special significance of the fetus-mother
relation⁴⁹ and is also consistent with the general assumption (albeit inapposite in this case) that the gestational mother is likewise the genetic mother. As in the case of sperm donation, anonymity helps, both conceptually and practically, to undo the linkage between donor and offspring. It allows the gestational mother to appear as the child’s “natural” mother and limits the possibility that her status as legal mother will be challenged. The position that regards the gestational woman as mother appears to correspond with the view of Jewish law-halakhah,⁵⁰ and it is reflected in the provisions of other legal systems.⁵¹

One might ask whether the gestational woman’s status as mother is in any way changed by the use of an egg from an identified source or by the fact that she carried the fetus on behalf of another woman (as well as on her own behalf). In our case, the gestational woman intended to be the mother, albeit not the exclusive mother. The egg


⁵¹ The legal systems that have regulated the matter have sustained the gestational mother’s status as legal mother. On the law in the United States and in Europe, see, e.g., Robertson, supra note 39; Reichman Schiff, supra note 36; A. Goodwin, Determination of Legal Parentage in Egg Donation, Embryo Transplantation, and Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 26 FAM. L. Q. 275, 277 (1992); D. Evans ed., CREATING THE CHILD – THE ETHICS, LAW AND PRACTICE OF ASSISTED PROCREATION 312-313, 260, 281-282, 289, 330, 333, 349 (1996); S. M. Cretney, FAMILY LAW 197 (4th ed, 2000).
donor, meanwhile, did not intend to sever her connection to the offspring; her identity was known; and she wanted to play a mutual role in caring for the child. Existing law offers no answer to the question of who should be regarded as the mother in such circumstances. It cannot determine whether the identification of the egg donor and her intention to serve as mother change the expected standing of gestational mother, and it certainly provides no formulated basis for recognizing both women as mothers. It could be argued that the gestational mother carries the fetus on behalf of her partner, in which case the circumstances would approach those of surrogacy. In the next section, I consider these circumstances and how they bear on the question of motherhood.

3. Birth Facilitated by Surrogacy

a) Surrogacy Agreement—Background and Legal Regulation

A surrogacy agreement is designed in principle to enable a couple or a single woman unable to carry a pregnancy to employ the services of another woman and bear their child through her. In its modern version, the surrogacy arrangement often uses the intended parents’ egg and sperm. Where the intended mother’s ovum is unusable, a third-party donation is often used. In these cases, the resulting child bears no genetic relation to the gestational woman. In other cases, typically referred to as “traditional surrogacy,” the surrogate carries a child who bears her genes along with those of the intended father.

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In Israel, surrogacy agreements are regulated by the Surrogate Motherhood Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of Newborn) Law (1996)\(^{53}\) (hereafter: Surrogacy Law). While authorizing surrogacy agreements in principle, the statute also subjects them to the oversight of a professional committee that must approve surrogate agreements before they can be carried out. The Committee is appointed by the Minister of Health and comprises professionals from the fields of medicine, welfare, law, and religion.\(^{54}\) In reviewing an agreement, the committee must verify that the agreement meets the statutory requirements. Among other things, it must confirm that the surrogacy arrangement is needed for medical reasons; that the surrogate satisfies the conditions set by the law, including those related to her family status;\(^{55}\) that all parties have undergone psychological evaluation or counseling; that the agreement was entered into on the basis of informed consent; and that the payment made to the surrogate, consistent with the statutory standard, does not amount to salary or the purchase of services but represents only reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses and compensation for lost income, for time, and for pain and suffering.\(^{56}\)

The limitations imposed by the statute mean that surrogacy arrangements in Israel can take only two forms: either use is made of sperm and eggs from the intended parents,

\(^{53}\) Surrogate Motherhood Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of Newborn) Law, 1996, S.H. 176. For discussion about the Surrogacy Law, see Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 11, at 318-321, 329; Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 9, at 95-98, 112.

\(^{54}\) Surrogacy Law § 3.

\(^{55}\) The intended parents should make an effort to find a surrogate mother who is unmarried. The surrogate mother must not be a family member of the intended parents. Surrogacy Law § 2(3).

\(^{56}\) Surrogacy Law § 6.
or use is made of an egg donated by a third party.\textsuperscript{57} In all cases, the statute requires use of the intended father’s sperm.\textsuperscript{58} The arrangement is available only to heterosexual couples; it may not be used by people wanting to establish a single-parent or same-sex family unit.\textsuperscript{59} In addition to obtaining the Committee’s approval in advance of the medical procedure, the parties, following the child’s birth, must also petition the court to establish their status.\textsuperscript{60}

Israeli surrogacy law is unique in that it authorizes surrogacy arrangements in principle, yet places a complex system of before-the-fact professional oversight and after-the-fact judicial ratification. Other legal systems, if they have considered the matter at all\textsuperscript{61}, have forbidden agreements to carry fetuses;\textsuperscript{62} some have done so by criminalizing the practice\textsuperscript{63} and others by imposing civil sanctions such as invalidation of the

\textsuperscript{57} Surrogacy Law § 2(4).
\textsuperscript{58} Surrogacy Law § 2(4).
\textsuperscript{59} Surrogacy Law §1, which defines intended parents as “a man and woman who are a couple, who contract with a gestational mother in order to bear a child.”
\textsuperscript{60} Some of the statutory limitations grew out of a desire to avoid direct conflict with halakhic principles, while others were included to promote the welfare of the parties, the best interests of the resulting child, or sound public policy. See Carmel Shalev, \textit{Halakha and Patriarchal Motherhood - An Anatomy of the New Israeli Surrogacy Law}, 32 ISR. L. REV. 51, 61, 64-69 (1998); Halperin-Kaddari, \textit{supra} note 11, at 320-319; Laufer-Ukeles, \textit{supra} note 9, at 112-113.
\textsuperscript{63} Sirola, \textit{supra} note 61, at 138.
agreement or refusal to ratify the parenthood of the intended parents in the event the surrogate has a change of heart. Still other legal systems have permitted the practice subject to specific conditions specified in the law.

**b) Establishing Parenthood in Cases of Surrogacy**

Once a surrogacy agreement has been carried out, the court must determine who are to be considered the parents of the resulting child. At least three and sometimes four parties were involved in the birth: the surrogate mother who carried the child; the intended mother, who initiated (along with her husband) the surrogacy arrangement and who, in most circumstances, is also the genetic mother; the intended father, who is necessarily the genetic father; and the egg donor, in those cases where the intended mother’s ova could not be used. Very soon after the birth, the court is called upon to determine the child’s legal parents. The statutory mechanism ensures a high degree of certainty with regard to parenthood, though it leaves the court the discretion to consider changes in circumstance.

In cases involving an egg donation, the statute does not consider the donor to be a potential legal mother. She is not a party to the agreement, and the implied premise is that she will take no part in the contest for the status of parent. As for the other three players, the statute distinguishes between two basic situations: on-going agreement

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64 Sirola, *supra* note 61, at 138; Richey, *supra* note 61 at 184-185.
among the parties on the one hand, and the onset of misgivings on the other. Right after
the birth, the intended parents must petition the court for a “parenthood order.” In the
absence of objection by the surrogate mother or other special circumstances, the intended
parents will be recognized, via the order, as the child’s parents “in all respects,” and the
surrogate’s connection to the child will be severed. If, however, the surrogate has
misgivings about giving up the child and wants to back out of the agreement and assert
her maternity, she can do so if she can demonstrate that circumstances have changed and
that the change justifies her backing out—as long as the child’s welfare is not thereby
impaired. On its face, the law appears to favor a judicial decree recognizing the
intended parents as the sole parents; implicit within it, however, is the possibility of
recognizing all three participants as having parental status. In that context, the statute
specifies that if the surrogate’s withdrawal from the agreement is ratified, the court
should declare her the mother, but “it may include in the order directives regarding the
child’s status and relations with the intended parents or with one of them.” One
interpretation of the statute (though not the only one possible) would suggest that its
underlying premise is that the parenthood of all three agents is recognized and that the
court’s intervention is needed, in contexts of continued agreement just as in contexts of

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66 Surrogacy Law § 11.
67 Surrogacy Law § 12.
68 Surrogacy Law § 13(a).
69 Surrogacy Law § 13(c).
misgivings, to declare which of the three is to be formally recognized in each situation that may arise.\textsuperscript{70}

The foregoing regulatory scheme is of little relevance to the case of a birth to two women. The case may be seen as a sort of agreement for joint birth: one woman carries the genetic child of the other, with the understanding that the other will ultimately be recognized as the mother as well. Yet in contrast to the situation in an agreement under the Surrogacy Law, these women do not intend that the gestational mother's connection to the child be terminated with the child’s birth. Moreover, the terms of the arrangement in our case preclude the Surrogacy Law’s applicability. As noted, the Law does not permit a single mother or a non-heterosexual couple to contract with a surrogate and requires that fertilization be with the sperm of the intended mother’s male partner, the intended father. Still, this statute, in the mechanism it creates for establishing parental status by court order and in the potential it embodies for recognizing the motherhood of two women, provides an important point of reference for the test case at hand. We will return to this mechanism in Part III of the article, which deals with the way in which parenthood should be established.

4. Adoption

a) Adoption—Background and Legal Regulation

The Adoption of Children Law, 1981\textsuperscript{71} (hereafter: the Adoption Law) lays the basis for the establishment of a legal parenthood relationship by means of a court’s adoption order. The 1981 Adoption Law replaced a 1960 statute\textsuperscript{72} which had introduced, for the first time in Israel, civil regulation of the institution of adoption.\textsuperscript{73} The statute was intended, essentially, to create a mechanism for the placement of children whose birth parents could not care for them and for recognizing the “substitute” parents as parents for all intents and purposes. This arrangement covers children put up for adoption by their parents and children removed from the custody of parents unqualified to provide proper care. The Adoption Law defines the conditions for terminating a child’s ties to its birth parents and determines when and how legal, adoptive parenthood may be established.

Here, too—as in the case of the legal structures previously discussed—the model contemplated by the legislator was that of the heterosexual family. The purpose of adoption was to find a home and family for a child bereft of parents; the family sought was one headed by a man and a woman whose relationship was grounded in marriage. Such a family was considered the ideal one to take in an adopted child and ensure its

\begin{flushleft}\textsuperscript{71} Adoption of Children Law, 1981, S.H 293.\textsuperscript{72} Adoption of Children Law, 1960, S.H. 317.\textsuperscript{73} The institution of adoption had been employed earlier, but there was a need for judicial “creativity” in that it was subject to the laws of personal status which, at least for the Jewish population, did not recognize the idea of adoption. Daniel Pollack, Moshe Bleich, Charles J. Reid & Mohammad H. Fadel, \textit{Classical Religious Perspective of Adoption Law}, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 696-701 (2004).\end{flushleft}
welfare. Moreover, adoption was meant to serve the needs of an existing child abandoned by his parents. It was not designed to provide the legal basis for recognizing the parenthood of a couple who conceive the child and raise him, and it was not meant to serve as a vehicle for the intentional creation of new (alternative) families.

b) Parenthood Through Adoption

The Adoption Law establishes a two-stage process through which a biological parental relationship may be superseded by an adoptive relationship. But while the biological parents are replaced by adoptive parents, the former retain, in all instances, some limited tie to the adoptee: the adoptee remains the legal heir of her biological relatives; remains bound by the applicable prohibitions on marriage to biological relatives; and becomes entitled, upon attaining the age of majority, to certain information about her roots. But these limited nods to biological parenthood do not detract from the legal parenthood established with respect to the adopter. It follows that the issuance of an adoption decree establishes a complete parent-child relationship.

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74 Inheritance Law, 1965 § 16, S. H. 446 and Adoption Law § 16(3), which provide, in addition to the mutual inheritance rights of adopter and adoptee, for the adoptee to inherit from biological relatives—though they do not inherit from the adoptee.

75 Adoption Law § 16(2). See also B. Schereschewsky, FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL 422 (4th ed. 1993) (Hebrew); Pinhas Shifman, Kinship by Adoption: Where Adoption Differs from Natural Affinity, 23 ISR. L. REV. 34, 40-41 (1989).

76 Adoption Law §§ 29, 30. See also Shifman, supra note 75, at 43-47.
The foregoing general rule is subject to qualification, however, where the court in its decree specifies that the adoption is to be “open.” The definition of “open adoption” can vary, and the arrangement can encompass different sorts of connections among the parties. It is characterized by information sharing and/or contact between the adoptive and the biological parents around the time of the adoption or after, sometimes with the adoptee’s involvement in an ongoing connection. The generally accepted form of adoption in the Israeli system is closed adoption. Only rarely and in special circumstances is adoption made open, as in the case of relatively older children who know their parents and siblings and have had a chance to form significant bonds with them. Open adoption will likely be relevant where the adoptive parent is the spouse of a biological parent; in such cases, the legal connection with the biological parent is

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77 Although the Israeli statute does not explicitly provide for the possibility of open adoption, Adoption Law § 16(1) has been interpreted to authorize the court to formulate an open adoption. C. A. 4616/94, Atty. Gen. v. Anon., P.D. 48(4) 298.


80 Nili Maimon, ADOPTION OF CHILDREN: LEGAL PRINCIPLES 55 (1994) (Hebrew). And even in these cases, the court has not been quick to use the open adoption alternative. C.A. 166/81, Anon. v. Atty. Gen., P.D. 36(4) 321.
maintained along with the connection to the adoptive parent;\textsuperscript{81} hence the relevance here of open adoption.

Use of the adoption mechanism to establish parenthood in the case at hand—a use that, until just a few years ago, would have seemed a fantasy—may well be possible today, given recent decisions by the Supreme Court that have recognized adoption by lesbian couples. In the first case (\textit{Brenner-Kadish v. Interior Minister}\textsuperscript{82}), the court dealt with the registration of a foreign adoption decree. The second case (\textit{Yaros-Hakak v. Atty. Gen.}\textsuperscript{83}) involved the adoption by a woman of her female partner’s child. It is difficult to disregard the substantive change in Israeli law wrought by these two cases.

In \textit{Brenner-Kadish}, the court was called upon to consider the entry in the Israeli population registry of a California court’s adoption decree.\textsuperscript{84} The California decree and the registration authorized under it declared that the petitioner was the mother of the child born to her partner through artificial insemination of donated sperm. The Israeli Interior Ministry denied the request of the two women to be listed as mothers in the population registry, arguing that the listing would be “erroneous on its face” and technically impossible; but the Supreme Court, by majority decision issued in 2000, granted the petition and held that the adoption should be recognized and registered in Israel. It based

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{82} H. C. 1779/99, \textit{Brenner Kadish v. Interior Minister}, P.D. 58(2) 368.
\item \textsuperscript{83} C.A. 10280/01, \textit{Yaros-Hakak v. Atty. Gen.}, P.D. 59(5) 64.
\item \textsuperscript{84} For an analysis of this decision, see Hanan Goldschmidt, \textit{The Renowned Identity Card of an Israeli Family—Legal Implications of the Ruling on Adoption by a Same-Sex Couple}, 7 HA-MISHPAT 217, 246-251 (2002) (Hebrew).
\end{itemize}
its ruling on the Interior Ministry’s usual practice (under which valid foreign adoption decrees were registered without consideration of their meaning or lawfulness under Israeli law); on the rules of private international law; and on the need to ensure consistency of status. Although the ruling explicitly avoided any substantive evaluation of dual motherhood or same-sex adoption, it ultimately recognized the adoption for registration purposes, directing that two women be listed as joint mothers in the Israeli population registry.\(^8\)

The 2005 *Yaros-Hakak* decision may be of even greater significance. That case dealt with two women who had lived as an established couple for many years. By mutual agreement, they each bore a child through anonymous sperm donation and they raised the children together, assuming full parental responsibilities. Their agreement provided for them to care for and support their mutual children. To ensure their status as a family, the women ultimately sought, by means of official adoption, to anchor each one’s relationship to her partner’s biological child. The Family Court (the relevant court of first instance) denied their petition,\(^8\) and the District Court majority denied their appeal.\(^7\) The path to granting their petition was cleared by the Supreme Court, in a decision issued by an expanded panel of judges.\(^8\) The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of first instance and rejected the state’s refusal to recognize the possibility

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\(^{85}\) The ruling does not end the matter, however, for the Interior Minister has petitioned for further proceedings in the matter and that petition, as of this writing, remains pending.


\(^{88}\) The Israeli Supreme Court usually sits on cases in three-judge panels. The Chief Justice, however, may direct the use of an expanded panel in cases he or she deems appropriate—typically, those raising complex or disputed questions.
that a woman might adopt her female partner’s children. Ultimately, the adoption decree was issued by the Family Court to which the case had been remanded.89

Although the Supreme Court enabled that form of adoption to be used in principle, it did so cautiously, on narrow grounds, and it refrained from opening a broad path to adoption by same-sex couples. In light of the wording of the Israeli statute, which limits adoption to heterosexual (married) couples,90 the Supreme Court relied on a narrow exception included in § 2(3) of the statute for a different purpose, that of enabling adoption by a single parent.91 Although the statutory conditions for adoption by a single parent (the adoptee’s parents must be deceased and the adopter must be an unmarried relative of the adoptee) were not satisfied in this case, the court relied on a provision authorizing departure from these conditions where warranted in special circumstances for the welfare of the child (Adoption Law § 25[2]).92 The court made clear—and thereby may have impeded reliance on its decision in our case—that the adoption would be permitted in view of the existing de facto parental relationship and in order to ensure the best interests of the children. In its view, the welfare of the child in the Yaros-Hakak

90 See Adoption Law §3, which states “Adoption is limited to a man and his wife acting together.”
91 See Adoption Law §3 (1)-(2), which states that “The court may grant an adoption decree to a single adopting parent if the adoptee’s parents are deceased and the adopter is a relative of the adoptee and unmarried.”
92 That subsection provides that where the court is satisfied “that doing so will be for the best interests of the child, it is authorized, in special circumstances and for reasons noted in its decision, to depart” from, among other things, the conditions of “death of the adoptee’s parents and family relationship with the adoptee under § 3(2).”
case dictated that a family relationship that already existed as a practical matter be recognized officially by the state.  

Reliance on the underlying rationale of *Yaros-Hakak* implies that an adoption decree in the circumstances here under review would be issued only after parental relations between the child and the genetic mother had existed for an extended time. It follows that in the absence of such relations, it would be difficult to rely on the decision.  

II. The Normative Quest—Who Should Be Declared the Child’s Parents?

1. The Need for Legal Regulation

Our examination of the current Israeli regulatory arrangements shows their inadequacy for resolving the question of parenthood in our test case. Although the existing rules governing assisted reproductive may provide the underpinnings for a definition of parenthood, they do not offer a clear methodological framework for establishing parenthood in a case of joint birth to a female couple. The rules contemplate a heterosexual couple, and they provide no theoretical framework for determining parenthood in cases diverging from the model. The Adoption Law was not intended to provide a mechanism for establishing a homosexual family, and certainly not for legally

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93 The court noted that the comparison to be made was between a situation in which the child was living in circumstances of dual motherhood without an adoption decree and one in which he was living in such circumstances with the partner’s motherhood officially recognized. C.A. 10280/01, *Yaros-Hakak v. Atty. Gen.*, P.D. 59(5) 64, par. 17 of Chief Justice Barak’s decision.  
94 The appropriateness of adoption as a solution in the case before us, given both the differences and the similarities, will be examined below, see infra Part III.2.a).
anchoring the relationship between parents and their offspring (i.e., children brought into the world in an act of mutual reproduction). It is doubtful whether our case—in which two women want to be recognized as the mothers of a newborn—would be encompassed within the court’s interpretation of the Adoption Law in *Yaros-Hakak* or even in the possibility, under *Brenner-Kadish*, of registering two mothers.

Still, our conclusion about the inadequacy of current Israeli law may assume that which needs to be proven. A close reading of the existing law suggests at least a prima facie solution: a child born to a woman from another’s egg that had been fertilized by sperm from an anonymous donor has one mother, the woman who bore him. Recognition of her partner—the egg donor—as a mother would be possible, under existing law, only after-the-fact, once a psychological parenting relationship between her and the child had developed. It would be accomplished by the court’s issuance of an adoption decree, if the court found that to be in the best interests of the child.

Given the existing law’s limitations, this part of the article will examine the question of who should be declared the parent of a child born in this way to a female couple. It will consider whether the result seemingly implied by the existing law—recognizing as the newborn’s mother only the woman who carried the pregnancy—is appropriate or whether there is room for some other decision. In view of the need to determine who are the parents, it seems preferable to do so at the outset, around the time the child is born. A clear legal determination enhances the stability of the unit into which the child is born and should be useful in resolving any disputes about it that might arise. Whatever one’s view on the substantive issues (preservation or termination of the sperm donor’s paternal status; granting exclusive or joint maternal status to the woman who
carried the child; granting exclusive or joint maternal status to the genetic mother), all might agree that the matter should be legally resolved. The desire for legal regularization\(^{95}\) is consistent with the desire to ease, to the extent possible, the need to resolve family disputes. A lack of regularization could open the door to conflict among those competing for parental status, lead to increased litigation, and threaten the welfare of the child, who would be born into a state of legal, if not familial, uncertainty.\(^{96}\)

Regularization cannot preclude a family crisis, but it can ease its prompt resolution and may avoid litigation by encouraging negotiated settlement.

Even where disputes among the parents are not a concern, the child’s needs and those of his caregivers cannot be fully met unless the *de facto* parenting arrangements are recognized *de jure*. Even when family life is proceeding normally, the need to recognize parenthood will arise in various contexts, both practical and symbolic. As a practical matter, legal recognition will allow a parent to exercise full authority and discharge all duties with respect to the child, whether in dealings with the government or with other people. As a symbolic matter, recognition of parenthood can confirm the relationships that exist in practice between parent and child and reinforce them emotionally.

\(^{95}\) It is desirable, though not necessary, that the resolution be grounded in primary legislation.

\(^{96}\) The premise of this article is that setting a relatively firm legal rule is valuable in itself; the analysis is devoted to clarifying what rule would be best. Clearly, once a uniform rule is set, even one allowing for certain exceptions, situations will arise in which the result dictated by the rule would be suboptimal; but that is the price to be paid for formulating a set legal rule: the benefits of simplified decision making in light of a general rule may harm to one party or another in a specific case. The goal is to propose a rule (with narrow exceptions) that will produce the best result in the greatest number of cases. The rule itself should fit, to the extent possible, to the characteristics of one paradigmatic case or another.
But the need for official determination of parenthood becomes even greater in circumstances of family crisis. Where one parent dies or the parents separate, official recognition of parenthood is necessary to protect the child’s rights and relational welfare. For example, if the *de facto* mother dies without having been recognized legally as a parent, the child may have difficulty in confronting legally recognized heirs. And where it is the legally recognized mother who dies, her partner may find herself called upon to prove her maternity in a confrontation with another party who may try to displace her.\(^{97}\)

Where the relationship between the partners runs aground, the legal mother might try to deny her former partner any custodial or even visitation rights with respect to the child. The latter might then ask the court to recognize her maternity; but the ensuing proceeding would likely take time, during which she and (more importantly) the child would be unable to maintain contact with each other. In some situations, such a proceeding could lead to an extended separation between mother and children—obviously a harmful situation. In the converse situation, the second mother might attempt to shirk her responsibilities and leave the child without the economic support to which he entitled.

For all these reasons, it seems to me that legally recognized parenthood should be determined at the time the child is born. The arrangements need to be clear and enable those preparing to bring a child into the world to know what sort of family they may design for themselves.

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\(^{97}\) One can, for example, readily envision the potential conflict between a surviving partner, who is the child’s genetic and psychological mother though not legally recognized as such, and the child’s grandparents, who may want to take over the maternal role of their deceased daughter and either adopt the child or become legal guardians.
2. The Suggested Legal Regulation—Mapping and Balancing the Interests

In this part, I attempt to clarify the standing of each agent taking part in the birth of the child. The inquiry will begin with the simpler question of the sperm-donor father’s legal status. It then turns to the status of the female partner who bears the pregnancy and, finally, that of the female partner who provides the ovum. After sketching the interests of these parties, I will outline the considerations that should govern the resolution of conflicts that may arise. I will argue that there are four such considerations: the will of the parties; the welfare of the parties as it is affected by flourishing family relationships; the best interests of the children already born; and the goal of enabling people who want to establish families to do so.

98 Reichman Schiff, supra note 36.
a) The Father: The Paternal Status (Or Lack Thereof) of the Sperm Donor

At the outset, let me state my view that the paternal connection of a man who has donated or sold his sperm via an intermediary, such as a sperm bank, must be severed.\textsuperscript{102} I believe that such severance, as a matter of law, should take place \textit{ab initio}, namely at the time the donation is made, and not be subject to \textit{post-facto} case-by-case determination after a child is born. It follows that the severance will be a matter of general application, regardless of whether the woman receiving the donation is planning to raise the child with her male partner, with her female partner, or in a single-parent family. This arrangement offers several advantages.

To begin, a regime that severs the sperm donor’s parental tie corresponds to the original intention and presumed will of the interested parties: the mother, the donor, and the second intended parent, if any. Where the donation is via a sperm bank to a woman and her female partner, neither the donor nor the recipients expected at the start to bind the donor to the offspring and turn him into a father.\textsuperscript{103} Any other approach would contravene the couple’s plan to establish an autonomous family unit, in which they would serve as exclusive parents to the offspring. The donor provides his sperm to the sperm

\textsuperscript{102} It matters not in this regard whether the donation was made anonymously (as is the practice today in Israel) or with identifiably (which affords the offspring the possibility of acquiring information about the donor once they are adults).

\textsuperscript{103} In Israel, the donation is made anonymously; but it is important to be clear that the donor’s anonymity is not a precondition to severing his paternal tie. As I have argued elsewhere, we may (and perhaps must) arrange things so as to ensure that the offspring, once grown, have access to the donor’s identity. Clearly, a precondition to fulfilling the offspring’s right to obtain identifying data is severance of the donor’s paternal tie. Ruth Zafran, “Secrets and Lies” – \textit{The Right of AID Offspring to Seek Out their Biological Fathers}, 35 MISHPATIM 519, 568 (2005) (Hebrew).
bank with no expectation of being a father (except in the barest genetic sense), and establishing a paternal link between him and the offspring would contravene his intention as well. Beyond the direct harm occasioned by contravening the parties’ intentions, there is also the prospect of discouraging future sperm donations and the use of donated sperm. The result might be to preclude the use of sperm donation—or at least have a chilling effect on its use—by people who could not otherwise establish families.

But a standard that calls for carrying out the parties’ intention is not necessarily met by carrying out their original intention, as of the time of the sperm donation. Although unlikely when the donation is accomplished through a sperm bank, it is nevertheless possible that one of the parties will undergo a change of mind and want to actualize the donor’s paternity. A willingness to recognize the sperm donor as an additional parent in such circumstances would likely generate uncertainty and compromise the stability of the parental relationships that had been forged. The interjection of a "stranger" into the family’s life, in the absence of mutual consent, contravenes the interest in establishing family ties, grounded on mutual, voluntary relationships.104 Weighing the difficulties that would likely be occasioned by recognition of the donor against the donor’s relatively weak connection to the child tilts the balance against recognizing his paternity. Severing the legal connection between sperm donor and child may have additional implications for ensuring the family relationships. There are those who would argue that severing the sperm donor’s paternal connection should be a precondition to establishing a legal parental relationship for the intended second parent

104 Mazzone, supra note 101, at 34.
(be it a father in a heterosexual couple or a second mother in a lesbian couple). That, of course, would not be the view of those willing to recognize three legal parents.¹⁰⁵

Moreover, severing the sperm donor’s paternal connection would also seem to be warranted by the best interests of the child. In the case of a woman wanting to raise her offspring together with her male partner, it seems self-evident that the best interests of the child call for denying the donor paternal status, especially when the donor himself is uninterested in having it. The widespread understanding of child development, which underlies the importance of preserving the stability of the family unit, maintaining existing ties, and avoiding tension between parental figures, would seem applicable here as well.¹⁰⁶ Imposing the parenthood of an additional father, something desired by none of the parties, would be ill-advised and might unnecessarily disrupt the familiar social relationships among the mother, her male partner, and the child. At that point the ties between the offspring and the sperm donor are limited to genetics; and while those links are not unimportant, they do not reflect emotional relationships that have already emerged. It seems to me that a similar stance is warranted in the case of a woman planning to raise the child in a same-sex family unit. Granting paternal status to a sperm donor to whom the mother and her female partner have no connection, against their will and against his, is inconsistent in principle with the best interests of the child. The child’s

¹⁰⁵ See infra Part IV.

welfare is provided for within the autonomous same-sex family unit through the devoted care of two significant parental figures.\textsuperscript{107}

Some may argue that the paternity of the sperm donor should be denied recognition only where the family is already headed by a mother and father, but not where the child would otherwise be fatherless.\textsuperscript{108} On that view, the family contemplated in our case “suffers” from two defects: it lacks a father and it is headed by a lesbian couple. With regard to the first, they emphasize the hardships likely to be suffered by a child raised without a father\textsuperscript{109}; but in doing so, they rely primarily on the model of the single-parent family, citing the results of studies showing significant impairment in the development and welfare of children who grow up fatherless.\textsuperscript{110} Their second point pertains to the specific characteristics of a lesbian family, and it stresses the alleged harm inherent in having two women act jointly as parents.\textsuperscript{111} These arguments can be responded to on several levels. First, the psycho-social claims and the research studies on which they are based are questionable. The findings of harm to children raised in the absence of a father figure are drawn from study groups having little relevance to the

\textsuperscript{107} For studies showing the quality of same-sex families and the development and welfare of children cared for within them, see sources cited infra note 114.


\textsuperscript{111} Wardle, \textit{supra} note 109.
situation here considered. Many of the studies examined single-parent families following divorce, and those studies failed to isolate, as distinct variables, the effects of the divorce process itself and of the quality of family life before and after the divorce. Accordingly, it is hard to tell whether the findings of impaired child development and welfare in these families are attributable to the absence of a father per se or to the circumstances of the family’s dissolution.\textsuperscript{112} Some of the studies were of one-parent families by necessity, involving women who “found themselves” pregnant, without the support of their partners. Their situation, it is fair to say, differs substantially from that of women who choose, consciously and deliberately, to bring a child into the world in the absence of a father; among other things, single-parent families “by necessity” are often subject to socio-economic stresses. In this context, too, the element of the father’s absence was not isolated from the other characteristics of the family, and reliance here on these studies’ findings seems problematic.\textsuperscript{113} Second, studies over the years have examined the situation of children raised in same-sex families and have shown that such children are as well-off as children raised in two-parent, heterosexual families.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{112} Wardle, \textit{supra} note 109, at 855-856.

\textsuperscript{113} Wardle, \textit{supra} note 109, at 862-863.

\textsuperscript{114} The following studies found that children raised in families headed by a lesbian woman (or homosexual man), including families headed by a same-sex couple, attain the same developmental level and enjoy the same degree of well-being as children raised in families headed by heterosexual couples: Wald, \textit{supra} note 6; James G. Pawelski et al., \textit{The Effects of Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Partnership Laws on the Health and Well-being of Children}, PEDIATRICS Vol. 118 No. 1 July 2006, 349 http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/118/1/349; Susan Golombok, \textit{New Families, Old Values: Considerations Regarding the Welfare of the Child}, 13 \textit{Human Reproduction} 2342, 2345 (1998). See also Louise B. Silverstein & Carl F. Auerbach, \textit{Deconstructing the
But the premise that same-sex families do not fall short in quality would not in itself close the door on the sperm donor’s claim to be recognized as father, especially if he himself asserts that claim.\textsuperscript{115} In contrast to the situation in which the state, contrary to the donor’s wishes, urges recognition of his paternity, it is possible that where the donor himself wishes to be recognized as father, the benefit enjoyed by the child through the presence of an additional parental figure might exceed the harm occasioned by the interjection of an additional parent against the mothers’ wishes. The man’s readiness to carry out his role as father and the advantages to the child of an additional support network (emotional as well as economic) may outweigh the harm of impeding familial harmony. This aspect of the matter needs to be examined in psychological studies. Similarly, separate studies are needed to examine the difference (if any) between adding a father to a family headed by a two-women couple and adding a father to a family headed by a single mother or by a heterosexual couple. At this stage, given the paucity of test cases, psychological research does not provide enough data to reach a conclusion.

The central reason for severing the donor’s parental tie is a practical one: to avoid creating disincentives to sperm donation, lest the technology become unavailable to people who could not establish families without it\textsuperscript{116}. Given the importance of family ties to both the individual and society\textsuperscript{117}, the regulatory regime must make it possible for

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\item Zafran, \textit{supra} note 70, at 256.
\item Lisa L. Behm, \textit{Legal, Moral and International Perspective on Surrogate Motherhood: The Call for a Uniform Regulatory Scheme in the United States}, 2 \textit{DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.} 557, 590 (1999).
\item On the importance of the family \textit{see supra} note 101.
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people wanting to establish families to do so. That obligation dictates facilitating the availability of alternatives to people having difficulty bearing children naturally. Severing the parental tie between sperm donor and offspring is essential if we are to ensure continued sperm donations, for a potential donor may decline to donate if he is concerned that he will end up subject to enforced parenthood and exposed to a whole range of obligations.\footnote{118} That concern would appear to be even more pronounced when the donation would be used in a single-parent family or one headed by two women, where there is no other father in the picture.\footnote{119} Cutting off the flow of donations to sperm banks could genuinely harm women and their male or female partners wanting to establish families and fulfill their desires to become parents in this manner. Concern about enforced fatherhood would not only detract from the willingness of men to serve as sperm donors; it would also deter a woman from using donated sperm, lest the donor’s paternity be imposed against her will. It appears that at least this weighty, practical argument, if not all the others along with it, requires a legislative determination that the sperm donor lacks all parental standing, whatever the nature of the family unit established with his assistance.\footnote{120}

\footnote{118} Anne Reichman Schiff, \textit{Frustrated Intentions and Binding Biology: Seeking Aid in the Law} 44 DUKE L.J. 524, 568 (1994).


\footnote{120} It might be argued that the forgoing range of interests could be adequately protected by relying on the mechanisms of anonymity to avoid unwanted paternity claims, and that there is no need to legislate severance of the donor’s paternal tie to the offspring. I would offer two replies to that argument. First, the existing arrangements (of anonymity) are not codified in a statute and are therefore subject to judicial intervention. Accordingly, they do not provide adequate protection to the donor and the other parties. Second, the harm caused by the existing arrangement, which
b) The Mothers

As mentioned above, a primary, though not an exclusive, consideration in the determination of parenthood is the parties’ intention at the commencement of the reproductive process and their on-going commitment to that intention until legal parenthood is established. The case treated in this article presupposes that the women taking part in the birth intended from the outset that each will serve as a mother. This section will consider the force of that intention and how to treat an ensuing dispute that puts an end to the mutual desire for joint parenthood before that parenthood is established.

(1) The Status of the Gestational Mother

Existing Israeli law acknowledges the status of the woman who carries the pregnancy (the gestational mother) as a legal mother, even in the absence of a genetic link to the offspring. That conclusion follows from the law as applied in the context of egg donation, and it appears that the Surrogacy Law does not call it into question. In those circumstances, the only choice is to ensure by law that revealing his identity will entail no consequences with respect to parenthood.

121 Although this article does not deal with the question of authorizing such a birth or with the circumstances in which such authorization might be granted, it may be noted that for purposes of subsequently recognizing both women as joint mothers, their intention should be expressed in writing at the time of the fertilization. A jointly signed document indicating their desire for joint parenthood and their awareness of what such joint parenthood entails will diminish future evidentiary difficulties. Arrangements such as these are already in place with respect to artificial insemination. See supra note 25.

122 See supra Part I.2.b).
Recall that the Surrogacy law — which does not apply directly in our case — requires court intervention to sever the parental tie of the gestational mother. It therefore stands to reason that, it, too, assumes the maternal status of the pregnancy carrier. Not only does that result follow ineluctably from existing law regulating similar practices; it is the desirable result as well. The criteria considered above—the will of the parties; their personal welfare insofar as it pertains to flourishing family relationships; the best interests of the child; and the goal of enabling people who want to establish families to do so, if necessary, by means of artificial reproductive technologies—can be applied here as well. These criteria suggest strongly that the gestational mother should be recognized as legal mother.

The gestational mother invested of her mental and physical strength in bearing the child, and she intended and still desires to be considered a mother. Her partner shared that intention as well. The two of them, partners in a stable, intimate relationship, wanted to bring a child into the world and raise it through their shared love. That intention indicates both the will and the need to recognize the gestational mother’s maternity. That result also corresponds to the child’s need to be considered the daughter of the woman who brought her into the world. Once the child is born, recognition of the gestational mother as legal mother is consistent with the child’s need to be cared for by the one considered to be the mother, that is, the one whose relationship to her will enjoy

123 See supra Part I.3.b).
124 As well as of the intended mother (who is in most cases the ovum provider), id.
125 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
126 Recognizing the gestational mother’s maternity does not preclude the recognition of the other partner as a mother as well.
legal protection. Legal recognition will enable her to fulfill her responsibility to the child without obstruction and will ensure the stability and continuity of the relationship. From the child’s point of view, recognizing the gestational mother’s legal maternity will protect the child’s rights. In the narrow sense, it will ensure the child’s right to economic support by her, ensure the child’s inheritance if she dies intestate, and, more broadly, ensure, in principle, her relationship with the child on the emotional, care-giving level. That result provides the needed platform for the development of the child and for the flourishing of family relationships, which constitute the most important criteria in deciding questions of parenthood.127

(2) The Status of the Genetic Mother

The review of existing law showed that the status of the woman providing the ovum is more problematic than that of the gestational mother, for there is neither statute nor presumption that can firmly support her legal standing as mother. In contrast to paternity, determined in principle by the source of the sperm (which dictates a genetic connection), maternity is determined, in Israeli law, by birth. The presumption that the woman bearing the child should be recognized as mother is supplemented by the conventional view that motherhood is a binary relationship and that parenthood is unique to one mother (and one father). That position would lead to only one conclusion: recognition of the gestational mother, and of her alone, as the offspring’s mother.

That, however, may not be the desirable outcome, and it certainly contradicts the desires of the two women who cooperated to produce the birth. In our case—unlike

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127 In a different context see Kavanagh, supra note 99.
accepted practice in routine egg donation—there was intention neither to sever the donor’s maternal connection nor to regard the gestational mother as the sole mother. Very much the contrary: the egg was transferred to the gestational mother with the intention that both women take part in the biological formation of the offspring, who would then be deemed their joint child in every possible way. The genetic mother is not an “outsider”, and it was her wish (and that of her partner) that she realize her parental status with regard to the child born to them.

But recognizing the motherhood of the genetic mother is not simply a matter of acting in accord with the parties’ will—a will that might change, of course, by the time legal parenthood is determined. Recognizing the genetic mother as the legal mother provides an official imprimatur for the realities of the situation at the time of the birth. It recognizes the mutual reliance that began to take shape with the fertility treatments and ensures recognition of the bond that existed between the women throughout the course of the pregnancy and of the bond with the offspring that will develop over the course of the latter’s life. In that sense, recognizing the ovum provider’s maternity does not merely carry out the will of the parties and promote their wellbeing; it also follows from the goal of ensuring the best interests of the child. It is difficult to undermine the centrality of the emotional bond between the child and his genetic mother, a bond strengthened as the relationship between them deepens. Recognizing the genetic mother as a mother (in

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128 On the desirable rule with regard to routine ovum donation (when the gestational mother seeks exclusive maternal status, with or without the paternity of her male partner but certainly without involvement of an additional mother), see Malina Coleman, *Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction*, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 497 (1996); Reichman Schiff, *supra* note 36.
addition to the gestational mother) promotes the relationship between the child and a parental figure in his life. It protects, in the event the family unit is broken up, the relationships forged between the offspring and a *de facto* mother. It thus provides legal grounding for the genetic mother's responsibility—which stems from her initiation of the process that resulted in the child, from her continued commitment during the pregnancy, and from the assumption of a parental role following the child's birth—to provide ongoing and lasting emotional and economic support for the child.

These concrete protections for the mother, the child, and their mutual relationships are consistent with the general purpose of enabling those who wish to establish families to do so. Fulfilling the women’s personal wish coincides with advancing the interests of society, which values the establishment of families (in my view, including “alternative” families).

### 3. Recognizing Joint Motherhood

Modern Western society confirmed and reinforced the standing of the heterosexual nuclear family, thereby declaring parenthood to be the exclusive status of two people—one mother and one father. When the child was biologically unrelated to the parents (as in the case of adoption), the couple who assumed the social role of parents acted *in lieu* of the biological parents, seeking to replicate, as much as possible, the traditional unit. They would try to conceal the adoption and to represent the relationship

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as "natural" (for example, by adopting a child who physically resembled them). Typically, they would try to ensure the exclusivity of their parenthood by severing all ties with the biological parents. In recent decades, however, the once unassailable dominance of the "natural" model has been challenged. Technological advances have made it increasingly easy to separate the genetic source from the caregiver; out-of-wedlock childbearing has come to be recognized as legitimate; and tolerance has grown for same-sex couples wanting to pursue their deepest aspirations by establishing parental relations. All of these factors have questioned the traditional definition of the family and thus require a basic redrawing of its boundaries.

In defining the limits of the family and deciding whether relationships should be recognized as “family relationships,” one must draw on the functional and emotional characteristics of the family unit. The importance of the family to the child, to the adult members, and to society as a whole call for a legal regime that seeks to ensure the formation of family ties, their quality, and their preservation. The emphasis must be on relationships premised on mutual concern, care, and long-lasting responsibility. Taking these considerations into account in our case suggests the preferred result:

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130 Even today, this desire is embodied in the preference to the closed model of adoption in the Israeli and other legal systems. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80. In general, see E. Wayne Carp, FAMILY MATTERS – SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION (1998); Judith S. Modell A SEALED AND SECRET KINSHIP – THE CULTURE OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN AMERICAN ADOPTION (2002).

131 On the importance of family see supra note 101.

132 Compare, Kavanagh, supra note 99.
recognizing the legal motherhood of both women.\textsuperscript{133} This conclusion would require further consideration where, at the time parenthood is established, the two mothers no longer agree on joint motherhood; those cases will be considered below.\textsuperscript{134}

In the ensuing parts of this article I will broaden the scope of the investigation to include other sources of law, beyond those directly regulating family law and reproductive matters in Israel. I will argue that the conclusion suggested here – the recognition of joint motherhood – may be further anchored once constitutional principles and comparative law are engaged\textsuperscript{135}. More specifically, I will argue that the constitutional right to become a parent lends support to the above conclusion. From a comparative law perspective, additional support for the conclusion may be drawn from the experience in California, where the issue has been considered by courts in recent years.

\textbf{a) The Right to Become a Parent as a Constitutionally Recognized Right}

The solution that recognizes the parenthood of both women is bolstered by the existing posture of Israeli constitutional law regarding the right to parenthood.\textsuperscript{136} That


\textsuperscript{134} \textit{See infra} Part II.4.

\textsuperscript{135} Comparative law is standard practice in Israel, including in matters of family law.

\textsuperscript{136} On the religious and cultural aspects of the “Right to be a parent” in the Israeli-Jewish context see Laufer-Ukeles, \textit{supra} note 9, at 120-122; Janie Chen, \textit{The Right to her Embryos: An Analysis of Nahmani v. Nahmani and its Impact on Israeli In Vitro Fertilization Law}, 7 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 325, 352-358 (1999); Ellen Waldman, \textit{Cultural Priorities Revealed: The
right comprises several aspects, not all of them relevant to the test case before us. It encompasses the freedom to procreate, at the core of which stands the individual liberty to bring a child into the world through the use of his or her biological faculties. While the case before us does not directly raise the right to bear children (because the state permitted the couple to go forward with the IVF and implantation) it does invoke another aspect of the right to parenthood—the right to act as a parent and to be recognized as such, to provide parental care, and to realize the parent-child connection.

In the case before us, in addition to providing the ovum, the genetic mother has been the partner of the gestational mother and a joint caregiver to the new born. Without legal recognition of the parent-child relationship, the genetic mother—who stands to serve as a psychological mother together with the gestational mother—might be unable to fully realize her parenthood. In that sense, the right to parenthood may serve as an impetus to legal recognition of parental relations, relations that were biological in origin and that began to take on a psychological dimension through the act of joint birth.

Further guidance in this connection may be found in a long line of cases decided by the Israeli Supreme Court in recent years. In these decisions, the court has emphasized repeatedly the existence and force of both aspects of the right to be a parent,

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138 Birck, supra note 137, at 1637-1642; Robertson, supra note 6, at 333-335.
namely the liberty to procreate and the right to act as a parent to one's child. Judge Mishael Cheshin stresses the naturalness of the right, noting that

The law of nature is that the natural mother and father keep the child, raise and love it, and tend to its needs...That tie is more powerful than anything; it is beyond society, religion, or state....It was not the law of the State that forged the rights of parents vis à vis their children or the world at large. The law of the State comes to something already in place, intending to protect the parenting instinct within us and tuning the “interest” of parents into a “legal right” under the law, the right of parents to keep their children.\textsuperscript{139}

Judge Ayala Procaccia likewise contributed much in recent years to reinforcing the constitutional status of the right to be a parent. Her decisions declare the centrality of the right to be a parent, especially when the parenthood is grounded on “ties of blood.” Drawing a connection between natural law and the Basic Laws\textsuperscript{140}, Judge Procaccia noted that “the law sees the tie between parent and child as embodying a natural right having a legal dimension.”\textsuperscript{141} Judge Procaccia went on to find a formal anchor for the right in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which in many ways constitutes the Israeli constitution’s bill of rights. Judge Procaccia holds that the right to be a parent “derives from the protection of human dignity, from the right to privacy, and from the fulfillment

\textsuperscript{139} Civil Rehearing 7015/94, \textit{Atty. Gen’l v. Anon.}, P.D. 50 (1) 48, 102.


\textsuperscript{141} C.A. 3009/02, \textit{Anon. v. Anon.}, P.D. 56(4), 872, 894.
of the principle of the autonomy of the individual will, constituting one of the foundations of human dignity.”

Along with the right to be a parent—which buttresses the biological parents' plea for legal recognition, for it was through their decision and efforts that the child came into the world—we may also speak of the child’s right to have parents. That right—grounded in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Israel has ratified—enumerates the child’s right to be recognized by her parents and, to the extent possible, to be cared for by them. Clearly, the child’s right to have parents does not dictate the identity of the individuals to be recognized as parents, and one may apply that right in various ways, depending on one's formulation of its core elements.

Formal legal recognition of parental relationships has a symbolic aspect as well, for both parent and child. Judge Dorit Beinisch of Israel’s Supreme Court identified it as follows:

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142 C. A. 377/05 **Anon. v. Biological Parents**, (not published), 52, Judge Procaccia’s opinion, par. 52.


144 If the child’s right to have parents implies the right to state recognition of the parental caregiver as parent, then legal recognition of the genetic mother might depend on her performing (or potentially performing) the parental role. If, however, the right to have parents encompasses, not only the right to receive parental care but also the right to establish identity, then the child may assert the right to have the genetic mother recognized as a parent due to the unique tie they share. For an interesting interpretation of the relevant rights see Ya'ir Ronen, *Redefining the Child’s Right to Identity*, 18 (2) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW, POLICY AND THE FAMILY 147 (2004); James G. Dwyer, *A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Making About their Relationships*, 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 845 (2003).
When “human dignity” is a fundamental right, we must respect an individual's desire to actualize himself. For this reason, we should honor his wishes regarding the family unit to which he wishes to belong... Similarly, a person's parents and children are part of his personality and social identity... Of course, a person cannot choose his parents. However, a person's choice to relate to another as his child, or the choice to relate another as one's parent, is an expression of that person's personality. In appropriate circumstances, it is suitable to give this desire legal form.\textsuperscript{145}

b) **Comparative Law—California**

Israeli jurisprudence recognizes comparative law as a source of guidance in cases where domestic law does not provide a clear legal answer. This applies in family law matters as well. Since the courts in California have treated the subject of this article and have done so in a rather convincing manner, this section will briefly outline the controlling cases on point and examine their reasoning.

American law in general allows consenting adults to make their own arrangements regarding the use of assisted reproductive technologies, subject only to specific state laws that address aspects of the process and deal in part with determining the parenthood of the resulting offspring\textsuperscript{146}. The widely varied situations that grow out of the use of those techniques frequently compel the courts to fill in the blanks and resolve

\textsuperscript{145} 7155/96 A v. The Attorney General 17/4/1997 (translated into English and accessible on the supreme court of Israel official web site) paragraph 10. The case dealt with a request to recognize the adoption of an adult. The Adoption Law allows for adoptions of minors, and the court was called upon to interpret that clause so as not to preclude the adoption of adults when such an adoption is central to the identity of the child and the parents. http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/96/550/071/n01/96071550.n01.htm

questions of parenthood in particular situations. The circumstances of one such case in California, *K.M. v. E.G.*, resemble those of the test case before us.\textsuperscript{147}

In *K.M.*, the California Supreme Court considered a case in which two women, joined in a domestic partnership, had jointly brought twin girls into the world.\textsuperscript{148} Ova from one of the women had been fertilized by donated sperm and impregnated in the other, who carried the pregnancy to term; the court was asked to rule on the maternity of the partner who had provided the ova. From birth to age five, the twins had been raised by the two women in full cooperation, but the couple then separated and the gestational mother (who was the legally recognized mother) sought to deny the egg providing mother all contact with the children. In view of that denial of access to the genetic mother, the courts were asked to rule on her motherhood status.

Reversing the decisions of two lower courts, the California Supreme Court held that while the maternity of the woman who had carried the pregnancy was not called into question, the woman who had provided the eggs was a mother in all respects as well. Despite a dispute over the circumstances in which the ova were provided (the gestational mother said they had been provided only as a donation, with no intention that the donor

\textsuperscript{147} *K.M.*, v. E.G. 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (Cal. 2005).

\textsuperscript{148} It might be argued that the status of the women as domestic partners, which affords a status analogous to that of marriage, has significance with respect to the determination of parenthood. The existence of a marriage (or other analogous institution) may create a presumption of parenthood and obviate consideration of the parties’ intentions or the nature of their relationships at the time of the birth. But that does not mean that the absence of marriage or its equivalent bars, a priori, recognition of relationships that have formed among parents and children. Either way, when the legal system does not allow for recognition of same-sex couples (as is the case in Israel), the absence of recognition should not have implications for parental relations.
thereby become a parent) and despite the genetic mother having signed a form waiving parental status, a majority of the court declared her to be a mother on the strength of her biological link to the children. The court’s rationale was definitive: it drew a parallel between the status of the genetic mother and that of a father in a case of birth to a heterosexual couple. On the basis of California law, it held that if the genetic material is provided to a domestic partner in the expectation that the resulting child would be cared for jointly in the shared household, the parental status of the gamete provider cannot be annulled. In these circumstances, the court held, the genetic mother cannot be ousted from her status as mother, and any waiver she may have signed—regardless of whether it was informed or under duress—will not be effective. The court confirmed her status as mother without any need for an adoption decree. Its rationale, which takes account both of the genetic tie and of the intention to raise the child, is not grounded on the relationship forged between the genetic mother and the twins while she was acting as their mother. Thus, the court in effect makes possible the issuance of an order of parenthood in circumstances such as those of our test case, even immediately following birth.

*K.M.* provides an instructive example of the importance of determining and declaring legal parenthood close to the time of the offspring’s birth. In that case, contact between the children and the genetic mother, who had raised them to the age of five, had been suspended for a lengthy period; only following the Supreme Court’s ruling recognizing her motherhood, about four years after the case was initially brought, could

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that contact resume. It goes without saying that so long a separation between a mother and her children, especially at a young age, is extremely difficult to bear. It is fair to assume that a clear set of rules for determining and promptly declaring the identity of the legal mother(s) could limit disputes in cases such as these or facilitate their earlier resolution.

It is noteworthy that on the day the California Supreme Court issued its decision in *K.M.*, it also issued two other rulings effectively recognizing joint maternity on the part of women in same-sex couples.\(^{151}\) In *Elisa B.*,\(^ {152}\) the partner of the bio-genetic mother (i.e., the genetic mother who had also given birth to the twin) was recognized as an additional legal mother on the basis that she had acted as a parent in practice. The partner had accompanied the bio-genetic mother through the artificial insemination process and had raised the children with her in their home as if they were her children. The court recognized her as a mother and required her to provide child support; it held she could not be divested of maternal status simply because she had separated from her partner.

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\(^{152}\) Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 46 (Cal. 2005).
Similarly, in *Kirsten H.*, the California Supreme Court declared that the bio-genetic mother of a child born to her from an identified sperm donation was estopped from revoking the statement she had made, together with her same-sex partner, on the basis of which the court had registered the partner as an additional legal parent of the child. The court declined to consider the validity of the initial court determination of joint motherhood, which had been based on the women’s agreed declaration even before the child was born; instead, it ratified, in effect, the actual motherhood of the partner, who for two years had raised the child as her own.

Significantly, in all three cases the court sustained the partner’s status as mother without requiring an adoption procedure. The motherhood of both women was recognized by court decree on the basis of the statute dealing with determination of parenthood; the decisions rested on biological ties (*K.M.*), on bonds forged between the woman and the children (*Elisa B.*), or on an agreement the parties were estopped from revoking (*Kristin H.*)

**4. And What if Disagreement Arises?**

The result of the foregoing discussion, which calls for both women to be deemed parents in cases where they agree to their joint parenthood, requires additional inquiry in

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154 It is interesting to note that the status of the identified sperm donor was not at issue and was not decided in that case.
155 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), Cal. Family Code § 7600 et seq.
156 It is important to note that these decisions were issued without regard to the statutory amendment that, since the beginning of 2005, has provided couples in a registered same-sex domestic partnerships the same status as married couples. That status pertains, among other things, to relationships with a partner’s children. Cal Fam Code § 297.5(d) (2006).
cases where there is no such agreement or where both parties request severance of the parental ties of one or the other. Like any relationship, an intimate relationship between two women may run into difficulties that lead to its dissolution. And while dissolution of the relationship does not necessarily imply a call to alter parenthood status, such a call may, in fact, ensue. If there is a dispute between the partners, the court will be called upon—as in the case of any disagreement over parenthood—to resolve the matter.

For purpose of analysis, it is helpful to distinguish between three scenarios: first, a dispute at or around the time of birth; second, a dispute long enough after the birth that significant parental ties have already crystallized; and, third, a dispute long after the birth, but without parental ties between the genetic mother and the offspring having crystallized.

Let me begin with the second situation, in which I believe the determination to be the simplest. The logic underlying this article suggests that once a significant parental tie has been forged between the child and its biological mother, it should not be allowed to be severed. That is the case even where the genetic mother herself wants to terminate the tie, and it certainly is so when she wants to preserve it. To the extent legal intervention is called for, it should not permit an agreement between the parents to terminate the parental tie of either of them to the child; parental relations should not be made severable merely by later agreement or by the desire of one of the parties to sever them. In such circumstances, parental ties that have been recognized, or would be recognized under the regime here proposed, could be severed only in accord with the provisions of the
Adoption Law, which sets forth a limited list of circumstances in which the parental tie might be ended.\textsuperscript{157}

When the wish to sever the parental tie (or to avoid having it recognized in the first instance) is expressed before or in close proximity to birth, before the second mother is or could be registered as a legal mother, the decision as to recognizing her maternity is more complex. The departure point for the analysis is the analogy to a case involving a male and a female parent who are known to each other. The law in such a case does not allow for severance of the parental tie, whatever the circumstances of the birth or the parties’ intentions. Even if one of them does not want to be recognized as a parent, and even if both of them want to limit parenthood to one, the law does not (in principle) allow that result.\textsuperscript{158} One may therefore ask whether there is any reason to distinguish between heterosexual and same-sex couples by allowing revocation of the agreed-upon joint parenthood in the same-sex case. In other words, should parenthood be a matter of revocable will? I would respond in the negative. Even though the element of intent played an important role in grounding the model proposed by this article, I doubt that a later-developing shared intent to sever the genetic mother’s parental tie would be legally effective. The legal status of the genetic mother, no less than that of the gestational mother, must be determined in a cogent manner. From the instant her maternity is recognized (or the conditions for such recognition have materialized), she should be able to renounce that status only by permission of the court and in accordance with the conditions specified in the Adoption Law.

\textsuperscript{157} See infra note 171 and accompanying text.

On the practical level, it is possible, as it is possible in the case of a birth to a heterosexual couple, that where a change of heart occurs before the genetic mother is registered and no objection is voiced, the genetic mother may avoid registration and recognition as legal mother. It follows that in practice, where the two agree that the genetic parenthood will not be registered, the non-parenthood may take effect “of its own accord”, basically because no one raises the issue. That position equates the standing of the genetic mother with that of the genetic father in cases of heterosexual parenthood. Where parenthood becomes a matter of dispute between the mothers, the court will have to decide by weighing the considerations outlined earlier. It seems to me that a woman who provides the child’s genetic make-up with the intention of acting as the child’s mother (in conjunction with the gestational mother) – matters that the court will have to ascertain as issues of fact – should in principle be declared a legal mother of the child.

A third possible case involves the situation in which the question of maternity is raised at a later point in the child’s life, without substantive parental ties having been forged in the interim. Following the lapse of a specified time (a year from the child’s birth might be reasonable\(^{159}\)), parental status would have to be established before a court of law; it could no longer be set administratively. Once that point in time was reached, the determination of parenthood should be in the discretion of the court, even if there were an agreement between the parties—and certainly if a disagreement had arisen. In such circumstances, the court would likely consider not only the mother’s genetic tie to the offspring and her original intention to act as mother but also the overall family

\(^{159}\) The one-year period does not reflect a fully considered judgment of what the proper time should be; it is based on the standard fixed in the Procedure mentioned below, see infra text accompanying note 162.
context of the parties. Under the model proposed here, in such cases the court would be authorized to inquire into who acts *de facto* as parent and what sort of relationships exist between those competing for parental standing and between them and the child. The genetic aspect, though a central element in the determination of legal parenthood (especially when combined with an original intention to form parental ties) does not exhaust the field.

**III. Procedures for Recognizing Maternity**

Regulating the determination of parenthood entails not only a substantive component – that is, the conditions for establishing maternity or paternity – but also a procedural element: the process by which state agencies ascertain whether these conditions are met. If the default rule in situations such as those discussed in this paper is to recognize both women as legal mothers, there is no reason why it should not be carried out by the administrative agency authorized to register parenthood. That is the fastest, most effective way to legally establish parenthood soon after birth. Court intervention would be sought, as already noted, only where one (or, perhaps, both) of the mothers raised objections to recognizing the genetic mother as a legal mother, where a significant amount of time had elapsed since the birth, or where an additional player was involved in the birth, as will be explained below.

Of course, the administrative agency can register such parenthood only if it is empowered to do so by law. A fair reading of current Israeli law (keeping in mind the Registry’s conservative interpretation of its powers) leads to the conclusion that the two women would be unable to secure recognition of their joint motherhood simply by
appearing together before the official to register the birth. At the very least they will have to prompt the agency to consider a more creative interpretation of the letter of the law by petitioning the High Court of Justice to consider the case,\textsuperscript{160} in which event the Attorney General might order the Registrar to register the mothers or the Court might consider the case on its merits. Given the views expressed in the cases discussed above, the Court in that instance would likely support the petition.

Before submission of such a petition to the High Court of Justice, the Family Court, which has jurisdiction to decide disputes over parenthood, might also be asked to weigh in. It is clear that a request for determination of parenthood submitted to the Family Court would likely face legal hurdles. There are three recognized ways in which the Family Court can declare parenthood—by ruling on a request to be declared a parent; by issuing an adoption decree under the Adoption Law; and by issuing a parenthood order under the Surrogacy Law.

Since seeking administrative review in the High Court of justice raises no particular procedural issues, this part of the article will focus on the three possible tracks to establishing parenthood before the Family Court. First, though, let me consider the administrative process and outline some legislative amendments that would facilitate administrative action without necessitating recourse to court involvement.

1. Registration of Parenthood by the Administrative Agency

\textsuperscript{160} Under Israeli law, the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, has original jurisdiction to hear petitions alleging that governmental agencies acted \textit{ultra vires} or otherwise abused their discretion. See Basic Law: The Judiciary, 1984, S.H. 158, §15 (c), (d), available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic8_eng.htm
The most direct and commonly used road to legal recognition of parenthood does not traverse the courts. Most children are born "naturally" to a couple who acknowledge that they are the parents, and their parenthood is officially recognized either in the hospital where the child is born or by filing a joint declaration to an official of the Population Registry.  

161 The mother is registered automatically, by notice sent from the hospital, by reason of having given birth to the child. If the mother and father are married, the father, like the mother, is registered without having to appear or provide written declaration. If the mother was unmarried, the father is registered on the basis of their written declaration. In neither case is there a requirement that paternity or maternity be scrutinized; the registration is made in reliance on the birth (for the mother) and the marriage or joint consent (for the father). The father may submit his declaration later, though not more than one year after the birth.  

162 Paternity may not be registered on the basis of such a declaration if the mother had been married to another man within three hundred days preceding the birth.  


162 Procedure 2.2.0007, Procedure for adding details with respect to the father of a minor residing in Israel and listed in the population registry, as updated 1 August 2005, available at: http://www.pnim.gov.il/Apps/PubWebSite/publications.nsf/PrintDoc?OpenAgent&unid=47389F AE080DED78422570B500419F69  

163 Population Registry Law §22. In those circumstances, the parties would be required to petition a court to declare paternity. In ruling, the court would take account, among other things,
It should be borne in mind that clear rules regarding parenthood mean fewer and shorter litigated cases. Such rules pertain, in the first instance, to the jurisdiction and discretion of the administrative agency. Their prompt implementation allow the process of identifying the legal parents to be completed as soon as possible after the child’s birth, thereby promoting certainty and stability in a matter of import to the lives of child and parents alike.

To what extent, if any, can the process described above be used to establish the legal maternity of the same-sex partner who is the child’s genetic mother? If the rule that the man can be registered as father on the basis of the parties’ implied consent were applied to the circumstances of the case before us, it would permit registration of the woman on the basis of a joint declaration, without the need for judicial intervention.\textsuperscript{164} Adopting such a practice would be the logical extension of a policy that recognized same-sex parents to the same degree and in the same manner as parents of opposite sexes. But while such a policy is supported by the principle of equality, which calls for disregarding differences based on sexual orientation, the differences between determining maternity and determining paternity\textsuperscript{165} make it doubtful that such a policy could be said to be required by existing law.

\footnote{of the best interests of the child and the concern about holding someone to be a \textit{mamzer}. \textit{See supra} note 12.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{164} As a practical matter, gender-neutral application of this rule might dictate an even more far-reaching result: it might allow for registration of the same-sex partner as an additional mother even where she lacks any genetic connection to the offspring. The voluntary registration of the father, as now practiced in Israel, does not require proof of a genetic tie to the child. However, it is clear that the current practice presumes the father’s genetic paternity.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{165} \textit{See supra} text accompanying note 9.}
For one thing, the rules designed to determine motherhood focus on the act of birth. True, the traditional premise is that the gestational mother is also the genetic mother, and thus the act of birth also represents genetic connection. But the emphasis is nonetheless on the gestation and delivery. Recognition of a non-gestational genetic mother on the basis of the two women’s consent (and her genetic tie to the child) would require changing the rule, for it is obvious that the second woman did not bear the child. A second difference follows from the accepted idea that a child could not have more than one mother. Given that parenthood is an exclusive state, it would not be possible to recognize the genetic mother, any more than any other mother, in addition to the gestational mother. It follows that when the woman who bore the child is present and recognized as legal mother, the conventional approach does not make it possible to recognize an additional woman as mother.

The foregoing implies that it would be quite difficult for the gestational mother’s same-sex partner, even where she is the genetic mother, to convince the Registrar to recognize her as a legal mother. Allowing the registration of motherhood on the basis of a joint declaration may be sound policy (as I believe it is), but existing law and its underlying social concepts make it unlikely that the administrative agency would adopt it in Israel without statutory amendment or Supreme Court intervention.

In light of this analysis, it seems desirable to formulate a legal rule that would make it possible to register the genetic mother as a parent on the basis of the two women’s joint declaration. That declaration would have to be made with the consent of

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both women and reflect the fact that the second woman is the genetic mother. An additional factor to be taken into account would be the identity of the father. My proposal would limit registration of two mothers on the basis of their joint consent to cases where the child was conceived through an impersonal sperm donation, without the involvement of the father.\textsuperscript{167} Where the father is known and involved, the declaration regarding an additional mother would result in there being three parents. In my view, that alternative, even if allowed for, should be examined by the court.

2. Judicial Determination of Parenthood

Given the administrative difficulties outlined above, it is likely that in the case before us, judicial intervention would be necessary to determine parenthood. But even if (or when) the law and regulation are amended (or the Supreme Court intervenes and grants same-sex mothers treatment equal to that according heterosexual couples), there will remain instances where Family Court intervention would be needed. These include cases in which there is conflict between the parties; in which sperm donor appears and puts forwards claims regarding his paternity (or lack thereof); or in which more than a year has elapsed since birth, (an interval that calls for examination of actual paternal ties). In this part of the article, I explore the possible procedures through which the court may tackle the issue.

\textsuperscript{167} The women’s declaration before the registry official would have to deal with that aspect of the matter as well.
a) Adoption Decree

The Adoption Law, as noted, formulates a mechanism for the creation of parental relationships by act of law. With the issuance of an adoption decree, the court in effect exchanges the biological parents (if they were originally recognized as such) for the adoptive parents. The court severs the biological parents’ parental ties with the child by determining that the child is free for adoption and declaring (in a separate proceeding) that the adopters are the child’s legal parents. A child can become legally free for adoption in two situations: where the biological parents consent or where specified circumstances exist that warrant declaring a child available for adoption even in the absence of consent. Those circumstances involve primarily abandonment or lack of capacity on the part of the biological parent.

It appears possible that an adoption decree could be used to establish the parenthood of the mother’s same-sex partner. The child was born through the use of an anonymous sperm donation obtained through the intermediary of a sperm bank. The father is absent; his identity is unknown and his position regarding the adoption could not be ascertained. These circumstances satisfy the conditions set in the Adoption Law for declaring the child available for adoption as far as the father is concerned. And if that is the case, it is possible in principle to declare the mother’s partner to be the second parent by adoption. That solution becomes even more appealing in light of the Yaros-

168 See supra Part I. 4.
169 Adoption Law §16.
170 Adoption Law §8.
171 Adoption Law §13.
172 Adoption Law §13(a) (1).
Haqaq precedent, which, as discussed earlier, allowed one partner to adopt the other’s children.¹⁷³

This resolution of the matter, however, is less than satisfactory. For one thing, the circumstances of our case differ from those in Yaros-Haqaq with respect to the parties’ genetic affiliation. In our case, the question arises whether it would be proper to declare a woman to be the child’s adoptive mother when she is the genetic mother. While there is no technical bar to the issuance of an adoption decree when the adopting mother is also the genetic mother, I doubt that doing so would be substantively proper. Adoption is employed to forge a parental tie in the absence of direct biological ties. A person who brought the child to the world (by giving birth or by giving the child his or her genetic makeup) should be prima facie recognized as a parent without the legal construct of adoption. Moreover, issuing such an adoption decree might well be met with the objection of the genetic mother. Given that adoptive parenthood may be regarded in some circles as, in a sense, "second-rate" the mother might have reservations about being so labeled. One must take account as well of the economic costs and emotional hardships associated with going through an adoption process.

Another difficulty with the adoption route is grounded in the Israeli Adoption Law itself, whose conditions arguably do not suit this case. The Adoption Law establishes several prerequisites to issuance of an adoption decree, and satisfying those prerequisites in the case before us is somewhat problematic. Under the statute, an

¹⁷³ See supra text accompanying notes 86-93.
adoptive parent may be recognized as such only after a trial period of six months, and only after meeting strict qualifying tests enforced by the welfare authorities responsible for applying the requirements. Can the child’s genetic (and intended) mother justifiably be asked to undergo these tests? And what would happen if a post-fertilization dispute between the two women led the gestational mother to change her mind about allowing the adoption? In these circumstances, would adoption be allowed without the gestational (legal) mother’s assent? Conversely, if the genetic mother no longer wished to adopt the child, would it be right to free her from her commitment to the child simply because she had changed her mind? As I understand it, the position of the genetic mother, the partner of the gestational mother (at least at the time of conception), should correspond to that of the father in a situation of “natural” birth. She in her case, no less than he in his, took an active part in the creation of the offspring and is genetically tied to the child from conception. In the case before us, that genetic tie is supplemented by the intention and desire to bring a child to the world and act as his or her parent—a characteristic not always present when the birth is the result of sexual relations. The woman’s parenthood, no less than that of the father in a case of birth resulting from sexual relations, should be recognized as reflecting the responsibility of the genetic mother.

A third difficulty associated with the use of the adoption procedure grows out of the reasoning of the Court in *Yaros-Haqaq*. Even though its decision smoothed the way

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174 Section 6 of the Adoption Law fixes the trial period, while section 25 allows for exceptions from the duration of the period but not from the trial requirement itself.

175 Section 22 of the Adoption Law requires that prior to issuance of the decree, the court be presented with the report of the welfare agency evaluating the nature of the familial relationships.
to recognizing the same-sex partner’s motherhood, it tied the justification for issuing the adoption decree to the existence of ongoing de facto maternal relations. The Court inquired into whether issuing such a decree, in the circumstances before it, would promote or impede the best interests of the children; it did so by comparing the children’s wellbeing (emotional and otherwise) on the premise that legal recognition was granted to the de facto family unit and on the premise it was denied. In other words, the Court relied heavily in its reasoning on the de-facto parenting of the two mothers for several years. In that light, it becomes difficult to use the adoption alternative to issue a declaration of parenthood immediately after the birth, and the procedure would therefore generate uncertainty by allowing time to pass while the question of parenthood was left open.

In sum, we may say that given the substantive resolution suggested above, which calls for a declaration of joint motherhood immediately following the birth, the Adoption Law does not provide an optimal solution.

b) Parenthood Order Pursuant to the Surrogacy Law

Another procedural mechanism for recognizing parenthood under Israeli law is found in the Surrogacy Law; as the statute’s name suggests, this alternative is tailored to suit a case of birth with the assistance of a surrogate gestational mother. As noted earlier, the statute allows a couple to contract with another woman to carry to term on their behalf, and transfer to them after birth, a child conceived through in vitro fertilization of the mother’s (or a donor’s) egg by the father’s sperm.176 The statute provides for an oversight mechanism and permits such agreements to be entered into only if certain

176 See supra Part I. 3.
conditions are met and the prior approval is obtained. As explained earlier, the mechanism itself is not relevant to our case, for its conditions are not met and its underlying purpose differs from that of the birth under consideration here. Moreover, I do not think that the prior approval of the State should be required for a joint birth to a same-sex couple. Nevertheless, insofar as the regulatory regime pertains to establishing the parenthood of the intended parents following the conclusion of the surrogacy process, it may be suited as well to establishing parenthood in our case.

The statute provides that seven days following the birth, a parenthood order, in which the child’s legal parents are determined, is to be sought from the Family Court. In the normal course, the intended parents will be recognized by the order as the legal parents. The order’s significance lies in its providing an exception to the usual legal rule recognizing the woman giving birth to the child as the mother. Moreover, the Surrogacy Law opens the door to establishing maternal ties with two or more women, by allowing the intended mother to retain ties to the child even when the gestational mother was declared to be the legal mother.

Though similar in some ways to adoption, the Surrogacy Law’s mechanism for establishing parenthood is less convoluted. In some respects it is more intrusive; in others, more respective of the parents’ autonomy. On the one hand, it involves the State in establishing parenthood. The court is required to intervene and declare who are to be the child’s legal parents; it thereby acquires a considerable degree of discretion. But the process is supposed to begin around the time of birth and to be completed, in the absence

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177 Surrogacy Law § 11.
of dispute, quickly. In most instances, the role of the court will be limited to enforcing the parties’ agreement and declaring the intended parents to be the legal parents. If special circumstances arose and confirming the intended parents’ parenthood would be contrary to the best interests of the child, the court would be authorized to order a different result.

The Surrogacy Law formulates an important route to establishing parenthood, and has implications, by analogy, for our case. First, as noted, it establishes a relatively quick and effective mechanism for judicial establishment of parenthood immediately following birth. Second, it opens the door in principle to establishing dual motherhood. The law allows for preservation of the surrogate's maternal ties even after the status of the genetic and intended mother is established. In that sense, a “parenthood order” or “order establishing the status of the child”\textsuperscript{179} is well suited to our case if the parties maintain their agreement. In the event, however, that disagreement between the women arises before parenthood is established by law, the statutory mechanism allows for a wide exercise of the court’s discretion, for the criterion to be applied is that of “the best interests of the child”\textsuperscript{180}. That criterion is vague, and a court hostile to same-sex families might allow its own position on the matter to intrude into its decision and torpedo the joint motherhood.

Although the Surrogacy Law mechanism is more convenient than that of the Adoption Law and allows the possibility of a decision recognizing dual motherhood, the

\textsuperscript{179} Surrogacy Law §14.
\textsuperscript{180} Surrogacy Law § 13.
circumstances of our case and the relationship between the parties are not ones of surrogacy.

c) Judicial Resolution of Paternity or Maternity Suites

The default mechanism for resolving disputes over parenthood (usually disputes over paternity), and the final one to be discussed here, is a court proceeding for a declaration of parenthood. The application initiating such a proceeding is filed with the Family Courts and relies on that court’s inherent jurisdiction common-law powers. As noted, the rule of thumb in Israeli law is to recognize paternity on the basis of genetic ties between father and child. A paternity petition filed by a woman who had not been married at the time of conception will ultimately be decided thorough genetic testing that indicates whether the respondent is the father. Where the respondent declines to undergo testing, paternity will be decided on the basis of all the evidence, giving due weight to the refusal to be tested. If the mother was married at the time of conception, the court will likely respect the marital paternity presumption and declare the husband to be the father even without a confirmed genetic tie between him and the child. In those circumstances, according to the approach accepted by the Family Courts, the principle of best interests of the child dictates waiver of genetic testing.

We may ask whether the child’s genetic mother could obtain, on the basis of existing law, a declaration of her maternity. The question is not a simple one; despite the seemingly persuasive analogy to the genetic father’s standing, it is possible that the

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181 Family Court Law, 1995, S.H. 393, §1(4).
182 That result would be justified on the basis of the best interest of the child, in order to avoid having him declared a mamzer under halakhah or to preserve his relationship with someone he has long recognized as his father. See also supra, notes 12, 163.
existing legal context would not allow for the issuance of such a declaration. Various factors might hinder a ruling in her favor: some judges may perceive joint maternity on the part of two women as “unnatural”; some may subscribe to the existing legal perception that the woman who bears the child is the mother; others may succumb to the position that the maternity of a particular child is a status unique to one woman. As in the case of other controversial family law issues, court rulings on this matter may be inconsistent, varying with the views of the presiding judges. Accordingly, reliance on this procedure in the absence of legislative direction is far from ideal.\footnote{For example, one finds inconsistency in the decisions of first-instance Israeli courts related to requests to sustain familial agreements between members of same-sex couples.}

Moreover, this default venue for resolving parenthood questions is a forum designed to accommodate fiercely contested applications, and it serves as the final resort of parties who have failed to resolve their disputes by other means. Accordingly, proceedings in the venue tend to be prolonged, expensive and punishing. An application for a decree by consent may technically be brought before the court, but it does not represent its ordinary mode of operation. Moreover, even if the application is jointly presented, the Attorney General must be notified, and the state may object to the order on various grounds.

It seems clear that this venue is not the ideal one for the case before us. Moreover, there is no reason to subject same-sex parents to a judicial procedure that would not be required of heterosexual couples. This venue, therefore, should be reserved for those cases in which dispute arises regarding the maternity or in which the father remains involved in the conception. It may also serve in cases where the passage of time creates a
need to determine whether the genetic mother indeed served as the psychological mother prior to her request to be registered as a mother.

IV. The Joys of Having Parents—How Many Are Too Many?

Before concluding, let me raise the following question: Does recognizing the joint maternity of two women open the door to recognizing three or more parents? Once maternity is no longer a binary status and the recognition of two mothers is possible, does it necessarily follow that we no longer view parenthood of a particular child as a status that only two can share? And if the two-parent construct is no longer beyond question, what can stop the "flood" of people seeking recognition as parents?

This question is of more than theoretical interest. In the circumstances of the case before us, the women were assisted by an anonymous sperm donor. It is possible, however, that the sperm would come from an identified donor, an acquaintance or friend of the women. In Israel, when the sperm comes from an identified donor, the donor is considered to be the father even where fertilization is carried out in a regulated clinic. In these circumstances, it seems to me, parenthood no longer limited to two people; rather, we have three biological parents (the gestational mother, the genetic mother, and the genetic father). All of them might request—and, on the analysis offered above, might well merit—recognition as parents.

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184 See for example Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 81 (cal. 2005), where the court does not consider the father’s status but notes that its decision to recognize two mothers (one of whom lacks any biological connection to the child) does not impair the father’s rights.

185 See supra note 19.
Although the case before us does not require resolution of that issue, I believe it warrants some attention. Without presuming to exhaust the discussion of the issue, it may be noted that there is no need to deny the genetic mother’s request to be recognized merely because it would make her a third parent. Adherence to the model proposed here for the establishment of parenthood could well lead to recognizing three parents. In deciding who should be recognized as parents, the model considers factors such as the will of the parties; the offspring’s meaningful relations with the people in her life (as part of the “child best interests” principle; the interest in finding solutions that will enable people wanting to establish families to do so; and the goal of preserving the family as a stable unit that ensures care of the offspring and attendance to her needs. Application of those criteria to the circumstances of the case at hand imply that all three who took part in the birth could be recognized as parents. It has been suggested that broadening parenthood in this way might open the floodgates to a stream of petitions by people citing a range of connections to the child—biological, but primarily psychological—as a basis for being recognized as a parent. That concern, however, seems in my view to be unfounded. At a time when many children lack the support of two parents, there seems to be no reason to fear an excess of contenders. Even if there may be cases in which more than two people will seek to be recognized as parents, the substantive tests required by law will determine which of them—perhaps all—ought to be recognized and will ensure the needed stability in the life of the child.

Certainly, a need to recognize three or even four parents would sometimes burden the day-to-day life of the family, for it would require coordinating a larger number of players. But similar concerns arise when couples separate. Declining to recognize the parenthood of one simply because doing so might make it harder for the other to function as a parent seems strained; after all, parents are parents. Put differently, the answer should look not toward denying parenthood but toward finding a way to ensure the relationships of the child with the parental figures in his or her life, maximizing the cooperation of the parties directed to the wellbeing of the child.

Conclusion

The changes taking place in Western societies, including Israel, are bringing about the formation of “new” families in a wide range of forms. Alongside the modern nuclear family, comprising a married couple and their biological children—the model that even today remains the dominant one—other families of diverse sorts are arising: single-parent families; two-parent, same-sex families; and even multi-parent families. The existence of these families as “facts on the ground” requires legal evolution so as to

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187 In such situations, the child is often shared between two sets of parents, each comprising a biological parent and his or her new spouse acting as step-parent.

clarify, among other things, the status of the individuals and to afford legal protection \textit{de jure} to the parental relations that have come into existence \textit{de facto}. These steps are needed in order to provide for the best interests of the child and the needs of the parents.

The goal of affording legal recognition to parental relations in the families at issue can be attained, in principle, in one of two ways. The first would call for examining the family unit afresh, starting from scratch. Such a general inquiry would call into question the nature of the family, the nature of parental relationships, and the manner in which they should be formulated today. Consequently, such an inquiry would necessitate a reshuffling of the deck and the development of a new basis for resolving fundamental questions of family structure\textsuperscript{189}. Legal precedent and existing provisions of law would play little role in such an endeavor, beyond pointing to possible problems that might need to be resolved. Such a back-to-basics approach to the question, though radical, is likely to prove conceptually coherent and ethically sound. The alternative is a more cautious approach, relaying on existing law and using interpretation to extract workable solutions from it\textsuperscript{190}. It will espouse minor and concrete amendments to the law – such as the explicit empowerment of one or another agency to make certain determinations – rather than call for an overall reform. By its nature, this method stands to suffer from the limitations and inconsistencies of the prevailing state of affairs; it is less expansive but


\textsuperscript{190} Garrison, \textit{supra} note 108.
also less pretentious. Yet it is possible that the two approaches may lead to similar substantive results, and, in that sense, the second view may be no less revolutionary than the first.

Within the context of this article, I have sought to blend the two methods, gleaning from existing statutes and case law some basic principles that should govern the resolution of the situation at hand, and then offering modest (but important) legislative amendments where such are called for. More specifically, I identified four governing principles: the centrality of the family; the will of the parties; the welfare of the parties as affected by flourishing family relationships; and the best interests of the child. These principles lead me to the substantive result this article advocates: the recognition of joint motherhood immediately following the birth of the child. Procedurally, I argued that the preferable method for granting the recognition is through appearance before a registry official, who should be authorized to recognize one of the women as mother by reason of the birth and the other by reason of the genetic tie. Since the current regulatory scheme in Israel – and in similarly situated democracies – is incomplete, legislative intervention or creative Supreme Court interpretation is necessary in order to effectuate this design. Until then, the Family Court – or, in other democracies, the equivalent court of first instance – may be faced with having to determine parenthood, given its jurisdiction over the matter and its common law powers.

I chose this path – namely the attempt to blend the “first principles” approach with the cautious “incremental steps” approach – because of the complexity of the test case. Past experience indicates the reluctance of legislators to legislate with regard to the definition of parenthood and the use of assisted reproductive technologies. Accordingly,
it is fair to assume that the test case before us will reach the courts sooner than it will generate a legislative response. In this article, I have tried to offer some tools the courts might use in dealing with the matter and to provide the reader unfamiliar with the intricacies of Israeli law an opportunity to understand some aspects of the system. Given the dialogic nature of comparative law, such analysis may prove useful to other jurisdictions confronted with similar challenges. Therefore, unless the Supreme Court interprets the legislative scheme as encompassing these powers, the governing statute should be amended to empower the official to act accordingly. Until then, the Family Court may be faced with the issue. This article attempted to chart some doctrinal milestones that may assist in the navigation of this unpaved path, in Israel and in similarly situated democracies.