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Strife Among Friends and Foes: The 1958 Anglo-American Military Interventions in the Middle East

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Dwight D. Eisenhower found it much easier to stop the British, French and Israelis at Suez than to maintain a pro-Western order in the Middle East afterwards. In the two years following the Suez imbroglio, the Eisenhower administration determined that it was locked in a struggle for the Arab world with Egypt and its Soviet patron, and that the West was about to lose. Post-Suez tension came to a head on July 14, 1958, when the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq fell in a coup d'état. Fearing the demise of other pro-Western regimes, Eisenhower sent the marines to Lebanon and agreed to the British dispatch of paratroopers to Jordan. The administration, however, lacked a coherent idea on how to use the troops or what to do next. Using recently declassified sources, this article shows that the elements comprising a strategy evolved only later, in the days and weeks ahead. The Eisenhower administration would, over the course of the 1958 crisis, attain a modestly deeper understanding than before of the forces animating Middle Eastern politics. Equally significant, the administration would begin to prioritize among Western interests in the region and develop a more sophisticated approach than it had earlier of how best to secure them.

I. Post-Suez Problems in the Middle East

At the beginning of the Suez crisis in 1956, the Eisenhower administration envisioned that its stand against the tripartite attack would enhance the United States' anti-colonial bona fides and would safeguard American interests in the Arab world. Within weeks, however, the administration feared that the British collapse at Suez had created a vacuum in the Middle East, and that Nasser and Soviet Chairman, Nikita Khrushchev, would fill it. The Soviet Union appeared to earn more credit among Arabs for its belated threat to intervene in the Suez war than did the United States for its timely action.
Even though Eisenhower had saved Nasser from defeat, Nasser’s prestige—as an Arab nationalist who had defied Great Britain, France and Israel—rose immensely throughout Arab lands. Suez intensified Nasser’s propaganda campaign and covert machinations against pro-Western regimes. A tidal wave of left-leaning Arab nationalism—promoting Arab unity, non-alignment, and socialism—threatened to sweep away pro-Western Arab regimes like sand-castles in a rough surf.

In January 1957, in an effort to stem this perceived tide, President Eisenhower promulgated the Eisenhower Doctrine, whose purpose was twofold: officially, to support pro-Western governments in the Middle East against communist subversion and, unofficially, to help them withstand radical Arab nationalism. Under the Doctrine, the United States furnished economic and security aid, and if necessary, American military force, to endangered pro-Western governments in the Middle East. Nasser and like-minded Arab nationalists considered the Eisenhower Doctrine a declaration of war shrouded in anti-Communist garb.

Middle Eastern turbulence preoccupied the Eisenhower administration during the next two years. In April 1957, King Hussein seemed threatened by communists and radical Arab nationalists, who were supported by Egypt and Syria. Washington tried to strengthen the King’s hand against both his internal and external opponents. The Eisenhower administration declared the “independence and integrity of Jordan as vital” to the United States, dispatched the Sixth Fleet to the Lebanese coast, and conveyed ten million dollars in emergency aid to Amman.

Syria, an American worry since the early Fifties, drew closer to Egypt and the USSR in 1957. By that year, the Soviet Union had sent Syria twenty-four MiG-15 jet fighters, one hundred thirty T-34 tanks, and nearly one hundred Soviet advisors and technicians. A large communist party, estimated at ten thousand members, operated in the country. The United States judged many Syrian military officers leftist, Nasserite, Ba’thist or communist; it blamed Syria for many of King Hussein’s troubles. At the end of July, Syrian Defense Minister, Khalid al-Azm, initialed a half billion dollar “grain-for-weapons” agreement with the Kremlin. Approximately ten days later, in early August, the United States Central Intelligence Agency moved ahead with a covert operation, Wrappen, aimed at installing right-wing military figures in power. Within days, Wrappen met disaster and Syria expelled three CIA agents.

In late August, the United States, Turkey and Iraq joined together to work on the Syrian problem. Turkish and Iraqi forces massed along Syrian frontiers. Eisenhower ordered U.S. aircraft “from Western Europe . . . to Adana, Turkey . . . and the Sixth Fleet again to the eastern end of the Mediterranean.” Except for Turkey, America’s Middle Eastern allies quick-
ly grew tepid about the prospect of war. Eisenhower also began to doubt whether he had sufficient legal justification and congressional support with which to act. He worried that the “Mid East Resolution said nothing about internal subversion and only mentioned . . . direct aggression against a country” that “asked for help. . . .” More importantly, perhaps, the Soviet Union tested successfully its first intercontinental ballistic missile at the end of August. At a National Security Council meeting on September 7th, Secretary of State Dulles declared that the United States had entered a “period of the greatest peril . . . since the Korean War. . . .” Eisenhower writes in his memoirs that the

Soviets . . . were conducting naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean; . . . their latest boasts concerning Soviet ICBMs had included threatening overtones; a recent note to us on the Middle East situation was couched in the rudest and most provocative terms.

The Eisenhower administration clearly feared a forceful Soviet reaction to any Western move against Syria. The administration backed off.

In 1957, not only did the Soviet Union draw closer into Syrian affairs, so did Egypt. Nasser forwarded a contingent of troops to Syria in October to help her deal with continued tension with Turkey. Egyptian diplomats developed strong ties with Syrian military officials. The Syrian Ba’th party—pan-Arab in orientation and closely associated with Nasser—knew that it could not attain control of Syria on its own even though it had supporters in the military. The Ba’th feared a Communist putsch on one hand and Western intervention on the other. Syria’s chaos of communists, Ba’thists, and a faction riddled army ended when a group of powerful Syrian military officers—some motivated by Ba’thism, others by a desire to bring order to Syria, and almost all by some degree of opportunism—flew to Cairo and offered to merge Syria with Egypt. The United Arab Republic (UAR) was established on February 1, 1958 under Nasser’s rule.

The first concrete step toward Arab unification had been taken. Calls for Arab unification and expressions of support for Nasser reverberated loudly in Arab lands. The merger horrified the Iraqi, Saudi Arabian, Jordanian and Lebanese regimes. They feared their own populations, the Egyptian drive for hegemony, and Nasser’s personal ambition. In a futile gesture to steal some of Nasser’s thunder, Iraq and Jordan formed the Arab Federal Union on February 14, 1958. The Iraqi and Jordanian governments, as well as those in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, however, appeared to many of their subjects too closely associated with Western powers.

Lebanon also witnessed its share of troubles in 1958. Successfully rigging
the 1957 parliamentary elections, the pro-Western Lebanese President, Camille Chamoun, secured a lock on the country's political institutions. This Maronite fanned the enmity of the Moslem, Druze and Greek Orthodox opposition: for the parliament elected the president and the parliament could also amend the constitution to allow Chamoun to stand for another term. The Moslem and Druze opposition prepared to cast off already weak government authority in areas populated by their coreligionists. Nasser, who detested the Chamoun government, for its close ties with Washington and its endorsement of the Eisenhower Doctrine, furnished the armed opposition, with additional weapons and even some Syrian volunteers. The Lebanese president and his foreign minister, Charles Malik, lobbied the Eisenhower administration tenaciously, claiming that their troubles stemmed from their outspoken support of the Eisenhower Doctrine and of the West. Moscow and Cairo had targeted Lebanon as a result. Lebanon thus represented a test case of American resolve. When it became known in early May 1958 that Chamoun definitely planned to use his control of parliament to obtain another six years in office, tremors shook the land of the cedars. On May 13th, conscious that they sat on a bubbling volcano, Chamoun and Malik sought Washington's commitment to provide military force if the Lebanese government was in imminent danger.

Eisenhower gave the Lebanese leaders that assurance on the same day they asked for it—even though neither he nor his administration had sufficiently analyzed the question. On one hand, administration officials knew from the cables of the United States' Ambassador to Lebanon, Robert McGintock, that Chamoun had stirred the Lebanese cauldron: both Eisenhower and Dulles were aware of Chamoun's overreaching. On the other hand, administration officials also knew of Nasser's efforts against Chamoun. Nonetheless, there had been no systematic attempt in the administration to sort out the conflicting information or ascribe a relative weight to each cause. The administration had hardly considered whether Chamoun caused more trouble than he was worth, whether suitable alternatives to Chamoun existed, and whether American interests required that he leave office regardless of Nasser's meddling. The Eisenhower administration had failed to weigh its options. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles focused instead on the need to back a pro-Western government that Nasser and also allegedly the Soviet Union opposed.

Eisenhower's promise was imprudent. Even though contingency plans for a Lebanese intervention had been prepared with Britain, Eisenhower had barely considered the scope of a military deployment, the likelihood and extent of hostilities, or the local, regional and international implications of intervention. When making the decision, Eisenhower told his Secretary of
State that he thought Chamoun might have to leave office to resolve the Lebanese conflict; Eisenhower, however, did not stress the point. Dulles’ message to Chamoun setting forth the U.S. promise, likewise, underemphasized that issue.

Once he had the U.S. commitment in hand, “blank checks” as Ambassador McClintock wrote shortly later, Chamoun lost whatever limited incentive that he previously had to compromise with the opposition: a problem when the cause of the Lebanese conflict was largely domestic and opposition demands on the whole reasonable. Dulles now feared that Chamoun would unnecessarily call on U.S. troops. The Secretary of State tried to emphasize to the Lebanese president that the United States viewed military intervention as a last resort to protect Lebanon from aggression, not to help Chamoun achieve his personal ambition. Dulles advised Chamoun to resolve Lebanon’s problems short of calling on the Marines.

Lebanese strife increased; rebellion ensued against Chamoun’s government. Though fighting was sporadic and destruction relatively limited, the government’s previously tenuous hold over many Moslem, Druze, and Christian areas crumbled completely as private sectarian militias rose to the fore. The government even lost control over the Moslem half of Beirut. General Chehab limited the participation of the Lebanese army in the fray. He blamed Chamoun for the revolt, feared that Lebanon’s multi-confessional army would disintegrate, and sought to preserve a positive image among the various Lebanese factions so that he might one day serve as a unifying figure in Lebanon. Eventually, a stalemate ensued, in which there were periodic skirmishes and in which each of the parties controlled different slices of territory.

II. Caught Off Guard

While the United States was poised to intervene in Lebanon, the dam burst elsewhere. On July 14, 1958, the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq—a founding member of the Baghdad Pact, staunchly pro-Western, anti-Nasserist and anti-Soviet—fell in a military coup d’État. King Feisal II, Crown Prince ’Abd al Illah—indeed, most of the royal family—and veteran Prime Minister Nuri es-Sa‘id were killed. A group of Iraqi Free Officers, led by Brigadier ’Abd al-Karim Qassem and his aide, Colonel ’Abd al-Salam Aref, led a quick and successful military revolt. Once in power, they abolished the monarchy, arrested supporters of the old regime, withdrew Iraq from its federation with Jordan, and declared that Iraq would no longer attend Baghdad Pact meetings. The Soviet Union and UAR recognized the new
regime on July 15th. Iraq proceeded to open diplomatic relations with communist countries.\(^{36}\)

American and British officials had known that the Iraqi monarchy was unpopular with its subjects, who resented Britain's long-standing political and commercial influence in Iraq, and Iraq's staggering economic inequality. The timing, success, and brutality of the coup nevertheless shocked Western policymakers. Iraqi, British and United States' intelligence services had failed to discover the existence of the Free Officers or any immediate threat to the monarchy.\(^{37}\) Lebanon and Jordan, instead, had been considered vulnerable.

London immediately saw Nasser's fingerprints on the Iraqi coup. British officials believed that Nasser, following on the heels of Suez, sought to liquidate their remaining positions in the Middle East.\(^{38}\) Indeed, Hashemite Iraq was their last powerful Arab ally. American policy-makers wavered as to the exact source of the Iraqi coup. Sometimes, they blamed Nasser; at other times, a Nasserist-Soviet conspiracy.\(^{39}\) Neither the American nor British policy-makers believed that the coup, despite a large outpouring of Iraqi public support, was homegrown as was in fact the case.

Even though Hashemite Iraq was a British client, the United States nevertheless considered the regime critical to the Western position in the Middle East.\(^{40}\) As a Baghdad Pact member, Iraq played a key role in the defense against the USSR and radicalism.\(^{41}\) Eisenhower and his advisors panicked: they believed that the demise of remaining pro-Western regimes in the area was imminent. Conservative resistance to radicalism was collapsing. Allen Dulles predicted a Middle Eastern domino effect: "If the Iraq coup succeeds it seems almost inevitable that it will set up a chain reaction which will doom the pro-West governments of Lebanon and Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and raise grave problems for Turkey and Iran."\(^{42}\) American and British officials feared that a Nasserist wave would sweep Kuwait.\(^{43}\) Eisenhower suspected that Nasser sought to "get control of" the West's oil supply.\(^{44}\) Regimes that survived might lose confidence in Washington and distance themselves from it.\(^{45}\)

Eisenhower felt that tangible action had to be taken:

This somber turn of events could, without a vigorous response on our part, result in a complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East. . . That morning . . . I gathered in my office a group of advisers . . . Because of my long study of the problem, this was one meeting to which my mind was practically made up regarding the general line of action we should take, even before we met.\(^{46}\)

When Chamoun's appeal for U.S. intervention reached the White House,
Eisenhower ordered the Sixth Fleet to proceed to Lebanon. Eisenhower sought, at a minimum, to safeguard the Lebanese regime from any Nasserist or Soviet takeover, and to assure pro-Western countries in the Middle East and Central Asia that the United States protected its friends. The deployment was limited to primarily the Beirut airport, harbor and adjacent shore. Despite all of Eisenhower’s purported certainty on what needed to be done and all of the discussion within the administration during the prior few months, there had been little thought on how the troops would actually support the Lebanese government; nor had there been much contemplation of the scope of operations necessary to deal with this regional crisis.

Several American allies advocated United States’ intervention in Iraq. King Saud of Saudi Arabia insisted that the “Baghdad powers intervene” in Iraq or “[w]hat is the use of all these pacts?” He “demand[ed] action at once, stating that if the United States and United Kingdom do not act now they are finished as powers in the Mid-East.” King Hussein of Jordan urged the same. Turkey considered moving unilaterally against the new Iraqi regime.

The British leadership advocated essentially Suez II. In a telephone conversation on July 15, 1958, British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, told President Eisenhower that “if we do this thing with the Lebanese it is only really part of a much larger operation, because we will be driven to take the thing as a whole . . . .” Eisenhower did not swallow the bait: “so far as we are concerned, as of this moment we can’t talk about anything happening elsewhere. . . .” Macmillan persisted:

If this thing is done, which I think is very noble, dear friend, it will set off a lot of things throughout the whole area. I’m all for that as long as we regard it as an operation that has got to be carried through.

It was one thing for Macmillan to seek assurance that the administration would not leave Britain in the lurch if the American intervention prompted the sabotage of oil pipelines and facilities as occurred during Suez. It was another matter for a British leader to advocate an extensive Middle Eastern war. Eisenhower became extremely concerned:

Now just a minute so that there is no misunderstanding. Are you of the belief that unless we have made up our minds in advance to carry this thing on through to the Persian Gulf, that we had better not go in the first place? . . . I will tell you of course I would not want to go further.

Eisenhower, one not normally shy at using presidential prerogatives, wrapped
himself in the United States Constitution: "If we are now planning the initiation of a big operation that could run all the way through Syria and Iraq, we are far beyond anything I have to [the?] power to do constitutionally. . ."56

Macmillan nevertheless persevered and immediately wrote to Eisenhower that:

... we are quite prepared to face these risks if it is part of a determination between us both to face the issues and be prepared to protect Jordan with the hope of restoring the situation in Iraq. . . But what I would like to feel is that it is our joint intention, not merely to be content with rescuing Lebanon (not very important in itself) but to face the wider issues together.57

Tories had not lost their belief that military force was the solution to radical Arab nationalism. Now, however, chastised by Suez, they first sought American permission and cooperation.

A few points are in order at this juncture. Eisenhower told Dulles that he "agreed with Macmillan" that the United States "can't sit down in Lebanon and do nothing, while the British are taking the hard knocks all over the area. . ."58 So the United States would not leave Britain in the lurch if British oil facilities were sabotaged. Eisenhower, moreover, desired British political support for the American intervention in Lebanon.59 He even wanted British forces to be available if the Western position in the Persian Gulf completely collapsed. However, he considered British eagerness to have the United States "clear. . . up the whole Mid-East situation. . ." inappropriate, premature and dangerous.60

Dulles received similar British pressure.61 He doubted the wisdom of any attempted U.S. overhaul of the Middle East:

If we go in, our action is likely to accentuate the anti-Western feeling of the Arab Masses. While the governments of Iraq [Iran?] Saudi Arabia and Jordan want us to intervene, it is not clear that this action will prevent them from being overthrown . . . . Our intervention would not therefore be likely to be a quick and easy solution.62

"To intervene militarily [beyond Lebanon] would introduce problems that we have not even considered."63 To ensure that Britain did not take any action inimical to the United States interest, Dulles had British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, come to the United States.64
President Eisenhower did consider Western intervention in Iraq. However, he refused to render a hasty decision. The Iraqi coup had taken the United States by surprise. As Dulles remarked, the United States had long planned for intervention in Lebanon and “had thought about many contingencies, but the Iraq development was a new one.” Unlike Lebanon, intervention in Iraq was a much greater undertaking. Pertinent contingency plans did not exist. Eisenhower wanted to see how the Middle Eastern situation unfolded. As he told Macmillan, “If this situation develops where our whole national interests are abandoned and destroyed”—that is, if other important pro-Western governments collapsed, then Eisenhower might consider more extensive action.

III. Jordan

Even though King Hussein had not asked for American or British troops, London was nevertheless eager to send them. On July 14th, Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower that they should “urge the King to make his request at once, since if our military support is to be effective and have a real impact upon the whole Middle East, it will have to be given promptly.” Eisenhower did not respond.

On July 16th, the United States received intelligence reports that a Nasserist plot against King Hussein was set for the next day. After the information was rushed to King Hussein, he appealed for Western forces. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, at the administration’s direction, ordered the Commander of the Sixth Fleet, Vice Admiral Charles Brown, to “[s]tand by to evacuate King Hussein from Amman” with two carrier-based propeller airplanes (which typically carry up to twenty-five individuals) and to provide such aircraft with “appropriate air cover.” Although Eisenhower and Dulles made provision to extricate King Hussein from Jordan, they were disinclined to “save” the country.

Eisenhower and Dulles were likewise unenthusiastic about British intervention, questioning its “need” and “desirability.” Some in the administration questioned “British motives,” perhaps fearing that Britain might try to snare the United States into a large Middle Eastern operation as it attempted to during Suez. In the end, however, despite deep reservations, Eisenhower and Dulles decided not to object to British plans to send paratroopers to Jordan. They reluctantly agreed, feeling it was a close call. While they would provide Britain with logistical support if necessary, they would not provide troops.

The British intervention almost met catastrophe at the start. As British
africa ferrying the paratroopers from Cyprus crossed Israeli airspace, Israeli fighter-planes fired warning shots at them, forcing the British to turn back. London had not sought permission to traverse Israeli airspace. As Macmillan recognized in his diary, the Jordanian intervention was poised to become another British debacle: if Israel had shot down or intercepted a British transport, "a terrible disaster, which would . . . have resulted in the collapse of all our policies and the fall of the Government. . . ." Repeated United States diplomatic intercession was needed to procure Israeli consent to British overflights over the next few weeks.74

In addition, once the flights resumed, it became evident that Britain hardly could pull off even this modest intervention. Britain lacked suitable means to supply by air its approximately two thousand paratroopers with necessary ammunition, weapons and petroleum, and had to call for American assistance.75 Selwyn Lloyd informed Dulles that British paratroopers in Jordan were "logistically and military . . . in an exposed position."76 Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower that "your Globemasters are so much bigger than any of our aircraft that the job could be done with far fewer sorties."77 By getting the United States to shoulder the logistics problem, Britain hoped to stifle Israeli objections to overflights and to get needed provisions that even absent the Israeli problem were arriving too slowly.78 The steady decline in British military strength since World War II now reached the point that Britain's status as a power, let alone a great one, was questionable in the Eastern Mediterranean.79 During July, Britain and Jordan beseeched the United States to send troops.80 Eisenhower agreed to send supplies and rescue British forces if necessary. In the third week of July, the United States even sent a demonstration flight of American aircraft over Jordan.81 Using the Congress and public opinion as an excuse, however, Eisenhower would go no farther and refused the request for troops.82

IV. The International Arena

Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev charged that the Anglo-American interventions threatened world peace. He proposed a five power conference, in which the heads of government of the United States, the USSR, Great Britain, France and India would meet.83 Though the British were eager to meet the Soviets, the Eisenhower administration did not want a high-level public confrontation with Khrushchev. The administration seemed to fear that such a confrontation would hurt the United States' image before developing countries. Washington's stance also reflected continuing ambivalence as to whether Nasser was a Soviet puppet or represented a separate, home-grown, non-communist force in the Arab world. The Eisenhower adminis-
V. Developing an Overall U.S. Strategy

Only once American troops were in Lebanon did the Eisenhower administration begin to clarify its goals. By July 16, 1958, Eisenhower concluded that he could not “send our troops further than Lebanon,” ruling out an invasion of Iraq. Eisenhower and Dulles wrote off the country as lost to Nasser and his Soviet sponsor—at least for the time being. Fear of confrontation with the USSR played little role in the decision: a consensus existed within the administration from the beginning of the crisis that the risk of a Soviet military response was low. Secretary of State Dulles stated that “[a]t the present time the Soviets do not have long range missiles, at least in any quantity. Nor do they have a substantial long-range air capability . . . .” Their long-range missiles are not ready . . . .” The Soviet Union “did not . . . wish. . . . to risk general war.”

In addition, Eisenhower decided that he lacked legal justification to move into Iraq and thus, perhaps, lacked sufficient political cover at home and abroad to act further. Eisenhower explained to General Nathan Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Brigadier General Andrew Goodpaster, the White House Staff Secretary, that the United States needed a “moral ground” on which to intervene: an appeal from the home government would suffice. “If, however, our only argument is economic—saying that the life of the western world depends upon access to oil in the Middle East—this would be quite different, and quite inferior to a purpose that rests on the right to govern by consent of the governed.” In Eisenhower’s opinion, U.S. forces had entered Lebanon at the request of its legally-constituted government. No such request, however, would issue from Baghdad.

Other factors in the Eisenhower administration’s decision seem to have included the assumption that Iraq was truly a British concern and thus not as important to the United States. It became clear, moreover, that intervention was infeasible. The old Iraqi regime had been leveled: most of its supporters were on the run, under arrest, or dead. Unlike Lebanon, there was no significant group or individual around which Western intervention could be based. Secretary Dulles told the president on July 15, 1958 that “as far as Lebanon was concerned, we were on pretty solid ground—that there was a large segment of the population on our side there. In the other countries, the thing might blow up. . . .” The new Iraqi government controlled the country, possessed the support of the army, and enjoyed broad public favor.
addition, the flow of Middle Eastern oil to the West from the Middle East continued unhampered.\textsuperscript{93} Dulles informed the British government that the administration deemed the Iraqi situation irretrievable. He reached an agreement with British Foreign Secretary Lloyd that they would seek to “retain . . . positions along the Persian Gulf—Kuwait, Abadan, Dhahran, [and] Bahrain,” and that neither side would “back a military effort to retake Iraq.”\textsuperscript{94} Better late than never, Eisenhower had finally settled American strategic priorities, drawing the line around Lebanon and the Gulf.\textsuperscript{95} By writing off Iraq, the Eisenhower administration backed away ever so consequently from blind belief in the applicability of the domino theory in the Middle East.

VI. Resolving the Lebanese Situation

President Eisenhower had placed military forces in Lebanon without clear military or political goals. The troops had no specific orders beyond limited deployments in Beirut. The President dispatched to Lebanon, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Robert Murphy, whom he had known since the North African campaign during World War II. After arriving in Beirut, Murphy cabled Washington that the “mere presence of our forces in a small coastal portion of the country seems to have brought no fundamental change in the local political climate,” his surprise representative of a peculiarly naive belief prevalent in the administration.\textsuperscript{96} Although the Lebanese rebels were scared by the destructive potential of U.S. forces, the Lebanese conflict did not disappear with the arrival of the Marines.\textsuperscript{97} Fearing that the United States might not gain anything from the intervention, Eisenhower and Dulles decided that they needed to work on an exit strategy.\textsuperscript{98} Upon meeting Chamoun, Murphy was shocked to discover that the Lebanese president had not left “his residence for 67 days” or even “dared to look out of the window of his house.”\textsuperscript{99} Murphy’s early cables to Washington painted a portrait of a disturbed man.\textsuperscript{100} Murphy concluded almost immediately that the key to solving the Lebanese problem was in Chamoun leaving office and electing a new Lebanese president.\textsuperscript{101} Murphy did not recommend at any time that U.S. forces subdue the Lebanese opposition. He thought that the Lebanese problem was amenable to a political solution.\textsuperscript{102} Eisenhower and Dulles endorsed Murphy’s approach and agreed that U.S. troops should not attack the rebels.\textsuperscript{103} Eisenhower came to believe that a severe anti-American backlash in the Middle East might arise if the United
States acted too forcefully in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{104}

With U.S. troops in Beirut, however, Chamoun pressed for military action, including an attack on the UAR. A negotiated solution was far from his mind; he was more inflexible than ever.\textsuperscript{105} Murphy ignored Chamoun’s entreaties and canvassed a diverse group of Lebanese on potential presidential candidates. Most factions, except those aligned with Chamoun, found General Chehab acceptable.\textsuperscript{106} Chamoun dragged his feet, frequently complaining about a lack of American resolve in fighting communism. Nonetheless, Chamoun could do little to stop Murphy—for if Chamoun had power, he would not have summoned the Sixth Fleet. Chamoun, who was on record as having advocated Chehab as a suitable presidential candidate in the past, reluctantly gave his blessing on the ground that Chehab constituted the only choice even remotely acceptable to him.\textsuperscript{107} Although the Lebanese presidential election did not have to occur until September 23, 1958, Murphy pressed that it be held immediately. Murphy left Lebanon on July 30, 1958 and on the next day, the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies elected Chehab president, to assume office on September 23, 1958.\textsuperscript{108}

In promoting Chehab’s candidacy, Washington took a chance. Chehab did not talk the same anti-Communist and anti-Nasserist game that had so endeared Chamoun and Malik to the Eisenhower administration. While all agreed that Chehab was pleasant and professional, little was known about his views. Originally he had opposed American intervention.\textsuperscript{109} While Chehab had been endorsed by most Lebanese parties, he had the dubious honor of bearing Nasser’s imprimatur.\textsuperscript{110} Fearing the disintegration of Lebanon’s multi-confessional army, Chehab still refused, despite American pressure, to use his army against the opposition. Murphy nonetheless suspected that Chehab was a Lebanese patriot and would not merge Lebanon into the UAR.\textsuperscript{111}

The Lebanese opposition continued to demand an immediate U.S. withdrawal. Though Chehab had opposed the entry of the Marines, now that he was president-elect, he wanted them to remain—at least for a while. Chehab contended that the American presence deterred Nasser from supplying the opposition with weapons and volunteers, and would enable the Lebanese army to disarm private militias. Chehab did not want to become titular head of a country ruled by war lords. With American military forces potentially at his disposal, Chehab’s hand was strengthened as he tried to create a new Lebanese political order.\textsuperscript{112} However ill-thought out the initial introduction of United States troops to Lebanon, now that they were there, they played a role in bringing about peace. At the same time, the political settlement that the Eisenhower administration promoted, in which Chehab replaced Chamoun, likely could have been engineered earlier in the year without resort
to the Marines. The settlement constituted tacit admission by Washington that the Lebanese problem had its roots primarily in the land of thecedars, not the Nile.

VII. The Jordanian Dilemma

Insofar as the Eisenhower administration derived satisfaction from the Lebanese intervention, they found none in Jordan. Even though King Hussein was pro-Western, administration skepticism about the value of maintaining Hashemite Jordan increased after the British deployment. Eisenhower reflected on July 20th, that “for the West to save Jordan may be largely a ‘beau geste’. . . it is very questionable whether we should get into the position of supporting Kings against their people.”

Jordan was isolated, under a virtual blockade, bordered by a hostile UAR (Syria) and Iraq, a cold Saudi Arabia, and an enemy by Jordanian choice, Israel. The port of Aqaba was Jordan’s lifeline: the kingdom had no overland supply of petroleum from its neighbors.

The country lacked economic resources: all of its expenditures were funded by foreign contributions, the Arab component of which now ceased. King Hussein enjoyed little support among his subjects. The King and his Prime Minister, Samir al-Rifai pleaded for U.S. backing. British leaders knew at this point that an invasion of Iraq out of question: now they just wanted U.S. help to prevent a second Hashemite collapse.

In an option referred to as “fortress Jordan” and circulated within the Eisenhower administration, the United States would try to fabricate an iron throne for King Hussein: that is, provide Jordan with such massive military and economic assistance that the Hashemite kingdom could survive a hostile domestic and external environment. The bill would amount to approximately $100 million a year on top of the annual $50 million that Jordan already needed: a huge some for a tiny country at that time. Dulles ruled out “fortress Jordan” as too expensive and not worth the investment. The Eisenhower administration agreed to fund Jordan’s ordinary budgetary needs for the current and upcoming year; it would not promise funding beyond the coming year.

Dulles was torn. On one hand, he felt that King Hussein’s position was hopeless and that Jordan was not a viable entity. Dulles was cognizant that Britain had created Jordan after the First World War, that Britain had installed and maintained the Hashemites, and that King Hussein’s hold over his population was tenuous. On the other hand, Dulles realized that any change in Jordan portended Middle Eastern chaos: a pro-Nasser government in Amman or an attempt to merge Jordan into the UAR would increase
Israeli fears—they had a vulnerable border in the east. Israel might seek to create a new defensive line at the Jordan River and occupy the West Bank. An Arab-Israeli war might occur, enhancing Soviet opportunities to curry Arab support.\textsuperscript{120}

VIII. International Negotiations

With Lebanon looking increasingly positive from the American perspective at the end of July, the United States tried to open some diplomatic channels. At Dulles' instruction, Robert Murphy undertook a Middle East tour that brought him to Cairo on August 6, 1958. His meeting with Nasser got off to a difficult start, Nasser indicating that he feared the American military presence in the area; he suspected that the United States would use an upcoming meeting of the UN Security Council to attack him. A skillful diplomat, Murphy treated Nasser like a confidant. Murphy tried to convince Nasser that this visit from an American representative was different than others. Nasser was treated to a detailed briefing on Murphy's activities in Lebanon. Nasser warmed up and indicated some potential flexibility on issues of U.S. concern.\textsuperscript{121}

At the same time, the United States became open to a United Nations meeting; perhaps the Soviet Union and UAR would lend a constructive hand in resolving the Lebanese and Jordanian crises.\textsuperscript{122} In early August, a Special Emergency Session of the General Assembly was convened.\textsuperscript{123} In a series of separate meetings with UAR Foreign Minister Fawzi and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York, Dulles tried to secure Lebanon and Jordan from foreign interference. The negotiating tactic that Dulles employed is astonishing. In a defeatist, confessional tone, Dulles told each of them that the United States had a weak hand in Jordan. He did not accuse the USSR of causing or exacerbating Lebanese and Jordanian distress; instead, Dulles told Gromyko that:

He did not see clearly how to keep Jordan going or how to face the consequences of its collapse. Jordan was originally created by the British as a base as an alternative to the one they had at Suez. It was subsidized by them. . . Now the United States is supporting it. It has no resources. No solution has been found for the problem of Arab refugees. It is nothing but a headache. The Secretary said that he had been unable to thing of any program that would not reopen the Israeli war.\textsuperscript{124}

Dulles told Fawzi that:
If the UAR really wanted to take over Jordan, they could probably do so since the United States was not willing to go to all lengths, including a commitment for substantial financial assistance over a an extended period of time, to keep Jordan out of UAR hands.

Dulles, who believed that Iraq was controlled by pro-Nasser figures, even raised the possibility of an Iraqi-Jordanian “association.” The only reason that Dulles offered to Fawzi against a Nasserist takeover of Jordan was that it would impose too great a financial burden on the UAR. Dulles’ candor: King Hussein had to go and Jordan had to enter the Arab fold—that is, follow Nasser’s lead. Fawzi, confident that King Hussein would not survive once Britain withdrew its forces, suggested that all interested parties cease interfering in Jordan. Let the chips fall where they may.

Dulles did not want a mutual non-interference agreement; he wanted an Egyptian non-interference agreement. Dulles pressed Fawzi for a commitment. In return for complete Western military withdrawals from Lebanon and Jordan, Fawzi agreed. On August 21, 1958, with the Dulles-Fawzi understanding having cleared the way, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved a resolution, sponsored by ten Arab states including the UAR, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq that instructed the UN Secretary-General to make “arrangements” that “help in upholding” the “[UN] Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan . . . and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries.”

Dulles was confident that Lebanon would hold its own after the American withdrawal. Regarding Jordan and its king, Dulles did not labor under any illusion that he had arranged a new lease on life for it. Dulles merely hoped for a grace period in which there could be an “honorable evolution” in Jordan. Dulles believed that as a starter, King Hussein would have to dump his overtly pro-Western Prime Minister and replace him with someone more acceptable to Arab nationalists. Dulles even had the United States chargé d’affaires in Jordan, Thomas Wright, explore this prospect. Dulles hoped that a cabinet could be assembled that would satisfy Arab nationalists yet not strike fear among Israelis. Dulles told Jordanian officials to reach an understanding with their Arab neighbors that would lift the blockade. Dulles thought that an even more far-reaching change in Amman was likely. With a breather, the West would have the option of loosening some of its ties with the Hashemite kingdom and would not suffer the same degree of embarrassment that would occur if the country folded immediately after the withdrawal of British forces.

King Hussein realized that Britain was powerless to maintain his throne.
and that United States' support was shaky. Suitably skeptical of UAR promises whispered to Dulles at the United Nations, the King's despair deepened. To British officials, Dulles' approach was bitter medicine. Britain had to withdraw. Macmillan and Lloyd, however, never lost hope: they looked to the promised break in UAR subversion as a period during which the United States might change its mind and embrace Hussein.

IX. The Withdrawals From Lebanon and Jordan

In Lebanon, a gradual United States withdrawal was underway, the final departure set for the end of October. Chehab, the president-elect and chief of staff, did not reassert government authority in the country nearly as quickly as American officials desired. Nonetheless, Syrian volunteers returned home. Chehab succeeded in reopening the Moslem sector of Beirut. Chehab wanted to compromise with the non-Maronite opposition, not subdue it, and his approach brought incremental results.

When Chehab assumed office on September 23, 1958, a strike was announced in Maronite communities. The Maronite Phalange militia began violent attacks that underscored their antagonism to and Chamoun's displeasure with Chehab's planned cabinet, which was devoid of Maronites, instead consisting of the former Moslem and Druze opposition. With American mediation, this latest twist in the Lebanese saga was resolved. Chehab found an acceptable formula that included both Moslems and Maronites in the government.

The United States and Britain completed their withdrawals by October 25, 1958, ahead of schedule. The change that U.S. policy on Lebanon underwent between July and October was reflected in an October discussion at the National Security Council between the Secretary of State and his brother, Allen Dulles, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Allen Dulles declared the new Lebanese cabinet anti-Western. Foster Dulles disagreed strongly, stating that the "new government was not really anti-American" and had the virtue of getting along with Arab nationalists. Time proved Foster Dulles correct. The new Lebanese Prime Minister, Rashid Karame, once considered by many American officials an anti-Western leftist, sought United States' financial assistance, even considered endorsing the Eisenhower Doctrine to get the money (only to be dissuaded by Ambassador McClintock), and even had a successful visit with President Eisenhower in 1959. Allen Dulles reflected the old, narrow-minded tendency to view any Arab leader who espoused anything less than the Cold War gospel as anti-Western. Foster Dulles represented the new subtle and dis-
criminating approach to Arab politics.

X. Anglo-American Relations with the New Iraqi Regime and the Qassem-Nasser Split

As for Iraq, the place where the '58 Crisis-ignited, change remained the order of the day. As British officials emerged from the shock of losing their long-standing Iraqi friends and accepted, albeit with disappointment, the American decision against intervention, they reconsidered whether they had too hastily determined that all of the new Iraqi leaders were Nasserists. While Nasser's picture appeared all over Baghdad after the coup, there were indications, for the observant, in Qassem's early proclamations, that he might not be a pan-Arabist.\textsuperscript{146} By July 18, 1958, Macmillan noticed that there was "quite a chance . . . from the character of the men and some of their first statements that they may turn out to be more Iraqi nationalist than Nasserite."\textsuperscript{147} A few days later, British officials contemplated "establishing good relations with the new Iraqi Government and building it up as a counterpart to the power of the UAR."\textsuperscript{148} Considering how reflexive British Middle Eastern policy had been since 1955, the British government began to show significant open-mindedness and flexibility.

While British policy-makers rapidly discerned promising elements in the chaos of revolutionary Iraq, it took their American counterparts much longer. American officials were convinced that the new Iraqi regime was fully in Nasser's grip and even expected its incorporation in the UAR.\textsuperscript{149} Although Eisenhower and Allen Dulles thought it possible that Nasserism and pan-Arabism might be overcome eventually by latent, state-based nationalism in the Arab world, they never imagined that such a development could occur in 1958.\textsuperscript{150} They did not pick up the signs of this phenomenon nearly as quickly as British policy-makers did. Only by late August 1958, did information reach the top echelon of the Eisenhower administration that Nasserists and other pan-Arabists faced vigorous opposition within Iraq.\textsuperscript{151}

The two top figures in the Iraqi coup, Brigadier Qassem and Colonel Aref, quickly fell out with each other in a dispute mixing personal ambition and ideology. Aref led pan-Arabist forces favoring Iraq's immediate accession to the UAR. Qassem, in the words of British ambassador to Iraq, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, was "not prepared to accept Arab unity at the price of subordinating himself to Nasser and Iraq to Egypt" on the other hand.\textsuperscript{152} Qassem led a diverse coalition of Iraqis opposed to pan-Arabism. Although Qassem supported inter-Arab cooperation in specific circumstances, at bottom, he was not a pan-Arabist: he was an Iraqi nationalist. He opposed
incorporating Iraq into a unitary Arab state. He believed strongly in the existence of an independent Iraq and in fostering a form of Iraqi nationalism, in which Iraq's ethnically and religiously heterogeneous population of Arabs, Kurds and Turcomans, and Sunni and Shi'i Muslims could unite. Qassem led the Iraqi revolution to end, what he perceived as, Iraq's humiliation before the West—not that of the entire Arab world. Qassem's avowed anti-imperialism and neutralism comported with his Iraqi nationalism. He wanted to use Iraq's petroleum resources to benefit Iraqis, not Arab masses stretched from Algeria to Syria. At essence, Qassem appears to have believed that he had not freed Iraq from British tutelage to hand it over to Nasser.\textsuperscript{153}

By September, Qassem had prevailed over Aref.\textsuperscript{154} He dismissed Nasserist and other pan-Arabist officials from the government. As Middle East scholar Malcolm Kerr has written, Qassem posed a serious obstacle to Nasser's drive for power in the Arab world. Qassem was a "revolutionary" who "failed to cooperate in the march towards Arab unity. . . ."

Had he been just another reactionary, like King Husayn or Nuri al-Sa'id, he would have posed no serious threat to Nasir's moral prestige, and the line of counter-attack would have been clear and familiar. . . But of course he was no reactionary: he was a flaming radical, a hero to the slum dwellers of Baghdad, the enemy of Nasir's presumed imperialist enemies and a friend of Nasir's presumed friend, the Soviet Union. Qasim showed signs of a certain mass appeal.

Qassem, thus, "posed a threat to the integrity of the Syrian-Egyptian union." Qassem paid no homage to Nasser unlike other Arab leaders, [and] chucked Nasser's "suspected admirers in jail by the thousands. . . ."\textsuperscript{155}

The Nasser-Qassem feud became vitriolic, and would eventually force Nasser "to mend his relations with the Jordanian and Saudi Arabian governments," as well as with the United States. The fight dominated regional foreign affairs for at least the next year.\textsuperscript{156} With the Nasser-Qassem split, radical nationalism in the Arab world revealed two different faces: one pan-Arabist, and the other local and state-centered.

The British hunch, formed after their initial hysteria following the Iraqi coup, about the independent path that Iraq might take, proved accurate. During the months following the coup, Qassem exhibited temperance on issues of British concern. He kept his promise, made immediately after the coup, that Iraq would honor existing oil agreements. Even though Qassem had ended Iraq's participation in the Baghdad Pact, he delayed Iraq's formal secession from it. He allowed Britain to resume certain military overflights over Iraq. Although Anglo-Iraqi relations were far from what they had been
under the monarchy and although Iraq propagandized against Britain, the
two countries reached an uneasy, yet functional, relationship. The Iraqi
Petroleum Company (IPC), which was nearly three-quarters British-owned,
operated relatively unhindered.157

United States-Iraqi relations, nonetheless, never reached the modest
Anglo-Iraqi level.158 Though the Eisenhower administration extended low-
key feelers to the new regime in August—offering to resume some military
and economic assistance programs—it is clear from declassified records that
the administration never adequately grasped the strategic import of the
Nasser-Qassem rift on the regional balance of power, despite the potential for
an immense reduction in Nasserist pressure on pro-American countries such
as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Arguably the United States did not sufficiently
try to reach out to Qassem and exploit the breach with Nasser.

At the same time, it is equally clear that at least certain figures in the new
Iraqi regime were deeply antagonistic to the United States. As August pro-
gressed, the focus of Iraqi propaganda attacks shifted from Britain to the
United States. American officials were perplexed. British diplomats appear
to have been the first to recognize the source of change: communist influence
was growing in the Iraqi government and in Iraqi society. Qassem relied, in
part, on communists in his campaign against Arab nationalists.159 No later
than the beginning of October, even Eisenhower knew that Iraq had
embarked on a path independent of Nasser.160 Yet, he could find not satis-
faction in this development. Just as the United States was pulling its forces
out of Lebanon, communism—ever so worse in Eisenhower’s eyes than rad-
ical Arab nationalism—began to rear its head in Iraq. The administration
that had so often conflated communism and Arab nationalism gained addi-
tional sensitivity to the difference.

XI

The 1958 Middle Eastern Crisis marked an important stage in United
States’ relations with Great Britain and with the Arab world. From the Iraqi
coup of July through the troop withdrawals in October, much of the crisis
transpired in the shadow of Suez. The first contacts between Washington
and London after the Iraqi coup illustrated the degree of suspicion and anx-
xiety that had come to permeate the trans-Atlantic “special relationship.”
Eisenhower and Dulles mistrusted London. Cognizant of the divergence in
Anglo-American interests in the Middle East and apprehensive that Britain
again might try to draw the United States into conflicts of British choosing,
Eisenhower and Dulles placed Britain on a short leash this time.
Concurrently, they maintained solid lines of communication with London to help Whitehall avoid another catastrophic misunderstanding of American views.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the dark days of 1956 had taught British leaders that their country's economic and military weakness precluded action independent of the United States. British leaders, however, had not given up their dreams of Suez; that is, of dealing radical Arab nationalism a devastating blow on the field of battle. In 1958, they thought that the key was to induce the United States to assume the lead and, at times, they were not beyond attempting to finagle Washington to their ends. While British officials had learned some lessons from Suez, they had not grasped one of the most important: the United States feared British perfidy.

Likewise, while Nasser, Chamoun and King Hussein each had derived lessons from Suez, albeit different ones, the '58 Crisis disabused them of a few, at least temporarily. Suez had fueled Nasser's ambition; the Anglo-American interventions in Lebanon and Jordan sobered him for a time. Likewise, Britain's decline after Suez and Nasser's concomitant rise had inspired Lebanese President Chamoun and Jordanian King Hussein to enhance their anti-Communist credentials to draw additional U.S. support, and it worked. Both men discovered during the '58 Crisis, however, the limits of such a strategy. Anti-communism did not always ensure unconditional and permanent American backing, especially if Washington deemed the anti-communist detrimental to the West's overall position in the Middle East or the Cold War in general.

The '58 Crisis is also notable for President Eisenhower's good fortune. The United States' military entered Lebanon without a defined mission. Eisenhower had not decided on whether the intervention would extend to other countries. Militias opposing Chamoun could have initiated a guerrilla war against U.S. forces. Eisenhower, who had brought the troops home from Korea, risked placing U.S. soldiers in the middle of a civil conflict that he little understood, a potential quagmire. Eisenhower was blessed in that American forces did not become involved in fighting before he arrived at a strategy: otherwise, his options might of narrowed if United States had become a combatant in a civil war.

Though it took a few days, Eisenhower and Dulles eventually opted against invading Iraq or attempting to rollback radical Arab nationalism. They limited their goals to preserving Lebanon within the Western framework, trying to deter Nasser with a powerful show of American force, and to assuring pro-Western governments in the Middle East of the worth of siding with the United States. Eisenhower and Dulles exercised suitable flexibility in following Richard Murphy's lead. By shifting away from Chamoun, the
United States reduced its likelihood of becoming a combatant in Lebanese civil strife. In a neutral corner, American forces exercised a positive political influence, facilitating a political compromise between Maronites and their Moslem and Druze opposition—a solution that worked for almost a decade and a half. Even though the new Lebanese President, Fuad Chehab, and his Prime Minister, Rashid Karame, lowered Lebanon's profile as a citadel of anti-communism and of opposition to radical Arab nationalism, neither leader evinced a desire to merge their country into the UAR or align themselves against the United States. With initial luck and then skill, the Eisenhower administration successfully mixed diplomacy with a tangible threat to use force.

On the other hand, the Eisenhower Doctrine died a quiet death during the '58 Crisis—for it was too clumsy a vehicle to secure American interests. Before the Iraqi coup, the Eisenhower administration mistakenly had sought overt acceptance of the Doctrine by Arab governments and overt identification with the United States. At a time when many Arabs placed a high premium on independence from foreigners, the Eisenhower administration's effort possibly had contributed to the domestic weakening of the Lebanese and Jordanian regimes. The Eisenhower administration had forgotten that the actions of Arab governments were more important to American interests than formal adherence to the West in the Cold War.

Though unconsciously at first, as the '58 Crisis unfolded, the Eisenhower administration eliminated some of the hard edges of its Middle Eastern policy. In facilitating a Lebanese solution, the Eisenhower administration recognized that greater Lebanese neutrality did not harm any core U.S. interest in the Middle East. While the United States continued to support pro-Western regimes in oil-laden areas with military and economic assistance, the United States demanded less of them publicly. During the '58 Crisis, the Eisenhower administration had became more discerning than before of the difference between communism and Arab nationalism. Similarly, the administration became less prone to label a government or individual anti-Western by shallow and mistaken criteria. Eisenhower and Dulles had begun to learn the virtues of speaking softly and carrying a big stick.
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NOTES


2  Arab nationalism, which originally grew out of the weakening and eventual disintegration of the Ottoman empire, emphasized the linguistic, racial and cultural bonds of Arabs. Beyond that emphasis, the definition and goal of Arab nationalism varied widely depending on who rendered the definition and when. During the Fifties, a popular form of Arab nationalism was “pan-Arabism,” which sought to give all Arabs some greater form of political unity. Proposals varied from loose federalism to a unity state; exponents of pan-Arabism were both on the right and left. “Radical Arab nationalism” was frequently pan-Arab, anti-imperialist, neutralist, and socialist. “Nasserism” was form of radical Arab nationalism associated with Egyptian President Nasser, emphasizing his leadership of the movement. On the other hand, pre-coup Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri es-Sa'id, was a prominent pan-Arabist, closely associated with Britain, who promoted Arab unity under the Hashemite dynasty of Iraq.


7 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 199.


9 Pre-Press Conference Notes, August 21, 1957, DDE Diary Series, Whitman Files, Eisenhower Library, cited in Little, 72.

10 Little, “Cold War and Covert Action,” 73.


13 Little, “Cold War and Covert Action,” 73.


15 Gorges, Superpowers and the Middle East, 90-96. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 78-82. The formation of the UAR put both the
United States and the Soviet Union in a quandary. On one hand, Nasser's power had increased dramatically, placing immense pressure on pro-Western Arab countries to join the UAR or at least accept Egyptian hegemony. On the other hand, Nasser clamped down on Syrian communists, eliminating their opportunity to take over the country. See Gerges, 90-96.


18 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 20-21, Doc. 12, Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, April 3, 1958, 6 p.m.; FRUS microfiche supplement, Telegram 3274, April 1, 1958.


20 E.g. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 1-2, Doc. 1, Telegram from Embassy in Lebanon to Department of State, January 9, 1958, 6 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 3-5, Doc. 2, Telegram from Embassy in Lebanon to Department of State, January 16, 1958, 3 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 8-9, Doc. 5, Telegram from Embassy in Lebanon to Department of State, January 30, 1958, 3 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 23, Doc. 14, Telegram from Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, April 18, 1958, 2 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 27, fn. 6, summarizing letter from Malik to Secretary Dulles, May 11, 1958, Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/5-1258.

For example, both Chamoun and opposition leaders had at one time or another thought the commander of the Lebanese Army, General Fuad Chehab, suitable to become the next Lebanese president or prime minister. Chehab, however, declined so long as it appeared that Chamoun would exercise true control. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 24-25, Doc. 15, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, April 23, 1958, 4 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 29, Doc. 18, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 4, 1958, 8 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 31, Doc. 20, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 7, 1958, 5 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 35-36, Doc. 23, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 11, 1958, 5 p.m.


FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 73-74, Doc. 49, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon, May 23, 1958, 8:14 p.m. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, doc. 87, p. 142. FRUS microfiche supplement, June 19, 1958. FRUS XI, DOC 75, P. 118. Dulles, nevertheless, kept watering down his message by reas-
suring Chamoun that the United States stood by its promise of military force.


35 The Hashemites of Iraq were close blood relations of those in Jordan. The Hashemites originated from the Hejaz in the Arabian Peninsula. Because of the relationship Britain developed with the Hashemites during World War I, Britain placed two Hashemite princes, Abdullah and Feisal I, on the thrones of Jordan and Iraq respectively. Iraqi King Feisal II was the cousin of Jordanian King Hussein.


37 Memorandum From Harold W. Glidden of the Division of Research and Analysis for Near East, South Asia, and Africa to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) July 16, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, p. 322. See also Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 8-12.


39 Briefing Notes by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, July 14, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, pp. 308-309; Memorandum of a Conference With the

The United States had left Iraq in British hands: in view of the Saudi-Hashemite feud, which originated when both dynasties lived in the Arabian Peninsula, the division of labor made sense.

United States' relations with the Baghdad Pact were deep and extensive. For example, "[a]lthough not a member of the Pact, the United States was largely responsible for its formation and has consistently given it strong moral and material support. In April, 1956 the United States agreed to participate in the Pact's Economic an counter-subversion Committees. . . . in March of 1957, the United States accepted an invitation to participate in the work of the Pact's Military Committee." The United States distributed military largess to Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan according to the "force objectives approved by the Pact." FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XII, pp. 42-43, Doc. 12, Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Irwin to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, February 28, 1958.

FRUS 1958-1963, Vol. XII, p. 310, Doc. 110, Briefing Notes by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, July 14, 1958.

FRUS 1958-1963, Vol. XII, p. 84, Doc. 26, Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, July 20, 1958, 3:45 p.m.

FRUS 1958-1963, Vol. XI, p. 244, Doc. 139, Memorandum Conversation Between the President and the Vice President, July 15, 1958, 9:00 a.m.


Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 269.

On importance that Eisenhower placed on maintaining American credibility among supporters of the West in the Cold War, see FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 219, Doc. 127, Memorandum a Conference With the President, White House, July 14, 1958, 2:35 p.m.


FRUS 1958-1963, Vol. XII, p. 310, Doc. 110, Briefing Notes by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, July 14, 1958.
Turkey genuinely feared Nasser and the Soviet Union. FRUS, Vol. XI, DOC 124, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, July 14, 1958, p. 2. FRUS, Vol. XI, DOC 178, Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, July 16, 1958, pp. 306-308. Testimony of William B. MacComber, Jr., Special Assistant to Secretary of State Dulles on July 24, 1958, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Vol. X, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 597-598; Ibid., July 28, 1958, pp. 628-629. FRUS, Vol. XII, DOC 27, Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 30-2-58, July 22, 1958, p. 90 ("Most of them [the Turks] continue to believe that the only answer to the challenge of Arab nationalism is military force."). George S. Harris, a specialist on Turkey finds that "the violent overthrow of an allied regime threw a scare into the Ankara leaders. Their own military establishment had been rocked by accusations of plotting, leading to the arrest of nine middle-grade officers in December 1957." The Iraqi coup "sharpened Menderes' fears that revolution might be a contagious disease and spread to his country." Nonetheless, "however much he may have wanted to make the move, his forces were not prepared for attack from this angle and could not have been deployed rapidly in numbers sufficient to accomplish this objective, given the difficulties of terrain and lack of roads in the vicinity of the Iraqi-Turkish border." George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective, 1945-1971 (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), 65-66.
53 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, Doc. 175, Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, Department of State, July 15, 1958, p. 304; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, Doc. 177, Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Minister of the British Embassy (Lord Hood), July 15, 1958, p. 305.


55 Ibid.

56 Ibid. The White House transcription of the telephone conversation does not confirm Macmillan's account in his memoir, where he alleges that he told Eisenhower "'[y]ou are doing a Suez on me,' at which the President laughed . . . ." Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm 1956-1959, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 512. The actual conversation lacked laughter; nor is it likely that Eisenhower would have found such a joke funny.


59 Memorandum of telephone conversation between Eisenhower and Dulles, July 14, 1958, Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations, FRUS Microfiche Supplement.


61 Dulles reported to Eisenhower: "[t]he British are greatly concerned that we should commit ourselves to act with them in Jordan and possibly Iraq." FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 137, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, July 15, 8:40 a.m., p. 241. The British, in Dulles' opinion, sought a "blank check which" he thought should not be issued. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Eisenhower and Dulles, July 14, 1958, Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations, FRUS Microfiche Supplement. 144, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, July 15, 1958, 5:55 p.m., p. 251.


63 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 137, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, July 15, 1958, 8:40 a.m., p. 242.

65 FRUS, VOL. XI, DOC 177, Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Minister of the British Embassy (Lord Hood), July 15, 1958, p. 306. FRUS, VOL. XII, DOC 117, Memorandum of Conversation, July 15, 1958, p. 320-321. FRUS, VOL. XII, DOC 115, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, July 15, 1958, 8:40 a.m., p. 317. FRUS, VOL. XI, DOC 137, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, July 15, 8:40 a.m., p. 242.


71 Ibid.


74 On the British-Israeli problem, see Telegram 57 from Tel Aviv, July 16, 1958;


British troops were ill-equipped even toward the end of August after they had
received U.S. support. The “British have informed us their forces Jordan have urgent need anti-tank rifles and ammunition to protect themselves in event Jordanian army should turn against them. . . .” (sic) FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 510, Doc. 286, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, August 21, 1958.


85 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 310, Doc. 179, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, July 16, 1958, 11 a.m. Although the president decided against intervention on Iraq on July 16th, on July 18th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered their Deputy Director for Strategic Plans to prepare “an outline plan covering a U.S.-British occupation of Iraq, with and without Turkish assistance . . . with the main objective of controlling Iraqi oil.” Memorandum for Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, Chairman, Joint Middle East Planning Group from Brigadier General, R.D. Wentworth, U.S.A.F., July 18, 1958, NARA, RG 218, Central Decimal File 1958, 381 (8-23-57) Section 6 Red Band.

87 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 212, Doc. 124, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, July 14, 1958, 10:50 a.m..

88 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 219, Doc. 127, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, July 14, 1958, 2:35 p.m..

89 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 245, Doc. 140, Memorandum Conference with the President, White House, Washington, July 15, 1958, 11:25 a.m. In that conversation, the day before deciding against intervention in Iraq, July 15th, Eisenhower stated that “he is giving deep thought to finding a moral ground on which to stand if we have to go further.” Ibid.


91 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XII, p. 317, Doc. 115, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, July 15, 1958, 8:40 a.m..

92 FRUS 1958-60, Vol.: XII, Doc. 25, Minutes of Cabinet meeting, July 18, 1958, 8:35-10:08 a.m., p. 80. FRUS, VOL. XII, DOC 112, Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, Baghdad, July 14, 1958, p. 314. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XII, Doc. 124, Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, Baghdad, July 19, 1958, p. 327. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XII, Doc. 126, Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to Counselor Reinhardt, Washington, July 20, 1958, p. 329.

93 If the pro-Western rulers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or Iran had fallen, Eisenhower likely would have rendered a different verdict. FRUS, VOL. XII, Doc. 25, Minutes of Cabinet meeting, July 18, 1958, 8:35-10:08 a.m., p. 80. Though not mentioned in the primary sources, it is interesting to note that American oil companies had a massive stake in Saudi and Iranian oil production unlike Iraq.


The evidentiary record indicates that Eisenhower held the reigns of power firmly during the early days of the crisis with Dulles in a subordinate role. Though he followed Eisenhower's line, Dulles, for his own part, revealed himself
relatively prudent, not a reckless crusader. Annoyed with Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik, who sought to involve the United States in Suez II, Dulles told him that “[t]here was no use in talking in grandiose terms about uprooting Communism and Nasserism. This was something were not prepared to go to war to do... we did not contemplate using Lebanon as a base for general war in the Middle East.” FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 198, pp. 335-6.


97 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 226, p. 383. See also Telegram 649 from Robert McClintock, Beirut, to Department of State, July 24, 1958, Department of State, Central Files,, 783A.00/7-2458, Microfiche supplement, where McClintock recounts how a Lebanese opposition leader was visibly shaken after Murphy stated that the assembled U.S. forces could destroy the Moslem half of Beirut in seconds.


100 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 199, p. 338, Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, July 19, 1958, 7 p.m.


102 Murphy wrote in his memoirs that “much of the conflict concerned personalities and rivalries of a domestic nature, with no relation to international issues. Communism was playing no direct or substantial part in the insurrection, although Communists no doubt hoped to profit from the disorders, as frequently happens when there is civil war. The outside influences came mostly from Egypt and Syria. Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, (New York: Pyramid Books, 1964), 404.


With forces on the ground, some American military officials advocated greater military action. The commander of the Sixth Fleet, Vice Admiral Charles R. Brown, recommended that U.S. troops spread out from Beirut, seal the
Lebanese border with Syria, and seize the port of Tripoli. Vociferous objections were raised by Deputy-Secretary Murphy, Ambassador McClintock, and Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr., the Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean and the Middle East, based in London, Under-Secretary Murphy and Ambassador McClintock. They did not want U.S. forces to engage the Lebanese opposition. They thought that disaster would ensure, preclude a political solution at a minimum. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 209, p. 358. Dulles ruled against Admiral Brown and sided with the latter group. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 229, p. 392, fn. 6, citing telegram 487 to Beirut, July 25, 1958.


106 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 227, pp. 386-388. Telegram 715 from Murphy, Beirut, to Department of State, July 15, 1958. See also Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 403-408.


Chamoun's approval for an interim government; nonetheless, no agreement was forthcoming. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 255, p. 432. Pedantic, the United States supported Chamoun on the ground that completion of his term would constitute a good example in Lebanon's constitutional development. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 262, p. 446.


115 The king and his prime minister admitted as much. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 361-362, Doc. 211, Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, July 21, 1958, 7 p.m.


to the Department of State, August 4, 1958, 5 p.m.
118 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 531-532, Doc. 300, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 7, 1958, 5:30 p.m.
122 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 252, p. 428, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, August 3, 1958, 5 p.m. See also FRUS Microfiche supplement, August 5, 1958, Telephone conversation between Herter and Dulles, General Telephone conversations, Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library. Britain sought a guarantee of Jordanian independence. UN Doc. A/PV.734.
123 Eisenhower addressed the Special Emergency Session of the General Assembly on August 13, 1958 and though he said that Lebanon and Jordan were subject to “indirect aggression,” he was careful not to attack the U.A.R; he limited his negative remarks to the Soviet Union. Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1958.
124 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 268, pp. 461-467, Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 12, 1958. Gromyko eventually stated that they could work on a joint statement or even seek UAR cooperation against foreign intervention in Lebanon and Jordan. Yet, the conversation came to no resolution. Ibid. Dulles’ subsequent meeting with Gromyko was not productive; Gromyko was inflexible and became too involved in semantics. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 495, pp. 495-501, Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 18, 1958, 3 p.m.


139 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 345, p. 598, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon in the Department of State, October 4, 1958, 9 p.m.

140 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 305, p. 541, Airgram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, August 29, 1958. Chehab now liked the U.S. military presence because he believed that it made all sides in Lebanon more amenable to compromise than otherwise. Telegram 1420 from Beirut, October 2, 1958, 783A.00/10-158.; Telegram 1790 from Beirut, October 1, 1958 Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10-158; Telegram 1862 from Beirut, October 6, 1958, in FRUS microfiche supplement.


142 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 339, pp. 589-90, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, October 1, 1958, 11 a.m. See also FRUS Microfiche Supplement, Telegram 1791 from Beirut to Washington, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10-158; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 347, pp. 600-601, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, October 9, 1958, 10 a.m. Moslem Rashid Karame was to be Prime Minister and to hold the Defense, Finance, Economic and Information portfolios. Another Moslem, Hussein Oueini would serve as Foreign Minister. Maronite Christian Pierre Gemayel was to become Minister of Public Works, Education, Agriculture and Health, and Maronite Christian Raymond Edde Minister of Interior and Social Affairs. FRUS XI, p. 613, fn. 2, citing Telegram 1966 from Beirut, October 15, 1958.

143 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 615, Editorial Note. See also FRUS Microfiche supplement, Telegram 1183 from Amman, October 24, 1958, Central Files, 785.00/10-2458, Department of State.


146 Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, 76.

147 Macmillan-Lloyd, 18/7/58, Public Records Office, PREM 11/2408, quoted in
151 Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, August 22, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, p. 337.
153 Ibid. See also Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, August 22, 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, vol. XII, 387. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem,1-2, 35, 54-68, 77, and 155-160. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, pp. 57-60. In addition, though only twenty-five percent of the population, Sunni Arabs traditionally dominated Iraq and, of all the ethnic groups in the country, were most drawn to pan-Arabism (Most Arabs throughout the Middle East are Sunnis, not Shi‘i). Shi‘i Arabs constituted approximately fifty percent of the Iraq population. The Kurds and Turcomans represented almost another twenty-five percent of the population. Other than the Sunnis, a majority of the other groups saw no great benefit in incorporation into Sunni dominated pan-Arab state. See generally, Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, 1-2.
154 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 59-60. By early to mid October, the top level of the Eisenhower administration was aware that Qassem had defeated the Nasserists in Iraq. FRUS, Vol. XII, p. 341, Editorial Note, citing, Eisenhower Diaries. FRUS Vol. XII, p. 341, Memorandum of Discussion of 381st Meeting of the National Security Council, NSC Records. FRUS Vol. XII, Doc. 138, Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, Baghdad, October 14, 1958, p. 345.
155 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 17-19. In addition, transliterations of a given Arabic name such as Qassem (e.g., Qasim or Kassem), Hussein (Husayn) or Nasser (Nasir) varies depending on the English language source quoted.
156 Ibid.
157 Annual Report, 1958 - Iraq, Diary 1958, p. 5, Foreign Office 371/140896, pub-
lished in Foreign Office Annual Reports from Arabia, p. 361; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p. 78.

158 U.S.-Iraqi relations had gotten off to a rough start following the July 14th coup. The concentration of American troops in Lebanon and the American administration's delay until August 2, 1958 to recognize the new regime naturally increased Iraqi fears that the United States would seek to reverse the coup. Memorandum From Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, July 23, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, pp. 331-333 and fn. 1, p. 333; Memorandum From Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower, July 30, 1958, cited in FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, p. 334, Editorial Note. (Even after ruling out intervention in Iraq, the Eisenhower Administration waited an additional two weeks to recognize the new Iraqi regime on the ground that pro-American countries such as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan might feel that the United States to easily abandoned its supporters).

159 Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, August 22, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, pp. 336-337. p. 10, found in Annual Reports from Arabia, p. 353.