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A BRIEF REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF THE STRUGGLE
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Despite appearances and an obsolete propaganda system which still manages to get a favorable hearing in some of the Western press, the degradation of the economic and political system in Portugal is a fact that the Portuguese authorities themselves, at all levels, can no longer conceal. This fact, reflected in the attitudes of the different Portuguese classes, is the main consequence of the outrage against humanity which the Portuguese government has perpetrated for ten years, from the moment it launched the colonial war in Angola, quickly to be followed by those in Guinea and Mozambique. For Portugal this is the result, dramatic today but certainly tragic tomorrow, of the absurd, irrational and lying policies followed by the Portuguese ruling class, who not only persist in scorning the rights of the African people and international law, but who also consciously operate against the interests of the Portuguese people.

It is this reality, made clearer in the last two years and particularly in 1971, that explains the weakness of the demagogic politics of Marcello Caetano, the growing split between the ruling class and the popular masses (workers in the towns and rural areas, students and intellectual anti-fascists), increasingly frequent and intense upheavals in Portuguese society and, as an extreme indication of the conflict, the armed revolutionary activity which has recently taken place in Portugal. The limited and sporadic nature of these actions should not mislead anyone. For a fraction of Portuguese society, however small a minority, to take the decision, despite the inveterate nationalism which is a common characteristic of all Portuguese, to resort to violence as a means of protest—means that the state of mind of the average Portuguese, faced with the aggravation of the socio-economic and political situation, is reaching the edge of despair.

In following Salazar's policies of colonial war and genocide against the African peoples, Marcello Caetano has not just deceived those who believe in his "political intelligence," he has also missed, or is in the process of missing, the one moment since the discoveries when a Portuguese could have gone down in history with credit. Because he cannot, or will not, understand the

trend of history, not even the very interests of his own people—something that will not surprise anyone who knows the development of his ideological formation—today, the present head of the Portuguese government is nowhere near concealing in his speeches and public pronouncements, after three years of trying, his perplexity and even his disappointment in the face of the socioeconomic and political reality of the complex of diversities which he insists on calling the "Portuguese world."

Tentative reforms, mainly of an administrative kind, that he has sketched out and dared to include in the new Portuguese constitution have convinced no one but the already converted. They even deceived that most important—being the most active—faction of the adept "liberals" (or those least confirmed in reaction), whence arose the conflict in the so-called Portuguese National Assembly during the recent discussion of the constitutional reforms, a conflict which, if parliamentary politics in Portugal were more than a farce, would have brought about the fall of the government.

The irrefutable truth of life in Portugal today is this: while Portugal protects and accentuates from day to day the miserable privilege of being the most backward country in Europe, the Portuguese government is deliberately waging three colonial wars of genocide in Africa, and persists in keeping the Portuguese people in suffering and ignorance, cut off from Europe and the rest of the world, outside all the advances in science and technology that have today been spread among all people. As always, the Portuguese are deprived of basic human rights.

The truth, of which the Portuguese masses are becoming increasingly aware, is that galloping inflation added to a decline in population due to emigration and the war, the increase in the cost of living and public and international debts, the lack of manpower as well as the stagnation of the Portuguese economy, are all the direct result of the absurd colonial policies of the ruling classes of Portugal, whom Marcello Caetano is used to obeying.

Marcello Caetano has confirmed by his own deeds that he is a prisoner of the weighty heritage of Salazar—which is fiercely defended by the "ultras" of the regime—and therefore has plenty of reasons to go from bewilderment to despair. All the more because the resistance of the African people, and of the Portuguese themselves, to the colonial wars is becoming more vigorous and effective every day.

One can understand then very clearly the role of a mere victim which the Portuguese head of government adopts, as was shown in his speech on 23 July last year (1971), to explain the
incidents which took place in the National Assembly. After expressing regrets that "unfortunately" he was not in the position of people who are able "to appeal further to liberty, in the name of immortal principles," he affirmed "on my shoulders rest the responsibilities of national defense, with military operations in three overseas provinces and a sensitive home front. Not a day goes by on the international scene without a new blow from our adversaries, which forces us to pay constant attention and make a continual effort in the diplomatic struggle and enlighten the jaundiced opinions of foreign countries."

With this assertion, the head of the Portuguese government is acknowledging publicly, for the first time, existence of colonial wars—which he calls "military operations"—though it is no less true that he is still pretending to enlighten "the jaundiced opinions of foreign countries," that is to say, that he stubbornly continues to disregard international law.

In the same speech, after recognizing that "internally (i.e., in Portugal) the enemy is receiving support...and is looking each day for opportunities to infiltrate schools, the armed forces and corporate organisations," he goes on to say, "and while we need to face all of this, we must give priority to the real needs of the people, from the struggle against inflation, which like a cancer devours the economy of all countries, destroying the stability of prices and making wage claims easy, to the problems of economic development of a nation which cannot and must not stagnate nor let itself be bled by the exodus of young people no more than by the unreasonable demands of a population desiring better educational opportunities and welfare. For all this takes money, and God knows, the worries we have to find it!"

With this Job-like lamentation, passed without comment, Marcello Caetano pretends to justify the fact that he is not going as fast as his "young friends" would like. But if it is true that (as he recalled in his speech a propos the French Revolution) when a Jacobin was made a minister, he did not necessarily become a Jacobin minister, the politics and the arguments of Marcello Caetano prove conclusively that, when a Salazarist is made president of the council, he becomes a Salazarist president of council.

In effect, despite his pretences of originality and liberalism, it is precisely the deep Salazarist character of the politics of Marcello Caetano—stubbornly continuing with fascism in Portugal and colonialism in Africa—that explains the minimal results, or indeed the complete lack of them, after three years of government. He gave the balance sheet on 27 September last. In this speech, where he called on "Portuguese worthy of that
name" to unite around the "leaders chosen by them" [sic] he asserted: "We are seeking courageously to face the problems of our nation. We have successfully maintained the defence of our overseas provinces against the subversion increasingly fostered by that incredible organisation called the United Nations [sic]... and if we are not discouraged in the struggle overseas, neither have we given quarter to those who wish to bring terrorism in the metropolis." The same terms, the same stubbornness. But Marcello Caetano does not ignore the fact that to face problems is not to solve them. That is why, after having flashed before the impoverished Portuguese people, the image of "the patrons of development in wealthy Europe," he recalls, so as not to allow dreams, that in Portugal, "a dangerous atmosphere of demands is being created absolutely incompatible with the realities and possibilities of the country." And then the usual lamentation: "I am failing in my duty to tell the truth to the Portuguese if I do not remind them that we are living in very critical times, times when the acuteness of national problems is also aggravated by disturbing conditions in international economics and politics. No one would think that we live amidst an abundance of human and material resources." Obviously, this would certainly not refer to the people of Portugal who would not make such an estimation; people who live in misery and watch their children facing the dilemma of secret emigration or an inglorious death in the colonies.

These quotations, perhaps too long, are nevertheless presented to show in the Portuguese ruler's own words, that it is true that the myths, tactics, lies, arguments and objectives of the fascist colonial regime have not changed in the slightest with the disappearance of Salazar; the social, economic and political degradation of Portuguese society as a result of the colonial wars, is a fact that even the lamentations of Marcello Caetano cannot manage to disguise. To be aware of this fact is of primary importance in the outline of the perspectives of the struggle.

Much more realistic than Marcello Caetano is the Confidential Report of the Portuguese General Staff presented in 1970 under the title Report of the Psychological Section, No. 15. In this document, which analyzes in detail the action of the liberation movements and Portuguese groups against the colonial war, as well as the methods, actions and results of psycho-social warfare, the authors showed that: "The proliferation of anti-government organizations and the agitation that they create, leads to an unsuitable psychological climate which, by affecting the activities of students, affects the country, which seems troubled and does not know what to do to lead its children back to the right path."

Having referred at some length to the increasingly difficult
situation among colonial troops, exacerbated by desertions and demands, the aforementioned report concludes:

"The enemy (i.e., the liberation movements and the forces against the colonial war) has perfected and increased its efforts on all fronts, internally as well as externally.

"In the metropolis generally, the population continues to show little interest in the war overseas and ignores the efforts being made by the armed forces. The student masses remain highly vulnerable to pacifist propaganda. The working masses, ignoring great national problems, let themselves be easily led by the propaganda oriented towards demanding better wages and living conditions. The most advanced groups continue to be the hotbeds of subversion and the groups which are springing up have proved highly effective.

"Overseas, in a general way, the native populations continue to tend towards subversion, especially when they have strength, or when geographic conditions make actions by our troops difficult or impossible. The indigenous population on the periphery of the largest urban centres, generally detribalised, continue to show themselves as very susceptible to enemy propaganda. The European population continues to demonstrate overt support for the war, but only co-operates against subversion when its material interests are directly in danger.

"The psychological situation is precarious, in the metropolis as well as overseas."

Before such a situation, which gets worse daily, one could ask oneself why the Portuguese government, which is aware of the difficulties it faces and still has to face, stubbornly persists in these absurd, criminal and willful policies of colonial war and domination of the African population. It's not difficult to recognize that the principal reasons for the unaltered continuation of Portuguese colonial policy rests on the following facts:

a) The chronic and characteristic underdevelopment of Portugal which does not have a valid economic infrastructure, and shows itself incapable of imagining a process of decolonization where the interests of the Portuguese ruling classes are safeguarded in the framework of a neocolonialist situation or effective competition with other capitalist powers.

b) The inhibiting effects of almost half a century of fascist rule on a society, which, throughout its history, has never truly (or significantly), known human rights, freedom and democratic practice.
c). The imperialist mentality of the Portuguese ruling class and the ignorance, myths, beliefs, prejudices, and narrow nationalism that characterize the culture and large sections of the Portuguese population subsided down the centuries in the doctrine of EUROPEAN SUPERIORITY AND AFRICAN INFERIORITY, as well as the myth of "the civilizing mission" of the Portuguese with regard to the African "savages."

Despite the vain attempts of Portuguese colonialists to foster the myth of "the creation of multi-racial societies" such a doctrine, to which has been added lately the bogey of "communist subversion," leads to the crystallization of a PRIMITIVE RACISM, often lacking any evident economic motivation.

The racist character of Portuguese domination is largely shown by the scorn of African cultural values just as much as by the most abject crimes committed by the administration and by the settlers during the Golden Age of Colonialism. Today the racist character of Portuguese colonialism manifests itself in the acts of cruelty which are typical of Portuguese troops. However, there is a tendency at present, in the face of African resistance, to show paternalism and false solicitude in "achieving the social promotion of the African within the framework of the Portuguese nation."

Portuguese racism, which is one of the subjective causes of colonial wars, reaches a peak in the upper echelons of the ruling class. It is then that General Kaulza de Ariaga (one of the most outstanding personalities of Portuguese colonial rule, commander in charge of colonial troops in Mozambique and candidate for the presidency), in approaching the Portuguese strategic problem—Volume 12 of Lessons of Strategy in the Course of High Command 1966/67—said, "Subversion is a war above all of intelligence. One needs to have superior intelligence to carry on subversion; not everyone is capable of doing it. Thus Blacks are not highly intelligent, on the contrary, of all the peoples in the world they are the least intelligent." [sic]

In these same Lessons the author, who reckons that "the exportation of African slaves to Brazil was a good thing" and that "the tribal condition of Blacks is favourable to Portuguese strategy" reveals in all his cruelty, the principal objectives of Portuguese colonialism, viz.: TO MAINTAIN WHITE DOMINATION OF BLACK PEOPLES.

After remarking that there is a danger in the rise of "assimilated Africans," Kaulza de Ariaga affirms that "we won't be able to maintain the same white domination, which is a national objective, because if the white population carries it out itself, in a rhythm which accompanies and overtakes, however slowly,
the production of assimilated Blacks [sic], and because if the opposite happens—if the white population is overtaken by the production of assimilated Blacks—two things will fatally arise: either we set up Apartheid, which would be terrible and which we couldn't maintain, or we'll have black governments with all the consequences that that would entail (breaking up of overseas provinces, etc.)."

The master racialist explains further tactics for avoiding such a situation: "The white population does not aim at the balance of demographic black potential; they aim for the balance of black assimilados...because thank God we cannot possibly assimilate all Blacks, and because it's possible, in fact almost certain, that we can place Whites there (in Africa) in such quantities that they will balance out the Blacks who become assimilated."

On this basis, after underlining that "we will not be too efficient in producing assimilated Blacks, because we'd have to promote them, yes, but not too much," the general, who is a candidate for the presidency, reveals the guiding line of Portuguese strategy in Africa: "Firstly, growth of the white population, then, secondly, limitation of the black population."

Faced with the difficulties of the problem and believing the myth of African fecundity, he suggests, albeit in a negative fashion, a scientific method of controlling the population: "Obviously it is an incredibly difficult problem because we can't give a contraceptive pill to every black family...the way in which we can do it is to discourage the growth of the black population."

One of the principal objectives of the Portuguese colonial wars in Africa, therefore, becomes more evident: since it is at present impossible to limit the birthrate in order to ensure white supremacy, recourse is taken to physical liquidation of the populations, through more intensive use every day of aerial bombardment, napalm, and other methods of mass destruction of Africans, in the course of the deliberate application of genocide.

This objective—the achievement of which is being frustrated by the effective armed resistance of the people of the Portuguese colonies, supported by African and international solidarity—clearly exposes the criminal nature of the support—moral, material and political—that Portugal received from her allies through NATO, or in bilateral agreements. Today it is no longer a secret to anybody that the Portuguese government cannot in any way sustain colonial wars in Africa and continue to repress the legitimate aspirations of the Portuguese people for peace and progress, without the aid of her racist allies in the West.
The enemy of our people is quite aware of the situation in which he finds himself and of the internal and external factors and circumstances which make possible and condition her criminal attitude. Thus we must constantly analyze the position of our struggle and the perspective for its evolution.

II.

The politico-military activity of the Portuguese colonizers in our country continues to have as its fundamental political objective the following:

a) To defend and consolidate the positions they still occupy in the urban centers and other zones not yet liberated.

b) To immobilize the populations in the liberated areas.

c) To continue to violently destroy the material and human resources which form the basis of the victorious development of our struggle.

d) To contain the war by war, encouraging Africans to fight against Africans.

e) To maintain the presence of colonial troops in the principal strategic positions at any cost, in the hope that in the long run our political and military organization will enter a crisis and finally disintegrate.

f) To deprive our people of the brotherly solidarity and logistic support of neighboring countries, using open aggression or armed provocation against these countries.

In order to try and practice these objectives the enemy continues to use the politics of the stick and carrot by making a number of social concessions to the population it still controls, and by ferociously repressing all those who, individually or collectively, are suspected of nationalism or of concretely supporting our party. However, the enemy, acting on the conviction that the African people are the "least intelligent in the world," have not got the results they had bargained on, and their despair at such a failure becomes more apparent every day.

In the urban centers and the other areas still occupied (a few coastal zones, the islands off Guinea and the Cape Verde archipelago) the enemy's position is less and less secure. This is the result partly of the blows—growing more forceful every day—struck by our armed forces, and partly because of the devel-
opment of an underground network by our party in the towns and on the islands.

In Guinea, the enemy continues its policy of lies, demagogic concessions, promises of promotion for Africans, even of a "social revolution" [sic], which, if it was practiced, would not only realize our party's social and economic program, but would also give our people a much higher standard of living than the Portuguese. To complete the farce the chief Portuguese colonialist—the sinister General Spinola—now promises to "lead the people to self-determination under the Portuguese flag."

A fervent follower of the ideas of General Kaulza de Ariaça, who considers the Black as a being without intelligence, the military governor of Guinea wants to bring to life the story of the shrewd man who promised the king he could teach a donkey to read. Like the man in the story he is no doubt convinced that, given time, either the donkey will die, or the king, or even himself.

Having just about arrived at the end of his four-year term of office—during which time our struggle, that he swore to destroy, has developed, intensified and has been consolidated on all fronts—General Spinola is showing signs of desperation sharpened by the growing support that the populations of the urban centers are extending to our party.

And also, after the attacks on Bissao and Dafata, and faced with the widely favorable reactions on the part of the inhabitants of these towns, the military governor abandoned his mask of paternalism and reformism to reveal himself as he really is in a threatening statement made on Radio Dissao on 25 July.

It is worth citing some passages from this declaration which marks, like the attacks on Bissao and Dafata, the start of a new stage in our conflict with the Portuguese government. He said: "In all the circumstances of life in the province it should surprise no one that sometimes nonsensical rumours are spread; this is a constant in any surroundings, and we do not claim to be exempt.... However, the scale and the nature of recent rumours have unfortunately made their mark among the most easily alarmed elements of the population. This has provoked an unjustified climate of apprehension in the capital of the province. It is essential to insist on an unequivocal position which shows the situation in its proper perspective, so that nobody can undermine those whose judgement might be impaired by fear."

Having recalled that "adequate measures have been taken to ensure peace and security at all times," he threatens an even fiercer repression: "It is important also that there are no illusions about the firmness with which the government will act to guarantee the peace, order and security of its citizens."
"Any attempt against the individual or collective security will therefore be considered as an act of treason against the people of Guinea. The offenders will be relentlessly punished, in the name of respect for the principles of liberty and equality that we are defending and to which all good Guineans aspire. Any lapses in civil discipline that could disturb the normal rhythm of life in the capital and the province will be taken as aiding and as an act of treason against the people. As such, they will be punished without the least mercy and with all the severity that the enemy deserves, as will all those who support the enemy's interests, who have nothing in common with Portuguese Guinea.

"It is right that nobody should doubt the fact that the normal rhythm of life in the town will be preserved at all costs, and in all circumstances. The necessary operations will be put in hand, and their effectiveness will only be doubted by those who do not yet know the firmness and determination of the Governor of the province."

If it can be agreed that this declaration is confirmation of the fact that the inhabitants of the urban centers, particularly Bissau, are giving their support to the struggle (as was noted in the above-mentioned secret report of the Portuguese general staff), then there can be no doubt at all that it is also a confession of the political failure of the so-called "Better Guinea" policy, just as all attempts by the colonialists to consolidate their position have failed.

In the face of the patriotic resistance of the people of the liberated areas, who are each day becoming more aware of the realities and objectives of the struggle and better integrated into the party organization, the Portuguese colonialists have this year intensified their bombing actions and their acts of terrorism. This has been made possible by virtue of the fact that they have obtained new airplanes and helicopters from their allies, but nevertheless they have not achieved their aims. Today the organization of the population for self-defense is better and more effective than ever in countering the bombing and in repulsing terrorist attacks and attempts to burn our crops in order to dominate us through hunger. What they have succeeded in destroying during the first few months of 1971 is not sufficient to affect the victorious progress of our struggle. On the other hand, and in the absence of an effective anti-aircraft defense, the civil defense measures generally adopted by the people have contributed to the significant decrease in the number of victims claimed by the barbarous actions of the Portuguese air force.

The attempt to contain the war by war, to bring Africans, mostly recruited by force, to fight against Africans is a pressing need for the colonialists, who are faced with the increase
of disputes and conflicts within the colonial army. But all these policies will fail, more than ever after Portugal's shameful defeat in its imperialist aggression against the Republic of Guinea. As much in Conakry as in Koundara and at Gaoual the Portuguese, in conjunction with European soldiers and mercenaries originating from the Republic of Guinea, used a number of their so-called "African units," of whom the vast majority did not return to Bissau because they had been killed or captured. This fact which sparked off a protest by the families of the victims in Bissau and other urban centers is a tragic lesson for those Africans who still allow themselves to be enrolled in the Portuguese colonial army. At the same time, the liquidation this year of some of their leaders such as "Captains" Joao Bacar Djiao and Guela Balde, and "Lieutenant" Ioro Bamba, has upset the colonialists' sinister plans. They thus have to face increasing difficulties even in the recruitment of tramps and convicts, as well as in the growing desertion rate within their so-called "African companies."

As for the enemy positions, we have attacked them all during the first months of this year, including the capital, Bissau. The colonial troops know that today they are not safe in any part of our country. The civilians in urban centers, especially the Portuguese, live now in a permanent state of alert and can hardly disguise their fear. Most of the officers are sending their families home to Portugal. The enemy has not only seen the security of its troops diminish everywhere, but it has had to recognize that our party is becoming stronger every day, and that our armed forces are more powerful than ever. Considering what we have and what the enemy has in terms of material and human resources at our disposal, this fact represents a major defeat for the Portuguese colonialists.

In desperation, the enemy has increased its armed provocation and criminal acts against the countries that border ours, in spite of condemnation by the United Nations and international opinion. It has committed numerous acts of aggression against the people of Casamance (Senegal) and against the frontier zones of the Republic of Guinea. hoping to free themselves from the nightmare that is our struggle, the Portuguese colonialists, with the support of their allies, are preparing a new act of imperialist aggression against the latter country. Like the last one, its aim is to overthrow the regime of President Sekou Toure and replace it with a government favorable to Portuguese domination of our country.

Even with this plan the Portuguese are condemned to defeat; our relations with the neighboring governments and peoples improve every day and no aggression against the Republic of Guinea would be able to stop the forward march of our struggle. My future aggression, whatever form it took, would only serve
to tighten the bonds that unite our people to the people of the Republic of Guinea even more, and to reinforce both African and international solidarity with our struggle.

The modifications introduced into the structures and the functioning of the leading organs of the party by the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau in April 1970 have permitted us to improve greatly the work of the militants and of those responsible for various fields of our activity. The political work both of the local commissars and Brigades of Political Action (BAP) has become more effective both in the recruiting and training of local populations in the liberated zones, and in the carrying out of new directives decided by the higher leadership of the party. In spite of certain difficulties which have arisen in getting the National Committee of the Liberated Zones (CNRL) off the ground, the regional committees (CR), the area committees (CZ), and the village committees (CT) have all been working normally and with encouraging results.

As a result of work undertaken at the end of last year, there have been several meetings between the secretary general of the party and delegates from local committees (approximately 200 delegates, of which a third were women). These meetings, which were really seminars, have been received with much enthusiasm by the village committees and by the local populations, and have brought immediate rewards in the militant spirit and practical activities at grassroots level. Here is an initiative which we must continue to develop with the utmost attention.

The results of the scholastic year have also been encouraging, both in the schools in the liberated zones (in spite of terrorist action by the enemy), and in the "Amizade" Institute. Around one hundred boys and girls have been selected this year to go and continue their studies in friendly countries, and they have already left for the start of the academic year.

In the field of health, where there is still a certain amount of confusion and inefficiency in the work of intermediary cadres, particularly where nurses are concerned, a clear improvement has been made both in medical supplies, and in help for the people generally. The vaccination campaigns which we have been carrying out, particularly against cholera, have enabled us to avoid some serious problems. However, in spite of the return to the country of several doctors trained during the course of the struggle, we still have difficulties in the area, largely because a large number of the foreign doctors who had come to help us have themselves had their health affected, and have been obliged to interrupt their work.

In spite of the lack of rain during the agricultural year
1970/71, production has, in general, sufficed both for the needs of the local population and for the basic needs of the guerrilla fighters. The return to the country of several technical cadres in the field of agriculture (agronomists, technicians, and other specialists) who have been trained abroad, has permitted us to improve substantially our assistance to the peasants, and above all to carry out limited projects and experimental schemes which could serve as a base for the development of agriculture, the principal element in our economy.

The People's Shops have also improved vastly in the range of goods they offer, and particularly with cloth, thanks to international solidarity.

Conscious of the progress the party has made in the last few years, which has been reflected in the strengthening of our clandestine organization and in the growing nationalist feelings of the population, the Portuguese colonialists are increasing their repression and vigilance in all the islands. Fourteen Africans have been arrested recently and charged with belonging to PAIGC and attempting to hijack a coastal merchant ship to Dakar. However, in the face of public opinion, the Portuguese colonialists were forced, during a trial at St. Vincent, to acquit four other Africans who were part of a group that had been imprisoned some time ago.

As a result of the criminal Portuguese policy of abandoning the people of the Cape Verde Islands to natural disasters, the people are once again suffering famine after three years of drought. The Portuguese have tried to use this circumstance to destroy the basis for the development of our struggle in the islands, and have resorted to the mass transportation of works to St. Tome and Portugal, where they have already sent around 10,000 Capeverdians.

The denunciation of the famine by our party in April this year has forced the colonialists, who refuse to accept offers of humanitarian aid springing from international solidarity, to take some measures to "combat the crisis." But these measures have not lured the people away from us, aware as they are of the necessity to liberate themselves from colonial domination in order to get rid of poverty and famine, and who therefore manifest growing support for the activities of our party. The reality of the growth of party activity in the Islands and the support that it is finding there is recognized even by the enemy himself. For example, in the so-called secret report of the Portuguese general staff in Cabo Verde, the enemy affirms: "During this period two subversive appeals were issued addressed to the Capeverdian soldiers, officers and sergeants. On the last night of the year pamphlets were distributed throughout three islands;
in May, parcels containing PAIGC leaflets destined for the Island were intercepted in Lisbon." In reality, on the last night of the year pamphlets were distributed simultaneously throughout all the populated islands.

During the first months of this year, conflicts between sections of the population and the colonial troops grew significantly in the principal islands. The colonial administration, both civil and military, is becoming more isolated every day. A gulf is progressively opening between the colonial class and the mass of the people, between the servants of colonialism and the patriots.

At the meeting of the Superior Council of the Struggle (CSL) in August last, which studied at a very profound level the principal problems of our life and our struggle, important decisions were taken towards the strengthening and bettering of our political work, and for the consolidation of the structures of our developing state, and the intensification and growth of our army. Among these decisions, it is important to highlight that of the creation of the first Popular National Assembly of Guinea, which will be elected with the shortest possible delay and give to our people yet another organ essential to the sovereignty of the people, opening new perspectives for our political action both in our own country and abroad. We should also highlight the decisions relating to the strengthening of the armed struggle, the development of the struggle in the Cape Verde Islands, and on the humanitarian level, the creation of the Red Cross of Guinea and Cape Verde.

In addition to the programs we already broadcast on "Voice of the Revolution" (Republic of Guinea, four times a week) we have recently been granted the use of the network of Radio Senegal (three times a week) and Radio Mauretania (once a week). This has enabled us to expand enormously the opportunities of conveying information to our own people and to Africa.

Our relations with independent African countries have grown and were consolidated during the first months of 1971. The Republic of Senegal is now showing more and more interest in giving us as much help as possible; but apart from our relations with neighboring states, other countries like Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and Libya have expressed a desire to help us by giving us aid bilaterally like other states are already doing.

The Conference of Heads of State held last June in Addis Ababa was yet another important victory for the liberation movement in Africa, in particular for our party. Yet again, we were unanimously elected as the delegates for all the liberation movements to the conference. The decision to increase aid to the freedom fighters as well as the creation of a special commission
of the OAU for West Africa, the assistant director of which is a member of the leadership of our party, permits us to hope for a considerable improvement in African solidarity with regard to our struggle. The OAU Liberation Committee continues at the same time to make unsparing efforts to get us all possible aid. In carrying out the decisions of the Extraordinary Conference at Lagos (December 1970), the committee has given our party special financial aid which has been of enormous help.

We must emphasize that, in the course of conversations that we have had with various African heads of state at Addis Ababa, Conakry, or In their respective countries, and with the secretary general of the OAU and the members of the Secretariat of the Liberation Committee, we have always noticed tremendous interest in our struggle and enthusiastic desire to help our party. That is a very great encouragement for our people and for all the militants and soldiers in our organization.

On the international front, even the enemy himself admits that he feels himself more and more accused, condemned, and morally isolated in spite of political and material support from his allies in NATO and others. We have made considerable progress during the first months of this year.

Our relations of solidarity with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are increasingly useful to our struggle. They are translated concretely into precious aid both of basic essentials, for which the need is most urgent, and other material, some of which we have already received this year. In the Western countries the support committees have intensified their activity in the fields both of disseminating information and of raising funds on our behalf. Sweden has decided to double the aid which she gave us last year, Norway and the other Scandinavian countries are also ready to help us. It is important here to make a special reference to the courageous attitude taken by the Norwegian foreign minister during the last meeting of the Council of NATO in Lisbon, during which he denounced the policies of the colonial wars of the Portuguese as being against the interests of humanity and incompatible with the principles defined in the charter of the organization.

In Portugal, the people are showing themselves to be more and more aware of the fact that the colonial war is a crime against their own interests. Increasingly frequent demonstrations against colonial policies and the actions taken by the courageous Portuguese patriots of the ANA constitute major victories in our common struggle against the colonial war, and a guarantee of the friendship and solidarity which our people hope to preserve, develop and consolidate with the Portuguese people.
From the military point of view, the actions of the Portuguese imperialists is still determined by the fact which the colonial authorities themselves have so often publicly admitted: that they cannot win the war waging against the African people. This failure is the result not only of the growing strength of our armed forces, and our victories in battle, but above all because of the continued growth of political consciousness among our people. Aware of this fact, the imperialists are trying every means within their power to perpetrate the most barbarous crimes possible against our people, killing our cattle, burning our crops, and, in short, intensifying their criminal and terrorist activities, which gives the lie to their claims to promote the socioeconomic and political life of the African people.

Thus the actions of the enemy during the first months of this year are characterized by continual aerial bombardment, including the use of napalm, and attacks by troops flown in by helicopter to destroy villages, burn crops and kill livestock. Having at their disposal the latest and best planes and helicopters, supplied by their allies, the colonialists have reinforced their bomb attacks and increased their terrorist activities. However, faced with the courageous resistance of both soldiers and local people, they rarely achieve their objectives. The areas most affected by these criminal acts are precisely those areas which are most densely populated, or where the party is strongest: Cubisseco, Cubucare, the Balana border (in the south), Oio and Saara (in the north).

Dozens of villages have been destroyed and large amounts of rice have been burned in the Unal, Tombali and Como areas, and about 200 head of cattle have been killed. Fortunately, the loss of human life falls short of the enemy's intentions, despite the fact that they deliberately attack hospitals and schools, and that their victims are mainly children and the old.

The actions of our armed forces in the first half of this year—at the height of the dry season—have been more expensive and vigorous than ever before. This fact has been recognized by the Portuguese imperialists themselves who, in order to gloss over the impression given by their war communiques (though these are always distorted), suggest that the development and intensification of our struggle is due to the presence of foreign experts, particularly Cubans, within our armies. This lie, like so many others, only convinces those who wish to believe it, succeeds only in underlining the abilities and increased level of activity of our fighters, who spare no effort or sacrifice in
carrying out the instructions of the War Council of our party.

Our national armed forces have been regrouped in different army corps and freed in part from the task of defending the liberated areas thanks to the formation and reinforcement of local armed forces. Thus, they have been able to increase and develop their activities on all fronts, at the same time making more efficient use of the materials at our disposal. Our reorganization, which took place early this year, our increased experience and use of certain kinds of material, have played an important part in the successes which our brave fighters, following the plans drawn up by our higher command, have obtained.

The renewed vigor of the armed forces reached its highest level during the April offensive. Indeed, during that month, by increasing the intensity and number of actions on all fronts, and by redoubling our efforts, we have completely disoriented the enemy, who has had to concede the defeat of its plans. We carried out eighty-six attacks on Portuguese positions (an average of three per day); we have set eight deadly ambushes, putting out of action more than 250 soldiers and officers of the colonial army, including 158 known dead. Among our operations the following deserve special recognition: the successful campaign of several army corps on the Kinara front from April to June, where all enemy positions were attacked repeatedly, with heavy enemy loss of men and equipment; the operations on the Catio front, where the town of that name was twice assaulted by our soldiers, causing considerable damage; the actions on the eastern front, where the town of Gabu was under attack three times from our ambushes during the campaign. In one of these ambushes the commanding officer of the garrison of Pitche was killed, ten lorries, an armored car and several artillery were destroyed. Finally, there have been equally intensive and continuous actions against Portuguese positions along the frontier with Senegal.

But the first half of 1971 will be particularly remembered in the history of our struggle as the period when, for the first time, we were able to attack all the urban centers still occupied by the enemy, including Bissau, the capital, and Bafata, the second largest city. As we said in our communiqué, published after we received reports of these operations, the attacks on colonialist positions in Bissau and Bafata mark a new stage in the political and military development of our struggle. They are also a clear refutation, if one was needed, of the Portuguese colonialist’s lying statements that we act from bases in neighboring countries, which they use as a pretext for their criminal aggressions against those countries.

It is true that the attack against Bissau was mainly intended as a warning to the population of the capital, and that
In order to carry it out we had to attack seven enemy garrisons for logistic support. Hence the enemy did not suffer serious losses of men and material; but the psychological and political effect of this action was higher than that of any previous one. At Bafata, where our infantry entered the town and remained for some time without any enemy response, our soldiers destroyed four barracks, the meteorological station, the airport control tower, and several military and administrative buildings. A number of colonialist troops were put out of action and our soldiers detained seventy-five suspects, of whom sixty-eight were later released.

During the period in question (January-August 1971), we carried out 508 major actions, including 369 attacks on garrisons in urban centers, 102 ambushes and other operations on roads, 15 major mining activities, 14 actions against river transport, and 8 commando operations in town centers.

Our forces put out of action 735 enemy soldiers and agents, including 480 dead. The number of confirmed wounded (255) is far from representing the true figure. In fact, news from Bissao and Lisbon indicates that the military hospitals have never had so many wounded as they have this year. As far as equipment is concerned, we have destroyed or damaged ninety military vehicles, sunk twenty-eight boats and speedboats, and shot down two airplanes and three helicopters. Our forces, who have driven the enemy out of three entrenched camps and razed several encampments, such as the one at Umaru Oosse, on the eastern front, have taken possession of a large quantity of military equipment, including G-3 machine guns, Hauser guns, American bazookas, and telecommunication equipment.

It is true that we are not reporting here the final victory in our armed liberation struggle. All the same, there is no doubt that the report of this eight-month period is the best in our eight-and-a-half year struggle, and represents a decisive contribution to the victory which our fight for liberation is certain to achieve. This result, and all our earlier victories, explain the growing despair of the Portuguese colonialists, and the ever-increasing ferocity and savagery of their colonial war.

In an attempt to justify their criminal obstinacy, and faced with the progress that our struggle is making, the Portuguese colonialists resort to all kinds of arguments, like those made, for example, by General Kaulza de Ariaça, in the above-mentioned Lessons of Strategy in the Course of High Command: "Naturally, as our troops are dying in Guinea, and as we are spending a lot of money there, I do not take these losses into account, and don't consider that such an amount is spent only in defending Guinea. Actually, if that was so, I should find
it unacceptable, but a man who dies in Guinea is indirectly defending Angola and Mozambique."

This confirms, in all its implications, the miserable cynicism and spite of the Portuguese colonialist leaders with regard to human life--even Portuguese life--but it has the merit of reminding us of the common struggle and the interests which unite our people with their brothers in Angola and Mozambique. It shows clearly the extent of our responsibilities in the united struggle for the total elimination of the Portuguese colonialist presence in Africa.

To make worthwhile the victories achieved by our people, and successes so far this year, and to live up to our responsibilities, we must make 1971 one of the most decisive periods in our long but rewarding struggle. We must daily increase our awareness of the facts, and not forget that we face a desperate enemy who has no scruples. We must be ready to make even greater sacrifices, to overcome all difficulties, behavior and our activities in political and military spheres, as well as in all the other branches of the new life that we are in the process of building.

We must at the same time as intensifying our armed activities, to bring them level with those of the enemy, pay close attention to our political work, both within the country, and on African and international levels. One of the principal strengths, if not the main one, of the Portuguese colonialists, is the political and material support of their allion. We must learn the lessons of this fact, as much for the present as for the future, and consolidate friendships and solidarity with all anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist forces. We must strengthen our links with Africans and non-Africans who, in helping us in our difficult struggle, have given us a real proof of their friendship.

No maneuver or crime on the part of the Portuguese colonialists--no power in the world--can prevent the inevitable victory of our African people, who are on the road to national liberation and the construction of the peace and progress to which they have a right.