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against Britain, primarily because of the limited, and at times conflicting, reports of the Rio teams.

Hitler’s Secret War is a study in the failure of the Brazilian espionage effort. Within six months after Brazil broke diplomatic relations with Germany (January 1942), virtually all Abwehr agents had been arrested, and operations had ceased in Brazil. This necessitated the shift of covert operations from there to Buenos Aires. The collapse of the espionage ring was the result of the Vargas government’s new political alignment on the side of the Allies. Aware of German activities before the diplomatic break, the Brazilian police no longer tolerated their espionage groups, and with the assistance of American agents, quickly and ruthlessly destroyed their network.

In the final analysis, the German intelligence effort was not of major importance to Brazilian and World War II history. As previous research by Hilton shows and as Frank McCann points out, by 1939 the Germans had little influence in Brazil and no important allies within the government, despite the admiration for the Nazi system by leaders of the armed services. Although Hilton’s narrative is exciting and exhaustively detailed, he proves conclusively that German agents did not provide essential information for the Nazis and did not threaten either the Battle of Britain or Brazilian security. Hilton’s thorough scholarship, however, makes this book useful to specialists in the field.

W. Michael Weis
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This book, originally published in France as La Liberation médiévale (1979), is not so much a study of ancient and medieval slavery as it is an application of Marxist sociopolitical theory to the question: When and why did slavery come to an end? “Gang-slavery,” as Pierre Dockes calls it, that form of slavery which existed on the great villae during the late Roman and early medieval period in Italy and Gaul, is the subject to which this question is addressed. The viability of chain-gang slavery on the great villae depended on the stability of the state. When the state grew weak, the gangs of slaves working on the villae tended to be broken up. Individual slaves were sent with their families to work
separate plots of land under some form of obligation to the master. Dockes states that the reason for dealing with the gang-slaves in this manner at the time of a declining state was not economic conditions, but social tension in the form of a class struggle. As the gang-slave moved up to become a serf, the free peasants also fell back into serfdom. Therefore, Dockes concludes that slavery was virtually non-existent by the tenth century in western Europe.

This book also operates at another level, a level which reveals interests of the author which are altogether wider and more contemporary than the questions of gang-slaves and the village system. Dockes is interested in countering what he calls a fashion in conceptions of history that holds that all social revolutions are doomed to failure and that “all social struggle is inane because...the only result is the replacement of one master by another” (p. 1). This is in reference to the failure of the communist revolutions in Russia, China, and elsewhere to measure up to their theoretical and ideological social goals. Dockes’s belief in such utopian goals is the foundation of his book. How and why slavery “came to an end in the Middle Ages,” Dockes insists, “is not a matter of indifference to anyone who believes in the possibility of an end to wage labor” (p. 1). His interest in slavery is rooted in a concern about all forms of exploitation. Serfdom and wage labor are described by Dockes as rising out of slavery, and it is slavery that the master always desires. The villae is presented as a precursor of the modern industrial plant with its accompanying exploitation of workers.

The reader need only note the great number of quotes from and references to Marx, Engels, and even to Mao to have suspicions confirmed that this is not a historical study of slavery but a socio-political tract. Dockes’s references in a chapter titled “Class Struggles” takes the party line of the state as the instrument of exploitation and the importance of the class struggle in dealing with exploitation. His frequent references to more recent forms of gang-slavery, such as American slavery, Nazi concentration camps, and manufacturing plants, omit any mention of forced labor camps in Russia and China.

Dockes’s main source for information about the villae is Columnella’s De re rustica, which he happily accepts as pertinent to the conditions in the villae during the late Roman and early medieval period. Columnella’s work, however, comes from the first century and is mainly concerned with large-scale agriculture in Spain. In fact, this reliance on inappropriate sources is a major defect of Medieval Slavery and Liberation. Dockes offers little primary source material to back up his assertions. In one chapter, “The Villae, Society and the State,” he cites approximately forty authors and their works, but only four of them are actual sources for
the nature of the villae system. The author also relies heavily on such contemporary scholars as Marc Bloch and M. Finley for information about slavery and the villae, supplemented by two aerial surveys of Gaul and some archaeological data. This book is heavily indoctrinated with Marxist historical interpretation and offers little critical insight to an important subject.

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*Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1810-1895* by Gerald Morgan is a study of the comedy of errors of British and Russian diplomacy in nineteenth-century central Asia. The region Morgan discusses includes present-day Soviet central Asia, Afghanistan, and bordering territories in Iran, Pakistan, India, and China. The guiding ideas of the book are that neither England nor Russia had any farsighted master plans for annexation in the area, that Russia posed no real threat to the integrity of the British Indian empire, and that England posed no real threat to Russian domination in Central Asia north of Afghanistan. According to this view, both empires were drawn into the region in a step-by-step fashion by such factors as the fluidity of their borders, the instability and aggressiveness of the neighboring principalities and tribes, a morbid suspicion of the motives behind each other’s moves in the area, and the meddlesome activities of their own nationals on the spot.

In the chapter “Russia in Central Asia up till 1842” we see the factors drawing Russia into the region: the construction of lines of forts in southern Siberia and Transcaspia, the suppression of Kazakh caravan raiding and Turkmens slave stealing, the acquisition of trading rights on the Aral Sea and the Amu Dar’ya River. Russia’s first large-scale military effort in the area, an invasion of the Khanate of Khiva in 1839, grew out of just such activities. The failure of this invasion supports the author’s contention that Russia could not threaten British India from this angle—the campaign turned into a complete fiasco as the inhospitable climate, disease, and supply shortages destroyed two thirds of the Russian forces, most of whom never even reached Khiva. Russia—subsequently