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Ibi et cor tuum: The Twin Perils of Studium and Otium in English Renaissance Intellectual Culture

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Ibi et cor tuum:  
The Twin Perils of Studium and Otium in English Renaissance Intellectual Culture

By
Gertrude Obi

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

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in

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in the

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of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:
Professor Joanna Picciotto, Chair
Professor James Grantham Turner
Professor Timothy Hampton

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Abstract

*Ibi et cor tuum:*

The Twin Perils of *Studium* and *Otium* in English Renaissance Intellectual Culture

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in English

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Joanna Picciotto, Chair

My dissertation, “*Ibi et cor tuum: The Twin Perils of Studium and Otium* in English Renaissance Intellectual Culture,” investigates the ways in which the temptations posed by intellectual labor were conceptualized and navigated by English Renaissance humanists. The competition pitting the *vita activa* against the *vita contemplativa*, which every age—including ours—must resolve anew, generated a spate of writings engaging with the mixed legacy of classical and medieval Christian attitudes towards the cultivation of knowledge for its own sake.

My first chapter traces the discourse of intellectual labor as leisure from the Aristotelian concept of *schole* through its transformations in the writings of Cicero, Seneca, Petrarch, and Erasmus. I discuss humanists’ attempts to draw upon traditions of monastic exemption and classical political exemption in order to add cachet and legibility to their “uselessness.” In doing so, I address the difficulties, both ideological and logistical, of integrating intellectual labor into an economic system.

Chapter 2 explores the creation of an intellectual realm defined against both the (masculinized) public sphere and the (feminized) domestic sphere in More’s *Utopia*. On one hand, the humanist who retreats into the intellectual realm runs the risk of opting out of his responsibilities as breadwinner of the *oikos* without providing any social utility; on the other hand, *otium litteratum* can be used to serve public as well as domestic interests. Luisa Sigea’s *Duarum virginum colloquium de vita aulica et privata (Dialogue of Two Young Girls on Courtly Life and Private Life)* treats the *activa-contemplativa* question from the female perspective; I read this document against the Dialogue of Counsel that takes place in book 1 of *Utopia*.

Chapter 3 on Christopher Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus* focuses on what happens when the ends of learning are perverted for personal gain. I argue that the sin Marlowe is most interested in is Faustus’s failure as a humanist; in both the production and consumption of knowledge, in the realms of both scholarly engagement and academic collegiality, Faustus is hobbled by his solipsism above all.
Chapter 4 examines the challenges that John Milton’s *Epitaphium Damonis* poses to the assumptions about the connective power of letters and learning that underpinned humanist conceptions of the *respublica litteraria* (Republic of Letters): relying too much on virtual communities for companionship runs the risk of devolving into solipsism. Milton finds a potential solution to this problem in the unlikeliest of places—Catholic Italy.

My discussion concludes with the archetypal example of the perils of intellectual labor—the Fall of Man story as depicted by Milton in *Paradise Lost*. Milton, extending the work of predecessors in the hexameral tradition such as Guillaume du Bartas and Francis Bacon, places intellectual life at the center of his Paradise; accordingly, his Adam and Eve struggle with the same issues that confounded contemporary humanists—questions of solitude vs. sociability, public good vs. private interest, embodied vs. virtual relationships, and, perhaps most important in *Paradise Lost*, the role of women in intellectual life. Not even in Paradise can Milton imagine a simple or straightforward resolution to these issues.
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Chapter One:

Introduction

Many years ago, when for the kingdom of heaven’s sake I had cut myself off from home, parents, sister, relations, and—harder still—from the dainty food to which I had been accustomed; and when I was on my way to Jerusalem to wage my warfare, I still could not bring myself to forego the library which I had formed for myself at Rome with great care and toil … Suddenly I was caught up in the spirit and dragged before the judgment seat of the Judge; and here the light was so bright, and those who stood around were so radiant, that I cast myself upon the ground and did not dare to look up.

Asked who and what I was I replied: I am a Christian.

But He who presided said: Thou liest, you are a follower of Cicero and not of Christ. For “where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.” Instantly I became dumb, and amid the strokes of the lash—for He had ordered me to be scourged—I was tortured more severely still by the fire of conscience, considering with myself that verse, In the grave who shall give you thanks? Yet for all that I began to cry and to bewail myself, saying: Have mercy upon me, O Lord: have mercy upon me.

― St. Jerome

Ciceronianus es, non christianus. Thus the angel reproaches St. Jerome, as he recounts the scene in his 22nd letter, before flogging him for the sin of reading pagan books during a time of seclusion intended for his Lenten devotion. The sin isn’t so much the reading itself but the excessive love of it—loving letters with the zeal one is supposed to reserve for God. Ubi thesaurus tuus, ibi et cor tuum: God should be one’s only thesaurus (“treasure”). Over 1,000 years later, the word thesaurus is associated with Latin letters in the title of Thomas Cooper’s 1565 Thesaurus Linguæ Romane et Britannice; a shameful association between thesaurus and Latin letters has become benign, if not positive. Ciceronians are so named for their Latin style rather than for a lack of piety. Love of pagan letters is no longer a sin worthy of flogging; in fact, Erasmus celebrates Jerome as an exemplar of scholarship alongside Peter as an exemplar of faith in his Antibarbari: “Take Peter and Jerome, one the first among the apostles, the other first among the doctors. In Peter there was the ardour of faith at its highest; in Jerome there was learning at its best. It is for you to imitate the spirit of the one and the scholarship of the other.”

Not only are faith and scholarship reconcilable, but the two are equally worthy of cultivation. Jerome represents several things to the humanist. His fundamental indecision between asceticism and worldliness was such that his life story could be appropriated for both intellectual and anti-intellectual purposes. While monastic orders in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Italy used letter 22 along with Jerome’s other anti-urban writings to support their hostility to everything secular, to Erasmus, who loved Jerome best of the church fathers, he embodied the project for the “New Learning”—the fusion of the pagan with the Christian; Erika Rummel tells us that in his “desire to put the studia humanitatis into the service of God,” he “sought to pattern himself after” Jerome. Indeed, if Jerome was Erasmus’s intellectual and spiritual model, he was also useful in a more pragmatic sense in the fashioning of his public persona. In his Vita Hieronymi Erasmus creates a Jerome in his own image—the Christian scholar successfully straddling the sacred and the secular; one scholar comments: “his portrait of Jerome is a self-
portrait, that of a Christian scholar attractively but disconcertingly Erasmian in attitude and personality.”

In the preface to his *Vita*, Erasmus embarks on a defense of Jerome, who apparently was criticized for both his “extravagant learning” and “his eloquence, which to [his critics] is somewhat more than befits a theologian.” On the contrary, Erasmus argues, these qualities were “the finest thing[s] about him.”

Lamenting that people “know nothing at all about Jerome except that he was pronounced a Ciceronian and scourged,” Erasmus tries to downplay the importance of Letter 22 by arguing that the angel wasn’t an actual apparition but just a dream. A century later, John Milton uses Jerome’s tale as a foil, skeptically noting in *Areopagitica* that “had an Angel bin [Jerome’s] discipliner … it had bin plainly partiall … to correct him for grave Cicero, and not for scourrill Plautus whom he confesses to have bin reading not long before.”

St. Jerome’s story offers several entry points into issues concerning humanist anxieties about the perils of intellectual labor—anxieties that offered a starting point for both attacks on and defenses of learning. The temptations of learning were many: excessive love of letters, illicit subject matter, tensions between pagan material and Christian material. In addition to Jerome’s substitution of the pagan for the Christian, humanists were equally haunted by the specters of idleness (with its associations of uselessness and lack of productivity) and “solitarinesses” (with its associations of solipsism and lack of sociability). Solitude could breed melancholy (as in *Il Penseroso*) or prideful fantasies of individual empowerment (as in *Doctor Faustus* and *Paradise Lost*); it could render the individual antisocial, hence useless to God and the commonwealth. In this sense, the dilemma of the Christian humanist who should love God above all else overlaps with the dilemma of the civic humanist whose work had to benefit society to be considered worthwhile.

Jerome, as his Lenten devotion devolves into reading Cicero and Plautus, is a prime example of the first dilemma for the religious contemplative—the danger of loving something else (study itself, perhaps, or pagan letters and culture) with the same zeal that one was to reserve for God. Any object of intense focus can become an object of intense love; it is the very mental attitude required for contemplation that primes one to (potentially) fall into sin. Indeed, *study* derives from the Latin word for zeal. Note that Jerome says he had put together his library “with great care and toil”—in the original, *summo studio ac labore*, which might be more aptly translated as “the height of zeal and toil.” While Jerome’s Christian zeal at times expresses itself in non-Christian study, the two are linked, as Erasmus suggests in his exhortation to cultivate both faith and scholarship (*alterius animum, alterius studia imitare*). And Jerome’s scholarship is inextricably linked to his faith, as evidenced in one scholar’s description of his life in seclusion: “his fasts and vigils punctuated systematic intellectual work, for he continued to build in these years the linguistic and scholarly foundation of his permanent achievements as a translator of and commentator on the Bible. He improved his spoken Greek and learned some Syriac. With the help of a Christian convert from Judaism, he began his heroic effort to master Hebrew.” Although less stringent than his contemporaries’ practices of self-mortification (some would bind themselves with chains so that they couldn’t move for most of the day), Jerome’s scholarly efforts would culminate in the intimate understanding of the Bible necessary to produce his magisterial translation and commentary.

Jerome’s identity crisis as a would-be *Christianus* revealed to be a mere *Ciceronianus* lurks behind the common humanist rhetorical move of claiming the object of one’s study as one’s identity: More puts *mihi* and *literis* into apposition in his prefatory letter to *Utopia*; Milton puts *libri* into apposition with *mea vita* in his *Elegia prima*. This tendency leaves one open to
the charge not just of idolatry but self-absorption—the humanist identification suggests that that scholarly zeal is ultimately a drive toward solipsism (we will explore this question in Chapter 4). For both Jerome and the humanists, the reference to identity serves as shorthand for communicating the all-encompassing zeal one feels for one’s object of study (the same all-encompassing zeal Doctor Faustus evokes with his quickly discarded vow to “live and die in Aristotle’s works” [1.1.5]). But if one’s object is (even rhetorically) oneself, the charges of self-centeredness, self-involvement, and solipsism are difficult to defend against.

Under this paradigm, zeal is a distinguishing feature of intellectual labor. As we will see in chapter 2, it is zeal that turns intellectual labor into something that does not feel like labor, like Milton’s *otia grata* in *Elegia prima*. Milton illustrates the paradox of *otium litteratum*, in which labor becomes recreation, in his description of his early studies in his 1642 *Apology against a Pamphlet*: he writes that he loved the “smooth Elegiack Poets” in his youth in part “for the pleasing sound of their numerous writing, which in imitation I found most easie; and most agreeable to natures part in me … I was so allur’d to read, that no recreation came to me better welcome” (*CPW* 1:889). His schoolboy exercises of imitation cease to be labor (“I found most easie; and most agreeable”) and reading becomes “recreation” instead. This phenomenon is familiar to academics today. Conversely, perhaps it is the fact that we can characterize the object of our zeal as “labor” (I would love to think about how to fix this social problem [a depressing task] but I must get back to work on my manuscript [a considerably more enjoyable, if less societally useful, prospect]) that allows us to indulge in it without feeling totally self-indulgent; it is a luxury, though. As Chapter 2 of this study will show, a society consisting exclusively of thinkers without makers is beyond the imaginative bounds of even a utopia.

Zeal supplements (or in some cases substitutes for) other types of motivation for undertaking an intellectually engaging project: monetary compensation, a sense of duty to society, a desire for status or prestige. And as we shall see, in defenses of intellectual labor, zeal for study is transformed into a more respectable or justifiable kind of zeal—for friend (see, for example, Milton’s second letter to Charles Diodati) or for the cause of reform—the beneficiary of whatever “action” eventuated from the studies (for example, see Milton’s *Reason of Church-government*). A reverse sublimation from the abstruse to the more embodied and material must take place in order for intellectual labor to become useful and sociable; ironically, this is another instance of the substitution for which Jerome is (verbally and physically) chastened.

For many commenters, the problem with zeal for studies is that it renders the scholar useless. For example, in his essay on the education of children, Montaigne cautions against encouraging any pupils who demonstrate a scholarly bent to indulge in too much study:

Nor would I think it good, if by virtue of some solitary and melancholy streak he were found to be addicted to the study of books with too undiscerning application, for him to be encouraged in that direction; such application makes them unfit for social intercourse and diverts them from better occupations. And how many men have I seen in my time made stupid by rash avidity for learning [*temeraire avidité de science!*]? A few decades after Montaigne publishes his *Essais*, London playgoers will see that *temeraire avidité de science* can result in the loss of one’s dukedom and exile to a place of pure seclusion. Ten years later, in his *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), Robert Burton criticizes the eagerness with which the study of ancient Rome is conducted and echoes Montaigne’s lament that scholars are “made stupid” by too much love of learning: “how many poore schollers have lost their wits, or become dizards, neglecting all worldly affaires, and their owne health, wealth, esse and benè esse, to gaine knowledge?” Twelve years later, Milton treats as a given the relationship
between excessive scholarship and uselessness in his 1633 “Letter to a Friend”; here he equates “love of Learning” with “a poore regardlesse & unprofitable sin of curiosity … wherby a man cutts himselfe off from all action & becomes the most helplesse, pusilanimous & unweapon’d creature in the world, the most unfit & unable to doe that which all mortals most aspire to, either to defend & be usefull to his freinds, or to offend his enemies” (CPW 1:319).

But each of these cases evinces a certain measure of ambivalence: although Montaigne decries “téméraire avidité de science,” in the same essay he reminiscens fondly about his téméraire avidité for Ovid: at age seven, Montaigne exhibits the worrisome signs of one addicted to studies: “I would steal away from any other pleasure to read them,” plunging himself into Ovid’s stories to the extent that he neglected his other studies: “Thereby I grew more careless in the study of my other prescribed lessons.” He praises his tutor’s allowing him to indulge in this zeal as good pedagogy—even though it contradicts the advice he gives earlier in the letter: “He went about it cleverly. Pretending to see nothing, he whetted my appetite, letting me gorge myself with these books only in secret, and gently keeping me at my work on the regular studies.”

As for Prospero, even as he describes the disastrous results of his over-investment in study, he describes the books Gonzalo saved for him as “volumes that / I prize above my dukedom” (1.2.196–97)—lines, I suspect, for which we are not to judge him harshly (even though the present tense “prize” suggests that he has not learned his lesson about the dangers of overvaluing study). Burton also evinces conflicting attitudes towards those who love letters, describing Democritus as one “wholly addicted to his studies” and yet praising him as “omnifariàm doctus [learned in everything], a general Schollar, a great student” (1:2). And even as Milton denigrates those who overindulge in studies, he justifies his own “studious retirement” by assuring his friend that it is only temporary (and by insinuation a necessary step on his path towards a vocation).

These instances of ambivalence reveal the writers’ difficulty in determining how much erudition and eagerness for studies is desirable: At what point does the ruin start? When does schole begin to slip into acedia? As Erasmus notes, Jerome is criticized because his eloquence is “somewhat more [plusculum] than befits a theologian”; how does one determine how much eloquence or study is too much? The difficulty these writers face in delineating adequacy from excess is perhaps akin to the difficulty we might have in distinguishing the disconcertingly similar figures of Contemplation and Despair in book one of Spenser’s Faerie Queene. In light of the anxiety about deceptive appearances that permeates book one of The Faerie Queene, the external similarities between Despair and Contemplation must give us pause. What exactly is the difference between them? If we can’t quite put our finger on it, how easy might it be to slip from one to the other?

Despair, of course, represents the flip side of zeal for studies: the melancholy traditionally associated with scholars. Melancholy is a function of both solitude and the intense single-minded focus on scholarship; this fact fed moral objections to such endeavor. By this logic, solitude leads to melancholy; solitude is necessary for studies; thus studies lead to melancholy, and studies are sinful because despair is sinful. But the situation is not quite that simple. Even here there was ambivalence: witness its manifestation in the alternating refrains of Burton’s “Abstract” to The Anatomy of Melancholy (“Naught so sweet as melancholy”; “Naught so sad as melancholy”).

Championing Jerome was only one way Erasmus and his colleagues defended against attacks on the New Learning, which were motivated by both fear of pagan influence on Christian culture and contempt for sophisticated language as fundamentally antithetical to Christian
Erasmus intended for the New Learning to transform all aspects of society, and he thought he could do this in a way that integrated “grammar, rhetoric, and moral philosophy.”

His curricular reforms put a greater emphasis on language (rhetoric and grammar) than on dialectic. The language serves a higher purpose—in fact, it is essential to the higher purpose. He believes, along with Matthaeus Adrianus, that “the divine mystery … was hidden in ‘the very idioms of a language.’”

On one level, the debate between traditionalists and reform-oriented proponents of the New Learning was an all-too-familiar “inter-departmental” struggle for control over the discipline of theology. Indignant at the suggestion that only scholars who read Greek and Hebrew could truly understand the scriptures, the Paris theologians were loath to relinquish their territorial monopoly in interpreting scripture to mere “Greeklings.” While it is amusing to imagine the scholars of yesteryear engaged in the same territorial warfare as we do, much was at stake. Scholastic dialectic offered a framework in which all other forms of knowledge could be organized. Walter Ong argues that by challenging the epistemological framework under which the scholastics were operating, the humanists were essentially changing the very definition of knowledge, thus “threaten[ing] the intelligibility of the whole universe.”

This is a bold claim requiring further explanation of the ontological and epistemological stance humanists offered as an alternative to the scholastic worldview. Hanan Yoran outlines three principles, each one flowing from the previous: 1. Knowledge is historically and socially contingent; there is not an abstractable universal set of principles from which knowledge can be derived; (and thus) 2. There is no epistemologically privileged realm separate from society to which one must turn in order to acquire or produce knowledge; (and thus) 3. the divide between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa is an artificial one. According to Yoran, these principles represent a great shift from “premodern times” when an intellectual’s authority was derived from “knowledge of ultimate religious or philosophical truths.” Unlike humanists, “scholastics saw their activity as an elaboration of logically valid knowledge of an objective and unchanging reality”; they were “primarily oriented to the transcendent realm.”

My exploration of the ways in which the temptations posed by intellectual labor were conceptualized and navigated by Renaissance humanists will take the studia humanitatis as its focus. Against the background of the so-called “crisis in the humanities,” there is growing interest in making intellectual labor itself an object of academic study; my dissertation participates in this self-reflexive turn. Among scholars of early modernity, Virginia Krause studies intellectual labor as it relates to the French humanist double imperative to be useful and to be idle. Brian Vickers looks at intellectual labor as it was used to redeem otium in a tradition stretching from Cicero through Petrarch and later Renaissance humanists. Janette Dillon studies intellectual labor as it was used to redeem solitude. But intellectual labor itself needed to be redeemed as well, from both its association with solipsistic scholarly melancholy and its association with forbidden knowledge and original sin. Kathy Eden, Anthony Grafton, and Lisa Jardine have written extensively on the Republic of Letters, a humanist construct which in part resolves the linked dangers of intellectual labor—idleness and “solitariness.” It is this dynamic that I study in this chapter. Among several issues intersecting with the questions raised by the New Learning, I have already treated the temptations and dangers of studium; in the following pages I will discuss the political, economic, and religious contexts of otium as well as the redemption of intellectual labor as both productive and sociable.
1. The marriage of action and contemplation

The action vs. contemplation divide can be traced to the habit, noted by Joshua Phillips, of Western societies releasing a special group of people from the realm of productivity, allowing this group to focus on activities separate from those necessary for sustaining the material needs of that society.39 In ancient Athens it was the men of the polis who were thus exempt; in Christian Europe it was the religious.40 Early modern humanists drew from both of these traditions of exemption in their efforts to create a conceptual space in which action and contemplation could touch.

One mode of marrying the two is represented by Francis Bacon’s experimentalist philosophy; in championing the (then oxymoronic) idea of intellectual labor, experimentalists attempted to “construct an intellectual life in which mind and body both participated.”41 As Joanna Picciotto recounts, “Bacon declared that it would ‘dignify and exalt Learning; if contemplation and Action were more neerely and straitly, than hitherto they have bin conjoin’d and united together’: the active life and the contemplative life would come together again in the experimental life.”42 Like the humanists, Baconians defined themselves against the scholastic tradition of the “given or ‘datum’ as the basis of trustworthy knowledge.”43 Rather than simply staying cloistered with his books, the intellectual was to encounter nature face to face by performing experiments. As Picciotto explains, “to become authors in their own right, university-educated gentlemen had to cultivate an alternative form of literacy”—that is, they had to learn to read the book of nature, as the Biblical Adam did when he named the animals. 44 Indeed, Bacon derives his authority in marrying action with contemplation from Genesis, asserting that the two were not separate in Eden.45 In doing this, he pushes back against the Fall tradition linking curiosity and sin, which was the source of so much early modern anxiety about the pursuit of knowledge. While Bacon would try to sever the putative link between curiosity and sin by redescribing Eden as a paradise of knowledge and discovery, sixteenth-century humanists were not so sanguine. As I will argue, they had vexed and often contradictory attitudes towards the learning they promoted, drawing on the long tradition linking learning to sin even as they tried to overturn that tradition. My dissertation will conclude by considering the most important rewriting of the Genesis myth in English literary history, Paradise Lost—in which Baconian elements abound.46

But although Paradise Lost contains many Baconian elements, Milton could not have used Baconian experimentalism literally to reconcile activity with contemplation. In addition to writing against the Christian Fall narrative, Bacon was also writing against a classical tradition in which “the … distinction between the slave and the freeborn … segregated the productive toil of the laborer, which altered the physical world, from the ataraxia of the contemplative man, which did not.”47 Since experiential learning was the basis of Bacon’s philosophy, those writing in this tradition encouraged scholars to visit craftsmen in their workshops to learn about the mechanical arts.48 It is this embrace of mechanical labor that prevented experimentalism from being a viable solution to the problem of fusing action with contemplation for men of letters; Bacon could be only a thematic inspiration rather than a methodological one. The classical model humanists held dear precluded engagement in physical labor; Aristotle famously excludes “mechanics” from citizenship in his Politics.49 Similarly, Hannah Arendt assumes a fundamental disjunct between physical and intellectual labor, as evidenced in her exclusion of “the activity of thinking” from her schema of the vita activa. For her, the realms of the three fundamental human “activities” of work, labor, and action overlap with the political and economic realms; her exclusion suggests that intellectual labor cannot be considered a part of these realms.50
Of course, this stance presents a problem for those who would marry the *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa* as it makes two arguments that are difficult to reconcile: that contemplation is indeed labor, and that it is a completely distinct and dissimilar thing from physical labor (as we will see in *Utopia*, the two could even be diametrically opposed); the insistence on the distinction from physical labor risks calling into question the status of contemplation as labor. Virginia Krause tells us that French humanists were caught in a double bind by these two contradictory assertions. They needed contemplation to be labor in order to fulfill the humanist mandate to be useful; they needed it to be useless because they aspired to the classical ideal of non-productive leisurely contemplation reflected in Aristotle’s notion of *scholia*. As Krause reminds us, because of their intellectual filiation with Aristotle “idleness was at the heart of the Fourth Estate’s self-definition, for it was literally and conceptually *schola* that gave rise to *scholarly*.”

Contemplation had to exist in a separate category from work while being at the same time onerous and productive—but not useful.

While humanists recognized the importance of hard work, believing that “strenuous effort was the very condition of knowledge and that the steps leading up Parnassus were steep indeed” at the same time they remembered their Aristotle: “citizens of the republic of letters also knew that work could not be the purpose of existence. Aristotle himself defined humanity’s highest calling as the contemplative idleness he termed *schola* … [French humanists] were not eager to make contemplation into work, and work itself into the purpose of existence.” Their challenge was thus “to reconcile an esteem for work with the ideal of classical leisure.”

Part of this dilemma can be traced to the material circumstances of French humanists. The so-called Fourth Estate consisted of members of the commercial class who had attained nobility, “passing from commerce on to office-holding and a noble lifestyle” by dint of hard work. Problems arose for them when the ethos that had allowed them to amass enough social and financial capital to attain nobility—*ex labore honor*, which could be understood literally as well as figuratively—came into conflict with the ethos of the aristocratic milieu to which they aspired: *mercatura deroget nobilitati* (commerce derogates nobility). As Krause puts it, “The true nature of the noble estate required abstention from *negotium*—or rather, parallel proposition, it instituted a mandatory *otium*.” But even as idleness came to form “the heart of the Fourth Estate’s self-definition,” it became something quite different from that *otium* enjoyed by the aristocracy. Members of the Fourth Estate redefined *otium* to imply busy-ness. While *otium* in aristocracy is associated with privacy and self-gratification, for the Fourth Estate it was to be used in service of the public good—or at least as a break from service of the public good—as in Cicero’s *otium cum dignitate*. Thus *otium* implies work—even if it is simply the work from which one is taking a break.

In addition, French humanists transformed idleness into an active performance of leisure. *Otium* became no longer a leisure to be enjoyed in private but performed for the public in order to “both reflect and establish membership in an elite.” *Otium* in the Fourth Estate had to involve effort—both in performing leisure and in proving that one’s leisure is not an occasion to indulge in laziness. And indeed performance was a capital part of *otium*—both aristocratic and humanist. The difference, according to Krause, was that “the ideal leisureed gentleman [of the Fourth Estate] … endeavored to be idle without being idle; he did not seek to *be* at leisure, but rather to *do* leisure.” The performance of leisure is labor and *involves* labor; the evidence is in the literary artifacts, as Krause argues: the “elaborate correspondence, poetry, translation, and other forms of what we might today call ‘personal cultivation.’”
Thus in addition to effort, cultivation of the self became the second value ascribed to the Fourth Estate’s *otium litteratum*: “the difference between nobiliary idleness and the art of idleness is culture, mostly literary culture … As a form of cultivation, idleness works and reworks a mental and cultural terrain. This *culture* of idleness was at the foundation of the Fourth Estate’s project.”58 We see this in More’s imagined Utopia, in which self-cultivation (*cultus animi*) is the highest goal to which one can aspire. Krause discusses the *captationes benevolentiae* of humanist books, which frequently rehearse the topos of transforming bad *otium* into good *otium litteratum*.

Burton also evokes this topos in his rhetoric when he defines the utility of his *Anatomy* as a “writing cure”:

I write of Melancholy, by being busie to avoid Melancholy. There is no greater cause of Melancholy then idleness, *no better cure then business*, as 59 Rhasis holds: and howbeit, *stultus labor est ineptiarum*, to be busied in toyes is to small purpose, yet heare that divine Seneca, better *aliud agere quâm nihil*, better doe to no end then nothing. I writ therefore, & busied my selfe in this playing labor, *otiosâque diligentiâ ut vitarem torporem feriandi* with Vectius in Macrobius, atque otium in utile verterem negotium … as he that is stung with a Scorpion. I would expell *clavum clavo*, 60 comfort one sorrow with another, idlenes with idlenes, *ut ex viperâ Theriacum*, make an Antidote out of that which was the prime cause of my disease. (1:6–7)

The phrases “*otiosâque diligentiâ ut vitarem torporem feriandi*” and “*otium in utile verterem negotium*” recall the *captationes benevolentiae* Krause discusses that rehearse the topos of turning bad *otium* into good through the exercise of letters. But here Burton seems less sure about his project than do his French counterparts. He at first describes himself as engaged in producing *nugae*—"busied in toyes"; “do to no end”; “playing labor”—but after this denigration, his writing becomes elevated to the status of “*diligentiâ*” and “*negotium,*” then finally reverts to being identical to that which he is trying to dispel (“I would expel *clavum clavo*, comfort one sorrow with another, idlenes with idlenes”). The passage evinces ambivalence about whether his writing is busyness or idleness, the cause or the cure of his melancholy, and this question is not resolved decidedly. In the end, it seems that he’s saying that he is going to turn bad idleness into good idleness, but there has been a lot of dithering along the way.

While *otium litteratum* is part of the solution, it does not entirely resolve the contradictions inherent in the French humanist stance towards idleness. A countervailing force to the positioning of *otium litteratum* as good, effortful leisure contrasting with aristocratic laziness was the “curious resistance to taking the next logical step by defining *otium* as a useful art for useful men”; instead of declaring their *otium* useful, they chose to “posit idleness as a third term: neither useless nor useful.”61 (Similarly, we will see the realm of the intellectual posited as a third term disrupting the public/domestic binary in our discussion of *Utopia* in Chapter 2.) Eventually, *otium litteratum* became unequivocally useless and virtuous for being so:

Making idleness manifestly useful would deprive it of its ethical potential—its capacity to transcend and question expediency … The highest ethical ideal must be absolute, something worthy in and of itself, and not simply useful in accomplishing some other end. Thus, for Aristotle, *schole* (contemplative idleness) is superior precisely because it is not useful (telic), just as Cicero defined *honestum* as an autotelic category. In accordance with Aristotelian ethics, work (*ascholia*) is to be endured only insofar as it leads to idleness (*schole*)—the locus of happiness.62
Krause writes that the usefulness of idleness “had to remain covert” despite the fact that *otium* was definitely practically and instrumentally useful: to be sure, letters were indeed useful, claims of their transcendence of *utilitas* notwithstanding. 63

How and why intellectual labor is fundamentally different from physical labor—and indeed, whether it can count as true labor at all—are questions that present themselves anew to each age; 64 thus it is worthwhile for us to consider these questions here. Usually labor is associated with production while consumption is not—consumers are the ones enjoying the fruits of the labor without (necessarily) having expended the effort needed to produce it. Perhaps it is only in the arena of intellectual affairs that consumption of a product may be just as arduous as its production; this is because the consumption and production of texts draw on the same operations. Physical labor is difficult as well, of course, but we are not constantly reminded of the effort that goes into this type of production when we eat an apple or sit on a chair, for example. 65 Also, products of intellectual labor can be consumed by multiple people multiple times; there is no economy of scarcity operating here unless one is artificially created—but in fact, it is more likely for the reverse to be true: a glut overwhelms the marketplace (a glut with which, as Burton complains in his *Anatomy*, “our presses be oppressed”), driving down prices and wages. For good or for bad, ingenuity is a perpetually renewable and inexhaustible resource. It is perhaps for these reasons, as well as humanist insistence on the fundamental difference between physical and intellectual labor, that integration of intellectual labor into the economic system proved so difficult (and to some extent remains so today).

2. **Classical scholē in service of the state**

The importance of distinguishing between good leisure and bad leisure is a constant thread in writing about labor and leisure in the Western philosophical tradition. For the purposes of this study, our discussion begins with Aristotle, who distinguishes *scholē*, or “intellectual work, which has its own intrinsic value” from “ordinary or mass leisure.” 66 For Aristotle, *scholē* has two benefits: both this intrinsic value and its usefulness in “prepar[ing] the individual for productive engagement in the world.” 67 But it was also an ethical stance, as Krause reminds us. 68 Time used not in the service of something else—thus transcending contingency and utilitarianism—is the most worthy.

When the concept of intellectual leisure passed into the Roman world, Aristotle’s *scholē* was translated as *otium*—but the connotations of the term were significantly different. 69 In Roman texts, *otium* “frequently connotes idleness, laziness, luxuriousness, and voluptuousness”; this is because, unlike *scholē*, *otium* was associated with both good and bad leisure. 70 Brian Vickers tells us that the Romans abhorred *otium*, but in the cases he cites *otium* is not necessarily identified with intellectual labor—in fact, it usually is not (for example, when Sallust and Livy talk about *otium* bringing ruin upon a state, they are referring to the idea that lack of military conflict leads both soldiers and civilians to engage in luxury and debauchery). 71 When *otium* is associated with intellectual pursuits, as in Cicero and Seneca, its negative valence is attenuated; Cicero and Seneca coined the terms qualifying “good” leisure as *otium cum dignitate* and *otium honestum*. These concepts, born out of an involuntary break (exile) from the political sphere, were the precursors of the Petrarchan/humanist conception of *otium litteratum*. 72 Cicero’s and Seneca’s attempts to rehabilitate the concept notwithstanding, the Christian world “inherited the Roman suspicion of *otium*” and linked it with the deadly sin of *acedia* (sloth). 73
This leads us into the debate over the superiority of the *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa*, which is at heart a debate about one’s relationship to society, as Phillips’s theory of exemption makes clear. Again, we start with Aristotle, as the familiar Latin terms we have inherited from medieval philosophy are translations of his *bios politikos* and *bios theoretikos*. These represent for Aristotle two of the three modes of life (*bioi*) available to the free subject (here, “free” means not constrained by necessity to labor—thus for Aristotle it was not only the slave who was unfree, but the “free craftsman” and “acquisitive merchant” as well). All three of these *bioi* are oriented towards the opposite of the necessary, which is the beautiful. The *bios politikos* (*vita activa*) pertained exclusively to politics; Greek *schole*, a component of the *bios theoretikos* (*vita contemplativa*), meant specifically “freedom from political affairs”—which, as Arendt explains, were very mentally and emotionally taxing for the citizen.74

Emulating Aristotle’s men of the *polis*, humanists made attempts to use their learning in the service of the king by joining the court—but they were not in ancient Athens, a democracy in which all citizens had the opportunity to speak frankly and persuade by frank speech. Stephen Greenblatt has observed a late medieval shift in the locus of power from church to courts, and argues that the humanists eagerly followed that shift; no longer operating under the auspices of the Church, most were all too happy to serve in the public sphere; others (such as Erasmus and Pico della Mirandola) were more wary of the ramifications of aligning themselves so closely with the emerging loci of state power and preferred to stand aloof.75 The demands of courtly patronage caused some (such as Erasmus) to chafe.

While Greenblatt’s humanists become ambiguously empowered, Léon Bourdon and Odette Sauvage offer an account of marginalization: humanists, who had enjoyed positions as politicians and merchants and contributed actively to the life of the city in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, were unceremoniously driven out of their active role in society in the sixteenth century by “emerging commercial capitalism.” Consequently, they became dependent on “grands” through the system of patronage; they then positioned themselves as moralists, in the world but not of it; the result was a glut of “education of princes” literature. Thus Bourdon and Sauvage frame the humanist withdrawal and detachment from society as undertaken by necessity rather than by choice: “The situation of the humanists … obliges them to take refuge in an ideal world that they build in opposition to the existing world. In this society, they can be only moralists, and give counsel to kings in order to guide them towards the good.” The difficulty of integrating intellectual labor with market demands leaves humanists with limited opportunities to play an active role.76

Common to both narratives is a sense that patronage becomes very important—almost inescapably so—for the humanist. Yoran tells us that unlike the situation of “scholastic philosophers,” whose social and professional identity was based in the university system, the humanist social and professional identity became tied to relationships with patrons.77 But all was not easy for these protégés. Although Thomas More and the members of his circle benefitted greatly from Henry VIII’s generosity in giving humanists prestigious posts, their situation was exceptional; according to Yoran “the majority of humanists could at most aspire to be educators, secretaries, and midranking administrators and diplomats. In a society dominated by an aristocratic ethos, the status of humanists was never very high.”78

Humanist utility to the state manifested itself in two types of activities. Activities of the first type fall under the category of administration; we see this with the rise of the Henrician “new man” in early-sixteenth-century England, whom Jennifer Summit describes as a “humanist-educated counselor … for whom literacy was an essential tool for employment and
advancement.”79 Humanist bureaucrats such as Thomas Starkey and Thomas Elyot became part of Thomas Cromwell’s “coterie of educated laymen … who applied their humanist training in the service of the state.” In co-opting humanist rhetoric in order to dismantle the old pre-Reformation order “under the banner of humanist reform,” Cromwell tied humanism inextricably to state power; in his hands the cluster of ideas and ideals Summit attributes to “Anglicized active humanism” became “a tool of state control.”80

Activities of the second type fall under the category of reputation-building; here the ideology of *translatio studii* is operative. Arguing that “Rome owed more to the eloquence of Cicero than to the victories of Caesar, more to Virgil than to Augustus,” proponents of *translatio studii* saw *litterae* as a crucial tool for enhancing a country’s standing among the community of nations.81 Yoran tells us that Henry VII commissioned Polydore Vergil to “write the first humanist history of England with the aim of internationally strengthening the insecure legitimacy of the new regime.”82 In the realms of both administration and reputation-building, the aim of humanist activity is determined by the demands of hegemonic power. Many humanists did not mind (as Greenblatt notes), but some, such as Erasmus, balked at these constraints.

Erasmus’s idealized conception of the relationship between patron and protégé gives the protégé near-complete autonomy: “ideally … the patron’s reward would be inherent in the relations of patronage without making any specific demands on the humanist.” That is, merely being associated with the humanist would bring so much benefit in terms of social capital to the patron that no concrete demands on the protégé would be necessary. In such a situation the patronage relationship would not affect or influence the direction of the protégé’s intellectual activities.83 This vision drives Erasmus to complain in a letter to a colleague that an English patron reneged on his promise of “complete leisure and the freedom to choose my own way of life [summo ocio vitaeque libertate] which I regard as so necessary that if deprived of that, I should think life not worth living.”84 But Yoran shows both that the patron had promised him no such thing and that the system of patronage as it was practiced in early-sixteenth-century England precluded such a promise: “A far more concrete, direct and continuous service was usually expected from the humanist. Moreover, no separation was to characterize the humanist’s intellectual activities and his service. On the contrary, he was precisely to employ his literary and intellectual skills and talents on behalf of his patron (who was expected, in turn, to support his protégé by using his own ‘capacities,’ namely wealth and power).”85

Such a system, Erasmus declares, is a poor match for his sensibilities; in the same letter, he confesses: “if truth be told, it was that not so much that no position came my way as that I would not live up to any position; such is my abhorrence of ordinary business [communibus negociis] and so far am I from ambition, so lazy if you like, that I need a position such as Timotheus enjoyed, and success caught in my nets while I sleep.”86 If Erasmus’s view seems hopelessly naïve (how can someone give a person money without expecting some concrete benefit in return?), the patron’s view seems morally questionable, if not abhorrent (intellectual endeavor without independence is in danger of devolving into propaganda). The gap between Erasmus’s ideal and the reality of the patronage system—and the impossibility of bridging this gap—reflects an inherent difficulty in finding a suitable way for intellectual labor to be integrated into the economic system of sixteenth-century England.

According to Yoran, it was Erasmus’s dissatisfaction with the system of patronage that led him to create the Republic of Letters as “an autonomous intellectual space” detached from the realms of court and marketplace. In fact, the locus of Erasmus’s republic was the printing-house rather than a court.87 I imagine that the Erasmians liked the idea of the printing press
substituting for court or city-state as hub of humanist activity: there are in theory no restrictions on who comes into a printing shop to have their work printed. There is also the ad fontes, rudimentary aspect, the implicit assertion that this is the foundation of what it means to be a humanist—to produce bonae litterae, not to perform in court pleasing princes. Centering humanist activity in the printing house strips away the trappings of “gentlemanly leisure” so that only the pure work of knowledge production remains. Although Yoran wants to draw a strict dichotomy between the Republic of Letters and the economic sphere (“The contrast between the … commercial world and the Republic of Letters cannot be sharper”), this separation cannot be absolute because the printing press is intimately connected with the marketplace. But as we will see, the marketplace was not much kinder to humanists than the patronage system.

If the dream of living by one’s pen “in complete leisure and freedom” through participation in the patronage system had its difficulties, humanist forays into the marketplace encountered equally formidable obstacles. Intellectual labor was not heavily remunerated. In his “Democritus Jr. to the Reader,” Burton decries the “scribling age” that has brought about a glut in the market of texts: “What a Catalogue of new books all this yeare, all this age (I say) have our Franc-furt Marts, our Domestick Marts brought out? … Who can read them? As already, wee shall have a vast Chaos and confusion of Bookes, we are oppressed with them, our eyes ake with reading, our fingers with turning” (1:8–11). Authors were disempowered because they did not own their work; only the person who paid to register a text with the Stationers held rights to the text. Ben Jonson reacted to the constraints of the literary marketplace in the way Erasmus reacted to the constraints of court: by taking bold measures to champion his autonomy (in this case not political but economic and aesthetic). Erasmus created an imagined space of political autonomy; Jonson “collected his plays, poems, and masques in an expensively printed volume which he titled The Works of Benjamin Jonson.” According to Martin Butler, this publication projected his claim to being a man of letters, his status in the slowly crystallizing world of professional literature … by his editorship of his own writings, he laid an implicitly revolutionary claim to ownership of them, since at this time copyrights were not normally held by authors but by theater companies or publishers. The book proclaimed Jonson’s ability to live off his own writing: he was neither a hack writer for the market, a slave to playhouse managers, nor a toady of the court. He was the first writer to present an image of himself as essentially working for his own artistic satisfaction.

But Jonson is an extreme and anomalous case; we do not see a movement for full-blown aesthetic autonomy flourish in England until the nineteenth century.

The precursor of a vision of poetic autonomy is a vision of poetry as a product of gentlemanly leisure; for poets like Sir Philip Sidney who circulated his works in manuscript among a coterie of poet-aristocrats, publishing (from Latin publicare ‘to make known to the public’) would have violated the courtly ideal of sprezzatura. George Puttenham, in his 1589 rhetoric manual The Arte of English Poesie, specifies that he “does not address himself primarily to scholars and schoolmasters but to the lords and ladies of court, ‘idle courtiers’ who wish to perfect their command of their mother-tongue and perhaps now and again to write a poem for their ‘private recreation.’”

We should note that even as Sidney defends the idea of the autonomous gentleman-poet, his stance is nonetheless responsive to the need for intellectual labor to be useful. While he allows the poet the liberty to “freely rang[e] … within the zodiac of his own wit,” Sidney also writes that learning should have “the end of well-doing and not of well-knowing only … the ending end of all earthly learning being virtuous action.” This is closer to the ethos of writers
like Milton, who elevated poetry from an avocation to a vocation. And not just poetry: in his Civil War writings, he continually justifies his intellectual labor as just as important as fighting. In a way, he sees himself as a throwback, one of the last to keep the humanist project alive as an engaged intellectual, combining religion, *bonae litterae*, and political engagement without compromising any of them— weaving the strands together so expertly that his life could be likened to a well-constructed poem, “a composition, and patterne of the best and honourablest things” (*CPW* 1:890).  

3. Monastic retreat

Alongside ambivalent gestures towards political utility, we see humanist attempts to fashion their withdrawal according to the monastic model. Recuperating the monastic ethos might not have seemed an obvious choice, since monasticism—the most common manifestation of the *vita contemplativa* in medieval society—had been attacked as early as Petrarch’s day, well before the Reformation swept across Europe. Critics of monasticism characterized monks as idle; in turn, religious contemplatives framed the *vita activa* as engagement in worldly “besynes.” This turn away from the world underpins one of the most significant genres of writing to come out of monasteries: *contemptus mundi* writing. According to Ronald E. Pepin, the many works written in this tradition “dwell on the fleeting nature of secular goods, the permanence of heavenly rewards; they detail the physical and spiritual afflictions of fallen mankind; they assail pride and summon to repentance. They are earnest, fervent expressions of the unshakeable conviction that the world and all its glories are mere vanity.” Eventually the model for the solitary contemplative life became the scholar rather than the hermit (although, as we will see, the scholar’s solitude was often highly populated).

It was Petrarch who first brought the *vita contemplativa* outside of the cloister, advocating retreat for secular purposes. His three works on solitude (*De otio religioso*, *De vita solitaria*, and *Secretum*) rank “among the most comprehensive works on solitude in Western literature.” He had great influence on humanist thinking about *otium* and solitude; Dillon locates the origin of what she calls the “cult of solitude” in sixteenth-century England in his *De vita solitaria*. It is to this text that we will turn because of its great popularity and influence—there are 120 surviving manuscripts of the text, which is the most for any of Petrarch’s works; it was printed in nine early modern editions, including three as a single text; and it was translated into Spanish and Italian.  

*De vita solitaria* is composed of two books: the first book contrasts life of the *occupatus* (“busy man”) with that of the *solitarius* (“solitary man”), eventually championing the superiority of the solitary life; the second book is an “encyclopedia of solitude” which traces the lives of several famous solitaries from both classical and Christian traditions. As his predecessors do, Petrarch takes care to make the crucial distinction between good and bad leisure:

I mean a solitude that is not exclusive [*solitudinem non solam*], leisure that is neither idle nor profitless but productive of advantage to many. For I agree that those who in their leisure are indolent, sluggish and aloof are always melancholy and unhappy, and for them there can be no performance of honorable actions, no absorption in dignified study, no intercourse with distinguished personalities.

In this way he redeems *otium* from its association with *acedia* and frames it as a productive undertaking—“performance of honorable actions,” “absorption in dignified study,” and “intercourse with distinguished personalities” are the potential fruits of this good type of *otium*. 
In doing this, Petrarch argues in favor of the by now familiar “paradoxical notion of leisure as labor.”104 But the supposed paradox of leisurely labor (or laborious leisure) is not really a paradox; in what will become a popular refrain among academics and scholars, Petrarch reminds us that the mind can be active even when the body is at rest: “The holiday which I ordain is for the body, not for the mind; I do not allow the intellect to lie fallow [in otio ingenium quiescere] except that it may revive and become more fertile by a period of rest” (556/291).105 For Petrarch, *otium* necessarily involves intellectual labor—this is its very purpose.106

Petrarch’s version of the vita contemplativa in *De vita solitaria* is exemplary because it represents a turn away from the world but *not* towards the cloister. Unlike Jerome, he is able to conceive of paths toward fulfillment other than God, as is evidenced in the first words of the text: “I believe that a noble spirit will never find repose save in God, in whom is our end, or in himself and his private thoughts, or in some intellect united by a close sympathy with his own” (296/105).107 Dillon makes much of the fact that Petrarch has three options—unlike Jerome, who would cut off the statement after “save in God,” Petrarch can treasure God *and* his intellectual labor.108 Although the *aet* seems to necessitate a choice, humanist desires will tend to manifest in a combination of the final two options—solitude with books and friends. Bondanella notes that Petrarch’s contemplation is very different from Jerome’s ideal, more literary than religious; his opening up of the possibilities of contemplation will allow the humanists who come after him more freedom to engage in literary pursuits without sustaining Jerome’s guilt.109 Indeed, as Petrarch quips in a letter, “I have no fear of being any less a Christian for being a Ciceronian, for to my recollection Cicero never said anything against Christ.”110

Freedom is what humanist withdrawal is all about at bottom—exemption from having one’s autonomy interfered with.111 As Diana Webb tells us, few in the Middle Ages could achieve Petrarch’s level of solitude and autonomy—the poor lived and worked side by side with others and were subject to the rules of those higher up in the social hierarchy; the rich were usually involved in some kind of public office which came with public obligations.112 Petrarch was able to opt out to the extent that he did only because he had an income from sinecures, “ecclesiastical benefices that did not require his personal attention”—in essence he was living Erasmus’s fantasy of “success caught in my nets while I sleep,” or income without subjection to another’s directives. Unlike monastic exemption from participation in society, which Webb characterizes as the freedom to serve God and to be “liberat[ed] from the vain entanglements of the flesh and the world,” Petrarch’s withdrawal is predicated on “the freedom to be what he was” rather than accommodating himself to any societal expectations.114 In Chapter 2, we will discuss the unintended consequences of such freedom in More’s imagined Utopia.

Petrarch does make gestures towards political participation, and indeed he still sought to influence the political situation of his day. Ideally, one would be able to live a *vita mixta*, he argues, since self-cultivation is crucial in order for someone to be useful in the political sphere—in other words, productive *negotium* must be fed by equally productive *otium*.115 However, he is skeptical about this ideal becoming a reality: thus, instead of hewing to the Aristotelian/Platonic view of *otium* oriented primarily towards the common good,116 “he was more concerned with the moral condition of the individual, especially himself, and what external circumstances were conducive to his tranquility and inner improvement.”117 Like Jerome, who took his library with him into seclusion and collaborated on texts with other hermits (prompting one scholar to remark that his cave “must have been a spacious one”), Petrarch cannot conceive of a solitude without books and friends.118 Both Jerome and Petrarch have a tendency to hedge, resulting in an attenuated withdrawal. As Bondanella notes, “although Petrarch emphatically condemns urban
life, he cannot bring himself to accept total isolation from other human beings”—and in this he is also similar to Jerome.\footnote{119} And despite his defining of himself as detached from the “vulgar horde \[vulgi,\]” Petrarch does not remain purely divorced from the civic life—Bondanella tells us that he “was concerned with political and religious matters … engaged in friendships with rulers, ecclesiastical dignitaries, and other writers, and enjoyed a public role as a poet and scholar.”\footnote{120}

But like the idea of laborious leisure, Petrarch’s solitudinem non solam is another paradox that is not really a contradiction. He tells us why: he considers a friend to be not another, but myself somehow duplicated. Surely they are not two who have a single mind. Love knows how to make one from two, otherwise the command of Pythagoras were impossible that through friendship many should be united into one. From this it follows that any place which is capable of holding one person can hold two friends. No solitude is so profound, no house so small, no door so narrow but it may open to a friend. (558/292)\footnote{121}

This single-sex amicitia is only one way Petrarch’s version of otium retained something of a monastic sensibility. (For Webb, the monastery was the unique locus of affinity-based friendships rather than friendships based on material needs, which were more common in the period.\footnote{122}) In fact, one could argue that Petrarch saw religious and secular otium as two sides of the same coin; the fact that he composed both De vita solitaria and De otio religioso (a text addressed to the Carthusian order his brother had joined) during the same span of time suggests as much.\footnote{123}

The flip side of De vita solitaria, De otio religioso can be read as a sort of companion book. Although (in contrast to De vita solitaria) Petrarch seems to turn his back on the profane in favor of exclusive devotion to the sacred in De otio religioso, his practice of solitude does not match his rhetoric; Demetrio S. Yocum points out that his otium is not that of the Carthusians to whom the treatise is dedicated and addressed: “The leisure he embraces instead differs somewhat from the strictly monastic type. Petrarch’s leisure has to do with the establishment of a laicized form of religious life combined with intellectual activity, a type of leisure which most certainly could never have found in the religious structures of the times a receptive ground wherein to flourish.”\footnote{124} Even in this treatise dedicated to the Carthusians, Petrarch’s otium is decidedly literary: Yocum argues that for him, “the act of writing itself becomes … the site of leisure and rest.”\footnote{125}

Although Petrarch’s position as a “clerical amphibian” (he had taken minor orders but still led an “essentially secular life”)\footnote{126} might have given him a unique perspective on the continuities between monasticism and the emergent humanism that would flourish in Quattrocento Italy, many would follow him in making such a connection. As late as the sixteenth century, the dissolution of the monasteries in England created a situation in which investment in otia monastica shifted from the religious realm to the literary realm, as Phillips has argued.\footnote{127} Vickers and Dillon, among others, note that the narrative of continuity between the monastic vita contemplativa and humanism was useful in lending a certain cachet and legitimacy to the humanists’ scholarly endeavors.\footnote{128} One such manifestation of this rhetorical strategy is the humanist practice of styling themselves as monastic scholars (or “scholar-saints”) in the portraits that would play such an important role in creating their public personas.\footnote{129} One might say that Erasmus on Jerome becomes Erasmus as Jerome—or Jerome as Erasmus.\footnote{130}
4. Redemption of intellectual labor as productive

Even as humanists sought to justify their withdrawal by analogizing it to both the classical ideal of *schole* and the medieval ideal of *otia monastica*, they still had to contend with the negative connotations of solitude inherited along with these traditions. Withdrawal needed to be defended from the charge of being harmful to productivity and sociability. For example, both Plato and Aristotle condemned solitude, which they associated with the privileging of self-interest over the common good: “Plato recognizes a conflict, at least for the philosopher, between a desire for contemplative solitude and a duty to the commonwealth, but insists that duty is paramount (*Republic*, 519c–521a, 540a–c). Aristotle, however, sees no such conflict and finds the idea of solitude repulsive and inhuman: ‘he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state.’”131 Plato’s position is the one I ascribe to the humanists (and the one I explore in this study)—the push and pull between two contrasting impulses or imperatives. One way of resolving the dilemma is to claim that what looks like withdrawal into oneself is actually beneficial to society. Another is to claim that solitude enables one to be part of a different type of community—one without physical boundaries.

To set the stage, I will explore learning and letters as a source of alienation from society. For the humanist, social withdrawal makes possible all sorts of perspectives on society that would otherwise be inaccessible. This leads to the paradoxical phenomenon of withdrawal by men of the world, who exploit writing’s ability to enable detachment in order to achieve the distance necessary to critique society. Certain genres of writing—the satire, the pastoral, the New World narrative132—play up this rift in an effort to claim critical distance from their subject matter. This outsider perspective shapes book one of *Utopia*, in which Raphael punctuates his trenchant criticism of court culture with hypotheticals alluding to recent political events—events which, according to the fiction of the tale, Raphael (as opposed to his creator) would be unlikely to know about.133 What are we to make of this paradox of speaking as an outsider with an insider’s knowledge?134 In his work on the Utopian narrative, Peter Ruppert suggests that one of its goals is to “defamiliarize the deficiencies that exist in the author’s society”;135 in this context, a narrator estranged from—yet paradoxically fully informed about—the society he is critiquing makes compelling sense.

The monastic urge to turn away from the rest of society that we see in Jerome (at times) and Burton, among others, is also famously evident in More. Most scholars agree that More retained part of the monastic sensibility even after he left the Carthusians; one might argue that *Utopia* represents his using the *contemptus mundi* stance to actually benefit the world. This would represent an adaptation of the *contemptus mundi* stance, which encourages flight from the world (*fuga mundi*) rather than engagement with it. It is worth noting that the most famous poetic contribution to the *contemptus mundi* genre, Bernard de Cluny’s *De contemptu mundi*, is a satire; it represents the perspective of someone looking askance at society.136 Contrary to Dillon’s assertion that the solitary spectator figure starts showing up in English letters in early Elizabethan drama,137 I would suggest that the pattern begins at least as early as More’s *Utopia* in Raphael; his alienation from the world stems from this aspect of the monastic *vita contemplativa*.

One and a half centuries after More, in a completely different genre, such cultivated estrangement is alive and well. In the “Democritus Junior to the Reader” section of his *Anatomy of Melancholy*, Burton takes up the mantle of the satirist and the philosopher (“I did sometime laugh and scoffe with Lucian, and Satyrically taxe with Menippus, lament with Heraclitus”), two
figures who also define themselves as outside of society in order to critique it. Taking on the name of Democritus—the philosopher at such a remove from society that he went about laughing at all its follies—Burton tries to convince the reader that he is well qualified to hold forth on the follies of the world, follies he attributes to melancholy (1:5). In addition, he presents us with a number of “spectator figures” for whom distance and estrangement provide a superior perspective. For example, he quotes a passage from Lucian in which Charon, viewing the world from a high promontory, recounts seeing “a vast multitude and a promiscuous, their habitations like Mole-hills, the men as Emmets … Citties like so many Hives of Bees, wherein every Bee had a sting, and they did nought else but sting one another, some domineering like Hornets bigger than the rest, some like filching Wasps, others as Drones” (1:32). The emphasis on the smallness of humans—“their habitations like Mole-hills, the men as Emmets”—highlights a similar pettiness in their behavior (“they did nought else but sting one another” for who knows what reasons; this behavior seems irrational and ridiculous when viewed from afar). Distance makes humanity seems small, and this perspective enables the viewer to perceive its pettiness.

Similarly, Burton cites Cyprian instructing Donatus to imagine himself on a promontory observing the world and St. Jerome in the wilderness imagining Rome:

> if any man doubt [me], I shall desire him to make a briefe survey of the world, as Cyprian adviseth Donat, supposing himselfe to be transported to the top of some high Mountaine, and thence to behold the tumults & chances of this wavering world, he cannot chuse but either laugh at, or pitty it. S. Hierome out of a strong imagination, being in the Wildernesse, conceived with himselfe, that he then saw them dauncing in Rome, and if thou shalt either conceive, or clime to see, thou shalt soone perceive that all the world is mad, that it is melancholy, dotes: (1:24)

Burton’s message is that one must alter one’s perspective through separation either mental or physical—"conceive, or clime to see"—to attain insight into the problems plaguing humanity.

Since Burton’s “conceive, or clime to see” implies that mental separation can substitute for physical separation in providing the altered perspective necessary to realizing that “all the world is mad,” it is crucial that Burton emphasizes his physical withdrawal from the world (for instance, claiming that he “never travelled but in Mappe or Card” [1:4]). In the example he gives of “conceiving,” Jerome is separated from Rome. Of course, the “climes” of Donatus and Charon are imaginary as well—all are instances of conceiving.

We have noted above that identifying with one’s object of study leaves one open to the charge of solipsism, but a humanist so accused might argue that it is in fact the opposite that is true: the object of study usurps one’s identity, leaving the scholar with none at all. (Notably, see Erasmus on his edition of Jerome’s works in Ep. 333: “I have thrown myself into this task [hoc negotium] so zealously [santo ... studio] that one could almost say that I had worked myself to death that Jerome might live again.”140) In the course of studies one is not simply consuming knowledge but also being consumed by it. It is being consumed by the studies that allows one to change—just as food is changed in being digested. Good production requires *proper* consumption, the reciprocal actions of consuming and being consumed.

If consuming and being consumed are reciprocal processes, so are consumption and production, and as I argue above, intellectual labor can include either. Of course, the two cannot be so neatly disaggregated or disentangled from each other; this is made clear in Cedric C. Brown’s description of the cycle of humanist knowledge exchange.141 Consumption feeds production—and as Burton shows us, there is a right way and a wrong way for this cycle to occur. Ideally, everyone would behave as Seneca’s bee.142
would use the stinging bee as a symbol of the viciousness of mankind) takes up Seneca’s bee metaphor to defend his use of other authors, framing consumption and production of knowledge as a single process:

As a good hous-wife out of divers fleeces weaves one peece of Cloath, a Bee gathers Wax and Hony out of any Flowers, and makes a new bundle of all,

\[143\text{Floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant,}\]

I have laboriously \[144\]collected this Cento out of divers Writers, and that sine injuriā, I have wronged no Authors, but given every man his owne … sumpsi, non surripui, and what Varro Lib. 6 de re rust. speakes of Bees, minimè maleficae nullius opus vellicantes faciunt deterius, I can say of my selfe, whom have I injured? The matter is theirs most part, and yet mine, apparret unde sumptum sit (which Seneca approves) alius tamen quàm unde sumptum sit apparet, which nature doth with the aliment of our bodies, incorporate, digest, assimilate, I doe conquoquere quod hausi, dispose of what I take … diverso stylo, non diversa fide, our Poets steale from Homer, he spews, saith Ælian, they lice it up.

(1:11)

But there is also an improper way to enact this alchemy, which Burton both criticizes and confesses to a few pages earlier:

wee skim off the Creame of other mens Wits, pick the choyce Flowers of their tild Gardens to set out our owne sterill plots. Castrant alios ut libros suos per se graciles alieno adipe suffarciant (so \[145\]Jovius inveighes). They lard their leane booke with the fat of others Workes. Ineruditi fures, &c. A fault that everie Writer findes, as I doe now, and yet faultie themselves, \[146\]Trium litterarum homines, all Theeves, they pilfer out of old Writers to stuffe up their new Comments … (1:9)

The bad version of consumption involves stealing and subordinating the good substance of others to one’s own bad substance. The antitheses in the paragraph above (“tild Gardens … sterill plots”; “leane booke … fat of others Workes”; “old Writers … new Comments”) suggest that one is creating a text at odds with itself rather than creating a unified whole (as does Burton’s housewife who “out of divers fleeces weaves one peece of Cloath” or the bee who “makes a new bundle of all”); one is working against the original authors’ purpose (compare “diverso stylo, non diversa fide”), creating disharmony rather than unity by mixing incompatible substances. In addition to incompatible substances we have contrary purposes. As he will charge in his critique of the “scribling age,” in such cases the writer’s purpose is not amalgamation or enrichment but mere self-aggrandizement. (According to the OED, “scribble” connotes facility and shallowness as well as rapidity and volume.\[147\]) This issue was at the forefront of academics’ minds at the time Burton wrote the Anatomy, as Bacon’s famous image of the spidery schoolmen shows;\[148\] in Chapter 3 we will discuss the ways in which Doctor Faustus explores the ethics of how one consumes and uses knowledge.

Burton’s aforementioned criticism of scribblers evokes the glut of mediocre texts in the literary marketplace, presenting us with a case of extensive but useless production—what Sarah Knight calls “promiscuous publication,” a stigma among the academics of late-sixteenth-century Oxford and Cambridge.\[149\] The problem with facile (re)production might be represented by the difference between a bee making honey and defecation. Defecation represents another by-product of digestion, but unlike the bee, the reader is taking all the good for himself and excreting the rubbish.
Indeed, Burton uses especially striking defecation imagery to describe this proliferation of text. His complaint about writers using old texts improperly concludes with a curious result: “By which means it comes to passe, 150 that not only Libraries and Shops are full of our putid Papers, but every Close-stoole and Jakes, Scribunt carmina quae legunt cacantes” (1:9). As a direct result (“By which means”) of the bad consumption/production cycle, an overabundance of text is produced, much of it destined for the “Close-stoole and Jakes.” The link between poor production, excessive proliferation, and excrement is quite telling here. *Scribunt carmina quae legunt cacantes* is from Martial 12.61.10; the translation is “They write poems that people read while shitting” (4:23n26).

The association of the pages of a book with toilet paper reflects the difference between a bee collecting honey and a person defecating: as a result of poor consumption and promiscuous publication, all that is left on the page is excrement—or in the case of certain vernacular texts, the pages are not even worthy of excrement: as he will charge a few pages later, undiscriminating publishers of English texts “print books upon whose pages a naked ape would hardly shit” (1:16; 4:35n14–15).

Earlier I suggested that intellectual labor is the only form of labor in which consumption can be just as arduous as production; this would seem to promote respect for the producer in the consumer. Of course, this formulation is a bit simplistic—not all writing is (or is recognized as) arduous intellectual labor as not all writing requires arduous consumption. We are amply reminded of this in Burton’s complaints about the proliferation of mediocre texts published in English:

> It was not mine intent to prostitute my Muse in *English*, or to divulge *secreta Minervae*, but to have exposed this more contract in *Latin*, if I could have got it printed. Any scurrile Pamphlet is welcome to our mercenary Stationers in *English*, they print all, ——— *cuduntque libellos*
> *In quorum foliis vix simia nuda cacaret;*
> But in *Latin* they will not deale. (1:16)

Of course, the distinction Burton makes between English and Latin texts (and implicitly the vernacular audience and the Latin audience) is crucial here, especially in the context of Burton’s position as an academic. According to Knight, Burton is referring specifically to texts published in English by university scholars, a manifestation of what was considered to be the insinuation of extramural financial concerns into the academy, resulting in the tainting of intellectual life at the universities. Forty years before Burton published his *Anatomy* at Oxford, Gabriel Harvey was pilloried by his fellow Cambridge academics for publishing his correspondence with Spenser in English.153 Knight tells us that commercial vernacular publishing was seen as akin to prostitution; thus Burton’s reference to “prostitut[ing] my Muse” is not as hyperbolic as it may seem to readers separated from his milieu by time and space. Fortunately for Burton, the seventeenth century saw “a new pragmatism about the importance of the vernacular” emerge in the universities.155 Knight suggests that in this passage Burton is not speaking sincerely but “dramatizing satirically the objections stern readers could raise to his work” in order to “obliquely question the idea of an academic élite having the power to condemn individual authorial decisions to publish.”156 But even if Burton were taking on the persona of “an élitist academic” to lampoon attitudes that were becoming obsolete, the fact remains that this scorn of vernacular commercial publishing was prevalent among university members in sixteenth-century Oxford and Cambridge. After his disastrous excursion into the
world of commercial vernacular publishing, Knight recounts, Harvey “left the capital to return to his home town, living the next forty years in obscurity.”

The anxiety about commercial interests infiltrating the halls of the academy ties in to a larger question faced by increasing numbers of scholars towards the end of the sixteenth century: how to make a living as a scholar. As it turns out, not even within university walls was there a respite from worldly economic concerns; in fact, academic satires such as the *Parnassus* trilogy (Cambridge, 1598–1601) and Burton’s own *Philosophaster* (Oxford, written ca. 1606, performed in 1617/18) dramatized the increasingly ubiquitous scholarly complaint about “the difficulty of making a living as a scholar, and in particular the problems scholars faced while seeking to maintain intellectual integrity within a grasping and opportunistic world of commercial literary production.”

The extreme reaction to Harvey reflects a fundamental assumption that there is an antithesis between material values and the world of the intellect; this notion causes trouble for those attempting to think for a living. How to integrate intellectual labor into the economic system without compromising its integrity? Intellectual labor seems to be opposed to material remuneration on principle—because with remuneration (or the expectation thereof) it ceases to be autotelic. The problem for scholars who wanted to court an audience outside the university, then, was that the profit motive inherent in commercial—and especially vernacular—publication brought up the same worries about compromising one’s scholarly integrity (or “scholarly seriousness and … their right to belong to the academic élite”) as patronage did—and indeed publishing was a means of seeking preferment.

Not even the Bodleian itself remained untainted: Emily Anglin notes that “as Oxford became more intertwined with the court, benefactions from the Crown were exchanged for institutional loyalty”; as the recipient of such benefactions, the Bodleian became “a major node of exchange between university and court, with the university relying on the court for benefactions and the court relying on the university to provide educated servants to the state, as well as to reproduce Royalist ideology.” Even the library—a supposed locus of free, disinterested intellectual inquiry and autonomy—was implicated in this odd relationship with the court.

Tainted though it might have been, the Bodleian could be praised by Burton in the opening of the *Anatomy* as equal to the libraries of the Vatican (1:3); it was likewise esteemed by Milton, who consigned his 1645 *Poems* there as to a treasure house in *Ad Johannem Rousium*. Almost a decade earlier, Milton himself had been lauded as a human treasure-house by the friends he had made during his stay in Italy. And here is where consumption—so frequently and easily perverted as Burton demonstrates, so easily relegated to the realm of the sinful (not surprising, since gluttony was one of the seven deadly sins, and for some, the prime cause of the Fall of Man)—becomes a positive virtue. Literary consumption was crucial to the humanist enterprise of preservation and revivification of the ancient world; it thus follows that in certain cases, consumption may be valued over production. It is noteworthy that Milton’s *Mansus*, written in tribute to the Marquis Giovanni Baptista Manso, focuses not on Manso’s own poetic achievement but on his patronage and his preservation and curation of the name and reputation of his great protégés—this even though, according to Richard Bradford, Manso was “arguably the most eminent Italian poet of the age.” Similarly, the two closest friends Milton made on his trip to Italy, Antonio Francini and Carlo Dati, praise Milton more as a consumer of letters than as a producer of them: both emphasize his scholarship and acquaintance with old texts. Dati addresses him as “one in whose memory is the whole world … who with constant
reading of authors as his companion explores the hiding-places of antiquity, restores the ruins of
the distant past, traverses the intricacies of learning” (lines 9–14). For his part, Francini writes
that Milton’s prodigious memory and apian collection process (which, as in Burton, creates a
singular unified product from the compilation of many sources) have given him the power to
conquer time—the dreaded tempus edax haunting much Renaissance poetry:

[As] the clever bee draws with industry its precious liquid from the lily and from the rose,
and from the multitude of wild flowers that adorn the meadow … artisan almost divine,
your thought, tracking down virtue alone, saw in every land those who tread the path of
noble worth; it selected the best from the better in order to forge the Idea of every virtue.
As many as were born in Florence or who had learned in her the skill of speaking Tuscan,
the memory of whom, made eternal in learned pages, the world honours—these you
wanted to seek out for your treasure, and you spoke with them in their works … Let not
Time beat his wings; let him stay motionless and let the years which run on, all too
damaging and harmful to immortal virtue, become stationary. For if ever deeds have been
worthy of a poem or of history, you have them present in your memory. (lines 31–34, 43–
54, 67–72)166

According to Dati’s and Francini’s testimonia, Milton is a storehouse, a repository for preserving
“treasures”—just like the Bodleian in Milton’s Ad Rousium, or the brain in Spenser’s House of
Alma (Faerie Queene book 2). Again the thesaurus imagery from Jerome’s letter emerges in a
benign rather than damning context.

5. Redemption of intellectual labor as sociable

Notably, it is in the company of his new scholarly acquaintances in Italy, that Milton “spoke with
[Tuscan authors] in their works”; according to Estelle Haan, “shared discussion of authors’
individual works was central to the operations of such Florentine academies as the Svogliati and
Apatisti in which Milton participated in the course of his Italian sojourn.” As we will discuss
in Chapter 4, the friendships Milton developed over the course of his Italian journey manifest the
alliance of friendship and studies underpinning humanist conceptions of the Republic of Letters.
We find the origins of this alliance between amicitia and studia in Petrarch, who made
contemplation (paradoxically) sociable as well as secular. Indeed, the Republic of Letters
encapsulates two of Petrarch’s three means of fulfillment for the solitarius discussed above—
time alone with “himself and his private thoughts” (i.e., independent intellectual pursuits) and
“some intellect united by a close sympathy with his own” (i.e., amicitia).

It was Petrarch’s discovery of Cicero’s letters to Atticus that paved the way for a
“transform[ation] [of] the cultural landscape of early modern Europe,” creating the conditions in
“education, literature, and printing” that would eventually lead to Erasmus’s conception of the
Republic of Letters. In reviving the classical genre of the familiar letter (which had been
largely supplanted in the Middle Ages by the dictamen, a more public form of communication
associated with administration and bureaucracy), Petrarch ascribed a potency to this form of
communication that harkened back to the classical notion of writing creating presence in
absence.

The origins of this idea are Aristotelian. Eden argues that the linking of writing with
intimacy grew out of Aristotle’s identification of epideictic rhetoric with written communication
(as opposed to forensic and deliberative rhetoric, which he associated with oral delivery).
Aristotle also associates writing with overcoming distance, as do thinkers who come after him.
Cicero and Seneca, the association narrows to become a link between specifically writing of letters and intimacy, then letter-writing and sermo (as opposed to oratio—informal speaking, conversation rather than oratory). For Cicero and Seneca, in familiar letters, one writes as one speaks. Stoic self-expression (or self-realization) rather than Aristotelian persuasion becomes the purpose of writing familiar letters, whence arises the notion that writing, and especially the writing of letters, reveals the “trace” of the mind” of the writer.170

As the primary mode of communication within the Republic of Letters, the epistola familiaris was a hybrid between personal letter and scholarly treatise, straddling the border between public and private utterance. As such, it is important to remember that humanist letters “cannot be regarded as mere mail, documents that have somehow survived from a private correspondence … The Latin familiar letter fused private and public, friendship and literary ambition … such letters were written with an eye toward publication.”171 In addition to reviving Cicero’s rhetoric of intimacy, Eden argues, Petrarch introduces a complementary hermeneutics of intimacy—the responsibilities incumbent on the reader of the letter to make sure that the transmission of the soul is enacted, that presence-in-absence is actually created.172 Thus reading intimately is as much an act of friendship as writing intimately, one that, according to Petrarch, requires undivided attention and focus.173 Later in his Ciceronianus Erasmus will pick up this notion of reading strengthening intimacy even as it is predicated on intimacy.174

If letter-writing can be construed as a social activity because it reinforces the bonds of amicitia, letter reading can be so construed as well. It is just a slight jump from letter reading to other types of reading, and this notion opens up a new possibility—if intimate understanding comes through reading, we can become intimate even with the ancients.175 In Chapter 4 we will take this logic to its inevitable conclusion—that the ancients can become “enrolled” in one’s social circle and become as much a part of one’s life as one’s contemporaries.176 Moderns can understand and even communicate with the ancients, as Petrarch famously wrote letters to Cicero and Seneca.

Erasmus inherited this tradition of letters strengthening intimacy and made an even stronger case for the potency of the letter—not only does it create presence, it surpasses presence in allowing a deeper familiarity between writer and reader than even a face to face encounter would:

[in their books] great men … live on for the world at large even after death, and live on in such fashion that they speak to more people and more effectively dead than alive. They converse with us, instruct us, tell us what to do and what not to do, give us advice and encouragement and consolation as loyally and as readily as anyone can. In fact, they then most truly come alive for us when they themselves have ceased to live. For such is my opinion: if a man had lived in familiar converse with Cicero (to take him as an example) for several years, he will know less of Cicero than they do who by constant reading of what he wrote converse with his spirit every day.177

When Blaine Greteman argues that “weak” ties can be more powerful than “strong” ties, he is in a way echoing Erasmus’s sentiment here (the dead live on in their works; one would know Cicero better through letters than through living with him); as we will see in Chapter 4, Milton expresses a similar idea to Carlo Dati. Of course, the crucial difference is that Greteman thinks weak ties are superior for reach while Milton and Erasmus suggest that they are better for strengthening intimacy.178 As Christine Bénévent notes, the “fantasy of presence” nourished by the conceit of the letter’s extreme potency “no longer appears as the simple substitute for an impossible dialogue, but on the contrary as its quintessence, its ultimate and deep truth.”179
effect, the letter makes the writer hyper-present to the reader by communicating only that which is essential—the mind.

In addition to providing a space for virtual friendships, the Republic of Letters also served as a network for transmitting knowledge across Europe. The relationships among members of this pan-European intellectual community were nourished by letters in all senses of the word: both the love of *bonae litterae* and the *epistola familiaris*. In this case, writing, rather than pulling one out of the world, serves to connect. Letters create virtual meeting-spaces in the world of *verba* and populate them with distilled versions of the writers and readers. This world, just like its counterpart, can be populated and traversed—mapped onto a physical space and thus be imbued with a quasi-real existence. In his “sketch map” of the Republic, Grafton characterizes it as “a new kind of virtual community: one sustained not by immediate, direct contact and conversation so much as by a decades-long effort of writing and rewriting.” Erasmus—who had a permanent intellectual home in the Republic of Letters even though he never stayed in any physical home for very long—was a central figure in the letter-writing culture of the Republic. In *De conscribendis epistolis*, he established boundaries or models for the new genre of *epistola familiaris*, which he treated “as a literary genre in its own right.”

Letter-writing is instrumental in the building and maintaining of *amicitia*; thus rather than turning inward, the letter-writer becomes more social. In the humanist imaginary, *amicitia* adds a social aspect to private work (again, inoculating one against the charge of being antisocial). *Otium litteratum* is made sociable through *amicitia; amicitia*, in turn, is strengthened through mutual intellectual engagement in *otium litteratum*. Put another way, the love of learning that binds together members of the Republic manifests itself in the intellectual projects they undertake. Zeal for studies is coextensive with zeal for the friend with whom one is undertaking them. There is also an element of admiration involved—being impressed and inspired by the friend’s intellectual capabilities to do even more brilliant work; this is perhaps why Brown talks of “congenial competition” as an aspect of the humanist’s intellectual landscape.

The revival of the idea of the extreme potency of letters contributed to a phenomenon that Lorna Hutson calls the “textualization of friendship” among humanists. In England this idea sparked shifts in both the conception of friendship and the notion of “credit” between friends. Credit was once signified by the exchange of gifts, which both created a reciprocal obligation for the recipient and deferred fulfillment of that obligation into the future, thereby ensuring that the friendship would continue. Humanism, with its high-minded notions of friendship disinterested from material obligations and benefits, substitutes words for things; now credit is established by “persuasive words” rather than gift exchange. In this way, says Erasmus, friendship can be strengthened by distance and built up between strangers who never meet face-to-face.

And literary tokens were not limited to letters: since displays of learning were both the currency and entrance fee of the Republic of Letters, densely allusive texts were the medium of intellectual and social exchange among humanists. Here other types of gift-texts are valorized alongside letters. Erasmus details his gift-text theory in the prefatory letter to Peter Giles published in his first edition of *Parabolae, sive Similia*, in 1514. In the letter Erasmus frames the *Parabolae* as a friendship token to Giles, but first he takes the opportunity to explain why such a text can serve as a friendship token:
Friends of the commonplace and homespun sort, my open-hearted Pieter, have their idea of relationship, like their whole lives, attached to material things; and if ever they have to face a separation, they favour a frequent exchange of rings, knives, caps, and other tokens of the kind, for fear that their affection may cool when intercourse is interrupted or actually die away through the interposition of long tracts of time and space. But you and I, whose idea of friendship rests wholly in a meeting of minds and the enjoyment of studies in common, might well greet one another from time to time with presents for the mind and keepsakes of a literary description. Not that there is any risk that when our life together is interrupted we may slowly grow cold, or that the great distance which separates our bodies may loosen the close tie between our minds. Minds can develop an even closer link, the greater the space that comes between them. Our aim would be that any loss due to separation in the actual enjoyment of our friendship should be made good, not without interest, by tokens of this literary kind.190

From this passage we can gather that distance actually makes a friendship stronger because literary tokens can add “interest [foenore],” compensating for the separation over and above the loss; this (perhaps counterintuitively) suggests that the friends are actually in a better position apart than they are together. We will come back to this notion of compensatory literary tokens in Chapter 4, in which we discuss how Milton wrestles with its limitations. Amicitia is not materialistic like other friendships, and thus it is not as weak as other friendships which are put in jeopardy through separation. Erasmus is setting up a contrast: textual exchange compensates for loss occasioned by separation in a way that “material” gifts do not. In introducing a non-economic idea of credit, humanists again announce their independence from the economic realm—an independence that necessarily remained attenuated, as we will see. It is perhaps telling that the language of commerce (“not without interest”) seeps into Erasmus’s attempt to frame letters as surpassing the material bonds that hold people together—it is hard to leave that mindset behind even as one attempts to disavow it. This, again, is a possible explanation for the shaky and uncertain position of intellectual labor in the economic system—it cannot abide being a part of it (loss of autotelos) but it also cannot abide being apart from it (one has to live on something, after all…).

The image in English literature of the scholar who nobly eschews life’s luxuries in devoting himself to learning is at least as old as Chaucer’s Clerk of Oxenford, who preferred to have “at his beddes heed / Twenty bookes, clad in blak or reed, / Of Aristotle and his philosophie, / Than robes riche, or fithele, or gay sautrie” (General Prologue, 295–98). It is in fact the difficulty of integrating intellectual labor into the economic system that gives rise to the “starving scholar” trope. But in the early modern context, the choice between Aristotle and worldly riches was far less straightforward than it was for Chaucer’s clerk.
Notes


2 Cited in the *OED* under def. 2a as the first use of the word *thesaurus* in English.


6 Rice, *Saint Jerome*, 132. Rice explains this by saying that the conception of Jerome fulfilled a specific need, as did previous conceptions of Jerome: “We revive a figure from the past because he meets a present need, suggests a present strategy, can be used to beat a present enemy and further a present cause, makes legitimate a present call for change and reform. The author of the fourteenth-century pseudographs had emphasized Jerome’s devotion to poverty in order to attack contemporary trimmers, his austerities to press for radical monastic reform, his evangelical piety and pastoral concern to show up the wickedness and irresponsibility of contemporary theologians and prelates. What Erasmus admired was not always the same; his tactic was” (132–33). For more discussion of Erasmus on Jerome and as Jerome, see Jennifer Summit, *Memory’s Library: Medieval Books in Early Modern England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 55; Erasmus, *Life of Jerome*, ed. and trans. James F. Brady and John C. Olin, CWE 61: 33, 35; Lisa Jardine, *Erasmus, Man of Letters: The Construction of Charisma in Print* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 43–44 and ch. 2.


8 “Neque quicquam omnino norunt de Hieronymo, nisi quod Ciceronianus dictus vapularit” (lines 1130–31).

10 According to Janette Dillon, “solitariness” was the most prevalent term for this condition among the Elizabethans. *Shakespeare and the Solitary Man* (London: Macmillan, 1981), xi.

11 Jean-François Vallée refers to these two strains of humanism, respectively, as “contemplative-Christian-platonic” and “active-civic-Ciceronian.” His formulation since it seems to suggest that the dangers of contemplation only apply to the Christian humanist—that not all humanism can be subsumed under the category of *vita contemplativa*. “The Fellowship of the Book: Printed Voices and Written Friendships in More’s *Utopia*,” in *Printed Voices: The Renaissance Culture of Dialogue*, ed. Dorothy Heitsch and Jean-François Vallée (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004), 46.


12 Jean Leclercq makes a similar point about the relationship between love and study, although he is working in a monastic context in which guilt did not necessarily attach to litterae; he tells us that “with the duty of studying they also inculcated the love of it. The joy that study showed through in more than one poem [*Avec le devoir de l’étude, ils en ont inculqué l’amour. La joie qu’elle procurait transparait dans plus d’un poème*]; he quotes the opening and refrain from a monastic poem: “Audite, pueri, quam sunt dulces litterae [Hear, children, to how sweet letters are]; “Et nos felices, qui studemus litteras [And we are happy, we who study letters].” *L’amour des lettres et le désir de Dieu: Initiation aux auteurs monastiques du Moyen Age* (Paris, Editions du Cerf, 1957), 240. Translations are my own.


14 See Rice, *Saint Jerome*, 9–10: “[Jerome’s] austerities were mild compared with the picturesque excesses of the Syrian anchorites around him. These ‘athletes of wisdom’ were usually simple peasants, often illiterate, ignorant of Greek, speaking only Syriac. One lived in a hole in the ground hardly larger than a fox’s burrow. A second survived the forty days of Lent on fifteen dried figs. All of them were filthy and hairy, skeleton-thin, their skins wrinkled by exposure to wind, rain, snow, and sun. They wore a goatskin, or plaited palm fronds, or nothing at all. Their common penitential practice was to load themselves with iron chains. A hermit named Eusebius festooned himself with 250 pounds of them. Another kept himself bent almost double, his eyes fixed permanently and humble on the ground, by attaching the chains he wore about his waist to an iron band riveted around his neck. He endured this penance for over forty years.”

15 Prefatory letter to *Utopia* (“relinquo mihi, hoc est litteris, nihil”); *Elegia prima*, line 26 (“Et totum rapiunt me mea vita libri”).

16 *Elegia prima*, line 18 (“Et vacuum curis otia grata sequi”).

17 Milton’s second letter to Diodati will be treated in Chapter 4; in the introduction to book 2 of *Reason of Church-government* (1642), Milton imagines God’s reproach if he remains silent in the face of attacks on the church: “When time was, thou couldst not find a syllable of all that thou hadst read, or studied, to utter in her behalfe … Thou hadst the diligence, the parts, the language of a man, if a vain subject were to be adorn’d or beautifi’d, but when the cause of God and his Church was to be pleaded, for which purpose that tongue was given thee which thou hast, God listen’d if he could heare thy voice among his zealous servants, but thou wert domb as a beast; from hence forward be that which thine own brutish silence hath made thee” (*CPW* 1:804–05).

18 Ny ne trouveroys bon, quand par quelque complexion solitaire et melancholique, on le verroit adonné d’une application trop indiscrete à l’estude des livres, qu’on la luy nourrist. Cela les rend inepettes à la conversation civile, et les destoune de meilleures occupations. Et combien ay-je veu de mon temps,
d’hommes abestis, par temeraire avidité de science? French original in Jean Balsamo, Michel Magnien, and Catherine Magnien-Simonin, eds., Les Essais (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), 170; English translation in Donald Frame, trans., The Complete Essays of Montaigne (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), 121. Etymologically “abestis” indicates becoming beastlike. The idea that overstudying renders one beastlike is a paradoxical notion, since it is precisely language and study—ratio and oratio—that separate man from beast in the humanist tradition.


20 “je me desrobois de tout autre plaisir, pour les lire”; “je m’en rendois plus nonchalant à l’estude de mes autres leçons prescrites”; “Il s’y gouverna ingenieusement, faisant semblant de n’en voir rien: Il aiguisoit ma faim, ne me laissant que à la desrobée gourmander ces livres, et me tenant doucement en office pour les autres estudes de la regle.” Balsamo, Magnien, and Magnien-Simonin, Essais, 182–83; Frame, Complete Essays of Montaigne, 130.

21 According to Milton, he delays not because he is tempted by the “endlesse delight of speculation” but because he takes the idea of vocation so seriously that he wants to be sure to get it right: “it is more probable therfore that not the endlesse delight of speculation but this very consideration of that great commandment ["that command in the gospell set out by the terrible seasing of him that hid the talent"] does not presse forward as soone as may be to undergo but keeps off with a sacred reverence & religious advisement how best to undergoe, not taking thought of beeing late so it give advantage to be more fit” (CPW 1:320).

22 Much work has been done on scholarly melancholy (which in the secondary literature is called both “the Elizabethan malady” and “the Jacobean malady”). See, for example, Lawrence Babb, The English Malady: A Study of Melancholia in English Literature from 1580–1642 (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1951); Stanley W. Jackson, Melancholia and Depression: From Hippocratic Times to Modern Times (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986); Bridget Gellert Lyons, Voices of Melancholy: Studies in Literary Treatments of Melancholy in Renaissance England (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1971); and Douglas Trevor, The Poetics of Melancholy in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).


24 Rummel, Humanist-Scholastic Debate, 16. Just as dangerous as the subject matter (res) of pagan authors was their style (verba) according to Rummel; “polished speech did not accord with the simplicity of heart recommended by the Gospel” (15).


27 Rummel, Humanist-Scholastic Debate, 11.

According to Ong, “Humanism forced a crisis by proposing a program which in effect challenged the primacy of dialectic and, in so doing, impugned the whole curricular organization and the teaching profession as such.” *Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 166, quoted in Kinney, introduction, lii.

Between *Utopia and Dystopia*, 3–4. Yoran continues: “the humanist *litteratus* was a producer and transmitter of knowledge only insasmuch as he was part of society and part of the great tradition of human knowledge (effectively the classical and Christian heritages as the humanists understood them). In other words, for humanism there was no essential epistemological and ethical (as opposed to professional) difference between intellectuals and other social subjects, and there was no privileged Archimedean point outside and above society from which knowledge could be produced” (4–5).

Between *Utopia and Dystopia*, 187; for more on sources of intellectual authority in “premodern times,” see also 227n2.

Yoran, *Between Utopia and Dystopia*, 188.


Vickers refers to Cicero’s concept of *otium honestum* as “that stock justification of the pursuit of letters” and claims that “the favorable associations of … retirement with the Christian contemplative life” were “much abused by proponents of idleness.” “Leisure and Idleness,” pt. 2, *Renaissance Studies* 4, no. 2 (1990): 137, 147.

According to Dillon, “the desire for solitude increasingly became associated with great intellect through its links with the pursuits of writing and study … Intellectual superiority now became an alternative to spiritual superiority in the seventeenth-century justification of solitude” (*Shakespeare and the Solitary Man*, 31).


See Phillips’s take on the monastic exemption in “Labors Lost,” 60; see also Diana Webb: “The ‘solitude’ to which the monk or nun was permanently committed was understood by the wider society as a licensed exception to the rules which governed the lives of most men and women”; “Monastic *otium*
signified the monk’s exemption, individually and collectively, from the practical demands that were made of the knight, the merchant or the peasant in the everyday world.” *Privacy and Solitude in the Middle Ages* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007), ix, xiv.


45 See Picciotto: “Against the classical tradition that identified ideal contentment with leisurely contemplation, Bacon presents paradisal bliss as consisting in ‘the work of Contemplation … for delight and exercise,’ weaving together conventionally opposed terms as if they were synonyms” (*Labors of Innocence*, 35).

46 For Baconian elements in *Paradise Lost*, see Picciotto’s discussion in *Labors of Innocence*, ch. 6.


48 For example, Juan Luis Vives argued that experimentalists should not be “ashamed to enter into shops and factories, and to ask questions from craftsmen, and to get to know about the details of their work.” *On Education: A Translation of the Tradendis Disciplinis*, trans. Foster Watson (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971), 209, quoted in Picciotto, *Labors of Innocence*, 604n96.

49 Despite resistance to this idea from late medieval thinkers such as Hugh of St. Victor, John of Salisbury, and Brunetto Latini, humanists by and large accepted Aristotle’s position and scorn of physical laborers. As Cary J. Nederman has shown, the valorization of mechanical labor in some strands of late medieval thought caused some writers to reject Aristotle’s exclusion of the mechanics from the polis—to the extent that they “distorted or entirely misrepresented Aristotle’s own clearly stated positions and ascribed to The Philosopher ideas manifestly at odds with his explicit statements.” “Mechanics and Citizens: The Reception of the Aristotelian Idea of Citizenship in Late Medieval Europe,” *Vivarium* 40, no. 1 (2002): 77.

50 *The Human Condition*, 5, 7.

51 *Idle Pursuits*, 20–21 (italics in original).


54 In fact, nobles were banned from engaging in commerce in 1540. Krause, *Idle Pursuits*, 182n14.


57 *Idle Pursuits*, 65.


60 [Burton’s note] *Otium otio dolorem dolore sum solatus.*


63 “Certainly, literature could function as a medium conveying useful information when it came to the erudite conversation expected of diplomats, courtiers, and learned magistrates, but it also presented an occasion to study and ideally master for use in one’s daily life different literary voices and performative modes (the request, the plea, or the demand, for instance). Most obviously, it could of course also be used to flatter important personages. But even the seemingly most *disinterested* of all literary pursuits with no direct applications in the professional sphere could serve the most prosaic uses: for it generated prestige, a kind of currency that could be converted into material resources.” Krause, *Idle Pursuits*, 81, 83.

64 For a relatively recent example, Frederic Jameson calls into question the notion of intellectual labor as “real work”: for him, one “cannot without intellectual dishonesty assimilate the ‘production’ of texts … to the production of goods by factory workers: writing and thinking are not alienated labor in that sense, and it is surely fatuous for intellectuals to seek to glamorize their tasks … by assimilating them to *real work* on the assembly line.” *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 45, quoted in Picciotto, *Labors of Innocence*, 594n6; my italics.

65 Picciotto makes similar points in *Labors of Innocence*, 594n6. There seems to be a middle ground for use *objets d’art* like clocks, for example; surely “fine craftsmanship” was important as a marker of cultural capital. On the status of artisans in early modern Europe, see Pamela H. Smith, *The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004).


67 Bondanella, “Petrarch’s Rereading of *Otium*,” 15. For leisure as “crucial to the development of virtue and the performance of political duties” see *Politics* 7.9; for leisure as essential for happiness, see *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7 (both quoted in Bondanella, 15n8).


69 See, for example, *Noctes Atticae* 11.16.2–3, a humorous episode in which the difference between Greek and Roman conceptions of “busyness” is foregrounded, reflecting the difficulties inherent in translation between the two cultures.

70 Bondanella, “Petrarch’s Rereading of *Otium*,” 15.

71 See the entire part one of his article, “Leisure and Idleness,” 1–37.


74 *Human Condition*, 12–17.
“Le capitalisme commercial naissant”; “La situation même des humanistes … les oblige à se réfugier dans un monde idéal qu’ils construisent en l’opposant à celui qui existe. Ils ne peuvent, dans cette société, être que des moralistes, et donner aux rois des conseils pour les guider vers le bien.” “Recherches sur Luisa Sigea,” Bulletin des Etudes Portugaises 31 (1970): 148. Translations from the French are my own. Of course, emerging capitalism is not the same as the mature capitalism we see today; its manifestation in the early modern period lies in the growing centrality of the market.


Between Utopia and Dystopia, 40.


Between Utopia and Dystopia, 39; my italics. See 202n8 for bibliographical information on Vergil’s history.

Yoran, Between Utopia and Dystopia, 48.

“Summo ocio vitaeque libertate … quam ego sic amplerctor ut, si quis hanc adimat, vitam esse non putem.” Ep. 333; CWE 3:87, quoted in Yoran, Between Utopia and Dystopia, 56. Original in Opus epistolarum, 2:70.

Between Utopia and Dystopia, 49; see also 56.

“Ut vere dicam, non tam mihi defuit fortuna quam ipse fortunae defui, homo sic abhorrens a communibus negotiis, sic alienus ab ambitione, imo adeo socors, ut plane Timothei fortuna sit opus, quae dormientis retibus felicitatem implicet.” Ep. 333; CWE 3:89, quoted in Yoran, Between Utopia and Dystopia, 57. Original in Opus epistolarum, 2:70.

According to Yoran, the printing press was most important as “a site of collective humanist activities and therefore of intellectual fermentation”; “As an institution the printing press represented an autonomous and cosmopolitan site for the production of knowledge free of lay and ecclesiastical control … In this respect, the printing press provided for Erasmian humanism the context which the city-state or
the court provided other groups of humanists”—whence arises the “library without walls” trope. Between Utopia and Dystopia, 63.

88 Between Utopia and Dystopia, 63.


90 Oxford Encyclopedia of British Literature, s.v. “Jonson, Ben.”


93 An Apology against a Pamphlet (1642), in CPW 1:890. For more on the interweaving of strands in Milton’s life and especially his writing, see Dobranski, Cambridge Introduction, 103–04.

94 Demetrio S. Yocum, “De otiu religioso: Petrarch and the Laicization of Western Monastic Asceticism,” Religion and the Arts 11, no. 3 (2007): 463n18. In particular, monastic libraries were seen as “representatives of a perceived, and resented, ecclesiastical control over literacy and its privileges,” and as such sustained attacks both physical and verbal starting as early as the fourteenth century (Summit, Memory’s Library, 9).

95 In Renaissance England hostility to the vita contemplativa manifested itself in the form of critiques of the Roman Church framed as active humanist critiques of “contemplation.” One example is Thomas Starkey, who as king’s chaplain complained that monks were “more mouyd by the idul quyetnes & vayn pleure therin, then by any desire of perfayt vertue & true relygyon” (quoted in Summit, Memory’s Library, 86). For critiques of “besynes, see 67–68.


97 Dillon, Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, 11.


100 Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, 14.


Volo solitudinem non solam, otium non iners nec inutile, sed quod e solitudine prosit multis. Qui enim otiosi prorsus et languidi et segnes et soli sunt, eos mestos semper miseroseque consentio, quibus nec honesti actus exercitium, nec nobilium studiorum, illustriumque nominum possit esse commerctium. Latin original in De vita solitaria, ed. Guido Martellotti, in Francesco Petrarca, Prose, ed. Guido Martellotti et al. (Milan: R. Riccardi, 1955), 554, 56. English translation in The Life of Solitude by Francis Petrarch, ed. and trans. Jacob Zeitlin (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1924), 290. Further references to De vita solitaria will be cited in text and refer to these texts; the page number of the Latin original will be given, followed by a slash and the page number of the translation, as 554, 56/290.


“Corpori non animo ferias indico; veto in otio ingenium quiescere, nisi ut assurgat et intermissione fecundius fiat.” Quoted in Bondanella, “Petrarch’s Rereading of Otium,” 25.

“With its classical emphasis on the proper use of reason … Petrarchan leisure involves, above all, the work of the intellect.” Bondanella, “Petrarch’s Rereading of Otium,” 19.

“Credo ego generosum animum, preter Deum ubi finis est noster, preter seipsum et archanas curas suas, aut preter aliquem multa similitudine sibi conjunctum animum, nusquam acquiescere.”

Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, 19.

“For Petrarch, the aim of serving God is too exalted for such moments, and, although he includes prayer, he tailors the experience to his own tastes and talents, elevating literary concerns above all others.” Bondanella, “Petrarch’s Rereading of Otium,” 19.


This idea is complicated by the case of cenobitic monks, who were just as embedded in a matrix of hierarchy and bureaucracy as secular workers; according to Webb the “price” for their “emancipation from the toils of office-holding, commerce or hard physical labour” was “submission to an intensive and lifelong communal discipline” (Privacy and Solitude, 219).

Only few could afford (or achieve) solitude—the poor had to work and live up to “associated social and familial obligations”; the rich likely held public roles in society: “The possession of riches was usually equally dependent on maintaining one’s inherited or acquired place in society; one was committed by rank and office to live in the midst of men and discharge duties which might include extensive hospitality” (Privacy and Solitude, 219).

Webb, Privacy and Solitude, 150, 154. Webb notes that in his writings, Petrarch “does not engage in elaborate justification of the work which he did there; in his heart of hearts, like most writers and scholars, he probably thought that it was self-evident and did not greatly care if it was not” (154).

Webb, Privacy and Solitude, 154; Bondanella, “Petrarch’s Rereading of Otium,” 25. “As if to respond to those who might argue that the active life of negotium is superior to that of otium, he states, with some irony, that he has yet to see any of his contemporaries make a successful contribution to the public welfare (322/125–26; 326, 328/129–30). In his view, those who devote themselves exclusively to public service risk losing control of their own lives, passions, and minds” (“Petrarch’s Rereading of Otium,” 25).

“The inherent tension between public action and solitary contemplation pushes the ideal of otium away from the Platonic and Aristotelian view that leisure has a primarily communal purpose towards a greater—and perhaps more modern—emphasis on the individual. It is the imaginative venture
of Petrarchan leisure to allow private individuals, who are not necessarily religious contemplatives or philosophers, time to cultivate the virtues of a higher life of the mind and spirit.” Bondanella, “Petrarch’s Rereading of Otium,” 26–27.

117 Webb, Privacy and Solitude, 154.

118 Rice comments: “Although Jerome probably did live in a natural cave, it must have been a spacious one, because he tells us himself that he brought his considerable library into the desert with him. Nor was he always alone. Other hermits were close by, Evagrius was a frequent visitor, and he specifically mentions his alumni, probably young monks who could read and write and were in some fashion in his service, whom he kept busy copying books and taking his dictation” (Saint Jerome, 10).


120 On the vulgar horde: “I studiously aim that they [‘my performances’] should give pleasure only to the few. For as you see, the matters that I treat are often novel and difficult, and the ideas severe, remote, and alien from the vulgar horde which regulates everything by its sensations. If I should fail to please the ignorant, I shall have no occasion for complaint; rather shall I enjoy good hopes of my talent according to my ambition [posse tibi res meas, pater optime, placere, que ut paucis placeant laboro, quando, ut vides, sepe res novas tracto duraque et rigidas, peregrinasque sententias ab omnia moderantis vulgi sensibus atque auribus abhorrentes. Si indoctis ergo non placeo, nichil est quod querar: habeo quod optavi, bonam de ingenio meo speram]” (286/97). For Petrarch’s political activities, see “Petrarch’s Rereading of Otium,” 17.

121 non alium … sed meipsum quodammodo geminatum censeo. Non penitus duo sunt quorun unus est animus; novit amor e duobus unum facere; alioquin impossibilem rem juberet Pithagoras, ut in amicitia scilicet unus fiat ex pluribus. Quod cum ita sit, sequitur ut quisquis unus idem et duorum capax amicorum locus sit. Nulla igitur solitudo tam profunda, nulla tam parva domus, nullum tam obstrusum limen, ut not pateat amico.

122 Webb, Privacy and Solitude, xii; see also Bondanella, “Petrarch’s Rereading of Otium,” 21 for Petrarch on Eve as the reason for the exclusion of women from his literary retirement.

123 Petrarch dedicated De otio religioso to the brothers of the Carthusian charterhouse in Montieux, where his brother Gherardo had become donatus, or procurator. Yocum, “De otio religioso,” 456–58.


125 Yocum, “De otio religioso,” 462.

126 Webb, Privacy and Solitude, 148.

127 “Labors Lost,” 45–68.

128 Summit contests the narrative suggested by the “icon of the scholar in his study”—that monastic contemplation evolved or slid naturally into humanistic contemplation. This was not a smooth transition, Summit argues, even though the “scholar-saint” iconography emphasized continuities between the two (as Erasmus did in his construction of himself as a new Jerome, mentioned above). Rather, “institutional violence” (e.g., censorship, the sacking of medieval monastic libraries under the auspices of
Henrician reform, which itself co-opted the rhetoric of humanism—or tried to align itself with the goals of humanism—to justify its projects) won the day for the humanists, suggesting that “in Reformation England the rise of humanism came about not through the spread of books and literacy but through their restriction”; it was not “a natural and even inevitable outgrowth of the laicization of literacy” (Memory’s Library, 100).


130 For Erasmus’s identification with Jerome, see Summit, Memory’s Library, 55; and Jardine, Erasmus, Man of Letters, ch. 2. For Jerome as icon for study-portraiture, see Mortimer, “Author’s Image,” 19; Rice, Saint Jerome; and Brian Cummings, The Literary Culture of the Reformation: Grammar and Grace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3–5.


134 Of course, it is important to avoid falling into the trap of reading Raphael as a simple mouthpiece for More.


136 Pepin, Scorn for the World, xi.

137 Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, 32–46.

138 [Burton’s note.] Ep. 2 lib. 2 ad Donatum. Paulisper te crede subduci in ardui montis verticem celsiorem, specularum inde rerum jacentium facies, & oculis in diversa porrectis, fluctuantis mundi turbines intuere, jam simul aut ridebis aut misereberis, &c.

139 The “high promontory” image is used in Elyot as well, but here the man is not spectator but spectacle. The Boke Named The Governour, ed. Foster Watson (London: Dent, 1907), 119.


143 [Burton’s note.] Lucretius.
Quicquid ubique benè dictum facio meum, & illud nunc meis ad compendium, nunc ad fidem & authoritatem alienis exprimo verbis, omnes authores meos clientes esse arbitror, &c.

Sarisburiensis ad Polycrat. prol.

Praefat. hist.

Plautus.

OED: scribble v¹, def 2. “To write something hastily or carelessly, either as to handwriting or composition; to produce abundance of worthless writing.”


Non tám refercta bibliothecae quàm cloacae.

cuduntque libellos / In quorum foliis vix simia nuda cacaret.

This passage indicts vernacular readers as well as publishers for being undiscriminating; similarly, Burton complains earlier that “it is a kinde of pollicie in these daies, to prefixe a phantastical Title to a Booke which is to bee sold; For as Larkes come downe to a Day-net, many vaine Readers will tarry and stand gazing like silly passengers, at an antick Picture in a Painters shop, that will not looke at a judicious peece” (1:6). We will see this denigration of vernacular audiences in Milton as well in Sonnets 11 and 12. On the other hand, J. B. Bamborough plays down the putative distance between Burton’s vernacular- and Latin-reading audiences; see his introduction to the Anatomy (1:xxxv).

Gabriel Harvey and Edmund Spenser, Three Proper and wittie, familiar letters: lately passed betweene two universitie men (1580).

“Academic Publication,” 44.

Knight, “Academic Publication,” 50. She adds: “Burton was a pioneer of this new scholarly pragmatism. He chose the vernacular as his medium of communication, negotiated ownership of at least part of the Anatomy’s copyright and ended up producing one of the most popular books of the seventeenth century, and one of the earliest bestsellers for Oxford University Press” (50–51).

“Academic Publication,” 50.

“Academic Publication,” 46.

Knight, “Academic Publication,” 46–47.

“Aacademic Publication,” 39.


See discussion in Anglin, “‘The Glass, the School, the Book,’” 58.
Milton likens the Bodleian to Apollo’s “sacred sanctuaries [adytis ... sacris],” asserting that Rouse watches over “a treasure more splendid than ... the golden tripods and Delphic offerings [gazae nobilioris, / Quam ... Fulvosque tripodas, donaque Delphica]” found in “the rich temple [Opulenta ... templae]” of Apollo (lines 52, 55–59, 58). In this chapter, texts and translations the Latin and Italian poems appearing in Milton’s 1645 Poems are taken from Poemata, ed. and trans. Estelle Haan, in The Shorter Poems, ed. Barbara Kiefer Lewalski and Estelle Haan, vol. 3 of The Complete Works of John Milton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Poems will be cited in text by title and line number.


My characterization of Francini and Dati as Milton’s closest Italian friends is based on the length of the testimonia they wrote for Milton and the fact that Milton mentions only these two academicians by name in Epitaphium Damonis (which will be discussed in Chapter 4). It is interesting to note that Salzilli and Selvaggi, two other academicians who wrote (much shorter) testimonia for Milton, praised him more as a producer of letters; a poet.

“Cui in Memoria totus Orbis ... Antiqvitatum latebras, vetustatis excidia, eruditionis ambages comite assidua autorum Lectione. / Exquirenti, restauranti, percurrenti.” (I have edited Haan’s translation for clarity.)

Così l’Ape Ingegnosa
Trae con industria il suo liquor pregato
Dal giglio e dalla rosa,
E quanti vaghi fiori ornano il prato; ...

Fabro quasi divino
Sol virtù rintracciando il tuo pensiero
Vide in ogni confino
Chi di nobil valor calca il sentiero;
L’ottimo dal miglior dopo scegliea
Per fabbricar d’ogni virtù l’Idea.

Quanti nacquero in Flora
O in lei del parlar Tosco appreser l’arte,
La cui memoria onora
Il mondo fatta eterna in dotte carte,
Volesti ricercar per tuo tesoro,
E parlasti con lor nell’opre loro. ...

Non batta il Tempo l’ale,
Fermisi immoto, e in un ferminsi gl’anni,
Che di virtù immortale
Scorrorn di troppo ingiuriosi a i danni;
Che s’opre degne di Poema o storia
Furon già, l’hai presenti alla memoria.

Poemata, 418n54.

Eden, Rediscovery of Intimacy, 50.

The medieval dictamen was less ostensibly “private” than Classical letter: “the letter was often dictated to a scribe (hence the term dictamen) and, when delivered, was often read aloud to an assembled group.” In the evolution from classical to medieval letter-writing, the dictamen took on administrative and bureaucratic purposes; structures and formulas were codified in manuals and treatises for training personnel. Judith Rice Henderson, “Humanist Letter Writing: Private Conversation or Public Forum?” in

170 Eden, Rediscovery of Intimacy, 6; see her chapter 1 for a more in-depth discussion of this evolution. Whereas the epistola familiaris became the proxy for the writer’s soul, the experimental essay—a later development in scholarly communication within the Republic of Letters—served as the proxy for the reader’s senses; see Maurizio Gotti, “The Experimental Essay in Early Modern English,” European Journal of English Studies 5, no. 2 (2001): 221–39. Gotti writes that in order to satisfy the expectation that experiments be reproducible, scientists recorded their experiments in painstaking detail: “Descriptions are vivid, with an abundance of data which provides a precise and immediate representation of the experience reported” (225; my italics). The idea was to mimic direct experience as closely as possible—a very literary/poetic goal—in order to gain credibility in the eyes of the readers (235).

171 William Kerrigan, John Rumrich, and Stephen Fallon, eds., The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose of John Milton (New York: Modern Library, 2007), 765. Henderson takes issue with the use of “public” and “private” in discussions of the epistola familiaris, noting that “humanists generally wrote for a coterie audience even when they wrote for publication. We use the words ‘public’ and ‘private’ to describe the tensions in humanist letter writing because we have no adequate substitutes, but we must not forget that the world we live in is not one that any Renaissance humanist knew” (“Humanist Letter Writing,” 21).

172 Rediscovery of Intimacy, 59.

173 Rediscovery of Intimacy, 67ff. “I wish my reader, whoever he may be, to consider me alone, and not his daughter’s marriage or a night with a lady friend, not the wiles of his enemy, not his security or his home, not his land or his money. Even as he reads me, I want him to be with me; if he is pressed by affairs, let him defer his reading. When he decides to read what I write, he must lay aside the burden of his affairs and the anxieties of his home life in order to direct his attention to what is before his eyes. If these conditions do not please him let him stay away from my useless writings. I refuse to have him simultaneously carry on his business and study; I refuse to allow him to learn without labor what I wrote with labor.” Fam. 13.5; Bernardo, 2:191, quoted in Eden, Rediscovery of Intimacy, 68.

174 Eden, Rediscovery of Intimacy, 85–86.

175 See Eden on the “Erasmian editor”: “If reading, on the model of reading letters, aspires to the intimacy that fosters understanding, it is the Erasmian editor, above all, who realizes this aspiration. For the editor—that is, the successful editor—is the most understanding reader” (Rediscovery of Intimacy, 87). On becoming intimate with the ancients, see 67, 67n38.


“Ce rêve de présence n’apparaît cependant plus comme le simple substitut d’un dialogue impossible, mais au contraire comme sa quintessence, sa vérité ultime et profonde” (“Érasme en sa correspondance,” 71).

In *Areopagitica* (1644) Milton puts forth a similar theory about writing as the distillation of a person; for him, books “are not absolutely dead things, but doe contain a potencie of life in them to be as active as that soule was whose progeny they are; nay they do preserve as in a violl the purest efficacie and extraction of that living intellect that bred them” (*CPW* 2:492).


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Grafton, “Sketch Map,” 8. “The citizens of the Republic carried no passports, but they could recognize one another by certain marks. Not wealth, of course; then as now, scholar did not rhyme with dollar. But they looked for learning, for humanity, for generosity, and they rewarded those who possessed these qualities. Any young man, and more than a few young women, could pay the price of admission. Just master Latin—and, ideally, Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic; become proficient at what now seem the unconnected skills of mathematics and astronomy, history and geography, physics and music; turn up at the door of any recognized scholar from John Locke in London to Giambattista Vico in Naples, bearing a letter from a senior scholar, and greet your host in acceptable Latin or French—and you were assured of everything a learned man or woman could want: a warm and civilized welcome, a cup of chocolate (or, later, coffee); and an hour or two of ceremonious conversation on the latest editions of the classics and the most recent sightings of the rings of Saturn” (8). On the quality of one’s Latin as credential for admission, see Bénévent, “Érasme en sa correspondance, 73.

The Usurer’s Daughter: Male Friendship and Fictions of Women in Sixteenth-Century England (London: Routledge, 1994), 6. One of the effects of such textualization is “the development of close bonds of sympathy through the exchange of sentiments.” The other effect, according to Hutson, is a generative anxiety about sincerity; she characterizes this anxiety as “productive (in the creation of fiction)” (6). For an in-depth treatment of the shift from things to words as credit, see Hutson’s chapter 2.


Vulgare quidem et crassum istud amicorum genus, Petre amicorum candidissime, quorum ut omnis vitae, ita necessitudinis quoque ratio in corporibus sita est, si quando procul sejunctos agere contigerit, anulos, pugiunculos, pileolos atque alia id genus symbola crebro solent invicem missitare;
videlicet ne vel consuetudinis intermissione languescat benevolentia, vel longa temporum ac locorum intercapedine prorsus emoriatur. Nos vero, quibus animorum conjunctione societateque studiorum omnis amicitiae ratio constat, cur non potius animi xeniolis et literatis symbolis identidem alter alterum salutemus? Non quod ulla sit periculum ne propter interruptam vitae consuetudinem frigus aliquod obrepas, neve tantis regionum intervallis semota corpora copulum ac nexitum soluant animorum; qui vel hoc arctius sibi conglutinari solent, quo vastioribus spaciis illa fuerint dirempta: verum ut si quid ex amicitiae fructu detrahatur videatur absentia, id huissum modi pignoribus literariis non sine foenore sarciamus. Ep. 312; *Opus epistolarum*, 2:33; translation in *CWE* 23:130.
Chapter Two:

The Instability of Work/Leisure-Related Binaries in *Utopia*

A wise man should not marry. For, first, marriage impedes the pursuit of philosophy, nor may any man serve both books and a wife.

– St. Jerome

What possible concord could there be between scholars and domestics, between authors and cradles, between books or tablets and distaffs, between the stylus or the pen and the spindle? What man, intent on his religious or philosophical meditations, can possibly endure the whining of children, the lullabies of the nurse seeking to quiet them, or the noisy confusion of family life? Who can endure the continual untidiness of children? The rich, you may reply, can do this, because they have palaces or houses containing many rooms, and because their wealth takes no thought of expense and protects them from daily worries. But to this the answer is that the condition of philosophers is by no means that of the wealthy, nor can those whose minds are occupied with riches and worldly cares find time for religious or philosophical study. For this reason, the renowned philosophers of old utterly despised the world, fleeing from its perils rather than reluctantly giving them up, and denied themselves all its delights in order that they might repose in the embraces of philosophy alone.

– Peter Abelard

Early modernity—a time period that saw the shift in meaning of the word “wealth” from “well-being” to “money”—can be conceptualized as a midpoint between the traditional vision of society as “commonwealth” and the modern vision of society as an economic system. It is at this midpoint in the development of the modern economic system that we see intellectuals thinking and rethinking the relationships between various forms of work, labor, action, and activity. Thomas More’s *Utopia* is a text given over to such thinking, which depends on the opposition between private interest and public good but also complicates it. Humanist theory has long been understood to be organized by the opposition between the private and the public. As Quentin Skinner influentially argued, humanists believed that “the greatest danger to political health arises when people ignore the good of the community as a whole, and concern themselves only with their own individual or factional interests.” Yet in the prefatory letters to *Utopia*, More and his fellow humanists trouble this simple and stark opposition. As Abelard did, they imagine a third term intervening in this binary—the realm of intellectual affairs or “philosophy alone,” which Abelard sets in opposition to both the public sphere (“riches and worldly cares”) and the domestic sphere (“the noisy confusion of family life”). But as we will see, although Morus (along with his correspondents) posits a unitary self aligned with the intellectual realm (his *literis*) alone, much seepage takes place in the world created by the prefatory letters to *Utopia*—an instantiation of Hanan Yoran’s “autonomous intellectual space” in which humanists congregate. This space supposedly exists in the intellectual realm, but cannot divorce itself from the domestic realm; Budé will show us the difficulty of sequestering it from the public realm as well.

The principle that stark oppositions between public and private, common good and self-interest fail to take into account is that of compromise. Morus compromises in making Raphael a hybrid sailor-philosopher; Giles shows his willingness to compromise by using appeals to private
self-interest in order to persuade Raphael to act on behalf of the public good. Of course, when Morus pipes in with an argument based solely on the public good, Raphael rejects it as well—because he refuses to make the compromises necessary to be an effective counselor. Morus’s imagined Utopia obviates the need for compromise by eliminating the private; it is a world of pretend, a fantasy of perfect meritocracy in which everyone naturally gravitates towards the activities that are beneficial for both the individual and the state. But this solution, eliminating as it does the division between the “public” and “private” self, is not without consequences for amicitia, the concept which at least one scholar posits as the “original subject” of Utopia.\textsuperscript{6}

1. Working to belong

The domestic space is traditionally viewed as the site of both one’s belonging and one’s belongings. According to Kathy Eden, “the Latin \textit{família} … corresponds to the Greek \textit{oikós}, often translated as ‘household’ or ‘family’; and both are the locus of not only belonging in an affective sense—the place where I belong, among those who are near and dear to me—but also of what belongs to me, my property.”\textsuperscript{7} For this reason (and also because the breadwinner engages with both realms), the \textit{oikós} is connected to the world of public business, even though it is physically separated from that world. However, because of this connection, the \textit{oikós} cannot be where the humanist self is conceptualized as residing. When one withdraws from the public sphere, the alternative we imagine is the diametrically opposed private sphere—the realm of the domestic (although many scholars have shown how the two spheres are interrelated).\textsuperscript{8} But there is a long tradition of delineating intellectual labor as separate from (and even incompatible with) the domestic realm; witness Jerome and Abelard in the epigraph to this chapter.

The intellectual sphere is a third realm inserted into the public/domestic binary, one that disturbs the neat mapping of this binary onto \textit{otium} and \textit{negotium}. It is adjacent to yet distinct from both the public and private spheres. I would suggest that it manifests itself, in part, as the “intellectually autonomous space” necessitated by Erasmian humanism and created in part in the \textit{parerga} of humanist texts.\textsuperscript{9} In the prefatory letters to \textit{Utopia}, Morus and his fellow humanists create such a space—to escape from both the public and the domestic spheres. As we will see, in defining the self as residing in this third sphere, an intellectual risks using intellectual pursuits to opt out of the public/domestic binary in a way that allows him to be idle and unprofitable—an action contrary to the humanist ethos of fusing the \textit{vita activa} and \textit{vita contemplativa}.

The delineation of the intellectual sphere is evident when we note that when Erasmus, Giles, and Paludanus talk up Morus’s extra-literary commitments, each refers to these commitments as \textit{negotium} and uses some form of the word \textit{distractus} (literally “drawn away”).\textsuperscript{10} In the world created by the letters, \textit{negotium}—both public and domestic—is a distraction. These letters touching on Morus’s extra-literary commitments prime us for the curious passage in Morus’s prefatory letter in which he allows the worlds of both the \textit{agora} and the \textit{oikós} to penetrate into his narrative, listing the many obligations from both realms drawing him away from the writing of \textit{Utopia}:

\begin{quote}
Even to carry through this trifling task [writing \textit{Utopia}], my other tasks left me practically no leisure at all. I am constantly engaged in legal business, either pleading or hearing, either giving an award as arbiter or deciding a case as judge. I pay a visit of courtesy to one man and go on business to another. I devote almost the whole day in public to other men’s affairs and the remainder to my own. I leave to myself, that is to learning, nothing at all.
\end{quote}
When I have returned home, I must talk with my wife, chat with my children, and confer with my servants. All this activity I count as business when it must be done—and it must be unless you want to be a stranger in your own home.

huic tamen tam nihilo negotii peragendo, caetera negotia mea minus fere quam nihil temporis reliquerunt. Dum causas forenseis assidue alias ago, alias audio, alias arbiter finio, alias iudex dirimo, dum hic officii causa visitur, ille negotii; dum foris totum ferme diem aliis impartior, reliquum meis, relinquo mihi, hoc est litteris, nihil. Nemo reverso domum, cum uxore fabulandum est, garriendum cum liberis, colloquendum cum ministris. quae ego omnia inter negotia numero, quando fieri necesse est (necesse est autem, nisi velis esse domi tuae peregrinus) (38/39)

In this passage, the brief mention of *literas* (*relinquo mihi, hoc est litteris, nihil*) forms a hinge between the more copious discussion of Morus’s public obligations and his domestic obligations. Since the reference to letters is the hinge, it is clear that he is setting *litteris* apart from both realms. He emphasizes the delineation of intellectual activities from his other tasks by making us stumble over it. The repetition *reliquum meis, relinquo mihi* draws attention to the lack of overlap or redundancy between *meis* and *mihi*—we expect redundancy but we are met with differentiation instead, and when we finally do get something equated to *mihi*, it is not *meis* but *literis*.

The *relinquo mihi* … *nihil* resolves the sense of suspension that has been built up in the periodic sentence of which it forms the main clause; the suspension is augmented by the repetition of clauses beginning with *dum* (“while”), and the parataxis in the repeated *dum* clauses communicates a sense of the heaping up of Morus’s responsibilities. The repetition of *dum* (*dum causas ... dum hic ... dum foris*) and *alias* (*alias ego, alias audio, alias arbiter finio, alias iudex dirimo*), primes us to expect the paratactic repetition of *reliquum meis, relinquo mihi* to indicate yet another list. The first surprise is the repetition, and the second surprise is that the repetition is not redundant—it is a list after all. And then we get the apposition of *literis*. It is notable that only letters and not his private affairs (*meis*) are in apposition to *mihi*.

The listing of Morus’s public obligations implies a hierarchy that is (possibly) subverted by the end. He frames others’ affairs as his prime task, to which he devotes almost the whole day (*totum ferme diem*); next come his own affairs, squeezed into whatever time remains (*reliquum meis*), and finally myself/letters (squeezed into whatever time remains after that—*relinquo mihi*—the remainder of the remainder, which comes out to *nihil*). The subversion of the hierarchy comes when we find that the last thing on his list is *mihi*—himself—obviously the most essential. Note that when *relinquo* and *relictis* appear in this letter, they connote something unimportant left over; see *ut pene nihil fuerit relictum* (“scarcely anything remained for me to do”), referring to the trivial tasks left over for Morus to do after Raphael supposedly completed the bulk of the text’s composition (38/39).

The shift to gerundive when Morus begins to detail his household obligations suggests a qualitative difference between his public and domestic responsibilities—as if each task he performs outside of the house is a discrete action while the situation at home is just a general state of things-needing-to-be-done—suggesting that maintenance of affective bonds is a continual process rather than a set of tasks one may check off on a list. Morus’s complaint falls into a long line of rhetoric opposing the intellectual and the domestic. However, I will argue that in the end, the domestic plays a huge role for Morus which he cannot simply relegate to the margins of his text.
If the Republic of Letters constitutes an “autonomous intellectual space” separated from the exigencies of political life, as Yoran argues, it is also situated rhetorically in opposition to the domestic realm. However, we will see in our discussion of More’s prefatory letter to *Utopia* that the intellectual cannot always avoid or escape the contingencies and obligations of domestic life. This intellectual space defines itself against the spheres that it participates in—the court, the market, the *oikos* linking the domestic and the economic—but maintaining this separation is easier said than done.

Although the humanists strive to maintain a distinction between the intellectual space of the Republic of Letters and the domestic space of the *oikos*, they do not (or cannot) completely excise the domestic from their correspondence. One might expect the emulation of “scholar-saints” in humanist portraiture to spill over into humanist correspondence (which, as Jardine shows, is used no less than portraiture to construct a public persona; the *epistola familiaris* straddles the boundary between public and private). But there is no pretense in the letters that they are the celibate and solitary *inclusi* whose image they evoke in their scholar-portraits. On the contrary, the letters demonstrate again and again the confluence of the intellectual with the domestic among the humanists—for instance, we learn from Erasmus’s prefatory letter to Froben that he is godfather to Froben’s son.

At times, the boundary between the domestic and the intellectual realms seems to vanish altogether. In his prefatory letter to Giles, Morus notes that his *puer*, John Clement, was also present for the conversation with Raphael: “I do not allow him to absent himself from any talk which can be somewhat profitable, for from this young plant … I expect no mean harvest some day [quam a nullo patior sermone abesse in quo aliquid esse fructus potest, quoniam ab hac herba … egregiam aliquando frugem spero]” (40/41). Morus’s use of *puer* (which Surtz and Hexter aptly translate as “pupil-servant”) implies an affective relationship; Surtz and Hexter’s translation makes clear the hybrid nature of this relationship—it straddles the boundary (or one might say it *blurs* the boundary) between the intellectual (“pupil”) and domestic (“servant”). Morus here demonstrates a sense of solicitude about Clement’s education (a sense that he has a responsibility to see that Clement is properly educated), and we find this same solicitude in Erasmus’s instructions to Froben regarding his *filiolum*: “Erasmus, the godson whom I share in common with you, has been born in an atmosphere of learning: so mind that he is trained in all good learning [*Erasmus filiolum mihi tecum commune, inter literas natum, fac optimis literis instituendum cures*]” (2/3). Erasmus’s *fac … cures*—“see that you take care”—emphasizes the weight of the charge he gives Froben regarding his godson’s education. Reading these letters, we get the sense that both Clement and young Erasmus are being inducted into the community of literati through bonds combining the domestic with the intellectual.

If the humanists in Morus’s circle seem to be creating a quasi-familial social structure in the realm of *literas*, they also acknowledge each other’s purely domestic bonds—whether to differentiate or liken the affective bonds in the domestic realm to *amicitia* in the intellectual realm is unclear. For example, in addition to providing instruction for the education of his godson, the closing of Erasmus’s letter acknowledges Froben’s “excellent father-in-law, sweetest wife, and most delightful children [*Bene vale cum optimo socio, conjuge suavissima, ac mellitissimis liberis*]” (2/3). Similarly, Morus closes his prefatory letter by juxtaposing his love for Giles with Giles’s conjugal bond: “Good-by, my sweetest friend, with your excellent wife. Love me as you have ever done, for I love you even more than I have ever done [*Vale dulcissime Petre Aegidi: cum optima conjuge: ac me ut soles ama: quando ego te amo etiam plus quam solem*]” (44/45). Notably, the acknowledgements of family ties use the same superlative-laden
rhetoric of effusion applied to the scholars themselves (optimo socio, conjuge suavissima, mellitissimis liberis, optima conjuge); this suggests that affective bonds in the domestic and intellectual realms are being assimilated. Despite the rhetoric of their incompatibility, the domestic bleeds into the intellectual realm—to the extent that it is sometimes difficult to differentiate the affective bonds formed in each realm (family bonds vs. amicitia) from each other.  

Indeed, this transference of effusion from amicus to conjuge suggests something like the transferability of amicitia among the members of the Republic, illustrated by Budé’s comment to Lupset about Morus in his prefatory letter. Here we see an encapsulation of the fundamental workings of the Republic of Letters—friendship formed through letters rather than through personal contact, the commutative property of amicitia, and the mutual passion for learning, admiration of others’ learning, zeal transformed or spilling beyond the boundaries of the object of study acting as the glue that makes everything work, holding together connections which otherwise might be tenuous:

I have never known More in person—I am now passing over the recommendation given his learning and character—but I love him on account of his sworn friendship with the illustrious Erasmus, who has deserved exceedingly well of sacred and profane letters of all kinds. With Erasmus himself, I have long ago formed an association of friendship sealed by an exchange of letters. (15)  

Budé is discussing two friends: one made through an exchange of letters, and the other made through the friend he made through the exchange of letters. It is striking that no personal contact is mentioned. Of course, this is all a rhetorical performance intended to shore up a public persona—but these conventions are crucial to the conceptualization of the Republic. (In other words, whether Budé and Erasmus had actually met in person matters very little—the rhetoric of the “friendship sealed by an exchange of letters” is doing important work here in constructing the parameters of the Republic.)

The discursive activity responsible for sustaining humanist amicitia—the exchange of letters—is strikingly similar to the activity Morus cites as responsible for maintaining affective bonds in the domestic sphere: conversation. The three verbs Morus uses to describe his domestic negocia—fabulandum, garriendum, colloquendum—all refer to acts of speaking. Of course, conversation is important to the humanist conception of amicitia as well. In book 1, Morus says that it is Peter Giles’s “delightful society and charming discourse [dulcissima consuetudine sua, & mellitissima confabulatione]” that eases his longing for his wife and children (48/49). The con in confabulatione indicates an activity undertaken “with” someone else, emphasizing the social nature of the activity. Tellingly enough, Morus uses the unprefixed fabulandum to refer to talking with his wife.

But with this seeming substitutability of familial and domestic relationships come important markers of their incommensurability. While the Republic of Letters would seem to be able to replace the family as the site of interpersonal intimacy in the humanist imaginary, it is nonetheless significant that Giles lightened Morus’s cares only magna ex parte, or “largely.” The substitution is not a perfect one. It is also significant that that conversation has a different status as work or leisure depending on Morus’s conversation partner: fabulatio with his wife is negotium; confabulatio with Peter Giles is otium—oddly enough, otium that takes away the pain of missing his wife, with whom conversation is work! This would seem to indicate that on some level, the affective bonds created in the oikos and in the intellectual realm are distinguishable (and distinguished) from one another. Morus’s categorization of conversation with his wife as
negocia is almost as curious as his statement that he participates in domestic life in order to not be a stranger in his own house; after all, the oikos is the site of belonging as well as belongings. Morus is framing himself as one who has to work to belong either in the public or domestic realm; the true self—mihi, hoc est litteris—resides elsewhere.17

Since the rhetoric of Morus’s prefatory letter posits a single, singular self (mihi), the boundaries of which he demarcates as separate from both public and domestic life (negocia), it follows that the self Morus imagines is congruent with his otium.18 Though his otium is laborious (even though he playfully denies this, claiming that Raphael did the bulk of the work), it is the only activity in which he does not have to do the work of being someone other than himself.

If More considers domestic management necessary (“All this activity I count as business [negocia] when it must be done—and it must be unless you want to be a stranger in your own home” [39]), Guillaume Budé’s letter demonstrates quite a different philosophy: for Budé, intellectual labor—even just reading his friend’s book—comes to take precedence over his activities in the domestic and commercial spheres (spheres which are tied in a way they are not in Morus’s discussion of his domestic responsibilities):

I had the book by me in the country as I ran up and down very busily and gave directions to the workmen, for, as you have partly come to know by yourself and partly heard from others, I had been expending much energy on the business of my country estate [villaticis ... negocis] now for the second year. As I learned and weighed the customs and laws of the Utopians, the reading of the book impressed me so much that I almost neglected and even forsook the management of household affairs. I perceived the trumpery [nugas] in all the theory and practice of domestic economy and in absolutely all anxiety for increasing one’s revenue. (5)19

Budé begins by referring to “the business of my country estate” as negotium and concludes by categorizing “all the theory and practice of domestic economy” as nugae. It appears that Morus’s is writing powerful enough to transform negotium into nugae. Here he is speaking not just of the specific instance of the “business of my country estate” but the entire concept of domestic economy as a whole.

Budé’s rhetoric acknowledges the balance between the affective and commercial in the conception of the oikos as the site of both one’s belonging and one’s belongings; this can be seen in the fact that Budé associates “anxiety for increasing one’s revenue” with domestic economy—a seeming conflation of public and private affairs.20 Later in his letter, however, he portrays the domestic sphere as threatened by the incursion of the logic of the marketplace, arguing that the corruption of the legal field creates a situation in which “great-great-great-grandchildren and their great-great-grandchildren vie in increasing [certatim ... cumulaverint] by splendid additions the patrimonies received from their forefathers ... as they oust, far and wide, their neighbors, their kindred by marriage, their relations by blood, and even their brothers and sisters!” (9).21 This is a clear example of the ideology of the marketplace (or simply greed, if they are not the same thing!) perverting domestic bonds. Now we see the oikos become the site of economic conflict and competition (certatim, “in competition”) rather than the site of belonging and belongings.

Resisting the intrusion of the marketplace into the oikos is not as simple as withdrawing into the third intellectual realm. Here humanists find themselves in a double bind. In the middle of his denunciation of the legal profession, Budé includes a curious aside about humanist withdrawal from the public and retreat into the intellectual sphere. He describes law as “the knotty bonds ... which the ignorant multitude and the humanistic scholars, living far from public
business for the sake of relaxation or for the investigation of truth, account a combination of
Gordian knots and charlatan methods hardly admirable” (8/9). It is curious that Budé takes
pains to specify that the humanists are “far from public business [procul foro]” and to explain
why this is so; one might read this aside as a suggestion that the humanists should take more
of an interest in public business to stop these abuses. By separating those who see through
the lawyers’ tricks into two groups (“the ignorant” and “the scholars”), he appears to imply that
the scholars have a duty to help the ignorant—to defend them from the corrupt “law of nations”
(although he might also be hinting that the corrupt state of the law is why the scholars stay far
away from the public business). There are strong echoes here of Cicero on the failure of
philosophers to prevent injustice: Cicero questions whether philosophers’ “pursuit of truth [veri
investigatione]” (compare Budé’s veritatis indagandae) justifies the risk of their being
“hampered by their pursuit of learning” to the extent that “they leave to their fate those whom
they ought to defend.” In suggesting that the humanists who stay far from the public business
are hampered by their pursuit of learning [discendi ... studio], Budé anticipates the question of
whether the pursuit of truth by individuals is beneficial to society, a question that will be taken
up in book 2 of Utopia.

But while in the passage quoted above Budé appears to suggest that humanists should be
on the front lines combating the “law of nations,” he also subjects lawyers and law to the
ultimate insult of uselessness; lawyers are men “who cannot help their fellow citizens by any art
or practice worth mentioning,” making their money through trickery rather than through honest
work (9). He fantasizes that putting Utopian principles into practice in Europe would result in
the elimination of law as an area of study altogether: “you would see that interminable array of legal
tomes, engrossing the attention of so many excellent and solid intellects even until death, viewed
as hollow and empty and therefore consigned to bookworms or used as wrapping paper in shops”
(11). The image of legal texts as wrapping paper literalizes the idea that the law itself is
hollow, without substance.

One might read these lines as a variation of his earlier ideas: just as he suggests that the
issues brought up in Utopia are more worthy of a humanist’s time than the nugae of domestic
economy, he also suggests that “many excellent and solid intellects” are wasting their time with
the legal studies, possibly because the law is too corrupted to be used to right injustices in the
public sphere. But he is actually—perhaps inadvertently—revealing the double bind in which
humanists find themselves: their attempts to better society are futile (since the legal profession is
corrupt and laws are empty) unless society is already utopian, in which case their efforts are not
needed (the legal profession disappears in Budé’s fantasy). One may argue that “bettering
society” would involve working to put Utopian principles into practice; but as we will see, in
Budé’s fantasy this happens by divine fiat rather than human activity. One danger of “taking
refuge in created worlds” (as Bourdon and Sauvage describe humanist activity) is becoming
stuck in these worlds; Budé’s letter suggests that humanists are thus trapped.

2. Perils of compromise, perils of detachment

The solution to this double bind appears to be the principle of compromise. In contrast to
Bourdon and Sauvage’s assertion that humanists had to “take refuge [se refugier]” in the
imaginary worlds they created because there was no role for them to play the real world except
that of the passive observer, one scholar describes the humanist problem as an ongoing
compromise between retreat into the imagination and engagement with the world:
How can we relate our disturbing ability to picture alternative worlds to the inherited world into which we have been born? One option is to remain faithful to the ideal and keep out of practical politics. The other, implicitly, is to compromise, and risk moral pollution in consequence.  

In this worldview, imagination—the “disturbing ability to picture alternative worlds”—can be used for good in the public sphere; one can do more than simply take refuge—but only if one is willing to “risk moral pollution” by compromising one’s ideals. Similarly, another scholar frames Morus’s achievement in *Utopia* as the result of his “sustained imaginative vision,” which he describes as “a dizzy height which a very few men scale once or twice in a lifetime”; the view from such a height “may bring some facets of human affairs into focus with a fierce brilliancy.”

In addition to recalling the promontory image we discuss in Chapter 1, the image of scaling a mountain indicates that in this formulation one has to be far from humanity in order to see it clearly; this echoes the trope of the disinterested “universal intellectual” Yoran discusses.

*Utopia* as a fantasy seems to solve the problem of “moral pollution” Baker-Smith notes and to bear out Bourdon and Sauvage’s account. Here is the perfect world conceived by the human imagination, unsullied by the need for compromise. In the world created by the prefatory letters, Utopian principles—the product of the *vita contemplativa*—can simply be applied, unaltered, to the real world to effect change. For example, Budé writes:

> Would that the inhabitants of heaven for their own name’s sake would cause these three principles of Utopian legislation to be fixed in the minds of all mortals by the beam-spike of a strong and settled conviction! You would immediately see pride, avarice, mad strife, and almost all the other wound-inflicting darts of the Stygian adversary fall to the ground and lie inert.

> Superi suo numine facerent ut haec tria Utopianae legis capita trabalibus clavis firmae ac statuae persuasionis in sensibus omnium mortalium figerentur, protinus superbiam, cupiditatem, contentionem vaesanam, atque alia pene omnia vulnifica Stygii adversarii tela concidere languereque videres, (10/11)

Similarly, Paludanus writes: “Would that, just as the Utopians have begun to receive our religion, so we might borrow from them their system of public administration! This perhaps might happen easily if a number of distinguished and invincible theologians would betake themselves to the island [*Utinam fiat ut quemadmodum illi nostram religionem accipere ceperunt: ita nos ab illis administrandae reipublicae rationem mutuemur. Id fortasse facile fieret: si Theologorum aliquot insignes & invicti in eam insulam se conferant*]” (26–28/27–29).

Note that these two scenarios—direct transplantation of Utopian principles from the divine and adoption of those principles as one would adopt a religion—leave no room for processual, gradual change or compromise. These statements, written as they are in the subjunctive (Budé: *Superi suo numine facerent ut ... videres*; Paludanus: *Utinam fiat ut ... mutuemur ... fieret ... se conferant*), show humanist idealism bumping up against the limits of imagination. For all his fantasizing about Utopian principles being directly transplanted through divine intervention into the minds of “all mortals,” Budé later calls *Utopia* “a nursery of correct and useful institutions from which every man may introduce and adapt transplanted customs to his own city” (15; my emphasis). Back down on earth, the process of accommodation and compromise must still take place—if such accommodation is even possible.

Similarly, in order to satisfy this double imperative of contemplation and engagement, Morus has to compromise in his characterization of Raphael by making him not a traditional
contemplative but an active philosopher. His *otium* is not the humanist *otium* of the life of the mind (although, we find out later, he does teach Greek classes). Morus calls attention to the strain of this compromise by showing the difficulty he and Giles have in pinning down exactly what Raphael is about:

“The moment I saw him, I was sure he was a ship’s captain.”

“But you are quite mistaken,” said [Giles], “for his sailing has not been like that of Palinurus but that of Ulysses or, rather, of Plato. Now this Raphael … is no bad Latin scholar, and most learned in Greek … He had devoted himself unreservedly to philosophy … He left his patrimony at home—he is a Portuguese—to his brothers, and, being eager to see the world, joined Amerigo Vespucci …” (49, 51)

In the narrative world Morus has created, it is surprisingly difficult to tell a sailor from a philosopher. Of course, Morus is not “quite mistaken”—Raphael is in fact a sailor; it is just that Giles sees Raphael as primarily a philosopher, likening him to Plato, emphasizing his knowledge of Greek and Latin, and describing him with the language of devotion to studies evocative of the *vita contemplativa*. Of course, as the comparison to Plato indicates, it is not unprecedented for a philosopher to travel extensively. But it is striking that at the beginning of the narrative both Morus and Giles seem to attend to only half of Raphael’s identity—Morus sees a sailor, Giles sees a philosopher—thus forcing the reader to attend to Raphael’s hybridity.

When we see that Raphael is addicted to studies and gives up his patrimony to his brothers, the next thing we expect to hear is that he shut himself up in his study and read to the exclusion of any other activity, as Shakespeare’s Prospero would do a century later. But Raphael is not the traditional contemplative. As Gerard Wegemer points out, his *studio contemplandi* is not for books, but for the world—*orbis terrarum*. His is an active form of contemplation involving not retreat from but engagement with the world, which has become the “book” he contemplates. As Skinner notes, in gathering and disseminating information about different societies, Raphael is performing precisely the function of advisor that he adamantly refuses. Thus his *otium* allows him to participate in the world of public affairs—or would allow him to, if he chose to do so.

Raphael represents the humanist fantasy that one can withdraw from society and still be useful to the state. In this case, one must withdraw in order to rid oneself of the temptation to focus on one’s self-interest. This is why Raphael speaks from an outsider’s perspective with an insider’s knowledge. In order to know what to critique, he must have an insider’s knowledge; in order to give advice free of the taint of self-interest, he must have an outsider’s perspective. This internally inconsistent hybrid perspective reflects the political reality that one can criticize the court (and the king) only through ventriloquism. This is the paradox inherent in what Yoran calls “Erasmian humanism”—the ability to create a space of independence from the world in order to critique it risks alienating the intellectual from the very society he wishes to improve. For humanists, knowledge is societally contingent—for example, there is no way Raphael could have spoken to these hypotheticals without being a part of the court culture that gave rise to the situations. But being enmeshed in that culture (as Raphael argues) disincentivizes his speaking up about these injustices because he needs to worry about his position—speaking frankly would threaten his self-interest. Here Raphael and Morus threaten to become identified with each other—since there is no way for an outsider to speak with the knowledge of an insider except through ventriloquism, the dialogue itself becomes part of the intellectually autonomous space for Morus, divorced as it is from the court.
Even though he, like Raphael, is traveling abroad, Morus anything but an outsider. As he does in the prefatory letters, Morus situates himself within a network of “busy men” at the beginning of book 1.\(^{36}\) The first words of book 1—*Quum non exigui momenti negocia*—immediately plunge the reader into the world of his “weighty matters” (46/47). Morus begins the book in the midst of an official embassy to the Netherlands; it is only when talks reach an impasse that he has the leisure to converse with Peter and Raphael. Thus the conversation that serves as the basis of *Utopia* is framed as taking place in a spare moment, much like Morus’s writing of the text. Collegial discussion is presented as an alternative to political speech; the two discourses belong to different realms, as Morus says explicitly in his later rebuke of Raphael. It is notable that the conversation takes place in a garden space explicitly delineated as separate from the political (the failed embassy) and the domestic (Morus’ *laris, uxoris, & liberorum*); this is perhaps the only space in which such a frank assessment of politics could take place.\(^{37}\)

In our first encounter with Morus, Giles, and Raphael, we see that Erasmian conventions of transferable friendship do not apply to Raphael, emphasizing that he is decidedly not of the Republic of Letters. When Morus automatically engages in the conventional “your friend is my friend” rhetoric that characterizes humanist discourse, Giles shuts him down, sweeping away the conventions of *amicitia* in favor of a focus on the individual and his accomplishments.

“Do you see this fellow? I was on the point of taking him straight to you.”

“He would have been very welcome,” said I, “for your sake.”

“No,” said he, “for his own, if you knew him.” (49)\(^{38}\)

Even among the members of the Republic, there is always a balance between loving someone for his own qualities and loving someone because he is a friend of a friend, as we see in Budé’s description of his friendships in his prefatory letter. With Raphael, the pendulum seems to have swung completely to the side of “for his own qualities”; this makes sense, because Raphael is singular, set apart, as Ernest B. Gilman notes—the “stranger” side of Morus’s divided psyche.\(^{39}\)

A citizen of the world, he has no obligations, roots, or interests in any particular place.

Raphael has taken the step that Morus, Giles, and the other writers of the prefatory letters have not by completely divesting himself of the domestic (giving up his patrimony is a symbolic of this break). The fact that he has no obligations or ties anywhere makes him the perfect disinterested philosopher (or “universal philosopher” as Yoran calls it). Thus, it is no surprise that when Giles tries to convince him to go into the king’s service by telling him he could provide “much advantage” to his family and friends, Raphael replies that giving up his patrimony is enough: “I think they ought to be satisfied with this generosity from me and not to require or expect additionally that I should, for their sakes, enter into servitude to kings” (55).\(^{40}\)

It is striking that Giles attempts to persuade him through an appeal to the benefit of his people (*omnium tuorum*); one would assume that the argument is one that at least Giles and possibly Morus would have found convincing.\(^{41}\) It is in part because of Raphael’s extreme detachment that he is impervious to both the “public” and “private” appeals Morus and Giles make in attempting to persuade him to join the king’s service. The rejection of the “private” appeal reflects the disinterestedness that comes from having no connections or obligations, and the rejection of the “public” appeal possibly reflects the downside of this detachment—a feeling of powerlessness to influence society, and perhaps an indifference to society’s fate akin to the *contemptus mundi* stance.

Although Raphael does not believe that he can help the public good at all—“in disturbing my own peace and quiet [*ocio meo*], I should still not promote the public interest [*publicam rem*]” (57)—we are not meant to accept this as a justification for avoiding the king’s
service.\textsuperscript{42} It is more threatening to the humanists than Raphael’s proto-Communism, contradicting as it does humanist optimism about the power of wisdom (gained from the \textit{studia humanitatis}) to transform society. But the interesting thing about this exchange is that we’re supposed to see Raphael as wrong on two counts—both in not going into the king’s service, and also in eschewing the domestic. And maybe we’re supposed to see his position as tied to the lack of attachment in the domestic sphere. Both the exclusive focus on personal virtue (i.e., on avoiding Baker-Smith’s “moral pollution”) at the expense of the public good and the evacuation of domestic are functions of Raphael’s extreme detachment from society. Ironically, it appears that a connection to the domestic sphere precludes a complete break from the public sphere. Perhaps this should be unsurprising given that the connection between the \textit{oikos} and the \textit{agora} runs through the figure of the breadwinner—a role Raphael rejects in eschewing the domestic.

The fact that Giless use appeals to private self-interest to entice Raphael towards working for the public good calls into question the stark opposition posed between the public good and private self-interest in humanist political theory. Raphael seems to think that one cannot get away from self-interest, even in the king’s service, a supposedly public-oriented post. Councilors give advice with an eye to positioning themselves in the king’s good graces; kings act out of self-interest, often disregarding the good of the country. Perhaps withdrawing so that one’s advice does not come from a place of self-interest—focused on bettering one’s position in society—is the only way to truly serve the public good. To be a part of society is necessarily to be self-interested—except in a place like Utopia, where private interests have been eliminated.

Raphael’s suggestion that public work does not always augment the public good threatens to compromise the validity of the humanist political theory (mentioned in the introduction to this chapter) opposing the public good and private self-interest. In Morus’s case, despite categorizing the work he does as “in public [\textit{foris}]” in his prefatory letter, he makes no mention of the public good, suggesting that those public “affairs” he mentions are no less self-interested than any “private” work would be. Ironically, Morus’s work in the intellectual sphere—the writing of \textit{Utopia}—appears to be more oriented toward the public good than his “public” work.\textsuperscript{43} If we define \textit{negotium} in Utopia as “the public business” (which translates \textit{res publica}), it follows that only in Utopia is \textit{negotium} guaranteed to be aligned with the public good. Given these circumstances, we might forgive Budé’s humanists for concluding that it better to work “far from the public business [\textit{procul foro}]]” for the investigation of truth than work “in public [\textit{foris}]” for someone’s private interest.

It is his sense of the futility of political engagement that allows Raphael to privilege \textit{otium} over \textit{negotium}, private life over public life. This question might be approached similarly by those who had no choice in their exclusion from the political sphere. The focus on private virtue at the expense of public good is almost inevitable if one is not in a position to contribute to the public good in the political arena. The man who feels useless politically can be said to be feminized: while “busy men” are engaged in public affairs, women are associated with the domestic sphere. A treatment of the issues underpinning the Dialogue of Counsel from a female humanist’s perspective might be instructive in understanding the assumptions determining Raphael’s stance.

Luisa Sigea, a humanist who held the position of \textit{dama latina} (Latin preceptor) at the court of the Infanta Maria in Portugal for thirteen years,\textsuperscript{44} engages with these very questions in her 1552 dialogue, \textit{Duarum virginum colloquium de vita aulica et privata} (Dialogue of Two Young Girls on Courtly Life and Private Life). The dialogue features the nun Blesilla as the proponent of the \textit{vita privata} and the courtier Flaminia as the proponent of the \textit{vita aulica}.\textsuperscript{45}
Flaminia makes the case for the *vita aulica* in terms that at times evoke humanist ideals, arguing that its benefits include “relationships of a benevolent familiarity with people whose speech is eloquent … and even the freedom to dare to say what one pleases” (77). From her description it appears that the only way one can properly live the humanist life at court is to be a woman; certainly this *libertas dicendi* Flaminia describes is more freedom than is allowed men at court. There are certain things men can’t or shouldn’t say; thus Morus locates humanist conversation and friendship away from court, in the *locus amoenus* of Giles’s garden: “In the private conversation of close friends this academic philosophy is not without its charm, but in the councils of kings, where great matters are debated with great authority, there is no room for these notions” (99). The difference, of course, is that Raphael and Morus are men whose opinions might be solicited when “great matters are debated with great authority”; Flaminia’s putative freedom of speech is a function of her lack of power or influence—a lack which becomes more significant when she describes her daily life at court.

Defending the *vita aulica* against Blesilla’s charge that it is *otiosa*, Flaminia recounts that her time at court is spent in choosing one’s clothes, arranging one’s jewelry, and devising charming and witty words with which either the women may please the men [*viris placeant feminae*] or the men in turn may please the women, or with which they may slight those who are not able to respond off the cuff to the witticisms addressed to them … I pass over the continual care of pleasing princes [*assiduum principibus placendi ... studium*] and of soliciting from them with extraordinary skill either a favor or an honor… (79)  

Rather than a humanist, Flaminia is revealed here as the stereotypically frivolous woman overly concerned with trifles—her main concerns are her clothes and jewelry, suggesting a conception of a woman’s role at court as primarily ornamental. Additionally, the repeated *placeant ... placendi* suggests a role oriented towards pleasing others; her *studium* is not for letters but for pleasing princes (*principibus placendi*) in order to extract favors and honors from them—activities which recall Raphael’s disparaging characterization of the concerns of courtly life. Like Raphael’s imagined courtiers, Flaminia performs “with extraordinary skill [*mira arte*]” for reasons of petty self-interest rather than concern for the public good.

One might counter that by virtue of her sex, Flaminia is not in a position to contribute to the public good. Flaminia’s *vita aulica* does not translate into the *vita activa* because she has no political power; thus her involvement in the public sphere involves not *negotia* but *otium*, which she uses frivolously (i.e., engaged in “public” activities not involving political or economic engagement) because she seems to have no other options. In contrast, Blesilla, who advocates withdrawal, takes the position of the humanist staying *procul foro*. But unlike Budé’s humanists, she cannot be indicted for failing to intervene in the public sphere to benefit the public good—for the same reason Flaminia escapes such a critique: by virtue of her sex she is excluded from the political sphere. Although male, Raphael feels similarly disempowered; he is bothered by this while Flaminia is not because he, being male, expects to be able to have influence with his words; Flaminia does not. Raphael might argue that both men’s and women’s courtly performances are equally useless and tainted with motives of petty self-interest; these flaws are much more apparent when viewing court life from a woman’s perspective, however, because men’s performances are invested with the mantle of “great matters” and “great authority.”

From a humanist perspective, the main problem with Flaminia’s project of filling up time is its lack of purpose. It is only away from court that she acquires both the liberty to speak freely...
and the authority to give her words purpose. If she does not enjoy a man’s political authority (*magna autoritate*), she nevertheless demonstrates the same intellectual authority that Morus, Giles, and Raphael do in the course of her dialogue with Blesilla; Inès Rada remarks that Flaminia argues for the *vita aulica* “not as a frivolous woman, but as a man would, taking arguments from Plutarch and Cicero as well as from Saint Jerome and Saint Augustine.” Blesilla, in turn, draws upon the same types of sources for her arguments in favor of the *vita privata*.

By contrast, the conversations Flaminia has with the *diserti* at court involve exchanging barbs rather than ideas; the goal is pleasing the opposite sex rather than arriving at truth. This difference complicates her claim that at court one has “the freedom to dare to say what one pleases”—she still has to worry about framing her words with an eye to pleasing others (although obviously the stakes for her are lower than they would be for an advisor in the councils of kings). For both men advising the king and women seeking favor at court, only the space of withdrawal (i.e., the imagined space in which the dialogue is taking place) can be a space of intellectual exchange and *amicitia*. Discussion away from court lacks both the flattery Raphael complains about and the frivolity Blesilla denounces; it is an arena in which truth(s) can be spoken.

If it seems that the intellectual exchanges that characterize *amicitia* must be confined to members of the same sex, perhaps this is because male-female conversations are somehow tinged with the domestic. Recall that the conversation Morus has with his wife is intended to prevent him from being a stranger in his own home. As for Flaminia, it is only when she is not trying to impress men that she can argue “as a man would.” Flaminia’s courtly conversations are not intellectual but almost instrumental, facilitating the operation of the marriage market ("the women may please the men or the men in turn may please the women"). In this context it is important that Blesilla says that men do not want to marry *garrulas*—yet another reason Flaminia needs to watch her words (155). Significantly, the same word More uses to describe domestic conversations—*garriendum*—is the one Blesilla uses to warn Flaminia about inadvertently pushing herself out of the marriage market: *garrulas*. Perhaps this indicates just how much more precarious the sense of “belonging”—even in the domestic sphere—is for “public” women than for “public” men.

The contrast between personal and public virtue is salient in the different stakes of the two dialogues: while Morus and Giles seem focused on the good of the people, Blesilla, who according to Bourdon and Sauvage “considers herself responsible before God for her friend’s choice between false and true goods,” seems concerned exclusively with the state of Flaminia’s soul. The moral choice for Flaminia and Blesilla is not one of selfish withdrawal versus selfless service, but becoming ensnared in the false goods of the court versus devoting one’s life to a higher purpose. Since Raphael has determined that he would be powerless to promote the common good, the only question that interests him is the same one that engages Blesilla and Flaminia: Is it possible to preserve one’s virtue at court? For Morus, the question of joining the king’s service is less about personal virtue than it is about influencing the prince to do good. While conceding that life at court would not be completely advantageous to Raphael, he implicitly argues that there are things—such as “the public interest”—more important than one’s own happiness: “it seems to me you will do what is worthy of you and of this generous and truly philosophic spirit of yours if you so order your life as to apply your talent and industry to the public interest [*publicis rebus*], even if it involves some personal disadvantages to yourself [*aliquo privatim incommodo*]” (57). The contrast Morus makes between public and private
echoes the humanist theory opposing private interests and the public good. This argument, however, does not convince Raphael: his only concern is about personal virtue, and he does not believe he can influence the prince while maintaining it. To serve at court would mean being constrained by the same performative pressure that constrains Flaminia without her realizing it (and, Raphael would argue, constrains all courtiers, male and female). Since he has no power to sway the king, he chooses to be a Blesilla rather than a Flaminia.58

3. The individuated self in the Utopian collective

Turning to the fantasy of Utopia itself, we find that the space imagined to be free from the tension between public and private virtue has not managed to escape all the dynamics of contemporary Europe that Raphael critiques. In a society that has attempted to rid itself of all unnecessary distinctions between individuals it is striking that the traditional division between the thinking class [classis literatorum] and the working class [opifices] is one of the few that persists. Of course, Morus’s Raphael tries to trouble the distinction between thinkers and makers, between (ostensibly useful, necessary, productive) physical labor and (ostensibly useless, unnecessary, unproductive) intellectual labor, by portraying them as both beneficial to the state and granting them an equal social valence. However, this attempt is not entirely successful. Although spending all one’s time working is “praised as useful to the commonwealth” and framed as something one “gets” to do (“he is not hindered” [129]—one does not even have to ask permission!),59 there can be no doubt that membership in the elite classis literatorum whose members have the liberty to spend all their thinking (since they are exempt from physical labor) is the real wish-fulfilment fantasy for the educated, Latin-reading humanist audience of Utopia. The exemption from physical labor is clearly a treat, a marker of special status; whereas anyone can simply choose to eschew intellectual labor for the physical, one must be chosen for membership in the thinking class.

Like the system operative in Plato’s Republic, the Utopian class system represents a humanist’s fantasy of meritocracy. As a system in which privileges are distributed based on deserts rather than arbitrary accidents of birth, it is perhaps the only system of distinction that could be justified as ethically sound to the idealistic humanist. The only people afforded the luxury of sitting back and thinking all day are the ones who are truly worthy—unlike in Europe, where, as Giles’s gloss wryly notes, “blockheads and loggerheads devote themselves to scholarship, whereas the best endowed talent is being ruined by pleasures” (181).60 But “if any of these scholars falsifies the hopes entertained of him [si quis conceptam de se spem fefellerit], he is reduced to the rank of workingman. On the other hand, not seldom does it happen that a craftsman so industriously employs his spare hours on learning and makes such progress by his diligence that he is relieved of his manual labor and advanced into the class of men of learning” (131–33).61

One might argue, though, that the problem with meritocracy is its demand that merit be measured, quantified—a demand that would seem to violate the ideal of schole and risk reproducing the mindset of the marketplace. This problem seems akin to “publish or perish” in the academic world, which (again) is a result of the awkward compromise necessitated by intellectual labor’s integration into an economic system. In order to justify the time spent on one’s intellectual labor, one must demonstrate productivity, value-added.

Usefulness and meritocracy both threaten the ideal of schole. But the Utopians, free from the constraints such an integration of the intellectual with the economic can impose in the real
world, use vague rather than concrete criteria for membership in the thinking class: one must “make ... progress by his diligence” or simply not “falsify the hopes entertained of him.” The second statement is by far the more intriguing; its vagueness is only one of its notable qualities. It is framed in the negative, suggesting that maintaining one’s position in the classis literatorum is not so much a positive accomplishment as it is a lack of failure. Also note that societal expectation, rather than an objective measurement of success or productivity, determines fitness for membership in the thinking class. Framing the criteria for membership in the classis literatorum in terms of relationships represents a compromise between the demand for productivity (and measurement) that goes with the fantasy of meritocracy and the desire to escape the logic of the marketplace and its demand for “usefulness.” Thus, instead of a concrete definition of these “hopes [spem]” such as publishing books (Raphael tells us that the printing press has made it to Utopia [182/183]), the mandate amounts to a vague warning: “don’t let us down.”

We have already seen this talk of spem; recall that Morus uses just this verb in describing his expectations for his puer, John Clement: “from this young plant ... I expect [spero] no mean harvest some day” (40/41). Spero is affective terminology; as in Morus’s prefatory letter, it carries a solicitous and avuncular tone rather than a disinterested and critical one. Raphael’s framing the criteria for retaining a position in the classis literatorum in terms of spem may suggest a similarly quasi-familial social structure existing between the Utopian priests (who choose the members of the classis literatorum) and their protégés. (Notably, while the requirement for one who works himself into the thinking class from the opifices is similarly vague—one must “make ... progress by his diligence”—this criterion is not tinged with affective language, suggesting the existence of a further class differentiation within those who are exempt from work.)

Given the above, one might argue that Morus’s imagined Utopia is a fantasy in which amicitia completely (rather than “largely”) replaces domestic affective bonds. How convincing we find this view depends, of course, on our reading of Utopian domestic life. Scholarly perspectives form a spectrum from that of Greenblatt, who sees no affective bonds at all in the domestic realm, to that of Hannah Chapelle Wojciehowski, who argues that familial bonds are emphasized to the exclusion of any other (including bonds of amicitia). Jean-François Vallée also argues that there is no amicitia whatsoever on the island, pointing out that most instances of the word “friend” in the text refer to collective entities. I lean more towards Greenblatt’s view in light of the cynical views expressed by Raphael about the marital bond: as Wojciehowski notes, it is heavily policed—but this is precisely because Utopians consider it to be quite fragile and in need of constant vigilance and protection. For example, premarital sex is punished severely because Utopians believe that “unless persons are carefully restrained from promiscuous intercourse, few will contract the tie of marriage, in which a whole life must be spent with one companion and all the troubles incidental to it must be patiently borne” (187). The same cynical reasoning is behind making divorces difficult to obtain: “they know that it is a very great drawback to cementing [firmandoae] the affection between husband and wife if they have before them the easy hope of a fresh union” (191). Just as in Morus’s prefatory letter, marriage is an arrangement that takes effort to maintain [firmandoae], full as it is of “troubles” [molestias].

In the famous passage likening choosing a wife to buying a colt, Raphael evinces the Utopian inability to imagine a relationship between the sexes that is not based largely on sexual attraction; while he gives lip service to the idea that ideally a relationship would be based on
more than looks, he ultimately reveals a fundamental belief (shared by Utopians) that looks will always matter: “all men are not so wise as to regard only the character of the woman, and even in the marriages of wise men bodily attractions also are no small enhancement to the virtues of the mind” (189).\(^6\) Being so focused on the bodily, Utopian marital bonds cannot be assimilated to the bonds of amicitia characterizing the circle of friends portrayed in Morus’s prefatory letters and book one.

Other domestic bonds do not seem very important to the Utopians at all. Individuals are transferred between households to keep numbers balanced (135–37); in the city, people eat in community mess halls where people are seated by age rather than by family: “though nobody is forbidden to dine at home, yet no one does it willingly since the practice is considered not decent” (143).\(^5\) In line with humanist ideals, we see again that the force of culture rather than the force of law governs Utopian behavior—in the humanist sphere, it is the exemplum rather than the law that has this power, just as the requirement to stay in the thinking class is “don’t disappoint us.”\(^6\)

The Utopian state is based on imperatives that seem irreconcilably at odds, perhaps reflecting the contradictory imperatives underpinning Erasmian humanism. According to Raphael’s description of Utopia, the ideal commonwealth is one organized with the well-being of the collective in mind but also dedicated to giving individuals space in which to cultivate themselves.\(^6\) The only way these imperatives can both be fulfilled is if individual cultivation also benefits the state. Here, the fantasy of meritocracy (along with its crucially vague articulation) proves very useful.

In Utopia, this fantasy holds that abilities and inclination are always congruent; we saw it with classis literatorum and we also see it in the mirror image of that class, those whose “minds which do not reach the level for contemplation of any of the higher intellectual disciplines” (129) and thus spend all their time in physical work.\(^7\) Left to their own devices, people will gravitate towards the activities for which they are best suited. This is what the Giles gloss relates: “Let every man learn the craft to which he is inclined by nature [Ad quam quisque natura sit appositus, eam discat artem]” (126/127). This idea is borne out by the fact that the language of individualism runs through Raphael’s description of Utopian pastimes—what to do in one’s free time is “left to every man’s discretion [suo cuiusque arbitrio permittitur]” (126/127); activities are chosen “according to taste [ex animi sententia]” (128/129); people choose which lectures to attend “according to their natural inclination [prout fert natura]” (128/129). This recourse to the language of individualism is part of Raphael’s (and ultimately Morus’s) having it both ways: we see sparks of individualism among the Utopians but these supposedly unique and particular sparks all lead to the same activities—physical or intellectual labor.

This fantasy of congruence sustains the fantasy that everyone following his “discretion,” “taste,” or “inclination” is naturally a boon for society, since everyone is inclined to do what he is suited to do, and all professions benefit the state. This idea—that a system in which everyone pursues his or her own interests leads to the best outcomes for the whole—shows up later in eighteenth-century economic thought.\(^7\) The upshot is that responsibility is no longer at odds with inclination. In discussing his decision to publish Utopia at the end of his prefatory letter, Morus makes s fanciful wish—he holds out the idea of “pleasantly and blithely indulging [one’s] own inclinations” as a temptation that would preclude bearing the burden of publishing in order to benefit an ungrateful public. The system of occupations in his imagined Utopia resolves the dilemma.

One may wonder how the personal choice of the intellectual “pleasantly and blithely
indulging [one’s] inclinations” accrues to the benefit of the state. After all, the exemptions given to the classis litteratorum seem to do the opposite, pulling people away from physical labor—the communal activity that ensures that people only have to work six hours a day—so that they can focus on self-centered intellectual endeavor. Such an arrangement seems to privilege self-interest over the public good. Here Morus’s Raphael makes a case that could perhaps be applied outside of Utopia, challenging both the idea that intellectual endeavor is solitary and the idea that it benefits only the individual. He does this first by showing that the intellectual class is necessary to the functioning of the state. According to Raphael, the classis litteratorum is where all the leaders come from. An approving gloss from Peter Giles notes, “Only scholars are chosen to official posts” (133); Giles’s approval suggests that, in the humanist mind, scholars bring value to their posts by virtue of being scholars. This is the ultimate humanist fantasy—they get to run everything without having to give up their books; compare the unfortunate case of Shakespeare’s Prospero, who was ultimately unable to do both. This idea harkens back to Plato’s wish for philosopher-kings, which Morus brings up in book 1 as he attempts to persuade Raphael to become counselor to a king.

Even those from the classis litteratorum who are not selected for office are useful to the state: when describing how the Utopians picked up Greek, Raphael emphasizes that the scholars “undertook to learn their tasks not only fired by their own free will but acting under orders from the senate” (180/181), which suggests that the state had an interest in their scholarly endeavor. And it did—it was the Utopians’ willingness to learn from other cultures that enabled them to advance so quickly in the first place. Raphael also notes that the reason the selected scholars picked up the language so quickly was because they were “picked for their ability and mature in years” (181).

In addition to challenging the idea that intellectual labor benefits only the individual, Raphael also revises the notion of intellectual endeavor as a solitary activity. In Utopia, one cannot simply map physical labor onto collectivism and intellectual labor onto individualism. The model of intellectual endeavor shown in Utopia is not that of a Jerome locked up in his cell. The two examples Raphael gives—the daily public lectures that citizens “flock to” and Raphael’s “classes” on Greek—portray learning as a communal activity. The fact that learning is a communal endeavor in Utopia means there is little opportunity for independent intellectual investigations of one’s own—no staying procul foro for the purpose of investigating truth. It is not surprising, then, that Jean-François Vallée notes a lack of amicitia among Utopians, since amicitia is in part based on and mediated through such intellectual activity. Greenblatt argues that in a society without private property, there can be no private self. Utopians’ aim is to erase distinctions between individuals in order to eliminate any basis for an individual to feel that he or she is better than anyone else. This project leads to “the destruction of the individual as a private and self-regarding entity.” In erasing distinction, Utopians “fail to appreciate the opacity of social existence, to grasp that men thrive on particularity and variety.” Put another way, if everyone is the same, what draws people to each other? This question will be explored at length in Chapter 4; for now, suffice it to say that the fantasy of a society in which humanist intellectuals could pursue their aims freely seems to break down again and again under the weight of its own internal contradictions.

One might argue that there is no need for amicitia because the whole island forms a scholarly community. Questions of intellectual property, like those of physical property, are moot—thus there is no competition between scholars, only collaboration. Perhaps this fact makes their relationships less fraught than in the Republic of Letters, where relationships were in
reality a balancing act between amicitia and competition—behavior towards other members could not always be collegial as scholars had to compete for posts and patronage. As Budé makes clear in his prefatory letter, even the most intimate bonds can be tainted by the logic of the marketplace. Given these circumstances, Morus’s imagined Utopia can be read as a fantasy of intellectual life outside economy.

But I read things slightly differently; I see the question of amicitia as not so much one of an individuated self but one of a divided self. We have seen that in his prefatory letter, Morus identifies himself with letters, suggesting that otium is the activity in which one can be oneself. Business is activity in which one must be what the activity requires, regardless of how that relates to the self. However, this idea does not hold true in Utopia, where all are free to “pleasantly and blithely indulge their inclinations” in service of the state. There is no need for division between a “public” and a “private” self, or negotium and otium—and it is this lack of division more than lack of individuation that seems to threaten amicitia. There is nothing—no private gift, whether ring or self—that one can give solely to an intimate friend and hold back from everyone else. Utopians’ supreme goal of cultus animi—“the freedom and culture of the mind”—appears to imply an individuated self, even though intellectual activities on the island are undertaken collectively and for the benefit of the state. This curious contradiction can be resolved only if, as I say above, that which benefits the individual also benefits the state. Such is the world that Morus creates through the imaginative power of humanist fantasy.
Notes


5 It is difficult to disambiguate More the author from Morus the character—especially in the prefatory letters in which Morus discusses his composition of *Utopia*. Acknowledging that he is always playing a part (as Stephen Greenblatt argues), I have chosen to refer to him as *Morus* throughout this chapter. See *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 31–32.


Unless otherwise specified, all references to the text of *Utopia* will be taken from Edward Surtz and J. H. Hexter, eds., *Utopia*, vol. 4 of *The Complete Works of St. Thomas More* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965). Even page numbers refer to the Latin text; odd page numbers refer to Surtz and Hexter’s English translation. Erasmus: “tot tantisque negociis distrahitur” (2); Giles: *praesertim unus in tot publica simul & domestica negotia distractus*” (22); Paludanus: “deinde publicis ac domesticis negociis adeo distractus” (26). Paludanus is referred to as John Desmarais in Surtz and Hexter’s English translation (27).

Surtz and Hexter ruin the piling-on effect generated by the repetition of *dum* by imposing full stops where the Latin text had commas and omitting the repeated *dum* from their translation.

Surtz and Hexter’s translation removes the potential for confusion by adding a full stop between the two phrases (“the remainder to my own. I leave to myself...”).

*Erasmus, Man of Letters*, 9 et passim.

Refer to my discussion of monastic-humanist continuities in Chapter 1 for suggested further reading.


quem virum nunquam coram a me cognitum (mitto nunc doctrinae morumque commendationem) eo nomine amo quod Erasmi clarissimi viri ac de literis sacris, profanis, omneque genus meritissimi, amicus est jurassimum, quicum etiam ipso jam duo societatem amicorum contraxi literis ultro citoque obsignatis. (14)

Perhaps the use of language makes the domestic realm a bit closer to the self than the realm of legal affairs (which are discursive as well, but not described in such terms).

Morus’s equating of writing with the self is an Erasmian move; in Chapter 1 we discussed Erasmus’s theory that letters transmit the trace of the mind.

Eum librum cum ruri in manibus cursitando, satagendo, operis imperitando haberem (partim enim nosti, partim audisti villaticis me negociis alerum iam hunc annum multum opera impendisse) usque adeo eius lectione affectus sum cognitis & perpensis Utopianorum moribus & institutis, atque etiam abiecerim, cum nugas esse viderem artem omnem industriamque oeconomicam, omnemque omnino curam ampliatricem. (4)

Also note that when Budé rails against the corruption of the legal system, he frames his critiques in terms of property and possessions: see his complaint that lawyers have the authority to decide “what each man should be allowed to have, what not to have and how much and how long to have it [*quid unum quemque habere, quid non habere, quatenus quemduique liceat*]” when both lawyers and the laws themselves are corrupt (6/7).

Surtz and Hexter think Budé’s point is that it is “ironic” that the “ignorant public and the impractical scholars see through the sham and fraud” (*Utopia*, 272n8/11).

25 Along with the investigation of truth, the second reason Budé gives for humanist withdrawal is animi causa, which most of the translators I’ve read render as “relaxation”—a decidedly un-humanist (i.e., self-interested, self-centered) justification for withdrawal from the public sphere. But Budé might be thinking of cultus animi: the term in book 2 of Utopia referring to what Utopians consider to be the key to happiness. Most translators render this phrase as “freedom and culture of the mind.” By translating “animi” differently in these two contexts, translators seem to be warning us against conflating the activities of sixteenth-century European humanists with the life goals of the Utopians. If we equate the two, humanists might be forgiven for staying procul foro, since in the Utopian value system—a value system consistently praised throughout the prefatory letters—the supreme good lies in doing just that in order to tend to one’s own intellectual needs. The discrepancy in the translation of animi suggests that eschewing the public (political) sphere for the intellectual sphere in Budé’s society is more vexed than cultivating the self in the collectivist Utopian society—an action that one would expect to cause friction. This difference will be treated below in our discussion of Utopian occupations. The translations compared were the following: George M. Logan, ed. and trans., Utopia, 3rd ed. (New York: Norton, 2011); David Wootton, ed. and trans., Utopia: With Erasmus’s The Sileni of Alcibiades (Indianapolis IN: Hackett, 1999); George M. Logan, Robert M. Adams, and Clarence H. Miller, eds. and trans., Utopia: Latin Text and an English Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and J. H. Lupton, ed., The Utopia of Sir Thomas More, in Latin from the edition of March 1518, and in English from the first edition of Ralph Robynson’s translation in 1551, with additional translations, introduction and notes (Oxford: Clarendon, 1895).

26 “qui nec arte nec industria memorabili juvare cives suos & populares possunt” (8); “videres, jurisque illam voluminum vim immensam, tot eximia solidaque ingenia ad libitinam usque detinentia, ut cassa & vacantia teredinibus permitti, aut involucris officinarum dicari” (10).

27 If Budé’s ambivalence about humanist withdrawal from the public sphere is possibly unconscious and inadvertently revealed, Morus’s is performed explicitly and foregrounded. At the end of his prefatory letter to Giles, Morus appears to dither about whether to publish, presenting a minor encapsulation of the question Raphael and Morus take up in the dialogue of counsel (is it better to be a public man or private? To share one’s wisdom with a potentially ungrateful audience or keep it to oneself?). He teases us by seeming to take Raphael’s part—that “those persons who pleasantly and blithely indulge their inclinations seem to be very much better off than those who torment themselves with anxiety in order to publish something that may bring profit or pleasure to others, who nevertheless receive it with disdain or ingratitude [haud paulo felicius agi videatur, qui jucundi atque hilares genio indulgent suo, quam qui semet macerant curis, ut aedant aliquid quod alii, aut fastidientibus, aut ingratiss, vel utilitati possit esse, uel voluptati]” (42/43). The question is left unresolved, as in the end he publishes his work. Morus’ association of the public realm with curis and the private realm with ease recalls Budé’s mention of those scholars who withdraw procul foro for the sake of “relaxation” (animi); however, unlike those for whom intellectual labor necessitates a complete withdrawal from the public sphere, Morus ultimately submits his intellectual work to the marketplace—perhaps reflecting his belief (or the reality) that only in a utopia can an intellectual fully eschew the world of commerce.


30 “elegantium, utiliumque institutorum seminarium, unde translatitios mores in suam quisque civitatem importent & accommodent” (14). Surtz and Hexter make a similar point about the necessity of accommodation (Utopia, 276n14/22).
31 primo aspectu protinus sensi hominem esse nauclerum. Atqui inquit aberasti longissime: navigavit quidem non ut Palinurus, sed ut Ulysses: imo velut Plato. Nempe Raphaël iste … & latinae linguae non indoctus, et graecae doctissimius … totum se addixerat philosophiae … relicto fratibus patrimonio, quod ei domi fuerat (est enim Lusitanus) orbis terrarum contemplandi studio, Americo Vespucio se adjunxit … (48, 50)

32 Logan glosses Giles’s comparison thus: “Palinurus … is an exemplar of the careless traveler; Ulysses, of the person who learns from traveling; and Plato (who made trips to Sicily and Egypt), of the person who travels to learn.” Utopia, 11n6.


36 Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, 33.

37 Although one could argue that the garden is still a domestic setting since it is part of Giles’s house, it is certainly not part of Morus’s oikos.

38 vides inquit hunc? … eum inquit iam hinc ad te recta parabam ducere. Venisset inquam pergratus mihi tua causa. Imo, inquit ille, si nosses hominem, sua. (48)


40 “quos debere puto hac mea esse benignitate contentos, neque id exigere atque expectare praeterea, ut memet eorum causa regibus in servitium dedam” (54).

41 Of course, this is only one of the three appeals Morus and Giles make to Raphael, and the other two involve pure self-interest and a notion of the public good, which he rejects as well.

42 “tamen quam ocio meo negocium facesserem, publicam rem nihil promoveam” (56).

43 Or at least equally oriented—society does benefit from having a functional legal system, but the prefatory letters such as Budé’s show that the jus gentium can be manipulated to serve individual interests at the expense of the public good.


46 “puta disertorum consuetudine ac benevola familiaritate … libera etiam dicendi quae placet audacia” (77).

47 “Apud amiculos in familiari colloquio non insuavis est haec philosophia scholastica. Caeterum in consiliis principum, ubi res magae magna autoritate aguntur, non est his rebus locus” (98).

48 Here “authority” refers to political power, the ability to influence events. But there is another kind of authority at play in these dialogues—intellectual authority. It is the authority with which Raphael speaks of the societies he has known; more broadly, it is the authority of one who has studied at length what he is talking about. Humanists vouch for each other’s intellectual authority all the time when they
refer to each other as “most learned,” etc. in their writings. (We see this in the prefatory letters to *Utopia*, which function in part to build up Morus’s intellectual authority in the eyes of the reader.) In the world of Sigea’s dialogue, questions of political authority are moot—neither Flaminia nor Blesilla has access to political power (as we are to see later, Flaminia’s courtly conversations have nothing to do with political affairs.)

49 *in vestium enim inventis, inque ornatus concinnitate, atque in dolandis lepidis et sale conditis
verbis quibus vel viris placeant feminae, vel rursus feminis viri, vel vilipendant illos qui non ex tempore
ad oblatos sibi sales ingenioso respondere norint … Praetereo assiduum principibus placendi atque apud
ipsos vel favorem vel dignitatem mira arte ambiendi studium… (79)*

50 An excessive concern with appearance was one of the three qualities historically cited by Christian moralists against women, according to Inès Rada, who argues that Flaminia rebuts the moralists. “Profil et trajectoire d’une femme humaniste: Luisa Sigea,” in *Images de la femme en Espagne aux XVIe
et XVIIe siècles: Des traditions aux renouvellements et à l’émergence d’images nouvelles*, ed. Augustin Redondo (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1994), 347. However, Flaminia here seems to be upholding rather than subverting this stereotype.

51 Withdrawal allowed women access to both *otium* and a form of *negotium*: “At a time when monasticism was in decline, and with it the contemplative life, the convent nevertheless remained a particularly compelling alternative for many Renaissance women. Recent work emphasizes that religious life gave women the opportunity to participate in localized politics, cultural influence, and administrative power, not to mention *otium—all forms of work or leisure from which women were generally excluded in the secular sphere.*” Virginia Krause, *Idle Pursuits: Literature and Oisiveté in the French Renaissance* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2003), 18–19 (my italics). See also Penelope D. Johnson, *Equal in Monastic Profession: Religious Women in Medieval France* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). On women’s exclusion from participation in *otium*, see Evelyne Berriot-Salvadore, *Les Femmes dans la société française de la Renaissance* (Geneva: Droz, 1990).

52 “pas comme une femme frivole, mais comme le ferait un homme, en prenant des arguments aussi bien chez Plutarque ou Cicéron que chez Saint Jérôme ou Saint Augustin.” Rada, “Profil et trajectoire,” 346. Translations from the French are my own.

53 In depicting these *doctae feminae*, Sigea is shoring up her own intellectual authority, “showing
the extent of an erudition from which she drew pride, and revealing the accumulation of knowledge that she owed to her humanistic studies as well as to her familiarity with the Bible and the Church Fathers [montrer l’étendue d’une culture dont elle tirait orgueil, et de révéler les enrichissements qu’elle devait à ses études humanistes ainsi qu’à sa connaissance de la Bible et des Pères de l’Eglise].” Léon Bourdon and Odette Sauvage, “Recherches sur Luisa Sigea,” *Bulletin des Études Portugaises* 31 (1970): 137. One difference is clear: the writers of the prefatory letters to *Utopia* vouch for Morus’s erudition, relieving him of the obligation to demonstrate his familiarity with the classics by constantly citing them, as Sigea must.

54 On the other hand, see Rada, “Profil et trajectoire,” 342ff on Sigea’s intellectual exchanges with male humanists.


56 “elle … se considère comme responsable devant Dieu du choix de son amie entre les faux et les vrais biens.” Bourdon and Sauvage, “Recherches,” 141.
“Caeterum videberis plane rem te atque isthoc animo tuo tam generoso, tam vere philosopho dignam facturus, si te ita compares, ut vel cum aliquo privatim incommodo ingenium tuum atque industriam, publicis rebus accomodes” (56).


“laudatur … ut utilis reipublicae”; “haud prohibetur” (128).

Noted by Surtz and Hexter, who cite Republic 3.415B–C: “if sons are born to them with an infusion of brass or iron they shall by no means give way to pity in their treatment of them, but shall assign to each the status due to his nature and thrust them out among the artizans or the farmers. And again, if from these there is born a son with unexpected gold or silver in his composition they shall honor such and bid them to go up higher, some to the office of guardianship, some to the assistanceship” (quoted in Utopia, 410n132/1–2). Here merit wins out over familial bonds in assigning children to classes. Surtz and Hexter note that “all the qualifications for rule that in fact or in theory determined the choice of men for positions of authority in Europe are disregarded in Utopia, except moral probity and literary learning—and only the latter is emphasized” (Utopia, 410n132/4).

Greenblatt: “Utopian marriage … does not strive for a deep affective union between husband and wife based upon their sexual intimacy; the latter serves the interest of generation, which in turn serves the general interest of the community rather than the particular interest of the family” (Renaissance Self-Fashioning, 43); Wojciehowski: “In Utopia, the tight ordering of culture around the social unit of the nuclear family, the extremely strict punishment of adultery, the infrequently exercised option of divorce only when agreed upon by both parties and by the Senators and their wives—all of these restrictions and many more—leave little space, literally and figuratively, for the pursuit of any other human relationships, including friendships” (“Triangulating Humanist Friendship,” 49).

“It is … interesting to observe that the question of personal friendship is almost totally evacuated from the Utopian society described by Raphael in his monologue of Book II. Utopian citizens have absolutely no individual identity, only social or familial roles, and apparently no significant amicable relationships. Interestingly, almost all the occurrences of the word ‘friend’ in Book II are situated in the section on ‘military affairs,’ where the term is used to describe nations allied to the Utopians. Thus, ‘friend’ is most often used here to describe collective entities rather than persons. Hence, in Book II of More’s Utopia, dialogue and (personal) friendship seem to share a similar fate, they recede in favour, respectively, of monologue (oratio) and of undifferentiated collective or communal relationships.” Jean-François Vallée, “The Fellowship of the Book: Printed Voices and Written Friendships in More’s Utopia,” in Printed Voices: The Renaissance Culture of Dialogue, ed. Dorothea Heitsch and Jean-François Vallée, 49–50.

“ut rari in conjugalem amorem coalescerent: in quo aetatem omnem cum uno videant exigendam: & perferendas insuper quas ea res affèrt molestias, nisi a vago concubitu diligenter arceantur” (186).

“rem minime utilem sciunt firmandae conjugum charitati, facilem novarum nuptiarum spem esse propositam” (190).
“Nam neque omnes tam sapientes sunt ut solos mores respicient, & in ipsorum quoque sapientum conjugiis, ad animi virtutes nonnihil additamenti corporis etiam dotes adiicient” (188).

“si domi prandere nulli vetitum sit, nemo tamen hoc libenter facit, cum neque honestum habeat” (142).

See Greenblatt’s discussion of Utopia as a shame culture as opposed to a guilt culture (Renaissance Self-Fashioning, 43ff).

According to Raphael, “the constitution of their commonwealth looks in the first place to this sole object: that for all the citizens, as far as the public needs permit, as much time as possible should be withdrawn from the service of the body and devoted to the freedom and culture of the mind. It is in the latter that they deem the happiness of life to consist [eius reipublicae institutio hunc unum scopum in primis respicit: ut quoad per publicas necessitates licet: quam plurimum temporis ab servitio corporis ad animi libertatem cultumque civibus universis asseratur. In eo enim sitam vitae felicitatem putant]” (134/135). More’s imagined Utopia is reminiscent of Petrarch’s *otium* in its emphasis on the freedom of mind and body necessary for *cultus animi*: “no man, though he be but moderately learned, is prevented from acquiring by reading and meditation a mind that lives on calm thoughts and is liberated from the chains of circumstance, submissive to God and reason but free in every other way, and a body also released from its heavy yoke, serving the mind alone [nulli mediocriter eruditio vetitum est, cogitando saltem legendoque placidis forum curis et rerum vinculis explicitum animum habere, Deo et rationi subditum, cetera liberum; corpus quoque gravi iugo iugo eductum animoque soli serviens]” (378/166). Quoted in Julia Conaway Bondanella, “Petrarch’s Rereading of *Otium* in *De vita solitaria,*” in “Writers as Readers: Essays in Honor of Thomas R. Hart,” ed. Caroline Jewers and Julian Weiss, special issue, Comparative Literature 60, no. 1 (2008): 19.

“quorum animus in nullius contemplatione disciplinae consurgit” (128). I have inserted “contemplation of” here to reflect Morus’s *contemplatione*.


“Soli literati ad magistratus vocantur” (132). According to Logan, Giles’s glosses “provide a valuable record of the response to *Utopia* … by a particularly well-positioned member of the humanist audience for it” (*Utopia*, 24n2); thus they may be considered to represent an index to humanist attitudes.

“Your favorite author, Plato, is of opinion that commonwealths will finally be happy only if either philosophers become kings or kings turn to philosophy. What a distant prospect of happiness there will be if philosophers will not condescend even to impart their counsel to kings [*Siquidem cum tuus censeat Plato. respublicas ita demum futuras esse felices, si aut regent philosophi, aut reges philosophentur, quam procul abierit felicitas, si philosophi regibus nec dignetur saltem suum impartiri consilium]” (86/87).

“non sua solum sponte accensi, verum senatus quoque decreto jussi, ista sibi discenda sumpserunt”; “selectissimis ingeniis, & matura aetate” (180).

“Private ownership of property is causally linked in *Utopia* to private ownership of self … to abolish private property is to render such self-conscious individuality obsolete” (Renaissance Self-Fashioning, 38–39).

*Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, 41.
77 Wootton makes a similar argument about the lack of friendship in Utopia: since Utopia tries to minimize distinctions, “love and friendship themselves become invisible because, instead of being exceptional and exclusive, they are normal and universal.” “Friendship Portrayed,” 266, quoted in Wojcieszowski, “Triangulating Humanist Friendship,” 48–49.


79 According to Grafton, although the Republic of Letters “imagined itself as Europe’s first egalitarian society … it did not always enact these high ideals in the grubby reality of its intellectual and professional practices” (“Sketch Map,” 1–2).
Chapter Three:

The End of Learning in *Doctor Faustus*

Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested; that is, some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read, but not curiously, and some few to be read wholly, and with diligence and attention.

– Francis Bacon

In *Utopia*, we see intellectual labor valued both as a public good and as a means of individual self-cultivation. The protagonist of Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus* perverts both ideals; his downfall demonstrates the perils of using learning for public self-promotion. One such danger is the degradation of the very notion of knowledge itself. Faustus’s flawed conception of knowledge is revealed as early as his first statement. His intended goal is to “level at the end of every art” (1.1.4, my italics). As Faustus goes on to contemplate specific fields of knowledge, he continues to talk about them in terms of their ends, eventually concluding that he has “attained the end” of both logic and physic (see 1.1.7–10, 16–18). That Faustus sees knowledge as exhaustible suggests that his conception of learning is quantitative: he thinks of learning as a hoardable, collectible *thing*. For humanists, in contrast, learning was truly a gerund, a process without end; there was no point at which one could say one was “done.” Learning described an ongoing cultivation of habits of thought that continually changed the learner, by enabling the proper internalization and digestion of knowledge.

Digestion as metaphor for learning was as essential to humanists as the notion of learning as a means of self-cultivation; indeed, one depended on the other. Our first notion of learning as a consumable object comes, of course, from the Fall of Man story. Although Adam’s sin was conventionally identified with pride in medieval commentaries, an alternative strand of thought associated Adam’s fall with the sin of gluttony, exhibited in the eating of the forbidden fruit. As we saw in Chapter One, Francis Bacon pushed back against this tradition in an attempt to redeem curiosity from its association with gluttony and the Fall. Bacon and his followers made a distinction between wrong consumption of knowledge, the type of consumption that Adam and Eve were guilty of, serving individualistic, “appetitive” ends, and right consumption, which served communal, “productive” ends. Part of Adam and Eve’s sin was using knowledge instrumentally for individualistic self-empowerment (i.e., to be as God) rather than for the communal good. Like the humanists, Baconian experimentalists were invested in the idea that learning could be used in the service of greater society; this is the concept of Baconian “charity.” For Baconians and humanists alike, right consumption and self-cultivation were part of the same process. The learner was transformed by the digestion and integration of knowledge—the rightness of its consumption attested to by its consequent digestion and the transformation of the learner. As Elizabeth Spiller explains, the reader of a moral tale was supposed to emulate the virtues presented in the tale—thus the transformation of the learner was the product of proactive self-cultivation. Although Bacon famously privileged experiential knowledge over authoritative texts, bookish knowledge, when well-digested, was not finally separable from experience.

But experiential knowledge could also be dangerously potent, as the Fall story and Faustus myth show. Just as Adam and Eve gain access to knowledge of Good and Evil through doing evil (disobeying God’s command), so Faustus can only understand the nature of hell by
essentially damning himself to it. The risk and sacrifice necessary to obtain the forbidden knowledge are evidence of its potency; for Faustus its potency justifies the highest cost of one’s immortal soul.

The Faustus myth, originating in Germany, is a retelling of the Fall of Man updated to reflect early modern circumstances and anxieties. As Paul Budra has observed, Faustus confuses externals with internals—for him, possessing books (without digesting or even reading them) becomes a substitute for possessing the knowledge inside, knowledge whose digestion should be part of the process of self-cultivation. Similarly, the forbidden fruit becomes a fetish object for Adam and Eve—they imagine that they can simply consume knowledge rather than cultivating it. By Bacon’s time, the traditional mistrust of curiosity had gained a new urgency due to anxieties brought about by the growth of print culture, the resulting explosion of knowledge, and the shift in the organization of medieval universities. It was print culture that especially made people nervous. Books were the first mass-produced commodity, and their potential for copious and rapid distribution enabled the indiscriminate, gluttonous consumption associated with original sin. Spenser’s Error, whose “vomit full of books and papers was” (FQ 1.1.20.6), manifests anxieties about a printing press whose seemingly uncontrolled, voluminous spewing out of texts is the mirror image of the glutton’s rapacious gorging—in the context of print culture, the two become symbiotic processes.

Commoditized knowledge could be used instrumentally in the pursuit of power—a far cry from Aristotle’s ideal of schole. Books of Secrets, which were among “the most popular and profitable products of sixteenth-century printing houses,” promised readers artisanal knowledge that would allow them to “control nature and, in so doing, acquire human power.” Such power became social as well as physical in the context of print publication—now the learned magus could gain notoriety for his knowledge, as in the case of Henry Cornelius Agrippa, a magus whose “shadows made all Europe honour him” (as evoked by an admiring Faustus who intends to follow in his footsteps). One’s name could be distributed as far and wide as one’s books were, which presented a dangerous trap. While knowledge could be used for personal advancement, the temptation to use it exclusively for self-empowerment had to be resisted.

The links between knowledge and power and the ethics of using knowledge instrumentally would have been particularly significant for Marlowe as an impecunious scholar with no prospects. As Richard F. Hardin notes, the influx of nobility and gentry into Oxford and Cambridge in the sixteenth century, spurred by humanists’ casting of learning as a requirement for good governance and proper civic participation, led many to question the purpose and practicality of the literae humaniores. Doctor Faustus, thought to be written just after Marlowe received his M.A. from Cambridge, reflects these debates. So Eric C. Brown posits that the main concern of Doctor Faustus is “an epistemological conundrum: what is the final end of knowledge? Furthermore, how ought one pursue it?” At Cambridge, Marlowe would have had daily acquaintance with both the newly arrived nobility and gentry as well as the other poor men destined for low-paying jobs in the clergy who made up the traditional population of university students. Although we still cling to the fantasy of education as a means of social mobility, then as now such advancement was rarely achieved by those whom Mark Curtis calls the “alienated intellectuals” of the period. Although they were part of a certain type of elite, their cultural capital did not necessarily enable social mobility or translate into financial solvency. These quasi-elite scholars of low birth were thus caught in a difficult position, as Elizabeth Hanson explains: “There was nowhere for a man like Marlowe to take his learning save into an increasingly scarce Church living or to the unstable and emergent market of the
commercial theatre. The early modern university may have helped to reproduce the social order, but it also jammed it, inviting the university’s denizens to imagine a power for learning because the actual relation between learning and power was so fraught with contradiction.”

As David Bevington and Eric Rasmussen point out in their edition of the play, there are two basic interpretations of Doctor Faustus—the “orthodox,” which sees the play as a cautionary tale about transgressing boundaries set by God, and the “heterodox,” which sees the play as an homage to the spirit of Renaissance “overreaching.” The play’s protagonist is either a flawed character whose comeuppance we relish (or at least accept as just) or an admirably heroic character whom we might not want to emulate, but with whom we sympathize and (to some extent) identify. Of course, some critics eschew both interpretations, such as Phoebe S. Spinrad, who argues that Faustus’s biggest failing is that he is “a bad humanist.” Spinrad takes into account Faustus’s triviality and highlights the importance in the play’s moral universe of Faustus’s flawed relationship to learning. Despite his rhetoric, he is not nearly as much of an intellectual as he thinks he is, as I argue below. In essence Spinrad agrees that Doctor Faustus is a cautionary tale; she just posits a different danger for us to be cautioned against. I make a related argument in this chapter—it is Faustus’s shallow attitude towards knowledge that is his downfall. But while Spinrad focuses on Faustus’s dilettantism, I focus on other ways in which he is a flawed intellectual: his indifference to the content of both arguments and books, his faulty conception of both the nature and the ends of learning, and his unreasonable expectations of the transformative power of knowledge, which go hand in hand with his failure to properly integrate and digest knowledge and engage in cultus animi. Faustus fails both in producing useful knowledge (he’s reduced to doing magic tricks in pursuit of fame) and in being collegial (his amicitia with the scholars becomes debased through the influence of his relationship with Mephistopheles). If we judge Faustus by these two criteria, we can certainly agree with Spinrad that he is a “bad humanist.” As we will see, his intellectual failures are moral as well.

If intellectual laziness explains Faustus’s shallow concept of learning, that laziness manifests itself, paradoxically, in an abundance of trivial activity. In arguing that Faustus is guilty of sloth, Joseph T. McCullen shows that idleness could be associated with action as well as with contemplation, as in the 1604 Two Guides to a good Life:

Omission is a kinde of sloth, whereby we let slippe the knowledge of such thinges as we ought to knowe, or the prosecution of such thinges as we ought to doe, and this is the faulte of those that being commaunded to watch and pray, overpasske that duety by the means of being impioied about worldly vanities.

Ironically, it is activity—“being imploied about worldly vanities”—that is associated with sloth, while contemplation—the command to “watch and pray”—is held up as the ideal. The passage’s opposition of praying to “being imploied with worldly vanities” allows McCullen to hold up Faustus as a figure of active sloth, asserting that “the feverish intensity of his misdirected activities conforms ironically to the traditional pattern of sloth outlined above.” This is true—he gets caught up in the “busy-ness” of pranks and magic tricks; McCullen’s characterization recalls More’s critique, in which idleness and business collapse into each other.

But sloth can also be a sin of knowledge, and Faustus is guilty on this count as well. He begins the play by contemplating his studies while “let[ting] slippe” the knowledge of their proper ends. His opening soliloquy engages in the same type of triviality (what R. W. Ingram calls “play[ing] with words and arguments”) we see later in his actions. Accordingly, this chapter will treat both Faustus’s improper knowing (“let[ting] slippe the knowledge of such
things as [he] ought to knowe”), and his improper doing (“let[ting] slippe … the prosecution of such thinges as [he] ought to doe”).

1. Marlowe’s deviation from his source

Marlowe’s source for Doctor Faustus was The History of the Damnable Life and Deserved Death of Doctor John Faustus (1588/9) (hereafter referred to as the English Faust Book or EFB), a translation of the 1587 Historia von D. Johann Fausten, dem weithbeschreiten Zauberer und Schwartzkünstler. The German original was translated into Danish, Dutch, French and Czech in addition to English; its popularity was a pan-European phenomenon.29 (The translator of the English version is given on the title page as P. F. Gent[leman]; he will be referred to hereafter as P. F.30) EBF editor John Henry Jones argues that it was popular because it engaged with sixteenth-century readers’ ambivalence about curiosity, speaking to both the desire for knowledge and the anxieties that this desire provoked. Readers could root for Faustus even as they knew, or possibly because they knew, that cosmic justice would eventually be satisfied.31

In addition to the reasons Jones gives, I suggest the English Faust Book was popular because the reader is implicated in Faustus’s demonic education. In the chapters following Faustus’s signing of the infernal contract, he peppers Mephistopheles with questions about the nature of hell, which Mephistopheles is of course bound to answer—thus satisfying not just Faustus’s but also the reader’s illicit curiosity (and appetite for lurid descriptions of hell). The result is a block of chapters sporting such tantalizing titles as: “Questions put forth by Doctor Faustus unto his spirit …” (ch. 10); “How Doctor Faustus … questioned with his spirit …” (ch. 11); “The second question put forth by Doctor Faustus to his spirit …” (ch. 12); “Another question put forth by Doctor Faustus to his spirit …” (ch. 13); “Another disputation betwixt Doctor Faustus and his spirit …” (ch. 14); “How Doctor Faustus desired again of his spirit to know …” (ch. 15); “Another question put forth by Doctor Faustus to his spirit …” (ch. 16).32 It is safe for the reader’s curiosity to be satisfied through this medium because the information is presented in the context of a cautionary tale, as we are reminded at the book’s end: “here we have a fearful example of [Faustus’s] writing, promise and end, that we may remember him”; his story is one “out of the which example every Christian may learn … to fear God and to be careful of their vocation” (EFB 2950–57).

In contrast to P. F., Marlowe seems more interested in deflating Faustus’s high aspirations and showing that he has been sold a bill of goods than in allowing his audience to experience vicariously the frisson of accessing forbidden knowledge. Unlike the Faustus of the EFB, Marlowe’s Faustus does not give us access to any knowledge of hell—we get magic tricks instead. What at first appears to be Faustus’s excessive curiosity turns out to be a lack of curiosity about anything non-trivial. (He is strikingly incurious about the nature of hell, for example, dismissing it as a “fable”—Mephistopheles rightly predicts that only experiential knowledge of hell will reach him).33 The two post-contract scenes of his “questioning” with Mephistopheles—unlike the five chapters following the signing of the contract in the EFB—are scenes of failed knowledge production. Faustus even highlights the banality of the knowledge Mephistopheles “reveals” to him by complaining that any university student would know it (“Tush, these are freshmen’s suppositions” [2.3.55–56]). One might surmise that Marlowe was more interested in satisfying a different appetite—one for spectacle.34 This is perhaps half-right: although Marlowe certainly indulges in spectacle, I agree with Bevington and Rasmussen that he deviates from the English Faust Book in focusing less on “the hell of folklore, replete with
fireworks and gruesome physical tortures“ and introducing a competing conception of hell—“the hell of theology,” in which estrangement from God is the ultimate torment. Later we will discuss what the discrepancy between Faustus’s reactions to these two conceptions of hell indicates about his character.

2. Improper knowing: Sins of consumption

We’ve seen that Faustus’s first words signal that his conception of knowledge is flawed; Marlowe hints at this even earlier, though, in his prologue. Following the English Faust Book, he has the Chorus describe Faustus as excelling in divinity—but makes one crucial change. According to the English Faust Book, “none [of the university rectors and masters] for his time were able to argue with him in divinity, or for the excellency of his wisdom to compare with him” (EFB 40–42; italics mine). Marlowe emphasizes Faustus’s skill in disputation (describing him as “Excelling all whose sweet delight’s disputes / In heavenly matters of theology” [Prologue.18–19]) but says nothing about wisdom.

In fact, the Chorus likens Faustus to Icarus, who seems to embody the opposite of wisdom: carelessness. To be sure, Icarus didn’t stand for only carelessness to Elizabethans; depictions of Icarus’s fall in sixteenth-century emblem-books represent the danger of “seeking to know high things,” which was seen as a question of spiritual as well as intellectual pride. Carlo Ginzburg observes that Icarus and Prometheus “were seen as symbols of astrologers, of astronomers, of heretical theologians, of philosophers prone to bold speculations, of unnamed political theorists.” In Ovid, Icarus “rejoic[ing] in his bold flight” is “drawn by longing for heaven” to “take an excessively high way”; Marlowe depicts Faustus similarly:

swoll’n with cunning of a self-conceit,
His waxen wings did mount above his reach,
And melting heavens conspired his overthrow.
For, falling to a devilish exercise,
And glutted more with learning’s golden gifts,
He surfeits upon cursed necromancy; (Prologue.20–25)

In Arthur Golding’s 1567 translation of the Metamorphoses, it is Icarus’s “frolicke courage” and “fond desire to flie to Heaven” that drive him to mount “above his boundes”; this rendering comes closer to Marlowe’s insinuation that Faustus is striving to rival God (and is directly echoed in Marlowe’s “above his reach”). The “rising” language in line 18’s “excelling” (from Latin excellĕre “to rise above” [OED]) and line 19’s “heavenly matters” is extended in line 21 with a vision of the boy flying with waxen wings; two lines later comes an abrupt shift with Faustus “falling to” necromancy. While anyone familiar with the story of Icarus would expect the “moun[ting]” and “melting” imagery to be followed by “falling” imagery, the surprise here is that, unlike in the myth, the falling is the cause rather than the result of the melting. Lines 21 and 23 are actually describing the same action—the “falling to a devilish exercise” is Faustus attempting to “mount above his reach,” which prompts the melting heavens to conspire his overthrow in line 22. The violence of this juxtaposition is commensurate with the violence of the discrepancy between Faustus’s perspective (he sees himself as flying) and ours (we know he is falling). His very attempt at flight is his fall, and it is because he, like Icarus, is careless, that he does not realize this. There is a rich comic irony in his promise in 2.3.175 that he will keep the book Lucifer gives him “as chary as my life” because we’ve just seen how careless he is with his life—he has just signed away his soul to Lucifer (“Ay, and body too. But what of that?”)
answers when Mephistopheles reminds him of his contract; he has—quite illogically—decided that he will not have to pay the debt stipulated in the contract because “hell’s a fable.”. 39 It is this same carelessness that is evoked in the Icarus passage. If Faustus’s pride leads him to mount “above his reach,” it is his carelessness that prevents him from realizing that in mounting he is actually falling.

As the prologue shifts from Faustus’s pride to his gluttony, references to falling become symbolic and allegorical rather than literal. Nodding to the medieval association of curiosity with \textit{gula}, Marlowe’s prologue figures Faustus’s turn to necromancy as a gluttonous “falling to” a demonic meal. 40 In lines 23–25 Faustus is portrayed as one with a ravenous appetite for “learning’s golden gifts” who starts a new kind of dish (“surfeits”) even though he’s already been “glutted.” Like “fall” (which at once evokes the Fall of Man, Lucifer’s fall from heaven, and the deadly sin of gluttony), the word “glutted” is overdetermined here. 41 If we read it as “overfed,” we see that Faustus has sinned in his relationship to knowledge (by glutting himself on licit knowledge) even before his turn to necromancy. As in Bacon’s distinction between right and wrong consumption, the sin here is less consumption itself or what Faustus consumes than his manner of consumption.

The shift from licit learning to necromancy represents a “surfeit”—a superfluous extra. 42 Here let us note that Faustus sins in both the consumption and production of knowledge. He sins in consumption through both his gluttonous self-indulgence and his conceiving of knowledge as something to be hoarded—the conception of learning that makes it possible to “glut” oneself with it. Marlowe’s description of Faustus’s intellectual exploits using graphically repulsive physicalizing language (“glutted,” “surfeit,” “swoll’n”) supports Lorraine Kochanske Stock’s suggestion that Faustus’s intellectual pride and physical gluttony are manifestations of the same character flaw. 43 Spiller and Hardin comment on the way Marlowe externalizes and renders physical Faustus’s mental rapacity. Invoking the humanist conception of right reading or consumption of texts, Spiller describes Marlowe’s Faustus as a “bibliophile,” arguing that in the play Marlowe “sets bibliophilia alongside gluttony, lust, and envy, making it the newest sin of the age of print.” 44 Similarly, in Hardin’s reading, “Marlowe presents a hero so suffused with the delights of learning that he becomes a voluptuary.” 45 (In doing this, Marlowe is demonstrating Faustus’s own habit of externalizing and rendering the intellectual physical; recall Budra’s suggestion that Faustus attributes talismanic power to books, confusing possessing them with digesting them. 46) This physicalization (which, like the entire first scene itself, is Marlowe’s invention) allows Marlowe to use books in a very deliberate, iconic way to frame his play: we first see Faustus in his study flipping through his books; his last line in the play is the desperate promise “I’ll burn my books” (5.2.123). 47

If Faustus overvalues the physical forms of books, he seems almost indifferent to their content. 48 This indifference is amply demonstrated for us in his opening soliloquy, in which he conflates Aristotle and Ramus (thus “lashing together the work of two philosophers who Renaissance thinkers would have considered diametrically opposed” 49 ), quotes selectively and misleadingly from the Bible, 50 and scrambles his reasoning for discarding fields of knowledge when talking to Cornelius and Valdes (divinity falls from “best” to “basest of the three,” for example). At some points in his opening soliloquy, Faustus presents himself as the high-minded intellectual rejecting fields of study for being too worldly and (thus) not intellectually satisfying enough—recalling Aristotle’s ideal of \textit{schole}. In rejecting law as befitting
a mercenary drudge
Who aims at nothing but external trash—
Too servile and illiberal for me

Faustus plays on the familiar Renaissance and classical tendency to divide work and knowledge into “liberal” (fit for a gentleman) and “illiberal” (unfit for a gentleman, mechanical) (1.1.34–36). His rhetoric is typically overblown (in his rarefied mental landscape, even the study of law is considered mechanical), but it is no accident that he denigrates law and physic—the two fields which most tangibly affect the lives of people outside the university walls—as being suited “for petty wits” (1.1.109). In essence, he suggests that knowledge that can be used instrumentally for the benefit of others is no more intellectually stimulating or fulfilling (or worthwhile) than manual labor. The practical usefulness of a subject is inversely proportional to its stature as an intellectual field of study.51

Even as Faustus uses the rhetoric of the intellectual eschewing worldly concerns for the purity of scholé, he reveals himself to be in no way averse to using knowledge instrumentally. His use of “mercenary” is especially ironic since one of his stated goals in pursuing medicine is to “heap up gold” (1.1.14). And as we see later, he ends up turning to artisanal knowledge as a supplement to his liberal learning in order to fulfill his ambitions. Though Faustus claims to want to go beyond the petty worldliness (“external trash”) of law, he actually wants to use knowledge as a means to worldly power and fame—the same external trash.52 This incongruity between Faustus’s word and action echoes the central incongruity underpinning the play: although Faustus begins the play by making grand projects, the greatest achievements that we see him accomplish are his magic tricks.53 As Sara Munson Deats argues, “Faustus, like so many Marlovian protagonists, pits the magnificent word against the ignoble or, in this case, the inane deed”;54 this habit results from Faustus’s intellectual sloth—his disregard for the content, truth, or accuracy of his words. Disputing—displaying his learning and rhetorical prowess—is his main concern (and as several scholars observe, his main thrill).55 And Marlowe’s audience, living in a notebook culture in which “a whole theory of imitatio was developed, teaching how [quoted] material should be digested, integrated into the body or metabolism of the new work ... could certainly tell the difference between learning integrated and learning flaunted, or not properly understood.”56 They would have seen through Faustus.

3. Improper doing: Faustus’s instrumental use of knowledge

The “dangers of empty loquacity” and rhetoric misused were keenly felt by early humanists; as Terence Cave notes, the first chapter of Erasmus’s celebrated De copia is Periculosam esse copiae affectationem [Copia: Dangers inherent in its pursuit].57 Scholastic caricatures of the copia-mad humanist were based on Plato’s rhetorical sophist, who delights in grandiose language and lofty speeches, favoring style over substance.58 A nagging problem for humanists was that their delight in rhetoric allowed their efforts to be read as self-conscious displays of verbal virtuosity rather than serious treatments of res. There’s a perverse delight in Erasmus—whether it’s purely delight in the words or delight in showing off his virtuosity—in that chapter of De copia with the demonstration of all the ways to say “Your letter pleased me very much.”59 Here he could be accused of flaunting his virtuosity in the guise of giving instruction. (In fact, Budé accused Erasmus of frivolity in De copia, and Erasmus even admits that he took “license” in its composition.60) But just as it is hard to tell exactly when otium slips into acedia, as we saw in Chapter 1, it is difficult to determine when virtuosity slips from instructive to self-aggrandizing.
Similarly, Faustus could be accused of turning debate into empty spectacle—a self-aggrandizing display of virtuosity in the guise of a serious exchange of ideas.

The contest between dialectic and rhetoric was an easy proxy for the differences between the scholastic and humanist camps. Faustus excels at disputations, which are of course based on the “concise syllogisms” and logical arguments demanded by dialectic, but the extreme popularity of his problems hints that he might be demonstrating rhetorical virtuosity as well as logical prowess; after all, when describing his popularity, he likens himself to the poet Musaeus. In Faustus’s sophistic worldview, learning and eloquence are merely means to the end of self-aggrandizement. For instance, he determines that the end of logic is “to dispute well” rather than to discover truth. Why? Because disputing well earns him fame: as he boasts to Valdes and Cornelius,

I … have with concise syllogisms
Gravelled the pastors of the German Church
And made the flow’ring pride of Wittenberg
Swarm to my problems as the infernal spirits
On sweet Musaeus when he came to hell (1.1.114–18)

Problems here refers to “the questions proposed for academic discussion or scholastic disputation.” It is worth noting that the disputation held a central place in both university and general culture; Debora Shuger argues that it “ha[d] a significance comparable to that of the drama” in late sixteenth-century England. Firmly ensconced in the early modern intellectual and theological landscape, it connected the university to the outside world, fulfilling the humanist ideal of imparting knowledge to the public for the public good. Faustus, of course, is not interested in the public good—for him, the disputation is purely a display of erudition by which he can garner fame.

Faustus’s earlier expressed desire to “have [his spirits] fill the public schools with silk, / Wherewith the students shall be bravely clad” (1.1.92–93) reveals a further hollowness at the heart of his conception of the disputation. In these lines, Faustus is referencing the sumptuary laws passed at Oxford and Cambridge in “repeated attempts” to address a growing problem arising from the influx of gentlemen and nobles into the universities: wealthier students could distinguish themselves by wearing fine clothes, which encouraged an arms race between rich and poor that drove the poorer students to spend beyond their means. Though this was a race they were bound to lose, the impoverished students had another weapon in their arsenal: the disputation. Typically superior scholars who had won the means to attend university through competitive scholarships, they could distinguish themselves in academic exercises. As Hanson describes it, lectures and disputations made erudition as conspicuous as wealth as a form of distinction among university students: “the university’s chief mode of assessment, the oral disputation, made intellectual accomplishment, as much as gentlemanly clothes and manners, visible and performative and potentially the object of an emulating gaze.” In other words, both were means of flaunting cultural capital. In this context, Faustus’s desire to “fill the public schools with silk” is quite telling, since the public schools were “the official site of disputation (at Cambridge, as at Wittenberg).” With this fantasy Faustus turns the disputation—an arena for the display of erudition—into what Sarah Knight calls a “gorgeous if empty display” of wealth: “such institutional opulence converts the university into just another context where Faustus can be seen to glory, and ‘reign sole king of all the provinces’ (1.1.96).”

Although Faustus excels in disputation, he wants to stand out for wealth as well; the two types of distinction are interchangeable for him. Of course, one might argue that clothing all the
students in silks neutralizes the wealth distinction so that only the academic distinction is operative—but it is clear from a sumptuary statute enacted at Cambridge that the “very costly and disguised manner of apparel, and other attires” gentlemen wore were considered “unseemly for students in any kind of human learning”; it would have been better to get rid of silks altogether. In exchanging erudition for silks as a mode of “reign[ing] sole king of all the provinces,” Faustus reveals that he cares more about standing out than progressing in any intellectual endeavor. This is part and parcel of his understanding of knowledge as a means to obtain personal power.

Faustus’s rejection of the humanist rationale for disputation is also evident in the play’s structure. We never see a real disputation in Doctor Faustus, despite its central position in university culture and the play’s continual reminders in act 1 that Faustus is a talented and prolific disputant (in addition to the “sweet delight’s disputes” and “flow’ring pride of Wittenberg” quotes discussed above, one of the scholars mentions that Faustus “was wont to make our schools ring with ‘sic probo’” [1.2.1–2]). Instead, we are presented with parodies (discussed below) that mock the disputation’s potential for knowledge production. The absence of disputation in the play suggests that in Faustus’s mental and moral landscape the humanist project of knowledge production for the common good is merely a “vain trifle” (1.3.63). For learning with more tangible real-world benefits for others, Faustus’s stance is similar. As we’ve seen, in medicine his intentions are to “heap up gold, / And be eternised for some wondrous cure” (1.1.14–15). Although his reading of Galen will tell him that sanitas is the proper end of medicine, Faustus’s goal is not the “wondrous cure” itself but the fame that comes as a result of the cure. His assertion that he has reached the “end of physic” likewise privileges fame over the health of his fellow citizens:

Are not thy bills hung up as monuments, Whereby whole cities have escaped the plague And thousand desp’rate maladies been eased? (1.1.20–22)

Here we see Faustus’s learning (bills here meaning “prescriptions, advertisements”) having power in the real world; a by-product of this efficacy is renown (monuments here meaning “records of the accomplishments of a famous man”).

A closer look at the convoluted syntax of this passage reveals the extent to which Faustus’s disordered hierarchy of values leads him to privilege and subordinate precisely the wrong things. First, I will offer a rewriting of the lines in a more syntactically logical way:

Hast thou not saved whole cities from the plague, And eased a thousand desp’rate maladies, Whereby thy bills are hung as monuments?

Here the evidence that Faustus has reached the “end” of physic is thus not the sanitas of his fellow citizens, but his own fama. Faustus’s syntactical perversity does not end there. In addition to subordinating the description of his actions, his statement paradoxically strips him of agency—in making his “bills,” rather than himself, the subject of the sentence (and thus governing the “whereby” clause), he positions learning itself (or artifacts of learning) as the agent. “Whole cities” and “thousand desp’rate maladies” are subjects rather than objects (as they are in my rewriting), occluding Faustus—whose presence in the sentence is
limited to the pronoun “thy”—as the ultimate agent. The beneficial results of his learning have
only a tenuous connection to Faustus himself (probably because he does not actually care about
these results—what matters to him is the reward). “Whereby” can mean “by means of which” or
“because of which”; in my rewriting of Marlowe’s lines, it clearly means “because of which.”
In Marlowe’s original, both meanings are possible, and the placement of “whereby” invites the
perverse reading that it is not the bills themselves, but the fact that his bills are hung up as
monuments that brings about the changes described in the subsequent lines. Cause and effect are
reversed, and an absurdly supernatural power is granted to Faustus’s fame.

Similarly, in disputations Faustus makes people “swarm to my problems as the infernal spirits / On sweet Musaeus” (1.1.117–18; my italics). The displacement of Faustus as object of
specular attention by his “problems” here is similar to the displacement of Faustus as agent of
healing by his “bills” in the lines discussed above; this time, however, he conflates knowledge
with himself instead of dissociating it from himself (as he does with physic). One might be
tempted to read this line the same way we read More’s mihi, hoc est literis—as an unequivocal
affirmation of letters or “problems” as a crucial constituent of one’s mental landscape and thus
identity. As we have seen, identification with one’s intellectual endeavors is a common trope in
humanist letters, one we might be surprised to see in the speech of a wayward humanist like
Faustus. But the situations are different: More is referring to private activities; even though he
will eventually publish his litteras, he frames them as lucubrations, personal night-work he
produces during “only the time I filch from sleep and food [hoc solum temporis adquiro quod
somno ciboque suffuror]” when he is freed from the negotium of interacting with others (Surtz
and Hexter, Utopia, 40/41). Faustus’s experience of knowledge production is more oriented
toward self-presentation; he bases his self-conception on the fame he attains for his academic
achievements. When he talks about his problems, he’s referring to the rhetorical performance,
not the content or composition. It is not surprising, then, that Faustus identifies himself with
rhetoric (he’s very invested in the display of his learning, although he would be equally invested
in the display of silks could he afford to be “bravely clad”) and distances himself from physic:
the real-life effects of his learning—anything that’s not a performance—do not interest him.

For both the humanist and the Baconian, learning can sustain both the active and the
contemplative lives, but Faustus does not make use of his necromantic learning for either.
Instead, he performs magic tricks. This is hardly surprising given that Faustus uses even his licit
learning for perverted ends. Still playing with words and arguments, he substitutes his own ends
for the “correct” ends scholars acknowledge; over the course of Faustus’s soliloquy, logic
acquires the same purpose as silk and sanitas shifts from “body and soul” to “body” and finally
cedes to fama as the summum bonum medicinae.

As we’ve seen in the previous chapter, the hope that products of the vita contemplativa
(for example, the text of Utopia) might be used to effect change in the world was a veritable
obsession among humanists. The difference is that while Faustus cares very much about his
learning having efficacy—the power to do things in the world, like raise the dead—he does not
care at all about his learning benefitting others. Focusing on merely the doing without a
concomitant focus on being useful inevitably leads to the “busy-ness” that amounts to active
sloth: “being imploied with worldly vanities.” This misplaced focus explains the triviality of
Faustus’s projects after he signs the contract with the devil.

If the ideal of efficacious knowledge substantiates the link between knowledge and
power, the most influential textual substantiation of that link was the Genesis account of the fall.
As I have suggested, both come together in Doctor Faustus, where the link between knowledge
and power is evident even at the level of the word. Immediately after Faustus signs the contract in 2.1, Mephistopheles invites him to “ask what thou wilt”; taking “ask” to mean “inquire” rather than “command,” Faustus responds: “First will I question with thee about hell” (2.1.118–19).80 The fact that “ask” can mean either “inquire” or “command”—a fact that Marlowe calls attention to by having Faustus misinterpret Mephistopheles’s invitation—highlights the connection between knowledge and power, between thinking and doing.81 The linking continues at the end of the scene, when Faustus asks for books of knowledge and Mephistopheles shows him that everything he asks for is contained in the spell book he has already given to Faustus.82 The fact that both the powers Mephistopheles describes and the knowledge Faustus requests are contained in the same book suggests a blurring of the demarcation between the two. For Faustus, the spell-book, and spells themselves, represent the intersection or overlap between knowledge and power, or knowledge at its most efficacious; it is because he believes so strongly in this power that he rhapsodizes over the constituent material of his magic book:

necromantic books are heavenly,
   Lines, circles, signs, letters, and characters—
   Ay, these are those that Faustus most desires. (1.1.52–54)

As Spinrad argues, however, Faustus treats all words as if they are performative—he never achieves any of the grand plans he makes in 1.1 because for Faustus talking about them is essentially the same as doing them.83 But magic can potentially make all words performative, so that saying is doing—an ideal situation for one whom Spinrad indicts for being “above all … lazy.”84 Yet, as we see in 1.3, in which Mephistopheles tells him that his conjuration was only a cause per accidens, Faustus’s “conjuring speeches” are not as powerful as he thinks (and by extension, neither is he).85 David Scott Kastan argues that the fact that Robin’s dog Latin succeeds in conjuring Mephistopheles in 3.2 is “evidence of how little Faustus achieves”; Budra thinks 3.2 inflates the power of the physical object of the book, confirming Faustus’s exaggerated conception of its potency: “With one book … a clown can command supernatural forces; with the right book, wisdom and experience are unnecessary.”86

Spiller reads the book Mephistopheles gives Faustus as a Book of Secrets. Derived from the pseudo-Aristotelian Secretum secretorum, Books of Secrets “integrat[ed] a range of mechanical and artisanal practices (printing, dyeing, mining, alchemy, physic, cosmetics, and distilling, among others).” Spiller characterizes the Books’ “artisanal” nature as “a rejection of both traditional scholastic learning and the new humanism.”87 As we’ve seen, however, this is not entirely accurate; although humanism had an uneasy relationship with artisanal knowledge, they were not necessarily opposed. Both humanists and Baconians were very invested in defining themselves against scholasticism, and both were products of print culture (despite the Baconians’ focus on empiricism, much of their knowledge was gained from books). Some humanists, such as Ramus and Vives, even encouraged scholars to learn the mechanical arts.88 Also note that Cornelius’s list of requirements for necromancy seems to cut across the artisanal/academic divide:

He that is grounded in astrology,
   Enriched with tongues, well seen in minerals,
   Hath all the principles magic doth require. (1.1.140–42; italics mine)

This new paradigm of learning links with the rise of the learned magus figure. The most famous Renaissance representative of this tradition is Henry Cornelius Agrippa, a figure Faustus mentions explicitly as a model for his necromantic career:
I …
Will be as cunning as Agrippa was,
Whose shadows made all Europe honour him. (1.1.114–20)

Faustus’s mention of Agrippa indicates that he, too will blend the artisanal with the academic in his quest for fame; the intellectual/mechanical distinction he draws in his opening soliloquy breaks down here. The blending is further evident in the polyvalence of “cunning,” which at the time Marlowe was writing could signify both “erudition” and “skill in magic.” In Faustus’s formulation, both the success of his own “concise syllogisms” and the fact that Agrippa’s “shadows made all Europe honour him” are evidence of cunning.

Knowledge, power, and fame are conflated in the person of Agrippa; knowledge (“cunning”) leads to power (e.g., Agrippa’s power over his shadows), which leads to fame (“honour”), and Faustus hopes that the same will be true for himself. Given that he already has fame for rhetorical prowess, one wonders what the fame for doing rather than saying (or knowing) will add. This distinction doesn’t concern Faustus as he is more interested in quantity than quality; what matters to him is that “all Europe” is greater than “the flow’ring pride of Wittenberg.” He’s already something of a celebrity, as he boasts, and his pride—joy in his bold flight—leads him to pursue even greater renown.

Thus, even when Faustus appears to be asking for knowledge, he’s really asking for a means of attaining power, as the Book of Secrets promises its readers. It makes sense, then, that there is little distinction between Mephistopheles’s spells and Faustus’s requested knowledge—they’re in the same book because they serve the same end. Both academic and artisanal knowledge can be used for self-advancement but should be used for the common good; in Faustus’s hands both become means to the end of individual self-empowerment.

The ultimate goal of Faustus’s self-empowerment is to attain Godhead through omnipotence. He fantasizes about unlimited, unrestrained power (“his dominion that exceeds in [magic] / Stretcheth as far as doth the mind of man” [1.1.62–63]) and fixates on the ability of magical powers to transform him into a different order of being. This fixation explains his dissatisfaction with the fields of knowledge he discards in 1.1: medicine allows him to cure people but leaves him “still but Faustus, and a man,” unable to perform the godlike feats of raising the dead or granting mortals eternal life (1.1.23–26). Similarly, with logic he can perform “no greater miracle” than disputing well (1.1.9); by contrast, “a sound magician is a mighty God” (1.1.64). Faustus voices his intention to “try [his] brains to gain a deity” (1.1.65), which Bevington and Rasmussen gloss as “obtain the godlike powers of a magician.” The ability Faustus thinks necromantic learning has to change his very essence is notable, but perhaps not surprising—after all, his liberal learning has transformed him socially (as it had transformed his creator, Marlowe) from one “base of stock” (Prologue.11) into a “scholar-gentleman.” While the ethics of such a transformation were already fraught, Faustus’s desire for an even greater transformation is antithetical to the humanist concept of what transformation by learning should look like. The alchemy by which Faustus hopes to be transmuted from man to God simply requires no self-cultivation at all—in his fantasies, merely possessing the type of power that necromantic knowledge enables one to possess will transform him into a higher order of being. In this way, Marlowe’s Faustus is similar to Milton’s Eve, who also desires the transformation that knowledge can effect without requiring the learner to engage in the labor of self-cultivation.
4. Knowledge production and sociability

Through Faustus’s introductory soliloquy we get glimpses of another version of the scholar—not only “[a] man that in his study sits,” consuming knowledge in private, but also a virtuoso performer producing knowledge for the public. When Faustus tells himself to “begin / To sound the depth of that thou wilt profess” (1.1.1–2; italics mine), he’s using a word that could mean both “affirm faith in or allegiance to” or “adopt as the subject of public teaching.” Faustus’s aspiration to “be a divine in show” (1.1.3), his fantasy of being “eternised for some wondrous cure” (1.1.15), and his boasts that “the flow’ring pride of Wittenberg / Swarm to my problems” (1.1.116–17) and that his “bills [are] hung up as monuments” (1.1.20) suggest that he relishes the publication of knowledge much more than its consumption (his expressed zeal for his own magic books notwithstanding).

It seems that knowledge production necessarily involves performance for Faustus; he is very invested in his identity as a performer. I’m defining “performance” here as “an instance of performing a play, piece of music, etc., in front of an audience; an occasion on which such a work is presented; a public appearance by a performing artist or artists of any kind.” The key component is the separation or differentiation of the performer from the audience, predicated on the performer possessing some skill or knowledge that the audience does not. Knowledge production lends itself well to performance because both require an audience. However, knowledge production in Doctor Faustus also takes place in other contexts not involving a separation from the audience—take, for example, the “conference,” referred to several times in the course of the play. Bevington and Rasmussen gloss “conference” as “conversation”—a favorite humanist pastime, and also a term that connotes equality among participants. A conference is not a lecture; it is a collegial exchange of the type that breeds and fosters amicitia among the participants. In the world of the play, the categories of knowledge production and performance occasionally overlap (for example, in the disputations Faustus boasts that the “flow’ring pride of Wittenberg / Swarm to”) but not all knowledge production involves performance (e.g., the “conferences” referred to in the play) and not all performance involves knowledge production (e.g., the magic tricks Faustus performs for the Emperor and the Duke and Duchess of Vanholt, as well as the conjuring of Helen of Troy for the scholars).

Sociability seems to go hand in hand with privacy in an odd way in this context. For example, a conference apud amiculos (as, say, the conversation between Morus, Giles, and Raphael in book 1 of Utopia) could be considered both private and sociable. On the other hand, the public disputation—and any sort of performance, really—must be considered an attenuated mode of sociability, relying as it does on the presence of others even as it is based on a distinction or separation from those others. As Rick Bowers argues, it is the paradox of celebrity that “real fame makes one endlessly lonely.” Whatever bond may be formed between performer and spectator in the course of a performance is not nearly as close as the bonds of amicitia nurtured by conversation.

Although Faustus pursues knowledge for self-serving, individualistic purposes, he nonetheless depends on others. He can’t let go of his need for an audience, for fame, for recognition; as a result, he is eventually reduced to performing parlor tricks for the crowned heads of Europe. McCullen’s reading of Faustus as “an egoist who would be independent of both man and God, but who will suffer his greatest agony when at last aware that he wants, above all things, the fellowship of both” appears to support this claim. But as we’ve determined, performance does not necessarily create a fellowship; Faustus’s desire for fame is separate from, and in some ways antithetical to, the desire for fellowship.
In addition to representing diametrically opposed moral stances (as one scholar has suggested), Faustus’s two sets of friends represent different social formations; this fact also plays a role in his choice to pursue necromancy. On the one hand, the scholars in the play are unnamed and identified solely by their role; Faustus is constitutionally different from them because of his access to necromancy. As I argue above, Faustus has faith that his study of magic will transform him into a different order of being; thus he imagines a distinction, not just a separation from the scholars, who essentially constitute an undifferentiated mass of pares. (As we will discuss in Chapter 4, this social formation becomes both Milton’s ideal and his nightmare in *Epitaphium Damonis*.) Not content to be part of an academic community of equals, Faustus relishes being set apart from the rest—this is why performance is his preferred mode of knowledge production. Unlike the scholars, Cornelius and Valdes are named individuals—what’s more, they are “infamous through the world” for their knowledge of necromancy (1.2.34). Of course, Faustus cares little about the difference between infamy and fame; in this context, his damnation is necessarily related to his self-aggrandizing individualism.

The rest of this section will explore Faustus’s brushes with sociability—his relationships are inflected through the kind of knowledge production in which he and his companions take part. But in the end sociability fails: Valdes and Cornelius disappear from the play, the scholars are kept at arm’s length at the moment of his death, and even Mephistopheles is not implicated in amicitia (because he does not engage in true knowledge production) with Faustus. Faustus’s propensity to choose performance over conference interferes with his ability to be a collegial humanist—we can see this by tracing the way the idea of the “conference” degrades over the course of the play. Ultimately Faustus remains incapable of collegiality—and it is this incapability, as much as his perversion of the ends of learning, that makes him a bad humanist.

We have established that Faustus desires knowledge for individualistic self-empowerment rather than benefit to society; be that as it may, his is not necessarily a solitary quest. In the lines immediately following his decision to learn magic (1.1.65), Faustus sends for Valdes and Cornelius (1.1.66–68). He frames this action as an explicit choice to forego solitude for companionship, preferring a “conference” with Valdes and Cornelius to solitary “labours”: “Their conference will be a greater help to me / Than all my labours, plod I ne’er so fast” (1.1.70–71). Upon their arrival, Faustus tells Cornelius and Valdes “Know that your words have won me at the last / To practise magic and concealèd arts” (1.1.103–04); since we have not yet heard them speak, we are to assume that they have discussed the topic before (and at length, if “at the last” is any indication). By inscribing sociability in what could have been a strictly solitary endeavor (Faustus remaining holed up in his study with his magic books), Marlowe is emphasizing that solitude is not intrinsic to the necromantic endeavor, and thus it is Faustus’s desire for self-aggrandizement that prevent him from being sociable. The conversation Faustus, Valdes, and Cornelius have about necromancy strongly suggests that it will be a joint venture for the three. According to Valdes, their success depends on the combination of “these books, thy wit, and our experience”; he predicts that “the subjects of every element [shall] / Be always serviceable to us three” (1.1.121, 124–25; my italics). Cornelius asks: “tell me, Faustus, what shall we three want?” (1.1.150; my italics).

In one of the great ironies of the play, this meeting is the only “conference” we see that conforms to the humanist ideal. Faustus greets Cornelius and Valdes with the request to “make me blest with your sage conference” (1.1.101); as we discuss above, he expects their conference to help him learn magic faster than he could on his own. Although knowledge seems to be flowing in only one direction (“we will inform thee … / … let him know … / … I’ll instruct thee
there’s no gulf of separation between teachers and student as there would be were the event a performance. The atmosphere is collegial; the three are on equal footing, as evidenced by Valdes’s claim (mentioned above) that their venture will succeed due to the combination of “these books, thy wit, and our experience” (1.1.121)—each member of the trio contributes something essential. Oddly enough, Faustus’s putative partners in the necromantic enterprise disappear completely from the play after this scene with no explanation.¹¹⁰

Scholars have not treated the oddity of this disappearance with the attention it deserves. Sullivan touches on it obliquely when he suggests that “in his travels, and in the ‘oversolitariness’ that his alliance with Mephistopheles engenders, Faustus alienates himself from the relationships, both good and bad, that are foregrounded at the beginning of the play.” McCullen makes a similar point: Faustus forsakes the fellowship of man and “abandon[s] himself to the fellowship of devils.”¹¹¹ These arguments suggest that Faustus’s relationship with Mephistopheles replaces those he had with his other friends; the Faustus-Mephistopheles relationship is so all-encompassing for Faustus that there’s no room for any other affective bonds in his life. However, as I will show below, this relationship between necromancer and devil has a shallow basis and thus cannot be considered an instance of amicitia.

Faustus’s next “conference” is less pure and more of a hybrid between a conference and a performance (with the separation that it entails). When Faustus returns home from his travels, his friendships with his colleagues appear to be intact, as the description of his homecoming in 4.Chorus shows:

[Faustus] returned home;
Where such as bear his absence but with grief,
I mean his friends and near’st companions,
Did gratulate his safety with kind words,
And in their conference of what befell,
Touching his journey through the world and air,
They put forth questions of astrology,
Which Faustus answer’d with such learned skill
As they admir’d and wonder’d at his wit. (4.Chorus.3-11)

For a scholar less enamored with visions of himself as an authority set apart, this scene of homecoming would have been a straightforward “conference” (as it is called in line 7). His fellow scholars, “gratulat[ing] his safety with kind words,” are ready to welcome him back to the fold. However, as we’ve determined, Faustus doesn’t want to be merely part of the fold—hence the quasi-oracular performance he offers. We’ve talked about the public disputation as a form of knowledge production that involves performance—it is this arena in which Faustus excels. There is, however, another form of knowledge production involving performance alluded to in the play—the oracular performance, which involves the imparting of wisdom by a single authoritative figure set above his audience both literally and figuratively. Cornelius, perhaps cannily playing on Faustus’s desire for fame, calls forth this image in encouraging Faustus to take up necromancy:

doubt not, Faustus, but to be renowned
And more frequented for this mystery
Than heretofore the Delphian oracle. (1.1.143-45)

Unlike the disputant, the oracle does not share the stage with anyone; in addition, he is neither questioned nor challenged; Roma Gill describes the oracle at Delphi as the “supreme authority in
classical Greece for most matters of religion and morality.” Ingram argues that Faustus “will not humble himself before God because he is a man who would rather have men humble themselves before him” (78); the oracular performance would seem to be the perfect occasion to demand and receive such humbling. In order to achieve this fantasy, though, Faustus would have to give up the potential for amicitia that a conference would offer. In lines 9–11, Faustus is described as a singular authority imparting wisdom to an audience seeking answers. Certainly the fact that his audience “admired and wondered at his wit” suggests the type of distinction I mentioned earlier—the performer is worthy of the audience’s attention because he knows something that the audience does not. Of course, one might argue that nothing precludes showmanship among amici, especially if they are academics. Be that as it may, showmanship does not nurture amicitia—the role of oracle must at least shift from person to person on different occasions for the flow of knowledge not to be one-sided. After all, amici should be pares according to classical friendship theory.

Faustus’s quasi-oracular “conference” is framed as an intermediate step between a conference like the one he had with Cornelius and Valdes and the kind of empty spectacle we see in 4.1 (which, in a further degradation of the term, Faustus himself refers to as a conference in 4.1.86). After describing the oracular performance, the chorus suggests that Faustus goes on to perform for nobles:

Now is his fame spread forth in every land.
Amongst the rest, the Emperor is one,
Carolus the Fifth, at whose palace now
Faustus is feasted ’mongst his noblemen. (4.Chorus.12–15)

In the following scene (4.1), we actually see such a performance. Faustus is now no longer providing knowledge to his audience—only spectacle. It seems that “conference” has shifted significantly in valence for Faustus since his Act 1 conference with Cornelius and Valdes.

The tenuous form of amicitia between Faustus and the scholars—mediated through knowledge, but fundamentally based on a separation between knowledge producer and knowledge consumers (roles which are never exchanged as they would be in a more robust amicitia)—devolves as the play continues. The next time we see the scholars, they are carousing with Faustus on the last night of his life (a fact which he has not revealed to them). Carousing is sociable, of course, but it is to humanist conversation what Faustus’s magic tricks are to his lectures and disputations. Note that the topic of discussion is a marginally scholarly one: “fair ladies—which was the beautifull’st in all the world” (5.1.10–11). For more serious humanists such a debate might be an occasion for a demonstration of copia, or some such rhetorical exercise—not quite knowledge production, but not merely empty show. In this case, of course, discussion does not even rise to that level; although the scholars demonstrate their erudition by deciding on Helen of Troy, the whole affair seems like a debased version of a “conference” (which term the first scholar uses for their discussion in 5.1.9). The scholars’ request for Faustus to conjure Helen, which recalls the Emperor’s request for Faustus to conjure Alexander the Great and his paramour in act 4, demonstrates the shift in the role of the scholars from that of friends to that of spectators. This happens on the micro as well as the macro level. The scholar’s preface to the request: “Master Doctor Faustus, since our conference about fair ladies … we have determined with ourselves that Helen of Greece was the admirablest lady that ever lived” (5.1.9–12) is notable: the shift in valence of the “we” from “our conference” (which we assume included Faustus) to “with ourselves” (an “us” that decidedly excludes Faustus) enacts the separation from the group that is required for a performer.
Faustus’s response to their request (“Gentlemen, / For that I know your friendship is unfeigned …” [5.1.17–18]) can be read as ironic—here the scholars are not acting as friends, comforting Faustus in his final hours (as they will attempt to do later), but acting as greedy spectators hungry for a show. Faustus’s ability to conjure has created an appetite for conjuration even among those who originally want nothing to do with “that damned art” (as the first scholar calls it in 1.2.33–34). Elizabethans perceived the same danger in the proliferation of books of practical magic in print—that the availability of wicked material would create a market for it. That Faustus sees conjuring a demonic illusion as a token of friendship indicates how warped his sense of amicitia has become; the scholars’ reaction to the demonic illusion (“for this blessed sight / Happy and blest be Faustus evermore” [5.1.32–33]) demonstrates, in turn, that they too have been warped by the poison of necromancy. Their notion of amicitia has become just as degraded as that of Faustus.116 Faustus’s relationship with Mephistopheles skewers how he relates to his other friends—he doesn’t abandon them, as McCullen and Sullivan suggest, but he does debase their friendship to the extent that their amicitia is no longer mediated by knowledge (as it was in the Act 4 chorus) but by a conjuring trick.

5. Faustus and Mephistopheles: A failed amicitia

Much ink has been spilled in trying to pin down the exact nature of the relationship between Faustus and Mephistopheles, undoubtedly Faustus’s most important bond.117 The relationship is given a great deal more prominence in Marlowe’s play (in which Mephistopheles appears in every scene featuring Faustus after his entrance in 1.3) than in the English Faust Book (in which Mephistopheles drops out of the narrative at around chapter 20, a third of the way in).118 Marlowe beefed up this role for a reason: to provide an up-close look at Faustus’s inability to connect meaningfully with even his constant companion. In my reading, Mephistopheles represents yet another failed or missed opportunity for sociability (even devils are sociable, albeit for self-serving reasons119); the “fellowship of devils” Faustus engages in is ultimately a shallow and ephemeral one. Faustus and Mephistopheles could form a strong friendship bond—necromancy doesn’t preclude that, as we see from Valdes and Cornelius—but attempts at knowledge production between Faustus and Mephistopheles fail, and thus no amicitia is possible between them. Even without the mediation of knowledge, they might bond over their similar fates—but Faustus, in his resistance to accepting Mephistopheles’s knowledge, refuses to believe that they will have similar fates (and in the moments when he does, Mephistopheles provides distraction rather than conversation to comfort him; for example, see Faustus’s speech about Amphion, 2.3.24–32120). All that is left for them to bond over are trifles; the pair’s happiest moments together involve mischievous “busy-ness” (pranks) like boxing the Pope on the ears. And as we’ve seen, this mediation of friendship through triviality spills over into how Faustus relates to his fellow scholars; it is perhaps because Mephistopheles uses demonic illusions as tokens of friendship throughout course of the play that Faustus thinks one would be a suitable token of friendship for the scholars.

Many scholars have noted Mephistopheles’s tactic of distracting Faustus with triviality when he begins to have qualms about his decision to sell his soul to Lucifer, and the resulting back-and-forth effect that is produced as Faustus lurches between despair and a desire to repent on the one hand and indulgence in mindless distraction on the other hand.121 Mephistopheles begins using this strategy even before Faustus signs the contract. When it looks as if Faustus is getting cold feet about the deal he is about to make, Mephistopheles conjures up something “to
delight his mind” (2.1.82)—but the mental “delight” is described in stage directions thus: “Enter [Mephistopheles] with Devils, giving crowns and rich apparel to Faustus, and dance and then depart” (2.1.82.1–2 s.d). What Mephistopheles offers is not actually mental delight—just a fantasy of fulfilling worldly ambition—and yet, his illusion succeeds at convincing Faustus to seal the deal with Mephistopheles just a few lines later (“Here, Mephistopheles, receive this scroll, / A deed of gift of body and of soul” [2.1.89–90]). Accordingly, by signing the contract Faustus gains merely the illusion of power. As he explains to the emperor in 4.1, he can’t actually raise Alexander the Great and his paramour from the dead; instead, he will conjure “such spirits as can lively resemble” them (4.1.53). Here he reveals his supposed agency to be a mere illusion, but he doesn’t seem to mind. If Faustus can “raise the dead … only in the form of hellish fantasies,” that’s enough for him—at after all, he does sleep with the hellish fantasy of Helen of Troy even though he knows that she is actually a demon.

Ultimately, Faustus’s tragedy is not that he is too probing or curious, but that he is too easily satisfied. Healy and Spinrad highlight his inordinately enthusiastic reactions to Cornelius and Valdes’s fantasies about what they will do with their necromantic powers (“O this cheers my soul!” [1.1.50]) and the pageant of deadly sins (“O this feeds my soul!” [2.3.166]). While these lines illustrate that Faustus is “enthralled by trifles and empty show,” I’m more interested in the telling references to his soul. Faustus is implying that his soul is just as worthless as the spectacle that feeds and cheers it. Earlier Faustus impatiently tells Mephistopheles that he is bored with discussing “these vain trifles of men’s souls” and would rather talk about Lucifer (1.3.63–64). It’s no wonder that a soul fed and cheered by vain trifles would be held as a “vain trifle” by Faustus; by contrast, a soul fed by God’s presence and wisdom would be worth infinitely more. Faustus’s only mistake in holding “men’s souls” as trifles seems to be assuming that all men are as fulfilled by triviality as he is.

The same facetiousness and tendency to trivialize the serious that are evident in Faustus’s flippant dismissal of “these vain trifles of men’s souls” are at the root of the failure of knowledge production in 2.1:

FAUSTUS. Come, I think hell’s a fable.
Mephistopheles. Ay, think so still, till experience change thy mind.
FAUSTUS. Why, think’st thou then that Faustus shall be damned?
Mephistopheles. Ay, of necessity, for here’s the scroll
Wherein thou hast given thy soul to Lucifer.
FAUSTUS. Ay, and body too. But what of that?
Think’st thou that Faustus is so fond
To imagine that after this life there is any pain?
Tush, these are trifles and mere old wives’ tales.
Mephistopheles. But, Faustus, I am an instance to prove the contrary,
For I am damned and am now in hell.
FAUSTUS. How? Now in hell? Nay, an this be hell,
I’ll willingly be damned here. What? Walking, disputing, etc.? (2.1.130–43)

Spinrad accuses Faustus of using forms or “outward shows” as a substitute for thought in his opening soliloquy; I say in this exchange he’s using glibness as a substitute for thought. Words are merely playthings; content and context are irrelevant. While Bevington and Rasmussen read 2.1 as demonstrating a genuine crisis of faith for a Faustus vacillating between belief and unbelief, I tend to think, with Bowers, that Faustus is not taking the question of hell seriously at all—he’s almost playing at debate. Faustus himself uses the terminology of
academic disputation to describe his two main conversations with Mephistopheles: “First will I question with thee about hell” (2.1.118–19); “Come, Mephistopheles, let us dispute again / And argue of divine astrology” (2.3.33–34). In another indication of how far Faustus’s humanist notions have degraded, what Faustus engages in here is merely a parody of a disputation, similar to Wagner’s parody of the genre in 1.2. Like Wagner, Faustus wields willful (or pretended) misunderstanding (“How? Now in hell? Nay, and this be hell, / I’ll willingly be damned”) against his interlocutor’s attempts to reason with him (“But … I am an instance to prove the contrary”). As Bowers suggests, “ironic scholarly one-upmanship [has] become a personal habit of conversation” for Faustus.

Unserious as Faustus’s rejoinders may be, they are nonetheless worth exploring in depth, as they allow us to compare Faustus’s engagement with the two different conceptions of hell presented by the play. In reading this scene, Bevington and Rasmussen observe that Faustus is frightened by only the “folkloric” conception of hell—the version lurid enough to capture an imagination glutted by trifles and spectacle. Fortunately for him, the same luridness that captures his imagination also makes this vision of hell implausible enough to dismiss as the stuff of “mere old wives’ tales.” On the other hand, Faustus interprets the theological version of hell as “a kind of hell that an intellectual might enjoy”; it is “a university made up of congenial sceptics like himself.” In dismissing the terrifying but implausible “folkloric” hell and distorting the “theological” hell into something congenial and anodyne, Bevington and Rasmussen argue, “Faustus has found the very condition that his intellectual premises have dictated.” He has intellectualized hell so much that it has almost ceased to exist for him.

While Bevington and Rasmussen present a Faustus who is extremely rational in his rationalizations, I see his thinking as the result of his moral and mental limitations rather than a (conscious or unconscious) methodical elimination of consequences—indeed, one of his problems is that he can’t grasp consequences that are too far into the future. Faustus’s response (“if this be hell, I’ll willingly be damned”) suggests that Faustus didn’t take in (or didn’t take seriously) Mephistopheles’s earlier explanation that he is “tormented with ten thousand hells / In being deprived of everlasting bliss” (1.3.81–82) and that “where we are is hell, / And where hell is must we ever be” (2.1.125–26). Certainly the fact that Faustus cannot grasp the horrors of the “theological” version of hell Mephistopheles presents him marks him as morally stunted; he is perfectly fine with the prospect of living without God since it is what his life is already like. This is the ironic truth underlying Faustus’s facetious response—if to be “damned and … in hell” is to live without God, Faustus is already in hell, too, just like Mephistopheles—and this does not bother him in the least as long as he still gets to walk and dispute. But this is also a failure of imagination, pointing to intellectual as well as moral stunting—Faustus simply can’t conceive of a God whose presence or absence would make a difference to anyone.

With an imagination thus stunted (or liberated, depending on one’s perspective), Faustus tends to dismiss knowledge that is not experiential. It is perhaps no accident that Faustus wants to learn necromancy by imitation, as Eric C. Brown observes. As with Adam and Eve, who learn evil by doing evil, Faustus must experience hell to believe in or understand it—which is exactly what Mephistopheles says in the exchange quoted above. Without the experience, the question is reduced to a matter of opinion (“I think hell’s a fable. / Ay, think so still … / Why, think’st thou … ?”) despite the physical evidence of the scroll and Mephistopheles’s first-person accounts (“Why this is hell, nor am I out of it” [1.3.78]; “I am damned and am now in hell” [2.1.140]). When he denies “that after this life there is any pain,” Faustus is of course speaking of physical pain—the only kind his limited intellect and moral sense can grasp. It is the imagery
of the “folkloric” hell that the devils use to frighten Faustus when he starts to backslide, as he confesses to the scholars: “Oft have I thought to have done so [i.e., to have gone to the scholars for help], but the devil threatened to tear me in pieces if I named God, to fetch both body and soul if I once gave ear to divinity” (5.2.46–48). Oddly, Faustus can imagine and be influenced by the threat of immediate punishment (if you repent, the devils will tear you to pieces and fetch you to hell right now) but not the threat of that same punishment in the future (if you don’t repent, the devils will tear you to pieces and fetch you to hell when you die)—even if that future is merely a few hours away. Even on Faustus’s last night on earth, Mephistopheles’s threat of physical violence prompts an immediate apology:

Mephistopheles. Revolt, or I’ll in piecemeal tear thy flesh.

Faustus. Sweet Mephistopheles, entreat thy lord

To pardon my unjust presumption (5.1.69–71)

Similarly, when the Bad Angel threatens: “If thou repent, devils shall tear thee in pieces,” Faustus fails to see the wisdom of the Good Angel’s rejoinder: “Repent, and they shall never raze thy skin”—which should remind him that if he doesn’t repent, the devils will most certainly torture him (2.3.80–81). Faustus is essentially reactive: unable to live or think beyond “right now,” he is a slave to the contingencies of the present moment. He may boast that magic’s dominion is “as far as stretcheth the mind of man” (1.1.63), but as Spinrad wryly observes, “Faustus’s mind doesn’t stretch very far.”

I mentioned above that Faustus treats all words—spells or not—as performative and gets a rude awakening when Mephistopheles tells him that his “conjuring speeches” were only a cause per accidens. Yet this is another piece of information that Faustus fails or refuses to take in; Mephistopheles’s revelation doesn’t prevent Faustus from again attempting to wield the power of words later on in the play—this time in order to distance himself from the possibility of his own damnation. In discussing this topic, he often refers to himself in the second or third person, at times making ungrammatical statements. Examples of this second- and third-person distancing include: “Think’st thou then that Faustus shall be damned?” from the dialogue quoted above (2.1.132; emphasis mine); similarly, Faustus tells himself, “Now, Faustus, must thou needs be damned” (2.1.1; emphasis mine); and tells Mephistopheles, “This word ‘damnation’ terrifies not him, / For he confounds hell in Elysium” (1.3.60–61; emphasis mine; his assertion is perhaps belied by the use of the third person him); and when Lucifer enters with Mephistopheles in 2.3, Faustus cries, “O Faustus, they are come to fetch away thy soul!” (2.3.89; emphasis mine).

Faustus’s linguistic idiosyncrasy is even more striking when he switches from first to second or third person in the middle of a thought, breaking the rules of grammar—Faustus’s grammatical perversity strikes again, and reveals just how essential it is for him not to take ownership of his own fate. Take his shift from first to second person in his lament “Whither shall I fly? / If unto God, he’ll throw thee down to hell” (2.1.77–78). The striking shift from “I” in line 77 to “thee” in line 78 calls attention to this distancing—as if it’s too scary to say “he’ll throw me down to hell.”; also, see his shift from first to third person in his plea, “Impose some end to my incessant pain. / Let Faustus live in hell a thousand years” (5.2.101–02; shift from “my” to “Faustus”). This distancing is yet another manifestation of Faustus’s failure to integrate, internalize, and digest his learning—in addition to refusing to accept what Mephistopheles tells him about hell in 2.1, he distances himself from learning that should intimately affect him.

Faustus’s wielding of words to keep unpleasant realities at bay is a manifestation of a larger self-delusion: overconfidence in his own agency, namely in his power to wish away
consequences. When he replies to Mephistopheles’s reminder about the contract with “Ay, and body too,” he acknowledges that he signed the contract and that the terms are actually more extreme than Mephistopheles’s characterization of them (since he values his body more than his soul\textsuperscript{138}). At the same time, he declares the contract to be meaningless (“but what of that?”) even as he gets the benefit of its terms (for instance, “that Mephistopheles shall be his servant, and at his command” [2.1.98–99]—the very basis of the conversation they’re having). In his fantasy of hermeneutic omnipotence, only the terms of the contract beneficial to him have meaning—terms only have meaning if he gives or allows them meaning, just as he can make the texts he misquotes and misinterprets in 1.1 mean whatever is necessary to serve his argument.\textsuperscript{139} With this semantic sleight of hand, he intends to get something (godlike power) for nothing; instead he gets nothing (empty illusion\textsuperscript{140}) for something (his soul, which, as he realizes on the brink of surrendering it to Lucifer, is more than a “vain trifle”). It is perverse—willfully perverse—that Faustus denies hell even after seeing Mephistopheles, hearing his stories, and making a contract with Lucifer. As Ingram notes, “he denies God, yet turns to the Devil, whose existence would prove God’s to anyone other than Faustus.”\textsuperscript{141}

In 2.3, we see both the failure of knowledge production that might have led to amicitia and the failure of Faustus and Mephistopheles to bond simply over their shared fate; two opportunities for sociability are missed. If Mephistopheles tells Faustus what Faustus refuses to know in 2.1, he tells Faustus what Faustus already knows in 2.3 (as mentioned earlier: “Tush, these are freshmen’s suppositions” [2.3.55–56]). But there is another more interesting moment of failure here. After complaining about being told what he already knows, Faustus asks a question whose answer he must surely know: Who made the world? Mephistopheles refuses to answer. In Bevington and Rasmussen’s reading of this curious moment, Faustus is asking this question because he has just realized that he hasn’t gotten the benefit of his bargain—he’s running up against limits once again—and thus desires the comfort of an affirmation that God exists.\textsuperscript{142} But Mephistopheles only comforts by providing distraction, not knowledge—and thus the scene concludes with the pageant of the seven deadly sins.

6. Final scenes and attempted repentance

As I have suggested, the weakness of Faustus’s friendship with the scholars is evidenced by the triviality of their bonding. In 5.1 we see not amicitia but carousing and belly-cheer—gluttony rears its ugly head again, and in the subsequent scene the connection between gluttony and Faustus’s fate is made explicitly by Faustus himself:

SECOND SCHOLAR. What means Faustus?
THIRD SCHOLAR. Belike he is grown into some sickness by being over-solitary.
FIRST SCHOLAR. If it be so, we’ll have physicians to cure him. [To Faustus.] ’Tis but a surfeit. Never fear, man.
FAUSTUS. A surfeit of deadly sin that hath damned both body and soul. (5.2.6–12)

Further evidence of the weakness of their friendship is the scholars’ cluelessness about the cause of Faustus’s distress, even though their suggestions are ironically apt: they do not realize the immediate cause of his distress (that he is going to be dragged down to hell) or its underlying antecedent (that he has engaged in necromancy for the past twenty-four years) but they do hit upon the two fundamental ways in which he is a flawed humanist: his lack of collegiality (being “over-solitary”) and his unwillingness or inability to digest learning (leading to a “surfeit”). It is these shortcomings that are at the root of his suffering. As we see in the prologue, it is his
“falling to” that ultimately causes his fall.\textsuperscript{143} In a master stroke, Marlowe contrives misdiagnoses that are at once comically off the mark (stomach troubles are a far cry from eternal damnation) and essentially accurate.

In arguing that Faustus’s friendship with the scholars is weakened over the course of the play, I disagree with Hardin, who sees Marlowe adapting the \textit{EFB} to “enhanc[e] the collegiality in his hero’s life.”\textsuperscript{144} He notes that Marlowe makes a point of giving his Faustus friends who are not involved in necromancy;\textsuperscript{145} while this is true, their presence illustrates both the debasing of Faustus’s conception of \textit{amicitia} and the danger of contagion inherent in necromancy. As I argue above, there is a strong distinction drawn between Faustus as individual and the scholars as a mass of \textit{pares}; Hardin seems to acknowledge this distinction when he suggests that Faustus doesn’t fit in with them. In his reading, the scholars are “simple souls” whose parochial outlook and “unworldly way of life” are incompatible with Faustus’s cosmopolitanism (traveling the world, meeting and entertaining the great) and desire for fame: “There is a certain dullness or complacency about those three colleagues in Acts 1 and 5.”\textsuperscript{146} Similarly, Brown reads the play as setting up the scholars’ worldview as a foil for Faustus’s own: “Marlowe’s alternatives to the overreaching of Faustus are the subdued musings of a few nameless scholars.”\textsuperscript{147}

An argument against viewing the scholars as interchangeable \textit{pares} is Hardin’s singling out of the second scholar as “Faustus’s peer and closest friend”; as Hardin notes, he is both the one who describes Faustus as “allied to me” (1.2.35) and the “sweet chamber-fellow” to whom Faustus laments, “had I lived with thee, then had I lived still!” (5.2.3–4).\textsuperscript{148} It is unclear whom Faustus is addressing in 5.2.3–4; if the scholars had names by which Faustus addressed them, this would be much easier to determine.\textsuperscript{149} Still, the fact that Faustus had a chamber-fellow is significant and suggests a close relationship with at least one of the scholars.\textsuperscript{150} Oddly enough, though, Faustus presents their living together as a counterfactual, and there’s no indication in the rest of the play that Faustus lived with anyone other than Mephistopheles. Thus only a flimsy case for Faustus’s sociability can be made on the basis of this line.

While it is true that Marlowe deviates from the \textit{English Faust Book} in giving Faustus extra non-necromancer friends, he makes other changes to Faustus’s social relationships which eliminate potential intimate connections. For example, the Wagner of the \textit{English Faust Book}, while not having a prominent role in the narrative, is described as being much closer to Faustus than he is in the play (“This Wagner was so well beloved with Faustus that he used him as his son” [\textit{EFB} 2680–81]). There might actually be \textit{amicitia} between them: Faustus teaches Wagner necromancy, leaves him all his books, and tells Wagner to write his story when he is dead. In another change, the Old Man in the \textit{English Faust Book} is a flesh-and-blood neighbor to Faustus rather than an apparition; the narrative of his conversation with Faustus is notable for its repetition of the word “friend” (see \textit{EFB} 2454–59).\textsuperscript{151} As a result of Marlowe’s changes, his Faustus becomes more isolated than he would have been had he lived with a servant he loved like a son.\textsuperscript{152} Transforming the Old Man from a friendly neighbor to an apparition again removes a potential personal connection for Faustus while nodding to the morality play tradition.\textsuperscript{153}

It is striking that Faustus has hidden the fact that he engages in necromancy from the scholars for twenty-four years; clearly they are not his confidants. There is such a wall between him and the scholars that they think he’s having stomach troubles while he’s fretting about the possibility of being dragged down to hell. After spending the night carousing with them, Faustus makes a point of separating himself from the scholars—even his erstwhile chamber-fellow—in the final hour of his life. For Sullivan, the fact that the scholars “pray for [Faustus] only one room away” indicates the strength of their bond; I see it rather as an indication that Faustus’s
sociability remains attenuated even in his final moments.\textsuperscript{154} Notably, Marlowe deviates from his source here: while the \textit{EBF} Faustus gives a final oration to the scholars, Marlowe’s Faustus speaks his final words in a soliloquy.\textsuperscript{155}

In the end, Faustus’s failures of collegiality extend to God; his repeated attempts to repent fail. But why, one might ask, does his lament “I do repent, and yet I do despair” (5.1.64) not count as repentance? Apparently repentance, like conjuration, is only a cause \textit{per accidens}, providing an opening for another agent to act. According to Calvinist doctrine, all a sinner can do is be open to receiving grace; it is God’s decision whether or not to give it. Michael H. Keefer explains that since “the theology of the Anglican church in the latter decades of the sixteenth century was overwhelmingly Calvinistic in orientation, [for] most educated Anglicans of Marlowe’s time … it was axiomatic that a sinner was powerless to help himself until Christ’s saving power was exercised on his behalf.”\textsuperscript{156} Here Faustus must finally acknowledge the ultimate limits of his own agency: in order to avoid damnation, he must depend on God. In the end, strictly personal agency is no agency at all—only shared agency matters. And as the audience already knows, even the singular agency he thought he had was an illusion. Even beyond the limitations imposed by the nature of his infernal contract (“conjuring speeches” as merely cause \textit{per accidens}, inability to conjure anything but illusions) Faustus lacks agency as a \textit{magus} on the most basic level. Always fulfilling the requests and fantasies of others (the Duchess, the Emperor, the scholars), he lacks the initiative to decide on his own what to conjure (the one exception—his request for Mephistopheles to “let me have a wife” [2.1.143]—again reveals his lack of power, as he has no choice but to abide his “servant’s” refusal). What is “most pathetic” about Faustus’s final request for Helen, Spinrad argues, is that “the idea was first suggested to him by the very scholars whom he always thought inferior to himself.”\textsuperscript{157}

But one might argue that in the case of repentance, agency ultimately lies with Faustus.\textsuperscript{158} Certainly the Old Man’s final attempt to persuade him to repent suggests a God more interested in offering than withholding grace:

\begin{quote}
I see an angel hovers o’er thy head,  
And with a vial full of precious grace  
Offers to pour the same into thy soul.  
Then call for mercy and avoid despair. (5.1.54–57)
\end{quote}

If all Faustus needs to do is simply ask for grace, what is it that stops him? For Spinrad, Faustus seals his fate when he tells the Old Man to “leave me a while to ponder on my sins” (5.1.60), thereby losing “the visual prop that he needs so badly.”\textsuperscript{159} McCullen suggests that Faustus’s lack of faith is the problem:

\begin{quote}
the important question is whether he can assert the will and have the faith to be forgiven … These words bring comfort to the soul of Faustus, but his acceptance of grace depends upon his assertion of faith, which is an assured hope and confidence in Christ’s mercy. With this confidence he could realize that true faith brings knowledge and happiness, but without such faith, his action depends upon whatever knowledge he can muster … he is without the attributes of spiritual wisdom.\textsuperscript{160}
\end{quote}

To find the answer we must return to the problem I highlighted above—Faustus’s inability or unwillingness to cede agency to others or even share agency with others. We’ve seen in the course of the play that he doesn’t want to learn from anybody—not Galen, not Aristotle, not Justinian, not Jerome, and (despite his questioning) not even Mephistopheles, as is evident in the scenes of failed knowledge production between the two.\textsuperscript{161} The only people Faustus actually
learns from in the play are Valdes and Cornelius. As mentioned above, Faustus is too unwilling to give up his self-appointed role as oracle/“conjuror laureate” in order to maintain amicitia with the scholars. So while the ordinary Christian undergoing a crisis of faith—“I do repent, and yet I do despair”—has recourse to the similarly oxymoronic prayer “Lord, I believe: helpe my unbelief” (Mark 9:24), Faustus has no way out of his predicament. As Keefer explains, he is “unable to will to repent”; he is unable to ask for the faith necessary to believe that God’s mercy can override the power of the contract he signed with Lucifer.

How different is this final scene of the abject sinner begging for mercy from Faustus’s first description of himself in hell. In 1.1.118, he likens himself to Musaeus with “infernal spirits” thronging about him, evoking a scene from Aeneas’s journey to hell. With this simile he swaps in the pagan literary tradition for the Christian, transforming the journey to hell from a punishment of the abject sinner to a divinely-guided leg of an epic journey. In fact, Faustus consistently uses the pagan tradition to opt out of the Christian framework of elect and reprobate, whether he “confounds hell in Elysium” (1.3.61) or recounts the (pagan) art and music Mephistopheles uses to soothe his worries (2.3.24–32). It is in these moments that the studia humanitatis make their presence felt in the play.

But if we want to choose the epic that gives the clearest commentary on Faustus’s rise and fall, we must return to Ovid’s Metamorphoses. In drawing from the Icarus story in his prologue, Marlowe preemptively deflates Faustus’s epic aspirations right from the beginning—as if to say that the only way in which Faustus’s story is epic is in his Icarus-like mistake. And this final scene indeed recalls the story of Icarus; the description of his pathetic attempts to fly without wings in Golding’s translation are mirrored in Faustus’s pathetic attempts to repent without faith or grace. It is revealed—by the melting of his wings—that the agency he thought he had is actually not his alone; he cannot fly on his own.

As soone as that the Wax was molt, his naked armes he shakes,
And wanting wherewithall to wave no helpe of Aire he takes.
But calling on his father loud he drowned in the wave:
And by this chaunce of his those Seas his name for ever have. (Golding, 1567)

“Calling on his father loud” finds an analogue in Faustus’s desperate plea, “My God, my God, look not so fierce on me!” (5.2.120). The allusion is to Christ’s words on the cross (Matt 24:26, Mark 15:34): “My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?” The line is altered because Faustus knows that he is the one who abandoned God, and he can’t even wish for reunification (as the original line implicitly does)—all he can do is create further distance—“fierce look” suggests that there is no possibility that God will relent and allow Faustus to repent. “And by this chaunce of his those Seas his name for ever have”: Like Icarus, Faustus becomes famous for his fall—his ultimate end—as much as for his flight.
Notes


2 I am using the 1604 A-text of Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus. Bruce E. Brandt and Michael H. Keefer indicate that most scholars writing on Doctor Faustus in recent years have based their readings on the A-text, considering it to be “both earlier and more authentic” than the B-text. In his article, Keefer makes a compelling case for preferring certain passages in the B-text as “earlier and more authentic” than their analogues in the A-text, and his edition of Doctor Faustus (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2007) substitutes those B-text passages for their A-text analogues. As far as I can tell, however, no other scholars have corroborated his work, and I am hesitant to base my readings on a text reconstructed according to the judgment of a single scholar. Thus I am using the A-text of Doctor Faustus as presented in David Bevington and Eric Rasmussen’s edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), which David Wootton refers to as “the standard edition.” See Brandt, “The Critical Backstory,” in Doctor Faustus: A Critical Guide, ed. Sara Munson Deats (London: Continuum, 2010), 20; Keefer, “The A and B Texts of Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus Revisited,” Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America 100 (2006): 228; and Wootton, introduction to Doctor Faustus: With the English Faust Book, ed. David Wootton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2005), xxxvi.

3 Bene disserere est finis logices.
   Is to dispute well logic’s chiefest end?
   Affords this art no greater miracle?
   Then read no more: thou has attained the end. (1.1.7–10)
   Summum bonum medicinae sanitas:
   The end of physic is our body’s health.
   Why Faustus, has thou not attained that end? (1.1.16–18)

4 See OED s. v. “gerund”: “the English verbal noun in -ing when used rather as a part of the vb. than as a n.” A hybrid part of speech, both verb and noun … in the case of “learning,” signifying both an action and the fruit of the action. See also OED s. v. “learning”—both “The action of receiving instruction or acquiring knowledge” (def 1a), and “What is learnt or taught” (def 2), and “Knowledge, esp. of language or literary or historical science, acquired by systematic study; also, the possession of such knowledge, learnedness” (def 3a). The new learning (def 3b) is closely related to this last sense.


10 Picciotto, Labors of Innocence, 8.


15 Henry Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486–1535) was “the most famous Renaissance magician,” according to Bevington and Rasmussen (Doctor Faustus, 119n119–20), and both Marlowe and P. F. (the translator of the German Faust Book, Marlowe’s source) were influenced by his legend; Faustus voices a desire to achieve Agrippa’s level of fame in 1.1, and P. F. draws upon passages from Agrippa’s Of the Vanity and Uncertainty of Arts and Sciences when adding speeches to his translation of the German Faust Book. See John Henry Jones, ed., The English Faust Book (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 203n772–84.


21 “Education, the University,” 190; italics in original. In her discussion of academic satire, Sarah Knight describes the situation thus: “Despite the idealistic pedagogical hopes expressed by earlier Tudor humanists such as John Colet, Richard Fox and Roger Ascham, that the right sort of higher education would train men to assume—and to expect—key positions in church and state, the reality in the late sixteenth century was very different: too many graduates were being produced for too few jobs … [scholars felt] frustration at being over-educated but socially under-valued” (“Flat Dichotomists,” 67).


26 McCullen, “Dr. Faustus,” 9.

27 I use “busy” here in the sense in which it is used in the phrase “busy work”—pertaining to activity of little value that keeps one occupied. (OED: “Work that keeps a person busy; repetitive or
routine activity, now typically that which is intended to keep a person busy but has little value in itself").

28 “‘Pride in Learning Goeth before a Fall’: Dr. Faustus’ Opening Soliloquy,” *Mosaic* 13, no. 1 (1979): 79.

29 Wootton, introduction to *Doctor Faustus*, xi.

30 Jones, introduction to *The English Faustus Book*, 11.

31 Introduction to *The English Faustus Book*, 1–3. I disagree with Michael Keefer’s characterization of the text as unequivocally homiletic (in contradistinction to Marlowe’s transgressive adaptation of it). Keefer characterizes the German *Historia* as a “repressive narrative,” one of a spate of *Teufelsbücher* arising out of an atmosphere of state-promulgated religious terrorism. Introduction to *Doctor Faustus: A 1604–Version Edition*, ed. Michael Keefer, 2nd ed. (Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2007), 39. Be that as it may, this does not preclude the incorporation—conscious or not—of subversive elements into the text allowing readers to experience vicariously that which the text is ostensibly condemning (demonic education). Keefer makes no mention of the work’s popularity in other countries—a popularity which could be due to its usefulness as a tool of oppression or to its allowing its readers to access the frisson of the forbidden wrapped in the guise of a cautionary tale, or both.

32 As if acknowledging the artificiality of this device (which has allowed the narrator to spend 5 straight chapters satisfying the reader’s appetite for the demonic), chapter 16 opens with Mephistopheles complaining about Faustus’s excessive curiosity: “Doctor Faustus, being yet desirous to hear more strange things, called his spirit unto him, saying: ‘My Mephostophiles, I have yet another suit unto thee, which I pray thee deny not to resolve me of.’ ‘Faustus,’ quoth the spirit, ‘I am loth to reason with thee any further, for thou art never satisfied in thy mind but always bringest me a new’” (*EFB* 712–16).

33 On this line, see McCullen, “Dr. Faustus,” 12–13.

34 Spinrad argues that in his use of spectacle, Marlowe is making a statement about theater itself, and the dangers of “show”:

> We have seen a proper Morality play after all, with its pageants, fireworks, devils, comic subplots, personified abstracts, and other special effects. “O this cheers our souls!”—which in itself should chill our minds. This play has in effect done the same thing for its audience that Mephostophilis did for Faustus: provided an opportunity to avoid thought through concentration on outward show. (“Dilettante’s Lie,” 252)

35 Introduction to *Doctor Faustus*, 7. This is not to say that there is no spectacle in *Doctor Faustus*, of course. But while the excitement of the devils and fireworks onstage was quite plenty for playgoers a case can be made for Marlowe’s “constraint and tact” as Bevington and Rasmussen show (6). Comparing the A-text with the B-text (which is believed to be a later text including additions by other dramatists, and which Bevington and Rasmussen argue “trivialises the very nature of Faustus’s tragic experience by its endless appetite for stage contrivance” [47]) is instructive in this regard. On the excitement caused by the play’s spectacular effects, see David Bevington, “The Performance History,” in *Doctor Faustus: A Critical Guide*, ed. Sara Munson Deats (London: Continuum, 2010), 42ff.

36 Line emended from “Excelling all whose sweet delight disputes” in accordance with Bevington and Rasmussen, *Doctor Faustus*, 107n18. Ingram notes the importance of wisdom to the humanist conception of learning: “The next necessary thing after intellectual wisdom is spiritual wisdom, that is, the ability to turn that wisdom to public rather than miserly private ends” (“‘Pride in Learning,’” 80).

37 “High and Low: The Theme of Forbidden Knowledge in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” *Past and Present*, no. 73 (1976): 34. Intellectual and spiritual pride were conjoined and conflated in a common mistranslation of Paul’s exhortation to the Romans: in Renaissance commentaries, *noli altum sapere* (Rom 11:20) hovered in meaning between “be not high-minded” and “do not seek to know high things” (28–29). In fact, the concluding paragraph of the *English Faust Book* singles out
“chiefly the stiff-necked and high-minded” (EFB 2952) as targets of the book’s moral message.

38 My translation from Ovid; the original reads:

\[
puer audaci coepit gaudere volatu
deseruitque ducem caelique cupidine tractus
altius egit iter. \text{(Ovid, Metamorphoses 8.223–25)}
\]

The audaci ... volatu recalls the Prologue, in which the Chorus denies that any “proud audacious deeds” will be presented in the play, offering instead “Only ... the form of Faustus’ fortunes” (Prologue.5, 8). (“Only” indicates that this alternative subject matter is something of a downgrade from usual theatrical fare.) The opposition set up here might be an indication of the role of predestination in the play—if free will is denied, then fortunes become much more important than deeds.

39 Bevington and Rasmussen gloss chary as “carefully” (Doctor Faustus, 159n175).


41 For a comparison of Faustus with Lucifer, see Anne Hargrove, “Lucifer Prince of the East and the Fall of Marlowe’s Dr. Faustus,” Neophilologische Mitteilungen 84 (1983): 206–13. “Glutted” can describe one who is satisfied (OED “glut, v.1,” def. 1a, 2a) or one who has been overfed to the point of sickness (def. 3).

42 Keefer glosses the verb “surfeit” as “an excessive indulgence in food or drink, and the resulting disorder of the system” (Doctor Faustus, 164n10).

43 Stock points to episodes of Faustus’s literal gluttony in the play (for which she uses the B-text), eventually concluding, “about the tragical histories of both Adam and Faustus, one could say that the gluttony of ‘pleasant fruit’ was but the outward expression of the desire to be an ‘overreacher’” (“Medieval Gula,” 385).

44 “Marlowe’s Libraries,” 108. In Spiller’s view it’s not just bibliophilia that’s the sin, but bad reading. In her article she describes the two normative modes of reading in sixteenth-century England—“humanist” and “Reformation” reading practices—and the ways in which Faustus fails at both in his opening soliloquy; in this way, she is similar to Spinrad, who sees Faustus’s great failing as his being “a bad Renaissance humanist” (“Dilettante’s Lie,” 243).


46 “Death of a Bibliophile,” 3, 7.

47 For further discussion of Marlowe’s iconic use of books in Doctor Faustus, see Spiller, “Marlowe’s Libraries,” 101–02; and Budra, “Death of a Bibliophile,” 1–11. Budra sees Faustus’s final promise as the result of his attributing too much talismanic power to material objects, confusing the external and the internal.

48 For McCullen, the ethical component is missing from Faustus’ demonstration of studies (“Dr. Faustus,” 6). In other words, the truth or accuracy of Faustus’s quotations is irrelevant—what matters to him is making a facile argument.

49 Clare Harraway, Re-citing Marlowe: Approaches to the Drama (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 32. Whether to attribute the misquotations in the opening soliloquy to Faustus or to Marlowe is an area of critical contention. Bevington and Rasmussen attribute the errors to Marlowe, asserting that he “is no
more likely to have looked up his Justinian for accurate quotation than he is to have consulted Aristotle in the original.” Roma Gill argues that the point is moot because nobody would have noticed; the Latin was simply atmospheric: “this is a play, not a doctoral dissertation; and only a modern editor (or a student with an annotated edition) is likely to observe that ‘Aristotles workes’ did not provide the formulation ‘Bene disserere est finis logices.’ Theatre audiences would be more likely to respect the Latin than question the attribution.” Noting that Ramists were often accused of preferring flashily performed erudition to substantial engagement with learning, Michael Hattaway suggests that “it is probable … that a university man would detect an element of criticism of Faustus in this line.” See Bevington and Rasmussen, Doctor Faustus, 111n28–9; Gill, introduction to Doctor Faustus, vol. 2 of The Complete Works of Christopher Marlowe (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), xxv; and Hattaway, “Theology of Doctor Faustus,” 55.

I read the misquoting as Faustus’s rather than Marlowe’s. Ramism was a hot topic at Cambridge while Marlowe was there (Gill, Doctor Faustus, 53n5), so it is difficult to believe that Marlowe was not familiar enough with Ramus to distinguish him from Aristotle, especially since they were considered diametrically opposed. Marlowe also wrote a play, The Massacre at Paris, in which Ramus—just before he is killed—is criticized for the sort of shoddy learning Hattaway describes in his article. Thus it is not too farfetched to think that Marlowe misquoted intentionally, intending to signal to his audience (as Hattaway suggests) that Faustus is not as great an intellectual as he imagines himself to be. As Harraway notes in the quotation above, Ramism was a part of the intellectual landscape of 1580s and thus (contrary to Gill’s assertion) at least some people in the audience would have noticed the error.

50 Many scholars have noted that in discussing the Bible, Faustus quotes the first (harsh-sounding) halves of two passages while ignoring the second halves promising God’s mercy to those who repent. Elizabethan audiences would have been able to fill in the blanks and thus would have known that Faustus was not seeing the whole picture. See Celia Barnes, “Matthew Parker’s Pastoral Training and Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus,” Comparative Drama 15 (1981): 258–67; Bevington and Rasmussen, introduction to Doctor Faustus, 16–17; Harraway, Re-citing Marlowe, 32–33; Ingram, “‘Pride in Learning,’” 76–77; McCullen, “Dr. Faustus,” 9; Spiller, “Marlowe’s Libraries,” 105; and Spinrad, “Dilettante’s Lie,” 253n9. According to Harraway, “the audience would have been thoroughly familiar with [Faustus’s] argument, for it is found in the Homilies that by law were read each Sunday in every church in the land” (“Theology,” 57).

51 Refer to my discussion of Virginia Krause on scholē in Chapter 1.

52 Ingram notes this as well (“Pride in Learning,” 76).

53 It might be that the disjuncture between word and action I see in the play is related to Faustus’s being enamored with the visible and the superficial, as Spinrad characterizes him; this is probably also the reason that he is so taken with the world of mere illusions the devils provide. According to Spinrad, he is “obsess[ed] with forms: outward shows which he uses as a substitute for thought” (“Dilettante’s Lie,” 245).


55 For example, see Gill: “For Faustus, ‘disputing’ is a function as natural and normal as ‘walking’; moreover, it is his ‘sweete delight,’ as the Prologue observes (line 18)” (Doctor Faustus, 72n142).
56 Brian Vickers, introduction to The Oxford Authors: Francis Bacon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), xli–xlii. Note that texts can digest learning just as people can.


58 Of course, the humanists came back with their own caricature of the schoolman, also taken from Plato’s discussion of sophists: the logician who delights in narrow, complex arguments of no importance whatsoever. Erika Rummel, The Humanist-Scholastic Debate in the Renaissance and Reformation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 20ff. See Gorgias 456, 463; Euthydemus 276 B–C, 278, 288; Sophist 268. For the importance of rhetoric to humanist conception of the moral order, see Hanan Yoran, Between Utopia and Dystopia: Erasmus, Thomas More, and the Humanist Republic of Letters (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 12–13.

59 We see the same self-conscious performance of virtuosity in Milton’s educational plan to teach his students a long list of languages. We also see Burton indulging his encyclopedic urge (or demonstrating his encyclopedic knowledge?) in The Anatomy of Melancholy.

60 Cave, Cornucopian Text, 22, 22n29.

61 McCullen sees Faustus’s problem as his tendency to confuse means and ends; “he cannot see truth as the end and logic as a mere tool” (“Dr. Faustus,” 10). Ingram agrees: “To ‘dispute well’ is a means to much greater ends than he chooses to contemplate; having the means to aid in the discovery of the truth, he should use them to that end” (“Pride in Learning,” 75).

62 Bevington and Rasmussen, Doctor Faustus, 118n117.

63 “St. Mary the Virgin and the Birth of the Public Sphere,” Huntington Library Quarterly 72, no. 3 (2009): 314. Shuger provides a nuanced account of the wide range of priorities among disputants and explores the functions the disputation served in the larger culture (325ff). For descriptions of the process, see Shuger, 315ff; Hanson, “Education, the University,” 188; and William Costello, The Scholastic Curriculum at Early Seventeenth-Century Cambridge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 14–31, 110–12.

64 For example, the disputation provided a public service in which members of the community not enrolled in the universities could propose questions for discussion. This is clear from Richard Hooker’s suggestion in the preface to his Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity that reform-minded Protestants do just that: “if the thing ye crave be no more than only leave to dispute openly about those matters that are in question, the schools in universities (for any thing I know) are open unto you. They have their yearly Acts and Commencements, besides other disputations both ordinary and upon occasion … and the favour of proposing there in convenient sort whatsoever ye can object (which thing myself have known them to grant of scholastical courtesy unto strangers) neither hath (as I think) or ever will (I presume) be denied you.” Richard Hooker, preface to The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, in The Works of … Mr. Richard Hooker, ed. John Keble, R. W. Church, and F. Paget, 7th ed., 3 vols. (Oxford, 1888), 1:163–64 (sec. 5.1), quoted in Shuger, “St. Mary the Virgin,” 331.

65 Curtis, Oxford and Cambridge, 54n1.

66 Hanson reports that “the most crucial distinction [between high-born and low-born] was academic: gentlemen had no need of scholarships or degrees and could come to university without the rigorous grammar school preparation which, as David Riggs has shown, Christopher Marlowe endured in order to win his Parker scholarship to Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. Once at the university, they might pursue what Richard Holdsworth, in a study manual for university students compiled in the 1620s, called studia leviorsa, a program largely of modern literature for ‘such as come to the University not with intention to make Scholarship their profession, but only to get such learning as may serve for delight and ornament and such as the want whereof would speake a defect in breeding.’” David Riggs, The World of
“Fellow Students,” 216. Hanson makes pains to stress that envy and emulation didn’t only go one way—the gentlemen admired their poor counterparts’ academic abilities—this is the basis of amicitia, after all (215–16).

Knight, “Flat Dichotomists,” 57. See also Keefer’s gloss of public schools: “the Cambridge term for the lecture halls where students of all colleges attended lectures and participated in academic disputations” (Doctor Faustus, 82n91).

Bevington and Rasmussen present a more sympathetic (if unconvincing) reading of Faustus’s fantasy: “His determination to clothe all the students of the public schools in silk (1.92–93), in direct contravention of university statues in the English and German universities … can be interpreted as a blow for academic freedom and the rights of students” (introduction to Doctor Faustus, 17).

On Faustus’s poor showing in the play’s parodic debates, see Hardin, who comments, “In the pointless dialogues with Mephistophilis … the edge seems to have gone off his talent for debate” (“Fruits of Scholarism,” 396). See also A. N. Okerlund, “The Intellectual Folly of Dr. Faustus,” Studies in Philology 74, no. 3 (1977): 258–78.

Other scholars concur that Faustus is not concerned about helping others. According to McCullen, “Faustus refuses the salutary parts of medicine and the social benefits of law, because neither science lends itself to the fulfillment of his impossible aspirations. His attitude towards ordinary studies amounts to scorn for common humanity, including its needs and potentialities” (“Dr. Faustus,” 10). For Faustus’s “psychopathic solipsism,” see Clarence Green, "Doctor Faustus: Tragedy of Individualism,” Science and Society 10 (1946): 275–82. On the other hand, for a discussion of how Faustus’s “seemingly public-spirited plans” might be read in a light favorable to him, see Bevington and Rasmussen, introduction to Doctor Faustus, 17.

Bevington and Rasmussen point out that Faustus’s translation of Summum bonum medicinae sanitas is “free” (Doctor Faustus, 110n16). Obviously, sumnum bonum is not the same as finis (which Faustus also translates as “end” in 1.1.8); it seems that it was important for Faustus to repeat the word “end” here, echoing 1.1.4 (“the end of every art”), 8 (“logic’s chiepest end”), 10 (“thou hast attained the end”), and 18 (“hast thou not attained that end?”).

Bevington and Rasmussen, Doctor Faustus, 111n20. Faustus also mentions that his “common talk [is] sound aphorisms” (1.1.19). Wootton emends “sound” to “found” (Doctor Faustus, 4n16), which would bring in the idea of public recognition (others find Faustus’s common talk to be aphoristic), but he seems to be alone in this reading. “Common talk” points to sprezzatura—Faustus is framing medicine as something he does off the cuff.

OED, “whereby, adv.,” def. II.2 and II.3.a.

See also Milton’s similar placing of mea vita in apposition with libri in Elegia Prima, line 26.

See McCullen on the putative ends of humanist learning: “In brief, the end of learning was to prepare individuals for better service to both God and the state”; “truth … even though … admittedly impossible of attainment, was the chief incentive behind humanistic quests for knowledge” (“Dr. Faustus,” 7, 10).
Both Ingram and Spinrad criticize Faustus’s narrow definition of *sanitas*—restricting its application to the body while excluding the soul. Ingram: “Once again he is too ready to define what is an end; not only must the body be cured but the soul as well: ‘For bodily exercise profiteth little: but godliness is profitable unto all things’” (1 Timothy 4:8, quoted in Ingram, “‘Pride in Learning,’” 75); Spinrad: Faustus “us[es] ‘sanitas’ to refer only to the body’s health, whereas its traditional meaning encompassed the well-being of body, mind, and spirit” (“Dilettante’s Lie,” 246).

Bevington and Rasmussen point this out as well, making a point about Faustus’s intellectual curiosity in illustrating the “heterodox” reading of the play. This and the point they later make about his asking for the books support the reading of Faustus as a protagonist driven primarily by intellectual curiosity, a reading in which the heterodox interpretation is heavily invested (*Doctor Faustus*, 26, 27). I, on the other hand, do not see Faustus as particularly intellectual.

The same thing happens earlier with the term “demand,” which is used to mean “question.” Mephistopheles refers to Faustus’s initial questions as “frivolous demands / Which strike a terror to my fainting soul” (1.3.83–84); later, Faustus asks Mephistopheles “To tell me whatsoever I demand” (1.3.93).

Mephistopheles gives Faustus a book enabling him to “bring gold;/ … /Bring whirlwinds, tempests, thunder, and lightning,” and to conjure “men in armour … / Ready to execute what thou desir’st” (2.1.163, 165, 167–68). Faustus, not yet satisfied with the powers he has been offered, asks for three more spell-books:

FAUSTUS. Thanks, Mephistopheles. Yet fain would I have a book wherein I might behold all spells and incantations, that I might raise up spirits when I please.

MEPHISTOPHELES. Here they are in this book. There turn to them.

FAUSTUS. Now would I have a book where I might see all characters and planets of the heavens, that I might know their motions and dispositions.

MEPHISTOPHELES. Here they are too. Turn to them.

FAUSTUS. Nay, let me have one book more—and then I have done—wherein I might see all plants, herbs, and trees that grow upon the earth.

MEPHISTOPHELES. Here they be. Turn to them. (2.1.169–79)

As the stage directions indicate, everything Faustus asks for is contained in the single book Mephistopheles has already given to him (Bevington and Rasmussen, *Doctor Faustus*, 146n172.1. s.d.). Note that this scene is not in the *EFB*—but the same blurring between knowledge and power is made in the *EFB* in a speech by Mephistopheles offering Faustus a long list of temptations mingling esoteric knowledge with supernatural power (EFB 789–837).

Spiller’s reading of these lines as a “comic give and take [in which] Faustus’s desires for a whole library of new books are frustrated by Mephistopheles’ repeated insistence that this one volume contains all he would want” (“Marlowe’s Libraries,” 107) implies that Faustus is after the physical objects more than the knowledge they might contain. In line with her argument that bibliophilia is the new sin in the age of print, she suggests here that Faustus wants to heap up books the way he would heap up gold by pursuing medicine. While Spiller thinks that Faustus is more interested in the books themselves than the knowledge contained therein, Spinrad argues that he confounds the books with the knowledge inside (“Dilettante’s Lie,” 247). Budra reads the scene as Spiller does, making similar points about Faustus’s acquisitiveness with books; he also agrees with Spinrad that Faustus gets caught up in externals, focusing on the object itself rather than the knowledge contained therein (“Death of a Bibliophile,” 3).

When Faustus asks if his conjuring brought about Mephistopheles’s appearance, Mephistopheles answers, “That was the cause, but yet per accidens” (1.3.47). *Per accidens* is a scholastic term “used to distinguish between agents that produce their own effect (efficient cause) and happenings that merely provide the occasion for the operation of some external agency (per accidens)” (Bevington
McCullen comments, “This situation is ironic. Any man can blaspheme and thereby exchange obedience to God for subservience to devils, though he possess no magic whatever” (“Dr. Faustus,” 11).

Mephistopheles’s response undercuts the agency that Faustus has imagined for himself. In the immediately preceding lines, Faustus revels in his potency—“such is the force of magic and my spells. / Now, Faustus, thou art conjurer laureate, / That canst command great Mephistopheles’” (1.3.32–34). Note that in Faustus’s mind, the mere wielding of power transforms him—“now thou art conjurer laureate” because he can “command great Mephistopheles” (“laureate” used perhaps proleptically here as one who has been recognized for his skill—again, Faustus’s ultimate focus is on renown).


89 Bevington and Rasmussen gloss “cunning” thus: “(a) erudition (b) expertness, cleverness (c) skill in magic (d) skilful deceit, craft” (Doctor Faustus, 108n20). Roma Gill says that at the time Marlowe was writing, the word’s connotations hovered between positive and negative (Doctor Faustus, 51n20).

90 Here I disagree with Brown, who sees the shift from giving lectures to becoming “as cunning as Agrippa was” as an “occlusion of the self” (“Shakespeare’s Anxious Epistemology,” 26). I see no evidence for this—Faustus still wants fame, wants “all Europe [to] honour him”; the shift is not a turning away but an advancement along a path leading to greater knowledge, power, and fame.

91 Paul Yachnin sees Faustus’s attraction to necromantic books as “related” to (if not a manifestation of) the “Baconian dream of power through knowledge”—for both Faustus and the Baconians, writing is divided into categories of “powerful” and “powerless” (as we see in the opening soliloquy). “Doctor Faustus and the Literary System,” 74–75. Hence Faustus is superstitious about the power of words; this superstition, of course, is proven baseless by the end of the play.

92 Compare the EFB Faustus, who, like Adam and Eve, seeks to be Godlike in omniscience. As he confesses, “having studied the lives of the holy saints and prophets, and thereby thought myself to understand sufficient in heavenly matters, I thought myself not worthy to be called Doctor Faustus if I should not also know the secrets of hell and be associated with the furious fiend thereof” (EFB 563–67). His desire for knowledge of both “heavenly matters” and “the secrets of hell” recalls Satan’s promise to Eve that she and Adam will be “as gods, knowing good and evil” (Genesis 3:5).

Jones points out that this speech was added by P. F.; the German original makes no mention of Faustus’s motivations for taking up necromancy (The English Faust Book, 200n562–8). In inventing this motive for EFB Faustus—not just a desire for illicit knowledge, but a desire for total mastery of the subject of divinity (as perversely conceived by Faustus)—P. F. further plays upon Elizabethan anxieties about curiosity, thematizing the problem of excessive desire for knowledge.


93 Bevington and Rasmussen read these lines as a “blasphemous analogy to Christ’s raising Lazarus from the dead” (Doctor Faustus, 111n24–5).
Curtis, Oxford and Cambridge, 82. Hanson describes the rise of a new “learned elite that now also consisted of gentlemen and some noblemen as well as men like [Marlowe]” (“Education, the University,” 183). For a summary of alternative perspectives on the class issues surrounding university education in the late sixteenth century, see Hanson, “Fellow Students,” 213–14.

Keefer, Doctor Faustus, 76n2.

On the “near-equation between learning and showmanship” in Doctor Faustus, see Clifford Leech, Christopher Marlowe: Poet for the Stage (New York; AMS Press, 1986), 89.

OED def. 4c.

Unlike the consumption of knowledge, which may be public or private, the production of knowledge must always be public—producing “new knowledge” requires an untutored audience for whom the knowledge is new. Oddly enough, an exchange that is public on one end (publishing a book; producing knowledge) may be private on the other end (reading a book; consuming the knowledge thus produced).

Doctor Faustus, 115n70. Even today we make a distinction between performative “lectures” and more collaborative/collegial “discussion sections” as modes of knowledge production. As we remind our students when encouraging them to speak up in section, ideally participants will learn as much or more from each other than they do from the putative discussion leader.

Recall that Morus chides Raphael, “In the private conversation of close friends this academic philosophy is not without its charm, but in the councils of kings, where great matters are debated with great authority, there is no room for these notions [Apud amicuos in familiari colloquio non insuavis est haec philosophia scholastica. Caeterum in consiliis principum, ubi res magnae magna autoritate aguntur, non est his rebus locus]” (Surtz and Hexter, 98/99). Morus’s distinction between the rhetoric appropriate for conversations apud amiculos and that appropriate for councils of kings acknowledges that they constitute two different types of knowledge production.


G. K. Hunter traces Faustus’s decline in the course of the play from magus to errand boy in his article, “Five Act Structure in Doctor Faustus,” Tulane Drama Review 8, no. 4 (1964): 84–99.

McCullen, “Dr. Faustus,” 13.

For Garrett A. Sullivan Jr., sociability is inherent in both of “the twin possibilities of damnation and salvation”; each fate maps neatly onto a set of friends “virtuous (the scholars) and vicious (Cornelius and Valdes).” “Geography and Identity in Marlowe,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christopher Marlowe, ed. Patrick Cheney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 240.

Their indistinguishability from each other might reflect what Hanson describes as the “clerical” tendency of the early modern university to “aggregate men and subject them to a common discipline” (“Fellow Students,” 210–11). See also Hardin’s theory that Faustus struggles against the
parochialism of the university and his colleagues ("Fruits of Scholarism," 398). Knight gives an alternative perspective: “For Marlowe, the universities were not a rarified, unworldly space, and scholars were not remote from contemporary political tumult” ("Flat Dichotomists," 55–56). On universities as institutions that checked rather than fomented irrational scholarly ambitions to worldly power, see Shuger, “St. Mary the Virgin,” 326; and Victor Morgan, 1546–1750, 112.

107 A discussion of sociability in Doctor Faustus must address two questions: is learning a social activity? Is necromancy a social activity? The answer to each question is “yes, it can be,” but this is not obvious at first. Act 1 scene 1 of Doctor Faustus, in which we see Faustus contemplate alone in his study the fields he wants to explore, presents solitude as the first condition for both learning—here defined as the consumption of knowledge in private—and temptation. With Jerome, we’ve seen the danger of solitary study. Necromancy does not preclude sociability, as one might have expected.

108 In fact, a 20th-century production of Doctor Faustus altered the staging to portray the protagonist as living in extreme isolation, trapped within his study and his mind: “As if agreeing with Mephistopheles’s ‘Why, this is hell,’ John Barton’s Royal Shakespeare Company touring version with Ian McKellen (1974) took place entirely in Faustus’s study. The Good and Evil Angels were a hand-puppet and a voodoo doll, operated and voiced by Faustus himself; the Seven Deadly Sins were also puppets. The play seemed to be happening entirely in Faustus’s mind, yet, as if to undercut his apparent freedom, devils spoke the Chorus’s lines, so that, as Robert Cushman (Observer 1 Sept. 1974) pointed out, the entire play seemed diabolically controlled.” Lois Potter, “Marlowe in Theatre and Film,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christopher Marlowe, ed. Patrick Cheney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 265.

109 In emphasizing the potential for sociability in necromancy, he’s following the English Faust Book, which states that Faustus “accompanied himself with divers that were seen in those devilish arts” (EFB 50–51).

110 Perhaps Faustus abandons Cornelius and Valdes in order to heap up fame for himself alone.

111 Sullivan, “Geography and Identity,” 241; McCullen, “Dr. Faustus,” 16.

112 Gill, Doctor Faustus, 61n143.

113 Maybe they can’t help him “prepare for death” because their friendship has been reduced to being mediated by trivialities like Faustus’s relationship with Mephistopheles. Spinrad sees the carousing as more evidence as Faustus’s triviality; instead of a “real preparation for death,” she argues, we get distraction (“Dilettante’s Lie,” 249); Stock, reading the B-text, reads the scene as a “parodic, blasphemous ‘Last Supper’” (“Medieval Gula,” 382).

114 On the mediation of male friendship by female bodies, see Lorna Hutson, The Usurer’s Daughter: Male Friendship and Fictions of Women in Sixteenth-Century England (London: Routledge, 1994). See also Brown on scholarship as necromancy in Love’s Labor’s Lost: “Scholastic learning becomes little more than a literary corpse, necromantic in its form and function as it keeps preserved the dead letters of those who have gone before” (“Shakespeare’s Anxious Epistemology,” 23–24). Reviving the classics and making them live again can be seen as a form of necromancy; in this scene we see Faustus performing a vulgarized version of what the humanist project aims to do. On humanist recovery of the ancients figured as “revivification,” see Eisenstein, “The Advent of Printing and the Problem of the Renaissance,” Past and Present, no. 45 (1969): 82–83; and Myron Gilmore, The World of Humanism, 1453–1517 (New York: Harper and Row, 1952), 199.

115 “Determined” recalls the world of disputation: “a ‘determiner’ would summarise and criticize the arguments on both sides, evaluate the disputers’ performances, and ‘determine’ the answer to the problem debated” (Hanson, “Education, the University,” 188); one has determined when one has participated in a disputation as a respondens (OED “determine, v.,” def. 13: “To discuss and resolve a
disputed question \textit{[determinare questionem]}, or maintain a thesis against an opponent in a scholastic disputation\). As with “conference,” the language of humanist scholarship is being deflated.

116 Thomas Healy notes the scholars’ positive reaction (“they celebrate his courtesy, and bless his ‘glorious deed’ [5.1.32–3]”) in arguing that the Helen and Duchess Van Holt episodes are meant to redeem illusion and artifice by portraying them as benign: neither the scholars nor the Duchess is “played as being at mortal risk for benefiting from Faustus’s organized performances.” “Doctor Faustus,” in \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Christopher Marlowe}, ed. Patrick Cheney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 187.

117 See Sullivan’s and McCullen’s arguments (mentioned above) that Faustus abandons his old friends for Mephistopheles (or replaces them with him). Sara Munson Deats sees the fellowship between Mephistopheles and Faustus as a parody of the fellowship between Jesus and his disciples; Spinrad says Mephistopheles “understands Faustus so well as to represent almost his personified id”; and Okerlund likens their relationship to “that of a demanding child indulged by a patient and cooperative parent.” Although Faustus’s contract states that Mephistopheles “shall be his servant, and at his command” (2.1.98–99), Faustus occasionally addresses him as “sweet Mephistopheles” when asking him to do something (2.1.148, 2.3.68, 4.1.104, 5.1.70); he never addresses his servant Wagner this way (see 1.1.66 and 4.1.190; in both scenes, Wagner addresses Faustus as “sir” in his response). Hardin also notes that the master-servant relationship established by the contract Faustus signs is inverted: “In Faustus’ ironic service the spirit who should follow him actually leads him around for most of the twenty-four years.” See Deats, “Ironic Biblical Allusions in Marlowe’s \textit{Doctor Faustus},” \textit{Medievalia et Humanistica}, n.s., 10 (1981): 203–16; Spinrad, “Dilettante’s Lie,” 251; Okerlund; “Intellectual Folly,” 269; Hardin, “Fruits of Scholarism,” 394.

118 Marlowe’s Mephistopheles appears in almost every scene after his entrance in 1.3 (although he does grow quieter, speaking fewer lines in the second half of the play than in the first, and appearing mute in 4.2 and 5.2). The only scenes in which he does not appear after his entrance in 1.3 are 1.4, 2.2, the choruses to acts 3 and 4, and the epilogue; Faustus does not appear in these scenes, either.

119 As Mephistopheles tells Faustus, Lucifer seeks human souls to add to his empire because \textit{solamen miseris socios habuisse doloris} (2.1.42). Bevington and Rasmussen translate this line as “It is a comfort to the wretched to have had companions in misery”; apparently this Latin proverb was commonly used in the Middle Ages and Renaissance (\textit{Doctor Faustus}, 140n42).

120 long ere this I should have slain myself
Had not sweet pleasure conquered deep despair.
Have not I made blind Homer sing to me
Of Alexander’s love and Oenone’s death?
And hath not he that built the walls of Thebes
With ravishing sound of his melodious harp
Made music with my Mephistopheles?
Why should I die, then, or basely despair?
I am resolved Faustus shall ne’er repent. (2.3.24–32)


122 It is ironically appropriate that Mephistopheles claims to “show thee what magic can perform” (2.1.85)—he’s showing that magic can conjure up illusions of power, not give real power. Compare
Milton’s Satan, who promises Eve knowledge of “all things visible in heaven, / Or earth, or middle,” which the astute reader should recognize as not that great a prize (Paradise Lost, 9.604–05).

123 Ingram, “‘Pride in Learning,’” 75. This discrepancy is not surprising, since for Marlowe’s audience, “it was accepted dogma that the devil could create nothing but illusions” (Jones, introduction to The English Faust Book, 16).


125 “Dilettante’s Lie,” 245.

126 Bevington and Rasmussen: “No question haunts Faustus more than that of hell’s existence and its nature. He believes himself damned to hell one moment and scoffs at the idea of hell the next” (Doctor Faustus, 26). Bowers, on the other hand, sees Faustus’s constant “questioning” with Mephistopheles in 2.1.124–30 as less a request for information than an occasion for debate—one of Faustus’s favorite activities: “Knowing that demons are always already liars, Faustus engages Mephistopheles in theological absolutes with all the confidence of linguistic free play.” Faustus doesn’t care that the devil is a liar because what matters to him is not acquiring knowledge but winning arguments (“Almost Famous,” 119).

127 Faustus’s request to “question with” rather than “question” uses the language associated with academic disputation (Keefer, Doctor Faustus, 110n116). The fact that the term used for disputation implies collegiality—it’s an activity one undertakes with someone else—makes Faustus’s use of the genre for individualistic empowerment seem all the more perverse.

128 The scenes involving Wagner and the clowns are generally read as low-comedy parodies of the main action; for instance, Gill observes that “Wagner’s first appearance [1.2] is almost a solo act, as he parades his Latin (in mimicry of Faustus) before the bewildered scholars. In [1.4], although he intends to imitate his master by becoming himself a master, Wagner in fact plays straight man to the Clown” (introduction to Doctor Faustus, xix). See also Hattaway, “Theology of Doctor Faustus,” 66; and Okerlund, “Intellectual Folly,” 267–68. But there’s a way in which the serious performances by Faustus and the comic echoes by Wagner and the clowns are too close for comfort. Faustus’s version of the disputation is just as much a parody of the genre as Wagner’s is, and by act 3 Faustus has descended into the realm of the slapstick. Note that as with the mock disputations, the distance between Faustus’s actions in 3.1 and the “parody” of his actions in 3.2 is not very great. Rather than fulfilling the great ambitions he voiced in 1.1, Faustus is now engaging in the type of low comedy that is properly the province of Wagner and the clowns. Okerlund also notes the similarity between his Faustus’s actions and those of the clowns in “Intellectual Folly,” 271. On 3.2 as a parody of 3.1, see Bevington and Rasmussen, Doctor Faustus, 288.

129 “Almost Famous,” 119.

130 “The torments of hell are at once intellectually incredible to him and personally terrifying to one who will suffer them if they are real” (Bevington and Rasmussen, Doctor Faustus, 26). Faustus is revealing himself as animated by something other than ratio here. What he fulfills with necromancy is not an appetite for learning which fulfills his ratio, but an appetite for sensuousness and spectacle that satisfy the appetites humanists denigrate as fit only for beasts—true gluttony (see 7 deadly sins pageant), desire for sex, etc.—appetites that their fantasy of total fulfillment through letters precludes them from having. For more on Faustus’s choice to abandon ratio, see Okerlund, “Intellectual Folly,” 260ff.

131 Doctor Faustus, 26, 27.

132 Spinrad makes a related argument about Faustus’s treatment of knowledge in his opening soliloquy: “Faustus cannot grasp what he cannot see. He is driven, by his need to visualize, into naming and placing things and into discarding the things not amenable to this treatment” (“Dilettante’s Lie,” 244–45). See Hattaway for the role of experiential knowledge in the Protestant theology of the play (“Theology of Doctor Faustus,” 66).
According to Brown, Faustus “really wants Valdes and Cornelius for their books and ‘words of art’ (1.1.152), to learn from them by imitating them” (“Shakespeare’s Anxious Epistemology,” 28). Faustus asks the pair to “show me some demonstrations magical, / That I may conjure in some lusty grove” (1.1.152–53).

Milton’s Satan echoes these statements in his lament that “which way I flie is Hell; my self am Hell” (Paradise Lost 4.75). Milton originally conceived of his Fall work as a play; it’s likely he would have looked to other theatrical representations of the heavenly and the demonic.

Storm agrees: “Faustus can never move toward a greater end when distracted by a present temptation” (“Faustus’s First Soliloquy,” 47). See also Healy on how Mephistopheles interrupts Faustus’s grand plans in Rome with triviality (“Doctor Faustus,” 184–85).


To be sure, he does refer to himself in the second and third person for other reasons as well. Bowers argues that Faustus, similar to modern celebrities who “know their names as brands,” constantly refers to himself in the 3rd person in an attempt to “step outside [himself] to assert an immature self-consciousness masking as accomplishment.” Keefer argues that Faustus’s “mode of apostrophic self-address is, very largely, what constitutes Faustus’s dramatic identity … enact[ing] a split between the speaking subject’s perverse willfulness and the fearful, speechless and strangely passive selfhood which his words invoke and to whom they are addressed.” Russ McDonald attributes the constant echo of “Faustus” in the play (the name appears 150 times in the 1485-line A-text of Doctor Faustus; as a comparison “Hamlet” appears only 72 times in the 3900-line Hamlet) to “the enthusiasm with which the Elizabethan ear responded to repeated patterns.” Spinrad notes the shifting in self-referral between “I,” “thou,” and “Faustus” in his opening soliloquy, arguing that Faustus’s “very method of naming himself … is subject to a grammatical vacillation that will be reflected in his later vacillation of purpose.” See Bowers, “Almost Famous,” 122; Keefer, introduction to Doctor Faustus, 49–50; McDonald, “Marlowe and Style,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christopher Marlowe, ed. Patrick Cheney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 60; and Spinrad, “Dilettante’s Lie,” 244.

Spinrad and Storm both observe that physical danger is more frightening to Faustus than danger to his soul (“Dilettante’s Lie,” 251; “Faustus’s First Soliloquy,” 47). And which is supposed to frighten us more? Are we being indicted here, too, for needing that visual hook of the folkloric hell to engage our imaginations rather than viscerally understanding the (virtually unstageable) horror of being exiled from God’s presence?

Okerlund also makes this point about Faustus’s abuse of language: “Faustus uses words as he pleases, making them mean what he wants to” (“Intellectual Folly,” 265; italics in original).

Spinrad observes that Mephistopheles correctly refers to the illusion he provides for Faustus before he signs the contract as “Nothing” (“Nothing Faustus but to delight thy mind” [2.1.249]); “The emphasis should be on the world ‘Nothing’: Faustus’ mind is indeed delighted by nothings” (“Dilettante’s Lie,” 249).

“Pride in Learning,” 78.

Introduction to Doctor Faustus, 29.

McCullen makes a similar point: “Faustus is afflicted with…pride when the play opens and is dissatisfied because of a surfeit induced by ill-digested gleanings from his reading” (“Dr. Faustus,” 7).

“Fruits of Scholarism,” 396.


In the A-text, 5.2.1 is spoken by first scholar and 5.2.6 is spoken by the second scholar. In the B-text (which Hardin is using), the reverse is true. In either case, there is no indication of which scholar Faustus is addressing.

OED: “chamber-fellow, n. A person who shares a room or rooms with another, esp. in university accommodation.”

The passage in question: “like a friend he invited Doctor Faustus to supper unto his house … and having ended their banquet, the old man began with these words: ‘My loving friend and neighbour Doctor Faustus, I have to desire you of a friendly and Christian request, beseeching you that you will vouchsafe not to be angry with me, but friendly resolve me in my doubt’” (EFB 2454–59).

Gill sees their relationship as “more academic than feudal” (introduction to Doctor Faustus, xix); I disagree. Wagner certainly does not enjoy the same type of bond with Faustus that the other scholars do—there is no amicitia between him and Faustus. As debased as Faustus’s relationship with the scholars becomes, it is still stronger and more intimate than his bond with Wagner.

Bevington and Rasmussen, introduction to Doctor Faustus, 9.

“Geography and Identity,” 241.

Wootton sees 5.1 as a rewriting of the EFB oration (Doctor Faustus, 148n305); I disagree. Marlowe’s Faustus doesn’t exhort his friends to be godly or present his fall as a cautionary tale—he is too distressed to think of anything but that next fatal hour. On the other hand, EFB Faustus still has his wits about him; he’s described as speaking “with a hearty and resolute mind, to the end he might not discomfort them [his friends]” (EFB 2878–79).

Introduction to Doctor Faustus, 55.

Spinrad, “Dilettante’s Lie,” 248, 251. As Spinrad notes, “most of the sometimes all too trivial benefits that he gains from his traffic in magic are things done for him by Mephostophilis or others, not things he has done himself” (248).

The question of when exactly Faustus is damned (and by implication when, if ever, it is too late for him to repent) is a matter of vigorous critical debate. See Bevington and Rasmussen, introduction to Doctor Faustus, 19–22, 85n84, for a summary of various positions.

“Dilettante’s Lie,” 250.

“Dr. Faustus,” 15.

The significance of ends for Marlowe’s play is established in the opening scene in Faustus’s study in which we see him discarding entire realms of knowledge—Aristotle’s logic, Galen’s medicine, Justinian’s law, Jerome’s divinity—because he thinks he has reached their ends (in terms of scope—e.g., logic and physic) or is dissatisfied with their ends (in terms of purpose—e.g., law and divinity). Faustus is not friendly to the idea of authority; his mention of authoritative figures reinforces the finitude of each domain. When Faustus finally brings up magic, he mentions no authority, no one who has delineated the ends of learning—“end” here in the senses of “purpose” and “scope.”


Highlighting 1.1.70–71, Brown argues that Faustus seeks out Cornelius and Valdes to serve as
authorities for him: “Faustus searches out endlessly more potent authorities to reward his labor—he really wants Valdes and Cornelius for their books and ‘words of art’ (1.1.160), to learn from them by imitating them” (“Shakespeare’s Anxious Epistemology,” 28). Casting Cornelius and Valdes as authorities implies a separation between them and Faustus, which I don’t see. It is true, however, that they are the only characters he is willing to learn from—so in that sense Brown is correct. It is worth noting that Cornelius and Valdes’s instruction of Faustus in magic is one of only two successful instances of knowledge production alluded to in the play (the other being Faustus’s oracular performance), both of which take place offstage. Like the exclusion of disputation from the action of the play, the absence of conference indicates the futility of humanist ideals in Faustus’s mental and moral landscape.

163 1560 Geneva Bible.

164 Introduction to Doctor Faustus, 57. Several scholars indict Faustus for his failure as a theologian to recognize that God’s mercy triumphs over justice: for example, see Ingram, “‘Pride in Learning,’” 77; McCullen, “Dr. Faustus,” 14; Spinrad, “Dilettante’s Lie,” 245; Storm, “Faustus’s First Soliloquy,” 43.


166 Indeed, the flight/fall imagery from the prologue returns in the final act, first in the Old Man’s triumphant cry: “Hence, hell! For hence, I fly unto my God” (5.1.119) and then in Faustus’s unsuccessful attempt: “O, I’ll leap up to my God! Who pulls me down?” (5.2.77). In Faustus’s line, Keefer reads Marlowe as quoting his own translation of Ovid’s Amores 1.15.41–42: Ergo etiam cum me supremus adederit ignis, / vivam, parsque mei multa superstes erit: “Then though death rakes my bones in funeral fire, / I’ll live, and as he pulls me down mount higher” (Doctor Faustus, 167n70); I think this couplet is more aptly compared with the Old Man’s line.

167 Although one might argue that the abandonment was mutual—scholars note that Faustus’s plea in 2.3.82–23: “Ah, Christ, my Saviour, / Seek to save distressed Faustus’ soul!” prompts the appearance of neither God or Christ but rather Lucifer, Beezlebub, and Mephistopheles. See Bevington and Rasmussen, introduction to Doctor Faustus, 30; and Keefer, introduction to Doctor Faustus, 48.
Chapter Four:  
Placing Absence in Milton’s *Epitaphium Damonis*

Since we had agreed upon it, I long expected letters from you; but though I had not yet received any, I did not, believe me, allow my old affection towards you to cool because of such a trifle … I do not wish true friendship to be weighted by Letters and Salutations, which may all be false but on either hand to rest and sustain itself upon the deep roots of the soul, and, begun with sincere and blameless motives, even though mutual courtesies cease, to be free from suspicion and blame. For fostering such a friendship there is need not so much for writing as for a living remembrance of virtues on both sides. Even if you had not written, that obligation would not necessarily remain unfulfilled. Your worth writes to me instead and inscribes real letters on my inmost consciousness; your candor of character writes, and your love of right; your genius writes too (by no means an ordinary one) and further recommends you to me.

– John Milton to Charles Diodati, 1637

From spring 1638–summer 1639, John Milton toured Europe and stayed in Italy, following the customary Continental itinerary of young Englishmen of means. There he encountered a novel cultural institution—Italian academies, which Barbara K. Lewalski characterizes as “private associations of scholars and literati [who] combined during their frequent meetings social warmth, intellectual exchange, poetic performance, and literary criticism.” In distinction to the Republic of Letters, a virtual and disembodied community of like-minded intellectuals scattered across Europe (one that Joshua Phillips in his study of communities in Tudor England might call a “corporate body”), the Italian academies fostered a community that was present and embodied (what Phillips would term a “collective self”). Milton’s early writing demonstrates the influence of both kinds of social organization on his conception of friendship; for example, in one of the two extant letters he sent to his closest childhood friend, Charles Diodati (quoted in the epigraph), he makes a stronger endorsement of virtual friendships than even Erasmus does. Just as Erasmus rejects material things as tokens of friendship in his letter to Peter Giles (discussed in Chapter 1), Milton here rejects even the “letters and salutations” Erasmus prefers; all the friends need to sustain a “true friendship” is a “living remembrance of virtues on both sides.”

Anna K. Nardo and Estelle Haan contend that Milton’s trip to Italy had a decisive impact on his view of English education; I would argue that it had an equally large impact on his view of friendship. Milton was the only Englishman to participate in the Italian academies; the recitation of *il Giovane Milton Inglese* is recorded in the minutes of the Florentine Accademia degli Svoagliati with the note that his poetry was *multo erudita*; the poems written by Milton in tribute to the academicians he befriended are published in the Latin section of his 1645 *Poems*, which is headed up by *testimonialia* from various academicians; he exchanged letters with Florentine academian Carlo Dati after he returned to England (although this exchange was almost thwarted by the vicissitudes of the international post). Diodati died when Milton was abroad; after Milton returned home, he wrote the Latin elegy *Epitaphium Damonis* as a tribute to Diodati, sending printed copies to the academicians he had befriended in Italy. *Epitaphium Damonis* reflects the influence of Milton’s experience with the academies in its questioning of the ability of letters to sustain friendships across great distance.

In *Epitaphium Damonis* Milton interrogates the idea that these barriers of distance can be surmounted through letters, that one’s physical location in relation to one’s addressee does not
matter. As I argued in Chapter 1, humanists often imputed to writing the power to take one out of the physical world, creating a virtual world in which amici could congregate. For the humanist, participating in the Republic of Letters was both an inoculation against the charge of being antisocial and a way to connect with other intellectuals across Europe, developing close friendships mediated through letters (both epistolae and bonae litterae) and learning.9 The idea that epistolae can conquer physical space is in many ways counterintuitive; as we will see, the very content of humanist letters often belies it. Rejecting his earlier rhetoric in his letter to Diodati, Milton makes clear in Epitaphium Damonis that virtual friendships are just as subject to the contingencies of time and space as embodied friendships are—if not more so. As we will see, Milton’s reliance on both models of friendship in his writing calls into question the necessity of the amicus, present or absent, for poetic production.

Ironically, in putatively conquering the physical contingencies making connection over distance difficult, the letters make these contingencies more salient by providing both a forum for and a record of complaints about them. Humanist correspondence is full of complaints about the vicissitudes of the postal system and references to the same mountains, seas, and other topographical features that the letters are supposed to render irrelevant. Another hindrance to connection is the questionable accuracy of the information received in letters. In one letter, Milton has to assure a correspondent that he is in fact not dead (as rumor has it):

Small wonder if, in the midst of so many deaths of my countrymen, in a year of such heavy pestilence, you believed, as you write you did, on the faith of some special rumour, that I also had been cut off … But, by the blessing of God, who had provided for my safety in a country retreat, I am still both alive and well, nor useless yet, I hope, for any duty that remains to be performed by me in this life.10

In his work on the early modern social network, Blaine Greteman shows that many letters contained information that the sender knew would be dated by the time it was read. Pointing to the frequency of deictic temporal markers in the letters, Greteman argues from this evidence that the goal in letter writing was less to communicate information than to communicate a moment—to impart a sense of present-ness or presence, irrespective of the location of writer and recipient.11 Yet humanists were also invested in the importance of place. The motivation for the customary Italian pilgrimage (which would in later centuries be called the Grand Tour) was a sense that one could get something from visiting Italy that one could not get from simply reading about it.12 One of the most productive tensions in Épitaphium Damonis comes from the recognition of the importance of place bumping up against the disregard for physical separation implied in the idea that letters can sustain friendships across vast distances.

Another mythos called into question in Milton’s poem is the mutually enriching nature of amicitia and studia—two concepts closely bound up with each other in the humanist imagination. What happens when your studia draw you to travel abroad, leaving your alter idem behind? We will explore how the push and pull between those two places—the seat of studia and the seat of amicitia—is negotiated in Epitaphium Damonis.

1. **Amicitia and studia**

In light of the fact that the humanist conception of amicitia centered on scholarly endeavor and love of letters, it is no surprise that Milton’s Latin poetry is at once more personal and more recondite than his English verse.13 Classical allusions are strings in the web knit by and knitting humanists together.14 For example, in Elegia quarta they serve to demonstrate Thomas Young’s
skill as a tutor (or alternatively, to win its author a pat on the head from his old instructor, as Stella P. Revard suggests\textsuperscript{15}). More generally, they are a means of connection, reinforcing the bonds between writer and reader by signaling that they are in the same exclusive club of erudition. Each allusion is another string in the web, doing the work of affiliation. Shared conventions—referring to the Christian God as Jupiter, for example—create a sense of community based on shared affiliation with the ancients, which is just as important.\textsuperscript{16}

*Epitaphium Damonis* calls this paradigm into question in presenting a situation in which pursuit of *otium litteratum*—*studia*—seems to hinder rather than foster *amicitia*. Thyrsis’s travel abroad is framed as a turn towards *studia* at the expense of *amicitia*.

The tendency of scholars to identify themselves with the objects of their study sets up the basis for the competition between *amicus* and object of study as one’s true *alter idem*. The object of study becomes yet another “other self”; this is why *amicitia* is always triangulated through this object. This is why the choice between *studia* and *amicitia* is so fraught in *Epitaphium Damonis*—either way, one is “compelled to live a half-life” (*Elegia quarta*, line 20).\textsuperscript{17}

*Epitaphium Damonis* takes on two important ideas underpinning humanist conceptions of the Republic of Letters: that letters are able to connect friends over distance, and that *studia* and *amicitia* are mutually sustaining rather than opposed. In his grief, Milton reveals a world in which neither of these truisms holds true. We know nothing about the correspondence that may or may not have passed between Milton in Italy and Diodati in England, but we do know that Thyrsis stayed abroad for two harvests after Damon died—we know because the poem insists on telling us. I agree with John S. Garrison’s suggestion that in the poem a sense of “culpability” threatens to attach itself to Thyrsis’s travel abroad and (by proxy) to his studies—based on the second sentence of the argumentum: “Thyrsis, having set out on a journey abroad for the sake of his soul, received news of Damon’s death [*Thyris animi causâ profectus peregrè de obitu Damonis nuntium accepit*].”\textsuperscript{18}

Here *animus*, which from our discussion in Chapter 2 we have seen is associated with intellectual labor, is in danger of being cast as worthless *nugae* in light of the poem’s reproach of Thyrsis (and his own self-reproach). *Animi causâ* has been translated variously; among the editions I have consulted, five render the phrase in terms suggesting play, making Thyris’s purpose in travel ultimately “gratification” (Haan), “pleasure” (Braden, Carey, Knapp), or “amusement” (Shawcross). Alternatively, seven translate *animi causâ* using the notion of “improvement” or “mental improvement” (Revard, Leonard, Flannagan, Campbell, Bush, MacKellar, and Masson). Hughes uses “studying abroad,” which could mean either or both.\textsuperscript{19} Garrison argues for the latter sense over the former because “within the context of that reading, Milton’s activity has a certain worth and is less culpable than amusement.”\textsuperscript{20} This notion of culpability suggests that intellectual labor in danger of being cast as frivolous leisure because it takes Thyrsis away from his friend. The ambiguity of *animi* (evidenced by the inability of translators to agree on a translation) is a threat in itself—perhaps intellectual studies are not that far from idle amusements after all. Later we are told that the love of the sweet Muse (*dulcis amor Musae*) holds Thyrsis in Rome and that he comes back only *ubi mens expleta* (when his mind had been filled), a phrase which seems to refer unambiguously to learning.\textsuperscript{21} The reader might feel relieved because of the undisputable reference to intellectual endeavor—if, of course, her conception of intellectual endeavor has not already been tainted by its (potential) association with *animus* and amusement.

The physical distance between the two friends adds to the culpability threatening to attach itself to study, as it seems to have blunted Thyrsis’s feelings of connection to Damon: it is
“anxiety for his abandoned flock,” not for his friend, that calls him back home (lines 14–15); he returns only “when his mind was filled to satisfaction”—that is, only after he had completely fulfilled his purpose in traveling abroad (line 14); and it is only sitting under the accustomed elm (line 15) that he truly feels the full force of the loss he has suffered (which suggests that some things, such as the loss of a friend, can never truly be communicated by nuntium, but apprehended only in situ.) After demonstrating the inadequacy of letters (in the form of nuntium) to fully convey the loss, now, of course, his challenge is to fully convey the loss in a poem. The fact that Thyrsis lingered so long in Italy suggests that the distance between the two had blunted Thyrsis’s affection for Damon without Thyrsis’s realizing it.

Whether we as readers assign culpability to Thyrsis’s lingering in Italy depends on the tone we assign to the narrator’s description of the amount of time he spent there. It is notable that the poem inserts facts about Thyrsis’s stay in Italy that the argumentum glosses over; there are several frames surrounding Thyrsis’s lament. While the argumentum moves directly from Thyrsis’s receiving the news to his arrival back home (“Thyrsis … received news of Damon’s death. Afterwards upon returning home …”), the narrator of lines 1–17 adds three details: 1. that he lingered abroad, 2. why he lingered abroad (love of the sweet Muse) and 3. how long he lingered abroad (two harvests). That the poem inserts these facts rather than glossing over them as the argumentum does suggests that it is important for us to be aware of them.

Even so, the poem gives us mixed messages about how to feel about Thyrsis’s decision to stay abroad:

Et jam bis viridi surgebat culmus arista,
Et totidem flavas numerabant horrea messes,
Ex quo summa dies tulerat Damona sub umbras,
Nec dum aderat Thyrsis; pastorem scilicet illum
Dulcis amor Musæ Thusca retinebat in urbe. (lines 9–13)

Twice already had the stalk sprung up with its green ear of corn and the granaries had counted in just as many golden harvests since his final day had borne Damon down beneath the shades, and Thyrsis was not yet present, for love of the sweet Muse detained that shepherd in a Tuscan city.

While scilicet (“obviously,” “naturally,” “evidently”) implies that staying was the self-evidently appropriate choice (or at least that that Thyrsis’s staying abroad is not at all unexpected), there is an emphasis on the span of time he stays (two harvests). Retinebat (“hold back”) suggests that Thrysis would have gone back if not for his love of the Muse, even as scilicet suggests that there was no mental struggle in making the decision. However, it does seem that the narrator of lines 1–17 thinks that it is strange that Thyrsis spent two more harvests abroad. The tone of the passage—and the question of the narrator’s approval or disapproval—seems to hinge on how we translate Et jam bis … / Et totidem … / Nec dum aderat Thyrsis … /… in urbe. Many of the translations I consulted give the impression that the narrator thinks two harvests is a long time to linger in Italy.

The jam in et jam bis (line 9) could mean “already” (suggesting impatience or emphasizing the length of time) or simply “now.” Braden and Carey translate jam as “already”; even more emphatic is the rendering of jam bis as “twice already” in Haan, Campbell, Bush, and Patterson. Others take the more neutral approach of rendering the jam as “now” (Revard, Leonard, Flannagan, Shawcross, Hughes); MacKellar and Masson don’t translate the jam at all.
Possibly the most neutral (least accusatory) translation of *Nec dum* (line 12) is “not yet”—which nonetheless gives off a slight air of reproach. Rendering the phrase with versions of “[Two harvests passed] … and Thyris was *not yet* there” are Haan, Campbell, and Knapp. Braden uses “yet” but in a more damning way: “[Two harvests passed] … and *yet* Thyris was not there”—implying a failure to fulfill the expectation that he *would* be there. Adding the implicit suggestion that he is dallying too long in Italy are those who render *dum* as “still” (e.g., “[Two harvests passed] … and *still* Thyris was not there”; Leonard, Shawcross, and Hughes). The most insistent on Thyris’s absence as a failure are Flannagan and Carey, who offer “yet still” as a translation; Carey makes the failure even clearer with his description of Thyris as “missing” (i.e., not where he is supposed to be): “[two harvests passed] … *yet still* Thyris was *missing*.”

If the narrator suggests (through tone) that Thyris’s stay in Italy was inappropriate (and if the narrator’s attitude suggests how we are supposed to respond), then perhaps we are supposed to think that Thyris acted disloyally towards Damon—and that this disloyalty is attributable to the distance between them that blunted Thyris’s affection, suggesting that distance *does* influence the strength of friendship. Contrary to the claims Erasmus makes in his letter to Giles, however, distance *weakens* rather than strengthens *amicitia*.

As if to resolve the question of culpability raised in lines 1–17, Thyris’s lament in lines 113–15 challenges the logic of the *scilicet*:

Heu quis me ignotas traxit vagus error in oras  
Ire per aëreas rupes, Alpemque nivosam!  
Ecquid erat tanti Romam vidisse sepultam? (lines 113–15)

Alas, what labyrinthine wandering drew me to travel to unknown shores across lofty cliffs and the snowy Alps! Was it worth so much to have seen buried Rome? These lines offer another instance of reproach, now intensified—it is more personal (Thyris directs it at himself), explicit instead of implicit (as the narrator’s is), and it attacks Thyris’s disloyalty not in tarrying abroad too long, but in leaving Damon’s side at all. In line 113, Thyris lets us know in no uncertain terms that his drive to go to Italy was caused not by something noble or worthwhile (potentially represented by *animi causa*) but by *vagus error* (which I’d like to translate as “wandering wandering”; the redundancy of meaning insists on the concept of aimlessness, suggesting that once Thyris is untethered from his friend, any travel at all is vain, without purpose). In this section of the poem, Milton is in dialogue with exile poetry, which, as mentioned above, makes much of the distance and topographical features separating the speaker and addressee. Thyris’s lament that “so many deep seas, so many mountains, so many woods, so many rocks and resounding rivers” separate him from his friend echoes that of Milton’s *Elegia quarta*; Haan notes an echo of Ovid’s *Tristia* 4.7.21–22 (*innumeri montes inter me teque viaequae / fluminaque et campi nec freta paucha jacent*; “Countless mountains lie between thee and me, and roads, and rivers, and plains, and not a few seas”). While following this model, Milton breaks with its conventions in two respects—culpability and center of gravity—to make a point about the complexity of the humanist situation: one is connected to so many others in a world with so many different centers of learning. The difficulty might be felt especially keenly by the English who were cut off from Europe (as noted in the effusive *testimonium* Antonio Francini writes for Milton: “Encircled by the expansive eddies of the deep ocean lies England, separated from the world” [lines 13–15]).
Unlike the situation in *Tristia* and *Elegia quarta*, the separation in *Epitaphium Damonis* is consciously chosen—hence Thyrsis’s lament takes on an element of self-reproach for putting himself in this situation *sua sponte*, something we do not see in the other poems. For example, the speaker of *Elegia quarta* complains, “I am compelled to live a half-life” (my italics; *Dimidio vitae vivere coger ego*, line 20) and laments that seas and mountains *me faciunt alia parte carere mei* (line 22; “caus[e] me to be separated from the other part of myself”; my italics). The use of *pelagi* and *montes* as subjects and *me* as object of *faciunt* gives the topographical features themselves responsibility for his predicament. Similarly, the topographical features (*montes, viae, flumina, campi, freta*) are the subject of *jacent* in the *Tristia* lines; they are given the responsibility of forming a barrier *inter me teque*. By contrast, in *Epitaphium Damonis*, it is Thyrsis’s own *vagus error* that unnecessarily puts seas and mountains between himself and Damon; Thyrsis is the subject of the verb *interponere* while the physical barriers separating him from Damon are objects of the verb: *Possem tot maria alta, tot interponere montes, / Tot sylvas, tot saxa tibi fluviosque sonantes*; “that I could place between us so many deep seas, so many mountains, so many woods, so many rocks and roaring rivers” (lines 119–20).

The humanist dilemma of exile is thus constructed differently from the classical version, in which there is only *one* center of arts and learning. While Ovid in *Tristia* is dealing with the contrast between home and not-home, or more specifically Rome (civilization) and not-Rome (barbarism), the situation for Milton is more complicated. Already in the first three lines he conjoins Sicily with London (“Declare a Sicilian song through the towns of the Thames,” line 3);34 in the course of the poem we will also encounter Rome, Florence, and a multiplicity of English locations. Each of them has value, holds something precious, and therefore cannot be denigrated as the culturally barren wasteland of a “not-London” (as Cambridge is in *Elegia prima*, another poem that plays with the exile trope—the ironic twist being that his place of supposed exile corresponds to Ovid’s desired Rome). What to do when you are in one of these special places and thus not in another special place with your *alter idem*? In *Tristia* and *Elegia quarta* (which refers to Thomas Young as being in exile from his own shores), the gravitational pull is in only one direction—home.35 In *Epitaphium Damonis*, by contrast, home and not-home (or England and Italy here) both exert attractive pressure on Thyrsis because they both hold something precious he desires (*amicitia* and *studia*). Attending to one means neglecting the other.36 In this passage Damon seems to be given greater weight, but these very lines testify that this has not always been the case.

2. **Presence of *Pastores Thucsi* and gift-texts as currency**

In addition to breaking exile poetry’s convention of the single center of gravity, Milton also breaks elegiac convention by featuring only a single mourner (Thyrsis).37 The introduction of the *Pastores Thucsi*—not as fellow mourners, in accordance with classical convention, but as friends of the poet unconnected to the subject of the elegy—resolves the *studia* vs. *amicitia* question. It is as if Milton is asserting that the two must be aligned, regardless of the violence done to the elegiac form. In other words, the *amicitia* vs. *studia* narrative is complicated by the fact that in choosing the sweet muse, he found *amicitia* with the *Pastores Thucsi*, the Florentine academicians who also happen to be “young men well-versed in the Muses” (line 126).38 Just as Thyrsis and Damon did, Thyrsis and the *Pastores* pursued the same studies [*eadem studia*] (*Argumentum*).
Milton’s inclusion of the *Pastores Thusi* also addresses the question of letters conquering distance; in order to understand how, we must turn to Cedric C. Brown’s theory about the role played by *Pastores* in the poem—and the concept of *amicitia* as a fungible good. The subject of the poem, according to Brown, can be taken to be not a single *amicus* but *amicitia* in its various manifestations; as a gift-text itself, it participates in the very cycle of textual gift-exchange that it depicts (what Brown calls “a widening circle of remembrance, obligation, and affection”). *Amicitia*, then, is fungible—or perhaps it is the acts of textual generosity sustaining *amicitia*, the imagined currency among this group of humanists, that are fungible. It is specifically poetry—or “gift-texts” to use Brown’s terminology—that is the currency among the group of individuals mentioned in *Epitaphium Damonis*, rather than simply “generosity” or “gifts”: Manso’s gift of cups (line 181) represent books of poetry; the “baskets, bowls and pipes with waxen fastenings” (line 135) given by the *Pastores* are the *testimonia* Milton publishes in his 1645 *Poems*. This circle of gift-text exchange reflects Lorna Hutson’s idea of the “textualization of friendship” touched on in Chapter 1.

Brown makes a case that the poem “builds up a web of memories of generosity, linking different parties together”; it is important that the parties that are linked call different places home. Take Manso’s gift of the pocula, which is the subject of an ekphrasis in lines 184–97 culminating in a scene of Diodati’s apotheosis: here Milton “allow[s] one act of hospitable friendship by another party [the Neapolitan Manso] to reveal the means of celebrating the special friendship in question [with the English Diodati], and consequently spread[s] that understanding to the [Tuscan] friends to whom the generous gift-text was sent.”

Milton actually pretends that Damon is one of the figures inscribed on the cup. Here *amicitia* is triangulated through an art object standing in for a text, Manso’s book of poetry. Inscribed on the cup is a scene of Cupid shooting his arrows into heaven rather than on earth—a condensed emblem of eros’s sublimation. And this sublimated eros ends up accruing more to poetry than to the friendship itself.

Brown’s theory that *Epitaphium Damonis* is a part of a set of gift-texts with the purpose of celebrating *amicitia* and connecting friends is borne out in Milton’s own comments on the poem. In a 1647 letter to Florentine academician Carlo Dati, he explains that he sent the poem including the *Pastores* in an “emblem” as both a token of friendship and a way to prompt connection through letters:

“I had taken particular care to send it [*Epitaphium Damonis*], so that however small a proof of talent it might be it should be an unmistakable proof of my affection for you all—by means of those few lines I inserted as an emblem. My idea was that by this means I might induce yourself or someone else to write to me; for if I wrote first, I must either write to all, or fear that if I gave the preference to one I should be offending all the others, when they got to know about it …”

Here we see the humanist dilemma of multiple centers of learning echoed in a Milton’s dilemma of multiple candidates for epistolary exchange; suffering from an embarrassment of riches, Milton cannot choose just one. Both the embarrassment of riches and Milton’s strategy for dealing with it become important later. Extending Brown’s claim, we can argue that Milton in *Epitaphium Damonis* attempts to do what letters are said to be able to do—create a virtual meeting place for his friends. Milton’s rejection of Erasmian theory might be nuanced thus: if letters cannot conquer distance, they may at least be able to celebrate friendship and, in celebrating friendship, bridge the gap between absent friends.
3. The virtual *hic*

Extending Brown’s argument that Milton connects his friends through images of generosity and gift-exchange in *Epitaphium Damonis*, we can conjecture that Milton also connects his friends through an involved and intricate process of scrambling space and time in the poem. This is important because it suggests that poetry has some connecting power that letters (or prose, or non-fiction) do not; it is worth noting that Milton chooses to send a poem rather than a letter to reconnect with the academicians upon his return to England. It is shortly after Thyrsis’s speech of self-reproach that we see *amicitia* redeeming *studia*:

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Quamquam etiam vestri nunquam meminisse pigebit
Pastores Thusci, Musis operata juventus,
Hic Charis, atque Lepos; & Thuscus tu quoque Damon,
Antiquâ genus unde petis Lucumonis ab urbe. (125–28)
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And yet I shall never grow tired of your memory, Tuscan shepherds, young men well-versed in the Muses; here were Grace and Charm; and you too Damon were Tuscan, deriving your family line from the ancient city of Lucca.

The interpretive crux of this passage is the *quamquam* in line 125 (“nevertheless” or “even though”), which signals a weighing of two opposing concepts or situations; the ambiguity surrounding the *quamquam* line prompts us to ask what exactly hangs in the balance for Thyrsis. Note that line 125 is the hinge between looking to England and looking to Italy; it is here that the poem pivots from looking to Damon to looking to the *Pastores Thusci*. Does *quamquam* qualify the preceding wish to have been there with Damon as he died (“I could have been permitted to touch your right hand for the last time and gently close your eyes as you peacefully died, and could have said ‘farewell: remember me as you journey to the stars’” [Ah certè extremum licuisset tangere dextram, / Et bene compositos placidè morientis ocellos, / et dixisse vale, nostril memor ibis ad astra, lines 121–23]), or the following statement that he will never weary of remembering the Tuscan shepherds? The most common rendering of *quamquam* among the translations I consulted is “And yet,” which signals that the contrast is being drawn with a previous idea; thus the first interpretation seems apt here.43 Braden’s “yet still” similarly points to the previous idea.

Alternatively, Campbell’s and Shawcross’s translations favor the second interpretation—that Milton is balancing the *Pastores* against Damon as Grace and Charm personified. In both, the use of a comma instead of semicolon after “Muses” indicates that “here were grace and charm” is the main clause that the “although” clause introduces and contradicts: “Although I shall never weary of your memory, Tuscan shepherds, youths devoted to the Muses, here were Grace and Charm” (Campbell). Masson’s “Albeit” similarly seems to point forward to a qualification.

The Hughes and MacKellar translations favor the second interpretation because each adds an extra “yet” to the line. For example, the Hughes reads: “Though I shall never weary of your memory, Tuscan shepherds … yet here was grace and here was gentleness”); this rendering suggests that Thyrsis weighs Damon against the *Pastores Thusci* and finds definitively in Damon’s favor.44

The second interpretation of the passage (essentially, “thinking about you, *Pastores Thusci*, is not enough because Diodati was Charm and Grace himself—and also half-Italian”) is intriguing because it is dicier than the first interpretation. But I find the first interpretation to be
more apt because is less agitated by competition: “I should not have left Damon to travel to Rome—although I will never be unhappy to remember the Tuscan shepherds.” Rather than definitively declaring a winner, Milton is staging the struggle, the push and pull between two centers of gravity, in these very lines.45

As difficult as it is to believe that Thyrsis would suggest that it was worth missing Damon’s last moments to have made these new friends, the situation is a complicated one. It is certainly nice that he has these new friends since his old friend is dead (as Milton writes in his letter to Dati: “When I felt crushed by grief and mourning in the course of honouring [Diodati’s] death, and sought solace and some respite where I could, the best joy I could find was remembering all of you in Florence, and yourself especially”46). Garrison would say that Milton here is demonstrating one of the benefits of group friendship over dyadic friendship: “Group friendship offers some insurance against loss.”47 One can’t help but be struck by the coldness of this formulation (to which we will return) and the utilitarian conception of friendship that it suggests. The choice seems stark: either Thyrsis goes abroad and makes new friends or he stays home and closes Damon’s eyes as he dies. The question of whether the solace he draws from remembering his new amici is greater than or equal to the solace he would have drawn from having shared in Damon’s last moments is unanswerable—but this would not necessarily prevent Thyrsis (or Milton) from asking it.

In the first interpretation of the quamquam passage, it is his acquaintance with the Pastores Thusci that saves his trip abroad from being completely vain and worthless in Thyrsis’s eyes. In reproaching himself for going abroad, Thyrsis tries to make his choice seem as loathsome and illogical as possible—thus what the argumentum characterizes as animi causa degrades in Thyrsis’s lament into vagus error—he is framing the choice as one between amicitia and error instead of amicitia and studia or animi; in Garrison’s terms, he presents a more “culpable” reason for leaving.48 But even as he paints the choice to stay with Damon in England as the unequivocally superior choice, he cannot help but qualify his harsh characterization of his trip: “Quamquam, what I do not regret is going to Florence, because I met such wonderful people.” It wasn’t completely vain, worthless; what saves it from being so is amicitia with the Pastores Thusci.

The narrative about choosing studia and neglecting amicitia is thus complicated by the answer to his question Why is it worth it to see buried Rome? Self-reproach turns into fond recollection (a strange turn)—not of Damon but of the Pastores Thusci. Thus the answer to question Why is it worth it to see buried Rome? is “to meet other people interested in buried Rome”—amicitia becomes the justification for studia, removing the taint of culpability. Thyrsis’s consolation for losing Damon comes not from ancient Rome (Roma … sepultam) but from seventeenth-century Florence.49

Even so, Milton’s curious use of hic (“here”) in line 127 suggests his recognition that physical contingencies cannot simply be wished away.50 By addressing the shepherds as Thusci (“Tuscan shepherds”), Thyrsis makes it abundantly clear that he and his addresssees are in different places; the reader is left to wonder where exactly “hic” is pointing. Carey, Leonard, and Bush try to resolve the ambiguity—unjustifiably, I think—by translating hic as “with you,” making unquestionable the physical separation between Thrysis and the Pastores Thusci.51 I think Milton uses hic to create ambiguity and confusion intentionally, making conspicuous the Erasmian trope of letters creating a space in which writer and addressee can be together—a virtual hic. However, the poem’s ability to create and populate an imagined space has some apparent limitations, since it seems that the space created by the poem must be tethered to a real
space: the city of Florence. Perhaps this is because, as Milton will lament later in his letter to Dati, “that departure from Florence deeply distressed me. It left a sting in my heart which penetrates deeper now whenever I remember so many good friends, such kind companions all living together in one city, so distant, but so dear; I left most unwillingly, wrenched away.”

Note that the second half of line 127 shifts address quite abruptly from the *Pastores Thusci* to Damon; pulling Damon into the same line as the *Pastores Thusci* pulls him into the virtual *hic* created by the line. But this move creates confusion and ambiguity as well, because the connection between the first and second halves of the line is not readily apparent. The second half of the line reads as a non sequitur; Milton is forcing us to figure out what binds these two ideas (“Grace and Charm are here” and “you also are Tuscan”) together. Is *Thuscus* associated with *Hic* (meaning “here” [i.e., in Florence], and by extension “of Tuscan ancestry”) or *Charis atque Lepos* (“possessing grace and charm” [i.e., like the Florentine academicians])? *Charis et Lepos* must be associated with *Thuscus* for the second half of the line not to be a non sequitur, I think, and so when Thyrsus says Damon is *Thuscus*, he could mean either “possessing grace and charm” or “of Tuscan ancestry.” It seems that he means both—the ambiguity is purposeful on Milton’s part. The *quoque* could apply to *Thuscus* (as all of my translators have it; “you too are Tuscan, Damon”) or the *Caris atque Lepos* (“and you too, Tuscan Damon [have these qualities]”). The ambiguity might suggest that Damon and the *Pastores Thusci* are interchangeable. The message seems to be: “Diodati is practically Italian himself, given his father’s lineage.” Another reason for this disconcerting ambiguity might be the importance of nationality. It is striking that out of all the characteristics that make Damon similar to (and thus fit for *amicitia* with) the *Pastores Thusci*, Milton chooses to single out his ancestry in this line. Surely this isn’t the only similarity between Damon and the *Pastores*, or the most important one. If indeed *hic* really is confined to Florence, if this is the *only* place such a meeting can be imagined, then the power of the letter (*litterae, epistola*) to bridge distance seems relatively limited.

If Milton emphasizes the importance of place in tying his virtual *hic* to Florence, he does the same in suggesting that connection to a common physical location is necessary to be able to build and sustain *amicitia*. The first thing Milton tells us about Thyrsis and Damon in his *argumentum* is that they lived in the same neighborhood (*Thyrsis et Damon ejusdem vicinae Pastores*)—there is a recognition here that physical proximity plays a significant role in fostering friendship. The first thing we are told about Diodati (as opposed to Damon) in the *argumentum* is that he has Italian ancestry (*Carolus Deodatus ex urbe Hetruriae Luca paterno genere oriundus*; “Charles Diodati, descended through his father’s family from the Tuscan city of Lucca”), but interestingly enough, the *argumentum* also makes it clear that Diodati is “in other respects English” (*cætera Anglus*), a phrase that some translators render more emphatic than others. The focus on Diodati’s dual attachment (if not citizenship) suggests that he *must* be amphibious (so to speak) in order to connect with both the *Anglus* Milton and the *Pastores Thusci*. Similarity is essential in classical conceptions of *amicitia*; Milton might be using place metonymically here to signify this similarity. Read literally rather than metonymically, however, the *argumentum* suggests that Damon/Diodati is related to Thyrsis/Milton by physical proximity (they are *eiusdem vicinae pastores*) and (thus) by being an Englishman (*cætera Anglus*); he is related to *Pastores* by having a connection to a physical location they are connected to and (thus) by being *Thuscus* *quoque* (*quoque* [“also”] emphasizes Damon’s similarity to the shepherds). There is a doubleness here that needs to be addressed: what does it mean to be *Anglus*, and what does it mean to be *Thuscus*? *Cætera Anglus* suggests that there is something
more to being an Anglus than physical presence in England; there is an intrinsic quality involved.55 Thuscus ... quoque is perhaps associated with Charis et Lepos, which are both present hic (in Florence, perhaps). Milton tethers his virtual hic to a specific place because he wants to make the virtual relationships with his friends as close as possible to embodied relationships.56 But in order to make the physical connection to a place, Milton must pull in the idea of ancestry,57 which takes us out of the present moment—adding a temporal dimension to Milton’s distortion of place. But in this case the temporality of the poem becomes untethered rather than fixed.

Greteman’s treatment of temporal deixis in early modern letters (discussed above) suggests that in addition to creating a space where writer and reader can congregate, letters do something similar with time. In both cases, communicating information is secondary, even ancillary, to creating a sense of shared space or time—shared presence and present-ness.58 Notably, this is not true in Epitaphium Damonis, as the omission of esse in line 127 indicates. While suppressing esse is common in Latin verse, the result here is a confusion about whether Thyrsis is making a statement about the past or present. The fact that it is impossible to distinguish between past and present in this line is evidenced by the nearly even split among translators in rendering the tense of the implied esse: Haan, Flannagan, Campbell, Shawcross, Hughes, MacKellar, and Masson translate the first half of the line in the perfect tense (e.g., Haan’s “here were Grace and Charm”), while Revard, Carey, Braden, Leonard, Bush, and Knapp use the present tense (e.g., Revard’s “Here are grace and charm”). Interestingly enough, all the translators I have consulted use past tense for the second half of the line (e.g., Haan’s “and you too Damon were Tuscan”)—possibly reasoning that because Damon is dead, any statement referring to him must be in the past tense. Compare the final characterization of Diodati in the argumentum: “he was while he lived a young man distinguished for intellect, learning and other most illustrious virtues [ingenio, doctrina, clarissimisque caeteris virtutibus, dum viveret, juvenis egregius].”59 Here the dum viveret (“while he lived”) is superfluous, and the superfluity of the phrase is emphasized by its being set off by commas, delaying the subject of the sentence. The phrase adds pathos as it drives home the fact that Diodati is no more,60 but it also subtly suggests that these characteristics (ingenio, doctrina, clarissimisque caeteris virtutibus) no longer inhere in or distinguish him (egregius, “distinguished”) because he is dead. The world of the poem is different: Diodati can be made to live again as Damon by a “living remembrance of virtues.”61 The dum viveret signals a distinction between the world of the argumentum—journalistic, unemotional, unaltered by imagination—and the world of the poem, in which one can play with time and space. Perhaps the fact that the argumentum and poem represent two different worlds explains the redundancy and overlap in their narration—and also the different treatment of events (i.e., the poem details events that the argumentum skips over). One might counter that the early stanzas of the poem demonstrate just as much of a concern with fixing events in time as the argumentum does; recall the precision of lines 10–13, which are saturated with instances of temporal deixis, in recording the length of Thyrsis’s absence. I would argue that the spilling over of prose temporality into the world of the poem hints that the boundaries between fact and imagination are in fact porous (which is both the benefit and danger of the poetic imagination, as discussed below). Or perhaps it is specifically Thyrsis’s lament, which begins after the discussion of the harvests, that makes Damon’s revivification possible. Milton is dramatizing the power of poetry.
4. The risk of solipsism

If the *argumentum*—in *prose*—represents metaphysical separation as an insurmountable barrier (*dum viveret*—and *only* while he lived), the *poem* allows Milton to pull both Damon and the *Pastores Thusci* into the same *hic* by pulling them into the same line: the *Pastores* from Florence, Damon from the great beyond. But Milton runs the risk of flattening out the distinction between physical and metaphysical distance, as if death were just a really far-away version of Italy. If it is just as easy to bring someone back from the dead as it is to conjure them from across the channel and the Alps, how much are we really attending to reality? If one can conjure up a virtual *hic*, would it not be just as easy to conjure up a virtual *friend*?

It seems as though an absent friend is still generative as an *instar*—one writes to an absent friend what one has no need to say to a present friend. At the end of *Elegia sexta*, Milton declares that he will send Diodati his poetry: *Tu mihi, cui recitem, judicis instar eris* (line 90). There are two possible translations here: “you will act as judge when I recite the poem to you” or “as I write the poem, you will be the guiding image I hold in my mind of the judge to whom I would recite it.” The second, of course, is more potentially fruitful, but few translators acknowledge the *instar* rather than rendering the line simply “you will be my judge.” Of the translations I consulted, only Braden renders the added distance from reality evoked by the word (“you to whom I recite them will be *as it were* my judge”). *Instar* signifies form, “image, likeness, resemblance”—a representation of reality rather than reality itself, something having less being than reality or standing in for reality, a figment of his imagination guiding his writing.

While it seems somewhat solipsistic to reduce one’s *alter idem* to an *instar*, one might argue that all writing is solipsistic in this way. Writing is an act of intellection (of imagination, and creation), and an act of intellection (and imagination, and creation) can be based upon only what we ourselves have already internalized and integrated mentally. All writing is solitary—unless the *testimonia* he and the academicians wrote for each other were literally composed and written down in the immediate physical presence of the addressees, which they more than likely were not. It may make very little difference, then, whether the addressee is across the street or across the Channel. Perhaps it is actually the mind’s image—the *instar* of a friend, present or absent—that generates the poetry, just as it maintains the friendship. When Milton tells Diodati “Your worth writes to me … and inscribes real letters on my inmost consciousness; your candor of character writes, and your love of right; your genius writes too (by no means an ordinary one) and further recommends you to me,” what he really means is that his “living remembrance” of Diodati’s qualities does the work of connection. The physical presence or absence of an *amicus* can only provide the occasion for writing (e.g., “Thank you for your hospitality” for *Mansus*).

The shepherds populating pastoral poetry would seem to be an exception to this rule—they compose (supposedly) off the cuff, gifted with unrealistically prompt eloquence in each other’s presence. Perhaps Milton is trying to evoke a similar dynamic with his image of the singing contests in Florence (lines 132–34). The idealized image of the singing contests with the shepherds brings together the polish of the written text with the intimacy and spontaneity of oral expression; in other words, this image of the ideal oral situation sets in relief the inability for written texts—including the very poem conjuring up this image—to achieve the same level of intimacy and connection. It is interesting that even in this gift-text we get hints of the limitations of gift-texts: the need to be tethered to a real place, the inability to provide the same intimate experience of *amicitia* that the singing contests (which represent the poetry recitals in which Milton took part at the Italian academies) can. Thus the gift-text is the medium of its own supplanting as facilitator of intimacy.
An explanation of the generativity associated with a friend’s absence: it is good for the friend to be away sometimes because then you can write to him meditating on the pleasure he brings you—this isn’t necessary when the friend is present, because you’re experiencing that pleasure; taking yourself out of the moment to expound on its meaning would be somewhat perverse. Letters make manifest things that are unspoken, because there is no need for them to be spoken when friends are together. But one might counter, how important is the friend himself if his *instar* is actually the Muse? If the very process of meditating on a friend (or writing to a friend, or about a friend) is generative for humanist scholars and poets, one wonders if it is the *amicitia* or the presence or the absence of the friend that is in fact generative. If both a friend’s presence (resulting in the *testimonia, Ad Salsilli, Mansus*—all written when Milton was in Italy) and a friend’s absence (resulting in *Elegia prima, Elegia quarta, Elegia sexta, Epitaphium Damonis*—all written to absent friends [Diodati and Young]) are equally generative, how relevant is the presence or absence of the friend, or actual friendship, at all?

Combine this question with the fact discussed in the introduction to this chapter that contingencies of the post interfere with the ability of letters to forge a palpable connection between correspondents, and this starts to look even more like an exercise in solipsism. Obviously, the writer cannot sense when the letter is read—it is not necessarily the *delivery* of the letter that makes the connection, perhaps, but the *acknowledgement* of delivery in a return letter. Nonetheless, the fact that Dati’s letters were lost in the post—not once but three times!—calls into question the efficacy of letter-writing in maintaining humanist friendships. If you cannot be sure that the letter actually gets to its intended recipient, perhaps the writing of the letter and the anticipation of having it read is more important than actually having it read. The connection the writer feels is generated by the writing—the only part of the process over which he has absolute control. The reading cannot be felt or experienced; it creates no reciprocal sentiment or sensation in the sender. In Milton’s case, it is only Dati’s letter in response that lets him know that *Epitaphium Damonis* has been received and read: “And this, you must have read by now, if that poem reached you; and now for the first time I learn from you that it did.” The “you must have” and “if” reflect the impossibility of certainty; the “for the first time” indicates that it is only with the arrival of Dati’s letter that he can know for sure. Similarly, in lines imbued with dramatic irony and pathos, Thrysis plans in Florence what he’ll say to Damon when he sees him again, not knowing that he is dead—the dramatic irony of the situation bolsters my argument about the inadequacy of letters to forge a palpable connection between correspondents.

Earlier we discussed the triangulation of *amicitia* through works addressed from one partner to the other and how it may be the *instar*—mental image—of a friend that is generative, rather than the friend’s presence or absence. Further triangulation of *amicitia* through texts and works produced by third parties might lead to an ever-broadening sense of who is in the social circle—or it might lead to an ever-narrowing conception of the world outside one’s consciousness. Texts and third parties lose their independent existence, and letter-writing becomes a kind of game in which reality does not seem to matter as much when third parties get co-opted into the circle of *amici*. Greteman notes that “Milton’s letters regularly invoke the texts and authors being sent back and forth as a living part of his social world,” giving an example from a letter to Diodati: “I beg you to send me Giustiniani, Historian of the Veneti … On my word I shall see either that he is well cared for until your arrival, or, if you prefer, that he is returned to you shortly.” Even though they are dead, or not known to them personally, these authors are co-opted into this social network—into an eternal present. One might argue that Milton’s treatment of Diodati and the Italians in *Epitaphium Damonis* is similar. The question of
solipsism comes up again; obviously Milton and Diodati are not friends with Giustiniani (and he is not really making a social visit to Milton’s home), just as Petrarch did not really exchange letters with Cicero.\textsuperscript{69}

Petrarch’s imaginary letter exchange with Cicero might be redeemed, however, by the Erasmian argument (discussed in Chapter 1) that one would know Cicero better through reading his letters than through living with him.\textsuperscript{70} The “hermeneutics of intimacy” Kathy Eden posits in Petrarch’s and Erasmus’s conception of epistolary exchange (discussed in previous chapters) allows one to become more intimate with the ancients through reading their books and letters than one is with one’s close circle of friends—so why wouldn’t the ancients become “enrolled” (to use Greteman’s term) into one’s social network? The question is—when does this enrollment turn into solipsism? It’s a tentative balance all humanists have to strike, just as the balance between \textit{otium} and \textit{acedia}, between productive displays of virtuosity and empty self-aggrandizement.

5. Milton’s group insurance policy

In the first half of this chapter, we establish that Milton uses \textit{Epitaphium Damonis} to connect with both Diodati and the academicians he befriended in Italy. It is possible that in pulling all of his friends together, Milton is arguing for a model of group friendship as the ideal rather than dyadic friendship. We will explore the ramifications (and perils!) of this idea below, but first we must treat Garrison’s theory of group friendship as an insurance policy.

Garrison contends that in \textit{Epitaphium Damonis} Milton is offering as a superior alternative a model of group friendship that differs from the ideal classical model which only allows \textit{amicitia} between a pair of \textit{pares}—“one soul in bodies twain,” as a contemporary translation of Aristotle puts it. One of the main advantages of group friendship over dyadic friendship, Garrison suggests, is that if one friend dies, the remaining members of the group will not be left desolate as Thyrsis is, since they will have a number of other friends to compensate for the loss (no “eternal wound lasting ages” here).\textsuperscript{71} Thus Milton obviates the two dilemmas we’ve been discussing (letters conquering space, \textit{studia} hindering \textit{amicitia}) by decreasing the importance of each friend. If one person cannot perform a specific duty of an \textit{alter idem}, someone else will be able to.

This theory may seem similar to Brown’s theory of \textit{amicitia} as a fungible good, but there is one significant difference: in Brown, it is the gift-acts, the exchanges between friends, that are substitutable, not the friends themselves. He argues that one \textit{amicitia} can stand in for all \textit{amicitia} (“all friendship is celebrated in the act of celebrating one friendship”\textsuperscript{72}), but he does not argue that one friend can stand in for any friend. Taken to its logical conclusion, Garrison’s reading suggests just this idea—that friends themselves are fungible goods. It is hard to believe that Milton as opposed to Thyrsis believes that friends ought to be fungible, and I do not think we are supposed to come away from the poem considering group friendship as a superior alternative to dyadic friendship; rather, I think Milton is demonstrating the precarious position of humans, a “long-suffering race” (line 106) for whom neither dyadic nor group friendship is completely adequate or satisfying (this is in addition to being vulnerable to the contingencies of time and space).\textsuperscript{73}

A useful way to explore this issue is to examine the passage in which Thyrsis compares animal friendship favorably to human friendship (lines 94–111),\textsuperscript{74} which indeed forms the
centerpiece of Garrison’s argument about the poem. But the picture Thyris draws of animals cavorting in bliss—as idyllic as it is—has troubling elements:

Hei mihi quam similes ludunt per prata juvenci,
Omnes unanimi secum sibi lege sodales,
Nec magis hunc alio quisquam secernit amicum
De grege (lines 94–97)

Ah, how like one another are the bull-calves75 who sport through the meadows; they are all comrades in like-minded accord, and none of them singles out from the herd one more than another as a friend …

For Garrison, the description of the *juvenci* is designed to show that members of a group are capable of having the intimate relationship with each other that members of a human dyad (*amicī*) do. In the first 4 lines of the animal passage, Garrison reads Milton arguing that *sodales* can also be *amicī*;76 Milton uses both *sodales* and *amicī* to refer to the *juvenci* in order to show that “one who is a companion within a group [sodalis] can also qualify as an ideal friend [amicus]”; placing the words at the ends of lines 95 and 96 “in a parallel position” links the terms.77 In my reading, the parallel positioning of *amicum* and *sodales* is for the purpose of creating contrast rather than highlighting similarities; the *Nec* at the beginning of line 96 suggests that *amicum* is being negated. In my reading, *amicum* and *sodales* seem to be opposed—Garrison reads *juvenci* as described by *amicum* (they enjoy *amicitia* with everyone in the herd, but they do not single out any of their *amicī* for extra-special *amicitia*), while I read *juvenci* as described by *Nec … amicum* (they do not single any of their *sodales* out for *amicitia*; the *juvenci* eschew the choosing of *amicī*).

The idea that Milton is offering group friendship a positive model is belied by the fact that the *passer*, which I argue is a model of group friendship gone wrong, gets a much fuller description than any other animal group:

vilisque volucrum
Passer habet semper quicum sit, & omnia circum
Farra libens volitet, serō sua tecta revisens
Quem si fors letho objecit, seu milvus adunco
Fata tulit rostro, seu stravit arundine fossor,
Protinus ille alium socio petit inde volatu. (lines 100–05)

the sparrow, the lowliest of birds, always has a companion with whom it cheerfully flits around all the heaps of corn, returning only late to its nest. And if chance strikes him dead, whether a kite with its curved beak has caused its fate or a peasant has cast it down with an arrow, instantly it seeks another to be henceforth its comrade in flight.78

Milton is making an important distinction between humans and animals that will become more salient in *Paradise Lost*. He includes much detail about the sparrow—denigration as *vilisque volucrum*, description of its flight around the grains and nightly return to its nest—that seems irrelevant to a putative depiction of animal companionship. The inclusion of these details makes sense only if we read them to suggest that Milton chooses to emphasize the sparrows’ lack of *curas* or employment in addition to their treatment of companions as interchangeable. The sparrow is portrayed as completely carefree, flying around heaps of grain that have been harvested by humans (harvest is mentioned in the first part of the poem as a marker of time; here it is a marker of labor. Arendt would say that the two functions are related, since the cycle of
human life is determined and measured by labor). As we will see in the epilogue to this study, these responsibilities distinguish man from beast in Paradise Lost. In Milton’s Eden, it is the mediation of work that provides humans both a common bond and the opportunity for individual distinction—a situation similar to that established by the Republic of Letters. For Milton, there is a relationship between the fact that man is employed and the fact that man makes special relations. Amicitia is based on a shared sense of vocation, the condition of humanity.

The sparrow has solved the problem of the limitations of the dyad—there is always another partner if his current partner is absent. Partners are interchangeable because they are all the same. But this—needless to say—is a position lacking in humanitas. The way the sparrow “instantly [protinus]” forgets and replaces its erstwhile partner would be morally abhorrent in the human world. What possible amicitia could have existed between the two? There is no way we can imagine the sparrow saying to its dying partner, “Farewell, remember me as you journey to the stars” (line 123)—and that is very important. Epitaphium Damonis is an ode to amicitia—both the product of and an ode to the fineness of feeling that can exist uniquely between humans. Garrison thinks Milton wants to make it common, erasing the very condition that makes this fineness of feeling possible. This passage illustrates that—to extend the economic metaphor of fungibility and scarcity—when the market is flooded with pares, they are held cheaply, as cheaply as the common sparrow is (vilisque volucrum).

Garrison minimizes the significance of the sparrows, asserting that the poem “distinguishes between the quality of different groups. While the poem’s depicted asses or sparrows might be taken as the lowest-ranked groups in this continuum, they still are characterized as always possessing a sexual or nonsexual companion. Unlike Thyrsis, they are never alone. They are always providing for—or being provided for by—others.” In this continuum of animal behavior, “high-ranked” animals are the ones that exhibit behavior worth emulating. Garrison’s argument that sparrows are “low-ranked” and thus not the most important model is belied by the fact that Milton devotes the most space to describing their approach to friendship (five and a half lines on the sparrows as compared to three and a half lines on the bulls, the animal group Garrison characterizes as the “most appealing”). Why would this be, if Milton wants to offer group friendship as a positive model? It seems absurd to suggest that the only thing we are supposed to note about the sparrows is the fact that they “always possess a sexual or nonsexual companion” or that they are “always providing for—or being provided for by—others” (an assertion for which I see no evidence in the poem).

But even among the more respectable animals, the argument that we see amicitia is questionable. On the high-ranked end of the spectrum are the juvenci and wolves. Garrison notes that the juvenci play together; this might be interpreted as otium or schole (and thus valorized). The wolves eat together—and Garrison points out that “group hunting offers a guarantee of protection and shared sustenance”; while essential to life, protection and sustenance are not the hallmarks of amicitia. In a way, this is a silly question—of course animals are concerned with survival rather than with amicitia; this type of relationship is mediated (in part) through ratio (hence the triangulation through intellectual labor), which animals do not possess in humanist theory. Group friendship as an insurance policy against loss of an amicus is a very practical, utilitarian solution—but humans need each other for more than simply practical or utilitarian reasons.

As I mentioned above, Garrison’s reading sees Milton obviating the two dilemmas we have focused on in this chapter. For instance, a group friendship can obviate the choice between amicitia and studia, friends and sweet Muse:
The failure of the dyadic friendship to meet the needs of Thyrsis and Damon suggests that an alternate formation might have better provided for them. Had the two men been in a group friendship, the death of a single friend would neither have left Thyrsis completely friendless nor would it have left the dying Damon friendless while Thyrsis was travelling.\textsuperscript{86}

Garrison claims that Milton is valorizing group over dyadic friendship by showing the limits of the dyad (now Thyrsis’s only friend is gone; now Damon has to die alone). Having more friends, he seems to be saying, would have let Thyrsis choose the Muses without feeling guilty, because \textit{someone} would have been with Damon. But Thyrsis isn’t upset because Damon died alone; he is upset because \textit{he} wasn’t there when Damon died. No matter how many friends had been with Damon, Thyrsis would still feel guilty—and I think in Milton’s eyes, this reaction is desirable because it demonstrates the significance of the particular \textit{parem}. It is as if Garrison thinks Damon is like the sparrow, who is content as long he has \textit{quicum sit}. It is hard to imagine that the Milton who wrote the letter to Diodati quoted at the head of the chapter, who in the \textit{argumentum to Epitaphium Damonis} characterizes Diodati as \textit{egregius} (lit. “out of the herd”), would ever advocate such a disinterested approach to \textit{amicitia}. Ultimately, it is difficult to conclude that we are supposed to agree with Thyrsis that it is better to have multiple \textit{pares}, or to ascribe this position to Milton.

Garrison suggests a source for the animal passage that nobody has yet mentioned: Plutarch’s “On Having Many Friends.” Unlike Milton, he argues, Plutarch casts group friendships among animals in a negative light:\textsuperscript{87}

friendship is a creature that seeks a companion; it is not like cattle and crows that flock and herd together, and to look upon one’s friend as another self and to call him “brother” as though to suggest “th’other,” is nothing but a way of using duality as a measure of friendship.\textsuperscript{88}

Garrison’s gloss: “According to Plutarch, animal relations cannot be equated with human friendship because animals fail to differentiate one from the other.”\textsuperscript{89} In Garrison’s reading, Plutarch and Milton disagree about whether animals’ inability to differentiate enables or precludes \textit{amicitia} among them. The inability or unwillingness to differentiate is what Milton highlights in the \textit{juvenci} in line 96. To Plutarch, this inability or unwillingness precludes \textit{amicitia}—animals that “flock and herd together” are all \textit{so} similar that no one can be picked out as \textit{more} similar than the others (in Garrison’s reading). To Milton, this lack of differentiation makes it possible for \textit{amicitia} to exist among members in a group instead of being limited to dyads (in Garrison’s reading), which is a good thing. For Plutarch, similarity is a precursor to \textit{amicitia}, but only in a world where people are different; since spreading \textit{amicitia} among more than two people dilutes it irrevocably, the situation in a society of \textit{unanimi} is untenable.

Plutarch writes that \textit{amicitia} cannot exist in a society of \textit{pares}; dilution results from an inability to distinguish the \textit{amicus} from others. Garrison says the animals are happy because they are similar—I would counter that the animals are happy because they are simple, and that their simplicity is due to this simplicity.\textsuperscript{90} The shallowness of their relationships bears out their simplicity—they play together, eat together, fly around together, but do not “teach [each other] to soothe … gnawing cares”\textsuperscript{91} as Damon does (lines 45–46) because, being animals, they do not have any (after all, they are, as Adam or Samson would say, “unemployed”). And lest we neglect (as Thyrsis does) the unpastured lambs, let us note that they are decidedly not joyful, even though they presumably have the same social structure that the other animals mentioned in the
poem do. Their (literal) gnawing cares cannot be resolved through their friendships with other lambs. The issues of simplicity and sameness are so tangled up in animal relationships that it is difficult to accept the animal passage as an unequivocal endorsement of group friendship, as Garrison sees it.

Although Garrison characterizes the *juvenci* as “the most appealing” animal group due to “their focus on play,” this “image of contented bovinity” (as Bruce Boehrer calls the passage describing them) is not unequivocally appealing.92 Boehrer characterizes the *juvenci* as “an undifferentiated body of companionship” and argues that animal society in the poem is characterized by “undifferentiated egolessness.”93 Boehrer’s evocative description of the bulls dovetails with what I say above about the similarity and simplicity underpinning animal friendships. This “undifferentiated body of companionship” is an almost inappropriately literal representation of “one mind in bodies twain”—as if the animals have a communal mind.94 Part of the appeal of this image of friendship is its impossibility—the extremeness and absurdity of the hyperbole reflect the depth of the emotion underpinning it; that is, the rhetorical value of the image is in being expressive rather than descriptive. In *Epitaphium Damonis*, however, it becomes descriptive and thus grotesque, eliminating the very condition for friendship.

Indeed, the bulls’ “undifferentiated egolessness” evokes the “all in all” Milton both desires and fears, an issue to which I will return shortly. Within secular time, however, it seems clear that the lack of ability to distinguish between the self and others (in addition to lack of distinction between potential *pares*) leads to lack of self-awareness and possibly solipsism. In attempting to escape what Boehrer calls “the discontents of human self-awareness,”95 Thyrsis risks succumbing to just this condition. In his reading, animals are *unanimi* because they are not self-aware—they do not or cannot distinguish the self from others. An inability to distinguish what goes on in one’s imagination from reality, or a sense that reality consists of only what goes on in one’s own head, follows from this lack of self-awareness.

Even though *amicitia* is based on likeness (according to classical tradition), Milton demonstrates that human friendships (as opposed to animal ones) are built on difference and particularities as well; difference is required for similarity to be meaningful. Personal idiosyncrasies are irreplaceable and prevent one friend from being interchangeable with another.96 Acknowledging Damon’s singularity, Thyrsus laments, “who will bring back to me your *[tuas]* allurements, who then your laughter, your Ccecropian wit and your elegant charms?” (lines 55–56).97 The answer, of course, is *nemo* (nobody). The *tuas* in line 55 is key—Thyrsis is emphasizing that these are qualities that belong to and distinguish Damon (much as Damon was “distinguished for genius, learning, and other most notable virtues” in the *argumentum*). Even if Thyrsis had a group of other *amicis*, none of them would be able to bring back Damon’s Attic wit. For Thyrsis, Damon is “that most precious of rarities: a friend whose presence had uniquely compensated for the alienation unique to the human condition.”98

In the end, the singling out of others wins out over the lack of differentiation which Garrison claims that Milton embraces. For him, Milton’s view of group friendship necessarily entails a flattening out of distinction among members of the group: “Milton’s lines [*Epitaphium Damonis* 94–96] arguably reflect a utopian desire for a situation where one could obtain a community of friends who are all alike.”99 This may seem borne out by Milton’s strategic rationale for sending out copies of *Epitaphium Damonis* to all of the academicians. But this does not mean that the indiscriminate interchangeability we see in the sparrow also applies to the *Pastores Thuscii*. Although Milton’s stated intention is to avoid (the appearance of) “picking one
out of the herd as a special friend,” in the end, he cannot help doing just that—singling out only two academicians, Dati and Antonio Francini, to mention by name in the text of the poem.100

Quin & nostra suas docuerunt nomina fagos
Et Datis, & Francinus, erant & vocibus ambo
Et studis noti, Lydorum sanguinis ambo. (lines 136–38)

Why, Dati and Francini, both renowned for their voices and their studies, both of Lydian blood, have taught their own beech trees my name.

The fact that Milton’s poem ends up demonstrating the favoritism that he asserts his eagerness to avoid suggests a belief it may not be so easy—or even desirable—for humans to eschew distinction and live like juvenci.

Garrison posits the “heavenly host” in both Epitaphium Damonis and Paradise Lost as an example of the idealized group friendship Milton is exploring: in addition to being “better able to meet the needs of its members than a pair of friends can … a group of friends offers the promise of a virtuous group—even a divine multitude—into which one might enter.” Diodati’s entry into this multitude at the apotheosis demonstrates (to Garrison) the preferability of groups over dyads.101 Garrison focuses on the idea of abundance in the apotheosis—a way Milton indicates, he thinks, that group friendship is superior to dyadic friendship in that it escapes the economy of scarcity.102 But abundance isn’t always a positive in Milton, especially when it comes to people and crowds. It is not a given that crowds or multitudes—in this poem and in his other poems—are meant to be seen in an unequivocally positive light. While Milton might cast “the multitude as a highly desirable social formation” in lines 191–97, he does something quite different earlier in the poem.103 Lines 24–25, which contrast “a company [agmen] worthy of you” with “the whole indolent herd [pecus] of the silent dead,” show that herds are not always given a positive valence in this poem.104 This is true of Milton in general, whose speakers often seem to want to avoid the herd.105 Milton is ambivalent at best about crowds—both in this poem and in others. According to Garrison, Milton’s “ideal of virtuous group friendship [is] characterized by an economy of endless goods.”106 But as we have already seen above, the overabundance of goods means that they are held cheaply. Milton is certainly aware of this problem because he calls attention to it in his depiction of the sparrows.

It is possible that Milton is showing the downsides of dyadic friendship without necessarily advocating replacing it with group friendship. In my reading, he is showing us that humans are caught between two imperfect choices—rare and precious friendship that can be lost in an instant, “leaving behind forever an eternal wound lasting ages” (line 111), and shallow and indiscriminate friendship, like that engaged in by the sparrow (who always has quicum sit), in which one is forgotten immediately after one’s death (Protinus ille alium socio petit inde volatu, line 105).

6. The limits (and limitations) of Milton’s “reach”

I would like to conclude this chapter by returning to Greteman’s theory of early modern sociability, a theory which leads him to a similarly utilitarian reading of friendship in Epitaphium Damonis. In his conceptualization of the early modern social network, “strong ties” and “weak ties” are measured in terms of “social distance”—the frequency and number of contacts between people. Weak ties are actually more advantageous in terms of “reach,” expanding one’s social circle by making connections to people one would not ordinarily have access to. Thus distance
between ties—physical and social—is a plus under Greteman’s paradigm. While Greteman cites Milton’s correspondence with Carlo Dati as evidence for his claim that distance is not detrimental to friendship, I will cite the Milton-Dati correspondence to argue the opposite—that distance can contribute to loneliness, which cannot be fully compensated for by extending one’s reach. Both Greteman and Garrison would seem to reduce friendship to a matter of quantity (how many people can I reach?) with less consideration of the quality of the bonds formed; the result is a conception of friendship that at some points seems more akin to the shallow relationships among the sparrows than the amicitia between Diodati and Milton.

Greteman leans on Mark Granovetter’s influential analysis of “social distance,” a quality which distinguishes “weak ties” … such as the ones formed by occasional correspondence” from “strong ties such as the ones formed within nuclear families.” Social distance may or may not correlate with physical distance, which is important in light of Granovetter’s rule that “weak ties’ in social networks… are paradoxically far more powerful in communicating new information than strong ties.” This is because strong ties contain redundancy and overlap in connections, whereas weak ties can link people to a member would otherwise have no way to access. Two questions arise here: 1. How does social distance correlate with physical distance (if indeed it does)? and 2. What do we mean by “more powerful”? Social distance seems to be defined by frequency of contact (“occasional correspondence” vs. “nuclear families”). If we take “frequency” as definition, social distance would have certainly been in part a function of physical distance—as noted in the introduction into this chapter, the struggle of letters to conquer distance is called out and highlighted in the letters themselves. “Powerful” here means allowing one access to more people to whom one otherwise wouldn’t have access—it is a purely utilitarian concept.

Physical and/or social distance notwithstanding, the rhetoric used between humanist amici would certainly seem appropriate for “close ties,” steeped as it is in effusion and intimacy. The prefatory letters published with More’s Utopia are an apt example. We know that More requested Erasmus to find people with cachet to write prefatory letters for Utopia—and that through Giles (who, according to some scholars, may not have been as close friends with More as their letters suggest) and other such connections, he achieved greater “reach” for his work on the Continent. Similarly, Greteman notes that “if a writer like Milton wants his voice to carry a long way … he needs an abundance of weak ties even more than he needs close personal attachments.” One might argue that this is a mercenary view situated in the context of fame and prestige and thus too steeped in the logic of negotium to be suited to amicitia; but this is not necessarily true—greater reach also means more people with whom to exchange ideas. According to Grafton, the Republic of Letters ended up facilitating both. In Epitaphium Damonis, however, Milton is concerned not with reach but with mental affinity—that quality found in only one among thousands, according to Thyrsis. It is precisely the loss of his “close personal attachment” with Damon that Thyrsis laments (and indeed, Greteman talks about the value of Milton and Dati’s friendship in terms of “mutual feeling” as well as in terms of Dati’s ability to connect Milton to scholars on the Continent).

Pointing to Dati’s request for Milton to contribute to a memorial volume for one of the academicians, Greteman convincingly argues that in spite of the physical contingencies making staying in touch by letter difficult—including the fact that three of Dati’s letters to Milton were never delivered—Milton is still a member of the academicians’ social circle. He falters, however, in reading Milton’s complaints about his in-laws as evidence that physical proximity is irrelevant to the quality of bond between ties. In complaining about his current living situation,
Milton declares his weak tie with Dati to be superior to his strong ties with his in-laws; Greteman comments: “Although this leaves him in ‘perpetual solitude’ [perpetua solitudine], the mutual feeling he shares with Dati provides solace.”

Here we run into the same paradox that we do in More’s prefatory letter to *Utopia*: physical proximity within the *oikos*—the supposed seat of belonging, according to Kathy Eden—does not necessarily imply emotional intimacy. Milton’s *perpetua solitudine* in a house full of relatives is just as counterintuitive as More’s suggestion that he risks “being a stranger in [his] own home.” As we saw in Chapter 2, domesticity does not ensure intimacy in the same way that intellectual affinity does, which supports Greteman’s point: the physical proximity of the members of the *oikos* is a function of social proximity (what Granovetter would call the “strong ties” of family)—and these strong ties of social proximity do not guarantee intimacy, either. But Greteman seems to me mistaken when he argues that the Dati letter proves that distance does not influence quality of relationship. According to Granovetter’s theory, Milton’s tie with Dati is “weak” in that they do not have contact very often, but strong (or “powerful”) in that Dati connects Milton to the academicians as well as with other scholars like Heinsius and Vossius. Greteman seems to be on solid ground here, but it is clear from Milton’s letter that membership in this academic circle—because of infrequency of contact, which is related to distance—is inadequate to assuage Milton’s loneliness. Greteman says Milton’s “almost perpetual solitude” means that proximity does not necessarily make for good bonds; I say this loneliness indicates that the bonds with the academicians are not robust enough to meet Milton’s needs. Distance and the resulting (in)frequency of contact do matter.

Similarly, Greteman seems to me mistaken in arguing that death has indeed been conquered by the end of *Epitaphium Damonis*. He reasons that Diodati’s death extends the “reach” of Milton’s network to the divine multitude participating in poem’s concluding orgy: “death does not sever the connection between Milton and Diodati—it merely extends the connection—and as the tie between Milton and Damon [sic] becomes weaker he moves into a more distant but powerful position in the network.” There are many problems with this formulation. It should be noted at the outset that Greteman’s definition of a “strong” or “powerful” bond is quite malleable, slipping between both “intimate” and “useful in terms of social connections.” But let us accept his premise that increased physical distance makes a contact more important to the network—a “more … powerful position” for the weak tie. Milton would not consider the weakening of his bond with Diodati something to be celebrated. And in making heaven a viable extension of Milton’s social network, Greteman falls into the same trap of flattening out the distinction between physical and metaphysical distance that Milton does in drawing both Diodati and the *Pastores* into the same virtual *hic*, which suggests that is just as easy to bring someone back from the dead as it is to conjure him from across the channel and the Alps. As I have suggested, this indicates a dangerous slip into solipsism. Of course Milton does not hew to the laws of physics in *Epitaphium Damonis*, and perhaps the point of poetry—and the basis of the distinction he makes between the world of the *argumentum* and the world of the poem—is that he should not have to. This is imagination’s primary boon—but also its primary danger.

Although in his letter to Diodati Milton goes beyond Erasmus in declaring that letters are not necessary to sustain a friendship, in his memorial elegy for Diodati he tries to emulate Erasmian theory in pulling his friends together into a virtual *hic*. This sort of metaphysical play risks trapping oneself in a web of one’s own creation—after the illusion dissipates, one is left with, if not an eternal wound lasting ages, at least an almost complete solitude. It is perhaps
because Milton realizes this that he argues for the establishment of Italian-style academies in England in recounting his Italy trip in his *Defensio secundo*: if letters can create a *virtual* space in which humanists could congregate, Milton also sees the value of creating *physical* spaces in which such congregation could actually be embodied. 116 This link between physical and intellectual intimacy will be explored, challenged, and elaborated in *Paradise Lost*; though unfallen, Milton’s Adam and Eve struggle with dilemmas surrounding embodied relationships similar to those Thyrsis confronts in *Epitaphium Damonis.*
Notes

1 Literas quidem tuas, quoniam ita convenerat, diu expectabam; verum acceptis neque dum ullis, si quid mihi credis, non idcirco veterem meam erga te benevolentiam tantillum refrigescere sum passus … Non enim in Epistolarum ac Salutationum momentis veram verti amicitiam volo, quæ omnia falsa esse possunt; sed altis animi radicibus niti utrinque & sustinere se; cœptamque sinceris, & sanctis rationibus, etiamsi mutua cessarent officia, per omnem tamen vitam suspicione & culpâ vacare: ad quam fovendam non tam scripto sit opus, quam vivâ invicem virtutum recordatione. Nec continuò, ut tu non scripseris, non erit quo illum suppleri officium possit, scribit vicem tuam apud me tua probitas, verasque literas intimis, sensibus meis exarat, scribit morum simplicitas, & recti amor; scribit ingenium etiam tuum, haudquaquam quotidiam, & majorem in modum te mihi commendat. Latin original in WJM 12:22, 24; English translation in CPW 1:326.


5 Note the concern about sincerity (“letters and salutations, all which may be false”) that Lorna Hutson mentions as a by-product of the use of words rather than things as tokens of friendship, as discussed in my Chapter 1. The Usurer’s Daughter: Male Friendship and Fictions of Women in Sixteenth-Century England (London: Routledge, 1994), 3.


7 For Milton as the only Englishman to participate in the Italian academies, see Joanna Picciotto, Labors of Innocence in Early Modern England (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 422. For the multo erudita note, see Estelle Haan, Both English and Latin: Bilingualism and Biculturalism in Milton’s Neo-Latin Writings (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2012), 97.


10 Si inter tot Funera Popularium meorum, anno tam gravi ac pestilenti, abreptum me quoque, ut scribis, ex rumore præsertim aliquo creditisti, mirum non est … Sed Dei benignitate, qui tutum mihi receptum in agris paraverat, & vivo adhue & valeo; utinam ne inutilis, quicquid muneris in hac vita restat mihi peragendum. Letter from Milton to Peter Haimbach dated August 15, 1666; WJM 12:112–15.


Many scholars have commented on this; for example see Roy Flannagan, who makes evident the connection between intimacy and learning underpinning the republic of letters: “Milton’s Latin poetry can be more intimate than his English poetry … perhaps because the Latin audience, though broader than an exclusively English one, was better educated.” *The Riverside Milton* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 173.


For example, Francini in his *testimonium* uses “Giove” to refer to the God of the Tower of Babel story: “In vain for you did Jupiter mingle speech in lofty Babel [*Nell’altera Babelle / Per te il parlar confuse Giove in vano*]” (lines 55–56).

“Dimidio vitæ vivere” (20). Unless otherwise specified, texts and translations of Milton’s Latin poems are taken from *Poemata*, trans. Estelle Haan, in *The Shorter Poems*, ed. Barbara Kiefer Lewalski and Estelle Haan, vol. 3 of *The Complete Works of John Milton* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Poems will be cited in text by title and line number. The description of Young as “more than one half of my soul [*animæ plusquam pars altera nostræ*]” (line 19) follows from Aristotle’s definition of friendship as one soul within two bodies. We will see this dictum literalized in a grotesque manner in lines (94–98), in which Thyrsis remarks upon the similarity of animals. This passage and its ramifications for Milton’s portrayal of friendship will be discussed at length below.

I have substituted the more neutral “for the sake of his soul” for Haan’s “for his own gratification.”


21 The use of amor here suggests the dangerously seductive power of learning (in the figure of the female Muse) to interfere with amicitia between men.

22 “pecorisque relictī / Cura” (14–15); “ubi mens expleta” (14); “assuetā sedītūque sub ulmo” (15). “Anxiety for his abandoned flock” could point to Milton’s quasi-ministerial concern for the English people during this tumultuous period; alternatively, Shawcross posits that this line refers to “Milton’s nephews Edward and John Phillips, who joined his household shortly after his return” (Complete Poems, 188n5). Leonard’s translation in particular of ubi mens expleta (“But when he had filled his mind with foreign sights”) emphasizes the tension between cultus animi and duty to Damon.

See also Mandy Green’s commentary on these lines in “Reaching a European Audience: Milton’s Neo-Latin Poems for Charles Diodati, 1625–39,” in “John Milton, European,” pt. 1, ed. Joseph Shub, special issue, European Legacy 17, no. 2 (2012): 175. As we will see below, actual physical presence is of the utmost importance to Thyrsis in hindsight. Green argues that in these lines Milton is “suggesting that he had attempted to keep the appalling knowledge from himself for as long as possible. It is only when Thyrsis sits under the familiar elm tree that his if forced to admit the truth to himself and confront the enormity of his loss … Until that point Thyrsis had managed to hold such thoughts at bay by keeping Damon alive in his imagination, deluding himself with thoughts of what his absent friend might be doing or planning future outings together (Epitaphium Damonis 142–49).” I have a slightly different reading: the “thoughts of what his absent friend might be doing” are not born from self-delusion but simple ignorance. Nobody has been able to pin down exactly when Milton heard about Diodati’s death, and the poem itself (as opposed to the argumentum) doesn’t mention him getting the news at all.

23 The fact that he wasn’t sure the news was true until he got home suggests the double whammy of distance between friends: one cannot know whether news of a friend’s death is true and in addition, it does not feel real.

24 Alternatively, he might have stayed because he knew that the distance provided a buffer from the grief he would experience upon returning home and wanted to preserve that buffer as long as possible; in this case dulcis Amor musae is just a pretext for staying, and thus it isn’t really studia that interfere with amicitia, but fear of facing reality.


26 One might argue that international travel was difficult and that there was nothing Thyrsis could do at home after Damon’s death, but if this were the most likely sentiment, it would not be necessary to explain that the Muse held him in Florence. Gordon Campbell and Thomas N. Corns write: “On this account [in the argumentum], he had reserved judgement on the veracity of Diodati’s reported death till he could confirm it once back in London. Milton would have gained nothing from making this up … Disclosure of the sequence by which he knew of the death—unreliable ‘news’ unconfirmed till his return—is wholly gratuitous, except to pre-empt the obvious comment that grief had not sooner driven him home.” John Milton: Life, Work, and Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 135. “Pre-empt[ing] that obvious comment,” of course, would be a compelling reason to include the information. For a summary of scholarly attempts to pin down exactly when Milton heard the news of Diodati’s death, see Carey, Complete Shorter Poems, 270–71.

27 Among my translators scilicet is most often rendered neutrally as “for” or “because” (Haan, Braden, Campbell, Bush, Hughes, Patterson, and Masson); renderings preserving the word’s emphatic connotations include “clearly” (Revard), “surely” (Flannagan), “namely” (Shawcross), and “forsooth” (MacKellar); the scilicet is not represented at all in Leonard and Carey.
There is scholarly controversy about the proper interpretation of Milton’s “two harvests.” According to Flannagan, “John Shawcross, in ‘Epitaphium Damonis Lines 9–13 and the Date of Composition,’ Modern Language Notes 71 (1956): 322–24, writes that, since there were two wheat harvests in Tuscany in one summer, Milton must be referring to October-November 1639. Sergio Baldi, from the vantage point of living in Tuscany, denies Shawcross’s assumption and suggests that autumn or winter 1640 is more likely (‘The Date of Composition of Epitaphium Damonis,’ Notes and Queries 25 (1978): 508–09). Bush (Variorum 1:298–99) believes that the passage has nothing to do with Italian harvests” (Riverside Milton, 238n4).

Alternatively, Revard and MacKellar take dum on its own rather than reading it as a part of the phrase nec dum, giving us “[Two harvests passed] … while Thyrsis was not there” (Revard) and “[Two harvests passed] … and Thyrsis was not there the while” (MacKellar). Bush and Masson don’t translate the dum. Another indication of the importance of time is found in nec … aderat Thyrsis. Aderat is imperfect indicative, which points to a span of time rather than a specific moment (e.g., the day of Damon’s death).

See Variorum 1:310n113 for classical echoes of vagus error.

Here the traditional lament about the topographical features that separate the two amici seems belated, especially since there is an even more significant chasm separating them now. The delayed response to their separation is similar to the delayed response to the nuntium of Damon’s death.

Haan, Shorter Poems, 431n21–22; translation is from Loeb edition of Ovid’s Tristia. Haan also makes the connection to Elegia quarta lines 21–22 (493n119–20). “On the pastoral mourner’s lamented absence from the native land at the precise moment of his friend’s death, cf. Castiglione, Alcon, 83–6, and esp. heu male me ira Deum patriis abduxit ab oris (83)” (493n113–23). The line Haan quotes from Alcon, which I translate as “alas, wickedly the anger of the gods carried me off from my paternal shores,” does not give the impression that the speaker left by choice.

Del Ocean profondo
Cinta dagli ampi gorghi Anglia risiede
Separata dal mondo (lines 13–15)

“Dicite Sicelicum Thamesina per oppida carmen” (3).

See, for example, lines 84–90:
Vivis & ignoto solus inópsque solo;
Et, tibi quam patrii non exhibuere penates
Sede peregrinâ quæris egenus opem.
Patria dura parens, & saxis sævior albis
Spumea quæ pulsat littoris unda tui,
Siccine te decet innocuos exponere fætus;
Siccine in externam ferrea cogis humum

You are living in a strange land in solitude and destitution, and in your state of need you are seeking in a foreign dwelling the sustenance that your native home did not afford you. Fatherland, unsympathetic parent, more cruel than even the white rocks of your shore battered by the foaming waves: is it right to expose your innocent offspring in this way; is this how you compel them, o heart of iron, to go to foreign soil …?

Garrison sees the name Damon as a reference to the story of Pythias and Damon, prompting an unfavorable comparison in the mind of the reader: “Whereas the mythical Pythias rushes back to Sicily to save his friend Damon, Milton’s Thyrsis is abroad and in no hurry to return” (Friendship and Queer Theory, 96).

“Musis operata juventis” (126).


In discussing the ekphrasis, Revard reads “the Amor who only shoots his arrows upward, wounding only sacred minds” as “clearly … the Amor of Plato’s *Symposium*, the child of the heavenly Aphrodite, who inspires the highest love, the friendship among men.” “Milton’s *Epitaphium Damonis*: The Debt to Neo-Latin Poets,” in “John Milton, European,” pt. 2, ed. Joseph Shub, special issue, *European Legacy* 17, no. 3 (2012): 314.


Haan, Carey, Leonard, Bush, and Patterson render *quamquam* as “And yet.” Revard’s translation (“not yet, not ever”) completely eliminates the sense of balancing one entity against another. Creating a similar effect, Flannagan alone buries “though” in the middle of the sentence rather than beginning with it (“I will never regret remembering you, though, shepherds of Tuscany, young men devoted to the Muses”); since the word is relatively unobtrusive, the reader might not even notice at all that entities are being balanced against each other.

Shawcross’s translation makes it clear that the *quamquam* begins a new thought—he begins with “And even though …”

Alternatively (in Brown’s reading) he is trying to bridge the gap between Diodati and the *Pastores Tusci*.


Leonard does the same in his especially suggestive translation of Thyrsis’s lament: “Alas, what desire of wandering enticed me to foreign shores, over the towering peaks of the snowy Alps?” It is no longer a desire to “improve … his mind” that leads Thyrsis to travel, but a (vain and useless) “desire of wandering.” The translation downplays any legitimate reasons for travel in order to make the choice to stay seem ridiculously easy.
Milton had a habit of pitting Rome against Florence. According to Picciotto, he “mak[es] dual use of Italy, identifying Florence as a site of resistance to Rome” in Areopagitica (Labors of Innocence, 421). Lewalski reports that after his trip “Milton often sorted out his impressions of Italy by the formula, ‘good humanist Florence, bad popish Rome’” (Life, 105). See also Suzanne Woods, “‘That Freedom of Discussion Which I Loved’: Italy and Milton’s Cultural Self Definition,” in Milton in Italy: Contexts, Images, Contradictions, ed. Mario A. Di Cesare (Binghamham, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1991), 9–18. But note that Milton had Henry Lawes intercede on his behalf to obtain permission to visit Rome: “At the time passports regularly forbade visits to Rome or contact with any representative of the Pope. Milton, of course, wanted to visit Rome … Lawes managed matters for him” (CPW 1:338).

Immediacy—both temporal and spiritual—is of the utmost importance here. Immediacy is also a theme in both Doctor Faustus (whose protagonist is constantly being distracted by the immediate, unable to escape the present moment) and Paradise Lost (in which Eve privileges touch).

Knapp makes a similar move in translating hic as “there.” Masson probably comes the closest to rendering the ambiguity created by the hic legible to English readers: “here there was grace and lightness.”

“discussed ille et mihi quoque fuit, eoque meo animo aculeos infixit qui etiam nunc altius inhaerent, quotiens mecum cogito tot simul sodales atque amicos tam bonos tamque commodos una in urbe—longinqu a illa quidem, sed tamen carissima—invitum me et plane divulsum reliquisse.” Hale, Latin Writings, 152/153.

For example, Brown sees grace and charm in Damon, too: “Diodati is celebrated … in 118 as charming companion sharing grace and charm with his other Tuscan friends in 127 (Hic Caris, atque Lepos; et Tuscus tu quoque Damon)” (“Milton and Diodati,” 122).

Compare, for instance, Bush’s emphatic rendering (“but who himself was in all other respects an Englishman”; my italics) with Braden’s more neutral rendering (“and otherwise an Englishman”). The discrepancy begs the question of how emphatic Milton meant to be about Diodati’s Englishness.

Knapp’s translation uniquely places Englishman in apposition with youth, suggesting that Diodati’s “intellect” and “learning” reflect his being “in all things else an Englishman”: “In all things else he was an Englishman, a youth, the while he lived, preeminent in intellect, in learning, and in all the other brightest and fairest virtues.”

Of course, it is also important to recognize that Florence is not the only hic represented in the poem. As I mentioned above, there are multiple centers of gravity presented in the poem; James Grantham Turner notes that the poem places Thyrsis “back in England in a very specific location,” pointing to the mention of “the insignificant River Colne in Middlesex” and “obscure Ancient British names.” Thyrsis is also presented among what Turner calls a “highly particularized group of friends, particularly the girl friends who try to ask him out to play” (personal communication). Although there has been speculation about the identities of the nymphs Thyrsis rejects, none has been identified with a specific person with certainty. According to the Variorum, “Most if not all of them are characterized too slightly and vaguely to be more than representative lay figures with pastoral names. Carey thinks that Milton’s classical names presumably ‘stand for real people, mutual acquaintances of himself and Diodati’” (1:305n69–90).

Rejecting his English nymphs and shepherds in favor of memories of Damon and the Tuscan shepherds is a counterintuitive move for Milton; in rejecting the English for the Italians, he rejects embodied friendships for virtual ones (leading to the conclusion that physical proximity isn’t everything, as we will see in our discussion of Greteman and the early modern social network). Some of the English friends might have known Damon/Diodati personally (which of course begs the question of why they’re not mourning with Thyrsis), whereas it is much less likely that any of the Florentine academicians did. Why, then, did Milton find “his best joy,” his greatest solace in his grief—as quoted above in his letter to
Dati—with them? Brown, in his discussion of Milton’s Italian sonnets, suggests that Milton and Diodati had a bond as fellow Italianophiles that separated them from their English peers (“Milton and Diodati,” 115–16). And indeed, Estelle Haan argues that Milton presents himself as bicultural in the same way he portrays Diodati:

at times he is the Anglus, an Englishman proclaiming a national identity, cherishing memories of an English landscape, announcing a projected national epic on King Arthur, and heralding his assumption of the vernacular henceforth; at others, he is, as it were, Thuscus ... quoque: quasi-Italian in his re-creation in verse of his travels to Rome and Florence, in his re-enactment via pastoral allegory of his Florentine academic experiences and the associated acclaim which he received there, and in his ekphrastic description of two ‘cups’ or books (of Italian verse and prose) gifted to him by the Neapolitan Manso. (Both English and Latin, 133)

Thus Haan suggests that Milton remains invested in his double identity even as he appears to be casting it off. For his part, Hale notes the “triumphant paradox” that “British places are celebrated by the sound and sequence of their versified Latin names, in the moment of turning away from Latin.”


57 Ancestry seems to be a particular concern of Milton’s; he opens both Sonnets 20 and 21 with allusions to his addressee’s ancestry (20.1: “Lawrence of vertuous Father virtuous Son”; 21.1 “Cyriack, whose Grandsire on the Royal Bench”), and calls attention to Dati and Francini’s descent from “Lydian blood” in line 138 of Epitaphium Damonis. John A. Vance argues that Milton alludes to the illustrious ancestors of his sonnets’ addressees to remind them of the importance of public service; something different seems to be at work in Epitaphium Damonis. “God’s Advocate and His Pupils: Milton’s Sonnets to Lawrence and Skinner,” South Atlantic Bulletin 42, no. 4 (1977): 31–40.

58 Note that “present” is a word that describes both time (present vs. past) and space (present vs. absent).

59 I have modified Haan’s translation by using “distinguished” to translate Milton’s egregius.

60 Of the translations I consulted, Bush’s “while his short life lasted” most successfully communicates the pathos of Milton’s dum viveret.

61 Brown: “The poem addresses Diodati as if he were still living” (“Milton and Diodati,” 121).

62 There is critical debate about which of his poems Milton is promising to send to Diodati in these last lines of Elegia sexta. While many scholars believe he is referring to the Nativity Ode he has just described, Brown and some others argue that he is actually referring to the Italian sonnets, 1–6 (“Milton and Diodati,” 115). For a summary of the debate, see 134nn16–17.

63 Et potui Lycidæ certantem audire Menalcam. Ipse etiam tentare ausus sum, nec puto multùm Displicui (lines 132–34)

I could … listen to Menalcas competing with Lycidas. I even dared to offer my own attempts, and I don’t think I greatly displeased.

64 According to Shawcross, the lines on the singing contest “refer to Idyl 7 of Theocritus and Milton’s poetical performances at the Svogliati Academy in Florence” (Complete Poems, 191n17).

65 For example, Campbell and Corns argue that because Milton was not sure that his father would be alive when he returned from Italy, his Ad Patrem “articulates feelings of gratitude that in normal circumstances would remain unspoken.” (Life, Work, and Thought, 102).

66 Milton laments: “coming to the passage where you write that you had already written three letters to me, which I realize must have got lost, then my pure joy began to be tainted, and to be disturbed by a sad longing [cum incido in illud quod scribis, ternas te jam olim ad me dedisse, quas ego periisse
scio, tum primum sincera illa infici tristique desiderio conturbari coepta est laetitia].” Hale, Latin Writings, 150/51.

67 “Id quod ipse jamdiu legisse debes, siquidem id ad vos carmen illud pervenit, quod ex te nunc primum audio.” Hale, Latin Writings, 152/53 (my italics).


69 See Kathy Eden’s discussion of how Petrarch creates a world of ancient companions (which is itself a classical trope) in The Renaissance Rediscovery of Intimacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 65, 65n32.

70 Refer to my discussion of this issue in Chapter 1 for citations of Eden and Greteman.

71 “æternum … in sæcula damnum” (111). I have emended Haan’s translation.


73 “durum genus” (106).

74 “Animal friendship” is the term I’ve seen used in the secondary literature; the poem itself seems to conflate friendship and mating (the bulls play, the asses mate, the sparrows seems to have a love nest), thus celebrating a bond that seems to blur the boundaries between amicitia and amor.

75 I have altered Haan’s “bullocks,” which Turner argues is overly specific in referring to castrated males; juveni may or may not be castrated.

76 To define sodales, Garrison cites the Oxford Latin Dictionary (ed. P. G. W. Glare [Oxford: Clarendon, 1984], 1780): the word “does not connote the idealized forms of friendship described by the term amicitia, but rather suggests a more casual type of friendship: ‘(1) a (fellow) member of a fraternity meeting for religious or social purposes, (2) an intimate companion, comrade, mate, crony, etc.’” (Friendship and Queer Theory, 91). cf. intro to Haan, Academies on sodales.

77 Garrison, Friendship and Queer Theory, 90, 145n11, 91.

78 I am especially drawn to Masson’s translation of lines 103–05:

Whom should fate strike lifeless,—whether the beak of the falcon
Pin him in air, or he lie transfixed by the reed of the ditcher,—
Quick the survivor is off, and a moment finds him remated.

Here, in distinction to other translations, the bird in question is the one who gets killed; the briefly mentioned companion (ille, “that one over there”) is the one who finds a new partner. This presentation of the situation seems colder and bleaker, more to Milton’s purpose—we assume the perspective of the bird who all of a sudden dies and is quickly replaced, rather than assuming the perspective of the bird doing the replacing. So quem refers to Passer in line 100, and ille refers to quicum sit.

79 Leonard notes that the sparrow is “notorious for lechery” (Complete Poems, 969n101); the ease with which a sparrow substitutes a new partner for the old could be an oblique commentary on the sparrow’s lechery—a hint that we are not supposed to be looking at them with envy the way Thyrsis is.

80 “vale, nostri memor ibis ad astra” (123).

81 Friendship and Queer Theory, 101.

82 Friendship and Queer Theory, 99.

83 Garrison, Friendship and Queer Theory, 99–100.
That said, Milton did not necessarily think animals were merely dumb brutes. Boehrer argues that Milton imbues animals with a sort of dignity in holding up animal companionship as noble and worthy of emulation in his divorce tracts. On the other hand, he also denigrates animal conjugality as irrational and exclusively carnal (“Animal Love,” 795–800).

“lenire docebit / Mordaces curas” (45–46). I have modified Haan’s translation by using “cares” to translate Milton’s curas.

The Hughes translation especially brings out this sense: “How like one another are the steers at play in the meadows, all mutually companions together, because, under the law which gives them one mind together in common, not one singles out another from the herd as a friend” (my italics).

Brown reads the entire series of texts exchanged between Milton and Diodati as particularly invested in the differences between the two (“Milton and Diodati,” 128); I do not see this in Epitaphium Damonis.


Boehrer, “Animal Love,” 788 (my italics). For Boehrer, the animal passage is about more than just Diodati—it is a meditation on the human condition. Adam was the only creature in Eden to suffer from loneliness—perhaps the only creature capable of feeling loneliness—and this was before the Fall. Similarly, Aristotle says that humans are especially desirous of friendship: “it is felt mutually by members of the same race, and especially by men, whence we praise lovers of their fellow-men.” Nicomachean Ethics, ed. W. D. Ross, in Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, vol. 9 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1925), 8.1.20–21, 1155a.

Oddly, Garrison argues that in the Epitaphium Damonis, “the single human or dyad of humans is characterized by a lack of emotional sustenance, by anxiety, or by the threat of loss that would leave one alone” (Friendship and Queer Theory, 100). On the contrary, Milton’s portrayal of the Thyrsis-Damon dyad in lines 35–56 is idealized as meeting Thyris’s every need—there is no lack alluded to here.

Francini and Dati wrote the most extensive by far of the testimonia printed in the 1645 volume; judging from this, it appears that Milton was closer to these two academicians than to the others. This is not to say that Dati and Francini are the only friends alluded to in the poem—as mentioned in an
earlier note, Carey sees submerged refs to mutual friends lines 69–90, in which other shepherds and
tymphs try and fail to comfort Thyrsis. In addition, Haan argues that “the nature of these terms ‘Grace’
and ‘Charm’ [Charis et Lepos in line 127] suggests the type of names (anagrammatic or otherwise)
assumed by Italian academicians, and may indeed contain veiled references to unidentified individuals”
(Shorter Poems, 494n127). If we accept her argument, we must acknowledge that the poem represents
three tiers of amici (or is it sodales?): those named, those unnamed but alluded to with names like
Lycidas, and those not in the poem at all. This gives the lie to the idea that Milton thought human
friendships should be like the animal friendships depicted in the passage—even if it were an ideal he
strived towards, he clearly did not meet it.

101 Friendship and Queer Theory, 88, 90.

102 Friendship and Queer Theory, 102. In addition, he suggests that the infusion of Christian
imagery into the apotheosis is a nod to the “more inclusive” Christian concept of friendship, which—as
opposed to classical amicitia—is not limited to dyads (148n44).

103 Friendship and Queer Theory, 101.

104 “dignumque tui … agmen”; “Ignavumque … pecus … omne silentum” (24, 25). Garrison
suggests the pecus that is denigrated at the beginning of the poem might represent the “the community of
shepherds that the friend has left behind” (Friendship and Queer Theory, 101).

105 For example, note that in the proem to Il Penseroso it is in part the multiplicity of the “vain
deluding joyes” that is portrayed as especially problematic—they are a “brood of folly” that is “thick and
numberless” (lines 1, 2, 7). Additionally, in Ad Johannem Rousium, he praises the Bodleian as a treasure-
house that will protect his work from “the perverse mob of readers [Turba legentum prava]” (line 80).

106 Friendship and Queer Theory, 115 (italics in original).

107 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973):

108 Greteman, “Early Modern Social Network,” 83. Greteman adds that “recent statistical analysis
has confirmed [that] we can remove strong ties from a network without much impact, but removing only a
few weak ties will cause a network to collapse.” But although the network becomes stronger with
increased social distance between ties, the relationship between the members of dyads may become
diluted.

109 Elizabeth McCutcheon argues that “Peter Giles … was not quite as close a friend as More’s
language and stance [in his prefatory letter to Utopia] seem to suggest.” My Dear Peter: The Ars Poetica
and Hermeneutics for More’s “Utopia” (Angers: Moreana, 1983), 14; see also Jean-François Vallée “The
Fellowship of the Book: Printed Voices and Written Friendships in More’s Utopia,” in Printed Voices:
The Renaissance Culture of Dialogue, ed. Dorothy Heitsch and Jean-François Vallée (Toronto: Toronto
University Press, 2004), 52. Utopia was first published in Basel, by Erasmus’s printer friend Froben; the
first prefatory letter to Utopia is addressed from Erasmus to Froben.

110 “Early Modern Social Network,” 83.

111 Grafton posits these twin purposes for letter-writing in his “Sketch Map” of the Republic of
Letters; it was “at once the only way to show their sympathy and affection for those from whom political
and religious borders separated them and the only way to enter into a regular relationship with the greats
who glittered far away” (9).

112 Greteman’s ultimate assessment of Milton’s letter to Dati: “as lonely as it claims to be,
Milton’s letter is an undeniably social work”—just like Epitaphium Damonis (“Early Modern Social
Network,” 87).

Renaissance Rediscovery of Intimacy, 8.

“Early Modern Social Network,” 91. Similarly, Garrison suggests that Diodati has gained by his death by moving from being a member of a dyad to being a member of a group—“a multitude worthy of him” (99).

In Garrison’s reading, “Milton positions the academies as the fruition of a desire to find an organization where classical ideals of amity might be realized” (*Friendship and Queer Theory*, 100). For on Milton’s argument in *Defensio Secundo* linking academies to friendships, see Haan, *From Academia to Amicitia*, 6. The *Defensio Secundo* account is in *CPW* 4.1:614-20.
The end then of learning is to repair the ruins of our first parents by regaining to know God aright, and out of that knowledge to love him, to imitate him, to be like him, as we may the neerest by possessing our souls of true vertue, which being united to the heavenly grace of faith makes up the highest perfection.

– John Milton

There is much that does not need to be taught in Milton’s Paradise. Adam and Eve are natural rhetoricians and even poets, effortlessly and spontaneously composing hymns of praise to God. Narration by characters is central to Milton’s epic, as if one of the markers of prelapsarian life is an ability to tell one’s own story. In Milton’s description of education quoted in the epigraph, the word “know” is significant because it suggests that the paradisal state is one of “right” knowledge (about God, at least) rather than a tabula rasa. And Milton’s educational program, like much Renaissance pedagogy, includes the study of languages and literature, rhetoric and eloquence—subjects notably absent from paradisal education because they are unnecessary. Since for him education is linked to regaining paradise, it is no surprise that Milton, even more than his predecessors in the hexameral tradition, locates intellectual life at the center of his Eden, capitalizing on Bacon’s redemption of curiosity by making it the condition of innocent Adam.

But all is not perfect—because Milton’s Adam and Eve struggle with the same thorny issues attached to intellectual labor that we have seen in the work of Renaissance humanists. Indeed, the problems underpinning humanism are shown to be the same problems that led to the Fall in Milton’s telling of the story. But even as he ties together the perils surrounding amicitia, intellectual labor, and solitude and sociability, he struggles. He does not provide all the answers. But we might read Milton’s leaving the interpretation of the epic open-ended as a method of training his readers in the hermeneutic struggles that make reading an active and productive process. In the realm of learning, right consumption is production.

Eve’s fatal act of eating the forbidden fruit is the very opposite. While the first disobedience seems a far cry from Doctor Faustus’s project of touring Europe to perform magic tricks for princes, the two actions are actually born from similarly disordered thinking about the purpose and power of intellectual labor. The primary similarity between Eve and Faustus is their superstitious faith in the power of knowledge to enact transformation without requiring effort on the part of the consumer. As I argued in Chapter 1, it is not enough to simply consume; one must be consumed as well. Otherwise, one perverts the digestive process whereby knowledge is both produced and consumed. Faustus’s superstitious belief that his books of magic can transform him into a “mighty god” (1.1.64) finds its analogue in Eve’s belief that knowledge potent enough to transform her into a “goddess among gods” (9.547) inheres in a fruit. The problem in both cases is an overattachment to the physical—Faustus’s books and Eve’s fruit become fetish objects, talismans with supernatural powers.

But perhaps we can’t be too hard on Eve—after all, some might argue that her particular ways of knowing prime her to view the forbidden fruit as a talisman able to impart knowledge through physical consumption. Eve seems to acquire knowledge not solely through language, but
in other ways that engage faculties other than ratio. For example, both Satan’s temptation and Michael’s revelation appear to her as dreams—which Adam says are “wild work” produced by the fancy while reason sleeps (5.112). Eve disappears when Adam and Raphael chat because she prefers to get lessons mingled with caresses. Perhaps most significantly, Adam’s and Eve’s differing accounts of their first meeting highlight the difference in how each perceives the act of learning. While Adam mentions that he reasoned with Eve, Eve’s account shifts directly from Adam’s act of physical domination (seizing her hand, emphasized because “Seized” begins a line with a spondee—an extra stress where it’s not expected—following a violent enjambment and clashes with “gentle” in the preceding line) and the result of Adam’s lesson: “thy gentle hand / Seized mine, I yielded, and from that time see / How beauty is excelld by manly grace” (4.488–90). The clause beginning “and from that time see…” reads as a non sequitur because the account of Adam’s reason is missing—which suggests that either the physical act was more memorable or that Eve’s experience of Adam’s reason is primarily physical.

Although Eve does receive verbal instruction (that disembodied voice she hears as she’s staring into the pool, Adam’s explanations of the origin of dreams and the purpose of starlight) her learning takes several different paths. Compare Adam who from the beginning reasons (I exist, thus I must have been created, thus there must be a creator and I should worship him): unlike Eve, he demonstrates ratio and oratio immediately. We have no account of Eve’s first words.

Since Eve doesn’t acquire knowledge exclusively from language or reason, often using more immediate means, and doesn’t necessarily privilege reason over other ways of learning, it is easy to understand why she is more likely to consider it appropriate to satisfy the intellectual appetite as one would satisfy a physical one. Thus she fails to make the crucial distinction between physical and spiritual, as Milton does in his implicit contrast between gaining access to “things invisible to mortal sight” (as an inspired prophet in 3.55) and learning about “all things visible” (as Satan-as-snake promises Eve in 9.604).

One may ask what Eve is doing in this dissertation if, as Cedric C. Brown claims, “she is not a good fit in the study.” One might respond that it is precisely because she is not studying that she belongs in this dissertation—she is the cautionary tale of the intellectual life’s perversion. A traditional allegorical reading of the Fall aligns Adam with Reason and Eve with Appetite; the Fall occurs when the Appetite ceases to be governed by Reason. A version of this allegory updated for the age of experimentalism is provided by Picciotto: right consumption of knowledge occurs when the ratio, represented by Adam, parses, processes, and interprets evidence of the senses, represented by Eve. Wrong consumption—and hence the Fall—occurs when the senses (Eve) are allowed to run free without the interpretive guidance of ratio (Adam). In this schema, Eve becomes a naïve empiricist trusting sensual data on its own: “On my experience, Adam, freely taste” (9.988). She might be likened to Bacon’s ant, hoarding up knowledge and sensory experience rather than subjecting it to the analytical pressure of ratio.

However, this is too stark a view of Eve’s intellectual failings, and at times it appears that Milton does not hold it. For instance, after Adam’s discussion of the “wild work” of the fancy “misjoining” images and ideas, we get a scene of Eve’s “right joining” of tastes for the meal she is about to serve:

with dispatchful looks in haste
She turns, on hospitable thoughts intent
What choice to choose for delicacy best,
What order, so contrived as not to mix
Tastes, not well joined, inelegant, but bring
Taste after taste upheld with kindliest change …
from sweet kernels pressed
She tempers dulcet creams, nor these to hold
Wants her fit vessels pure, then strews the ground
With rose and odours from the shrub unfumed. (5.331–49)

Eve mixes the fruits in due proportion; the phrase “tastes not well joined” (5.335) recalls Adam’s discussion of fancy’s “misjoining” of forms (5.111). Here, Eve is rather like reason, who joins things rightly. Although a committed critic might insist that this suggests only an ability to “join rightly” in the lower physical realm, words like “intent” (5.332), “contrived” (5.334), and “tempers” (5.347) signal intellection and care. “Tempers” also connotes moderation and reasonableness.

Adam, in turn, is not entirely a creature of pure ratio. James Grantham Turner notes the double meaning of “apprehension” in Adam’s narration of his naming of the animals:

I named them, as they passed, and understood
Their nature, with such knowledge God endued
My sudden apprehension: but in these
I found not what methought I wanted still; (8.352–55)

Read in the context of the preceding text, “apprehension” refers both to intellection and grabbing (“sudden apprehension” might be an apt characterization of the way he grabs Eve). But in the context of the dialogue that follows, “apprehension” can also be read as an emotional state—Adam feels apprehensive because he sees that there is no one to share Paradise with him (“I found not what methought I wanted still”).

If Adam instinctively apprehends the importance of sociability, Eve does not always seem to. If Eve can be forgiven for her mistaken conception of the fruit, she cannot be excused for her other Faustian trait—the desire to hoard the fruits of learning to benefit only herself rather than the totality of the corporate body of which she is a part. After eating the fruit, she engages in zero-sum thinking about knowledge and power: wouldn’t it be better to keep the fruit for herself, perhaps thereby becoming

more equal, and perhaps,
A thing not undesireable, sometime
Superior: for inferior who is free? (9.823–25)

Note Eve’s abrupt shift from the notion of equality, with its attendant connotations of mutuality, to that of superiority, a situation in which only one member of the pair can be “free” while the other becomes subject; for the corrupted Eve, this is a “thing not undesireable.”

Eve’s desire to hoard knowledge for herself points to the individualistic model of learning as solitary consumption that was criticized for not attending to the common good. One might compare the humanists Budé appears to indict for withdrawal procul foro in his prefatory letter to Utopia, but there is a crucial difference: while these humanists claim to eschew political power (which is arguably more of a rhetorical move than anything else), Faustus and Eve embrace the power they imagine learning can give and want to occupy a position in the public sphere—quite an elevated one for Faustus (who intends to “reign sole king of all the provinces” [1.1.96]) and the “sometime / Superior” Eve. One scholar notes that in the temptation scene Satan “deploy[s] a series of political titles for Eve: ‘sovereign mistress,’ ‘Empress of this fair
world,’ ‘sovereign of creatures, universal dame,’ ‘Queen of this universe,’ and finally ‘Goddess humane’” (9.532, 568, 612, 684, 732). Although at first she is skeptical of his “overpraising” (9.615)—whether of her or the fruit is open for debate—she eventually succumbs to the temptation of power that these titles hold out.

Eve’s extreme break from unity with Adam (and the resultant cleaving of the corporate body of which both are a part) reflects another aspect of Eve’s precarious position in Eden. As Picciotto has argued, Eve is “individual” in both senses of the word—indivisible from Adam and indivisible in herself. She is both half of a corporate person and person in her own right; witness the telling discrepancy between Adam’s characterization of her (“my other half” [4.488]) with God’s (“thy other self” [8.450]). As we saw in Chapter 4, for Milton, it is employment—rather than simply ratio and oratio—that separates human from animal, and for Milton, employment lies at the intersection of individual and collaborative. Employment requires individuation—even as it provides the basis for a relationship based on common work. Employment is the basis of collective relations; it is in part laboring together that fuses Adam and Eve into a corporate body. This corporate body is made up not just of Adam and Eve, but of all their future descendants—all of humankind. It is to this subject that the benefit of Adam and Eve’s labor, intellectual and physical, should accrue. But unlike the situation in More’s imagined Utopia, such accrual is not automatic—one must make a choice between laboring to benefit the self, as Milton’s Faustian Eve does, and laboring to benefit the collective. We don’t have the nice Utopian solution of individuation (born of intellectual labor, or cultus animi) serving at once the self and the collective—in Milton’s Paradise we must deal with the fact that the two can be at odds and the possibility that one (such as Eve) may take the individuation aspect of employment too far.

Employment in intellectual (rather than physical) labor promotes individuation even as it cements bonds between individuals. (This is similar to the workings of Morus’s imagined Utopia—physical labor supports the collective benefit of short working days for all; intellectual labor risks—without actually doing so—pulling people into their own private intellectual spheres.) But does intellectual labor actually do the work of individuation in Paradise Lost? The long conversation between Raphael and Adam seems to cement their link, but it does so while delineating the differences between them: witness Raphael’s speeches about the differences between angelic and human digestion, angelic and human sex. And perhaps it is this individuating tendency of intellectual labor that Adam and Eve are attempting to mitigate with their “philosophy mingled with caresses” arrangement—they join in “one flesh” (8.499) as they engage in the “rational delight” (8.391) which risks cleaving them from each other.

In fact, in Adam’s experience, it does—in describing his experience of undertaking intellectual labor with Eve, he uses the same zero-sum discourse of superiority and inferiority:

```
nature … on her bestow’d
Too much of ornament, in outward shew
Elaborate, of inward less exact.
For well I understand in the prime end
Of nature her the inferior, in the mind
And inward faculties … yet when I approach
Her loveliness, so absolute she seems
And in herself complete, so well to know
Her own, that what she wills to do or say,
Seems wisest, vertuouest, discreetest, best;
All higher knowledge in her presence falls
```
Degraded, wisdom in discourse with her
Looses discount’nanced, and like folly shows;
Authority and reason on her wait,
As one intended first, not after made
Occasionally; and to consummate all,
Greatness of mind and nobleness thier seat
Build in her loveliest, and create an awe
About her, as a guard angelic placed. (8.534–58)

Adam complains that Eve is overpowering his *ratio* (or, as Luxon might say, that her feminine is overpowering his masculine). This interaction seems counterproductive to the (implicit) charge to ascend to Godhead “in contemplation of created things” (5.511)—his perception and reasoning are getting worse rather than better, his *ratio* is being led astray, and thus wisdom begins to look like folly. His speech is full of *ratio*-related words (e.g., wisdom, authority, reason, greatness of mind), reminding us that (in the seventeenth-century mind) men, not women, are supposed to be associated with *ratio*—why should “authority and reason” wait on *her* rather than him? Why should “greatness of mind and nobleness” and build their seat in *her* visage rather than in *his*?

Of course, this speech could also be read as evidence that Adam is not driven exclusively by reason; according to Turner, “the place where he falls into sin and speaks folly is where he defines Eve as an afterthought made ‘occasionally’—after almost an entire book proving the opposite.” It is curious that Adam, after explicitly rejecting the idea of an unequal pairing in his first conversation with God, now seems to take it for granted; his complaint here is not that hierarchy exists, but that his superior role in the hierarchy is being undermined. Whether this crosses the line into “sin” as Turner suggests I am not prepared to say. Certainly, there are several places in the narrative where Milton pushes back against the seventeenth-century notion that *ratio* is the “sole proprietie” of men. Indeed, perhaps the key unresolved problem of the poem is the issue of a woman’s position in the intellectual, public, and domestic realms of prelapsarian Eden.

This was a humanist problem as well: recall Sigea’s courtier Flaminia, who is excluded from *negotium* and constrained to fill her life at court with triviality, framing her words to please men and win favor from princes; it is only in dialogue with the nun Blesilla, away from court, that she can demonstrate intellectual authority and purpose with her words. Milton’s Eve is less constrained and more empowered in many ways. Unlike Flaminia, she participates in the same labor that her male counterpart does; she, like Adam, is employed.

It appears that Eve has a comparable position to Adam in both the public realm of labor (“public” inasmuch as she forms part of the corporate body of humankind) and in the intellectual realm (witness her discussion with Adam about the heavenly spheres in 4.657–88—a far cry from Flaminia’s trivialities). It is strange, then, that in our first encounter with the couple, Eve declares her inferiority to Adam:

I chiefly … enjoy
So far the happier lot, enjoying thee
Pre-eminent by so much odds, while thou
Like consort to thyself canst nowhere find. (4.445–48)

There is a tinge of mournfulness in this statement that recalls that of Thyris’s much sadder lament, as if Eve, like Thyris, understands that the impossibility of finding a *parem* is something
of a tragedy—that to be unequalled is to be unhappy. Notably, Adam doesn’t respond to reassure her—or responds with a kiss that turns out not to be reassuring. It is interesting that the first experience we see Eve having with Adam in paradise is not one of unalloyed joy, including as it does wistful notes. Similarly, Adam’s first experience of Eve is one of loss; even before she turns away from him in real life, he narrates, she disappears from his dream and “left me dark”; he vows to find her “or for ever to deplore / Her loss, and other pleasures all abjure” (8.478–80). This is not an uncomplicated love story by any means—even before we get to Eve’s initial rejection of Adam, which is the cause of so much critical agitation.

But Eve’s turning away—or rather her capacity to turn away—can be read as a demonstration of her free will, just as man’s disobedience—or rather his capacity to disobey—is a demonstration of man’s free will. God refuses to make drones who have no choice but to serve him, and he refuses to make for Adam an Eve with no choice but to love him; he must do the work of winning her over. She is made to order—his “dream girl,” in Picciotto’s cheeky characterization—but since God did not create “a mere artificial Adam, such an Adam as he is in the motions” (as Milton argues in Areopagitica), God could not create a puppet Eve to be his helpmeet.

But then why is Eve’s first speech act a disavowal of parity with Adam, especially since (as we find out in book 8) a parem is exactly what Adam requested from God (one “fit to participate / All rational delight”; Adam wonders, “among unequals what society / Can sort, what harmony or true delight?” [8.390–91; 8.383–84]). In response, God promises to Adam that Eve will be “thy likeness, thy fit help, thy other self, / Thy wish, exactly to thy heart’s desire” (8.450–51). Of course, the question of Eve as “fit help” has vexed readers for centuries and will continue to do so as long as Paradise Lost has readers. This question of the precarity of Eve’s position in paradise might be best answered (or at least explored) through a discussion of the meal scene that stretches from book 5 to book 8 of the poem.

We began this study with a conversation in a garden—Morus, Giles, and Raphael Hythloday discussing the benefits and drawbacks of public service for the intellectual. We end with another amicable conversation in a garden—yet another stranger-turned-friend named Raphael recounts stories about a strange new world. The stakes here are of course much higher than those in Utopia, even if the fact that the angelic visitor is conversing with Adam “as friend with friend” (5.229) tends to disguise this. As Milton makes intellectual life central to prelapsarian existence, he makes the quintessentially humanist genre of the dialogue (set in the ultimate locus amoenus of Eden) the centerpiece of his narrative of prelapsarian existence. One thing to note is that the meal scene is decidedly a dialogue in the strict sense—Eve remains silent as she “minister[s] naked” at the table (5.444) and even leaves in the middle of the conversation.

So spake our sire, and by his countenance seemed
Entering on studious thoughts abstruse, which Eve
Perceiving where she sat retired in sight …
Rose, and went forth among her fruits and flowers,
To visit how they prospered, bud and bloom …
Yet went she not, as not with such discourse
Delighted, or not capable her ear
Of what was high: such pleasure she reserved,
Adam relating, she sole auditress;
Her husband the relater she preferred
Before the angel, and of him to ask
Chose rather; he, she knew would intermix
Grateful digressions, and solve high dispute
With conjugal caresses, from his lip
Not words alone pleased her. (8.39–57)

Here we cannot help but notice Milton’s difficulty in finding the proper place for women—and the marriage relationship—in his imagined paradise of labor and curiosity. While Adam and Raphael express esteem and affection for each other in their course of their philosophical conversation, these expressions remain strictly verbal. In contrast, philosophical conversation between Adam and Eve adds an element of the physical. “Solve” (8.55) recalls Adam’s request to Raphael in 8.13–14: “something yet of doubt remains / Which only thy solution can resolve.” While Raphael resolves doubts with “solution” (glossed by David Scott Kastan as “explanation”), Adam “solve[s] high dispute” with caresses. One can make all sorts of arguments about Eve’s preference for added caresses indicating her closeness to the beasts, her sensuousness contrasting with Adam’s pure ratio, how she’s even rendering Adam more bestial by leading him to focus on the physical rather than the spiritual, facing downwards rather than upwards on the great chain of being (as Luxon does, for example). These arguments might be convincing if the narrator didn’t go on to praise this arrangement as the epitome of what has been lost with Paradise—an ideal marital union possible only in prelapsarian Eden that the fallen strive to emulate in vain: “Oh when meet now / Such pairs, in love and mutual honour joined?” (8.57–58). As Morus would say, it is a relationship “rather to be wished for than expected” in the postlapsarian world. But what makes this the quintessential scene of ideal marital relations in unfallen Eden? One explanation (mentioned above) is that this is Adam and Eve’s attempt to overcome the nature of intellectual labor to individuate them. Another reading suggests that the relationship between Adam and Eve—their ability to mix caresses and philosophy, ratio and the physical—is powerful enough to render Eve’s departure from the conversation a thing indifferent. Of course, Eve’s sin is precisely failing to distinguish between the physical and spiritual; this is another tension that Milton leaves to the reader to hammer out.

It is striking that Milton takes pains to distinguish the marital bond from a relationship one might consider the humanist ideal—Adam and Raphael engaged in completely spiritualized intellectual labor. One might argue that he is telling us that there is a necessary difference between one’s “fit help” and one’s amicus; Eve’s departure shows that marriage and amicitia must be distinct and separate relationships. This, of course, seems a bit perverse—in the course of Adam and Raphael’s conversation, Adam recounts that he specifically asked God for a partner with whom he could “participate all rational delight”; as many scholars have noted, Raphael clearly seems to fit the bill here more than Eve. But it is important to remember that Adam does “participate … rational delight” with Eve—we just get mere glimpses of it (such as their discussion about the stars in 4.657–88) rather than the extended scene Milton devotes to Adam and Raphael’s conversation. Adam’s expression of joy in conversation with Raphael in book 8 seems to mirror Eve’s expression of joy in conversation with Adam in book 4, possibly indicating that Eve’s intuition that “like partner thou [Adam] canst nowhere find” is accurate. Perhaps the key piece of information we’ve learned is that Adam, Eve, and Raphael cannot form a society of three like Giles, Morus, and Hythloday did in Utopia.

Perhaps Adam needs both Eve and Raphael to be satisfied. After all, Milton, commenting on Gen. 2:18 in Tetrachordon, argues that the woman’s place in Adam’s life is one that no other companion, divine or bestial, can fill:
heer alone is meant alone without woman; otherwise Adam had the company of God himself, and Angels to convers with; all creatures to delight him seriously, or to make him sport. God could have created him out of the same mould a thousand friends and brother Adams to have bin his consorts, yet for all this till Eve was giv’n him, God reckn’d him to be alone. (CPW 2:595)

Here Milton is rejecting Augustine’s dictum that woman was created only for reproductive purposes and that Adam would have been better off if God had created a male companion for him. He goes on to characterize woman’s conversation as something of a holiday—a “slackning [of] the cords of intense thought and labour” engaged in with the amicus (CPW 2:596). But if Adam and Eve engage in the same physical labor (as Diane K. McColley discusses in Milton’s Eve), wouldn’t it stand to reason that they engage in the same intellectual labor as well? (This idea is at odds with the narrator’s assertion in 4.297–98 that one was “formed” for contemplation while the other was “formed” for softness and ornament.) In this case, the only difference between Raphael’s conversation and Eve’s is the added caresses—and the fact that with Eve, Adam is instructor (except in the question of their “stores” of fruit, in which she corrects him). Maria Magro thinks this is very important—she sees the arrangement so praised by the narrator as the prototype of the public man cultivating himself in the private sphere with the (sexualized) help of his help meet. This image feeds into the ideology of the identity of the public man being constituted by his interactions in the domestic sphere (or, as Habermas argues, the domestic sphere forming a proto-public sphere)—an ideology Milton both reflects and helps to create in his writings.

It might be more useful, then, to read Eve and Raphael as less rivals for Adam’s conversation and more complements to each other. Adam gets philosophy lessons from Raphael and caresses from Eve—maybe indicating that it’s impossible fully to “feed at once both body and mind” (9.779), or obtain mental and physical fulfillment from the same source. Eve’s case would seem to provide a counterexample to this theory, however, since Adam gives her both the philosophy lessons and the physical touch she craves: “from his lip / Not words alone pleased her” (8.56–57). There’s an implied zeugma here—Adam’s “lip” is framed as source of both “words” and kisses, both mental and physical fulfilment. Again, Eve doesn’t teach Adam philosophy, only household management—but according to Ann Torday Gulden, Milton alone “elevates rather than demeans female domesticity” in a way we don’t see in contemporary works on household management. If we agree with her, it is difficult to see how Eve’s conversation could be assigned to a less important or less arduous “holiday” status.

What Milton refers to as the “slackning [of] the cords of intense thought and labour” is what Turner describes as a situation in which eroticism wanders from the marriage bed and “extend[s] its peripheral delights into every corner of the relationship.” Yet intercourse does not disappear: when postlapsarian Eve discusses the idea of refraining from sex in order to avoid having children, she suggests that Adam might find it too difficult

Conversing, looking, loving, to abstain  
From love’s due rites, nuptial embraces sweet,  
And with desire to languish without hope  
Before the present object languishing  
With like desire (10.993–97)

In Eve’s formulation, “conversing, looking, [and] loving” lead to “love’s due rites, nuptial embraces sweet,” and the link between these activities is so strong that Adam and Eve might
have to kill themselves to escape the torment of frustrated desire for the latter bred by the former. This potential predicament reinforces the idea that Adam and Eve’s marriage is an ideal companionate marriage built on the foundation of amicitia plus sex, and that each flows from the other (that is, there is nothing unnatural about grafting amicitia onto sex or sex onto amicitia—the two go together so well that it would be suicidal to try to separate them, as the perpetual pun on “conversation” suggests).

The idea of women’s conversation as “holiday”—reminiscent of Flaminia’s courtly conversations—also bumps up against the paradox of intellectual labor as leisure: if the labor is leisure (or the leisure is laborious), how can we draw a line between the two? In other words, what is woman’s conversation a “holiday” from, exactly, if men’s conversation (i.e., intellectual labor) is a holiday in itself from negotium? Consider Adam and Raphael’s conversation, which is framed as a break from the physical labor of tending the garden: this is the charge explicitly given by God to Adam and Eve. Of course, one can argue that cultivating their minds is an implicit charge; God doesn’t expect them to be mindless drones, after all—he praises Adam for questioning him (8.399–402). As Adam tells Raphael when he requests to know how the world was created, the more he and Eve know, the better they can magnify God’s works (7.96–97).

As mentioned, Eve does instruct Adam in one instance—she corrects him about household management (an area in which he appears less than perfectly competent, according to Gulden and Amy L. Tigner). Gulden goes as far as to say that Eve does in fact contribute to the “discourse at table”: the very fruits she brings to the table—a fittingly material contribution, perhaps—serve as the starting point for Raphael’s discussion of human and angelic digestion. In this case the fruits themselves are transmuted into immaterial knowledge by serving as the basis for Raphael’s discussion, which mirrors the process by which human food is digested by the angelic body—the body “convert[s]” the food “to proper [its own] substance” (5.492–93). Gulden argues that the relationship between the material and the spiritual was one that Milton was keen on preserving as important, as he did not believe in a divorce between the two. Perhaps, then, Adam and Eve’s “philosophy mingled with caresses” arrangement is an emblematic way of celebrating this bond between matter and spirit, senses and ratio.

In connection with the marriage of matter and spirit, the meal scene is the only one in which physical and intellectual labor are juxtaposed: Adam and Raphael discuss the war in Heaven while Eve “minister[s] naked” at the table (5.444). Eve’s departure to check on her flowers at the point when Adam is about to embark on “studious thoughts abstruse” recalls the division of labor operative in More’s imagined Utopia—if one is not fit for intellectual activities, Hythloday says, one can always keep working during one’s breaks. Her departure also reminds us of the first distinction that is made between Adam and Eve in the narrative:

Not equal, as their sex not equal seemed;
For contemplation he and valour formd,
For softness she and sweet attractive grace (4.296–98)

Read in the light of this distinction, Eve’s departure from the dinner scene suggests that each member of the pair has a special domain in which the other doesn’t participate. Here we might crudely map Adam’s domains as the public and intellectual spheres—domains of both action (or “valor”) and contemplation. Eve’s ornamental nature, on the other hand, seems apt for the domestic sphere; it is perhaps significant in this context that she takes it upon herself to “adorn” the nuptial bower “with what to sight or smell was sweet” (11.280–81).

But Milton rejects this view as quickly as he evokes it. The narrator is at pains to reassure us that Eve is just as fit for contemplation as Adam is, just as capable of “studious thoughts...
abstruse”; her leaving is a matter of preference, not necessity. We are not in Morus’s imagined Utopia, where preference is uniquely congruent with merit. But because of the division of labor (and thus disunity) implied, Eve’s departure from the meal scene could be read as even more severe a separation from Adam than the calamitous separation in book 9; whereas in book 8 Adam and Eve are engaged in different activities (perhaps reflecting their different natures), in book 9 they are working towards a common goal even though they are apart. One must wonder, then, what makes the former separation benign (even praiseworthy!) while the latter is fatal—besides the obvious answer of the Fall. Again, Milton’s text offers a paradox seemingly impossible to resolve. As Turner notes, in Paradise Lost “Milton’s concrete imaginative power allows the unresolvable clash of the two ideologies of gender—the ecstatic-egalitarian and the patriarchal-masculinist … each claims the sanction of divine approval, and so each overrides the other—[evoking] Escher’s impossible staircase.”

The Escher staircase is a fitting image with which to end this discussion (and this dissertation) precisely because of its impossibility—it can exist only in the mind, not in the material world. The life of the mind is rife with impossibilities—including the impossibility of fully integrating the intellectual into the economic system and public sphere and the difficulty of fully reconciling the intellectual life and the domestic life (hence Eve’s precarious status in Milton’s Eden). Paradise Lost resists a simple, straightforward answer to these problems, possibly signaling Milton’s inability to imagine a world—even before the fall—in which intellectual labor is not troubled by tensions between the individual and the collective and questions surrounding woman’s precarity. But as I have suggested, Milton’s refusal (or inability) to resolve these questions engages his reader in the knowledge production that he sees as crucial to proper knowledge of God. As I argue above, to consume correctly is to produce—this is why there is so much interpretive openness in the epic.

Intellectual labor was to take on a different valence in the eighteenth century due to the rapid increase of literacy and resultant fragmentation of literary audiences. There was no longer a single body of classical knowledge that served as a universal cultural touchstone for all literate and educated people. Processes that began in the early modern period accelerated: the vernacular, for example, became ever more popular as a medium for scholarly texts (a development that Gabriel Harvey’s colleagues at Cambridge would surely have regarded with dismay). Thus the rules of engagement for the intellectual shifted—and the trials of intellectual labor include making up, or adapting to, the new rules of every era. It is thus that we embark on the impossible task of restoring Eden, “repairing the ruins” of the impossible, at the same time fitting for ourselves and fitting ourselves for a better world.
Notes

1 Of Education (1644); CPW 2:366–67.


3 A notable predecessor is Du Bartas, whose La sepmaine and La seconde sepmaine were translated into English by Josuah Sylvester as The Divine Weeks. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Bacon also theorized Eden as a paradise of intellectual discovery.

4 See the reverse digestive process Raphael describes in 5.469–505, in which one is digested by what one consumes.

5 All quotations from Paradise Lost are taken from Alastair Fowler, ed., Paradise Lost (London: Longman, 1998).

6 Note that in referring to the “tree / Of interdicted knowledge” in her dream account (5.51–52), Eve lets slip that she unconsciously (and erroneously) “knows” that it’s the knowledge rather than the tree that is forbidden—it’s not a long leap from here to surmise that the tree contains the forbidden knowledge.


10 Personal communication.


13 Picciotto, Labors of Innocence, 464–76.

14 Labors of Innocence, 472.

15 At the same time, Raphael makes it clear that humans and angels are not that different; this is why they can share the same meal.


18 Personal communication.

Labors of Innocence, 474.

CPW 2:527.


Swen Voekel characterizes the dinner scene thus; he discusses Milton’s engagement with the epic tradition of hospitality scenes in “Propitious Guests: Paradise Lost and Epic Hospitality,” Milton Studies 54 (2013): 209–27.

Note that the narrative contradicts itself on the timing of Eve’s departure. David Scott Kastan, among other scholars, notes the discrepancy between lines 7.50–51, in which “Adam and Eve both seem to be listening together” and lines 9.275–78, in which “Eve claims that she only accidentally ‘overheard’” Raphael’s warning. Paradise Lost (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2005), 213n50–51.

Paradise Lost (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2005).

Single Imperfection, 119: “The partner defined as meet for [Adam], designed to remedy the loneliness that distinguishes him from both God and Woman … must draw his attention down the scale of perfection toward the body and away from the spirit.” See also Luxon’s discussion of Milton’s attenuated monism in 130–31.

The concluding words of Utopia: optarim verius, quam sperarim (Surtz and Hexter, 246).

Cedric C. Brown, for one, compares Raphael favorably to Eve, who “is only half engaged with intellectual conversation and is often shown as preoccupied with domestic activities” in “Europe Comes,” 296.

Adam to Raphael in book 8:
while I sit with thee, I seem in heaven,
And sweeter thy discourse is to my ear
Than fruits of palm-tree pleasantest to thirst
And hunger both, from labour, at the hour
Of sweet repast; they satiate, and soon fill,
Though pleasant, but thy words with grace divine
Imbued, bring to their sweetness no satiety. (8.210–16)

Compare Eve to Adam in book 4: “With thee conversing I forget all time, / All seasons and their change, all please alike” (4.639–40).

30 “And the Lord said, it is not good that man should be alone; I will make him a help meet for him.”

31 This is noted by Luxon in Single Imperfection, 118, 111.


33 In Magro’s reading, “Adam’s cultivated self, a prerequisite for interaction in the public sphere, is predicated on the role of Eve as rapt auditor and audience of his discourse. Notably, Eve’s function as auditor is fulfilled in a sexualized context. Not only is she a willingly captive audience to Adam’s discourse, but she also understands her role as wifey listener as inseparable from her position as Adam’s sexual partner.” “Milton’s Sexualized Woman and the Creation of a Gendered Public Sphere,” Milton Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2001): 108–09.


36 Gregory Chaplin argues that Milton’s own “vacations” seem to involve just as much male-male fellowship as his intellectual relationships. “‘One Flesh, One Heart, One Soul’: Renaissance Friendship and Milonic Marriage,” in “Milonic Revisions,” special issue, Modern Philology 99, no. 2 (2001): 290. One must ask, though, whether Milton ever actually takes a vacation from being an intellectual? The poems Chaplin points to as “vacation” poems (Elegia prima, etc.) are just as drenched in learning as his others. The intellectual never stops being an intellectual, even in his otium. And if amicitia is based on or involves otium, what is a vacation from that called? Can otium be strenuous, taxing, laborious enough to necessitate a vacation? This, of course, is one of the central questions of this study.


39 Again, we see a contradiction: it is precisely because Eve conflates matter and spirit that she falls. Or perhaps is it that she separates the two—using senses without ratio to apprehend: the fruit, the snake? It seems that Milton cannot decide whether or not matter and spirit are one substance—or rather, that scholars cannot decide whether or not he is truly a monist.

40 The fact that “her fruits and flowers” (8.44; my italics) represent a domain in which she exercises authority without Adam becomes clear in her lament about leaving her flowers in book 11. Having been shooed away by Adam at Michael’s approach (another example of her exclusion from the “public” realm), she breaks into their conversation with an impassioned outburst after Michael announces that she and Adam will have to leave Eden:

Oh unexpected stroke, worse than of death!
Must I thus leave thee Paradise? Thus leave
Thee native soil, these happy walks and shades,
Fit haunt of gods? ... O flowers,
That never will in other climate grow,
My early visitation, and my last
At ev’n, which I bred up with tender hand
From the first op’ning bud, and gave ye names,
Who now shall rear ye to the Sun, or rank
Your tribes, and water from the ambrosial fount? (11.267–79)

This lament—her only contribution to the conversation—is dismissed condescendingly by Michael, who takes the opportunity to put her in her place—“Where [Adam] abides think there thy native soil” (11.292). Or rather—her native soil is Adam himself, if we imagine (as the term “native soil” prompts us to) the woman made from Adam’s flesh as a flower growing from his flesh. Michael essentially strips her of her authority in the horticultural realm twice over—first, in announcing her banishment from Eden, and then, in making clear that her only concern should be her relationship with Adam.

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