EVERYDAY IMAGININGS UNDER THE LION ROCK: AN ANALYSIS OF
IDENTITY FORMATION IN HONG KONG

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by

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Abstract

EVERYDAY IMAGININGS UNDER THE LION ROCK: AN ANALYSIS OF IDENTITY FORMATION IN HONG KONG

by

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This dissertation examines the ways in which Hong Kong identity is discursively constructed through banal everyday instances, which do not, on their face, speak to issues of political identity. Fifteen years after Hong Kong’s change in sovereignty, the embracing and acceptance of a Hong Kong identity is at an all time high. Despite efforts by Beijing and the Hong Kong government to increase cooperation and integration with Mainland China, Hong Kongers are increasingly distinguishing themselves from the Chinese nation. Typical explanations for such divisions focus on issues such as universal suffrage, school curricula, and press freedom. In contrast, this study demonstrates that divisions in identity can also be seen in (1) the politics, practices, and discourses of the Hong Kong-Mainland China border; (2) discussions on redevelopment and heritage preservation; and (3) the commodification of nostalgic everyday items such as toys, clothing, and household goods.

While not a nation per se, this dissertation finds that Hong Kong’s strong place-based identity shares many similarities with conceptions of nationalism and national identities, and exhibits what I refer to as “near-nationalism.” Similar to many other nations, a founding myth is central to understanding the context of Hong Kong identity. This dissertation demonstrates how what was a colonial myth about Hong
Kong’s founding and development entrenched in the colonial power’s ideology became decolonized, localized and embodied by Hong Kongers. The new formulation of the myth emphasizes the work ethic, go-getting spirit and upward mobility of a displaced community of immigrants coming together under hardships to build a global city. The ideological aspects of globalization and neoliberalism make up the core of this myth and, by way of that, Hong Kongers’ self-understanding. The paradox is that despite increasing similarities between Mainland Chinese cities and Hong Kong, the myth remains an integral part of the everyday debates and heightened political moments in which Hong Kongers distance themselves from Mainland China.
Acknowledgments

And so my graduate school career ends here. When I first embarked on this journey six and half years ago this day seemed so far away and out of reach. It’s a journey that could not have happened had it not been for the help and support of countless people who I am grateful to have had in my life.

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“Polemically put, isn’t the very idea of modern peoplehood absurd? By contemporary racial, ethnic or national categorization, we might call Moses black or Egyptian and Abraham Arab or Syrian. What do we gain by identifying Apuleius or Saint Augustine as Algerian except perhaps as a fodder for the contemporary nationalist pride of Algerians? Should we regard Santa Claus as Turkish? Was Saladin a Muslim or Arab hero, or an Iraqi, a Syrian, an Egyptian, or a Kurd? What do we learn of Hume and Rousseau by observing that they are Scotch and Swiss? ... Why do we simplify and reify people into essentialized categories of modern peoplehood”


**CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

I. SETTING THE SCENE

According to Chinese beliefs, the Year of the Dragon (which fell on 2012) is supposed to be the luckiest and most prosperous year within the cyclical Chinese zodiac calendar. In Hong Kong, 2012 also marked the 15th anniversary of the establishment of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. Scholars, the international press around the world, and residents of Hong Kong knew that come July 1, 2012 a new Chief Executive, the head of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s government, would be selected by Beijing to take office. Those ringing in the new year were filled with a mix of emotions – of anticipation, excitement, hope, and in some cases unease and caution.

Just over a week after Hong Kongers had been celebrating the Lunar New Year festival Hong Kongers awoke to a full-page advertisement in the popular broadsheet tabloid *Apple Daily*. The full-page advertisement was paid for anonymously and showed an enlarged image of a locust in the foreground and the Hong Kong skyline in the background (See Fig 1). In large text, the advertisement asked readers, “Do you
want to see Hong Kong waste HKD $1 million every eighteen minutes to raise mainland babies? Hong Kong People, we’ve had enough!” The advertisement appeared at a time when residents of Hong Kong were already caught up in the media frenzy surrounding a number of incidents. The first was an incident on the Mass Transit Railway (MTR) that had been filmed by a passenger’s mobile phone, uploaded onto the Internet and “gone viral.” The two-part video begins with a person pressing the emergency stop button on the train. Amidst the commotion, one can hear people calling for a train attendant to come into the carriage. The carriage itself is fairly full with children, elderly people and couples, and a number of people are seen carrying large suitcases. It is clear that this train was not a train that ran through the residential areas or the business district of Hong Kong, instead this was a train that shuttled people to and from the border. All of a sudden, a clearly agitated woman says in Cantonese, “The nerve! I can’t believe we got yelled back at. They’re telling us off?” Her comment is quickly followed by a man (later dubbed Mr. Hong Kong by the press) who says out loud in Cantonese, “What are you going to do? Are you going to apologize?” At this point in the video, it becomes clear that the agitated passengers were addressing a young woman sitting next to her child. The woman calmly responded to the man’s question in Mandarin, “I don’t understand what you’re saying.” As the passengers continued to wait for a train attendant to arrive, things continued to get heated. The Mandarin-speaking woman is heard repeatedly saying, “but she’s just a child!” To which the Cantonese-speaking woman switches from Cantonese to Mandarin (albeit broken Mandarin) and angrily says, “It’s not about the
child!” As the two women continue to argue with each other, the train attendant finally enters the train with Mr. Hong Kong beside him. The man begins to explain the incident to the attendant. “They’re all sitting over there on the train and eating. They’re eating their noodles to the point where their noodles are spilling onto the floor of the train. I told them that they’re not allowed to eat on the train, and then they got mad at me and insulted me. This is Hong Kong!” While the train starts to move again, the attendant sought out the Mandarin-speaking woman and tells her to just apologize to Mr. Hong Kong so “everyone can get on their way.” Another woman, presumably a friend of the young child’s mother, stands in front of the train attendant and in English says “Sorry.” To which another passenger is further enraged and sarcastically says, “Oh, look, now she apologizes in English. What is she trying to pull?” Realizing that the situation is not going anywhere the attendant asks in Cantonese if all parties involved would agree to disembark the train and sort out the situation at the next stop. More confusion ensues as the Mandarin speakers continued to repeat, “We don’t understand.” As the attendant tries to calm the situation, things got more heated again as a group of Mandarin speaking women and various Cantonese speakers on the train began yelling at each other again. The video ends

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1 Shortly after the video went viral and caught the attention of the mass media, Mr. Hong Kong (real name Ken Wai) posted a public message on his Facebook wall explaining the situation that led up to what was posted online. He explains how upon witnessing the children eating the noodles, he pointed to a sign posted on the carriage and explained to them in Mandarin that eating was not permitted on the train. To which the mother of the child responded by saying it was only the child eating and told Wai to mind his own business. Wai pointed out that he had seen the mother also eating on the train. Wai’s message also details how the mother’s friend, sitting across from the child, laughed out loud and made a comment about Hong Kongers not being able to speak Mandarin properly. Wai explains in his Facebook message that he was quite angry by the woman’s response and retorted, “Yes, my Mandarin is bad. But this is Hong Kong and since you are in Hong Kong you should be speaking to me in Cantonese.” After more back-and-forth, according to Wai, a fellow passenger was clearly fed up and decided to call the train attendants to come to help (K. Wai 2012).
with a Cantonese speaking man loudly saying, “Just stop. Don’t bother talking to them. There’s no point – that’s just the way Mainlanders are” (2012-01-15).

Shortly after the video made headline news, controversial Peking University professor Kong Qingdong appeared on a mainland Chinese news website lambasting Hong Kongers.³ In the video, Kong is asked by the news anchor to comment on the

Figure 1: Full-page locust advertisement (Image from Apple Daily)

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² My translation.
³ Many Peking University students were already familiar with Kong’s earlier antics and were already calling for his resignation prior to his appearance on the Internet news show. His claims of being a direct descendant of Confucius only further established him as a controversial figure within the university community. According to a post on the Peking University news and campus affairs website (dated November 20, 2011), a number of students viewed Kong’s encounter with a journalist as unacceptable with the potential to incite violence. According to the bulletin, a large debate on whether or not Kong should be fired from the university flourished on the university’s message boards (Liu 2011).
footage of the incident that occurred on the MTR. Kong begins by first noting that everyone in China should speak Mandarin. He continues to argue that it should not be the responsibility for Mandarin speakers to speak the dialects of other places. In a situation where individuals who speak two different dialects meet, Kong notes, both speakers should communicate in Mandarin. Those who do not speak Mandarin, Kong argued, “are bastards.” While he correctly pointed out that many Hong Kong people see themselves as separate from China, he continued his tirade by claiming that although Hong Kongers were formerly the “running dogs of the British, today they are simply dogs, and not people.” Further on in the video, Kong suggests that Hong Kong people are traitors to China. The video continues with Kong criticizing Hong Kongers for lacking morals and only caring about money. He ends his polemic by pointing out that Hong Kong, compared to Shanghai, is useless and nothing more than a “pungent port.” Despite Kong’s questionable accolades, Kong’s ultra-nationalist views and derogatory comments added fuel to a fire that had long been burning, and enraged the people of Hong Kong even more.

The second incident occurred around the same time the video of the dispute on the train was uploaded onto the Internet. A Hong Kong photographer was outside the Italian luxury chain store Dolce and Gabbana (D&G) in Tsim Sha Tsui – a popular shopping destination for tourists in Hong Kong. The amateur photographer was taking pictures of the storefront window when the mall’s security guard came up to

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4 This is a play on the word Hong Kong (香港) which is translated to mean “Fragrant Harbor.”
the photographer and told him he was not allowed to take pictures of the store for copyright reasons. When the photographer pointed out that the mainland tourists close by were also taking photos of the store, the guard responded by saying that the tourists (Mainland tourists and tourists from other places) were permitted to take photographs. News of this incident spread quickly and was soon made public by Apple Daily newspaper. Netizens took to the Internet and called for a “10,000 man protest” the following Sunday afternoon. Through various forms of social media, participants were told to visit the storefront and show their dissatisfaction about the shop’s policy by purposely taking photographs in front of the store. While ten thousand people did not show up, the shop was faced with protestors outside the storefront for almost a week until the shop was forced to close down for a number of days. Protestors stood outside the shop and took photographs (in jest, some even dressed up and took graduation and wedding photographs) while others yelled out slogans, carried banners and harassed those going into the store. The mainstream media were quick to report on the incident and mostly framed the protest as a debate over private and public space. Certainly, many protestors did see the incident as an opportunity to question what can take place in public spaces and critique the draconian copyright policies of the store. However, falling on the heels of the MTR incident, the protests soon turned into another opportunity to attack Mainland Chinese tourists. While some of the signs were aimed at the luxury-clothing store and

5 The video footage produced by the newspaper can now be found online: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHzJu00Kdgk&feature=player_embedded#!
displayed slogans like “D and Go Home” and “D and Pig,” the majority of the signs and slogans chanted by protestors were aimed at the store’s large Mainland customer base. News footage showed protestors outside the store chanting, “Go back to the Mainland” and swore at Mainland Chinese tourists in Mandarin as they walked into the store.

While the events that took place outside a luxury fashion store might seem trivial, verging on gimmick by some and unrelated to questions of identity in Hong Kong, as evidenced by one particular sign held by a number of protestors would suggest, this supposedly one-off incident was more than a battle between foreign corporations and the local. This particular sign was written in the vernacular form of Cantonese, or written Cantonese,⁷ and read, “I am a Hong Konger. I refuse to be re-colonized.” One concurring sentiment among the protestors seemed to be that because the store’s main clientele were tourists (specifically mainland Chinese tourists), the shop was willing to relax their intellectual property policies for their patrons but not for the average Hong Konger walking by on the street. Moreover, they believed that the shop’s policy discriminated against Hong Kongers who had been denied the right to take

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⁶ The Cantonese word for pig is phonetically similar to the letter G.
⁷ The official written form of Chinese taught and used in schools and the workplace is based on Standard Chinese (specifically, Standard Mandarin Chinese). This written form is considerably different from the spoken form of Cantonese (the local dialect spoken in Hong Kong). The differences and discontinuity between the written form and spoken form can be seen in the two forms’ grammar, sentence structure, syntax and vocabulary. Spoken Cantonese in the written form, though considered an unofficial written medium in Hong Kong, is slowly growing in popularity and can be seen in tabloid magazines, social media, and advertising (Snow 2004).
photographs in public spaces.\textsuperscript{8} It is for this reason that the signs mentioned above were widely displayed. For those protestors, the incident served as a reminder of the preferential treatment those from the metropole received upon their arrival in Hong Kong. Like almost all colonial subjects, Hong Kongers were subjected to overt racism and discriminatory treatment at the hands of the British colonizers. Britons who came to Hong Kong to work for the government (in law enforcement, the civil service or education) were often treated to speedy promotions, generous salaries, attractive vacation packages, housing, and copious other benefits and privileges that the local Chinese had no access to (Leonard 2008).\textsuperscript{9} The cultural capital and colonial (white) privilege that many British expatriates and Western expatriates had access to meant preferential treatment in the most banal instances such as flagging down a taxi cab, being assisted first in shops, or being seated at a “nicer table” in a restaurant. In that same light, these protestors saw the shop and mall’s reverence toward the Mainland shoppers as driven by the management’s recognition and acceptance of their neo-colonial power and privilege. As one taxi driver I spoke to said, “You know, I really

\textsuperscript{8} Of course, while it is true that private interests cannot determine what activities can or cannot take place in a public space (i.e. the street adjacent to the shop), as I show in Chapter Three, property developers and owners of the large shopping malls often acquire the adjacent streets and walkway as part of their real estate. As I show in Chapter Four, it is quite common for public spaces to fall under the auspices of corporate power and their real estate. This, as scholars have argued, is a result of the ambivalent language in planning, zoning and building ordinances (Law 2002).

\textsuperscript{9} This was especially true after the 1970s – a decade in which the colonial government attempted to address the widespread corruption within the city. Significant increased wages for government employees was seen as a way to combat the rampant corruption that occurred within the civil service and police force. Outside of the Civil Service, other industries such as the finance industry openly encouraged British expatriates to transfer to Hong Kong. The acronym FILTH (Failed in London, Try Hong Kong) became particularly vehement during this late 1980s. Of course, British expatriates in Hong Kong were not limited to public schoolboys from London, but government positions attracted Britons from across the British Isles. Since 1997, the decreasing numbers in British expats in Hong Kong suggests that the acronym holds less currency.
thought and believed that after 1997 us Hong Kongers would be treated better under Chinese rule. When we were under British rule, I understood if the colonial government didn’t want to help us, or didn’t care about us – they knew it was just a temporary situation and that they’d be on their way out in 1997. But now, I just don’t understand – we’re all Chinese after all. You think they’d want to look after us, and help us. Instead, us Hong Kongers are expected to kowtow to them. They think they’re so superior just because they’re getting rich. It’s not just the rich though, I’ve driven middle-class Mainlanders and they still treat me like dirt” (Personal conversation with author).

Of course, while a large number of Mainland tourists do frequent high-end luxury good stores when they visit Hong Kong, there are a significant number of middle and lower class Mainland tourists who either do not partake in shopping at all, or frequent less expensive shops. Moreover, many Mainland visitors come to Hong Kong for reasons other than shopping trips to high end shopping malls: some partake in the phenomenon of cross-border trading, the speculation of property prices, and within the past decade a growing number of women come to Hong Kong to give birth to their children. In addition to the criticisms about Mainland Chinese “sullying” Hong Kong, depleting resources and services at the expense of tax-paying Hong Kongers, these instances illustrate how Mainland visitors are seen by Hong Kongers as bypassing the law and receiving preferential treatment in some shape or form. Thus, the Dolce and Gabbana protests should not be seen as merely being about a Hong
Konger’s right to take photographs of the shop’s storefront, nor was the incident on the train simply about eating noodles onboard a train. There is certainly an aspect of shaming and public humiliation, and exaggeration that is attached to the public sharing of these online videos and stories; the virility of the stories and videos and the comments posted can be attributed to “Internet Trolls” and xenophobic gossipmongers. But, it is also important to recognize these incidents often make their way into public, everyday discourse. Lay people, in general, are more willing to open up and talk about their daily life and their run ins with Mainland visitors than to go into an extended conversation about Chinese sovereignty, China’s human rights records or a critique of Hong Kong’s constitution, the Basic Law. Rather than thinking about the incidents as short, momentary events that saturate the media and public discourse as “media events”\(^\text{10}\), the publics’ response to these events should instead be seen as a collective, discursive reaffirmation of a Hong Kong identity (Wodak et al. 1999).

By 2012 much of the public and political discourse in Hong Kong was centered on Mainland Chinese visitors and migrants. Few government officials publicly addressed the incidents that had captured the public’s imagination, while others saw them as one-off incidents and claimed that Hong Kong and its people had made great strides to embrace the Chinese nation and had fully incorporated and assimilated itself with the rest of Mainland China. Despite Chief Executive Donald Tsang’s insistence that

\(^{10}\) A term used by Eric Ma (E. K.-W. Ma 2000, 174).
Hong Kong was a harmonious society, it appeared as if there was even more division, xenophobia, discrimination and disdain toward Mainlanders than back in 1997. The results of a bi-yearly poll conducted by the Hong Kong University’s Public Opinion Program, entitled “People’s Ethnic Identity,” suggested that by the end of 2011 the percentage of people who identified as “Hong Kong citizens” over “Chinese” was at an all time high since 1997. Similar subsequent results were seen in the public opinion poll’s June 2012 findings (Chung 2012). Such numbers should not, however be surprising if one considers the increased turnout numbers and increased frequency of demonstrations, rallies and sit-ins since the change in sovereignty. These movements, in many ways, turn Beijing’s assumption of Hong Kong as “economically active but politically quiescent” on its head (DeGolyer 2004, 124).

The movements of the early twenty-first century bear a close resemblance to the social movements and anti-colonial riots of the 1960s in that the movements are organized in the name of local Hong Kong politics and the participants ascribe to a Hong Kong identity. However, the recent demonstrations and rallies also address a deep anxiety about Hong Kong’s current and future place within the Chinese nation.

Since Hong Kong’s change in sovereignty, the media in Hong Kong and abroad have largely focused on political issues that illustrate the growing influence China has over Hong Kong, and Hong Kong’s struggle for autonomy. Issues have included debates about mother tongue education (1997), Right of Abode debates (1999), Article 23 – a piece of anti-sedition legislation (2003), the creation of national studies in the
education curriculum (2012), and the ongoing fight for universal suffrage. In addition to these weekly rallies, every year on January first, July first, and at the June fourth candlelight vigil various political parties, political groups, and activists come together to remind the government of its promise that Hong Kong would eventually be governed by Hong Kongers democratically elected into office by Hong Kongers.\(^\text{11}\)

Since 2003, the popular local and international press has often commented on the frequency of the demonstrations and rallies. Scholars such as Chan and Chan have similarly written about the meaningful maturation of civil society in Hong Kong (2007).\(^\text{12}\) Without question these movements and debates speak directly to concerns about Hong Kong’s autonomy, sovereignty and political identity. However, debates that are less obviously centered on Hong Kong’s political future (i.e. debates about redevelopment and gentrification) also speak to issues concerning a Hong Kong identity. In addition, the concerns and vignettes described within this dissertation show how issues regarding a Hong Kong identity loom over less obviously “political” incidents. For instance, debates over redevelopment, the trend of nostalgic goods, and tensions at the border do not obviously speak to issues regarding Hong Kongers self-identification. However, these incidents, like social movements and protests, gain

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\(^{11}\) Rallies and protests often take place on Sundays and public holidays such as New Years Day, January first. The July first protests date back to the establishment of the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong in 1997 and has been held every year since then. A candlelight vigil is held every year on June fourth to commemorate the victims of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989.

\(^{12}\) Amongst the many “roles” civil society plays in Hong Kong, Chan and Chan point to the way in which civil society can be seen as a defender of its and Hong Kong’s autonomy. They understand civil society to be an arena in which common interests are advanced outside of the state (for examples in NGOs, interest groups, political parties, clubs and associations) (E. Chan and Chan 2007).
currency, and capture the public’s imagination and can be found in everyday public discourse.

What this suggests is that questions about Hong Kong’s autonomy and sovereignty, its relationship to the Chinese nation-state, and challenges to Hong Kong identity permeate through multiple layers of discourse. Political imaginings occur on a daily basis in a much more banal, yet equally politically salient way than the weekly protests and sit-ins (Billig 1995). The primary focus of this dissertation will be on public discourses heard throughout the city of Hong Kong. As my project demonstrates, these discourses are continually shaped by Hong Kong’s localized, de-colonized founding myth. This myth is so pervasive that issues that do not obviously speak to concerns of identity ultimately refer back to the myth in some way.

The previously dominant myth was entrenched in the colonial power’s ideology and has, since the 1970s, been decolonized, localized and embodied by locals. Since the 1970s, a “bifurcation” within the historical narrative occurred. The colonial historical narrative about the city’s transformation from barren rock to capitalist paradise under the colonial power’s guidance became bifurcated and de-colonized. As I show in Chapter Four, themes of development and progress, the triumph of capitalism are still maintained despite the bifurcation. The decolonized myth also

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13 I borrow the term “bifurcated history” from Prasenjit Duara (1995). A bifurcated history allows for previously ignored, dismissed or marginalized histories to be considered alongside dominant historical narratives.
underscores the work ethic, go-getting spirit and upward mobility of a displaced community who built the city. This is seen even in issues that do not at first seem to be related to issues of Hong Kong’s self-determination: for example, the way the border is understood and remembered, debates surrounding redevelopment and the preservation of historic buildings, and the commodification of nostalgic goods.

One of this dissertation’s goals is to demonstrate how Hong Kong’s founding myth can be seen as shaping current public debates and daily discourses about Hong Kong’s relationship with Mainland China. As such, this founding myth can thus be seen as an expression of “everyday nationalism” (Anderson 2006) – a concept which brings me to my overall goal for this dissertation. My dissertation provides numerous examples of ways in which something resembling nationalism and nationhood appear in daily life: examples of what I refer to as near-nationalism. I use the term near-nationalism, as while Hong Kong is not a nation in the traditional sense, there exists in the Hong Kong example aspects that speak very closely to conceptions of nationalism, the nation and nation-states. For instance, as I show in Chapter Two, Hong Kong has an “imagined community” which rallies around a localized naturalized founding myth. So much so that it is often referenced as a way to distinguish Hong Kong from other nations and is used in ways that are similar to nation-building projects around the world. Certainly, as I argue in Chapter Three, a border that is so essential to modern day nation-states and the system in which they reside within (Winichakul 1994) is still present in Hong Kong. Even with its
increasing porosity, the memories and importance attached to the border remain, and the border (like borders elsewhere in the world) is a divisive space. And finally, as I demonstrate throughout the dissertation, a strong place-based Hong Kong identity, or a near-national identity, cannot be ignored and in recent years has become especially prominent and at times the source of conflict and anxieties. By introducing a concept such as near-nationalism with the Hong Kong example, I hope to provide the opportunity for scholars to consider new approaches to studying place-based identities, of which national identities and near-national identities are merely two types of place-based identities.

In the remainder of the chapter, I will examine the Hong Kong case in depth. Specifically, I will look at how the development of Hong Kong is typically understood and the variant forms of identities in Hong Kong. Following this, I will examine the body of literature related to this dissertation. Specifically, through an examination of the literature on nationalism and national identities, I show how the present literature does not take into consideration the notion of a place-based identity that is just a salient as nationalism and yet cannot speak or make claims to nationhood. I end this chapter with a brief consideration of how everyday near-nationalism can be studied and why it is relevant for the Hong Kong case.

II. THE HONG KONG CASE

Part of this dissertation’s goal is to show how Hong Kong has engaged in projects that are very similar to nation-building projects around the world. Specifically, I will
show how a colonial myth about Hong Kong’s founding and development entrenched in the colonial power’s ideology became decolonized, localized and embodied by locals. Through this example, I show how a bifurcation of Hong Kong’s historical narrative made it possible for a population made up largely of immigrants to imagine itself as one, cohesive community.

Prior to the 1970s, the dominant founding colonial myth was one that emphasized the city’s development from barren rock to capitalist paradise made possible only under the colonial power’s guidance and benevolence. The myth begins with the British crown’s first encounters with Hong Kong during the Opium War. As the myth goes, the British landed on the island of Hong Kong in 1841 (in the midst of the war), and raised the British flag while characterizing it as a “barren rock,” or a “nonplace” – nothing more than a forgotten, unattended, uncared for island. The raising of the flag on the “barren rock” was met with trepidation and skepticism back in London where the crown itself was hesitant to commit to occupying Hong Kong (Bremner and Lung 2003, 224). As the myth continues, the barren rock surprisingly proved to be a successful investment for the British as it developed into a thriving treaty port, with various institutions introduced by the British (banking systems, legal systems, a police force). As the population of the city slowly grew, so too did various industries (first trade and later the manufacturing industry) who benefitted greatly from the government’s laissez faire policies. The “barren rock”, in other words eventually became a global metropolis under the colonial state’s guidance, control of trade
routes and liberal governance. This myth, colonial in nature, depicts the colonial power as the key protagonist, without whom the city would not have developed into the metropolis it is today.

For reasons such as the closing of the border and the growth in the city’s population (specifically the growth of a local population born and bred in the colony), a de-colonized myth was soon bifurcated from the dominant colonial myth and established as a counter historical narrative. By localizing and de-colonizing the colonized myth, the emphasis was shifted to underscore the work ethic, go-getting spirit and upward mobility of the Hong Kong people – a displaced community of refugees and migrants coming together under hardships to build the city. In this myth, there is little mention of the role of the British. As I demonstrate in Chapter Two, one can look at Hong Kong’s education curricula, its various history museums, and media sources to see how this de-colonized myth has become part of an institutionalized and naturalized historical narrative. Elsewhere, the pervasiveness of the myth was explicitly marketed in the aftermath of the SARS outbreak (see Chapter Three). Pop songs such as the presumptuously titled, “We Shall Overcome” were part of the government’s effort to boost the city’s economy and knock people out of the doldrums, but it also served as an opportunity to cement the myth.

This myth-making complements, and is partly fueled by, the public’s growing desire for modern historicity as a way to justify the decolonized founding myth’s narrative
of Hong Kong’s capitalist development – something Eric Ma identified through his analysis of the way TV commercials were received in Hong Kong (Ma 2001). This search for “historical truth” manifests itself in the way the border is understood and romanticized; in debates surrounding redevelopment and the preservation of historic buildings; and in the commodification of nostalgic items. Not surprisingly, the ideological aspects of globalization, capitalism and neoliberalism that make up the very foundation of the myth are not explicitly mentioned within this localized myth. Instead the myth’s emphasis is largely placed on the hard working individuals, the sense of community, and perseverance of the Hong Kong public. The Hong Kong story is first and foremost a story of capitalism’s triumph. Despite the bifurcation of historical narrative, one thing is clear: both the colonized myth and the localized, de-colonized myth share a similar teleology, in that both myths detail the spectacular development of the city from an undeveloped, fairly unpopulated island to a global metropolitan city. Specifically, both myths agree that Hong Kong’s past and future has always been, and will always be, about the city’s development, growth and progress.

14 As Ma argues, in the lead up to 1997, elites began to push for the preservation of Hong Kong’s History and past. The elites, Ma argues, were epistemologically committed to the notion of an “authentic”, “factual history” – a commitment that is intimately tied ideologically to the notion of linear, progressive, capitalist development in Hong Kong (E. K.-W. Ma 2001).
A PRIMER ON HONG KONG’S DEVELOPMENT

The British acquired Hong Kong after defeating the Chinese in the First Opium War in 1842. The war – a classic example of gunboat diplomacy – was fought as a way to determine trade routes, but was also the British response to the Qing dynasty outlawing the import and trade of opium (despite the increasing demand for opium in China). The Royal Navy implemented a blockade of Canton, China and, following that, the plan was to establish Hong Kong as an outpost as a way to help the British establish their trading routes along the South China Sea (Carroll 2007, 13). Through a series of treaties, the Qing government leased out its land to the British. From the latter half of the nineteenth century up until World War II, the crown was committed to fostering the development of Hong Kong into a port city.

As the city grew in size, so too did its population. Prior to 1950, the border between Mainland China and Hong Kong was considerably porous and open. Migrant workers and sojourners from different parts of China could enter and exit Hong Kong relatively freely; many saw Hong Kong as a temporary base and not as their “home” (Simpson 2007, 71). The free-flowing nature of such crossings allowed for complex economic and familial linkages to develop. These linkages would ultimately become necessary as Hong Kong developed as a trading port, industrial center, transitory space and crossroads for “money, people, and goods” (Newendorp 2008, 41). As

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15 Other parts of what is now known as Hong Kong were ceded to Britain through later treaties. For example, Kowloon Peninsula was ceded to the crown under the Convention of Peking in 1860; and the rest of Kowloon, the New Territories and the 230 plus outlying islands were leased to Britain in 1898.
such, prior to 1950, the make-up of Hong Kong’s population was constantly in flux. Migrants would cross into Hong Kong in order to look for work or during periods of political unrest, but would often return to Guangzhou or elsewhere in Mainland China for various reasons. China had been plagued with a tumultuous start to the twentieth century; various regional turbulence, civil wars, uprisings and eventually the Pacific War meant that economic and political refugees had long looked to Hong Kong as a safe haven. By the end of the 1940s the population of Hong Kong had grown substantially, and the population would continue to grow with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949.

By the beginning of 1950, both the People’s Republic of China and the colonial government in Hong Kong placed restrictions on travel and closely policed the Mainland China-Hong Kong border. Within Hong Kong, immigration policies were in part a reaction to the rapidly growing refugee population from the Mainland, but also a response to Cold-War politics and the specter of Communism across the border. As a result, Hong Kong immigration policies became highly restrictive and reactionary (Ku 2004). The heavy enforcement was not however a straightforward move as the legislature and appropriate bodies went through rounds of relaxing and tightening border control legislation, and also rounds of trial and error throughout the next few decades. The first pieces of legislation enacted were the requirement of formal documentation at every border crossing, and the suspension of direct through-transportation from Hong Kong to the Mainland that bypassed any checkpoints at the
border (A. Y. So 2003). This however did not deter migration, and those who had managed to smuggle themselves into Hong Kong without getting caught by authorities were typically welcomed by the community of migrants who had made Hong Kong their permanent home. In the late 1960s, immigration policies were momentarily relaxed in response to the growing industrial and manufacturing sectors’ reliance on immigrants as a source of cheap labor (Ibid.). Despite the constant change in immigration policy, one thing was certain: what had previously been a free-flowing and open border became an apparatus that isolated those in Hong Kong from the Mainland culturally, economically and politically.\(^{16}\) Agnes Ku has also identified that during this period a discourse of “Hong Kong belonging” and eventually “Hong Konger” emerges. In part, this was due to the creation of new legal categories addressing residency and citizenship issues (Ku 2004). However, as I show in Chapter Three, during this period, such a legal state discourse transcended to the public realm and imagination.

By the 1970s, Hong Kong had become a manufacturers’ haven; between the years 1968 and 1973, Hong Kong’s gross domestic product increased by 117 percent (Carroll 2007, 168). The transition from trading port to manufacturing hub and the accompanying growth of the city can be attributed to a number of global factors. For instance, the US-led embargo on China forced the colonial government to reassess the colony’s position as a declining trading port (C. Chu 2010, 1776). While the myth

\(^{16}\) Peter Sahlins makes a similar analysis in his study of nationalism and nation building in the Pyrenees (1991).
celebrates the laissez-faire, non-interventionist economic policies of the Hong Kong colonial government (and the SAR government today), paradoxically the state also had a very explicit interventionist role in ensuring their developmental policies would go forth accordingly (Castells 1992). For instance, The Federation of Hong Kong Industries, with the encouragement of the colonial government, greatly encouraged the city’s transition into a manufacturing base (providing goods such as textiles, garments, plastics, electronics mostly for Western markets) (Turner 2003, 25). The government also had an interventionist role in ensuring the “collective consumption” among Hong Kong’s growing population, and in developing and fueling the growth of the property market (discussed further in Chapter Four) (Castells 1992). With the growth in manufacturing, modernization projects in the city also began to take shape: In 1979, for example, the city’s first underground, rapid transit system was completed and opened to the public.

Beginning in 1979, reformist leader Deng Xiaoping introduced a new set of economic reforms to China. As part of his economic policies and Four Modernizations, Deng coined the term “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Part of the new reforms included re-introducing China to previously closed off markets through the creation of Special Economic Zones set up along the Pearl River Delta, adjacent to the mainland China-Hong Kong border. The 1980s and 1990s was a period in which a larger number of Hong Kong manufacturing firms relocated their businesses across the border to the Pearl River Delta. Jianfa Shen argues that it was during this time that
the border came to signify another function: a contact zone (2003, 4). Hong Kong-based workers, managers and technicians would cross the border daily or, income permitting, set up second homes in Guangdong for work purposes. With increased cooperation and interaction between Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta, migration across the border increased steadily in the 1980s and 1990s. Since 1997, cross-border movement has increased even more dramatically – partly as a result of new cross-border economic cooperation arrangements and free trade agreements (i.e. the 2003 Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, also known as CEPA) but also as part of the SAR government’s attempt to integrate Hong Kong with the rest of the Chinese nation.

Eric Ma has argued that following 1997, negative attitudes toward Mainland China lessened partially due to a process of re-sinicization and what he calls “grassroots nationalism”. Grassroots nationalism and re-sinicization occur, Ma argues, through daily practices and increased cross-border contacts. The effects of increased cross-border business travel and family visits has led to a blurring of economic differences (as a result of Hong Kong’s weakening economy and China’s rapid economic growth) and by way of that a re-negotiation of national imaginations takes place (2007). However, as I will demonstrate, the increased integration and cross-border contact has led to a “de-sinicization”; this has been especially true since 2003. As part of the Hong Kong state’s attempt to reinvigorate the economy after the SARS outbreak and

17 Other “linkages” include economic cooperation pacts, relocation of Hong Kong business to Mainland China, and families with residential homes on both sides of the border.
as a way to encourage integration between Hong Kong and Mainland China, travel restrictions for those from Mainland China were scaled back. Today, the majority of visitors who come to Hong Kong are from the Mainland. As such, for many Hong Kongers, encounters with Mainland Chinese, which in the past had been a rarity, are now a common everyday occurrence. Through these encounters, perceived social and cultural differences, stereotypes and jokes remain and Mainland China still exists as a place of difference.

As I will discuss further in Chapter Two, both the myths are similar in that they focus on the growth and development of Hong Kong. One cannot deny that tremendous growth and development has occurred within the past one hundred and eighty years. However, what both myths tend to neglect is the way in which cold war politics, a trade embargo on China, a growing population that could work in the newly developing manufacturing industry in the 1950s and 1960s were key in helping Hong Kong’s development.

In the next section, I will briefly give an overview of the varying ways in which one can characterize a Hong Kong identity.

**Variants of Hong Kong Identity**

Regional identities, urban identities, cosmopolitan and global identities, post-colonial identities, Han identities, and Chinese identities are a number of different ways in
which a Hong Kong identity can be understood. For this dissertation, the strong place-based, city identity I refer to as a Hong Kong identity (香港人) encapsulates aspects of these variants. Indeed, as Lynn White and Li Cheng submit, these identities are not mutually exclusive nor do they merely coexist, rather these identities are often reinforcing each other and allow for greater flexibility in movement and, also, greater economic opportunities (1993, 190).

The Chinese nation, Han Chinese Identity and Regional identities

The notion of a Han Chinese ethnicity is perhaps the most readily claimed identity among Hong Kongers outside of a local Hong Kong identity. The Han ethno-nationality (or minzu) was originally used to refer to descendents of the Han dynasty.

While China had long interacted with other parts of the world, nationalism scholars have focused on the period towards the end of the Qing dynasty period as the period in which the Chinese nation-state began to take form. During the Qing reign, the Qing dynasty had multiple and substantial encounters with the West. Scholars most often depict these encounters between the West and the Qing dynasty as a period in which Western notions of modernity were introduced to China. Modernity is often noted as one of the main legitimating forces behind the rise of nationalism and the nation-state system in the late-nineteenth century. One of the more widely accepted narratives in Chinese scholarship on nationalism is that of the culturalism-to-nationalism paradigm (Townsend 1992). By culturalism, Townsend is referring to the set of governing
principles and beliefs under the dynastic system that the people of the empire, and those within the tributary system, were part of *tianxia* (all under heaven). *Tianxia*, as Lisa Rofel has noted, can be understood as a concept that not only united tribes under one central imperial rule, but can be seen as an ideology or a discourse that extended to all those under imperial rule (Rofel 2012). With that understanding *tianxia* was a “universal empire” and was not limited by boundaries, and those who participated in the tributary system in the dynasty were part of *tianxia* (Rofel 2012; Zarrow 2011). The reconceptualization of the ordering of the world was pushed by encounters with those from foreign lands whether for trading purposes, territorial disputes, or through travel. Rebecca Karl, for example, examines the ways in which late Qing intellectuals came to conceptualize the Chinese nation via their knowledge of countries such as Poland, Turkey, Hawaii and South Africa – the commonality between these case studies being the oppression the minorities had to endure (Karl 2002). The 1911 Revolution was the culmination of years of social, cultural, economic and political (Zarrow 2011). The nation-state of China that was formed shortly thereafter represented an epistemic break from the past. As Zarrow writes, “Nationalism was about creating ‘Chinese,’ as distinct from ‘men of Qing.’ The empire, which was a multinational project, was not compatible with the concept of a ‘people’ who more or less shared common blood and a common culture and who were collectively the subject of history” (2011, 4). However, who was to be included under the term Chinese was less clear. Discord among the different nationalist thinkers existed with some fighting for an integrationist interpretation, some demanding a Han nationalism,
while others conceived of the nation as a group of multiethnic anti-dynastic reformers (Ibid., 147-211). Han minzu would later be appropriated by nationalist state-building projects to signify the “Chinese race” and the Chinese people as descendents of the Yellow Emperor. As an imagined identity, the Han Chinese identity can also be understood as a cultural identity with ties to Confucianism and traditional practices and customs. In comparison to “marked minorities” such as the Manchus, Dai and Uighur, the unmarked Han majority connotes civility and modernity (Gladney 1994). Alongside a new discourse of citizenship and the introduction of terms such as “Chinese”, were also new understandings of the nation-state as the ultimate protector of sovereignty.

During the New Cultural Movement and the May Fourth Movement (1919), a period in which James Townsend describes as the apex of Chinese nationalism and repudiation of Confucian beliefs, nationalists and reformers began campaigns that denounced the “century of humiliation” in China. This discourse in many ways carried on into the CCP’s rhetoric of nationalism. Under the CCP, the century of humiliation which was characterized by wars fought with Japan and the West, was a result of feudalism and imperialism (Gries 2004, 48). Echoes of that propagation still exist and were reignited during the late-1990s. Hong Kong’s change in sovereignty

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18 Under nationalist Sun Yatsen’s reign, surveys conducted identified the Han nationality encompassing 91 percent of China’s population. A new conceptualization of the Han race during this period included groups that had previously considered minorities. Sun believed that a strong Chinese nation was possible because of a “common blood” within the “yellow race” (see Dikotter 1994; Dikotter 1992).

19 Among the many “humiliations” is the defeat of China in the Opium wars, and the British colonization of Hong Kong.
(or “return to the motherland”) was celebrated by those in Mainland China and understood as an opportunity to let go of the past (Ibid.). Of course, with the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, disputes over the Taiwan strait, and more recently territorial disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands / Senkaku Islands nationalists were quick to jump back on the narrative bandwagon of “China as victim” (Ibid.).

Beginning in the 1990s, the Han Chinese identity has also been used to uphold the popular term Greater China. The term was used to describe the linkages and interaction between Chinese societies around the world. However, as Harry Harding notes, the definition of the term Greater China is opaque and its application can be used to address political issues ranging from “reunification with China” (with a focus on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau), references to a transnational Chinese economy, or a global “Chinese” culture (Harding 1993).20

Much work has been conducted on native-place identities and regional Han identities in China; however, very few incorporate Hong Kong identities into their discussion. Emily Honig, for instance, shows how even at the regional level, identification with a native-place (for example, a village or a province within a region) remains a salient part of an individual’s self-understanding. Honig shows that prejudice and

20 Shu-mei Shih has also noted while the term “Greater China” in many ways correlates to notions of Chinese transnationalism and Chinese diaspora communities in Taiwan or Hong Kong, recent resistance to economic, cultural or political integration with China highlights the problematic integrationist logic behind the China-centric term “Greater China” (1998).
discrimination against Subei migrants became particularly prevalent during a time of Westernization, modernization and migration in Shanghai. As such, local Jiangnan anxieties towards the Western colonizers and mass in-migration engendered the category of the Subei people. Honig writes, “Jiangnan natives may have been the undisputed elite, but they were always subordinate to foreigners. To the extent that foreigners portrayed all Chinese as uncivilized and backward … Jiangnan natives may have more desperately than otherwise needed to create an other” (Honig 1992, 132). Here, one can indeed see similarities with Hong Kong. In the same way that the Jiangnan people’s prejudice towards the Subei people was a response to industrialization and Shanghai’s role as a treaty port, Hong Kong people’s anxieties regarding their political future are also projected onto the construction of “Mainlanders.”

But perhaps the most ubiquitous and long-standing discussion on regionalism has been focused on the North-South divide of China. The establishment of Special Economic Zones in Guangdong during the Reform Era further enabled this divide with connotations of economic success, creativity, sophistication and style associated with the South of China. The pervasiveness of such connotations led some scholars to argue that China’s nationalizing project, since the Reform Era, has shifted from the North to the South (Friedman 1994). Esteem for the South is a fairly recent phenomenon; in previous centuries the South (especially Guangdong) was

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marginalized and considered lowbrow, less aristocratic and less sophisticated than the North (L. White and Li 1993, 165; Lin 2002). While there is evidence for the existence of Southern nationalist groups such as the Southern Society (Friedman 1994, 77), it appears as if their efforts were often short-lived.\(^{22}\) Much of this can be attributed to the salience of the ethnic Han Chinese identity, which some scholars claim trump any regional identities. As Dru Gladney notes, the strength and longevity of the imagined Han Chinese identity can be seen in the way it “holds” and “unites” the culturally distinct Cantonese, Shanghainese, Sichuanese, etc (Gladney 1994, 99). Certainly, while the Chinese state does not envision themselves as a multi-cultural nation in the same way that Australia or Canada does, it should be noted that part of the PRC’s nation-building project is its continued celebration of China’s multiple ethnic and regional minorities.\(^{23}\) For example, every year on the eve of Chinese New Year, the state-owned China Central Television (CCTV) airs its Chinese New Year Gala on all its stations. The Gala itself is made up of skits, dance performances, and music performances. Among the various performances are the musical and dance numbers which celebrate the various ethnic minorities in China. The various minorities that are featured, e.g. the Miao, Mongols, the Hui, Uighurs, are dressed in

\(^{22}\) In 2010, a suggestion that TV and radio stations in neighboring Guangdong province would be switching to Mandarin broadcasts angered many Hong Kongers. Groups of concerned Hong Kongers and language enthusiasts took to the streets alongside citizens from Guangdong who were bussed down to Hong Kong for the day to partake in the rally. As such, it is a fallacy to suggest that Hong Kong is completely separated from and divorced from political issues on the Mainland. This suggests that a Cantonese identity remains an important regional identity for many people. However, this does not necessarily apply to many Hong Kong whose relatives and ancestors migrated to Hong Kong from other regions such as Shanghai.

\(^{23}\) In the 1950s, the Chinese state began its state-led project of organizing and designating minority ethno-racial groups within China. Today, the Chinese state officially recognizes fifty five “minority nationalities.” A similar multi-cultural and multi-ethnic nation-building project was seen in the USSR in which Yuri Slezkine defines the USSR as a “communal apartment” (Slezkine 1994).
“traditional” colorful garb and often sing in their dialect. This example of “internal orientalism” on stage can also be seen in recent tourism practices, where Han-Chinese hailing from China’s cities visit the exotic, remote regions to “experience culture” (Schein 1997).

While many Hong Kongers certainly identify as Han Chinese, regional identities remain an important part of a Hong Konger’s self-identification. For example, it is still common to hear people referring to their native-place or ancestral hometown. This is especially true for migrants and their family from Guangdong Province who came to Hong Kong in the latter half of the twentieth century. Typically, those whose ancestry originates from Guangdong claim association with their native-place (specifically, towns, cities, villages, districts), as a Chaozhou-person or a Shunde-person, for instance. The currency of regional and native-place identities is especially highlighted when one examines how such identifications were beneficial to many migrants upon their move to Hong Kong in the mid-twentieth century. For instance, for many immigrants who came to Hong Kong in the early to mid-twentieth century, employment could often be found through networks based on regional and native-place linkages. In addition to employment, new immigrants were also able to find a place or room to live in and a support network made up of fellow townsfolk. Of course, to place an emphasis on regional and native-place identities is to ignore the five percent of the population who are not ethnically Chinese. Given Hong Kong’s

24 Immigrants, whose families came from outside of the Guangdong province, typically stick to city, regional identities or provincial identities (i.e. a Shanghai-person or a Ningbo-person).
past as an important trade and manufacturing colonial city, there exist within Hong Kong large numbers of Indian, Pakistani, and Nepalese families who have resided in Hong Kong for generations. In addition, there exists a population of Indonesian and Filipino domestic workers who make up over 3 percent of Hong Kong’s population (Census and Statistics Department 2012). The larger presence of a large Indian and Pakistani population in Hong Kong is related to Hong Kong’s colonial past.

Post-colonial citizens
A project of this scope must consider the ways in which Hong Kongers were once subjects of the colonial crown and how that might shape local politics today. Rey Chow has written extensively on “The Orientalist project” which she also refers to as a nativism project. Upon arriving in Hong Kong, the British colonizers engaged in a project of orientalizing the local Chinese population. By engendering a discourse of orientalism, British colonists were able to strip the local Hong Kong population of any meaningful identity (despite the complexities and variations of identity discussed above). The colonizers simply affixed the term “the native” or “Chinese” onto the local population. This term “native” (which ultimately became embraced by the population as “Hong Konger”) served as an indicator of difference and denoted how far the Chinese population had to go to become “developed” and “civilized” like the British (Chow 2001). Chow’s use of the terms “native” and “nativism” is problematic in that these terms have also been used by American immigration scholars to refer to colonial settlers. For instance, in the case of the United States, nativists refer to
descendants of those from the original thirteen colonies. Nativists and nativism also encapsulate an aspect of reactionary anti-immigration politics. Again, in the case of the United States, nativists opposed the immigration of Irish Roman Catholics, the Chinese and other ethnic groups. As former colonial subjects, the people of Hong Kong (many of whom migrated from elsewhere in China) have been responsible for, and actively took part in, the decolonizing and localizing of the founding myth and its perpetuation. As such, the Hong Kong case is not too dissimilar from the American Studies understanding of nativism – that is, descendants of those who immigrated to Hong Kong claim an identity of “local” or “native,” despite the fact that they too are descendants from immigrants and used to justify much of the anti-Mainland xenophobia that can be seen in present day politics (See Chapter Three). As such, Chow’s misuse of the term is helpful for this study after all. In that sense, the term Chow uses – which once served to establish negative differences between colonizers and the Chinese – became appropriated and embraced by the local Hong Kong people. The Chinese term for “native” or “local” is punti (本地) and is used not in a pejorative way among Hong Kongers, but in some cases celebrated as an identity in the same way the First Nations in Canada, Aborigines in Australia, or Native Americans are in the United States are. In fact, the Hong Kong Museum of History refers to punti as one of the first “ethnic clans” of Hong Kong (See Chapter Two).

Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty distinguishes itself from other cases of decolonization and independence. Unlike other colonial states in Asia such as
Singapore and Malaysia, following World War II, anti-colonial nationalist sentiments were relatively muted in Hong Kong. As Ackbar Abbas has noted, July 1, 1997 did not simply mark the return of territory to China. Instead, it is a “situation that is quasi-colonial, but with an important historical twist: the colonized state, while politically subordinate, is in many other crucial respects not in a dependent subaltern position but is in fact more advanced – in terms of education, technology, access to international networks, and so forth – than the colonizing state … it will be accompanied by displaced chronologies or achronicities” (1997, 5–6). As such, the case study of Hong Kong problematizes the conventional understanding of postcolonialism (Ibid.). Similarly, Chow asks:

Hong Kong confronts us with a question that is yet unheard of in colonial history: how do we talk about a postcoloniality that is a forced return (without the consent of the colony’s residents) to a “mother country,” itself as imperialistic as the previous colonizer? Is Hong Kong then simply an anomaly in the history of colonialism? Or does it not, in its obligatory “restoration” to China, in fact crystallize and highlight the problem of “origins” that has often been suppressed in other postcolonial cultures because of ethnic pride? (1998, 151)

Abbas’ and Chow’s comments certainly present an important contribution to the body of literature on postcolonialism. In the case of Hong Kong, it would appear that the postcolonial subjectivity of Hong Kongers almost serves as a form of cultural capital that, like Abbas notes, does not put Hong Kongers in a subaltern position – at least not for the meantime. The examples that were detailed at the beginning of this chapter suggests that as China’s growth continues, that position as subaltern could be a real possibility – something Hong Kongers are grappling with and can be considered a source of contention. As Helen Siu has astutely noted, “When China was poor and
isolated, these Hong Kongers found a strategy to thrive. But their functional links to trade and the world assembly line have given them the false impression that they are global and modern” (Siu 2011, 136). For the majority of Hong Kongers encountering competition from Mainland China, they recognize that Hong Kong has moved from a manufacturing and trade-based economy to a finance driven economy which they cannot participate in.

**Cosmopolitan and Global citizens**

One way in which Hong Kongers highlighted their difference from Mainlanders in the past was by presenting themselves as cosmopolitan and global citizens. As I will show in this dissertation, both the localized founding myth and the colonized founding myth celebrate the forces of globalization and capitalism. In both myths, there is the belief that a laissez faire government (both before and after 1997) was instrumental to the development of Hong Kong. As the localized myth reminds us, the many immigrants who came to Hong Kong with little in their pockets were rewarded with social mobility and capital made possible in Hong Kong’s free-market economy and the government’s “positive non-intervention” – something that would not have been possible in Maoist China. Hong Kong’s specific colonial past and current position as a center for global capital flows and trade has also enabled many individuals and families to establish strong links abroad and by way of that, a self-understanding of themselves as cosmopolitan citizens (McDonogh and Wong 2005; Chiu 2009; Sinn 2008).
Immediately following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, large numbers of Hong Kongers (specifically, middle to upper class skilled Hong Kongers) emigrated to Canada and Australia as a way to obtain a “safety citizenship” before Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty (L. White and Li 1993; Meyer 2000; Chiu 2009). Hong Kongers have long established global links, for example, Hong Kong served as the origin point for many Chinese moving abroad to the United States and elsewhere in the nineteenth-century (Lin 2002; L. J. C. Ma and Cartier 2003). Similarly, during the 1960s, many middle to upper-class families sent their children to the United Kingdom or the United States for education.\(^{25}\) Such a trend continues to exist even today resulting in what Ong refers to as the phenomena of flexible citizenship and parachute kids (1999, 71). Imbricated in this understanding of transnational citizenship and mobility are new modes of subject making, and thusly, new subjectivities accessible to Hong Kong’s middle and upper classes (Ibid.). The cosmopolitan citizens who move abroad retain strong bonds with Hong Kong in the form of something resembling Benedict Anderson’s idea of “long-distance nationalism” (1998).\(^{26}\)

However, today, the flexible citizenship that Aihwa Ong wrote about has proven to be a hindrance to many Hong Kongers. Many Hong Kongers who left Hong Kong in the lead-up to 1997 and emigrated to Australia, Canada and elsewhere have since

\(^{25}\) During the colonial period and even into the early 2000s, high-level civil servants were entitled to education benefits and subsidies for their children. These education benefits included subsidized tuition fees and flights to overseas boarding schools (especially in the United Kingdom).

\(^{26}\) Bruce Robbins argues that Anderson’s concept of long-distance nationalism is merely another terms for cosmopolitanism (1998, 11).
returned to Hong Kong and have been left in a quandary. Their children, despite being of Chinese descent, if born abroad prior to 1997 are denied access to Hong Kong passports and by way of that Chinese nationality. Those who wish to apply for a Hong Kong SAR passport (a travel document that is different from a PRC passport) and citizenship must meet certain criteria as set forth by the Nationality Laws of the People’s Republic of China. For instance, one stipulation requires that the individual must first be a Chinese national residing in Hong Kong (A Chinese national is a person of Chinese descent born in Hong Kong or other parts of China, or someone who meets the criteria of the Nationality Laws). Among the many articles in the Nationality Laws are clauses such as, “Any person born in China whose parents are both Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese national shall have Chinese nationality” (Hong Kong Immigration Services 2010). As such, many Hong Kongers of Pakistani or Indian origin who have resided in the city for generations are denied the opportunity of gaining citizenship and naturalization as they and their parents are not considered Chinese nationals. Despite this, a number of the city’s business elite and entrepreneurs who are not ethnically Chinese seem to have had no problem in renouncing their citizenship for a Chinese citizenship. For example, the owner of Hong Kong’s most popular theme park, property developer and all-round entrepreneur Allan Zeman is a Canadian born in Germany who renounced his Canadian citizenship and quickly became a naturalized Chinese citizen. Similarly, Hong Kong based architect and former district council member Paul Zimmerman, and

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27 The Nationality Law was adopted in 1980 during the 3rd Session of the 5th National People’s Congress.
former director of the government’s financial secretary’s office Mike Rowse have had no problems obtaining a Hong Kong passport and easily became naturalized Chinese citizens despite having been born in Holland and the United Kingdom, respectively. In addition to being successful businessmen, the men above are also involved with local Hong Kong politics. This of course raises the question of how cosmopolitan a Hong Kong identity really is if for the state, and certainly some local Hong Kongers, a Hong Kong identity is one that is necessarily racially and ethnically Chinese.

The long-term presence of non-Chinese Hong Kong residents also contributes to the idea of Hong Kong as a multicultural city. Since colonial times, and even as early as the establishment of the colony, Hong Kong has been home to countless Indian, Pakistani, Filipino, Nepalese, Persian and British inhabitants (Knowles 2009; B.-S. White 1994; Constable 2007; C. Y.-Y. Chu 2005). As colonial subjects many Indians, Pakistanis, and Nepalese had access to unfettered restrictions to travel throughout the British Empire. A large number of Indians, Pakistanis, and Nepalese initially came to Hong Kong to serve as members of the colonial military and police force, while others came to Hong Kong to work as sailors and traders. Families such as the Indian family the Harilelas and the Parsee family the Ruttonjees have been in Hong Kong for over a century and are today part of Hong Kong’s elite. Nevertheless there also exists a large percentage of minorities within the lower classes of Hong Kong and cannot claim to have fully integrated into Hong Kong society, and are faced with racial discrimination on a daily basis in the workplace and at school. The Government and
its bureaucracies such as the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Race Relations Unit in the Home Department however are determined to depict Hong Kong as a culturally diverse and cosmopolitan city. They frequently engage in a post-racial rhetoric that embraces ideas of “Hong Kong’s racial harmony” and “Hong Kong as a world of color” to emphasize Hong Kong’s ethnic diversity. Hong Kong’s most recent branding project was launched in 2001, the culmination of which was to brand Hong Kong as “Asia’s World City.” One of the themes emphasized in the brand is the celebration of diversity, cosmopolitanism and cultural fusion within Hong Kong (Brand Hong Kong 2012).

Hong Kongers have also come to differentiate themselves from the mainland via an urban-rural binary. The development of Hong Kong cosmopolitanism and modernity took a different path compared to cities such as Shanghai. Up until Sino-British negotiations began in the 1980s, the Hong Kong state had been largely ambivalent about its loyalties to China or Britain and which language it should master. Instead, the Hong Kong state was mostly concerned about the city’s development and growth (Abbas 2000, 777). As Abbas argues, Hong Kong cosmopolitanism and its global, cosmopolitan identity is a fairly new imagination that dates back to the 1960s and 1970s when the city began to modernize in various ways (Ibid.). During this time, Hong Kongers began to identify their city as an urban space that provided numerous opportunities and possibilities for career development (Mathews, Ma, and Lui 2008, 35). This identification has fed into the popular understanding of Hong Kong people
as hard working and industrious with a “go-getting” attitude (S. Tsang 2007, 195), and certainly speaks to the bifurcation of Hong Kong’s founding myth at this time. In contrast to the hard-working, social-climbing Hong Kongers, new immigrants from the mainland were depicted as country-bumpkins lost in an urban, modern city (Mathews, Ma, and Lui 2008, 35). In many ways, this stereotype is still prevalent today and informs how Hong Kongers often differentiate themselves from the “uncouth,” “uncivilized” and “ignorant” Mainlanders (See Chapter Three). Of course, the cosmopolitan global characteristics of a Hong Kong identity that many Hong Kongers cling to are not necessarily a point of uniqueness anymore. Today, Chinese cities such as Beijing and Shanghai are hardly “less cosmopolitan” or “less global” than their Hong Kong counterparts. Of late, the media and popular press around the world have eagerly picked up on the so-called “rivalry” between Hong Kong and Shanghai (Schifferes 2007; Garten 2009). The reality of course is that China has a long history of cosmopolitanism. Lisa Rofel has detailed how cosmopolitan desires, or at least a precursor to cosmopolitanism and global desires date back to the universalizing principle of tianxia. She also details the ways in which during the socialist period, China engaged in countless cultural and diplomatic ties with places such as the Soviet Union and countries in Africa (2012).

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28 It should be remembered, however, that populations associated with village life in Hong Kong do not necessarily subscribe to the pervasive urban Hong Kong identity. Outside the urban hustle and bustle exist large populations who still reside in rural farming and fishing villages in the New Territories. Many of the original village inhabitants are considered punti (i.e. local, “indigenous” populations who have resided in Hong Kong prior to Hong Kong’s colonization) (J. L. Watson and Watson 2004; Hayes 2006).
Given the variants and complexities surrounding a Hong Kong identity, it is clear that this study must necessarily avoid essentializing “Hong Kong identity.” To study the what of Hong Kong identity (i.e. Hong Kong identity as a category of analysis) would be a futile academic exercise. Nevertheless, this study not only recognizes the importance of understanding Hong Kong identity as a category of practice (i.e. the how of Hong Kong identity), but it aims to bridge the gap between understanding identity as a category of analysis and as a category of practice – what Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper refer to as the “identity crisis” within the social sciences (2000). Before going into the methodological directions of this dissertation, I will first survey the literature on nationalism, identity studies and everyday nationalism. In doing so, I hope to sketch out the justification for studying the how of Hong Kong identity.

III. THEORETICAL STARTING POINTS

Writ large, this is a dissertation about the everyday politics of Hong Kong after Hong Kong’s change in sovereignty on July 1, 1997. As many scholars have noted, the concept of the everyday and banal should be considered an integral part of the study of nations and national identity (Edensor 2002; de Certeau 1984; Billig 1995; Brubaker 2008; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). However, before I address the current scholarly literature on “everyday nationalism” I shall first briefly go over the broader body of literature on nationalism and national identity.
Following the end of the Cold War and the formation of new, former-Soviet states, a flurry of new literature on nationalism blossomed in the face of the likes of Francis Fukuyama and their over-zealous celebrations of globalization and cosmopolitanism (Calhoun 2007, 11). Despite the continuously burgeoning body of literature, the phenomenon of nationalism remains a puzzling one. As Benedict Anderson notes in the edited volume *Mapping the Nation*:

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[...] \text{it is hard to think of any political phenomenon which remains so puzzling and about which there is less analytic consensus. No widely accepted definition exists. Not one has been able to demonstrate decisively either its modernity or its antiquity. Disagreement over its origins is matched by uncertainty about its future [...] All these uncertainties mean that any anthology ‘mapping the terrain’ of nationalism finds the authors more often with their backs to one another, staring out at different, obscure horizons, than engaged in orderly hand-to-hand combat (1996, 1).}
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To illustrate just how diverse the body of literature is Anthony D. Smith has mapped out the range of ways in which people have referred to nationalism in their work. This lack of consensus and ambiguity can be seen in Smith’s list:

1) the whole process of forming and maintaining nations or nation-states
2) a consciousness of belonging to the nation, together with sentiments and aspirations for its security and prosperity
3) a language and symbolism of the ‘nation’ and its role
4) an ideology, including a cultural doctrine of nations and the national will and prescriptions for the realization of national aspirations and the national will
5) a social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realize its national will (1991, 5–6).

Smith’s list, while neither exhaustive nor complete by any means, shows the heterogeneity and multifariousness implicit within the way in which one can write about and refer to the term nationalism.
For instance, Ernest Gellner defines nationalism as a “principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” – in short, nationalism is a “theory of political legitimacy” (2008, 1). John Breuilly goes further to imply that more than just a principle, nationalism can be understood as a political movement which is “seeking or exercising state power.” By way of that, Breuilly’s definition sidelines aspects such as culture, identity, class, modernization – things which Breuilly argues will detract from focusing on nationalism as a “form of politics” (1994, 1–2). Breuilly’s definition in many ways speaks directly to the works of Michael Billig. For all the attention that has been placed on nationalism expressing itself in the form of separatist movements, anti-colonial movements and independence movements leading to the collapse or re-evaluation of the borders of a state, Billig warns of the potential pitfalls of portraying nationalism as “exotic” and as a peripheral force. As such, Billig introduces the term banal nationalism to “cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced. It is argued that these habits are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have supposed” (1995, 6). To complicate matters further, scholars have written extensively on the varied nature of the types of nationalism. Implicit within all these definitions – a mere sampling of the many more definitions that exist within the field – are understandings of the role of the state, what a nation is, how nations come about and when. A further refining of the term has been attempted by scholars who differentiate between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism – however, as Rogers Brubaker has documented, the distinctions are not
entirely clear cut partly because of the definitional ambiguities regarding what is considered an ethnic group and “civic” (Brubaker 1999).

In an attempt to simplify the “messiness” of the field, Anthony D. Smith also provides a paradigmatic approach to parsing out the literature on nationalism. Smith’s approach concerns the origins of nationalism. The introduction of this three-pronged conceptualization can be found in Smith’s survey of nationalism in *Nationalism and Modernism*. Perhaps due to its accessibility and applicability, Smith’s approach has since been popular among scholars who wish for some theoretical clarity. The three paradigms (or fields) most commonly referenced are primordialism, ethno-symbolism, and modernism. Primordialism is an approach to studying nationalism which is premised on the notion that nations exist as “natural phenomena” and “naturally occurring social groupings” bounded by shared cultural features such as a language, religion, customs, traditions and cultural practice (Ichijo 2005, 51). Problematically, primordialist scholars see nations and nationalism as natural existing component of humans, and having a nation is seen “as natural as speech, sight or smell” (Özkirimli 2000, 64). Ethno-symbolism can be seen as a middle ground approach whereby the notion of nations predating modernity is emphasized, as is the understanding that nations are linked to modernization. Ethnosymbolist scholars focus on the “continuity” between pre-modern and modern societies (Grosby and Leoussi 2007). Lastly, modernism is an approach where nations and nationalism are understood as modern phenomena and products of modernity. For instance, modernist
scholars have argued that nations and nationalism are social constructions that arose from the ascendance of capitalism (Greenfeld 2001), industrialization (Gellner 2008), new understandings of the individual, the modern bureaucratic state, new forms of communication (i.e. print capitalism) and secularism (Anderson 2006).

Of course, the very definition of “nation” is no less messy or contested than the conceptual term “nationalism” in its everyday usage and in its academic analytical usage (Barrington 1997). Scholars such as Brubaker and Cooper argue that nations are at once categories of “social and political analysis” and “categories of everyday social and political practice” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Brubaker and Cooper are thus less concerned with the definitional uncertainty surrounding the term “nation” than the all too common reification of nations, and presupposition of nations as substantive entities when discussing nationalism. The nation, if understood as a category of analysis, is theoretically limiting. Instead, Brubaker calls for understanding the “nation” as a category of practice. By reconceptualizing the nation as a category of practice, one can see the ways in which a nation can shape one’s thought, experience, and actions (Brubaker 1996, 16). A category of practice also allows for different and changing conceptualizations and articulations of the nation over time and space. Ultimately, understanding the nation as a category of practice allows one to understand the “real power of nationalism” and the realities of nationhood and its practices (Ibid.). As Brubaker correctly notes:

To understand the power of nationalism, we do not need to invoke nations. Nor should we, at the other extreme, dismiss nationhood altogether. We
need, rather to decouple categories of analysis from categories of practice, retaining as analytically indispensable the notions of nation as practical category, nationhood as institutionalized form, and nation-ness as event, but leaving “the nation” as enduring community to nationalists (Ibid., 11).

For analytical clarity, Brubaker proposes the following: Nations should be understood as a category of practice, nationhood as institutionalized, cultural and political forms, and nation-ness as a “contingent event or happening” – something that can develop over time (Ibid., 19). 29 Benedict Anderson’s conceptualization of the nation is then a useful one that allows for Brubaker’s suggestion. If the nation is understood as an imagined community (2006, 4–6), one must then ask, who is doing the imagining? What is being imagined? And how is the imagining taking place?

Brubaker’s call to reconceptualize “the nation” as a category of practice is likewise repeated in his insistence that scholars should pay attention to how the idea of “identity” exists as a category of practice. With roots in psychoanalysis, the term “identity” was incorporated into the social science discipline in the 1960s, initially in studies of ethnicity (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 2–3). The term’s currency continued to grow and was soon incorporated into various other disciplines and even in the political realm (Ibid.). By the late 1960s, alongside mass social movements, the term had come to describe and distinguish groups and communities who were fighting for specific social causes. Brubaker and Cooper have identified five ways in which

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29 Brubaker’s idea of nation-ness owes much to Anderson who coined the term in Imagined Communities. Anderson understood nation-ness as encompassing the phenomena of nationalism, the nation, its practices and national identities; nation-ness, then, is in many ways akin to a value, cultural artifacts or a Grand Discourse (Anderson 2006, 3–4; Sutherland 2005).
identity is used today. Like the above discussion on nationalism and nation, one can see a great variance in the usage of the term. They show how identities can be: 1) A ground or justification for social or political action that is not based on interests; 2) a collective phenomenon in which there is a believe “sameness” within a group i.e. a nation; 3) a core aspect of “selfhood” i.e. a national; 4) a product of social or political action that allow for the processual aspect of social movements to take form; 5) an evocation of the post-modern, fragmented, ever-changing, multiple self (Ibid., 7-8).

Beyond the variance in the term’s usage as identified by Brubaker and Cooper, there is also great variation in how the term itself is conceptualized. For instance, Poletta and Jasper define the term collective identity as: “as an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution” (2001, 285); Judith Butler understands identity as something that is performed (1993); whilst Siniša Malešević conceives of identity as ideology (2006). But perhaps the best depiction of the conceptual murkiness as is best demonstrated by Smith’s definition of national identity. In his rather problematic definitional list Smith notes that a national identity encompasses the following features: “1) an historic territory, or homeland; 2) common myths and historical memories; 3) a common, mass public culture; 4) common legal rights and duties for all members; 5) a common economy with territorial mobility for members” (1991, 14). What is perhaps most noticeable about Smith’s definitional list of what a national identity is that they appear as if they could also be features of a nation. Such a move further highlights the
conceptual messiness and confusion regarding these terms and how they are often conflated with each other.

Given the definitional confusion surrounding the term identity, it is no wonder that critics have critiqued the very concept itself. Criticisms of identity as “flawed”, “operationally porous” and “de-politicizing” are not new (Malešević 2006). As James Clifford correctly points out:

Identity politics is under attack from all sides these days. The political right sees only a divisive assault on civilizational (read national) traditions, while a chorus on the Left laments the twilight of common dreams, the fragmentation of any cumulative politics of resistance. Meanwhile intellectuals of a post-structuralist bent, when confronted with movements based on tribal, ethnic, gender, racial or sexual attachments, are quick on the anti-essentialism trigger (2000, 94–95).

Furthermore as Ernest Gellner eloquently points out, in spite of the critiques put forth about identity as flawed and de-politicizing, a person is expected to belong to a nation or have some form of national identity “as he must have a nose and two ears” (2008, 6). Indeed, while it is accepted that a nation and an identity are socially constructed, Gellner writes “that it should have come to seem so very obviously true [that a person belong to a nation] is indeed an aspect, or perhaps the very core, of the problem of nationalism” (Ibid). Gellner’s suggestion seems an important one for the focus of this dissertation. If belonging to a nation is as “natural” as having a nose and two ears, it would seem that for some people of Hong Kong (a growing number of whom openly reject their place within the Chinese nation) they are left blind and without the sense of smell. Of course, if Gellner were to widen his scope and suggest that place-based
identities are as natural as having a nose and two ears, then perhaps Hong Kongers would no longer be without their senses. While Hong Kong is one example of such a case, places like Goa (Goa was repossessed by India in 1961) and Macau (a former Portuguese colony, now a Special Administrative Region of China) have also undergone a similar past (Clayton 2009).

Lastly, beginning in the 1990s a growing body of literature warned of the diminishing role of the nation-state in a cosmopolitan and globalized world (Ohmae 1995; Köhler 1998; Habermas 2001). Saskia Sassen (1991) and Manuel Castells (1997), for instance, have written extensively on how globalization has led to a de-emphasis on the nation-state and the rise of a global networks of cities or a network society. Specifically, these authors discuss how capitalism and globalization have led to a refiguring of collective (national) identities (Castells 1997); a preference to nurture the global market over the welfare of the state; and a rise in transnational civil society. In response to such claims, a handful of nationalism scholars have recently written about how the nation-state and globalization need not necessarily be at odds with each other. For instance, John Hutchinson (2011) and John Breuilly (2011) have written of how trade between nations and something resembling proto-globalization has existed alongside thriving nation-states (or proto-nations) for a long time. Anthony Giddens (1990) and Homi Bhabha (1994) have similarly argued that identities based on nation, kinship, and ethnicity are also becoming less significant as a result of globalization, global networks, and the increasing porosity of boundaries.
Another aim of this dissertation is to further the work of scholars who are trying to bridge the concepts of nationalism and globalization (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2011) and show how the powers of globalization, neoliberalism, and cosmopolitanism can be seen in congruence with aspects of nationalism and national identity and need not necessarily be seen as mutually exclusive. This case shows how Hong Kong’s sense of identity champions cosmopolitanism and globalization, and despite the calls made by “hyperglobalist enthusiasts,” near-nationalism within the city seems to be on the rise.

Thus far in this literature review, I have tried to illustrate that the terms on which this dissertation centers around are conceptually messy. It is likely that the continued study of these terms will continue to yield literature on ways to establish clarity. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) and Mara Loveman (1999), for example, have argued that terms such as identity are “everywhere and nowhere”, and have become ubiquitous and evasive at the same time (2000). For example, scholars such as Stuart Hall (1996) and Jay Lemke (2008) see identity as an ongoing and always incomplete process of production, but rarely do they examine how identities are constructed and the ensuing real-world effects of such constructions. As argued by Pierre Bourdieu, the fear of essentializing identities has resulted in a theoretical “softening” of the term (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 228). Troubled by the term’s ambiguity and multiple (and at times contradictory) usages as a result of its theoretical “softening”, Brubaker and Cooper hope to go “beyond ‘identity’” as an attempt to avoid falling into a
definitional cul-de-sac. For Brubaker and Cooper, the usage of a term such as identity is what constantly trips scholars up (see the example of Smith), and its analytical usage become conflated with the way in which it is referred to in public discourse. By unbundling the term and coming up with three “clusters” of alternative terms they hope to go “beyond ‘identity’” as a way to avoid using a term they believe to be confusing and contradictory: 1) Identification and categorization – the emphasis here is on the processual aspect and those involved with the process of identification and categorization (whether by the state or by lay people); 2) Self-understanding and social location – a “dispositional term [of] one’s sense of who one is, of one’s social location, and of how … one is prepared to act”; 3) Commonality, connectedness and groupness – these last three terms pay particular attention to the affective, “emotionally-laden” sense of belonging to a religious groups, ethnic group, gender, nation, social movement (2000, 14–21). While Brubaker and Cooper provide a novel way of understanding the constructed nature of a term like identity, they also recognizing the reality of its usage and application among lay people. Given the widespread currency of the term, identity, this study is not yet ready to move away from it completely. However, this dissertation will take heed of Brubaker and Cooper’s suggestions in its study of the way identity is invoked and evoked by the people of Hong Kong. Perhaps the best way to study identity, with these suggestions in mind, is to examine how nationalism and national identities are constructed from the “bottom up” by the lay people. As Eric Hobsbawm eloquently notes: “[Nations and their associated phenomena are] constructed essentially from above, but …
cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people…” (1992, 10).

Furthering Hobsbawm’s call, I suggest that if one is to truly commit to studying the ordinary interests and longings of ordinary people, one must do so in the setting of the everyday.

**The Politics of the Everyday**

As Tim Edensor argues, much has been written about linear, “official” national histories and tradition, while the “everyday rhythms” of the nation are often ignored. He writes:

> Small everyday arrangements merge the local with the national through serialization and the persistence of identifiable patterns over time underpins a common sense that this is *how things are* and this is *how we do things*. There is thus an interweaving of conscious and unreflexive thought that typifies everyday practice and communication. Most actions are habitually (re-)enacted without reflection, but occasionally they are subject to communal surveillance or self-monitoring to ensure consistency and the upholding of values and practical norms (Edensor 2006, 529).

Edensor’s emphasis on the everyday in the forging of identities is similar to Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus. Specifically, Bourdieu stresses the role of the state in identity formation via habitus. For example, the state is responsible for inscribing laws, bureaucratic procedures, educational structures and rituals. Thus, “mental structures” and principles are shaped by the state accordingly to forge a national identity (Bourdieu 1994, 7–8). When this national habitus or “everyday rhythm” is disrupted, questioned or challenged by an individual or a group, it becomes clear that such an individual or a group is an outsider or “other.” An example of this disruption
is the way the incident with the girl caught eating noodles on the train snowballed into a larger one: it became a viral video on the Internet and took on a larger meaning of its own. The same can be said of the spectacle and media sensation around “Mainland Mothers” crossing the border to give birth in Hong Kong, property speculators, and Mainland Chinese tourists in Hong Kong.

Perhaps the most notable scholar who has written about “everyday rhythms” and practice and their subsequent contribution to nation formation is Benedict Anderson. Much of Anderson’s introductory chapter in his seminal book *Imagined Communities* is dedicated to explaining the uprooting of religious, cosmological temporality. The transition to empty homogenous time, Anderson argues, is furthered by the arrival of print capitalism. The reading of the newspaper, a “mass ceremony” feeds the imagination of the “imagined community”: “Each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion” (Anderson 2006, 35).

As mentioned earlier, Eric Hobsbawm (1992) argues that nationalism cannot be fully understood unless one analyzes it as a top-down and a bottom-up process. According to Jon E. Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss, nationalism, when studied through the lens of nationalist movements, conflict, assimilation and extermination campaigns, or

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30 A term borrowed from Walter Benjamin
through institutionalized forms such as the education system, languages, economic policies, etc, fails to attribute agency to the very masses which make up the nation. By focusing on the more “spectacular” examples of nationalism, and by sideling the bottom-up, everyday and banal examples of nationalism, such literature is susceptible to a situation where “the people in whose names nations are being made are simply assumed to be attuned to the national content of their self-appointed nationalist messengers. Nationhood from this perspective resonates evenly and unwaveringly among the people…” (2008, 537). Fox and Miller-Idriss conclude, on the contrary, that everyday nationalism is forged via four different methods: “Talking the nation,” “Choosing the nation,” “performing the nation,” and “consuming the nation” (Ibid.). Rather than looking at these four methods as distinct from each other, in my dissertation, I show that the four methods of transmission are very much intertwined. For instance, the way in which one “talks about and with the nation” very much determines the way in which one might choose, perform or consume the nation, and also when they do so. Fox and Miller-Idriss’ concept of “talking the nation” has been touched upon by many other scholars, specifically those within the field of Discourse and Discourse Analysis studies. Ruth Wodak et al (2009), Claire Sutherland (2005), and van Dijk (2011) have written extensively on the ways in which the nation, and by way of that national identity, is discursively constructed. Indeed, the fact that these discursive acts are replicated and naturalized, and “willed into existence” (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 538) is of particular interest for this dissertation. One can certainly see Fox and Miller-Idriss’ examples of everyday nationalism in the case of Hong Kong.
In addition to the suggestions put forth by scholars such as Fox and Miller-Idriss, in *Banal Nationalism* Michael Billig’s concept of “unflagged nationalism” offers another fruitful way in which everyday nationalism can be studied. Billig eloquently points readers to an oft overlooked example of banal nationalism – the limp, tattered American flag on the side of a building: “The uncounted millions of flags which mark the homeland of the United States do not demand immediate, obedient attention. On their flagpoles by the street and stitched on to the uniforms of public officials, they are unwaved, unsaluted and unnoticed. These are mindless flags” (Billig 2005, 188). The passivity of the flag, or at least its perceived passivity, is merely a guise as the unnoticed, unforgotten limp flag is “flagging unflaggingly” (Ibid.). The limp flag, as Billig argues, evokes a sense of nation-hood that is just as relevant as the displays of nationalism seen during election time, memorial days, and on the news. Using Billig’s work as a point of departure, in Chapter Five I suggest that not only should the “mindless flag” be considered as an example of banal nationalism, but the building on which the “mindless flag” hangs can also be symbolic and an example of banal nationalism.

All the examples of everyday nationalism that will be examined in this dissertation are examined alongside Hong Kong’s founding myth. Not every instance examined in this project can be considered banal or everyday. However, I use the literature on everydayness as a point of departure for studying things, debates and discourses
which are not immediately seen as relating to issues of identity, sovereignty, or near-nationalism. Understanding the strength, longevity and currency of Hong Kong’s localized founding myth is integral to a complete study of Hong Kong identity. Thus, this dissertation has a number of aims: 1) Rather than taking for granted the term “identity”, this study is concerned and interested in the ways a strong place-based identity is created. Specifically, I understand Hong Kong identity as a discursive formation (Wodak et al. 1999). This discursive formation is created, imagined, perpetuated and re-formulated by the people of Hong Kong as well as the state. 2) I aim to show that despite Beijing arguing otherwise, a strong everyday near-nationalism exists in Hong Kong. The vigor and presence of this near-nationalism can be seen in the ways in which the founding myth is invoked in everyday conversation to create a sense of belonging, but also, as a way of keeping out “the other.” 3) The strong place-based near-national identity that is described in this dissertation shows the potential for new approaches to understanding nationalism and national identities. For instance, national identities, like city identities, or regional identities are but examples of place-based identities.

IV. AN APPROACH TO STUDYING IDENTITY FORMATION IN HONG KONG

This project takes on an inter-disciplinary, qualitative approach to studying identity formation. While it involves an examination of elite discourses produced by the state, it is primarily concerned with the discourses of the everyday. Such an examination is supported by the notion that individuals make sense of politics via everyday experiences and conversations and the understanding that identities are best
understood as categories of practice, and yet their analytical importance should not be dismissed too readily. Conceptualizing identity as a category of everyday practice allows one to examine the everyday social occurrences, practices and discourses of social actors in Hong Kong, and how a Hong Kong identity is forged through these acts. Despite the salience of these banal and pedestrian acts, they remain overlooked in studies and debates over issues of Hong Kong’s sovereignty and Hong Kong’s relationship with the Chinese nation and are overshadowed by the press’s and most scholars’ concentration on more obviously “political” concerns such as universal suffrage, press freedom, and the elections of the Chief Executive. However, during my fieldwork, I found that rarely did people speak about these issues on a daily basis.

This dissertation is the culmination of twelve months of field work in Hong Kong. During my stay I interviewed over sixty individuals who self-identified as a Hong Konger. Given the nature of this project, I felt that it would be unsuitable for me to define what a Hong Konger is and interviewees were allowed to define the term Hong Konger as they pleased. The individuals interviewed for this project ranged in age, gender, ethnicity and background. They come from all over Hong Kong including the border town of Sheung Shui, the outlying islands, Kowloon, the New Territories, and Hong Kong Island. All interviewees mentioned in this dissertation appear under pseudonyms. In addition to these planned, organized and tape-recorded interviews, I also draw from participant observation and ad-hoc conversations with people I encountered at the everyday level. These unexpected and unplanned interviews,
proved to be detailed, rich and full of examples of how everyday conversations perpetuate understandings of what it means to be a Hong Konger. In addition to interviews conducted by myself, I also found the oral history recordings at the Hong Kong Museum of History library to be incredibly useful. These oral histories were recorded in the late 1980s and were recordings of individuals who had lived through the Japanese invasion. Many of these oral histories provided a rich detailed account of everyday Hong Kong life before and after the war, and also before and after the cementation of the border. While these stories, tales, oral histories and interviews arguably do not provide a complete picture of daily life in Hong Kong, they are, to borrow from Gail Hershatter, “good enough stories” (2011, 3). For instance, in Chapter Three, the tales told in which various people remember the border are in no way complete stories, nor do they provide a thorough account of the past. The snippets of memories that have arisen from the interviews I conducted and oral histories do however “surprise” and “engender thought, unspooling in different directions depending on which thread the listener picks up” (Ibid.). These good-enough stories are also capable of being reinterpreted, replicated and incorporated into various other narratives and meta-narratives (in the case of this dissertation, that narrative is Hong Kong’s founding myth) – something that the current body of literature on Hong Kong identity does not consider.

Previous studies, such as the one by Mathews, Ma and Lui, examine the ways in which the people of Hong Kong are “learning to belong to a Chinese nation” via
popular media and the educational system (2008). Such studies have become commonplace and are often based on quantitative data from surveys in which participants are asked to identify as “Hong Kong-ese,” “Chinese”, or “Hong Kong-Chinese” (See Chan 2000; Lau 1997; E. K. W. Ma and Fung 1999). While qualification on what such terms mean is oftentimes lacking, the studies show a general trend amongst locals, since 1997, to identify as Hong Kong-Chinese rather than Hong Kong-ese. This dual identity suggests a number of things; first, Hong Kong peoples’ increasing acceptance of a tie (whether economic, cultural, or national) to China, and second, the resolute identity of being Chinese, but in “Hong Kong way.” As Mathews, Ma and Lui note, this dual identity is expressed by the following sentiment: “‘Yes, we’re Chinese now, but more important, we’re Hong Kong-ese, not like those Chinese over the border’” (2008, 98).

In addition to Mathews et al.’s study, the city’s largest and most reputable public opinion research institution has been conducting a similar poll every six months since 1997. In December 2011, the Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme released its newest findings. The results showed that since 1998, the number of respondents who identified as “Chinese” had reached an all time low (16 percent), and those identifying as a “Hong Kong citizen” had reached a ten-year high (37.7 percent). This trend continued in their most recent poll, conducted in mid-June 2012, where those identifying as a “Hong Kong citizen” reached another high (45.6 percent) (Chung 2012). The poll from December 2011 yielded quite surprising results and
quickly made headline news. The Public Opinion Program’s director noted that because the survey’s results showed an increased distancing from the Chinese nation (despite China’s economic growth) social, cultural and political factors might be a better way of explaining the recent trends (C. Lee 2011). As word of the poll spread, a Beijing official based in Hong Kong quickly dismissed the poll as “unscientific” and “illogical.”31 In his criticism, Hao Tie Chuan, head of the Publicity, Sports and Cultural Affairs Department in the PRC’s Liaison Office, claimed that the two terms “Hong Kong citizen” and “Chinese citizen” should not be thought of as mutually exclusive. Instead, Hao argues, since 1997, a “Hong Kong citizen” should be thought of as the same as a “Chinese citizen.” While the survey’s director Professor Chung welcomed the criticism, he was quickly faced with condemnation by various pro-Beijing advocates in Hong Kong and on the Mainland. Those siding with Hao commended him on use of “free speech” to openly criticize the survey. In addition, the pro-Beijing press questioned Chung’s motivations behind the poll and whether he was qualified to conduct such a study since he was an “outdated scholar,” and lastly made claims that Chung had long been involved with US intelligence officials (Song 2012; Peng 2012a; Peng 2012b). One op-ed columnist went so far as to suggest that the “seditious” study should be abandoned and that Chung ought to be denied the academic freedom to publish such findings (Song 2012). Many academics in Hong Kong saw such responses from pro-Beijing newspapers and Beijing representatives as

31 The criticism made no note of the fact that the survey was well-established and had been conducted every six months since 1997. Nor did the criticism speak to any of the other earlier surveys and their results.
a threat to their academic freedom. What began as a twice-yearly public opinion poll led to a widespread public debate about academic freedom in Hong Kong. In an education panel hearing in March 2012 at Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, numerous academics from Hong Kong’s academic institutions and members of various non-profit groups and think tanks expressed their concern regarding academic freedom. A number of individuals who testified at the hearing detailed instances in which they were under pressure to not publish findings that might be deemed “politically sensitive” (LegCo 2012).

For the purposes of this study, while the findings of the public opinion poll are interesting in their own right, I am more interested in the responses and debates surrounding the poll. Certainly, one way of understanding Beijing’s knee-jerk reaction of discrediting the poll is that the integration of Hong Kong with China has not gone as smoothly as Beijing had desired. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the public opinion poll saga of 2011 is more importantly an example of the theoretical limits that Brubaker and Cooper identify in their study. The results of the poll, those who partook in the polls, and certainly those who responded in haste to criticize the poll’s findings and sparked the beginning of the debate, show how identity exists as a category of everyday practice (i.e. the way lay people understand it to make sense of themselves). As Brubaker and Cooper write, “If [identity] is fluid, how can we understand the ways in which self-understandings may harden, congeal, and crystallize? If it is constructed, how can we understand the sometimes coercive
force of external identifications? If it is multiple, how do we understand the terrible singularity that is often strived for – and sometimes realized – by politicians seeking to transform mere categories into unitary and exclusive groups?” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 1). There has been little discussion regarding the meanings of the terms used in the public opinion poll, nor is there any discussion of the meanings of these terms are susceptible to change. As my research will show, the meanings attributed to terms such as Hong Konger not only demonstrate the very “emptiness” of the term (Laclau 1996, 36–46), but I will show that identity as a practice is practiced through everyday discourse, debates, and narratives.

V. A ROAD MAP OF THE DISSERTATION

My dissertation begins by charting the founding myth of Hong Kong and its bifurcation. In Chapter Two, I examine the myth of the “barren rock” – a myth typically associated with the arrival of the British, and the colonial state’s achievements. As I show, a de-colonization of Hong Kong’s development myth occurs in the 1960s, during Hong Kong’s rapid development. The de-colonized version of this myth, what I will refer to as the Lion Rock Myth, argues that the city’s development was a result of the city’s hard working population, their “go-getting” spirit and sense of community. Today, the de-colonized, localized myth has become part of Hong Kong’s institutionalized history. The ubiquity of this myth is evidenced in TV commercials, popular media, education curricula, and at the Museum of Hong Kong History. Lastly, in this chapter, I demonstrate how these myths are part and
parcel of the same grand narrative that underscores the role and triumph of capital in Hong Kong.

In Chapter Three, I begin with an examination of the creation and institutionalization of the border between Mainland China and Hong Kong during the 1950s. The institutionalization of the border was in part the colonial government’s response to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and China’s subsequent role in the Korean War. While the border still exists today and its location and stretch has been left largely unchanged since the 1950s, the porosity of the border, in the past fifteen years, has however increased and movement from both sides of the border, to and from Hong Kong has increased substantially. Despite the increased porosity of the border, however, the memories of this institution still remain. As I illustrate in Chapter Three, the memories of the border are very much intertwined with the founding myth. The intentions of the colonial government in the 1950s were to create a border that would physically separate capitalism and communism. Such an official state discourse of the border did not find its way into the public discourse until decades later. As the localized myth grained prevalence, the border came to represent Hong Kong’s exceptionalism – it became a border that signified change and new opportunities for many who sought refuge in Hong Kong during the 1940s and 1950s. It also marked the entryway into a community of displaced people who would one day contribute to the development of the city. However, this welcoming attitude did not last.
Today, the border is much more porous than it was in the 1950s, and it is clear that it no longer represents the entryway to a revered city of refuge welcoming to all. Instead, the border has reverted back to a border that is depicted in a way that is similar to the colonial state’s original intent in the 1950s. The border has come to represent the separation between civilized and uncivilized, rule of law and lawlessness, and demarcates Mainland China as “the Other.” For example, “Mainland mothers” who cross the border to give birth to their children are no longer welcomed to join the community of displaced people, rather they are seen as reaping the benefits of Hong Kong’s welfare system. With an increase in cross border movement, narratives resembling nativist anti-immigration discourses in the United States and Australia, and a rhetoric of “the Other” which mimics orientalist discourses of the past has been appropriated by Hong Kongers. These discourses became especially virulent in times of crisis such as the 2003 SARS outbreak.

The fourth chapter explores recent debates over redevelopment in Hong Kong. I show how the de-colonized founding myth is featured heavily on both sides of the redevelopment debates. For example, the area known as Government Hill was seen as the location in which the colony was established, and where many governmental institutions were headquartered. Today, preservationists argue that the preservation of this area is crucial to the people of Hong Kong as the area was the very first space in which Hong Kong people actively engaged with the state (whether through protest or
use of government resources). Government Hill and the cityscape of Hong Kong embodied this de-colonized myth and became crucial to how Hong Kongers imagine their city and themselves. I argue that this imagination, and by way of that, a Hong Kong identity, is perceived to be threatened by recent redevelopment and urban renewal projects. Those against redevelopment and urban renewal projects believe that such redevelopment, growth of capitalism, and the collusion of state interests and the developers’ interests are undemocratic and will lead to an abatement of the city’s uniqueness and become “another Chinese city.” The pro-redevelopment argument also relies on the founding myths as a way to justify the redevelopment and renewal projects. As their argument goes, Hong Kong has always been, and will be, a city that has gone through cycles of development and redevelopment – it is this aspect that makes Hong Kong supposedly unique. What is absent from these arguments, however, is the way in which redevelopment and renewal in the city has long aided in the formation of neoliberal subjectivities, which I argue can be seen as synonymous with what Hong Kongers believe to be a “unique” identity.

Lastly, in Chapter Five I examine how the city’s founding myths are reified, turned into commodities and consumed by Hong Kongers. In recent years, there has been a resurgence in everyday objects from Hong Kong’s heydays (i.e. the 1950s-1970s), such as simple porcelain bowls, white t-shirts, rubber toy balls, and eating institutions (i.e. diners, hawker stalls). I argue that as more Hong Kongers worry about the renewal of the city, and the disappearance of their city’s uniqueness and identity,
restaurateurs, and fashion designers are encouraging a resurgence of the “made in Hong Kong” brand that is often associated with city’s heydays and Hong Kong’s developmental success. As the myth goes, the 1960s and 1970s was the peak of Hong Kong’s growth and development, and people are certainly buying into this myth through purchasing these commodities. Those who purchase and produce these commodities, in many ways, are trying to appropriate, reaffirm and preserve Hong Kong’s founding myths. The commodification and politicization of nostalgia further entrench the de-colonized founding myths in the public imagination and help shape Hong Kong identity.

These chapters hope to show how the localized founding myth of Hong Kong is not only part of Hong Kong’s institutionalized history, but it has also become naturalized and permeates through multiple levels of discourse within the city.

VI. CONCLUSION

As the beginning of the Lunar New Year Festival finally came around in mid-January celebrations seeing off the past year and welcoming in the new year were overshadowed by the media’s drummed up phenomenon of the “dragon baby.”

According to Chinese belief, the Year of the Dragon is supposed to be a year of prosperity, and those born within that year are considered especially lucky. Under

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32 Each year in the Chinese calendar is named after an animal or beast from the cylindrical calendar system; the year 2012-2013 was the Year of the Dragon
Article 24 of the Hong Kong SAR’s Basic Law\(^3\), one of the stipulations asserts that a person of Chinese citizenship born in Hong Kong after 1997 is entitled to the right of abode in Hong Kong. The individual thus has the right to land and leave Hong Kong freely, and to not be deported or removed from the SAR (Hong Kong SAR Government 2010).\(^4\) As a result of a Basic Law ruling in 1999, Hong Kong hospitals have seen a rising number of cross-border births and the rise of “birth tourism.” Local Hong Kong media and foreign media became transfixed on the idea that since 2012 was the Year of the Dragon, there would be a significant number of Mainland parents crossing the border to give birth to “dragon babies” in Hong Kong. These babies and their mothers, as the media and public argued, would take advantage of social welfare benefits, educational opportunities and medical care Hong Kong had to provide to the baby by law (Al Jazeera 2012).

In addition to this fear mongering over “Mainland mothers”, the media began to report on the steep increasing prices in real estate. Rising real estate prices were

\(^3\) Hong Kong’s constitution.

\(^4\) A heated political debate began in 1999 over the legal stipulations in the Basic Law (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s constitutional document). This was quickly followed by a debate over whether or not the legislature in Hong Kong could pass ordinances that further restricted immigration and amended the Basic Law. The Court of Final Appeal (Hong Kong’s highest court) in Hong Kong found that the Basic Law should be treated as a living document, and by way of that, interpretations and amendments were to be expected. Nevertheless, the court found that the new restrictions on immigration were unconstitutional and overturned the legislative action. Worried that a “flood” of immigrants would soon come across the borders of Hong Kong as a result of the new ruling, the SAR government quickly turned to the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress to overturn the Court of Final Appeal’s ruling – which they did, and the Court of Final Appeal’s ruling was struck down. This would be the first of many cases in which the Court of Final Appeal’s rulings would be turned over by Beijing. The Bar Association of Hong Kong saw this as an undermining of Hong Kong’s judicial system’s autonomy, whereas Mainland legal critics saw the Court of Final Appeal’s actions as stepping over their jurisdiction – judicial review was strictly reserved for the purview of Beijing (A. Y. So 2003).
attributed to wealthy Mainland Chinese who had the capital to buy various properties in the city. Their investments and participation in the housing market troubled a larger number of Hong Kongers who claimed the rising housing prices were above the means of the local, Hong Kong homebuyers. It seemed as if the media was no longer concerned about the Dolce and Gabbana incident or the online footage of the MTR altercation, and instead had moved on to its next piece of sensational reporting. A few weeks later Hong Kongers awoke to a full-page advertisement in the newspaper. The advertisement likened the increasing number of Mainland Chinese visitors to a plague of locusts. While such episodes are explicit and extreme ways Hong Kongers have actively distanced themselves from the Chinese nation, as the rest of the dissertation will show, more banal and less confrontational discourses address Hong Kong’s complex relationship with Mainland China.
“[I]n this infinite variety of forms, it is present at all times, in all places, in all societies; indeed narrative starts with the very history of mankind; there is not, there has never been anywhere, any people without narrative; all classes, all human groups, have their stories, and very often those stories are enjoyed by men of different and even opposite cultural backgrounds: narrative remains largely unconcerned with good or bad literature. Like life itself, it is there, international, transhistorical, transcultural.”

-- Roland Barthes (1975, 237)

CHAPTER TWO: FROM BARREN ROCK TO GLIMMERING ROCK – THE MYTHS OF HONG KONG

I. INTRODUCTION

In March 2002, amidst much public dissatisfaction with the Hong Kong government’s performance, the Hong Kong economy entered its fifth year of decline. Under much close scrutiny and aware of the critical reception he would receive, former banker-turned-financial secretary Antony Leung Kam-cheung ended his first budget speech by reciting the song lyrics from the popular song, “Below the Lion Rock” before bowing out. It is no surprise when politicians borrow from the works of great novelists and poets in their speeches. However, to use the lyrics of a pop song in a speech is less common. Despite the fact that the financial secretary himself had presented few solutions by way of improving the economy, a wave of nostalgia for “the old days of Hong Kong” and approval for the secretary swept through the city (Pepper 2008, 355). Critics were fast to point out that the tugging of heartstrings was nothing more than a staged performance by the government to underscore a notion of responsible, harmonious citizenship among the public. This responsible citizenship would allow for the government to shirk responsibility for the economic downturn
(Lam 2005, 319). While it’s possible that many felt uplifted and reassured by the contents of the budget speech, the reason approval ratings initially skyrocketed had more to do with the popularity of the song and the song’s evocations of Hong Kong’s heyday.

The popular song “Below the Lion Rock,” written in 1979, was the theme song to Hong Kong’s most popular and longest running TV series of the same name. The TV series chronicled the lives of working class individuals in Hong Kong. Produced by Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), the show has currently had five successful runs with the first season beginning in the 1974 and its latest revival in 2006. The popular reception of the latest run, DVD reissues, and replays of older episodes were partly fueled by the renewed interest in the show following the Financial Secretary’s address in 2002. In its first inception, the series focused on individuals such as new immigrants, boat dwellers, factory workers, fishermen, and Hong Kong’s first public housing residents. The drama followed these individuals through key moments in Hong Kong’s history, such as the Shep Kip Mei squatter hill fires, civil unrest, and periods of water rationing, and has been lauded for its accurate portrayal of lower and working class Hong Kongers in the 1970s. As noted on the series website, the show not only chronicles the lives of Hong Kongers, but also charts Hong Kong’s growth and development, and places an emphasis on “the spirit of the people, riding through many ups and downs to face challenges” (RTHK 2012). The show and the popular

35 Lion Rock (獅子山) is one of Hong Kong’s famous mountain ranges. It is named as such because of the rock formation’s profile: from the side, the mountain range appears as in the shape of a resting lion.
song rely on a narrative of hope, social mobility and progress through social cohesion, hard work and sacrifice as evidenced in the theme song’s lyrics:

There is laughter in life and inevitably there are tears,  
But we have all met under the Lion Rock.  
We’ll laugh more than we sigh,  
Life is inevitably rough and seldom without grief.  
We are all on the same boat,  
so let’s help each other under the Lion Rock.  
We must give up our prejudices and work together,  
Let go of indifferences in our mind  
And pursue our dreams together.  
We are a crew on our boat and vow to stay together 
With no fear nor fright. 
We are all at the end of the world, 
Hand in hand, we traverse the rough seas. 
With hard work and perseverance 
We write the immortal verse of Hong Kong.  

Commonly, the show’s opening credits visually represent the juxtaposition between “old Hong Kong” and “present-day Hong Kong” through a stream of images that chart Hong Kong’s development. For one season, the credits begin with images of people struggling and living in poverty. The black and white footage shows single mothers with their children in public housing, homeless people, refugees from Vietnam, and individuals crying and looking forlorn in shantytowns. As the tempo of the song picks up, the images quickly shift from one image to the next. The second half of the opening credits is made up of juxtaposing images which underscore Hong Kong’s development and success. Viewers now see children’s happy faces, students hard at work, office workers walking to work during the rush hour, and various other

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36 My translation.
shots of happy, satisfied Hong Kongers. The image then pans out, and as the song ends, viewers are shown the familiar Hong Kong skyline, now filled with skyscrapers. What is particularly salient about the popularity of the song and the series, however, is that the stories and tales which make up each episode are familiar and resonate with individuals who have never lived in squatter houses, boats, or public housing estates (C. Chu 2007, 49). In short, while the song and the series might not necessarily resonate with most Hong Kongers’ experiences today, the affective claims cannot be ignored. The fact that the story lines of the TV series, the lyrics of the song, and the images of public housing estates conjur up nostalgia or sentiment among viewers has little to do with the actual experience of living in a public housing estate or braving the South China Sea in search of refuge. In fact, it is highly unlikely that the show’s fans had all previously lived in a housing estate and was part of their community or lived in a boat house. And yet these objects are all familiar precisely because they are examples of the founding myth itself: the content of the song’s lyrics are about the founding myth, and the TV show’s plotlines are

38 Unlike previous seasons that had followed this formulaic opening credit montage, the 2006 season’s opening credits are made up of hand-drawn cartoon images instead of footage and images from the past. The opening credits nevertheless include predictable images such as the Hong Kong harbor, families, the Lion Rock with skyscrapers foregrounding it. One image that does stand out is the image of protestors on the streets of Hong Kong. The 2006 season came back to screens after a twelve-year hiatus, and was the first season to air after the change in sovereignty. By 2006, public protests were a means for the public to voice dissatisfaction with the government, and had become a common weekend occurrence. The image of the protestors represents a new sense of community spirit – a sense of community and solidarity that becomes alive during these protests and marches. In many ways this could be seen as the ‘new Hong Kong spirit.’

39 Cecilia Chu has suggested that the renaissance of the song and TV series in the collective memory was less an affirmation of Leung’s pledge for Hong Kongers to weather the storm, but rather, an opportunity for them to witness and reflect upon how their present lifestyle in Hong Kong is one that is “more affluent, modern and superior” than the past. Chu continues, this is particularly the case for much of Hong Kong’s middle class today, who either grew up or whose parents spent much of their lifetime in Hong Kong’s public housing (C. Chu 2007).
mini retellings of the founding myth. In short, the familiarity is less about the experience than familiarity with the myth itself. If one were to do a web search for video clips of the song, one is sure to find comments by viewers proclaiming the song to be “Hong Kong’s song” and “the national anthem of Hong Kong and its people.”

In the same way a national anthem may bring a nationalist to tears and arouse certain feelings of pride and happiness, the theme song “Below the Lion Rock” does just that to some Hong Kongers. To illustrate, I spoke to two Hong Kongers who had represented Hong Kong at the national level numerous times for different sporting events and tournaments. I met both women over ten years ago when we were all members of the same sports club. Amanda was born in Hong Kong, and except for a few years of university studies in England, had lived in Hong Kong for most of her life. Upon finishing her bachelor’s degree she returned to Hong Kong and has since worked as a personal fitness trainer and a sales representative at a sporting goods store. Since the age of fourteen Amanda has represented Hong Kong at the national level in field hockey, and to this day she is one of the national team’s most valuable players and top scorers. My second acquaintance, Cynthia, was also born in Hong Kong and has lived in Hong Kong her whole life. Cynthia began playing rugby at the age of fourteen and, like Amanda, Cynthia has represented Hong Kong at the national level, and has played rugby for Hong Kong in various international tournaments including the Asian Games in 2010. As a key member in Hong Kong’s rugby

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40 A search on YouTube for “獅子山下” and “Under/Below the Lion Rock” yielded 689 search results. A search on Google yielded 4,410 search results.
community, Cynthia has led a number of training camps and development programs in Hong Kong and in Mainland China. While not playing rugby, Cynthia is an administrative executive at an international commercial real estate firm and moonlights for a multilevel marketing company. I caught up with Cynthia and Amanda separately and in both instances, after inquiring about how their sports careers were going, they both expressed how “odd” it was to hear the Chinese national anthem playing at the beginning of each field hockey or rugby match. I pushed both of them a little bit more to explain what they meant by that comment. Amanda admitted that she did not know the lyrics to the anthem, “I know it’s all part of a ritual, and that’s just what you have to do when you play in international tournaments. But it’s weird. I’m standing on the field and the Chinese national anthem is playing, and I don’t know the words. I was never taught the lyrics and I don’t speak Mandarin, so I just kind of stand there. I really feel no connection to it. I’m not saying that playing the British national anthem was any better, but I just think Hong Kong should have its own anthem.” Cynthia echoed Amanda’s sentiment. “To me, I just can’t connect with the anthem. A song like the ‘Below the Lion Rock’, for instance, just means something to me. It’s a show about Hong Kong and its people.”

Cynthia’s comments, like the comments on the song’s video webpage, show how the TV series and its theme song are seen by some Hong Kongers as “realistic” portrayals of the Hong Kong experience and Hong Kong’s past.

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41 As a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong shares China’s national anthem. Prior to 1997, the anthem played at sporting events was the British national anthem “God Save the Queen.”
The popularity of both the TV series and song demonstrates that a myth not only becomes institutionalized in history books, education curriculum and museum exhibits but it also becomes part of the everyday as it is reproduced, retold and disseminated by the public. This chapter is about Hong Kong’s founding myths, narratives and stories. Specifically, this chapter demonstrates how a decolonized, localized founding myth of Hong Kong initially began as a counter-narrative to a colonial founding myth. This localized myth has since configured itself to be part of Hong Kong’s historical narrative – I will refer to this myth as the Lion Rock Myth. The Lion Rock Myth is ultimately about a community of displaced individuals coming together in Hong Kong. These individuals came to Hong Kong having left Mainland China either during its various periods of turmoil and civil war in the twentieth century, as a result of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, or due to the party’s subsequent policies and campaigns such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. As this myth goes, the immigrants and refugees who came to Hong Kong overcame poverty and hardships upon their arrival in Hong Kong. Together with the help of the community, through hard work and perseverance, many of these newcomers to Hong Kong not only contributed to its tremendous growth, but profited from it as well. At its core, this myth is about sacrifice, self-reliance (or the reliance on the community), and perseverance. As I show in this chapter, this myth becomes part of Hong Kong’s historical narrative and becomes part of its institutionalized history while simultaneously becoming part of
the everyday. Prior to this, the dominant myth was a myth about the successes of Britain’s colonization of Hong Kong. It was a myth that was largely circulated by the colonial government, in Western literature and Western historical accounts. As a generation of locally born Hong Kongers came of age, and a discourse of belonging and citizenship came into being, a de-colonized version of this myth also arose and became part of Hong Kong’s historical narrative. The remainder of the dissertation will show how Hong Kong’s de-colonized, localized founding myth is a crucial component in understanding the process of identity formation in Hong Kong.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the historical and political significance of myths. This section serves to clarify my understanding of what a myth is. With the help of Roland Barthes’ articulation of myth and mythology, I show how myths are politically important and how everyday objects can become signifiers of myths. I next introduce readers to what I call the colonial founding myth, or the Barren Rock myth. In the section following this, I look at how Hong Kong’s historical narrative undergoes a bifurcation in the 1960s and 1970s. Bifurcation – a concept introduced by Prasenjit Duara – is a particularly helpful concept in understanding how two different historical narratives about Hong Kong’s development and growth arise. As a localized, decolonized narrative of Hong Kong’s history (what I call the Lion Rock myth) gains currency from the 1970s onwards, I show how the localized, decolonized myth becomes institutionalized and becomes part of the Hong Kong’s “official” interpretation of history and the dominant historical narrative. The dominant
historical narrative continues to resonate among the public: its presence can be seen in the way museums such as the Hong Kong Museum of History curate exhibitions and its incorporation into school curricula. I finally conclude this chapter by examining some of the key themes that are present in the myth through popular TV commercials and folk tales: inconvenience and perseverance; growth and development; self-reliance; and sacrifice.

Myths can be seen as one form of historical narrative. Historical narratives have featured centrally in the works of those critiquing the field of history. The arguments put forth by the likes of Hayden White (1990), Paul A. Cohen (1992), and Prasenjit Duara (1995) encourage readers to consider the ways in which linear, progressive history (what Duara calls History, with a capital H) is not only privileged in modern scholarship, but what makes modernity possible in the first place (Duara 1995, 20). Moreover, as scholars have noted the relationship between History and the “imagined community” is an intimate, even “unbreakable”, one. As Duara astutely notes, “nations emerge as the subjects of History just as History emerges as the ground, the mode of being, of the nation” (Ibid., 27). While there are numerous examples in which the nation-state, nationalist leaders and nationalist movements often rely on History as a means of legitimacy and often institutionalize such a History, the nation itself is also seen as “the subject of History.” So much so, that modern History as a narrative is “meaningless” without the nation (Ibid.). To further develop his criticism of linear History, Duara conceives of the idea of a “bifurcated conception of history.”
For Duara, bifurcation occurs when: “[t]he past is not only transmitted forward in a linear fashion, its meanings are also dispersed in space and time. Bifurcation points to the process whereby, in transmitting the past, Historical narratives and language appropriate dispersed histories according to present needs, thus revealing how the present shapes the past” (Ibid., 5). In many ways, a bifurcated history allows for a move away from a privileged historical narrative and the possibility of counter-narratives or previously ignored histories to become new, hegemonic historical narratives. For instance, the notion of a bifurcated history allows for the creation of new political communities that previously might not have been possible under the dissemination of a mainstream narrative history. The new political communities are legitimized as their once alternate and previously sidelined history becomes recognized and institutionalized. As Duara continues, this new imagined community’s bifurcated history is made possible by a “narrative of discent” – a play on words that denotes that the narrative underscores aspects of historical descent and dissent (Ibid., 66).

In this chapter I argue that through a bifurcation of the historical narrative, the people of Hong Kong, a community largely made up of immigrants and refugees from Mainland China (or descending from Mainland China) could “discent” from the colonial historical narrative and instead construct an alternative historical narrative.  

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42 Duara understands societies and communities as entities bounded by cultures, languages, rituals, and other practices – what some might refer to as “groupness.” Boundaries may be porous (or soft), meaning practices can be shared with another group or community, or they may be concrete (or hard). A nation, then, is composed when a political community’s boundaries are solidified and hardened (Duara 1995, 65–66).
a founding myth which emphasizes the displaced community’s distinct circumstances. A “discent” from the colonial historical narrative can be interpreted as not only an anti-colonial move, but as a way to legitimize the local population as the rightful inhabitants and “founders” of Hong Kong. By the 1960s, the majority of Hong Kong’s population was composed of immigrants, refugees, and their descendents. It is no surprise that Hong Kong’s historical narrative – a narrative largely constructed and determined by the colonial state – did not resonate with the local public and can be seen now as an example of a colonized historical narrative. The colonized founding myth dates the beginning of Hong Kong’s history with the arrival of the British in 1841. In this myth, Hong Kong was no more than a barren rock prior to the arrival of the British. Following colonization, the colonial state (seen as the protagonist in this narrative) became responsible for Hong Kong’s development and growth – much of which had to do with the state’s laissez faire economic policies, the implementation of colonial institutions (such as the legal system), and benevolent attitude towards local inhabitants. In many ways this myth represents two different types of “founding moments.” In the first instance, the arrival of the British signified the moment in which Hong Kong’s institutional foundations were laid. In the second instance, Hong Kong was nothing more than an island amongst a sea of over hundreds of islands in the South China Sea, waiting to (literally) be “found.”

43 Similarly, British writer, Jan Morris’ Eurocentric view of history is exhibited when she writes that Hong Kong “first entered world history” in 1841 (Morris 1985, 17).
What is clear is that the people of Hong Kong (indigenous inhabitants, long time residents, immigrants and refugees) are noticeably absent from this colonized historical narrative. Beginning in the 1970s, an alternate myth began to emerge. Unlike the colonized historical myth, this bifurcation of history emerged from the people of Hong Kong and incorporated the experiences of the Hong Kong people and their sense of belonging. This decolonized myth, or the Lion Rock myth, emphasizes the people of Hong Kong’s work ethic, resilience, sacrifice, social mobility and self-sustainability. In addition to these factors, the myth stresses the importance of community. Taken together, these factors tell a narrative of a community of refugees and immigrants working day and night to rise from poverty and to contribute to the future growth of Hong Kong. As I will show in the chapter, this myth has since become the dominant historical narrative and is institutionalized and seen in history museums and school curriculum. While it is still common for people to allude to and evoke the barren rock, it is often done as a way to highlight the development and growth of Hong Kong, rather than as a moment of colonial discovery and the beginning of colonial rule.

II. THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MYTHS

It is important to first lay clear this dissertation’s understanding and employment of the term myth. Common dictionary definitions would attribute the word to a tale which features the supernatural and is used to explain or justify a phenomenon, religious belief or ritual, or the beginnings of an early society (OED Online 2012).
Moreover, common parlance would suggest that things described as myths are often understood as having little truth-value. The etymology of the word stems from the Greek word, *mythos*, which is typically understood to mean story or utterance. However, even among scholars of classical mythology, the word myth and its definition is highly contested and can be seen as a multifaceted phenomenon (Woodard, 1). For example, as Diskin Clay notes, the word *mythos* in Homer refers to what is spoken in the epic; while in Herodotus, *mythos* is used to describe a fictitious and unbelievable tale (Clay 2007, 210). Clay goes further to show how *mythos* is seen elsewhere to describe one’s history, while Plato’s use of the words *mythos* and *logos* are taken to mean fictions and the truth, respectively (Ibid., 211). Outside of classical Greek mythology, other disciplines bear witness to a similar contestation of definitions: “For some people, a myth is a story which gives a poetic form to an unsayable truth while for others it has an essentially fictitious character” (Lavers 1982, 105). Paul A. Cohen argues that mythologization always encompasses an element of distortion and oversimplification of the past. Moreover, he argues that mythologization necessarily ignores or dismisses material or evidence that questions the myth’s validity. Perhaps the biggest overarching element that connects all myths together, however, is their ability to persuade. As Cohen reminds us, while the mythologized past may be historically questionable and inaccurate, they are “bound by at least a loose conception of ‘truthfulness’ as a means to persuade people to believe in the myth in the first place” (1992, 83). Despite the contest surrounding the interpretation of the word itself (i.e. whether a myth is akin to a historically
questioned past, or a fictitious, romanticized narrative), what many scholars agree upon is the longevity, endurance and appeal of myths, and the way “truth” is projected onto myths. Recognizing this, Helen Morales pushes for an understanding that privileges an understanding of what myths do – specifically, Morales looks at how myths are capable of projecting lore, projecting ideology, and enabling pleasure or escapism (Morales 2007). It is safe to acknowledge that while many definitions understand myths as having a fictitious component to them, this will not be my main concern. Instead, my focus will be on understanding myths as an ideological and political tool that is unique in its timeless appearance. Thus my understanding of myth is three-fold. I understand myths as: 1) an ideological process, 2) a form of signification, and 3) an instrument of social integration.

It is for this reason that I find the work of Roland Barthes particularly helpful for this chapter. Barthes shows that myths operate as part of everyday politics. For Barthes, it is important to first recognize that mythical speech need not pertain to written discourses, but can be supported by images, photography, rituals, objects, a gesture, an entire book, or a minute word (1972, 120). Through his collection of short essays in Mythologies, Barthes demonstrates how myths can take common objects and imagery of everyday cultural life – in Barthes’ case, French cultural life – (French wine, toys, food in magazines, the French Citroën, washing detergent, the cover of a football magazine, plastic objects) and transform them into having a universal and naturalizing value as if they had always been items that signified something more
than its everydayness. In this instance, myths have an ideological function that can transform potentially any object or image. For Barthes, a meal of steak and french fries is not simply a plateful of beef and fried potatoes. Rather, the mythology of steak and fries signifies Frenchness or a French identity for the French men and women who consume it. A rare steak symbolizes nature and morality – steak “is the heart of meat, it is meat in its pure state; and whoever partakes of it assimilates a bull-like strength” (Ibid., 62). Beyond the primal aspect of steak and chips, a steak dinner belongs to the people of France – it is nationalism on a plate. The ubiquity of the dish appearing in neighborhood bistros, or as a simple meal for one, or even on the menus of a haute cuisine, Michelin-starred restaurant underscores the universality of the dish, and, more importantly, the universal value of the dish: “It is a food which unites, one feels, succulence and simplicity. Being part of the nation, it follows the index of patriotic values: it helps [the French] rise in wartime, it is the very flesh of the French soldier…” (Ibid., 63). Through this example, Barthes demonstrates how everyday presumably banal objects that are seemingly devoid of political meaning can signify nation-ness. Following Barthes’ theoretical suggestions, I suggest that evocations of the barren rock enable Hong Kongers to understand the island as more than a geographical rock formation in the South China Sea. Instead, themes that are present in both versions of the myth are attached to the idea of the rock so that it comes to symbolize the foundations of hope, refuge, capitalism and entrepreneurialism. Barthes argues that myths are a system of communication; specifically, they are a mode of signification that is intimately tied to power (Barthes 1972, 109). Thus, an object that
was previously devoid of any contingency or history (i.e. a barren rock) upon becoming mythologized takes on a whole new meaning which is historical, intentional and determined. In this application of Barthes, the cityscape and everyday items from the past also take on meaning through the founding myth. In the remainder of the dissertation I will show how these objects become imbued with meaning. The cityscape is that which is built upon the rock; the border becomes that which distinguishes the rock from other nearby islands; and household goods of the past represent the achievements that took place on the rock, the triumph of capital and the endurance of the Hong Kong people – together they helped make Hong Kong into what it is today. Myths, then, do not evolve “naturally,” rather there are specific historical conditions that condition the myth. Lastly, Barthes notes that what makes a myth politically salient is the way in which it is capable of naturalizing itself. As Barthes writes, “it transforms history into nature” (Ibid., 129). Beyond that, myths can also shape the way individuals go about their daily lives and the practices they partake in. As Charles Taylor suggests, myths and memory are a “common understanding that enables us to carry out the collective practices that make up our social life” (2004, 24).

Beyond mythologizing objects, myths are also an important component of nation formation. Given the ideological possibilities inherent in myths, especially founding myths which focus on a nation’s “founding moments” and narratives of development, this chapter has to necessarily engage with ideas of History. Eugen Weber has
explicitly suggested that the role of the historian and scholars should not be overlooked in understanding how myths are reproduced. Having spent much of his academic career devoted to studying the formation of the French nation-state, Weber writes:

Memory is what we make it. We are the sons and daughters of our history, but national history, the national heritage, had to be forged by debate, research, invention; had to be acclimatized, inculcated, catechized, made to compel belief, take hold of minds, until it was sanctified by habit. Historians were the clerisy of the nineteenth century because it fell to them to rewrite foundation myths; and history was the theology of the nineteenth century because it provided societies cast loose from the moorings of custom and habit with new anchorage in a rediscovered – or reinvented – past (E. Weber 1992, 23).

Similarly, Prys Morgan in Eric Hobsbawm’s edited volume *The Invention of Tradition* demonstrates how during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, Welsh scholars and patriots actively “rediscovered the past” in historical and literary traditions – a past was in essence “recreated.” Morgan argues that the myth and imagery of the Welshman that is still a national symbol in Wales was created during this period (1983). Paul A. Cohen has likewise pointed to the less than clear-cut distinction between myths and history as ways to understand the past (1992). Indeed, while historians understand that their role is to seek the “truth” (unlike mythologizers who already have an understanding of the past), as Cohen notes, the truth they seek is often informed by a historical paper trail that is shaped by the past’s gender, class, racial and ethnic relations. Thus, the historical paper trail or oral histories a historian relies so heavily upon may render truth seeking and the goal of recording history as fundamentally problematic and relative in itself (Ibid., 83).
These considerations point to a discipline that has long understood historical accounts as driven by narratives. Hayden White famously looked to annals and chronicles to demonstrate the way in which the modern discipline of history and historiography is constrained by the need to produce a narrative. The annal – compiled of a list of dates, some years are marked by the death of a duke, and next to other dates are the banal comments on a year’s harvest, some years are left blank – serves as an alternate way to represent history. The “incomplete”, conclusion-less, subject-less nature of the annal appears at first to be a frustrating read: “There are too many loose ends – no plot in the offing – and this is frustrating, if not disturbing […] there is no story conclusion. How could there be, since there is no central subject about which a story could be told?” (H. White 1990, 8–9). Historians have relied on documents and archives as part of their quest to depict a “complete picture” of the past. Through these documents historians are able to describe, analyze, and tell stories of their subject matter. Thus, if all historical accounts are merely a narrative of the past, or a form of institutionalized story telling, White concludes that there is little difference between a narrative told by the historian versus a fictional tale or story. What does differentiate between the two is their content. The narrative form, however, remains the same (White 1984, 2-3). Duara goes further to note that the discipline of history and its teleological emphasis is responsible for reifying the nation while simultaneously silencing voices (1995). In Duara’s attempt to “rescue history from the nation,” he proposes the notion of a bifurcated history that allows for
marginalized narratives to be recognized. As I argue, the de-colonized founding myth, what I call the Lion Rock myth, is an example of a bifurcated history. In the next section, I will introduce the colonized myth, and by way of that introduce the bifurcated, de-colonized myth that becomes the dominant “official” historical narrative of Hong Kong.

III. THE BIFURCATION OF HONG KONG’S HISTORY

TALES OF A BARREN ROCK – A COLONIZED HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

Perhaps the most powerful aspect of the colonized founding myth is the power and hold the image of the barren rock still has on individuals. The barren rock is used to symbolize the beginning of Hong Kong’s history and the “starting point” of its tale of development. This myth was popularized not only by the colonial state, but also by journalists, academics and historiographers (mostly from the West) who depicted Hong Kong as a wild, inhospitable, barren, unwelcoming island upon the British arrival. The local population had hardly reached maturation, and the small local population that did exist was understood to be composed of a scant number of village clans, sojourners, fishermen, and pirates passing through the area. This myth stresses that anything resembling a local community, governance or state was nowhere to be found. In short, the myth paints Hong Kong prior to 1841 as a Hobbesian state of nature where institutions had to be quickly established. More importantly, as a colonial myth, it reinforced the idea of Hong Kong existing as nothing more than an island among a sea of other islands. That is to say, the island at the time of
“founding” was never really understood as being part of China but just another deserted island. As the myth goes, there were no Chinese institutions on the island, nor were there any signs of Chinese inhabitants. Spatially, the island was off the coast and separated from the Mainland and waiting to be inhabited. Beyond the perceived geographic isolation of Hong Kong, Hong Kong was depicted as a cesspool of disease, decay, sin, tyranny and lawlessness, where the subtropical wilderness was commonly imagined as a mask for disease and death. “Alas! Sickness and death lurk amid this picturesque scenery … Death is the presiding genius of Hongkong … the strong man and the weak, the sober man and the drunkard, the man who never exposed himself to the sun, he who defied it – all died alike” (Henry C. Sirr, *China and the Chinese, Their Religion, Character, Customs, and Manufactures*, Vol I [London: Wm. S Orr & Co., 1850] as cited in Y. Wu 1999, 148).

Upon claiming Hong Kong as part of their victory in the Opium War and the subsequent signing of the 1842 Treaty of Nanking (also known as the first of the “unequal treaties”), the British began an all out transformation and development project of the island. Unlike other colonial missions, Hong Kong “was not thought of in terms of territorial gain, but as the minimum space required for what were thought to be the necessary British institutions” (Endacott 1973, viii). As such, it can be argued that the colonization of Hong Kong was a mission led primarily by diplomatic, commercial and economic interests (Ibid.; Tsang 2007). Hong Kong was

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44 The colony did not extend into the peninsula of Kowloon and the New Territories until 1860 and 1898, respectively with the signing of two additional treaties.
declared a free port and entrepreneurs (under the protection of British controlled waters) began to trade goods and opium across the seas (S. Tsang 2007, 17). In contrast to the inhospitable “barren rock” described by Lord Palmerston, colonial officials who had by now spent some time on the island were quick to emphasize the beneficial geopolitical location of Hong Kong. Captain Elliot noted that Hong Kong was of “first rate importance” for trade and British interests, and should be the base of British commercial, military and political operations. The first governor of Hong Kong, Henry Pottinger, agreed similarly, stating Hong Kong would be an asset as a naval base and a “mart” (Ibid.).

Following World War II and the Japanese occupation, as the colonized myth goes, the colonial government was on-hand to assist in post-war redevelopment. Specifically, the colonial government’s laissez faire rule of free market and free trade allowed Hong Kong to get back on its feet and develop its industrial sector, which was largely fueled by the surge of incoming refugees and migrants escaping turmoil and civil unrest on the mainland. Certainly, the 1949 victory of the Communist Party and its subsequent Great Leap Forward policy served as catalysts for the increase in Hong Kong’s population. To indicate the immense increase within a ten-year period, Hong Kong’s population in 1945 was 600,000 and had risen to 2.5 million by 1955 (Hung 2010, 57). With the rapidly increasing immigrant and refugee population, squatter settlements sprung up on the hillsides of Hong Kong until a fire broke out in 1953 which demolished the homes of 58,000 squatters (Smart 2006, 2). The benevolent
colonial government quickly responded by building Hong Kong’s first public housing estates for the homeless new citizens of Hong Kong.

The colonized founding myth is one about the colonizers success in transforming Hong Kong. In his 1895 account of Hong Kong, Ernest Eitel writes: “[t]he genius of British free trade and political liberty constitute the vital element in the historic evolution of Hongkong. Hence it is that co-operation with this divine tendency of things is the unalterable condition of success. Every measure, every event in the history of Hongkong, that is in the harmony with this general innate tendency, is in part a fulfillment of Hongkong’s mission in the history of the universe” (Ernest Eitel as cited in Wu 144). This common trope remained well into the late twentieth century, for instance G.B. Endacott’s 1958 historical account entitled, A History of Hong Kong, specifically states that Hong Kong’s history began with the British (Endacott 1973, 4). Similarly, in 1993 Soloman Bard wrote of how the British were to be commended as they had “applied all [their] empire-building experience to transform the ‘inhospitable, pestilence-ridden’ island into a salubrious haven of trade and enterprise” (Solomon Bard as cited in Ngo 2003, 544).

46 The book has been reprinted a total of ten times, with its last reprint dated 1995.
In addition to history books, other forms of literature such as travel literature and
guidebooks (again, mostly from the West) have also replicated the myth of the barren
rock. For example, in an 1893 guidebook written by a local British resident, the
author writes that until 1841 Hong Kong “existed only as a plutonic island of
uninviting sterility, apparently capable only of supporting the lowest form of
organisms” (*A Hand-Book to Hong Kong: Being a Popular Guide to the Various
Places of Interest in the Colony, for the Use of Tourists* [Hong Kong: Kelly and
has described Hong Kong in the 1840s as “remote and inconsequential” and “remote
indeed from the exquisite subtleties of the Chinese Establishment” (Morris 1985, 18–
19). Perhaps one of the most pernicious formulations of this myth was put forth by
British journalist Richard Hughes. It was Hughes’ notion of Hong Kong as a
“borrowed place living on borrowed time” that suggested that Hong Kong, as a place,
simply did not exist prior to 1841 (R. Hughes 1976, 97).

The myth of Hong Kong as a barren rock or “non-place” prior to the arrival of the
British is crucial in understanding the construction of Hong Kong island as a British
colonial territory (Bremner and Lung 2003). As Bremner and Lung show, the
imagination of Hong Kong as a non-place helped to cement the “classic progression

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47 Hughes’ work is an unabashedly stereotypical account depicting the relationship between colonizer
and the colonized. Written twenty years prior to the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, Hughes
depicts life under colonial rule as unquestionably favorable and beneficial, and Hong Kong’s future
without colonial rule is belittled and filled with doom and fatalism. He writes, “There is work and
profit today. There will be work, and there may be profit, tomorrow – if tomorrow is allowed to come”
(Hughes, 12).
of the modern colonial state: discovery, acquisition, administration, and civilization” (Ibid., 224). Bremner and Lung demonstrate that the production and use of maps and surveys enabled the British to imagine and identify Hong Kong as a British colonial space. The use of cartography demarcated and separated Hong Kong from its surrounding two hundred twenty islands off the coast of South China, and delineated it a “space of political hegemony” (Ibid. 228). Likewise the very space where the British Union Jack flag was first raised was named Possession Point – this also helped foster the imagination of claiming Hong Kong as a colonial space.48 Bremner and Lung also show how colonial spaces were also produced culturally. Specifically, they look to paintings and sketches, and architecture at the time. By depicting and imagining Hong Kong as a barren rock or non-place prior to colonialism, colonial powers and European business elites emphasized their instrumental role in “giving Hong Kong a history” (Ngo 2003, 544). Moreover, the spectacle of an island’s spectacular transformation from a barren land to a built up, modern city rapidly underscores the “success” of British-directed growth.

As mentioned earlier in the introduction to this chapter, all myths inherently oversimplify and overlook certain aspects of the past. In the example of the colonized founding myth of Hong Kong, we see that the protagonist is the colonial state. The myth depicts the acquisition of Hong Kong as a straightforward process, however in

48 Interestingly, Possession Point still exists today in Hong Kong, and is marked by boulders identifying it as the place where the British first landed. The site is now part of a Heritage trail walk set up by the Antiquities and Monuments Office of the Leisure and Cultural Services Department in Hong Kong. The adjoining street is now called Possession Street.
reality there was considerable skepticism and reluctance of the British to acquire Hong Kong. Historians such as Ngo Tak-Wing, John Carroll, Yiching Wu, G.B. Endacott and James Hayes have uncovered early colonial correspondences that illustrate the general feeling of displeasure and uncertainty. Those unhappy with the treaty argued and stressed that Hong Kong was unbeneﬁcial and unsuitable for the purposes of British trading interests and showed little promise in becoming the headquarters of British trade in Asia, where colonial traders could supervise and negotiate trade with little interference (S. Tsang 2007). It was widely recorded that Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston was less than pleased to have acquired Hong Kong as a trading post.49 Palmerston, upon receiving news of the acquisition of the island, wrote to Captain Elliot, the British superintendent of trade in China, chiding him for the signed treaty. It was in this letter that Palmerston, who thought Hong Kong was not worth governing, coined the infamous description of Hong Kong as a “barren island with hardly a house on it.” Palmerston angrily continued, “You seem to have considered that my instructions were waste paper which you might treat with entire disregard, and that you were at full liberty to deal with the interests of your country according to your own fancy” (Endacott 1958, 18 cited in Hayes 1984, 106). Others shared his displeasure: Palmerston’s successor, Lord Aberdeen, likewise believed that the governing of Hong Kong was too expensive, geographically isolated from the rest of China, and not worth it (Carroll 2007, 12; Y. Wu 1999, 144). Robert Montgomery Martin, the colonial treasurer, and Robert Fortune, a botanist, made it


49 Correspondence from the Secretary for the Colonies, Lord Stanley, in 1843 notes that Hong Kong was to be occupied mainly for diplomatic, commercial and military purposes (Carroll 2007, 12).
clear that they doubted the future success of Hong Kong as a trading port; while others such as Alexander Matheson, in an address to the House of Commons, expressed his regret that English firms had not withdrawn from investing in the island earlier (Carroll 2007, 20). The general feeling of skepticism was not limited to colonial officers stationed in Hong Kong and members of parliament. In a letter from Queen Victoria to King Leopold of Belgium, the Queen wrote with mild embarrassment: “Albert is so amused at my having got the Island of Hong Kong” (cited in Y. Wu 1999, 141).

Beyond the supposed laissez faire economic policies, guidance, rule of law and institutions introduced by the colonial state, the colonized myth has little mention of the Chinese inhabitants of Hong Kong and their contributions to the development of Hong Kong. Moreover, the myth does not take into consideration that part of the reason Hong Kong’s industrial sector was able to grow at such an alarming rate was because of Hong Kong’s geographical location next to China. Its strategic location became crucial in Hong Kong’s growth. In particular, the trade embargo placed on China during the 1950s meant that Hong Kong had to shift from a trading port and took over as one of South East Asia’s manufacturing centers (Castells 1992). Lastly, as Cynthia Chu notes, claims of the state’s “benevolent rule” and laissez faire policies are greatly exaggerated (C. Chu 2010).
Beginning in the 1960s and well into the 1970s, a generation of a different type of local Hong Konger had emerged. Unlike previous generations of local Hong Kongers, this generation was born and raised during a period when travel to China was heavily restricted (see Chapter Three). In addition to this population, a large number of the working class population was composed of immigrants and refugees from China. It is for that reason that a bifurcated history emerges during this period. This bifurcated history incorporates a de-colonized founding myth, known as the Lion Rock myth.

THE LION ROCK MYTH – A LOCALIZED, DE-COLONIZED MYTH

Work by historians and archaeologists has noted that pre-colonial Hong Kong was far from the “barren rock” that so many scholars had previously alluded to in their writings. Archaeological digs have uncovered tombs and temples dating back to the Han period. Other archaeological findings have suggested that as early as 111BCE, Hong Kong was the center of the Southern Yue Kingdom. Throughout the thirteenth to eighteenth century, settlers of mostly fisher folk and farmers would move to Kowloon and Hong Kong and participated in an important fishing and salt trade within regional China, suggesting that Hong Kong had been engaged in trading long before the British arrived (Carroll 2007, 10). James Hayes has detailed how much of the early colonial depictions of Hong Kong did not do the island justice. By 1841, Hong Kong had numerous fishing villages, boat dwellers and coastal villages.

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50 Criticisms of the Barren Rock trope can be seen as early as the 1950s, with work by Lo Hsin-Lin, et al, Hong Kong and its external communication before 1842 (Hong Kong: Privately Printed, 1959) as cited in Gary McDonogh and Cindy Wong, Global Hong Kong (New York and London: Routledge, 2005).
scattered around the island. Many of the villages, Hayes notes, included schools, shops, and business. Moreover, unlike the images of the “infertile” and “inhospitable” landscape portrayed by many colonialists, many of the villages relied on farming of crops such as rice, sweet potatoes, sugar cane or peanuts. Accounts dating back to 1793 suggest that some villages even had access to poultry, fish and hogs as a food source (Hayes 1984, 110). A letter by an inquisitive and adventurous Lieutenant Collinson of the Royal Engineers describes his visits to villages around the island, and the village life he witnessed. Describing one particular village, he writes:

There is really a great deal more to be seen in Hong Kong that its appearance promises. Besides the town of Chuck Chu there are 10 villages and at least 400 acres of well cultivated ground. […] The valley between Shuckpyewan and Hong Kong bay (called Hong Kong in the map) is the proper Hong Kong of the Island and is the largest and best cultivated and prettiest in the island […] it contains a piece of civilization I did not expect in Hong Kong – a village schoolmaster; who in his black cotton coat and white stockings is ridiculously like both in manner and appearance (if his tail was cut off) the same character in England (in Hayes, 107-108).

By the time the British acquired Hong Kong in 1841, Hong Kong had various established clan villages scattered around the island and in many ways was reminiscent of an American West frontier town with a population of 5,000-7,000. Carroll estimates that by 1842 the island had grown to a population of 15,000-20,000 inhabitants. The island had its own institutions such as jails, post offices, and land and record offices. In addition, wharves, warehouses, shops, brothels and marketplaces could be found around the island (Carroll 19).
Indeed, while these historical accounts certainly disprove many aspects of the colonized myth discussed earlier, in this chapter, I am more interested in the way an alternate, counter-narrative of this myth arose. The de-colonized, localized myth, the Lion Rock Myth, concentrates mostly on the “golden age” of Hong Kong – the postwar boom of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s that coincided with Hong Kong’s tremendous growth as an industrial city. As with most myths, the de-colonized localized myth glosses over key historical facts. For instance, in stressing that Hong Kong’s key moment of growth occurred in the 1950s-1970s ignores the fact that a thriving city with locally run institutions pre-dates this moment of immense growth. Elizabeth Sinn, for example, has traced the Chinese-run Tung Wah Hospital back to the 1860s (Sinn 2003). A number of factors contributed to Hong Kong’s development and are not addressed in the founding myth. While most of Hong Kong’s growth as a manufacturing and industrial growth occurred in the postwar era, small scale manufacturing industries had been present in Hong Kong since the 1920s. Hong Kong had long been home to a number of small scale manufacturing industries (mostly to support local shipping firms), however the economic, political and social turmoil beginning in China during the 1920s served as the first “catalyst” for the rapid expansion of manufacturing industries. The already established close financial linkages between Hong Kong and Shanghai made it easy for many industrialists to not only relocate to Hong Kong, but also provided easy access to the capital and

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51 Prior to World War II, as the myth goes, Hong Kong served as mainly a port for trade and not manufacturing. For a critical analysis of this myth see Ngo 2003.

52 For example, as a result of the Guomindang’s statist policies, a great number of Shanghai textile and clothing industrialists relocated to Hong Kong in the 1920s, and by 1947 over 200 import and export firms had moved from Shanghai to Hong Kong (Meyer 2000, 151-2).
social capital needed. Given the access many Mainland Chinese industrialists had to capital and social networks, it might seem strange that many industrialists would choose to set up shop in Hong Kong rather than other industrializing cities. As David Meyer argues, Hong Kong was also seen as a more desirable port compared to other ports in the region such as Jakarta, Saigon, Manila. At the time these ports were seen by traders and industrialists as risky investments given their “propensity” for revolutionary action, political uncertainty, or strict government regulation (Meyer 2000, 151).

Hong Kong’s rapid industrial growth was not fueled by regional politics alone, however. Cold War politics and China’s role in the Korean War meant that beginning in 1950 the US had established a trade embargo with Mainland China and pressured Hong Kong to also enforce this embargo. While the smuggling of goods from Hong Kong to the PRC did occur, for the most part exports to the Mainland underwent stringent controls (Tsang, 164). Hong Kong officials, entrepreneurs and industrialists cooperated with their American counterparts to ensure that goods to the US were not re-exports from the PRC; thus a certification program indicating the origins of goods was institutionalized (Ibid.). Coupled with the thousands of new immigrants and refugees escaping political persecution in the People’s Republic of China, a large labor pool became available during this era, and what formerly was a commercial and

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53 While Hong Kong did not cut off all ties with China, the PRC began to rely on the Easter bloc as a supplier for goods. Hong Kong’s share in China’s trade dropped from 32 percent in 1951 to 5 percent in 1959 (Schenk 2001, 11).
54 The population in 1945 was 600,000 and rose to 2.5 million in 1955 (Hung 2010, 57).
trade entrépot became a center of light industrial, low technology, labor intensive manufacturing (Hung 2010, 57). This new, skilled labor pool assisted in the growth of Hong Kong’s manufacturing industry; popular industries included plastics, textiles, footwear and enamelware. As figures show, the growth was tremendous and fast. Between 1950 and 1959, the number of firms jumped from 1,478 to 2,437, and by 1960 this number had doubled to 5,346. In 1950, textile firms employed up to 24,975 workers (31 percent of the industrial work force), and by 1960 this number had gone up to 54,759 (Meyer 2000, 152–153). While the Hong Kong colonial government initially provided little guidance to entrepreneurs and industrialists, this hands off approach changed during the mid-1950s. Politically stable, the government provided and improved on local infrastructures needed for trade and industry: transportation networks were built, land was available at a low cost for the building of factories, and by 1953, low cost housing schemes meant subsidized public housing was available to laborers. The government further encouraged growth in this industry with interventionist policies such as reducing any bureaucratic red tape firms might face which were welcomed by industrialists, entrepreneurs and investors (Tsang, 165). The development of these industries throughout the next three decades propelled Hong Kong into its position as one of the four dragons in the East Asian miracle (World Bank 1993). As can be seen, one way in which the colonized myth and the decolonized myth are similar is their emphasis on the role of trade in Hong Kong’s growth. As in the colonized myth, Hong Kong’s growth and development are not attributed to Hong Kong’s comparative advantage or Cold War and regional politics.
of the time. Where the two myths truly bifurcate is in the way the decolonized myth’s stresses the role of the local population and the community of Hong Kong’s perseverance, sacrifice, work ethic and entrepreneurial spirit – something that will be discussed in the next section.

Like many immigrant nations, stories of the immigrant experience occupy a focal point in Hong Kong’s historical narrative. Regarding the localized Hong Kong myth, it is common to hear of individuals’ experiences as they fled civil unrest, political persecution, or the Chinese Communist Party with little to no possessions in their pockets. One popular evocation of this myth is the story of Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka Shing. It is said that Li came to Hong Kong as a young boy to avoid the turmoil during the Sino-Japanese war in China. Following his father’s death, Li was held responsible for providing for the family, and was forced to drop out of school as a young teenager to work in a watch strap factory, where he worked his way up to become a salesman. With time, Li learnt the trade and soon ran his own plastics factory. Li’s success allowed him to eventually buy up land during the 1960s political turmoil at a low price. Currently, Li’s subsidiary companies have built one in every seven residences in Hong Kong, and control up to 70 percent of Hong Kong’s port traffic (Flannery 2012). His success in the plastics industry and real estate market has made him into a self-made billionaire, and the world’s tenth richest individual with a net worth of $25.5 billion (Forbes Magazine). Li’s story is a classic example of the

refugee who climbed his way to the top through hard work, selflessness, determination, entrepreneurialism and a go-getting spirit. However, his story is not the only one of the sort. Many of Hong Kong’s wealthiest individuals echo the narrative of self-sacrifice, overcoming obstacles, and a self-made fortune through hard work and perseverance – all of which are characteristics of the “true Hong Konger” who contributed to Hong Kong’s development. In many ways, this myth of Hong Kong’s development is not dissimilar to the founding myth of the United States. For example, tales of late nineteenth century industrial barons who benefited tremendously from laissez faire capitalism and the influx of immigrants prepared to contribute to the booming industries provide a backdrop for the myth of the American Dream and America as a “land of opportunity” (R. T. Hughes 2004; Jacobson 2006). Furthermore, the emphasis on social and economic mobility within the founding myth is one way in which capitalism is legitimated in the American nation. One should note that that the colonized and de-colonized historical narratives have a similar trajectory: both are tales of Hong Kong’s development and capitalist growth. Both myths succeed in emphasizing the success of capital, and the way development is a part of Hong Kong’s history and perceived uniqueness.

Today, the de-colonized, localized Lion Rock Myth has become the dominant historical narrative. In his historical account of Hong Kong, historian Steve Tsang draws straight from this myth. He writes:

“...The refugee mentality meant most entrepreneurs and workers saw this British enclave as the lifeboat with China being the sea. Those who had..."
climbed into the lifeboat did not want to rock it. Enterprising as they were, they did more than just stay passively on board and wait to be rescued. They used all their imagination, ingenuity, available resources, hard work and sheer single-minded determination to make sure the lifeboat sailed to safety. The foundation of Hong Kong’s spectacular post-war economic miracle was built on the blood and sweat of its workers as much as on the resourcefulness, business acumen and spirit of enterprise of its entrepreneurs (170).

Of course, had Hong Kong not fared so well in its developmental and economic success, it is unlikely this side of the story would have been told. Not surprisingly, one will find that Tsang’s depiction is one that is often told by those who have succeeded. The imagery of the immigrant’s blood, sweat and tears is something that is understood to have existed in Hong Kong’s past and not part of Hong Kong’s present day story. Over time, this myth shifted from a counter narrative which was a bifurcation of the original colonial myth and became the dominant historical narrative of Hong Kong. This shift occurs as Hong Kong’s first sizeable generation of local Hong Kongers came of age. The notion of a “Hong Konger” comes about in part due to the colonial state’s new legal discourse of “belonging” – of which the “local Hong Konger” became a new legal category (Ku 2004). At the same time, many in this generation either had gone through the immigration experience themselves or knew someone who had, or were part of Hong Kong’s manufacturing labor force (See Chapter Three). As such, one can see how the myth gained currency, resonated with the public and became part of not only popular public discourse, but also Hong

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56 This is, however, far from the truth. A local non-profit group working estimates that around 100,000 individuals in Hong Kong live in substandard living conditions known as “cage homes.” The average area of a cage home is about 20 square-feet in size. Slightly larger dwellings known as cubicles (about 100 square-feet in size) are also common among those living in poverty. In 2005, an estimated 1.2 million individuals lived in poverty, and that trend is currently rising (Hong Kong Society for Community Organisation).
Kong’s dominant historical narrative. Hong Kong’s de-colonized myth then draws upon a number of themes: 1) Hong Kong is a community of immigrants that came together and overcame obstacles and sacrifices and; 2) Hong Kong’s growth and development into a world city was made possible through the hard work and perseverance of its people. With its emphasis on growth and development (as will be illustrated in Chapter Four), the de-colonized myth is one that ultimately champions capitalism and neoliberalism and their perceived role in sustaining such growth. As such, the myth instills in the population a belief that “true Hong Kongers” are self-sustaining, hard working, neoliberal subjects in a world city. In the following section I will demonstrate the ways in which the Lion Rock Myth has become institutionalized and part of the everyday.

IV. THE MYTH INSTITUTIONALIZED

With origins tracing back to the 1960s and 1970s, the Lion Rock myth can be said to be part of Hong Kong’s official historical narrative. Today, it is featured heavily in education curricula, and is the main narrative thread running through the Hong Kong Museum of History’s permanent exhibition, “The Hong Kong Story.” As noted by Ng, under the auspices of Hong Kong’s Leisure and Cultural Services Department, the museum functions as the state’s official archive, and is also an apparatus to “inscribe a specific political ideology” that speaks to Beijing’s nationalist demands while also attending to appease local understandings of history and local sentiment (45-46). Up until 2012, the museum’s vision and mission statement noted that the
museum would serve to: “[p]rovide quality museum services commensurate with Hong Kong's development as a world-class city and events capital”; and “[e]nhance public awareness and understanding of the history and culture of Hong Kong with a view to enriching our cultural lives and strengthening social cohesion […] Promote public awareness and understanding of world history and culture with a view to expanding our global cultural vision, which draws on the essence of other cultures to develop Hong Kong into an international cultural metropolis” (Hong Kong Museum of History 2012). I argue that one way in which the museum tries to achieve these goals is by emphasizing Hong Kong’s spectacular development into a modern metropolis, and the citizens’ exceptional “Hong Kong spirit.”

Museums can be understood as an institution of power. In *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson notes the ways in which colonial states relied on maps, the census and the museum as a way to solidify the state’s control of colonial subjects, the space in which they resided, and “the legitimacy of [the nation’s] ancestry” (Anderson 2006, 146). “Ancient” sites of import were systematically “disinterred, unjungled, measured, photographed, reconstructed, fenced off, analyzed, and displayed” in museums (Ibid., 175). As the state included archaeological sites in maps and identified them as “national” places of interest, items found in these archaeological studies were placed in museums. Museums thus housed and displayed items that detailed and proved the nation’s existence and history. One can certainly see the state’s attempt at “proving” Hong Kong’s existence and history at the Hong Kong
Museum of History and its branch museum the Hong Kong Heritage Museum. Both museums make a concerted effort to distance themselves from the myth of Hong Kong existing as a non-place and a “barren rock.” Artifacts dating back to the Neolithic period are displayed in a gallery titled, “Prehistoric Hong Kong” – suggesting that the existence of Hong Kong and its people have existed in its current location since time immemorial. The Museum of History, the Hong Kong Heritage Discovery Centre and the Heritage Museum display artifacts, dioramas, and tableaus that serve as “evidence” of the Hong Kong people’s shared existence and heritage. Lastly, the layout of the Museum of History’s permanent exhibit “The Hong Kong Story” and the one way movement through the museum necessarily forces visitors to understand the history of Hong Kong in a linear progressive way that underscores the de-colonized founding myth of Hong Kong.

The Hong Kong Museum of History’s permanent exhibit has been in place since the museum was relocated in 2001. Spread over seven thousand square meters, the HK$200 million exhibit is comprised of eight galleries on two floors, each one flowing into the next, to effortlessly present a linear and chronological account of the Hong Kong story (J. Ng 2009, 46). The first level of the museum houses the first three galleries. The first gallery, “The Natural Environment” showcases the geological processes, river plains, climate, flora and fauna and various other ecosystems six thousand years ago in Hong Kong. As visitors first enter the exhibit they first come across a globe where Hong Kong and China is clearly marked out.
The gallery then introduces visitors to volcanic rock formations and river formations that make up Hong Kong’s mountains, streams and lakes. Throughout the museum, short documentary pieces produced by the museum are broadcasted in small rooms.\textsuperscript{57} The first video essentially summarizes the first section of the gallery and explains how various geological formations and Hong Kong’s landscape has changed over time. Moving on, visitors enter a dimly lit room with artificial mangrove forests, trees and bushes, with recorded rain, thunder and animal sounds playing over the speakers. Replicas of wild animals such as tigers, bears, snakes and wild birds peek through the artificial forest. One bird, which could be easily missed by visitors because of its size, is the replica of the silver phoenix. A placard next to the bird notes that while pheasants can be found in many parts of the world, the silver phoenix is particularly special because of its colors and can still be found in some parts of South China. The bird, visitors are told, is the official provincial bird of Guangdong. Interestingly, the placard mentions that while the bird does not exist in present day Hong Kong, it may have existed in the wild at one point in time. Given the uncertainty over its existence in Hong Kong, it seems odd that the bird would even be displayed in the first place. However, I suspect that the featuring the bird in the museum was a way for the museum to assert Hong Kong’s connection with Mainland China.

As visitors enter the next gallery, “Prehistoric Hong Kong: the Neolithic period,” they encounter a diorama of a beach with individuals on the beach hunting, gathering and

\textsuperscript{57} The videos are looped and are shown in Cantonese, Mandarin and English.
cooking food with fire. This gallery displays artifacts, models of Neolithic graves, stone tools and pottery from architectural digs conducted in Hong Kong. In an attempt to debunk the Barren Rock myth, this gallery attempts to show how life existed thousands of years prior to the British arrival. The third gallery, “The Dynasties: From the Han to the Qing,” continues this work of debunking the Barren Rock myth. In this exhibit, efforts are made to show how Hong Kong and its inhabitants were very much a part of the Chinese empire. Artifacts such as Tang dynasty coins, ceramic bowls from the Ming dynasty, pottery shards and other household items are displayed. As noted in the exhibition guide, the artifacts displayed here were mostly unearthed in Penny’s Bay on Lantau Island and is meant to serve as historical evidence that Hong Kong was not only an important trade route during the colonial period, but had long been an important stop on the Maritime Silk Route (Hong Kong Museum of History 2011, 35).

The last gallery on the first level, “Folk Culture in Hong Kong,” focuses on Hong Kong folk life, with an emphasis on Hong Kong’s “aboriginal” clans or “ethnic groups” (e.g. the Punti, Hakka, Hoklo, and boat dwellers). The gallery’s spaciousness allows for the displays to be neatly separated into sections that are conveniently organized around the four clans. The gallery itself stands in stark contrast to the previous three galleries; as visitors enter, the space is instantly brighter, the rooms are more spacious, and the tableaus and dioramas are more colorful, and one can hear music, singing, and chanting from various tableaus’ loudspeakers. Towards the left is
a replica of a Chinese junk that visitors can climb and walk on. The replica of the junk is supposed to depict the everyday living conditions of boat dwellers that once inhabited the seas of Hong Kong. Across from the junk are replicas of salted fish and shrimp paste productions – boat dweller industries that predate the arrival of the British. Further ahead on the right is a display of a salt field – another industry that predates colonization and was integral to the livelihoods of the Hoklo people.

Towards the left is a life-size replica of an ancestral hall – similar to ones that can still be found in the New Territories today. Inside the ancestral hall are displays and artifacts that explain the Punti’s marriage ceremonies and birth ceremonies. The last “ethnic group” displayed in this gallery are the Hakka. In this area, a replica of a “traditional” Hakka farmhouse and its interior are displayed. Before visitors exit the gallery, they come across replicas of a “bun mountain” – a bamboo scaffolding about 15 meters high and covered with lotus-seed buns – which are erected once a year for the Cheung Chau Bun Festival. Next to it is a mini parade of floats that is also featured in the bun festival, a Cantonese puppet show, and a replica of a Chinese temple. The gallery successfully showcases the ways in which thriving communities and villages with day-to-day living practices, means of subsistence, beliefs, and traditions existed in Hong Kong prior to the arrival of the British. More importantly, it is a gallery that asserts a local culture that existed independently and remained unchanged during the colonial era. This is demonstrated by placing the gallery on the

58 The Cheung Chau Bun Festival is held on the island of Cheung Chau. The highlight of the festival is the bun snatching competition in which competitors climb and race to the top of the bun mountain in hopes of getting the bun at the top.
level that is supposed to exhibit “pre-modern Hong Kong,” and yet, the video displays and photographic images of the festival are taken from the late-twentieth century.

Like most museums, in the first two galleries, visitors can roam around the exhibit as they please. However, upon turning the corner and reaching the gallery entitled, “Folk Culture in Hong Kong”, museum guards stand at every turn, especially in between galleries, and quickly escort visitors back on path should the museum visitor choose to “walk the wrong way” and go “back in time” to a former gallery, or skip a gallery.59 Visitors must thus understand the history of Hong Kong in a linear way and follow a clear teleology – a conception of history that Duara has worked hard to contest in his work. This is most clearly demonstrated by the escalator leading to the fourth gallery, “The Opium Wars and Cession of Hong Kong.” The single escalator is programmed to only take visitors from the first level to the second. While there is an elevator available for museum personnel, it is clear that for the museum visitor, heading down from the second floor to the first floor is not a possibility. The first level of the museum can thus be thought of as Hong Kong’s premodern, pre-colonial history, while the second level is composed of galleries depicting Hong Kong’s colonial past.

59 Janet Ng has made a similar observation in her study (J. Ng 2009).
Museum visitors are ushered up to the second floor of the museum, which showcases the fifth gallery, “The Opium Wars and the Cession of Hong Kong.” Moving up one level in the museum signals to the visitor that this next gallery highlights an important turning point in Hong Kong’s history. As one enters the gallery a room towards the left screens a mini-documentary on the lead up to the wars. On the right, a display documents the ways in which Hong Kong was an important trading port prior to the Opium Wars. As visitors walk straight ahead, they walk pass replicas of cannons used during the battles and “historically significant monuments” such as the arch erected in Possession Point and Napier Column which were donated to the museum (Hong Kong Museum of History 2011), other displays in this gallery include replicas of the Treaty of Nanking and the Treaty of Peking. As visitors walk into the sixth gallery titled, “the Birth and Early Growth of the City,” they will come across the façade of a three-storey building and facades of the tenement-style tong lau. The buildings stand in contrast to the previous models of homes and halls in the museum’s previous galleries such as the ancestral halls, the boat dwellers’ junk, and the model of the temple. In telling the story of the city’s development, the museum attempts to create a lively street scene from the early twentieth-century, street noises are played in speakers, and a replica of a green tram is placed in the middle of the street. To really capture the growth and bustle of the burgeoning city, the gallery features replicas of old banks, mercantiles, post offices, medicine shops, teahouses and pawn shops. Gallery seven focuses on the war with Japan and the Japanese occupation. The exhibit ends with Gallery eight, named, “Modern Metropolis and the Return to China.” The
last gallery is focused on the postwar heydays of Hong Kong’s development. In this gallery are reconstructions of barbershops, restaurants, grocery stores, and a cinema (airing a mini-documentary on Hong Kong cinema). In particular, the museum places a great deal of emphasis on the manufacturing industry of Hong Kong. Visitors will encounter a display focused on Hong Kong’s annual trade fair. The bright, light-heartedness of this gallery stands in contrast to the dark gallery that focused on the Japanese occupation. The cornucopia of replica foodstuffs, toys, fashion, movie posters, and records displayed in this gallery is meant to demonstrate the wealth, growth and development that were occurring during these decades. The second part of this last gallery is dedicated to the Sino-British negotiations, and the Handover Ceremony. Like Hayden White’s example of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica’s Annals of Saint Gall, the museum exhibit ends abruptly. Are museum goers supposed to assume that the 1997 display represents the conclusion to the Hong Kong Story?

Visitors then move to the second floor where the final four galleries are located: “The Opium Wars and Cession of Hong Kong,” “Birth and Early Growth of Hong Kong,” “The Japanese Occupation,” and last exhibit, “Modern Metropolis and Return to China.” All the galleries within the museum are composed of numerous tableaus, graphic panels, dioramas, and countless multimedia and multi-media screenings as a way to showcase Hong Kong’s development in a “life-like manner” (Hong Kong Museum of History 2011). While a large number of the artifacts, tableaus and dioramas in the museum are replicas, as Cathryn Clayton reminds us, replicas are
valued for their ability to evoke “pastness” and a sensory experience in “carefully managed ways” (2009, 237).

A theme running throughout the latter half of the exhibit is the celebration of the Hong Kong spirit, and the way people in Hong Kong have endured hardships to achieve success whether it has been during post-war reconstruction or battling typhoons. The exhibition ends with a video clip with the song, “Below the Lion Rock”, playing in the background. As Anthony D. Smith suggests, a nation’s history and the history of nationalism is “as much history of its interlocutors as of the ideology and movement itself” (1999, 29). Historians are a part and parcel of the story of nationalism, and are able to conjure up myths. This is especially the case in the Hong Kong History Museum. While the museum has been careful not to allude to the idea of a Barren Rock, the exhibit itself spatially separates the period prior to British colonialism and Hong Kong’s history after the arrival of the British. Moreover, the juxtaposition of the two split-levels still suggests and depicts the spectacular development of Hong Kong.

The Hong Kong Museum of History reopened and relocated to its current location in 2001. Accompanying the move was an expansion of the permanent exhibition, then titled “The Story of Hong Kong.” It is not surprising that the current exhibition “Hong Kong Story” reflects a historical narrative account that coincides with the de-colonized, localized history – a historical narrative that not surprisingly is favored by
the Hong Kong SAR government. A clear allusion to the Lion Rock Myth is the way in which the first level is curated. The second and third gallery both focus on a pre-colonial Hong Kong. In these galleries, Hong Kong is not depicted as a barren rock in the South China Sea. Instead, the gallery entitled, “The Dynasties” makes explicit connections that link Hong Kong to the rest of the Chinese dynasty. For example, pottery displayed in this exhibit suggests that trade and commerce existed between Hong Kong and the rest of China (J. Ng 2009, 47). Similarly, the gallery entitled “Folk Culture in Hong Kong” suggests that unlike the colonized myth that dates the start of Hong Kong’s history to the arrival of the British, a vibrant native and aboriginal culture had long thrived in Hong Kong and can be dated back to the Tang dynasty. Moreover, displayed alongside the dioramas and display of village and folk life in Hong Kong are descriptions that clearly link the cultural practices of the clans to Chinese cultural practices. Lastly, the heavy emphasis on the people of Hong Kong’s contributions to the development of the city is clearly visible throughout the latter half of the museum. There is little mention of a “barren rock”, and while the colonial period comprises the majority of the second floor, there is little mention of British institutions. In general, there is a fairly light-handed British presence throughout the permanent exhibition (except, of course in the gallery on the Opium War). As mentioned earlier, the Lion Rock myth and Barren Rock myth are both narratives about the city’s tremendous development and the exhibit certainly traces the “remarkable development” of Hong Kong.
Indeed, on any given school day, one can find countless school groups traversing through the museum. As mentioned earlier, the Museum of History is not only the official state history museum, but it certainly is the only large-scale history museum in Hong Kong. Of late there have been a number of small galleries and exhibition halls run by community groups and other non-profit groups; however, without funding, these small galleries and exhibitions pale in comparison to what is available at the Museum of History. School groups thus tend to gravitate toward the biggest and the most established museum. Hong Kong history and its story of development is a compulsory part of the Hong Kong education curriculum. In particular, students will be introduced to areas such as the “spirit of Hong Kong” and the salience of the TV show, “Below the Lion Rock.” Since the mid-to-late 1980s, the education department in Hong Kong identified a need to concentrate on local history curricula and economic successes of Hong Kong in both junior and senior schools. By teaching students about the growth and development of Hong Kong, it was hoped that Hong Kong’s economic growth would come to be seen as a key component that would speak to a local distinctiveness. Written a few years after the Joint Declaration in 1984, a local advisory inspectorate of the Education Department argued that “a study of local history would ‘enhance pupils’ understanding of the local setting, enforce their sense of identity to the local community, and activate the search for and interest in cultural heritage” (Vickers 2002, 596 - emphasis mine). In his study of history curricula in the public education system, Edward Vickers has noted that potentially “difficult” and “sensitive” political issues such as the opium trade, and the mui tsai
system have been overlooked. Instead, there is a focus on the more “desirable” history of economic growth, specifically an emphasis on teaching the “role played by the Chinese” and “the growth of Hong Kong into an entrépot” (Ibid., 597). As 1997 approached, history curricula took on another turn, with changes reflecting Hong Kong’s growth vis-à-vis Hong Kong’s relationship with China (Ibid.). The myth, however, is not limited to one subject area such as the study of history or social studies, but can be found in curriculum for subjects such as religious studies, liberal studies, media studies, music, and English. For example, in one religious studies syllabus, teachers have to cover how “Hong Kong cultural symbols” change or have a new meaning throughout time compared to the way religious symbols have changed to accommodate modern society – the Hong Kong cultural symbol in this example is the song, “Below the Lion Rock” (A. D. Smith 1999, 29). 60 In a core module for the compulsory Liberal Studies subject, students are asked to discuss and give examples of how the media (specifically the show and lyrics of the song from “Below the Lion Rock”) shapes understandings of Hong Kong community and pluralism within the city.

V. THE MYTH IN CONTEMPORARY POPULAR MEMORY

Beyond school textbooks, exams and museums, the myth continues to resonate with the people of Hong Kong, and is propagated in various ways such as through the

60 Specifically, teachers are asked to discuss Anthony Leung’s use of the song, and also how the Hong Kong spirit in the 2000s compares to that of the 1970s.
popular media and the telling of folk tales. I have identified three themes within the myth that are present within popular memory today.

Perseverance

In 2010, amidst much public disapproval of the expansion of the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) railway line across the island and peninsula, the MTRC launched a new campaign across the city. Under the guidance of the international advertising firm Ogilvy and Mather, this new advertising campaign was featured during prime time TV advertising segments, mass media and in posters next to bus stops, along the sides of buses, and in the MTR stations themselves. The TV commercials feature the use of the song “Below the Lion Rock” played on the piano as background music as a way for viewers to be taken back to the 1970s, a period of mass development in Hong Kong, and also the time in which the MTR began building its railway lines across the city. The commercial would roll ahead to the 1980s and 1990s to show the ongoing projects the corporation has undergone throughout Hong Kong’s past.61 The commercials follow four protagonists who “grew up with the development of the railways” and have had to endure numerous “inconveniences” alongside the building of the railways throughout the decades. In the flashbacks to the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the four protagonists include a school boy who because of construction for the railway line is late for school and is held in after-school detention, a stylish woman whose shopping trip is disrupted, a blue collar

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worker who wolfs down his breakfast only to get lost on his way to work because of a road detour, and the owner of a roadside diner whose all but one empty table suggests that business has been disrupted by the construction going on nearby. The four protagonists are supposed to represent “true Hong Kongers.” As noted in the press release, the true Hong Kongers, despite the inconveniences endured, understood the need for the disruption, and “their understanding has helped to create this world-class city” and success for them (MTR 2010). The commercial ends with shots of the four protagonists in present day Hong Kong: the young boy is now Dr Lee; the stylish young woman, is now a stylish Auntie Wong; the blue collar worker is now Manager Ho; and the owner of the roadside diner is now the owner of a successful café. As the advertisement ends, viewers are introduced to the final protagonist, Baby Tak in 2010, who is carried by his mother next to an MTR construction site. The construction site is cordoned off with corrugated steel and a sign indicating the MTR is responsible for the construction project. Underneath the corporation’s logo is their slogan, “Caring for life’s journeys” (see Fig 2). The voiceover ends the commercial by addressing Baby Tak, “Baby Tak, please excuse us for the inconveniences we will be causing you and your family in the next few years.”

The commercial implies a number of things:
1) Construction and development are an integral part of the Hong Kong Story.
2) Despite these inconveniences, with hard work and sacrifice, Hong Kongers will succeed and climb up the social and economic ladder.
3) The construction is required to make Hong Kong’s citizens into what they are, modern, global citizens of the world.
Indeed, the commercial on its face is seeking to gain the public’s approval, understanding and patience through a period of development in the city, and it does so by pulling on the heartstrings of its viewers. There is no doubt that the song is a sentimental one that evokes certain emotions with Hong Kong viewers. For the purposes of this chapter though, the commercial also harkens back to the myth of Hong Kong that is so familiar to the people of Hong Kong. It serves as evidence that not only is the myth of Hong Kong extremely salient and prevalent within different public discourses, but that it is utilized the railway corporation to justify its development plans.

Growth, Change and Development

In 2011, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) unveiled a similar TV advertising campaign. This advert once again played off common images
and tropes of the founding myth. The advert is a combination of digitally enhanced images and real-life actors. The entire advert is shot from the visual angle of someone lying down and looking up into Hong Kong and traversing through time simultaneously. Within the 47-second advert, viewers are shuttled through the city’s past. The advertisement begins with an undershot of fish swimming in the sea. From the side of the TV, a fisherman enters the frame and casts his net over the school of fish. As the monochromatic image of the fisherman fades away, the silence is quickly broken by street noises of cars passing by and colored images taken from the streets of Hong Kong in the 1960s-70s (See Fig 3).62

Figure 3. HSBC commercial – “Foundations” (screenshot from HSBC commercial).

62 There is no indicator of when in time this particular scene is taking place – unlike the other shots in the advertisement. Given the specific caricatures (a street vendor, a double-decker bus, various other motor vehicles, a traffic police, a woman in a cotton cheong-sam dress, and public housing estates), viewers should assume that the street scene is one from the 1960s-1970s – the city’s “golden days of development.”
The camera zooms into a shot of a young woman wearing a cotton cheong-sam (Chinese style dress) who is opening up her bank passbook. The next screenshot is of an older woman dressed in black trousers and a white linen top. The woman is pulling money out of the city’s first automated teller machine in 1980 as indicated by text that appears next to the clip, and the voiceover begins to narrate: “We’ve always been at the heart of this remarkable city.” The next computerized image is that of the busy street scene of Central from the early 1980s. Viewers should be note that compared to the early shot of the 1960s street scene, the streets in this shot are a lot busier and are filled with Hong Kong’s red taxis and double-decker buses passing by Hong Kong’s legislative building and the old headquarters of HSBC. The voiceover continues, “Laying the foundation for Hong Kong’s progress…” During this narration, viewers are shuttled into the year 2000, and taken inside the home of a Hong Kong couple at their computer using accessing the company’s online banking website, and then into the 2011 when the bank introduced mobile banking and online US stock trading to its Hong Kong customers. The commercial finishes with a number of other street scenes that should be familiar to Hong Kong viewers: the current streets of Central outside the current HSBC headquarter building designed by Norman Foster (See Fig 4); bank customers lining up at the bank; and the busy shopping district of Causeway Bay at night. This image of the bustling Causeway Bay district coincides with the voiceover, which continues, “…Growing with you;

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63 This is the first indication to viewers that the advert is progressing through time. Next to the image of the woman at the ATM, viewers are told that the year is 1980.
64 The 1935 HSBC building, replicated in this shot, was demolished in 1981.
progressing with you; centering around your needs. And because of you, we’re the number one bank of choice, across the generations. HSBC: the world’s local bank.”

The last image is of a group of children playing with hoses, and the image quickly pans to the iconic HSBC building. With a sudden change in visual angles, the camera now pans up and shoots up the face of the building. The last image before the fade out is of a child touching the famous bronze lions outside the HSBC headquarters building.

Figure 4 HSBC commercial – “Foundations” (screenshot from HSBC commercial).

At its most superficial level, the advert is ultimately a catalog of the services HSBC has brought to its Hong Kong client base. Upon further analysis, the commercial is clearly targeting a Hong Kong audience, and only its Hong Kong audience. As noted by various advertising industry publications, the advertisement was the first in a period of ten years to speak specifically to a Hong Kong audience. The images used in this advertisement certainly suggest that only someone familiar with Hong Kong’s
past, or someone who had lived in the city for a long period of time, would recognize such images and the story the advertisement is telling. The message of the advertisement, as suggested by the very specific camera angles, is that Hong Kongers have been, and will always be, the foundation of the bank. By suggesting that the people of Hong Kong are the “foundation of the bank” (and Hong Kong’s development) the commercial also reinforces the decolonized founding myth of Hong Kong. Furthermore, the narrative of the commercial further celebrates the free-market capitalism in Hong Kong’s founding myth.65

**Self-reliance and Sacrifice**

The two commercials mentioned above are only two recent examples that depict a selective, romanticized story of Hong Kong’s past. Similar commercials have existed in the recent past and play on a similar narrative. For instance, Eric Ma has analyzed another HSBC commercial from 1997. The 1997 commercial is told from the viewpoint of a local Hong Kong fisherman who endures hardships (a typhoon in 1962, water shortages in 1963, and floods in 1972), which ultimately “strengthen” the protagonist and contribute to his family’s upward mobility. Towards the end of the commercial, the fisherman’s family is identifiable as middle-class Hong Kongers, and viewers are left with a voiceover of the fisherman who says, “…In Hong Kong, whether you make a living all depends on you” (E. K.-W. Ma 2001, 135–136).

65 It should be noted that HSBC had an active role in the British Empire’s expansion. Founded in 1865, the bank served mostly British merchants and traders and operated transactions between Hong Kong, China and India.
Local fairy tales and urban legends in Hong Kong also function as a way of replicating the myth of Hong Kong’s founding. For example, the rock formation known as Amah Rock (望夫石) is a natural rock formation that is shaped like a woman carrying a child, facing out to sea. As the legend goes, a fisherman left his wife one day in search of food for the family, only to die at sea. The fisherman’s wife would climb the mountain everyday with her child, looking out to sea awaiting his return. It is said that the gods took pity on the woman, and turned her into a rock formation where she now looks over the waters (Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department 2010). While this legend can be understood as a story about love, it is also a tale of individuals who witnessed death and persevered despite losing their loved ones – something that many Hong Kong people could relate to. For example, as I will discuss further in Chapter Three, immigrants who helped to construct the localized myth remember their journey from Mainland China to Hong Kong as one that was often faced with danger (sometimes death), sacrifice, and perseverance. This tale could have come straight from an episode of “Below the Lion Rock.”

VI. CONCLUSION

While this chapter could have also addressed the historical accuracy of the founding myth, I have chosen to focus mainly on a counter-narrative or myth that became part of the hegemonic, institutionalized history of Hong Kong. The de-colonized myth’s
tenacity and pervasiveness of the myths can still be seen today, not only in institutionalized setting such as in schools and museums, but also in popular media. While it is widely acknowledged that Hong Kong was very much a “place” prior to the arrival of the British, the Lion Rock Myth successes rely on a narrative that juxtaposes a barren Hong Kong with a built-up Hong Kong. The true signification of the Lion Rock Myth narrates the story of the city’s growth and development. As this growth also stresses the economic development of Hong Kong in its various industries (trade, manufacturing, and finance) it is also an ode to the triumph of capital. The city’s growth is attributed to the people of Hong Kong, their work ethic and bootstrap attitude. Another part of the Lion Rock Myth’s success can be attributed to its politically convenient narrative. The absence of the colonial government’s role in this myth, and instead its emphasis on the Hong Kong people agrees with a post-1997 government concerned about the former colony’s affinity with the colonizer. Despite this, it is puzzling as to why Hong Kong’s pre-war successes are rarely mentioned or glossed over in this myth. For instance (as I describe in Chapter Three) Hong Kong was an important last port of call for those travelling to the United States, it also traded throughout Southeast Asia, and was at one point connected to the maritime silk route.

More importantly, the replicability of this myth enables the myth to be propagated to maintain its relevance in present day politics and in everyday situations. As mentioned earlier, Barthes notes that the political significance of myths is their ability
to appropriate different forms and to turn history that has been politicized into something natural. By bringing in Anderson’s notion of reproducibility, one can see how that naturalization might occur. Indeed, Anderson notes that the technological advancements of print and photography contributed heavily to the reproducibility of South East Asian nations’ histories. Indeed, this is also the case for Hong Kong, the clichéd and yet powerful juxtaposition of images of Hong Kong in the 1800s and images of present-day Hong Kong certainly help propagate Hong Kong’s historical story. This reproducibility is furthered by songs and TV shows such as “Below the Lion Rock” and museum exhibits, and becomes part of the everyday (Anderson, 182-183).

The Lion Rock Myth, however, should not be seen as unique or different from other city’s or nation’s myths. For instance, Shanghai’s founding myth is very similar to Hong Kong’s Lion Rock myth. As the Shanghai myth goes, Shanghai was nothing more than a fishing village, or swamp, prior to its development into a center of modernity and cosmopolitanism (Wasserstrom 2009; Johnson 1995). Similarly, the United States has its own founding myths and narratives, some of which resonate with the Hong Kong myth. Ellis Island and stories of the Mayflower remain present in popular memory. Immigrant life in America is depicted as unpredictable, full of uncertainty, hardships and sacrifices. Those individuals who endured such hardships and sacrifices were rewarded at the end of the day, and are now an integral part of the American historical narrative. Similarly, Hong Kong’s Lion Rock Myth places a
heavy emphasis on the struggles and sacrifices of the immigrant and refugee community, and the rewards such sacrifices brought. The fact that many of the individuals who came to Hong Kong were fleeing from the Chinese Communist Party’s reign might speak to the wide appeal of a myth that celebrates the triumph of capital.

As following chapters will show, objects such as Hong Kong’s cityscape, the border, and nostalgic everyday items are attached with significant meanings that incidentally help to perpetuate and naturalize this myth. Michael Boss’s study of memory and identity writes, “[m]emory and narrative [myth] are two sides of the same coin, because we remember in and through narrative. And as our self-narratives are informed by the narratives of our life worlds and the groups to which we belong, so are our memories” (Boss 2011, 14). I submit that the powerful nature of the myth that effortlessly becomes naturalized also in turn informs our memories, such that memories of the past take on an aspect of the myth. For example, while few people in Hong Kong today can relate to the tales depicted in ‘Below the Lion Rock’, the show and the song still resonate among the Hong Kong public who simultaneously are willed into remembering the “good old days of Hong Kong.”
CHAPTER THREE: THE BOUNDING OF A CITY AND ITS MYTH

PROLOGUE: A JOURNEY TO THE BORDER

The forty-five minute journey on the East Rail line departing from Hunghom station to the last stop, Lo Wu, travels through the heart of Hong Kong’s Kowloon Peninsula and to the frontier land of the Northern New Territories. The train passes through Mong Kok and then comes up over ground as it meanders through the residential area, Kowloon Tong. For the rest of the journey, the train remains above ground and arrives at its next station, the ever-busy Shatin where tens of thousands Hong Kongers work and live. The next stop, Fo Tan, again serves a large residential area and a small industrial zone. Depending on the time of day, you can see young professionals coming back home after a long day’s work, or domestic helpers carrying their grocery trolleys back home, or a young mother who just picked her children up from school getting off at the station. On race days, the East Rail line is diverted and instead of stopping at Fo Tan, the train heads towards the Racecourse station in Shatin. Punters are easily identifiable as they often carry the horse racing newspaper supplement in one hand and, with one headphone to their ear, they listen to the races via their portable radio. They stream off the train boisterously as they head to the Hong Kong Jockey Club’s twice-a-week horse races. The next station, University station, is particularly busy in the morning and late in the afternoon. Young men and women who spent most of their train journey reading and poring over lecture notes quickly scramble to put their belongings back in their bags as they set off to class for the day. As the train continues, one passes into one of the greener and quainter areas of Hong
Kong, Tai Po. Tai Po Market station serves the busy residential area Tai Po New Town, but also as the main station for the many village houses in the area. After passing two more stops, the train arrives at Hong Kong’s “frontier town”: Sheung Shui – the last major urban area before reaching the border. At this station, large numbers of people disembark while a smaller number enter the train. Those entering the train are clearly heading to one place: Lo Wu station which feeds directly into the Lo Wu border, the busiest land border control point between Hong Kong and Mainland China. Only those crossing the border into Mainland China remain on the train as it heads to its final destination. The remaining passengers include a mix of people: professionals who are crossing the border for business meetings, Hong Kongers who are crossing the border into Shenzhen for a day of shopping, a round of golf, or a day of pampering at day spas. These individuals are calm for the most part or excitedly chatting with their friends about their impending day trip. Not counting the business professionals, those crossing the border for the day are dressed as if they were on vacation – they may be wearing jeans, t-shirts or sneakers. Women who may typically dress in nicer clothes while spending a day in Hong Kong’s city center are wearing casual clothes, and maybe a less-fancy watch. Instead of a designer handbag, the women are carrying backpacks or cross-body bags that lie close to their body to ward off potential pick-pocketers.

The other set of passengers are the men and women who got on the train at the last stop, Sheung Shui. These individuals stand out among the other passengers. They are
Guangzhou residents passing through Shenzhen on their way home from a trip to Hong Kong. These passengers are dressed like any other young men or women in Hong Kong and are carrying large suitcases. The remainders of the passengers are known as cross-border traders. These individuals are identifiable by their shopping trolleys, crates, and stacked boxes of home goods and groceries including milk powder, bottled water, cosmetics, health care products, diapers, and electronics such as mobile phones, cameras and I-Pads. Prior to arriving at the final stop, these men and women can often be found frantically unpacking their bags on the train and re-packing them to fit everything into one piece of luggage. The individuals are clearly marked as different from the other passengers on the train by their shopping trolleys, boxes and nylon bags filled with these goods. They are easily identifiable as Mainland travelers.

As the train arrives at Lo Wu station, passengers begin to file off the train. Signs direct train passengers to the immigration counters where Hong Kong residents with their Hong Kong identity card (ID card) go through a rapid, self-service “e-channel.” Hong Kong residents simply insert their ID card into the reader, go through the turnstiles and have their fingerprint read by a scanner. The Hong Kong residents then go through another set of turnstiles and successfully “exit” Hong Kong. The entire process, including waiting in line, takes an average of three minutes, and may take longer on busy days during the weekend or during the holidays. Foreign travelers

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ается и реализуется. В результате, прибытие поезда в Lo Wu станция начинается с того, что пассажиры начинают покидать поезд. Информационные таблички указывают на иммиграционные пункты, где жители Гонконга с их Гонконгским идентификационным картой проходят через быстрый, автоматизированный “e-канал.” Жители Гонконга просто вставляют свою идентификационную карту в считыватель, проходят через ворота и их отпечаток пальца считывается сканером. Жители Гонконга затем проходят через другую серию ворот и успешно “выходят” из Гонконга. Процесс занимает в среднем три минуты, и может быть дольше в случае занятости станции в выходные дни или праздничные дни. Пассажиры из других стран

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66 The MTRC Corporation, which operates Hong Kong’s train services, has implemented a one luggage rule, with weight limitations, for those travelling between Hong Kong and Mainland China.
carrying a passport and Mainland Chinese visitors wait in a separate line, which can often take up to fifteen minutes on a quiet day, and up to an hour on a busy day. After clearing immigration, travelers walk a short distance and pass another post with a large X-Ray machine. Not everyone is required to put their luggage and belongings through the machine. Instead, only those carrying large, “suspicious-looking” luggage are asked to place their belongings through the machine. It is clear that Hong Kongers going to Shenzhen are rarely targeted; instead, customs officials typically pick out Mainland Chinese travelers returning to the Mainland. After clearing immigration and customs in Hong Kong, travelers follow the signs that lead them across a walkway over the Shenzhen River. The walkway, which hangs above the width of the river, is the no man’s land between Hong Kong and Mainland China. On the Shenzhen side one sees large barbed wire covering the stretch of the riverbed. After crossing the murky river, travelers arrive at the People’s Republic of China’s border control point. Since many Hong Kong travelers also carry a “home return permit” they do not have to go through a visa check point and can wait in the slightly more expedited immigration checkpoint line along with those carrying a PRC passport. Having gone through the PRC immigration checkpoint visitors go through the building, pass a

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67 The permit is now known officially as the Hong Kong and Macau resident’s Mainland Travel Permit (港澳居民來往內地通行證), however it was first introduced under the name Home Return permit (回鄉證) – the name of which has since stuck among permit holders. The permits are issued to Hong Kong and Macau residents of Chinese ethnicity. Holders of this permit are allowed to freely exit and enter the People’s Republic of China, and stay for as long as they wish. The name of the permit, ‘home return permit’, is also worth noting as it implies that those residing in Hong Kong or Macau are simply there temporarily and that their true “home” is Mainland China. Hong Kong and Macau, in this instance, is merely a place of temporary residence. Of course, by differentiating Hong Kong or Macau as a “non-home” and Mainland China as the only “home” suggests that Hong Kong (or Macau) is distinct and separate from the People’s Republic of China. It is safe to assume that this was one of the main reasons the name of the permit was officially changed in 1999.
customs control point, up some escalators and exit into Shenzhen. Again, like the Hong Kong customs check point, this second checkpoint targets those with large pieces of luggage, and those carrying boxes of goods from Hong Kong. Hong Kongers, business professionals, and those with little luggage are rarely asked to stop at the customs checkpoint and instead can be quickly on their way.

In 2011, 92.83 million people crossed the Lo Wu border control point, and 31.37 million people crossed the Lok Ma Chau border control point. Lo Wu and Lok Ma Chau are two of the busiest land crossings between Hong Kong and Mainland China. That same year, land crossings made up 75 percent of the total number of passenger movements in Hong Kong (Information Services Department, Government of Hong Kong SAR 2012). The increase in forms of travelling across the border has grown tremendously in the past twenty years. Currently there are six land border crossings between Hong Kong and Guangdong province. In addition to these six land crossings, individuals can reach the border via a ferry. Nevertheless, perhaps because of the ease and effectiveness of the railway system in Shenzhen and Hong Kong, the Lo Wu and Lok Ma Chau control points remain the most popular places to cross the border. Of course, the border as it stands today, is a far cry from what the space resembled when the British first arrived in Hong Kong. Historians have documented how an institutionalized border did not come about until the 1950s when the colonial government implemented a set of immigration legislation concerned with migration across border. The People’s Republic of China likewise did the same in response to
the colonial government’s actions. Prior to 1950, the border was merely a no man’s land in the middle of rural plantations with a river running between the two sides. Movement was free, unregulated, and individuals would come and go as they pleased.

Figure 5: Map of Hong Kong MTR (metro) network and connections with Shenzhen metro network. Note: Map is not to scale (Map courtesy of chinamike.com).

I. INTRODUCTION

Perhaps in its most common understanding within the field of politics, the border is a marker of the state and a state’s limits of power and sovereignty.\(^68\) Weber’s classic definition of the state certainly underscores the importance of the territorial and spatial aspect of the state and that which happens within its boundaries. The border is

\(^{68}\) The state, as Max Weber famously noted, is a “human community that (successfully) claims the legitimate use of force within a given territory” (M. Weber 1958, 78).
also a marker of a state’s territorial integrity. Of course, beyond that, within the field of nationalism studies, the border of a nation-state can denote the boundaries of the “imagined community” and its shared history, identity, culture and/or language. For the imagined community, a clearly demarcated border distinguished the nation-state from other nation-states and their community. Thongchai Winichakul has persuasively argued that in addition to the shared commonalities that exist within a nation, modern nations are driven by the need to assert and mark ones territoriality. Territoriality, Winichakul writes, arises from three “basic human behaviors: a form of classification by area, a form of communication by boundary, and an attempt at enforcing [that territory]” (1994, 16–17). Of course, while territoriality in its most basic understanding is most closely related to the nation’s demarcation, borders, and topographic depiction, one must also understand what drives such “basic human behaviors.” Winichakul’s term, “geo-body”, allows one to consider not only the territorial space a nation occupies (or wishes to occupy), but it also allows us to see how the territoriality of nation can be its very essence; specifically, the affective qualities of belonging to a nation is a source of “pride, loyalty, love, passion, bias, hatred, reason, unreason” (Ibid., 17).

By considering the importance of territoriality and the affective qualities of belonging to a nation, one is better equipped to understand why the battles fought between nations over territorial land and its boundaries during the nineteenth century and twentieth century can be thought of as amounting to a type of political nationalism
(Sahlins 1991), the ongoing debates over the US-Mexico border, or the disputes in the South China Sea between China, Vietnam and the Philippines. Of course, the numerous studies that already exist on boundary disputes are, as Winichakul argues, prone to presupposing the nation’s existing territoriality and its boundaries (Ibid.). This chapter’s goal is to understand how the territoraility of Hong Kong arises from a founding myth that is closely tied to stories and memories of the border.

Borders must also be considered as a “contradictory zone of culture and power” (Donnan and Wilson 1999, 26). Moreover, as argued by Cunningham and Heyman, borders can also be analyzed via a framework of enclosure and mobility (2004). A study of who, and what, can move across borders, and whom is enclosed enables an examination of power relations at borders. On one hand, the porosity of the border since 1997 has instilled a sense of national belonging within many Hong Kongers (for example, many Hong Kongers and people from Shenzhen cross the border daily for work or school and consider both Shenzhen and Hong Kong their home). On the other hand, the border also serves as a divisive space, physically and psychologically separating the people of Hong Kong from those on the Mainland, and restricts ones mobility. In the social sciences, borders have long been applied to studies of sovereignty, identity formation, national security, immigration, nation-building and state-making, local economies and the global economy (Heyman 2004). Postmodern cultural studies and border theory scholars, in turn, have used the border as a way to demonstrate the fluid, unpredictable and constructed nature of identities. Moreover, in
the past two decades, scholars have been forced to engage with a new “global imagination” in which new technologies allow for time and space to rapidly compress and capital flows across borders take on new forms (Appadurai 1996; Harvey 1989). Indeed, since the implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s reform era policies and rapid industrialization projects, scholars have been interested in how time and space are compressed and understood in China. One common example is the Chinese subject’s new, flexible attitude toward citizenship (Ong 1999, 17). As Aihwa Ong notes, imbricated in this understanding of transnational citizenship and mobility are new modes of subject making, and thusly, new subjectivities (Ibid.)

The prominence of notions of a “flat world” and time-space compression are however critiqued in the works of Smart and Smart (2008), Massey (1994), and Mahler and Pessar (2001). As Smart and Smart rightly maintain, the compression and the shrinking (or flattening) of the globe occur unevenly for different actors, object and ideas (2008, 175). In their study, the border is synonymous with punctuation and can operate as full stops, commas and semi-colons. For example, the Hong Kong border is like a full stop (period) for some Mainlanders (such as pregnant Mainland Chinese women), prohibiting and denying their legal entry into Hong Kong. For other Mainland Chinese who require visas and work permits, the border is similar to a semi-colon.69 For Hong Kong citizens who cross into Mainland China, the border is a

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69 The Hong Kong government’s position, since 1997, has focused on not only controlling the number of immigrants, but also the quality of immigrants. By emphasizing Hong Kong society as a knowledge-based one, the Hong Kong government has encouraged the migration of elites, professionals, and people of “outstanding talents” who are unlikely to become welfare kings or queens.
comma (Ibid., 183). While not speaking directly to borders, Doreen Massey notes that the specific conditions that the “power geometry” of time-space compression gave individuals different access to, and power over, others’ movements. As Massey notes, her interests are not limited to who moves and who cannot move, rather she is interested in the “power in relation to the flows and movement […] Some people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movements, others don’t; some are more on the receiving-end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it” (1994, 149). Building upon Massey’s study, Mahler and Pessar bring a “gendered optic” to transnational studies by introducing the notion of “gendered geographies of power” (Mahler and Pessar 2001).

A border discourse has figured prominently in Hong Kong’s popular memory for a long time. This discourse has not only shaped policy and legislation on immigration, cross-border movement and citizenship rights, but the discourse itself has been integrated into the localized founding myth. Since the creation of the border, individuals and families have crossed the border for a variety of reasons and their border-crossing experiences have likewise varied. The location of the current border has been in place since 1898, however, for the first fifty years of its existence, the border existed only as a formal way to establish the boundary between Hong Kong

(Leung 2004, 107–108). Policies such as the Admission Scheme for Mainland Talent, the Quality Migrant Admission Scheme, and the Capital Investment Admission Scheme all aid in the smooth and quick path to immigration for Mainland Chinese professionals, elites and students (Information Services Department, Government of Hong Kong SAR 2012).

70 The colonial government first acquired Hong Kong Island in 1842, and gained Kowloon Peninsula in 1860. The last acquisition occurred in 1898, when the Qing government leased out an additional parcel of land, the New Territories, to the British crown.
and Mainland China. Individuals from both sides of the border would cross back and forth as they pleased, with little policing or formal border control. Shortly after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, border crossings and border crossings experiences changed considerably as a result of the border’s reinforcement on both the Chinese side and the Hong Kong side. A border that formerly had little significance (in part due to its porosity) now came to signify sacrifice, bravery, and an entryway into a land of opportunities, so to speak, for the many Mainland Chinese political and economic refugees and migrants coming to Hong Kong. Not surprisingly, the border is seen in a very different light today. Of late, the border has been seen as one possible way Hong Kongers can distance themselves from the rest of the nation. To be clear, the cross-border traders mentioned in the prologue are not the only Mainlanders who come to Hong Kong. Since the 2000s, the border has gradually opened up and relaxed travel restrictions for those coming from Mainland China, individuals come to Hong Kong for various reasons such as leisure, education, business, or family-related reasons. The traders and the “Mainland Mothers” (introduced in Chapter One) are merely the latest phenomenon of cross-border movement that has captured the public imagination in Hong Kong. And while cross-border movement from both Hong Kong and Mainland China has increased in the most recent past, the border crossing experience is very different depending on whether you carry a Hong Kong identity card or a passport issued by the People’s Republic of China. For Mainland Chinese who cross the border, the experience varies
based on the individual’s gender, age, and social status. On the other hand, for Hong Kongers the process of crossing the border is relatively carefree, straightforward and easy.

There are two parts to this chapter. The first part of this chapter begins with a historical overview of the border between Hong Kong and Mainland China. This overview focuses on the ways in which the border became institutionalized in the 1950s through different legislations, travel restrictions and law enforcement to serve as an ideological divider between communism and capitalism. The state discourse and institutionalization of the border ultimately shaped the way a locally born and raised generation would self-identify as Hong Kongers. And for those who crossed the border at the time as immigrants to Hong Kong, the institutionalization of the border shaped those immigrants’ memories of the border as a space of danger. At the same time border restrictions were strengthened, in the 1960s and 1970s a localized de-colonized myth was constructed by those who had themselves (and whose family members had) crossed the border as immigrants to Hong Kong. As mythmakers, their experiences and memories of the border and border crossings speak to the founding myth in various ways. Specifically the border as a space of danger and risk becomes entrenched in popular memory. In the second part of the chapter, I examine how these memories shape present-day understandings of the border. Today, while the border

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71 In addition to the additional inspections and policing of their movements, Mainland travelers are often met with stares and whispering from other passengers. This is especially true for the socially marginalized travelers such as the cross-border trader and the “Mainland Mother.”
can no longer be understood as a separation between communism and capitalism, it is still spoken of as a space of danger and risk. While a Hong Kong identity has long been established, following the outbreak of SARS in 2003, a Hong Kong identity became particularly virulent and encouraged xenophobia in some extreme cases. In analyzing the border in such a way, I hope to underscore that the significance of the border as the boundary of Hong Kong as a “geo-body” is not simply determined by legislations and official state discourse but also by the memories and experiences of crossing the border.

II. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE BORDER

Hong Kong: Open Borders, Open Seas

During pre-colonial times, Hong Kong was often seen as a sanctuary from uprisings and regional political and economic instability on the Mainland. Following the colonization of Hong Kong, Chinese people continued to freely travel from Mainland China into Hong Kong and vice versa, and were even encouraged to do so. For instance, the 1843 Treaty of Bogue specifically stated that those of Chinese ethnicity would be welcome to enter Hong Kong as they pleased for purposes of trade (J. M. M. Chan 2008, 153). After the British established Hong Kong as a colony, Hong Kong continued to serve as a sanctuary, but also became a major transportation hub and emigration port. As Elizabeth Sinn has shown, Hong Kong’s role as a “space of flows” – where networks, goods, ideas, people and capital converged – made it an integral part of the history of Chinese transnationalism and diaspora. With the Gold
Rush in the United States, and subsequent discoveries of gold in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, many Chinese emigrants in search of labor would leave China via passenger ships from Hong Kong (Sinn 2008). As a declared “free port,” Hong Kong was an ideal location for sailors and captains of passenger ships and cargo ships who wanted to avoid strict regulations and red tape (M. K. Chan 1995; Kwok and Ames 1995; Faure and Siu 1995). In addition, Chinese elites who were obtaining an overseas education in the United States or Great Britain would first pass through Hong Kong on their travels. However, the United States and Great Britain were not the only options for such individuals. Sun Yat-Sen, upon returning from Hawaii, received the majority of his secondary school education and medical training in Hong Kong. Sun’s tenure in Hong Kong is also remembered as a key moment in Chinese national history. Revolutionaries, such as Sun, sought safety in Hong Kong and would often meet with what was then an underground resistance movement to overthrow the Qing Empire. In that respect, the majority of individuals crossing the border into Hong Kong were not necessarily seen as immigrants per se, but as travelers, sojourners, traders, or students, many of these would come through Hong Kong by boat and, later in the early twentieth century, by train.

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72 As a free port, Hong Kong did not impose import or export duties. For merchants, there was also a favorable absence of red tape and bureaucracy (Sinn 2008, 18).
73 An education abroad was a particularly welcoming idea for those who were seeking a modern education curriculum in lieu of the imperial civil service exams which were still in practice in China.
74 A Sun Yat-sen Museum and Sun Yat-sen heritage trail has been created in Hong Kong by the Leisure and Culture Department. The trail marks out locations of key importance to Sun Yat-sen’s life, places where revolutionaries met, or where revolutionary groups were first founded. In addition, the well acclaimed 2009 Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese co-produced film, “Bodyguards and Assassins,” is set entirely in Hong Kong and tells the story of Sun Yat-sen’s meeting with the Tongmenghui (同盟會), and the lengths his bodyguards and allies went to protect him from assassination.
Today, the railway line from Hong Kong to Mainland China is the most popular form of transportation for travelers. Compared to other border crossing points such as the Lok Ma Chau control point (used mostly by those travelling in cross-border vehicles\textsuperscript{75}), the Lo Wu border has a long history that is tied to the development of Hong Kong’s first railway lines. The origins of the Kowloon-Canton Railway (a railway line that was to run through Hong Kong into Mainland China) date back to 1864. Recognizing the potential trade and economic benefits of building a railway which would connect the main treaty ports in China with the rest of China (and even Calcutta), the colonial trading house Jardine, Matheson and Co. commissioned the British engineer Sir Macdonald Stephenson to lead the new railway project (A. J. Smith 1999, 45). In May 1898, the British were granted a lease by the Chinese which extended British rule to the New Territories – meaning the railway line could extend from Kowloon, through the New Territories and into China. The entire line was completed and began operating in October 1911. From 1911 to 1949 through passenger services and cargo services from Hong Kong to Guangdong (and vice versa) operated on a daily basis and was used by many people traveling to and from Hong Kong (Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation 2010).\textsuperscript{76} By the mid-century, the government expressed growing concerns about the increasing numbers of individuals moving to Hong Kong; the colonial government responded by consolidating earlier

\textsuperscript{75} Vehicles which are licensed to operate in both Hong Kong and Mainland China.

\textsuperscript{76} This did not last and beginning in 1949 and the CCP’s occupation of Guangdong, passengers had to terminate their travel at Lo Wu and, not completely dissimilar from today, walk across a bridge over the Shenzhen River before continuing their journey on a different train.
immigration, population control and deportation ordinances, and by opening official border check points maintained by the newly created Immigration Department.

Despite the constant back and forth movement across a porous border and a sizeable population made up of travelers and sojourners, historical evidence suggests that ordinances controlling immigration numbers and who could or could not enter the colony did exist at the beginning of Hong Kong’s colonial rule. Legislative bills and subsequent ordinances such as the Registration Ordinance of 1844, the Vagrancy Ordinance of 1897, the Banishment Ordinance of 1903, and the Deportation of Aliens Ordinance of 1935 existed as a way to control population increase through legally justified deportations. Lawmakers recognized that the border’s porosity and lacking infrastructure meant controlling the movement of people travelling into Hong Kong from Mainland China would be difficult. As such, the ordinances focused less on controlling population numbers through ridding the population of “undesirables” already in the colony. Part of the difficulty in implementing border control had to do with the long-established links between Hong Kong and Mainland China that went beyond the purposes of trade and predate the British arrival (M. K. Chan 1995; Kwok and Ames 1995; Faure and Siu 1995; Sinn 2008).

**New Legislation and the Creation of the Immigration Department**

Prior to the beginning of the Japanese occupation in Hong Kong in 1941, the Japanese had long been in battle with the Republic of China in what is known as the
Second Sino-Japanese War. The beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War can be dated back to a series of skirmishes and conflicts such as the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the Mukden Incident, and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in the 1930s. Japanese imperialist aggression was not mitigated and by 1937, the Republic of China was in a state of war against the Japanese imperialist forces. As the conflict on the Mainland intensified, families sought refuge in the yet to be occupied Hong Kong. As a result, Hong Kong’s population increased substantially by the early 1940s. Agnes Ku shows that during this decade a discourse which she refers to as the “problem of the people” emerged. This official state discourse is the first instance in which immigration was regarded as a “nuisance,” a “social ill,” contributing to poverty, health concerns, overcrowding, lawlessness, and a burden on state resources (e.g. access to public health). This can be seen, for instance, in the implementation of the 1940 Immigrants Control Bill (and later the accompanying ordinance of the same name) tabled by the Excess Population Reduction Committee. The bill required that all individuals, including Chinese citizens, carry passports or travel documents when travelling into Hong Kong (Legislative Council 1940). In the past, Chinese travelers had been exempt from such requirements and could travel into Hong Kong freely without documentation. The bill also stipulated that under the recommendation of the Excess Population Reduction Committee, the government would set up a new agency, the Immigration Department, to ensure adherence to the ordinance. The agency was to handle fees, detainment, and the deportation of those who did not abide by the new

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77 A term borrowed from the booklet entitled, Problem of the People, produced by the Hong Kong government in 1960.
legislation. While the actual rhetoric does not specifically link such “nuisances” to new Chinese immigrants, it is worth noting that beginning with the Immigrants Control Ordinance of 1940, all later bills and ordinances such as the Immigrants Control Bill of 1949 and the quota system of 1950 specifically mentioned those of the “Chinese race” (Ku 2004, 34). The 1940 ordinance, however, only permitted immigration control to take place at the border entry point. From 1949 onwards, the government tried addressing the “immigration problem” in a number of different ways. These new methods, as established in later ordinances, allowed for the policing of migrants who might have entered and remained in Hong Kong undetected. One form of policing introduced was the required registration of all incoming immigrants who were then provided with an identification card (J. M. M. Chan 2008, 156).

Alongside the creation of the Immigration Department and immigration officials, one can identify this period as the beginning of the institutionalization of the border.

The Specter of Communism across the Border

Beginning in the 1950s, the colonial state implemented various techniques to monitor and control the population of Hong Kong and the number of immigrants coming into

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78 Not surprisingly, the bill was met with some hesitation among the Chinese honorary members of the Legislative Council. Council member Li (one of the few Chinese representatives on the Council) declared, “I should like to point out that the average Chinese generally looks at immigration measures, however mild, with askance. If this were not a wartime measure, it would have been viewed by the Chinese with the utmost concern” (Legislative Council 1940). By recognizing the important, interdependent relationship Hong Kong had with Guangdong, the senior Chinese honorary member Lo Man-Kam expressed, “To me, at least, it is a matter of great sadness and profound regret that for the first time in its history, now approaching its Centenary, the Colony should find itself compelled to pass a measure which puts an end to the right of free and unrestricted movement between this Colony and China” (Ibid.). As members of the elite Chinese, the Chinese honorary members also seemed concerned with the ways in which the legislation would affect the shipping trade. In one instance, a council member consulted the Chinese Chamber of Commerce on the proposed bill.
Hong Kong. The intensity of such control wavered, however. In 1950, a quota system was implemented which restricted the number of those entering Hong Kong from the Mainland. In response to this, the People’s Republic of China imposed an exit policy that restricted the number of those leaving China. This exit policy was controlled by the Chinese government, which issued a limited number of one-way permits per day for those wishing to leave the Mainland. The process, however, was susceptible to corruption by party officials and lacked transparency (J. M. M. Chan 2008, 162). In addition to the strict exit policy, the border zone in Mainland China was heavily policed by Mainland police and army patrols.

Given the highly policed border crossing (on both sides of the border) it was not uncommon for refugees and migrants to find other means of entering Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s location in the South China Sea meant many would travel by boat and swim parts of the journey to Hong Kong.79 In 1958, the Attorney General, Arthur Ridehalgh, proposed a new bill, the 1958 Immigration (Control and Offences) Bill, which explicitly referenced the “problem” of illegal immigrants. In the minutes of the first reading of the Bill, Ridehalgh is noted as saying, “…illegal immigration is a serious problem in this Colony, and it is essential to tighten up the law with a view to preventing illegal entry so far as possible, and also to make the racketeers who

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79 Entering Hong Kong through its waters continued well into the 1990s. One Monday morning, during my schooling in Hong Kong, one such refugee was found sleeping in one of the faculty offices (which was equipped with sofas and a refrigerator with food in it) on the school grounds. To the police’s best knowledge, the man must have partly swam his way to the shores of Hong Kong (the school was located close to Aberdeen harbor, in South Hong Kong) and discovered an empty school to rest in that weekend.
engage in the traffic amenable to the law” (Legislative Council 1958). Those found aiding the entry of an individual (even if a family member) would be liable for prosecution. In addition, this bill ensured that anybody in Hong Kong found to be an “illegal immigrant” would be repatriated back to Mainland China. Given the new stipulations of the ordinance and the PRC’s heavily enforced exit policy, it was unlikely that the majority of individuals travelling to Hong Kong from Mainland China did so with the appropriate paperwork and through “legal channels.” Lastly, the bill allowed for the curbing of arrivals (even with the appropriate travel documents and papers) as the immigration officer saw fit.

Indeed, the name of the bill itself is an indication of how far the official state discourse had changed within less than a decade. As the Attorney General pointed out, “The opportunity has been taken to change the title of the Ordinance, the old title [Immigrants Control Ordinance] being somewhat misleading in that the Ordinance provided for the control of all persons entering the Colony, whether they were by definition immigrants or not” (Ibid.). Of course, while such a correction did serve to clarify that the ordinance applied to all people entering Hong Kong (be they British subjects, residents of Hong Kong, or immigrants), the change of name also implied a new understanding of whom the ordinance targeted. The name of the old ordinance implied that those crossing the border into Hong Kong were “immigrants” and thus suggested that the individuals who entered Hong Kong also intended to make Hong Kong their new home. By re-naming the ordinance to the Immigration (Control and
Offences) Ordinance, those crossing the border were no longer given the opportunity to be acknowledged as “immigrants” who would be welcomed into the colony. The new name of the ordinance also suggested that the state would be policing and monitoring all aspects of the process of immigration (i.e., at the border crossing, individuals’ entry and registration as residents, and the deportation of “illegal immigrants”).

Despite the changes put forth in the 1958 ordinance and the heavier policing of the border, the reality was that immigrants were still leaving China and coming to Hong Kong. Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward and its ensuing famine and the Cultural Revolution led to even more people coming across the border. One way the government addressed this was to add to the already established population control ordinances. One way the colonial government did so was through a campaign to address the “problem” of boat squatters and shantytowns on the hillsides of Hong Kong, which many new immigrants lived in, by declaring them illegal. The new migrants, almost all of whom were refugees living in such situations, thus embodied illegality in a number of ways: According to legislation in the new ordinance, these migrants had come to the city illegally; and as dwellers and residents, they were inhabiting illegal structures and making ends meet through illegal, informal employment (Ku 2004, 336). It was not long before the government soon recognized the less than satisfactory results at curbing immigration. In the 1960s and early 1970s

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80 Between 1952 and 1962, Ku estimates that around 142,000 people left China and came to Hong Kong (2004, 336).
the colonial government adopted a different approach – an “open door” policy, and later on a “reached base” policy, which emphasized integration rather than illegality or refuge (J. M. M. Chan 2008, 159). The reached base policy, while short lived, did not criminalize migrants nor deport migrants back to China. Instead, the new policy stated that migrants who had entered Hong Kong through “unofficial channels” could stay in Hong Kong so long as they registered with the necessary government authorities. While the government’s change in approach to immigration was partly fueled by the less than stellar results at curbing, the less restrictive policies were also partly driven by local demands and public opinion. Public opinion suggested that the public, for the most part, saw the new group of refugees and immigrants as no different from the majority of already established Hong Kong residents who had also come to Hong Kong under similar circumstances. Indeed, while immigration policies were arguably relaxed and less stringent, the conditions of acceptance were oftentimes determined by the “viability” of the individual (i.e., whether or not the individual would be able to contribute to the Hong Kong economy, obtain employment and not run into any trouble with the law) (Ku 2004, 339). By 1980, the government once again changed their stance on immigration and decided to impose heavy restrictions and punishments on those entering Hong Kong illegally and thus put an end to the “reached base” policy. In arguing for the end of the Reached Base Policy, Governor MacLehose argued:

81 Perhaps as a humanitarian effort and as part of ongoing Cold War politics, the US government contributed funds to aid in the integration of refugees into Hong Kong (Ku 2004, 337).
82 The reached base policy was later repealed in 1980 and the Hong Kong government reverted back to a policy of repatriation.
Far from being welcomed by our people, the illegal immigrants are now more and more resented as they are seen to be eroding the improvement in standards that the people of Hong Kong have worked so hard to achieve… There is also the constant diversion of Police from combating crime, which is what really matters, to combating illegal immigration, and crime committed by illegal immigrants is on the increase and out of all proportion to their numbers… The ‘reached base’ policy has become a tragic charade in which the illegal immigrant has little to lose and everything to gain by attempting to run the gauntlet of Chinese and Hong Kong forces (Hong Kong Legislative Council 1980).

The amendment was passed swiftly. Immigrants who came to Hong Kong “illegally” were quickly detained and later deported back to Mainland China. In addition, the amendment made the hiring of “illegal immigrants” an offense in Hong Kong.

By tracing the official state discourse produced by the colonial government, it is clear that the state had identified a problem (population control) and a solution (border control) well before the cementation and institutionalization of the border in 1950. At the time the 1940 Immigrant Control Bill was passed in the Legislative Council, the Chinese representatives in the Council believed that such border control policies would be enacted only during the war. The discourse that stemmed from the various bills and their debates during the Second Sino-Japanese War saw immigration as a potential problem for the colony – a discourse that certainly extended beyond the war years. The bills and debates that arose during this period newly defined individuals who were once seen as travelers or sojourners as immigrants. Specifically, the use of the term immigrants implied a group of individuals’ departure from one place, their
movement across boundaries into another place, and permanent (or long term) settlement in Hong Kong.

In addition to the discursive changes in official state documents, the physicality and surrounding environment of the border also changed. Having spent much of his academic career doing field work in the New Territories and the border region, James Watson notes that for many of the villagers, prior to the institutionalization of the border, “the [early] border was not a serious impediment: it was a muddy creek, not an impenetrable wall” (2010, 17). The border which had previously been open and welcomed movement across it became a closed, militarized space as required by the bills and ordinances that emerged in the 1950s. The newly established Immigration Department served to primarily police all crossings. Officers from the Immigration Department and the police force were required to patrol and monitor the area with round the clock surveillance. In addition, border checkpoints were created to enable the inspection of official travel documentation for all travelers crossing through. The establishment of the Immigration Department led to a further institutionalization of the border.

Not surprisingly the landscape surrounding the border changed as a result of the government’s increasing restrictive immigration policies. As mentioned elsewhere in the dissertation, the present-day border between Hong Kong and Mainland China is:

83 To this day, the Immigration Department handles all matters relating to immigration, citizenship and residency in Hong Kong.
dates back to the signing of the Second Convention of Peking in 1898. The convention extended British sovereignty from Boundary Street in Kowloon northwards to the south of the Shenzhen River and Sha Tau Kok River – the newly acquired land was called the New Territories and the rivers would serve as a convenient natural boundary between colonial Hong Kong and Mainland China. Prior to the 1950s, the border which lay south of the two rivers was simply marked by a series of boundary stones. However, by 1951 the colonial government had not only erected barbed wires and a fence along the river, but it had designated the area running adjacent to the border as the Frontier Closed Area (FCA). The FCA, which serves as a buffer zone, is twenty-eight square kilometers in area on the Hong Kong side, and encapsulates over thirty small villages and towns (the largest being Sha Tau Kok) that pre-date the creation of the FCA and the arrival of the British in Hong Kong. The zone was intended to help “maintain the integrity of the boundary between Hong Kong and the Mainland and to combat illegal immigration and other cross boundary criminal activities” (Security Bureau 2002). A perimeter fence that runs parallel to the border clearly marks out the FCA.84 Within the zone are five police check points, police stations and a number of villages and shops. Following the creation of the closed area, only individuals who worked or lived in the zone could travel freely through the area, those who didn’t were required to carry the appropriate

84 The Hong Kong Police and Immigration department spend HK$41 million to upgrade the boundary fence system in 1998. Following the 1998 upgrade, the fence now includes barbed wire, advanced sensor cable systems, closed circuit television, and video motion detection systems.
travel documents and permits.\textsuperscript{85} Those caught without the right travel documents are subject to a fine and the possibility of imprisonment. For the latter half of the twentieth century visiting the FCA was a difficult endeavor and the villagers in the FCA lived undisturbed from the rest of Hong Kong. However, cross-border relationships, commerce and interactions \textit{within} the zone flourished in response to Cold War politics, reform policies in the PRC, and Hong Kong’s change in sovereignty in 1997 – this is especially true of a street located in the FCA called Chung Ying Street.

Like the Frontier Closed Area, following the cementation of the border, Chung Ying Street and its inhabitants were subjected to numerous new provisions, regulations and a heavy police presence.\textsuperscript{86} Nevertheless, the villagers, traders and shop-owners who resided along Chung Ying Street managed to traverse the politics on both sides of the border and negotiate their everyday activities accordingly. Chung Ying Street (中英街) is located within the village of Sha Tau Kok in the FCA. The street lies directly on the border: one side of the street lies within the jurisdiction of the PRC.

\textsuperscript{85} Individuals who do not reside within the FCA must apply for travel permits through the Hong Kong Police. The process is a complicated one where applicants are required to provide numerous supporting documents. Permits are only issued to individuals who live or work within the area, are transiting through the area to reach their place of abode, need to maintain a “traditional link with the local community because of family or historic ties,” are visiting their relatives or friends, liaising with local rural committees, own property in the area or has been legally appointed to look after property in the area, and those who need to access the area for school, work or business (Hong Kong Police Force 2013).

\textsuperscript{86} As mentioned in an above footnote, obtaining a permit to enter the FCA is a long, difficult process. Visitors who wish to enter into Chung Ying Street are subjected to an even longer process, and the types of visitors who can apply for a permit are even more limited.
while the other side of the street is part Hong Kong. At the time the Second Convention of Peking was signed and the boundary between Hong Kong and China marked out, the river’s water levels had been much higher and the street itself was under water. The river eventually dried up and by the 1920s left a plot of dry land. The street which used to be the river boundary served as the new boundary separating colonial Hong Kong from Chinese territory (N. Chu 2013). Since the 1950s, Chung Ying Street has arguably served as an ideological and spatial divider. For instance, as a large state-run department store on the Mainland Chinese side of the street popped up in the 1950s, selling utilitarian household goods and simple clothing produced by the Maoist-state, on the Hong Kong side of the street, abundant grocery stores, convenience stores, jewellery stores and pawn shops opened displaying the wealth of material goods available to Hong Kongers (Ibid., 12). The uneven development on either side of the border was clearly visible to those living on either side of the street and are remembered in the stories of Hong Kongers who were known to have thrown bags of clothing, money and food across the street in the middle of the night to relatives (Ibid.). By the 1980s and 1990s, as the PRC’s reform policies came into effect the daily activities and cross-border relations were also renegotiated. Guangdong residents could now apply for tourist passes to visit the street on the Chinese side and shop from the numerous shops that catered to them. These shops sold Hong Kong-made clothing and goods that had been smuggled over from Hong Kong. As Nellie Chu shows, the informal trading that took place along Chun Ying

87 With half of the road lying on the Hong Kong side, and the other half on the Chinese side of the border, the literal translation of the street name is Chinese-British Street.
Street facilitated the growth of Guangzhou’s role in global garment and fashion commodity chains. In fact, the street within the FCA can be seen as a testing ground for the economic reforms China would take part in (Ibid.).

A discourse on immigration across the border can be traced back to the early 1940s. This discourse was primarily a discourse among legislators, lawmakers, law enforcement and the colonial government – that is to say, it was a discourse that operated at the state-level only. This particular discourse focused on the ways in which immigration to Hong Kong from the Mainland and the subsequent increase in population could be detrimental to state resources and population control efforts, and produce a “populace of lesser quality.” In the 1950s, as state relations with the People’s Republic of China grew sour (in part to the Korean War and Cold War...
politics), the discourse changed from “problem of the people” to “problem of the immigrant” (Ku 2004). In particular, the government was concerned with the possibility of Communist sympathizers “infiltrating Hong Kong.” In an effort to restrict movement across the border, actions were taken to cement the border, increase border patrol, implement a quota system and increase bureaucracy for those who wished to travel across the border (whether from Mainland China or Hong Kong). Not surprisingly, such enforcements did not stop immigrants and refugees from finding ways to smuggle themselves into Hong Kong. A few decades prior to the institutionalization of the border, these individuals would have been seen as travelers, sojourners, or traders; however, with the creation of various legislations regarding migrants and their legal status they came to be legally defined as immigrants. As the countless immigration policies took shape and developed, they also became increasingly reactive. Within a few decades, the once problem free crossing into Hong Kong from Mainland China now raised issues of legality. Migrants could now be legally defined as “illegal immigrants.” As a result of a state discourse that emphasized the need for a hard border alongside heavy policing at the border and beyond, the border signified a clear separation from Hong Kong and the Chinese nation; moreover, it signified the separation between Communism and non-Communism. However, this signification did not penetrate into the everyday public discourse of most Hong Kongers until later in the twentieth century.

88 This was especially true following the Hong Kong Riots of 1967, which were led by leftist anti-colonial groups.
At the local non-state level, the reaction to these implementations was rather different. Up until 1950, travel and movement across the border were frequent and in some cases part of the everyday. For many Hong Kong families who originated from Guangdong province, trips across the border to visit relatives on a frequent basis were not uncommon. For others, Guangdong’s main metropolitan city, Guangzhou, offered schooling and jobs for those who had difficulty accessing them in Hong Kong. The closure of the border came as a surprise for the many people who crossed it on a daily basis, suggesting that the discourse at the state level never really reached the public— that is until the 1960s and 1970s. Part of this can be attributed to the colonial government’s state-making project in the 1960s. This project included the creation and maintenance of a border, and the creation of a new discourse on belonging, citizenship and residency. This state-level discourse initially formed around ideas of “settled residence,” and later on the notion of “local belonging” (Ku 2004).89 Agnes Ku correctly notes that in addition to the immigration policies of the mid-twentieth century, state building in Hong Kong involved “the invention of official identity or immigration categories…; the acquisition of a language of ‘stateness’…; the continuation of the ideological formation of liberalism versus communism; and the increasing will to govern and achieve” (Ku 2004, 328). By 1971, a new legal category, “Hong Kong belonger,” was created, and from this category emerged a discourse of Hong Kong identity and the identity of a Hong Konger (香港人) (Ibid.).

Certainly, while the creation of a Hong Konger had much to do with the baby

89 Incidentally, the term “local belonging” never really penetrated into local discourse at the public level (Ku 2004).
boomers coming of age in a Hong Kong that was ideologically, culturally, economically distinct and spatially separated from Mainland China (Mathews, Ma, and Lui 2008; S. Tsang 2007), the construction of a state discourse which defined Mainland Chinese migrants as “immigrants,” and in certain circumstances, “illegal immigrants” cannot be dismissed. The entrenchment of this state discourse was further assisted by the Registration of Persons Bill of 1960 which made the carrying of an identification card (ID Cards) compulsory (Hong Kong Legislative Council 1960). By 1980, the Touch Base policy was repealed and an amendment was added to the Immigration Act which allowed the police force and officers from the Labour Department and Immigration Department to stop individuals and request for proof of identification at any time (Hong Kong Legislative Council 1980). Those found without an identification card could be subject to imprisonment, fines, and in some cases deportation. The practice of carrying the card quickly became normalized and part of the every day. For example, one is required to show their identification card when applying for a job, opening bank accounts, or signing up for a library card. The practice of identification card inspections, cha sun fun tsing (查身份證) became a part of daily police beats and were met with little resistance from the public. In the eyes of the public, the act of inspection was associated with criminal activity, for only illegal immigrants (known colloquially as IIs) would be caught without the necessary documents. This is best demonstrated in common parlance amongst Hong Kongers at

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90 The issuance of identification cards had been in practice since 1949; however, the cards were only issued to government employees and residents within the FCA (Information Services Department, Government of Hong Kong SAR 2003).
the time: the term used to describe inspections, *cha sun fun tsing*, was used interchangeably with the phrase *cha II* (查II), or illegal immigrant inspections.

Modern day border crossings with their countless technologies necessarily create a space of surveillance. In addition to the surveillance, travel documents are seen as a necessity for any international or foreign travel. Indeed, in a Post 9-11 world proof of identification is also seen as a matter of national security. Border control and the border as modern institutions can be seen as two of the many practices and institutions that are related to, and enforce, a modern nation-state’s territoriality such as the practices of surveying and map making (Winichakul 1994). And indeed, prior to the creation of the Chinese nation-state and the signing of treaties where China had to lease increasingly more land to the British, such a boundary space and the implementation of carrying travel documents did not exist. In her example of Indian migration, Radhika Mongia argues that the passport should be seen as a technology implemented to restrict and limit ones movement (1999). Specifically, Mongia examines the way in which Indian colonial subjects had their “raced-migration” limited through the issuance of official travel documents. This state-sponsored project further entrenched the premise of a nation being territorially demarcated and circumscribed (Ibid.).

Another example of the way in which a nation-state’s boundaries can be reified is through an examination of national security policies. This has been especially true of the U.S. – Mexico border. Jason Ackleson has shown how political issues such as (illegal) immigration, drugs, and even terrorism are discussed at the state-level and fall under the rubric of national security which are then used to discursively construct the border or a boundary zone (2005).
the implementation of the identification card. The boundary between the Chinese nation-state and the crown colony Hong Kong is further reified with the mandatory issuance of identification cards and inspections.

Around the time in which identity cards were issued to all Hong Kongers, a burgeoning local population was also coming of age and acquired the new discourse on belonging and identity that was integral to the bifurcation of the myth. Not only would the border and border crossings play an important role within the myth (See Chapter Two), but through a naturalization of the myth Hong Kongers would attach new meanings and significance to the border that did not necessarily coincide with the official state discourse of the border.

IV. THE BORDER THROUGH THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE

A Boundary of Stones

Prior to the cementation of the border in 1950, colonial legislation up until that point exempted those of the “Chinese race” from carrying travel documentation and having to go through border checks and as such, travel to and from the Mainland was a common practice and explains its porosity. Regular through train services ran from Hong Kong into the heart of Guangzhou, and individuals would cross the border for varying reasons such as schooling, family visits, marriage, or day-to-day business. Through a series of interviews conducted with older members of the population and through oral histories available at the Hong Kong History Museum archive I found
that when individuals spoke of border crossings prior to 1950, the border was represented as another banal crossing. For many, the bridge over the Shenzhen River that connected Guangdong Province with Hong Kong was simply another bridge to cross.

James Watson’s research in the Hong Kong border village San Tin depicts the banal, non-spectacular border crossings which occurred daily before the war. He notes that in the early twentieth century the porous border was marked by simple, unobtrusive boundary stones. Crossing the river (the official boundary line) was a daily activity, with around three hundred people crossing the river, back and forth, via a rickety footbridge (2010, 17). Watson’s description of the porous border is mirrored in the accounts found the Hong Kong Museum of History’s oral history archives and in my own interviews. While the oral history interviews focused mostly on how everyday life changed during the Japanese occupation, I was struck by how many of the interviews also included stories of border crossings. The stories of everyday, banal pre-war border crossings that were part of so many individual’s daily lives or routine juxtaposed the heightened vigilance and temporary wartime closure of the border. While the border did reopen up after the war, within less than a decade, the border would once again be closed. For some individuals, the cementation of the border came as a surprise, and marked an important and devastating moment in their lives as their families were separated.
Mrs. Tang was born in 1927 and grew up in the Central district in Hong Kong. Mrs. Tang introduced herself as a Punti; her family had lived in Hong Kong for quite some time (her father and grandfather were born and lived in Hong Kong). Despite her family’s rootedness in Hong Kong, they still maintained cross-border relationships with extended family members who lived in Guangzhou. Mrs. Tang recalled how, as a child, her family would make frequent, short trips to Guangzhou. On these trips, the family would visit her great-grandfather’s grave and stay with her grandmother. Mrs. Tang’s grandmother would also take turns and frequently visit the family in Hong Kong. During the war, the back and forth trips to Guangzhou were suspended, in part due to wartime travel restrictions, but also because of the passing of Mrs. Tang’s father. “After the war, everyone had a hard time finding a job,” Mrs. Tang recalled, “one of my younger brothers decided he would try his luck in Guangzhou. He went to Guangzhou with an uncle and they worked at a bakery. He initially planned to travel back and forth from Hong Kong as he pleased to visit his family. One day, it must have been in the early 1950s, we were told that he wasn’t allowed to come back to Hong Kong. We were devastated.” She continued, “Just like that, I wasn’t allowed to see my brother. When my mother passed away, he had to apply for a travel permit to come to Hong Kong. The permit wouldn’t allow him to stay and he had to go back to

92 The term Punti (本地人) can be translated to mean “local person” and can be used to refer to families that have been in Hong Kong for generations. Another usage is to refer to Cantonese speakers from the Guangdong region (as opposed to, for example, people from Chiu Chow, Guangdong who speak in Chiu Chow-nese). In this respect, the two usages are quite different from the way in which the Museum of History uses the term Punti (see Chapter Two). In the museum, the Puntis are understood as one of the four main “ethnic groups” in Hong Kong.

93 The woman’s date coincides with not only Hong Kong’s cementation of the border and the People’s Republic of China’s decision to control the number of people leaving China.
Guangzhou after the funeral. We didn’t want him to go back” (Mrs. Tang 1987). Even through a tape recording, one could hear Mrs. Tang sobbing gently as she told the interviewer of how she “lost her brother.” For Mrs. Tang, crossing the border had never been an out of the ordinary experience, however the sudden closing of the border shocked her whole family as Mrs. Tang and her family were forcibly separated from her brother.

Unlike Mrs. Tang, Mr. Tse was nor born in Hong Kong. Instead, Mr. Tse first came to Hong Kong in 1937 at the age of seventeen and moved in with family members in Happy Valley. Mr. Tse quickly found employment at the locally owned department store Sincere, and worked in the perfume counter and helped to make perfumes. He stressed how important cross-border familial or kin relationships were at the time, “You had to come with someone, or know someone, who could help you find a job.” As a young single man in a big city, Mr. Tse lived a comfortable life. He had done well and risen up in the department store. He bought some company stocks, was given insurance and housing from the company, and even had a maid to help him cook his dinner. Mr. Tse admitted that when he initially moved to Hong Kong he had envisioned his stay as a temporary one: he had hoped to work, save up some money and buy some land in his hometown. However, after settling in Hong Kong for a few years, Mr. Tse was reluctant to move back to his hometown (Tse 1988). While Mr. Tse did not move back to his hometown of Pan Yu, Guangdong, he did visit his family on a regular basis. As Mr. Tse noted, the trips were stressful as his mother
would always pressure him to stay and marry a woman from their hometown. During the Japanese occupation, as has been documented by scholars, a large number of sojourners, economic migrants and laborers returned to their hometown in Mainland China which was deemed safer than occupied Hong Kong (K. C. Chan 2007, 381). Mr. Tse was one such person who returned to his hometown of Pan Yu, albeit reluctantly. As Mr. Tse noted, “If it hadn’t been for the Japanese in Hong Kong, I would have wanted to stay in Hong Kong and not have gotten married. I was happy in Hong Kong, and it was quite easy meeting girls at work. Sometimes, after work, I’d go to dance clubs with these girls. Eventually I married someone from my hometown.” He continued, “After the war, I left my wife in China and returned back to Hong Kong to work. We had to wait awhile before she was allowed to move to Hong Kong.” Looking back, Mr. Tse did not seem too bothered that he had to be separated from his new wife as a result of the new border legislation that came into place. Mr. Tse’s interview highlights a number of things. In his interview, he spoke of his frequent movement across the porous boundary prior to its cementation. In his discussion, it was not so much the trip that was a burden for Mr. Tse (and indeed, it should not have been, given the relative ease at which people crossed the border each day); rather it was his mother and her expectations for him to marry that frustrated Mr. Tse. Following the war, despite being a newlywed, Mr. Tse’s decision to return to Hong Kong was influenced by his prior success at the department store and his comfortable lifestyle. Not only did Mr. Tse not say anything about the cementation of the border, but also he never explained that the reason he was temporarily separated
from his wife was because of the new border legislations implemented in the 1950s. Similarly, Mrs. Tang never outright spoke of the new border legislations with regards to her brother’s separation. For Mrs. Tang, she was simply “told” that her brother “wasn’t allowed to come back to Hong Kong” (Mrs. Tang 1987). Both these interviews not only demonstrate that the border was truly porous prior to World War II, but it also demonstrates that while they certainly were affected and were separated from loved ones, the border’s closing for most people was not imagined in the same way it was understood in official state discourse. For these two individuals, the border cementation was a nuisance that prevented them from seeing their loved ones.

From these excerpts, one is hard pressed to find any mention or evocation of the official state discourse of “Problem of the People.” During this period, crossing the border was akin to a daily commute that was not spectacular in any way. The individuals mentioned above do not address concerns such as lawlessness, poverty, health concerns, and overcrowding that had preoccupied the colonial government since the start of World War II. Rather, they were preoccupied with life concerns such as finding a job, and in the case of Mr. Tse, fulfilling his obligation to visit his family. These concerns were distinct from the state’s anxieties over the city’s population and migration from Mainland China. What is also worthy of noting is the muddled oral history of some of the oral history subjects. The oral histories by Mr. Tse and Mrs. Tang, perhaps due to their old age, appeared particularly muddled upon first listening to them. Both oral histories would jump back and forth in their description of their
lives in Hong Kong and their description of visits to Guangdong. For instance, it became particularly confusing when Mr. Tse spoke of his wife living in Hong Kong, when just prior to that he had explained how, after the war, he left his wife in China while he returned to Hong Kong for work. However, further reflection raises the question of whether such “muddled narrating” was a symptom of the free movement across the border at the time. Mr. Tse’s “muddled description” of time in Hong Kong and Mainland China raises the notion that during this period, many did not distinguish between Hong Kong and Mainland China as two separately distinct places where they resided for clearly defined periods of time in their life. Instead, the muddled description suggests that as a result of the porous border, Hong Kong and Mainland China were not lived, spoke of or remembered as distinct places, but rather a region where people circulated and moved about with ease.

Danger and sacrifice at the border

As has already been discussed in this chapter, both the colonial state and the PRC state took a new approach to border control in the 1950s. During this decade, the border’s wall grew higher and thicker, and barbed wire was affixed to the top of the border wall. In addition, lookout towers sprung up at different intervals, and patrols would be found walking up and down the border. As the government actively institutionalized the border and implemented checks at all border control points, travel across the border became increasingly difficult. Hong Kongers looking back on the 1950s and 1960s characterize the border crossing experiences in this period as a
key moment in Hong Kong’s narrative history: Those who sacrificed their life, swam shark-infested waters, scaled walls, or hitched rides on trains did so as a means of survival. For instance, the lyrics to the theme song of the popular TV drama “Below the Lion Rock” echo the localized founding myth discussed in Chapter Two. The lyrics of one verse of the popular song speak directly to the sacrifice and danger that new immigrants had to endure: “We are all on the same boat, so let’s help each other under the Lion Rock …/With no fear nor fright/We are all at the end of the world./Hand in hand, we traverse the rough seas.” There are a number of themes present within the lyrics. First, the lyrics paint the perilous and treacherous journey from Mainland China to Hong Kong – a common motif heard not only in the media but also in a number of my interviews and archived oral histories. The vivid picture in the song depicts the migrant experience (especially during the 1950s and 1960s when border security was at its peak): the group of people in the boat, who despite the rough waves of the South China sea, and despite the feeling of being at the ends of earth, remain steadfast in their journey. Lyrics illustrating immigrants stranded in the rough seas also serve as a metaphor for the hardships many immigrants had to endure upon their arrival in Hong Kong (i.e. destitution, unemployment, separation from family members, or the threat of deportation). In addition to the potential danger and risk that came with crossing the border, border crossing experiences of the 1950s and 1960s are remembered as journeys of sacrifice.

Every year during the month of August, the seventh month in the lunar calendar,
Hong Kong celebrates the Hungry Ghost Festival. During this time various ceremonies and rituals such as the burning of incense and the preparation of offerings take place to appease the spirits. The Hungry Ghost Festival also coincides with the start of the academic year at many of Hong Kong’s universities, including the Chinese University of Hong Kong – located a few train stops away from the border. As Joseph Bosco has noted, during orientation, students often tell ghost stories to each other – partly as a way to bond with fellow students but also as a way to orient themselves in the campus (2003). One particularly horrifying ghost story tells the tale of a young couple who had illegally crossed the border to Hong Kong and were stowaways on a cargo train. As the train was passing by the university, the couple jumped from the train. While the young man had jumped to safety, the woman caught her braid in the train door and died. A road on the university campus where the accident purportedly happened has been re-named “One-Braid Road” by the students. As the ghost story goes, students walking home late at night have encountered the spirit of the young woman who appears with a mangled face (A. Cheung 2005). Of course, such a story should be taken with a grain of salt, but it does underscore the ways in which the 1950s and 1960s border signified danger. More importantly, that stories of dangerous crossings are still circulated today underscores the way in which danger is still understood in conjunction with border crossings. The re-telling of the ghost story each year at student orientations further adds to the perpetuation of the notion of a “dangerous” crossing. Of course, such tales that emphasize the border’s danger are not limited to ghost stories and folk tales, but are also part of individuals’
memories of their border crossing experience.

In one of my interviews, I spoke to an elderly gentleman who came to Hong Kong during the 1950s. A soft-spoken man, he told me of his early occupation as an accountant in China. When I asked him when and why he came to Hong Kong, he glossed over his experience in a re-education camp. It was clear that he did not want to discuss it in detail. While his train of thought was rather scattered, he very clearly described how he “escaped from the Communists.” “I just remember running and then swimming and swimming [across the river]. Once I crossed that river, I knew I was safe. I never looked back again. My sister was here, so I had people I knew in Hong Kong” (Interview conducted by author). Later in the conversation, when I asked if he had been back to China, he shook his head, “No. I don’t want to go back. I don’t want to think about what happened there.” For the elderly gentleman I interviewed, crossing the border was a momentous achievement in his life and something he emotionally and physically endured. Not only was the journey across the border one filled with risk and potential danger, but in the mind of the elderly man, the river boundary also represented the separation of a dangerous space (Mainland China) and a sanctuary (Hong Kong).

Public discourses that represent the border as a place of danger were also partly engendered by reports of crime and encountering the unknown at the border. James Watson, for example, describes how the residents of the village spoke in “hushed
tones” about the border, life on the other side of the border, and about those who crossed the border at night. He writes, “during our stay in San Tin, 1969-1970, [we] knew refugees had strayed into the village late at night when our neighbors’ guard dogs erupted into coordinated, orchestrated, barking, signaling alarm. No one went out after dark in 1969” (2010, 14). In addition, Watson further shows how the Hong Kong Police detailed accounts of young people who were executed by Communist Border Guards as they attempted to swim across the river (Ibid.). During the 1960s and 1970s, the legal concept of the illegal immigrant (colloquially referred to as IIs) appeared in state and public discourse and was frequently a topic of discussion in the media. In these reports, not only were these individuals entering Hong Kong “illegally” but also they often turned to thievery and robbery once they arrived in Hong Kong.\footnote{A weekly television show called The Police Report, similar to America’s Most Wanted, would show re-enactments of crimes that had taken place. Many of these re-enactments featured a “Mainland Chinese” individual who had committed some petty crime.} In all these tales, the border during the 1960s and 1970s is remembered as a place of danger and risk that had to be endured if one wanted to start anew in Hong Kong.

Even today, ghost stories, cautionary tales, and rumors of dangerous border crossings permeate popular memory. However, for the most part the stories originating from Hong Kongers depict the crossing from Hong Kong to the Mainland as the dangerous journey. In August 2000, the media in Hong Kong were swept away by the tragic story of Yu Man-hon. Yu was a severely autistic teenager who ran away from his
mother in the train station and had crossed the border into Shenzhen by himself, despite not possessing any legal travel documents. Border control officers in Shenzhen noticed the boy and upon realizing he had entered Mainland China without documentation, returned him to border control officers in Hong Kong. In a disheartening series of events that were to follow, Yu Man-hon was shuttled back and forth in between no man’s land as a result of Shenzhen and Hong Kong border officers’ gross negligence and mishandling of the situation. As the public picked up on the story, everyone including the press and members of the public seemed to want to include their own two-cents on the incident (C. A. G. Jones 2011). As Jones notes, the reports, stories and rumors that came from Hong Kong all included an aspect of danger. For instance, reports would speculate about the likelihood of a teenage boy with autism surviving the “dangerous streets of Shenzhen” as stories of mentally disabled people being “collected from the streets and dumped [elsewhere]” were not uncommon (Ibid., 105). Theories, rumors, dramatized tales of a mother’s love for her son, and cautionary tales of border crossings largely drowned out the main issue of concern – namely, the PRC and Hong Kong authorities’ mishandling of the situation. That the public was so preoccupied with Yu Man-hon’s story is no surprise. Since the creation of Shenzhen as a Special Economic Zone, travel to the region has increased, and with it rumors and tales of the dangerous journey of crossing into Shenzhen. Shenzhen was depicted as a Wild West frontier town, run by triads and rife with crime, prostitution, drugs, and corruption (C. A. G. Jones 2011; Lo 2009). Travelers crossing the border were constantly reminded of stories of vulnerable Hong Kongers
being drugged, kidnapped, stabbed, robbed, and in some extreme stories, even having their kidneys removed (Jones 2011). Building upon Abbas’s theory of Hong Kong as a liminal space (2000), Jones suggests that stories of dangerous border crossings which date back to the 1990s are examples of “cultural barriers” that were erected to shield Hong Kong from the uncertainty and perceived danger across the border in Mainland China. However, it is also possible to understand the dissemination of these stories that originate from Hong Kong, as a way of underscoring and legitimizing Hong Kong’s founding myth. That is, to cross the border to Mainland China is to go back to what the refugees and migrants chose to leave behind in the first instance – a space of uncertainty and risk. To this day, a black-and-white missing persons flyer with Yu Man-hon’s picture and description can be found plastered on the walls at the border station Lo Wu. The flyers actively and perpetually reminds Hong Kongers of the possible “dangers” and “risks” they might encounter as they embark on their journey across the border.

The second group of memories of this period focuses on the sacrifices that were often made as people embarked on their journey across the border. Stories of leaving family members and possessions behind in search of new opportunities in Hong Kong are common. And is well illustrated in my encounter with Mrs. Cheung. Mrs. Cheung invited me to her office in adjacent next to one of Hong Kong Island’s busiest MTR stations. Mrs. Cheung had previously sat on the area’s district council board and worked as a founding executive member of one of Hong Kong’s main women’s
health clinics that is also located next to the same MTR station. She is a familiar face in a neighborhood which is currently undergoing much change and gentrification. Older residents of the area know her through her advocacy work and they continue to drop by her office – which also serves as a communal meeting space – to catch up on happenings of the neighborhood. Though retired from her work at the clinic, at eighty-four year old, she also sits on the executive board of one of Hong Kong’s largest women’s groups and is a member of the PRC’s advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. One of the concerns of the women’s group is to address the needs of new immigrant women in Hong Kong. While Mrs. Cheung described the work the group did, she noted that while she was sympathetic to the problems the women faced with regard to employment, language difficulties, and access to healthcare; however, as she added, “we’re aware of the difficulties they face, and we’ll help them and provide them with the training. It’s hard, I had to deal with adjusting to Hong Kong when I moved here” (Interview by author).

Briefly diverging from our previous conversation, Mrs. Cheung began to tell me about her “escape” from China as a young woman. Mrs. Cheung had come from a fairly well to do family in Shanghai. “My mother was quite forward thinking and insisted that all her daughters had to get an education. And so I went to school and university,” she continued, “so we lived comfortably. Up until my twenties, I didn’t really know what it was like to suffer hardships.” Prior to the victory of the CCP in 1949, Mrs. Cheung was a few months shy of finishing her university degree. Her
father, as a high-ranking member of the Nationalist government had already left Shanghai and had relocated to Hong Kong. “My brothers and younger sister joined him after he arrived, and they pleaded for me to join them,” Mrs. Cheung recalled, “I, however, really wanted to stay in Shanghai and finish my degree. The school was aware that a Communist victory was likely to happen and they said that I could just hand in my final thesis and graduate.” In the end, Mrs. Cheung finished her lectures and her thesis, but didn’t get a chance to take any of the exams or attend her graduation. She quickly left in haste and with one small suitcase and travelled to Hong Kong. “I only had a few outfits with me, but everything else I loved, I had left behind in Shanghai. See, we thought that our stay in Hong Kong was going to be a temporary one. During World War II, when Shanghai was attacked, we took one suitcase and fled to Guangzhou, then Hong Kong. But we returned shortly after. We thought that 1949 would be the same. So all I had was my one suitcase, and I had to start anew in Hong Kong.” While it’s clear that Mrs. Cheung, who had come from a well-off family likely had a less traumatic migration experience than other economic or political refugees, we are reminded of the sacrifices she made as a young woman. “At that time Hong Kong, as a city, was a lot poorer than Shanghai, and I didn’t like it at all” Mrs. Cheung said. Mrs. Cheung’s comment underscores the comfortable lifestyle she had given up in Hong Kong. However, as a young, well-connected, well-educated woman who was fluent in English, Mrs. Cheung’s main sacrifice was leaving the job opportunities that could have been available to her elsewhere in China or in the West. Because of her family, Mrs. Cheung stayed in Hong Kong and took up
a low-level job at a trading company. When I asked her if she would ever return to Shanghai, Mrs. Cheung shook her head, “No. Everything I need is here now and I’ve done quite well for myself. I have no reason to move back to Shanghai.” Of course, the majority of migrants who came to Hong Kong in the 1950s and 1960s were not as wealthy or as well educated as Mrs. Cheung. Their stories likewise draw upon the theme of sacrifice but of a different type of sacrifice.

Janet W. Salaff, Siu-lun Wong, and Arent Greve’s recent publication follows the migration stories of nine Hong Kong families (2010). Not surprisingly, survival and sacrifice are common themes features in the compilation of migration stories. For instance, one individual in the compilation, Cheung-Kwok, recalls how his family was displaced and forced to come to Hong Kong after the CCP appropriated his father’s land and property. “Because of that, I didn’t go to school until I was ten. Then when I finished, I had to go to work and give half my earning to my younger brothers to go to school.” Later on, Cheung-Kwok recalls his living situation as a new immigrant child in Hong Kong, “I didn’t know the meaning of breakfast or dinner. We’d wait until Father or Mother returned from work and eat what they brought. Usually it was a bun. I slept in the hallway of our Lei Cheng Uk housing estate room on a rattan mat” (Salaff, Wong, and Greve 2010, 36). As Salaff, Wong and Greve show, resourcefulness and putting family survival before one’s own interests were common narratives.
In these memories and stories of border crossings, especially those that took place in the 1950s-1970s, the border is remembered as a perilous liminal space. The tales are also about the heroism, survival and sacrifice endured while crossing this liminal border space. Those who crossed the border and came to call Hong Kong their new home saw themselves as a community of displaced people who had shared the experience of crossing the border, enduring hardships and overcoming adversity together. In almost all instances, after “starting anew” in Hong Kong many also spoke of their upward mobility and weren’t shy to stress the material rewards and opportunities that were made available to them upon settling in Hong Kong.

Certainly, given the economic growth and industrial development of Hong Kong at the time, it was likely that many would find prospects and employment in Hong Kong that were not available to them in Mainland China at the time. For those individuals who crossed the border in search of political or economic refuge, the journey across the border came to signify a transition into a new (oftentimes more prosperous) chapter of their life. So much so that during the waves of migration that took place in the mid-twentieth century two terms became popularized and used to refer to Hong Kong: *fook dei* (福地) – prosperous land and *teen tong* (天堂) – heaven (K. C. Chan 2007, 382). While referring to Hong Kong as such has become less common today, they are still heard frequently among the older generations in Hong Kong as I was reminded of during the lead up to one of Hong Kong’s typhoon seasons. That August, the weather observatory had predicted that a particularly ruthless typhoon was making its way to Hong Kong. The eye of the storm was predicted to pass right over
Hong Kong and residents were told to prepare for the typhoon appropriately. On the bus ride home, I overheard two elderly women in conversation with each other. One was asking the other if she was scared about the typhoon and whether or not she had stocked up on food at home. The other elderly woman quickly replied, “Don’t be silly. Of course I’m not scared. Hong Kong’s a fook dei and we’ll be safe and protected.”

These tales and recollections of the border not only compliment the localized founding myth but have become a focal part of it. Part of this can be explained by the fact that those who created the myth were likely to have either experienced such a border crossing during the 1950s or 1960s, or knew someone who had done so. By sharing these stories (common stories, I might add) today, the myth is perpetuated and naturalized. In short, the border crossing experience brought people together via their memories. By the end of the 1970s and well into the 1980s and 1990s, China would embark on a new developmental path. Part of this new economic reform would entail the opening up of the border to Hong Kong business interests. By way of such reforms, the border was rearticulated and remembered in a different way.

Open borders, open markets and “open women”

In 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China began its foray into liberalizing the Chinese state-owned and controlled economy. Part of Deng’s economic reform policies included the gradual opening of the Chinese market and the
introduction of foreign trade and foreign direct investment opportunities. Through the creation of special economic zones (SEZs), many of which were located across the border in Guangdong, the Chinese state was able to experiment and tinker with China’s economic reforms, and observe the managerial practices and technologies in the day-to-day operations at a distance from Beijing (Harvey 2005, 130). The close proximity to Hong Kong meant that regional and more importantly, economic ties were re-established. As David Harvey notes, the role of Hong Kong investors and the Chinese business diaspora was crucial in the establishment of the Special Economic Zones and in the later creation of open coastal cities and open economic regions (Ibid.). During the early 1990s, as much as two-thirds of the foreign direct investment in the area was made possible through deals with Hong Kong and Taiwanese investors (Ibid., 136). I argue that for Hong Kongers during this period, the border is remembered as signifying the entryway into a new set of economic opportunities, such as business ventures, manufacturing and capital. The economic reform and opening of the border also meant the creation of a new type of workforce. By the late 1980s large numbers of Hong Kong men frequently crossed the border into China for work, sometimes for long periods of time, and would thus establish relationships and families on the Mainland. As such, for many men, the opening of the border also signified the entryway for new social and marriage opportunities. Unfortunately, beginning in this period, pernicious gendered stereotypes also began to emerge about Mainland Chinese women, stereotypes that still exist today.
Alvin So identifies two forms of cross-border families which are often determined by the social and economic class of the male breadwinner (2003). The first type of family involves white-collar businessmen, managers, technicians and supervisors who cross into Guangdong for lengthy stays at a time. These men engage in the phenomenon known as the second-wife phenomenon (Tam 1996). Such relationships are usually long term and monogamous. The men often provide their mistresses with regular financial support and a household while still in a legal marriage with their partners in Hong Kong. The second type of cross-border families involves working class, blue-collar workers such as truck drivers and construction workers. These men were typically old in age, less educated and recent immigrants to Hong Kong. Unlike women in the first type of women in cross-border families, women in these relationships are known as “first wives” as the men were not engaging in an extra-marital relationship (A. Y. So 2003, 524–525; Newendorp 2008b, 74). Women who become second-wives or mistresses are said to have been younger in age and better educated than women who marry the second group of men (So 2003). Nevertheless, for almost all of the women who engaged in cross-border relationships, as suggested by Cindy C. Fan and Ling Li, marriage was often a way in which women could “move to more favorable locations” (Fan and Li 2002). As Nicole Newendorp astutely recalls from her fieldwork, “none of [her] informants cited “marriage” as a primary reason for originally leaving home, but that does not mean that these women were not aware that their moves to urban areas might carry with

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95 Monogamous in that both partners do not have relationships with other partners in China.
them the possibility of marriage to either urban-dwelling Chinese men, or possibly, to Hong Kong or foreign men” (Newendorp 2008b, 78). Aihwa Ong further suggests that for many women, cross-border marriages are a source of network capital (Ong 1999, 155). I would add that cross-border marriages could also be considered as a source of cultural capital. For many women, the move to an urban city and establishing a relationship with a Hong Kong man signifies the transition from a rural, “backward” subject into a modern, cosmopolitan, autonomous subject (Hershatter 2007, 73). Nevertheless, it should also be noted that many women also experienced “downward mobility” upon their move to Hong Kong. Hong Kong legislation and bureaucracy meant that women often had to wait a decade or so following their marriage before they could legally migrate to Hong Kong. Upon arriving in Hong Kong, language difficulties or a lack of education often hinder the women from finding employment. In addition the downward mobility, these women are also viewed in a negative light by the Hong Kong media, popular press and many Hong Kongers.

Siumi Tam and Alvin So write about how the Hong Kong public responded to the second-wife phenomenon. Much of the reception can be traced to the Hong Kong mass media’s gendered portrayal of the “first wives” in Hong Kong as women who had “let themselves go” – such women are neglectful, unattractive, ignorant and dull. In contrast, the second wives are depicted as beautiful, young, self-less, and subservient women who provide a nurturing, comfortable living environment for the
men who stay in Mainland China for long periods of time. As second wives, these women provide psychological care and comfort, home-cooked meals, and sexual intimacy (A. Y. So 2003, 522; Lang and Smart 2002). In contrast to the loving, caring, understanding depiction of the second-wife stands the image of the seductress, the dalumei – a young, money-hungry, highly sexualized woman. In such instances, the men are portrayed as innocent bystanders, who are seduced by mainland women at karaoke bars. In all the above instances, the men are rarely held responsible for their actions; rather gendered stereotypes have facilitated the normalization and acceptance of the phenomenon (Tam 1996). Twenty years on, these stereotypes and gendered depictions still remain.

One afternoon, I met two friends for lunch, both of whom were professional women working for a large international law firm and had spent a considerable amount of time in Mainland China. One woman, Jenny, was about to get married in a few months time, and shortly after our lunch arrived, the topic shifted to discussions about her wedding preparations, and marriage and divorce in general. Jenny’s friend, Leslie, who had just gotten a divorce, asked Jenny if she had thought about a prenuptial agreement. As a lawyer, Leslie claimed to have heard from her colleagues who had handled divorce cases that marriages between Hong Kong men and Mainland Chinese women typically ended in a long, drawn out litigation process. Getting increasingly heated in the discussion, Leslie exclaimed loudly, “Mainland women are really cutthroat. I mean, when I got divorced, we split everything fifty-fifty. Ok, sometimes
you hear about women who get a little more than 50 percent, but Mainland women, somehow they manage to get like 80 percent or 90 percent! They just take everything and leave nothing for the man!” I was surprised to hear such comments from Leslie.

As a lawyer in a large firm, she often spent a lot of time on the Mainland for business trips and had plenty of Mainland Chinese friends and colleagues in the Hong Kong office. Furthermore, Leslie’s parents had both moved from Hong Kong to Beijing and had lived there for over a decade; Leslie would often visit her parents there during the holidays. In fact, Leslie had admitted to me once, that she sometimes felt “more at home” in Beijing than Hong Kong, despite having grown up in Hong Kong. And yet, despite having spent a considerable amount of time in Mainland China, and despite having friends and colleagues who were from the Mainland, such gendered stereotypes remain. The gendered stereotype of the Mainland women is further cemented through recent debates surrounding the phenomenon of Mainland mothers.

As mentioned in Chapter One, since the court ruling on right of abode legislation in 2001 there has been an increase in women partaking in what is colloquially called “birth tourism.” As per the Basic Law, children who are born in Hong Kong to Chinese-born parents are eligible for Hong Kong’s medical, educational and social welfare benefits, and citizenship rights in Hong Kong. One statistic notes that of the 88,000 babies born in 2010, half were born to Mainland mothers (Yang 2013). In many ways, these women are not dissimilar to the women who give birth to the pejoratively termed “anchor babies” in the United States - both sets of women are
seen by some as breaking the law, reaping welfare benefits and residency rights.

Speaking to a new mother during my fieldwork, I asked her of her experience at the obstetrician and hospital during her pregnancy. Kathy was quick to respond: “During my first visit to the doctors, right after I found out I was pregnant, she told me that the first thing I had to do was go reserve a space in the hospital for the delivery date. I also had to put down a deposit. It was crazy since we still had nine months to go! I’m lucky because my doctor works at a private hospital. I hear it’s even more crowded in public hospitals. That’s not to say that mainland women aren’t going to private doctors though. You see them in the clinic too with their agents” (Interview with author). Birth tourism has become such a popular phenomenon that small businesses have started up to assist the women. Agents typically charge a sum of money and provide services such as hospital bookings, visas, and transportation (Lafraniere 2012). Mainland mothers are depicted as seen as non-tax payers who are reaping Hong Kong’s social welfare benefits and “cheat the system.” Lastly, not only are the mothers blamed in this instance, but they are additionally seen as reckless, selfish and putting their child’s life in danger for not going to necessary prenatal checkups and for making the long journey and crossing the border close to the date of their child’s birth and sometimes during labor (Yang 2013; Lafraniere 2012).

The opening of the border during the 1980s and 1990s also meant that travel restrictions to China were eased. A large portion of the Hong Kong population who had previously had little to no contact with Mainland China were returning to their
ancestral homes for the first time in decades to reunite with distant relatives.\textsuperscript{96} Stark differences between living standards in Hong Kong and Mainland China were noticed. Those who were travelling to their ancestral home for the first time were also the generation of Hong Kongers who not only engendered the localized founding myth, but also identified themselves as Hong Kongers – a fairly new legal category that was partly a state-building project by the colonial state in the 1970s. For this group of individuals, the border during this time is remembered as separating Hong Kong – with its successful thriving economy – from Mainland China – a nation that needed to be developed and modernized. A friend, Angie, recalled the first time she went back to her father’s ancestral home for a short vacation. “I hated it,” she expressed. “To me, summer holidays were supposed to be about going out with your friends. But each year, my parents insisted that we had to visit our aunties and uncles in Mainland China. I just thought things were so primitive there. And I hated going to the bathroom. It wasn’t like anything we had in Hong Kong, it was more of an outhouse.” Angie continued, “Of course, I look back and I just laugh. Last year, I spent almost half a year doing charity work with the church in China. And I seem to be spending more and more time there for work” (Interview by author). The opening of the border also meant that philanthropic groups and regional associations, which had been relatively dormant, became active again. Since well before the border was cemented in 1950, individual Hong Kongers, community groups and regional

\textsuperscript{96} As Elizabeth Sinn has noted, while travel to China was particularly difficult during the 1950s-1970s, a small number regional associations in Hong Kong did assist in organizing trips back to ancestral villages and native places (1997, 386–387).
associations have remitted money to China for disaster relief aid and public works, and the participation of local politics – this was especially true of the period up until 1949 (Sinn 1997). As China’s new economic policies came into fruition in the late 1970s, Hong Kongers and regional associations from around the world strengthened and renewed ties with their native place for investment purposes, cultural integration, aid and the strengthening of the Chinese Diaspora (Sinn 1997; Candela 2013).

Memories of the border in the 1980s and 1990s are largely shaped by the changing economic climate in the Pearl River Delta. The border during this period is remembered as the entryway for new economic partnership and opportunities; as separating a successful capitalist economy from a nation in need of economic development and modernity; and lastly, and perhaps most pernicious, as separating “honest” Hong Kong women from “deviant” Mainland women. Especially with regard to the latter signification, one can see how the border would eventually come to signify the separation of Hong Kong and Mainland China – “the Other.” This would appear to go against the common belief that as the border gradually re-opened and became more porous (especially after 1997), Hong Kong would effortlessly integrate with the rest of the Pearl River Delta. As I show in the next section, this was not the case. While there was a period of renewed relations with Mainland China and a renewed interest in travel to China from Hong Kong, following the outbreak of SARS in 2003 Hong Kong relations with the Mainland soured.
The outbreak of 2003 and the subsequent discursive construction of the Other

Towards the end of 2002, rumors of an atypical flu-like disease began circulating in Guangdong. Newspaper reports in Hong Kong began to report on the increased sale of vinegar, facemasks and bleach across the border. Following the avian flu outbreak in 1997, local health officials were aware of the potential severity of another outbreak, and tried to quickly identify the infection and possible sources of outbreak for this new disease. However, as is public knowledge today, while the Chinese state had been battling to identify the source of contagion and were recording new cases daily the results were not circulated widely, nor were they reported to the World Health Organization (WHO). Some even argue that local legislation in China had been put in place which would prevent any public reporting or sharing of the outbreak (Huang 2003). Despite the initial state secrecy behind the outbreak, Chinese mobile phone users and Internet chat-room users had already taken to message boards and forwarding text messages alerting fellow web users and mobile phone users of a “fatal flu” (Fidler 2004, 74). At the start of 2003, a Chinese physician who had been treating patients in Guangdong and exhibited symptoms of the infection checked into the Metropole Hotel in Hong Kong. Soon after, twelve other guests would later be diagnosed with that same infection which came to be called SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome). The various hotel guests, unaware of the virility of the infection, returned to their home country where they were later hospitalized. As new cases were reported in Canada, Taiwan, Australia and Singapore, the disease quickly

97 Vinegar is said to have anti-bacterial or disinfectant properties and boiling vinegar is believed to be a way to disinfect the air.
became identified as worldwide health threat. A number of the guests, including the physician from Guangdong, remained in Hong Kong and sought treatment in the city, and in doing so further spread the infection. By March the Hong Kong government had alerted the WHO about the flu-like epidemic. As the daily number of infected individuals grew, outbreaks occurred in a large public hospital and a residential building in Hong Kong and subsequently made Hong Kong a “SARS hotspot.”

This was certainly not the first time that Hong Kong had been taken by an epidemic that came from outside the city’s waters. Given Hong Kong’s locality as a colonial port city and its adjacency to Mainland China, it has historically been susceptible to disease outbreaks. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the crown colony faced endless malaria outbreaks – dubbed by the British as “the Hong Kong fever” (Cowell 2013), the bubonic plague of 1894, the cholera outbreak of 1862, and tuberculosis outbreaks. Charlotte Furth has noted how port cities in China were particularly susceptible to serving as testing grounds or laboratories for disease control. In many instances, treaty ports were also spaces in which new forms of urban architecture, governance and surveillance could be practiced (Furth 2010), and the case can certainly be made for Hong Kong in the twenty-first century. Today, Hong Kong is a major travel hub in East Asia with massive numbers of travelers coming in and out of Hong Kong on a daily basis by planes, cruises or trains, it’s not surprising that Hong Kong is particularly susceptible to the outbreak of diseases. In fact, in 1997 Hong Kong succumbed to a particularly virulent mutation of the Avian Flu. Fueled by the
rumors that had already been circulating about a mysterious illness on the Mainland, and since the initial point of contagion of the Avian Flu was traced back to a poultry-market and slaughterhouse in Guangdong, the public and health officials hypothesized that the origin of the disease likewise came from across the border.

I submit that during the SARS outbreak of 2003, a narrative dominated the discourse of the outbreak which highlighted perceived distinctions between the people of Hong Kong and the people of Mainland China, many of which were factually untrue and were variations of already present stereotypes. The narrative depicted the epidemic as one that was brought to Hong Kong by way of the unhygienic, irresponsible, and superstitious eating habits of the Mainland Chinese. As such, the narrative identified the Mainland Chinese as scapegoats. Not only were Mainland Chinese seen as different and almost “exotic,” but more importantly, the Mainland Chinese were not to be trusted.98 The similarities of this discourse with discourses seen during the bubonic plague, tuberculosis and cholera outbreaks in the early colonial years are striking and can be seen as one of the many British colonial legacies. For instance, following the plague of 1894, subsequent tuberculosis outbreaks were associated with the local Chinese and their poor living conditions, poor personal hygiene, uncivilized mannerisms and poor public health awareness.99 Such health discourses were

98 This was especially true after it was revealed that the Chinese state did not go public about the outbreak on the Mainland until a later date.
99 Reports put out by the 1900-1912 medical director, J.M. Atkinson, links the disease to “inveterate habit of lower class Chinese of spitting in public buildings, offices, staircases, footpaths and wharves,” Atkinson would also later refer to the local Chinese as “living incubators of the disease” (M. Jones 2003, 666–667).
appropriated and mimicked by local Hong Kongers and reproduced during the outbreak in 2003. The narrative allowed for a further entrenchment of stereotypes and perceived differences in cultural and social practices between Hong Kongers and those from Mainland China.

The narrative, which was commonly heard during and after the outbreak, alluded to the idea that the people of Hong Kong were more hygienic, scientifically advanced and modernized than the Mainland Chinese. From an analysis of my interviews and various newspaper reports from that period, Hong Kongers would complain of how the Chinese frequently spat, urinated and defecated on floors in public spaces. In addition, Hong Kongers would comment on the “disturbing” Mainland Chinese eating habits and their over-reliance on Chinese medicine, which many believed led to the transmission of the SARS virus from different species.\textsuperscript{100} Not only did the eating of such “exotic” animals for “health reasons” question the validity of and threaten Western public health and hygiene discourses appropriated by the local Hong Kong people, but as Mei Zhan argues, it “indexe[d] an exoticized bodily continuity between the wild animal and the Chinese people who readily consume it” (Zhan 2005, 33). At the core of this narrative is the Hong Kong people’s desire to overcome the outbreak for the betterment of Hong Kong. Hong Kong in this narrative is understood as a modern, autonomous, global city; a city with transparency, scientific

\textsuperscript{100} As Marta E. Hanson argues, Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) was actually a successful form of medication for a large number of patients. In many instances, medical professionals would incorporate aspects of TCM to Western medical practices (Hanson 2010).
progress and a healthy economy. The Hong Kong health authorities worked hard to educate the Hong Kong public on ways to avoid transmission of the disease. Hong Kongers, as modern, civilized, disciplined bodies needed to discipline themselves accordingly. For instance, a “true Hong Konger” knew that they were supposed to wash their hands frequently, wear a face mask, and, if ill, they had to stay at home so to not risk infecting others. Employers were asked to hand out facemasks to all their employees and were expected to inform their colleagues should anyone fall ill with symptoms of the flu. In a conversation with a friend Daisy, a student at the time of the outbreak, I was told about how “getting through SARS was just part of a new daily routine.” She continued, “I remember that I would put on my face mask before leaving the house and when I arrived at school, I would get my temperature taken. Then I would wash my hands with hand disinfectant. Every few hours, I would change my facemask. I would only take off the mask when I came back home. During that period I really stayed at home for most of it.” When I asked if anything beneficial came out of the outbreak she responded, “Well, people really stepped up and cooperated with each other. Everyone’s much more aware of what to do if you’re sick. It’s normal to put on a facemask – you just don’t want to get any others sick. Of course, people are also a lot more aware if others around them are sick. Also, you see

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101 An example of this can be found at the Hong Kong Museum of Medical Sciences. The museum has a small gallery concentrating on the SARS outbreak of 2003. Throughout the exhibition, one is constantly reminded at various stages of Hong Kong’s modernity, its strong scientific community and a healthy economy that bounced back after the outbreak. For instance, in a display addressing factors that helped combat the disease were: diligent health care workers; a communication system which relied on cooperation between residents, the Police force, the medical community, scientists and the state; an advanced medical and scientific community; and an active participation in public health and hygiene.
hand disinfectant everywhere, and public places are cleaned more often. I guess that’s a good thing” (Personal conversation with author). My conversation with Daisy shows how even today, “responsible individuals” such as Daisy continue to discipline themselves, and understood that the disease was combated through the coming together of Hong Kongers, health care workers, scientists and the state.

I was also struck by something else Daisy said. “You can always tell if someone’s not from Hong Kong, or didn’t go through what we went through. For instance, if you sneeze on the MTR, Hong Kongers might move to another seat or move away from the person who sneezed. I guess Hong Kong people are just a little bit more aware about hygiene and things like that. Mainlanders on the other hand, they just spit on the street, they don’t cover their mouth when the sneeze. It’s disgusting! And it doesn’t seem like they care if the person next to them is hacking away either.” In this instance it became clear how prevalent the narrative still was, even in 2011. Daisy’s comment suggests that the negative associations with Mainland Chinese that became publicly voiced during the outbreak still exist and that Mainlanders are still identified as “the Other.” In this instance, the Mainland Chinese’s lack of self-discipline, their questionable personal hygiene and disregard for the public health and hygiene of others differentiates Hong Kongers from Mainland Chinese. The Mainland Chinese’s lack of discipline is also highlighted in the Museum of Medical Sciences exhibit. In the exhibit, in a poster titled “Why did the SARS coronavirus suddenly infect man?” a number of convergent factors are listed: the destruction of wild animals’ habitat, a
demand for wild game meat for human consumption, overcrowded animals in markets, and a large wildlife market. The last three factors speak directly to practices that take place in Mainland China.

The perceived differences that were highlighted in the SARS narrative, as mentioned earlier, was similar to the colonial discourses of disease in Hong Kong’s early colonial period. The Europeans believed that not only were the Chinese’s squalid living condition mostly to blame for the bubonic plague, but their inability to follow the “rules” and “behavior” within a modern, “civilized” society was partially responsible for the disease. Recognizing the dire situation and the potential damage to the trade industry, the colonial government quickly took on a campaign to wipe out the disease. Despite the disease’s indiscriminate nature, the intrusive campaign mostly targeted the local Chinese population and their day-to-day activities. In a similar way, the Hong Kong state began a campaign to wipe out SARS which included the implementation of travel advisories where people were urged to cancel unnecessary travel to and from Mainland China. Cross-border surveillance was increased. For instance, visitors were reminded before leaving their destination that should they fall ill or exhibit symptoms, they were to alert the appropriate authorities. If arriving by plane, all travelers were required to watch a video on disease prevention prior to landing. Travelers also had to fill out a health declaration form prior to

102 For example, the densely populated area Tai Ping Shan was cordoned off. Elsewhere residents were relocated or had to endure house inspections. Anyone who was found sick during the inspections were forcefully removed and quarantined on a ship, while their house was fumigated and condemned (Yip 2009, 18; Lei 2010, 83).
arrival, and go through two infra-red thermometer scans before they could finally enter Hong Kong. If found with symptoms, or suspected of having symptoms, travelers would be quarantined for days before being allowed to enter Hong Kong.

Six years after the change in sovereignty, there was a marked level of uncertainty regarding the future of Hong Kong, and it was the first time such a fissure between the two identities (a Hong Kong identity and a Mainland Chinese identity) had been so explicitly expressed since 1997. As Jennifer Eagleton has suggested, the disease itself served as a “‘blank screen’ onto which various fears could be projected” (2004, 34): These fears and anxieties included Hong Kong’s political future, its sovereignty, the gradual reopening of the border and rulings on the right of abode, among other things. The discourse, which highlighted perceived differences and antagonisms, allowed the people of Hong Kong to negotiate and renegotiate their socio-political and place-based identities. As mentioned throughout the dissertation, while not a nation, the Hong Kong place-based identity shares a number of similarities with how scholars have typically understood nationalism and national identities. For instance, Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and Ruth Wodak et al.’s understanding of a national habitus is particularly useful in analyzing the discourse. The idea of a national habitus is: “… a complex of common ideas, concepts or perception schemes, (a) of related emotional attitudes intersubjectively shared within a specific group of persons; (b) as well as of similar behavioral dispositions; (c) all of which are internalized through ‘national’ socialization” (Wodak et al. 1999, 55). A national
habitus is also contingent upon stereotypes and perceptions of the Other (in this case, mainland Chinese); such stereotypes often lead to the creation of behavioral dispositions which “…include both dispositions towards solidarity with one’s own national group as well as the readiness to exclude the ‘others’ from this constructed collective and to debase them” (Ibid.). It can be argued that while the national habitus that exists in Hong Kong is historically contingent upon its colonial past, as Andreas Pickel reminds us, it can also be renegotiated according to different beliefs, values, attitudes and worldviews (2004, 346). The appropriation of a modern, Western health discourse and specific views toward hygiene exemplify a common conception and “behavioral disposition” shared by, and appropriated by, the people of Hong Kong. Moreover, the experience of overcoming the outbreak together as a community is something that was particularly emphasized during and after the outbreak. In this instance, the discursive construction of identities is contingent upon the past, the present and the future (Wodak et al. 1999, 26). Lastly, as Alison Bashford has argued, the act of quarantine during an epidemic is an important practice which can further enable the imagining of a geo-body (2004).

Following the end of the outbreak, it became evident that Mainland bureaucrats’ need for secrecy and the Hong Kong government’s tardy response were partly responsible for the rapid spread of the disease in the city. Scientists and microbiologists soon put early rumors about the disease being spread through eating habits that many Hong Kongers associated with the Mainland Chinese to rest. However, what remained in
the minds of many Hong Kongers was the role cross-border movement played in the outbreak of disease and the shared understanding that the border ought to be policed closely or even closed.

In the aftermath of the outbreak, the government announced a HK$11.8 billion SARS relief package which would provide tax reliefs, lowered rental rates and rebates across the city (“Hong Kong Unveils Aid Package” 2003). As Hong Kong was preparing to be lifted from the World Health Organization’s “Infected Areas” list in June 2003, the government also announced a cross-border effort to help the economy and travel industry: the Individual Visit Scheme – a relaxation of travel restrictions on individuals from Mainland China who in the past could only enter Hong Kong on a business or group travel visa. The scheme was at first made available to individuals from neighboring Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai and other major Chinese cities, and was later expanded to thirty other cities. Of course, while the increase in tourism and the prospect ought to have been a welcome idea, for many Hong Kongers the scheme was a reminder of how a porous border led to the outbreak in the first place.\(^{103}\) If anything, the belief was that the border ought to be cemented with heavier restrictions placed on those coming across the border. After all, as it was argued, a closed border with restricted travel allowed Hong Kong medical professionals to control and manage the disease. The government was quick to point out that while the Individual

\(^{103}\) In the past few years, a small contingent of Hong Kongers have taken to filming Mainland Chinese tourists fighting, spitting, urinating and defecating in public places on their cell-phones and uploading the footage to sites like YouTube. Certainly while there is an aspect of shaming these individuals, it is not uncommon for viewers to react by bringing up the SARS outbreak.
Visit Scheme would mean even more travelers passing through overland checkpoints, border safety would not be compromised and the number of border patrol staff would be increased and travelers would be monitored more closely. At the land crossings between Hong Kong and Mainland China, customs checks stepped up for fear that those travelling from mainland China to Hong Kong were attempting to smuggle wildlife such as “exotic animals” or poultry and wild game for consumption – a remnant of the initial rumor that the “exotic” eating habits were to blame for the outbreak of SARS. To this day, any signs of mysterious flu-like outbreaks are quickly reported on the nightly news and in newspapers. The Department of Health and news reporters will make a point of indicating whether an individual had travelled to or from Mainland China or if the patient had had any contact with individuals from Mainland China (Centre for Health Protection 2009) – and was especially true during the Swine Flu epidemic in 2009. Almost all reports of the mysterious illnesses (some of which can’t even be considered as an outbreak, but rather as isolated cases) are framed in a way that suggests that mysterious diseases only “come” to Hong Kong across the border, and that new diseases could not possibly be developed in Hong Kong.

Today, most discussion of SARS is reserved for medical journals, medical museums, Hollywood movies,\textsuperscript{104} and as a case study for future “outbreak scenarios.” An earlier version of this chapter was presented at a conference in 2008. As the panel finished

\textsuperscript{104} The plot of the 2011 Hollywood movie \textit{Contagion} was based on the SARS outbreak.
and I exited the room, a fellow panelist turned to me and asked, “Is SARS still even relevant in Hong Kong? Do people even talk about it anymore?” While SARS, for the majority of people in Hong Kong, is a thing of the past, and was, to put it crudely, a hump that the people of Hong Kong had to get over, I maintain that the legacies of the divisive discourse that arose out of the SARS outbreak still remain, and is one of the most relevant legacies of the outbreak. Following the SARS outbreak, a growing public discourse depicted Mainland Chinese as untrustworthy, incapable of safeguarding public health, superstitious and “exotic.” The belief that Mainland Chinese are “reckless”, “callous” and “selfish” are further entrenched in stories by bystanders and Internet users who upload videos of Mainland Chinese tourists defecating, urinating, and spitting on the streets of Hong Kong Internet. The border and its closure during the outbreak are remembered as being key to combating the outbreak.

V. CONCLUSION: LOCUSTS AT THE BORDER

Ten years after the outbreak of SARS, Hong Kongers frequently travel across the border for a plethora of reasons and crossing the border from Hong Kong into Mainland China is something that is not out of the ordinary. In addition to travelling for work-related issues, many see neighboring Guangdong as a place of leisure: many middle to upper-class individuals in Hong Kong have second homes or holiday homes in Guangdong; others like to play golf in the golf courses; many people cross the

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105 For example, see “Hong Kongers irked by Mainland Chinese habits” on Al Jazeera English (2012).
borders for cheap shopping, tailored clothes and access to knock-off goods; whereas others will cross the border for a weekend trip of pampering at the spa; and those with children might go on a family trip to one of the zoos or amusement parks. An acquaintance of mine, Alice, was getting her apartment renovated in Hong Kong. And while she could have gone shopping for hardware in Hong Kong, she told me how she and her husband found raw materials such as tiles, faucets, showerheads, curtains and even furniture much cheaper across the border. The couple would spend every weekend for about a month sourcing materials for their renovation project. When I asked her if it was a hassle, she shook her head, “No. The guys there say they get a lot of Hong Kong customers. It’s easy. You cross the border and then you take the subway a few stops. In this one building they have everything you need: one floor for tiles, one for wooden boards, one for bathroom fixings.” When I asked how she knew where to go, she told me that many of her friends had done a similar thing. “If you look in home design magazines, you’ll often see that a lot of the materials are sourced in Shenzhen. And it’s not necessarily of a worse quality – all the stuff you see on Lockhart Road they have in China” (Interview with author).

Of course, when I asked if they felt or acted differently when crossing the border, many responded and said that they felt “less safe.” In describing her renovation project experience, Alice mentioned that there were times when her husband could not go with her to Shenzhen. However, she wasn’t worried because she never had to

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106 Countless home improvement stores line this road in Wanchai.
spend much time on the streets of Shenzhen itself: “Instead of taking the subway straight to the building, I would take the train to Lo Wu, cross the border, and as soon as I exited the immigration building I would hop into a taxi or a shuttle bus which took me directly to the home improvement building. And when you leave, there are taxis and shuttle buses that take you directly back to Lo Wu” (Interview with author).

The border has also been imagined as a space that separates safety, law and order from disorder, crime, and danger. Individuals I spoke with would mention how they would always be careful of scams, deals or pick-pocketers. Much of this can be tied to the plethora of media reports that followed the rise in cross border crime associated with the opening of the border. Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo’s study in part documents the ways in which the media reports about criminal activity across the Hong Kong and Chinese border (criminal activity which includes prostitution, human smuggling, kidnapping, youth crime, drug trade, the counterfeit market, and more bizarrely, “tree smuggling”) (2009). The border as a liminal space that is perceived to separate danger from safety has been discussed throughout this chapter. The examples of the missing teenager Yu Man Hon, the dangerous eating habits of Mainland Chinese, the mysterious diseases that originate from Mainland China are present in Hong Kongers’ memories and shape a particular understanding of the border and what is on the other side of it. In addition to understanding the border as demarcating safety from danger, the journey one takes to cross the border is also remembered as a risky journey.
By 2012, the daily operations of the birth tourism industry became public knowledge and public pressure was put upon the government, hospitals and the Immigration Department to address the issue. The Immigration Department stepped up to be cross-border inspections, and in a series of press releases described their attempts at curbing birth tourism. The cases presented in these press releases included the arrest of Mainland Chinese women who presented fraudulent medical documentation to border control agents, and Mainland Chinese residents in Hong Kong who worked in cooperation with Shenzhen health clinics and escorted pregnant women across the border (Hong Kong Immigration Department 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 2012d).

Beginning in 2012, the Hong Kong government began implementing a quota system that would cap the number of Mainland women admitted to the hospital. By the beginning of 2013, the government took further steps and implemented a zero-quota approach to birth tourism. In the example of the “Mainland Mothers,” the women are depicted as conniving, frauds, relentless, and in some instances, as criminals.

In September 2012, a number of scuffles and short-lived rallies took place in the border town of Sheung Shui. Local Sheung Shui residents were seen shouting and harassing mainland travelers who were about to board the train to the Lo Wu station. Some at the rally took to waving the colonial Hong Kong flag. In recent months,

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107 It’s also worth noting that in a number of the press releases, the Immigration Department indicated that those assisting the birth tourism operations on the Hong Kong side were “Mainland residents” and not simply residents. To highlight the “Mainland-ness” of these residents suggests in some way that despite having the legal right to live in Hong Kong, they were not true Hong Kongers.

108 Under the new zero-quota approach, only Mainland Chinese with a Hong Kong husband are allowed to enter Hong Kong and be admitted to public and private hospitals.
shops in the Sheung Shui area were reportedly selling out of household goods at an
incredibly fast rate. Items such as bottled water, toilet paper, detergent, and milk
powder were nowhere to be found in local supermarkets, and any goods that were left
on the shelf were accompanied by an inflated price tag. With the introduction of
multi-permit entry visas for Guangzhou residents, Sheung Shui had been hit
particularly hard by “parallel traders” or “mules.” Residents of Sheung Shui had long
been making complaints that the traders not only bought out supplies in neighborhood
stores, or were causing prices to go up, but were also a physical obstacle and blocked
pavements and streets. Many of the traders come to Hong Kong to pick up their
goods in bulk and return across the border within a few hours. Like drug mules, the
individuals do not work for themselves but are part of a larger operation. The goods
that make it back across the border are re-sold across the border in various shops with
the guarantee that the goods, since coming from Hong Kong, are less likely to be
counterfeit or tainted. In response to the rallies to “reclaim Sheung Shui”, the
government worked closely with cross-border law enforcement agencies to crack
down on the traders. In one crackdown, up to 130 traders were arrested, detained and
deported.

This incident is another example that shows Hong Kongers growing increasingly
frustrated with Mainlanders crossing the ever-increasing porous border. Like the
Mainland mothers, the Mainland investors, and the Mainland property buyers, many
Hong Kongers see the mules as corrupting and sullying what the border represents
(an entryway into a community seeking refuge, and a community championing hard work and meritocracy). As such, one response from Hong Kongers has been to demand a closing or reinforcing of the border. In requesting such demands, one can see an echo of the colonial period in the way “the other” is discursively created. Moreover, many people view the mules and Mainland mothers as undermining the founding myth of Hong Kong. Unlike the strong community that bonded over the treacherous, dangerous journey across the border, and sacrificed their daily lives to better their family’s opportunities, the mules and mainland mothers are seen as reaping benefits the easy way.

In this chapter, I have shown the ways in which memories of the border and memories of border crossing experiences are an integral part in understanding how the border might contribute to the imagining of a community. As Glynn and Kleist have noted, migration studies have, for the most part, rarely focused on memories and how memories shape how people are received and assimilated into a community. They show that while remembering might take place on an individual basis, remembering also connects individuals together thus creating notions of collectivity and belonging (Glynn 2012, 5–7). In the case of Hong Kong, remembering can also be used as a way to exclude individuals. Through the imagination of a community based on shared experiences and memories, a Hong Kong myth has been created. Moreover, this chapter has shown that how the border is understood is not determined by official state discourse as seen in legislature, bills and ordinances. Rather, the
memories that are retold in stories or oral histories have also shaped the border’s significance and how it is understood today. Writing about memory and oral histories, Gail Hershatter notes:

Memory appears to be created anew whenever it is called upon, as the teller actively creates new meanings. It entails constantly rearranging one’s understanding of what one remember in such a way that the coloring of the memory may shift. Every telling enacts a loss, because as memory is restarted and resituated, it moves further away from the sensuous experience and the teller’s earlier understanding of an event. But at the same time, every memory is also a creation … a product of the confluence of past events and present circumstances (2011, 22).

When I conducted most of my interviews for this chapter tensions between Mainland Chinese tourists and Hong Kongers had not reached the peak that was seen at the beginning of 2012. Nevertheless, one could sense the anxiety among Hong Kongers when shopping in an area that is popular with Chinese tourists, or on a train ride to the border. The SARS outbreak was still fresh in the minds of many people I spoke to, and many people I spoke to still believe that the Mainland Chinese were to blame for the outbreak. As such, it is not surprising that there was a desire for Hong Kongers to distance themselves from the Mainland Chinese by romanticizing the border. By romanticizing the border and by periodizing the border though the different decades, the border’s significance complements and perpetuates Hong Kong’s founding myth. Lastly, Barbara Morehouse has suggested that “mapping the edges [of a state] is motivated by a desire to articulate, and most importantly, spatialize, rules of differentiation, is/is not, inside/outside, membrane/barrier, he/she/it” (Morehouse 2004, 20). As the mapped edges of the border become more diffuse, the memories of
the border and what has become of those borders serve as a key foundational element of Hong Kong’s founding myth.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE POLITICS OF REDEVELOPMENT AND HERITAGE PRESERVATION IN HONG KONG

I. INTRODUCTION

The Hong Kong cityscape is perhaps one of the more recognizable cityscapes to many around the world. The ubiquitous images often show a sea of modern skyscrapers, packed densely together serving as the backdrop to Hong Kong’s namesake\(^{109}\), Victoria harbor. They are also images of the densely packed streets filled with pedestrians, cars and buses, with a plethora of neon lights hanging overhead and trams meandering through it all. Indeed, the particular images mentioned above can be quickly found, in various replications and various manifestations, on the Internet, postcards, travel guidebooks, travel documentaries and films about Hong Kong. For example, one of the most widely seen images is of a Chinese-style junk in the harbor and tall skyscrapers in the background (See Fig 7).

\(^{109}\) The name Hong Kong, translated from Cantonese means fragrant harbor.
There is another cityscape that is more familiar to the locals and represents the “everyday” cityscape. This cityscape is of the old neighborhoods with its corner houses and tenement-like tong lau (唐樓), colonial era buildings, public housing estates, street markets, mom and pop stores, and hawker stalls, affectionately called dai pai dong (大排檔) by the locals. These old neighborhoods appear to effortlessly blend in with Hong Kong’s modern high rises and skyscrapers, and fill in the gaps between the high rises. It is, in many ways, a perfect depiction of the hackneyed saying, “where East meets West”, and where “the old meet the new.” However, these images are not limited to the outsiders’ gaze, they also permeate the imaginations of many local Hong Kongers. For instance, as I discuss in Chapter Five, the popular design house Goods of Desire (G.O.D.) designed a print that consists of Hong Kong’s public housing estates. The endless repetition of the familiar building façade has been used as a print pattern and made available to Hong Kong consumers in the form of bed linens, wallpaper, and clothing. The ubiquity of these images is an example of how Hong Kong’s founding myth is present in different aspects of everyday life. The cityscape of Hong Kong, which is promoted in tourism campaigns and commodified into nostalgic goods, vindicates the myth of Hong Kong’s transformation from a barren rock to a global, metropolitan city. Hong Kong’s imagined cityscape (that is ideas about the street life, images of its markets, transportation networks, and buildings) is imprinted with and embodied by political meanings and memories that are attuned to the de-colonized founding myths of Hong Kong. The cityscape stands in stark contrast to the image of Hong Kong as a barren rock and thus serves to prove
the validity of the myth. The people of Hong Kong and their sacrifices, labor, and dedication are, according to the myth, what enabled the spectacular growth and development.

In the early 2000s, widespread public concerns regarding the changing cityscape of Hong Kong were first voiced in response to the state’s ongoing reclamation, redevelopment and renewal plans of the Star Ferry Pier. To allow for the completion of the Central reclamation in 2006, the iconic Edinburgh Place Ferry Pier (more popularly known as the Star Ferry pier and Queen’s pier) in Central was demolished. The eruption of opposition voices, rallies, occupations and protests in response to this demolition could hardly go unnoticed. Such opposition, and the alliances built between civil society and non-profit groups during 2006, can also be seen in the most recent saga regarding the Government Hill redevelopment project. These growing concerns and the burgeoning preservation movement followed a period in which a number of battles over redevelopment, gentrification and reclamation elsewhere in Hong Kong (i.e. Wedding Card street in Wanchai and the West Kowloon Cultural District reclamation project) ended unsuccessfully for preservationists (Ku 2010, 385). The debates surrounding urban renewal, heritage preservation and the state’s redevelopment plans can be seen as civil society’s desire for transparency and participation in government policy making (E. Chan and Chan 2007, 87), but they are also about Hong Kong’s political future and is an example of what I have termed near-nationalism in Hong Kong.
As mentioned in earlier chapters, the founding myth of Hong Kong is very similar to those of immigrant nations such as the United States. The colonial government and post-1997 government successfully presented Hong Kong as a “capitalist utopia” where “rags to riches” tales run rampant (J. Ng 2009, 55). From barren rock to bustling city, Hong Kong is a city that, for many of its current residents, was a place of refuge. Indeed, many of Hong Kong’s wealthiest property tycoons, including billionaire Li Ka Shing, have made claims to the clichéd rags to riches narrative that in many ways is no different to the myth of the American Dream.\footnote{It is said that as a young boy, Li fled Mainland China during the Japanese occupation with little to no money. Upon arriving in Hong Kong and faced with further hardships, he was forced to drop out of school and work at a plastics factory. He slowly made his way to the top to become one of the world’s richest billionaires (Li Ka Shing Foundation Limited 2010).} Hong Kong’s current cityscape, many argue, is a testament of how far Hong Kong has come since the early days of its founding, and both sides of the harbor certainly visually reflect this. The skyscrapers that line the harbor side compose a catalog of the who’s who in the international architecture circle and include names such as Norman Foster, I.M. Pei, Cesar Pelli and Paul Rudolph. Every evening, the skyscrapers are lit up, making the sight even more visually breathtaking and spectacular. As suggested by Abbas, the very presence of the buildings is a reminder of the physical dominance and presence of the free market and neoliberalism in Hong Kong (Abbas 1997, 63). The very fact that these skyscrapers are often home to investment firms, law firms, hotel chains and other banking institutions further cement Abbas’s claims. The constantly changing skyline of Hong Kong and ever-expanding shoreline (due to land
reclamation) on either side of the harbor are also reminders of the salience of Hong Kong’s competitive property and real estate market. All this is in stark contrast to the image of the “barren rock” Lord Palmerston described as the British flag was first planted in Hong Kong (Carroll 2007, 15; Owen and Shaw 2007, 2).

To capture the importance placed on cityscapes by the public, one need only examine the heated debates surrounding redevelopment and urban renewal in Hong Kong. Unlike many debates, revolts, protests and social movements against redevelopment, urbanization, and urban renewal in other cities around the world, in Hong Kong, those who oppose redevelopment are not only demanding a “right to the city” (Harvey 2003), but they are also demanding a right to their own Hong Kong identity. During my stay, movements to preserve and designate buildings as heritage buildings were especially noticeable and increasing in number. The heightened awareness and interest was not limited to non-profit and environmental groups, but could be heard among the general public. This, in turn, was reflected in the popularity of TV shows and documentaries such as HK Architecture,111 and movies such as Echoes of the Rainbow and Bruce Lee, my Brother. Both of the films are set in the 1950s and 1960s, and heavily feature the colorful, tenement-like structures, known as tong lau (唐樓), found throughout Hong Kong’s urban residential areas,112 and had a clear

111 The documentary, HK Architecture, was shown on the local free-to-view station, TVB. The channel is known primarily for airing soap operas and game shows. Thus, it is surprising that the show managed to garner so much attention and acclaim for a documentary.
112 Many of the city’s tong lau have been razed to make way for taller residential and commercial buildings. Only a handful of these buildings are listed as grade two or three historic buildings, meaning some “efforts should be made to selectively preserve the buildings” or “preservation in some form
preservationist message. Popular Hong Kong film and TV media, beside a few exceptions, have mostly played down the opportunity to serve as commentary for social, cultural and political concerns within the city. Filmmakers such as Wong Kar Wai and Ann Hui whose films can often be seen as political and social commentary are still, for the most part, regarded as what we in the United States would call art house filmmakers. Given Hong Kong’s fairly apolitical media industry, the fact that the two films garnered the attention they did from movie critics and the public would appear surprising. However, given the very public debates regarding preservation in the early 2000s, it does not seem that peculiar that the public would be so drawn to the message of these movies.

It is thus important to trace and understand how certain spaces are produced in Hong Kong and how these spaces are appropriated in a grand narrative about Hong Kong identity. This chapter is also a demonstration of how space is socially produced. I show how spaces that once divided the colonizer from its subjects and in which colonial power was exercised, have been co-opted by local Hong Kongers. By claiming these once divided, colonial spaces of power as “theirs”, Hong Kongers have imprinted a certain meaning to these buildings which narratively speaking coincide with the founding myths of Hong Kong. This chapter undergirds work by theorists such as Henri Lefebvre (1991) who maintain that space is socially produced.

would be desirable and alternative means could be considered if preservation is not practicable” (Antiquities and Monuments Office).

113 Notable exceptions include movies from the 1990s and early 2000s such as A Better Tomorrow and Infernal Affairs, which can be seen as allegories of the events in 1997 (Abbas 1997; J. Ng 2009).
The work of space-making is an ongoing process, where spaces and the practices within them are constantly renegotiated. In Hong Kong space-making involves different interlocutors: the people who use the space, the architects who design buildings in the space, city planners, the state, and conservationists, for example.

Following the works of Michael Billig and Tim Edensor, this chapter understands that the formation of a Hong Kong identity can be found in banal everyday instances that presume the existence of an imagined community. Whereas Billig’s articulation of national identity and nationalism is not concerned with “the flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; [instead] it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building” (Billig 1995, 8), this chapter goes further in arguing that the building and cityscape on which the flag hangs limply and unnoticed is also capable of engendering banal nationalism (or what I would call banal near-nationalism). As noted by Edensor, different spaces, and the debates surrounding spaces, have the ability to “interweave with each other to consolidate a strong cognitive, sensual, habitual and affective sense of […] identity” (Edensor 2002, 37).

In this chapter, I examine the argument put forward by preservationists and anti-redevelopment activists who argue that the political meanings and the Hong Kong identity that is imprinted on the cityscape is questioned and undermined upon the cityscape’s destruction and/or redevelopment. Countering that argument is the narrative put forth by developers and the state, who maintain that to build and rebuild,
develop and redevelop, and gentrify areas is inherently part of the city’s character and ongoing story. Upon examination, I argue that what is noticeably absent from both sides of the redevelopment debate is the acceptance in which the Hong Kong state has actively pursued redevelopment and urban renewal plans that cater to private interests and the state’s capitalist and neoliberal desires. The neoliberal subjectivities that are formed as a result of the redevelopment and urban renewals policies are synonymous with what Hong Kongers believe to be a “true” Hong Kong identity – cosmopolitan, modern, competitive, driven, multi-faceted individuals. The mainstream founding myth of Hong Kong that is perpetuated by locals embraces aspects of neoliberalism and global capital so much so that it appears that the state’s collusion with private interests in gentrification and redevelopment projects is hardly a source of contention the way that the razing of historic “heritage” sites is.\textsuperscript{114} I suggest that while preservationists have framed the destruction of heritage as an attack on Hong Kong identity, such criticisms cannot be made regarding the state’s commitment to neoliberalism. Such criticisms of the state’s relationship with private interests cannot be made precisely because a Hong Kong identity is premised on ideas of global capital and a neoliberal subjectivity. As such, both sides of the debate ultimately converge as they are driven by the desire to ensure Hong Kong’s status as a global city, albeit through different ways.

\textsuperscript{114} Indeed, while the Occupy Wall Street movement found its way to Hong Kong under the banner of ‘Occupy Hong Kong,’ activists who were taking part in the movement and who criticized the structural forces of global capital were seen as radical, naïve, and out-of-touch individuals.
Redevelopment, urban renewal and reclamation have taken place in Hong Kong since the mid-nineteenth century. They are not new phenomena in any way. What is new, however, is how vocal local opposition movements and heritage preservation movements are becoming. The pressure to constantly reassert that Hong Kong is a world city has heightened since the change in sovereignty. This pressure has also been partly fueled by anxieties over the rapid development and “catching up” of Chinese cities on the Mainland. The state has responded to such pressures by continuing the pattern of building and re-building. As buildings are torn down and its residents relocated, new skyscrapers are erected in their place. The daily practices of Hong Kongers which are so important to place-making (such practices can include having lunch in a park or a commute on the Star Ferry) are abruptly halted, and the process of place-making must begin again. It is this constant repetition of having to re-become a world city that is so troubling for many.

II. HONG KONG’S “NEED FOR CHANGE”

The city center, Central, formerly known as Victoria, has long been the political, cultural and business hub in Hong Kong. Its earliest inception came about with the creation of a main thoroughfare through the island as a link between army posts. Soon after, settlements began to cluster in the area and soon after government administrative buildings, courts, police stations and religious institutions were established in the area (Ingham 2007, 25). In her travelogue, Jan Morris, imagining back to the early twentieth century, paints this picture of Central:
From this belvedere, fifty years ago, we could have looked down upon a ceremonial plaza of some dignity, Statue Square. It opened directly upon the harbor, rather like the Piazza Unita in Trieste, and to the west ran a waterfront esplanade, called the Praya after its Macao original. The steep green island hills rose directly behind the square, and it was surrounded by structures of consequence – Government House where the Governor lived, Head Quarter House where the General lived, a nobly classical City Hall, the Anglican cathedral, the Supreme Court, the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. The effect was sealed by the spectacle of the ships passing to and fro at the north end of the square, and by the presence of four emblematically imperial prerequisites: a dockyard of the Royal Navy, a cricket field, the Hong Kong Club and a statue of Queen Victoria (Morris 1985, 44).

Needless to say, the city center of the 1930s is tremendously different from the city centre today. From the 1850s up until the present day, the state has engaged in an almost ongoing project of reclamation on the island’s harbor front. This chapter will focus on the debates surrounding the area commonly referred to as Government Hill, located in Central, Hong Kong. Between 2010 and 2012, the Government Hill area, which currently houses the Central Government Offices, Murray Building, Government House, St. John’s Cathedral and the French Mission Building, was the subject of a long and heated consultation process. The Hong Kong SAR government proposed that upon relocating the Government Offices, the plot of land should be sold to a property developer and redeveloped into an office and commercial complex.

Since the 1990s, the colonial government and the SAR government have been committed to numerous redevelopment, renewal and reclamation projects in – all of which were done in order for Hong Kong to reach its full potential of becoming an economic and financial world city comparable to New York and London. This claim has long been used to justify and legitimate redevelopment and urban renewal.
projects within the city. For instance, in 1998, the Chief Executive at the time, Tung Chee Hwa, stressed the importance of Hong Kong’s goal to further develop into an international finance center amidst the Asian economic crisis, and the importance of developing the infrastructure that was necessary for attaining such a goal (Tung 1998). A year later, he reasserted:

I have on many occasions during the past two years spelled out our long term developmental objectives, the purpose of which was to establish a clear positioning for Hong Kong […] I firmly [believe] that Hong Kong should not only be a major Chinese city, but could become the most cosmopolitan city in Asia, enjoying a status comparable to that of New York in North America and London in Europe […] They are vibrant economies and possess the financial strength to serve the region and the world at large in areas such as finance, trade, tourism, information industry and transport, while being home to numerous multi-national enterprises (Tung 1999).

The proposal to redevelop Government Hill echoes such sentiments and can be seen as part of Donald Tsang’s (Tung’s successor) “Manifesto for Progress” project (L. O. Lee 2008, 53). As has been suggested, the Hong Kong government, especially in recent years, has been in a constant push for “more economic development so as to create more jobs, reduce unemployment, and increase wages – in short, to make the rich richer and the poor not quite so poor” (Ibid., 53). The manifesto maintains that in order to become a truly global city, Hong Kong needs the infrastructure of a global, financial center, such as transportation links, “world class” office complexes such as the one proposed in the Government Hill redevelopment proposal. Such concerns raised by the government are, however, not entirely surprising and can be a symptom of the increasingly intertwined network of cities in the age of neoliberalism.
As Saskia Sassen’s analysis of globalization astutely points out, the ‘world city’ is a crucial component in economic globalization. The world economy, as Sassen points out, has long shaped the life of cities, and this is certainly the case of Hong Kong (1991, 3). Indeed, Hong Kong is very much a ‘world city’ that is closely intertwined with the workings of the global economy. In fact, the development that is celebrated in Hong Kong’s decolonized founding myth (as discussed in Chapter Two) took place as a result of economic and political changes in the region at the time. Since Hong Kong shifted from a trade-based economy to a finance-driven economy, the state has increasingly created opening spaces for non-state actors, such as foreign financial corporations and private property developers, and invited these non-state actors to participate in making claims to the city, at the expense of its citizens.

David Harvey notes that the inner workings of neoliberalism encourage competition between cities. He notes, “the coercive laws of competition […] force the continuous implementation of new technologies and organizational forms, since these enable capitalists to out-compete those using inferior methods” (Harvey 2003, 24). The 1980s saw the beginning of a move towards globalization and neoliberalism, and an increasing demand for “world cities” and competition between them. In response, the colonial and SAR Hong Kong governments have been committed to rebuilding, redeveloping and renewing Hong Kong in order to maintain its competitiveness. In addition the city has become increasingly more polarized, socially and spatially. By striving to remain globally competitive, the city has become more welcoming to
international businesspeople and those who participate in globalization and consume the goods offered by the global city. These new subjectivities become the new “city users” and ultimately contribute to the changing morphology of the city (Sassen 1991; Sassen 2002, 169). Indeed, this is certainly the case for Government Hill and the reclamation projects along the harbor.

Another characteristic that is common among global cities is the spatial formation and geographical divisions that lie within it. Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen demonstrate how a new socio-spatial formation within cities such as Hong Kong occurs as cities become increasingly connected with other global cities. Two aspects of this new socio-spatial formation can be found in the Hong Kong case: 1) Hong Kong, like many global cities, is composed of a “citadel” where in which the rich and elite reside,¹¹⁵ and 2) gentrification occurs adjacent to the older, poorer populations. Specifically, Marcuse and van Kempen’s proposition that the new spatial order of cities represents “a spatial concentration within cities of a new urban poverty on the one hand, and of specialized “high-level” internationally connected business activities on the other, with increasing spatial division not only between each of them but also among segments of the “middle class” in between” (2000, 3) seems to ring especially true of Hong Kong and the state’s intended plans for Government Hill.

¹¹⁵ Most recently, an apartment in a building on the Peak design by Frank Gehry was sold for an astounding US$61 Million (Chen 2012).
One indication of this commitment and aspiration to assert itself as a global city is the presence of high-profile architects or “starchitects” who are commissioned to lead and design urban mega projects (Sklair 2012). Urban mega projects in which large parts of cities are gentrified, rebuilt or recreated, Leslie Sklair notes, are becoming a global phenomenon (the redevelopment of East London for the 2012 Olympics, and the Palm Jumeirah project in Dubai are two examples of this) and can be used to see how architecture, space making and globalization are becoming increasingly intertwined. Neoliberal subjectivities, which Sklair calls the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC), composed of elite bureaucrats, corporations and business professionals, are the driving force behind the desire for global, iconic architecture and their presence in urban mega projects. In Hong Kong, the US$40 billion mega project to create a forty hectare arts and cultural district in Hong Kong called the West Kowloon Cultural District (WKCD) has taken over a decade to come to fruition. An open call was put out for architects around the world to submit their design proposals for the district. Out of the three final proposals, the governing board selected the design put forth by Foster and Partners, under the supervision of Norman Foster. Such urban mega projects and the presence of international starchitects can also be seen as a way to not only put global cities on the map (Ibid., 352), but also as a way to “brand” the nation (McNeill and Tewdwr-Jones 2003; Ren 2008). For example, in the run up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008, Beijing underwent a regeneration of sorts and

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116 The cultural district, which is to be built on reclaimed land, will include theatres, arenas, museums and concert venues, and is believed to be a way for Hong Kong to culturally compete against other global cities such as London and Paris.
embarked on large infrastructure projects that went beyond the minimally required infrastructure needed for the games. In addition to the building of the National Stadium, also known as the Bird’s Nest, led by Herzog and de Meuron, were two major infrastructure projects: the Chinese Central Television (CCTV) building which was designed by Rem Koolhaas, and the National Theatre commissioned to Paul Andreu (Ren 2008). While the projects were national in nature, the interlocutors themselves were global neoliberal subjects. For instance, as Ren Xuefei notes, the artists, journalists, academics and political elites who rallied for the starchitects were part of what Sklair calls the TCC – individuals who had studied or lived abroad (Ibid., 186). The global nature of such a project in Hong Kong is underscored by the way in which Hong Kong project managers have approached international artists, investors, architects, think tanks, academics, curators and city planners to help lead the projects. In a reciprocal fashion, urban projects such as the Grand Paris projects have sought out the help of Chinese and Hong Kong investors to fund their own projects (Wallis 2011). The presence of starchitects are not however reserved for mega-projects; skyscrapers which newly protrude out of an ever changing skyline are often the works of international architects. New skyscrapers that have appeared in the Hong Kong cityscape include the International Commerce Centre designed by a partnership between the American architectural firm Kohn Pederson Fox and a Hong

117 For example, the Chief Executive Office of the West Kowloon Cultural District, Michael Lynch is the former Chief Executive of London’s Southbank Centre, and the executive director of the art museum M+ is Lars Nittve, a former director of Moderna Museet in Stockholm.

118 Theresa Erin Enright has written extensively on the Grand Paris Project (Enright 2012).
Kong based architectural firm Won & Ouyang Ltd and Two International Finance Centre (IFC) designed by the Argentine American architect César Pelli.

Redevelopment, Gentrification, Reclamation and the Founding Myth

Part of Hong Kong’s exceptionalism for many years has been the myth of Hong Kong’s origins. For instance, the pro-development narrative often uses the logic of “Look how far Hong Kong has come, and look how far it will go.” Such a narrative is reiterated regularly to remind citizens of the necessity of redevelopment, reclamation and renewal as a way to develop and move forward. For instance, at the stone laying ceremony of the soon to be built Harrow International School, Donald Tsang spoke of the Harrow alumnus Lord Palmerston. Tsang, evoking Palmerstone, said: “[Lord Palmerstone] famously described Hong Kong, which was a rather desolate place in those days, as a ‘barren rock with nary a house upon it.’ If Lord Palmserston were alive today, I am sure he would be impressed with the progress of our city” (D. Tsang 2011). Likewise, the Planning Department’s Conserving Central website is filled with images of Central from the late 1800s and early 1900s. The main page of the website, in an effort to “take one down memory lane” notes:

If we could walk back in time to the early nineteenth century, we could hardly imagine that the sparsely populated area along the northern shore of Hong Kong Island, in front of the steep hills and facing a beautiful deepwater harbor, would one day be transformed into the heart of Asia's world city [...] In less than two hundred years, Central has witnessed the transformation of Hong Kong from a fishing village into an entrepot; from a manufacturing centre into a services hub; and, more recently into today's modern metropolis and global financial centre [...]”

In all the instances mentioned above, the notion is that development is essential and part of Hong Kong’s history and its future as a global, world city. These examples show how an idea of Hong Kong as always having been a city of renewal, development and reclamation is a strong narrative. It is an idea in which the “two-R’s and one-D” have made Hong Kong into the competitive global city that it is.

Nevertheless, the growth of nearby cities such as Shanghai and Singapore have, of late, posed a looming threat to Hong Kong’s perceived uniqueness within the region. For example, Hong Kongers’ “flexible citizenship”\textsuperscript{120} that can be attributed to Hong Kong’s colonial legacy, is becoming more common across the border and less of an example of Hong Kong’s exceptionalism. To return to David Harvey, a key characteristic of global world cities in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is the constant competition between them (Harvey 2003). Aihwa Ong has also written about this trend. Not only do cities constantly measure their new skyscrapers alongside another city’s new megaproject, but there exists the tendency to reference other cities as a way of “learning” from others. Ong notes that this was especially true of the rapidly expanding cities in China (2011, 17). While such referencing can lead to a cooperation between cities and the formation of new “inter-city relationships,” inter-referencing can also lead to a “stirring up” of hopes, desires and aspirations, or enhance rivalries between cities (Ibid.).

Hong Kongers are acutely aware of Singapore and China’s growing economic power in the region. In 2010, a ranking on living standards in cities came out; Singapore ranked higher than Hong Kong in many categories (Tomlinson 2010). The Hong Kong press was quick to jump on this, and a flurry of op-ed pieces, surveys, and reports were published, some criticizing the government for letting Hong Kong “fall behind”, others claiming that Hong Kong really had nothing to worry about. Part of the state’s response to the looming “threat” of cities such as Singapore and Shanghai has been to accelerate and intensify urban renewal, redevelopment and reclamation. Citing the myth of “barren rock” to “capitalist paradise”, the state argues that urban renewal, redevelopment and reclamation are simply “part of Hong Kong’s history and future.” Preservationists however argue that in order for Hong Kong to remain unique, competitive, and “ahead” of other Mainland Chinese cities, they must resist redevelopment that could erase the past and Hong Kong’s identity (i.e. “heritage buildings”). Hearing this the government has revisited its approach to sustainable living in a city with “heritage” and “culture.” For example, in the late 2000s the SAR government stressed that world city building had to also take into account “cultural life.” Redevelopment and urban renewal had to now also include, if possible, a component of “culture” or “heritage.” Tsang noted, “A progressive city treasures its own culture and history along with a living experience unique to the city. In recent years, Hong Kong people have expressed our passion for our culture and lifestyle. That is something we must cherish” (D. Tsang 2007). With this in mind, it seems
clear that the state is now also partly implicit in engendering and reifying tradition and heritage, but for neoliberalism’s sake.

Redevelopment and Reclamation in Hong Kong

Reclamation has long been practiced in Hong Kong and it is a popular means of producing land in areas where land and property are in high demand. Hong Kong’s mountainous topography is often cited as the main justification for land being reclaimed from the sea (Glaser, Haberzettl, and Walsh 1991). As noted by Ng and Cook, there are three identifiable “periods” of land reclamation in Hong Kong. The first was the disorganized, uncoordinated reclamation headed largely by private shipping interests (in the mid-nineteenth century) and the Praya Reclamation that took place from 1890-1904. The raggedy coastline of Hong Kong at the time was evidence of how individual private interests battled the interests of the navy and their dockyards at the time. Wealthy merchants, with little oversight and regulation from the government’s end, would reclaim land and build around the “immovable” military barracks and dockyards. It was not until the late-nineteenth century that the colonial government began to take an interest in monitoring and controlling reclamation on either side of the harbor through the creation of the Land Commission and the start of the Praya Reclamation. The second period took place following World War II. This reclamation project was headed by the state and was primarily a move to create residential areas and new towns for the growing immigrant population in Hong Kong. The last period of reclamation dates from the 1980s to present day Hong Kong (M. K.
Ng and Cook 1997). Today, the grand Central and Wanchai Reclamation project and the urban renewal of Central (of which the Star Ferry Pier’s relocation and the Government Hill project fall under) are part of the government’s ongoing role to ensure Hong Kong’s competitiveness in the global financial market. Indeed, while the technologies and methods in which land is reclaimed has certainly changed throughout the years, one common trend that runs through the three periods is the state’s close relationship with private interests.

Evidence of the government and tycoons’ collusion can be traced back to the first reclamation projects in the city. British, Indian and Parsee traders were among the first to claim land lots along the harbor front. At their behest, private land lots were expanded and land reclaimed at no extra cost and with little government interference. That is, no rent was ever paid to the government during this period (Antiquities Advisory Board (AAB) 2007). During the late 19th century, the Armenian, Calcutta-born taipan of Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown Company, and founder of Hong Kong Land, Paul Chater, headed the largest reclamation project, known as the Praya Reclamation. The justification for this reclamation scheme was to alleviate population density and improve housing and hygiene standards (Ibid.) The Praya Reclamation’s second phase, Praya East Reclamation Scheme, began in 1921 and commenced in 1931. Like the first phase, Paul Chater’s role in pushing through the scheme could hardly be ignored. In 1896, Chater was appointed by Governor William Robinson to serve on the Executive Council of Hong Kong and no doubt actively
pushed for rapid expansion in the city (Ingham 2007, 29). Paul Chater’s seamless transition from private business to a government post demonstrates how, even at an early stage in Hong Kong’s urban development, businessmen and traders from the private sector could simultaneously hold positions in government while maintaining their ties to the trading industry. Today, the relationship between the state and private interests remain close, especially with regard to property development.

In Hong Kong, it is well known that the state has a “dual-role as the biggest landlord and as an administrator which determines the development agenda in the executive-led polity in the territory” (M. K. Ng and Cook 1997, 5). However, one should not be misled to believe that the fact that land is owned by the state suggests a nationalized land system or collective ownership. Rather, the leasehold system in Hong Kong can be understood to be a system where land is a private commodity in the market, which is allocated via the government (Lai 1998, 2005). Prior to the Handover, all land was owned by the British Crown and leased out to private individuals. Following the change in sovereignty, under the Basic Law, the SAR government remains the leaseholder of all land in Hong Kong and parcels of land are leased out for a period ranging from seventy-five to nine hundred and ninety nine years (Haila 2000; Poon 2011; Bell and de-Shalit 2011). Land is leased out to the highest bidder (usually one Hong Kong’s three big developers: Henderson Land, Sun Hung Kai Properties, or Cheung Kong) at auctions. To this day, land auctions are the major source of revenue for the Hong Kong government, and account for one-third of the government’s
As the state’s major source of revenue, the government has a vested interested in keeping land values high while ensuring taxes will be kept low for its citizens (Bell and de-Shalit 2011, 121–122). Given the premium placed on land and the revenue from land sales, it should come as no surprise that the government also had (and still has) a stake in land reclamation (Glaser, Haberzetll, and Walsh 1991; Haila 2000; M. K. Ng and Cook 1997). The premium of land value is further increased as this reclaimed land comes with a view of the harbor, and is linked to transportation networks, office complexes and shopping malls within Hong Kong’s financial center. In fact, the government’s justification for the current behemoth reclamation projects on the West Kowloon Peninsula and on Hong Kong Island was to further develop and improve the transportation infrastructure on either side of the harbor (a necessity, the state argues, for Hong Kong’s growing import and export trade and financial sector). It should thus be clear how the state, property developers, and urban planners in Hong Kong come to understand space as “‘economic space’ rather than ‘life space’” (M. K. Ng and Cook 1997). Moreover, it speaks to the Hong Kong state’s long practice of encouraging urban renewal, redevelopment and reclamation.

The dependence of Hong Kong’s economy on these sectors suggests that the Hong Kong government has an economic interest in providing the land and infrastructure to these sectors in a number of ways. First, the state can push forth reclamation projects, and through the state’s Urban Renewal Authority encourage urban renewal projects
and the razing of old inner city areas. Second, the government can sell the plots of land at a high value to private property developers who can then build the office skyscrapers, transportation links and networks needed by these sectors.\textsuperscript{121} The state can then inject the capital made from the land auctions back into the Hong Kong economy. Third, the state and developers have the financial means to invite international architects to showcase their talents in their new skyscrapers along the much-photographed harbor. The world-renowned architects who create the distinct, easily identifiable cityscape of Hong Kong are also thought to help enhance and maintain Hong Kong’s image as a cosmopolitan, world city.

\section*{III. Reclamation: The Star Ferry Saga}

Riding the Star Ferry is considered to be an iconic and unique Hong Kong experience. Touted by the Hong Kong Tourism Board, the “humble but legendary” Star Ferry service allows one to witness the “living culture” of Hong Kong’s most famous attraction, the Hong Kong Harbor (Hong Kong Tourism Board). The design of the ferry fleet has stayed consistent, and its present-day design is based on the 1923 design of the ferry (Ingham 2007, 162).\textsuperscript{122} On the seven-minute ride, one can take in the views of Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon peninsula, as the diesel engines chug along. Its fleet of twelve ferries cross the harbor daily, departing every fifteen to

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{121} In a few instances the reclaimed land is used for public housing purposes (M.K.Ng and Cook 1997, 11).
\textsuperscript{122} The ferry service’s origins can be dated back to 1880 when a Parsee merchant, Dorabjee Naorojee, began offering harbor crossings throughout the day (L. O. Lee 2008, 54). Upon his retirement and return to India, Naorojee sold the service to The ‘Star’ Ferry Company Limited (later called Kowloon Wharf), then owned by Paul Chater.
\end{footnotesize}
twenty minutes, and it remains one of the cheapest forms of transportation in Hong Kong with a fare of HK$2.50 (US$0.32). Not surprisingly then, the ferry is used by many locals who rely on it to cross from one side of the harbor to the other at a cheap fare. The ferry truly represents an everyday, quotidian practice for local Hong Kongers, and for many people it is recognized as a nostalgic space.

As a result of ongoing reclamation projects, the Star Ferry Pier on Hong Kong Island has relocated numerous times in its history. Its first incarnation was located in what was known as Pedder Wharf. The pier’s first relocation in 1912 took place as a result of the Praya Reclamation Scheme and was moved to what was then called Queen’s Statue Wharf (the pier doubled as a ceremonially pier for colonial officials). But perhaps most memorable to the local public is what is dubbed the “third generation” pier which lasted up until 2006. Following another reclamation project in 1954 the Star Ferry pier and Queen’s Statue Wharf relocated to Edinburgh Place Pier (Antiquities and Advisory Board, 1997) the space in which the most recent Star Ferry Pier protests took place.

The Edinburgh Place location of the Star Ferry Pier and Queen’s Pier was a ceremonial pier and also a public pier. The space was a popular spot for social gatherings and get-togethers, movie shoots, sporting events (such as the annual cross-harbor swim which ceased in 1973 due to poor water quality), departure points for boat and cruise trips, and was a popular fishing spot (1997). City Hall, situated just 50
yards or so away from the Edinburgh Place Pier, is also home to one of the larger
branches of the Hong Kong public library, numerous concert, exhibition and
performance halls and theatres, and a large Chinese restaurant, Maxim’s Palace. This
massive restaurant is a local institution where families gather every weekend to have
their dim sum for lunch. City Hall also has one of the few marriage registries in the
city; thus, it was often common to see couples and their wedding parties posing for
wedding photos outside City Hall and along the waterfront nearby.

Beyond serving as a space for leisure or cultural activities, up until 2006 it was also
one of Hong Kong’s largest commuter hubs. Including the Star Ferry, which shuttled
between Kowloon and Hong Kong, each day, various other ferries from Hong Kong’s
outlying islands (Lantau Island, Lamma Island, Cheung Chau Island) would come in
and out of the pier. These ferries serve the 160,000 people who live on the outlying
islands, many of whom commute into the city for work or school (Census and
Statistics Department 2010). The piers for the outlying islands were lined up next to
each other, and commuters could disembark their ferries and within a few steps reach
numerous bus and mini-bus depots, taxis, or cross through an underground walkway
which would connect to the metro line (MTR). Those who needed a quick snack, or
to pick up the daily paper on their way to work, could do so at any of the convenience
stores and snack stalls by the pier. Those who preferred to drive into the city center
could also access the huge parking structure that was adjacent to the transportation
concourse. Various foot bridges and under paths made it easy for those on foot to
It would be unfair, however, to claim that the Edinburgh Place Pier was only lived in and appropriated by Hong Kongers. The numerous outdoor and covered seating areas also made it a popular gathering place for many Filipina domestic workers on Sundays. The city’s 118,000 Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong are often assigned one day off a week (usually Sunday) from their employment (Constable 2007, 4), during which they can leave their employer’s home on their day off and meet with friends and family, and run personal errands. Each Sunday, the streets of Central (starting from the pedestrianized Chater Road, to the public podium of the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank building, to Chater Garden, and along the Central Post Office) are filled with Filipina domestic workers. Central becomes, as Constable notes, the Filipinos’ “home away from home” where part of the Philippines is transplanted into Hong Kong (Constable 2007, 3). Up until the mid-2000s, it was common to see large gatherings of Filipina domestic workers meeting with friends, holding picnics, celebrating birthdays and socializing in the outdoor seating areas of the pier. The pier offered shelter during the rainy season, and it also offered them a chance to connect with loved ones back home. The women would often line up outside the four or five public phone booths at the pier and with their phone cards

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123 Numbers are based off a 2005 Hong Kong Immigration Department statistic.
purchased in nearby World Wide Plaza spend a few minutes talking to their loved ones in the Philippines.  

More than serving as a place for social gatherings and daily commutes, the third generation Star Ferry Pier and Queen’s Pier were also the stage for one of Hong Kong’s most important social movements, the Star Ferry Riots in 1966. Amidst mounting public frustrations regarding a recession in the real estate market, a 5-cent ferry fare increase was proposed. Despite a 174,000-signature petition objecting to the fare increase, the Star Ferry Company went ahead and granted the increase. In opposition to this, a 26-year old man, So Sau-chung, staged a one-man hunger strike at the Star Ferry. While the Star Ferry Riots lasted less than a week, it was the beginning of a year marked by political discontent and the city-wide riots of 1967 that would end in the ultimate imposition of a curfew (Lam 2005, 311). Following the 1966 Star Ferry Riots the Hong Kong colonial government made a concerted effort to legitimize their power, and strengthen that legitimacy (Ibid.,312). It was, however, the first time the colonial government took the demands of the Chinese general public seriously. Thus, the Star Ferry pier in its Edinburgh Square location is deeply symbolic to many people in Hong Kong, in various ways.

124 Edinburgh Place was located a short walk away from Chater Road and World Wide Plaza. World Wide Plaza is a shopping plaza filled with shops, many of which sell food products, cosmetic products, newspapers, and DVDs from the Philippines. Filipino telecommunication services, shipping services (for Balikbayan boxes), and banking services can also be found in the shopping center. The popular Filipino fast-food chain, Jollibee, is also located at the base of World Wide Plaza.
The third generation pier’s usage as a public space was a marked change from its predecessors, the old Queen’s pier and Star Ferry pier in Queen’s Statue Wharf (a.k.a. the second generation wharf). Queen’s Statue Wharf was far from open to the Chinese public. The wharf and its adjacent Statue Square was a “cooperative project between the colonial Government and Hongkong Bank” (M. K. Ng et al. 2010, 417), where quadrants of manicured lawns and flower-beds, and low railings, served to deter (Chinese) pedestrians from walking through the space (Wordie 2002, 31). Moreover, beyond being situated directly in front of the Hongkong Bank Headquarters, Statue Square was also bounded by the Supreme Court (currently known as the Legislative Council Building) and the Hong Kong Club, a members-only club for white, British subjects only (Carroll 2007, 106). The square and its neighboring wharf were reserved for British merchants, businessmen, taipans, naval officers, and colonial administrators (Law 2002, 1630). Moreover, the space and its buildings had “‘an air of Edwardian civic dignity’ that denied the Chinese a right to use them and imbue them with meanings” (M. K. Ng et al. 2010, 418). As I will argue, the current location of the Star Ferry Pier is equally as divisive and exclusionary as the pier was when it was located off of Statue Square. However, rather than serving as spaces of inequality based on notions of race (i.e. colonizer and colonized), the new Star Ferry Pier and its neighboring skyscrapers privilege the new neoliberal subjectivities it was built to serve.
The Destruction of “the People’s” Pier

Although the government’s decision to demolish the Edinburgh Place piers took place in 1999, the voice of the opposition only gained momentum in November 2006. While the government claimed that they had faced no opposition during the consultation period, it became clear upon the pier’s eventual demolition date, that there was in fact a sizeable opposition group, and more importantly, an empathetic public who supported their cause.\(^{125}\) Moreover, as Chan and Chan have documented, the government’s claims that they were surprised by the objection was particularly unfounded given the large number of conservation, environment, and concern groups that had continuously voiced their opinions early on (E. Chan and Chan 2007, 13–14). On November 11, 2006, 150,000 protesters gathered to watch the Star Ferry depart from Edinburgh Pier for the last time (L. O. Lee 2008, 56).

The collective nostalgia and opposition that swept through the city was palpable.\(^{126}\) In particular, people were especially enraged to hear that the iconic clock tower would be destroyed in the demolition and not preserved. Preservationists claimed that the clock tower was an iconic part of the everyday lives of Hong Kong residents. The clock tower, many protestors argued, ought to be a heritage piece that had to be

\(^{125}\) This is considerably different from various other social movements and causes, to which the public and the media are generally less empathetic. In many instances, the general sentiment amongst the public is that the activists, who are often in their youth known pejoratively as the “Post-1980s generation”, are merely privileged, idealistic, troublemakers or extremists.

\(^{126}\) As I mention elsewhere in the dissertation, in the past ten years, there has been a wave of collective nostalgia sweeping Hong Kong. Oftentimes this nostalgia has been commodified (i.e. the Starbucks on Duddell Street has been decorated to replicate a 1950s Hong Kong style cafe). Star Ferry and Edinburgh Place Pier paraphernalia can be found at design stores such as G.O.D.
preserved. Again, with little attention paid to the public dissatisfaction and anger, the
clock tower was eventually razed.\textsuperscript{127} The last phase of the government’s reclamation
project was to raze the adjacent Queen’s Pier in August 2007. In a similar narrative to
the opposition to the Star Ferry pier’s destruction, the group of students argued that
Queen’s Pier was a historic landmark, and demanded a democratic, transparent
consultation system which took into consideration the voices of the public (M. K. Ng
et al. 2010, 49). Hundreds of people including the media camped out at the pier to
show support and follow the events. Marches throughout the city, carnivals, and
candlelight vigils were organized in the lead up to the impending demolition. The
movement garnered much support from the public, and even the media, usually quick
to denounce the “post 1980s generation” and their “radical” politics, were
sympathetic to the cause. Despite their efforts, the protestors, hunger strikers and
occupiers were forcibly removed from the pier by law enforcement in the late
morning of August 1, 2007.

The present day location of the Star Ferry pier, now called the Central Star Ferry Pier,
and its neighboring outlying island ferry piers, are located next to the new
International Finance Center (IFC) skyscrapers – all of which has been built on a total
of 38 hectares of land that had been reclaimed a few years prior, extending the
reclaimed coastline 350 meters from the original coastline. The center itself is

\textsuperscript{127} The Clock Tower, whose bell was made by the same makers of the Big Ben in London and the
Liberty Bell, was a “gift to the city” from the tycoon of the trading company, Jardine, Matheson and
comprised of two blocks: IFC Two is currently the second tallest building in Hong Kong (see image below), standing at eighty-eight stories, and is attached to the earlier built IFC One. As described by Lee, “the two buildings shine like gigantic beacons in this city of mammon, inviting investors from around the world to enter the harbor and make a fortune” (L. O. Lee 2008, 59).

![IFC Tower Two](Author's own photograph)

The skyscrapers house various investment banks (Goldman Sachs), banking institutions (e.g. UBS, Bank of America, Société Générale), financial auditor groups (e.g. Ernst and Young), insurance groups, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, and the Four Seasons Hotel. Connecting the two buildings is a luxury shopping mall, numerous fine-dining restaurants, a subway station, and the in-town check in facility for those heading to the airport – all of which is open to the public. While one can technically walk from the shopping mall to the ground floor of the office blocks, you
first have to walk past the security guards, armed with automatic weapons and sniffer
dogs, who guard the elevator podiums which takes you up to the offices of the various
international corporations. For those who do not work in the offices and do not have
an access card, one must “check in” at the front desk and provide information such as
name, phone number and Hong Kong identification card number. In many ways, IFC
is, as developers had hoped it would be, a “city within a city” (Ingham 2007, 53).
Like a city, the building has its own transportation networks, its own banking
facilities, shops, entertainment venues, restaurants and hotels. Moreover, it has its
own security force that constantly keeps watch over the space. More significantly,
like a state, those who enter the office building section must “check in” as if you were
going through immigration at border checkpoint. In the larger shopping complex area,
anyone who is dressed inappropriately, deemed suspicious looking or behaving
inappropriately, is quickly approached by the security guards, who may or may not
usher them out of the complex.\(^{128}\)

\(^{128}\) I witnessed a delivery man who, given the hot weather in Hong Kong, had taken off his shirt as he
was making a delivery to one of the shops in the mall. A guard quickly approached the delivery man
and told him to put his shirt back on.
The new street (built on reclaimed land) that the buildings are located on is aptly named Finance Street. It is not uncommon to see chauffeurs in luxury Mercedes Benzes and BMWs lining Finance Street, waiting to pick up high paid executives after a day of work. Similarly, on the street behind the other side of the building are various chauffeurs in SUVs and luxury vehicles, waiting to pick up their employers after a day of shopping. For the general public who wish to actually reach the ferry piers, one must traverse one’s way through the building and flyover footbridges owned by IFC’s joint property developer, The Henderson Group and Sun Hung Kai Group. Even those who take the subway to the ferry pier’s closest subway stop have to walk through the shopping mall in order to reach the pier. As the commuter footbridges are considered the property of The Henderson Group, Sun Hung Kai Group and Hong Kong Land, loitering is prohibited and again strictly enforced by security personnel.
Upon reaching the new ferry pier, it is clear that unlike the former Edinburgh Place pier, there is no public gathering space, nor is there a public outdoor seating area. There are only a few meters of space between where you disembark from the ferry and the main road that leads you into the city. Any outdoor seating areas that do exist are viewing decks, which can be accessed only after payment for the ferry ride, or outdoor eating areas owned by cafes and restaurants that have rented spaces within the ferry terminal. The government’s compromise for the dismantling and destruction of the old clock tower was to create the façade of the new Star Ferry pier in the style of Edwardian buildings, complete with a clock tower that resembles something out of Disneyland or a Las Vegas casino.\(^{129}\) Upon its completion, the pier building was heavily criticized for its lack of, not only authenticity, but also sense of modernity, and its disjuncture from the Star Ferry’s iconic dark green and white color scheme (T. W. Ng 2006). It appeared that the state was attempting to “claim back” this notion of heritage that the opposition was trying so desperately to protect. However, the state’s replication of the Edwardian building was done to promote a narrative of rapid development, modernization and cosmopolitanism taking place side-by-side “the past” (albeit a replicated, signifier of the past). That the state did so legitimated Hong

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\(^{129}\) This is similar to other instances in which the Hong Kong government was met with opposition and skepticism for razing a “heritage” building or gentrifying an area. For instance, when an open-air bird market and colonial museum were razed by the government, in an attempt to placate angry residents, the street market and building were re-created and sanitized in what Jeffrey W. Cody has called “a vessel of last resort for the residents’ memories” (Cody 2002, 196). In the case of Murray House, now home to the Hong Kong Maritime Museum, the building was dismantled brick-by-brick at its original location in Central in 1982. After cataloging each brick, the building was reassembled brick-by-brick twenty years later.
Kong’s founding myth and stresses “how far Hong Kong has come, and how far Hong Kong will go.”

During my visit to Hong Kong in 2010, upon walking by the City Hall (which had evaded demolition), there was no evidence of Edinburgh Place Pier ever existing. Instead, the once heavily frequented area of Hong Kong, the “lived” space of Hong Kong, was now a concrete road with construction vehicles, dump trucks, and cement trucks parked nearby. The area was eerily quiet and inhospitable for walking, congregation or socializing in. The first photo below shows City Hall, which used to sit on the harbor front and the land reclaimed since the relocation of the Star Ferry Pier. The extent of reclaimed land that extends from City Hall goes further and can be seen in the second photo. The second photo was taken from the same direction as the first photo, but further down a few yards (the cranes seen on the left of the first photo can be used as a point of reference).

Figure 10: City Hall (Right, Marked by two flags) and reclaimed land
Figure 11: Reclaimed land in front of City Hall.

An ongoing joke among many locals is that every time one rides the Star Ferry to cross from one side of the harbor to the other, in addition to the fee, the journey time shortens as the two shorelines encroach on each other. Some people even joke that eventually Hong Kongers will be able to walk across from Hong Kong to the Kowloon peninsula. Since 1997, 334 hectares of land was reclaimed for the area now known as West Kowloon, and a total of 38 hectares would have been reclaimed in the Central district. Since the relocation of the Central Star Ferry pier, passenger numbers have gone down significantly. Various people I spoke to would openly reminisce about the Star Ferry and its old location at Edinburgh Place Pier. One young man, a university student, speaking of the Star Ferry said, “The Star Ferry isn’t the same anymore. I used to take it everyday, because it was easy to get to, but it’s just more convenient to take the MTR now.” Nodding in agreement, his friend also spoke of the inconvenience of the new pier, “It’s so far away now, it takes me 15 minutes to walk

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130 In April, 2011 the Star Ferry cancelled the Hung Hom to Central service citing low passenger numbers as a reason (Y. Ng 2011).
into where I need to go in Central. I don’t ever have to go to IFC, and I don’t work in IFC. The new ferry piers only benefit the people who work in IFC. And let’s face it, the bankers who work at IFC don’t ever take the Star Ferry; they get driven to work or take taxis into work.”

As has been suggested, one way to understand the importance and nostalgia of the Edinburgh Place Pier, is how it was a space conceived by the government, which ultimately became appropriated by local Hong Kongers as a lived space. Those who frequented the pier, walked through it everyday, got married in the nearby City Hall, or took part in the Star Ferry riots, “imbued [the space] with meaning” (M. K. Ng et al. 2010, 422). Arguably, since 1954 the piers could be accessed, used, and lived in by the people of Hong Kong, rather than previous incarnations that had been mostly reserved for colonial dignitaries, aristocrats and elites. However, this space was not initially intended to be a “lived” space, rather it was imagined as such.

IV. THE BATTLE FOR GOVERNMENT HILL

In the Chief Executive’s 2009-2010 policy address, it was stated that in order to compete with other world cities and their creation of new financial districts, Central, with its lack of space, would go through a process of “progressive development.” The initiative, known as the Conserving Central initiative, was to take on Donald Tsang’s notion of progressive development; that is development that “strikes a balance between economic development and cultural conservation.” The project’s main aim was to “add a new dimension to Central” while “enhan[ing] visitor flow […] and]
generat[ing] commercial vibrancy”, while also providing quality “A-grade” office space (D. Tsang 2009). In a move that further demonstrates the government’s close relationship with private property developers and owners, Tsang goes on to state that:

[t]o conserve Central more effectively, we need the support of the owners of other properties in the district. I am pleased to know that the Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui is actively pursuing the idea of revitalizing its building cluster at Lower Albert Road with a view to balancing conservation and development. The Government will exchange views with the parties concerned in an open and mutually respectful manner. We will ensure that the diversity of Central will be preserved, and its magnificent and modern cityscape fully displayed (Ibid.).

The Chief Executive’s initial plans for the renewal and “progressive development” project includes eight sites or “projects”: 1) the continued development of the Central Ferry Pier (see above); 2) The Central Market – one of Hong Kong’s oldest wet markets; 3) the former Central Police Station compounds; 4) the Central Government Offices (CGO) – CGO is comprised of three phases: the East Wing, the Central Wing, and the West Wing; 5) Murray Building; 6) the former Police Married Quarters on Hollywood Road; 7) the Sheng Kung Hui (the Hong Kong Anglican Church) Compound in between Lower Albert Road.131 All projects are within a ten to fifteen minute walking radius of each other.

Upon relocating all the offices and departments in the Central Government Offices in 2011, the government was faced with the task of deciding what should be done to the three office wings in Government Hill. The government appraisal provided the following recommendations:

131 The area known as Government Hill includes the Central Government Offices.
[...] The Central and East Wings should be retained [...] the West Wing is of lower value and could be demolished for redevelopment [...] It would seem to be very undesirable to have commercial use which demeaned the historic and current function of the building and site. [...] the exterior of the buildings should be respected as far as possible. If the West Wing is to be demolished and redeveloped the new development should generally respect the footprint and height of the existing building. [...] It would be very desirable, when considering any new use, to allow public access across and around the site [...] (Morrison 2009, 3–4).

As shown, it is clear that the appraisal stresses that the space and area of Government Hill (in which CGO is located) is perhaps more significant than the actual buildings. It is also suggested that any development to be done should be in accord with the surrounding environment of Government Hill. The report finishes by suggesting that “there might be a case for making all the low rise and well planted area into a ‘Special Protected Area’ where the presumption would be against any significant redevelopment work” (Morrison 2009, 135). Despite the suggestions put forth in the appraisal, the SAR Government chose an alternative plan to lease the land to a property developer and build a large office tower in its place.

As already mentioned, the Conserving Central urban renewal project is a continuation of the Central reclamation project that went into planning in the late 1980, with aspects of heritage preservation. The government line, as was heard during the Central reclamation project debates, was that the Conserving Central initiative is needed in order for Hong Kong to remain competitive in the global economy, and to truly become a “world city.” It is interesting to note that the government has chosen to refer to the initiative as “Conserving Central.” Indeed, the government’s inclusion
of the word “conserve” was included as an attempt to placate environmentalists and conservationists. However, I understand the initiative “Conserving Central” to mean urban renewal, redevelopment and reclamation as a means to “conserve” and “protect” Hong Kong’s status as an important world city in the global financial market.

The Significance of Government Hill

Government Hill is located in the Central district on the northern part of Hong Kong Island. On the western side of Government Hill, the intersection of Queen’s Road Central and Ice House Street (a narrow, sloping vehicular road), is the entrance to the West Wing of the Central Government Offices (See Fig 12).

As one turns left and walks past the West Wing (the northern side of Government Hill), you walk up the sloping Battery Path which is parallel to the frenetic Queen’s
Road Central, and is strangely peaceful, tranquil and shaded by looming trees and vegetation. Benches are provided alongside the path, presumably a spot for the weary to sit and rest as they climb up the steep hill. The path, which can be seen in maps as early as 1887, leads to the Former French Mission building (built in 1842 and currently home to the Court of Final Appeal) which is round the corner from St. John’s Cathedral (constructed in 1847). Both these two buildings have been given official heritage statuses. The hill itself is bounded on the northern side by Battery Path and thick vegetation, and on the southern end, by Lower Albert Road. On the southern end of Government Hill, on Lower Albert Road, sits Government House (built in 1855). Government House is the official residence of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong and was formerly the official residence of colonial governors.

Government House is another protected heritage building. Government House lies just north of the Zoological and Botanical Gardens, a 5.6-hectare public garden which opened in the 1860s (Morrison 2009, 18). To the west of Government Hill lies the built up restaurant and bar districts, Lan Kwai Fong and Soho. However, amidst the built up areas are a number of declared heritage sites, namely Sheng Kung Hui Compound, the Hong Kong Anglican Church, (first constructed in the 1840s), and the former Central Police Station. One can also access Government Hill via the Duddell Street Steps. The steps are a declared monument and date back to 1875 and 1889 (Ibid.). Gas lamps dating back to the 1920s light up the top and bottom of the steps and remain in operation today. One part of Government Hill that many people do not notice or see is the network of air raid tunnels that lie underneath the Hill. The tunnels
were constructed in 1940, and a few of the tunnels’ entrances can be seen on ground level on Lower and Upper Albert Roads.

Government Hill, like the old Edinburgh Place pier, is seen as an iconic part of Hong Kong cityscape, and a space which Hong Kongers have imbued with meaning and identity. Various historic and architectural appraisals have stressed the significance of the area. The appraisals, do not, however, only come from those in the opposition camp. In 2009, the government’s Antiquities and Monuments Office commissioned a historic and architectural consulting firm based in England to conduct an appraisal of Government Hill. The appraisal, notes that the Government Hill site is perhaps more historically significant than the buildings themselves (Morrison 2009). Historically, Government Hill, which dates back to the 1840s was the home to the colonial government’s first headquarters. Up until the relocation of government offices and departments in 2011, for 150 years, Government Hill has been the home of the state, its offices and bureaucracies, and its judicial institutions. The present day Central Government Offices are comprised of the East, Central and West Wings, which were built on the same plot of land as the original government headquarters, and were completed in 1954, 1956 and 1959 respectively. The Government Hill area is surrounded by some of the former colony’s earliest buildings such as Government House, St John’s Cathedral, and the former French Mission Building (Morrison 2009, 121). As the location of the main seat of power in Hong Kong, Government Hill is also the space where Hong Kongers have gone to air their opinions regarding politics
and engage in the political process. Battery Path, which runs through the hill and connects Ice House Street with the various government offices and buildings, was also formerly the “end point” for many of the large political rallies, demonstrations and protests in Hong Kong. As pointed out by Katty Law, “Most people are familiar with Government Hill from seeing it on the news during protests […] The protesters march up Battery Path and then stop right here [at the Central Government Office gate], which is always very symbolic” (DeWolf 2011).

Perhaps most significant in many people’s memories was the event that ultimately led to the 1967 riots in Hong Kong.132 In response to several labor disputes, rising transportation fares, police brutality, and state corruption, a string of students and leftists, and union groups led by a local branch of the Chinese Communist Party (which was technically banned by the colonial state) marched through Government Hill, the Central Government Offices and up to Government House on May 19, 1967. For several days, the activists plastered the walls and gates of Government House with posters, and handed over petitions to the colonial government, while reciting quotes from Mao’s Little Red Book. What started off as a peaceful form of protest over labor conditions and the rising cost of living ultimately turned into an anti-colonial movement and assault of the British. In the following days, David Trench, governor of Hong Kong at the time, invoked the Emergency Regulations Ordinance – a set of suppressive ordinances which allowed the confiscation of leftist published works.

132 The Star Ferry Riots of 1966 can be seen as a prelude to the riots of 1967 (G. K. Cheung 2010).
material and posters, a city-wide curfew, and the arrest and deportation of various activists (G. K. Cheung 2010, 49–50). Things quickly became violent, with the police responding to protestors with batons and tear gas (Carroll 2007, 151). By the end of it all 51 people had died (including ten police officers), 1,936 were convicted (over 500 of whom were jailed for crimes including “unlawful assembly”, possession of bombs, and “explosion-related events”). By the end of 1967 (with much help from Beijing), things had calmed down substantially (G. K. Cheung 2010, 2–3). Nevertheless, the events of 1967, and the events leading up to 1967, are seen as a watershed moment in Hong Kong’s political history. It was the first movement that saw the public openly condemning the British government and its indifference to state corruption, and its reluctance to implement social, educational, and labor reforms. The slow implementation of reforms was partly attributed to the large influence of the business sector, and its resistance to reform.\footnote{In 1971, Trench’s tenure ended and he was replaced by Murray Maclehose under the British Labour government. Maclehose introduced wide sweeping reforms including the implementation of free education, public housing and a public assistance welfare system.}

In a similar way, both the Edinburgh Place pier and Government Hill are particularly significant spaces that have contributed to local Hong Kong politics and its history. Even after the 1967 riots, and up until 1997, individuals could walk up Battery Path, cross through the Central Government Office grounds and approach or enter the

\footnote{A legacy that still exists today. In July 2010, a minimum wage legislation was passed in Hong Kong for the first time. This legislation was met with substantial opposition from the business sector.}
buildings with ease. Protestors would typically wait and congregate underneath the large Burmese Rosewood tree by the main entrance of the main wing. Soon after July 1, 1997, the SAR government erected large iron fences around the perimeter of the offices allowing entry only to those who work in the buildings and their guests. In an archived interview from 1997, Paul Tang a government official stated, “[t]he fence will remain open most of the time. We envisage the gates will be closed only if there is a real, very serious security risk” (“The Pearl Report” 2011). Despite closing off the Central Government Offices to the public, protestors continue to mark the end of protests and rallies by symbolically handing over petitions and letters addressed to the government through the gaps of the fence, or by passing over documents to an official meeting them at the gate.

As a lived space, the area known as Government Hill connects the wealthy residential area known as the Mid-Levels to the Central Business District of Hong Kong. However, it should be argued that the space is, and has always been, frequented and used by all members of the Hong Kong public, especially starting in the latter half of the twentieth century. As Vito Bertin, a retired architecture professor, notes, the cross-street of Queen’s Road Central\textsuperscript{134} and Ice House Street is “where [the West Wing] meets the city. And exactly where it meets the city, it forms an entrance, which means it makes a welcoming gesture. It says, “Please, enter this building!” (“The

\textsuperscript{134} Queen’s Road is split up into sections, namely, Queen’s Road East, Queen’s Road West, Queensway, and Queen’s Road Central. It is the major thoroughfare on Hong Kong Island and extends from Wanchai to Sheung Wan.
Pearl Report” 2011). In fact, upon completion, the West Wing housed offices and departments that were pertinent and frequented by the public regularly. In 1961, a service center was set up in the lobby of the building. It was easily accessible to the public who could visit the desk to enquire about “any aspect of live in Hong Kong – ranging from business matters to domestic disputes” (Morrison 2009, 87). The service center has since been dismantled, and where the service desk formerly stood are barriers and turnstiles.

In a city that has been called a “concrete jungle”, Government Hill also remains one of the few green and open spaces in Hong Kong. The roads that traverse around Government Hill (Cotton Tree Drive, Battery Path, Lower and Upper Albert Road) are lined with many large, mature trees.¹³⁵ Lying adjacent to Government Hill is the Zoological and Botanical Gardens and further along Hong Kong Park – which equal to 13 hectare of green space. The gardens and park alongside Government Hill have together been described as the largest “green lung” in urban Hong Kong (Morrison 2009, 107). On any given day, during the mid-morning strollers, dog-walkers, and joggers can be frequently spotted on these roads. During lunch hours, one can find office workers from the Central district escaping to the nearby parks for an alfresco lunch, or strolling through the area. Preservationists argue that the tranquility of the area can be seen as a public “oasis” within the busy, frenetic urban center of Hong

¹³⁵ In addition, within the Central Government Office complex are a number of trees which are protected under the Register of Old and Valuable Trees in Hong Kong (Morrison 2009).
Kong – a rarity in many urban areas in Hong Kong and is another reason the area should be protected from urban renewal.

**The Government’s Proposal and Responses**

The debate that surrounded the redevelopment plans for Government Hill, as I will argue below, is a window into larger debates regarding redevelopment and urban renewal in Hong Kong. Those in opposition to redevelopment and renewal projects argue that the projects are guided by private investor and property developer interests who want nothing more than to buy up lucrative real estate that “belongs to the local population” and turn it into a privately owned, exclusive shopping mall or apartment complex. Moreover, preservationists argue that by prioritizing such projects and razing these colonial institutions, Hong Kong’s “heritage” and “history” and “identity” will be soon lost. Those in favor of redevelopment, urban renewal and reclamation have long argued that development projects are a necessity for Hong Kong to maintain its status as a competitive, world city. Developers and the government argue that in order to stay competitive and not be over-shadowed by cities such as Tokyo, Shanghai, Singapore, Hong Kong must constantly build and re-build. This need to build and re-build, they argue, is nothing new and is part of the founding myth of Hong Kong.

In September 2010, the Planning Department and Development Bureau announced the start of the public consultation period on the Central Government Offices and
Murray Building. Despite the recommendations put forth in the government commissioned appraisal report, the Planning Department proposed to preserve the Main and East Wing of Central Government Offices, redevelop Murray Building into a hotel, and demolish the West Wing for commercial development comprising a shopping mall and an office block – the commercial building is estimated to be around thirty-two storeys high. In addition, the land that would have occupied the West Wing will be auctioned to a property developer (Planning Department 2010). The government’s proposed design included an additional footbridge leading into Central, a public underground parking structure, and a widening of Ice House Street. Despite urging from the consultants that any new use for the building needs to be “suitably ‘serious’ to show some respect for the previous use as one of the major seats of Government,” and that “to turn the spaces into low grade offices, a hotel or perhaps worse still housing would be a denial of the significance of the site and buildings” (Morrison 2009, 136), it would seem that the government’s proposal for redevelopment is significantly in discord with the suggestions put forth by the commissioned preservation experts.

The proposal was put through a four month long public consultation period in which individuals, non-profit groups, community groups and experts voiced their opposition in the media, in public forums across the city, and at rallies. Their concerns

136 The West Wing currently stands at 17 storeys high.
137 In fact it was during this period that I came to learn about the proposed redevelopment plans for Government Hill. I attended a public forum at the Hong Kong Fringe Club (a non-profit arts organization). At the forum, local activists, preservationists, architects and academics spoke of the
included the lack of transparency in the whole decision making process, the
unsustainability of the project, and the leasing of what they understood to be public
space. The narrative of the public’s right to be included in the decision making
process of a public space (Government Hill) is perhaps at the forefront of the
oppositions’ arguments. As Katty Law, a preservationist and founding member of the
Government Hill Concern Group, argues, “We hope the people of Hong Kong will
understand that [Government Hill] belongs to us, and it should not be turned over to a
developer which will exclude most of the Hong Kong public” (“The Pearl Report”
2011). Opposition groups were worried that should Government Hill be auctioned off
and leased to a commercial property developer, the developers could make what was
a “public space” into an exclusionary space. Moreover, opponents are concerned that
at the hand of developers, the use and design of the commercial building that will take
the place of the West Wing would further ignore the recommendations put forth in the
appraisal.

Various politicians, concern groups, professional groups, community groups and even
international preservation groups like the UNESCO associated International Council
on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) came together and issued numerous joint
statements and press releases strongly condemning the government’s proposals, not
only on the demerits of the proposed design, but also of the government’s feeble

government’s plans to redevelop the area. After the forum, those sitting in the audience were invited to
go on a walking tour of Government Hill. At the forum on Government Hill, various activists and
individuals jokingly made reference to Government Hill’s soon-to-be new name, Developer Hill.
attempt to include the public and enhance transparency. Many opposition voices feared that like the Star Ferry Saga of 2006, the so-called public consultation period was merely a front and way for the government to appear open and transparent in the decision making process. The various groups and individuals issued a joint statement stating the following:

The present public consultation is another example of government undertaking a false-consultation – having already announced advanced plans and models and presented its preferred use of the site to the Town Planning Board, the government is merely offering a fait accompli to the public. Since the announcement of CGO buildings were to be transferred to Tamar in 2006, community groups have demanded that the CGO site be conserved for public use, but it appears now that the government has given preferential treatment to property developers – which is highly inappropriate and against the principles of fair and open governance (Government Hill Concern Group 2010).

Indeed, this concern was legitimated when the Financial Secretary made his annual budget speech in February of 2011 – in the midst of the public consultation period. The Financial Secretary announced: “When the new Central Government Complex at Tamar comes into operation, the Main and East Wings of the Central Government Offices will be used by the Department of Justice and the West Wing will be demolished for redevelopment into Grade A offices” (J. Tsang 2011). In a blog post that very same day, the Government Hill Concern Group rebutted, “While this consultation procedure is still in progress, and reports have yet to publicize the results of such public consultation for information of the general public, the Financial Secretary chose to announce the demolition of the West Wing as a foregone decision of the Government. […] Does it mean that public consultation is merely a trick to fool
the public, and the Government has no intention of taking public opinion seriously?”
(Government Hill Concern Group 2011).

As mentioned earlier, the SAR government has been long committed to the idea of “progressive development.” In a recent publication put forth by the SAR Development Bureau, it was stated that the government’s urban renewal strategy had taken on the 4R business strategy of redevelopment, rehabilitation, revitalization and heritage preservation. The report states:

While improving the quality of life of residents in the urban areas remains a primary goal, the vision of urban renewal should embrace the concepts of sustainable development and building a quality city (including appropriate development intensity, land use planning, urban design, greening, local culture, heritage preservation and harbor beautification, etc.) and be forward-looking to support the development in the long run (Development Bureau 2011, 4).

Furthermore, the strategy is said to incorporate and underscore a public participatory aspect that is transparent, and balances the needs and interests of the community (Ibid.). Listening to community groups and civil society groups such as the Government Hill Concern Group, one hears them claiming that the government did not incorporate the voices of those truly concerned and affected by the proposed project. The concern group argues that the government’s urban renewal strategy contradicted what was actually happening on the ground. As the following example shows, the government did include a public participatory aspect to their planning. However, the inclusion was limited to a select group of people: the business community.
In November 2010, the Chief Executive, Donald Tsang, spoke at a luncheon with Hong Kong’s business community. A question was posed to Tsang regarding Grade-A office space in Hong Kong. Specifically, the question was concerned with the lack of Grade-A office spaces and also the rising rent of office space in Hong Kong.

Turning to the ongoing debates and opposition to the redevelopment and auctioning of the West Wing land, Tsang said:

We must have balanced development [...] But some politicians are saying well, sorry we don’t need it, but we should turn it into a turf and raise lambs and cattle. [...] The business community, the professional bodies should make your case clear. I believe there is a need for [grade A offices] because our business community cannot stand still [...] the heart of Hong Kong cannot stop upgrading itself and we must not price ourselves out of the regional business market by allowing rents to rise to impossible levels [...] But [the business community has] to help me (D. Tsang 2010).

Tsang’s response is a clear demonstration of the government’s close relationship with the business community and its intention to maintain these relationships. But the speech also demonstrates how the government relies heavily upon this community. Within his speech there are glimmers of desperation as he literally calls upon the business community to help him by encouraging them to take part in the consultation process and to show their support to the government. Tsang’s hyperbolic reference to letting the land regress to an agricultural farm can be understood as a scare tactic of sorts. Hong Kong, as the government asserts, has always been and must continue to remain on the path of progress. To “go back” in time to a rural Hong Kong is in

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138 Of course, no actual arguments from opposing politicians, community groups, environmental groups, etc. ever made the suggestion that the Government Hill plot ought to be used to raise cattle, lamb or any other farm animals.
contradistinction to Hong Kong’s founding myth, which ultimately is about Hong Kong’s development and growth. In his speech, preservationists and opposition forces who are more interested in raising lambs and cattle, can be seen as preventing Hong Kong’s progress. Moreover, as inhibitors to growth, it can be assumed that preservationists – according to this speech – are not “true Hong Kongers.” As mentioned above, the unique land ownership system of Hong Kong means the government has an interest in focusing its efforts on land auctions and maintaining strong relations with property developers. Indeed, the Central district in which Government Hill is located fetches some of the highest land value and thusly the highest real estate prices within the city and the world. Should the government gain the support of the business community, the government would be a step closer to auctioning off Government Hill to the highest property developer as a means of revenue. It is thus interesting to note that Tsang should envision the redevelopment project as a means to keeping property and real estate prices sustainable.

V. CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN THE CITY AND THE PRODUCTION OF CITY SPACES

Despite the rosy images preservationists paint of Edinburgh Place Pier and Government Hill, the two spaces have not always been as welcoming and open as remembered and perceived by anti-redevelopment forces. In fact, while civil society groups and activists claim that the Star Ferry pier and Government Hill are public land, and more importantly lived spaces imbued with meaning, this was not the case in the late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth century. As mentioned earlier, the
The settler’s town is a strongly built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly lit town; the streets are covered with asphalt, and the garbage cans swallow all the leavings, unseen, unknown and hardly thought about. [The settler’s] feet are protected by strong shoes although the streets of his town are clean and even, with no holes or stones […] The town belonging to the colonized people, or at least the native town, the Negro village, the medina, the reservation, is a place of ill fame, peopled by men of evil repute. […] It is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other, and their huts are built one on top of the other (Fanon 1965, 39).

Drawing from Fanon, Timothy Mitchell further expounds upon how the segregation of the colonial city is necessary as a way to underscore differences, not only between the colonized and the colonizer, but also between who can participate in and move freely in the modern city space, and who is to be kept out of these spaces. The distinction, then, is necessary in the self-understanding of the modern city. Mitchell further states:

The reorganization of towns and the laying out of new colonial quarters, every regulation of economic or social practice, the construction of the country’s new system of irrigation canals,[…] the building of barracks, police stations and classrooms, the completion of a system of railways – this pervasive process of ‘order’ must be understood as more than mere improvement or ‘reform.’ Such projects were all undertaken as an enframing, and hence had the effect of re-presenting a realm of the conceptual, conjuring up for the first time the prior abstractions of progress,
reason, law, discipline, history, colonial authority and order (Mitchell 1988, 179).

In many ways, the close proximity of the various government offices, legislative chambers, legal courts, police headquarters in Government Hill, a large prison facility, and the governor’s official residence atop a hill, made these state institutions inaccessible and spatially distant from the local Hong Kong populace. Any political processes that were to take place, took place atop a hill, far from the everyday, local, lived space of the Hong Konger.

Colonial projects over the world used architecture and embarked on city planning projects that not only separated the indigenous populations from the colonialists, but also demonstrate the latter’s cultural superiority (Rainbow 2003, 353). More importantly, urban planning has been used to reinforce and establish power over the indigenous population. Racial segregation policies existed throughout the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. In 1888, the European Residential District Ordinance was put into affect, but beyond that existed other bills and legislation tabled which would serve to not only police the Chinese but purposely created spaces of exclusion. For instance, bills that introduced the demarcation of land on Hong Kong Island would prevent property from being leased or sold to anyone of Chinese descent were introduced. Other legislations dictated the style of architecture allowed within a district and listed various building regulations; these legislations would prevent “Chinese style” accommodations or buildings from being erected and also prevented large Chinese families from living together under one roof. And lastly,
legislations concerning living standards within specific European residential areas were tabled. These legislations meant that Chinese could live in such areas as long as they maintained the customs and habits of Europeans (Bremner and Lung 2003). As already mentioned, early incarnations of the Star Ferry Pier were spatially planned to dissuade Chinese pedestrians from using the pier. For instance, the second generation pier was bounded by the Supreme Court, the Hong Kong Club (exclusively for White patrons), and the Hong Kong Bank. Government Hill can likewise be seen as a space of exclusion in Hong Kong. Bremner and Lung argue that the location and overbearing gothic and classicism style architecture on Government Hill allowed for Europeans to maintain some sense of colonial cultural identity and assert their power (Ibid.). Furthermore, like Foucault’s panopticon which serves as a political technology allowing those beneath it to be seen by those in the tower (who are never seen), Government Hill and its various institutions also functioned in a similar manner: the presence of the court house, church, legislative body, and police force atop a hill was certainly felt and seen on a daily basis by those living beneath (See Fig 13).
Following the Japanese occupation in Hong Kong, the colonial government was forced to reconsider their policies. In particular, with an increasing number of colonies gaining independence after World War II, the government felt the need to attend to improving Hong Kong’s development, something that had largely been dismissed before (P. Y. Ho 2004, 136). For instance, the relocation of the Star Ferry and Queen’s Pier to Edinburgh Place, maximized the use of land for community facilities (for Chinese and Europeans) rather than providing space for privately owned buildings (M. K. Ng et al. 2010, 421). The new pier also featured wide boulevards, shops and was easily accessible for all. Moreover, it was located directly opposite to the City Hall – a facility that would be used by many. Government Hill also underwent a similar transformation as the Central Government Office was repurposed: Government offices were open to the public, and an information desk for the population was created in 1961. The local population accessed these new spaces,
which could be appropriated and imbued with meaning that would be in synchronicity with the de-colonized founding myth of Hong Kong.

The examples above illustrate the ways in which spaces imbued with meaning are produced and constructed. As such the works of Henri Lefebvre provide a useful theoretical lens to help us understand how spaces are socially and cultural produced to obscure relationships of power and, in the case of present-day Hong Kong, the powers of neoliberalism. Lefebvre’s conceptual triad is used to demonstrate the ongoing process of socially produced space. The triad consists of three dialectical concepts: 1) spatial practice (perceived space); 2) representations of space (conceived space); 3) representational space (lived space). Spatial practice, or perceived space, can be understood as the production and reproduction of spatial relations. These social relations are “secreted” into society to ensure continuity between individuals’ relationships to the space. The practices within a space condition how the space is understood. Representations of space, also referred to as conceived space, is the space conceived of by “scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers, and social engineers […] all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived” (Lefebvre 1991, 38). Lastly, representational space is the everyday, lived space that is passively experienced. Unlike the representations of space conceptualized by architects and city planners, representational space is, as Lefebvre writes, “alive: it speaks […] It embraces the loci of passion, of action and of lived situations, and thus immediately implies time”.

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It is also the space in which “the imagination seeks to change” (Ibid., 39). Together, the three concepts work in tandem to constantly produce and reproduce space.

In applying Lefebvre’s analysis to the Hong Kong case, it can be argued that prior to World War II, the heavily racialized and segregated space of Government Hill was sustained by daily, spatial practices. Government Hill was largely inaccessible to the local Chinese public. The site was the main colonial seat of power, and its nearby prison and police station an institution of that colonial power. Moreover, the area was only lived in and frequented by elites and Westerners. Following World War II, the government began to represent and conceive of space in a different way. As mentioned earlier, the ferry pier was rebuilt and moved to a more accessible and open location, more accessible to the public (including the Chinese). Likewise, the building of the Central Government Offices, with public offices pertinent to the daily life and bureaucracy of Hong Kongers, was made within reach to the public. The best example of this is the building of the service desk in the lobby of the West Wing in the Central Government Office. This conceived space served as a meeting place of different intersections of Hong Kong society and gave way to the representational, lived space that Hong Kongers remember today. The Star Ferry and Government Hill, which were once symbolic spaces of Colonial power, are now understood as a symbolic, “heritage” space within the memories of many Hong Kongers. Its demise (or its once impending demise in the case of Government Hill) is seen as a threat to this lived space and its daily practices (such as dog walking, jogging, commuting
through the park). Moreover, this lived space has been appropriated for various social and political, everyday purposes.

In speaking to opponents of the Government Hill plan and those who reminisce about the old Edinburgh Place Pier, there is a certain understanding amongst Hong Kongers that these are “heritage sites” which tell the history of Hong Kong and Hong Kong identity. One Sunday, I joined a tour arranged by the Government Hill Concern Group during my stay in Hong Kong. On the tour, I was told that these spaces and the institutions that stood on Government Hill were what made Hong Kong unique. To raze these spaces, the tour guide argued, would be to erase Hong Kong’s history and its identity. Following Lefebvre’s triad, as changes to Government Hill were made following the war, these spaces become lived spaces and are currently remembered as lived spaces and not spaces that represented colonial power and rule. As a way to maintain the “lived” aspect of Government Hill, the civil society groups and politicians who are against redevelopment argue, the Government should amend the zoning so that Government Hill can be conceived as a “heritage precinct” which would protect it from any redevelopment. Failing that, the opposition made suggestions that the outer shell of the buildings remain intact to allow other offices to relocate into the empty buildings (“The Pearl Report” 2011). In this understanding, preservation is merely a way to perpetuate the space as a familiar, representational space (Lefebvre 1991). As Cathryn Clayton reminds readers, it is important to recognize how individuals within the cityspace and its changing urban environment
struggle or cope with “make[ing] places out of these transformed spaces” (Clayton 2009, 181). As such, the constant and rapid transformation, reclamation and gentrification of the city makes place making even more difficult. Daily place-making practices such as jogging, walking your dog, walking to and from work or school, eating your lunch at a park, or grocery shopping at the local market are forcibly uprooted once the setting and buildings within that space are razed. It is thus easy to see why and how Lefebvre sees representational space, and its disruption as a potential avenue for resistance movements (Lefebvre 1991).

As heritage scholars have noted, heritage narratives can help garner a sense of belonging – this is certainly the case in Hong Kong, as these spaces have been represented and reconfigured to be a space belonging to the Hong Kong public, and a space that is important in understanding Hong Kong’s history. For instance, Kate Moles describes how heritage is a re-creation of the past, plucked and selected from obscurity for contemporary purposes – such as a political tool (Moles 2009, 130). As discussed in Elsa Peralta and Marta Anico’s edited volume, the connection between heritage and the national identities is inexorable, and especially relevant for the study of nationalism and nation-building. Similar to the ways in which “tradition” can be used to legitimate a culture or nation, they argue that:

Identities, in order to be effective, have to have some kind of materiality: the totems that symbolize the solidarity felt by generations of heterogeneous individuals towards a unifying narrative of belonging. In this context, heritage provides a rather effective material and symbolic support for these narratives, both serving as a resource for the representation of identities and a place for its performance. Through heritage, people not only experience
community; they simultaneously legitimize and consent to the agendas of its builders and caretakers (Peralta and Anico 2009, 1).

The idea of heritage is further problematized when one considers the way it is often used to garner private profit. For instance, one project that tried to incorporate the state’s needs and heritage preservation is the aptly name Heritage 1881 Building in Kowloon. The building, which was the former Marine Police Headquarters, was auctioned to a Cheung Kong Holdings subsidiary for $352.8 million. In cooperation with the Hong Kong Tourism Board, the heritage building was renovated into a large, luxury shopping mall to promote “heritage tourism.” The shopping mall attracts mainly tourists from Mainland China who enjoy the fine dining and luxury shopping. Developers and planners conceived the space of Heritage 1881 as a space to promote Hong Kong’s heritage. This is probably best reflected in the restaurants inside the complex. The restaurants focus on mostly Western food and have names that appear as if they were colonial relics. Restaurant names include Hullet House, Mariner’s Rest, St. George, Stable’s Grill, and the Parlour. The podium area of the shopping center is well manicured, and strangely, one can find hidden speakers within the planters airing recordings of Vivaldi’s Four Seasons.

The “heritage tourism” and the new pseudo-1930s Star Ferry pier are examples of what Abbas has called “history as decoration” (Abbas 1997, 83). In both these projects, heritage buildings become used for “unreflective visual consumption” – that is, their history is no longer relevant, rather the space and buildings become
“heritage” for heritage’s sake. Indeed, the government is fully aware that a world city must also incorporate “heritage” sites and a preserve “local culture” – hence the SAR government’s creation of the “Conserve Central” branch of the Development Bureau.

The Conceived Space of Central and New Spatial Practices

In a televised interview, then Secretary for Development, Carrie Lam stated, “The West Wing redevelopment, seen in the overall context of the CGO complex, is, I would say – hand on my heart, a conservation-cum-redevelopment proposal. It is not led just by redevelopment, it is also conservation to create a major public park – very accessible, and connected to the rest of Central” (“The Pearl Report” 2011). Indeed, the government and developers are well aware that new redevelopment project must, if it wants to obtain the public’s approval, include aspects of conservation.

The conceived space as shown in the government’s designs of the commercial building suggests a space that is heavily trafficked by pedestrians, and vehicles, as a way to portray the accessibility and open-ness of the building (See Fig 14). The road has been widened so to welcome more traffic into Central. However, upon a closer examination of the image, one sees the commercial building’s shopping mall and its shop fronts – the shop fronts belong to luxury boutiques such as the Italian design house, Gucci. Moreover, the new proposed landscape footbridge is meant to connect the new commercial building with The Galleria luxury shopping arcade at Queen’s Road Central. It will be an addition to the already existing footbridge network in
Central. It should be noted that one can traverse through Central without having to ever step foot on ground level. Presently, there is a network of footbridges that allow individuals to walk from Central to nearby Admiralty. The footbridges also connect the various high-end shopping malls in Central to the high-end office blocks. On any given workday, one will see mostly office workers from nearby banks and law firms scuttling through the footbridge network. The footbridges are covered spaces and provide protection from the heat and rain; some of the footbridges are even air-conditioned – they are, however, all owned by the property developers and maintained by the various shopping malls and office buildings which they are connected to. While users of the footbridges and flyover networks may conceive of them as a luxury on any given hot summer’s day, Neferti Tadiar notes how in post-developed Metro Manila, flyovers can be critically understood as a way to “provide a relatively exclusive, suspended network for the emergence of mobile, metropolitan subjects liberated from the assaulting contradictions of third world modernist development” (2009, 217). Tadiar’s description of these neoliberal, “transnational” subjects are very similar to the way the users of the footbridges in New Central have been envisioned. Arising out of the urban excess of Metro Manila, or any other city for that matter, Tadiar describes how the individuals will not come into contact with those who might disrupt the “continuation, permutation, and expansion of a ruling economic and political order” (Ibid., 218).
What is particularly interesting about the proposal drawings are what has been
colloquially referred to as “scalies” (Walker 2011). Scalies are the human figures that
are often included in architectural drawings. The figures are often unassuming
individuals who blend effortlessly into the proposed drawings: “they are a happy and
healthy lot: they jog past environmentally responsible retail, stride in smart business
attire toward gleaming office structures, hobnob in the former back alley magically
converted to green space” (Ibid.). Moreover, what is significant about these figures is
how the inclusion of them in drawings is an attempt to make the new space appear as
livable, acceptable, and beyond critique (Ibid.). This is certainly the case in the
drawings published by the Development Bureau and the Planning Department (see
above figures). The images put forth in their proposal show many individuals walking
the streets of Central, with the new green sloped commercial building behind them.
The individuals are mainly men, wearing business suits, perhaps to indicate that the
new commercial building will be an important business location within the Central
district. Other “scalies” include individuals with shopping bags - perhaps to indicate
how the space will also be a premier shopping destination. In these images, the
redevelopment project is envisioned as one bringing in extra capital and one which
could theoretically raise the real estate of the area.

The state’s idea of a “New Central” is one that is in line with the government’s idea
of progressive development – a concept that has always been associated with Hong
Kong and is the backbone of its founding myth. Specifically, New Central is meant to
feed into the idea that a “world city” must incorporate aspects of development that are
“pro-growth, infrastructure-led, formal, technical, and professional” (M. K. Ng 2006).
Like the colonial government following World War II, the SAR Government in the
years 2005-2011 realized that it must address the public’s needs and hear their voices.
As such, the government drew up plans and proposals that included a green space for
the public which, they claim, can be accessed by all. Moreover, as Ng has suggested
and as is discussed above, while the government has shown some willingness to
include the public in the planning process, the participatory aspect in discussing Hong
Kong’s future is insignificant when compared to the Government’s prioritization of
the needs of the business sector, property developers, and the state’s overall goal of
becoming a ‘World City.’ This is particularly clear upon examining the incorporation
of global, designer fashion stores in the images. Moreover, the “scalies” who are all
wearing suits, and driving high-end, luxury cars, invoke a sense of cosmopolitanism,
efficiency, and technological progress. Concretely, the scalies in the state and developer’s proposal are representations of the neoliberal subjectivities that the state has actively created and hopes to continue to create.

V. CONCLUSION

It should be clear that despite the heated debates over redevelopment, urban renewal and gentrification of heritage sites in recent years, both parties’ narratives are heavily reliant on the founding myth of Hong Kong as a means to justify their causes, and this further demonstrates the way in which the founding myth shapes public discourse in Hong Kong. The pro-development faction has always looked back at Hong Kong’s past and argued that development and change has been part of Hong Kong’s unique development story. The anti-development faction also uses the founding myth of Hong Kong in their argument. For preservationists, the spaces that should be protected are understood to be all historically important sites of Hong Kong’s development, founding and resistance to colonial powers. Both narratives in these debates thusly do not critique the founding myth as such, and instead help to perpetuate the myth. However, as the city is continuously re-made, redeveloped and renewed as per the state’s desire to reassert Hong Kong’s world city status, Hong Kongers are forced to renegotiate their place-making practices alongside the redevelopment.

The building of Hong Kong’s public housing estates and later new towns was a way in which the colonial state could “solve” the squatter problem in Hong Kong. As
Smart astutely points out, while many colonial cities experienced a division that led to “dual cities” existing side-by-side (i.e. a western, European city and a non-Western city), Hong Kong’s division was determined by the legality of spaces. For instance, the large number of squatter housing, over-crowded tenements, and boat dwellers occupied what the colonial government saw as “illegal” spaces.\footnote{It should be of no surprise that those in “illegal” spaces were also Chinese residents of the city.} In many ways, one can see similarities with pre-public housing Hong Kong and the experience described by Neferti Tadiar. In her vivid description of the Filipino capital, Manila, Tadiar describes a city that is teeming with visual, sensory and audible overloads. The smell, cacophony, human waste, and shanty houses on the overcrowded streets – what Tadiar describes as the “urban excess” – are not only symptoms of the Marcos Regime’s collaboration with the IMF and their dreams of modernity and development, but more importantly serve to “interrup[t] the vision of development” (2009, 148). The building of public housing estates to house those who lost their squatter settlement in the Shek Kip Mei fire can thus be seen as a way to solve that interruption and hindrance to development – and in many ways, it did. Today, the public housing estate is ubiquitous, common and romanticized part of Hong Kong’s cityscape. Of course, what lies behind the façade is rarely discussed. Today, Hong Kong’s Urban Renewal Authority engages in a similar practice. Buildings that are deemed hazardous, susceptible to fire, containing “illegal” extensions, housing “cage homes” or considered part of “urban decay” are taken under the wings of the authority and are torn down, while residents are compensated or re-housed. On the
Urban Renewal Authority’s website, visitors are met with the welcoming message that states the authority’s main aims: “Urban decay is a root cause of the most acute problems of city life almost everywhere in the modern world. Hong Kong is no exception. Despite our sustained economic success, our business resourcefulness and our highly productive labor force, urban decay remains one of the most urgent issues we face in Hong Kong today. More than 110,000 families in our community still live in homes that are substandard” (B. Cheung 2011). Of course, many of the buildings that the authority focuses its efforts on are in the older districts of Hong Kong and house the elderly and, often cases, the poor in Hong Kong, which can be seen as a hindrance to Hong Kong’s development and aspirations of maintaining its global city status.¹⁴⁰

In examining the debates surrounding the preservation of Government Hill, it seems clear that the only demand preservationists had was to preserve the plot of land as it is. The preservationists initially seemed less concerned about whether the space would be used for public or private usage. To illustrate this in the best way, I turn to the example of the nearby former Central Police Station compound. The nearby former Central Police Station Compound (CPS) was also recently on the precipice of destruction. As Agnes Ku details in her study of the compound, the now defunct compound sat in the heart of central on what was considered by real estate developers

¹⁴⁰ The practice of sub-dividing flats is a common practice in some of the city’s poorer neighborhoods. By sub-dividing flats, slumlords are able to rent out the incredibly small, amenity-less rooms to the very poor.
to be commercially viable real estate. In a scenario almost exactly the same as that of Government Hill, preservationists fought to have the compound declared a historic site and thus protected from redevelopment, claiming it be to a central important part of Hong Kong’s history. The police station managed to obtain that status and it cannot be torn down. The government consequently joined forces with the private corporation the Hong Kong Jockey Club to transform the space into an arts facility and museum. Not surprisingly, the rhetoric used to justify this gentrification was the need for Hong Kong, as a global city, to have a thriving arts and culture scene. As the website states, “CPS will be a new kind of cultural space that creates a dynamic synergy by combining contemporary art, architecture, design, memory and heritage” (CPS.org 2012). While the government and the Hong Kong Jockey Club maintain that the CPS compound is for the community,141 it is also satisfies the state’s “worlding”, cosmopolitan, neoliberal and global desires. In December 2012, after long battles between preservationists and the government and developers, the Government Hill site (in its entirety) was declared a Grade I historic monument, meaning that it cannot be destroyed and is a protected space.

The imagination of a city, then, is an active practice of the state and its various planning departments, but also of preservationists and the everyday people of the city. James Donald writes of how “remembering a city” and “describing a city” are acts

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141 Bizarrely, the website, in an effort to stress the importance of the community in this project, welcomes individuals to submit stories of their memories within the Central Police Compound. Of course, memories of the compound will either be of those in power (police officers, guards) or those who were detained in jail there.
which allow a city to be imagined and mediated through political and social circumstances (Donald 1997). While Donald focuses his attention on literary and cinematic mediums, the imagined city is also sustained through everyday speech acts such as in the examples mentioned above. They are also, as will be discussed in the following chapter, conjured up in times of crises (i.e. such as the destruction of the cityscape). Donald suggests that previously “unrepresentable spaces” of the city become “liveable” when they are translated and incorporated into narratives. Thus, events associated with a space may be remembered, or misremembered, as taking place against a more symbolic topography (Ibid., 186). The misremembering of events in a space is particularly common in both the Edinburgh Place Pier and Government Hill examples. Government Hill as a space which originally represented colonial rule, power, and might in Hong Kong, for the most part, was not part of the public’s collective memory and was not assigned that symbolic meaning. Similarly, Edinburgh Place Pier and its previous incarnations were spaces that divided colonizer from colonized but were not assigned those symbolic meanings. Rather, Government Hill is remembered as a space in which important political events and rallies took place, and the Star Ferry pier is remembered as the people’s space for easy transportation and a place of social gatherings. Such a phenomenon is not only limited to the examples seen in this chapter; in the previous chapter I discussed how memories and significance attached to the border are at odds with how the state understood the border at the time.
The collective memories of these spaces are conjured and imbued with meaning by preservationists. These conjured memories paint a rosy history of these spaces. It can safely be said that change seems to be part of the modern, contemporary urban life, and an inevitable part of the neoliberal city (Wilson 1997, 129). In the case of Hong Kong, change and development are a central part of the city’s founding myth. And while preservationists certainly cling to the beauty that lies within the old, there is, as Wilson notes, a “secret pleasure of nostalgia […] that allows us, as we look back […] at those lost corners of the old city, at the same time to measure the distance we have come” (Ibid., 138). That distance, I would argue, is a key component of Hong Kong’s founding myth.
“Technology is a glittering lure, but there’s the rare occasion when the public can be engaged on a level beyond flash. They have a sentimental bond with the product. My first job I was in-house at a fur company with this old pro, Greek, named Teddy, and Teddy taught me the most important idea in advertising is ‘new’, it creates an itch, you simply put your product in there as a kind of calamine lotion. But he also talked about a deeper bond with the product, nostalgia. It’s delicate, but potent.”

Don Draper, Mad Men

CHAPTER FIVE: THE COMMODIFICATION OF HONG KONG

I. INTRODUCTION

It was another sweltering, mid-summer day in Hong Kong and I was walking to the nearby subway station from the busy, up-market Western restaurants of Soho in Central. I quickly found a shortcut, and found myself cutting through one of Hong Kong’s oldest wet markets to reach the station. The closely packed stalls on either side of me displayed colorful vegetables, freshly butchered meats, and seafood so fresh that one could see prawns still twitching and jumping and fish still swimming in tanks. It was midday and the market was packed – one could overhear Filipina maids buying groceries to prepare for that night’s dinner and haggling over prices; homemakers greeting their neighborhood green-grocer, gossiping and briefly chatting about the latest soap opera before enquiring the grocer about what vegetables just came into season; or office-workers quickly picking up groceries for that night’s

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142 Wet markets (街市) are named as such because the floors are often wet from the hosing down of floors. There are approximately 210 wet markets in various neighborhoods in the city. These markets are often in open-spaces with stalls lining up and down streets. As of late, there has been an increase of markets moving indoors into buildings for “hygienic purposes.” Vendors sell a range of goods, however one vendor typically focuses on one type of product (i.e. poultry, seafood, noodles, dried foods, fruit, vegetables and sundries). Markets are open most days of the week as many shoppers will visit markets daily or many times a week – an everyday practice that underscores the importance of freshness in Chinese cooking (S.-C. Ho 2005).
dinner during their lunch break. Such a scene is one that can be found in any of Hong Kong’s wet markets.

Off to one corner of the market, on a sloping side street, is a stall that unlike other market stalls selling daily necessities sold something different. Placed directly in front of a noodle house, this market stall had the familiar corrugated metal roof and a rolled up blue tarp that served as a shutter for when the stall was closed during the night, and like many stalls the space of the stall must have had an area of less than 15 sq ft – enough space for shops to display their goods and some leftover room for a small stool for shop keepers to rest on. However, instead of vegetables, eggs, or other groceries, the stall was filled with toys, jars of candy and a mini refrigerator with bottles of cold drinks called Green Spot, and bottled soy-milk. The displayed toys were toys that would not be found in large toy retailers round the city, they included the red and white “watermelon” balls, Chinese checker boards, plastic pick-up sticks, jacks, cardboard planes, plastic flying discs, and slings. It was clear that this market stall was selling “antique” or “vintage” toys. A middle-aged woman was sitting on a small stool wrapping up small gift bags. In the small cellophane bags were an assortment of different types of candy and toys such as plastic airplanes and stickers. The woman inside the stall quickly got up as I paused to peer through the refrigerator door. After paying for a bottle of the fluorescent orange beverage Green Spot, I began to look at what the toy shop had to offer. “Are you looking for anything in particular?” the shopkeeper asked. “We have lots of toys here. I bet you haven’t seen
some of these items in a long time. There are some things here that I’m sure you didn’t even get a chance to play with when you were young.” Enthusiastically, she began to pull out toys from the display and showed how they work. “These are all toys that used to be made in Hong Kong. These are the toys I played with when I grew up. Feel free to browse.” As I began to pick up some of the toys and get a closer look, I did find candy and toys that were common when I was a child in the 1980s. The shopkeeper, having realized that I had spotted something from my past, quickly started talking to me again. “I knew you’d recognize something! You know, a lot of kids these days have never even played with pick-up sticks. I knew when you chose to buy a bottle of Green Spot, you must have grown up in Hong Kong. I have a lot of customers who grew up in Hong Kong in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s who keep coming back. They just love the selection of toys and sweets I have.” Repeating herself, “See, you can’t find these things today. These are all things that used to be made in Hong Kong. This is what Hong Kong was known for!” Asking if the toys were antiques and where she found the second-hand items, the shop-owner responded, “Oh no! These are just replicas of old toys. Some of these toys are from our own collection, but almost all of these are all brand new. I had to cross the border into China to find these toys. Same with the Green Spot you’re drinking. You used to be able to find them at all the shops and supermarkets, now it’s a real pain to find them. But I found a supplier.” It was clear that the owner of the store had great pride in what she was doing and what she was selling, even if it meant that she had to go to great lengths to stock her shop. When I asked her why she opened such a shop she
said, “Well, things were just better back then. I’m here to help make people feel happy, hence the name of the shop, Feel Happy HK. It’s best that I have these items to sell to people now, before they really do become extinct. People want these toys and sweets. They want to hold on to the past, and we can help people do that.” And indeed, the shop can help people hold onto the past. Inside the store, attached to the roof is a mobile with pieces of paper hanging from it. The “wishing hook” allows patrons to post up items from their past that they’re looking for. In a recent magazine interview, the shopkeeper explained the purpose of the wishing hook. “Many of our patrons wish to find childhood treasures from the good old days, so that’s why we have this ‘wishing hook.’ People can write down [the names of] their old-time playthings and goodies they wish to find, and we will try our best to help search for them” (Tsoi and Chu 2012).

What struck me about the example of the toy storeowner was the ease and willingness of the shop’s patrons to pay a price for the shop owners to find these toys of the past for them. However, I see this exchange as not merely the purchasing of a service and a good (searching for the toy and the toy, respectively); it is also about paying for a specific type of service – helping people “find” their past. In this chapter I show how Hong Kong’s founding myth has become attached to items previously understood as pedestrian everyday items. These items are emptied of their original everydayness and significance, and instead have the ability to affectively trigger a powerful sense of nostalgia. What used to be items of the everyday become items within the competitive
and lucrative nostalgia market, and not only celebrate but *signify* the developmental successes of Hong Kong’s past as determined by the founding myth. This chapter, then, is about the reification and commodification of the founding myth of Hong Kong.

In Chapter Two, I demonstrated how today’s dominant founding myth of Hong Kong has its origins as a colonial myth – that is, a myth created and disseminated by the colonial state. This colonial historical narrative not only identified the colonial government as the main protagonist in Hong Kong’s developmental story, but attributed its successes to the crown. It was not until the latter half of the twentieth century that the myth underwent a decolonizing and localizing effect by the now well-established Hong Kong populace, and bifurcated from the colonial narrative. The decolonizing and localizing effect changed the founding myth and focused on the Hong Kong people and their achievements. This version of the myth underscores the work ethic, sacrifices, and sense of community among the Hong Kong people. More significantly, this myth champions the role of capitalism and neoliberal state policies, and as such, the global, modern, neoliberal subject is a characteristic embodied by “true, quintessential Hong Kongers.” Specifically, this localized myth focuses on the period between the 1950s and 1970s as Hong Kong’s transformative years. The decades are characterized by Hong Kong’s shift away from trading and into the manufacturing sector, the growth and modernization of the city, and the simultaneous coming of age of a truly “local” generation. As factory numbers in the city slowly
increased so too did the variety of goods produced. The sector had initially focused on the production of clothing and garments, and later plastics,\textsuperscript{143} and by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the industry diversified into the manufacturing of light electronic goods. Certainly, while many Hong Kongers, especially Hong Kong’s new immigrant population, were actively involved in the manufacturing sector and worked in the factories, the rise and success of the manufacturing industry must also be partly attributed to the embargo placed on Mainland China, Hong Kong’s burgeoning population, and a state that was keen to encourage the continued growth and sustainability of the manufacturing industry. Nevertheless, the dominant myth today emphasizes the local Hong Kong population who contributed to Hong Kong’s growth and development. This myth is celebrated and perpetuated through the renaissance and commodification of the goods produced during this period. These everyday goods – whether it be a porcelain bowl, a white t-shirt, a plastic red and white ball – signify Hong Kong’s growth and development.

This chapter sets out to achieve a number of things. I will first survey the current literature on commodification to establish a theoretical grounding for this chapter. I then examine the first instances of the commodification of nostalgia in Hong Kong. This occurred during the lead up to Hong Kong’s change in sovereignty. At the time, the nostalgic goods produced by the market were produced under a Western,

\textsuperscript{143} The plastics industry itself was a behemoth in its own right and the variety of goods produced were incredibly varied. Goods produced included plastic flowers, toys, soles for shoes, and also everyday home goods, such as plastic plates and cups.
Orientalist gaze. I then contrast the first wave of the commodification of nostalgia with the most recent renaissance whereby local Hong Kongers now dictate and make up the nostalgia goods market. The localization of the commodification of nostalgia entails the process of emptying everyday objects of their meaning and significance, and affixing a new significance that speaks directly to the founding myth of Hong Kong. By way of this, such goods further perpetuate the founding myth and can be seen as the commodification of the myth itself. Lastly, I finish the chapter by showing that Hong Kongers’ self-understanding of their position within a global market cannot be ignored. By localizing nostalgia goods, these goods must go beyond the local Hong Kong audience and speak to global consumers as well. Part of the anxieties that surround Hong Kongers in the twentieth century has been renegotiating Hong Kong’s place on the world stage. The desire to re-become a global city is fueled by a celebration of the past success and heydays of Hong Kong. As much as Hong Kong’s founding myth is about the city’s growth, modernization and development, and the new subjectivities that arise out of Hong Kong’s “golden period”, the myth also underscores the notion of the global, cosmopolitan Hong Konger. Thus, the nostalgia goods are produced for the local and global market.

II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING COMMODIFICATION AND NOSTALGIA

Commodities and Commodification

Before examining the Hong Kong case in depth, I first examine the ways in which a “commodity” has been theoretically understood. For instance, how do commodities
differ from “things?” It is widely agreed upon that commodities are first and foremost objects with some form of economic or monetary value. Of course, how that value comes about and how such objects become exchangeable is not so clear. One starting point would be to consider Marx’s definition of a commodity. Although Marx begins his volume with a broadly defined conceptualization, “the commodity is, first of all, an external object, a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind” (Marx 1990, 125), he quickly delves into an analysis of what social conditions might determine such human needs. Marx is careful to distinguish between the exchange value and the use value of a commodity and their relationship to labor – something that is often masked once a “mystical” commodity enters the market (Ibid., 164). As Marx writes:

The form of wood, for instance, is altered if a table is made out of it. Nevertheless the table continues to be wood, an ordinary, sensuous thing. But as soon as it emerges as a commodity, it changes into a thing which transcends sensuousness…The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s own labor as objective characteristics of the products of labor themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things. Hence it also reflects the social relation of the producers to the sum total of labor as a social relations between objects, a relations which exists apart from and outside the producers (Ibid., 164-165).

As Arjun Appadurai has noted, while there is much to be considered in Marx’s work, too many disciplines have narrowed the scope of Marx’s work down to commodities as manufactured goods existing in capitalist modes of production (Appadurai 1986, 7). Instead, Appadurai pushes readers to embrace Marx’s work in a different light – a reading that can lead to “broader, more cross-culturally and historically useful
approach[es]” that don’t speak to just the capitalist mode of production (Ibid., 8). For instance, Appadurai looks to Marx’s suggestion that individuals produce social use values for others at specific historical epochs (Ibid., 8) as a point of departure in his study. Appadurai notes that to fully comprehend what a commodity is one must also look at the “total trajectory from production, through exchange/distribution, to consumption” and not simply look at commodities as goods that are production driven determined by supply and demand (Ibid., 13). As such Appadurai’s approach forces one to consider the “social life of things.”

By considering the “social life of things”, the works of Appadurai and Igor Kopytoff suggest that temporal, cultural and social factors must be regarded when looking at the process of commodification – or, the “moving in and out of commodity state” (Ibid., 13). Kopytoff’s essay goes so far as to suggest that objects have a “culturally informed economic biography” to them; such an approach looks at objects as “culturally constructed entit[ies], endowed with culturally specific meanings, and classified and reclassified into culturally constituted categories” (Kopytoff 1986, 68). Kopytoff correctly points out that the process of commodification (or the production of commodities) entails a cultural and cognitive process. Through his example of slavery, Kopytoff shows why some things are considered commodities by some people, and something else by others; and why some things are considered commodities at one time and not another (Kopytoff 1986). The commodities discussed within this chapter all share the characteristic of having a “social life”. That
is, they are not only items that are traded on the market, but they are culturally, ideologically and historically informed. The cultural and cognitive process that gives rise to the meanings and significations attached to these items are what makes them commodities as opposed to “everyday items” or “things.”

In addition to the cultural significance within the process of commodification, Jean-Christophe Agnew urges us to also pay attention to the “sentiments attached”. As Agnew writes, the process of commodification can often be a momentarily jarring experience, for within an instance, “someone or something...has somehow managed to dislodge an article or service from its ordinary context and, in doing so, has left prospective buyers unsure whether the good remains good, whether its legitimacy, authenticity, or desirability has been enhance or inhibited by the fact of its having been priced” (Agnew 2003, 11). And as Agnew suggests, this momentary uncertainty is just that – momentary. The process of commodification has become common enough in (post-modern) society that the moment of discomfort is quickly assuaged. Agnew’s suggestion in many ways speaks to the work of Ernesto Laclau, who describes the way objects via discourse are often “emptied” of their meaning and acquire different, new meanings as a result of changing social relations specific to that object. I do not contest that the process of commodification is a historical one. However, rather than merely showing readers how something that was previously produced and distributed outside of the market becomes an object (commodity) for exchange within a market economy, the items of nostalgia discussed in this chapter
begin as everyday commodities themselves. For example, a porcelain bowl was produced and distributed as an everyday commodity to aid in mealtimes. This porcelain bowl, like many commodities, has a “shelf-life” and did not necessarily remain on the market for exchange. Fast-forward forty years, and the porcelain bowl has returned to the market. Once again, the porcelain bowl is used, produced and exchanged on the market and even sold in high-end stores, however, the meaning attached to the bowl is not the same. Fueled by a sense of nostalgia, consumers are no longer buying an eating vessel, rather they are buying the founding myth as commodity. The term I will use throughout this chapter (or variations of it) – “commodified founding myth” – speaks to the phenomenon in which items of nostalgia are marketed and sold to the public as a means of perpetuating Hong Kong’s founding myth. I draw much of my influence from the works of Elizabeth Outka who has written about the “commodified authentic.” Outka describes the commodified authentic as the phenomenon in there is the need to search for images and ideas that represent the “authentic”. Today, this search for the authentic goes beyond the works of novelists, painters and filmmakers. Instead, the authentic has been commodified to build model homes and communities in the United Kingdom (Outka 2009). Thus, in many ways, my approach and Outka’s approach demonstrate how the process of commodification should not only be understood as a historical process, but also a process which encompasses the tangible and intangible as suggested by Susan Strasser (2003, 7). The recent works of John and Jean Comaroff likewise engage in an in-depth analysis of the ways in which ethnicity and culture have become
commodified within global neoliberalism. The Comaroffs put forth the notion that “ethnocommodities” rather than alienating producers from their labor can further enhance a sense of group identity (2009). As I will show, the commodification of Hong Kong’s founding myth is dependent on the affective power of nostalgia, and yet, the continued commodification of founding myth also fuels this sense of nostalgia. In the following section, I will survey the literature on nostalgia – a phenomenon that many scholars have linked to the postmodern condition.

Nostalgia

Nostalgia has long been a troubling concept for many scholars. Scholars such as Frederic Jameson, Jean Baudrillard and Arjun Appadurai fear that the postmodern fixation on nostalgia can lead to a departure from historicity. Jameson is perhaps recognized as being the most vocal of such scholars. In his analysis of nostalgia films, Jameson shows how nostalgia is, at its core, incompatible with historicity. He writes, “Everything in the film […] conspires to blur its official contemporaneity and make it possible for the viewer to receive the narrative as though it were set in some eternal thirties, beyond real historical time” (Jameson 1999, 21). Nostalgia, Jameson continues, is an aesthetic symptomatic of the “waning of our historicity, of our lived possibility of experiencing history in some active way” (Ibid.). Similarly, Linda Hutcheon blames nostalgia for people’s lack of engagement with real history and instead, individuals engage with an idealized past (Hutcheon referenced in Enns 2007, 476).
Arjun Appadurai is not only concerned that items of the past which are often mass-marketed as having a “patina” are too readily associated with nostalgia; he is also concerned with the way in which these very items lead to “imagined nostalgia.” He writes, “nostalgia, as far as mass merchandising is concerned, does not principally involve the evocation of a sentiment to which consumers who really have lost something can respond. Rather, these forms of mass advertising teach consumers to miss things they have never lost […] That is, they create experiences of losses that never took place, these advertisements create what might be called ‘imagined nostalgia’, nostalgia for things that never were” (Appadurai 1996, 77). The insincerity that surrounds nostalgia has been recognized by other scholars such as Margaret Hillenbrand, who refers to nostalgia as the “whiff of the phoney” which is inevitably tied to its marketability (Hillenbrand 2010). Susan Stewart is perhaps more sympathetic to the condition of nostalgia. She suggests that “nostalgia is a sadness without an object, a sadness which creates a longing that of necessity is inauthentic because it does not take part in lived experience. Rather, it remains behind and before that experience. Nostalgia, like any form of narrative, is always ideological: the past it seeks has never existed except as narrative, and hence, always absent, that past continually threatens to reproduce itself as a felt lack” (Stewart 1993, 23). One can

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144 Appadurai borrows the term patina from Grant McCracken. McCracken understand patina to be a physical property of an object that symbolically represents an object’s longevity and age (such properties can include chips, fading, dirt lodged into crevices, oxidation, or dents). In the past, the patina on objects served to symbolically denote the longevity, legacy and social status of a family, and thus serving as a way to police social mobility (McCracken 1988, 31–43).
look to Eric Hobsbawm’s work which discusses the state’s role in creating tradition and nostalgia as an ideological tool for nation-building (Hobsbawm 1992).

Stewart’s contribution is similarly echoed in the works of Rey Chow. In her piece regarding nostalgia within Hong Kong film, Rey Chow posits the notion that the turn in nostalgic practice should be understood as more than a kneejerk response to the (then) impending change in Hong Kong sovereignty and the looming possibility of an erasure of identity. Rather, the nostalgic turn and the growing desire for all things of the past, Chow argues, is a symptom of the continuing affects of colonial and Orientalist projects. Chow begins by first identifying two forms of nostalgia: First, as a “linear and teleological” conceptualization, nostalgia is triggered by “an object lost in the past.” A conceptualization of nostalgia is that it is “loop[ed], a throw, a network of chance, rather than a straight line” (Chow 2001, 11). Such a loop or throw constantly arises as a result of temporal and spatial displacement – specifically, a displacement caused by the ongoing disruption and erasure of the once stationary, physical and architectural environments and spaces of the past, thus there is no “straight line” to go back to. Loss is constant, and nostalgia is understood as the “repeated sense of loss and melancholy” and the subsequent desire to search for something. This continuous search for something is what ultimately prevents the “native” from ever reaching the cosmopolitan, universalism of the colonizers (Ibid.) As such, the colonial project – in which the British conferred upon local populations a “native” identity – can be understood as successful in so far as the practice of
nostalgia is a means of perpetuating this orientalism and continuing the process of self-nativizing. In that sense, Hong Kong’s colonial past suggests that items of nostalgia should not be seen in the same light as other examples of kitsch, nostalgia, cherishing and romanticization of the past seen elsewhere in the world that were not part of colonial projects. It should be noted that Chow’s reference to the process of creating the native as “nativism” may appear to be mis-appropriated. For many, especially those in the field of immigration studies, nativism is a term that is also, and more commonly, used to refer to the process of settler societies claiming a native identity as the rightful owners of the land. Thusly, the term is also used in reference to groups of individuals (nativists) who are against immigration and multiculturalism, and believe in the need to preserve cultural aspects of the nation (i.e. language), and may be associated with assimilationist projects. However, in using Chow’s use of “nativism” as a point of departure, I suggest that one can apply Chow’s argument by understanding Hong Kongers as natives – a colonial and orientalist construction, and as nativists – a group of individuals who believe in the preservation of Hong Kong culture via their anti-immigration stances (See Chapter Three for more). In the next section, I turn to the first examples of a nostalgia market in Hong Kong. However, unlike the one seen in present day Hong Kong, this nostalgia market was one that served foreigners living in Hong Kong and the middle to upper class in Hong Kong. Given that this wave of nostalgia became prominent during the lead up to 1997, it suggests that in addition to the exoticization and orientalist gaze, the goods served to romanticize the colonial era in Hong Kong.
III. COMMODIFICATION UNDER THE WESTERN GAZE

The trend of “evoking/bringing back the past”, or what is locally known as wai gow (懷舊) for commercial gain is certainly nothing new to Hong Kong. Scholars such as Rey Chow, Ackbar Abbas, Eric Ma, Esther Yau and D.J. Huppatz have written extensively on the subject matter. Specifically they point to the first wave of nostalgia and nostalgic sentiment in the decade leading up to the change in sovereignty in 1997. The trend of nostalgia was not limited to museums where objects of nostalgia were put on display, but could also be found in the way buildings were rebuilt and renovated to preserve the colonial past and “flavor” (Chow 2001, 209). Early examples of the trend to rebuild and renovate colonial buildings include the Repulse Bay Hotel, the Peak Restaurant and Western Market – all spaces which were intended for tourists, expats or middle to upper-class Hong Kong patrons. Around this time, designer Alan Chan and the fashion house Shanghai Tang, owned by David Tang, began to expand their business ventures into foreign markets.

Fashion and design

The Alan Chan Design Company designed trinkets and packaging for luxury good items sold at five-star hotels, tourist districts and luxury shopping malls. Shanghai Tang, comparable to a “Chinese version of Ralph Lauren”, sold clothing that took

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145 The literal translation for nostalgia in Chinese means to miss/cherish the past.
146 Sir David Tang is a British-educated entrepreneur and socialite. Having set up the fashion house Shanghai Tang, he went on to own a number of restaurant groups and clubs. He resides in London and Hong Kong, and received the title of Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire (KBE) in 2008 (Jacobs 2010).
inspiration from 1930s Shanghai. In the flagship store in Hong Kong one can find silk Chinese-style dresses, the *qipao*, or Mao suit. In addition, the store offers the services of an “Imperial Tailor” and Shanghai art-deco furniture, or kitsch such as “Waving Mao” wrist-watches (Huppatz 2009; Ling 2010). Chan’s and Tang’s nostalgia fever was clearly geared toward the Western tourist, the expatriate and the upper-middle class of Hong Kong who were “searching” for items that were “authentically Chinese” and goods sold were designed with the Western gaze in mind. Hong Kong nostalgia goods during this period were designed by cosmopolitan entrepreneurs who exoticized Hong Kong and its past for the western market in Hong Kong (Clark 2009; Huppatz 2009; Ling 2010). Recognizing the untapped market available to him, in an interview with David Tang, Tang expressed surprise that no one before him had tried to market China to an upscale audience in the West (Huppatz 2009, 22). Of course, possibly dating back four hundred years ago, the West had long been drawn to orientalist images and worked to incorporate such images into fashion and design (Clark 2009). Shanghai Tang and the Alan Chan Design Company, however, aspired to be the first “Chinese-made” luxury brands, and by extension a global luxury brand.¹⁴⁷

In his attempt to court the global fashion market, Tang decided to gradually expand the store’s presence outside of Hong Kong. A store opened in New York in 1997, and

¹⁴⁷ Hazel Clark suggests that the decision to label Shanghai Tang’s garments as “Made by Chinese” was a deliberate attempt to distance the brand from mostly Western connotations of “Made in China” clothing – i.e. garments made in sweatshop conditions, made in mass, and of a much lower price point (Clark 2009, 180).
was followed by another branch in London. In 1998, Tang sold his shares of the fashion house to the Swiss-based luxury goods conglomerate Richemont. Like Richemont’s other brands (e.g. Cartier, Van Cleef and Arpels, Chloe, Montblanc and Piaget) Shanghai Tang has asserted itself as a global luxury brand owned and managed by a multinational conglomerate. In addition to its seven locations on Mainland China and three stores in Hong Kong, Shanghai Tang can be found in other global cities such as Manhattan, London, Frankfurt, Dubai, Moscow, and Singapore. The only thing remaining “Chinese” is the labor of assembling the garments together. With the exception of the manufacturing of the garments all aspects of the design house (design, marketing and branding) have moved to the West (Huppatz 2009; Clark 2009). The evidence suggests that designer nostalgia in Hong Kong during the 1980s and 1990s was primarily concerned with selling something reminiscent of “Chineseness”148 as dictated by the creative team in the West under a Western gaze and for a global audience: the parameters of what was considered nostalgic were determined by the non-Hong Konger and the global market.

Not only are the designer nostalgia goods in Shanghai Tang and the Alan Chan Design Company, as Huppatz notes, exoticizing and reifying orientalist imaginings of China’s past, but the designer nostalgia also falls into the trap of neglecting history (see Jameson 1999). Both Chan and Tang claim to have heavily utilized 1920s and 1930s Shanghai as a point of reference in their designs. However, Chan and Tang’s

148 And thus not necessarily “Hong Kong-ness.”
evocation of 1920s and 1930s Shanghai often simultaneously evoked other periods and stood in for modern Shanghai, colonial Hong Kong, the Maoist era or even going as far back as Qing dynasty China (Huppatz 2009, 28). The conflation and conflicting historical narratives that can be seen in this designer nostalgia is, as Huppatz suggests, an example of the postmodern condition whereby nostalgia enthusiasts partake in what Arjun Appadurai calls “armchair nostalgia” for a global market (Appadurai cited in Huppatz 2009, 28).

Another example of “armchair nostalgia” can be seen in the slew of art exhibitions that popped up around the city in the 1990s. As Rey Chow has noted, beginning in the 1990s, exhibitions of images, photos and paintings of Hong Kong’s history became common in the art and design circles. Again, more oftentimes than not, these exhibitions displayed photos and images of Hong Kong captured by Western photographers. These art exhibitions are an explicit example of how the orientalist Western gaze viewed Hong Kong and Hong Kong’s past. In her account of Hong Kong’s design history, Wendy S. Wong identifies a key design exhibit in 1988, entitled Made in Hong Kong: A History of Export Design in Hong Kong 1900-1960, as one of the first exhibits that celebrated Hong Kong-ness and as starting the trend which Huppatz calls “nostalgia fever” (Wong 2011). Made in Hong Kong celebrated Hong Kong’s textile and design legacy and was curated by a British professor of Design, Matthew Turner, who at the time was at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. A few years later in 1994, Turner would hold another exhibit, entitled
Hong Kong Sixties: Designing Identity, which was also well received. This exhibit was a clear example that not only celebrated local designers, but also entrenched the idea that material goods and their design, in some way, were examples of Hong Kong-ness. Not only did this exhibition reinforce the trope of Hong Kong as a hybrid of East-meets-West, but it also further entrenched the localized myth of the 1960s as a romanticized decade in Hong Kong’s developmental period by evoking a sense of nostalgia within the exhibition hall. Matthew Turner’s exhibits demonstrate a central theme running throughout this dissertation. In many ways Turner’s exhibitions and his role in curating the exhibitions can be seen as a way in which the de-colonized founding myth was reified. Increasingly, after 1997, art exhibitions would be curated by local Hong Kong artists and would claim to accurately depict Hong Kong and through the lens of a “true Hong Konger.” This most recent wave celebrates the banal mundane goods of the past. Thus, rather than nostalgia produced via a Western gaze, this most recent renaissance can be described as nostalgia produced via a local gaze.

IV. COMMODIFICATION FOR THE LOCAL HONG KONG CONSUMER

As my examples below will show, the decolonization and localization of nostalgia represents a move away from the Western gaze and exoticized Hong Kong past. Instead, in the past decade, a group of local designers, artists, restaurateurs, filmmakers and entrepreneurs have been working hard to increase the visibility of “true” Hong Kong nostalgia – that is a nostalgia determined by local Hong Kongers, and using their childhood experiences as a point of reference. Specifically, by re-
introducing everyday items from 1960s-1980s Hong Kong into the present day, they are attempting to re-claim nostalgia. Unlike the qipao and “waving Mao” wrist-watch, these everyday goods from the past are understood to be specific to Hong Kong and something Hong Kongers can relate to, and perhaps something they once played with or used at home. However, what is most significant for this project is how this new design wave is also responsible for further perpetuating Hong Kong’s founding myth. In addition to seeing such items as nostalgia goods, I argue that they are also examples of the de-colonized myth being commodified and further perpetuated. The toys proudly displayed in the market stall are not only about holding on to the toys of one’s childhood; the toys are also a way in which the Made in Hong Kong brand which took off during the 1960s and 1970s can be memorialized. Like all nostalgic goods, however, these items which were once part of everyday life have been emptied of their “everyday meaning” and have become representative of the past and, in the instance of these goods, they have come to signify Hong Kong’s founding myth. Perhaps one of the city’s best examples of this “emptying” is the home ware and design store, G.O.D (Goods of Desire). G.O.D was founded in 1996 by Douglas Young, a Hong Kong born, British educated designer. In response to the growing mall-ification of Hong Kong, which increasingly catered to the Mainland Chinese market, there has been a trend among designers such as Young to showcase and celebrate “Hong Kong culture” and the “made in Hong Kong” brand.

149 At present, there are nine store locations throughout the city.
Restaurateurs and designers such as Young aim to provide an alternative to the Italian or French designer brands or restaurants that seem to overpopulate the city.

“Made in Hong Kong”

The most recent wave of nostalgia in the 2000s focuses on the more banal everyday practices of the Hong Konger in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1960s and 1970s can be seen as a period of tremendous growth and modernization in Hong Kong. It was also the period in which Hong Kong’s first sizeable generation of individuals who were born and raised in Hong Kong came of age. Coupled with a new state discourse on belonging, this generation would be key in engendering the localized decolonized founding myth of Hong Kong and the popularization of the term ‘Hong Konger’ (香港人). As the population grew and income became slightly more disposable, plastic toys such as the “watermelon ball,” clothing such as white plimsoles and utilitarian cotton t-shirts and vests, and home goods such as the ceramic “chicken bowl” and blue and white porcelain dishware that were produced locally in Hong Kong became affordable, commonplace everyday items in the Hong Kong home.

The products available in the G.O.D. store attempt to capture the everydayness in Hong Kong and simultaneously celebrate Hong Kong culture. According to their website, “Goods of Desire is quintessentially Hong Kong […] Our designs are inspired by the vibrant culture of this energetic city where east meets west, and age-old traditions meet cutting-edge technology. With humor and creativity, we turn
everyday subjects into truly extraordinary objects” (GOD Ltd 2011). Commonplace and colloquial images are captured for design purposes. For example, a plastic enamel red lampshade found at a butcher’s stall is repurposed as a designer lighting fixture for the modern home; a red, white and blue polyethylene bag often used as makeshift luggage becomes a stylish laptop case; and images such as tenement buildings and newspaper classified advertisements become patterns on a bed spread, duvet cover or I-phone case. As Wessie Ling has noted, unlike the design houses of Chan and Tang, G.O.D. has captured the local population’s attention because of its use of common everyday items and images, and what started off as a home ware store now sells clothing. Moreover, Young’s playful attitude and incorporation of East-meets-West in the everyday is best seen in the shop’s use of puns that favor the Cantonese speaker.\textsuperscript{150} The use of puns and swear words further underscores how the everyday, including everyday vernacular and slang, are seen as inspiration for Young’s designs (Ling 2010). In this respect, it is clear that G.O.D. is primarily marketed at the local populace. At G.O.D. one can find the ceramic and porcelain dishware, white plimsoles and cotton t-shirts that were common in the 1960s and 1970s on sale as “design” ware. These goods are no longer purchased as everyday items to be used at home or worn on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{151} Instead, these goods have been emptied of their everydayness to become representatives of the past and serve to trigger a sense of nostalgia. These items serve as cultural ambassadors from the spectacular and

\textsuperscript{150} The store’s acronym, G.O.D. (Goods of Desire), sounds like the Cantonese phrase, “to live better.” Similarly, the fashion branch of the store, Delay No More, sounds very much like a Cantonese swearword.

\textsuperscript{151} Certainly the price of these items do not represent the pedestrian everyday prices these goods used to be sold for.
romanticized period of the 1960s and 1970s. Beyond the realm of fashion and home goods, local restaurants and cafes that were popular in the same decades have recently become in vogue again in Hong Kong. These restaurants and cafes can be seen as another example of everyday items becoming exalted to symbolize Hong Kong’s culture and myth.

While the cha chaan teng (Hong Kong diner) and bing sutt (Hong Kong café) first emerged in the 1940s, their popularity really grew as the city’s emerging middle-class began to eat out more frequently in the 1960s and 1970s. These diners became places of convenience, and were open from early in the morning to late at night, serving breakfast, lunch and dinner for students to blue-collar workers. David Wu’s account of the café and diner industry in Hong Kong suggests that the humble, common, utilitarian and unfussiness of the cha chaan teng and bing sutt served to contrast with the high-end, haute cuisine of elite restaurants which catered to expatriates or the wealthy Hong Konger (D. Y. H. Wu 2002, 74). The food served in these establishments can be seen as a local interpretation of Western food and the Western dining experience. For example, in the 1950s, cafes and diners began to serve what local chefs interpreted as “Western” dishes. For example, dishes that can be found in these establishments include a Hong Kong style borscht (closer to a vegetable and tomato broth than the Russian beetroot-based soup), macaroni in broth with spam (eaten for breakfast), sandwiches, pasta dishes and baked rice dishes. Beyond Wu’s suggestion that these diners and cafes made Western, high-end food accessible to the
everyday middle-class Hong Konger, I submit that these eating establishments were also a way for the new subjectivity – the Hong Konger - to mimic and experience modernity and cosmopolitanism. For example, the restaurants Tai Ping Koon 152 and The Goldfinch Restaurant while not diners or cafés are higher-end restaurants serving three-course meals that also became popular during this period. Colloquially these restaurants are called “soy sauce Western” restaurants. 153 One could easily mistake the restaurant for a French restaurant or steak house: tables are covered in tablecloths and servers wear pristinely ironed white shirts with bowties. Menu items include smoked pomfret, roast pigeons, and “Swiss-style chicken wings” and “Portuguese chicken.”154 The everyday consumption and eating habits can be thought of as being part of the everyday experience in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, these restaurants have become in vogue again and have also appeared in a number of Hong Kong-made films.

The Goldfinch Restaurant located in Causeway Bay was used as a set location in two films directed by Cannes Film Festival winner Wong Kar-Wai: the award winning *In the Mood for Love* (2000) and *2046* (2004). The restaurant was used as a backdrop for numerous key scenes in both films that took place in 1960s. Not surprisingly the segments set in the 1960s are a nostalgic depiction of life in Hong Kong in that decade. While the restaurant had long had its legion of old time customers since it

152 While Tai Ping Koon was first established in 1860, other restaurants mimicking the food at Tai Ping Koon became popular in the 1960s and 1970s.
153 They are named as such because of their heavy use of soy sauce in gravies and sauces.
154 The latter two dishes were likely conjured by Chinese chefs with no connection to Switzerland or Portugal.
first opened in 1962, the restaurant’s popularity rose alongside the success of both films. Cinema buffs and food enthusiasts of a younger generation began to frequent the restaurant. Known for his perfectionism and highly stylized screen shots, the films’ director chose the restaurant for its “authentic” 1960s “feel.” The restaurant’s tables are covered in turquoise tablecloths, wallpaper with green palm leaves line the walls, wooden table booths give diners a little privacy from other patrons, and within each booth is a dimly lit lamp. The maroon leather-bound menu appears unchanged except for a recent addition. Cashing in on its association with the film, the restaurant began to offer a special 2046 and In the Mood for Love set menu. It is interesting to note that the restaurant was first sought out by the cinematographer and director for its perceived authenticity; the website for In the Mood for Love describes the restaurant as “capturing the beautiful moments of the 1960s” and describes that “the décor and furniture inside Goldfinch Restaurant … have not changed since the 1960s” (JetTone Films 2013). Upon returning to the restaurant for the second film, the film crew redecorated the restaurant – perhaps to evoke and enhance a stronger sense of restaurants of the 1960s. By the time 2046 was released, there was a palpable wave of nostalgia in Hong Kong. And perhaps for that reason, the restaurant’s owner has reportedly not changed the layout or interior of the restaurant since (D. So 2012). The restaurant is not only another example of the commodified past, but an example of the commodified past in film.
Nostalgia in Hong Kong cinema

The process of bringing the past onto the silver screen is also surely nothing new. Writing about the popularity of TV sitcoms such as *The Wonder Years* and other nostalgic films, Caryl Flinn writes: “Classical and contemporary accounts alike riddle their conceptions of the present with lacks and deficiencies, obliging the past to function as a site of comparative cohesion, authority, and the hope of ‘something better’” (Caryl Flinn cited in Wu 2002). In the United States and the United Kingdom, the trend is still very much present as can be seen by the successes of shows such as *Mad Men* and *Downton Abbey* (De Groot 2011; Tudor 2012; Black 2012). Indeed, while nostalgia film and TV sitcoms enable a moment of escape and, perhaps, catharsis, they can often be seen as a reflection of the current political climate and a desire to return to an idealized past, even if only for sixty minutes, one week at a time.

For Rey Chow, loss is an inherent aspect within nostalgia film and nostalgia itself. Chow writes that the constant loop of nostalgia throw individuals into a perpetual “feeling [of] looking for an object” which is enhanced by a temporal dislocation (Chow 2001). Likewise, films that evoke the past are not, as Chow suggests, “nostalgic for the past as it was; rather, they are, simply by their sensitivity to the movements of temporality, nostalgic in tendency. Their affect is interesting precisely because we cannot know its object for sure. Only the sense of loss it projects is definite” (Ibid., 225).
This definite sense of loss is perhaps best articulated in my conversation with Mr. Leung. Nostalgia films go beyond serving as a trigger to reignite old memories, often in a romanticized way, films also have the ability to appear as evidence or “truth” providers to individual’s accounts of the past, despite Chow’s suggestion that the object of loss is never known for sure. I met Mr. Leung, a retired headmaster of a local primary school, for lunch one day in a small hotel on a busy street of Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon. Upon getting to the restaurant, Mr. Leung kept asking if I managed to find the hotel without any problems – a common way to greet people in Hong Kong. I assured him that I found the restaurant without any problems and asked him if he lived in the area or in the area a lot. As our lunch arrived, Mr. Leung jumped right into explaining that the hotel and the neighborhood was where he grew up, and where the schools he would later go on to teach at for forty years used to be located – the schools have all since closed down. Asking if he still lived in the area, he shook his head, “I live in Shatin now, but this is where I grew up, I still like to come back here every now and then.” “You see this big street here that’s filled with cars, that was not what it was like before. Things have changed.” He then excitedly described his childhood neighborhood to me in detail, street by street. “I remember trees lined the roads, and as a child, my brothers and I would go and pick fruits from the trees. Have you seen that movie, Echoes of the Rainbow? That’s what it was like. The director managed to capture it exactly right, and the school scenes were quite accurate too.” When I asked him if he thought that some things were worth preserving or feeling
nostalgic about in Hong Kong, he replied, “Hong Kong has a lot of places that are worth feeling nostalgic about. Especially for my generation – things changed so much and so fast during our time. I graduated from teachers college in 1961 and by the 1970s everything had changed. My parents came over before World War II, and I was born here. We lived as family together – thirteen in a room. Our place was small so we often went out to play, we had to invent things to play with – I think kids had more fun back then, there were more things to play with.” Nostalgia films often feed individuals’ need for historicity, and such was the case for Mr. Leung. The film *Echoes of the Rainbow* was set during the 1960s, a time when Mr. Leung himself had just graduated from college, thus, the film could not have accurately portrayed Mr. Leung’s childhood. In many ways, this observation further support the cautioning words put forth by Appadurai, Jameson and Hutcheon who point out nostalgia’s inability to accurately engage with history. Nevertheless, as Chow has suggested, nostalgia can be understood as a “feeling looking for the object,” however as she notes, the object of loss is never certain nor static. Mr. Leung in his continuous search for something that resembled his childhood in Hong Kong was instantly attracted to the scenes and images from the film *Echoes of the Rainbow*. Indeed, I suspect that for many of the Hong Kongers who applauded the film and widely received it, they encountered a temporal dissonance or dislocation as they viewed the street scenes of Hong Kong in the 1960s. Recognizing that “something” has been displaced in time is what triggers the “feeling” of looking for an object (Chow 2001).
My encounter with Mr. Leung shows how nostalgia movies can be used as reference points for those describing the past, regardless of whether or not they fall into the trap of ahistoricism. This suggests that there is an aspect of historicity that viewers yearn for and expect from such films. The filmmakers themselves are very aware of this.

The film *Echoes of the Rainbow* was written and directed and produced by Alex Law and Mabel Cheung respectively. It is the biographical story of Alex’s childhood in 1960s Hong Kong. The film follows the daily life of a young boy and his relationship with his brother. What was originally supposed to be an independent art-house film quickly became a runaway hit in Hong Kong. The film garnered a number of awards at the Hong Kong Film Festival and achieved critical acclaim abroad at the Berlin Film Festival in 2010. Many of the reviews in Hong Kong congratulated and commended the film on its “accurate portrayal” of life in the 1960s and 1970s. It is well known that the screenwriter and the director of the popular film, Alex Law, based the film on his childhood adventures in Hong Kong. In an interview, Law said, “It’s really about my childhood, about 90 percent of the film is about what happened to me as a child” (Law 2011). A majority of the film takes place on the streets of Hong Kong. In the film, the boy’s family owns and runs a street stall. The boy’s father is a cobbler and hand makes all his shoes for sale. The family resided in the second storey of the shoe store. In another interview with the producer and director, Cheung and Law spoke of the need to accurately portray street life in 1960s Hong Kong: “Wing Lee Street was the only location we found that still resembled HK in the 1960s. We were very lucky because we found, one day, in the newspaper that they
were thinking of tearing down the place and [sic] rebuild it” expressed Law. Cheung continues, “Because before then we were thinking, ‘oh, we couldn’t find any streets like that in Hong Kong anymore and thought of moving the film to Malaysia or Canton, Guangzhou. […] And the neighbors, they remained in the 1960s, you know, with their hairdo and everything, so [we didn’t] need to re-do their hairstyle or clothing. [They] can just walk onto the set and be our extras” (Cheung and Law 2010). Indeed, the line between creating the “authentic” and historicity is a fine one, and can be seen in the way filmmakers conflate their art with history, as evidenced in the following quote: “I think film is not just a commercial product. It’s part of a country or place’s cultural heritage. And it’s a very good tool to keep that history, to keep that heritage and to be an ambassador for that place or city. I think people have to realize that” (Cheung and Law 2010). It is thus not surprising that scholars have blamed nostalgia for contributing to the disappearance of historicity. However, in the above case, it is clear that viewers utilize nostalgia films as a historical guide or reference thus leading to what Eric Ma has called “the collective urge to rediscover the “authentic”…” Ma succinctly continues, “The irony is that the currency of historicity is actually enhancing the ideological power of nostalgic practices” (2001, 137–138).

The collective urge that Ma speaks of has led to a noticeable public interest in nostalgia films from the past fifteen years or so. Films such as *Echoes of the Rainbow*, Wong Kar Wai’s *In the Mood for Love*, and *Bruce Lee, My Brother* would
previously have garnered little to no attention in mainstream cinemas. The films are a
departure from period films produced in the 1980s and 1990s, where the 1920s-1930s
Shanghai modernity trope was often used to evoke nostalgia. Instead, the films
mentioned above all use Hong Kong in the 1960s and 1970s as a reference point. In
focusing on this period, the films further entrench the idea of the 1960s and 1970s as
a key moment in Hong Kong’s history. Speaking in an interview about his film,
*Echoes of the Rainbow*, Alex Law said: “You see Hong Kong back in the 1960s. You
see how Hong Kong has… you know, we’ve really come a long way from a fishing
village to a cosmopolitan city in Asia” (Law 2011). In another interview, when asked
if Law felt nostalgic about his childhood and whether this was projected in the film,
Law replied, “Yes. Even though I grew up poor, I was so happy. And I think a lot of
people in my generation would also agree. Life was easy-going and leisurely, and
possibilities were endless. And I think my primary school, secondary school and even
university days, are worth feeling nostalgic about” (Law 2011a). What Law has
revealed is that he wanted to give the audience a romanticized version of his poverty-
stricken childhood. While the film’s themes touch upon childhood exploration,
coming-of-age, and death, *Echoes of the Rainbow* is ultimately a film with a
conservative narrative at heart that is very much in tune with the localized founding
myth of Hong Kong. The film is about a family living in poverty and throughout the
film, the family is challenged by hardships such as dealing with police corruption, a
typhoon destroying their house, and the death of a child. The protagonist’s parents are
self-sacrificing, hard-working individuals who ultimately succeed in raising a
successful young man: Alex Law, the director. One of the main premises of the decolonized founding myth is the idea that a community of former immigrants who came to self-identified as Hong Kongers contributed to the success and development of the city. Certainly, Alex Law the director has contributed to the arts scene in Hong Kong and has won numerous foreign prizes for his directing. In addition, at different points in the film, viewers are given glimpses of street life in Hong Kong. Scenes such as the family eating dinner outside on a terrace with other neighboring families further underscores the myth’s popular trope of a community of immigrants coming together, working together, and help other families out. The practice of using a founding national myth in cinema is deployed around the world. Films such as *One Upon a Time in America, The Godfather* and even the mega-production *Titanic* all speak to the American myth of immigration as a core component of the nation’s make-up. Likewise, scholars have shown how the film *Braveheart* not only aided in promoting Scottish nationalism and “Scotland the brand” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009), but it also introduced the Wallace myth to the Scottish diaspora and Scottish descendents residing in the United States and Canada (Edensor 1997).

**Bringing Nostalgia Inside**

The phenomenon of nostalgia (*wai gao*) also includes the act of what I call “bringing nostalgia inside.” I submit that one way to preserve objects of nostalgia and to ensure that their legacy lives on and evades common urban plights such as gentrification and redevelopment, is to bring items of the past inside so to attempt to assuage the
temporal dissonance experienced (Chow 2001). As nostalgia is brought inside, it is housed in museums, exhibitions, or becomes institutionalized. Many aspects of street life in Hong Kong has become institutionalized, and the street life itself becomes an object of desire.

In the summer of 2011, a local shopping mall, CityPlaza, located in the middle class residential area, Tai Koo Shing, invited a group of individuals to display their craft work in an exhibit entitled “In Retrospect: Hong Kong Zoomed In Miniature Exhibition.” Artists contributed to the 42 miniature dioramas of Hong Kong’s street scenes (specifically, dioramas were of daily life in Hong Kong during the 1960s-1970s). Examples of dioramas included street scenes of market stalls, tenement buildings, diners, hawker stalls, and butchers. The models also gave viewers a glimpse of the artists’ interpretation of home life during the 1960s to 1970s. In addition to miniature renderings of commonplace street scenes, one of the miniature dioramas was of a shoe store. It was, however, not any shoe store, but a miniature version of the pivotal shoe store in the nostalgia film Echoes of the Rainbow.155 Writing about the miniature, Susan Stewart notes, “the function of the miniature here is to bring historical events ‘to life’ to immediacy, and thereby to erase their history, to lose us within their presentness” (Stewart 1993, 60).

155 The shoe store in the film is where the majority of the film takes place. The shoe store is owned by the protagonist’s father and is the only source of income for the family. The shoe store is also key as it also serves as the family’s home in the film. The miniature replica of the movie set piece in many ways exemplifies Jameson’s fear of nostalgia disrupting historicity (Jameson 1999).
Perhaps the most obvious example of bringing Hong Kong street life inside can be seen in museums. I have already mentioned how the Hong Kong Museum of History is a tool that perpetuates and institutionalizes the myth as Hong Kong’s dominant historical narrative. Museums, their exhibitions, and the collection and curation of relics can be understood as strategies which help to verify and inform individuals of their cultural past (Stewart 1993). The Hong Kong Museum of History and the Hong Kong Heritage Museum (both run by the Hong Kong government’s Leisure and Cultural Services Department) include tableaux of street life and street scenes of life in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s Hong Kong. A good two-thirds of the second floor in the Museum of History is dedicated to “modern Hong Kong” where visitors view reconstructions of tea shops, post-offices, a modern theatre, barber shops and other mini shop fronts one would have found on the streets of Hong Kong during that period. These images and recreations not only appear in museums but can be found in movies, TV shows, history textbooks and the like. Museums, for the most part, certainly hold a degree of weight in that people expect museums to assert historicity and serve as holders of historical truth. Given that both the Hong Kong Museum of History and the Hong Kong Heritage Museum are both government institutions, it is not all too surprising that these museums reflect the dominant discourse surrounding Hong Kong’s development. However, as this dissertation has tried to show, Hong Kong’s founding myth appears and is also perpetuated in everyday circumstances, and is commodified and consumed by everyday Hong Kongers.
The Wanchai Livelihood Place is one such example. I visited the Wanchai Livelihood Place in 2010 when it was located in the first level of The Blue House, a 1920s tenement building that is classified as a protected heritage building by the Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance.\textsuperscript{156} It is a small space – more a gallery than a museum – that is around 700 square-feet in area. Various conservationists, academics, artists, the Wanchai district council, a non-profit charity the St James’ Settlement group, and a group of neighborhood residents and former residents of the house itself came together in 2007 and transformed the first floor of the tenement building into an exhibition space.\textsuperscript{157} The changing exhibits are put together and curated by neighborhood volunteers who also lead heritage walks and tours of the neighborhood. My last visit coincided with the museum’s exhibition on Childhood in Wanchai. Neighborhood volunteers had collected and donated items such as toys, snacks, school uniforms, and stationary that volunteers had used during their childhood to put on display in the museum. From the ceiling of the small gallery space hung the infamous “watermelon ball” (see Fig 15 and 16).

\textsuperscript{156} The Blue House and its neighboring Yellow House and Orange House is currently undergoing a revitalization project which is slated to be complete in 2013.

\textsuperscript{157} The negotiation of what was to be done with The Blue House took many years. After years of consultation, the Development Bureau decided that the St James Settlement would be in charge of operating the now government-owned tenement building. St James Settlement works with neighborhood residents, heritage enthusiasts and preservationists in the daily running operations of the building and the Livelihood Museum inside (Tsoi 2010).
The watermelon ball is another item from Hong Kong’s past that is making a comeback (the watermelon ball was also sold in the small toy store in the market). While most of the exhibit was made up of donated items and exuded a sense of “authenticity” and importance (objects with a “patina”), the watermelon balls that hung from the ceiling were newly purchased for the purposes of decorating the space. While some of the watermelon balls were displayed in its original form, there were some balls that had been redesigned and repurposed specially for the temporary exhibit. These balls had been cut in half, and attached to pieces of string, which were tied to the balls, were mini figurines of toy soldiers. The repurposed nostalgia item was made to resemble a parachute. The watermelon ball parachutes are an excellent
example of what Appadurai has called “imagined nostalgia” (Appadurai 1996, 77). The parachutes do not merely serve as décor, but they are also attempts to recreate and re-imagine the past. The exhibition, while small, was meant to invoke a feeling of nostalgia and, as mentioned in a brochure, “display real-life stories, culture, history, customs and traditions of the Wanchai community” (St. James’ Settlement). While displaying real life stories and culture was one of their stated goals, nostalgia was not only “brought inside” but also repurposed to become part of the gallery’s décor. Lastly, while the exhibition was entitled Childhood in Wanchai, it should be noted that the museum was not interested in curating an exhibit based around any childhood; rather, this was an exhibit about growing up as a child in 1960s and 1970s Wanchai.

Nostalgia on the streets

While beginning in the 1980s and up until the 1990s there was a concerted effort to protect and preserve colonial-style architecture, in recent years there has been a shift in the trend to also preserve and celebrate “local” Hong Kong architecture such as tenement buildings built in the Pre World War II period – this is also an example of wai gao. For example, the private kitchen158 Yin Yang recently opened up in a pre-war tenement building which formerly housed a pharmacy and serves home-style locavore

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158 Private kitchens became popular about fifteen years ago in the city. As a way to avoid the increasingly high rental spaces, chefs would eschew the common ground level rental spaces and instead run and operate restaurants in industrial estates, commercial buildings or apartments. Word of restaurants were spread through word of mouth. One can liken them to speakeasies during the prohibition era, or the underground kitchen or supper club in the West, or paladar and restaurante de puertas cerradas in Latin America.
food from Hong Kong’s past. Nearby the high end restaurant *The Pawn* is in a restored and repurposed pawn shop dating back to the early 1900s. And the Blue House mentioned in the previous section is currently undergoing a revitalization project and will be transformed into a new community space and is situated next to the recently opened bar *Tai Lung Fung*. The upstairs space of the bar is an art and design studio, while the downstairs level holds the drinking establishment that is decorated in 1960s and 1970s retro design.

![Figure 17: The exterior of Yin Yang restaurant (Author's own photograph)](image)

All of these examples are located in the Wanchai district of Hong Kong, and there are a number of reasons for this: 1) The area is one of the oldest residential and business districts on Hong Kong Island. As the colony developed, there was a demand for local laborers to work as coolies and rickshaw pullers, many of whom were attracted to the area due to its proximity to the nearby colonial center Victoria where they worked.
(see Chapter Four). As such, some of the city’s initial neighborhood housing and turn-of-the-century tenement buildings can be found in Wanchai (Wanchai Livelihood Museum 2009). 2) As one of the oldest neighborhoods in Hong Kong, the area is also the key focus of Hong Kong’s Urban Renewal Authority (Urban Renewal Authority 2011). The Urban Renewal Authority (URA) and the Commissioner for Heritage’s office (under the government’s Development Bureau) work together with home and building owners and private business to gentrify buildings that have been deemed “unsafe”, “old” and “unsustainable” by the URA. In the past ten years, the area of Wanchai has undergone massive renovation and renewal as a result of URA projects. In place of the former tenement buildings are gentrified buildings and redeveloped neighborhoods that house modern residential apartment buildings, office, restaurants and bars. Not surprisingly, the gentrification of the area has also slowly changed the demographic of the area, which is marked by the growing number of working professionals in the area and rising real estate prices in the neighborhood. Indeed, it is this particular demographic – middle and upper-class upwardly mobile professionals – who are also spurring the wave of nostalgia. Many of these nostalgic renovations are fueled by the neighborhood’s interests and needs. Such projects are often partially assisted by the Urban Renewal Authority, and both parties justify such gentrification as worthy projects which are said to promote not only heritage

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159 One of the results of gentrification and redevelopment, as with gentrification in other areas around the world, is the increase in property value. Lower and middle-class residents who used to occupy the tenement buildings are pushed out of the neighborhood and often relocate to less expensive residential areas in the city.
preservation but also Hong Kong culture. While I have already discussed the politics behind heritage preservation in Hong Kong at length in an earlier chapter, my interest in the above establishments are the way in which these buildings are part of what I call the localization and decolonization of nostalgia.

The examples mentioned in this section illustrate how nostalgia (and by way of that the founding myth of Hong Kong) has been commodified by local Hong Kongers. In comparing this commodification with the wave of nostalgia in the 1990s, one can see that not only are these nostalgic goods consumed by Hong Kongers, but the Hong Kongers consuming these goods are not only of the middle and upper classes. The accessibility of these nostalgic goods had to be made available to all for the simple fact that those who consumed these goods, ate at the diners, played with the toys and wore the garments in the first instance were the everyday Hong Kongers. Goods produced under the nostalgic wave in the 1990s, however, were not made accessible to the everyday Hong Konger precisely because the goods were produced under a Western gaze and incorporated depictions of a romanticized colonial Hong Kong. This romanticized colonial Hong Kong is simpatico with the colonized version of Hong Kong’s founding myth, and of late has even branched out to a foreign, global consumer base. However, as I will show in the next section, many of these “nostalgia projects” hoped to also attract the attention of a global cosmopolitan market.

160 To be clear, such gentrification and preservation of heritage buildings occur elsewhere in the city, and not just in Wanchai.
V. Commodification for the Cosmopolitan Consumer

Thus far, I have discussed how nostalgia has been commodified for two very different groups of consumers: the foreign expatriates and middle and upper-class consumers who approached 1997 with hesitation and engaged in a premature mourning for the colonial era through their consumption of orientalized nostalgia, and local Hong Kongers who were in part responding to the general anxieties regarding the increased integration with the Chinese nation (of which one outcome was the gentrification and subsequent “mall-ification” of Hong Kong geared towards the rising number of Mainland Chinese tourists – see Chapter Three). The paradox is that in their attempt to resist the multitude of international and foreign brands that set up shop in Hong Kong, local designers have also collaborated with global corporations such as Starbucks to promote “Hong Kong-ness.” In short, the nostalgic goods market today serves two consumer bases: the commodification of nostalgia exists for both the local population and the global cosmopolitan consumer (tourists and expatriates). In short, these goods romanticize Hong Kong’s heydays while simultaneously exoticizing this period for the global consumer.

Local and Global Collaborations

In 2009 a new branch of Starbucks opened in the side streets of Central, Hong Kong. Since Starbucks was introduced to the Hong Kong market in 2000, by 2009 there were already one hundred branches open in the city, and there was no reason for the busy city dwellers to bat an eye over another branch opening in the city. The popular
American coffee chain had become a regular fixture throughout the city and locals, especially the young and middle-class, had grown accustomed to the famous green letters enticing thirsty patrons with their caffeinated beverages. The coffee chain has managed to open up alongside local diners and cafes and proved a serious competitor to the local start-up and regional coffee chain Pacific Coffee Company. It is fair to say that many Hong Kongers are now familiar with Starbucks’s esoteric menu offerings and the chain’s familiar interior design. Indeed, it is this familiarity and predictability that people come to expect, and perhaps appreciate, whether in Hong Kong, Shanghai or Seattle.

However, the opening of the aforementioned Starbucks branch was different. In 2009, the local home furnishing store, G.O.D. (Goods of Desire) joined with Starbucks to produce a crossover project called the G.O.D. x Starbucks Bing Sutt (冰室) concept. During my visit in 2010, as I entered this particular store, I was met with the all too familiar clean, brightly-lit space filled with comfortable upholstered lounge chairs, ottomans and recliners set in circles, birch veneer chairs set up in neat pairs around their matching tables, and hanging overhead orange and red lamps that are found in Starbucks around the world. The store with its green, white and brown color palette had shelves displaying countless varieties of free-trade coffee, French-presses, and coffee mugs. Posters and prints advertising new promotions and the origins of their coffee beans adorned the walls, while light jazz music played in the background. Business professionals were seen holding meetings with colleagues; others, sitting by
themselves, would be pouring over the morning’s newspapers or checking their smart phones during their quick coffee break. Such a scene should be familiar to anyone who has frequented the ubiquitous chain coffee store around the world. However, this familiar scene only took up a quarter of the space within the branch. Walking beyond the accustomed espresso machines and display case filled with pastries, sandwiches and snacks, it was as if one had been transported back into a 1950s Hong Kong coffee house.

Modeled after a 1960s Hong Kong coffee house, in place of the Starbucks’ sameness were laminate booths to seat four, tiled walls, wooden stools and wooden chairs that one could find in any hawker stall around the city. Folded up wooden stools lean against the wall, presumably in the scenario that others might want to add an extra seat to a table. The floor inside the Starbucks bing sutt store was partly laid with plain white tiles and partly covered in a cement finish. Instead of menus with images and descriptions of beverages printed in English and Chinese clearly on display and visible to consumers, menus were typed in Chinese, in a plain font, printed and sealed inside the acrylic topped linoleum tables. Elsewhere other menus detailing the beverages on offer were hand-written in white markers on acrylic plaques and attached to a brown wooden board, or items were written on strips of paper – made to look as if they had been specials of the day written in haste and haphazardly tacked to the wall (See Fig 18).
The walls and ceiling of the café are adorned with plastic, utilitarian ceiling fans. From the rafters hang a few birdcages made from bamboo. The walls of the interior are adorned with green, steel window frames superimposed on a backlit mural depicting the “outside” streets of 1950s and 1960s Hong Kong. A cheap and cheerful plastic beaded curtain separates the main dining area from the toilets. Lastly, to finish off the whole look, “artificial grime” had been placed with precision on the windowsills, posters and decorative accessories (such as clocks and standing fans) to date the diner. While this particular Starbuck branch opened in 2009, the *bing sutt*

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161 The fans are meant for purely decorative purposes as the entire branch is cooled by a central air-conditioning system.

162 Owning small birds (e.g. canaries, budgies, sparrows) as pets is a popular hobby in China, and they are believed to bring good luck. Typically, men who owned small birds as pets would keep them inside intricately designed bird cages. Bird ownership also encompasses a social aspect as part of owning birds as pets includes the responsibilities of “bird walking” (taking your bird and its cage out for a walk). Men would take their birds out for a walk and would meet other men also taking their birds out in cafes, gardens and parks where they would socialize, chat and catch up on gossip and news.

163 There are no actual, real windows in this Starbucks branch as it is located in the basement of an office building.
side of the branch appeared as if it had been in operation for decades and was in need of a deep cleanse and had seen many a patron. True to the Hong Kong cafes, diners and snack shops of the mid-twentieth century, the décor within the Starbucks bing sut is purely utilitarian and purposely designed to appear as if it were ambivalent to design aesthetics, and is a remarkable contrast to the more familiar Starbucks a few steps away.

![Image of Starbucks bing sut](Author's own photograph)

Despite the obvious aesthetic differences in décor, and while the presentation of the menu is noticeably different visually from other stores’ menu, the menu at this hybrid Starbucks mostly remains the same and offers the Westernized caffeinated drinks one can find in Starbucks all over – one can still order a caramel mocha frappuccino and a chai. The only noticeable difference is the addition of two snacks offered only at the bing sut Starbucks – a coffee egg custard tart and a sweet bun with butter. Both these
snacks are quintessential pastries offered at bing sutt and diners (cha chaan teng) around the city. While the sweet bun with butter remain largely the same in composition, the coffee egg tart can be seen as an attempt to fuse the Hong Kong traditional egg custard tart with the more Westernized coffee. The fact that the egg custard tart is not quite authentic in taste, and the fact that the beverages served still remain loyal to the Starbucks menu is a reminder to patrons that whilst they may feel as if they have been transported back into time, they are still patrons of a worldwide coffee chain.

As I sat down, at least five different people come into the bing sutt, ordered their drinks at the counter and after picking up their drinks headed to the bing sutt and began taking pictures of the café. But beyond the people coming in to simply take pictures, I was also struck by the number of people who were reading the newspaper and magazines, meeting up with friends, and doing their homework and seemed unfazed by their surroundings. They blended effortlessly into this pastiche as if it were any other chain café in the twenty-first century. And indeed, the bing sutt might as well have been any other chain café in the twenty-first century. While newcomers to the branch entered the café with intrigue and excitement, the intrigue and excitement quickly dissipated. Similarly, those who had been to the branch more than once made nothing of the mid-century diner-turn-coffee shop. What strikes me as particularly interesting in this example is that a global multi-national company such

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164 Typically an egg tart consists of a regular sweet pastry crust, and is filled with an egg custard.
as Starbucks, which prides itself on sameness around the world, was willing to engage in a joint project with the design-house G.O.D. that prides itself on setting itself apart from sameness.¹⁶⁵

Nostalgia and the Tourist

If the Starbucks’ theme branch is an example of fusing the everyday Hong Konger of the past with the modern, cosmopolitan Hong Konger of today, the opening of a new “adventure land”, Old Hong Kong (香港老大街), in the Ocean Park theme park is an example of combining the everyday Hong Konger of the past with modern day Mainland China. Opened in 1977, Ocean Park is part zoo, part aquarium, and part adventure theme park and is a major tourist attraction in Hong Kong. In 2005, the theme park began its Master Redevelopment Plan of which included the construction of the attraction Old Hong Kong. However, unlike previous examples of commodification mentioned, Old Hong Kong and the Ocean Park amusement park primarily cater to tourists and not Hong Kong locals. Between 2010-2011, over 5 million people visited the theme park; over 50 percent of the 5 million were tourists from Mainland China (Ocean Park 2011). As visitors enter the new “land”, Old Hong Kong, they must first walk under a bamboo scaffolding covered in garlands. This type of structure was commonly seen in dai tat dei (大笪地) – public, open spaces which

¹⁶⁵ The success of the G.O.D.’s Starbucks collaboration led to another joint project a few years later. This time, rather than celebrating the café and diner culture of the 1950s-1970s, the Mong Kok branch celebrates the popular and booming film industry in Hong Kong. Walls are decorated with flyers mimicking old hand-written “for rent” signs and street stall signs, and old movie posters. Instead of regular seats and stools around tables, were cinema seats from recycled from cinema houses of the 1950s-70s.
served as bazaars in the 1950s-70s. The bazaars, which opened at night, were filled with food-stalls and street vendors who had clustered together. Together, they sold a plethora of snacks and hot dishes. Entertainment, music and games could also be found in the bazaar, and it was common to see people of all ages congregate at these bazaars. As such, these \textit{dai tat dei} were also nick-named “Ordinary People’s Nightclubs” (Hong Kong Heritage Museum 2012). The re-creation of a structure mimicking those formerly seen at \textit{dai tat dei} serves to remind visitors that as they enter Old Hong Kong, they are entering into a space that transports visitors back to the open, welcoming spaces of the everyday Hong Konger in the 1950s-1970s.

As visitors continue walking through Old Hong Kong, they will encounter tenement buildings from that same period, \textit{tong lau}; a mini cinema airing classic Hong Kong films; hawker food stalls and street vendors selling popular snacks from the past; and shop fronts replicating the everyday street stalls from the mid-century period. Park employees are dressed in clothing in the style of the 1950s. For example, women wear cotton \textit{qipaos}, or simple trousers and \textit{qipao} tops; men wear simple black trousers, white vests and wide-brimmed bamboo hats. Old Hong Kong also employs individuals to serve as “characters” within the streetscape. Characters in the post-office will be dressed as postal workers from that period; similarly, there are police officers, tram conductors, delivery men, school boys and school girls, and rickshaw drivers, to name a few. What is clear is that the park has made a concerted effort to include “all walks of life” in their depiction of Old Hong Kong. Not only do you have
characters depicting the “everyday laborer” in Hong Kong, the streetscape includes characters depicting the patrons who ride the rickshaws, and patronize the shops and restaurants.

Lastly, visitors to Old Hong Kong will get the chance to sit and eat at restaurants, *dai pai dong*, and buy snacks to go from hawkers which are a now rarity in Hong Kong. They’ll also have a chance to get their picture taken next to a replica of an old double-decker tram or ride on the back of a rickshaw and visit a replica of the razed old Star Ferry building (see Chapter Four). There are of course a number of criticisms that can be made with regard to Old Hong Kong, namely, what Jameson et al. call the divorce from historicity (Jameson 1999; Appadurai 1996). It would appear that Old Hong Kong is merely a space in which anything considered “old” from all different decades are merely lumped together in a convenient attraction. Another point worth mentioning is what can be termed as the self-designated extinction of Hong Kong tradition. While it is true that the replica of the Star Ferry clock tower is a replica of something that is no longer present in Hong Kong, this is not true for all aspects of the attraction. *Tong lau* and street vendors and hawkers are still very much present in Hong Kong despite the efforts of the Urban Renewal Authority and the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department to phase them out. And yet, it appears as if the park has written these buildings and eating establishments off into pages of the history book, and in this case, an attraction in a theme park. Lastly, as has already been mentioned, critics of nostalgia are also concerned about not only the potential of
ahistoricism but also the depoliticization of the past. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the destruction of the Star Ferry Building was met with much contestation and political outcry that is not mentioned in the attraction. Likewise, the political historical significance of the Star Ferry Building is conveniently absent. Instead, the replica of the Star Ferry clock tower is placed within a romanticized, depoliticized miniature version of Hong Kong. It is no surprise, of course, that the streetscape of Old Hong Kong replicates the streets of 1950s and 1970s Hong Kong. True to the founding myth of Hong Kong, at the opening ceremony for the new attraction, the chairman of the theme park, Allan Zeman, said, “Hong Kong experienced a golden period between the 1950s and 1970s, which saw the city establish itself as an economic miracle and bastion of creativity.” Zeman continues, “Old Hong Kong offers everyone a chance to immerse themselves in the communal pride of that period and the many small joys that enriched the lives of a previous generation” (Ocean Park 2012).

In many ways the new adventure zone at Ocean Park, Old Hong Kong, has many similarities to Main Street USA found in Disney theme parks across the world. Both serve as spaces where visitors can enter a world of a bygone era (Outka 2009, 4). For instance, in all Disney theme parks, Main Street USA serves as the main gateway to the rest of the park. From the ticket booths, visitors must pass through Main Street USA before entering other zones in the theme parks. The street is lined with turn-of-the-century Victorian architecture, and visitors will periodically encounter horse-
drawn carriages, “railway trains” or barbershop quartets in candy colored suits. Architects of Disneyland have pointed out that Main Street USA serves as a “transition” space designed to “mood set” between the streets of Anaheim and the themed adventure “lands” elsewhere in the theme park (Francaviglia 1995, 70). Visitors are supposed to forget about the world outside of the theme park and step back into time.

Scholars such as Robert Neuman and Richard Francaviglia discuss how the symbolism, myth and folklore surrounding Main Street USA provide visitors with the possibility of escapism. Quoting historian Richard Snow, Francaviglia notes how for many people, walking through Main Street USA instills a sense of amazement, enchantment and excitement:

I was enchanted by all the rides, but the thing that made the strongest impression on me was Main Street. Walt Disney’s evocation of the small-town America of his youth. I remember standing there in the dusk while the lights came on. I watched them outlining the busy comices while a horsecar clapped quietly past, and suddenly I wanted to stay in this place forever (Richard Snow in Francaviglia, 70).

One wonders, what is it about reliving the past that produces such affective emotions? Specifically, what elements about Main Street USA contributed to such amazement and excitement? Francaviglia suggests that the pastiche of Main Street USA allowed visitors to return to a “treasured time (circa 1900) in a treasured place (the generic American small town)” during a period of urban sprawl, development and change. Francaviglia suggests that Main Street USA also helps shapes the public’s understanding of the past, even if for a momentary second. While entering the
harmonious Main Street USA, the public’s imagination is captured. The past is understood as harmonious, orderly, conflict-free and representing true American values. In this sense, as Fracaviglia suggests, Disney becomes a historian of sorts – narrating America’s past to the public, and becoming America’s spokesman (Fracaviglia 1995, 70–72). Indeed, while Main Street USA can be seen as a reflection of Walt Disney’s reading of American history and culture, it is also a reflection of Disney’s nostalgia for a bygone era (Neuman 2008, 85). And while much has been written about the autobiographical, personal aspect of the theme parks’ design, Neuman’s article quickly shows how the “idea” of a Main Street USA goes beyond the theme park and could be found in movies, theatre productions and widespread literature that predate the creation of the Disney theme park. The similarity between Main Street USA and the small towns depicted in popular Hollywood films from the 1940s would suggest that American visitors to the theme park would immediately be able to locate and place Main Street USA to a certain period in the past (Neuman 2008, 88). The mythic aspect of the small, quaint, turn of the century town and all its associations were thus ingrained in the minds of public. Upon entering the park, what had been seen on the silver-screen suddenly came alive.

166 The recession of 2009 prompted the return of the idea of Main Street back into public and political discourse. Main Street, with its association with “true American values”, was used to contrast with Wall Street and all that Wall Street represented (big business, corporations, cronyism, banking institutions).
167 Main Street USA was rumored to be a replica of the main thoroughfare in the town Walt Disney grew up in, Marceline, MO. Neuman’s article questions this rumor.
168 Of course, the very fact that Main Street USA was supposed to mimic any small main street in America from the turn of the century, makes locating it easy.
Indeed, while the directors and creators of Ocean Park certainly worked to feed visitors’ nostalgia, I argue, that Old Hong Kong is an example of a myth-as-experience commodified and is an entrenchment of Hong Kong’s founding myth. By walking underneath the grand archway upon entering Old Hong Kong, visitors are prompted to think of Hong Kong, the city, as one large bazaar. Old Hong Kong does not merely represent one small, typical street in 1950s-1970s, rather Old Hong Kong is supposed to be a microcosm of the city. Thus, the archway does not represent an entryway into an empty square serving as the neighborhood dai tat dei bazaar, as was done in the 1950s-1970s; instead, the archway signals the transition into 1950s Hong Kong, the bazaar. Like the nighttime bazaar, Hong Kong is depicted as a welcoming and open place: The attraction includes employees in costume representing “all walks of life” living, working and eating together with a strong community spirit – a theme that runs throughout the decolonized founding myth.

The depoliticization and romanticization of an attraction designed for Mainland Tourists in mind is worth considering. Is it possible to assume that the Old Hong Kong attraction is an example of nostalgia viewed under a new foreign gaze – the Mainland Chinese gaze. And if so, does this new gaze reflect China’s position as Hong Kong’s new colonial power? Certainly, such an opinion does resonate with the demonstrations, video uploads, protests, concerns and discourses seen elsewhere in Hong Kong (see Chapter One and Chapter Three). However, as Lisa Rofel has argued a similar phenomenon of evoking the past and consumption of nostalgia is also taking
place on Mainland China. Like Hong Kong, Shanghai has recently experienced a wave of nostalgia. Celebrations of “Old Shanghai” can be seen along the Shanghai Bund and in the former concession district with the repurposing of former residences, mansions, foreign banks, trading houses and consulate houses into trendy bars, hotels and high end restaurants. A celebration of Old Shanghai can also be seen in the preservation of a number of longtangs (alleyways) and their adjacent buildings (Liang 2008). Perhaps one of the most successful of the revitalization and gentrification projects in Shanghai is that of the Xintiandi entertainment district (Ren 2006; Liang 2008; A. W. T. Wai 2006). The area now known as Xintiandi in the Taipingqiao area was formerly a residential area of mostly shikumen tenement style housing. The large gentrification project was truly an international joint project: the local government had leased the land to the main investor who came from Hong Kong, extra investment capital came from Europe, Asia and the United States; and architects and designers from around the world were consulted (Ren 2006). Today global restaurant and coffee chains, boutique hotels and shops occupy the entertainment district. In addition there is a shikumen museum in a replica shikumen house decorated with leather sofas, teak dressings tables, phonograph player, and other soft furnishings from 1920s Shanghai. While such gentrification and preservation projects are commonplace in many cities around the world, Lisa Rofel argues that such nostalgia among the entrepreneurs and workers she spoke to is driven by their propensity to distance themselves from the recent socialist past (Rofel and Yanagisako forthcoming). The

169 Lisa Rofel describes a similar interior in the exhibition at the factory art complex she attended (Rofel and Yanagisako forthcoming).
CCP’s long condemnation of the lifestyle and history of Shanghai by deeming it semi-colonial and semi-feudal was now being rebuffed by the workers, entrepreneurs and elites Rofel spoke to. These individuals looked to pre-Socialist Shanghai as inspiration for their entrepreneurial endeavors and fuel for their desires of becoming cosmopolitan, entrepreneurial subjectivities (Ibid). As such, it is likely that the Mainland Chinese visitors who frequented the theme park not only look to Hong Kong but specifically “Old Hong Kong” as inspiration for their cosmopolitan or entrepreneurial hopes.

VI. CONCLUSION

In the above examples, I have shown how nostalgic goods have changed in the past thirty years. Like the founding myth, nostalgia itself was once predicated on the desires, hopes and gaze of the colonial power. Since the change in sovereignty, local entrepreneurs have decolonized nostalgia, and instead injected a local, “native authenticity” in nostalgia goods, art, and film. By localizing these items of nostalgia, these entrepreneurs are also complicit in the further dissemination of the localized founding myth of Hong Kong. This myth, as discussed earlier, is integral to understanding the formation of Hong Kong identity in Hong Kong. However, as indicated above, although a localization of nostalgia has occurred, and while local Hong Kongers are making claims to Hong Kong’s past, these designers must also reckon with the fact that Hong Kong’s founding myth (and by way of that, its identity) is premised on notions of globality and cosmopolitanism. As such, the local
nostalgic market had to necessarily go beyond the Hong Kong consumer and engage with foreign markets and foreigners in Hong Kong. By replicating and commodifying the 1960s and 1970s of Hong Kong – the height of Hong Kong’s development and growth – the local designers, entrepreneurs and those who consume these products and movies are also looking to the past as a way to determine their future. As the creator of the design house G.O.D. maintains, “ownership of our culture endows us with a sense of authenticity. It is only in being confident of who we are that we can hold our heads up high on an international level” (Young 2012). By consuming nostalgic commodities, Hong Kongers not only claim ownership of their “culture” and founding myth, but the see these commodities as a way to fulfill their desires of re-becoming a world city.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

The morning of July 1, 2012 in Hong Kong began with a flag ceremony at Golden Bauhinia Square – a new ceremonial space created in 1997. Surrounding the flagstaff stood the outgoing Chief Executive, Donald Tsang, and his wife, and to their left was the man selected by Beijing to take over office, Leung Chun-ying, and his wife. As the Hong Kong SAR flag arose alongside the People’s Republic of China flag, the band began to play the national anthem of the PRC, the \textit{March of the Volunteers}. As the anthem came to a close, three People’s Liberation Army helicopters were seen flying across the harbor carrying the PRC flag and the Hong Kong SAR flag. After the early morning flag ceremony, officials slowly made their way to the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Center, where in a closed exhibition hall the Chinese President Hu Jintao swore in the new Chief Executive of Hong Kong. Among those in the audience were party officials, loyal members of the party, and prominent Hong Kong business members and leaders. The podium was sparsely decorated, with little on stage except for two podiums and some flowers. In addition were two flags painted on the background; the larger flag – the PRC flag – was adjacent to a considerably smaller flag – the Hong Kong SAR flag. After the swearing in ceremony, Leung took to the podium and gave his inaugural address. Unlike his predecessor, Tsang, Leung addressed the audience in Mandarin, the official language on Mainland China, but certainly not in Cantonese-speaking Hong Kong. President Hu Jintao then took to the stage and started speaking to the audience. Halfway through his address, a scuffle broke out in the audience as a man began to demand
that the Chinese government take responsibility for the events in Tiananmen Square on June 4th, 1989, and called for an end to authoritarian rule in China. Ignoring the protestor, Hu continued his speech only changing his tone and volume to sound more forceful, as security quickly carried the protestor away.\textsuperscript{170} The small disruption at the ceremony would appear as a mere blip when compared to events that would take place on the streets a mere 1.5 miles away in Causeway Bay.

By noon, streams of people had already gathered at Victoria Park in Causeway Bay for the starting point of the annual July 1\textsuperscript{st} pro-democracy march. According to one woman who had tried to make her way to the park, the traffic was so backed up that she couldn’t get to the park itself and instead had to slip in to the march as protestors passed by further along the protest route. Organizers of the event put the number of participants at 400,000. Among the 400,000 were the usual pro-democracy activists, human rights groups, NGOS, and politicians such as the infamous legislator Leung Kwok-hung.\textsuperscript{171} This time, however, they were marching alongside young children, students, families and the elderly in the 89°F heat and humidity. Finally giving in to the enormous crowds, the police opened up all lanes and tramways of the busy thoroughfare of Hennessy Road which runs through Causeway Bay, Wanchai and Central. Along the way, popular pro-democracy politicians and activists set up mini-

\textsuperscript{170} The lone protestor was quickly hurried out of the conference hall venue, and was carried kicking and yelling by up to five security guards. As the guards had the protestor out the door, the audience began clapping. Footage of the incident can be found on Al Jazeera (Hong Kong Leader Sworn in Despite Controversy 2012).

\textsuperscript{171} As a longtime pro-democracy activist, Leung – a founding member of the League of Social Democrats Party – is known for wearing a Che Guevara T-shirt in the otherwise formal setting of the Legislative Council chambers. He openly denounces the actions of the Beijing government.
stages and cheered the protestors on. Protestors carried banners and signs that called for Leung Chun-ying to step down. Of the many different signs, one was a cartoon drawing of Leung with wolf-like ears alluding to the popular sentiment that Leung was a wolf in sheep’s clothing and that despite his attempt to appeal to the masses he was a Beijing loyalist and member of the Chinese Communist Party. Other banners and signs spelled out demands for universal suffrage in Hong Kong, the protection of civil liberties, demands for better welfare provisions, and better checks on the unfettered property market. Beyond local concerns, many protestors were also demanding an inquiry into the mysterious death of Tiananmen Square dissident Li Wang Yang. These protestors, wearing black, held up signs and wore T-shirts of a lone tank (similar to the ones used in Tiananmen Square), with a figure hanging by a noose from the main gun. A quick survey of the plethora of concerns and issues voiced during this protest suggests how fifteen years following Hong Kong’s change in sovereignty, citizens wanted to hold the state accountable for Hong Kong society’s various grievances, and were questioning the legitimacy of Leung. The signing in of Leung Chun-ying as Chief Executive of Hong Kong, hand chosen by an elite group of Beijing loyalists and Chinese party members, was a reminder to Hong Kongers that regardless of how the public felt about Leung, he would safely remain in office with Beijing’s blessing and support. But perhaps the most lasting image of the protest was

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172 The Japanese cartoon character Hello Kitty also featured prominently in the march. Leading up to Leung’s election, it was revealed that Leung Chun-ying had managed to evade building legislations by erecting illegal structures to his luxury home in Hong Kong. Leung’s response to the media was that the presence of Hello Kitty stickers on the illegal structure proved that the illegal addition to the property had existed prior to Leung taking occupancy. Mocking Leung’s comments, some protestors came armed with Hello Kitty dolls, umbrellas and clothing demanding “Hello Kitty will be vindicated.”
the image of dozens of individuals who did not align with specific concern groups, and yet were seen collectively waving the flag that had not been seen for fifteen years in public: the old colonial Hong Kong flag. Since July 1, 2012, the colonial Hong Kong flag has been seen at numerous other protests and marches and has garnered much attention from the media and Beijing.

![Figure 17: Protestors carrying the colonial Hong Kong flag in the July 1st, 2012 protest. (Photograph courtesy of Caroline Mak).](image)

To those marching that day, it seemed to be clear that the flag’s presence was a symbolic reminder of how attempts to “reunify” (to use Beijing’s parlance) Hong Kong with the Chinese nation had not only been met with resistance, but that resistance was at an all time high. The July 1st march showed that fifteen years on, the public responded to the increased integration with the Chinese nation with a
simultaneous distancing from the Chinese nation. This distancing can be seen and heard in the debates surrounding the footage filmed on the MTR, the locust advertisement, people’s reaction to “Mainland Mothers,” and how Mainland China was used as a scapegoat for the SARS outbreak. While the video of the child eating noodles on the train certainly had elements of the “spectacle”, uploaded video recordings on the Internet of Chinese tourists having verbal altercations with local Hong Kongers, or collections of photos of the children of Chinese tourists “caught” urinating or defecating on the streets, have long been shared and circulating the Internet. Similarly, the “I-once-saw-a-Mainland-tourist-do-this” story has become a common topic of discussion. Even in the most unsuspecting places and conversations with strangers, I was often surprised with the frequency of these tales. I witnessed one such as I was waiting in line to use the restroom in a popular shopping mall. The mall is frequented by locals and tourists from all over the world and sells a range of low-end to high-end fashion and electronics. As I got closer to the front of the queue, it was clear that a cleaner was mopping the floor of one bathroom stall to the next. As one would imagine, the elderly woman was clearly not enjoying her job and she would mumble to herself every now and then as she cleaned the stalls. As she reached one booth she let out a sigh and said loudly, “Oh not again! They’re standing on the toilet seats again! Why do they have to leave everything in a mess? You can see their shoeprints on the toilet seat!” Despite what many commentators have suggested,

173 Like many places, many toilets in China are in the “squatter” style instead of the toilet-bowl style. The shoeprints the cleaner was referring to probably came about as a result of individuals standing on the toilet seat and squatting over it.
examples such as this one and the protest at the Sheung Shui station against cross-border traders (Chapter One and Chapter Three) show that anti-Mainland sentiment is not limited to the middle and upper-class of Hong Kong.

Many Hong Kongers see the Hong Kong state’s eager encouragement of economic integration and openness to Mainland Chinese investors and property speculators as the source of wider local economic and social problems such as rising property prices, the rising gap in income inequality, and a strain on public resources and social services. In seeing the return of the colonial flag, the Chinese state was faced with the harsh reality that Hong Kong’s reunification with China had a bumpy road ahead. Later that year in November, at the 18th National People’s Congress Meeting, newly appointed President Xi Jinping openly addressed issues of reunification and quelled fears of secession by insisting on the need for a harmonious relationship between Hong Kong and China. Certainly, while any call for an independent Hong Kong is still downplayed by the media, scholars and activists, as my dissertation has shown because Hong Kong shares many characteristics with the traditionally defined nation such claims for independence and secession should not be dismissed too readily.

The Project

The main goal of this dissertation was to show that, while not a nation, Hong Kong’s strong place-based identity (what I call near-national identity) shares many similarities with conceptions of nationalism and national identities. Within the social
sciences, constructivists have been troubled with the possibility of reifying analytical terms such as “identity” and “nation” in their work. And yet, as Brubaker and Cooper point out, the constructivist tendency to describe these terms as fluid, constructed and in flux does a disservice when trying to understand how nations and identities are deployed, debated over, co-opted into social or nationalist movements, and in some cases fought over in the real world by politicians, social movements, and individuals (2000). These social experiences can be understood as comprising a category of practice which has been the focus of this dissertation. However, this study has also understood the terms “nation” and “identity” to be a “category of analysis” existing within the confines of academia that are reified into a “category of practice” used by lay people in the everyday. Of importance to this dissertation is to understand the ways in which a Hong Kong identity as a category of analysis becomes a Hong Kong identity in practice, or as Brubaker and Cooper suggest: “We should seek to explain the processes and mechanisms through which what has been called the “political fiction of … ‘identity’ can crystallize, at certain moments, as a powerful, compelling reality” (2000, 5).

Like many founding myths, Hong Kong’s myth has become part of Hong Kong’s official historical narrative, and has become institutionalized and naturalized. To emphasize the constructed nature of this myth, I described the ways in which the dominant colonial historical narrative was bifurcated by the local Hong Kong

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174 This arises with other categories of analysis such as “citizenship”, “race”, and “ethnicity” to name a few.
population in the 1960s. The bifurcation was a response to the minimal role Hong Kongers played in the colonial historical narrative. Through this bifurcation, Hong Kongers were able to rally around the version of the founding myth, and create a historical narrative that celebrated the work ethic, go-getting spirit, tenacity, sacrifices and social mobility of a population made up of former immigrants and refugees. The myth is ultimately concerned with Hong Kong’s spectacular development and how the “imagined community” of Hong Kongers participated in the development of the city. The popularity and currency of this myth is evidenced in the way the myth has been institutionalized and memorialized as History. Today, this myth can be seen and heard in various daily scenarios and situations.

This decolonized, localized myth has shaped Hong Kong politics and Hong Kong’s relationship with Mainland China. Specifically, the Mainland Chinese-Hong Kong border is featured prominently in the founding myth. In the myth, the border is seen as a necessary institution that separated Hong Kong from Mainland China and the specter of Communism. Mythologically speaking, the border represented Hong Kong’s exceptionalism. The border represented change and new opportunities for those who sought refuge in Hong Kong during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. It also marked the entryway into a community of displaced people who would one day contribute to the development of the city and become part of the imagined community. The memories of the border described in Chapter Three also underscore how the founding myth shapes ones memories of the border today. For example, tales
of heroism and a spectacular escape from Mainland China to Hong Kong fit in conveniently with the founding myth that emphasizes sacrifice and tenacity. As the border became more porous towards the 1980s, the exceptionalism of Hong Kong’s founding myth (and the basis of many Hong Kongers’ self understanding) began to be questioned. Beginning in the 1990s, the opening of the border led to an increased movement across the border; these movements, however, did not encapsulate stories of heroism, struggle or sacrifice. From this period on and reaching a xenophobic peak in 2003 during the SARS outbreak, the border came to signify the separation between civilized and uncivilized, rule of law and lawlessness, and demarcated Mainland China as ‘the Other.’ The traders and women who cross the relatively porous border are seen as “cheating the system” and dismissing ideas of community, hard-work, and sacrifice that feature so prominently in the Hong Kong myth that is so near and dear to many Hong Kongers.

This dissertation also showed how the powers of globalization, neoliberalism and cosmopolitanism can be seen in congruence with aspects of nationalism (or near-nationalism) and national identity. Specifically, the ideological aspects of globalization, neoliberalism and cosmopolitanism make up the very foundation of Hong Kong’s localized founding myth and Hong Kongers’ self-understanding. In Chapter Four, I examined the way Hong Kong’s imagined cityscape (that is the street life, markets, transportation networks, and buildings) is imprinted and embodied with political meanings and memories that are attuned with the de-colonized founding
myths of Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s founding myth is used as a way to justify ongoing redevelopment and gentrification projects, but also preservationist movements. Preservationists, for example, argue that the political meanings and significance of Hong Kong’s uniqueness are imprinted onto the cityscape, and will be undermined upon the cityscape’s destruction by developers. Developers, however, maintain that to build and rebuild, develop and redevelop, and gentrify the city is inherently part of the Hong Kong’s development story and founding myth. However, as I identify, what is significantly absent from both sides of the redevelopment debate is the way in which the Hong Kong state has actively pursued redevelopment and urban renewal plans that cater to private interests, and the state’s global capitalist and neoliberal politics. The neoliberal subjectivities that are formed as a result of the redevelopment and urban renewals policies are synonymous with what Hong Kongers believe to be a “unique” identity and are, as such, not questioned. The mainstream founding myth of Hong Kong that is perpetuated and upheld by locals who embrace aspects of neoliberalism and global capital, who hardly consider these as a point of contention.

Lastly, in Chapter Five, I examine the way in which the founding myth of Hong Kong has not only become institutionalized and naturalized in history books, debates over the role of the border, and redevelopment debates but has become commodified and transcend into the production of everyday objects. As more Hong Kongers worry about the renewal of the city, the disappearance of their city’s uniqueness and
identity, and also Hong Kong’s integration with Mainland China, restaurateurs, and fashion designers are encouraging a resurgence of the “made in Hong Kong” brand that is often associated with city’s heydays and Hong Kong’s developmental success. As the localized myth goes, the 1960s and 1970s was the peak of Hong Kong’s growth and development. The trend of nostalgic goods entails the process of emptying everyday objects of their meaning and significance, and affixing a new significance that speaks directly to the founding myth of Hong Kong. Those who purchase and produce these commodities actively appropriate, reaffirm and preserve Hong Kong’s founding myth. Given Hong Kong’s positionality as a global city, these re-fashioned nostalgic goods must also go beyond the local Hong Kong consumers and speak to global consumers as well. The example of the Starbucks bing sutt is an example of how the local has embraced the global.

This dissertation has shown how founding myths are an integral part to the engendering of nationalism. Specifically, this dissertation has focused on how Hong Kongers participate in everyday nationalism, and how that nationalism is intimately tied to beliefs about Hong Kong’s founding and development. The founding myth that has been a central component of this dissertation is grounded in ideas of cosmopolitanism, globalism and capitalism – terms that have been seen by some scholars as not readily sharing an affinity with nationalism and the nation. As such, this dissertation has shown ways in which globalization and nationalism can be seen as commensurate. In the case of Hong Kong, the founding myth grounded in ideas of
capitalism and globalization was used as a way to distance Hong Kong from Mainland China. The paradox is that despite China’s increasing role within the global economy and its participation in neoliberal projects, the myth remains an integral part of the everyday debates and heightened political moments in which Hong Kong’s distances itself from Mainland China.
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