Probabilistic Semantics for Modal Logic

By
Tamar Ariela Lando

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Committee in Charge:
Paolo Mancosu (Co-Chair)
Barry Stroud (Co-Chair)
Christos Papadimitriou

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Abstract

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Professor Paolo Mancosu & Professor Barry Stroud, Co-Chairs

We develop a probabilistic semantics for modal logic, which was introduced in recent years by Dana Scott. This semantics is intimately related to an older, topological semantics for modal logic developed by Tarski in the 1940’s. Instead of interpreting modal languages in topological spaces, as Tarski did, we interpret them in the Lebesgue measure algebra, or algebra of measurable subsets of the real interval, \([0, 1]\), \textit{modulo sets of measure zero}. In the probabilistic semantics, each formula is assigned to some element of the algebra, and acquires a corresponding probability (or measure) value. A formula is satisfied in a model over the algebra if it is assigned to the top element in the algebra—or, equivalently, has probability 1.

The dissertation focuses on questions of \textit{completeness}. We show that the propositional modal logic, \(S4\), is sound and complete for the probabilistic semantics (formally, \(S4\) is sound and complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra). We then show that we can extend this semantics to more complex, multi-modal languages. In particular, we prove that the dynamic topological logic, \(S4C\), is sound and complete for the probabilistic semantics (formally, \(S4C\) is sound and complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra with O-operators). The connection with Tarski’s topological semantics is developed throughout the text, and the first substantive chapter is devoted to a new and simplified proof of Tarski’s completeness result via well-known fractal curves.

This work may be applied in the many formal areas of philosophy that exploit probability theory for philosophical purposes. One interesting application in metaphysics, or mereology, is developed in the introductory chapter. We argue, against orthodoxy, that on a ‘gunky’ conception of space—a conception of space according to which each region of space has a proper subregion—we can still introduce many of the usual topological notions that we have for ordinary, ‘pointy’ space.
To Dana and Grisha,
for turning a philosopher into a mathematician,

and to Barry and Paolo,
for turning her back again.
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This dissertation had its beginnings in the Colorado mountains. I went there in a break between Summer Session 2009 and the beginning of the fall semester to visit a friend, Darko Sarenac. At the time, I was having serious doubts about finishing my degree, and was exploring the possibility of dropping out to become a photographer in the more remote parts of Southwestern New Mexico. Darko and I discussed the different things I might photograph, and even, as I remember, made plans to travel together with my camera to Wyoming and the South. Soon enough, though, we got to talking about logic. On a hike up a mountain as a storm set in, I learned that there was a deep connection between topology and modal logic—indeed, that there was a whole field called topological modal logic that had been quite active at Stanford and elsewhere in the last several years. In those 48 hours, Darko taught me the basics. By the time he dropped me off at the airport in Denver, we had plans to write a paper together. (This paper forms the first chapter of the dissertation.) Thank you, Darko. Without you, I would be somewhere in New Mexico.

I want to thank, most of all, the people who have worked with me throughout my graduate career at Berkeley. I was incredibly fortunate to have Barry Stroud as an advisor from very early on. Our conversations shaped the way that I think about so many things, and his way of doing philosophy has been a great influence on me. Although the topic I eventually chose for my dissertation was quite far afield from Barry’s own interests, he was the first to encourage it. More than anyone else, Barry was witness to the many ups and downs of my career at Berkeley, and I always felt his staunch support and confidence.

I was also very fortunate to have Paolo Mancosu as an advisor and mentor. Paolo was the first professor to take me on as a Graduate Student Instructor. I learned from him how logic could be taught in a way that was clear, engaging, and philosophically rich. When it came time to my writing a dissertation in modal logic, Paolo was aware of the many professional challenges that lay ahead and despite this, was fully supportive of the work I was doing and the project I had chosen. He provided me with invaluable advice and help at critical moments.

In the first few days of working together, Darko surreptitiously sent an e-mail to Grigori Mints at Stanford, encouraging him to be in contact with me. I still remember seeing Grisha for the first time after many years at a talk by Dana Scott in the Berkeley Logic Colloquium. At the talk, Dana introduced a new,
probabilistic semantics for modal logic—a semantics about which very little was known at the time. Some days after the talk, Grisha approached me. “Tamar,” he said, “Vai you not prove completeness?” in his inimitable accent. Grisha became a mentor to me of the best kind, always pointing me in the way of interesting questions, and giving practical advice at every turn in the road. I am very grateful for his taking me in with such generosity and kindness.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Almost half a century has now gone by since S. Kripke introduced Kripke semantics for modal logic. This semantics crystalized ideas in the analysis of modal propositions that can in some sense be traced back to Leibnitz, and his conception of ‘necessity’ as that which holds not just in the actual world, but in all possible worlds. Today Kripke semantics is standard not just in philosophical circles, but in such related disciplines as linguistics, computer science, and mathematics. No other semantics for modal languages rivals the simplicity and flexibility of the Kripke framework.

But long before Kripke, there was Tarski.

Looking at the axioms for the modal logic, $S4$, Tarski realized that, rearranged a certain way, these axioms resembled the axioms used by mathematicians to describe a topological space.\footnote{Recall that a topological space is a pair, $\langle X, \mathcal{T} \rangle$, where $X$ is a set, and $\mathcal{T}$ is a collection of subsets of $X$ that is closed under finite intersections, arbitrary unions, and contains the entire set $X$ and the empty set, $\emptyset$.} If you are unfamiliar with topology, don’t worry. Think of a topological space (or simply a space) as a collection of points glued together in some way. The most familiar space is, perhaps, three-dimensional Euclidean space. Here we think of individual points as triples of real numbers. This space has some special features: between every two points, there is a well-defined distance; a sequence of points that converges, converges to a single point; and so on. What Tarski showed is that modal logic can be interpreted in topological spaces, and that—in a sense to be further specified below—the modal logic $S4$
is the logic of topological spaces. Here, rather than thinking of the ‘necessity’ or ‘□’-modality as picking out some collection of possible worlds, Tarski thought of it as a spatial operator, which picks out the interior of a region of topological space.

Tarski and McKinsey’s work in the 1930’s and 1940’s led to what is now called the topological semantics for modal logic. Their elegant completeness results predate Kripke semantics by more than a decade, but in the years after the introduction of the Kripke framework, the topological semantics was largely forgotten. The flexibility of the Kripke framework—the fact that it can be used to model not just $S4$, but many different propositional and predicate modal logics—as well as its intuitive appeal are perhaps jointly responsible for the near-oblivion into which the topological semantics fell. In the last fifteen years or so, however, things have changed. Modal logicians, familiar with the many advances in temporal logics (or modal logics used to describe time, and temporal processes) started asking, ‘What about a modal logic of space?’ Tarski’s work on the topological semantics came to be seen as the foundation stone of a much broader project: using modal logic to describe, make distinctions between, and systematize our reasoning about space and spatial structures. This research program has produced many new and interesting results in recent years: logicians have simplified and refined Tarski and McKinsey’s original completeness results; extended Tarski’s topological semantics to more complex, multi-modal languages; and proved new results concerning the model theory and complexity of these extensions.

In the pages that follow, we take Tarski’s topological semantics as our starting point. This is not to say that we ignore Kripke’s relational semantics—far from it. Interesting relationships between the two will be developed throughout the text. But the primary aim of this work is not, in fact, to develop either Tarski’s topological semantics, or Kripke semantics. Rather, it is to introduce the reader to a new way of interpreting modal languages—one that can be developed quite naturally, as we’ll see, from Tarski’s topological semantics, but which differs in important ways from any of the well-known semantics for modal logics to date. Those semantics all share the following feature. In a given modal model (or formal interpretation of the modal language), each formula is either true or false. In Kripke semantics, we say that a formula is true in a model if it’s true at every (accessible) possible world in the model. In the topological semantics, we say that a formula is true in a model if it’s true at every point in the relevant topological

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Footnote: For a probabilistic semantics for classical logic, see K. Popper’s (31) and H. Field’s (12). See also Keisler’s (16) and (17).
space. What if instead we interpreted modal languages probabilistically? What if, in other words, each formula in a given model got assigned not just a truth value, but a probability value between 0 and 1? The idea for a probabilistic semantics was introduced by Dana Scott in the last several years, in talks given at Stanford and Berkeley. As Scott said, the semantics “provides rich ingredients for building many kinds of structures having non-standard random elements.” At the time, however, many fundamental questions about the semantics—particularly those relating to completeness—were still unanswered. In the chapters that follow, we answer some of these questions, and show that the probabilistic semantics can be elegantly extended to more complex, multi-modal languages.

In embarking on the work that follows, the question naturally arises: Why define a new semantics for modal logic in the first place? Isn’t the standard Kripke semantics good enough?

There are two ways to respond. On the one hand, we may start out from an interest in existing modal languages (or existing axiomatic modal systems), and be interested in what the different semantics for these languages are. Here, of course, the probabilistic semantics will have quite different features from the standard Kripke semantics and even from the topological semantics for \( S_4 \). Formulas, as we noted, acquire not just truth values in probabilistic models, but probability values. Someone interested in the various uses to which probability theory has been put in the more formal areas of philosophy might take interest in this new semantics for this reason. But secondly, one might start out from an interest in certain mathematical objects themselves—topological spaces, say, or topological spaces together with Borel measures in the present case. Then one will want to know: to what extent can modal languages describe, make distinctions between, and help us reason about these structures? From this point of view, the flexibility of Kripke semantics—the fact that it can be used to interpret not just \( S_4 \), but many different modal logics—is not essential. What we want to know is what modal logics the mathematical objects we’re interested in give rise to, and what distinctions between such objects can be made within the confines of different modal languages.\(^3\)

\(^3\)J. Van Benthem makes this point in connection with Tarski’s topological semantics:

Some modal logicians see topological models as a means of providing new semantics for existing modal languages, mostly for logic-internal purposes. This can be motivated a bit more profoundly by thinking of topologies as models for information, making this interest close to central logical concerns. But someone primarily interested in Space as such will
As the reader moves forward through the work of the next chapters, she is invited to keep these two perspectives in mind. The new semantics presented here is not meant as a rival for Kripke (or relational) semantics. Rather, the hope is that the probabilistic semantics can take its place alongside those other semantics, opening up some new avenues, both philosophically and mathematically. Why not let a thousand flowers bloom?

1.2 Modal beginnings

But first: what exactly is modal logic? The standard propositional modal language consists of some countable collection of propositional variables, \( \{ P_n \mid n = 1, 2, 3, \ldots \} \), the Boolean connectives, \( \{ \neg, \lor, \land, \rightarrow, \leftrightarrow \} \), and the two modal symbols, \( \square \) and \( \diamond \). The symbols \( \square \) and \( \diamond \) are typically interpreted as expressing ‘It is necessary that . . . ’ and ‘It is possible that . . . ’, respectively. More generally, modal symbols may be used to express a host of modalities from natural language—including, as we’ll see, temporal, deontic, epistemic and, of course, metaphysical modalities. What exactly is a modality? R. Goldblatt says,

A modality is any word or phrase that can be applied to a given statement \( S \) to create a new statement that makes an assertion about the mode of truth of \( S \): about when, where or how \( S \) is true, or about the circumstances under which \( S \) may be true. (13, p. 310)

Goldblatt gives as examples the English language expressions, “henceforth,” “eventually,” “hitherto,” “previously,” “it is obligatory/forbidden/permitted/unlawful that,” “it is known to \( X \) that,” “it is common knowledge that,” “it is believed that,” and so on. Modal logics, we can say, are logics expressed in modal languages. They have been used to get at the meaning of, and formalize many of these English-language

not worry about the semantics of modal languages. She will rather be interested in spatial structures by themselves, and spatial logics will be judged by how well they analyze old structures, discover new ones, and help in reasoning about them. (40, p. 11)

\(^4\)My account of the history here follows Goldblatt in (13). See his excellent discussion for much more detail.
modalities.

1.2.1 Early motivations

The modern history of modal logic begins perhaps with C.I. Lewis. Lewis was motivated by the idea of understanding the English-language “implies”—a conditional connective that he took to have quite different properties from the material conditional of classical logic. “Expositors of the algebra of logic,” Lewis noted, “have not always taken pains to indicate that there is a difference between the algebraic and ordinary meanings of implication.” Lewis was particularly disturbed by what have come to be known as the paradoxes of the material conditional: the fact that in classical logic a false proposition implies (in the algebraic sense) any proposition, and a true proposition is implied by any proposition. In symbols,

\[ \neg P \rightarrow (P \rightarrow Q); \]

\[ P \rightarrow (Q \rightarrow P) \]

Under the ordinary meaning of implication, Lewis thought that ‘P implies Q’ means something like, ‘Q can be legitimately inferred from P.’ But one cannot legitimately infer any proposition from a false proposition. The paradoxes of the material conditional highlighted the way in which the material conditional of classical logic failed to capture the ordinary meaning of “implies”—a connective which Lewis thought stood at the foundations of fundamental notions in logic. “Unless ‘implies’ has some ‘proper’ meaning, there is no criterion of validity, no possibility even of arguing the question whether there is one or not,” Lewis claimed. “And yet the question, What is the ‘proper’ meaning of ‘implies’? remains peculiarly difficult.” (24, p. 325)

What system of logic, if not the classical one, could formalize the ordinary meaning of “implies”? The proposition expressed by ‘A implies B’ was, according to Lewis, equivalent to the proposition expressed by ‘Either not-A or B.’ But Lewis distinguished between what he called an extensional and intensional reading of “or.” On the extensional reading, “or” is the truth-functional disjunction of classical logic. This yields the algebraic meaning of “implies” as a material conditional. But on the intensional reading of “or,” Lewis claimed that “at least one of the disjuncts is necessarily true.” Using this intensional reading to understand the ordinary meaning of implies, ‘A implies B’ is equivalent to ‘Necessarily not-A or B.’ To understand the ordinary “implies,” Lewis was moved to appeal to
modal vocabulary—vocabulary that he thought functioned differently from any of
the truth-functional connectives of classical logic.

Lewis came at modal logics from a syntactic, or axiomatic, point of view. His
aim was to identify axioms and rules of inference in a new, modally-enriched
language—ones that would be appropriate to what he took to be ordinary implica-
tion. In an appendix to their 1932 volume, Symbolic Logic, Lewis and Langford
defined five different axiomatic modal systems, $S_1 - S_5$. In these systems ‘$\Diamond$’
is taken as a modal primitive, with the intended interpretation “possibly” or “it
is possible that.” The strict conditional—which was meant to formalize ordinary
implication—is then defined in terms of this modal primitive as follows:

$$P \Rightarrow Q \equiv \neg \Diamond (P \& \neg Q)$$

In words: ‘$P$ implies $Q$’ is equivalent to ‘It is not possible that $P$ and not-$Q$.’
(Although Lewis did not himself introduce a separate “necessity” operator, $\Box$, it
can be defined in terms of $\Diamond$ and $\neg$ in the usual way: $\Box \phi \equiv \neg \Diamond \neg \phi$. In words:
‘Necessarily $P$’ is equivalent to ‘It is not possible that not-$P$.’) The systems, $S_1 -
S_5$, were the first modern axiomatic systems of modal logic.

### 1.2.2 Relational semantics for modal languages

Already at the beginning, there was a range of views about what modalities the
symbols ‘$\Box$’ and ‘$\Diamond$’ naturally expressed. While Lewis took them to symbolize
necessity and possibility, respectively, Gödel saw in the new language a way of
talking about provability within a formal system. He interpreted ‘$\Box$’ as the senten-
tial operator ‘It is provable that...’ and argued that on this interpretation, $S_4$ was
the correct axiomatic system. McKinsey and Tarski, meanwhile, noticed the deep
connection between Lewis’s axioms for $S_4$ and Kuratowski’s axioms for a topo-
logical interior operator. They interpreted ‘$\Box$’ spatially, as picking out the interior
of a region of topological space (more on this below). Finally, Prior interpreted
modal languages temporally, and took ‘$\Box$’ and ‘$\Diamond$’ to symbolize the temporal sen-
tential operators, ‘Henceforth ...’ and ‘At some point in the future ...’ (or ‘Until
now ...’ and ‘At some point in the past ...’). These differing viewpoints struck,
in some sense, at the heart of the modal logic program: What was modal logic
about? What modalities did it seek to formalize?

Although Lewis did not concern himself with the problem of giving a for-
mal semantics for modal languages, interest in the subject was quickly growing.
Broadly speaking, there were two competing traditions that developed more or
less simultaneously: the algebraic tradition, in which modal languages are interpreted in Boolean algebras with operators, and the relational tradition, which culminated in Kripke’s possible world semantics. We focus in this section on the latter, in view of it’s present-day prominence.

An early precursor to Kripke’s possible worlds semantics was proposed by Carnap. According to Carnap, “necessity” was to be interpreted as logical truth, or analyticity (truth in virtue of meaning alone). Influenced by Leibnitz’s analysis of necessity as that which holds in all possible worlds, Carnap introduced the notion of a state description. A state description for a propositional language, $L$, is a collection of sentences in which for every propositional variable $P$ in $L$, either $P$ or $\neg P$ is in the collection, but not both—and nothing else is in the collection. Each state description is a total specification of truth for the propositional variables in $L$. We can think of a state description as picking out some possible world, or possible state of affairs, as described by the language $L$. The collection of all state descriptions for $L$ is, then, the collection of all possible worlds or states of affair visible from the point of view of the language, $L$. In Carnap’s semantics, $P$ holds in a given state description if $P$ is a member of the state description; $\phi \lor \psi$ holds if either $\phi$ holds or $\psi$ holds; $\neg \phi$ holds if $\phi$ does not hold. Carnap’s idea was to analyze necessity, or logical truth, as truth across all state descriptions. Thus, the formula ‘$\Box \phi$’ holds in a state description if ‘$\phi$’ holds in every state description.

A number of problems attended Carnap’s semantics, some of which Carnap himself recognized. One simple one concerns the failure of standard laws of substitution. In particular, since there is always a state description in which $P$ is

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5See (8) and (9).

6Although Carnap’s semantics was developed for first-order modal languages with the modal operators, ‘$\Box$’ and ‘$\Diamond$’, we present only the simpler propositional case.

7More formally, in Carnap’s semantics, we get the following recursive definition of satisfaction. Let $M$ be a state description, and $\phi$ a formula in a propositional modal language, $L$. Then:

1. $M \models P$ iff $P \in M$ (for any propositional variable, $P$).
2. $M \models \neg \phi$ iff it’s not the case that $M \models \phi$.
3. $M \models \phi \lor \psi$ iff either $M \models \phi$ or $M \models \psi$.
4. $M \models \Box \phi$ iff $M' \models \phi$ for every state description $M'$ in the language $L$.

The important clause is the modal one. ‘Necessarily $\phi$’ holds in a state description, $M$, just in case ‘$\phi$’ holds in every state description. One important consequence of this definition of satisfaction is that if the sentence ‘Necessarily $\phi$’ is true in one state description, then it is true in every state description. Necessity is not world-relative, as we might say.
true, the formula $\Diamond P$ (or $\neg\Box\neg P$) is true in every state description. Nevertheless, the formula $\Diamond(P \& \neg P)$ is not true in any state description. Taking validity to be truth across all state descriptions, we cannot substitute ‘$P \& \neg P$’ for ‘$P$’ while preserving validity. This violates Lewis’s rule of Uniform Substitution, according to which one can substitute arbitrary propositions (sentences) for propositional variables (sentence letters) in valid formulas.\(^8\) (Other problems concern the failure of completeness for quantified $S5$, but we do not go into this here. For a brief discussion, see (4). For a fuller discussion, see (25).)

In the late 1950’s, Kripke came up with an idea for a formal semantics for modal logic that effectively did away with this problem. (Kripke was not responding to Carnap—he arrived at this early work independently, while still in high school!) His idea was to interpret propositional modal logic in partial truth tables—or truth tables, in which some of the rows are deleted. Each row of the truth table for a given sentence, ‘$\phi$’, is an assignment of truth values to the propositional variables occurring in ‘$\phi$’. Again, we can think of these rows as possible worlds in some attenuated sense. In Kripke’s early conception, a model for a formula ‘$\phi$’ in the standard propositional modal language is a pair $\langle G, K \rangle$, where $K$ is some collection of truth assignments for the propositional variables occurring in ‘$\phi$’, and $G$ is a member of $K$. (Thus, a model is a partial truth table in which one row is highlighted.) Each truth assignment in $K$ assigns a truth value to every subformula occurring in ‘$\phi$’ according to the usual recursive clauses for Boolean connectives, as well as the following rule for the ‘$\Box$’-modality:

$$\Box \psi \text{ is true just in case } \psi \text{ is true in every member of } K$$

Thus, to say that ‘$\phi$’ is true in a model is to say that ‘$\phi$’ is true throughout all truth assignments in that model. In this semantics, we say that a formula is valid if it is true in every such model.

Notice that under these rules, neither ‘$\Diamond P$’ nor ‘$\Diamond(P \lor \neg P)$’ is valid! Indeed, if we select only rows of the truth table where ‘$P$’ is false, then in this model, ‘$\Diamond P \equiv \neg\Box\neg P$’ is false. So ‘$\Diamond P$’ is not valid. More generally, depending on

\(^8\)The SEP entry, “Modern Origins of Modal Logic,” points out that Carnap nevertheless proved completeness of propositional $S5$ for his semantics, but that the proof employs Quine’s schematic notion of validity, according to which “a logical truth... is definable as a sentence from which we get only truths when we substitute sentences for its simple sentences.” (32, p. 50)

\(^9\)Somewhat more generally, the problem with Carnap’s semantics was that if the sentence ‘Necessarily $\phi$’ is true in one state description (or possible world), then it is true in every state description. As a consequence, we cannot have two models of the modal language, on this semantics, in which ‘Necessarily $\phi$’ is true in one but not the other.
—or our selection of rows of the truth table—‘□P’ is true in some models and false in others (and the same for ‘□P,’ or boxed formulas generally). The ability to restrict the collection of possible worlds, $K$, that matter for the truth of modal formulas is what allows us to do away with the problems faced by Carnap. Kripke showed that the partial truth table semantics is sound and complete for Lewis’s $S5$—the strongest of the axiomatic systems introduced in Lewis and Langford (1932).

But what about weaker propositional logics? Consider, for example, the formula ‘$P \rightarrow □P$.’ This formula is not a theorem of $S4$, and so should not come out valid in any (complete) semantics for that logic. But the formula is satisfied in every partial truth table. Indeed, if there is some row of the truth table in which $P$ is true, then $\diamond P$ is true in every row, and so $□\diamond P$ is true in every row as well. If, on the other hand, there is no row where $P$ is true, then the formula comes out true in every row in virtue of the fact that the antecedent is false. The simple partial truth tables semantics, while suitable for $S5$ (where this formula is a theorem), did not suggest a semantics for the full range of propositional modal logics. In order to give a proper semantics for these systems, a full-blown relational structure had to be developed. (Notice that such structure was implicit—in hindsight—in the simple partial truth tables. If we think of each row in a truth table as a possible world, then a partial truth table consists of some collection of possible worlds, each of which is related to every other.) Such structures had been considered in some form by Hintikka, Kanger, and Prior but it wasn’t until Kripke’s work in the early 1960’s that a fully flexible and workable version was articulated.10

### 1.3 Kripke semantics

By now, several of the ideas that appear in the mature version of Kripke semantics [Kripke, 1963] are familiar. The semantics interprets modal formulas in relational structures (or frames), which consist of some set of possible worlds, together with a binary ‘accessibility’ relation on worlds. Pictorially, we can think of a Kripke frame as a graph consisting of some collection of nodes together with arrows pointing from some nodes to others. (See Figure 1.) To say that ‘□$\phi$’ is true at a particular world, $w$, is to say that ‘$\phi$’ is true throughout the worlds that are accessible from $w$. More informally: It is to say that from the point of view of $w$, $\phi$ is true as far as the eye can see. (Similarly, to say that ‘$\diamond\phi$’ is true at $w$ is to

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10For a very thorough account of this history, see (13).
say that \( '\phi' \) is true at some possible world accessible from \( w \).

Formally, a *Kripke frame* is a triple \( F = \langle w_0, W, R \rangle \), where \( W \) is a set of possible worlds, \( w_0 \) is a member of \( W \) (the actual world), and \( R \) is a binary relation on worlds. A *Kripke model* is a pair \( \langle F, V \rangle \), where \( F \) is a frame, and \( V : W \times \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \{ \top, \bot \} \) is a *valuation function*, assigning to each world and propositional variable a truth value (the truth value of that proposition in the given world). We extend the valuation function to the set of all formulas in the language in the way one would expect. In words, \( \phi \lor \psi \) is true at a world \( w \) just in case \( \phi \) is true at \( w \) or \( \psi \) is true at \( w \); \( \phi \land \psi \) is true at \( w \) just in case \( \phi \) is true at \( w \) and \( \psi \) is true at \( w \); and \( \neg \phi \) is true at \( w \) just in case \( \phi \) is not true at \( w \). But what about the modal symbol, \( \Box \)? The formula \( \Box \phi \) is true at \( w \) just in case \( \phi \) is true at each world \( w' \) such that \( wRw' \). More colloquially, \( \Box \phi \) is true at a world \( w \) if \( \phi \) is true at all worlds accessible from \( w \). Note that it is the binary accessibility relation that allows us to interpret modalities in Kripke semantics.

Here we see for the first time the full-fledged relational framework. Instead of each possible world being related to (or accessible from) every other, we have, as

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11 More formally, we extend the valuation function, \( V \), according to the following recursive clauses:

1. \( V(w, \phi \lor \psi) = \top \) if \( V(w, \phi) = \top \) or \( V(w, \psi) = \top \);
2. \( V(w, \neg \phi) = \top \) if \( V(w, \phi) = \bot \);
3. \( V(w, \Box \phi) = \top \) if \( V(w', \phi) = \top \) for each \( w' \in W \) such that \( wRw' \).

A slightly more complex version of the semantics for predicate modal languages was presented in (20), but in keeping with the focus here on propositional modal logics, we skip over this material.
Kripke puts it, a notion of one world being possible relative to another.

We read “$H_1 Rh_2$” as $H_2$ is “possible relative to $H_1$,” “possible in $H_1$” or “related to $H_1$”; that is to say, every proposition true in $H_2$ is to be possible in $H_1$. Thus the “absolute” notion of possible world in [1959a] (where every world was possible relative to every other) gives way to relative notion, of one world being possible relative to another . . . In accordance with this modified view of “possible worlds” we evaluate a formula $A$ as necessary in a world $H_1$ if it is true in every world possible relative to $H_1$ . . . Dually, $A$ is possible in $H_1$ iff there exists $H_2$, possible relative to $H_1$, in which $A$ is true. (20, p. 70) quoted in (13)

The relational structure in Kripke semantics gives us great flexibility. To see, for example, how in this semantics we can refute the formula ‘$P \rightarrow \square \Diamond P$’ consider a model consisting of two worlds, $w_1$ and $w_2$, where $w_1$ points to $w_2$, and $P$ is true at $w_1$ but not $w_2$. (See Figure 2.) Here $w_2$ does not point to any world where ‘$P’’ is true, so ‘$\Diamond P’’ is false at $w_2$. Since $w_1$ points to $w_2$, ‘$\square \Diamond P’’ is false at $w_1$. It is the relational framework—in particular, the fact that not every world is related to every other—that allows us to find a refuting model for this formula in Kripke semantics. 12

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12 As is well-known, simple conditions on the accessibility relation correspond to various special axioms of Lewis and Langford’s axiomatic systems. For example, if we require that the accessibility relation on worlds is reflexive (i.e., every world points to itself), we validate the axiom of the system, $T$: ‘$P \rightarrow \square P’.’ Why? If $P$ is true at a given world, $w$, then since $R$ is reflexive, $w$ points to itself. So $w$ points to some world where $P$ is true. This means that the formula ‘$P \rightarrow \square P’’ is satisfied in every model defined over a reflexive Kripke frame. Moreover, if a frame is non-reflexive, then the formula can be refuted in that frame. Consider a world, $w_1$, which does not point to itself. Let $P$ be true at $w_1$ and false everywhere else. (See Figure 3.) Here $P$ is false at every world to which $w_1$ points. So ‘$P’’ is false at $w_1$, and we have refuted ‘$P \rightarrow \square P’.’ The example shows that Axiom $T$ corresponds to the class of reflexive Kripke frames. Similar arguments show that other axioms correspond to the class of transitive frames, symmetric frames, and frames in which $R$ is an equivalence relation.
Figure 3: A refuting model for the formula ‘$P \rightarrow \Diamond P$’ in an arbitrary, non-reflexive Kripke frame. The Kripke frame is non-reflexive at the world $w_1$, which is where we falsify ‘$P \rightarrow \Diamond P$’.

## 1.4 Space and topological semantics

Relational structures provide a natural setting for interpreting modal languages, but let us now shift gears. We said above that some two decades before Kripke introduced Kripke frames, Tarski noticed a surprising connection between the axioms of Lewis’s $S4$, and the axioms used to describe topological space. His work led to what is now called the topological semantics for modal logic. Here modalities are interpreted not via a binary accessibility relation between worlds, but via the topological structure of space. To understand the semantics, we need to say something about what a topology, or topological space is.

### 1.4.1 A mathematical view of space

In our ordinary lives, we have a number of well-entrenched views about space and spatial properties. Any two distinct points bear a precise distance relation to one another. A sequence of points that converges, converges to a single point. No two points are infinitely far away. And so on. From a mathematical point of view, these features of space are not universal. When we think about space mathematically, we think in more general terms: there are many different kinds of space, with different spatial properties. For example, not all spaces come with a notion of ‘distance.’ In some spaces, it is impossible to say that one point stands three units away from another. Indeed, spaces that do allow for a notion of distance are rather special: we call them metric spaces, or spaces that have a metric (read: distance) function defined on them. What, then, is space in the fully general, mathematical sense that we are after?

A space, as we think of it here, is just a collection of points that are glued...
together in a certain way.

There are two ways to understand this. The first involves the notion of a neighborhood, or as mathematicians say, open set. Think of the city of London. That city is made up of a very large number of different points on the earth that lie inside of its municipal boundaries. These points lie at various distances from one another: the Big Ben is (let us suppose) one mile from the Tate Modern, which is itself another half mile from the London Eye. But quite apart from specific distances, there are also neighborhoods in London: Hampstead, Notting Hill, Chelsea, and so on. Some of these neighborhoods overlap; others are disjoint. Imagine throwing out all information about the relative distances between individual points in the city. London, as you view it now, is a collection of points linked together by a system of neighborhoods. The information about neighborhoods furnishes some sense of how points in this space are related to one another spatially. When we speak of space mathematically, in a completely general way, we view it in this way: as a collection of points together with a system of neighborhoods, or open sets.

These open sets, or neighborhoods, must satisfy certain conditions if they are to define a topology on the underlying set of points. In words these conditions state that the entire space and the empty set are open; the intersection of any two open sets is open; and finally, the union of any collection of open sets is open. More formally, a topological space is a pair, \((X, \mathcal{T})\), where \(X\) is a set (of ‘points’), and \(\mathcal{T}\) is a collection of subsets of \(X\) that satisfies the following conditions:

1. \(X \in \mathcal{T}\), \(\emptyset \in \mathcal{T}\);
2. If \(S_1, S_2 \in \mathcal{T}\), then \(S_1 \cap S_2 \in \mathcal{T}\);
3. If \(\{S_i \mid i \in I\} \subseteq \mathcal{T}\), then \(\bigcup_{i \in I} S_i \in \mathcal{T}\).

We call the sets in \(\mathcal{T}\) open. Any collection of subsets of \(X\) that satisfies these conditions defines a topology on \(X\). Again, space according to this definition consists of a collection of points together with a system of open sets, or neighborhoods.

A second, less familiar way to think about space is as a set of points together with an interior operator. This operator identifies, for any subset of points, what the interior of that subset is. Think of the interior of a region as the region minus any boundary points. For example, if we start out with a potato-shaped region of

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13 Although it is standard to use the expression ‘neighborhood of \(x\)’ to mean any set containing an open set containing \(x\), we use the term ‘neighborhood’ to mean, simply, open set.
three-dimensional Euclidean space, the skin of the potato is the boundary, and the interior is the white, fleshy stuff inside. Or, starting with a disc in two-dimensional space, the circumference of the disc is the boundary, and everything else is the interior. There may be regions of space that have no interior. For example, the region of the real plane consisting of a point at (0,0), another point at (1,0), another point at (2,0), and so on. This region is all boundary. Or, there may be regions of space that have no boundary. Consider, for example, the open disc in two-dimensional space—the disc without any of the points along its circumference. This region is all interior. Information about the interior of each region of space again gives us some conception of how points in the space fit together spatially. On this way of viewing things, we think of space as a collection of points, together with information about what the interior of each region, or subset of points, is.

Again, the interior operator must satisfy certain conditions in order to count as an interior. In words these conditions state that the interior of any region is a subset of that region; the interior of the whole space is the space itself; the interior of the intersection of two regions is the intersection of their interiors; and finally, the interior of the interior of a region is just the interior of that region. (Iterating interiors gives us nothing new.) More formally, let X be a set of points, and let A and B be arbitrary subsets of X. Then an interior operator, I, on X must satisfy:

1. \( I X = X \).
2. \( I A \subseteq A \).
3. \( I(A \cap B) = I A \cap I B \).
4. \( I I A = I A \).

On this conception of space, a topology consists of a set of points, X, together with an interior operator, I, on X. Again, any operator that satisfies these conditions defines a topology on X. (Thus, there may be many different topologies on any given set of points.)

Although these two ways of viewing space may seem quite different, from a mathematical point of view they are interchangeable. Starting from a collection of open subsets of X, we can define the interior of any set \( S \subseteq X \) to be the union of all open sets contained in \( S \):

\[
\text{Interior} (S) = \bigcup \{ O \text{ open} \mid O \subseteq S \}
\]
Or, starting from an interior operator on $X$, we can define an open set as a set that is equal to its own interior:

$$S \text{ is open if and only if } \text{Interior}(S) = S$$

The technicalities here are, for the moment, not essential. The point is just that information about spatial structure is encoded in the collection of open sets, or alternatively, the topological interior operator.

### 1.4.2 Topological semantics

But what does any of this have to do with modal logic?

In the late 1930’s, McKinsey and Tarski were studying what they thought of as the ‘algebra’ of topology. A topological space can be represented as the Boolean algebra of all subsets of the space. Here the interior operator is conceived of as an operator on the algebra itself, taking elements of the algebra (subsets of points) to other elements of the algebra.¹⁴ Thus, a topological space is represented as a Boolean algebra with an operator. Viewed in this way, Kuratowski’s axioms are really just algebraic equations. They tell us that the interior of the top element in the algebra is equal to the top element; the interior of any element is less than or equal to that element; the interior of the meet of two elements is equal to the meet of the interiors; and finally the interior of the interior of any element is equal to the interior of that element. More formally, the algebraic analogs of (1) - (4) are:

(1*) $I 1 = 1$.

(2*) $I a \leq a$.

(3*) $I(a \land b) = I a \land I b$.

(4*) $II a = I a$.

where ‘1’ denotes the top element of the algebra.

But here now was a curious thing. Substituting ‘□’ for ‘$I$’ in these equations,¹⁵ and rearranging things a bit, what we get is just the axioms for the modal

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¹⁴Meets, joins and complements in the algebra are, respectively, set-theoretic intersections, unions and complements.

¹⁵And, of course, making the appropriate substitutions for Boolean connectives—in particular, replacing ‘$\subseteq$’ with ‘$\rightarrow$’, ‘$\cap$’ with ‘&’, and ‘$=$’ with ‘$\leftrightarrow$’.
logic $S4$! Or, conversely, substituting ‘$I$’ for ‘□’ in the axioms for $S4$, what we get is the algebraic version of Kuratowski’s axioms for a topological interior.\textsuperscript{16} In other words, a set of axioms introduced by Lewis and Langford to formalize the ordinary notions of possibility and necessity were the very same axioms (under this translation) that describe topological space, or space as it is understood mathematically!

This discovery must have been quite surprising. A friend of mine, D. Sarenac, likes to imagine the following scenario. It is sometime in the early 1930’s and C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford are puzzling over what exactly the new axioms for modal logic should be. Langford is tending to the fire; Lewis is sitting in an armchair nearby, pen and paper in hand. The two men are engaged in the following conversation:

**Lewis**: So, Langford, about those axioms for our new system of ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’…

**Langford**: Yes?

**Lewis**: Well, I was wondering. Suppose that ‘Necessarily $P$’ is the case. Does it follow that $P$ is the case?

\textsuperscript{16}The modal logic $S4$ in the language $L$ consists of some complete axiomatization of classical propositional logic, $PL$, some complete axiomatization of the minimal normal modal logic, $K$, say the axiom:

$$K : \Box(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\psi)$$

and the rule:

$$N : \vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash \Box\phi$$

together with the special $S4$ axioms:

$$T : \Box\phi \rightarrow \phi$$

$$4 : \Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\Box\phi$$

With a bit of work, $K$ together with $N$ yield: $\Box(\phi \land \psi) \leftrightarrow (\Box\phi \land \Box\psi)$. This states that the intersection of the interiors of two regions is equal to the interior of the intersection of those regions. $N$ states that the interior of the entire space is the space itself. $T$ states that the interior of a region is a subset of that region. Finally, $4$ together with $T$ states that the interior of the interior of a region is just the interior of that region. The connection to Kuratowski’s axiomatization of the interior operator should now be clear.
Langford: Yes, sir, I believe it does. If P is necessarily true, then P must, at the very least, be true, right?

Lewis: Okay, I’m with you there, Langford. But how about this. Suppose ‘Necessarily P’ is the case. Does it follow that ‘Necessarily, Necessarily P’ is the case?

Langford: That’s a tough one, sir...

Reasoning in this way, the two men arrive at a system of axioms and rules of inference that they think captures the English-language ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ modalities. How extraordinary that these axioms should coincide perfectly with Kuratowski’s axioms for topological space!

In the topological semantics, a model consists of a topological space together with a valuation function. Here formulas are true or false not at a possible world, but at a point in a given topological space. The Boolean connectives are interpreted in just the way you would imagine: a disjunction is true throughout the union of the set of points where each disjunct is true; a conjunction is true throughout the intersection of the set of points where each conjunct is true; and a negation is true throughout the complement of the set of points where the negated formula is true. The important clause, as always, is the modal one, and this is where the topological semantics gets its name. The formula ‘□φ’ is true throughout the interior of the set of points where ‘φ’ is true. We say that a formula is satisfied by the model if it is true throughout the entire space, and is valid in the space if it is satisfied in every model defined over the space.

What these definitions tell us is that each topological space picks out, seman-

\[ V(\phi \lor \psi) = V(\phi) \cup V(\psi) \]
\[ V(\neg \phi) = X - V(\phi) \]
\[ V(\Box \phi) = \text{Int}(V(\phi)) \]

We say that a formula, ‘φ,’ is satisfied in the model if \( V(\phi) = X \). Finally, ‘φ’ is valid in X if ‘φ’ is satisfied in every model defined over X.

17 In fact, of the five axiomatic systems for modal logic that Lewis and Langford proposed, they were said to favor the system S2 as a formalization of the English language ‘necessity’ operator.

18 More formally, in the topological semantics a model consists of a pair, \((X, V)\), where X is a topological space and \( V : \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{P}(X) \) is a valuation function that assigns to each propositional variable P some subset of the space X. We extend the valuation function, V, to the set of all formulas by the following recursive clauses:
tically speaking, some set of modal formulas—namely, the set of formulas that are valid in that space. In other words, to each topological space is associated some collection of sentences in the given propositional modal language. But now we can ask some fundamental questions: Do different topological spaces pick out different sets of formulas? Moreover, is the set of formulas picked out by a given topological space axiomatizable? Does it coincide with the theorems of any known axiomatic system? In particular, does it coincide with the theorems of $S_4$? This last question can be broken down into two more specific ones: Is it the case that every theorem of $S_4$ is valid in the given space? And: Is it the case that every formula valid in the space is a theorem of $S_4$? Respectively: Is $S_4$ sound and complete for the topological space?

Soundness, you will have noticed, is had for free. Indeed, this is the real content of the connection between the $S_4$ axioms and Kuratowski’s axioms for topology. The axioms of $S_4$, interpreted topologically, just restate the conditions that a topological interior must satisfy in order to count as an interior operator at all. So of course they are valid. But what about completeness? Here things are much more complex. Completeness of $S_4$ for a given topological space, $X$, is the claim that every validity in $X$ is provable in $S_4$:

$$\models_X \phi \implies \vdash_{S_4} \phi$$

It is helpful to restate this claim in an equivalent way, by taking the contrapositive. Thus, completeness says that if $\phi$ is not a theorem of $S_4$, then $\phi$ is not valid in $X$.  

Figure 4: A topological model in the real plane, $\mathbb{R}^2$. Here $P$ is true throughout the disc; $Q$ is true throughout the rectangular region of space.
In symbols,
\[ \forall_{S_4} \phi \implies \nexists_X \phi \]
Putting things this way allows us to see that completeness is really a claim about
the flexibility of a given topological space—the availability, in that space, of a
broad enough class of refuting models.

In 1944, Tarski and McKinsey proved a very strong completeness result that is
sometimes called the Tarski Theorem, and which is in some ways the culmination
of their work on the topological semantics. The result is that \( S_4 \) is complete for
any dense-in-itself metric space. (A metric space is a space in which we can
define a distance function; a dense-in-itself space is a space where every point is
the limit of other points in the space.) Dense-in-themselves metric spaces include
the most familiar and widely studied topological spaces—for example, the real
line (indeed, any finite dimensional Euclidean space), the rationals, Cantor space,
and so on. If we think of Euclidean space as our space, then the Tarski theorem
says that \( S_4 \) is the logic of space as we know it.\(^{19}\)

1.5 Measure and probabilistic semantics

Tarski’s work is part of an algebraic tradition in modal semantics, in which for-
formulas are interpreted not in relational structures, but in Boolean algebras with
operators. The idea here was that just as classical propositional logic is inter-
preted, at the most general level, in Boolean algebras, so too propositional modal
logic should be interpreted in Boolean algebras with operators that interpret the
new modal symbols. What kind of operators? The modal axioms of an existing
axiomatic system dictate what is needed. We saw that in the case of \( S_4 \), the appro-
priate operator was one that satisfies Kuratowski’s four axioms—or the algebraic
version of those axioms. But once we’ve put things in this general algebraic way,
it’s clear that we need not restrict our attention to Boolean algebras that arise,

\(^{19}\)The Tarski theorem can be seen in both a positive and negative light. On the positive side,
it tells us that any dense-in-itself metric space has the resources to refute all non-theorems of \( S_4 \).
Viewed in this way, the result is, again, a statement about the availability of counter-models in the
given topological space. Fixing a topological space, we can ask of interesting modal formulas,
what do such refuting models look like? What is their geometry, say, on the real line? On the
negative side, the result groups together many different spaces that have quite different features.
To say that \( S_4 \) is the logic of any dense-in-itself metric space is to say that as far as the sentences
of the basic modal language go, we cannot tell these spaces apart. This says something important
about the expressive power of the basic modal language, interpreted topologically.
in the way described, from pointed topological spaces. Indeed, we can interpret $S4$ in any Boolean algebra together with an interior operator that satisfies (1*) - (4*).\footnote{Of course, there is no guarantee that this will yield a complete semantics, only a sound one.}

What other algebras are of interest? Here we should recall the second of the perspectives on the topological semantics mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Beginning with an interest in existing mathematical structures—namely, topologies—we take interest in the topological semantics because it allows us to describe these structures using modal languages. What we are interested in is, to reiterate, such questions as: What logics do such structures give rise to? What is the expressive power of modal languages vis-à-vis these mathematical objects? To what extent can such languages describe and discriminate between different kinds of topological spaces? This point of view is quite natural. Topologies are fundamental objects in mathematics, and the fact that we can talk about them in a formal modal language is entirely non-trivial. Tarski’s completeness results show that $S4$ characterizes any dense-in-itself metric space—and in particular, Euclidean space of any finite dimension.

But Euclidean space has, in addition to topological structure, measure structure. Different subsets of the reals have different size or measure. This measure structure is quite distinct from topological structure. Sets that appear large from a topological point of view may be small, or insignificant from a measure-theoretic point of view. (Take, for example, the rationals, which are dense in the reals, but have measure zero.) What if we could interpret modal languages in a Boolean algebra that encoded not simply the topological structure of Euclidean space, but it’s measure structure?

1.5.1 Measure

To get a feel for measure, consider the following simple game. You have, in front of you, a ruler which is exactly one meter in length. The left end of the ruler is marked by a zero, and the right end is marked by a 1; points in between are marked by their distance in meters from the left endpoint. Your opponent chooses a region of the ruler, by specifying any set of points that she likes, and a dart thrower prepares to throw one hundred darts at the ruler in sequence. Your job is to guess how many of those darts will land within the region of the ruler selected by your opponent. The closer your prediction is to the actual outcome, the more points you make in the game. Assuming that the darts land on the ruler in a more
or less random fashion, what should your strategy be?

Here we can make a number of simple observations. If your opponent selects any interval, then the probability that the dart lands in that interval is equal to the length of that interval. So, for example, if your friend selects the interval \([\frac{1}{4}, \frac{3}{4}]\), the probability that a random dart lands in the selected region is \(\frac{1}{2}\). Likewise, if your friend selects some finite union of disjoint intervals, say \([\frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{2}] \cup [\frac{3}{4}, \frac{5}{8}]\), the probability that the dart lands in the selected region is equal to the sum of the lengths of the intervals, or \(\frac{3}{8}\). But what if the region selected is more complex? What if your opponent selects, e.g., the collection of all rational points in the interval? Or all irrational points? Is there a way of saying, for any region of the ruler, what the probability of hitting that region is? Here we run into some practical obstacles. For example, although your opponent would have no trouble naming the region of the interval consisting of all rational points, there would be no way to determine—indeed, no fact of the matter—whether the dart landed in that region or not (given that the dart has non-zero thickness). Likewise for sets like the irrationals, the Cantor set, and so on. More troubling still, assuming the Axiom of Choice, there are regions of the ruler that cannot even be named. This is because such regions are not constructible—they cannot be picked out explicitly. Nevertheless, if we accept the Axiom of Choice, such regions do exist. Is there a well-defined probability that the dart lands in one of these regions?\(^{21}\)

What we are after here is a notion of measure. We would like to know what proportion of the interval or the ruler is taken up by any given set, so that we can say what the probability is of a random dart landing in that set.

In 1901, H. Lebesgue defined what is now the standard measure on the real line. He showed that while there is no way to define a ‘nice’ measure on every subset of the reals which extends the notion of length for intervals, we can define such a measure on a very large and important class of subsets (the Borel subsets, or more generally, Lebesgue-measurable subsets). Without going into the mathematical details, we can describe this measure by saying that it (1) extends the notion of length for intervals, (2) is translation-invariant, and (3) is countably additive. In other words, the measure of any interval is equal to its length; “pushing” a measurable set up or down the real line does not change its measure; and the measure of any countable union of disjoint sets is the sum of the measure of the...

\(^{21}\)It is well-known that one needs the Axiom of Choice to prove the existence of non-measurable subsets of the reals. Thus someone who denied the axiom could insist that all subsets that really exist are measurable. Here one is reminded of Bill Clinton’s famous line: “It depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is.”
When we restrict Lebesgue measure to the interval $[0, 1]$, as we’ve been doing, this function captures the familiar notion of probability. The *measure* of a given region of the interval is just the *probability* that a dart hitting the interval at random lands in that region (leaving aside practicalities having to do with the thickness of the dart). It is important to note that there are many subsets of the real interval $[0,1]$, which are non-empty but nevertheless have measure equal to zero. The simplest example is a singleton set $\{a\}$, where $a$ is any point in the interval $[0,1]$ (see Note 22). In the game we described, the probability of hitting any one of these sets with a dart is precisely zero. *This does not mean that this event cannot occur.* Events which have probability, or measure zero, are not impossible; it is simply that no finite number, however small, can capture the likelihood of their occurrence.

From a measure-theoretic point of view, measure-zero subsets of the reals are insignificant. Taking this thought seriously, what if we were to literally ignore the existence of such sets? What if, in other words, we were to identify any two subsets of the reals that differ from one another by a set of measure zero? Imagine, if you will, that you have blurry glasses, and that these glasses do not allow you to distinguish between such sets.\(^\text{23}\) Seen through these glasses, the real interval, $[0, 1]$, consists, for you, of some collection of blurry regions, each of which has a precise measure (namely, the measure of any one of the sets which make up that region). Formally, these regions make up a Boolean algebra: the algebra of all measurable subsets of the real interval, *modulo sets of measure zero*. This is a measure algebra—or Boolean algebra, in which each element has a measure between 0 and 1.\(^\text{24}\) We call it the *Lebesgue measure algebra*.

### 1.5.2 Probabilistic semantics

The Lebesgue measure algebra encodes information about the measure structure of the real line. Just as we used Boolean algebras generated by topological spaces...
to get a topological semantics for modal logic, Scott’s idea was to use measure algebras to get a probabilistic semantics for modal logic. Formally, a probabilistic model in the basic propositional modal language is a pair, \( \langle M, V \rangle \), where \( M \) is the Lebesgue measure algebra, and \( V : \mathbb{P} \to M \) is a valuation function that assigns to each propositional variable some element of the algebra, \( M \). We would like to extend the valuation function to all formulas in the language by a recursive truth definition. For Boolean connectives, the definitions are straightforward:

\[
V(\phi \lor \psi) = V(\phi) \lor V(\psi)
\]

\[
V(\neg \phi) = -V(\phi)
\]

but how to interpret the \( \square \)-modality? Here of course, we must construct an interior operator on the algebra, \( M \), but we’ve said nothing at all about how to do this. Indeed, how can we be sure that there is non-trivial interior operator on this algebra?

The key, again, is to consider the topological structure of the reals from an algebraic point of view. Just as there are open subsets of real numbers, so too we define open elements of the Lebesgue measure algebra. We say an element of the algebra is open if it has some representative which is an open subset of the real interval, \([0, 1]\).25 Thus, for example, the element of the algebra corresponding to any interval, or any finite disjoint union of intervals, is open. (Take as your representative set the interval without its endpoints.) But recall the interchangeability of the two ways of defining topological structure described in Section 4.1. Once we have open sets we have an interior operator, and vice versa. In topology, we define the interior of a set, \( A \), as the union of open sets contained in \( A \):

\[
\bigcup \{ C \text{ open} \mid C \subseteq A \}
\]

The algebraic analog of this topological definition is not hard to find. Indeed, we define the interior of an element, \( a \), in the Lebesgue measure algebra as the supremum of all open elements dominated by \( a \):

\[
\bigvee \{ c \text{ open} \mid c \leq a \}
\]

---

25Note that the collection of open elements, so defined, satisfies the algebraic analog of the conditions on open sets. In particular, the top and bottom elements of the algebra are open, the meet of any two open elements is open, and the join of an arbitrary collection of open elements in open.
(One of the deep lessons of Tarski’s work in this area is that topological definitions are essentially algebraic, whether we focus on those conditions placed on open sets or on an interior operator.) Completing the recursive definition of truth for the probabilistic semantics, we have:

$$V(\Box \phi) = I(V(\phi))$$

In the probabilistic semantics, we interpret the basic propositional modal language in the modally-expanded Lebesgue measure algebra—or algebra together with interior operator. Each formula is assigned to some element of the algebra, and thus acquires the probability—or measure—value associated with that element. We say that a formula ‘\(\phi\)’ is satisfied in a probabilistic model if the value of that formula is the top element of the algebra (i.e., \(V(\phi) = 1\)). Equivalently, \(\phi\) is satisfied if the probability of \(\phi\) is 1.

The modally-expanded Lebesgue measure algebra encodes information about both the topological and measure structure of the real line. Other topological spaces and measures give rise to different measure algebras. But now we can ask all of the familiar questions that we asked about the topological semantics in this new setting. Do different measure algebras give rise to different sets of validities? Is the set of validities of the Lebesgue measure algebra axiomatizable? If so, does it correspond to any known axiomatic system? In particular, does it correspond to the theorems of \(S4\)? In other words, is \(S4\) sound and complete for the probabilistic semantics? At the time I began work on this project, these questions had not yet been answered. Indeed, much of the work that occupies the chapters ahead is devoted to settling some of the most pressing among them. The third and fourth chapters, in particular, show that \(S4\) is complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra; that the probabilistic semantics can be extended to more complex, dynamic modal languages, and finally, that we get nice completeness results here too. Reading between the lines, the reader will also discover what I take to be something of an analog to the Tarski Theorem in the measure-theoretic setting.

It is important, before getting lost in the mathematics, to reiterate two different perspectives from which we might approach the probabilistic semantics developed in these pages. On the one hand, one might take interest in the fact that we have here a new semantics for existing axiomatic systems—one, moreover, with probabilistic features that set it apart from other well-known semantics. This point of view may be attractive to those philosophers dealing in the many formal areas of philosophy which exploit probability theory for philosophical purposes. Indeed, the new semantics provides a very general and flexible framework for attaching
probability values to formulas in rich, modal languages in a systematic way. It is not implausible to think that this could be of use in such areas as Bayesian epistemology and rational choice theory, where we model agents as having precise credences in propositions, and not just full-fledged beliefs. Other applications may be found in philosophy of language—in particular, where it comes to understanding the various components of meaning in natural language. In an early paper addressing such issues, H. Field argues that Popper’s probabilistic semantics for classical logic can be put to that use. Indeed, Field understands agents as attaching conditional probabilities to formulas in a classical language, and argues that the conceptual role component of meaning should be understood in terms of these probabilities. According to Field, two propositions, $P$ and $Q$, have the same conceptual role for an agent, $S$, just in case for any proposition $C$,

$$\text{Prob}_S(P|C) = \text{Prob}_S(Q|C)$$

where $\text{Prob}_S$ is the conditional probability function representing $S$’s beliefs. Field shows that Popper’s probabilistic semantics for classical propositional logic can, with some effort, be extended to predicate logic. Although there are significant differences between Popper’s semantics for classical logic and the probabilistic semantics presented here, the latter does give us the tools to interpret not just classical languages, but rich modal languages probabilistically. The greater expressive power of these languages, as well as the ease with which the present framework can be exported to predicate and multi-modal settings, may prove useful to those sympathetic to Field’s endeavor.\(^2\)

On the other hand, one might approach the new semantics from a more mathematical point of view. Just as topologies are basic objects in mathematics, so too are Borel measures. As we’ve seen, topologies together with Borel measures give rise to modally-expanded measure algebras. To what extent can modal languages describe, discriminate between, and express the various properties of these measure structures? There is, in my view, no one correct way to think about the probabilistic semantics: each of the perspectives announced here has its merits, and will, with luck, yield new ways of developing the work begun here. But before launching into that work, I want to briefly mention one surprising philosophical application. The application is in the field of metaphysics, or mereology.

\(^2\)See (12).
1.6 Gunk via the Lebesgue measure algebra

Space as we conceive of it in mathematics and physics consists of dimensionless points. We typically describe not just positions in space, but trajectories, velocities and accelerations in terms of three-dimensional spatial coordinates. Over the years, however, some have sought to deny that points, or point-sized parts, are genuine parts of space or matter. In the words of P. Roeper,

Points are not parts or elements of space; a point is a location in space. As a consequence, points are not the primary bearers of spatial properties and spatial relations, nor the primary objects of spatial mappings. This role belongs rather to the parts of space.

According to what is sometimes called a ‘gunky’ picture of space, space consists of regions that can be arbitrarily small, but no region is literally dimensionless. Space, on this conception, is not chunky—there are no smallest bits of space which cannot be broken up further—but rather gunky—each region can be further broken up into smaller regions. We can put this loose picture of space in the form of a more precise mereological thesis:

GUNK (S): Every region (part) of space has a proper subpart.

The thesis as stated is a thesis about physical space. But there is, of course, a parallel thesis about physical matter that could, in principle, be held independently of any view about space:

GUNK (M): Every region (part) of matter has a proper subpart.

It’s easy to see that these principles rule out the existence of point-sized bits of space or matter. As points in space are literally dimensionless, they cannot be further broken down into proper subparts.27

27One could, in principle, affirm one of these two theses about gunk and deny the other. Thus, one could believe for example that while matter is gunky, space is not. Arntzenius and Hawthorne argue against this sort of split position. “If we are to restrict the Difference thesis to material objects, we need some reason for tolerating zero measure differences in the domain of spatiotemporal objects while prohibiting them within the realm of the material. We are not aware of any such reason.” (2). In what follows, we focus primarily on the thesis GUNK (S), but the reader who is interested only in a gunky view of matter can make the appropriate substitutions.
1.6.1 Motivations

There may be many motivations for adopting a gunky conception of space or matter, some more prosaic, and others reaching deep into phenomena in mathematics and physics. Fränk Arntzenius, for example, motivates a gunky conception of time by reference to Zeno’s paradox, and argues as follows. Zeno argued that if time consists of instants of zero duration, then an object is always stationary during a single instant of time. So an object is never in motion. But if objects are never in motion, how do they succeed in moving?

Aristotle’s response to the paradox was to relinquish the idea that there are zero-sized instants of time. Instants of time can be of arbitrarily small duration, he thought, but no single instant has duration strictly equal to zero. Although this move avoids the problem raised by Zeno, one might think that there are other, less costly responses to the paradox. To be in motion, one might say, is just to be in different locations at different instants of time. The fact that at a single point-sized instant of time an object is stationary is not, on this response, a problem for the possibility of motion at all. Stationary objects at single instants is just the stuff of which motion is made. On this response, however, motion (or velocity) is not an intrinsic property of the state of an object at a given moment. Indeed, motion as conceived of here is a property that arises from the relationship between the state of an object at one time, and the state of that object at past or future times. If that is the case, it would seem wrong to say that the intrinsic state of an object (or of all objects in the world) at any given instant determines the state of that object at future instants. In short, some form of physical determinism seems to be threatened here.

Another motivation for gunk, again discussed in (1), is more mathematical in nature. It is well known that if we admit points in space, then using the Axiom of Choice, we can prove the existence of non-measurable subsets of Euclidean space. The existence of such sets, however, leads to the Banach-Tarski paradox. What Banach and Tarski showed is that we can divide a sphere in three-dimensional space...
Euclidean space into finitely many parts (five, to be precise), move these parts around without stretching or deforming them in any way (thus, performing only rigid motions), and end up with a sphere that has twice the volume of the original. This result is quite startling, and depends on the existence of non-measurable sets. (Recall that Lebesgue measure is translation-invariant. Thus some of the parts into which we divide the sphere must be non-measurable.) One response to the paradox is, of course, to give up the Axiom of Choice. Without that axiom we would not be able to prove the existence of non-measurable sets, and so we would not be able to divide the original sphere into the kind of parts needed to get the paradox going. But although the Axiom of Choice was initially greeted with controversy, it is now accepted by practically all practicing mathematicians. Retaining all of pointy mathematics while doing away with the axiom is not a realistic option. Another response would be to deny the existence of point-sized regions of space (or matter). On this response, we can allow that points and the axiom have a role to play in mathematics, but deny that they have a similar role to play in the correct understanding of physical space and matter. In other words, we can preserve points in a purely abstract, mathematical setting, while at the same time staving off the idea that a sphere-shaped region of space or matter could be doubled at no cost.

These motivations do not form anything like a complete list, and even as they stand are quite tenuous. Nevertheless, in the words of F. Arntzenius and J. Hawthorne, “The idea that all physical objects are gunky seems sufficiently sweeping, interesting, and plausible that it is worth examining.” (2, p. 441)

1.6.2 The approach based on regular closed sets

Suppose then, for the moment, that space and/or matter really are gunky. The question now arises: How should we model space mathematically? What model of space respects standard mereological assumptions together with the gunky picture of space sketched above?

This challenge—as well as the traditional response to it—is most famously associated with A.N. Whitehead. As early as the 1920’s, Whitehead was investigating the possibility of doing geometry without points. The idea was, as Biancino and Gerla point out, to conceive of “axiomatic systems in which the concept of

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31 For a much more thorough discussion of motivations, see (1).
32 Here the gunk thesis is defended for physical objects, but as we saw above, Arntzenius and Hawthorne do not think it plausible to adopt a gunky conception of matter together with a pointy conception of space. See (2).
a point is defined from primitive terms more easily interpretable in nature.”  

Whitehead took as a topological primitive the notion of two regions being connected. Intuitively, a region $A$ is connected to $B$ if $A$ and $B$ overlap, or at least share some boundary point. In 1929, Whitehead showed that his axiomatization of this relation was satisfied in regular closed algebras (defined below), and that one could use such algebras to model pointless geometry. Points, lines and surfaces were constructed as mathematical abstractions on these algebras of solid regions.

Recall that a regular closed set is a set that is equal to the closure of its own interior. In symbols:

$$A = Cl(Int(A))$$

where the closure of a set is the set together with its topological boundary. The simplest example of such sets is a closed sphere in $n$-dimensional Euclidean space. (The interior of the set is the open sphere, and the closure of the interior is the original, closed sphere.)  

The algebra of regular closed sets can be constructed from the collection of all subsets of a topological space in the following way. Starting with the set of all pointy subsets of a space, we write $A \sim B$ if the closure of the interior of $A$ is equal to the closure of the interior of $B$. It is not difficult to see that the relation ‘$\sim$’, so defined, is an equivalence relation. Taking equivalence classes we get a Boolean algebra in which each element of the algebra has exactly one regular closed representative—that set equal to the closure of the interior of any set in the equivalence class.

Modeling gunky space in regular closed algebras brings with it many advantages. The Boolean structure of the algebra satisfies standard mereological assumptions, which we do not repeat here. Moreover, the regular closed algebra that arises from finite-dimensional Euclidean space (indeed, from any Hausdorff topology) is non-atomic: every non-zero element in the algebra dominates some

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33See (6), p. 431.

34For an example of a closed set in one-dimensional Euclidean space that is not a regular closed set, consider the Cantor set. This set has no interior, so the closure of its interior is empty.

35Operations in the algebra of regular closed sets are defined as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
    a \wedge b &= Cl(Int(A \cap B)) \\
    a \lor b &= A \cup B \\
    \neg a &= Cl(X - A)
\end{align*}
\]

where $X$ is the entire space, $A$ and $B$ are regular closed subsets of $X$, and $a$ and $b$ are the corresponding elements of the algebra.

36In fact, standard mereology does not admit a null element, whereas such an element is present in the algebra of regular closed sets.
other, non-zero element. More formally, for every non-zero element $a$ in the algebra, there is an element $b$ such that $0 < b < a$. In words, every region of space has a proper subregion. This fact about regular closed algebras is precisely what is required by the thesis GUNK (S) given above. But, as J.S. Russell points out, Whiteheadian space is not just mereologically distinctive, but also topologically distinctive. To see this, let us say that a region $x$ is an interior part of $y$ if $x \leq y$, and $x$ is not connected to any region disjoint from $y$ (where two regions $a$ and $b$ are disjoint if there is no region that is part of both). Then in Whiteheadian space, every region has an interior part. Russell calls space that satisfies this condition ‘topologically gunky.’ As he argues, “Topological Gunk is a natural extension of Mereological Gunk: not only does every region have a proper part, it has a part which is strictly inside of it.”

More recently, however, powerful arguments have been leveled against the idea of interpreting space (or at least actual, physical space) in regular closed algebras. These arguments stem from difficulties associated with defining a reasonable measure on the algebra. Indeed, the gunk theorist would like to be able to talk not just about mereological structure, but also about the size of various regions of space. Ideally, he would like to be able to say, of any region of space or matter, what the size of that region is. Moreover, in keeping with the spirit of gunk, many gunk theorists would add that no region of space has size equal to zero. We can put these desiderata concerning size in the form of two additional theses:

**SIZE:** Every region (part) of space has a precise size.

**NO ZERO:** No region (part) of space has size equal to zero.

The notion of size in play here is not one of, e.g., cardinality. In talking about the size of a region, we distinguish between, e.g., the size of a cone that is one meter tall, and a cone that is 100 meters tall, each with the same base. In finite-dimensional Euclidean space, it is most natural to take the size of a region to be its standard Lebesgue measure.

Let us then restrict our attention to a simple case: the real line (or one-dimensional Euclidean space). How to construct a measure function on the algebra of regular closed subsets of this space? As we noted already, each element in the algebra contains one regular closed representative set. Since this set is Borel, it is measurable. Thus we can assign to each element of the algebra the Lebesgue measure of

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37See (35), p. 6.
its unique regular closed representative. But here is where we run into difficulties. The measure of a countable fusion (or, in algebraic terms, join) of disjoint regions of space should equal the sum of their individual measures. This is the principle of Countable Additivity. But the measure function just defined violates this constraint. To see this, consider a thick, or ‘fat’, Cantor set. We construct the set in stages, starting with the real interval, \([0, 1]\), and at the first stage of construction, removing the open middle \(\frac{1}{4}\) of that interval. We are now left with the intervals \([0, \frac{3}{8}]\) and \([\frac{5}{8}, 1]\). At the second stage of construction, we remove the open middle \(\frac{1}{16}\) of these remaining intervals. In general, at stage \(n\) we remove the open middle \(\left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{n+1}\) of all remaining intervals from the previous stage \((n \geq 0)\).\(^{38}\)\(^{39}\) The sum of the measures of the removed intervals is

\[
\sum_{n \geq 0} 2^n \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{n+1} = \frac{1}{4} \sum_{n \geq 0} \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^n = 1/2
\]

but the union of these intervals is equivalent, in the algebra of regular closed sets, to the entire interval, which has measure equal to 1.

How serious a problem is this? Unfortunately, moving to a different measure on the algebra will not help matters. It can be shown that any measure defined on every element of the algebra of regular closed subsets of reals is not countably additive. We could, perhaps, look to measures that are only defined on some elements of the algebra, but even this does not look promising. After all, we must at the very least have measures for intervals, and there really is no natural alternative to identifying the measure of an interval (or an element of the algebra represented by an interval) with its length. But the example just given shows that already at the level of intervals, countable additivity fails. It seems right to conclude with F. Arntzenius that “our attempt to do physics in this kind of pointless topological space is in big trouble. (1, p. 18)"

### 1.6.3 The measure-theoretic approach

In recent work, Arntzenius proposes an alternative, measure-theoretic approach to modeling gunky space, which makes significant revisions to Whitehead’s pro-

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\(^{38}\)The set constructed here is the complement of the Smith-Volterra-Cantor set, and has measure \(\frac{1}{2}\). This is not mandatory. An easy manipulation of the lengths of intervals in the construction yields a Cantor set of measure arbitrarily close to zero or one. For a fuller discussion of the Smith-Volterra Cantor set, see (42).

\(^{39}\)The intervals removed are open intervals, as is standard in the Cantor construction. But of course, each such interval is identified in the algebra with its closure, which is a regular closed set and has the same measure.
Arntzenius, like Whitehead, takes as primitive a relation of ‘connected-ness’ among regions of space, but his aim is to allow for models in which we have a workable notion of measure as well. On Arntzenius’s approach, instead of identifying sets in pointy space if the closures of their interiors are equal (as we do in the algebra of regular closed sets), we identify sets that differ from one another by a set of Lebesgue-measure zero. Thus gunky space is modeled not via algebras of regular closed sets, but via measure algebras arising from pointy topological spaces together with Borel measures. To simplify matters, let’s focus for the moment on one dimensional Euclidean space with standard Lebesgue measure. The algebra corresponding to this space is just the Lebesgue measure algebra defined above—the very same algebra used to give a probabilistic semantics for modal languages.

The first thing to note is that in this algebra individual points disappear. Indeed, individual points have measure zero, so modulo measure zero any singleton set is identified with the empty set, and so represents the bottom element of the algebra. Moreover, like the algebra of regular closed sets, the Lebesgue measure algebra is atomless: every non-zero element of the algebra dominates some other, non-zero element. Again, this means that our model satisfies the thesis GUNK (S) given above. These two facts are no doubt congenial to a gunky point of view. But the real advantages in turning to the measure-theoretic approach are that here, unlike in Whiteheadian space, we can define a workable notion of measure. Indeed, since representative sets in a given equivalence class in the algebra differ from one another by a set of measure zero, we can define the measure of an element in the algebra to be the measure of any of its representative sets. This measure function is countably additive. Moreover, only the bottom element of the algebra—that element represented by the empty set—has measure zero. In words, every region of space has a precise size, and no region, except the null region, has size equal to zero. So far, things seem quite promising.

But in addition to mereological and measure structure, we would like space to have topological structure, and here is where certain complications arise. Standard topological structure is, as we know, defined in terms of a collection of prim-

\footnote{See (1).}

\footnote{More generally, for any point, $a$, and subset, $A$, of Euclidean space, the sets $A - \{a\}$ and $A \cup \{a\}$ are equivalent in the Lebesgue measure algebra.}

\footnote{I take mereological structure to be Boolean structure, or that structure captured by the ordering relation, ‘$\leq$’, on the algebra. A more careful presentation of this material would state explicitly which mereological assumptions are made, but in this short introduction we do not have the space to spell out the details. For a fuller discussion, see (35).}
itively distinguished open (or closed) sets (a closed set is the complement of an open set). In Euclidean space, for example, basic open sets are open spheres, or spheres without any of the points on their surface. But according to Arntzenius, Hawthorne, and Russell, the distinction between open and closed sets is one which cannot be made in the setting of the Lebesgue measure algebra.

“Mathematical orthodoxy casts topological structure in terms of primitively distinguished open point-sets. But among the spaces we are concerned with here are those that make no distinction between closed and open regions; so the orthodox approach won’t do.” (35, p. 253)

“The topological structure we will give pointless regions can not be given in the same way that we gave pointy spaces topological structure, namely in terms of a distinction between open and closed regions. For that is exactly the kind of distinction that we do not believe exists if reality is pointless.” (1, p. 237)

Why is it that, according to these philosophers, there can be no distinction between open and closed regions on the measure-theoretic approach to gunk? Many open sets differ from their closure by a set of measure zero (where the closure of a set is the smallest closed set containing it). Consider, for example, any open interval. This set differs from its closure only at the endpoints. If sets of measure zero do not exist, then the distinction between such an open set and its closure would seem to collapse: these two regions of space could not be told apart. The conclusion these authors have drawn is that if we are to have topological structure on the Lebesgue measure algebra, it must be topological structure of a non-standard variety—topology done, not in terms of primitively distinguished open (or closed) sets, but in terms of other primitive notions that do not rely on the existence of points or sets of measure zero.

The adoption of non-standard topological primitives is not itself anything new. Indeed, Whitehead did this in 1929, when he took as primitive the binary relation of ‘connectedness,’ and used this to axiomatize all of pointless geometry. Some years later, A. Grzegorczyk assumed as primitive the relation of being separated, providing an axiomatization of that relation which allowed him, like Whitehead,

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43See (1), (2), and (35).
44One should be careful not to read too much into talk of the distinction between open and closed sets. Depending on the topological space, we may have sets that are both open and closed. Finite-dimensional Euclidean space ($\mathbb{R}^n$) is connected, and so in this special case there are no sets of this kind. In general, however, this is not the case.
to define points. More recently, and in the same tradition, P. Roeper takes as primitive both the relation of connectedness and the property of being limited, and axiomatizes these notions by way of defining what he calls ‘region-based topology.’ In taking the relation of connectedness and the property of being limited as primitive, Arntzenius attempts to show that the measure-based approach can, in some sense, mimic the topological structure that Roeper gives for Whiteheadian space: that Roeper’s axioms are satisfied not just in regular closed algebras, but also, to a large degree, in measure algebras.

But is the turn to non-standard topological primitives necessary in the measure-theoretic setting? Let us re-examine the arguments given against standard topological structure in more detail. As Arntzenius and Hawthorne argue:

“...When No Zero is combined with our mereological assumptions, further results follow. In standard point-set topology, we can distinguish an open region from its closure. Typically, each has the same volume, since the latter differs from the former only by including the boundary points of the former. Can the Gunk lover admit a distinction between such closed and open parts...?

Assume for reductio there is some open piece, call it 'Open’, that is a proper part of some closed piece, call it 'Closed’, each of the same volume. Remainder tells us that there will be a part x of Closed that does not overlap with Open, such that Closed is the fusion of x and Open. Assuming Finite Additivity, it follows that x has zero measure, violating No Zero. So, once No Zero is assumed, we cannot admit the standard distinction between open and closed regions.” (2, p. 443)

Summarizing the argument: Because in many cases an open set differs from its closure by a set of measure zero, there can be no distinction between open and closed regions.

I now want to argue that such arguments fall flat. While turning to non-standard topological primitives makes sense in the context of Whiteheadian space (where in some sense every element is open, and there are no boundary regions),

45 See (14).
46 See (34).
47 For Roeper’s axioms, see Appendix A.
48 The Remainder principle states: If x is a part of y and not identical to y then there is some z that is part of y that is discrete from x, such that y is the fusion of x and z (where x is discrete from y iff there is no part that x shares with y).
49 My emphasis.
this is not the case for the measure-theoretic setting, where space is not topologically distinctive in the same ways. Of course, in the Lebesgue measure algebra, there is no distinction between sets that differ by a set of measure zero. So if an open subset of the reals and its closure have the same measure, then these two sets are identified. This is the case for many familiar subsets of the real line: for example, any interval, or finite union of intervals. But it does not follow that we have to throw out the distinction between open and closed regions altogether. In the measure-based semantics for modal languages, we defined an open element of the Lebesgue measure algebra to be any element that has an open representative, or representative that is an open subset of the real interval, [0,1]. Likewise, let us define a closed element of the algebra to be the Boolean complement of an open element. An immediate question presents itself: Are there any elements of the algebra that are not open? (Equally: are there any elements of the algebra that are not closed?) Consider the thick Cantor set mentioned above. The element of the Lebesgue measure algebra, $c$, corresponding to this set is not open. Indeed, as we show in Chapter 2, the thick Cantor set differs from every open subset of reals by a set of non-zero measure. Moreover, the same example shows that there are open elements of the algebra that are not equal to their own closure. Indeed, the complement of $c$ is an open element of the algebra that has measure strictly less than 1, and its closure is the top element in the algebra. Here, then, we have a non-trivial algebraic distinction between open and closed regions of space: precisely the sort of distinction with which to do standard topology.

One may object at this point that the thick Cantor set and its complement are rather special sets. “According to the definitions given,” you say, “most elements of the algebra are both open and closed and so the distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ in the algebra cuts little water.” There are two ways to respond. First, although it is true that many of the open subsets of the real line that we talk about in mathematics differ from their closure by a set of measure zero (hence are identified with their closure in the Lebesgue measure algebra), the sets that we tend to talk about are a very restricted few. By necessity, such sets are ones that can be simply described. But limits on our discursive powers should not mislead us as to the variety of subsets of the real line. There are many sets that we are not accustomed to talk about because they are not easy to define, but which exist all the same. (In a certain sense, even the thick Cantor set is quite simple. It has

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50 Equivalently, a closed element is any element that has a closed representative, or representative that is a closed subset of the real line.

51 Hence, the complement of $c$ is not equal to the top element in the algebra.
a very regular, fractal structure.) So while it may be true that for many familiar subsets of the real line, the distinction between closed and open collapses once we move to the Lebesgue measure algebra, there is, I think, no sense to the notion that ‘most’ subsets are like this. But second, if space really is pointless, then we should expect to modify our view of space in sometimes significant ways. The distinction between simple open regions of the real line (e.g., intervals) and their closures must, of course, fall by the wayside. Another way to put the fact that such regions do not differ from their closure, is to say that they have no boundary. Now the boundary of an open interval in the real line is just the endpoints of the interval. Surely on a gunky conception of space—a conception of space on which there are no point-sized parts—we should deny that such regions exists. But unlike in Whiteheadian space, there are regions of space that are properly called ‘boundary.’ Indeed, the thick Cantor set is one example. It has non-zero measure, and yet has no interior. On the measure-theoretic approach to gunk, this result is quite welcome. It is not that boundary regions do not exist, but rather that true boundary regions—regions that do not simply consist of the endpoints of intervals—are quite special.

Still, many questions remain. Arntzenius and Roeper take as primitive the relation of connectedness and the property of being limited. These notions have some intuitive appeal. It would be nice if we could reproduce them in the measure-theoretic setting without taking them as primitives—either by defining those relations in terms of the open-closed distinction, or by adding additional topological structure to our measure models. In Appendix A we suggest a way to this this according to the second approach. (By the isomorphism results of Chapter 4, the first approach will not work.) Further questions concern our ability to extend these definitions to reduced measure algebras that do not arise from Euclidean spaces. Unfortunately, we do not have the time or the space to pursue those questions here. I hope, at any rate, that these loose remarks point in a direction in which this work will be further developed.

1.7 Game plan

The dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we develop in detail the topological semantics, and show that Tarski’s completeness result for the real line can be proved in a simplified way, using well-known fractal curves. In Chapter 3, we develop the probabilistic semantics, and prove that $S4$ is complete for this semantics. Also in this chapter, we show that intuitionistic propositional logic
(IPC) is complete for the subframe of open elements in the Lebesgue measure algebra. In Chapter 4, we show that the probabilistic semantics can be extended to dynamic topological logics—or multimodal logics intended to describe dynamic spaces. Here we prove that $S4C$ is complete for the probabilistic semantics and develop some interesting isomorphism results that allow us to extend completeness to other measure algebras. The reader interested in some, but not all, of the results that follow is invited to skip ahead to the relevant chapter. Individual chapters are written so as to be readable independently of one another.
Chapter 2

Topological Semantics for Modal Logic: The Tarski Theorem Reproved

Abstract. This chapter explores the connection between fractal geometry and topological modal logic. In the early 1940’s, Tarski showed that the modal logic $S4$ can be interpreted in topological spaces. Renewed interest in Tarski’s topological semantics can be seen in such recent papers as (5), (18), (39), and (40). In this chapter we introduce the use of fractal techniques for proving completeness of $S4$ and non-trivial extensions of $S4$ for a variety of spaces in the topological semantics. These techniques are developed to relate the somewhat peculiar non-Hausdorff tree topologies with more familiar Euclidean and other metric topologies. The main results of the chapter are completeness of $S4$ for the binary tree with limits, and completeness of $S4$ for the Koch Curve, a well-known fractal curve. An important corollary is a new and simplified proof of completeness of $S4$ for the real line, $\mathbb{R}$ (originally proved by Tarski and McKinsey in (27)).
2.1 Introduction

In the late 1930’s, Tarski developed a topological semantics for modal logic in which formulas are interpreted in topological spaces. In a topological model, each propositional variable, \( P \), is assigned to an arbitrary subset of a given topological space—the set of points where \( P \) is true. Conjunctions, disjunctions and negations are interpreted as set-theoretic intersections, unions and complements; the ‘necessity,’ or ‘\( \Box \)’-modality is interpreted as a topological interior operator. (Thus, ‘\( \Box \phi \)’ is true throughout the interior of the set of points where ‘\( \phi \)’ is true.) Although this semantics was largely forgotten in the years since Kripke’s relational semantics was introduced, the last fifteen years have witnessed a burst of renewed interest. Indeed, researchers have come to see Tarski’s work as the foundation of the much broader project of using modal logic to describe space and spatial structures. As early as 1944, Tarski and McKinsey showed that the modal logic \( S4 \) is sound and complete for any dense-in-itself metric space (27). Their proof was notoriously complex, and in recent years, completeness for the special case of the real line was reproved in such papers as (5), (18), (26), (29), and (38). In this chapter, we explore new, fractal techniques for proving a variety of completeness results in the topological semantics.

The main result of the chapter is a proof of completeness of \( S4 \) for the Koch Curve, a well known fractal curve. An important corollary is a new proof of completeness of \( S4 \) for the real line, \( \mathbb{R} \). The fractal techniques introduced in these proofs are, as we argue, the chapter’s main contribution to the topological semantics for modal logic. The results of Section 4 and the techniques developed below are not tailor-made for solving completeness of \( S4 \) for the real line or for the slightly wider problem of completeness of \( S4 \) with respect to interesting classes of metric topological models. The main technique is developed to relate formally the somewhat peculiar non-Hausdorff tree topologies with more familiar Euclidean and other metric topologies. As we will see, completeness is transferred from an appropriate tree to a metric space by means of a known fractal curve. Completeness for both the Koch Curve and \( \mathbb{R} \) are best seen as examples of the power of the fractal techniques introduced.

The chapter is organized in five sections. Section 1 introduces the basic propositional modal language and Kripke (relational) semantics, and recalls some basic completeness results. Section 2 demonstrates the use of trees as Kripke frames,
and shows that \( S4 \) is complete for the infinite binary tree. Section 3 explores
the topological semantics for the modal language, introduces the complete binary
tree (or infinite binary tree with limits), and shows that \( S4 \) is complete for this
tree. Section 4 is the part of the chapter where we prove our main results. In this
section we introduce the Koch Curve, and simultaneously prove completeness of
\( S4 \) for the Koch Curve and for the real interval \([0, 1] \). The reader familiar with
modal logic can skim through much of Sections 1 and 2. Furthermore, the reader
familiar with Tarski’s topological semantics can leaf through all but the proof of
completeness of \( S4 \) for the complete binary tree in Section 3. If the reading seems
somewhat terse in places, sufficient background information can be obtained by
reading the excellent and very current summary of the state of topological modal
logic in (40).

2.2 Kripke semantics for \( S4 \)

2.2.1 Language, models, and truth

Let the modal language \( L \) consist of a countable set, \( \mathbb{P} = \{ P_i \mid \text{for all } i \in \mathbb{N} \} \),
of atomic variables and be closed under binary connectives \( \rightarrow, \vee, \wedge \) and unary
operators \( \neg, \Box, \Diamond \).

A frame is an ordered pair, \( F = \langle U, R \rangle \), where \( U \) is a set of points called the
universe, and \( R \) is a binary relation on \( U \). We say \( F \) is transitive (reflexive) if \( R \) is
transitive (reflexive). We interpret \( L \) in a model \( M = \langle F, V \rangle \), where \( F \) is a frame,
and \( V : \mathbb{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(U) \) is a valuation function.

Formulas are interpreted on points \( x \in U \) and we write \( M, x \models \phi \) to mean
that in the model \( M \) at the point \( x \), \( \phi \) holds. More specifically for a model
\( M = \langle \langle U, R \rangle, V \rangle \) and a point \( x \in U \), the ternary relation \( M, x \models \phi \) is inter-
preted inductively as follows. For \( P \in \mathbb{P} \),

\[
\begin{align*}
M, x \models P & \iff x \in V(P) \\
M, x \models (\phi \lor \psi) & \iff M, x \models \phi \text{ or } M, x \models \psi \\
M, x \models \neg \phi & \iff M, x \not \models \phi \\
M, x \models \Box \phi & \iff M, y \models \phi \text{ for all } y \text{ such that } Rxy \\
M, x \models \Diamond \phi & \iff M, y \models \phi \text{ for some } y \text{ such that } Rxy.
\end{align*}
\]

The interpretation for \( \wedge, \rightarrow \) and \( \iff \) can be obtained from the above via the
standard definitions. We could have defined \( \Diamond P \) as \( \neg \Box \neg P \) but the definition was
added for the completeness of presentation.

**Definition 2.2.1 (Logic S4).** The modal logic $S4$ in the language $L$ consists of some complete axiomatization of classical propositional logic $PL$, some complete axiomatization of the minimal normal modal logic $K$, say the axiom:

$$C : (\Box P \land \Box Q) \rightarrow \Box(P \land Q),$$

and the rules:

- $RN: \vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash \Box \phi$, and
- $RM: \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi \Rightarrow \vdash \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \psi$;

and, finally, the special $S4$ axioms:

- $4 : \Box P \rightarrow \Box \Box P$
- $T : \Box P \rightarrow P$

We define standard validity relations. Let $F = (U, R)$ be a frame, and let $M = (F, V)$ be a model over $F$. For any formula $\phi \in L$, we say $\phi$ is true in $M$ if $M, x \models \phi$ for all $x \in U$. We say $\phi$ is valid in $F$ if $\phi$ is true in every model over $F$. If $\mathcal{C}$ is a class of frames, we say $\phi$ is valid in $\mathcal{C}$ if $\phi$ is valid in every frame in $\mathcal{C}$. Finally, the logic $S4$ is complete for $\mathcal{C}$ if every formula valid in $\mathcal{C}$ is a theorem of $S4$ (i.e., can be derived from the axioms together with the rules of inference). With slight abuse of notation, we will sometimes say that $S4$ is complete for for a single frame $F$, where we mean $S4$ is complete for $\{F\}$.

### 2.2.2 Kripke’s classic completeness results

**Definition 2.2.2 (Rooted Frames and Models).** A rooted (or pointed) frame is a triple, $\mathcal{F} = (U, R, x)$, where $(U, R)$ is a frame, $x \in U$, and for all $y \in U$, $(x, y) \in R$.

That is, the point $x$ is $R$-related to every other point in $U$ (or $x$ “sees” all $y \in U$, for short).

\footnote{This somewhat unusual axiomatization of $K$ and hence of $S4$ makes the topological connection introduced later on in the chapter more explicit. $C$ interpreted topologically states that the intersection of opens is open, $RN$ states that the universe is open, $RM$ states that if $P$ is a subset of $Q$, then the interior of $P$ is a subset of the interior of $Q$. Furthermore, $T$ states that the interior of $P$ is a subset of $P$, and, finally, $4$, together with $T$, states that the interior of the interior of $P$ is just the interior of $P$. This should strongly remind the reader of Kuratowski’s axiomatization of the interior operator.}
Theorem 2.2.3. [Kripke]

The modal logic $S4$ is sound and complete for (i) the class of all transitive, reflexive frames; (ii) the class of all finite transitive, reflexive frames; (iii) the class of all rooted, finite, transitive, reflexive frames.

We will not reproduce this classic result here. Most standard introductory presentations of modal logic contain proofs of (i), (ii), and (iii). For Kripke’s original proof we refer the reader to (20); for a more contemporary variant, see (7).

In the next section we recall that the infinite binary tree, $T_2$, with a transitive, reflexive relation, $R_2$, can be used to build models for the modal language. Indeed, the logic $S4$ is complete for the class of models over the frame $T_2$: a modal formula $\phi$ is a theorem of $S4$ if and only if it is valid in every model over $T_2$. Below, we show how to view $T_2$ (and, for that matter, any transitive, reflexive frame) as a topological space. We then introduce an uncountable topological extension of $T_2$ that we call $T_2^+$. This new structure extends $T_2$ by adding to it uncountably many “limit nodes,” corresponding to each (infinite) branch of $T_2$. Our main contribution to the theory of tree topologies is the proof that $S4$ is complete for $T_2^+$. As we mentioned above, the significance of $T_2^+$ for us lies in large part in its use in extending topological completeness results to various metric and fractal spaces. We start with a brief discussion of $T_2$ viewed as a relational frame.\(^3\)

\section{Infinite binary tree}

\subsection{The modal view of the infinite binary tree, $T_2$}

Let $\Sigma = \{0, 1\}$, and let $\Sigma^*$ be the set of all finite strings over $\Sigma$ including $\langle \cdot \rangle$, the empty string. Let $\Sigma^\omega$ be the set of all countably infinite strings over $\Sigma$, and let $\Sigma^+ = \Sigma^* \cup \Sigma^\omega$. For $x, y \in \Sigma^*$, let $x \cdot y$ denote the concatenation of $x$ and $y$. We will also write $xy$ for $x \cdot y$. Concatenation is further defined for $x \in \Sigma^*$ and $y \in \Sigma^\omega$, but not for $x, y \in \Sigma^\omega$.

Note that $\Sigma^*$ is closed under concatenation, that is, if $x, y \in \Sigma^*$ then $x \cdot y \in \Sigma^*$. Similarly, $\Sigma^+$ is closed under “right-concatenation” in the following sense: for $x \in \Sigma^*$, $y \in \Sigma^+$, $x \cdot y \in \Sigma^+$.

\(^3\)The formal details of the next section follow the presentation in (40). The details can be skipped by a reader familiar with the notion of tree unravelling.
We let \( s_i : \Sigma^* \to \Sigma^* \) for \( i \in \{0, 1\} \) be the function defined by \( s_i(x) = x \ast i \). Thus for example \( s_0(1) = 10 \), and \( s_1(110) = 1101 \). We call \( s_0(x) \) the “left successor” of \( x \) and \( s_1(x) \) the “right successor” of \( x \).

We can now define the binary relation \( R_2 \) on \( \Sigma^* \) as the transitive reflexive closure of \( s_0 \cup s_1 \) (where \( s_i \) is viewed here as a relation, rather than a function).

**Definition 2.3.1** (\( T_2 \), a modal frame). \( T_2 = \langle \Sigma^*, R_2, \langle \cdot \rangle \rangle \)

We call \( T_2 \) the infinite binary branching tree or full binary tree. We call the empty string, \( \langle \cdot \rangle \), the root, and for any \( x \in T_2 \), \( s_0(x) \) and \( s_1(x) \) are called the immediate successors of \( x \). For simplicity of notation, we will often leave out the root, \( \langle \cdot \rangle \), denoting \( T_2 \) by \( \langle \Sigma^*, R_2 \rangle \).

**Fact 2.3.2.** Every node \( x \) is accessible from the root in finitely many steps along \( R_2 \) and hence in one step by transitivity. Every \( x \in T_2 \) has exactly two immediate successors and countably many successors altogether.

A valuation function \( V : \mathbb{P} \to \mathcal{P}(\Sigma^*) \) defines a model \( T_2 \) over \( T_2 \). Since \( T_2 \) is transitive and reflexive any such model validates the S4 axioms—i.e., S4 is sound for \( T_2 \).

**Claim 2.3.3.** For any finite, transitive, reflexive, rooted, model \( M \), with root \( x \), there is a valuation \( V \) over \( T_2 \) such that,

\[ M, x \models \phi \iff \langle T_2, V \rangle, \langle \cdot \rangle \models \phi \]

for every \( \phi \in L \).

(The proof of the claim is postponed until the next section.)

It follows from Claim 2.3.3 and Theorem 2.2.3 that every nontheorem of S4 can be shown false on some model based on the frame \( T_2 \). Indeed, if \( \phi \) is not a theorem of S4, then by Theorem 2.2.3, there is some finite rooted frame \( \mathcal{F} = \langle U, R, x \rangle \) and valuation \( V \) such that \( \mathcal{F}, V, x \models \neg \phi \). But then by Claim 2.3.3, there is a valuation \( V' \) over \( T_2 \) such that \( \langle T_2, V' \rangle, \langle \cdot \rangle \models \neg \phi \). Thus any nontheorem fails on \( T_2 \), and S4 is complete for the class of models over \( T_2 \).

### 2.3.2 Building a \( p \)−morphism from \( T_2 \) onto finite Kripke frames

We prove Claim 2.3.3 by constructing a \( p \)−morphism \( f : T_2 \to \mathcal{F} \), where \( \mathcal{F} = \langle U, R, x \rangle \) is a finite, rooted, transitive and reflexive frame. We briefly recall the notion of \( p \)−morphism.
Definition 2.3.4 ($p$-morphism). Let $\mathcal{F} = \langle U, R, x_r \rangle$ and $\mathcal{F}' = \langle U', R', x'_r \rangle$ be rooted frames. A $p$-morphism from $\mathcal{F}$ to $\mathcal{F}'$ is a function $f : U \rightarrow U'$ satisfying:

For any $x, y \in U$ and $y' \in U'$,

(i) $f(x_r) = x'_r$;
(ii) If $Rxy$, then $f(x) R' f(y)$;
(iii) If $R' f(x) y'$, then there is a $z \in U$, $Rxz$ and $f(z) = y'$.

We say that $f$ is a surjective $p$-morphism if, in addition, $f(U) = U'$.

Fact 2.3.5. If there is a surjective $p$–morphism $f$ from $\mathcal{F}$ to $\mathcal{F}'$, then for any valuation function $V : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(U')$, any point $x \in U$, and any modal formula $\phi$, we have:

$$\langle \mathcal{F}, [f^{-1}] \circ V \rangle, x \models \phi \iff \langle \mathcal{F}', V \rangle, f(x) \models \phi$$

Thus, to prove Claim 2.3.3 it suffices to show that for any finite, transitive, reflexive, rooted frame $\mathcal{F} = \langle U, R, x \rangle$, there is a surjective $p$–morphism $f$ from $T_2$ to $\mathcal{F}$.

Let the cardinality of $U$ in $\mathcal{F}$ be $n$. Notice that no point in $U$ has more than $n$ distinct successors and $x$, the root, actually has $n$ successors. We now construct the function $f$. For $1 \leq i \leq n(= |U|)$, we define the set of functions $s_i : U \rightarrow U$ ($1 \leq i \leq n$). For each $y \in U$, the function $s_i$ chooses the $i$th distinct $R$–successor of $y$, if such a successor exists. Otherwise $s_i(y) = y$. More formally,

Definition 2.3.6 (Successor functions $s_i$). For all $y$, $s_1(y) = y$ ($s_1$ is the identity function). Fix $i \in \mathbb{N}$, and suppose that $s_1(y)$, $s_2(y)$, ..., $s_{i-1}(y)$ are already defined, and that $Rys_k(y)$ for all $k < i$. Then we let $s_i(y)$ be some $z \in U$ such that $Ryz$ and $s_k(y) \neq z$ for all $k < i$, if there is some such $z$. Else, $s_i(y) = y$.

Example 2.3.7 (A set of successor functions). Let $y \in U$ have 3 distinct successors including $y$ itself: $y, w$ and $z$ and no others. Then if $|U| = 5$, we let $s_1(y) = y$, $s_2(y) = w$, $s_3(y) = z$, but $s_4(y) = s_5(y) = y$ as we have run out of distinct successors.

Definition 2.3.8. [UNRAVELING $p$–MORPHISM]

We define a linear ordering on the nodes in $T_2$. This can be done in many ways, but for specificity, we let, e.g., $\langle \cdot \rangle < 0 < 1 < 00 < 01 < 10 < 11 < 000 < ...$

---

The function $[f^{-1}] : \mathcal{P}(U') \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(U)$ raises the type: for $A \subseteq U'$, $[f^{-1}](A) = \{ y \mid f(y) \in A \}$. Note that although $f^{-1}$ is likely not a function, $[f^{-1}]$ is always a function, but of a higher type. Thus, the function $[f^{-1}] \circ V : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(U)$, i.e., it is a valuation function.
[BASE STEP.] First let \( f(\langle \cdot \rangle) = x. \)

[RECURSIVE STEP.] Until \( f \) is defined for all nodes in \( T_2 \), find the least\(^5\) node \( t \) such that \( f(t) \) is defined, but neither \( f(t * 0) \) nor \( f(t * 1) \) is defined. Assume that \( f(t) = y. \) Then let,

\[
\begin{align*}
  f(t * 1) &= s_1(y), \\
  f(t * 01) &= s_2(y), \\
  f(t * 001) &= s_3(y), \\
  &\quad \ldots
\end{align*}
\]

where \( 0^{n-1} \) is a sequence of \( n-1 \) zeros. Finally, let,

\[
\begin{align*}
  f(t * 0) &= f(t * 00) = f(t * 000) = \ldots = f(t * 0^n) = s_1(y) = y.
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 5: The recursive step of the definition of the \( p \)-morphism \( f \). Here \(|U| = 5, f(t) = y, s_1(y) = y, s_2(y) = y_1, s_3(y) = y_2, s_4(y) = y_3, \) and \( s_5(y) = y_4. \) Following the definition, \( f(t * 01) = y_1, f(t * 001) = y_2, f(t * 0001) = y_3, f(t * 00001) = y_4, \) and all other points visible in the diagram are labeled \( y. \) No successor of \( t \) except for the eleven nodes (really ten and \( t \)) explicitly shown in the diagram is labeled at this stage.

**Lemma 2.3.9.** [Unravelling Lemma] Let \( f \) be the function defined in Definition 2.3.8. Then \( f \) is a \( p \)-morphism.

**Proof.** (i) It suffices to show that if \( R_2 st \) and \( t \) is the immediate successor of \( s, \) then \( Rf(s)f(t). \) This can be seen by inspecting the recursive step of Definition 2.3.8. If \( f(s) = y, \) then \( f(t) \) is \( s_i(y), \) for some \( i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}, \) but, by definition of \( s_i, \) we know \( Rys_i(y) \) for each such \( i. \) (ii) We need to show that if \( Rf(t)z, \) then

\(^5\)On the ordering just given.
there exists \( s \in T_2 \) such that \( R_2 ts \), and \( f(s) = z \). We let \( f(t) = y \) and recall that \( s_1(y), s_2(y), ..., s_n(y) \) exhaust the distinct \( R \)–successors of \( y \) in \( F \). Then for some \( i \in \{1, ..., n\} \), \( s_i(y) = z \). If \( t \) was ever the least node satisfying the antecedent condition of Definition 2.3.8, then some successor of \( t \) was labeled by \( s_i(y) \)—i.e., by \( z \). Otherwise, \( t \) is a successor of some other node \( t' \), which did at some stage satisfy the antecedent condition of Definition 2.3.8 and \( t = t' * 0^k \) for some \( k \leq n \). But then, at that stage, for some successor \( t'' \) of \( t \), \( f(t'') = y \) and \( t'' * u \) was undefined for any nonempty finite sequence \( u \). Thus at some future stage a successor of \( t'' \) was labeled with \( s_i(y) \) (i.e. \( z \)). But a successor of \( t'' \) is a successor of \( t \) by transitivity of \( R_2 \), as desired. \( \square \)

Putting Fact 2.3.5 and Lemma 2.3.9 together, we obtain the desired completeness result:

**Fact 2.3.10.** The modal logic \( S_4 \) is complete for the class of models over the frame \( T_2 = (\Sigma^*, R_2, \langle \cdot \rangle) \).

In the next section we look at modal language \( L \) and the frame \( T_2 = (\Sigma^*, R_2) \) from a topological perspective.

### 2.4 Topological semantics for \( S_4 \)

We now turn to topology and the topological interpretation of the modal language \( L \). Long before Kripke-semantics for the modal language was established as the yardstick, A. Tarski and J.C.C. McKinsey noted an irresistible connection between Lewis and Langford’s axioms for the modal logic \( S_4 \), and Kuratowski’s axioms for the topological interior operator. The topological interpretation of modal logic exploits this connection.\(^6\)

Tarski’s idea was to view \( \Box A \) as the interior of the set \( A \) and \( \Diamond A \) as the closure of \( A \) and try to understand what kind of logical structure such an interpretation supported. Tarski was able to prove—in some sense quite unsurprisingly—that under this interpretation the logic of the interior and closure operators turns out to be nothing less than \( S_4 \). The argument for the general case is straightforward, as we’ll see below. The arguments for specific topological spaces turn out to be rather more involved. It is part of our goal here to try to understand where such complexity comes from. Let us introduce some basic background notions.

\(^6\)Equivalently, one can exploit the connection between the \( \Diamond \)-version of the \( S_4 \) axioms and the behavior of the closure operator \( C \), via the definition \( I(A) = -C(-A) \). (In words, the interior of a set is the complement of the closure of the complement of that set.)
2.4.1 Topological semantics

A topology is a set of points with some spatial structure (one can think of it as a set of points glued together in a certain way). Specifically, a topology is a pair, \( \langle X, \mathcal{J} \rangle \), where \( X \) is a set and \( \mathcal{J} \subseteq \mathcal{P}(X) \) satisfies,

1. \( X, \emptyset \in \mathcal{J} \),
2. If \( A, B \in \mathcal{J} \), then \( A \cap B \in \mathcal{J} \),
3. If \( A_i \in \mathcal{J} \) for all \( i \in I \), then \( \bigcup_{i \in I} A_i \in \mathcal{J} \).

If in addition a topology satisfies,

4. If \( A_i \in \mathcal{J} \) for all \( i \in I \), then \( \bigcap_{i \in I} A_i \in \mathcal{J} \)

then the topology is called Alexandroff. As we’ll see, most interesting topologies are not Alexandroff. More (structure) is not always better, as a cursory comparison between Italian and American pizza quickly reveals.

Although a topological space is strictly speaking a pair, \( \langle X, \mathcal{J} \rangle \), we will for simplicity of notation (and where the meaning is clear) often denote both the topological space itself and the underlying set of points by \( X \). The sets in \( \mathcal{J} \) are called open sets. We say a set is closed if its complement is open. The union of open subsets of a set, \( A \), is called the interior of \( A \):

\[
\text{Int}(A) = \bigcup \{ O \text{ open} \mid O \subseteq A \}
\]

The closure of a set is the complement of the interior of the complement:

\[
\text{Cl}(A) = -\text{Int} - (A)
\]

(Equivalently, a point \( x \) is in the closure of \( A \) if every open set containing \( x \) contains some element in \( A \).

We wish to interpret our language \( L \) in topological models. A topological model is a pair \( M = \langle X, V \rangle \) where \( X \) is a topology and \( V : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(X) \) is a valuation function. We define a ternary relation \( M, x \models \phi \) that as before holds between a point in a model and a formula. The cases for the atomic and Boolean formulas are the same. The only real difference is in the modal cases of \( \Box \) and \( \diamond \). We want \( \Box \phi \) to be true at a given point \( x \) if \( x \) is in the interior of the set defined by the formula \( \phi \). Then also \( \diamond \phi \) should hold at \( x \) if \( x \) is in the closure of the set defined by \( \phi \). We encode these observations in the following truth definitions:
Let $X$ be an Alexandroff topology and let $x \in X$. Consider the set $O_x = \bigcap \{O \text{ open} \mid x \in O\}$, i.e., the intersection of all open sets containing $x$. Note that since our topological space is Alexandroff, this is a non-empty open set. We define the binary relation $R$ on $X$:

\[ R_{xy} \iff y \in O_x. \]

**Claim 2.4.1.** $\mathcal{F}_X = \langle X, R \rangle$ is a reflexive, transitive frame.

**Proof.** For reflexivity, note that $x \in O_x$. For transitivity, suppose $R_{xy}$ and $R_{yz}$. Then $y \in O_x$ and $z \in O_y$. From the first inclusion it follows that $O_y \subseteq O_x$. So we have $z \in O_y \subseteq O_x$, and hence $R_{xz}$. \[ \square \]

Moving in the reverse direction, we can generate a topology from a reflexive, transitive frame. Let $\mathcal{F} = \langle X, R \rangle$ be a reflexive, transitive frame. We will say that a subset $O$ of $X$ is open if it is upward-closed under $R$ (where a set $O$ is upward-closed under $R$ if $x \in O$ and $R_{xy}$ implies $y \in O$). Note that the collection of open sets are closed under finite intersections, arbitrary unions, and contain both the empty set and the entire space $X$. Let $X_\mathcal{F}$ be the topological space defined in this way. Then,

**Claim 2.4.2.** $X_\mathcal{F}$ is Alexandroff.

**Proof.** The reader can verify that $X_\mathcal{F}$ is a topological space. To see that it is Alexandroff, suppose that $\{O_i \mid i \in I\}$ is a collection of open sets in the topology and let $x \in \bigcap_{i \in I} O_i$ and $R_{xy}$. Then since each $O_i$ is upward-closed under $R$, $y \in O_i$ for each $i \in I$. But then $y \in \bigcap_{i \in I} O_i$, and $\bigcap_{i \in I} O_i$ is upward-closed under $R$, as desired. \[ \square \]

The reader is invited to verify that the operations of generating a transitive, reflexive frame from an Alexandroff topology, and of generating an Alexandroff topology from a transitive, reflexive frame just described are inverses of one another: if one starts with an Alexandroff topology, then generates a transitive reflexive frame, and then, from this frame, generates an Alexandroff topology in the manner described, one ends up with the original topological space (and similarly, when one starts from a transitive, reflexive frame). When a frame and topological space are generated in this way by one another, we will sometimes say they “correspond.” The next proposition states that corresponding frames and topological spaces satisfy the same modal formulas:
Proposition 2.4.3. Let $X$ be an Alexandroff topology and let $F$ be a transitive, reflexive frame. If $X$ and $F$ correspond, then for any formula $\phi$ in $L$, any $x \in X$, and any valuation $V : \mathbb{P} \to \mathcal{P}(X)$,

$$\langle F, V \rangle, x \models \phi \iff \langle X, V \rangle, x \models \phi$$

Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of $\phi$. We show only the modal clause, $\phi : \equiv \Box \psi$. We have,

$$\langle F, V \rangle, x \models \Box \psi \iff \langle F, V \rangle, y \models \psi \text{ for all } y \text{ such that } Rxy$$

$$\iff \langle F, V \rangle, y \models \psi \text{ for all } y \in O_x \quad \text{(by IH)}$$

$$\iff \langle X, V \rangle, y \models \psi \text{ for all } y \in O_x$$

$$\iff \langle X, V \rangle, x \models \Box \psi$$

What these observations tell us is that Alexandroff topologies are nothing more than reflexive, transitive frames. This is both useful and limiting. On the positive side, it allows us to transfer a variety of important results directly to the topological semantics. On the negative side, most interesting topologies are non-Alexandroff (e.g., metric spaces). Much of our work in what follows will be constructing “nice” maps between metric spaces and non-Alexandroff topologies.

2.4.2 Interior maps and truth preservation in the topological semantics

The work in the sections below requires us to recall some additional topological notions. In the topological semantics, the notion of an interior map plays the role of $p -$ morphism in the Kripke (or frame) semantics. In fact, when the topologies in question are Alexandroff, the notions of $p -$ morphism and interior map correspond exactly.

Let $X$ and $Y$ be topological spaces.

Definition 2.4.4 (Open Map). A map $g : X \to Y$ is open if for every open subset $O \subseteq X$, $g(O)$ is open in $Y$.

Definition 2.4.5 (Continuous Map). A map $g : X \to Y$ is continuous if for every open subset $U \subseteq Y$, $g^{-1}(U)$ is open in $X$.

Definition 2.4.6 (Interior Map). A map $g : X \to Y$ is interior if it is both open and continuous.
Definition 2.4.7 (Full-Interior Map). A map \( g : X \to Y \) is full-interior if it is interior and surjective.

Fact 2.4.8 (Full-Interior Maps Preserve Modal Formulas). Let \( g : X \to Y \) be a full-interior map, and \( \phi \) any formula of the standard propositional modal language \( L \). Let \( V' : \mathbb{P} \to \mathcal{P}(Y) \) be a valuation function and let \( V = ([g^{-1}] \circ V') \).\(^7\) Then, for any \( x \in X \),

\[
\langle X, V \rangle, x \models \phi \iff \langle Y, V' \rangle, g(x) \models \phi
\]

Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of \( \phi \). The base case and the Boolean cases are straightforward. For the modal case:

\[
\langle X, V \rangle, x \models \Box \psi \iff \langle Y, V' \rangle, g(x) \models \Box \psi
\]

we use the preservation of open sets along \( g \) to show the left-to-right direction, and we use the continuity of \( g \) to show the right-to-left direction. The details of the proof can be found in, e.g., (40). \( \square \)

Now suppose that \( X \) and \( Y \) are Alexandroff topologies, and let \( \mathcal{F}_X \) and \( \mathcal{F}_Y \) be the corresponding frames. Moreover, let \( g : X \to Y \) be a full-interior map. Then,

Fact 2.4.9. The function \( g \) reinterpreted as \( g : \mathcal{F}_X \to \mathcal{F}_Y \) is a \( p \)-morphism.

Proof. See e.g., (40). \( \square \)

Just as \( p \)-morphisms play an important role in transferring completeness results in the relational semantics, interior maps play a similar role in transferring completeness results in the topological semantics. In the remainder of this section, we recall some of the better known topological completeness results for \( S_4 \). We then use a particular sequence of interior maps to prove completeness for the Koch fractal and the real interval \([0, 1]\).

2.4.3 Topological completeness results for \( S_4 \)

Theorem 2.4.10. The logic \( S_4 \) is sound and complete with respect to

(i) the class of all topologies (McKinsey & Tarski);

(ii) the class of all finite topologies (Kripke);

\(^7\)Thus \( V \) is a valuation function on \( X \), defined as the composition of \( g^{-1} \) with \( V' \).
(iii) any dense-in-itself metric space (McKinsey & Tarski);

(iv) the infinite binary tree, $\mathbb{T}_2$ (see below) (van Benthem, Gabbay).

In this chapter we will show,

(v) a direct construction for the Koch Curve, $K$. The Minkowski-Bouligand dimension of $K$ is 1.26. (This chapter or McKinsey & Tarski).\footnote{Since the standard topological dimension of $K$ is 1, there is a homeomorphism $h$ between $K$ and $[0, 1]$. Thus, we know that $S4$ is complete for $K$ as we can transfer counterexamples via $h$. However, this is the first direct completeness construction on a fractal curve of non-integer Minkowski-Bouligand dimension, except for Cantor Set.}

(vi) the Wilson tree or complete binary tree, $\mathbb{T}^+_2$, equipped with the topology generated by finite initial segments [see Definition 2.4.11]. (This chapter)

\textbf{Proof.} (ii) follows from completeness for finite frames; (iii) is proved in (27); (i) follows from either (ii) or (iii); (iv) follows from Lemma 2.3.9, originally due to van Benthem and Gabbay.\footnote{Both J. van Benthem and D. Gabby introduce a variant of the unravelling technique.} For (v) and (vi), see the later sections of this chapter. \hfill $\square$

Part of our goal in this chapter is to revisit (iii)—in particular, the special case of the real line, $\mathbb{R}$—as well as to give a direct completeness proof for the Koch curve. We will also mention some other fractals that are useful in topo-modal constructions and for which completeness results can be had. We have in mind, in particular, a direct proof of completeness of $S4$ for $\mathbb{R}^2$ and $\mathbb{R}^3$ via the Sierpinski Carpet and Menger Sponge, respectively.

\subsection{2.4.4 The infinite binary tree and the complete binary tree, viewed topologically}

The infinite binary tree, $T_2$, is a rare object in mathematics that exhibits interesting structural features from a great range of different perspectives. As we saw above, it has enough structural symmetry and flexibility to carry the weight of the completeness theorem of $S4$ in the relational semantics. $T_2$ recurs when we start thinking of space fractally. We look next at an extension of $T_2$ called the Wilson tree, or complete binary tree, that allows us to prove two completeness results in the topological semantics.
Wilson tree (complete binary tree), $T_2^+$

**Definition 2.4.11.** Take alphabet $\Sigma = \{0, 1\}$ and construct the set $\Sigma^*(\Sigma^+)$ of all finite (countable) strings over $\Sigma$. For any $s \in \Sigma^*$, let $B_s = \{s \ast t \mid t \in \Sigma^+\}$, i.e., the set of all (possibly infinite) strings with initial segment $s$ (where $s$ is allowed to be the empty string). Let $B = \{B_s \mid s \in \Sigma^*\}$. Note that $B$ is closed under finite intersections (for any $s, t \in \Sigma^*$ either $B_s \subseteq B_t$, $B_t \subseteq B_s$, or $B_s \cap B_t = \emptyset$), hence is a basis for some topology $J^+$ over $\Sigma^+$. Finally, let $T_2^+ = (\Sigma^+, J^+)$. 

**Fact 2.4.12.** (i) $\Sigma^+$, the underlying set of $T_2^+$, is uncountable; (ii) $T_2^+$ is first countable; (iii) $T_2^+$ is non-Alexandroff. 

**Separation Axioms:**

(iv) $T_2^+$ is $T_0$,

(v) $T_2^+$ is not $T_1$ (hence non-Hausdorff and non-metrizable)

**Proof.** (i) follows from an injection between the set of countably infinite strings over $\Sigma$ and the real interval $[0, 1]$; (ii) follows from the fact that the basis, $B$, is countable; (iii) the intersection of basic opens $B_0, B_{00}, B_{000}, ...$ (i.e., the countable sequence 000...) is not open; (iv) For $s, t \in \Sigma^+$, $s \neq t$: if $s$ is a descendant of $t$, then either $B_s$ separates $s$ and $t$ (if $s \in \Sigma^*$) or there exists $t' \in \Sigma^*$ which is a descendant of $t$ such that $B_{t'}$ separates $s$ and $t$ (and vice versa, if $t$ is a descendant of $s$). If neither $s$ nor $t$ is a descendant of the other, there exists $t' \in \Sigma^*$ such that $t'$ is an ancestor of $s$ but not of $t$, and $B_{t'}$ separates $s$ and $t$; (v) take, for instance, $s = 0$ and $t = 00$: there is no open set containing $s$ that does not contain $t$.  

In the remainder of this section, we show that $S4$ is complete for $T_2^+$. To this end, recall the map $f : T_2 \rightarrow \mathcal{F} = \langle U, R, x \rangle$ given in Definition 2.8. We view this function now as a map, $f : \Sigma^* \rightarrow U$, between underlying sets, and extend it to a map, $f^+ : \Sigma^+ \rightarrow U$. Moreover, we now view the frames $\mathcal{F}$ and $T_2^+$ as topological spaces, and the map $f^+$ as a topological map. We show that $f^+$ is full-interior. Since $S4$ is complete for finite, transitive, reflexive frames, it follows from Fact 2.4.8 that $S4$ is also complete for $T_2^+$. 

We will need a few simple infinitary notions. We begin by defining an infinite branch $b$ of the tree $T_2$.

**Definition 2.4.13.** [Countable Branch] Let $b = < t_0, t_1, ... >$ be an infinite branch of $T_2$. That is:

(i) $t_0 = \langle \cdot \rangle$;

(ii) For each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, either $t_{n+1} = t_n \ast 0$ or $t_{n+1} = t_n \ast 1$. 

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Lemma 2.4.14. [Cycling Lemma] Let \( f \) be any function from \( T_2 \) onto \( \mathcal{F} = \langle U, R, x \rangle \), and let \( b = < t_0, t_1, ... > \) be an infinite branch in \( T_2 \). Then there exists \( N \in \mathbb{N} \) such that for all worlds \( x \in U \), and all \( m > N \),

\[
f(t_m) = x \text{ implies } f(t_m) = x \text{ for infinitely many } m.
\]

Proof. The lemma follows from the fact that \( U \) is finite, so there are only finitely many labels in \( U \) for \( f \) to “choose” from. Labels that occur only finitely many times on a branch, occur for the last time at some finite node of \( T_2 \).

For a given branch \( b \), let \( n_b \) be the least such \( N \in \mathbb{N} \). Let \( A_b = \{ f(t_m) : m > n_b \} \). (Thus \( A_b \) is the collection of worlds in \( U \) that label infinitely many nodes of the branch, \( b \), under \( f \).

Note that the Lemma states that after some initial segment of \( b \) all nodes of \( b \) are sent by \( f \) to elements in \( A_b \) and each of these elements labels infinitely many nodes on the branch.

Fact 2.4.15. For any \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) and any \( x \in A_b \), \( \exists m > n \) such that \( f(t_m) = x \).

Proof. This follows from the fact that every element in \( A_b \) labels infinitely many nodes in \( b \).

Definition 2.4.16. [Branch Labeling] Let \( f \) be a \( p \)-morphism from \( T_2 \) onto the finite rooted frame \( \mathcal{F} = \langle U, R, x \rangle \). For every branch \( b \) in \( T_2 \), we let the finite choice function \( C(b) \) return a choice of \( y \in A_b \). Further, noting that every branch \( b \) has a unique countable sequence in \( \Sigma^* \) associated with it, we can think of the branches and elements of \( \Sigma^+ \) interchangeably. We define the extension, \( f^+: \Sigma^+ \to U \), of \( f \) as follows: Let \( t_b \) be the element in \( \Sigma^+ \) that corresponds to the branch \( b \). We let \( f^+(t_b) = C(b) \). Thus we label each countable string in \( \Sigma^+ \) with a node in \( A_b \subseteq U \).

For the remainder of this chapter we view \( f^+ \) and \( f \) interchangeably as a maps between topological spaces, frames, or simply underlying sets. From the context it should be clear which of these we intend. Also, we refer to ‘finite’ and ‘limit’ nodes of the tree \( T_2^+ \), with the obvious interpretation.

Theorem 2.4.17. \( f^+: T_2^+ \to \mathcal{F} \) is full-interior.

Proof. We need to show that \( f^+ \) is open, continuous, and surjective.
Let \( O \in \mathcal{J}^+ \) be a basic open set. Then \( O = B_s \) for some finite node \( s \). Let \( y = f^+(s) \) and let \( D_y = \{ z \in U | Rxz \} \). We show that \( f^+(B_s) = D_y \). We know that every point in \( D_y \) labels some node in \( B_s \) by the fact that \( f \) is a p-morphism. Thus \( D_y \subseteq f^+(B) \). For the reverse inclusion, let \( z \in f^+(B_s) \). Then \( z = f^+(t) \) for some \( t \in B_s \). If \( t \) is finite then \( f^+(t) = f(t) \in D_y \), where inclusion follows from the fact that \( f \) is a p-morphism. If \( t \) is a limit node, then \( f^+(t) = f^+(t') \) for some finite node \( t' \in B_s \) (by construction of \( f^+ \)). Moreover, \( f^+(t') = f(t') \in D_y \) (since \( t' \) is finite). Thus \( f^+(B) \subseteq D_y \), as needed.

**Theorem 2.4.18.** \( S_4 \) is complete for \( \mathbb{T}_2^+ \).

**Proof.** By Fact 2.4.8, Theorem 4.2.3, and Theorem 2.4.17.

In the next section, we construct a full-interior function from the real interval \([0, 1]\) onto \( \mathbb{T}_2^+ \), via the Koch Curve. That construction gives us both completeness of \( S_4 \) for the Koch Curve, and a new proof of completeness of \( S_4 \) for the real interval \([0, 1]\).

### 2.5 Fractal curves and topological completeness

Our goal is to construct a homeomorphism between the interval \([0, 1]\) and Koch Curve fractal, \( K \), and a relatively simple full interior labelling \( l : [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{T}_2^+ \) inspired by the construction of Koch Curve. The labeling itself provides a straightforward proof of completeness of \( S_4 \) for the real interval. When composed with the homeomorphism we obtain completeness of \( S_4 \) for the singleton class \( K \), the Koch Curve.
Figure 6: \( K_1: a = \frac{1}{3} \)

Figure 7: \( K_2: \) The length of each line segment is \( \frac{1}{9} \), and the five triangles with apex’s at \( y_0, y_2, x, z_2, z_0 \) are equilateral triangles.

2.5.1 The Koch curve

Recall the construction of the Koch curve, \( K \).

We begin with the unit interval \([0, 1]\). At the first stage, \( K_1 \), we let the middle third of the interval be “pushed up” to form two sides of an equilateral triangle with side length \( \frac{1}{3} \), as pictured in Figure 6. At the second stage we let the middle third of each line segment of \( K_1 \) be raised to form two sides of an equilateral triangle of length \( \frac{1}{9} \). This gives \( K_2 \) in Figure 7.

In general, at stage \( n \) of construction, we raise the middle third of each line segment of \( K_{n-1} \) to form two sides of an equilateral triangle of side length equal to the length of the segment raised.

The Koch curve is a limit of the construction stages in the following sense. Let \( K_0 \) be the unit interval \([0, 1]\). For \( n = 1, 2, \ldots \), let

\[
g_n : K_{n-1} \to K_n
\]

be the obvious homeomorphism from \( K_{n-1} \) to \( K_n \). And let
Figure 8: This figure shows how \( g_n \) acts on a single segment \([x_0, x_4]\) of \( K_{n-1} \). \( g_n \) is the identity function everywhere except: (i) \( g_n(x_2) \) is the apex of the triangle, and (ii) \( g_n \) maps the line segment \((x_1, x_2)\) linearly onto \( a \) and maps the line segment \((x_2, x_3)\) linearly onto \( b \).

\[
f_n = g_n \circ g_{n-1} \cdots \circ g_1
\]

Thus, for each \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), \( f_n : [0, 1] \to K_n \) is a homeomorphism from \([0, 1]\) onto \( K_n \). Finally, we let \( f \) be the pointwise limit of these functions:

\[
f = \lim_{n \to \infty} f_n
\]

and the Koch curve, \( K \), is the range of this limit:

\[
K = \text{Range}(f)
\]

**Claim 2.5.1.** \( f : [0, 1] \to K \) is a homeomorphism.

**Proof.** We need to show that \( f \) is bijective, continuous and open.

1. (Bijective) Note that any two distinct points \( x, y \in [0, 1] \) eventually end up on different line segments under some \( f_n \). Indeed, since \( x \neq y \), we know \( d(x, y) > 0 \) (where \( d \) denotes the usual distance function). But the length of line segments in \( K_n \) is \((\frac{1}{3})^n\). Since \((\frac{1}{3})^n \to 0\), the length of line segments in \( K_n \) is eventually smaller than the distance \( d(x, y) \), and \( x \) and \( y \) belong to different line segments. We leave it to the reader to verify that such points are not identified under \( f \) — i.e., \( f(x) \neq f(y) \). This shows that \( f \) is injective. Surjectivity follows from the fact that \( K = \text{Range}(f) \).

2. (Continuous) We show that \( f \) is the uniform limit of continuous functions, hence continuous.\(^1\) Note that for any \( x \in [0, 1] \), \( d(f_n(x), f_{n-1}(x)) = \)

---

\(^{10}\)Here we view the functions \( f_n \) as functions from the space \([0,1]\) to \(\mathbb{R}^2\), with the usual metrics on each of these spaces.
\[ d(g_n(f_{n-1}(x)), f_{n-1}(x)), \]

where \( d \) denotes the distance function in the usual metric on \( \mathbb{R}^2 \). Moreover, by construction of \( g_n \), \( g_n \) moves points at most a distance of \( (\frac{1}{3})^n(\sqrt{3}/2) \). So \( d(f_n(x), f_{n-1}(x)) < (\frac{1}{3})^n(\sqrt{3}/2) \to 0 \), for all \( x \in [0,1] \). Thus the \( f_n \)’s converge uniformly, and the uniform limit of continuous functions is continuous.

3. (Open) We first show that the image under \( f \) of a closed set is closed. Indeed, if \( A \subseteq [0,1] \) is closed, then it is also compact (since \([0,1]\) is bounded). But the continuous image of a compact set is compact, so \( f(A) \) is a compact subset of \( K \). So \( f(A) \) is closed (and bounded), as desired. Now suppose that \( O \subseteq [0,1] \) is open. Then \( f(O) = f([0,1]) - f([0,1] - O) = K - f([0,1] - O) \), since \( f : [0,1] \to K \) is a bijection. By the above argument, \( f([0,1] - O) \) is closed, so \( f(O) \) is open. It follows from the previous claim that \( f^{-1} : K \to [0,1] \) is a homeomorphism. We now wish to construct a function \( l : [0,1] \to \mathbb{T}_2^+ \) that is full-interior. Once we have done so, \( l \) alone will prove completeness of \( S4 \) for the real interval \([0,1]\), and the composition \( l \circ f^{-1} : K \to \mathbb{T}_2^+ \) will prove completeness of \( S4 \) for the Koch curve, \( K \). Much as we constructed \( f \) as a limit of finite approximations, \( f_n \), we now construct the function \( l \) as a limit of stagewise labeling functions, \( l_n \). Indeed, as the reader will presently see, the functions, \( l_n \), correspond neatly to stages of Koch construction.

Note above that each \( g_n : K_{n-1} \to K_n \) sends \( K_{n-1} \) to \( K_n \) by breaking up each line segment of \( K_{n-1} \) into four line segments of \( K_n \). For any line segment \( s \) in \( K_{n-1} \) we refer to its “successor” segments in \( K_n \) as (in order from left to right) \( A(s), B(s), C(s) \) and \( D(s) \) (see Figure 9). There is an ambiguity here with respect to endpoints: is the point \( \frac{1}{3} \), for example, in the segment \( A([0,1]) \) or \( B([0,1]) \)? For reasons that will become clear below, we decide that \( B(s) \) and \( C(s) \) are always open on both ends, while the “right” end-point of \( A(s) \) and the “left” endpoint of \( D(s) \) are always closed. (The left endpoint of \( A(s) \) and the right endpoint of \( D(s) \) are either open or closed, depending on whether the segment \( s \) itself is open or closed at that endpoint). Thus, \( e.g. \), \( \frac{1}{3} \in A([0,1]) \) and \( \frac{2}{3} \in D([0,1]) \). Note that for each segment \( s \) this leaves one point still unclassified—namely, the midpoint of \( s \) which becomes in the next stage of construction, the apex of the equilateral triangle (in Figure 9, the point \( x_2 \)). For simplicity, we let this one point constitute a new singleton set \( E(s) \).
Figure 9: Segment $s$ in $K_{n-1}$ is $[x, y]$. Then $A(s) = [x, x_1]$, $B(s) = (x_1, x_2)$, $C(s) = (x_2, x_3)$, $D(s) = [x_3, y]$, and $E(s) = \{x_2\}$.

These definitions allow us to construct stages of labeling in a natural way. Fix $x \in [0, 1]$, $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and let $s_{x,n-1}$ be the line segment in $K_{n-1}$ containing $f_{n-1}(x)$. We let:

$$l_n(x) = \begin{cases} 
  l_{n-1}(x) \ast 0 & \text{if } f_n(x) \in B(s_{x,n-1}) \\
  l_{n-1}(x) \ast 1 & \text{if } f_n(x) \in C(s_{x,n-1}) \\
  l_{n-1}(x) & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}$$

Stages of labeling correspond to stages of Koch construction. If in the $n$-th stage of Koch construction $x$ “stays in the same place” (i.e., $f_n(x) = f_{n-1}(x)$), then the label for $x$ at stage $n$ remains what it was in the previous stage (i.e., $l_n(x) = l_{n-1}(x)$). If on the other hand $x$ gets “pushed up” to a side of an equilateral triangle introduced at stage $n$, then the new label $l_n(x)$ appends a 0 or 1 to the old label $l_{n-1}(x)$ (depending on which side of the equilateral triangle—i.e., “left” or “right”).

Note that some elements in $[0, 1]$ “stabilize” over successive labelings and some do not. More precisely, some but not all points $x \in [0, 1]$ satisfy the following condition:

$$(*) \exists N \in \mathbb{N} \text{ such that } \forall n \geq N, l_n(x) = l_N(x)$$

If every point in the interval stabilized, we could happily restrict our attention to the infinite binary tree $T_2$ (without limits) and use this tree to label points in the real interval $[0, 1]$. The fact that many—in fact uncountably many—points do not stabilize is our motivation for passing from $T_2$ to $T_2^+$. Our final labeling function, $l$, agrees with stage-wise labeling functions on points that stabilize, but assigns limit nodes of $T_2^+$ to all points that do not stabilize. We define the function $l: [0, 1] \rightarrow T_2^+$ as follows:
\[ l(x) = \begin{cases} 
  l_N(x) & \text{if } x \text{ satisfies } (*), \\
  t & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} \]

where \( t \) is the unique countable sequence over \([0,1]\) that has \( l_n(x) \) as initial segment for each \( n \in \mathbb{N} \).

To take a simple example, it is clear that the point \( \frac{1}{3} \) stabilizes and therefore \( l(\frac{1}{3}) \) is a finite string. Indeed, \( l(\frac{1}{3}) = \langle \cdot \rangle \), as \( l_n(\frac{1}{3}) = l_0(\frac{1}{3}) = \langle \cdot \rangle \) for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \). Note that successive labeling functions, \( l_n \), are monotonic in the following sense: For any \( x \in [0,1] \), if \( m < n \), then \( l_n(x) \) is an descendant of \( l_m(x) \) (i.e., \( l_n(x) = l_m(x) \ast t \) for some \( t \in \Sigma^+ \)). Moreover, \( l(x) \) is a descendant of \( l_n(x) \) for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) (i.e., \( l(x) = l_n(x) \ast t_n \) for some \( t_n \in \Sigma^+ \)).

**Theorem 2.5.2.** \( l : [0,1] \to T_2^+ \) is a full, interior map

The proof of this theorem is given in the section below. We state as corollaries the two main results of this chapter:

**Corollary 2.5.3.** \( S_4 \) is complete for the class of models over the real interval \([0,1]\).

**Proof.** Immediate from Fact 2.4.8, Theorem 2.4.18, and Theorem 2.5.2. \( \square \)

**Corollary 2.5.4.** \( S_4 \) is complete for the class of models over Koch curve, \( K \).

**Proof.** By the map \( l \circ f^{-1} : K \to T_2^+ \). That the composition is full-interior is immediate from Claim 2.5.1 and Corollary 2.5.3. \( \square \)

### 2.5.2 Completeness via the Koch curve

In this section, we prove Theorem 2.5.2.

**Proof.** As before, for any finite node \( s \in T_2^+ \), let \( B_s \) be the basic open set \([s \ast t] \mid t \in \Sigma^+ \).

1. (Continuous) Let \( U \) be a basic open set in \( T_2^+ \). Then \( U = B_s \) for some finite node \( s \in T_2^+ \). Suppose \( x \in l^{-1}(B_s) \). We show there is an open set \( O \subseteq [0,1] \) such that \( x \in O \subseteq l^{-1}(B_s) \). By construction of the functions \( l_n \), there exists a least \( N \in \mathbb{N} \) such that \( l_N(x) = s \). Moreover, at stage \( N \) all points belonging to some open interval \( O \) which contains \( x \) are labeled by \( s \)—i.e., for each \( y \in O \), \( l_N(y) = s \). By monotonicity of the labeling functions, \( l(y) \) is a descendant of \( l_N(y)(= s) \) for each \( y \in O \). So \( O \subseteq l^{-1}(B_s) \). Moreover, \( x \in O \) and \( O \) is open, as needed.
2. (Open) We introduce the notion of a maximal, uniformly labeled (MUL) interval under \( l_n \). In particular, \( I \subseteq [0,1] \) is a MUL interval under \( l_n \) if for all \( x, y \in I \), \( l_n(x) = l_n(y) \), and there does not exist a strictly bigger interval \( I' \supseteq I \) with this property. With slight abuse of notation, where \( I \) is a MUL interval under \( l_n \), all of whose points are labeled by some node \( t \), we will write \( l_n(I) = t \). Note that for each point \( x \in [0,1] \), \( x \) belongs to successively smaller MUL intervals under the finite labeling functions, \( l_1, l_2, l_3, \ldots \). (Thus, e.g., for \( x = 1/4 \), \( x \) belongs to the MUL interval \([0, 1/3]\) under \( l_1 \), then to the MUL interval \([2/3, 1]\) under \( l_2 \), etc.) Letting \( I_{x,n} \) be the MUL interval under \( l_n \) containing \( x \), we have that \( \text{length} (I_{x,n}) \to_{n \to \infty} 0 \). It follows that if \( O \subseteq [0,1] \) is open, and \( x \in O \), then for large enough \( n \), \( I_{x,n} \subseteq O \).

Now let \( O \subseteq [0,1] \) be open, and suppose \( s \in l(O) \)—that is, \( l(x) = s \) for some \( x \in O \). We need to show that there exists an open set \( U \subseteq \mathbb{T}_2^\omega \) such that \( s \in U \subseteq l(O) \).

If (case 1) \( s \) is finite, then for large enough \( n \), \( I_{x,n} \subseteq O \) and \( l_n(I_{x,n}) = s \). We claim that \( l(I_{x,n}) = B_s \). Since \( I_{x,n} \subseteq O \), we have \( s \in B_s \subseteq l(O) \), and \( B_s \) is open, as needed. (Proof of the claim: By monotonicity of the labeling functions, we know that \( l(I_{x,n}) \subseteq B_s \). The difficult part is to show that \( B_s \subseteq l(I_{x,n}) \)—in particular, that every limit node in \( B_s \) labels some point in \( I_{x,n} \) under \( l \). We prove this part, and leave the case for finite nodes to the reader.

Let \( r \) be a limit node in \( B_s \). Then \( r = s \ast r' \) for some countably infinite string \( r' \in \Sigma^+ \). We write \( r' = (r'_1, r'_2, r'_3, \ldots) \). We need to find \( x' \in I_{x,n} \) such that \( l(x') = r \). It will be useful for us to label different segments of an MUL interval, \( I \), by \( A(I) \), \( B(I) \), \( C(I) \), and \( D(I) \), just as we labeled different parts of the line segments in \( K_n \) above.\(^\dagger\) We now define a sequence of points \( x_n \in [0,1] \), recursively. For the base step: If \( r'_1 = 0 \), then let \( x_1 \) be some point in \( B(I_{x,n}) \); if \( r'_1 = 1 \), then let \( x_1 \) be some point in \( C(I_{x,n}) \). For the recursive step, assume we have defined the points \( x_1, \ldots, x_k \). Then if \( r'_{k+1} = 0 \), let \( x_{k+1} \) be some point in \( B(I_{x,n+k}) \); if \( r'_{k+1} = 1 \), then let \( x_{k+1} \) be some point in \( C(I_{x,n+k}) \). By construction, for each \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), we have

\(^\dagger\)Thus, if \( I = (i_1, i_2) \), we have:

\[
B(I) = (i_1 + \frac{1}{2}(i_2 - i_1), i_1 + \frac{i_2 - i_1}{2}) \\
C(I) = (i_1 + \frac{i_2 - i_1}{2}, i_2 - \frac{1}{3}(i_2 - i_1))
\]
$x_{k+1}, x_k \in I_{x_k, n+k}$. So $|x_{k+1} - x_k| \leq \text{length}(I_{x_k, n+k}) \to_{k \to \infty} 0$. Thus the sequence $\{x_k\}$ is Cauchy, hence convergent. We let $x' = \lim_{k \to \infty} x_k$. It is then clear by construction that $x' \in I_{x, n}$ and $l(x') = s \ast r' = r$, as needed.

If (case 2) $s$ is a limit node, then $l_n(I_{x, n})$ is a finite ancestor of $s$, for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$. We pick $n$ large enough so that $I_{x, n} \subseteq O$ and let $t = l_n(I_{x, n})$. Then, as in the previous case, $l(I_{x, n}) = B_t$. Moreover, $s \in B_t$ by monotonicity of the labeling functions. Since $I_{x, n} \subseteq O$, we have $s \in B_t \subseteq l(O)$, and $B_t$ is open, as needed.

3. (Surjective) We know already that for some $x \in [0, 1]$, $l(x) = \langle \cdot \rangle$, which is the root of $T_2^+$ (pick, e.g., $x = \frac{1}{3}$). Moreover, the entire interval $[0, 1]$ is open. So by the fact that $l$ is open, $l[0, 1]$ is open, and contains the root of $T_2^+$. Since every node in $T_2^+$ is a descendant of the root, it follows that $l$ is surjective.

This completes the proof of the theorem.
Chapter 3

Completeness of $S_4$ for the Lebesgue Measure Algebra

This chapter explores a new, probabilistic semantics for the basic propositional modal language. In a series of recent talks, Dana Scott showed that the standard propositional modal language can be interpreted probabilistically, by assigning formulas to elements of the Lebesgue measure algebra, or algebra of Borel subsets of $[0,1]$ modulo sets of measure zero. In this semantics, formulas are not simply true or false in a given model, but acquire a probability value between 0 and 1, corresponding to the measure of the element of the algebra to which they are assigned. We prove completeness of $S_4$ for Scott’s semantics (formally, that $S_4$ is complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra). Several interesting corollaries follow from the proof of this result. First, any non-theorem of $S_4$ can be refuted at each point in a subset of the real interval $[0, 1]$ of measure arbitrarily close to 1. Second, intuitionistic propositional logic ($IPC'$) is complete for the subframe of open elements in the Lebesgue measure algebra, or elements that have an open representative.
3.1 Introduction

We saw, in the previous chapter, that modal languages can be interpreted in topological spaces, and that the modal logic $S4$ characterizes any dense-in-itself metric space—in particular, the real line, $\mathbb{R}$. The real line, however, can be investigated not just from a topological point of view, but from a measure-theoretic point of view. Here, the probability measure we have in mind is the usual Lebesgue measure on the reals. In the last several years Dana Scott introduced a new probabilistic or measure-based semantics for $S4$, which is built around Lebesgue measure on the reals.

Scott’s semantics is essentially algebraic: formulas are interpreted in the Lebesgue measure algebra, or the $\sigma$-algebra of Borel subsets of the real interval $[0,1]$, modulo sets of measure zero (henceforth, “null sets”). We denote this algebra by $\mathcal{M}$. Thus elements of $\mathcal{M}$ are equivalence classes of Borel sets. In Scott’s semantics, each propositional variable is assigned to an arbitrary element of $\mathcal{M}$. Conjunctions, disjunctions and negations are interpreted as meets, joins and complements in the algebra, respectively. In order to interpret the $S4$ ‘$\Box$’-modality, we add to the algebra an interior operator (defined below), which we construct from the collection of open elements in the algebra, or elements that have an open representative. Unlike the Kripke or topological semantics, there is no notion here of truth at a point (or at a “world”). Indeed, singleton sets—sets consisting of a single point—have measure zero, and so “disappear” in the Lebesgue measure algebra.

The introduction of a new semantics brings with it familiar questions. Is the set of validities in the Lebesgue measure algebra axiomatizable? If so, is it characterized by any known modal logic? In particular, does the set of validities in the measure algebra coincide with the theorems of $S4$ (i.e., is $S4$ sound and complete for Scott’s measure-based semantics)? Such questions belong to a broader family of questions that parallel, in some sense, the questions that we are accustomed to ask about Tarski’s topological semantics. Do different measure algebras give rise to different modal logics? To what extent can modal languages describe, discriminate between, and help us to reason about different measure structures?

In this chapter, we address the question of completeness for Scott’s semantics. Our main result is that $S4$ is complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra. Two

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1A version of this paper was published in *Journal of Philosophical Logic* (see (22)). Since then I thought of an easier way to go about the main proof, and so parts of the current version are changed from the published version. This easier way is inspired by the main construction in (38). I would like to thank the publishers of the *Journal of Philosophical Logic* for granting me the permission to reproduce the published work here.
important corollaries follow from the proof of this result. First, any non-theorem of \( S4 \) can be refuted at each point in a subset of the real interval, \([0, 1]\), of measure arbitrarily close to 1. Second, intuitionistic propositional logic (IPC) is complete for the subframe of ‘open’ elements in the Lebesgue measure algebra, or elements with an open representative set.

### 3.2 Topological and algebraic semantics for \( S4 \)

Let the propositional modal language \( L \) consist of a countable set, \( \mathbb{P} = \{P_i \mid i \in \mathbb{N}\} \), of propositional variables and be closed under binary connectives \( \rightarrow, \vee, \wedge, \leftrightarrow \) and unary operators \( \neg, \Box, \diamond \).

**Definition 3.2.1.** The modal logic \( S4 \) in the language \( L \) consists of some complete axiomatization of classical propositional logic \( PL \), some complete axiomatization of the minimal normal modal logic \( K \), say the axiom:

\[
K : \Box(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\psi)
\]

and the rule:

\[
N : \vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash \Box\phi
\]

and finally the two special \( S4 \) axioms:

\[
4 : \Box P \rightarrow \Box\Box P
\]

\[
T : \Box P \rightarrow P
\]

We are interested in algebraic models of the modal system \( S4 \), or topological Boolean algebras.

**Definition 3.2.2.** A topological Boolean algebra (henceforth TBA) is a Boolean algebra with an interior operator, \( I \), satisfying the following properties:

\[
(l_1) \ Ia \leq a \\
(l_2) \ I(a \wedge b) = Ia \wedge Ib \\
(l_3) \ IIa = Ia \\
(l_4) \ I(1) = 1
\]

A complete TBA is a TBA in which every collection of elements has a supremum (and infimum).
**Example 3.2.3.** *(Topological field of sets)* The set of subsets $\mathcal{P}(X)$ of a topological space $X$ with set-theoretic meets, joins and complements, and where $I_a$ denotes the (topological) interior of $a$, is a complete TBA and we denote it by $B(X)$. More generally, any Boolean algebra, $\mathcal{A}$, of subsets of a topological space $X$ that is closed under topological interiors is a TBA ($\mathcal{A}$ need not contain all subsets of $X$). We call any such algebra a topological field of sets. Note that we reserve the notation $B(X)$ for the topological Boolean algebra generated by all subsets of $X$.

**Definition 3.2.4.** An algebraic model of $S4$ is a pair, $\langle \mathcal{A}, V \rangle$, where $\mathcal{A}$ is a topological Boolean algebra, and $V : \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{A}$ is a valuation function, assigning to each propositional variable some element of the algebra, $\mathcal{A}$.

We would like to extend the valuation function, $V$, to the set of all formulas in $L$, and we do so by the following recursive clauses. For any formulas $\phi$ and $\psi$, let:

$$
\begin{align*}
V(\phi \lor \psi) &= V(\phi) \lor V(\psi) \\
V(\neg \phi) &= -V(\phi) \\
V(\Box \phi) &= I(V(\phi))
\end{align*}
$$

(3.1)

where symbols on the RHS denote (in order) the algebraic join, complement, and interior. (The remaining binary connectives $\{\&, \to, \leftrightarrow\}$ and unary operator $\{\Diamond\}$ are defined in terms of the above in the usual way.)

Let $M = \langle \mathcal{A}, V \rangle$ be an algebraic model. We say a formula $\phi$ is *satisfied* in $M$ ($M \models \phi$) iff $V(\phi) = 1_\mathcal{A}$ (the top element in the algebra). We say $\phi$ is *satisfied in $\mathcal{A}$* ($\mathcal{A} \models \phi$) iff $\phi$ is satisfied in every model $M$ defined over the algebra $\mathcal{A}$. Finally, for any class $C$ of TBA’s, $\phi$ is *satisfied in $C$* ($\models_C \phi$) iff $\phi$ is satisfied in every TBA in $C$.

We now define completeness in the usual way: A logic $S$ is complete for a class, $C$, of TBA’s if every formula that is satisfied in $C$ is provable in $S$. In symbols,

$$
\models_C \phi \Rightarrow \vdash_S \phi
$$

An equivalent formulation will be more useful in what follows: $S$ is complete for $C$ if any non-theorem of $S$ is refuted in $C$. In symbols,

$$
\not\vdash_S \phi \Rightarrow \not\models_C \phi
$$

---

2This semantics can be generalized by defining a set of designated elements, $D_{\mathcal{A}}$, of $\mathcal{A}$ and letting satisfaction in a model $M = \langle \mathcal{A}, V \rangle$ be defined by: $V(\phi) \in D_{\mathcal{A}}$. The definition used in this chapter is the special case where $D_{\mathcal{A}} = \{1_\mathcal{A}\}$.
Note that if \( A \) is a topological field of sets, it makes sense to talk about truth at a point (much like truth at a world in Kripke semantics for the standard propositional modal language). For any formula \( \phi \), valuation \( V : \mathbb{P} \to B(X) \), and point \( x \in X \), we can say that \( \phi \) is true at \( x \) if

\[
x \in V(\phi)
\]

This ternary relation between a valuation, formula and point in the topological space has no place in the general algebraic semantics—where \( A \) need not be a topological field of sets—and, in particular, has no analog when it comes to the Lebesgue measure algebra, as we will see below.

**Theorem 3.2.5** (Tarski’s completeness theorem). The modal logic \( S4 \) is sound and complete for:

(i) The class of all topological spaces (i.e., \( \{ B(X) \mid X \text{ is a topological space} \} \)).

(ii) The class of all finite topological spaces (i.e., \( \{ B(X) \mid X \text{ is a finite topological space} \} \)).

(iii) Any dense-in-itself metric space (i.e., \( B(X) \) for any dense-in-itself metric space, \( X \)).

**Proof.** The theorem was proved by McKinsey and Tarski in 1944 in (27). \( \square \)

**Definition 3.2.6.** A \( S4 \) Kripke frame is a pair \( \langle U, R \rangle \), where \( U \) is a set (of ‘worlds’) and \( R \) is a reflexive, transitive binary relation on \( U \). A rooted \( S4 \) Kripke frame is a triple \( \langle U, R, w_0 \rangle \), where \( U \) and \( R \) are as above, \( w_0 \in U \), and \( w_0 Rw \) for each \( w \in U \). We say that a (rooted) Kripke frame is finite if \( U \) is a finite set.\(^3\)

**Definition 3.2.7.** Let \( X \) be a topological space. Then \( X \) is Alexandroff if the collection of open sets in \( X \) is closed under arbitrary intersections.

It is well-known that \( S4 \) Kripke frames are just Alexandroff spaces, and vice versa. Indeed, let \( \langle U, R \rangle \) be a \( S4 \) Kripke frame, and say that a set \( U' \subseteq U \) is open if it is closed under the binary relation \( R \). The collection of open sets so defined contains the empty set, the entire space \( U \), and is closed under arbitrary unions and intersections. Thus the collection of open sets defines a topology on \( U \). Conversely, if \( X \) is an Alexandroff space, then for any \( x \in X \), the set \( U_x = \)

\(^3\)This somewhat non-standard definition of Kripke frames is meant to highlight frames as topological spaces. On a more standard presentation, a Kripke frame is what I call here a rooted Kripke frame.
\[ \bigcap \{ O \text{ open} \mid x \in O \} \text{ is an open set. We put } xRy \text{ iff } y \in U_x. \] The reader can verify that \( R \) is reflexive and transitive. It follows that \( \langle X, R \rangle \) is a S4 Kripke frame.

Notice that any finite topology is Alexandroff. (There are only finitely many points in the space, so only finitely many open subsets.) Thus the collection of finite topological spaces is just the collection of finite S4 Kripke frames. We can now state Theorem 3.2.5 (\( \text{iii} \)) as follows: S4 is complete for the class of all finite S4 Kripke frames. In fact, more is true: S4 is complete for the class of all \textit{rooted} finite Kripke frames. That is to say, any non-theorem, \( \alpha \), of S4 can be refuted at the root of a finite Kripke frame. (We do not reprove this classic result here. To understand it, though, think about what happens if we simply delete from a (non-rooted) Kripke frame every node not related under \( R \) to the world at which \( \alpha \) is refuted.) In the final section of this chapter, we will appeal to this stronger completeness result.

### 3.3 The Lebesgue measure algebra

In this section we define our central object of study: the measure algebra, \( \mathcal{M} \). We prove that \( \mathcal{M} \) is a complete Boolean algebra, and define an \textit{open} sublattice in \( \mathcal{M} \). We then show that the sublattice of open elements forms a complete Heyting algebra.

**Definition 3.3.1.** Let \( \mathcal{A} \) be a Boolean algebra. We say that a non-empty subset \( I \subseteq \mathcal{A} \) is an \textit{ideal} if

1. For all \( a, b \in I \), \( a \lor b \in I \)
2. If \( a \in I \) and \( b \leq a \), then \( b \in I \)

If \( I \) is closed under countable suprema, we say \( I \) is a \( \sigma \)-ideal.

We can construct new Boolean algebras from existing ones by quotienting by an ideal. If \( \mathcal{A} \) is a Boolean algebra and \( I \subseteq \mathcal{A} \) is an ideal, we define the correspondence \( \sim \) on \( \mathcal{A} \) by:

\[ x \sim y \text{ iff } (x \triangle y) \in I \]

where \( \triangle \) denotes symmetric difference.\(^4\) Letting \( \mathcal{A}/I \) be the set of equivalence

---

\(^4\)Note that differences and symmetric differences are defined in any Boolean algebra, not just in fields of sets. In particular, \( x - y \) is defined as \( x \land -y \) (where \( -y \) is the Boolean complement of \( y \)) and \( x \triangle y \) is defined as \( (x - y) \lor (y - x) \).
classes under \(\sim\), and letting \(|x|\) be the equivalence class corresponding to \(x \in A\), the operations \(\lor, \land\) and \(-\) on \(A/I\) are defined in the obvious way:

\[
\begin{aligned}
|x| \lor |y| &= |x \lor y| \\
|x| \land |y| &= |x \land y| \\
-|x| &= |-x|
\end{aligned}
\]  
(3.2)

It is easy to verify that \(A/I\) is a Boolean algebra with top and bottom elements \(|1_A|\) and \(|0_A|\), respectively. From the definitions of \(\lor\) and \(\land\) we can reconstruct the lattice order \(\leq\) as follows. For any \(|x|, |y| \in A/I|,

\(|x| \leq |y|\) if and only if \(|x| \land |y| = |x|\)

**Lemma 3.3.2.** Let \(A\) be a Boolean Algebra and \(I\) an ideal in \(A\). Then for any elements \(a, b\) in the quotient algebra \(A/I\), the following are equivalent:

(i) \(a \leq b\)

(ii) For any representatives \(A\) of \(a\), and \(B\) of \(b\), there exists some \(N \in I\) with \(A \leq B \lor N\) (in the Boolean algebra, \(A\)).

(iii) For any representative \(A\) of \(a\), there exists a representative \(B\) of \(b\) with \(A \leq B\) (in the Boolean algebra, \(A\)).

**Proof.** (i) \(\rightarrow\) (ii) Suppose \(a \leq b\) and let \(a = |A|, b = |B|\). Then \(|A \land B| = |A| \land |B| = |A|\), so \(A \land B \sim A\). Thus \(A - B = A - (A \land B) = N\) for some \(N \in I\). It follows that \(A \leq B \lor N\).

(ii) \(\rightarrow\) (iii) This follows from the fact that \(B \lor N \sim B\) for \(N \in I\).

(iii) \(\rightarrow\) (i). If \(A \leq B\), then \(|A| \land |B| = |A \land B| = |A|\), and \(a = |A| \leq |B| = b\). \(\Box\)

We want to add measure-structure to Boolean algebras. The simplest such structures are Boolean algebras carrying a finitely additive measure. We are interested, however, in Boolean \(\sigma\)-algebras carrying a countably additive measure. The relevant definition is given below.

**Definition 3.3.3.** A measure, \(\mu\), on a Boolean \(\sigma\)-algebra \(^5\) \(A\), is a real-valued, non-negative function \(\mu\) on \(A\), with \(\mu(0_A) = 0\), that satisfies countable additivity: If \(\{F_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}\) is a countable collection of elements in \(A\) with \(F_n \land F_m = 0_A\) for all \(n, m \in \mathbb{N}\), then

\[
\mu(\bigvee_{n \in \mathbb{N}} F_n) = \sum_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \mu(F_n)
\]

\(^5\)A Boolean \(\sigma\)-algebra is a Boolean algebra that is closed under countable joins (and meets).
We say that a measure, \( \mu \), on a Boolean \( \sigma \)-algebra, \( \mathcal{A} \), is \textit{normalized} if \( \mu(1_\mathcal{A}) = 1 \). We say that \( \mu \) is \textit{positive} if \( \mu(a) = 0 \) iff \( a = 0_\mathcal{A} \).

\textbf{Definition 3.3.4.} (Halmos) A measure algebra is a Boolean \( \sigma \)-algebra, \( \mathcal{A} \), together with a positive, normalized measure, \( \mu \), on \( \mathcal{A} \).

\textbf{Fact 3.3.5.} Let \( \mu \) be a normalized measure on a Boolean \( \sigma \)-algebra, \( \mathcal{A} \), and let \( U \) be the set of elements \( a \in \mathcal{A} \) with \( \mu(a) = 0 \). Then,

(i) \( U \) is a \( \sigma \)-ideal in \( \mathcal{A} \)

(ii) The quotient \( \mathcal{A}/U \) is a Boolean \( \sigma \)-algebra.

(iii) There exists a unique measure \( \nu \) on \( \mathcal{A}/U \) defined by

\[ \nu(|a|) = \mu(a) \]

Moreover, \( \nu \) is positive and normalized.

\textbf{Proof.} (i) If \( a \leq b \), and \( \mu(b) = 0 \), we write \( b = a \lor (b - a) \). But then \( \mu(a) \leq \mu(b) \), by additivity of \( \mu \), so \( \mu(a) = 0 \). If \( \{a_n \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\} \) is a countable collection of elements in \( \mathcal{A} \) with \( \mu(a_n) = 0 \) for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), then by countable subadditivity of \( \mu \), \( \mu(\bigvee_n a_n) \leq \sum_n \mu(a_n) = 0 \). (ii) We need to show that the quotient algebra \( \mathcal{A}/U \) is closed under countable joins. Let \( \{a_n \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\} \) be a collection of elements in \( \mathcal{A}/U \), with \( a_n = |A_n| \) for each \( n \in \mathbb{N} \). We claim \( \bigvee_n a_n = |\bigvee_n A_n| \). Clearly \( |\bigvee_n A_n| \) is an upper bound on \( \{a_n \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\} \). If \( b = |B| \) is an upper bound on \( \{a_n \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\} \), then \( |A_n| = a_n \leq |B| \), and \( A_n \leq B \lor N_n \) for some \( N_n \in U \) (see Lemma 3.3.2). But then \( \bigvee_n A_n \leq B \lor \bigvee_n N_n \), and \( \bigvee_n N_n \in U \) (since \( U \) is a \( \sigma \)-ideal). So \( |\bigvee_n A_n| \leq |B| = b \). (iii) the proof can be found in, e.g., (15). \( \Box \)

Let \( \text{Leb}([0, 1]) \) be the \( \sigma \)-algebra of Lebesgue-measurable subsets of the real interval \([0, 1]\), and let \( \mu \) denote standard Lebesgue measure. Then \( \mu \) is a normalized measure on \( \text{Leb}([0, 1]) \) with \( \mu(\emptyset) = 0 \).

\textbf{Definition 3.3.6.} (The Lebesgue Measure Algebra, \( \mathcal{M} \)) Let \( \text{Null}_\mu \) be the set of measure zero subsets of \([0, 1]\). Then by Fact 3.3.5, the quotient algebra,

\[ \text{Leb}([0, 1]) / \text{Null}_\mu \]

is a measure algebra. We denote this algebra by \( \mathcal{M} \) and refer to it as the Lebesgue measure algebra.
In what follows, we use uppercase letters $A, B, C...$ to denote subsets of $[0, 1]$ and lower-case letters $a, b, c...$ to denote elements of $M$. Equivalence classes of measurable sets are denoted with a bar above the relevant set (e.g., $a = \bar{A}$, $0_M = \emptyset$, $1_M = [0, 1]$). We use ‘measure ($A$)’ or simply ‘$m(A)$’ to denote the measure of the set $A$. The definitions in (3.2) give, for any subsets $A$ and $B$ of $[0,1]$:

$$\bar{A} \lor \bar{B} = \bar{A \cup B}$$
$$\bar{A} \land \bar{B} = \bar{A \cap B}$$
$$-\bar{A} = [0,1] - \bar{A}$$

(3.3)

**Lemma 3.3.7.** For any sets $A, B \in \text{Leb}([0,1])$,

$$A \sim B \iff \bar{A} \leq \bar{B} \text{ and } m(A) = m(B)$$

**Proof.** The left-to-right direction is obvious. For the right-to-left direction, suppose $\bar{A} \leq \bar{B}$ and $m(A) = m(B)$. Then $A \subseteq B \cup N$ for some $N \in \text{Null}$, so $m(A - B) = 0$. Furthermore,

$$m(B - A) = m(B) - m(B \cap A) = m(A) - m(B \cap A) = m(A - B)$$

and we have $m(B - A) = 0$. Thus $A \Delta B \in \text{Null}$ and $A \sim B$. \hfill \Box

**Proposition 3.3.8.** $\mathcal{M}$ is a complete Boolean algebra

**Proof.** We show that any well-ordered subset $S$ of $\mathcal{M}$ has a least upper bound. The proof is by transfinite induction on the order type of $S$. Let $S$ have order type $\alpha$ and write $S = \{p_\gamma | \gamma < \alpha\}$. For $\beta < \alpha$, let $q_\beta = \sup \{p_\gamma | \gamma < \beta\}$ (existence follows from the inductive hypothesis). If $\alpha$ is a limit ordinal then $\{q_\beta | \beta < \alpha\}$ is a non-decreasing sequence of elements in $\mathcal{M}$ and $\{m(q_\beta) | \beta < \alpha\}$ is a non-decreasing sequence of reals. But note that there are only countably many distinct reals in this sequence (for each “jump” between two reals in the sequence, there is a distinct rational number.) It follows from Lemma 3.3.7 that there are only countably many distinct elements ‘$q_\beta$’ in the sequence $\{q_\beta | \beta < \alpha\}$. But $\mathcal{M}$ is closed under countable suprema (see Fact 3.3.5 (ii)), so $\sup S = \sup \{q_\beta | \beta < \alpha\}$ exists. \hfill \Box

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6 This proof was suggested to me by Dana Scott. In fact, the more general claim that every (positive, normalized) measure algebra is complete is proved in (15). The proof proceeds by showing that an algebra is complete iff it satisfies the countable chain condition, and that any measure algebra so defined satisfies this condition.
By contrast, \( \text{Leb}([0, 1]) \) is not a complete Boolean algebra. If, e.g., \( S \) is a non-measurable subset of \([0, 1]\), then the collection \( \{ \{ x \} \mid x \in S \} \) has no supremum in \( \text{Leb}([0, 1]) \). Note that the Lebesgue measure, \( \mu \), on \( \text{Leb}([0, 1]) \) is not a positive measure: any non-empty countable set has measure zero, but is not equal to the bottom element, \( \emptyset \) of the algebra. Indeed, it is proved in (15) that every (positive, normalized) measure algebra is complete.

The Lebesgue measure algebra, \( \mathcal{M} \) is well-known, but now we would like to turn \( \mathcal{M} \) into a topological Boolean algebra. To do so, we must define an interior operator on the algebra. We do this by first defining a collection of ‘open’ elements in \( \mathcal{M} \).

**Definition 3.3.9.** We say an element \( a \in \mathcal{M} \) is open if some representative \( A \) of \( a \) is an open subset of \([0, 1]\). We denote the set of open elements in \( \mathcal{M} \) by \( \mathcal{G} \).

The next proposition states that not all elements of \( \mathcal{M} \) are open.

**Proposition 3.3.10.** \( \mathcal{M} \neq \mathcal{G} \)

**Proof.** The proof is postponed until §3.5.1, where we introduce thick Cantor sets. \( \square \)

In the next proposition we show that open elements in \( \mathcal{M} \) form a complete Heyting algebra. Recall that a complete Heyting algebra is a complete lattice that satisfies the following infinite distributive law: For any \( x \in A \) and \( \{ a_i \mid i \in I \} \subseteq A \),

\[
x \wedge \bigvee_{i \in I} a_i = \bigvee_{i \in I} (x \wedge a_i)
\]

(3.4)

**Proposition 3.3.11.** \( \mathcal{G} \) is a complete Heyting algebra.\(^7\)

**Proof.** We need to show that \( \mathcal{G} \) is a complete lattice. Let \( \{ a_i \mid i \in I \} \subseteq \mathcal{G} \), and let \( a_i = \overline{A_i} \) for each \( i \in I \), with \( A_i \) an open representative of \( a_i \). Let \( \{(p_n, q_n) \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\} \) be the collection of open rational intervals (open intervals with rational end-points) contained in some (or other) \( A_i \). We claim that \( \bigvee_i a_i = \bigcup_n (p_n, q_n) \). Clearly RHS is an upper bound on \( \{ a_i \mid i \in I \} \) (this follows from the fact that

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\(^7\)In general, infima in \( \mathcal{G} \) and \( \mathcal{M} \) do not coincide. Example: For each \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), let \( K_n \) denote the set of points belonging to “remaining intervals” at the \( n \)-th stage of construction of \( K \) (defined in §3.5.1). Then \( \overline{K_n} \in \mathcal{G} \) for each \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), but \( \inf_M \{ \overline{K_n} \mid n \in \mathbb{N} \} = \overline{K} \), and \( \inf_G \{ \overline{K_n} \mid n \in \mathbb{N} \} = \emptyset \) (where \( \inf_M \) and \( \inf_G \) denote infima in \( \mathcal{M} \) and \( \mathcal{G} \), respectively).
each open set, $A_i$ is equal to the union of rational intervals contained in it). Suppose $b = \overline{B}$ is an upper bound on $\{a_i \mid i \in I\}$ with $b \in \mathcal{G}$. \footnote{The reader can verify that the condition $b \in \mathcal{G}$ does no work in the proof. Indeed, this shows that suprema in $\mathcal{M}$ and $\mathcal{G}$ coincide. This is not the case for infima (see note 6).} For each $i \in I$, choose $N_i \in Null$ such that $A_i \subseteq B \cup N_i$. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, choose $i(n)$ such that $(p_n, q_n) \subseteq A_{i(n)}$. We have: $\bigcup_n (p_n, q_n) \subseteq \bigcup_n A_{i(n)} \subseteq B \cup \bigcup_n N_{i(n)}$, where $\bigcup_n N_{i(n)} \in Null$. So $\bigcup_n (p_n, q_n) \leq \overline{B} = b$, proving the claim. This shows that every collection of elements in $\mathcal{G}$ has a supremum. What about infima? Consider now the collection of $\{b_j \mid j \in J\}$ of lower bounds \footnote{It is crucial that we take lower bounds in $\mathcal{G}$ and not in the larger $\mathcal{M}$. In general, the set of lower bounds in $\mathcal{G}$ and $\mathcal{M}$ do not coincide! See note 6.} in $\mathcal{G}$ on $\{a_i \mid i \in I\}$. This collection has a supremum, $b$. We claim that $b = \wedge_i a_i$. The proof is similar to the previous and is left to the reader.

Note that the proof shows that $\bigvee_i a_i = \bigcup_i A_i$, where $A_i$ is any open representative of $a_i$ (for $i \in I$). We use this fact to show that $\mathcal{G}$ satisfies the distributive law (3.4), as follows. Let $x = \overline{X}$, with $X$ an open representative. Then,

$$x \wedge \bigvee_i a_i = X \wedge \bigcup_i A_i = \bigcup_i (X \cap A_i) = \bigvee_i (X \cap A_i) = \bigvee_i (x \wedge a_i)$$

\[ \square \]

With our definition of open elements in hand, we can now equip $\mathcal{M}$ with an interior operator $I$ defined as follows. For any $a \in \mathcal{M}$,

$$Ia = \sup \{b \text{ open} \mid b \leq a\} \quad (3.5)$$

**Proposition 3.3.12.** $I$ is an interior operator.

**Proof.** Let $a, b \in \mathcal{M}$. Axiom $(l_1)$ is obvious. For $(l_2)$, note that $I(a \wedge b) \leq I(a)$ and $I(a \wedge b) \leq I(b)$. So $I(a \wedge b) \leq I(a \wedge b)$. For the reverse inequality, note that $Ia \leq a$ and $Ib \leq b$. Thus $Ia \wedge Ib \leq a \wedge b$. Moreover, $(Ia \wedge Ib) \in \mathcal{G}$. It follows
that \( I_a \land I_b \leq \sup \{ c \in G \mid c \leq a \land b \} \). For \((l_3)\) note that \( I_a \in G \), and \( I_a \leq I_a \), giving \( I_a \leq \sup \{ c \in G \mid c \leq I_a \} \). By \((l_1)\) we also have \( II_a \leq I_a \). Finally for \((l_4)\), note that \([0, 1] \in G\). Thus \( I[0, 1] = \sup \{ c \in G \mid c \leq [0, 1] \} = [0, 1] \).

**Remark 3.3.13.** At this point, the reader may be wondering: Why not define the operator \( I \) via the topological interior on underlying sets (just as Boolean operations on \( M \) are defined via set-theoretic operations on underlying sets):

\[
I(A) = \overline{\text{Int}(A)}
\]

(where \( \overline{\text{Int}(A)} \) denotes the topological interior of the set \( A \subseteq [0, 1] \)). A simple example shows that definition \((*)\) is not correct (i.e., not well-defined). Let \( A = [0, 1] - \mathbb{Q} \). Then \( A \sim [0, 1] \). But \( \text{Int}(A) = \emptyset \), and \( \text{Int}([0, 1]) = [0, 1] \). So according to \((*)\), \( [0, 1] = I(A) = \emptyset \).

**Corollary 3.3.14.** The Measure Algebra, \( M \), with unary operator \( I \) is a TBA.

**Proof.** Immediate from Proposition 4.8 and Proposition 3.3.12.

In general, there is no easy way to calculate the supremum of an uncountable collection of elements in \( M \), as indicated by the non-constructive proof of Proposition 4.8. However, when we calculate \( I_a \), we take the supremum of a collection of open elements, and arbitrary joins of open elements reduce to countable joins, and so are well-behaved (see proof of Proposition 3.3.11). The following proposition shows how to calculate the interior operator in \( M \) in terms of underlying sets.

**Proposition 3.3.15.** Let \( a \in M \) and let \( \{(p_n, q_n) \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\} \) be an enumeration of open rational intervals (open intervals with rational endpoints) contained in some (or other) representative \( A \) of \( a \). Then, \( I_a = \bigcup_n (p_n, q_n) \).

**Proof.** The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.3.11. We need to show that \( \bigcup_n (p_n, q_n) = \sup \{ c \in G \mid c \leq a \} \). Suppose that \( c \in G \) and \( c \leq a \). Then \( c = \overline{C} \) for some open representative \( C \) and \( C \subseteq A \) for some representative \( A \) of \( a \) (see Lemma 3.3.2). Since \( C \) is open, \( C \) can be written as the union of open rational intervals contained in \( C \). Each such interval is also contained in \( A \), so

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\(^{10}\)Indeed, the example shows that the interior operator in the topological fields of sets \( \text{Leb}([0,1]) \) and \( \mathcal{B}([0,1]) \) behaves quite differently from the interior operator in \( M \). This is crucial in what follows, where, despite this difference, we aim to transfer valuations over \( \mathcal{B}([0,1]) \) to \( M \).
$C \subseteq \bigcup_n (p_n, q_n)$, and $c \leq \bigcup_n (p_n, q_n)$. This shows $\bigcup_n (p_n, q_n)$ is an upper bound on $\{c \in \mathcal{G} \mid c \leq a\}$. Now suppose that $b = \overline{B}$ is an upper bound on $\{c \in \mathcal{G} \mid c \leq a\}$. Then, for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $(p_n, q_n) \leq b$, and $(p_n, q_n) \subseteq B \cup N_n$ for some $N_n \in \text{Null}$. So $\bigcup_n (p_n, q_n) \subseteq B \cup \bigcup_n N_n$ and $\bigcup_n (p_n, q_n) \leq b$. This shows that $\bigcup_n (p_n, q_n)$ is the least upper bound on $\{c \in \mathcal{G} \mid c \leq a\}$. \hfill \Box

We state without proof an obvious corollary which represents the interior in $\mathcal{M}$ in terms of open sets rather than rational intervals:

**Corollary 3.3.16.** For any $a \in \mathcal{M}$,

$$Ia = \bigcup \{O \text{ open} \mid O \subseteq A \text{ for some representative } A \text{ of } a\}$$

Note from Corollary 3.3.16 that $Ia \in \mathcal{G}$ for any $a \in \mathcal{M}$. Thus, as expected, boxed formulas (i.e., formulas of the form $\square \phi$ for some $\phi \in L$) are evaluated to open elements in $\mathcal{M}$.

### 3.4 Invariance maps

Our aim in what follows will be to transfer completeness of $S4$ from finite topologies (= finite $S4$ Kripke frames) to the measure algebra, $\mathcal{M}$, by means of truth-preserving maps. In this section, then, we study truth-preserving maps between topological Boolean algebras. In the special case where we deal with topological fields of sets, the key notion is that of an interior, surjective map. The key notion in the more general algebraic semantics is that of an embedding. The relevant definitions are given below.

**Definition 3.4.1.** Let $\mathcal{A}_1$ and $\mathcal{A}_2$ be TBA’s. A function $\pi : \mathcal{A}_1 \rightarrow \mathcal{A}_2$ is a homomorphism if it preserves Boolean operations and the interior operator:

$$\pi(a \lor b) = \pi(a) \lor \pi(b)$$
$$\pi(a \land b) = \pi(a) \land \pi(b)$$
$$\pi(-a) = -\pi(a)$$
$$\pi(Ia) = I(\pi(a))$$

We say that $\pi : \mathcal{A}_1 \rightarrow \mathcal{A}_2$ is an embedding if $\pi$ is an injective homomorphism. Finally, we say that $\pi : \mathcal{A}_1 \rightarrow \mathcal{A}_2$ is an isomorphism if $\pi$ is a surjective embedding.

\textsuperscript{11}We say that $\pi : \mathcal{A}_1 \rightarrow \mathcal{A}_2$ is an embedding if $\pi$ is an injective homomorphism. Finally, we say that $\pi : \mathcal{A}_1 \rightarrow \mathcal{A}_2$ is an isomorphism if $\pi$ is a surjective embedding.

\textsuperscript{11}In the final equation, ‘$I$’ on the LHS is the interior operator in $\mathcal{A}_1$ and ‘$I$’ on the RHS is the interior operator in $\mathcal{A}_2$. We trust that the slight abuse of notation here will not confuse.
Lemma 3.4.2. Suppose that $A_1$ and $A_2$ are TBA’s and that $\pi : A_1 \to A_2$ is a homomorphism. Let $V' : P \to A_1$ be any valuation over $A_1$ and define the valuation $V : P \to A_2$ by $V(P) = \pi \circ V'(P)$. Then for any formula $\alpha$ in the propositional modal language, $L$,

$$V(\alpha) = \pi \circ V'(\alpha)$$

If $\pi$ is an embedding, then (also)

$$V'(\alpha) = 1_{A_1} \iff V(\alpha) = 1_{A_2}$$

Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of $\alpha$. The base case is true by definition of $V$, and we prove only the modal clause:

$$V(\Box \phi) = I(V(\phi))$$

$$= I(\pi \circ V'(\phi)) \quad \text{(by inductive hypothesis)}$$

$$= \pi(I(V'(\phi))) \quad \text{(since $\pi$ a homomorphism)}$$

$$= \pi \circ V'(\Box \phi)$$

For the second part of the lemma (where $\pi$ is an embedding), note that if $V(\alpha) = 1_{A_2}$, then by the previous part, $\pi \circ V'(\alpha) = 1_{A_2}$. But since $\pi$ is injective, $V'(\alpha) = 1_{A_1}$. Conversely, if $V'(\alpha) = 1_{A_1}$, then $V(\alpha) = \pi \circ V'(\alpha) = \pi \circ 1_{A_1} = 1_{A_2}$. □

Lemma 3.4.3. Let $X$ and $Y$ be topological spaces, and form the corresponding topological field of sets $B(X)$ and $B(Y)$. If $g : X \to Y$ is interior and surjective, then $[g^{-1}] : B(Y) \to B(X)$\footnote{The map $[g^{-1}]$ is defined on $B(Y)$. It takes subsets of $Y$ to their pullbacks in $X$—i.e., for $S \subseteq Y$, $[g^{-1}](S) = \{x \in X \mid g(x) \in S\}$.} is an embedding.

Proof. Suppose $S_1, S_2 \in B(Y)$, with $S_1 \neq S_2$. WLOG, let $y \in S_1$, $y \notin S_2$. Then since $g$ is surjective, there exists $x \in X$ with $g(x) = y$. But then $x \in [g^{-1}](S_1)$ and $x \notin [g^{-1}](S_2)$, proving that $[g^{-1}]$ is injective.

We need to show that $[g^{-1}]$ preserves the algebraic operations. The Boolean operations are straightforward and we prove only the modal clause: i.e., for any $a \in B(Y)$,

$$[g^{-1}](Ia) = I([g^{-1}](a))$$
By continuity of $g$, we know that $[g^{-1}](Ia)$ is open in $X$. Moreover, since $Ia \subseteq a$, we have $[g^{-1}](Ia) \subseteq [g^{-1}](a)$. Thus $[g^{-1}](Ia)$ is an open subset of $[g^{-1}](a)$.

To see that it is the largest such subset, suppose $O \subseteq [g^{-1}](a)$ is open in $X$. Then, since $g$ is open, $g(O)$ is an open subset of $a$, hence $g(O) \subseteq Ia$. But then $O \subseteq [g^{-1}](Ia)$.

**Proposition 3.4.4.** Suppose that $X$ and $Y$ are topological spaces and $g : X \to Y$ is an interior, surjective map. Let $V' : \mathbb{P} \to B(Y)$ be a valuation function and define $V = [g^{-1}] \circ V'$. Then for every formula $\alpha$ of $L$ we have:

$$V(\alpha) = [g^{-1}] \circ V'(\alpha)$$

and

$$V'(\alpha) = 1_{B(Y)} \iff V(\alpha) = 1_{B(X)}$$

**Proof.** Immediate from the previous two lemmas. $\square$

We want to construct embeddings not just from one topological field of sets into another, but from a topological field of sets into the Lebesgue measure algebra, $\mathcal{M}$. Such maps will allow us to transfer completeness from a given topological space, or class of spaces, to $\mathcal{M}$. To this end, let us define a new, measure-theoretic property of maps between topological spaces.

**Definition 3.4.5.** Let $X$ be the real interval, $[0,1]$, let $\mu$ be standard Lebesgue measure on $X$, and let $Y$ be a topological space. We say that a function $g : X \to Y$ has the M-property if for every subset $S \subseteq Y$,

(i) $g^{-1}(S)$ is Lebesgue-measurable.

(ii) For any open set $O \subseteq X$, if $g^{-1}(S) \cap O \neq \emptyset$, then $\mu(g^{-1}(S) \cap O) > 0$.

**Proposition 3.4.6.** Let $X, \mu$, and $Y$ be as in Definition 3.4.5. Suppose $g : X \to Y$ is an interior, surjective map, and that $g$ satisfies the M-property. Then the function $\Phi : B(Y) \to \mathcal{M}$ defined by:

$$\Phi(S) = \overline{g^{-1}(S)}$$

(for any $S \subseteq Y$) is an embedding.\(^{13}\)

\(^{13}\)Note that $\Phi = q \circ g^{-1}$, where $q$ is the restriction of the quotient map from $B([0, 1])$ to $\mathcal{M}$ to the set $\{g^{-1}(S) | S \subseteq Y\}$. We know that $g^{-1}$ is an embedding, but the (unrestricted) quotient map is not an embedding. What the proposition shows is that when we restrict the quotient map to the collection of $g$-pullbacks of subsets of $Y$, then the resulting map is an embedding.
Proof. We need to show that $\Phi$ preserves Boolean operations, the interior operator, and is injective. The Boolean cases are straightforward and we leave them to the reader. For the interior operator, we need to show that

$$\Phi(I(S)) = I(\Phi(S))$$

We know that:

$$\Phi(I(S)) = g^{-1}(\text{Int}(S))$$

$$= \text{Int}(g^{-1}(S))$$  \quad (since $[g^{-1}]$ is a homomorphism)

$$= \bigcup \{O \text{ open} \mid O \subseteq g^{-1}(S)\}$$  \quad (by definition of interior)

$$I(\Phi(S)) = \sup \{c \text{ open} \mid c \leq g^{-1}(S)\}$$

$$= \bigcup \{O \text{ open} \mid O \subseteq g^{-1}(S) \cup N \text{ for some } N \in \text{Null}_\mu\}$$

(where the last equality follows from Corollary 3.3.16). So it is sufficient to show that for any open set $O \subseteq X$, if $O \subseteq g^{-1}(S) \cup N$ for some $N \in \text{Null}_\mu$, then $O \subseteq g^{-1}(S)$.

Suppose not. Then there exists $O \subseteq X$ open such that $O \subseteq g^{-1}(S) \cup N$ for some $N \in \text{Null}_\mu$ but $O \nsubseteq g^{-1}(S)$. So there exists $x \in O$ such that $x \notin g^{-1}(S)$. Thus $x \in N$. Now let $g(x) = y \in Y$. We know that $O \cap g^{-1}(y) \neq \emptyset$. And since $g$ has the M-property, $\mu(O \cap g^{-1}(y)) > 0$. But $y \notin S$, and $O \subseteq g^{-1}(S) \cup N$. It follows that $O \cap g^{-1}(y) \subseteq N$. This contradicts the fact that $N$ has measure zero. \(\square\)

It remains to show only that $\Phi$ is injective. Suppose that $\Phi(S_1) = \Phi(S_2)$. Then $g^{-1}(S_1) = g^{-1}(S_2)$. So $\mu(g^{-1}(S_1) \triangle g^{-1}(S_2)) = 0$. But $g^{-1}(S_1) \triangle g^{-1}(S_2) = g^{-1}(S_1 \triangle S_2)$. So $\mu(g^{-1}(S_1 \triangle S_2)) = 0$. Now it follows from the fact that $g$ has the M-property that for any non-empty set $S \subseteq Y$, we have $\mu(g^{-1}(S)) > 0$. (Take as the open set $O$ in Definition 3.4.5 (ii) the entire space, $[0,1]$.) This means that $S_1 \triangle S_2 = \emptyset$. So $S_1 = S_2$. \(\square\)

Corollary 3.4.7. Let $X, \mu, Y, g,$ and $\Phi$ be as above. Suppose that $V' : \mathbb{P} \to B(Y)$ is a valuation, and define the valuation, $\nabla = \Phi \circ V'$. Then for every formula $\alpha$ in $L$ we have:

$$\nabla(\alpha) = \Phi \circ V'(\alpha)$$

and

$$\nabla(\alpha) = 1_M \text{ iff } V'(\alpha) = 1_{B(Y)}$$

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Proof. Immediate from Lemma 3.4.2 and Proposition 3.4.6.

Remark 3.4.8. Let $B$ be a subset of the real interval $[0, 1]$ of measure 1 with the relative topology, and let $Y, \mu, g,$ and $\Phi$ be as above, except that $g$ is now defined on $B$. Then we can still view $\Phi$ as an embedding of the algebra $B(Y)$ in $\mathcal{M}$—even though, strictly speaking, these definitions are not correct (i.e., well defined). That is because the measure algebra $\text{Leb}(B) \setminus \text{Null}_\mu$ is isomorphic to the Lebesgue measure algebra, $\mathcal{M}$. Thus it is sufficient, in Corollary 3.4.7, to require that $g$ be defined only on a subset of $[0, 1]$ of measure equal to 1. This will make life simpler for us in the next section, where we aim to construct such a map, $g$.

3.5 Completeness of $S4$ for the Lebesgue measure algebra

We know that the logic $S4$ is complete for the class of finite $S4$ Kripke frames (= finite topologies).\textsuperscript{14} Algebraically put, $S4$ is complete for the class of topological Boolean algebras, $\{B(\mathcal{F}) | \mathcal{F} \text{ is a finite topology}\}$. Our aim in this section is to leverage this nice result toward a proof of completeness of $S4$ for $\mathcal{M}$. Our strategy will be to embed such Kripke frames in the algebra $\mathcal{M}$. To do this, we need to construct ‘nice’ maps from the real interval $[0, 1]$ (or, more precisely, a subset, $B$, of the interval of measure 1) to the Kripke frame, $\mathcal{F}$. In particular, we need to construct a map, $g : B \rightarrow \mathcal{F}$, that satisfies the conditions of Proposition 3.4.6. We begin by recalling the thick Cantor sets, which will play a crucial role in the construction of our map, $g$.

3.5.1 Thick Cantor sets

Recall the construction of the (normal) Cantor set. We begin with the interval $[0, 1]$. At stage $n = 0$ of construction, we remove the open middle third $\left(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}\right)$, leaving “remaining intervals” $[0, \frac{1}{3}]$ and $[\frac{2}{3}, 1]$. At stage $n = 1$, we remove the open middle thirds of each of these intervals, $\left(\frac{1}{9}, \frac{2}{9}\right)$ and $\left(\frac{7}{9}, \frac{8}{9}\right)$, leaving remaining intervals $[0, \frac{1}{9}], [\frac{2}{9}, \frac{1}{3}], [\frac{2}{3}, \frac{7}{9}]$ and $[\frac{8}{9}, 1]$, and so on. In general, at stage $n + 1$ of construction, we remove the open middle thirds of each remaining interval from stage $n$. The Cantor set, $C$, is the set of points remaining after infinitely many

\textsuperscript{14}In the remainder of the chapter, I will use ‘finite $S4$ Kripke frames’ and ‘finite topologies’ interchangeably.
stages of construction. To calculate the measure of $C$, we need only subtract the total measure of intervals removed from the measure of the unit interval, $[0,1]$:

$$1 - \sum_{n \geq 0} 2^n \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^{n+1} = 1 - \frac{1}{3} \sum_{n \geq 0} \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^n = 0$$

An easy argument due to Dana Scott shows that removing middle *fourths*, *fifths*, etc. (as opposed to middle *thirds*) does not affect the measure of $C$. Indeed, let $C_n$ be the set resulting from removing open middle intervals of proportional length $1/n$ at each stage of construction. After removing the first middle interval we produce scaled copies of $C_n$ on the intervals $[0, \frac{n-1}{2n}]$ and $[\frac{n+1}{2n}, 1]$, giving,

$$m(C_n) = 2 \frac{n-1}{2n} m(C_n)$$

and $m(C_n) = 0$.

We can, however, construct a set that is ‘Cantor-like’ with non-zero measure. The trick is to remove successively smaller portions of remaining intervals. The set we end up with is sometimes called a ‘thick’ or ‘fat’ Cantor set. The particular version of it below has measure $= \frac{1}{2}$, but this is not necessary—sets of arbitrary positive measure can be constructed in similar fashion.  

**Definition 3.5.1.** Begin with the interval $[0,1]$, and at stage $n = 0$ of construction, remove the open middle interval of length $\frac{1}{4}$, leaving remaining intervals $[0, \frac{3}{8}] \cup [\frac{5}{8}, 1]$. At stage $n = 1$, remove open middle $\frac{1}{16}$’s from each interval, leaving $[0, \frac{5}{32}] \cup [\frac{7}{32}, \frac{3}{8}] \cup [\frac{5}{8}, \frac{25}{32}] \cup [\frac{27}{32}, 1]$, etc. In general, at stage $n$ of construction, remove open middle intervals of length $\left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{n+1}$ from each remaining interval. The set of points remaining after infinitely many stages of construction is the Smith-Volterra-Cantor set. We call it the ‘thick’ Cantor set and denote it by $K$.  

What is the measure of $K$? Note that at each finite stage $n$ of construction of $K$, $2^n$ intervals of length $\left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{n+1}$ are removed, so the total measure of points removed is

$$\sum_{n \geq 0} 2^n \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{n+1} = \sum_{n \geq 0} \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{n+2} = \frac{1}{2}$$

and $m(K) = 1 - 1/2 = 1/2$.

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15To construct a thick Cantor set with measure $1-\epsilon$, remove middle intervals of length $2\epsilon \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{n+1}$ at stage $n$ of construction. Over the course of the construction we remove a total measure of $2\epsilon \sum_{n \geq 0} 2^n \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{n+1} = 2\epsilon \sum_{n \geq 0} \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{n+2} = 2\epsilon \left(\frac{1}{2}\right) = \epsilon$.

16Figures 10 and 11 are licensed by Creative Commons.
Figure 10: First five stages of construction of the Smith-Volterra-Cantor set, $K$.

Figure 11: The set $K$. After white intervals have been removed, the black points which remain make up $K$.

**Proposition 3.5.2.** Let $O$ be an open set with $K \cap O \neq \emptyset$. Then $K \cap O$ has non-zero measure.

*Proof.* Let $O$ be open and $x \in K \cap O$. Then, since $x \in K$, $x$ is in a remaining interval at each stage of construction of $K$. Let $R_{n,x}$ denote the remaining interval containing $x$ at stage $n$ of construction. The length of remaining intervals tends to zero, so for $N$ large enough, $R_{N,x} \subseteq O$. But, by symmetry, $m(K \cap R_{N,x}) = \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{N+2} > 0$. (At stage $N$ of construction, there are $2^{N+1}$ remaining intervals and they split the measure of $K$ equally). Thus

$$m(K \cap O) \geq m(K \cap R_{N,x}) > 0$$

\[Q.E.D.\]

We can construct a ‘scaled copy’ of $K$ by starting from the interval $[a, b]$ instead of $[0, 1]$, and successively removing middle segments of length $(b-a)\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{2n+2}$. In fact, we can carry out the construction of $K$ on any closed, open, or half-open interval $[a, b], (a, b), [a, b), (a, b]$. If we start from the open interval $(a, b)$, the resulting set is not closed (compact, etc.) and hence differs in important topological properties from $K$. Nevertheless, with slight abuse of notation, we refer to all such constructions as ‘scaled copies’ of $K$. Clearly the measure of a scaled copy of $K$ on any of the intervals $[a, b], (a, b), [a, b), (a, b]$ is just $\frac{1}{2}(b - a)$.

We state without proof an obvious corollary to Proposition 3.5.2:

**Corollary 3.5.3.** Let $K^*$ be a scaled copy of $K$. If $O$ is open and $O \cap K^*$ is non-empty, then $O \cap K^*$ has non-zero measure.
We are now, finally, in a position to prove Proposition 3.3.10, which states that \( M \neq G \) (see §3.3). The example is due to Dana Scott, but we give a different proof here.

**Proof of Proposition 3.3.10.** We claim that \( K \notin G \) (and thus \( M \neq G \)). We need to show that for any open set \( O \), \( K \not\sim O \). Suppose \( O \subseteq [0, 1] \) is open and \( O \sim K \). We know \( O \cap K \neq \emptyset \) (else \( K \subseteq O \triangle K \) and \( O \not\sim K \)). Let \( x \in O \cap K \). By the proof of Proposition 3.5.2, there exists \( N \in \mathbb{N} \) with \( R_{N,x} \subseteq O \) (where \( R_{n,x} \) is, again, the remaining interval at stage \( n \) containing \( x \)). But at stage \( n + 1 \) of construction of \( K \), we remove from \( R_{N,x} \) an open interval, \( I \), of non-zero measure. So \( I \subseteq O - K \) and \( K \not\sim O \). \( \square \)

### 3.5.2 Construction of a truth preserving map

We now construct the map \( g \) mentioned above, that will transfer completeness from finite topological spaces (= finite Kripke \( S4 \) frames) to the Lebesgue measure algebra.

Let \( \mathcal{F} = \langle U, R, w_0 \rangle \) be a finite rooted \( S4 \) Kripke frame (= finite topology), where \( U = \{ w_0, \ldots, w_m \} \).

Preliminary to constructing the map, \( g \), we define a sequence of approximating functions, \( g_i \) (\( i \in \mathbb{N} \)).

We begin by constructing \( g_0 \). Recall the construction of the thick Cantor set, \( K \), given above. We will denote the union of open intervals removed at the \( n \)th stage of construction of \( K \) by \( O_n \) (\( n \geq 0 \)). Now we put,

\[
g_0(x) = \begin{cases} w_s & \text{if } x \in O_n \text{ and } n = s \pmod{m} \\ w_0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]

Note that \( g_0 \) labels each point in the thick Cantor set, \( K \), by \( w_0 \), and that all other points belong to some open interval that is uniformly labeled under \( g_0 \) by some node (or other) in \( U \). If \( I \) is a maximal such interval (i.e., there does not exist an open interval \( I' \) such that \( I \subset I' \) and \( I' \) is uniformly labeled under \( g_0 \)), then we call \( I \) a ‘removed interval under \( g_0 \).’ This completes our construction of \( g_0 \).

Now suppose that the function \( g_i \) is defined on every point in \([0,1]\), and that under \( g_i \) there is some countable collection of disjoint open intervals uniformly labeled under \( g_i \) by some node (or other) in \( U \). Moreover, assume that each of these intervals, \( I_i \), is maximal in the sense specified above (i.e., there does not
exist an open interval $I'$ such that $I \subset I'$ and $I'$ is uniformly labeled under $g_i$. We call these intervals the ‘removed intervals of $g_i$.’ For each such interval, $I$, uniformly labeled by $w_k \in U$, we now put $U_k = \{w \in U \mid w R w \}$ and we denote by $n_k$ the cardinality of $U_k$. Finally, we order the elements of $U_k$ in some way, putting $U_k = \{u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_{m_k} \}$. We now repeat the construction given above, on the interval $I$. That is, denoting by $O_n$ the union of open intervals removed at stage $n$ of the construction of $K(I)$, we let, for $x \in I$:

$$g_{i+1}(x) = \begin{cases} u_s & \text{if } x \in O_n \text{ and } n = s \pmod{m_k} \\ w_k & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3.6)$$

For all $x \in [0,1]$ such that $x$ does not belong to a removed interval of $g_i$, we put $g_{i+1}(x) = g_i(x)$.

Note that under $g_{i+1}$ there is a countable collection of maximal (in the sense defined above) uniformly labeled open intervals. We call these intervals the ‘removed intervals of $g_{i+1}$.’ This completes our construction of the maps, $g_i$ ($i \in \mathbb{N}$).

Note that some points $x \in [0,1]$ belong to a ‘removed interval of $g_i$’ for each $i \in \mathbb{N}$. We denote the collection of all such points by $L$. We denote the collection of all other points in $[0,1]$ by $B$. Thus, the interval $[0,1]$ is the disjoint union of $L$ and $B$.

For each $x \in B$, there exists $i \in \mathbb{N}$ such that

$$\text{for all } j \geq i, g_j(x) = g_i(x)$$

Let us denote the least such $i$ by $i_x$.

We are now ready to define the function $g : B \to F$ as follows:

$$g(x) = g_{i_x}(x) \quad (3.7)$$

for all $x \in B$.

### 3.5.3 Completeness proof

We need to show that the map $g : B \to F$ defined in the previous section satisfies the conditions of Proposition 3.4.6. In other words, we need to show that $g$ is interior, surjective and satisfies the $M$-property. Also, we need to show that the measure of the set $B$ is 1. The work of this section is devoted to that end.

In what follows, let $g_i$ ($i \in \mathbb{N}$), $g$, $B$ and $L$ be as defined in the previous section.
Lemma 3.5.4. For all \( x \in [0, 1], i \in \mathbb{N}, \)

\[ g_i(x) R g_{i+1}(x) \]

Proof. By construction of \( g_i. \)

Lemma 3.5.5. Suppose \( x \in B, g(x) = w, \) and \( wRw'. \) Then for any \( \epsilon > 0, \) there exists \( y \in B \) such that \( |x - y| < \epsilon \) and \( g(y) = w'. \)

Proof. Let \( x \in B, g(x) = w, \) and \( wRw'. \) Then since \( x \in B, \) there exists \( i \in \mathbb{N} \) such that for all \( j \leq i, \) \( x \) belongs to a removed interval of \( g_j \) and \( x \) does not belong to any removed interval of \( g_{i+1}. \) By construction, this means that \( x \in K(I) \) for some removed interval \( I \) of \( g_i. \) But then \( x \) belongs to some remaining interval \( R_{n,x} \) at each stage \( n \) of construction of \( K(I), \) and as we know, \( \text{length}(R_{n,x}) \to 0. \)

It follows that for \( N \) large enough, \( R_{N,x} \subseteq B(x, \epsilon), \) where \( B(x, \epsilon) \) is the open interval centered at \( x \) with radius \( \epsilon. \) But now, by construction of \( g_{i+1}, \) there exists a removed interval \( I' \) of \( g_{i+1}, \) with \( I' \subseteq R_{N,x} \) and \( g_{i+1}(I') = w'. \) (To see this, consider all the intervals removed during construction of the scaled thick Cantor set \( K(I) \) between stages \( N \) and \( N + m \) of construction.) Again, by construction of \( g_{i+2}, \) for any \( y \in K(I'), g(y) = w'. \) Thus we have,

\[ y \in I' \subseteq R_{N,x} \subseteq B(x, \epsilon) \]

and \( g(y) = w', \) as desired.

Lemma 3.5.6. \( \mu(L) = 0. \) \( \mu(B) = 1. \)

Proof. Let \( S_i \) be the union of removed intervals of \( g_i (i \in \mathbb{N}). \) Then,

\[ S_i \supseteq S_{i+1} \]

and

\[ L = \bigcap_{i \in \mathbb{N}} S_i \]

and \( m(S_0) = 1. \) It follows that \( m(L) = \lim_{i \to \infty} m(S_i). \) But \( m(S_{i+1}) = \frac{1}{2} m(S_i).^{17} \)

So \( m(S_i) \to 0, \) and \( m(L) = 0. \) Now we have \( m(B) = m([0, 1]) - m(L) = 1. \)

Proposition 3.5.7. \( g \) is continuous.

\textsuperscript{17}By construction, and since \( m(K(I)) = \frac{1}{2} m(I). \)
Proof. Let $U$ be an open subset of $\mathcal{F}$, and suppose $x \in g^{-1}(U)$. Then $x \in B$, so by construction, there is some $i \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $x$ belongs to a removed interval of $g_j$ for all $j \leq i$, and $x$ does not belong to a removed interval of $g_{i+1}$. Let $I_{i,x}$ be the removed interval of $g_i$ containing $x$. Then by construction of stagewise labeling functions, for each $y \in I_{i,x}$ we have $g_i(y) = g_i(x) \in U$. It follows from Lemma 3.5.4 that for each point $y \in I_{i,x} \cap B$, $g(y) \in U$. So $x \in I_{i,x} \cap B \subseteq g^{-1}(U)$. But $I_{i,x} \cap B$ is open in $B$. Thus $g^{-1}(U)$ is open. \hfill \square

**Proposition 3.5.8.** $g$ is open.

Proof. Let $O \subseteq B$ be open, and let $w \in g(O)$. Then there exists $x \in O$ such that $w = g(x)$. Suppose $wRw'$. By Lemma 3.5.5, there exists $y \in B$ such that $y \in O$, and $g(y) = w'$. Thus $U_w \subseteq g(O)$, and $g(O)$ is open. \hfill \square

**Proposition 3.5.9.** $g$ is surjective.

Proof. This follows from the fact that $g$ is open and $g$ ‘hits’ the root, $w_0$, of $\mathcal{F}$ (i.e., there exists $x \in B$ with $g(x) = w_0$.) \hfill \square

**Proposition 3.5.10.** $g$ has the M-property.

Proof. (i) To see that for any set $S \subseteq U$, $g^{-1}(S)$ is Lebesgue measurable, let $w \in U$. Note that by construction of $g$, $g^{-1}(w)$ is a countable union of scaled copies of thick Cantor sets, $K(I)$. Thus $g^{-1}(w)$ is a countable union of Borel sets, hence Borel. Since $S$ is finite, $g^{-1}(S)$ is a finite union of Borel sets, hence Borel. (ii) We need to show that for any open set $O \subseteq [0,1]$ and $S \subseteq U$, if $g^{-1}(S) \cap O \neq \emptyset$, then $\mu(g^{-1}(S) \cap O) > 0$. It is sufficient to prove this for the case where $S = \{w\}$ for some $w \in U$. Thus suppose $O \subseteq [0,1]$ is open, and for some $w \in U$, $g^{-1}(w) \cap O \neq \emptyset$. Then there exists $x \in g^{-1}(w) \cap O$. Since $x \in B$, there exists $i \in I$ such that $x$ belongs to a removed interval of $g_j$ for all $j \leq i$, and $x$ does not belong to a removed interval of $g_{i+1}$. By construction of the stagewise labeling functions, $x \in K(I)$ for some removed interval $I$ of $g_i$, and for every $y \in K(I)$, $g(y) = g(x) = w$. So $K(I) \subseteq g^{-1}(w)$. But since $x \in K(I)$, we know $O \cap K(I) \neq \emptyset$. By Corollary 3.5.3, $\mu(O \cap K(I)) > 0$. Now we have $O \cap K(I) \subseteq O \cap g^{-1}(w)$. So

$$\mu(O \cap g^{-1}(w)) \geq \mu(O \cap K(I)) > 0$$

\hfill \square

---

[18] where $K(I)$ is, again, the scaled copy of the thick Cantor set, $K$, on the interval, $I$
We now define the function $\Phi : B(\mathcal{F}) \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ by

$$\Phi(S) = g^{-1}(S)$$

for all $S \subseteq \mathcal{F}$.

**Proposition 3.5.11.** $\Phi$ is an embedding.

**Proof.** Immediate from Proposition 3.4.6, Proposition 3.5.7, Proposition 3.5.8, Proposition 3.5.9, and Proposition 3.5.10.

**Proposition 3.5.12.** Suppose that $V' : \mathbb{P} \rightarrow B(\mathcal{F})$ is a valuation, and define the valuation, $\overline{V} = \Phi \circ V'$, over the algebra $\mathcal{M}$. Then for every formula $\alpha$ in $L$ we have:

$$\overline{V}(\alpha) = \Phi \circ V'(\alpha)$$

and

$$\overline{V}(\alpha) = 1_M \iff V'(\alpha) = 1_{B(\mathcal{F})}$$

**Proof.** Immediate from Lemma 3.4.2, and Proposition 3.5.11.

**Theorem 3.5.13.** $S_4$ is complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra, $\mathcal{M}$.

**Proof.** Let $\alpha$ be a non-theorem of $S_4$ (i.e., $\not\vdash_{S_4} \alpha$). Then $\alpha$ is refuted in some finite Kripke frame, $\mathcal{F}$. That is, there is some algebraic model, $\langle B(\mathcal{F}), V' \rangle$ such that $V'(\alpha) \neq 1_{B(\mathcal{F})}$. We define the algebraic model $\langle \mathcal{M}, \overline{V} \rangle$, letting $\overline{V} = \Phi \circ V'$, where $\Phi$ is as defined above. By Proposition 3.5.12, $\overline{V}(\alpha) \neq 1_M$, and $\alpha$ is refuted in $\mathcal{M}$. We have shown that for any $\alpha$ in the language $L$,

$$\not\vdash_{S_4} \alpha \Rightarrow \not\vdash_{\mathcal{M}} \alpha$$

We close this chapter by proving two interesting corollaries of the above theorem.

We know, from Tarski’s proof of completeness of $S_4$ for the reals, that any non-theorem, $\alpha$, of $S_4$ can be refuted at a point in the real interval, i.e., there is a valuation, $V : \mathbb{P} \rightarrow B([0,1])$, and point $x \in [0,1]$ with $x \notin V(\alpha)$. The next corollary states that if $\alpha$ is a non-theorem of $S_4$, there exists a valuation, $V : \mathbb{P} \rightarrow B([0,1])$, that refutes $\alpha$ at each point in a subset of $[0,1]$ of measure arbitrarily close to 1.
Corollary 3.5.14. Suppose \( \alpha \) is a non-theorem of \( S4 \). Then for any \( \epsilon > 0 \), there exists a valuation \( V : \mathbb{P} \to B([0, 1]) \), with \( \mu(V(\alpha)) < \epsilon \). Likewise, for any \( \epsilon > 0 \) there exists a valuation \( V^* : \mathbb{P} \to M \), and an element \( s \in M \), with \( m(s) < \epsilon \) and \( V^*(\alpha) = s \).

Proof Sketch. Let \( \alpha \) be a non-theorem of \( S4 \), and let \( \epsilon > 0 \). Then \( \alpha \) is refuted in some model, \( M = \langle B(F), V' \rangle \), where \( F \) is a finite Kripke frame. We define an embedding, \( \Phi^* : B(F) \to M \), using thick Cantor sets of measure \( 1 - \epsilon \), but otherwise identical to \( \Phi \). Let \( K^* \) be the thick Cantor set of measure \( 1 - \epsilon \). Then stagewise labeling functions, \( g^*_i \), are constructed as before (see (3.6) above) but using \( K^* \) instead of \( K \). Again, let \( g^* \) be the limit of stagewise labeling functions, \( g^*_i \) (see (3.7) above). Now \( g^* \) is an interior, surjective map. We define the valuation \( V : \mathbb{P} \to B([0, 1]) \) by putting \( V(P) = g^* - 1 \circ V' \). The reader can now verify that \( K^* \subseteq \Phi^* \circ V'(\neg\alpha) = V(\neg\alpha) \). It follows that \( \mu(V(\neg\alpha)) \geq 1 - \epsilon \), and \( \mu(V(\alpha)) < \epsilon \).

For the second part of the corollary, we define the valuation \( \overline{V} : \mathbb{P} \to M \) by \( \overline{V}(P) = \Phi^* \circ V' \). Again, \( \Phi^* \) is an embedding\(^{19} \), and so for any formula \( \phi \) in the language \( L \), we have \( \overline{V}(\phi) = \Phi^* \circ V'(\phi) \). The reader can again verify that \( \overline{K}^* \leq \Phi^* \circ V'(\neg\alpha) = \overline{V}(\neg\alpha) \). It follows that \( \mu(\overline{V}(\neg\alpha)) \geq 1 - \epsilon \), and \( \mu(\overline{V}(\alpha)) < \epsilon \).\(^{20} \)

As a final corollary, we prove that Intuitionistic propositional logic (IPC) is complete for the frame \( G \). Let the propositional language \( L_0 \) consist of a countable set, \( \mathbb{P} = \{P_n \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\} \), of atomic variables and be closed under binary connectives \( \to, \lor, \land, \leftrightarrow \) and unary operator \( \neg \). Recall that \( G \) is a complete Heyting algebra. In particular, for any elements \( x, y \in G \), there exists an element, \( x \to y \in G \), called the relative pseudo-complement of \( x \) with respect to \( y \) and defined by:

\[
\sup \{ c \in G \mid c \land x \leq y \}
\]

Let \( V : \mathbb{P} \to G \) be a valuation assigning propositional variables to arbitrary elements of \( G \). We extend \( V \) by the following recursive clause:

\[
V(\phi \to \psi) = V(\phi) \to V(\psi)
\]

\(^{19}\)One has to check, here, that when we use Cantor sets of measure \( 1 - \epsilon \), Lemma 3.5.6 still holds. We do not carry out the relevant calculation here, but leave it to the reader.

\(^{20}\)Here \( \mu \) is used to denote both the standard Lebesgue measure on the reals, and the measure on the Lebesgue measure algebra, \( M \). We trust that this does not lead to undue confusion.
(For the remaining connectives: \( V \) is defined in the usual way on \( \{\& , \lor \} \), ‘\( \neg \phi \)’ abbreviates ‘\( \phi \rightarrow \bot \)’ and ‘\( \phi \leftrightarrow \psi \)’ abbreviates ‘\( \phi \rightarrow \psi \& \psi \rightarrow \phi \)’.)

For any formula \( \Phi \in L_0 \), let \( T(\phi) \) be the Gödel-Tarski translation of \( \phi \) given inductively as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
T(P) &= \Box P \text{ for all propositional variables } P \\
T(\bot) &= \bot \\
T(\phi \lor \psi) &= T(\phi) \lor T(\psi) \\
T(\phi \land \psi) &= T(\phi) \land T(\psi) \\
T(\phi \rightarrow \psi) &= \Box(T(\phi) \rightarrow T(\psi))
\end{align*}
\]

Gödel and Tarski showed that \( \vdash_{IPC} \alpha \) iff \( \vdash_{S4} T(\alpha) \) for any formula \( \alpha \in L_0 \). Moreover, for any valuation \( V : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{M} \), we can define the valuation, \( V_I : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{G} \), by \( V_I(P) = V(\Box P) \). It is easy to show that for any formula, \( \alpha \in L_0 \), \( T(\alpha) \in L_1 \) and

\[
V_I(\alpha) = V(T(\alpha))
\]

In particular, \( V(T(\alpha)) \in \mathcal{G} \) for each \( \alpha \in L_0 \) (the Gödel translation of any formula is evaluated to an open element).

**Corollary 3.5.15.** \( IPC \) is complete for \( \mathcal{G} \).

**Proof.** Suppose \( \not\vdash_{IPC} \alpha \). Then \( \not\vdash_{S4} T(\alpha) \). By completeness of \( S4 \) for \( \mathcal{M} \), there is a valuation \( V : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{M} \) with \( V(T(\alpha)) \neq [0,1] \). But letting \( V_I \) be defined as above, we have \( V_I(\alpha) = V(T(\alpha)) \neq [0,1] \), so \( \alpha \) is refuted under \( V_I \) in \( \mathcal{G} \). \( \Box \)

\[\text{87}\]

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\[\text{21The proof is by induction on the complexity of } \alpha.\]
Abstract. In this chapter we extend Dana Scott’s probabilistic semantics for the basic propositional modal language to a more complex modal language with two independent modalities. In particular, we give a probabilistic semantics for basic dynamic topological logic. Dynamic topological logics were introduced in the 1990’s as a way of describing dynamic space, or a topological space together with a continuous function acting on the space. The simplest dynamic topological logic is $S4C$, which has both the usual necessity modality, ‘□’, and a new temporal modality, ‘○’. We extend Scott’s probabilistic semantics to this bimodal logic. The main result of the chapter is that $S4C$ is complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra. A strengthening of this result, also proved here, is that there is a single probabilistic model in which all non-theorems of S4C are refuted.
4.1 Introduction

Kripke frames for normal modal logics, consisting of a set of possible worlds together with a binary accessibility relation, are, by now, widely familiar. But long before Kripke semantics became standard, Tarski showed that the propositional modal logic $S_4$ can be interpreted in topological spaces. In the topological semantics for $S_4$, a topological space is fixed, and each propositional variable, $P$, is assigned to an arbitrary subset of the space: the set of points where $P$ is true. Conjunctions, disjunctions and negations are interpreted as set-theoretic intersections, unions and complements (thus, e.g., ‘$\phi \land \psi$’ is true at all points in the intersection of the set of points where ‘$\phi$’ is true and the set of points where ‘$\psi$’ is true.) The ‘$\Box$’-modality of $S_4$ is interpreted via the topological interior: ‘$\Box \phi$’ is true at any point in the topological interior of the set of points at which ‘$\phi$’ is true.

In this semantics, the logic $S_4$ can be seen as describing topological spaces. Indeed, with the topological semantics it became possible to ask not just whether $S_4$ is complete for the set of topological validities—formulas valid in every topological space—but also whether $S_4$ is complete for any given topological space. The culmination of Tarski’s work in this area was a very strong completeness result. In 1944, Tarski and McKinsey proved that $S_4$ is complete for any dense-in-itself metric space. One particularly important case was the real line, $\mathbb{R}$, and as the topological semantics received renewed interest in recent years, more streamlined proofs of Tarski’s result for this special case emerged in, e.g., (5), (18), (26), (29), and (38).

The real line, however, can be investigated not just from a topological point of view, but from a measure-theoretic point of view. Here, the probability measure we have in mind is the usual Lebesgue measure on the reals. In the last several years Dana Scott introduced a new probabilistic or measure-based semantics for $S_4$ that is built around Lebesgue measure on the reals and is in some ways closely related to Tarski’s older topological semantics.

Scott’s semantics is essentially algebraic: formulas are interpreted in the Lebesgue measure algebra, or the $\sigma$-algebra of Borel subsets of the real interval $[0,1]$, modulo sets of measure zero (henceforth, “null sets”). We denote this algebra by $\mathcal{M}$. Thus elements of $\mathcal{M}$ are equivalence classes of Borel sets. In Scott’s semantics, each propositional variable is assigned to some element of $\mathcal{M}$. We say the value of the propositional variable $P$ is that element of the algebra to which $P$ is assigned. Conjunctions, disjunctions and negations are interpreted as meets, joins and complements in the algebra, respectively. In order to interpret the $S_4$ ‘$\Box$’-modality, we add to the algebra an interior operator (defined below), which we construct.
from the collection of open elements in the algebra, or elements that have an open representative. Unlike the Kripke or topological semantics, there is no notion here of truth at a point (or at a “world”). In (11) and in (22) it was shown that $S4$ is complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra.\footnote{The proofs were arrived at independently and at roughly the same time.}

The introduction of a measure-based semantics for $S4$ raises a host of questions that are, at this point, entirely unexplored. Among them: What about natural extensions of $S4$? Can we give a measure-based semantics not just for $S4$ but for some of its extensions that have well-known topological interpretations?

This chapter focuses on a family of logics called dynamic topological logics. These logics were investigated over the last fifteen years, in an attempt to describe “dynamic topological systems” by means of modal logic. A dynamic topological system is a pair $⟨X,f⟩$, where $X$ is a topological space and $f$ is a continuous function on $X$. We can think of $f$ as moving points in $X$ in discrete units of time. Thus in the first moment in time, $x$ is mapped to $f(x)$, in the second moment to $f(f(x))$, and so on. The simplest dynamic topological logic is $S4C$. In addition to the $S4$ ‘□’-modality, it has a temporal modality, which we denote by ‘⃝’.

Intuitively, we understand the formula ‘⃝$P$’ as saying that “at the next moment in time, $P$ will be true.” Thus we put: $x \in V(⃝P)$ iff $f(x) \in V(P)$. In (19) and (37) it was shown that $S4C$ is incomplete for the real line, $\mathbb{R}$. However, in (38) it was shown that $S4C$ is complete for Euclidean spaces of arbitrarily large finite dimension, and in (10) it was shown that $S4C$ is complete for $\mathbb{R}^2$.

The aim of this chapter is to give a measure-based semantics for the logic $S4C$, along the lines of Scott’s semantics for $S4$. Again, formulas will be assigned to some element of the Lebesgue measure algebra, $\mathcal{M}$. But what about the dynamical aspect—i.e., the interpretation of the ‘⃝’-modality? We show that there is a very natural way of interpreting the ‘⃝’-modality via operators on the algebra $\mathcal{M}$ that take the place of continuous functions in the topological semantics. These operators can be viewed as transforming the algebra in discrete units of time. Thus one element is sent to another in the first instance, then to another in the second instance, and so on. The operators we use to interpret $S4C$ are O-operators: ones that take “open” elements in the algebra to open elements (defined below). But there are obvious extensions of this idea: for example, to interpret the logic of homeomorphisms on topological spaces, one need only look at automorphisms of the algebra $\mathcal{M}$.

Adopting a measure-based semantics for $S4C$ brings with it certain advantages. Not only do we reap the probabilistic features that come with Scott’s sem-
tantics for $S4$, but the curious dimensional asymmetry that appears in the topological semantics (where $S4C$ is incomplete for $\mathbb{R}$ but complete for $\mathbb{R}^2$) disappears in the measure-based semantics. The main result of the chapter is that the logic $S4C$ is complete for the Lebesgue-measure algebra. A strengthening of this result, also proved here, is that $S4C$ is complete for a single model of the Lebesgue measure algebra. Due to well-known results by Oxtoby, this algebra is isomorphic to the algebra generated by Euclidean space of arbitrary dimension. (Indeed, as we show below, it is isomorphic to the reduced measure algebra generated by any separable metric space together with a $\sigma$-finite, non-atomic Borel measure on the space.) In other words, $S4C$ is complete for the reduced measure algebra generated by any Euclidean space.

4.2 Topological semantics for $S4C$

Let the language $L_{\Box,\Diamond}$ consist of a countable set, $\mathbb{P} = \{p_n \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\}$, of propositional variables, and be closed under the binary connectives $\land, \lor, \rightarrow, \leftrightarrow$, unary operators, $\neg, \Box, \Diamond$, and a unary modal operator $\Diamond$ (thus, $L_{\Box,\Diamond}$ is the language of propositional $S4$ enriched with a new modality, $\Diamond$).

**Definition 4.2.1.** A dynamic topological space is a pair $\langle X, f \rangle$, where $X$ is a topological space and $f : X \rightarrow X$ is a continuous function on $X$. A dynamic topological model is a triple, $\langle X, f, V \rangle$, where $X$ is a topological space, $f : X \rightarrow X$ is a continuous function, and $V : \mathbb{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(X)$ is a valuation assigning to each propositional variable a subset of $X$. We say that $\langle X, f, V \rangle$ is a model over $X$.

We extend $V$ to the set of all formulas in $L_{\Box,\Diamond}$ by means of the following recursive clauses:

- $V(\phi \lor \psi) = V(\phi) \cup V(\psi)$
- $V(\neg \phi) = X - V(\phi)$
- $V(\Box \phi) = \text{Int}(V(\phi))$
- $V(\Diamond \phi) = f^{-1}(V(\phi))$

where ‘Int’ denotes the topological interior.

Let $N = \langle X, f, V \rangle$ be a dynamic topological model. We say that a formula $\phi$ is satisfied at a point $x \in X$ if $x \in V(\phi)$, and we write $N, x \models \phi$. We say $\phi$ is true in $N$ ($N \models \phi$) if $N, x \models \phi$ for each $x \in X$. We say $\phi$ is valid in $X$ ($\models_X \phi$), if for any model $N$ over $X$, we have $N \models \phi$. Finally, we say $\phi$ is topologically valid if it is valid in every topological space.
**Definition 4.2.2.** The logic $S4C$ in the language $L_{\Box, \Diamond}$ is given by the following axioms:

- the classical tautologies,
- $S4$ axioms for $\Box$.

(A1) $\Diamond (\phi \lor \psi) \leftrightarrow (\Box \phi \lor \Diamond \psi)$,

(A2) $(\Diamond \neg \phi) \leftrightarrow (\neg \Box \phi)$,

(A3) $\Diamond \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \Diamond \phi$ (the axiom of continuity)

and the rules of modus ponens and necessitation for both $\Box$ and $\Diamond$. Following (19), we use $S4C$ both for this axiomatization and for the set of all formulas derivable from the axioms by the inference rules.

We close this section by listing the known completeness results for $S4C$ in the topological semantics.

**Theorem 4.2.3.** (Completeness) For any formula $\phi \in L_{\Box, \Diamond}$, the following are equivalent:

(i) $S4C \vdash \phi$;

(ii) $\phi$ is topologically valid;

(iii) $\phi$ is true in any finite topological space;

(iv) $\phi$ is valid in $R^n$ for $n \geq 2$.

**Proof.** The equivalence of (i)-(iii) was proved by Artemov et. al. in (3). The equivalence of (i) and (iv) was proved by Duque in (10). This was a strengthening of a result proved by Slavnov in (38). □

**Theorem 4.2.4.** (Incompleteness for $R$) There exists $\phi \in L_{\Box, \Diamond}$ such that $\phi$ is valid in $R$, but $\phi$ is not topologically valid.

**Proof.** See (19) and (37). □
4.3 Kripke semantics for $S4C$

In this section we show that the logic $S4C$ can also be interpreted in the more familiar setting of Kripke frames. It is well known that the logic $S4$ (which does not include the ‘temporal’ modality, $\Box$) is interpreted in transitive, reflexive Kripke frames, and that such frames just are topological spaces of a certain kind. It follows that the Kripke semantics for $S4$ is just a special case of the topological semantics for $S4$. In this section, we show that the logic $S4C$ can be interpreted in transitive, reflexive Kripke frames with some additional ‘dynamic’ structure, and, again, that Kripke semantics for $S4C$ is a special case of the more general topological semantics for $S4C$. Henceforth, we assume that Kripke frames are both transitive and reflexive.

**Definition 4.3.1.** A dynamic Kripke frame is a triple $\langle W, R, G \rangle$ where $W$ is a set, $R$ is a reflexive, transitive relation on $W$, and $G : W \to W$ is a function that is $R$-monotone in the following sense: for any $u, v \in W$, if $uRv$, then $G(u)RG(v)$.

**Definition 4.3.2.** A dynamic Kripke model is a pair $\langle F, V \rangle$ where $F = \langle W, R, G \rangle$ is a dynamic Kripke frame and $V : \mathbb{P} \to \mathcal{P}(W)$ is a valuation assigning to each propositional variable an arbitrary subset of $W$. We extend $V$ to the set of all formulas in $L_{\Box, \Box}$ by the following recursive clauses:

$\begin{align*}
V(\phi \lor \psi) &= V(\phi) \cup V(\psi) \\
V(\neg \phi) &= W - V(\phi) \\
V(\Box \phi) &= G^{-1}(V(\phi)) \\
V(\Box \phi) &= \{w \in W \mid v \in V(\phi) \text{ for all } v \in W \text{ such that } wRv\}
\end{align*}$

Given a dynamic Kripke frame $K = \langle W, R, G \rangle$, we can impose a topology on $W$ via the accessibility relation $R$. We define the open subsets of $W$ as those subsets that are upward closed under $R$:

(*) $O \subseteq W$ is open iff $x \in O$ and $xRy$ implies $y \in O$

Recall that an *Alexandroff topology* is a topological space in which arbitrary intersections of open sets are open. The reader can verify that the collection of open subsets of $W$ includes the entire space, the empty set, and is closed under arbitrary intersections and unions. Hence, viewing $\langle W, R \rangle$ as a topological space, the space is Alexandroff.

Going in the other direction, if $X$ is an Alexandroff topology, we can define a relation $R$ on $X$ by:
(®) \( xRy \) iff \( x \) is a point of closure of \( \{ y \} \)

(Equivalently, \( y \) belongs to every open set containing \( x \).) Clearly \( R \) is reflexive. To see that \( R \) is transitive, suppose that \( xRy \) and \( yRz \). Let \( O \) be an open set containing \( x \). Then since \( x \) is a point of closure for \( \{ y \} \), \( y \in O \). But since \( y \) is a point of closure for \( \{ z \} \), \( z \in O \). So \( x \) is a point of closure for \( \{ z \} \) and \( xRz \). So far, we have shown that static Kripke frames, \( \langle W, R \rangle \) correspond to Alexandroff topologies. But what about the dynamical aspect? Here we invite the reader to verify that \( R \)-monotonicity of the function \( G \) is equivalent to continuity of \( G \) in the topological setting. It follows that dynamic Kripke frames are just dynamic Alexandroff topologies.

In view of the fact that every finite topology is Alexandroff (if \( X \) is finite, then there are only finitely many open subsets of \( X \)), we have shown that finite topologies are just finite Kripke frames. This result, together with Theorem 4.2.3 (iii), gives the following completeness theorem for Kripke semantics:

**Lemma 4.3.3.** For any formula \( \phi \in L_{\square,\Diamond} \), the following are equivalent:

(i) \( S4C \vdash \phi \);
(ii) \( \phi \) is true in any finite Kripke frame (= finite topological space).

In what follows, it will be useful to consider not just arbitrary finite Kripke frames, but frames that carry some additional structure. The notion we are after is that of a stratified dynamic Kripke frame, introduced by Slavnov in (38). We recall his definitions below.

**Definition 4.3.4.** Let \( K = \langle W, R, G \rangle \) be a dynamic Kripke frame. A cone in \( K \) is any set \( U_v = \{ w \in W \mid vRw \} \) for some \( v \in W \). We say that \( v \) is a root of \( U_v \).

Note in particular that any cone, \( U_v \), in \( K \) is an open subset of \( W \)—indeed, the smallest open subset containing \( v \).

**Definition 4.3.5.** Let \( K = \langle U, R, G \rangle \) be a finite dynamic Kripke frame. We say that \( K \) is stratified if there is a sequence \( \langle U_1, \ldots, U_n \rangle \) of pairwise disjoint cones in \( K \) with roots \( u_1, \ldots, u_n \) respectively, such that \( U = \bigcup_k U_k \); \( G(u_k) = u_{k+1} \) for \( k < n \), and \( G \) is injective. We say the stratified Kripke frame has depth \( n \) and (with slight abuse of notation) we call \( u_1 \) the root of the stratified frame.

Note that it follows from \( R \)-monotonicity of \( G \) that \( G(U_k) \subseteq U_{k+1} \), for \( k < n \).
Definition 4.3.6. Define the function \( CD \) ("circle depth") on the set of all formulas in \( L_{\Box, \Diamond} \) inductively, as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
CD(p) &= 0 \text{ for any propositional variable } p; \\
CD(\phi \lor \psi) &= \max \{ CD(\phi), CD(\psi) \}; \\
CD(\neg \phi) &= CD(\phi); \\
CD(\Box \phi) &= CD(\phi); \\
CD(\Diamond \phi) &= 1 + CD(\phi).
\end{align*}
\]

We also refer to \( CD(\phi) \) as the \( \Diamond \)-depth of \( \phi \).

Lemma 4.3.7. Suppose the formula \( \phi \) is not a theorem of \( S4C \), and \( CD(\phi) = n \). Then there is a stratified finite dynamic Kripke frame \( K \) with depth \( n + 1 \) such that \( \phi \) is refuted at the root of \( K \).

Proof. The proof is by Lemma 4.3.3 and by a method of ‘disjointizing’ finite Kripke frames. For the details, see (38). \qed

4.4 Algebraic semantics for \( S4C \)

We saw that the topological semantics for \( S4C \) is a generalization of the Kripke semantics. Can we generalize further? Just as classical propositional logic is interpreted in Boolean algebras, we would like to interpret modal logics algebraically. Tarski and McKinsey showed that this can be done for the logic \( S4 \), interpreting the \( \Box \)-modality as an interior operator on a Boolean algebra. In this section we show that the same can be done for the logic \( S4C \), interpreting the \( \Diamond \)-modality via \( O \)-operators on a Boolean algebra.

We denote the top and bottom elements of a Boolean algebra by 1 and 0, respectively.

Definition 4.4.1. A topological Boolean algebra is a Boolean algebra, \( A \), together with an interior operator \( I \) on \( A \) that satisfies:

\[
\begin{align*}
(I_1) \ I 1 &= 1; \\
(I_2) \ I a &\leq a; \\
(I_3) \ I 1 = I a; \\
(I_4) \ I(a \land b) &= Ia \land Ib.
\end{align*}
\]

Example 4.4.2. The set of all subsets \( \mathcal{P}(X) \) of a topological space \( X \) with set-theoretic meets, joins and complements and where the operator \( I \) is just the topological interior operator (for \( A \subseteq X, I(A) = \text{Int}(A) \)) is a topological Boolean
algebra. More generally, any collection of subsets of $X$ that is closed under finite intersections, unions, complements and topological interiors is a topological Boolean algebra. We call any such algebra a topological field of sets.

Suppose $A$ is a topological Boolean algebra with interior operator $I$. We define the open elements in $A$ as those elements for which

$$Ia = a$$ (4.1)

Definition 4.4.3. Let $A_1$ and $A_2$ be topological Boolean algebras. We say $h : A_1 \to A_2$ is a Boolean homomorphism if $h$ preserves Boolean operations. We say $h$ is a Boolean embedding if $h$ is an injective Boolean homomorphism. We say $h$ is a homomorphism if $h$ preserves Boolean operations and the interior operator. We say $h$ is an embedding if $h$ is an embedding from $A_1$ onto $A_2$.

Definition 4.4.4. Let $A_1$ and $A_2$ be topological Boolean algebras, and let $h : A_1 \to A_2$. We say $h$ is an O-map if

(i) $h$ is a Boolean homomorphism

(ii) For any $c$ open in $A_1$, $h(c)$ is open in $A_2$.

An O-operator is an O-map from a topological Boolean algebra to itself.

Lemma 4.4.5. Let $A_1$ and $A_2$ be topological Boolean algebras, with interior operators $I_1$ and $I_2$ respectively. Suppose that $h : A_1 \to A_2$ is a Boolean homomorphism. Then $h$ is an O-map iff for every $a \in A_1$,

$$h(I_1a) \leq I_2(h(a))$$ (4.2)

Proof. We let $G_1$ and $G_2$ denote the collection of open elements in $A_1$ and $A_2$ respectively. ($\Rightarrow$) Suppose $h$ is an O-map. Then $h(I_1a) \in G_2$ by Definition 4.4.4 (ii). Also, $I_1a \leq a$, so $h(I_1a) \leq h(a)$ ($h$ is a Boolean homomorphism, hence preserves order). Taking interiors on both sides, we have $h(I_1a) = I_2(h(I_1a)) \leq I_2(ha)$. ($\Leftarrow$) Suppose that for every $a \in A_1$, $h(I_1a) \leq I_2(h(a))$. Let $c \in G_1$. Then $c = I_1c$, so $h(c) = h(I_1c) \leq I_2(h(c))$. But also, $I_2(h(c)) \leq h(c)$. So $h(c) = I_2(h(c))$ and $h(c) \in G_2$.

We are now in a position to state the algebraic semantics for the language $\mathcal{L}_{\Box,\Diamond}$.
Definition 4.4.6. A dynamic algebra is a pair \( \langle A, h \rangle \), where \( A \) is a topological Boolean algebra and \( h \) is an O-operator on \( A \). A dynamic algebraic model is an ordered triple, \( \langle A, h, V \rangle \), where \( A \) is a topological Boolean algebra, \( h \) is an O-operator on \( A \), and \( V : \mathbb{P} \rightarrow A \) is a valuation, assigning to each propositional variable \( p \in \mathbb{P} \) an element of \( A \). We say \( \langle A, h, V \rangle \) is a model over \( A \). We can extend \( V \) to the set of all formulas in \( L \Box, \Diamond \) by the following recursive clauses:

\[
V(\phi \lor \psi) = V(\phi) \lor V(\psi) \\
V(\neg \phi) = -V(\phi) \\
V(\Box \phi) = IV(\phi) \\
V(\Diamond \phi) = hV(\phi)
\]

(The remaining binary connectives, \( \rightarrow \) and \( \leftrightarrow \), and unary operator, \( \Diamond \), are defined in terms of the above in the usual way.)

We define standard validity relations. Let \( N = \langle A, h, V \rangle \) be a dynamic algebraic model. We say \( \phi \) is true in \( N \) (\( N \models \phi \)) iff \( V(\phi) = 1 \). Otherwise, we say \( \phi \) is refuted in \( N \). We say \( \phi \) is valid in \( A \) (\( \models_A \phi \)) if for any algebraic model \( N \) over \( A \), \( N \models \phi \). Finally, we let \( DML_A = \{ \phi \mid \models_A \phi \} \) (i.e., the set of validities in \( A \)). In our terminology, soundness of \( S4C \) for \( A \) is the claim: \( S4C \subseteq DML_A \). Completeness of \( S4C \) for \( A \) is the claim: \( DML_A \subseteq S4C \).

Proposition 4.4.7. (Soundness) Let \( A \) be a topological Boolean algebra. Then \( S4C \subseteq DML_A \).

Proof. We have to show that the \( S4C \) axioms are valid in \( A \) and that the rules of inference preserve truth. To see that (A1) is valid, note that:

\[
V(\Box(\phi \lor \psi)) = h(V(\phi) \lor V(\psi)) = h(V(\phi)) \lor h(V(\psi)) \quad (h \text{ a Boolean homomorphism}) = V(\Box \phi \lor \Box \psi)
\]

Thus \( V(\Box(\phi \lor \psi)) \leftrightarrow (\Box \phi \lor \Box \psi) = 1 \). Validity of (A2) is proved similarly. For (A3), note that:

\[
V(\Box \phi) = h(IV(\phi)) \leq Ih(V(\phi)) \quad \text{(by Lemma 4.4.5)} = V(\Box \phi)
\]
So $V(\bigcirc \square \phi) \leq V(\square \bigcirc \phi)$ and $V(\bigcirc \square \phi \to \square \bigcirc \phi) = 1$. This takes care of the special $\bigcirc$-modality axioms. The remaining axioms are valid by soundness of $S4$ for any topological Boolean algebra—see e.g., (33). To see that necessitation for $\bigcirc$ preserves validity, suppose that $\phi$ is valid in $A$ (i.e., for every algebraic model $N = \langle A, h, V \rangle$, we have $V(\phi) = 1$). Then $V(\bigcirc \phi) = h(V(\phi)) = h(1) = 1$, and $\bigcirc \phi$ is valid in $A$. \qed

### 4.5 Reduced measure algebras

We would like to interpret $S4C$ not just in arbitrary topological Boolean algebras, but in algebras carrying a probability measure—or ‘measure algebras.’ In this section we show how to construct such algebras from separable metric spaces together with a $\sigma$-finite Borel measure (defined below).

**Definition 4.5.1.** Let $A$ be a Boolean $\sigma$-algebra, and let $\mu$ be a non-negative function on $A$, with $\mu(0) = 0$. We say $\mu$ is a measure on $A$ if for any countable collection $\{a_n\}$ of disjoint elements in $A$, $\mu(\bigvee_n a_n) = \sum_n \mu(a_n)$.

If $\mu$ is a measure on $A$, we say $\mu$ is positive if 0 is the only element at which $\mu$ takes the value 0. We say $\mu$ is $\sigma$-finite if 1 is the countable join of elements in $A$ with finite measure.\footnote{I.e., there is a countable collection of elements $A_n$ in $A$ such that $\bigvee_n A_n = 1$ and $\mu(A_n) < \infty$ for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$.} Finally, we say $\mu$ is normalized if $\mu(1) = 1$.

**Definition 4.5.2.** A measure algebra is a Boolean $\sigma$-algebra $A$ together with a positive, $\sigma$-finite measure $\mu$ on $A$.

**Lemma 4.5.3.** Let $A$ be a Boolean $\sigma$-algebra and let $\mu$ be a $\sigma$-finite measure on $A$. Then there is a normalized measure $\nu$ on $A$ such that for all $a \in A$, $\mu(a) = 0$ iff $\nu(a) = 0$.

**Proof.** Since $\mu$ is $\sigma$-finite, there exists a countable collection $\{s_n \mid n \geq 1\} \subseteq A$ such that $\bigvee_{n \geq 1} s_n = 1$ and $\mu(s_n) < \infty$ for each $n \geq 1$. WLOG we can assume the $s_n$’s are pairwise disjoint (i.e., $s_n \land s_m = 0$ for $m \neq n$). For any $a \in A$, let

$$\nu(a) = \sum_{n \geq 1} 2^{-n} \frac{\mu(a \land s_n)}{\mu(s_n)}$$

The reader can verify that $\nu$ has the desired properties. \qed

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In what follows, we show how to construct measure algebras from a topological space, \( X \), together with a Borel measure on \( X \). The relevant definition is given below.

**Definition 4.5.4.** Let \( X \) be a topological space. We say that \( \mu \) is a Borel measure on \( X \) if \( \mu \) is a measure defined on the \( \sigma \)-algebra of Borel subsets of \( X \).\(^3\)

Let \( X \) be a topological space, and let \( \mu \) be a \( \sigma \)-finite Borel measure on \( X \). We let \( \text{Borel}(X) \) denote the collection of Borel subsets of \( X \) and let \( \text{Null}_\mu \) denote the collection of measure-zero Borel sets in \( X \). Then \( \text{Borel}(X) \) is a Boolean \( \sigma \)-algebra, and \( \text{Null}_\mu \) is a \( \sigma \)-ideal in \( \text{Borel}(X) \). We form the quotient algebra

\[
\mathcal{M}_\mu^X = \text{Borel}(X)/\text{Null}_\mu
\]

(Equivalently, we can define the equivalence relation \( \sim \) on Borel sets in \( X \) by \( A \sim B \) iff \( \mu(A \triangle B) = 0 \), where \( \triangle \) denotes symmetric difference. Then \( \mathcal{M}_\mu^X \) is the algebra of equivalence classes under \( \sim \).) Boolean operations in \( \mathcal{M}_\mu^X \) are defined in the usual way in terms of underlying sets:

\[
\begin{align*}
|A| \lor |B| &= |A \cup B| \\
|A| \land |B| &= |A \cap B| \\
-|A| &= |X - A|
\end{align*}
\]

**Lemma 4.5.5.** There is a unique measure \( \nu \) on \( \mathcal{M}_\mu^X \) such that \( \nu|A| = \mu(A) \) for all \( A \) in \( \text{Borel}(X) \). Moreover, the measure \( \nu \) is \( \sigma \)-finite and positive.

**Proof.** See (15, p. 79).

It follows from Lemma 4.5.5 that \( \mathcal{M}_\mu^X \) is a measure algebra. We follow Halmos (15) in referring to any algebra of the form \( \mathcal{M}_\mu^X \) as a **reduced measure algebra**.\(^4\)

**Lemma 4.5.6.** Let \( X \) be a topological space and let \( \mu \) be a \( \sigma \)-finite Borel measure on \( X \). Then for any \( |A|, |B| \in \mathcal{M}_\mu^X \), \( |A| \leq |B| \) iff \( A \subseteq B \cup N \) for some \( N \in \text{Null}_\mu \).

\(^3\)I.e., on the smallest \( \sigma \)-algebra containing all open subsets of \( X \).

\(^4\)In fact, Halmos allows as ‘measure algebras’ only algebras with a normalized measure. We relax this constraint here, in order to allow for the ‘reduced measure algebra’ generated by the entire real line together with the usual Lebesgue measure. This algebra is, of course, isomorphic to \( \mathcal{M}_\mu^X \), where \( X \) is the real interval \([0, 1]\), and \( \mu \) is the usual Lebesgue measure on \( X \). This amendment was suggested by the anonymous referee.
Proof. \((\Rightarrow)\) If \(|A| \leq |B|\), then \(|A| \land |B| = |A|\), or equivalently \(|A \cap B| = |A|\). This means that \((A \cap B) \triangle A \in \text{Null} \mu\), so \(A - B \in \text{Null} \mu\). But \(A \subseteq B \cup (A - B)\).

\((\Leftarrow)\) Suppose \(A \subseteq B \cup N\) for some \(N \in \text{Null} \mu\). Then \(A \cap (B \cup N) = A\), and \(|A| \land |B \cup N| = |A|\). But \(|B \cup N| = |B|\), so \(|A| \land |B| = |A|\), and \(|A| \leq |B|\). \(\square\)

For the remainder of this section, let \(X\) be a separable metric space, and let \(\mu\) be a \(\sigma\)-finite Borel measure on \(X\). Where the intended measure is obvious, we will drop superscripts, writing \(\mathcal{M}_X\) for \(\mathcal{M}^\mu_X\).

So far we have seen only that \(\mathcal{M}^\mu_X\) is a Boolean algebra. In order to interpret the \(\Box\)-modality of \(S4\mathcal{C}\) in \(\mathcal{M}^\mu_X\), we need to construct an interior operator on this algebra (thus transforming \(\mathcal{M}^\mu_X\) into a topological Boolean algebra). We do this via the topological structure of the underlying space, \(X\). Let us say that an element \(a \in \mathcal{M}^\mu_X\) is open if \(a = |U|\) for some open set \(U \subseteq X\). We denote the collection of open elements in \(\mathcal{M}^\mu_X\) by \(\mathcal{G}^\mu_X\) (or, dropping superscripts, \(\mathcal{G}_X\)).

**Proposition 4.5.7.** \(\mathcal{G}^\mu_X\) is closed under (i) finite meets and (ii) arbitrary joins.

**Proof.** (i) This follows from the fact that open sets in \(X\) are closed under finite intersections. (ii) Let \(\{a_i \mid i \in I\}\) be a collection of elements in \(\mathcal{G}^\mu_X\). We need to show that \(\sup \{a_i \mid i \in I\}\) exists and is equal to some element in \(\mathcal{G}^\mu_X\). Since \(X\) is separable, there exists a countable dense set \(D\) in \(X\). Let \(\mathcal{B}\) be the collection of open balls in \(X\) centered at points in \(D\) with rational radius. Then any open set in \(X\) can be written as a union of elements in \(\mathcal{B}\). Let \(S\) be the collection of elements \(B \in \mathcal{B}\) such that \(|B| \leq a_i\) for some \(i \in I\). We claim that

\[
\sup \{a_i \mid i \in I\} = |\bigcup S|
\]

First, we need to show that \(|\bigcup S|\) is an upper bound on \(\{a_i \mid i \in I\}\). For each \(i \in I\), \(a_i = |U_i|\) for some open set \(U_i \subseteq X\). Since \(U_i\) is open, it can be written as a union of elements in \(\mathcal{B}\). Moreover, each of these elements is a member of \(S\) (if \(B \in \mathcal{B}\) and \(B \subseteq U_i\), then \(|B| \leq |U_i| = a_i\)). So \(U_i \subseteq \bigcup S\) and \(a_i = |U_i| \leq |\bigcup S|\).

For the reverse inequality \((\geq)\) we need to show that if \(m\) is an upper bound on \(\{a_i \mid i \in I\}\), then \(|\bigcup S| \leq m\). Let \(m = |M|\). Note that \(S\) is countable (since \(S \subseteq \mathcal{B}\) and \(\mathcal{B}\) is countable). We can write \(S = \{B_n \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\}\). Then for each \(n \in \mathbb{N}\), there exists \(i \in I\) such that \(|B_n| \leq a_i \leq m\). By Lemma 4.5.5, \(B_n \subseteq M \cup N_n\) for some \(N_n \in \text{Null} \mu\). Taking unions, \(\bigcup_n B_n \subseteq M \cup \bigcup_n N_n\), and \(\bigcup_n N_n \in \text{Null} \mu\). By Lemma 4.5.5, \(|S| = |\bigcup_n B_n| \leq m\). \(\square\)
We can now define an interior operator, \( I_X^\mu \), on \( M_X^\mu \) via the collection of open elements, \( G_X^\mu \). For any \( a \in M_X^\mu \), let

\[
I_X^\mu a = \sup \{ c \in G_X^\mu \mid c \leq a \}
\]

**Lemma 4.5.8.** \( I_X^\mu \) is an interior operator.

**Proof.** For simplicity of notation, we let \( I \) denote \( I_X^\mu \) and let \( G \) denote \( G_X^\mu \). Then (I₁) follows from the fact that \( 1 \in G \). (I₂) follows from the fact that \( a \) is an upper bound on \( \{ c \in G \mid c \leq a \} \). For (I₃) note that by (I₂), we have \( Ia \leq Ia \). Moreover, if \( c \in G \) with \( c \leq a \), then \( c \leq Ia \) (since \( Ia \) is supremum of all such \( c \)). Thus \( \bigvee \{ c \in G \mid c \leq a \} \leq \bigvee \{ c \in G \mid c \leq Ia \} \), and \( Ia \leq Ia \). For (I₄) note that since \( a \wedge b \leq a \), we have \( I(a \wedge b) \leq Ia \). Similarly, \( I(a \wedge b) \leq Ib \), so \( I(a \wedge b) \leq Ia \wedge Ib \). For the reverse inequality, note that \( Ia \wedge Ib \leq a \) (since \( Ia \leq a \)), and similarly \( Ia \wedge Ib \leq a \wedge b \). Moreover, \( Ia \wedge Ib \in G \). It follows that \( Ia \wedge Ib \leq I(a \wedge b) \).

**Remark 4.5.9.** Is the interior operator \( I_X^\mu \) non-trivial? (That is, does there exist \( a \in M_X^\mu \) such that \( Ia \neq a \)?) This depends on the space, \( X \), and the measure, \( \mu \). If we let \( X \) be the real interval, \([0, 1]\), and let \( \mu \) be the Lebesgue measure on Borel subsets of \( X \), then the interior operator is non-trivial. For the proof, see (22). But suppose \( \mu \) is a non-standard measure on the real interval, \([0, 1]\), defined by:

\[
\mu(A) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \frac{1}{2} \in A \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

Then \( \text{Borel}([0, 1]) / \text{Null}_\mu \) is the algebra 2, and both elements of this algebra are ‘open.’ So \( Ia = a \) for each element \( a \) in the algebra.

**Remark 4.5.10.** The operator \( I_X^\mu \) does not coincide with taking topological interiors on underlying sets. More precisely, it is in general not the case that for \( A \subseteq X \), \( I_X^\mu(|A|) = |\text{Int}(A)| \), where ‘\( \text{Int}(A) \)’ denotes the topological interior of \( A \). Let \( X \) be the real interval \([0, 1]\) with the usual topology, and let \( \mu \) be Lebesgue measure restricted to measurable subsets of \( X \). Consider the set \( X - \mathbb{Q} \) and note that \( |X - \mathbb{Q}| = |X| \) (\( \mathbb{Q} \) is countable, hence has measure zero). We have:

\[
I_X^\mu(|X - \mathbb{Q}|) = I_X^\mu(|X|) = I_X^\mu(1) = 1. \text{ However, } |\text{Int}(X - \mathbb{Q})| = |\emptyset| = 0.
\]
Remark 4.5.11. Note that an element \( a \in \mathcal{M}^\mu_X \) is open just in case \( I^\mu_X a = a \). Indeed, if \( a \) is open, then \( a \in \{ c \in \mathcal{G}^\mu_X | c \leq a \} \). So \( a = \sup \{ c \in \mathcal{G}^\mu_X | c \leq a \} = I^\mu_X a \). Also, if \( I^\mu_X a = a \), then \( a \) is the join of a collection of elements in \( \mathcal{G}^\mu_X \), and so \( a \in \mathcal{G}^\mu_X \). This shows that the definition of ‘open’ elements given above fits with the definition in (I).

In what follows, it will sometimes be convenient to express the interior operator \( I^\mu_X \) in terms of underlying open sets, as in the following Lemma:

Lemma 4.5.12. Let \( A \subseteq X \). Then \( I^\mu_X(|A|) = \bigcup \{ O \text{ open} | |O| \leq |A| \} \)

Proof. By definition of \( I^\mu_X \), \( I^\mu_X(|A|) = \sup \{ c \in \mathcal{G}^\mu_X | c \leq |A| \} \). Let \( B \) and \( D \) be as in the proof of Proposition 4.5.7, and let \( S \) be the collection of elements \( B \in \mathcal{B} \) such that \( |B| \leq |A| \). Then by the proof of Proposition 4.5.7, \( I^\mu_X(|A|) = \bigcup S \). But now \( \bigcup S = \bigcup \{ O \text{ open} | |O| \leq |A| \} \). (This follows from the fact that any open set \( O \subseteq X \) can be written as a union of elements in \( \mathcal{B} \).) Thus, \( I^\mu_X(|A|) = \bigcup \{ O \text{ open} | |O| \leq |A| \} \). \( \square \)

We have shown that \( \mathcal{M}^\mu_X \) together with the operator \( I^\mu_X \) is a topological Boolean algebra. Of course, for purposes of our semantics, we are interested in O-operators on \( \mathcal{M}^\mu_X \). How do such maps arise? Unsurprisingly, a rich source of examples comes from continuous functions on the underlying topological space \( X \). Let us spell this out more carefully.

Definition 4.5.13. Let \( X \) and \( Y \) be topological spaces and let \( \mu \) and \( \nu \) be Borel measures on \( X \) and \( Y \) respectively. We say \( f : X \to Y \) is measure-zero preserving (MZP) if for any \( A \subseteq Y \), \( \nu(A) = 0 \) implies \( \mu(f^{-1}(A)) = 0 \).

Lemma 4.5.14. Let \( X \) and \( Y \) be separable metric spaces, and let \( \mu \) and \( \nu \) be \( \sigma \)-finite Borel measures on \( X \) and \( Y \) respectively. Suppose \( B \) is a Borel subset of \( X \) with \( \mu(B) = \mu(X) \), and \( f : B \to Y \) is measure-zero preserving and continuous. Define \( h^{|\cdot|}_f : \mathcal{M}^\nu_Y \to \mathcal{M}^\mu_X \) by

\[ h^{|\cdot|}_f(|A|) = |f^{-1}(A)| \]

Then \( h^{|\cdot|}_f \) is an O-map. In particular, if \( X = Y \), then \( h^{|\cdot|}_f \) is an O-operator.
Proof. First, we must show that \( h_f^{|A|} \) is well-defined.\(^5\) Indeed, if \(|A| = |B|\), then \( \nu(A \triangle B) = 0 \). And since \( f \) is MZP, \( \mu (f^{-1}(A) \triangle f^{-1}(B)) = \mu (f^{-1}(A \triangle B)) = 0 \). So \( f^{-1}(A) \sim f^{-1}(B) \). This shows that \( h_f^{|A|} \) is independent of the choice of representative, \( A \). Furthermore, it is clear that \( h_f^{|·|} \) is a Boolean homomorphism.

To see that it is an O-map, we need only show that if \( c \in G_\nu \), \( h_f^{|·|}(c) \in G_\mu \). But if \( c \in G_\nu \) then \( c = |U| \) for some open set \( U \subseteq Y \). By continuity of \( f \), \( f^{-1}(U) \) is open in \( B \). So \( f^{-1}(U) = O \cap B \) for some \( O \) open in \( X \). So \( h_f^{|·|}(c) = |f^{-1}(U)| = |O| \in G_\mu \). \( \square \)

By the results of the previous section, we can now interpret the language of \( S_4C \) in reduced measure algebras. In particular, we say an algebraic model \( \langle A, h, V \rangle \) is a dynamic measure model if \( A = M_\mu^\alpha \) for some separable metric space \( X \) and a \( \sigma \)-finite Borel measure \( \mu \) on \( X \).

We are particularly interested in the reduced measure algebra generated by the real interval, \([0, 1]\), together with the usual Lebesgue measure.

**Definition 4.5.15.** (Lebesgue Measure Algebra) Let \( I \) be the real interval \([0, 1]\) and let \( \lambda \) denote Lebesgue measure restricted to the Borel subsets of \( I \). The Lebesgue measure algebra is the algebra \( M_\lambda^I \).

Because of its central importance, we denote the Lebesgue measure algebra without subscripts or superscripts, by \( M \). Furthermore, we denote the collection of open elements in \( M \) by \( G \) and the interior operator on \( M \) by \( I \).

As in Definition 4.4.6, we let \( DML_M = \{ \phi \mid \models_M \phi \} \) (i.e., the set of validities in \( M \)). In our terminology, soundness of \( S_4C \) for \( M \) is the claim: \( S_4C \subseteq DML_M \). Completeness of \( S_4C \) for \( M \) is the claim: \( DML_M \subseteq S_4C \).

**Proposition 4.5.16.** (Soundness) \( S_4C \subseteq DML_M \).

*Proof.* Immediate from Proposition 4.4.7. \( \square \)

**Remark 4.5.17.** The algebra \( M \) is isomorphic to the algebra \( Leb([0, 1])/Null_\mu \), where \( Leb([0, 1]) \) is the \( \sigma \)-algebra of Lebesgue-measureable subsets of the real interval \([0, 1]\), and \( Null_\mu \) is the \( \sigma \)-ideal of Lebesgue measure-zero sets. This follows from the fact that every Lebesgue-measureable set in \([0, 1]\) differs from some Borel set by a set of measure zero.

\(^5\)Note that by continuity of \( f \), \( f^{-1}(A) \) is a Borel set in \( B \), hence also a Borel set in \( X \).
4.6 Isomorphisms between reduced measure algebras

In this section we use a well-known result of Oxtoby’s to show that any reduced measure algebra generated by a separable metric space with a \(\sigma\)-finite, nonatomic Borel measure is isomorphic to \(M\). By Oxtoby’s result, we can think of \(M\) as the canonical separable measure algebra.

In the remainder of this section, let \(J\) denote the space \([0, 1] - \mathbb{Q}\) (with the usual metric topology), and let \(\delta\) denote Lebesgue measure restricted to the Borel subsets of \(J\).

**Definition 4.6.1.** A topological space \(X\) is topologically complete if \(X\) is homeomorphic to a complete metric space.

**Definition 4.6.2.** Let \(X\) be a topological space. A Borel measure \(\mu\) on \(X\) is nonatomic if \(\mu(\{x\}) = 0\) for each \(x \in X\).

**Theorem 4.6.3.** (Oxtoby, 1970) Let \(X\) be a topologically complete, separable metric space, and let \(\mu\) be a normalized, nonatomic Borel measure on \(X\). Then there exists a Borel set \(B \subseteq X\) and a function \(f : B \to J\) such that \(\mu(X - B) = 0\) and \(f\) is a measure-preserving homeomorphism (where the measure on \(J\) is \(\delta\)).

**Proof.** See (30). \(\square\)

**Lemma 4.6.4.** \(^6\) Suppose \(X\) and \(Y\) are separable metric spaces, and \(\mu\) and \(\nu\) are normalized Borel measures on \(X\) and \(Y\) respectively. If \(f : X \to Y\) is a measure preserving homeomorphism, then \(M^{\mu}_X\) is isomorphic to \(M^{\nu}_Y\).

**Proof.** For simplicity of notation, we drop superscripts, writing simply \(\mathcal{M}_X, \mathcal{G}_X,\) and \(I_X, \) etc. Let \(h^f_J : \mathcal{M}_Y \to \mathcal{M}_X\) be defined by \(h^f_J(|A|) = |f^{-1}(A)|\). This function is well-defined because \(f\) is MZP and continuous. (The first property ensures that \(h^f_J(|A|)\) is independent of representative \(A\); the second ensures that \(f^{-1}(A)\) is Borel.) Clearly \(h^f_J\) is a Boolean homomorphism. We can define the

---

\(^6\)We can relax the conditions of the lemma, so that instead of requiring that \(f\) is measure-preserving, we require only that \(\nu(f(S)) = 0\) if \(\mu(A) = 0\). In fact, we can further relax these conditions so that \(f : B \to C\), where \(B \subseteq X, C \subseteq Y, \mu(B \Delta X) = 0,\) and \(\nu(C \Delta Y) = 0\). We prove the lemma as stated because only this weaker claim is needed for the proof of Corollary 4.6.5.
mapping \( h_{f^{-1}} : \mathcal{M}_X \to \mathcal{M}_Y \) by \( h_{f^{-1}}(|A|) = |f(A)| \). Then \( h_f \) and \( h_{f^{-1}} \) are inverses, so \( h_f \) is bijective. We need to show that \( h_f \) preserves interiors—i.e., \( h_f(I_Y a) = I_X h_f(a) \). The inequality \( \leq \) follows from the fact that \( h_f \) is an \( \mathcal{O} \)-map (see Lemma 4.5.14). For the reverse inequality, we need to see that \( h_f(I_Y a) \) is an upper bound on \( \{ c \in G_X \mid c \leq h_f(a) \} \). If \( c \in G_X \), then \( h_f(I_Y a) \in G_Y \) and if \( c \leq h_f(a) \), then \( h_{f^{-1}}(c) \leq h_{f^{-1}}(h_f(a)) = a \). Thus \( h_{f^{-1}}(c) \leq I_Y a \), and \( c = h_f(h_{f^{-1}}(c)) \leq h_f(I_Y a) \).

**Corollary 4.6.5.** Let \( X \) be a separable metric space, and let \( \mu \) be a nonatomic \( \sigma \)-finite Borel measure on \( X \) with \( \mu(X) > 0 \). Then,

\[ \mathcal{M}_X^\mu \cong \mathcal{M} \]

**Proof.** By Lemma 4.5.3, we can assume that \( \mu \) is normalized.\(^7\) Let \( X_{\text{comp}} \) be the completion of the metric space \( X \). Clearly \( X_{\text{comp}} \) is separable. We can extend the Borel measure \( \mu \) on \( X \) to a Borel measure \( \mu^* \) on \( X_{\text{comp}} \) by letting \( \mu^*(S) = \mu(S \cap X) \) for any Borel set \( S \) in \( X_{\text{comp}} \). The reader can convince himself that \( \mu^* \) is a normalized, nonatomic, \( \sigma \)-finite Borel measure on \( X_{\text{comp}} \), and that \( \mathcal{M}_{X_{\text{comp}}}^\mu \cong \mathcal{M}_X^\mu \). By Theorem 4.6.3, there exists a set \( B \subseteq X_{\text{comp}} \) and a function \( f : B \to J \) such that \( \mu^*(B) = 1 \) and \( f \) is a measure-preserving homeomorphism. By Lemma 4.6.4, \( \mathcal{M}_J \cong \mathcal{M}_B \). We have:

\[ \mathcal{M} \cong \mathcal{M}_J \cong \mathcal{M}_B \cong \mathcal{M}_{X_{\text{comp}}}^\mu \cong \mathcal{M}_X^\mu \]

\[ \square \]

### 4.7 Invariance maps

At this point, we have at our disposal two key results: completeness of \( S4C \) for finite stratified Kripke frames, and the isomorphism between \( \mathcal{M}_X^\mu \) and \( \mathcal{M} \) for any separable metric space \( X \) and \( \sigma \)-finite, nonatomic Borel measure \( \mu \). Our aim in what follows will be to transfer completeness from finite stratified Kripke frames to the Lebesgue measure algebra, \( \mathcal{M} \). But how to do this?

\(^7\)More explicitly: If \( \mu \) is \( \sigma \)-finite, then by Lemma 4.5.3 there is a normalized Borel measure \( \mu^* \) on \( X \) such that \( \mu^*(S) = 0 \) iff \( \mu(S) = 0 \) for each \( S \subseteq X \). It follows that \( \mathcal{M}_X^\mu \cong \mathcal{M}_X^{\mu^*} \) (where the isomorphism is not, in general, measure-preserving).
We can view any topological space as a topological Boolean algebra—indeed, as the topological field of all subsets of the space (see Example 4.4.2). Viewing the finite stratified Kripke frames in this way, what we need is ‘truth-preserving’ maps between the algebras generated by Kripke frames and $\mathcal{M}_X^\mu$, for appropriately chosen $X$ and $\mu$. The key notion here is that of a “dynamic embedding” (defined below) of one dynamic algebra into another. Although our specific aim is to transfer truth from Kripke algebras to reduced measure algebras, the results we present here are more general and concern truth preserving maps between arbitrary dynamic algebras.

Recall that a dynamic algebra is a pair $\langle A, h \rangle$, where $A$ is a topological Boolean algebra, and $h$ is an O-operator on $A$.

**Definition 4.7.1.** Let $M_1 = \langle A_1, h_1 \rangle$ and $M_2 = \langle A_2, h_2 \rangle$ be two dynamic algebras. We say a function $h : M_1 \rightarrow M_2$ is a dynamic embedding if

(i) $h$ is an embedding of $A_1$ into $A_2$;

(ii) $h \circ h_1 = h_2 \circ h$.

**Lemma 4.7.2.** Let $M_1 = \langle A_1, h_1, V_1 \rangle$ and $M_2 = \langle A_2, h_2, V_2 \rangle$ be two dynamic algebraic models. Suppose that $h : \langle A_1, h_1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle A_2, h_2 \rangle$ is a dynamic embedding, and for every propositional variable $p$,

$$V_2(p) = h \circ V_1(p)$$

Then for any $\phi \in L_{\Box, \Diamond}$,

$$V_2(\phi) = h \circ V_1(\phi)$$

**Proof.** By induction on the complexity of $\phi$. \hfill \Box

**Corollary 4.7.3.** Let $M_1 = \langle A_1, h_1, V_1 \rangle$ and $M_2 = \langle A_2, h_2, V_2 \rangle$ be two dynamic algebraic models. Suppose that $h : \langle A_1, h_1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle A_2, h_2 \rangle$ is a dynamic embedding, and for every propositional variable $p$,

$$V_2(p) = h \circ V_1(p)$$

Then for any $\phi \in L_{\Box, \Diamond}$,

$$M_1 \models \phi \iff M_2 \models \phi$$

**Proof.** $M_2 \models \phi$ iff $V_2(\phi) = 1$

iff $h \circ V_1(\phi) = 1$ (by Lemma 4.7.2)

iff $V_1 = 1$ (since $h$ is an embedding) \hfill \Box
Let \( \langle X, F \rangle \) be a dynamic topological space and let \( A_X \) be the topological field of all subsets of \( X \) (see Example 4.4.2). We define the function \( h_F \) on \( A_X \) by

\[
h_F(S) = F^{-1}(S)
\]

It is not difficult to see that \( h_F \) is an O-operator. We say that \( \langle A_X, h_F \rangle \) is the dynamic algebra generated by (or corresponding to) the dynamic topological space \( \langle X, F \rangle \).

Our goal is to embed the dynamic algebras generated by finite dynamic Kripke frames into a dynamic measure algebra, \( \langle M^\mu_X, h \rangle \), where \( X \) is some appropriately chosen separable metric space and \( \mu \) is a nonatomic, \( \sigma \)-finite Borel measure on \( X \). In view of Corollary 4.7.3 and completeness for finite dynamic Kripke frames, this will give us completeness for the measure semantics. The basic idea is to construct such embeddings via ‘nice’ maps on the underlying topological spaces. To this end, we introduce the following new definition:

**Definition 4.7.4.** Suppose \( X \) and \( Y \) are a topological spaces, and \( \mu \) is a Borel measure on \( X \). Let \( \gamma : X \to Y \). We say \( \gamma \) has the M-property with respect to \( \mu \) if for any subset \( S \subseteq Y \):

(i) \( \gamma^{-1}(S) \) is Borel;

(ii) for any open set \( O \subseteq X \), if \( \gamma^{-1}(S) \cap O \neq \emptyset \) then \( \mu(\gamma^{-1}(S) \cap O) > 0 \).

**Lemma 4.7.5.** Suppose \( \langle X, F \rangle \) is a dynamic topological space, where \( X \) is a separable metric space, \( F \) is measure-zero preserving, and let \( \mu \) be a \( \sigma \)-finite Borel measure on \( X \) with \( \mu(X) > 0 \). Suppose \( \langle Y, G \rangle \) is a dynamic topological space, and \( \langle A_Y, h_G \rangle \) is the corresponding dynamic algebra. Let \( B \) be a subset of \( X \) with \( \mu(B) = \mu(X) \), and suppose we have a map \( \gamma : B \to Y \) that satisfies:

(i) \( \gamma \) is continuous, open and surjective;

(ii) \( \gamma \circ F = G \circ \gamma \);

(iii) \( \gamma \) has the M-property with respect to \( \mu \).

Then the map \( \Phi : \langle A_Y, h_G \rangle \to \langle M^\mu_X, h_F \rangle \) defined by

\[
\Phi(S) = |\gamma^{-1}(S)|
\]

is a dynamic embedding.
Proof. By the fact that $\mathcal{M}_X^\mu$ is isomorphic to $\mathcal{M}_B^\mu$, we can view $\Phi$ as a map from $\langle A_Y, h_G \rangle$ into $\langle \mathcal{M}_B^\mu, h_F^1 \rangle$, where $h_F^\mu$ is viewed as an operator on $\mathcal{M}_B^\mu$. Note that $\Phi$ is well-defined by the fact that $\gamma$ satisfies clause (i) of the M-property. We need to show that (i) $\Phi$ is an embedding of $\langle A_Y, h_G \rangle$ into $\langle \mathcal{M}_B^\mu, h_F^1 \rangle$, and (ii) $\Phi \circ h_G = h_F^1 \circ \Phi$.

(i) Clearly $\Phi$ is a Boolean homomorphism. We prove that $\Phi$ is injective and preserves interiors.

- (Injectivity) Suppose $\Phi(S_1) = \Phi(S_2)$ and $S_1 \neq S_2$. Then $\gamma^{-1}(S_1) \sim \gamma^{-1}(S_2)$, and $S_1 \triangle S_2 \neq \emptyset$. Let $y \in S_1 \triangle S_2$. By surjectivity of $\gamma$, we have $\gamma^{-1}(y) \neq \emptyset$. Moreover, $\mu(\gamma^{-1}(y)) > 0$ (since $\gamma$ has the M-property w.r.t. $\mu$, and the entire space $B$ is open). So $\mu(\gamma^{-1}(S_1) \triangle \gamma^{-1}(S_2)) = \mu(\gamma^{-1}(S_1) \triangle \gamma^{-1}(S_2)) \geq \mu(\gamma^{-1}(y)) > 0$. And $\gamma^{-1}(S_1) \not\sim \gamma^{-1}(S_2)$. ⊥.

- (Preservation of Interiors) For clarity, we will denote the topological interior in the spaces $Y$ and $B$ by $\text{Int}_Y$ and $\text{Int}_B$ respectively, and the interior operator on $\mathcal{M}_B^\mu$ by $I$. Let $S \subseteq Y$. It follows from continuity and openness of $\gamma : B \rightarrow Y$, that

$$\gamma^{-1}(\text{Int}_Y(S)) = \text{Int}_B(\gamma^{-1}(S))$$

Note that,

- $\Phi(\text{Int}_Y(S)) = |\gamma^{-1}(\text{Int}_Y(S))|$
  $$= |\text{Int}_B(\gamma^{-1}(S))|$$
  $$= |\bigcup \{O \text{ open in } B \mid O \subseteq \gamma^{-1}(S)\}|$$
- $I(\Phi(S)) = I|\gamma^{-1}(S)|$
  $$= |\bigcup \{O \text{ open in } B \mid |O| \leq |\gamma^{-1}(S)|\}|$$ (Lemma 4.5.12)

Thus it is sufficient to show that for any open set $O \subseteq B$,

$$O \subseteq \gamma^{-1}(S) \iff |O| \leq |\gamma^{-1}(S)|$$

The left-to-right direction is obvious. For the right-to-left direction, suppose (toward contradiction) that $|O| \leq |\gamma^{-1}(S)|$ but that $O \not\subseteq \gamma^{-1}(S)$. Then $O \subseteq \gamma^{-1}(S) \cup N$ for some $N \subseteq B$ with $\mu(N) = 0$. Moreover, since $O \not\subseteq \gamma^{-1}(S)$, there exists $x \in O$ such that $x \notin \gamma^{-1}(S)$. Let $y = \gamma(x)$. Then $\gamma^{-1}(y) \cap O \neq \emptyset$. Since $\gamma$ has the M-property with respect to $\mu$, it follows that $\mu(\gamma^{-1}(y) \cap O) > 0$. 

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But $\gamma^{-1}(y) \cap O \subseteq N$ (since $\gamma^{-1}(y) \cap O \subseteq \gamma^{-1}(S) \cup N$, and $\gamma^{-1}(y) \cap \gamma^{-1}(S) = \emptyset$). \hfill \bot

We’ve shown that $\Phi$ is an embedding of $\langle A_Y, h_G \rangle$ into $\langle M_B^\mu, h_F^{\|} \rangle$. In view of the isomorphism between $M_B^\mu$ and $M_B^\mu$, we have shown that $\Phi$ is an embedding of $\langle A_Y, h_G \rangle$ into $M_B^\mu$.

(ii) We know that $\gamma \circ F = G \circ \gamma$. Taking inverses, we have $F^{-1} \circ \gamma^{-1} = \gamma^{-1} \circ G^{-1}$.

Now let $S \subseteq Y$. Then:

$$
\Phi \circ h_G(S) = |\gamma^{-1}(G^{-1}(S))|
$$

$$
= |F^{-1}(\gamma^{-1}(S))|
$$

$$
= h_F^{\|} \circ \Phi(S)
$$

$\square$

## 4.8 Completeness of $S4C$ for the Lebesgue measure algebra with O-operators

In this section we prove the main result of the chapter: completeness of $S4C$ for the Lebesgue measure algebra, $M$. Recall that completeness is the claim that $DML_M \subseteq S4C$. In fact, we prove the contrapositive: For any formula $\phi \in L_{\Box, \bigcirc}$, if $\phi \notin S4C$, then $\phi \notin DML_M$. Our strategy is as follows. If $\phi$ is a non-theorem of $S4C$, then by Lemma 4.3.7, $\phi$ is refuted in some finite stratified Kripke frame $K = \langle W, R, G \rangle$. Viewing the frame algebraically (i.e., as a topological field of sets), we must construct a dynamic embedding $\Phi : \langle A_W, h_G \rangle \rightarrow \langle M, h \rangle$, where $\langle A_W, h_G \rangle$ is the dynamic Kripke algebra generated by the dynamic Kripke frame $K$, and $h$ is some O-operator on $M$. In view of the isomorphism between $M$ and $M_X^\mu$ for any separable metric space, $X$, and nonatomic, $\sigma$-finite Borel measure $\mu$ on $X$ with $\mu(X) > 0$, it is enough to construct a dynamic embedding of the Kripke algebra into $M_X^\mu$, for appropriately chosen $X$ and $\mu$.

The constructions in this section are a modification of the constructions introduced in (38), where it is proved that $S4C$ is complete for topological models in Euclidean spaces of arbitrarily large finite dimension. The modifications we
make are measure-theoretic, and are needed to accommodate the new ‘probabilistic’ setting. We are very much indebted to Slavnov for his pioneering work in (38).\footnote{Where possible, we have preserved Slavnov’s original notation in (38).}

4.8.1 Outline of the proof

Let us spell out the plan for the proof a little more carefully. The needed ingredients are all set out in Lemma 4.7.5. Our first step will be to construct the dynamic topological space \( (X, F) \), where \( X \) is a separable metric space, and \( F \) is a measure-zero preserving, continuous function on \( X \). We must also construct a measure \( \mu \) on the Borel sets of \( X \) that is nonatomic and \( \sigma \)-finite, such that \( \mu(X) > 0 \). We want to embed the Kripke algebra \( \langle A_W, h_G \rangle \) into \( \langle M^n_X, h_F \rangle \), and to do this, we must construct a topological map \( \gamma : B \to W \), where \( B \subseteq X \) and \( \mu(B) = 1 \), and \( \gamma \) satisfies the requirements of Lemma 4.7.5. In particular, we must ensure that

(i) \( \gamma \) is open, continuous and surjective,

(ii) \( \gamma \circ F = G \circ \gamma \)

and

(iii) \( \gamma \) has the M-property with respect to \( \mu \).

In Section 8.2, we show how to construct the dynamic space \( (X, F) \), and the Borel measure \( \mu \) on \( X \). In Section 8.3, we construct the map \( \gamma : X \to W \), and show that it has the desired properties.

4.8.2 The topological carrier of countermodels

Let

\[
X_n = I^1 \sqcup \cdots \sqcup I^n
\]

where \( I^k \) is the \( k \)-th dimensional unit cube and \( \sqcup \) denotes disjoint union. We would like \( X_n \) to be a metric space, so we think of the cubes \( I^k \) as embedded in the space \( \mathbb{R}^n \), and as lying at a certain fixed distance from one another. For simplicity of notation, we denote points in \( I^k \) by \( (x_1, \ldots, x_k) \), and do not worry about how exactly these points are positioned in \( \mathbb{R}^n \).

For each \( k < n \), define the map \( F_k : I^k \to I^{k+1} \) by \( (x_1, \ldots, x_k) \mapsto (x_1, \ldots, x_k, \frac{1}{2}) \).

We let

\[
F(x) = \begin{cases} 
  F_k(x) & \text{if } x \in I_k, k < n \\
  x & \text{if } x \in I_n 
\end{cases}
\]
Clearly $F$ is injective. For each $k \geq 2$ we choose a privileged “midsection” $D_k = [0, 1]^{k-1} \times \{\frac{1}{2}\}$ of $I_k$. Thus, $f(I_k) = D_{k+1}$ for $k < n$.

The space $X_n$ will be the carrier of our countermodels (we will choose $n$ according to the $\bigcirc$-depth of the formula which we are refuting, as explained in the next section). We define a non-standard measure, $\mu$, on $X_n$. This somewhat unusual measure will allow us to transfer countermodels on Kripke frames back to the measure algebra, $\mathcal{M}_{X_n}$.

Let $\mu$ on $I_1$ be Lebesgue measure on $\mathbb{R}$ restricted to Borel subsets of $I_1$. Suppose we have defined $\mu$ on $I^1, \ldots, I^k$. For any Borel set $B$ in $I^{k+1}$, let $B_1 = B \cap D_{k+1}$, and $B_2 = B \setminus D_{k+1}$. Then $B = B_1 \sqcup B_2$. We define

$$\mu(B) = \mu(F^{-1}(B_1)) + \lambda(B_2)$$

where $\lambda$ is the usual Lebesgue measure in $\mathbb{R}^{k+1}$. Finally, for any Borel set $B \subseteq X_n$, we let $\mu(B) = \sum_{k=1}^{n} \mu(B \cap I^k)$

Note that $\mu(I^1) = 1$, and in general $\mu(I^{k+1}) = \mu(I^k) + 1$. Thus $\mu(X_n) = \mu(I^1 \sqcup \cdots \sqcup I^n) = \sum_{k=1}^{n} k = \frac{1}{2}(n^2 + n)$.

**Lemma 4.8.1.** $\mu$ is a nonatomic, $\sigma$-finite Borel measure on $X_n$.

**Proof.** Clearly $\mu$ is nonatomic. Moreover, since $\mu(X_n) < \infty$, $\mu$ is $\sigma$-finite. The only thing left to show is that $\mu$ is countably additive. Suppose that $\{B_m\}_{m \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a collection of pairwise disjoint subsets of $X_n$. 

Figure 12: The space $X_3 = I^1 \sqcup I^2 \sqcup I^3$. Note that $\mu(I^1) = 1$, $\mu(I^2) = 2$, and $\mu(I^3) = 3$. The shaded regions in $I^2$ and $I^3$ denote the midsections, $D_2$ and $D_3$, respectively.
Claim 4.8.2. For any \( k \leq n \),

\[
\mu \left( \bigcup_m (B_m \cap I^k) \right) = \sum_m \mu(B_m \cap I^k)
\]

(Proof of Claim: By induction on \( k \).)

But now we have:

\[
\mu \left( \bigcup_m B_m \right) = \sum_k \mu \left( \bigcup_m (B_m \cap I^k) \right) \quad \text{(by definition of \( \mu \))}
\]

\[
= \sum_k \mu \left( \bigcup_m (B_m \cap I^k) \right) \quad \text{(defn. of } \mu \text{)}
\]

\[
= \sum_k \sum_m \mu(B_m \cap I^k) \quad \text{(by Claim 4.8.2)}
\]

\[
= \sum_m \sum_k \mu(B_m \cap I^k) \quad \text{(by definition of } \mu \text{)}
\]

\[
= \sum_m \mu(B_m) \quad \text{(by definition of } \mu \text{)}
\]

Lemma 4.8.3. \( X \) is a separable metric space and \( F : X_n \to X_n \) is measure-preserving and continuous.

Proof. The set of rational points in \( I^n \) is dense in \( k \) \( (k \leq n) \), so \( X_n \) is separable. Continuity of \( F \) follows from the fact that \( F \) is a translation in \( \mathbb{R}^n \); \( F \) is measure-preserving by the construction of \( \mu \).

---

9The base case is by countable additivity of Lebesgue measure on the unit interval, \([0, 1]\). For the induction step, suppose the claim is true for \( k - 1 \). Then we have:

\[
\mu(\bigcup_m (B_m \cap I^k)) = \mu(F^{-1}(\bigcup_m (B_m \cap I^k) \cap D^k)) + \lambda(\bigcup_m (B_m \cap I^k) \cap D^k)
\]

\[
= \mu(\bigcup_m F^{-1}(B_m \cap I^k) \cap D^k) + \lambda((B_m \cap I^k) \cap D^k) \quad \text{(defn. of } \mu \text{)}
\]

\[
= \sum_m \mu(F^{-1}(B_m \cap I^k) \cap D^k) + \sum_m \lambda((B_m \cap I^k) \cap D^k) \quad \text{(count. add. of } \lambda \text{)}
\]

\[
= \sum_m \mu(F^{-1}(B_m \cap I^k) \cap D^k) + \lambda((B_m \cap I^k) \cap D^k) \quad \text{(IH)}
\]

\[
= \sum_m (B_m \cap I^k) \quad \text{(defn. of } \mu \text{)}
\]
4.8.3 Completeness

Assume we are given a formula $\phi \in L_{\mathcal{C}}$ such that $\phi$ is not a theorem of $S4C$ and let $n = CD(\phi) + 1$. By Lemma 4.3.7, there is a finite stratified, dynamic Kripke model $K = \langle W, R, G, V_1 \rangle$ of depth $n$ such that $\phi$ is refuted at the root of $K$. In other words, there is a collection of pairwise disjoint cones $W_1, \ldots, W_n$ with roots $w_0^1, \ldots, w_0^n$ respectively, such that $W = \bigcup_{k \leq n} W_k$; $G$ is injective; and $G(w_k) = w_{k+1}$ for each $k < n$; and $K, w_1^0 \neq \phi$. Let the space $X = X_n = I^1 \sqcup \cdots \sqcup I^n$ and the measure $\mu$ be as defined in the previous section. We construct a map $\tilde{\gamma} : X \to W$ in a countable number of stages. To do this we will make crucial use of the notion of $\epsilon$-nets, defined below:

**Definition 4.8.4.** Given a metric space $S$ and $\epsilon > 0$, a subset $\Omega$ of $S$ is an $\epsilon$-net for $S$ if for any $y \in S$, there exists $x \in \Omega$ such that $d(x, y) < \epsilon$ (where $d$ denotes the distance function in $S$).

Observe that if $S$ is compact, then for any $\epsilon > 0$ there is a finite $\epsilon$-net for $S$.

**Basic Construction.** Let $w_{\text{root}}^1 = w_0^1$, and let $w_1, \ldots, w_{r_1}$ be the $R$-successors of $w_{\text{root}}^1$. At the first stage, we select $r_1$ pairwise disjoint closed cubes $T_1, \ldots, T_{r_1}$ in $I^1$, making sure that their total measure adds up to no more than $(\frac{1}{2})^{0+2}$—that is, $\sum_{k \leq r_1} \mu(T_k) < \frac{1}{4}$. For each $x$ in the interior of $T_k$ we let $\tilde{\gamma}(x) = w_k (k \leq r_1)$. With slight abuse of notation we put $\tilde{\gamma}(T_k) = w_k$. We refer to $T_1, \ldots, T_r$ as terminal cubes, and we let $I_1^1 = I^1 \setminus \bigcup_{k=1}^{r_1} \text{Int}(T_k)$.

At any subsequent stage, we assume we are given a set $I_i^1$ that is equal to $I^1$ with a finite number of open cubes removed from it. Thus $I_i^1$ is a compact set. We find a $\frac{1}{2}^i$-net $\Omega_i$ for $I_i^1$ and for each point $y \in \Omega_i$, we choose $r_i$ pairwise disjoint closed cubes, $T_y^0, \ldots, T_y^{r_i}$ in the $\frac{1}{2}^i$-neighborhood of $y$, putting $\tilde{\gamma}(T_y^k) = w_k$ (for $k \leq r_i$, with the same meaning as above). Again, we refer to the $T_k$’s as terminal cubes. Since $\Omega_i$ is finite, we create only a finite number of new terminal cubes at this stage, and we make sure to do this in such a way as to remove a total measure of no more than $(\frac{1}{2})^{i+2}$. We let $I_{i+1}^1$ be the set $I_i^1$ minus the interiors of the new terminal cubes.

After doing this countably many times, we are left with some points in $I^1$ that do not belong to the interior of any terminal cube. We call such points *exceptional points* and we put $\tilde{\gamma}(x) = w_{\text{root}}^1$ for each exceptional point $x \in I^1$. This completes the definition of $\tilde{\gamma}$ on $I^1$.

Now assume that we have already defined $\tilde{\gamma}$ on $I^j$. We let $w_{\text{root}}^{j+1} = w_0^{j+1}$ and let $w_1, \ldots, w_{r_{j+1}}$ be the $R$-successors of $w_{\text{root}}^{j+1}$. We define $\tilde{\gamma}$ on $I^{j+1}$ as follows.
first we choose \( r_{j+1} \) closed cubes \( T_1, \ldots, T_{r_{j+1}} \) in \( I^{j+1} \), putting \( \tilde{\gamma}(T_k) = w_k \) (for \( k \leq r_{j+1} \)). In choosing \( T_1, \ldots, T_{r_{j+1}} \), we make sure that these cubes are not only pairwise disjoint (as before) but also disjoint from the midsection \( D_{j+1} \). Again, we also make sure to remove a total measure of no more than \( (\frac{1}{2})^{0+2} \mu(I^{j+1}) \). We let \( I^{j+1}_1 = I^{j+1} - \bigcup_{k=1}^{r_{j+1}} \text{Int}(T_k) \).

At stage \( i \), we assume we are given a set \( I^{j+1}_i \) equal to \( I^{j+1} \) minus the interiors of a finite number of closed cubes. Thus \( I^{j+1}_i \) is compact, and we choose a finite \( \frac{1}{2^i} \)-net \( \Omega_i \) for \( I^{j+1}_i \). For each \( y \in \Omega_i \) we choose \( r_{j+1} \) closed terminal cubes \( T_1, \ldots, T_{r_{j+1}} \) in the \( \frac{1}{2^i} \)-neighborhood of \( y \). We make sure that these cubes are not only pairwise disjoint, but disjoint from the midsection \( D_{j+1} \). Since \( \Omega_i \) is finite, we add only finitely many new terminal cubes in this way. It follows that there is an \( \epsilon \)-neighborhood of \( D_{j+1} \) that is disjoint from all the terminal cubes added up to this stage. Moreover, for each terminal cube \( T \) of \( I^j \) defined at the \( i \)th stage, \( F(T) \subseteq D_{j+1} \), and we let \( T' \) be some closed cube in \( I^{j+1} \) containing \( F(T) \) and of height at most \( \epsilon \). To ensure that the equality \( \tilde{\gamma} \circ F(x) = G \circ \tilde{\gamma}(x) \) holds for all points \( x \) belonging to the interior of terminal cubes of \( I^j \), we put:

\[
\tilde{\gamma}(T') = G \circ \tilde{\gamma}(T)
\]

Finally, we have added only finitely many terminal cubes at this stage, and we do so in such a way as to make sure that the total measure of these cubes is no more than \( (\frac{1}{2})^{i+2} \mu(I^{j+1}) \). We let \( I^{j+1}_{i+1} \) be the set \( I^{j+1}_i \) minus the new terminal cubes added at this stage.

We iterate this process countably many times, removing a countable number of terminal cubes from \( I^{j+1} \). For all exceptional points \( x \) in \( I^{j+1} \) (i.e., points that do not belong to the interior of any terminal cube defined at any stage) we put \( \tilde{\gamma}(x) = w_{\text{root}}^{j+1} \). Noting that exceptional points of \( I^j \) are pushed forward under \( F \) to exceptional points in \( I^{j+1} \), we see that the equality \( \tilde{\gamma} \circ F(x) = G \circ \tilde{\gamma}(x) \) holds for exceptional points as well.

This completes the construction of \( \tilde{\gamma} \) on \( X \). We pause now to prove two facts about the map \( \tilde{\gamma} \) that will be of crucial importance in what follows.

**Lemma 4.8.5.** Let \( E(I^j) \) be the collection of all exceptional points in \( I^j \) for some \( j \leq n \). Then \( \mu(E(I^j)) \geq \frac{1}{2} \mu(I^j) \).

**Proof.** At stage \( i \) of construction of \( \tilde{\gamma} \) on \( I^j \), we remove from \( I^j \) terminal cubes of total measure no more than \( (\frac{1}{2})^{i+2} \mu(I^j) \). Thus over countably many stages we remove a total measure of no more than \( \mu(I^j) \sum_{i \geq 0} (\frac{1}{2})^{i+2} = \frac{1}{2} \mu(I^j) \). The remaining points in \( I^j \) are all exceptional, so \( \mu(E(I^j)) \geq \mu(I^j) - \frac{1}{2} \mu(I^j) = \frac{1}{2} \mu(I^j) \). \( \square \)
Lemma 4.8.6. Let $x \in I^j$ be an exceptional point for some $j \leq n$. Then $\tilde{\gamma}(x) = w_0^j$, and for any $\varepsilon > 0$ and any $w_k \in W_j$ there is a terminal cube $T$ contained in the $\varepsilon$-neighborhood of $x$ with $\tilde{\gamma}(T) = w_k$.

Proof. Since $x \in I^j$ is exceptional, it belongs to $I^j_i$ for each $i \in \mathbb{N}$. We can pick $i$ large enough so that $\frac{1}{2^i} < \varepsilon$. But then in the notations above, there exists a point $y \in \Omega_i$ such that $d(x,y) < \varepsilon/2$. The statement now follows from the Basic Construction, since for each $w_k \in W_j$ there is a terminal cube $T_k$ in the $\frac{1}{2^i}$-neighborhood of $y$ (and so also in the $\varepsilon/2$-neighborhood of $y$) with $\tilde{\gamma}(T_k) = w_k$. □

Construction of the maps, $\gamma_l$. In the basic construction we defined a map $\gamma : X \to W$ that we will use in order to construct a sequence of ‘approximation’ maps, $\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3, \ldots$, where $\gamma_1 = \tilde{\gamma}$. In the end, we will construct the needed map, $\gamma$, as the limit (appropriately defined) of these approximation maps. We begin by putting $\gamma_1 = \tilde{\gamma}$. The terminal cubes of $\gamma_1$ and the exceptional points of $\gamma_1$ are the terminal cubes and exceptional points of the Basic Construction. Note that each of $I^1, \ldots, I^n$ contains countably many terminal cubes of $\gamma_1$ together with exceptional points that don’t belong to any terminal cube.

Assume that $\gamma_l$ is defined and that for each terminal cube $T$ of $\gamma_l$, all points in the interior of $T$ are mapped by $\gamma_l$ to a single element in $W$, which we denote by $\gamma_l(T)$. Moreover, assume that:

(i) $\gamma_l \circ F = G \circ \gamma_l$

(ii) for any terminal cube $T$ of $\gamma_l$ in $I^j$, $F$ maps $T$ into some terminal cube $T'$ of $\gamma_l$ in $I^{j+1}$, for $j < n$

where $F$ is again the embedding $(x_1, \ldots, x_j) \mapsto (x_1, \ldots, x_j, \frac{1}{2})$.

We now define $\gamma_{l+1}$ on the interiors of the terminal cubes of $\gamma_l$. In particular, for any terminal cube $T$ of $\gamma_l$ in $I^1$, let $T^1 = T$ and let $T^{j+1}$ be the terminal cube of $I^{j+1}$ containing $F(T^j)$, for $j < n$. Then we have a system $T^1, \ldots, T^n$ exactly like the system $I^1, \ldots, I^n$ in the Basic Construction. We define $\gamma_{l+1}$ on the interiors of $T^1, \ldots, T^n$ in the same way as we defined $\tilde{\gamma}$ on $I^1, \ldots, I^n$, letting $w^j_{\text{root}} = \gamma_l(T^j)$ and letting $w_1, \ldots, w_{r,s}$ be the $R$-successors of $w^j_{\text{root}}$. The only modification we need to make is a measure-theoretic one. In particular, in each of the terminal cubes $T^j$, we want to end up with a set of exceptional points that carries non-zero measure (this will be important for proving that the limit map we define, $\gamma$, has the M-property with respect to $\mu$). To do this, assume $\gamma_{l+1}$ has been defined on $T^1, \ldots, T^j$, and that for $k \leq j$, $\mu(E(T^k)) \geq \frac{1}{2} \mu(T^k)$, where $E(T^k)$
is the set of exceptional points in $T^k$. When we define $\gamma_{l+1}$ on $T^{j+1}$, we make sure that at the first stage we remove terminal cubes with a total measure of no more than $\frac{1}{2}^0 + 2 \mu(T^{j+1})$. At stage $i$ where we are given $T_i^{j+1}$ we remove terminal cubes with a total measure of no more than $\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^i + 2 \mu(T^{j+1})$. Again, this can be done because at each stage $i$ we remove only a finite number of terminal cubes, so we can make the size of these cubes small enough to ensure we do not exceed the allocated measure. Thus, over countably many stages we remove from $T^{j+1}$ a total measure of no more than $\mu(T^{j+1}) \sum_{i \geq 0} \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^i + 2$.

Letting $E(T^{j+1})$ be the set of exceptional points in $T^{j+1}$, we have $\mu(E(T^{j+1})) \geq \frac{1}{2} \mu(T^{j+1})$.

We do this for each terminal cube $T$ of $\gamma_l$ in $\mathcal{I}$. Next we do the same for all the remaining terminal cubes $T$ of $\gamma_l$ in $\mathcal{I}^2$ (i.e., those terminal cubes in $\mathcal{I}^2$ that are disjoint from $D_3$), and again, for all the remaining terminal cubes $T$ of $\gamma_l$ in $\mathcal{I}^3$ (the terminal cubes in $\mathcal{I}^3$ that are disjoint from $D_3$), etc. At the end of this process we have defined $\gamma_{l+1}$ on the interior of each terminal cube of $\gamma_l$. For any point $x \in X$ that does not belong to the interior of any terminal cube of $\gamma_l$, we put $\gamma_{l+1}(x) = \gamma_l(x)$. The terminal cubes of $\gamma_{l+1}$ are the terminal cubes of the Basic Construction applied to each of the terminal cubes of $\gamma_l$. The points in the interior of terminal cubes of $\gamma_l$ that do not belong to the interior of any terminal cube of $\gamma_{l+1}$ are the exceptional points of $\gamma_{l+1}$.

In view of the measure-theoretic modifications we made above, we have the following analog of Lemma 4.8.5:

**Lemma 4.8.7.** Let $l \in \mathbb{N}$ and let $T$ be any terminal cube of $\gamma_l$ and $E(T)$ be the set of exceptional points of $\gamma_{l+1}$ in $T$. Then

$$\mu(E(T)) \geq \frac{1}{2} \mu(T)$$

Furthermore, the reader can convince himself that we have the following analog of Lemma 4.8.6 for the maps $\gamma_l$:

**Lemma 4.8.8.** Let $x$ be an exceptional point of $\gamma_l$ and let $\gamma_l(x) = w$. Then for any $\epsilon > 0$ and any $v$ such that $wRv$, there is a terminal cube $T$ of $\gamma_l$ contained in the $\epsilon$-neighborhood of $x$ with $\gamma_l(T) = v$.

Finally, note that if $x$ is an exceptional point of $\gamma_l$ for some $l$, then $\gamma_{l+k}(x) = \gamma_{l+k}(x)$ for any $k \in \mathbb{N}$. We let $B$ denote the set of points that are exceptional for some $\gamma_l$, and define the map $\gamma : B \to W$ as follows:

$$\gamma(x) = \lim_{l \to \infty} \gamma_l(x)$$

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Lemma 4.8.9. \( \mu(B) = \mu(X) \).

Proof. Let \( T_i \) be the set of all points that belong to some terminal cube of \( \gamma_l \). Note that \( T_i \supseteq T_{i+1} \) for \( l \in \mathbb{N} \), and \( \mu(T_i) \) is finite. Thus \( \mu(\bigcap_i T_i) = \lim_{i \to \infty} \mu(T_i) = 0 \). (The limit value follows from Lemma 4.8.7.) Finally, note that \( B = X - \bigcap_i T_i \). So \( B \) is Borel, and \( \mu(B) = \mu(X) - \mu(\bigcap_i T_i) = \mu(X) \).

We have constructed a map \( \gamma : B \to W \) where \( \mu(B) = \mu(X) \). Moreover, by the Basic Construction, we have \( \gamma_l \circ F(x) = G \circ \gamma_l(x) \) for each \( l \in \mathbb{N} \). It follows that \( \gamma \circ F(x) = G \circ \gamma(x) \) for \( x \in B \). All that is left to show is that (i) \( \gamma \) is continuous, open, and surjective; and (ii) \( \gamma \) has the M-property with respect to \( \mu \).

Lemma 4.8.10. \( \gamma \) has the M-property with respect to \( \mu \).

Proof. We show that for any subset \( S \subseteq W \), (i) \( \gamma^{-1}(S) \) is Borel; and (ii) for any open set \( O \subseteq X \), if \( \gamma^{-1}(S) \cap O \neq \emptyset \) then \( \mu(\gamma^{-1}(S) \cap O) \neq 0 \). Note that since \( W \) is finite, it is sufficient to prove this for the case where \( S = \{ w \} \) for some \( w \in W \).

(i) Note that \( x \in \gamma^{-1}(w) \) iff \( x \) is exceptional for some \( \gamma_l \) and \( x \) belongs to some terminal cube \( T \) of \( \gamma_{l-1} \), with \( \gamma_{l-1}(T) = w \). There are only countably many such cubes, and the set of exceptional points in each such cube is closed. So \( \gamma^{-1}(w) \) is a countable union of closed sets, hence Borel.

(ii) Suppose that \( O \) is open in \( X \) with \( \gamma^{-1}(w) \cap O \neq \emptyset \). Let \( x \in \gamma^{-1}(w) \cap O \). Again, \( x \) is exceptional for some \( \gamma_l \). Pick \( \epsilon > 0 \) such that the \( \epsilon \)-neighborhood of \( x \) is contained in \( O \). By Lemma 4.8.8, there is a terminal cube \( T \) of \( \gamma_l \) contained in the \( \epsilon \)-neighborhood of \( x \) such that \( \gamma_l(T) = w \) (since \( wRw \)). Letting \( E(T) \) be the set of exceptional points of \( \gamma_{l+1} \) in \( T \), we know that \( E(T) \subseteq \gamma^{-1}(w) \). By Lemma 4.8.7, \( \mu(E(T)) \geq \frac{1}{2} \mu(T) > 0 \). So \( E(T) \) is a subset of \( \gamma^{-1}(w) \cap O \) of non-zero measure, and \( \mu(\gamma^{-1}(w) \cap O) > 0 \).

In what follows, for any \( w \in W \), let \( U_w = \{ v \in W \mid wRv \} \) (i.e., \( U_w \) is the smallest open set in \( W \) containing \( w \)).

Lemma 4.8.11. \( \gamma \) is continuous.

Proof. Let \( U \) be an open set in \( W \) and suppose that \( x \in \gamma^{-1}(U) \). Let \( \gamma(x) = w \in U \). Then \( x \) is exceptional for some \( \gamma_l \). So \( x \) belongs to an (open) terminal cube \( T \) of \( \gamma_{l-1} \) with \( \gamma_{l-1}(T) = w \). By \( R \)-monotonicity of \( \langle \gamma_l(y) \rangle \) for all \( y \in B \), we know
that for any \( y \in T \), \( \gamma(y) \in U_w \)—i.e., \( T \subseteq \gamma^{-1}(U_w) \). Moreover, since \( w \in U \) and \( U \) is open, we have \( U_w \subseteq U \). Thus \( x \in T \subseteq \gamma^{-1}(U) \). This shows that \( \gamma^{-1}(U) \) is open in \( X \).

**Lemma 4.8.12.** \( \gamma \) is open.

**Proof.** Let \( O \) be open in \( B \) and let \( w \in \gamma(O) \). We show that \( U_w \subseteq \gamma(O) \). We know that there exists \( x \in O \) such that \( \gamma(x) = w \). Moreover, \( x \) is exceptional for some \( \gamma_l \). Pick \( \epsilon > 0 \) small enough so that the \( \epsilon \)-neighborhood of \( x \) is contained in \( O \). By Lemma 4.8.8, for each \( v \in U_w \) there is a terminal cube \( T_v \) of \( \gamma_l \) contained in the \( \epsilon \)-neighborhood of \( x \) such that \( \gamma_l(T_v) = v \). But then for any exceptional point \( y_v \) of \( \gamma_{l+1} \) that lies in \( T_v \), we have \( \gamma(y_v) = \gamma_{l+1}(y_v) = v \), and \( y_v \in O \). We have shown that for all \( v \in U_w \), \( v \in \gamma(O) \). It follows that \( \gamma(O) \) is open. \( \square \)

**Lemma 4.8.13.** \( \gamma \) is surjective.

**Proof.** This follows immediately from the fact that \( \gamma \) ‘hits’ each of the roots, \( w_0, \ldots, w_{0+n} \), of \( K \) and \( \gamma \) is open. \( \square \)

**Corollary 4.8.14.** \( \phi \) is refuted in \( M \).

**Proof.** We stipulated that \( \phi \) is refuted in the dynamic Kripke model \( K = \langle W, R, G, V_1 \rangle \). Equivalently, letting \( M_1 = \langle A_K, h_G, V_1 \rangle \) be the dynamic algebraic model corresponding to \( K \), \( \phi \) is refuted in \( M_1 \). By Lemma 4.8.11, Lemma 4.8.12, Lemma 4.8.13, and Lemma 4.8.10, we showed that \( \gamma : X \to W \) is (i) continuous, open and surjective; (ii) \( \gamma \circ f = G \circ \gamma \); and (iii) \( \gamma \) has the M-property with respect to \( \mu \). Thus by Lemma 4.7.5, the map \( \Phi : \langle A_K, h_G \rangle \to \langle M_X^\mu, h_F \rangle \) defined by

\[ \Phi(S) = |\gamma^{-1}(S)| \]

is a dynamic embedding. We now define the valuation \( V_2 : \mathbb{P} \to M_X^\mu \) by:

\[ V_2(p) = \Phi \circ V_1(p) \]

and we let \( M_2 = \langle M_X^\mu, h_F, V_2 \rangle \). By Corollary 4.7.3, \( M_2 \models \phi \). In view of the isomorphism \( M_X^\mu \cong M \), we have shown that \( \phi \) is refuted in \( M \). \( \square \)

We have shown that for any formula \( \phi \notin S4C \), \( \phi \) is refuted in \( M \). We conclude the section by stating this completeness result more formally as follows:

**Theorem 4.8.15.** \( \mathsf{DML}_M \subseteq S4C \).
4.9 Completeness for a single measure model

In this section we prove a strengthening of the completeness result of the previous section, showing that there is a single dynamic measure model \( \langle M, h, V \rangle \) in which every non-theorem of \( S4C \) is refuted.

**Definition 4.9.1.** Denote by \( M^\omega \) the product \( M \times M \times M \ldots \) This is a Boolean algebra, where Boolean operations are defined component-wise:

\[
(a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots) \lor (b_1, b_2, b_3, \ldots) = (a_1 \lor b_1, a_2 \lor b_2, a_3 \lor b_3, \ldots)
\]
\[
(a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots) \land (b_1, b_2, b_3, \ldots) = (a_1 \land b_1, a_2 \land b_2, a_3 \land b_3, \ldots)
\]
\[
-(a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots) = (-a_1, -a_2, -a_3, \ldots)
\]

**Definition 4.9.2.** We say \( (a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots) \) is an open element in \( M^\omega \) if \( a_k \) is open in \( M \) for each \( k \in \mathbb{N} \).

The collection of open elements in \( M^\omega \) is closed under finite meets, arbitrary joins and contains the top and bottom element (since operations in \( M^\omega \) are componentwise). We define the operator \( I_\omega \) on \( M^\omega \) by:

\[
I_\omega(a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots) = (Ia_1, Ia_2, Ia_3, \ldots)
\]

Then \( I_\omega \) is an interior operator on \( M^\omega \) (the proof is the same as the proof of Lemma 4.5.8). So the algebra \( M^\omega \) together with the interior operator \( I_\omega \) is a topological Boolean algebra.

**Lemma 4.9.3.** There is a dynamic algebraic model \( M = \langle M^\omega, h, V \rangle \) such that for any formula \( \phi \in L_{\boxdot,\lozenge} \), the following are equivalent:

(i) \( S4C \vdash \phi \);  
(ii) \( M \models \phi \).

**Proof.** Let \( \langle \phi_k \rangle \) be an enumeration of all non-theorems of \( S4C \) (there are only countably many formulas, so only countably many non-theorems). By completeness of \( S4C \) for \( M \), for each \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), there is a model \( M_k = \langle M, h_k, V_k \rangle \) such that \( M_k \not\models \phi_k \). We construct a model \( M = \langle M^\omega, h, V \rangle \), where \( h \) and \( V \) are defined as follows. For any \( \langle a_k \rangle_{k \in \mathbb{N}} = (a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots) \in M^\omega \), and for any propositional variable \( p \):

\[
h((a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots)) = \langle h_k(a_k) \rangle_{k \in \mathbb{N}}
\]
\[ V(p) = \langle V_k(p) \rangle_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \]

(The fact that \( h \) is an O-operator follows from the fact that \( h \) is computed componentwise according to the \( h_k \)'s, and each \( h_k \) is an O-operator).

We can now prove the lemma. The direction \((i) \Rightarrow (ii)\) follows from Proposition 4.4.7. We show \((ii) \Rightarrow (i)\), by proving the contrapositive. Suppose that \( S4C \not\models \phi \). Then \( \phi = \phi_k \) for some \( k \in \mathbb{N} \). We claim that

\[ \pi_k V(\phi) = V_k(\phi) \]

where \( \pi_k \) is the projection onto the \( k \)th coordinate. (Proof: By induction on complexity of \( \phi \), and the fact that \( \pi_k \) is a topological homomorphism.) In particular, \( \pi_k V(\phi_k) = V_k(\phi_k) \neq 1 \). So \( V(\phi_k) \neq 1 \), and \( M \not\models \phi_k \). \( \square \)

**Lemma 4.9.4.** \( \mathcal{M}^\omega \) is isomorphic to \( \mathcal{M} \).

**Proof.** We need to construct an isomorphism from \( \mathcal{M}^\omega \) onto \( \mathcal{M} \). Let \((a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots)\) be an arbitrary element in \( \mathcal{M}^\omega \). Then for each \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), we can choose a set \( A_k \subseteq [0, 1] \) such that \( a_k = |A_k| \) and \( 1 \notin A_k \). We define a sequence of points \( s_k \) in the real interval \([0, 1]\) as follows:

- \( s_0 = 0 \)
- \( s_1 = 1/2 \)
- \( s_2 = 3/4 \)

In general, \( s_k = \frac{2^k - 1}{2^k} \) \((k \geq 1)\). We now define a sequence of intervals \( I_k \) having the \( a_k \)'s as endpoints:

- \( I_0 = [0, \frac{1}{2}) \)
- \( I_1 = [\frac{1}{2}, \frac{3}{4}) \)
- \( I_2 = [\frac{3}{4}, \frac{7}{8}) \)

and in general \( I_k = [s_k, s_{k+1}) \). Our idea is to map each set \( A_k \) into the interval \( I_k \). We do this by letting \( B_k = l_k A_k + s_k \) where \( l_k \) is the length of \( I_k \). Clearly \( B_k \subseteq I_k \) and \( B_k \cap B_j = \emptyset \) for all \( k \neq j \). We can now define the map \( h : \mathcal{M}^\omega \rightarrow \mathcal{M} \) by:

\[ h(a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots) = \big| \bigcup_{k \in \mathbb{N}} B_k \big| \]

where \( B_k \) is defined as above. The reader can now verify that \( h \) is an isomorphism. \( \square \)
Corollary 4.9.5. There is a dynamic measure model $M = \langle M, h, V \rangle$ such that for any formula $\phi \in L_{\Box, \Diamond}$, the following are equivalent:

(i) $S4C \vdash \phi$;
(ii) $M \models \phi$.

Proof. Immediate from Lemma 4.9.3 and Lemma 4.9.4. □
Bibliography


Appendix A

‘Connected’ and ‘Limited’ in Gunky Space

In (1), Arntzenius takes as topological primitives the relation of being ‘connected’ and the property of being ‘limited.’ (These first appeared together in Roeper’s axiomatization of what he called ‘region-based topology.’ 1) Intuitively, two regions

1Roeper’s ten axioms for pointless topology are as follows:

(A₁) If pointless region A is connected to pointless region B, then B is connected to A.
(A₂) Every pointless region that is not the pointless 1null region’ is connected to itself.
(A₃) The null region is not connected to any pointless region.
(A₄) If A is connected to B and B is a part of C then A is connected to C.
(A₅) If A is connected to the ‘fusion’ of B and C, then A is connected to B or A is connected to C.
(A₆) The null region is limited.
(A₇) If A is limited and B is a part of A then B is limited.
(A₈) If A and B are limited then the fusion of A and B is limited.
(A₉) If A is connected to B then there is a pointless limited region C such that C is a part of B, and A is connected to C.
(A₁₀) If A is limited, B is not the pointless null region, and A is not connected to the complement of B, then there is a pointless region C which is non-null and limited, such that A is not connected to the complement of C, and C is not connected to the complement of B.

Arntzenius shows that on his definitions of ‘connectedness’ and ‘limited’ for elements of reduced measure algebras, axioms (A₁) - (A₉) are satisfied, but (A₁₀) fails.
are connected if they overlap or at least share a boundary point; a region is limited if it is bounded from the outside. Arntzenius defines these relations in reduced measure algebras by giving definitions for pointy topological spaces that are invariant under differences of measure zero:

**Definition A.1** (Arntzenius: Connected). Pointy Borel sets $A$ and $B$ are connected if there exists a point $p$ such that any open set containing $p$ has an intersection of non-zero measure with both $A$ and $B$.

**Definition A.2** (Arntzenius: Limited). Pointy Borel set $A$ is limited just in case for some compact pointy set $B$ we have measure $A \cap B = \text{measure}(A)$.\(^2\)

In this appendix, we suggest a way of reproducing these relations in the measure-theoretic setting by introducing a topological basis for the collection of open elements in the algebra.

Recall the notion of a *basis* in pointy topology.

**Definition A.3.** Let $\langle X, T \rangle$ be a topological space. A subset $B$ of $T$ is a basis if every member of $T$ is a union of members of $B$.

In the real line with its standard topology, for example, we could take as a basis the collection of all open intervals, or the collection of all rational open intervals (intervals with rational endpoints). Let us define an analogous notion for reduced measure algebras.

**Definition A.4.** Let $\mathcal{M}$ be a reduced measure algebra, and let $\mathcal{G}$ be the corresponding collection of open elements. A subset $B$ of $\mathcal{G}$ is a basis if every member of $\mathcal{G}$ is a join of members of $B$.

In the remainder of this appendix, let $\mathcal{M}$ denote a reduced measure algebra arising from $n$-dimensional Euclidean space together with standard Lebesgue measure. We select as our basis the collection of elements represented by $n$-dimensional open cubes, or the collection of elements represented by $n$-dimensional open spheres (alternatively, rational cubes and rational spheres).

We now define the relations of connectedness and limitedness by reference to this basis.

\(^2\)In fact, Arntzenius gives a different but equivalent formulation: $A$ is limited if there is a compact pointy set $B$ such that measure $(A \cap \text{complement}(B)) = 0.$

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**Definition A.5.** Let \( a \) and \( b \) be elements of \( \mathcal{M} \). Then \( a \) and \( b \) are connected if there exists a set \( \{ c_n \mid n \in \mathbb{N} \} \) of non-zero basic open elements in \( \mathcal{M} \) such that

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \text{measure}(c_n) = 0 \quad c_n > c_{n+1}
\]

and

\[
c_n \land a \neq 0, c_n \land b \neq 0
\]

for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \).

**Definition A.6.** Let \( a \) be an element of the Lebesgue measure algebra, \( \mathcal{M} \). Then \( a \) is limited if there exists a basic open element of the algebra, \( c \), such that \( a \leq c \).

The following two propositions show that Definitions A.1 and A.2 are equivalent to Definitions A.5 and A.6, respectively.

**Proposition A.7.** Two elements \( a \) and \( b \) of \( \mathcal{M} \) are connected according to Definition A.1 if and only if they are connected according to Definition A.5.

**Proof.** Let \( A \) and \( B \) be Borel subsets of the real line, and let \( a \) and \( b \) be the corresponding elements of \( \mathcal{M} \). If \( a \) and \( b \) are connected according to Definition A.1, then there is a point, \( p \), such that any open set containing \( p \) has an intersection of non-zero measure with \( A \) and with \( B \). Let \( C_n \) be the open interval centered at \( p \) with length \( (\frac{1}{2})^n \), and let \( c_n \) be the corresponding element of \( \mathcal{M} \) \( (n \geq \mathbb{N}) \). Then \( c_n \) is a descending chain of non-zero basic open elements such that \( \lim_{n \to \infty} \text{measure}(c_n) \to 0 \). Moreover, \( \text{measure}(c_n \land a) = \text{measure}(C_n \cap A) \neq 0 \). This shows that if two elements of the algebra are connected according to Definition A.1, then they are also connected according to Definition A.5.

For the converse, suppose that \( a \) and \( b \) are connected according to Definition A.5. Then there is a descending sequence, \( \langle c_n \rangle \), of non-zero basic open elements in \( \mathcal{M} \) with measure tending to zero, such that \( c_n \) intersects both \( a \) and \( b \) for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \). Let \( C_n \) be a representative open interval of \( c_n \). Then \( C_n \) has left and right endpoints, which we denote by \( L_n \) and \( R_n \), respectively. Note that \( \langle L_n \rangle \) and \( \langle R_n \rangle \) are bounded, monotone sequences of real numbers, hence converge. Moreover, since the measure of \( c_n \) tends to zero, these sequences converge to the same point,

---

3Here we use ‘measure’ both for the Lebesgue measure on the real line, and for the measure function on the Lebesgue measure algebra. Strictly speaking, these functions have different domains, and so should be denoted differently. We trust the sloppiness here will not lead to any obscurity.
which we denote by \( p \). The reader can now convince herself that any open set of reals containing \( p \) has an intersection of non-zero measure with both \( A \) and \( B \). This shows that if two elements of the algebra are connected according to Definition A.5, then they are also connected according to Definition A.1.

\[ \square \]

**Proposition A.8.** An element \( a \) of \( \mathcal{M} \) is limited according to Definition A.2 if and only if it is limited according to Definition A.6.

**Proof.** Suppose that \( a \) is an element of \( \mathcal{M} \) and that \( A \) is a representative of \( a \) satisfying Definition A.2. Then there is a compact set \( B \) such that measure \((A \cap B) = \text{measure}(A)\). Since these sets live in \( n \)-dimensional Euclidean space (i.e., \( \mathbb{R}^n \)), \( B \) is closed and bounded. This means that there is a closed interval, \( C \), such that \( B \subseteq C \). Let \( b \) and \( c \) be the elements of \( \mathcal{M} \) corresponding to pointy sets \( B \) and \( C \), respectively. Then \( c \) is a basic open element, and we have:

\[
\text{measure}(a) = \text{measure}(a \land b) \leq \text{measure}(a \land c) \leq \text{measure}(a)
\]

It follows that \( a \leq c \). This shows that if an element of the algebra is limited according to Definition A.2, then it is also limited according to Definition A.6.

For the converse, suppose that \( a \) is limited according to Definition A.6, and that \( A \) is a representative of \( a \). Then there is a basic open element, \( b \), such that \( a \leq b \). Let \( B \) be an open interval representative of \( b \). The closure of \( B, Cl(B) \), is a compact pointy set. Moreover, measure \((A \cap B) = \text{measure}(A)\). This shows that if an element of the algebra is limited according to Definition A.6, then it is also limited according to Definition A.2.

\[ \square \]