

From British Women’s WWI Suffrage Battle to the League of Nations Covenant: Conflicting Uses of Gender in the Politics of Millicent Garrett Fawcett

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If the political citizenship of women in all the countries concerned had become an established fact long enough to secure its organisation into concrete political power, it is impossible to doubt that this power would have been used to ensure such a political reorganisation of Europe as would have rendered it certain that international disputes and grievances should be referred to law and reason, and not to the clumsy and blundering tribunal of brute force.

- Millicent Garrett Fawcett, September 1, 1914

Women are as subject as men are to national prepossessions and susceptibilities and it would hardly be possible to bring together the women of the belligerent countries without violent outbursts of anger and mutual recrimination.

- Millicent Garrett Fawcett, December 15, 1914

In July 1914, on the eve of World War I, Millicent Garrett Fawcett faced a crucial decision. As president of the 50,000 member National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) in Britain, she could stand for peace or for war. By early August 1914, Fawcett decided that it was politically expedient to swing the women’s suffrage movement in Britain behind support for the war which had just begun. Thus, during the war, she would stress women’s nationalism and dedication to the defense of their country as a reason to grant them the vote. Historians have emphasized that Fawcett’s own patriotic devotion to Britain contributed to this decision. What has not received recognition, however, is the conflict in Fawcett’s concurrent insistence that if the vote had been granted to women in all nations, their international political power as the
"peaceful sex" would have made the war less probable.

As both president of the NUWSS and first vice-president of the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA), Fawcett wrote of the long-term objective of gaining women's suffrage in each nation as a means for international peace, an argument she would later use to press for inclusion of women's concerns in the League of Nations Convenant. World War I itself presented the opportunity to suggest that women's votes and political diplomacy would prevent future wars. Yet the desire to gain votes for women in her own country made it necessary for Fawcett to emphasize the nationalism of women, due to the political climate in Britain which required women to prove their fitness for citizenship and for the suffrage. At certain times, Fawcett extended this line of thought into an argument equating women's nationalism with that of men; she insisted on women's aggressiveness when she debated female pacifists whom she believed threatened votes for women by their attempts to ally women's suffrage with the women's peace movement. Thus, depending on the political situation, Fawcett's arguments on behalf of women's suffrage included conflicting constructions of gender—contrasting definitions of female "nature"—as she used them to advance the cause of votes for women.

Historian Joan Scott has suggested that scholars should "analyze the ways in which politics constructs gender and gender constructs politics." Scott applies this phrase to the deconstruction of patriarchal structures. This type of analysis can also be applied to the constructions of gender that women themselves used for political purposes. Such political uses of gender by women can be examined and understood in relation to existing institutions and social patterns which denied power to women. In Fawcett's case, in her position as a leader in the women's suffrage movement, she created expedient versions, or depictions, of women's "nature" in response to national and international political situations of war and peace over which women had no control. An examination of Fawcett's rhetoric during the wartime period 1914-1918 and the subsequent Paris Peace Conference reveals that the definition of women's "nature," a set of characteristics supposed to be inherent in women, was subject to qualifications determined by political objectives of the women's suffrage movement. Fawcett's concurrent projection of women as both naturally peaceful and patriotic, and as various shades thereof, depending on the political goal, is an important illustration of how gender constructions were used to advance the cause of women's rights. Such an illustration is particularly significant since it focuses on one of the most enduring issues—service to one's country in wartime—in women's fight for suffrage and equality with men. This illustration also suggests ways that women attempted to create new roles for their sex at both national and international
levels of politics while not always accepting the patterns established by men.

The mixed tradition of British liberalism and feminism which had its impact on Fawcett helps to explain her conflicting allegiances to the state and to women and suggests the basis for her ability to view women as both devoted members of the state and as outsiders who hoped to change it. Fawcett's background stressed the values of liberal politics, but it also made her aware of the restrictions on women's opportunities in that system. She became devoted in her national allegiance to Britain and its form of parliamentary government while at the same time protesting the strictures against women's participation in that system. She extended this view to the British Empire and eventually to women internationally.

Millicent Garrett was born in 1847 and grew up under the influence of her older sister, Elizabeth, who became the first woman physician in Britain. At the age of eighteen, Millicent attended a speech by John Stuart Mill. At the age of twenty she married Henry Fawcett, a Liberal member of Parliament. Eventually becoming a leader in the women's suffrage movement, she was also prominent in other women's causes including education and moral reform. However, her main devotion was to women's suffrage, and from 1897 to 1918 Millicent Garrett Fawcett would serve as president of the NUWSS, the largest women's suffrage organization among many in Britain.5

After her husband's death in 1884, Fawcett eventually shed her political party allegiance to liberalism. Although she remained loyal to the basic tenets of that philosophy, she realized that liberalism as understood by most politicians did not include women's equality. She was concerned to find support for women's suffrage and did not hesitate to use organizations and candidates of the various parties, including tapping the growing strength of the Labour Party in the years before and during World War I.6

Despite her lack of party loyalty, Fawcett remained intensely patriotic, and she accepted the situation of her nation's racist imperialism; she was, for example, against Irish Home Rule, as well as being a proponent of British rule in India. However, she saw women's issues as in need of increasing attention in the British Empire; for instance, she insisted on the improvement of women's lives in India and their inclusion in political changes there. She continued to address these concerns and to press for attention to women's status worldwide when she became a leader in the international women's suffrage movement, serving as the first vice-president of the IWSA from 1909 to 1920. During World War I, Fawcett demanded better conditions for women munitions workers and soldiers' wives in her own country at the same time that she stressed their patriotism as a reason for granting them the vote. Thus, the picture that emerges from Fawcett's
past shows her national loyalty in conflict with the way she saw women treated in her own nation and in its imperial holdings. This state of affairs also allowed her to extend her vision to women in other countries whose situation was parallel with and often worse than that of women in Britain.7

Fawcett’s conflicting rhetoric about women’s “nature” can also be understood in the context of two strains of philosophy in the women’s suffrage movement. As historian Sandra Holton has argued, a humanist strain and an essentialist strain coexisted. The humanist strain, originally propounded by both Mary Wollstonecraft and John Stuart Mill, stressed the primacy of the human capacity for reason and argued for “the common human attributes of men and women and the consequent social injustice involved in their unequal treatment.” The essentialist strain, evidenced in the writings of William Thompson, Anna Wheeler, and Frances Power Cobbe, “conflated sex and gender”; “the biological capacity to give birth was held to be the determining factor in femininity,” which included “characteristics which were also morally superior to men’s.” Thus, as Holton explains, “female enfranchisement could be argued to be essential to the creation of a more caring state through the furtherance of social reforms informed by feminine understanding and experience.”8

Fawcett was influenced by both the humanist and essentialist strains in the women’s suffrage movement. She was concerned with gaining equal opportunities for women and having women enter the male-dominated areas of better-paid work and politics. She believed women, like men, could participate in Britain’s system of government, and that women, like men, owed allegiance to their nation. However, she also believed in and was concerned with women’s particular values and needs as a sex-class,9 and this concern of hers cut across national lines, extending to women’s international subjection. Fawcett wanted to redefine politics and include what she perceived as women’s values from the more “cooperative” sphere of the home versus the more “competitive” sphere of business and politics. She is evidence for Holton’s argument that “suffragists did not seek merely an entry to a male-defined sphere, but the opportunity to redefine that sphere. They rejected the characterization of political life in terms of masculine qualities, and sought to redefine the state by asserting for it a nurturant role.”10 During World War I, women also wanted to redefine the way states interacted with each other in the field of international relations. Although she was a dedicated nationalist in Britain’s cause in the war, Fawcett was concerned about the future of states’ relations and wrote suggestions for the inevitable peace conference, in which she saw women’s inclusion as crucial. She wanted for women the same political rights as men, but she wanted to bring what she saw as women’s more caring values to politics to promote change and to im-
prove women’s lives. The prevention of war and the subsequent improvement of all human lives would be a result of the extension of the franchise to women.

Fawcett’s rhetoric must also be seen in the context of women’s work during the war. The formulation by Fawcett and other women leaders of concepts of women’s roles in nationalism and internationalism, in the state and in international relations, was influenced by the realities of women’s lives during World War I. As men left for the battlefield, women took on what had formerly been perceived as men’s jobs to help the war effort. Women worked in munitions factories and transportation services. They also joined auxiliaries of the fighting forces and risked their lives as nurses and ambulance drivers at the front. Not only did these ventures of women into male-dominated territory receive recognition, but the more traditional women’s “sphere,” impacted by wartime, also gained more attention. Suffragists emphasized women’s suffering and heroics as civilians during wartime, both as victims and survivors in invaded countries, and as those who managed relief efforts and suffered from unemployment and wartime shortages on the home front. Thus, women’s experiences in formerly male roles and in traditional female settings were given attention. Fawcett made use of both in her efforts to gain the vote for women.\(^1\)

Despite her declared support for the war in 1914, Fawcett had stood against the militant tactics of the Women’s Social and Political Union in Britain in the period beginning in 1909 when the WSPU added violence such as stone-throwing and arson to their actions. Fawcett had insisted that constitutional change and non-violent tactics were the only appropriate means for the women’s suffrage movement. In 1909 Carrie Chapman Catt, president of the National American Woman Suffrage Association, had written to Fawcett requesting her presence to discourage the militant activities of some suffragists in the United States.\(^2\) Yet in the same year, Fawcett’s personal correspondence to her friend Lady Frances Balfour revealed that, despite her misgivings over the WSPU, she recognized the political impact that militant action and the publicity from jailings and forced-feedings could have. She wrote: “I don’t feel it is the right thing and yet the spectacle of so much self-sacrifice moves people to activity who would otherwise sit still and do nothing [until] the suffrage dropped into [their] mouths like a ripe fruit.”\(^3\) In later years as the WSPU expanded their activities into violence against property, she would see militance as a drain on the suffrage movement when members of Parliament used the violence as an excuse not to pass women’s suffrage. Her friend Lord Robert Cecil, a member of Parliament, wrote to her in 1913 that militance was preventing support from his party: “I fear it is true that so long as militancy goes on nothing can be done with the Conservatives.”\(^4\) However, as historian Leslie Hume has pointed out, the WSPU
also served as “a valuable foil” to the more traditional NUWSS, making the latter seem like the acceptable alternative to the government. With the coming of the war in August 1914, that foil would disappear as the WSPU declared its all-out support for Britain’s involvement in the war and abandoned its woman suffrage activities.

The NUWSS faced more indecision among its membership. Fawcett’s own international perspective, based on her connections to women suffragists in European countries, created personal uncertainty over whether to support Britain’s entry into WWI. Initially there was shock and rejection of the war on her part. On July 31st, 1914 she signed an International Manifesto of Women which called upon “the Governments and Powers of our several countries to avert the threatened unparalleled disaster.” This document was “drawn up by the International Woman Suffrage Alliance and delivered on July 31st at the Foreign Office and Foreign Embassies in London.” It referred to women’s “responsibilities as the mothers of the race” and to “the home, the family” which would be “subjected...to certain and extensive damage” during the war. The manifesto emphasized women as givers and preservers of human life and tied the war’s destruction to women’s powerlessness “to control the political destinies of their own countries.” In other words, it suggested that “if women had shared with men the power which shapes the fate of nations,” more effort would have been made to avert the war.

This reference to women’s more peaceful tendencies was abandoned by Fawcett when the news was announced that Britain had declared war on Germany. Yet by that time she had already decided to take part in a large women’s meeting originally called to urge preservation of the peace. The meeting was attended by both working-class and middle-class women. At this Kingsway Hall meeting in London on August 4th, Fawcett’s rhetoric indicated her switch from a stance of rejection of the war as a woman to a stance based on duty to her nation as a patriot. Her first words included the image of woman as mother, hoping for peace as long as peace was possible. However, her words changed to those of acceptance of the war and women’s role in it. This became even more clear in her message the next day. “We have another duty now,” she wrote to the members of the NUWSS on August 5th in The Common Cause, the weekly journal of the organization. “Now is the time for resolute effort and self-sacrifice on the part of every one of us to help our country,” Fawcett declared, and the next issue of the journal ran her final words of this address under the masthead in enlarged, bold print:

Women! Your Country Needs You!
Let us show ourselves worthy of Citizenship, whether our claim to it be recognised or not."

Citizenship for women became tied to support for the British war effort and the various ways in which women could do their part in relief work. *The Common Cause* also declared quite specifically:

We are not going to enter into any discussion as to the rights and wrongs of British intervention in this war. Great Britain has gone to war. This is a British paper. We accept the war as our condition for the time being, and our immediate concern is to bear ourselves as good citizens under this condition.

The use of the words "good citizens" was certainly well planned. Those in charge of writing this editorial also felt compelled to defend the NUWSS from association with the Kingsway Hall "peace meeting," as it had been depicted by critics:

We do not intend to discuss the speeches made on August 4th in the Kingsway Hall, but we renew the explanation given in our last issue, that it was not a meeting of the National Union, but a joint meeting, at which two members of the National Union spoke."

The other member besides Fawcett was Helena Swanwick, who spoke regarding the principles of the NUWSS and stated that "it declared always that force was no remedy." Swanwick's steadfast maintenance of this line of argument and her desire to lead the NUWSS to follow it in advocacy of pacifism would eventually lead to a split between her and Fawcett and to resignations from the organization as well. Although Swanwick herself was familiar with the anti-suffragist argument that "the danger of the women's vote lies in their 'tampering' with foreign affairs and Imperial defence," she would not be deterred from pursuing the stand which was consonant with her belief in the inseparability of feminism and pacifism. Letters to *The Common Cause* made clear the range of disagreement on this issue within the NUWSS, from those who advocated an immediate negotiated peace, to those who preferred education about the causes of war, to those who maintained the importance of winning women's suffrage as the first step toward peace. In contrast to Swanwick, suffragists who wanted to maintain the NUWSS position of support for the war expressed the fear that a contrary stand would have ill effects on the main goal of their organization, as one letter writer declared:
I think...you should...most emphatically state that these writs for peace at any price are strictly individual, the utterances of irresponsible members, and that the N.U. is not officially advocating any faddist opinions....The mere man on seeing our paper may well say to himself, “if such thoughtless tomfoolery...is advocated by women...they show they are not fit for the vote in an Imperial Parliament.”

An earlier letter to Fawcett from Lord Robert Cecil, one of the main women's suffrage advocates in Parliament, made clear the reality of this fear. Cecil wrote regarding Fawcett's participation in the Kingsway Hall meeting of August 4th:

Permit me to express my great regret that you should have thought it right not only to take part in the “peace” meeting last night but also to have allowed the organization of the National Union to be used for its promotion. Action of that kind will undoubtedly make it very difficult for the friends of Women's Suffrage in both the Unionist and Ministerial parties. Even to me the action seems so unreasonable under the circumstances as to shake my belief in the fitness of women to deal with great Imperial questions. I can only console myself by the belief that in this matter the National Union do not represent the opinions of their fellow country women.

In fact most of the societies in the NUWSS would concur with the stand taken by Fawcett in support of the British war effort, and the use of their suffrage organization for massive relief efforts not only in Britain, but in Allied countries as well. In the period from the fall of 1914 to the summer of 1915, however, the internal politics of the NUWSS remained unstable. One of the officers, treasurer Helena Auerbach, expressed concern for the survival of the Union and for the achievement of its main goal of women's suffrage, as she wrote to Fawcett in November 1914:

Surely we should make ourselves ridiculous if we were to 'take a line' with regard to the conditions of Peace that can have no practical application to any of the other countries concerned. I have no doubt that we could string together miles of platitudes upon which there would be no possibility of disagreement in the Union but as soon as we come to the practical application of any one of them I am certain we shall find ourselves in the arena of heated party controversy. This can only be disastrous to the one cause which we exist to promote.

Factional conflict continued and Fawcett entertained concern not only for the national but also for the international reputation of women's suffrage, as many of the NUWSS officers who had pacifist leanings also held positions of influ-
ence in the IWSA, in addition to women's peace proponents from other countries who had power in that organization. Fawcett did not want women's suffrage to be seen as joined with a women's peace movement which could be viewed as giving in to the aggression of Germany. In November 1914, Fawcett had already felt it necessary to go so far as to make clear in the IWSA journal that the NUWSS "did not join in the appeal [by certain IWSA affiliates] to the President of the United States asking for his intervention on behalf of peace."6

Despite this action and her rhetoric in support of the war and women's patriotic duty to their country, and despite the evidence that such a stand seemed to her politically necessary for women's suffrage, Fawcett had not totally abandoned her view that women would have prevented the war, and she retained her concern with the international situation of women, especially during the horrors of wartime. She held on to the message which she had written to the members of the IWSA on the eve of the war, urging that "we must firmly resolve to hold our International Alliance together," despite the war. She made reference again to the view that "women stand for the life force and the future; impersonated in the woman and the child," and she connected this image to the idea that if women had had the vote and real political power, the war could have been averted. She wrote that:

If the political citizenship of women in all the countries concerned had become an established fact long enough to secure its organisation into concrete political power, it is impossible to doubt that this power would have been used to ensure such a political reorganisation of Europe as would have rendered it certain that international disputes and grievances should be referred to law and reason, and not to the clumsy and blundering tribunal of brute force.

She went so far as to suggest "the necessity for a political reorganization of society, giving power to the masses of the people and to women to control their own lives and destinies."7

Her call to the IWSA to stand together, her emphasis on the international sisterhood of women, their peaceful nature, and their more likely maintenance of democratic institutions, was evidenced in her later defense of German women in the IWSA. The Daily Mail, a British newspaper, had suggested that since two German women's names appeared as officers of the IWSA that Fawcett should resign or force the German women to do so. Fawcett declined to do either and replied,

It appears to me, not only from the international point of view, but especially from the
point of view of the Allies, that it is to our advantage to stimulate the demand of German women for free representative institutions. The course which your...correspondent suggests would have...a contrary effect."

Another conflict with the media also illustrated Fawcett’s concern with women beyond Britain’s borders. She denounced newspapers’ false reports of German atrocities against a British nurse in Belgium and the desire for vengeance which they apparently created to retaliate in like manner against German women. Fawcett wrote to the press on September 18, 1914, “It is surely no part of patriotism to stir up by speech or writing feelings of ungovernable rage and fury against the whole German people.” Her emphasis in referring to the whole German people seemed to indicate her frustration with and anger at the position in which women were placed during a war over which they had no control."

Nevertheless, Fawcett did not view the growing calls for peace by female pacifists as the direction in which she could lead the women’s suffrage movement. She was prepared to use her position as both president of the NUWSS and first vice-president of the IWSA as leverage for stemming the pacifist influence in both the national movement in Britain and the international movement in Europe. The fact that the headquarters and newsletter offices of both organizations were located in London was helpful to her. However, dissension continued to grow and conflict among officers in the NUWSS over the position on the war would eventually lead to resignations of pacifists from the organization in 1915. In addition the dissent would force Fawcett into much different rhetoric regarding women’s “nature” in contrast to her view of females as those who guide the world toward peace; what emerged would also be stronger rhetoric than that referring to the role of good citizen in wartime relief efforts which she had already ascribed to women. In the fall of 1914, after she read a letter being circulated among IWSA officers urging that a peace congress be held, Fawcett felt compelled to write to Catt, the organization’s president. Fawcett threatened to resign as first vice-president if such a meeting were called and she were compelled to attend. She declared:

I am strongly opposed...mainly for the reason that women are as subject as men are to national prepossessions and susceptibilities and it would hardly be possible to bring together the women of the belligerent countries without violent outbursts of anger and mutual recrimination. We should then run the risk of the scandal of a Peace Congress disturbed and perhaps broken up by violent quarrels and fierce denunciations. It is true that this often takes place at Socialist and [other] international meetings; but it
is of less importance there: no one expects men to be anything but fighters. But a Peace Congress of women dissolved by violent quarrels would be the laughing stock of the world.\textsuperscript{30}

Whether or not Fawcett truly believed that violence would be the result of a peace meeting of women from belligerent countries, or whether she embellished her prediction of the possibility in order to make her case to Catt, is not clear. As a skilled politician for women's suffrage, however, she ably depicted women's inherent "nationalistic prepossessions" as a reason for not holding a peace congress, and she was obviously aware of the politically destructive impact which association with such an event would have on the women's suffrage movement, especially in terms of the different ways in which women's and men's behavior were perceived.

Fawcett wrote similar letters to The Common Cause and to Jus Suffragii, the journal of the IWSA. In these she repeated her belief that at a peace congress of women, "We should run the risk of outbursts of uncontrollable Nationalism as opposed to Internationalism." She offered the example that, "Many of us remember a Peace Congress a few years ago, at which delegates with peace on their lips came to blows with hands and umbrellas."\textsuperscript{31} The editor of The Common Cause disputed that such an event had ever taken place.\textsuperscript{32} Swanwick and Chrystal Macmillan, who were active in both the NUWSS and IWSA, responded to Fawcett's negative prediction. They emphasized the positive possibilities that such a peace congress of women could achieve, including plans for women's role in the inevitable peace conference after the war. Macmillan wrote of certain proposals which "are being made with a view to having them brought forward at the International Congress which decides terms of peace. It is therefore urgent—whatever may be our individual opinions on these proposals—to keep before the international public that women, no less than men, are included in the population and in the democracy."\textsuperscript{33} Swanwick criticized Fawcett for failing to live up to her previous rhetoric of September 1914, which had appeared in Jus Suffragii. At the time, Fawcett had declared: "We women who have worked together for a great cause have hopes and ideals in common; these are indestructible links binding us together. We have to show that what unites us is stronger than what separates us."\textsuperscript{34}

In 1913 Fawcett had written an introduction to Swanwick's book The Future of the Women's Movement. However, by 1915, with the publication of Women and War by Swanwick, the split between their allegiances had become clear. In Women and War, Swanwick leveled a harsh criticism, in what was undoubtedly a thinly veiled reference to Fawcett and the NUWSS: "[One suffragist group] fears that,
by adopting a definitely pacifist attitude, women would ‘antagonise’ militarist men...but there is something a little contemptible about the fear...No one ought to wish to get the vote on false pretenses.” She claimed further that, “Every suffrage society ought to be a pacifist society.”

Although Fawcett was willing to use rhetoric regarding women as the peaceful sex when it seemed likely to be helpful in pressing for the vote, she reverted to images of women’s nationalism when necessary to ward off any connection of women’s suffrage with the growing women’s peace movement that might be harmful to the attainment of the ballot for women. At the February 1915 Council Meeting of the NUWSS, she called it “treason to talk of peace.” Because of disunity among those officers who advocated pacifism, Fawcett was able to maintain the policy of the NUWSS as supportive of the British war effort and to continue to use the organization for war relief. A resolution was passed “endors[ing] the actions of the Executive Committee in approaching the President of the International Women’s Suffrage Alliance to request her to convene a Congress this year (1915) in a neutral country, and express[ing] the hope that, should this prove impossible, such a Congress may be called at the earliest possible opportunity”; however, this resolution was interpreted as applying only to an IWSA meeting, which was never called during the war, and not to the Peace Congress of Women which was held in the Hague in late April of 1915. NUWSS members were only allowed to go to the Peace Congress as individuals and not as representatives of the NUWSS, the British affiliate to the IWSA. Reports were carried in both The Common Cause and Jus Suffragii regarding the Women’s Peace Congress in the Hague, but along with statements disclaiming any formal association with either the IWSA or the NUWSS. One report noted that the sessions of the Peace Congress contained “most vigorous differences of opinion” and “some energetic misunderstandings,” and that English and German newspapers both viewed the Congress as propaganda of the other side, “find[ing] it worthwhile to invent all sorts of false reports about it.”

Interestingly, in the April 1915 version of Jus Suffragii, Fawcett wrote her own call for inclusion of women’s concerns in the inevitable international peace conference after the war. She was especially interested in a resolution calling for women’s suffrage in all nations, and she reasoned:

To extend self-government and political power to women would enormously strengthen the forces which make for peace. The gigantic cost of war in precious lives comes home to women as the mother sex, even more vividly than it does to men....I do not claim that women would be immune from the war fever; but I do claim that they are more likely than men are...to prevent wars, to strengthen those relations between States
which lead to mutual understanding and goodwill, rather than relations based on mutual hatred and rivalry. It is this point of view that we must endeavour with all the strength we have to bring before the statesmen who will meet at the Congress which must be called when the war is over.  

Fawcett seemed to be taking a “middle ground” in her rhetoric regarding women’s “nature” in contrast to her earlier more one-sided projections in either case. She apparently found she could have it both ways. She maintained women’s nationalism, but also insisted on their greater possibilities for peacekeeping than men. Previously, in December 1914, Fawcett had written of her hopes for “a world organization to prevent any nation or group of nations from breaking the peace,” and she clearly saw the moment was right to proclaim her belief in women’s crucial role, and in the importance of women’s suffrage, to the success of such an organization. In July 1915, she wrote to Catt regarding the Swedish proposal for an IWSA conference to be held at the same time as the peace conference after the war in order to push women’s concerns. However, this suggestion was quashed by the French members of the IWSA, who objected to a combined meeting of women from the belligerent countries.

By 1916, towing the line in support of the British war effort had prepared the NUWSS for an opening in Parliament when electoral reform on behalf of soldiers became an issue and raised the question of suffrage reform in general, including votes for women. The effect of women’s war work in Britain had seemingly brought about the “conversion” of Prime Minister Asquith. Support for women’s suffrage in the press, based on women’s war work, was widespread and growing, and conversions of other anti-suffragists were steadily increasing. The Observer on August 13, 1916 announced its change of mind regarding “the right of women to vote,” and explained the reason:

They have earned it. We say so frankly. In the past we have opposed the claim on one ground, and one ground alone — namely, that women, by the fact of her sex, were debarred from bearing a share in national defence. We were wrong. Women have borne, and are bearing, their full share, in the hospitals, in the munition factories, in all the departments of life in which they have taken men’s burdens upon their shoulders in order to release men for the war. And more yet in the deep, uncomplaining heroism with which they are bearing their sorrows and giving their all.  

Despite such accolades, however, immense opposition to votes for women still remained, and the NUWSS had its work cut out for it. Fortunately, political work had not been abandoned by the NUWSS. As The Common Cause noted
as early as August 28, 1914, they had “temporarily suspended *ordinary* political work,” but had taken up “a good deal of *extra-ordinary* political work.”*44* Indeed, using the NUWSS for war relief work had kept its structure and a majority of its membership intact, and the extraordinary dedication and record of its members in these endeavors was certainly political work as far as it went to gaining the vote for women. Fawcett was prepared with political rhetoric demanding that women’s commitment to the war effort should be recognized no less than that of the soldiers: “If a new principle is about to be introduced into our electoral law, and the vote conferred in respect of service and not in respect of mere residence or occupation, why should the services of women to their country be overlooked?”*45* In fact as early as 1915, *The Common Cause* had made a similar and more specifically poignant claim:

> If voluntary service for the country is to be a qualification for the franchise, what about the hundreds of women who are serving at the front, and risking their lives in nursing deadly fevers, and who have in many instances been exposed to shell fire as well as the soldiers? Moreover, for every woman who is accepted for service abroad, there are probably dozens who have volunteered, and beyond this are the multitudes of women who risk their lives as a matter of course, and die in thousands in order to give life to the men who serve the State.⁴⁶

When it became clear that Parliament would actually consider changes in the election register during the war, Fawcett began negotiations and deputations to supporters involved in the Speakers’ Conference, the all-party Parliamentary Committee which was to make recommendations regarding electoral reform, including women’s suffrage. Fortunately, the cause was aided by the accession of a more sympathetic Prime Minister, Lloyd George, to whom a deputation of representatives of women’s suffrage societies and women war workers was sent, headed by Fawcett, in March 1917. Fawcett also communicated with women’s suffrage advocates in the Conservative, Liberal, and Labour parties, stressing the contribution of women’s war work.⁴⁷

At about this same time in 1917, Catt in the United States declared that the National American Woman Suffrage Association, of which she was president, would support the United States’ entry into the war. She was appointed by President Woodrow Wilson to the Woman’s Committee of the Council of National Defense and was subsequently heavily criticized by the Woman’s Peace Party to which she had formerly had strong ties. For Catt, who had been committed to what were presumably pacifist values, the political expediency of pledging her suffrage organization’s support to war relief efforts must have been much
more difficult than the same route taken by Fawcett.48

In December 1917, the battle for women's suffrage in Britain scored a partial victory in the House of Commons. Suffrage for women over thirty years of age was included in the Representation of the People Bill along with electoral reform for soldiers. This bill left out a great number of the young women who had in fact done war work, but under the circumstances of continued opposition to the inclusion of votes for women in the bill for electoral reform, women's suffrage forces understood that to press for more would have been to risk all. To pave the way for a more difficult passage through the House of Lords, Fawcett wrote carefully worded rhetoric regarding women's fitness for citizenship. Tying together women's love of country and mother's love, she emphasized that women would bring to politics sorely needed values. She was in effect relating women's patriotism to the view of women as protective caretakers of the home. She wrote:

We see that, on the whole, it falls to women to protect the weak, the very old, and the very young, to nurse the sick, and to guard the helpless. It is they and the homes they make that to a large extent keep alive in the world the spirit of mutual helpfulness and co-operation as opposed to competition, and in so far as this is true, I believe that the domestic experiences of women will be no bad preparation for the duties of citizenship. A mother's love is no bad schooling for a love of country, and our political life can hardly fail to be the better for this influence.49

The House of Lords passed the Representation of the People Bill, including the provisions for women's suffrage, in January 1918.

With the achievement of suffrage in Britain for women over thirty, "with certain property and educational qualifications,"50 Fawcett knew that the battle for women's equal citizenship was just beginning. Not only would there be a continued fight for women's equal suffrage with men, but important issues needed to be addressed regarding women's employment opportunities, which would be critical in the post-war era as soldiers returned. Fawcett saw an upcoming opportunity in the Paris Peace Conference to make gains for women, an opportunity for which she and the NUWSS had long been planning. Suffragists from Allied nations, including representatives from the NUWSS, would also urge as one of their proposals that the Peace Conference issue a resolution in support of women's suffrage in all nations.51

In January 1919, Fawcett's rhetoric in The Common Cause tied women's suffrage to hopes of preventing war in the future, now that the Great War was
finally over. Her words emphasized women’s “nature” as the peaceful, “non-fighting” sex:

It is far safer, in the interests of peace, to place the power of war and peace in the hands of the people who will be the chief sufferers if war takes place. This argument holds good and with even greater force where women are reckoned among “the People.” All through the animal kingdom the male is the fighting sex, and human beings form no exception to this rule; if the non-fighting sex were included in every democracy the risk of war would be proportionally diminished.13

It was a far cry from the image she created of females having “violent outbursts” and coming “to blows with hands and umbrellas” at the proposed Women’s Peace Congress in the Hague four years earlier.9

In February 1919, Fawcett led the deputation of women representatives from the Allied countries which met with President Wilson and other heads of state at the Paris Peace Conference. The women were not successful in pressuring for an international resolution on women’s suffrage. But with the motion of Lord Robert Cecil, “the Peace Conference...accepted...that women shall be admitted to any position in the League [of Nations] whether as members of the Executive Council, or of the main body, or of the secretariat,” as the IWSA newsletter proudly announced in April 1919. This provision was included in Article VII of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Later deputations of women were also able to secure provisions in the Treaty of Versailles regarding women’s votes in plebiscites, women’s labor, equal pay for equal work, and attempts to abolish the white slave traffic. Historical accounts make clear the tenuous and non-binding nature of many of these achievements, although they stood as important precursors to later work on behalf of women in the League of Nations and the United Nations.14

In any case, the Inter-Allied group of women which Fawcett joined illustrated her continuing commitment to women internationally. However, she believed, probably quite accurately, that her national commitment to British women’s suffrage, as well as the headway being made by American women towards this goal, was responsible for the achievement of the clause regarding women’s eligibility to serve in the League of Nations, especially since President Wilson had become sympathetic to women’s claims. “If we had not won Women’s Suffrage in Great Britain, and if the United States had not been travelling so fast in the same direction, it is certain that no such clause would have found its way into the constitution of the League,” she wrote in April 1919.8 In this sense, then, Fawcett saw her national and international work as being very closely tied. In December 1920, at a “luncheon given by the National Union of Societ-
ies for Equal Citizenship” (the successor to the NUWSS) “to the officers of the International Women's Suffrage Alliance,” Fawcett “spoke of the love of one's own country as the basis and foundation of love for other countries... and showed how out of the patriotic effort of women for their own dear motherlands a great international movement has grown.” Undoubtedly her political skill in using rhetoric allowed her to combine such national and international images very effectively, but it may also be true that the weight of experience had made her sincere in the expression of this belief.

Fawcett's uses of gender were politically calculated, and examination of her rhetoric in the struggle for women's suffrage in Britain during and after World War I illustrates this most clearly in her definitions regarding women's inherent “nature” as both patriots and peacekeepers. It is important to recognize that Fawcett's manipulative use of gender constructions was in response to patriarchal institutions which denied equality to women. These patriarchal structures maintained restricting definitions of women's “nature” in order to deny women access to power in society. Fawcett attempted to use her own constructions of gender, which appeared to be conflicting, in response to these restrictions. Rather than accepting limited definitions of women's gendered roles, she expanded the possibilities by claiming that women's “nature” made them eligible to be voting citizens, whether they were dutiful war industry and war relief workers, aggressive defenders of their country in opposition to pacifism, or adherents of peace after the war was over.

Perhaps it is not too much to venture that Fawcett's rhetoric shows not only the political malleability of definitions of women's “nature,” but also suggests the possibilities for actual female reality. Fawcett's rhetoric forces us to consider that conflicting definitions may be simultaneously accurate. Linda Gordon proposes as much in a recent article entitled “The Peaceful Sex?” in which she suggests that feminism consider both “ways of thinking that honor women’s difference from men but never treat them as inevitable” and “ways of thinking that reach for equality with men without assuming that we must emulate men to get it.” We can see this in Fawcett's insistence that women should share equal rights with men but that they may bring different values to politics and the public realm. In some sense this also applies to her dual vision that women can be patriotic, even aggressive defenders of their country, but may also make war less likely. There are both “difference and similarity trends” found in feminism, and as Gordon asserts, the “legacy of feminism is the richer because of the coexistence of these contrary claims.”

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Notes

1. Millicent Garrett Fawcett, *Jus Suffragii*, 1 September 1914, 159. *Jus Suffragii*, roughly translated as “the right to vote,” was the name of the monthly journal of the International Woman Suffrage Alliance, which had a membership of twenty-six countries in 1914.


3. Biographers of Fawcett and historians of the British women’s suffrage movement have approached in various ways the combination of Fawcett’s patriotism during the war and her leadership in the struggle for women’s right to vote. Yet, the overriding emphasis, with good reason, has been on Fawcett’s patriotism, placed in contrast to the protests of the anti-war suffragists. However, in not paying attention to the conflicts in Fawcett’s own rhetoric, the complexity of the wartime women’s suffrage struggle in Britain is minimized, and so are the implications for women’s appearance in the international arena of politics. In the most recent and meticulously researched historical biography of Fawcett, *A Different World for Women: The Life of Millicent Garrett Fawcett* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1991), David Rubinstein stresses Fawcett’s patriotism throughout the book, 78, 115, 127-128, 216-217, 286, especially during the war. He also emphasizes Fawcett’s feminism as an equally important conviction of hers, but without pointing to her conflicting uses of gender. Rachel Strachey, in an older and more favorably biased biography, *Millicent Garrett Fawcett* (London: J. Murray, 1931), celebrates her subject’s devotion to England and to women, but without analyzing Fawcett’s various conceptions of women’s “nature.” Jo Vellacott Newberry, in her article on “Anti-War Suffragists,” *History* 62, no. 206 (October 1977): 411-425, writes that Fawcett “was quite ardently patriotic,” even jingoistic, in her view of the war,” 416, but she does not mention Fawcett’s shock at the news of England’s possible involvement in the war in July 1914. She effectively counterposes Fawcett’s later and more “patriotic” stance, once war was declared, with that of the anti-war suffragists. Ann Oakley, in her article “Millicent Garrett Fawcett: Duty and Determination (1847-1929)” in *Feminist Theorists: Three Centuries of Women’s Intellectual Traditions*, ed. Dale Spender (London: Women’s Press, 1983): 184-202, writes that Fawcett “was a nationalist and an imperialist,” and “was more inclined to put her country first than many other suffragists,” 195. Anne Wiltsher, in *Most Dangerous Women: Feminist Peace Campaigners of the Great War* (London: Pandora, 1985), emphasizes that Fawcett was “an ardent nationalist,” 58, who “believed that how women bore themselves in this war would have a profound effect, not only upon the outcome of the war itself but upon their future status in the country,” 71. Wiltsher does note that although Fawcett found the war-time arguments of the feminist peace campaigners “abstract and visionary and hopelessly idealistic,” the president of the NUWSS “admired these women; she had worked closely with them, thinking them intelligent and very capable,” 70.

4. Joan Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 27. I am using Scott’s definition of gender for the purposes of this article; her definition, as she describes it, has two parts: “Gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power,” 42.
5. Biographies of Fawcett include those by Rubinstein, Strachey, and Oakley (see footnote 3).

7. Rubinstein concludes his biography of Fawcett by stressing her "inflexible and unattractive form of patriotism," but he also points to the importance of her steadfastness in working "for over sixty years for the emancipation of her sex, touching virtually every aspect of feminist aspirations and inspiring the devotion and loyalty of large numbers of women," 286. In his descriptions of the reforms she pursued for women in India, Rubinstein notes the combination of Fawcett’s “feminism, humanity, and imperialism,” 101, as well as her racism. While Fawcett did not believe the English and the Indians should intermarry, and while she maintained the condescending view of the British as “a governing race” in India, she fought vigorously against the sexual exploitation of Indian girls and women, as well as for their improved educational opportunities and political rights, 92, 100-101, 206-207, 236. Vron Ware in *Beyond the Pale: White Women, Racism and History* (London: Verso, 1992) notes the “urgency of understanding how feminism has developed as a political movement in a racist society,” xiii, and the implications of her work are important for an understanding of how the feminism of women like Fawcett was influenced by racism as well as by concern for her sex. In their introduction to the special issue on “Gender, Nationalisms, and National Identities” in *Gender and History* 5, no. 2 (Summer 1993), the authors note how “collaboration between nationalism and feminism was full of contradictory possibilities,” 162; the meaning of their phrase can be extended to provoke thought about the possibilities as well as the limitations involved in the politics of such a combination as nationalism and feminism.

8. Sandra Holton, *Feminism and Democracy: Women’s Suffrage and Reform Politics in Britain, 1900-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 9-17. Suffragists and advocates of women’s rights were not necessarily exclusive in their use of humanist or essentialist philosophy, as the example of Fawcett indicates.

9. Rubinstein notes Fawcett’s use of the phrase “a grand freemasonry between different classes of women” in 1911, 188. He writes that “within months of [the] meeting” at which this phrase was used, “the NUWSS and the Labour party began to draw closer together.” The issue of economic class divisions and alliances in women’s organizations in Britain is certainly relevant to a study of Fawcett’s rhetoric and to her complicated attitudes towards women and men in the working class, but will have to remain outside the limited scope of this article.

10. Holton, 18. Two examples of Fawcett’s reference to women’s “co-operation as opposed to competition” are contained in the 4 January (p. 485) and 11 January (p. 502) issues of *The Common Cause* in 1918. For earlier examples, see Holton.

11. For photographs and histories of British women’s war work during World War I, see Diana Condell and Jean Liddiard, *Working for Victory? Images of Women in the First World War, 1914-18* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987) and Arthur Marwick, *Women at War, 1914-1918* (Fontana Paperbacks, 1977). Both contain examples of Fawcett’s rhetoric. It is important to note the point which Fawcett herself made, that “the war only emphasised and underlined the lessons already learnt” by politicians and the general public regarding the changing position of women in British society after fifty years of the women’s movement (*The Common Cause*, 15 March 1918, 632). Fawcett predicted in 1886 that women’s suffrage “will be a political change . . . based upon social, educational, and economic changes which have already taken place” [Nineteenth Century, May 1886, as quoted in Constance Rover, *Women’s Suffrage and Party Politics in Britain, 1866-1914* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), 2].

16. For background on conflict and communication between the WSPU, the NUWSS, and Fawcett, see Rubinstein.
17. *Jus Suffragii*, 1 September 1914, 159.
22. *Jus Suffragii*, 1 June 1914, 129.
23. See *The Common Cause*, 18 September, 9 October, 6 November, and 20 November, 1914, for correspondence regarding the position of the NUWSS, and 16 October 1914, 485, for the specific letter quoted.
25. Helena Auerbach to Fawcett, 9 November 1914, in the Autograph Letter Collection of the Fawcett Library. For background on the internal politics of the NUWSS, see Rubinstein, Newberry, and Wiltsher.
27. *Jus Suffragii*, 1 September 1914, 159.
28. Strachey, 325. This incident conveys the rhetoric Fawcett used regarding Britain’s role, and by extension the British women’s suffrage movement’s role, in spreading representative government to other countries. Rubinstein, drawing on Wiltsher, emphasizes that to Fawcett, “support for the suffrage implied support for the war” since in Fawcett’s view “the British Empire . . . was struggling for democracy, an aim in line with the [NUWSS’s] own position as part of the democratic movement of the day,” 216. The example of Fawcett’s response to the *Daily Mail*’s criticism of the IWSA’s inclusion of German women demonstrates, however, that she was also able to use such a philosophy to defend the international membership of women’s suffrage organizations during the war.
30. Fawcett to Catt, 15 December 1914, in the Autograph Letter Collection of the Fawcett Library. Historian Johanna Alberthi, in *Beyond Suffrage: Feminists in War and Peace, 1914-38* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), claims that Fawcett’s “own identity as a suffragist had been submerged by her patriotism,” in her objection to the women’s peace congress in the Hague in 1915, but this seems only to have been true if one accepts that feminism must be identified with pacifism in order not to be “submerged” by patriotism. The fact that Fawcett’s main concern was for the achievement of women’s suffrage and not for the peace congress also suggests that a different reading of this episode may be more appropriate.
31. *Jus Suffragii*, 1 January 1915, 230; *The Common Cause*, 8 January 1915, 641. A letter appeared in *The Common Cause* of 15 January 1915, arguing that, “At a time like the present the most praiseworthy efforts at drawing closer the ties of sympathy between nations are liable to misconstruction that might most seriously compromise the position of our Union, in the eyes of the nation, and throw back indefinitely the achievement of our object — which, we must not
forget, is the enfranchisement of women," 653.


38. See the disclaimers and much debate through correspondence, as well as reports from the Women's Peace Congress in the Hague, in issues of *The Common Cause* and *Jus Suffragiis* in the spring of 1915 (especially April-June). French and German letter writers in *Jus Suffragiis* voiced both support for and disapproval of the Women's Peace Congress. For the specific article concerning tension during the Congress and the false press reports, see *Jus Suffragiis*, 1 June 1915, 306-307. Lela B. Costin, in "Feminism, Pacifism, Internationalism and the 1915 International Congress of Women," *Women's Studies International Forum* 5, no. 3/4 (1982), writes that "the sessions were not without tension," 311. Jo Vellacott Newberry, in "Anti-War Suffragists," notes that "particularly fierce argument took place on what conditions must be fulfilled before it was reasonable to call for peace," 420.


42. Martin Pugh suggests that a factor other than women's wartime work was primarily responsible for Asquith's "conversion" in "The Politicians and the Women's Vote, 1914-1918," *History*, LX (1974): 367-368.

43. *The Observer* is quoted in *The Common Cause*, 18 August 1916, 239. Of course, one shouldn't take *The Observer*'s word for it that previous objections to women's suffrage were based only on the question of whether women were capable of "bearing a share in national defence."


50. Newberry, 424. The "final grant of votes to women aged between 21 and 30, as well as [to] certain previously disqualified categories of older women," occurred in 1928 after another decade of struggle with Parliament (Rubinstein, 278). Fawcett played a leading role in this battle also, and lived to see the achievement of British women's equal suffrage with men before her death in 1929.
51. Jus Suffragii, March 1919, 79, especially the “N.U.W.S.S. Resolution Re Paris Peace Conference”; Rubinstein, 253. There were other women, in addition to the organized group from the Allied nations, who also met and presented concerns to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Information about them is included in some of the material cited in footnote 54.

52. The Common Cause, 24 January 1919, 487.


55. The Common Cause, 4 April 1919, 268.

56. The Woman’s Leader (successor to The Common Cause), 10 December 1920, 968.

57. Linda Gordon, “The Peaceful Sex?: On Feminism and the Peace Movement,” NWSA Journal 2, no. 4 (Autumn 1990): 631, 634. Gordon’s article is “a slightly edited version of a speech delivered [in 1989] at the National Congress of the United States Branch of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom” (which grew from the Women’s Peace Congress in the Hague in 1915). In her article, Gordon declares: “I would argue that any progressive women’s organization ought to understand both parts of this legacy [of feminism], and use them both to build,” 631. She also writes: “While it may be true that we can make some limitedly universal claims about the peculiarities of female socialization, it is by no means obvious that these patterns always lead to progressive results. The same ‘female consciousness’ that in some circumstances makes women militant in peace movements or in bread riots, where women are fighting for the very subsistence of their families, can in other circumstances produce conservative movements,” 629.

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