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Textiles, Guano and Railroads: The Role of the United States in the Early Development Failures of Peru, 1818-1876

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The Role of the United States in the
Early Development Failures of Peru, 1818-1876

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in History

by

William Bollinger

2012
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Textiles, Guano and Railroads:
The Role of the United States in the Early Development Failures of Peru, 1818-1876

by

William Bollinger
Doctor of Philosophy in History
University of California, Los Angeles, 2012
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Peru’s importance to the United States in the nineteenth century has been underappreciated because there were few instances of sharp conflict between the two nations. But, beginning with U.S. export of coarse cloth from new cotton mills just after Peruvian independence, continuing during the influence of Peruvian guano on U.S. “scientific agriculture,” and then in the period of Peru’s extraordinary effort to build trans-Andean railways, Peru exercised important influence on U.S. economy and imagination.

This work traces the relationship of both “developing nations” from their early engagement through Peru’s “guano era,” with an emphasis on why the

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United States pursued industrialization and Peru did not. Conventional wisdom holds that Peru lacked the requisite labor, capital and entrepreneurship required to become an industrial nation. Yet, preindustrial textile manufacturing was well established in Peru, and a country reaping large fortunes from guano in the nineteenth century could not be wanting in capital. Study of how relations with Peru were advantageous to U.S. development helps clarify some of Peru’s nineteenth century development policy failures.

It is argued here that the cotton textile “revolution” was actually an evolution that Peru could have engaged in during the first decades of its independence. Peru possessed key factors (water power, high quality cotton, merchant capital, potential labor) and had a source of machinery in the United States. A U.S. ship captain was impressed with water-powered machinery he glimpsed in Lima in 1805 during a trip immortalized by Herman Melville in *Benito Cerreño*. But, the necessary “Hamiltonian” policies were defeated politically by elite groups, including those who exploited national sentiment to gain special commercial privileges as *hijos del país*.

The social backgrounds of the first U.S. representatives, merchants and naval officers sent to Peru are contrasted as an introduction to early U.S. industrialization and its implications for Peru. The study’s formal opening year, 1818, marked establishment of the U.S. navy’s Pacific Station off the west coast of South America, a U.S. whaleship’s discovery of the fabled “Peruvian grounds” and arrival of the first U.S. agent in Peru, Bartow Prevost. The future of the U.S.-Peruvian relationship was presaged in the years leading up to Peruvian independence by the U.S. navy’s aggressive protection (over Prevost’s objections)
of U.S. merchants who defied the patriot blockade to resupply Spain’s forces. U.S. naval captains also collected fees for moving U.S. and Spanish merchant capital out of the viceroyalty.

Following Peruvian independence in 1824, U.S. interests worked over the next decade to discourage Peru from following the very policies used to achieve development success in the United States. The guano bonanza that gave rise to the Peruvian oligarchy was largely squandered as a development vehicle because Peru’s human capital was neglected and abused through forced labor. Evidence from the U.S. guano market demonstrates, contrary to conventional belief, that Peru underpriced its precious fertilizer.

To provide focus, this study examines the relationship to the United States of a subgroup within Peruvian elites, here termed the “Barreda social network,” whose rise was based upon control of the U.S. guano market in the 1850s.

Throughout the period under study, misguided policy choices were driven by elite Peruvian racial contempt for labor and laboring classes (Indians, blacks and Chinese), something scholars have minimized when accepting elite claims that the country was plagued by a “labor shortage” throughout the nineteenth century.

Because they despised their country’s Indian majority, Peruvian elites dreamed of attracting European immigrants and, in the meantime, made recourse to importation of Chinese bondsmen for their development projects and even conducted slave raids on Polynesia. White artisans tried to prevent blacks and Indians from competing in skilled trades. The man who tried to launch a
Peruvian cotton textile industry with U.S.-made machinery felt obliged to promise he would only employ white workers.

At the same time, guano riches and foreign borrowing supported extravagant importing of U.S. and European manufactures, dampening stimulus to local production. U.S. goods were especially damaging because they most closely resembled those Peruvians could produce for themselves.

Frustrated by stagnation, in the late 1860s Peruvians embarked on a frantic program of railroad building to leverage the guano boom into something concrete before the bubble burst. Unfortunately, while impressive from an engineering and quality standpoint, the construction was conducted under the same cheap-labor and import-intensive policies that had discouraged manufacturing.

For the final years examined here, this study looks at the relationship between two much-mystified figures, railroad evangelist Manuel Pardo (the Barreda’s political figure whose presidency ended in 1876), and U.S. railroad contractor Henry Meiggs (whose projects became paralyzed at the same time), showing how the latter carried to extreme the same import-intensive development approach favored by the Barredas. How Pardo and Meiggs brought the country to bankruptcy demonstrates the failure of Peru’s nineteenth century development model.
The dissertation of William Bollinger is approved.

Robert Dallek
James Lockhart
Christopher B. Donnan
David Lopez
Robert N. Burr, Committee Co-Chair
James W. Wilkie, Committee Co-Chair
Dedicated with love and gratitude to

Víctor Villanueva
Harold F. Bollinger
Eleanor Sampson Bollinger
Juan Enrique Ríos Izquierdo
and
Carmen Ríos Villaverde
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GLOSSARY

Alameda de los Descalzos colonial-era park and walkway favored by elites for strolling, located just across the Rimac River from downtown Lima; remodeled by Felipe Barreda in 1859

*aliño* salad dressing or seasoning; to “dress with aliño” is to be fashionable

Alsop largest U.S. merchant house in Lima, a partnership founded by Richard Alsop c. 1820; Alsop y Cía. was a commercial rival of Felipe Barreda for Peru’s Asia trade

*arequipeño* a person from the city of Arequipa in Peru’s southern Andes

*arriero* muleteer who transports goods, often an Indian, an essential personal contractor for U.S. citizens traveling in Peru’s interior

Banco del Perú the most important guano-era bank, established by the Barreda group and Manuel Pardo in 1863

*barracoon* *barracón, barracones*, pen, barracks or other place housing a large group of workers, such as slaves or coolies

Barreda social network an expanding group of intermarried families originally developed by Felipe Barreda and his “gatekeeper” wife, Carmen de Osma

*captialistas nacionales* a group of prominent businessmen anchored by the Barredas and their associates that fought the government taking the guano business out of their hands in the late 1860s

F. Barreda y hermano business established by Felipe Barreda to run Peru’s guano business in the United States; the “hermano” was his kid brother, Federico

*hijos del país* groups of artisans or others born in Peru who sought special protection or business privileges based upon being native born

Chinchas the main guano islands located off the Pacific coast near Pisco

Cerro de Pasco great silver (and later copper) mines located at the Nudo de Pasco in the Andes northeast of Lima, and north of the Mantaro Valley

*chalaco* a person from the port of Callao; often connoting someone who can get along it its diverse, rough, heavy-drinking environment

Compañía Nacional Consignataria company formed by Felipe Barreda and business associates to operate Peru’s guano business in Great Britain, taking over from the Gibbs firm in the early 1860s; its first general manager was Manuel Pardo

*consignatario* commission merchant or significant import/export house

*falta de brazos* labor shortage, the much-lamented “lack of arms”

Ferrocarril Central Peru’s Central Railway as designed by Ernesto Malinowski, promoted by Manuel Pardo and his father-in-law, and built by U.S. contractor Henry Meiggs

*garua* a heavy mist that hovers over Lima, Callao and other parts of the central coast for several months of each year; Peruvians sometimes say “it’s raining,” but there is no significant precipitation from *garua*, which often burns off by afternoon
Jauja region and Andean town in the rich Mantaro Valley; the Mantaro River was formerly called the Jauja River

limeño a person from Lima; the term can carry the connotation of person who is self-important, even arrogant with respect to others in Peru

Mantaro Valley the Jauja River, renamed Montaro, runs mostly southward from a lake near Cerro de Pasco and irrigates land that serves as a “breadbasket” for mining districts and Lima

montaña well-watered eastern slopes of the Andes; with each stage of descent from the highlands the land becomes more tropical

Morococha Andean mining district on the road (later, near the rail line) travelers take from Lima to the Mantaro Valley and Cerro de Pasco

obraje workshop or sweatshop producing coarse cotton and/or woolen textiles; workers in some obrasjes were confined against their will

Pablo Jeremías nom de guerre of a mysterious, legendary U.S. citizen working as an evangelist for Peruvian independence; assassinated (apparently on orders of Bernardo Monteagudo) in Lima in 1822

Pacific Station permanent U.S. naval squadron stationed at ports of Peru and Chile but responsible for protecting U.S. interest up and down the Pacific Coast

Paita northern Peruvian provisioning port favored by U.S. whaleships; there was usually a U.S. physician and consul resident there

Partido Civil political party that took shape from the movement Manuel Pardo organized to gain the presidency in 1872

Peruvian grounds a large area due west of Peru rich in whales that was discovered in 1818

Prevost Peruvian-American family established by the son of Bartow Prevost, the first U.S. political agent sent to Peru

prócer a recognized leader or hero from among the small minority of elite Peruvians who fought for independence from Spain; “liberator”

saya y manto a dress worn by limeñas up until the early 1850s in which a shawl is drawn over the face

tocuyo coarse cotton cloth made in an obraje or imported from early U.S. looms established in New England; called “grey goods” in the United States

silencioso silent; according to Heinrich Witt, Felipe Barreda was called El silencioso, “The Quiet One,”

Tres Amigos, Los name of Lima’s first cotton mill established by Juan Norberto Casanova on a model he designed from his study of U.S. mills; Casanova had his looms manufactured by Rodgers, Ketchum and Grosvenor of Patterson, New Jersey

Tribunal del Consulado colonial sanctioned leadership group elected from among the guild of merchants of Lima/Callao; resurrected in the nineteenth century; both Manuel Barreda (colonial) and his son Felipe (republic) served on the Tribunal

Verrugas canyon and bridge named for the viral infection verruga peruviana
Anyone working in nineteenth and early twentieth century Peruvian history owes a huge debt to Jorge Basadre, and mine is especially large. It would have been impossible to undertake a study of U.S.-Peruvian relations covering such a long period without being able to walk on pathways he developed. His monumental *Historia de la República del Perú*, together with its bibliographical appendices, were never more than arms length away throughout my journey. The sixth edition (1968-1969) added important elaborations on, as he put it, both the forest and the trees. I especially appreciated the generous personal guidance he gave to a novice during his twilight years. Two other historians, Heraclio Bonilla and Alberto Flores Galindo, provided encouragement during early phases of my research for which I will always be grateful.

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During years as lecturer and researcher in the Latin American Studies Program at California State University, Los Angeles, I cherished the support of colleagues who work to build cultural and intellectual bridges between the people of Latin America and the United States. They included Raquel Ackerman, Donald Bray, Marjorie Bray, Beth Baker-Cristales, Donald Bray, Marjorie Bray, Albert Cohen, Charon D’Aielo, Cynthia Hamilton, Timothy Harding, Terry Kandal, Marta Lopez-Garza, Andrea Maxie, Enrique Ochoa, Jaime Regalado, Gloria Romero, David Sandoval and Lamont Yeakey. I also want to thank Donald Dewey, Joseph Bragin, Pat Cates and Susan Steiner for their support of my work, as well as Victor Quevedo and Dennis Kimura for providing technical assistance.

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No one acknowledged here bears responsibility for my errors. On the contrary, some of these colleagues have been my best critics. As I navigated
through various theoretical perspectives concerning the subject matter of this work, I made mistakes that showed up in my writing and lecturing on Peru. I tended to embrace certain explanations with an excess of enthusiasm. At one point, much to my later embarrassment, I fancied myself as something of a polemicist regarding matters of historical and political interpretation. I am happy to have this opportunity to apologize to those whose work I criticized in an article published in 1972 and at a subsequent conference in Lima. I am grateful to Peruvian colleagues and Eric Hobsbawn for showing forbearance.

Searching Peruvian history for the contours of a bourgeois revolution may have been a useful exercise, but my assessments of the dependency framework and the historical import of the Velasco military regime were flawed. I thank Ron and Fran Chilcote for patiently pointing out my errors of judgment and tone at that time. Study of the development framework of Amartya Sen and related case studies of the remarkable Kerala experience has given me, I hope, a deeper understanding of my subject. I’d like to echo Pablo Macera’s warning when he said, *también hago trampas, [pero] no sé cuáles son.* Therefore, everyone may *desconfiar de todo lo que he dicho.*

I want to acknowledge friends in the religious community in Peru, whose daily commitment to peace and social justice has been a beacon of inspiration for my scholarship and teaching. Their work has helped build constructive ties between the people of Peru and the United States. They eschew public recognition of their work, but I cannot write these acknowledgements without an

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The warm and generous hospitality of Peruvians is legendary. Several families embraced me with cariño, and I am grateful for the many ways they have enriched my life. Their support and love made long hours in archives bearable. I also want to give special appreciation to the family of Víctor Villanueva. To him, to my parents, to Juan Enrique Ríos Izquierdo and his daughter Carmen, this manuscript is dedicated with love and gratitude.
**Vita**

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*Courses taught, listed by most recent year taught with approximate number of times taught shown in parentheses:*

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Commerce, as one of the principal sources of the prosperity and wealth of nations, should be encouraged by laws . . . such that the freedom which is conceded or the restrictions to which it is subjected be the most effective means for promoting the development of national industry.

Peru’s 1826 Commercial Code

Peru is a beggar sitting on a bench of gold.

Antonio Raimondi

[The fundamental question for Peru] is whether, amid the abundant resources that Providence has provided, the new Tantalus must suffer the horrors of misery and depend for everything on foreign industry.

Juan Copello and Luis Petriconi

In 1858, Federico Barreda, a Peruvian merchant in New York, went to Boston to purchase wooden doors, windows, furniture and hardware for the Chorrillos station of a new railway his brother Felipe promoted to link Peru’s capital, Lima, to the coastal resort fourteen kilometers away. Felipe Barreda’s contract with the government allowed the firm to import everything needed for building the railway free of any duty, a policy that Peruvian artisans and local businesses thought prejudicial to their livelihoods. When the U.S. ship Lammergier arrived at the port of Callao in December carrying the goods for the railway station, carpenters and other angry citizens began to assemble at the docks to watch for the ship’s unloading of U.S. products into launches and to demonstrate against any transfer onto the wharf. The result was a memorable event in U.S.-Peruvian relations.
This conflict brought into the open one of several dilemmas of development inherent in Peru’s relationship with the United States. If Peruvian entrepreneurs imported most of what they put into their investment projects, the stimulus to development might be felt more in the United States and Europe than in Peru itself. Could or should Peruvians promote, as the new nation’s 1826 commercial code declared, “the development of national industry”? Or, was it fated that, even during and after the great guano bonanza of the mid-nineteenth century, Peru should be, in Antonio Raimondi’s memorable phrasing, “a beggar sitting on a bench of gold,” or, as Juan Copello and Luis Petriconi judged in 1876, a new Tantalus dependent “for everything on foreign industry”?  

This study explores some of the ways Peru and the United States influenced each other’s culture and history from the countries’ respective independence eras through the decades in which Peru’s guano exports were vital to the development of U.S. agriculture. It begins with the 1805 events behind Herman Melville’s Benito Cereno and subsequent establishment of a U.S. political presence and naval station on the west coast of South America in 1818, and it

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2 A reason for drawing repeated attention to this law is to contrast Peru’s failure to implement it, on the one hand, with the strategy that Alexander Hamilton and Lucas Alemán charted in support of U.S. and Mexican industry, on the other. The 1826 code is found in “Reglamento de comercio,” in Pedro Emilio Dancuart, ed., Anales de la hacienda pública del Perú (24 vols.; Lima: 1902-1926), II, p. 77; hereafter cited as Dancuart (later, Rodríguez, who assumed editorship), Anales.

3 Raimondi’s remark struck such a chord in Peru that it became embedded in public conversation, a verity in the country’s popular culture, a frase consagrada, to use the characterization of Luis Alberto Sánchez in El Perú: retrato de un país adolescente (3rd edition; Lima: Ediciones PEISA, 1973), p. 18.

4 Juan Copello and Luis Petriconi, Estudios sobre la independencia económica del Perú (Lima: Imprenta de “El Nacional,” 1876), p. 3. Copello and Petriconi’s powerful Tantalus metaphor alluded to the figure in Greek mythology who suffered the punishment of eternal temptation, having ripe fruit and fresh water seemingly within reach but never able to satisfy himself with even a small taste or drink.
ends with the management of railroad building, Chinese labor procurement and guano sales during the administration of Manuel Pardo (1872-1876). Two following works will pick up the story of the U.S. role just before and during the War of the Pacific and carry it through the immediate post-World War I period. The second volume, “The Battle for Cerro de Pasco: Peru and the United States, 1876-1924,” traces the competing Peruvian, U.S. and British interests that sought to control Peruvian mining. The third volume, “Development, Nationalism and Democracy: Peru and the United States, 1895-1924,” examines the more subjective aspects of the U.S.-Peruvian relationship and concludes with the construction of the Hotel Bolívar by a U.S. firm in 1924, a project designed to celebrate Peru’s development ambitions on the occasion of the centennial of the Battle of Ayacucho, Spain’s final military defeat on the continent. The general title of the three studies is Dilemmas of Development, Peru and the United States, 1818-1924. It is a history of competition and partnership, both intertwined and fraught with contradictions. As guests in a foreign land, U.S. citizens and their institutions did their best to be seen as friends and collaborators whose interests coincided with or complimented those of their Peruvian hosts. For the most part, their work in Peru was tolerated, sometimes eagerly promoted, but rarely seen by Peruvians as benign, a fact U.S. citizens pretended to ignore but also resented. Because the U.S.-Peruvian relationship did not involve a Smedley Butler leading Marines ashore to impose order, and because U.S. political intervention in Peru never rose anywhere close to the sorts of actions Peruvians saw the United States take against a José Santos Zelaya or Francisco Madero, the interplay between competition and partnership was negotiated without much bloodshed or dramatic rupture of the awkward balance between the two (there was one brief threat of war between Peru and the United States in 1852). It was
not until 1968, the year I began my research, that important U.S. guests actually began to be expelled from Peru, including some of the major businesses established in the period of the larger study. Also terminated in the interest of national dignity was the U.S. Peace Corps, the institution that sent me to Peru in 1965. But, even in times of partnership and cooperation, quite a few key U.S. actors left Peru disillusioned, bankrupt, resentful or under clouds, legal and moral. A few put down permanent roots, forming Peruvian families.

While Peru was never as strategic to U.S. development as Mexico or Cuba, its importance to U.S. culture, commerce, agriculture and industry during the nineteenth century has not been sufficiently appreciated. Although there has been abundant study of the U.S. role in Peruvian affairs during the twentieth century, most work on foreign influence in the nineteenth century has focused on trade and financial relations with Europe, which consumed the lion's share of Peru's silver, guano and wool. The chapters that follow are an effort to bring greater balance to the story of Peru's entry into the modern international community by examining it’s relations with a fellow "developing country" – one whose interests were often at variance with those of Peru. As norteamericanos gradually acquired Pacific ambitions, many people in the United States came to see Peru as part of a broad American frontier on which the United States was destined to displace Europeans. Almost every conflict between Peru and the United States that came to a head in the late 1960s was sown during the first century of Peru’s national development.

This study reexamines some well-known figures in the U.S.-Peruvian drama, such as John Quincy Adams and Henry Meiggs, but the emphasis is to bring to light other actors, North American and Peruvian, who shaped the relationship. Adams is considered as supervisor of the first U.S. political agent in
Peru, a man he much disliked. Meiggs is placed in the context of the rise to power of Peru’s self-described “national capitalists,” including Manuel Pardo.

Much of the history chronicled here was played out in the capital and adjoining areas of central Peru, in commercial and production corridors that ran from the Chincha Islands north to Callao, from Lima up through a series of mining camps and into the Mantaro Valley, and from there north to the legendary Cerro de Pasco mineral district. Part of Peru’s nineteenth century history may be visualized as an effort to leverage the guano windfall found on the Chinchas into an imagined socio-economic revolution driven by railways penetrating the Andes, with control and exploitation of Cerro de Pasco always the grand prize, one gilded with nostalgia for a time when Peru’s image in the world was envied and admired, when anything of great value could be said to vale un Perú. Most U.S. explorers, educators, scientists, investors and soldiers of fortune worked in or traversed this region (figs. 1.1 and 1.2).

U.S. citizens in Peru almost always saw themselves as bearers of progress, or what Peruvians in the nineteenth century began to call fomento, development. However defined in the specifics, development is a complex process of historical change, both welcomed and dreaded. U.S. citizens and Peruvians wrapped their ideas of development in lofty ideals of progress, by which they meant varied notions of how the human condition of people in Peru and the United States would be improved. By examining U.S.-Peruvian relationships, the objective of this study is to better understand the decisions Peruvians made that led to desarrollo frustrado and to put a human face on that process by highlighting the respective backgrounds and actions of individual norteamericanos and Barredas.5

5 Pablo Macera used the term desarrollo frustrado to characterize the second half of the period of Peruvian history under study here. Pablo Macera, Visión histórica del Perú (del paleolítico al proceso de 1968) (Lima: Editorial Mella Batres, 1978). p. 15.
From the mid-nineteenth century, Peruvians struggled to leverage the Chincha Islands windfall into modern access to the Cerro de Pasco mining region. U.S. entrepreneurs were in the middle of most of those struggles and finally prevailed, to the disappointment of Peruvian investors.

The Peruvian historical maps adapted by the author and reproduced here are courtesy of the digital map archive of David Rumsey, [http://www.davidrumsey.com](http://www.davidrumsey.com). They originate in the magnificent 45-map atlas published by Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán, then serving as director of public works, *Atlas geográfico del Perú* [Paris: Librería de Augusto Durand, 1865]. Paz Soldán conducted an important study of U.S. penal institutions as part of his effort to reform Peru’s prisons. On the title page of the atlas he listed his affiliation as *Socio Corresponsal de la Sociedad de Prisiones de Filadelfia*. His brothers also were key figures in the period under study here. Mateo was a mathematician and geographer, while José Gregorio was foreign minister under three presidents during the guano era. Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán was close to the Barredas, the core Peruvian group studied here. Federico Barreda mentored Mariano Felipe’s son Carlos at the Peruvian legation in Washington during a period when Mariano Felipe was public works director and José Gregorio was foreign minister.
The Chorrillos railway was built by U.S. guano market consignee Felipe Barreda, promoter, and his Peruvian investors. Barreda’s brother, Federico, headed operations in the United States and purchased materials for the Chorrillos project in Boston.

U.S. ship owners and their crews were heavily involved in carrying guano to U.S. and European markets. Some were also involved in the controversial trade of shipping Chinese indentured servants to Callao where their “contracts” were sold to Peruvian agriculturalists and guano islands subcontractors.

Henry Meiggs, Michael Grace and James Ben Ali Haggin were three of the U.S. principals in efforts to secure access to the Cerro de Pasco mining region. As recounted in a companion study, when Grace could not interest U.S. investors, he turned to British capital. Haggin and partners finally prevailed in 1901 against strong Peruvian competition. The U.S. group later had to indemnify Peruvian investors to get them to back off their legal claims.
Behind the banners of development and progress were, of course, the special pleadings of individual and group interest. As Peruvians interacted with U.S. citizens, relationships were rarely easy or comfortable, nor were they simply or even primarily determined by economic interest. Culture, national sentiment, social ties, political ambition, racial tensions and personal temperament conditioned the balance between partnership, competition and exploitation in Peruvian-Yankee relationships. Conflict between narrow self-interest and broad national aspirations among Peruvians of different social classes, when combined with measures of U.S. ambition, ego, impatience, overreach, miscalculation or willful ignorance, made for a volatile brew. Unhappy Peruvian experiences with foreigners influenced the disparate body of Peruvian nineteenth century writing on national and regional development problems. Sometimes departing from a critique of contemporary economic failures and the perception that foreigners seemed always to walk off with most success and profit, these works were produced by Peruvians and immigrant entrepreneurs alike.\(^6\)

With the exception of the period of railroad building in the late 1860s and early 1870s, British merchants dominated Peruvian trade throughout the nineteenth century, and the British colony in Peru dwarfed that of the United States. Nevertheless, the United States received special attention from the more development-minded among Peruvian elites. Precisely because of North America’s historical subordination to Great Britain, U.S. development offered a

hopeful path that Peru might follow. It was to the United States that a Peruvian went to study the textile industry, because U.S. manufacturers had managed to prosper in the face of Britain’s superior productivity. Peru also sent specialists to study the U.S. penal system and acquire the latest weapons and warships. As Peruvians became frustrated with their lack of meaningful development, every advance of the United States was felt as a rebuke. It was noteworthy, therefore, that Peru's first post-colonial advocates of a national economic development strategy found their most annoying opponents among U.S. merchants and diplomats.

**OVERVIEW**

Chapter two is an extension of this introduction exploring a U.S. literary use of Peru in 1805, interweaving aspects of Herman Melville’s novella, *Benito Cereno*, with its source material. While serving to introduce early U.S. commercial incursion into the Pacific, when Peru became a supplier to U.S. whaleships and an indirect market for the burgeoning U.S. carrying trade, the story concludes with a fortuitous observation of Amasa Delano, captain of the *Perseverance* (in Melville’s telling, *Bachelor’s Delight*), of the use of water power in Lima.

Chapter three, “Prevost, Tudor and Alsop,” traces the backgrounds and roles of three U.S. citizens in Peru, using their stories to compare the respective independence periods of the United States and Peru. Its purpose is to highlight development conflicts and dreams that would shape the two nations. The focus is on the first diplomatic representatives the United States sent to Peru, John Bartow Prevost and William Tudor, one liberal and the other conservative,
together with the merchant who established the first important U.S. firm in Peru, Richard Alsop. Their origins during the U.S. war for independence exemplify competing approaches to U.S. development. The work of the three men in Peru offer conflicting perspectives on the country’s unusual independence process, which was mostly fought by armies from abroad. Several U.S. naval historians have previously examined the U.S. role in this period, during which U.S. naval commanders aggressively defended a claim of neutral trading rights while cozying up to royal authorities in Lima. Those scholars mostly allowed the negative judgment of Prevost by his supervisor, John Quincy Adams, to go unchallenged. By giving a fuller view of Prevost’s activities and objectives, the account developed here is more critical of Adams and the U.S. navy. And, apart from a brief 1941 reference by Arthur Whitaker, this is the first study to make use of Richard Alsop’s views on Prevost’s struggle to reign in the egos of U.S. naval commanders.\(^7\)

Chapter four, “Tariffs and Textiles,” looks at cottons’ manufacturing and protectionism in the early stages of industrialization. Cotton spinning and weaving was the key industry in any nineteenth-century national development program. The chapter is illustrated to emphasize how Peru might well have joined the industrial “evolution” by pursuing a “Hamiltonian” strategy advocated by some Peruvians. Peru’s failure with protectionism is contrasted with Mexico’s success.

“Impressions” and “Grandmother’s Grim Tale” (chapters five and six) look at Lima, Callao and las islas Chinchas (Peru’s principal guano islands) through the eyes of foreigners, especially Herman Melville, Philo White, George

W. Peck and a seventeen-year-old girl from Thomaston, Maine, Lilly Gilchrest. The latter probably saw Peru’s guano operations closer up and longer than any other U.S. citizen, since she lived on a store ship after marrying a young man in the ship chandlery business and gave birth to two children while at the Chinchas. While “Impressions” reveals more about the observers than the Peruvians they were describing, “Grim Tale” provides, I hope, a realistic introduction for the business that was making Peru a much-resented household name in the United States. The fact that Peru opted to utilize convict and other forced labor and, therefore, added little value to guano before shipping it to foreign markets, set the country on a disappointing development path.

Chapter seven, “The Barreda Conquest of the United States,” is the story of how Felipe Barreda managed to take over control of the U.S. guano market, giving rise to what I call the Barreda social network, a key component in the emergence of Peru’s modern oligarchy. Because he put his youngest brother, Federico, in charge of the U.S. operations, Felipe Barreda established a small U.S. wing of his family – one whose spectacular rise and fall became a cautionary tale within U.S. elites. The Barreda group’s preference for import-intensive development is presented in chapter eight, which contrasts a failed effort to establish water-powered cotton textile manufacturing modeled on U.S. factories with two Felipe Barreda projects, building the Chorrillos suburban railway and remodeling of Lima’s Alameda de los Descalzos.

“Breath of Steam” (chapter nine) is a vignette about a U.S. naval exploration of Peru in which Lt. William Lewis Herndon had an epiphany while sitting beside Lake Morococha. His vision of how U.S. commerce and steam-powered machines would tie together the Mississippi and Amazon rivers reflected U.S. ambitions in South America in the 1850s. Herndon’s resulting
book had considerable impact on many North Americans, especially a young Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain). His vision also serves to introduce the man who became the prophet of railroad building in Peru, Manuel Pardo, who was Felipe Barreda’s son-in-law.

“Guano and U.S. Development” (chapter ten) explains the importance of Peru’s fertilizer to U.S. agriculture and Federico Barreda’s administration of Peru’s business in a market increasingly plagued by fraud throughout the fertilizer industry. Evidence is presented that Peru underpriced its product in the United States. That is followed by “Passage to Hell,” an examination of U.S. citizens and Manuel Pardo in the trafficking of Chinese indentured servants.

Chapter twelve examines how Felipe Barreda used profits from the U.S. market as a trampoline to win control of the much larger British market, with his son-in-law in charge of managing a new Compañía Nacional Consignataria. This led to allegations of corruption and an epic battle for control of the guano trade in the late 1860s.

Chapter thirteen examines the Manuel Pardo administration’s management of Peru’s development policy during the time that U.S. entrepreneur Henry Meiggs was building Peru’s railroads into the Andes. In most Peruvian narratives, the stories of Pardo and Meiggs are told separately. The goal here has been to try, however imperfectly, to situate them in relation to each other, especially in regard to the heavy labor and import demands of railroad building. Constructing the U.S. transcontinental railroad over the Rocky Mountains was relatively simple compared to the engineering challenges that the Andes presented. It is hard to overestimate the benefits that the United States reaped from the choices Peru made in its business with Henry Meiggs. It is argued here that Meiggs followed the import-intensive, forced-labor
development approach of the Barreda group, and that Pardo failed to pursue an alternative strategy. On the contrary, the president was personally invested in continued importation of Chinese labor. As a result, railroad construction provided only limited stimulus to other areas of the economy. And, as the Pardo administration faced a desperate financial crisis, Peru continued to sell its remaining stocks of guano in the United States at below the market value of their components even as synthetic fertilizers were overpriced.
CHAPTER 2

AMASA DELANO AND HIS TOUR OF
LATE-COLONIAL WATER-POWERED MACHINERY

Almost all the heavy work was done by water. There seemed to be as many wheels and bands going in it as in one of our cotton factories.

Amasa Delano
A Narrative of Voyages and Travels,
in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres
1805

One of the most fascinating late colonial U.S. visitors to Peru was Amasa Delano from Duxbury, Massachusetts, a coastal settlement that dated back to the original Plymouth Colony. This chapter mainly concerns Herman Melville’s uses of Peru and only concludes with the view Delano got in Lima of waterpower used in the Casa de Moneda. However, his observations there are a fitting launch into the themes of this study, and Melville’s life intersected with the U.S.-Peruvian story at several points.

Delano’s father was a minor shipbuilder in the Massachusetts region that was the center of early U.S. shipbuilding, and Amasa and his brother trained as carpenters and foremen in their father’s yard. Delano was twenty-six when, through a shipbuilding friend of his father, he was able to sail to China as navigator and second officer on the Massachusetts, which at the time was the largest U.S. merchant ship ever built. That voyage, however, was ill fated due to defects in the ship’s construction and a Pacific typhoon that left its cargo

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8 Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s mother was a Delano, and Amasa Delano was a distant cousin of Roosevelt’s grandfather. See Daniel Henderson, Yankee Ships in China Seas: Adventures of Pioneer Americans in the Troubled Far East (New York: Hastings House, 1946), p. 43.
damaged. The owner was on board and, faced with commercial losses, sold off the Massachusetts in Canton. Delano could have gone home but preferred to work in various trade routes around Asia before returning to Massachusetts after some six years of Far East trading. He and his younger brother then built a 200-ton ship, the Perseverance, specifically designed for the South Pacific sealing trade with China.

As captain of the Perseverance during 1803-1805, Delano made his now famous voyage that took him to Peru by accident. His account of his seafaring days, A Narrative of Voyages and Travels, in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, which he published in 1817 (the year president James Monroe appointed John Bartow Prevost as its first agent in Peru), gained some attention in the United States but was mostly forgotten until scholars realized that it was the basis for Herman Melville’s novella, Benito Cereno. Harold Scudder is credited with first making the connection when, as he wrote in 1928, “coming by chance upon an old volume of the voyages of Capt. Amasa Delano, ... I discovered the interesting fact that in Chapter XVIII of Captain Delano’s book Melville found his story ready made.” Delano’s ship had been seal hunting and trading with Canton in 1805 when the captain put into the natural harbor of the Chilean isle of Santa María, where U.S. sealing ships sometimes went for water and wood. Santa María was a favorite rendezvous – near enough to Concepción but

9 In his memoir, Delano claimed that he had known before sailing that some of the wood used to build the Massachusetts was too green.

generally out of range of Spanish officials – for privateers, smugglers, escaped prisoners, whaleships and others who wanted to “gam” before or after embarking on a solitary trek around the Pacific. It was also a place where a captain might dump sailors or stowaways they could no longer tolerate, and Delano dropped off several misfits there that he had unwillingly acquired in Australia.

Another ship had just sailed from Santa María when, early one morning, as dawn was breaking, a strange ship approached Delano’s without colors and running much too close to a submerged reef. At a distance, as the story was embellished in Melville’s prose, the captain and his mate could see that a dim light “from her cabin streamed equivocally enough” through some “vapors partly mantling the hull.” For mood and emphasis, Melville reached for a uniquely Peruvian metaphor, saying that the image at a distance was “not unlike a Lima intrigante’s one sinister eye peering across the Plaza from the Indian loop-hole of her dusk saya-y-manta [sic].” Even supposing Melville heard the term saya y manto in Peru in 1843, it is unlikely he could recall it twelve years later when writing Benito Cereno. Amasa Delano did not refer to the dress in penning his own observations of Lima; but Melville subscribed to Harper’s Magazine, so it is probable, as others have noted, that his source was an unsigned October 1851 Harper’s article entitled “Lima and the Limanians.” Like other foreigners, the U.S. writer declared that, “The first thing which attracts one’s regard in Lima, is the singular and picturesque costume of the females.”

Whether the author of this article ever set eyes on Peru is doubtful, as much of

11 For an idea of the garments that comprised saya y manto and their effect on foreigners, see figs. 5.1 – 5.3 in chapter five.

12 The Lima term was spelled correctly in the Harper’s article (October 1851, pp. 598-610).
the description of Lima seems lifted from other sources, especially J. J. von Tschudi’s book, *Travels in Peru*. Another possible source for Melville was the first volume of Charles Wilkes’s narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition that he led around the Pacific during 1838-1842. When visiting Lima in early July 1839, Wilkes found the saya y manto disgusting. “I never could behold these dresses without considering them as an emblem of the wretched condition of domestic society in this far-famed city.” While originally intended as a “retiring, modest dress … to enable ladies to go abroad without an escort,” it was now worn for very different purposes. “Intrigues of all kinds are said to be carried on under it,” and it “enables the wearer to mix in all societies,” he said. “In this dress, it is said, a wife will pass her own husband, when she may be walking with her lover, and the husband may make love to his wife without being aware it is she.”

Whatever the specific inspiration for Melville’s metaphor of “one sinister eye” coming from a distant ship, in the actual historical event captain Delano felt not dread but concern. Suspecting that the ship was in some sort of distress, he ordered his boat lowered and rowed over so he could offer to pilot the strangers to a safe mooring. As he came along side, he saw dozens of black men on deck and learned that all aboard the *Tyral* had been without water for some time. The ship was a Spanish coastal trader and was taking slaves to Callao for sale in Peru. Delano got them water and tried to engage the *Tyral’s* captain, Bonito Severo, in

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conversation. Melville used Delano and Cereno’s real names (with Severo spelled differently), but in the novella the distressed Tyral became San Dominick and Delano’s Perseverance became Bachelor’s Delight.\textsuperscript{15} Delano perceived that the captain, men of his crew and blacks all behaved in unusual ways, and in Melville’s hands the sense of mystery and menace grew by the moment. If fact, Delano could see only a couple of white crew members, and he surmised, to quote Melville’s phrasing, that this was “a vessel by sickness almost dismanned of her crew – a vessel whose inmates [slaves] were parched for water.”\textsuperscript{16} In looking back on the incident, Delano concluded that his ignorance as to what was really going on with the Tyral was to his benefit. “As I was deceived in them at the time, I did them every possible kindness. Had it been otherwise there is no doubt I should have fallen victim to their power,” wrote Delano. “The apparent sufferings of those about me had softened my feelings into sympathy; or, doubtless my interference with some of their transactions would have cost me my life.”\textsuperscript{17}

Melville took Delano’s story far beyond the facts of slave trading with Peru. Scholars have established that Melville drew upon U.S. slave narratives and accounts of other shipboard rebellions in crafting Benito Cereno. The sensational 1839 Amistad revolt and subsequent trial in Connecticut took place over the eighteen months prior to Melville departing on his whaleship voyage to

\textsuperscript{15} Delano gave the captain’s name variously as Bonito Severo or Sereno; but, in the translations of Spanish documents that he appended to his account, the name was written as Melville used it.

\textsuperscript{16} Herman Melville, Benito Cereno, ed. By Wyn Kelley, (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2008), p. 57.

\textsuperscript{17} Amasa Delano, A Narrative of Voyages and Travels, in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres: Comprising Three Voyages Round the World; Together with a Voyage of Survey and Discovery, in the Pacific Ocean and Oriental Islands, 2nd edition (Boston: E. G. House, 1818), p. 323.
the Pacific. Another well-publicized revolt occurred aboard the Creole in 1841, as the ship was transporting slaves from Virginia to New Orleans. Frederick Douglass published his Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave within months of Melville’s return to the United States. While no direct evidence has emerged that the two personally met, they probably did. In any case, there are unmistakable literary connections between Douglass and Melville, including their respective uses of the “slumbering volcano” metaphor for the possibility of slave insurrection.18 Douglass ran an excerpt of Melville’s travel account, Typee, in his newspaper in 1848. While the public mostly did not care for Moby-Dick when it first appeared in 1851, Douglass published an excerpt from it three years later and gave another of Melville’s books a rave review. Also, there can be little doubt that, by changing the name of Cereno’s ship to San Dominick and changing the incident’s date from 1805 to 1799, Melville made allusion to the Santo Domingo (Haitian) revolution.

**Political Color**

The time that Amasa Delano spent on board the Tryal while his men rowed the Perseverance’s boat back for supplies, took only one-and-a-half pages for the captain to narrate, but in Melville’s hands it lasted an eternity for the anxious reader, as the author explored confused perceptions of black/white relations. The central, riveting event during the time Delano was alone and vulnerable on the mystery ship consisted of the shaving of captain Benito Cereno by his “servant,” Babo. In The Piazza Tales, where Melville first published the novella in book form, on page 196 Babo suggested it was time for his master’s

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18 For an overview of scholarship probing Douglass and Melville links, see Wyn Kelley, “An Introduction to Benito Cereno,” in Herman Melville, Benito Cereno (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2008), pp. 18-23.
shave and invited Delano to watch while continuing to converse with Cereno, and the process continued to page 209, when “Captain Delano playfully complimented [Babo] upon his achievement” of completing the shave. Once the trio reached the room where the shave would take place, and Babo “searched among the razors, as for the sharpest,” Melville framed the event with authorial side comments about how, “There is something in the negro which, in a peculiar way, fits him for avocations about one’s person.” In fact, “Most negroes are natural valets and hairdressers; taking to the comb and brush congenially as to the castanets, and flourishing them apparently with almost equal satisfaction.” In such personal service to the white man, the black, according to Melville’s narrator, employs “smooth tact” and a “marvelous, noiseless, gliding briskness” that is graceful and “singularly pleasing to behold.” Furthermore, this service is performed with “good humor,” and “easy cheerfulness,” harmonious “in every glance and gesture; as though God had set the whole negro to some pleasant tune.” These thoughts pleasing to Delano interrupted the dread of the whole shipboard scene. While not Melville’s intention, his prose invites comparison with the fact that Lima elites, colonial and post-colonial, showed a marked fondness for blacks as their personal servants, while largely shunning the more numerous Peruvian Indians for such work.

Melville also framed the shaving scene with political color. After “throwing back his master’s collar and loosening his cravat,” there was for Delano an amusing “odd instance of the African love of bright colors and fine shows.” The black man made an informal ceremony of “taking from the flag-locker a great piece of bunting of all hues, and lavishly tucking it under his master’s chin for an apron.” The reader was already informed that, as the San Dominick approached the harbor, she “showed no colors,” and thus, perhaps, the
The apron was the flag that should have been flying. Sure enough, later, after the shave “being over at last, the standard of Spain removed, tumbled up, and tossed back into the flag-locker,” Melville made the symbolism explicit.

Throughout the shaving, Babo’s sense of mission and craft, including expertly sharpening the razor on the “firm, smooth, oily skin of his open palm,” labor that was supposed to give such pleasure to the white master, was at variance with the evident discomfort of captain Cereno, who shuddered and flinched when the glistening steel of the razor was placed at his lathered throat. At one point, when Delano told Cereno he might doubt the veracity of the strange story of how the San Dominick came to be disabled, “an involuntary expression came over the Spaniard” and there was “a momentary unsteadiness of the servant’s hand,” and “just then the razor drew blood, spots of which stained the creamy lather under the throat.”

Whenever Delano would try to stand back and sort through his “undefined misgivings,” something would happen to contradict the direction of his thought. So, after he had gone on deck and was reflecting on how dominant Babo had seemed over his master, Babo suddenly appeared holding his hand to a bleeding cheek that he blamed on the “sour heart” of Don Benito. How strange was the turnabout.

Is it possible, thought Captain Delano; was it to wreak in private his Spanish spite against this poor friend of his, that Don Benito, by his sullen manner, impelled me to withdraw? Ah, this slavery breeds ugly passions in man. – Poor fellow!

He was about to speak in sympathy to the negro, but with a timid reluctance he now reentered the cuddy.

Presently master and man came forth; Don Benito leaning on his servant as if nothing had happened.

But a sort of love-quarrel, after all, thought Captain Delano.
A ship carrying slaves to Peru in 1805 was not unusual. The captain of the Tryal said that his slave-trading employer was Alexandro Aranda, “inhabitant of the city of Mendosa,” and that he had gone on board with his human cargo. At that time, the most important Peruvian importer of slaves from Argentina was José Antonio de Lavalle y Cortés. In her biography of the merchant, Cristina Ana Mazzeo estimated that he brought about 3,040 slaves to Peru from Buenos Aires between 1783 and 1809, earning him a net profit of more than 300,000 pesos. Lavalle’s family will figure prominently in this study, because his son purchased hacienda Villa, the former Jesuit sugar estate near Lima, in 1808, and his grandson married the sister of Manuel Pardo, a central figure at the core of the Barreda social network.

HYDROPOWER IN LIMA

For his role in bringing an end to the slave revolt around which Melville developed Benito Cereno, Amasa Delano became a celebrity and honored guest in Lima. “The reason I had so much attention paid me at Lima was on account of the different services I had rendered,” he wrote. “This cause may be assigned for the viceroy’s noticing me, and among other marks of respect, gave me liberty to examine any curiosity in or about the city.” Delano was invited to visit jails and free any detained foreigner that he was willing to remove from Peru on board the Perseverance.


Unlike some later U.S. visitors, Delano was not offended by Lima’s racial complexities, nor did he repeat common ethnic slurs that abounded in Lima about the supposed inferior characteristics of blacks or Indians. His feelings about Peruvians were mostly positive. “The Indians of Peru are in general quick of apprehension, penetrating, and very fond of study; the females exceed the men in the lighter branches of learning, and are remarkable for their wit and vivacity. The mestizos, or children of Spaniards and Indian women, chiefly apply themselves to the liberal arts and sciences, and make great progress both in painting and sculpture,” he said. “The inhabitants are all lively, sociable, and polite; which, along with a good taste, seem to be the hereditary qualities of every Peruvian.” Delano said that, “Indians are very well skilled in the use of medical herbs and plants, of which the country abounds; but are very fond of keeping their science a secret.” He said that many people for whom physicians had given up hope, “were cured by the Indians in the neighbourhood of that city.”

Others related to Delano how neglected was Peru’s internal transportation system. “The roads in the interior provinces of Peru are perhaps the worst on the whole globe,” he said, noting also the geographical challenges. “The passes are on the brinks of precipices, up steep ascents, and over stone quarries,” some connected with “cross poles fixed in the rocks,” structures “trembling and bending under the passenger.” Delano imagined that, “A man passing over one of those tottering bridges the first time, must think it safer to navigate round Cape Horn than to travel from Huanuco to Cuzco.” The image of such perilous bridges in Peru had an enduring fascination for North Americans, as evidenced

21 Ibid., pp. 520-521.
later in the writings of Ephraim George Squier, Hiram Bingham and Thornton Wilder.

For insight into Peru’s development prospects, Delano was given a tour of the Casa de Moneda, and he was impressed with the mint’s use of hydropower power from a channel off the Rimac river. “Almost all the heavy work was done by water.” He observed that, “There seemed to be as many wheels and bands going in it as in one of our cotton factories.” The industrial uses of water, he said, “can be carried on in Lima with as much convenience as in any place I ever visited.”22 This observation would seem to bode well for the ability of an independent Peru to establish its own cotton factories. There was no need to wait for steam power, with its expensive coal requirements.

Fig. 2.1
WATER POWER
A century after Amasa Delano was shown Lima’s Casa de Moneda, its machinery was still being driven by hydropower, as seen in this photograph probably taken in the late 1890s. (Biblioteca Nacional del Perú)

22 Delano, p. 503.
Peru’s pre-Columbian civilizations harnessed rivers carrying large volumes of water from the Andes to irrigate the desert coastal plain. Those same rivers could power manufacturing, as demonstrated by the Casa de Moneda and a couple of other small water-powered factories in Lima. With its discharge of from 700 to 1,000 million cubic meters of water per year, a fraction of the Rimac River’s flow would provide sufficient hydropower for development of infant industry, including textile mills. Even during droughts and seasonal lows, the Rimac discharged a minimum of five cubic meters per second. During one day in its full season, on February 20, 1903, an engineer measured the Rimac’s discharge as it passed Lima at 240 cubic meters per second.23 A recent Harvard graduate who briefly visited Peru in 1842 and stood over the Rimac on the Puente de Piedra just two blocks from the plaza de armas could appreciate the river’s power. “The Rimac rushes through with tremendous speed, & not a little noise.”24

Beyond Lima, Peru had six coastal rivers with much greater discharge than the Rimac (Santa, Pativilca, Cañete, Tumbes, Chira and Piura), and another five in the Rimac’s range (Lambayeque, Jetequepeque, Chicama, Huaura and Pisco). As will be shown in chapter four, the fact that Peru did not take advantage of this development opportunity was due, in part, to the action of U.S. interests.


Chapter 3

PREVOST, ALSOP AND TUDOR:
DEVELOPMENT TRANSITIONS IN PERU AND THE UNITED STATES

[John B.] Prevost has been one of their dupes, if not worse, and by his correspondence has contributed all in his power to make us dupes also.

John Quincy Adams

[Peruvians] are of a mild character, without instruction & effeminate.

William Tudor

[Bartow Prevost] came to Peru to live among our tribulations and, then, die after his heart had felt the rush of the triumph of our liberty.

Simón Bolívar

The meeting of norteamericanos resident in Lima and Callao took place in late March 1825. Gathered were representatives of key elements of the small U.S. community in Peru. They included William Wetmore, partner in the largest U.S. trading company in Lima, Alsop, Wetmore y Cía., whose owners were prominent in New England and New York commerce. Lt. Beverly Kennon from the USS Peacock represented the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Station, a tiny squadron of ships established in 1818 to protect U.S. commerce and the New England whaling fleet. Edward McCall was the second most important U.S. trader in Lima and from a well-to-do Philadelphia family. U.S. consul general William Tudor presided over the meeting. He obtained his post through family connections to president John Adams and his son, the outgoing secretary of state and just-inaugurated president, John Quincy Adams.

These men and others came together to honor the life of John Bartow Prevost, the first U.S. political agent sent to Peru, who died suddenly March 5 on
a trip by mule from Arequipa into the southern Andes.\textsuperscript{25} They were also paying their respects to Prevost’s son, Stanhope, who was then serving as U.S. vice consul in Lima and worked in McCall’s business.

Consul general Tudor read a letter from Simón Bolívar. In Prevost, the \textit{libertador} had just lost his most important U.S. ally. Bolívar said that no one could appreciate Prevost’s contributions as much as he. It was an honor to have known a man “whose talents and moral qualities as an agent were a credit to the freest and best-constituted country in the universe,” Bolívar wrote, describing Prevost as “a true philanthropist and above all, a liberal political representative.” Bolívar asked that his deepest condolences be conveyed to the son of the man “who came to Peru to live among our tribulations and, then, die after his heart had felt the rush of the triumph of our liberty.”\textsuperscript{26}

Having to read this letter must have been distasteful for Tudor, because, if Prevost was the Liberator’s greatest U.S. champion, Tudor was becoming his harshest critic among all U.S. representatives in South America.\textsuperscript{27} The presence

\textsuperscript{25} The 1938 master’s thesis on Prevost by Raymond Estep was written under the guidance of Watt Stewart, and the author acknowledged using notes Stewart had taken in the National Archives in Washington. Raymond Estep, “Diplomatic Services of J. B. Prevost, Special Agent to Buenos Aires, Peru and Chile” (Master’s thesis, Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, 1938). It built upon previous articles by Stewart that were concerned with others sent to South America, not Prevost. Watt Stewart, “The South American Commission, 1817-1818,” \textit{Hispanic American Historical Review} IX(1829). Watt Stewart, “The Diplomatic Service of John M. Forbes at Buenos Aires,” \textit{Hispanic American Historical Review} XIV(1934). Estep did a good job of narrating by topic from Prevost’s letters to Adams. He provided little information on Prevost’s background, and he erred (p. 5) in stating that Prevost was “an ensign in the British army” (his father, as explained below, was a British officer). Estep was also incorrect in characterizing Prevost as a “private agent” (p. 6).

\textsuperscript{26} Bolívar to Tudor, March 28, 1825, U.S. Department of State papers in U.S. National Archives, available on microfilm in \textit{Despatches from United States Consuls in Lima, 1823-54}.

\textsuperscript{27} Bolívar’s reputation among many U.S. citizens living in South America had declined over the previous five years. According to J. Fred Rippy’s survey of the reports of U.S. consul generals, Tudor’s opinions in both official and private correspondence were more derogatory than those of officials in Guayaquil and other South American posts. However, as explained below, Tudor also had a personal reason to resent Bolívar. Rippy, “Bolívar as Viewed by Contemporary Diplomats of the United States,” \textit{Hispanic American Historical Review}, v. 15, no. 3 (August, 1935, 287-297).
of Wetmore also may have made Tudor uncomfortable, since the U.S. consul was now preoccupied by public criticism leveled at him anonymously by Richard Alsop, a principal in the merchant house bearing his and Wetmore’s names, who had recently left Lima for a visit to the United States.28 Tudor felt he was the victim of “a most infamous libel that was written against me” and published with, he alleged, the encouragement of the new Peruvian government, i.e., Simón Bolívar.29 Tudor had implored Bolívar to disclose Alsop’s name to him, telling the Liberator that he knew full well that Alsop was the author but wanted formal acknowledgment from the Peruvian government so he could sue the merchant in the United States for libel.

With the consent of all gathered at the memorial, a committee was appointed to attend to the formalities. Tudor was named chairman. Reflecting his closeness to Prevost’s son, McCall agreed to be the secretary. A vote of gratitude was given to a Mr. Clarke, Prevost’s friend, who had undertaken at his own expense a sad trip into the Andes to investigate Prevost’s death, obtain a proper death certificate and supervise the agent’s burial in the cordillera. (According to a version that circulated in Lima and the United States, provincial authorities barred Prevost’s burial in a local cemetery because of their belief that he was not a Catholic.) Clarke gave a report to the meeting, and those attending offered remembrances of the deceased. The appointed committee proceeded to

28 As explained below, Richard Alsop is sometimes confused with his father, the Connecticut author known as a “Hartford Wit” and who translated Giovanni Ignazio Molina’s Geographical and Natural History of Chile (Middletown: I. Riley, 1808). The father died in 1815.

29 While I have not located Alsop’s letter denouncing Tudor, its thrust can be inferred from a letter Richard Alsop wrote Henry Clay from Lima on September 1, 1823. In it Alsop criticized “the conduct of some of our naval commanders on this coast,” specifically that of commodore Charles Stewart, who was Tudor’s brother-in-law. This letter will be discussed below. See James F. Hopkins, ed., The Papers of Henry Clay: Presidential Candidate, 1821-1824, vol. 3 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1963).
draw up several resolutions. By unanimous vote, U.S. citizens agreed to wear black crepe armbands for the next thirty days in honor of Prevost’s patriotism and service “in the cause of Liberty and Independence of the South American states.” Another resolution called upon all U.S. ship captains to lower their flags to half-mast on March 31. The committee drafted a letter to Bolívar expressing appreciation for his kind words. Copies of the resolutions were to be sent to Washington, where Prevost had enemies who would soon be pleased to learn he was out of the way.

Because of the range of U.S. interests represented at this meeting, the backgrounds of the participants can serve to introduce the young nation that presented itself to Peru in the 1820s. Edward McCall traded with merchants of Philadelphia, located some one hundred miles from the mouth of the Delaware River. While technically classed as a fresh water port, Atlantic tides moved sea water up the Delaware many miles past the city. During Peru’s late colonial period, Philadelphia became the largest city and most important port of the thirteen British colonies in North America, and McCall’s family had been prominent in commerce there for four generations. Members of the extended Alsop family had been merchants in New England even longer than the McCalls. Based in Middletown, Connecticut, Alsops also were prominent in New York commerce since the mid-1700s. Wetmore, whose uncle was a partner of the largest East India trader in the United States, probably had charge of the trade of the Lima Alsop house with Canton and the Philippines, intruding into a commerce that had been a tightly-guarded Spanish monopoly.

Lt. Beverly Kennon temporarily commanded the smaller of two ships then assigned to the U.S. navy’s Pacific Station. The Peacock was a 509-ton sloop-of-war that could carry a crew of about 140 men, and its new captain was en route
from the United States to Peru via Panama. Kennon was recently acquitted in a court martial of charges against him made by the commander of the recently established West Indies Station. The men had a very public row in newspapers concerning alleged defamation of character.\textsuperscript{30} Given the small size of the U.S. community in Lima, Kennon probably had entertained McCall and Wetmore on board the \textit{Peacock} in Callao harbor, and the merchants returned the favor in Lima, especially since McCall was the U.S. Navy’s local purchasing agent. While Kennon would not have known the details, he probably had heard of Prevost’s disapproval of the behavior of a succession of U.S. naval commanders in the Pacific. Indeed, the previous commander of Pacific Station, Charles Stewart, who happened to be Tudor’s brother-in-law, faced a much more serious court martial based in part upon an official complaint that Peru asked Prevost to forward to Washington.

Most study of the role of the United States in Peruvian independence has focused on the efforts of U.S. naval commanders like Stewart to defend the “neutral rights” of U.S. merchant ships in trading with the belligerents. The consensus has been to accept the view of then secretary of state John Quincy Adams that Prevost failed in his duty to defend vigorously U.S. commerce during Peru’s independence war, leaving that job in the hands of the U.S. navy. One objective of this chapter is to balance those accounts by distinguishing between different aspects of Prevost’s mission and between U.S. short and long-term interests.

\textsuperscript{30} Kennon stayed on the \textit{Peacock} as first officer after the ship’s new commander arrived at Callao via Panama. Details of Kennon’s court martial along with the texts of the offending newspaper articles were published in U.S. House of Representatives, 18th Congress, First Session, Doc. 150, \textit{Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Report of the Secretary of the Navy … For the Trial of Lt. Beverly Kennon …} (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1824).
Unlike U.S. merchants and naval officers on the west coast of South America, Bartow Prevost and William Tudor were political appointees. And, the stories of these two contrasting men who first represented U.S. interests in Peru well reflected the main political divide in the United States between Jeffersonian democrats and the nation-builders earlier called Federalists. Differences between Prevost and Tudor offer insight into U.S. political dynamics and contrasting U.S. views about South America’s future. Prevost’s route to Peru was through outgoing U.S. president James Monroe, from Virginia, and Thomas Jefferson’s first vice president, the disgraced Aaron Burr, from New Jersey and New York. Tudor was a New Englander and a personal acquaintance of Jefferson’s main adversary, John Adams. He had a long relationship with Adams’ son and now president, John Quincy Adams. Prevost became a champion of Bolívar (to the discomfort of the younger Adams while he was secretary of state), and his son formed a Peruvian-American family. Tudor hated Bolívar and never seemed happy in Peru. The two men personified competing visions that shaped early U.S. development. Rather than a product of the victory of one political current over another, United States development and its consequent policy toward Peru were a blend of the aspirations and complexities of both. The postures in Peru of Prevost and Tudor can be understood in the context of the careers of Alexander Hamilton, the Adams family and the man who shot and killed Hamilton, Aaron Burr.

HAMILTON, ADAMS AND TUDOR

Some forward-looking men in early Republican Peru might have recognized a kindred soul in Alexander Hamilton, the principal architect of early U.S. national development. Caribbean born, Hamilton was the illegitimate
second son of seriously declassed parents. Out of the chaos of the U.S. war of independence, he rose to become one of the most willful, enterprising and class-conscious men ever to cross the U.S. political stage. It is no wonder that he died in a duel prompted by a clash over male honor. U.S. political history has been so frequently scandal-driven and rife with personal slander that some Peruvian political contests during the nineteenth century appear almost decorous and principled by contrast. Nothing about U.S. development at the national policy level was achieved without momentous political conflict, bitter recrimination and occasional violence. The battles over development policy that Hamilton waged on behalf of the Federalists were harbingers of policy conflicts Peruvians faced in the aftermath of their own independence. For Hamilton, the purpose of the federal government was to help construct the financial and transportation infrastructure that would allow business, especially nascent industry, to flourish. Hamilton’s instruments were creation of a national bank and enough protectionism to nurture manufacturing. One of William Tudor’s criticisms of Simón Bolívar was that he did not promote infrastructure development.

Hamilton was George Washington’s secretary of the treasury and author of the “Report on Manufactures,” which not only advocated a protective tariff but also government subsidies to industry, two measures that Peru would desperately need a generation later. Congress had requested his tariff study, and Hamilton spent over a year preparing it. The Federalists continued in power when New Englander John Adams succeeded Washington. (Hamilton and

Adams were personal enemies, but Adams put the treasury secretary in charge of developing the professional U.S. army.) Hamilton’s heirs would deny to Peru the very policies they promoted in the United States.

William Tudor was about twelve years younger than Adams’s son, John Quincy Adams, under whom he would serve in Peru. Tudor’s father, William Sr., apprenticed in law for three years with John Adams, and the future Federalist president helped him get appointed as the revolutionary army’s first judge advocate general. Later, he was George Washington’s personal secretary. After the war’s conclusion, he served in various elected and appointed positions in Massachusetts, finishing out his career as clerk of the state supreme court.

“Judge Tudor” received a considerable inheritance and seems to have spoiled his eldest son and namesake, William Jr. A relative described the younger Tudor as fun-loving and fond of fine arts, “but he was wholly deficient in business capacity, and knew not how to live with small means.” The father lost much of his wealth in South Boston land speculation and other failed ventures, and the family went into debt to keep up their comfortable lifestyle. The son was sent to Harvard and then worked for his younger brother, Frederic, the family’s one successful entrepreneur, in West Indies commerce. Frederic Tudor became known in New England as the “Ice King” by shipping frozen water to the Caribbean and later to other semi-tropical climes. (Not a luxury, refrigeration was important to improvements in public health; and during the nineteenth century the United States sold a good amount of ice to Peru.)

32 The quotation and other information on Tudor’s background are from Claude G. Berube and John A. Rodgaard, A Call to the Sea: Captain Charles Stewart of the USS Constitution (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), beginning on p. 98.
Because the family’s finances were distressed, William Tudor helped pressure his sister, Delia, into a loveless marriage to a naval officer and Princeton graduate from a Philadelphia commercial family, Charles Stewart. Delia felt he was below her in social refinement and once told a relative she regarded him with “repugnance.” For his part, Stewart later confided to an in-law that “they quarreled the first night of their marriage, and the more they became acquainted, the more distasteful they became to each other.”\footnote{Ibid, p. 104.} Charles Stewart and Delia Tudor preceded William Tudor to Peru, where the naval commander was in frequent conflict with Bartow Prevost and South American patriots.\footnote{The naval officer Charles Stewart, who married Delia Tudor and served in the Pacific Squadron during 1820-1824, is not to be confused with Charles Samuel Stewart, chaplain of the U.S. sloop of war Vincennes, who was also in the Pacific Squadron and author of \textit{A Visit to the South Seas, In the U.S. Ship Vincennes, During the Years 1829 and 1830; With scenes in Brazil, Peru, Manilla, the Cape of Good Hope and St. Helena} (New York: John P. Haven, 1831).}

Meanwhile, in 1815 Tudor was a co-founder and first editor of the \textit{North American Review}, which became New England’s foremost publication. He later sought a diplomatic appointment because his personal finances were distressed, and John Quincy Adams helped him get the Peru assignment. By the time Tudor reached Peru, the Federalists had disappeared as a national political party. But, men like Tudor remained devoted to their vision of elite governance and vigorous government support for building infrastructure, industrial development and promotion of international commerce and shipping. A consular position in Peru was a social step down for Tudor, but it placed him in service of Federalist dreams of a U.S. maritime empire.

John Quincy Adams is considered by many historians as one of the most effective U.S. foreign policy leaders to hold that office, although many South
Americans considered him a great disappointment. Adams served in various diplomatic posts beginning at age twenty-six and, much to the distress of his fellow Federalists, supported Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase in 1803. He left the party in 1808, prior to its demise. The Federalist party collapsed after the War of 1812, discredited for its British ties and sympathies. But Adams remained a conservative nationalist who always gave consideration to New England’s business interests. There can be little doubt that Adams designed Tudor’s appointment as U.S. consul general in Lima to be a conservative counterweight to Prevost there.

Burr and Prevost

The Prevost family occupies a special place in the history of U.S.-Peruvian relations. Bartow Prevost reached Peru through a circuitous route that took him from New Jersey and New York to Europe and Louisiana, then back to New York before removing to South America. Later, there were other U.S. citizens who established Peruvian families: Thorndike, Pease, Giesecke and even a Meiggs offshoot. But the Prevosts were the first U.S. family to play a significant role in Peru’s economic and social development. Stanhope Prevost was the only U.S. citizen to serve on the prestigious board of Lima’s Beneficencia Pública during the guano era. His Peruvian-born son, Charles (Carlos) Agustín Prevost, also would later serve on the Beneficencia board. Stanhope eventually joined Alsop y Cia., the premier U.S. merchant house in Peru prior to the advent of la casa Grace. And, the firm bearing the Prevost name had a role in propelling a

35 John Bartow Prevost has been mostly omitted from Peruvian scholarship on the independence era. Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán made no mention of him in Historia del Perú independiente and Jorge Basadre made only one passing reference to the U.S. agent. U.S. scholars also have given little attention to Prevost, with the exception of naval historians. The latter limited their interest to his conflicts with U.S. navy commanders and, as will be seen below, may have had their perceptions of him colored by institutional bias.
future president, Augusto B. Leguía, from provincial society into circles of the Barreda social network.

The U.S. and Peruvian Prevosts trace back to two Geneva-born brothers who emigrated to England and enlisted in the British colonial army; both served in the Americas. The older brother eventually rose to the rank of general and had a son who also became a British general; this brother was rewarded with an English baronetcy. The younger brother, Col. James Marcus (Mark) Prevost, married Theodosia Bartow of New Jersey, where he was regional commander of British forces. The couple established a home on a ninety-eight acre New Jersey estate near Paramus that was known as the Hermitage. It featured two separate residences large enough to accommodate visiting relatives and traveling guests. Col. Prevost and Theodosia Bartow had two sons at the Hermitage, Frederick and John Bartow, and the parents owned some slaves, including Mark, a self-taught preacher, and his wife, Jenny, who made their escape from the Prevost household on the eve of the American Revolution. Beginning in October 1774, the Prevosts ran an advertisement in *The New York Journal* offering a reward for the capture and return of the two slaves:36

**FIVE POUND REWARD**
Run away from the house of Mark Prevost in Bergen County, on the 29 of September last, a negro man and his wife: the fellow is serious, civil, slow of speech, rather low in stature, reads well, is a preacher among the negroes, about 40 years of age, and is called Mark. The wench is smart, active and handy, rather lusty, has bad teeth, and a small cast in one eye; she is likely to look upon, reads, and writes and is about 36 years of age. She was brought up in the house of the late Mr. Shackmaple, of New London, and as she had a note to look for a master it is probable she may make a pass of it to travel through New-England. They took with them much baggage. Whoever takes up the said negroes and brings them to the subscribers, or gives such information that they may be had again,

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shall be entitled to the above reward, or fifty shillings for either of them, to be paid by Mark Prevost, Archibald Campbell in Hackensack, or Thomas Clarke, near New-York. October 12, 1774.

The loss of these slaves must have been a blow to the Prevosts, for they were still pursuing them a year later, offering the news that “both are dressed as Indians.” Bartow Prevost was about eight years old when Jenny, described as a “smart, active, handy, rather lusty” house slave, and her husband fled from his family.

When the independence war broke out, Theodosia found herself living in rebel-held territory while her husband was posted in the Savannah region and, later, in the West Indies. As the wife of a British officer, Theodosia Prevost’s possessions, including the Hermitage, were subject to torching or confiscation by the insurgents. But she was a well-educated, independent minded and charming woman versed in codes of chivalry. She presided over gatherings of elite patriot refugees from British-occupied New York City and offered young rebel officers, such as Princeton graduates James Madison and Aaron Burr, pleasant days of conversation, dancing and polite society flirtation with her unmarried sister and other female guests. In July 1778, Theodosia offered her estate to George Washington for his temporary headquarters. The relationship between Burr and the matron of the Hermitage blossomed into an ongoing political and social relationship that Burr’s fellow officers thought had romantic overtones. Col. Burr became a surrogate father to Bartow and his brother.

The book *Runaways of Colonial New Jersey: Indentured Servants, Slaves, Deserters and Prisoners, 1720-1781* by Richard B. Marrin (p. 242) gave only a summary of a later Prevost advertisement in the same newspaper, June 5, 1775, but provided the details of the name Jenny and “dressed as Indians.”
Prevost’s name appears in most documents as John B. Prevost, which is how he signed his name, but family and friends called him Bartow. He was ten when the war broke out and must have gradually assumed a range of responsibilities in the absence of his father. Col. Burr was ten years his senior and mentored the young man. Burr had a keen interest in how children were raised to become exemplary citizens. He was only eleven when he first applied for admission to Princeton, so he probably set high expectations for Bartow at the same age.

A major feature of young male socialization at Princeton was two rival fraternities (Burr belonged to both at different times) that instilled proper manners, loyalty, secret confidences and an honor code. Some have suggested that male college life in clubs in the period influenced everything from the habit of dueling to settle perceived affronts to the manner of negotiating factional differences at the 1889 Constitutional Convention. A few assert that they even fostered development of the country’s two-party system.\(^{38}\) Nine Princeton graduates took part in the Constitutional Convention, including James Madison.

In 1779, word reached the Hermitage of the death of Theodosia’s husband in the West Indies. Thereafter, Burr warmly embraced the Prevost boys as his own sons.\(^{39}\) Burr enjoyed the company of educated and independent-minded women like Theodosia, and he determined to marry her as soon as he could.

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establish his own law practice. Both identified with Rousseau’s humanistic writings on the education of children. Both later came to admire the writing of Mary Wollstonecraft, who in 1792 published her famous *Vindication of the Rights of Women*, extending Rousseau’s principles to the education of girls. In letters to each other, Aaron Burr and Theodosia Prevost practiced an intellectual friendship of the sort that, at the time, was usually limited to writing between men. They married in 1782, when Bartow was sixteen. In letters to her traveling second husband, Theodosia wrote with pride of Bartow’s work ethic. “Bartow’s industry and utility are striking to the family and strangers.” In another letter she said, “Bartow never quits the office and is perfectly obliging.”

Burr moved his adopted family to New York City in hopes of building a successful law practice. He hired a tutor for Bartow and his brother, and he assigned both clerkships in his office. He and Theodosia had a daughter in 1785, when Bartow was nineteen. As with the boys, the parents kept little sister Theodosia busy, teaching her to read and write at the age of three. By the time the girl was ten years old, she was translating Horace from the Latin, speaking French and excelling in math. Burr and his wife also believed girls should develop their physical skills, and the child excelled at ice skating, horseback riding and dancing.

After some months of declining health, Theodosia Prevost Burr died in 1794. Bartow was twenty-eight and practicing law, her daughter only nine.

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40 Pidgin, pp. 154.
With the death of his wife, Burr was even more determined to further educate his daughter in his wife’s honor. Bartow had great affection for his half-sister, who would later marry Joseph Alston, a wealthy plantation owner and governor of South Carolina. Scholars speculate that Theodosia Burr married a rich man partly out of loyalty to her father. Aaron Burr was often strapped for money.

As he would later demonstrate in Peru, Bartow shared the democratic and humanistic principles that had placed Burr at the center of the growing anti-Federalist movement. Anti-Federalists ran for political office as “republicans” and organized in “democratic” societies and clubs. Some – including Aaron Burr and Thomas Jefferson – identified with the leaders of the French revolution and condemned Federalist “monarchical” elitism, a political tendency Prevost would later denounce in Peru. The Federalist/Republican polarization eventually evolved into the U.S. two-party system, and Burr’s election to the U.S. Senate in 1791 made him a political and, eventually, very personal enemy of Alexander Hamilton, New York’s most ambitious Federalist leader.

In 1794, James Monroe, one of the main organizers with Thomas Jefferson of the democratic/republican groups opposing the Federalists, was appointed U.S. minister to France and, at Burr’s urging, chose Bartow Prevost as his personal secretary.41 During his years in Europe, Prevost developed a close relationship with the future president that would later protect him from critics of his role in Peru. Upon return from Europe, Prevost was active in New York City

politics and served as city recorder under three different mayors, no doubt a patronage position. The 1800 U.S. census recorded two slaves and a like number of “other free persons” in Bartow Prevost’s household.\(^{42}\) Prevost solicited Monroe’s assistance in obtaining a federal appointment after Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency. (His step-father was vice president, but Jefferson and Burr were estranged).\(^{43}\) When the new president committed “Jefferson’s Folly” by purchase of France’s North American territories from Napoleon, Jefferson dispatched the New York attorney to New Orleans where Prevost served on the territory’s first and highest judicial body, the Louisiana superior court, from March, 1804, to November 1808.\(^ {44}\) From that time on, many people, including some in Peru, referred to him as Judge Prevost. Aaron Burr followed his stepson into the Louisiana territory, engaging in land speculation and planning a filibuster into northern Mexico. It is not clear how much contact Burr and Prevost had during the period of the so-called “Burr conspiracy” for which the

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\(^{42}\) Of seventy-five men from the state of New York appointed to federal government positions between 1789 and 1805, at least forty-eight held slaves. Most, like Prevost, held fewer than five. See Arthur J. Alexander, “Federal Officeholders in New York State as Slaveholders, 1789-1805,” in *The Journal of Negro History*, vol. 28, no. 3 (July 1943), pp. 326-349. Prevost’s slaves and the “other free persons” listed in the 1800 census are mentioned on p. 346.


\(^{44}\) In Charles G. Gill, ed., *Louisiana Reports*, vol 133 (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1914) there is a series of historical accounts and documents to commemorate the centennial of the Louisiana supreme court, and on p. lxxxiv is an unsigned biographical note on Prevost giving his dates of service. That brief text was repeated verbatim in the *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, vol. 4, p. 133. Some published references to Prevost identify him as serving on the Louisiana “supreme” court, which did not exist until 1813, when Louisiana was admitted as a state. However, the superior court was the territory’s highest court prior to that date, and therefore Prevost’s name has been placed erroneously on lists of judges who served on the state’s supreme court.
former vice president was indicted for treason and then acquitted in 1807.\textsuperscript{45} There is no consensus among scholars regarding Aaron Burr’s activities, but he was consulting closely with a man who, it was later discovered, was working as a paid secret agent of Spain. Accounts of the great Louisiana slave uprising of 1811 make no mention of Prevost, so he had probably left New Orleans and returned to New York by then.

**Prevost’s Call to Peru**

Prevost was practicing law in New York when, in early 1817, the new administration of James Monroe was ready to appoint replacement U.S. political agents to the Caribbean and South America, who would follow in the footsteps of Joel Poinsett, the first U.S. agent sent to South America in 1810. Because of conflicts that Prevost would have with U.S. naval commanders in South America, it is important to clarify the context of his appointment in some detail. When he was secretary of state, in late 1815 Monroe had written to John Quincy Adams, then U.S. ambassador in London, making clear his sympathy for the independence of Spain’s American colonies. Those that “have already abrogated [Spain’s] authority and established independent governments” were now insisting on the “acknowledgement of their governments by the United States.” While Washington had to weigh many factors in managing its relationship with Spain, Monroe told Adams that, “there is no cause to doubt in which scale our

\textsuperscript{45} In her reconstruction of Burr’s activities in Louisiana, Nancy Isenberg made no mention of Prevost other than to note he was serving in New Orleans at the time and had been involved in business with Burr previously (*Fallen Founder*, p. 287).
interest lies." After his election as president, in an April 1817 letter to Poinsett, Monroe said that the United States had “a well founded hope” that the Latin American independence revolutions would succeed.  

The president decided in May to send agents on political missions to South America. He understood that Chileans had set up a government and were in a protracted war on the viceroyalty. Monroe chose his former secretary, Prevost, for the sensitive post on the west coast, making him representative to both the still unrecognized government in Santiago and the Spanish regime in Lima. Prevost received his instructions in July from acting secretary of state Richard Rush.  But, since Adams was only then arriving to take over as secretary of state, Monroe delayed the mission. In October the president posed a series of questions for discussion in his cabinet regarding Spain and Latin American independence. Was it “expedient for the United States to recognize Buenos Aires or other revolted province?,” he asked. Should Washington proceed with the plan “to send a commission to South America to report on the


48 The relevant letters are Rush to Prevost, July 18, 20 and 24, 1817, filed by the department of state under papers of political agents. While Prevost was not accredited to either government as a consul or chargé, he carried his appointment letters as an official political representative to be presented to whatever authorities he found in Chile and Peru. One of his misfortunes in South America was to lose his papers in a boating accident while attempting to make contact with Simón Bolívar. Because correspondence with Washington could take a full year before Prevost could receive a reply, Chilean officials issued him provisional documents he used to attest to his official U.S. status with patriot leaders in Peru.
progress of the revolution and the probability of its success?” Adams persuaded the cabinet to withhold recognition, and he probably influenced the National Intelligencer newspaper editorial a few days later deploring U.S. citizen aid to rebel forces. Monroe told a friend he wanted “to elevate South America as high as we could” without antagonizing European powers that backed Spain. So, Prevost’s mission was reauthorized, and John Quincy Adams would be responsible for him as Monroe’s secretary of state. Prevost served in South America on behalf of a protégé of Thomas Jefferson and future announcer of the “Monroe Doctrine,” but his direct supervisor was the New England son of Jefferson’s Federalist nemesis and the actual author of the 1823 declaration. Adams admitted in his diary to be personally inclined to deal harshly with Prevost at times, but, as a former secretary of state himself, Monroe kept Adams under close supervision.

Prevost’s service in Peru would have been quite different had Monroe appointed Henry Clay to the secretary of state position. The speaker of the

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49 Griffin said he “paraphrased” the questions from a memorandum of October 1817, in Monroe Papers, Library of Congress. Griffin, United States, pp. 140-141.

50 Ibid., p. 141.

51 Griffin could not determine to whom Monroe’s letter of December 2, 1817, was addressed. Ibid., p. 142.

52 Adams met with Monroe once or twice a day. As Adams’ biographer Paul Nagel put it, Adams “grew accustomed to Monroe’s annoying habit of invariably insisting on some change in the content or the style of the official letters and statements Adams would labor to perfect before submitting to him.” Thus, it is no surprise that critical remarks about Prevost by Adams are found in his diary, not in letters he sent from the state department (with one exception that Monroe authorized). Paul C. Nagel, John Adams: A Public Life, A Private Life (New York: Knopf, 1997), p. 218
House of Representatives was the most prominent U.S. champion of the Latin American revolutions against Spanish rule, and he fully expected the appointment. It is possible that Monroe, while still the secretary of state of outgoing president James Madison, had already decided to deny Clay the post. 53 Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams had grown to dislike each other while both served on the 1814 commission to negotiate peace with Great Britain. 54 Adams shared none of Clay’s enthusiasm for Latin American patriots, as Prevost would be reminded time and again. When Adams undermined Prevost and, in the opinion of an important U.S. merchant in Lima, jeopardized the future of U.S. interests in Peru, the businessman could only make a private appeal to Clay in the hope of bringing political pressure on the secretary of state, but to no avail. 55

Prevost’s annual salary of $4,500 placed him in the higher ranks of U.S. political appointees working abroad in consular and diplomatic posts, perhaps reflecting his status as former chief judge of the Louisiana territory and his years of service for Monroe in Europe. 56 He was issued an advance of three thousand


54 Clay at first tried to help Adams become more friendly and sociable. Adams wanted to take his meals at Ghent alone, writing of the other members of the U.S. negotiating team that, “They sit after dinner and drink bad wine and smoke cigars.” Clay persuaded Adams to dine with the group, explaining that his arrogant demeanor was offensive. Nagel, p. 218.

55 It was surprising, therefore, that when John Quincy Adams was elected president to succeed Monroe, he turned around and appointed Clay to replace himself as secretary of state.

56 For point of comparison with Prevost’s $4,500, the U.S. secretary of state was paid $6,000 per year. His department in Washington had only eleven other employees, most earning from $800 to $1,600 per year. See Elmer Plischke, *U.S. Department of State: A Reference History* (Westport, CT:
dollars to cover salary and expenses. In turn, Monroe and Adams gave him supervision of another political agent, William Worthington, who would report mainly from Buenos Aires, as well as the informal consular agent Jeremy Robinson, who had no salary apart from fees he collected for services to U.S. ships and merchants, but dreamed of a much bigger role. Robinson had received an appointment in 1817, but it was revoked soon after, and he became a freelancer. In fact, Prevost had the position Robinson coveted.57 Amid the political conflicts and warfare up and down the west coast, Robinson complicated U.S. affairs by misrepresenting his status to local officials. The state department seems to have tolerated this because Robinson sent a steady stream of reports, although it is unclear how much weight was given them.58 In most historical work on the period, attention has been paid to the colorful and prolific Robinson but very little to Prevost, whose letters to Washington became

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57 Rush informed Prevost of his “paramount” authority relative to Worthington and Robinson in Rush to Prevost, July 24, 1817. He asked Prevost to deliver letters to the two men informing them that “they are to conform to such directions as you may, from time to time give them ....”

58 Robinson’s letters were collected among the reports of special agents, but were later tagged with a note stating that “he reported unofficially to the State Department on South American affairs for several years.” Robinson frequently requested that he receive some formal appointment with a salary. Robinson mostly resided in Chile. Although Prevost was responsible for Chile and Peru, he spent more time in the latter. See Department of State record group 59, in microfilm publications M37, “Despatches from Special Agents of the Department of State, 1794-1906,” vols. 5-6, on reel no. 3.
scattered in different government files.\textsuperscript{59} Robinson eventually turned against Prevost.

Rush and Adams gave Prevost minimal guidance. He was to report on the state of the region’s governments, population, resources, and “wealth of the contending parties.” President Monroe wished to receive the “names and characters of leading men” and to learn how people perceived the United States. Prevost was to investigate the principal goods imported and exported, the duties levied on them, and the prospects – both “moral and physical” – for those portions of South America likely to become independent from Spain. Rush knew that Prevost had already had a meeting with the president, and he told the agent that Monroe trusted him to decide what political, fiscal and commercial subjects he should report on. Rush neglected to summarize for Prevost U.S. policy in relation to the Latin American wars of independence, but the attorney must have been aware of its essentials. That same day Rush did lay them out in instructions to two other political agents being dispatched to other Latin American regions. In those documents, he went into detail about U.S. assertion of neutrality in the face of any party’s efforts to enlist U.S. support for their cause or attempts to restrict U.S. commerce with antagonists. Rush said that the United States did not accept Spain’s claim that it could prohibit U.S. trade with “colonies as in a state of rebellion.” Instead, he said, the United States “has considered the contest in

\textsuperscript{59} The main reason for dispersion of Prevost’s papers was due to the degree to which he was obliged to address problems in South America of U.S. naval officers, as will be discussed below. Selected extracts from Prevost’s correspondence were published in 1925 under sponsorship of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in William R. Manning, ed., \textit{Diplomatic Correspondence Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations}, vol. 3, part XI, pp. 1719-1755, hereinafter cited as Manning, \textit{Diplomatic Correspondence … Independence}.
the light of a civil war, in which the parties were equal.” All the United States sought from the two sides was “a just return” for its commercial endeavors. “In whatever quarter the authority of Spain was abrogated and an independent government erected,” he continued, “it was essential to the security of our rights that we should enjoy its friendship.” Spain, he wrote, “could not impose conditions on other powers incident to complete sovereignty in places where she did not maintain it.”

Prevost knew that James Monroe had political sympathy for the insurgents and viewed their victories as inevitable. This left areas of ambiguity in U.S. policy that he would interpret differently than U.S. traders and naval officers. And, Prevost would have to report to John Quincy Adams, who shared none of the president’s confidence in either South American patriots or himself.

Prevost’s original instructions were to go to Buenos Aires and then travel overland to the west coast, thereby gaining a fuller understanding of the continent’s economic and political affairs. But, in September, secretary of state Adams changed Prevost’s commission. Prior to taking up residence in Peru and Chile, Prevost would sail around the tip of South America on the USS Ontario, under command of navy captain James Biddle, and touch only briefly at the main west coast ports en route to the mouth of the Columbia River, where he was to “assert there the claim of Sovereignty in the name and on behalf of the United States” by some symbolic means. It was to be a “ceremony of taking possession,”

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60 Rush to Prevost, July 18, 1817, and Rush to Rodney and Graham on the same day.
as Adams put it in his instruction to Biddle, part of several transfers of territory as negotiated with Britain in the Treaty of Ghent.\textsuperscript{61} While this new objective enhanced Prevost’s mission, it prevented him from getting a view of Peru’s interior.

**PERU’S ATTRACTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES**

Amasa Delano’s 1805 visit to Lima occurred at the onset of a key period in United States development. Commercial opportunities for the United States in South America grew because of Spain’s misfortunes throughout the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). Shipbuilding, seafaring skills and mercantile experience served North Americans well in South America until the United States became developed enough to seek markets for its own manufacturers. The European conflicts had the effect of turning over a good part of the transport of goods to and from South American markets to New England ship owners. Although Spain tried to maintain a more jealous control over the Peruvian viceroyalty than over other parts of its American empire, North American sea captains managed to penetrate Peruvian ports with European cargoes. Much of their business was conducted by smuggling. Spain lost Buenos Aires and much of Chile beginning in 1810-1811. Yankees earned profits as intermediary transporters, since actual control of most of the trade remained in the hands of European merchants. Income from re-exported goods and the carrying trade between Europe and the Americas was the most dynamic sector of the U.S. economy from 1793 until the end of the Napoleonic wars.\textsuperscript{62} Wealth generated from U.S. commerce in Latin

\textsuperscript{61} Adams to Prevost, September 29, 1817, and Adams to Biddle, on the same day.

America fueled the fledgling U.S. economy into its later period of industrialization, and Peru became an important component of commercial relationships, as both partner and competitor. British houses that had operated through Spanish fronts moved in to establish more direct commerce. Several U.S. businessmen actively sought a direct presence on the west coast of the continent as part of their commercial ambitions in Asia, notably John Jacob Astor and the extended Alsop family of merchants.

Although the War of 1812 and subsequent peace in Europe cut down the profitable U.S. carrying trade, several factors contributed to a renewal of U.S.-Peruvian commercial contact. Peruvian ports served as supply stations for the New England-based whaling fleet that became more active in South Pacific waters after the War of 1812, and Valparaiso, Callao and other west coast ports became stop-off points for U.S. commerce with Asia, Hawaii and the disputed northern Pacific Coast of North America. A British commercial agent would later report to London that South America’s trade with the Orient "has been entirely engrossed by the North Americans," adding that selling China goods was the most profitable import business in Peru. Direct trade between Baltimore and Peru began as early as 1812. But it was the Latin American wars of independence that provided the impulse for the first major sales of the United States' own domestic merchandise in South America, not just barrels of wheat


64 Frank R. Rutter, South American Trade of Baltimore (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1897), p. 14. Arthur Whitaker wrote that by 1818 U.S. commerce with the west coast of South America "had grown to exceed that of any other foreign nation." Perhaps he was referring more to the carrying trade than direct commerce. See Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830 (1964).
flour but also ships, fittings, rigging, shoes and – especially – armaments and cotton cloth from just-established New England mills.

WHALING AND THE 1818 DISCOVERY OF THE PERUVIAN GROUNDS

New England whaleships began rounding Cape Horn to fish in Pacific waters in the early 1790s, competing with dozens of British whalers already working the region. The Rebecca of New Bedford fished the Pacific during 1791-1793 and reported that ten other U.S. whaleships were seen from among about forty sighted in total. Seven were from Nantucket, Massachusetts. Over the next few decades, the U.S. whaling fleet grew to surpass that of Britain by many hundreds, bringing rich profits into New England ports. One estimate in 1818 suggested there were some 150 whaling vessels off the Peruvian coast belonging to the United States. At its height in the 1840s, U.S. whaling employed about seventy thousand men, and whaleships worth about $70 million comprised twenty percent of all U.S. merchant tonnage. Many of these ships touched Peruvian ports two or more times per voyage. If a whaleship captain ran short of funds or faced an emergency, U.S. consular agents in Peru would advance him money and then send the invoice for collection to the ship’s owners in the United States.

Whale oil was mainly used for lighting lamps. A U.S. whaleship was a sea-going factory carrying as many as nine hundred different articles, from spars and harpoons to carpenter’s tools, spare sails and casks of flour and beef. To

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save space for large amounts of provisions, oil casks were broken down, their
staves amassed in bundles, to be later assembled as needed by the ship’s cooper,
or barrel maker. A whaleship’s deck behind the fore-mast was weighted down
by a massive brick trywork, a large wood-burning furnace, with a reservoir of
water underneath to keep the supporting deck from catching fire and two
enormous kettles (try pots) above in which to render whale blubber into oil. In
addition to the cooper, ships usually had a blacksmith and a skilled carpenter.
By law, ships carried a medicine chest, and the best of those included surgical
instruments. The captain served in lieu of a doctor, following written diagnostic
and surgical instructions kept in the chest. Most of the pay of the crew was
based upon luck – a share of the “lay” from the number of barrels brought back –
and many a sailor wound up with nothing for his labors. Since a voyage could
last two years or more, whaleship owners often had trouble rounding up enough
crew.
A U.S. whaleship was a floating factory and microcosm of U.S. society. Hundreds sailed in and out of Peruvian waters on voyages of from 1½ to three years. The diagram is of the 303-ton, three-masted barque, Alice Knowles, from New Bedford, Massachusetts. Arrows point to the trywork with try pots above a large furnace built on the deck, and the disassembled barrels stored in the hold. (Source: Drawn by C. S. Raleigh for George Brown Goode, et al., United States Bureau of Fisheries, The Fisheries and Fishery Industries of the United States, section V, vol. 2, p. 234.)

By law U.S. whaleboats had to carry a medicine chest (left), and some also had surgical instruments on board (right). (Source: Smithsonian Institution)

A number of northern Peruvian ports were favorite provisioning stops for whaleships. The ship that took Herman Melville to the Pacific, the Acushnet, stopped in Tumbes in 1841 and found another whaleship there, the Roman of New Bedford, which was making its fourth visit to Tumbes on that particular
whaling voyage. In addition to taking on water, U.S. ships found plentiful supplies of potatoes, bananas, oranges and fresh beef, all at much more reasonable prices than would obtain at a major port. Melville and the Acushnet were at Tumbes for thirteen days, and later the author twice worked the port into his writing, once to extol “the finest sweet potato in the world” (in Omoo), and again in White-Jacket, in reference to a woman well remembered by fictional sailor Jack Chase. When the seamen of the frigate Neversink were ordered to shave their beards, Chase complained to the ship’s barber: “Ah! Barber, have you no heart? This beard has been caressed by the snow-white hand of the lovely Tomasita of Tombez – the Castillan belle of all Lower Peru. Think of that, barber!”

A major boost to the industry in 1818, the year Bartow Prevost reached Peru, was discovery of the fabled “Peruvian grounds,” waters teeming with sperm whales that lay about one thousand miles west of Peru. The Peruvian grounds were found by Capt. Edmund Gardner of the Globe, and, when his ship returned to Nantucket in 1820, it carried 2,090 barrels of oil. The productive Peruvian grounds helped usher in the “Golden Age” of U.S. whaling. It was around this time that the north coast Peruvian port of Paita gradually evolved into the main South American provisioning and medical post for U.S. Pacific whaling.

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Why U.S. whaleship captains chose Paita over the more developed ports of Callao or Guayaquil can be inferred. The higher cost of goods in those urban centers was a factor. Paita connected to a subregion of Peru that was attentive to producing the staples whaleships needed. But, the main reason was probably the lower probability of crew desertion than in larger, relatively cosmopolitan
ports. Paita’s isolation from anything like the social environments with which U.S. sailors were familiar back home allowed ship captains to give their crews a little shore time with less risk. Small Peruvian tavern, prostitution and provisions supply businesses accommodated them. A physician operated a clinic in Paita where sick and injured sailors were dropped off, the cost of their care charged to ship owners back home. There were desertions at Paita, but fewer than would happen in Callao. “[Paita] is without exception the most uninviting desolate spot that ever human beings selected for a habitation,” complained one U.S. sailor. Captains sometimes hired Peruvians to keep tabs on their sailors and, if necessary, to track down deserters. “A spy on us all day,” a whaleman on Paita shore leave wrote in his diary. Another said that sailors deserting at Peruvian ports “are hunted with bloodhounds worse than fugitive slaves in the states.” Among their expenses at Paita and Tumbes, whaleship captains submitted receipts for “Watching and Hunting up men.”

U.S. naval officer Philo White thought that many U.S. whaleships would head back for Paita once every six months “for refitting, provisions, etc.,” and then return to sea. Anywhere from one up to a dozen “may be seen lying here at the same time; and scarcely a day passes without seeing a whaleship either coming in or going out.” The livelihood of most residents was linked to whaling. “The business these ships give, the money they expend, etc. is the life and soul of Payta.” During a visit in 1841, White found Paita “poverty-stricken and wo-begone,” due mostly to a long drought in the region. Fish was available for subsistence, but, “Even the water used for cooking and drinking, is brought from

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the River Chira, 15 or 20 miles distant.” The only consulate in the port was that of the United States, and White estimated that the consul earned about 3,000 dollars per year by charging a ten percent fee on cash he provided to captains who drew bills on their ships’ owners. “In addition to this, he gets some other business, of small amount,” notarizing documents or, probably, charging a commission on services provided sailors in distress. Invoices for these expenses were sent back to the ship owners in New England.

ROYALISTS AND PATRIOTS

When Bartow Prevost worked in Peru, political independence was being forced upon the colony by rebel armies led by José de San Martín from the south and Simón Bolívar from the north, the former drawing upon forces from Buenos Aires and Chile, the latter from Colombia and Ecuador. At the beginning of his mission in 1818, Prevost thought the revolutionaries would triumph fairly quickly. Instead, it took seven more years, until December 1824, shortly before his death. In Lima, the center of Spanish administration in South America, many individuals profited more from the decaying colonial system, with its special privileges and protections for those engaged in commerce, than they might expect to gain in an unregulated market. One of these was a Spanish-born merchant, Manuel Barreda, who, although married to a Peruvian woman and raising a large family in Lima, would arrange a legal exit after viceregal power collapsed. His son later founded the Barreda social network (chapter seven).

Nevertheless, some Peruvians conspired and agitated for independence. From an economic standpoint, their principal desire was liberation from Spain’s monopolistic commercial practices that kept the prices of imported European manufactures high while, they believed, inhibiting local manufacturing. These Peruvians also were frustrated by Spain’s own economic decline, which left it a weak intermediary between Peru and the rising industrial metropolis of Britain and other European centers. "The interests of the Peninsula are diametrically opposed to those of America," wrote one of the principal conspirators in Lima, José de la Riva-Agüero (whose grandson would marry into the Barreda social network in 1880). In 1816 he lamented the state of the Spanish economy. “Spain does not have sufficient factories to supply America with merchandise; and her few manufactures are in every way inferior to the foreign [e.g., British] products.” Instead, Riva-Agüero wrote, Spain was reduced to an intermediary. “Her commerce consists of buying first-hand from the foreigners and depositing the goods in Cádiz or other ports.” The Spanish traders who brought goods to Peru were “secondary merchants,” he said, who purchased their goods from the Cádiz depot and then resold them to Peruvian wholesalers, who then resold

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71 Paul Gootenberg suggested that monopolistic colonial policies had little to do with the decline of the provincial obrajes that flourished throughout much of the colonial period using forced Indian labor. Instead, he concluded that Bourbon reforms freeing up trade, competition from Buenos Aires and decline of the mita (traditional indigenous collective labor system) all helped to destroy the "natural" protection obrajes had enjoyed. See Paul Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano: Commercial Policy and the State in Postindependence Peru (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 46.

72 The son of José Mariano de la Riva Agüero y Sánchez Boquete (1783-1858) was Manuel Pardo’s foreign minister in the mid-1870s (chapter thirteen). José Mariano’s grandson, José Carlos de la Riva Agüero y Riglos, married Carmen de Osma’s niece, María de los Dolores de Osma Sancho-Dávila. José Mariano’s great-grandson, José de la Riva Agüero y Osma, is a figure in the third volume of this study, which takes up the role of the Barredas and the United States in Peru’s early twentieth century social reform efforts. (See appendix chart 15.1.)
them to retail shopkeepers. “This system could not be called commerce,” Riva-Agüero complained. “Rather, it is monopoly.”

Such incipient Peruvian nationalism was rooted in the conviction that Spain, unlike other European nations, was seeking excessive short-term profits and was no longer capable of contributing to the long-term economic prosperity of its American colonies. For the good fortune of Great Britain and the United States, the independence spirit in Peru was accompanied in many minds by an almost blind faith in the wisdom of free trade. "Without freedom of commerce and industry," wrote Riva-Agüero, "America will always be poor, in spite of her mines." Free trade, he said, is the "soul of talent and industry.”

NEUTRAL RIGHTS

Throughout most of Prevost’s service in Chile and Peru, the political agent found himself in frequent conflict with U.S. naval commanders, whose main instruction was to protect U.S. commerce under a claim of “neutral rights.” By this doctrine, the United States wished that the belligerents allow U.S. merchants and ships to trade freely with both parties in the independence wars. However, it was not in the interest of either Spain or the revolutionary forces to respect the U.S. claim of neutrality. Each side imagined that U.S. traders operated on behalf of their enemy, and often their fears were well founded.

Having worked in Europe for the incoming president, Prevost knew that James Monroe had personal sympathy for the rebels, and U.S. officials met in

73 José Mariano de la Riva-Agüero y Sánchez Boquete, Manifestación histórica y política de la revolución de la América y más especialmente de la parte que corresponde al Perú, y Rio de la Plata. Obra escrita en Lima, centro de la opresión y del despotismo, en el año de 1816 (Buenos Aires: Expósitos, 1818), pp. 68 and 74.

74 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
Washington with patriot agents sent to lobby for U.S. support. But those representatives were more successful among republican/democrat newspaper editors than with government leaders, who were accountable to U.S. commercial interests that demanded diplomatic and naval protection to carry on their business in South America unhindered by any partisan sentiments. U.S. assertion of neutral rights conflicted with the nation’s professed democratic ideals, as personified in Peru by Bartow Prevost. Spain’s minister to the United States, Chevalier Luís de Onís worked to deny recognition to the South American republicans, and he also took on the role of arms procurement agent in the United States, arranging shipment of U.S. weapons to the beleaguered viceroyalty in Lima.

Monroe himself had been the secretary of state under the Madison administration, where he fully embraced the U.S. policy of asserting neutral trading rights backed, if necessary, by naval force. Monroe appointed the son of the great Federalist, John Adams, as his own secretary of state. Prevost’s position was further complicated by partisan political debates over Latin America in the United States. Congress was divided on the question of recognition of new governments declared by patriots in South America. Henry Clay, speaker of the house of representatives, led the campaign for immediate recognition and was in frequent contact with patriot agents sent from South America. John Quincy Adams was firmly opposed. The New Englander was influenced by loud complaints from U.S. merchants and ship captains returning from Latin America. They alleged that many nationalists there were lawless opportunists who confiscated property more for personal gain than patriotism. In March 1818, Clay attempted to force recognition through an attachment to the general
appropriations bill, but members overwhelmingly defeated him in a vote of 45 in favor and 115 against.\(^75\)

In his 1817 inaugural address, James Monroe made the “neutral” trading rights of the United States as a non-belligerent the centerpiece of his South America policy; and Adams set a rather severe test for eventual U.S. recognition of Latin American republics. In response to Clay’s frequent agitation for recognition of the South American independence movements, Adams sent the president a letter in August 1818 outlining his view of U.S. neutrality. The United States should acknowledge independence only when it was so well “established as a matter of fact” that Spain’s chances of recovering its dominion were “utterly desperate.”\(^76\) This rigid position served the interests of those U.S. traders, many of whom were from Adams’ own home region of New England, who sought opportunities to trade with both sides in the conflicts. It would be more than four years before James Monroe was ready to offer recognition, a delay that earned the United States considerable ill will among patriots on the west coast of South America. Meanwhile, U.S. traders were in frequent conflict with the authorities of the opposing sides, and they lobbied Washington for deployment of U.S. warships on the Pacific coast that could protect their ships and cargoes as they willfully violated the interests of one side or the other.

Among those pushing for U.S. naval protection of commerce in the Pacific was John Jacob Astor, reputed to be the richest merchant in New York. Astor made his fortune buying sea otter skins and other animal furs cheaply from

\(^75\) As has been so often true in U.S. relations with Latin America, European affairs, especially how Spain’s troubles might work to advance British ambitions in the hemisphere, weighed heavily in the calculations Monroe and Adams made regarding the independence movements in Spain’s colonies, a story well told in Griffin, \textit{op. cit.}

Native Americans in the Pacific Northwest, selling them for handsome prices in China and then bringing back tea to the United States. He became New York’s premier furrier to U.S. elites. Under the Lima viceroyalty, Peru’s own trade with Asia was a tightly regulated monopoly chartered to the Filipinas Company, whose partners were well represented in the Lima Tribunal del Consulado. U.S. trade across the Pacific would inevitably come into competition with Peruvian interests, royal or national, especially since the best U.S. route to China throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, up until the Panama railroad was built in the mid-1850s, was via Cape Horn.

In July 1817 the department of the navy ordered captain James Biddle to prepare the sloop-of-war Ontario for the mission to Chile, Peru and Oregon. This coincided with the Monroe’s appointment of Bartow Prevost as the U.S. political agent for the west coast of South America. By sending the Ontario into the Pacific, the president was also calling upon the underfunded U.S. navy to protect the property of U.S. citizens in the conflict zones and to defend the “dignity” of the United States in exercising its neutrality. This was a tricky business that would require great maturity and patience on the part of U.S. naval commanders sent around Cape Horn and up the west coast, moving back and forth between reliberated Chile and colonial-controlled Peru. Capt. Biddle turned out to be the wrong man for the job, at least in Prevost’s opinion.

U.S. merchants were already embroiled in a number of conflicts that would require the immediate attention of Prevost and Biddle. Astor’s ship Beaver was seized and impounded by Spanish authorities at the port of Talcahuano, together with a second U.S. merchantman, the Canton, both accused of smuggling arms to the patriots. At the same time, however, the greater the rebel pressure on the Spanish viceroyalty, the more urgent was the royalist need
in Peru to buy arms and other supplies from U.S. traders. Commercial opportunities abounded up and down the west coast, but they were risky, and the U.S. navy, supported by U.S. diplomacy, was being asked to provide, in effect, free insurance.

Biddle and the U.S. naval commanders in the Pacific who followed him all adopted inflexible postures in defense of U.S. merchants. As Edward Baxter Billingsley noted, U.S. naval officers tended to be fairly authoritarian in running their ships, and he described the typical captain as proud and “sometimes arrogant.” Furthermore, they “instinctively equated their own honor with that of the nation.”

A naval officer’s tendency toward brashness and quick action in the face of challenges to U.S. “dignity” played well in the press back home and among U.S. citizens, whatever their political sympathies. A militarily weak, upstart nation that had so recently waged revolutionary war against colonialism now craved the respect that heavy cannon of British and French warships more easily commanded. The written orders Washington gave U.S. captains heading to South America were brief, focused on property protection and without hint of sympathy for the patriots.

Prevost’s communications with Washington took many months from Peru and back, usually the better part of a year. A typical letter Prevost wrote from Peru on June 10, 1818, reached Washington six months later on December 2. Adams had no way to really supervise Prevost, except during a period when he

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77 Edward Baxter Billingsley, In Defense of Neutral Rights: The United States Navy and the Wars of Independence in Chile and Peru (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), p. 18. Except where otherwise cited, this narrative of Prevost’s interactions with the first two U.S. naval commanders (Biddle and Downes) relies on Billingsley’s account. He is the only scholar I have found who made significant use of Prevost’s correspondence with the department of state. Understandably, given his subject, he tended to be understanding of the flaws of naval captains but was less generous toward Prevost.
was in Buenos Aires, where mail delivery took less than two months. Soon, as Adams developed animosity toward Prevost, he was reluctant to write him at all. According to Richard Alsop, the most prominent U.S. merchant in Peru at the time, Prevost told him in 1823 that he had not received any instructions from Washington for over two years.\(^{78}\)

Once they reached Lima, political differences between Prevost and Biddle deepened. Viceroy Joaquín de Pezuela charmed Biddle but was cold toward Prevost, having been told, mistakenly, that his mission was to negotiate U.S. recognition of an independent Peru with the patriots. Biddle’s leverage was Pezuela’s need to acquire U.S. weapons. U.S. shipping increased throughout 1818, and the royalists were the primary beneficiaries, much to the distress of Chileans. The patriots hired admiral Thomas Lord Cochrane, who had fallen from grace in Britain, to be their naval commander precisely to put a stop to such resupply of the viceroy’s forces. The patriots could win a battle here and there, but any chance of finally defeating the viceroy’s forces on land would depend on ending Spanish control of Pacific ports.

While Prevost wrote to Washington advocating U.S. recognition of Chile, Biddle got comfortable with the Spaniards in Lima. The city was full of intrigue, and Pezuela flattered Biddle and made him a gift of his personal sword when the captain prepared to leave on the mission to the Columbia River. For accepting the weapon as a goodwill departure gesture, Biddle’s critics later accused him of taking a gift from royalty.\(^{79}\)


\(^{79}\) Ibid., p. 52.
The general view of U.S. naval historians is that, however problematic was the behavior of Biddle and the navy commanders who followed him, they served U.S. interests well by protecting U.S. merchants from, to use their favorite word, the “depredations” of patriot forces. While royalists detained a few U.S. merchantmen, as noted above, most seizures over the next six years were by the patriot navy blockading Peruvian ports controlled by Spanish colonial authorities. U.S. policy held that the patriots were trying to enforce a “paper blockade,” and U.S. blockade runners kept the U.S. navy busy. However, not all U.S. merchants approved of a U.S. policy that objectively aided royalists. To understand how the U.S. navy’s approach threatened longer range U.S. commercial interests, it is helpful to look at U.S. merchants resident in Peru, such as Alsop, Wetmore and McCall, who could appreciate patriot anger at the United States and how U.S. policy aided their British rivals. These merchants saw the conflict differently than did the blockade runners who traded from their ships and had no plan for permanently establishing themselves in an independent Peru.

There has been some scholarly confusion about the origins of what became the most successful early U.S. firm in Peru, Alsop y Cía. The Alsop family of Connecticut was prominent in U.S. foreign trade for generations, and Richard and Joseph were two favorite names for Alsop children, making it possible to mistake one Richard for another. Misidentification also was understandable because the man who translated (mostly from the Italian version) Ignatius Molina’s *Geographical and Natural History of Chile* was not the
merchant, but rather his father. The father died in 1815, some years before his son first went to South America.\textsuperscript{80}

Richard Alsop first established his business in Lima and Valparaíso in 1820. While for a time it was called Alsop, Wetmore y Cía., mostly it was known in Peru simply as Alsop y Cía. From its founding on the eve of Peruvian independence until its gradual dissolution five decades later (first in Lima in 1869 and then in Valparaíso in 1873), the firm evolved through eleven partnership agreements, most set for five years and with a varying lineup of partners. Throughout the 1820s, 1830s and 1840s, Alsop ranked among the top four or five merchant houses in Lima.\textsuperscript{81}

The Alsop family was from Middletown, a busy eighteenth century port up the Connecticut River, where they pioneered the West Indies trade prior to U.S. independence. Over the years, Alsops partnered with and sometimes intermarried with other Middletown merchant families, the Chaunceys, Whittelsays, Wetmores and Wrights.\textsuperscript{82} Brothers John (1724-1794) and Richard

\textsuperscript{80} The most fulsome confounding of the Alsop merchant in Peru and Chile with his relatives was penned by Jay Monaghan in \textit{Chile, Peru, and the California Gold Rush of 1849} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 91-92; and from there the misinformation migrated into Lawrence A. Clayton’s “Private Matters: The Origins and Nature of United States-Peruvian Relations, 1820-1850,” in \textit{The Americas}, vol. 42, no. 4 (April 1986), p. 382. Monaghan merged elements of three generations of Alsops into one man, describing the merchant in Lima as “a New England millionaire” (that was the brother of his grandfather) and “genial conservative” (his father). Everything in the Monaghan and Clayton descriptions of Alsop must be discarded. I am writing a research note, “Richard Alsop: Pioneer U.S. Merchant in Peru and Chile,” in progress, that explains his place among many of his fascinating relatives.

\textsuperscript{81} See the \textit{Matrícula de patentes} in Dancuart, ed., \textit{Anales}, IV, p. 12. Official U.S. trade data were not a good measure of early U.S. merchant activity in Peru, for reasons that will be explored later. For example, U.S. trade returns credited not a single export dollar to Peru in 1839-1843 and 1846, despite the fact that Alsop y Cía. was ranked among the top five merchant houses in Peru.

\textsuperscript{82} Some Chaunceys spelled their name “Chauncy.” Sources used to trace these families include \textit{The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Who’s Who in America, Dictionary of American Biography}, [John S. Whittlesey, et al.], \textit{Memorial of the Whittlesey Family in the United States} (privately published, MDCCCLV), William Chauncey Fowler, \textit{Memorials of the Chaunceys} (Boston: Dutton and Son, 1858) and James Carnahan Wetmore, \textit{The Wetmore Family of America and Its Collateral Branches: With Genealogical, Biographical and Historical Notices} (Albany: Munsell & Rowland, 1861).
(1726-1776) made their fortunes trading in the Caribbean from both Middletown and New York. John was a member of the Continental Congress and president of the New York chamber of commerce. His daughter married the Federalist leader, Rufus King. Richard’s son, Joseph W. Alsop, expanded the family’s trading to the East Indies, bringing their trade into contact with South America. This Joseph’s brother, Richard, was a writer, one of the so-called “Hartford wits,” who translated Giovanni Ignazio Molina’s *Geographical, Natural and Civil History of Chili*, published in 1808 by his brother-in-law. The writer Richard Alsop, sometimes confused with merchants who preceded and followed him, “never traveled abroad,” according to one authority. The coincidence of his interest in Chile no doubt lead people to assume he spent time there.

Prevost’s friend was the Hartford wit’s son. Richard Alsop (1789-1842) established the business in Peru and Chile. New England maritime historian Samuel Eliot Morison wrote that, “Richard Alsop … at Valparaiso, with a branch at Lima, was making $100,000 a year by 1827.” Morison mentioned Alsop to illustrate the importance of New England’s trade with Oregon, California and South America. “Let historians seeking economic origins of the Monroe Doctrine

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83 The influential conservative political columnists, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, born in 1910 and 1913, respectively, were great-grandsons of this Joseph W. Alsop.


86 Harrington began his biography of the “Hartford wit” Richard Alsop with a rather humorous review of published confusion and errors regarding the poet and some of his relatives (pp. 1-4).
look to the Northwest fur trade and to this early intercourse with South America!” he exclaimed.\(^{87}\)

While Alsop’s grandfather, also Richard Alsop, was erroneously rumored to be the richest man in Middletown, he died fairly young when his wife was thirty-six, leaving the widow with eight children ranging from about one year old to fifteen, the oldest being the Richard who became a writer. The grandfather’s estate was valued at about £35,000, much of it scattered in notes, partnerships, warehoused trade goods and parcels of land. The poet and father of our South American merchant eventually received about £2,700, and by 1800 he was strapped for funds and casting about for some venture that would yield him an income. Thus, neither the father nor grandfather of the Lima merchant should be described as a “millionaire.” The writer was a conservative Federalist who spoke of Jefferson’s Monticello home as a dreaded headquarters of Jacobins.\(^{88}\) He married Mary Pomeroy, sister of Samuel Wyllys Pomeroy, husband of Alsop’s sister, Clarissa. He died suddenly on a visit to New York’s Long Island in 1815, at age fifty-four, when the soon-to-be merchant in Lima and Valparaiso was twenty-six. At the time of Bartow Prevost’s death, the founder of Alsop y Cía. was thirty-six. His mother remarried, but the merchant provided some of her support, including a large home he built for her in Middletown that was known as “Dana House,” after the name she took when she married Samuel W. Dana in 1821.\(^{89}\)


\(^{88}\) Richard Alsop letter to Rufus King (who was married to his aunt), February 16, 1800, excerpts reproduced in Harrington, *Richard Alsop*, pp. 32-33.

\(^{89}\) Harrington, *Richard Alsop*, p. 47.
Like many merchant houses in Lima at the time of Peruvian independence and thereafter, Alsop was a partnership with a varying number of traders. While Alsop partners entered or left at various times, most of the partnership agreements were signed for sequential five-year periods. William S. Wetmore was also from Middletown, and he got stranded in South America after arriving as a young supercargo on the ship *Lion*, which was lost in a wreck. He joined Alsop in 1823. In the story that opened this chapter, Wetmore was the Alsop partner present in Lima in 1825 at the memorial for John Bartow Prevost. (Alsop himself had left for a trip to the United States.) Wetmore retired from the partnership in 1829 with “an ample fortune,” and he later established his own China house and did business with Alsop in Peru, until he and Richard Alsop had a falling out. Wetmore’s son became a U.S. senator and governor of Rhode Island.90

John Cryder of Philadelphia joined the firm in Lima in 1825.91 Richard Alsop’s cousin, Lucy Alsop, married Henry Chauncey, who became a partner in the Lima house after Cryder moved to London to set up a company that became the Alsops’ bankers there, Morrison, Cryder & Co. When Cryder’s banking house went through difficulties and was dissolved in 1841, the far-flung Alsop merchant houses gave their London banking business to George Peabody & Co, which in turn was succeeded by J. S. [Junius Spencer] Morgan & Co. (Morgan will figure in this study later as the London bankers of Felipe Barreda and his

90 Wetmore, *The Wetmore*, p. 364. The Chaunceys and other Middletown families wove the names of their business partners into their own families. So, Cryder married Mary Wright of Middletown in 1830, and they named their first sons Samuel Wetmore Wright Cryder and William Wetmore Wright Cryder. William Wetmore had married the daughter of his cousin, Samuel Wetmore. William Wetmore named his son George Peabody Wetmore. Henry Chauncey named a son Richard Alsop Chauncey.

91 Ibid., pp. 357-358.
The Peabody/Morgan business evolved into the powerful firm led by the most celebrated financier in U.S. history, John Pierpoint Morgan. Cryder returned to the United States and later associated with Wetmore in the China business.

Although Richard Alsop in Lima did business with different U.S. merchants, he could always count on interest in South American markets by members of his extended family. Henry Chauncey and his brother-in-law, Joseph W. Alsop (son of the man of the same name), did business with the Lima and Valparaiso partnership under the name Alsop & Chauncey in Middletown, but the Connecticut port was in decline after the War of 1812. They moved Alsop & Chauncey to New York City in 1841, shortly after Stanhope Prevost and Edward McCall joined the Lima firm. In the wake of the California Gold Rush, both Alsop and Chauncey were involved in establishing the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, which, as its name implied, was subsidized with a U.S. mail contract. They also had roles in constructing the Panama Railway. Two of Chauncey’s sons succeeded him as “special partners” in the Alsop firm in Lima and Valparaiso. When Joseph Alsop retired from the New York business in 1863, Chauncey took as his partner an Italian-born merchant, Egisto P. Fabbri. Their firm, Fabbri & Chauncey, became the most important New York shipping company for goods sent to and from Peru and Chile, collaborating closely with Junius Morgan by providing him information on the creditworthiness of companies they did business with in South America, such as Bryce, Grace & Co. in Callao.


Richard Alsop died in 1842 without children, and he left his share of the Peru and Chile business to his cousin, Joseph Alsop. According to one account, “This was a fortune of itself, for it was notorious from many years, that Alsop & Co., every five years, made a profit of over a million dollars.”

U.S. special agent Bartow Prevost’s son became the best-known member of the Alsop partnership during the guano era. Samuel Stanhope Prevost was born in New York in 1804 and was thirteen-years-old when his father sailed for Peru. The son became one of the most respected merchants in Lima and served periods as U.S. consul during the guano era. He was a co-founder of the Sociedad de Beneficencia Pública de Lima in 1834, a rare foreign presence in this elite institution. In 1846 Stanhope Prevost helped draft one of the first proposals to build a rail line between Lima and Callao. He died in Lima in 1868, but his sons, who also were Alsop partners, continued in business under their own name after dissolution of the Alsop house and until after the War of the Pacific. Prevost y Cía. is best known in Peruvian history as the commercial house where the future president, Augusto B. Leguía, got his first job in Lima, working there for a modest salary until its bankruptcy in 1886.

The Alsop partnership in Lima and Callao thrived in part because of its specialization in two niche markets, U.S. wheat flour and coarse cottons, competing against Chilean producers for the first and Peru’s small provincial sweatshops (obrajes) for the second. Over half of the U.S. ships calling at Callao during 1825-1826 carried flour as their principal cargoes, according to reports.

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compiled by Stanhope Prevost in his capacity as U.S. vice-consul. The ships carried crews of from ten to twenty men and were in the range of 125 to 400 tons in size. Most sailed for Peru from Baltimore, various New England ports (mainly Salem and Boston), Philadelphia and New York.96

THE BIDDLE AFFAIR

Prevost returned to Lima from Oregon in January 1819. When not trying to mediate conflicts between U.S. ship captains and Spanish authorities, he gathered political intelligence. In a letter to Adams on January 15, 1819, Prevost reported – much too optimistically – that the patriots “are daily expected” under command of José de San Martín and Adm. Thomas Cochrane. “I really do not perceive preparations [by royalists] to resist the force anticipated,” he wrote, adding that, “The consternation [in Lima] is great and the depression beyond description.”97

Meanwhile, the Argentine government dispatched an agent, Manuel Hermenegildo Aguirre, to the United States to purchase two frigates for Chile. While Biddle developed his relationships with the royalists in Lima, the patriots were gradually putting together a respectable navy, partly from capture of Spanish ships and partly from purchases from U.S. and British owners. Now it was Cochrane’s turn to declare a blockade, adding risk to Lima merchants who urgently wanted to transfer their profits out of Peru. Viceroy Pezuela had to rebuild his army after the defeat at Maipú, and both Spanish and Creole merchants in Lima worried that the hard-pressed viceroy would confiscate their

96 Depatches from U.S. consulate at Lima, reports no. 4 (for six months ending December 31, 1825) and no. 5 (for six months ending June 30, 1826).

97 Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence ... Independence, vol. 3, p. 1728.
wealth for the war effort. This was when the captain of the *Ontario* began a side business that patriots believed cast doubt on U.S. claims of neutrality.

The role assumed by Biddle and, later, other U.S. navy captains moving in and out of Callao, apparently for personal profit, was to accept specie for safekeeping on board or for transport out of the war zone. While sailing from Peru back to Valparaiso, Biddle carried $201,000 in private funds, of which only $41,000 was on behalf of John Jacob Astor and two other U.S. merchants. The remainder belonged to Spanish merchants in Lima, and, thus, Chileans might reasonably regard his business as assistance to their enemy. Biddle charged merchants a two-and-one-half percent commission on the funds. Worse, he let Pezuela talk him into transporting a Spanish army officer, the viceroy’s nephew, bound for Spain with an urgent request for naval reinforcements. Biddle knew the risk. As he later reported to the secretary of the navy, “I regretted very much that such a request should be made since I felt reluctant to comply with it lest the government of Chile should complain of it as a breach of impartiality.”

Biddle’s excuse was that he felt an obligation to Pezuela after the viceroy finally released two impounded merchant ships, including the one belonging to Astor.

If the captain hoped he could keep his cargo a secret, it is hard to understand how he then allowed himself to get into a petty but volatile dispute with Cochrane over salutes between their ships. Rumors about Biddle’s cargo preceded him to Chile; and while the senate in Santiago debated whether to use the threat of force to board and inspect the *Ontario*, Cochrane asked Biddle to publicly salute the Chilean flag. Back-and-forth letters escalated tensions as the two headstrong commanders embedded veiled insults and threats in ostensibly

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polite language. U.S. citizens in Chile fretted that Biddle was damaging the local reputation of the United States. In a letter to Adams in March 1819, Prevost explained that he had just arrived in Chile from Lima and regretfully discovered that, “feelings very different from those which prevailed when I left [Santiago] are now indulged towards my Countrymen.” Prevost then tactfully addressed the matter that outraged Chileans. “It appears that one of the passengers introduced by Capt. Biddle into the [Valparaiso] Harbor was an officer of distinction and nephew of the Vice King” and that this gentleman had “abused the confidence of Capt. Biddle by detailing the imperfect state of preparedness for invasion.” Prevost’s restrained language here was typical. In his letters to Adams, the agent was generous toward the U.S. naval commanders who were causing him headaches. However, he was obliged to send official patriot complaints about them to Washington. In a report translated and forwarded by Prevost, the Chilean responsible for foreign affairs made much of Biddle’s partiality toward the Spanish side and his acceptance of the viceroy’s sword.

Biddle’s biggest affront to the Chileans was the manner of his departure for the United States. Either out of pique toward Cochrane or fear that the Chileans might try to forcibly board the Ontario, Biddle loaded supplies quickly and gave notice of his intention to leave Valparaiso. However, Cochrane was readying his own ships for their first foray into colonial-held waters. The Chilean government told Biddle to stay put in order to allow Cochrane’s safe departure from the harbor. When Cochrane positioned his ships too close to the

99 Ibid., pp. 65-68.
100 Prevost to Adams, March 20, 1819, in United States Department of State, “Special Agents,” vol. 6, U.S. National Archives, College Park, Maryland, hereinafter cited as Department of State, “Special Agents,” vol. 6.
Ontario for Biddle’s comfort, the U.S. captain decided to defy the government and get his ship underway on December 31, 1818. The Ontario’s flight was as undignified as it was dangerous to other ships and insulting toward the Chileans. Prevost forwarded to Adams copies of letters exchanged between Biddle and Cochrane, together with the January 23, 1819, issue of the Gazeta Ministerial de Chile, in which the lead article told the story of the flight of the Ontario. ¹⁰¹

Prevost endeavored to repair the damage in Santiago, and his letters to Washington over the next few months mostly dealt with fallout from the Biddle affair and conflicts between authorities and U.S. merchant ships. Chileans acknowledged that, at least personally, Prevost was their friend. On behalf of the government of Supreme Director Bernardo O’Higgins, Chilean foreign minister Joaquín Echevarría Larraín made a formal complaint against Biddle. This action was echoed in pro-patriot newspapers back in the United States, which aired a range of complaints against Biddle, preventing Adams and Monroe from ignoring the issue. U.S. newspapers made much of the captain’s acceptance of the viceroy’s sword, a matter that Henry Clay took up in Congress. John Jacob Astor applauded Biddle, the Spanish legation in Washington came to his defense, and his wealthy brother Nicholas mounted a public relations campaign on his behalf. The navy department absolved him of wrongdoing.

Meanwhile, the Monroe administration decided to establish a permanent U.S. Navy presence in Pacific waters off Peru and Chile. Orders went out to prepare a small frigate, the *Macedonian*, to inaugurate the station. For technical reasons, the U.S. Navy officially dates the Pacific Station from 1821; but, in fact, the decision to post a continuing naval mission to protect U.S. commerce on the Pacific side of the Americas was taken earlier, and the *Macedonian* set sail in 1818. Robert Erwin Johnson explained the semantic distinctions that caused the Navy’s retrospective dating and made a compelling argument for the earlier date in his book, *Thence Round Cape Horn, The Story of United States Naval Forces on Pacific Station, 1818-1923*. The Navy held that a station be manned by a squadron of two or more ships. Since the *Macedonian* served alone, it was not a squadron and, hence, not a station. But, Johnson noted that, “it is stretching the point a bit to dignify two vessels with the title of squadron.” What distinguished a station from, say, the *Ontario*’s earlier voyage, was the mission. The ship on which Prevost sailed had been given two specific assignments, including the Oregon mission on behalf of Astor’s operations, without a decision that it would constitute the beginning of a permanent force and, hence, need to be relieved while the *Ontario* was still in Pacific waters. Beginning with the *Macedonian*, one or more replacement ships were sent to the Pacific before the tour of the predecessor would end. The encounter between incoming and outgoing vessels would take place off Peru or Chile and would be formalized in an onboard ceremony. In the case of the *Macedonian*, its captain did not know that the relieving ship had sailed from the United States until so informed by the crew of a whaleship. A “squadron” implied a concentration of naval forces in preparation for possible use of force. Instead, Johnson explained, the commercial
purposes of the Pacific and other stations that followed called for a dispersion of forces patrolling over wide areas in support of merchant ships.  

Like the Mediterranean Squadron that preceded it, Pacific Station was intended as a largely symbolic force to deter abuses of U.S. commerce. As other stations were established during 1822-1843, only Home Station and Africa Station had other purposes, the first being military defense and the second to suppress the illegal African slave trade.

Table 3.1
Establishment of Naval Stations To Protect U.S. Foreign Commerce
1815-1843

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Station Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>Mediterranean Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>1818</td>
<td>Pacific Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822</td>
<td>West India Station [Caribbean]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>Brazil Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>East India Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>Home Station [North Atlantic]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843</td>
<td>Africa Station</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Johnson, Thence Round, p. 7.

Besides protection for the property of U.S. traders, even a small frigate like the *Macedonian* could perform a myriad of special services for merchant vessels. U.S. warships carried carpenters, sailmakers, blacksmiths, calkers, armorers and surgeons. U.S. naval commanders had the discretion to lend skilled craftsmen to make repairs on merchant ships or even assign them sailors when their crews were too depleted. The third and most important commander of Pacific Station

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during Peru’s independence wars, discussed below, even used his crew to build small vessels, apparently for his own private commercial use.

**REMOVAL OF PREVOST**

Adams favored Biddle over Prevost, caustically commenting in his diary that, “Prevost has never saved a dollar” of U.S. property confiscated in South America. Adams wrote that, “Biddle’s conduct was perhaps indiscreet, and not entirely disinterested.” But he approved Biddle’s objectives, saying that the captain “saved and rescued property to a very large amount” on behalf of U.S. merchants. Then, Adams expressed frustration at the difficulty of managing U.S. policy in South America, which he called a “disheartening” experience. “We have done everything possible in their [the patriots’] favor,” he stated dubiously, “and have received from them little less than injury in return.” Adams complained that the patriots “have been constantly endeavoring to entangle us with them and their cause.” Such angry, private judgment by Adams has clouded historians’ view of Prevost and served those who tend to excuse or minimize the misbehavior of U.S. naval officers. Adams acknowledged in his diary that Monroe did not necessarily share his opinions. The president, he wrote, “judges of him [Prevost] more indulgently than I do.”

Because Biddle’s actions were a partisan issue of debate over the course of some months in the United States after Chile’s foreign minister made his formal complaint through Prevost, there was pressure on the administration to have the navy launch an investigation of the captain. But Monroe and Adams decided to spare Biddle a court-martial. Instead, they sent documents to Prevost and told

him to present them to Chilean leaders so that he could “tend to justify the conduct of Captain Biddle,” which of course went against Prevost’s own understanding of events.\footnote{Adams to Prevost, in Manning, \textit{Diplomatic Correspondence ... Independence}, vol. 1, p. 133.} Due to long delays between the sending of correspondence and the receipt of replies, it was not until December 29, 1820, that Prevost wrote to Joaquín Echevarría to say that, “In justice to Capt. Biddle … upon his return to the United States, he deposited in one of the public offices at Washington, the sword presented to him by the Vice King of Peru.” President Monroe was satisfied, Prevost continued, that in receiving the gift Biddle was not motivated by hostility to Chile.

Meanwhile, abetted by his brother, Biddle worked in Washington to undermine Prevost, if only in the cause of his own defense. In May 1819, Adams sent Prevost a strange letter ordering him to Argentina on a weak pretext. It was the wish of president Monroe, said Adams, that “you should proceed immediately to Buenos Ayres, and there take charge of the public papers left there by the late consul Thomas L. Halsey ….”\footnote{Adams to Prevost, May 3, 1819.} There were no further instructions other than to keep an eye on things in Argentina until he received communications from the department that he would present to Buenos Aires authorities. The United States had numerous consular officials posted on the Atlantic side of South America, so there seemed to be no need to send Prevost around Cape Horn to undertake clerical work. Adams’s letter was carried from Washington as far as Rio by the new U.S. minister to Brazil and his secretary. Surely that team could arrange safe collection of Halsey’s papers much faster
than Prevost. This move to relocate Prevost by the Monroe administration left U.S. relations with Chilean authorities and the Spanish viceroy in Lima entirely in the hands of U.S. naval officers at a critical juncture in the struggle to liberate Peru.

Prevost’s banishment from Peru lasted almost a year. Perhaps it had been an Adams maneuver and not the president’s own doing.

SPANISH INTRIGUE AGAINST PREVOST

Someone sent Washington a letter about Prevost that was purportedly written by San Martín’s aide and representative to the Chilean government,

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106 What else Adams asked Prevost to do in Argentina is unclear. There is reference in the State Department’s copies of letters Adams sent out to consuls and agents during this period that the documents were in disorder, and the next Adams note found among them to Prevost in Buenos Aires was sent a year later.
Tomás Guido, and addressed to Chile’s supreme director, Bernardo O’Higgins. Supposedly, this letter was intercepted by Spanish authorities and then forwarded to John Quincy Adams. Probably it was a fake designed to discredit Prevost. After summarizing the nature of Prevost’s mission, Guido said he decided to check the agent out closely and found him to be “a person of strong democratic principles, a warm friend of our Independence and well disposed to prepare the American Government to adopt a course favorable to the happy conclusion of our Revolution.” Prevost told Adams he thought the document was a Spanish forgery, and Adams seems to have assumed as much, while enjoying the fact that it put Prevost in the hot seat. “[E]ven if it is a forgery, written with the express purpose of injuring Prevost here, it shows too much knowledge of his real conduct, and tallies too well with his own letters ....” The point was, wrote Adams in his diary, “that it extols in the highest terms of commendation that which was in reality gross misconduct ....”

On another occasion, Adams conceded that Prevost had greater ability than any of the other U.S. government political agents appointed to South America, but he judged that Burr’s stepson committed “the common error of making himself a blind partisan, not only to their struggle for independence, but to their internal feuds.” Referring to the complaints of U.S. ship owners and captains running the patriot blockade, Adams said Prevost was “very remiss in

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107 The document is reproduced in Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence ... Independence, v. 1, p. 553.

supporting the rights and interests of his countrymen.” When the Chilean naval forces confiscated U.S. property destined for the royalists, Adams groused that Prevost had won “no satisfaction” from Chile, and that patriot forces “have been constantly endeavoring to entangle us with them and their cause.” Then came his harshest words against the U.S. agent: “Prevost has been one of their dupes, if not worse, and by his correspondence has contributed all in his power to make us dupes also.”

**BACK TO PERU, WITH ADMONISHMENT**

In June 1820, Adams wrote in his diary that, “Prevost is a special favorite of the President’s,” and he indicated that he had to be careful in presenting any facts to Monroe “in a manner which attaches blame to him [Prevost].” A month later, Monroe gave Prevost the opportunity to return to Peru and Chile. The administration appointed a new commissioner to South America, John M. Forbes, and told him he would serve in whichever post Prevost declined, Buenos Aires or the west coast. With the assumption that Prevost would choose the Peru post, Monroe removed an ongoing west coast conflict between Cochrane and a U.S. ship captain and merchant, Eliphalet Smith, from Prevost’s portfolio and instructed Forbes to handle it. No doubt Prevost was relieved to not have

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111 Smith seems to have been the single most active blockade runner among U.S. merchants active during Peru’s war of independence, and his activities deserve a full study, including his
anything more to do with the matter, but the action signaled the kind of domestic
pressure being put on Washington to neutralize, if not remove, Prevost. While
the president, “After the most careful examination of the circumstances,”
defended Smith’s claims, he absolved Prevost of any wrongdoing, although
allowing that the agent suffered from “too much zeal in favor of the Colonies [in
rebellion].” Monroe told Adams to inform Prevost of the criticisms being leveled
against him by some U.S. naval and commercial interests. “It will I think be
proper that he should distinctly understand that his conduct in this affair has
been criticized, as necessary, in delicacy to him, to explain the cause of the
arrangement [assignment of Smith to Forbes].”112 In his instructions to Adams,
Monroe also said he thought the “Guido” memorandum “is not authentic” based
on his own analysis of its contents.113

On July 5, 1820, Adams notified Forbes of his appointment as commercial
agent. Adams worked on his letters of instructions to Prevost and Forbes on July
8, taking care not to reveal his animosity toward the former. But that evening in
his diary Adams vented his annoyance at having to be so tactful. “I found no
small difficulty in preparing the letter to Prevost, whose conduct has, in my
opinion, been very exceptionable,” he wrote, but noting that the agent “is in such

business dealings with U.S. naval captains. Regarding his relationship with viceroy Pezuela, see
Patricia H. Marks, Deconstructing Legitimacy: Viceroyos, Merchants and the Miliatry in Late colonial
Peru (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 2007), pp. 209 and 277; regarding San
Martin’s criticism of Smith, see Billingsley, In Defense, pp. 153-154.

112 Monroe to Adams, June 26, 1820, in Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed., The Writings of James
Monroe, Including a Collection of his Public and …, vol. 6, p. 139.

113 Ibid., p. 140.
high favor with the President.” Adams said that his duty was “to convey to him the President’s sentiments rather than my own,” and that “I am always apprehensive, in alluding to the parts of his conduct which I think improper, of manifesting the displeasure which I feel, and of touching upon them with a hand not sufficiently gentle.”

Adams’ letter to Prevost said that the president left it “entirely at your option” as to which post to take up. The secretary of state seemed to have no doubt that Prevost would return to the west coast, and he frankly told him that there were concerns in the United States over his reputation as an advocate for the independence cause there. In reference to money that Cochrane’s navy took from Eliphalet Smith, Adams wrote Prevost that, “you are doubtless aware that Captain Smith himself has intimated apprehensions that your favorable opinions of the South Americans, might have some bias upon your judgment, unfriendly to the interests of his owners, and that animadversions of a similar character have appeared in the public journals of this country.” So, against his secretary of state’s judgment, Monroe sent Prevost back to Peru, but with a quite specific caution.

Following his original instructions, Prevost might have traveled overland to Chile and Peru in order to better study the continent’s resources. A British merchant acquaintance, Samuel Haigh, wrote that Prevost was dissuaded from doing so by fear of becoming entangled with the montoneros of José Miguel.

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114 Adams, Memoirs, pp. 163-164.

115 Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence ... Independence, vol. 1, p. 135.
Carrera, a Chilean general leading a small army against Buenos Aires unitarios.\textsuperscript{116} Washington’s permission for Prevost to return to the west coast arrived just in time, for the U.S. agent was no longer welcome in Argentina. Perhaps the story is apocryphal, or maybe Prevost embellished it in the retelling. Faced with continual political intrigue and turmoil in Buenos Aires, Prevost said he developed the custom of stepping out on his balcony early each morning and facetiously calling out to the first passerby, ¿Quien manda hoy? Sometimes the person would shrug and answer, ¿Quien sabe? One day, word of his ritual supposedly reached a particularly sensitive governor du jour. Not amused, he proceeded give Prevost the answer to his question by expelling him from the country. Haigh claimed that the U.S. agent was given but four hours to clear out.\textsuperscript{117}

Prevost gave Adams a less colorful explanation of his expulsion from Buenos Aires. There had been a great deal of intrigue around a proposal to establish a monarchy that would constitute, as Prevost put it, “Surrender of their country to France.” Prevost made his opposition widely known and apparently had a hand in leaking some secret documents to the press. Then, one of his letters to Adams about the scheme was published in the United States, and word of that reached Buenos Aires “just before the arrival of Mr. Forbes and

\textsuperscript{116} Samuel Haigh, Sketches of Buenos Ayres, Chile, and Peru (London: Effingham Wilson, 1831), p. 305.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., pp. 304-305.
determined them to order me out of the Province.” When summoned before the new governor of Buenos Aires, Martín Rodriguez, Prevost said that, “I entered into no explanations, but treated the communication with silent contempt,” not wanting to complicate things for his successor, Forbes.118

Haigh’s brig was destined for Valparaiso and, not wishing to pay a transit tax upon her cargo, he forbade the captain to land at the Argentine port. “Shortly after my arrival,” Haigh recalled, “I received a note from my friend Judge Prevost, the minister from the United States, wishing for a passage round Cape Horn … and stating that he was … on board of an American vessel [in the harbor], where he had only a few days before been banished from Buenos Ayres.” Haigh sent a boat for Prevost, and soon the two men had quite an adventurous trip to Chile. While anchored at the south channel of the wide mouth of the Río de la Plata, four of the ship’s best sailors took an unauthorized nighttime shore leave. Suddenly, fierce winds came off the pampas. “That same night, a heavy pampero blew so hard that it became necessary to run out to sea; accordingly all hands, including the judge and myself, having assisted to heave away the anchor, we were soon blown out of he river, and the following day, at noon, were fifty miles from its mouth.” Besides Prevost, his servant, the captain, a cabin boy, a steward, the cook, an English passenger and Haigh, there were only two sailors on board. With the offer of a special bonus, the crew agreed to navigate around the Horn rather than go back for replacements. “[Y]et with this

118 Prevost to Adams, Santiago, January 6, 1821, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence … Independence*, v. 2, p. 1047. Griffin gave a slightly different version, consistent with both Prevost’s and Haigh’s, writing that, when Federalists ousted Unitarios from Buenos Aires, Prevost made
small crew did we perform what is called the most dangerous voyage in the world, the mates volunteering to go aloft and assist in reefing.” Just as the ship was about to “make our westing” and safely enter the Pacific Ocean, a storm drove them back, “and it was twenty-two days before we again came in sight of Diego Ramirez.” Haigh credited the cook, “a man of gigantic stature and strength,” as well as the passengers, with getting the ship through after one of the sailors fell ill. “I was obliged both to pull the ropes and take the helm, for the rest were almost worn out, and indeed Judge Prevost assisted in trimming the vessel for the general safety.”

PREVOST AND DOWNES

Once again Prevost faced the volatile temperament of certain U.S. naval officers on what was now the Pacific Station. Captain John Downes was given the command of the USS Macedonian, probably because he was familiar with the region, having served during the War of 1812 on the Essex expedition. From their Mediterranean experiences in the undeclared war on the Barbary tribute collectors, some U.S. navy men rather enjoyed using force or threat of force. To this was added a subjective factor – U.S. officers’ sense of honor was steeped in the rivalry with their British counterparts, and many captains in the new patriot navy were British.

Besides problems of personality and male ego, the political agent had to cope with the cynical opinion regarding Latin America’s patriots that was developing throughout the ranks of U.S. naval personnel. Latin American independence had a few champions among senior leaders in the navy, especially

his approval apparent. So, when Unitarios regained power, they expelled the U.S. envoy. Griffin, p. 259.
commodore David Porter of *Essex* fame, who had gotten to know Chilean leaders while he pursued British ships in 1812. But more recently, officers spread stories of unpleasant encounters with patriot officials they considered little better than pirates eager to confiscate U.S. property. Among seven lieutenants Downes selected for the Pacific was John Minor Maury, also an *Essex* veteran, Virginian and older brother of Mathew Fontaine Maury, who became the U.S. navy’s most celebrated nineteenth century cartographer and oceanographer (and who defected to the Confederacy during the Civil War). Three decades later the younger Maury would dispatch an historic naval expedition to Peru.

Orders given to Downes were, like those to Biddle, vague as to dealing with the unsettled political realities, instead emphasizing protection “to our Whale Fishery or Merchant Ships in that quarter,” while also being respectful to “all existing authorities,” i.e., on either side of the war. The operative paragraph read:

One of the principal objects of the expedition of [*USS Macendonian*], is to afford to the persons and property of the citizens of the United States protection and security, consistently with the laws of nations, and the respect due to all existing authorities, wherever and whenever such protection may be needed, and can be afforded.119

In supplemental orders, Downes was told to use the *Macedonian* to “produce impressions favorable to the United States,” a political objective harmonious with orders given to Prevost. When problems arose, Downes was ordered to contact Prevost. “In all difficult cases, you will advise and consult with John B. Prevost, Esqr. United States Agent at Lima.”120 However, in light of

120 Billingsley, *In Defense*, pp. 80-81.
the troubles Biddle got into, additional orders specifically precluded Downes from certain activities sure to provoke the patriots, such as transporting passengers who could be regarded as Spanish spies. Unfortunately for Prevost, these admonitions were not as forceful or detailed as they could have been in covering the types of problems Biddle created. Furthermore, coordination with Downes was impeded by the fact that during almost half of the Macedonian’s Pacific service Prevost was at distance in Buenos Aires.

From Norfolk, Virginia, the Macedonian reached Valparaiso in eighty days, arriving on January 28, 1819. Billingsley surmised that the U.S. consul gave Downes an account of Biddle’s conflict with Cochrane, because the Macedonian proceeded to give the Chileans a fifteen-gun salute, even though the patriot fleet was not in port. Downes was initially quite cordial with patriots. Some Chileans and foreigners made their homes available to officers and sailors on shore leave, and Downes reciprocated their courtesies. So many Chilean ladies and members of the foreign colony visited his ship that the captain had his carpenters build a special steps for their boarding comfort. To celebrate Washington’s birthday, Downes and his crew decorated part of the ship’s gun deck with flags, candle-lit lanterns and other ornaments to create a festive ballroom, and they threw a great musical gala and banquet in which much liquor flowed as Americans and Chileans gave rousing toasts to the causes of U.S. and South American independence. Finally, it seemed, the U.S. navy truly honored the patriot project.

Although Cochrane was away, Downes established a friendly relationship with the admiral’s young wife – too friendly in the opinion of one officer aboard

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121 Johnson, Thence Round, p. 20.
the Macedonian who kept a diary. The U.S. consul in Valparaiso, Henry Hill, described Lady Katherine Cochrane as "young, genial, a bold rider, fond of picnics, parties, music and dancing."122 Downes assigned a painter and a half-dozen carpenters to work on her residence. As Billingsley put it, "some of the ship’s company thought their commander was seeing entirely too much of her ladyship."123 But, Prevost was impressed with the captain’s socializing, later writing to Adams that, by “associating with the members of the [Chilean] government,” Downes had “sensibly diminished their jealousies.”124 The captain even accepted a Chilean request that he not stop at Callao on his northward journey out of respect for the patriot blockade that Cochrane established after a failed attack on the port.

However, the harmony was not to last. In Washington’s view, a blockade of a port or coastal stretch should be honored by U.S. merchantmen only if the blockader’s ships were present to enforce it. Prevost thought the United States should consider Cochrane’s blockade in the context of Spain’s weakening hold on Peru. “The Changes brought about in one short twelve months are almost incredible,” Prevost wrote Adams. “At this period all is confidence, the patriot Flag waves triumphantly on the ocean and upwards of forty large vessels at Valparaiso proclaim its success.”125

122 Henry Hill, Recollections of an Octogenarian (Boston: D. Lothrop and Co., 1884), p. 139. Hill had gone to Chile as supercargo for Baltimore merchants on the ship Savage, carrying goods consigned for sale to the Chilean government, including arms.

123 Billingsley, In Defense, pp. 82-84.

124 Ibid., p. 92.

125 Ibid., p. 96.
The wording of Prevost’s report to Washington suggested that he believed the patriots were giving proper effect to their declared blockade. Downes, by contrast, felt Cochrane was unjustifiably seizing U.S. merchantmen trading with the Peruvian royalists. Cochrane evaded the objections of the captain of the *Macedonian* by promptly taking seized ships and their captains before a Chilean court. “Our vessels are suffering on the coast of Peru by the depredations of Lord Cochrane,” Downes wrote the secretary of the navy, adding that Cochrane’s pretension to blockade more than a thousand miles of coast was “ridiculous.” But Prevost cautioned him that, once an accused ship captain was taken to court, the confiscation was a matter to be settled between governments and not by the U.S. navy. “If I were present,” Downes continued, “I would not allow him to take possession of an American vessel under any circumstances, but if he takes or sends a vessel to Valparaiso during my absence, and it is regularly condemned there I conceive the affair is to be decided between the Governments and that I have nothing to do in such a case.”\(^{126}\) Although Downes recognized this restriction on his scope of action, he was not happy about it.

Prevost might have kept Downes out of trouble with the patriots were it not for the captain’s temper and the lucrative temptation to transport specie on behalf of colonial merchants in Lima. Because of the messes Biddle had got into, the navy ordered Downes to “decline taking on board for either [waring] party, either Men, Money, provisions or Supplies to be carried from such party to any other Port or Country whatsoever ....” However, the instructions to Downes made an exception for “Specie which you have permission to bring to the

\(^{126}\) Ibid., pp. 97-98.
U.S.”¹²⁷ By combing through reports by Downes and his clerk, Billingsley estimated that, during two years of patrolling off Peru, Downes took on board almost two million dollars in specie from Spanish colonial, British and U.S. merchants, most not destined for the United States. That majority portion Downes carried in clear violation of his orders. Indeed, about half of all specie carried on the Macedonian Downes later delivered to commercial agents, including those representing royalist traders, at Rio de Janeiro.¹²⁸ The spiriting of Spanish funds out of the war zone was hardly a “neutral” action, and Prevost later told Downes that it was wrong for the captain to accept compensation for such service.¹²⁹

**Dueling with Cochrane and Prevost**

U.S. consul Henry Hill, who developed a close friendship with John Downes that lasted decades, characterized the Macedonian’s captain as having contradictory impulses of “lion and lamb at the same moment.” He could be kind and gentle, “but impulsive and passionate,” quick to get angry.¹³⁰ And, so, once again, a U.S. commander got into a contest for male honor with Lord Cochrane. It began in Valparaiso when Downes complained to Chilean authorities that they treated British warships with more deference than his own. In presenting his complaint, Downes gratuitously tossed in the comment that,

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¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 99.

¹²⁸ Billingsley, *In Defense*, gave the details of his research on these funds in endnote 81 of chapter 5, p. 227.


“experience proves to me how little this government is disposed to reciprocate civilities.” The Chileans made formal complaint to Prevost that Downes used offensive language.

Meanwhile, now that Cochrane’s ships dominated west coast waters, José de San Martín prepared an army for invasion of Peru by sea. Although his troops and officers were still largely Chilean and Argentine, in May 1820, before Prevost learned he would return to Peru, San Martín assumed the title of commander of a force to be called the Ejército Libertador del Perú. Rumors reached Downes that Cochrane had bragged that he would prevent any ship, including the *USS Macedonian*, from entering Callao. Downes immediately began preparations to fight his way to the Peruvian capital, and he confided to consul Hill that he was contemplating attacking Cochrane’s flagship, the *O’Higgins*. “If Cochrane attempts to stop me I shall pour a broadside into him, aiming all my guns to one point, hoping to sink him at once.” Downes sought battle out of anger. When the *Macedonian* arrived off Callao, the two commanders engaged their ships in some tense posturing before Cochrane wished Downes and his crew a pleasant arrival at the Peruvian port.

As he had done with Biddle, Viceroy Pezuela charmed Downes and his officers, whose sympathies for the patriots waned. The viceroy relied on neutral traders to supply Lima. Eliphalet Smith’s *Canton* and another U.S. merchant ship that had been seized by the viceroy during the earlier royal blockade were now freely transporting food and other supplies from Peru’s northern provinces. Together with the merchant brig *Macendonian* (not to be confused with the naval


132 Hill, *Recollections*, p. 142. Hill also described a later incident in which Downes seemed eager to offend Cochrane in Valparaiso, and Hill had to talk sense into him. See pp. 143-145.
frigate) and the schooner Amanda, a small armada of U.S. merchants and ship captains were, in effect, helping the viceroy prepare Peru’s defenses and keep communication lines to Spain open through Panama. Some of the ships brought in contraband arms and munitions. Contrary to orders, Downes allowed passengers on the USS Macedonian who had secret missions for the viceroy, although Billingsley charitably thought the captain may have been unaware of their roles. The viceroy asked Downes not to help Spanish or foreign merchants smuggle un-taxed specie out of Lima, but they reached an agreement for the Macedonian to carry regulated specie, including a large amount on behalf of the merchant brig Macedonian destined for Panama.

By the time Downes returned to Valparaiso in June 1820, the patriots were making final preparations for Cochrane’s ships to convoy San Martín’s army to Peru. Downes decided that his role would be to evacuate U.S. merchant ships from Callao before they would be caught in crossfire. He worked out an agreement with Chile whereby he would remain behind Cochrane’s convoy, but once the army was disembarked in Peru he would be free to enter Callao and carry out the evacuation. When Cochrane’s army transporting ships delayed at Pisco, the Macedonian proceeded ahead and was again cordially received by the viceroy.

The U.S. navy frigate was of modest size at 1,325 tons, but Downes had a crew of about 360 officers and sailors, more than enough hands to accomplish his mission. But, instead of bringing out the six U.S. merchant ships when he had the opportunity, Downes stayed in port and wound up just maneuvering those vessels and his own from one part of the harbor to another when they appeared to be in an anticipated line of fire. In this he was not too successful. On October 29, Cochrane anchored his forces off Callao. A week later, the admiral personally
led commandos in a nighttime raid on the Spanish ship *Esmeralda*, which, once unmoored, drifted near the *USS Macedonian*. From shore it appeared to royalists that the U.S. navy’s ship had collaborated with Cochrane’s attack, and the next day an angry mob swarmed the *Macedonian’s* tender sent on its regular trip to buy food ashore, killing two U.S. sailors. Six others were taken to a hospital, looters began to board merchant ships, and several foreigners in Lima were murdered. Downes was in the city when the riots began and took refuge in the viceroy’s residence. By not following the plan he made with the Chileans, Downes put U.S. ships and citizens in jeopardy, resulting in loss of life and property.

Two days later, apparently believing that a U.S. schooner was ferrying patriots for an attack, Spanish ships opened fire, drove off the captain and crew and then plundered the merchantman. After much recrimination, Downes and Pezuela agreed that the U.S. captain would submit a report to Washington and let their respective governments work out a settlement of the damages suffered. It was a simple, almost cordial resolution under international law that Downes and other U.S. naval commanders were loath to extend to patriot forces. Finally, on November 21, the *Macedonian* escorted the U.S. ships out of Callao and through the patriot blockade.

At Paita, Downes encountered a whaleship recently come around Cape Horn and learned that the *USS Constellation* was en route to relieve the *Macedonian*. But, Downes was not through getting the United States into trouble. Sailing south toward Chile, the *Macedonian* stopped at Huacho to take on water, only four miles from San Martín’s headquarters at Huara. There the patriots had detained four U.S. merchantmen accused of violating their blockade. Downes

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decided to take a complaint on behalf of one of them, the *Louisa*, directly to San Martín. The general said naval matters were not his responsibility, but agreed to order the *Louisa* sent to Valparaiso within eight days or ask the patriot navy to release the ship. When Downes returned to the *Macedonian* and San Martín’s promised letter arrived at Huacho, he was upset that the general’s wording made reference to a condition for release of the *Louisa*. Meanwhile, San Martín left Huara to take the field with his army. Downes wrote back implying that he would free the *Louisa* by force, if necessary, unless the offending language was changed or clarified to his satisfaction. Perhaps it was fortunate that San Martín was gone and unable to read the threatening tone of Downes. Getting no reply, Downes defied the Chilean forces and took the *Louisa* to sea, mindful of the consequences. In a letter to O’Higgins, the supreme director of Chile, Downes conceded that he had no way of knowing whether or not the patriot detention of the merchant ship was legal. “But your Excellency will readily perceive the enormity of the outrage in detaining a neutral vessel upwards of a month without sending her in for adjudication,” he wrote, adding that Cochrane’s behavior was “pernicious.” In a separate letter to Prevost, he facetiously said that he had “flattered myself that I should escape from this Country, without getting into difficulty with the Chilean Government ….”

The contrast between Downes’ conciliation of viceroy Pezuela and his deliberate provocation of the patriots left no doubt regarding which way the U.S. navy was leaning in the independence war. Like Biddle, Downes left a mess for Prevost to clean up, and he acknowledged that, “It is perhaps a fortunate circumstance for [me] that I am about to leave the Coast, for I feel satisfied that I should get into some difficulty with His Lordship [Cochrane], if I were to remain
Given the male ego on display, one wonders if Downes’ parting shots at the patriots might not be partially traceable back to his much-observed flirtations with Cochrane’s wife.

At Valparaiso in early March 1821, while Downes was transferring command of Pacific Station to just-arrived captain Charles Goodwin Ridgely of the *USS Constellation*, he claimed that a merchant told him that Prevost had described his conduct as “disgraceful,” so he fired off an angry letter to the political agent, who was then in Santiago. Billingsley judged the intent of Downes’ language as bordering on inviting Prevost to a duel, which Prevost ignored.135 Ridgely and the *Constellation* reached Valparaiso on February 6, 1821.

Downes and his friend, Henry Hill, supplied Ridgely with lots of derogatory stories regarding the Chilean government and Cochrane’s policies, so it was not surprising that Ridgely quickly adopted some of their views.136 But, he managed to be more prudent and keep out of a major row. In fact, the U.S. navy secretary had asked him to avoid harming relations with the patriots.137 Ridgely and Prevost had disagreements regarding U.S. merchants’ use and abuse of neutral rights, but they also found opportunities to consult and cooperate. Ridgely’s command of Pacific Station was relatively short but eventful. Among the highlights were Spanish use of the U.S. merchantman *General Brown* while it was under the protection of Ridgely’s *USS Constellation*, including a successful

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135 Ibid., p. 119.
136 Ibid., p. 127.
137 Griffin, p. 264.
scheme to spirit deposed viceroy Pezuela and his family away from Peru at a time when the Chilean navy was giving full effect to its blockade of Callao. Billingsley suggested that probably Ridgely knew of the plan but was careful to have official deniability.\footnote{Billingsley, \textit{In Defense}, p. 134.} Another naval historian, David Foster Long, said Ridgely “appears to have connived” with the captain of \textit{General Browne} in the Pezuela affair.\footnote{David F. Long, \textit{Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798-1883} (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1988), p. 81. Long used a quote from Billingsley’s book to contrast a whaleship captain’s positive assessment of Ridgely with a derogatory reference to Prevost, and Billingsley may or may not have intended the same. It is by no means clear that the captain was thinking of Prevost when he hoped that the U.S. would appoint no more \textit{consuls} who were “Frothy Mercantile speculators.” Prevost was neither a consul nor a merchant. Perhaps the captain was thinking of actual U.S. consuls he encountered in South America.} If so, he violated his orders and solemn agreements he made with patriot leaders, including San Martín.
Table 3.2
First U.S. Warships in the Pacific
Before, During and Immediately After the Wars For Independence, 1812-1929

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Dates (departure – return)</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Tons</th>
<th>Estimated Annual Cost*</th>
<th>Approximate Number of Men**</th>
<th>Guns*** (#/pounds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>January 1813 – lost to British off Valparaiso 3/28/1814</td>
<td>Small Frigate</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>26/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>October 4, 1817 – April 23, 1819</td>
<td>Sloop-of-war</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>18/32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonian</td>
<td>October 4, 1818 – June 19, 1821</td>
<td>Small Frigate</td>
<td>1,325</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>28/long 18 16/32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constellation</td>
<td>July 25, 1820 for approx. two years</td>
<td>Small Frigate</td>
<td>1,278</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>28/18 10/24 car.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin</td>
<td>October 11, 1821 – August 29, 1824</td>
<td>Ship-of-the-line</td>
<td>2,243</td>
<td>162,000</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>63/long/32med 24/32 car.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolphin</td>
<td>December 8, 1821 to accompany Franklin and remained in Pacific, receiving relief crews until sold in 1835</td>
<td>Schooner</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10/12 car 2/long 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacock</td>
<td>March 1824 – about September 1827</td>
<td>Sloop-of-war</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>2/12 20/22 car.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandywine</td>
<td>September 3, 1826 – October 8, 1829</td>
<td>Large Frigate</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>108,000</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>33/long 24 20/42 car.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincennes</td>
<td>September 3, 1826 – June 3, 1827 to circumnavigate globe</td>
<td>Sloop-of-war</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2/long 24 18/32 car.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimated annual maintenance cost extrapolated from Johnson, p. 14 (average for a ship of its class in 1825) and number of men in crew, and did not include pay and rations of commissioned and warrant (specialist) officers.

** The size of crews varied as men were added or lost to disease, accident and desertion.

*** Abbreviation car. = carronades. For most ships, data on armaments vary from source to source.

Mysterious U.S. Revolutionary Spy

It is unfortunate that Prevost left no record concerning a fellow North American in Peru that he almost certainly knew. The South American wars of independence drew some idealistic private U.S. citizens to the cause, and one of the more mysterious was a man known as Pablo Jeremías, perhaps a nom de guerre; or, if Ricardo Palma was correct, those were two separate names by which he introduced himself. This Yankee was said to work in Peru as a spy for Bernardo O’Higgins, and he moved about the Peruvian highlands, claiming to be a doctor. Palma romanticized his story in one of his tradiciones, “El Médico Inglés,” by calling him a “prophet” and comparing his political evangelizing to the preaching of Jesus among the Jews. “I’m Pablo,” Palma quoted him as often saying, “and I’ll always be on the side of the oppressed fighting their oppressors.” Or, at other times, “I’m Jeremías, and I praise goodness and human freedom, just as I deplore evil and tyranny.”

Palma said this blond, medium-sized man, who walked with a cane and wore a cape, first came to the attention of the Spaniards in 1919, and they ordered the arrest of “the English doctor.” He became viceroy Pezuela’s “nightmare,” the folklorist and satirist wrote, saying that rumors in Lima included the notion that the mystery man was San Martín himself doing

140 It seems likely that the North American chose the name Jeremiah to reflect his self-conception as a political prophet facing great hostility, in the tradition of the Jewish prophet who is also honored by Muslims and Christians.

reconnaissance. Whenever Spanish authorities thought they had found him in Cajatambo or Huaylas, he made his escape just a couple of hours ahead of them.

Later, in 1822, after San Martín’s forces occupied Lima, the norteamericano was said to have joined up with the most liberal, anti-monarchical and “democratic” Peruvians, led by Francisco Javier Mariátegui, who seems to have been Palma’s primary source. After appearance of Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán’s Historia del Perú independiente, primer periodo, in 1869 Mariátegui published his own “corrections” to the historian’s work, Anotaciones a la Historia del Perú independiente de don Mariano F. Paz-Soldán, in which he gave his version of the story of the “good American.” Mariátegui called Jeremías a tireless “apostle of democracy,” not just an independence activist.

After San Martín resigned, one of his closest associates, the leader of the most conservative and monarchical patriot faction, Tucumán-born Bernardo Monteagudo, had Pablo Jeremías assassinated on Lima’s Santa Ana plazuela, “without due process, trial, witnesses or a competent judge,” wrote Mariátegui, who added that “not even a little death notice was published in the Gaceta.” According to the liberal Peruvian leader, Monteagudo wanted to silence any public discussion of his elimination “of a man who used every means to oppose the favorite idea of the [San Martín/Monteagudo] government: to establish a monarchy,” and Mariátegui explicitly implicated San Martín in the

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142 Lima: Imp. de “El Nacional,” 1869, pp. 11-12. The adjective “good” is probably Mariátegui’s manner of distinguishing Jeremías from other North Americans, who were seen as mostly untrustworthy in the eyes of Peruvian elites during the mid-nineteenth century. In the case of Jeremías, the “correction” that Mariátegui was making to Paz Soldán’s Historia was that the latter had stated that the Yankee had been sent to Peru from Argentina by San Martín. Mariátegui wished to clarify that Jeremías and another agent “did not come from Buenos Aires; they embarked [for Peru] from the ports of Chile.” The distinction Mariátegui made was political.
This act apparently fueled the hatred many Peruvians had for Monteagudo, who was himself murdered with a dagger in Lima in 1825 on calle Belén (at what is today a corner of the main plaza devoted to the memory of San Martín), without the act ever being definitively proved political. Was Pablo Jeremías or some other of Monteagudo’s victims avenged? Many people were suspected of being the intellectual author of his death. According to one account, “When they learned of Monteagudo’s assassination, all of his enemies trembled.”

Prevost also may have been close to Mariátegui, but further research is needed on his relationships with key Peruvians, such as José de la Riva-Agüero and José Bernardo de Tagle. Prevost had high expectations for the latter two, but then became disillusioned with their leadership. Riva-Agüero feeted Prevost at a banquet in Lima in March 1823. But, judging by how rarely the U.S. agent is mentioned in Peruvian literature, he seems to have kept a low profile.

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144 Monteagudo is a major figure in Argentine independence historiography, and the mystery of his murder has occupied a great deal of attention. In Peru he is a controversial politician for those trying to make sense of the independence period. Most sources state that he had many enemies and that two black men who were arrested, tortured, put on trial and convicted were the actual murderers of Jeremías, but that they were paid to do the crime by someone else. Mariátegui insisted that San Martín and Monteagudo had been well received by Peruvians, but that the proclamation of a dictatoriship had soured people on them, and finally the assassination of Jeremías and another man had made Monteagudo odiosísimo. Mariátegui, *Anotaciones*, p. 128.


146 The only mention of Prevost in Juan Miguel Bákula’s two-volume history of Peruvian diplomacy is the “banquete de cien cubiertos al agente diplomático de los Estados Unidos,” for which he cited *La gaceta del gobierno*, no. 20 (March 8, 1823). See Bákula, *Peru: Entre la realidad y la utopía, 180 años de política exterior* (Lima: Fondo de Cultura Económica del Perú and Fundación Academia Diplomática del Perú, 2002), v. 1, p. 69.
The lucrative U.S. wartime trade in South America lasted until Spain was finally defeated in Peru at the end of 1824. An idea of the extent and profitability of this high-risk commerce was suggested by the fact that U.S. diplomats subsequently pressed twenty-six different claims on Peru, totaling 421,432 dollars, for seizures and damages allegedly suffered by U.S. merchants and shippers during the revolutionary wars.\textsuperscript{147} U.S. merchants and ship captains complained that Bartow Prevost was too involved in support for the patriots to be their effective advocate. As soon as Peru’s independence was definitively secured at the Battle of Ayacucho, William Tudor became the first in a succession of U.S. officials to doggedly press claims of U.S. citizens on the new nation. Meanwhile, his brother-in-law preceded him to the west coast of South America. Prevost would hope that the messes caused by Biddle and Downes would temper the behavior of the next Pacific Station commander. Instead, Charles Stewart repeated just about every questionable behavior of his predecessors.

Stewart’s career closely tracked the early history of the U.S. navy. First apprenticed at age twelve as a cabin boy in the West Indies trade, he was commissioned as a nineteen-year-old lieutenant in 1798, the same year congress established the navy department. Like Biddle, Stewart served in the Mediterranean campaign against the Barbary States and, later, in naval engagements against the British in the War of 1812. Stewart was lionized in early 1815 when he commanded the \textit{USS Constitution} and successfully engaged two British ships simultaneously in waters off the Iberian Peninsula. The battle took place just days after U.S. ratification of the Treaty of Ghent.

\textsuperscript{147} Nolan, \textit{Diplomatic}, p. 117.
Perhaps by coincidence, perhaps not, Tudor and his brother-in-law both received their Pacific appointments in 1821. Stewart was the first naval officer of commodore rank to command Pacific Station, and he and his family spent three years on his flagship, the USS Franklin, which, at 2,243 tons displacement, was the largest warship the United States had sent to Peru. As a squadron commander and commodore, Stewart would not have been required to captain the Franklin; but he chose to do so in order to have more space on board for Delia and their two young children. The ship was rated a 74-gun ship-of-the line, but Stewart had an additional eight guns fitted. He directed carpenters to make extensive accommodations for his wife, her maids and ample personal belongings, and he installed a 1,500-volume library, said to be the first ever placed on a U.S. naval vessel. Stewart’s librarian was midshipman Charles Wilkes, who later became an important U.S. naval commander and leader of an historic Pacific expedition. In his autobiography, Wilkes said that, “It is believed that the Commodore did not make any application to the Department for the privilege of taking his wife and children, but her influence and charms carried everything before it and it was thought that her presence and influence with the society of the countries on the Pacific would have a beneficial effect.” But, in fact, the secretary of the navy did give Stewart permission to take his family. The Franklin carried 74,000 gallons of water and provisions for six months. For resupply abroad, selected U.S. merchants at Pacific destinations held appointments as naval procurement agents. The U.S. naval agent at Lima was


149 Billingsley, In Defense, p. 150, citing a letter to Stewart on June 9, 1821.
Philadelphia merchant Edward McCall, who was, then or later, in business with Prevost’s son, Stanhope. Stewart ordered that six horses and a small wagon be stored on the *Franklin*’s deck for shore travel in Peru and elsewhere. Whereas previous U.S. ships in the Pacific had averaged about 335 men on board, the *Franklin* was built to carry up to almost 800 officers and sailors, and its annual cost to the U.S. navy was about $162,000 (see Table 3.2).

Delia Tudor Stewart made the most of her relatively luxurious quarters, and the ship’s officers and sailors soon dubbed her *La Comadora*, as befit her viceregal demeanor. Later, facing a court-martial for his actions during Peru’s war for independence, Stewart bitterly remarked that the charges against him were “offences of which she [his wife] was really guilty.”

Stewart was already somewhat familiar with South America from his days in the merchant marine, and in New York he discussed his voyage with the captains of several merchant ships that were preparing to leave for Peru, offering to convoy them on the west coast. One was the same Eliphalet Smith whom patriots regarded as the main U.S. commercial ally of the Spaniards in Peru. Smith and Stewart became so close in South America that some thought they were business partners, something both men later denied under oath.

The *Franklin* left New York harbor on October 7, 1821, with a crew of about 735, including 56 Marines and a large compliment of officers. Some of the forty-three midshipmen and lieutenants were on the *Franklin* more for training than practical need. To fill out the newest version of the Pacific squadron, the *Franklin* was accompanied by a twelve-gun schooner, *USS Dolphin*. Both ships sailed by the Cape Verde Islands and reached Rio on November 30. By the

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150 Ibid, p. 182.
second week of January 1822, they had rounded Cape Horn and headed to the Juan Fernandez Islands of Robinson Crusoe fame. There the squadron encountered the storied and controversial Philadelphia merchant ship, Canton, which had pioneered U.S. trade with Asia forty years earlier. On board the Canton was Eliphalet Smith, the same U.S. merchant much in conflict with the patriots and now allegedly Stewart’s business partner. At Stewart’s subsequent court-martial it was revealed that the Canton carried contraband destined to breach the patriot’s blockade of Peru, and Stewart was accused of providing the private ship with carpenters, musket cartridges, canvas, wine and other supplies converted into contraband. The Franklin and Dolphin reached Valparaiso on February 6, 1822, a fast sixty days from New York. Although William Tudor had been appointed consul in Lima the previous August, he did not travel with his sister and brother-in-law, reaching the west coast only toward the end of Stewart’s Pacific tour. In March, Downes and his USS Constellation met the Franklin and officially handed over Pacific Station to Stewart’s squadron.

Despite fighting two anti-colonial wars against the British over the past two generations, U.S. officers on this tour were divided in their opinions about the patriot cause. According to midshipman Wilkes, there were two well-defined factions on board the Franklin, and the politics of South American independence “caused a great deal of Animosity” between them. Stewart

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151 While Daniel Defoe formally set his novel in the West Indies, he based it on the story of a shipwrecked English sailor who survived for more than four years on the largest of the three Juan Fernandez islands, Más a Tierra. (Shakespeare had earlier set The Tempest in the Caribbean, but inspired by a different castaway incident.) The Chilean government later renamed the island “Robinson Crusoe” to honor not the actual sailor but Defoe’s fictional character.

152 Billingsley, In Defense, p. 185.

153 Ibid., p. 160.
began freeing U.S. merchant ships from patriot detention and escorting them in their commerce with royalist buyers.

Stewart and Prevost missed contact with each other, both in Valparaiso and Lima, and they later exchanged a series of letters, each written with more evident distaste than the previous. Stewart complained with urgency about vast numbers of patriot “depredations” committed on U.S. merchantmen, and Prevost thought he was exaggerating and warned him not to become aggressive with patriot authorities. “I have no information, sir, touching the seizure of vessels and property belonging to the citizens of the United States, other than such as have hitherto been the subject of discussion,” Prevost wrote Stewart. Mindful of the problems his predecessors had caused, the agent told the commodore that, “I know of no grievances, either here [writing from St. Jago, Chile] or in Peru, in which your interference can avail.” If, however, Stewart was correct that some new issues had arisen, Prevost stated forcefully that, “I do not hesitate to advise a total silence on your part.” Leave these matters to negotiations between U.S. and South American diplomats once relations between the respective governments are established, Prevost said, hoping that by his candid reply, “I have not awakened an unkind feeling.” But, Stewart did take offence, saying that the U.S. government went to great expense in sending a larger naval force to the west coast for protection of U.S. commerce precisely because “these [South American] governments and the officers under their authority” had “exhibited so much avidity in depredating on our commerce, imprisoning our citizens,” and so on. The United States, he said, would not “abandon either their rights or their commerce in the sea.” Those were his instructions, and he had received no indication that U.S. policy had changed in
anticipation of diplomatic relations between the United States and Peru or Chile.\textsuperscript{154}

Stewart suggested it was Prevost’s fault that the two had not rendezvoused as planned when he assumed command of Pacific Station. Prevost doubted that Stewart had ever desired to make himself accountable to the political agent’s guidance, as specified in Stewart’s instructions. The missed meeting was an excuse, since Stewart could have consulted by other means.

“Had it pleased you upon your arrival at Valparaiso to have made the communication I yesterday had the honor to receive,” Prevost wrote Stewart on January 5, 1823, “it would have enabled me, either in person or by letter, to have exhibited for your information a view of the progress of the revolution, and the nature of our commerce, and of the jealousies excited by those preceding you in command.” Prevost said that, if Stewart had properly understood the patriot blockade, “you might then, sir, upon consideration, probably have thought proper to decline the protection afforded to the Pearl and other merchantmen” at Arica. The United States had not yet extended Peru recognition. But, Prevost advised Stewart that he should understand that “the independence of these people is an act performed,” that foreigners (Prevost said “the world”) must accept that “responsibility is incurred” when Peru is now “placed among the nations of the earth.” Prevost said that as regards U.S. interests in the region, Stewart must take into consideration that “the peace of our country is involved in the early conclusion of the struggle” and that “it is important to cultivate [South] American feelings, to cherish a national character, and to foster

\textsuperscript{154} Prevost to Stewart, January 5, 1823, and Stewart to Prevost, January 19, 1823, in \textit{American State Papers ... 1824-1827 ... Naval Affairs}, vol. 2 (Washington, Gales & Seaton, 1860), pp. 562-563. The correspondence between the two men, consisting of exchange of six letters (pp. 562-565) was published as part of the administration’s report to Congress on Stewart’s courts-marshal.
sentiments of good will.” Adams would have supported Stewart on the matter of the blockade as a technical matter of international law, but he and Monroe also expected Prevost to weigh other factors and help guide Stewart. Instead, like his predecessors, Stewart wanted to exercise naval power to shield U.S. merchants from patriot efforts to establish their legitimacy and defend their interests. The difference between Biddle and Downs, on the one hand, and Stewart, on the other, was that tide of the conflict had clearly turned in favor of independence.

In April 1824, the Franklin was officially relieved of Pacific Station duty by arrival at Valparaiso of the USS United States, under command of Captain Isaac Hull. After the Franklin sailed for home, and once Peru’s independence was decisively secured, the government in Lima filed a formal complaint against Stewart that Prevost forwarded to U.S. authorities. Some U.S. merchants also sent grievances to Washington against the captain, including the accusation that Stewart had refused to return $60,000 given to the Franklin for safekeeping by the captain of the merchant brig Cora. The financial burden on Stewart of his wife’s extravagances was known among fellow naval officers, adding weight to questions about his business dealings in the Pacific. From the standpoint of the Monroe administration, the most troubling aspect of Stewart’s behavior was his evident partiality for the royalists that placed a cloud over the right that the

155 Ibid., p. 562.

156 Adams had set an almost impossible test for the legitimacy of the patriot blockade. If they could not enforce their blockade at all ports up and down the coast, then U.S. policy seemed to be that the blockade was illegitimate even at those ports where its forces could enforce it. Adams said that Prevost had made this U.S. position on “paper blockades” clear to Cochrane in mid-1919, and that the admiral seemed to accept that “all claim of forfeiture for any infraction [was] disavowed.” Adams acknowledged that Cochrane’s “disavowal was but partially satisfactory.” (Adams to Forbes, July 6, 1820.) Stewart later cited this letter in his own defense. But the military and political situation was much different in 1822 than it had been in 1919.
United States claimed for using military force in defense of its commercial rights. As the *Franklin* reached the United States to deliver Stewart for trial, one of its scientifically minded midshipmen prepared to pass along some seed samples he had collected in Peru to John S. Skinner, founder and editor of the influential journal, *American Farmer*. And, more importantly, he handed Skinner a significant sample of guano to be distributed for trial among U.S. farmers (chapter fourteen).

**THE ALSOP LETTER**

Although couched in his usual generous language, Prevost’s reports about Stewart were unfavorable, and he forwarded a declaration by a U.S. citizen that described how the commodore handled money. Although Adams was contemptuous of Prevost and discounted his opinions, he was now the president-elect and probably preferred to have the matter discussed in Monroe’s cabinet rather than wait for it to come before his own. The U.S. navy suspended Stewart pending court-marshal.

While Prevost was reserved in how he communicated with Washington regarding the conduct of U.S. naval officers, something of his true feelings can perhaps be glimpsed from a letter that Richard Alsop wrote to Henry Clay from Lima on September 1, 1823, to denounce Stewart. Although Alsop did not know Clay personally, the Kentucky congressman was in his third term as speaker of the House of Representatives, had distinguished himself as the leading U.S. politician voicing support for the patriot cause, and soon would be tapped by John Quincy Adams to succeed himself as secretary of state. In case Clay wanted to check his references, Alsop mentioned that he was currently partnered with Philadelphia merchants Manuel Eyre and Charles Massey in the merchant ship
Kensington, presently trading with Peru and Chile. Alsop was careful not to suggest that he was writing on behalf of Prevost, saying that certain information about the agent’s problematic relationship with Adams were facts that “have come accidentally to my knowledge.” Alsop said that Stewart and other U.S. naval commanders had engendered “prejudice and ill will” in the people of Peru and Chile toward U.S. citizens doing business there. Stewart, in particular, “has, apparently, manifested a malignant hostility to the cause of Patriotism on the shores of the Pacific.” It was galling, Alsop lamented, that Peruvians drew unfavorable comparisons between the actions of British and U.S. naval officers on the west coast. After all, his nation was “the parent and advocate of colonial independence and liberty,” while England was “the mere Pander of her own monopolists and manufacturers.”

Alsop advised Clay that, at the author’s direction, he was enclosing a copy of a report on Stewart’s activities written by Platt H. Crosby, the translator of letters to Clay about South America by Vicente Pazos that were published as a book in New York in 1819. Evidence suggests this was the same document Prevost had forwarded to Adams. Crosby, said Alsop, detailed “a history, of facts, to rouse the indignant spirit of every honest man, and mantle his cheeks with burning blushes of shame at his country’s dishonour,” namely the actions of the officers of the Franklin and Dolphin, “and which Mr. Crosby pledges himself to substantiate, if ever called upon so to do.”

157 Alsop’s letter is found in James F. Hopkins, ed., The Papers of Henry Clay, vol. 3 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1963), pp. 481-484. This book does not, however, contain the attachment of Crosby’s letter that Alsop forwarded and discussed, nor have I yet located the copy that Prevost sent Adams.

158 According to the editor of Clay’s papers, Platt H. Crosby, who had written up an account of Stewart’s actions that Prevost sent to Adams and Alsop sent to Clay, later said he regretted that that his memorandum was sent to Washington, and he claimed that Prevost had embellished it.
Clay, “jeopardizes our commercial relations” and “is completely subversive of
the righteous principles we are taught to venerate, and painfully degrading to
our Naval establishment.” Alsop begged that Clay use his “superior
intelligence” to bring the truth to public light so as to “wipe out this foul blot” on
the reputation of the United States. In vehement conclusion, Alsop utilized an
anti-Semitic slur to characterize Stewart’s “inordinate lust of gain,” which would
“profane the fair Temple of our holy Liberty, convert our national Ships into
huxters’ shops, and our high minded chivalric officers into Jew Brokers.”

U.S. naval historians have tended to favor Biddle, Downes and Stewart
over Prevost, and they cite Adams to validate this perspective. Yet, here was the
most important U.S. merchant in Lima denouncing “the conduct of some of our
naval commanders on this coast,” Tudor’s brother-in-law in particular, for
generating ill-will that jeopardized the business of those who wanted to trade
with Peru over the long term. The naval officers indulged their emotions,
becoming irate over the “depredations,” as Downes and Stewart termed them.
Some U.S. traders benefited from the navy’s rescues in the short term, but Alsop
and others worried about the perception of U.S. government hostility toward the
new nations.

However, Crosby did not say Prevost had changed any factual information. Instead, Prevost’s
version was “rather a second edition, revised and enlarged by him.” See Ibid., footnote 3, p. 483.

159 Prevost’s nemesis, John Quincy Adams, also employed the anti-Semitic slur at least twice. In
referring to dubious claims brought by an Irish-American ship captain, Adams wrote of his
On another occasion, while he was serving as a diplomat in the Netherlands, Adams complained
about “stock-jobbing and Jew-broking tricks.” Steve Fraser, Every Man a Speculator: A History of
STEWARD’S COURT-MARSHAL

On October 21, 1823, Stewart wrote to the secretary of the navy preemptively that it was his “painful task” to inform him that, “by the contrivance” of his wife, “a person was received on board [the USS Franklin], at Callao … and secreted in the pantry, among the servants” without his knowledge. The U.S. government could expect a complaint from Peru because this man “may be some person escaping from justice or the laws of war, and who could have no possible claim on us or our flag.” Stewart accused his first officer of “dereliction of duty” in keeping his wife’s action a secret from him. At the commodore’s subsequent court-martial, a letter of introduction was entered into evidence, which was written to Mrs. Stewart by the countess of Valle Hermosa, who said that the bearer would make a special request of her, and the countess begged her to grant it. This gentleman was another Spanish spy operating under protection of the U.S. navy.

Whether Stewart was indeed ignorant that a senior Spanish official was on board his ship in flagrant violation of his orders may never be known. But the long list of charges that were brought against Stewart in Washington give some understanding of the scope of his activities that brought him into conflict with Prevost. While Stewart was acquitted of all charges, most of the basic facts specified in the charges were not contradicted by testimony in his trial. Like Biddle and Downes, he had transported specie on behalf of merchants supplying the patriots’ enemy. In the court-marshal, Stewart faced four general charges, including unofficerlike conduct and disobedience of orders. Those charges were broken down into forty specifications that included allegations that he violated the laws of neutrality, gave material support to the transport of contraband, joined in private commerce with merchant Eliphalet Smith, misappropriated
navy resources to build and supply three schooners for his private use, and helped Smith’s *Canton* and other ships violate the patriots’ blockade of Peru and thereby risk U.S. involvement in a violent confrontation should Cochrane’s forces try to detain or board the offending vessels.

As his trial in Washington approached, Stewart wanted his wife’s testimony regarding the most serious charge by the government of Peru, that he had willfully transported a Spanish spy in violation of U.S. neutrality. But Delia fled with their children to a relative’s estate in Maine and refused to return to Washington, although she later gave a vague deposition that could be construed to vindicate her husband. A messy divorce lay ahead. Stewart’s fellow officers on the *Franklin* may have disliked Stewart and his wife, but they seem to have protected him with silence. Wilkes testified in an earlier but related court-marshal, and later stated he knew more than he wished to reveal.¹⁶⁰

In the end, the court went easy on Stewart, whether because of deference toward the renown of his service against the British, his influential Philadelphia ties, the awkward light that the charges placed on U.S. policy during Peru’s independence war, or perhaps all of those factors. The U.S. navy secretary did Stewart the favor of withholding a letter from the court in which Stewart characterized Cochrane and San Martín as “two of the greatest rogues ever existing.”¹⁶¹ The manner by which the court finessed its dilemma was to find that many of the specifications were proved, but that those actions did not violate the orders given to Stewart. Basically, the court held that Stewart had

¹⁶⁰ According to Berube and Rodgaard, Wilkes was related through his uncle to Lord Cochrane and, as a boy, had met the future admiral when he once visited his U.S. relatives (*A Call To The Sea*, p. 154).

been granted broad discretion to promote the public interest, i.e., furtherance of U.S. commerce in South America. Stewart claimed that, legally, he was not prohibited from engaging in private business during his mission, but he also insisted that he had declined Smith’s offers of partnership. It was well known that every U.S. commander on Pacific Station had carried specie on behalf of merchants, charging a fee for the service; and senior naval officers perhaps wanted to avoid action against Stewart that would lead to exposure of other business conducted by peers on private account. Charles Ridgely, the captain who preceded Stewart in command of Pacific Station, had carried $200,000 on behalf of the same Eliphalet Smith.

Two previous Pacific commanders, John Downes and James Biddle, both of whom had disappointed Prevost, gave testimony favorable to Stewart, at least in part to justify their own conduct. Downes testified on the matter of carrying specie and Biddle on the political difficulties naval captains faced in South America. “I believe it is impossible for any commanding officer to be in the Pacific without giving offense to the one side or to the other,” said Biddle in dismissing Peru’s charges. “The royal party [of Peru], knowing the general feelings of our country, is jealous of them. The patriots, on the other hand, expecting too much, are dissatisfied.”162 Given their own histories on Pacific Station, the statements of Downes and Biddle were self-serving, since a conviction of Stewart could have been construed as a condemnation of their own

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162 American State Papers, Naval Affairs (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834-1861), vol. II, p. 513. This self-serving comment, while partly true, is frequently quoted by historians to excuse U.S. naval captain behavior and leave unexplored the political and policy difference that lay behind their conflicts with Prevost. Besides Johnson’s Thence Round Cape Horn, p. 34, the quotation appears in two of Long’s books, Gold Braid, p. 78, and twice in his biography of Biddle, pp. 125 and 253; Berube and Rodgaard, A Call to the Sea, p. 186; Billingsley, In Defense, p. 193; and Clayton, Peru and the United States, p. 27.
roles. The court accepted as trustworthy the testimony of Eliphalet Smith, who said he offered Stewart a personal interest in several business deals, but that the commodore had declined. One wonders why Stewart kept for his own private use one of the three schooners he had his men build for sale to private parties if he did not intend to use it in business schemes. The court absolved Stewart of all charges, leading many U.S. historians to assert that Stewart’s actions were vindicated and that, implicitly, Adams’ judgments of Prevost were validated by the court.\footnote{For example, in footnotes appended to Alsop’s letter, the editor of Clay’s papers stated that, “The Court not only cleared Stewart but took occasion to praise his conduct,” and then he went on to quote Adams’ more damning diary entries about Prevost. An example of how U.S. naval literature tends to present Stewart as vindicated by the court’s verdict, see Long, p. 83, who spun Stewart’s deplorable conduct into a ringing navy triumph over Prevost by concluding that, “Here is a clear instance in which the navy had outscored the Department of State in diplomacy.”}

That is an oversimplification. The navy had ample justification in putting Stewart on trial, and the court’s verdict was mostly a political act. Prevost’s criticisms of Stewart were mild in light of the evidence presented against him. And, finally, the trial highlighted the political nature of differences between Adams and Prevost.

Meanwhile, doubts in Washington about the outcome of the war in Peru evaporated, and the Monroe administration was finally ready to assign diplomats who would serve U.S. interests before a fully independent Peruvian nation. Adams would soon craft the policy that the president would present at the end of 1823, later called the “Monroe doctrine.” Throughout all of Prevost’s tribulations in South America that so annoyed Adams, James Monroe’s trust in his political agent in Peru never wavered. On January 13, 1823, he nominated John Bartow Prevost to be the first U.S. chargé d’affaires in Peru, but the president soon had to withdraw the nomination “to avoid mortification of his
reputation.” Several U.S. senators told Monroe that dislike of Prevost was so strong among certain naval officers and merchants that they could not vote to confirm him.

In a letter the following May, Monroe asked a friend to contact Prevost and explain the situation (the copy of the letter among Monroe’s papers apparently does not indicate to whom it was addressed). Had the Senate rejected Prevost, the president said, “it most probably would have done him essential & permanent injury” and left him without a salary. By withdrawing the nomination, “time is allowed him to vindicate himself against the charges alleged against him,” and, in the interim, “I continue him as political agent” with his present compensation. Monroe then summarized the criticism of those who condemned Prevost. “The general idea is that he has become so much a partisan of our southern friends, that he does not do justice to his fellow citizens, in their claims on the new government.” Others were circulating stories that showed him to be “on bad terms with all our naval commanders, a circumstance which makes it more delicate & difficult for me ….” Monroe said he could not go into details because “I ought to be neutral & impartial.” The president wanted Prevost to come forward and clear his name. If the U.S. naval commanders and merchants were in the wrong, “let him show it.” But, Monroe indicated his own belief that patriot forces lacked the resources to assert a legitimate blockade. “The blockade of Adm’l Cochrane, of the whole coast, with a trifling force, has been disclaimed by this govt., & cannot be sustained, by the Law of the nations.” He agreed with Adams that it was a paper blockade. In any case, even when U.S. citizens were in the wrong, Monroe said Prevost should

164 A transcription of the letter is available online from the Gilder Lehrman Institute for American History, doc. #5, at www.gilderlehrman.org.
conduct himself in a manner that would command their “confidence and support.” Monroe’s conclusion is consistent with that governing U.S. historians’ view of these conflicts: U.S. traders and naval officers may have been in the wrong, but Prevost should have backed them up regardless.

TUDOR AND BOLÍVAR

The relationships that Bartow Prevost and William Tudor developed with Peruvians deserve further study, especially their respective dealings with Simón Bolívar. Prevost’s support and admiration for the Liberator was summarized in this chapter’s introduction. For contrast, this chapter concludes with an overview of Tudor’s role in Peru.

Tudor had a tedious journey of about 120 days from New York, finally reaching Valparaiso in March 1824, where he was met by commodore Charles Stewart and his sister, Delia. Brother-in-law Stewart transported him on the Franklin to Callao, and on March 27 Tudor took up residence and assumed his position as U.S. consul general in Lima, just eight months prior to Spain’s final defeat at the Battle of Ayacucho. Scholars who have traced early U.S.-Peruvian relations have favored Tudor with interest, with much less attention to Prevost.165 Tudor’s missives to Washington were full of memorable phrases. Prevost’s letters often had a dashed-off feel, as if he had pulled away from interesting political networking because he suddenly realized that a ship was about to depart that could carry his correspondence. But the main differences

165 Lawrence A. Clayton, for example, relegated Prevost to a footnote in his Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle, p. 317, note 19.
between the two were political, social and cultural. Tudor was an heir to Alexander Hamilton’s vision of U.S. development by which government and business worked in partnership, and elites managed the state. His judgments about Peru deserve careful consideration for what they portended in a future U.S.-Peruvian relationship.

After less than two months in Peru, Tudor was ready to give his overall assessment of its independence war. He sent a letter to Adams from Callao on May 3, 1824, that showed off his talents as a writer and former journal editor. By contrast with Prevost, who was always overly optimistic about the course of the war, Tudor doubted that Bolívar could prevail in the looming battle. The “disparity of force” between that commanded by the Liberator and that of Gen. Canterac “is too great to admit of a battle with any hope of success” for the patriots. He said Bolívar claimed to have 6,800 men and was awaiting arrival of 1,500 in reinforcements from Colombia. He expressed cynicism regarding Peruvian military participation. “He had besides 2 or 3,000 Peruvians on whom he placed no reliance as they were known to be very discontented, and only anxious to seize the first opportunity of getting back to their friends.” The Spanish, on the other hand, had between ten and twelve thousand men under arms. “One person who seemed well informed” told Tudor that Canterac’s army included 2,000 cavalry. Even if Bolivar won the next battle, it would not be decisive, as the Spaniards “would still hold the whole of Upper Peru, the strongest & most valuable part of this country.”

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166 Tudor to Adams, May 3, 1824. All of the following Tudor quotations from this letter are from Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence ... Independence*, pp. 1749-1752. A larger body of Tudor’s correspondence from South America to Washington was published by the U.S. House of Representatives in 1837 in conjunction with a “bill for the relief of the legal representatives of William Tudor, junior.” It is House document 167 of the 24th Congress, 2nd Session and titled...
Peru was, Tudor said, an “unfortunate country.” If the Spaniards prevailed, Peru would be returned to “a despotic monarch & the Inquisition,” which would “reduce it once more to the withering bigotry & monopoly of their ancient system.” He saw Peruvians as caught in the middle between a Spanish army and a Colombian army, and if the latter won there “will be a further exhaustion of the inhabitants by a protracted civil war” and “almost useless expenditure of the resources of Colombia.” The soldiers from the north “are excessively disliked by the Peruvians,” and Bolívar “is especially an object of dread & hatred to them.”

The hapless Peruvians, Tudor judged, “are of a mild character, without instruction & effeminate.” Their geographical niche and “the peculiar jealousy of the Spanish Court” had isolated them. Peruvians “were almost entirely ignorant” of the rest of the world. Yet, they understood that the United States and Europe were undergoing significant development; “the progress other nations were making could not be wholly concealed from them.” So, Peruvians were “prepared to accept of any change,” as he put it, implying that they were not, however, prepared to fight for it. “When therefore the invasion of the ‘patriot’ chiefs was made they caught with eagerness at the ideas of liberty and independence,” without realizing “what sacrifices” must be made, and that “those who commence even a successful revolution seldom live to enjoy its results.”

In short, Peruvians were neither educated, realistic, sufficiently liberty-loving nor manly enough to forge a nation. And, “Unfortunately for Peru,” the invading “‘patriots’” (Tudor choked on that word to describe them) “were cruel,

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*William Tudor, Junior: Message from the President ... Transmitting ... in relation to the correspondence of William Tudor, etc (February 21, 1837).*
rapacious, unprincipled & incapable.” As a result of “mismanagement, their profligacy, & their thirst of plunder,” they alienated Peruvians who became ready “to hail the return of the royal armies who were left unmolested to recruit their forces in the fine regions of Upper Peru.” By contrast with malevolent patriots, Tudor thought the royalist leaders were educated, principled, well organized and determined. The viceroy, he told Adams, was “distinguished for his moderation, humanity and uprightness.” La Serna was perhaps a little too old, but his generals were “men in the prime of life with an energy, intrepidity & enterprise that recall the character of their countrymen in the 16th century.” In Spain’s recent civil war, Tudor thought they all aligned “of the Constitutional party.” Therefore, while ill-fated, they were the “real patriots.” This time Tudor put no quotation marks around “patriots.”

In this bleak situation for Peru, Tudor called on Washington to send naval reinforcements “on this ocean where our commerce is so considerable, & so capable of being enlarged.” The patriot blockade was now enforced “in the name of the Peruvian government,” and U.S. commerce was being subjected to its “depredations.” One of admiral Jorge Guise’s ships had recently “detained a very valuable American ship which was fortunately rescued by our squadron.” Peruvian authorities said they were prepared “to be very liberal,” and only charge a twenty-five percent levy on “the value of their cargoes in this market.” This was a blockade, Tudor said, “not to distress an enemy but to pillage neutrals.” Tudor thought that, if the blockade were Chilean, “we might bear this injustice for a time,” because the United States could later collect reparation.

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167 Martin George Guisse, like Cochrane a British naval officer, is known in Peruvian history as Jorge Guise, with one “s,” founder of the Peruvian navy. He married a young limeña, Juana María Valle Riestra, and they had a daughter before he was killed in a conflict with Colombia.
“But in this case who is responsible?” he asked. The Peruvian government “has really no existence, it is extinct.” Worse, the patriot exactions were carried out by “a number of foreign adventurers” who “are almost all Englishmen” and who “will like their predecessors disperse themselves, and leave us without a hope of future compensation.” He desired that U.S. naval commanders would not wait for further instructions from home, but use their “superior force” to prevent “their countrymen [from being] thus plundered in their very sight.” Now the United States had a diplomat in Peru ready to cheer on aggressive U.S. naval commanders, whose leader up until a month prior happened to be his brother-in-law.

Tudor concluded by saying that there were eight U.S. merchantmen in Callao’s harbor “with assorted cargoes,” including some 7,000 barrels of flour. “Their voyages generally will give them a fair profit.” He said that the Spanish general José Ramón Rodil assured him that the viceroy, then in Cuzco, would soon formally recognize his credentials.

Although he still condemned admiral Guise for abusing U.S. commerce, by August 1824 Tudor sensed the tide was shifting against Spanish forces.168 His own relations with royal officials deteriorated, partly over a letter he considered offensive that accused English-speaking foreigners of “scandalous profanation of Churches” in Lima. He reported also that relations between the U.S. navy and the Spaniards had soured, with Gen. Rodil accusing commodore Hull of “insulting him with perpetual threats and other irritations.”169

168 Tudor to Adams, Lima, August 24, 1824.
169 Tudor to Adams, Lima, October 17, 1824.
In the wake of the battle of Ayacucho, Tudor on December 7 reported the arrival of Bolívar in Lima. The general immediately rode out toward Callao to assess the strength of the Spanish officers and troops still holding the port’s old colonial fortress. That same night patriot sentries mistakenly shot and killed the British consul, who was traveling by carriage from Callao to Lima with his daughter, wearing his English military uniform. He defied an order to stop in the darkness, and Tudor added that, “However much this unfortunate event is to be regretted for himself and others it is only justice to state, that no one attaches any blame, to the sentinels, who thought it was a party of the Spanish troops advancing & the noise made by the carriage they took for that of artillery moving.”

Despite the judgment of historian J. Fred Rippy that Tudor became the single U.S. representative in South America most hostile toward Bolívar, the U.S. consul initially found positive things to say about him on occasion, particularly concerning the stability he lent to governance while he was in Lima. On February 25, 1825, Tudor told Adams that, “The Congress have wisely continued the political power in the hands of General Bolivar for another year, which appears indispensable for the safety of Peru.” He also commended Bolívar for choosing Washington’s birthday as an occasion to make an official visit aboard commodore Hull’s USS United States. Wishing to ingratiate themselves with the Liberator, U.S. navy officers invoked the French Gen. La Fayette’s role as a major ally with Washington in the U.S. revolutionary war. Although it was an analogy hard to square with the U.S. role on the west coast of South America, Bolívar took it in the positive way it was intended. “General Bolivar afterwards rose [to

170 Tudor to Adams, Lima, December 7, 1824.
salute] La Fayette as a toast, & made a very complimentary speech,” recounted Tudor.\footnote{Tudor to Adams, Lima, February 25, 1825.}

Perhaps Tudor’s temporary softening tone toward the patriots and Bolívar was affected by a personal attack leveled at him from a Trujillo newspaper he considered an official patriot mouthpiece. While it was anonymous, Tudor felt certain the letter was written by Richard Alsop, and he personally asked Bolívar to order his Peruvian staff to make an official disclosure of the authorship to him. It was published the previous June, but Tudor did not learn of it until September, and he told Adams that it “doubtless will be published throughout the United States.” It was, he said, “a miserable libel against me,” and alleged that he had been given a ship “as a reward for my servility to the Spaniards” (Tudor’s emphasis). He claimed that he had, in fact, purchased the brig Frederic “in conjunction with Nixon & McCall, an American house here.” Tudor said his brother-in-law “was acquainted with the whole transaction” and would vouch for him to the U.S. government. The Frederic’s former owner was with commodore Stewart on the USS Franklin en route back to the United States.\footnote{Tudor to Adams, Lima, September 18, 1824.}

At his “very earnest conversation with General Bolívar,” the Liberator told Tudor to write formally to one of his ministers and said he would ask him to disclose the letter writer’s name to the U.S. consul. Tudor told Bolívar he knew the author was Alsop, “but I wanted his name to be given me in a regular manner” so that he could sue Alsop in a U.S. court. After three more weeks of lobbying the government, Tudor told Henry Clay, the new secretary of state, that the former prefect of Trujillo turned down his petition for official disclosure.
Tudor was bitter. “The case of a government thus protecting a libeller, is singular.” He said he had explained “the whole business” to his “friend,” the conservative New England attorney Daniel Webster, who was at that time arguing some of the most important cases to come before the U.S. Supreme Court. Tudor declared that “[I] have spared no exertion, to bring Alsop to justice, because the circumstances of this case are very peculiar, & display a union of treachery, malignity, falsehood, & meanness rarely to be found.”

One wonders if Tudor’s disappointment did not contribute to souring his judgment of Bolívar and the men around him. In good Federalist tradition, he criticized the general for not promoting large-scale transportation and public works projects. While in early 1826 he continued to think that a withdrawal of the Liberator would plunge Peru “at once into a conflict of factions” and that most Peruvians wanted him to stay, Tudor began to give voice to opposition claims that he was surrounded by men who worshiped him uncritically and were “unconditionally submissive.” He said that Peruvians resented being “governed by bayonets.” By May, after Bolívar dissolved the congress, Tudor told Clay that it was “painful to change a favourable opinion we have formed of any individual,” but now Bolívar’s mask had fallen off. “The deep hypocrisy of General Bolivar has hitherto deceived the world.” Tudor endorsed Peruvian opposition complaints that Bolívar was a “Napoleon.” He quoted Peruvians who said that they preferred the Spaniards to “the Mulattoes of Colombia,” even applying the term to Bolívar himself, “tho’ improperly.” Tudor explained to Clay that Colombian officers like Sucre, Paez and Carvajal “have a tinge of

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173 Tudor to Clay, Lima, March 21, 1825.

174 Tudor to Clay, Lima, April 9, 1826.
African blood, & some of the subalterns are entirely of that origin.” He blamed Bolívar, on the one hand, for letting his aides adulate him and, on the other hand, for terrifying those who did not do so. “There is no individual among those about him, who dares tell an unpleasant truth, & at the slightest opposition he gives way to an unrestrained violence.” He said towns were obliged to put on expensive festivals in his honor whenever he visited, and that “Arequipa has within a short period been obliged to furnish three of these fetes that have cost 60,000 [dollars].” Tudor said corruption was spreading and that he had spoken with some Colombians who regretted Bolívar’s present course.

Peru might need a monarchy rather than a republic, Tudor mused. His opinion of Peruvians had improved a bit from that expressed upon his arrival two years earlier, but it was hardly complimentary. Peruvians “are naturally intelligent, & tho’ there is a sad want both of morality & education in Peru, both may be produced” under proper governance. Tudor told Clay he hoped that “the most strict reserve should be maintained with respect to the enclosed observations, which if known might be fatal to their author.”

Other U.S. diplomats in South America expressed similar criticisms of Bolívar. William Wheelwright, then serving as U.S. consul in Guayaquil, condemned the general as “the cause of all our evils,” adding that “ambition and intrigue have marked his career since he last landed on the shores of Colombia.” William Henry Harrison, who served as U.S. minister to Colombia during 1828-1829 (elected president in 1840, he died after one month in office), told Washington that Bolívar was going to establish a monarchy. “The crown is, in

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175 Tudor to Clay, Lima, May 17, 1826.
the first instance, to be offered to General Bolívar. Should he refuse it, a Foreign Prince is to be invited to accept it.”

Historian Rippy cautioned that all of these U.S. witnesses were “men of strong political prejudices” who succeeded in turning most opinion in Washington against Bolívar. Attitudes of men like Wheelwright and Tudor, he concluded, “place them in sympathy with the Liberator’s enemies,” and their “passionately biased statements” were received by officials in Washington “with childish credulity.” The few in the United States who still admired Bolívar did so from a patronizing posture, imagining that only an authoritarian figure could bring order to South Americans lacking in democratic traditions. Only Prevost provided an alternative view to the consensus.

DEATHS OF PREVOST AND TUDOR

After Tudor arrived in Lima, Bartow Prevost was mostly traveling in the field with patriot forces. In early 1825, he arranged with commodore Hull to be transported by the schooner USS Dolphin from Callao to Quilca to begin a journey into the southern Andean highlands. He told Adams that from the southern port he would “proceed thence to Arequipa and Cuzco.” His original orders some eight years earlier had directed him to study the Upper Peru region by traveling overland from Buenos Aires. That plan had been cancelled due to the urgency of the Oregon mission. He explained the purpose of his new trip as

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177 Ibid., p. 296.

178 For example, Prevost to Adams, Chancay, November 9, 1824, Department of State, “Special Agents,” vol. 6.
one of economic reconnaissance. “It appeared to me that it might be interesting
to our Government to have some view of the Interior and of its commerce and
this I shall hope to offer in my next [letter] to bear date from the decayed Capital
of the Incas.” It may have been no coincidence that Simón Bolívar also had
scheduled a tour of Upper Peru at the same time. Prevost said he entrusted
reporting of the expected “Fall of the Castles” (the Callao fortress) to his son,
Stanhope, who wrote Washington on January 29, 1825, to say that after the battle
of Ayacucho the Spanish fleet departed for Manila.

Prevost never reached Cuzco. It was probably a heart attack that
prevented him from rendezvousing with Bolívar. He died on March 5, 1825.
Whether true or not, word reached Lima and the United States that Peruvians in
the Andes had denied Prevost a proper burial because they believed he was not
Catholic. This caused some indignation among those who had known him. A
judge in Louisiana, in a speech reviewing the history of the territory and state’s
highest court, used the occasion to fulminate against Peru for its alleged
intolerance and uncivilized behavior toward the deceased Prevost.

Prevost’s son, Stanhope, stayed on in Peru and became a significant figure
in U.S.-Peruvian relations and the most prominent U.S. merchant in Lima, first in
partnership with Edward McCall and later as a member of the Alsop firm.
Prevosts in Peru today are descended from Bartow and Stanhope Prevost.

William Tudor also never returned to the United States. He seemed not to
have ever warmed to the “unfortunate” country or to most Peruvians, partly for
political and cultural reasons but also because he believed that the Lima post was
beneath a man of his status. He resented the fact that he was paid less than

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179 Prevost to Adams, Lima, January 10, 1825, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence ... Independence*, v. 3, p. 1777.
Prevost, and after his death his mother petitioned congress to indemnify her for underpaying her son while he was in Lima. There were periods, she claimed, when her son bore the burden of Prevost’s duties while the political agent was traveling with the patriots.180

Tudor finally obtained a promotion to Brazil in 1827. In a letter to his mother written at sea en route from Peru to Brazil, he again lambasted Simón Bolívar. After Tudor’s mother visited Washington and shared the letter with him, John Quincy Adams, now the U.S. president, noted in his diary that, “it speaks with great severity of Bolivar.”181 In 1830 Tudor took ill and died of fever in Rio de Janeiro.

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CHAPTER 4

TARIFFS AND TEXTILES:
AN ILLUSTRATED INTERPRETATION OF THE
INDUSTRIAL “EVOLUTION” AND PERU’S FAILURE TO JOIN IT

As yet, not a barrel of [U.S.] flour, or a yard of our coarse
cottons has felt the effects of the nominally revived
prohibitory decree.

Samuel Larned, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Lima
1831

Gentlemen deceive themselves. It is not free trade that they
are recommending to our acceptance. It is, in effect, the
British colonial system that we are invited to adopt; and, if
their policy prevail, it will lead substantially to the
recolonization of these states, under the commercial
dominion of Great Britain.182

Henry Clay
1832

Bartow Prevost’s stepfather, Aaron Burr, shot and killed Alexander
Hamilton in July 1804. Their duel was personal, triggered by accusations of
sexual escapades rather than some weighty matter of U.S. development policy.
Nevertheless, it had politics at its root. As Hamilton biographer Ron Chernow
wrote, “Their affair of honor was less about slurs and personal insults than
politics and party leadership.” Growing up poor in the Caribbean, Hamilton
well knew how lack of development could leave citizens in misery. He became
the U.S. architect of strong state action to promote domestic manufacturing,
including direct subsidies and erection of at least modestly-protective tariffs.
Chernow characterized Hamilton’s childhood as “squalid” and said that no other

182 Register of the Debates in Congress … of the First Session of the Twenty-Second Congress …, vol.
VIII (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1833), p. 266.
founder of the U.S. republic ever had to bear “such shame and misery.” His keen intellect was, as a result, complimented by “a touchy ego that made him querulous and fatally combative.” Although that temperament led him to the tragic duel, his uncompromising nature made him a formidable policy hawk for nation building and a tireless Federalist campaigner. Development opportunities for the new nation were his central political concern, and he was George Washington’s obvious choice to be the first secretary of the treasury of the United States. He was, said Chernow, “the prophet of the capitalist revolution in America.”

Burr was born to the elite; Hamilton had to earn his entrance by effort and marriage. After the death of Bartow Prevost’s mother, Burr showed his sense of entitlement by becoming quite a womanizer. His enemies – who were not just Federalists like Hamilton, but also rivals within his own political camp – loved to spread gossip about his alleged affairs, including a supposed escapade with a black woman. (Hamilton was no sexual innocent; he was blackmailed over an affair with a married woman and used a black messenger to communicate secretly with her.) Ironically, by the time of their duel, the two men had found policy issues to agree upon. Both were ardent nationalists, and Hamilton broke with many of his Federalist brethren in supporting Jefferson’s purchase of the Louisiana territory from Napoleon. After being told he would not continue as vice president in Jefferson’s second term and then losing a race for governor of New York, Burr became heavily involved in western expansionism. Early U.S. nationalism was a combination of Hamilton’s nation-building and the twin expansionisms embodied by New England commercial interests (seen in the

Adams and Tudor families) and the Jeffersonians’ westward continental ambitions (seen in Aaron Burr’s Louisiana territory machinations).

Hamilton’s term as secretary of the treasury coincided with Britain’s advances in the production of textiles and its strenuous efforts to prevent the technology from getting into the hands of other nations. Not only did the British ban the export of textile machinery, they made it a crime for skilled textile mechanics to emigrate, lest they sell their knowledge abroad. During and just after the U.S. war for independence, the United States had no textile factories. In the first volume of his classic study, Main Currents of American Thought, Vernon Parrington wrote of Hamilton that, “Certainly no other man in America saw so clearly the significance of the change that was taking place in English industrialism, and what tremendous reservoirs of wealth the new order laid open to the country that tapped them.” Factors such as industry’s organization of the division of labor and replacement of the artisan’s tools by machinery “appealed to his materialistic imagination, and he threw himself heart and soul into the cause of industrial development in America.”

How industrialization could negatively impact artisans and farmers might worry Burr or Jefferson, but not Hamilton. In his famous report to congress on manufactures, Hamilton said that industry could be a compliment – not a threat – to agriculture. It was “quaint and superficial,” he wrote, to think that productions of the soil by which “nature co-operates with man,” are more productive than the labor of man and machines. Much farm labor is “periodical and occasional,” he observed, “while that occupied in many manufactures is

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constant and regular … embracing, in some instances, night as well as day.” The farmer, “even with a considerable degree of carelessness” and only intermittent work, may gain a livelihood, while the worker in industry faces keen competition and cannot earn his living “without exerting himself pretty equally with all those who are engaged in the same pursuit.” Furthermore, Hamilton saw in industry a solution to the problem of women, children and men unfit for farm work who were, in his opinion, much too idle. “It is worthy of particular remark, that, in general, women and children are rendered more useful, and the latter more early useful, by manufacturing establishments, than they would otherwise be,” Hamilton told the legislature. “Of the number of persons employed in the cotton manufactures of Great Britain, it is computed that four-sevenths, nearly, are women and children; of whom the greatest proportion are children, and many of them of a tender age.” This was a man who harbored no idealistic views about childhood and education, which were concerns of Jefferson and Burr. Hamilton appreciated that the textile industry was the great development battleground on which some countries would win and others lose.

By the time Bartow Prevost “felt the rush of the triumph of [Peru’s] liberty,” as Simón Bolívar put it, cotton for proliferating textile mills was beginning to challenge sugar as the preeminent commodity in global capitalist development. No one yet perceived how profoundly machines would alter human life. William Tudor judged Peruvians “almost entirely ignorant” of the wider world, and yet he thought they were ready to follow the “progress”

transpiring in Europe and the United States. The cotton textiles now being
directly imported into Peru by the Alsop partners and other foreign merchants in
Lima demonstrated to Peruvians that the pre-industrial era was waning.

PRE-INDUSTRIAL TEXTILE MANUFACTURING

Peruvians domesticated cotton more than five thousand years ago and
possessed an excellent arid coastal climate for its cultivation. Peruvian
shepherds also raised camelids, the llama and alpaca – the latter a source of
exquisite wool. By c. 500 BC, ancient Peruvians had adopted a number of
technological innovations, including the heddle loom, and they were expert
weavers of cotton and woolen cloth. Peruvian yarns did not match India’s in
quality, but most were relatively smooth and strong two-ply yarns, including
good cotton-wool blends. Yarn was treated with dyes made from a range of
substances to produce fast colors of superior intensities: indigo ranging from
light to dark blue (from fermented shrubs); shades of red to black (cochineal),
and yellows from the bark of trees. From these and the natural colors of alpaca
wool, Peruvians could produce violet and a range of browns and greens.


Despite limitations of the rustic backstrap loom, Peruvian weavers compensated with impressive skill in their craft. Women wove fine fabrics, including tapestries and double-cloth, in widths determined by their ability to pass the bobbin from hand to hand (about 23 to 30 inches) and in lengths that were sometimes up to two or three meters. Household cloth production in the United States prior to introduction of machinery was comparable in technology

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188 Explanation and judgment on Peruvian skill and technical details about spinning and weaving in the Andes are from Raoul D’Harcourt, reedition ed. by Grace G. Denny and Carolyn M. Osborne, *Textiles of Ancient Peru and their Techniques* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), beginning with the introduction on pp. 5-11.
to pre-Columbian Peruvian household weaving but could not match its quality. Double cloth weaving was common to both. Pre-industrial U.S. weaving was simple compared to what the most skilled Peruvian weavers produced. At Paracas burial sites, people of lower social status were mummified in many meters of lower grade cloth, while leaders were wrapped in a textile cornucopia representing their status and illustrating how cloth was a storage of value. Anne Paul described a Paracas mummy bundle containing forty-four elaborate and twenty-five plain cloths. She calculated that one weaving was an extraordinary eleven feet wide by eighty-five feet long, and about three quarters of its surface was embroidered with minute stitches. She estimated that textiles in the bundle of one high ranking leader might have required over 25,000 hours of spinning, weaving and needle work.189

Figs. 4.2-4.3
ELABORATE
Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala, himself of native nobility, depicted the tunic of an Inca (left) similar to the one on the right.

Textile production was the socio-economic foundation of the Inca empire. Cloth was highly valued and the most important commodity in regional trade. Inca administrators closely managed its production and collected it in tribute. Design and quality were used to mark social status. Most scholarly study has naturally focused on the most complex and beautiful garments of elites, but more recent research has clarified how plain cloth and simple design reflected the status of commoners. Unique styles, patterns and colors worn marked each locality, an expression of the Incas’ cultural tolerance but also an important means of social and political control. Inca administrators kept warehouses full of cloth. Elite leaders rewarded commoners for special service with pieces of quality cloth. A particular textile style could distinguish a locality for hundreds of years.\textsuperscript{190} John Murra studied textiles to show how a particular culture established its own satellites in other geographical regions to form a “vertical archipelago.”

Double Cloth and Floatwork

Pre-Columbian Peruvians and early English settlers in North American colonies mastered complex weaving techniques. Both made double cloth (Peruvian example left) and floatwork (bedcovering from New Hampshire, c. 1740). Warp patterning or warp substitution (two warps of contrasting colors interlaced with one weft color), was popular in the Wari civilization (post-Moche, pre-Inca middle horizon) and is still used widely by hand weavers in the Andes today.


On the eve of the industrial revolution, most textile manufacturing – and certainly the highest quality – was centered in India and China. A barrier holding back technical innovation everywhere was spinning the yarn and thread, which required much more labor time than it took to weave it. About three hours of carding and spinning in England were required to provide enough yarn for one hour of weaving. The ratio was much higher in Mexico and Peru. As long as so much labor time was consumed in spinning, the imperative of more efficient weaving technology lagged. Early Peruvians spun alpaca wool and cotton using a drop spindle with a low whorl that is still employed for household
yarn production in the Andes today (fig. 4.7). This spindle allowed Peruvians to spin yarn while carrying out other tasks, such as tending children and animals, walking to and from fields and markets, or engaging in conversation and community activities. Children spun even when engaged in play. From the Greeks (fig. 4.6) and Romans up to the fifteenth century, spindles similar to those in Peru predominated in Europe. Gradually, they were displaced by hand-cranked spinning wheels, such as the device envisioned by Leonardo da Vinci (fig. 4.8).

Figs. 4.6-4.8
SPINNING
On the left, a Greek woman spinning with a spindle and distaff from an illustration on a wine jug c. 490. In the middle, a Peruvian woman spinning from Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala’s illustrated chronicle, Nueva Crónica y Buen Gobierno. On the right, sketches of the design of a hand powered spinning wheel by Leonardo da Vinci (Codex Atlanticus). The image from Poma de Ayala has been cleaned up. A facsimile of an original on which writing has bled through appears on page 177 of the English edition translated by Ronald Hamilton, The First New Chronicle and Good Government: On the History of the World and the Incas Up to 1615 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009).
OBRAJES

During the colonial period, non-household Peruvian textile production was carried on in obrajes, textile factories or sweatshops. While Spain discouraged some types of manufacturing in its colonies, the república de indios was clothed by Peru’s domestic production. John Murra speculated that Peru’s obrajes may have built upon the tradition of Inca workshops of the aclla, girls and women chosen for service to the ruling elite. Some aclla groups inside Inca convents specialized in the different tasks of carding, spinning, weaving and sewing clothes. European workshops had such specialization on the eve of the industrial revolution. Peru’s pre-Columbian weavers used the backstrap loom, which continued as the household-weaving mode throughout the colonial and nineteenth-century periods, and they were able to manipulate numerous heddle rods (fig. 4.1). Foot treadle looms, probably of Asian origins, began to appear in medieval Europe and later were introduced by Spaniards into Peruvian obrajes distributed throughout the viceroyalty. While Spanish weavers benefited from selling quality cloth to American colonies, most textiles in colonial Peru were made domestically. Scholars have understood Peru’s colonial obrajes to be an incipient form of capitalist manufacturing, mostly operating with conscripted labor. The barriers to entry into the business were lower than, say, to acquire and develop an agricultural estate.


In his *Nueva Corónica y Buen Gobierno*, Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala suggested that weaving in colonial obrajes was more oppressive than similar work performed for the Incas. Given his indignation at Spanish abuses, it is difficult to know if he romanticized labor under Inca rule.

Accusations of abuses of Indians in obrajes graphically depicted by Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala (fig. 4.9) were echoed almost two centuries later by Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Spanish naval officers and colonial administrators who spent eleven years in the viceroyalty in the 1730s and 1740s. Some of their writing on South America was translated and published in English in the 1760s in the multiple-volume *A Voyage to South America*. When their confidential exposé of Peru’s social conditions was published in Spanish in 1826 (in London) with the sensationalist title *Noticias secretas de América*, the report was widely distributed in the United States and Europe and became a basis for the “Black Legend” that blamed Spain for Peru’s development misfortunes.193

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193 A modern edition is Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, *Discourse and Political Reflections on the Kingdoms of Peru*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978). The authors were best known for their four volume *A Voyage to South America*; the confidential reports were suppressed because they contained a penetrating critique of colonial corruption, economic mismanagement and
As late as the 1840’s, their *Voyage* and *Noticias secretas* were still considered important descriptions of Peru for the U.S. merchant, traveler or diplomat. Their perspective on social conditions given in *Noticias secretas* was a good deal more humanistic than would be offered subsequently to U.S. readers by Johann Jakob von Tschudi, Clements Markham or Ephraim Squier. An English version, *Secret Expedition to Peru*, was published in Boston in 1851.¹⁹⁴

To obtain field and obraje workers, colonial employers resorted to the traditional *mita*, a forced labor draft imposed on Indian communities. The *mitayos* were supplemented by convict labor of Indians punished for not paying their tribute taxes or other transgressions. In theory, laborers thus recruited were paid a salary of from fourteen to eighteen pesos per year, but Juan and Ulloa demonstrated that the wages were accounting devices masking a system of bondage. Just as with many Chinese servants on Peru’s coastal plantations in the nineteenth century, at the end of a year’s service, most Indians wound up more indebted to their employer than when they began. Although provided garden plots for growing their own maize and potatoes, "whatever they produce for themselves after having completed their obligatory work is seized by the hacendado for a debt owed," the authors wrote. "The hacendados show no compassion for the miserable condition of the Indians and leave them to perish of starvation."¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ The subtitle of this sensational work by Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa as published in the United States in mid-nineteenth century was: *The practical influence of the Spanish Colonial system upon the character and habits of the Colonists: exhibited in a private report read to the secretaries of his majesty, Ferdinand VI King of Spain* (Boston: Crocketer and Brewster, 1851).

used to gain compliance. Peruvian debate over the role of Indians in the country’s development was somewhat analogous to U.S. debate over slavery. Capitalist entrepreneurs insisted that Indian laborers in Peru and slave laborers in the United States could only be worked by force. “The moment their husbands are condemned to an obraje, Indian women begin weeping over their men’s death,” Juan and Ulloa wrote.196 The mortality rate in the sweatshops was high. “The expedient of condemning Indians to these abominable places has become so common that it is used as a special death penalty for many offenses.” Workers were confined day and night in filthy rooms, fed a starvation diet and subjected to cruel punishments. Indians contracted disease from spoiled meat and other contaminated food. “The majority die in the obrajes with their piecework still in their hands.”197 Ulloa imagined that the abuses he saw in obrajes might have been more inhumane than in the era of the early colonial encomienda. “Even if it seemed desirable to continue the tyranny that the early encomenderos inflicted on the Indians at the time of the conquest, I am not persuaded that it ever reached the extreme to which the Spaniards and mestizos now go.” The reason, he said, was that under encomienda the Indian had one master. But, “now the corregidor, priest, and hacendado have replaced him and treat the Indians more inhumanly than slaves are treated.” This “worse than slavery” notion became conventional wisdom in the nineteenth century, when it was also applied to the fate of Chinese indentured servants. “One small debt to a private individual is enough,” Ulloa wrote, to permit confinement in an obraje. Bounty hunters might be employed to recover runaways. “On the roads one can meet Indians being led

196 Ibid., p. 137.
197 Ibid., p. 136.
to the obrajes with their hair tied to the tails of horses ridden by mestizos and other unsavory persons of the area,” and he noted that, “Sometimes the crime is as trivial as having fled from the cruelties of their persecutors.”

Indians were not the only weavers in colonial obrajes. African slaves were imprisoned in textile mills in Lima’s San Lázaro district. During a period in the 1600s, a Jesuit priest took seminary students on weekly visits to console and instruct the weavers “in order that they may patiently bear the heavy labor that there weighs them down.”

Highland employers of forced Indian labor routinely complained that the indigenous people were lazy, that all economic enterprise would collapse without stern discipline, and that harsh punishments were the only effective tool to induce performance and forestall Indian rebellion. These arguments were the similar to those landowners employed to justify African slavery on the Peruvian coast and, for that matter, in the United States. Juan and Ulloa answered that, on the contrary, they found free Indians to be resourceful and hard working. It was the system of excessive toil, lack of food and barbarous cruelties that induced slothfulness in Peru’s Indians, they argued. To drive their point home, they described the typical whipping of an Indian. The whip itself “is about a yard long, a finger's width or a bit less, made of strands of cowhide twisted together like a bass guitar string, and hardened ....” Indians in obrajes who did not satisfy owners’ demands, they wrote, “are commanded to stretch out on the ground face down and remove their light trousers (their usual garb). They are then forced to count the lashes given them until the number set by the sentence has been


inflicted.” The whipping ritual was concluded with a Christian oath. The Indian was made to kiss the hand of his tormenter and declare, “May God be pleased, and may He give you thanks for having punished my sin.”

Juan and Ulloa said the whippings were done to any Indian, even old men, women, children and sometimes caciques. The authors wrote that, “One must recognize that Indians are treated more cruelly and rigorously than slaves and that a Negro slave is valued more highly than an Indian.”

This worse-than-slavery claim became a litany of social critics in the nineteenth century.

Juan and Ulloa argued that Peru’s system operated to the detriment of development because it gave the Indians no incentive to be productive, and it corrupted both the employers and government administrators. They urged the mita be abolished (or at least reformed) and that severe sanctions be imposed on anyone who physically punished an Indian. Obrajes should be allowed only near towns, where any brutalization could be witnessed and controlled, they said; and only free, wage-earning Indians should be employed. The law should require that the doors to sweatshops be left open at all times, and workers should be allowed to return to their homes at night. But the authors knew that their recommendations would be resisted, especially any curtailment of the mita.

“Everyone in Peru would rail against a measure of this type,” they wrote. “They would emphasize that those kingdoms would be completely ruined by freeing the Indians from the mita. They would argue that no one would work, and there would be danger of indolent Indians conspiring to revolt. In this way those with vested interests in the mita would maliciously subvert the measure, even though

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200 Juan and Ulloa, Discourse, pp. 145-146.
201 Ibid.
it is possible to put it into effect.” They doubted that regulations could achieve the necessary reforms. “Clearly, those with Indian mitas desiring to avoid the loss of huge profits from forced labor would engage in the worst duplicity.”

**Organization of Labor**

To speak of textile “industry” or “factories” before the late 1700s in Peru, Europe or the United States was to refer to labor specialization within an enterprise. A few larger European factories employed up to one thousand men, women and children, but that was unusual. The Inca regional administrative center of Huánuco Pampa, about 375 miles north of Cuzco, contained some four thousand structures, including warehouses to store textiles, but the site was mainly ceremonial. Its relatively small permanent population included a compound of fifty residences and workshops for women spinners and weavers. When examples of Inca textiles first reached Europe, Spaniards recognized that their quality was superior to their own cloth. Pedro de Cieza de León wrote c. 1545 that the Incas had such “perfect” dyes – red, blue, yellow, black, and other vivid colors – that their cottons *verdaderamente tienen ventaja a las de España.*

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202 Juan and Ulloa, *Discourse*, pp. 149.

A model in Chavin style from the central coast depicts a woman training a girl to weave. The figurines are made of camelid yarn with needlework to render their faces, and they wear clothing of cotton and wool. The scene is mounted on a cloth bundle. This art is part of the huge Peruvian collection of the American Museum of Natural History in New York City. Exhibition staff chose the piece from among ten thousand ancient Peruvian objects they examined in order to portray Peru in a new permanent collection in the museum’s Hall of South American Peoples, opened in 1989. Peruvian objects from the museum’s collections were first put on permanent display in 1907, but the original exhibit was closed in the 1960s. Wealthy U.S. citizens made gifts of Peruvian collections to the museum in the late nineteenth century, and then the institution expanded its holdings by sponsoring archeological digs in Peru in the twentieth century.

But most weaving in Peru and Europe was still done in households. Workers could be more productive if they focused on carding or spinning, weaving or finishing. In this respect, neither the Incas nor colonial Peruvians were “behind” Europe. In fact, some weaving innovations spread by the Romans in Europe were lost after collapse of the empire. Unlike the Inca tradition of mostly female weavers, men wove in the obrasjes, as they did
throughout Europe, where women were mostly confined to carding and
spinning.

European leaders understood that the strength of a nation was bound up
in its textile manufacturing and foreign trade of its cloths. To protect local
spinners and weavers, who increasingly improved the quality of their
workmanship by specializing in one task, Britain restricted imports of Indian
cloth and prohibited export of its wool. Guilds – *gremios* in Spain and its colonies
– and fraternal societies of textile workers had wide influence, especially at the
municipal level. Spain once had more developed pre-industrial textile
manufacturing than Britain. Arab traders had brought luxurious fabrics of China
and India across the Silk Road, and Moors introduced domesticated cotton into
Spain before 1,000 A.D. Iberian regions specialized in making different types of
cloth, and Spain’s industry flourished during the sixteenth century. Its merino
woolens were of the highest quality in Europe.²⁰⁵ By contrast, Peru’s obrajes
were relatively small and scattered around the colony. One factor sustaining
Peru’s obrajes may have been the gradual decline of Spain’s own textile industry
under foreign competition.

²⁰⁴ Some Roman technology was preserved in Byzantium, owing to better trade connections
Technology*, vol. 2 (191-220, covering 700 BC to 1500 AD), p. 191.

vol. 3 (151-180, covering 1500-1750), pp. 151-152.
Backstrap loom weaving as depicted on Moche flaring ceramic bowl (top and left, British Museum collection) and by Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala (right). For a drawing of all panels on the bowl and analysis of why depiction of textile and other manufacturing was so rare in Moche art, see Christopher B. Donnan, *Moche Art and Iconography* (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Studies Center, 1976), pp. 66 and 130-132. For examples of headdress bands similar to those being woven in the bowl fineline paintings, see Christopher B. Donnan, *Moche Portraits from Ancient Peru* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), pp. 50-51.

**The Textile “Evolution”**

Mechanization of textile production was the dream of inventors at least since Leonardo da Vinci c. 1490 (fig. 4.8). Weaver guilds throughout Europe opposed introduction of automation devices. Cities banned them, as did
German regions from 1685 to 1726. Threats of specific mechanical innovations caused riots in Leiden in 1620 and London in 1675.206

So intimately is textile production associated with the European industrial revolution that its onset is generally given as 1760, based upon textile-making inventions. But this is misleading, for the road between inventions and their successful adoption in large scale manufacturing was a long one. Many early English patents for devices to improve spinning and weaving were never put to practical use until others adapted them in the right combination for effective use. To recognize this is not to discount their eventual revolutionary impact – only to clarify that the process took many decades. It was an evolution rather than a revolution, and “industrial revolution” is easily mystified. Because it is often presumed that Peru could not have joined in its early phases, the process – particularly as it unfolded in the United States – must be examined in relation to the timing of Peru’s development decisions made beginning in the late 1820s.

In the 1730s an English clockmaker and inventor, John Kay, improved productivity of the loom with elements of what he called a “wheeled shuttle” (later known as the “flying shuttle”) that was hand powered. This efficiency called for stronger efforts to develop faster spinning. But, even some fine inventions, such as Lewis Paul’s spinning machine patented in 1758, did not become successful until much later. One of Paul’s devices was driven by two donkeys in 1741 in Birmingham, and another was powered by a water wheel in

206 Ibid., p. 167.
1743 at Northampton. The eight-spindle spinning jenny, the device so often credited with launching the industrial revolution, was not patented by James Hargreaves until 1870. Like everything else in textile manufacturing, the wheel of the jenny initially was turned by hand. How quickly such devices reached Latin America is not well documented. The Brazilian naturalist Alexandre Rodrigues Ferreira drew a cotton spinning wheel he saw in the north Brazilian interior in the early 1780s that might have been imported directly from England (figs. 4.15-4.16). Around 1810 a French botanist found twelve water-powered cotton gins being used in the Meia Ponte region of the central Brazilian interior.

Typically, the workmen of one inventor would conceive of improvements and strike out on their own. Richard Arkwright, who made important spinning technology advances, crafted machines powered by hand until he converted them to be powered by horses. He had been apprenticed as a barber and wig-maker, inventing a waterproof dye for hair before turning his attention to the manufacture of cotton thread. As Arkwright added more spindles, it became clear that the future of spinning lay in water power, which, as we saw in chapter two, was introduced in Peru at the Casa de Moneda. Arkwright converted to water power in 1771, and his spinning machine would become known as the water-frame.

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207 Ibid., p. 162.

A hand-powered spinning machine by Richard Arkwright (left) that later became known as the water-frame when the inventor switched to water power in 1771, just five years before the U.S. Declaration of Independence. Mechanization of textile production was at the heart of the industrial “revolution,” but dating of specific devices gives a misleading impression of the timing of technological change, which came as a gradual evolution that was still in its infancy at the time of Peruvian independence. A Brazilian naturalist drew the roda de tear algodão he saw in the Amazon interior in the early 1780s (center). He also found a hand-cranked dual-roller cotton gin (right).

The Lima Moneda, which had been run by private contractors, had to be rebuilt after the destruction of most of the city in the great earthquake of 1746. Spain tightened its control of the Monedas of Mexico and Peru the same year by sending a new superintendent to Mexico City, Andrés Morales de los Ríos Ramírez de Arellano, to learn the business and then take over the Lima Moneda two years later under direct royal ownership. It is not clear when water power was introduced to drive its machinery, but it may have been during installation of new milling equipment and presses during 1751-1753. According to an

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In his study of the Lima Moneda, Manuel Moreyra Paz Soldán did not mention water power or describe its machinery in any detail. He wrote that, “En 1751 se acabó instalar un molino y tres volantes …” and that two years later, se dio término a tres nuevos molinos con 6 volantes ….” See
unpublished dissertation, late colonial Lima may have had one or more flour mills that were water powered.\textsuperscript{210} Amasa Delano’s description of the proliferation of leather straps and pulleys driven by hydropower suggested that Peruvian technicians could have adapted this technology to other uses in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Spanish forces carried off some of the mint’s machinery to Cuzco during their retreat from Lima in 1823.\textsuperscript{211}

To understand Peru’s opportunities at the dawn of the industrial revolution, the U.S. case is instructive because it illustrates how relatively simple and transferable was the technology. Additionally, North American industry was the logical source for transfer to Peru. While Peru’s colonial period was closing, mechanical inventions still were being adopted slowly in actual production in Britain. The revolution began mainly with cotton because its fibers were easier to spin by mechanical means, although machines made to handle one


\textsuperscript{211} Robert Proctor, \textit{Narrative of a Journey Across the Cordillera of the Andes, and of a Residence in Lima, and Other Parts of Peru, in the Years 1823 and 1824} (London: Archibald, Constable and Co., 1825), p. 215. According to the \textit{Gaceta de Madrid}, the mint’s machinery was removed during the royalist evacuation of Lima in July, 1823, and in December the order was given to transport it to Cuzco where, by June 1824, \textit{el Cuzco se ve hoy con una casa de moneda constituida con todos sus elementos}. See \textit{Gazeta de Madrid}, March 10, 1825, p. 119.
fiber were later adapted for use with another.\footnote{212 Julia de L. Mann, “The Textile Industry: Machinery for Cotton, Flax, Wool, 1760-1850,” in Charles Singer, et al., eds, \textit{A History of Technology}, vol. IV (277-307), p. 277.} When Hamilton gave his “Report on Manufactures,” the British industry was still in infancy, and it would be several decades before factory machine-made cottons could compete effectively with hand woven cloth made at home. The first U.S. power looms could produce only plain “grey goods,” the least desirable cloth. Popular checks and plaids had to be woven by hand at home (fig. 4.17).

![Fig. 4.17](image)

At the time of Peruvian independence, a single master craftsman could carry out of Britain or the United States all of the essential knowledge and skills required to start making textile machines anywhere in the world. This was the reason Britain outlawed the emigration of its textile machinery designers and craftsmen. The policy held the United States back for a time, but preventing such people from crossing the Atlantic proved futile, and there was no reason
Peruvians could not acquire the technology. Because household spinning and weaving remained so important to the industry, factory-sized machines were scaled down for home production. A “vertical spinning jenny” for the home was patented around 1820, reducing the cost and mobility of the technology.

Mechanics often built spinning and weaving machines right in the mills where they were to be installed. Many, like the c. 1820s loom shown in fig. 4.19 were portable. They were held together with wooden pegs and could be dismantled and moved from mill to mill, mill to home, or mill to a ship destined for South America.²¹³

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²¹³ Rivard, p. 5.
Britain’s head start in textile manufacturing was a serious U.S. concern, as it was later in Peru. By the time the U.S. constitution was adopted in 1787, it appeared that British cloth might completely dominate the U.S. market. So, Hamilton believed that government must jump start the U.S. industry. In deference to New England merchants and Southern agriculturalists, in his 1791 “Report on Manufactures” he put more stress on direct subsidies to textile companies than on protective tariffs. He reminded merchants – naturally adverse to tariffs – that a thriving textile industry eventually could be a source of exports. To better understand Hamilton’s policy it is helpful to review the information he was receiving during the months he was drafting the report.

The Massachusetts state assembly had led the way, putting up prize money in 1786 for the first person who could build Arkwright-type carding and spinning machines to be put on public display for training purposes. Two Scottish brothers won the contest, and mechanics began to study and copy their “States Models” for three years before investor Moses Brown financed the first
U.S. spinning mill in Rhode Island. The performance of machines patterned on the States Models was unsatisfactory, and Brown concluded that the Scottish brothers probably had seen such devices but never built or operated them. Meanwhile, a young English mechanic, Samuel Slater, who had been apprenticed in a cotton mill at age ten, learned all aspects of the design and operation of Arkwright-type spinning machinery. Hearing of interest in the United States and the fact that Massachusetts had offered a handsome reward to the person who could replicate the Arkwright system, Slater defied the British ban on exporting the technology and began to memorize all the designs and methods of components manufacture. In 1789, at age twenty-one, he sailed for New York. While looking for a suitable investor there, Slater heard of the efforts in Rhode Island and wrote Moses Brown. “Sir, A few days ago I was informed that you wanted a manager of cotton spinning, etc. in which business I flatter myself that I can give the greatest satisfaction, in making machinery, making good yarn, either for stockings or twist, as any that is made in England.” He made the dubious claim to have had some “oversight” of “Sir Richard Arkwright’s works,” in addition to the mill to which he was indentured. Brown was becoming discouraged and wrote back that his machines had proved “too imperfect to afford much encouragement” or remuneration to Slater, but that “if thou wilt come and do it, thou shalt have all the profits made of them over and above the interest of the money they cost, and the wear and tear of them.” Brown was offering Slater the possibility that he could become principal owner of the enterprise, if he were successful (he wound up with one-third ownership). “We
are destitute of a person acquainted with water-frame spinning,” Brown admitted.214

It took Slater all of 1790 to rebuild the imitations of the “States Models” machines and extend them to just one hundred spindles, a pitiful number compared with Britain’s estimated 2.4 million. The mill was in the village of Pawtucket along the Blackstone River. Alexander Hamilton was following these developments, requesting the latest news about Slater and others right up until he delivered his 1791 “Report.” What became known as Slater’s Mill in the United States did not acquire the next British advance, a hybrid of the spinning frame and the jenny called the “mule,” until Slater’s brother brought one over in 1804. Amasa Delano must have seen one of these early New England mills up close, because the Lima Moneda reminded him of it in 1805.

Right from the outset, Slater employed children to run his spinning machines.215 Some mechanics building Slater’s devices moved on to take advantage of their new skills, and spinning mills spread until there were whole New England towns built around them. This, in turn, touched off a great expansion of home weaving as merchants placed orders for cotton cloth on a piecework basis. The “putting-out” system still prevailed across New England.


215 By the 1830s, Slater and his brother operated 9,500 spindles in an area of Rhode Island known as Slaterville. They employed 169 children, 109 women and 66 men. Tucker, p. 302.
Spinning mill owners used local networks of shopkeepers as agents who contracted with the weavers. The shopkeeper received the yarn from the mill, distributed it to mostly rural families, checked their cloth for quality, paid them in cash or store goods, and returned the cloth to the mill owner.\footnote{216}{Ibid., p. 303.}

He may have been remembered in his hometown back in Britain as “Slater the traitor,” but, according to his friend and first biographer, George White, U.S. president Andrew Jackson visited Slater early in his first term and proclaimed him “the father of the American manufactures.”\footnote{217}{White, ed., Memoir of Samuel Slater, p. 264.} In White’s recollection, the president said to Slater, “I understand you taught us how to spin, so as to rival Great Britain in her manufactures; you set all these thousands of spindles at work, which I have been delighted in viewing, and which have made so many happy, by a lucrative employment.” Slater is said to have replied, “Yes sir, I suppose I gave out the psalm and they have been singing it ever since.” Henry Clay wrote White that he was pleased to possess as souvenir of U.S. development “some cotton yarn spun by the first spindles which [Slater] put up.”\footnote{218}{Henry Clay to George S. White, July 4, 1835, in Ibid., p. 422.}
When Peru’s independence was declared in 1821, about two-thirds of all cloth in the United States was still made at home. This early phase of U.S. industrialization was centered on spinning and did not threaten home weavers but supported them, at least until 1830. According to Paul Rivard, former director of the American Textile History Museum, cotton spinning machines ushered in “the era of most intense home manufacturing.” Rivard gave the example of a brother and sister, Mary Ann and Benjamin Mowry, who during 1817-1819 wove almost one and one half miles of cotton checks and stripes at home under contract to Rhode Island’s Blackstone Manufacturing Company. With about fifty threads per inch, the teenagers passed the shuttle through the warp threads more than four million times.219

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England had about 2,400 power looms by 1813. The United States had none, just eight years before the proclamation of Peruvian independence. The Embargo of 1807 (a retaliatory measure against Britain and France during the Napoleonic Wars) and the War of 1812 with Britain should have provided major stimulus to U.S. manufacturing, but the war proved disruptive to business, and postwar conditions were unsettled. Rhode Island mills did not have a fully-operational water powered loom of U.S. manufacture until 1818, the year Bartow Prevost arrived in Peru.\(^{220}\) The U.S. “progress” that William Tudor recommended to Peru in 1824 was of very recent vintage and centered in his own New England region.

\(^{220}\) James L. Conrad, Jr., “‘Drive that Branch’: Samuel Slater, the Power Loom, and the Writing of America’s Textile History,” *Technology and Culture*, vol. 36, no. 1 (January 1995), (1-28), p. 6. The purpose of Conrad’s article was to show that Samuel Slater was not an opponent of water-powered looms, as scholars had previously assumed.
In 1813 a group of Massachusetts merchants pooled $100,000 to establish the Boston Manufacturing Company. The firm hired mechanics to build machine shops and try to perfect a viable power loom. They may have made one or more operational by 1814, but it took several years to perfect the devices. The Boston Manufacturing Company was highly profitable, but technological refinements were incremental until more sophisticated mills were built at Lowell beginning in 1821. Even in the 1830s, the success of power looms was mostly limited to the cheapest and coarsest grades of plain cloth similar to Peru’s *tocuyos*. 
– the product Alsop was importing into Peru. Quality U.S. cottons were still woven at home by the putting-out system.

When Peru won the decisive battle of Ayacucho in 1824, home woven cloth still predominated over mill-made textiles in the United States, but power looms were gaining. As Rivard put it, “The industrial revolution, led by the manufacture of textiles, was in fact no revolution at all but rather an evolution which lasted for generations.” Some of the newer looms were too complicated to be run by children, so the Massachusetts producers began to recruit single women. By the time Peruvians were debating the value of manufacturing to their own development in the late-1820s to early 1830s, U.S. machine shops could produce a complete water-powered carding, spinning, weaving and finishing operation. As with Lima’s Casa de Moneda, all manufacturing steps could be contained in different parts of a single building, each set of machines powered by the same water wheel. Overbuilding put downward pressure on prices, and numerous mills failed, leaving idle equipment available for transfer elsewhere. The United States had reached a point in its infant industrialization where the machines themselves were only one factor in the success or failure of a factory, and the country was ready to export its technology and best operational practices.

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221 Rivard, pp. 19-20.
INDUSTRY AND BANKING

Manufacturing contributed to parallel development of a U.S. financial industry. The same merchants who backed men like Samuel Slater and the Boston Manufacturing Company founded numerous small banks, and Slater himself became president of the Manufacturers Bank. The three-dollar bank note purportedly signed by Samuel Slater above is actually a well-engraved contemporary counterfeit. Peru’s spurring of a U.S. fertilizer market in the 1850s also contributed to establishment of small U.S. banks (chapters seven and ten).


COTTON AGRICULTURE TO SUPPORT TEXTILE MANUFACTURING

The issues Hamilton grappled with were precisely those Peru faced in the late 1820s and early 1830s. One disadvantage of Peru was the sorry state of its agriculture, a fact bemoaned by Alexander von Humboldt in his 1803 assessment. Peru’s cotton was grown on a narrow band of coastal desert, and farming there required irrigation, something pre-Columbian civilizations had developed much better than Peru’s colonial or republican regimes. The rainless coast is crossed by almost sixty rivers that bring water down from the Andes. While there is great seasonal and year-to-year variation in the volume of these rivers, the twelve largest carry an annual water discharge of from 700 million cubic meters to five billion cubic meters. Even some of Peru’s smaller rivers were harnessed by pre-Columbian cultures to create impressive agriculture-based civilizations – the Moche river being a renowned example.²²² Lack of

colonial investment in irrigation left Peru unable to attract more than small numbers of free farmer immigrants from the highlands or abroad, and many of the larger coastal estates relied on a diminishing supply of slaves and other forced labor. Peru’s modest imports of slaves in the late colonial and early republic periods (see the Amasa Delano incident chronicled in chapter two), were insufficient to replace those lost to service by age, disability and death.

By contrast, the Louisiana territories that the United States obtained from France in 1803 after Haitian defeat of Napoleon’s reconquest expedition were vast and well-watered. Their incorporation as U.S. territories touched off a relentless southwestward expansion of cotton produced by slaves and northwestward expansion of farming by free immigrants. In the decade leading up to Peruvian independence, more than 200,000 settlers streamed onto some twenty million acres of land that Andrew Jackson and others expropriated from the Creeks and extorted from the Cherokee, Chicksaw and other tribes. The African slave trade to the United States was still legal and thriving until 1820. In Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi, migrating white squatters clashed with land speculators and slave owners. In 1801, Asian cotton dominated world production with sixty percent. But, U.S. cotton output surpassed India’s by 1820, and rose to sixty-eight percent of world production by the mid-nineteenth century. When the United States outlawed the slave trade in 1820, illegal traders based in Cuba moved Africans to the cotton region through Mexican territory, and production of cheaper cotton spawned further growth of textile mills in northern states. While U.S. factories had trouble competing against high quality British goods, they began to excel in the coarse cottons similar to those

woven in Peruvian obrajes. Cotton growing helped feed early U.S. industrialization, and expansion of cotton and slavery was a factor driving the United States to war with Mexico. State action was critical to U.S. expansion of cotton growing and development of textile mills. Similarly, Peru would require government intervention to make its transition from hand powered weaving to water powered spinning and weaving factories.

**INITIAL DEVELOPMENT IDEAS IN PERU**

Hipólito Unanue, landowner and Peru’s foremost scientist of the late colonial and independence periods, summed up the country’s development prospects in an 1825 report to congress. While declaring that “Peru is not a manufacturing nation,” he insisted that it “should not abandon” its textile obrajes that produce for *las clases inferiores*. On the contrary, government should seek their improvement because “we should not depend on foreign sources for what we ourselves can produce.” Although he did not use the term “protection,” he noted advances in Peruvian textile production during the years of interruption of trade with Spain.224 In 1791, Jacinto Calero y Moreira had observed that the obrajes produced only “bayetas, que llaman de la Tierra” that were consumed “almost only” by Indians and blacks.225 But, then, the same European conflicts that gave such impetus to U.S. shipbuilding and the carrying trade afforded Peruvian spinners and weavers with important natural (non-

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224 Unanue was Peru’s first treasury minister and then served as government and foreign affairs minister under Simón Bolívar. See Hipólito Unanue, “Memoria preparada para la presentación nacional por el señor ministro de estado el el departamento de gobierno y relaciones exteriors, y vice-presidente del consejo de gobierno, doctor don Hipólito Unanue,” in Manuel de Odriozola, ed., *Documentos literarios del Perú, colectados y arreglados por el coronel ...,* vol. 6 (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1874, 372-384), p. 380.

legislated) protection. Unanue stated that local manufacturers were able to supply “even those persons who dress with aliño” as they improved the quality of their products. Peruvian producers responded well to the demand for better-made textiles.226

Accounts of Peru’s lack of development following independence cite endemic political unrest and civil wars as the cause. On the surface the conflicts appeared to be a matter of personalities, but as the renowned intellectual Francisco García Calderón put it a century later, “[Peru’s] continuous revolutions hide the economic motive behind facile ideologies and sonorous enthusiasm.”227 One of the most important of those economic disputes was the attempt by some Peruvians to protect artisans and infant industries from the destructive competition of foreign manufactures. The British, who had long traded with Peru indirectly through Spanish intermediaries, quickly dominated many parts of Peru’s foreign commerce, including supply of a wide range of quality cotton and woolen goods. But, the United States figured prominently in Peru’s early conflicts over development policy, although not in the way a follower of Hamilton might have imagined.

FAULTY U.S. DATA ON TRADE WITH PERU

To appreciate the context of the U.S. role, it would be helpful to know the volume and components of U.S. trading in Peru for each year during the post-independence period. Unfortunately, good data are hard to come by. Official U.S. trade statistics provide an unreliable measure of the U.S.-Peruvian


227 Francisco García Calderón, La creación de un continente (Paris: Ollendorff, 1913), p. 188.
relationship. In fact, U.S. records indicated a total end to U.S. exports to Peru by the early 1830s (chart 4.1). But, the activities of U.S. merchants in Peru tell a different story.

![Chart 4.1: Officially Recorded U.S. Trade with Peru (1825-1846)](image)

Source: appendix.

Throughout the period charted above, the Alsop firm was one of the most active importers in Peru, and a couple of other U.S. merchants were established in Lima. Most important among the latter was Edward McCall, the Lima agent of one of Philadelphia’s most distinguished commercial families. His great-grandfather, George McCall, emigrated to Philadelphia from Glasgow, Scotland, where his father was a wealthy merchant.228 George McCall invested his commercial profits in real estate in and around Philadelphia. He and his wife had fourteen children, of whom nine survived to adulthood and married in Pennsylvania. His four sons and each of his five sons-in-law were engaged in

commerce, and the most successful was Edward McCall’s grandfather, Archibald. Contrary to the city’s prevailing Quaker norms, all of the McCall brothers and their brothers-in-law were involved in developing an elite dancing club where they practiced the fashionable English and Parisian styles, paying annual dues of forty shillings. Alexander Hamilton was a member of the dance group. According to the family’s genealogist, Archibald amassed “a very considerable fortune by trade in both the East and the West Indies.”

Archibald’s son and namesake (1767-1843) followed him into the business and was a co-founder of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce. This third-generation Philadelphia merchant did not have a large family, and Edward McCall apparently was his only son to go into business with him.

McCall probably went to Peru to represent his father’s commercial interests in South America (and perhaps also those of his uncles and other Philadelphia merchants). Evidence of McCall family political connections was the fact that Edward was the U.S. navy’s purchasing agent in Peru. McCall was successful enough there to attract Bartow Prevost’s son, Stanhope, into a business partnership. Enough is known about Stanhope Prevost’s life in Lima to judge the partnership’s importing and exporting as good-to-excellent, although never a threat to Alsop’s dominance in U.S.-Peruvian trade.


230 Archibald McCall’s family is profiled in Keen, The Descendants, pp. 199-210.

231 Edward McCall’s two brothers did not go into commerce. One was an attorney and writer, the other a professional military officer, George Archibald McCall. The latter graduated from West Point in 1822 and served in Florida and Mexican wars before retiring. At onset of the Civil War he came out of retirement and was tasked with raising a Pennsylvania volunteer force of 15,000 men. President Lincoln later named him Brigadier General of U.S. Volunteers. Keen, Descendants, p. 206.
Even if the Alsop and McCall-Prevost partnerships were the only two U.S. merchant groups in Peru (they were not), U.S. direct exports to Peru during the 1830s and early 1840s did not wither and disappear, as the *Commerce and Navigation* data would indicate. The most important evidence of significant U.S. trade with Peru at this time is the role U.S. merchants and diplomats played in Peruvian debate over development policy.

**TARIFF PROTECTION IN PERU**

Peru's first commercial code, promulgated in June 1826, was explicitly "Hamiltonian" in its development intentions. Its goal was to promote industrialization in the new nation. "Commerce, as one of the principal sources of the prosperity and wealth of nations, should be encouraged by laws ...," the preamble stated, "such that the freedom which it is conceded or the restrictions to which it is subjected be the most effective means for promoting the development of national industry." The law slapped an eighty-percent tariff on the value of sixteen classes of articles whose importation was considered "injurious to the agriculture or industry" of Peru.

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233 As noted earlier, Hamilton saw protectionism as merely one component of a program for industrial development, and therefore a "Hamiltonian" strategy is not limited to protectionism.

234 The 1826 commercial code and the 1828 "law of prohibitions" are found in Dancuart, ed., *Anales*, II, pp. 77-82 and 140-141.
Paul Gootenberg found that Peru’s early protectionists were a coalition of Lima’s “nationalistic” merchants, artisans and shopkeepers, all interested in limiting the reach of European and U.S. merchant houses. The Alsops and others might dominate the import trade, but their Peruvian competitors wanted them confined to ports as consignment houses (consignatarios), with other wholesale and retail distribution reserved to Peruvian companies. Native-born merchant interests were strengthened in 1828 by reestablishment of the colonial-era Tribunal del Consulado, to which Manuel Barreda had belonged.

The people with the greatest stake in protectionism from a development standpoint were shoemakers, tanners, tailors, silversmiths, cigar makers, bakers, carpenters and other craftsmen threatened by foreign imports. Iñigo García-Bryce charted their emergence as a political force advocating a high tariff policy, both to nurture nascent industry and to claim rights as hijos del país. However, attempts to revive colonial era artisan guilds met with some popular opposition to the degree that their actions were perceived as “monopolistic” or designed to limit entrance by Indians, blacks and mixed-race people into skilled trades.

Some of Peru’s liberal leaders opposed protectionism because they associated tariffs and the high price of imported goods with the last decades of Spain’s colonial rule. Especially resented was the high cost of English goods during Spain’s wars with Britain. Thus, British arguments that free trade fostered greater consumption, and larger sales of imports produced greater economic development (the growth fallacy) found acceptance among liberal reformers. Looking back on the late colonial period, Francisco Javier Mariátegui

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lamented that English goods “paid excessive taxes” when they left Cadiz and then again when they reached Peru, and that duties were also imposed on Spanish goods even though “they were not of good quality.”

Thus, U.S. interests found allies among the most reform-mined of Peru’s elites.

What U.S. merchants especially resented in Peru’s early protectionist measures was the fact that the list of high tariff items covered almost all of the principal U.S. exports to Peru, while European products were less affected. For example, the only textiles heavily taxed were cheaper coarse cottons in which U.S. mills were more competitive than British manufacturers. Furthermore, the list included lard, furniture, soap, candles and liquor – all basic items in the early U.S. trade with Latin America. And, in 1828 this tariff was converted into a total exclusion of the same products, to which wheat flour was added. Thus, the protectionists would prohibit virtually all trade with the United States, due to the special incompatibility, from the Peruvian perspective, of trade between the two economies. The rationale of those Peruvians who promoted these policies grew not merely out of a reaction against the "metropolitan avarice" embodied in the Spanish colonial regulations which had strangled Peruvian development; it was also based on their understanding that the United States and the nations of Europe had promoted their own development of "primitive articles of their industry" through precisely such measures.

U.S. products were more of a threat to Peru’s development at this “primitive” or proto-industrial stage because they were so similar to those Peru could and did produce for itself.

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238 For example, see the 1827 report of minister of finance José de Morales y Ugalde, in Dancaurt, *Anales*, II, pp. 119-120.
In explaining his opposition to protective tariffs and the 1828 prohibitions, treasury minister José María Pando seemed to adopt the arguments of U.S. traders. Even Great Britain, with its powerful navy, could not prevent contraband if tariffs were set too high, he said. The higher the tariff, the greater the “stimulus to ambition” and profit. Peru’s coast offered too many opportunities to carry on illicit commerce, as the viceroy in Lima had discovered. Pando named eight lightly populated places where contraband thrived, including Mancora and Piura. “There flocked the buyers, fairs opened, stores were set up, and markets were supplied with an abundance of every type of provisions.” Frustrated in their coast-guard efforts to suppress contraband in Bengal, he said, the British opted for minimal duties. Peru should use reason to find cierto termino medio between its need for customs revenue, on the one hand, and taxes so high as to invite contraband, on the other.239

Pando then offered a rather narrow view of U.S. development since independence. The tariff conflict in the United States was just a little short of “a civil war between the states of the south and north,” and John Adams lost reelection in 1800 over that issue, he declared. U.S. efforts to achieve “independence from the English factories and manufactures” led to disappointment and great loss of capital invested in manufacturing. “It was finally realized that the American capitalist and manufacturer could not yet compete with the English capitalists and manufacturers,” Pando thought. If that was true for the North Americans, then surely Peru was “trying to pick the fruit before planting the tree.” Furthermore, he said that the loss to the Peruvian

239 José María Pando, Memoria sobre el estado de la hacienda de la república peruana, en fin del año de 1830, presentada al congreso por el ministro de estado del despacho de hacienda (Lima: Imprenta de José Masias, 1831), pp. 22-23.
treasury of customs revenue on the prohibited list of products was tantamount to an “embezzlement” of 600,000 pesos.  

U.S. COMPETITION WITH CHILE

U.S. commercial interests in Peru conflicted with the goal of South American regional integration. Peruvians and Chileans had long carried on a preferential trading relationship, primarily by exchanging Peruvian sugar for Chilean wheat and flour. The goal of regional integration not only ran counter to the Alsops and other U.S. merchants who had taken over much of Peru’s flour market from Chile during the wars of independence, but it was contrary to U.S. diplomatic principles designed to insure U.S. commerce most-favored-nation rights in all foreign markets.

Its relationship with Chile was difficult for Peru. Lima wanted to protect Peru’s traditional commercial dominance over Chile, but Valparaiso was better located geographically to be a Pacific distribution point for ships rounding Cape Horn. Chile’s late colonial rivalry with the power of the Lima viceroyalty had brewed animosity. Chileans resented Peruvian economic discrimination and limeño patronization. Perhaps the insults were mostly apocryphal, but Chileans thought the latter had mocked them behind their backs with such comments as, “Whereas in Lima even mulattoes wear silk stockings, in Chile gentlemen wear sandals and in Argentina they go barefoot.”

Chileans felt Peruvians showed

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240 Ibid., pp. 23-24.

241 I am indebted to Robert Burr for brining attention to this quotation, which Francisco Antonio Encina termed a frase célebre, and recorded in his Historia de Chile desde la prehistoria hasta 1891 (20 vols., Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1949-1953), vol. 11, p. 128. I phrased it as it would have been voiced by a contemporary, but Encina presented it in the past tense: Cuando en Lima los mulatos usaban medias de seda, en Chile los caballeros calzaban hojotas y en Argentina andaban a pata.
little gratitude for their sacrifices in blood and treasure to liberate Peru from Spanish rule. Chileans were pained when José de San Martín, Argentine leader of the liberation army that fought its way from the south to seize Lima, dissolved Chilean army units and drafted their expeditionary forces into a new Peruvian army. Unstable Peruvian governments showed no interest in paying a debt of one million pesos to cover Chile’s military aid in defending Lima from Spanish counterattack. Now, Chileans could offer traders a more secure personal and business environment compared to the lawlessness that plagued Lima and its environs up until the mid-1840s. To forestall further commercial erosion of Callao vis-à-vis Valparaiso, Peruvians threatened to impose a punitive tariff on ships that did not proceed directly to Callao after rounding the cape.\textsuperscript{242} The peril that a government in Lima might impose such a tax was complicated by the fact that Peru was Chile’s principal market for some of its own products, especially wheat flour.

Chile reacted to Peru’s commercial threats in 1832 by launching a little retaliatory trade war of its own. After Peru instituted regulation of Chilean wheat and flour warehoused at Callao, Chile imposed a prohibitive duty on Peruvian sugar and began to seek Brazilian supplies. Peru’s vulnerable sugar producers then got Lima to end hostile escalations and to negotiate a commercial treaty with Santiago, which the two countries ratified in 1835. Meanwhile, Chile’s political strengths paid development dividends. Custom receipts collected at Valparaiso rose three-fold during 1831-1835 and allowed Chile to put its fiscal house in order.\textsuperscript{243} Although Peru repudiated the commercial treaty


\textsuperscript{243} Ibid., pp. 29-32.
with its southern rival during Chile’s efforts to destroy the Peru-Bolivian Confederation (1836-1839), the resulting war only strengthened Chile’s commercial position.

Some U.S. agents sympathized with Peru’s objectives of industrial protection and special arrangements with Chile. U.S. chargé d’affaires Samuel Larned, who was moved by Washington from Chile to Lima specifically to contest Peru’s protectionist policies, pointed out to Washington that those measures were dictated by Peruvian self-interest and only coincidentally fell heaviest on U.S. products. About half of Chile’s exports to Peru consisted of wheat and flour. Jeremy Robinson had earlier written that, "Peru and Chile, economically, are like husband and wife," referring to the extensive trade relations developed during the late colonial period. Washington, however, was uninterested in Peruvian motivation and viewed these events as a discriminatory attack on U.S. commerce that should be resisted by diplomatic lobbying and negotiation.

Although Chile was successful in taking back much of the Peruvian wheat and flour market from U.S. merchants, it does not appear that Peru’s protectionist measures were ever consistently implemented. A young U.S.

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244 Jeremy Robinson, quoted in Francisco A. Encina, Historia de Chile (3rd ed., 20 vols.; Santiago: Nacimiento, 1949-1952), X, p. 172. As noted in an earlier chapter, Robinson was originally named to the coveted “special agent” status that Prevost enjoyed. But, according to Whittaker, the State Department had second thoughts about him and withdrew the appointment before he sailed to South America. Robinson tried to pass himself off as an agent anyway, and he deluged Washington with long-winded reports.

245 Gootenberg came to an opposite conclusion, perceiving that it was free trade initiatives, not protectionism, that were poorly implemented until their triumph during policy struggles of 1848-1851. “Social Origins,” pp. 331-332. He wrote that, “This structure of ‘protectionism,’ broadly conceived, proved relatively successful throughout the 1830s in both its political and economic aims” (p. 334). However, there may be little or no disagreement here, since Gootenberg focused more on protection afforded to native-born merchants (restrictions on the reach into wholesaling and retailing by foreign import houses) than on protectionism in the Hamiltonian sense. The focus of this chapter is on tariffs designed to nurture local crafts and manufacturing.
merchant on his first voyage to South America in 1829 wrote to Boston from Valparaiso that word of a revolution in Peru had just arrived, and that the prohibitions had been lifted. He said, “there is now every reason to expect a better state of things and moderate rate of duties in Peru.”

A Larned diplomatic report in 1831 implied that the famous "law of prohibitions" was not enforced, even by governments that claimed to support it. “As yet, not a barrel of [U.S.] flour, or a yard of our coarse cottons has felt the effects of the nominally revived prohibitory decree,” Larned declared.

As Pando had noted, smuggling was an obstacle to effective protectionism, and U.S. ship captains were notorious for moving contraband all over Latin America. Smuggling was a double-edged sword for the United States. On the one hand, it undermined Peruvian protectionist efforts. At the same time, U.S. representatives in Peru used the fact of smuggling as an argument for regulation of imports rather than prohibition. It was better, they warned, for Peru to receive tax revenue on legal imports rather than nothing on smuggled goods.

However, even regulated commerce could be dodged, as was noted earlier in discussion of secret shipments of silver out of Peru by Pacific Station ships. Heinrich Witt described his own minor role in facilitating contraband in July 1825, when he helped take plata pina aboard the British warship H.B.M. Mersey in the dead of night at Quilca. While he did not say so, such operations probably involved paying Peruvian officials to look the other way. If Witt’s

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example was typical, the Royal Navy’s haul of specie out of Peru was many times greater than that taken on U.S. Navy vessels. Witt’s main duty on behalf of the Arequipa branch of Gibbs Crawley that night was to count out and register with the British captain 60,000 pesos the firm was sending to London. The total taken aboard the Mersey on that stop was 331,000 pesos. (A net worth of 100,000 pesos was considered a respectable sum to have accumulated for someone working for five or more years in a foreign merchant house in Peru.)

In comparing U.S. consular records to those of the British and French, Paul Gootenberg formed the opinion that the foreign battle against Peruvian tariffs was led by "the impetuous North Americans." He concluded that, "the United States was Peru’s most strategic trade partner in the aftermath of independence." He noted that, unlike more cautious British representatives, U.S. officials were conspicuous in their meddling in Peruvian politics, especially in efforts to reverse the protectionist laws. Gootenberg found evidence that U.S. consuls may have subsidized much of Peru’s liberal free-trade propaganda during the 1827-1837 period, perhaps going so far as to have some of it ghost written.248 The United States had the most to lose from Peruvian protectionism, and that may explain why U.S. officials sometimes threw caution to the wind.

PROTECTIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

Trade policy in the United States, as Pando noted, was equally contentious, and opponents were able to weaken Hamilton’s protectionist regime over time. At one point in 1832, Henry Clay, who had been the most outspoken champion of U.S. recognition of South American independence, gave an

248 Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano, pp. 18-19.
impassioned speech against free trade proponents, alleging that they would have Great Britain recolonize America. “Gentlemen deceive themselves,” Clay thundered. “It is not free trade they are recommending to our acceptance. It is, in effect, the British colonial system that we are invited to adopt.” Clay heaped scorn on the call for “Free trade! Free trade!” He said it existed only in proponents’ imaginations. “The call for free trade is as unavailing as the cry of a spoiled child, in its nurse’s arms, for the moon or the stars that glitter in the firmament of heaven.” Free trade that is fair, equal and reciprocal “has never existed,” he said, echoing language heard in the Peruvian congress. All nations protect their own producers with prohibitions, duties and other barriers, he noted. The choice, said Clay, was between the “American system” and a “foreign system.”

Clay lost the 1832 presidential election to Andrew Jackson, who proceeded to undermine the Hamiltonian program, just as free traders effectively had done in Peru. The difference was that infant U.S. industry had gotten its legs under more than forty years of protectionism and other government encouragement, whereas the Peruvian counterpart was smothered in its cradle.

Peru was not the only newly-formed Latin American nation debating protectionism. Under pressure from artisan spinners, the Mexican government banned imports of cheap cotton cloth in 1829 before shifting the following year to a tariff on such goods to raise money to aid Mexico’s spinners and weavers. Under leadership of Lucas Alamán, Mexico diverted the special custom duty to establish a bank in support of industrial development. The money generated was lent to manufacturers, inducing some Mexican and foreign merchants to

249 Register of Debates in Congress, Comprising ... of the First Session of the Twenty-Second Congress ... (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1833), p. 266.
invest in textile production. They ordered machines from the United States and began operating Mexico’s first power cotton spinning mills in 1833. Before exhausting its funding in 1836, the bank lent more than half a million dollars for textile mill development, $146,000 of it to Estevan de Antuñano, who built Mexico’s largest mill in Puebla, and another $60,000 to Alemán himself to build a factory in Veracruz in partnership with Legrand Hermanos. In ten years the Mexican textile industry expanded to fifty-three mills representing an investment of some ten million dollars, demonstrating, as in the U.S. case, how modest initial government support could open the path to private investment.

Mexico’s new mill owners sought a total prohibition of cheap cottons imports, but mostly had to settle for a fairly stiff protective tariff that lasted until the U.S. war with Mexico. That disaster discredited conservatives and led to control of government by liberal free traders. The shift was driven more by ideology, politics and war-related fiscal crisis than by sound economic reasoning. An influential 1845 critique of Mexican protectionism by a member of a foreign bondholders’ commission was a shallow, zero-sum analysis arguing that protectionism cost the government four million pesos in lost customs revenues annually and supported about 35,000 industrial workers to the detriment of seven million other Mexican citizens and every other area of economic activity. It even made the claim that because Mexican farmers sold their cotton to local industry they were somehow prevented from also seeking foreign markets.

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251 He said that by developing 30,000 acres of cotton to supply local spinning mills, Mexico retarda the development of the country’s other 794,848,007 arable acres. See Roberto Crichton Willie, “Mexico, noticias sobre su hacienda pública bajo el gobierno español y después de la independencia,” in Córdova, El comercio, pp. 107-111.
While there is debate over what this protected industry actually contributed to Mexico’s long-term development, the contrast between Mexican and Peruvian industrial policy was stark. One result of the failure of Peruvian protectionism during those crucial first years of independence was that the flood of U.S. *tocuyos* extinguished many of the remaining *obrajes* that had produced coarse-grade textiles during the colonial and immediate post-independence periods in small factories in Cuzco and other interior towns.\(^{252}\)

U.S. sales of coarse cottons to Peru were one component in a South American market important to early U.S. industrial development. “The Lowell power looms at Waltham were making sheetings for the South American trade before 1824,” wrote historian Samuel Eliot Morison, “and by 1850 that continent was taking over three-quarters of the total export of ‘domestics’ from Boston.”\(^{253}\)

As with the carrying trade in the period prior to Peruvian independence, South America was a key component in early U.S. industrial development.

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INDIRECT MEASURES OF U.S. TRADE WITH PERU

Exactly how much of an effect Peruvian protectionist measures actually had on U.S. trade with Peru remains a mystery, because of the data reporting problems noted above. Probably there was some decline, especially relative to Peru’s imports from other countries. British and continental firms rushed agents to Lima at the first signs of independence. Enough prospering European merchants were on hand in Lima by 1821 to form an English businessmen’s club there. With the final defeat of Spanish forces in 1824, U.S. traders and smugglers lost some competitive advantage in a market long dependent on European merchandise and Chilean provisions. The growing British dominance of trade in a generally stagnant Peruvian market is seen in table 4.1 and chart 4.2. Business income figures for Lima compiled by Paul Gootenberg were flat or declining during the 1830s, but the value of British exports to Peru rose modestly after 1834. The British share of Peru’s imports rose from about one-third in 1826 to almost six-tenths in 1837. Some of this British gain may have come at U.S. expense. By the late 1830s, the U.S. share of Peru’s imports may have fallen to about fifteen percent or lower (next table).
Table 4.1
Estimated Origins of Peruvian Imports
1826 and 1837
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1826</th>
<th>1837</th>
<th>1839*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1839 is for the nine months only. See P. Emilio Dancuart, Anales de la hacienda pública del Peru, v. 2, 2nd ed. (Lima: Imprenta “La Revista,” 1906, p. 23. Gootenberg (Between Silver and Guano, appendix) cited British consular reports for both 1826 and 1837 estimates, with the exception of Chile 1837; the latter is an average based on the two Chile estimates given for 1835/36 in Gootenberg’s note “b,” citing a report in a Lima newspaper.

In 1831 U.S. records showed exports to Peru falling almost to zero, but that was the same year Samuel Larned, the U.S. charge d'affaires in Lima and point man for the anti-protectionist forces, boasted that the prohibitions had no effect on U.S. commerce there. Surely, if there had been a precipitous decline in U.S. exports to Peru, there would have been frequent discussion of the problem in the diplomatic correspondence.
Sources: Business income figures are from patente tax data in Paul Gootenberg's *Between Silver and Guano*, appendix table 1.4, p. 164. British exports are from the appendix.

Probably there was a misidentification by U.S. customs officials of the actual destination of some U.S. goods exported to South America. Lima and Callao were in relative decline as South America's dominant commercial center, a process accelerated by the early consolidation of independence in Buenos Aires and Chile. Buenos Aires was assuming control over much of the market of the Spanish American interior;²⁵⁴ and with Chilean independence, Peru faced ever-growing competition from merchants in Valparaiso anxious to capitalize on the shorter distance between their port and Europe. As a result, not only did Lima-

Callao decline as an entrepôt for the rest of South America, but European and United States goods which eventually entered the Peruvian market sometimes did so indirectly via warehouses in Buenos Aires and Valparaiso. The Alsop partnership was active in Chile, and so ships carrying their goods to Peru stopped first at Valparaiso. This probably caused distortion in U.S. customs house records. For example, the Boston merchant, Augustus Hemenway was an important U.S. trader on the West Coast of South America in the 1830s. Although he was known to have sold goods in Peru as early as 1829, his home office was located in Valparaiso, and U.S. exports handled by his firm presumably were recorded as destined for Chile. Further research may show the degree to which Alsop and Hemenway ships and other vessels from U.S. ports destined for Valparaiso continued on to Callao.


256 Hemenway-owned ships in the Boston to west coast of South America trade included the *Magellan* (631 tons), *John Wells* (817), *Sunbeam* (798), *Prospero* (645), *Melona M. Knowles* (205) and *P. M. Tinker* (286). The *Sunbeam* burned at sea off southern Chile in 1870. Hemenway had two large ships built for his South America business at the East Boston shipyard, the 952-ton *Independence* in 1871 and the 1,073-ton *Magellan* in 1873, the last of the firm’s sailing ships. In 1875, shortly before the founder’s death, Hemenway ordered construction of two steamships, the 1983-ton *City of Valparaiso* and the 2,032-ton *City of Santiago*. Ibid., pp. 30-39.
Chart 4.3
British Exports to Peru
Value of All Exports (1820-1848) and
Millions of Yards of Cottons (Selected Years)

Discussion of Chart 4.3

Official U.S. trade records did not properly show U.S. exports to Peru. Indeed, recorded U.S. exports to Peru in 1839-1843 and 1846 were zero, which was impossible. Actual U.S. exports to Peru can be deduced by reference to Peru’s trade with Great Britain during this period. United States consular reports detailing the cargos carried by U.S. ships arriving at Callao, and the notices published in El Comercio beginning in 1839 announced consignments to the Alsop firm that cleared customs.

The small circles on the black value line mark years (1826 and 1837) for which there are estimates of the U.S. share of the Peruvian market as a percent of the British share (twenty-eight and eighteen percent, respectively). If those estimates were roughly accurate, the absolute volume of U.S. exports to Peru probably declined little, if at all. Instead, the United States lost some relative share in a market that was recovering very gradually. U.S. sales to Peru probably remained in the range of two to three hundred thousand dollars. Also charted here are British sales of cotton textiles to Peru (in million of yards, right scale), illustrating how the textile trade was the singular force in British exports to the market.
Official Peruvian and European trade returns were similarly distorted by the Valparaiso phenomenon. Of the twenty-seven British vessels that reached Peru in 1840, four had landed first at Valparaiso. In the same year there was supposedly no direct trade between Asia and Peru; but, according to British commercial authority John MacGregor, "two cargoes from China arrived at Valparaiso towards the end of 1840, of which the whole assortments for Peru were purchased at Valparaiso and sent down to Callao, and which promised to yield one purchaser a fair profit."\(^257\) Germany likewise exported nothing directly to Peru, although shipments of German goods from Valparaiso to Callao were said to be considerable. While *Commerce and Navigation*, the U.S. government’s annual trade report, showed no United States exports to Peru in 1839 and 1840, MacGregor put Peruvian imports of U.S. cotton goods at 3.4 million yards, or about one-fourth as great as imports of British cottons, and he observed that, "cotton drills imported from the United States were preferred to those of Great Britain."\(^258\) In his opinion, the United States commanded fifteen percent of the overall Peruvian import market in 1837.

Charles Wilkes was in Lima in mid-1839 and said he could not get good data on Peru’s imports. “The annual imports into Peru are combined so much with those of Chili, that it was deemed proper [by U.S. trade officials?] to include them under the one head; those of Peru amount to about two-fifths of the whole,” which he estimated at about five million dollars. As for the main U.S. product, *tocuyos*, Wilkes stated that, “These countries offer a large market for our

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\(^258\) MacGregor, *Commercial*, pp. 358-359.
domestic cottons; and if the prices can be maintained, the United States will supply the most of the coarser kinds used there. I have it from the best authority, that the consumption of these goods is now double what it was five years ago, and it is still increasing.”

Since Wilkes made reference to assistance received from a member of the trading partnership of “Bartlett,” and Edwin Bartlett was an Alsop y Cía. partner and also U.S. consul in Lima at the time, this information was almost certainly based upon Alsop sales.

Peru’s failure to support infant industry worked to Alsop’s advantage, as did the firm’s relationship to El Comercio, founded in 1839. Alsop partners were among the newspaper’s initial subscribers, and no merchant house made better early use of its pages to highlight the range of goods it imported. An example of considerable Alsop activity in Peru is shown in table 4.2. The ship Jorge y Enrique reached Callao in May 1839 and landed a wide range of goods consigned to Alsop, which earned free publicity by allowing El Comercio to publish the ship’s manifest. The diversity of goods was notable, including 7,000 yards of tocuyos, 1,580 pairs of shoes, 1,570 lbs. of candles made of sperm oil, 145 barrels of nails, 14,000 lbs. of Virginia tobacco, 75 barrels of paint, 25 shotguns, a dozen sofas and a piano. Over the next decade this sort of importing of U.S. furniture, shoes and other products competing with the manufactures of

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259 Charles Wilkes, Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition, During the Years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842, published originally in 1845. Page citations are to the 1852 London edition (Ingram, Cooke and Co.), vol. 1, pp. 76 and 110.

260 As befit the new paper’s name, El Comercio designed its news format around arriving imported goods. Early issues listed the names of its subscribers.

261 This particular shipment of 7,000 yards of cotton cloth was insignificant compared to the 3.4 million yards that a British authority estimated the U.S. exported to Peru in 1839 and 1840, as mentioned above.
Peruvian artisans generated resentment and put renewed pressure on legislators to do something to stop it.
Table 4.2
Manifest of the Ship *Jorge y Enrique*
Showing Goods Consigned to Alsop y Ca.
Landing at Callao, May 7, 1839

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>quantity</th>
<th>type</th>
<th>product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>181</td>
<td>dozens</td>
<td><em>silletas de esterilla</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>sillas poltronas</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>sofas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>crates</td>
<td>wooden locks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>crate</td>
<td>piano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>carretillas completas</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>m.</td>
<td>cigars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>crates of 5 dozen ea.</td>
<td><em>rape</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>crates of packages of 10 dozen each</td>
<td><em>tobacco</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>chewing tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>fardos of 85 lbs. each</td>
<td><em>Virginia tobacco</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>m.</td>
<td>cigars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>yards</td>
<td>white cotton cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>lbs.</td>
<td>silk for sewing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>pieces</td>
<td><em>jénero para chalecos</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>pieces</td>
<td>hide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>pieces</td>
<td><em>pañuelos de chapa</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>pieces</td>
<td>idem. negra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>dozen</td>
<td>idem. seda?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>dozen</td>
<td>silk stockings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>dozen</td>
<td>cotton stockings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>bultos</td>
<td>mercería</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>crates</td>
<td>carpentry tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240</td>
<td>various sizes</td>
<td>mirrors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>bultos</td>
<td>various medicines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>heaters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,072</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>duelas</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,580</td>
<td>pair</td>
<td>shoes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>molejones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>atados of 280 each</td>
<td>empty sacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>complete</td>
<td><em>alambiques de cobre</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168</td>
<td>crates of una arroba each</td>
<td><em>pasas</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>crates totaling 1,570 lbs.</td>
<td>candles made of sperm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>crates of 590 dozen</td>
<td><em>cintas de hilo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>m.</td>
<td>pens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>gruesas</td>
<td><em>lapices</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>crates of 25 lbs. each</td>
<td>powder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>gruesas</td>
<td>betún</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>dozen</td>
<td>colored ink</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148</td>
<td>dozen</td>
<td>black ink</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>barrels</td>
<td>paint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>barrels of one qql. Ea.</td>
<td>nails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>crates</td>
<td>cristalería</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>crates of 30 quintales</td>
<td>tachuelas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.2 (continued)
Manifest of the Ship Jorge y Enrique
Showing Goods Consigned to Alsop y Ca.
Landing at Callao, May 7, 1839

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>shotguns</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gruesas</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>botones concha perla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dozen</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>cajetas corchitas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dozen</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>encordaduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>silk umbrellas</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cotton umbrellas</td>
<td>109</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mustard</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>crates of 3 dozen each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relojes con sus utiles</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>crates/62 ps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limas</td>
<td>139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suspensor</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ship captained by Wilson, from the United States, with intermediate stops at Valparaiso and Islay, El Comercio, May 13, 1839, p. 1.

On the other hand, Chile had largely taken over the U.S. share of Peru’s flour market, which had been another Alsop niche. “The article of flour, however,” Wilkes wrote, “has greatly fallen off; previous to 1830, there were nearly thirty thousand barrels exported to Peru from the United States; in the last three years, only six thousand, and in 1841 [sic], but one thousand, in consequence of Peru being abundantly supplied from Chile.” The Chilean flour mills that supplied Peru used machinery that “is brought from the United States.”

It possible that the Alsop’s biggest commercial rival in Lima and a merchant importing Chilean flour, was Pedro Gonzales de Candamo. If so, his ability to squeeze U.S. flour out of the Peruvian market could help explain the rise of the Chilean-born merchant, who in 1848 won the contract to build the

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262 Ibid. Since Wilkes was in Lima in 1839, but he gave a figure for 1841, he may have added information from other sources when he wrote up his Narrative.

263 This hypothesis is based upon scattered references in El Comercio to his importing flour (country of origin not specified) in 1839-1840.
Lima-Callao railway and, at the same time, was the principal source of financing for the next effort to establish a cotton textile industry in Peru (chapter eight).

A comparison between the United States and Peruvian returns for 1851 shows the *Commerce and Navigation* figures on U.S. exports to Peru to have been understated by at least 40 percent. The published Peruvian *Balanza Jeneral* for that year was a particularly thorough and perhaps reliable report, detailing the contents and value of the cargoes of each vessel that arrived from the United States. Thus, there is ample evidence that the low *Commerce and Navigation* figures for U.S. exports to Peru throughout the 1830s and 1840s were simply wrong (tables 4.3a and 4.3b).

Table 4.3a
Unreliable Data on Selected U.S. Exports to Peru 1825-1831
(Thousands of Lbs.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Butter (Thousands)</th>
<th>Hams (Thousands)</th>
<th>Lard (Thousands)</th>
<th>Soap (Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1825</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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264 *Commercial Relations*, 1856, I, pp. 689-690, footnote (a).
Table 4.3b
Unreliable Data on Selected U.S. Exports to Peru
1825-1831
(Thousands of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Wheat Flour</th>
<th>Cotton Textiles</th>
<th>Furniture</th>
<th>Liquor</th>
<th>Boots and Shoes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1825</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>1826</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Peru’s reliance on imported manufactures and the consequent loss of industrial opportunities does not imply that there was no capitalist development in early Republican Peru. Independence brought about a degree of income redistribution. The trend of continuous real-estate accumulation by the Church was reversed, and restrictions on acquisition of Indian-occupied lands were gradually removed.265 But, in general, dependence on imported manufactures ensured that productive investment would continue to be oriented toward the traditional commodity-export sectors developed during the colonial period. This is seen clearly in the reported U.S. imports from Peru, which, unlike the recorded U.S. exports, did not show a sustained decline until the U.S. depression of the early 1840s. In fact, the U.S. records contain a surprise indicating that the United States may have been Peru’s primary market for several of its commodities exports during the early post-Independence period. U.S. imports of Peruvian

copper, for example, were larger than those Heraclio Bonilla found in British and French records (see table 4.4).266

266 Much Chilean copper also went to the United States until imposition of a high tariff in 1869. The firm of A. Hemenway y Cía. of Valparaiso typically sent South American copper back on return voyages from Peru and Chile that originated at Boston.
Table 4.4
Peruvian Exports of Copper
To the United States, Great Britain and France
Thousands of $ or £
1829-1846

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>$ Exports to the United States</th>
<th>£ Exports to Britain and France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1836</td>
<td>57</td>
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<td>1843</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>1845</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: appendix.

The United States also appears in some years to have been Peru's principal market for hides and skins, as shown in table 4.5. These facts were obscured by the general high level of Peruvian exports to Europe, which included a range of commodities, such as wool, nitrate of soda, cinchona bark and cotton. The smaller volume of exports to the United States was dominated by copper.
Table 4.5
Peruvian Exports of Hides and Skins
To the United States, Great Britain and France
Thousands of $ or £
1829-1846

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>$ Exports to the United States</th>
<th>£ Exports to Britain and France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
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<tr>
<td>1833</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1834</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1836</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>1837</td>
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<td>1844</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>10</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: appendix.

Despite early failure of Peruvian protectionism, foreign merchants were not hegemonic in the Peruvian economy. Importing and wholesaling were highly competitive for Peruvians and foreigners alike; firms were many and of relatively modest size. According to the 1839 Lima patente business tax register, Lima had a chocolate factory and several wholesale tailor shops that were more prosperous than most foreign-owned import houses. Seven carpentry and wood working establishments paid as much tax on income as the city’s most active foreign physicians. But the large numbers of businesses dealing in foreign
merchandise (importers, wholesalers and retailers) suggested that together they comprised a powerful constituency reaping impressive aggregate profit.\textsuperscript{267}  

The commerce was largely the province of men. Only 160 out of 2,478 recorded businesses in Lima in 1839 were run by women, who were confined mostly to retailing in clothing, shoes, vegetables and accessories like ribbon and buttons. Only a handful of women competed in male-dominated trades; several ran mule train or ox cart agencies, and a few others were in the saddle-making business. Eight women ran small carpentry shops, and twenty-two had little neighborhood bars where informal gambling was common (chinganas). Nevertheless, a dozen Peruvian women owned medium-sized businesses, and one chocolate shop owned by a woman ranked as one of the largest businesses in the city. While women are rarely mentioned in studies of Peru’s artisans, it would appear that some women in Lima businesses would have had personal stakes in the debates over protectionism.

FELIPE BARREDA, NATIVE-BORN IMPORTER

Taken together, foreign merchants and their legations could be a formidable force in the first decades of independent Peru. But the cost of imported merchandise and the distance from the United States and Europe left some Peruvian artisans and entrepreneurs with a measure of natural protection, even when they could not rely on law or government promises. Whether or not such protection could be leveraged into a viable national development policy would depend on the leadership of those who brought peace to Peru under the umbrella of guano revenues. Political battles over protectionism erupted again

\textsuperscript{267} I have digitalized the 1839 and selected other Lima patente tax registers found in the Archivo General de la Nación.
in the late 1840s. At least as influential over trade policy as foreign houses such as Alsop were Peruvian merchants like Felipe Barreda, the subject of chapter seven, who could have the ear of presidents and finance ministers. In 1839, El Comercio’s reports on imported goods cleared through Callao customs showed him handling such varied goods as plata sellada, mercury and wax. But his imports also included the products of infant industry: ribbon, handkerchiefs, stockings and bolts of cotton cloth. Felipe Barreda became a conservative nationalist who advocated special privileges for native-born Peruvian merchants, but he was no friend of protectionists.

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268 For examples of goods cleared by Felipe Barreda, see El Comercio, July 2, 1839 (plata sellada) July 10 (1,800 yards of cotton cloth); July 30 (cotton handkerchiefs, silk stockings), July 31 (cotton handkerchiefs, wax, mercury), September 10 (ribbons, French silk handkerchiefs).
Chapter 5

IMPRESSIONS

Callao is a most miserable, filthy, ill built … port.
Charles Darwin, 1835

There is perhaps no country where Heaven’s gifts
to man are so wretchedly neglected.
Philo White, c. 1841

[Skys veiled by garua] make tearless Lima the strangest, saddest city.
Herman Melville, 1844

Peru’s failure to offer its small craft and manufacturing enterprises
protection from cheap foreign goods left the capital city in a depressed state for
two decades after independence. The most ample profits flowed to importers,
and their development priority was improvements to the port of Callao. The
challenges can be seen in the observations of foreign visitors, whose accounts
demonstrated how Callao gradually received the attention denied Lima. Peru
also presented travelers with sometimes troubling issues of race and gender. As
counterpoint to the impressions of U.S. citizens, this chapter begins with the
diary of Charles Darwin.

While making his historic H.M.S. Beagle voyage in 1835, Darwin lamented
that his visit to Peru was spoiled by political conflict. "No state in South
America, since the declaration of Independence, has suffered more from anarchy
than Peru," he wrote in his diary, noting that four different factions were
embroiled in civil war. The turmoil confined Darwin largely to Lima and Callao.

269 The Darwin, Melville and White dates refer to their visits to Peru, not publication dates for
their quotations.
"I am precluded from making any excursions beyond the limits of the towns." Even the road between Lima and Callao was "infested with groups of mounted robbers," he wrote.\textsuperscript{270} Three years earlier, the U.S. chargé d'affairs in Lima, Samuel Larned, had informed Washington that, "We are still almost in a state of siege from the operation of the armed bandits who rob and plunder almost daily, on the great thoroughfare between this city and its port-town."\textsuperscript{271} Now Darwin vented his annoyance, poking fun at Peru and its pretensions to nationhood. He recounted the tale of a recent highway attack on the British consul general and a French companion, noting that the thieves took care to "plunder them so completely, that they returned naked, excepting their drawers." Darwin added sarcastically, "The robbers were actuated by warm Patriotism; they waved the Peruvian banner & intermingled cries of 'Viva la Patria'; 'give me your jacket'. 'Libertad Libertad' with 'Off with your trowsers.'"\textsuperscript{272}

With roads unsafe, Darwin spent many of his days in Peru holed up on board the Beagle. To this frustration of his scientific mission was added the depressing seasonal garua that enveloped the coastal zone. "During nearly every day there is a thick drizzle or Scotch mist which is sufficient to make the streets muddy and one's clothes very damp." The effect, wrote Darwin, was a "ceaseless gloom" that would "render any landscape uninteresting."


\textsuperscript{272} Darwin, \textit{Charles Darwin’s Diary}, p. 331.
With his mood soured, Darwin’s judgment of Peruvians and the local economy was harsh. He did allow that "a residence of some years in contact with the polite and formal Spaniards certainly improves the manners of the English merchants," but he penned several pages of negative comment on Peru and its people. "The city of Lima is now in a wretched state of decay; the streets are nearly unpaved and in all directions heaps of filth are piled up." The atmosphere was heavy with foul smells, Darwin said, and the local economy depressed. "There is little air of business." Darwin noted that only the many churches gave testimony to Lima’s past vice-regal splendor.
This was not a new development, nor was it caused by Peru’s post-

independence turmoil. According to Alexander von Humboldt, Lima was already in notable decline three decades earlier. The German naturalist was disappointed with the city, especially compared to how he had heard it described in Europe. “[T]his capital has declined greatly with the rise of Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile and Arequipa,” he wrote in 1803 in a private letter, ascribing the problem to the relative poverty of the coastal region’s agricultural development.273 The larger agriculturalists living in Caracas earned 35,000 to 40,000 pesos per year, he noted, while among the richest landowners in Lima, “no one reaches 30,000, and few even 12,000.” Humboldt also disparaged the famed beauty of Lima’s women. “I saw nothing of that,” he remarked coldly, adding that Lima’s cultural life could not compare with Havana or Caracas. He found Lima socially and intellectually detached from the rest of Peru. “In Lima itself I cannot study about Peru” or its welfare, he wrote. “Lima is farther from Peru than London,” he said in his now famous quip. With few exceptions, people in Lima lacked patriotic sentiments. “A cold egotism governs everyone, and, if something does no damage to oneself, then it harms no one.” The sting of Humboldt’s comments, when indignant limeños discovered them a century later, was that many observers thought them to be as true in 1906 as they had been in 1803.274


274 Humboldt’s letter was first published in Peru by Ricardo Palma as “Carta del barón de Humboldt al gobernador de Jaén D. Ignacio Checa, copiada del original que existe en poder de un caballero, vecino de Piura.” El Ateneo, tomo VII, núm. 40 (second trimester, 1906), p. 117.
Charles Darwin saved his most caustic comments for the port. "Callao is a most miserable, filthy, ill built, small sea port," he wrote in his diary. The normally liberal Darwin even expressed some racial animosity: "The inhabitants both here and at Lima present every imaginable shade of mixture between European, Negro and Indian blood. They appear a depraved, drunken set."275

THE FOREIGN GAZE ON PERUVIAN WOMEN

Yet, like almost every early nineteenth-century U.S. or European traveler to Peru, notwithstanding Humboldt’s opinion, Darwin was smitten by Peruvian women, especially those wearing saya y manto, a unique traditional dress topped off with a shawl drawn over the head and across the face. He compared the renowned tapadas (women in saya y manto) to Peru’s chirimoya fruit, saying that "the former is as beautiful as the latter is delicious." After describing how the close-fitting gown, stockings and black silk veil were worn, Darwin told how women left only one eye uncovered. "But then, that one eye is so black and brilliant, and has such powers of motion and expression, that its effect is very powerful."

Unlike female dress in some Muslim cultures, where men required the veil as a control over women’s behavior, Lima folklore suggested women used the saya y manto as a seductive, mysterious ensemble to manipulate and even deceive men. While foreign visitors probably exaggerated its importance, Peruvian men won abolition of the saya y manto in the 1850s. The effect of the saya y manto on foreigners was a product of their own imaginations and desire,

275 There are several ways to read Darwin’s racial comment, including that he meant to say people in Lima and Callao were depraved because they were a mixture of races. However, other racial references in his diary suggest he did not see human behavior as biologically determined.
as a U.S. naval officer recognized during a visit to Callao in 1844. After describing the dress “with a mantilla over the head having an opening for but one eye,” John Kell, echoing Darwin, said that, “This eye, often of brilliant appearance, united to a graceful, queenly carriage and walk, leaves great scope for imagined beauty.” 276

Figs. 5.2 – 5.4

IMAGINED BEAUTY

Women dressed in saya y manto often flirted with foreign visitors to Lima. John Kell thought that the single exposed eye of the tapada was “often of brilliant appearance, united to a graceful, queenly carriage and walk, leaves great scope for imagined beauty.”

Johann Moritz Rugendas details from his work in Lima, 1841-1843, in El Perú romantic del siglo xix, pp. 126, 144.

Thomas King, a recent Harvard university graduate employed by Richard Alsop as supercargo on the merchantman Helena, stopped in Lima en route to China in 1842, and he was equally taken by the limeñas, whom he thought “exceeding kind & attentive, withal very pretty.” He thought the saya y manto

276 John McIntosh Kell, Recollections of a Naval Life ... (Washington: Neale Company, 1900), p. 16 (text scanned by the University of North Carolina, 1998, http://docsouth.unc.edu/fpn/kell/kell.html). As noted in chapter two, Charles Wilkes, who returned to Lima on the outward voyage of the Pacific Exploring Expedition, found women’s behavior in saya y manto to be repugnant.
was “far more becoming than any thing we have” in the United States, because “it displays the figure to the greatest possible advantage.” Women in Lima, King was informed, “never laces” in a corset, and that accounted for “the ease & grace of their motion.” After his ship sailed from Peru, he wrote that, “I do not remember to have seen a single bad figure among the whole of the Limeñas.” With no stiffness and “no hamper about the limbs,” Peruvian women gave nature free action, he thought, regretting how confined U.S. women were in their dress. “And how much more beautiful is it than our poor girls encased in their whalebone & cords!”

Philo White provided less superficial reflections on South American women. He was a U.S. navy purchasing agent who lived and worked in Lima and Callao during 1831-1834 and commuted between Peru and Chile. In a second tour that overlapped Herman Melville’s, he returned to observe Peru on visits during 1841-1843, when he was purser on the USS Dale. Because White spoke Spanish and had knowledgeable friends in the region, the captain of the Dale used him as a guide and interpreter during shore visits. There White was quite taken with the charm and intelligence of women he met, and he commented especially on the social maturity of teenagers and young women. He described a girl of about fourteen as “a most modest, amiable, and lovely little girl.”


278 The folks at Alsop told King that Lima women were vain and lazy, overspending on clothes that they purchased with borrowed money. Alsop partners apparently were fearful that, if they introduced him to limeñas, the women would find him an easy mark, hitting him up for loans never to be repaid. “For the sake of the beautiful Limeñas,” King wrote gallantly, “I would not wish to believe it.” Ibid., p. 104.
creature.” He developed a crush on another, the eighteen-year-old daughter of a Guayaquil acquaintance. He first met her on an unannounced morning visit to her family’s home for which the girl was unprepared. Her father became impatient when she did not appear and ordered a servant to – as White wrote in Spanish – *dígale que venga de cualquier manera.* “Being hurried into my presence by her father, her garments were rather negligently thrown on; but she looked the more interesting for the half-dishavelle of her vesture,” he thought. “She is sprightly, intelligent, and quite pretty, altho’ not what the world would call a ‘beauty.’” When White learned that the young woman had been suffering from some mysterious ailment, he returned from the Dale with the ship’s surgeon in tow, and later corresponded with her to follow her recovery.

Most of White’s interactions in Peru were with elites, but he got to observe women of other social classes at the *Fiesta de Amancaes* starting on St. John’s day, June 24, and continuing for several days in the Rimac valley about three miles outside of Lima (figs. 5.4-5.5). Well-to-do women arrived in carriages, but he was impressed that all the others came proudly on horseback and delighted in showing off “dexterity as Equestrians.” As “vast numbers” of women rode in, “they continue to gallop about a great deal after they reach the valley.” The multitude of horses and tight quarters offered women opportunities to be playful with men who were strangers, for women of color to flirt with whites, and so on. “So dense is the crowd here, sometimes, that a *woman* ought to be pretty expert to maintain her saddle while *galloping* among such a mass of people; but they not only do it, but are able frequently to *unhorse* lubberly riders among the other sex,

by riding afoul of their horses as if by accident: this is considered all ‘fair play’; and is practiced upon ‘gringos’ (foreigners) whenever an opportunity offers.”

Fig. 5.5
PERUVIAN DAFFODIL
In Mediterranean cultures St. John’s Day is associated with the summer solstice. In Peru, el día de San Juan celebrates the flowering of the indigenous amancaes plant, *Ismene amancaes*, sometimes called a Peruvian daffodil and whose scientific name is sometimes given as *Hymenocallis*.

Peru’s *Ismene amancaes* was illustrated in an 1809 issue of *Botanical Magazine*, vol.30, plate 1224.

Fig. 5.6
ATREVIDAS
What Philo White found striking about the festival was how people of all colors and social classes interacted publicly in ways that would be unthinkable in Lima itself.

Johann Moritz Rugendas “Paseo de Amancaes,” c. 1843

280 Ibid., p. 16.
Apart from noting the recent marriage of Bartow Prevost’s son, Stanhope, White did not remark on Peruvian women’s taste for men. In order to describe a pattern of Yankee marriage on the west coast, White had to look beyond Lima. He thought that, “Ladies of Guayaquil have shown a marked fondness for intermarrying with North Americans and Europeans.” He marveled at how the president of Ecuador had allowed his daughter to marry a foreigner at age fifteen. He listed merchants and two U.S. consuls who had married local women there. “It is not unlikely,” he believed, “one motive with some of these ladies, in selecting Husbands from among foreigners, may be a desire to preserve the complexions of their families!”  

281 Yankee men in Peru earned a bad reputation among elites. However, as White suggested, even some of those of questionable character brought a valuable asset with them, their whiteness. Later, Peruvian

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281 Ibid., pp. 26-27.
men of varying outlooks, including José Carlos Mariátegui in the early twentieth century, would comment about the effect of their fair skin on Peruvian women.

Philo White perceived that his own attitudes about Latin American women were gradually changing, and he seemed somewhat troubled by the fact. This was, of course, a century before U.S. men were influenced by cultural stereotypes about Latinas that recast them in a Madonna/whore binary, with the demure señorita or long-suffering mother played off against the ditzy flirt, seductive temptress or aggressive “spitfire.” Some of his unease may have been racial. He was living far from the security of his own country’s color line. He noted delicately that the “complexion” of Prevost’s wife “tends toward the brunette.” While wrestling with his conflicted feelings, White penned some comparative musings about U.S., European and Latin American women. He began rather defensively by extolling the virtues “of my own countrywomen,” reassuring himself that, “there is, in my estimation, no nation on this our Globe, whose women possess the real charm of modesty, – the most lovely trait in female character, – to a greater extent than those of the United States of North America.” Although he perhaps did not know it, some of his language echoed sentiments of elite Peruvian men about their own women. He thought that “a feminine softness about their manners, and a diffidence in their association with the world” lent a “loveliness to our women” unmatched anywhere. By contrast, White said that the “English women are more masculine in their manners, – more manly, as it were, in their bearing; and in English society, the retiring diffidence of our women is viewed as rather child-like, and whimpering.” A still greater contrast were French women, who shamelessly intruded into her husbands affairs at “his office, his store-house, his shop, his fields, – indeed, will have a
finger in every thing that is going on!” The French, “according to my American notions, are unwomanly,” White exclaimed.  

These comments served as an introduction to White’s main subject, which was Latin American females. (He was married but separated by travel from his wife for years at a time.) They had some of the manners of the French, he thought. “Their self-confidence, however, is unlike the bold assurance of the French.” South American ladies, he said, had a “characteristic dignity in the manners” that gave them a “more apparent reserve, and less forwardness, than the French.” As he became “more familiar” with Latin American women, he struggled with their attractiveness, trying to convince himself that their traits were more like “the retiring modesty of my own country-women.” He allowed that there might be “too much truth in what I have more than once been told by English ladies: That there is too much refinement upon ‘modesty’ in the Ladies of the U. States, – that it is the parent of prudishness, and begets a ‘whimpering’ mode of expression.” And, as a matter of fact, he decided that, “I have too often witnessed so much ‘mock-modesty’ exhibited among my Country-women.” So, finally, through much struggle and against his own claim and wish, he concluded that the manners of Latin American women might actually be superior to those found in his own country. Unlike female modesty in the United States, he wrote, “the Spanish American Ladies, I have observed, seldom, if ever, make an effort to show off their ‘modesty’: their modesty consists in their native dignity: They call things by their legitimate names, and seldom use any circumlocution, but tell the plain truth, when speaking of what our women consider delicate subjects: The customs of society here do not require

282 Ibid., p. 30. All emphasis is by White. He used underlining throughout his journal, but more frequently in these passages about women, perhaps reflecting the difficulty he was having in sorting out his own perceptions and feelings.
dissimulation in them.” White gave an example. He had invited a family to visit his ship, the Dale, and he overheard young women “speaking among themselves” about pantalettes, a lace-fringed undergarment that well-to-do women wore when riding or doing some other activity where their legs might become exposed. White said that, “perceiving that I understood what they were talking about, they inquired by what means they were to ascend to the ship’s deck from the boat alongside?” The discussion focused on the term escalera, which might mean ladder or stairs, and the women understood that they would be climbing up a ladder. So, White clarified that, “the ‘accommodation’ was rather a stair-way than a ‘ladder,’ and was lined underneath with flags” and hence would not cause them embarrassment. He imagined they were worried about appearances and wished to reassure. When the women caught his drift, they corrected him and insisted that modesty was not a concern. They were quite accustomed to dressing properly for such an occasion, and they explained to White that they “were only discussing the kind of pantallettes to wear during their visit to the Dale.” It struck White that, “This conversation [with me] was held with a frankness of manner, yet with a becoming propriety, which showed their artlessness and good breeding, and an entire absence of prudishness.” One can imagine that, while White found this exchange to reveal the young women to be charmingly candid, they, on the other hand, found the Yankee’s awkward concern for their sensibilities to be “cute.” Perhaps his growing fondness for South American women influenced his career, because a decade later Philo White obtained appointment as the first U.S. minister to Ecuador, serving four years, 1854-1858 (of course, with his wife).  

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283 Formerly, as in Peru, the senior U.S. official in Ecuador was the chargé d’affaires. White was married in 1822 and had two daughters, one of whom, Mary, married John W. Ellis, future
LIMA AND CALLAO

Darwin was not alone in finding Peru both mysterious and depressing. Eight years after the *Beagle* was provisioning at Callao, Herman Melville briefly visited Lima and the port while returning from his whaleship voyages in the South Pacific. His stop there probably was his only close look at Latin America, and he later made important literary uses of Peru.\(^{284}\) If Darwin was struck by Lima’s economic decline and the gloom of the seasonal *garua* that enveloped it, Melville painted an even more disturbing portrait in *Moby Dick*. The skies filtered by the haze "make tearless Lima the strangest, saddest city," Melville wrote in the chapter on "The Whiteness of the Whale." Using the image of a town that adopted a white veil (i.e., the *garua*), his references to Peru almost seem surrealistic. Melville saw the "horror" in Lima’s "woe," the spreading atmospheric "pallor of an apoplexy that fixes its own distortions." His use of Peru’s capital as a foreboding metaphor for the whale was an effort to explore what he called the "palsied universe" of life itself.

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284 Melville’s ship made port briefly in Mexico and Brazil, but there is no evidence he went ashore in those countries. Melville first worked at sea in 1839, sailing to Liverpool. In December 1840 he signed up for a four-year whaling voyage that he dubbed “my Yale college and my Harvard” and later used as the basis for writing *Moby Dick*. Outward bound, Melville’s ship made a brief stop for provisions at the Peruvian port of Santa in June 1841, but it is doubtful he saw more of Peru until the return trip two-and-one-half years later. To leave the Pacific, Melville enlisted as a seaman on the American naval frigate *United States*, which sailed from Honolulu in August 1843. He had only three days of shore liberty throughout the voyage, and two-thirds of that was taken in Lima and Callao between December 28, 1843, and January 3, 1844. See Charles Roberts Anderson, *Melville in the South Seas* (New York: Dover Publications, 1966), pp. 355-361. As for possible stops in Peru while whaling aboard the *Acushnet* in 1841, Melville may or may not have been granted shore leave in Tumbes. As noted earlier, Melville biographer Hershel Parker has cast doubt on the story by Victor W. von Hagen in *The Four Seasons of Manuela* that Melville was in Paita and there encountered Manuela Sáenz, exiled former partner of Simón Bolívar.
Neither Melville nor Darwin could see much beyond these surface appearances, given the brevity of their visits to Peru. The population of Lima was still in decline, urban rents fell, and owners spent little on upkeep of their properties. While the considerable autonomy of Peru’s varied regions and insularity of surviving Indian communities may have cushioned Andean provinces from some of the economic deterioration seen in Lima, farmers and cattle producers suffered from the reduced prices their goods brought during two decades of deflation and stagnation, 1825-1846.285

The port of Callao, however, recovered sooner than Lima, and the reason went to the heart of Peru’s development dilemmas. The fledgling nation was heavily reliant on foreign manufactures, and the import-export trade was Peru’s main profit center. Improving port facilities received priority attention, as Philo White saw when he returned Callao on the USS Dale. “I discovered some improvement in this Town,” he wrote in May, 1841, “which is the Port of Lima City.” White found that, “Callao has increased in its population, as well as increased in the number, and improved in the style, of its buildings; and particularly has it been improved in its streets, many of which are now well paved, etc.”286

“The Mole at Callao, is the best work of the kind on the entire Pacific Coast of America,” White continued. “It was some six years in building; its cost, I am unapprised of, – but it cannot have been much short of half a million dollars. Being in the form on an L, there is a perfect Basin within, where all Boats land in entire safety. This Mole adds great facilities to commercial transactions, and

285 Paul Gootenberg, "Carneros y Chuño: Price Levels in Nineteenth-Century Peru," Hispanic American Historical Review, 70, 1 (1990), pp. 28-29, 33-35, and Fig. 1, p. 27.

286 Camp, ed., Philo White’s Narrative, p. 15.
reflects much credit upon those who projected and constructed it. Besides this, the Harbor of Callao is the best on the Pacific coast.” In only about six years time, Callao was considerably improved from Darwin’s "most miserable, filthy, ill built, small sea port.” But the capital languished. “Lima is much the same it was when I left here, in 1834” (a year before Darwin arrived), said White.

White’s description of Lima’s condition and Peru’s politics in 1841 closely tracked those of Darwin and Melvile. In Lima there was “Very little improvement in any thing, but much dilapidation in almost every thing.” He blamed anarchy and bad government, which “is playing the mischief with Lima, and indeed the whole of Peru.” Then White made a judgment that would be repeated by many others in the course of the nineteenth century. “With a climate and soil as genial as any in the Western World, there is perhaps no country where Heaven’s gifts to man are so wretchedly neglected.” Instead of being employed productively, Peru’s Indians were “’forced to volunteer’ into the armies of the contending parties.” Although he thought them to be “a docile race,” he said they were “the victims of avaricious leaders, and sanguinary and unprincipled chieftains!” For emphasis he added, “Unhappy people!”

COMPARING CHILE AND PERU

Thomas Worthington King spent a couple of weeks in Lima in 1842 while trading for Richard Alsop. Having spent time in Valparaiso prior to reaching Peru, King thought Chile “is advancing, while Peru with equal rapidity retrogrades.” He wrote that the population of Lima was in decline and had been surpassed by that of Valparaiso. He noted that Chilean bonds were quoted in London at 76½ percent, “about the average of those of the United States.”
Peuvians were discontented, he believed, while “the Chilenos are eminently happy & proud of their country, full of order & patriotism.”

King had not personally seen Lima when it was still under Spanish rule, but Charles Wilkes had been Commodore Charles Stewart’s librarian on the USS *Franklin* during the last days of the viceroyalty. He now returned briefly to Peru on a special mission. One role envisioned for Pacific Station in projection of U.S. power was to undertake comprehensive surveys of Pacific islands and coastline, but congress held up funding to expand the force. Political conflict in Peru, and later looming conflict with Mexico, kept the squadron’s ships close to Callao and other major ports up and down the west coast. Finally, congress decided to form a separate squadron to undertake the Pacific surveys, and Wilkes was given command of the expedition. Departing from Hampton Roads in August 1838, Wilkes led six relatively small ships able to navigate in shallow waters on what was officially called the United States Exploring Expedition. The two sloops-of-war, *Peacock* and *Vincennes*, had formerly served on Pacific Station, the first at the end of Prevost’s tenure and the second on two later occasions. They were supplemented by a brig, two pilot schooners and a store ship, all staffed by eighty-three officers and 342 seamen.

Wilkes reached Peru at the end of June 1839. While attending to the expedition’s affairs in Callao and Lima, he sent a team of four officers by mule on a natural sciences trek into the Andes that he hoped would reach Cerro de Pasco. The main interest of these officers was in making botanical collections, and they hoped to see something of the eastern *montaña* but got only as far as Casa Cancha and Baños. While unable to reach Cerro de Pasco, they did visit the active silver
mine of Alpamarca. Wilkes supplemented their reporting with other information to describe Cerro and Peru’s silver industry.287

Like Philo White, Wilkes judged that Callao was improved from when he saw it in 1821, but Lima had deteriorated. “At Lima I was struck with the change that had taken place since my former visit. Everything now betokens poverty and decay; a sad change from its former splendour and wealth,” he wrote. “Whole families have been swept off, and their former attendants, or strangers, have become the possessors of their houses and property.” Lima, he lamented, “may with truth be designated a declining city.” The evidence was in “neglected walls,” “ruined tenements,” and “the want of stir and life among the people.” Wilkes said he was told that Lima’s population had declined from “as many as sixty-five or seventy thousand” inhabitants to only about forty-five thousand. “There are few buildings that have the look of durability, and no new ones have been put up for the last forty years.”288 The filth of trash and sewage around both Callao and Lima repulsed Wilkes. He saw “utter neglect” of what had been beautiful fruit trees and flower gardens on the roadway leading to the entrance to Lima. “No one seems to take interest in the public works.” Anticipating King’s opinion, Wilkes wrote that, “So marked a difference from Chili could not but be observed.”

In its state of “dilapidation,” it is no wonder that Lima lent itself well to Melville’s literary purposes. Callao reflected Peru’s development priorities, and that focus on importing just about everything only intensified as the country entered its guano era. To U.S. observers, Peruvians were willfully opting out of

287 The botanical trip occupies most of chapter IX in Wilkes, Narrative, pp. 88-107.

288 Ibid., p. 82.
development, leaving their people and abundant natural resources, as Philo White put it, “wretchedly neglected.”

This situation might have – many would say should have – changed in the 1850s, as Peru rather suddenly found itself with abundant capital for investment derived from its trade in guano. To understand the reasons for the disappointments that Peruvians suffered during and after guano’s “fictitious prosperity,” it is important to examine how the Chincha Islands were a microcosm of the degradation of labor in nineteenth century Peru.
Old sailors must be allowed to spin their yarns after their own fashion.

George W. Peck
*Melbourne and the Chincha Islands; With Sketches of Lima, And a Voyage Round the World*
1854

Lillius (Lilly) Gilchrest Grace told engaging stories of her adventures around the world, a narrative gift that came from growing up around New England ship captains like her father, George Gilchrest. An only child, from the age of six she spent much of her youth accompanying her parents aboard the *Rochambeau*, ferrying cargo to far away places, worlds apart from her hometown of Thomaston, Maine. One of her pleasures was recounting stories for her grandchildren of a terrifying waterspout in the Indian Ocean or how the *Rochambeau* came under cannon attack during the Crimean War. Now in the spring of 1921, at age eighty-two, the matriarch of the Gracefield estate on New York's Long Island dictated her tales once more in the form of a memoir that was entitled, "Reminiscences of Mrs. W. R. Grace, May 24, 1921." Included was a story that might help seven-year-old Peter Grace and her other grandchildren

289 Characterizations of Lillius Grace, direct quotes and the "grim tone" of her Chinchas recollections are based upon Marquis James, *Merchant Adventurer: The Story of W. R. Grace* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1993), chapter three, where the profile of her was drawn from her own memoir and another by her daughter, Lilas Grace Kent. James was given access to these personal documents of the Grace family when he was commissioned to write the biography of William Russell Grace. The Grace family papers were donated to Columbia University, but archivists said they are unable to locate the memoirs among the documents.
understand how they came to inherit a vast and complex South American enterprise. In Peru their domain was called "Casa Grace," the country’s most diversified company and its second-largest employer. By the time of her memoir, the Grace empire in Peru encompassed sugar estates, textile mills, a shipping line and a commercial network representing General Electric and other major U. S. manufacturers. The wholesale business reached into Peru’s major provinces, and its offices were primary contact points for U.S. travelers in the Andes.

The Grace fortune was born in Peru amid the foul odors and opprobrium of the trade in guano. Placing the recollections of Lilly Grace in the context of the observations of other visitors to the Chinchas guano islands provides an introduction to the business of transporting the unique fertilizer, which was the most lucrative aspect of the trade for the United States. It also helps clarify the origins of a major U.S. multinational firm, since W. R. Grace & Co was established during a bonanza that made Peru a household name in the United States and Europe during the mid-nineteenth century. When Lilly Grace first reached the shores of South America, she was seventeen.

A FORTUITOUS ENCOUNTER IN CALLAO

Spinning a good tale was a necessary skill for seafaring families like the Gilchrests, part of the exchange of information (as in the “gam” among whaleships) that could have both commercial and life-and-death implications. In Peru in the 1850s, such ritualized conversation was especially important. In some years, over one-hundred sailing ships, most U.S.-built and U.S.-owned, gathered around the Chincha Islands, waiting to load a cargo as precious as it was base and prosaic. Guano is a natural manure formed from the excrement of
sea birds along Peru’s rainless coast. Its uses in agriculture were well known among Peru’s Indian farmers, and German naturalist Alexander von Humboldt collected a sample in 1802 that was analyzed by two prominent French chemists. A larger sample of guano was sent to the United States for agricultural experimentation in 1824, but people there and in Europe did not fully appreciate the fertilizer’s economic potential until the early 1840s. The Gilchrests reached Peru as world demand for the manure was booming, and after the United States had become the number two guano market, one exclusively controlled by Felipe Barreda and his brother, Federico. In all probability, the Rochambeau was under contract to F. Barreda y Hermano.

Shipping guano from Peru was an enterprise conducted with a good measure of politics, and some sea captains were prepared to offer bribes if they thought they could jump ahead in the loading schedule. Others were content to accumulate penalty payments, underwritten by the Barredas but ultimately paid by the Peruvian government, for every day they waited beyond a standard loading period. When they put in to the port of Callao for supplies, repairs and necessary permits, the skippers would gather in front of two ship chandlery stores, one across the street from the other, sitting in old chairs and swapping stories. And, during what seemed like endless weeks spent out at the Chinchas waiting for their turn with the loading launches, the captains and their wives organized a social network, giving dinners in honor of a just-arrived ship from Massachusetts or a farewell breakfast for one about to sail to England.

Humboldt’s name is associated powerfully with Peru, since the great Pacific current that produces the unusual climatological conditions along Peru’s coast was named for him. However, Humboldt spent very little time in Peru, and his brief visit to the region of the guano islands was rather accidental, after his passage to Mexico was delayed and he decided to take a short trip south from Lima to Ica. See Antonio Raimondi, El Perú, libro II: historia de la geografía del Perú ... (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1879), pp. 14-20.
This was the practice when Lilly Gilchrest, a slender young woman with wavy brown hair, reached Peru in 1856 aboard the *Rochambeau*, a ship under contract to load some of the 177,016 tons of guano exported to the British Isles that year (shipments to the United States that year were down sharply for reasons explored later). As voyagers approached Callao, they could see anchored sailing ships taking on supplies, making repairs and giving their crews free time on shore. Sailors spent their days ashore carousing in bars and flop houses, places like the seedy Marine Hotel (photograph in chapter five, fig. 5.1). Except for the great stone Real Felipe naval fort, Callao seen from the deck of the *Rochambeau* would appear little more than a small frontier town. But off in the distance a traveler like Lilly Gilchrest could see the plain of Lima and a white line formed by the churches of what had once been a splendid colonial capital, the City of the Kings. Crews laying anchor in the harbor could hear the whistle of a new train that ran every two hours from Callao to Lima. Although later called the "English Railway," the modest railroad was built with Peruvian capital and symbolized Peru's growing economic development aspirations. Before the nine-mile line was completed in 1850, the ride between Callao and Lima was a dangerous adventure for foreign visitors who were routinely held up by mounted bandits, as Charles Darwin had noted with annoyance in his *Beagle* diary two decades earlier.

Capt. Gilchrest was anxious to report his arrival to the U.S. consul in Callao,291 and Lilly probably watched from the *Rochambeau* as her father got into a shore-boat and was rowed through flocks of some of the largest pelicans in the world. The birds fattened themselves on the abundant fish that thrive in the

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291 James, *Merchant Adventurer*, p. 33. Although the port was Peru’s largest, the U.S. consulate was not moved from Lima to Callao until May, 1854, two years prior to the Gilchrest’s arrival.
Humboldt Current sweeping northward up Peru’s Pacific coast. Reaching the mole, he disembarked onto a stairway, climbed to the wharf and headed to the street corner.

First time visitors to Callao were usually a bit startled by its contrasts. Darwin had described it as "a most miserable filthy, ill built, small sea-port." A U.S. traveler said its architectural disorder, compactness and disrepair jarred his memories of old school lessons about earthquakes in South America. There were mulatto women in bright, gay dresses; men caked with dirt leading donkeys; short, dark-complexioned army conscripts whose uniforms and sharply-defined Indian features seemed incongruous to foreign eyes; tall, burly Afro-Peruvian stevedores; sailors quarreling in many languages; thieves waiting for opportunity when a visitor got drunk; and a mix of captains and merchants large enough so that a New Engander might run into an acquaintance from the United States.

As Gilchrest rounded the corner, he came upon the two adjacent ship chandlery shops, Velasquez & Lyons on his left and John Bryce’s to the right. Knowing no Spanish, the captain had trouble getting directions to the U.S. consulate. He entered Bryce’s and was relieved to find twenty-six-year-old William Grace, the store’s enterprising, Irish-born partner, who by then had five...
years residence in Peru. Grace showed Gilchrest the way to the consulate, noted that he lived out at the Chincha Islands on a Bryce store-ship of his own creation, and was cordially invited by the captain to call for tea on the *Rochambeau* when he returned to the guano islands.294

**SOCIAL LIFE AT THE CHINCHAS**

Given the nature of the guano business and the hot, dry climate, one might imagine the Chinchas to be a disagreeable place. But, in fact, the area had some quite enchanting aspects. As the *Rochambeau* sailed back down from Callao and approached the northernmost of the three Chincha Islands, Lilly Gilchrest would have been able to make out the masts of the guano fleet. It was a rather awesome sight, with dozens of ships anchored just to the leeward side of first two islands. By custom, a greeting party of several captains would row out to a newly-arriving ship, like the *Rochambeau*, to offer pilot assistance to the proper anchorage. To the east was the small Peruvian mainland port of Pisco, and above the coastline loomed the Andes, forming an extraordinary outline at what seemed like almost fifteen degrees from the horizon.295 No other ocean vista in the world had such an imposing mountain backdrop. Three years before the Gilchrests arrived, New Yorker George Peck wrote of the panorama of the Andes mountains in his diary: "But the immense height – the perfect stillness – I cannot tell how awful and at the same time how glorious it is .... I was never tired of

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294 James, *Merchant Adventurer*, p. 33-34.

295 In his *New York Times* letter, Peck said the Andean mountains at a distance of sixty miles rose "ten degrees or more above the horizon," but that these, "I am told by a gentleman who has crossed them, are but the spurs of the great ridges which lie beyond." January 7, 1854.
looking at [the Andes from aboard ship], and I always felt by night and day that they were looking down upon us and watching the great ocean."\textsuperscript{296}

If the winds were calm, the main sounds heard as the \textit{Rochambeau} approached were the sea lions, whose throaty barks echoed across the waters. Every once and a while one could hear a hearty cheer by sailors go up at North Island, which was echoed by men on neighboring ships. The cry meant that laborers working from launches with sacks, tubs and hoists had just finished loading guano in the hold of a ship, an arduous, dirty transfer that could take several weeks of effort. Its impatient crew would soon be heading for the United States or Europe, and another ship could prepare to move into place close by the chutes, long canvas tubes that ran from a high cliff down to the launches bobbing just off the islands' jagged rocks.

What happened over the next few days was a legendary event in the lore of Lilly's family, and she told the story many times. William Grace took up Capt. Gilchrest on his invitation to visit the \textit{Rochambeau}. He was the first merchant to install a store-ship right at the Chinchas, saving captains repeated trips to Pisco or Callao. Calling on the new arrivals, he established acquaintances and provided services so that, when the captains did go to Callao, they turned right to Bryce's ship chandlery and not left to that of Velasquez & Lyons. But on this occasion, when Grace visited the \textit{Rochambeau}, he had trouble keeping his mind on business. The young man who had boasted to friends that, "I'm not the marrying type," was quite attracted to young Lilly Gilchrest. With his Irish luck, it took the \textit{Rochambeau} three long months to get its load of guano, giving Grace plenty of time to impress his future in-laws.

\textsuperscript{296} Peck, \textit{Melbourne and the Chincha Islands}, p. 157.
Lilly had fond memories of that ship-board courtship. Three years later she returned to the Chinchas as the bride of William Grace, living on the Bryce store-ship. During a floating residence off the main guano islands she gave birth to the first two of her eleven children (seven survived). Living at sea was a safer, more healthy environment than provided by Callao, with its depressing garua, raucous bar scene and periodic breakouts of infectious disease. At the Chinchas there was an abundance of fresh beef, seafood and fruit brought from Pisco, including the chirimoya, the fruit that Darwin had found so delicious that his description implied a metaphor for sexual desire. New York’s Peck, who spent over a month at the Chinchas, exclaimed of Peru’s renowned custard apple, "But the cherimoyas! Shut your eyes and fancy yourself eating strawberries and cream – the illusion will be perfect. The very look of them, with their bulbous shape about the size of a fist, and dark green-checkered rind, has a tropical flavor. Their only fault is their excess of perfection; one cannot devour a bushel of them." Pisco was also renowned for Peru’s grape liquor of the same name, although the Gilchrests were strict Protestant abstainers.

While the long wait of weeks or months to be loaded with guano could try the patience of ship crews, the islands offered interesting day trips for natural exploration. The guano beds cast their ammonia like odor only when disturbed by digging, and their surface color was a pleasing reddish-brown yellow. Where cut away by workers using picks, pikes and shovels, guano had a lighter color that Peck described as a subochure, similar to white and red ashes of anthracite coal mixed together. The rocks and caverns about the islands reminded him somewhat of the Pictured Rocks of Lake Superior. “The rocks and caverns of the

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297 Ibid., p. 171.
Islands are the most singular and romantic I ever beheld.” Peck lamented not being an artist who could paint the scene. “Indeed, these Islands would afford the best studies for a landscape artist,” he said, adding that, “I would most strongly recommend some of our young artists to follow me in this voyage.”

All around were playful dolphins and schools of whales blowing their mighty spouts. In the grottoes and on the rocks lay hundreds of bellowing seal lions, which Peck called “the hereditary lords of the islands.”

EMBODIMENT OF DESPAIR

Yet, judging from her 1921 memoir, Lilly told young Peter Grace and her other grandchildren little or nothing of the pleasures of ship-board life in Peru, or the grandeur of the natural setting. When she recalled her time at the Chinchas, her tone turned morose. What stood out about Peru in her memory was not the playful dolphins but scenes of horror and unspeakable human cruelty. She must have seen some of it with her own eyes, since Peck indicated that abuses could be seen from aboard ship. She would have heard stories of the island hell from discussions among her religious parents and their shipboard social circle of New Englanders. It was as disturbing as anything in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s recently published Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which Lilly may have read during the Rochambeau’s


299 Peck, Melbourne and the Chincha Islands, p. 190.

long voyages.\textsuperscript{301} Perhaps the cries of pain from Chinese indentured servants were not audible to Lilly when she later lived on the store ship, but she probably could see the taskmasters wield their leather thongs. One U.S. captain told of seeing from his ship a bondsman hurl himself off a two-hundred foot cliff to escape the lash of a driver.\textsuperscript{302} Could those aboard the ships hear the bloodcurdling scream of a man who hoped such a leap might carry his spirit back to his homeland? Had a bloated, half-naked body of one of the suicides floated by the shipboard home of William and Lilly Grace? In the early 1850s, the death rate by suicide on the islands was said to be at least thirty per year.\textsuperscript{303} She told her grandchildren that, for many of the Chinese workers, death was welcomed as a liberation. Some "would take enough opium to kill, dig a grave and lie in it." It was not uncommon, Lilly said, "to see a Chinaman lying in an open grave, still alive," awaiting release from his fate in Peru.\textsuperscript{304}

George Peck said no one took time out to afford dead Chinese a dignified burial. "They are buried, as they live, like so many dogs," he observed. "I saw one who had been drowned – it was not known whether accidentally or not – lying on the guano, when I first went ashore. All the morning his dead body lay

\textsuperscript{301} Stowe’s account of abuses of slaves created a publishing sensation when first published in 1852, four years before the Gilchrests reached Peru. Peruvians would have expected any U.S. visitor to be familiar with the book, because \textit{La Chosa del Tio Tom} had caused keen interest in Peru after it was translated into Spanish and published locally.

\textsuperscript{302} Peck, \textit{Melbourne and the Chincha Islands}, p. 208.

\textsuperscript{303} The overseer on the middle island, who called himself Kossuth and claimed to be a brother of the great Hungarian nationalist, told Peck that sixty Chinese had committed suicide in the two years he had been there. Peck, p. 208. Peck reported the same number of suicides in his \textit{New York Times} letter, January 7, 1854, and he said their occurrence happened “weekly.”

\textsuperscript{304} James, \textit{Merchant Adventurer}, p. 38.
in the sun; in the afternoon they had covered it a few inches, and there it lies, along with many similar heaps, within a few yards of where they are digging.”

Neither Lilly Gilchrest nor William Grace could have been insulated from the atmosphere of moral guilt that hung over the whole guano enterprise. In Gilchrest’s native New England, already aroused against the evils of slavery, the Peruvian situation was well-publicized. New Englanders were in the forefront of U.S. missionary activity in China, and prominent ministers there were outspoken in condemnation of Peru’s so-called coolie traffic, which was run out of Macao. Lilly must have understood that her husband’s growing prosperity was rooted in the nasty business, although it is doubtful that such a notion entered the consciousness of seven-year-old Peter Grace, as he listened to his grandmother’s grim tale in 1921. To explain to the grandchildren how people could tolerate the barbarism meted out to laborers on the Chinchas, Lilly Grace remarked rather cryptically, "The guano business ... paid very well." George Peck himself had rationalized the moral issues by sanctimoniously blaming the British commercial establishment, conveniently overlooking the involvement of U.S. entrepreneurs and ship owners. But the Gilchrests and other New Englanders anchored at the islands might not have been so cavalier in their reflections. If she had curiosity regarding how the business operated, Lily Gilchrest might have read a copy of Peck’s narrative, which was published by Charles Scribner in New York in 1854 and could have been important reading for her father when sailing for the Chinchas two years later. Peck’s New York Times account of the treatment of the Chinese reached a wide U.S. audience when it was reprinted earlier that year in The Living Age and the Friends’ Intelligencer.

After beginning to raise her first two children at the Chinchas, Lilly Grace finally left the islands in 1862 to take up residence in Callao. Perhaps she felt some of Peck’s sense of relief. As he sailed away, he wrote in his diary, "I am glad I have done with the Chinchas, and the Guano, and the Coolies.” Despite the picturesque natural environment and the fascinating aspects of guano’s origins and processing, he was tormented by the experience. "The Coolies and their fate impart a gloomy coloring to the recollection of the whole time spent there," he said, unable to put them out of mind. "I seem to see them at their work, their slender figures quivering under the weight of loads too heavy for them to wheel." There was never a time ashore when he had not witnessed the overseers whipping the naked backs of the Chinese. "I observed Coolies shoveling and wheeling as if for dear life, and yet their backs were covered with great welts."306

So disturbing to Peck were the workers’ cries and groans, the images of their small, emaciated bodies, and the memory of their faces with "a wild, despairing expression," that he came away from the islands with a strange aversion to the sea lions whose loud barking echoed about the ships at anchor at the Chinchas. In his description of these "devils in half human forms," Peck developed a metaphor worthy of Herman Melville’s *Moby Dick*, and one which may help explain the gloomy mood that came over Lilly Gilchrest Grace in May 1921, as she looked back on her experiences in Peru. There is no creature in the world that "wears so horrible a face and shape," said Peck of the sea lions. "To see them come up half out of the water near a boat is positively awful to behold, and enough to shake any unaccustomed nerves .... I never saw or dreamed of anything more horrid to look at ...." He went on to say that their behavior

suggested a mysterious fierceness and cruelty, as if they were "the compelled agents of some diabolical spell or inevitable doom." It is impossible to read Peck's description of Peru's sea lions without feeling a link to how he was haunted by the human suffering of the indentured servants on the Chinchas. He said the animals have the look and sound of "agony and suffering." Either they were possessed by devils, he thought, or they were "lost souls imprisoned in and made subject to the appetites of the most repulsive and voracious bodies. Their breathing is always like sobbing; their cries are wails; who knows what they could reveal if they could speak?"³⁰⁷

**Pride and Race**

Guano gave Peru power that was resented in the United States and that tested the patience of U.S. ship captains and crews at the Chinchas. High freight rates offered had to be balanced against the long delays in receiving the guano. Cordiality among different nationalities was sometimes undermined when one felt Peruvian authorities were partial toward another. Everyone complained of corruption. The general view among U.S. captains was that their British counterparts were better protected by that country's diplomats and warships, and that the Pacific Squadron was spread too thin to give pause to abusive Peruvian authorities. These relations easily drew out national feelings and racial attitudes in relation to Peru.

As noted earlier, George Peck spent over a month at the Chinchas and got to know U.S. citizens there. Entertaining was important to stave off boredom; as

³⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 191-192.
Peck put it, “there is no lack of society” among the ships at anchor. “There are quite a number of ladies – the wives and daughters of captains in the fleet – and we make calls and visits, and even have evening parties.”

Peck’s descriptions of Peruvians were colored by his own racial posture and by the comments of other Yankees he interacted with. He thought that the drivers of the Chinese were “the most ugly looking blacks I ever saw.” He said Indian conscripts in the Peruvian army were “average four feet, broad in the beam, narrow in the shoulders, which are round and stooping and have noses like the Mexican idols.”

He found their appearance striking, and in reaction asked his readers, “Have you any recollection of the armies of supes we used to see at the Park long ago?”

While Peck was showing sympathy for abused Chinese workers at the Chinchas, he felt obliged to give assurance that he was no lover of the Chinese, calling them “wretched and half-barbarous” people with “dark” souls.

Peck expressed pity for U.S. ship captains who had to round up men in Callao to complete their crew. He said the native Peruvians there were called “Cholas.” “They are a diminutive race, half black, and said to be passionate and treacherous.” When added to a crew of U.S. and British sailors, the Peruvians created “constant trouble” and needed to be dealt with severely. Some recruited at Callao were already let go at the Chinchas and put aboard the Peruvian guardship there. But, Peck doubted the Peruvians would punish them properly.

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309 “Supe” was slang for supernumerary. While the term was sometimes used in the military, it is more likely that he referred to garishly costumed actors without speaking roles who populated the background of scenes, such as in an opera.
“They will get off, it is likely, without such punishment as is necessary to secure discipline.”

White Peruvians in authority could also be problematic in Yankee eyes. In describing a conflict with U.S. ship captains, Peck referred to “the mixture of cowardice and ferocity which seems to belong to the Spanish American blood.” Peruvian officers were authorized to punish any sailor shooting a bird or committing other transgressions. On one occasion, a large delegation of U.S. captains went to talk to the commandant on the guardship about how regulations were being enforced. Tempers flared, and the officer – in a fit of “jealous obstinacy,” Peck said – “ordered up a file of soldiers, and, before the shipmasters were aware what was to happen, had them bayoneted off the deck and down the gangway!” Foreigners called this incident “the Pelican War.” Even though Peck allowed that the offending officer was a Mexican national who had brought to Peru “all his national prejudice against Americans,” he was representing the Peruvian government. As far as Peck was concerned, the officer was the typical “petty tyrant” that Yankees had to deal with in an underdeveloped country like Peru. The man “fancied himself in a position to treat them with military contempt, and all that sort of insulting manner which inferior Peruvian officials, who live by cheating their Government, are so fond of affecting toward foreigners.”

Peck admitted that his intention was to write with “some feeling” on behalf of his fellow citizens, and part of his message was directed at Washington. “Probably a greater or more unprovoked and brutal insult was never offered to the American flag,” he decried. If Peruvians had committed such an outrage against British or French citizens, “serious retribution would have followed at once.” He bemoaned the “neglect of our Government,” which could “only arise from ignorance of the magnitude” of U.S. interests in Peru. The guano business was a major international enterprise, and hundreds of U.S. ship captains employed in it were selected from among the country’s most exemplary citizens, he stated. “There are no class of men in all the various business of the world to whom is committed so great a trust.” Captains were responsible for a commerce “whose ships and freights are each worth more than the stock of a large wholesale store, or than a large manufactory.” But the U.S. government was leaving these noble men and their ships at the mercy of bad Peruvians. While the senior Peruvian officer at the Chinchas was not involved in this particular incident, Peck imagined that, “The Commandant Serrate is probably as thorough an old scoundrel in his way as Peru can produce.”

PHOTOGRAPHIC DOCUMENTATION OF PERU’S LABOR REGIME

This portrait of Peru’s guano operations by U.S. observers would not be complete without mention of the images of New York photographer Henry de Witt Moulton that were published in elegant album format by Alexander Gardner in 1865 and titled *Rays of Sunlight from South America*.

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A reviewer in the *New York Times* declared the work to be “One of the most superb and interesting collections of photographs we have ever seen,” and said that “The views of the Chincha Islands give one a clearer idea of the immense guano deposits, and the mode of working them, than could be obtained from the most elaborate description.” It is impossible to do justice to either the artistry or historical content of the album here, but a few of Moulton’s images will serve to highlight points of analysis in subsequent chapters.

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312 The reviewer said there were “one hundred pictures,” but I counted seventy in the copy in the U.S. Library of Congress. *New York Times*, September 17, 1865.
CHAPTER 7

THE BARREDA CONQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES

I have ordered a considerable quantity of guano to be sent to you.... My object is to get the guano well into the ground, so that its strength shall not evaporate into the air. Put one ton and a half of guano upon ten acres.

Daniel Webster
U.S. Secretary of State
Letter from Washington to his farm manager
March 9, 1851

[We Barredas are in] President Ramón’s carriage.
Federico Barreda
1862

At the center of Peruvian groups that struggled to control the guano trade were merchant Felipe Barreda y Aguilar, his wife and in-laws of the Osma family, his kid brother Federico, his son and namesake, Felipe Barreda y Osma, and, most importantly, his son-in-law, Manuel Pardo. Their rise was fueled by profits made in the sale of guano in the United States. The Osmas were passive investors in Barreda’s enterprises, but they played key political and diplomatic roles. Two Osma brothers were the first Peruvians appointed as ministers in Washington (previously represented by a chargé d’affaires). The guano business placed Felipe Barreda’s brother Federico in the United States, where his family joined the U.S. eastern seaboard elite – until economic reverses sent the U.S. Barredas to California.

The Barreda family of Lima originated in Spain and Peru’s central Andes mining region. In 1799, a twenty-three-year-old Spaniard, Manuel Barreda,
married a nineteen-year-old *criolla* from Huánuco, María Mercedes Aguilar Narvarte. Her father had emigrated a generation earlier from Spain to Huánuco, where he served as a cavalry officer in the royal army and seems to have been involved in mining. The bride’s mother was a third generation Huanucaína. Creole parents often preferred that their daughters marry a young man born in Spain because of privileges and opportunities open to *peninsulares* in late colonial Peru, and they sometimes offered dowries to secure the right match. Manuel Barreda probably married into the provincial elite and perhaps obtained business opportunities in Lima through his in-laws, for he and his wife relocated to the capital and began a family there.

The first child of María Mercedes Aguilar de Barreda was born in 1800, and she had eleven more in succession, all born in Lima. Manuel Barreda was appointed a captain in the royal army and found success in commerce. Although Barreda was a royalist, his wife’s older brother was a wandering messianic advocate for restoration of an Inca ruler. In 1805, at the age of thirty-two, authorities caught José Gabriel Aguilar Narvarte in the highlands while conspiring against colonial rule. He was tried and executed in Cuzco after

313 According to genealogist Raul Antonio Alvistur Trigo, María Mercedes was born October 19, 1780 (d. in Spain, 1852), daughter of Salvador de Aguilar Rodriguez, born in Spain in 1747 (d. Huáuco 1806), and María Mercedes Clara Narvarte Andrea de Doria (born in Huánuco), who were married in Huánuco on February 11, 1771, and then had a large family. María Mercedes’ father was described as “captain, miner.” Her mother’s father was Juan Ignacio Narvarte, described as a “general” and “in November 1754 he held the position of corregidor de Huánuco” (no birth or death dates given), who was married to María Mercedes Andrea de Doria Martel (1735-1820), daughter of Sebastian Andrea de Doria and Francisca Martel. Accessed January 2012: http://gw0.geneanet.org/antonioalvistur?lang=en;pz=epifanio;nz=carballido+rincon;ocz=0;p=maria+mercedes+clara;n=narvarte+andrea+de+doria.

making statements in which he seemed to see himself as a prophet to whom important things were revealed in dreams.\textsuperscript{315}

In 1819 Manuel Barreda was appointed a member of the Tribunal del Consulado. A division among Lima’s merchants was over whether or not to support an 1818 proposal by viceroy Joaquín de la Pezuela’s to open Callao to trade with Great Britain. Patricia Marks suggested that Barreda sided with the faction opposed to this move.\textsuperscript{316}

Whether Manuel Barreda actually ever saw combat against the revolutionary army of San Martín is doubtful, for the royalist military abandoned Lima in July 1821, without a fight. Like some well-to-do \textit{peninsulares} in the

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\textsuperscript{315} Some sources, including Alberto Flores Galindo, describe Gabriel Aguilar as “mestizo,” but that appears to be a supposition not based in biographical research, of which there is little. Descendants of his sister in the Barreda network certainly did not consider her to be mestiza. Flores Galindo described Aguilar as a mystic and utopian, based upon testimony he gave in custody and at trial. It seems that he might well have aspired to personally lead an Indian insurrection if he could have claimed an Indian heritage. Instead, he wanted to marry an Indian woman and sought to recruit a descendant of Túpac Amaru I (executed by Viceroy Toledo in Cuzco in 1572) who would become Peru’s new ruler. See Flores Galindo, “In Search of an Inca,” in Steve J. Stern, ed., \textit{Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries} (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), pp. 193-210. The “mestizo” description is at the bottom of p. 206. David T. Garrett described Aguilar as “a creole from Huánuco who claimed descent from Huascar.” \textit{Shadows Of Empire: The Indian Nobility Of Cusco, 1750-1825} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 243.
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\textsuperscript{316} Patricia H. Marks, \textit{Deconstructing Legitimacy: Viceroyos, Merchants and the Military in Late colonial Peru} (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 2007), p. 262, footnote 111, where she stated that Manuel Ortiz de Villate was “an ally of Manuel de Barreda and therefore likely to oppose direct trade.”
\end{flushright}
capital, Barreda remained in Peru long enough to try to save assets and options for his family. Sooner or later, there might be expropriations and deportations. On July 4, 1821, he transferred control of his property to his wife who, as the younger sister of a martyred prócer, might be able to keep it. Barreda signed San Martín’s declaration of independence, probably fearing the economic consequences of doing otherwise. He applied for permission to leave Peru legally, ahead of any punitive action. He also arranged for his wife to grant power of attorney to a criollo associate for the moment when she and the children needed to exit.

By the time some other royalist peninsulares were humiliated and exiled from Peru, their properties confiscated, Barreda was safely back in Spain. María Mercedes Aguilar de Barreda left Peru with her children one year later – all with their Peruvian citizenship and property rights intact. Spain itself was in political turmoil, but over the next decade at least six of Barreda’s Peruvian children married in Seville.

How the Barredas reestablished in Lima and, eventually, the United States, requires a little family storytelling. The oldest Barreda daughter, Rosa, married Pablo Francisco Laverriere less than a year after she reached Spain. They had four daughters. Three years after Rosa had started her own family, her Huanucaina mother had her last child with Manuel Barreda, her twelfth, a boy named Federico, the only one of the Barreda children not born in Peru. Rosa’s

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317 Eminent independence figure, a “Liberator.”
brother Felipe, the third child of the large Barreda/Aguilar brood, had been eighteen when he fled from Lima with his siblings. Within a few years, Felipe elected to return to Peru and, presumably, reclaim some family assets there. Heinrich (Enrique) Witt met him in 1829 aboard the English merchantman Susanna, which afforded “excellent passenger accommodations,” while traveling from Islay to Callao. Witt said Barreda “recently returned from Europe where he had been studying,” which was probably Barreda’s way of avoiding the subject of how and why he left Peru.319 He became a modestly successful merchant and was, as he would later emphasize, un hijo del país deserving of special government support. Like his father, he rose to become a member of the Tribunal del Consulado, serving during 1838-1841, and, like Stanhope Prevost, he was elected to the prestigious board of Lima’s Sociedad de Beneficencia Pública. Marriage helped accelerate this ascent, for in 1836 he wed Carmen de Osma,320 a second-generation Peruvian from an elite family, and together they had eight children. The Barreda/Osma alliance proved strategic in ways that transcended a mere marriage among the well-to-do. It became the anchor of


319 Heinrich Witt, Diario, 1824-1890: un testimonio personal sobre el Perú del siglo XIX (Lima: Banco Mercantil, 1992), v. 1, p. 309. Witt’s diaries are indispensable for understanding Lima’s foreign and native merchants. He worked for Gibbs, the largest British house, and later established his own partnership with another merchant.

320 Some members of the de Osma family continued to use the “de” in their names, while others dropped it. For those who retained it, I will give “de Osma” in their first mention and then call them simply “Osma” thereafter. It is possible that retaining it was a sign of aristocratic pretensions, while abandoning it suggested a more democratic or nationalistic sensibility. For example, Felipe Barreda y Osma did not use it in his claim to be an hijo del país. On the other hand, Pedro de Osma y Pardo broke with his family’s loyalty to the Civilista Party and was a leader of the rival Democratic Party, but he kept the “de,” as did his son Pedro.
what I term the “Barreda social network,” which developed after Felipe Barreda and his Osma brothers-in-law landed the contract for exporting guano to the United States (see chart in the appendix).

RIVALRY FOR PERU’S TRADE WITH ASIA

Foreign firms dominated Peru’s import/export business, and Felipe Barreda lobbied the government to restrict certain trade to Peruvian nationals. In the wake of Peru’s independence war, U.S. ships and merchants took over most of Peru’s trade with Asia from what had been a Spanish colonial monopoly. Trade with Asia was a focus of Alsop partnerships in the United States, and so Alsop ambitions brought the commercial network into direct competition with aspiring Peruvian merchants. Felipe Barreda was, in the opinion of Enrique Witt, “envious” of Alsop’s Asia success.321

A voyage of the 250-ton brig Nile will illustrate how a U.S. house traded between Asia and Latin America. The ship was owned by Thomas H. Perkins, a prominent Boston merchant, with offices in Manila and Canton. Perkins’ sister was married to Ralph Bennet Forbes, who “had been unfortunate in business, and was much broken down in health,” according to his son, Robert Bennet Forbes, who was therefore sent to apprentice in the “counting house” of his uncle Perkins at age eleven. Nine years later, in 1825, the Perkins firm gave then twenty-year-old Forbes his own merchant ship command. While en route to China, he switched Perkins ships and became captain of the Nile. After a stop in Manila, he sailed the merchantman to Canton. The ship was equipped with four

321 Witt, Diario., v. 1, p. 482.
small cannon and “a good supply of small arms” to fend off pirates, and nearing Canton they had to prepare the weapons to deter an attack. Perkins paid Forbes $50 per month plus the privilege of six tons of goods he could trade on his own account. Loaded with China goods, the ship made for Hawaii and then Mexico’s Pacific ports, where Forbes learned how to bribe customs officials in order to conduct contraband trade. Forbes’ uncle was John M. Forbes, who was special agent in Buenos Aires while Bartow Prevost was in Peru.322

In El Salvador, Forbes learned that his uncle was known and admired by the principal foreign merchant in Sonsonate. Upon reaching Guayaquil, Forbes stayed with merchant and U.S. consul William Wheelwright, who later organized the Pacific Steam Navigation Co. Forbes had a falling out with the supercargo of the Nile, who tried to hide some China goods from customs inspectors and got the ship seized and his contraband sold at auction. Wheelwright intervened to get the Nile released. Then Forbes did Wheelwright the favor of lending his whaleboat to transport “an officer who was on his way with despatches for General Bolivar.”323

It rained for more than two months while they were in Ecuador, and the crew got sick. So they made for Paita and a small clinic run by a U.S. doctor. “One man died on the way,” said Forbes, “and I had my hands full with others.” The rest of the crew recovered in the dry air of Peru’s north coast. Forbes and the supercargo parted ways, leaving the young captain to carry on the rest of the


business in consultation with Wheelwright. From Paita the Nile made its way to Callao. The main goods Forbes was trading were India shawls and China silk, but he gave no details of what he sold in Peru. While there he fraternized with U.S. navy officers of the USS United States and Peacock. “At Callao, I bought a black mare of Lieutenant Ramsey, of the United States, one of the finest I have owned, and took her to Guayaquil.” Stopping again at Paita, the Nile then returned to Hawaii to take on sandalwood. Once back in Canton, Perkins’ partner there loaded the Nile with a cargo worth about $100,000 of China goods destined for a Buenos Aires house and where Forbes hoped to see his uncle. It was a risky proposition, as Brazil and Argentina were at war. Sure enough, the Brazilian fleet was blockading the Rio de la Plata and seized the Nile. However, Perkins’ customer in Buenos Aires managed to bribe officials and get $30,000 of China goods landed before the Nile headed back to Boston with the remainder of its China cargo.324 While this Nile voyage may not have been typical or similar to Alsop trading, it appears that bribery was commonplace in getting Asian goods into Latin American countries.

In the face of U.S. dominance of trade between Asia and South America, Felipe Barreda sought to recreate the colonial monopoly on cross-Pacific commerce as a privilege for post-independence Peruvians. He disliked Alsop’s intrusion into what in his father’s day was a tightly regulated trade reserved for Spanish-born traders. In 1839, Barreda got state approval to organize the Compañía de Asia (people also called it the Compañía Asiática), winning what was supposed to be a fifteen-year monopoly on Peru’s trade with the Philippines.

324 Forbes went on to become a well-known captain, merchant and shipbuilder.
and China, the resurrection of a similar colonial company. The firm was to be
capitalized at 500,000 pesos, and foreigners were prohibited from buying shares
of its stock. The company was constituted in June 1841, and its officers
included Nicolás Rodrigo, Juan de Ugarte and José Canevaro, who all would
later partner with Barreda in other ventures. Rodrigo seems to have been
Barreda’s closest business partner in this period. Rodrigo was a Spaniard by
birth, a status that later barred him from Barreda’s guano ventures. José
Canevaro later became Peru’s biggest trafficker in Chinese indentured servants,
forming a partnership that included Barreda’s son-in-law, Manuel Pardo. The
Peruvians purchased the ship Asia and sent it off under command of Domingo
Vallieriestra, brother of the widow of Admiral Guise. In Witt’s version, the Asia
made only one voyage for Barreda’s firm before he gave up on the business.
In theory, foreign merchants could no longer import from Asia without going
through Barreda, but foreign houses apparently found ways to circumvent the

325 For the decree establishing the monopoly, see P. Emilio Dancuart, Anales de la hacienda pública
del Perú (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1903), v.3, pp. 89-90.

326 Heinrich Witt was shown the account books of a merchant friend in Arequipa in 1846 who
did business buying alpaca wool from a partnership that seems to have been composed of José
Canevaro, Nicolás Rodrigo and Felipe Barreda. See Witt, Diario, v. 2, p. 156.

327 José Nicolás de Rodrigo was born in Spain 1800 and went to Peru at age seventeen. Perhaps
he was considered to be a Peruvian to meet the criteria of the Compañía de Asia, but after Chilean
forces advancing on Lima burned his Miraflores and Chorrillos homes in 1881, he utilized his
Spanish nationality to make an 1884 claim presented by Spain to Chile for damages. Ambrosio
Montt, Dictamenes del fiscal de la Corte suprema de justicia de Chile, vol. 1 (Santiago: Imprenta
Nacional, 1894), pp. 346-347. Rodrigo is best known in Peruvian history for being a co-founding
patron (with cotton baron and guano-loading contractor Domingo Elías) of what eventually
became Lima’s premier public high school, the Colegio de Guadalupe.

law. The Compañía de Asia protested the arrival of Asian goods in 1843 in violation of their privilege, so the government imposed a double tariff on such imports.\textsuperscript{329}

While Heinrich Witt did not comment on how foreign merchants undermined the would-be monopoly, he was dismissive of Barreda’s commercial abilities, claiming that the Compañía Asiática \textit{fue un fracaso}, and that the firm \textit{desapareció muy pronto}.\textsuperscript{330} Witt later helped his own son engage in Peru’s Asia trade, and Barreda was among the Peruvian merchants who purchased their Canton imports.\textsuperscript{331}

The possibility that bribery and contraband helped frustrate the Peruvians’ plans is seen in Witt’s account of the business of Henry Higginson. Peru’s Higginson family is usually described as hailing from Buenos Aires, where father Charles, an Englishman born in the East Indies, had business and where most of his children were born. But, Witt described Henry, the youngest child, as \textit{un chalaco completo}, meaning a person typical of Callao. \textit{Enriquito} was apprenticed in the port agency business of Henry Dalton at age twelve or thirteen. After Dalton left for Mexico and California, Henry worked for another agent before establishing his own customs brokerage in partnership with a Peruvian

\textsuperscript{329} Dancuart., pp. 34-35.

\textsuperscript{330} Witt, \textit{Diario}, v. 1, p. 482. There was a rather gloating tone in Witt’s comment that cried out for explanation. He said that, “of course,” the firm failed. Witt probably was not alone in resenting government regulation that gave a privilege to Peruvians.

\textsuperscript{331} Ibid., v. 2, pp. 365-371.
sometime around 1845. His father Charles, who had taken the position of British consul in Paita, asked Witt to give Henry the Witt y Schutte port agency contract for their for importing business. While describing how Higginson prospered in Callao, Witt wrote what is surely one of the most important statements in his extensive diary. Higginson was successful because, as Witt described, *El entró de lleno en el lucrativo negocio del contrabando que, durante muchos de los años pasados, la mayoría de agentes portuarios del Callao estuvieron llevando a cabo en combinación y con la ayuda de los funcionarios de la propia oficina de Aduana, cuya obligación era prevenir tales nefastas transacciones.*332 The sentence deserves careful parsing. These contraband operations were not surreptitious landings at some isolated beach in the dead of night. They were integral to Callao’s daily operations and practiced by “the majority” of the port’s customs brokers. Higginson dove *fully* into the lucrative business of routine corruption. Coming from an important merchant with intimate knowledge of how Peru’s international commerce was conducted, this testimony about routine corruption in the country’s importing of foreign manufactures must be taken into consideration in any evaluation of guano-era development policy and its economic effects. Despite Witt’s apparent indignation, as if the *nefastas transacciones* were some Peruvian disease among immoral civil servants that the honest merchant must suffer, surely the importers expensed it as a cost of doing business and could have, if they thought it detrimental to their interests, exposed it and brought it to an end. By his own admission, Witt was an enabler of

Higginson. (Witt credited Rafael Velarde Echevarría with ending customs brokerage corruption after 1868.)

While Peru’s reconstituted Asia monopoly may not have been effective, it established an important precedent at the onset of the guano era. Felipe Barreda and his colleagues next worked to secure portions of the guano trade for los hijos del país like themselves.

GUANO-RELATED INITIAL CAPITAL

In 1840, Felipe sent for the baby brother of the family, Federico, then only thirteen, to apprentice him in the Lima business. The boy witnessed the dawn of the guano trade and Peru’s improving development prospects. In the early 1850s there were guano-linked windfalls from the government by which speculators, merchants and the politically-connected could build up capital. First was the “consolidation” of 1850 by which vales (bond-like instruments) were issued covering debts the government supposedly had accumulated since the independence period; then came a foreign debt “conversion,” and, finally, there was indemnification of owners for the manumission of their slaves after the 1854 abolition decree. Alfonso Quiroz showed how these government measures were fraught with corruption and how merchants and other speculators shared in the rewards. Among the beneficiaries were a number of people close to Felipe

333 According to Witt, Federico also at some point worked in Lima for Benito Dorca, whose business was focused on French imports. Dorca also employed Enrique Ayulo, a man whose family would become a component of the Barreda social network. Dorca took Ayulo in as a partner, adopting the company name of Dorca Ayulo y Cía. Enrique Ayulo’s son married the daughter of Mariana Barreda and Manuel Pardo.
Barreda, and he himself acquired 59,000 pesos in consolidation vales (table 7.1). His brother-in-law, Mariano de Osma, received 64,125 pesos in manumission bonds for 213 slaves. Fernando Carrillo de Albornoz y Zavala, whose brother-in-law would soon marry one of Felipe Barreda’s daughters and whose son would later marry a Barreda niece, was a major recipient of consolidation bonds and the second largest recipient of manumission bonds, issued for 389 slaves.  

Table 7.1
1850 Consolidation and 1855 Manumission Vales Received by Current and Future Barreda Network Members and Business Associates (Thousands of pesos)

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Consolidation</th>
<th>Manumission</th>
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<tr>
<td>Felipe Barreda y Aguilar</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan Bautista de Lavalle**</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Antonio Lavalle**</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariano de Osma</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José María Sancho Dávila</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolás Rodrigo*</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro Gonzalez de Candamo*</td>
<td>184</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Canevaro**</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando Carrillo de Albornoz**</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benito Dorca*</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Unanue*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Mansueto Canaval**</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sometime business associate of Felipe Barreda, but not intermarried.  
** Marriage connection after 1850.

Recipients of vales could collect interest payments or sell them at discount to speculators. There were no banks in Peru at the time, so merchants functioned

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334 Alfonso W. Quiroz, La deuda defraudada: consolidación de 1850 y dominio económico en el Perú (Lima: Instituto Nacional de Cultura, 1987), tables 4 and 16, pp. 76 and 161.
as clearing houses. They could loan money against the vales or, buy them at low prices.

**POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FOREIGN LOANS**

When Federico Barreda, writing from Baltimore, explained to his fiancée (and niece) in Spain why he was confident of providing her with a comfortable lifestyle and security in the United States, he alluded to politics. The president of Peru, Ramón Castilla, was the protector – he used the word “friend” – of the businesses of the Barredas and Osmas, he said.\(^{335}\) Carlos Camprubí Alcázar, who wrote a history of Peru’s banks in the late guano era, described Felipe Barreda as “advisor and friend of Castilla.”\(^{336}\) In 1846 Castilla had named Barreda to be treasury minister in his first administration, but Barreda decided to

\(^{335}\) Federico Barreda used the term to reassure her about prospects for the F. Barreda y Hermano guano business, with “friend” implying that their company enjoyed special protection of Castilla. Information on the Barreda brothers’ relationship with Castilla is from a biography of Federico written and privately published by his grandson and namesake, Frederick Barreda Sherman. Although published in 1977, Sherman’s book has a lovely nineteenth-century title, *From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate, By Way of Lima, Baltimore, New York, Newport, Washington, London, Paris, and Cuajiniquilapa: Being the Story of the Lives of Federico Luciano Barreda y Aguilar and Matilde Laverrerie y Barreda, His Wife, With Certain Information Concerning their Ancestors and their Descendants* (Mill Valley, California: Hall and Smith, 1977). (Sherman privately distributed two small supplements of corrections and additions to the book that are dated July 1981 and November 1984.) Castilla was also close to the man reputed to be the wealthiest in Peru, Pedro González de Candamo, a Chilean by birth who, according to one account, first met Castilla in Valparaíso when he was a young royalist officer. In this version, after being taken prisoner in the battle of Chacabuco, Castilla escaped to Montevideo with assistance from González de Candamo. See Quiroz, *La deuda defraudada*, p. 176.

decline the post. Witt’s diary references make clear that Castilla and his wife were frequent dinner guests of Felipe Barreda and Carmen de Osma. In personal correspondence with his wife, Federico Barreda later took the liberty of referring to Castilla as the “Old Man.” In 1862 Federico told his wife that his brother Felipe did not like his taking up a career in diplomacy because of how it placed him in politics, and noted that “we” are in “President Ramón’s carriage.” Nothing in this ongoing relationship with the Barredas suggested that Castilla was corrupt. But, the Barredas had the president’s ear, entertained him discretely in the dignified colonial manner and were his development partners on projects without being public partisans. Federico Barreda sincerely admired the “Old Man” and could not disguise his pride when Castilla gave him an honorary appointment as a “Colonel of the Guard.” If Federico’s public visibility ran against his brother’s preference for a low political profile, perhaps there is a clue in the nickname Felipe Barreda apparently earned in the 1840s.

According to Heinrich Witt, Barreda was called El silencioso.

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337 Decree of Ramon Castilla on May 19, 1846, published in El Peruano of same day, reprinted as document 542 in Juan Oviedo, ed., Colección de leyes, decretos y órdenes publicadas en el Perú desde el año de 1821 hasta 31 de diciembre de 1859, vol. 2 (Lima: Felipe Bailly, 1861), pp. 233-234.

338 References to Castilla as the “Old Man” are in Sherman, From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate, pp. 88 and 103. The reference to “President Ramón’s carriage” (p. 103) is specific to Federico’s diplomatic role, not necessarily his earlier guano business, although his brother was still heavily involved in the guano trade. Elsewhere Sherman wrote that “General Castilla was a close friend of Felipe,” and that in the 1840s Castilla “had watched the younger man [Federico] grow up.” Sherman imagined that “Federico must have talked with him often in the Barreda home.” Ibid., p. 49.

339 Ibid., p. 102-103.

340 Witt said he still bore that nickname in the early 1870s. Witt, Diario, v. 2, p. 354.
A window on the Barreda/Castilla relationship and how it gained the U.S. guano market for the Barredas is the foreign debt conversion. During the 1840s, British speculators anticipated that Peru’s guano revenues would permit the country to pay on its defaulted independence-era debts. Just as independence damage claims of U.S. citizens were a preoccupation of U.S. officials in Peru, claims of British bondholders were a constant irritant in early Anglo-Peruvian relations. Negotiations went nowhere in the 1830s. But in January 1842, a caretaker government in Lima issued a decree that a portion of revenues from guano sales in Britain would be reserved for payments to bondholders. Britain’s representative in Lima, Belford Wilson, took personal credit for prompting the decree, although it was not implemented at the time. Peruvian bonds were trading in London in early 1842 as low as 16½ percent of face value, and one of the speculators who jumped on them, purchasing £16,000 (face value), was the British merchant house of Gibbs, Crawley and Co., whose Lima affiliate was already getting involved in the guano trade and would later become the Peruvian government’s exclusive agent for the British guano market.³⁴¹

In early 1847, Peru informed the bondholders in London that further negotiations on the debt would have to be held in Lima, where presumably the government could better control the process. The bondholders reluctantly appointed the Lima merchant house of Maclean Rowe as its negotiator, but the agent lacked independent authority to engage in back-and-forth deal making

that the Peruvians envisioned. In his study of how Peru handled its debt to British bondholders, W. M. Mathew described the process by which the Peruvian government reversed itself under the leadership of Ramón Castilla’s foreign minister and Felipe Barreda’s friend, Felipe Pardo y Aliaga, moving the negotiations from Lima back to London and appointing José Joaquín de Osma as its agent with full powers to do a deal. Sent with Osma as his assistant in the negotiations was Barreda, his brother-in-law and the future father-in-law of Manuel Pardo, the foreign minister’s son (see chart below).

Chart 7.1
Selected Barreda/de Osma Family Members
Clearly, the Barreda alliance with the Pardo family began long before the celebrated 1859 marriage of Mariana Barreda y Osma to Manuel Pardo. The British chargé d’affaires in Lima, W. P. Adams, wrote that Joaquín de Osma and Felipe Barreda were Felipe Pardo’s “most intimate private friends and political associates,” and in a dispatch to London dated October 12 he suggested that the three men intended to be rewarded in making a deal with the bondholders. “Minister Sr. Pardo is not above suspicion on financial points,” he said, repeating word heard in Lima that “a percentage on the bonds is understood to have been arranged for the successful negotiators with the Bondholders.” Osma also was empowered to renegotiate the terms of the Gibbs exclusive guano contract for the British market so that it would provide the means by which guano revenues would be applied to the foreign debt restructuring. Mathew found that after Osma and Barreda reached London – but before their appearance was reported in The Times – trading in Peruvian bonds became more active and their price rose (see table 7.2).

In March 1848, Peruvian bonds were trading in London as low as twenty percent of their face value. That was up from around sixteen percent quoted on the London exchange in 1842, when, as noted earlier, Gibbs, Crawley made their purchase but before the significance of guano for Peru was fully appreciated in Europe. Most of the bonds were now believed to be in the hands of wealthy speculators, something known to Felipe Pardo and his Osma and Barreda associates. In June 1848, Pardo wrote a memorandum to the British chargé in
Lima in which he observed that the present holders of the bonds, who “are not ... the original ones, but having bought the bonds they now hold at low prices, do not seek in a settlement of the loan an indemnification for [the long default], of which the [original] lenders alone could complain, but for an augmentation of positive profits.” Pardo implied that the gestures Peru had made in negotiations stimulated active trading in the bonds in recent months, so that already the speculators could cash out at a rich profit.

Table 7.2
Price of Peruvian Bonds Trading on the London Market
(Percent of Face Value, 1842-1850)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1842</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>16 ½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In June Peruvian foreign minister Felipe Pardo told the British chargé that speculators were profiting from the rise in value of Peruvian bonds after Peru began negotiating with its creditors.

“June 30 ½ - 36

In September Pardo dispatched Osma and Barreda to London and they arrived there November 12.

“December 7 37
“December 9 37 ½
“December 13 39
“December 16 40

December 21 Osma gave terms to bondholders.
December 23 first newspaper report of Osma and Barreda mission.

“December 23 45
“December 30 49

January 5 The Times published terms of agreement.

1849 | January | 49 - 50
“February | 49 - 50

1850 | January | 53

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342 Ibid., p. 94.
Sources for table 7.2: W. M. Mathew, “First Anglo-Peruvian,” pp. 86, 96-98; P. Emilio Dancuart, Anales de la hacienda pública del Perú (Lima: Gmo. Stolte, 1903), tomo IV, p. 34. However, there may have been earlier increases in the value of Peruvian bonds, as Witt wrote that he bought in 1844 at about 23 percent (inferred from purchase price of $2,107) and then regretted that he sold too soon (in February 1846) at 38 percent, since, “En el transcurso de los años estos bonos subieron casi a un 100%.” Witt, Diario, v. 2, p. 198

If Osma and Barreda purchased bonds upon their arrival in late November (day uncertain), perhaps also on behalf of foreign minister Pardo, at, say, mid-30s (percent of face value), then within a few weeks they could have reaped a handsome profit by turning around and selling them at about 49 or 50 percent of face value at the beginning of January. One source said Barreda bought at 33 percent. British speculators who bought earlier in the year would have made even more spectacular profits.343

Just what else Osma and Barreda obtained for themselves from the settlement with the bondholders is unclear. Nor is it known what commissions, if any, they might have earned on new contracts negotiated with guano consignees. When the defaulted bonds were converted into new bonds to be paid directly from guano revenues, one matter to be decided by Joaquín de Osma and Felipe Barreda was which company in Britain would act as the Peruvian government’s financial agent in making the payments. Mathew showed that

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343 The conversion benefited holders of Peruvian debt by creating new securities guaranteed by guano revenues. But speculators could still purchase Peruvian bonds at great discount from people needing cash. A major speculator in the new instruments was Pedro González de Candamo, later reputed to be the richest man in Peru, sometimes a business partner of the Barredas and, like them, a “friend” of Ramón Castilla. According to an 1866 inventory, González de Candamo held assets worth 6.3 million pesos, of which 4.2 million were in converted Anglo-Peruvian debt bonds. See Quiroz, La Deuda Defraudada, p. 192. Was a share of the new bonds provided to the Peruvians negotiating the deal as a promoter’s fee? Could González de Candamo have acquired some of these bonds through the Barreda/Osma/Pardo group?
Felipe Barreda tried to get a dealmaker’s commission from Gibbs, whose guano consignment contract Osma was empowered to renegotiate in London. The Peruvian government wanted Gibbs to be the agent, Mathew wrote. He quoted from a Gibbs internal document dated April 16, 1849: “Barreda has sounded us about the [foreign debt] Conversion, as to what we could cede out of our Commission to him [and] Osma and [Francisco de] Rivero,” the latter being Peru’s minister in London. Gibbs was amenable. “We said if we had to charge ½, ¼.” This meant an even split between Gibbs and the negotiators. But, Gibbs was not about to jeopardize its guano contact. Gibbs had no way of ensuring that a commission to the Peruvians could be kept secret. So, they told Barreda that his share of the charges would have to be formally disclosed to the Peruvian government. “We would make no simulated charge.” Barreda and Osma refused a public deal, so they turned elsewhere, arranging for a Spanish house in London to handle the bondholder payment arrangements. The Gibbs document stated that, “He [Barreda] went away and has arranged with Murrieta.” Mathew said that Osma appointed Murrieta on April 9, “at a

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344 When later accused of using inside information to profit from personal speculation in Peruvian bonds, Francisco de Rivero stated that he did not purchase his bonds until “many months after the arrangements made by el Señor Osma were published and [generally] known.” He denied being a “stock speculator” but said he did make a profit and that all his operations were “perfectly legal.” He said he did not own real estate in Peru or Europe, and that, in his twelve years of service to Peru in Europe up to 1860, he lived exclusively off his government salary. Francisco de Rivero, Ojeada sobre el guano (Paris: Imprenta de D’Aubusson y Kugelmann, 1860), pp. 196-197.

commission rate of $\frac{1}{2}$ percent,” leaving the reader to guess what the share was for the Osma/Barreda/Pardo/Rivero group.346

While Gibbs did not agree to an under-the-table deal with Felipe Barreda, the casualness with which the firm discussed sharing a commission with the Peruvians is suggestive of how Peru’s business was conducted during the guano era. In an 1854 letter to William Gibbs, Henry Gibbs wrote cryptically, “We pay the Dividends to Murrieta but don’t enquire what he does with the money.”347

At the conclusion of the Osma/Barreda bond negotiations in early 1849, Peru’s foreign debt had risen to 22.4 million pesos, of which more than half was converted interest charged on loans that originated in 1822 and 1825.348 Now Felipe Barreda and his brothers-in-law set their sights on the guano consignment business.

BARREDA CONTROL OF THE U.S. MARKET

Felipe Barreda previously had some minor involvement in one or more guano contracts, but he now moved to score a major one. In November 1849, congress passed a law giving preference to Peruvian businessmen, los hijos del...

346 Ibid; Mathew cited the same April 16 letter together with subsequent Gibbs documents of September 15, 1849, and February 11, 1850. Mathew noted that Gibbs later in the mid-1850s did assume the role of financial agent for the Peruvian government in payments on the foreign debt bonds. See his footnotes 28 and 29, pp. 102-103, for suggestive details on the handling of guano revenues by Gibbs in 1851 and the fifty percent share turned over to the agent for payment to bondholders.

347 Ibid, pp. 102-103.

348 The loan agreements and related decrees and legislation are given in P. Emilio Dancuart, Anales de la hacienda pública del Perú (Lima: Gmo. Stolte, 1903), tomo IV, pp. 34-43.
in guano contracts and consignment agreements. Barreda leveraged his association with Felipe Pardo, his Osma in-laws and his friend, president Ramón Castilla, to gain exclusive rights to the U.S. guano market. His initial 1850 consignment contract was for ten years in partnership with his longtime business associate, Nicolás Rodrigo, and with merchant Julián de Zaracondegui, and it covered the United States, the Caribbean, France, Spain, China and Brazil. Mathew described the consignment terms the government granted as “unusually generous.” The Castilla regime required no up front loan from Barreda such as that which Gibbs always provided. The sales commission was higher than what Gibbs received, and interest earned on the cost of shipping was six percent, also higher than Gibbs received. This was truly the fulfillment of lucrative privileges granted to emerging national capitalists envisioned in the 1849 law.

Presumably the group intended to divide or subcontract some of these markets, as the project was quite ambitious. So, in August 1851, a few months after Castilla had passed the presidency to his handpicked successor, José Rufino Echenique, Barreda got a modification giving him just the U.S. market. He

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349 The Peruvian merchants seemed to be appropriating a nationalistic phrase artisans had used to describe themselves in their campaigns for protectionism.


351 During an 1853 trip to Lima, Federico Barreda made a cryptic reference to Peruvian politics and a relationship with president Echenique, whose family appears in the Tristán group (to the right of the Barredas in the appendix chart). On July 12 Barreda wrote, “I have been very well received by my old friends who have praised me more than I deserve and I could not avoid getting into politics if I stayed here much longer.” Later in the same letter to his niece and fiancée, he described a pending trip to the Chinchas with the president. “In two or three days I am going with President Echenique to the guano islands to make arrangements about loading the ships and I expect to return in seven days.” Sherman, *From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate*, p. 38.
incorporated the new partnership as F. Barreda y Hermano. Felipe’s kid brother was the hermano. Federico put up no capital himself and worked initially on salary. The Osmas were silent partners, investing a majority of the capital to set up the U.S. business. President Castilla had named one of the silent partners, Joaquín de Osma, who handled the debt consolidation deal with Barreda in London, to be the Peruvian minister in Washington. Profits gained from U.S. guano sales would ensure large dowries for making or strengthening alliances; and, with eight children, Felipe Barreda and Carmen de Osma did not lack vehicles with which to put their assets in play and forge what I will call the Barreda social network.

U.S. DEMAND FOR GUANO

It was noted in chapter three that the democrats or Jeffersonians with which Bartow Prevost was identified were the most enthusiastic champions of westward expansion of family farms in the north and plantations in the south. A significant factor in the spread of plantation agriculture westward was soil exhaustion in the east. Soil depletion was of special concern to a number of leaders of the American Revolution who hailed from Virginia. George Washington struggled with declining soil productivity at Mount Vernon, and his heirs would be among the first U.S. farmers to try out Peruvian guano. Thomas

\[352\] Sherman in *From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate* made no mention of Rodrigo or Zaracondegui investing in this partnership, so their relationship with F. Barreda y Hermano is unknown. Perhaps the original plan had them involved in the markets that Barreda gave up: the Caribbean, France, Spain, China and Brazil.

\[353\] See appendix chart.
Jefferson corresponded with Washington in 1793 concerning the need to put used-up land in “repose under grasses.” Jefferson betrayed an attitude that prevailed for all too long among his farming colleagues, telling Washington rather glibly that, “we can buy an acre of new land cheaper than we can manure an old one.”

That was just the sort of complacency that James Madison bemoaned twenty-four years later. Upon leaving the presidency in 1817 (the year Bartow Prevost was appointed to Peru), Madison returned to tobacco farming on his Montpelier plantation and became active in the local Agricultural Society of Albemarle. In an 1818 address to the members, he focused on efforts to restore the soil. Unfortunately, he said, Virginia’s “prevailing crops have been very exhausting, and the use of manures has been particularly neglected.” He then began a lengthy review of the benefits of articles used to manure the soil, from tobacco plant residue to wheat straw, corn stalk, gypsum plaster, lime, marle and animal manures. Madison felt that the efforts of Virginia farmers in restoring the productivity of the land were grossly inadequate, and in concluding his address he apologized for omissions in his “catalogue of errors in our rural economy.”

The growing soil crisis in Virginia, Maryland, the Carolinas and other states became Peru’s opportunity two decades later.

While Great Britain became firmly established as the principal destination for Peru’s guano during the 1840s, the United States was a significant market

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356 Ibid., p. 95.
throughout much of the guano era. This was especially true for the period leading up to the U.S. Civil War, as seen in charts 7.2 and 7.3. During nine years, 1852-1860, according to official statistics the United States imported 630,573 tons of Peruvian guano, an amount equal to almost forty percent of British imports. The actual volume was probably higher, and the trade had considerable impact on U.S. agriculture, ship building, foreign relations and, at certain moments, domestic politics.

Chart 7.1
Peruvian Guano Exports to Great Britain and the United States
As a Percent of Estimated Total Guano Exports
1849-1862

Peruvian guano first reached the United States via the Pacific Station ship USS Franklin commanded by William Tudor’s brother-in-law, Charles Stewart (chapter three). John S. Skinner, founding editor of the widely read Baltimore journal, American Farmer, credited a midshipman by the name of Bland with
sending him some guano along with seeds from Peru in 1824.\textsuperscript{357} He distributed the fertilizer for experimentation among several farmers, one of whom responded that he had never seen a more powerful manure for Indian corn.\textsuperscript{358} Nevertheless, guano was not reintroduced into the United States on a commercial scale until after it had been marketed in Europe in the early 1840s. New land was more plentiful in North America, agricultural commodities there generally brought lower prices, and, thus, the demand for fertilizers was less intense than in Europe.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Chart 7.2}
Estimated Total Peruvian Guano Exports
And Recorded U.S. and British Imports
Of Peruvian Guano in Tons
1849-1862
\end{center}

Note: U.S. trade records significantly understated the tonnage of Peruvian guano entering the United States. The chart should have


showed a big spike in U.S. imports in 1853 (rather than the decline seen above) after the Barredas took over sales to the U.S. market. Much of the 1853-1854 spike in Peru’s guano exports (seen in the upper line) were tons actually sent to the United States.

U.S. interest in Peru’s product coincided with the spread of scientific knowledge among U.S. farmers. A U.S. edition of German scientist Justus Liebig’s influential text, *Organic Chemistry in its Applications to Agriculture and Physiology*, was published in 1841. In an unsigned comment on the book in the *North American Review* a writer noted that, “As illustrative of the value of ammonia in vegetation, Liebig refers to guano. This is the excrement of sea-birds, and found in large quantities on several islands in the South Sea. The effect of this manure is understood to be most powerful.” The author suggested that guano could bring to life soil that was almost without nutrients. “It renders the soils, which consist of clay and sand, and contain, as is represented, no organic matter, highly fertile. This manure is composed principally of salts of ammonia, and a few earthy salts.”

In the summer of 1842, reports of the success of guano in Britain began appearing in U.S. agricultural journals. *Niles’ National Register* said that English papers reported that Chincha Islands guano “has the power of fertilizing the soil to a wonderful degree,” and the *Southern Agriculturalist* wrote that the English press carried stories describing the manure as “one of the most efficient yet known.” An editor at the *Southern Cultivator* thought that guano would not suit the United States because it had “so many easy accessible sources of fertility,” that is, new lands from which Indians were expelled but had not yet been cleared and planted. On the other hand, a writer in the *Southern Agriculturalist* opined

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that U.S. farmers “should not be so timid” by declining to try out the Peruvian product.\textsuperscript{360}

The first significant cargo of Peruvian guano arrived in Baltimore in 1843 and was sold for trial in small amounts at seven cents a pound, or the equivalent of about 140 dollars per ton.\textsuperscript{361} The editor of the \textit{Southern Planter} decided to try some out on his garden, and he was impressed. “Much as we heard of its marvelous effects we were astonished at the magical result upon our flower bed.”\textsuperscript{362} In 1844 Peru’s consignees sent 445 tons to Baltimore, and shipments grew steadily thereafter, with the guano marketed at 45 dollars per ton.\textsuperscript{363}

As in Great Britain, Peruvian guano soon gained renown in the United States as the world’s superior manure, and it was thought to be suitable for almost any crop. Interest in experimenting with guano in U.S. agriculture grew as farmers grasped the mineral theory of soil composition developed in Liebig’s 1841 book.

Holding the consignment contract covering the U.S. market but preoccupied with sales in Britain, Gibbs subcontracted distribution in the United States to two merchants, Edwin Bartlett of New York City and Samuel K. George of Baltimore. Bartlett was a partner in Alsop y Cía. of Lima, having joined the firm in its fourth copartnership in 1835. He served as U.S. consul there from 1836

\textsuperscript{360} Quotations are from Jordan, p. 216.

\textsuperscript{361} See Avery Odelle Craven, \textit{Soil Exhaustion as a Factor in the Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland} (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1926), p. 149.

\textsuperscript{362} Jordan, p. 216.

\textsuperscript{363} Although Jordan reviewed many agricultural journals over the course of the 1840s and 1850s, regrettably he did not present a detailed tracking of guano prices. See his extensive list of U.S. agricultural journal articles on guano in footnote 49 on p. 217.
to 1841, continuing Alsop’s tradition of having a partner in this position.364 George probably had no need to advertise, given the high demand in his area, but Bartlett invested in promotion of the Peruvian product. He published an eighty-page pamphlet offering farmers a history of Peruvian guano, instructions on its use, brief reports on experiments conducted in Britain, and numerous testimonials from English and Caribbean farmers. In early 1845, he sent a copy to Henry Clay in Kentucky and had an agent deliver him a sample barrel of the Peruvian product. Clay had just lost his 1844 bid for the U.S. presidency, and he wrote Bartlett to thank him for the gift “which you have done me the favor to present to me” and promise the merchant that, “I will submit its use to a fair experiment, according to the directions contained in the pamphlet, a copy of which I have also received.”365 Bartlett no doubt hoped that Clay would later send him a report on the results that he could use in future advertising.

The greatest initial U.S. demand centered in the worn-out tobacco lands of the upper South, primarily Maryland, Virginia and Delaware. A farmer in Montgomery County, Maryland, in a letter to the U.S. Patent Office in February, 1849, said that “unfortunately” his region formerly produced tobacco “which impoverished her soil to that degree that it was scarcely worth tillage ....” But


365 Because Clay’s letter to Bartlett is held by a private collector, I quote its full text: “I have received a letter from Mr. D.L. Sayre informing me that he had, by your direction, shipd to Messrs Swift and Robbins of Lexington one barrel of Peruvian Guano, which you have done me the favor to present to me. I have not yet received it, but I have no doubt it will come safely to hand. In the mean time, I tender my grateful thanks for the interesting present. Upon its arrival, I will submit its use to a fair experiment, according to the directions contained in the pamphlet, a copy of which I have also received. I am, with high respect, Your obt. Servant.” Henry Clay, Ashland, Kentucky, to Edwin Bartlett, No. 42 South St, City of New York, March 7, 1845 (photograph of the original in author’s collection).
with application of Peruvian guano over the past four years, he continued, “the improvement in many parts have been very considerable.” He estimated that about 100 tons of guano were used per year in 1847 and 1848 “within a few miles of me.” Alluding to the California gold rush then underway, he said that, “The effects realized by the application of guano have been so favorable on a great portion of our worn out lands, as to create almost as great a fever to procure it as appears to affect some sections of the country at the present time in regard to the gold region of our newly acquired territory ….” He thought that the amount of wheat produced in his area in 1848 was double that of the previous year, mostly due to Peruvian guano’s revival of worn-out soil.366

The most serious problem faced by Bartlett, George and their retail fertilizer dealers was competition from inferior and adulterated “guanos” that began to appear on the market, especially those fraudulently sold as the authentic Peruvian product. In late 1845, Bartlett placed an ad in the American Agriculturalist stating that the only genuine Peruvian guano presently on the market in the United States had been brought from Peru on the ship Orpheus and could only be obtained from his agents, whom he listed in the announcement. “Farmers and others are cautioned against purchasing any [guano] as Peruvian, not imported into this port by the undersigned, or into Baltimore by Saml. K. George.” One month later, Bartlett sent out letters to agricultural publications warning that merchants were offering “Peruvian Guano, from the Chincha Islands” brought in by the ship Caroline Amelia. In fact, he said, this material was “loaded under a license from the Chilean Government, at a distance of nearly a thousand miles from the Chincha Islands.” Not only was this cargo “far inferior

To that obtained in Peru,” but he had word from England that material “from the same place has been found to be entirely worthless, from exposure to the rain where deposited; and from being strongly impregnated with salt, from the beating of the surf against the low rocks where it is gathered.” Bartlett advised that a Dutch ship, the Wodan, also was loaded at this Chilean spot and was headed for the United States.367 To demonstrate the contrast with authentic Peruvian guano, Bartlett enclosed a chemical analysis of the Chilean product showing it consisted mostly of phosphate of lime, sand, salt and only about four percent of various ammonias. He clarified that he was the exclusive consignee of the Peruvian Guano Company for the U.S. market, and that he in New York and George in Baltimore were the only companies authorized to receive shipments from the Chinchas. “Any other offered as Peruvian, is spurious, and our farmers must be cautious to ascertain the origin of what they buy to avoid imposition.”

When F. Barreda y hermano took over control of guano sales in the United States, Peru faced a growing problem as distributors and would-be guano “manufacturers” were tempted to exploit this new market with adulterated and inferior guanos or by offering substitute products of untested value.

ESTABLISHING THE U.S. BARREDA BASE

Federico Barreda’s role was to set up and manage the firm in the United States, and this part of the story brings us back to Felipe and Federico’s oldest sister, Rosa. It will be recalled that Federico was born three years after Rosa had her first of four daughters and that Felipe called him to Peru in 1840. Sister Rosa and brother Felipe were old enough to be Federico’s parents; and Federico had

developed a crush on his niece, Matilde, who was three years his senior. Separated by Federico’s move to Peru when they were, respectively thirteen and sixteen, their initial flirtations grew in memory and through frequent correspondence into a long-distance courtship. Federico declared his love for Matilde in 1851, once the U.S. market was secured and he had the requisite prospects. “Always you have been my darling; always since you were a little girl you must remember that I have loved you,” he wrote. Federico had spent his teenage years and young adulthood apprenticing with Felipe in Lima, but his niece and bride-to-be would see Peru during only one short visit. Once they received Vatican dispensation allowing the niece/uncle union in 1853, Federico and Matilde were destined to live out their lives in the United States.

Barreda was only twenty-five when given responsibility for guano distribution in the United States, but he had already worked for about twelve years for his brother in Peru. Baltimore, Maryland, was the main U.S. port receiving Peruvian guano, so it was logical that Federico set up his operations there. Maryland was a Southern slave state; more precisely, it was one of four Border States where slavery, as in Peru, was in decline. Unlike the cotton regions of the lower South, where slavery was expanding into new lands, Maryland’s economy felt a strong Northern pull. In 1830, almost a quarter of Maryland’s population was slave; two decades later, when Federico Barreda arrived, it was down to about fifteen percent. In northern Maryland, where Baltimore was

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368 Sherman, From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate, p. 21.
located, the proportion of blacks who were free rose from 51 percent in 1830 to 71 percent in 1850. In the city itself the proportion of free blacks was even higher, and Baltimore was becoming an industrial center. It had long been a flour milling center, but it was now also important in metalworking, textiles and garment production. Its population had doubled over the past twenty years to about 170,000. Skilled workers were in high demand, so some masters let their slaves hire themselves out to employers and keep a share of their wages.

By June 1852, Federico Barreda had leased a Baltimore office, hired and supervised five U.S. clerks and spent a considerable amount of his time at the port overseeing the unloading, bagging and reshipment of guano. His initial impression of business dealings in the United States was unfavorable. Alsop was the largest U.S. merchant house in Peru, so Barreda made a reasonably safe choice for his New York distributor, selecting a New York Alsop partner (as Gibbs had done before him), despite the earlier Alsop/Barreda rivalry over Peru’s Asian trade. As he began making contracts with distributors in other port cities, he wrote Matilde in Spain that he struggled with “people who are the most tricky scoundrels in Christendom.” Wanting some freedom from day-to-day office and port work, Federico sent to Lima for a nephew of sister Rosa’s


husband, Juan de Barril, to serve as a trusted office manager and supervisor of his U.S. employees.\footnote{Sherman, From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate, p. 29.}

Once he could leave the U.S. business on its own for a while, Barreda headed for Spain to prepare his marriage to Matilde Laverrerie Barreda, his niece. When reaching Seville in March 1853, he paid an application fee of about 800 dollars for the Papal Dispensation that permitted such a union, noting in the petition that, since the deaths of his sister and her husband, he provided support for their four daughters and would continue to do so. Although Barreda sometimes bragged of his rectitude, he falsely stated that Matilde was two years younger than himself, when actually she was three years older.

In an 1854 letter to Matilde, her uncle (and now brother-in-law) in Lima, Felipe Barreda, offered an opinion about the United States, warning her that its favorable business opportunities were in contrast to the undesirable social conditions she would have to endure. She would discover that living “in the land of the Yankees,” he said, was “detestable for those who are not businessmen and much more detestable for a native of Andalucia ….”\footnote{Sherman, From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate, p. 44.}

In a city where most blacks were free and worked for competitive wages, Federico hired three black Catholic servants for his new household, describing in a letter the color and personal traits of each. The steward, Joseph, was “quite black, married, well-dressed, clean, pleasant personality, good worker,” and was paid $18 per month. The Barredas’ cook, Rachel, was “over 50, color dark,
intelligence white, very steady, amiable,” and, although “a bit of a talker,” not to the point of being “impertinent.” She was paid $12 per month. And, finally, there was the housemaid, Josephine, twenty-two years old, “dark white with black shading, modest and humble in appearance, experienced,” and paid $9 per month.373

As in Washington, D.C., summer heat and humidity made Baltimore uncomfortable. Felipe Barreda’s brother-in-law, Juan Ignacio de Osma, who replaced his brother Joaquín as Peru’s minister in Washington in 1848, enjoyed relief in Newport, Rhode Island. And, so, when his wife became pregnant, Federico sent Matilde and her sister there too. Well-to-do families passing “the season” in Newport found Matilde Barreda to be a charming young lady. She proved to be one of the Peruvian guano merchant’s most important assets.

BARREDA'S INCREASE SHIPMENTS

Guano was becoming a significant political issue in the United States just as the Barredas took over the U.S. market. Accidental president Millard Fillmore addressed the U.S. need for Peru’s fertilizer in his December, 1850, state-of-the-union speech to congress and made a promise that his administration would seek a price reduction. “Peruvian guano has become so desirable an article to the agricultural interest of the United States that it is the duty of the Government to employ all the means properly in its power for the purpose of causing that article to be imported into the country at a reasonable price,” he said, adding that, “Nothing will be omitted on my part toward accomplishing this desirable end.”

373 Sherman, From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate, p. 45.
While acknowledging that it would take considerable diplomatic work to satisfy the demands of U.S. farmers, Fillmore patronized Peru. “I am persuaded that in removing any restraints on this traffic the Peruvian Government will promote its own best interests, while it will afford a proof of a friendly disposition toward this country, which will be duly appreciated,” he intoned.374

Former Federalist lawyer and now Fillmore’s secretary of state, Daniel Webster, whom William Tudor had wanted to enlist to sue Richard Alsop for libel (chapter three), was among guano’s enthusiasts. He purchased an estate in Marshfield, Massachusetts, thirty-four miles south of Boston, in 1831 and then expanded it to 1,800 acres. A believer in the new “scientific farming,” Webster experimented with various natural fertilizers, including fish, kelp and stable manure. He made tests of Peruvian guano there as early as 1845.375 From his office in Washington in 1851, he notified his farm manager that, “I have ordered a considerable quantity of guano to be sent to you.” He said his objective was “to get the guano well into the ground, so that its strength shall not evaporate into the air.” Webster ordered that the guano first be mixed with three parts of plaster. “Put one ton and a half of guano upon ten acres,” not counting the plaster, he instructed.376 As secretary of state, it was Webster’s job to try to get Peru to offer its guano to U.S. farmers on more favorable terms. But, his personal


375 [N. E. Farmer], “Visit to the Farm of Hon. Daniel Webster, Marchfield, Mass.,” in Vermont Family Visitor, v. 1, no. 5 (October 1845), pp. 149-150.

376 Webster to John Taylor, March 9, 1851, in Peter Harvey, Reminiscences and Anecdotes of Daniel Webster (Boston: Little, Brown, 1882), pp. 300-301. According to Robert Vincent Remini, Webster developed the Marshfield estate more as a hobby and to be lord of the manor than for profit. See Daniel Webster: The Man and His Time (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), pp. 347-352.
interest in Peruvian guano soon contributed to a major diplomatic blunder that tainted the final year of Webster’s career with rumor of corruption (chapter ten).

For their part, the timing of the arrival of the Barredas in the United States could not have been more perfect. When Federico Barreda set up his office in Baltimore, farmers in some U.S. regions already were making large orders of guano and applying it to a wide variety of crops, from corn and potatoes in Massachusetts to sea-island cotton in the deep South.\textsuperscript{377} Peruvian guano flew out of Baltimore as soon as he could unload the ships and bag the product. The quickening pace of U.S. interest was reflected in the press serving the agricultural community. \textit{American Farmer} made no reference to guano in 1840 and only cited the fertilizer once the next year. But there were twenty-seven references in 1845 and eighty-five in 1851.\textsuperscript{378} The Richmond \textit{Times} judged in 1850 that the product was “producing a wonderful revolution upon the poor lands in middle and lower Virginia.” If the newspaper could be believed, exhausted soils that yielded only three to five bushels of wheat per acre, “now promise to give 20 to 25 bushels.” The \textit{Alabama Planter} declared in February, 1851, that “no manure was so cheap and efficacious as Peruvian Guano.”\textsuperscript{379}

The Barredas responded by chartering a large flotilla of ships to head to Peru. Unlike most of the 1840s guano contracts, which specified a certain tonnage over the life of the concession, the Peruvian government placed no limitation on the amount of guano the Barredas could sell. Federico sent some


\textsuperscript{379} Jordan, p. 219.
ships from Baltimore, New York and New England, but Barreda agents also grabbed ships unloading cargo in Valparaiso, San Francisco and other Pacific ports. During August and early September, 1852, the Barredas had twenty-two loaded ships in Callao awaiting clearance to sail for U.S. ports, with an official guano tonnage of 12,124. But, at the same time, they had fifty additional ships anchored off the Chincha Islands awaiting loading, and another six ships at Callao awaiting permission to head south also to join the lineup there. Altogether, the Barredas had seventy-eight ships of 53,494 registered tons in Peruvian waters during that period.

Far from satisfying U.S. consumers, the flood of guano the Barredas unleashed into the United States only served to stimulate demand over a larger area and cause U.S. farmers to question Peru’s pricing. Dealers jacked up the retail price, and U.S. ship captains spread word that Peru had almost no costs of production at the Chinchas.

QUICK FORTUNE, IMPENDING CIVIL WAR

In addition to managing Peru’s guano sales in the United States, Federico Barreda somehow got involved in some of the controversial financial

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380 A scattering of papers and a few ledgers from the Barreda guano business have survived and, with assistance of David Werlich, were donated to the library of Southern Illinois University by Federico’s grandson and biographer, Frederick Barreda Sherman (cited hereafter as Barreda Papers). Regrettably (for this study), the bulk of the papers archived at SIU concern Barreda’s diplomatic career in the 1860s, not the guano business in the 1850s.

381 At least once a month, Felipe Barreda’s Lima house sent Federico Barreda a list of their chartered ships broken down into four categories: those cleared at Callao, listed as “exports,” those at Callao loaded but not yet cleared, ships at Callao awaiting permission to go to the Chincha Islands, and ships currently loading at the Chinchas, where “loading” mostly meant sitting and waiting one’s turn. Twenty-six of these lists from 1852-1856 are in the Barreda Papers, and the data is summarized in the appendix. Only the earliest list (September 11, 1852) included the freight rate for each ship.
machinations of the Echenique government. His grandson reported that in early 1853 Barreda left the United States for Europe, and that while in England he helped convert bonds of Peru’s internal debt into foreign securities. Without mentioning a source for his information, Sherman wrote that, “As a result, Federico should receive 122,000 pesos of external bonds,” and that “he expected an annual income of 6,300 pesos from the bonds to be received.”

The guano business provided the Barreda immigrants to the United States with a privileged lifestyle, and Federico began spending rather freely. In 1856 Felipe Barreda obtained a new consignment contract for the U.S. market to run for six more years, and the brothers decided to move their U.S. headquarters to New York City. The emergence of New York City as a chief U.S. port was a consequence of inland waterways for transport, an important development advantage that Peru lacked. The 363-mile Erie Canal, built during 1817-1821, linked the Hudson River to the Great Lakes region, cutting transportation costs from the Atlantic Ocean to the Northwestern region by over ninety percent. As a result, Northwestern farmers no longer shipped the majority of their products down the Mississippi. By 1850, the Great Lakes region had grown into a major

382 Sherman continued, “The loan conversion required discussions with leading London bankers to ascertain on what terms they would underwrite an issue of Peruvian Government external bonds payable in pounds sterling and secured by the proceeds of the sales of guano. They agreed to underwrite but it took four visits by Federico to London and one to Lima to settle the exact terms and conclude the transaction ….” Sherman’s biography contains but glimpses of these goings on, such as a Federico Barreda letter from London of May 2, 1853: “Today I will sign a contract with Murrieta, the Peruvian Minister, requiring me to be in Lima before the first of July.” Sherman, *From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate*, pp. 34-35. Regrettably, the documentation for these statements by Sherman and Barreda does not seem to be in the Barreda Papers.
force in U.S. economic development, with its politics generally favorable to strong federal action for internal improvements.

Because tariffs were the main revenue source for federal subsidies to build canals, roads and better river transport, many Northwestern districts became allies of Northeastern manufacturers who wanted stronger tariff protection. During Federico Barreda’s first decade in the United States, conflict over economic development policy and the South’s determination to expand slavery westward was tearing the nation apart. By contrast, since the defeat of protectionists in the 1830s, Peru had only a few weak constituencies who fought politically for tariff protection, and, able to enjoy their guano-linked comforts, most Peruvian elites remained committed to “free trade” policies. Demand for tariff protection in Peru was episodic and came mainly from artisans, whereas in the United States the fight over protectionism stayed very much alive in national politics and became entangled in sectional conflict over expansion of slavery.

Only a small minority of Northern whites opposed slavery out of democratic or anti-racist convictions. In an 1853 message to free blacks in his state, Indiana congressman George Julian admitted that, “The American people are emphatically a negro-hating people.” Nevertheless, Northwestern farmers and laborers did not want to see rich Southern planters bringing slave labor into their regions. Therefore, they gradually became de-facto political allies of moderate abolitionists and high-tariff business leaders.

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383 Egnal, Clash, p. 143.
To undertake their move to New York, Federico had the family’s Baltimore furnishings and household goods sold at auction. The sale list showed that in roughly three years he had accumulated more than enough belongings to engage in serious social entertaining, including 870 bottles of wine, 48 wine and champagne glasses, a grand piano, seven paintings, thirteen engravings and seven spittoons.

The same year the family relocated to New York, 1856, Federico took his wife and daughter to meet the Barreda family in Lima, no doubt spending some of their time at a spacious home Felipe had built in Miraflores. This was also Federico’s opportunity to strengthen his social ties to Ramón Castilla, who had taken back the presidency by force of arms from Echenique in 1854, and make sure that the president understood his willingness to help Peru in any matter concerning the United States. No Peruvian had ever become so well connected among U.S. elites, and his commercial business linked him to all of the country’s regions.

Frederick Barreda Sherman remembered that as a child his grandmother Matilde told him exciting tales about Peru that she picked up during her visit to Lima. One was about Indians who supposedly once took her husband blindfolded to a secret mountain cave where they made him a gift of reddish dust that proved to be almost pure silver. She told of severe mistreatment of Indian laborers in Peru. And, she repeated some of Lima’s criollo humor. “In the morning they cry, ‘Run in the street, run in the street; it is an earthquake!’ And
in the afternoon they cry, ‘Run in the house, run in the house; it is a revolution!’”

**PERU AND GUANO IN U.S. CULTURE**

Federico Barreda and his wife returned to a United States that was becoming acquainted with Peru mainly through growing interest in the science of agriculture and the country’s reputation as a “monopolist.” Guano’s agricultural impact was intertwined with rapid development of western farming, intensified debate over the expansion of slavery and other developments leading to the U.S. Civil War. Most North Americans had probably never heard of Peru prior to the guano mania. A merchant, consular official or U.S. warship’s library would have had little or nothing written on Peru in English – perhaps a couple of British traveler accounts, such as Basil Hall’s *Extracts from a Journal, Written on the Coasts of Chili, Peru, and Mexico, in the Years 1820, 1821, 1822*, which had a Philadelphia edition in 1824. More dated but still of interest to U.S. readers was *A Voyage to South America* by Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, discussed in chapter four, republished in the United States in two volumes in 1806-1807.

However, educated U.S. citizens in the late 1840s and 1850s saw a number of cultural windows open on South America unrelated to guano. Peru’s first important appearance in U.S. literature came with William H. Prescott’s 1847 two-volume publication by Harper and Brothers of *A History of the Conquest of Peru*, which, like his earlier work on Mexico, was a U.S. publishing success.

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384 Sherman, *From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate*, p. 50.
Prescott provided readers a vivid portrait of the wealth, cultural grandeur and political sophistication of the Incas. In contrast with his earlier harsh assessment of the militaristic Aztec empire, he described Inca rule as a mild despotism and suggested its overthrow by Catholic zealots was an injustice driven by avarice and accomplished by treachery and unrestrained brutality. Appearing as the U.S. waged war on Mexico, Prescott’s version was consistent with a mid-nineteenth-century convergence of U.S. attitudes concerning the “black legend” of blaming Spain for Peru’s misfortunes, New England anti-Catholicism and expansionist propaganda of a U.S. “manifest destiny” to assume control of Spain’s American possessions. Prescott expressed his hope that “a kindred spirit of enterprise” would some day bring about a more scientific understanding of pre-Columbian cultures, and a young U.S. student of Native American archeology, E. George Squier, kept the challenge in mind and later was mentored by Prescott prior to going to Peru, one of several writers heading to Peru that the New Englander assisted. Prescott’s book was well-received in Peru and began to be cited by elite reformers. A copy of Conquest of Peru reached Clements Markham, an affluent young English naval officer serving in the South Pacific since the mid-1840s, and helped persuade him eventually to leave the Royal Navy to become an expert in Peruvian history, geography and culture.

Also appearing in 1847 was the English translation of Johann Jakob von Tschudi’s Travels in Peru During the Years 1838-1842, which became the most

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385 Prescott helped get Squire his U.S. government appointment to Peru, and Squire devoted most of his time in Peru to archeology, a story taken up in the third volume of this study.
important contemporary guide to Peru for U.S. citizens, providing important information about key regions interspersed with a largely negative and racist assessment of Peru’s social groups. The impact of Tschudi on the minds of U.S. citizens was seen in the racial descriptions of an anonymous 1851 *Harper’s* article. Perhaps the same author wrote “Dona Paula; or, the Convent and the World,” a piece of fiction in the May 1851 issue of the *American Whig Review*, for Tschudi’s descriptions figured prominently there too.386

Peru’s guano islands made their literary debut in the United States in 1848 with publication of *The Little Savage* by Frederick Marryat, who died earlier that year. It was a retelling of the *Robinson Crusoe* saga for adolescents, written in the voice of an English boy, the protagonist, who was stranded for many years on a small, rocky Peruvian island. “It was, as I afterwards discovered, one of the group of islands to which the Peruvians dispatch vessels every year to collect the guano, or refuse of the sea birds which resort to the islands.” But, his little island happened to be neglected, being too small and at many miles distance from the Chinchas. (Unexplained was how the boy could survive for years without a source of fresh water.) Apart from the Pacific locale, nothing else about Peru figured in the story. Critics believed Marryat died before finishing the novel, because later chapters “are, unfortunately, somewhat inferior to the rest.”387

386 *American Whig Review*, v. 13, no. 77 (May 1851), pp. 419-443.

book’s limitations did not prevent if from being republished numerous times, including in 1896, 1907, 1920 and 1929 editions.

The most enduring U.S. literary references to Peru during this period came, as noted in chapters two and five, from Herman Melville, first in *Moby Dick*, published to a cool reception in 1851, and then in his historical novella, *Benito Cereno*, published in three 1855 installments in *Putnam’s Monthly Magazine*. In addition to the metaphoric description of Lima’s “woes,” Melville made a second use of Peru’s capital in *Moby Dick* in chapter fifty-four, “The Town-Ho’s Story,” which is a story-within-a-story. Ishmael, the novel’s narrator, informs the reader that he will tell the tale of the whale ship *Town-Ho* just as he once recounted it in Lima while sitting, talking and drinking on the main plaza at the Golden Inn. During the narration, Ishmael makes reference to things back in the United States, and he is periodically interrupted with questions by don Pedro and don Sebastian who want U.S. terms explained. The story concerns a mutiny aboard the *Town-Ho* and the ship’s encounter with the white whale, Moby Dick. When Ishmael completed his tale, one of the Peruvians asked him if it was really true.

“Are you through?” said Don Sebastian, quietly.
“I am, Don.”
“Then I entreat you, tell me if to the best of your own convictions, this your story is in substance really true? It is so passing wonderful! Did you get it from an unquestionable source? Bear with me if I seem to press.”

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388 October, November and December, 1855.
Ishmael asks that a priest and bible be brought to the inn, and when they arrive he takes an oath, declaring that, “on my honor the story I have told ye, gentlemen, is in substance and its great items, true,” and that he personally had visited the *Town-Ho* and spoken to one of the principals.

Melville specialist Wyn Kelley argued that Prescott’s *Conquest of Peru* was not only an important source for Melville, but that the latter was writing a challenge to the former. While Prescott criticized Spanish treatment of the Incas, Kelly noted that he romanticized the European construction of Lima, with its “regular plan,” “ample space for gardens to the dwellings,” and, especially, the great *plaza*. It was in Lima that Pizarro exchanged the sword “for the tool of the artisan” and sought repose. “[A]midst the woe and desolation which Pizarro and his followers brought on the devoted land of the Incas, Lima, the beautiful City of the Kings, still survives as the most glorious work of his creation, the fairest gem on the shores of the Pacific,” said Prescott. In Kelley’s view, Melville countered this idealized version of the colonial city-builder with Lima’s desolation and decay, that Melville had seen with his own eyes at the end of 1843.389

By the early 1850s, “Peru” and “guano” were household names in many parts of the United States, as people debated the pros and cons of the fertilizer,

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389 Wyn Kelley, “The Style of Lima: Colonialism, Urban Form, and ‘The Town Ho’s Story,’” in Sanford E. Marovitz and Athanasios C. Christodoulou, eds., *Melville ‘Among the Nations’* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2001), pp. 61-65. As discussed in chapter two, while the references to Lima in *Moby Dick* seem to have been inspired by the author’s own brief 1843 visit while he worked his way home from the Pacific on the warship, *USS United States*, Melville crafted *Benito Cereno* from events recounted in an 1817 traveler’s account by a veteran captain of the early U.S. trade with Canton, Amasa Delano (1763-1823).
Peru’s control of it and, eventually, the conditions of the Chinese who harvested it. Ralph Waldo Emerson used guano as a bleak metaphor in the context of the early 1850s U.S. debates over slavery. Emerson was the most influential New England writer and lecturer of his era, North America’s great prophet of individualism and a literary life independent of Europe’s. Emerson and the other American transcendentalists were liberals, in the sense of challenging received wisdom, and particularly fond of metaphorical thought. In his essay, “Fate,” published in 1860 but probably developed during the same period of polarization provoked by the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act that produced *Moby Dick*, he introduced “guano” into a riff about the colonization of some races – specifically blacks and immigrants, such as the Irish – by others. “We know in history what weight belongs to race,” he wrote, making deterministic references that were sometimes contradictory. The English colonizers in America enjoyed “the nervous and victorious habit of our own branch of the family [of man],” tracking those whose subjugation gives meaning to the identity of the dominant. “We follow the step of the Jew, of the Indian, of the Negro,” although the first of these seems never satisfactorily brought to heel. “We see how much will has been expended to extinguish the Jew, in vain,” he said, leaving the reader to make the contrast to U.S. extermination of the Indian. The Germans might colonize parts of the world, but not America. “The German and Irish millions, like the Negro, have a great deal of guano in their destiny.” Then, Emerson explained his metaphor. “They are ferried over the Atlantic, and carted over America, to ditch and to drudge, to make corn cheap, and then to lie down
prematurely to make a spot of green grass on the prairie.” These exploited toil for others, only to end up as a little bit of fertilizer.

Peru somewhat faded from U.S. consciousness during the Civil War, but it roared back in the last stage of the guano era, especially because of interest in the U.S. entrepreneurs and engineers who administered Peru’s railroad construction during the late 1860’s and early 1870’s (chapter thirteen).

**INVESTING AND SPENDING IN THE UNITED STATES**

In addition to managing guano commerce between Peru and the United States, Federico Barreda traded other goods, especially to take advantage of chartered or owned ships on their outward voyage to Peru to pick up guano. The brothers’ ships frequently made stops in Europe and ranged as far as Hong Kong, Calcutta and Bombay. Thus, even after revocation of their guano contract, Federico prospered for a time as an immigrant merchant in the United States. His wife complained of his absences from the family on business. “One of my ships, the [Lammergier], has just come in,” he wrote in a letter, “and I must find a cargo for her.” Reminding Matilde of where their lavish life style came from,

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390 “Fate” appears on a website devoted to Emerson’s work: [http://www.rwe.org/works/Conduct_1_Fate.htm](http://www.rwe.org/works/Conduct_1_Fate.htm), accessed July, 2008. I became familiar with Emerson’s use of guano through the work of Eduardo Cadava, who developed much more extended interpretation of the metaphor than most would venture. See Cadava, “The Guano of History,” in Eduardo Cadava and Aaron Levy, eds., *Cities Without Citizens* (Philadelphia: Slought Books, 2003), pp. 137-165. Cadava thought Emerson alluded with the guano metaphor in “Fate” to Manifest Destiny and a critique of slavery in relation to U.S. ideals of “freedom” and “liberty.” Cadava noted in passing (p. 161) that when Emerson echoed the language of Social Darwinism and pro-slavery propaganda, he might have mixed in his own racial thoughts with what he seemed to criticize.

391 Sherman spelled the name of the ship “Lumerguier” (Sherman, p. 56). Based upon cross-referencing Sherman’s spelling with other sources, I have concluded that he misspelled the name of Barreda’s ship. Evidence for this is presented in the next chapter.
he added, “Ships sitting in port don’t make any money.” Federico got into the habit of placating his wife with expensive gifts bought at Tiffany’s in New York. At the end of one trip, he presented Matilde with a comb bought at Tiffany’s for $110. His grandson reported that Barreda’s Tiffany bill for the 1859 Christmas holiday season was a whopping $3,440, and included a bracelet and a brooch costing almost one thousand dollars each.392

PERU’S ORGY OF IMPORTS

Profits from the U.S. market, and the fact that he was sending off a flotilla of sometimes empty ships to pick up Chinchas guano in South America, gave Federico Barreda the perfect opportunity to compete with the Alsop house in Lima for a share of U.S. exports to Peru. In a letter to his wife he explained, “I have bought two ships and have obtained cargoes for them. The Elvira is already loaded and en route to France [to pick up additional goods for Peru]. She is beautiful and will do a good business.” In the face of Matilde’s complaints that he was away from home too much, Federico said facetiously that she should not fear he was running off “to join the Mormons.” He chided, “I am a businessman, not a marquis.”393 Barreda was getting in on what became an orgy of Peruvian imports of foreign manufactures whose pathway was greased by guano.

Frederick Barreda Sherman compiled a sample list of the variety of goods Federico shipped from the United States to Peru, and it affords a much more

392 Sherman, From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate, p. 54.

393 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
detailed look at U.S. trade than is available from the official statistics (table below). Many of the U.S. products sold to Peru were goods that could reasonably have been produced locally were it not so easy and fashionable to rely on foreign sources. F. Barreda y Hermano imported Peruvian wine, goatskins and cowhides into the United States. They sent Peru brooms and buckets, ham and whiskey, candles and cigars, hatchets and pistols, farm equipment and a printing press. This was a mixed bag from a development perspective. As with U.S. exports to Peru in the 1820s, 1830s and 1840s, most Barreda shipments were things that Peruvians could and did produce for themselves. Sherman’s profile of Barreda’s trading is especially valuable because official U.S. trade data did not provide a breakdown of categories of U.S. exports to Peru until 1864. As seen in appendix tables 15.5a and 15.5b, during the 1860s Peru continued to import foodstuffs, household furniture and other products from the United States that local producers could have supplied to a more protected market. The Peruvian government also charged Barreda with managing its purchase of several million coins minted by Holmes, Booth and Company of Waterbury, Connecticut.

394 Sherman described his list as a “partial” record of what was being shipped (p. 58).

395 Sherman, From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate, p. 146.
Table 7.3
Typical U.S. Products Exported to Peru By Federico Barreda
During the 1850s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Merchandise</th>
<th>Copper tacks</th>
<th>Kerosene oil</th>
<th>Wooden shoe pegs</th>
<th>Patent candles</th>
<th>Cigars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buckets</td>
<td>Pine boards</td>
<td>Straw brooms</td>
<td>Spades</td>
<td>Barrel shooks</td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washtubs</td>
<td>Kerosene oil</td>
<td>Spades</td>
<td>Wooden shoe pegs</td>
<td>Patent candles</td>
<td>Cigars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil cloth</td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>Straw brooms</td>
<td>Spades</td>
<td>Barrel shooks</td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrel heads</td>
<td>Kerosene oil</td>
<td>Spades</td>
<td>Wooden shoe pegs</td>
<td>Patent candles</td>
<td>Cigars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galvanized pipe</td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>Straw brooms</td>
<td>Spades</td>
<td>Barrel shooks</td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kitchen Equipment</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wood ranges</td>
<td>Tea kettles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pots</td>
<td>Gridirons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coffee roasters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naval Stores</th>
<th></th>
<th>Navy beans</th>
<th>Water crackers</th>
<th>Tar</th>
<th>Caustic soda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton twine</td>
<td>Manila rope</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Navy beans</td>
<td>Water crackers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy bread</td>
<td>Log books</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakum</td>
<td>Pitch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gum packing</td>
<td>Dried apples</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>Duck</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saleratus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For the Lima Fire Department</th>
<th></th>
<th>Leather buckets</th>
<th>Canvas buckets</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helmets</td>
<td>Capes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red flannel shirts</td>
<td>Hatchets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanterns</td>
<td>Belt buckles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leather buckets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canvas buckets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foodstuffs</th>
<th></th>
<th>Tea</th>
<th>Ketchup</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hams</td>
<td>Bacon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whiskey</td>
<td>Vinegar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanical and Agricultural Equipment</th>
<th></th>
<th>Hay cutter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Printing press</td>
<td>Lithographic stones</td>
<td>Hay cutter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cane cutter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sherman, p. 58 (Sherman’s categories have been reorganized).
With his guano and other trading profits, Federico Barreda possessed sufficient capital to move beyond commerce. The main banker of the Barreda brothers was George Peabody & Co. in London. Founded by a New Englander in 1837, the firm took on a dynamic U.S. partner, Junius Spencer Morgan, in 1854. Peabody later was the Europe banker of Bryce, Grace & Co., and, upon the founder’s retirement in 1864, the London firm took the name of J. S. Morgan & Co., from which the New York firm of J. P. Morgan & Co. originated. George Peabody visited with Federico Barreda during a trip to the United States in 1856, and one result of that relationship was Barreda’s speculation in Peruvian bonds. In July, 1856, Peabody wrote Barreda that bankers had completed purchases for him of some $232,000 in Peruvian bonds that carried a total face value of $400,000 (an average price of 58 cents per dollar of face value), adding that, “No more, however, can now be had [at that price].” Peabody sold about half of those bonds for Barreda two years later for an average price of about 61 and one-half cents. Believing Barreda had an appetite for a good speculative deal, Peabody wrote confidentially to him in 1859 that, due to a ruinous decline in the London stock market, “Peruvian bonds may be ‘dumped,’ resulting in very low prices.” And later that year, Junius Morgan, father of the future U.S. financier, wrote to Federico that, “Such is our confidence in your judgment that there is little doubt but we should be willing to join you in any matter where you are willing to risk your own money.”

396 Sherman, *From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate*, pp. 61-63.
In his most of his other investments Federico Barreda followed the path of the quintessential U.S. tycoon into land speculation and railroads. While visiting one of his guano distributors, George Fowle, in Alexandria, Virginia, he thought the port and surrounding region had development potential; so he bought waterfront property and purchased stock and bonds of the Orange and Alexandria Railway. Later, in 1860, both men invested in a new company, the New York and Virginia Screw Steamship Co., an unfortunate move on the eve of the Civil War. Barreda also purchased farmland at Drum Point in Maryland because he thought someone would extend a railroad there, a dream not fulfilled.

**BARREDA SOCIAL TRIUMPH**

When Federico Barreda told his wife, “I am a businessman, not a marquis,” he might have added that he nevertheless hoped to give his wife the life of royalty. By the late 1850s, Barreda was spending money as if his fortunes in the United States were assured. After their three years in Baltimore, the family made their principal residence in New York for the next seven years. There Barreda purchased a home for $85,000, furnishings included, at the corner of Fifth Avenue and 31st Street, a location, as his biographer put it, “not far from the Belmonts and the Astors.” As in Baltimore, the hot and humid summers were uncomfortable. And, since the richest New York families spent those months in resort areas, he again packed his family off to Newport for the season.

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397 Sherman, *From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate*, p. 52.
By the end of the decade, Barreda and his wife were entertaining guests on a grand scale, so he decided to build his own Newport mansion that would outdo anything U.S. millionaires had yet put up there. In July 1859, he paid $24,000 for about nine acres on the Bellevue Avenue hill overlooking Narrangansett Bay. It afforded a gorgeous and lordly vista for a man successful in international commerce. Then he hired New York architect Calvert Vaux for a five percent fee on a construction budget of $100,000. Just one year before, Vaux had collaborated with Frederick Law Olmsted in designing New York’s extraordinary Central Park. Barreda eventually spent at least $26,000 more on furnishings and interior decoration. This seasonal “cottage” had sixteen bedrooms, library, billiard room, wide surrounding verandah and ample quarters for housekeepers, nannies and cooking staff. It was once described as “the most pretentious and elaborate villa in Newport,” and Barreda’s wife later claimed that she supervised up to eighteen servants there.  

Federico commuted back-and-forth from New York to Newport on the Fall River Line steamer. For the first big social gathering Federico Barreda held at his new summer home, he hired New York City’s Delmonico restaurant to cater the event for $1,560. This “elegant ball and reception,” according to the “Life at Newport” columnist for the New York Times, culminated the “social gayeties” of the summer season on August 30, 1860. Throughout the previous months, erection and completion of the Barreda house “had been the freshest

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398 Sherman, From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate, pp. 64-67.
object of architectural interest,” and locals and villa-owners alike “all desired to witness the interior effect when brilliantly lighted and filled with a gay crowd.” Guests that evening were not disappointed. “Nature smiled upon the occasion; the full moon shed a tempered but ample light over lawn, terrace and balcony; a fresh breeze from the west played through and around the lofty and spacious apartments.” Guests driven up to the property in horse-drawn carriages approached the house from a semicircular drive until they were beside “the massive and turreted front” of the house, which the reviewer said “resembled a chateau of the old régime.” But, once inside, the views were Mediterranean. “[A]s you stand upon the rear verandah, with stone vases on the balustrade, and a lawn running down to the sea, athwart which glittered a silver pathway traced by the moonlight, almost irresistible was the reminiscence of a villa on the shore at Genoa or Naples.” The impression was unlike anything the columnist had seen in North America. “The atmosphere, the light, the proportions of the edifice, the marine landscape and wide stretch of green turf, combined to form a scene totally different, both in its features and associations, from any elsewhere visible in this country.” The writer gushed over interior details. The reception hall was “palatial” and “paved with the blue and yellow tiles so suggestive of Pompeii and the East.” Furniture was “elegant” but “not redundant.” Chairs had “exquisite pattern,” the divans a “cool tint,” cabinets “the finest inlaid wood” and vases “flowers tastefully disposed.” The hall, billiard room, drawing room and verandah intercommunicated to form “as effective and pleasing an arena for social intercourse and tableaux as it is possible to imagine.” Barreda
and his wife “evinced rare artistic taste,” which the columnist believed reflected the Andalusia upbringing of Matilde. “Out of the principal drawing room opens a charming little temple, with a fountain plashing in the centre, plants and birds and a stained-glass dome and marble floor – all breathing of Moorish architecture and domestic life at Seville – the native city of our fair hostess.” Her “costume,” the writer declared, “was an artistic success, individual, effective, and singularly adapted to her face and figure.” Those invited found Barreda’s wife quite charming. “Seldom have we witnessed more true lady-like ease, graceful dignity and winsome kindliness than marked this lady’s reception and entertainment of her guests.” All combined to produce a successful event. A “remarkable zest and geniality marked the social spirit of the scene.” Federico Barreda could not have purchased a more favorable report, unless the overwrought praise suggested parody. “In one room the waltzers flew gaily around; in another rose the hum of pleasant talk; here a genial pair sauntered, and there a veteran observed; some looked forth from the fairyland within to the lovely prospect without, and all was harmonious and enjoyable.”

To have an idea of the scale of Barreda’s social ambitions, years later an Astor heir purchased his Newport estate and grandly named it “Beaulieu.”


400 After he sold it, some U.S. elite lore became associated with Barreda’s house and neighboring “Beechwood” and “Marble” houses due to social rivalries between two Astor wives and between the Astor and Vanderbuilt families. Newport and its mansions went into decline in the mid-twentieth century. Barreda’s house was rundown when purchased and restored in the early 1960s by Wiley T. Buchanan Jr., president Eisenhower’s chief of protocol, and his wife, Ruth, a Dow Chemical heiress. The restored home was profiled in the February 2002 issue of Washington Life Magazine. The non-profit Preservation Society of Newport County has purchased and conserves eleven neighboring mansions, but the Barreda’s house remains in private hands.
Lavish spending of Federico’s scope was a characteristic among some “new rich” in the United States. Perhaps he sought to leverage the favorable impression among U.S. elites of European and Latin American aristocrats being socially “cultured,” as suggested in the fawning praise in the *New York Times*, the antithesis of the stereotype of the hard drinking, uncouth native tycoon. Sherman imagined that his grandfather was motivated by Peruvian nationalism, wanting to show off a small, poor country in the most favorable light.401 Extending Sherman’s notion, perhaps Barreda’s lifestyle reflected insecurity, an overcompensation against the U.S. notion of Peru as racially inferior and hopelessly underdeveloped. Maybe, too, Barreda dreamed of emerging from the shadow of his older brother. Just as Federico began constructing his Newport mansion in 1859, his brother Felipe provided a 100,000 peso dowry for his daughter Mariana’s marriage to Manuel Pardo. That alliance eventually captured the presidency for the Barreda network.

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401 Sherman, *From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate*, p. 66.
CHAPTER 8

INDUSTRY AND IMPORT-INTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT

[Why] should Peru be exporting its cotton to Europe when it must import eight to ten million yards of cotton cloth [yearly] to provide for its population of about 1.5 million?

Juan Norberto Casanova
1849

It is a profound misconception that free trade constitutes the most powerful lever to achieve progress and happiness ....

José María García
Lima artisan leader
1849

Having been involved in establishing the Callao and Chorrillos railways and having knowledge of this type of enterprise in Europe and the United States, you shall be president of the commission [to plan Peru’s Central Railway].

José Fabio Melgar to Felipe Barreda
1859

Scholars have tried to estimate what percent of guano revenues flowed into the Peruvian economy. Shane Hunt thought that “total returned value” was somewhere between 65 and 71 percent of “final sales value,” which, if true, would have been “an extraordinarily high figure.” He estimated that the Barredas and other private contractors he labeled as “Peruvian” reaped some sixty to eighty million pesos, and that the state received between 381 and 432 million pesos “in direct income.”402 Hunt’s figures were ballpark and subject to

402 Shane Hunt, “Growth and Guano in Nineteenth Century Peru,” Woodrow Wilson School Research Program in Economic Development discussion paper no. 34 (mimeo, Princeton, February 1973), p. 84. Hunt used his revenue estimates to criticize the notion that guano was a classic “enclave” economy, going so far as to claim that, on the contrary, guano was “the antithesis of what we normally mean by the term enclave” (p. 84). This opinion is questionable. Hunt seemed to assume that an export investment was an “enclave” only if foreign factors carried off most of the revenue, which was true in some cases. But, in others similar to guano,
revision (probably downward) as Peru’s finances are better understood, especially since it is not clear that he fully accounted for the portion of guano revenues supposedly accruing to Peru that was consumed in debt service and flowed into the hands of bond speculators. Part of the attraction of Peruvian bonds was that the government’s agents sold them at a discount but then had preferential claim on guano revenue to service them. Nevertheless, an awful lot of money flowed to Peru in the 1850s and 1860s, and Peruvians are right to ask why the capital available for investment did not produce greater development. If the Barredas and other Peruvians who got into some aspect of the guano business earned only half of what Hunt imagined, thirty or forty million, what did they do with this money?

TEXTILE INDUSTRY AND PROTECTIONISM

The easy answer is that they joined other Peruvians, including the personnel of the Peruvian civil service and military, in importing a lot of foreign stuff. Peru became, in Hunt’s description, “a rentier economy, exporting guano and importing virtually all manufactured products,” a country with chronic unemployment, stagnation and growing income inequality.403

It did not have to turn out like that. As the Barredas assumed control of the U.S. guano market, their profits had the potential to be an engine of development. Certainly that was the rationale behind the policy of putting guano consignment contracts into the hands of Peruvian nationals. After the failure to implement pro-industrial policies in the 1820s and 1830s, the

with petroleum being perhaps the most analogous case, most of the revenue can flow to the producing nation, and yet the industry still consists of an island of production mostly divorced from the rest of the economy. That is the essence of “enclave” from a development perspective.

403 Ibid., pp. 92-105.
government of president Ramón Castilla appeared to embody a *constructor* ethos. This chapter will examine three investments, two with U.S. connections, to explain Peru’s guano era disappointments.

The importance of the first case was that it promised to help Peru catch up in the key area of cotton textile manufacturing. President Castilla personally applauded the building of a cotton textile mill in Lima by Juan Norberto Casanova during 1847-1848 as a significant event for the future of the country’s economic development, and the project was incubated in the United States. There is still much study needed on infant Peruvian industry in the late 1840s and early 1850s, especially the stories of the first paper and textile mills, but the main outlines can be seen. Manuel Amunátegui and Alejandro Villota, owners of Lima’s largest newspaper, *El Comercio*, decided to import paper making machinery from the United States in 1847 so they could print the daily on their own newsprint. They used the same water source delivered from a channel off the Rimac river that powered the Moneda, and the factory began production in June 1848. People began calling this domestic paper stock “de Villota,” which suggests the partner who played the leading role. Much of the raw material was used rags. The next year Amunátegui and Villota received a state subsidy in the form of a loan based upon the sale of two thousand tons of guano. During the same period the government gave an exclusive privilege to support development of a glass factory. Finally, perhaps, a guano-enriched government would help bring Peru into the industrial age.


For other examples of exclusive privileges given to support industrial investments, including for use of steam power in making chocolate products, see Dancaurt, *Anales*, IV, p. 20. Beyond manufacturing, the government promoted other types of development, ranging from the coastal steam navigation concession given to William Wheelwright and a ten-year privilege given to a
The key was to get a cotton textile industry off the ground. But, the “Los Tres Amigos” textile enterprise was ridiculed from the start by some businessmen, and it was an obvious threat to Alsop y Cía., because it would produce *tocuyos* or grey goods locally with U.S. machinery. As noted in chapter four, Alsop and the U.S. legation in Peru had been the principal opponents of Peru’s protectionist efforts in the 1820s and 1830s, and Alsop remained the largest U.S.-owned merchant house in Lima and the biggest importer of U.S. coarse cottons.

Perhaps not coincidentally, therefore, these manufacturing initiatives in Peru were accompanied by a renewed political battle over protectionism during 1848-1849, as free trade liberalism was still in ascendancy. Speaking in the name of Lima’s artisans, master cigar maker José María García went before congress in October 1849 and declared that free trade was leaving Peru’s *clase industriosa* “mortalmente herida.” A country trying to initiate development in the wake of the “splendid conquest” of independence, needed to encourage skilled labor. “It is a profound misconception,” he declared in a Peruvian echo of Henry Clay, “that free trade constitutes the most powerful lever to achieve progress and happiness for any state without taking into account its exceptional circumstances, such as ours.”

Under this democratic pressure, congress enacted a Ley de Artesanos in December imposing ninety percent tariffs on some imported items competing with those produced locally. Poet Miguel Guzmán

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Brazillian entrepreneur for commercial navigation on Peru’s Amazon tributaries to a patent granted for a medicine to cure dysentery. See Dancuart, *Anales*, v. 3, pp. 105-106 and 172.

extolled García in verse and sang the praises of artisans who were making “Peru Free in Her Progress.”

CASANOVA’S STUDY OF THE U.S. COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY

It seems likely that artisans received encouragement from Casanova and others who dreamed of bringing U.S. manufacturing technology to Peru. The “three friends” of the textile company’s name were Casanova, Carlos de Cagigao and the merchant house called Señora Vda. [widow] de Santiago, whose active partners at the time were José Fernando de Santiago and Modesto Herce. The principal financing for the project may have come mainly from Pedro Gonzales de Candamo, Chilean-born owner of the very profitable Lima-Callao railway.

Pablo Macera described Juan Norberto Casanova as a “Peruvian entrepreneur,” but it seems certain that he actually was a widely-traveled Spanish doctor who had worked previously in Cuba, Manila, Calcutta and Chile. In a paper drafted in Calcutta on cholera, which he edited in New York and published in Philadelphia in 1834, he described himself as a member of the Real Colegio de Medicina y Cirugía of Cadiz and the Medical and Physical Society of Calcutta. What seems most important about Casanova from a

408 Macera wrote an introduction to the facsimile edition of Casanova’s work published by the Centro Peruano de Historia Económica in 1972. Paul Gootenberg subjected Casanova’s work to an economic theory critique in his Imagining Development, pp. 45-57.
409 He was described as a Spanish medical doctor in at least one Chilean source. Diego Barros Arana, Obras completas de Diego Barros Arana (Santiago: Imprenta Cervantes, 1908), p. 343.
410 J. N. Casanova, General Observations Respecting Cholera-Morbus (Philadelphia: E.L. Carey & Hart, 1834), 173 pages. Casanova said this work was drafted for presentation to the Medical and Physical Society of Calcutta, but that he left Calcutta on January 25, 1834, prior to the society’s meeting. He then prepared his manuscript for publication while in New York, apologizing for any “peculiarities of style and arrangement,” because “I am a Spaniard, writing in a foreign language.” He said he began his medical career in Cuba, mentored by Dr. Thomas Romay, a Havana-born doctor who helped introduce vaccination for small-pox in Cuba. After leaving
development standpoint is that he was a determined scientist who believed in the power of reasoning to tackle human problems. His interests ranged far beyond medicine, and his time in countries that had diverse experiences with textile making, including a long residence in India and visits to the United States, allowed him to be curious about the process of industrialization. When Casanova lived in Calcutta, India was still the biggest manufacturer of cotton textiles in the world, but its exports to Britain were in sharp decline. Some of the factors in the rise of the British textile industry were discussed in chapter four, and the epochal global shift during British colonization of India is reflected in table 8.1. After decades of Indian exports of cottons to Britain conducted by the East India Company monopoly, the British conducted import-substitution development of its own cottons industry. The United States did the same, and now Casanova believed Peru could follow.

Cuba in 1827, Casanova worked primarily in Manila for the military hospital and medical board, followed by service in Calcutta, where he was “resident member of the Medical and Physical Society of Calcutta; of the Asiatic, and of the Agricultural and Horticultural Societies of the same place.” His mention of the latter two societies evidenced the range of his scientific interests.
Table 8.1
Global Shift in Textile Manufacturing
1790s – 1840s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indian annual exports of cotton textiles to Britain (thousand pieces)</th>
<th>Great Britain’s average annual consumption of raw cotton (millions of pounds)</th>
<th>British cotton textile exports (thousands of £)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1760s</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1770s</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1780s</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1790s</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>2,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800s</td>
<td>1,824</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>8,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1810s</td>
<td>1,358</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>18,845</td>
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<tr>
<td>1820s</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>166.5</td>
<td>29,830</td>
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<tr>
<td>1830s</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>320.7</td>
<td>51,605</td>
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<tr>
<td>1840s</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>526.3</td>
<td>85,947</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Stephen Broadberry and Bishnupriya Gupta, “Cotton Textiles and the Great Divergence: Lancashire, India and Shifting Competitive Advantage, 1600-1850,” File: CotDiv9, Department of Economics, University of Warwick (April 12, 2005), tables 1, 2A and 6, pp. 31-34.

Fig. 8.1
INDUCTIVE REASONING
Juan Norberto Casanova was proud of his ability to approach problems with a scientific mind, and he brought his skills to bear on the U.S. cotton textile industry and its application to Peru. While in New York in 1834 he prepared for publication a paper presenting evidence that physicians were making errors in diagnosis and treatment of cholera. To highlight his method and contrast it with weaknesses of others, he quoted the following statement from a U.S. medical journal: “In no science is the pure inductive mode of reasoning more important, and in no science perhaps is it less observed, than in that of Medicine.”
Casanova was approximately forty-five years old in 1846 – just a year after Friedrich Engels published his exposé of labor conditions in Manchester’s textile industry – when he persuaded some investors in Lima to send him to the United States to study its cotton textile industry and then bring back the secrets to Peru. The publicity Engels and others gave to the horrid working conditions in British factories was something Casanova kept in mind as he surveyed U.S. companies and envisioned factories in Lima. The cost of labor was higher in the United States than in Britain. Casanova wanted to understand how a former British colony could develop its own cottons industry in the face of the more experienced English industry that dominated American markets, north and south. After several months in the United States, he was convinced that Peru enjoyed similar or even greater comparative advantages than those of the \textit{norteamericanos}. He also was convinced that that industry in Lima could be socially beneficial for workers, unlike the ugly European model seen in Britain.

In 1849 Casanova published a treatise that he dedicated to developmentalist citizens and members of government who supported his initiative with new protectionist legislation. This work was also published to answer doubters and opponents, some of whom probably were potential investors who turned down his proposal. It was titled in grand nineteenth-century style, \textit{Ensayo económico-político sobre el porvenir de la industria algodonera fabril del Perú, y demostración de las ventajas que puede tener a su favor sobre la de los Estados Unidos de Norte-América e Inglaterra, mediante la debida protección del gobierno a la cual es acreedora} (Lima: J. M. Masias). Casanova’s \textit{Ensayo} was a manifesto against a series of prevailing assumptions in Peruvian business circles holding that such an industrial enterprise was impossible in Peru. Not only did
cynicism make financing such ventures more difficult, but it played politically into the hands of opponents who wanted to deny government protection of infant industry. The format of the Ensayo was to review how the United States utilized technological innovation to gain competitiveness with British industry (the cotton gin, etc.); analyze U.S. costs of raw material, power, wages and machinery; showcase the U.S. model of government support; and then demonstrate how Peru could be competitive. In its scope, detail and thoroughness, the study reflected Casanova’s practice of the scientific method.

Casanova said he was able to obtain cost data in the United States covering a ten-year period (1836-1846) for purchase of raw cotton, transportation and warehousing. The cost of getting cotton delivered to Lima from the Ica fields of Domingo Elías was higher than to Boston from Louisiana, Alabama or Georgia; but he estimated that Peru had a net advantage due to the superior quality of its cotton compared to the lower grades (deperdicios) used to make tocuyo in the United States and England.

411 For different readings of Casanova, see Pablo Macera’s introduction to the facsimile edition, republished in Vol. III of his Trabajos de Historia (Lima: Instituto Nacional de Cultura, 1977), pp. 275 – 296; and Chapter III of Paul Gootenberg’s Imagining Development. Gootenberg thought that Casanova had weakened his work by relying for authority on Spanish writer and newspaper publisher, Andrés Borrego, who was not an economist. Borrego wrote most of his book, Principios de economía política: con aplicación á la reforma de aranceles de aduana, la situación de la industria fabril de Cataluña, y al mayor y más rápido incremento de la riqueza nacional (Madrid: Imprenta de la Sociedad de Operarios del Mismo Arte, 1844), while in exile in the early 1840s. Casanova’s approach was to produce a feasibility study based upon actual textile production experience, and he needed assessment of alternate varieties of government support to this kind of industry. Borrego’s work included data on regional Catalán textile mill development similar to that Casanova was researching in the United States. Casanova needed a precedent for the form in which he proposed Peruvian government support should take, and Borrego favored a moderate protectionism. Borrego was a pioneer of professional journalism in Spain who founded El Español in 1835. The newspaper aspired to be a Spanish version of The Times of London in terms of focus on international economic affairs and government development policy. Familiar with the work of British and continental economic theorists, Borrego struggled to apply their ideas to the reality of Spain as an underdeveloped economy. See Concepción de Castro, Andrés Borrego: romanticismo, periodismo y política (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1975), pp. 63-75, 83-86 and 217-222.

The U.S. advantage over England in the production of quality cotton was well known, Casanova said. But Peru had a raw material advantage over the United States. “We have no reason to envy [the United States],” he said, noting the Peruvian coast’s excellent climate for growing cotton. “There are places in Peru where the cotton produced is so smooth that it rivals silk,” and each plant produces a greater yield than any other in the world, he boasted. “Peru should be supplying cotton to neighboring countries. Nowhere else does the cotton plant provide three harvests per year. In Peru, each plant yields a principal harvest of up to twenty-five pounds, and then two smaller harvests of not less than six pounds each.” Establishing textile factories in Peru would provide a stimulus to agricultural production, he said. But, even if Peru were limited to the current cotton production on just the plantations of Domingo Elías, his annual yields of fourteen to sixteen thousand *quintales* were enough cotton for manufacturing four or five million yards of cloth.” Why, asked Casanova, “should Peru be exporting its cotton to Europe when it must import eight to ten million yards of cotton cloth [yearly] to provide for its population of about 1.5 million?”

Casanova went on to analyze other factors of production. The cost of steam power from coal in England and water-wheel power in the United States was higher than that available in Lima from the Piedra Lisa channel drawing water from the Rimac river, he stated. In chapter two it was noted that Amasa Delano in 1805 was impressed with the industrial uses of water inside Lima’s Casa de Moneda, whose many pulleys and belts reminded him of “one of our [U.S.] cotton factories.” Using a channel from the Rimac, Delano said, industrial pursuits “can be carried on in Lima with as much convenience as in any place I
ever visited.”413 With Piedra Lisa assigned the right to one-fourth of the Rimac’s flow, Casanova calculated that factories would pay an annual water-lease cost of one peso per each horse-power unit, “which is insignificant compared to [power costs] in the United States and England.”414

In his chapter VIII, Casanova addressed the most difficult and politically-contentious factor of the state’s role in encouraging new industries, which he titled, simply, “development” (fomento). Basing himself on what he said were established principles of political economy and the development experiences of Europe and the United States, he divided government support options into four categories: exclusive privilege, protective tariffs, temporary import prohibition and subsidies. As if to answer his appeal, in 1849 the Peruvian congress passed protectionist legislation for the first time since the late 1820s and early 1830s.415 Scholars have attributed this to pressure from artisans thrown out of work by the growing volume of imports; but Casanova was lobbying the legislature, and the law’s timing suggests political support for his initiative.

Casanova acknowledged that the average price of cotton during 1836-1846 was higher in Peru (seven to eight pesos per quintal) than in the United States (six to seven pesos). But he provided samples of invoices for cotton shipped from New Orleans, Mobil and Savannah showing that shipping, warehousing and wholesale commission charges paid by U.S. mills were high enough to equalize the effective costs in the two countries.416

413 Delano, p. 503.

414 Casanova, p. 10.


416 Ibid., pp. 15-18.
Turning to the matter of machinery, Casanova wrote that, “all the English manufacturers are agreed that the textile machines made in the United States are superior to those made in England.” This outcome was an important lesson for Peru, because wages, interest rates and the cost of some raw materials for machinery were higher in the United States than in Britain. These competitive cost differences required machine makers in the United States to innovate, reducing the number of workers required to operate the equipment and raising the output per hour of each machine. Casanova saw that competitive disadvantages in certain areas could be overcome.

Casanova found variations in factory productivity in the United States, and he studied the causes. He learned that a key to success was how work was

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417 Ibid., pp. 45-47.
organized within a facility and how workers were managed. This led him to the conviction that he could combine the finest U.S. machinery with best practices in factory organization to make Peru competitive with any nation.

One of the biggest obstacles to industrial development always highlighted by nay-sayers in Peru was labor; it was supposedly insufficient in both supply and skill. Casanova took these beliefs head on. Here again, he thought, it was important to compare Europe with the United States. According to economic theory, a factory owner must pay a living wage, whereby the worker can support his family. Yet, contrary to principles of political economy, European workers “are submitted to the most pitiful misery,” he said. With their labor paid at below value, workers make recourse to private charity, public welfare, theft and even more destructive means “in order to meet their needs.” By contrast, he said, “workers in the United States can even build savings after covering their expenses,” citing the savings plan established in Lowell, Massachusetts, in 1829. Of course, this was achieved by employing mainly girls and young women, whom he described as “blancas decentes.” Echoing Alexander Hamilton, he noted this labor force composition without the slightest qualm, intending to replicate it in Peru. Casanova presented a table comparing weekly wages in Lima with those of twelve U.S. states. Casanova said the wages were for those employed on an hourly basis, but that workers paid by piece rates, especially children, could earn between one-third and one-half more. Casanova emphasized that he would follow the “happier” U.S. model for workers, not that of Europe.

418 See his corrections pages, which would have been pp. 131-132 if they had been numbered.
Failure

Casanova’s financing to establish a cotton mill in Lima came from the Peruvian merchant house, Señora Vda. de Santiago e Hijo. According to Alfonso Quiroz, merchant and investor Pedro González de Candamo, a sometime Barreda partner and developer of the Lima-Callao railway, was originally going to be the principal investor in the project, but he instead gave indirect support by loaning 85,563 pesos to the Vda. de Santiago firm. The support of González de Candamo may have been encouraged by president Castilla, for there was reference to the president and the factory in the merchant’s will.

419 Peruvian sources spell his name variously as González or Gonzales. On rare occasions a document would list him simply as Candamo, which is the way his son (and future president) Manuel was known. I will use “González” because his other son’s name was invariably spelled “Carlos González de Candamo.”

420 Quiroz in La Deuda Defraudada, p. 192, said the loan was for 100,000 pesos at one percent interest per month. González de Candamo built the extremely profitable Lima-Callao railway, and Felipe Barreda was subsequently involved in putting together a deal for the Lima-Chorrillos line, as will be described below. According to an 1866 inventory, González de Candamo held assets worth 6.3 million pesos, sixty-six percent of which was invested in foreign bonds and commerce, including 4.2 million in converted Anglo-Peruvian debt bonds (the conversion that was negotiated by Joaquín de Osma and Felipe Barreda, discussed in chapter seven). It would have been likely that one or more of González de Candamo’s children would have married into the Barreda network were it not for the inconvenient fact that they were illegitimate. That, however, did not prevent them from partnering with the Barredas in business and politics (see chart 48.1 in appendix). González de Candamo’s daughter married John Pablo Bryce y Vivero, son of the former partner of Michael and William Grace. Son Carlos González de Candamo was a capitalista nacional (chapter 17), and son Manuel Candamo was a major financial backer of the Civilista Party and later president of Peru.

421 Quiroz (Ibid., p. 176) found a reference to Castilla and the cotton factory in González de Candamo’s 1865 will. There he asked that his son Carlos take a large (bastante) portion from his inheritance to revive the cotton mill, which probably had been assigned to the father after the bankruptcy of Vda. de Santiago e hijo. The merchant wished this be done para que en esta fábrica se dé trabajo a mujeres pobres, previniéndose de que el testamento dispone que la administración de esta obra corra a cargo de su buen amigo el Gran Mariscal don Ramón Castilla, que tender la facultad de nombrar las personas que después de su fallecimiento la administren. So, this bequest seemed aimed at charity, development and a comfortable pension for his friend and former president that would later serve as an historic monument to Castilla’s presidency. However, Castilla died two years after the will was prepared.
Casanova had his looms built by one of the finest U.S. machinery manufacturers, Rodgers, Ketchum and Grosvenor of Patterson, New Jersey. The company was founded in 1831 by Thomas Rogers and was already expanding into locomotive production when Casanova placed his order. The firm was the forerunner of the Rogers Locomotive and Machine Works, a company that later would supply Peru with some of its earliest railway engines. Casanova stated proudly that Rogers built his machines in only three months time. President Ramón Castilla presided over the inauguration of the Lima plant. By May 1849, Peru’s first modern cotton textile factory employed eighty-two women, fifty boys (ages ten to fifteen) and twenty men, for a total of 152 workers. Casanova said the workforce would be brought down to about 130 after everyone was properly trained. All workers were white, he assured rather defensively.

![Fig. 8.3](image)

**Fig. 8.3**

**YOUNG WOMEN**

U.S. cotton textile companies competed with Britain by employing mainly girls and young women to run their looms. This illustration is a detail from a daguerreotype thought to be the oldest surviving image of a weaver at a U.S. power loom, taken c. 1850, or just a couple of years after Casanova’s research into the U.S. textile industry. Judging from the simplicity of this loom, it is probably an older model than the looms Cananova had built for his factory by the firm of Rodgers, Ketchum and Grosvenor of Patterson, New Jersey. Casanova’s strategy was to couple Peru’s comparative advantages with state-of-the-art machinery and organization. He systemized all he had observed in his tour of U.S. mills into sixteen rules governing workers and their supervisors. He laid out a factory floor plan so that raw cotton would enter and pass seamlessly through a circuit from each stage of production to the next over three floors, without time and labor wasted on warehousing between spinning and weaving.

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422 He wrote that, *no hay ninguno de la clase de color*, by which he probably meant that no worker was “Indian” or “black.”
Fig. 8.

WATER POWER DISTRIBUTION

This diagram illustrates how a single water wheel powered machinery by means of straps and pulleys on three floors of an integrated carding, spinning and weaving factory similar to that which Casanova installed in Lima.

The first cloth off the U.S.-made, water-powered looms was presented in a ceremony to president Ramón Castilla for conservation in a museum. After all, an infant Peruvian textile industry would be competing with the engine of European industrialization and the economic foundation of the British Empire. The new Peruvian product must have had a decent reputation, for Lt. William Herndon said that in 1851, while preparing his expedition through the central Andes to Cerro de Pasco and on to Brazil, he "purchased about a thousand yards of coarse cotton cloth, made in the mills at Lima, and put up for the mountain travel in bales of a half a mule-load." 423

423 Price and quality may have dictated Herndon’s choice of Peruvian tocuyo, and he apparently planned to use the cloth for bartering with Indians in places where money might not be accepted. It is unlikely that he would have invested in locally-made tocuyo if he thought Peruvian-made cloth could be recognized as an inferior product. See William Lewis Herndon and Lardner Gibbon, Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon, Made Under the Direction of the Navy Department, 2 vols. (Washington: Robert Armstrong, Public Printer, 1854), v. 1, pp. 35-36.
Table 8.2
Peruvian Cotton Cloth Production and Imports
From Great Britain, 1849-1853
(Thousands of Yards)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Peruvian Production</th>
<th>Imports from Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>20,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>21,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>35,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>29,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39,247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four-year total: 1849-1852 1,244 107,741

Sources: for Peru mill production, Manuel A. Fuentes, Estadística general de Lima (Paris: Lainé et Havard, 1866), p. 536; British data from appendix table 15.3. Peru’s imports from Great Britain are understated because, as seen in the appendix table, not all cottons were entered by the yard in British records, others being listed by value.

Meanwhile, free trade advocates were conducting a broad and spirited counterattack against the 1849 protectionist legislation, deriding the quality of local workmanship. One writer warned in 1850 that Peru risked falling into “the isolation brought to Paraguay by Dr. Francia.” Lima’s elites felt threatened by the very idea of restricting imports, insisting that they deserved to consume the finest French wine and ride around in the comfort of “a beautiful English carriage.” The dignity of the rich was conflated with that of the nation. The 1849 Ley de Artesanos, complained one writer, “forces us to drink that Lanchas wine (so unpleasant to the tongue!) and to pass the parks in those bothersome carts called balancines.”424 Peru’s underdevelopment was the excuse to rely on foreign manufactures. El Comercio editorialized in 1851 that, “Industry [in Peru] whose

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products cannot compete with foreigners should disappear.” Paul Gootenberg noted the irony that the newspaper’s owners seemed to be advocating the elimination of their own paper mill (although they quickly reversed themselves and lobbied for government support). So, by mid-1851, congress threw out policy designed to encourage industry and substituted a tariff “in protection of commerce.” In Gootenberg’s judgment, Peru’s “opportunity to produce [manufactures] for the expanding mass market during prosperity was irrevocably lost.”

Less than four years after opening, and only 1.2 million yards of domestic cloth later, the Peruvian cotton mill closed its doors, overcome by imported cloth. Carlos de Cagigao, one of the partners in the failed enterprise, committed suicide, and the mill was not reopened for almost two decades. The overwhelming onslaught of imports against the local producers can be appreciated in table 8.2, which compares Peruvian cotton cloth production with imports from Great Britain. During much of the guano era, even as Peruvians purchased an ever more diverse array of European imports, textiles usually constituted over sixty percent of total British exports to Peru. If cottons entered at value in the British trade register were added to those entered by the yard, local Peruvian production was only about one percent of imports from Great Britain. This pathetic ratio, even had the government properly supported it, was hardly going to make Peru in any way comparable to Francia’s protectionist

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425 Ibid., pp. 355-356


model in Paraguay. Manuel Fuentes in his 1866 *Estadística general de Lima* cited the high cost of local labor and cotton, in addition to foreign competition, as causes of the mill’s failure.\(^{428}\) And, there were other examples of mid-nineteenth-century industrial failure in Peru, including struggling glass factories started as early as 1841 and a silk mill begun in 1848, likewise overrun by imports.

Unfortunately, there are no U.S. trade data that would focus more specifically on tocuyos. It is interesting to note in table 8.2 that, after a year-and-a-half of Los Tres Amigos operation, there was a big spike of 71 percent in imports of British cottons in 1851 over the average of imports in 1849-1850. The next year, when the Peruvian factory met its demise, imports of British cottons were 43 percent above the 1849-1850 average. Further research may show that British importers deliberately helped sabotage Casanova’s factory. Note the possible oversupply of British cloth to Peru in the 1850s seen in chart 8.1, followed by a big drop in the early 1860s. In any case, Peru committed industrial suicide at exactly the moment when the internal market was expanding.

\(^{428}\) Fuentes, pp. 535-536.
Discussion of chart 8.1

British exports of cotton textiles to Peru grew even as a Peruvian mill began its first full year of production in 1849, as shown in Table 8.2. Trends in this chart are shown as three-year moving averages, with British exports of cottons entered by the yard to Peru (left scale) compared to the total of such British exports to all of South America. Peru is seen to have been a relatively stagnant market throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. By contrast, British exports to the rest of the continent more than doubled over six decades. Source: appendix tables 15.3 and 15.4.

While Peru’s first cotton textile mill was going bankrupt, Federico Barreda was purchasing cotton guano bags from United States textile suppliers. The Barreda firm simply passed along the cost of those bags to the Peruvian government. As with shipping expenses, the Barreda brothers were the state’s procurement contractors. The business Peru gave to U.S. cotton goods producers
was large enough to be newsworthy in New York. On February 11, 1854, the *New York Times* carried notice of a $35,000 Barreda contract with a Baltimore cotton mill. The annual salaries in Lima shown in fig. 8.5 give an idea of the sort of stimulus that such a contract might have provided the Peruvian economy if the contract had gone to Casanova's factory.

![Selected annual salaries in pesos (roughly equivalent to U.S. dollars) 1848-1849](image)

The failure of the Peruvian government and its F. Barreda y hermano consignee to direct cotton bags production to a struggling local factory was of a piece with the incoherence of the whole guano enterprise from a development standpoint. The man holding the contract to load ships at the Chinchas by employing convict and imported unfree labor was none other than Casanova's cotton supplier, Domingo Elías. So focused does he seem to have been on short-term profit there that the benefit of packaging guano on site in bags made of his own cotton may never have entered his mind.
With the eventual bankruptcy of the Vda. de Santiago e hijo merchant house, ownership of the Los Tres Amigos looms and other assets probably reverted to Pedro Gonzalez de Candamo. Carlos López Aldana reopened the mill in 1871, perhaps with British financing, relocating it to Vitarte, a town along the Central Railway just up the Rimac River from Lima. It was a testament to the quality of the U.S. looms and skill of Peruvian mechanics that the factory could be resurrected after almost two decades in storage.

**FELIPE BARREDA, DEALMAKER**

As a portion of guano income began to accumulate in private hands in Peru during the 1850s, there were growing funds of investment-seeking capital, especially among merchant groups. In a market awash with imported manufactures and afforded little government protection, industrial opportunities were limited, as Casanova’s failure demonstrated. The return was highest, the danger of loss lowest, and the payoff quickest in new enterprises that capitalized on the existing structure of the import-export system. It was not surprising, then, that most guano-era investment went into the production of other export commodities – and infrastructure systems to support them – or into urban improvements that served the expanding commercial center in Lima. The Peruvian state was active in promoting investment, either through subsidies and exclusive concessions or on its own account, as with railroad projects that imported U.S. technical expertise and equipment. These investments resulted in an increased Peruvian market for U.S. manufactures.

With the success of his United States guano business, Felipe Barreda became an important dealmaker in Lima, able to enlist the support of the Castilla administration and mobilize the capital of investors like Pedro Gonzalez de
Candamo and José Vicente Oyague. The Lima-Callao railway was very profitable for the Chilean-born Gonzalez de Candamo, so merchants in the capital decided to build a second road to the nearby seaside resort of Chorrillos south of Callao, where some of their families spent leisure time. That project illustrated a fundamental feature of the development course that Peru’s guano-enriched elites pursued. In their haste to make up for lost opportunities, reap quick profit and regain some of Lima’s lost colonial splendor, they tended to import everything possible to put an investment in place quickly. Even in the Lima region, where unemployment was high, for local labor they turned mainly to Chinese bondsmen and prison inmates rather than free workers and artisans. Then, a decade later they used the same model to begin building railways into the Andes.

**THE CHORRILLOS RAILWAY**

Some of Lima’s merchants gathered in May 1851 at the Tribunal del Consulado to discuss formation of a company to build a Lima-Chorrillos line, and in December of that year the congress authorized the government to negotiate terms for such a project. After some false starts, the government asked for bids in December 1855. The winning group included Nicolás Rodrigo, Felipe Barreda’s closest business partner in the 1840s, and Gonzalez de Candamo, who not only owned the Lima-Callao railway but was becoming known as one of the

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country’s richest men. When that deal fell apart, Felipe Barreda stepped forward, probably at the behest of the others due to his special relationship with Ramón Castilla. In late 1856, Barreda negotiated government support for a fourteen-kilometer railway from Lima to Chorrillos. The seaside community had some of Newport’s attraction for Lima’s well-to-do, and it bordered on the former Jesuit estate of Hacienda Villa, which his future son-in-law, Manuel Pardo, was co-managing. It will be recalled that Pardo’s father had sent Barreda to London with Joaquín de Osma to negotiate a settlement of the foreign debt, a prelude to Barreda gaining the U.S. guano market, and that the senior Pardo was suspected of being a party to whatever benefits that Barreda and Osma reaped for themselves. Hacienda Villa belonged to the Lavalle family, whose wealth derived in part from the business of importing over 3,000 slaves to Peru from Buenos Aires. The grandson of the slaver, José Antonio de Lavalle y Cortes, was José Antonio de Lavalle y Arias de Saavedra, whom Manuel Pardo’s sister married in 1854, the year of emancipation. Pardo and Lavalle were best friends and managed Hacienda Villa together. At the same time, Pardo imported European goods in partnership with Marcó del Pont and was a supplier of boots and other supplies to the Peruvian army. Lavalle and Pardo were not-so-distant cousins, for the slave trader was the great-grandfather of Pardo and his sister, Mariana (see appendix chart). While Chorrillos served as an ocean-view retreat, it substituted as an alternate port when ships had to bypass Callao for some

reason, and the rail line’s proximity to Hacienda Villa could benefit the estate. In fact, prior to completion of the last phase of construction in December 1858, the provisional terminal was at potreros de la hacienda Villa. A Lima-Chorrillos railway would raise land values in the area.

Felipe Barreda’s contract with the government to build the Chorrillos line was signed on January 9, 1857, and its clauses illustrated how the Castilla government and emergent Peruvian capitalists favored import-intensive investments over economic development more grounded in Peruvian realities. The main state subsidy to the project was an 80-year exemption from paying taxes. The performance bond could be put up in the form of depreciated internal debt securities. The company was exonerated, read one contract clause, “from paying duties on all materials and equipment necessary for the building, improvement and maintenance of the line.” Furthermore, even the required labor was to be unfree, much of it imported. Barreda’s company was allowed to bring in 700 indentured servants from China, and the government would supplement that force with “80 convicts provided daily.”

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431 Contract clauses were reprinted in Regal, Castilla, p. 57. According to one source (see Leubel in next note), the railway cost 350,000 pesos to build, not the 600,000 envisioned, but perhaps that was the amount of paid up stock purchased by private investors. In 1860, the Chorrillos trains ran back and forth three times a day to Lima, carrying 86,065 first class passengers and more than 100,000 in second class, producing annual revenues of 111,524 pesos. If one assumes a profit of about one-third of that, say 35,000 pesos, the investment would be recovered in ten years. The government exonerated the firm from paying taxes for eighty years. See also Alberto Regal, Historia de los ferrocarriles de Lima (Lima: Instituto de Vías de Transporte, 1965), pp. 81-82 and 92-93. To compare the Chorrillos contract with that of the Lima-Callao line, see the latter (revised) in Dancuart, Anales, v. 4, pp. 164-168. It specified that González de Candamo and José Vicente Oyague y hermano would own the line for 99 years; the government would cede free any needed public lands and arrange transfer of private land at its currently-assessed price; all materials needed for construction, maintenance and operation (including coal) would be imported free of duty; and the government would provide from 200 to 300 convict laborers, for which the company would pay three reales daily, plus one real daily for each soldier needed to keep watch over the labor force.
construction manager was imported; the Barreda group hired William “Guillermo” Jones, a U.S. citizen working in Peru for about two years. It is not clear if Felipe Barreda’s role was primarily as a dealmaker or if he also made a significant investment.432

Although the locomotives were purchased from a British firm, R. & W. Hawthorn, U.S. exports of iron and steel manufactures to Peru increased dramatically during the fiscal year 1858-1859. While Commerce and Navigation provided little detail regarding the specifics of the iron and steel grouping, it can be inferred from the vehicles category that cars for the Chorrillos line were purchased in the United States (table 8.3 below).

432 Alfredo Leubel put the Chorrillos railway cost at “more or less” 350,000 pesos (El Perú en 1860, ó sea anuario nacional (Lima: Imprenta del “Comercio,” 1861), p. 139). In his Estadística general de Lima, Manuel A. Fuentes wrote (p. 132) that Manuel González de Candamo invested 150,00 pesos and that another 150,000 was shared by Antonio Joaquín Ramos, José Vicente Oyague, Nicolás Rodrigo “and others.” Rodrigo had been Barreda’s closest business partner in the 1840s. The government subscribed one-fourth of the shares, and the remainder were to be offered to other investors. Alfonso Quiroz wrote of González de Candamo that, Las acciones de dicho ferrocarril las adquirió de Felipe Barreda. See his La deuda defraudada, p. 190. If correct, Barreda was more of a dealmaker than investor, taking, in effect, a developer’s fee rather than holding on to his shares in the company.
Table 8.3
U.S. Exports of Carriages and Railroad Cars To Peru
(Excluding Locomotives)
1853-1860

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Carriages and Railroad Cars (U.S. $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1860</td>
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**POPULAR BACKLASH**

The Barreda development model of importing *everything* required for an investment project did not go unnoticed by Lima’s carpenters, furniture makers and other artisans. Felipe Barreda wanted the railway’s terminus in Chorrillos to be a beautiful showcase of the sort of development he fostered, so he sent his brother in 1858 from New York to Boston to purchase the required wooden doors, windows, furniture, hardware and other first-class furnishings. 433 This is the story that opened the introduction to this study.

President Ramón Castilla and other dignitaries made an inaugural trip from Lima on November 9, 1858, even though government engineers had not yet inspected the work for official operation certification and the Chorrillos station was bare, still awaiting the materials that Federico Barreda bought in the United

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433 Sherman stated that Federico Barreda went to Boston to purchase New England manufactured goods for the railway. See Sherman, *From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate*, p. 49.
States. Two years earlier, when they won a six-year extension of their U.S. guano market concession, the Barredas commissioned building of the 1,049-ton ship Lammergeier in Bath, Maine, and placed it into service between the United States and Peru, hauling U.S. manufacturers to South American and ferrying guano back.434

The Lammergeier was laden with the Chorrillos station materials when it arrived in Callao on December 16, 1858, some five weeks after the official inauguration. It apparently also carried additional materials consigned to the neighboring Lima-Callao railway. To express their displeasure at such importing in general and the Chorrillos case in particular, carpenters and other angry citizens began to assemble for what they called “peaceable protests” at the docks to watch for any sign of unloading of the ship’s U.S. cargo into launches.435

434 “In the District of Bath, Me.,” The U.S. Nautical Magazine and Naval Journal, vol. V, no. 5 (February, 1857), p. 386. The New York Times on July 3, 1858, carried notice that the Lammergeier had just arrived in Boston from New York under captain Coffin. A conflicting source states that the ship was built in Newcastle, England, by R. Chapman & Son. This seems unlikely. Both countries had ship builders named Chapman. However, this source may be correct that Barreda sold the Lammergeier in 1863 to an M. Wilson of Liverpool, who renamed it the Ernestine. See the list, accessed December 2010, at http://marinerslist.com/site_pages.php?section=Shipping+Companies&category=English&page_name=R.Chapman+%26+Son. As noted in the previous chapter, Sherman spelled the name of Barreda’s ship “Lumerguier” (Sherman, p. 56), but I could find no published record of a ship with this name anywhere in the world.

435 This description of the arrival of the Lammergeier, its U.S. products and the consequences is based upon Francisco Quiroz Chueca, La protesta de los artesanos, Lima-Callao, 1858 (Lima: EAP de Historia, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 1988), pp. 16-29, plus the wonderful collection of documents reproduced following p. 90 (unnumbered pages 91-165 containing documents 1 through 19). I have found no contemporaneous reference to the incident in the U.S. press, nor in subsequent U.S. literature. The Barredas must have had the Lammergeier in Callao a year earlier, for the January 28, 1858, issue of the Brooklyn Daily Eagle reported that the ship’s captain, named Doane, “had been rudely assaulted when in his boat at Callao, by sailors of the Peruvian navy, and grossly insulted on the war ship Yzuchaca [sic – Izcuchaca?] when he sought redress.”
Peruvian skilled trades workers believed they were perfectly capable of producing the railings, doors and other furnishings themselves.

The next day, as launches piled with crates left the Lammergier and approached the wharf, the launch crews were met by angry carpenters and others who impeded transfer of the U.S. merchandise. The railway owners later said that workers were armed with hatchets and other instrumentos de actitud hostil. The launches apparently turned around and returned to the U.S. ship.

Citizens were taking protectionism into their own hands and calling on the government to change its policies. In a petition addressed to the prefect of Callao, Col. José Dañino, and signed by many dozens of artisans, the Callao gremio de carpinteros said they were alarmed by the arrival of the U.S. goods and asked for protection of their jobs, their families and the country’s industry. They begged that he ban unloading of the U.S. ship. Col. Dañino demurred, saying he had no such authority, and he forwarded the petition to the government in Lima.

Seeing the buck passed, the artisans sent a delegation to appeal directly to president Ramón Castilla. A larger group followed in a march on Lima, chanting their grievances and causing quite a stir in the capital. They gathered in the plaza de armas to await word on the delegation’s meeting with the president. Castilla

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437 Nine carpenters signed the petition, and then two sheets of additional signatures were subsequently attached. In all, there were 121 signatures, but a few individuals may have signed each of the attached sheets. See “Expediente sobre la protesta de artesanos en 1858,” in Quiroz Chueca, La protesta, document 1, unnumbered pp. 91-94.
replied that he was sorry not to be able to satisfy the requests of his “friends, the honorable artisans of Callao.” His hands were tied. He must obey the law passed by congress for Felipe Barreda permitting duty-free importation of manufactures for the railways. However, he wanted the artisans to know that no one esteemed them more than he, and he would work for their protection in the future.

It is not clear what was happening on the Lammergier over the next few days, but presumably the ship’s captain was in daily communication with Callao authorities and the Peruvian merchants who were importing the U.S. manufactures duty-free. The Lammergier made no further attempt to land the goods for four days, which included a Sunday. Perhaps the Castilla administration was being cautious and waiting for things to cool down. Perhaps the surprising strength and vehemence of the protest temporarily paralyzed authorities in Callao and Lima.

On Saturday, December 18, artisans of diverse trades gathered at a meeting in Callao to form a new association, the Sociedad de Artes y Oficios, with the declared objectives of “preventing from now on the importation of foreign goods” and to demand that the supreme government declare “an absolute prohibition of stoneware, construction materials, footwear and finished clothing.”438 Workers in Lima also began to mobilize against the U.S. merchandise sitting on the Lammergier.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT MANIFESTO

A large mass meeting took place on Sunday in Lima in the Santo Domingo convent to prevent, the attendees declared, “the impending ruin” of artisans and “damage to national industry” by the “monopoly [administered] by foreigners of manufactures of footwear, carpentry and clothing,” especially through contraband.\(^{439}\) The movement was spreading far beyond those conceivably affected by the U.S. goods on board the *Lammergier* to include hundreds of shoemakers, tailors and seamstresses. The proof of illicit trade, they said, was the fact that imported products were being offered in the marketplace at a price equivalent to their tariff rate. On this point it is important to bear in mind Heinrich Witt’s statement that customs operations in Callao were thoroughly corrupt (chapter seven). The group drafted an instrument of representation given to *maestro sastre* don Juan Guevara that was signed by 271 citizens and small business owners. Guevara then used that authority to prepare a several-page declaration to the nation and to congress that was nothing less than a national development manifesto. Government permission to introduce foreign goods duty-free was, he said, a grave assault on the working people of Peru, condemning them “to total ruin and annihilation.”\(^{440}\)

\(^{439}\) One artisan declaration published in *El Comercio* claimed there were “more than 1,000” in attendance at the Lima meeting, but Quiroz Chueca thought that number was exaggerated. “¡Artesanos!,” *El Comercio*, December 22, 1858, in Quiroz Chueca, *La protesta*, document 16.

\(^{440}\) All quotes by Juan Guevara are from “Artesanos,” document apparently found by Francisco Quiroz Chueca among chamber of deputies papers, and bearing the date December 22, 1858, and name of Mariano Loli, chamber of deputies *comisión de hacienda*, in Quiroz Chueca, *La protesta*, document 6.
The first duty of “civilized governments” was to promote the development of national industry, wrote Guevara. This was especially important in countries where work opportunities for the mayoría social were limited. Peru was being swamped by imports from “foreign speculators” that constantly threatened the livelihood of local workers. Men who sought their daily bread through “honest means” were being reduced to misery. The result was industrial stagnation, where “no one establishes workshops where native sons can perfect their arts.” Contraband was rampant. Government policy was the opposite of that required by “economic and administrative science,” killing off all hope among the younger generation. “The working class everywhere in the world … deserves the dedicated protection of their governments.”

Guevara reached for poetic expression of the national development vision of the artisans. Workers constitute the citizenry that loves and preserves peace, he said, because they “eat and live from the honorable sweat of their labor.” To allow the freedom to import finished clothing forces workers to “abandon their workshops in order to fill the jails.” Congress must act on “previously discussed” proposals to prohibit such imports and, then, build schools of arts and trades. Guevara said that the skilled workers who entrusted their voice to him expected “with confidence” action from the congress. “One does not … measure the progress of a people by its number of foreign speculators.” Without the ability to exploit Peru’s own natural resources through las artes, the country will not be “rich and flourishing.” Guevara said that France, England and Germany were “rich because they produce and not because the consume
[products] from abroad.” He signed the manifesto: Lima, diciembre 19, 1858, Señor Juan Guevara.

The Callao prefect deferred to the national government. The president said he was powerless. Now, in the face of popular mobilization, the congress passed the buck a couple of days later when it merely requested that the government order a report “as quickly as possible” from the customs administrator concerning the issues workers had raised.

Ramón Castilla’s cabinet requested an opinion from a special meeting of comerciantes notables. The Tribunal del Consulado called together Lima’s “leading merchants,” but said they “abstained from giving any opinion whatsoever,” trusting that the enlightened government would adopt a “just” resolution of the conflict. They limited themselves to a request that any change of policy allow for a proper transition period (plazos establecidos) before taking effect.441 The merchants would make their will felt behind the scenes, not in public, but their statement showed that they understood the government might be accountable to artisans, not just themselves. Evasions by congress, merchants and the Castilla government were testimony to the force workers were exercising on public opinion.

POPULAR PROTECTIONISM

Meanwhile, on Monday workers gathered on the Callao wharf and looked out to the Lammergier. They saw no movement. But, railway administrators later

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441 “Memorial presentado por los empresarios de los ferrocarriles,” El Peruano, January 5, 1859, in Quiroz Chueca, La protesta, document 14.
said that the minister of government, religion and public works gave them the green light to resume unloading. So, on Tuesday, December 21, the U.S. ship dispatched launches piled with U.S. merchandise consigned to the two railway companies. The prefect, Col. Dañino, went down to the docks to meet the launches with his police officers. A large crowd gathered. As the launches came aside, citizens jumped in them and, according to the railway owners, attacked the merchandize crates with tools, reducing some to “splinters,” and started throwing doors, windows and other goods purchased by Federico Barreda into the water. The prefect’s men were unable to contain the “fury,” and a full-scale riot got underway. Confederates of the protesters cut the telegraph line to Lima. These actions brought out the military man in president Castilla.

News reports said that Ramón Castilla himself rode at the head of army infantry and artillery units that marched into the port that evening. The army secured the Callao wharf, and the next morning troops protected launches bringing more goods from the Lammergier, which were transferred onto railway cars so they could be taken up the Callao-Lima line to secure warehouses in Lima. However, anti-importing sabotage and rioting now spread up toward the capital. President Castilla later accused people of firing on the train from homes and shops along the route. When the rail convoy reached Lima, workers attacked the San Juan de Dios station, setting fire to cars carrying the hated products of the United States. Other protesters started digging up some rails. The army put the rioting down, with at least one man killed and several injured.

442 Quiroz Chueca, La protesta, document 14.
but Castilla was shaken. He ordered reorganization and strengthening of police and army forces in Callao and decreed that civilians were obliged to assist in putting down future breaches of law and order.\(^{443}\)

Now government officials and business leaders went on the counteroffensive, exploiting public fears of “mob” violence to drown out the demands of the artisans. Prefect Dañino was moderate in his tone, describing events as “disagreeable.” He said foreigners were mostly to blame, naming nine alleged leaders who were arrested in Callao, of whom only one was chalaco. Three were Chileans, two were from Guayaquil, and one each from Grenada, Ica and Chiclayo, he said.\(^{444}\) But, Ramón Castilla called the behavior of the artisans “scandalous and degrading,” and he alleged that a group of adventurers and agitators had sought to “demoralize” Peru. The president said that complaints against imports were simply used as a pretext to promote disorder. “Happily,” he said, artisans now recognized “the gravity of their crime” and had returned to “calm and reason.”\(^{445}\) He decreed that, henceforth, the armed forces would protect the unloading of imported merchandise and its transport by rail. He said citizens were “prohibited from nearing or standing around a place of rioting.”

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that rioters could not take refuge. Anyone protecting lawbreakers “will be prosecuted and punished as if they were accomplices,” he decreed.\textsuperscript{446} The import-intensive development model was made secure.

Several groups of workers defensively issued their own condemnations of the rioters; others tried to keep their demands against imports alive in the press. Someone signing as \textit{Peruanos} in \textit{El Comercio} called the riots a “horrible cataclysm” unexpected from Peruvians known for their “noble, tame and peaceable character.” This writer proceeded to empty bile and contempt on the workers involved, saying they were from the \textit{plebe más abyecta y despreciable}, “whose only trade is looting and vagrancy.” They were foreign adventurers and, disgracefully, low-life Peruvians showing their vices and “depraved tendencies and customs,” probably criminals escaped from prisons. The complaints of the artisans were “insignificant.” The man who died, he said, was one of the “thieves” who broke into the store of \textit{señor} Herouard, in calle de Mercaderes, shot by troops who rushed from the plaza de armas. Was he an artisan? \textit{No señores}. He was a black man, \textit{un tal Ramírez}, a notorious highway bandit. What further proof is needed to know the character of the rioters? Genuine artisans should remember, according to \textit{Peruanos}, that their love of work, subordination to the law and \textit{respeto a las autoridades} is a guarantee of \textit{la subsistencia}.\textsuperscript{447}


\textsuperscript{447} “Escandaloso atentado,” \textit{El Comercio}, December 27, 1858, in Quiroz Chueca, \textit{La protesta}, document 19. Peruvians were not alone in circulating a racialized version that blamed blacks for the disturbances. In letters against abolitionists published in newspapers and then as a pamphlet, George Francis Train wrote, “The American captains tell me you cannot go from Callao to Lima with safety. The ship Lammergeier [sic] arrived at Callao last December, with a cargo of framed houses, imported by the Peruvians, because carpenters or laborers could not be
To establish liability, Pedro Gonzalez de Candamo and his railway colleagues sent the Castilla administration a statement saying they had followed the guidance of government officials throughout the conflict. They demanded the state compensate them for their losses.\textsuperscript{448}

During 1860, the Chorrillos road carried 195,217 passengers and took in revenues of 111,524 pesos, or about thirty-two percent of its estimated investment, compared to about 700,000 passengers and roughly 337,000 pesos for the Lima-Callao line.\textsuperscript{449} Together the two railways in that year employed eight locomotives, 36 passenger cars and 49 freight cars.

**BARREDA’S TRANS-ANDEAN RAILWAY COMMISSION**

His success in getting the Chorrillos line built earned Felipe Barreda a government commission to study the feasibility of a trans-Andean railroad, a project that will be explained in greater detail in subsequent chapters. It was evangelized by his son-in-law, Manuel Pardo, and planned in a preliminary design by an immigrant engineer, Ernesto Malinowski.

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obtained since the abolition act. What did the negroes do? They burnt a portion of the frames, took possession of the ship, and threw the balance overboard in spite of General Castilla’s military force.” See *The Facts: Or, at Whose Door Does the Sin (?) Lie? ... These Questions Answered* (New York and London: R. M. de Witt and Trübner & Co., 1860), p. 68. Train mentioned this tale to demonstrate that, “Emancipation is a dangerous experiment,” and he went on to say that abolition in Peru destabilized the country. “The sugar, the rice, and the tobacco crops were nearly all lost, and the starving negroes fled to the highways, where murder, rapine, and outrage is reported by every incoming packet.”


\textsuperscript{449} Leubel, *El Perú en 1860*, pp. 135-141. Chorrillos trains ran back and forth three times a day to Lima, carrying 86,065 first class passengers and more than 100,000 in second class.
José Fabio Melgar, foreign minister and the acting president in the temporary absence of Ramón Castilla, wrote Barreda in December 1859 that he would chair a group consisting of his son-in-law, Pardo, plus Pardo’s partner in trafficking Chinese bondsmen, José Canevaro, and the man who designed the Lima penitentiary based on study of the U.S. penal system, Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán. The latter was a good friend of Federico Barreda and probably Castilla’s most important development official, serving as director of public works during 1860-1865.

“Having been involved in establishing the Callao and Chorrillos railways and having knowledge of this type of enterprise in Europe and the United States,” Melgar told Barreda, “you shall be president of the commission.” He asked Barreda’s group to consult engineers and other specialists and then report back to the government as soon as possible regarding the most feasible route, how long construction would take, its cost, expected revenues and “whether it would be best built by the state or a private firm, and, in the latter case, what would be the government’s burden.” Less than six weeks later, the Peruvian government approved construction of a railroad across the Andes from Lima to Jauja and authorized Malinowski, the government’s chief engineer, to purchase necessary equipment for surveying the route. While the decree of January 27, 1860, was only an approval in principle, it was taken two years before California leaders managed to get U.S. government financing for their own transcontinental railroad.
The Barredas did not build the trans-Andean road. That honor fell to a U.S. entrepreneur, Henry Meiggs. But the import-intensive practices of the Barredas provided the template for Meiggs. If more evidence was needed for the development model of the Barredas and the Castilla government, an additional project will clarify. The same year that he secured the Chorrillos deal, Felipe Barreda took on an urban renewal project, repairing and remodeling the colonial Alameda de los Descalzos just across the Rimac River from Lima’s plaza de armas. He seemed to view this as a monument to the legacy he would leave Peru, a revival of Lima’s colonial splendor.

The Alameda was first developed as a paseo and public garden in 1611, based upon design of a garden in Seville. There is a great deal of Lima folklore associated with it, including stories of romantic intrigue involving disguised women – la tapada limeña, dressed in saya y manto (see chapter . Along the sides of the paseo, Barreda installed fifty marble benches and one hundred iron flowerpots on tall iron bases. He imported all of the ornate ironwork fences and gates from England, and he purchased one dozen marble statues in Italy representing the twelve signs of the zodiac, plus others to adorn the main gate.

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450 Juan Oviedo, ed., Colección de leyes, decretos y órdenes publicadas en el Perú desde el año de 1821 hasta 31 de diciembre de 1859, tomo sexto (Lima: Felipe Bailly, 1861), pp. 162-163.
Once he remodeled it to evoke Lima’s colonial splendor, the Alameda de los Descalzos was an enduring symbol of Felipe Barreda’s approach to Peru’s development. The ironwork fences and gates, the marble benches and statues – everything – was imported. This Barreda approach was the template for Henry Meiggs a few years later.

Barreda restored the Alameda so that it again became a favorite place for Lima’s elites to wander and be seen, reinforcing their colonialist and Eurocentric cultural orientation. His project concluded a period in which Lima’s elite women, under male pressure, abandoned the saya y manto in favor of French fashions. Barreda received accolades for his Alameda work, which he apparently
conducted with financial transparency. A U.S. visitor in early 1866 was quite impressed. Daniel Trigg, who hailed from a “well-connected” Virginia family, wrote in his diary that he “Went out this morning to see the Alameda (public walk of the City). It is the most beautiful place of the kind I ever saw.”

Members of the Barreda network built or restored handsome residences in Lima during the pervious fifteen years, and the city bore little resemblance to the run-down, squalid place described by Darwin, Melville and others two and three decades earlier. Trigg described Lima as “splendid” and added, “I think I should like to live there.” Critics were beginning to judge the development model harshly, but the capital’s appearance in the eyes of foreigners no longer brought shame to Felipe Barreda or his son-in-law, Manuel Pardo.

Given that this import-intensive approach was favorable to sale of U.S. manufactures and had been so fatal to Peru’s first cotton textile factory, it seems rather ironic that, when a U.S. naval officer made an expedition into the Andes in 1851 and needed to carry some goods to barter with Indians along the way, he did not turn to Alsop y Cia. for U.S. cotton cloth. This was all the more curious because Alsop partners Stanhope Prevost and Edward McCall helped him plan and pack for the trip. Instead of grey goods from the looms of Lowell, Massachusetts, Lt. William Lewis Herndon loaded a mule with a thousand yards

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452 Ibid.
of cotton cloth woven in Lima on the Rogers-built looms of Juan Norberto Casanova’s ill-fated “Los Tres Amigos” factory (see the next chapter).

Barreda’s import-intensive approach helps explain why, despite the energetic protests of Peru’s urban workers, employment in Lima’s trades may have fallen – or was stagnant – throughout most of the guano era. As noted earlier, Shane Hunt estimated a seventeen percent decline in “industrial” (crafts) employment in Lima between 1857 and 1876. The patente tax rolls tell a similar story. The number of tailoring and finished clothing shops paying the tax declined from fifty-four in 1852 to forty-four in 1859, and to only twenty-nine by 1869.453 The number of tax-paying carpentry shops was stagnant, although the number of shoemaking shops rose. Imports of U.S. and European manufactures, such as furniture, continued to rise. Lima’s ladies ordered their formal gowns from Paris. Senior officers of the Peruvian armed forces ordered their uniforms from the same place.454 Felipe Barreda and Carmen de Osma would retire there.

453 Patente category of sastres por mayor y por menor, in appendix table 15.1e.

454 Sherman, From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate, p. 37.
CHAPTER 9

A VISION:
BRINGING THE "BREATH OF STEAM" TO PERU

I should not have been the cause of injustice
and oppression.

Lt. William Lewis Herndon
1851

The Andean mountain air was clear, calm and refreshingly cool on the
afternoon of June 2, 1851. At an elevation of about 15,000 feet, reduced oxygen
invited repose, and Lt. William Lewis Herndon enjoyed a contemplative moment
on a grassy slope beside Lake Morococha, only vaguely aware of the extent of the
mineral riches that lay nearby. Although relaxing, he still felt excitement over
the purposes of his mission to Peru. The U.S. Secretary of the Navy had ordered
him and a fellow U.S. naval officer, Lt. Lardner Gibbon, to make an expedition
through Peru, over the Andes and down the Amazon to chart the region’s
commercial, industrial and mining potential. Their instructions made clear U.S.
interest in specific aspects of Peru's economic development. The navy secretary
charged Herndon and Gibbon with the "most important and delicate duty" of
reporting on "not only ... the present condition of that [region], ... both industrial
and social, of its inhabitants, their trade and products ... but also to its capacities
for cultivation, and to the character and extent of its undeveloped commercial
resources, whether of the field, the forest, the river, or the mine."\(^{455}\)

\(^{455}\) William Lewis Herndon and Lardner Gibbon, *Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon, Made
Under the Direction of the Navy Department*, 2 vols. (Washington: Robert Armstrong, Public Printer,
1854), v. 1, p. 24. All Herndon quotations are from v. 1, which he authored.
Naval officers were a logical choice for this assignment, since one object was to secure for U.S. ships free navigation and commercial access of the Amazon and its tributaries. The expedition was launched from Peru because the United States wanted to understand better the economic potential of the Andean region and because Brazil had not opened the river to foreign commerce.\textsuperscript{456} Herndon was given a list of specific questions: "What is the present condition of the silver mines of Peru and Bolivia ...? What is the machinery used, whence obtained, and how transported?" Regarding agricultural production, the U.S. government wished to know "the state of tillage; of what class are the laborers; the value of a day's work; the yield per acre per hand ... the price at the place of production ... the mode and means of transportation?"

The officers were told to keep a low profile and avoid offending the national sensibilities of Peruvians. They should be careful not to form an expedition party so large "as to excite the suspicion of the people, or give offence to the authorities." But, in fact, Herndon had been well received by Peruvian officials, beginning in Chile where he stayed while awaiting more specific orders. Herndon was a guest in Santiago of Peruvian minister Felipe Pardo y Aliaga, the former foreign minister who had sent Felipe Barreda and Joaquín de Osma to London in 1848. Pardo helped him with research and provided introductions to officials in Lima. Once there, Stanhope Prevost and other U.S. merchants resident in Lima advised him on preparations for a long trip. Herndon and Gibbon met personally with president Ramón Castilla, who ordered special

\textsuperscript{456} U.S. concern was timely, since a few months later Peru and Brazil signed a treaty (October 23, 1851) governing commerce and navigation throughout the Amazon basin, reserving trade and navigation to themselves. The United States petitioned Peru to grant U.S. ships and citizens the same rights, but to no avail. Brazil did not decree free navigation of the Amazon until 1866, followed by Peru in 1868. See Basadre, \textit{Historia}, II, pp. 962-966.
Peruvian passports issued for their journey. Herndon would not have met Pardo y Aliaga’s son, Manuel Pardo, who was studying in Europe.

Herndon's plan was to travel by mule up into the Andes east of Lima, inspect the mining region of Morococha near the summit, and cross over and down through the fertile Mantaro Valley to La Oroya and Tarma in the Department of Junín. The haciendas, cattle pastures and Indian peasant communities of the Mantaro provided cattle, sheep, wheat, alfalfa and vegetables to Lima and to the mining centers of central Peru.\textsuperscript{457} Then they would travel northwest up to the fabled mines of Cerro de Pasco. From there they planned to cross the Department of Huánuco, descending north into the montaña. At the town of Tingo María they would exchange their mules for canoes and continue their journey down the Huallaga River into the Amazon basin.\textsuperscript{458}

The captain of a U.S. Pacific Station frigate anchored in Callao assigned a master's mate to the exploration party, and Herndon contracted the services of a young Peruvian interpreter, Manuel Ijurra, who was familiar with Amazon travel and whose father had been a silver miner in Cerro de Pasco. During the course of the journey, Herndon grew very fond of Ijurra, praising him in the concluding pages of his report to Washington for his energy, high spirits and loyalty, which "made the little Peruvian as dear to me as a brother."\textsuperscript{459} Herndon was less enamored of the man he hired as his muleteer (see illustration), whom

\textsuperscript{457} For the historical importance of the Mantaro Valley in Peru's economic development, see Florencia E. Mallon, \textit{The Defense of Community in Peru’s Central Highlands; Peasant Struggle and Capitalist Transition, 1860-1940} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 15-24.

\textsuperscript{458} While at Tarma, Herndon decided to split up his small party, sending Gibbon south into Bolivia. The second volume of \textit{Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon} consists of Gibbon’s account of his journey to Cuzco, La Paz, Cochabamba and through Brazil.

\textsuperscript{459} Herndon, \textit{Exploration}, v. 1, p. 273.
he accused of everything from theft to having an ugly face. In addition to provisions, Herndon purchased in Lima a range of goods that could be traded with Indians for food or services. These included a thousand yards of coarse cotton cloth (*tocuyos*) manufactured locally in Lima’s only cotton textile mill, as well as fish hooks, knives, ribbon and "cheap trinkets."  

Alsop y Cía. partners Stanhope Prevost and Edward McCall assisted Herndon in outfitting and readying his team. As the U.S. navy’s procurement agent, McCall was authorized to supply the expedition and provide Herndon necessary cash.

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U.S. citizens traveling through Peru’s interior had to rely on an Indian muleteer. The relationship between white visitor and independent contractor was often fraught with social, cultural and racial tension. Interesting contrasts of attitude can be found in U.S. accounts. Although their experiences were separated by over sixty years, Lt. William Lewis Herndon and Hiram Bingham both faced moral dilemmas in their employ of arrieros and other Indian laborers. (Hiram Bingham’s relationships with Peruvians is a subject of the third volume of this study.) The arriero photograph is in the collection of the U.S. Library of Congress.

On the day of departure, Prevost and McCall accompanied Herndon, Gibbon and the other six members of the party to the outskirts of Lima. The merchants warned them to look out for robbers and other dangers. "With the comfortable observation from Mr. McCall that he never expected to see us again, we shook hands and parted," Herndon wrote in his diary.
Now they were in Morococha, part of one of Peru’s most active mining regions, at the divide where the Andes branch into two great cordilleras. Sitting by the lake, "I was now, for the first time, fairly in the field of my operations," recalled Herndon. He imagined himself as something of a U.S. Marco Polo, sent to South America in the era of railroads and Manifest Destiny. "I was commanded to examine its fields, its forests, and its rivers, that I might gauge their capabilities, active and dormant, for trade and commerce with the states of Christendom, and make known to the spirit and enterprise of the age the resources which lie in concealment there, waiting for the touch of civilization and the breath of the steam engine to give them animation, life, and palpable existence." Herndon did not doubt that, if he conducted his mission properly, the United States would provide that “touch of civilization” to bring Peru’s interior regions to life.

At that moment beside the lake, Herndon visualized a parallel between Peru and the U.S. Western frontier recently opened by the U.S. War with Mexico (1846-1848). Overlooking water and thinking about the upper reaches of the Amazon, he imagined another agent like himself exploring the headwaters of "our own majestic Mississippi." While Lt. Gibbon sat nearby sketching the view of the cordillera with the aid of a camera lucida, Herndon reached for a piece of vegetation. "I musingly dropped a bit of green moss, plucked from the hill-side, upon the bosom of the placid Lake Morococha, and as it floated along I followed it, in imagination, down through the luxurious climes, the beautiful skies, and the enchanting scenery of the tropics, to the mouth of the great river; thence across the Caribbean sea, through the Yucatan pass, into the Gulf of Mexico;

461 Herndon, Exploration, v. 1, p. 63.
thence along the Gulf-stream; and so out upon the ocean, off the shores of the 'Land of Flowers' [Louisiana].” There Herndon fantasized that his floating piece of Peruvian moss would meet with similar "silent little messengers cast by the hands of sympathizing friends and countrymen high upon the head-waters of the Mississippi, or away in the 'Far West,' upon the distant fountains of the Missouri."\(^{462}\)

Despite his enthusiasm for projecting a U.S. destiny in Peru's economic development, Herndon could hardly have envisioned that, within less than two decades, crews of U.S. engineers would be directing thousands of workers in a frantic race to bring the "breath of the steam engine" over a railroad running almost past the spot where he sat – one of the most costly and technically audacious development projects ever undertaken in the history of the Americas.

**PERUVIAN LABOR**

Herndon was no social reformer. Like most Virginian whites, he supported slavery in both the United States and Peru. But, he was a well-trained, earnest and sensitive observer. As he made his way over the Andes and to the first navigable river that would take him to the Amazon, his job was to write down everything he could about Peru and its people. Some of his observations about Peruvians flowed from their employment in his little enterprise. A revealing incident occurred in the Tarma region that would come under Manuel Pardo’s observation a few years later.

\(^{462}\) Ibid., p. 62.
Herdon led an expedition of seven people. His U.S. countrymen were another Gibbon and a navy masters mate. To obtain his Peruvians, Herndon required assistance in Lima from Peruvian officials and members of the American community there. He hired an interpreter, two servants and an arriero, who could supply enough mules to carry their instruments, the thousand yards of cotton cloth, supplies and other baggage to Tarma. From there, the group made a side trip to Chanchamayo in the montaña, and Herndon again had to procure transportation, both animals and men. Outgoing president Ramón Castilla had introduced him to the only minister his successor, José Rufino Echenique, had so far appointed, Juan Crisóstomo Torrico, who issued special passports and a letter instructing that Peruvian officials “shall afford them all the assistance and facilities that may be necessary for the fulfillment of their object.”

Once in Tarma, Herndon paid off the arriero and then faced several choices. He could hire another arriero, who would supply pack mules or donkeys and their attendants. Or, he could lease the animals himself and hire a couple of Indians to tend them for the duration of the round trip. Instead, he decided to use Torrico’s letter and have local authorities work out the arrangements. The district prefecto, or governor, said he was happy to oblige and would have men and animals ready for departure the next day. The local priest

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463 Over the years I have consulted both Herndon’s 1854 edition (cited earlier) and that of 1853, William Lewis Herndon, *Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon, Made Under the Direction of the Navy Department*, Part 1, U.S. Senate executive document no. 36, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Robert Armstrong, Public Printer, 1853), p. 43. The 1853 edition was prepared for publication by Herndon prior to the return of Lt. Lardner Gibbon to the United States.
promised to find him a replacement for one of his servants. That is when Herndon began his education in Peruvian labor relations.

In the morning the governor sent for him and introduced him to a mule owner and the owner of a couple of donkeys, together with two Indian men who would be responsible for the animals and cargo. The governor told Herndon that he should pay the Indians a half dollar a day that they would share, and the U.S. officer promptly gave each an advance of three dollars. The rental of the mule was to be two dollars now and a like amount upon return. Each donkey was half that amount. “The peons were then lectured on their duties, and sent round to my house with an escort of half a dozen ... [policemen] “armed with sticks, to prevent their escaping or getting drunk before the start.” The animals “were also sent under similar guard, so that my patio seemed filled with a clamorous multitude, who created such a confusion that I had to turn out all but my own people.”

By impulsively dismissing the governor’s police force, Herndon was on his own, and the facts of the situation began to reveal themselves. The Indians made excuses for not loading the pack animals. They complained that the owners had not sent ropes with which to tie on the loads. “I soon discovered that there was a general unwillingness for the job,” he wrote in his diary. His Indians were drafted and working under duress, he realized. In addition, “the governor had pressed the animals into the service against the will of the

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464 Herndon, Exploration (1853 edition), p. 78, and all further Herndon quotations from there and the following two pages.
owners.” Out of the house came a woman who warned Herndon not to take the mule, saying “it was a bad, vicious animal, that would do me a mischief.” Herndon expressed surprise because “he looked particularly docile.” So, he ordered his new servant, the man the priest procured and “who looked twice as vicious as the mule,” to mount the animal and ride around the patio. “The fellow grinned maliciously, and proved my judgment correct.” The mule was fine. The woman retreated, and now out came the mule’s owner who told Herndon that he “must pay half a dollar more, as the governor had kept back that much of the price.”

When Herndon declined to pay more, the owner “tried to steal away his mule while our backs were turned.” Failing that, the man went off, “got drunk in about fifteen minutes,” and returned to try a different approach. He started “embracing, kissing, and weeping over his mule, crying in piteous tones, ‘Mi macho, mi macho.’” Herndon ignored the owner but was distressed. “This was all very annoying to me,” he wrote. “We shoved him aside and rode off, followed, I have no doubt, by the curses of the community.”

Herndon made clear that part of his annoyance was at himself, that he “was sorry for it,” meaning he regretted his decision to make the arrangements the Peruvian way. He felt somewhat ashamed. The navy had granted him authority to charge all “necessary expenses” of his mission, with a generous upper limit of five thousand dollars, more than enough to properly pay his workers throughout the expedition. He had no need to rely on coercion for either men or animals. Now he had given encouragement to corruption. Also,
he had technically violated one of his orders, which stated that he should conduct himself in a manner that would not “excite the suspicion of the people” or give offense to anyone during his journey. If he had contracted directly with those who would work for him and supply the animals, he reasoned, “I would probably have been cheated in the price.” But that would have been the proper course. This U.S. principle – a matter of honor, really – of not allowing oneself to be “cheated in the price” by any Peruvian of low social status, even when the money involved was of little or no consequence, would be the source of much interpersonal U.S.-Peruvian misery over the next seventy-five years.

Herndon talked over what happened with several people, and two of them provided an excellent contrast of Peruvian viewpoints regarding labor. The first was the commandant of the army post at Chanchamayo. Herndon told him he would rather have paid “double the price and get voluntary service.” The officer disagreed strongly, telling him “that my sympathies were all thrown away upon these people.” This Peruvian said, “I must go to the governors for the means of transportation” (Herndon’s emphasis). The military man thought that “Indians would not let me have their beasts at any price,” and proceeded to tell Herndon of cases where he himself used “threats, and even force” to get Indians to do his bidding.

Herndon was becoming quite impressed with his young interpreter, Manuel Ijurra, whom he later said had become “as dear to me as a brother.” The employee gave Herndon a completely different viewpoint, “relating instances of oppression and tyranny [against Indians] on the part of the governors.” He told
of the labor conditions in the province of Maynas, where Indians were compelled
to carry goods for long distances on their backs. Ijurra explained the chain of
command for obtaining forced labor in Peru. “A traveling merchant goes to the
governor and says, ‘I have such and such a cargo; I want so many Indians to
transport it.’” Herndon noted that this governor would be “white or mestizo,”
and that he would call for a local curaca, the head of an Indian community, and
order him to draft the required number of Indians. Herndon thought that
without the curacas “the whites probably could not govern at all.” The Indians
would have to provide their own food for the road, “and they are taken from
their occupations and sent off, for probably many days, at a pay of anything that
the governor may direct.” For other labor drafts, such as for building a house or
clearing land for a farm, Indians would be paid in kind, usually in the form of
the cheapest and coarsest cotton cloth. He thought that in this case Indians
would be compelled to work for each month for “as many yards of cotton cloth
as will make each a shirt and pair of trousers.” As noted, Herndon carried a
large bundle of such cloth for barter.

Summing up his Tarma experience, Herndon concluded that, “I should
not have been the cause of injustice and oppression.” Rarely did other U.S.
citizens in Peru speak so candidly about their feelings, but they told similar
stories about their relationships with Peruvian workers. Sometimes the story
itself revealed the U.S. writer’s sense of moral superiority. Such was the case
when E. George Squier, a U.S. official and keen student of Native American
archeology, told of visiting a priest on Peru’s north coast. The cleric pointed
contemptuously at his servants, declaring that, “These poor people are mere children; they must be governed by a father. The Incas were right, after all.” Then he turned to an Indian and screamed at him. “Beast! Coffee and cigars! Quick! Holy Mother!”

**A PERUVIAN ERIE CANAL**

Herndon’s 1851 vision of bringing the steam locomotive into the Andes was echoed by Peruvians toward the end of the decade, particularly as they learned of U.S. plans to construct a transcontinental railway across North America. As noted earlier, two key figures in the development of a *ferrocarril transandino* were a Polish immigrant engineer, Ernesto Malinowski, who verified the feasibility and designed the route, and Felipe Barreda’s son-in-law, Manuel Pardo, who became its evangelist. Such a project, Pardo had said, would do for Perú’s development what the Erie Canal had done for the United States. And, its construction was urgent, he warned, because guano was being wasted and would soon run out (chapter thirteen). But, before looking at Peru’s railroad projects, it is important to examine Manuel Pardo’s own personal involvement in the guano trade, which was of two dimensions. The first concerned the Barreda’s rather hasty exit from management of the U.S. guano market (the next chapter). The second was Pardo’s investments in the trafficking of Chinese bondsmen (chapter eleven).

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CHAPTER 10

GUANO AND U.S. DEVELOPMENT

Any other [guano] offered as Peruvian, is spurious, and our farmers must be cautious to ascertain the origin of what they buy.

Edwin Bartlett
New York merchant and former Alsop Partner
1845

The German and Irish millions, like the Negro, have a great deal of guano in their destiny. They are ferried over the Atlantic, and carted over America, to ditch and to drudge, to make corn cheap, and then to lie down prematurely to make a spot of green grass on the prairie.

Ralph Waldo Emerson
The Conduct of Life
1860

Federico Barreda’s most important marketing move in the United States was to commission a book extolling Peruvian guano’s virtues by Solon Robinson, regarded by historians as the most knowledgeable agricultural writer of his day. The grandly titled Guano: A Treatise of Practical Information for Farmers; Containing Plain Directions How to Apply Peruvian Guano to the Various Crops and Soils of America, with a Brief Synopsis of Its History, Locality, Quantity, Method of Procuring, Prospect of Continued Supply, and Price; Analysis of Its Composition, and Value as a Fertilizer, Over All Other Manures was first published in 1852 by Messrs. F. Barreda & Brother and their New York agent, Theodore W. Riley, Esq.466 Like the Gibbs use of Edwin Bartlett as their U.S. distributor, Barreda’s use of Riley suggested a relationship – at least indirect – with the Alsop merchant group. In

466 There was also an 1853 edition.
fact, Gibbs in London used the name “Alsop” to describe the Barreda’s New York distributor. Theodore Riley was a merchant closely associated with Henry Chauncey and other members of the Alsop network, and in 1840 he joined the Lima and Valparaiso Alsop y Cía. copartnership. He was a former U.S. consul in Chile and later a co-founder of – and largest investor in – Fabbri & Chauncey, the most important U.S. shipping firm between New York and the west coast of South America from 1860 until the Grace brothers developed their own shipping line.467

Fig. 10.1
MARKETING
Commissioning Solon Robinson to write a book promoting Peruvian guano was an astute marketing move on the part of Federico Barreda. Through years of travel and writing on farming throughout the U.S. Midwest and South, Robinson earned credibility for his analyses of how farm owners could increase output and profits with application of agricultural science. He himself had sold guano and could back up his claims for the Peruvian product with dozens of favorable quotations from farmers located in diverse soil and climate regions.

467 Riley invested $200,000 in the Fabbri & Chauncey shipping partnership (New York Times, June 6, 1860). He was a director of the Panama Railway, and beginning in 1870 he rejoined the Alsop partnership in Peru and Chile during its final phase. He named his son after his partner, and the Rev. Dr. Henry Chauncey Riley was an Episcopal bishop leading development of the church in Mexico, work financed in large measure by the Riley family (see http://anglicanhistory.org/usa/alee/mexico1879.html). See also, United States, Alsop Claim, p. 15.
Solon Robinson was born in Connecticut in 1803 into a family that had sold clothing and other provisions to the U.S. army, but he was orphaned at a young age and then abandoned by his stepfather. According to family lore, in his early or mid-twenties he worked his way West as a peddler, residing in Cincinnati by 1827, where a city directory listed him as a clerk. After marrying and starting a family, he moved to Indiana and purchased some land on a post road between Madison and Indianapolis. He had the property surveyed, cleared, subdivided and recorded as a town named after himself, Solon. He built a small tavern but could not find ready buyers for town lots. That disappointment led him to Madison, where for a couple of years he ran an auction business. In 1834, he and his family joined other white settlers in colonizing a section of northwestern Indiana where the Potawatomi Indians were being forced out. Tall, with a forceful personality, piercing eyes and a shock of prematurely white hair, Robinson organized the Squatters’ Union to protect the colonists’ claims from land speculators. Locals called him “King of the Squatters.” It was here, in what became Indiana’s Lake County, that Robinson found success as a developer and owner of a general store in a town he helped establish, Crown Point.\footnote{Solon Robinson is acknowledged as the principal founder of the town of Crown Point, the county seat of Lake County, Indiana (2000 population of 19,806), and today it has an elementary school named for him.} Involved in local Whig politics, he wrote political articles and campaign songs, as well as short romantic frontier fiction, some focused on the lives of Indians and white settlers he traded with in his store. He
even bought his own small printing press on which to produce broadsheets and other promotional materials.\textsuperscript{469}

Robinson was more of a land developer than a farmer, but he carried out agricultural experiments on his own properties and took a keen interest in improved farm practices and agricultural science. He traveled to fairs and conventions, becoming a popular public speaker on improved farming methods. His writing career grew naturally from these trips, and he adopted a folksy, personal narrative style so that readers would look forward to his next “letter.” A missive might be addressed “To my friend of Richmond Co. N. Y.,” but when he would write a phrase like, “one thing I beg of you,” the “you” would be his farmer readership. He was as much a travel writer as agriculturalist. He named the farmers he visited, offered opinions about their regions, commented on the amenities of hotels he stayed in and was a champion of westward development. “But if you (by you, I mean eastern farmers generally,) and particularly your book farming hating neighbor, will take a journey through the west,” he wrote in the Albany \textit{Cultivator} in 1843, “there will be no more doubts expressed as to the magnitude of western farming.”\textsuperscript{470} The jibe at “book farming hating neighbor” was classic Robinson, who saw himself as an educator and sold books on farming during his travels.

\textsuperscript{469} Herbert A. Kellar wrote a brief but well researched biography of Robinson that serves as the introduction to the two volumes of Robinson’s selected writings that he edited, \textit{Solon Robinson: Pioneer and Agriculturalist} (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1936. See Kellar, “Introduction,” vol. I, pp. 3-41.

Robinson was becoming an evangelist for scientific farming in the United States, in which Peruvian guano would play an important role within the next decade. “The prejudice against ‘book farming,’” he wrote in 1841, “is fast giving way to a growing anxiety after scientific knowledge, as applicable to the cultivating of the soil.” He was not shy about complimenting himself for the role he played in advancing “the agricultural interest of the country.” There was “great good” accomplished “by public spirited individuals traveling as I have done through the country, stirring up and awakening the lethargic feeling of the farmers, and urging them to arouse themselves to take the stand in the first rank of society, that their occupation entitles them to hold.”

Penning notes on everything from proper storage of grain and curing of beans to how to manage harmful insects and plant diseases, Robinson developed an encyclopedic knowledge of U.S. agriculture; and, shortly before working for Federico Barreda, he published his own farmers’ Almanac. Robinson was very active in the Union Agricultural Society, founded in Chicago in 1840, and he advocated for the founding of a national agricultural school and journal. Almost every issue of the Union Agriculturalist and Western Prairie Farmer carried an article, announcement or comment by Robinson. Later, he was a regular correspondent of the American Agriculturalist, one of the most widely read farm journals in the United States. He made six major tours of different states, north and south, and many shorter journeys between 1841 and 1851, supporting his

471 Ibid., pp. 290-291.
travels by selling magazine subscriptions, seeds and, eventually, farm machinery and Peruvian guano. A theme of Robinson was to compare the “indolence” of western farmers like himself who cultivated new soil with the “industriousness” of eastern farmers who devised the means to make a profit from exhausted earth through application of fertilizers and other innovations. For example, he heaped praise upon two Wilmington physicians (who probably hosted him in Delaware), one of whom, Dr. J. W. Thompson, was president of the local Agricultural Society. “The power of one man to accomplish wonders is indeed wonderful,” he gushed. “By the judicious use of manure, marl, and lime, the poor worn out farms of this part of Delaware have been doubled in value within a few years past, and now who a state of fertility that was considered impossible for them ever again to attain, after having been ‘skinned’ for more than a hundred years.”

Robinson made this particular tour in late 1841, before guano was introduced in the United States. Over the next ten years, he observed that farmers increasingly relied on fertilizers to improve their yields and gain profit from used up lands, and he wrote about use of plaster, straw, swamp muck, oak leaves, bagasse, ashes, oak leaves and pea vines. He was late in appreciating the gradual adoption of the Peruvian product. If the selected articles in Keller’s two-volume collection of Robinson’s work are a reliable guide, he did not discuss

472 Ibid., p. 292.
guano until 1849. By then, he was writing for the *American Agriculturalist*, whose co-owner, Anthony B. Allen, was also a New York guano agent for Gibbs. His letters to his wife made mention of Allen’s guidance of his work, and by 1850 Robinson was a sales agent for Allen, not just a writer for his journal. In a May 9, 1850, letter sent to his wife from Lancaster Co., Virginia, Robinson said, “I am engaged in doing a very large business for the firm, of which I expect to reap a fair per centage of profit to myself.” So, it is no wonder that, from then on, Robinson took every opportunity to write about the wonders of the Peruvian product. “I have sold within the last ten days *Twenty Thousand Dollars* worth of merchandise, mostly Guano, which is extensively used as a manure for wheat in several counties here.”

Robinson was now an evangelist for Peruvian guano, and he and his publisher could be said to have a conflict of interest.

**ROBINSON, PROTECTIONISM AND SLAVERY**

On the great issues of his day, Robinson was similar to many westerners in holding contradictory views. Like Henry Clay, he was a Whig and protectionist who once described “free trade advocates” as “wild and almost insane.” If their policies prevailed, he thought, they would “finally succeed in making this country, as far as all manufactures are concerned, a dependent colony of Great Britain.”

As a newspaperman, constant letter writer and former

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475 Ibid., p. 375.
postmaster of his small, self-named community, he wanted government subsidy of low postage rates and to pay only one rate regardless of distance, yet he also advocated privatization. “Let the watchword then be in all coming Congressional elections,” he said in 1844, “‘Down with the P. O. monopoly, a reform of its abuses.’”

During his visits to slave states, Robinson became quite an apologist for slavery, speaking warmly of plantation owners he met and the admirable conditions in which they kept their servants. On the ten-year-old, 640-acre Mississippi estate of John T. Leigh, formerly of Virginia, he enumerated the weekly rations provided each slave and noted that, “all show by their looks that they are full fed and well clothed.” Leigh owned about ninety blacks living in separate family log cabins, some of which were “very comfortable” and “neatly furnished and provided with household matters and things.” Others, were “exactly the reverse” and, he joked, “look just like some white folks’ houses.” Although Robinson described many blacks as being skilled (“blacksmiths, carpenters, spinners, and weavers”), he infantilized them, insisting that “negroes, like children, want a deal of careful watching at all times.” In fact, he thought whites could learn to better raise their own children by following a good slave master’s practices. Robinson wrote of another Mississippi planter that, “One fact in regard to his management of negroes might be pursued by parents toward children…. *He keeps them at home*; and he very rarely has occasion to punish.”

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477 Ibid., pp. 454-455.
Robinson’s reports about U.S. slavery were similar to those U.S. readers could find in J. J. von Tschudi or Clements Markham’s accounts of benign bondage in Peru.

Robinson felt that Northerners were ill-informed about actual conditions in the South and that all sorts of false horror stories were being spread there. He blamed the political divisions in the United States over slavery on abolitionists. In an 1851 letter from Georgia to his wife in Indiana, he said, “I am more and more satisfied with the institution of slavery as one of the best for the negro race that could be devised, but I am fully satisfied that the opposition to it will dissolve the Union. No country was ever cursed with worse enemies than the abolitionists.”478 In the September and November 1849 issues of pro-slavery De Bow’s Review, Robinson published a lengthy defense of slavery that was a combination of dissertation and manifesto. In all his travels around the South, he said he never met a single cruel, abusive slave master. Nor did he see them employ overseers who would use the whip to impose excessive labor on their charges. An “overseer of this character cannot get employment among masters who know that overdriving a negro, as well as a mule, is the poorest way to get work out of either of them.” The same power (God) that decreed blacks to a life of servitude, he wrote, “has also planted in his bosom, a principle of protection against wanton abuse and tyrannical oppression, so that though he fall into the hands of cruel or avaricious masters, who would exact more labor from him than

478 Quoted in Keller, “Introduction” to Solon Robinson, p. 38, footnote 1. Keller believed Robinson became more critical of slavery later under the influence of Horace Greeley, for whom he worked from 1853 to 1868.
is just that he should render, no power can force him for any continued length of
time to render it.” On the contrary, Robinson said U.S. slave masters treated
blacks better than employers in states that had abolished slavery. “Northern
men are always the hardest masters,” he said, able to coerce a black laborer lest
he “lose his place and wages.” And, he argued, nowhere were slaves treated like
“the poor starved wretches of England’s manufacturing towns.”479 That
European workers would envy the life of U.S. slaves was a Robinson theme.
Much of his article was a discussion of evidence he thought proved blacks were
inherently inferior to whites, and why God had placed the former under tutelage
of the latter. Without white control, “the present race of peaceful, happy and
contented slaves of the United States, would relapse into barbarism.” In the
Bible, Robinson claimed, God “ordained [slavery] for the good of the Canaanite
race.”480 Robinson sometimes worried how his words would strike his
abolitionist “friends,” and he repeatedly claimed he was not advocating slavery.
All he would do, he said, was “to give a plain narrative of the facts, from which
every one may draw his own conclusions.” Blacks were responsible for their
situation, and he was merely an observer. “I have no doubt that while the negro
continues to exist, he will continue to be enslaved by the white man.”481


480 Ibid., pp. 264-265. As slavery came under political attack in the United States in the 1850s, its
apologists reached for the Bible. Scripture rarely had been mentioned in earlier periods.

481 Ibid., pp. 253-255.
An objective of Federico Barreda in employing Robinson was to refute arguments that some U.S. farmers made against its use, most of which the author dismissed as “deeply prejudiced.” Robinson said that the Peruvian product was better suited to dry soils, quite the opposite of what many believed. On the spectrum of soils from sandy to clay, guano performed better on the former than the latter. But he thought this was partly due to misapplication. Everyone knew of guano’s success in Britain, yet, “It is nonsense to say, it will answer in the moist climate of England, but not in our dry one.” On the contrary, as one would know from guano’s use in Peru “for ages untold,” he said that “it has been used with continued success in the burning sun and soils” of coastal South America. Guano could be employed profitably on any soil “which can be improved with manure, because this is a manure of the very best and most concentrated kind,” and that contains “more of the ingredients necessary to promote vegetable growth, in the exact proportion and combination, ready prepared for use, than any other substance in the known world.” To those who thought they could not make the necessary investment, Robinson suggested they use only as much as they could afford.

The biggest mistake in applying guano, according to Robinson, was to fail to plow it in deeply. “We hold all top-dressings with guano, to be wasteful, on account of its volatile character, and because it needs the moisture in the earth to

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482 These quotations are taken from a digitalized republication of Robinson’s *Guano* by BiblioBazaar, LLC, p. 74.
fit the substance of which it is composed so its fertilizing properties can be taken up by the roots of the plants.” Premature contact with moisture allowed ammonia to escape. Guano should be kept dry in storage and be sifted through a 3/8 mesh sieve before being taken to the fields. “If spread upon the surface, it must wait for a dissolving shower to carry it down to the roots; in the meantime, it is moistened by dews and evaporated by the sun, and carried off to enrich your neighbor’s crops half as much as your own.” Robinson recommended using from 200 to 600 pounds of guano per acre, depending on the soil, crop and farmer’s budget. Machines to distribute and sow guano were not yet on the market, and he suggested measuring an acre of land, dividing it into sections eighteen feet wide and putting the guano in a pail. Then, “walk up one side and down the other with a moderate step throwing handfuls across at each step, and you will find you do not vary much from two hundred pounds to the acre.” He warned farmers to “Never sow in a windy day if it can be avoided, nor faster than it can be plowed in the same day.” He also advised wearing a homemade protective mask to avoid inhaling or ingesting the fertilizer. “Take a thin piece of sponge and wet it and tie over the mouth and nose. Whenever the dust accumulates, wash it out. If you must sow while the wind is blowing, mix earth enough with guano to prevent blowing away.”

Lest one imagine that Robinson hyped guano just to please his client, F. Barreda y hermano., he continued to extol the Peruvian fertilizer even after he became a fulltime agricultural writer for Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune. If

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483 Ibid., pp. 72-73.
he exaggerated the value of guano, it was part of Robinson’s style in presenting himself as a candid, witty and knowledgeable “friend” of farm owners. For example, in 1855 he was scheduled to speak at the New York State Fair held at Elmira. To assure himself a big audience, he spread word in advance that “he would prove that no farmer could afford to [haul barn-yard] manure a mile, even could he obtain it for nothing.” This publicity caused “some little excitement,” and, “At the appointed hour the room was filled” with people eager to see if Robinson could prove such an outlandish statement. As was his custom, Robinson laid out his argument with examples from actual farmer experience, showing that the benefits to the soil and crops produced could be obtained more cheaply with a concentrated fertilizer that cost less to transport. He laced his remarks with humor, as when he described calculations on his own farm and concluded that he “preferred to move the barn instead of the manure.” Robinson then called on other authorities present for comment. Joseph Harris of the Country Gentleman cited chemical analysis to support Robinson’s view, saying that, “Good Peruvian guano contains twenty-five times as much ammonia or nitrogen as good barn-yard manure,” and that, therefore, at present guano prices, “barn-yard manure is worth $2 per ton.” With a fertilizing value ratio of 25/1, Harris said that Robinson was correct to ask his audience “whether they could afford to draw manure one mile for this, or not.” He thought Robinson might better have said it was “more profitable” to use guano than transport
manure. Harris said that some profit would accrue from hauling free manure one mile, just not as much as from using guano at the current price.\footnote{\textit{Agricultural Discussion at the New York State Fair," The Valley Farmer,} December, 1855, pp. 494-496. Eight years later at the New York State Fair in Utica, Robinson was more favorable about use of barn-yard manure, and he made no special claims for guano. The latter was merely one choice among a number of options, although he implied it was still best for adding nitrogen. “Discussions at the New York State Fair, Utica, 1863,” in \textit{Transactions of the New York State Agricultural Society}, vol. XXIII, 1863, pp. 52-53.}

If Robinson wanted to stir up controversy with a clever but extreme position, he succeeded. Years later, a farmer in Fulton County, Georgia, after hearing a report of Robinson’s address, said he disbelieved Robinson ever made the “one mile” statement. For it to make sense, “the Peruvian Government must annually compliment us with a few tons of No. 1 Peruvian Guano.” And, he added, “Well-rotted, dry stable manure, collected and saved under shelter is the best of all manures.”\footnote{\textit{Southern Farm and Home,} September, 1871, p. 432.}

It should be noted that Robinson modified his guano advice a decade later when he published his encyclopedia, \textit{Facts for Farmers}. There guano was simply one option among many, and he issued some qualifications. Robinson emphasized that “exhausted” soils often have retained some of their nutrients, but not others, and that repeated application of a specialty fertilizer, like guano, year after year, can be counterproductive and produce a soil that in the vernacular is said to be “guano sick,” because now it is deficient in a different nutrient. He also warned that, if guano is to be applied dissolved in water, “it should be made a very weak solution, or it will kill all it comes in contact with, whether seeds or plants.” He recommended an application of 200 pounds of
guano per acre, without stating his former suggestions that farmers could profitably use larger amounts. Clearly, by the early 1860s, U.S. farmers were becoming more selective in their application of Peruvian guano, and Robinson now reflected their practices.

During the period in which he prepared his Guano book for Federico Barreda, Robinson tried to establish his own periodicals in New York as successors to the American Agriculturalist. They were short-lived, and in 1853 Horace Greeley hired him as agricultural editor of the New York Tribune, a post he held for the next fifteen years.

A TREACHEROUS U.S. FERTILIZER MARKET

No one in the United States was able to judge the quality of guano just by looking at it, and few farmers went to the trouble and expense of having their guano purchases analyzed by a chemist. Because Peruvian guano was so valuable, the product invited corruption up and down the marketing chain, bringing out some of the negative hustling traits so characteristic in U.S. development. Peruvian guano was sold by weight, and it was fairly easy to mix in some sand, dirt, lime or other material. Because the product was not bagged until landed at U.S. ports, there was minimal standardization in its

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486 Facts for Farmers was first published in 1864. This quotation is from an 1867 edition of volume two (Cleveland: F. G. and A. C. Rowe), p. 891. Like his Guano, Robinson gave Facts an imposing, paragraph-long subtitle, which included a humorous agricultural metaphor for encyclopedia: A Compost of Rich Materials for All Land-Owners.

packaging, especially in the early years of its sale. U.S. customers of the Peruvian product were at the mercy of not only their local fertilizer dealer, but unseen intermediaries in the chain of distribution. Problems of adulteration and other forms of guano fraud plagued the trade from the outset. As noted in chapter seven, Gibbs’ U.S. distributor Edwin Bartlett felt obliged to warn U.S. farmers in 1846 of people trying to pass off questionable fertilizer, including some “guano” shipped from Chile that was “entirely worthless.” For proof he provided the chemical analysis “of a sample of this Chilean Guano by Dr. Chilton” showing a mostly phosphate content mixed with salt, silica, alumina and other “stony matter.” The ammonia (nitrate) content was only 4.16 percent. Bartlett suggested farmers must try to identity the ship that brought in any guano they were considering for purchase. Farmers “must be cautious to ascertain the origin of what they buy to avoid imposition,” and he put them on notice that the only ships presently unloading genuine Peruvian guano were the Orpheus and Coquimbo. Even though this was before guano had really caught on as an important fertilizer in the United States, Bartlett was placing an unrealistic burden on the U.S. consumer to monitor the marketing chain. “The only genuine Peruvian Guano sent to this country, is shipped at the Chincha Islands, by the Peruvian Guano Company [Gibbs], under authority of the Peruvian Government, and all to my consignment.” If the guano did not come through his

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488 The development consequences of the failure to package guano in Peru prior to export will be taken up in the conclusion to this study.
hands in New York or through those of Samuel George in Baltimore, it was not genuine. “Any other offered as Peruvian, is spurious,” he advised.489

By the time the Barredas assumed control of the U.S. market, the problem of fraud was as rampant as that taking place in Britain under Gibbs management. There were several dimensions to the problem. First, importers of inferior “guanos” from Africa and elsewhere marketed them as Peruvian or as an equivalent substitute. The fact that investors put money into alternate sourcing gave such products a legitimacy they did not deserve. And, since African guano did have some fertilizing value, many farmers could not be sure how it compared to Peru’s even after they experimented with it. But, all alternative natural sources of guano, except insignificant supplies of bat guano from caves, eventually were proved by chemical analysis and experimentation to be greatly inferior to Peruvian guano, especially that from the Chincha Islands. Wherever deposits of bird dung had accumulated in other climes, there had been sufficient precipitation to cause much of the nitrogen to be released, and in some places ocean spray had put enough salt in the deposits as to render the guano poisonous if not properly mixed with other substances. This cast a cloud over the “Peruvian guano” brand.

489 Bartlett said he was writing in response to an advertisement that ran in the Baltimore American, Washington’s Daily National Intelligencer and other newspapers offering the sale of guano imported in the ship Caroline Amelia “as Peruvian Guano, from the Chincha Islands.” Instead, he said, the Caroline Amelia was loaded under a Chilean government license “at a distance of nearly a thousand miles from the Chincha Islands.” The American Agriculturist, v. 5, no. 2 (February 1846), p. 64.
Figs. 10.2 and 10.3
EQUAL, IF NOT SUPERIOR

Well before the Barredas took control of the U.S. guano market, farmers were being offered competing products with the claim they were equal to or superior to Peruvian guano. Gibbs had subcontracted U.S. distribution to former Alsop partner Edwin Bartlett, who then appointed agents in key cities (left) and warned farmers to beware of other dealers falsely claiming to sell genuine Peruvian guano. Ichaboe guano from an island off Africa probably had about half the nitrogen of Peruvian guano, but the 1846 advertisement (right) claimed it was “equal, if not superior, to any other guano.” The American Agriculturalist (September 1846), p. 295. The best Ichaboe deposits were quickly exhausted, and a sample analyzed in Connecticut in 1856 was found to be almost worthless.
In the 1845 letter (left), Henry Clay thanked Edwin Bartlett for sending him a sample barrel of Peruvian guano (discussed in chapter seven). An 1859 advertisement published at the end of the Barreda term (right) falsely claimed that Pacific island guanos supposedly high in phosphates were “superior to any Guano or fertilizer ever imported or manufactured in this country,” and stated they were offered for sale at “Thirty per cent less than Peruvian Guano.” Country Gentleman, October 13, 1859, p. 246. Peru’s product was the gold standard against which competing (and often fraudulent) fertilizers were marketed.

Second, because the price of guano was higher than that of other fertilizers, in some places there was anti-Peruvian resentment and farmers convinced themselves they should boycott guano until the United States could force concessions from Peru. Even in areas where farmers continued its purchase, Peru’s product was threatened by a nationalist backlash.
Third, manufacturers of phosphate fertilizers appropriated the “guano” label for their own products in order to bolster their claims that synthetics were the equal of Peruvian guano. Farmers resentful of Peru’s “monopoly” and manufacturers hyping synthetic products constantly predicted a well-deserved “ruin” for Peru that never came. But they did succeed in creating a confusing atmosphere where farmers had to experiment with different products and practice trial-and-error fertilizing.

Fourth, the Peruvian product itself was being adulterated and then sold as pure. Later, Peru itself compromised the reputation of its brand by authorizing shipments of inferior-grade guano.

And, finally, the market became flooded with a bewildering array of fertilizer blends, some including a portion of Peruvian guano, marketed as equal to or superior to the Peruvian product for specific uses. The government of Peru took no steps, and its official consignees took only limited steps, to educate farmers about what Chincha Islands guano could and could not achieve, how much to use on specific crops and how to properly apply it.

Neither the Barredas in the United States nor Gibbs in Great Britain took much trouble to avail themselves of four relatively inexpensive vehicles at their disposal to attack fraud: the media, farmer associations, state regulators and the law. U.S. agricultural magazines and newspapers had to depend on anecdotal reports from farmers to try to sort out the value of different fertilizer products, and manufacturers and dealers were constantly trotting out testimonials of unknown reliability. Gradually, the media developed a conflict of interest when
they accepted advertising from manufacturers and distributors of products of unverified quality. I have found no evidence that Federico Barreda or his successors in the U.S. market ever collaborated with state agricultural officials in their quests to evaluate fertilizers and protect the interests of local farmers. And, only rarely did Barreda or Gibbs initiate legal action against the perpetrators of guano fraud. A few individual U.S. states made some important efforts to regulate the fertilizer industry and provide farmers with unbiased information, but these fell far short of the need and apparently received no Peruvian encouragement. All of these failings can be traced back to Peruvian government policy, as will be discussed in this study’s conclusion.

ADULTERATION
AND THE “CHILIAN GUANO FRAUD”

The success of guano and complaints about its “monopoly” pricing in the United States stimulated chemists to develop substitutes. Many dozens of synthetic commercial fertilizers were introduced and, to Peru’s detriment, sold under the name “guano.” Synthetics worked well on some soils and for some crops, but their low or nonexistent nitrogen content and relative poor solubility prevented them from displacing Peruvian guano. Use of all types of fertilizers and combinations of fertilizers, including crop remains, seeds, cowpeas and fish byproducts, expanded rapidly in the United States, with authentic guano always finding a strong market, even as its price rose and synthetics proliferated. Like guano, stable manure and compost are fairly rich in nitrogen; but guano held the nitrogen in a lighter, more compacted product and, thus, could be brought to
farms at less cost of transportation. There has been a belief among scholars that synthetics threatened Peru’s guano business, but this does not seem born out by the U.S. evidence.

Peru’s problem in the United States was corruption in the marketing chain, adding much risk for the farmer who bought any type of fertilizer, synthetic or natural. Referring to the spread of brands of synthetic products calling themselves “guano,” agricultural historian Lewis Cecil Gray wrote, “Many of these new fertilizers were fraudulent ….”

Neither the Peruvian government nor its agents in the United States took effective action to protect the name “guano” or help state governments regulate the fertilizer market. Peru lost the opportunity to assume a “defense of the American farmer,” which might have mitigated some of the anti-Peruvian feelings in the United States and helped farmers distinguish the actual value of competing fertilizers.

Many U.S. wholesalers and retailers of Peruvian guano adulterated the product with sand, lime and other substances. Some mixtures added more moisture content than was present in unadulterated guano, further cheating farmers, who purchased the product by weight. Solon Robinson’s reports noted

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490 Robinson, Guano, p. 5.

491 Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, v. 2, p. 806. Not all farmers were satisfied with their Peruvian guano. Since reports of bad experiences were infrequent, it is not possible to know if they were the result of the Peruvian product not being economical, misapplication or adulteration. An example of a farmer who said, “I shall use no more Guano,” and instead extolled Coe’s Superphosphate of Lime was G. Thorburn. He said that in one case he tried both Coe’s and guano on turnips, and there was “no perceptible difference” between the two crops, except that “the Guano was just double the price of the Superphosphate.” He also complained that the turnips grown with guano were attacked with “rust” and suffered rotting, although, “Whether this was caused by the Guano or not I cannot tell.” See The Genesee Farmer, vol. XXV, second series, no. 3 (March 1864), p. 98. Coe products were among the more successful superphosphates in the United States.

492 How Peru could have protected its product from fraud will be taken up in the conclusion to this study.
that sellers of adulterated guano were cheating U.S. farmers, and he included chemical analysis of some diluted samples as a warning to customers. The British and French guano markets also were plagued by adulterated products, with Gibbs rarely taking legal action against perpetrators. 493

In response to the sale of fraudulent synthetics and adulterated Peruvian guano, the Maryland state legislature passed a law regulating the quality of commercial fertilizers in 1846. Other states followed with similar reforms, but their effectiveness was limited. “In Virginia,” wrote Gray, “the early system of inspection was found so inefficient and corrupt that the State agricultural society urged repeal of the law.” 494

In an excellent bit of nineteenth-century investigative reporting, the editors of The Cultivator of Albany, New York, were able to show exactly how a particular fraud was undertaken in 1855 in the city of Newark, New Jersey. As background to their investigation, the editors wrote that, “We have long been convinced that there were parties in this country engaged in manufacturing various artificial fertilizers which are of little value,” and that “inferior guanos are often sold under an assurance that they are equal or superior to the best Peruvian ….” 495 The editors said that, “How we discovered this fraud, we are not at liberty to state.” But, they received a tip from an informant and were

493 Francisco de Rivero discussed adulteration in Britain in his Ojeada, pp. 51-59, and he also noted adulteration problems in France. He said that adulteration of synthetics was just as common as it was with the Peruvian product, and he cited a case where Gibbs sued a perpetrator. But, Rivero argued that even the most conscientious consignee could not prevent adulteration. In the conclusion, I will explain that there were means to prevent this from happening to the Peruvian product.


495 The colorful title of this journal was The Cultivator, A Monthly Journal for the Farm and Garden, Devoted to Agricultural and Rural Improvement, and Designed to Improve the Soil and the Mind. Quotations are from the article, “Great Fraud in Guano,” v. 3, 3rd Series, June 1855, pp. 186-187.
directed to an establishment near Newark. There they found “a large heap, of about 250 tons of Mexican guano,” which was being mixed with other substances and a measure of genuine Peruvian guano to create a product labeled “Chilian guano.” The editors obtained samples of both the “Mexican” and “Chilian” guanos and had each analyzed by the chemist to the New York State Agricultural Society. He found that the “Mexican” product had no detectable ammonia content and the “Chilian” only about one percent.

Convinced they had uncovered a scam, the editors returned to Newark and obtained an “account of the modus operandi” of the factory, which involved mixing three barrowfuls of sugar-house scum pounded fine with six barrowfuls of the “Mexican guano,” with “barrowful” defined as 2½ bushels. To that was added 1½ bushels of common salt, one bushel of plaster, ½ bushel of lime and three bushels of Peruvian guano. Bags labeled “Chilian Guano” were moistened with water and laid in a heap interspersed with layers of Peruvian guano. When put in the wet bags, the mixture gave off a “tremendous strong” odor. “In other words,” the editors explained, “the lime sets free the ammonia of the Peruvian guano,” and the pungent ammonia odor, “to the unreflecting, is a sure indication of a valuable guano.” Because genuine guano “in this country comes thro’ the hands of Barreda Brothers, and has their mark upon it,” it was easier to market the spurious product as Chilean. “The name, therefore, has been chosen with consummate cunning.”

The editors then tried to determine to whom the product was being sold. In New York they were offered the same “Chilian guano” at 35 dollars per ton in large quantity, but elsewhere it was being sold for 40 dollars per ton. They heard through another publication that it was to be tested on a model farm of the Union Agricultural Society of Petersburg, Virginia. The farm’s superintendent
said he obtained it from a local dealer for 40 dollars per ton. That retailer said he got it from a Boston distributor. When alerted to a possible problem, the model farm had the product analyzed by a chemist who judged that “it was a fraud.” Being generous with its calculations, *The Cultivator* estimated that the “Chilian guano” they sampled contained the following elements per ton: about $9.80 worth of insoluble phosphate of lime, about one dollar of salt, about fifty cents of plaster, $1.18 of carbonate of lime (chalk) and non-azotized organic matter, and twenty-one pounds of ammonia, which would be worth $2.52 at twelve cents per pound. Altogether, then, the components were worth about fifteen dollars, or less than half the value of Peru’s product. “And for this the farmers are asked $40, and are told that it is better than Peruvian guano.”

Experience was showing that neither state inspectors nor the media could deter adulteration and other forms of fertilizer fraud in the United States. As *The Cultivator* put it, “Numerous as are our agricultural papers, great as are their circulation and influence, they are found insufficient to prevent unscrupulous men from attempting to palm off on the credulous farmers of our broad domain a comparatively worthless article, at a high price, under a false name ….”

Who exactly was behind this particular fraud? The editors, without specifically naming the man, perhaps for fear of a libel lawsuit, said that, “it is one of the professed friends and teachers of scientific agriculture, that is engaged in this deception.” *The Cultivator* seems to have been accusing the agricultural chemist and inventor, James Jay Mapes, who had moved to New Jersey in 1847. Mapes developed new methods of sugar refining in the 1830s (note the use of

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496 The editors said that they later learned that two lots “purporting to be ‘Chilean guano,’ and so marked” were tested by an inspector of guano at Baltimore, who found “a little more ammonia than we found,” but that “the article is comparatively worthless, even taking the highest figures.”
“sugar-house scum” in making Chilean guano above), helped found the National Agricultural Society, and was soon to patent a “nitrogenized superphosphate of lime” and market it as “Mapes Fertilizer.” The editors cleverly placed Mapes’ name in the article by noting that a circular advertising “Chelian guano” received by a Maine newspaper stated that the product was “Endorsed by Prof. Mapes.”

This case illustrated the scope of the problem Peru faced in the United States. Even when adulterated or spurious “guanos” were “comparatively worthless,” most did contain cheaper components beneficial to plant growth. Even as they experimented with different brands, most farmers could not be sure what degree of their success could be attributable to the fertilizer as opposed to some other product they might have applied instead. As will be seen also in chapter thirteen, there was wide variation even in the components of synthetic blends bearing the same manufacturer’s name. A synthetic blend might be worth $30 one year and only $20 the next.

**The Price of Guano Under the Barredas**

Prior to the Barredas taking over U.S. distribution of Peruvian guano from Gibbs, the price was so low that, according to Frank Roy Rutter’s study of Baltimore trade, “Local dealers instituted the practice of buying up cargoes on

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497 Mapes’ fertilizer manufacturing business was continued by a son after his death in 1860. See “James Jay Mapes,” in *Biographical and Genealogical History of the City of Newark and Essex County, New Jersey* (New York: Lewis Publishing Company, 1898), pp. 149-151. Adding to the evidence that *The Cultivator* was accusing Mapes is the fact that the synthetic fertilizer blend for which he was granted U.S. patent no. 26,507 (December 20, 1859) did call for mixing in a portion of Peruvian guano. If “Mapes Fertilizer,” “Mapes Formula” and other products his company produced were actually made according to the patent specifications, they probably would have had considerable value. But, if the Newark operation exposed by the magazine was any guide, the patent was probably more of a marketing ploy than a guarantee of product quality.
arrival, often before arrival, and thus maintained a monopoly of the local supply and raised the retail price.” In other words, under Gibbs the Peruvian government obtained a share of a wholesale price that had no relation to the much higher retail price U.S. farmers were paying. Upon assuming his duties as manager of sales to the United States, Federico Barreda promised to rectify the wholesale/retail disparity – not by getting a higher price for Peru, but by increasing the supply. One journal in 1853 estimated that, at the current low price, U.S. farmers would purchase four times the actual supply.\footnote{Frank R. Rutter, \textit{South American Trade of Baltimore} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1897), p. 44.}

During most periods of Barreda’s marketing of guano in the United States, farmers simply could not get enough of the fertilizer. Repeating the term used in contemporary farming journals, agricultural historian Lewis Cecil Gray said that Southern farmer interest in Peruvian guano became a “mania.”\footnote{Gray, \textit{History}, v. 2, p. 701.} Weymouth T. Jordan surveyed Southern agricultural journals of the 1850s and found farmer praise for guano stretching from the Carolinas to Louisiana. “Fervent testimonials of farmers operating holdings of all sizes indicates the existence of a literal guano crusade.” To those who wanted to boycott guano to punish Peru for its price, Solon Robinson answered, “It is idle to reject [guano] because the Peruvian Government won’t let us have it at our own price, because we can profit by it at theirs.”\footnote{Robinson, \textit{Guano}, BiblioBazaar digitalized reproduction, p. 74.}
While U.S. farmers complained that guano’s price was too high, ample evidence suggests the opposite. With each rise in the price, Peruvian guano continued to find new U.S. markets beyond those of the worn out soils of Virginia and Maryland. Most guano was consumed in the Atlantic and Gulf regions near the coast, but Weymouth Jordan found that, by the time of the Civil War, and as the wholesale price reached almost 70 dollars per ton, Peruvian guano was being used in at least ten Southern states.\(^{501}\)

After the Civil War, Solon Robinson summarized the price and efficacy of “No. 1 guano,” a term used to distinguish the quality Peruvian product from a flood of imitators and a cheaper product Peru began selling. “The price of Peruvian guano has risen since it was first introduced and extensively used in this country from about $45 to about $70 a ton, and at that some of our farmers fear its use is not economical.” But, he insisted that, even at a high price, “guano is as economical as anything in the market.” Many experiments, he said, “prove that a dressing of 200 lbs. of Peruvian guano, upon grass and grain, has doubled the yield per acre.”\(^{502}\) U.S. farmers could get good results by using less guano per acre than they had previously used, but that put no downward pressure on the price because the number of farmers seeking guano continued to expand.

Part of the problem of the price question is lack of data on retail prices of the Peruvian product. For example, at a meeting of the Farmers’ Club in 1866, a


Dr. Ward said that Peruvian guano was selling for “over $100 a ton,” while he could get superphosphate or bone dust at $50 per ton, and he asked Solon Robinson which fertilizer farmers should use. Robinson answered, “For immediate effect, guano is best. For lasting effects, bone dust [at $50] is worth as much or more per ton than guano [at over $100].” His response implied that both were a better value than superphosphate blends and that he was not surprised to hear that guano sold for over one hundred dollars. Yet, U.S. sources mostly refer to the wholesale price of the Peruvian product in the 1860s as rising up to about $70 per ton. One advertisement offered Peruvian guano for $120 per ton. Peruvian authorities seemed to pay no attention to retail prices.

Available supply-and-demand information published to date for the U.S. market indicates that that Peru could have reasonably pursued a policy of carefully regulated shipments at a much higher price. When sold at $45 per ton, the quantities allocated to the U.S. market were entirely insufficient to meet the demand for eight years, from 1846 to 1853. Why would Felipe and Federico Barreda want to keep the price low if their commission was based on a percentage of sales? The answer seems to be that it was easier to increase the volume and reap easy profits without having to manage a more competitive business enterprise. A higher price would bring risk of mismanagement of marketing in the United States. A low price made the Barreda’s business almost risk free, with the quest for higher profit satisfied by greater supply. Keeping the price low also allowed Federico Barreda to mollify or at least neutralize Peru’s critics in the United States. In response to repeated instructions from

503 “Proceeding of the Farmers’ Club,” in Documents of the Assembly of the State of New York, 88th session, 1865, p. 287.
Washington that he get Peru to lower the price, U.S. chargé in Lima John Randolph Clay (no relation to Henry Clay) replied that Peru’s guano revenues went largely to satisfy foreign creditors and that, therefore, the price was about as good as could be expected.

A similar phenomenon took place in Europe. At the beginning of the 1850s, the base wholesale price (for large tonnage sales) in Great Britain was £9 5s per ton. It seems that the price could have been set much higher for the volume of guano available, since Gibbs complained in late 1849 of a “want of power of loading at the islands.” The London office wrote to its Lima house that demand in Great Britain “now exceeds your means of export.” Yet, even in the face of excess demand over supply, the price was kept low throughout 1849-1854. And, when the price was finally raised, the results were instructive. After the price was lifted to £10 and then £11 per ton, all stocks were sold. Even after the price was increased to £12 in June 1856 and £13 in December of that year, there was still a shortage of guano in Britain through at least March of 1857.504

Across the Atlantic, as the "guano mania" spread in the United States, the price per ton was increased, ignoring temporary fluctuations, to 47 dollars in 1850, 55 dollars in 1853, and on up to 65 dollars and more by the eve of the U.S. Civil War.505 With one exception explained below, the market easily absorbed the amount of guano made available. Guano even spread into the cotton region


of the lower South. Cotton plantation owners were notorious for not using fertilizers and for not taking very good care of their properties, as long as new lands were available. The need for cheap land partially explained why the Southern states became so determined after the War with Mexico that newly admitted states should be slave states, a factor that led to the Civil War. But during the late 1840s and throughout the 1850s, farmers on the older cotton estates of Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana began applying barn-yard manure, compost, lime, swamp mud – and finally guano – on their used up soils. Entrepreneurs developed improved farm equipment, and greater use of plows and other implements freed more labor time for application of manures.\textsuperscript{506} Inventors devised implements to work guano into the soil, and most agricultural supply businesses sold a variety of “guano spreaders” or “guano distributors” to farmers. These made fertilizing more economical by reducing the labor time required to apply manures.

\textsuperscript{506} Gray, \textit{History}, pp. 700-701, 735 and 807.
Peru’s failure to protect the integrity of its product from adulteration or combat fraudulent labeling of synthetics as “guano” hastened the term’s adoption as generic. An important consideration for the farmer in weighing the price of guano was the cost of transporting it from store to farm and then the labor cost of applying it in the field. Farm equipment designed to work guano into the earth became so common on U.S. farms that, even long after Peru’s guano era was over, any farm implement or machine used to apply fertilizers was known as a “guano spreader” or “guano distributor,” as seen in this 1907 example. Inventors adapted such devices so they also could be used for seed planting. Advertised as “absolutely the best one-horse” device on the market, this implement could be adjusted for spreading fertilizer, drilling grain or planting cotton or corn, hence “four machines in one.”

(\textit{The Southern Cultivator and Dixie Farmer}, v. 65, no. 20 [October 15, 1907], p. 6)

Expansion of agriculture to new lands in Texas, the Midwest and elsewhere portended an ever-expanding market for Peruvian guano in the United States, even as farmers became more discriminating in their application of the product. Customers applied less guano as they learned how best to use Peruvian fertilizer in conjunction with other manures, but the number of guano buyers expanded constantly.

Peru’s problem in the mid-1850s was that, to raise their profits, the Barredas began shipping enormous volumes of guano to the United States. The number of U.S. ships loading guano at the Chinchas for the United States rose from five in January 1853, to thirty in October 1854 (chart 10.1). As a result, in
1855, Barreda Bros. found themselves overextended and with product piling up in warehouses.

Source: Clay to Marcy, August 24, 1854, annexed table A. There was an evident error in the table as published in “Message of the President of the United States, in Answer to a Resolution of the Senate, Requesting Information in Relation to the Guano Trade,” in U.S. Senate, Executive Documents … 1858-1859, vol. 7, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, Ex. Do. No. 25. There were eleven ships shown for March 1854, but the tonnage given was 66,471, an impossible amount for the ships of the day. I assume “6” was duplicated, and so the correct tonnage was 6,471 (as illustrated above), giving a correct total for the semester of 60,713 tons instead of the mistaken 120,713 tons given in the report. The figures shown in this chart are lower than the number of ships loading found in records in the Barreda Papers summarized in the appendix and shown in the chart below. The difference might be in what was meant by “loading.”
The Barredas appealed for a big loan from the Alsop group, their New York distributor, and another from Gibbs in London. Gibbs supplied the equivalent of about £150,000 in credit and agreed to take 28,000 tons of guano off the U.S. consignee’s hands. Gibbs did not want the Barredas to have to lower the price to get rid of their excess, since even £1 in price difference would allow U.S. wholesalers to more than cover shipping costs from the United States to Europe. They would be able to buy from Barreda and then divert the guano to

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507 Mathew, *House of Gibbs*, pp. 190-191. Mathew was not certain about credit Alsop provided the Barredas, saying that “apparently” the New York merchants provided the equivalent of £200,000 in credit.
Britain. Henry Gibbs worried lest Barreda’s financial embarrassment cause “the whole of the Huano in the States” to be “let loose upon us.” This temporary glut did not prove that the price was too high, for once the mountain of oversupply was worked through it was possible to continue raising the U.S. price of guano.

Fig. 10.7
THE BARREDA HIGH-VOLUME FLEET
One dozen ships are visible in this image taken by Henry DeWitt Moulton at the Chinchas and published in the United States in 1865. Visitors sometimes reported seeing over one-hundred ships gathered in floating communities off the islands. The Peruvian government paid a penalty fee to whip owners for each day a ship waited to load beyond a specified period. In January 1854, the Barredas alone had over ninety ships under contract that were entering, waiting in or leaving Peruvian waters on guano voyages (see appendix table 15.7).

508 Ibid.
Table 10.1
Guano Price, Sales and Gibbs Profit in the British Market
1855-1861
(£ for price and profit, tons for imports and sales)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Sales</th>
<th>Profit</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1849-50</td>
<td>£9 5s</td>
<td>77,098</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>growing demand, sales for fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850-51</td>
<td>£9 5s</td>
<td>96,145</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851-52</td>
<td>£9 5s</td>
<td>112,638</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852-53</td>
<td>£9 5s</td>
<td>118,286</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853-54</td>
<td>£9 5s – 10</td>
<td>135,524</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854-55</td>
<td>£11</td>
<td>177,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>£11</td>
<td>255,535</td>
<td>161,852</td>
<td>115,530</td>
<td>guano hard to find</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>£11 – 13</td>
<td>177,016</td>
<td>211,647</td>
<td>109,148</td>
<td>dealer shortage continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>£13</td>
<td>264,230</td>
<td>110,490</td>
<td>135,268</td>
<td>dealers out of guano (March report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>£13 – 12</td>
<td>302,207</td>
<td>122,819</td>
<td>125,562</td>
<td>falling wheat prices and enough guano on the docks “to fill the Crystal Palace”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>£12</td>
<td>49,064</td>
<td>132,082</td>
<td>99,450</td>
<td>Gibbs profit takes big hit in 1859 and 1860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>£12</td>
<td>122,459</td>
<td>146,145</td>
<td>22,783</td>
<td>1860 = third straight year of sales increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>£12</td>
<td>161,566</td>
<td>161,707</td>
<td>150,264</td>
<td>fourth year of sales increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total for 1855–1861 | 1,332,077 | 1,046,742 | 758,005


Gibbs, however, did not seem to learn a lesson from the Barreda mistake, since they put themselves in the very same fix two years later. The British house imported 333,128 tons of guano in excess of sales during 1857-1858, as seen in the table above. Soon there was enough guano on English docks “to fill the Crystal
Shipments were drastically curtailed, and Gibbs took a hit on its 1859-1860 profits as the excess was worked through at a price lowered from £13 to £12. William M. Mathew concluded from these events that Peru had found the highest price at which its guano could be sold in foreign markets. Whether or not two momentary supply crises, one in the United States and the other in Britain, proved that a low price strategy was the correct one will be explored in the conclusion.

Waste

One consequence of the high-volume policy was wasteful harvesting at the Chinchas. Instead of following the pre-Columbian practice of treating guano as a precious commodity to be handled with care, hundreds of Chinese were lashed to break it up with picks, shovel it into wheelbarrows and rush it to the mangueras, canvas chutes by which the aerated, powdery loads were sent sliding down the sides of cliffs. Clouds of guano dust rose like smoke and were carried away by wind. In its natural state, guano was caked solid. “The guano is compact, like hard, lay-like loam,” wrote George Peck. Once disturbed, it became powdery, some lifted into the air. “The guano blows through and through everything,” said Peck, who spent a night on the North Island in the

509 The Crystal Palace allusion was to the 990,000 square foot hall built for London’s 1851 Great Exhibition showcasing Britain’s industrial revolution. Walls and ceilings featured a type of strong plate glass invented three years earlier; hence its popular “crystal” name.

residence of a medical aide. “The floor was carpeted with guano; books, clothing, everything was yellow with it.”

Because the Chinese could not dig fast enough for British and United States demand under the high-volume policy, two steam shovels were introduced on the islands, producing even more guano dust. Peck implied that dynamite also was used, remarking that, “it has to be blasted for the steam paddies.” So much guano dust was sent into the air that, “It blows away in a yellow cloud miles to leeward,” said Peck.

Probably the greatest loss of guano occurred at the chutes. These mangueras had large openings stretched over canes at the top, like the bowl of a funnel. Clouds of guano dust poured out of the top and bottom of the chutes, as this mode of transfer further aerated the product. “When a ship or launch is loading she is in a complete smother, as if ashes were poured into her from a hundred and fifty feet overhead.” Another storm of dust rose from the ships as guano from the launches was lifted out and poured into the hold. Guano dust fouled rigging and decks (“the fine dust of it penetrates everywhere”), but most of the dust blew into the water. Peck said that New Yorkers and New Englanders who saw the U.S. ships leave their ports, “perfumed by champagne”

511 Peck’s account, cited in chapter six from the New York Times, appeared in several other 1854 periodicals, including The Living Age (vol. 40, pp. 213-217), the Quaker magazine Friends’ Intelligencer (vol. 10, pp. 741-744) and the March 1 issue of The Working Farmer (vol. 6, pp. 17-19).

512 In the United States, early steam shovels were called “steam paddies,” a name taken from the derogatory term for the Irish immigrant workers they replaced. The term “paddywagon” to describe a police van has a similar etymology.
from ladies who visited to bid good voyage, would not recognize them after
loading at the Chinchas.513

Carelessness and waste was a direct result of the degradation of labor and
Peru’s low-price/high-volume policy. Peru treated guano with no more respect
than that it accorded the Chinese bondsmen and convict drafts that shoveled it.
This contrasted with guano’s treatment in pre-Columbian and even colonial
times. Amasa Delano, who was in the Pacific in 1803-1805 and whose story
opened this study in chapter two, said he saw guano handled “as carefully as if it
were corn or grain.”514

HIGH FREIGHT RATES, UNNECESSARY EXPENSES
AND GUANO SHIPPED OFF THE BOOKS

The consignment system allowed Peru to be overcharged for freight costs.
To attract an armada of ships to carry the high volumes, Barreda and Gibbs paid
premium rates that they were allowed to pass along to the government as
expenses. Peru’s structure of the business also invited corruption in the form of
kickbacks and underreporting of tonnage on official documents. Since Peru
would pay whatever freight rate a ship owner charged Barreda or Gibbs, there
was nothing to prevent ship owners from offering the consignees under-the-table
inducements.

An issue that deserves further study is Peru’s control over how much
guano was actually placed on each vessel. A ship’s registered tonnage was the

513 Peck, in all versions cited.
514 Delano, p. 484.
standard measure of how much guano it carried. One of the charter party agreements used by the Barredas specifically allowed ships to load excess tons of guano, “not to exceed one-third above the Vessel’s Register Tonnage … unless otherwise agreed upon between the Captain and Charterer’s Agent.”

Because the contract allowed the ship to carry extra tons of the fertilizer, the charter party agreement was careful to clarify that all guano on board belonged to the Barredas, regardless of how the cargo was described on the manifest or other documents. In theory, Peru controlled the potential for corruption by requiring loaded ships to return from the Chinchas to Callao prior to departure on their voyages around Cape Horn to the United States or Europe. Before receiving clearance to export its cargo, a Peruvian auditor went on board the ship to measure its tonnage, and the Barredas often had several guano laden ships waiting for government clearance at Callao. But, if corruption was the norm in the customs brokerage business in Callao (as discussed in chapter four), it is possible that inspectors were induced to allow ships to carry off more guano than was recorded in their manifests and bills of lading.

A case of two ships sanctioned for overloading guano in 1869 will illustrate some aspects of the problem. British ships Prince Rupert and Star of Brunswick were each making their fourth voyages to carry guano from Peru to Europe, this time on behalf of Enrique Witt’s partnership, Witt, Schutte y Cía., which then was the government consignment house for the German market. While at Callao and prior to receiving government permission to proceed south

515 Barreda papers, box 4, folder 10.

516 The ships’ owners said that their charter party agreement was with “Schutte and Co.,” but they must have shortened the name. Description of events and quotations are taken from Moran, Galloway & Co., Arrest and Detention of Two British Ships, (The “Prince Rupert” and the “Star of Brunswick,”) By the Peruvian Government (Liverpool: Lee and Nightingale, 1870).
to the Chinchas, the captains were required to sign agreements they said they did not understand but were told meant that, as the ships’ owners later stated, “the vessels would have to be loaded according to Lloyd’s rules,” which they said had been the custom on previous trips. Lloyd’s rules, named for the British insurance market, were based upon an inspection and rating of a ship’s hull and designation of its load line, or the point marked on the hull up to which the ship could be safely loaded for an ocean voyage. However, it appears that in the documents the Peruvian surveyors made their own specification of the proper load lines. The captains signed these documents under protest and then sailed to receive their guano at the islands, which they reached on January 8, 1869.

It took the ships almost five months to wait at the Chinchas, finally get loaded and return to Callao, where they arrived on May 31. There both vessels were inspected “and passed” by a government surveyor. The owner’s statement mentioned “the surveyor’s certificate” and “bills of lading,” with the former probably being an endorsement on the latter. The bills specified that Prince Rupert drew 20 feet 10 inches forward and 21 feet six inches aft, and that Star of Brunswick drew 24 feet forward and 24 feet aft, which the captains said was “somewhat less” than the guano they carried on previous voyages. According to the ships’ owners, the bills of lading were endorsed with the statement that, “This ship is loaded to our satisfaction, and may proceed on her voyage.” The bills contained “a further endorsement,” specifying that, “so many days’ demurrage were still due to the ships, to be settled at the port of discharge.” This was a penalty payment that Witt, Schutte y Cía. would pass on to the Peruvian government for each day the ships had to wait at the Chinchas beyond the number of loading days specified in the charter party contract.
The captains signed the bills and took them to Lima to the office of Witt, Schutte, “whose duty it was, as provided by the charter-party, to procure the final clearance or sailing license of these ships.”

When the captains returned to Callao with these papers, “expecting at once to obtain their sailing license, and so proceed to sea,” they instead were “informed that both ships were overladen.” A long, back-and-forth conflict ensued over just how much guano was on board, including independent surveys made by officers of British and U.S. warships that happened to be at the port. There were, no doubt, several versions of the events that unfolded, and we have only the account of the ships’ owners, who were indignant because, in the course of events, both of their captains had been put on trial for dumping guano into the bay. But, details hint at how corruption had been practiced. The ship owners complained that Peruvian authorities were being inconsistent, since the same vessels had carried greater loads on previous voyages. Witt, Schutte’s port agent was none other than Henry Higginson, whom Enrique Witt in his diary described as a master of contraband at Callao. Higginson told the captains that they should unload a token amount of guano “for appearance sake,” and then everything could be worked out. Witt, Schutte did not use the word “bribe,” but they said that, once there was a face-saving “consent to discharge a few tons of guano,” and honor thus satisfied, “an arrangement might then be easily effected with the Government surveyor” [my emphasis].517 The captains, who no doubt felt their own honor had been assaulted, refused.

If “arrangements” were so easily made with Peru’s inspectors, and overloading practiced without obstacle on previous voyages, why did this particular incident arise? Witt himself left an explanation when he praised

517 The Witt, Schutte letter is quoted in a footnote on page 12 of Ibid.
Rafael Velarde Echevarría for cleaning up corruption in Callao.\textsuperscript{518} Treasury and commerce minister Nicolás de Piérola named Velarde as Peru’s \textit{visitador de las aduanas} on February 22, 1869, at a substantial salary of four thousand soles per year.\textsuperscript{519} In other words, the \textit{Prince Rupert} and \textit{Star of Brunswick} had been surveyed initially and were already waiting at the Chinchas when Velarde took office. A little more than two weeks after assuming his post, Velarde outlined the challenges he faced in reforming the port’s customs services, which he said must be be cleared “of all fraud.” In fact, he said, the fiscal operations at the port \textit{constituyen una verdadera dislocacion y desorden}, and, given all of their defects, \textit{no hay violencia en sostener la proverbial impunidad de disfruta el contrabandista del Callao}.\textsuperscript{520} So, the captains of the ships chartered by Witt, Schutte were trying to gain clearance from the port at a moment when the norms for bribes and other “arrangements” were changing.

\textbf{PERU AS HATED “MONOPOLIST”}

Believing themselves exploited at each stage of guano price adjustments, U.S. farmers railed against the "Peruvian monopolists," although writers noted that the Peruvian government received, at best, only fourteen dollars profit per ton.\textsuperscript{521} In fact, much of Peru’s share was eaten up in payments to European bondholders. But, U.S. farmers demanded diplomatic action on their behalf to

\textsuperscript{518} Witt, \textit{Diario}, v. 2, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{519} Peru, \textit{Boletín oficial de leyes, decretos, resoluciones y oficios del gobierno}, 1er semestre de 1869 (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1869), p. 227.

\textsuperscript{520} Velarde’s memorandum addressed to the treasury’s \textit{director general de rentas} was dated March 8, 1869, and published in Ibid., pp. 323-327.

\textsuperscript{521} \textit{American Farmer}, 5th series, XIV (March 1859), p. 289.
reduce the price; and one of their spokesmen went so far as to suggest that U.S. soldier-of-fortune William Walker be sent from Nicaragua to Peru. Beginning in 1850, when Felipe Barreda was about to secure his exclusive consignment contract to sell guano in the United States, chargé Clay in Lima made efforts to secure guano price concessions from Peru. At the same time, Yankee entrepreneurs set out to search the Pacific and Caribbean for new sources of guano.

So exuberant was official U.S. government interest in the guano search that, for a brief moment in 1852, the United States actually laid claim to Peru's Lobos Islands. U.S. secretary of state Daniel Webster, himself a gentleman farmer and guano enthusiast, issued an official opinion doubting Peruvian claims of sovereignty and asserting certain historical rights of U.S. citizens who had once hunted sea lions there. He urged that the U.S. navy offer protection to U.S. guano prospectors on the Lobos, and on June 16, 1852, the secretary of the navy ordered the commander of the Pacific Squadron to do so. At this suggestion of military intervention against Peru, some forty ships sailed from New York to pick up "our" guano. The Lobos Islands affair brought U.S. guano fever to a high point.

The young Englishman, Clements Markham, who would become a well-known Peruvianist and who had recently spent ten days in New England


visiting with William Prescott, happened to reach the Lobos Islands on October 14th aboard the steamer *Quito* en route from Panama to Callao. "We found the whole Peruvian navy assembled at anchor, with the bicolour flag flying all over the place," he wrote in his journal. "About three hundred soldiers had been landed. So the Yankee pirates did not come, though twenty-three vessels were on their way."524

The dangerous "Lobos affair" grew out of the business relationship between the U.S. government and New York merchant Alfred Benson, who in 1841 obtained a clipper ship contract to carry government supplies to the Oregon Territory. Benson was an acquaintance of Daniel Webster, whose final year in public service was tarnished by the odor of scandal that surrounded the U.S. conflict with Peru.525 Benson was seeking Pacific cargo to carry in his ships on return voyages from Oregon, California and Hawaii; and in 1851 he directed one of his captains to carry out an inspection of the Lobos Islands guano fields, which Peru had closed to foreign ships in 1842 as a conservation measure. Benson may have been unaware that Peru elected to hold Lobos guano in reserve while concentrating on Chinchas production. But it appears that the U.S. department of state did little or no research regarding Peruvian sovereignty before Webster issued his letter to the effect that Peru had no valid claim. It was never clearly established whether Webster was misled, swayed by U.S. public anger and


525 In Skaggs’s 1994 study, *The Great Guano Rush*, Benson’s background is discussed on pp. 17-19. The evidence regarding the exact nature of Webster’s relationship with Benson is sketchy, and the accusations of collusion seem to have involved a measure of yellow journalism, speculation and/or political bias. *The Great Guano Rush* appears to be thoroughly researched, although the author misspelled the name of the Chincha Islands throughout the book and generally seemed only slightly familiar with Peruvian history.
resentment of Peru or stood to profit personally from Benson’s Lobos venture. The British Foreign Office, faced with comparable pressures from British farmers to declare Peru’s sovereignty invalid, mostly held to the opinion that there was "no ground upon which the British Government would be justified in claiming for British subjects the right to appropriate at their pleasure the guano to be found on those islands."

Peruvian diplomats, led by Felipe Barreda’s brother-in-law and minister in Washington, Juan Ignacio de Osma, swiftly mounted a legal and diplomatic defense of Peru’s rights, and cooler heads eventually prevailed in Washington. As Peru developed its defense of its sovereignty over the Lobos Islands, Webster fell ill, and the Fillmore administration began to backtrack. On August 25th the secretary of the navy countermanded the order to the Pacific Squadron, explaining that, “you are required to abstain from aiding or abetting any citizen of the United States who may forcibly resist the execution of the laws of Peru by the authority of that republic.” When press reports linked Webster financially to Benson – the hint of scandal – he expressed indignation from his deathbed. Within weeks of his death in October 1852, the United States officially recognized Peru’s sovereignty over the Lobos Islands. The new U.S. secretary of state later

526 Skaggs, The Great Guano Rush, chapter two ("The Entrepreneur and Daniel Webster"), pp. 17-34.

527 Cited in Mathew, House of Gibbs, p. 151.

528 The official U.S. correspondence and some of Osma’s letters and those of his brother Joaquín to Washington officials regarding Peru’s rights in the Lobos Islands affair are found in U.S. Senate, 34th Congress, 3rd Session, Rep. Com. No. 397 (February 18, 1857), whose pages are headed “Alfred G. Benson” but which constitute a documentary history of the events.

529 Skaggs, The Great Guano Rush, p. 29. Just days before his death, Webster reportedly said that it was “exceedingly painful” to face the grave with his reputation clouded, according to a contemporary report in the New York Daily Times cited by Skaggs.
wrote that the United States had blundered, committing an "international injustice" against Peru.\footnote{530 Basadre, Historia, II, p. 969}

As a gesture designed to help Washington weather the storm of an aroused U.S. public, Peru announced it would allow all U.S. ships that had set sail on the basis of Webster's action to load guano at the Chincha Islands for twenty dollars per ton. In addition, Peru agreed to purchase the supplies and equipment the U.S. fleet carried on board for excavating Lobos guano.\footnote{531 Skaggs, The Great Guano Rush, p. 30.} Benson later asked the U.S. government to indemnify him for more than two million dollars in "losses" he alleged to have suffered when he was unable to import Lobos guano, which he asserted should have netted him a profit of \$fifteen\ dollars per ton.\footnote{532 Ibid., p. 153.} He based his claim on an estimate of 200,000 tons of guano, more than twenty times the total amount of non-Peruvian guano that actually entered the United States during a typical year.

While the Lobos incident ended reasonably well for Peru, it left some U.S. farmers and merchants even more convinced that Peruvians were unfairly exploiting the U.S. fertilizer market. This resentment fueled hopes that alternative sources of supply could be found. Reports of new guano discoveries appeared in the press, and U.S. commentators optimistically predicted that, to quote \textit{DeBow's Review} in 1853, the "happy dream of the Peruvians [to maintain their 'perfect monopoly'] is about to be sadly interrupted." The following year the same journal was less certain but more vindictive, wishing that some new discovery might "render Peru unnecessary, and punish her for the monopoly she
appropriated for so long a time." Speculative syndicates were formed, such as the American Guano Company, which in 1855 made the ridiculous claim to own an island in the Pacific bearing "more than two hundred million tons of ammoniated guano." The following year, the U.S. congress passed the Guano Islands Act that encouraged U.S. entrepreneurs to search out and occupy uninhabited guano bearing islands anywhere in the world. If it were demonstrated that such a territory was not the lawful possession of another nation, the United States pledged to grant the discoverers an exclusive right to mine fertilizer under U.S. naval protection and sell it in U.S. markets. The legislation spawned dozens of new syndicates, enticed by the prospect of cutting into Peru's business. Over the next five decades, the U.S. State Department granted recognition to some sixty-six territorial claims under the Guano Islands Act. As sensational as these "discoveries" sometimes appeared, there was never any danger to Peruvian guano. Few finds yielded much fertilizer, and many of the appurtenances were little more than rocky formations that could hardly be dignified by the term "island." But the activity contributed to commerce-driven expansionistic attitudes in some sectors of U.S. society. Jimmy M. Skaggs argued that guano mania in the United States should receive greater attention by historians seeking to understand the impulses that later crystallized in the U.S. interventionism in Latin America of the late 1890s and early twentieth century.

533 DeBow's Review, XV (October 1853), p. 419.


535 See the text of the act in Skaggs's appendix, pp. 227-228.

536 A central purpose of Skaggs's book was to develop his thesis of a speculative "guano rush" as
During the mid-nineteenth century, however, Peru’s monopoly over natural guano held fast. Nowhere else in the world did climate and geography combine to preserve the ammonia content of guano as off the coast of Peru; and, despite new competition from artificial manures, the more expensive Peruvian product was never supplanted in world markets. As the total volume of different available fertilizers grew, farmers became more selective, reserving for guano the jobs it could do best. One British fertilizer authority, Augustus Voelcker, wrote in 1864 that for many crops "a much cheaper manure may often be used with greater advantage in preference to guano." Indeed, guano had proved injurious on some clay and light sandy soils in Britain. But, at the same time, Voelcker added, "The true interests of the importers of guano and the manufacturers of [synthetic] manures are not opposed to each other; for Peruvian guano, judiciously used for special purposes, can well compete with other artificial manures." 

RANDOLPH CLAY AND U.S. FARMERS

With the U.S. public aroused against Peru and farmers pressing Washington for some sort of action on their behalf, U.S. officials asked minister John Randolph Clay in Lima to see if the Peruvian government would agree to some sort of price accommodation or change in the consignment system. U.S. policy makers wanted to know why Peru would not simply sell guano at the Chinchas to the highest bidder and then let U.S. traders bear the burdens of precedent for later expansionism; Skaggs (p. ix) credited Larry Gara with originating the idea that "the droppings of birds played an important role in the history of U.S. imperialism," quoting Gara’s book, The Presidency of Franklin Pierce (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991).

transport, insurance and distribution. Clay felt that much of the discussion about Peru and guano in the United States was based on ignorance and unrealistic expectations. He cautioned U.S. officials that they were asking him to do the impossible. In January, 1854, he wrote Washington that, “I feel certain that the Peruvian government will not consent to a change in its present manner of disposing of the article, or in the price at which it is now sold in the United States.” He would try his best, but “I am convinced that my efforts will be fruitless.”

One of the misconceptions in the United States concerned a 1850 commercial treaty that the U.S. senate ratified but that Peru repudiated. The sixth article made reference to a hypothetical situation in which Peru might, at some future time, decide to sell guano directly to foreigners from the islands or its own ports, and it guaranteed that the United States would receive most favored nation rights. Clay was at pains to explain that, contrary to some belief in the United States, the treaty, had Peru ratified it, would not have conferred any advantages to U.S. citizens that they did not already enjoy, since the United States already had most favored nation status with Peru and, in practice, Peru would never make the changes alluded to in the treaty. He also tried to explain that there were no terms in the treaty that Peru found objectionable. Peru rejected the treaty simply because guano was mentioned at all. Guano is state property and, for Peru, “not a proper subject for negotiation” or mention, however innocent, in a treaty, wrote Clay.

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538 Clay to Marcy, January 11, 1854. Portions of Clay’s report were published in “Message of the President of the United States, in Answer to a Resolution of the Senate, Requesting Information in Relation to the Guano Trade,” in U.S. Senate, Executive Documents ... 1858-1859, vol. 7, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, Ex. Do. No. 25.

539 Clay to Marcy, August 24, 1854.
Clay also believed that people in the United States were misinformed about how much guano Peru actually possessed, in part because estimates in Peru itself were too high. He sent Washington copies of confidential guano reports to the Peruvian government that he said had not been made public. A commission reported in late 1853 that the three Chincha islands had about 12.4 million tons of guano remaining, but Clay thought—correctly it turned out—the estimate too high. “A more accurate survey would, I believe, reduce the amount of guano at the islands of Chincha to eight millions of tons, English, more or less.” Clay’s guess proved quite sound and, implicitly, had implications for price that will be explored later in this study.

To those who thought Peru could be easily pressured to reduce the price of guano, Clay emphasized that the price set was in large measure dictated by the country’s foreign bondholders. Guano “is the only resource on which the Peruvian government can rely to cover the annual interest upon its debt,” he said, adding, with a hint of sarcasm, “and the principal also, if it ever shall be paid.” Clay’s main point was implicit. Powerful European interests needed Peru to maintain guano’s current price, or Peru’s debt service would be impossible.

Nor was Clay convinced that it would really be in the interest of U.S. farmers to have foreign merchants purchase guano directly at the islands. In the lengthy report he submitted in August 1854, Clay reasoned that Peru’s need to service its foreign debt “insures to the consumers an ample supply of the article, which might not be the case were the trade to be opened and the public to depend for the supply upon the mercantile community.” With hundreds of different traders trying to determine if a voyage would or would not be profitable, the guano business would be subject to typical supply and demand cycles. “The market would thus probably be glutted at times, and at others be
entirely bare, and the trade reduced to a state of uncertainty, which might be very prejudicial to the agriculturists.” He also worried about the action of speculators and unscrupulous traders. “Moreover, as the trade is now conducted, it is the manifest interest of the Peruvian government to furnish a good and genuine article to the consumer …; whereas, were it sold at the island to the first comer, speculators, being only interested in one or more voyages, and naturally indifferent to the general result of the trade, might be tempted, by the prospect of profit and the difficulty of detection, to palm adulterated guano upon the public.” (He might have added that market distribution at the wholesale and retail levels already produced such an outcome.)

Peru then derived “a profit of about twenty dollars per ton” on guano sales, Clay stated, with the emphasis suggesting that the government’s take was not unreasonable. Furthermore, farmers should not be the only U.S. concern in assessing guano’s benefit to the United States, Clay noted. The Barreda firm was directing the guano carrying trade to U.S. ships. And, although Clay did not say so explicitly, the consignment arrangement ensured that U.S. ships would receive premium freight rates, or about $17 per ton. Clay quoted a critic of Peru in the United States who had claimed that British capitalists exercised undue influence over Peru, and that, “by their management they have acquired the exclusive carrying trade, to a very great extend, at least, in the article of guano.” This was false, and Clay presented detailed shipping records to refute the notion. During all of 1853, only twenty-five British ships loaded guano at the Chinchas that was destined for the U.S. market, as compared with 208 U.S. ships. Even taking into consideration four Dutch ships and a few from other nations, U.S.

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540 Ibid. The doubts about the advantages of direct sale appear on p. 10.
ships carried ninety percent of the guano taken from Peru to the U.S. market in 1853, generating revenue of about 2.8 million dollars that year for the U.S.
carrying trade. Clay thought Washington should view U.S. farmer complaints in
the context of this benefit to the U.S. economy.\footnote{Clay said that the export figures were in “tons register” (137,135 for 1853) but that freight charges were based upon the larger “tons weight” (164,562). Clay to Marcy, August 24, 1854.} In fact, Clay’s estimate of the value of the trade to U.S. shippers was too low. By 1854, guano shipped by the Barredas to the United States was carried almost exclusively in U.S. ships.

CLAY AND F. BARREDA Y HERMANO

Clay’s rather positive assessment of Peru’s guano consignment system did not mean that he approved of Barreda management of the U.S. market. On the contrary, he lobbied hard to get the contract for Peru’s guano sales in the United States transferred to a U.S. company, although both Gibbs earlier and Barreda now shared parts of the U.S. business with Alsop and other distributors. As noted before, under Gibbs management of the U.S. market, the New York agent was Edwin Bartlett, an Alsop y Cía. partner since at least 1835 and former U.S. consul in Lima; under Barreda, the New York agent was Theodore W. Riley, also an Alsop investor.\footnote{Frank R. Rutter, \textit{South American Trade of Baltimore} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1897), p. 41.}

Clay thought the Barredas took advantage of Peru’s lax regulation of the industry in ways that were detrimental to U.S. interests. The Barredas received a six and one-half percent commission on all guano sold in the United States, and, if that were all they reaped, Clay said, it might be a “just compensation.” But, “Messrs. Barreda & Brother derive profits from their agency to which they are
not entitled, but which they are permitted to enjoy through the carelessness, incompetency, and cupidity of the officers whose business it is to audit their accounts.” The U.S. minister alleged that, “peculation on a large scale is made easy, and can be practiced without danger of detection” when Peru’s consignees “render accounts only once in six months, and who sometimes do not exhibit any at all.” He saw two specific means by which the Barredas cheated Peru. The first was through an accounting gimmick and the consignee’s right of charging the government six percent “upon all money advanced to the government on account of the guano.” The Barredas would collect money from their U.S. clients, but they were not required to render account to Peru but once every six months. So, for example, money collected during January-to-June of one year would not be credited to Peru’s account until January 1 of the following year. Barreda would hold the float as if the funds were its own. “When, therefore, the Peruvian government is in want of money, it issues a requisition on the agent in Lima, who draws upon the United States at sixty or ninety days ….” Barreda treated money paid on such drafts as a loan to Peru, charging interest. “By this, apparently, fair process, the Barredas contrive to make advances to the government out of its own funds, and it actually pays interest upon its own money.”

A second means of cheating Peru, according to Clay, directly affected U.S. interests. Barreda passed along to Peru the shipping charges on each voyage. Out of their per ton fee, U.S. ship owners had to pay Barreda $150 for “port agency” charges at Callao and the Chinchas. But, in addition, Barreda made U.S. ships pay a five percent shipping commission for the expense of “transacting the

543 Clay to Marcy, August 24, 1854, in op. cit., p. 7.
business of the vessels and procuring the freight.” Such a charge might be fair if “the mercantile house were obliged to collect the freight at more or less trouble and labor.” However, the guano was put on board the ship at the government’s expense. Clay calculated that for 1853 alone, the Barredas might have collected about $140,000 “under the specious pretense ‘of managing the ship’s business.’” The Peruvian company was “very arbitrary in exacting this onerous condition, and will take up on vessel upon freight, for account of the Peruvian government, unless the owners or captains consent to subscribe to it.” Clay asked that Washington “give me urgent instructions” to protest these charges on U.S. shipping in the guano trade.544

Clay did not mention another feature of Barreda’s charter party contracts. U.S. ship captains could ask the Barredas for an advance in Callao to cover certain expenses. Receipts suggested that such advances were modest, and some ships did not take any at all. However, after the guano was unloaded in the United States, Federico Barreda was given two months before he was required to settle the freight charges. Like money owed to the Peruvian government, this float was sizeable. F. Barreda y Hermano was operating like a bank.

But, how could the United States wrest the consignment contract from Barreda and place it directly in the hands of Alsop or another U.S. firm? Clay thought Peru and the Barredas could be vulnerable under U.S. law against monopoly. If the U.S. government had granted one of its own citizens an “exclusive right of vending” a commodity that “has become an article of almost primary necessity to our agriculturalists,” Clay thought the U.S. Supreme Court would declare the arrangement unconstitutional. He thought Washington

544 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
should allow him to raise this red flag with Lima in order to give weight to his insistence that “the guano agency should be given by [Peru’s] government to a citizen or citizens of the United States.”

And, finally, Clay reached for a fanciful solution to all of these problems. Peru was losing a great deal of money by virtue of its debt burdens on which it was paying an enormous interest bill. If the United States were to assume responsibility for Peru’s domestic and foreign debts, he said, “I think the government would sell its sovereignty and property in the Chincha islands for eighty or perhaps even sixty millions of dollars.” He calculated Peru’s debts at about fifty million and the value of the country’s remaining guano at about 360 million dollars.545 Since a huge amount of Peru’s share of guano revenues were allocated to service the country’s growing foreign debts, Clay calculated that the United States could strike a deal by which the United States would pay off bondholders. Here Clay’s understanding of Peruvian politics failed him.

OFFICIAL VALUE AND PRICE OF U.S. GUANO IMPORTS

In order to properly evaluate the role of the Barredas and other merchants in the Peruvian consignment system and the decisions the Peruvian government made regarding guano sales, further study of the U.S. and European markets for fertilizer is needed. Although Peru was everywhere denounced for trying to keep the price of guano too high, the U.S. experience suggests that Peru might have successfully pursued a high-price, restricted volume strategy.

The British guano market has been studied in the most detail, and William Mathew saw no evidence that the Gibbs consignment firm conspired to keep the

545 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
Certainly, however, like the Barredas in the United States, Gibbs had to be mindful that the price of guano was politically charged and that British farmers had their supporters in government. Gibbs managers sometimes seemed baffled or divided concerning how the market might respond to price changes. Mathew’s positive assessment of Gibbs’ management of price and supply in Europe seems predicated on the assumption that raising the price would be unwise if it would have led to a significant decline in sales— which was surely the case. What must be explored, however, is the possibility that Peru’s own development interests would have been better served by severely limiting the amount of guano which could be dug and sold each year, marketing it in the United States and Europe as a specialty fertilizer commanding a premium price.

Unfortunately, the official U.S. trade data published in *Commerce and Navigation* do not shed much light on the value of guano. During the 1851-1860 decade, government statistics showed total U.S. imports from Peru of only 4.6 million dollars, giving the United States a favorable balance of trade with Peru of 2.6 million. But these figures were based upon a very low official U.S. valuation of Peruvian guano destined for U.S. tobacco fields, probably because there was no duty and perhaps also reflecting U.S. opinion regarding actual costs of guano production. A more realistic valuation of U.S. imports is presented in table 10.2, based on prices of guano in the United States found in literature of the period. This exercise produces an estimate of U.S. guano imports for the decade of about 36 million dollars, most of it flowing through the hands of the Barredas and indicating a large U.S. trade deficit with Peru.

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Table 10.2
Estimated Value of U.S. Guano Imports from Peru
In Thousands of Dollars, 1849-1861

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Official valuation (000)</th>
<th>Estimated U.S. cost in dollars per ton</th>
<th>Est. actual wholesale cost (000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>8,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>5,314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13-Year Total
1849-1861  1,745  42,527


**CORRUPTION ALLEGATIONS AGAINST BARREDA AND GIBBS**

The control, volume and destination of revenues from guano sold in the United States and Europe was a contentious issue in Peru. Throughout the 1850s, critics alleged that consignment houses were corruptly profiteering and cheating the government out of its proper share of guano proceeds. In 1857, U.S. minister Clay sent to Washington some pamphlets “published by Mr. Barronilhet
and Don Santiago Tavara” that made specific accusations against Barreda and Gibbs. Clay said, “The accusation against one of the principal firms in Lima has caused some excitement in the commercial community.” The congress, meeting as a convención nacional, launched an investigation under leadership of the country’s renowned liberal, José Gálvez, that obliged the Castilla administration to send auditors to Europe and the United States. A main purpose was to find out if the Barredas, Gibbs and others were keeping the price of guano low due to conflict of interest with Peru, and to ascertain if fraud was practiced. The investigation of Gibbs in London seems to have been either grossly incompetent or “fixed.” By his own admission, the man that the Castilla government sent to Britain, Manuel Basagoitia, did not speak English and knew little about commercial transactions, nor did he take along an assistant who could properly examine the Gibbs books. After one or two days of perfunctory visits to Gibbs’ home office, he wrote Lima that everything was fine. On subsequent days he spent, according to Mathew’s examination of Gibbs papers, “no more than two hours” per visit. Basagoitia’s audit of Gibbs was a whitewash, and Mathew acknowledged that, after the Castilla regime’s quick exoneration of Gibbs, the government “was certainly acting with unseemly haste.”

547 Gibbs alleged that Barronilhet sent them an extortion letter threatening them with exposure if the consignment house did not pay him a certain sum. Clay to Cass, February 12, 1857, in Ibid., p. 43.

548 Mathew described the Basagoitia mission in House of Gibbs, pp. 203-205.
The Barreda brothers in the United States were not so fortunate. The appointed agent that confronted Federico Barreda in New York was Toribio Sanz, an attorney and at that time director of public credit, whom Jorge Basadre described as a very competent and uncorrupted public servant. U.S. minister Clay wrote of Sanz that, “This gentleman is well acquainted with the guano trade in all its details, and a very proper person to communicate with in relation to the state of the guano trade between the United States and Peru.” Sanz began pouring over the company’s books from the date of the Barredas’ second contract in 1856. The Peruvian firm seemed to cooperate with Sanz initially; but, when the auditor finished the books for 1856, Federico Barreda refused to open any records after February 1857, on the grounds that their contract with the Peruvian government exempted them from audit after a specified period. Unable to resolve the conflict with the auditor, Federico Barreda declared that he was taking out U.S. citizenship and would fight any further auditing in U.S. courts. This did not go down well in Lima, heightening the impression that the guano trade was corrupt. There were, it turned out, limits to the protection that Castilla could or would provide the Barredas.


550 Clay to Cass, Septeember 10, 1857, “Message of the President of the United States, in Answer to a Resolution of the Senate, Requesting Information in Relation to the Guano Trade,” op. cit., pp. 43-44.

551 Federico Barreda does not seem to have followed through on these threats. There is no evidence of a lawsuit, and he served during much of the 1860s as a Peruvian diplomat. He may not have formally taken out U.S. citizenship until the 1870s when he moved his family to California and traveled in Central America on business.
As a result, Felipe Barreda indignantly resigned his contract, setting in motion a lot of maneuvering and lobbying to win the U.S. market prize. The Alsop partners decided to bid on the U.S. consignment contract, and minister Clay exerted himself with the foreign ministry on their behalf, telling the Peruvian government that a U.S. company “would be better acquainted with the wants of the community, and from their relations at home could better ascertain the districts where the substance was required, and distribute it probably with greater advantage to the agriculturist.” Furthermore, Clay argued that, “by giving the contract to an American firm the Peruvian government would evince an interest in drawing closer the relations of commerce and navigation between the two countries.” Clay thought his work had borne fruit, reporting to Washington that, “Alsop & Co. is the only American house that has offered to take the consignment, and their pretensions are supported by Mr. Zevallos, the minister of foreign affairs and finance, who will use all his influence to obtain the contract for them.” But, he allowed that “some difficulty would be interposed by Mr. Barreda.”

The government revoked the Barreda contract, giving it over to the firm of Julián de Zaracondegui, who had backing from Juan de Ugarte and José Vicente Oyague. But Clay wondered to what extent Felipe Barreda might still be

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552 Clay to Marcy, in “Message of the President of the United States in Answer ... to the Guano Trade,” in U.S. Senate, Executive Documents ... 1858-1859, vol. 7, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, Ex. Do. No. 25, pp. 60-61.

553 Ugarte (but not Zaracondegui or Oyague) was part of the capitalistas nacionales group discussed in chapter twelve. Ugarte was involved in the initial slave raids on Polynesia.
involved in the U.S. market. It will be recalled that Zaracondegui was briefly part of the abortive 1850 consignment deal for the United States and several other markets. It is possible that Pedro González de Candamo was a silent financier of Zaracondegui and, for that matter, other Peruvians who bid on guano contracts. As a Chilean national, González de Candamo could not openly contest for contracts reserved for hijos del país. In 1860 the British chargé d’affaires in Lima characterized González de Candamo as “the Rothschild of Chile and Peru,” and he and Zaracondegui had been import-export partners in the 1850s. Alfonso Quiroz found a telling anecdote about the two men in the memoir of Manuel Argumaniz Muñoz, a partner in one of their joint ventures. After making an unflattering remark about how Gonzales de Candamo accumulated his wealth, Argumaniz did the same for Zaracondegui’s business practices. “Don Julián Zaracondegui … wanted absolute control and had no scruples in the managing [of] matters related to his business.” For this reason, Argumaniz explained, “señor Candamo usually took a revolver with him on his rare visits to Zaracondegui’s office, and señor Zaracondegui had his always ready ….”

Whether Zaracondegui paid Felipe Barreda a fee (or gave him a passive share of the new business) in return for use of the processing and distribution network Federico had established in the United States is not known. U.S.


minister Clay said he believed that Felipe Barreda influenced the government’s decision to select Zaracondegui. He noted that there were other bidders, including “Canevaro & Co., representing the Rothschilds, and Alsop & Co.,” but said that “there is good reason to suppose that a previous arrangement had been agreed upon between the present contractors and the house of Barreda which was calculated to prevent other parties from obtaining the contract.” Under the Zaracondegui contract, the New York and Baltimore agent was Barril and Mur. Juan J. Barril was a Barreda relative from Spain (nephew of sister Rosa’s husband) whom Federico Barreda had employed as manager of his Baltimore office.

Felipe Barreda paid Federico $136,000 as his brother’s share of the liquidation of their guano business in the United States. To visualize the scale of Federico’s concluding profit, the dowry that Felipe bestowed on his daughter upon her marriage to Manuel Pardo in 1859, as already mentioned, was 100,000 pesos (the dollar and peso, and subsequently the dollar and the sol, were roughly equivalent in the nineteenth century), and Witt judged that a capital of 100,000 to 200,000 pesos made a businessman a person of substance. With his independent wealth of more than a half million dollars seemingly secure, Federico Barreda started a second career as Peruvian diplomat in the United States and during the U.S. Civil War became a close confidant of Abraham Lincoln’s secretary of state, William Seward.

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Chapter 11

PASSAGE TO HELL

Whereas the traffic in laborers ... known as the coolie trade, is odious to the people of the United States, as inhuman and immoral ... be it therefore resolved, that it is the duty of this government to give effect to the moral sentiment of the nation ... for the purpose of preventing the further introduction of coolies into this hemisphere ....

Joint Resolution of the U.S. Congress
1867

There is lots of money in the business .... [A Chinese indentured servant can be sold in Peru for] $340 hard dollars each.

William R. Grace
c. 1871

No hell has ever been conceived . . . that can be equaled to the fierceness of its heat, the horror of its stink, and the damnation of those compelled to labor there [on Peru's guano islands].

Alexander J. Duffield
1877

Exploring the U.S. agricultural market reveals only part of the story of the importance of guano for the U.S. economy, for the United States recouped a good portion of the money spent on guano imports by being the principal nation engaged in Peru’s guano carrying trade and a significant participant in Peru’s “coolie trade.” Building on their South American commercial experience during and after the Latin American wars of independence, New England ship owners and their crews loaded more than half of the guano taken from the Chincha Islands in some years.

The freight rates for guano shipped to the United States and Europe ranged from about fourteen to twenty dollars per ton during the 1850s and then
declined somewhat thereafter.\textsuperscript{557} The monopolistic structure of the guano trade, with ship owners having to submit their freight bids to a single consignee for a particular market, in theory was to have kept transport rates competitive. In practice, some contemporary observers judged the freight charges consignees presented the government to be excessive. Ship owners had to charge a premium for the messy, stinky nature of the cargo that fouled up rigging and found its way into a ship’s every nook and crevice. Extra charge had to be factored in for long delays in Peru awaiting loading. At the same time, there may have been collusion in the shipping contracts. There was certainly a hint of corruption in the fact that some consignment houses, including the Barredas, put their own ships into the guano business, defeating any incentive to get Peru the best shipping price. On the other hand, in 1857 the British chargé d’affaires in Lima reported that U.S. ship owners were lobbying the Peruvian government for a change in the guano consignment system in the hopes of gaining more favorable (higher) freight rates.\textsuperscript{558} The twenty-dollar peak was reached during the cargo shortage caused by the Crimean War (October 1853–February 1856), right in the middle of the Barreda’s U.S. contract.

The share of the carrying trade captured by U.S. ship owners grew steadily during the early 1850s, a boon to the New England ship building industry. By 1857, North American vessels were loading more of the fertilizer bound for Europe and the United States than were their chief rivals sailing under

\textsuperscript{557} Frank R. Rutter, \textit{South American Trade of Baltimore} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1897), and Mathew, \textit{House of Gibbs}, p. 124. Mathew found in the Gibbs records evidence of considerable fluctuation in guano shipping rates according to world conditions. He disputed Levin’s conclusion that the contracting system encouraged artificially high cargo rates to the detriment of Peru. In 1851 rates for carrying guano to Britain were around £3. As a result of the Crimean War they rose steadily, reaching £5 in 1854. But the rates fell back in the late 1850s.

\textsuperscript{558} See Mathew, \textit{House of Gibbs}, p. 125.
the British flag (table below). During a six-month period in 1860 almost half of the tonnage passing through Callao, which included all guano shipments, was carried in U.S. ships. The U.S. consul there estimated that the freights paid to U.S. ship owners for the outward-bound cargoes, at fifteen dollars per ton, would amount to about 2.3 million dollars. Most charter party contracts also granted a fee to ship owners for each day of delay at the Chinchas beyond a specified period. As the floating community of ships having to wait one, two and three months for loading grew to many dozens, Gibbs and the Barredas passed along these additional freight charges to the government.

Table 11.1
U.S. and British Share Of the Guano Carrying Trade 1855-1858 (Thousands of Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S. Vessels</th>
<th>British Vessels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The U.S. Civil War temporarily disrupted U.S. participation in the carrying trade, as suggested in the figures shown in table 11.2, but it was partially revived by 1863. Remarkably few Peruvian-owned ships carried guano, and the failure on the part of Peru to establish national preferences or other

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559 United States Department of State, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Commercial Relations, 1856, I, p. 710.
incentives for development of either ship building or carrying trades is a subject that has not received much scholarly attention. Mathew examined British customs records for five separate years over the period 1842-1862 and could find evidence of only three Peruvian ships engaged in hauling guano, two listed in 1842 and only one thereafter. Even when there was a scarcity of available cargo space, such as during the Crimean and U.S. Civil wars, there seems to have been scant stimulation of a Peruvian shipping industry. An exception was in the Peruvian guano trade with the United States, where the Barredas owned or chartered some of the ships during their period of control of the trade in the 1850s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of Vessels</th>
<th>Thousands of Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1860</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1860</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1860</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1861</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1861</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1861</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appears that in some years U.S. ship owners received a portion of guano revenue per ton almost as large as the revenue share of the Peruvian government. A very rough calculation would estimate that, except for the Civil War period, between one-third and one-half of the guano carrying trade was in U.S. hands. Assuming that at least one-third of Peru's guano was shipped in U.S. vessels, at a conservatively estimated average transport charge of $15 per ton,
then U.S. ship owners grossed some 63 million dollars from the guano carrying trade during the 1841-1879 period.

To this honorable commerce must be added the associated profits made in one of the most odious trades of the nineteenth century: Peru was by far the most notorious center of Pacific trafficking in forced human labor. Peru’s guano policies entailed a big increase in the Chinese coolie trade, especially after 1854 when the much-delayed abolition of slavery was triggered by El Comercio’s 1853 publication of a Spanish translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin.

CARRYING BONDSTERS TO PERU

The large presence of U.S. ships and sailors in the Pacific placed them in the arena of a risky but highly profitable “coolie traffic” by which Peruvian agriculturalists, guano contractors and railway builders supplied themselves with a steady supply of Chinese bondsmen. The North American role was most direct prior to the U.S. Civil War, after which it became more informal and covert. As debate over African slavery polarized people in the United States, sensitivity also developed concerning the abuses of Chinese indentured servants in Peru, particularly to the extent that the public realized U.S. citizens were involved. The manner in which Chinese were deceived regarding their destination – or simply kidnapped – was publicized in the U.S. press, as were the dismal conditions on New England-made ships that resulted in a high death rate during the Pacific crossing. Some U.S. missionaries in China played a role in exposing the trade, particularly in light of the fact that the Chinese government did little to protect the human rights of its citizens sent to Peru, Cuba, Hawaii or
California. Not all comment in the U.S. media was negative, however. In 1856 a Brooklyn resident submitted a lengthy letter to the New York Times asking rhetorically if the coolie trade was not “one of the grand means God is using for opening China to foreigners?”

British regulation of Chinese emigration from Hong Kong kept the coolie trade there less slave-like, and so the trade with Peru and Cuba was largely run out of Portugal’s Macao colony. Portuguese tax revenues and intermediary profits from the trade were a key to the colony’s prosperity. This led in the 1850s and 1860s to condemnation of Portugal in the United States and Britain for the evils of a trade in which their own citizens were involved. As Arnold Meagher concluded, “responsibility must be more evenly distributed among many Western nations,” including the United States. Sometimes word about the treatment of Chinese on the guano islands got back to China, and authorities there made token efforts to address the situation. A U.S. writer in 1856 said, “In the Peru contracts it is expressly stipulated that they shall not be called upon to work in guano or at the Chincha Islands.” Nevertheless, China had no

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560 Chinese indentured servitude was introduced in Hawaii on the heels of the 1848 Great Mahele, a fateful decision by Hawaiian leaders, urged on them by foreign advisors, to privatize the lands of native Hawaiians, paving the way for dispossession and sugar plantations. See Lawrence Fuchs, Hawaii Pono: A Social History (New York: Harcourt, 1967).

561 W. G. Clarence-Smith, The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825-1975: A Study in Economic Imperialism (University of Manchester Press, 1985), p. 72. The spelling of “Macao” (and not “Macau”) given here is that used in contemporary U.S. accounts.

562 My use of Meagher’s work was based upon his 1975 dissertation. I have changed some references to the pages of his resulting 2008 book.

563 New York Times, April 12, 1856.
representatives in Peru, leaving responsibility for protecting its citizens there in the hands of U.S. officials and China’s minister in Washington.

While there was variation in the indenture contracts drawn up in Macao, Peruvian purchasers of the bondsmen seemed to pay little attention to such details. Nor was it clear that the Chinese understood what was on the paper they signed, or even that the documents were personally signed by the individuals bound by them.

Table 11.3
Comparison of Selected Features of Four Indenture Contracts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>British Guiana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>185?</td>
<td>1852</td>
<td>187?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>(blank)</td>
<td>Domingo Elías</td>
<td>Vargas &amp; Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of service</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly wage</td>
<td>(blank)</td>
<td>$3/mo.</td>
<td>$4/mo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deductions</td>
<td>$1/mo. for advance</td>
<td>$1/mo. for advance</td>
<td>$12 for clothes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours labor/day</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>per local custom</td>
<td>at master’s discretion &amp; per local custom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days off</td>
<td>Sundays plus 3 per year</td>
<td>3 per year</td>
<td>reduced labor on Sundays per local custom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assignable</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To circumvent regulations and international criticism, ship owners switched the official registration of their vessels according to circumstances and opportunities. Data compiled from shipping records by Arnold Joseph Meagher.
indicates that the U.S. flag was flown in the coolie trade mainly in the 1850s, with U.S.-made and U.S.-captained ships using other registration thereafter, especially after an 1862 U. S. law prohibiting U. S. citizens and ships from engaging in the trade.\textsuperscript{564} In 1866, the U.S. minister in Lima reported that, “American-built bottoms with American crews are engaged in this trade under the flags of other countries.” He also warned that a Peruvian agent was en route to the United States to procure freed slaves as contract labor for Peru. “I have been positively informed that Mr. Antonio Millan left Peru on the last steamer for New York for the purpose of bringing out a cargo of negroes from the United States to this country.” He endorsed secretary of state William Seward’s order prohibiting such trafficking. The condition of former slaves “would certainly not be improved,” in Peru, he wrote, and “they would share the fate of the coolies.”\textsuperscript{565}

Both Portugal and Peru worked to counter their bad reputations. Portugal’s consul general in Peru issued a constant flow of documents certifying that Chinese passengers arriving in Callao were “well treated during the voyage,” or that certain minors that were placed in domestic service with such-and-such “very respectable” Peruvian family would be properly treated according to the terms of their contracts.\textsuperscript{566}


\textsuperscript{565} Alvin P. Hovey to William H. Seward, Lima, November 28, 1866, in Papers Relating to the Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President, part II (Washington: GPO, 1867), p. 653.

\textsuperscript{566} See for example, consul general Narciso Velarde’s report no. 82 to the Macao government’s secretary general, November 15, 1871, in which he reassured that Chinese minors placed with the family of the Callao custom’s agent Henry Higginson would be properly treated. Boletim da provincia de Macau e Timor, vol. 18, no. 5 (January 29, 1872), p. 18.
Beginning in 1869, when demand for railway laborers shot up in Peru, quite a few coolie ships were registered as Salvadoran. Toward the end of the period of officially sanctioned trade in bondsmen, an American traveler from the University of Michigan, J. B. Steele, reported that ships employed were mostly from the United States but sailed under the Peruvian flag.

In either 1870 or 1871 (part of the date was illegible), William Grace in New York wrote his brother Michael in Callao urging him to consider getting involved in the trafficking. “There is lots of money in the business,” he said, explaining his reasoning with some cost figures he may have picked up from a source in New York or Peru. Each Chinese laborer could be procured for about one-hundred dollars, and their shipment to Peru cost the same. Grace added ten percent to that two-hundred dollar average for insurance and interest “on ship and [human] cargo.” Then he tacked on ten dollars per servant to cover a projected ten percent death rate during the Pacific passage. This brought the total cost of one Chinese servant delivered live in Peru to about $256, whereupon he could be sold for $340.567

In 1873 Steele found about twenty-five ships still engaged in the trade and said that each carried from five to nine hundred Chinese per voyage. He himself traveled from Peru to Hong Kong on a coolie ship "fitted up with bunks for eight

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hundred Chinese."\textsuperscript{568} There were rows of wooden shelves running the length of
the ship, with each passenger assigned a space about twenty-one inches wide,
only slightly more space than had been common for Atlantic slaving of Africans.
The ship's holds were filthy and the passengers underfed. While the Portuguese
consular agents always stated to the Governor of Macao that passengers were
well treated, they also listed for each voyage the numbers of Chinese who died
en route to Peru, stark facts that seemed to contradict the rosy language of the
reports. Typical causes of death were said to be dysentery, scurvy, opium
withdrawal, "nostalgia" and "home sickness" – the latter two being evidence of
severe depression.

Throughout the voyages men coped with disorientation and fear. Since
deceit and kidnapping brought many on board, captains frequently established a
routine of floggings to terrorize the Chinese into utmost passivity. Getting into a
minor quarrel with a bunkmate might result in being dragged above deck for a
lashing. When publicized in the United States, such treatment focused attention
on the U.S. role in Peru. U.S. ship captains had a particularly bad reputation for
cruel treatment of Chinese on board the "coolie clippers."\textsuperscript{569} A Caribbean-born
captain from St. Kitts said he saw U.S. captains order their crews to fire rifles on

\textsuperscript{568} J. B. Steere, “Mr. Steere to Mr. Bailey,” in \textit{Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United

\textsuperscript{569} Regarding the reputation for cruelty of U.S. captains, Meagher (1975), "Introduction," p. 178,
Chinese in the water who were committing suicide by jumping overboard. "The men will sometimes make a fearful yell and leap into the open sea," he said. Depressed and desperate Chinese may have hoped that death would bear them back to their native land, and therefore the purpose of shooting them in this manner probably was to have their companions watch them bleed and sink, with the expectation that this would deter others contemplating such an escape. Captains also may have felt vengeful, since every bondsman lost at sea lowered commissions they earned for landing the Chinese at Callao. Captains and crew alike viewed themselves as racially and culturally superior to the Chinese, and they reacted angrily to any show of insubordination or pride on the part of their passengers. Punishments were designed to humiliate, according to accounts that found their way into consular reports and other dispatches.

The average mortality rate of coolies on voyages from China to Latin America was over ten percent, according to official records that may have understated deaths. Mistreatment, suicide, overcrowding, poor sanitation, insufficient food and bad water seem to have been the main causes. Meagher found evidence of sixty-eight mutinies by Chinese during three decades of the coolie trade. All but three of the mutinies occurred on ships bound for Latin America (1975), p. 178.

Captain Wilson of St. Kitts said he was baffled by this behavior, since "when they have killed them they are a dead loss." By contrast, it was his practice to try to recover the suicides alive. "I always put salt in the gun, which stings them. Then I lower the boats and pick them up." Ibid.
America, and nineteen took place on ships headed for Peru. Approximately twelve captains, at least two hundred sailors and over four thousand Chinese were killed during such shipboard revolts. The notorious U.S. captain, Francis Bowen, whose work in the Atlantic earned him the sobriquet, "Prince of Slavers," was said to have decided in the late 1850s that carrying Chinese to Peru was too dangerous, and he switched back to illegal African slaving. Some mutinies began so soon after setting sail from Macao that rumors circulated to the effect that they were planned in advance by pirates who infiltrated the ranks of bondsmen. Of sixty-four voyages by U. S. flagged ships carrying Chinese to Latin America, as tabulated by Meagher, there were eleven mutinies, most on ships headed to Cuba.

What attracted U.S. ship owners, captains and sailors to Peru’s traffic in humans, despite danger and opprobrium, was profit. A sailor working in the tea trade between China and the United States might earn ten dollars a month, but he could make half again as much transporting coolies. A skilled carpenter could earn up to forty dollars a month if willing to be known as a "slaver," and a captain could make one-hundred dollars.

Watt Stewart estimated the total number of Chinese sold into bondage in Peru at about ninety thousand, but this figure was too low, probably by almost twenty percent. In subsequent research, Meagher found Macao government


records, consular dispatches and newspaper reports documenting that about 127,800 Chinese were embarked for Peru. After subtracting for mortality on voyages, mutinies, ships lost at sea, and so on, it may be surmised that approximately 110,000 Chinese indentured servants were landed alive in Peru.

FORCED LABOR

The coolie trade kept forced and debased labor a viable part of the socio-economic system during Peru’s development of capitalist export commodity sectors. Both native and foreign-born entrepreneurs used the Chinese as a transitional group in the forced labor segment during the time between earlier reliance on African slavery and the later expansion of enganche relations with Indian communities. As with African slavery during and after the colonial period, nineteenth-century use of forced Chinese labor was not exclusive. It was one component in a complex system stratified variously by ethnicity, nationality and social class. If it is true, as foreign observers claimed, that black overseers in Peru drove the Chinese with almost unimaginable brutality, they were well apprenticed for the role.

When the coolie ships reached Callao, the reception of the laborers was quite similar to that experienced by African slaves brought to Havana or Charleston. Health officials went aboard to check for communicable disease. Then prospective buyers were allowed to inspect the cargos. Chinese recoiled with humiliation as Peruvian buyers squeezed their arms and pinched their rib cages. The eight-year contract of each man was auctioned off to the highest
bidder at prices ranging from 300 to 500 dollars. Bewildered and terrified immigrants were powerless to stop their separation from friends or family members.

The most unfortunate were sent to the guano islands. Many hundreds of Chinese were worked to death at the Chinchas, where each laborer was forced to dig between four and five tons of guano per day. The ocean afforded a natural barrier to any hope of running away, and former slaves were employed to drive them mercilessly with whips. As described in chapter six, in 1854 New York visitor George Peck wrote that, "their slender figures quiver[ed] under the weight of loads too heavy for them to wheel." They hacked away with picks and shovels at the crusty beds of guano, inhaling and choking on clouds of ammonia-laden dust. "No hell has ever been conceived ..." Alexander Duffield wrote in the mid-1870s, "that can be equaled to the fierceness of its heat, the horror of its stink, and the damnation of those compelled to labor [on Peru's guano islands]." Opium rations were used to sedate the natural instinct to

574 Stewart, Chinese Bondage, p. 82.

575 Meagher believed five tons to be the norm for many years, reduced to four later under the pressure of international opinion.

576 Peck, p. 215. A British writer later seems to have appropriated some of Peck’s language (or both simply picked the phrasing up at the Chinchas). S. A. Emery wrote that, “Each coolie is required to dig and whell five tons of guano a day; their slender figures quiver under the weight of he loads [my emphasis]. Little do our farmers realize the trouble and labour, the heart-sickness and sorrow with which this fertilizer is procured for the enrichment of their quiet, fruitful fields.” Emery’s article, “A New Year’s Day at the Chinchas,” was published as 1850s diary entries in The New Monthly Belle Assemblée; A Magazine of Literature and Fashion vol. LXVI (January-June, 1867, 307-312), p. 315, and also published with same date and pagination as The Illustrated Magazine.

577 Alexander J. Duffield, Peru in the Guano Age (London: Henry Colburn, 1877), p. 244.
rebel, but numerous Chinese committed suicide on the Chinchas nevertheless. As recounted earlier, Lilly Grace reported that a bondsman would dig his own grave, lie down in it, and take an opium overdose.\textsuperscript{578} According to one contemporary estimate, the average Chinese worker digging guano survived the ordeal for about three years.\textsuperscript{579}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image}
\caption{DEFENSIVE PHOTOGRAPHY}
In theory, Chinese bondsmen were to receive a modest wage in Peru. Critics alleged that they were being held like slaves without regard to protections or benefits stipulated in their contracts. This image (detail) from the Chinchas by New York photographer Henry DeWitt Moulton has been composed rather transparently to answer criticism of Peru in foreign media.
(U.S. Library of Congress copy of the album, \textit{Rays of Sunlight from South America})
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{578} For further discussion of Chinese labor at the Chinchas, see chapters seven and nine.

The vast majority of the Chinese sent to Peru – perhaps as many as 90,000 – were employed in agriculture on the coast and in railroad construction, playing a pivotal role in the development of capitalism following the abolition of slavery in 1854 and throughout the rest of the nineteenth century. Their treatment varied from barbaric to tolerable, depending on circumstances. Many found themselves in forms of Peruvian bondage little different from the African slavery described in 1834 by Flora Tristán. Peruvian employers used Chinese phenotype as a marker of an unfree person and sometimes branded workers on the face. "I saw at one estate between thirty and forty [Chinese] come up from their work heavily ironed, and holding up their chains with one hand to keep them from galling their ankles," wrote U.S. observer J. B. Steere in a report sent to Washington, "while they carried their spades, with which they had been at work, with the other." Some free Chinese were hired as bounty hunters to track down runaways. Peru’s small colonies of free Chinese in towns and Lima did their best to provide sanctuary for runaways, which generated angry complaints from coastal agriculturalists.

The greatest single impetus to the importation of Chinese laborers to South America was the railroad projects managed by U.S. impresario Henry Meiggs, who not only contracted for entire shiploads of coolies but also leased hundreds at a time from coastal estate owners. In the early 1870s, Meiggs

probably employed over six thousand Chinese, and evaluation of his use of their labor will be made in chapter thirteen.

U.S. REACTIONS

Because of the special relationship between China and the United States, there seems to have been some expectation on the part of Chinese officials that the United States would work to help protect the rights of Chinese in Latin America. But U.S. officials did little to combat the abuses of Chinese until U.S. public opinion was aroused. Several shipboard rebellions by Chinese headed for Peru were so bloody and sensational in the telling that they galvanized world attention on the trade and, eventually, spawned measures for its curtailment. At the urging of North Americans in China, Congress passed a law in 1862 warning U.S. citizens not to engage in the coolie traffic. In 1867 both houses of the U. S. Congress passed a joint resolution declaring that, “Whereas the traffic in laborers … known as the coolie trade, is odious to the people of the United States, as inhuman and immoral … be it therefore resolved, that it is the duty of this government to give effect to the moral sentiment of the nation … for the purpose of preventing the further introduction of coolies into this hemisphere ….”

Four years later the New York Times demanded that, “It is high time that a traffic embodying all the worst features of the African slave trade is put to a stop.” The 1862 law and 1867 resolution were subsequently contradicted by the 1868

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Burlingame Treaty with China, which encouraged Chinese emigration.\textsuperscript{582}

Because Henry Meiggs was willing and able to pay high bounties for each laborer, some coastal sugar estate owners leased their Chinese servants to him and then turned around and purchased the contracts of newly landed bondsmen. The contradiction of U.S. policy against the trade being overwhelmed by actions of a renowned Yankee entrepreneur in Peru seems not to have registered in the U.S. media. The open commerce in Chinese labor for Peru was finally halted as much by economic crisis as by U.S. reform measures, although the U.S. role in an incident involving a Peruvian ship and bondsmen in Yokohama, Japan, contributed to China’s eventual decision to shut down the Macao trade to Peru and Cuba (see chapter thirteen).

\section*{SLAVE RAIDS ON POLYNESIA}

Despite the vigilance of the New England missionary community, one of the most terrible incidents in the history of the coolie trade went largely unnoticed in the United States. Only through the researches of Harry Maude and other Pacific historians, has the story been told of one of the most tragic and horrific episodes in Peru’s long history of forced labor: the 1862-1864 slave raids on Polynesia.\textsuperscript{583} Since the Civil War temporarily curtailed U.S. shipping of

\textsuperscript{582} Meagher, p. 323.

\textsuperscript{583} Harry E. Maude was trained in anthropology at Cambridge, worked beginning in 1929 as a British colonial administrator in the Gilbert Islands, retired to a research position in Polynesian history at the Australian National University, and began collecting documents on the Peruvian slave raids in 1958. Over the next twenty years he studied the incidents and wrote his book, \textit{Slavers in Paradise: The Peruvian Slave Trade in Polynesia, 1862-1864} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981). This richly detailed account added immeasurably to Watt Stewart’s classic 1951 portrait of indentured servitude in Peru, \textit{Chinese Bondage in Peru, A History of the Chinese Coolie in
Peruvian guano, and Pacific trading in general, U.S. involvement in this assault on almost two-dozen island territories escaped the attention of most U.S. historians. But, as one U.S. consul in South America, John Lovejoy, delicately noted in 1863 during the sad conclusion of the episode, "I am sorry to say that some American citizens were engaged in this inhuman traffic."584 In addition, temporary effects in South America of the U. S. Civil War provided some of the motivation in Peru to initiate slave raids on Polynesia.

While most of the thirty-two ships that raided the islands sailed under the Peruvian flag, they were generally U.S.-built, and quite a few were staffed at least in part by U.S. citizens. This relative absence of Peruvians as sailors or captains, even on Peruvian-owned ships, had development significance. In addition to Americans who served as masters and crew members on some of the ships, at least two U.S. physicians were enlisted in the Polynesian slaving operations. Maude believed that one of the latter was from a prominent Philadelphia family; the second ship's doctor sought the protection of the U.S. consul in Tahiti after he was arrested for participation in kidnapping.585

By contrast with the significant U.S. role, Maude thought few Peruvians served on the ships and that only four vessels sailed under the command of

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584 Commercial Relations, 1863, p. 631.

585 Maude, Slavers in Paradise, p. 98.
Peruvian captains. One of the latter was Miguel Grau, an exceptionally important figure in Peruvian history, who was apprenticed in the U.S. whaling industry at age twelve. Grau later became a leader of the Civilista Party and Peru's greatest naval hero, a martyr of the War of the Pacific.

An American by the name of B. D. Clark was one of two initiators of the entire enterprise. While information about Clark's background is sketchy, he seems to have been more a schemer and adventurer than legitimate businessman, as was the case also of his Irish partner, Joseph C. Byrne. Clark's role was enhanced after Byrne died on the initial recruiting voyage, which presumably left the American as the senior administrator of the labor recruitment syndicate formed with funds from a group of Peruvian investors.

Byrne and Clark had been kicking around Australia and New Zealand, both largely failing at their respective enterprise promotion efforts, which, in

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586 The international character of the raids was reflected in the crews of the ships, which Maude thought usually included few Peruvians. The crew of the Empresa, for example, was composed of two men from the United States, four British citizens, four Italians, two Spaniards, two Chileans, and one each from Greece, Portugal, France and Malta (Maude, p. 33). Typically, once a ship reached the islands, one or more foreign residents familiar with the local scene were contracted to assist with the “recruiting” and paid a commission for each laborer secured. For example, an American from New York living in Tahiti, Byron Lee Knapp, was hired as the labor procurement agent for both the Barbara Gomez and the Mercedes A. de Wholey, at a salary of $82 a month plus about two dollars for each Polynesian man and woman shipped to Callao (Maude, pp. 26-27).

587 Grau was a career naval officer, but he was twice forced out of the Peruvian navy for his political activities, in 1857-1863 and 1865-1867, at which times he worked in the merchant marine (Basadre, Historia, V, pp. 2337-2338). It was during the first of his civilian stints that Grau was enlisted to command the 189-ton brigantine, Apurímac, for a raid on the Northern Cook group of islands. While anchored off Tongareva atoll in November 1862, Grau's ship was destroyed on the reef during a storm. Local villagers helped the crew salvage some of their provisions, which Grau placed in the care of a mission teacher on Tongareva. Maude found a letter in the archives of the London Missionary Society that Grau left behind with instructions for the teacher (p. 45 and note 2, chapter seven, p. 202). The story of Grau’s apprenticeship on a U.S. whaleship is told in Jorge Ortiz Sotelo, Miguel Grau, el hombre y el mar (Lima: Fondo Editorial del Congreso del Perú, 2003). pp. 47 and following.
Byrne's case, included several unfulfilled immigration contracts. Meanwhile, the U.S. Civil War was driving up the price of cotton and other commodities, prompting coastal agriculturalists in Peru to expand production and intensifying their competition for unskilled labor. Responding to pressure from both landowners and the labor contractor for Chincha Islands guano operations, the Peruvian legislature in March 1861 overturned President Ramón Castilla's veto of a law lifting some restrictions that had been placed on further importation of Asian contract labor.

Hearing of this new Peruvian opportunity in the bondsmen trade, Byrne and Clark went into partnership and sailed for Lima. There they persuaded a group of investors headed by a sometime Barreda partner in the U.S. guano consignment trade, Juan Manuel de Ugarte, to finance a labor recruiting operation in Melanesia. The syndicate contracted the 151-ton ship _Adelante_ which, although Peruvian-flagged, was led by a U.S. captain, August Grassman, and run by a largely foreign crew. The ship's chief officer also was from the United States.\(^{588}\) While the _Adelante_ was en route to Melanesia, Byrne discovered quite by accident that a French ship had just recruited a group of natives from Tongareva to go work sugar cane plantations in Tahiti. Tongareva, also called Penrhyn Island or Mangarongaro, was the largest atoll in the Northern Cook Islands and much closer to Peru than Melanesia.

For Byrne and Clark, this coincidence was fortuitous, since Maude's research showed that Tongareva was probably the only island in all of Polynesia

\(^{588}\) Maude, _Slavers in Paradise_, p. 5.
where residents had compelling reasons to hire themselves out as temporary contract laborers. First, many were starving after disease had blighted their coconut palms. And, second, a group of teachers sent from the London Missionary Society were urging their Tongarevan converts to go abroad to earn money for construction of a church. During nine days at Tongareva, Byrne induced eighty-three men and a similar number of women to board the *Adelante*, along with forty-nine children and thirty-eight infants. The "recruits" were told they would be going to work on another Pacific island. While acknowledging that they had no notion that they were destined for South America or what sort of labor awaited them, Maude opined that these Tongarevans were "recruited without deceit," unlike the many hundreds who subsequently were kidnapped or tricked into volunteering for Peru.\(^{589}\) Such were the fine legal distinctions used to provide a fig leaf of legitimacy in the Pacific human labor trade.

When the *Adelante* reached Callao, the Peruvian syndicate sold the Polynesians for prices ranging from about one hundred dollars for children to

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589 See table 8, p. 193. Maude's criteria for distinguishing which Polynesians were kidnapped, which were tricked into sailing for Peru through "misrepresentation," and which were "recruited without deceit" seem overly legalistic. By any reasonable standard of informed consent, Maude's own evidence shows that almost none of the Polynesians went to work in Peru voluntarily. Furthermore, it was never the intention of any of the slavers (or those who purchased the workers' contracts in Peru) to live up to the letter or the spirit of Peruvian law regarding the rights of contracted Asians. To assume adherence to any legal or moral framework would be similar to assuming that slaves or Indians in Peru were well treated because their rights were spelled out in law. Although Maude was moved to undertake his research by evident respect and affection for the Polynesians, his clinical language sometimes gives his text a tone that seems inappropriately and heartlessly jargonistic. For example, in characterizing the decimation of from 24 percent to 79 percent of the population on thirteen different islands, he coldly noted the "disruption of their social structure." At a key moment in detailing the fate of the Polynesians in Peru, based upon a study commissioned by French authorities, Maude abruptly stopped with this sentence: "There is no point in continuing this harrowing narrative through the remaining areas visited [by the investigators]." Such interruption in his meticulous reconstruction of events was at variance with the rich detail offered elsewhere.
two hundred dollars for adult males. This was considerably below the contemporary rate for Chinese bondsmen or the price of African slaves sold a decade earlier. Yet, after deducting costs of about ten thousand dollars, the enterprise had netted a profit of perhaps three hundred percent in only four months. As word of this windfall spread, other speculators joined in competition with Clark’s syndicate, and a small Peruvian flotilla raced the Adelante back to scour Polynesia for native labor. Among the competitors in the raids was the Callao customs broker and contraband specialist discussed in chapter seven, Henry Higginson, who chartered the ship Guillermo.590

Most of the ships joining in the slave raids were U.S.-built but in poor condition. One may have been used formerly in the African slave trade, and a few others may have seen service in the Chinese coolie trade. But most were crudely converted for slaving by having iron grates hinged over the hatches. These were designed as simple trap doors, which could be quickly closed and bolted once a group of natives was enticed aboard ship and taken below deck. Captains tried to attract natives to their ships by offering fish hooks, mirrors, tools, clothing and other goods for sale or barter. Indeed, once the Adelante discharged the first load of Polynesians, captains and their business partners dropped all pretense of actually recruiting workers for contract labor. The element of surprise was deemed key to a profitable voyage. Each crew hoped to

590 Maude (p. 60.) did not otherwise identify Higginson or give his first name, but he was almost certainly the corrupt “Enriquito” Higginson described in chapter seven.
find natives on an island that had not yet experienced a slave raid, so that people would not be wary of visiting on board their ship.

One of the most detailed eyewitness accounts of how the slaving was undertaken came from George S. Nichols, a Massachusetts-born carpenter who eventually deserted his ship and expressed remorse for his role.\textsuperscript{591} Nichols’s testimony was especially valuable because he was a participant in the most devastating of all the raids, an eight-ship assault on Rapa Nui. Better known in the United States as Easter Island, Rapa Nui was the island closest to Peru and had an estimated population of 4,126 in 1862, the largest in Polynesia. Rapa Nui is well known in U. S. culture for the oft-published images of its stone monoliths, enormous head figures standing like rows of sentinels.

Like many Pacific islanders, the people of Rapa Nui had cause to be wary of visiting ships. Time and again, contact between exuberant natives and Western sailors resulted in misunderstandings, angry fights and sometimes violence. In the wake of each incident, some islanders were determined to avoid foreigners; but curiosity and the thrill of interacting with these strange visitors overcame the doubts of others, including rambunctious children who had no memory of previous incidents. Now in 1862, the islanders faced a dangerous small armada of ships from Peru. When most islanders declined to go on board any of the ships, the eight competitors resolved to act in concert, forming from their crews an expeditionary force of about eighty armed men led by their

\textsuperscript{591} Nichols’s background and regret are mentioned in footnote 12 of chapter three, Maude, \textit{Slavers in Paradise}, p. 199.
respective captains. The natives seized were to be apportioned according to the number of men each ship provided to the raiding party. Two days before Christmas, 1862, the captains assembled their men on the beach at Hangaroa Bay at 7:30 a.m. Piecing together various accounts, Maude described the scene. Most in the attacking force were “dispersed to wander about as inconspicuously as possible in the neighborhood of the beach area.” Meanwhile, some captains and seamen “spread out a selections of trinkets, such as necklaces, mirrors and other knick-knacks on the shore.” Incited by curiosity and desire, about 500 islanders began to gather around this display: "most on their knees examining the goods." As arranged beforehand, a captain named Marutani fired his revolver in the air, “whereupon the armed crews followed suit with a simultaneous volley.” The ensuing panic turned deadly. “[The] confusion which arouse was such that some of the sailors lost their heads and, fearing an attack, killed at least ten of the islanders. The rest of the crowd fled in all directions, shouting and screaming.”

Some of those who tried to hide were gunned down. At the end of the onslaught, over two hundred natives were bound hand and foot by the raiders. Before distributing the islanders, their captors labeled them with distinctive marks, and some were tattooed on the forehead. This was similar to practice followed in Peru, where some Chinese bondsmen were branded on the face by hot irons to facilitate recovery of runaways.592

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Altogether, between June 1862 and July 1863, more than 3,600 Polynesians were "recruited" for labor in Peru, with 1,407 of those taken from Easter Island alone. The majority died in Peru during the ensuing months.

MANUEL PARDO’S TRAFFICKING SYNDICATE

Thanks to the work of Stewart, Meagher, Maude and the scholars of nineteenth-century Peruvian coastal agriculture, a great deal is known about how Chinese labor was procured, transported and put to work in Peru. What has not been well studied are the Peruvian entrepreneurs who formed partnerships to engage in what critics considered slaving: paying the brokers in Macao, chartering the ships to bring the bondsmen across and then selling them in Callao. If William Grace’s figures were correct when he told his brother, “There is lots of money in the business,” it was a lucrative trade, with high profit margins more than compensating for the danger of shipboard rebellions and approximately ten percent mortality en route. The death rate in transit was factored in as a cost of the business, a measure of how Peruvian entrepreneurs viewed labor.

Fortunately, Ulrich Muecke has published some data from accounts of one member of a trafficking syndicate, Felipe Barreda’s son-in-law and future Peruvian president, Manuel Pardo, son of Felipe Pardo y Aliaga, the man who got Barreda on his guano journey by sending him to London in 1848. The alliance between the Barreda/Osma clan and the Pardo/Lavalle clan is the

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593 Maude, Slavers in Paradise, tables 2 and 3, pp. 186-188.
Manuel Pardo’s involvement in the Barredas’ guano business will be discussed in the next chapter. Since Pardo is often described as “liberal” and a reformer, it is important to try to understand his views on labor – slave, Chinese and Indian – in Peruvian development, in addition to his relationship to the coolie trade.

Manuel Pardo’s grandfather was a senior royal official, and his grandmother brought aristocratic heritage into the Barreda social network. His father was fifteen when the family fled back to Spain around the time of San Martín’s declaration of Peruvian independence, returning about seven years later to take charge of an inheritance. Felipe Pardo y Aliaga became one of his generation’s most important conservative leaders, both in politics and literature. In 1832 he married a granddaughter of one of late colonial Peru’s most important traffickers in African slaves, José Antonio Lavalle y Cortes. Pardo y Aliaga was exiled numerous times and developed a special relationship with Chile, from where he mobilized Peruvian support for Chile’s wars of intervention against the Confederación Perú-Boliviana of Andrés de Santa Cruz. Pardo y Aliaga’s white supremacy was on full display when he satirized Santa Cruz in verse for having a cholo phenotype and ridiculed people who spoke Spanish with a Quechua

594 For a summation of conventional wisdom on Pardo as a liberal, see Gootenberg, Imagining Development, pp. 71-73. Gootenberg’s own assessment that Pardo “exemplified the ‘new generation’ liberals of the 1860s” and that the party he founded was “the liberal civilian party” seems rooted in the author’s focus on “free trade” or “export liberalism.” I use the term in its broader democratic and reform meaning and will argue that Pardo was an administrative reformer who lacked a liberal vision. It seems to me that José Gálvez was the “martyr of Peruvian liberalism” (p. 73), not Pardo. Gálvez championed the whole range of liberal reforms, from abolition of slavery and the death penalty to direct, universal suffrage, freedom of religion, free primary education, and a strong legislature to balance executive power. While not a conservative ideologue, Pardo was a pragmatist with few liberal convictions.
accent.595 This racial attitude must be kept in mind to understand the conservative nationalism596 that the Barreda network embodied and how it helped shape the development ideas of Manuel Pardo.

595 Pardo y Aliaga published his mid-1830s anti-Santa Cruz poem La Jeta (“The Mug,” as in “he looks ugly in his mug shot”) under the “humorous” pseudonym of Monsieur Alonse Chunca Capac Yupanqui, with a dedication in Quechua-corrupted Spanish to la muy noble y augusta señora la Cacica de Calaumana, referring to Santa Cruz’s mestiza mother, Juana Basilia Calahumana. See Jorge Basadre, La iniciación de la república: contribución al estudio de la evolución política y social del Perú, v. 2 (facsimile republication of the nineteenth century work, Lima: Fondo Editorial de la UNMSM, 2002), pp. 51-52. Santa Cruz’s father was Español criollo from Huamanga (Ayacucho), and, in fact, any cholo features he had were not pronounced. Hence, Pardo y Aliaga had to highlight an impure ancestry rather than simply mock Santa Cruz’s phenotype. A fetish over ancestry became a hallmark of the Barreda social network.

596 Cecilia Méndez noted regarding the character of this nationalism that, “Santa Cruz was more a foreigner for being Indian than for being Bolivian,” noting that his father was a Peruvian criollo born in Huamanga and that he had fought for Peruvian independence ever since San Martín’s arrival in Peru. She said that Pardo’s conception of nacionalidad peruana was rooted in un primordial rechazo al elemento indígena. Méndez, “Incas sí, indios no: apuntes para el estudio del nacionalismo criollo en el Perú,” Instituto de Estudios Peruanos Documento de Trabajo no. 56 (Lima: IEP, 1993), p. 15.
Chart 11.1
Pardo/Lavalle and Barreda/Osma Marriages
1859 and 1864
As a result of Pardo y Aliaga’s ties to Chile, his son was partially raised and educated there. After university study in Spain and France, Manuel Pardo got his first business experience co-managing the Hacienda Villa estate his cousin inherited. The importance of Villa and the friendship between Pardo and José Antonio de Lavalle y Arias de Saavedra were mentioned in chapter eight in relation to the building of the Chorrillos railway. There were three important developments in succession while Pardo worked at Villa. Slavery was abolished in 1854, and Lavalle became eligible for a large government indemnity for 241 slaves he claimed to own. Retaining the newly-freed labor force must have been an interesting business challenge for Pardo, given the estate’s close proximity to Lima’s large black community. That same year, Lavalle married Pardo’s sister, Mariana. And, just the year before, Pardo began investing in the coolie trade in partnership with José Barrón and Peru’s largest trafficker in Chinese bondsmen, José Canevaro. The firm was called Canevaro, Pardo y Barrón. Pardo and Barrón were the active partners and invested 20,000 pesos each. Canevaro put up more or less 150,000 pesos, mostly in IOUs but also including 30,000 pesos in cash. Pardo and these coolie partners later held the guano consignment for the Holland market.

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597 See Quiroz, *La deuda defraudada*, p. 194. Quiroz said Canevaro’s participation was 162,000, but the cash and notes he cited added to only 142,000. Perhaps one role in the company for Pardo and Barrón was to go out and collect on some of those personal loans that made up most of Canevaro’s investment. Because of the amount and character of the capital contributed, I have assumed here that Canevaro was the Italian-born father, and not his son, who is often cited as José F. Canevaro. The latter married into the Barreda social network in 1871 (see appendix chart).

598 Quiroz, *Corrupt Circles*, p. 148.
Manuel Pardo fell ill and on doctor’s instructions moved to the clear Central Andean air of Jauja, a story discussed in chapter thirteen in relation to railroads. But he remained heavily invested in the coolie trade. As seen in the next chapter (tables 12.1 and 12.2), by the mid-1860s, most of Manuel Pardo’s assets were in trafficking Chinese bondsmen, the guano trade and government bonds. In 1863 he went into partnership with Canevaro’s son, José F. Canevaro, and José Sevilla and Carlos Delgado para negociaciones sobre China de colonos o mercaderías.\textsuperscript{599} Pardo and his new coolie trade partners in 1863 purchased three ships, Camilo Cavour, Perseverancia and Napoleón Canevaro, to bring servants from Macao, and over the next ten years he probably made more profit from selling Chinese than from his better-known guano investments.\textsuperscript{600} His coolie trade assets were listed as 31,069 pesos in 1864 and jumped to 105,382 pesos two years later.

Apart from personal profit, how did Pardo understand the place of the Chinese in Peru’s development? Believing that their country was underdeveloped partly because it was underpopulated, and having mostly contempt for Indian, black and Asian labor, Peruvian elites sometimes debated the need for immigration and looked with envy upon the attraction of United States and Argentina for European migrants. Throughout the guano era, there was only one dynamic immigration sector – the Chinese one Pardo was

\textsuperscript{599} Ibid. Pardo’s share in the partnership was 31,078 pesos; Sevilla had 64,864 pesos and Delgado 43,245 pesos; Quiroz did not give a figure for Canevaro, who was the son of Pardo’s 1853 partner.

\textsuperscript{600} Muecke, p. 33-34.
conducting. A project bringing fifty-eight Basque families to Peru in 1860 afforded Pardo an opportunity to discuss the place of Chinese bondsmen in the country’s development.

He opened the article rather defensively with all manner of praise for the Basque people, referring to the immigrants’ ship, the Asie, as bearing Peru a “precious” human cargo from la Madre Patria.601 Besides bringing to Peru the “dominant” characteristics of all Spaniards, which he said included honesty, morality and nobility, Basques were known for their amor al trabajo, which Pardo thought was product of their particular geography and commercial position. Nevertheless, Pardo said he wanted to contest the opinion of those who thought Peru should prohibit any nonwhite immigration to Peru (i.e., either there should be immigration carried out con gente blanca y de ojos azules o prohibise en lo absoluto), thereby denying Peru’s agriculture and national industry el recurso de colonos chinos. No doubt referring to management of Hacienda Villa, Pardo said that his own practical knowledge of the “needs and special circumstances of our agriculture” showed that during the past ten years the socorro of Chinese bondsmen had been indispensable. The labor shortage was due to manumission, Pardo advised foreign readers in a footnote, as freed slaves abandoned haciendas for the cities. Manuel Salcedo, the Peruvian importer of the Basque laborers, had invested in irrigation canals to open new land to cotton, but most Peruvian coastal estate owners could not offer such opportunities to European immigrants,

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he wrote. Europeans who came to Peru indentured, he suggested, would find it easy to break their contracts.\textsuperscript{602} Implicit was the point that it was easier to keep Chinese – marked by phenotype and culture – in bondage.

It is hard to find in Manuel Pardo’s writing on labor the concerns of a liberal. On the contrary, he evidenced some of the racial attitudes of his father in trying to reassure readers that the Chinese workers would not contaminate Peru. He claimed that all estate owners using Chinese bondsmen could testify that los colonos asiáticos no se han propagado en el Perú, y que es rarísimo el caso de cruzamiento con las otras razas. By his own definition, Pardo was not a liberal. He expressed annoyance with the liberal/conservative debates, which he felt were polarizing discussion on policy questions such as the labor requirements of agriculture. Without denying the importance of “principles” (a slight bow to liberals), he presented himself as a pragmatist.\textsuperscript{603}

Even as Pardo was writing his essay, it began to appear that what he termed the “generous” terms the Spaniards were offered would prove inadequate to keep European labor on a Peruvian hacienda. Within days of the arrival of the European colonos at Salcedo’s Talambo cotton estate, the immigration effort began to unravel. About half of the Basques refused to work

\textsuperscript{602} He wrote that, es muy difícil obtener inmigración europea que … cumpla con sus contratos, tan fáciles de eludir … entre nosotros. Ibid., p. 146.

\textsuperscript{603} He was offering his voice of reason, he suggested, at a moment when nadie puede ser en Lima sino conservador o liberal. Ibid., p. 144.
for Salcedo, and things went downhill from there. In response, Pardo devoted a large part of his article to defending the specific terms of the contract that Salcedo’s labor recruiter in Spain had offered the immigrants.

Given the war with Spain that followed, it was ironic that Pardo indignantly attacked the Spanish consul in Lima for trying to prevent the emigration of the Basque families. The Spanish official warned his countrymen not to be fooled by seductive promises by a Peruvian contractor that would reduce them to *otras tantas víctimas sacrificadas a la ambición personal*. According to Pardo, this anti-Peruvian propaganda caused a Bilbao newspaper to report that *los negros de Lima se apresaban a comprar blancos españoles*. Well, maybe not; but within three years this guano dream of a wave of European immigration had exploded violently in Peru’s face, providing Pardo’s beloved *Madre Patria* a pretext to seize the Chinchas Islands, attempt to appropriate the guano treasure and wage war on Peru and Chile. The effect of this disaster made it all the easier politically for Pardo and his partners to continue importing Chinese labor. In December of 1873, toward the end of the second year of his presidency, Pardo’s account books showed his trafficking assets as worth 118,109 pesos (chapter thirteen).

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604 For a satirical account of the Talambo debacle see Juan de Arona [Pedro Paz Soldán y Unanue], *La inmigración en el Perú: monografía histórico-crítica* (Lima: Imprenta del Universo de Carlos Prince, 1891), pp. 78-81. For an emotional defense of Talambo owner Manuel Salcedo, together with relevant documents, see J. G. R. [José García Robledo], *La cuestión talambo ante la América* (Lima: Imprenta del “Comercio” por J. M. Monterola, 1864).

The year following his article on Chinese bondsmen, Pardo chastised liberals as they drafted a new penal code for their timidity in not making vagrancy a criminal offence. Idleness, he thought, was an assault on the material and moral progress of a nation, and ever since the “political earthquake of 1820” Peru was becoming more lawless. He cited a recent estimate that 1,600 people frequented gambling dens daily in Lima. Vagrancy, he argued, was the cause of crime, again posing the problem in racial terms. “Is not idleness in the white race and [mixed groups],” he asked rhetorically, “the constant encouragement of the spirit of sedition and revolt, and which in the inferior races always leads to crime?” Peru should follow Germany and el mundo civilizado in arresting vagrants and imposing the penalty of hard labor (detención forzosa con el trabajo) and, perhaps, industrial training.606

This mid-nineteenth-century Peruvian development approach, with its abundant capital combined with unrestrained importing (chapter eight) and unfree labor (this chapter), needs a name. Perhaps there is a more suitable label, but one might call it the Barreda/Pardo development model.

CHAPTER 12

MANUEL PARDO AND THE “NATIONAL CAPITALISTS”

Politics in this country is not for decent people.
Felipe Barreda
1866

There has been much talk in the family about leaving the country.
Felipe Barreda
1869

There was a paradox in the congressionally-mandated auditing that ended Federico Barreda’s career as Peru’s U.S. guano empresario. The inspector sent to the United States proved incorruptible, while an incompetent sent to London gave the Gibbs firm a clean bill of health. Yet Gibbs control of the British market was about to end, and Felipe Barreda used the wealth and power he earned from the U.S. market as a trampoline to grab the larger prize. Then he put his new son-in-law, Manuel Pardo, in charge.

In 1860 Barreda backed an ambitious multi-market guano consignment bid headed by Julián Zaracondegui, the successor consignee for the U.S. market. But, Gibbs had large quantities of guano stockpiled in Britain, perhaps in part to discourage this eventuality. The Peruvian government stipulated that Gibbs could continue to sell these stocks until May 1862. Only then would remaining guano be transferred to the Barreda/Zaracondegui group, which would have to advance payment to Gibbs of all costs of bringing it into Britain, plus interest. This increased risk and added up-front costs effectively sabotaged the contract
that had been awarded in return for a loan to the government. Throughout 1861, various coalitions of Peruvian merchants labored to put together a new deal, with Felipe Barreda always in the mix. Eight years later, many of the firms engaged in the 1861 deal-making efforts would come together in an epic political battle over guano, styling themselves as Perú’s captialistas nacionales.

Meanwhile, Felipe Barreda’s brother-in-law, José Joaquín de Osma was now Peruvian minister in Spain, and the government instructed him to search out a European partner for the Peruvians who could give them the financial heft to take over from Gibbs. That effort dragged on, and back in Lima Manuel Pardo, who married Barreda’s daughter Mariana in 1859, took a more visible role in putting together the deal that was finally worked out in late 1861 and the first weeks of 1862. In addition to Barreda and Pardo, the Peruvian group taking over the British market included Clemente Ortiz de Villate, Carlos Delgado y Moreno, Felipe Gordillo and José F. Canevaro, the latter being one of Manuel Pardo’s partners in trafficking Chinese indentured servants.607 The European firm that Osma found for them to partner with was Thomson Bonar & Co. of London. Thus was born the Compañía Nacional Consignataria, with diplomat Osma assigned the Peruvian firm’s power of attorney in Great Britain. Organization of this guano consignment syndicate also marked the beginning of transfer of the core Barreda group’s business management to the next generation, for Pardo

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607 Witt said that this José Canevaro was the father, but he was born in Italy and therefore not an hijo del país. More likely the Canevaros participated through his son, José Francisco Canevaro Valega. Both men were Manuel Pardo’s coolie trade partners. To see how the Canevaros were connected to the Barreda network beyond business affairs, observe in the appendix chart how the female Laos Elguera and Laos Argüelles sisters/cousins were a kind of social yarn knitting the Canevaros to the group.
took control as the company’s *gerente*. Profits made in the U.S. guano market had allowed Peruvians to assume a more prominent economic role, even though they relied on a significant degree of European financing.  

**BARREDA AND PARDO INVESTING**

As his brother Federico did in the United States, Felipe Barreda looked about for ways to invest his guano profits in Peru. Perhaps his most important use of his U.S. profits was his investment in Manuel Pardo. One might call the financial arrangements in his two daughters’ 1859 marriages “U.S. guano market dowries.” One was successful, the other a failure.

Felipe Barreda seemed most comfortable investing in partnerships with friends. He was not a pioneering or high-risk entrepreneur, and, it will be recalled, Heinrich Witt was not impressed with his abilities as a merchant. Like many a nineteenth-century U.S. investor, Barreda sought options that had state backing. The most common such arrangement in Peru, following colonial practice, was to obtain an exclusive right over some activity. His role in putting

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608 Heraclio Bonilla said that the group’s financial dependence on Thompson Bonar called into question their claim to be national capitalists. “In reality, the domination of British capital was not only exercised directly, through their own agents, but also through their Peruvian partners.” See his *Guano y burguesía en el Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1974), pp. 44-45. However, by such a distinction there almost could be no such thing as national capitalists, since there are always elements of mutual dependence in international economic relationships. Peruvians utilized the state to gain a measure of control over the industry and direct a share of the profits to themselves.

609 In addition to the 100,000 peso dowry for Mariana’s marriage to Manuel Pardo, Felipe Barreda and Carmen de Osma gave the same amount for daughter Isabel’s 1859 marriage to Manuel Mendoza y Boza (appendix chart), who squandered the money. Upon his death twenty years later, he left Isabel with debts that Carmen de Osma paid off.
together the Chorrillos railway deal was an example (chapter eight). While this required good ties to people in government, Barreda was discrete in his relationships with Peru’s caudillos. Only his friendship with Ramón Castilla stands out, and even that was conducted mainly at the social level, through private dinners and the like. In 1866, when Matilde, his brother Federico’s wife, wrote to complain of her husband’s preoccupation with the intrigue of diplomacy in Washington and Europe, Felipe Barreda answered her that he too disliked Federico’s post-guano career choice. Peruvian enemies of the Compañía Nacional Consignataria syndicate were making all sorts of accusations against Federico in order to discredit the Barreda group in Peru, Felipe thought. “You can well understand how disagreeable these occurrences have been for me,” he said, adding that, “politics in this country is not for decent people.”

Manuel Pardo’s debut in politics in the mid-1860s could be seen in isolation as a son following in his father’s footsteps and against the preference of father-in-law Felipe Barreda. But, Felipe’s complaints notwithstanding, the Barreda group’s non-political facade was eroding, and the mask would be completely removed by the end of the decade. Thereafter, Felipe Barreda’s concern about Manuel Pardo’s political role seemed to be that of a worried father lamenting the stress that politics put on his daughter.

Since Manuel Pardo’s emergence as an important business figure was made possible by Felipe Barreda, Carmen de Osma and their daughter, and since he probably received investment advise from his father-in-law, the business

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610 Sherman, p. 187.
activities of the future president may have reflected types of businesses in which Barreda himself invested.\textsuperscript{611} The two men co-founded the Banco del Perú in 1863, and Manuel Pardo initially held 100,000 pesos of its shares (probably subscribed only to 50,000 or less).\textsuperscript{612}

In the early 1870s, Pardo diversified into railroads, private companies and real estate by borrowing heavily and selling some of his government bonds. According to Ulrich Muecke’s study of his accounts, he began taking out bank loans sometime before December 1871, and by the end of 1873 his debt to banks ballooned to 320,981 pesos, mostly to buy a sugar estate. This was the period of the formation of the Partido Civil, his successful campaign for the presidency and the moment when Felipe Barreda helped his daughter Mariana purchase Tumán, a sugar hacienda, for 404,000. Muecke suggested that Barreda’s role was temporary, since Pardo placed the property in his own account on his books and

\textsuperscript{611} Much of Pardo’s capital originated with his wife, Mariana Barreda y Osma, and, hence, Felipe Barreda and Carmen de Osma. Basadre wrote that Felipe Barreda made an 1872 gift of the Tumán estate to his daughter; Muecke disputed that, saying that Mariana Barreda purchased the estate, and that it did not first pass through the hands of her father. Basadre cited a notarized document signed May 25, 1872, whereas Muecke cited one done three days later. In any case, this would seem to be a dispute more about form than substance, since most of the capital that made Manuel Pardo’s investments possible unquestionably came from his in-laws through his wife. Manuel Pardo kept account of his wife’s funds separate from his own on his ledgers, and by December, 1871, he owed her account almost 400,000 pesos, a jump of almost fifty percent from the year before. This fact, of course, does not discount Pardo’s own investment decisions. Muecke doubted the probably apocryphal story that, upon being mortally wounded in 1878, Manuel Pardo gasped that he was dying a poor man. The story may have been concocted by Civilistas who believed that the president’s family should be indemnified for their loss and/or to convince people that Pardo did not use his office to further enrich himself. The business figures analyzed by Muecke end in 1873, so the published data do not show how badly Pardo may have been hurt in the 1870s financial crisis. Basadre credited later development of the Tumán estate into an important sugar producer to Pardo’s sons, especially Felipe Pardo y Barreda during 1881-1890.

\textsuperscript{612} Carlos Cambrúi Alcázar, \textit{Historia de los bancos en el Peru (1860-1879)} (Lima: no pub., 1957), p. 41.
took out two large mortgages, one from the Banco de Crédito Hipotecario for 300,000 pesos and another from merchant Carlos Delgado for 125,000 pesos (Delgado was one of his partners in Chinese trafficking). As a result, the book value of his real estate, at 557,127 pesos, now dwarfed all his other investments, and his debt to Mariana Barreda doubled to almost 400,000 pesos – a strong indication that the money to purchase Tumán did, indeed, come from Felipe Barreda and Carmen de Osma. Pardo was betting a good portion of his modest fortune on the future of Peru’s sugar export industry which depended, to a significant degree, on imported Chinese labor. Perhaps he wished to have a challenging business for himself and his sons to operate in the future. The assumption of these debts reduced his net worth shown in his account books from a high of 466,869 pesos at the end of 1870 to only 273,434 at the close of the following year.613

613 The reliability of some of these figures is questionable. For example, despite variation among accounts and a general increase in both assets and liabilities, Pardo’s books showed his net worth in 1873 to be virtually identical to that for 1871, differing by only 90 pesos, and even that tiny difference disappeared when a clerical error was corrected. This seems highly improbable and suggests numbers were manipulated to produce an outcome or mostly carried forward without recalculation. By then, of course, Pardo was president of Peru.
Table 12.1
Manuel Pardo
Selected Investment Accounts, 1864-1873
(Pesos)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Guano</th>
<th>Chinese Trafficking</th>
<th>Government Bonds</th>
<th>Railroads &amp; Companies</th>
<th>Real Estate &amp; Other Property</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1864</td>
<td>14,324</td>
<td>-10,814</td>
<td>71,567</td>
<td></td>
<td>93,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1864</td>
<td>128,127</td>
<td>31,069</td>
<td>43,520</td>
<td></td>
<td>68,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1866</td>
<td>120,350</td>
<td>105,382</td>
<td>174,751</td>
<td>6,823</td>
<td>77,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1868</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>69,318</td>
<td>168,998</td>
<td>30,185</td>
<td>84,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1870</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>101,951</td>
<td>131,229</td>
<td>91,518</td>
<td>109,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1870</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>77,603</td>
<td>57,928</td>
<td>216,344</td>
<td>89,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1871</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>110,686</td>
<td>56,235</td>
<td>239,019</td>
<td>98,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1873</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>118,109</td>
<td>46,985</td>
<td>231,528</td>
<td>557,127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This simplified table is constructed from Muecke, table 1.1, pp. 32-33. Guano and Chinese figures are net (credit minus debit). “Railroads” probably referred mainly to railroad bonds, although Pardo did invest directly in one smaller rail project.

Table 12.2
Manuel Pardo
Debt, Losses and Net Worth, 1864-1873
(Pesos)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Loan Balances, Business Losses &amp; Other Liabilities</th>
<th>Debt to Wife’s Account</th>
<th>Net Worth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1864</td>
<td>-101,543</td>
<td>-2,442</td>
<td>257,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1864</td>
<td>-69,035</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>256,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1866</td>
<td>-152,761</td>
<td>-2,980</td>
<td>370,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1868</td>
<td>22,447</td>
<td>-104,054</td>
<td>395,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1870</td>
<td>36,976</td>
<td>-203,309</td>
<td>425,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1870</td>
<td>71,771</td>
<td>-203,309</td>
<td>466,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1871</td>
<td>-67,573</td>
<td>-398,941</td>
<td>273,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1873</td>
<td>-441,308</td>
<td>-398,941</td>
<td>273,434</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Muecke, table 1.1, pp. 32-33. The loans column here combines categories of personal loans, unpaid participating interests, bank loans, business losses and miscellaneous liabilities. Net worth is the category of “capital” which was all assets minus all liabilities. The big jump in debt between 1871 and 1873 included an increase in bank loans from 88,574 pesos to 320,981 pesos. (Pardo’s accounts from 1871 were in soles, but Muecke converted the figures shown here to pesos.) As can be seen by comparing the 1871 and 1873 figures in both tables, real estate and loans accounted for almost all of the difference, while listed net worth remained constant.
Manuel Pardo and Federico Barreda played key roles during Peru’s mid-1860s war with Spain. They helped Peru purchase arms, Barreda in the United States and both men in Europe. Barreda and Chilean envoy Benjamín Vicuña
Mackenna also recruited former Confederate navy officers to help lead a combined Peruvian-Chilean armada against Spain. Barreda hoped that his diplomatic service to bolster Peru’s armed forces would earn him gratitude in Lima, repairing, at least in part, the damage to his reputation done in the late 1850s by critics of his alleged corrupt guano profiteering in the United States. But some of those same antagonists leveled new charges against him, claiming that Federico, as his brother wrote, had “robbed millions in the loans and in the purchase of the warships.” Guillermo Bogardus accused Barreda and Manuel Pardo, who became finance minister in 1865 after heading the Barreda group’s guano syndicate, of corrupt mismanagement of loans floated in Europe to finance Peru’s military buildup.

At minimum, Manuel Pardo had a serious conflict of interest when acting as the government’s fiscal agent in Europe, since about 2.3 million pesos from the bond issues were used to pay off advances plus interest to the government from his own Compañía Nacional Consignataria. According to an 1868 report to the legislature, Peru’s foreign debt exploded to 42.2 million, most from loans arranged by Pardo and Barreda, and now required an astronomical 7.1 million in debt service per year. Six years earlier, Pardo wrote an article warning that excessive importing had pushed Peru’s trade deficit out of control. Now, he

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614 The story of Peru’s Yanquis del Sur is wonderfully narrated by David Werlich in Admiral of the Amazon: John Randolph Tucker, His Confederate Colleagues and Peru (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1990).

615 December, 1866, letter from Felipe Barreda to Federico’s wife, Matilde, referring to accusations by Guillermo Bogardus, quoted in Sherman, p. 187.


617 The article, “Estudios sobre la provincia de Jauja,” will be discussed in the following chapter.
himself helped compound the deficit by loading Peru up on additional foreign
debt.

Bogardus also accused Barreda of vastly overpaying for two French
corvettes, with the implication that he took kickbacks. The Peruvian government
formed a commission of fiscal agents that investigated the charges and then
initiated a lawsuit against the Compañía Nacional Consignataria and its British
partner. Both Barreda and Pardo published replies in their defense, but Pardo
also claimed to be divesting himself of his interest in the company he had led.618
As seen in table 12.1, Pardo’s personal account books showed his guano assets as
120,350 soles in 1866, declining to 80,000 soles in 1868.

If Federico Barreda stole “millions” from Peru, where did the money go?
This is a question that surrounds many corruption allegations in nineteenth-
century Peruvian history. A host of individuals were alleged to have reaped
illicit fortunes, yet in some cases little evidence has shown up in the historical
record that their families acquired wealth on the imagined scale. In Barreda’s
case, readers must draw their own conclusions from contradictory facts. A
summary of his finances also can serve as a point of reference for estimating the
fortune that his brother was amassing in Peru.

There is no doubt that the luxurious lifestyle of the U.S. Barredas reached
heights of extravagance in the 1860s. When Federico received his second
appointment as minister to the United States in 1866, after concluding ship
purchases and loans in Europe, he left his wife, five children and Matilde’s two

618 The investigation and lawsuit were still very much alive when Pardo took office as president
in 1872, and he used his supposed divestiture as a legal and political shield when the matter came
before a meeting of his cabinet on October 4, 1872. Critics accused him of using the presidency to
twart justice. See Jorge Basadre, Peru: problema y posibilidad, y otros ensayos (Caracas: Biblioteca
spinster sisters in Paris where they entertained without apparent concern for the cost.\footnote{An idea of this Paris entertaining is found in a letter that José Antonio de Lavalle wrote to Manuel Pardo, his cousin, brother-in-law and “best friend.” Lavalle was in France with his wife Mariana (Pardo’s sister) and two of Felipe Barreda’s daughters, Pepita and Rosita. “Matilde Barreda receives regularly on Wednesday afternoons but she receives her close friends on Sunday evening.” He went on to describe usual Sunday guests as including members of the Mexican court of Maximilian and Carlota, including Gen. José López Urága, whom the nationalist government under Benito Juárez had declared a traitor (but later pardoned). Lavalle’s letter is quoted in Sherman, p. 190.}

On the other hand, in mid-1867, Barreda put his Newport mansion up for sale for $210,000, of which he hoped to obtain $100,000 in up-front cash. How severely had the U.S. Civil War hurt his investments? Did he need that money to cover expenses? If so, his need was not so urgent as to force him to lower the asking price when it failed to sell. Did he expect to make France his permanent home? He and his wife seemed uncertain about their long-term plans. In a letter to the family’s young business affairs manager in the United States sent the same month the property was put on the market, Matilde wrote, “If we return to the United States, I could not bear the thought that the house in Newport, having been built by Mr. Barreda himself, should be the property of any other person.”

Third, in a private letter to the manager of his U.S. accounts dated February 21, 1868, Barreda said, “I have no reason to fear any investigation of my proceedings,” meaning the naval purchases and loans.

Fourth, Barreda took the Newport mansion off the market in late 1867 after resigning as minister in Washington; and, when the Barredas returned to the United States for good in mid-1868, they were accompanied by “a mountain of luggage” and five servants, including a French cook. Barreda declined the offer of a New York friend to stay temporarily with his family rather than rent out a large number of hotel rooms. Did his U.S. manager, who relayed the offer
by telegram, believe the family needed to economize? Barreda seemed not to think so, as he fired off instructions from Paris to purchase all manner of things to get the Newport villa ready for them. In addition to horses, he asked that two grooms be hired, specifying that they be “white.” He ordered that his farm manager at the Drum Point property “put in order the vegetable garden, the chicken and pigeon houses and the flowers.” He wanted 1,500 pounds of Peruvian guano delivered to the farm. “Tell Brewster that I will want carriages – landau, basket, a light four-seater for me and perhaps a coupe Rockway.” This was not a man worried about any shortage of ready cash. “I will bring with me a coachman and probably a groom and three saddle horses that I bought at the [Paris] Exposition.” The market wagon should have “plenty of seats for all the servants to go to church.”

Indeed, once reestablished in Newport, the family entertained in grand style. Frederick Barreda Sherman reviewed their food market bills for August-October, 1868, which averaged $290 per week, not counting the produce and fowl from their own estate. He estimated that the family employed “over a dozen” servants. Sherman found a newspaper society column anticipating “a very full and brilliant season in America’s pet watering place and most attractive resort where the visitors are the best class of the true aristocracy – and nobody pretends but that America has its aristocracy.” No doubt the article pandered in keeping with local merchant boosterism, but one sentence particularly appealed to Federico’s pride: “Among the celebrities expected this season will be F. L. Barreda, owner of the most expensive villa in Newport.”

620 Ibid., pp. 201-202.
Fifth, in late 1868, Barreda purchased a Manhattan property on the corner of Madison Square and East Twenty-Fifth Street for $135,000, hired German-born architect Carl Pfeiffer, and proceeded to spend over $200,000 more on construction of a “townhouse” mansion with nineteen bedrooms, nine water-closets, six bathtubs, a drawing room for entertaining, separate formal and family dining rooms and a kitchen with a twelve-foot-long range and numerous separate rooms for pantry, vegetable cellar, meat cutting room, wine cellar, servants’ mess and a laundry with eight washtubs. Although he took out a $75,000 mortgage, with furnishings the New York home must have required an expenditure of about $275,000. During their winter months in New York, the Barredas also did considerable entertaining, including a dinner given in honor of family friend and former secretary of state, William Seward.621

Sixth, did Barreda actually earn a big commission he hoped for on an arms sale to Mexico? If so, could those funds have supported his rather reckless spending?

The question regarding Federico Barreda corruption is whether or not these expenses could have been paid from income earned from investing the approximately $400,000 in wealth that he had amassed at the end of his merchant days when he managed sales for the U.S. guano market, plus any additional income from speculation and/or the Mexican deal. His grandson found Barreda’s balance sheet for November 1868, and it showed that in the eleven ensuing years his net wealth had roughly doubled to about $800,000. He had almost $120,000 in bank deposits, and his stocks ($117,000), bonds ($241,000) and real estate ($266,000) were listed at cost, which, depending on U.S. economic

621 Ibid., pp. 202-204.
fortunes, could turn out to be conservative. We would need a study of when he acquired these assets in order to determine if there was a corrupt windfall during the mid-1860s purchase of ships and floating of Peruvian loans in Europe.\(^{622}\) He held $30,000 in bonds of the Barreda group’s guano consignment company, and he showed a cost of $58,262 for U.S.-floated Peruvian-Chilean conjoint bonds he owned with a face value of $100,000. Sherman said Barreda bought the latter when political controversy over the loan deal in Peru drove their price down, noting that the later Dreyfus Brothers loans allowed the Peruvian government to redeem the Peruvian-Chilean bonds in full.

A six percent return on $400,000 would produce $24,000 per year in income. His U.S. Treasury bonds paid five percent and some of his railroad bonds paid seven percent. But Sherman thought Barreda was speculating in railroad stock, most of which he said paid few or no dividends. Perhaps Barreda had done well in those speculations during the post-Civil War economic boom, selling stock at good profit to meet expenses. He had a few Baltimore properties that may have produced income, but most of his real estate earned nothing.

During his years as Peruvian minister in Washington and Europe, Peru paid Barreda $10,000 annually. Presumably the foreign ministry in Lima paid some of his official travel and office expenses, although in private letters he complained that he was assisting Peru diplomatically at considerable personal expense. He had the proceeds from sale of his previous New York home and his Washington residence that doubled as the Peruvian legation, but he sold first and perhaps the second at a loss.

\(^{622}\) Unfortunately, the limited financial information that is in the Barreda Papers at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale does not reveal much about these matters. In personal correspondence, Sherman’s grandson said he and his mother searched for papers I found missing at SIU but could find none. The grandson had assisted Sherman in organizing the Barreda papers.
In short, the question of corruption must be left open. Given the awesome level of his family’s consumption and the newest New York mansion, his assets in 1868 seem higher than one would expect, because he no longer conducted a business earning regular income. If he, Francisco de Rivero and Manuel Pardo stole from European operations, Federico’s share probably was not on the scale Bogardus alleged. But, it could have been on the order of one hundred thousand dollars or more. Historian Alfonso Quiroz doubted the accusations against Manuel Pardo, concluding that, “Pardo conducted his official affairs then [the Europe financing mission] and thereafter with uncommon transparency and honesty despite the failings of some of his business associates.”\footnote{Quiroz, Corrupt, p. 149.} It is not clear what evidence supports this statement.

In mid-1867, the constituent assembly passed a vote of no confidence in ministers Federico Barreda in the United States, Manuel Pardo’s father, José Pardo y Aliaga in Chile, and Francisco de Rivero in Great Britain and France. But, Barreda had already resigned his post. To indict the father but not the son had the odor of a political exemption given Manuel Pardo. While the issue of corruption requires much further study, there is no doubt that the charges placed a cloud over the business dealings and wealth of the Barredas and Pardos that their political enemies could and did exploit.

\textbf{BARREDA NEMISIS NICOLÁS DE PIÉROLA}

While running their U.S. guano monopoly, the Barredas were protected by Ramón Castilla. It was after becoming Peru’s minister in the United States, and while his brother and Manuel Pardo were securing the British guano market,
that Federico Barreda made reference to the caudillo’s support when he told his wife that he and his brother were in “President Ramón’s carriage.” Castilla left office near the end of 1862, but Barreda group involvement in the guano trade lasted another six years. The consignment system was brought to an end in 1869 by a new government after a hard-fought battle between those wanting to enhance the state’s economic development role, represented in the person of thirty-year-old Nicolás de Piérola, the minister of finance, and the Peruvian guano merchants, who tried to appropriate the mantle of economic nationalism by styling themselves Peru’s capitalistas nacionales.

Piérola had considerable public support in trying to bolster the financially strapped Peruvian government by switching from the consignment arrangement to a system of direct sale of the next two million tons of guano. Considerable public resentment had grown up among Peruvians who perceived that the guano consignees were accumulating great wealth. The great liberal leader of the early republic, Francisco Javier Martiátegui, suggested in 1869 that merchant fortunes had become “excessive.” But, instead of using tariffs to restrain imports, the reformers elected to use direct sales to guarantee new loans and generate for the government a hoped-for larger share of the revenues. When Peruvian merchants balked at the idea, the government mortgaged the guano

624 Sherman, p. 103.

625 Mariátegui, Anotaciones a la Historia del Perú independiente de don Mariano F. Paz-Soldán. p. 5. Without naming the Barredas or other guano consignees, Martiátegui contrasted the “excessive” merchant fortunes “today” of one million pesos or more with the more reasonable ones of the early republic, which he said were from 100,000 to 200,000 pesos.
trade to a French merchant and financier, Augusto Dreyfus, who allied with Peruvians not part of the consignee circle and received backing from the Société General de Paris in the amount of 70 million francs.\textsuperscript{626} The debate for and against the "Dreyfus Contract" was one of the seminal economic policy conflicts in Peru during the nineteenth century, probably second only to the earlier conflict over protectionism.

While Dreyfus and his Peruvian allies capitalized on popular resentment against the wealthy Barreda consignee syndicate, what appeared to carry the day for the Dreyfus group was the huge scale of the European financing and its promise of a more equitable sharing of guano wealth. Peruvians frustrated by limited economic development benefits that the guano bonanza appeared to bring the nation (and hurt by attendant inflation) got swept up in what became a feverish dream – the exchange of guano for something tangible: railroads and the prosperity that railroad building brought to Peru. Steam powered iron horses would bridge regions not integrated economically since the Incas were overthrown.\textsuperscript{627}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{626} Basadre, \textit{Historia}, v. 4, p. 1737.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{627} For a study of different economic visions, including detailed analysis of Manuel Pardo’s proposed railroad program, see Paul Gootenberg, \textit{Imagining Development: Economic Ideas in Peru’s “Fictitious Prosperity” of Guano, 1840-1880} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). For analysis of the inflationary pressures touched off by the guano bonanza, see Gootenberg’s article, “Carneros y Chuño: Price Levels in Nineteenth-Century Peru,” \textit{Hispanic American Historical Review}, 70, 1, (1990), pp. 1-56.}
Manuel Pardo had written the best-known study promoting the idea of a central Andean railroad, *Estudios sobre la provincia de Jauja*, published in 1860, just two years before he became manager of the Compañía Nacional Consignatarias guano consignment syndicate. Pardo’s relationship to railroads will be developed in the next chapter.

**CONSERVATIVE NATIONALISM OF THE HIJOS DEL PAÍS**

The Barreda group’s unsuccessful political attack on the *contrato Dreyfus* was based in Peruvian law. As explained in chapter seven, the Barredas gained control of the U.S. market with help of an 1849 law granting preference to Peruvian businessmen in the guano trade. That original law had placed its implementation in the hands of the executive branch. The precedent was given renewed force in August 1860 by a law that repeated the preference in the guano business for *los hijos del país* (a phrase that wealthy merchants appropriated from artisans lobbying for tariff protection) but added that guano contracts be ratified by the legislature. In January 1861, the newspaper *El Comercio* had called for revocation of Gibbs control of the British guano market. At the time, the British consul acknowledged the pressure the Barredas and others put on the Peruvian government to deliver the largest guano market to Peruvian control. “I have been informed that the president [Castilla] was willing to extend the guano contract with this firm [Gibbs],” he wrote to London, “but he was persuaded by

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628 Lima: Imprenta de la Epoca, 1862.
others who frightened him, saying there would be a revolution if he did not give
the contract to a national firm.” 629

Now a young provincial upstart, Nicolás de Piérola, was taking away the
Barredas’ privileges. The alliance of the self-described capitalistas nacionales was
broader than any of the investment groups Felipe Barreda had helped put
together before. Barreda formally stepped aside in favor of his son and
namesake, Felipe Barreda y Osma. Because they were not hijos del país, former
partners Nicolás Rodrigo and Pedro González de Candamo had to be excluded.
But the latter was represented through his son, Carlos. This quest to maintain
control of guano continued the Barreda and Tristán combination that was seen in
organizing the Banco del Perú. (There was no marriage linking them until 1898;
see appendix chart). In fact, the arequipeño Piérola faced an impressive business
coalition of the most prominent families of both Lima and Arequipa. Emilio
Althaus was the son of Flora Tristán’s cousin and the German-born hero of the
independence war, Clemens von Althaus. The capitalistas nacionales also brought
the Barredas together with Arequipa’s wealthiest family, the Goyeneches. The
Barredas’ political patron, Ramón Castilla, also a southerner, had induced the
Pope to make Arequipa’s long-serving bishop, José Sebastián Goyeneche y
Barreda, 630 archbishop of Lima in 1859. Juan Mariano de Goyeneche y Gamio
was the archbishop’s nephew. The self-styled national capitalists also included

629 The bit about “revolution” sounds like a Peruvian informant was spinning the British
gentleman. The quotation is my translation from Bonilla’s Spanish translation of Foreign Office,
Jerningham to Russell, October 13, 1860, in Heraclo Bonilla, Guano y burguesía en el Perú (Lima:

630 The Arequipa Barredas were no relation to the Lima Barredas.
Manuel Pardo’s coolie trafficking partner, José Francisco Canevaro. Other members were Juan Manuel de Ugarte, José Maria Sancho Dávila, José Vicente Unanue, Clemente Ortiz de Villate, J. Domingo Castañeda and the firms of Dorca Ayulo y Cía. and Denegri Hermanos. Three of these, Castañeda, Denegri and González de Candamo, did not appear consistently in the official documents challenging the government. Althaus was the main political spokesperson for the group. Their legal team was headed by Andrés Zenteno. The political and legal appeals by the new syndicate of capitalistas nacionales against the Dreyfus contract were collected and self-published in 1869 as the three-volume *Dos causas célebres: juicio de despojo* ....631

Zenteno, the syndicate’s lawyer, said he took up the group’s defense because he did not want Peru to be forever indebted to foreigners. The United States, he said, was a great nation because it looked to its own resources for development. Relying on *sus propios hijos* would give Peru greater public order and stability, and prevent the resources of the national treasury’s from always a *ensanchar exclusivamente la fortuna del comercio extranjero.*632 Wealthy Peruvian importers argued that they could better keep Peru’s trading profits in the country, but they failed to pick up on Manuel Pardo’s theme of promotion of Peru as a *manufacturing* nation that he had laid out in his 1860 “Jauja” article.633 This was a striking omission – a failure to try to build alliances with artisans and

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631 See also Basadre, *Historia*, v. 4, p. 1748.

632 *Dos causas*, (Lima: Imprenta Liberal, 1869), vol. 1, p. 81.
other local producers – especially given the fact that the railroad building into the Andes had finally begun.

633 On the other hand, Pardo’s import-substitution goal was a minor note in a long article, one easily missed if not closely reading the text.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 12.3a</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profiles of the “National Capitalists”</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emilio Althaus</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Felipe Barreda y Osma</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>José Francisco Canevaro</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>José Domingo Castañeda</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dorca Ayulo y Cía.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Carlos González de Candamo</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12.3b
Profiles of the “National Capitalists”
(continued from 12.3a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Self-description</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Juan Mariano de Goyeneche y Gamio</strong></td>
<td>landowner from the most prominent and wealthiest Arequipa family</td>
<td>“has a large fortune acquired by virtue of his long years of honest and persevering work, and from an exemplary morality.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clemente Ortiz de Villate</strong></td>
<td>Barreda partner in the Compañía National de Consignación del Guano en Inglaterra that was managed by Manuel Pardo; joined as an investor in the Banco del Perú upon its reorganization in 1865</td>
<td>“inherited his [fortune] from his millionaire parents.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>José María Sancho Dávila</strong></td>
<td>landowner; daughter married into Barreda social network in 1850 as did his sister-in-law’s son in 1853; founding member of Club Nacional in 1855</td>
<td>“has inherited his fortune from his forefathers, bien manejada y major dirijidad, se ha acrecentado considerablemente.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Juan Manuel de Ugarte</strong></td>
<td>merchant; founding member of Club Nacional in 1855; involved in the first slave raids on Polynesia (see chapter 11); did not invest in the Banco del Perú</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>José V. Unánue</strong></td>
<td>Gómez sugar estate, agriculturalist of “great financial capacity,” received vales worth about 25,000 pesos for 83 slaves in 1855; founding member of Club Nacional in 1855; did not invest in the Banco del Perú</td>
<td>“has a fortune inherited from his respected father and furthered by his own efforts.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Dozens of sources were consulted to crossreference biographical data; banking information from Carlos Camprubí Alcázar, *Historia de los bancos en el Perú* (1860-1879) (Lima: Editorial Lumen, 1957). “Self-description” is the profile given in *Dos Causas*, v. 1, pp. 91-92.
The attorney for Dreyfus, Luciano Cisneros, said that the national capitalists did not merit the trust of the government. Zenteno answered on September 22 with a rather pompous summary of the origins of the wealth of each, shown in tables 12.3a–12.3b in the self-description column. Starting with Felipe Barreda’s son, the group was notable for having few self-made entrepreneurs. Most enjoyed inherited money to pursue their business interests. Family ties among five of the capitalistas are shown in table 12.4.

Table 12.4
Chronology of Selected Marriages
Involving Five Families of the “National Capitalists”
(Capitalistas nacionales shown in bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Felipe Barreda y Aguilar</td>
<td>1836</td>
<td>Carmen de Osma; their son a capitalista nacional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrique Ayulo Zagal</td>
<td>1841</td>
<td>Santos Mendíval</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignacio de Osma, brother of Carmen de Osma</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>Carmen, sister of José María Sancho Dávila</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariana Barreda y Osma, daughter of Carmen</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td>Manuel Pardo y Lavalle, close associate of capitalistas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariano de Osma, brother of Carmen</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>Francisca Pardo y Lavalle, sister of Manuel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Francisco Canevaro</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Luisa Soyer y Lavalle, cousin of Manuel and Francisca</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafael Canevaro, brother of José Francisco</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Inés Laos Elguera, see sister and cousins below</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilio Althaus</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>María Luisa Dartnell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felipe Barreda y Osma</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>Amalia Bolívar Pardo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfredo Ayulo Mendívil, son of Enrique</td>
<td>1884</td>
<td>Josefina Laos Elguera, sister of Inés</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrique Ayulo Mendívil, son of Enrique</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Angélica Laos Argüelles, cousin of Inés</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>María Pardo y Barreda, daughter of Mariana</td>
<td>1893</td>
<td>Ernesto F. Ayulo Mendívil, son of Enrique (above)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberto Ayulo Mendívil, son of Enrique</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>Delfina Laos Argüelles, cousin of Inés</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luis Pardo y Barreda, son of Mariana</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Cecilia Althaus Dartnell, daughter of Emilio Althaus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendix chart.

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634 *Dos causas*, v. 1, pp. 91-92.
Notably absent from the group was the former manager of the Compañía Nacional Consignataria, Manuel Pardo, who, since serving as treasury secretary in 1865-1866, was emerging as the Barreda network’s political figure and who will be a subject of the next chapter.

Defeat of the capitalistas nacionales seems to have affected feelings toward their own country among at least some members of the Barreda group. A few already had ties to France or dreamed of retiring there. In September 1869, Felipe Barreda wrote his sister-in-law (and niece) in the United States that he was alarmed by government policy and that “there has been much talk in the family about leaving the country.”635 At the same time, despite Barreda’s oft declared aversion to involvement in politics, loss of the guano consignment contract provided a motivation for members of his family and his broader social and economic network to enter the political arena. Birth of the Partidio Civil under Pardo’s leadership was a seminal moment in the development of the Peruvian oligarchy, and for the next four decades service in the national legislature became routine for some members of the Barreda social network.636

635 Sherman, p. 193.

636 Ulrich Mücken argued that the Peruvian guano consignees had cohered into the core of a new Peruvian bourgeoisie, and that the Partido Civil was founded to defend the interests of this class. “From the mid-nineteenth century on, a bourgeoisie – mainly in Lima – emerged on the back of the guano trade” (Political Culture in Nineteenth Century Peru: The Rise of the Partido Civil [University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004], p. 12). Loss of the guano contract, he wrote, “became an important incentive for the bourgeoisie – which had guano to thank for its wealth – to become more involved in politics to prevent its business interests from being ignored” (p. 26). I prefer the term “oligarchy” to describe the guano-enhanced Peruvians because that is the term contemporaries assigned them and because they did not seem to constitute a separate social class. Jorge Basadre said the earliest he noticed the term “oligarchy” used in Lima periodicals was in 1876, and he credited the essay by José Andrés Torres Paz, La oligarquía y la crisis, published a year later, for being the first serious use of oligarchy to describe Peru’s guano-enhanced elites. The historian used the term interchangeably with plutocracia limeña. (See Basadre and Macera,
Conversaciones, p. 161.) Basadre sometimes used “oligarchy” rather loosely to refer to a non-democratic or restrictive governing group. For example, a coup by Pedro Pablo Bermúdez in 1834 was “to the benefit of Gamarra and his oligarchy of military men and intellectuals.” Or, a Peru-Bolivia political accord at the end of the 1830s (pacto de Tacna) restricted voting to una oligarquía de propietarios y rentistas. (Basadre, La iniciación de la República [originally published in 1929-1930, reissued 2002 the Fondo Editorial de la UNMSN], pp. 145 and 368.) I do not employ the term here in that manner. In my own use of “Peruvian oligarchy,” this is the group that grew out of the “false prosperity” of the guano era when a few families acquired significant riches and partnered through business and marriage with families who brought in aristocratic heritage to their social circles. The gatekeepers of this oligarchy were the members of the Club Nacional and their wives. Use analogous to mine by Basadre would be the following: “The names that stand out are definitely those of José de la Riva-Agüero and Francisco García Calderón, both members of the Peruvian oligarchy” (p. 19).
Nothing has been done [with Peru’s guano riches], and there is so much that could have been done!

Manuel Pardo

Anywhere the llama goes, I can take a train.

Henry Meiggs

[W]e have the whole of Peru, Boots and Breeches.

John G. Meiggs

The ruin of Peru is the monument of Henry Meiggs.

Anonymous writer in a New York newspaper

Shortly after his marriage, Manuel Pardo in 1860 seemed to boldly and passionately condemn his country’s development framework. “Nothing has been done [with Peru’s guano riches], and there is so much that could have been done!” Who would disagree? As historian Jorge Basadre judged, from 1842 to 1868 a well-managed guano industry should have produced inversiones reproductivas, “for irrigation of the coast, for the country’s industrialization, for the development of public education” and for other urgent enterprises. An important question in assessing Pardo’s place in Peruvian history is, what did he personally do to change the policy over the next eighteen years of his life, 1860-1878, and especially during his presidency, 1872-1876? This is where the established narrative of Peruvian history begins to break down. Pardo is justly


638 Basadre, Historia, v. 4, p. 1724.
credited with being the greatest promoter of the idea of building railroads into the Andes. But, those roads were constructed under a Yankee entrepreneur, Henry Meiggs, and utilizing the same development policies that Pardo appeared to have condemned. Even after Pardo achieved the presidency in 1872, it is difficult to discern his relationship to the empresario. Mention of Manuel Pardo by Watt Stewart, biographer of Meiggs, was as rare and fleeting as mention of Meiggs has been in biographies of Pardo. Stewart did cover Pardo’s handling of the financial crisis that jeopardized the railroad construction projects, but he made no mention of any personal contact between the two men. This enigma cannot be resolved here. This chapter’s purpose is more modest, to place important aspects of the two men’s actions in sequence, particularly as they concerned labor, import-intensive investment and guano sales in the United States.

Pardo’s duties as managing director (gerente) of the Compañía Nacional Consignataria lasted from early 1862 to the middle of 1864, and during that time he co-founded the Banco del Perú. His transition from consignatario to public official deserves further study, given the apparent conflict of interest when the government sent him as a comisionado fiscal to Europe in 1864 to negotiate loans. Then he was treasury secretary during the war with Spain (1865-1866), offering him an opportunity to closely study the country’s finances at a time when liberal

639 Stewart was forced into speculation, and he tried to read Meiggs’s mind, as when he wrote that, “Don Enrique may have had reason at the time to believe that President Pardo would decide ….” Watt Stewart, Henry Meiggs: Yankee Pizarro (Durham: Duke University Press, 1946), p. 298.

640 Basadre, Historia, v. 4, p. 1754.
reformers were momentarily influential. In late 1866 Guillermo Bogardus accused both Pardo and Federico Barreda of corruption in their negotiations of loans in Europe, accusations that both men vehemently denied. Bogardus also claimed that the Compañía Nacional Consignataria under Pardo’s management had overcharged the government on various guano expenses.

Pardo was an industrious director of the Sociedad de Beneficencia de Lima in 1867-1868, and he won praise for leading the organization’s response to a yellow fever epidemic in Lima. In June 1868 Pardo sold his interest in the Compañía Nacional Consignataria to his coolie trafficking partner, José F. Canevaro, thereby gaining some political immunization from the allegations of corruption in the guano business and his handling of foreign loans and arms purchases that remained very much in the news.

While the battle of the capitalistas nacionales over guano was raging, a Junta de Notables named Manuel Pardo mayor of Lima in 1869. His service in the wartime finance portfolio, as Beneficencia director and mayor of Lima showed him to be an energetic and practical administrative reformer who sought to stand

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641 Popular repudiation of a humiliating settlement with Spain brought to power a liberal-backed temporary dictatorship under Col. Manuel Ignacio Pardo. His cabinet was organized by the liberal’s most talented younger leader, José Gálvez, political heir to the aging Francisco Javier Mariáñgui. Gálvez assumed control of the military. To herald their reform ambitions, the liberals changed the names of ministries to secretariats. It was presumably the core group of Gálvez liberals who decided to recruit Manuel Pardo as treasury secretary.


643 The epidemic may have affected ten percent of Lima’s population. Hospitals diagnosed 6,042 patients with the disease, of whom 2,561 died, and another 1,884 died at home. Three of Pardo’s children contracted the disease, and one succumbed to it. His father, who had been so instrumental in Felipe Barreda’s emergence as a guano contractor, died at the end of the year.
above liberal/conservative debates. He would build and reorganize Peru’s institutions but not challenge the racial ideology of Lima’s elites or the prevailing import-intensive development model. It is noteworthy that, despite Pardo’s professed concern for proper collection of government revenues, the cleanup of corruption in Callao customs was not undertaken while he was treasury secretary, but rather under the tenure of the Barreda group’s arch enemy, Nicolás de Piérola.

Carmen McEvoy has demonstrated that, in his bid for the presidency in 1871, Pardo built a socially heterogeneous political base and should not be seen as a mere instrument of the guano consignatarios. Various economic sectors were represented, including merchants, bankers, landowners, factory and mine owners – and with outreach to artisans. But the “Sociedad Independencia Electoral” was very much a network among elites, mostly white, and with plenty of links to the commercial circles he and Felipe Barreda frequented. Pardo’s political collaborators included the García y García brothers, a couple of whom were involved in importing Chinese bondsmen (chapter eleven); Domingo Elías, cotton producer and former holder of the contract to load guano at the Chinchas; custom’s broker Enrique Higginson; El Comercio owner Manuel Amunátegui;

(Basadre’s reference to cultural figures affected by the epidemic is ambiguous regarding the cause of Pardo’s death.) See Ibid., pp. 1717, 1781 and 1915.

644 For a list of Pardo’s political correspondents, see Carmen McEvoy, “Estampillas y votos: el rol del correo político en una campaña electoral decimonónica,” in her Forjando la nación: Ensayos de historia republicana (Lima: Instituto Riva-Agüero, 1999), pp. 160-165. The alliance with the artesano honrado who “loved his work” (as opposed to, perhaps, the common laborer who was more likely to be non-white) was through the Lima guild, “Sociedad de Auxilios Mutuos.” See Carmen McEvoy, La utopía republicana: ideales y realidades en la formación de la cultura política peruana (1871-1919) (Fondo Editorial de la Universidad Católica del Perú, 1997), p. 87.
Demitrio Olavegoya, leader of the most entrepreneurial landowning family in
the Mantaro Valley of the central Andes; and “national capitalists” José María
Sancho Dávila and Juan Mariano Goyeneche.645

Pardo enjoyed some racial humor at home when he related the lengths he
went to in order to connect with the masses during his 1871 campaign for the
presidency. While visiting the working class calle de Malambo across the Rimac
River from downtown Lima, an old black lady called out, Mi niño don Manuel,
vengan a verlo ¡Que viva!, and she proceeded to give him a big kiss. Imagine that,
Pardo told his family: ¡Un beso de una negra vieja en la boca!646

AN ENGINEERING WONDER

The Ferrocarril Central rail line from the coast into the central Andes is one
of the wonders of the world – still a thrill to ride. For all its limitations and
controversial history, it well deserves its original designation, the Central Trans-
Andean Railroad (Ferrocarril Central Trasandino). The initial 33-mile stretch from
Callao through Lima and up to Chosica is uneventful, except that passengers
slowly rise up through the gloomy coastal garua and into hazy sunshine. Not
long after pulling out of the Chosica station, however, the locomotives stop and
reverse, stop and go forward – pushing and pulling the train up a series of
twenty-one simple and five compound switchbacks.

645 For discussion of the business and family ties of founding members of what became known
as the Partido Civil, see Ulrich Mücke, Political Culture, pp. 62-81. The University of Pittsburgh
Press published the author’s name as “Muecke,” but library cataloguers prefer Mücke, as in the
German original and Spanish editions.

646 Basadre said the anecdote came from Paulino Fuentes Castro. Basadre continued the
quotation with Hasla alli llegaron los extremos del aura popular, but it is not clear if that was Pardo
speaking or, more likely, the person relaying Pardo’s words. Historia, v. 4, p. 1921.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Railway成就</th>
<th>Aprox. Elevation Reached in Feet</th>
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<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>Semmering Pass (Vienna to Trieste)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>Rockies (Union Pacific)</td>
<td>8,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>European Alps</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>Central Railway of Peru</td>
<td>15,840</td>
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As one makes the trip to the summit at almost 16,000 feet, it is amazing to contemplate how the Central Railway was constructed over so formidable a terrain. The summit is more than a mile and one-third (7,240 feet) higher than the highest point on the U.S. transcontinental railroad, which was completed just when the Peruvian project began. Many would say its cost to the nation far outweighed its eventual economic benefits. "But can anyone who has ever seen the Peruvian Central Railway deny the grandeur of the concept and achievement?" asked historian Eric Hobsbawm in his *Age of Capital*. The straightaway grades do not exceed four percent – on curves, no more than three percent. Its design required sixty-five tunnels running a total of 9,140 meters (about 5.7 miles) and sixty-one bridges spanning a total of 1,832 meters (over one mile). It was built simultaneously over seven sections, each with its own engineering crew, supervisors and labor recruitment staff. Up to 800 pack mules

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647 Peru’s *Central* is almost universally described as the highest ever built in the world. It is more accurately described as the world’s highest *standard gauge* railroad.

were in constant service ferrying supplies and equipment, and hundreds of llamas were used for transport at the higher elevations.

The Central’s construction did have limitations. Zig-zags add to running time and limit train lengths on downward runs. A length of dead-end track extends beyond the switch that joins two converging lines. A train too long to be contained in the space between the switch and the terminus of the dead-end track must be “sawn” through.

No accurate record survived as to how many workers were employed (there was much turnover), nor is it known exactly how many died performing their dangerous tasks.\textsuperscript{649} There may have been as many as one thousand laborers working on each of the seven segments of the Central Railway at any particular time. Competition for workers was so keen that the boss of one labor camp wrote in 1871 to his superiors in Lima to complain that the supervisor on another segment of the line was sending over labor recruiters to raid his work force.\textsuperscript{650} Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán, the former director of public works, was the most prominent Peruvian employed as a supervisor on one of the

\textsuperscript{649} In a detailed report on Meiggs’ operations, a U.S. visitor to Peru wrote that, “at least 10,000 persons are computed to have died thus far in the progress of the work.” See J. Eglinton Montgomery, “A Railroad in the Clouds,” \textit{Scribner’s Monthly}, vol. 14, no. 4 (August 1877, 449-464), p. 461. That enormous (and suspiciously round) number of deaths probably circulated among foreigners as another way of saying, “a lot of workers have died.” Biographer Stewart did not hazard a guess as to exact numbers but believed that most deaths were from disease and were preventable. Perhaps one-fourth of workers who came down with “Oroya fever” and “verugas” (the viral infection \textit{verruga peruviana}) while working for Meiggs died, maybe even more. Members of a 1913 Harvard medical research expedition to Peru reported they were told that seven thousand railroad workers died of infections during the 1870s. See Richard P. Strong, et al., \textit{Verruga Peruviana, Oroya Fever and Uta: Preliminary Report of the First Expedition to South America from the Department of Tropical Medicine of Harvard University} (Chicago: American Medical Association, 1913).

\textsuperscript{650} Jesse L. Wetmore to Henry Meiggs, July 31, 1871, quoted at length in Stewart, \textit{Henry Meiggs}, pp. 168-169. Curiously, Wetmore had been one of the victims of the 1854 swindle in San Francisco that prompted Meiggs to emigrate to South America. His employ by Meiggs in Peru evidenced the contractor’s determination to repair his reputation in the United States.
Tunnels were dug from both ends at once, and alignment was never off by more than a few inches. At the height of Peru’s railroad construction boom in the early 1870s, there may have been more than twenty thousand people working on various rail lines throughout the country, with a total monthly payroll reaching near one million soles. Hundreds of foreign engineers and other technicians were employed, and business in Lima boomed. How a country supposedly suffering from an acute and longstanding falta de brazos could mobilize such a workforce will be a focus of this chapter.

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651 The place of Paz Soldán and his brothers in Peru’s nineteenth-century development deserves a full study. Brother Gregorio was a political figure and foreign minister who supervised Federico Barreda during periods of his diplomacy, and Gregorio placed Mariano Felipe’s son Carlos under Barreda’s tutelage in Washington. The sentimental boy called Federico and Matilde papa and mama, and he long swore he would marry one of their daughters (Sherman, pp. 49 and 107). Brother Mateo was one of the country’s most important science and math educators. Yet another brother married into the family of scientist and prócer José Hipólito Unanue and was father of writer Pedro Paz Soldán (“Juan de Arona”).

652 For most of the nineteenth century, Peru’s peso and sol currencies were, with some variations, almost on a par with the U.S. dollar.

653 Conventional wisdom holds that Peru suffered a “labor shortage” or falta de brazos throughout the nineteenth century, and especially after abolition of slavery in 1854. See, for example, Michael J. Gonzales, “Capitalist Agriculture and Labour Contracting in Northern Peru, 1880-1905,” Journal of Latin American Studies, v. 12, no. 2 (November 1980), pp. 295-296. Emilio Dancuart wrote, “La falta de brazos era, desde la abolición de la trata de negros …” (Dancuart, Anales, vol. 4, p. 11). Treasury minister Juan Ignacio Elguera made reference to endemic falta de brazos in the mining sector in his 1868 report to the legislature (Anales, v. 8, p. 148). Stewart said that the Chinese were brought to Peru, “[p]rimarily because of a labor shortage” (Chinese Bondage, p. 3); Gootenberg described “obsessive demographic concern with ‘falta de brazos’” as epitomized by Juan de Arona (Gootenberg, “Population and Ethnicity,” p. 119, note 14. In this latter article Gootenberg noted that Peruvian elite lament over “depopulation” was “highly ideological.” The Peruvian legislature justified its 1849 ley general de inmigración on the grounds that the country’s agriculture was “in a degree of prostration” due to falta de brazos (Basadre, Historia, v. 2, p. 835). Shane Hunt wrote that, “Even with the importation of coolies, falta de brazos remained a binding production constraint …” (Hunt, “Growth and Guano,” p. 56). In his 1880 Apuntes para la historia económica del Perú, Luis Esteves wrote that the “two great obstacles” holding back Peruvian agriculture on the coast were “water scarcity and falta de braceros” (Lima, 1882), p. 2. Esteves, however, clarified this statement with a discussion on immigration (chapter II, pp. 7-12) in which he seemed to place much of the blame on landowners who abused their workers, an issue that will be addressed below and in the conclusion to this study. Summing up all literature he reviewed, Fernando de Trazegnies Granda wrote in 1994 that, “All authors, old and modern, attribute [the poor condition of Peru’s coastal agriculture] to the lack of sufficient people to work the fields” (En el país de las colinas de arena: reflexiones sobre la inmigración china en el Perú del s. XIX desde la perspectiva del derecho [Lima: Fondo Editorial, Pontífica Universidad Católica del Perú, 1994], p. 95).
The name of U.S. entrepreneur Henry Meiggs will be forever synonymous with both the grand ambitions and even larger failures that building the railways represented in Peruvian history. It is little wonder that most descendants of Meiggs who live in Peru today keep low profiles and do not seem anxious to be publicly associated with his memory. The only evidence of his final resting place that his biographer, Watt Stewart, could locate in Lima is a large granite boulder in the central cemetery, presumably brought down by his relatives from the Andean mountain peak that bears his name. The marker was to symbolize the geographical obstacles that Meiggs so eagerly challenged; but, in Stewart’s memorable metaphor, the huge rock weighs down the American’s bones even as the debts Peru incurred in pursuing a particular vision of development continued to weigh down the Peruvian nation more than a century later.654

According to local lore, Henry Meiggs bragged in a meeting with top government officials that, “Anywhere the llama goes, I can take a train.”655 He and his U.S. associates reaped handsome profits and spent freely on bribes and luxuries; but, unlike some twentieth century counterparts, the railroad

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654  Stewart, Meiggs, pp. 340-341. The reasons why Meiggs’s gravesite is obscure make up a great detective story that I will not spoil for readers who would like to enjoy Stewart’s biography.

655  This quote is apocryphal. Stewart said that Meiggs supposedly made it during an appearance before the Peruvian cabinet. Watt Stewart, Meiggs, p. 153.
contractors and their U.S. suppliers did not also profiteer by delivering Peru inferior goods or poor craftsmanship. The high quality of the construction was a credit to U.S.-Peruvian collaboration. The whole enterprise was known around the world in the 1870s as an extraordinary engineering achievement, and some U.S. engineers found their experience in Peru an advantageous step forward in their careers once they returned home.\textsuperscript{656} Thousands of U.S. mechanics, stonemasons, bridge engineers, doctors and others wrote Henry Meiggs in Peru asking to be hired on. Young women offered to sail to Peru to teach music or English. "We receive perhaps a hundred letters every day from persons in the United States who are anxious to go to Peru and be employed by Mr. Meiggs," his brother John declared. "When we need men we select from the applicants and send for them."\textsuperscript{657} Quite suddenly, Peru became one of the most important foreign markets for an impressive range of U.S. products.

What was wrong with this picture? From a Peruvian development standpoint, just about everything. Meiggs and Peru were perched atop a speculative bubble, with all the attendant waste that accompanies such disasters. Yet, in his inaugural speech Manuel Pardo, who took office on August 2, 1872, made no reference to the impending reckoning, which he himself had so clearly forecast a decade earlier.

**AROUSING THE INDIAN FROM LETHARGY**

If the modernization of coastal agriculture begun in the late 1850s was undertaken at the initiative of individual Peruvian entrepreneurs seeking to

\textsuperscript{656} For example, one Meiggs engineer later served as head of the New York City railways.

\textsuperscript{657} The statement was given in an interview in January 1976, after John Meiggs left Peru. Stewart, *Meiggs*, p. 307.
invest guano-related profits, the railroad program represented a more collective economic response of what Jorge Basadre called an emergent Peruvian plutocracy, a class whose formation he dated to about 1860. Aware that guano reserves were finite and that much of the early revenues had not been channeled into productive investment, the parliamentary representatives of this group began to focus on the idea that the government should organize and finance a series of railroads. Manuel Pardo was the program’s prophet. Felipe Barreda’s son-in-law envisioned that the steam-powered locomotive would serve as the foundation for economic development by expanding capitalism from the coast into the sierra. In the minds of guano’s nouveau riche, "the whistle of the locomotive would arouse the Indian from his centuries-old lethargy," as Pardo put it. With the 1860 publication of his essay in a new journal he helped start, Revista de Lima, Peruvian elites embraced as their own the dream Lt. William Lewis Herndon had in 1851 whereby the “breath of steam” would bring the “touch of civilization” to the Andean highlands.

Some initial planning for Andean rail lines was begun in Peru in the late 1850s. Peruvian deliberations coincided with proposals in the United States to build a transcontinental railroad. Disagreement in the U.S. congress over whether to build it and over which route frustrated the advocates, especially as the projected road got caught up in sectional conflict. Mexico was long thought to have the best North American transcontinental route, and the 1853 Gadsden


Purchase from Mexico of what today is the southern end of Arizona and New Mexico was part of a railway plan. U.S. investors bridged the Panamanian isthmus in 1855 with the Pacific Railroad, as it was popularly known. In 1856, a bill was introduced in the U.S. Congress to provide government support of building a northern transcontinental line, and another was sponsored in 1860. That same year, the Peruvian legislature, in part because of Manuel Pardo’s urging, began authorizing building Andean railways, one to run from the southern coast to Arequipa.

The U.S. Civil War resolved the question of where to build the U.S. road across the continent. On July 1, 1862, as a long, bloody war raged in the United States, president Abraham Lincoln signed into law what was officially called "an act to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri river to the Pacific ocean, and to secure to the government the use of the same for postal, military, and other purposes." The legislation provided for generous state support to the two companies that were set up in 1862 to build from opposite directions, the Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroads. William Wheelwright had already demonstrated how steam power could revolutionize transport on the west coast of South America; and Peruvians like Pardo pondered the development role of railroads in the United States, wondering how steam engines might conquer their own country’s difficult geography.

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660 Because of the war, construction did not actually begin until 1864.
“Virgin Territories”

Two years before Washington began direct support to the transcontinental railway, Manuel Pardo published *Estudios sobre la provincia de Jauja*, one of the most intensively analyzed documents in Peruvian historiography. Pardo envisioned railroads as integrating Peru economically and leading to import-substitution industrialization. The country, he warned, was using guano revenues to import too much of what it consumed. This was unsustainable. It was in this article that he lamented that “nothing” had been done with the guano windfall and that so much “could have been done.” Peru exported about seven million pesos of its agricultural and mineral products in 1847, and imported about the same in foreign manufactures, he wrote. In 1853, six years later (and when his father-in-law controlled the U.S. guano market), Peru still exported about the same amount as before, but now imported twenty-one million of foreign goods. Exports were stagnant, but consumption of foreign manufactures had tripled. Guano and guano-backed borrowing made up the difference. The day was coming, he said, when the last ton of guano would sail away, producing a disaster, *un espantoso cataclismo*, a plunge that would take Peru de la civilización a la barbarie. It was imperative that Peru begin to develop its production of

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661 Pardo first published the essay as a series of articles in the *Revista de Lima* (1860), which he co-founded, and then as a 66-page booklet (Lima: La Epoca, 1860).


goods for local consumption and expand its domestic tax base. For a man about to become manager of the Barreda network’s guano business, these were refreshing views. However, instead of promoting the development of Peru’s human capital and offering local producers some protection from the avalanche of imports, he sought a technological fix.

In visualizing his relationship to both guano and railroads, it may be helpful to again summarize Pardo’s personal background. In 1853, shortly before abolition of slavery, he returned from three years of study in Europe and the following year joined his cousin, José Antonio de Lavalle y Arias de Saavedra, in administration of the Villa sugar hacienda, which was one of the Jesuit estates expropriated toward the end of the colonial period. This job did not require him to live away from Lima, since Villa was the largest sugar plantation adjacent to the capital. As noted earlier, Lavalle family wealth originated in the slave trade. Villa was the site of Flora Tristán’s famous argument over slavery with Lavalle’s father in 1832. Lavalle’s grandfather had been Peru’s biggest importer of slaves from Buenos Aires. The same year Pardo went to work managing the hacienda, his cousin Lavalle married his sister, Mariana.

Almost nothing has been published on Pardo’s administration of the Villa estate. Abolition must have complicated Pardo’s job at Villa, and years later he made a general statement about freed slaves abandoning the coastal estates. Ramón Castilla’s administration named Pardo to a commission to administer the
government indemnities paid to slaveowners. Meanwhile, his future father-in-law controlled the U.S. guano market.

After just a couple of years co-managing the Villa estate and living in Lima, Pardo came down with a pulmonary infection, and in 1857 his doctor sent him to recover in the clear air of the Mantaro valley on the eastern side of the Andean cordillera, where he spent the next year-and-one-half. While he was convalescing there, Felipe Barreda was putting together the deal to build the Lima-Chorrillos railway that would pass by Hacienda Villa. In 1859, Pardo married Barreda’s daughter, Mariana, the couple receiving a dowry of 100,000 pesos, sufficient capital to get involved in guano-related businesses in a significant way. In December 1859, Pardo was named, together with his father-in-law and public works director Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán, as a three-member commission to study the feasibility of a trans-Andean railway from Lima to Jauja.664 The following year he co-founded the Revista de Lima, where his Jauja study was first published.

Pardo was mostly educated in Chile and Europe, and his family often hosted foreign visitors in Lima and Santiago, where his father, as minister to Chile, assisted Lt. William Lewis Herndon in 1851. So, it is not surprising that he felt – and thought Lima’s elites should feel – embarrassment for Peru’s “backwardness.”665 Pardo experienced shame when a foreigner made a


665 In his article on immigrant labor published the same year (discussed in chapter eleven), Pardo indicated concern that he be properly understood by foreign readers of La Revista de Lima.
disparaging remark about Peru’s lack of development, such as Italian naturalist
Antonio Raimondi’s comment that, “Peru is a beggar sitting on a bench of
gold.”666 Pardo opened his Jauja essay with a lament that his fellow citizens
heard new ideas with “indifference and apathy,” even to the point of treating
development proponents as fools: llegan a hacer ridículo al desgraciado,667 perhaps
alluding to textile mill entrepreneur Juan Norberto Casanova and his partner,
who had recently committed suicide.

Pardo represented the elite limeño who, as Alexander von Humboldt
suggested in 1803, knew Europe better than his own country. “Lima is farther
from Peru than London,” Humboldt quipped, adding that he knew no other part
of Latin America where patriotic feeling was so weak.668 Carmen McEvoy
suggested that Pardo’s residence in the Mantaro valley was like that of a foreign
traveler, a stranger in his own country.669 Living in the Jauja region was,
therefore, a revelation. The area had tremendous economic potential, he
thought, if only steam power could awaken “those virgin territories.” As noted in chapter nine, Lt. Herndon had similar feelings about the region just a few years earlier. Jauja provided foodstuffs for the Cerro de Pasco mining zone, but the expense of transport and long travel time limited its ability to supply Lima. Pardo wrote that the cost of moving goods from Jauja to Lima was four times greater than from Callao to Liverpool.

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670 Manuel J. Baquerizo, “Manuel Pardo y el primer estudio económico sobre la region central,” Universidad Nacional del Centro del Perú, Cuadernos Económicos, 1988, p. 49; McEvoy, La huella, p. 103.

671 This exact point about Jauja was made by Jacinto Calero y Moreira in his 1791 overview of the Peruvian economy, “Idea general del Perú, Mercurio Peruano, v. 1, no. 1 (January 2, 1791), p. 6.

Lt. William Lewis Herndon had his “breath of steam” epiphany beside Lake Morococha while en route to Tarma in 1851 (chapter nine). Between the two locations is the Mantaro valley, an Andean breadbasket for urban centers and mining operations. The Río Mantaro (Río Junín on this map) originates at the Lago Junín near the mining center of Cerro de Pasco and runs southward through the modern-day provinces of Junín, Yauli, Jauja, Concepción and Huancayo. The most prominent advocate for connecting this region to Lima by rail was Manuel Pardo, who began convalescence there six years after Herndon’s visit. This adapted detail is from a map in Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán’s atlas, *Atlas geográfico del Perú*, and is used here because it embodied geographical knowledge of the time (“Morococha” was not given on the map).

The most telling aspect of Pardo’s critique of his country’s development model came in the middle of his essay when he described the circuit passed by wool produced in the Peruvian Andes, summarized the following table. Given his subsequent political connection to Demetrio Olavegoya, we may presume that his figures came from him or other wool producers that Pardo met in the
valley. The Olavegoya family was unique among central Andean landowners in that they established a business base in Lima by which to trade their goods to the capital, thus establishing themselves (and their daughters) in Lima’s elite business and social circles.

Table 13.2  
Wool Circuit Peru / England / Peru  
(as described in Manuel Pardo’s 1860 essay)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haciendo sells wool to comerciante extranjero</td>
<td>12 pesos per quintal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport from Jauja to Lima</td>
<td>70 to 80 pesos per ton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation and packaging</td>
<td>1 peso to 12 reales per quintal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport from Lima to Callao</td>
<td>4 or 5 pesos per ton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping from Callao to England</td>
<td>7 or 8 British pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unloading, commissions, import duties</td>
<td>18 to 20 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing and other processing</td>
<td>“a few shillings”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale to woolens factory</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale back to “perhaps the same merchant who exported it”</td>
<td>35 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool cloth sent back to Peru</td>
<td>4 pesos per quintal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import duties at Callao</td>
<td>que lo paga todo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport back to Jauja</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale to the indio del interior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: McEvoy, La huella, pp. 104-105

While this description fell short of a fully-calculated picture, Pardo must have felt certain he provided enough detail to demonstrate the absurdity of Peru’s development model. Why could the woolens sold to Indians not be produced in a local Andean factory?, he asked rhetorically. Just about all of the required elements were there, he thought. The province had raw materials, market demand, excellent dyes de todas clases, and both natural and tariff protectores. But, not caminos! Without roads, todos los esfuerzos son inútiles. The

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wool circuit was only one example. Peru had abundant other raw materials that could be manufacturadas locally, he wrote. Someone at the center of the Barreda network finally envisioned manufacturing as a verb, action that Peruvians could undertake.

For those who doubted that transportation investments could jump-start a nation’s development, Pardo pointed to the example of New York’s Erie Canal, built over eight years, 1817-1825, a project that he termed atrevido and for which he provided statistics. Wealth in New York City had risen by $1.5 million over the ten years prior to the canal’s opening, he said. During the first ten years of the Erie’s operation, the city’s wealth rose by $144.6 million, and revenues of the state tripled. He said he could cite many other examples from England, France or Germany; even nuestra madre España had benefited from the cambio mágico that railroads brought.674

IGNORANT AND BACKWARD MASSES

Pardo’s Jauja study was notable for what he left out: there was no profile of the region’s human capital. Indians for the limeño played no role in Peru’s development. They were a faceless abstraction, almost without life, what Pardo described as masas atrasadas e ignorantes.675 Their vague potential could be realized only through complete transformation. Indian methods of farming in the region were, to Pardo’s mind, shockingly primitive. Indians, he thought, had

674 McEvoy, La huella, p. 119. The Erie Canal was one of several references to U.S. development Pardo made in his article, calling the United States l’enfant colosse (p. 106).

675 Ibid., pp.119-120.
Railroads would perform a “civilizing” and “educational” mission upon them. “All of Peru’s primary schools would not educate our indigenous population in a century what the locomotive could teach them in ten years,” he exclaimed. In forecasting that railroads would transform Peru like “magic,” Pardo echoed the “hidden hand” imagery of classical economics that he may have studied in Paris.

Pardo elaborated on his views about Peru’s Indians in an article he sent to congress concerning the Huancané revolt that shook the Puno region in 1867. Peru was threatened with a “race war,” he feared, an unintended consequence of the abolition of Indian tribute in 1855. During his tenure as treasury secretary in 1865-1866, Pardo introduced a series of taxes, one of which – contribución personal – effectively reintroduced the head tax on Indians. While the Huancané insurrection was against a whole range of abuses against Indians, Pardo’s tax was an important grievance. In March 1867, liberals in the legislature led an attack on it, and the vote to overturn it was overwhelming, 55 to 19. But, Pardo stood his ground. The moral and material decline of the Indian was due to the loss of discipline that Inca organization had provided. Abuses committed

676 Ibid., p. 92.
677 Baquerizo., p. 21; McEvoy, La huella, p. 86.
679 Manuel Amunátegui, owner of El Comercio, joined Juan Bustamante, champion of the Indians’ cause, in founding a Sociedad Amiga de los Indios in Lima in 1867. The organization was supported by a number of military officers who had seen first hand how local authorities abused
against Indians since then did not mean the tribute had no value. Indians understood their annual *contribución personal* as their rightful payment for use of the land, and without it the Indian was isolated from the nation, Pardo thought. There was no other tax that could be conceivably collected from the country’s interior. Without such an obligation, the Indian reverted to his nature of idleness. The consequent slacking of Indian labor was accompanied by *decadencia moral*. The bloody and frightening Huancané events reflected a broader deterioration in Peru’s interior provinces that, while condemning *a la raza indígena al retroceso*, also produced *malestar social* among *la raza blanca y mestiza*.

Pardo revealed a deeply-felt *limeño* racial contempt for Peru’s Indians and their culture. He hammered on words like *ignorancia* and *aislamiento* with pious judgment. “The Indian of Peru, like most individuals of his race in other parts, is by nature restrained and without ambition,” he said. He will only work to produce the bare minimum he needs to live, said the future president.\(^{680}\) This was the ideology of a man who believed that whites had an obligation to compel labor from an inferior race. (His views about the Chinese servants he imported and his argument for criminalizing vagrancy were discussed in the previous chapter.) Behind his high-minded vision of how Peru’s non-whites could be put

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\(^{680}\) Ibid., p. 368.
to labor lay, perhaps, some of the cynical racial and class-conscious views of his father, who wrote:

Pueblo que no trabaja y come huano;
Pueblo de zamacueca y desenfrenos;
Pueblo de cholos, blancos y morenos,  
Sin sentido moral ni un ciudadano ….
Tu fin es ser manjar de ánglos ó galos.

Left to their own devises, their vagrancy supported by guano, Peru’s non-whites drag down even the blancos to their level of licentiousness. No wonder that the Anglo-Saxons eat Peruvians for lunch. For the son of the poet, Railroads would accomplish what the political system could not.

In his “Jauja” study, Pardo appealed to the self-interest of his Lima readers – concerned no doubt for their narrow-mindedness when it came to the interests of the larger nation – saying that the economic benefits of rail integration would be as important for the coast as for the highlands. If there was any part of Peru that should attract the attention of government, “and even capitalists and speculators,” it was this central highlands valley. In the context of Peru’s development needs, Pardo said that the first 150 million pesos in guano revenues over the past fifteen years had been wasted on narrow political interests. For a man about to get into the guano business in a big way, a

681 The sonnet by Pardo’s father, Felipe Pardo y Aliaga, is found in Juan de Arona (Pedro Paz Soldán y Unanue), Páginas diplomáticas del Perú (Lima: Imprenta de la Escuela de Ingenieros, 1891), p. 94. For Pardo y Aliaga, the attraction of the offensive zamacueca dance (with its Afro-Peruvian influences) for some (probably younger) whites in Lima seems to have crystallized the danger that the popular culture of cholos and morenos represented. Basadre suggested someone should undertake a sociological study of Peruvian literature in the guano era, particularly regarding cynicism about the bonanza’s supposed cause of moral decay. Basadre, Historia, v. 4, pp. 1889-1891.

682 Baquerizo, p. 25; McEvoy, La huella, p. 89.
major trafficker in Chinese bondsmen, and newly married to the daughter of one of Peru’s biggest guano consignees and former holder of the contract for the United States market, Pardo’s sweeping and vehement condemnation of the government’s guano policies was rather striking: ¡Basta para nuestro propósito recordar que nada se ha hecho; y que se ha podido hacer tanto! 683 Henceforth, he said, Peru should devote three or four million pesos per year to service a one-hundred million peso investment in four rail lines. His plan suggested even greater foreign borrowing – guaranteed by guano revenues, of course. Roads from the Pacific would go over the Andes in the north to Cajamarca, in the center via La Oroya to Jauja and Cerro de Pasco, and in the south to Cuzco. Those three would be tied together by a coastal line, Pardo said, noting that William Wheelwright, whom he called “the Fulton of South America,” had already proposed building the northern railway. It would be nothing less than “a revolution, both physical and moral.” 684

Pardo, Malinowski and Meiggs

Within months of publication of Pardo’s manifesto, in April 1861, Peruvian legislators passed a law to begin the design of a rail line from Lima up and over into the Jauja valley of the Central Andes, which would be the most difficult rail construction feat ever attempted in the world. Another authorized planning a southern road from the coast to Arequipa. As noted earlier, Pardo’s

683 Baquerizo, p. 19; McEvoy, La huella, p. 85.
684 Baquerizo, pp. 20-21, McEvoy, La huella, p. 86.
father-in-law, Felipe Barreda, was named to head the planning commission of the central line. Lawmakers specified that the government seek construction bids from specialists in Europe and the United States. From a technical and feasibility standpoint, however, the main visionary of the Central Railway was an immigrant engineer, Ernesto Malinowski, and it is clear that Pardo had already discussed details with him. Malinowski was a Polish scientist and liberal refugee from the repression that followed Europe’s 1848 revolutions. He became the Peruvian government’s chief engineer and won much praise for his design and construction of Callao’s battle stations in preparation for the Spanish attack of Dos de Mayo (1866). He was a good friend of José Gálvez and, sadly, built the cannon tower on which the liberal leader was killed that fateful day.

Malinowski surveyed three different possible trans-Andean routes and weighed them in relation to their potential contribution to Peruvian development. Malinowski’s assurance that engineers could blast roads through the difficult Andean terrain gave Pardo the confidence to risk his reputation on the plan. It was Malinowski who chose La Oroya as the road’s nexus on the eastern side of the Andean passes, a compromise between routes that could have


686 Some U.S. and Peruvian authors spell Malinowski’s name “-sky,” but biographers José Ignacio López Soria and Danuta Bartkowiak used the spelling given here, as did Perú’s postal service in issuing his commemorative stamp.
led more directly either to Cerro de Pasco to the north or to Chanchamayo and Jauja to the south.687

Coincidentally, U.S. entrepreneur Henry Meiggs was having success in Chile with construction of the Valparaíso to Santiago line during 1858-1863, an accomplishment that made him a bankable contractor for Peru. Originally from New York, Meiggs had lived in South America since fleeing from creditors in San Francisco in 1854. The fact that he moved to Latin America just as police were going to arrest him for fraud has given rise to the notion in Peruvian culture that he was, at best, a corrupt adventurer, and, more probably, a scoundrel. The truth is more complex. His eldest son, Manfred, married a Chilean woman, and by the time Meiggs reached Peru he was well acclimated to Latin American culture, business practices and labor recruiting methods. Meiggs had tremendous ambition and an ego to match; he was more grandiose than dishonest, at least from the standpoint of those who did business with him in Peru. He bore the shame of his San Francisco debacle, and Peru would be his redemption. He invested railroad profits in other local ventures that bound his destiny to Peru’s, and he much enjoyed being the nation’s grandest philanthropist. When a more dishonest man who cared little for Peru would have fled with his money, Meiggs stayed in Peru to try to save the nation’s investment and thereby lost most of his fortune.

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687 At the same time, the route up the Rimac valley and over to La Oroya was convenient for maintaining Lima-Callao’s economic and political dominance of the nation. The other routes would have reached the Pacific Coast at Chancay or Lurín, stimulating development of a port to rival Callao.
Beginning in 1868, just as construction of the U.S. transcontinental railroad was nearing completion, Meiggs negotiated a series of railway construction contracts with the Peruvian government that remain at the center of scholarly debate over how Peru’s guano revenues were used or misused. What is important from a development standpoint is that the Meiggs contracts followed the Barreda model. They were import-intensive. Their most important clauses provided for the free importation of all goods necessary for their completion. This was exactly Felipe Barreda’s approach for the Lima-Chorrillos railway, as discussed in chapter eight, when hundreds of artisans protested in 1858 that government permission to introduce foreign goods duty-free was an attack on the working people of Peru, condemning them “to total ruin and annihilation.”

Nor was the import-intensive approach challenged by Manuel Pardo’s Jauja study or his subsequent political platform. The Meiggs-run projects opened a special era in U.S.-Peruvian relations, but they also reinforced an unfortunate development policy path that would continue for the next century.

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689 Peru continued this approach into the mid-twentieth century. Compare, for example, clause 18 of Meiggs’s 1869 Central Railway contract with the 1954 Toquepala agreement between the Peruvian government and the Southern Peru Copper Corporation. So massive were duty-free imports under the latter that the military government of Manuel Odría divided the country’s annual foreign trade register in two, publishing a separate import record just for the goods supplied from abroad to U.S. mining companies. See [Simon Camacho] and Enrique Meiggs, comp., Los ferrocarriles del Perú; colección de leyes, decretos, contratos . . . 2nd ed. (Lima: Imp. del Estado, 1876), p. 117; and Kathleen Barrows, “The role of U.S. Trade and Investment in Peruvian Socio-economic Development, 1950-1970” (UCLA Masters Thesis, 1973).
Meiggs was careful to incorporate key Peruvians into executive positions in his enterprises. He hired Malinowski as his chief engineer and, as noted above, made former director of public works, Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán, one of his senior construction supervisors on the Central Railway. The latter was a multi-talented development leader and Peru’s first historian of the independence period. He had undertaken a serious study of the U.S. penal system and published the magnificent *Atlas geográfico del Perú*. When it appeared in Paris in 1865, Paz Soldán listed his affiliation on the title page as *Socio Corresponsal de la Sociedad de Prisiones de Filadelfia*. Meiggs retained Francisco García Calderón as his personal attorney. The man who compiled the authoritative two-volume *Diccionario de la legislación peruana*, could make sure that every legal document was prepared to the most exacting Peruvian standards and that no legal issue was overlooked.

**TWELVE PERCENT**

During the initial phase of U.S. machinery exports to Peru, 1858-1867, the United States expanded its trade with South America based upon the growing strength of its railroad, arms and agricultural equipment industries. But, in the second phase, Pardo’s vision and a small army of U.S. engineers provided an extraordinary market in Peru for U.S. goods. As Meiggs took charge of building the Peruvian railroads into the Andes, U.S. exports to Peru grew in 1868-1876 to two-and-one-half times greater than in the previous nine-year period (see table below). Peru's importance as a market for U.S. manufactures of iron and steel already had been rising in the 1860s, growing from 0.8 percent of total U.S.
exports in 1864 to 2.2 percent in 1867. With Peru’s ambitious railroad projects directed by Meiggs, they reached remarkable heights. Almost twelve percent of total U.S. exports of manufactures of iron and steel were shipped to Peru in 1872, the year Manuel Pardo took office.

National preference and cronyism were not necessarily the determining factors in purchase of U.S. materials, although friendships and nepotism were found in Meiggs’s business practices. Given the structure of the government’s contracts with Meiggs, the entrepreneur was encouraged to seek quality at reasonable price. In respect to bridge contractors, for example, Henry’s brother, John Gilbert Meiggs, wrote in 1874 that their experience in Peru had shown U.S. materials and design to be superior to those of French and British firms. He cited several examples for comparison. He said it took French contractors in Peru longer to erect a single span fifty meters long than it did U.S. contractors to erect the entire Verrugas bridge spanning 575 feet and reaching much greater height (see fig. 13.12). He said that an English firm took eight weeks to build a 127-ton bridge on the Pacasmayo line, and that it promptly collapsed. The replacement bridge supplied by a U.S. firm cost and weighed much less (61 tons), was erected in only eight days, and performed well. After a second British-supplied bridge failed on the central line, Meiggs said that, “I have returned entirely to the American market for all Bridges.”

690 In addition to U.S. sales placed through Lima merchant houses like Bryce, Grace or directly with U.S. suppliers, some of the orders for U.S. goods handled by Meiggs’ U.S. agent Joseph Spinney went to New York relatives of Henry Meiggs.

691 Stewart, Henry Meiggs, pp. 158-159.
Table 13.3
United States-Peruvian Trade
1866-1879

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Ended June 30</th>
<th>U.S. Exports To Peru</th>
<th>U.S. Imports From Peru</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>1,215,835</td>
<td>807,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>1,730,914</td>
<td>1,701,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>1,666,355</td>
<td>1,765,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>1,673,445</td>
<td>1,386,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>3,793,185</td>
<td>2,557,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>3,581,005</td>
<td>4,731,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>9,095,403</td>
<td>1,676,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>4,414,844</td>
<td>1,206,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>2,621,906</td>
<td>1,256,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>2,480,941</td>
<td>1,344,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>1,208,098</td>
<td>1,440,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>1,300,552</td>
<td>1,545,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>1,010,772</td>
<td>2,078,296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commerce and Navigation, various years (see appendix).

In addition to machinery, rails, ties, tools, locomotives, cars, blasting powder and animal feed, the Meiggs contracts permitted the free import of whatever supplies and provisions the work force required, and they included meat, fish, potatoes, rice, spices, lard, beans, peas, crackers and wheat flour. The U.S. contractor even was allowed to import forage for animals.\footnote{Stewart, Henry Meiggs, p. 95-96.} Little wonder, then, that John Meiggs who was second-in-command under his brother,\footnote{John Gilbert Meiggs was Henry’s youngest brother, born in Catskill, New York, in 1827, and was sixteen years younger than Henry. He was in San Francisco at the time of his brother’s fraud and fled on the ship to South America with him, but was never charged in the crime. It is probable that Henry accepted all the blame to cover up for his brother’s role.} could write to a U.S. shipper in 1870 that, "[W]e have the whole of Peru Boots and..."
If that language sounds colonialist, it must be remembered that Meiggs was following government policy. Peru did not require the contractor to seek out Peruvian suppliers. Also, it must be noted that the colorful “boots and breeches” boast was made somewhat defensively, explaining to a skeptical U.S. shipper why the contractor would take government bonds in payment for work performed. With huge imports of men and materials, Meiggs was able to promise speedy construction. For example, a Peruvian contractor bidding on the Juliaca-Cuzco rail line lost out to Meiggs, in part, because he said he could do the work in six years, while Meiggs offered to complete it in three. This combination of haste and massive importing explains the relatively small stimulus that Peru’s railroad building gave to Peruvian businesses.

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694 James, Merchant Adventurer, p. 58. The boast was made in reference to government guarantees of payment to the railroad contractor.

695 In the March 13, 1870, letter sent to E. P. Fabbri, an owner of the only U.S. line of sailing ships (Fabbri & Chauncey) operating between New York and the west coast of South America at that time, John Meiggs was explaining that the contractor had preferential claim on many assets, such as customs receipts, guano and future gross receipts on railway operations. See Stewart, Henry Meiggs, p. 96. Fabbri & Chauncey was linked to the Alsops and carried much of the goods Michael Grace ordered for Meiggs from his brother William in New York. The firm must have made a sizeable fortune on shipping to Peru in the 1870s. The shipping line eventually established by William Grace originated in what seems to have been a modest ploy to impress Fabbri & Chauncey, and thereby obtain from them better terms and service for Grace (see James, Merchant Adventurer, p. 52).

696 The Peruvian group was led by Sebastián Salinas. Stewart, Henry Meiggs, p. 97.
Chart 13.1
U.S. Furniture and Wood Manufactures Exports to Peru
1864-1873
(U.S. Dollars)

Source: appendix. Published U.S. trade statistics did not break out these product categories during years previous to 1864.

The big jump in importing of the sort of manufactures from the United States that could easily have been made in Peru is suggested in chart 13.1.

LABOR AND RAILROADS

Even importation of temporary foreign labor was encouraged, dampening the stimulus of wage income on economic activity and limiting the training Peruvians received during construction. Meiggs relied initially on Chilean workers, especially on the Arequipa line, but many died of disease or deserted. The Chilean press harshly criticized Peru and Meiggs for their mistreatment. So, the U.S. contractor turned increasingly to the labor pool that Manuel Pardo and
his partners were importing from China. Meiggs bid up the cost of Chinese bondsmen, paying for delivery of each coolie 420 soles in 1871 – about as much as the price of imported slaves just prior to abolition seventeen years earlier. Meiggs even contracted to purchase entire shiploads of Chinese prior to the ships sailing from Callao to go fetch them. Chinese labor also was employed extensively during the same period on construction of the U.S. transcontinental railroad, especially in remote and mountainous regions (fig. 13.2).

In July 1870, John Meiggs wrote enthusiastically of Chinese workers, saying "they are steady, never drunk," which may be taken as a backhanded slap at Chilean rotos. At one point he inquired about the feasibility of contracting Chinese laborers in California. Language used to describe the Chinese in the United States was remarkably similar. In an 1866 report from the U.S. Central Railway, which was building the western portion of the transcontinental line from California, S. S. Montague wrote of the Chinese that, “They are faithful and industrious and, under proper supervision, soon become skillful in the performance of their duty. Many of them are becoming very expert in drilling, blasting and other departments of rock work.” The U.S. company’s legal counsel wrote that Chinese workers “prove nearly equal to white men, in the amount of labor they perform, and are far more reliable. No danger of strikes

697 Stewart cited the case of the ship Clotilde in a letter of November 30, 1871 to “Candamo and Company” outlining the terms of a contract to purchase the entire shipload. “The price to be paid for each coolie should be S/420 on the average – it being understood that none ill of contagious diseases would be accepted – to be paid in notes of four, six and eight months, without interest, and dated from the arrival of the vessel in a Peruvian port.” This language appears to be Stewart’s summary of the letter rather than actual text. Stewart, Meiggs, pp. 162-163.

among them.” A principal owner of the Central, Leland H. Stanford, said in a letter to president Andrew Johnson, “As a class they are quiet, peaceable, patient, industrious and economical. Ready and apt to learn all the different kinds of work required in railroad building, they soon become as efficient as white laborers. More prudent and economical, they are contented with less wages.” In a follow up message, Stanford told the president that, “A large majority of the white laboring class on the Pacific Coast find more profitable and congenial employment in mining and agricultural pursuits, than in railroad work.” While conditions Chinese workers faced in the Andes were more challenging in some respects, the Chinese in the United States worked in difficult winter weather before major snowstorms forced suspension of construction. A supervisor, J. O. Wilder, said in an interview that, “The Chinese were as steady, hard-working a set of men as could be found.”

Henry Meiggs was close enough to some of his Chinese employees that they asked him to be padrino at their marriage or children’s baptism. Some people bearing the Meiggs name in Peru today are descendants of Chinese who worked for Meiggs and adopted his name.

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700 My research assistant, Fabiola Santana, and I interviewed a number of people in Lima by telephone and in person who are named Meiggs, including a Chinese-Peruvian man who showed her family papers dating to the Meiggs era. Others said they did not know how their families came by “Meiggs.” As one man told me, “I’ve lost the thread.”
This iconic photograph appears in countless U.S. textbooks to represent completion of the U.S. transcontinental railroad. Men stand on the locomotives of the two respective companies, Central Pacific (wide smokestack) on the left, and Union Pacific (narrow smokestack) on the right. Hidden from view were thousands of Chinese workers who, as in Peru, did much of the most difficult work in mountainous regions. Each strike of the hammer on the last spike was supposed to be heard over telegraph across the nation. Bad weather and a labor conflict delayed the ceremony, finally held on May 10, 1869. Technical problems forced telegraph operators to simulate the hammer strikes, which they followed with the word “Done.” According to Frederick Barreda Sherman, his grandfather’s brother is seen holding and tipping his hat in the manner of a gentleman’s salute, several men to the left of the two shaking hands.

Photographers of Peru’s Central Railway liked to capture the elevation of the terrain, as here with snow-capped peaks in the background of a locomotive on a spur between Ticlio and Morococha. In many Peruvian photos the locomotive is dwarfed by the Andes.
NO LONGER HIDDEN
Although apparently not permitted to be visible in the “Golden Spike” ceremony photographs taken in Utah on May 10, 1869, eight Chinese men were given the honor of carrying up and laying the last rail. Three of those men, Ging Cui, Wong Fook and Lee Shao, were invited to the fiftieth anniversary celebration in 1919 and are seen above standing on the hand cart.

LABOR
As many as 10,000 Chinese laborers worked on the Central Pacific (western) side of the U.S. transcontinental railroad, blasting the line through the most difficult mountain terrain. Henry Meiggs employed about 6,000 Chinese on the Central Railway, and some found their way in to a Peruvian photography studio (five cartes de visite above).
Eventually, the Meiggs brothers may have had six thousand Chinese bondsmen working on the Central Railway alone, with other Chinese employed on other roads. That was approximately sixty percent of the labor force on the Oroya line, compared to eighty percent or more Chinese in the force on the western leg of the U.S. transcontinental road. Chinese railroad workers considered themselves better treated by Meiggs than by coastal sugar producers, something the empresario made sure foreign visitors noted. British consul Thomas Hutchinson gave Meiggs a compliment for his labor practices, saying that an acquaintance quipped that the U.S. contractor’s railroad labor camps were the only places to see “fat Chinamen in Peru.” He said the *galpón* for some 480 Chinese workers at the Bartolomé camp was of solid wood construction and well ventilated, “their sleeping-places being arranged in the style of sailors’ bunks on board a ship.” At dinner, Hutchinson wrote, “I saw them regaling on rice, and beef in great plenty.” The adjacent hospital, called Esperanza, “is deficient in nothing that can conduce to the comfort of those cared within.”

**BUSINESS EXPANSION**

Shane Hunt asserted that the guano prosperity left the Peruvian economy fairly stagnant and employment depressed. But those effects should not be
exaggerated. Such heavy increase in importing must have been accompanied by expansion of the number and size of businesses – certainly in the capital – and that is what business tax records and city directories indicate, as seen in the table below.

Peru’s patente tax on urban business was first created in 1826, but it is not clear how regularly or thoroughly the rosters were revised in subsequent years.\(^{703}\) It was conceived as a tax on profits rather than gross sales, half to be collected each semester. In 1852 the tax rate was fixed at four percent of net income, and in 1879 it was raised to five percent.\(^{704}\) The patente rolls indicate that guano’s effect on activity in Lima was modest and gradual, but the impact of the railroad projects was more dramatic if the jump in number of businesses in Lima from the late 1860s to 1872 is credible. The era deserves its reputation for “fictitious prosperity” in the sense that linkages to the rest of the economy were

\(^{703}\) For the original patente tax decree, signed by vice-president Hipólito Unanue and treasury minister José de Larrea y Larrea, see Dancuart, *Anales*, I, 276-277. The law stated that this tax was known generally as a *contribución de gremios*, and said it applied to anyone engaged in commerce, art, a profession or *ocupación industriosa*. In effect, this was a business license as much as a tax, and no one, native or foreign, was supposed to engage in business without registering. Anyone found with a warehouse, store, workshop or obrador without the corresponding patente was subject to arrest and a month in jail. Regarding the origins and early history of the patente, see J. M. Rodríguez, *Estudios económicos financieros, y ojeda sobre la hacienda pública del Perú y la necesidad de su reforma* (Lima: Imp. Gil, 1895), pp. 197-211. For a discussion of early experience with the tax, see José María Pando, *Memoria sobre el estado de la hacienda de la república peruana, en fin del año de 1830, presentada al congreso por el iministro de estado del despacho de hacienda* (Lima: Imprenta de José Masias, 1831), pp. 709.

weak,\textsuperscript{705} but some changes that accompanied railroad building survived the 1870s depression and War of the Pacific.

Table 13.4
Number of Firms Recorded in Lima
(Comparing Patente Tax Rolls with City Directories)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Patente Business Tax Rolls</th>
<th>Lima Business Directories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1839</td>
<td>2,478</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>2,028</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>2,509</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>2,813 (Fuentes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>3,129</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>4,148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>3,696</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>4,021 (Soto &amp; Ramirez)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>3,921</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>3,474</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>4,018 (Paulet)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LABOR SHORTAGE?

The demand for Chinese bondsmen was based upon two interrelated flaws in Peru’s development strategy: the supposed need to build railroads fast and the supposed need to use imported cheap labor. A justification always cited was Peru’s so-called “labor shortage.” But, what if Peru had modified the construction schedule to accommodate the work rhythms of the country’s large

\textsuperscript{705} The “fictitious prosperity” tag was used by Juan Copello and Luis Petriconi, 	extit{Estudios sobre la independencia económica del Perú: causas geográficas}, (Lima: Imprenta de “El Nacional,” 1876), p. 15,
Indian peasantry? The Meiggs operations used lots of explosives to blast through solid granite, but without trucks or steam shovels each engineering team required a legion of men with picks, shovels and wheelbarrows. If highland mine owners could recruit Indians, why not railroad builders?

Fortunately, there was one large Meiggs operation that relied on an Indian workforce and from which some lessons can be extracted. At the summit and on adjacent eastern slopes of the central railway project, Meiggs needed to employ people acclimated to high elevation and accustomed to working in a cold climate. Watt Stewart reviewed the correspondence of the supervisor on this branch and published data on his workforce that I have summarized in the next table. (This looks like a fruitful area for future research.) From comments that Stewart quoted, it appears that Meiggs was willing to pay Indians whatever daily wage was required to attract them. In June 1871 the labor camp supervisor, J. L. Wetmore, wrote Lima that, although he was authorized to pay eighty cents per day (plus provisions), he didn’t think he would have to offer anything like that wage. In September he reported to John Meiggs that he was feeding workers a pound of corn per day, plus another pound in a stew of meat, rice, potatoes, flour and beans, “and I think that as soon as the news of my feeding gets into the Province, they [more Inidan workers] will com along more willingly.” 706 In October he said the health of his laborers was “very good.” By December he had built up a workforce of 1,000 men, even though some

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706 Stewart, Meiggs, p. 166.
periodically left to plant or harvest back home. During some months in 1872 he had almost 2,000 Indians on the job.

A single case cannot refute the conventional wisdom about Peru’s nineteenth-century \textit{falta de brazos}. But, that phrase always had a self-serving ring. If I am not mistaken, Peru suffered from no real labor shortage. Decent pay and healthy living conditions attracted plenty of workers to the railroad projects. Behind the \textit{falta de brazos} lament lurked the racial posture that blacks and Indians in Peru were too lazy, and that development had to proceed with a labor regime based upon coercion. In the Meiggs case, there were certainly headaches for the supervisor, who had to contend with desertions when Indians needed to plant or harvest crops at home, visit family for the holidays or get relief from bitter cold. At one point the camp administrator wrote regarding bad weather that, “I am afraid I shall have to pay more per day to hold them here.”\textsuperscript{707} But these difficulties did not jeopardize the enterprise itself and would have been even more manageable if construction could proceed at a less hurried pace with more targeted hiring.

\textsuperscript{707} Indians were not the only difficult employees for this administrator. He had to fire at least two U.S. workers for drunkenness and another for stealing. When one begged for his job back, Wetmore wrote, “if you will promise Mr. J. G. Meiggs or Mr. Cilley that you will mind what I say and keep clear of drink, there is a place here as long as you want to stay, but I assure you the first time I catch you in liquor off you go for good.” Ibid., p. 168.
Table 13.5
Indian Workers on the La Oroya/Yauli/Visca Section
Of the Central Railway Project
June 1871-December 1872

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Men in Camp</th>
<th>Comment in report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>155</td>
<td><em>in 15 days more we will have plenty of men</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>230</td>
<td><em>80 of the 192 llamas too young to bear loads for six more months</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>200</td>
<td><em>more men expected</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>700</td>
<td><em>they keep going away on pretext of planting their corn</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td><em>expect will have 1,000 men by next week</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td><em>short on cash for payroll</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>500</td>
<td><em>weather bitter cold, losing men except the mine workers</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>850</td>
<td><em>had to tell men pay would be delayed, some left but more on the way</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1,980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td><em>many left for Christmas holidays</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Stewart, Meiggs, pp. ****. As work on the section progressed, the camp housing the Indian laborers moved from La Oroya to Yauli, and then from Yauli to Visca.

YOKOHAMA INCIDENT

A threat to continued procurement of Chinese bondsmen was one of the first issues Manuel Pardo faced when he took office as president in 1872. It was an international crisis that ensared U.S. diplomats in Japan, much to Washington’s annoyance. But it was also an unflattering exposure of Peru’s
development model. Pardo was fortunate that foreign media never got wind of his own personal involvement in Peru’s coolie trade.

In mid-July, 1872, in the dead of night, just a couple of weeks before Manuel Pardo was inaugurated as president of Peru, a Chinese man named Mok-hing climbed over the side of the Peruvian bark *María Luz*, which was under the command of a young Peruvian captain, Ricardo Herrera de la Lama. Mok-hing slipped into the cool waters of Yokohama harbor and swam toward the British warship *Iron Duke*. The *María Luz* was forced to Yokohama by severe weather that broke one of its masts. It had departed from Macao on May 28 en route to Peru carrying 238 Chinese “passengers,” all but a few supposedly under indenture contracts with self-proclaimed *capitalista nacional* and Barreda group business partner, Emilio Althaus. As discussed earlier, among other prominent investors in the “coolie trade” was incoming president Pardo.

When British sailors spotted Mok-hing in the water, he was exhausted and on the verge of losing consciousness. Officers lowered a boat and rescued him. After recovering, he recounted cruelties committed by the Peruvian crew of the

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708 An official Peruvian exposition gave the date as July 13. That was the day that the British consul notified the Kanagawa Kencho that the man said he was abused, so the date of Mok-hing’s escape may have been earlier.

709 Certain parts of the Yokohama story have been well described by Watt Stewart, who utilized Peru’s diplomatic archives. The purpose of this section is to focus more on the U.S. role and aspects that were not visible to Peruvians, who saw captain Herrera as a victim of British meddling and who considered Japan’s actions to be a grave insult to the Peruvian flag. For Peruvian documents and perspective, I will mostly cite Stewart’s excellent book, *Chinese Bondage in Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1951). After this section was written, Daniel V. Botsman’s article appeared (“Freedom without Slavery? ‘Coolies,’ Prostitutes, and Outcastes in Meiji Japan’s ‘Emancipation Moment,’” *American Historical Review*, vol. 116, no. 5 [December 2011, 1323-1347], and his footnote 24 (p. 1330) discusses Japanese sources and some other articles dealing with the *María Luz* affair.
*María Luz* on himself and other Chinese. The British took him to shore and placed him into custody of their consul. But Japanese authorities, instead of investigating the man’s complaints, returned Mok-hing to the *María Luz.* Offended by this complacency and concerned about the man’s fate, the British chargé d’affaires, Robert G. Watson, took an *Iron Duke* officer as escort and went aboard the *María Luz* on August 2. Captain Herrera happened to be ashore, and although his mate tried to impede the investigation, Watson determined that Mok-hing had been severely punished for his escape, including having his cue cut off, and that other Chinese were being unlawfully abused.

Watson wrote a strong letter to the Japanese government insisting that it take prompt action, since the *María Luz* was preparing to leave port. On August 7, the Kanagawa Kencho, the prefecture encompassing Yokohama, sent an investigating team to the ship. A U.S. journalist with a good nose for a story tagged along. Herrera complained that each day he was delayed in Yokohama was costing him from $100 to $150 *duros,* a figure he later raised to 250 dollars. The Kencho next demanded that Herrera bring it each Chinese passenger’s indenture contract. Herrera wanted the government to reimburse him for his expenses of remaining in port, and at one point he threatened to abandon his ship and cargo so he could return to Peru. On August 17, the Kanagawa governor’s office held a criminal investigation, or what the Peruvian government

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710 Watson’s letter dated August 3 is in, “Japan,” in U.S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President,* December 1, 1873, part I, vol. 1, pp. 529-530. Unless otherwise noted, quotations from U.S. documents regarding the *María Luz* case are taken from this 1873 volume of *Foreign Relations.* The “Japan” section begins on p. 524 and ends on p. 630.
later called an “inquisition,” aboard the Maria Luz, taking testimony from the Chinese and assuring them that they would be under Japan’s protection. This “trial” was, Peru later alleged, “an incitement to rebellion” that resulted in shouting and “disorder.”  

Herrera and his ship were held in port, the Japanese justice ministry began its own investigation, and the Chinese were brought ashore under the government’s protection. Governor Ohye Tak, using his authority as the Kanagawa Kencho judicial officer, decided that Herrera, by his own admission, had forcibly detained the Chinese while in Japanese territory, thus illegally denying them the rights and privileges of Chinese citizens in Japan that were guaranteed by treaty. While a great deal of testimony was amassed concerning contracts prepared in Macao, Ohye Tak said those matters were not “in anywise before this Kencho for consideration or decision.” The governor found that the Maria Luz captain had abused the Chinese while in Yokohama harbor. The punishment for such offenses could have brought Herrera a severe lashing, a minimum of one hundred stripes, or, in deference to his rank, one hundred days of house arrest. But, the governor said the Peruvian captain “has been delayed for a long time, and subjected to much inconvenience;” and, in any case, he wished to show mercy. So, Japanese authorities pardoned Herrera.  

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711 Ricardo Aranda, ed., Colección de los tratados, convenciones capitulaciones, armisticios, y otros actos diplomáticos y políticos celebrados desde la independencia hasta el día . . . (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1907), vol. 10, p. 155-156.

712 The official Japanese position on the Maria Luz case and twelve key documents were published by the foreign ministry in English as [Japan, Gaimusho] Case of the Peruvian Barque Maria Luz, with Appendix (Yokohama: Ni-shu-sha Book Printing Office, 1872). The governor’s finding of August 26, 1872, is appendix A. The booklet will hereafter be cited as [Japan,
Ricardo Herrera de la Lama was born in 1850, the son of a Peruvian attorney who had served on the Lima superior court beginning in the 1830s. He entered the Peruvian navy’s Colegio Naval Militar in 1866, but he was in the merchant marine from 1867 until returning to the navy briefly in 1869-1870. He then went back into the merchant marine, conducting Chinese across the Pacific. Captain Herrera claimed to have purchased the contracts of Chinese on the María Luz not owned by the Althaus group, and the servants he called his “boys” were apparently all children, including one he described as “a little girl.”

With the investment of Althaus and himself at stake, Herrera decided to fight back legally, and he received at least moral encouragement from merchants and consuls in Yokohama’s foreign community who believed that their extraterritorial rights should preclude such Japanese intervention in what they saw as a business matter involving contracts signed in another country. Herrera's age (he turned twenty-two on March 17) might cast doubt on this identification, and there are discrepancies in how Herrera’s name was spelled. Herrera said he was one of only three Peruvian naval officers who engaged in the coolie trade, and the only Ricardo Herrera in the biographical dictionary by Jorge Ortiz Sotelo and Alicia Castañeda Martos is this Herrera de la Lama (Diccionario Biográfico Marítimo Peruano [Lima: Asociación de Historia Marítima y Naval Iberoamericana, 2007], p. 138). He was described there as being in the merchant marine in the period of the María Luz affair. Most books and articles mentioning María Luz give the captain’s name as Herrera, and it so appears in Peruvian documents. It was given as “Heriera” in Japanese documents and as “Heriero” or “Heriera” in most official U.S. messages to and from Washington, including attachments such as newspaper articles and letters from the Peruvian envoy, Aurelio García y García. Arnold Meagher’s list of coolie voyages taken from published notices in Macao spelled the captain’s name as “Herriera.” Meagher, (2008), p. 402.

Herrera’s parents were Manuel Herrera Oricain and Rosa de la Lama. His father received his law degree from San Marcos in 1814, was a member of the Colegio de Abogados in 1822, a vocal of the superior court in 1833, and he served several terms as the court’s president, the last in 1855.
found a resourceful British expatriate attorney, Frederick Victor Dickins, to help him recover his human cargo.

The United States landed right in the middle of the *María Luz* incident. Peru had no diplomatic relations with Japan. Two years earlier, Peru notified the United States that it intended to establish a legation in Japan at some future date and requested that the United States represent Peru’s interests in the meantime. The United States accepted. In limited respects, the U.S. legation in Japan was also the Peruvian legation. So, Herrera asked U.S. representatives to intercede with the Japanese government to have it forcibly deliver his passengers back on board. The U.S. chargé d’affaires in Japan, Charles DeLong, was visiting the United States on a trip, and the U.S. consul in Tokyo, Charles Shepard, handled Herrera’s request. Shepard knew U.S. policy was opposed to Peru’s coolie trade, so he told Herrera and Japan’s foreign ministry that he would not intervene. Of course, Shepard might have better represented official U.S. policy if he had supported Britain’s firm defense of Japan in the Yokohama Consular Board deliberations.\(^\text{715}\) However, when DeLong returned, the U.S. minister realized that Japanese officials did not consider him qualified to represent Peruvian interests, whereas he believed he was. To rectify that misunderstanding, DeLong reviewed relevant documents from Peru and Washington with Japanese authorities and found himself backing into Herrera’s case. Despite his insistence in a letter to the Japanese foreign ministry that, “My every feeling is antagonistic

\[\text{715}\] U.S. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish approved Shepard’s hands-off position. Fish to DeLong, August 29, 1872, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1873, p. 524.
to this so-called coolie-trade ...,” DeLong seemed more inclined to get involved than had Shepard. He said he was not advocating on behalf of Herrera’s claims, but rather asking that Herrera be afforded proper treatment under law.

By the next stage of the María Luz affair, the Japanese government decided that DeLong did, indeed, represent Peru in their country. This led to unfavorable coverage back home by a U.S. journalist resident in Japan, and the secretary of state reprimanded DeLong for giving the appearance that the United States government was in league with Peru in Pacific slaving.

**PARDO ADMINISTRATION THREATENS MILITARY ACTION**

At first, Meiggs obtained his Chinese workers by lease from Peru’s coastal agriculturalists. Now, spurred by his need to hire thousands, Peruvian traffickers sent waves of ships across the Pacific to obtain more bondsmen, some with agreements to deliver all their human cargo directly to Meiggs. But would China continue to allow Peru to take its citizens in the wake of the María Luz incident?

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717  I have written a more extensive examination of the María Luz affair and an earlier case of a Peruvian ship carrying Chinese bondsmen that fell into U.S. hands in Japan, the Cayaltí. There is simply not room here to do justice to these two fascinating stories involving such a large constellation of nations. In addition to Japan, Peru and the United States, the parties included an indignant Portugal (offended by the idea that Peruvians conducted a nefarious business from Macao), China (which could more easily protect its citizens in Japan than in Peru), Russia (eventually brought in as international arbitrator of the María Luz case), and a split among various European powers enjoying extraterritorial rights in Yokohama.
Manuel Pardo apparently did not understand how events in Japan were being followed in China and the United States. Reporting about the *María Luz* affair in Peru was somewhat sensationalized and garbled. One newspaper reported that, “The captain, upon protesting, was sentenced to either one hundred lashes or to one hundred days’ imprisonment, as he might prefer,” without noting that the sentence was commuted. The report confounded the two separate judicial proceedings in which Herrera was, first, defendant, and, second, plaintiff. The Peruvian government of Manuel Pardo “is more than indignant,” the article continued, and was sending to Japan captain Aurelio García y García in the *Independencia*, “a formidable iron-clad frigate, mounting sixteen heavy guns.” The editors hoped the affair could be settled “without recourse to gunpowder,” but felt that Peru must extract an about face from the government of Japan.\(^{718}\) Almost two years later, Pardo was still telling the Peruvian congress that the *María Luz* events were a “deplorable incident” on the part of Japanese authorities for which they owed Peru “reparations.”\(^{719}\)

With attorney Dickins at the helm, Herrera became a plaintiff, suing two Chinese defendants in order to obtain a civil judicial decision that would return all the passengers to the *María Luz*. The case of *Herrera v. Sai Jam* would affect

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\(^{718}\) U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1873, p. 570. The U.S. Department of State Papers gave the date (November 12, 1872) but not the name of the newspaper. The language does not seem translated from Spanish. Therefore, it was probably published in the Callao English-language paper, *South Pacific Times*.

\(^{719}\) Manuel Pardo message to the 1874 congress in McEvoy, ed., *La huella*, p. 442.
minors whose contracts were made directly with the Peruvian captain. The tandem case of *Herrera v. Li Chiong* would affect all of the other Chinese men now under Japanese protection, whose indenture contracts they had supposedly signed in Macao with Emilio Althaus, the Barreda group associate. It will be recalled that Althaus was the designated spokesperson for the self-proclaimed *capitalistas nacionales*. Althaus’ daughter later married a son of the president, Luís Pardo y Barreda. It was possible that a loss by Herrera in the Japanese court would be felt, directly or indirectly, on the personal balance sheet of president Pardo. When he assumed the presidency, Pardo still had over 110,000 pesos invested in the coolie trade. At minimum, the Yokohama affair cast an unfavorable light on a business from which the president had profited handsomely. News coverage in Peru of the *María Luz* incident tended to regard the matter as a Japanese insult to the Peruvian flag without mention of the business interests involved or the parties’ connection to the Pardo government.

**PROFIT EXERCISE**

How profitable was trafficking in Chinese to president Pardo and other Peruvian investors in 1872? José Canevaro, with whom Pardo had made at least some of his Chinese coolie investments, was still Peru’s biggest trafficker. Of

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720 Sai Jam’s name was given as Lai Taim in another document.

721 Althaus was in the Tristán group (see appendix chart). The 1893 marriage of Luís Pardo y Barreda to Althaus’ daughter, Cecilia Althaus Dartnell, was the first between the Barreda and Tristán networks. Mücke did not specify Althaus as a Pardo partner in the latter’s Chinese trafficking, but it seems possible that he was, given Althaus’ leading role in the Althaus/Canevaro/Barreda relationship in the “national capitalists” grouping.
twenty-six ships carrying Chinese bondsmen into Callao during the first nine months of 1872, ten were consigned to Canevaro’s firm. To operate such a business probably would have required a capital of from $200,000 to $300,000. On the ten voyages the Canevaro partners embarked 4,229 Chinese from Macao. Over ten percent, 445 souls, died before reaching Peru, with most of the deaths occurring on two of the ten ships.\textsuperscript{722} Even assuming that an additional 85 died in Callao of illness from the voyage, the Canevaro group was left with an importation of some 3,700 coolies, most of whom were probably sold to work for Henry Meiggs on the Central Railway.\textsuperscript{723} We can assume conservatively that purchasers paid at least $350 per bondsman, by which the Canevaro group would have grossed perhaps 1.3 million dollars.\textsuperscript{724} The voyage from Macao to Callao took from one hundred to 120 days, so invested capital could be turned perhaps twice a year. Assume that the cost of obtaining each laborer from “recruiters” in China was, say, fifty dollars. Add another twenty dollars for barracoons, bribes and other transaction costs in Macao; ten dollars for water and

\textsuperscript{722} The Peruvian flagged \textit{Lama Canevaro} had 192 Chinese deaths, or a mortality rate of about twenty-six percent. The Canevaro firm also chartered the Portuguese flagged ship \textit{Emigrante}, which lost 107 Chinese en route to Peru. The data on coolie ship arrivals at Callao from January 20 to October 3, 1872, were published by Hutchinson, v. 1, p. 247.

\textsuperscript{723} Hutchinson indicated that mortality was even higher because many Chinese taken off the ships had to be hospitalized in Callao. The Mother Superior of the hospital in Callao caring for the immigrants said that 733 had been hospitalized during the first ten months of 1871, and that their death rate there was twenty-nine percent.

\textsuperscript{724} The $350 figure is low. It was given in a letter William R. Grace in New York sent to his brother, Michael, in Peru c. 1871. Grace said, “There is lots of money in the business .... [A Chinese indentured servant can be sold in Peru for] $340 hard dollars each.” De Secada, “Arms, Guano,” p. 608. But, Stewart showed that Meiggs was driving the price up to $400 and more, as previously noted.
provisions per man on the voyage; the cost of leasing ships with their crews of about twenty-five dollars per registered ton (on a total of 6,731 tons); and then another twenty dollars per man for insurance, inspections, bribes and port fees in Callao. The expenses on the ten voyages would have looked something like the hypothetical figures shown in table 13.6:

| Procurement of 4,229 Chinese in Macao @50 | 211,450 |
| Transaction costs in Macao @20          | 84,580  |
| Water and provisions @10                | 42,290  |
| Charters on 6,731 registered tons @ $25 | 168,275 |
| Insurance, bribes and port fees in Callao | 84,580 |
| **Total expenses**                      | 591,175 |
| Loss by death crossing the Pacific      | 445     |
| Additional deaths in Callao             | 85      |
| Chinese available for sale              | 3,699   |
| **Revenue at 350 per laborer**          | 1,294,650 |
| **Hypothetical profit**                 | 703,475 |

The Canevaro group’s average profit per voyage could have been about $70,000. This is why William Grace encouraged his brother to get involved in the trade. President Pardo was probably invested in the Canevaro operations. Pardo’s account figures published by Mücke were ambiguous because they valued his Chinese trafficking business as assets rather than income. The president was committed to a development model based upon imported forced labor in more ways than one. Unlike the immigrants from *la Madre Patria* so valued in his 1860 article, these Chinese were not “precious.” But, the Europeans simply would not accept to toil under Peru’s labor regime. The Chinese fit into
Peru’s plans because they could be driven slave-like at low cost. They were, to use Pardo’s terms, a “resource” that provided “help.” In his vision they required no investment in public education or other social services because, unlike slaves, they did not even reproduce. This was a disposable labor force.725

**United States Takes Over the María Luz**

Ricardo Herrera lost his lawsuits, and his Chinese bondsmen would not wind up in Peru after all.726 So the Peruvian captain and his mate abandoned their ship, returning to Peru via Hong Kong. Japan asked the U.S. legation to take possession of the María Luz and handle debts to the crew and Yokohama merchants. The U.S. secretary of state approved DeLong’s assuming management of the María Luz accounts as long as everyone understood that the ship itself was the sole collateral for debts and expenses and that the U.S. government would not be financially liable. Although Washington objected to DeLong dragging the United States into Herrera’s defense, it acknowledged that he did have diplomatic responsibilities on behalf of Peru.

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725 Pardo’s article comparing importation of Spaniards and Chinese was discussed in chapter eleven. Manuel Pardo, “La imigración vascongada,” *La Revista de Lima*, v. 2 (1860), pp. 145-152.

726 The case is famous in Japan because of a clever argument presented by Herrera’s attorney. Japanese authorities claimed that the indenture contracts signed in Macao had no validity because no such servitude was recognized in Japan. Frederick Victor Dickins was able to demonstrate that young Japanese women were kept in bondage through indenture contracts similar to those Peruvian buyers of Chinese were using. This embarrassed the Japanese government, which promptly abolished such servitude. Thus, the María Luz incident became woven into modern Japanese history.
Furthermore, Japanese authorities relied upon the United States to help them try to dispose of the affair before there were further repercussions. Word reached Japan that the Pardo administration was sending a warship and threatening military action.

If the Japanese ruling in the María Luz case was partly designed to demonstrate to foreign nations Japan’s competent implementation of a modern judicial system, it was successful in the United States. In a November 11, 1872, article in the New York Times entitled “Progress in Japan,” the newspaper extolled that country’s “rapid strides toward modern civilization, in the fullest sense,” giving María Luz as the example. “A proceeding has just taken place before a Japanese Court at Yokohama, that exemplifies, in a gratifying manner, the civilized progress to which we refer.” Japan exercised law on “behalf of suffering Chinamen” and dealt “a blow at the barbarous and threatening coolie traffic.” The Times noted the irony that a consequence of the court’s action might “embroil Japan with Peru, and probably also with Portugal,” whereby a non-Christian nation would be “defending principles of advanced philanthropy against civilized Christian nations.” In that case, said the New York paper, U.S. “sympathies” will be with Japan. Foreign powers should urge “prudence and dignity” on Peru.

After decades of ignoring reports of mistreatment of its citizens in Peru, the Yokohama incident moved China to action. The government in Beijing appointed a commission to go to Japan to bring home the men freed from the María Luz, and a pioneer U.S. medical missionary, scholar and government
advisor resident in China, Divie Bethune McCartee, served as the delegation’s secretary and interpreter. China awarded him a medal and letter of commendation for his services in the María Luz affair. He stayed on in Japan to teach at the Imperial University, write on Asian history and culture, and serve in the Chinese legation in Japan.\textsuperscript{727}

**Pardo Administration Mission to Japan**

Manuel Pardo understood none of these developments, but he did opt not to send the Independencia on a warlike mission. Instead, he and his foreign minister, José de la Riva Agüero\textsuperscript{728} sent senior naval commander Aurelio García y García as a diplomat to retrieve the human cargo of the María Luz and also try to establish diplomatic relations with both Japan and China. The Pardo administration expected that European nations enjoying extraterritorial rights in Yokohama would help force Japan to repair the insult done to the honor of the Peruvian nation. Captain García y García was the brother of former Peruvian minister to the United States, José Antonio García y García, appointed to succeed Federico Barreda in 1867. He was known within the Peruvian armed forces as


\textsuperscript{728} This Riva Agüero was the son and namesake of the man who had so disappointed Bartow Prevost (chapter three). The foreign minister was a founder of the Club Nacional and became president of the Civilista Party after Pardo’s assassination. See appendix chart for how the Riva Agüero family was incorporated into the Barreda network.
one of the “four aces of the navy,” close personal friends who were also political actors.\textsuperscript{729}

Two of García y Garcíía’s brothers, Narciso and Guillermo, also were Peruvian naval officers and were personally involved in Peru’s coolie trade, as shown in table 13.7. These García y García-led voyages transported more than double the number of coolies brought across by Herrera.\textsuperscript{730} Aurelio García y García was now considered a staunch Civilista Party man in the navy and obviously harbored no ill will toward president Pardo, who had arrested him in 1866 during the Tucker affair.\textsuperscript{731}

\textsuperscript{729} “Los cuatro ases de la Marina” were Manuel Ferreyros, Aurelio García y García, Lizardo Montero and Miguel Grau; the first three were witnesses at Grau’s wedding. Grau was involved in the slave raids on Polynesia (see chapter eleven). Aurelio García y García was later a vice-admiral and served as minister of foreign relations. His daughter, the writer and educator Elvira García y García, pioneered quality schools for girls. She was born in Lambayeque on June 1, 1872, just before her father’s mission to Japan.

\textsuperscript{730} Maude thought that Aurelio García y García participated in the slave raids on Polynesia, but Jorge Ortiz Sotelo said this was unlikely, as he had reentered service in the Peruvian navy in 1862. Ortiz Sotelo, citing El Comercio of September 29, said the Peruvian captain of the Manuelita Costas that sailed for Polynesia on September 23 with ships captained by Miguel Grau and José Basagotia was Andrés García, and he thought the similarity in names confused Maude. See Jorge Ortiz Sotelo, Miguel Grau, el hombre y el mar (Lima: Fondo Editorial del Congreso del Perú, 2003), pp. 103 and 109.

\textsuperscript{731} Federico Barreda had hired an ex-Confederate admiral, John (“Jack”) Randolph Tucker, to lead the combined Peruvian and Chilean navies in a hemispheric counterattack against the Spanish fleet during Peru’s war with Spain. But Peruvian officers, including García y García, refused to accept his authority. Because liberal minister of war José Gálvez was killed in the Battle of Callao, it fell to treasury minister Manuel Pardo to go to Valparaiso and arrest the insubordinate officers. Tucker’s Peruvian odyssey is told in David P. Werlich, Admiral of the Amazon: John Randolph Tucker, His Confederate Colleagues and Peru (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1990).
Table 13.7  
Coolie Trade Voyages Captained by the García y García Brothers  
From Macao and Destined for Peru  
1868-1872

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month left Macao</th>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Days on voyage</th>
<th>Chinese passengers</th>
<th>Died on voyage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>January</td>
<td><em>Auroa</em></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td><em>Auroa</em></td>
<td>115</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>July</td>
<td><em>María Gavina</em></td>
<td>106</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td><em>Clothilde</em></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>March</td>
<td><em>Clothilde</em></td>
<td>79</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td><em>Rosalía</em></td>
<td>?</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>February</td>
<td><em>Clothilde</em></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td><em>Rosalía</em></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>**</td>
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<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 4,234 263

Source: based upon lists in Meagher (2008), pp. 396-402. Meagher provided a first initial only for the first listed García y García voyage, and it is not legible. But, the García y García captains were two persons, since the 1872 voyages of the *Clothilde* and *Rosalía* overlapped. According to Jorge Ortiz Sotelo, three García y García brothers spent time in the merchant marine. I found reference in a Portuguese publication that Narciso captained the *Clotilde* [sic] and Guillermo captained the *María Gavina* and *Rosalía*. See *Boletim da provincia de Macau e Timor*, v. 17, no. 8 (February 20, 1871), p. 33, and vol. 17, no. 25 (June 19, 1871), p. 102.

In Japan, U.S. chargé DeLong said the news from Peru about a warship

“has created considerable excitement here in official circles.” He met with the

732 According to naval historian Jorge Ortiz Sotelo (*Miguel Grau*, p. 97), the diplomat and political leader, José Antonio (1832-1886), and the naval officer, Aurelio (1834-1888) had two other brothers who served in the Peruvian navy, Narciso and Jerónimo Guillermo (1847-1879). However, according to detailed genealogies published on the Internet, the full name of their brother Guillermo was Guillermo Santos Escolástico García y García (with no “Jerónimo”). In the version of Ortiz Sotelo, Aurelio, Narciso and Guillermo spent time in the merchant marine, the latter on voyages to China, Australia and New Zealand. Regarding Narciso, see Jorge Ortiz Sotelo and Alicia Castañeda Martos, *Diccionario biográfico marítimo peruano* (Lima: Asociación de Historia Marítima y Naval Iberoamericana, 2007), p. 117-118. In the War of the Pacific, Guillermo served on the *Independencia* and died in the battle of Punta Gruesa. The brothers were sons of José Antonio García González and Josefa García Urrutia, so they were the first in their family to carry the García y García apellido. But another García y García family may have formed in that era. José Antonio’s brother married Josefa’s sister, but their children went by the apellido García García (without the “y”). Quiroz (*Corrupt Circles*, p. 148, footnote 22) cited a José Manuel García y García as a cashier in the treasury ministry who was caught in corruption in 1866 and denounced by treasury secretary Manuel Pardo. Cabello’s *Guía política* for 1865 listed him as *cajero*. He was probably the same José Manuel whose mother was Mercedes García de Urrutia de García y Zela (Esteban M. Cáceres, *España en el Perú* (Lima: Casa Editorial “La Opinión Nacional,” 1923), p. 65.
minister of foreign affairs, Soyeshima Taneomi, who “asked me if I believed these reports [of a Peruvian warship]. I replied that I did not.” DeLong explained that the United States would use its good offices to assist the Peruvian mission when it arrived, and that Lima understood U.S. objections to the coolie trade. He said that Japan, “by arraying itself against this business, had and would enjoy the fullest sympathy of the United States.” Furthermore, DeLong assured the minister that, if the Peruvian mission were “disposed to make trouble,” he would “at once put forth every effort in my power to dissuade it.” DeLong said that, if Peru ignored his advise, he would terminate his relationship with the Peruvian mission. At the end of the meeting, the Japanese minister “expressed his unqualified satisfaction.”

Aurelio García y García did not arrive in Japan until February 27, 1873, and not on a Peruvian warship but on a U.S. mail steamer. Accompanying him as secretary was Juan Federico Elmore, a young diplomat and teacher of law at the University of San Marcos, who would soon be assigned to the Peruvian legation in Washington. García explained that the original intention to send his mission on ships of war had been revoked by the Pardo government. U.S. chargé DeLong escorted the pair to meet foreign minister Taneomi at his home, and the government put them up in the imperial chateau at Yedo. DeLong briefed the Peruvians on Japan’s progress “in favor of civilization,” noting its embrace of a Western-style judiciary and its recent repeal of edicts against Christianity. The

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733 DeLong to Fish, January 22, 1873, in Ibid., pp. 568-569. The U.S. documents on the María Luz affair gave the Japanese foreign minister’s surname as Soyeshima, but most other references to him gave it as Taneomi, with Soyeshima as his given name, e.g. Charles Lanman, Leading Men of Japan: With an Historical Summary of the Empire (Boston: D. Lothrop & Co., 1883), pp. 223-234.
U.S. diplomat assured the Peruvian mission that, if Peru challenged Japan over the *María Luz* matter, the latter would enjoy “the liveliest sympathies of many of the Christian states.” DeLong seemed to believe that this appeal to common Christian values had the desired effect on the Peruvians, who said they would give his views serious consideration. Later, DeLong received a letter from Riva Agüero (whose son later married into the Barreda network). The foreign minister had been told that most foreign consulates in Yokohama were against the decision of the Japanese court. Therefore, he imagined that “a mere suggestion” to the Japanese government by the United States on Peru’s behalf “will, perhaps, be sufficient to induce them to do us justice.” If so, this would be one more reason Peru had “for being grateful to the United States.”

When a formal conference between García and Taneomi was scheduled to discuss relations between Peru and Japan, the foreign minister asked DeLong for advice. Taneomi said he needed to wrap up the *María Luz* business because he was going to leave on a long trip to China. *María Luz* “had evidently become somewhat distasteful” to the foreign minister, DeLong wrote to Washington. The U.S. diplomat suggested Japan take a two-pronged approach, first stating its

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734 Pardo’s foreign minister was the son of the independence-era figure, José Mariano de la Riva Agüero y Sánchez Boquete (1783-1858) who had so disappointed Simón Bolívar and Bartow Prevost (chapter three). José de la Riva Agüero y Looz Corswarem (1827-1881) was a founder of the Club Nacional and Pardo’s foreign minister from his inauguration until February, 1875. The minister’s son, José Carlos de la Riva Agüero y Riglos married a very wealthy Barreda network woman, Maríad de los Dolores de Osma Sancho-Dávila, and administered her assets. Their son, José de la Riva Agüero y Osma, was a reform-oriented intellectual in his youth who turned ultraconservative.

willingness to open diplomatic relations with Peru on a most favored nation basis. As to the María Luz matter, DeLong suggested the minister assure the Peruvian mission that Japan meant no offence and that, if Peru believed there had been any injustice, Japan would give respectful consideration to a written exposition, but not before the minister left on his mission to China.

García also sought out DeLong’s counsel prior to the conference. When Taneomi met with García, U.S. consul Rice acted as interpreter, and he subsequently briefed DeLong on what had been said. According to the summary sent to Washington, García claimed that some Peruvians “had sustained inconveniences and pecuniary loss” in the María Luz incident and that Peru wanted to settle the matter of an indemnity before signing a treaty of friendship and commerce with Japan. Taneomi asked García to put Peru’s complaints in writing but not expect a formal reply until after his successor was named.

Next, García was granted a formal audience with the emperor by which to exchange amicable greetings. When the Peruvian minister was finished drafting his complaint, he asked DeLong to read it. DeLong complimented him on cogently putting forth Peru’s rationale that it should be paid an indemnity for the seizure of the María Luz and removal of her cargo, but the U.S. minister was taken aback by García’s demand that Peru’s dignity be restored by a salute fired to the Peruvian flag. DeLong argued that Japan had given Peru’s mission a most warm and courtly reception, and that minister Taneomi had given assurances that in their handling of the María Luz affair Japanese authorities “had not been animated by any ill-feeling towards Peru or by any desire to wound the honor of
that nation.” DeLong told García that Japan had acted to relieve the sufferings of citizens of a neighboring nation with which Japan had a treaty of friendship and commerce when those people were claiming to have been kidnapped and bound in slavery. DeLong advised the Peruvian that “the best friend of Peru could not conscientiously advise the Japanese to go further or do more than had already been done to appease ill-feeling.” The U.S. official cautioned García that to demand a salute would be to reject the good will gestures Japan had already offered, and that “if the Japanese were to refuse to accord the salute, it would result in [Peru’s] being compelled to resort to war or submit to an affront.” He should content himself with asking that Peru be indemnified for any damages, leaving the way open for third party arbitration. “The minister very readily acknowledged the correctness of my views, and remodeled his case accordingly; or, at least, he so informed me he would do.”

Japan begged off replying to García, just as Taneomi and DeLong had planned, saying the matter would have to wait for Taneomi’s return from China or appointment of a new minister. The Peruvians were impatient. Meanwhile, a foreign ministry official told DeLong that pressure was building in the Japanese government not to sign any more treaties granting extraterritoriality. DeLong replied that he was certain Peru would take offence at not being offered the same terms as other governments. Japan then put out “indirect overtures” to the Peruvians that, were they to accept a treaty without an extraterritoriality clause, Japan would “at once adjust the María Luz case to [García’s] entire satisfaction.”

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736 DeLong to Fish, April 21, 1873, in Ibid., pp. 584-585.
Japan, in effect, would pay Peru to dispense with an extraterritorial clause. The Peruvian envoy, said DeLong, “at once indignantly rejected” the proposal. The Japanese emperor was present at one or two meetings of senior government officials discussing their strategy for disposing of the María Luz matter.

In the end, Peru agreed with Japan to not let María Luz stand in the way of a treaty of friendship and commerce, which García signed on August 21, 1873. Without using the word “extraterritorial,” Japan conceded to Peru in a general way most favored nation rights. The Peruvian congress ratified the treaty the following year, September 12, 1874.

**Potatoes and Locomotives**

If anything symbolized the wastefulness of Peru’s approach to building its transportation system, it was the coals-to-Newcastle patterns revealed in U.S. trade records. Under the Meiggs contracts, the United States began exporting potatoes to the nation that gave the world the potato:
Table 13.8
U.S. Exports of Potatoes to Peru
1866-1877

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bushels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>1,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>1,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>2,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>3,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>8,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>2,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>1,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>7,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These were not a lot of potatoes, perhaps, but such shipments to a country where Indians were potato farmers points to a broader problem of lost opportunities inherent in the extravagant importing of the guano era. It was evidence of how even a state-funded development program could go awry when its implementation was left to the vagaries of individual entrepreneurial action without accountability to the sort of national development goals that Manuel Pardo and others had outlined but never summoned the will to implement. This should be the crux of the negative judgment in Peruvian history of the "Yankee Pizarro," who simply followed existing Peruvian practice and operated on the timetable of Peru’s own design.

Table 13.9 and charts 13.2-13.6 illustrate the tremendous impact of the railroad programs on U.S. exports to Peru. During the early 1870s, at least half of total U.S.-Peruvian trade can be directly attributed to them.
Chart 13.2
United States-Peruvian Trade
1866-1879

Millions of Dollars

1866 1868 1870 1872 1874 1876 1878

U.S. Exports
To Peru

U.S. Imports
From Peru

Source: Commerce and Navigation, various years.
Selected U.S. Exports to Peru, 1864-1876

Chart 13.3
Machinery

Chart 13.4
Iron and Steel Products

Chart 13.5
Cars and Carriages

Source: Commerce and Navigation, various years.
One of the principal beneficiaries of the projects was the Rogers Locomotive Works of New Jersey, successor to the company that built the looms for Casanova (see figs. 13.10 and 13.14). Out of a total of sixty-eight Meiggs-era locomotives still operating in Peru in 1908, Rogers built forty-six, of which fourteen had entered service in 1871, ten in 1872 and thirteen in 1873. The Baldwin Locomotive Works produced nine, the Danforth plant supplied six, and H. K. Porter of Pittsburgh built two. Altogether the United States exported 110 train engines to Peru in the eight years between 1870 and 1877.

Chart 13.6
U.S. Exports of Locomotives to Peru
1870-1876

Source: Commerce and Navigation, various years.

These figures include only those Meiggs-era locomotives listed as still in active service by Federico Costa y Laurent (Reseña histórica de los ferrocarriles del Perú [Lima: Fabbri, 1908]) and for which a manufacturer was identified. Only four were British-made, and two of those were very small engines. However, Germany and Great Britain did sell quite a few smaller engines for service on Peru’s sugar estates in the nineteenth century.
The great importance of Peru, Brazil and other Latin American countries to the total U.S. overseas market for train engines is shown in table 13.9. Peru alone accounted for almost one-fourth of all U.S. locomotive exports during the eight-year period, 1870-1877, and Latin American countries together purchased 69 percent. During a little more than two decades (1870-1892), the Latin American market absorbed 2,439 U.S. locomotives, representing 70.3 percent of U.S. worldwide sales.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Total Latin America</th>
<th>Total U.S. Exports</th>
<th>Percent to Latin America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>79</td>
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<td>1872</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
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<td>1873</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
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<td>1879</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>73</td>
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<td>1880</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>62</td>
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<td>1881</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>2,439</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Chile and Europe also benefited from Peru’s railroad projects. British exports to Peru doubled between 1867 and 1872, and its exports of manufactures of iron and steel, including machinery, rose tenfold. Whereas textiles had usually constituted at least 70 percent of all British exports to Peru, they declined temporarily in relative importance (though growing slightly in absolute terms) to as low as 30 percent in 1872. This shift is seen in chart 13.7. In dollar
equivalents, British metals manufactures and machinery alone exceeded the value of total U.S. exports to Peru in 1872. A major item in this British trade was rails, a product in which the United States was a net importer. At one point European rails must have been shipped to Peru faster than construction required, since in 1871 the United States imported 1.6 million pounds of rails from Peru worth $32,900. The following year, Peru was Britain's fourth largest market for rails, trailing only the United States, Russia and Canada.
**Chart 13.7**

**British Textile and Non-Textile Exports To Peru**

1850-1913

(Millions of £, Three-Year Moving Averages)

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**Discussion of chart 13.7**

This chart compares British textile and non-textile exports to Peru. Year-to-year variations are three-year moving averages. Apart from the sharp decline registered from the onset of the 1870s depression through the War with Chile, British textile exports to Peru (as measured by £) were fairly stable. By contrast, British sales of other products were more dynamic, rising and falling according to conditions in the Peruvian economy. The extraordinary British sales of non-textile products during the period of railroad construction are seen in the sharp rise (and fall) of the shaded line from the late 1860s to the mid-1870s.

Although U.S. exports to Peru never reached the level of those of Britain, Yankee sales climbed at a much more rapid rate. This was due not only to the fact that the United States provided most of the rolling stock, but also because the United States shipped a wider variety of other railroad-related supplies,
particularly lumber for ties and provisions to help feed Meiggs' laborers. U.S. exports of Pacific Coast wood products grew from $198,000 in 1867 to five-times as much in 1872. Sales of lard, the biggest item in the provisions category, jumped from a half-million pounds in 1867 to 3.3 million pounds in 1873. Observe the furniture imports, and it is no wonder that Lima’s artisans resented their nation’s approach to development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>To Peru (U.S. $000)</th>
<th>Million of Pounds of Lard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>To Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td></td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td></td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>3.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>2.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commerce and Navigation, various years.

The total value of U.S. exports to Peru in the nine-year construction period 1868-1876 was about twenty million dollars, compared to seventy-eight million dollars for Great Britain. Chile supplied most of Peru’s grain requirements during the railroad construction period; U.S. exports of wheat and flour were
low or nonexistent in 1864, 1865, 1867, and 1870-1873, if the government’s data can be believed. Chile also provided a major portion of the wood track ties. But a large share of other contracts went to U.S. suppliers. The contract to construct the largest bridge on the Oroya route went to the Baltimore Bridge Company, which erected the famous Verrugas bridge in 1871-1872. Spanning a canyon that carried water into the Rímac River, the Verrugas was regarded at the time as one of the wonders of the world. It was 578 feet in length and reached a height of 252 feet (see photographs).

Fig. 13.11
VERRUGAS BRIDGE (1872)
Built by the Baltimore Bridge Company during 1871-1872, the famous Verrugas Bridge symbolized the developmental vision, grandeur and reckless extravagance of Peru's railroad building program. The bridge took its name from the infectious disease that felled construction workers by the hundreds. So many died in accidents and from disease while building the Lima-to-Oroya line that total casualties were often said by contemporaries to be in the thousands. The work was headed by five teams of engineers living at camps along the route. Henry Meiggs initially acquired the contracts of hundreds of Chinese indentured servants from coastal estate owners. At one point he tried to obtain experienced Chinese rail workers from California. At the higher elevations, however, the contractors found that only Indian laborers could tolerate the arduous and painful work.

(Photograph: Archivo Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles)
The original bridge was destroyed by an avalanche following heavy rains in 1889. It was rebuilt during the following year, and this photograph showing the U.S. flag flying was taken on the day a train made the first test run in 1890. It was replaced in c. 1937 by a new Verrugas Bridge designed to carry heavier loads and built by Cleveland Bridge and Engineering. Notice how the tinting of the black and white photo for the postcard accentuated the U.S. flag. But, was there really a U.S. flag at the scene of this carefully composed picture? (See figs. 13.15 and 13.16.)

**REPUTATION OF MEIGGS**

While the benefits to the United States of the enclave approach to building Peru’s railroads are apparent from the trade data, the short-term economic benefits for Peru are harder to calculate. Certainly Meiggs was the nation’s most benevolent employer, and he gave lavishly to charities and other social causes. When a devastating earthquake struck Arica, Arequipa and other southern cities and ports in 1868, the U.S. press reported that Meiggs donated $75,000 for relief efforts.\(^{738}\) He made certain that Peruvians understood he had become the

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nation’s premier philanthropist. When disease began to devastate work crews on the line from Lima to La Oroya (hence the name of the Verrugas bridge), he built and staffed a large company hospital. One U.S. traveler reported in 1873 that the Chinese employed by Meiggs "appeared robust and contented," since they were given the same rations as other workers. They seemed to be the only Chinese workers not mistreated in Peru, he suggested.739 Meiggs supported a number of Lima’s volunteer fire stations. Although he imported small armies of foreign engineers and bridgemen, he was mindful of the need to offer employment to Peruvians, lest he touch off nationalist resentment. A few Peruvians served in top management of the construction projects, including, as noted above, Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán. And, Meiggs spared no expense when it came to Peruvian lawyers and consultants.740 But he seems to have viewed these moves more as a political calculation than a development strategy.

Meiggs’s lavish style, sponsorship of countless local investment schemes and tireless self-promotion as Peru’s most generous philanthropist earned him legendary status during his lifetime. He spent a good portion of his early profits in local land speculation and other ventures. "Meiggs was an inveterate gambler in real estate," wrote his biographer.741 By May 1870, he had purchased land stretching from Lima to Callao, including the entire corridor over which he built

739 J. B. Steere (1873); China’s investigating commission in 1874 (discussed below) found some things to criticize about the treatment of Chinese workers on the Lima-Oroya line, but the evidence did not contradict the judgment that Meiggs treated them better than other Peruvian employers.

740 Meiggs’ biographer reported that, as he neared death in August 1877, Meiggs “called to his home a group of eight of his business associates and friends” to witness his reading and sealing of his last will and testament. Those eight were Jorge de Texanos Pinto, Dionisio Derteano, Henry M. Brent, Manuel Gaspar Chávez, Luis Benjamín Cisneros, M. Moscoso Melgar, Felipe Varela y Valle and Francisco Palacios. Stewart, Meiggs, footnote 10 on p. 332.

741 Stewart, p. 226.
the first leg of the Central Railway. He mortgaged some properties to raise cash when his financial distress deepened, sold some at profit and gave others to relatives.

Meiggs's love of gambling included horse racing, and he developed a fine stable of thoroughbreds. He offered land from one of his estates to build a new racetrack, and he was the largest donor to the facility's construction fund. He is credited with transforming horse racing in Peru from an amateur sport into an organized spectacle and center of elite social life. When the new track was finally inaugurated, it was posthumously named "Cancha Meiggs" in his honor. His son, Minor K. Meiggs, served three terms as president of the Sociedad de Carreras del Perú, forerunner of the Jockey Club de Lima, and lived out much of the rest of his life in Peru.742

742 When the Cancha Meiggs was opened in 1877, leading figures associated with social events there included the daughters-in-law of John Bryce (original partner of William Grace) and John Gallagher (sugar estate owner instrumental in first attracting Grace to Peru in 1851). Today, the Jockey Club at the Monterrico racetrack still holds the annual "Clásico Enrique Meiggs," one of
While Meiggs’s biography is subtitled *Yankee Pizarro*, one writer suggested the widower was better known in elite social circles as a *Yankee Casanova*. “The fathers of [elite society] family called him 'the gentleman Meiggs'; the mothers, 'the friend Meiggs'; the young girls, 'Papa Meiggs,” wrote Manuel Gonzáles Prada 743 This aspect of Meiggs’s relationship with Peru became a powerful symbol later in the hands of critics of the excesses, corruption and lost opportunities of the guano age. Social critic Gonzáles Prada made the most direct and biting Peruvian comment on Meiggs, but his purpose was to ridicule Lima’s guano oligarchy, not the American. Many of the most prominent and respected men in Lima society, he noted, had been *niños de bien* in the 1870s. These young lads, he asserted, earned their gold watches and ponies from Meiggs’s stables "for mounting guard while their mothers, their sisters, or their cousins took the horizontal position on the couch of Meiggs." 744 In commenting on the evidence his father compiled with such wit, Alfredo González Prada summed up the social impact of the U.S. entrepreneur: "He built many bridges and tunnels in the Andes, but wrecked many homes and reputations in Lima." 745 Watt Stewart seemed to take these statements at face value. “Neither in business nor in his personal life,” wrote the biographer, “was Meiggs ever held back by inhibition or modesty.” But the comments of the González Pradas rang of anti-oligarchic hyperbole. Stewart went on to say that Meiggs’s

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743 Manuel Gonzáles Prada, quoted in Stewart, pp. 245-246.

744 Stewart, p. 245.

745 Personal letter from Dr. Alfredo Gonzalez Prada sent in 1938 to historian Watt Stewart, quoted in *Henry Meiggs*, p. 246.
shameless self-promotion was designed to better position himself to profit from "the universal hunger for gain which held in its grip the directors of Peru's economic and political life." It is certainly true that Meiggs milked the reputation in South America of Yankees as nation builders. Some around him, especially his brother, saw that the years of easy profiteering were over and that the Meiggs empire was as fragile as Peru's financial reputation. Whether Meiggs himself was essentially honest in his intentions for Peru – i.e., caught up in his own overoptimistic vision of Peru's possibilities – will remain an enigma.

Fig. 13.14
GIGANTITO
Rogers Locomotive Co. in Paterson, New Jersey built the 'Little Giant' engine in 1870, the first locomotive Henry Meiggs purchased for Central line. It featured a saddle tank, an 0-4-0 design (four driving wheels for traction and no pilot or trailing wheels) and was used for switching. Locomotives put into service in Peru received names painted on their sides (mostly denoting provinces). The wonderfully composed photograph of Gigantito was taken at the Monserrate station between Callao and Lima as the engine bellowed steam, silhouetting the man standing by the track.
(Photograph: Biblioteca Nacional del Perú; engine data: Kirchner and Copland, "Locomotives of Peru")

746 Ibid., pp. 245-247.

747 I do not mean "honest" in a technical or legal sense, since Meiggs regarded corruption as a normal and proper part of business affairs in Peru or the United States. Stewart compared Meiggs morally to Vanderbilt and the notorious U.S. Robber Barons, but the analogy is questionable. "Honest" is used here regarding his intentions for Peruvian development.
Pardo and Meiggs

It is hard to imagine any Peruvian who could have brought the wastefulness of the Meiggs operations under control other than Manuel Pardo. His 1872 election was democratic, he had broad elite support and his popularity was enhanced by the failed Gutiérrez coup. Yet, upon assuming office in August 1872, he did not prepare the public for difficult decisions ahead as Peru’s guano bubble burst, just as he had predicted it would twelve years earlier. In his inaugural speech he laid out what he said were the most urgent issues: municipal reform, government administrative reform, measures to prevent corruption and military reform. He would provide financial transparency and reduce general (non public works) government spending. Public education would be the only area he would expand, “because education of every citizen is the first requirement of the true greatness of nations.” There was not a word about guano or the orgy of foreign borrowing to support the Meiggs operations. By announcing he would not touch public works (railroads), Pardo was evading responsibility for regulation of the biggest item in the national budget. The warning signs were everywhere. A month after Pardo took


749 It is noteworthy that so little has been written about Manuel Pardo’s administration and Henry Meiggs. In his book on Pardo’s political rise and development of the Civilista Party, Ulrich Mücke mentioned Meiggs only once (p. 139), and that was a tangential reference to a matter that took place after Pardo left office.
office, Meiggs indicated he was loosing money on his lease of the Arequipa railway, the first he built in Peru.

When Pardo reported on the bleak financial situation at the end of September, he signaled that Peru would continue to press ahead on a gigantic foreign loan to finance railroad building at the current pace, even though European investors were beginning to sour on Peruvian bonds. Every penny of government revenue from guano “must be completely absorbed in the service of the foreign debt after emission of the new loan,” he said. He blamed the previous administration for launching projects with disregard for Peru’s realistic financial capacity, but he did not question the manner in which the building was being undertaken. His scapegoating of the previous government conveniently masked his own role in exploding Peru’s national debt when he was treasury minister in the 1860s.

The Meiggs program must be pushed through to completion, Pardo said. He told members of congress that, “you cannot fail to finish [the railroads] without disturbances which may be still more grave.” Instead of reforming the public works projects to bring Meiggs under development-oriented regulation, the government would try to raise new revenue to cover ordinary expenditures. “Without it everything collapses, foreign credit, domestic credit, railways, public prosperity and administration.” 750 Pardo and Meiggs locked themselves in an embrace (Pardo’s finance minister called it an “iron circle”) to sustain a flawed

750 Stewart, Meiggs, p. 290.
development model, each hoping the other could work some magic solution to the crisis.

In early 1874, Meiggs had to suspend work on a new boulevard he was building between Lima and Callao, a sign that his real estate speculations might go bad. Throughout the year he struggled to meet his payroll, which ran as high as one million soles per month. But, the Pardo government kept delivering funds to Meiggs for three long, painful years, until finally ordering suspension of railroad construction on August 13, 1875. When a New York newspaper later exclaimed that, “The ruin of Peru is the monument of Henry Meiggs,” it failed to note that his biggest Peruvian enablers included Manuel Pardo. Besides his own role in raising unrealistic public expectations about what railroads would do for Peruvian development, Pardo evidently feared the social and political consequences of suddenly throwing twenty thousand men off their jobs.

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751 Watt Stewart, *Henry Meiggs*, note 27, p. 344. The statement appeared in a press clipping that Stewart found in an archive of Meiggs papers. He was unable to identify the source exactly, but believed it to be from a New York newspaper of the early 1880s.
STARS AND STRIPES?
The much-reproduced image of the Verrugas bridge that was turned into a postcard (fig. 13.12) has two flags in the carefully-composed scene, one of which is the U.S. stars and stripes. But, were there flags in the original photograph? The image below, sin la bandera de los yanquis, appeared in Pablo Macera’s essay on the sweep of Peruvian history, Visión histórica del Perú (del paleolítico al proceso de 1968) (Lima: Editorial Milla Batres, 1978), p. 197. The arrow points to the man who appeared to be standing in front of a flag pole in the more widely distributed version. Notice that most objects made of wood or steel, such as the railing posts on the bridge, appear as dark forms, while the two flag poles are white.

THE PARDO ADMINISTRATION AND THE LAST YEARS OF PERUVIAN GUANO IN THE UNITED STATES

One option would have been to finally gain the optimum price for Peru’s dwindling supply of guano. During the Prado administration, management of
the U.S. guano market was in the hands of Hobson, Hurtado & Co., a firm partly owned by Peruvians and the Bryce brothers (former Grace partners), John and Francis, both of whom produced Peruvian families. A New York directory showed the firm as having two active and nine passive partners, as seen in the following table. Joseph Hobson had been a partner in the ninth Alsop partnership in Lima, so it appears that, from beginning in the 1840s to the end in the 1870s, there was at least one person associated with Alsop involved in U.S. guano distribution. In a trial where he appeared as a witness in New York City in April 1873, Hobson described himself as being a “commission merchant” in South America before returning to the United States in 1870.\footnote{He did not give a specific date for establishing Hobson, Hurtado & Co. in New York, but said it was “about three years ago.” New York (State) Court of Appeals, Records and Briefs, pp. 36-39.}
Table 13.11
Partners in Hobson, Hurtado & Co.
Peru’s Guano Agent for the U.S. Market During the Pardo Administration
1874-1876

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active partners</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>1874</th>
<th>1876</th>
<th>Prior background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Hobson</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td></td>
<td>Active Alsop partner in Lima**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José M. Hurtado</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably citizen of Colombia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special partners</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>1874</th>
<th>1876</th>
<th>Prior background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Francis Bryce</td>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>55,556</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>Bryce, Grace in Callao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Bryce</td>
<td>Lima/ England</td>
<td>55,556</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>Bryce, Grace in Callao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luis Josue Rainusso</td>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>55,556</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>Probably Italian immigrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilio Althaus</td>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>55,556 (not listed)</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>Tristán group, Barreda partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andres A. Calderon</td>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>55,556</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>Guano loading contractor***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gustave Heudebert</td>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>27,778</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>Immigrant merchant from France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederic Errequeta</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>27,778</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>French partner of Heudebert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miceno Espantoso</td>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>55,556</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Manager Barreda group’s bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicente Hurtado</td>
<td>Lima (not listed)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brother of the active partner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total capitalization</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>388,892</td>
<td>530,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1874 values listed as “gold,” 1876 as “$”
** Brother of Alsop partner George G. Hobson.
*** Andres Álvarez Calderón took over the guano loading contract in 1862 after Domingo Elías was removed. He was reported to have donated $50,000 for earthquake relief in 1868, the same amount as contributed by Henry Meiggs.


After passively watching its product sold adulterated for decades, only as the guano age was winding down in 1873, did the Peruvian government finally take legal action against perpetrators in the United States. That measure was limited and perhaps mainly symbolic. Employing the Wall Street law firm of Pritchard, Choate & Smith, Peru initiated lawsuits against five New York distributors who allegedly bought up old guano bags from farmers that bore the Peruvian trademark and then filled them with phosphates and other material,
including generous amounts of sand and brick dust. The Peruvian government claimed damages and sought to enjoin the firms from continuing fraudulently to sell the adulterated product. However, in statements to the New York Times, the accused made light of the charges. E. H. Reeves claimed his firm did not deal in large quantity sales and, so, purchased the product from jobbers, not Peruvian government agents. He said he sold the fertilizer just as he bought it from his suppliers, and he suggested that everyone knew that Peruvian products were sold mixed with other substances. “He said that dealers for the last twenty years were aware of the fact that guano was adulterated, but that he doubted if it was tampered with to a much greater extent than most articles of trade.” Robert C. Reeves was just as complacent, shrugging off the Peruvian lawsuit and stating that he was “guilty of no dishonorable practices.” L. B. Coxe, according to the Times, said “he had never guaranteed to his customers that he was selling them genuine guano.” Besides, Coxe suggested his adulterated product was better for his clients. “Mr. Coxe thought that, by mixing the guano, it is much better for the consumer, as it saves him the trouble, and pure guano is altogether too strong to be used without adulteration.”

753 Gazette & Courier (Franklin County, Massachusetts), August 4, 1873, and New York Times, July 29, 1873. The accused businesses were located in the same New York district a few blocks from Wall Street: George Ricardo & Co., 195 Water Street; L. B. Coxe & Co., 197 Water Street; George S. White, 160 Front Street; Robert C. Reeves, 185-187 Water Street; E. H. Reeves & Co., 184 Water Street.

754 The media reported that from 25,000 to 30,000 tons of Peruvian guano were sold annually in the city, but that figure is probably too high.

Peru’s attorneys said they took action because Peru was receiving numerous complaints from customers who said they had been swindled. But, in fact, the investigation that led to the lawsuit was conducted by the New York State Agricultural Society in collaboration with chemist William M. Habirshaw, who offered to conduct necessary tests. In May 1872, the Society appointed a chemical committee “instructed to obtain samples of guanos sold at retail in the city of New York.” Members purchased one bag from each of ten dealers and, for comparative purposes, obtained a bag of “Guanape guano” from Hobson, Hurtado & Co., agents of Peru, and another of nitrogenized superphosphate from the Manhattan Manufacturing and Fertilizing Company. Habirshaw analyzed samples taken from the twelve bags. The results were embarrassing to the Pardo administration, prodding it to take action. They are summarized in the table below by converting the bag weights and retail prices paid into comparable dollar costs per ton (column 3), and subtracting the chemist’s estimated market value of the main components (nitrogen and soluble phosphate) from the price actually paid. (The chemist did not try to put a value on other components, which would have been minor.)

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### Table 13.12
Chemical Analysis and Value of Twelve “Guano” Samples
New York City, 1872

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dealer</th>
<th>Product</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bag weight</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert C. Reeves</td>
<td>guano</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>6.87</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. H. Reeves &amp; Co.</td>
<td>guano</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decatur &amp; Coxe</td>
<td>guano</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>6.72</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Ricardo &amp; Co.</td>
<td>guano</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanderbilt Bros.</td>
<td>P. Guano</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Moore</td>
<td>guano</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. A. Reeves</td>
<td>No. 1 Peruvian</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. H. Allen &amp; Co.</td>
<td>guano</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapman &amp; Van Wyck</td>
<td>No. 1 Peruvian</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George E. White</td>
<td>No. 1 P. Chincha</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobson, Hurtado &amp; Co.</td>
<td>Guanape No. 11</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattan Manuf. &amp; F.</td>
<td>Phs. Bld. Guano</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes to table 13.12: It is not clear that the brief product description shown above was complete, so that “guano” may or may not have been sold as the Peruvian product. The dollar cost per ton was calculated from the bag weight and cost figures that were given in the report. All percentage and dollar figures are rounded off.

- % nit. = the ammonia equivalent of the nitrogen found in the sample.
- % phos. = percent equivalent of soluble bone phosphate (there was also unsoluble phosphate).
- % s & s = percent of sand and silica.
- $ val. = computation for comparative purposes of the value per ton, “in which it was assumed that the value of [total] nitrogen [in sample] is seventeen cents in gold per pound, and of [total] phosphoric acid ten cents in gold per pound, and that no other constituents should be taken into account.”
- $ diff. = the dollar price charged per ton above the computed “value.”

The Manhattan Manufacturing and Fertilizing Co. sample was branded as “Phosphatic Blood Guano.” Hobson, Hurtado & Co. said that they supplied both R. H. Allen & Co. and Chapman & Van Wyck with the Peruvian guano sampled, from stocks imported on the ship Andrew Johnson, and that their own chemical analysis confirmed the accuracy of Habirshaw’s results. The dealers selling the products of samples 1, 2, 3 (under the Coxe name only), 4 and 10 were sued by Peru the following year.

Among the insights that emerge from this survey is the fact that in 1872, single bags of purported Peruvian guano that contained lots of worthless material were retailing for the equivalent of from seventy-five to eighty dollars per ton in New York City. In other words, during the first year of the Pardo
administration, an inferior grade of Peruvian guano was selling for almost double what the Barredas got fifteen years earlier for the best guano. Sellers of the adulterated products were not discounting them below the seventy-five dollar price, and this level of fraud was taking place at the end of the guano era and in what New Yorkers would claim was one of the most sophisticated capitalist markets in the world. The weight amount of sand and silica in the samples ranged from almost none (two percent) to almost half (47 percent). According to the public rationales of two of the offending companies, these fertilizer marketing practices were well understood in the marketplace and had been going on for decades.

According to Peru’s own agent, shipments of genuine Chincha Islands guano were now quite variable in their quality. As the mountains of pure guano were almost exhausted, sand and other impurities appeared in shipments like those of the Andrew Johnson, where, unlike others, no one in the United States had tampered with them. Hobson, Hurtado & Co. wrote in their letter of February 24, 1873, to the New York State Agricultural Society that, “The quality of the Chincha guano has from the first been so uniform that we have had no analysis made of it, while we analyze each cargo of Guanape on arrival, and which is now so little inferior to the Chincha that farmers prefer it to the latter, at the lower price they pay for it.”

But, apparently the Peruvian agent was soon compelled to perform analysis of Chincha guano as well and begin lowering its price. An 1882 report by the secretary of the Connecticut State Board of Agriculture stated that, “All
the guano received is analyzed, sorted, manipulated or rectified by [Hobson, Hurtado & Co.], and sold under certain brands with a guaranteed composition, so that the purchaser had comparatively little uncertainty as to the value of the goods, as analysis made showed the goods to be in every respect fully up to the guarantee.” That confident statement contrasted with reports by chemists of the State Agricultural Society showing a steady decline in the quality of Peruvian guano during the 1870s, from a high of fifteen-and-one-half percent of nitrogen early on to a high of 8.5 percent among seven samples in 1876 and 6.2 percent in 1881. In sum, during the 1870s the quality of Peruvian guano became untrustworthy, “because the genuine article has varied so widely from year to year and even from cargo to cargo, and has been so variously doctored. It has truly ‘suffered many things of many physicians,’ … so that sometimes it is impossible to say from the inspection of an analysis whether it was made on a genuine Peruvian guano of very poor quality, or on one which had been mixed with sand or shells with fraudulent intent.”

Of the ten New York dealers surveyed in 1872, only two, Vanderbilt Bros. and John Moore, seemed to have sold a quality Peruvian product, judging by the nitrogen content of the samples and the amounts of sand and silica found. Embarrassed by the test results were two dealers (samples 8 and 9) who obtained their product directly from Peru’s agents, Hobson, Hurtado & Co. The latter firm said it was able to identify the ship on which the guano was imported from

the Chinchas; and, after the Society’s revelations, it had the product independently tested. The second analysis verified the first. In a letter intended to repair the damage done to the reputation of its two dealers, Hobson, Hurtado & Co. stated that, “We regret that we, as well as the eminently fair dealing and reliable firms from whom this guano was obtained, were thus deceived in this rare instance of the Andrew Johnson’s cargo of Chincha guano not proving of standard quality. We believe Messrs. R. H. Allen & Co. and Messrs. Chapman & Van Wyck are among those who have sold only pure guano, as obtained from us; and from out long intercourse with them they have our full confidence, and are entitled to that also of those who deal with them in Peruvian guano, either Chincha or Guanape.”

While the Society’s chemical committee did not pretend that their calculations of the value of nitrogen and other components in each sample represented the actual values of the fertilizers to farmers, it is clear that adulteration typically reduced the value by half or more.

In 1874 the newly-installed Massachusetts state inspector of commercial fertilizers gave his own assessment of Peruvian guano based upon analysis of a more limited number of samples. He reported some prices and values in both gold and currency (1 gold = 1.14 currency). His samples were No. 1 Peruvian, but of the Guanape island stock because “genuine Chincha guano is very scarce in the market.” He said that, while Hobson, Hurtado & Co. in New York said they sold Guanape guano at $60 gold or $68.40 currency per ton of 2,240 pounds,

758 Ibid., pp. 235-236.
“Farmers in our vicinity paid $80 currency for 2,000 pounds.” While others reported the nitrogen in No. 1 Chinchas guano as about 13.50 percent, his Guanape sample was found to have only 9.70 percent. Nevertheless, it was a superior value compared to synthetics because its components were worth $92.78 per 2,000 pounds. “A good average sample of [Peru’s] Guanape guano furnishes us, therefore, nitrogen and phosphoric acid at about $10 to $12 cheaper than most of our home-made fertilizers.” He then told of the adulteration of “Peruvian guano” discovered in New York City. He also warned local farmers that, even if Peruvian guano were not adulterated, they would find that the authentic product “is sometimes damaged by water during the transportation from the islands or in consequence of having been stored in moist store-rooms.”

The quality of the Peruvian product seems to have continued to decline over the next three years, with a consequent diminishing of price. One distributor began to overhaul Peruvian guano and sell it under the brand, “Peruvian Guano – Guaranteed.” After unloading the guano from the ship arriving from Peru, this company crushed any lumps found (perhaps due to exposure to moisture) and then removed stones, petrified guano and all other impurities by screening. Now in a “dry, powdery condition, fit for immediate use in the drill,” they packaged the product. “The analysis of contents of each bag, is also warranted, and printed in full on one side; and, to guard, as far as practicable, against adulteration, the extremities of the twine with which the

mouth of the bag is sewn, are secured by lead seals, on which the monogram of the trade mark is stamped.” The chemical analysis of the resulting product was printed on the bag, “stating the percentage of Ammonia, Phosphoric Acid in its different forms, and Potassa.” Then the distributor marked the retail price per ton of 2,000 pounds, “to serve as a guide to the purchaser.” These innovations will be discussed in the conclusion of this study.

A study conducted in 1877 under the auspices of the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station provided additional insight into this final stage of Peru’s large-scale sales of guano to the United States. While the Connecticut institution’s mandate was to advance agricultural science broadly, its main immediate purpose was to test fertilizers and help farmers determine the real value of competing products. Thirteen samples of “guano” were tested, including four sold as “Peruvian No. 1” by authorized dealers in New York, Hamden and New Haven. The others included two manufactured by the quite successful Pacific Guano Co., one by E. Frank Coe and three by the Manhattan Fertilizer Co. The products were purchased for as little as $40 per ton and as great as $60 per ton, and their nitrogen contents were determined to range from as little as 1.97 percent to as much as 8.56 percent. Using the term “guano” in the brand name was meant to imply a high nitrogen content, but all synthetic products were low in nitrogen content, and most could not match even the now

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deteriorated Peruvian guano. One of the Pacific Guano Co. samples had only one-fourth of the nitrogen as in Peruvian guano.

Table 13.13
Chemical Analysis and Value of Thirteen “Guano” Samples
Studied by the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station, 1877
(Ranked by Difference Between Value and Price)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Test #</th>
<th>Brand Name</th>
<th>Manufacturer</th>
<th>Percent Nitrogen</th>
<th>Nitrogen as a Percent of No.1 Peruvian Average</th>
<th>Percent Soluble Phosphoric Acid</th>
<th>Retail Value per Ton</th>
<th>Retail Price</th>
<th>Retail Price - Retail Value</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>No. 1 Peruvian Guano</td>
<td>Peru's U.S. Agent</td>
<td>8.56</td>
<td>104%</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>67.04</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>17.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>No. 1 Peruvian Guano</td>
<td>Peru's U.S. Agent</td>
<td>8.55</td>
<td>104%</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>63.29</td>
<td>54.50</td>
<td>8.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216</td>
<td>Lobos Peruvian G.</td>
<td>Peru's U.S. Agent</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>59.40</td>
<td>51.00</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>No. 1 Peruvian Guano</td>
<td>Peru's U.S. Agent</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>59.26</td>
<td>56.00</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>No. 1 Peruvian Guano</td>
<td>Peru's U.S. Agent</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>61.47</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174</td>
<td>Abbatoir Guano</td>
<td>E. Frank Co</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>8.56</td>
<td>39.76</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>Soluble Pacific G.</td>
<td>Pacific Guano Co</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>38.41</td>
<td>45.00</td>
<td>-6.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Pine Island Guano</td>
<td>Quinnipiac Fert. Co.</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>35.36</td>
<td>42.50</td>
<td>-7.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Soluble Pacific G.</td>
<td>Pacific Guano Co</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>36.94</td>
<td>45.00</td>
<td>-8.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>Pine Island Guano</td>
<td>Quinnipiac Fert. Co.</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>34.01</td>
<td>42.50</td>
<td>-8.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>Blood Guano</td>
<td>Manhattan Fert. Co.</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>7.79</td>
<td>37.21</td>
<td>47.50</td>
<td>-10.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>Blood Guano</td>
<td>Manhattan Fert. Co.</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>35.99</td>
<td>47.50</td>
<td>-11.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>Blood Guano</td>
<td>Manhattan Fert. Co.</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>7.91</td>
<td>34.09</td>
<td>47.50</td>
<td>-13.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Notes:
Samples of product made by the same company were purchased from different dealers in different cities and/or by different clients. Retail price of sample #132 was blank, listed right under sample #90 from same company, and here assumed it was to be understood as the same as above ($42.50). Sample #155 had a question mark following the listed price. Peru’s U.S. agent at the time was Hobson, Hurtado & Co. The five Peruvian samples were provided by the following farmers and purchased from the following local dealers:

#120 by T. N. Bishop of Plainville, purchased from Chapman & Van Wyck of New York
#141 by Andrews Bros. of Southington, purchased from Olds & Whipple of Hartford
#156 by J. J. Webb of Hamden, purchased from R. B. Bradley & Co. of New Haven
#179 by J. J. Webb of Hamden, purchased from Olds & Whipple of Hartford
#211 by G. M. Barber of New Britain, purchased from Chapman & Van Wyck of New York

Source:
If the Connecticut study was reasonably representative of farmer experience with synthetics and Peruvian guano in the late 1870s, purchasers of synthetic fertilizers were almost guaranteed to overpay for nutrients, even in products branded as “guano,” whereas purchasers of the Peruvian product would usually obtain a bargain, although the nitrogen content was now considerably below that obtained from Peruvian guano a decade earlier. On average, the Peruvian samples (four from the Chinchas and one from the Lobos Islands) were underpriced by $7.79 per ton, while the synthetic competitors were overpriced by an average of $8.22, a spread of sixteen dollars per ton between the two groups. Given the fact that value calculations were based upon market prices of chemical components, rather than product performance, the actual difference could have been larger because Peruvian guano was renowned for its solubility and effectiveness during the season in which it was applied. The synthetics were superior for their phosphate content, but portions of that may not have been in forms readily absorbed by plants. Some manufacturers of superphosphates made no effort to compete with Peruvian guano. The more honest manufacturers of “guano” products added crushed bone, blood and fish meal, and other organic substances to their phosphates to gain nitrogen content, but their results varied widely. A smaller test of “guano” products in 1879 verified the Connecticut Station’s previous results. The components of the Peruvian product had an estimated value of $66.67 per ton, but it was purchased at retail for $53.50, meaning it was underpriced by over thirteen dollars. Samples of Pine Island and Manhattan Fertilizer Co. products labeled as “guano” were
overpriced by $4.43 and $4.33 per ton, respectively. “As usual,” the report concluded, “the Peruvian Standard Guano is one of the cheapest sources of its ingredients.” 762 This was stated almost four decades after Peru began shipping guano to foreign markets and should give pause to those who continue to insist that synthetic fertilizers undermined demand for Peruvian guano. 763

Such praise would not last. In the Connecticut Station’s report for 1881, the authors lamented that, “Peruvian guano now varies in value unpleasantly,” due to exhaustion of the ancient deposits. “Rumor has it,” they continued, “that very inferior or adulterated shipments from England have been coming to this country for disposal, and consumers would do well not to purchase without guaranty of composition.” 764

Successive Peruvian administrations had allowed the very name guano to become debased, and the government of Manuel Pardo continued the pattern of doing nothing to secure the proper value of the Peruvian product.

Pardo Administration and China

Meanwhile, the María Luz affair forced China to reevaluate the whole business of providing Chinese laborers for Peru and Cuba. A Chinese


763 The conventional wisdom that Peruvian guano was being challenged by “strong” competition from synthetics is repeated in Peruvian textbooks and scholarly literature alike. Many books in Peru echo Heracio Bonilla’s phrasing, “la aguda competencia presentada por los abonos sintéticos” (Guano y burguesía, p. 123). Mathew based his theory that Peruvian guano’s price had to be kept low on “[i]ncreased supplies of alternative fertilizers” (“Peru and the British Guano Market,” p. 128). This will be addressed in the conclusion.
commission to Cuba later found that Chinese indentured servants there “were decoyed abroad and not legitimately induced to emigrate,” and that their treatment in Cuba was dreadful. It was going to be difficult for Peruvians to convince China that treatment of its citizens on the María Luz was an aberration.

Once he had completed a treaty with Japan, Aurelio García y García moved on to China, where U.S. diplomats gained him an official audience. The emperor designated the superintendent of trade and viceroy of Zhili province, Li Hongzhang, to negotiate with the Peruvian. During a series of diplomatic dinners, Li told García he had heard that most Chinese laborers in Peru were worked to death. Pardo’s negotiator was indignant and wrote his foreign ministry that Li’s understanding of conditions in Peru was of “the most crass ignorance.” García said that prominent Chinese in Lima had written president Pardo, thanking him for the opportunities Peru provided for Chinese immigrants. His reporting of that letter was partially true. It was something of a

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764 Ibid., ... for 1881 (1882), p. 27.
765 The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal (Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1888) vol. 19, p. 374-375. The date of the Chinese commission to Cuba was given here as 1873, but that was the year of its appointment, and other sources said the commissions to both Peru and Cuba took place the following year.
766 Because of Zhili’s proximity to Beijing and the importance of its capital, Tianjin, to foreign commerce, its viceroy played a central role in China’s foreign affairs. In 1871, Li Hongzhang had replaced Zeng Guofan, whom many considered a more capable leader. For example, the merchant and educational reformer who would soon lead China’s investigative commission to Peru, Yung Wing, said that Zeng Guofan (spelled Tsang Kwoh Fan by Yung) “as a statesman, a patriot, and as a man, towered above his contemporaries even as Mount Everest rises above the surrounding heights of the Himalaya range.” By contrast, Yung said that Li “was of an altogether different make-up from his distinguished predecessor and patron. He was of an excitable and nervous temperament, capricious and impulsive, susceptible to flattery and praise, or, as the Chinese laconically put it, he was fond of wearing tall hats. His outward manners were brusque, but was inwardly kind-hearted.” Yung Wing, My Life in China and America (New York: Henry Holt, 1909), pp. 187-188.
formalistic gesture, a small group of Chinese merchants in Lima reaching out to a newly-elected president. But some of those same leaders of Peru’s Chinese community had also petitioned the U.S. legation in Lima, asking for U.S. assistance in bringing deplorable conditions of coolies in Peru to the attention of Chinese government. Francis Thomas replied with indifference. He told them he could make no comment on Peru’s internal affairs and advised them to send their concerns to China by regular mail. He expressed confidence that the Pardo administration’s mission to China would resolve problems of the coolie trade.767

Li Hongzhang told García that the truth of what was going on in Peru must be ascertained, and he proposed that China send over an investigating commission. “How can China treat with Peru while such things exist?” Li asked.768 Under the circumstances, García could not oppose such an investigation.

Manuel Pardo’s investment in the coolie trade was at risk, and his administration would now face a Chinese investigator in Peru. But, Chinese authorities did not wait for the commission to report back before beginning to take steps to end the commerce. Although the British criticized Portugal for allowing the trade to be conducted from Macao, most Peruvian ships involved spent time in Hong Kong for repairs and resupply before picking up the bondsmen in the Portuguese port. But, on September 1, 1873, Hong Kong’s

767 Concerning the committee of seven prominent Chinese in Lima who requested U.S. assistance, see Thomas to Fish, December 13, 1873, in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States . . . 1874 (Washington: GPO, 1874), pp. 795-796.
*China Mail* reported that people who just the year before were defending Peru’s trade had fallen “prudently silent.” The newspaper’s editors wrote that a person opposing the trade would have been mocked, that “[h]alf a score of the soundest, most practical, and most utterly conclusive arguments would have been sprung on him,” not the least because of “the amount of money involved in the trade.” And, yet, “within so few months, we find coolie-ships quietly turned out of this harbor.”

Not one remained in Hong Kong, and the reason was soon revealed. From Hong Kong the Peruvian ships fled to the Chinese port of Whampoa, where the same companies that served them in Hong Kong also had facilities. But, the *China Mail* wrote on September 9 that, “We learn on good authority that the Chinese government has resolved to henceforth forbid Macao coolie-ships from resorting to Whampoa,” and that the Portuguese and Peruvians involved would “henceforth have to depend upon [their] own resources to prosecute” the trade. On September 11, the *Hong-Kong Times* reported that the British viceroy had sent a letter to the captain of each Peruvian coolie ship at Whampoa, “ordering that you will leave this port and the adjacent waters at once with the vessel which you are the master of.”

More ominously for Manuel Pardo’s business, apparently some Chinese authorities began to apply the death penalty to middle men who tricked peasants

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into emigrating. The China Mail’s editors suggested that the Portuguese and Peruvians who hired these men were more deserving of the punishment. “Many of the native crimps and kidnappers have suffered the punishment – more deserved by their employers – of decapitation.” A man “who has decoyed hundreds to semi-slavery or worse [in Peru], now finds his own wretched and worthless life in danger.” If Pardo considered Herrera’s treatment by Japan to be an affront to the nation, one can only wonder about his reaction if, say, one of the García y García brothers had lost his head in China. “The Chinese are drawing their lines closer and closer round Macao,” the editors thought. Rumor on the street suggested that Peruvian captains would find the price of each coolie had gone way up, if they could be found at all. “We are informed from trustworthy sources that coolies are not to be had for money, and they are certainly not likely to come for love.”

YALE UNIVERSITY’S YUNG WING

The man Li Hongzhang chose to lead China’s commission to Peru was working on a separate mission in Hartford, Connecticut. Yung Wing was Yale University’s first Chinese graduate in 1854 and became a champion of educational reform in his homeland. Yung faced some discrimination back in China for his lack of traditional training, so he became a successful merchant, and the government twice sent him back to New England to purchase tool making machinery to be used in modernizing the country’s military. During the
course of his commercial dealings, Yung had several opportunities to observe how Peru’s labor recruitment program was carried out in China. In his autobiography, Yung said that during business trips to Macao he learned “how the country people were inveigled and kidnapped, put into barracoons and kept there by force till they were shipped on board, where they were made to sign labor contracts either for Cuba or Peru.” Yung wrote that, “one of the first scenes I had seen on my arrival in Macao in 1855 was a string of poor Chinese coolies tied to each other by their cues and led into one of the barracoons like abject slaves.” He proudly recounted how, “while in Canton, I succeeded in having two or three kidnappers arrested, and had them put into wooden collars weighing forty pounds, which the culprits had to carry night and day for a couple of months as a punishment for their kidnapping.”

In 1870, after several years of lobbying by Yung, China appointed him and Chin Lan Pin to lead an educational commission to the United States through which 120 Chinese students would go to New England for education of up to fifteen years each. Yung and the first complement of students reached Connecticut in 1872. The students were placed with local families, and Yung set up his commission headquarters in Hartford, where Mark Twain had recently established residence with his new wife and where he would write many of his most important works, including *Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*. Yung was

772 Yung, pp. 192-194.
befriended by several men in Twain’s social circle, including Joseph Hopkins Twichell, minister of Asylum Hill Congregational Church, which was attended by many of the state’s top politicians and businessmen. Chinese students and their teachers were guests at the Twichell dinner table. Mark Twain and his wife held a reception for Yung at their newly constructed Farmington Avenue mansion.\footnote{Courtney, pp. 124-126, 130-131 and 146-147.}

The following spring Yung obtained appointment by the Gatling Company as China sales agent for their new machine gun, which he described as “a comparatively new weapon of warfare of a most destructive character,” and so he made a trip to Tianjin (then written Tientsin), which the British had opened to foreign trade through the Second Opium War.

\textbf{YUNG, TWICHELL AND KELLOGG IN PERU}

While Yung was negotiating an initial order for a battery of fifty Gatling guns, Aurelio García y Garxía coincidentally arrived in Tianjin from Japan in the hope he could save Peru’s source of forced labor. “While I was in Tientsin, attending to the gun business,” said Yung, “the Viceroy told me that the Peruvian commissioner was there waiting to make a treaty with China regarding the further importation of coolie labor in Peru.” Li Hongzhang asked Yung to check the Peruvian out. García was mistaken if he thought he could manipulate Yung. “In his conversation, he [García] pictured to me in rosy colors how well

\footnote{The eventual undoing of the educational mission in 1881 marked a sad moment in U.S.-China relations. It was driven by political differences and intrigue in China and the anti-Chinese movement in the United States, a story summarized by Yung Wing on pp. 197-215.}
the Chinese were treated in Peru; how they were prospering and doing well there, and said that the Chinese government ought to conclude a treaty with Peru to encourage the poorer class of Chinese to emigrate to that country, which offered a fine chance for them to better themselves.” But, after letting the Peruvian spin his tale, Yung revealed to García that he knew quite a bit about conditions in Peru from reading reports and that he had personally seen Peruvian trafficking as it was conducted from Macao. “Then I told him something about the horrors of the middle passage between Macao and Cuba or Peru; how whole cargoes of them revolted in mid-ocean, and either committed wholesale suicide by jumping into the ocean, or else overpowered the captain and the crew, killed them and threw them overboard, and then took their chances drifting of the vessel.” Yung said he told García that, upon landing in Peru, the Chinese “were then sold to the highest bidder, and made to sign another contract with their new masters, who took special care to have the contract renewed at the end of every term, practically making slaves of them for life.”

García was shocked by his encounter with Yung. “How the Peruvian’s countenance changed when he heard me deliver my mind on the subject! Disappointment, displeasure and anger were visible,” Yung recalled with evident delight. The educational reformer informed García that, “he must not expect me to help him in this diabolical business.” On the contrary, Yung wrote,

775 Yung, pp. 192-193.
“I told him I would dissuade the Viceroy from entering into a treaty with Peru to carry on such inhuman traffic.”

After initial diplomatic meetings with García and agreement to send investigating commissions to Peru and Cuba, Li Hongzhang appointed Yung to lead the mission to Peru and his colleague at the educational commission in Hartford, Chin Lan Pin, to carry out a similar study of the conditions of the Chinese in Cuba. Yung hurried back to Connecticut to recruit men to assist him in his work in Peru.

Meanwhile, García obtained U.S. and British assistance in his negotiations, and he signed a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with China on June 26, 1874. As a condition, China obtained from Peru a special side agreement on the trade in Chinese emigrants that García signed the same day. At Li Hongzhang’s insistence, it stipulated that China would send a commission to Peru to investigate “the representations that have been made to the effect that some of these are suffering grievances.” The Peruvian government pledged to give the commission its full cooperation and support, and to establish judicial review of any ill treatment of Chinese servants the commission might discover. Li Hongzhang’s plan was to hold up Chinese ratification of the treaty pending the outcome of Yung’s investigation in Peru, and then perhaps use the evidence

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776 Ibid.
to get it rejected. The Pardo administration was about to receive an energetic envoy from China via the United States.

Yung’s first U.S. candidate to accompany him to South America was pastor Twichell of the Asylum Hill church, who by then had begun his regular long walks with Mark Twain from their Nook Farm neighborhood in Hartford along country roads and through the woods as far as the Talcott Mountain range west of the city. Their conversations generated many of the minister’s sermons and many of Twain’s literary anecdotes. Prior to Yung’s arrival with the Chinese students in Connecticut, Twichell and his wife contemplated leaving the United States for missionary work. Yung’s educational reform mission changed their plans. “Lo,” Twichell declared, “God has brought the work to my very door.” So, it was not surprising that Twichell accepted Yung’s offer with enthusiasm.

Yung also recruited Edward W. Kellogg, brother of his fiancée. Twichell wrote to a close friend, Harry Hopkins, of his excitement at leaving for Peru, filling the letter with exclamation marks. “But Harry, Peru!!! Think of it, dissolute man. Lima! Llamas!! Incas !!! Guayaquil!!!,” he wrote, before ending with “Guano!!!!” He and Kellogg would be Yung’s traveling companions holding no official Chinese appointment, but their roles in Peru were important to the commission’s work. Twichell asked Mark Twain to look in on his wife while he was gone; she was seven months pregnant.

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Yung, Twichell and Kellogg sailed on the steamer *S.S. Colón* from New York on August 15, 1874. They crossed the Isthmus on the Panama railway and then boarded the Pacific Steam Navigation Company’s *Lima* for the voyage down the west coast to Callao. Fortuitously, on the ship they met a fellow U.S. traveler who was returning to work in Peru. Kellogg wrote that Thomas Gaig was “an intelligent mechanic who has lived [in Peru] for thirteen years” and had worked as an engineer on sugar plantations where he could closely observe mistreatment of Chinese workers. He was eager to recount the tortures the Chinese endured, which Kellogg summarized in letters to his wife. Gaig told the three men that the Chinese were treated “like brute beasts, that is too mild – for worse than that

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778 Courtney, p. 146.
they are starved – not housed properly – not clad – are whipped horribly, often till they die, – are burned & we have heard of one who was undoubtedly buried alive." 779  Twichell suggested that Yung was only mildly enthusiastic about his Peru trip until he heard Gaig’s stories, whereupon he became very passionate about the mission.

Upon arrival in Peru, Yung hired Gaig to conduct a week of field research for the commission, paying him twenty dollars in gold. Gaig produced a report about visits to seventeen places where Chinese servants lived on Peruvian agricultural estates. During a short stay of only twelve days, Yung, Twichell and Kellogg mainly interviewed Chinese merchants and former indentured servants in Lima and Callao, some probably runaways. President Manuel Pardo met with Yung, and a U.S. vice consul facilitated other contacts and meetings. Yung wanted to stay in Peru longer, but Kellogg and Twichell, whose wife was due to give birth in a few weeks, resisted. At one point, Yung became angry at his U.S. partners, threatening to stay on in Peru even if having to sacrifice his forthcoming marriage to Mary Kellogg. “W[ing] rebuked me in a very unkind & unjust manner,” Kellogg wrote his wife. “I was thunderstruck.” But Yung apologized, and Kellogg begged his wife not to mention the incident to his sister. Twichell thought the spat between Yung and his future brother-in-law was amusing. 780

779  Sonoda, p. 7
780  Courtney, p. 154. Mary Kellogg and Yung Wing had two sons, Morrison Brown Yung and Bartlett Golden Yung, both Yale graduates and both named after various U.S. men who
Henry Meiggs arranged for the three men to travel up the Central Railway line and visit the camps of his Chinese workers. Meiggs no doubt believed that, by comparison with Peruvian employers, the commission would find his treatment of Chinese workers to be exemplary. From her study of letters and memos of Twichel and Kellogg written while in Peru, Setsuko Sonoda concluded that Twichel worked as Yung’s secretary and recorder during many interviews, and that he and Kellogg pulled together a good amount of the commission’s documentation.\textsuperscript{781} Twichel once used the term “auditor” to describe the U.S. citizens’ role in the commission.\textsuperscript{782} On their trip up to the Chinese camps on the Central Railway, they met Dr. George A. Ward, a Yale classmate of Twichel who was employed by Meiggs as medical superintendent of the project. Ward provided a report on the condition of Chinese workers that was not as positive as Meiggs might have liked, since it described instances of ill treatment as well as suffering from altitude sickness and infectious disease.\textsuperscript{783} The U.S. minister to Peru provided the commission advice on how China could help ensure that its citizens were better treated in Peru.\textsuperscript{784}

\textsuperscript{781} Sonoda, pp. 5-8.

\textsuperscript{782} Court, p. 154.

\textsuperscript{783} Sonoda, pp. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{784} Court, p. 156.
PHOTOGRAPHY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Yung’s own role was primarily in networking with leaders and merchants in Lima’s Chinese community, who set up interviews with former coolies. Some of the latter seemed fearful of possible reprisals for telling their stories. Twichell described a moment when he and Kellogg walked in on a meeting between Yung and men who had worked as indentured servants. “Coolies panic struck at our appearance supposing us to be Peruvian.” While taking testimony from numerous Chinese, Yung, Twichell and Kellogg found some who were willing to show their scars from whippings and other forms of torture. In the journal he kept on his Peru trip, Twichell wrote, “We saw two Chinese (coolies) who had on their buttocks the marks – great cicatrices – of horrible floggings.” It is not clear whether it was Yung, Twichell or Kellogg who came up with the idea of taking pictures of their bodily injuries, but China’s commission made a pioneering use of photography as a human rights tool. Yung said, “I had these photographs taken in the night, unknown to anyone except the victims themselves, who were, at my request, collected and assembled together for the purpose.” Yung attached twenty-four photos to his commission report to viceroy Li. He said they showed “how their backs had been lacerated and torn, scarred and disfigured by the lash.” Perhaps Yung had known the impact that photographs of the naked backs of slaves who had been whipped had in the United States before and after the U.S. Civil War. “I knew that these

785 Ibid., p. 154.

786 Sonoda, p. 3.
photographs,” Yung recalled, “would tell a tale of cruelty and inhumanity perpetrated by the owners of haciendas, which would be beyond cavil and dispute.”787

Li used the Peru commission to delay action on ratification of the commercial treaty, and Yung did his best to provide Li with a report that the viceroy could use to prevent ratification. “We can not expect any fairness to resolve the Chinese problems here in Peru,” Yung wrote. He expressed a low opinion of Manuel Pardo’s government. There was, he said, “a wide-spread atmosphere of self-interest.” Yung doubted the Pardo administration was inclined to protect Chinese workers, and, in any case, he thought it lacked the capacity to do so. Peruvian “governance is small in scale,” he wrote, “and all kinds of tasks sit stagnant.” He said that Peru had plenty of Indians and others available for labor, but that “business managers here avoid hiring these native laborers because of their higher labor costs.” Peruvians, Yung reported, “consider the Chinese as being held in bondage and as cheap labor.” China should not be a party to this. “Peru should not recruit foreign laborers as slave labor.”788 Yung, Twichell and Kellogg returned to Connecticut on October 5, 1874. Mark Twain met them at Hartford station.

According to Yung, Aurelio García y García was still waiting in China when his report reached Li Hongzhang. Yung anticipated that Peru’s representative would loudly deny the veracity of the commission’s report, so he

787 Yung, p. 195.

788 Sonoda, p. 4.
made a suggestion in a separate letter to Li. “I had written to the Viceroy beforehand that he should hold the photographs in reserve, and keep them in the background till the Peruvian had exhausted all his arguments, and then produce them.” Yung said he was later told that, “the Viceroy followed my suggestion, and the photographs proved to be so incontrovertible and palpable that the Peruvian was taken by surprise and was dumbfounded.” Yung took satisfaction from having given Pardo’s envoy his comeuppance. “He retired completely crestfallen.”789

The Pardo administration secured Peruvian ratification of the commercial treaty with China in 1875, and China did likewise. A side agreement designed to regulate Chinese emigration to Peru spoke to many past abuses. Where indenture contracts were expired and Chinese wanted to return to China, Peru agreed to compel employers to “provide them with passage back to their native country,” if that had been stipulated in their original contracts. For Chinese servants who wanted to return but had no contractual right to repatriation by employers, Peru agreed to pay for their passage back to China.790 The agreement provided for “free and voluntary” Chinese emigration to Peru. From the Chinese standpoint, the language of the treaty and side agreement banned indentured servitude, although there was no mention of “contract” in the accord. The parties agreed to “punish severely” those who would use “violence or fraud” to induce emigration and to crack down on ships “employed in such

789 Courtney, pp. 195-196.

790 The texts of the side agreement and treaty are in Meagher (2008), pp. 348-355.
unlawful operations.” There is no indication that China was aware of the personal involvement of president Pardo or the García y García brothers in such trafficking. Peruvian entrepreneurs and government officials read the language as leaving open their supply of Chinese laborers,791 and the dreams of Peruvian plantation owners would lead to the bankruptcy of one of the most storied U.S. shipping companies in the history of U.S. trade with China. Many Chinese already in Peru would continue to suffer (fig. 13.21), but Peruvian slaving across the Pacific was over.

791 Stewart, Chinese Bondage, p. 206.
IRONS

One of the most extraordinary photographs taken in Peru in the nineteenth century was of a Chinese bondsman in irons on the Chicamita sugar estate. Colleague Keith McElroy and I found it in an album in the Biblioteca Nacional, and I published it in 1973. It has since been reprinted frequently in Peru, drawing public attention to the country’s nineteenth-century labor regime. The photo is probably from the 1890s, some two decades after Yung’s mission during the Pardo administration. Because it dates from the later period, the image is analyzed in the third volume of this study. A detail is included here as a counterpart to Yung’s use of photography to document abuses in Peru in 1874.
(Source: Biblioteca Nacional)

ARBITRATION

While Manuel Pardo’s envoy to Japan and China succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with the two countries, the matter of Peru’s claims of moral and material damages against Japan in the María Luz case was deferred. Peru and Japan asked the United States to arbitrate the matter. But Washington felt that its policy on the coolie trade precluded impartial judgment and got the two countries to submit the dispute to Tsar Alexander II of Russia. Peru’s exposition to the Tsar carried the date April 5, 1875, and was submitted by
none other than Barreda network member José Antonio de Lavalle. Manuel Pardo’s brother-in-law was then serving as Peru’s minister in Russia. As noted before, the two men had co-managed the Villa sugar estate, and Lavalle later wrote that Pardo was his dearest friend. In his brief presented to the Russian leader, Peru made a legal and moral defense of its coolie trade, claiming that it was false that Chinese indentured servants were mistreated in Peru.

The main evidence Lavalle gave to support this claim of benign treatment was a recent article by Clements Markham, “From China to Peru,” published in Geographical Magazine in 1874. After noting the legal ending of the Indian mita, tribute and African slavery, Markham gushed that, “The modern Peruvians have indeed set a noble example as regards the treatment of the labouring classes, both in legislation and in practice.” In his travels Markham said he found Peru’s black plantation workers to be “happy and contented.” He singled out Barreda group member Mariano de Osma, among others, as humane “country gentlemen” who inherited estates from their fathers and should not be confused with “ordinary planters and speculators” of England or the United States (who, he implied, did abuse black and Chinese servants). He allowed that the Chinese were a “disturbing element,” given that there were no women among the immigrants. Nevertheless, he commended Henry Meiggs for paying Chinese bondsmen more than what was specified in their contracts. Furthermore, he

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stated that without the indentured servants “the progress of agriculture in Peru would have been impossible.” 793

Markham acknowledged that the coolie trade out of Macao had fallen into the hands of “private speculators, whose sole object was to make money out of the traffic.” There was, he said, “much kidnapping, over-crowding, and ill treatment.” This admission would not have lent much support to Lavalle’s María Luz brief were it not for Markham’s next sentence: “But these evils have been grossly exaggerated,” he said, noting that such abuses happened in other parts of the world when the labor trade was in “private and irresponsible hands.” Then he vouched for the proper treatment of the Chinese on Peruvian ships regularly engaged in the trade, blaming abuses mainly on French ships. He cited specific examples of horrible British treatment of Asian labor to contrast with their relatively better treatment in Peru. Turning to the María Luz case, Markham suggested that the British in Yokohama had “somewhat gratuitously assumed” that the Chinese on board were mistreated, and he echoed the Peruvian belief that the treatment of captain Herrera had been an “outrage.” He extolled the work of the foreign minister and García y García in their dealings with Japan and China. He noted that a commission of Chinese businessmen resident in Lima and Callao had sent a memorandum to Manuel Pardo on the occasion of the second anniversary of his government, complimenting him for the equal rights

793 Markham was the founding editor of Geographical Magazine, and the timing of this article in the first volume (December 1, 1874, pp. 367-370) raises the possibility that his friend Mariano de Osma or someone in the Pardo government might have solicited his piece in relation to the María Luz affair. Markham’s apology for the coolie trade was criticized in some circles.
and protection they have been afforded in Peru. “The address of the Chinese emigrants in Peru is a sufficient reply to the misrepresentations of the Aborigines Protection Society, which have recently been published.” Markham concluded his article with a paean to Pardo and the Chinese immigrants for “restoring wealth and prosperity to the glorious land of the children of the Sun.”

On May 29, 1875, St. Petersburg awarded the decision to Japan, an event cited in histories of Japan as vindicating the country’s newly developing judicial system. Upon receiving the result, Lavalle wrote Pardo’s foreign minister in Lima that, “I never held much hope for success in the [María Luz] mission you entrusted to me.”

EL ESPANTOSO CATACLISMO (PERU)
AND CATACLYSM (UNITED STATES)

Twelve years before he won Peru’s presidency, Manuel Pardo predicted that exhaustion of its guano treasure would bring the country to an espantoso cataclismo. He was quite accurate in his estimate of its timing but could not have imagined that he himself would preside over Peru’s bankruptcy. How he and Henry Meiggs tried to cope with the disaster is mostly beyond the scope of this study. Pardo focused on the nitrate mines in the region bordering Chile,

794 Ibid., p. 370.
795 J. A. de Lavalle to Reclaciones Exteriores, in Aranda, pp. 184a to 184c.
796 Peru’s bankruptcy and the final months of the lives of the two men is the point of departure of the second volume of the larger study of which this dissertation is a part.
while Meiggs tried to finance continued railroad building with the promise that the central line would revive the Cerro de Pasco mining region.

Peru stopped paying interest on its foreign loans in July 1875. While his brother John opted to take his money out of Peru at the end of that year, Henry stayed on the sinking ship. Asked in New York if it was true that the Pardo administration was unfriendly to Henry Meiggs, John Meiggs said, “No. We have got along pleasantly with him, as we have with every administration.”

By the time Pardo left office in mid-1876, neither the banks he helped establish, nor his government, nor Meiggs had much hard currency with which to pay their obligations. Pardo may have had mixed feelings, but he gave approval to the banks and Meiggs to each float mountains of paper currency which, sooner rather than later, merchants would repudiate.

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797 Stewart, Meiggs, p. 307.
In a desperate attempt to keep building Peru’s central Andean railway, Henry Meiggs issued his own currency in 1876, which people called *billetes Meiggs*. Like most Peruvian paper currency of the 1870s (and postage stamps issued in the same period), they were printed by the National Banknote Company of New York. The picture on the one-sol note just above and left of the signature of *don Enrique* is of a locomotive hauling a coal car named “Progress” (author’s collection). For photographs of Meiggs notes, railroad bonds, stock certificates and other Peruvian paper of the era, see the beautifully-illustrated book assembled by Margarita Giesecke, *La bolsa de valores de Lima: 140 años de historia* (bilingual Spanish/English edition, Lima: Bolsa de Valores de Lima, 1997).

By coincidence, the United States was not faring much better than Peru in some financial respects. The post-Civil War economic expansion had led to great speculative excesses in railroad shares and other stocks. A bank panic in New York at the end of 1872 was followed by an 1873 stock crash and long depression, and the combination ruined the fortune of Federico Barreda. To curtail

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798 The 1873 U.S. depression is generally regarded as part of the first thoroughly international financial crisis, having begun in Austria and Germany, then spread to Italy, Holland and Belgium, followed by the United States, Britain, France and Russia. Trading had to be halted on the New York Stock Exchange during the crash in September 1873. Local exchanges in Pittsburgh and New Orleans closed for two months. See Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber, *Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises*, 5th ed. (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), pp. 137 and 211.
expenses, he sold his Newport summer residence in December 1873 and then had to assign his other assets as collateral to his brother Felipe in return for a large loan. “The financial situation of the world is incomprehensible,” Federico wrote Felipe in October 1874. “Everywhere general conditions are bad and there is such a complete paralysis of business that it seems as if everybody is expecting a cataclysm.”

Federico’s wife and children were living in Paris, partly due to the poor health of his eldest daughter. When she died in 1875, he made plans to sell his New York City mansion and settle his family on a Maryland farm he had bought in 1860.

Since purchasing and reconstructing his nineteen-bedroom New York residence in 1868, Barreda had invested almost $400,000 in the property on Madison Square at Twenty-fifth Street. A brief description will suggest the life and social position that Peruvian guano gave the Barredas in the United States. The basement held a huge kitchen with a twelve-foot-long range, butler’s pantry, vegetable cellar, meat cutting room, servant’s hall, steward’s room, laundry with eight washtubs, steam drying room, refrigerators, wine cellar and numerous closets and bins for coal and kindling. The first floor featured a marble-tiled central hall, drawing room, 25 by 28 foot main dining room, plus a smaller family dining room – all served by a dumb waiter to carry up food and

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799 Sherman, From the Guadalquivir to the Golden Gate, pp. 205-210. According to Sherman’s reading of his grandfather’s accounts, Federico Barreda had assets of some 850,000 dollars in 1868, but much of that was listed at cost and some was leveraged and mortgaged. In any case, his financial collapse was spectacular. Sherman said Felipe gave Federico a loan of $402,000 at seven percent interest (c. 1874), and also deferred collection of another $108,000 that Federico owed him.
refreshments from the kitchen. The four adult bedrooms on the second floor were flanked by two dressing rooms, library and boudoir. The third floor was for children, with five bedrooms and a study. The fourth floor was devoted to servants’ quarters with seven smaller bedrooms, a recreation room and storage facilities for the many trunks the family used in moving back and forth between the United States and Europe. Throughout the five levels there were six bathtubs and nine water-closetts, which Barreda’s grandson noted were “a generous number for those days.” The mansion had its own adjoining stable with a carriage room, bedrooms for grooms and coachman, and stalls that could accommodate nine horses, some of which Barreda acquired in Europe. The family lived in the New York Hotel and their Newport summer house throughout 1869 while the residence was rebuilt and furnished. When forced to sell in 1876, Barreda could get only 187,500 dollars for the mansion, plus 15,000 for the furnishings, which meant a loss of almost half.

Barreda had purchased about 250 acres on a Maryland peninsula called Drum Point more as a speculation than with any intention of becoming a gentleman farmer. The peninsula formed a fine natural harbor. But, the railroad he thought would increase the land’s value was never built. So, as Manuel

800 Sherman’s description of how Barreda developed his New York mansion is on pp. 202-203.

801 Barreda and some friends incorporated the Baltimore & Drum Point Railroad in 1868, hoping to get county and municipal financing. The business strategy was to link Drum Point to existing lines in eastern Maryland at one end and the city of Baltimore on the other, spurring land development. But, local entities did not pledge funds until much later, and construction did not actually begin until 1888. At its height, as many as 250 laborers worked with picks and shovels, together with perhaps one hundred teams of horses drawing plows and carts. However, both private and public investors failed to honor their funding pledges, and the company went bankrupt in 1891, leaving a series of uncompleted and noncontiguous road sections. The family
Pardo faced the disappointment of the last months of his failed administration and Henry Meiggs was having the National Banknote Company of New York print up his notorious *billetes Meiggs* (fig. 13.22), Federico Barreda spent much of late 1875 and the first half of 1876 converting a neglected property into a functioning farm. Once that was accomplished and his family installed there, Barreda accepted an offer from a Guatemalan friend to establish a coffee importing business in San Francisco. The man that Spain’s agents had mocked a decade earlier as Abraham Lincoln’s “Peruvian prince” became an employee of a Guatemalan company in late 1876. His mission was to open the Guatemalan’s office in San Francisco, and soon the small U.S. wing of the Barreda family relocated to California, where descendants reside today.

**PERU’S 1876 PHILADELPHIA EXHIBIT AS A MIRROR OF FAILED DEVELOPMENT POLICIES**

This study concludes in Philadelphia with the final service Federico Barreda performed for Peru. In 1876, the city hosted the first U.S. world’s fair, the U.S. Centennial Exhibition, to commemorate the anniversary of the U.S. Declaration of Independence. Manuel Pardo’s administration named Barreda to the commission charged with preparation of Peru’s exhibit, and the results can

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802 Because of Federico’s debts to his brother, Drum Point eventually became the property of Felipe Barreda’s heirs.
serve as a metaphor for several dimensions of the country’s development failures. While this episode might seem trivial to Peruvians enduring severe economic crisis, it dramatized the ongoing shift in South American fortunes – the triumph of Chile over Peru – that would be an important guano and Barreda/Pardo legacy.

Philadelphia’s exposition drew almost ten million visitors over six months to see displays of agricultural and industrial progress from thirty-seven countries. Pardo’s foreign minister, José de la Riva Agüero, accepted the U.S. invitation in February 1874, giving Peru more than two years to prepare its participation. He then appointed a four-member team to organize Peru’s contribution. While the membership of the group changed one or two times according to personnel changes in the Peruvian legation in Washington, Federico Barreda was a commissioner from beginning to end. Unfortunately for Peru, this coincided with his personal financial debacle and retreat to the Drum Point farm, which must have distracted him from his duties.

Of twelve participating Latin American countries, only Brazil constructed its own separate structure within the main exhibition hall. Peru, Mexico and others put up their displays along the hall’s corridors. Taking advantage of Peru’s weakness and perhaps confusing visitors for whom “Peru” was

803 Among several illustrated books published as guides to the exhibition was James Dabney McCabe, The Illustrated History of the Centennial Exhibition Held in … (Philadelphia: National Publishing Co., 1876).

synonymous with “guano,” the Pacific Guano Co. built a separate small but very visible guano pavilion outside the main hall.  

Peru’s exhibits drew mixed reactions, with the overall impression less favorable than those made by Mexico or Chile. In their respective mining industry profiles, Mexico won in the awe category by bringing in large amounts of silver, including a huge piece weighing 4,002 lbs. and valued at $72,000. This spoke perfectly to the U.S. public’s economic ambitions: raw, grandiose, get-

805 In its published material handed out at the Exhibition, the company advertised a range of products and did not claim they were from Peru. The Pacific Guano Co. was, over the long term, the most successful U.S. firm in the post-War-of-the-Pacific guano market. Indeed, the company later became involved in Peru’s modest twentieth-century guano exports.

806 Mexico published its own promotional book of information about the country and its exhibits. Mexico’s aim was to counter U.S. prejudices about the country that were spawned by the Texas conflict and Mexican American War of 1846-1848. See [Mexico], Philadelphia
rich-quick. For a moment, people could put aside their U.S. stereotypes of Mexico: bereft of irrigation, bandits roaming primitive roads, peasants in squalid villages. Regular visitors could fantasize about finding treasure that might sit just below the rocky surface of hills, home to a goat-herder’s flock. More importantly for the Mexican government, the exhibit could not fail to impress the occasional visiting New York or Boston investor.

By contrast, Chile’s mineral samples were small but impressive in their variety, contrast and beauty. Emilio Escobar of Santiago lent the Chilean government his private collection of 445 rock and ore specimens, including 105 different natural conformations of native silver, many chosen for the delightful designs they made. The Chilean mining exhibit was ablaze in color, ranging from light blue alabaster to malachite, cobalt and contrasting varieties of copper ores. Chile also caught the attention of the more scientifically-minded children and adults by showing ninety-one samples taken from a single mine, Chañarcillo, at different strata from the surface down to a depth of more than 600 yards. Most importantly, in a hall so large and full of tens of thousands of items impossible to view in a week, let alone the single day available to most visitors, Chile drew in visitors through a wood pavilion entrance with a thematic design consisting of an enormous stuffed condor, resting atop a mound of silver-bearing ore.

In contrast to Mexico’s scale and Chile’s thematic coherence, Peru presented an eclectic mix of ancient and modern items on cases around a colonial

style courtyard, most arranged in a pedestrian manner and some displayed in poor light. Peru’s gallery of art seemed thrown together. One reviewer was not impressed by the artistic talent of either pre-Columbian artisans or colonial Peruvian painters. No one had thought through what story Peru was telling its U.S. audience. Unlike Chile’s display, Peru’s had no theme that would show how such “crude” and earthy designs and materials could be understood as properly in place among the elegant displays from around the world of the latest agricultural and industrial technology.

At the center of Peru’s courtyard was a risky display of mummies unearthed from coastal pre-Columbian tombs. While fascinating in their own right from an anatomical and ethnographic standpoint, this exhibit offended the sensibilities of many visitors. Shown alone in the middle of the courtyard and presented out of context, it seemed more designed to shock than educate. While U.S. audiences of the day flocked to traveling “freak shows” that exhibited all manner of human and animal abnormalities, this unexpected surprise in Philadelphia was divorced from any meaningful story. “We saw in the centre a rather repulsive collection of half-decayed mummies, skulls, skeletons of the aboriginal races,” wrote J. S. Ingram in one of the best-selling books about the exhibition. “These mummies, taken out of their tombs where they have lain for the last three thousand years, seemed to leer and grin as if in hideous mockery on the surrounding trophies of modern civilization.” Ingram acknowledged that such “relics of an extinct race” might be of interest to ethnologists, “but to us we must confess they were not particularly attractive.” He did allow that the
display of a collection of pottery, weapons and other artifacts found buried with the mummies “showed that the ancient Peruvians had made considerable progress in many useful domestic manufactures.”

Over the next three decades, U.S. museums, universities and private collectors began to be drawn to the superb craftsmanship and artistry of Peru’s pre-Columbian cultures that were so poorly displayed in Philadelphia. Only gradually did limeño elites realize – and even then, only a few individuals – that there were aspects of indigenous culture worthy of study and preservation, and that foreign desires were draining the country of many of its best archeological treasures. This served to heighten elite insecurities. Foreigners were in awe of the grandeur of Peru’s pre-Columbian civilization, including the quality of its most sumptuous textiles. By contrast, what the Barredas and other nineteenth century elites had accomplished with their wealth and power appeared rather pathetic.

[Guano] has caused a fictitious prosperity because it has diverted us from developing with our own labor the abundant resources we possess ... [and instead] has made us dependent on foreign industry, and in this way has destroyed our economic independence.

Juan Copello and Luis Petriconi

No one wants to wait. In this respect we live for today and we live badly.

Pedro Dávalos y Lissón

The disorder, lack of narrative theme and inattention to design that the Manuel Pardo administration presented in Philadelphia in 1876 was a sadly relevant symbol of the country’s development path. Consistent with this metaphor, the separate Pacific Guano Co. exhibit was a small monument of misinformation. It implied that the fertilizer was still the country’s main industry in 1876 and that Peru yet possessed abundant reserves worth hundreds of millions of dollars.\(^808\)

**FLAWED HYPOTHESES**

At the outset of this study, I had imagined that Peru’s failed development was due to policies largely dictated by foreign merchant houses. I wondered

\(^{808}\) Ingram, *Centennial Exposition*, p. 492.
why Mexico, although closer to Manchester and New England, could initiate industrial manufacture of cotton textiles while Peru, with greater natural protection that distance afforded, did not. I accepted the conventional notions that competition from synthetic fertilizers prevented Peru from properly exploiting guano as a development tool; that Peruvians were fatally addicted to foreign loans; that Henry Meiggs was a clever, opportunistic “Yankee Pizarro;” and that Manuel Pardo was a victim of circumstances he inherited at a bad moment. These assumptions proved flawed.

Instead, I discovered that Peruvian elites exercised great control over the historical process; that they were frequently challenged by critics who understood how and why their policies were misguided; that Meiggs followed practices that the Barredas and others had established; and that Manuel Pardo’s failures were rooted in the fact that he shared the outlook underlying them. When the crisis he himself predicted arrived right on schedule, he had no alternative vision or plan.

TRADE, U.S. NAVAL HISTORY AND BARTOW PREVOST

From the birth of the Peruvian republic, U.S. interests were never monolithic, Washington’s ability to work its will in South America was limited and U.S. threats of use of force were mostly bluff. Peruvians could always find allies in the United States but mostly neglected to pursue relationships with them. The United States pursued narrow commercial interests but could be checked by appeal to values and international norms. From William Tudor and successor U.S. consuls and chargés to the powerful Henry Meiggs, U.S. actors were always circumscribed by the regulatory power of the Peruvian state,
especially when the former perceived that the government’s actions were backed by popular support. As much as chargé John Randolph Clay in Lima wanted to place Peru’s U.S. guano sales into the hands of the Alsop firm, he realized he was unlikely to accomplish this feat and doubted it would bring much benefit to U.S. farmers. He spent a good deal of effort trying to educate Washington about Peruvian realities.

Bartow Prevost’s conflicts with John Quincy Adams illustrated the paradigm. While Henry Clay was giving voice in congress to U.S. citizens sympathetic to anti-colonial revolution in Peru, Prevost represented them indirectly by countering the questionable activities of U.S. merchant contrabandistas and head-strong U.S. naval commanders.

Adams’s annoyance with Bartow Prevost was not simply because the Bostonian placed U.S. commercial interests above the public’s sympathy for Simón Bolívar and the patriot cause in Peru. Adams indeed was disposed to justify the conduct of U.S. naval commanders Biddle, Downes and Stewart while scapegoating Prevost. But part of the problem lay in Washington’s vague orders to its naval captains and their volatile temperaments. Prevost’s role required him to move back-and-forth between what is today Ecuador in the north and Valparaiso and Santiago to the south. He could not be in all places at all times. He worked to clean up messes that the officers helped create by stubborn adherence to male honor codes and dogmatic interpretation of neutral rights. Merchants and ship owners were taking risks, and it offended the patriots’ claims of sovereignty that the U.S. navy tried to settle everything in the merchants’ favor on the spot. Prevost thought that appearances and longer-range political objectives mattered. One can read between the lines of Adams to see that James Monroe recognized that U.S. policy was a balancing act in which
Prevost must take care to ensure good U.S. relations with the future independent Peruvían government. No one doubted Spain would have to relinquish Peru.

Richard Alsop worried that patriot anger against the U.S. navy would damage his business prospects. U.S. merchants were divided between those speculating in sending ships and supercargos to violate Cochrane’s blockade versus those trying to set up permanent commercial houses in Peru and Chile. Latin America’s wars of independence were messy affairs with stakes very different from those in the Mediterranean conflict with Barbary privateers. Biddle, Downes and Stewart needed political guidance from the Monroe administration (through the secretary of the navy and Prevost) in order to act as diplomats, control their pridefulness and restrain action that objectively aided Spain. Chile was a constituted government that offered U.S. merchants judicial recourse. Patriots in Peru were a legitimate and representative force that Prevost was assigned to identify and establish friendship with, even as he tried to be properly diplomatic with the viceroy’s regime. U.S. merchants could and did try to recover losses after the war was over. The goodwill Prevost built up among the patriots was an invaluable counterbalance to the objectively pro-royalist actions of private ship captains backed up by the U.S. navy. It was not the differences between Prevost and the naval commanders that, as the secretary of the navy wrote, had “done injury to our national character and interests.” Prevost was upset with actions already taken in his absence and whose consequences he was required to try to repair. Compared to some of the disparaging remarks navy men made about him, Prevost usually reported about them to Washington in moderate language.

In most U.S. naval literature, Prevost is judged in the wrong because he did not forcefully press every claim of U.S. ship captains and their merchant
investors. This is perhaps understandable given institutional biases and the orders given to U.S. naval commanders calling on them to focus on protection of U.S. commerce. Naval historians portray Biddle, Downes and Stewart as conscientiously and determinedly protecting the commercial interests of their countrymen, with Prevost at best passive, and at worst an apologist for patriot depredations; and then they cite Adams to validate this perspective. David F. Long labeled Prevost “a doctrinaire liberal.” Edward Baxter Billingsley, who among naval historians was the most understanding and fair regarding Prevost, called him a “doctrinaire democrat” who “abandoned objectivity.” The author did allow that Prevost was “a noble figure” whose assessment that U.S. merchants were providing aid to the royalists was fundamentally correct.

Prevost was inconsistent in ways that showed his political sympathies. In 1818, he ridiculed the Spanish claim to blockade the entire west coast, but later he was more understanding of patriot efforts to extend a similar blockade. But, what U.S. naval commanders and Adams seemed to ignore was the fact that, as the patriot navy became larger and more formidable, it was able to give armed effect to the blockade in many regions. The viceroy’s blockade had always been

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809 In using the term “institutional bias,” I do not wish to cast doubt on the scholarship of the authors, who all did important and ground-breaking research to open up this underappreciated area of U.S. and Latin American history. However, it can be noted that Claude G. Berube was a naval commander and professor at the U.S. naval academy, and his coauthor of the Stewart biography (A Call to the Sea), John A. Rodgaard, was also a U.S. naval officer. Prior to becoming a highly respected naval historian at the University of Alabama, Robert Erwin Johnson served in the U.S. Naval Reserve, and his study of the early years of Pacific Station was published by the United States Naval Institute. Edward Baxter Billingsley, author of Neutral Rights, was, prior to his career as a historian, commander of a U.S. destroyer in the World War II assault on the beaches of Normandy. Of the naval historians cited in this study, only David Foster Long of the University of New Hampshire (Gold Braid and Foreign Relations) was not a navy man prior to becoming a historian. Billingsley retired from the navy as a rear admiral. Each writer weighed the evidence in a professional manner and did not shy from narrating the flaws of Biddle, Downes and Stewart. While my own conclusions are different, I have relied heavily on their work. Of these scholars, Billingsley was the most understanding of the difficulties Prevost faced.

810 Long, Gold Braid, p.75: Billingsley, p. 205.
a paper one, but Cochrane’s gradually ceased to be so; and, thus, patriot confrontations with U.S. merchants became more frequent. When U.S. navy captains choose to escort merchantmen past the guns of Cochrane’s modest but growing armada, it hardly seems proper to call the blockade “paper.”

U.S. naval historians could be more mindful that Adams was famously and harshly negative about many people, not just Prevost. Adams’ parents had let him know that they expected greatness in their son, and biographers have sensed in his temperament a pressure-filled upbringing and life-long fear of failure. The result, by his own admission, was a need for absolute control and an arrogant intolerance of others. In a letter to his wife, Adams commented on what he realized were shortcomings. “My natural disposition is of an over-anxious cast, and my struggles to accommodate myself to circumstances which I cannot control have given my constitution in less than fifty years the wear and tear of seventy.”

The rants by Adams against Prevost in his private correspondence provide scholars with high government authority by which to excuse the behavior of Downes and Stewart, even when they were violating their orders (Biddle’s orders were so vague that he could hardly violate them). The naval officers could see only the injuries to property that individual ship captains brought before them. The clearer orders given to Pacific Station commanders after Stewart can be interpreted as an implicit recognition by the U.S. navy that previous orders were flawed.

Prevost’s task was to put these incidents in broader perspective and try to quietly align U.S. interests with the Peru of the future. Adams complained that the patriots “have been constantly endeavoring to entangle us with them and

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their cause.”

He seemed unable to imagine how his own country would have fared if the French had adopted such an attitude during his father’s generation. Furthermore, Prevost was more discrete in his relations with patriots and royalists than Joel Poinsett had been a decade earlier, when he represented the James Madison administration in South America. Poinsett meddled deeply in Chilean politics, sometimes functioned as a freelance military advisor against the royalists and sought U.S. recognition of an independent Chile more forcefully than Prevost ever did. His biographer, J. Fred Rippy, observed that Poinsett departed “farther and farther” from his instructions. Rippy exclaimed about his subject: “He had long been encouraging a declaration of independence, but now he would participate in an insurgent campaign!” Furthermore, Poinsett was deceptive in his correspondence with Washington so as to hide his activities from president Madison.

There is no evidence that Prevost violated his instructions. On the contrary, when Bolívar asked him for help in gaining U.S. diplomatic recognition for an independent Peru, Prevost explained U.S. policy to him in a most direct manner. Peru, he told the Liberator, would have to win U.S. recognition on the battlefield. Prevost worried that he had crossed the line in one instance in verbal remarks given at a dinner party; but that was done so late in the conflict that even Adams probably did not mind, and Prevost fully disclosed his remarks to the secretary of state.

Despite Adams’s dismissiveness of Prevost’s efforts on behalf of U.S. commerce, the special agent’s correspondence with the department indicates that

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he spent a good deal of time, up until he was removed to Buenos Aires, trying to work out the problems of U.S. ship captains and naval officers. Adams did not understand that Prevost was using the goodwill he had built up in Chile and with Bolivar’s forces in the north to try to defend U.S. trading interests even when, objectively, U.S. citizens were violating local and international law. With Spain’s authority contested in Peru, and Chile a base of patriot forces, Adams sometimes did not seem to appreciate that Chile, as a legally constituted nation, could compel U.S. citizens to obey its laws wherever Chilean forces exercised authority in Peruvian territory or territorial waters. Chile was a nation at war, and U.S. policy recognized that patriot forces were not simply bands of rebels in the Spanish empire. It is hard to imagine that the United States in wartime would ever tolerate the sort of activities U.S. citizens were engaged in on the west coast. Indeed, when the tables were turned during the U.S. Civil War, the United States was anxious to defeat any foreign power’s claim of neutral rights in order to trade with the Confederacy. Once Cochrane deployed his forces, most of Peru’s coastal waters were in patriot control. The viceroy needed U.S. ships to run the blockade and resupply his own forces. U.S. merchants ran risks, suffered losses but reaped good profits over all. In many instances, the U.S. navy objectively placed itself in the viceroy’s service. To achieve this goal, the viceroy played to the vanity of U.S. naval captains.

Prevost’s greatest mistake in Peru was in the area of political intelligence. His sympathies led him repeatedly to overestimate the speed with which Spain’s Peruvian colony would collapse into hands of a worthy patriot government. But, no one, and certainly not William Tudor, doubted the outcome. Prevost was not alone in looking to the longer-term commercial interests of the United States. To gratuitously antagonize Cochrane and other revolutionary leaders for reasons of
personal and naval “honor,” as U.S. naval commanders certainly did, hardly served the larger interests of U.S. trade with South America. As Richard Alsop’s scathing 1823 letter to Henry Clay demonstrated, there were U.S. citizens in Lima who identified with Prevost’s approach, commercially and politically, and saw it as more consistent with the honor of the United States. Stewart’s actions, in what Alsop called both his “public and private conduct,” were so egregious as to “rouse the indignant spirit of every honest man, and mantle his cheeks with burning blushes of shame at his country’s dishonour.” The U.S. navy’s captains’ behavior “jeopardizes our commercial relations,” Alsop declared.814 Stewart’s acquittal on a technicality was politically motivated and should not be used by scholars to absolve his conduct in South America or imply that Prevost was in the wrong.

Explicit in the instructions given to Prevost and other U.S. political agents sent to South America in 1817 was the duty, in addition to defending “neutral rights” for U.S. commerce, to secure the “friendship” of emerging independent authorities wherever the “authority of Spain [was] being shaken.” Prevost was to operate in regions that Washington understood were in flux by “the extension of the revolutionary movement.” The United States rejected Spain’s claim that it was suppressing an internal rebellion. Furthermore, in his instructions to political agents, interim secretary of state Richard Rush said that, “As inhabitants of the same hemisphere, it was natural that we should feel a solicitude for the welfare of the colonists,” referring to those who aspired to independence.815 The


815 As noted in chapter three, the detailed instructions were addressed to agents Rodney and Graham, but were not included in Rush’s letter to Prevost that same week, perhaps because Rush knew that Prevost had a close personal relationship with president Monroe and had just met with him.
secretaries of the navy made no such clarifications to the successive Pacific commanders, but did instruct them to consult with Prevost.

Despite all his personal animosity toward Prevost, Adams acknowledged that he was the “best” political agent the United States had sent to South America. Furthermore, Adams was mindful that, even in the face of great political pressure brought to bear by Prevost’s critics in the navy and among merchant ship captains, James Monroe not only continued to support him, he wanted to promote him to the position of first U.S. chargé d’affaires in Lima. Even when senators told Monroe that they would not approve the appointment, the president said he hoped Prevost would take initiative to defend his reputation and explain and justify his work in Peru. If Prevost intended to do so, his unexpected death prevented it, although he did, in one brief paragraph, suggest that Adams consider the character of four men he specifically named as his enemies. He was not ashamed or intimidated, he implied, to be attacked by those men, and he hoped Adams would weight the evidence fairly.

**TARIFFS AND DEVELOPMENT**

In his only positive comment on Peru’s 1876 exhibit at the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition, J. S. Ingram praised the evidence of “considerable progress” made by pre-Columbian Peruvians “in many considerable domestic manufactures.” Like the archeological lines of irrigation channels running high along slopes of Peru’s coastal valleys, this art and science of ancient Peruvians stood in silent judgment over the country’s nineteenth-century failures, especially in the area of *domestic manufactures*.

A comparison between the early industrial experiences of Peru and the United States is instructive. Struggle over tariff policy in the United States was
long and bitter. Protective duties were gradually eroded after Hamilton’s
generation, reduced only to a revenue policy under Andrew Jackson, and then
not resolved decisively in favor of protectionism until the U.S. Civil War. By the
time Peru emerged as an independent nation in the early 1820s, the United States
was passing through one of the most critical phases of its path to
industrialization, the establishment of New England cotton manufacturers
supplied by southern slave plantations. The difficulties of U.S. trade with
Europe due to political factors beginning in 1808 created a situation of "natural"
protection for infant U.S. industry. Local Peruvian producers lacked their full
measure of such shelter, in part because each time Peru was cut off from Europe,
the United States filled the void. Once U.S. textile mills and other factories were
established, and after several crises in which it was demonstrated that U.S.
industry could not survive against European competition without protection, the
United States erected tariff barriers that fostered the nation's industrial
development.\textsuperscript{816} The conflict in the United States was not between tariffs or no
tariffs, but rather how high they should be. Meanwhile, the United States
steadfastly opposed attempts by Peruvians to erect protectionist barriers.

It was in this context that men like Henry Clay became outspoken
proponents of Latin American independence from Spain. Clay declared on the
floor of Congress that, "In the establishment of the independence of Spanish
America, the United States have the deepest interest.... This interest concerns our
politics, our commerce, our navigation."\textsuperscript{817} He and others visualized U.S.

\textsuperscript{816} F. W. Taussig, \textit{Protection to Young Industries as Applied in the United States: A Study in Economic

\textsuperscript{817} Henry Clay, quoted in Dexter Perkins, \textit{A History of the Monroe Doctrine} (Boston: Little, Brown,
1963), pp. 3-4.
interests in South America in the long term, but the fight against Spain also was a source of immediate profit that helped to introduce U.S. merchandise into Peru on a large scale for the first time. Revolutionary disruption of Peru’s normal trade relationships provided an ideal chaotic business environment for the competitive Yankee blockade-runners and contraband specialists who supplied Peruvian royalists and insurgents alike with North American provisions in exchange for specie and bullion. Upon achieving independence, a more stable, developmentalist Peruvian government – one that employed Alexander Hamilton’s ideas – would have reserved coarse cotton weaving for domestic producers, and some Peruvian leaders understood this at the time. Peru had excellent conditions for growing cotton, a crop that had been domesticated in Peru by indigenous peoples thousands of years earlier. Wheat flour could have been reserved to Chileans as part of a regional trade relationship.

But U.S. merchants and Peruvian free traders, assisted by a U.S. legation instructed by Washington to change Peru’s tariff policy, won the battle over protectionism. Then, U.S. citizens turned around and blamed Peruvians for their pathetic development efforts. As Philo White wrote, “With a climate and soil as genial as any in the Western World, there is perhaps no country where Heaven’s gifts to man are so wretchedly neglected,” a judgment repeated by many others in the course of the nineteenth century. Peruvians were held responsible for a situation the United States helped to create.

The political failure to pursue a limited but effective protectionism had far reaching significance for the U.S. role in Peru over the next sixty years, allowing the United States to supply basic manufactures that Peruvians could otherwise have produced locally. Not until the end of the nineteenth century did Peruvian elites seriously pursue industrial development. Prior to the war with Chile, local
entrepreneurs bore risks, were denied most government support and were mocked as foolish when they failed. Even Manuel Pardo felt pity for them, admonishing his readers for sometimes making fun of development proponents in Peru: \textit{llegan a hacer ridículo al desgraciado}, was the way he put it.\footnote{Pardo’s “Jauja” article in McEvoy, ed., \textit{La huella republicana}, p. 83.}

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MELVILLE AND PERU
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Herman Melville found specific uses for Peru in crafting his stories about early U.S. emergence on the Pacific. Peru’s importation of Africans allowed him an opportunity in \textit{Benito Cereno} to explore black/white relationships, remind readers of the Haitian revolution and address the ongoing but now illegal slave trade.

U.S. development has been a continual expansion of frontiers, often by what Richard Slotkin called “regeneration through violence,” and the tale of \textit{Moby Dick} can be understood as a metaphor in which the reaches of U.S. national character and ambition were extending to Peru and all corners of the Pacific.\footnote{Slotkin’s interpretation of Melville and the frontier prophesy of \textit{Moby Dick} is a large part of the conclusion to his book, \textit{Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860} (New York: HarperCollins, 1973), pp. 538-554, 560 and 564 in the HarperPerennial edition of 1996.}

Melville was a social critic of this process. He rooted the name and origins of the ship \textit{Pequod} in violent white settler relations with Native Americans, and its crew was a microcosm of all of the racial elements in the drama of expansionistic U.S. nation building. The U.S. public did not appreciate the prophetic significance of \textit{Moby Dick} until after the U.S. conquest of the resources of Latin America, Hawaii
and the Philippines began taking concrete form in the early twentieth century. A novel rejected by reviewers and the public in the 1850s only then entered the canon of U.S. literature and, eventually, came to be regarded by scholars as the single greatest work produced in the United States during the century of the present study.

The man who many contemporaries thought was insane had to support himself as a humble New York customs inspector during the period of Peruvian railroad building and, I speculate, could well have been on duty the day that John G. Meiggs landed with many large trunks holding his Peruvian fortune. If so, one of the Peruvian gold coins that Meiggs supposedly placed on top of each trunk could have found its way into Melville’s pocket. The civil servant was probably suffering depression as he spent evenings trying to finish the longest epic poem ever published in the United States. It met with hostile reviews, and most copies had to be dumped. As in the United States, Melville mostly was forgotten in Latin America, while Walt Whitman became the most inspiring U.S. writer there after José Martí extolled him in 1887 and Rubén Darío devoted a sonnet to him the following year. An irony is that Melville wrote realistically and critically about U.S. expansionism, while Whitman was its cheerleader, especially during the U.S. war with Mexico.820

820 Selections of Whitman’s Leaves of Grass were first translated into Spanish by Álvaro Armando Vasseur and published in 1912. See Matt Cohen and Rachel Price, “Introduction to Walt Whitman, Poemas, by Álvaro Armando Vasseur,” a companion article to the digitalized version of Vasseur’s work (http://www.whitmanarchive.org/published/foreign/spanish/vasseur/introduction.html, accessed January 2011), in which the authors provide an instructive retranslation of some of Vasseur’s Whitman back into English, and which contains ample references to Latin American writing on the poet. The earliest Spanish translation I found of Moby Dick was published in Mexico in the 1940s.
THE PRICE OF PERUVIAN GUANO

Like their British counterparts, U.S. farmers complained that Peru’s guano price was too high. But, this limited study of the U.S. guano market indicates that the Barredas could have kept shipments of guano to the United States at moderate levels in the 1850s and sold at a much higher price, and that Peru could have sustained the higher price during the subsequent two decades. The Barredas still would have become rich oligarchs, but they would have had to work harder to manage the business.

William Mathew’s work on the British market reached a different conclusion, so I will begin consideration of guano’s price with a summary of Mathew’s own conclusions. He did not dispute that Peru’s policies during the guano era proved detrimental to the nation’s development. Peru was “dependent on the guano trade ... to a precarious degree,” he wrote. Mathew recognized the consequences of inequalities of power in economic affairs. “The weak, of course,” he said, “will be taken advantage of when they form an association with the strong ....” Peru’s borrowing from European credit markets “proved highly destructive in the long run and were the cause of much of the trouble that befell the country in the guano period,” he acknowledged. He endorsed Witt’s quip that Peru’s government treasury was always broke, that every dollar borrowed abroad “vanished like smoke, to satisfy the urgent claims of hundreds of creditors.” Thus, it is important to bear in mind that Mathew’s

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822 Mathew was reading from the Witt manuscript provided him by Eloyda Garland Melián de Montero, not the published version, and he gave the Witt diaries citation as VI, 1 January 1862.
critique of the work of Jonathan Levin and Heraclio Bonilla was a limited one, despite the sharpness of some of his statements.

Mathew objected to dependency interpretations that portrayed Peru as “the passive, innocent victim of economic imperialism.” Peru was not compelled to borrow against its will, he said. Nor was Peru a victim of exploitation by Gibbs, its largest foreign guano consignment contractor. Mathew said that Gibbs rarely sought to lower the price of guano, and then only in response to temporary market conditions. Gibbs did its best to please its Peruvian client, and the merchant’s profit-seeking interests were largely aligned with those of the Peruvian government, Mathew thought. He sometimes acknowledged that the approach taken by Gibbs and Peru was flawed, given that the fertilizer was a finite resource being exhausted at a rapid rate. He recognized that some Peruvians perceived the folly, quoting finance minister José Gregorio Paz Soldán, who said that conventional market theory did not apply to guano. “Each ton of guano that is consumed represents and irreversible diminution: this resource cannot be reproduced through labour or manufacturing; every reduction in its price means a loss of capital.” But Mathew said that Peruvian government policy was to ignore this fact, preferring to rely on inflated estimates of the amount of guano remaining. Even the most conservative (low) estimate “hardly brought the day of clearance close enough to alarm the short-tenure ministers of finance in Lima, beset as always by a host of immediate budgetary difficulties.”

823 W. M. Mathew, The House of Gibbs and the Peruvian Guano Monopoly (London: Royal Historical Society, 1981), p. 3. He gave the Witt diaries citation as VI, 1 January 1862 (Mathew was reading from the manuscript provided him by Eloyda Garland Melián de Montero), not the published version.

824 Ibid, pp. 227-228.

825 Ibid, p. 146.
It was not the responsibility of merchants or foreign consumers to properly manage the conservation of the precious resource. Blame must be placed on the Peruvian government for squandering the guano treasure, according to Mathew. “There is hardly any evidence to suggest that price policies for guano were related to sober and thrifty concern for the country’s long-term economic well-being.” Mathew did show that, when Gibbs first became involved in guano in the early 1840s, the company advocated a low price in order to promote volume sales. Mathew quoted Gibbs’s argument that it was “better to sell much with a small profit than for the Huano [that is, the volume to which the company was entitled to sell] to be eaten up with rent and charges.” Mathew showed no evidence that Gibbs ever questioned this strategy.

Gradually, the goal of increasing revenues by increasing the volume of sales became the policy of Peru. In the picture painted by Mathew, merchants like Gibbs were caught in the middle between a government needing to maximize short-term returns on its product and the farmer consumers and politicians who campaigned against the hated “monopolists.” Mathew quoted a British farmer who complained he was being forced to “submit to all the disadvantages of Free Trade” and, therefore, “it is but just and reasonable that I should expect a share of its advantages, the greatest of which would be the obtaining of this most valuable manure [Peruvian guano] at a moderate price.” Farmers directed almost as much anger at Gibbs as they did at Peru, Mathew implied. Despite attacks on the company, Gibbs in future years sometimes resisted market pressure to lower the price. As for proposals to raise the price, Gibbs never

826 Ibid, p. 228.
827 Ibid, p. 52.
defied the government but quietly counseled it to consider likely adverse market reaction. And, Mathew showed evidence that guano sales in Britain were sensitive to price.\footnote{Ibid, p. 132.}

The same supply-and-demand evidence Mathew presented can be interpreted differently, as it was by some Peruvians at the time. The problem with efficient market theory (a belief that free markets always determine the “right” price) is that the happy transaction between buyer and seller does not necessarily produce an outcome beneficial for society or a nation’s long-term economic development. Mathew acknowledged that under Gibbs in the 1850s many other potential markets for guano in Europe were largely ignored. The continental market, he said, “was badly served.”\footnote{Ibid, p. 132.} In fact, as José Casimiro Ulloa noted in 1859, the Gibbs price in Britain was lower than the price guano often fetched in other markets. Gibbs showed awareness of this fact when it called for imposition of a uniform price worldwide, one that would correspond to its lower British price.\footnote{Ulloa said this proposal came from Francisco de Rivero, whom he suggested was a mouthpiece for Gibbs. Ulloa also said that it was Gibbs policy to mainly sell its supply of guano to Britain’s big landowners and then allow them to resell it to others. See José Casimiro Ulloa, \textit{Huano (apuntes económicos y administrativos)} (Lima: Tipografía de Aurelio Alfaro y Ca., 1859), especially pp. 15-17.}

\footnote{Instead of price, Mathew believed Peru’s problem was in the area of finance. Peru was always treated as a sub-prime borrower caught way over its credit limit and forced to pay exorbitant interest. The country’s problem, Mathew argued, was its finances. The guano contractors advanced money to the government secured by future guano sales. By late 1861, this floating debt was up to thirteen million pesos (Mathew, p. 232, citing MacQueen, \textit{Peruvian Public Finance} (1926), p. 38). Mathew acknowledged that, “Continual borrowing ... may place an undesirable degree of power in the hands of the creditor” i.e., Gibbs. However, Gibbs and other merchants were not to blame for this situation, he said. They were simply favored by decisions the Peruvian government felt pressured to make. Mathew quoted Henry Gibbs in 1859 as saying he would extend to Peru “a large advance” as the means to ensure his firm’s position in the guano trade. But, Mathew concluded, “There is no evidence to support the contention that Gibbs deliberately sought to keep the government so poor that borrowing became obligatory.” It was Peru that always took the initiative in seeking larger loans, sometimes pushing Gibbs to “strain the firm’s liquidity” (Mathew, \textit{The House of Gibbs}, pp. 233-234).}
The case against a higher price seems to rest on three main factors. First, there were two moments, one in the United States and another later in Britain, when consignees could not move guano fast enough and had to lower the price. Second, it is assumed that the proliferation of cheaper synthetic fertilizers put downward pressure on guano’s price. And, finally, the consignees faced strong public anger at Peru for overpricing its product.

It is certainly true that, after Barreda and Gibbs speeded up shipments of guano to incredible levels, first in 1855 in the United States and then in Britain in 1857-1858 enormous stocks accumulating in warehouses put downward pressure on prices. But these were extraordinary circumstances. Mostly it was the converse, with the price so low that guano was in short supply, as Mathew’s own studies showed. Gibbs complained that there was not enough supply in 1849; but, nevertheless, the price was maintained at £9 5s for most of the next five years. One would think that the situation called for a price increase and illustrated the beneficial market effects of moderation in shipments. Yet, Mathew criticized Peru for raising the price beginning in January 1854. But, even when raised to £11 in 1855, the price probably was still too low. When the price was finally raised to £13 in December, 1856, dealers sold out for more than an additional year. Just as had happened to Barreda in the United States in 1855, the problem that loomed for Gibbs was that the merchant was bringing in extraordinary volumes of guano. In fact, in 1857 and 1858 the excess of imports over sales was 333,128 tons. The price was lowered back to £12 in July 1858, and imports were cut to about one-sixth of the pace of the previous year in order to clear the warehouses.
From this data I conclude that the price was never too high in the United States or Europe. The Chinese at the Chinchas, whom George Peck had described as “shoveling and wheeling as if for dear life” under the lash of their taskmasters, were being driven to death to oversupply the U.S and British markets. Peru was rapidly depleting its guano resource through an ill-conceived high-volume sales strategy.

Rather than quote Peruvian critics of the consignment system to show that this was understood at the time, we can turn to Francisco de Rivero, Peru’s consul general and later minister to Britain and France and the foremost apologist for Gibbs and the status quo. In his self-defense published in Paris in 1860, he chided those who wanted a high-price policy as having too many illusions about the market. Nevertheless, he admitted the logic of restricted and carefully managed shipments. “If sales [i.e., supply] are without limit,” he wrote, “it is difficult to maintain present prices or raise them some, as perhaps would be wise.” He took umbrage with those who attacked him for his personal association with the consignees, but he acknowledged that advocates of a high-price policy included people who were “disinterested patriots.”

Restraints on Peru’s guano exports, he implied, did not have to prejudice the revenue needs of the government. Rivero thought that the history of consignment sales at different prices demonstrated a price ceiling above which sales would collapse. But, that history was based upon high-volume shipments. After many years of reaping easy revenues (government) and lucrative profits made on effortless and ever-greater high-volume sales (Barreda and Gibbs), the parties kept jacking up shipments as if the low-price market could not become saturated.

Mathew presented another rationale for a low price: competition from synthetic fertilizers. Study of the U.S. market indicates that the challenge from synthetics was always more hypothetical than real. Yes, there were certain crops and certain soils for which guano alone was unsuitable or unprofitable. But, the growing use of synthetics never displaced guano or prevented Peru from rapidly exhausting its treasure through high-volume sales. No synthetic fertilizer could match guano for its solubility and high nitrogen content. Mathew acknowledged as much when he wrote that guano sales in Britain “survived, and indeed came quite close to old peaks again in 1870,” and that in quite a few farming circumstances “superphosphate was often found to be a less effective application than guano.”  

Yet, Mathew stated that synthetics “dealt a severe blow to a once buoyant and growing trade,” and that Gibbs was unjustly accused of pursuing a low price policy. This conclusion is unwarranted because “once buoyant and growing trade” is synonymous with the reckless high-volume policy that Mathew acknowledged was not in Peru’s development interests.

What study of the U.S. guano market suggests is that the proliferation of synthetics caused a great deal of disorder and corruption in the fertilizer market. In the late 1860s and early 1870s, Solon Robinson himself began to doubt that he could give good fertilizer advice to farmers. He simply urged experimentation and consideration of all options. I have shown that, despite state government attempts to expose fertilizer scammers and educate consumers, U.S. farmers right through the 1870s tended to overpay for synthetics and underpay for Peruvian guano if measured by the market costs of separate elements.

The third rationale for a low-price policy was the anger of U.S. farmers and their demand that the U.S. government take action against Peru. They

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wanted a U.S. naval seizure of the guano islands or some other means to force Peru to reduce the price. The Lobos Islands incident demonstrated that there was no danger of U.S. military intervention against Peru to secure guano or force the price down. The United States was embarrassed and Daniel Webster disgraced by the Lobos “misunderstanding.” The law passed to allow U.S. citizens to seize unclaimed guano islands was no threat to Peru or the price of authentic guano, and it resulted mainly in a succession of business scams and further proliferation of poor quality “guano.”

The anger of U.S. consumers was based upon a grave economic development error of Peru. Farmers read reports that Peru used slave labor to harvest guano, and they could therefore imagine that the “true” value of Peru’s product was little more than the shipping cost. An exchange between Francisco de Rivero and British foreign secretary Lord Palmerston captured Peru’s dilemma. Rivero told Palmerston that, while Peru was selling guano at £9 per ton, European scientists had valued its components at £12 4s. Therefore, Rivero claimed that Peru was “giving away” more than one fourth of guano’s effective value. Palmerston was not impressed. He said that scientific calculations were based upon real economic costs of production of fertilizer components. Peru, by contrast, bore little cost other than £3 shipping per ton. “You gather it up in Peru with no elaboration expense,” he said. While an exaggeration, there was too much truth to these perceptions in Europe and the United States.

833 Rivero based himself primarily upon a study by Way. See Rivero’s letter addressed to the British foreign office, November 29, 1855, in Rivero, Ojeada, p. 248.

834 Ibid., p. 227.
This was not a mere public relations problem. Solon Robinson’s *Guano* published by Barreda Bros. avoided serious discussion of its harvesting. Peru’s “value” dilemma needed to be tackled at its source – both to defend Peru’s interests internationally and to reap development benefits from guano, as will be discussed below.

Taken together, Peru’s experience with the U.S. market and a critical examination of British data indicate that Peru should have pursued a low-volume, high-price policy from the beginning – and most certainly during the tenure of the Barredas as consignee for the United States and, later, British markets. It is not a matter of “blaming” the consignees to observe that the structure of the Barreda and Gibbs consignment contracts worked against Peru’s interests. Because all expenses were charged to Peru, and Barreda and Gibbs earned a set commission on sales, the consignees had a sweet deal that exposed them to minimal risk and required little entrepreneurial effort. Even the loans advanced to the government were a source of easy, low-risk profit, since the consignees held the collateral in their own hands and earned a favorable interest rate. Gibbs acknowledged as much when, as the firm retired from the guano trade, its partners anticipated that much harder work was ahead in whatever new business they entered. Whether or not Federico Barreda was taking kickbacks on bags and shipping – or otherwise cheating the government out of its rightful share of revenues – is interesting but not nearly as significant as the structural problems.

Mathew was no doubt correct that Gibbs and, by extension, the Barredas, were not the main culprits in the undervaluation of guano. If it can do so, any business will pursue easy short-term profits rather than sweat the longer-term and less certain rewards that might flow from a nation’s coherent development
strategy. Proper regulation of an industry is the government’s responsibility, especially when the state owns the product. Business always opposes regulation until brought to heel. Once regulation is instituted, business adjusts to a new norm.

To understand how and why guano’s potential to contribute more directly to national economic development was lost, attention must be focused on how Peru’s inhumane and destructive approach to guano’s harvesting devalued the product. Many in the mid-nineteenth century heard the story of the severe penalty pre-Columbian Indian administrators imposed on anyone who disturbed the delicate ecological balance required to husband guano. It was death. Those individuals who would harm guano bird ecology in the nineteenth century were threatened with less draconian but still sobering penalties. But the occasional shooting of a bird by an ignorant foreigner was infinitesimal damage compared to the hasty, wasteful and disruptive harvesting that state contractors performed. Peruvians perpetuated the symbolism of the sanction without much concern for its underlying rationale. To sustain the industry, guano must be harvested with delicacy, and only in one location at a time, leaving other zones undisturbed by human activity. Farmers in the United States and Europe could not have complained so loudly about price if Peru had put added value into the product and properly cared for the industry. Peru did neither.

Even with the development of synthetic fertilizers, there was plenty of room in the market for a premium product like guano that could be used as a special amendment to help in recovery of exhausted soils. If European investors perceived guano as threatened by synthetics, why did they purchase Peruvian bond issues in the late 1860s and early 1870s? The threat to Peruvian guano from other manures was fallacious. There was a good market for quality fertilizers,
organic and synthetic. The problem with synthetics was fraud, just as the problem with organics was adulteration. Organic products provide benefits that, in combination with synthetics, can improve crop yields and reduce wasteful misapplication of fertilizers. Partly because Peru put no effort into study of the proper uses of guano, the premium product was exhausted before science could master its best use. The price was low enough that many farmers applied too much Peruvian guano per acre. Peru not only squandered its development opportunities, it kept the price so low that much of the product’s benefit to the world was wasted.

In sum, study of the U.S. guano market supports the thesis that Peru grossly mismanaged its guano resources and failed to place the business within a coherent development plan. Peru sold guano too cheaply, wasted a significant amount of the product at the islands, failed to properly husband the ecology that produced guano, did not capture an optimal share of the revenue stream, did almost nothing to add Peruvian value to the product, did not develop its own technical mastery of the proper uses of the product and, therefore, failed to properly serve the end consumer, the U.S. and European farmer. All of this result can be minimized by a narrow economic framework where “efficient markets” always determine the right price and Peru was supposedly in a race against the clock before synthetic fertilizers drove guano from the market. Furthermore, it is far from clear how much of the money the consignment houses supposedly collected for Peru effectively entered the Peruvian economy. Shane Hunt’s estimates were very rough. Much further study is required to understand what share of guano revenue was paid to service loans, for example. Everyone is agreed that Peru’s guano income was mostly spent unproductively,
and the reasons will be debated forever. But little attention has been given to how Peru could have run a better guano business.

At the root of all of Peru’s failures was the degradation of labor in Peru. The recourse to forced labor meant that the Peruvian economy lost the benefit of wages that could have been paid comfortably by U.S. and European consumers of guano. Peru also lost moral legitimacy. If guano could be shipped from the Chinchas at little cost of production, then a higher price could be opposed in foreign markets on grounds of monopolist price gouging. By flooding markets with ever-increasing volumes of guano and paying the Barredas based upon volume of sales, all of the incentives in the business were wrong from a development standpoint. While labor was not paid at value, let alone dignified wages that would stimulate other dimensions of development, Peru allowed shipping costs to be too high. When over one hundred ships were sitting idly at anchor off the Chinchas and earning penalty fees for delay in loading, something was amiss. Such unnecessary costs should have set off alarm bells.

Here follows an outline of ways that Peru could have added value to the product, slowing down the rate of harvest in the interest of spreading guano’s economic benefits over a longer period, cutting down waste, and marketing the fertilizer as a premium product designed for more limited and scientifically-based uses. Rather than engage in a tiresome “could have”/”should have” exposition, I take the liberty of envisioning ways Peruvian value could have been added to guano in the form of a business proposal. The exercise is, of course, counterfactual; but, if squandering a nation’s resources for so little development benefit were inevitable just because it happened, there would be no need for historical judgment and conclusions. In the following hypothetical business
plan, the driving goal is to add Peruvian value to the product and get more guano revenue circulating through the local economy.

**BUSINESS PLAN**

**A WELL-REGULATED GUANO INDUSTRY**

Guano has been used in Peruvian agriculture for centuries, and a first step in a coherent business plan must be to systematically recover lost knowledge of its uses for different crops and throughout Peru’s diversity of ecological environments. This knowledge can then be used to help properly price and market the product abroad. Therefore, the government shall establish a Guano Research Institute within a new ministry, the Ministry of Science and Development, to bring modern methods to bear on guano’s optimum uses in agriculture and to advise the government on regulation of the industry.

The Institute shall have the following four departments: (1) agronomy and experimental farms, (2) bird and marine studies, (3) chemistry and soil studies, and (4) market studies. The Institute will determine the cycles by which each guano island will be harvested or left in recovery. In addition to laboratories in Lima and on the Chincha Islands, the Institute will operate experimental farms in different agricultural zones of Peru. Under the Institute’s supervision, farms will collect and disseminate evidence of the effects and benefits of guano on the full range of agricultural crops. The experimental farms will be largely self-supporting. Farming families will be attracted to the farms through a program in which they will share in revenues from the sale of their farm’s produce and the opportunity to work for limited periods on the guano islands at slightly above-market wages indirectly subsidized by government health and education programs at all farms.
The government will pay for the Institute’s facilities, permanent staff, student interns, and labor recruitment and training programs through a levy on each one hundred-pound bag of guano exported. The Institute will send Peruvian staff abroad for training in chemistry, biology and agronomy, and will hire foreign scientists to train Peruvians locally. No one may be employed on the guano islands that has not been trained and certified by the Institute. In collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Institute will host foreign visitors and provide tours of facilities related to the study and production of guano. Selected scientific reports by Institute staff will be published in Spanish, English and French editions, and the agency will establish correspondence relations with the agricultural and scientific societies of Europe and the United States. The Institute will commission a photographer to document all aspects of guano production and application. Illustrators will make engravings from the photographs for local and international distribution and for use on guano packaging. At its Lima headquarters, the Institute will establish a museum showcasing its work. Portable display cases will be built that can be packed up and shipped abroad for exhibition at Peruvian embassies, scientific meetings and international fairs.

The Treasury Ministry will create a separate audit bureau charged with collecting, auditing and publishing all data concerning guano production, sales, shipping, marketing and the finances of guano-related government agencies. The audit will include the expenses that the navy and Ministry of Foreign Relations incur in relation to guano. The audit bureau will sponsor a biennial contest to estimate Peru’s total tonnage of available guano on a particular island and award prizes for the best methods developed to make the estimates. A photographer shall document the islands’ excavations on an annual basis from standard distance points to create a time series charting depletion rates.
The government shall declare all guano islands to have a twenty-five kilometer perimeter demarcating them as special protected zones. No person, boat or ship may enter the zones without a license. The Peruvian navy will secure and protect the zones. Ships licensed to carry guano must wait at Callao until notified that it is their turn to load the product.

The government shall establish an Office of Guano Regulation and Marketing within the Ministry of Science and Development to administer guano harvesting, packaging, shipping and sales. Harvesting guano will be organized to strictly limit disturbance to bird life on the islands as designed and approved by staff of the Guano Research Institute. Only one area of one island will be worked during a given term of years. Excavation will be limited to certain hours, and the same workers employed in excavation will work during other hours in the processing and packaging plant. Labor crews will be rotated onto and off of the islands on a schedule that protects their health and allows them to fulfill their duties on the experimental farms and maintain a proper family and community life.

Processing and packaging of guano will be carried out in a manner designed to protect the integrity of the product and enhance the reputation of Peru. No guano
will be allowed to be wasted. Each lot of guano will be tested, graded and certified by Institute staff. Guano will be packaged in one hundred-pound cotton bags printed with distinctive and stylish Peruvian designs and the words “Authentic Peruvian Guano” in Spanish, English and French. Printed designs will be fashion compatible, so that farmers can make shirts and dresses from the used bags. Because fertilizers in the United States and Europe are often sold in 200 lb. or other larger bags, the smaller units will distinguish Peru’s premium product. All bags will be manufactured in Peru, with the grade of the cloth being higher than the norm for other fertilizer products. When tightly packed and closed, the bag’s drawstring will be sealed with wax and the Institute’s stamp. To encourage farmer experimentation with smaller amounts, an adequate supply of fifty and ten lb. bags will also be produced.

Each filled, tightly-packed and sealed cloth bag will be wrapped with heavy paper (with small folds that allow for bulging of the sides and ends of the bags when stacked or carried on a shoulder) that will serve as the bag’s outer wrapper. Glued seams joining sheets of paper will be hand stamped to protect the wrappers from tampering. The paper will be printed on both sides with detailed instructions to farmers on the proper uses of the Peruvian product, together with statements of endorsement by individual farmers in U.S. and European markets who describe how they use the product, its effects on yields and profitability. The instructions and endorsements will be given in Spanish, English and French, and will be accompanied by short articles with illustrations concerning the natural conditions that produce the guano and the care that Peru gives to their conservation. The articles will be written in a clear style so that the farmer’s children are drawn to them and accompanying illustrations. When folded over to completely enclose the cloth sack, ends of the wrapper will be glued closed with the seams stamped with the Institute’s name. The Institute’s certification of the guano’s composition will be hand stamped on the
wrapper, together with a handwritten lot number, serial number and date of packaging. Colorful revenue stamps will be applied that represent the levy on behalf of the Guano Research Institute. The purposes of the paper wrapper will be to protect the product from moisture; encourage careful handling, stacking and securing during transport and storage; guarantee to the farmer that the product has not been adulterated; allow tracing of each package by lot and serial number through the distribution chain; compel wholesalers and retailers to treat the product with care in order to preserve the paper wrapper and certification; educate the consumer as to the benefits and proper uses of the premium product; help support local paper and printing industries; and enhance the prestige of Peru and its premium product.

All cloth sacks, paper wrappers and revenue stamps must be produced and printed in Peru according to specifications established by the Institute.

The government will open schools for the children of people employed in guano production, experimental farms and associated sectors, such as private textile and paper industries. The schools will be indirect subsidies to wages for businesses in the guano sector.

Guano may only be shipped in specially licensed and Peruvian-owned ships that are inspected before each loading to ensure they meet standards set by the Office of Guano Regulation and Marketing. The Peruvian navy will be responsible for inspections. Upon completion of loading, there will be a final inspection to ensure that packages are properly secured and protected from weather. All ships and their cargo must be insured by Peruvian insurance companies, with foreign companies allowed to participate in reinsurance.

The Office of Guano Regulation and Marketing will lease warehouse space in foreign markets, set wholesale prices and sell directly to distributors. Preference in
the sale will be given to Peruvian wholesale merchants who get into the guano distribution business abroad, as long as their bids are competitive.

An inspection bureau will be established in the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and Peruvian inspectors will be stationed in the receiving ports of Europe and the United States to monitor unloading and transfer to distributors. Inspectors will cancel the certification and serial number of water-damaged packages and impose fines on shippers if there has been negligence. Inspectors will file regular reports on the distribution and marketing of guano in their assigned regions, prices at each stage of the distribution process, performance of distributors, press coverage of Peru and its premium product, local market conditions, allegations of adulteration, competing fertilizers and the reception of Peruvian guano by consumers. Inspectors will purchase and ship samples of competing fertilizers for chemical testing in the Institute’s laboratories and field testing on Peru’s experimental farms. Inspectors will submit samples of Peruvian guano to U.S. and European chemists for independent analysis and send their reports to the Institute in Peru. Ambassadors and consuls in each country will meet with the press, government regulators and agricultural societies to explain Peru’s product, its production and pricing. They will be supported by the publications of the audit bureau and Institute. When needed to counter anti-Peruvian criticism, ambassadors will work with distributors to commission local agriculture specialists and journalists to write about Peruvian guano, its production and benefits. Whenever inspection bureau staff detect adulteration or other fraud in the chain of distribution in a particular country, the responsible minister, chargé d’affaires or consul shall initiate legal action against the perpetrators and inform the local press about the evidence.
ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT EFFECTS OF THE BUSINESS PLAN

This business plan is designed to raise the price of guano by adding Peruvian value to the product, prevent wasteful harvesting, protect the ecology of the bird populations, limit supply so as to maximize price, clearly distinguish the Peruvian product and its superior qualities among farmers, attract and train thousands of workers at a range of skill levels, encourage building and staffing of public schools and hospitals, and transform guano’s production and distribution into a genuine industry that provides stimulus to other economic sectors.

Peruvians at the time proposed some of the plan’s features, and foreigners sometimes privately acknowledged their wisdom.\(^{835}\) No measure proposed here would be inconceivable or considered unreasonable by nineteenth-century standards.\(^{836}\) Instead of favoring a handful of merchants who bribe local officials and reap large fortunes, guano revenues would be dispersed among many small and medium entrepreneurs running ship repair and reconditioning companies, shopkeepers selling to decently-paid workers, cotton farms supplying a textile industry, shipping companies, printing shops, shoe and clothing makers, paper manufacturers, insurance companies, doctors, dentists, Peruvian sailors and ship captains, and government agencies providing useful services. Hundreds of foreign-owned ships would not sit idly off the Chinchas. Wasted guano would not foul ship decks and rigging or be dissolved into the sea. Foreign specialists attracted to Peru for its focus on science and good pay would be training Peruvians rather than displacing them. With nitrate

\(^{835}\) Mathew judged that José Casimiro Ulloa made the strongest case for doing away with the Gibbs-dominated consignment system. See Mathew, *House of Gibbs*, pp. 206-208.

\(^{836}\) For example, it was not understood in the nineteenth century that the social factor that correlates most positively with economic development is education of girls, so that is not proposed here.
production in Peru’s southern departments, Peru would manufacture its own organic and synthetic fertilizer blends to supplement pure guano sales. The blends would be produced with the same quality controls and certification, giving them an enhanced value in competition with other (often adulterated) products in the United States and Europe.

Guano would be shipped and distributed in relatively small, tightly packed bags, allowing for less waste and spoilage. Because the 100 lb. bag is half the size of most fertilizer bags, it would symbolize the premium character of the product. The outside wrapper with certification would discourage cheating of the end customer and perhaps motivate U.S. states and European countries to better regulate the sale of all fertilizers to their farmers. Because of the quality of the cotton cloth used in the bag, consumers would wash the bags and turn them into homemade clothing and other goods that give continued visibility to the Peruvian product. The interesting designs printed on the bags would remove some of the sting when children are teased for wearing a “guano shirt.”

Part of the value Peru would be adding to guano would be packaging and tracking features to protect U.S. farmers from fraud. Former Alsop partner Edwin Bartlett had been one of the first guano distributors to warn farmers that they “must be cautious to ascertain the origin of what they buy.” But, that was an impossible requirement to place on the individual U.S. consumer. The evidence presented in chapter ten suggests that a guarantee against fraud would be worth at least five or ten dollars per ton, more in some cases. The packaging and Peruvian monitoring of distribution abroad would provide the guarantee.

Farmers would pay a higher price but receive a superior, more consistent product. The farmer would receive more education on using soil amendments for different types of soil and crops, and therefore would apply the product more
effectively in conjunction with animal manure, human “night soil,” bones, fish byproducts and synthetic fertilizers. The inexpensive ten-pound sample bags would advertise Peru’s confidence in its premium product and put it in the hands of many more farmers for experimentation. Farmers’ first guano use from the sample bag would be on the vegetable garden grown for the owner and his workers’ own consumption and on experimental patches of their cash crops. In a single season the farmer could test the economics of Peruvian guano for a modest investment. Some of the ten-pound bags might be distributed as a free bonus to retailers who stock a certain amount of the product. In sum, the market would consist of more farmers, but, on average, each using less guano.

Opportunities for corruption would still exist under this business plan, but on a more limited and decentralized scale (in shipping, insurance, distribution and other contracts). A multiplicity of constituencies would grow up in Peru in favor of government transparency and the highest possible price for Peruvian guano. Government authority over the industry would be divided among four competing ministries: treasury, war, foreign relations and the new science and development ministry. Each would have some interest in and responsibility for monitoring the performance of the others. The scientific and publishing functions would be centered in the new ministry, hopefully attracting younger, public spirited employees more likely to work for transparency, professionalism, honesty and pride in practical accomplishments. Expansion of guano-related, decently-paid employment opportunities would make it more acceptable to reduce military spending and refocus the military on development functions, especially the navy. A robust, experienced and professional navy and commercial fleet would deter foreign nations from using the threat of force against Peru.
Highland Indian farmers would be attracted to the experimental farms and bring along their families for real material and social opportunities (training, decent wages, schools for children, health care benefits), not because they were in debt to intermediaries. Service on the guano islands would be well-remunerated, divided among different tasks and for limited weekly rotations, allowing men to return to the mainland frequently to tend to their families, farm work and community activities. Dynamic towns would grow around the experimental farms, attracting merchants, doctors, dentists, lawyers, farm equipment makers and the like. Experimental farms and their associated towns would stimulate regional development and transportation networks. The two largest farms would be near Pisco at lower and higher elevations; the others might be in the Cajamarca, Tarma, Cuzco and Arequipa regions.

Political conflict over control of the state would still affect the presidency and public sector spoils, but there would be built-in incentives not to disrupt the functioning of the guano industry upon which large and diverse constituencies depend. Training of a better educated and skilled labor force would bring more people into the political system.

Participation of Peruvian capitalists in the guano trade would be focused mainly on shipping, insurance, foreign market wholesaling and the manufacturing and service sectors related to the guano industry. Their incentive would be to find ways to push the premium product out to the largest number of potential consumers in the largest number of markets. The rate of profit of wholesalers would be limited by commercial conditions in foreign markets, but their percentage would be on a higher price earned by Peru. The Peruvian government would contract for the shipping and bear the cost of warehousing abroad. The shipping cost would include charge for Peruvian-supplied private
insurance. The insurance companies would invest their capital locally. If the guano price caused a falloff in sales in a market, the government would promptly cut back shipments or divert them to other markets.

Fortunes earned by private parties in the guano industry would be more modest than those accumulated by the Barredas, and more widely dispersed. Profits earned in shipping and elsewhere would require effort and talent. Merchants would be less cynical about investing in local industry. The textile, garment, paper and printing industries would be subsidized indirectly because of their exclusive claim on the guano industry. The education and health services programs would be a subsidy to wages. Peru’s income distribution would look more like Chile’s, with corresponding benefits to development and nation-building. Peru’s naval power – a vital factor in regional affairs – would be enhanced. State-owned experimental farms would provide improved agricultural knowledge to Peruvian farmers throughout the nation. By not exhausting the guano quickly, more of the fertilizer would be available for development of Peruvian agriculture. The dignified participation of Indian families in the nation’s development would be visible to local elites. Higher wages paid for agricultural and other manual labor would cause the much-lamented “labor shortage” to disappear. Foreign immigrants would find many opportunities to work in training capacities rather than just be a substitute for local labor. The backward and forward linkages of the guano industry would broaden the tax base. There might even be some railroad projects in Peru’s future.
Manuel Pardo and Henry Meiggs

Manuel Pardo is something of a sacred cow in Peruvian history. As a railroad evangelist and founder of Peru’s first civilian-led political party, his martyrdom by assassination in 1878 has served to shield him and the Barredas from the critical judgment given others of their era.\(^8\)

In a letter to his brother in the United States, Felipe Barreda made a comment about the political opposition his son-in-law faced. Conspiracies against Manuel Pardo, he said, were “those of people who prefer the old system because it makes them rich.” The remark was curious because he and Pardo were among the men made rich by the “old system.” Here was a seed of the interpretation promoted by members of the Barreda network and their later admirers to the effect that the Pardo administration was a break from the past by virtue of the president’s talents, political popularity, civilian status or vision for national development. The truth in this perspective is that Pardo was an energetic administrative reformer. But, there is an important distinction to be made between improved government management and development policy. Pardo was neither a liberal social reformer nor advocate for an alternative development path. He was bound up personally and politically with the import

\(^8\) An example is the treatment of Pardo and his in-laws by Alfonso W. Quiroz in his chronicle of the history of official corruption in Peru. In *Corrupt Circles: A History of Unbound Graft in Peru*, Quiroz relegated much of Felipe Barreda and Manuel Pardo’s guano-era business dealings, including importation of Chinese servants, to a footnote. This had the effect of diminishing their central roles in profiting from the state’s guano operations. Quiroz employed the term “rumors” to characterize specific corruption charges against Pardo, and he summarized them in a single sentence using the passive construction: “Pardo was attacked ….” The author then allowed Pardo and his colleagues to answer their accusers, an opportunity rarely given to others profiled in the book. Finally, Quiroz concluded that, “In fact, Pardo conducted his official affairs then and thereafter with uncommon transparency and honesty despite the failings of some of his [unnamed] business associates.” Curiously, the only Barreda tarred in Quiroz’s account of official malfeasance was Mariano de Osma, whose business difficulties seem to have been of a private character that did not involve government corruption. Quiroz, *Corrupt Circles* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), pp. 147-149.
merchants and guano consignees, and he did not question the cheap labor, import-intensive development model. On the contrary, he was an apologist for the inhumane exploitation of Chinese immigrants and invested profitably in their trafficking. His racist contempt for both Indians and Chinese as laborers and human beings prevented him from envisioning a different development strategy.

Henry Meiggs capitalized on this “Barreda/Pardo” development approach. Time was running out on the guano bonanza, so he promised to build the railroads rapidly. He and his Peruvian enablers thought that required importing everything, including much of the labor – from the engineers and managers to thousands of Chinese with picks and shovels. In this he followed the contracts Felipe Barreda negotiated with the government for the Chorrillos and Alameda projects. (Barreda won the right to import 700 Chinese and use convict labor to build the Chorrillos line.)

The “Yankee Pizarro” metaphor does not fit Don Enrique well. First, the role of Meiggs must not be exaggerated. He did not originate Peru’s railway plans. Much of the preliminary design work for the roads was done before he reached Peru, and, as far as construction and financing were concerned, there was continuity between the Balta and Pardo administrations. The grand dream was thoroughly Peruvian, and Manuel Pardo is rightfully assigned credit for popularizing it. Reliance on U.S. personnel and goods was unusual only in its scale. The Barredas were among those in the elite who wanted everything done to match what could be found in Europe and the United States. Peruvians would pursue a similar development strategy for much of the next century. Henry Meiggs was a larger-than-life persona, but he adhered to the policies that Peruvians placed in his path. The privilege he was granted to import anything
from the United States – even potatoes – was not much different from that granted U.S. companies by Gen. Manuel Odría almost one-hundred years later.

Manuel Pardo inherited a financial mess that was the perfect opportunity to put Meiggs on a better development path. A severe economic crisis sobered up even the most arrogant, ambitious or speculative entrepreneur. He failed to act.

While Meiggs did not draw Peruvians into his innermost circle, he made sure that key figures, such as Francisco García Calderón, Mariano Paz Soldán and Malinowski, had prominent roles in his enterprises. He socialized with Peruvian elites by throwing parties and being active in one of their favorite pastimes, horse racing. But he also professed an interest in the lives of his workers, took pride that he paid them fairly and enjoyed being Peru’s most generous philanthropist and patron of organizations of middle and more humble Peruvian social groups.

As with guano and the Barredas, a proper evaluation of Meiggs must weigh alternative courses. Meiggs knew that his fortune in Peru and redemption in the United States were wholly dependent on the Peruvian government. While he was willing to bribe to win a contract, Peruvians had leverage that they could have exercised with him. That was especially true of the Pardo administration, which commanded popular and elite support and had every reason to slow the projects down and take steps to Peruvianize them as guano revenues and foreign financing ran out. Pardo was desperate to raise new revenue, and one means would have been to bring Meiggs to the negotiating table and compel him to accept tariffs on everything he imported. This would have encouraged him to seek local suppliers.

When Meiggs's brother and second-in-command, John G. Meiggs, wrote to a U.S. merchant in 1870 that, "We have the whole of Peru Boots and
Breeches,“ he was defining an intolerable situation that Pardo needed to confront. If Meiggs’ language sounds neocolonialist, it must be remembered that the brothers were following government policy. If the Pardo administration had demanded that its contractor seek Peruvian partners for different aspects of the projects, I am inclined to believe that Meiggs would have obliged.

Would he, instead, have followed his brother in flight? It seems unlikely. To try and cut his losses and run would have the odor of his disgrace in San Francisco. Furthermore, Meiggs had aggressively invested much of his profits locally, and the country’s deepening financial crisis rapidly depreciated those assets. He would have to stay in Peru longer term and help the country recover in order to reclaim his fortune. It was Peru that allowed Meiggs to regain his dignity in his homeland; his honor and fortune were bound up in Peru’s fate.

Meiggs’ empire was “foreign” by virtue of his citizenship and ties that linked him in preferential fashion to the Grace brothers and certain other U.S. businesses. But the economic benefits that Meiggs brought to the United States were driven by circumstantial business needs, not Yankee patriotism. The

838 James, Merchant Adventurer, p. 58. This boast was contained in a March 1870 letter sent by John Meiggs (brother of Henry and manager of the empresario’s Peruvian operations) from Peru to E. P. Fabbri, an owner of the only U.S. line of sailing ships (Fabbri & Chauncey) operating between New York and the west coast of South America at that time. (See Stewart, Henry Meiggs, p. 96.) Fabbri & Chauncey was linked to the Alsops and carried much of the goods Michael Grace ordered from his brother William. The firm must have made a sizeable fortune on shipping to Peru in the 1870s. The shipping line eventually established by William Grace originated in what seems to have been a modest ploy to impress Fabbri & Chauncey, and thereby obtain from them better terms and service for Grace (see James, Merchant Adventurer, p. 52).

839 It could be argued that Meiggs feared returning to the United States because of the criminal charges against him in California. Such an assumption makes little sense for several reasons. Meiggs would have joined his brother in New York or London, not San Francisco; his wealth and fame would have insulated him from any possible extradition to California, and he had a lot of friends in New York. Second, Meiggs had made sure that the damage to his personal relationships in San Francisco was largely repaired, offering direct and indirect compensation over the years to people he had harmed. And, finally, Meiggs and one of his sons maintained a comfortable family mansion in Chile, should he need to reside in a third country.
Meiggs enterprises were fundamentally Peruvian and governed by policies crafted by Manuel Pardo and other elites in power. Meiggs brought quintessential Yankee pragmatism to Peruvian business, but prior to his death he was becoming incorporated into at least the periphery of the nascent Peruvian oligarquía. One of Meiggs’ children disliked living in Peru, but she was safely married off. Even after Meiggs suffered financial catastrophe and death, a number of his relatives and business associates opted to live out their lives in Peru. Others departed only after trying for years to revive enterprises in the Meiggs estate. The vision Meiggs pursued was a Peruvian vision, with all its flaws.

Meiggs’s relative obscurity in Peruvian history and culture today may be due to a range of factors: the civilista heritage of idealizing the government of Manuel Pardo, requiring a separation between his administration and Meiggs; the fact that the central and southern lines eventually fell into foreign hands, spoiling Peru’s pride of ownership; discomfort with the outsized celebrity and admiration that the Yankee enjoyed among Peruvians right up until his death; assumption that Meiggs must have been corrupt and, consequently, dismay that he bought off Peruvian leaders so cheaply, as in Gonzalez Prada’s sister/pony story; and, the fact that Meiggs’s work contributed to financial collapse and was a prelude to the disastrous war with Chile.

It does not help that scholars have left Watt Stewart’s biography to stand alone, because that work is weak on Meiggs’s relationships with Peruvians. Treating Meiggs as a separate phenomenon obscures the importance of the railroads to other aspects of Peru’s development. It also overlooks the fact that Meiggs and some of his entrepreneurial associates and employees, such as Watson, Thorndike, Backus and Johnson, were fully invested in Peru. They were
not, as Stewart’s metaphor suggested, *conquistadores* looking to get rich and then haul away their treasure for some better life in the United States. Peru was their better life. Railroads were their starting point. Peru was full of opportunities that made Meiggs’s San Francisco aspirations seem insignificant. He was an urban developer; taking down Lima’s colonial walls was a phase in his plan for expanding on what the builders of the urban rail lines had begun, turning the Lima-Callao-Chorrillos triangle into a single grand city. Peru was Meiggs’s redemption but not his ticket back to the United States, where he would be a minor, obscure figure. (That path was his brother’s, and he did not stay long in the United States, moving on to Britain, where he, too, lost his fortune.)

A reason Meiggs deserves to be woven into the main narrative of Peru’s nineteenth-century history is because his program, while extravagant, was consistent with the import-based economic development path that Peruvians pursued before and after. The effort in chapter thirteen is a mere first step in examination of the relationship between Manuel Pardo and Henry Meiggs. Peru’s importing of U.S. potatoes and other foodstuffs was a symptom a flawed development model. Pardo was not just Meiggs’s enabler. He and his father-in-law helped design and perpetuate the policies that produced the much-lamented squandering of the country’s guano riches.

This work ends with the building of the Andean roads, not their subsequent use. Yet, it is easy to see that their cost was too high— not because Meiggs took enormous profits (he did, but then mostly lost them in Peru itself), but because policy did not require that their construction benefit the broader Peruvian economy. U.S.-Peruvian trade figures record the stimulus Peru gave to the U.S. economy and denied to itself. Nor was Peru alone in pursuing a wasteful path. According to historian Richard White, the U.S. transcontinental
railroads did not bring benefits commensurate with their costs. As in Peru, the U.S. roads “left disaster in their wake.” As White summed it up, “They came too early, in too great an abundance, and at too great a cost.” The corporations that controlled them were not businesses devoted to the efficient use of transportation resources, but rather “corporate containers for financial manipulation and political networking.”

RACE, LABOR AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Peruvian elites followed an import-intensive development path because they were contemptuous of the country’s Indian, black and Chinese workers. Race consciousness was at the core of the conservative nationalism practiced by Manuel Pardo and other members of the Barreda social network. Labor was consistently devalued throughout the period of this study. Workers were not people who deserved a living wage or any voice in the nation’s affairs. “Labor shortage” was a convenient excuse used to forcibly recruit – and justify exploiting – non-white workers at below value. The Peruvian phrase for the shortage was telling: falta de brazos. What aspiring Peruvian planters like

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841 The term “below value” is usually understood to mean to mean below a “living wage,” an admittedly subjective notion. Even Meagher accepted the notion of a “shortage of labor” confronting Peru and other Latin American nations, thereby making recourse to Chinese indentured servitude appear as something of an economic imperative (Meagher [2008], p. 46).

842 The pervasiveness of the idea that Peru suffered from a labor shortage was discussed in the previous chapter. See the references in the “conventional wisdom” footnote on falta de brazos in the section entitled, “An Engineering Wonder.”
Pardo wanted was cheap *brazos*, not citizens. European workers refused to tolerate those conditions, yet Pardo and others continued to fantasize that European immigrants would find Peru attractive. Even as financial disaster was crashing down upon his administration, in his 1875 message to congress Pardo said he was prioritizing a new effort for the *fomento de la inmigración europea*. As soon as Henry Meiggs offered a market (living) wage, workers appeared and got busy. Meiggs’ labor policy was simple: pay what it took to get and keep workers on the job. (In terms of backward and forward linkages, it was regrettable that he imported so much of the food and other supplies to sustain them.)

Meiggs demonstrated that guano gave Peru the ability to attract Indians into national development, but racism blinded Peru’s elites to the national interest. As José Carlos Mariátegui later argued, their racial hatred of Peru’s non-white majority was a factor preventing Peru’s elites from fulfilling the role expected of a national bourgeoisie in capitalist development. “In Peru, the aristocrat and white bourgeois are contemptuous of popular culture, all that is national,” wrote Mariátegui. “They feel, above all, white.”

In looking back on Peru’s nineteenth-century experience, Mariátegui contrasted his country’s privileged sectors to those of other nations. Chinese.

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844 Mariátegui wrote the essay, “Punto de vista anti-imperialista,” in 1929 near the end of his life as part of a thesis to be presented at the First Latin American Communist Conference held in Buenos Aires in June, 1929. It is reproduced in his posthumous *Ideología y política* and in the collection edited by philosopher Augusto Salazar Bondy, *Ensayos escogidos* (Lima: Editorial Universo, [1971]), pp. 190-198.
elites could feel genuine nationalist sentiments, he said, because they had a memory of long sovereignty over their own nation’s affairs and the ambition to take back what foreigners had usurped. He thought that Argentina – *tal vez* – had a bourgeoisie sufficiently large, rich and proud of nation that it could have a *personalidad nacional*. Nor could Peru be compared to the Central American nations, where U.S. military intervention provoked a patriotic reaction among bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sectors.  

There was more than race at work, of course. Guano riches allowed Peruvian elites to be self-indulgent. Suffering from something of an inferiority complex in the ways they perceived themselves seen by foreigners, they put a premium on appearances. They felt they deserved better (imported) goods than those local workers produced. They wanted development on the cheap, with a minimum of discomfort to themselves. “No one wants to wait,” was the way Pedro Dávalos y Lisson later put it. “In this respect we live for today and we live badly.”  

When artisans got angry, workers could make their voices heard, as they did in 1858 when the Barredas brought in U.S.-made doors, windows and other furnishings for the Chorrillos railway. However, racial and other divisions in their own ranks undermined the workers’ effectiveness. Race trumped nation in nineteenth-century Peru.

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847 Not long after Mariátegui’s death, use of “race” as a category for analysis of Peruvian reality fell out of favor. For analysis of shifting Peruvian views on the relevance of race, see Marisol de la Cadena, “Silent Racism and Intellectual Superiority in Peru,” *Bulletin of Latin American Research*,
In March 1876, the newspaper *El Nacional* ran a series of articles that provided an obituary for the era under study here. “[Guano] has caused a fictitious prosperity because it has diverted us from developing with our own labor the abundant resources we possess,” wrote Juan Copello and Luis Petriconi. The model of exploiting forced labor and importing even what Peruvian artisans were eager to produce, “has made us dependent on foreign industry, and in this way has destroyed our economic independence.”

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848 The articles were then assembled in Juan Copello and Luis Petriconi, *Estudios sobre la independencia económica del Perú* (Lima: Imprenta de “El Nacional,” 1876), and the quotation appears on p. 15.
CHAPTER 15

APPENDIX

Most tables and charts appear with the text and carry the number of their respective chapter (e.g., table 13.5 is in chapter thirteen).

Chart 15.1 is the master diagram of the “Barreda social network,” introduced below and included in this dissertation as a separate pdf file.

The patente tax data in tables 15.1a–15.1g is based upon Lima registers found in the Archivo General de la Nación and published records. The patente was a levy on urban business first created in 1826, but it is not clear how regularly or thoroughly the rosters were revised in subsequent years.\(^{849}\) It was conceived as a tax on profits rather than gross sales, half to be collected each semester. In 1852 the tax rate was fixed at four percent of net income, and in 1879 it was raised to five percent.\(^{850}\) Paul Gootenberg made skillful use of patente records for the period from 1830 to 1861, modifying their results with a price index he developed.\(^{851}\)

Table 15.7 was compiled during a research trip to Southern Illinois University in 2011. My thanks to David Werlich for his efforts to preserve the papers of Federico Barreda.

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\(^{849}\) For the original patente tax decree, signed by vice-president Hipólito Unanue and treasury minister José de Larrea y Larrea, see Dancuart, *Anales*, I, 276-277. The law stated that this tax was known generally as a *contribución de gremios*, and said it applied to anyone engaged in commerce, art, a profession or *ocupación industriosa*. In effect, this was a business license as much as a tax, and no one, native or foreign, was supposed to engage in business without registering. Anyone found with a warehouse, store, workshop or *obrador* without the corresponding patente was subject to arrest and a month in jail. Regarding the origins and early history of the patente, see J. M. Rodríguez, *Estudios económicos financieros, y ojeada sobre la hacienda pública del Perú y la necesidad de su reforma* (Lima: Imp. Gil, 1895), pp. 197-211.


\(^{851}\) See his appendix tables 2.1 and 2.2, in *Between*, pp. 165-166.
The Barreda social network was an expanding constellation of intermarried families, a wing of what Peruvians came to call the “oligarchy.” A significant part of the wealth of its core group (the de Osma/Barreda and Pardo/Lavalle families) came from efforts to secure national dominance of the guano trade in general, and the United States market in particular. “National” in this case was the Barredas’ own term to signify the reserving of privileged business rights for hijos del país over foreign interests. To secure such privileges they had to achieve an important measure of control over the state, first in alliance with Ramón Castilla, and eventually forming a political party for that purpose. Selected members of the Barreda network are diagramed in the attached chart 15.1, together with two other groups for comparative purposes (shown to the left and right of the Barredas).

During its initial formation, Carmen de Osma and her husband, Felipe Barreda, seem to have operated as the network’s principal gatekeepers. Much of the fortune of the Barreda and Osma families originated in the U.S. guano market, which they controlled in the 1850s. In partnership with their Pardo/Lavalle allies, they also appear to have profited from some of Peru’s international financial transactions that contributed to the country’s huge debt and eventual bankruptcy in the 1870s (described in chapters seven, eleven and twelve).

Over the past century, the Barredas and other wings of the Peruvian oligarchy have exercised remarkable control over what has been publicly disclosed about their lives and fortunes. Even in fiction, the windows on their lives are opaque, despite glimpses from Alfredo Bryce Echenique. Mario Vargas Llosa has interacted socially and politically with Barreda network folks and other oligarchy heirs, but he does not hail from their world and does not seem to find them particularly interesting as subjects. Guillermo Thorndike combined
admirable research with fictional elements to project his own unique style back into the nineteenth century; but, regrettably, he did not take on the Barredas.

To attempt to penetrate this opaqueness of the Barredas, their rivals and the environment in which they operated, I have mined the diaries of Heinrich (Enrique) Witt, both as regards business affairs and social matters. Witt was a successful merchant, sometime guano consignee and player in Lima’s financial affairs. In his diaries he would often jot down his opinion of a person’s character; but, more importantly for this study, he also sometimes wrote about how a person was regarded in Peruvian elite circles. He had a keen sense of different social levels in urban Peruvian society, including stratification among elites. Witt was a neighbor of Carmen de Osma and Felipe Barreda but seems to have been largely excluded from their social circle. Witt implied that this distance was due to the social origins of his wife, whom the Barredas judged as unacceptable.

One anecdote will illustrate Carmen de Osma’s gatekeeping role. Witt’s stepdaughter played with a couple of the Barreda children, and one day Carmen de Osma used that as a pretext to do a social reconnaissance of the Witt household. Witt could sense that the visit was not about him; Carmen de Osma wanted to check out his wife. Witt seemed to have thought of his wife as white. She was from Arequipa and had been married to one of Witt’s best friends. The merchant was smitten with her even before she was widowed. Witt knew that her brother was an army officer posted in Lima and well known to the public for the political nature of his assignments. But, when Witt finally met his brother-in-law, he could not hide his surprise at the man’s dark coloring. Carmen de Osma’s eye would have been discerning even if she were unaware of the brother/sister connection – which she most certainly was.

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852 Heinrich Witt, *Diario*, v. 1, p. ****
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| Fábrica de Cal y Ladrillos (see Venta)             | 16   |
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| Fábrica de Catres                                 | 1    |
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| Fábrica de Cigarrillos                            | 17   | 16   | 7    |
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| Fábrica de Espejos y Cuadros                      | 7    |
| Fábrica de Fideos                                | 5    |
| Fábrica de Fósforos                               | 1    |
| Fábrica de Galletas (y Carmelos)                   | 1    | 1    |
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| Fábrica de Jabón                                  | 4    | 3    | 6    | 6    | 6    | 17   | 9    | 8    |
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<tr>
<td>Tejedores en Ésterillas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tiradores</td>
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<td>Vinerías</td>
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<td>Vinerías/Vinicultores</td>
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Table 15.2a
U.S. Recorded Exports to Peru*
1825-1860

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S. Domestic Exports</th>
<th>Change from Previous Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1825</td>
<td>359,854</td>
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<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>278,724</td>
<td>-22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td>202,944</td>
<td>-27.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td>159,389</td>
<td>-21.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>91,542</td>
<td>-42.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>32,400</td>
<td>-64.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>8,560</td>
<td>-73.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>7,126</td>
<td>-16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1833</td>
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<tr>
<td>1834</td>
<td>42,767</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1836</td>
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<tr>
<td>1837</td>
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<tr>
<td>1838</td>
<td>163,868</td>
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<tr>
<td>1839</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1840</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1841</td>
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<td>1842</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1845</td>
<td>33,424</td>
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<td>1846</td>
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<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>192,978</td>
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<tr>
<td>1848</td>
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<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>93,195</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>258,939</td>
<td>177.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>249,416</td>
<td>-3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>333,794</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>654,316</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>646,707</td>
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<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>756,323</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>1,151,632</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>449,733</td>
<td>-60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>603,827</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>893,857</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>869,781</td>
<td>-2.7%</td>
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Note: data unreliable prior to c. 1850 for reasons discussed in text.
Table 15.2b
U.S. Exports to Peru
1861-1890

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S. Domestic Exports</th>
<th>Change from Previous Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>370,435</td>
<td>-57.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>571,652</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>843,130</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>699,105</td>
<td>-17.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>722,803</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>1,144,255</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>1,698,518</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>1,602,927</td>
<td>-5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>1,556,534</td>
<td>-2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>1,858,244</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>2,279,773</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>4,439,995</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>2,671,534</td>
<td>-39.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>1,811,369</td>
<td>-32.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>2,443,657</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>1,001,722</td>
<td>-59.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>1,239,006</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>975,507</td>
<td>-21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>1,293,991</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>907,603</td>
<td>-29.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>93,785</td>
<td>-89.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>531,823</td>
<td>467.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>487,360</td>
<td>-8.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>1,043,902</td>
<td>114.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>735,979</td>
<td>-29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>798,577</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>717,968</td>
<td>-10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>865,160</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>773,244</td>
<td>-10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>1,418,561</td>
<td>83.5%</td>
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Table 15.3
British Exports of Textiles to Peru
1849-1889

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cottons Entered</th>
<th>Cottons Entered</th>
<th>Linens Entered</th>
<th>Woolens Entered</th>
<th>Woolens Entered</th>
<th>Total British</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>By The Yard</td>
<td>At Value</td>
<td>By the Yard</td>
<td>By The Yard</td>
<td>At Value</td>
<td>Exports To Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yards</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>20807385</td>
<td>373575</td>
<td>24839</td>
<td>1945862</td>
<td>64690</td>
<td>593289</td>
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<td>21047306</td>
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<td>44907</td>
<td>403429</td>
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<td>34851</td>
<td>2627112</td>
<td>102071</td>
<td>692016</td>
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<td>3189138</td>
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<td>388840</td>
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<td>25062318</td>
<td>23561</td>
<td>1907569</td>
<td>69776</td>
<td>326891</td>
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<td>38629349</td>
<td>52677</td>
<td>2417978</td>
<td>89565</td>
<td>925167</td>
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<td>1874</td>
<td>26969617</td>
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<td>34147895</td>
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<td>2270412</td>
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<td>33722558</td>
<td>199688</td>
<td>1194549</td>
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<td>1999920</td>
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<td>51745</td>
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<td>65706</td>
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<td>44239</td>
<td>1721036</td>
<td>48302</td>
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<td>49767</td>
<td>1909050</td>
<td>54243</td>
<td>2967214</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Source: Great Britain, Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom, various years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 15.4
British Exports of Textiles to South America
1849-1879

Cottons Entered
By The Yard

1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879

Cottons
Entered
At Value

Linens Entered
By the Yard

Linens
At
Value

Woolens Entered
By The Yard

Woolens
Total
EnterBritish
ed At Exports To
Value
S.A.

Yards

£

£

Yards

£

£

Yards

£

£

229,883,470
205,347,806
248,487,319
266,379,173
251,106,638
246,617,840
273,170,718
298,441,802
338,146,382
265,922,285
270,529,545
409,568,162
364,212,603
208,219,358
217,000,384
323,408,103
280,911,714
417,375,335
409,796,370
362,864,885
423,138,484
390,259,526
433,134,149
404,298,269
447,524,506
336,859,771
383,458,090
376,163,660
439,905,338
422,114,200
407,346,800

3,350,973
3,111,768
3,663,649
3,928,415
3,837,879
3,410,020
3,741,282
4,146,709
5,169,732
3,895,625
4,071,301
6,075,490
5,339,090
3,567,078
4,833,256
7,923,514
6,274,619
9,572,116
7,799,211
6,278,763
7,469,420
6,615,770
7,268,469
8,907,575
7,960,877
7,002,139
6,270,160
5,808,485
6,350,749
6,043,247
5,267,788

176,554
143,454
167,209
191,531
187,036
181,133
199,210
181,950
203,537
181,056
183,027
240,069
233,317
177,907
191,646
288,904
316,849
512,657
619,070
430,235
447,768
371,311
428,328
583,045
589,110
435,436
449,438
435,690
456,922
491,086
422,030

14,741,383
14,031,225
24,653,474
26,048,158
29,533,983
14,927,175
17,779,263
17,793,892
24,413,881
20,414,621
18,882,374
19,330,692
18,873,975
14,251,095
24,890,962
32,035,393
35,810,800
41,657,201
39,846,589
28,846,066
31,999,063
21,970,504
21,646,414
29,282,342
24,264,060
17,521,168
15,728,632
14,561,540
17,475,305
14,397,400
11,096,500

410,167
396,050
631,153
640,768
439,433
454,237
486,674
451,480
654,278
527,379
473,477
514,126
502,370
391,626
723,532
1,023,413
1,059,140
1,288,667
1,167,473
821,841
882,536
633,814
625,858
872,287
776,573
553,138
471,857
408,147
457,550
418,532
342,167

7,447
5,152
5,042
9,815
8,646
4,513
26,382
21,596
27,646
10,623
13,615
18,067
27,627
15,974
44,074
44,607
62,103
82,497
54,581
62,709
9,804
3,902
11,547
18,368
14,418
7,522
9,302
6,746
7,123
7,179
8,985

2,463,359
2,897,964
3,637,330
4,245,356
4,522,835
4,818,404
4,870,357
5,328,768
8,340,158
4,246,463
12,381,804
13,460,744
13,741,455
9,551,174
13,125,179
15,582,973
15,666,247
19,085,324
17,963,271
14,640,211
21,763,841
20,320,219
20,796,818
26,877,962
23,356,573
15,084,061
14,199,391
13,382,766
15,606,312
15,999,050
15,747,300

147,831
149,025
202,041
232,842
269,048
291,172
236,247
291,588
436,514
244,011
1,000,948
1,219,291
1,128,212
863,089
1,074,927
1,250,464
1,420,833
1,738,855
1,607,062
1,209,024
1,584,149
1,440,934
1,286,563
1,810,666
1,716,332
1,228,745
1,140,356
1,024,427
1,172,991
1,167,001
1,012,951

23,435
30,156
24,320
16,883
28,158
29,030
56,387
81,143
81,568
51,211
60,393
79,057
70,780
78,703
90,433
81,114
93,942
155,404
174,611
115,738
114,892
79,403
119,532
148,921
146,635
105,342
77,597
67,268
59,211
93,532
83,245

£
6,332,254
6,121,215
7,328,970
7,887,890
7,509,761
7,575,911
7,941,933
8,781,702
10,989,332
8,646,491
8,739,636
11,444,888
10,482,865
7,834,345
10,259,663
14,564,027
13,996,865
18,082,356
16,630,330
14,117,449
16,291,177
15,293,034
16,990,949
23,060,219
22,505,264
19,571,917
15,650,279
13,292,577
13,776,994
13,432,919
11,228,322

This is a master table compiled from British trade statistics for each individual South
American country. Its purpose is to provide contrast for Peru’s importing of textiles
seen in the previous table (see chapter eight, chart 8.1).

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### Table 15.5a
Selected U.S. Exports to Peru
1864-1890

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Drugs, Chemicals and Medicines $</th>
<th>Glass and Glassware $</th>
<th>India Rubber Manufactures $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>46,976</td>
<td>24,627</td>
<td>1,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>31,170</td>
<td>23,558</td>
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Table 15.5b
Selected U.S. Exports to Peru
1864-1888

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Paints and Painter’s Colors $</th>
<th>Paper and Stationery $</th>
<th>Cotton Manufactures $</th>
<th>Lard Lbs.</th>
<th>Lard $</th>
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Table 15.6
Measures of U.S. and British Exports to Peru
1850-1885

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<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S. Domestic Exports to Peru (Millions)</th>
<th>Annual Percent Change</th>
<th>Three-Year Moving Average</th>
<th>£ British Textile Exports to Peru (Millions)</th>
<th>Annual Percent Change</th>
<th>£ Total British Exports to Peru (Millions)</th>
<th>Three-Year Moving Average</th>
<th>Annual Percent Change</th>
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660
Table 15.7
Snapshots of the Barreda Guano Business
Selected Months, 1852-1856
(Registered tons, except number of ships in right column)

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<th>Date</th>
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<th>Loaded and waiting for clearance at Callao</th>
<th>Waiting or loading at the Chinchas</th>
<th>Waiting at Callao for permission to sail to the Chinchas</th>
<th>Total tonnage</th>
<th>Total ships in Peru under Barreda contract</th>
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Source: Barreda Papers, Southern Illinois University, box 4, folder 10.
Reports sent from F. Barreda y hermano in Peru to Federico Barreda in the United States.
(These are the only months for which records were found in the papers.)
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