Title
Language and Empire, c. 1800

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6pz0z83z

Author
Rothschild, Emma

Publication Date
2005-03-10
Language and empire, c.1800*

Emma Rothschild, King’s College, Cambridge/Harvard University

The nineteenth century opened, like so many new centuries, to the sound of ideas at war. The ideas with which this essay is concerned are ideas about what was really happening, at a time which was widely described as historic, or extrahistorical. As General Bonaparte said on his return from Egypt on the 18th Brumaire of the Year Eight – 9 November 1799 – ‘Nothing, in history, resembles the end of the eighteenth century; nothing, in the end of the eighteenth century, resembles the present moment.’¹ But a substantial number of people, including Napoleon himself, were also interested in setting the events of the times in a larger and longer-term perspective, and it is these larger perspectives of 1800 with which I will principally be concerned.

I will look, in particular, at two opposing vistas which were much discussed in 1800. They were perspectives sub specie eternitatis; ideas of two opposing and eternal empires, which were global empires, empires founded in universal connections, empires of the mind. There are three long pamphlets which were at the heart of the war of ideas in Europe, and these will be taken as a point of departure. The first was written in German in late 1799 by the Prussian writer Friedrich Gentz, and published in 1800 under the not entirely enticing title Essai sur l’état actuel de l’administration des finances et de la richesse nationale de la Grande-Bretagne. The second was published in 1800, as an answer to Gentz, by a French writer, Alexandre d’Hauterive, and was called De l’Etat de la France. The third was published by Gentz, as an answer to Hauterive, in Berlin in 1801, and in London in 1802, under the title On the State of Europe.

All three were concerned with an extraordinarily extensive prospect: from Carinthia to Bengal. They were also concerned with the ideas and impressions of very large numbers of people; with what another theorist of 1799, James Madison, described as the ‘stock of ... ideas and sentiments’.² This article will look first at Gentz’s and Hauterive’s, and some of their contemporaries’, conceptions of an eternal empire of
commodities (an English sort of empire), and second, at their conceptions of an eternal empire of ideas (the French sort of empire). It will then discuss the lives of Gentz and Hauterive themselves, and the extent to which the imaginary dominions of 1800 may or may not have corresponded to how it really was, in the new epoch of the nineteenth century.

Two preliminary words of warning. The first is that most of the individuals with whom I will be concerned are not very estimable characters, at least in this period of their lives. Gentz was the editor of a Berlin publication with the imposing title of the *Historische Journal*. Hauterive described him as the ‘organ and echo of the English ministry’, ‘protected and probably paid’ by English gold. This was indeed the case, and in June 1800, soon after the publication of his *Essai*, Gentz wrote in his diary ‘Through Garlick, a letter from Lord Grenville, which contains a present [‘einem Geschenk’] of 500 £ st. – the first of this sort!’ (‘Garlicke’ was a British diplomat, Benjamin Garlike).

Hauterive was, at the time, the director of the North Atlantic and Russian correspondence division of the French Foreign Ministry. This followed a reasonably tumultuous early diplomatic career, which included a period as a market gardener in rural North America, after having been destituted as French consul in New York on the grounds of falsifying accounts, or inspiring thoughts of anarchy, or both; as well as a journey on foot from Constantinople to Jassi in Moldavia, preceded by one flag, two banners, three men carrying horse tails, and seven trumpeters. Gentz described Hauterive as ‘the echo of the times. He represents the prevailing sentiments and opinions, the uniform bias of a great multitude of politicians in all countries’.

The minor cast of characters will not be much more edifying, in an article on a subject as lofty as the history of ideas. We will encounter Madison, to be sure, and Raynal and Leopardi. But we will also be engaged at some length with the revolutionary orator Bertrand Barère, of whom Lord Macaulay wrote modestly, in the course of a 108-page biographical essay, that ‘Our opinion then is this: that Barère approached nearer than any person mentioned in history or fiction, whether man or devil, to the idea of consummate and universal depravity’.
My second warning is related, and it has to do with the loftiness of the history of ideas. The ideas with which this article will be concerned fit only rather awkwardly into the familiar vertical classification of kinds of thought and kinds of history. They are, I suppose, ‘medium’ thoughts, and in particular medium thought about ‘low’ thought, and how it is changing over time. They are also to a great extent thoughts about economic life, and one of the things that I want to suggest, as I have tried to suggest elsewhere, is that writings about commerce and money were a very important expression, in this period, of political sentiments.

The ideas of virtual and global empire under discussion here are difficult to classify, too, by their national origin. Gentz and Hauterive were ornaments, later in their lives, of two of the great foreign ministries of European history, the Austrian and the French. But their conceptions of Europe were capacious. Both of them had American connections; both had Valachian and Moldavian connections. They were preoccupied, in 1800, with the connectedness of European, American and Asian life. C. A. Bayly has recently demonstrated the extent of ‘global connections’ in this period. This article will examine how people thought at the time about these global connections, and how they thought about how other people were thinking.

Gentz’s first Etat, of English financial administration, was a mass of figures or, in Hauterive’s description, an ‘extraordinarily complicated daedalus of numbers, tables, and comparative states’. But its principal contention was that the advantages of the recent progress of English commerce were ‘in a certain sense, and even in a very real sense, assured for ever’. Statistics of English exports and imports, and of English shipping, reflected only a portion of this progress. English funds were employed around the world, and ‘from the mines of Carinthia to the looms of Bengal there are few places inhabited by industrious men where foreign labours are not brought to life by British capital’. Even war was a source of prosperity, and the English government ‘brings to life all operations from Lisbon to the Gulf of Finland, and from the North Sea into the deserts of Syria’. The ‘cultivated nations compose among themselves a vast state united by a thousand different links’, Gentz wrote of the commerce of the time, and in this ‘great market which civil society forms in all the cultivated parts of
the world’, the English were at an eternal advantage. Every enlightened European, he concluded, having quoted a lugubrious Latin poem by the governor-general of Bengal, should call out to England, ‘Esto perpetua!’.

Hauterive’s *Etat de la France* began, in response, on a note of high historicity. He was concerned with causes, he said; he wished to rise above passions and to return, in particular, to the Treaty of Westphalia. He identified three major causes of the destruction of the European system of public law in the course of the eighteenth century: the rise of Russia, the rise of Prussia, and the ‘prodigious increase in the colonial and maritime system in the four parts of the Universe’. It was this third development which was Hauterive’s principal subject, and it was of literally worldwide consequence.

The ‘action of the industrial and commercial system on the social system of all the peoples of Europe’ had transformed ways of thinking, increased social mobility and made more similar the ideas and feelings of individuals in different classes, Hauterive wrote. It was the most important cause of the French Revolution. But there was also, by 1800, something peculiarly English about this system. The ‘vessels of England cover all seas; she sends soldiers, arms, money, agents to the four parts of the Earth’; she introduced a ‘principle of anxiety, trouble and versatility’, a ‘perpetual principle of uncertainty’ in commerce. To Gentz’s imagined dominion, which Hauterive evoked in various versions (the ‘métiers de Bengale’, the ‘fabriques de Bengale’, the ‘comptoirs de Bengale’), he added an American correspondence: throughout north America, and ‘from the isthmus of Panama to the south pole’, England’s speculators carried ‘an indefatigable spirit of discovery, monopoly, and contraband’.

The influence of England had been extended in a multitude of ways, from the correspondence of English associations to establishments of philanthropy in west Africa; from rights to establish shops, mines and factories to credit arrangements and bankruptcies. In this ‘empire of her commerce’, England could be thought of as a country with a vast ‘exterior population’, constituted by all the individuals around the world who consume English goods, for ‘consumers belong less to the nation in which they live, than to the one whose productions they consume’. The English national wealth, conversely, could be considered to include the subsistence of the ‘Chinese,
Indians and Russians whom her yearly consumption keeps alive, and the wages and expenses of the German, Italian and Ottoman soldiers whom her subsidies support’.  

The political consequences of the new empire were prodigious, in Hauerive’s description. The ‘sceptre of universal commerce’ conveyed the power of ‘interfering in the most important relations of the social, administrative and political organisation of all nations’, including the ‘relations between property-owners and employees, producers and craftsmen, the tax-revenue and the tax-payers’. It changed the relationship between national commerce and public power, in distant countries. It carried, everywhere, the ‘ferments of an anxious emulation and of a jealous competition’.  

Gentz’s response to Hauerive, in turn, his State of Europe of 1801, was in large part a state of France. But it was also a resounding defence of the ‘multiplication of trans-European connexions’. The new system was presented as a consequence of the very long-term improvement of mankind: ‘all civilized nations must be impelled by the desire of establishing a permanent system of connexion with the remotest parts of the world’, and ‘civilization [‘Cultur’] is not to be the exclusive privilege of this or that favoured people; it will spread over the whole habitable globe in the course of time’. The dominance of England in global commerce was, in these circumstances, the consequence not of insidious practices, or even of the Navigation Act, but of the ‘intrinsic, peculiar, positive superiority of the English’.  

Gentz’s own system of connections with England was now flourishing. Benjamin Garlike, when he delivered to Gentz Lord Grenville’s letter of June 1800, with its Geschenk, was instructed to ‘mention to him that it has been thought here that this mark of his Majesty’s Favour would be more agreeable to him in this form than in that of a ring or any other present of a similar nature’.  

Gentz replied, in his letter of thanks to Grenville, that ‘le moment, ou Mr. Garlike m’a remis la lettre, dont vous eu la grace de m’honorer, a été pour moi un des plus doux de ma vie’, and he promised life-long devotion to ‘un Souverain, dont j’ai toujours adoré les vertus, la bonté et la sagesse’.  

In April 1802, following the publication of the State of Europe, he was able to report in his diary that ‘destiny brought a gift [‘eine Rimesse’] of 1,000 £ st. from England!’.
Gentz’s and Hauterive’s evocations of the eternal empire of commerce were not entirely new in 1800. They were a compendium, in several respects, of earlier observations. Gentz’s view was essentially that of William Pitt, in a speech in parliament in 1792 on the ‘history of commerce’ and the ‘constant accumulation of capital’: ‘The difficulty will be to imagine limits to its operation. None can be found ... while there remains abroad any new market that can be explored, or any existing market that can be extended.’20 The panorama of Carinthia and Bengal was Henry Beeke’s. ‘A large part of the data and above all of the principles which form the basis of my work have been drawn from your writings, My Lord’, Gentz wrote in March 1800 to Lord Auckland (William Eden), at the time the postmaster-general.21

The seascape of English universal commerce had also been a commonplace of French discussion over the entire period since the Seven Years’ War. A ‘maritime people created a new system, so to speak, and by her industry submitted the earth to the sea’, the Abbé Raynal wrote in 1774, in a new volume of the Histoire des deux Indes, which was adorned, from that year, with successive engravings of the same pitiful scene, ‘Un Anglais de la Barbade, vend sa Maitresse’. English vessels covered the seas; there was a ‘local correspondence to be found between the isthmus of Suez & that of Panama, between the Cape of Good-Hope and Cape Horn, between the archipelago of the East Indies and that of the Antilles’. Commerce was the ‘new soul of the moral world’, in Raynal’s account, to the extent that it had become ‘essential to the organization or existence of the body politic’.22

But these old images, for the orators of the French Revolution, were transformed into an ocean of evil. When Bertrand Barère, the Toulouse lawyer with whom Macaulay was so fascinated, presented a French Navigation Act in September 1793, he described England as a ‘modern Carthage’, which had corrupted the world with its ‘floods of gold’ and its ‘francisations simulées’, in the form of vessels sailing under false papers and French flags. The English government was a merchant in constitutions, in Europe as in India, which ‘buys and gives prices to men, cities and ports’. ‘A ridiculous Anglomania’ had subjugated France: ‘commissioners of customs, metal workers, speculators in colonial commodities, shippers of Indian fabrics, these are our real masters.’23
‘As a colonial power, it has federalized the globe’, Barère wrote in 1798 of the English government, in a three-volume work called *La liberté des mers*. It disseminated ‘anxiety, fear, envy, corruption and hatred’; it had ‘conceived the project of COLONISING THE UNIVERSE’; it ‘divides by words and by things’. English political law, ‘in relation to Bengal and to France’, was far more atrocious than the political law of the Carthaginians. In 1793, Barère had described the proposed Navigation Act as a ‘bridge from Calais to Dover’, across which ‘our revolutionary communications’ would travel to destroy the modern Carthage. In 1798 he looked forward, rather, to an apparently aerial descent on England, to the enfranchisement of India (‘the most glorious expedition which a revolutionary army could undertake’), and to the enfranchisement even of the British Isles, or of England, Scotland and Ireland, each with their own parliament, navy, and Directoire.24

The virtual empire of English commerce, in these visions, was essentially oceanic. England was described, endlessly, as an island, an island conquering islands (from Trinidad to Ceylon), seizing hold, in Barère’s description, ‘of all capes, all straits, all gulf’s, and the best situated islands’.25 In the new geography of empire, even the names of deltas were an incantation of horror. The English world of commerce was the seductive, sinister, post-Westphalian world of seaports and seasides: Hauterive wrote that a new force, ‘more powerful, perhaps, than that of religious fanaticism, impressed hitherto unknown movements on the social organization of the industrial professions. Seaside towns were inspired with an emulation which soon knew no bounds other than those of the element which put them in communication with the entire world’.26

This seaside world had been the object of suspicion throughout the history of European morality. In the classical texts with which late eighteenth-century writers were so familiar, the world of an Asiatic Greece, or an African Carthage, was opposed to a virtuous and inland Rome. It was a scene which Romulus repudiated with amazing foresight, in Cicero’s account in Book Two of *De Republica*, when he decided not to found the city of Rome ‘down by the sea’:

maritime cities also suffer a certain corruption and degeneration of morals; for they receive a
mixture of strange languages and customs, and import foreign ways as well as foreign merchandise ... [their inhabitants] are constantly being tempted far from home by soaring hopes and dreams; and even when their bodies stay at home, their thoughts nevertheless fare abroad and go wandering. In fact, no other influence did more to bring about the final overthrow of Carthage and Corinth ... than this scattering and dispersion of their citizens, due to [the] lust for trafficking and sailing.  

The ocean of English power, in 1800, was in this sense an ocean of corruption, in respect of the thoughts and language and imagination of millions of distant individuals, of words and of things. ‘Countries hardly known to Europe have been endowed by England with names which she regards as signs of possession; others which are still known to no one await English denominations’, Hauterive wrote, in a reproach to what Gentz regarded as one of England’s most useful ‘titles’.  

The floods of gold were floods of paper, imprinted with disconnected and deceiving words: insurance documents, commercial correspondence, ‘objects of foreign consumption, and the signs which mark their prices’, advertisements, the ‘simulation of flags, of ships’ documents’ (‘papiers de bord’), state papers (‘papiers d’Etat’), ‘depreciated from the first moment of their issue’; ‘these easy floods of monetised papers’ (‘papiers monétisés’).

The English ocean of words was frightening even in America. Gentz himself was a friend of the United States, and its diplomats, as well as of George III. The eternal and virtuous empire of English commerce, founded on the free exchange of commodities and credit, had been made possible, in his view, by the independence of the north American colonies in 1783. He repeated, in pamphlet after pamphlet, that ‘the loss of her colonies was the first aera of the lasting and independent greatness of Britain’, and ‘the first complete demonstration of the true principles of the wealth of nations’. Freed of monopoly power, and of the oppression of formal empire, England and her former colonies could constitute a lasting union, of language and principles.

Another of the pamphlets written by Gentz in the winter of 1800, about the American and the French revolutions and the post-colonial prosperity of the British empire, was translated into English by John Quincy Adams, then the American minister in Berlin (he apologized for the occasional ‘Germanisms’). Even John Adams commented at great length on Hauterive’s *Etat de la France*, which he described as ‘an exulting
history of French tyranny', albeit, in its description of simulated invoices, ‘Awfully true’. Gentz’s idyll, of an Atlantic communication of principles, was itself in the spirit of the American Federalists. In the prospect of the historian David Ramsay of South Carolina, whom Gentz described as ‘the best of all the writers upon the American Revolution’, ‘the western world will have possessed no language so uniform and so universal as our own is likely to be’, and Englishmen ‘have reason to be proud of the means of communication thus offered’.32

But the uniformity of language and principles was also, in the turbulent politics of the early Republic, a frightening destiny. An essay called ‘Foreign influence’, published anonymously in 1799 by James Madison, was an even more vivid evocation of the English empire of commerce at the turn of the century than those of Hauterive or Barère. ‘Corruption is confessedly the vital principle that pervades the whole system’, Madison wrote, in which the British had ‘the peculiar advantage of the same language, the same usages & the same manners, with our citizens’. In elections, the British mixed ‘among the people without any badge of their alienism in their language, dress or appearance’. ‘Money in all its shapes is influence; our monied institutions consequently form another great engine of British influence.’ Even the ownership of commercial capital by Americans ‘has more effect in Anglicizing them, than in Americanizing the influence it gives’; the press was corrupted, as the inland papers copied from the city papers, ‘the city papers are supported by advertisements’, and the advertisements ‘are furnished by merchants and traders. In this manner British influence steals into our newspapers, and circulates under their passport’. Commerce was the ‘copious fountain’ of British influence, Madison concluded, in an oceanic and waterborne metaphor of Ciceronian grandeur:

Every shipment, every consignment, every commission, is a channel in which a portion of it flows. It may be said to make a part of every cargo. Our Sea-port towns are the reservoirs into which it is collected. From these, issue a thousand streams to the inland towns, and country stores: which ... [receive] a stock of British ideas and sentiments proper to be retailed to the people. Thus it is, that our country is penetrated to its remotest corners with a foreign poison vitiating the American sentiment, recolonizing the American character.33
The other eternal and virtual empire of 1800 was aerial rather than oceanic. It was an empire of ideas; an opposite empire. ‘Two great plans are drawn on the globe, by politics and by philosophy’, Bertrand Barère wrote in his *Liberté des mers* of 1798, and ‘Paris and London are the locations where the scene unfolds’. The empire of ideas was French and, like the English empire of commodities, it was considered to be of universal extent. It, too, was founded on much older conceptions (of culture, or of civilization); it, too, was expected to last forever.

‘The truth is, that France, in her present state, is contained by no limits’, Gentz wrote in his *State of Europe*. Hauterive was the theorist of this new empire, in which France ‘is now in a situation to give Europe a new federal constitution’. In Hauterive’s own description, to do so would be a return to and transcendence of France’s heroic past, in which ‘her princes have given laws to almost all civilized peoples’. France’s own post-revolutionary constitution was in conformity with the new way of life of the French, and with the progress of civilization over the past two centuries in all modern societies.

The revolutionaries in France, Gentz wrote in the pamphlet which was translated by John Quincy Adams, aspired to have planted ‘the tree of liberty, from Lisbon to the frozen sea, and to the Dardanelles’. The revolution, for the French, was not local. It was rather one of the transformations ‘which give a new form to civil society, and which must draw all mankind within its vortex’: ‘they wished to tear up the world from its poles, and commence a new aera for the whole human race.’ It is interesting that Gentz contrasted these enthusiasms, not entirely convincingly, to the wise modesty of the American revolutionaries: ‘never did it enter the head of any legislator, or statesman in America ... to set up the American revolution, as a new epoicha in the general relations of civil society.’ The Americans spoke of rights, but they had ‘allowed to these speculative ideas, no visible influence upon their practical measures and resolves’. ‘It never occurred to them, in the rigorous sense of the word, to reform, even their own country, much less the whole world’; they kept a constant distance ‘from every thing that may be called proselyting and propagandism’.

The prospect of French revolutionary proselytism was a universal anxiety, by 1800. It had been Edmund Burke’s prospect, in particular, in the *Reflections on the Revolution*
in France, which Gentz translated into German, and in the Letters on a Regicide Peace of 1796, with its evocation of an ‘evil spirit that possesses the body of France’, the ‘boundless, barren ocean of the homicide philanthropy of France’, having ‘dominion and conquest for its sole objects, – dominion over minds by proselytism, over bodies by arms’. 37 French principles were disseminated through the air like an infection, or like commerce, Burke said in the house of commons in 1792, speaking in favour of the newly introduced Alien Bill. Three thousand daggers had ‘been bespoke at Birmingham’ [‘Here M. Burke drew out a dagger which he had kept concealed, and with much vehemence of action threw it on the floor’]; ‘I vote for it, because it will break the abominable system of the modern Pantheon, and prevent the introduction of French principles and French daggers.’ 38

But the vision of a virtual empire of French principles, like the empire of English commerce, was the expression of much older conceptions as well. In the ‘Papierkultur’ of the times, Johann Gottfried Herder wrote in 1774, the culture of ‘Abregés, Dictionaires, Histoires, Vocabulaires, Esprits, Encyclopedieen’, the philosophers of Paris had assumed the destiny of ‘cultivating all of Europe and all the universe’. ‘Soon we will all speak French’; ‘is there anywhere where what Voltaire writes is not read?’ Voltaire had been born in the only place in which it was possible to ‘use the world’ [‘die Welt zu nützen’]; he was read, learnt, admired and followed ‘from Lisbon to Kamchatka, from Zembla to the colonies of India’. 39 The ‘true value of colonies for a nation’, the great reforming economist A. R. J. Turgot wrote in 1766, can be reduced to ‘the advantage of extending its language in a larger space’. 40

These theories of universal example were much embellished in the period of the French alliance with the American Revolution. Even Gentz, who was embarrassed by ‘those idle declaration of rights’, or ‘this empty pomp of words’, which preceded ‘most of the constitutions of the United States’, found it impossible not to observe in the ‘founders of the French revolution’ an ‘endeavour to imitate the course, the plans, the measures, the forms, and, in part, the language of those, who had conducted that of America’. 41 In France, the idea of exemplification was straightforward, as in the words of an French orator of 1789: ‘Let us follow the example of the United States; they have given a great example to the new hemisphere; let us give one to the universe.’ 42
But the French empire of example was at the same time oddly similar to the English empire of commerce. It was an economic as well as a spiritual dominion. It was indeed particularly suited, in Haurerive’s description, to the new world of commerce, which for France was a scene of ‘beautiful, fruitful, and powerful correspondences’. Even Barère presented his project of a French Navigation Act, in 1793, as the completion of ‘the liberty of France, or rather the liberty of Europe’, by ‘the liberty of commerce, or rather the liberty of the seas’: ‘it is not enough for you to have founded the political Republic, it remains to found a commercial politics, this universal language which must one day bring the peace of the world and the happiness of mankind.’

One of Barère’s oddest projects, in 1792, was on the subject of ‘Foreign idioms, and instruction in the French language’. French was the language learnt in ‘all the globe’, in Barère’s account. But it required certain reforms in France itself: ‘We have revolutionized government, laws, habits, morality, customs, commerce, and thought itself; let us therefore also revolutionize the language which is their daily instrument.’ His proposal, in particular, was to eradicate, successively, the Breton idiom in the north and the west; the Basque idiom in the south-west; the use of Italian in Corsica; and the use of German in the east, where the ‘empire of language and of intelligence’ was incontestable, and where ‘the power of the identity of language has been so great that more than 20,000 men from the countryside of the lower Rhine emigrated with the retreating Germans’.

France could be liberated from these ‘barbaric jargons and gross idioms’, with the appointment of instructors in the French language. Only then would French be prepared for its global destiny. It had no rivals elsewhere; not the Italian of a soft poetry, or the German of feudalism, or the Spanish of inquisitions and universities, or the once great English language, ‘no more, now, than the idiom of ... the bank and of letters of exchange’. ‘Our enemies have made the French language the language of courts: they have degraded it. It is for us to make it the language of peoples’, and it will become, at last, a ‘universal language’.

Even the great conservative, Joseph de Maistre, who fled from the French armies of
annexation, and who spent the revolutionary period traversing Europe in the service of the king of Sardinia, conceded, in 1797, the ‘true magistrature’ which France exercised over Europe, and which it would be useless to contest. This magistrature was founded on ‘the power, I am tempted to say the monarchy of the French language’, and on a ‘spirit of proselytism’ which ‘is known like the sun; from the merchant of fashions to the philosopher’. It was a quasi-religious power; it had made it possible for France to ‘move the world’.46

The power of France was not only military in 1800, in Hauterive’s account, although it was founded on military genius. It was the power of modernity, and of political institutions which were suited to modern times. The most important cause of the French Revolution, for Hauterive, had been the rise of the commercial and industrial system, which was itself universal. Only France, as a consequence of the revolution, was endowed with laws and institutions which were suited to this new system; only France, in this sense, was the example of a modern society; and France was now, once more, a secure society, a good example. As General Bonaparte said to the Army of the Orient in December 1799: ‘France knows all the influence of your conquests for the restoration of her commerce and the civilization of the world.’47

The eternal empire of French institutions was indeed, in 1800, on the eve of its most lasting success, in the form of the Code Civil, or the Code Napoleon, which was adopted in Paris on 21 March 1804. The preparatory discussions over the code were concerned to a striking extent with the new universe of global commerce, which ‘knows no limits, penetrates to the extremities of the globe, exercises everywhere a liberal and benevolent influence’, as the tribune Ganilh said in the debate over the civil rights of foreigners. For the tribune Carion-Nisas, by contrast, the law should rather seek to prevent an ‘indiscreet fusion, an unrestrained mixture of people’; to protect the distinctive national characteristics whose effacement ‘is always one of the signs of the decadence of empires’.48 But the heart of the code, in the words of its ‘Discours préliminaire’ of 1801, was a uniformity of laws; ‘one comes back to the ideas of uniformity in legislation, because one glimpses the possibility that they can be realized.’49 This was Napoleon’s own prospect, too, in France and in the world: a ‘unity of codes, of principles, opinions, sentiments, views and interests.’ My glory will not be military, he said in St. Helena; ‘what nothing will efface, what will live
eternally, is my civil code.'

In respect of language itself, the universal empire of French principles was on the eve of spectacular success. ‘The universality of the french language gives a wonderful facility to the Government of France in circulating principles of policy and representations of publick affairs’, the London Morning Chronicle wrote in December 1802, in an article on the occasion of Gentz’s first visit to England, which he cut out and sent to his friends in Germany; and ‘thus the cause of England, which has not the same opportunity of making herself be heard, is materially injured in the opinion of contemporaries.’ This empire of language, too, was more resilient than the political power of imperial dominion. French was still the only universal language, the Italian poet and philologist Giacomo Leopardi wrote in 1820. Even Latin had never been so diffused, ‘just as the English language is not universal today, even though it has become established and is spoken as a mother tongue in all the four parts of the world’. Only French, in a world of bilingualism, was the second language of almost everyone. The ‘universality and the influence’ of France had transformed all the civilized languages; they had been ‘francesizzate’. Spelling, vocabulary, grammar, literature, all were more French and more universal. Even German was filled with francesismi; Leopardi was pleasantly surprised to find extracts, in the Spettatore of Milan, from various late-Napoleonic opuscoli published in Chemnitz and Schwelm, with titles like Ein Wurt, ‘Una parola per la depurazione della nostra lingua dalle parole francesi’, or Auch in unserer Sprache, ‘Anche nella nostra lingua possiamo e dobbiamo essere Tedeschi’. There was a ‘sort of little language, or a strictly universal vocabulary’, a language of gallicismi or europeismi, which had insinuated itself into the first languages of all nations.

Let me return, in conclusion, to Gentz and Hauterive, and to the history of ideas. The two men were not especially estimable, or philosophical, as I said at the outset. They were, at heart, correspondents. Hauterive, in 1785, was sent to conduct the political correspondence of the ‘hospodar’ or Ottoman governor of Moldavia (this was the journey with the horses’ tails); Gentz, in 1813, began a correspondence with the hospodar of Valachia which continued until 1828. Both men were preoccupied with
the practice of writing. I have a ‘passion for writing’, Hauterive observed in a journal he kept at night in New York, where he lived with his wife, two silent birds and a turtle-dove, amidst the refugees from the ‘scenes of general extermination’ in Saint-Domingue. ‘I use all my nights, from 11 until 4 in the morning’ in writing memoranda, Gentz wrote plaintively to one of his English correspondents.55

‘I have seen very much writing, I have instructed very much to be written, I have myself written a great deal’, Hauterive recalled many years later, when he was a great eminence, the founding director of the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a little work printed in proof for young diplomats. You should make a habit of writing, he told a young official who was leaving for Brazil; you should cut a large number of sheets of paper into four parts, and write in capital letters, in the upper right hand corner, a word like ‘finances’, or ‘navy’, or ‘interior’, or ‘biography’; you should observe the ‘moeurs’, the sympathies, and the changes in the language of the people; you should write a ‘biography of Brazil’, from the royal family to the lowest ranks of people.56

The two prospects of eternal empire with which Gentz and Hauterive were so concerned were similarly unsublime. Their descriptions of these ideas were a compendium of many earlier conceptions, as this article has tried to show. They were unsuccessful conceptions, as well, in the sense that the English empire of commodities was not, in the end, an eternal empire; nor was the French empire of constitutions. Even in 1800, the British were well advanced in the transformation that C. A. Bayly has described as an ‘imperial meridian’, and at the end of which the British empire emerged as a dominion more Roman than Carthaginian, more territorial than oceanic, more an empire of edicts than an empire of minds.57 The French empire reached its greatest grandeur between 1800 and 1814, and French was not, in the end, the universal language of modern political life. (There is a different question, although it is not my present concern, of whether the two ideas of eternal empire, each of which, as has been seen, was closely connected to ideas about the new United States, has had a subsequent life, of sorts, in the ideology of a universal American empire, commercial or constitutional.)

Gentz’s and Hauterive’s pamphlets were works of the moment, although of a moment
– the beginning of a new century, a time of decision in an extended war – which was
self-consciously portentous. Both writers were almost poignantly concerned with the
long term, and with the effort to identify lasting causes of moral and social
transformation (in the British constitution, for Gentz, or in the Westphalian system of
international law, for Hauterive, or in the rise of commerce and colonies.) They were
both influenced by ancient theories of imperial expansion. They say very little, for
example, about the industrial and scientific changes which would within a few years
come to loom so large in explanations of economic expansion. Their understanding of
English (and French) commercial success was an eighteenth-century one, of
improvements in credit, correspondence, organization and communication. They say
very little, too, about the religious consequences of political transformation, or about
the dramas of race with which the colonial and commercial world was already
consumed, and of which Hauterive wrote, in his New York journal about the events in
Saint-Domingue, that ‘perhaps the white race will be exterminated, perhaps the native
race will disappear from this unhappy soil ... leaving no one to weep over so much
debris of the unhappy human race. This is what was produced by the slavery of
ancient peoples’.59

But Gentz’s and Hauterive’s ideas of empire are still of interest, and even of
importance. They were the expression of ‘medium’ thought about ‘low’ thought, or
about the thoughts and sentiments of very large numbers of individuals; they were a
way of reflecting on what was really happening in the tumultuous world of 1800, and
how it really was. Gentz’s and Hauterive’s conclusion, in general, like the earlier
conclusions of Herder and Raynal and Barère and Madison, was that the thoughts of
these millions of individuals were changing in profound ways; that the changes were a
consequence of the global expansion of the commercial, industrial and colonial
system; and that they were expressed, in particular, in new uses of language. The
English and the French empires were both, in their opposing ways, empires of the
mind.

These are interesting ideas, it seems to me. One of the striking characteristics of these
European pamphlets is the extent to which they were concerned with oceanic
‘connexions’, to use one of Gentz’s favourite words, as well as with their own
continental situation, or with the national dramas of European states. The
revolutionary and Napoleonic wars were an ‘effort to bring under the yoke of their own policy the commerce of the whole world’, the late-nineteenth-century naval historian A.T. Mahan wrote of the great powers at war; ‘like two infuriated dogs, they had locked jaws over Commerce, as the decisive element in the contest.’ For Gentz and Haurterive, too, the drama of the times was unfolding in Trinidad and Smyrna, in Calcutta and Brazil and Ceylon. The revolution in sentiments that was so widely observed in the early years of the nineteenth century – a ‘tremendous change’ in ‘the character of the lower orders’, in the poet Robert Southey’s description, or a ‘great moral revolution’ – was for Gentz and Haurterive a matter of maritime and commercial relationships.

But I want to conclude by making a more exotic suggestion about these ideas of empire and connection, which is that they may have been not only interesting, but true. Now this is of course a very odd thing to say. I adapted Ranke’s famous description of what history is about – ‘how it really was’, in Anthony Grafton’s translation – in trying to explain what I thought that Gentz, Haurterive and the others were doing, in their distinctively unhistorical (and unimpartial) way. They were trying to describe ‘how it really is’, in 1800. But they are not the kind of voices, or sources, whom we are likely to take seriously in our own inquiries, as historians. Even though their correspondence is profusely available in European and American archives, it is not the kind of correspondence which is of interest to cultural or social or intellectual historians.

What I do think we can learn from their observations is that it was a commonplace, in and around 1800, to believe that a tremendous transformation was under way, in ideas and sentiments and language, and that this transformation was intimately connected to the expansion of long-distance commerce. The idioms in which Gentz and Haurterive and others described these changes – observing the sympathies of Brazilians, or reflecting on Carthage, or composing philosophical histories, or measuring changes in the stock of ideas and sentiments – are archaic, now. They were archaic, in fact, at the time; as the Edinburgh Review wrote in 1803, the enterprise of philosophical history had been made useless by the lack of ‘inductive science’, and of ‘accurate details of fact’, in an epoch when history was about to be ‘degraded to the rank of German
statistics’. But the changes themselves were real, or so it was believed at the time.

Historians have an advantage over contemporary observers in understanding the details of historical events, Tocqueville wrote in his notes to *L’ancien régime et la révolution*. They are at a disadvantage, always, in understanding ‘the movement of minds, the general passions of the times ... the great movement of facts’. His own great subject was exactly this, or the ways of thinking, the ‘sentiments, habits, ideas’ of large numbers of individuals, and how they were changing in the late eighteenth century. It was the great subject of the observers of 1800, as well, especially in relation to empires of commerce, and it is not a subject, I think, which modern historians of ideas can simply set to one side.

The history of ideas is a very unassertive sub-discipline, at the moment. It was the ‘highest’ form of intellectual history, in Robert Darnton’s semi-serious classification of 1980, which descended from the study of philosophical thought to ‘intellectual history proper’, the ‘social history of ideas’, and to ‘cultural history (the study of culture ... including world views and collective mentalités)’. The lowest kind of history is now clearly the highest. But what is not so clear is that the cultural history of ideas is actually about ideas; that it has found a way to describe the history of the ideas of very large numbers of people; of the sort of ‘ordinary’ or ‘low’ people whose thoughts and sentiments were the subject of the generalizations of 1800.

The late-twentieth-century disrepute of the history of ideas is often attributed, not without some justification, to the influence either of Marxist historiography, or of a scientific economic and social history, or both. It is, however, also the case, as Eric Hobsbawm pointed out half a century ago, that many political historians have tended to see ‘ideals and movements [as] transitory and superficial, lobbying in some sense eternal and “real”’, and that ‘Marxists have had to remind them that history is the struggle of men for ideas, as well as a reflection of their material environment’. An even more serious danger for the history of ideas, now, is no doubt the influence of an anti-scientistic or anti-scientific history in which nothing is real, and everything is an idea, or a representation.

These are particularly disturbing dangers for a historian of the eighteenth century,
because so much of the theory of the Enlightenment, and of the philosophical history of the human mind – the old fashioned theories which were also Gentz’s theories, and Hauterive’s – was founded on the presumption that all individuals, without exception, have ideas, and that these ideas change over time. ‘The meanest of men has his Theory’, in Coleridge’s beautiful words, and ‘to think at all is to theorize’. But the period with which this article has been concerned, the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century epoch of transformation in global connections, is itself of great interest as a subject for the history of these low or ordinary ideas.

I would like to conclude, therefore, by suggesting that Gentz’s and Hauterive’s own writings indicate a number of milieux and media (the words are Darnton’s, again) in which their large views of empire can be explored. The first is the seaside world, the world of influence and emulation, of commissions and consignments, of strange languages and customs, which so mesmerized James Madison. All Gentz’s and Hauterive’s own journeys passed through this maritime and riverine world. When Gentz finally arrived in London, ‘this Paradise of Europe, this garden of God’, as he wrote to his friend Adam Müller, he had made his way through ‘frightful cold’ and ‘frightful inconvenience’ on the Rhine shipping, to a dismal choice between Ostend, Harwich, Margate, Dover and Calais; he had at least managed to find a ‘French (that is to say Flemish) servant, who knows England and the language very well’.70

The seaside and riverside milieux were worlds of words; bills, customs declarations, visas, passports, contracts, histories of ports, denunciations, the letters of the transitory and the settled. ‘To Commerce they pay all their Adoration, and bustle through life’, the author of a History of Gravesend wrote in 1797, describing a ‘flux and reflux of strangers’, in which ‘the Tiltboat, like the grave, confounds all distinctions; high and low, rich and poor, sick and sound, are indiscriminately blended together’. Another historian of Gravesend, John Mazzinghi, an inspector of aliens in the port and author of a bilingual guide to London, was denounced in 1798, in an anonymous letter to the duke of Portland, for having been visited by a subversive Irish woman. He was described in the letter as the ‘late Linguist at this place’; his subsequent investigation for high treason was a jumble of Dutch ship brokers, German master sugar refiners, Portuguese Jews from Edinburgh with hopes of ‘Bounaparte’s settling them in Eygpt’, a half guinea dropped in a snuff box, the wife...
of a soap boiler, her Irish daughter, who ‘omits no Opportunity to villify and traduce her Majestys Government’, and a man ‘namd de Nion or some such Name’, to whom Mazzinghi said that ‘frenchmen were a set of Rascals, & he was another-exant says this passd in French’. 72

A second milieu is the history of language and language instruction itself, of the translations and translators with whom early-nineteenth-century foreign ministries were preoccupied, of the bilingualism which fascinated Leopardi, and of the difficulties which so many individuals encountered, in this world without the mechanical reproduction of sound, in learning foreign languages. The politics of language was of interest to the loftiest public figures. General Bonaparte wrote to the French Foreign Ministry, in June 1800, that ‘I wish you to have printed a pamphlet under this title: Letter from a patriotic member of the German Diet’, and to spread it ‘in profusion’ in Germany; ‘it will be important to take care to get hold of German paper, and to use characters of the German sort.’ 73 When Gentz, on his visit to England in 1802, was presented to George III, the king asked about the quality of the translations of his book, and the queen expressed her dismay that the translation into French had been done in Berlin, ‘which is not much better than France’. 74

But language was also an opportunity, or an anxiety, in daily life. Hauterive reported that he had lived in the United States for two years before he had ‘understood a single word of the conversations and dialogues’ – ‘I was completely prevented from using it because of my ignorance of how it was pronounced.’ 75 In Moldavia, in the seventeen-eighties, Hauterive had counted twenty-one different idioms, from Persian and Illyrian to Hebrew and ‘Saxon, which is a sort of English’. The ‘Moldavian language was threatened by a revolution which would relegate it to the class of the lowest people ... how would it resist the comparison with the so fashionable languages of the West, and the so sonorous, so harmonious languages of the South?’ 76 In this new world of universal empires and universal fashions, even instruction in languages was a flourishing industry. It was also, by 1800, an industry in which the shipwrecks of lives had left thousands of individuals to make their way by teaching their own and others’ languages.

‘He came out to Berlin as my servant’, and he ‘went often as Courier to Hamburgh,
Cuxhaven & Vienna’, our old acquaintance the British diplomat Benjamin Garlike wrote to Gentz’s patron Lord Auckland, in 1802, of William Street, a ‘sort of usher’, with ‘a precarious way of life’; ‘he gives English lessons to a few German scholars’. Garlike was earlier much concerned, in April 1800, by the activities in Berlin of a Mr. Beresford and a Dr. Ellison. Dr. Ellison was ‘an American Physician (so He announces himself) of New York’, and Mr. Beresford was an Englishman who had been ‘at Paris at the time of Robespierre, and connected there with a Printer, in correspondence with the Revolutionary Societies in England’; ‘at Berlin his ostensible occupation has been that of a teacher of the English language, in which capacity He has given lessons to the Queen of Prussia. He is now teaching English to one of her Majesty’s brothers.’

A third milieu is really a medium, or a collection of media: the streams of paper, insurance documents, commercial correspondence, signs of prices, advertisements, ships’ documents, ‘floods of monetised papers, of notes from the exchequer, the navy, the bank, etc. etc.’ which were for Haurterive (and Madison) at the heart of the English empire of commerce and influence. Even Edmund Burke believed that the ‘correspondence of the moneyed and the mercantile world’ had contributed to the new spirit of France, in a ‘kind of electric communication everywhere’. ‘The influence of the press, on the opinions of mankind, and, finally, on the affairs of nations, has now become fearfully manifest’, William Cobbett wrote in June 1801 to Lord Auckland, complaining of the taxes imposed on newspapers exported to the West Indies and the United States. His evocation of English influence in the United States was very like the insidious colonization of Madison’s imagination; ‘for the people of that country look to Europe for sentiments as well as for manufactures, and if we do not supply them, our enemies will.’

The correspondence of shipping and export companies, the records of customs and excise, the commercial and financial press, have been (or once were) a subject of continuing investigation for economic historians. But they have been studied, in general, for the numbers that they contain, or for the numbers that they make it possible to derive, more than as the evidence of ideas. I have tried to suggest, throughout this article, that economic life and economic connections were a subject of intense interest to large numbers of people in 1800, and a location of ideas and
sentiments. The characteristic media of the world economy, too, are rich sources for the history of ideas.

The last milieu is the most important of all, and it has its own imposing floods of paper. It is the world of the law, and in particular of the law, or legal procedures, as a location in which individuals express their ideas and fears. The story which I have tried to tell, Gentz’s and Hauterive’s story of the two empires of the mind, has been concerned at every point with the law; with the ebb and flow of customs and codes, of common and civil and maritime law, of English law and French law, of the Spanish law of Trinidad and the Roman-Dutch law of Ceylon, the multi-lingual and multi-legal islands which were exchanged at this turn of the nineteenth century. As French consul in New York, Hauterive corresponded with Thomas Jefferson about the ‘general admiralty jurisdiction’, the ‘validity of prizes’, and the relationship between the ‘local Government’, the ‘general Government’ and ‘your courts’. But he was also enclosed in a universe of individual misfortunes, of fugitives and refugees and imprisoned merchants, the flotsam and jetsam of commerce and ‘colonisme’. The story which I have tried to tell, Gentz’s and Hauterive’s story of the two empires of the mind, has been concerned at every point with the law; with the ebb and flow of customs and codes, of common and civil and maritime law, of English law and French law, of the Spanish law of Trinidad and the Roman-Dutch law of Ceylon, the multi-lingual and multi-legal islands which were exchanged at this turn of the nineteenth century. As French consul in New York, Hauterive corresponded with Thomas Jefferson about the ‘general admiralty jurisdiction’, the ‘validity of prizes’, and the relationship between the ‘local Government’, the ‘general Government’ and ‘your courts’. But he was also enclosed in a universe of individual misfortunes, of fugitives and refugees and imprisoned merchants, the flotsam and jetsam of commerce and ‘colonisme’.

There was the case of the brigantine Little Sarah, which was renamed the Petite Démocrate; of a New York merchant and his Spanish trader, with ‘eleven Blunderbusses’ and ‘One thousand weight of Gunpowder’, who were seized in Port-au-Prince; of the black women, the ‘tricoteuses’, in quarantine for yellow fever, and the tonnage duty in respect of refugees; of a sea captain, Montval, who had never slept on shore in eighteen years, and who ‘in his narratives has adopted the form of the ancient historians; he includes all the speeches that have been made; his harangues are there in all their full length’. Hauterive was able to release a prisoner who had been seized on a journey from Honduras to London (‘he is an individual, he is a merchant, he is neutral’); he tried to organize a hospital for 400 people; he was unduly affected, or so he was told by the French minister, by his ‘lack of money’, and his ‘pity for the little white children and white women from Saint-Domingue’; he protested in the United States district court about another brigantine, the Catharine, and its cargo of ginger. These milieux, too, can be our observatories, two centuries later, of the new worlds of empire of 1800, and of the ideas in which they consisted.
A version of this essay was given as the Coffin Lecture on the History of Ideas at the University of London, and will be published in May 2005 in Historical Research. I am most grateful to David Bates and David Cannadine for the invitation to deliver the lecture, to Chris Bayly and John Morrill for helpful comments, to the New-York Historical Society for permission to quote from the Alexandre d’Hauterive Diary, and to the staff of the Society Library for their assistance.


7. ‘Barère’ (1844), in The Miscellaneous Writings, Speeches and Poems of Lord Macaulay (4 vols., 1880), i. 337.


10. Gentz, Essai, pp. 65, 203. The phrase about Carinthia and Bengal was a semi-quotation from a work of 1799 by Henry Beeke: ‘from the steel-mines of Carinthia to the looms of Bengal, British capital is, in various instances, engaged in animating foreign industry; and the profit on the capital so employed … must not be wholly omitted, because it forms a part of our income’ (H. Beeke, Observations on the Produce of the Income Tax, and on its proportion to the whole Income of Great Britain: including important facts respecting the extent, wealth, and population of this kingdom. Part the first. (1799), p. 34).

11. Gentz, Essai, pp. 16-17, 265, 275.


13. Hauterive, Etat, pp. 6, 34, 140, 144, 151, 258, 300; Gentz, Essai, p. 65.


15. Hauterive, Etat, pp. 54, 149-51.


18. T.N.A.: P.R.O., FO 64/57, letter from Gentz to Lord Grenville, 2 June 1800, enclosed in a letter from Garlike to George Hammond, 6 June 1800.

19. Entry for 5 Apr. 1802 in Gentz, Tagebücher, i. 19.


24. Bertrand Barère de Vieuzac, La liberté des mers, ou le gouvernement anglais dévoilé (3 vols., Paris, 1798), i. 42, 93, ii. 172, 206, iii. 337-50; Buchez and Roux, xxxii. 478.

25. Barère, La liberté des mers, i. 20.


46. Joseph de Maistre, *Considérations sur la France* (1797; Paris, 1988), pp. 22, 38. Gentz reported in his diary in Apr. 1802 that he had dinner in Berlin, at the house of an English diplomat, with the ‘great Count Maistre’, on his way ‘from Turin to Petersburg’ (Gentz, *Tagebücher*, i. 27-8).

47. *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, vi. 19.


67. E. Hobsbawm, ‘Where are British historians going?’, *Marxist Quarterly*, ii (1955),


70. Letters of 20 Oct. and 15 Nov. 1802 from Gentz to Adam Müller (Wittichen, ii. 373-4, 376-7, 387).


72. T.N.A.: P.R.O., PC 1/43/A150, papers concerning the treason trial of John Mazzinghi (1798).

73. Letter to Talleyrand of 4 June 1800 (*Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, vi. 331).

74. Letter from Gentz to Adam Müller of 22 Nov. 1802 (Wittichen, ii. 395-6).


78. Letter from Benjamin Garlike of 28 Apr. 1800 (T.N.A.: P.R.O., FO 64/57, no. 32).


