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Author
Pino, Julio Cesar

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the Mantuan War summarizes in an abstract way the success of Richelieu and the failure of Olivares. The former was consistently quick to maneuver to the advantage, while the latter tended to bide his time, realizing that unexpected circumstances upset even the best laid plans. Yet Elliott agrees with Olivares himself that, in the end, chance favored his rival.

Richelieu and Olivares by John Huxtable Elliott is a work of clarity and insight. The author masterfully compares the two men and manages to minimize the distance by which history has separated them. His analysis is excellent and succinct, yet far-reaching. Although some of the parallels of the two lives, thoughts, and policies may seem stretched, the points nevertheless validate the author's thesis. Frequent use of appropriate quotations from both ministers further substantiates the author's arguments.

Charissa Bremer-David
University of California, Los Angeles


As the debate rages over the United States' intervention in Central America, the appearance of Richard E. Welch's book, Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, could not be more timely. An historian of American diplomacy, Welch reminds us that United States policy towards Latin America has often been grounded on ignorance and ideological premises that bear little relation to the Western Hemisphere. When the United States has intervened in the internal affairs of its southern neighbors, the author warns, the results have usually been tragic for all concerned.

Welch's work is a welcome departure from the traditional historiography on Cuban-American relations. American historians who have treated the United States response to Castro's revolution usually concentrated on the impact that the "loss" of Cuba had on American-Soviet relations. With few exceptions, American policy towards Cuba since 1959 has been analyzed through the prism of Cold War ideology. Policy-makers active in the Kennedy administration, such as Arthur Schlesinger and Roger Hilsman, concede that American neglect of Cuba's internal problems prior to 1959 contributed to Batista's downfall. If the United States had shown greater interest in promoting democracy and economic development in Cuba, both authors argue, it would have been difficult for a radical leader like Castro to take power. Other historians from the intellectual left, such as Maurice Zeitlin and Richard Walton, have argued that United States hostility towards Castro resulted from the expropriation of American property in Cuba. In their view, the
United States pushed Castro into the arms of the Soviet Union by sponsoring terrorist raids against Cuba. All these writers concur that the “loss” of Cuba was a major disaster for American foreign policy. The thought never seems to have occurred to them that Cuba was not of the United States to lose. By contrast, Welch offers the refreshing notion that the Cubans themselves decided the fate of the revolution.

Response to Revolution depicts the rift between the United States and Cuba after 1959 as the result of internal factors in Cuba that altered the course of the Revolution. Welch documents the radicalization of the Cuban regime from 1959 to 1961, a process he divides into three stages: (1) the polarization of the July 26th Movement; (2) the socialization of the Cuban economy; and (3) the establishment of a Fidelista Communist state in Cuba. Confrontation between Cuba and the United States was inevitable, Welch believes, because the Cuban Revolution was incompatible with American economic interests in Cuba and the United States’ commitment to free enterprise in Latin America.

The United States, Welch contends, did not drive Castro into the arms of the Soviet Union. The Cuban premier quickly realized that he would need assistance from the Soviet bloc if the revolution were to survive. American policy unintentionally gave Castro greater credence with the Cuban people, helping to justify his decision to bring Cuba into the Soviet sphere of influence. “It is possible to accept two seemingly contradictory propositions: (1) Castro’s revolution would probably have turned leftist whatever the United States did or did not do. (2) Although U. S. policy did not force Castro to establish a revolutionary dictatorship, a socialized economy or a communist state, it did have real influence on the evolution of the Cuban Revolution. Actions by the United States do not furnish the primary explanation for the course of the Cuban Revolution, but they facilitated its radical transformation” (p. 24). Welch argues that all American efforts to weaken Castro’s government backfired, indeed, they convinced him his salvation lay in a military alliance with the Soviets. This lesson should be kept in mind as Reagan’s current Republican administration tries to “recover” Nicaragua from the Sandinistas.

The United States reacted to the radicalization of the revolution in exactly the manner Castro said it would: by implementing military and economic aggression against Cuba. Welch is convinced that John F. Kennedy was even more committed than Eisenhower to preventing the loss of Cuba to the Soviets. When he took office, Kennedy substantially altered the nature of the Bay of Pigs operation. Whereas Eisenhower had instructed the Central Intelligence Agency to train a small guerrilla army, Kennedy mobilized a full-scale invasion force. Kennedy intended the exile brigade to overthrow the Cuban government, as evidenced by his commission of the 1961 State Department White Paper on Cuba, a document based on myth, fabrication, and half-truths according to Welch. Political activists today who look to-
wards the Democratic party to oppose Reagan’s assault on Nicaragua should keep this precedent in mind. The liberal Democrat, Kennedy, took an even tougher line on Cuba than his Republican predecessor in the White House, Eisenhower. Welch posits that Eisenhower and Kennedy’s confrontational approach against Castro reflected the opinions of a substantial majority of Americans. “U. S. response to the Cuban Revolution serves in many ways as a mirror of the beliefs and discontents of the American public, its conviction of national righteousness and its periodic sense of national frustration” (p. 185). Response to Revolution cites public opinion polls, articles from the major popular magazines and newspapers, and the comments of intellectuals of the left and the right, to show that there existed a fairly strong consensus of U. S. public opinion on Cuba from 1959 to 1961. Most of the American public, according to Welch, believed that no people ever willingly opted to live under communism. If such a thing occurred, it must be the result of a conspiracy hatched in Moscow. Another fervent belief among the public was that Latin America was part of the United States’ sphere of influence. The Soviet Union had no right to intervene in the Western Hemisphere, and no Latin American nation had the right to exit from the North American orbit. Since Castro had chosen to antagonize the United States and ally his country with the Soviet Union, the contemporary argument ran, he had to be punished for his actions.

Welch seems to be making a gross mistake with his argument that the United States government’s hostile actions against Cuba expressed the desires of most Americans. He assumes that American public opinion about the Castro regime was formed after a thorough debate on the origins and consequences of the revolution. Yet in their fine work, Cuba: Tragedy in Our Hemisphere (1963), Maurice Zeitlin and Robert Scheer demonstrate that the response of the American public to the Cuban Revolution was framed for the most part by popular periodicals like Time, Life, and the New York Times, and by the pronouncements of the State Department. The American mass media and federal government both resented Castro for infringing on U. S. individual and corporate property rights in Cuba, especially after the promulgation of the first agrarian reform law in May of 1959. The author fails to appreciate how public opinion in the United States can be manipulated by the press, the president, and other government officials.

Welch’s study of the United States’ response to Castro’s revolution is not exhaustive, and should be read in conjunction with a serious work on developments in Cuba during these crucial years, such as Hugh Thomas’s, Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom (1971). A major deficiency of Welch’s book is that it fails to explore in any detail the radicalization of the Cuban Revolution during the initial three years in question, 1959 to 1961, though this is one of the author’s stated aims. The collectivization of Cuban agriculture and industry, the creation of the Comites por la Defensa de la Revolucion (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution), and the demise of all oppo-
position parties in Cuba receive scant attention. Nevertheless, Welch has written a fascinating study of a critical turning point in the United States’ relationship with Latin America.

Julio Cesar Pino
University of California, Los Angeles