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This paper will focus on the Mexico-origin component of the California immigrant population. Drawing on the results of field studies conducted throughout California and in west-central Mexico during the last ten years, the paper will describe how the profile of Mexican migration to California has changed since the 1970s, suggest explanations for these changes, and discuss their implications for public policy. Effects of the long-running economic crisis in Mexico and of the 1986 U.S. immigration law will be highlighted.
MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN CALIFORNIA TODAY

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The objectives of this paper are to highlight several important changes in the profile of Mexican migration to California since the 1970s, to offer some tentative explanations for these shifts, and briefly discuss their implications for public policy, especially at the local level. The profile of the contemporary Mexican immigrant population that I present here is necessarily a composite, assembled from many different fragments. It draws heavily on data from a series of field studies conducted between 1982 and 1989 on both sides of the border by the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at UCSD. The research design, sampling methods, and data collection procedures for these studies are described more fully in the appendix to my paper. Our studies have included censuses, sample surveys, unstructured interviewing and ethnographic observation among U.S. employers, immigrant and U.S.-born workers employed in the same firms, recently-arrived migrants who were seeking work as day-laborers in southern California’s street-corner labor markets, and returned migrants and prospective first-time migrants living in three traditionally labor-exporting rural communities in west-central Mexico. These data are supplemented by findings from other sample surveys and ethnographic studies, INS apprehension statistics, samples of Border Patrol apprehension records, and evidence from El Colegio de la Frontera’s ongoing studies of would-be unauthorized entrants, photographed and interviewed on the Mexican side of the border.

It must be emphasized at the outset that the available data, while suggestive of trends, are far from conclusive, and problems of comparability limit our ability to generalize from them. With very few exceptions, we lack historical time-series data, longitudinal studies of

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1 This paper draws upon field research in California and Mexico supported by grants from the Ford Foundation, the University of California’s Pacific Rim Research Program, and the Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development. The comments of Manuel Garcia y Griego and Jeffrey Weldon on an earlier draft are gratefully acknowledged.
specific sending or receiving areas, and panel studies of samples of Mexican immigrants that would permit us to describe and explain changes in labor migration to California from Mexico (and other Latin American countries) with greater certainty and precision. Cross-sectional data, even when collected at various points in time using reasonably comparable sampling and interviewing techniques, are no substitute for systematic longitudinal evidence. Nevertheless, the available data provide a base from which certain plausible propositions about the changing character of Mexican immigration can be derived.

THE CHANGING PROFILE OF MEXICAN MIGRATION TO CALIFORNIA

When the “bracero” program of contract labor importation ended in 1964, and for up to a decade thereafter, Mexican migration to California consisted mainly of a circular flow of mostly undocumented, mostly young adult males who left their immediate relatives behind in a rural Mexican community to work in seasonal U.S. agriculture for several months (normally six months or less) and then returned to their community of origin. Most came from a small subset of communities, located in seven or eight Mexican states that for many years had sent the bulk of Mexican migrants to the United States. Thus, the typical undocumented Mexican worker of the late 1960s and early '70s strongly resembled his legal contract-worker predecessor. In fact, in many cases the post-1964 illegal entrants had themselves worked in the United States as braceros up to 1984. This was the picture that emerged from data collected from apprehended “illegals” interviewed in the United States (North and Houstoun, 1976), returned migrants interviewed in traditional “sending” communities (Cornelius, 1976a), and a national sample of 62,000 Mexican households interviewed by CENIET, a Mexican government agency, in 1978 (Bustamante and Martinez, 1979; Zazueta and Garcia y Griego, 1982; Ranney and Kossoudji, 1983).

Because of their research designs and data collection methods, these studies tended to understate the importance of permanent settlement in the United States by Mexican immigrant
families. The 1980 U.S. Census, which some demographers believe counted a substantial portion of the illegal aliens in the United States at that time, found that most Mexicans were living with their immediate relatives (Warren and Passel, 1987; Borjas, 1990: 66-67): To the extent that living with their families in the United States can be treated as a proxy for permanent settlement, the 1980 U.S. Census depicted a much more settled stock of Mexican immigrants than the stereotypic illegal alien population dominated by transient, mostly male, farm workers living on their own or with unrelated persons. Of course, those enumerated in the U.S. Census were supposed to be settlers rather than sojourners; so short-stay Mexican migrants are virtually unrepresented in the census data. But evidence from more recent studies done on both sides of the border, using methodologies that enable us to differentiate with much greater precision among the various fractions of the stock and flow of migrants, have, confirmed that Mexican migration to California has become much more heterogeneous, in terms of settlement patterns, gender, legal status, employment experience before and after migration to California, and in other ways -- so much so that it increasingly defies generalization.

I hypothesize that the erosion of the stereotype, which probably began in the late 1960s or early '70s, has been intensified during the last ten years by four principal factors: (1) changes in the California economy that have affected the nature and magnitude of the demand for Mexican immigrant labor; (2) the long-running economic crisis in Mexico; (3) the 1986 U.S. immigration law (IRCA); and (4) the maturation of transnational migrant networks whose formation was initiated by earlier waves of migrants to California.

**Origins in Mexico**

In the last 10-15 years, Mexican migration to California has become increasingly diversified in terms of its points of origin in Mexico. In 1973, 47.4 percent of the undocumented Mexicans apprehended in the San Diego area -- which accounts for more than 40 percent of all apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border -- originated in just two states: Jalisco and Michoacan. Other major sending states were Baja California Norte, Sinaloa, and
Guerrero (Dagdag, 1975; Jones, 1984: 45-49). These data, from a sample of 3,204 “I-213” forms completed in the San Diego Border Patrol sector, reflect the high concentration within states like Jalisco and Michoacan of towns and rural communities that have built up their own multi-generational traditions of migration to California.

More recent data on Mexican migrants in southern California show greater diversity in states of origin within Mexico. In a random sample of 871 illegal Mexican entrants apprehended by the U.S. Border Patrol in the San Diego sector during calendar year 1987, only 28.7 percent had originated in Jalisco or Michoacan. Among Mexicans (both legal immigrants and unauthorized migrants) employed in 100 southern California non-agricultural firms in 1987-1988, 37.8 percent had resided in Jalisco or Michoacan just before their most recent migration to California (see Table 1). Twenty-seven out of Mexico’s 32 states had sent migrants to these firms. An even more dispersed pattern is shown in our data collected from recently-arrived, job-seeking, unauthorized migrants in southern California in 1987-1988 (Table 2, column 2). Jalisco and Michoacan accounted for just 21.9 percent of these post-IRCA migrants, while six non-traditional sending states (the Federal District, Puebla, Hidalgo, Estado de Mexico, Morelos, and Oaxaca) accounted for 45.5 percent. The state of Guerrero, while previously among the

2Unpublished tabulation provided by the Statistics Division, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C., April, 1990. The data were drawn from a border-wide sample of 1,575 “I-213” forms filled out by Border Patrol agents on apprehended Mexicans (Bjerke and Hess, 1987). The sampling interval was one out of every 500 Mexican I-213 forms. The sampling error for migrants originating in Jalisco was plus or minus 2.3 percentage points, and 2.4 percent for those originating in Michoacan (95 percent confidence level). It must be kept in mind that this sample was designed to be representative of those clandestine entrants who were apprehended by the Border Patrol (about 97 percent of whom, in recent years, have been Mexican nationals); it is not necessarily representative of the overall flow of unauthorized aliens into California. Information on state-of-origin within Mexico is collected continuously by the Border Patrol, as part of the I-213 forms completed on each apprehended alien. However, this information is not keyed into the INS computerized data base on apprehensions, because of a shortage of data entry personnel; hence the need to draw special samples of I-213 forms.

3For most of this century, about eight Mexican states have contributed the bulk of Mexican migrants to California (70 percent or more, according to most estimates). However, it has not always been the same eight states. For example, Sonora and Coahuila were important sending states in the 1920s, but are no longer important sources. The four entities that consistently have ranked among the top sending states are Jalisco, Michoacan, Guanajuato, and Zacatecas (see Jones, 1984). These, more than any others, merit the label “traditional sending states.”
major sending states for Mexican migration to California, increased its relative contribution to
the migrant flow in the 1980s.4

The increasing importance of the Mexico City metropolitan area (the Federal District
and contiguous municipalities in the State of Mexico) as a source for unauthorized migration-
to California in recent years is particularly striking. Before the 1980s, the Federal District never
ranked among the top seven sending states. Several sample surveys conducted among
apprehended Mexican illegal entrants during the 1970s found that capitalinos constituted from
0.6 to 3.0 percent of those interviewed (Bustamante, 1979: 33-35). The Mexico City
metropolitan area accounted for only 3 percent of the unauthorized Mexican migrants
apprehended in the San Diego sector in 1973 (Jones, 1984: 45); in a 1987 sample of “illegals”
apprehended in the same sector, it accounted for 8.2 percent.5 Among 4,269 would-be illegal
entrants interviewed from August 1987 through April 1989 as they prepared to cross the border
in the Tijuana area, 11.7 percent came from the Mexico City metropolitan area.6 The Federal
District was the fourth most important sending state (after Michoacan, Jalisco, and Oaxaca)
among migrants represented in this sample. Another study, based on interviews with 656
apprehended unauthorized immigrants interviewed in Laredo, Texas in the first half of 1986,
found that the Federal District was the third most important state of origin -- accounting for
9.6 percent of the sample -- behind Nuevo Leon and Guerrero (Fatemi, 1987). As shown in

4Reflected in data collected by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Tijuana, Baja California
(Bustamante, 1990), and two surveys conducted in southern California by the Center for U.S.-
Mexican Studies, UCSD, in 1981-82 (Cornelius, Chavez, and Jones, 1984) and 1987-88
(Cornelius, 1990b).

5Data from the Statistics Division, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, from the above-
referenced sample of “I-213” forms completed in the San Diego sector during calendar year
1987. The sampling error for migrants originating in the Federal District was plus or minus 1.5
percentages points; for those originating in the State of Mexico, it was 1.1 percentage points.

6Unpublished data provided by the Canyon Zapata Project, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte
(COLEF), Tijuana, Baja California, March, 1990, combining the shares of migrants from the
Federal District (9.8 percent) and the State of Mexico (1.9 percent). Each weekend since
August 1987, COLEF’s research project has interviewed 75 persons in Tijuana, selected at
random from those gathered at the two points of entry most frequented by migrants attempting
clandestine entry into California (see Bustamante, 1990).
Tables 1 and 2, among our 1987-1988 interviewees in southern California, the Mexico City metropolitan area was the top-ranking sending area for recently-arrived unauthorized migrants (23.1 percent of the sample, combining those whose last place of residence was either the Federal District or the State of Mexico), and the fourth most important sending area for more settled, employed immigrants (11.1 percent of the sample). In sum, the available evidence indicates that at least one out of ten Mexican migrants entering the United States clandestinely in recent years has come from their country’s largest city.

Such evidence suggests that while traditional source areas have by no means dropped out of the U.S.-bound migration flow, important new ones have come “on stream” in recent years7 The economic crisis of the 1980s -- which reduced real wages for most Mexicans by 40-50 percent -- propelled into the migratory flow people from families, communities, and states without a long history of U.S.-bound migration. And the 1986 U.S. immigration law has not prevented the formation of new migrant networks originating in these non-traditional sending areas. To the contrary, the extensive publicity surrounding IRCA’s legalization and “Replenishment Agricultural Worker” (RAW) programs seems to have attracted into the migratory flow persons from communities and states that heretofore had not participated significantly.8

7Nor does the available evidence indicate that, within principal sending states, U.S.-bound emigration has become less geographically concentrated than in previous decades. On the contrary, data from Border Patrol apprehension records for the 1983-1986 period (Jones, 1988) show that the bulk of unauthorized migration from Mexico to the United States continues to originate in a relatively small number of highly migration-prone municipios.

8The same effect was observed in connection with the “bracero” program of contract labor importation, implemented beginning in 1942 (see Durand, 1988: 12). In 1989, the RAW program, which would provide short-term visas to foreign agricultural workers, attracted some 650,000 applicants, virtually all of them Mexican nationals. These applicants -- the majority of whom are already working in the United States, mostly in California -- are now in a registry maintained by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, awaiting the issuance of RAW visas. No such visas have been issued for 1990, and there is substantial doubt whether any will be issued in the remaining three years of the RAW program authorized by Congress as part of the 1986 immigration law, because the U.S. Departments of Agriculture and Labor have determined through national sample surveys of farm workers and employers that there is an ample supply of legal resident farm workers to meet anticipated demands for labor in perishable crop agriculture. The government surveys and determinations of the farm labor demand and supply will be repeated annually through 1993, at which time Congress will reassess the RAW
Mexican migrants to California in the 1980s included skilled, urban-born workers from Mexico’s principal cities, as well as destitute campesinos from some of Mexico’s most underdeveloped states, such as Guerrero, Oaxaca, Hidalgo, and Puebla. These states all have large indigenous populations. It is significant that several of the non-traditional areas now sending migrants to California are among the Mexican states most adversely impacted by the economic crisis of the 1980s (the Federal District, Morelos, Hidalgo, all of whose economies contracted by more than 2 percent during the 1980-1985 period; Guerrero and Puebla, whose economies contracted by 0.1-2.0 percent in the same years).

Another indication that the economic crisis of the 1980s pushed more residents of Mexico’s principal cities into the U.S.-bound migration stream is provided by a comparison of migrants’ birthplaces with their last place of residence in Mexico before migration. As shown in Table 3, one out of five migrants employed in our 1987-1988 sample of southern California firms were “step-migrants,” who had moved initially to a major Mexican city and subsequently to California. Sixteen percent of our sample of recently-arrived, job-seeking, unauthorized migrants in southern California also came via one of these Mexican cities. Rather than simply absorbing internal migrants from the countryside and provincial cities as they have done for many years, Mexico’s large urban centers today are serving increasingly as platforms for migration to the United States. In the 1980s, internal migrants encountered saturated labor markets, skyrocketing living costs, dangerously high levels of air pollution, and rising crime in Mexico City and other large cities. Having failed to solve their economic problems there, many

9On the “new” migration of Oaxacan Indians (especially from the Mixteca region) to California, Oregon, and Washington state, see Kearney, 1986; Kearney and Nagengast, 1988; and Zabin, n.d. For many Mixtecos, the agricultural areas of Baja California and the city of Tijuana have become important way-stations (see Garduno, et al., 1989).

10This pattern of stepwise migration to California was not common in the 1960s or ’70s. For example, in Dagdag’s (1984: 64) sample of apprehended unauthorized aliens, there was a very close (98 percent) correspondence between migrants’ birthplace and their last pre-migration place of residence in Mexico.
of them headed for cities in California.

As our data suggest, the native-born populations of large Mexican cities have also become increasingly important sources of migration to California. Further support for this contention comes from several surveys conducted among the population of Guadalajara during the 1980s by Agustin Escobar Latapi and Mercedes Gonzalez de la Rocha. They found that in the 1982-1987 period, 23 percent of Guadalajara households were receiving regular cash remittances from household members living in the United States. Additional households had immediate kin in the United States who did not remit income to their Guadalajara relatives. In a separate 1982 sample of 1,223 Guadalajara workers in manufacturing, construction, and public-sector manual labor, 18.3 percent had worked in the United States. Another sample of Guadalajara manufacturing workers, interviewed in 1987, reported fewer sojourns in the United States. The researchers believe that this difference was not caused by fewer workers migrating to the United States, but occurred because more of them were staying there longer.\textsuperscript{11}

This phenomenon is consistent with the widely-held notion that, in relative terms, the economic crisis from which Mexico has suffered since 1982 has affected urban dwellers (especially residents of the largest cities) even more severely than the rural population. Prior to the economic crisis and the government austerity measures that it provoked, Mexico City and other large urban centers were heavily subsidized, as places to live and work. Moreover, they were major centers of government employment, and the wages of government workers filtered back into the general urban economy. Therefore, crisis-induced austerity has disproportionately impacted Mexico’s large cities (Escobar, Gonzalez, and Roberts, 1987).

Even with a sustained economic recovery in the 1990s, we can anticipate that, by the end of this decade, the majority of new (first-time) Mexican migrants to California will come from urban Mexico. This trend reflects not only the emptying-out of traditional rural sending

\textsuperscript{11}Unpublished tabulations provided by Agustin Escobar-Latapi and Mercedes Gonzalez de la Rocha (Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropologia Social-Occidente, Guadalajara).
communities, as urbanization proceeds, but also the saturation of labor markets in Mexico’s largest cities. Over half of the Mexican population now lives in large-scale urban areas (one out of every four in the Mexico City metropolitan area alone), and labor force growth rates in these cities remain quite high despite declining fertility.

CALIFORNIA: THE PREFERRED DESTINATION

One of the constants in the profile of Mexican migration to the United States in recent decades is the leading role of California as a destination. The 1978 national survey of households in Mexico by CENIET found that California was the destination of 47.3 percent of Mexican migrants to the United States (49.2 percent of “long-stayers”). Although many parts of the United States attract Mexican labor -- including the Pacific Northwest, Chicago and other midwestern cities, parts of the Southeast, and even New York City -- California now appears to be the preferred destination for the majority of Mexico’s U.S.-bound workers and their dependents. This is reflected in national-level statistics on legal immigration and the unauthorized alien population, evidence gathered in Mexican sending communities, and applications for legalization under the two “amnesty” programs created by the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).

INS statistics show that since the 1970s California has absorbed about half of the total flow of legal immigrants from Mexico. In recent years, four of the top-ten receiving metropolitan areas for legal Mexican immigrants have been located in California (Los Angeles-Long Beach, San Diego, Anaheim-Santa Ana, and Riverside-San Bernardino); these and seven other California urban areas accounted for 50 percent of all Mexican legal immigrants admitted to the United States in Fiscal Year 1988. The Los Angeles-Long Beach metropolitan area

12“Long-stayers” (designated as “Population V” in the CENIET survey) were defined as Mexicans 15 years of age or older who were in the United States working or seeking work at the time of the December, 1978, survey -- a month when most short-term or seasonal Mexican migrants traditionally have returned to their home communities (Zazueta and Garcia y Griego, 1982).

13The other seven principal receiving metropolitan statistical areas in California were San Jose, Oakland, Oxnard-Ventura, Fresno, San Francisco, Sacramento, and Stockton, in order of
received 6.6 times more legal Mexican immigrants than any other metropolitan statistical area in
the country (INS, 1989b: Table 18, p. 38).

It is probable that the distribution of unauthorized Mexican migrants is roughly the
same, because most of them are now part of extended-family networks anchored by long-
staying legal immigrants in California. Passe and Woodrow (1984: 65) have estimated that 67
percent of Mexican undocumented aliens counted in the 1980 U.S. Census lived in California.
One-third of all censused, unauthorized immigrants in the United States (of all nationalities)
were located in the Los Angeles metropolitan area alone. Another study, based on a large,
comprehensive sample of INS apprehension records covering the period from 1983 to 1986,
found that among the 35 Mexican municipios having the highest density of unauthorized
migrants to the U.S. per 1,000 residents, more than half sent workers principally to a California
destination (Jones, 1988: 16, Table 2).

Studies done at points of origin in Mexico have often found even higher proportions of
California-bound migrants. In our study of three sending communities in the states of Jalisco,
Michoacan, and Zacatecas, we found that among those residents who were considering a
permanent or long-term move to the United States, more than 70 percent planned to go to
California. California was even more dominant as a destination for short-term labor migrants
from these communities. Among all residents aged 15-64 who had ever migrated to the United
States, 81.7 percent had gone most recently to California, followed by Oklahoma (5.7 percent),
Texas (5.0 percent), and Illinois (3.1 percent). Two of the three communities send virtually all
of their migrants to California (95.5 percent and 99.0 percent, respectively); in the other
community, 50.9 percent of those with U.S. migratory experience had chosen California as their
most recent destination.

Another indicator of California’s predominance in the Mexican migration stream is the

distribution of applications for the regular and Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) legalization programs created by the 1986 immigration law. California accounted for more than 54 percent of total applicants for these two programs -- far more than any other state (INS, 1989a). The Los Angeles-Long Beach metropolitan area alone generated 36 percent of the national total of applications for the general “amnesty” program, and 24 percent of the SAW applicants. Together, the general amnesty program and the SAW program may have legalized up to 1.7 million Mexican immigrants in California’s work force.15

A substantial portion of the recent growth of California’s Mexican immigrant population is the inevitable product of the maturation of immigrant networks that began to form in the early 1950s (Rouse, 1989; Mines, 1981; Mines, 1984; Reichert and Massey, 1979; Massey, et al., 1987; Fonseca, 1988; Fernandez, 1988; Lopez, 1986). Data from sending-community studies indicate that the social networks linking these communities to U.S. receiving areas have become the key factor affecting the choice of migration destinations. Among the interviewees in the three rural sending communities that we studied in 1988-1989 who were considering permanent emigration, 45.1 percent explained their choice of destination by citing the presence of relatives and friends in that place, and an additional 14.6 percent mentioned job opportunities (in many cases, to be arranged by relatives) as the principal attraction. New migrants generally tend to follow their predecessors, settling in the same U.S. communities and often working in the same firms, where they will be more likely to have social support as well as assistance in finding

15The final number of legalized aliens will not be known for some time. Those who secured temporary legal status under the general amnesty program -- 70 percent of whom were citizens of Mexico -- have until sometime in 1989 or 1990 (depending on the date when their temporary permiso was issued) to apply for permanent legal residency. They must also meet English proficiency and knowledge of U.S. history requirements during this period, in order to retain their legal status. As of July, 1989, only 4.2 percent of the applications for the general amnesty program had been disapproved, and 2.6 percent of the applications for the SAW program had been denied, but two-thirds of the SAW applications remained to be adjudicated (INS, 1989a). Only 250,000-350,000 SAW applicants were originally expected; 1,301,970 applications -- 82 percent of them from Mexican nationals -- were actually filed by the November 30, 1988 deadline, leading some observers to argue that the SAW program had been “too successful.” Researchers at the University of California, Davis, have estimated that as many as two-thirds of the SAW applications from California could be fraudulent (Martin, 1990b; Martin and Taylor, 1988).
housing and jobs.

Social network-based migration does not necessarily tie a Mexican sending community to a single receiving area within the United States. While cases of “specialization” -- migration to a single destination -- can be found, the more common pattern entails multiple migration networks leading to a variety of U.S. communities, both urban and rural. For example, in a 1975-1976 study of Union de San Antonio, a town in the Los Altos region of Jalisco, I found that emigrants from that community were living in 110 different U.S. localities, 57 of which were in California (Cornelius, 1976b: 16-19). Another community in the same municipio, studied in 19751976 and again in 19881989, had established immigrant networks linking it to the San Francisco Bay area; the Sacramento area, Watsonville, Los Angeles, Palm Springs, and other California cities; several cities in Texas and Illinois; Oklahoma City; Las Vegas, Nevada; and agricultural towns in Oregon and Washington states.16 In the case of Las Animas, Zacatecas, Mines (1981: 74-78) found concentrations of Animenos working in four different agricultural towns in California and four urban areas in 1977. Emigrants from this and other long-time, labor-exporting sending communities that we have studied in Mexico have dispersed geographically within California in the last two decades. Established migrant communities in the initial receiving areas have served as springboards for “settled-out” immigrants to move elsewhere in search of higher-paying, more stable (usually non-agricultural) employment opportunities (Mines, 1984; Cornelius, 1990a).

California’s attractiveness to the most recent wave of Mexican migrants also reflects the more robust, more diversified employment growth in that state, relative to other potential destinations. Following the 1980-82 recession, a boom occurred in most sectors of the highly diversified California economy. Since 1986, this boom has coincided with a sharp contraction in employment opportunities in “oil-bust” Texas, whose economy only recently has begun to revive. In the last two decades, employment growth in California has been far more robust than in the

United States as a whole. During the 1970s, for example, blue-collar jobs increased in California at twice the national rate, and manufacturing employment expanded at nearly four times the national rate (Muller and Espenshade, 1985: 54-55). This pattern continued in the 1980s, and most economists expect it to persist into the next century. In southern California alone, an estimated 7 million new jobs will be created during the next 20 years. While new technologies may eliminate many low-skilled jobs in manufacturing, data for the 1984-1989 period indicate that “low-tech” manufacturing continues to expand in California and other western states, more than offsetting job losses due to automation in “high-tech” industries (Birch, 1990).

In addition to its overall dynamism and diversity, there are certain structural features of the contemporary California economy that increase the demand for immigrant labor. For example, the system of contracting out labor-intensive tasks to small, largely non-union, immigrant-dominated firms in such industries as garment, electronics, and construction appears to be advancing more rapidly in California than in other parts of the nation (Bonacich, 1990: 4; Cornelius, 1990b; Fernandez-Kelly and Garcia, 1990). And while the demand for entry-level workers in manufacturing and construction is likely to remain strong, the largest numbers of new jobs to be created in California during the next twenty years will be relatively low-paying, low-skill, low-status jobs in restaurants, hotels, and other parts of the urban service sector -- precisely the kinds of jobs that are increasingly shunned by young, better-educated, native-born Californians. The need for personal services among the rapidly expanding business-financial-professional elite has been a significant source of jobs for female immigrants in Los Angeles in recent years (Morales and Ong, 1990). Similarly, Roger Rouse has described the most recent emigrants from Aguililla, Michoacan to Redwood City, California (a bedroom suburb of northern California’s high-tech “Silicon Valley”) as that community’s janitors, dishwashers, gardeners, hotel workers, and house cleaners -- “proletarian servants in the paragon of ‘post-industrial’ society” (Rouse, 1989).

As long as California’s economy continues to out-perform the national economy, the
state will be a strong magnet for future waves of Mexican migrants. Jobs in both California agriculture and non-agricultural industries are likely to remain plentiful, quick to obtain, and high-paying, at least in comparison with those in other southwestern states. A strong feedback effect also operates, in which consumer spending by Mexican immigrants and their availability as a large, young, flexible labor pool stimulates the creation of new, locally-owned small businesses (especially in the service sector), while helping to retain older labor-intensive industries like garment and shoe manufacturing (Birch, 1990; Cornelius, 1990b; Muller and Espenshade, 1985). This feedback effect is strongest in the largest metropolitan areas, where California’s immigrant population is increasingly concentrated. Los Angeles, for example, became the principal manufacturing center in the United States during the 1980s because of its combination of “a first-world infrastructure and a third-world workforce....In the Los Angeles area, garment employment jumped even as it fell elsewhere” (Martin, 1990: 1). In addition to favorable labor-market conditions and mature immigrant networks, California offers to prospective migrants from Mexico a variety of other inducements, including a superior climate, less racial discrimination than in other potential destinations (such as Texas), and -- for those who enter clandestinely -- a relatively easy point of entry, the border city of Tijuana.

The reservoir of potential California-bound migrants in Mexico is likely to remain quite large in the foreseeable future. One indicator comes from a national sample of 1,835 Mexicans living in 42 randomly selected towns and cities throughout the country, who were interviewed in August, 1989 for The Los Angeles Times Poll. Thirteen percent of this national sample had already been to California at least once, and 23 percent expressed a desire to live in the state.

17Based on field interviews with illegal border crossers conducted by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Tijuana and other Mexican border cities since 1986, Jorge Bustamante (1990: 98) concludes that “at any given time, close to 60 percent of the total of unauthorized immigrants from Mexico in the United States can be found in the state of California, where employer demand for Mexican unauthorized immigrants is higher and more diversified than in any other state, according to our survey data.”
(14 percent in Los Angeles alone) -- far more than any other potential destination. While the gap between preferences and actual behavior undoubtedly will prove to be quite large, such data are suggestive of the powerful attraction that California exerts upon would-be migrants in Mexico today.

GENDER, FAMILY, AND DURATION OF STAY

The shift from a migrant population consisting mainly of highly mobile, seasonally employed “lone males” (unmarried or without dependents in California) toward a more socially heterogeneous, year-round, de facto permanent Mexican immigrant population in California accelerated in the 1980s. To be sure, the absolute number of young, temporary Mexican male farm workers in the state did not decline during the 1970s and 1980s, but it grew slowly in absolute terms and, in relative terms, this fraction of the Mexican immigrant population was overtaken and overwhelmed by migrants who remained in the United States for long periods, accompanied by their dependents. Ethnographic and survey studies of both sending and receiving communities, interviews with would-be illegal migrants at the border, and INS apprehension statistics all show that there is now considerably more migration by whole family units (moving together), more family-reunification migration (women and children joining family heads already established in California), and more migration by single women than there was a decade ago (Bean, et al., 1990; Bustamante, 1990; Cornelius, 1989, 1990a; Rouse, 1989).

Increased Female Migration

There are many indications that the female component of the Mexican migratory stock and flow has expanded in recent years. An analysis of data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey of June 1988 suggests that females may now constitute a majority of...
the “settled” undocumented immigrant population from Mexico (Woodrow and Passel, 1990).

Our data from traditional sending communities in Mexico show that the probability of migration to the United States -- especially temporary migration -- is still much higher among males than among females. Nevertheless, we found substantial female participation in U.S.-bound migration in certain communities and age groups, especially women currently in their twenties (Cornelius, 1990: 30-31). A study of Mexican immigrants residing in rural and urban areas of San Diego County conducted in 1981-1982 found that female immigrants are especially likely to originate in urban areas of Mexico; almost two-thirds declared their place of origin to be a city (Solorzono Torres, 1987: 45).

Increased female migration to the United States reflects, in part, generational changes in the attitudes and expectations of Mexican women. Gonzalez de la Rocha (1989) has summarized her findings from a high-migration town in Jalisco as follows:

“During the last three years more women have left the town to be reunited with their husbands in the United States....Upon getting married, the woman no longer stays in the town....The young women do not want to repeat the loneliness that their mothers experienced nor the hardships that they had to endure [while their husbands worked in the United States].”

The higher propensity of females to migrate to the United States in recent years is also a consequence of Mexico’s economic crisis, which has driven more wives, single women, and children into the work force. Especially among Mexico’s urban poor, the male family head’s income is not nearly sufficient now to meet the family’s needs. Among our 1988-1989 southern California sample of recently arrived undocumented migrants who still had no regular employment and were found looking for work in street-corner labor markets and other public areas, 8 percent were women; and among the male interviewees who were married, 17 percent had brought their spouses with them to southern California.

The 1986 U.S. immigration law also gave new impetus to female migration, by

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encouraging whole-family migration and family reunification in the United States. Frank Bean and his colleagues found that by the third year after IRCA’s enactment, there was a statistically significant increase in the number and proportion of females and children being apprehended by the INS (Bean, Espenshade, White, and Dymowski, 1990; Cf. Bjerke and Hess, 1987: 4-5). Another indicator of IRCA-related migration for family reunification is the 82 percent increase in Non-Immigrant Visa seekers at the U.S. Consulate in Tijuana during the last quarter of 1989, as compared with the same period in 1988. Most of these visa applicants were dependents of persons who were granted amnesty under IRCA. In 1986, the Border Patrol apprehended and expelled an average of 3-5 unaccompanied children (aged 5-17) each day from California at Tijuana; in the first quarter of 1990, an average of 15 such minors were returned to Mexico each day.21

In the immediate post-IRCA period, there was widespread fear in Mexican sending communities that the “door was closing” because of employer sanctions and the deadlines attached to the legalization programs created by the 1986 law.22 Especially in the first half of 1988, thousands of undocumented women and children left Mexican sending communities with their husbands, many for the first time, in hopes of gaining legal-immigrant status.23 Many others were summoned to the United States by family heads who had secured amnesty for themselves or made application for it; they used coyotes to guide them across the border. Many of these dependents were disappointed, since they could not possibly meet the five-year,

21 Data from the U.S. Consulate, Tijuana, Baja California; and Jorge Bustamante, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Tijuana, Baja Calif.

22 Interestingly, the abrupt shift toward restrictive immigration laws and policies in Germany and other West European countries in the last half of the 1970s had a similar effect -- increasing family reunification immigration and speeding up the process of permanent settlement in the host country. See Buechler (1987: 286) and Hollifield (1986).

continuous-U.S.-residence requirement for the general amnesty program. More of them were able to secure legalization under the SAW program, since the eligibility criteria and documentation requirements for that program were much less stringent than for the general amnesty program.24

Female emigration to California has also been increasing because of the abundance of new employment opportunities for which women are the preferred labor source. There is a booming market in California’s largest urban areas for undocumented female Mexican labor to provide child care, clean houses and offices, and iron clothes.25 In the San Diego area, recently arrived female Mexican migrants now find housecleaning work by going door-to-door, as males have done (for gardening work) for many years. In San Diego and other U.S. border cities, such as El Paso, Texas, domestic work has become institutionalized as an occupation performed almost exclusively by unauthorized female immigrants (Solorzano Torres, 1987: 55-56; Ruiz, 1987). And Mexican immigrant women are still the preferred work force for low-level production jobs in California’s garment firms, Silicon Valley semiconductor manufacturing firms, fruit and vegetable canneries, and packing houses (Hossfeld, 1989; Mummert, 1988: 290). Moreover, the recent relaxation of federal laws restricting “homework” for the apparel industry enables increased employment of recently-arrived undocumented women in their own homes.26

24Experienced observers of the migratory flow from the state of Oaxaca to California have reported that IRCA’s legalization programs stimulated a great deal of first-time migration by women and children in 1988 and 1989. They observed that male family heads already employed in California encouraged their dependents to join them there almost immediately after the family head applied for legalization. Since the vast majority of these family members could not qualify for amnesty themselves, and entered California illegally, they are now “stuck” in that country, unable to travel back and forth to their home community as easily as the family head. (Unpublished research reported at a workshop on “Oaxacan Migration to California’s Agricultural Sector,” Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California-San Diego, and California Institute of Rural Studies, 15 February 1990.)


26In both the garment and electronics industries of California, large numbers of immigrant women are now employed as “homeworkers.” See Fernandez-Kelly and Garcia (1990).
Sojourners vs. Settlers

The shift from a temporary to a long-staying or permanent Mexican immigrant population in California was well underway by the 1970s (Browning and Rodriguez, 1985; Cornelius, Chavez, and Jones, 1984), and it accelerated in the 1980s. Among Mexican workers employed in southern California non-agricultural firms whom we interviewed in 1983-1984, 50 percent stated that they definitely intended to stay in the United States permanently; the proportion of “permanent settlers” among Mexicans working in the same firms in 1987-1988 was 69 percent. Traditional temporary migrants -- those working about six months in California during each sojourn, and returning regularly to their home community -- certainly have not disappeared, especially in the agricultural sector.27 Even in urban areas, Mexican migrants still prefer to think of themselves as sojourners rather than permanent settlers (Chavez, 1988; Rouse, 1989). But the reality is that most of these urban-based immigrants are settled more-or-less permanently in California.

The shift toward more “settled-out” Mexican migrants in California is directly related to the maturation of transnational migrant networks during the last fifteen years. Kinship/friendship networks reduce the costs and risks of long-term stays in California and facilitate integration into U.S. society. They can offer extensive support systems for dependent family members. U.S.-born children and wives quickly become strong supporters of remaining permanently in California.28 Teenagers are attracted to the lifestyle of California’s young people, and housewives find that domestic chores are considerably easier in California, with all its modern conveniences, than in Mexico. Financial obligations -- debts owed to friends and relatives in California, home mortgages, and so forth -- accumulate. All these factors strongly

27For example, Massey and his associates found that two-thirds to three-quarters of the household heads, and 55-65 percent of all U.S.-bound migrants from four Mexican sending communities surveyed in 1982 adopted a temporary migration strategy.

28In a 1986 study of unauthorized Mexican and Central American immigrants in San Diego and Dallas, over 80 percent of the respondents believed that their children did not want to return to the parents’ country of origin (Chavez and Flores, 1988).
increase the probability of permanent settlement. Indeed, many long-staying Mexican immigrants -- irrespective of their legal status -- feel trapped in California by these family and financial circumstances.

Greater “settling-out” is also very much related to changes in the California economy that have increased the demand for year-round low-skilled labor (Cornelius, 1990b). Even in agriculture, recent changes in crop mix and technology have made it possible for many growers to engage in year-round production and have increased the labor-intensity of agricultural production (Palerm, 1987, 1989, 1990). Thus, year-round employment in California has become a realistic option for a growing segment of the Mexican migrant population. Many of the firms and industries in which Mexican migrants are now employed -- including construction, landscaping, light manufacturing, restaurants and hotels -- are still subject to seasonal or cyclical fluctuations in demand for their product or service. Nevertheless, it is usually possible for migrants to ride out these slack periods. Thus migrants have a strong incentive to remain in California, and their employers prefer to have them continuously available -- if not always on the payroll.

Accordingly, increasing numbers of Mexicans are being forced to choose, finally, between long-term residence in Mexico and long-term residence in California. With the option of more economically secure, year-round residence in California now open to them, more migrants from traditional sending communities view migration to California as a permanent change in their life situation, instead of just a short-term income-earning strategy. And high-emigration communities in central Mexico are being transformed increasingly into rest-and-recreation centers for families whose principal base is now in California (Cornelius, 1990a; Rouse, 1989).
EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS IN MEXICO AND CALIFORNIA

The Exodus from Agriculture

Since the late 1960s the share of Mexican migrants working in the agricultural sector of the U.S. economy has declined sharply. According to recent estimates, agriculture currently employs no more than 10 to 15 percent of the Mexican immigrants (legals and illegals) in California, Texas, and Arizona, and a much smaller proportion of the Mexicans working in Illinois (Wallace, 1988: 664-65).

Among the Mexico-born, non-U.S. citizen males included in the 1980 U.S. Census who had moved to the United States between 1975 and 1980, only 17.3 percent were employed in agriculture (or mining) at the time of the census; and an even smaller proportion -- 10.4 percent -- of post-1975 female Mexican immigrants were working in these sectors (Bean and Tienda, 1987: Table 4.12, p. 132). This occupational distribution is not surprising, since any census or household survey conducted in the United States will record very few temporary migrants, who are more likely to be agriculturally employed than permanent settlers from Mexico. This does not necessarily mean, however, that most temporary Mexican migrants are still employed in agriculture. In fact, only about one-third of the “short-stay” migrants to the United States detected in the 1978 CENIET survey of households in Mexico were employed in agriculture in the United States (Zazueta and Garcia y Griego, 1982). And as noted below, there is more recent evidence from Mexico-based research indicating that the majority of unauthorized, mostly temporary migrants to the United States are now working in non-agricultural occupations.

Especially since the enactment of IRCA, there has been much speculation about the rate of attrition of Mexican labor from California agriculture. In our recent fieldwork, we found that Mexican migrants with extensive experience in the state’s agricultural sector are not abandoning farm work in large numbers; but young workers migrating for the first time in the 1970s and ’80s were much more likely to choose less arduous, higher-paying jobs in non-
agricultural enterprises as their point of entry into the U.S. labor market, and to remain in urban occupations for the duration of their U.S. migratory careers. Those most committed to working in U.S. agriculture tend to be older men who began their migratory careers as agricultural workers and have remained in that sector, acquiring permanent legal immigrant status along the way.

Those who legalized themselves through the Special Agricultural Workers (SAW) program created by the 1986 U.S. immigration law are not required to keep working in the agricultural sector, and many of those who obtained SAW status actually had little or no previous agricultural employment experience. Among a statewide sample of applicants for SAW visas, only 28 percent gave farm work as their pre-migration occupation (CASAS, 1989: 5-7/5-8)).29 Moreover, only about one-third reported usually working in agriculture during the 12 months preceding the interview, and among those who had been agriculturally employed, 60 percent said that they planned to seek employment outside of agriculture. In this survey, urban-based SAW applicants are overrepresented (indeed, almost 50 percent of the SAW visa holders in this sample were drawn from Los Angeles County). Other surveys of SAW applicants in California have found higher levels of continued commitment to farmwork (see CASA, 1989: 5-9).

Similarly, a national survey of agricultural workers conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor to measure changes in the labor supply resulting from the movement of newly legalized farm workers from agriculture to other sectors found that in 1989 there was actually an increase in the number of SAW visa-holders performing agricultural labor during the course of the year -- i.e., the “exit rate” among SAW workers was negative (Rural California Report, 1990: 9).

Clearly, it is premature to reach any conclusions about the impact of IRCA’s legalization programs on the sectoral distribution of Mexican migrants in the California economy.

29The sample consists of 4,180 general-amnesty and 796 SAW applicants, who were randomly selected from the statewide population of newly legalized persons who were enrolled in special educational programs operated by public and private agencies during the period of February-July 1989. The survey was conducted by the Comprehensive Adult Student Assessment System of San Diego, Calif., under contract to California Health and Welfare Agency.
The longer-term exodus from agriculture is reflected in the data from our recent field studies on both sides of the border. As shown in Table 4, more than three-quarters of the economically active population in the rural sending communities that we have studied who had U.S. migratory experience were employed primarily in agriculture in their home towns, immediately before their most recent trip to the United States. However, only 41 percent worked in agriculture once they got there (i.e., during their most recent U.S. sojourn). The proportion of migrants agriculturally employed in the United States varied considerably among the three communities (14.9 percent, 21.3 percent, and 88.6 percent, respectively). Seventy percent of the migrants in the three-community sample who were employed most recently in agricultural jobs in the United States were residents of a community in Michoacan that has long specialized in exporting labor to the strawberry fields of Watsonville, California. Even among migrants from this community, however, there is attrition out of the U.S. agricultural sector, especially among the youngest, better-educated migrants, who prefer to work in urban services. The data reported in Table 5 show that, contrary to the popular stereotype, unauthorized migrants from our Mexican research communities were much less likely to be agriculturally employed in the United States than legal immigrants and those who were in process of legalizing themselves under the 1986 U.S. immigration law (popularly known as “Rodinos”).

The migration profile of Tlacuitapa, Jalisco -- a community with about 2,300 inhabitants located in the Los Altos region of Jalisco -- is particularly instructive. This community, which I initially studied in 1976 and restudied in 1988-89, sends some migrants to work in the orchards and flower fields of Oregon; but these agriculturally employed migrants are now outnumbered by those who go to Oklahoma City to work in highway and bridge construction, those who go to Las Vegas and Palm Springs to work in the hotel and restaurant industries, and those who migrate to the San Francisco Bay area to work in light industry and

Among those agriculturally employed in Mexico, 44.1 percent were landless laborers; 25.2 percent were share-croppers; 21.9 percent were small private landowners or employed on the family’s small private landholding; and 8 percent were ejidatarios or employed on the family’s ejidal plot.
services. In 1976, 55.3 percent of Tlacuitapefios who had migrated to the United States had worked most recently in agriculture; in our 1988-89 survey of the same community, only 21.3 percent were employed in agriculture during their most recent trip to the United States. Between 1976 and 1988-89, the proportion of the community’s U.S.-bound migrants employed in service activities more than tripled, and those in retail commerce and manufacturing nearly doubled (see Table 6). Similarly, in a 1982 sample of Guadalajara residents with U.S. migratory experience, 91 percent of those who had last migrated to the United States before 1962 had worked in agriculture, while 48 percent of those who had been in the United States between 1962 and 1972 and only 33 percent of those who had migrated after 1972 were agriculturally employed there (Escobar, Gonzalez, and Roberts, 1987: 50).

Most Mexican migrants to California today -- both legal and unauthorized -- are being absorbed into the urban service, construction, light manufacturing, and retail commerce sectors. In the service sector, Mexicans work primarily as janitors, dishwashers and busboys, gardeners, hotel workers, maintenance and laundry workers in hospitals and convalescent homes, car washers, house cleaners, and child-care providers (Cornelius, 1990b). The Mexicans filling these types of jobs are increasingly likely to be persons whose previous work experience, if any, has been limited to non-agricultural employment (Bilateral Commission, 1988: 91-93). Among our sample of Mexican immigrants employed in southern California non-agricultural firms in 1987-88, only 18.4 percent had been working in agriculture prior to their most recent trip to the United States (excluding those who had been economically inactive before migration). Nearly 14.6 percent had been factory workers in Mexico. Skilled craftsmen, small business owners, restaurant workers, white-collar workers, and other urban service workers were significantly represented. However, agricultural and horticultural enterprises in California that require only seasonal labor continue to attract mainly migrants with rural, agricultural backgrounds.

Wages and Impacts on California Wage Levels

Recent field studies have found that the majority of both legal and unauthorized
Mexican immigrants in California are employed in jobs paying between $4.25 (the state’s legal minimum wage, as of July 1, 1988) and $6.00 per hour. Among our sample of 146 regularly employed, unauthorized immigrant workers in southern California in 1987-1988, most of whom were interviewed when the state’s legal minimum wage was $3.35 per hour, the median hourly wage was $4.98. Among 154 “illegals” who had applied for amnesty, the median wage being earned was $5.16. \footnote{Personal, in-home interviews conducted by the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California-San Diego, in San Diego, Los Angeles and Orange counties in 1987 and 1988. Legal immigrant workers interviewed for the same study (N=103) were receiving an average of $6.00 per hour.} These wage levels may be upwardly biased because of our sample design, which excluded workers employed in very small, “underground economy” firms that are more likely to pay sub-minimum wages.

Wages in certain subsectors of California economy may have been depressed by the influx of Mexican labor in recent years. In the case of Los Angeles manufacturing industries, there is persuasive evidence that relative wage declines during the 1970s for low-skill jobs in these industries were related to the presence of large numbers of Mexican and Central American immigrants. In the apparel industry, for example, the wages of production workers grew considerably more slowly in Los Angeles than elsewhere in California between 1969 and 1977 (Muller and Espenshade, 1985: 10). In southern California non-agricultural firms studied by the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies in 1983-1984 and again in 1987-1988, the median hourly wage for unauthorized immigrants rose by only 19 cents per hour during the four-year interval between the surveys -- a real wage decline, when inflation is factored in (see Table 7). Wages for legal immigrants in the two samples had risen by 85 cents per hour, and those of U.S.-citizen employees by $1.00 per hour.

Latino immigrant workers, especially unauthorized Mexicans, do tend to earn less than U.S.-born workers employed in similar job categories. But little evidence exists that immigration status is \textit{per se} an important determinant of these wage differentials (Cornelius and Bustamante, 1990: 7-8; Tienda, 1990). Far more important are such factors as the particular
region and sector of the economy in which the worker is employed, gender, the ethnicity of one’s employer, and especially, labor union membership. 32

**Impacts of IRCA**

The “employer sanctions” component of the 1986 U.S. immigration law was supposed to exert upward pressure on wage scales in immigrant-dominated industries, by reducing the supply of unauthorized job-seekers and inducing firms to raise wages in order to retain their newly-legalized immigrant employees. Thus far, however, there is little evidence of such an effect in California. Very few of the migrants who legalized themselves under IRCA have received pay increases as result of their new immigration status, and surveys of both agricultural and non-agricultural employers in California show that only a small minority of them have any plans to wage raises, at least in response to any IRCA-related labor market changes (Cornelius, 1990b: 44; Martin and Taylor, 1990). In part, this is because IRCA thus far has failed to reduce the undocumented immigrant labor supply in most California industries that have come to rely on such labor. But econometric studies suggest that even if the labor supply were to be reduced by IRCA, real wage rates in agriculture would not rise significantly because many growers would introduce labor-saving technology or switch to less labor-intensive crops to avoid paying higher wages (Duffield, 1990).

There is no evidence that IRCA has reduced the total pool of Mexican migrants employed or seeking work in California’s labor markets. In fact, the 1986 law seems to have augmented that pool, by drawing into it thousands of first-time migrants who sought to take advantage of the SAW and general amnesty programs (Cornelius, 1989). IRCA has also

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32 Among our sample of unauthorized Mexican immigrants employed in southern California non-agricultural firms in 1987-1988, 17 percent were union members. This compares with 30 percent among legal immigrants, and 32 percent among U.S.-citizen workers in the same sample. Our 1983-84 study of Mexicans employed in immigrant-dependent firms, which included firms located in northern California where unionization levels traditionally have been much higher than in the south, found much higher proportions of union members, among both unauthorized and legal immigrants (see Cornelius, 1990b).
increased the segmentation of the Mexican immigrant labor force, by opening up inter-firm and inter-sectoral mobility opportunities for the newly legalized segment (in theory, at least), and adding a new layer of highly vulnerable, economically desperate workers at the bottom of the labor force. This new underclass consists mostly of recently arrived, unauthorized migrants, especially those coming from non-traditional sending areas in Mexico, who are not attached to well-consolidated family support networks in California. Even though they are being enforced cautiously and selectively (Fix and Hill, 1990), employer sanctions have reduced the range of employment prospects available to these new arrivals, and have lengthened their job-search time. Unauthorized migrants without a pre-arranged job are still getting work in California, often using fraudulent or borrowed documents (Cornelius, 1989; Bach and Brill, 1990); but it takes them longer to find steady, full-time employment. Many of them must devote several weeks or even months to poorly paid, highly irregular day-labor before finding steady employment.

One of IRCA’s most conspicuous unintended consequences in California and other parts of the United States has been the proliferation of street-corner labor markets in major urban areas (Bach and Brill, 1990; Kelley, 1990). In Los Angeles County, immigrant day-labor markets now operate at an estimated 40 sites, and there are dozens of them in Orange and San Diego counties as well. These informal labor markets serve mostly non-agricultural employers - small building contractors, painters, roofers, landscape maintenance businesses, individual homeowners who need help moving dirt, weeding yards, or moving furniture. The vast majority of workers who congregate in these markets are unauthorized, but some newly legalized SAW workers can also be found there, reflecting a general oversupply of low-skilled immigrant labor in some areas. Four southern California cities (Los Angeles, Costa Mesa, Encinitas, and Carlsbad) have opened their own “hiring halls” to give migrant workers a regulated alternative to the chaotic, often highly exploitative street-corner labor markets -- and, not incidentally, to get the migrants off the streets and away from retail businesses. Some of these hiring halls have failed to achieve their objectives, because city councils have restricted
them to serving only legal immigrants, while unauthorized migrants continue to line the streets seeking work.33

IRCA has also contributed to the informalization of employment among California’s Mexican immigrant population by encouraging the growth of sweatshops and other “underground economy” firms, homework (especially linked to garment subcontractors), and self-employment (street-vending, participation in swap meets, and so forth). Such enterprises were by no means absent in California in the pre-IRCA period (see, for example, Wolin, 1981), and it is difficult to estimate how much of their recent expansion is attributable only to IRCA. The proliferation of sweatshops, for example, is also associated with the intensification of competitive pressures within the garment industry resulting from the growth of imports and “offshore” production facilities (Bonacich, 1990: 35). It is clear, however, that such economic activities draw disproportionately on the pool of Mexican workers whose employment prospects have been most adversely affected by IRCA, i.e., new “unattached” illegal arrivals and women who did not qualify for amnesty under the 1986 law.

CONCLUSION

Over the last 100 years, Mexican migration to California has never been a static phenomenon. The changes or intensifications of preexisting trends that occurred during the 1980s, however, are particularly significant. The shift from short-term, shuttle migration to permanent settlement in California has accelerated considerably. Mexico’s economic crisis has brought into the migration stream many rural communities as well as urban centers that had not been traditional labor-exporters to California. The crisis has also discouraged many Mexican migrants already here from returning to their places of origin, as they might otherwise have

33There are conflicting legal opinions about whether such city-run hiring halls can be “immigration status-blind” without violating the employer sanctions provision of the 1986 U.S. immigration law. The City of Los Angeles has chosen to run its hiring hall in this way, but the other three cities mentioned above have limited their halls to documented immigrants.
done. The 1980s brought major changes in the social composition of the flow: many more women and children, and more whole family units, are now participating in the migratory process. And the continuing dispersion of Mexican migrants outside of the agricultural sector is one of the most conspicuous features of the current wave of Mexican immigration to California.

Some of the patterns I have just noted are not really “new,” when viewed from a broader historical perspective. For example, there are important similarities between the profiles of Mexican migration to California in the 1920s and that which occurred in the 1980s. In both decades, points of origin within Mexico were relatively dispersed, and there was considerable employment of Mexican workers in non-agricultural sectors of the state’s economy. After the hiatus caused by the Great Depression, the bracero program of contract-labor importation greatly increased the proportion of short-stay, agriculturally employed migrants, and altered the migration flow in other enduring ways (García y Griego, 1983). Thus in certain respects, the migratory profile of the 1980s represents a return to patterns established before the deformation of the migratory process caused by bracero.

In understanding the contemporary Mexican immigration phenomenon, we must also take care to distinguish analytically between absolute and relative changes. For example, while permanent emigrants may have grown considerably as a proportion of the total flow of Mexican migrants to California in the 1980s, this does not necessarily mean that short-term migration has diminished in absolute terms. The same caveat applies to the decline in the proportion of Mexican migrants who are agriculturally employed in California. This does not mean that agriculture has ceased to be an important employer of Mexican migrants in California; indeed, a

34Roger Rouse (1989: 200-207), who has studied migration to Redwood City, California from the town of Aguililla, Michoacan, found that the economic crisis of the 1980s had stimulated inflation in land and livestock prices in the community of origin, thereby preventing returning migrants from the United States from using their savings to good advantage.

35For example, a survey of Los Angeles manufacturing industries in 1928 found that 17 percent of all workers were Mexicans. The single largest concentration of Mexican industrial workers was in textiles, but substantial numbers were also employed in construction and railroad yards (California Mexican Fact-Finding Committee, cited in Muller and Espenshade, 1985: 57).
1983 survey of the state’s farmworker population found that 73 percent were Mexican-born, and 44 percent of these farmworkers admitted that they were unauthorized immigrants (Mines and Martin, 1986; Taylor and Espenshade, n.d.). In relative terms, however, Mexican migrants’ today are finding far more employment opportunities in the nonagricultural sectors of California’s economy.

The profile of Mexican migration to California is changing in ways that raise new questions about the social and economic impacts of this population movement on the receiving areas. The shift from a Mexican immigrant population dominated by transient, “lone male” agricultural workers to a much more socially heterogeneous, year-round, urban-dwelling immigrant community is unlikely to be reversed, barring an economic calamity in California that would severely reduce the non-agricultural demand for Mexican labor. Already, this qualitative change has greatly increased the day-to-day visibility of the Mexican immigrant population, thereby intensifying the objection of the non-immigrant population to their presence. Moreover, the legalization of a large part of the formerly unauthorized Mexican workforce, combined with the steadily increasing proportion of women and children in the flow of migrants from Mexico, inevitably will increase the impacts of the Mexican immigrant population on housing, schools, and health care systems in localities that attract large numbers of migrants.

In the foreseeable future, Mexican immigrants in the United States -- both legals and unauthorized migrants -- are likely to remain highly concentrated in a few states and localities, with California alone receiving well over half of the total. Transnational migrant networks are now anchored in those places, and the networks will continue to expand. The character of the neighborhoods where Mexican immigrants cluster will change visibly. This high degree of spatial concentration will increase the perceived threat posed by Mexicans and other Spanish-speaking immigrants to the non-immigrant population.

It is important to underscore the cultural basis of that perceived threat. Polling data and anecdotal evidence show that most native-born Californians (not of Latino ancestry) and recent
in-migrants from the East and Mid-West do not see themselves as being in competition with Mexican immigrants for jobs or social services (Cornelius, 1983). They do see such people, however, as a very real threat to their high quality of life. As Los Angeles City Councilman Ernani Bernardi has put it, “The immigrants are resented strongly because of their impact on livability” (quoted in Kotkin, 1989: 8). They are blamed for rising local crime rates (Wolf, 1988), harassment of school children and other passersby, littering, and public health hazards. Local merchants complain that their “regular” customers are being driven away by migrants loitering or seeking work on nearby streets. For many members of the non-immigrant population, racism and fears of a bilingual society are additional sources of hostility toward Latin0 immigrants.

The changing social composition and spatial concentration of the Mexican immigrant population will provide a stern test of California’s capacity to develop as a viable multicultural society in the 1990s and beyond. The early signs are not particularly encouraging. Intolerance toward the Latino immigrant presence clearly is rising in heavily impacted areas of the state. A case in point is the “North County” area of San Diego County -- home to more than 1.5 million largely middle and upper-income people, most of whom have migrated from other parts of the United States. For over three years, several of the principal North County cities have been in an almost continuous uproar over the presence of Mexican and Central American day-laborers and the make-shift camps built of cardboard, used lumber, and plastic sheeting in which they live. IRCA has put more migrant day-laborers -- the new underclass -- on the streets of these communities. Meanwhile, high-priced housing developments and shopping centers, sprouting up throughout the region during the 1980s, have encroached upon the vacant land where migrant farm workers in San Diego County have traditionally sought shelter. The cultural clash implied by upscale housing developments in immediate proximity to Third-World-style squatter settlements could hardly be more dramatic.

On April 24, 1990, the North County community of Encinitas became the first city in California to declare a “state of emergency” because of its failure to resolve its perceived
“migrant crisis” through local means. Encinitas is a community of about 55,000 residents. Its “crisis” consists of an estimated 200-800 homeless Mexican and Guatemalan migrants, living and seeking day-labor within its city limits. Authorities in Encinitas and other North County communities have spent the last three years raiding and bulldozing migrant encampments, hiring security guards to patrol vacant public land to stop migrants from camping there, debating ordinances to ban curbside hiring, and clamoring for more strenuous Border Patrol efforts to sweep the streets of migrant day-laborers. They have demonstrated only that they can chase migrants from one vacant lot, canyon, or street corner to the next one; the migrants have not been induced to go back where they came from, nor to drop out of the California labor market. Until quite recently, when Encinitas and Carlsbad reluctantly agreed to study the idea of establishing legal, city-maintained camps for migrant workers, no thought was given by local authorities to solving the fundamental problem afflicting both the migrants and irate non-immigrant homeowners, i.e., the almost total lack of low-income housing in their communities.36

The experience of San Diego’s North County, together with abundant statewide polling data,37 suggests that the majority of non-immigrant Californians are far from being prepared to accept the notion of a settled, highly visible Latino immigrant presence in their immediate living and working environments. If the futility of efforts to “stop them at the border” and other law-enforcement approaches comes to be widely recognized, the focus of public debate in California will gradually shift to how to deal more effectively with Mexican immigrants as a “settler” population, and to the problems of “assimilating” the second and third generations. Such a shift in the terms of the public debate over immigration occurred during the 1980s in

36This is clearly a statewide problem. A recent study by the California Coalition for Rural Housing found that no low-cost housing at all had been built in nearly one-fourth of all California communities during the 1985-1989 period, and most others had fallen far short of actual needs. In San Diego County, for example, only 4,281 low-cost housing units were built from 1985 through 1989, while an estimated 38,648 new low-cost units were needed during this period.

37For example, a Los Angeles Times Poll conducted in January, 1989 found that 57 percent of the respondents agreed that there are “too many” immigrants in California.
Western Europe, faced with the *de facto* permanent presence of millions of culturally distinct Algerian, Moroccan, and Turkish immigrants (see Buechler, 1987; Layton-Henry, 1990). And as in Western Europe, the overall level of anti-immigrant hostility is likely to rise, as the majority population confronts this new and unwelcome kind of challenge.
METHODODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

This paper makes frequent reference to data gathered through a long-term field study based in the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego. The project began as an attempt to gauge the impact within California of a specific government intervention in immigrant-dominated labor markets -- namely, the INS “Operation Jobs,” a well-coordinated, highly publicized national sweep of workplaces during the last week of April and the first week of May, 1982. Our interest was in how patterns of labor recruitment, hiring practices, and labor force composition in immigrant-dominated or immigrant-dependent firms might have been altered by this government effort to reduce the utilization of unauthorized immigrant labor and, in the absence of any durable impacts, to explain the lack of change.

Our interests quickly broadened, however, beyond the realm of government attempts to regulate the use of immigrant labor. It became apparent that such a focus was too narrow; that there were some basic transformations underway in many sectors of the U.S. economy and society that were generating an increased demand for Mexican and other foreign-born labor; and that these change processes and their consequences for the organization of production, labor/management relations, and the mobility of capital were of far greater significance in understanding the role being played by Mexican labor in the state’s economy than anything that federal or state government agencies were doing (or might conceivably be doing in the future). We therefore came to focus more on the conditions within various industries and different types, of firms within them that affected the hiring of Mexican and other foreign-born workers, the terms of their employment, and more generally the ways in which labor was being utilized by businesses that heretofore have depended heavily on immigrant workers.

The original universe for the study was defined as all firms in California’s three largest metropolitan areas (San Diego, Los Angeles-Orange County, and the San Francisco Bay area) with ten or more employees that make substantial use of Mexican and other foreign-born labor. “Substantial” users were defined as firms where at least 25 percent of the jobs in production were filled by Mexicans. The actual average proportion of Mexicans in these jobs among our 177 firms, as revealed by our interviews with workers, was 65 percent, as of 1983-84.

In each metropolitan area, we attempted to contact all firms that had been raided by the INS during “Operations Jobs” in 1982. Lists of these firms were compiled both from INS sources and from newspaper reports on “Operation Jobs.” We then randomly sampled the more comprehensive lists of firms in each of the three metropolitan areas that the INS had already raided or had enlisted in its “voluntary” job applicant screening program, “Operation Cooperation.” Access to these lists was provided by INS officials. About half of the 177 firms in our sample were chosen in this way.

We wanted to capture a wide range of dependence on Mexican labor, particularly on unauthorized Mexicans. Therefore it was important to expand our sample of firms beyond those that could be identified through INS enforcement activities, which were presumably targeted at the most intensive users of illegals. There are several other important biases in INS enforcement practices: concentration on larger, higher-wage, frequently unionized firms; on sites where substantial concentrations of illegals could be found and easily rounded up (factories, for example, rather than numerous office buildings being cleaned by unauthorized workers employed by a particular company); work places that could be raided on a 9 to 5:00 schedule; and so forth. In order to gain a more comprehensive view of the role played by Mexican labor in California economy, we took care to include in our sample representatives of certain types of firms that, by their very nature, are not cost-effective targets of the INS, and therefore were not well represented on the lists of firms that have been raided by the INS. Examples would be building maintenance firms, construction firms, and restaurants.
The one-half of our sample firms that had not been targeted by the INS were identified in various ways. During interviews with unionized employers, we asked them to name their principal non-union competitors, who were subsequently interviewed. Other firms were identified in our interviews with labor union officials in each metropolitan area. Some firms were selected at random from industry and telephone directories. In San Diego, several employers who had been identified in a 1980-81 Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies survey of 2,100 Mexican immigrants in San Diego County were selected for inclusion in the new study. Several of our Mexico-origin interviewers also used their personal contacts to tap into immigrant networks for assistance in identifying firms that might be appropriate for inclusion.

This eclectic set of purposive sampling techniques limits the generalizability of our results in a strict statistical sense. However, considering the impossibility of sampling the universe of immigrant-dependent firms in California (no such sampling frame exists), and the limitations of a random sampling approach relying on populations that may have been significantly biased in various ways (e.g., firms that have been raided by the INS, or apprehended illegals who identify their employers on INS forms), we opted for eclecticism. Our goal was to study a cross-section of immigrant-dependent firms that would be as representative as possible of the universe, excluding only the smallest employers (family-owned and operated business, household employers, etc.). Agricultural employers were also underrepresented in our sample, because of the limitation of our study to the state’s three principal metropolitan areas.

The first stage of the study consisted of very detailed interviews with employers and labor union representatives (if they were present) in each firm. In the second stage, we selected for more intensive study firms in seven non-agricultural industries that make heavy use of Mexican labor. They include construction (including roofing and construction site-clean up), food processing, shoe manufacturing and tanning, high-tech electronics, building and landscape maintenance, hotels, and restaurants. We chose to concentrate on these nonagricultural sectors of the economy, because so much less is known about how they use Mexican labor than about agricultural employers, and because urban employers are considerably more important as sources of jobs for Mexicans and other immigrants in California today than are agricultural firms.

In this second stage of the project, we interviewed 834 workers employed in the 94 firms that fell into our seven “intensive-study” industries. So, for example, we interviewed no workers employed in agriculture, which had been excluded from the second stage of the study. We attempted to interview 10 workers in each firm, chosen at random from the workers in all job categories in which Mexicans were employed. If non-Mexican workers (Anglos, Chicanos, Blacks, Asians) were also found to be employed in those same job categories, we interviewed several of them in each firm as well. Interviewers were instructed to choose a cross-section of production workers in a given firm: some young, some older, some unauthorized immigrants, some legal immigrants, and (if present) some non-Mexican workers. One-fifth of the resulting worker sample consisted of U.S.-born workers, the majority of them second-generation Mexican-Americans (Chicanos). Our interviewers made initial contact with them at the workplace -- sometimes inside the plant, sometimes outside the gates; sometimes with the knowledge of management, sometimes not. But all interviews with workers were conducted in the privacy of their homes, rather than at their work place. Most of these interviews lasted from 90 to 120 minutes.

In the third stage of the project, from May 1987 to June 1988, we returned to a subsample of the original 177 firms, to conduct new interviews with management and with a new sample of workers employed in each firm. These employer interviews were done in 105 non-agricultural firms located in southern California (San Diego, Orange, and Los Angeles counties), 71 of which were included in the earlier stages of the project. These 71 firms represent all of the original-sample firms that were located in southern California and which were still in business by May 1987. Firms in the San Francisco Bay area could not be included.
in this last phase of the project, due to financial constraints. Thirty-two firms not represented in earlier stages of the project, but belonging to the same industries we have been studying, were selected for inclusion in the 1987-88 fieldwork. Detailed, in-person interviews were conducted with 105 employers or managers, 500 workers employed in their firms (an average of 5 workers per firm, interviewed, as before, in their homes), and 200 recently arrived unauthorized immigrants -- interviewed mostly in street-corner labor markets and public parks -- who were still seeking steady employment in southern California. In this phase of the project, particular attention was devoted to the impacts of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) on the behavior of U.S. employers and immigrant workers.

In the final stage of the project, 945 sample survey interviews were conducted in three rural communities located in west-central Mexico, a region with a 100-year tradition of sending workers to the United States. A binational field research team assembled by the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies and several Mexican universities interviewed 586 randomly-selected household heads; 233 recent (post-January 1, 1982) migrants to the United States; and 126 prospective first-time migrants -- persons aged 14 or older who had no history of work in the U.S., and who identified themselves as likely to migrate in the future. Our selection of the non-migrant household member deemed most likely to migrate to the United States in the near future necessarily was based on the judgment of the interviewer. Nevertheless, the subsequent behavior of these interviewees suggests that we succeeded in tapping a highly migration-prone stratum of the non-migrant population in these communities. In a follow-up study of residents of one of the three communities who had been interviewed in July or August, 1988 as prospective first-time migrants to the United States, we found that about 15 percent had actually migrated between August 1 and December 1, 1988. This rate of emigration is particularly impressive, since these were first trips, occurring during a season when very few people normally leave for the United States; indeed, migration during the August-December period traditionally runs in the opposite direction.

In each community, a simple random sample of 200 households was drawn from a sampling frame assembled through a complete household census conducted by our research team. In May 1988, according to our census, the research communities contained 299, 400, and 691 households, respectively. Our interviews with recent migrants to the United States and prospective first-time migrants were done within the same set of households. Thus the number of interviews conducted per household ranged from one to three. Interviews with household heads averaged about 2 hours in duration; those with recent migrants to the United States averaged 1.5 hours; and interviews with prospective first-time migrants lasted about one hour.

The universe for our study of sending communities was defined as all households maintaining a residence in the three research communities. To be included in the sampling frame, a household need not occupy a dwelling in the community on a year-round basis. Indeed, in all three communities, numerous dwelling units are occupied for only a few weeks each year (usually in December, January, and early February, when migrant families traditionally return from the United States) or are occupied for most of the year by renters or housesitters (14.4 percent of the houses in the three communities, combined). To prevent underrepresentation of residents who spend most of the year working in the United States, we took several steps. The field interviewing was divided into two principal periods: July-August, 1988 and December-January, 1988-89. The latter period was timed to coincide with the habitual return of migrants from the United States for the Christmas holidays and annual town fiestas. Some interviewing was also conducted in the interim months, as families returned from the United States. If an entire household was found to be absent both in July-August, 1988 and in December-January, 1988-89, it was replaced with a household that was also absent in July-August, 1988, but had returned to the community by December-January, 1988-89. Finally, nine interviews with household heads (1.5 percent of the total) were conducted in various California cities, where they were located in the fall of 1988. The level of cooperation was
quite high; the refusal rate among sampled household heads in the three communities ranged from 2.5 to 4.0 percent.

The research communities are located in the states of Jalisco, Michoacan, and Zacatecas. All three are predominantly agricultural (73 percent of the economically active adult males were principally employed in agriculture). U.S.-bound migration from all three communities began in the first decades of this century, was briefly interrupted in the 1930s by the Great Depression, and became a mass movement in the 1940s and ’50s, when many residents participated in the “bracero” program of contract labor importation. In numerous families having homes in these communities, members of three different generations have worked in the United States. All three communities had been studied in depth by members of our research team prior to the enactment of the 1986 U.S. immigration law.39 Since these communities were selected purposively, we make no claim that our findings are statistically representative of the entire universe of Mexican communities -- now including large cities as well as rural localities -- that send migrants to the United States. Our research sites are, however, quite typical of the small rural communities of west-central Mexico that have contributed heavily to the U.S.-bound migratory flow since the 1920s. 40

Finally, in an effort to better assess how IRCA has affected the social and economic linkages between sending areas in Mexico and Mexican immigrant communities in California, several members of the research team conducted unstructured interviewing and ethnographic observation among a “snowball” sample of U.S.-based emigrants from the communities we had studied in Mexico.41 These informants reside, more-or-less permanently, in northern California -- primarily the San Francisco Bay area, the Sacramento area, and the city of Watsonville.

39 The pre-IRCA fieldwork in these three communities has been reported in Lopez Castro, 1986; Mines, 1981; and Cornelius, 1976a.

40 See, for example, Massey, et al., 1987; Calvo and Lopez, 1988, especially the chapters by Rafael Alarcon and Omar Fonseca; Lopez, 1988, especially the chapters by Celestino Fernandez and Gustavo Lopez; and Tamayo, 1990.

41 For a description of the snowball sampling technique as it has been applied in studies of undocumented immigrants in California, see Cornelius, 1982.
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TABLE 1
POINTS OF ORIGIN OF MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS
EMPLOYED IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Birthplace (N=315)</th>
<th>Last place of residence before most recent migration to U.S. (N=324)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baja California Norte</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michoacan</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal District (Mexico City)</strong></td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrero</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oaxaca</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nayari t</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chihuahua</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinaloa</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puebla</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queretaro</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colima</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Edo. de Mexico (mostly Mexico City)</strong></td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonora</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yucatan</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coahuila</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morelos</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Luis Potosi</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aguascalientes</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuevo Leon</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tlaxcala</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veracruz</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hidalgo</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuevo Leon</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2

**POINTS OF ORIGIN OF RECENTLY ARRIVED UNAUTHORIZED MEXICAN MIGRANTS TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Birthplace (N=184)</th>
<th>Last place of residence before migrating to U.S. (N=187)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal District (Mexico City)</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michoacan</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puebla</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrero</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hidalgo</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Edo. de Mexico (mostly Mexico City)</strong></td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baja California Norte</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morelos</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oaxaca</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chihuahua</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nayarit</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiapas</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queretaro</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinaloa</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonora</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veracruz</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aguascalientes</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colima</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuevo Leon</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Personal interviews with job-seeking, unauthorized migrants who arrived in San Diego, Orange, and Los Angeles counties in 1987 or 1988, conducted by the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.*
TABLE 3
STEP-WISE MEXICAN MIGRATION TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
VIA LARGE CITIES IN MEXICO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration sequence</th>
<th>Sample of employed migrants (N=320)</th>
<th>Sample of recently arrived migrants (N=184)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birthplace+Mexico City-S. Calif.</td>
<td>15 (4.7%)</td>
<td>18 (9.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplace+Guadalajara-S. Calif.</td>
<td>8 (2.5%)</td>
<td>3 (1.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplace+Leon, Gto.+S+Calif.</td>
<td>1 (0.3%)</td>
<td>3 (1.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplace+Baja Calif. N.+S. Calif.</td>
<td>41 (12.8%)</td>
<td>6 (3.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>65 (20.3%)</td>
<td>30 (16.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Includes cities of Tijuana, Mexicali, and Ensenada.
### TABLE 4

**SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT OF MIGRANTS TO THE U.S. FROM THREE RURAL MEXICAN COMMUNITIES, BEFORE AND DURING THEIR MOST RECENT TRIP TO THE U.S.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Sector of employment before most recent migration (N=631)</th>
<th>Sector 0 j employment during most recent stay in U.S. (N=891)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail commerce (including restaurants)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies survey of three rural communities in Mexico, 1988-89. The sample consists of all members of 586 households in the three research communities who have ever migrated to the United States (N=1,126). Unemployed, retired, student, and other economically inactive persons are excluded from the tabulations.*
TABLE 5
SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT OF MIGRANTS TO THE U.S.
FROM THREE RURAL MEXICAN COMMUNITIES,
DURING THEIR MOST RECENT TRIP TO THE U.S., BY IMMIGRATION STATUS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Legal immigrants (N=257)</th>
<th>&quot;Rodinos&quot; (N=157)</th>
<th>Unauthorized Migrants (N=466)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Commerce</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Same as for Table 4.

Chi-square = 103.59; significance: p<.0000
TABLE 6

SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT IN U.S., AMONG MIGRANTS FROM A RURAL MEXICAN SENDING COMMUNITY, DURING MOST RECENT TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES, 1976 AND 1988-89*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1976 sample (N=76)</th>
<th>1988-89 sample (N=300)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail commerce (including restaurants)</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s sample surveys in the community of Tlacuitapa, Jalisco. Unemployed, retired, student, other economically inactive persons, and missing cases are excluded from the tabulations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented immigrants</td>
<td>$4.79</td>
<td>$4.98</td>
<td>$0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Rodinos” (legalization applicant)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5.16 (N=154)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal immigrants</td>
<td>5.15 (N=102)</td>
<td>6.00 (N=98)</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. citizens</td>
<td>7.00 (N=110)</td>
<td>8.00 (N=93)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Personal interviews with two different samples of production workers employed in “immigrant-dependent” firms in San Diego, Orange, and Los Angeles counties, conducted by the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies in 1983-84 (N=447) and 1987-88 (N=489). Missing cases are excluded.*