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The European Practice of Region Building and the  
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by

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Abstract

This paper lays out a normative approach to the study of power in International Relations. This approach emphasizes the role of cooperative security practices, region building, and pluralistic integration in order to achieve peaceful change. The paper discusses the challenges to cooperative security practices in the Euro-Med process, a process that aims to promote the construction of a Mediterranean “region” of stability and peace. In order to understand what lies behind the EU’s use of use of these practices, this paper suggests that they represent the application of “normative power” (Manners 2002: 240) in international relations. The practice of normative power differs significantly from a traditional understanding of the use of power in international relations. The paper assess the potential this concept of normative power to promote a shared sense of security in, and peoples' regional identification with, spaces and socially constructed regions that transcend the cultural and civilization borders of the Mediterranean region.

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Introduction

“The ambition of Europe in the Mediterranean is to turn its former power into positive influence, to help build trust among all countries, to share our experience of consolidating peace through economic cooperation. These are the same instruments that shaped the European continent. So we are confident these instruments will also serve to gradually achieve stability and prosperity in Euro-Mediterranean relations, while bringing our societies closer.” George A. Papandreou and Chris Patten

This volume seeks to achieve two related goals. First, it lays out a normative approach to the study of power in International Relations (IR), in particular, to the study of regional security and peace. This approach emphasizes the role of cooperative security practices, region building, and pluralistic integration in order to achieve peaceful change. We ground this approach in “new regionalism” theories that highlight the crucial importance of identity for understanding security (Williams 1998), and in the literature on “security communities” (Deutsch et al. 1957). Security communities are “transnational regions comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler and Barnett 1998, 30).

Second, the volume’s empirical task is to take stock of recent efforts by the European Union (EU) to promote the construction of a Mediterranean “region” of stability and peace via the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or Barcelona Process. Although the EU has associated regional security with pluralistic regional integration and the development of regional identities and mutual trust, an interpretation that resonates with the concept of “security communities,” the latter concept has suffered from an inadequate exploration of the relationship between security community practices and power. Attempting to overcome this problem, and in order to understand what lies behind
the EU’s use of security community practices, this volume suggests that security
community practices represent the application of “normative power” (Manners 2002: 240) in international relations. As we describe below, the practice of normative power
differs significantly from a traditional understanding of the use of power in international
relations. We thus put together this volume’s theoretical and empirical objectives by
asking what was, what is, and what will be of, the EMP or “Barcelona Process,” born in 1995 in the city that bears its name. The chapters in this volume assess the potential of
new security practices to promote a shared sense of security in, and peoples’ regional
identification with, spaces and socially constructed regions that transcend cultural and
civilization borders.

The chapters in this volume begin by looking at the language and intentions of the
Barcelona Declaration. That language represented a radical departure from past efforts to
achieve security through alliances, economic “interdependence,” and other conventional
practices. In a bold departure, the thrust of the Barcelona Declaration was one of
community and region building and the creation of a security partnership, eventually
leading to a security community. The regional community of the Euro-Mediterranean
process is distinctly built on Western Enlightenment principles and values. It depends not
only on shared norms that create a civil and tolerant culture, but also on institutions that
embody those norms with the backing of materially powerful states. In the Mediterranean
region, these norms, institutions, and powerful states all are located in or spring from the
West.

Both of these tasks are especially important in the historical context of post-
"9/11" events, including the forceful security practices the US adopted and carried out in
Afghanistan and Iraq. These events, only a decade after the end of the Cold War, seem once more to be changing the way we understand security practices, agendas, coalitions and goals. What will happen now to security practices that European institutions, such as the EU and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), helped promote at the closing days of the Cold War and after? More specifically, what will happen to the Euro-Mediterranean process as a result of 9/11? Those tragic events may have accelerated the prospect of political and religious conflicts alongside two Mediterranean axes: the West vs. Islam, and North vs. South. Have post 9/11 events enhanced the danger of a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1996) between the West and Islam? Does the prospect of such a clash make the use of normative power less effective and less likely? Indeed, the escalation of violence in the Middle East after 2000 has not only made the prospect of a clash of civilizations more ominous, but it has also raised many more obstacles for the effective use of normative power.

The prospect of major instability and insecurity in the Mediterranean area, therefore, cries for the development of both theoretical and practical suggestions as to how to promote a "convergence of civilizations" around the Mediterranean Sea. The task of bridging these two regional cleavages between rich and poor and between the West and Islam is thus urgent and long overdue. All of the above, of course, means that the importance of constructing a Mediterranean region now transcends the regional boundaries of the Mediterranean itself, and the interests of European states and their Mediterranean partners. Instead, a convergence of civilizations around the Mediterranean Sea is also becoming a critical issue of global security, as well as of global security governance. By global security governance we mean the development of collective
ideational and material resources -- including collective identities, practices, and institutions -- for dealing with the global security challenges of a post-9/11 world.

In the chapter’s second section, we suggest a theoretical framework for studying region building as a practice of regional governance. First, we argue that the global power structure is constituted not only by the distribution of material capabilities, but also by the “balance of practices,” in other words, by the type of security practices states use as part of systems of regional governance. Power, thus, is the ability of a state to induce other states to use its preferred practices. Second, we introduce the concept of “normative power” and its relationship to security practices. Third, we link the concept of security communities, and, in particular, of security community practices, to normative power. Finally, in this section, we ground our theoretical research framework in recent constructivist theory, which deals with the relationship between identity, security, and peace.

In the chapter’s third section, we explain the EMP or Barcelona Process as an experiment in normative power projection and the practice of security building. In addition, we briefly describe the evolution of the EMP and, in particular, of EMP practices. Section four deals with the obstacles before the EMP, arising both from within the Mediterranean region and from global developments, and considers ways to overcome the obstacles. Section five raises several research questions and hypotheses, which subsequent chapters address, with particular emphasis on their respective specific subjects. In this section we also briefly describe these chapters.
Region Building: A Novel Practice of Regional Governance

A New Bipolar Structure?

Even to the untrained observer, the current world looks unmistakably “unipolar.” Not only is the United States by far the most powerful nation on earth; its possession of a disproportionate amount of material resources allows it, if it so desires – after 9/11 it desires -- to behave as a hegemonic global power. As a corollary, other great powers, such as France, Germany, China, and Russia have been relegated to the back stage, and, as shown by the crisis that preceded the 2003 war in Iraq, they are at best playing a subsidiary role in power political games. It is precisely this imbalance of material, primarily military, power, says Robert Kagan (2002), which motivates the US to behave as if the current international system is a Hobbesian “state of nature,” thus, as IR realists would expect (Mearsheimer 2001). In turn, it motivates Europeans to behave as if the world is becoming a Kantian “pacific league,” and, therefore, as liberals would expect (Russett 1993). Indeed, small powers may have the recourse to use rules, legitimized practices, and institutions to bind the most powerful state on earth. However, as shown by the outcome of the confrontation between the US and smaller powers, such as France, Germany, and Russia, which preceded the war in Iraq, the likelihood of small powers to checking the US is very low.

Material power, however, even if possessed in overwhelming quantities, such as the US does, may be translated into influence only in and through practice. For it is only in and through practice that material resources can be directed toward a particular
purpose or target. For example, the state that exercises material power may not know its value and effectiveness until it uses it in practice. Moreover, some practices may fail to turn material resources into actual influence. And still other practices may lead the use of material power to become counter productive, either because they may produce a response that otherwise would not take place, or because they create unintended consequences that may end up decreasing aggregate material power. In addition, the purpose of a practical use of material power will be perceived as authoritative only if it is collectively perceived as legitimate (Weber 1978). Only at the background of collectively accepted norms, however, will the purpose of using power be perceived as legitimate.

Because the effects of power depend on practices and on their legitimacy, what if a less materially powerful state, or combination of states – we have in mind the EU – has devised, invented, or conceived an entirely new set of practices, whose ability to change something in the world, influence others, and do this in ways that appear legitimate, depends, not only on material resources, but primarily on “normative power,” i.e. the ability “to shape conceptions of ‘normal’” (Manners 2002: 240), or “civilian power,” the ability to tame anarchy with civilian (as opposed to military) practices (Duchêne 1973, Whitman nd, Moravcsik 2002, Nicolaidis and Howse 2002)? What if a new form of power has evolved in history, whose ability to induce the adoption of desired political and economic policies depends, less on the ability to use raw material power, in order to induce or to force other states into compliance, than on the ability to attract states to become members or partners of a political community, the access to which, depends on the adoption of a set of norms, practices, and institutions? And what if this power, which has been applied by Europeans since the end of World War II, has already succeeded in
bringing stability, security and well being more often and to a greater number of peoples than the US did by means of material power? If indeed this were the case, it then would not be farfetched to argue that the current global power structure is “bipolar” (Moravcsik 2003b: 74). In this case, the “balance of practices” – what and whose practice has been widely institutionalized as part of a system of governance -- would be as, if not more, important than the balance of material power. If this were the case, power would lie in the ability of practices, and of the norms on which they are based, to diffuse in time and space (geographically and functionally) and thus to “conquer” other states and cultures. Competition in world politics, then, would take place, not only among great or lesser powers, but also, and primarily, among the practices themselves.

**Normative Power**

What, then, is “normative power”, which allows the EU to be effective in influencing the minds and practices of peoples beyond its own? And what are the current alternatives to normative power and related practices, which originate mainly in the US and attempt to change other peoples’ minds and practices by the use of material military power? In this next subsection we offer a preliminary answer to these questions.

Changes in global perceptions, discourse, and security policies happened quite rapidly after 9/11. Driven by anger, desire of revenge, and a conservative ideology, US leaders became increasingly disposed to bypass multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and, as the US did in the war in Iraq, to act alone, or at most, with the help of a few like-minded states. At the strategic level, the US adopted forceful antiterrorist practices of military
preemption, which meant turning its back to international practices of “cooperative security” (more about it below) that had began developing even before the end of the Cold War. In so doing, the US placed itself on a normative collision course with European countries, and other countries, such as Canada, for which, multilateral cooperation and cooperative security had become part, not only of their foreign policy tools, but, also of their self identification. It is in the context of deep disagreements between the US and Europe about the nature of the threat of global terrorism, and about how to deal with it, that, even if simplistic and partly incorrect, Kagan’s (2002) recent characterization of the US as “coming from Mars” and Europe as “coming from Venus” struck a note with large audiences around the world.

A closer look at US’s preemptive security practices shows, that, departing from Cold War containment and deterrence, they take international security as a “cleaning” and “cleansing” operation, as a “getting rid of” kind of operation, undertaken by the forces of freedom, democracy, and open markets against global terrorist networks and the states that supports them (The National Security Strategy 2002). To defend the Western world and its democratic and liberal economic values, the 9/11 aggressors, and those still expected to come along, must be purged rather than be reformed and reintegrated to the system. Forceful preemption and prevention, therefore, mean not only weakening and defeating the terrorist networks (Deibert and Stein 2002), such as al-Qaeda, and the states that support them, like Iran, but also defending the basic rules on which the existing international order is based, if necessary, by force. Seen from this perspective, the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and the war on Iraq, as well as the use of the UN to legitimize anti terrorism warfare, are but the practice’s first formative steps of forcefully
preventing global terrorism threats.

Europeans, on the other hand, which, in the words of Graham Fuller (2003) have “forged their homelands into a new cooperative whole,” and taken their power to be “the power of a gradually expanding international community of consent,” follow seemingly “Kantian” “pacific community” practices and thus conceive their overall security as the enlargement of a liberal democratic security community (Deutsch et al., 1957, Adler and Barnett, 1998). They thus have begun to practice, and would like the whole world to practice, cooperative security, which postwar Europe did so much to perfect. Based on concepts of pluralistic integration and inclusion, cooperative security is "comprehensive," for it links classic security elements to economic, environmental, cultural and human-rights factors. It is also "indivisible," in the sense that one state's security is inseparable from that of other states. Most important, it is "cooperative," i.e. security is based on confidence and cooperation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the work of mutually reinforcing multilateral institutions. Applied to the post 9/11 war on terrorism, it primarily means treating the social, economic, and political conditions that foment terrorism, with multilateral means, and within the boundaries of International Law.

The EU’s adoption of cooperative security fits the mark of a group of states that have pooled their material and ideational resources to become a “normative power.” According to Ian Manners, the concept of normative power, which “comes from its historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution….is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constituted on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics” (Manners 2002: 240, 252). Thus, whereas material power has historically been conducive to understanding political reality
from a national and international point of view, normative power is also conducive and consistent with a transnational and supranational point of view. Whereas material power related practices, such as military preemption, means often bypassing and overruling the rule of law, normative power related practices, such as cooperative security, depend on the diffusion of the rule of law. Whereas states that use material power may be able only to force democracy, the rule of law, and human right practices onto other states (and hope for the best), normative power, if effective, may be able to achieve the same outcome by means of learning processes, which rely on endogenous rather than on exogenous changes, and, thus, it is likely to be more effective and durable.

The notion of normative power is akin, although not identical, to the concept of “civilian power,” which is how Francois Duchêne described the European Community thirty years ago. According to Duchêne

The European Community’s interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force is as far as possible to domesticate relations between states, including those of its own members and those with states outside its frontiers. This means trying to bring international problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics, which have been in the past associated exclusively with ‘home’ and not foreign, that is alien, affairs” (Duchêne 1973).

A quick glance at the EU today, shows, that, in spite of the fact that some Europeans would like Europe to become a “normal” “Westphalian” state, which is endowed with a powerful army, and that some analysts predict that the EU will compete with the US in the future (Kupchan 2002), from the perspective of civilian power “Europeans already wield effective power over peace and war as great as that of the United States, but they do so quietly through ‘civilian power’ [which] does not lie in the development of battalions or bombs, but rather in the quiet promotion of democracy and development through trade, foreign aid and
peacemaking” (Moravcsik 2002:12). The EU as civilian power obtains security by instilling expectations and dispositions in near abroad states, to the effect that adoption of EU norms and values will gain them inclusion into the ranks of the EU. A civilian power, thus, wields influence via EU accession, “perhaps the single most powerful policy instrument for peace and security in the world today” (Moravcsik 2003a). It also provides civilian development assistance, builds global trust needed to manage crises, and works through multilateral means and world public opinion. (Moravcsik 2003a. See also Whitman nd). Most important, however, through “the propensity of the EU to seek to reproduce itself by encouraging regional integration around the world,” the EU’s civilian power’s “power” rests mainly in it becoming a “‘laboratory’ where options for politics beyond the state are generated, for the taking,” and, thus, also in it becoming a normative and practical model of regional or even global governance (Nicolaidis and Howse 2002:768, 771, 782).

It follows, then, that, as normative and civilian power, the EU has integrated democracy, the rule of law, peacekeeping and human rights to its own identity, and has began to act in a fashion that, with a measure of exaggeration, may be called “Kantian,” not as Kagan says, because it is weak in military capabilities. Rather, as Nicolaidis (2003, see also Wendt 1999) recently argued, the EU has chosen to be weak in military capabilities, because it has adopted a “Kantian” culture. Moreover, in the EU solidarity is grounded in shared projects not in shared history. And Europeaness ought not to mean a shared identity but rather the sharing of identities…. This vision speaks against reification of the European boundary (whatever it may be) as we move from our relationship with the other European to our relationship with the non-European ‘other.’” There is no radical separation between national, European, and universal community of fate, only a gradation in the amount and range of common uncertainties to be faced and managed. Thus, consistency between the EU’s pursuit of justice within its borders and beyond should be a paramount concern (Nicolaidis and Howse 2002: 773).
Such as the European Community, and later the EU, the Helsinki Process, as loosely institutionalized in the CSCE, also played an important role in the emergence of normative power in the world scene, and, thus, in the development of practices that seek the resolution of conflicts by peaceful multilateral means. Ideas of inclusion into a European house helped the Helsinki process and the CSCE to “conquer” the Soviet empire, and these ideas, institutionalized in NATO’s partnership for peace, helped turn NATO into a security community building institution. Cooperative security received a big boost at the end of the Cold War, not as a result of military victory by the West over the East, but due to processes of identity and interest change, that the Helsinki process and the CSCE helped to unleash. Moreover, the human rights practices and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) that the CSCE helped place on the agenda of world politics, were diffused to other parts of the world, most importantly, South East Asia.

**Security Communities**

In the last few decades, Europeans have used normative power to turn themselves into a Union, and are now using normative power to stabilize the near abroad and thus to guarantee their regional security. They have done and are doing this, and, in the process, they are now turning what previously was “external” into “internal,” “foreign” into “domestic,” and “them” into “we,” by learning to practice peaceful change within the expanding boundaries of their collective identity. They have in fact used normative power to socially construct an expanding pluralistic security community. The main point that we would like to advance in this sub-section, then, is that Europe as normative power is achieving its “pacification” goals, both, domestically and in its immediately
contiguous geographical environment, by using security community-building practices.

Some examples of security communities include Scandinavia, Canada and the US, the EU, the Euro-Atlantic community, if it does not disintegrate, and, to a lesser extent, the southern cone of Latin America and ASEAN. The concept of security community goes back to Karl Deutsch, who defined security community as “a group of people who has become integrated.” According to Deutsch, security communities may be either “amalgamated” or “pluralistic.” In an amalgamated security community, two or more (sovereign) states formally merge into an expanded state. On the other hand, a pluralistic security community retains the legal independence of separate states but integrates them to the point that the units entertain “dependable expectations of peaceful change.” A pluralistic security community develops when its members possess a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions and mutual responsiveness – a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of “we-ness,” or a “we-feeling” among states. (Deutsch et al. 1957: 5-6). Pluralistic security communities, in turn, may be loosely or tightly coupled. Loosely coupled pluralistic security communities maintain the minimum properties of the Adler/Barnett definition. Tightly coupled pluralistic security communities, on the other hand, possess a political regime that lies between a sovereign state and a centralized regional government (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30). The Euro Atlantic Area, for example, is a loosely coupled security community, whereas the EU is a tightly coupled pluralistic security community, with a propensity to become amalgamated.

To understand the role security communities play in region building and pacification processes, it is important to take community, not only as a group of people,
who interact on the basis of common values and understandings. Rather, community refers to a social structure that constitutes the identities and interests of community members. Community “we-feeling,” therefore, is not only in people heads, but it is also institutionalized in community practices. Second, security communities are not a geographic place made of states, but the material representation of the condition or state of peace. In other words, peace is an ongoing condition or state in which peoples and states constituting pluralistic security communities find themselves. Third, security communities amount to a mechanism of international security that is different, and, in some ways antithetical, to the balance-of-power mechanism. Whereas achieving security by means of the balance of power warrants the use of deterrence, compellence, and preemptive force, a security community mechanism, because of shared norms and identities, enables states to become secure in relation to one another. It therefore relies on a different and more benign set of practices, such as dialogue and persuasion. Security, thus, seems increasingly to be related not only to how many tanks and missiles a state has in relation to other states, but also to whether the states inhabit a common space characterized by common values and norms (Adler 1998a, Adler and Barnett 1998).

Only those states that learn how to achieve and maintain a "we-feeling" develop into security communities. Learning and not balancing thus becomes part of the mechanism of change, in other words, by learning we do not mean exclusively the internalizing of some idea or belief by individuals. Rather, we also mean an active process of collective redefinition and interpretation of reality, which, based on new causal and normative knowledge, becomes institutionalized and, thus, has practical effects. It is therefore the change, not only of individual minds, but, primarily, of background
knowledge, institutionalized in practice, which leads to the enlargement of the group of people who practice peaceful change.

Although security communities first develop due to factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other’s direction, they are not spontaneous creations. Rather they rely on individuals, state institutions, and regional international and transnational institutions, which turn structural potential and propensities into social and political reality. Agents rely on material and ideational resources of states, which they infuse with the shared meanings around which new identities evolve. Without material resources (and expectations of increased welfare and security in the future), agents may not be able to apply normative power. But without normative concepts of proper and legitimate domestic and international behavior (democracy, human rights, sustainable development, "the Asian way to development," etc.), agents may not be able to legitimize the project of seeking the adoption of a regional transnational identity. From the point of view of security communities, therefore, we may understand the role normative power plays as a normative magnetic attraction of periphery states to the core. This magnetic attraction is the wellspring of both mutual trust and collective identity, which, in turn, are the proximate necessary conditions for the development of dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett, 1998).

Identity, Security, and Peace: A Sociological Explanation of Peaceful Change

It is relatively easy to understand how a state that uses its superior material power against weaker states ends up “persuading” them. Pain, loss, grief, and military defeat leads to a change of preferences. However, how do political agents exerting normative power and
using security community making practices achieve the goal of creating “normality,” i.e. of constituting reality in ways that fit the norms on whose behalf power is being exerted? We may find some preliminary answers to this question in new theoretical perspectives on the role of culture, identity, social communication, and regionalism in international relations (Acharya 2001, Adler 1998b). Although these new theoretical perspectives have built on a recent turn to IR constructivism (Kratochwil 1989, Onuf 1989, Ruggie 1998 and Wendt 1999), which suggests that cultural and normative factors are critical to the development of international cooperation, they also have a strong liberal component (Solingen 1999), which emphasizes the role of liberalizing coalitions in the construction of peaceful collective identities. Both constructivism and liberalism address the question of how peaceful change develops by looking at transactions, socialization processes, institutional developments, and domestic political processes by means of which mutual trust and shared identities develop.

These ingredients of international change are central to new theoretical frameworks of regionalism in international relations (Acharya 2001, Checkel 1999, Katzenstein 1996). Theorists of regionalism point to regional integration in the post-cold war context as a key indicator of international change because regional integration changes the character of state sovereignty and national identity. Thus, the new literature on regionalism no longer conceptualizes regions in terms of geographical contiguity, but rather in terms of purposeful social, political, cultural, and economic interaction among states which often (but not always) inhabit the same geographical space (Calleya 1997). Theorists of the new regionalism hypothesize that the purposeful guidance of these interactions can lead to the creation of a regional political culture and a regional
“identity” that will have important implications for peace and stability (Jong Choi and Caporaso 2002).

A central premise of the new regionalism theories is that states’ interests and their sense of security are relative and dependent on their identities (Wendt 1994, 1999, see also Del Sarto in this volume). The definition of an actor’s identity (“we”) is always in reference to another actor (“them”), and this need for an identity defined in opposition can lead to conflict (Mercer 1995). As new regions are created and existing regions are enlarged, a new "we" may be created. A common identity can ease negotiations and compromises among conflicting interests, provide a basis for shared interests, and thus create a more solid basis for political stability. New social identities are constructed around commonly agreed attributes, norms, and principles of legitimate behavior. The identification of shared identities and mutual interests can thus replace threat perceptions. "Talk-shops," "seminar diplomacy," and confidence-building measures, widely practiced by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO's Partnership for Peace (Adler 1998a), and a variety of Asian institutions (Acharya 2001), are strategic interactions aimed at creating an environment that can lead to the creation of shared meanings, social reality, and mutual trust (Attinà 2001).iv

Identity, however, is neither a "cause" of security in any positivist sense, nor it is a necessary or a sufficient condition for its existence. Rather a shared identity is a collective meaning that becomes attached to material reality, thus helping to constitute practices, which make people feel more secure within their national or their transnational "borders." Shared social identities thus play a constitutive role in that they account “for the properties of things by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist”
Because shared identities are learned by agents their intentions can play a causal role in the construction and reconstruction of security practices (Adler and Barnett 2000). In addition, identity always works in relationship to and interacts with other social processes and variables, including material resources. This is why it is mistaken and futile to artificially separate between “ideas” and interests and to stick to a purely materialist understanding of power. Of course interests are usually articulated with the help of material resources, but identity enters the power equation in the way people set agendas and talk about the world. It also enters in the ability of people to make their identity-based understandings of reality "stick" as taken-for-granted collective reality (Cox 1983, Barnett and Duvall 2002).

This “identity” approach to security is consistent with a "social communication" theoretical understanding of regional integration. This theoretical understanding suggests that a regional political identity does not emerge from the convergence of pre-existing actors' interests, but through conceptual bargaining and argumentative consensus. Over time, as key concepts and norms are accepted as a part of collective identity, the spread of that identity arises from active persuasion and socialization rather than solely from instrumental bargaining and the exchange of fixed interests (Deutsch et al. 1957; Habermas 1984, Risse 2000). Instrumental agreements are not unimportant, however, and political actors often use normative understandings in a rhetorical fashion for instrumental reasons (Schimmelfennig 2001). However, instrumental use of norms and instrumental agreements may in time become the structures within which deeper processes of social communication and the internalization of values and norms develop.

We are not naïve to think that, across cultures, civilizations, and states that have
conflicting interests, processes of social communication free of power politics and instrumental considerations can easily develop. Nor do we believe that it is possible to think in the context of regional conflict resolution and conflict prevention about social communication processes that resemble Habermas's ideal type of dialogue aimed at shared understandings (Habermas 1984). The reason is that a necessary condition for such processes to occur is the previous existence of a "life-world" of shared understandings, meanings, and discourse. But these are precisely the missing elements in conflicts that pit states, not only with different interests and power capabilities, but also with different cultures and civilization backgrounds.

Where lies, then, the potential of social communication for constructing collective identities and thus helping to promote security and peace? Persuasion that appeals to the scientific truth of statements, as in epistemic communities (Adler and Haas 1992), will not do. Moral persuasion also is very unlikely, not only because many of the most intractable conflicts are about the location of the just and moral point, but also, because people do not agree on the meaning of justice. Thus, the potential of social communication to change identities, promote trust, and help change interests in the direction of security and peace, relies on social communication’s effect on people's practices. Said otherwise, social communication may motivate people to practice the same practices. It is thus the practical or pragmatic agreement on practicing the same practices, for example, the rule of law, which, in time can lay the basis for conflicting actors to develop reciprocal peaceful dispositions.

The most obvious example of this process in which the purposeful shaping of a common identity is expected to lead to regional stability is the enlargement of the EU.
The Cold War had created a “we-versus-them” dynamic in Europe built on a perception of threat, which raised the odds of violent conflict to levels deemed unacceptable. The integration process, however, rested on a common cultural basis and was driven by expectations of enhanced security and economic welfare. The accession of the Visegrad countries into the EU, for example, is a deliberate attempt to bring these countries into a shared identity called “Europe” that has already been constructed around a specific set of norms, principles, and behaviors spelled out in the Accession criteria. These criteria are intended to construct a new liberal, capitalist, democratic identity in former Communist countries through a set of specific practices. Those countries that desire to be part of the European “region” must demonstrate that they have built new institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. They must develop a functioning market economy and show that they have the ability to take on the obligations of community membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. The architects of the criteria that leads to and enforces these practices believe that they create a common identity necessary for regional integration and thus, for regional security.

The belief that security is built on a common identity is nowhere more obvious than the EU’s unexpected decision to accept a second wave of applicants for EU entry (Tovias 2001). That decision was taken under the pressure of events surrounding the wars of Yugoslav succession and the Kosovo crisis. When war broke out in Croatia in 1991, policy-makers recognized it as the first war since 1945 on what they considered to be European soil. The failure of various European efforts to contain the crisis—from offering aid to a united Yugoslavia to the creation of a European Monitoring Mission to
oversee various cease-fires led to important “learning” on the part of EU elites. EU intervention in conflicts on European soil would not be enough; a common European identity was the surest road to a stable peace on the continent. At the end of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, EU elites believed more than ever before that war in Europe could only be prevented through the creation of a common European identity deeply embedded in EU membership (Crawford 2000).

We must be careful, however, not to push the generalization potential of the European case too far. Conditions in Europe may not be replicable elsewhere, and it would be unwise to argue that what was good for fifteen European countries will necessarily be good for the West and Islam, or for Israel and the Palestinian people. We do not mean by this that a social communication theory cannot be applicable to other regions, such as the Mediterranean. We mean, rather, that we first need to understand better the conditions under which pluralistic integration may develop in the Mediterranean. And we also must be aware of the huge obstacles that Mediterranean integration effort faces and will continue to face.

Pluralistic integration may be so difficult to achieve, not only because it takes time for people to change their identities. As shown by the examples of Europe (Checkel 1999), and, to a lesser extent, Southeast Asia (Acharya 2001), people may be able to develop new transnational identities, which overlap with, and stand on top of, deeper and older national and ethnic identities. The difficulty is rather one of agency, because, for pluralistic integration to succeed, agents must first seize material resources and constitutive norms (Kratochwil 1989), and develop reasons and the political will, which then makes possible the construction of collective identity transnational spaces. Once
such cognitive regions (Adler 1997) are socially constructed, however, people can then imagine that they share their destiny with people of other nations, who happen to share their values and expectations of proper action in domestic and international affairs. This is why social communication and pluralistic integration may be conducive to peace.

**The EMP: An Experiment in Normative Power Projection and the Practice of Security-Community Making**

**The Experiment**

As the EU’s main Middle East policy instrument and preferred tool for engaging Islam in a “dialogue of civilizations,” the EMP or Barcelona Process is probably one of the best examples, and probably the hardest case, of using normative power and of taking advantage of security community building practices, including cooperative security practices, to try to deal with the root causes of global terrorism and to socially construct a Mediterranean partnership identity. In fact, the Barcelona Process is a laboratory where one of the most outstanding experiments in international relations may have started to take place. We are referring to the invention of a region that does not yet exist and to the social engineering of a regional identity that rests, neither on blood, nor religion, but on civil society voluntary networks and civic beliefs. The long-term aim of this experiment is to construct in the Mediterranean region a pluralistic security community whose practices are synonyms of peace. Thus, the Mediterranean concept is about building future peace by building present community links. In the short term and middle term, however, the experiment consists of constructing a less ambitious regional security partnership (Attinà in this volume). While stopping short of attaining institutionalized
dependable expectations of peaceful change, because of states’ consensus to cooperate through multilateral mechanisms, such as treaties, stability pacts, and CBMs, regional security partnerships may nevertheless be able to achieve a reduction of violence and the enhancement of stability and peace.

In spite of the fact that we do not believe that a Mediterranean pluralistic security community will happen in our lifetimes -- if only because it is not a short-term goal of political actors, and thus it may take a very long time to develop -- we still use the concept of security communities in the context of Mediterranean integration, because the Barcelona Process has been framed around pluralistic security community processes, institutions, and practices. And, although the present stage of relations make the notion of constructing the less ambitious regional security partnerships more plausible, still the main power being projected is not material but normative and the overall mechanism at play is not balance of power but rather security community making. Moreover, because of the logical, historical, and practical congruence and relationship between a redefined understanding of security as comprehensive, indivisible, and cooperative on one hand, and the development of security communities on the other, security community building already has consciously or unconsciously become part of Mediterranean integration practice.

**The Evolution of the EMP**

The Barcelona Process, or EMP, is a wide multilateral framework of political, economic, and social relations that, before EU enlargement, involved 700 million people in 27 countries or territories around the Mediterranean. In addition to the 15 EU states, the
EMP included Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority. EU enlargement has turned Cyprus and Malta, which, until May 2004 were partner countries, into full members of the Union. It also has added eight more countries to the EMP: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

Like the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which set in motion the CSCE, on which the Barcelona Process was modeled, the EMP established 3 baskets. These baskets deal, respectively, with: (a) security on the basis of mutual confidence and partnership, (b) a zone of shared prosperity through economic integration, and (c) the rapprochement between peoples through social and cultural links and the creation of a Mediterranean civil society. The political element of the Barcelona declaration includes a list of principles concerning respect for democracy and the rule of law, human rights, the right of self-determination, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and peaceful resolution of disputes. It also stipulates cooperation to combat terrorism. On the economic front, the Barcelona document provides for a regional partnership to promote economic development by means of a free trade zone to be created by the year 2010. Basket three of the Barcelona Declaration refers to the building of cultural bridges between Mediterranean civil societies.

We may to a certain extent regard the Barcelona Process as part of the EU increasingly pro-active Middle East policy. Thus, the EU was moved to start the Barcelona Process primarily because of fears of immigration from the South, and of xenophobia in the North. It also perceived security threats arising from the South, such as terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction, and felt anxiety arising from the growth of
militant Islamic fundamentalism. The EU also regards the Barcelona Process as a strategy to compete with other trade blocks, without having to invite non-European Mediterranean countries to join the EU. The EU says “take this money, the norms, and the practices, go create your own region and, thus, give us your stability.” To the South, however, the Barcelona Process has so far meant, at best, "Euros," and, at worst, a neo-colonialist plot. All of the above, however, is not incompatible with the notion that, in order to achieve these instrumental goals, the EU chose to practice what it knows best, regional security through partnership and mutual confidence. Although the Barcelona Process was born out of instrumental necessity and calculation by European states, and for the time being it rightly focuses in the more modest goal of building a regional security partnership, decades from now, this experiment may result in the construction of a Mediterranean security community. A security community will not require Mediterranean partner countries to become full members of the EU, but it will provide access to the EU’s internal market, and, what is more important, it will promote peaceful change in the entire region. The concept of building future peace in the Mediterranean, thus, goes through building present community.

Before the EU became involved in Mediterranean pluralistic integration, efforts to create a Mediterranean “region” were severely limited or failed altogether. In 1972, with France leading the way, the European Community launched the “Global Mediterranean Policy,” which was aimed at setting bilateral trade and aid agreements between European and Mediterranean Non-Member Countries (MNMCs). It was the first time that the Mediterranean was recognized as a region (Bicchi 2003). Subsequently, the foreign ministers of Italy, Libya, Malta, and Tunisia held a series of meetings with the goal of
establishing cooperative programs in communications, tourism, fishing, and trade among the nonaligned countries of the Mediterranean. Due to limited representation, however, cooperation did not materialize. In 1973 the CSCE identified a Mediterranean component to its program, and throughout the 1970s and 1980s, it called together regional experts in economics, science, culture, and the environment to explore cooperative efforts that would build mutual trust and contribute to regional stability. The meetings accomplished little, however, and did not attract the attention of the United States, which was focused primarily on the East-West conflict. The Euro-Arab Dialogue began in 1974, in the wake of the oil crisis in order to establish cooperation between members of the European Community and members of the Arab League. These efforts, however, also remained frozen in the context of the Cold War, and the insistence of the Arab League that the Palestinian issue be placed on the agenda, a condition that was unacceptable to the Europeans, became a large obstacle. The Action Plan for the Mediterranean, which was formulated within the framework of the Barcelona Convention of 1976 to combat pollution of the Mediterranean sea was indeed successful, but the focus of cooperation has remained limited to technical environmental issues, without “spillover” effects on other areas of concern (Haas 1990).

In a post-war world dominated by East-West confrontation, the creation of a Mediterranean area of cooperation and stability was clearly a low priority for the world’s powerful states. The end of the Cold War, however, promised to eliminate the obstacles to regional cooperation, and in 1990, the European Community began an initiative called “Renovated Mediterranean Policy,” which dealt mainly with financial aid. In turn, aiming to boost regional economic development and social conditions through cooperation, and
to increase regional trust and transparency, Italy and Spain promoted the idea of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). The Western European Union (WEU) and the Council of Europe have also been involved in regional trust promoting activities. In addition, the French put forward in 1990-1991 a plan for a Western Mediterranean CSCM and NATO formulated a Mediterranean policy in 1994, promising to work with non-members to strengthen regional stability. Encouraged by progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process, the EU became formally involved in the project of creating regional stability. The first major steps were given at the European Council Summit of 1992, which were followed by the EMP initiative in 1995; it included the largest financial commitment outside the EU to launch economic, cultural, and social initiatives for the region. vi

The objectives of the Barcelona Declaration were slated to be confirmed by twenty-seven Mediterranean states in Malta in 1997. But the stalled Middle East peace process and ensuing tensions in the Middle East overshadowed the meeting and cast grave doubts on the partnership’s success. Subsequent meetings, including at Stuttgart, Marseille, and Valencia did very little to get the EMP out of its failing path, or, worst, irrelevance. True, some bilateral economic agreements were signed, and the idea of having a free-trade area by the year 2010 still stands. Moreover, regional cooperation in the field of Justice, and in combating terrorism and drug trafficking has been added to the list of agreements and there has been a great deal of activity at the level of civil society networks, mainly about promoting common cultural and security understandings, including EuroMeSCo, a security think-tank, which has become an important example and leading promoter of seminar diplomacy in the region.
After less than a decade, however, the "spirit of Barcelona" is almost gone, and, the main reason, other than the failure of the Oslo peace process, is that the Barcelona Process focused too much on form and procedure and too little on content. To survive, the Barcelona Process will thus require that all of its members agree to endow the concept of partnership with shared content, meaning, and to spend material, political and symbolic capital to develop shared understandings about the purposes of Mediterranean partnership. The purposes of a meaningful Mediterranean partnership should reflect the interests neither of the West nor Islam. Rather they should aim at producing a new multicultural space, which does not come at the expense of national cultures and religions. A new EMP content will require the development of shared narratives and myths, which, in this case, may develop only from thick social communication between civil society members and social networks (Neumann 2002). In addition, only Mediterranean peoples can and will determine, in practice, the meanings and content of their regional endeavor. We believe however, that, a good place to start is the rule of law, regardless of whether different national laws are compatible or incompatible across national borders.

**EMP Practices**

We should be careful not to take security community building, or, as in the case of the EMP, the more modest goal of regional security partnership building, as a proven formula for bringing about regional security, peace and stability. Rather, the process of building cooperative security will be one of trial and error. This trial and error experiment also applies to discourse, which is an intrinsic part of people’s practices. For example,
when it became evident that CBMs, with their share of hard security measures, such as arms control, were a non-starter for conflicting Israelis and Arabs, the discourse shifted to Partnership Building Measures (PBM), a softer security concept based on political dialogue.

At the most basic level, the goal of regional peaceful change is served by the practice of pluralistic integration or “region building.” On one hand, as in the case of EU’s enlargement from 15 members to 25 members in 2004, there is integration “deluxe.” Accordingly, the EU uses inclusion to its ranks as a powerful incentive for states -- which by culture, tradition and historical circumstances are perceived to be either “European” or consistent with a European identity -- to accept the EU’s “acquis communautaire” and the postwar set of norms and values -- e.g. democracy, the rule of law, human rights and peaceful change -- that made the EU what it is today. Even if Schimmelfennig (2001) is right when he argues that prospective members may agree to follow the “acquis communautaire” only for instrumental reasons, a change of practices and discourse often leads those states that subsequently adopt them to embrace the norms and values, on which the EU practices and discourse are based (Risse 2000).

On the other hand, the EU has opened a second track of pluralistic integration that creates a sense of togetherness or regional “we feeling,” without the need to offer EU membership. For this purpose it has adopted and adapted a set of practices, first developed by the CSCE a generation ago, which are intended to shape new transnational identities based on liberal values among states that belong to the EU’s sphere of influence, such as Russia, the Ukraine, and Middle East states (Adler 1998a). Consonant with the region building practice, the EU invites prospective regional partners to join in
the effort of constructing common regions and a “Wider Europe-Neighborhood” for the benefit of both European and partner states, and their respective peoples.

“Wider Europe-Neighborhood” refers to a 2003 initiative of the EU to create “a ring of friends with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperate relations. It suggests that, in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, all the neighborhood countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s internal market. This should be accompanied by further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital” (Patten 2003, see also Commission of the European Communities, 2003). Although EU officials have argued that “Wider Europe-Neighborhood” purports to deepen and strengthen the Barcelona Process, the relationship between the latter and the former is still unclear. On the other hand, it is clear that “Wider Europe-Neighborhood” is a new institutionalized means of promoting pluralistic integration, without creating expectations of future EU membership. As Commissioner Chris Patten argued when suggesting the recent concept of “Wider Europe-Neighborhood,” “over the past decade, the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument has undeniably been the promise of EU membership. This is not sustainable. For the coming decade, we need to find new ways to export the stability, security and prosperity we have created within the enlarged EU. We should begin by agreeing on a clearer vision for relations with our neighbors” (Patten 2003).

Region building, such as in the case of the Barcelona Process and the recent initiative of a “Wider Europe-Neighborhood,” works by means of the social construction of collective regional understandings, especially the development of new and
encompassing social identities. As noted above, these identities do not cancel deeply seated cultural and national identities, but rather pools those identities into a larger “we.” Following the CSCE model, EMP partner states are invited to belong to a region of peace and stability that does not exist, but which is supposed to develop because people collectively believe that promoting region building is mutually beneficial. Partners receive the material pay-offs from belonging to “regions” and “neighborhoods,” for example access to markets, and financial and technological aid. They also have access to human and symbolic capital and to the institutional “software” that is conducive to modernization. The EU side of the bargain consists of inducing partners to accept liberal values of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and peaceful change, with the expectation that these normative changes will lead to peace and stability. There is, however, nothing naïve and idealistic in the steps and practices the EU uses in order to build partnerships and neighborhoods. Rather, these steps and practices help translate normative power into real material influence, and, sometimes, also political control.

Region building depends on practices that have been evolving since the end of World War II, first and foremost, from the process of European integration, and, second from the CSCE process. From European integration, the EMP has borrowed the practice of creating common economic spaces, which start from free trade areas. These free trade areas generate spill over effects that lead to more integration in related economic endeavors, such as in transportation, energy, and communication. Thus, for example, the EMP’s Basket II, which purports to lead to the creation of an “area of shared prosperity,” owes much to neo-functionalist intellectual conceptions, which guided European integration processes (Haas 1958). The EMP’s association agreements, negotiated
between the EU and its partners with the aim of establishing free trade in industrial
goods, follow the EU practice of introducing special Human Rights clauses in the
agreements, that empower members to complain about Human Rights abuses. Similar
clauses have been added to EMP’s dedicated assistance programs (MEDA).

From the CSCE process, the EMP has adopted a series of practices that played a
positive and active role in bringing the Cold War to a peaceful end. First, directly
emulating the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the EMP adopted a “code of peace” (Jones 1991)
-- i.e. a set of principles that set the normative guidelines around which the prospective
region is supposed to be constituted. These principles include respect for International
Law and human rights, non-intervention, respect for the territorial integrity of states, and
the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. Second, the EMP adopted soft security
practices and discourses, such as regular political and security dialogues, security expert
meetings, and “seminar diplomacy.” Third, the EMP has adopted the practice of PBM, which, as argued above, amount to soft CBMs, with the aim of building trust and
collective security understandings between EU members and partner states.

One of the most important initiatives in the security field has been the drafting of
a “Charter for Peace and Stability,” which, modeled after the 1993 “European Stability
Pact” in Central and Eastern Europe, aims to increase regional security and stability by
means of enhanced political dialogue, PBM, preventive diplomacy, crisis management,
and post-conflict rehabilitation measures. Fourth, the EMP followed in the steps of the
CSCE and developed a cultural basket, with the purpose of breaking the barriers between
cultures around the Mediterranean, and promoting a dialogue between civilizations. High
on the negotiation agenda of the EMP is now a “Declaration of principles of the Dialogue
of Cultures and Civilizations” and the establishment of a “Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures.” Based mainly on civil society networks of academicians, students, religious authorities, and the like, this basket aims at building the long-term conditions for the future development of a Mediterranean security community.

**Obstacles for Region Building in the Mediterranean**

*The Obstacles*

A number of serious obstacles have emerged that block or distort the realization of EMP goals. First, within Europe we have seen a move to the right and the rise of nationalism, with frightening implications for EU’s relations with the Arab world and specifically for the Euro-Mediterranean process and its multilateral agenda. Internationalist coalitions are weakened in the process as “backlash” political coalitions come to power (see Solingen in this volume). Their decidedly anti-liberal stance, nationalism, xenophobia, and commitment to territoriality, sovereignty and self-reliance spell a rejection of "multilateralism,” openness, and construction of a regional identity which lie at the heart of the Euro-Mediterranean process.

A second obstacle is the persistence and strengthening of authoritarian regimes in North Africa and in the Middle East. These regimes reject the liberal orientation of the Barcelona process and resist any kind of "conditionality” imposed upon them. As Calleya (in this volume) writes: “many of the requirements of free trade and greater foreign investment (abolition of monopolies and licensing arrangements, reduction of customs and excise fees, legal security and transparency, autonomous civil society organizations and institutions) threaten the revenue-base and even the power base of neo-patrimonial
authoritarian regimes.” Many of these states are also torn by internal schisms and by blurred territorial definitions. Their very existence is tenuous, and their own national identities are uncertain. It is questionable whether, without a secure national identity, these states will be able to assume the regional identity believed to be necessary for the building of a security community.

A third obstacle lies in the divergence of expectations and goals that the various partners bring to the table. While European countries seek stability through the "careful Westernization" of the Arab world (Tovias in this volume), or the “convergence of civilizations” toward the European model, the Arab world seeks preferential access to European markets and development aid and resists Europe’s vision of convergence.

Two historical legacies—colonialism and economic “backwardness” provide a fourth obstacle. Colonial domination and exploitation have bred deep-seeded resentment and created cultures of victimization in North Africa and the Middle East. The economic “backwardness” of the Arab states around the Mediterranean have been perpetuated and deepened by colonialism and European domination. The economic inequality between Europe and the rest of the Mediterranean has created a structure of asymmetrical interdependence, giving the EU the upper hand in all negotiations in the Euro-Mediterranean process. The trade dependence of the MNMCs on the EU has increased in recent years, while Europe’s trade dependence on the MNMCs is negligible and consists primarily of dependence on energy supplies. Even that dependence is likely to weaken as the EU enlarges and begins to look eastward to the former Soviet Union to fill its energy requirements.

Indeed, EU enlargement will greatly exacerbate these legacies. Trade dependence
of MNMCs on the EU will increase, leading them to perceive the EU as a more
formidable trading bloc. And as the EU looks eastward for products that currently come
from MNMCs, EU trade sanctions will “bite” more than before (Tovias 2001). This will
deepen Arab suspicions of European neo-colonial intentions in the Euro-Med process.
And as Tovias also notes, as the EU turns its focus eastward, interest in the
Mediterranean will continue to wane, and the Barcelona process will lose steam.

Furthermore, once EU enlargement is completed, most Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) will flow to Eastern Europe, and without an infusion of capital, countries of the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) will remain low-wage raw materials suppliers
and export platforms for the EU’s industrial machine. To the extent that FDI flows into
the region, it will be attracted by low-cost labor and will concentrate in labor-intensive
production methods across the industrial spectrum. In modern sectors, plants in these
countries might be simply "screwdriver factories"--assembling final products, importing
key components, and using few local suppliers. Other foreign investments might be in
"services"--sales, marketing, and distribution outlets for imports produced in the EU. Or
investments will flow to low-technology extractive sectors, like oil and gas. All
innovative activity would continue to be concentrated in the EU as the “core.” This
means that prospects for rapid economic development of the MNMCs are bleak.

These two historical legacies have a pernicious effect on the Barcelona process.
The agenda of Barcelona is liberal, the practices are meant to be liberal, but the legacies
and heavy-handed behavior in the region distort and discredit the liberal agenda, an
agenda already battered by the rise of illiberal right-wing nationalism in Europe.
Fifth, the liberal agenda carries with it its own problems and contradictions that act as cultural roadblocks to region building. Economic inequities are exacerbated by current policies of economic liberalization, and the longer-term effects of globalization can undermine the process of political liberalization envisioned at Barcelona by exacerbating economic inequality and thus endangering liberal democracy. George Joffe’s (2002) discussion of the effects of the imposition of the “Washington Consensus” in Algeria provides an apt example. There, economic liberalization facilitated the growth of a unaccountable elite, feeding on patronage and outside of the control of the democratic state.

Furthermore, liberalism is considered by many Muslim critics to be an unattractive blueprint for social and economic life. Its relentless insistence on individual freedom and competition weakens community. Community provides protection, cooperation, and mutual obligation, but strong community also interferes with the operation of the market and its principles of self-interest and competition. Markets, in turn, breed insecurity and inequality, feeding the longing for human community. Many Muslim critics regard the market as deficient and flawed for these reasons.

And many Muslim leaders eschew democracy, arguing that many democracies pay only lip service to the rule of law, minority and citizen rights, and independent judicial review. With its “tyranny of the majority,” repression of minorities, and absence of a binding system of values, democratic systems, they argue, can actually exacerbate social and cultural conflict. In periods of economic uncertainty and political transition, when states that once provided entitlements pull back or are dismantled according to neo-liberal demands, when democracies are so constructed that they fail to protect rights, and
when the introduction of markets leads to deep insecurities, the strong values and rich symbolic resources of community and religion offer hope in their promise of collective power to those populations who feel powerless. Many right-wing nationalists as well as “liberal” Western critics make similar arguments (Zakaria 1997, Crawford 1998).

Differences between Muslim and Western critics arise mainly over which justice system should constrain political power.

Most importantly, Europe's liberal identity and its liberal discourse and practices are out of step with the reality that Europe's interaction with Islam has helped create.

Thus, the Barcelona Process is caught between the language of post-colonialism and the behavior of neo-colonialism. What this means is that Europe’s security community practices, which were so successful elsewhere, for example in eastern Europe, are out of step, not only with Islam, and Europe's negative legacy in the Islamic world, but, also, with Europe's own political objectives, the internal struggles within European liberalism, and Europe's turn to the right, and its own neo-colonial and power politics behavior.

Sixth, the Israeli-Arab conflict, in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular, together with the events that were unleashed by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, provide one of the most visible obstacles to the realization of the Barcelona Process. Since the EMP’s inception in 1995, the Middle East peace process was halting and uncertain, and the higher the tensions, the more the EMP was disrupted and weakened. Thus when the 2000 Camp David talks between Israelis and Palestinians failed to produce an agreement, the “El-Aksa Intifada” erupted, and the bloodshed began, leading to de facto demise of the Oslo Peace Process, the EMP entered a phase of permanent crisis. These events thus helped to produce a deep cleft, not only between Israel and
moderate Arab countries that were promoting the Barcelona Process, but also between Israel and Europe. The triangular partnership between Europe, the Arab world, and Israel, is now in turmoil.

At the same time, emboldened by the disappearance of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and empowered by President Bush’s lack of opposition to Israeli measures in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel remains steadfast in its opposition to any European intervention in the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While the Palestinian Authority still looks up to Europe for diplomatic support, both, Europeans and Palestinians are too weak to withstand American post 9/11 “engineering” of the Middle East, partly by the use of force. The best one can hope now is that the Roadmap to Peace in the Middle East, which the warring parties have now accepted, will bring about some measure of cooperation and a division of labor between the US and the EU. For example, the US can “deliver” Sharon and the Europeans can “deliver” Arafat. However, it is not clear whether Arafat or any of his representatives want or can reach an agreement with Israel under a Sharon government, and it is still to soon to tell whether President Bush is determined to bring Sharon to fully implement the Roadmap and whether the rift between the US and the EU, which became very acute during the war in Iraq, will allow future American-European cooperation in bringing about a peaceful solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Seventh, and following on the above, American hegemonic power and the 2002 American security strategy (The National Security Strategy 2002), based on predominance, preemption and preventive war, pose one of the strongest obstacles to the Barcelona Process. America’s first reaction to the tragic events of 9/11 was to redefine the ideological lines in the world; the new global divide would become the West versus
Islam. The Bush administration showed that the US would not hesitate to send its "legions," in order to uphold its values. The "war on terror" led to a redefinition of alliances around the world, pitting in one camp the US and all those states that favored the US in its war on terror, and in the other camp all those states that supported terrorists, or were not ready to back the US and its global anti-terrorism security strategy. This division reached unprecedented proportions when the US decided to go to war against Iraq without UN Security Council approval. Several key European countries, especially France and Germany, opposed the use of force against Iraq and since then the Euro-Atlantic alliance and security community, which was one of the pillars of post World War II international order, has been living on borrowed time. This situation was complicated by the support that a relatively large number of European countries lent to the US, for example the UK, Spain and Poland, which led the US to lean on what American policy-makers called the “new Europe,” and, at the same time, to shun the French and German led “old Europe.” The rift of EU members renewed concerns about the future of the Union, aggravated the crisis of multilateralism -- the UN and NATO appeared to be threatened by extinction -- and strengthened the notion that international order was about to change dramatically. To sum up this paragraph, post 9/11 US, by challenging multilateral organizations and cooperative security, and by helping to generate a rift in the EU, weakened the EMP process, and relegated it to what may become a security “obsolescent” project under the shadow of American hegemony.

The US’s striking military victory over Iraq in April 2003 and American subsequent successes in capturing Saddam Hussein and in persuading Libya to disarm itself of weapons of mass destruction also had negative unintended consequences for the
Barcelona Process. Emboldened by victory, and not disturbed by the difficulties it has encountered in pacifying Iraq after the war, the US now has set itself the goal of transforming the Middle East from scratch. American leaders did not shy away from stating openly what was in many observers’ minds, i.e. that the US will use a combination of military force, coercive diplomacy, and economic "carrots" in order to bring about reforms in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and other Middle East countries. The plan is nothing less than bringing democracy and open markets, American style, to the entire Middle East. This is why, shortly after the Iraqi war, the US proposed a free trade agreement between the US and Middle East countries, which directly challenges the EMP’s goal of setting a free trade zone in the Mediterranean by 2010, and, more recently, the US launched a Middle East "partnership" to fund social projects in the Middle East.

However, concerned by prospects of a long and protracted war against Iraqi insurgent groups, and eager to win back European and global support that the US lost when it alone went to war with Iraq, US government officials announced in February 2004 the future launching of a "Greater Middle East Initiative." This multilateral initiative, consisting primarily of a "charter for freedom" and a follow up process, both of which build on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and its follow up CSCE process, aims at promoting democracy in the greater Middle East (Washington Post, January 24, 2004: A20). Although at this time, the details of this US initiative are very sketchy, the American suggestion to borrow from the pool of European security practices may purposefully or unintentionally weaken Europe's own Middle East security initiatives, including the EMP. Alternatively, however, it may sow the seeds of meaningful European American collaboration in bringing about peace in the Middle East.
The impact of US policy on the EMP, thus, is uncertain. If the US succeeds to forcefully engineer the Middle East, European normative power and the application of cooperative security practices in the Mediterranean will be weakened, and the Barcelona Process will recede into history. Moreover, if the US will launch a competing initiative to the Barcelona Process, the latter may also be mortally wounded. Still another alternative, especially if American plans to use Helsinki-based practices do not materialize, is that the Barcelona Process may continue to be a complement of, if not the cooperative security alternative to, American forceful preemptive action in the region for years to come. The alternative we prefer, however, is that, due to domestic political changes, international developments, or both, the US will be more circumspect with the use of material power, and move in the direction of normative power, which means using the Greater Middle East Initiative as a tool to promote the convergence, rather than the clash, of civilizations. In this case, the Greater Middle East Initiative, not only will not threaten the Barcelona Process, but may "form the basis for a common European-American strategy for addressing one of the world's most serious challenges" (Washington Post, January 24, 2004: A20).

**Overcoming the Obstacles**

The emergence of the obstacles mentioned above suggests that Europe has to deal with almost insurmountable problems, such as the Middle East conflict and US hegemony. And, possible, it has to “win” the contest between forceful practices and cooperative security practices. In addition, the Barcelona Process has to confront the notion that region building in the Mediterranean means engaging Islam, a civilization that is bitter
and resentful, that is very different from the West, and that does not want to "converge," if by convergence we mean the adoption of liberal ways. It is therefore not enough for our project to identify how Europe has been trying to construct peace through inclusion by the use of security communities. Rather, this project needs to describe why using socialization practices to liberalize "the other" will not suffice, when the lasting historical legacies of European expansion and colonialism created the Western perception of the Arab world as the “lesser other,” and Europe’s continued domination and imposition of neo-liberal economic practices have imposed new hardships, layering new resentments over the old.

How, then, can peace and stability be achieved? First, we believe that the goal must be for the West and Islam to engage each other, without expectations that failure to imposing one’s norms on the other necessarily means defeat. Instead, the West and Islam need to socially construct a sense of common purpose, which, reflecting mutual interests, motivates both sides to change enough in order to accommodate “the other.” Second, there is a need for the development of shared narratives and myths. This requires not only functional cooperation, for example, economic agreements, but also a thick web of communication processes between civil society members and social networks. Finally, only Mediterranean peoples can and will determine, in practice, the meanings and content of their regional endeavor.

One path toward this end can be the conscious creation of sub-regions in the Mediterranean (Calleya in this volume). This means the opening of sub-regional markets and the creation of sub-regional free trade areas, in which the EU pursues measures to facilitate South-South transnational cooperation. These sub-regions could eventually be
“nested” within the larger regional grouping (Aggarwal 1998). Sub-regional cooperation, however, will not be enough to change the nature of the discourse and the rules of mutual engagement. Nor is it enough to deepen mutual trust around the Mediterranean.

Another path is to develop institutional spaces within which mutual socialization can take place, trust can develop, and the social construction of common interests, discourse, narratives and myths can be promoted. With this purpose, we recommend that the Euro-Med partnership emulate the CSCE process (Adler 1998a). This does not mean the adoption of the same ideas and "constitutional" norms that the CSCE adopted with the hope to bring about the end of the Cold War (Thomas 2001). Rather, we mean the development of shared norms and principles that, without compromising Western and Islamic cultural norms and beliefs, still identify and promote norms, principles, and practical procedures, which would be acceptable to all countries around the Mediterranean. The "Rule of Law," "Sustainable Development" and "Human Security," are three potentially appealing ideas around which all Mediterranean countries can converge. Moreover, a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) may help promote the development of transnational civil society networks, around which future community may be built. In this sense, the type of security that would be pursued would be cooperative and indivisible, and comprehensive. In a CSCM, classic security elements would be linked to elements of so called "human security." That is, individuals would be free from pervasive threats to their rights, safety, and lives. This would allow the CSCM to pursue a human rights agenda, without the use of human-rights concepts, which are suspect, and which have little currency in the Muslim world.

Eventually the US-led "Greater Middle East Initiative" should converge with the
CSCM. Thus, US involvement should be determined as part of a grand bargain between the EU and the US on a division of labor in the Mediterranean. After all, the Euro-Atlantic security community is still in place and the recent disagreements between Americans and Europeans have been more about means than about goals, and have been heavily influenced by domestic politics. We believe, therefore, that the way to open the gates of development in the Mediterranean region is to engage rather than confront the US. If the EU decides to confront the US in the Mediterranean, including in the Middle East, or, still worse, chooses to neglect the US’s paramount importance in the region, it will bring self-inflicted obsolescence to the entire Mediterranean region experiment. Instead, Europeans must seize the opportunity presented by the "Greater Middle East Initiative" in order to socialize US practitioners and US academic experts to the ways of normative power, civilian power, cooperative security, and more generally, security community building. This does not mean merely “teaching” the US to act multilaterally. Indeed, the US wrote the book on multilateralism, creating the post World War II institutions that brought a measure of order to the postwar world. Rather, Europe must socialize Americans to the “power” of normative power and cooperative security practices, and to the notion that materially strong states, such as the US, may have as much to gain from using normative power as relatively weaker states, such as France and Germany.

There is fertile ground in the Mediterranean region for this grand bargain to take root. The EU and the US need each other to fight terrorism, prevent new security threats, and bring the Israeli-Arab conflict to an end. The EU, in particular, should begin to generate a political dialogue with the US. Few people among the American political elite
know about the Barcelona Process, let alone understand what it is all about. This is why this project, which brings together scholars from the US, Europe, and MNMCs is a step in the right direction. Of course we do not believe that an academic project will be able to persuade the US about normative power and cooperative security practices. However, if it can help in laying the foundation for a conceptual framework to think together about the subject, the project may thus be able to fulfill a useful policy relevant role.

**Research Questions**

The above discussion of the Barcelona Process and its goals leads us directly to the analytical questions and hypotheses that guide the research of subsequent chapters. Unlike most edited volumes, we did not ask the authors to "use" the editors' theoretical framework, historical analysis, and discussion. Rather, we asked them to assess our framework, analysis and discussion, taking into account that this volume takes a “non-conventional” cultural approach to the understanding and promotion of peace and security. In this regard we ask, what was and is the Barcelona Process all about? Is it only an instrumental means by which European states, who, becoming increasingly conscious of their combined influence, and of their security needs beyond their borders, decided to "talk the Mediterranean region into existence" (Neumann 1994)? Or is it an attempt to seize an important historical moment in the Middle East with the signature of the Oslo process, in order to promote peace, but also to gain influence there? And why did the EMP architects use the experience of European integration to promote Mediterranean security and prosperity? Did they not suspect that what worked in the continent may not work across cultures in the Mediterranean? And why use EU and CSCE- like security practices? Because Europeans thought that these practices were successful, or because
there were no other practices available to fit the regional problems at hand?

From the above questions, we deduce the ("realist") null hypothesis. None of the new security practices really have much to do with, or to add to, the Barcelona Process; they are just a front for imposing European interests and discipline over MNMCs, and are aimed at promoting southern European stability. The alternative (constructivist-liberal) hypothesis, however, is that the construction of a Mediterranean Partnership is "for real," mainly, because it is the corollary of the step-by-step creation of the EU on the rubble of World War II. This hypothesis is based on a mixture of normative and coercive/material power; trade, aid, etc. In fact, regional transnational partnerships, which to some extent are based on normative power, are not unprecedented outside Europe. For example, the recent ASEAN initiative to start a Regional Forum as the basis of a regional security system suggests the possibility of region building in non-western areas that are not culturally homogeneous (Acharya 2001, Attinà 2001). Further, in the larger international context, traditional arrangements among states to ensure their security are beginning to disappear. As Attinà (2001) has noted, national armed forces are increasingly used in multilateral peace enforcement and the number of military alliances in the world has diminished. Even NATO, the last remaining military alliance, has also developed into a security community institution (Adler 1998a, Weber 1990).

Why would states around the Mediterranean change their identities, if they did not experience the traumatic experience European countries experienced at the end of WWII? To answer this question, we suggest three additional -- non-mutually exclusive -- hypotheses. First, without power, the task of constructing an area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean is a chimera. Normative power or civilian power may be the answer to
achieving this goal. Normative power cannot be used to force states to adopt norms and practices, but it can be used to offer incentives and persuade states that it is in their interest to adopt collectively agreed norms, and create collective security expectations and dispositions. Moreover, by its very nature, normative power may prevent the backlash or dialectic response that is usually associated with the use of military force. Thus, once a goal is achieved by means of normative power, it may persist for a long time. Because the EU was founded not only on a series of material bargains, offering both carrots and sticks to prospective members, but also on normative power, this experience can come on handy when engaging MNMCs.

Second, the set of practices associated with the use of normative power and the constitution of security communities is fit to the task of bringing peace and stability to the Mediterranean region and can go a long way to preventing a major clash between Islam and Western countries. To show these practices' value, however, will require that Europeans not only demand change from their partners but change enough themselves to make their partners feel that the EMP is a real partnership and not just another European neo-colonialist machination, model 2005. Self-transformation would require Europeans to adopt a more multicultural identity than in the past and present, and to devise multilateral institutions that are more consistent with a real partnership than with hegemonic designs. Third, when dealing with MNMCs, Europeans will be required not only to preach, but also to practice, economic liberalism (see Tovias in this volume). Our final hypothesis says that collective learning processes may drive the pluralistic integration processes forward. Thus, for the EMP to succeed, EU members and partner countries need to devise institutions and practices that promote collective learning.
processes at the highest levels of government. Collective learning processes, therefore, are not unrelated to political actions and the political will and determination of political actors to put the EMP high on the political agenda. We hypothesize that if European political actors at the highest level begin to perceive the EMP as Europe’s response to the latest American anti-terrorist practices and the American way of “preventing” a “Clash of Civilizations,” then, the EMP can be empowered enough for learning processes to occur where they matter most.

In addition to the above hypotheses, as we look into the EMP’s recent past and gloomy present (at the time of this writing [2004] we perceive a clear negative balance viii) we ask the authors to address the following questions about the EMP’s future: First, will the EMP process be able to bridge the gaps between the West and Islam, and the North and the South in the region? Second, can a regional “identity”—that would not replace, but only supplement national identities—be consciously constructed? And if so, to what extent is the construction of a Mediterranean region able to ensure stability and prosperity? Third, as Claire Spencer notes, the original Barcelona template treats security as an “organic” and intrinsic aspect of regional development (Spencer 2002). How is this "organic" view of security related to the processes, practices, and institutions that follow a security community perspective? Is "social engineering" possible at all, and, can a region be constructed "from scratch?"
In the section immediately following our chapter, Etel Solingen and Saba Senses Ozyurt pursue the general theoretical framework of the volume by emphasizing institutions and socialization within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The chapter begins with an analysis of the theoretical foundations of the institutional theory that underlies the "triple logic" of the EMP, that is, economic reforms, democratization, and regional multilateralism, and elaborates on specific arguments on which each pillar of the "triple logic" rests. Subsequently, Solingen and Senses Ozyurt use Turkey as a case study in order to analyze the "triple logic" at work, paying attention to both the role of institutions and the effects of socialization. By exploring the difficulties of the triple logic in the case of Turkey, a state that might be expected to provide an "easy case" for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, Solingen and Senses Ozyurt point out a number of intrinsic dilemmas within the "triple logic" on which the future of Euro-Mediterranean region building will hinge.

In the next chapter, Richard Gillespie concentrates on the promotion of democracy as one of the instruments of Euro-Mediterranean region building in the framework of the EMP. In particular, this chapter assesses the record of the EU’s democracy promotion in North Africa. Gillespie emphasizes the obstacles, and the causes for hesitation within the EU to an effective promotion of democracy. He further examines the set-backs in light of post-Barcelona international events, such as the breakdown of the Middle East peace process, 9/11, the Iraq war, and the eastern enlargement of the EU. Gillespie argues that, in spite of constraints, the EMP could still prove to be a valuable framework for the promotion of democracy in the long run. This is
especially the case if the EU will act as democracy promoter in a more energetic manner than hitherto, and if local developments in North Africa actually help place democracy more firmly on the political agenda.

Finally in this section, Stephen Calleya's contribution focuses on sub-regionalism as a tool of region building within the EMP. This chapter's main concern is the question of whether, in view of the present EMP difficulties, subdividing the southern Mediterranean into various sub-regions (such as the Maghreb and the Mashreq) may be an efficient tool of region building. By taking account of regional relations among southern Mediterranean states and sub-regional initiatives, Calleya discusses several options and conditions under which sub-regionalism within the EMP could contribute to Euro-Mediterranean region building. Calleya argues that if the EU is serious about having a significant positive impact on regional integration in the Mediterranean in the short term, it is necessary to develop an adequate strategy for supporting more directly all regional sub-groupings in the southern Mediterranean.

The book's third section begins with a chapter by Federica Bicchi, in which she compares the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership with previous efforts of the EU to address the southern Mediterranean. The chapter focuses on the main practices by which the EC/EU has pursued its aim of region building in the Mediterranean. First, by examining the making of the Global Mediterranean Policy the chapter analyses how the concept of a "Mediterranean region" came to be enshrined in European external relations. Second, it describes the multilateral institutional setting created by the EMP. Third, the chapter shows how the agenda of the EMP has changed since 1995. Bicchi then analyzes the origins of these practices, as well as their pros and cons, arguing that EMP practices
strictly relate to EC/EU internal practices, more so than to OSCE core principles. She warns that ‘downloading’ from EU cooperation history with little adaptation might miss the point in diversified and fragmented Southern Mediterranean societies.

In the next chapter, Said Haddadi examines the interaction between security and democracy discourses and their mutually affecting relationship within the framework of the political and security basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In this context, Haddadi places special emphasis on the role that institutions and practices within the EMP may play in contributing to the convergence of security and democracy views between the EU and North Africa. Against this background, this chapter assesses the main arguments that underlie the political and security partnership within the EMP. The focus is on the process that led to the EU’s ‘securitization’ of the Maghreb, that is, the EU’s prioritization of security concerns relating to North Africa. Haddadi’s analysis of the interaction between security and democracy discourses in the EU and in North Africa points to a number of inconsistencies and dilemmas that are not sufficiently addressed by the institutions and practices of the EMP.

The following chapter, by Alfred Tovias, argues that the EU’s efforts to promote economic liberalization in the southern Mediterranean rely on the principles and instruments of economic liberalism within the so-called "second basket" of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This contribution focuses on the contradictions between the EMP’s underpinning principle of economic liberalism, upheld by the EU on a theoretical and declaratory level, and both the methods suggested to achieve this principle and the EU’s conduct of the economic dimension of the EMP in practice. The author argues that the EMP's economic component cannot attain its
own declared objectives, namely the stabilization and growth of Arab Mediterranean economies. This is because the EMP’s economic strategies do not lead to real economic integration of southern Mediterranean states into the European economy. In the absence of reforms of the EMP’s economic tools, the author is dubious of their success. The full implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade agreements will be the acid test of the economic rationale of the EMP and its initiators.

To end this section, Joel Peters focuses on the failed peace-making practices of the Middle East multilateral track process launched at Madrid in 1991. He thus uses the dynamics within Arab-Israeli relations to inform an assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Peters shows that conflicts of interests and rivalries among the participating parties emerged as soon as the multilateral peace talks moved from the discussion of ideas to the stage where decisions on the actual implementation of cooperation projects had to be reached. Thus, the demise of the multilateral talks and the subsequent slowdown in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process were underway before the launching of the EMP. The failure of developing peace-making practices within the multilateral Arab-Israeli peace talks inevitably spilled over to the EMP from the outset.

The next section begins with a chapter by Fulvio Attinà on "regional security partnership and the security culture divide in the Mediterranean region." The concept of "regional security partnership", which Attinà explores both theoretically and in the context of Euro-Mediterranean region-building, is taken to be an intermediate venture on the road to the possible appearance of a Euro-Mediterranean security community. By discussing the difficulties of negotiating a security partnership in the
framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Attinà highlights the security culture divide on both sides of Mediterranean. The differences in the security culture between European and Arab states have deepened in recent years in view of regional and global developments, constituting a major obstacle to the implementation of a security partnership. Attinà argues, however, that the interaction between the two shores of the Mediterranean in coping with globalization-driven problems may prevail over the factors that have led to a deepening of the security culture divide in recent years.

In the following chapter, Metin Heper discusses the formation of Turkey’s identity, which came to encompass both an "Eastern" and a "Western" (or European) dimension. Against this background, Heper discusses three main issues within the politics of Turkey that have remained problematic from the perspective of the EU: Islam in politics, nationalism and the consideration of Turkey’s ethnic minorities, and the political role of the military. Based on the "identity history" of Turkey, Heper puts forward some suggestions about how the alleged divide between East and West, and Islam and Europe, may be soothed. The chapter concludes by exploring the possibility that an intellectual departure from the concept of a "shared civilization" towards the idea of "sharing a civilization" may contribute to the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean region.

In closing this section, Raffaella Del Sarto considers the effects of the EMP’s region-building efforts on Israel's identity. Her chapter serves as a case study of the viability of "identity manipulations" involved in the Euro-Mediterranean region-building effort. By drawing the attention to domestic constraints on the EU’s use of
“normative power” in southern Mediterranean states, Del Sarto shows that in the case of Israel, the EU’s attempted interference into how the state defines itself, touches directly upon domestically disputed questions. Del Sarto argues that Israel cannot be part of a Mediterranean region as long as it has not sorted out what kind of state and society it wants to be.

The book ends with a chapter by Kalypso Nicolaidis and Dimitri Nicolaidis, who take a critical but constructive look at both the EMP and the chapters comprising this volume.
This chapter's contents solely reflect the opinion of its authors and by no means are said to represent the views of the volume's remaining authors.

i “We Will Not Astonish You.”  

ii For an excellent study dealing with the importance of practice in International Relations, see Neumann 2002.

iii We purposefully use this concept to evoke the notion of process. Similarly to Ole Waever’s concept of “securitization” (1995), which means endowing an issue with security meanings and discourse, by “pacification” we mean a process by which the concept of region building becomes endowed with peace meanings and discourse.

iv “Adler shows how the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) uses its legitimacy and perceived impartiality to carry out 'seminar diplomacy' among its members—teaching them new values and new models of behavior. Seminar diplomacy refers to meetings of political practitioners and academic experts, which are aimed at promoting political dialogue. The mechanisms for social construction elaborated here draw heavily on Max Weber's work and on organization theory in sociology. Organizations are effective agents of social construction in part because the rational-legal authority they embody is widely viewed as legitimate and good. Further, the perceptions that these organizations are merely technical (not political) and that the social models they push are chosen because they are efficient and effective add to the power of these norms.” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 401).

v Barcelona Declaration Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference (Barcelona, November 28, 1995)

vi The European Council Summit of June 1992 recognized for the first time that “The southern and eastern shores of Mediterranean and the Middle East are both areas of interest to the Union, in terms of security and social stability.” Indeed, with the Cold War’s end and Germany’s achievement of unity and sovereignty, France feared that Europe would drift eastward; the EMP would help achieve a new power balance between France and Germany (Weinber 1999). And the wars of Yugoslav succession reminded Europeans that the post-war peace on the continent could again be threatened. The EU longed to be an actor on the world stage, and, at the very least, a regional hegemon (Nicolaidas 1999). In November 1995, the Spanish presidency of the EU organized a conference in Barcelona, with the 15 members of the EU and 12 countries of the South Mediterranean. The outcome was the Barcelona Declaration or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) Initiative. Backed by the largest EU financial commitment ever made outside the Union, the Declaration launched a set of economic, political, cultural, and social initiatives, intended to reinforce one another in an open-ended process of regional integration.

vii “Wider Europe Neighborhood” is supposed to include the Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian authority, Syria, and Tunisia. It is also supposed to reinforce the EU-Russia partnership.

viii This includes setbacks in achieving agreement on confidence building measures (CBMs) and a Peace and Stability pact, the suspension of the Arab-Israeli multilateral negotiations and the MENA economic summits, and the recent eruption of violence between Israelis and Palestinians. Because of these mishaps, critics, and even supporters, have increasingly become skeptical about the EMP’s long-term and even short-term potential for success.
We would like to thank Raffaella Del Sarto for helping us summarize the chapters' main content.

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