bution to our understanding of geographic and temporal variations in the practice and politics of border controls.

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This book is the capstone of a long collaboration of the two authors, and presents a series of statistical analyses designed to evaluate hypotheses derived from the “steps-to-war” explanation for war developed by John Vasquez. This explanation is a self-conscious opponent to realism and posits: first, that for a variety of reasons, human beings, and by extension states, are intensely territorial; second, that states tend to handle territorial claims through Realpolitik policies (arming, forming alliances); third, that the repeated use of these coercive tactics produces a security dilemma (both sides become more fearful and hostile); and fourth, that the steps involved at each stage eventually lead to war rather than peace. Contra Vegetius (and Ronald Reagan), if you try to obtain peace by preparing for war, you will get war.

The authors first counter two criticisms of the influence of territoriality on the likelihood of war. Could it be that territoriality is more likely to cause militarized disputes (MIDs) but is no more, or even less, likely to cause an MID as to escalate to war? The authors find that territorial claims not only make MIDs more likely but also destabilize them (within a five-year window), and reject the selection bias hypothesis. It would have been nice if the authors also dealt with omitted variable bias (aggressive nationalist leaders who want conflict are also more likely to use territorial claims as pretext) or endogeneity (leaders who anticipate war use territorial claims to consolidate domestic support for their war policies).

In Chapter 4, the authors take on the idea that states cannot fight unless they can get at each other, which means that wars will tend to occur among geographically proximate, or contiguous, states. To see whether territory is just a proxy for contiguity, the authors estimate the effect of both variables and find that while contiguity does increase the likelihood of MID onset, it reduces the probability of war. Territoriality, on the other hand, increases the chances of war, and does so even more for noncontiguous dyads. In other words, it is not the opportunity to fight but the territorial grievances that destabilize disputes.

Having dealt at length with the question of how territory relates to the probability of war, the authors turn to the relationship that is more central to their explanation: the relationship between power politics and war. Chapter 5 tests the idea that the more steps to war that occur in a given dyadic interaction, the more likely is each subsequent dispute to end in a war. The authors look at the
entire history of a dyad and note whether its members: first, have politically relevant external alliances; second, have engaged in repeated disputes with each other; or third, have experienced an arms race; and then assess whether dyads who have more of the three possible steps are more likely to experience war. I am not sure what to make of the results, because this coding ignores temporal sequencing: a dyad that has experienced war in the past and, as a result, is now arming or concluding alliances, causing a new MID to end peacefully, would be coded the same as a dyad that has armed and allied in the past and then gone to war.

Chapter 6 attempts a more direct approach by asking whether the presence of these Realpolitik factors within an MID dyad make the MID more likely to escalate to war. The potential for endogeneity is greatest here, especially when it comes to arming and forming alliances: do they “cause” war (as the authors contend), or are they failed attempts to prevent war? To put it another way, do these actions create a security dilemma, or are they what states do when they expect to have to fight a war? The authors find that the occurrence of war is correlated, at least in the pre-Cold War period, with both sides having alliances and being in an arms race, which makes one wish they had tackled the question of reverse causality head on. Chapter 7 is essentially a series of robustness checks, where the authors run various permutations of variables to test for the presence of interactive effects. It is difficult to say whether this adds much to their analysis, because there is no theory to guide the choice of variables to interact and how to do it.

While it is true that the main purpose of the authors here is to test the steps-to-war explanation, I would have preferred to have an expanded treatment of the theory. For instance, it is not obvious to me how MIDs escalate to war. Like the security dilemma on which it is based, the steps-to-war explanation does not specify agency—who makes the decisions that lead to war, and why. There are spirals of increasing hostility and mutual alarm, but never a decision to start fighting. Statements such as “eventually a crisis goes out of control [through] some stochastic process” (p. 30) are symptomatic. I do not know of any stochastic process that can start a war, but the lack of agency might be a problem with empirics as well: the MID data set, on which the study relies, defines a militarized dispute on the basis of acts that are “explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government sanctioned” (Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz, “Militarized Interstate Disputes 1816-1976,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (December 1984): 587).

The authors assert that “since at least 1648, realist thinking and practice have created an ideational system that guides diplomats and tells them when to handle certain situations by a resort to arms” (p. 32). One wants to know how such knowledge is institutionalized and transmitted, especially given the wildly diverse cultural, ideological, and economic backgrounds of policymakers across countries and time. One further wants to know how such a system perpetuates itself when “it underestimates how many of the policies
it recommends to avoid war actually backfire and make war more likely” (pp. 32–33). For nearly four centuries, diplomats have followed policies that universally make war more likely; have they seen this? And if they did, did they never learn from their mistakes?

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U.S. civil–military relations were dramatically transformed during the Second World War, with the armed forces gaining unprecedented power and influence in the government, economy, and society at large. Numerous scholars have examined specific aspects of this transformation in an effort to understand not only what happened during the war, but also how it set the stage for what followed during the Cold War era. In Toward the National Security State, a volume in Praeger’s “In War and Peace” series on U.S. civil–military relations, Brian Waddell combines his own previous research into this topic with the works of other scholars to produce an admirable and important synthesis.

An associate professor of political science at the University of Connecticut, Waddell organizes his work around three major wartime issues: military–industrial relations regarding production of war material; top-level civil–military command relationships regarding wartime strategy; and the manpower mobilization that created the largest armed force in U.S. history. He begins with a chapter summarizing U.S. civil–military relations in these realms before World War II and then devotes a separate and independent chapter to each during the war. A fifth chapter then explains how all of them came together during the early Cold War years, followed by a brief section of conclusions.

With a few exceptions, each chapter is based upon extensive research in and use of appropriate secondary sources. The exceptions are in chapter 2 on military–industrial relations and chapter 5 on the early Cold War years, where Waddell also makes use of his own previous research and scholarship (most notably his The War Against the New Deal), as well as the work of others. He concludes in chapter 2 that during World War II, the military, expanding upon relations first created during World War I, forged an important and lasting alliance with big business over control of the economy, and that it did so largely at the expense of New Deal government officials in a series of intense wartime controversies. It similarly developed a totally new and exceptionally strong role in governmental policymaking, he explains in chapter 3, though with far less controversy, due to the overall control exercised by President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the war. Nevertheless, Waddell concludes, military officials found their powers enormously increased and their worldview