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Reviewing Contemporary Problems and Prospects

Introduction

We begin this article with two fundamental questions: Is there any form of democracy in Africa? Are there model democracies in the industrialized countries today that can be used as standard measures? These, indeed, are very pertinent questions to Africans. They are especially important as they come at a time when there is a dramatic shift towards a new international order that has embraced the concepts of democracy and globalization as the ultimate “catchwords” toward the actualization of sustainable development.

Two events have dramatically altered the international system. The first is the end of the Cold War era and the second is the fall of communism in the early 1990s. These events have clearly elevated the “status” of democracy to an unprecedented level throughout the world, as most nations have moved away from the system of authoritarian regimes. These dramatic changes in the world led to the emergence of powerful pro-democracy movements in Africa between 1989 and 1990. They were preceded by massive demonstrations calling for a “new continental order.” This new development affected most nations where democracy was never given a chance. By 1991, spawned by decades of political authoritarianism, assailed by economic decay, and prodded by growing aid conditionalities on the part of international donor agencies, pro-democracy pressure groups were systematically transforming the political landscape of the continent (Ake 1991; Barya 1993; Diop 1994).

As a consequence of these pressures, up to fifteen African leaders lost their
positions during the period between 1991 and 1996. This number represents the highest turnover since the Organization for African Unity (OAU) was created in 1963 (Mazrui 1999; Ezeanyika 2007). As it is, the majority of Africa’s fifty-three nations remain in some sort of political transition (Baynham 1996).

As democracy euphoria spreads, the situation leads to a series of questions, including the following: How is the concept of democracy affecting Africa and its people? Has it been embraced in the continent? And, if it has, what type of democracy is it going to be? These are the questions that this article attempts to answer. To do this, we will outline and discuss a few definitions of democracy and spell out the fundamental tenets that are expected to be found in a democratic system. We will also examine the so-called Western ‘‘ideal models of modern democracy.’’ Next we will examine political development in Africa’s precolonial era, with a focus on establishing whether any form of democracy existed in Africa before the arrival of European settler societies. Finally we discuss democracy during the colonial period and the impact of the colonial legacy on democratic development in the postcolonial era.

Proponents of democracy postulate that its pursuit is the quest for freedom, justice, equality, and human dignity; it is the quest for the liberation of humankind from all manner of subjugation, injustice, discrimination, and humiliation. According to this view, democracy embodies a far-reaching and wide-ranging movement comprising the liberation of the citizenry from local cabals, despots, and tyrants. It frees women and children from domestic and social servitude, and nations from covert and overt foreign domination and exploitation (Wilmot 1986; Anyang’ Nyong’o 1987, 1992; Cheru 1989; Ake 1994, 1995; Chole and Ibrahim 1995). It is an undisputable fact that democracy, along with other
important concerns such as health, development, and peace, has become one of the core and foremost preoccupations of today’s world. All over the world, millions of men and women, young and old, are clamoring for it, ready to make enormous sacrifices of sweat, tears, and blood—up to and including death—to secure it. This is the measure of the value of democracy in the contemporary international system.

To appreciate these new international developments, it is important to adequately define the concept of democracy. From its very origins in the ancient Greek city-states, the term “demos-kraten” had an easily understandable connotation: demos, meaning people, and kraten meaning governing. In his Gettysburg Address of 1865, Abraham Lincoln referred to democracy as “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” Viewed from this basic perceptive, democracy connotes popular power actualized through generally acceptable political institutions that are based on and supported by mass participation and popular sovereignty, and in which the ideals of liberty, equality, and unity are imbedded (Ibeanu 2000; Ezeanyika 2002).

In the contemporary world, “it is a commonly accepted truism that defining democracy leads to major conceptual confusion; because of too many users, the concept has different and sometimes contradictory meanings” (Ezeanyika 2002), as evidenced by the existence of a considerable variety (and diversity) of regimes and juntas that claim to be democratic.

It follows, therefore, that the concept of democracy tends to be understood according to particular national circumstances. This is considerably true in Africa, where despotic and retrogressive “rulers” have used the term. In most of these countries, allusion to democracy by the ruling clique is usually an overt mockery of the concept. This
is because, in such despotic regimes that wear the garb of democracy, the participation of the electorate in the electoral process is a camouflage for political manipulations. To buttress this point on Africans leaders’ attitude to democracy, Nzouankeu (1991) explains that ‘‘democracy appeared to have become a hackneyed term applicable to any situation, to the extent that notorious dictatorships would take advantage of this ambiguity to pass themselves off as democracies’’ (p. 373).

Many definitions of democracy tend to be tailor-made to fit specific types of regimes or systems. They are often little more than exercises in political marketing designed to sell those particular regimes or systems. The confusion in the meanings of democracy is primarily due to the propagandistic usage and value of the term as a weapon for competing----and even warring----social systems. Our position is informed by the fact that, more often than not, democracy is used and defined in a self-interested, opportunistic, and holier-than-thou fashion. Because of this, it not at all an easy matter to establish what the precise and objective meaning of democracy is or can be (Ezeanyika 2002, 2008). In his seminal publications, Lipset (1959a, 1959b) summarized this general perception of democracy: ‘‘In the case of a word like democracy, not only is there no agreed definition but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides. The defenders of any kind of regime claim that it is a democracy’’ (Lipset 1959b, pp. 23-34).

The above notwithstanding, Arblaster (1987) rightly argued that at ‘‘the root of all definitions of democracy, however complex, lies the idea of popular power, of a situation in which power, and perhaps authority too, rests with the people’’ (p. 8). Ranney and Kendall (1951) summed up the definition of democracy to embody political equality: a government that is responsive to the popular will, and the adherence to rule by the
majority rather than the minority.

In almost all circumstances, democracy is visualized as a process encompassing the assurance of social justice, government accountability and transparency, responsibility and responsiveness, freedoms, and good governance (Ezeanyika 2008). Similarly, Clapham (1993) states that:

democracy is a process that requires consensus building among all stakeholders. It involves an agreement over the management of political competition, including competition to hold the major offices in a particular nation, by means short of escalated violence, save in very limited and containable circumstances. It calls for accountability of rulers to the governed according to procedures which are broadly accepted by those rulers, and which can be enforced on them should they dissent. (p. 132)

Clapham (1993) also emphasizes the importance of adequate social, political, and economic conditions. He explains that these help foster the sense of identity which is needed to make such accountability feasible, and thus to institutionalize democratic methods as a regular and respected way of organizing political life. Following from this argument, we can say that the tenets of a stable democratic polity are those that are socio-culturally institutionalized and promote egalitarian development. They are equally expected to engender political tolerance and, in the economic realm, to create a sustainable environment for healthy competition. All of these must take place in an atmosphere that promotes the rule of law, order, peace, and stability.

However, spelling out what the institutionalization of democracy requires is one thing; practicing it is another. As it is, the concept of democracy has been associated
primarily with Western values. Western nations have been the most vociferous when it comes to democracy. Nations like the United States seem to have exclusively assigned to themselves the responsibility to judge and check on the rest of the world on democracy issues. This begs the question: Are such nations’ models of democracy the ‘‘standard’’ in the contemporary international system? It is a known fact that France, Switzerland, and the United States are nations that have always been used as role models of Western liberal democracy (Arblaster 1987). In these nations, the levels of overall development are considerably high.

Constitutional development, in particular, that allows freedom of speech, political pluralism, and tolerance has been institutionalized in these nations. However, as in the case of the United States, this has taken a couple of centuries to achieve. Whitehead (2002) observed that ‘‘the process of total democratization is an incredibly lengthy one and even the Western models referred to are yet to reach such stages’’ (p. 30). This statement is supported by the fact that a critical scrutiny of these democratic models reveals quite a number of glaring discrepancies. For instance, injustice----expressed mainly through racism and gross marginalization----still abounds in France and the United States. Absolute, acute, and severe poverty can still be found in the ghettos and slums of Marseille and Harlem. Gitonga (1998) succinctly sums up this particular phenomenon of democracy as follows: ‘‘If there were a people of gods, they would rule themselves democratically. So perfect a Government is not suited for men’’ (p. 15).

The use of Western liberal democratic models in Africa is understandable, as this was a part of the colonial legacy bequeathed to the continent. However, we need to be very careful when comparing their adaptability with the dynamic realities within Africa.
This is because the steps undertaken in Western nations were taken under conditions of relative order, peace, and stability. Apart from the devastation of the Second World War, France has known national peace. Since the end of the Civil War, the United States has only been involved in proxy wars and other violent conflicts outside its borders. Switzerland has effectively used its policy of neutrality to stay out of conflicts (Bryce 1921; Sartori 1968). Such conditions of relative peace have allowed these already industrialized nations to develop and, in the process, lay suitable foundations for democracy. Over the decades, they have institutionalized the democratic process, and provided its dividends to the greatest majority of their citizenry.

From the above discussion, we sum up that democracy is generally perceived as a social process that requires acculturation. This implies that inherent in it is a learning process, more precisely, a learning-by-doing endeavor (Powell 1992), requiring the learners to accept their ignorance and open their minds to accept and acquire new knowledge in forms of behaviors, habits, and norms that entrench the tenets of democracy. As such, democracy is far from being a Western-prescribed cure-all drug, which, if obtained and administered, could instantly transfer its healing capacity a few moments after administration.

Having discussed the meaning and substance of democracy, and the process of its acquisition, we will now examine democracy in precolonial Africa. The focal premise of the Afro-centric school of thought is that, in the majority of African territories, good governance existed prior to the arrival and settlement of European societies. Green (1964) argues that before the advent of colonialism, the nature of some African traditional governments and social systems was egalitarian and democratic. For example, a careful
examination of the traditional society of the Igbos of Eastern Nigeria shows that this large-
population ethnic nationality had an indigenous political system that ensured the making,
execution, and adjudication of decisions, and that its government was decentralized and
segmented (Uchendu 1965; Stride and Ifeka 1971; Ejiofor 1982; Ikejiani-Clark 1995).

The Igbos governed themselves through a communalist political system that was
largely referred to as democratic, republican, or segmentary. Their system was considered
democratic because it allowed each married adult member of the household, kindred,
village, and clan (the various sub-divisions of the Igbo world) to participate in debates,
express his or her views, and vote. It was republican because it embodied a corresponding
set of democratic, meritocratic, and egalitarian values and political cultures. It was
segmentary because it was actualized through various segments from the household to the
clan level. The Igbos’ communal and social democracy used the village as a basic unit of
political organization. Two traditional institutions were representative of village
government: the council of elders, made up of titleholders, and the village assembly, in
which every adult was a member. The council of elders was responsible for matters
relating to customs and rituals, while the village assembly took decisions on policy issues.
This Igbo bicameral arrangement strengthened the liberal structures of its communalist
democracy. Similar functional democratic scenarios were reported in Tanzania and Kenya
(Onwubiko 1973; Ezeanyika 2007).

It is safe to state that communalist democracy as discussed above, though
distinctive in its institutionalization, which was based on cultural socialization, was in
some ways similar to liberal democracy. It can also be said that it did not exist in all
African territories before the advent of colonialism. Viewed from a general standpoint,
political institutions, procedures, and mechanisms of the precolonial African societies represented a mixture of approaches to governance; some exhibited communal autocratic, and/or militaristic tendencies and practices.

It is a fact that quite a number of Africa’s precolonial regimes were authoritarian. Examples are the regimes of the emperors of Ethiopia, the Kabakas of Uganda, and Shaka the Zulu of South Africa. They were dictatorial in the government and politics they actualized in their respective domains, displaying authority that abhorred and rejected criticism. However, Botswana’s relative success in incorporating the traditional Kgotla, a system of leadership by elders (a system similar to the Umuna of the Igbos of Eastern Nigeria) into a modern constitution is a clear testimony to the usefulness of the original African commumalist democracy. This type of democracy is generally institutionalized through a social process of acculturation. It is acquired through community-engineered civic education, as well as interpersonal and group socialization.

The new constitutions of Ghana and South Africa also incorporate significant roles for the traditional authorities, thus recognizing the democratic culture and values of the African traditional systems that have always existed in the many territories and complex political structures within the continent (Ezeani 2000; Ezeanyika 2007).

In summary, when European settler societies converted their status in Africa from that of settlers to that of colonizers, they were not confronted by a single existing and institutionalized democratic tradition and culture; rather, they had to deal with various mixtures of communal democratic institutions and centralized governments.

We will now examine the types of governance actualized by European colonizers in the occupied African territories. From the onset, we posit that it was never the intention
of Europeans (particularly through their settlers), to introduce, establish, and institutionalize any liberal democratic culture and values in Africa. This is premised on the fact that the very essence of colonization was the comprehensive and systematic exploitation of Africa and Africans (Rodney 1972; Nkrumah 1963; Umezurike 1979; Ezeanyika 2007). Therefore, colonialists mainly concentrated their attention and energies on exploiting African territories under their rule. What they left behind were some selected values that were meant to protect their interests in Africa. Such values included the educational and cultural systems that were meant for a selected few Africans who became “educated” in the Western sense. When European colonizers granted the majority of African nations nominal political and no economic and socio-cultural independence in the early 1960s, they left the apparatus of governance in the hands of these “educated” and a few trusted African collaborators who were meant to safeguard European interests in the scheme of exploiting Africa. The literature supporting this position is considerable (for example, see Dumont 1966; Rodney 1972; Amin 1977; Offiong 1980; Ezeanyika 2007).

The irony of the matter is that it was some of these educated African elites who, after excellently acting the role of nationalists in the process of “liberating” their nations, turned out to be very intolerant of the so-called legacy of the multi-party system bequeathed to them by the outgoing colonizers, and employed all manner of strategies to perpetuate themselves in power. Examples of such leaders abound in Africa. They include Alhaji Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroon, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sekou Touré of Guinea, Dr. Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, and a number of other tyrants who concluded that their position of power was their birthright. Even in a few African nations (like Ethiopia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) that did not experience
colonialism, the royal theme, manifested in their leadership’s inordinate desire to stay and
die in power, persisted.

A discussion of democracy in postcolonial Africa is necessary at this stage in order
to establish what, if any, linkage exists with developments in the colonial era. The
postcolonial period in Africa was characterized by a plethora of regimes, ranging from
one-party states and several military juntas to cabalistic and ruthless dictatorships. The
situation became even more of a fiasco in the Cold War era, when most of these regimes
endlessly competed in the polarized international system to serve their adopted ideological
bloc, either the Eastern one (communist) spearheaded by Russia or the Western one
(capitalist) headed by the United States. In Zaire, for example, the opposition led by
Kabila fighting for the control of the central government was branded a rebel group
attempting to impose Marxist-Leninism in the country. In Sekou Toure’s Guinea,
members of the feeble and emasculated opposition were branded Western stooges
attempting to unseat a peoples’ government.

The Eastern bloc had jumped into the fray as they brought their competition with
the Western bloc into Africa. As the superpowers competed for recognition and spheres of
influence in Africa, all forms and packages of development aid were dangled as carrots to
these despotic African regimes in order to lure them into debt traps and to continue the
political, economic, and socio-cultural exploitation of the colonial era (Ezeanyika 1999).
Following from this scenario, African nations became pawns in the international power
game of the industrialized nations. The emerging complex situation led to desperation
within the continent’s masses suffering from absolute, acute, and disproportionate poverty
(Ezeanyika 2006). Even the intellectual class was not exempted. This explains why
Peterson (1994) could state that:

Africa is not ready for democracy. Africans neither want it nor understand it. What Africa really needs is food, stability, and development. Democracy is just another fad—another Western imposition. Little has changed in Africa; the dictators are still in place, and corruption and human rights abuse are the norm. Democracy only leads to tribalism and war; it hinders economic development. Africa is still too poor and illiterate for democracy. The entire continent is strategically insignificant anyway. All the foreign aid to Africa only makes the situation worse. At best, democracy will take decades to emerge. (p. 3)

Such a position on the part of a member of the Western intelligentsia is very informative; on the one hand, it sends the message that the industrialized nations’ drive to impose their models of liberal democracy is a futile exercise because the basic prerequisites for its institutionalization in their nations do not yet exist in Africa. On the other hand, Peterson takes for granted that there exist alternative approaches to development.

The tremendous international changes following the end of the Cold War seem to have heralded yet another chapter in Africa’s history of political development. After the events that led to the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and East Germany in 1989 that heralded the end of the Cold War, most African nations experienced considerable changes. Both the domestic and international pressures exerted on them, followed by the emergence of an organized and focused civil society, have forced them to adopt political openness (Beckman 1989, 1991; Ake 1991, 1994; Anyang’ Nyong’o 1992; Ihonvbere and Vaughan 1995; Jega 1998).

If the mere formation of political parties, participation in the political process, and
the subsequent elections of political leadership through the ballot box constitute most political parties are formed along ethnic and tribal lines, participation in the political process is highly restrictive, and the so-called election of the leadership is a mere process of selection through intensive lobbying and material inducements. With a few exceptions, such as Algeria and the Sudan, where there are some religious fundamentalist tendencies, the rest of Africa has willingly, and at times unwillingly, embraced the “democracy project.” In the majority of African nations, the adoption of a democracy project was presented as a precondition for the continuance of international assistance. As a response, a total of forty-eight multiparty elections have taken place in Africa between 1989 and 2001 (Caron, Gboyega, and Osaghae 1992).

In this sense, the majority of African nations have been engaged in the democracy project in the last decade. An African nation is said to be at the democracy project stage when it has established nascent national institutions, created a sustainable environment for the formulation of a policy-making machinery (PMM), and outlined the requisite policies for its national technological capabilities (NTCs) within a gradually stabilizing political environment. Nigeria, Ghana, the Republic of Benin, and Togo are examples (Ezeanyika 2002). However, this is a project that is still on the drawing board; the fundamental institutions needed for guaranteeing the sustainability of democracy are still at their foundation stage, and exposed to the vicissitudes of poverty, underdevelopment, and conflicts (Ezeanyika 2008).

The new drive toward spreading democracy in the African continent has led the Western sponsors of this political ideology to link the much-needed development aid packages to the introduction of liberal democratic principles and values. African leaders
have also launched several democratic initiatives targeted at institutionalizing the
tolerance of militaristic tendencies such as military coups d’états and rebellions, as has
been recently demonstrated by the coming together of Nigeria and other Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) members in dealing with coups in Sierra
Leone, Sao Tome, and Principe. These efforts are targeted at creating a dynamic
environment of law and order, peace, and stability—fundamental ingredients for the
sustenance of democracy in Africa (Wiseman 1993).

It is generally agreed that the development of a democratic culture is normally a
gradual and progressive process rather than an abrupt and dramatic one (Keller 1995).
There is, however, no commonly agreed upon number of stages to the process. While it is
difficult to assess the long-term significance of what is currently transpiring in the
African continent, it is equally difficult to underestimate the magnitude of the change that
is sweeping through it. It is clear, therefore, that the pressures for the development and
institutionalization of democracy in the continent have become generally attractive to the
greatest majority of Africans. These pressures represent a growing global desire for
change and improvement in the welfare of the greatest majority of the world’s poor. They
emanate from within Africa, and from the global community, desirous to benefit from the
opportunities and challenges presented by the new global economy.

The peculiar historical development of Africa has affected the evolution of liberal
democracy in the continent. This history has been characterized by multidimensional and
multifaceted problems. These problems are intricate, and are reflected in economic,
political, and socio-cultural realms. They include economic stagnation reflected in a poor
growth rate of 1.5 percent per year (IMF 2004). By 1995, the continent hosted thirty-two
of the bottom forty poorest nations in the world (Baynham 1994). Added to this is a long list of related problems, including steadily worsening terms of trade; drastic reductions in social welfare programs; the ravages of the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and other pandemic diseases; rapidly deteriorating infrastructure; rising unemployment; rampant corruption and economic mismanagement; environmental degradation and drought; and protracted intercommunal, religious, and ethnic conflicts that have uprooted millions of families. Other problems are a debilitating and insupportable debt burden, hunger and poverty, genocide, border disputes, military rebellions and coups, abuse of human rights, and unfair political practices. These problems were created by the synergy of two negative forces: Western-inspired policies of underdevelopment and neocolonialism, and the politics of ethnic and tribal particularisms championed by the majority of African leaders.

The above list, though not exhaustive, is indicative of the dynamic reality of the situation in Africa. An appraisal of the continent shows that these problems truly threaten the evolution and development of democracy in there. It is, therefore, essential that Africans strive to find functional solutions to these problems first, if democracy is to be institutionalized.

Remarks and Conclusions

In this paper, we extensively discussed the peculiarities associated with conceptualizing a generally acceptable definition of the concept of democracy, particularly as it is applied to Africa. Thus, for lack of a non-subjective definition, the generally accepted tenets of democracy have been used as standard measures. I have argued that African communalist democracy, as illustrated in the examples of the Umuna
was, and remains, fundamentally based on the community support system. It is expressed through a social compact within and between the various social segments. Though unique to the peculiarities of the continent, communalist democracy shares the basic tenets of Western liberal models.

Communalist democracy did not spread throughout the entire continent, but its manifestation in some territories portends to its potential to exist in others. Colonization was intertwined with the comprehensive and systematic exploitation of African territories and never developed any meaningful democratic systems and structures in the continent. At the end of this period came the granting of nominal political independence and the “handing over” of the “liberated” nations to the “educated” class, which had been groomed by the different colonialists for the purpose of continuing and sustaining the already established processes of exploitation in the continent. This class of Africans has sustained the exploitation of the continent, assisted by the entrenchment of despotism in their nations.

The new trend in the process of democratization indicates that Africans have awakened to the realities of development linked to the dynamism of democracy. Quite a number of African nations have expressed a concerted resolve through the rejection of authoritarian, autocratic, and despotic regimes. The emerging communalist and liberal democratic trends in Africa are undergoing a complex process of institutionalization. This democracy project, adopting a learning-by-doing process, will develop through sustained nurturing, taking form and shape and an African coloring that are rooted in Africa’s socio-cultural values. This “new democracy” is at its nascent stage in Africa. To stimulate its development and sustain its growth, Africa and Africans should look inward.
The continent cannot wholesomely follow the European or American style of democracy. It needs a form of government that speaks to its own culture and tradition.

References


Good Governance, organized by the Human Rights Club in Kano, October 26-29.


