Making Language
The Ideological and Interactional Constitution of Language in an Indigenous Aché Community in Eastern Paraguay

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology

by

Jan David Hauck

2016
This dissertation develops a theoretical and empirical framework for the analysis of the ideological and interactional constitution of language. It discusses the process of “making language,” namely, how language emerges as an object of speakers’ attention, the historical processes leading to this type of language consciousness, and the interactional means through which it is achieved and becomes recognizable and analyzable. Integrating work on language ideologies, phenomenology, language socialization, practice theory, conversation analysis, and the ethnographic description of ontologies, this work offers insights into the underlying mechanism of how language becomes a meaningful entity in the lifeworld of its speakers.

Focusing on the constitution of language opens up new avenues for the investigation into its ontological status. Language is here understood as an equivocation that might index potential referential alterity. Individual languages need not always be tokens of the same type and thus arbitrary and translatable. Language and languages are specific objects that result from the socialization of speakers into conceiving of and attending to particular communicative practices as languages.

To analyze the constitution of language, the dissertation introduces the concept of metalinguistic repair, understood as the deliberate replacement of a term from one code with a semantically equivalent
term from another in ongoing interaction. Together with other metalinguistic strategies in language play and language teaching, metalinguistic repairs are theorized as phenomenological modifications by which the code is highlighted and language is constituted as an object that is distinct from the speaker, the meaning, and the context of the utterance. The consequence of these modifications is what is called here *enlanguagement*, a term from studies of pidgin and creole genesis that is redefined to designate the process through which speakers are oriented to notice particular pragmatically salient linguistic features as belonging to different languages, thereby constituting these as distinct entities.

This work is based on ethnographic research in an indigenous Aché community in Eastern Paraguay. It draws on five years (2008–2013) of language documentation work with the Aché, as well as one year (2013–2014) of in-depth language socialization research in one Aché community through video-recordings of children’s everyday interactions, interviews, and participant observation. The Aché are a recently settled hunter-gatherer collective, currently experiencing language shift from their heritage language, Aché, to a Paraguayan national language, Guaraní. The presently dominant medium of communication in the communities is a mixed code, using elements from Aché and Guaraní.

The context in which the Aché children grow up is unique and ideal for this study, because despite the fact that language differences are not relevant in everyday interaction since language mixing is the default mode of communication, the children do attend to them in everyday conversation and play. Through spontaneous repairs and corrections, the deliberate use of specific forms, and discussions about language, they demonstrate an awareness of the linguistic code as a distinct aspect of language use. Such situations are analyzed in detail as key moments in which “language” and “languages” are created. The Aché children do not merely use different languages that are somehow already constituted as given entities in their lifeworld. Rather, by employing a multiplicity of linguistic resources in their everyday interactions they end up making language and languages and making them over.

This dissertation bridges the domains of ideology and interaction in order to provide an integrated account of how language emerges as a cultural and historical product on the one hand, and as an interactional achievement on the other.
The dissertation of Jan David Hauck is approved.

Marjorie Harness Goodwin

John Heritage

Elinor Ochs

Sherry B. Ortner

C. Jason Throop

Paul V. Krookrity, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles
2016
To the Aché children,
may you never stop making language ...

And to Teru (Djakugi),
for the joy you bring into our joint
exploration of the makings of language.
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TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

For the transcription of naturally occurring discourse and words from the languages used in the Aché communities I use the following conventions:

Transcription Symbols


<table>
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<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>::</td>
<td>Elongated sounds (number of colons is relative to duration of sound);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>;;</td>
<td>Elongated sounds in creaky voice;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[</td>
<td>Onset of overlap;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[]</td>
<td>Onset of overlap through simultaneous start;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=</td>
<td>Latching speech;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>A dash at a final word boundary indicates a cut-off or drop-out;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.)</td>
<td>Micropause (silence of less than .2 seconds);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.4)</td>
<td>Pause (number indicates silence duration in seconds);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>Falling intonation (not the end of a sentence!);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>,</td>
<td>Continuing intonation that may rise a little;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>Rising intonation (not necessarily a question!);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>Audible aspiration, usually breathing or laughter; enclosed in parentheses when occurring within a word; multiple h mark longer or more intensive aspiration;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.h</td>
<td>Aspiration that is an inhalation is marked by an h preceded by a dot; without a dot it is usually an exhalation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h(h)</td>
<td>Laughter;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbol</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL CAPS</td>
<td>Increased volume;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>° within</td>
<td>Low volume;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>degree signs</td>
<td>&quot;within quotation marks&quot; Reported speech, quoted discourse;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(best guess)</td>
<td>Incomprehensible speech (best guess of transcriber);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( )</td>
<td>Incomprehensible speech;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((screaming))</td>
<td>No participant specified: Events relevant to the interaction;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((sits down))</td>
<td>Participant specified: Non-verbal behavior, additional information about utterance;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((imitating sound of cellphone))</td>
<td>In the translation: Additional information to aid the interpretation of the utterance;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[in the forest]</td>
<td>In the translation: Additional semantic information that is not in the original text but evident from context and necessary to clarify the meaning.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Orthographic Conventions and Pronunciation Guide

The currently dominant code in the Aché communities is a mixed one composed of elements of the Aché and Guaraní languages, and some Spanish words too. For transcriptions I mostly follow established orthographic conventions for Aché and Guaraní. Since both languages are related, their orthographies are also similar with a few exceptions. In cases where the orthographic representation of the same sound differs between the two languages I choose the grapheme based on the language from which the word originates. For example, in Guaraní [j] is represented by ⟨j⟩ and in Aché by ⟨ll⟩, both of which are used in Guaraní jahu (bath) and Aché lla’a (fruit) respectively. This also holds for Spanish words where I follow Spanish conventions. The Spanish word cinco (five), for example, is pronounced [siŋko], where the first ⟨c⟩ represents [s] and the second one [k]. I am only changing conventional orthographic representation when the pronunciation is markedly different, e.g., cingo [siŋgo]. There is one exception where I modified the orthography from the standard, which is the case of the grapheme ⟨ch⟩. In the respective standard orthographies this grapheme represents two different sounds, [ʃ] in Aché and [ʃ] in Guaraní. Since this is an important distinction, in order to capture the
differ
cence I am departing from standard Guaraní orthography and mark \([\text{ʃ}]\) with the grapheme \(<\text{çh}>\), using a \(<\text{c}>\) with cedilla. I retain \(<\text{ch}>\) to represent \([\text{ʧ}]\) in (mostly) Aché and also Spanish words. Where necessary I also use IPA symbols to point out phonetic particularities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol IPA</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
<th>Symbol IPA</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vowels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>[a]</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>[o]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>[e]</td>
<td>u</td>
<td>[u]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>[i]</td>
<td>y</td>
<td>[i]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>å, ê, è, õ, ŵ, ĭ A tilde (\tilde{\text{}}) is used to mark nasal vowels. Vowels occurring adjacent to m, n, or ñ are also nasal although they do not have a tilde.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consonants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>[b]</td>
<td>çh</td>
<td>[ʃ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mb</td>
<td>[mb]</td>
<td>ch</td>
<td>[ʃ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m</td>
<td>[m]</td>
<td>j</td>
<td>[j]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>[f]</td>
<td>ll</td>
<td>[j]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v</td>
<td>[v]</td>
<td>dj</td>
<td>[dʒ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>[t]</td>
<td>ň</td>
<td>[n]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>[d]</td>
<td>k</td>
<td>[k]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nd</td>
<td>[nd]</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>[k]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>[n]</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>[ɡ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>[r]</td>
<td>ng</td>
<td>[ŋ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rr</td>
<td>[r]</td>
<td>w</td>
<td>[w]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s</td>
<td>[s]</td>
<td>h</td>
<td>[h]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l</td>
<td>[l]</td>
<td>'</td>
<td>[ʔ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 In Spanish words \(<\text{j}>\) is pronounced \([x]\) as j in jota.

2 Note that in Spanish words the graphemes \(<\text{c}>\) and \(<\text{g}>\) can represent two different sounds. Before front vowels /i, e/ \(<\text{c}>\) is rendered \([s]\) as c in eera and \(<\text{g}>\) is rendered \([x]\) as g in gente. Elsewhere \(<\text{c}>\) is rendered \([k]\) and \(<\text{g}>\) is rendered \([ɡ]\).
### Glossing Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gloss</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Gloss</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>First person</td>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Second person</td>
<td>FRUSTR</td>
<td>Frustrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Third person</td>
<td>OF</td>
<td>Genitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>HAB</td>
<td>Habitual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Plural</td>
<td>IAM</td>
<td>Iamitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>IDEO</td>
<td>Ideophone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EX</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>IMP</td>
<td>Imperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>INTNS</td>
<td>Intensifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSER</td>
<td>Assertive</td>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>Irrealis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTN</td>
<td>Attenuative</td>
<td>ITER</td>
<td>Iterative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAUS</td>
<td>Causative</td>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Locative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WITH</td>
<td>Comitative</td>
<td>NEG</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIKE</td>
<td>Comparative</td>
<td>NMLZ</td>
<td>Nominalizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORE</td>
<td>Comparative</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Patient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPL</td>
<td>Completive</td>
<td>PST</td>
<td>Past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COND</td>
<td>Conditional</td>
<td>PROG</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Counterfactual</td>
<td>PROH</td>
<td>Prohibitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Copula</td>
<td>PROSP</td>
<td>Prospective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
<td>PURP</td>
<td>Purposive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>Desiderative</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Question particle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET</td>
<td>Determiner</td>
<td>REFL</td>
<td>Reflexive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOM</td>
<td>Differential object marker</td>
<td>RELN</td>
<td>Relational prefix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIM</td>
<td>Diminutive</td>
<td>REL</td>
<td>Relative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPH</td>
<td>Emphatic</td>
<td>RET</td>
<td>Retrospective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGRESS</td>
<td>Egressive</td>
<td>REAL</td>
<td>Superlative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A dissertation is the culmination of a process made possible by a great many colleagues, friends, and supporters who contributed to it along the way. First and foremost, I thank the Aché families whom I have been working with for this dissertation research. I consider myself very fortunate to have had the opportunity to share a part of their life and memories. I have learned so much from living with them for a year, much more than I would ever be able to write down, let alone discuss in a dissertation. I miss the energy, joy, and mischievousness of the Aché children that would make every day of my research worthwhile.

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Introduction

A group of children are playing in the trees in front of one of the small wooden houses that dot the indigenous Aché village in Eastern Paraguay where I am doing my fieldwork. The sun is about to set; a few clouds have abated the heat on this summer's day in November. Suddenly, one child calls them together suggesting they all go and hide in the nearby bushes and off they run. Pikygi, a six-year-old girl, notices me following them with my video camera and turns around to let me know:

Ore hota ka'aguyype.
We'll go to the forest.¹

The children know I am a researcher interested in their language practices and as if to help me in my work they often explain to me what they are doing. Though at times I wished my presence was a little less obtrusive in order not to interfere in their activities, I was also thankful for these moments since they brought up interesting situations such as the sequence that follows.

Bupigi, Pikygi's same-aged cousin, arrives at the scene. Having overheard what she just said, he comes up to me and repeats it, slightly altering the sentence:

Kwewe, ha'ekuera guatata kadji.
Kwewe,² they will go to the forest.

They all start giggling and pause their escapade to the forest. Others chime in:

Kwewe, ore hota amo- (.) kadji ogape. ... Ore wedjata depe.
Kwewe, we'll go there- (.) to the forest home. ... We'll leave you behind.

¹ Detailed transcripts of these interactions with interlinear glosses will be provided in chapters 1 and 4, where I will discuss them in more detail.
² The name they had given me.
Analyzing Bupigi’s utterance reveals that while repeating what Pikygi said in terms of its meaning, he used different words. Most importantly, he substituted the word *ka'aguype* that she used with *kadji*. Both words refer to “forest,” but each belongs to a different language. *Ka'aguype*, or, to be precise, *ka'aguy* is a word from the Guarani language, a national language of Paraguay, *kadji* is from Aché, the language of Pikygi’s and Bupigi’s grandparents. Usually the children talk in a mixed form of both, without caring for where one or the other word belongs. In Bupigi’s quick intervention though, the difference has become meaningful and he and his playmates recognize and make use of Aché and Guarani as distinct linguistic codes.

In this dissertation I explore the origin of language in ideology and interaction. I want to understand how language emerges as an object to speakers’ attention, the historical processes leading to such a particular type of language consciousness, and the interactional means through which it is achieved and becomes recognizable and analyzable. The context in which the Aché children are growing up is unique and ideal for this study, because despite the fact that language differences are not relevant in everyday interaction since language mixing is the default mode of communication, the children do attend to them in situations such as the one just described and thus demonstrate an awareness of the linguistic code as a distinct aspect of language use that is independent of the message and of the speaker. It is in such situations, I will argue, that “language” and “languages” emerge.

To begin with, a situation like the above teaches us two fundamental lessons about language: First, the degree to which a language in use is available to consciousness is highly variable. Only under certain circumstances do languages become salient in interaction as meaningful objects of our attention. Second, this availability of language to our awareness depends on the assumptions that we have about it, on the meanings that different linguistic elements and different languages carry for us in a given context. Let me unpack these statements:

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3 He also used third person instead of first person, since he was not part of the group that was leaving, and a different word for “go.” More on this in chapter 1.

4 -pe is a locative suffix.
Usually, when we use language, we do not perceive it as language. We do not think about the words that we use to ask a question, to greet someone. Language is just there, available to us, a transparent window onto the world. Only sometimes there are situations when language gets in our way, when it is not immediately available, or not as transparent as it was the moment before; when our everyday unobtrusive language-using breaks down and we have to attend to the medium of communication in its own right. We want to say something but we can't find quite the right word. Someone says something to us but we don't understand it. Maybe it was mispronounced. In the classroom a teacher corrects something we say. What if the word we didn't understand was in a foreign language that we don't know? Or we have to translate for a friend? It is in such moments that the communicative code itself emerges as an object of our attention. Language appears for us as an entity that is independent from the content of the message, independent of the world it refers to, independent from the communicative action that we are performing. From a window-onto-the-world it turns into a thing-in-the-world.

Above we have just one such moment. Pikygi simply wanted to inform me of their plan to go to the forest. But Bupigi, for reasons I will explain below, hears how she says it, becomes aware of the code she used to talk to me and intervenes. He does not explicitly talk about the code, he does not say, “Hey, that's not how you say 'forest'!,” but by repeating the utterance in an altered form he turns the code into an object that can be examined. In this case, unlike in situations where we are forced to attend to the code because of a communicative disjuncture, he deliberately turned his attention (and thereby also that of the others) to it and made it an issue. But what was the impetus behind his intervention? Why did he not leave Pikygi's remark as it was? After all, that is the way they usually talk and I understood perfectly well what she said. Language had not gotten in the way of successful communication.

To make sense of this episode we need to include a second fundamental fact about language into our analysis: that no two linguistic codes are equivalent. While Aché and Guaraní both have a word for forest, the two words, *kadji* and *ka’aguy* are nonetheless not simply two ways of saying the same

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5 My use of “code” follows Jakobson ([1956] 1980) who distinguishes it from message, context, addressee, addressee, and contact, relating each to a different function of language.
thing. As Mikhail Bakhtin ([1975] 1981, 293) observed, “there are no ‘neutral’ words and forms. …
Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life.” It has its
own history and carries with it its own set of meanings, far beyond its referential content. Linguistic
anthropologists often use philosopher Charles S. Peirce’s (1992, 1998) concept *indexicality* to describe
the ways in which linguistic forms can index, or “point to” aspects of socio-cultural context (Silverstein
1976; Ochs 1990). By virtue of their belonging to the Aché and Guaraní languages, *kadji* and *ka'aguy*
index different worlds.

Aché is the heritage language of Bupigi’s and Pikygi’s community. The Aché used to live as nomadic
hunter-gatherers in the forest and they communicated exclusively in Aché before they were forced to
settle on reservations in the 1960s and 70s. In the newly founded communities they soon had to learn
Guaraní, which is a national language of Paraguay. Today Aché is a so-called endangered language,
because it is spoken fluently only by a small number of elders, while most of the community uses a
mixed language that combines elements of Aché and Guaraní, sometimes referred to as “Guaraché.”
The Aché children grow up learning Guaraché as their first language, and this is what makes their
conscious use of the two different words for forest so interesting.

Usually, in everyday interaction the difference between Aché and Guaraní is as relevant to them
as the difference between Latin and Germanic languages to an English speaker. By way of analogy, if
we translate *Ore hota ka'aguype* into English as “We’ll go to the forest,” we could modify it along the
same lines as Bupigi modified Pikygi’s sentence and say instead “We’ll go to the woods.” While one
could think of situations where such a modification would make sense, since the two words “forest”
and “wood” have different “tastes,” as Bakhtin would say, their difference is not thought of primarily
as a difference of languages. “Forest,” which has Old French and ultimately Latin origin (*foresta*), and
“wood,” which comes from Old English *wudu*, are not items indexing two different languages. After
centuries of language contact and cross-linguistic borrowing in English the difference between Old
French and Old English words has faded.

But for the Aché children, although their first language is a mixed language composed of words
from Guaraní and of words from Aché, the difference between the two languages is still meaningful,
or rather, as I will show later, it has become meaningful. This is what the above interaction, among
many others that I will analyze in this dissertation, gives evidence of. This meaningfulness can only be explained in terms of the beliefs that the Aché have about these two languages, their language ideologies (Kroskity 2010). Here Bupigi’s use of the word *kadji* to replace *ka’aguy* stems from the belief that at least in this situation Aché is to be preferred over Guaraní. Why they hold this particular belief will become clear below. First I will turn to a closer consideration of these two dimensions of language use, the awareness that speakers have of language and the language ideologies that impact their awareness.

**Metalinguistic Awareness and Phenomenological Modifications**

Speakers’ awareness of the language they use is usually referred to in the literature as *metalinguistic awareness* (Cazden 1974; Sinclair, Jarvella, and Levelt 1978; Silverstein 1981; Tunmer, Pratt, and Herriman 1984; Mertz and Yovel 2009; Paugh 2012). Metalinguistic awareness refers to speakers’ ability to become aware of their medium of communication as a system or a thing, “to make language forms opaque and attend to them in and for themselves” (Cazden 1974, 13). It is the recognition of the code or aspects of it as a communicative device distinct from the speaker and from the content of the message (Jakobson [1956] 1980; Benveniste [1966] 1971). Part of metalinguistic awareness is, for example, the understanding that a word is separable from the thing it refers to, that the relationship between a signifier and a signified is “arbitrary” in Saussurean ([1916] 2013) terminology. “There is nothing doggy about the word ‘dog.’ There can’t be, since the French recognize much the same characteristics in ‘*un chien*’” (Belsey 2002, 11). Metalinguistic awareness is important for successfully learning second or third languages or to translate between them; even writing a single language implies metalinguistic awareness to some extent (Mertz and Yovel 2009). But metalinguistic awareness is not confined to the awareness of symbolic, i.e., conventional aspects of a language but can refer to the awareness of any linguistic phenomenon as part of the code. Different linguistic phenomena or levels are thereby susceptible to different degrees of awareness (Levelt, Sinclair, and Jarvella 1978; Silverstein 1981; Errington 1988; Zhou 2000).

However, metalinguistic awareness is not an aspect of language practice that is universally present in all communicative situations. Most of the time language is not attended to metalinguistically and
functions as a transparent medium, intrinsically conjoined with experience (Ochs 2012). Only in specific moments—we see one such moment in the episode above—does language emerge as an object that we are conscious of (Cazden 1974; Clark 1978). Phenomenologists in the tradition of Edmund Husserl ([1913b] 1976, [1936a] 1976, 1939) have analyzed such changes in the ways in which we are aware of a given phenomenon as modifications of our attention (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2012; Depraz 2004; Waldenfels 2004; Duranti 2015). Husserl ([1936a] 1976) starts his analyses from what he calls the Lebenswelt, the “lifeworld,” the world how it is given to us in everyday experience. The objects of this lifeworld appear to us as they appear as the result of the ways in which we “constitute” them through intentional experience, i.e., through directing our attention towards them in specific ways (Husserl [1913b] 1976, [1936a] 1976, 1952). “Our way of relating to entities in the world, whether real or imaginary, does not ‘create’ them out of nothing, but it ‘constitutes’ them, that is, it ‘objectivates’ them—makes them acquire objectivity—through distinct intentional acts” (Duranti 2015, 190; see Sokolowski 1970, 46–57). Maurice Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 2012) as well argues that we do not merely perceive what is already there, but we constitute it by turning our attention to it. As he puts it, “our perception ends in objects” (69), it does not begin with them. And through different acts of attention we constitute objects in different ways; we change the ways in which they appear to us by modifying our attention (Duranti 2015, 191–2). Husserl ([1913b] 1976, [1936a] 1976) called such changes “intentional modifications.”

Under normal circumstances, the constitution of the objects of the lifeworld goes largely unnoticed, since we are too busy in our “everyday coping” with them (Dreyfus and Taylor 2013). In this “natural attitude” (Husserl [1913b] 1976, 56) we attend to the world and its objects in a “prepredicative” (Husserl 1939, 21, 73) or “preobjective” (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2012, 12) mode (Throop 2005). Sometimes though, we step out of our natural attitude and “transform a particular experience into an object of our reflection” (Duranti 2015, 198). Husserl called this stepping out a “phenomenological modification” (Husserl 1952, 5–8) or “reorientation” (Husserl [1936a] 1976, 285, 350–1), a specific type of intentional modification by which we trade our natural attitude for a “theoretical attitude” (Husserl 1952, 2–3; Duranti 2015, 198).

It is such a phenomenological modification that we see in the episode when Bupigi corrects his cousin. What is modified is language itself; it is the code that emerges as the intentional object that
Bupigi and the others become metalinguistically aware of. But how can the sentence Kwewe, ha’ekuera guatata kadji by itself demonstrate metalinguistic awareness? I will consider a second similar interaction involving Bupigi and his elder sister, Anegi, and compare it to the one above. I will then discuss both in light of insights from conversation analysis in order to fundament my claims.

On a hunting trek, children are sitting at a campfire. A one-and-a-half-year-old tries to stand up. Her elder cousin, Anegi, orders her to sit back down:

Eguapy.
Sit down.

Immediately Anegi’s brother Bupigi corrects her:

Nda’e (. ) .hh “wapy:::” ei
That’s not it (. ) .hh° One says “sit do:::wn”

Bupigi’s objection concerns the pronunciation of the word for “sit.” The word is a cognate in Aché (wapy) and Guaraní (guapy), the difference being that the Guaraní syllable-initial velar stop–diphthong sequence [ɡua] is rendered with a labiovelar approximant [wa] in Aché. Aché also does not mark the imperative through the prefix e-.

In this interaction Anegi’s brother demonstrates his awareness of the word guapy by framing his correction with the metapragmatic expressions nda’e (it is not) and ei (says). This is a classic metapragmatic utterance, an utterance explicitly commenting on Anegi’s language use (metapragmatics) by drawing attention to the code (metalinguistics) (Silverstein 1976, 1993). In the other example though, when Bupigi says ha’ekuera guatata kadji there is no such metapragmatic framing. How then can I claim that his aim was to intentionally produce the Aché word for forest?

Both of these interactions involve what conversation analysts have called repair (Jefferson 1974; Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977; Schegloff 1987a; Hayashi, Raymond, and Sidnell 2013a). A repair

6 () = micropause; .hh = audible inbreath; a full list of transcription symbols is provided on page xi.

7 The context in which this interaction occurs is one where the children have already been discussing the pronunciation of words, a factor that will be given full consideration when discussing it in more detail in chapter 4.
occurs when ongoing talk is interrupted in order to attend to some sort of trouble with the talk itself. Sources for trouble can be “misarticulations, malapropisms, use of a ‘wrong’ word, unavailability of a word when needed, failure to hear or to be heard, trouble on the part of the recipient in understanding, incorrect understandings by recipients” (Schegloff 1987b, 210), but, as Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks (1977, 363) have noted, “nothing is, in principle, excludable from the class ‘repairable’.” To repair the trouble the talk is interrupted and the word is repeated, corrected, or substituted by a different word, sometimes by the same speaker, sometimes by the recipient, sometimes by a third party. The repair works therefore like what C. Goodwin (1994) called “highlighting,” the visual marking of certain aspects of a perceptual field in order to make them stand out from a ground and become relevant to the observers. A repair perceptually “highlights” a specific aspect of talk and makes it salient to the participants. It simultaneously preserves and modifies that aspect of talk (C. Goodwin 2013, forthcoming) and thus forces participants to become aware of and attend to it.

In the interaction involving Bupigi and Pikygi mentioned at the beginning, the repair is an “other-replacement.” Someone other than the speaker of the trouble source repairs it by embedding an alternative term in a subsequent utterance (Jefferson 1987). In the other interaction with Bupigi’s sister Anegi the trouble is resolved by explicitly correcting the first speaker; it is therefore an “other-correction” (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977; Field 1994). In both cases the “trouble” is the language that was used, Guaraní, or rather, Guaraché. The repair operation is the substitution of the troubling element with a referentially equivalent term from a different language, Aché in this case, and it therefore highlights the code itself. I will refer to these types of repair as metalinguistic repairs. Metalinguistic repairs are well-suited to demonstrate the phenomenological modifications through which language is constituted as an object of attention for the following reasons:

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8 In using the term “repair” for these types of substituting or replacing items from one language with those of another, I am mobilizing a very broad understanding of repair that is not confined to cases where the intention of the repair initiator was the explicit “correction” of prior talk. I believe that the basic mechanisms of how repairs operate identified by conversation analysts is helpful for understanding the metalinguistic replacements I am analyzing here, despite the fact that the motivation for these is not necessarily and in most cases not primarily “maintaining and restoring intersubjectivity or mutual understanding in interaction” (Schegloff 1987b, 211), but rather the deliberate drawing attention to language by “highlighting” (C. Goodwin 1994) one aspect of it.
By definition a repair constitutes its object as a repairable (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977). Everything can be potentially repaired and therefore it is the enacting of a repair that turns its object into the trouble source. There is nothing “wrong” with the word ka'aguy and had Bupigi not repaired it, Pikygi's utterance would have gone completely unnoticed. A repair thus works as a “performative” in Austin's (1962) sense (see B. Lee 1997). In a metalinguistic repair it is the Jakobsonian code that is constituted as trouble source, and thus, as the intended object of the repair. By highlighting the code, participants' attention is directed to it; the awareness of the code is thus produced by the repair operation. Scholarship on the language acquisition of children has analyzed repairs as evidence of the development of metalinguistic awareness. In the language-learning phase repairs show that children “are aware of language, its forms and functions, throughout the acquisition process” (Clark and Andersen 1979, 11). Repairs have here a similar function to explicit metalinguistic comments and questions, the latter being designed to prevent potential communicative failures whereas the former are an efficient means to cope with those that occur (Levelt, Sinclair, and Jarvella 1978; Clark 1978; Slobin 1978).

But unlike in these cases, the repairs here are not dealing with communicative failures; they are the conscious and deliberate manipulation of preceding talk. As Jefferson (1974) has argued, correcting errors in interaction is a powerful resource for a speaker to portray a certain stance or persona, and can therefore give crucial insights into attitudes and ideologies. Repairs make mental processes “visible” for both, for the conversation analyst as well as for the participants (Hayashi, Raymond, and Sidnell 2013b, 17–20) and thus provide a “window onto the social mind” (Dingemanse and Enfield 2015, 96). Therefore in order to understand the motivations for the occurrence of the repair, we will need to consider the ideological context in which it occurs.

Language Ideologies

The object is not given in advance of the viewpoint: far from it. Rather, one might say that it is the viewpoint adopted which creates the object. (Saussure [1916] 2013, 9)
If ... people act toward objects in accord with the meanings they attribute to them in social inter-
action, then surely observations about the meanings that speakers attach to a language cannot be
irrelevant to students of linguistic behavior. (Kroskrity 1993, 53)

The meanings that speakers attribute to language and linguistic forms are the focus of the study of
language ideologies, a major line of research in linguistic anthropology since the late twentieth cen-
tury. Summarizing various aspects of language ideologies that have been emphasized in the literature
(Woolard 1998a, 3–4), Kroskrity characterizes them broadly as

beliefs, feelings, and conceptions about language structure and use, which often index the politi-
cal economic interests of individual speakers, ethnic and other interest groups, and nation states.
These conceptions, whether explicitly articulated or embodied in communicative practice, rep-
resent incomplete, or “partially successful,” attempts to rationalize language usage; such rational-
izations are typically multiple, context-bound, and necessarily constructed from the sociocultural
experience of the speaker. (Kroskrity 2010, 192)

While Silverstein’s (1979, 193) early definition of language ideologies as “sets of beliefs about language
articulated by the users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use”
foregrounds beliefs that are explicitly articulated, the way in which the concept has been taken up in
theory and research and the broad range of phenomena it has helped illuminate go much further and
make such emphasis, retrospectively, a rather unfortunate one. The notion of “belief” carries with it
the assumption of a subject that actively does the believing and a proposition as its object that has
some independent truth value (independent of the subject and of the act of believing). True, language
ideologies can be such explicitly (and reflexively) held beliefs, but they are far more than that, going all
the way to unacknowledged presuppositions and stances that provide “automatic aesthetic responses”
(Kroskrity 2004, 512n1; see Reynolds 2002). This is why Kroskrity (2004, 512n1) includes “feelings”
in the above definition, inspired by Williams’ (1977, 128) “structures of feeling,” to capture the fact
that language ideologies can range from “articulated” conceptions of language to those “ideologies
of practice that must be read from actual usage,” often operating below the conscious awareness of
speakers (Kroskrity 2010, 198). Just as speakers display varying levels of awareness of different features
of linguistic structure (Silverstein 1981), they also display different degrees of awareness of language
ideologies (Kroskrity 1993, 1998, 2010). If I use “beliefs,” “assumptions,” or “presuppositions” as a shorthand for “language ideologies” throughout this work, these terms should be taken to include this range of definitions.

Language ideologies include assumptions such as what the “correct” or “standard” form of a language is (Silverstein 1996; Lippi-Green 1997; Milroy 2001), which items belong to a certain language and which do not (Urciuoli 1995; Zentella 1997), whether or not a language should be kept “pure” from outside influence (Hill and Hill 1986; Kroskrity 1998; Makihara 2007; Jaffe 2007), or which forms are indexes of linguistic etiquette, the relationship between participants, or a particular group of speakers (Silverstein 1985; Errington 1988; Kroskrity 1993; J. H. Hill 1998b; Irvine 1998; Meek 2007; Bunte 2009). Language ideologies operate on each linguistic level, such as phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, or pragmatics; speakers always rely on assumptions about sounds, words, grammatical structures, or uses. At the same time ideologies are by themselves a distinct “level” of language (Silverstein 1979; Kroskrity 2010).

With respect to our example, language ideologies would be such assumptions as that kadji is the “correct” form, that ka’aguy does not belong to the Aché language, or that kadji is the appropriate word or Aché the appropriate language in a given context or situation or for addressing a given person, such as me. Language ideologies thus mediate the relationship between language practices (the use of language), linguistic structure (certain words or grammatical forms), and sociocultural context (settings, participants, or their attributes). They are therefore also a key analytical category for relating changes in language structure and use to changing contexts. Regulating the feelings that people have about their languages, the values that they attach to specific linguistic codes, and their indexical functions (Silverstein 1976; Ochs 1990; Agha 2007), language ideologies provide invaluable insights into the reasons why people choose one linguistic code over another, important factors that crucially impact language development in the long run (Silverstein 1985; Kulick 1992; Errington 1988).

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This parallels Giddens’ (1979, 1984) distinction between practical and discursive consciousness, relating the “scope and nature of the discursive penetration that actors have of the social systems in which they participate” to the degree of control over these systems (Giddens 1979, 6). The more discursively conscious the actors are of dominant structures, the more control can they exercise in the unfolding of events (see chapter 3).
The term “language” in “language ideologies” should be understood as an umbrella notion, comprising any particular language as manifest in human communicative behavior; specific registers, genres, and styles; poetic, ritual, or song language; phenomena like syncretic speech or codeswitching; but also the idea or concept of language in general. Presuppositions about some linguistic forms can be extended to influence the perception and use of other forms, in some cases becoming “dominant language ideologies” (Kroskrity 1998), ideologies that organize a large spectrum of languages, forms, and uses within a single framework, but language ideologies should be taken as a default plural concept (Kroskrity 2010); since there is no use of language that is “ideology-free” (J. H. Hill 1998b; Irvine 1998), different users also often hold different and sometimes conflicting ideologies and multiple ideologies might be overlapping within the same community or even within the same speaker (Briggs 1998; Gal 1998).

Assumptions about any particular language and speech form will thereby necessarily be informed by ideas about what language in general is. The idea of “language,” in turn, depends on specific ideas about particular languages. This implies a “self-reflexive awareness of the underlying comparability of ‘folk’ and ‘expert’ conceptions of language” (Errington 1999, 115), and the science of language cannot be granted a special status vis-à-vis “folk” ideologies. All conceptions must be treated as equally situated in particular local contexts (Collins 1998; Gal 1998; Bauman and Briggs 2003; Agha 2007; T. J. Taylor 2016).

In the above interaction we can distinguish three mutually dependent levels of language ideologies. First, Bupigi’s intervention implies that he takes the word *kadji* to be preferred over the word *kaaguy* when talking to me, by virtue of its belonging to the Aché language. The underlying ideology is that of the Aché language as the appropriate way to speak to the foreign researcher. This ideology thus assigns the Aché language a particular cultural value in the context of the indigenous child and anthropologist interaction. I will provide a more detailed interpretation of this interaction and the ideological context that informs it in chapter 4.

On a second level, before assigning different values to the two words/languages that determine the choice of one or the other in a given situation, Bupigi also has to rely on another language ideology, namely that there exist two distinct languages such as Aché and Guaraní in the first place. This might
seem fairly straightforward to someone who has access to historical data about Aché and Guaraní that shows their independent development, which I will discuss below. But for Bupigi, who is growing up learning the mixed form as his first language, given that in most everyday interactions the distinction between Aché and Guaraní is not meaningful to speakers, it is not straightforward at all. For him it requires consciously differentiating among his repertoire of words between those that belong to Aché and those that do not. The degree to which he is able to accurately assign other words to the two languages is irrelevant here. It is the general idea of Aché and Guaraní as distinct languages that is important for the particular difference of kadji and ka’aguy to be meaningful in this interaction.

These two ideological levels rely on two complementary assumptions about linguistic equivalence. The first one is the assumption of equivalence of semantic meaning: kadji and ka’aguy both stand for (i.e., symbolically represent) “forest.” The second is the assumption of their nonequivalence in terms of pragmatic meaning: the two words stand for (i.e., index) different contexts (settings, participants, etc.; see Silverstein 1976). Figure 0.1 illustrates these two dimensions.

However this relation of equivalence and nonequivalence depends on another assumption, namely, the assumption that code and (pragmatic and semantic) meaning can be distinguished in the first place. Therefore we have to add a third ideological level relevant for the recognition of Aché and Guaraní
as distinct languages, an ideology of language as a “code,” i.e., the presupposition and concomitant recognition of the code (Jakobson [1956] 1980) as a distinct aspect of language practice. Figure 0.2 adds this dimension to the diagram.

By way of ideology we have thus returned to metalinguistic awareness. Is metalinguistic awareness then only a specific aspect or level of language ideology? While not going so far as to conflate the two concepts or including metalinguistic awareness within language ideologies, I suggest a dialectical relationship between language ideologies and metalinguistic awareness as mediated by metalinguistic practices in the following way:

Ideologies of language as code impact to what degree speakers become metalinguistically aware of and attend to the code in practice. But metalinguistic awareness also makes the code available to ideologies through practices that attend to the code. Metalinguistic repairs, as one of the primary means by which the code is attended to in its own right, thus show how language ideologies manifest in interaction at the same time as they work at sustaining and producing such ideologies. More specifically, by demonstrating the deliberate production of a particular code they reveal an ideological preference for that code in a given interactional context. Thereby they also produce the code as the intended object of the repair operation. By highlighting a certain element as repairable (i.e, substitutable and
Thus to an extent “arbitrary”), they create not only the difference between one code and the other, but by the same token the difference between the code and the message.\textsuperscript{10} If the code or certain parts of it become available to metalinguistic awareness is thus dependent upon the dialectical interplay of language ideologies and metalinguistic practices, which constitutes the code as an object of attention.

But language ideologies and metalinguistic practices vary widely across communities, and thus the degree of metalinguistic awareness and the ways in which language is constituted must also vary (Zhou 2000). Just as the languages they are about, beliefs and practices are the products of the particular history of a given community and the ways in which its members are socialized into a particular cultural organization of attention (Gibson [1979] 2014; Ochs and Schieffelin 1984; Ingold 1991; Throop 2010; Brown 2011). I will therefore consider three further dimensions that intersect with language ideologies and metalinguistic awareness: history, socialization, and ontology.

History, Socialization, and Ontology

The more central focus that Husserl gives to the lifeworld in his later writings coincides with an important reorientation towards considering history and temporality in his phenomenological analyses, and importantly not only the history of ideas, but also the cultural history of a society (Husserl [1936a] 1976; Merleau-Ponty [1961] 1964; Carr 1974). The lifeworld, as the meaningful world of everyday experience and practice, is the product of past experiences and practices that are inscribed in what Bourdieu ([1972] 1977, 1990) calls the \textit{habitus} of social agents (Throop and Murphy 2002). More specifically the natural attitude of each individual—our default orientation to the world as we are “coping” (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015) with it—is the result of a long process of socialization into the cultural norms and habits in a given community and by the same token the product of the history of that community.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10} To be sure, the code is not the only aspect that speakers become metalinguistically aware of and that is available to ideologies. And while different levels of language are more or less likely to become salient to speakers’ awareness (Silverstein 1981; Errington 1988; Zhou 2000), any aspect of language use can potentially be attended to metalinguistically. If I focus here primarily on the “code” it is to point out one aspect of the data that is particularly highlighted by the children, which at the same time hints at transformations in the understanding of language of the Aché, to be discussed in chapters 2 and 3.

\textsuperscript{11} This is also why Duranti (2015, 197) suggests to recast the natural attitude as the “cultural attitude.”
When Duranti (2009) first pointed to the importance of Husserl’s phenomenology for anthropological research, he did so explicitly recognizing its affinity to the theory of language socialization (Ochs and Schieffelin 2011). The language socialization paradigm is founded on the premise that “language is a fundamental medium in children’s development of social and cultural knowledge and sensibilities” (1). While growing up, children learn how to speak, act, feel, believe, and attend to the surrounding world in ways required by the sociocultural context in which they are raised, by their family, community, society, and the environment. This socialization happens largely through the use of language by caregivers and peers, by explicit instruction as well as participation in routine activities (Rogoff et al. 2003; de León 2015), and it does not stop at a given age but must be considered a lifelong process. It is through language then that children become “speakers of culture” (Ochs and Schieffelin 2011, 7), that they acquire the social and cultural competence necessary for members of a given community or communities (see Gadamer [1966] 1993).

An important part of language socialization is to orient novices “to notice and value certain salient and relevant activities, persons, artifacts, and features of the natural ecology” (Ochs and Schieffelin 2011, 8). What is relevant and what becomes salient differs from one cultural context to another. Socialization is thus first and foremost the “education of attention” (Gibson [1979] 2014, 243) through culturally specific practices into culturally specific modes of perceiving the world, interacting with it, and orienting oneself in it (James 1891; Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2012; Ochs and Schieffelin 1984; Ingold 1991; Descola 2009; Throop 2010; Brown 2011). In every collective across the globe children participate in verbal and non-verbal activities aimed at directing their “engagement with their surrounding world—a world made of people, animals, food, artifacts, things of nature, and, at times, spirits or other kinds of supernatural beings” (Duranti 2009, 205–6).

Language itself, while being an important means by which this process of socialization is carried out, is at the same time no exception when it comes to the meaningful entities of the lifeworld that are its result. In other words, whether or not language is a relevant and salient object in the everyday lifeworld of a given community depends on the socialization of its members into a culturally specific mode of attending to a certain set of behaviors as language, and specifically into an ideology of language as code. At the same time, different socialization practices are also informed by different ideologies. A
language socialization perspective thus adds temporality to the dialectic between language ideologies and metalinguistic practices and makes us attentive to historical and cross-cultural variation of the degree to which language can become available to linguistic objectification (Zhou 2000).

Cross-cultural differences in what entities exist in a given local lifeworld, what their properties are, the respective similarities and differences that they share with other entities, and in what types of relations one is able to enter with them have been debated in anthropology recently in relation to the notion of “ontology.” The turn to ontology stems from a dissatisfaction with the analytical tools derived from traditional anthropological theories to account for the multiple lifeworlds that ethnographers encounter across the world, particularly the culture concept. The assumption that the world is made up of multiple “cultures” that differ in their beliefs, practices, and traditions is ill-suited to account for such questions as, for example, whether a given orphaned orca whale is an animal or the abode of an ancestor spirit (Blaser 2013), whether a jaguar sees humans as peccaries or as humans (Weiss 1972), whether or not a garden plant has a soul that enables it to communicate with humans (Descola [1993] 1996), or whether a particular language is entirely controlled by its speakers or rather has control over its speakers (Course 2012b). Such questions do not arise from diverging perspectives on the same “thing.” Rather, they concern different assumptions about what a given entity is, about its ontological status. Taken seriously, such differences cannot be reframed as different (cultural) beliefs about or (symbolic) representations of the same world or reality; they must be recognized as pointing to different ontologies (Descola [2005] 2013; Viveiros de Castro [2009] 2014; Costa and Fausto 2010; Halbmayer 2012; Kohn 2015).

For the purpose of this dissertation I remain agnostic to the question of whether or not the ontological properties of humans and nonhumans that are reported in ethnographies hint at underlying differences in modes of identification that can be assembled into distinct “ontologies” (Descola [2005] 2013). But I do think that the recognition of fundamental differences in the ways in which local communities conceptualize, attend to, and engage with the environment in which they live, and in

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12 A phenomenologist like Husserl ([1935] 1993, 164) might have been sympathetic to such a project.
the properties that they ascribe to the entities that they encounter and relate to in their everyday lives—in short, different lifeworlds—is an ontological problem and not merely a cultural one.

Here I use the notion of ontology as follows: On the one hand, I take it to refer to the presuppositions about what is (and the ascription of properties of what is) taken seriously, i.e., not as beliefs (whether right or wrong) about something the ontological status of which can be established by other means, but as reality (Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2007; Kohn 2015). I take such a heuristic conflation of the “ontic” and “ontological” (Vigh and Sausdal 2014), or “strong” reading of ontology as “fundamental reality independent of any representation of it” (Keane 2013, 187), to be productive for trying to understand the ways in which human beings actually relate to and engage with entities of the lifeworld. On the other hand, I think such a notion of ontology remains incomplete if we do not support it with an account of how a given ontology comes into being. Here I rely on the phenomenological analysis of “constitution” as the process through which entities emerge for us (acquire “reality”) as we engage with and move through the world. Importantly, entities do not appear to us as they appear as the result of either their inherent properties or of our subjective intentionality, but rather as the result of the ways in which we as embodied beings intersubjectively relate to and engage with them, moving constantly between reflective and prereflective, objective and preobjective modes of attending to the world (Husserl 1939; Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2012; Gallagher 1986; Dillon [1988] 1997; Csordas 1990; Toadvine and Embree 2002; J. Smith 2005; Throop 2005; Dreyfus and Taylor 2015; see chapter 4). The analysis of an “ontology” must therefore be the joint consideration of both, taken-for-granted presuppositions about what is and practices of socialization into attending to or coping with what is. These work together towards organizing the attention to and perception of locally meaningful human and nonhuman entities. In this dissertation I will limit myself to one such entity, language. The question of the constitution of language is, I believe, a quintessentially ontological one (Kohn 2013, 2015).\14

\13 Heidegger ([1927] 1977) distinguishes between the “ontic” and “ontological” levels of Being, where the ontic refers to what is actual, specific, or observable (beings), and the ontological refers to the recursive or theoretical understanding of it (the Being of beings), distinctive of Dasein.

\14 To avoid any confusion let me make clear from the outset that I do not mean to conflate the Husserlian lifeworld with the recent anthropological notion of ontology. According to Husserl, each person participates in multiple lifeworlds that are always intersubjectively constituted (see Schütz 1945). Ontology, on the other hand, has come to stand for commonalities and differences (continuities and discontinuities) in how self and non-self are constituted on a much
Language has been conspicuously absent from debates about ontology. That is not to say that no attention has been paid to the linguistic and communicative abilities of humans and nonhumans, how they interact, or how communication impacts relations among and between them (Townsley 1993; Descola [1993] 1996; Severi 2002; Viveiros de Castro 2004; Cesarino 2011; Course 2013a; Kohn 2013; Vilaça 2016). But the ontological status of language vis-à-vis other entities has not been the focus of discussion (for a notable exception see Course 2012b). Linguistic anthropologists are of course highly aware of the fact that the people whose languages we study often times have very different ideas about what these languages are (we are usually especially aware that those ideas are especially different from the ideas that some linguists have about the very same languages). Solutions to this problem usually take two forms. One is to extend the concept of language to include what had been confined to the paralinguistic, the metalinguistic, or the nonlinguistic realms in the Western intellectual tradition. An alternative was to abandon language altogether and focus on discourse, performance, or representation instead (see Sherzer and Urban 1986; Bauman and Briggs 1990; Goodwin and Duranti 1992; Silverstein and Urban 1996; Mühlhäusler 1996; Duranti 1997; Makoni and Pennycook 2007; Kohn 2013).

While not questioning the utility of turning the focus away from language or of including within language a range of phenomena that, while not part of the code, are nonetheless indispensable in its functioning, for the purpose of discussing language and language awareness among the Aché, I take here a different approach. Instead of expanding the scope of language to guarantee its widest-most applicability to a broad range of discourse phenomena, I would like to restrict what we take “language” to mean. By restricting the notion of language, however, I do not mean to define language narrowly in advance as, for instance, “the use of symbols” or “a system of communication that can be distinguished from other such systems.” Rather I would like to leave the question of what language is open and instead turn the attention to how language is constituted locally—thereby also acknowledging that different languages might actually be constituted in very different ways (Course 2012b), or not constituted at all.

broader scale. My concern here is not with “ontologies” but with the ontological status of language. I do not attempt to unambiguously assign language a place within a specific “ontology” (but see Bauman and Briggs 2003); my point is rather that we should not take language for granted in any particular lifeworld and open the inquiry to its local constitution.
Such an approach to language must necessarily rely on a notion of “language ideologies” that is broad enough to include the constitution of language itself. I believe this is warranted by how the notion of language ideologies has been used in the literature, as assumptions about both, particular languages, as well as language in general (Woolard 1998a; Collins 1998; Kroskrity 2000a, 2010; Irvine and Gal 2000). A distinction between linguistic and metalinguistic ideologies or between languages as tokens and language as a type, can therefore not be made in advance. In chapter 2 I will return to a more detailed discussion of these issues.

Lastly, since each lifeworld is the result of the history of its community, and since the constitution of meaningful entities (and the constitution of entities as meaningful) changes over time, a local ontology of language might also change. Not only (cultural) practices (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 1990; Sahlins 1981, 1985; Sewell Jr. 2005) but ontologies too are necessarily historical products (Lloyd 2011, 2012). Especially situations of colonial and post-colonial encounters that cause profound sociocultural transformations can lead, via changing socialization patterns, to phenomenological reorientations and thus to the restructuring of the lifeworld. Specifically the objectification of beliefs and practices that had been previously taken for granted can result in changes in awareness through which new entities can emerge while old ones disappear (Giddens 1979, 1984; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; Comaroff and Comaroff 1997; Sahlins 1992; Bourdieu [1997] 2000; Sewell Jr. 2005; Robbins 2005a; Ortner 2006; Keane 2007; Throop 2012; Vilaça 2015). The story that I will tell here is the story of such changes.

I will argue that language is a quite recent invention among the Aché; as an entity it has not always existed for them. No myth has anything to say about how the Aché used to speak, ways of speaking

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15 I am aware that a similar reasoning can be found in Tedlock’s (1988) and Keane’s (2003, 2007) separate suggestions to use the term “semiotic ideologies” for a more inclusive understanding of beliefs that “set linguistic processes within a larger context that includes nonverbal signs” (Tedlock 1988, 59) or of “basic assumptions about what signs are and how they function in the world” as well as about “what kinds of agentic subjects and acted-upon objects might be found in the world” (Keane 2003, 419). In an earlier discussion (Hauck 2012) I had tried to put both notions to use to analytically distinguish between ideologies about languages as tokens (language ideologies) and language as a type (semiotic ideologies). However, given that beliefs about particular languages (tokens) are necessarily informed by beliefs about what language in general is (as a type) and vice versa (Kroskrity 1998, 2000a; Collins 1998; Irvine and Gal 2000), and that the idea of “language in general” is in itself already a culture-specific assumption and in many local context not divorceable from ideas about particular languages, for the present discussion I will continue to use “language ideologies” in both ways, while acknowledging that what we mean by the “language” part of “language ideologies” needs to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
of humans or animals, or the origins of speech. In early wordlists, ethnographic descriptions, and transcriptions of Aché texts, the word that is now used for language, *djawu*, is reported to refer to conversation, talk, animal sounds, narratives, or myths. The first documented references to *djawu* as a form of speech that can be distinguished from other such forms occur in reference to other languages, such as Guarani. Before contact with Paraguayan society the Aché had no peaceful contact with other groups and were most likely also only minimally exposed to the languages of those. There was no necessity for translation or other practices that would have required attention to language in its own right. Therefore, while living in the forest in the pre-contact lifeworld of the Aché socialization practices had not constituted language as a legitimate object of attention.

Today, however, language has become an important object in the Aché communities. Sociocultural transformations after contact have caused the Aché to revise their language ideologies such that language emerged as a meaningful entity. And these ideologies surface in everyday linguistic practices through metalinguistic repairs and other means (see chapter 4). Interactions such as the two that I have briefly described above would not have happened among the Aché forty years ago (see chapter 2). But metalinguistic repairs are not only reliable indicators of awareness of language and language ideologies. By substituting one constituent with another one of a different language and thereby highlighting particular aspects of an utterance as language, they also create language and linguistic difference in the process. This is what the data from the Aché makes unmistakably clear. Given that the default mode of communication is Guaraché, the mixed language that does not distinguish between elements from Aché and Guarani, through the deliberate substitution of one code with the other the metalinguistic repair produces the linguistic difference between the two languages and that between code and message. In the children’s spontaneous interactions on the playground and in the forest it is irrelevant whether a lexical item belongs to Aché or to Guarani. Only in the moments that I have isolated, these become metalinguistically recognizable as different codes, thereby allowing the constituents in question to emerge as pragmatically salient elements (Errington 1988), as referentially equivalent alternants, available to native speakers’ awareness in terms of their assignability to one or the other code. Here, metalinguistic repairs invite phenomenological modifications that constitute the lexical difference between *ka'aguy* and *kadji* and the phonological difference between *guapy* and
wapy as metalinguistic markers by which the children’s speech can be identified as one thing or the other.

Language emerges as a phenomenological object in everyday interaction through metalinguistic repairs and other means by which boundaries between languages are drawn and subsets of linguistic features are recognized as belonging to specific languages. I call this process “enlanguagement,” borrowing a term from studies of pidgin and creole genesis (Jourdan 2006) and redefining it by drawing on work on the semiotic differentiation of language registers (Agha 2007), language socialization (Ochs and Schieffelin 2011), and phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2012). A phenomenologically grounded definition of enlanguagement is the process through which speakers are oriented to notice particular linguistic features as belonging to different languages, thereby constituting these as distinct entities. This process is informed by ideologies and achieved through interactional means. By focusing on the phenomenological constitution of language and linguistic difference, enlanguagement thus bridges the domains of ideology and interaction in order to provide an integrated account of how language emerges. In this dissertation I analyze enlanguagement among the Aché as a diachronic and synchronic process.

Overview of the Dissertation

In chapter 1 I will set the stage by describing the linguistic, cultural, and historical background of the Aché. I begin with a brief historical and sociolinguistic discussion of Paraguay and an ethnolinguistic description of the Aché. I then compare and contrast linguistic differences and similarities of Aché and Guaraní and describe the main features of Guaraché by analyzing a number of detailed transcripts of interactional data, including the two interactions that I have already discussed in this introduction. I will also discuss language endangerment and activism. The final section gives an overview of my fieldwork and research methodology.

Chapter 2 begins with a brief description of the emergence of a modern notion of language as autonomous domain in European modernity and then contrasts it with alternative conceptions of language with specific focus on the indigenous Americas. I will then turn to a critical discussion
of the concept of language itself. I suggest that we might productively consider it in terms of an “equivocation” that might hint at referential alterity and that we should not take language to exist as a universal phenomenon. The final part of the chapter contrasts different conceptions of language among the Guaraní and the Aché. Here I argue that language did not exist as an entity in the pre-contact lifeworld of the Aché and that the common narrative that there once was such a thing as “the Aché language” that has now become endangered as their speech practices are changing is problematic.

Chapter 3 is concerned with the diachronic emergence of language among the Aché. I begin with a brief theoretical discussion of sociocultural change in terms of the structure of the conjuncture of structures (Sahlins 1981; Sewell Jr. 2005). I then discuss the early encounters of the Aché with Paraguayan society and how their understandings of self, other, and language were transformed in the process. The latter part of the chapter is dedicated to the specific impact that missionaries had on local conceptualizations of and attention to culture and language.

Finally, chapter 4 provides a detailed analysis of the synchronic emergence of language in interaction. The theory of language socialization will provide a general framework through which to understand metalinguistic repairs and language play that I analyze in detail in the main section of the chapter. A deeper consideration of phenomenological theory follows and is mobilized for an understanding of these interactions. I end the chapter by discussing the constitution of language through a language class in school and relate my analyses to Gestalt psychology, the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, and theories of code-switching.
CHAPTER I

The Aché and Their Wor(l)ds

Bupigi, Pikygi, their siblings and playmates grow up in an indigenous Aché village called Krendy' in Eastern Paraguay. Krendy has a population of 290, living in 60 wooden huts arranged in a circle around a soccer field. In the surroundings of the village there are gardens and fields on which the Aché plant manioc (cassava), corn, and a variety of other vegetables. Throughout the village abundant trees provide the Aché with shade and fruits such as mango, orange, grapefruit, papaya, avocado, and the orange fruits of the pindo palm (*Syagrus romanzoffiana*). The children spend most of their time playing outside in the open spaces between their homes and on the soccer field. They attend school in a small long brick building consisting of four classrooms. Their parents also take them on occasional hunting treks that usually last for three to five days.

Krendy is situated adjacent to a forest reserve where the Aché have hunting rights. The reserve is one of the last stretches that is left of the Atlantic forest, the subtropical rainforest that had once covered the land between the Paraguay River and the Atlantic coast of southern Brazil. Before settling in villages the Aché used to live in this forest as nomadic hunter-gatherers, roaming the area west of the Paraná River. Persecutions by colonists, disease, and deforestation forced them onto reservations in the 1960s and 70s. Aside from Krendy there are six other Aché communities spread over Eastern Paraguay.

Sedentarization entailed dramatic changes of socio-cultural structure and everyday life: They shifted to agriculture as their main form of subsistence, evangelical missionaries converted the majority of the population to Christianity, virtually all of their traditional ritual practices were aban-

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1 Pseudonym.
done, and a process of language shift began. Their heritage language, Aché, is slowly being replaced by Guaraní, a closely related language and one of the national languages of Paraguay. Although both are indigenous languages from the same language family, they followed different historical trajectories and today occupy different positions in terms of status and function in Paraguayan society, and thus also in the village. Guaraní is spoken by the younger generations and mainly with outsiders. Only the elder generations speak Aché fluently. However, the Aché have also started to engage in language maintenance activities to reverse the process of language shift and teach the language in the primary schools. The currently dominant code in the communities is Guaraché, a mixed language composed of structural and lexical elements from Guaraní and Aché. This is the first language of Bupigi and Pikygi and the other Aché children and will be described in section 1.3.

Besides Aché, Guaraní, and Guaraché, Spanish is heard frequently, especially on radio and television and, to a lesser extent, also Brazilian Portuguese. I will start with a brief account of the historical processes that account for the presence of all these languages in Bupigi and Pikygi’s community.

1.1 The Languages of Paraguay

Guaraní is a national language of Paraguay spoken by over six million people here, in Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia, and is the largest language of the Tupí-Guaraní language family. It was the native language of the indigenous people of the same name, an assemblage of horticulturalist collectives that once were living across wide stretches of Lowland South America. Today, owing to the country’s particular history, it is also spoken by the majority of Paraguay’s non-indigenous population, alongside Spanish, the language of the conquerors. Unlike in other South American countries, where indigenous languages are confined to ethnic or regional minorities, most Paraguayans are bilingual, and competence and use of Guaraní is even more widespread than that of Spanish (Warren 1949; Melià 1986, 1992, 2003; Gynan 2001; Ganson 2003).²

² The latest general census from 2002 gives the following figures for language use: Spanish–Guaraní bilingual, 52.6 %; Guaraní only, 28.8 %; Spanish only, 10 %; Other languages, 8.6 % (Gynan 2007, 286).
This expansion of Guaraní beyond the boundaries of its original speech community is usually attributed to two institutions: One was the system of *encomienda*, installed in 1556, a labor system based on trusteeship that the Spanish conquerors were granted over indigenous people. Guaraní women supplied not only labor but also concubinage, and polygamy was practiced and encouraged by political leaders; the Guaraní language was passed on to the children of these unions (Warren 1949, 78–80; Gynan 2001, 79–81). The other institution were Franciscan and Jesuit missions between the late sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Christianization was accomplished by preaching in Guaraní and the Jesuits were also the first to write the language and publish grammars, dictionaries, and translations of the catechism (Melià 1986, 174–209; 1992, 78–155; 2003). After the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1768 the mission Guaraní integrated into Paraguayan society and their numerical predominance further expanded the Guaraní speaking population (Gynan 2001, 81; Ganson 2003, 125–36).

After independence from Spain in 1811, Paraguayan rulers favored the rural Guaraní-speaking mestizo population against Spanish-speaking elites, first as part of a strategy to maintain autonomy from the centralizing powers in Buenos Aires, and later to consolidate their grip on power over rivals. This pattern would continue well into the twentieth century (Lewis 1993, 1–6; Gynan 2001, 82–4) and contributed to Guaraní being associated with Paraguayan nationalism. In the wars of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870) and the Chaco (1932–1935) Guaraní was a shibboleth for the troops and an important symbol of national unity and resistance (Warren 1949, 217–314; Melià 1992, 168–72; Gynan 2001, 81–6). The constitution from 1992 recognizes both, Spanish and Guaraní, as national and official languages.

It should be noted that the national variety of Guaraní, commonly known as Paraguayan Guaraní, differs considerably from the five Guaraní varieties spoken by indigenous groups living on Paraguayan territory today. Almost 500 years of contact has left its imprint on the language at all levels (Gregores and Suárez 1967; Granda 1996; Gómez Rendón 2008; Penner et al. 2009). Furthermore, dynamic mixing of Paraguayan Guaraní and Spanish through codeswitches, borrowings, and phonological and syntactic interference is a common countrywide phenomenon, known as *jopara* (Boidin 2000; Penner

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3 These are Mbyá, Avá, Paí-Tavytera, Ñandeva, and Occidental Guaraní.
Thus, it is never quite straightforward to determine what phenomenon the label “Guaraní” points to (Melià 1999; Penner 2007; Hauck 2014).

Further complexity is added by the functional specialization and unequal distribution of the two languages, commonly described as diglossia (Ferguson 1959; Fishman 1967). In diglossia terminology, Spanish would be the “high” language (H), since it has higher prestige and is the language of the public sphere, written communication, and formal education. It is spoken mainly in the capital city Asunción and other urban centers. Guaraní would be the “low” language (L), associated with confidence and intimacy, the vehicle for the expression of sentiments like love, humor, or sarcasm, spoken mostly at home, transmitted orally, and dominant in the rural areas (Rubin 1968; Melià 1973; Granda 1981, 1988; von Gleich 1993; Gynan 1997, 2001).

While the diglossia model is useful for a broad characterization of the language situation in Paraguay, it is much too crude to account for the actual use of and competence in one or the other, or multiple languages. Mapping distinctions like formal vs. informal, public vs. domestic sphere, urban vs. rural, and high vs. low prestige onto language practices is not always straightforward since these dimensions crosscut and intersect in complicated ways across region and social class. And the Paraguayan speech community is much less integrated than the diglossia model would imply.

Expanding on Bourdieu’s (1991, 1977) notion of “linguistic markets,” Woolard (1985) proposes to analyze such situations of bi- and multilingualism in terms of multiple alternative linguistic markets, that do not integrate on a national level, but overlap and intersect, each impacting language choice in a given local context. Drawing on data from Catalonia she argues that “it is as important to produce the correct vernacular forms in the private, local arenas of the working-class neighborhoods or peasant communities as it is to produce the official form in formal domains” (744). Thus instead of assigning the labels “high” and “low” to different languages on a national level, what counts as high and low code varies by region, context, and situation and there are always multiple economical and ideological forces at play.⁴

⁴ Woolard’s analysis echoes an argument of Bakhtin ([1975] 1981), who suggests a dynamic model of language use based on “centrifugal” and “centripetal” forces (272), i.e., the unifying and homogenizing vs. the decentralizing and heterogenizing tendencies, that always depend on perspective and situation (see as well Platt 1977 and Errington 1988, 1991).
Woolard’s model is therefore better suited to describe the situation in Paraguay since Guaraní and Spanish do not occupy the same positions everywhere. While Spanish is dominant in the capital city Asunción, where its mastery determines a speaker’s social position to a large degree, in smaller cities and rural areas Guaraní is by far the more important code. In the surroundings of the village where Bupigi and Pikygi are growing up it is the dominant and popular medium of communication and thus it is also Guaraní, not Spanish, that is replacing their heritage language, Aché.  

1.2 A Brief Ethnolinguistic History of the Aché

Aché is the first language of Bupigi’s and Pikygi’s parents and grandparents. Before persistent contact with the national society in the 1960s, the Aché (or Guayaki as they used to be called in the ethnographic literature and by neighboring groups) lived as full-time nomadic hunter-gatherers in the subtropical Atlantic forest west of the Paraná River. Hunter-gatherer groups are rare among the

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5 Spanish is taught in the Aché schools and spoken among Paraguayan school officials and with outsiders not proficient in Guaraní or Aché. It also plays an important role as the language of media as most television and radio programs are in Spanish. Many estates in Eastern Paraguay are in the hands of Brazilian landowners and their preference for Brazilian farmworkers has led to a considerable minority whose first language is Brazilian Portuguese, living in the villages and small towns surrounding the Aché communities. The Aché listen to radio stations in Guaraní, Spanish, and Brazilian Portuguese.

6 A remark is in order about my use of the ethnonym “Aché” together with the English determiner “the.” Anthropologists have become wary of this construction in the context of a general suspicion of generalizations as they homogenize and objectify and are thought to lead to essentialist constructions of culture and ethnicity. I am aware that the people among which I have been doing my fieldwork do not constitute a homogenous group, neither culturally, nor linguistically, nor politically. If I am using the construction here it is for the following reasons: First, the term ache in the Aché language means simply “person.” As most Amerindian autonyms it is characterized by deictic referentiality, being both stingy and generous at the same time, in that it can sometimes include the whole of living beings capable of subjectivity, and at other times be restricted to one’s very own band (Seeger, da Matta, and Viveiros de Castro 1979). Thus, when talking about “the Aché” here, I am strictly speaking not circumscribing any specific group of people but rather using the most neutral term available that may or may not correspond to what is usually seen as an “ethnic group.” Second, while ache can potentially refer to any human or nonhuman being, today it is used by the Aché first and foremost to designate those who indeed share a common language, history, and descent and has become a marker of ethnicity (see chapter 3). This does not contradict the first point, since for the Aché such double use is unproblematic and warranted by the Amerindian perspectival logic (Viveiros de Castro 1998). When the Aché use it primarily as an ethnonym today it is mostly for political reasons, to highlight a common history and common political interests. Their distinction from the Paraguayans to this day continues to be the most important ethnic boundary for them, the maintenance of which is critical, not least to assert themselves as a culturally and politically autonomous group. In my view this also justifies the determiner, given that in this dissertation I am indeed focusing on their collective experience, both linguistically and culturally speaking, which makes the Aché particular and special.
mostly horticulturalist Tupí-Guaranian societies and the Aché also present a number of cultural traits that distinguish them from their Guaraní neighbors. Meliá and Münzel (1973, 10) as well as Hill and Hurtado (1996, 58–60) claim that there were no sustained peaceful relations such as intermarriage or trade with these or other indigenous groups in Paraguay since the time of the Spanish conquest. If there was any non-hostile contact it was not frequent and might have been the result of population movement resulting from the expansion of the colonial frontier and later from Paraguayan expeditions into indigenous territories (Mayntzhusen 1911).

However, linguistic data suggests that the Aché language is the result of language contact, so there must have been some social contact in history. Aché and Guaraní are closely related languages of the Tupí-Guaranian family. Almost all of the lexicon of the Aché language is cognate with Guaraní and both languages share the bulk of their phonological inventory. But Aché also presents a number of morphosyntactic features that are atypical of Guaraní and other Tupí-Guaranian languages. More recent linguistic studies therefore suggest its origin in a pre-Columbian contact situation, between a group of speakers of some early variety of Guaraní with those of a different linguistic affiliation, possibly Gê (Susnik [1961–1962] 1974; Dietrich 1990; Rodrigues 2000; Hill and Hurtado 1996; Rößler 2008, 2015). The accurate historical period when that contact had taken place, the type of contact, and whether or not it was peaceful or sustained is uncertain.

The Aché lived in foraging bands of 15–70 individuals (Hill and Hurtado 1996, 41), usually not camping for more than a week at the same site. Affiliated bands call each other iroidjì, “the ones who are habitually friends,” distinguishing themselves from the irollângi, “the ones that are non-friends.” We can distinguish five ethnolinguistically distinct subgroups of iroidjì bands: Northern, Yvytyrusu, Ñacunday, Ypety, and Jakui Aché.7 Bands of one subgroup did not interact peacefully with bands of other subgroups and were careful to not set foot on the others’ territories (P. Clastres [1972] 1998, 81),

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7 These designations are by their approximate geographic location before contact, since their auto-denomination is ache or ache gatu in all cases. The Northern Aché roamed a large area, the core of which was located in what today is the department of Canindeyú. A part of that group split in the 1930s and lived towards the south in the Yvytyrusu mountain range. The latter three designations use the names of rivers in south eastern Paraguay in the proximity of which these groups had their core territory.
but interactions and intermarriage between affiliated bands were frequent. Larger gatherings of each subgroup happened for ritual purposes.

The varieties spoken by Northern and Yvytyrusu Aché are quite similar, as the groups have been divided geographically only for nearly forty years between the 1930s and 70s. The Ñacunday group in the south was isolated earlier and reestablished contact with the two northern Aché subgroups only recently. The fourth subgroup, Ypety, was the first one to be settled in 1959, but few members have survived. Only a handful of elders speak that group’s variety. Of other bands that lived further towards the south in the area of the Jakui River we only know through the literature. Members of these bands had been settled in 1911 at the ranch of a German land speculator (and later trained anthropologist) Friedrich Mayntzhusen (1911, 1935, 1948). This group completely integrated into the Paraguayan society after Mayntzhusen’s death in 1949.

In the 1960s and 70s, rapid deforestation, contact-related diseases, persecutions from Paraguayan colonists, and slave trade had a disastrous demographic impact on the Aché and forced one band after another to give up their nomadic life (P. Clastres [1972] 1998; Melià and Münzel 1973; Münzel 1983; Hill and Hurtado 1996). By 1978 the last group had left the forest and settled on a reservation. This process entailed dramatic changes of socio-cultural structure and everyday life: They shifted to agriculture as their main form of subsistence, evangelical missionaries converted the vast majority of the population to Christianity, and virtually all of their traditional ritual practices were abandoned. Ethnographic reports from that period (P. Clastres [1972] 1998; Münzel 1983) point out that this was by no means only a coercive process engendered by foreign agents, but that sedentarization and “becoming Paraguayan” was a project that was embraced by the Aché themselves (see chapter 3).

This process of becoming Paraguayan implied learning their language. The Aché language, highly adapted to nomadic life in the forest as many vocabulary items and ways of communicating were associated with hunting practices, was suddenly very restricted in its usefulness. Contact with Paraguayans was now permanent and in the new world the Aché found themselves in, it was no question who the

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8 I will use the term “Paraguayans” for all members of the Paraguayan society that are not part of an indigenous community, thereby following the way that the Aché and other indigenous groups in Paraguay contrast their ethnicity with the national identity.
politically and economically dominant group was. In the newly established camps and settlements knowledge of Guaraní was an important tool to facilitate communication with them and thus also one of the key advantages of those Aché already settled over newly arriving groups (P. Clastres [1972] 1998; Münzel 1983). In this way the emergent hierarchy of languages was perpetuated within the Aché population and a process of rapid language shift began.

Today only the elder generations of 50 years and above are still fully fluent in Aché, and even they rarely use it in its traditional form. Its intergenerational transmission is nearly completely interrupted and children are taught their heritage language only in language classes in school. However, as of yet language shift is not complete and has led to the emergence of the aforementioned Guaraché, a mixed language of Guaraní and Aché, which is currently the dominant medium of communication in all communities.9

1.3 Approaching Guaraché

As I have mentioned above, current consensus among linguists is that the heritage language of the Aché is a contact language. A more precise classification of Aché has not been achieved. As Rößler (2015, 374) points out, “clear distinctions between pidgins, creoles, vernaculars and other commonly assumed contact language types remain hard to establish for South American indigenous languages.” These terms have very specific meanings in the literature and their definitions usually include the socio-historic context that produced them. There is little to no information about the context of emergence of Aché or other indigenous contact languages. Guaraché, by contrast, is a very recent phenomenon, and if it is also hard to classify this is not due to lack of data about the context in which it appeared, but rather because of its current uncertain state alongside the ambiguous status of one of

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9 At first I was reluctant to use the term “Guaraché” for the language mixing practices in the Aché communities, a label that Aché activists and educators use to highlight the difference of current language use from the ways they imagine their ancestors to have been speaking in the forest, sometimes with a negative overtone. However, for lack of a better alternative and since in a more recent discussion among community representatives I have also noticed that the term was embraced as pointing to a unique way of speaking of the Aché that differentiates them first and foremost from Paraguayans who speak Guaraní, I have decided to use it here too.
its parent languages, Aché. As of yet we cannot know whether or not Guaraché is only an ephemeral phenomenon and will disappear again as subsequent generations fully shift to Guaraní.

I should state from the outset that while Guaraché occupies a central place in this dissertation, my aim is not its linguistic or sociolinguistic description. And while I will return to a discussion of the context of its emergence and how it impacted language use in the Aché communities in a later chapter, my goal is not a comprehensive documentation of Guaraché’s social and linguistic origins. If I claim to be discussing the “origin of language” as I have stated in the introduction, by that I do not mean the origin of Guaraché as a language. Rather my goal is to investigate how “language” itself and thus also multiple “languages” emerge as objects in a context in which the range of phenomena that I will here summarily and heuristically label “Guaraché” constitute the primary mode of communication, but where its speakers are also frequently exposed to other codes, such as Aché, Guaraní, or Spanish, that are conventionally and customarily called “languages.” Whether Guaraché itself is a “language” or not, a contact language, or more specifically a mixed language, is not my concern here.

Therefore, beyond a few observations in this chapter I will also sidestep a discussion of the vast recent literature on language contact and pidgin and creole genesis. Hotly debated questions are whether or not contact and non-contact languages can be analytically separated into different classes, whether or not the structures of contact languages are the results of universal cognitive or biological principles, and the extent to which social and linguistic factors enable or constrain contact-induced language change (Bickerton 1984; Thomason and Kaufman 1988; Jourdan 1991; Bakker 1997; Mufwene 1999, 2001, 2007; DeGraff 1999, 2005; Holm 2000; Thomason 2001, 2008; Garrett 2004; Heine and Kuteva 2005; Aikhenvald and Dixon 2007; Muysken 2008; Siegel 2008; Kouwenberg and Singler 2008; Matras 2009; Hickey 2010). My data is relevant to these discussions, but the discussions themselves are somewhat tangential to the argument that I want to advance here.

In order to minimally orient the reader I will give a few examples of children’s language use in the communities and point out the most relevant dimensions of linguistic convergence. I have selected ten short excerpts from different settings. These examples will also serve to give some insights into the children’s lifeworlds. In order to situate the transcripts I will briefly describe the main differences between Aché and Guaraní. I limit the discussion to those aspects that are relatively salient to speakers’

1.3.1 Linguistic Differences of Aché and Guaraní

Since Aché emerged out of a contact situation involving Guaraní (or a possible proto-Guaraní language [Dietrich 2015]), where the latter might have occupied a position similar to that of a superstrate or lexifier language in comparable situations of pidginization or creolization, most of the Aché vocabulary is of Guaraní origin. However, this does not mean that the Guaraní and Aché lexicons are essentially the same. There are many words that are distinctly Aché and do not occur in any form in Paraguayan Guaraní, i.e., in the variety of Guaraní that the Aché are in contact with currently, out of which Guaraché emerged. At the same time there are many Paraguayan Guaraní words that are new and do not have a corresponding term in Aché. Before contact both languages were mutually unintelligible. Guaraní has also been in contact with Spanish for almost 500 years, unlike Aché. Guaraní convergence with Spanish has thus led to further differences with Aché.

Phonologically Aché is also markedly different from Guaraní. While the vowel inventory and a large part of the consonants overlap, there are a number of consonants that are unique to Guaraní, such as /s/ or /l/. Aché features two distinct phonemes, a voiced palato-alveolar affricate /ʤ/ and a palatal approximant /j/. These sounds correspond to the same phoneme in Guaraní, the affricate /ʤ/ occurs in indigenous varieties and in some regions of Paraguay, but the approximant /j/ is more common. Furthermore, Guaraní canonic syllable structure is (C)V(V), i.e., no syllable ends on a consonant and two consonants must always be separated by a vowel. While Aché too requires syllables to end on a vowel, it allows for consonant clusters, ((C)C)V(V). At the same time, Aché has a preference for bisyllabic stems (C)V.CV and many Guaraní cognates with three or more syllables, be they single words, compounds, or inflected stems, are reduced (sometimes involving reanalysis) to Aché bisyllabic words, mostly by syncope of the first vowel(s), resulting in word-initial consonant clusters. Examples for Guaraní : Aché are borevi : brewi (tapir), tembi-reko : breko (wife), mbo-aku : baku (cook).10

10 Note that the latter two involve reanalysis of functional prefixes tembi- (NMLZ) and mbo- (CAUS) as part of the stem.
Aché also presents a number of phonetic features that distinguish it from Guaraní. The voiceless palato-alveolar affricate /ʧ/, for example, while it is pronounced roughly the same in Aché and some indigenous varieties of Guaraní, in Paraguayan Guaraní it is rendered as palatal fricative [ʃ] without plosivity. This is a salient marker of Aché–Guaraní distinction, especially given its presence in the first person pronoun cho /ʧo/ (Aché) vs. çhe /ʃe/ (Guaraní). Aché also has less prenasalization of voiced plosives.

Morphosyntactically, as is common in Tupí-Guaranian languages, Guaraní has two sets of person markers, usually referred to in the literature as set A and set B. Set A is used for agent-like subjects, i.e., the subjects of transitive verbs and of intransitive verbs of the inerative type. Set B is used for more patient-like arguments, marking unaccusative subjects and the direct objects of transitive verbs. The latter selection of transitive agreement depends on a well-studied person hierarchy that selects first over second, and first and second over third person arguments (Jensen 1998b). This leads to a system where direct objects are marked on transitive verbs when they are first or second person and the subject is third person.

Aché, by contrast, does not have person–number agreement. Person and number are expressed exclusively through free and strong personal pronouns. These correspond etymologically to a set of free pronouns in Guaraní, which in turn are historically related to the Set B markers but are functionally different. There is still a controversy among linguists about the exact status of the Guaraní Set B; some claim they are weak pronouns or pronominal clitics, others suggest analyzing them as bonafide object agreement markers (see Gregores and Suárez 1967; Velázquez-Castillo 1991; Rößler 2015; Rose 2015). In Aché, verb stems are not inflected by person–number agreement, an inflectional erosion that is likely one result of language contact. Alongside agreement, Aché has also lost most inflectional morphology, such as tense–aspect–mood marking, relational agreement marking, but also morphological elements linked to valency, reflexives, reciprocals, and causatives. This lack of functional morphology is a common feature of contact languages and understood as a direct result of contact induced change.

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11 Since Aché [ʧ] and Guaraní [ʃ] are both represented by ⟨ch⟩ in their respective orthographies, in order to capture the phonetic difference in my transcripts I am unconventionally marking the fricative version with a cedilla on the c ⟨çh⟩.

12 Thanks to Eva-Maria Rößler (personal communication, December 2, 2016) for clarifications on Guaraní morphology.
Rößler (2008, 2015) has discussed in detail how morphological and syntactic features of Aché compare to those found in different Guaraní varieties.

These differences of Aché and Guaraní are important for understanding the distinctiveness of Guaraché. As we will see, convergence between Aché and Guaraní occurs on every linguistic level. In the following sections I will present a number of examples of everyday language use in order to describe the main aspects in which Guaraché follows Aché, or Guaraní, or neither of them.

1.3.2 Transcriptions

The interactions are transcribed in detail with interlinear glosses and identifying the language to which each morpheme belongs. Each utterance is transcribed in standard Aché and Guaraní orthographies with a few modifications. Transcriptions of original talk are followed by multiple lines of glosses, each representing a different analytic level. These lines will be called “tiers” in order to distinguish them from “lines” representing utterances, which are marked by line numbers, and which are preceded by a label identifying the speaker. Each line may or may not correspond to a turn or to what conversation analysts call a turn-constructional unit. If multiple lines are required to represent a single turn, the speaker label is not repeated.

The first tier of each line represents the original utterance and also contains symbols for a number of discourse features such as silences (indicated by numbers in parentheses), cutoffs (indicated by a dash, –), elongated sounds (::) and elongated sounds in creaky voice (;;;), overlaps ([) and speech that is latched onto the prior utterance (=), as well as basic information about volume (ALL CAPS mark increased, ºdegree signsº low volume) and intonation contour, as well as non-verbal behavior (in double parentheses). Note that punctuation marks are used to mark intonation contour, not grammar.

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13 For the analysis of Guaraní morphemes I am relying mainly on Guasch (1961 2008), Jensen (1998a), and Tonhauser (2006), for jopara on Kallfell (2010), for Aché on Cadogan (1968), Susnik (1961–1962 1974), Rößler (2008, 2015), and my own work. During the writing process, Warren Thompson has been of great help clarifying further questions with native speakers while he was in Paraguay.

14 See footnote 11 above. Pronunciations and orthographic representations used are explained on page xii.

15 Creaky voice is very frequent in the Aché children’s talk.
so that the symbol ⟨?⟩ marks rising intonation, not necessarily a question, or the symbol ⟨⟩ marks falling intonation not necessarily the end of a sentence.16

The second tier contains the original utterance without this additional information while marking morpheme boundaries. The third tier is aligned with the second tier and contains interlinear English glosses. Glosses of functional morphemes follow the Leipzig Glossing Rules (Comrie, Haspelmath, and Bickel 2015); where necessary I have added my own description of morphemes that are not contained in the rules.17

In addition to the interlinear glosses, I have added a fourth tier below the glosses to mark each morpheme for the language it belongs to, Aché is marked with a small caps A, Guarani with G, and Spanish with S. Cognates that are part of both lexical inventories of Aché and Guarani are labeled with B, designating “bivalence.” I follow Woolard’s (1998b, 5) definition of bivalence as the use “of words or segments that could ‘belong’ equally, descriptively and even prescriptively, to both codes.” Woolard has coined the term in the description of data from a bilingual context. Whether or not it is possible to describe language use in the Aché communities as bi- or multilingual will be discussed briefly in sections 1.3.4 and 1.3.5 and in chapter 4.

The very last tier provides a free English translation. I have mostly repeated markers of silences, cutoffs, elongated sounds, and volume information in the translation, but not overlaps and latches. Since Aché and Guarani intonation is considerably different from English, in the free English translation I have adapted the symbols that mark intonation contour to resemble the most likely English rendering of it, in order to aid the interpretation of the utterances. For example, the Aché question-marker -ba, when attached to the last constituent of a clause, mostly causes falling intonation, while in English one would end a question with rising intonation; therefore I have sometimes used a question mark for the English translation of a question despite the fact that the original utterance ends with falling intonation. Square brackets in the translation encode additional information that is not in the original text but evident from context and necessary to clarify the meaning.

16 A full list of transcription symbols is provided on page xi.
17 Abbreviations of functional glosses are explained on page xiv.
1.3.3 Everyday Language Use of Aché Children

The examples that follow are all transcripts of videos recordings of naturally occurring children’s interactions. For this section I have selected interactions that are representative of unmarked language use by the children. By “unmarked use” I mean that the children were neither metalinguistically attending to the code nor attempting to enact particular roles or identities in play that would make them adapt their language use accordingly. In the following section I will then return to the two examples of repairs that served as starting points for my discussion of metalinguistic awareness in the introduction, i.e., marked language use, and analyze them in detail.

All recordings were made by me on a handheld video camera in the three settings that the Aché children grow up: in and around their homes in the community, on occasional hunting treks to the forest, and in the classroom. See the end of the chapter for a description of fieldwork and research methodology.

Transcript 1.1

Setting: On a hunting trek in the forest. The group is resting near a little stream that we just crossed over a tree trunk serving as a natural bridge. A girl and a boy, Rytagi and Kandjegi, wash their sandals in the stream underneath it. Taydjangi, another girl, starts passing over the trunk in direction of where we came from. (The children are between 5 and 6 years of age.)

1 TAYDJANGI: *(to Rytagi)* Ryta čhe hotama čhe ogape.

   Ryta čhe ho-ta-ma čhe oga-pe
   Rytagi 1SG go-prosp-iAM 1SG oga-LOC
   – G G-G-B G G-B

   Rytagi I’m going back home.

   (1.8)

2 RYTAGI: De djawypete tape beru rekwatyma de ho *(joking)*

   De djawy-pa-ete tape beru rekwaty-ma de ho
   2SG err-compl-real way Paraguayan towards-iAM 2SG go
   B G-B-B G A A-B B G

   What if you go wrong and you end up where the Paraguayans live

   (.8)
The mixed character of the children’s utterances is immediately apparent from the labels provided. In the three turns it seems that Guaraní elements outweigh those from Aché. However, a closer analysis will reveal that linguistic belonging is not as straightforward as the labels suggest. In fact, most items are not unambiguously assignable to one or the other language, not even as bivalent items, when considering linguistic levels other than mere etymology.

Let us just focus on the second clause of Taydjangi’s turn (line 1), ignoring the vocative. Çhe is the first person singular pronoun in Guaraní, corresponding to cho in Aché. Ho is the Guaraní stem for “go,” and it is a cognate in Aché and Guaraní. The Aché version would be o'o, or simply o in compounds. Since [h] is not part of the Aché phonetic inventory I have labeled it Guaraní. The other morphemes are two suffixes, -ta marks prospective aspect in Guaraní and -ma is used in Guaraní and Aché for what has been called iamitive aspect, close in meaning to the English expression “already” (Olsson 2013). Çhe hotama can thus mean “I am already going” or “I am about to go.”

Considering only lexicon and phonetics would suggest that Guaraché çhe hotama is not different from Guaraní. But this is not the case. The standard form expressing “I am already going” in Guaraní would be ahatama. As I have mentioned above, Guaraní has two sets of person markers (Jensen 1998b) alongside a set of personal pronouns. Table 1.1 provides a simplified overview of the Guaraní, Guaraché, and Aché person markers and pronouns. In this case in Guaraní one would inflect the verb by using the pronominal prefix a- of the A-set, and not çhe, which is either a B-set marker or a

18 In Aché all traditional names are composed by a root, denoting an animal species, and the determiner suffix -gi. Vocative case is marked by dropping the determiner. In this case the girl Rytagi is directly addressed and therefore her name in vocative case loses the determiner -gi, and becomes Ryta. Earlier we have seen the children addressing me, Kewegi, with the vocative Kwewe. In order to simplify the transcript and to aid identification of the participant that is being referred to, in the gloss I always provide the full name, with the determiner, although this would be incorrect grammatically in Aché. Likewise, in cases where the name of a person is contracted or cut off in the original utterance, the gloss provides the full name.
Table 1.1: Person markers and pronouns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Guaraní agreement markers</th>
<th>Guaraní free pronouns</th>
<th>Guaraché free pronouns</th>
<th>Aché free pronouns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Set A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>a-</td>
<td>çhe</td>
<td>çhe/che</td>
<td>cho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL.IN</td>
<td>ja-</td>
<td>ñane</td>
<td>ñande</td>
<td>ñande/nande</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL.EX</td>
<td>ro-</td>
<td>ore</td>
<td>ore</td>
<td>ore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>re-</td>
<td>ne-</td>
<td>de</td>
<td>de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>pe-</td>
<td>pende</td>
<td>pende</td>
<td>pende</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG</td>
<td>o-</td>
<td>i-</td>
<td>ha’e idja</td>
<td>idja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>o-</td>
<td>i-</td>
<td>ha’eküéra idja</td>
<td>idja</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a pronoun, çhe could be used together with a-, for example to mark contrastive focus as in çhe ahatama (I [not you or someone else] am going), but not alone. Furthermore, for the verb ho inflection with a- causes vowel alternation of the stem ho to ha; the paradigm goes a-ha (1SG-go), re-ho (2SG-go), o-ho (3SG-go). Thus the form çhe hotama is ungrammatical from the Guaraní point of view.

Not so in Guaraché. Guaraché follows Aché in that it does not inflect verbs to mark agreement, but only uses personal pronouns, some from Aché and some from Guaraní (see table 1.1). In this case it uses a Guaraní personal pronoun (çhe vs. Aché cho) and the Guaraní form of the stem ho, but without the inflecting prefix (çhe o-ho-ta ma [Guaraché] vs. a-ha-ta-ma [Guaraní]) and therefore also not alternating the vowel.

Looking at the third clause we get a similar picture. Çhe and oga (house) are both Guaraní lexical items, çhe being used here as a possessive. However, marking possession in Guaraní requires a relational prefix r- on some nouns (h- for third person, see below). Oga is such a noun and in standard Guaraní the clause would therefore be çhe r-oga-pe vs. Guaraché çhe o-oga-pe. Guaraché, while using the Guaraní word for house (in Aché it would be tapy), is following Aché, which does not have relational prefixes. Thus, comparing the utterance in the three codes we have: a-ha-ta-ma çhe r-oga-pe (Guaraní) : çhe ho-ta-ma çhe oga-pe (Guaraché) : cho o-werä-ma cho tapy-pe (Aché).

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19 This is a simplified table. It does not take into account different forms for oral and nasal contexts in Guaraní and for different varieties of subgroups in Aché.
This analysis considerably complicates the picture provided by the language labels that I have added above. Instead of uniquely identifying each morpheme by language it would be more accurate for such labels to distinguish between different linguistic levels. Before analyzing the other turns I will thus repeat the transcript with additional tiers added, each representing a different level of analysis. I have added colors to make the examples more readable.

The first three tiers are the same as above. The fourth tier (blue) concerns the lexicon or etymology, the fifth (pink) adds phonetics/phonology, and the sixth (orange) morphosyntax. The lexical level identifies languages by word origin. On the phonetic level A and G indicate the presence of a sound (phone or pronunciation) that is unique to the phonetic inventory of either Aché or Guaraní but not both, B indicates the absence of such a sound and that all phonemes are therefore “phonetically bivalent.” If there is a specific sequence of phonemes that is characteristic of the phonological structure of one or the other language, I have also marked it on this level. On the level of morphosyntax A and G indicate the presence of a morphosyntactic feature that is unique to either Aché or Guaraní but not both, for example the absence or presence of an inflectional prefix or a pronoun that, while lexically bivalent, in a specific context can be identified as belonging to a particular syntactic set; B is here used to indicate that the item does not feature any morphosyntactical characteristics that would make it identifiable as either A or G.  

Transcript 1.1

1 TAYDJANGI: Ryta çhe hotama çhe ogape.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ryta</th>
<th>çhe</th>
<th>ho-ta-ma</th>
<th>çhe</th>
<th>oga-pe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rytagi ISG</td>
<td>go-PROSP-IAM</td>
<td>ISG</td>
<td>oga-LOC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G-G-B</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G-B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G-B-B</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G-B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A-B-B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A-B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rytagi I’m going back home.

(1.8)
2 RYTAGE: De djawypete tape beru rekwatyma de ho

de djawy-pa-ete tape beru rekwaty-ma de ho
2SG err-COMPLE-REAL way Paraguays towards-IAM 2SG go
B G-B-B G A A-B B G
A A-B-B A B B-B A G
B A-B-B B B B-B B A

What if you go wrong and you end up where the Paraguays live

(.8)

3 KANDJEGI: De oho gua’u krypy nambi.

de oho gua’u krypy nambi.
2SG go kidding butt ear
B G G A B
A G G A B
B G G A B

What if you go with your butt first.

Such a representation is able to show more accurately the different levels of convergence of Aché and Guaraní in Guaraché. In the first clause I have marked çhe as G|G|B (lex.|phon.|morph.) to point to the fact that it is lexically and phonetically Guaraní but used as a free pronoun, which is possible in both, Aché and Guaraní. Ho on the other hand is marked G|G|A as it is lacking the Guaraní inflection for person and number, so it is morphosyntactically definitely not Guaraní, although lexically and phonetically it is.21 The Guaraní suffix -ta (G|B|B) is phonetically bivalent and used here similarly to the Aché suffix -werã,22 hence I have marked the morphosyntactic level as bivalent too. And finally -ma (B|B|B) is bivalent on all levels.23

Similarly, in the second clause çhe is again labeled G|G|B, since possession is marked in a similar way in Aché and Guaraní (hence the B for morphosyntax). Oga is labeled G|G|A to point out the lacking

21 Technically I could have also labeled the lexical level as bivalent, given that o and ho are cognates, however, my interpretation is that the Aché speakers who first used ho instead of o, did not aim at incorporating the Guaraní sound [h] but the Guaraní word /ho/ and therefore it is phonetically and lexically Guaraní. The use of ho instead of o was already widespread in the 1970s (see transcriptions in Münzel 1973a).

22 The Aché suffix -werã is actually a compound of -we (pst) and -rã (prosp). It is not used in Guaraché and identified by the children as a salient marker of Aché as I will show in chapter 4.

23 There are some differences in its distribution in Aché and Guaraní, but they are not relevant for the uses I am discussing here.
relational prefix from a Guaraní point of view. The locative -pe (b|bb|b) is a widespread if not universal morpheme in Tupí-Guaranian languages.

In the second turn (line 2) Rytagi jokingly warns Taydjangi that if she goes alone she might get lost and end up where the Paraguayans live. She uses the Guaraní verb javy but pronounces it with a syllable-initial palato-alveolar affricate [ʤ] instead of the palatal approximant [j]. Just as the verb ho in the turn before, djawy is lacking the inflectional prefix re- and Rytagi uses the second person pronoun de instead. De is not prenasalized as much as it would be in Guaraní (nde). The suffixes -pa and -ete are bivalent although their use in this combination is more common in Guaraní than it is in Aché. The nouns tape and beru are from Guaraní and Aché respectively, the demonstrative rekwaty is Aché and the final verbal construction de ho follows the same pattern as above.

Figure 1.1: Children with carrying baskets passing over natural bridge

Interestingly in Kandjegi’s turn in which he adds another joke—what if she went with her butt first—he uses de oho and not de ho. In Guaraní the construction o-ho is the verb ho inflected for third person with the prefix o- as the table above shows. However, here we have a second person pronoun
and therefore oho cannot be inflected for third person. It is most likely that oho is no longer used as an inflected form but instead reanalyzed as the verb stem. Such reanalysis of functional morphemes is common in Guaraché, as it was in Aché (Rößler 2008, 2015). For example, Guaraché speakers will ask “what is your name” with the phrase ba-ișha de hera (thing-LIKE 2SG name). In Guaraní the noun era (name) requires a relational prefix, r- when used with a possessive pronoun in general and h- when used specifically with a third person possessive, just like the noun oga that we have seen above. Thus in Guaraní one says nde r-era (2SG RELN-name) but not nde h-era (2SG 3.RELN-name), which would be “your his name.” However in Guaraché h- has been reanalyzed as part of the stem hera and is thus used indistinctly with any possessive pronoun. Third person reference is accomplished by adding a third person pronoun as in idja hera (3 name).

But why did Rytagi and Taydjangi use ho and not oho (lines 1 and 2)? One answer could be that Guaraché is a recent phenomenon and some patterns have not yet consolidated across the speech community. Another answer could be that ho is in fact an aphetism of oho. If, as other data suggests, Guaraché follows the Aché preference for bisyllabic stems, then it could be that oho is the new form for the stem “go” which is rendered ho when taking a suffix. This would correspond to a phenomenon observed in Aché where the vowel of monosyllabic (verbal and nominal) stems is reduplicated, separated by an epenthetic glottal stop /ʔ/, but where the reduplication is dropped in compounds or with a suffix (Rößler 2008). And the occurrence of ho without suffix at the end of line 2 could be due to its position. In Aché for the verb o'o (go), even when it does not have a suffix, reduplication is frequently dropped in clause-final position. Further research is necessary to confirm or reject this hypothesis.

Kandjegi further adds the Guaraní adverb gua’u (line 3), which functions as a marker of non-seriousness more or less along the lines of the ironic “totally” in the English expression “you could totally go with your butt first.” He ends the turn using the Aché noun krypy (butt) and the bivalent nambi (ear), literally meaning something like “with your butt as your ear.”

Thus this example already demonstrates quite nicely some features of convergence between Aché and Guaraní. Guaraché uses personal pronouns from Guaraní but without adopting its inflectional verbal morphology and agreement marking, thus “retaining” Aché’s lack of inflectional and relational prefixes (Rößler 2015). Some Guaraní stems are adopted with an inflectional or relational prefix and
these are reanalyzed as part of the stem and thus morphologically “frozen.” Phonologically Guaraché has incorporated the Guaraní voiceless palatal fricative [ʃ] with Guaraní morphemes that contain it such as čhe, but it is not used with Aché morphemes that retain the voiceless palato-alveolar affricate [ʧ] as other examples show. The first person pronoun is also sometimes rendered čhe [ʧe]. Guaraní words that contain the palatal approximant [j] are often rendered with a voiced palato-alveolar affricate [ʤ] in Aché as the verb djawy above. As I mentioned these sounds correspond to the same phoneme in Guaraní but not in Aché, and Guaraché here seems to be following Aché in retaining this phonological distinction. Guaraché also tends to have slightly less prenasalization of voiced plosives compared to standard Guaraní but there is a lot of variation across speakers and also depending on word origin.

In what follows I will add a few other transcripts of interactions in different settings and involving different children, but I will limit myself to pointing out only the most important features that are relevant, and that differ from those previously discussed.

Transcript 1.2

Setting: Chimbegi (10) and his younger brother Irongi (7) are sitting on the ground in front of their hut, building a small little corral out of wooden sticks that they hammer into the ground with other sticks.24

1 IRONGI: Moõ ikwa oĩ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>moõ</th>
<th>ikwa</th>
<th>oĩ?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where is a hole? (to put a stick in)

(5)

24 Legend:  ■ lexicon;  ■ phonetics;  ■ morphosyntax.
2 **CHIMBEGI:**  (A[mogi] (.3) Mo
amo-gi  mo
DEM-DET where
G-A  G
B-A  B
B-B  B
That one (.3) Where

3 **IRONGI:**  [Kwaiba, (1.9) Kwai?
kwa-gi-ba  kwa-gi
DEM-DET-Q  DEM-DET
G-A-A  G-A
A-A-A  A-A
A-A-A  A-A
This one, (1.9) This one?
(.5)

4 **CHIMBEGI:**  Ingo?
ingo
yes
A
A
B
Yes?
(.4)

5 **IRONGI:**  Ma’ena.
má’e-na
look-ATTEN
G-G
G-B
B-G
Look.

The question particle *moõ* (where) is from Guaraní. *Oĩ* is a Guaraní third-person-inflected copula verb. While it is here used for third person, elsewhere in the data I have found constructions such as *de oĩ* (2SG COP) and *ore oĩ* (1PL.EX COP) suggesting that it is lexicalized in Guaraché as a verb stem along the same lines as discussed above. In lines 2 and 3 we find two demonstratives with the Aché determiner -gi. The distal demonstrative *amo* is borrowed from Guaraní (line 2), the proximal demonstrative *kwa* as well (line 3) but here we have another interesting modification. *Kwa* is short for Guaraní *koa*, which is itself
the result of the elision of the consonant in ko-va (DEM-REL). Aché -gi can be used similarly to Guaraní -va as a relativizer, but it would not make sense from either language’s point of view to put both together. Thus in Guaraché koa/kwa is most likely also reanalyzed as demonstrative, which therefore can take the -gi. As question marker the Aché -ba is used in Guaraché (see also next transcript). The exclamation ingo (yes) is borrowed from Aché (line 4), whereas for its negative counterpart the Guaraní version nahani is used (see next transcript).

Transcript 1.3

Setting: At a camp on a hunting trek. The two brothers Irongí (7) and Gunegí (6) discuss what animal parts they have already eaten.25

1 IRONGI: Bere de umaba.

2 gunegi: Hã?

3 IRONGI: De no‘ui bereba=.

---

25 Legend: ■ lexicon; ● phonetics; ▲ morphosyntax.
Irongi’s questions about whether or not his brother has already eaten tongue are constructed in two ways, first for yes-preference (line 1) and then for no-preference (line 3). We are familiar with the lack of inflection from the previous discussion—here for the verb u (eat) in line 1—but I have not yet discussed negation. Guaraní uses a circumfix for verbal negation with the form n(d)(V)- ... -(r)i and Guaraché has adopted a modified version of it. In Guaraní the form of the preverbal part of the circumfix depends on whether or not it occurs in nasal (n-) or oral (nd-) context and on the inflection of the verb. 2sg requires an epenthetic [e] and 1pl.in an epenthetic [a] before the inflecting prefix, e.g., nda-ja-japo-i (neg-1pl.in-make-neg). As Guaraché does not inflect verbs it also has not adopted the complexity of different preverbal forms of the circumfix and uses no- instead, even for oral contexts. That the form no- has consolidated as universal negative prefix (and not ndo- or nda-) might be due to Spanish influence, as the negative Spanish adverb no has the same form and also occurs in preverbal position (this feature has not been observed in Guaraní or jopara [Kallfell 2010]). Gunegi answers with the Guaraní exclamation nahani (no).

Transcript 1.4

Setting: In the classroom. The children are working in their notebooks.\(^{27}\)

\(^{26}\) The postverbal epenthetic [ɾ] for stems ending on [i] is frequently omitted in spoken discourse.

\(^{27}\) Legend: ■ lexicon; ■ phonetics; ■ morphosyntax.
1 Bepurange: Echana otroite čhe dįapo agwe.

Look, this is different what I've done.

2 Uno do tre cuatro cingo sei siete,

One two three four five six seven,

In this example from school we have another frequent borrowing from Spanish, the word otro (other), here with the Tupi-Guaraní widespread suffix -ete/-ite, which has a range of meanings from “real” to “true” to “exactly.” Spanish borrowings have entered Guaraché most likely via the colloquial mixed Spanish-Guaraní form known as jopara. Numbers are also mostly in Spanish (line 2), except for the numbers one, two, and three, for which the Guaraní forms are also frequent, peteũ, mokõi, mbohapy. An interesting element is the last morpheme in line 1, used as a past marker. It is composed of two Guaraní suffixes, the nominalizer -ha and the retrospective modality marker -gue. However, its use in Guaraché is far more general and its distribution wider compared to Guaraní. Furthermore, Guaraché is lacking the Guaraní past marking adverb kuri and hague/agwe is used in its stead. Hague/agwe is therefore morphosyntactically not really Guaraní and must be seen as a proper Guaraché item (hence marked GA). It might have become lexicalized as an adverb.

Transcript 1.5

Setting: At a camp on a hunting trek. The children sit on a tree trunk, an older girl, Bepegi (12), is serving mate. The other children are between 6 and 9.
1 BUPIGI: AKE ÑATTŬ? (looking at Gunegi’s face)

AKE ÑATTŬ watch.out mosquito
G G
B G
B B

WATCH OUT MOSQUITO

2 Epacho çha’a.
e-pacho çha’a IMP-hit dude
G-A G
B-A G
G-G G

Hit it dude.

(.4)

3 CHACHUGI: ((singing in Portuguese)) Belícia, assim você me mata Delícia, assim você me mata ((Brazilian pop song))

4 RYTAGI: (((to Bepegi)) Çhe no’umo’i
če no’-u-mo’â-i ISG NEG-drink-CF-NEG
G S-B-G-G
G B-B-G-G
B G-B-G-G

I don’t want anymore

(.7)

5 (((to Gunegi)) Depori Gune, de tō’ōpe chikō nongagi.
depori Gune de tō’ō-pe chikō nongagi NEG.COP Gunegi 2SG head-LOC mosquito like-DET
G – B A-B A A-A
A – A A-B A B-B
G – B B-B B A-A

There’s nothing Gunegi, it only looks like a mosquito on your head.

In this interaction two colloquial Guaraní expressions are used, in line 1 the interjection ake (watch out) and in line 2 the construction çha’a. Çha’a is a contraction of çhe ra’a, “my friend,” mostly used between men indexing solidarity; it roughly corresponds in tone to the English “dude” (Kiesling 2004). Bupigi here warns Gunegi about a mosquito on his head. He uses the Guaraní word ñati’ũ. Rytagí,
who is standing behind Bupigi realizes it is not a real mosquito, it only looks like a mosquito, which
she expresses in line 5 with the Aché nonga-gi (like-DET). Rytagi uses the Aché word for “mosquito,”
chikô here. For many expressions Guaraché has two lexical items from Aché and Guaraní that are used
interchangeably by the children.

In line 2 we have an imperative construction, using the Guaraní prefix e- on the Aché stem pacho
(hit). This use is common in Guaraché, the corresponding Aché modal mondo is not used in Guaraché
by the children. In line 4 we have another negation, but this time marked for prospective aspect
by using Guaraní -mo’a, what Tonhauser (2006) calls a “counterfactual modality marker.” Line 5 also
introduces a negative Guaraní copula ndaipori, here phonetically adapted to Guaraché as depori.

Transcript 1.6

Setting: At a camp on a hunting trek. An elder women is weaving ribbons out of palm leaves. The
children are sitting around her watching. ²⁹

1 BUPIGI: (touche the end of the ribbon that the elder is making!)

2 BEPEGI: (to Bupigi) Edja go da’e de ba’e ina.

e-dja go da’e de ba’e ina
IMP-let.go DEM NEG.COP 2SG thing PROG
G-B A G B G G
B-A B A A A B
G-G B G B B B

Don’t touch that’s not gonna be yours.

(1.6)

3 BUPIGI: (to the elder) Aguela erumi Anegi ba’erã?

aguela e-ru-mi Anegi ba’e-rã
grandmother IMP-bring-DIM Anegi thing-PROSP
S G-B-B – G-B
G B-B-B – A-B
B G-G-B – B-B

Grandma please give me one for [my sister] Anegi?

²⁹ Legend: ■ lexicon; ■ phonetics; ■ morphosyntax.
In lines 2 and 3 we have two constructions using the Guaraní imperative marker e- again, e-dja and e-ru. In this case though the analysis is not unambiguous. In Aché the two verbs would be wedja and eru respectively. Although the imperative could be constructed with the auxiliary mondo this is not always necessary and imperative can also be achieved by intonation. Thus I could have also analyzed eru and edja as Aché stems (apheresis of word-initial consonant w in the latter case). The non-contracted form in Guaraní for edja would be e-heja. This form is found in the data only as realized by adults. In line 5 we have another negative copula, da’e, which is a contraction of the Guaraní nada-ha’e-i (NEG-COP-NEG). Note also the use of the Spanish word abuela for “grandmother,” rendered in Guaraní pronunciation as aguela.

Transcript 1.7

Setting: Children are climbing in trees to pick fruits. Kwategi (7) is in a tree, Anegi (9) is waiting on the ground. 30

30 Legend: □ lexicon; □ phonetics; □ morphosyntax.
1  kwategi:  ANI TOMOVEITI?
ani  tomo-ve-iti
proh  shake-MORE-STILL
g  A-G-G
b  B-B-B
g  A-G-B

WAIT, DON'T KEEP SHAKING IT?

(.4)

2  anegi:  ÑE’ITI O’AI.
ñe’iti  o’a-i
not.yet  fall-NEG
g  G-G
ga  B-G
ga  A-G

IT DIDN’T FALL YET.

Corresponding to the Guaraní imperative marker in the previous transcript, in this example we see the use of the prohibitive preposition ani, also from Guaraní. Like the imperative, it is pervasive and has fully replaced the corresponding Aché modal eme even in the speech of the elders. However, in Guaraní the use of ani still requires the following verb to be inflected with either the singular e- or the plural pe- imperative prefix but here the verb tomo (shake) is not inflected. Tomo is Aché and has two Guaraní suffixes, the comparative -ve (more) and an aspectual suffix indicating a projected change of state of a continuing condition, close in meaning to English “still.” In Guaraní there are two ways of expressing this, either with the suffix -iti or with the postposition gueteri (not attested for Guaraché). Polarity reversal is achieved with the construction ne’ira gueteri (not yet). In line 2 Anegi responds with ñe’iti o’ai (it didn’t fall yet), which seems to be composed of a contracted version of ne’ira (ñe’) and -iti, not attested for Guaraní and therefore unique to Guaraché. Note that the following verb o’a (fall) is lacking the inflection but also the word-initial consonant [h] (the verb is ho’a in Guaraní, wa’a in Aché) and also only features the postverbal part of the negative circumfix -i.

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31 There is an instance of ani already in a transcript from 1972 [Munzel:1973, 96], which suggests that it was among the features adopted early on.
Setting: The children are playing soccer in front of one of the huts.\[^{32}\]

1. \[\text{ANEGI:} \quad \text{ATUTAITETA KOA UMIA ITA:: Atuta mba'e.}\]

   a-tuta-ite-ta \quad koa \quad umia \quad ita \quad a-tuta \quad mba'e
   ISG-shoot-REAL-PROSP \quad DEM \quad DET \quad stone \quad ISG-shoot \quad thing

   \begin{align*}
   &G-S-B-G \quad G \quad G \quad B \quad G-S \quad G \\
   &B-B-B-B \quad G \quad B \quad B \quad B-B \quad G \\
   &G-G-G-G \quad B \quad B \quad B \quad G-G \quad G \\
   \end{align*}

   I'LL KICK IT HARD LIKE A STONE, I'm kicking it.

   (1.7)

2. \[\text{((shoots)) GO::[:::L}\]

   gol \quad goal
   S \quad S
   B

   GOA::::::L

3. \[\text{(?):} \quad \text{[( ( ) )]}\]

   (1.2)

4. \[\text{GUNEGI:} \quad \text{Çhe HA;;=}\]

   çhe \quad ha
   ISG \quad turn
   G \quad G
   G \quad G
   B \quad G

   My TU;;RN

5. \[\text{ANEGI:} \quad =\text{HALE GUNEGI EMUNGE=}\]

   hale \quad Gunegi \quad e-mu-nge
   go-ahead \quad Gunegi \quad IMP-CAUS-enter
   S \quad - \quad G-G-G
   G \quad - \quad B-B-B
   S \quad - \quad G-G-G

   LET'S GO GUNEGI SCORE

\[^{32}\text{Legend: \quad \begin{array}{c}
\text{lexicon; \quad phonetics; \quad morphosyntax.}
\end{array}\]
If so far the picture of Guaraché that I have painted has been fairly homogenous, this interaction adds a little more diversity and complexity. First, we note a number of additional Spanish borrowings. *Tuta* is a modification of the Spanish verb *chutar*, “to shoot” (line 1). *Hale* is the Paraguayan Spanish affirmative exclamation *dale*, literally “give it” (lines 5 and 7), adapted to Guaraní phonology with the syllable-initial [h]. And *gol* is the Spanish word for “goal.” Second, if I have been pointing out the pervasive lack of inflections in Guaraché, this interaction relativizes this claim, since it shows the use
of the first person singular prefix a- from Guaraní Set A even twice, in line 1 with the verb tuta and in lines 6 and 9 with the construction munge. However, Kwategi in line 10 uses the 2SG pronoun de with the same verb. Thus it is not the case that Guaraché speakers ignore Guaraní’s inflectional system completely, but there is a considerable degree of variation and flexibility. From the data analyzed so far no pattern has emerged that might allow any hypothesis about when inflecting the verb with Guaraní Set A markers would be preferred over the use of free pronouns in Guaraché. The latter are much more frequent.

This interaction also demonstrates the use of a Guaraní causative prefix, mbo- here rendered mu- in a nasalized context. I have mentioned above that traces of this prefix can be found in Aché stems such as baku (cook), which is presumably a contraction of the Guaraní construction mbo-aku (CAUS-hot) (Rößler 2008). In Guaraché mbo- has recovered (or retained, depending on the point of view) its functionality as a causative prefix, used with a variety of stems.

1.3.4 Mixed Codes and Codeswitching

What the discussion of these interactions shows is that in everyday language use in the Aché communities Aché and Guaraní are not two languages that are juxtaposed; speakers do not “codeswitch” from Aché to Guaraní and back. As Meeuwis and Blommaert (1998, 93) observe, “‘languages’ in the usual sense of the term may not be the best parameters for describing and assessing various forms of multilingualism.” For the Aché communities a “monolectal view of code-switching” is appropriate since “the overall code-switched variant used by speakers is not seen as a product of blending between two or more languages (with its implication of full knowledge of those languages), but as one code in its own right” (76), an “alloy of two ... speech varieties” (Alvarez-Cáccamo 1998, 39).

While atomically (i.e. intra- or intersententially) fragments of the varieties constituting the alloy can be identified, on the overall level utterances and discourses come across as samples of a particular type of alloy. (40)

As Auer (1998b, 20) notes, “in gestalt-psychological terms, the figure of code-alternation is most salient against a ground which is not in itself mixed, but monolingual. The more frequently code-alternation occurs, the less salient it becomes.” In Guaraché code-alternation is indeed so frequent that it is not
salient at all. Thus we must see “switching [itself] as an unmarked code” (Muysken 2011, 312), what Auer (1999) calls a “fused lect” (see chapter 4).

To finish the discussion of Guaraché I would like to return briefly to the two examples that I have started the chapter with. Since they involve the deliberate conscious production of a certain code (Aché) in what I have called metalinguistic repair above, they must not be taken as examples of everyday language use (Guaraché), and indeed as a type of codeswitch. However, it is instructive to subject them to the same analysis as I have done with the unmarked examples in order to fully understand how the repairs operate. In chapter 4 I will return to the examples again to analyze their interactional aspects and implications. Here I will focus on the linguistic aspects of the repairs and the interactions in which they are embedded.

Transcript 1.9

Setting: A group of children have been playing in the trees in front of a small wooden house. They make plans to go and hide in the nearby bushes and as they notice me following them with my video camera, six-year-old Pikygi turns to me to let me know.33

1 PIKYGI: (Ore) hota ka’aguype.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ore</th>
<th>ho-ta</th>
<th>ka’aguy-pe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1PL. EX</td>
<td></td>
<td>go-PROSP</td>
<td>forest-LOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>G-G</td>
<td>G-B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>G-B</td>
<td>G-B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>A-B</td>
<td>G-B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We’ll go to the forest.

(1)

2 BUPIGI: Kwewe, ha’e-kuera guata-ta kadji.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kwewe</th>
<th>ha’e-kuera</th>
<th>guata-ta</th>
<th>kadji</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kwewegi</td>
<td>3-PL</td>
<td>walk-PROSP</td>
<td>forest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>G-G</td>
<td>B-G</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>G-G</td>
<td>G-B</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>B-G</td>
<td>A-B</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kwewegi, they will go to the forest.

(5)

33 Legend: ■ lexicon; □ phonetics; ■ morphosyntax. Kwewegi is the name I have been given.
I have pointed out earlier that the trouble source of the repair is *ka'aguy*. Pikygi’s original utterance *ore ho-ta ka'aguy-pe* is “standard” Guaraché, using the Guaraní form of the verb stem (*ho*) but without inflecting it for person and number as in the other examples above. She pronounces the noun *ka'aguy* fairly close to how it would be in (standard) Guaraní; in Guaraché the word is also often contracted to *kawy*, which is closer to the bisyllabic structure of most Aché stems.

In the next turn, *kadji* is the main repair target, the Aché substitute for *ka'aguy*. It is missing the (bivalent) locative suffix *-pe*. This might be due to two factors, one morphosyntactic, the other semantic or pragmatic. I will consider the semantic one below but morphologically, *kadji* is composed of the stem *ka*, “plant,” and the comitative suffix *-dji*, which is incompatible with the locational *-pe*. *Kadji-pe* is judged as ungrammatical in Aché, and while in Guaraché *kadji* might be on its way to
becoming lexicalized, the expression *kadji-pe* is not attested in the data and so far I have also not yet heard it in everyday talk.

In this turn, although Bupigi is consciously producing an Aché utterance, he nonetheless uses a fair amount of Guaraché. In fact, the only item fully Aché is *kadji*. All other elements, are mixed to a greater or lesser degree.³⁴ *Ha’ekuera* is the Guaraní third person pronoun *ha’e* combined with a plural quantifier *kuera*, also Guaraní. Guaraché uses this Guaraní compound to express third person plural, whereas for third person singular it uses (mostly) *idja*, the Aché pronoun, as shown in Table 1.1. The second item, again, is lacking inflection, but note the verb that Bupigi is using here. Pikygi used the verb *ho* (go) in the utterance that was the trouble source. Bupigi, substitutes not only *kadji* for *ka’aguy*, but also *guata* (walk) for *ho* (go). Why?

While this again demonstrates the importance of a detailed analysis on all linguistic levels, it also shows its limits. The actual Aché form corresponding to Guaraní *ho-ta* would be *o-werã* (go-prosp, the Aché prospective aspect marker -*werã* has fallen out of use in Guaraché). But Bupigi does not say *o-werã* or even *o-ta*, because the expression “to go or walk through the forest” usually takes a different verb, the verb *wata* (walk) instead of *o* (go), as in *ore wata-werã kadji* (we will walk through the forest). Bupigi thus does not just substitute the Guaraní items with semantically equivalent ones in Aché, but also makes sure that the entire construction is well-formed semantically and pragmatically.

In this example then, we see that semantic and pragmatic considerations are as relevant for the analysis of the repair as the other levels. “Go” and “walk,” in conjunction with all other aspects of the code are here also repairable items. This could also be the possible second reason for the missing locative -*pe*, mentioned above. Since the construction *kadji* means literally “with the plants (trees)” in Aché, it is semantically more appropriate to use the verb “walk” as opposed to the verb “go,” since “go” implies stronger directionality of movement than walk. While the expression *o kadji* (go among the trees) is not incorrect grammatically, in the case at hand it would not be the right expression. In Aché, to express “I am going to the forest” (one is not in the forest yet) one would say *cho o-werã ka-pe*, here using the locative suffix -*pe* together with the root for plant/tree, *ka* (more or less the idea

³⁴ I have not marked the first word, Kwewe, as it is a proper name—the Aché name they had given me.
that one is going to the place where the trees are). Bupigi could have said ha'ekuera ho-ta ka-pe, but I believe that in his mind the semantic equivalent of ka'aguy is ka-dji (I have not found ka-pe to refer to the forest in children's utterances in the data), which might be semi-lexicalized for him (he takes it to be the word [stem] for forest, but he still recognizes -dji as a functional morpheme incompatible with -pe). Therefore ho was the second target of Bupigi's repair, first, as a Guaraní word, and second, as the “wrong” word in conjunction with kadji, to be substituted with guata.

However, Bupigi does not pronounce guata the way it would be pronounced in Aché. The lexical item /wata/ is rendered [wata] in Aché and [ɡuata] in Guaraní, and Bupigi is using the latter, beginning with a velar stop–diphthong sequence [ɡua] instead of a labiovelar approximant [wa]. But it might also not have been necessary for him to accurately produce a full Aché sentence. The laughter and the way his playmates respond demonstrates clearly that he has achieved what he wanted. This shows that in order for the repair to be effective, two simple lexical substitutions are sufficient, and the rest of the utterance can remain in Guaraché, lacking inflection (A), using ha'ekuera (G) as pronoun, and the prospective aspect marker -ta (G). The deliberate production of Aché is demonstrated by highlighting (C. Goodwin 1994) kadji and guata, and it is irrelevant if the rest of the sentence is also in that code or not.

This is even more apparent in line 5. Kwategi, Bupigi's brother who is among the group that was about to go to the forest, takes up Bupigi's repair and repeats it, but using hota again, as has Pikygi. However, he is not “unrepairing” that part of the repair, he is not deliberately substituting guatata with hota, but simply focusing on kadji as the main target, and reiterating it. This might have caused a morphological conflict with kadji for the reason just described and have motivated him to add an additional word after kadji, the Guaraní word for “house.” It is unclear to me what the exact meaning of oga is in this context. An idea that the forest is their home might be involved but it is not straightforward. A morphosyntactic explanation could use the following reasoning: Since kadji does not take the locative suffix and since Kwategi has already started his sentence with hota which requires a prepositional phrase that is a destination of going, he is looking for some item that can take the locative suffix -pe and which at the same time would work with kadji. Using oga might have been his way out of this conflict. Note the slight hesitation before the word kadji. Note also the repetition of
kadji oga, which might indicate that it is an uncommon construction. Lastly, the additional ore wedjata depe is again a "standard" Guaraché utterance, lack of inflection on wedja (A; vs. G: heja), -ta (G), and depe (A; vs. G: ndeve).

The fact that it goes unnoticed that such elements are not Aché corresponds to the phenomenon described as “erasure” by Irvine and Gal (2000). Furthermore, from universal constraints on speakers’ awareness analyzed by Silverstein (1981) it is predictable that Bupigi’s repairs concern primarily the lexical level and that the phonetic shape of guata escape his awareness. However, Bupigi’s use of guata instead of wata, should not be taken as an indicator that the children are unaware of the phonetic differences between Aché and Guaraní. As a last example, let us look in detail at the second metalinguistic repair mentioned above.

*Transcript 1.10*

*Setting:* On a hunting trek, children are sitting at a campfire. A one-and-a-half-year-old tries to stand up. Her elder cousin Anegi (9) orders her to sit back down.35

1 ANEGI: Eguapy.
   e-guapy
   IMP-sit
   G-B
   B-G
   G-G

   Sit down.

   (.2)

2 BUPIGI: Nda’e (.).hh “wapy:::” ei.
   nda’e  wapy  he’i
   NEG.COP  sit  3.say
   G  B  G
   G  A  G
   G  A  G

   That’s not it (.).hh One says “sit do:::wn.”

35 *Legend:*  ■ lexicon;  ■ phonetics;  ■ morphosyntax.
The analysis reveals that the lexical item in question is not substituted with a different item. The metalinguistic repair concerns the phonetic rendering of the word /wapɨ/, which is lexically the same item in Aché and in Guaraní, but which differs phonetically along the same lines as guata and wata above: In Aché it is pronounced [wapɨ], with the syllable-initial labiovelar approximant [wa], whereas in Guaraní it is pronounced [quapɨ], beginning with the velar stop–diphthong sequence [qua]. Here Bupigi attends precisely to that aspect of Aché–Guaraní difference that he had been disregarding in the earlier repair, the phonetic rendering of the phoneme /w/. Lacking any other repairable element, Bupigi specifies how the word for “sit” should be pronounced in Aché.

The other modification that might be part of the repair also does not concern a word stem but the imperative prefix e-, which is left out since Aché does not mark the imperative with a prefix. Since the corresponding modal in Aché, mondo is not supplied—the correct Aché way would be wapy mondo—it could also be that the target of the repair was only the stem and that the prefix was simply ignored. However, the imperative prefix e- has clearly marked Anegi’s utterance as not Aché, and is therefore part of the trouble source. For the metapragmatic framing of the repair Bupigi uses the Guaraché negative copula nda’e, a contraction of Guaraní nda-ha’e-i—the negative circumfix, nda- ... -i has lost the suffix here—and ei, a contraction of Guaraní he’i, “says.”

It is instructive to look at these repairs in light of my brief analysis of Guaraché, since it demonstrates the difficulty to keep Aché and Guaraní apart, even in contexts where the explicit attention is on the code. Here metalinguistic repairs do perform a codeswitch as the children deliberately produce the Aché words, but the rest of the utterance remains mixed, i.e., one “fused lect” (Auer 1999) or “alloy” (Alvarez-Cáccamo 1998). I will return to these examples in chapter 4 when discussing the phenomenological constitution of language and linguistic difference.

1.3.5 Language Contact and Convergence

From this necessarily incomplete survey of interactions the following picture of Guaraché as a mixed code emerges: The Guaraché lexicon is supplied by Aché and Guaraní, with a few Spanish expressions that have been adopted by way of the Spanish–Guaraní mixed code known as jopara. A number of se-
mantically equivalent or similar items are incorporated from Aché and Guaraní. Guaraché uses several personal pronouns from Guaraní (see table 1.1) but does not adopt its inflectional verbal morphology and agreement marking, thus “retaining” Aché’s lack of inflectional and relational prefixes (Rößler 2015). However, as seen in transcript 1.8, the children do sometimes use Guaraní Set A inflectional verbal prefixes. Some Guaraní stems (verbs and nouns) are adopted with an inflectional or relational prefix and these are reanalyzed as part of the stem and thus morphologically “frozen.” Table 1.2 gives an overview of the most salient functional morphemes adopted from Guaraní and Aché respectively.

Table 1.2: Functional Morphemes used in Guaraché

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aché</th>
<th>bivalent</th>
<th>Guaraní</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-a A</td>
<td>djepe/jepe</td>
<td>ALTHOUGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ba Q</td>
<td>djewy/jevy</td>
<td>ITER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-bu COND</td>
<td>-ete/-ite</td>
<td>REAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-dji WITH</td>
<td>ko DET</td>
<td>(h)ína PROG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>djiwa ABOUT</td>
<td>-ma IAM</td>
<td>ikatu MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-gi/-ngi DET</td>
<td>-mi DIM</td>
<td>-iti STILL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>go DET</td>
<td>-pa/-mba COMPL</td>
<td>-k(-e) REFL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gobu THEN</td>
<td>-pe DOM</td>
<td>(k)atu EMPH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-py/-mby P</td>
<td>-pe LOC</td>
<td>-ke INTNS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ty LOC</td>
<td>-rã PROSP</td>
<td>-kue/-ngue RET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ty/-ndy HAB</td>
<td>-re PST</td>
<td>mante ONLY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-wã PURP</td>
<td>m(b)ö- CAUS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-werã PROSP</td>
<td>-moã CF</td>
<td>-moãi IRR.NEG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Guaraní morphemes reanalyzed or adapted in Guaraché

- hague PST -re(he) WITH
- no- ... -i NEG re(he)gua ABOUT
- rei FRUSTR
- -se DES
- -ta PROSP
- -va REL
- -ve MORE
- -í DIM
Phonetically Guaraché incorporates [ʃ], [s], [h], and [l] from Guaraní and Spanish, and [ʤ] and [ʧ] from Aché (note that /ʧ/ is also a Spanish phoneme). Guaraché makes a phonological /ʤ/ : /j/ distinction as does Aché. It tends to have less prenasalization of voiced plosives compared to standard Guaraní, but more than standard Aché, especially on Guaraní expressions. There is considerable variation across speakers and discursive context. Guaraché shows vowel or syllable elision and other alternations of Guaraní morphemes and compounds to assimilate Aché phonology and syllable structure.

My discussion inevitably raises the question about the linguistic classification of Guaraché, and while it is not my concern for this dissertation, I would like to hint at three possible interpretations. First of all, it is clear that Guaraché is the result of language contact. In an influential and by now classic volume, Thomason and Kaufman (1988) provide a classificatory framework for linguistic contact phenomena. And although some of its premises have been criticized from a variety of perspectives, it still stands as a standard work orienting many discussions. Here it shall suffice to briefly summarize their main analytical axes.

First, they distinguish between situations of language contact where both languages are maintained and situations of language shift. The second set of criteria are the intensity of contact and the amount of cultural pressure from source-language speakers in language maintenance situations, or the size of the shifting group, the availability of the target language, and the relative socioeconomic dominance of the latter’s speaker group in language shift scenarios. Third, they consider whether or not normal transmission of the language was interrupted or the target language was imperfectly learned, and also universal markedness considerations and typological distance.

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36 This table is not exhaustive. I have only listed morphemes that occur frequently in the data. For a list of glossing abbreviations see page xiv.

37 The two main controversial points are (1) the claim that in principle “any linguistic feature can be transferred from any language to any other” (Thomason and Kaufman 1988, 14), asserting that purely linguistic factors play only secondary roles in determining the outcomes of a given contact situation, and (2) their radical distinction of languages that unproblematically can be assigned a node in a linguistic family trees from those that cannot, contact languages that result from a break in the normal transmission of a language and thus have a “non-genetic” origin (Mufwene 2001, 2007; DeGraff 2005; Thomason 2008).
In our case it is clear that we are facing a situation of language shift. The Aché—a very small group compared to Guaraní speakers—were exposed to and began to learn Paraguayan Guaraní from the early days of contact, the economic and political advantages of Guaraní-proficiency and the power dynamics between different groups contributed to its spread in all subsequent settlements. Frequent visits by Paraguayans provided continuing exposure to the language. Its acquisition as a second language was facilitated by its typological closeness to Guaraní, since both share a common origin. However, until 1978, newly arriving Aché-speaking bands also posed continuing linguistic influence. Their numerical dominance and other factors that I will discuss in chapter 3 have likely also contributed to decelerated shift to Guaraní

Thomason and Kaufman (1988, 100) observe that in some cases, “for reasons of stubborn language and cultural loyalty, the pressured group may maintain what it can of its native language while borrowing such large portions of the dominant language's grammar that they replace all, or at least sizable portions of, the original grammar.” In Thomason and Kaufman’s schema, Guaraché would thus be the result of incomplete language shift with heavy interference due to interrupted transmission of the source language. This, however, should not be read to imply that the Aché were unable to learn Guaraní but rather that they might not have chosen to fully adopt Guaraní. Possible reasons for this will be discussed in chapter 3. As Jourdan (1991) points out, rather than the result of interrupted transmission or imperfect learning, in pidginization or creolization processes emergent early varieties often themselves soon become the targets of language shift.

However, the typological closeness of (pre-contact) Aché and Guaraní also suggests an alternative analysis. Given the high number of bivalent morphemes, owing to a common lexical stock of vocabulary and phonological inventory and many shared basic syntactic features of both languages, Guaraché could also be considered a “new variety” (Kerswill 2010), result of a process of koineization (Siegel 1985, 2001; Kerswill 2013). Broadly defined, a koine is the result of “dialect contact” (Trudgill 1986), involving two or more varieties or linguistic subsystems that are mixed and subsequently leveled and stabilized. The problem with such an analysis is that it takes the two varieties to be “similar enough to be mutually intelligible, such as regional or social dialects” (Siegel 2001, 175); prior to con-
tact Aché and Guaraní were not mutually intelligible. While typological similarity certainly plays a role for linguistic convergence, neither Guaraché nor Aché can be seen merely as a variety of Guaraní.

Given the status of (pre-contact) Aché as a contact language with some Guaraní variety as its hypothesized lexifier (Rößler 2008), a third possibility would be to analyze Guaraché as the preliminary result of an ongoing process of “decreolization” (Escure 1982; Thomason and Kaufman 1988; Jourdan 1991; Mufwene 1994; Siegel 2008). Indeed, besides a large number of vocabulary items, Guaraché does (re-)incorporate some structural and morphological features from Guaraní, as we have seen, such as the causative prefix, the negative circumfix, a reflexive, and the imperative and prohibitive markers, among others. However, very little is known about the presumed former lexifier Guaraní variety from which Aché emerged, although it likely was much different from the Guaraní that is the target language of current language shift (Dietrich 2015). As I have mentioned above, Paraguayan Guaraní itself has been heavily influenced by Spanish after five centuries of language contact, and therefore Guaraché also incorporates many Spanish morphemes. Furthermore, rather than (re-)incorporating structural elements of Guaraní systematically into Guaraché, many of them are lexicalized (“frozen”) in Guaraché (such as the relational prefixes and personal pronouns), or repurposed (such as an inclusive plural first-person pronoun that has taken on the function as an optative). Guaraní words are also adapted to Aché/Guaraché phonology and syllable structure. Guaraché has moreover resisted the adoption of Guaraní’s two pronominal paradigms and split ergative subsystem. And finally, the negative circumfix that Guaraché incorporated from Guaraní is simplified through the elimination of contextual alternants (for nasal harmony and word initial vowel) in favor of the general no- ... -i, probably due to Spanish influence as I have argued above. These observations suggest that instead of a process of decreolization, more appropriately we would need to speak of a process of “recreolization” (Le Page 1977; Sebba 1997; DeGraff 2005).

With these remarks I shall end the linguistic discussion and refer the reader to future work for further exploration of the phenomenon Guaraché. The dissertation will be limited to trying to understand how in interactions in which Guaraché is the unmarked code, Aché and Guaraní elements are strategically used and how through such use language is constituted as an intentional object.
1.4 Language Endangerment and Activism

My discussion of linguistic convergence in Guaraché in the previous section suggests that for Guaraché speakers distinguishing between Aché and Guaraní elements is not always straightforward. However, the differences between the two languages have become very significant today for the Aché. As in other “endangered language communities” (Grenoble and Whaley 1998; Avineri and Kroskrity 2014) the imminent demise of their heritage language is a cause of concern to many Aché and a number of teachers and community activists have taken steps toward language revitalization. The focus of these revitalization activities is on unmixed Aché, i.e., the speech community’s ideological construction of original, pre-contact Aché. Through these processes, Aché, no longer the default medium of communication, has become a highly “marked” resource (Avineri and Kroskrity 2014), albeit one with shifting boundaries and sometimes contested and contradictory indexical values. To sort out which words belong to Aché and which ones do not is a task that has become increasingly important, but also increasingly difficult.

Determining what counts as original or “pure” Aché is of course itself largely dependent on language ideologies, specifically on ideologies that rely on language-internal factors to assess whether or not a certain variety of a language is the “pure,” “correct,” or “original” one. Bauman and Briggs (2003, 5) have argued that “classificatory purity is itself an epistemological construction, and every ‘pure’ form can also be conceived as hybrid by some measure or other.” A linguistic variety might be perceived as “pure” regarding its phonology, for example, but as “impure” regarding its lexicon when it incorporates borrowings. But what counts as a borrowing depends also on historical and social processes; there is no unambiguous rule by which one could assess when a loanword becomes part of the lexicon. Far more important is therefore the idea of purity or correctness, since it constitutes a cultural ideal by which speakers observe, evaluate, and orient towards their own and others’ speech practices. Language activism therefore creates an ideological environment that facilitates speakers’ becoming aware of language—and results in metalinguistic repairs such as the above.

Language activism in general and the emphasis on unmixed Aché in particular must be understood within a larger context where indigenous languages are mobilized to support claims of cultural conti-
nuity in relation to land rights, funding for education, or representation on a national level (Errington 2003; Whiteley 2003). Increasing contact and exchange between indigenous communities on a national and international level through meetings and assemblies and government policies that promote relative autonomy of indigenous communities to determine culturally sensitive educational structures and school curricula, further fosters the Aché communities’ attention to their language practices as an important site of indigenous identity politics.

Endangered language communities and their members typically live in a world of unprecedented levels of cultural contact in which their languages are deployed with a high degree of awareness and in situations where linguistic forms are being recruited to mark community boundaries and to make identities within them. These are the communities in which relying on shared traditions for demarcation no longer seems especially viable. Relevant, semiotically constructed, social boundaries between communities may not be highly visible (to outsiders) or even phenomenally overt. Yet many speech communities still see themselves as bounded, unified, and centered in ways that may defy the external analyst’s gaze. (Avineri and Kroskrity 2014, 3)

It is thus not surprising that languages turn into one of the most important markers of ethnicity or indigeneity, “diacritical features that people look for and exhibit to show identity,” and therefore important criteria for ethnic boundary maintenance (Barth 1969, 14).

In such contexts, national ideologies that take a standard or homogeneous language as the only legitimate form for such indexing of identity (Silverstein 1996; Lippi-Green 1997) are often recursively projected onto indigenous languages (Irvine and Gal 2000), they have “‘trickled down’ into local consciousness” (Kroskrity 2009a, 196), causing activists to be “imposing standards, elevating literate forms and uses, and negatively sanctioning variability in order to demonstrate the reality, validity, and integrity of their languages” (Woolard 1998a, 17). Supported by Paraguayan activists, missionaries, and Bible translators, Aché language activists are producing educational materials, text collections, and DVDs in (unmixed) Aché, which is also taught as a subject in the primary schools. My own involvement with the Aché communities started in this context through a language documentation project (see next section) that also focused on the Aché language as spoken before contact and primarily on elder speakers.

This is the context in which we must understand the episode involving Pikygi and Bupigi transcribed above. They not only knew that I was doing research about their language practices, they also
knew, whether they remembered me or whether their parents or other children had told them, that for the past couple of years I had been doing research on the language practices of the elders, on the original Aché language. This knowledge, alongside what they learned in language classes in school that teach the linguistic differences between Guaraní and Aché, and the ideological context that valorizes Aché as an ethnically important language (especially for an outside anthropologist) prompted Bupigi’s metalinguistic repair.

1.5 Fieldwork and Research Methodology

My previous work with the Aché on language documentation ranges back to December 2008, when my colleagues Eva-Maria Rößler (State University of Campinas, Brazil) and Warren Thompson (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor) and I started the Aché Documentation Project (ADOP). This project, under the direction of Jost Gippert and Sebastian Drude (Goethe University, Frankfurt), was part of the DOBES endangered languages program funded by the Volkswagen Foundation. Given the status of Aché as an “endangered language” (Grenoble and Whaley 1998; Evans 2010) the goal of that project was to document aspects of the language as it had been used before contact with Paraguayan society through audio and video recordings (Gippert, Himmelmann, and Mosel 2006; Himmelmann 2008). These were then archived at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen. The principal focus was on traditional language material and mainly the elder generations who were still fluent in Aché. During our field visits we could be seen in the communities sitting down with elders and video recording them as they performed songs or told stories and responded to our interview questions. With teachers and community activists we would transcribe these recordings and also organize meetings about the Aché language. These meetings and our presence in general also contributed to a heightened awareness about language within the communities.

In 2012 we were awarded a research grant for a follow-up project, called the Aché Language Studies Project (ALSP) through the same Volkswagen funding initiative. This project was designed to study the history and mechanisms of contact-induced language change in Aché. My colleagues Rößler and Thompson worked on cross-linguistic comparison of Aché and Guaraní data to analyze structural
changes in order to clarify the position of Aché within the Tupí-Guaraní language family. My research within that project was the investigation of current changing language practices and language shift. The present dissertation forms part of the results of that research.

1.5.1 Selection of Fieldsite

While in the documentation project we had been visiting all six main Aché communities frequently, for the present study I chose one community for an in-depth study of children's language practices. I worked closely with two focal families and their children in order to learn about their everyday language practices and daily life. The community chosen was Krendy,38 in the Canindeyú department close to the Brazilian border. The following considerations went into that decision:

My goal was to study language practices in a variety of settings. Given that the Aché used to live as nomadic hunter gatherers, one of the main changes that correlated with, and, as we will see, contributed to language shift was sedentarization. Nevertheless, although all Aché now live in permanent settlements and subsist mainly by small-scale agriculture, they continue to go on hunting treks into forest reserves occasionally, usually for four or five days. These excursions are only to a degree comparable to their previous life as full-time nomads (P. Clastres [1972] 1998, 66; Hill and Hurtado 1996, 65–6).

However, Hill and Hurtado (1996, 65) claim that their “informants report that daily life prior to outside contact was very similar to the patterns that we have observed during the past fifteen years on extended forest treks.” Therefore, in order to be able to document possible differences between language practices in the forest and in the village and to understand the potential impact of village life on language shift, I planned to accompany the Aché on hunting treks as often as possible.

While Aché from all communities carry out hunting treks, the access to stretches of forest varies greatly by community. Some communities have to use motor vehicles to reach the edge of a forest, parts of the land of others is still forested although most of these stretches are very small and do not

38 Pseudonym.
allow for multi-day excursions. Krendy and one other community are situated adjacent to a large forest reserve. The Aché have hunting rights in the reserve and can access it by foot from these two communities. This was the main motivation behind my choice of fieldsite.

Another consideration was size. The six main Aché communities differ in size from about 150 to almost 600 individuals. Krendy is a middle sized community; at the time of my research there were about 290 individuals living permanently in Krendy, 155 of them children. This allowed me to stay informed not only about the immediate surroundings of the families I worked with but also about what was going on elsewhere in the community. It was also large enough to have a number of families to choose from that would agree to work with me. Further considerations were rapport with community members established through previous visits, the availability of teachers or other community members with knowledge of computers but also still fluent in Aché that could help me transcribe data, and the receptiveness of the community leaders to my enterprise.

In September 2012, on a preliminary visit to Krendy, I discussed my plans of doing a study of children’s language practices with the leader then and he was very welcoming to my proposal. I returned to Paraguay for fieldwork in January 2013. I spent the first two months in Asunción for language training in Guaraní. In March I went on a roundtrip to all six communities and participated in meetings with teachers and community leaders. While in Krendy I talked again to the leader in order to confirm my plans and he repeated his invitation to the community.

I arrived in Krendy on April 22, 2013 to begin my fieldwork. On Sunday, April 28, the leader convoked a community meeting where I was given the opportunity to present my project. I explained that I would study the ways in which Aché children grow up in the community and learn languages in order to understand why they are increasingly less competent in their heritage language; that I will focus particularly on child rearing practices, peer group interaction, and schooling; and that I am interested particularly in the differences between life in the forest and in the communities.

I also explained the research methods, video-recording of children, interviews, and taking of fieldnotes. I assured the community that I will not disclose any identifiable information obtained to anyone outside of the community unless the participants explicitly give me permission to do so. All names
in the present work, including the name of the community, have been anonymized. I then officially
asked for permission to live in the community for a year and obtained oral consent to do my research. I
also announced that I would like to work closely with two families in particular, explained the criteria
that the families would need to meet, what participation in my research involved on their part, and
the monetary compensation I would pay, which had previously been established with the community
leader.

1.5.2 Selection of Focal Families

The first requirement for the families was the presence of at least three children between the ages four
and ten. I wanted to focus on this age group mainly since it comprises primary language acquisition
and socialization in the family and peer group and because for them most social contacts are still
within the Aché village. Older children spend more time outside of the community where Guaraní is
the dominant language. Some attend a boarding school in another Aché community.

A second criterion was related to my choice of community. Since I wanted to compare language
practices in the forest and in the communities I was dependent on families that would frequently go
on hunting treks. Family structures vary greatly in the community. Some of the parents of four- to
ten-year-olds are very young couples in their late teens or early twenties. These families no longer have
the experience to go hunting in the forest. Therefore I was looking for older parents. Of about fifty
families living in Krendy less than fifteen still go on hunting treks frequently. These treks are carried
out sometimes by one family only, but usually by two or three extended families together and mostly
involve three generations, grandparents, parents, and sometimes children.

At the meeting I asked for families that would want to volunteer. One family showed interest and
the community leader suggested another family although that family was not present at the meeting;
they had gone on a hunting trek to the forest for a few days. This was a welcome coincidence, since I
wanted to be sure that they went hunting frequently by themselves. I knew that family from before,
and Tokangi, the father, had already served briefly as a language consultant in the documentation
project. They returned a day later and I asked him directly. He agreed and I obtained oral consent
from him and his wife Rytagi on April 30. The first family that had showed interest initially at the meeting opted out and did not participate in the research, but another family, the family of Tokangi's half-sister Minogi joined. I had known this family from before too. Minogi and her husband Cherygi gave me oral consent on May 9.

Of Minogi’s and Cherygi’s children three were under ten and participated as focal children in my research, one girl, Anegi (9), and two boys, Kwatægi (7) and Bupigi (6). Of Rytagi and Tokangi’s children all five participated, three boys, Chimbægi (10), Irongi (7), and Gunegi (6), and two girls, Nambugi (4) and Warukugi (1). Minogi, Cherygi, and Tokangi were in their forties or fifties and had been born in the forest. Thus I could be sure they had learned Aché as their first language. Since all families living in Krendy belong to the Northern subgroup that left the forest between 1970 and 1978, most adults 35 years and older were born in the forest and therefore were only exposed to other languages when settling on the reservation. Rytagi was Tokangi’s second wife and in her late twenties.

1.5.3 Ethnographic Fieldwork

In-depth fieldwork was carried out for a total of twelve months between April 2013 and September 2014. I was absent from the community in June and July 2013 and between April and June 2014. Data collection consisted of multiple parts. First and most importantly for my endeavor I ethnographically documented children’s everyday practices. This consisted of video ethnography, participant observation, and extensive taking of fieldnotes in three settings, the community, the forest during hunting treks, and the primary schools. I recorded a total of 165 hours of video, 87 of which were recorded on hunting treks and 78 in the community. Of the recordings in the community 28 hours were filmed in classrooms of the primary school. I filmed on 62 days in the communities and 32 days in the forest. We went on a total of 8 hunting treks, each lasting between three and five days.

I lived in Krendy in a small room behind a storehouse, conveniently located at an angle between the houses of my two focal families. The primary playground of the children was right in front of the door of the storehouse. Individual huts and houses in Krendy are not separated by fences or other spatial

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39 All names are pseudonyms.
dividers and the children are free to roam wherever they please. Figure 1.2 illustrates the immediate surroundings of my families.

![Figure 1.2: Sketch of surroundings of family homes](image)

Everyday life in the community for the adults is dominated by work in the gardens and fields surrounding the village, drinking *mate* or *tereré*[^40] while resting from work, playing volleyball, and doing handicrafts. Both genders engage in all of these activities, with men spending usually more time on the fields. The women are in addition mainly responsible for cooking and doing laundry. On the weekend the whole community gathers around the soccer field to watch soccer matches, sometimes against teams from surrounding villages. They also do archery frequently. There is church service on Sundays between 8 and 11 am.

[^40]: Mate leaves (*Ilex paraguariensis*) are used in many South American countries for a hot infusion. It is usually prepared by pouring hot water over the leaves in a hollow calabash gourd, which is then immediately taken with a metal straw. *Tereré* is a cold infusion of mate, a popular drink in Paraguay especially in the summer months.
The Aché usually get up with sunrise (between 5 and 7 am depending on the season). In summer, adults sometimes go to work in their gardens and fields even earlier than that in order to avoid the day’s heat. Children also rise fairly early, sometimes before their parents and start playing in front of their huts as early as 7 am. Their parents usually prepare manioc (cassava) or flatbread for breakfast, which the children grab when it is ready. They eat home-cooked meals for lunch and for dinner. On schooldays they also get milk or a snack in school. The children usually go to school either for the morning session between 7 and 11 am or in the afternoon between 12 and 4 pm. Their free time is dominated by play in small peer groups outside of the huts or in larger groups in the center of the village. Especially in the late afternoons large groups of children assemble to play or romp around on the soccer field. Their plays include soccer, volley, and other ball games, hide-and-seek, tag, hopscotch, and a variety of role plays. They also play with objects or bugs that they find throughout the village and frequently climb trees to hunt for bugs or collect fruits. Sometimes they accompany the adults to the fields and gardens either to help or just to play. A few families have TV sets and at night the children can be found watching it.
The families that still go hunting usually do so once a month. Usually two to three extended families would accompany each other, including grandparents. All families camp together at the same spot but each family has their own fire. On hunting treks days also start at sunrise. Meals from the night before are warmed up for breakfast and manioc (cassava) roots are put into a campfire. Days would be spent in one of two ways: either we would stay in one place or we would move the camp.

On days where the camp would remain at the same spot, women and children stayed in the camp while men would leave right after breakfast to go hunting. Sometimes they would only return at night, on lucky days they would stop by in between to bring their prey. Prey was usually given to the elder women who would distribute it among the families. Often families would take turns cooking for the others. Throughout the day, women would be engaged in weaving baskets and preparing meals or go to gather fruits, larvae, fibers from trees, and firewood in the surroundings of the camp. Children would collaborate frequently in these gathering activities and help by getting water or lending a hand to the women but they would also explore the surroundings of the camp, climb trees, or play, preferably in the little streams next to which the Aché often rest. They also always intently observe women clean the prey and prepare meals.

On days where the camp was moved some men would still go out hunting on their own, but others would accompany women and children on their treks to a new campsite. Women were responsible for carrying everything in their nokô, baskets woven from palm leaves that they carry with a strap over their forehead. Small children are carried in front in a swaddle. On these treks the entire group would stop frequently to gather larvae, fruits, or honey. After arriving at the new camp site, the women would clear the area from brushes, set up fires, and wait for the hunters’ return.

1.5.4 Interviews, Meetings, and Radio Sessions

Aside from ethnographic fieldwork I also conducted interviews, mainly with elders from various communities. These interviews were semi-structured, usually involving the main interviewee or interviewees and either family members or teachers. Interview topics were the experience of the interviewee of leaving the forest as a child and arriving in a community, growing up in the community, under-
standing and perception of language use in the community, and opinions about current language use and language development. Excerpts of some interviews are reproduced in chapter 3.

I also participated in and recorded teacher meetings comprised of teachers from all communities that were held several times a year, as well as a meeting of representatives of the Aché federation, a political organization of all Aché communities. Starting in September 2013 the Aché organize a yearly cultural week where all communities come together and engage in several cultural activities, meetings, and sports events. The 2014 cultural week was held in Krendy in September in the last weeks of my stay.

Another site that contributed immensely valuable data which I had not planned on was, a community radio station that was installed in Krendy in January 2014. A few language activists had won a government-funded project for the radio. As the house where the radio should eventually have been located had not been finished yet, and as the room that I was using was the only other room available, it turned out that one day I returned from a hunting trek to find myself in company of two tables, two computers, a mixer, and a radio transmitter. This was a very fortunate and also convenient additional
site for my research, not only because the use of different languages on the radio would give insights into language ideologies, but also because the radio soon became a platform for community activists to engage in discussions about language, to invite elders to perform traditional songs and narratives, and play recordings of those. I made audio or video recordings of 44 hours of radio sessions. An excerpt of a radio session is included in chapter 3.

1.5.5 Data Management and Transcription

I started to transcribe the data already in the field with the help of parents of my focal families. One of the school teachers continued to transcribe data together with different members of the families in 2015 and 2016. A total of 21 hours of video recordings have been transcribed thus far. For transcription I use the ELAN annotation software developed at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen. Primary transcription consists of a detailed two-tier annotation of original text and a Spanish translation. Secondary transcription adds detail and three new tiers. Additional information about visual behavior, silences, and intonation contours is added to the first tier of original text. Of the new tiers one contains the original text without any further information but indicating morpheme boundaries, the tier below it English morpheme-by-morpheme glosses, and the last one a free English translation. Selections of these transcriptions are exported and typeset in LaTeX as we have seen in the examples above. The information about the language of the morphemes is added after export from ELAN.

All recordings were organized into four hierarchical databases: Interactional Data, Radio Sessions, Interviews, and Meetings/Events. Each recording was assigned its unique session identifier and each session was coded with the following information: environment (community or forest), setting (home, playground, school, forest camp, etc.), context (play, work, meals, resting, trekking, etc.), activity (type of interaction such as playing, caregiving, planting, conversation, etc.), participants, description of the recording, and observations of language phenomena in the interactions. Radio sessions and interviews were coded for language use and metalinguistic discussions. No recordings from events have been analyzed for this dissertation.
CHAPTER 2

What is Language?

And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men builded. And the Lord said: “Behold, they are one people, and they have all one language; and this is what they begin to do; and now nothing will be withheld from them, which they purpose to do. Come, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another’s speech.” (Genesis 11:5–8)

Time and again linguistic diversity has puzzled human minds. Throughout the ages and across continents humans have come up with explanations for the fact that there are multiple mutually incomprehensible ways of speaking among members of the same species. Many of the world’s mythological traditions offer accounts of the origin of the different languages out of a primordial single tongue (Frazer 1918, 382–7). At some point in history a primordial linguistic unity was disturbed by a transformative event, involving a quarrel or discord among humans in some cases, human disobedience in others, like breaking a food taboo or trying to reach the heavens by building a ladder or a huge tower. This then caused the intervention of a god, a trickster, or some other figure, who would confuse the human tongues. The result was that people ceased to understand each other and dispersed across the earth to live in different communities. In many traditions the origin of different languages is thus linked to geographical separation of human communities and distinct histories and customs.

However, the wide distribution of the Tower of Babel motif and the similarities of the different accounts that comparison reveals should not lead one to think the explanation for linguistic diversity is essentially the same everywhere. A closer look at different narratives reveals crucial differences, showing that the end of linguistic unity meant something quite different in different parts of the world. They diverge on the foregoing event that led to the confusion of tongues, on the intervening agent, or, most importantly, on the extent of the community upon which it was inflicted. While in the
Bible the original condition seems to have been that all of humanity spoke the same language (Genesis 11:1), elsewhere the primordial linguistic community is reported to have been much greater. In the indigenous Americas, for example, humans not only lost the ability to communicate with each other, but also with nonhumans—or rather, what the Western tradition sees as nonhumans.

For the Amerindians and most of the peoples who long remained without writing, mythical times were those when human beings and animals were not really distinct from one another and could communicate. These groups would have seen the decision to make historical time begin with the Tower of Babel, when humans lost the use of a common language and ceased to understand one another, as the expression of a singularly narrow view of things. The end to an original harmony, according to them, occurred on a much vaster scale; it afflicted not only humans but all living beings. (Lévi-Strauss [2013] 2016, 112).

Here linguistic differentiation not only affected humans that had already been distinct from animals—possibly also because of their use of language, after all it was Adam who named all the animals after they were created (Genesis 2:19–20)—but was part and parcel of speciation. As Lévi-Strauss observed, the primordial nondifference of (pre-)humans and (pre-)nonhumans that has lately been the topic of much debate also had a linguistic dimension (Lévi-Strauss and Eribon [1988] 1991, 193; Tedlock 1988, 67; Descola [2005] 2013, 131–2). This linguistic nondifference in turn must be understood in two ways: as a nondiversity of linguistic form on the one hand, and as the same capacity for language of all beings, on the other. If all beings communicated in the same language, it is implied that they all spoke a language, however conceived, i.e., that they all had the same capacity for language.

On this point the Amerindian and Western intellectual traditions are in radical disagreement. Where the former affirms language to be part of the original common condition of humans and nonhumans, in the latter it is a crucial trait that distinguishes them from each other. This is true for the Biblical account as well as for modern science. It is language, defined as the capacity for symbolic representation, which makes humans exceptional: “There is a fundamental difference between the mind of man and the mind of non-man. ... Man uses symbols; no other creature does” (White 1949, 25; see Benveniste [1966] 1971; Deacon 1997; Tomasello 1999; Cartmill, Beilock, and Goldin-Meadow 2012; 1

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1 Whether or not animals were capable of human language in the Biblical paradise is subject to debate (at least the serpent was). However, it is unambiguous that their creation was separate from and prior to that of man, they did not diversify from pre-man by losing language.
Barnard 2012). Lévi-Strauss too, unlike his Amerindian interlocutors, takes language and symbolic thought to be the defining criterion of human uniqueness—at least in his early writings (Leach [1970] 1996, 54). And if the capacity for language is presumed to be uniquely human so is linguistic diversity. “We are the only known species whose communication system varies fundamentally in both form and content” (Evans and Levinson 2009, 431; see Enfield, Kockelman, and Sidnell 2014, 1; Fuchs and Robert 1999). So when linguistic diversity accounts for the difference between humans and nonhumans, by the same token, within the human species it is one of the primary means by which human communities distinguish themselves from each other, by which speakers index their belonging to a particular group vis-à-vis other such groups (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller 1985; Kroaskrity 1993; Urciuoli 1995; Irvine and Gal 2000; Silverstein 2004; Bucholtz and Hall 2004).

In the Western approach these two levels of differentiation are treated separately. The (linguistic) distinction of one human group from another is the result of the use of language (among other things), whereas the distinction of humans from nonhumans by means of language is a given, an evolutionary achievement if anything. In the indigenous Americas by contrast both, the difference between humans and nonhumans, as well as the difference between human groups, are something that must be achieved on a daily basis, also, but not exclusively through the use of language.

In any case, these differences between the Western and Amerindian intellectual traditions are not only interesting as different approaches towards the problem of human uniqueness and difference—one of the central problems of anthropology—but also as different approaches to language itself. In an account that sees “language,” i.e., (a) the capacity for language and (b) the diversity of languages, as that which distinguishes humans from nonhumans, and in which (c) different languages are the primary means to distinguish human groups from one another, language must be something quite different from what it is in an approach that takes it to be the common condition of humans and

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2 According to Enfield, Kockelman, and Sidnell (2014, 1), the two central questions of anthropology are “what distinguishes humankind from other species” and “the nature and extent of diversity” within our species. Their recent edited volume about the state of the art in linguistic anthropology puts language at the heart of these questions: “One way in which human groups are alike is that none are without language. This universally distinguishes humans from other species.” At the same time, “human groups are radically unlike insofar as languages show considerable diversity at all levels of their structure.”

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nonhumans. Amerindian and Western accounts must rely on different language ideologies or, more specifically, ontologies of language—on different understandings of what language is. In this chapter I will discuss these different understandings and what they might tell us about language among the Aché.

2.1 The Idea of Language

In the introduction I claimed that the two metalinguistic repairs of the Aché children analyzed are contingent upon the following ideological presuppositions: (1) the linguistic code is (in principle) separable from the meaning of the utterance, (2) there exist two clearly distinguishable languages, and (3) one language is more appropriate than the other in a given context. Taken together, these presuppositions constitute language as an autonomous object that is distinct from speaker and utterance, i.e., decontextualized from its instantiation in actual discourse, but at the same time tied to context by the indexical referentiality of “different words for the same thing.”

I argue that such an understanding of language, far from being universal, is a recent product of specific historical processes tied to the rise of European modernity (Bauman and Briggs 2003). Among the Aché it is the result of their encounter with Paraguayan society and missionaries (see chapter 3). But I will go further than that and claim that the idea of language itself (and thus also of different languages) is a recent one for the Aché. There was no such thing as “language,” however conceived, before contact.

This claim is debatable. There are no recordings of Aché verbal interactions before contact and even if there were and their comprehensive analysis would show no metalinguistic repairs as indicators of language awareness, it would still not say anything about the presence or absence of a notion of language. To prove an absence is impossible, since, as every archaeologist and every statistician knows, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence (Bille, Hastrup, and Sørensen 2010; Fowles 2010). In this chapter I will therefore try to give positive evidence for language ideologies and practices that would preclude such metalinguistic awareness and the constitution of language as an object.
But before turning to the Aché I will need to contextualize my discussion. First I will briefly analyze the particular notion of language that is common in Western and scientific accounts, that particular hybrid, ideologically autonomous but indexically linked to all kinds of contexts, arbitrary and non-arbitrary at the same time. I will then survey a few language ideologies across the Americas in order to discuss what language might be for different Amerindian groups. Finally I will engage in a more detailed comparison of language ideologies among the Aché with those of their closest neighbors, the Guaraní.

I should thereby add a cautionary note about my own understanding. In the introductory paragraphs to this chapter I have been rather careless in my use of the term “language,” letting it be anything from the use of symbols, mutually intelligible communication, the perceived difference between group-specific ways of communicating, to the general capacity to communicate within and across species. The reader will object that the alleged differences of language ideologies might be the result of such an inconsistent definition (or lack thereof) of the object about which these ideologies are—and therefore ultimately stem from a problem of translation (or equivocation) (Asad 1986; Viveiros de Castro 2004b). I agree, but this is just the point. Language ideologies, as I have argued in the introduction, concern presuppositions about language understood as a shorthand for particular languages and language in general. I have also suggested that these two levels, that of language as a type and of languages as tokens, are mutually constituted and constitutive, and that we can therefore not decide in advance what we take language (as a type) to mean.3 While differences in presuppositions about language should not be confused with differences in the ontological status of language, I argue that they can provide important hints that languages may be constituted quite differently in different local contexts and histories. How they are constituted and thus what language and languages ultimately are in a given lifeworld should be the result of careful analysis and not the a priori decision of the researcher. I will return to this problem in due course.

3 Since assumptions about any particular language are necessarily informed by ideas about what language in general is and vice versa (Collins 1998; Gal 1998; Kroskrity 1998, 2000b; Woolard 1998a; Errington 1999; Irvine and Gal 2000; Bauman and Briggs 2003; T. J. Taylor 2016), a distinction between linguistic and metalinguistic ideologies or between languages as tokens and language as a type cannot be made in advance. See also footnote 15 on page 20.
2.1.1 The Modern Invention of Language

We invent an incidental and historical or situational “reality” through the conscious use of language, one that demands “correct usage” from the speaker. If language is arbitrary and capable of correction and change for us, the world of “fact” and “event” is definitely nonarbitrary: our scientific, legal, and historical investigations are (inventive) efforts to find out “what the facts are” and “what really happened.” Like the rational methodologies of these disciplines, we require our language to be a precision instrument (albeit one of our own making) for the description and representation of a stubbornly factual world, and our view of language in general often reflects this bias. (Wagner [1975] 1981, 107)

Much has been written about language in the Western intellectual tradition (e.g., Foucault [1966] 2002; Harris 1981; Aarsleff 1982). What many would regard as the currently dominant notion of language in the West, a system of representation unique to humans of which different instances are juxtaposed to each other (“languages” in the plural), is in fact a fairly recent historical product (Heryanto 1990), the outcome of particular scientific and philosophical developments (Foucault [1966] 2002; Latour [1991] 1993; Bauman and Briggs 2003). While many concepts of the European scientific and philosophical traditions are traced back to the ancient Greeks, their notions of language were still radically different from what is now assumed to be common sense. Indeed, an original time where humans and nonhumans were able to communicate with each other and shared basic social skills and behaviors was known not only to Amerindians, but also to Greek poets and philosophers such as Hesiod, Homer, Socrates, and Plato (Gera 2003, 18–23; J. Heath 2005, 12–4). Just as in the indigenous Americas, it seems that there was “no sharp division between nature and culture” (Gera 2003, 36n66).

But there is no uniformity in Greek accounts of the development of humanity and the role of language, and especially in later accounts a second view gained ground in which “the evolution of language and society go hand in hand” (6) and humans became the primary inventors of language (158–81). However, from a human notion of language it was still a long way to a notion of language as an abstract, arbitrary, symbolic system, and numerous factors contributed to this development.4 It

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4 Most prominent among these are the development of writing (Havelock 1963; Goody 1977; Ong 1982; Harris 2009) and reflexivity (Jeremiah 2012).
was not until the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that language had been fully isolated “as an autonomous organic structure” and acquired “a being proper to itself” (Foucault [1966] 2002, 322).

As Foucault ([1966] 2002) argues in *The Order of Things*, this constitution of language as an autonomous medium of representation was a key part of the development of modern knowledge and prepared the ground for language itself also becoming an object of science (Aarsleff 1982). However, in order to understand the particular notions of language operative not only in scientific accounts of language but also in global concerns about language change, the decline of linguistic diversity, and language endangerment (Silverstein 1998a; Kibbee [2001] 2003), the autonomization of language must be related to a complementary process that would tie languages back to the social and natural worlds. A comprehensive account of the emergence of the language ideological complex at the heart of current Western scientific and common sense notions of language is given by Bauman and Briggs (2003) in *Voices of Modernity*.

2.1.2 Ideological Purification and Indexical Hybridization

Bauman and Briggs draw on Latour’s analysis of the modern constitution. Latour’s ([1991] 1993) well-known argument is that modernity does not emerge out of the rise of science or scientific thinking as such, but rather out of the production of a great divide between the natural and social worlds—he terms this “purification”—alongside its ongoing mediation—which he calls “translation” or “hybridization.” The primary distinctive feature of modernity is the presupposition of a material world independent of human action, no longer subject to the arbitrary will and power of superhuman beings inhabiting it, but functioning by knowable and thus controllable rules and laws: the object of study of the natural sciences. However, these laws in their pure form remain hidden from human beings and can only be discovered through the creation of idealized situations, such as laboratories, in which they are extracted from context and purified. To be accessible to human knowledge though, the results of scientific experiments need to be somehow translated. Latour uses the term “hybridization” to point to the fact that for this process of translation it is necessary to relink the purified facts with social constructs.
Bauman and Briggs (2003) expand Latour’s analysis in two ways: (1) they demonstrate the role that language played in the constitution of nature and society as separate domains; and (2) they show how the Latourian processes of purification and hybridization are at work in current constructions of language. By turning to the work of Francis Bacon and John Locke they point out that the separation of nature and society went hand in hand with the constitution of language as an autonomous domain, set apart from things and social relations, a purified medium that could accurately represent both at the same time. Bacon, as an empiricist, was suspicious about language being able to transparently convey the facts of nature and saw it as obstacle to the development of modernity, given its connections to the social world and its constructs (20). By contrast, Locke did not dismiss language but advocated its modification to make it a cornerstone of modernity. His argument was that “the value of language for acquiring knowledge lies in its fundamental difference from the means by which we could come to know nature” but it must be purified “of ties to particular social positions, interests, and from differences between human beings in general” (31). He separated language from nature on the one hand and from society on the other and made it one of “the three great provinces of the intellectual world, wholly separate and distinct one from another” (Locke [1689] 1894, II: 463). Language became a “precision instrument ... for the description and representation of a stubbornly factual world” (Wagner [1975] 1981, 107).

However, at the same time he also inevitably contributed to the creation of the very hybrids he pretended to combat. His efforts to divest language and speech of its indexicality, of its ties to the social and natural worlds, failed performatively as the “neutral” and “disinterested” language he created became an index of his social status. Locke performed an exemplar Latourian hybridization in tightening the indexical connections between the intellectual elite of his time, purified language, and modernity itself for which it came to stand (Bauman and Briggs 2003, 59). While language was ideologically purified “in theory,” it became indexically hybridized implicitly.

Bauman and Briggs (2003, 68) characterize the Lockean project as the “deprovincialization of language,” mobilizing Chakrabarty’s (2000) call for “provincializing Europe.” Chakrabarty criticizes the reliance on European concepts and theories to represent non-European histories and experiences in the practice of (European and non-European) scholars. “Europe works as the silent referent in his-
torical knowledge” (Chakrabarty 2000, 28), the benchmark to which all non-European histories are aligned. European knowledge, while like any knowledge being the product of particular local histories and experiences, became separated from its conditions of production and thus “deprovincialized.” “Ideologies and practices tied to a specific gender, race, class, and time were reframed as a universal, timeless knowledge of ‘man’ ” (Bauman and Briggs 2003, 68).

Locke’s denial of the indexical connections of language to the social world would be challenged but also complemented a century later by the rise of language ideologies that would make the social indexicality of language explicit in connection to the rise of nation-states and the fashioning of national traditions. Opposing Locke’s purification efforts, German philosopher, folklorist, and literary critic Johann Gottfried Herder engaged in a different politics of purification and hybridization. He considered oral traditions the touchstone of cultural continuity and related language to poetry, history, and the national character of a people. His philosophical work resulted in a “metadiscursively founded theory of culture, society, and history, ... that has served as one of the cornerstones of the project of modernity for the past two hundred years” (163). He imagined a nation in its natural state as an extended family, one people (Volk) with one language and one national character (Herder [1877–1913] 1967–1968, XIII: 384). A national language became the treasurer of a people’s essence (II: 13).

While Locke’s project was aimed at the explicit ideological purification of language (alongside nature and society), which implicitly produced indexical hybridization, Herder’s efforts worked the other way around. By explicitly hybridizing language through anchoring it in national character, history, and society, and conflating nature, family, and nation (Bauman and Briggs 2003, 170), Herder implicitly paved the way for projects of purification by which language–culture–nation hybrids could be juxtaposed with one another and hierarchically arranged.

[The] ideology of a monoglot and monologic standard has provided a charter not only for homogenizing national policies of language standardization and the regulation of public discourse, but for theoretical frameworks that normalize and often essentialize one society–one culture–one language conceptions of the relationships among language, culture, and society. (195)

It was the combination of Lockean and Herderian elements that would inform later language ideologies present in much of scientific and folk accounts of language in the West. Indexically linked
to social groups in Herderian tradition, language was nonetheless at the same time fashioned into a neutral, disinterested, and freely available means of communication in Lockean manner. This is the notion of language dominant in current scientific and folk linguistic theory, but which also informs global concerns about language change and language mixing, the decline of linguistic diversity, and language endangerment (Silverstein 1998a; Kibbee [2001] 2003). It also informs the current concern of the Aché with their changing language practices (chapter 3).

In the remainder of this chapter I will turn to alternative ways in which language has been imagined. I will survey language ideologies across Amerindian groups in order to understand what they might tell us about the status of language vis-à-vis other entities and practices, relating them to what is known about the ontological properties of humans and nonhumans and the natural and the cultural in the ethnographic record. My specific focus will be any potential shared properties of language in indigenous communities that could give us some clues about the separability of linguistic form from meaning or of one language from another, and their availability as legitimate objects of attention. At the end of the chapter I will turn to a closer comparison of language ideologies and practices of the Aché and their closest neighbors, the Guaraní, since these are particularly instructive for understanding local differences in the ways in which language is constituted. I will show that while there are general ways in which understandings of language across the indigenous Americas differ from the Western intellectual tradition, maybe even more important are language ideological differences between indigenous groups, as some ways in which language is constituted lend themselves easier to metalinguistic awareness than others.

2.2 Language in the Amerindian Imagination

Any discussion of Amerindian language ideologies must begin with the acknowledgement that there is no such thing as a unified account of language that is shared by groups on the continent. Theories of language vary widely among Amerindian groups, not least because of the enormous variety of sociolinguistic contexts that range from regions with extensive multilingualism (such as the Vaupés [Jackson 1974], California [O’Neill 2008], or the Upper Xingu [Franchetto 2011]) to groups that had
lived until recently in relative isolation (such as the Sirionó [Holmberg 1950], the Wari’ [Vilaça 2016], or the Aché). Therefore any attempt to present a unified conception of language for all, or even most, Amerindian groups is naïve. Furthermore, as I suggested above and as will become clear towards the end of the chapter, it is precisely language ideological differences that can help us understand different trajectories of language development in different groups.

However, there are certain features of Amerindian cosmologies such as a primordial unity and intercommunicability of species that are found widely on the continent, which, I hypothesize, have some bearing on any local understanding of language. Therefore I will start on a macro-level and then discuss how potentially shared general presuppositions about language might manifest in local language ideologies and actual communicative practice.

2.2.1 Humanity and Nonhumanity in the Indigenous Americas

I will start to approach language in the indigenous Americas where an Amerindian might start: in mythology. An understanding of what language in the Amerindian imagination could be should first take into account what local intellectual traditions have to say about it. Origin myths in particular are widely shared across the continent and are usually a reliable source for explaining the current order of things as it is meaningful in a local lifeworld. Maybe there is a myth that explains the origin of language (Tedlock 1988).

Unfortunately, here we run into our first difficulty. There are relatively few explicit accounts of the origin of language or speech in Amerindian mythology. In Lévi-Strauss’ four volume survey Mythologiques (1964–1971), no more than a handful of myths talk about language at all and even if they do the focus is mostly on other topics. Among the Tereno the little red toad made them laugh, which prompted them to start speaking (Lévi-Strauss [1964] 1968, 123). Among the Tukuna someone stole two hummingbird eggs which caused the confusion of tongues (Nimuendajú 1952, 130). Most of the times when language is mentioned it is in relation to the theme of the origin of fire. Since the origin or (mostly) conquest of fire is central to the ability to render raw meat edible through cooking and therefore directly relevant to the process of separation of humans from pre-humans (Lévi-Strauss
I will first briefly outline the ontological implications of this nondifference before turning to discuss what idea(s) of language it might imply.

Depictions of the origin of humanity as the diversification out of a primordial unity of (pre-)humans and (pre-)nonhumans, a leitmotif of indigenous cosmologies across the Americas, can be summarized as follows: In ancient times—or maybe before there was “time”—the ones that were to become humans shared essential characteristics with those who were to become nonhumans: animals, plants, gods. The myths differ regarding the beings contrasted, some explain speciation, others the separation of humans and gods, still others the origin of ethnic differences, but all share the basic principle by which social and biological diversity is explained: as the result of transformations of an original situation of nondifference. The general theme is that of the unequal twins analyzed by Lévi-Strauss ([1991] 1995) in *The Story of Lynx*, the organization of the world in terms of an unstable dualism that leads to series of progressive transformations (see also Lévi-Strauss [1964] 1968, [1985] 1988).

As Descola ([1986] 1994, 93–4; [2005] 2013, 131–2) and Viveiros de Castro (1998, 471–2; 2012, 55–8; [2009] 2014, 65–9) have argued, the assumptions underlying such myths are diametrically opposed to those common to the European philosophical and scientific traditions. Whereas the latter assume an evolution out of a primitive state of animality, where humans and animals share a basic “nature”—the former having developed special capacities that the latter are lacking—in Amerindian accounts the original common condition is not animality but humanity. Their presently observable differences are to be accounted for through a series of transformations through which animals acquired the bodies that now define them. In both accounts humans and nonhumans share common ancestors, but the original condition and subsequent transformations are imagined in completely different ways.

The ontological consequences of these two origin stories are radically distinct orders of things. Descola ([2005] 2013, 2006, 2009) conceptualizes these as different relations of continuity and discontinuity between “interiorities” and “physicalities.” The concepts of interiority and physicality are inspired by Husserl’s (1956b, 1956a) distinction between intentionality and body (Descola 2006); their
respective differences and similarities from one’s own, attributed to other beings, result in different modes of identifying these beings.

Humans arrive in the world equipped with a certain kind of body and with a theory of mind, i.e. endowed with a specific biological complex of forms, functions, and substances, on the one hand, and with a capacity to attribute to others mental states identical to their own, on the other hand. This equipment allows us to proceed to identifications in the sense that it provides the elementary mechanism for recognising differences and similarities between self and other worldly objects, by inferring analogies and distinctions of appearances, behaviour and qualities between what I surmise I am and what I surmise the others are. In other words, the ontological status of the objects in my environment depends upon my capacity to posit or not, with regard to an indeterminate alter, an interiority and a physicality analogous to the ones I believe I am endowed with. (Descola 2009, 150)

Modes of identification common to Western modernity are based on the perception of a continuous physicality (“nature”—humans and nonhumans are made of the same matter—paired with discontinuous interiorities—they do not have the same soul/mind/intentionality. Descola calls this naturalism. By contrast, in modes of identification such as those common to Lowland South America, nonhumans are perceived to have an interiority similar to humans—they have the same soul/mind/intentionality—but physicalities that are discontinuous—they have different bodies. Descola calls this animism.³

Viveiros de Castro (1998) has illustrated differences between naturalism and animism in a parallel way by contrasting the naturalist assumption of a single continuous nature with what he calls multi-naturalism, to describe animist ontological presuppositions. While the Western (multiculturalist) ontology is founded on the unity and objective universality of nature that is transcended by the plurality of cultures, the subjective particularities of meaning, multi-naturalism presupposes a universal identity of subjectivities of all human and nonhuman entities inhabiting the world, where differences between species are grounded in corporeal diversity: “a representational or phenomenological unity ... indifferently applied to a radically objective diversity. One single ‘culture’, multiple ‘natures’” (478). The differences in nature (or physicality) account for differences in the relations between species, which has come to be known as “perspectivism” (Viveiros de Castro 1998; Lima 1999; see also Weiss

³ Animism and naturalism are only two out of a total of four modes of identification in Descola’s model, the other two being totemism and analogism, but since I am less interested in the model and only what it can tell us about the Amerindian context in particular I will not discuss them here.
1972; Århem 1990). While all species see things in similar or identical ways to humans (i.e., they have the same point of view or perspective), what they see is different depending on the body they have. Having a perspective is tantamount to “humanness” but whereas a human sees peccaries and armadillos as prey, and snakes and jaguars as potential predators, the peccaries see humans (and snakes) as predators, and snakes see humans (and peccaries) as prey. But all of them see themselves as themselves—i.e., as “humans.”

2.2.2 Language and Amerindian Ontologies

But where is language in relation to interiority and physicality, culture and nature, mind and body? In section 2.1 I argued that the notion of language that came to be prominent in Western modernity relied on its distinction and separability from nature and society (Latour [1991] 1993), while at the same time being tied back to each in complex ways (Bauman and Briggs 2003). I have also mentioned at the beginning of the chapter that language is the chief capacity that is said to set humans and nonhumans apart in naturalism, whereas in animism it is part of the original common condition of humans and nonhumans, a linguistic community of maximal extent.

Myths are filled with beings whose form, name, and behavior inextricably mix human and animal attributes in a common context of intercommunicability, identical to that which defines the present-day intrahuman world. (Viveiros de Castro 2004a, 464)

In those days, animals and plants were masters of all the skills of civilization, communicated with one another with no difficulty, and abided by the major principles of social etiquette. As far as one can tell, their appearance was human, and only a few clues, such as their names and their strange behavior, indicated what they were to change into. Each myth tells of the circumstances that led to a change of form and of the actualization, in a nonhuman body, of an animal or a plant that up until then had existed in a state of potentiality. (Descola [2005] 2013, 131–2)

So even if speciation resulted in distinct plant and animal bodies, different from those of humans, “most of them have so far preserved the faculties that they enjoyed before they split into different

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6 There are important differences between Descola’s animism and Viveiros de Castro’s perspectivism (Latour 2009), but for the purpose of my discussion here they are not essential.
species. These faculties were subjectivity, reflective consciousness, intentionality, the ability to communicate in a universal language, and so on” (Descola [2005] 2013, 132; see A.-C. Taylor 1993a, 1993b). For example, Smith (1998, 412) observes among the Chipewyan that “all beings, human and nonhuman, are inextricably engaged in a complex communicative interrelationship.” And among the Wari’, in Amazonia, “it is not language that differentiates beings but their bodies” (Vilaça 2016, 27). Language is never mentioned as an obstacle to communication in “encounters with humanized animals, whether mythic or historic” (60). From their shamans the Wari’ know that

animals speak the same language as themselves ... although they can be comprehended only by those who can “hear” ... what they say, a capacity that depends exclusively on the social relations established between them, especially living and eating together. The Wari’ concept of translation, as the possibility of communication between different types of people, therefore involves the shift from one collective of humans to another and occurs through a bodily transformation enabled by new foods, the proximity to other bodies, and the new relations of sociality as a whole. The person thereby begins to inhabit another world, the automatic consequence of which is the capacity for verbal communication with these new people. (59–60)

This description suggests that language in animism is an aspect of interiority and an invariant that is continuous across species. On a general level there is thus a formal unity of language and a diversity of referents. The Saussurean ([1916] 2013) distinction between signifier and signified is still maintained, but inverted: different signifieds are referred to by the same signifier depending on the perspective of who makes the enunciation, “a constant epistemology and variable ontologies, the same representations and other objects, a single meaning and multiple referents” (Viveiros de Castro 2004b, 6). Language here would be an object that is radically unlike the common Western assumption of a system of symbols. While separable in principle from their referents words are nonarbitrary and non-substitutable, semiotically fixed but semantically multivalent by definition.

However, Descola ([1986] 1994, 93), in a statement that seems to contradict his assertion of the cross-species ability to communicate in a universal language, claims that when the original (pre-)animals “lost their human form, they also, ipso facto, lost their speech organs and therefore the capacity to express themselves in spoken language.” Here language is seen as a part of the body, of physicality, of that which differentiates humans and nonhumans, and between different nonhumans, since “each
animal species has its own language, which was assigned to the species when it acquired its final form” (Descola [1986] 1994, 99). And the Achuar are not able to communicate with the animals effortlessly.

Each species can express itself only in its own language although humans are capable of imitating other animal sounds and use these, for instance to lure or to reassure the prey they are stalking. Nevertheless, and unlike the various human languages, of which the Achuar are aware, languages that translate into one another and permit an exchange of meaning providing one has mastered them, animal languages can be reproduced by voice or by a game call, but cannot be used to converse. (99)

The solution to this apparent paradox is that “spoken language” is not the same as “universal language.” How is it possible for the Achuar and other groups to communicate across group and species boundaries? Through very specific verbal means particularly through songs and incantations.

In effect, intersubjectivity can be expressed by speech from the soul, which transcends all linguistic barriers and transforms every plant and animal into a subject capable of producing meaning. Depending on the way in which communication is to be established, this soul speech can take any of a number of forms. Normally humans speak to plants and animals by means of incantations, which are supposed to go straight to the heart of whoever they are addressed to. ... This sort of sung metalanguage is also used by various species of animals and plants to communicate with each other, thus overcoming the solipsistic curse of separate languages. (99)

While particular languages of humans and nonhumans are indeed an aspect of physicality such as the body and its dispositions, song languages are part of universal subjectivity and continuous across species, an aspect of interiority. In order to activate this plane of shared intercommunicability the medium has to be modified by using songs or specific vocabulary, a task that is safely carried out only by shamans. Whether or not (mundane) language would be separable from what it refers to is unclear. Since it is an aspect of physicality itself, a habit, practice, or activity, it does seem to be directly connected to each species' body and therefore, again, not an arbitrary system of symbols. For cross-species communicative forms though, the relationship between language, speaker/singer, and message seems to be more complex as I will discuss.

2.2.3 Linguistic Asymmetries and Nonequivalences

That cross-species communication has to occur through specialized registers is not surprising given the importance that Amerindians put on distinguishing themselves from nonhumans (A.-C. Taylor
Lima 1999; Viveiros de Castro 2004a; Fausto 2007). Since every being, independent of its actual form is potentially a person, a human endowed with subjectivity, and one's own position as human (subject) depends on the relational status vis-à-vis other beings, in order to maintain that position it is important to keep ontological boundaries intact, i.e., “to disconnect entities, which are in a certain way already connected” (Course 2013a, 307).

If a human who is not a shaman happens to see a nonhuman (an animal, a dead human soul, a spirit) in human form, he or she runs the risk of being overpowered by the nonhuman subjectivity, of passing over to its side and being transformed into an animal, a dead human, a spirit. A meeting or exchange of perspectives is, in brief, a dangerous business. (Viveiros de Castro 2004a, 468)

Responding to someone's interpellation, when that someone is a member of a different species could result in the subject's abduction into that species. Language is not transparent since the same words uttered by different beings may refer to different worlds (Overing 1990; A.-C. Taylor 1993b; Course 2013a; Vilaça 2002, 2016; Kohn 2013). In order to avert the potential dangers that such encounters with Others imply, the medium of communication is modified. The Runa in Ecuador, for example, speak to their dogs in what Kohn (2007, 2013) calls a “transspecies pidgin,” using grammatically altered forms and tying the dogs snout to prevent it from talking back—after all “the Runa do not want to become dogs” (Kohn 2007, 13; 2013, 144–50, 213–6).

The primary means for cross-species communication across the continent are song languages, which are usually very different from spoken language (see P. Clastres [1974] 1987; Basso 1985; Seeger 1986, 1987; Descola [1986] 1994; Viveiros de Castro [1986] 1992; A.-C. Taylor 1993b; Townsley 1987, 1993; Carneiro da Cunha 1998; Severi 2002; Cesarino 2011; Walker 2013; Heurich 2015). Moreover, usually only shamans are able to safely cross such communicative boundaries and “adopt the perspective of nonhuman subjectivities in order to administer the relations between humans and nonhumans” (Viveiros de Castro 2004a, 468). I will briefly mention two aspects of shamanic songs that might help us further illuminate the status of language in Amerindian collectives. The first concerns communication of shamans with the dead, the second that with the spirits of other nonhuman entities.

Shamans among the Arawete (Viveiros de Castro [1986] 1992; Heurich 2015) or among the Marubo (Cesarino 2011) invoke the dead or other spirits through their songs. However, this does not mean that
they would talk with the dead or to them, nor are they reporting, i.e., “representing” a message that the dead might want to convey. It is the dead themselves who manage to speak through the shamans, appropriating their speech organs. The shamanic songs are not a form of “reported speech.” Rather, the shamans’ bodies become a type of extension of the bodies of the dead. Shamanic speech here does not “represent” a nonhuman subjectivity but that subjectivity “re-presents,” i.e., manifests itself in it.

In their koshuiti (songs), Yaminahua shamans refer to things not by their real name but by “metaphoric circumlocutions or unusual words for common things which are either archaic or borrowed from neighboring languages” (Townsley 1993, 458; Seeger 1986 reports the same for the Suyá). These “twisted words,” as they call them are necessary for two reasons. First, because they enable the shaman to attain clarity in their visions. “With my koshuiti I want to see—singing, I carefully examine things—twisted language brings me close but not too close—with normal words I would crash into things—with twisted ones I circle around them—I can see them clearly” (quoted in Townsley 1993, 460). But it is not only the clarity of vision that makes this twisting necessary. For the shamans, songs are “vehicles for communication with the animate essences upon which their practice depends” (Townsley 1987, 16), the yoshi spirits, and by twisting their language they are able to establish a metonymical connection with these and can therefore effect material change in a patient who is suffering from a given illness.

Yoshi are real beings who are both “like and not like” the things they animate. They have no stable or unitary nature and thus, paradoxically, the “seeing as” of “twisted language” is the only way of adequately describing them. Metaphor here is not improper naming but the only proper naming possible. The whole strategy of the song is precisely to drag these refractory meanings and images of the yoshi world out into this one and embed them unambiguously in a real body. (Townsley 1993, 465)

The words of the song do not “stand for” their object or metaphorically for a different object; they also do not merely “point to” it or the world to which they belong. Rather, they establish a physical connection with them and it is from this connection that the power of the songs stems (see Carneiro da Cunha 1998; Severi 2002; Cesarino 2011; Walker 2013; Heurich 2015). Language is not a symbol or representation of the world but a part of it. And as such, shamanic practice is not about “magically influencing the world through discourse but rather changing it and the enunciating subject” (Cesarino 2011, 21, my translation).
About 5000 miles north of the Yaminahua and Arawete, and in a very different cultural context, the performative force of language was also known to the Navajo but on a much wider scale. According to Witherspoon (1977, 34), for the Navajo “ritual language does not describe how things are; it determines how they will be.” This is because the world itself was created through language by gods who thought it into existence (15–6).

Thinking and singing the world into existence attributes a definite kind of power to thought and song to which most Westerners are not accustomed. It is rather obvious that the Navajo ontological conception of thought and speech is very different from our own. (17)

Speech, thought, language and knowledge are intrinsically connected, and “creation is the external manifestation of knowledge” (33). The performative force of knowledge manifests itself through language, thought, and ultimately speech that are all embedded within one another through relations of inner and outer form. The world that is the product of this force is not a world of things but a world of process or motion (118–40).

This world was transformed from knowledge, organized in thought, patterned in language, and realized in speech (symbolic action). The symbol was not created as a means of representing reality, on the contrary, reality was created or transformed as a manifestation of symbolic form. In the Navajo view of the world, language is not a mirror of reality; reality is a mirror of language. (34, emphasis in the original)

The Navajo model is more complex than my short discussion could do justice to, given its multiplex relations between substance and form and inner and outer aspects of both. It should be pointed out, though, that the reversal of the “hierarchy of representation and reality” (Course 2013b) parallels the perspectivist inversion of nature and culture discussed above. In the Navajo case, language or speech seems to be situated clearly on the “interiority” side of things, at least in relation to the worlds it creates, although this is relative to the extent that speech is the outer form of language and thought who in turn are the outer form of knowledge. This might situate language as a mediating term between interiority and physicality. In either way, it is the performative force of language that makes it such an important part of Navajo lifeworlds.

However, there is one important limitation: For Navajos the performative force or power does not seem to be a general property of language, but particular to the Navajo language. Contemporary
Navajos emphasize Navajo as the “language of ritual,” opposing it to English as “the language of external power” (quoted in Webster 2009, 85). This external power does not seem to be the same type of power by which the worlds were created.

English lacks the connection to Navajo religion that the Navajo language has. As one Navajo explained … English is more powerful in the secular world, Navajo is more powerful spiritually. That is why—according to him—English and Navajo cannot be translated, the one into the other or vice versa. In such ways, Navajo and English are said to be not equivalent because they tap into two entirely different stocks of knowledge. (208)

This nonequivalence is not surprising since Navajo was created by the deities and English was not (Webster 2015, 157) and it also suggests an asymmetrical relationship between the two languages where Navajo is able to effect worldly changes and evoke feelings and emotions in a way that English cannot. That is why Navajo should be used in ritual contexts, and why even in secular contexts, place or clan names or kinship terms are often kept in Navajo even when the discourse is mainly in English and despite otherwise widespread use of a mixed code of both (Webster 2009).

A nonequivalence in how multiple languages or registers are perceived and used by the same speech community has also been documented among the Arizona Tewa. The Arizona Tewa, living in First Mesa on the Hopi reservation, are surrounded by their Hopi neighbors (who, in turn, are surrounded by the Navajo), but despite a long history of language contact they have kept the Tewa language largely impervious to outside influences and linguistic convergence—there are almost no loanwords from Hopi or other languages (Kroskrity 1993, 60–78). Most Tewa are multilingual in Tewa, Hopi, and English but this multilingualism is asymmetrical since few Hopis know Tewa (Kroskrity 1993, 1998, 2012). This is to be expected given the minority status of the Arizona Tewa in relation to their Hopi

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7 This is true at least for the semantic level of analysis. Arizona Tewa phonology (Kroskrity 1993, 72) and discourse patterns (75) show a considerable amount Hopi influence. The lack of awareness of phonological and syntactic levels makes these more susceptible to convergence (Kroskrity 1993, 75; see as well Kroskrity 1998, 110). An ideology of linguistic purism can therefore also camouflage cultural influence and convergence (Kroskrity 2012, 155–6).

8 In Tewa folk history this asymmetry is explained through a “linguistic curse” that was placed upon the Hopi by the ancestors of the Arizona Tewa. The curse was uttered in response to “Hopi failure to live up to the terms of an agreement in which [the Tewa’s] military service to the Hopi would be repaid by granting land use rights and other concessions,” and since then knowledge of the Tewa language was restricted to the Tewa, although they did learn the language of their Hopi hosts (157).
hosts (Kroskrity 2012, 157), however, it seems also tied to an underlying cultural logic about language relationships that is found not only among the Tewa but across Pueblo groups. Linguistic asymmetry is grounded in the prominence of kiva speech, the language, or register of the ceremonial elite. This is “a pan-Pueblo pattern in which ceremonial speech is elevated to a linguistic ideal through its association with the highly valued cultural domain of religion” (Kroskrity 1993, 36). The features and norms of use of kiva speech and its relationship to other forms are recursively projected onto other languages or forms and therefore “kiva speech serves as a folk model for evaluating speech outside of strictly ceremonial contexts” (48).

Kroskrity (1998, 114) analyzes this projection as a “culturally dominant language ideology,” an ideology that extends the regular (ideal) patterns of use of one type of language or speech form to others so that the norms of use of Tewa and other languages are all oriented on those of kiva speech (cf. Errington 1988; Collins 1998; Silverstein 1998a; Irvine and Gal 2000; Bauman and Briggs 2003). Thus, while all languages and speech forms remain commensurable, they are asymmetrically distributed. The Tewa word for “language” is hi:li, but it is broader than the English term as it “includes more than the rules of pronunciation and grammar, more than the lexical items; it includes other norms regarding conversational turn-taking behavior and accompanying non-verbal communication as well.” It is used not only to refer to the Tewa language, Tewa hi:li, or Hopi language, Khoson hi:li, but also to kiva talk, as te’e hi:li (Kroskrity 1993, 35). These distinct linguistic phenomena are thus commensurable in native metasemiotics, they are treated on the same plane, and therefore kiva norms can be recursively extended in Arizona Tewa dominant language ideology.

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9 Kroskrity (1998, 105) identifies four areas in which this is particularly salient: “As a key symbol of Tewa linguistic values, kiva talk embodies four closely related cultural preferences: regulation by convention, indigenous purism, strict compartmentalization, and linguistic indexing of identity.” These values extend to other languages and are one reason why Tewa has resisted areal pressure. If kiva speech is to be maintained in its original form, unmixed, and used only in kiva context, then by the logic of the dominant language ideology this applies to the Tewa language as a whole too, it is regulated by convention, not mixed, and to be used only by Tewa. This latter point has to conflicts about teaching Tewa in schools that might also be attended by Hopi children and the publication of dictionaries without being able to control who might read them (Kroskrity 2014, 13).

10 Hi:li contrasts with tų́, roughly corresponding to the English terms “word,” “voice,” or “speech,” and also extending to animal cries.
However, the asymmetric relational structure also suggests that the languages are not interchangeable, i.e., not always translatable, and if so, translatability is unidirectional and partial at best. The Tewa language is taken to be directly linked to the history and identity of its speakers, as a popular saying, “our language is our history” confirms (Kroskrity 1993, 44). Language here too does not simply “point to” Tewa ethnic identity but is rather “a kind of metonymy” (193) of it, not simply an icon or rheme (Irvine and Gal 2000; Gal 2005). Furthermore, kiva speech is nonequivalent to Tewa along the same lines that I have outlined above for Navajo, since it is kiva speech that is to be used in the ceremonies since it is connected to religion and cosmic forces in a way that mundane Tewa is not (Kroskrity 1993, 2012). We might therefore be mistaken to take hiːli as a generic type—such as the English word “language”—of which particular languages are tokens.

An asymmetrical relationships between languages was also observed by Course (2012b, 2012a, 2013a) among Mapuche communities in Southern Chile. Just as Navajo and English, Tewa and Hopi, the two languages that the Mapuche speak, Spanish and Mapudungun, are not perceived as equivalent. In particular, it is highly inappropriate to use Spanish for funeral orations, ritual sports events, and ceremonies. Such contexts prescribe the use of Mapudungun. This is largely due to local language ideologies that relate Mapudungun to the force, newen, that is constitutive of all being. Language is not merely an instrument at the hands of those who use it, readily available to represent speakers’ intentions, but has a force of its own.

That language is said to have its own “force” is neither to personify it, nor to deny that it can serve the intentions of a speaker. Rather, it is to suggest that the excess or potentiality of language is of a kind, or continuous with, the essential force of which all things are instances. (Course 2012b, 10)

This connection to newen is particular to Mapudungun and does not extend to Spanish. Indeed, while the Mapuche term for Spanish is winkadungun, the “language of the whites,” mapudungun is not conceived of as the language of a particular group of people such as the Mapuche, but rather as the language of mapu, of the land itself. While dungun is translatable as “language” or “speech” (but also as “thing” or “event” [5]) in each case it seems to be referring to different kinds of things.

This leads Course (2012a) to suggest that it might actually be misleading to think about Spanish and Mapudungun in terms of two languages at all, two symbolic systems of representation that are
arbitrary and translatable, and to explain the observed asymmetry with their different values, where each language is indexical of different identities, Mapuche being the language of solidarity or tradition and therefore in certain contexts more appropriate. While not necessarily wrong, Course takes such reasoning to be only a “partial explanation.”

For this kind of socio-linguistic explanation only really addresses the question of the relationships between different languages and different identities; it leaves unanswered the fundamental question of what a language actually is according to local language ideology. Languages remain in a perfect state of ontological equivalence with people simply hanging values and identities on them, like coats on a peg. (Course 2012b, 3)

By contrast, Course proposes that in Mapuche language ideologies Spanish and Mapudungun might be perceived as fundamentally different kinds of things, i.e., as ontologically nonequivalent. Or rather, that there might be different language ideologies pertaining to the two languages. Spanish and other non-Mapuche languages are indeed understood as arbitrary systems that symbolically represent things in the world, something that anyone familiar with the Western intellectual tradition would call “language.” Mapudungun, on the other hand, is part of the world itself, a synecdoche, and as such part of a force that exceeds human intentions and agency.

2.3 Arbitrariness and Indexicality in Amerindian Language Ideologies

Given the diversity of takes on language, even within the small sample surveyed above, are there any general points that we can take away that might help us understand some more fundamental facts about the status of language in Amerindian collectives?

First of all, all of the examples above seem to question the role of arbitrariness and the symbol as a fundamental aspect of language. According to local language ideologies, different languages are not simply symbolic systems representing the same reality. Rather they are directly linked or coextensive with the history of their speakers, with interchangeable perspectives onto different cosmical worlds, with features of the geography, or with cosmic forces. A characterization of language as a system of symbolic representation where the code is distinct from the speaker and from the content
of the utterance and therefore arbitrary and translatable runs against the presuppositions of native metasemiotics.

Such arguments against arbitrariness from local language ideologies and metapragmatic analysis are, of course, not new. They have long been part of the standard repertoire of linguistic anthropologists. As Irvine and Gal point out,

In our view, the notion of arbitrariness is more problematic than has generally been supposed. Saussure’s assertion of the “arbitrariness of the sign” is often celebrated as the originary moment of modern linguistics. But publicly voiced claims about the inherent properties of particular languages or of standards as opposed to dialects, have not abated in contemporary life. We suggest that a useful way to unpack this term and its dilemmas is to distinguish among the possible social positions from which the judgment of “arbitrariness” is made. (Irvine and Gal 2000, 78)

Irvine and Gal (2000, 78) contrast the perspective of modern linguistics that takes linguistic signs to be arbitrary with “the perspective of ordinary speakers,” from which “linguistic differences are understood through folk theories (ideologies) that often posit their inherent hierarchical, moral, aesthetic, or other properties within broader cultural systems that are themselves often contested and rarely univocal.” And since such ordinary speakers’ theories about the nonarbitrariness of signs (just as that of linguists about its arbitrariness) “make a difference in the production, interpretation, and reporting of linguistic differentiations” (78), they must be included in any account of what languages and linguistic boundaries are.

In this way, the above examples would fit well into the linguistic anthropological canon. It is certainly the case that the perceived differences between languages, registers, or linguistic forms in the examples above is “indexical” of different values and identities which makes them to an extent nonarbitrary. However, the examples also hint at more fundamental questions about language that go beyond semiotic nonarbitrariness and take the incommensurability between languages to a different level. Indeed, in a paradoxical way an analysis in terms of indexicality simply seems to shift arbitrariness onto a different plane, viz. onto the plane of indexical meanings and iconic representation; but the two planes, the plane of the signs and that of their objects are nonetheless kept apart. The distinction between signs and the material world remains intact (Irvine 1989, 248; Keane 2003, 412), despite the fact that the Peircean semiotic framework that most linguistic anthropologists have adopted was
precisely a means to overcome the ignorance of the “outward clash” (Peirce 1992, 233; Keane 2003, 413). Indexicality as relation of contiguity is explicitly meant to include material contiguity.

The asymmetrical relationship between languages analyzed above suggests that languages are not only different ways of saying the same thing or different ways of saying different things, but nonetheless commensurable and comparable in that they are all forms that correspond iconically, indexically, or symbolically to certain meanings. At least some of the differences in the examples above seem to imply that the languages themselves might be different things, parallel to Course’s (2012b) distinction of Mapudungun and Spanish. The one way in which all cases reviewed are alike is that the languages or ways of speaking involved in each are all fundamentally un-alike. Navajo and English, kiva speech and Tewa, song language and mundane language among the Achuar, Arawete, or Yaminahua.

This leads us back to the question from the beginning of the chapter. Is it even appropriate to talk about such a diversity of beliefs and practices in terms of “language” at all? I have entitled the section “language in the Amerindian imagination,” but would not “social interaction in the Amerindian imagination” or “verbal communicative behavior in the Amerindian imagination” have been better choices?

2.4 No Nature, No Culture, No Language?

[T]he aim of perspectivist translation ... is not that of finding a “synonym” (a co-referential representation) in our human conceptual language for the representations that other species of subject use to speak about one and the same thing. Rather, the aim is to avoid losing sight of the difference concealed within equivocal “homonyms” between our language and that of other species, since we and they are never talking about the same things. (Viveiros de Castro 2004b, 7)

The question about the adequateness of the concept of language for describing interactional phenomena is not new and has been the subject of much debate (Harris 1981; Benveniste [1969] 1981; Heryanto 1990; Bauman and Briggs 1990, 2003; Mühlhäusler 1996; Milroy 2001; Errington 2001; Makoni and Pennycook 2007b; Kohn 2013). On the most general level this question could be reframed as a type of Meno’s well-known paradox: How will one search for something without knowing what to look for, but then also already knowing what it is? And if one did not know what to look for, how would one
determine whether something that one might find was the thing one was looking for in the first place? The paradox plays on the impossibility of knowledge, since, in the first case there would be no need for inquiry (one already knows what one knows and therefore would not be searching for it), and neither in the second (since one would not know what to search for) (Plato, *Meno* 80d; Dillon (1988) 1997, 1–6; D. Scott 2006, 75–91). If we delimit our object of inquiry, language, in advance, then we have already excluded a number of things that could potentially also be “language,” we already know what we are looking for, so there is nothing new we would come up with. However, if we do not delimit what we take language to mean, if we do not know what we are looking for, then we also cannot know if what we find is “language” at all.

Interestingly, it is this linguistic version of Meno's paradox which surfaces when we compare Peirce's and Saussure's different approaches to language. In trying to establish linguistics as a science, Saussure ([1916] 2013) delimits its object of inquiry, language, in advance—thus he “already knows” what it is that he is looking for. Peirce (1998, 1992) takes the opposite approach. In his quest for a semiotics that would account for all of reality by way of its functioning as a system of signs he completely bypasses the question of what language is—thus he can never know (and probably also does not care) whether what he is analyzing is language at all (Benveniste [1969] 1981).

But there is also a more specific way in which the adequateness of the concept of language for describing interactional phenomena poses a problem. This problem, which I have touched upon in the introduction, concerns differences in local ontologies of language—what my above survey of “language in the Amerindian imagination” gives evidence of—and whether a particular conception of language derived from the Western intellectual tradition (T. J. Taylor 2016) is adequate for describing such diversity. One type of response to such criticisms was to extend what we mean by language to include a range of practices that had usually been confined to the extra-linguistic. A lot of recent work in linguistic anthropology especially has thus contributed to broadening the concept of language or to use linguistic or semiotic terminology and methods to analyze phenomena that traditionally have been considered to belong to other disciplines (Duranti 2003). The preference of Peircean semiotics over Saussurean semiology is part of this trend. But, as Duranti (1997, 339) writes at the very end of his
textbook treatise of the field, this “has meant that we have amplified the phenomenon ‘language’ to such an extent that it seems increasingly difficult to identify what is not language.”

In the previous section I have briefly referred to Kohn’s work among the Runa as one Amerindian example of cross-species communicative practices. Kohn (2013) explicitly engages with the concept of language in his book How Forests Think. In a productive dialogue with the works of Peirce (1992, 1998) and Deacon (1997, 2012), he criticizes that “we conflate representation with language in the sense that we tend to think of how representation works in terms of our assumptions about how human language works” (Kohn 2013, 8). Thereby we reduce representation mainly to the symbolic modality to exclude others, which are at least as important for understanding the ways in which the Runa engage with the world around them. In order to adequately understand the myriad ways in which the Runa and their nonhuman co-participants interact in and with their forest environment, it is necessary to “radically rethink what it is that we take representation to be” (41). His book explores the multiple ways of representing, interpreting, and thinking of human and nonhuman life forms and he cautions that “projecting language onto this nonhuman world blinds us to these other representational modalities and their characteristics” (158).

Thus, Kohn’s project is not to expand language beyond the human and to extend it to include nonhuman interpretive and communicative practices, but instead to “provincialize” it, to make explicit the ways in which anthropological theory has been “colonized” by a narrow (human) understanding of language. “We need to provincialize language because we conflate representation with language and this conflation finds its way into our theory” (39). Kohn here echoes Chakrabarty (2000) and Bauman and Briggs (2003), criticizing the “deprovincialization of language,” i.e., the elevation of language, understood narrowly as human language, based on symbolic representation, the specific product of the Western intellectual tradition (T. J. Taylor 2016), to account for all representational, interpretive, and communicative processes. Instead of understanding language as a timeless universal and projecting it onto a wide range of phenomena elsewhere, we should “reprovincialize” it, recognizing its emergence as a particular object, the result of specific historical processes.

The conclusion that language is not universal but “a phenomenon expressing the particular history of a society” was also one that Heryanto (1990, 40) arrived at, writing from a different disciplinary
background than Kohn and about a very different region. “Language is not a universal category or cultural activity. Though it may sound odd, not all people have a language in the sense in which this term is currently used in English” (Heryanto 1990, 41). Language did not exist in pre-colonial Indonesia, but is the result of a “radical social transformation” in the past centuries that involved the “restructuring of pre-existing vernacular world-views and social activities of non-Western and non-industrialised communities” (40).

Heryanto (1990, 41) argues that the words that are currently used to denote language in Malay or Javanese, bahasa or basa, both of old Sanskrit origin, “did not then mean ‘language’. The newly acquired meanings of bahasa were derived from modern European languages.” The non-existence of a “word for language” should, of course, not in and of itself be taken to mean that a given concept does not exist in a given society (the converse argument of the popular folk-assumption for Eskimos to have many more words for snow than other people, effectively refuted by Martin [1986]). It should rather be seen as a precautionary reminder that we should be careful not to impose terms from the Western intellectual tradition with their particular histories and etymologies onto phenomena elsewhere (see as well Asad 1986). So if there was “no word for language” it is not because no one used language, but first and foremost because there was no “need to express the idea until the latter part of the last century” (Heryanto 1990, 41). In its original sense, ba(ha)sa was “not an abstract and generic category as ‘language’ is,” but “a social activity, ... socially bound, constructed and reconstructed in specific settings” (43). Only in later centuries its meaning changed to the current one of “a system of sounds that signifies certain meanings” (44). And while the views of scholars differ on the subject, “the notion of language as primarily an instrument is clearly dominant in modern Indonesia” (44). These transformations, the “demise of the old ba(ha)sa and the rise of bahasa as ‘language’ can be seen as part of the process of globalization and Westernisation” (46); at the same time they were integral “to the process of constructing Indonesia as a bangsa, “nation” (41).

In light of linguistic heterogeneity and polylingualism, Mühlhäuser (1996, 7) also claims that “the notion of ‘a language’ is one whose applicability to the Pacific region, and in fact most situations outside those found within modern European type nation-states, is extremely limited.” It is “a recent
culture-specific notion associated with the rise of European nation states and the Enlightenment [and] makes little sense in most traditional societies” (Mühlhäusler 2000, 358).  

This is not to say that differences between languages were not perceived before the advent of nation-states or colonialism, that such differences were conceived of primarily as linguistic form, or that they were irrelevant for local identities. Evidence of language contact long before colonialism and ethnographic reports from areas with complex systems of multilingualism (Jackson 1974; O’Neill 2008; Franchetto 2011) suggest that the ideological differentiation of languages was not everywhere the sole product of European invaders. However, even in such situations, local notions of language were likely much different from the modern construction of language reviewed in section 2.1 that still informs linguistic descriptions and theory alike (see Harris 1981).

Kohn, Heryanto, and Mühlhäusler have different agendas. Kohn is concerned with the inclusion of nonhuman communicative practices, Heryanto’s target is mainly language as autonomous system, extracted from its social and cultural context, Mühlhäusler is criticizing the ignorance of linguistic ecologies. But all are arguing for the inadequacy of the concept of language for describing local interactional phenomena, including speakers’ presuppositions about them. The specific target of these criticisms is language as a bounded and uniform system of symbolic signs structuring verbal communicative behavior. But more generally, even if we expand what we mean by language, are we able to free the concept completely from the meanings it carried? Would it not be better to abandon it altogether?

In an insightful essay that inspired this section’s heading, Strathern (1980) has argued that the concepts of nature and culture are inadequate to account for the corresponding concepts mbo and romi of the Hageners from Papua New Guinea with whom she did research. Thereby she did not claim that the Hageners did not recognize a distinction along the lines of a distinction between “cultural”

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11 Mühlhäusler (1996, 282) goes as far as to say that “the very notion of separate languages is an imported one and that the process which has led to the emergence of Pacific and Australian ‘languages’ has at the same time accelerated their decline,” criticizing that assumptions such as the “existence of separate languages” and the “separability of language and other non-linguistic phenomena” (328) are detrimental when it comes to efforts at maintaining languages since they disregard what he calls the “ecological support system (language ownership, cultural practices, speakers’ lifestyles, settlement patterns, speakers’ physical and spiritual well-being) and their functional relationship with other languages (language chains, bi-, dual- and multilingualism, sign languages, pidgins, etc.)” (322–3).
and “natural” phenomena (domestic and wild, to be more precise) or that the distinction was not meaningful to them. Rather, her point was that the distinction as conceptualized in Western (and thus anthropological) accounts carries so many unquestioned assumptions that it fundamentally distorts the picture of what it might be in a given local environment (see also C. Scott 1996).

In line with Asad’s (1986) work on anthropological translation, Viveiros de Castro (2004b, 9) has suggested the term “equivocation” in order to refer to a “communicative disjuncture where the interlocutors are not talking about the same thing, and know this.” By that he tries to capture the fact that when two parties that are talking about what purports to be “the same thing,” e.g., nature, culture, or humanity, or simply a very specific orphaned orca whale (Blaser 2013), even if their communication is not inhibited, they might be relying on different underlying ontological assumptions that render the communication or translation an equivocation.

To translate is to situate oneself in the space of the equivocation and to dwell there. It is not to unmake the equivocation (since this would be to suppose it never existed in the first place) but precisely the opposite is true. To translate is to emphasize or potentialize the equivocation, that is, to open and widen the space imagined not to exist between the conceptual languages in contact, a space that the equivocation precisely concealed. The equivocation is not that which impedes the relation, but that which founds and impels it: a difference in perspective. To translate is to presume that an equivocation always exists; it is to communicate by differences, instead of silencing the Other by presuming a univocality—the essential similarity—between what the Other and We are saying. (Viveiros de Castro 2004b, 10)

Instead of expanding concepts such as nature, culture, or language to an extent that we can be sure of there being no phenomenon that they will not capture (and with Meno there was no need for inquiry anymore), we should truly reprovincialize them, i.e., make explicit the equivocations on which we rely when “applying” them to contexts other than where they emerged. In this sense language is not necessarily language. Language is not a neutral word, as Bakhtin ([1975] 1981, 293) would say.

The diversity of language ideologies described above makes it evident that in lifeworlds informed by animist or multinaturalist ontological presuppositions we cannot classify language simply as an aspect of (human) nature or (human) culture. It is neither clearly a part of interiority nor of physicality. In certain contexts it seems to be an independent entity in the world, a force or “actant” in its own right (Latour 2005, 54; Course 2012b, 20) that is beyond human control; a force that creates the world
instead of representing it. Therefore any all-encompassing model of Amerindian language ideology that would assign “language” its unambiguous status vis-à-vis nature and culture should be met with suspicion.

And here I am reaching the main point to take away from this discussion. Following Course’s (2012a) call to be sensitive to a potential ontological difference between Spanish and Mapudungun, human spoken language and the “universal” (mainly song) languages that enable cross-species communication too should be treated as ontologically nonequivalent. What would usually appear to be different languages, different registers of the same language, or different modes of communication, might in fact all be situated on different ontological planes in native metasemiotics. Just as the dungun of the Mapuche (and their mapu), the same word may refer to completely different things. Language as the token and multiple languages as its different types, in short, an equivocation.

Inspired by the discussions of Course, Heryanto, Kohn, and Mühlhäusler, I hold that we should not assume that we find “languages” wherever people are talking. What “language” is and if “languages” exist in a given local lifeworld should be the result of careful analysis—not the a priori decision of the linguistic anthropologist. My claim that the Aché too were a “language-free community” (Makoni and Pennycook 2007a, 32; Heryanto 2007), which I will explore in the next section, should thus not be read to imply that they did not talk, or did not know that they were talking (or “languaging” [Becker 1988] to use an old term that has become fashionable recently), but that what “we” take language to mean is ill-suited for describing “their” language practices.

Lastly, in their arguments against language, Heryanto and Mühlhäusler are concerned not only with the inadequateness of language for the description of communicative practices, but primarily with the effects that the introduction or invention of “language” had on local linguistic communities (Silverstein 1998a; Milroy 2001; Makoni and Pennycook 2007b) and the transformation of local lifeworlds that it implied. Since language ideologies impact the way people attend to and model the way they and others speak, the effects of ideologies of language as code, as arbitrary, as “the standard,” or as indexical of particular identities, but also simply ideologies of language as language, have profound influences on communicative behavior. I will discuss this emergence of language among the Aché in chapter 3. But before doing so I must make my case for the “absence” of language among the Aché.
2.5 Of Words, Souls, and Word-Souls

Still in the middle of language documentation, shortly after having started my Ph.D. at UCLA in 2010, when I began to ask around in the Aché communities and do interviews that were directed at getting information about language ideologies, I could not help but admit my initial frustration. Aside from tales about the importance of language maintenance, the fact that speaking Aché was connected to some vague idea of indigeneity, and, above all, the lack of (school) materials in their language that was responsible for its demise (see Dauenhauer and Dauenhauer 1998), I did not encounter anything that I could count as “Aché language ideology,” let alone a “dominant” ideology (Kroskrity 1998). And what was said about language sounded conspicuously like what missionaries, Bible translators, activists, and language documenters like me were also saying.

Since I knew from the literature that language ideologies need not always be explicitly articulated, I also looked for hints in what I assumed for the Aché would be the prime sites for language and language ideological reproduction, their stories and songs. We had collected a fair amount of traditional songs, ritual wailing, myths, and life history narratives. But again, I was frustrated. Nowhere could I find a hint that would allow me to make inferences about implicit ideologies. The only “pattern” that I could find was the joy that the Aché found in retelling sexually explicit myths (of which there are a lot) and the amusement that every single instance of telling would cause among the audience. Language was never the content of any of the narratives. Either the Aché had been completely indifferent about language. Or I did not now how to ask (Briggs 1986). Or maybe both.

Only later when I would do interviews about the contact history, I would get comments about and evaluations of changing language practices, but I had not gotten there quite yet. However, my initial lack of success at “finding” language ideologies had the side effect that I started looking elsewhere. I wanted to know how language was conceptualized among other groups. I had known from previous work with Paraguayan language activists that the Guaraní had a concept called the “word-soul,” a conceptual congruence of the notions of word and soul. Given that the indigenous Guaraní are not only geographically and culturally the closest neighbors to the Aché, but also their linguistic cousins, so to speak, or rather half-siblings, it seemed to me a good starting point to look into their beliefs.
about language in more detail. Maybe I would get some hints how to ask better questions among the Aché. There could be a myth that I had overseen and that the Aché had forgotten to tell us.

After some research on what had been published about the Guaraní, though, it started to dawn on me that indeed I had most likely been asking the wrong questions. A first comparison of Guaraní and Aché material suggested that despite the fact that there was a lot of overlap in mythology, nothing concerning language and related issues such as naming practices was shared. Aché and Guaraní cultural ideas and practices seemed completely different if not the exact opposites in these areas. This was when I first considered the possibility that there was no such thing as language among the Aché. After all you cannot have beliefs about something that does not exist. In what follows I will briefly describe key elements of Guaraní and Aché cultural beliefs and practices.

2.5.1 The Word-Soul-Nexus among the Guaraní

Before creating the earth, we learn from the Mbyá-Guaraní creation myth, Ñamanduí, the creator god, created the “origin” or “foundations” of human language or speech, ayvu rapyta, which he made from his own spirit (Cadogan 1959, 19–21). The first sacred word-souls were then taught by Ñamanduí to the other gods who, in turn, sent them to the body of human-beings-to-become. The word-soul of a person is thus of divine origin and it is the task of the shaman to determine which kind of word-soul is instantiated in the child during the naming ceremony. The gods communicate with the shaman or father, usually through dreams, and tell him the origin of the word-soul that has been received by the pregnant woman (Cadogan 1959, 39–48; Melià 1991, 33–6; Nimuendajú Unkel 1914; Schaden [1954] 1998). The “name” of a person is thus an integral part of his or her being and that “which maintains the flow of speech” (Cadogan 1959, 42; see H. Clastres [1975] 1995, 75). The Guaraní is not “called” this or that way but “is” this or that (Nimuendajú Unkel 1914, 303). This suggests a strong connection between language and a particular subject position; each person’s name is an index of his or her divine

12 As Tedlock (1988, 103n8) observes, this might be one of the only myths on the continent that accounts for the actual creation of language. Language seems to be as taken for granted among indigenous groups as the soul or subjectivity.

13 Among some Guaraní groups it falls under the responsibilities of the father; structurally the shaman occupies the position of a father (Schaden [1954] 1998; Melià 1991).
origin. And sharing a language guarantees being part of the same divine origin. Paraguayan language activists draw on the concept of the word-soul to underline the importance of Guaraní maintenance for national identity; the Guaraní word for their language is *āva ſe'ẽ*, the word-soul of the people.

Guaraní has two terms for language, *ayvu* and *ñe'ẽ*. Different Guaraní groups use both terms in opposite ways: in some groups *ñe'ẽ* is used for animal sounds and *ayvu* for human language, in other groups it is the other way around (Nimuendajú Unkel 1914, 293–4; Cadogan 1959, 25, 186). The respective term for human language can be translated as soul, spirit, breath, word, speech, or language alike. It is thus clearly part of “interiority” in Descola’s sense. It is important, though, that this word-soul is not the only “spiritual” part of human beings. As is common among Amerindian groups (Viveiros de Castro 1998, 481), the Guaraní believe human beings to have two souls (and in some groups three or more [Melià 1991, 34; Schaden [1954] 1998, 138]). In addition to the divine *ayvu* there exists *atsygua* (also *ã* or *ang*), the terrestrial principal or animal portion of the soul. It represents the animal character of the person (associated with a particular animal), and it is the product of human imperfection, responsible for bad temperaments and the desire to eat meat (cannibal principle), also enabling humans to walk upright. It nourishes itself from what the person eats. After death, *atsygua* emanates from the corpse and turns into an (animal-)specter wandering about on earth and haunting the living; if it was of a predatory animal then it transforms into a dangerous *anguery/angue* (Nimuendajú Unkel 1914, 305, 310–1; Cadogan 1959, 185–9; Schaden [1954] 1998, 138–43).

The notion of a dual soul is widespread among Tupi-Guarani groups albeit groups differ starkly in the exact configuration of the two (Viveiros de Castro [1986] 1992, 264–9). The word-soul and specifically the association of the personal principle with human speech seems to be something quite particular to the Guaraní. In the next section I will compare these ideas to what we know about Aché cosmology.

2.5.2 Souls and Names among the Aché

Some anthropologists (Cadogan 1955; Godoy 1982) claim for the Aché to have a duality of the soul similar to that of other Tupi-Guaraní groups; *owe* (flesh-PST) is believed to be the element that strives to rise
above the forest towards the cloudless skies and ultimately into the sun, and *djãwe* (heart/lungs-pst) the part that wanders about on earth and haunts the living (P. Clastres [1972] 1998, 169; Münzel 1983, 278–80). However, P. Clastres ([1972] 1998, 302–5) was unsure about the nature of the distinction of *owe* and *djãwe* and even whether there was a (meaningful) distinction at all, and Mayntzhusen explicitly rejects the bifurcation of the soul for the Aché (quoted in Cadogan 1955, 149–50). In any case, independent of what the exact configuration of the Aché soul might have been, there was certainly no relationship between *owe* (or *djãwe* for that matter) and language or speech (contrary to the claims of Godoy 1982) and an affinity of *owe* to the Guaraní concepts of *ayvu* or *ñe’ẽ* (Chamorro 1998, 54) must be rejected.

The difference between Aché and Guaraní conceptualizations of the soul and language is also evident in the process of acquiring personal names. While for different Guaraní groups the personal names are indexes of the divine origin of their word-soul, Aché personal names are strictly terrestrial. The *by-kwa-py-re* (temper-hole-p-pst), the personal identifier of the individual for the group, is acquired through the meat that the pregnant woman ingests prior to birth. The *bykwapyre* is derived from the name of an animal, the meat of which the mother eats in the last months before birth (P. Clastres [1972] 1998, 56). The “name,” the “word” for a person can be seen as an index of material (animal) substance and not of some spiritual essence. It is moreover firmly located in social relationships as it establishes the social bond between the family of the child and the *chikwagi*, the provider of the meat in question.

Other Tupi-Guaraní groups as well privilege the animal world for personal onomastics, and in some groups the characteristics of the respective animal are projected onto the person. As Viveiros de Castro ([1986] 1992, 153) remarks, “such resemblances evoke the exact opposite of the soul-name: the *atsygua*, the terrestrial soul.” I cannot speak about possible implications for language ideologies in other cases, but for the Aché I want to suggest that this “absence” of the word-soul and the establishment of (personal) identities by other means might also be related to the absence of local notions of “language.”

Of course, the Guaraní notion of the word-soul must not be conflated with Western ideas of language as sign-system. Language ideological transformations have certainly taken place among the
Guaraní as well. But given the ayvu rapyta and the concept of the word-soul, language had been constituted as an entity in some way. Moreover, the well-established link between language and personal identity among Guaraní groups could lend itself easily to be recursively projected onto the group and mobilized for identity politics on a larger scale.\footnote{This might be illuminative for an analysis of Paraguayan nationalist rhetoric.}

So while among both, Guaraní and Aché, names are not symbols, arbitrary signifiers that “stand for” a subject, in the case of the Guaraní the name is part of interiority, that which is continuous across species, whereas in the case of the Aché the bykwapyre is a part of the body, of physicality, of the discontinuous aspect of beings. While both cases differ starkly from “modern” conceptions of names, the differences between them, language ideological differences as they are, are at least as instructive. Among the Guaraní, language had clearly been constituted as an entity in its own right in the word-soul, whereas the Aché did not have any similar concept that would lend itself to translation (or equivocation). And as there was no such thing as “language” for the Aché in the first place, no link could have been established between an imagined system of specifically patterned sound-waves emanating from the mouths of speakers in everyday use and the sociocultural attributes of those speakers. Ideologies of language as iconic for cultural identity (Silverstein 1998a; Irvine and Gal 2000) were therefore definitely absent. And one could wonder why there should have been. The lack of (peaceful) contact with groups speaking other languages and even with other Aché subgroups speaking different varieties might have provided no grounds for group-identification via language and neither was this necessary. What Vilaça (2016, 57) observes for the Wari’ who also “were not exposed to any other language” seems to hold for the Aché:

\begin{quote}
The only differences in speech identified by [the Wari’] refer to prosody and to elements from the lexicon of foreigners, members of other Wari’ subgroups, inhabitants from neighboring territories, and speakers of the same language, in the broad sense, who maintain ritual and marriage relations. (57)
\end{quote}

The virtual absence of any explicit local theory of language among the Aché is thus not surprising. No origin myth gives an account of how or when humans started to speak or communicate. Language does not appear as a discursive object in their mythology at all and there are no explicitly formulated beliefs
about language or the nature of speech. And we do not find a term easily translatable as “language” in the Aché lexicon.

The cognates to the Guaraní terms ayvu and ñe’ẽ in Aché are djawu (to speak/make a noise) and na’t/ina (to tell/say) respectively. Today, indeed, ache djawu is used to designate the Aché language—and quite frequently so (see chapter 3 below). However, there is no evidence of such a use in any of the traditional material or earlier accounts. Djawu appears in early Aché linguistic material in vocabulary lists and transcribed texts almost exclusively as a verb (speaking) or to refer to the sound of animals, such as mynga djawu (honey speech) for the buzzing of bees. An unpublished vocabulary list by Mayntzhusen from the year 1948 lists djawu (yabu) as “speaking” and “making a sound/noise (animals),” dja is listed as “sound” although this is not found in any other material on the Aché, nor is this use known today. Cadogan’s (1968) dictionary lists djawu (javú) as “speaking, rumor, noise.” Susnik’s ([1961–1962] 1974) vocabulary list gives examples as a verb (žavú), speaking, in a few compounds she translates it as “speech.”

Münzel (1973a, 103–4, 112) published a number of songs and narratives from when he visited a reservation in 1971–2 (see next chapter) where djawu is used to talk about speaking well, or speaking like the Paraguayans. In Sammons’ (1978) text collection all occurrences are verbs with one exception. This exception is a transcribed recording from 1978 of a relatively young speaker (born 1953) who talks about his experience of coming to Asunción and not knowing the “new language/speech,” the language of the Paraguayans (Spanish). It is indicative that the first occurrences of the word djawu used to refer to what we would call “language” of which we have evidence in the historical record is in the context of the encounter of other languages.

2.5.3 Endolanguage

However, even if the Aché were a “language-free” community, even if language was not an object in discursive consciousness and there were no explicit theories among the Aché, this does not necessarily

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15 We must obviously also ask whether the use of avu ñe‘ẽ for the Guaraní language as “language” is not also a product of Jesuit intervention.
Figure 2.1: Wild honey

imply an absence of language ideologies altogether. Language ideologies range from explicit formulations about the nature of language and assumptions of ideal usage that can be read from metalinguistic discourse, to implicitly held presuppositions, deeply rooted in practical consciousness that never become available to discursive awareness (Kroskrity 1998, 2010). We have to ask, then, how did the Aché approach language/speech in practice?

Pierre Clastres visited the Aché in 1963, right after the first groups had permanently left the forest. He not only wrote a beautiful ethnography of the Aché, the Chronicle of the Guayaki (P. Clastres [1972] 1998) but also advanced a number of thoughts about the functions of language. Best known is the argument contained in the chapters “Exchange and Power: Philosophy of the Indian Chieftainship” and “The Duty to Speak” of Society Against the State (P. Clastres [1974] 1987), where he discusses the powerless speech of chiefs as one of the mechanisms that help to prevent centralized hierarchical structures (the “state”) to emerge in Amerindian collectives. In a nutshell, the argument is that a series of asymmetrical exchange relations exist, where chiefs (a) are obliged to be generous in providing resources to the collective (more than they receive in return), (b) practice polygamy, i.e., are the “receivers” of
women (more than they “give”), and (c) regularly hold extended speeches (i.e., “give” more words than they receive). Clastres argues that these exchanges are non-reciprocal, not even if taken as a whole. Giving goods is an obligation, not a voluntary act that would provide the chief with symbolic capital in return (if he did not provide goods he would be abandoned by his “subjects”), receiving women is not a privilege but a type of warranty as only an apt hunter will be able to provide for a large family and thus to care for the entire group, and, lastly, giving words is a duty not a right, since no one is obliged to listen, let alone would follow an “order.” According to Clastres, in the figure of the powerless chief the state is kept at bay—the real locus of power is the collective (Clastres’ “society,” which should not be seen so much as the Durkheimian reified “social,” but rather as set of relations or “sociality” [Barbosa 2004]).

Whatever the merits and flaws of Clastres’ broader argument, here I will focus on language, the third of the non-reciprocal exchange relations. Clastres ([1974] 1987, 46–7) understands language primarily in terms of its communicative function, i.e., as signs by means of which messages are exchanged. The speech of the chief is different in that it negates precisely the sign-function of language—nothing is communicated about if no one pays any attention. While the role of the chief is defined largely by his command of language (a chief has to be an eloquent orator), this command does not translate into power but is rather the paying off of a type of primordial and permanent debt to the collective.

Clastres’ theory of the society against the state including the remarks on the speech of the chiefs is cast in general terms as a theory of stateless collectives (the main chapter of the book had been published before his fieldwork among the Aché). However, in the same book he also engages directly with material from the Aché in the chapter “The Bow and the Basket.” Here Clastres discusses different gender roles among the Aché and observes that women and men practice very different verbal art forms that are “total opposites in style and content”: women’s singing is a type of ritual wailing that can be both, a tearful greeting and a lament over negative aspects of existence, such as death, illness, and violence, called chinga. The men’s song is a monotonous chant that celebrates their feats as hunters, called pre’e. Clastres has little to say about the female wailing but his analysis of the male pre’e connects directly to his theory of the powerless discourses of the chiefs.
The hunters sing usually at night and before dawn and, as Clastres observes, their chants are delivered in a way that is in stark contrast to what one would expect from a public performance. The performer, although singing about his own feats as a hunter concerning the content of the pre'e, engages in an almost incomprehensible monotonous chant that seems not to be meant for anyone to be actually understood. Moreover, several hunters chant simultaneously, but each one for himself, not paying the slightest attention to the other singers, thus producing a polyphonic disjointed chorus.

He discusses the pre'e in the terms of his broader theory of asymmetrical exchange relations. The relations on which Aché social structure is based include a food taboo—the hunter cannot eat meat of his own prey but has to distribute everything among the group—polygamy—exchanging and sharing women as a means to establish social bonds—and vengeance. The songs by contrast are oriented inward and like the chief’s speech they negate the communicative function of language and the (exchange) relation to others. “Consequently the hunter’s song assumes a position which is symmetrical to and the reverse of the food taboo and polyandry” (P. Clastres [1974] 1987, 122). They constitute a type of individual “endo-language” (123), a language that seems to be reduced to its emotive function (Jakobson [1956] 1980):

The men’s song, while it is certainly language, is however no longer the ordinary language of everyday life, the language that enables the exchange of linguistic signs to take place. Indeed it is the opposite. If to speak is to transmit a message intended for a receiver, then the song of the Ache men is located outside language. For who listens to the hunter’s song besides the hunter himself, and for whom is the message intended if not the very one who transmits it? Being himself the object and the subject of his song, the hunter dedicates its lyric recitative to himself alone. (P. Clastres [1974] 1987, 122)

Later research by Münzel (1986) confirms the suggestions made by Clastres. He finds that the language of the songs is highly variable and claims that the Aché assign the highest value to those performances in which the performer presents the most “distorted” version of the normative metric (218–9). Not only are the expressive and poetic functions of language emphasized; the referential and phatic functions are explicitly disregarded (Jakobson 1960). The parallel to the speech of the chief is obvious. But

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16 Münzel (1986, 196–9) observes in general that the Aché valorize performance rather than content and place less emphasis on the semantico-referential level of discourse in favor of its form and paralinguistic features.
is it really the same? Is the apparent radical alterity of the male pre’e reducible to its negation of the communicative function?

Linguistic anthropologists throughout the past decades have explored a multiplicity of functions of language and to reduce language to communication and anti-communication as Clastres seems to do, certainly does not do justice to the multifaceted phenomena we are dealing with. However, even if the theories that we would draw on today to explain song language and political oratory might not have been available to Clastres at the time he was writing, I still think his observations are important and can help us understand language among the Aché and elsewhere.

First, I would reiterate the argument of an ontological nonequivalence of different languages or linguistic forms. During my fieldwork, in light of discussions about how to incorporate further cultural content into the school curriculum given that today the Aché language is taught in school (see chapter 3), I once made the suggestion to an elder that she should teach songs to the children in school. This was in a context where children had been jokingly imitating the songs of the elders. But she immediately rejected that idea, explaining to me that the songs cannot be taught. Her granddaughter would develop the songs herself when she was old enough. The songs would come out of her as she grew up. While this is consistent with the general mode of socialization of the Aché, that can be broadly characterized as “intent participation” (Rogoff et al. 2003), it might also hint at something else: That songs are still incommensurable with language. Songs are not teachable and not divorceable from their singers.

However, these songs are the only “standardized” genre of Aché. In many communities particular genres of verbal art, registers, or forms of discourse provide models around which speech practices are ideologically centered (Errington 1988; Kroskrity 1998; Silverstein 1998b). Such forms, maybe most salient in the Arizona Tewa kiva speech discussed above, can be “functionally similar to the hegemony of a standard register” (Silverstein 1998a, 135) in that the values embodied by them extends to all use of language taken to be commensurable at least on this level.

17 Today the songs are performed by women and men alike.
By contrast, what Clastres suggests is that the songs are a type of “anti-standard.” They do not center but “de-center” discourse (Sherzer 1987). They stand in opposition to “language” as a tool for communication and as a means to establish social bonds. They do not serve inter-species communication as the incantations among the Achuar (Descola [1986] 1994, 98–101). Nor is it the gods who are singing through the Aché hunters as among the Arawete (Viveiros de Castro [1986] 1992, 116, 201; Heurich 2015). They may be more like what Seeger (1986, 1987) reports of the Suyá songs that are also characterized by a deemphasis of communicative function and semantic meaning. They are certainly no “model” for language and a “song language ideology” that we could read from these performances is certainly no “dominant” language ideology (Kroskrity 1998) that could lend itself for providing community norms of linguistic exchanges, compartmentalization, or grounds for a metalinguistic awareness of language as denotational code.

Therefore, it is appropriate to characterize the Aché prior to contact as a “language-free community” (Makoni and Pennycook 2007a, 32; Heryanto 2007). The phenomenon “language” as a type of which particular forms were instances and that would allow translation between them did not exist. Silverstein (2014) has recently remembered the initial difficulties with the “how would you say that in your language” language game of linguistic elicitation at the beginning of his fieldwork among the Worora people, in northwestern Australia. “The concept of giving an equivalent to something like English language or Creole meaning was not something that ever occurred to them” (1). Language as denotational code had not been constituted as a legitimate object of speakers’ attention. Only in the encounter with the researcher did they begin to develop a notion of “intertranslatability of the different forms for ‘the same’ denotational content” (1).

The absence of language should not be taken as a void. Absences have played a problematic role in anthropology as is well known. The “lack” of things—the absence of states, kings, monetary economies, and the like—has often times been taken as the defining feature of the otherness of the other, i.e., that what made and kept them different from the moderns. Is not language one of the primary means to deny coevalness (Fabian 1983)? Weren’t the barbarians barbarians precisely because they did not speak a language?
What I am suggesting here is to take the absence of language not as a “lack” of something that was later acquired, but on the contrary, as a particular mode of experience, of being in the world that precluded the constitution of language as an object. As Fowles (2010, 37) argues, “we must do away the assumption that every absence in the world is a void in need of being filled” and take the absence of language as something positive.

What if, rather than ignoring the absences that seem to cling to anthropological models of non-modern societies, we took these absences seriously, wiped them clean of their stigma, granted them their presence, and explored their material effects? What if we approached the missing things of society—and here we should speak of all societies, be they primitive or modern—as possessions precisely because they are missing or not present. (36)

This is in line with Clastres’ ([1974] 1987) argument mentioned above. The book he wrote is not about societies without a state but about the society against the state (see Graeber 2004). They were not “lacking” a state, but they were preventing it from emerging. In a similar way in the Aché communities “endolinguistic” practices and ideologies might have contributed to precluding the “petrification of parole into langue” (Csordas 1990, 27).

Language in its absence should be located among the Aché as among the Worora in what we might call their linguistically pre-objective lifeworld. Phenomenologists like Husserl (1939) and Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 2012) have placed emphasis on the analysis of modes of experience and engagement with the world before it becomes an object of reflection or contemplation (see chapter 4). As we are using language we use it in its absence, as a transparent medium or part of our taken-for-granted mode of being in the world. As Ochs (2012) argues, language and experience are intrinsically conjoined.

Therefore I would go further and argue that this absence of language is nothing specific of the Aché or other indigenous group. In fact, language everywhere is characterized mostly by its absence. It is a pre-objective mode of being in the world, something inseparable from our body and the way we move through the environment. Only through specific mechanisms and ideologies it becomes an object that we can become aware of as distinct from ourselves, from the meaning of what we say, and the world as we perceive it. In the following chapters I will analyze the emergence of such an awareness of language among the Aché, first diachronically in ideology (chapter 3), and then synchronically in interaction (chapter 4).
I argued in the preceding chapter that in order to understand the diversity of language practices and ideologies in indigenous communities of the Americas, we must not take language for granted as a universal category. I suggested to approach language by way of “equivocation” (Viveiros de Castro 2004b), i.e., as a provisional homonym indexing potential referential alterity. I pointed out that for many Amerindian groups language does not exist as a unified phenomenon encompassing speech genres and describing the majority of communicative situations. To be sure, there are plenty of language-like phenomena, different ways of speaking with distinct norms and functions such as everyday speech, ritual languages, songs, and cross-species communicative practices, but they are not necessarily ontologically equivalent, i.e., they are not always commensurable, translatable, and referential of the same reality.

I also suggested that the degree to which such phenomena are attended to metalinguistically and metadiscursively varies. While some groups, such as the Guaraní, had elaborate metalinguistic theories and did allocate the word-soul a place in their cosmology, other groups, like the Aché, did not constitute language as an entity at all, not in ritual contexts, not in verbal art forms, nor in mythology. I have therefore argued, following Heryanto (1990), that we cannot assume the Aché “had” a language, which they are now losing. Until contact the Aché did not attend to their speech practices metalinguistically as a “language.” The common narrative that there was once such a thing as an “Aché language” that has now become “endangered” as their speech practices are changing is problematic.

However, today the Aché do not seem indifferent about such changes. As in many “endangered language communities” (Avineri and Kroskrity 2014) across the world, the fact that and the ways in which speech practices differ from how they are remembered to once have been are frequently debated.
topics among the Aché. In such debates the way that these practices are talked about is reminiscent of the modern notion of language that I have described at the beginning of the previous chapter.

3.1 Language as an Object of Discourse

Consider this excerpt of a discussion about the topic. Krombegi, a slightly amused elder answers younger community member Gunegi’s question as follows:

Transcript 3.1

1 GUNEGI: Mawe nonga de kwa kowebu:: (.) ache pougi,
What do you think about today the new Aché,
(.7)

2 Ache djawuete nonga djawullâma.
The real way the Aché speak, they don’t speak anymore.

3 Goriwagi manon[ga de kwa.
About that what do you think?

4 KROMBEGI: [E(h)h(h)(h)(h)h hua (h)h(h)(h)(h)h (h)(h)(h)(h)
E(h)(h)(h)h hua (h)(h)(h)(h)(h)(h)(h)(h)(h)(h)(h)

5 Ache djawuete (.) illâ nonga djwei nongama go (h)(h)(h)(h)(h)
The real Aché language (.) that way is no more, that way is hard now (h)(h)(h)(h)(h)(h)

6 GUNEGI: Manonga de [kwa gogi.
What do you think about that?

7 KROMBEGI: [Eh gogi kwa djepe djwei nonga h(h)(h)(h)
Eh that used to be known, that way is difficult h(h)(h)(h)

8 Ache djawuete wê rawe djwei’i.
The real Aché language is almost gone, it is hard.
(.3)
As I have pointed out in the previous chapter, *djawu* can refer to a range of things, from talk, conversation, and speech/speaking in general, to a single word, a text, or a story, and even to the noise animals make. The elder here is explaining that the Aché today speak like the Paraguayans as opposed
to how they spoke in the forest. In the excerpt, in the free English translation I have still translated most instances of *djawu* as “speaking.” However, it seems to me that *ache djawu* even for this elder appears to have acquired a meaning close to that of “Aché language,” imagined as a coherent whole, divorceable from content and speaker, for the following reasons:

First, in lines 5 and 8 he uses the suffix *-ete*, which translates as “real” or “true,” to qualify *djawu*. This implies that there is some “real” way of speaking and some way of speaking that is “other-than-real.” He also describes *ache djawu* as *gatu*, which translates as “good/well” or “proper” (lines 13 and 14). *Gatu* can also be used to distinguish the Aché of one’s own group from enemy tribes.

Second, lines 5 and 10 show a parallelism by which *ache djawu-ete* (Aché speech-REAL) is directly contrasted with speaking like the *beru*, the white people.

5 krombegi: Ache djawu etegi (.6) illa nonga djwei nongama go
ache djawu-ete gi  i-lla   nonga djwei nonga-ma go
Ache speak-real DET neg.COP like hard like-IAM DEM
The real Aché language (.6) that way is no more, that way is hard now

10 krombegi: Beru djawu nonga, ima.
beru   djawu nonga i-ma
white.people speak like COP-IAM
The way the Paraguayans speak, that’s how it is now.

*Illa nonga*, “that like which it is not” here corresponds structurally to *nonga ima*, “like which it is now,” directly opposing the two ways of speaking and linking them with past and present respectively.

Third, while I would not go as far as claiming that the elder thinks that one way of speaking is “correct” and the other “incorrect” in the sense of a prescriptivist ideology, he does remark that the way they spoke in the forest was one where they did not ever “err” (line 13).

13 krombegi: Kape gatu ache djawu djapallaitegi
ka-pe   gatu  ache  djawu djapall-ite-gi
plant-LOC good Aché speak err-NEG-REAL DET
In the forest absolutely no one erred speaking Aché well
He uses the verb *djāpā*, which usually describes situations such as when an arrow misses a target. Here he metaphorically transposes this meaning to describe the language practices in the forest: They never missed their target, *ache djawuete*. This implies that before contact, and unlike today, they did not speak incorrectly, and maybe also that there was no such thing as incorrect language use.

All this suggests that *ache djawuete* or *ache djawu gatu* and the way the *beru* speak, which the Aché have now adopted, are not just different ways of communicating on a spectrum of equivalent possibilities. Rather, the “true Aché language” is opposed to its counterparts via an exclusionary logic that resembles that of standard language ideologies (Silverstein 1996; Milroy 2001). Of course, one could object that the elder is prompted by his young interlocutor to talk about *ache djawu*, so his answer is necessarily designed to correspond to the latter’s question. However, his immediate recognition of the topic and his amusement indicated by his laughter that overlaps with the prompt suggest that *ache djawu* is a frequently talked about subject across generations. It is indeed.

The passage above is an excerpt of a recording that I made in 2011 in the middle of fieldwork for the Aché Documentation Project. Already when I visited an Aché community for the very first time in 2007, talk about *ache djawu* was omnipresent. Bible translators had started to translate the New Testament and a number of younger Aché were working with them, school officials were discussing how to include Aché classes in the primary schools, and activists had just founded a non-profit organization called *Ache Djawu*, which promotes the Aché language on the Internet and by publishing books and DVDs in and about it. This was the context in which in the following year two colleagues and I started the project to document Aché, i.e., *ache djawuete*, the language of the elders (see chapter 1).

In the years since I have made recordings on many occasions, at teacher meetings, community reunions, cultural events, workshops, and of discussions on a community radio, that include a plethora of examples where Aché leaders, teachers, activists, and elders discuss language, arguing that if they “mix” (*perō*) the language with the language of the Paraguayans it is bad, *nande āpā djawu-pe perō-bu nande djwei nonga* (1PL.IN Paraguayan speak-LOC mix-COND 1PL.IN hard like) and that they should not speak in the language of the Paraguayans, *ani āpā djawu-pe bwaţā* (PROH Paraguayan speak-LOC try). Here is a brief excerpt from the discourse of an elder on a community radio station where he admonishes other elders for how they speak, recorded in early 2014.
Transcript 3.2

1 KARÈNGI: Pende wenduwâ,  
For you to hear,  
(.7)  

2 Cho ina pendepê. (.) Ache wywy inandy nonga nande djauwerâ.  
I will say to you. (.) The way all Aché used to talk, that is how we will speak.  
(.9)  

3 Pende djawu buchâbu, (.6) Ápà wywy djudjawerâ.  
If you speak badly, (.6) all the Paraguayans will laugh.  
(.6)  

4 Ñande ina kowebu, (.8) “Era'a ñade– de aguerope.”  
Nowadays we say, (.8) “Bring that to our– your aguero.” [grandfather]  
(1.1)  

5 Goba nande ache djawuba.  
Is that in our Aché language?  

6 TATUGE: Da'e go::-  
It’s no::t  

7 KARÈNGI: Deba ina de aguero maïpe nondebu [“Che aguero.”]  
In the past, did you say to your late grandfather, “Che aguero”? [my grandfather]  

8 GARAGE: [Djamo  
Grandfather  
(.3)  

9 TATUGE: Djam[o  
Grandfather  

10 KARÈNGI: [Deba ina?  
Did you say that?  
(.6)
“Dja::mo” Ńande inandy. (.5) “Djarypură,”
“Dja::mo” [grandfather] is what we used to say. (.5) “Djarypură,” [grandmother]

GARAGE: [Djamo ((several others repeat the word))]

Grandfather

(1.1)

KARÈNGI: Ńande djarypură. Goware (.4) kowepe emi cho: i pende djawë.
Our grandmother. Therefore (.4) here I am with you,

Cho wenduwâ pende djawu mawenonga pende djawu.
In order to hear you speak, how you speak.

(1.5)

Pende djâpâ. (.6) Pende djâpâba=
You get it wrong. (.6) You get it all wrong,

=Goware Ńande ache djawu āpâ djawupe ina nande pe djudjama=
Therefore, if we speak the Paraguayan language in the Aché language the Paraguayans
laugh at us.

=“Baeçha ache idja djawupe djawu berôrâ.”
“How come the Aché no longer speak in their language?”

(.8)

Gononga ina.
That’s how they say.

(.4)

Goware ina, (.2) “Ache djawu manoma,”
That’s why they say, (.2) “The Aché language has died.”

(.9)

Go inama Ńandepe “Manoma, pechema mondo nondewe ywydji ohoma.”
That’s what they say to us, “It died, go bury it in the ground, it is gone.”

(.7)
Go ware kowebu ñande djwei nonga ekò.
That is why today it is hard for us.

(.8)

Ñande djawullâma,
We don’t speak anymore,

(.3)

Ñande kllullâma ñande kminope mawenonga idja ekôwâ,
We don’t teach our grandchildren anymore how they should live,

Mawenonga idja djapowâ,
How they should behave,

(.6)

Ñande djawu wenduwâ ñande kmino emi.
So that our grandchildren as well will hear our language.

He explicitly criticizes them for using the word aguero (from Spanish abuelo) instead of the Aché word djamo for “grandfather” (lines 4–11) or djarypurâ for “grandmother” (lines 11–13). That is why the Paraguayans laugh at them and say that the Aché language is dead (lines 19–20). The fact that the Aché do not speak their language anymore and mix it with Guaraní is one of the reasons why it is “hard/difficult” for them now (line 21). On the community radio as elsewhere, the concept of Aché as a language has become an “object of discourse” (Foucault [1969] 2002, 49). The goal of this chapter is to provide an account of the processes that led to this objectification.

I should maybe clarify that this chapter (and the dissertation) is not about linguistic change. That is, I do not analyze language ideologies and their transformations in order to explain language shift. Rather, I analyze the sociocultural processes—among them language shift—that have led to the constitution of language defined primarily by attention to the code (Jakobson [1956] 1980). While rapid changes in language practices might contribute to a heightened awareness of those practices as language practices and as changes in the linguistic code, there is no automatism involved that would cause such changing practices to always become salient to the metalinguistic awareness of speakers as changes of
languag. Furthermore, the factors that lead to the (re-)conceptualization of language and heightened metalinguistic awareness were not always the same factors that lead to changing language practices. Therefore, in what follows the discussion of metalinguistic, viz. ideological change will be privileged over that of linguistic change, pointing out changes “within” the code as they are relevant for the broader discussion and for understanding the dialectical relationship between these two levels.

A discussion of the ways in which the (ideological) objectification of language impacts current linguistic practices as well as how language is constituted through interactional means will be the focus of chapter 4. For now it shall suffice to say that this omnipresent discourse about language indicates its emergence as a phenomenological object in the lifeworld of the Aché after contact with Paraguayan society, and that that objectification amounts to profound changes of language ideologies and, indeed, of the ontology of language. These changes are part of the broader sociocultural transformations and it is to these that I will now turn. While a complete consideration of the entire history of the encounter in all of its social, cultural, and economic dimensions would go beyond the scope of this dissertation, in what follows I will analyze those aspects that pertain to the objectification of language.

3.2 Theorizing Change

Without doubt, the history of the Aché in the twentieth century is a history of dramatic and tragic changes. Abandoning a nomadic lifestyle and settling in reservation communities, giving up hunting and gathering as sole subsistence strategy for a mixed form heavily reliant on agriculture and horticulture, and conversion to Protestant Christianity, all had profound impacts on their cultural and language practices, and everyday experience. The lifeworld of the Aché has been radically transformed through their encounter with Paraguayan society.

However, the recognition of changes does not explain anything about how they have happened. While it is fairly obvious that the encounter of several small nomadic groups of a few dozen individuals with a settler society backed by a nation-state took place on highly unequal terms and such differences in power are largely responsible for the extent of these transformations, numerous questions remain unanswered, such as why some changes took place and not others, how these changes came about,
what set of factors influenced them, and who were the agents of change. For example, while almost all Aché are devout Christians and organize most of their communal life around the church, why are they also still proudly practicing traditional chants and wailing, once decried by missionaries as a demonic practice? While they have adopted most routines of everyday life from Paraguayans, such as drinking tereré while resting from work or playing soccer on the weekends, and all send their children to school, why are they still so interested in resurrecting traditional cultural practices? Recently the Aché have started an annual “Cultural Week,” practicing and showcasing what they presume to have been key cultural practices before contact. And why do they still paint their faces and bodies with black ornaments on public occasions, especially in the presence of outsiders? Finally, while they have abandoned many grammatical features and most lexical items of their heritage language, why have they not completely shifted to Guaraní?

Interpreting change is seldom straightforward when it comes to the analysis of cultural practices and beliefs. The idea of “cultural change” is based on a distinction between the cultural and the non-cultural on the one hand, and between change and continuity on the other. If culture, as Wagner ([1975] 1981) has argued, is that which human collectives invent in order to make sense of the differences between their and other collectives’ everyday routine behaviors, and if this invention is the result of each collective’s particular creativity, then what is interpreted as culturally continuous and discontinuous must necessarily also differ between one collective and another. What is interpreted as a practice in continuity with ancient traditions from one perspective might look like radical change from another. Furthermore, it is precisely the ways in which events are locally interpreted that impacts how they unfold (Sahlins 1981, 1991, 2004). In what follows I will briefly lay out a theoretical framework that might help us understand the encounter of the Aché with Paraguayan society. I will conceptualize this encounter with Sahlins (1981) and Sewell (2005) in terms of the structure of the conjuncture of structures, and the projects and prospects of the actors involved (Ortner 2006).

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1 Tereré is a cold infusion of mate (*Ilex paraguariensis*), a popular drink in Paraguay especially in the summer months.
3.2.1 The Structures of Practice

For the conceptualization of the transformation but also of the reproduction of social and cultural orders, anthropologists have drawn upon and developed a variety of theories and concepts. Most prominent among these is what has come to be known as “practice theory” (Ortner 1984). Practice theory, broadly conceived, tries to understand human practice as constituted not by structural constraints, individual agency, or situational contingency alone, but through their relationship and interdependency. Culture and history are conceptualized in terms of a number of dialectics between structure and agency, structure and event, and agency and awareness, that allow for a comprehensive account of the ways in which human behavior is structured and how those structures are modified (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 1990; Giddens 1979, 1984; Sahlins 1981, 2004; Sewell Jr. 2005; Ortner 2006). For the present discussion I will only broadly outline the most important dimensions of practice theory that can help us analyze the post-contact history of the Aché.

The idea of structure owes much to Bourdieu’s ([1972] 1977, 1990) conceptualization of the habitus and Giddens’ (1979, 1984) theory of the duality of structure. Bourdieu defines the habitus as set of durable and transposable bodily and mental dispositions that generate thoughts, perceptions, and actions, “structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 72; see Bourdieu 1990, 53). A habitus is the “universalizing mediation, which causes an individual agent’s practices, without either explicit reason or signifying intent, to be nonetheless ‘sensible’ and ‘reasonable’” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 79). In a similar way, Giddens’ (1979, 5) notion of the “duality of structure” refers to “the essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices: structure

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2 Earlier macro-theoretical frameworks, be they functionalist, structuralist, Marxist, or interpretive were, as Ortner (2006, 2) observes, essentially “constraint-based theories” that saw human behavior as shaped by external forces, “by culture, by mental structure, [or] by capitalism” (1–2), and did not account for human agency, whereas alternative micro-theoretical approaches like symbolic interactionism (Goffman 1967) bracketed any “institutional analysis” and therefore dismissed structural constraints through an exclusive focus on “interaction as strategic conduct” (Giddens 1979, 80). Neither of these approaches was able to account for the fact that human behavior is indeed patterned and these patterns often remain the same over time, yet people do not always follow the patterns nor does their relative stability guarantee their reproduction.

3 By extracting certain elements from the theoretical frameworks in which they originated I am certainly not doing justice to the latter, but my aim is not to develop an integrated framework and rather to draw on those parts of the ones existing that I deem to be most helpful for understanding the post-contact linguistic and cultural history of the Aché (for more comprehensive syntheses see Sewell Jr. 2005 and Ortner 2006).
is both the medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices.”

These notions of structure incorporate temporality. Habitus is inscribed in the bodies of social agents “by past experiences” (Bourdieu [1997] 2000, 138) and thus a “product of history,” at the same time as it makes history through the production of individual and collective practices (Bourdieu 1990, 54). A theory of practice must therefore always be a theory of history (81).

The similarities notwithstanding, both theorists differ in the role that they ascribe the actors’ awareness of and attention to structures. Bourdieu (1990, 92) argues that “practice excludes attention to itself” and that “it is unaware of the principles that govern it.” This is why social actors can also end up reproducing even those structures that are unfavorable to them; the dominated are “complicit” in the reproduction of structures of domination since they “misrecognize” those structures as dominant (Bourdieu 1991, 113, 140; [1997] 2000, 94). Giddens (1979, 72) claims that “all social actors, no matter how lowly, have some degree of penetration of the social forms which oppress them,” and distinguishes between practical and discursive consciousness (Giddens 1979, 25, 73; 1984, 4–7, 41–4). Practical consciousness refers to the tacit knowledge that actors have of what they are doing, “inherent in the capability to ‘go on’ within the routines of social life” (Giddens 1984, 4). Discursive consciousness is the explicit knowledge that actors can verbalize. It is discursive awareness that can be related to Bourdieu’s remarks on complicity and misrecognition and both theorists would probably agree that the relative (discursive) awareness of structures and their availability to awareness correlates with

4 In an important intervention, drawing on Giddens and Bourdieu, Sewell (2005, 130–43) specifies the notion of structure as dual in nature, i.e., as virtual and actual at the same time. Structures according to Sewell are composed on the one hand of schemas, which are virtual and include “not only the array of binary oppositions that make up a given society’s fundamental tools of thought, but also the various conventions, recipes, scenarios, principles of action, and habits of speech and gesture built up with these fundamental tools” (131). On the other hand they include resources, which are actual and encompass knowledge, skills, and emotional commitments alongside animate or inanimate objects (133)—close to what Bourdieu ([1983] 2001; [1997] 2000, 225–227) calls “capital,” which includes economic, cultural, social, or symbolic capital, i.e., material and non-material goods, capacities, relations, and values.

5 In some way practical and discursive consciousness can be thought of as two poles of a continuum but this does not necessarily imply that they are mutually exclusive or inversely correlated. They might be in a given situation but they are also different types of awareness (two sub-dimensions of awareness, so to speak) of which one can have more or less and which are also sometimes not clearly distinguishable.

6 Some structures lend themselves better to awareness than others. Drawing on Gramsci (1971) and Williams (1977), Comaroff and Comaroff (1992) conceptualize the relationship between structures of domination that actors are discursively aware of, and those that they are not, as that between ideology and hegemony. Hegemony is ideology misrecognized, it is “that order of signs and material practices, drawn from a specific cultural field, that come to be taken
the agency, understood as the power of “‘intervention’ in a potentially malleable object-world,” of an intentional actor who “could have acted otherwise” (Giddens 1979, 56).

Ahearn (2001, 112) proposes a “provisional” definition of agency as “the socioculturally mediated capacity to act.” All human action is mediated by sociocultural structure “both in its production and in its interpretation” and agency refers to the capacity to produce and interpret socioculturally meaningful actions. This capacity, as Ahearn (2001, 113–6) warns, should neither be taken to be synonymous with “free will,” nor with “resistance.” Approaches that rely on the former ignore “the social nature of agency and the pervasive influence of culture on human intentions, beliefs, and actions” (114), whereas the latter definition too hastily subsumes agency under an all-encompassing dominant power structure (Ortner 1995). As Ortner (2006, 143) has pointed out, in “probably the most common usage ‘agency’ can be virtually synonymous with the forms of power people have at their disposal.” But while “people in positions of power ‘have’—legitimately or not— ... ‘a lot of agency,’ ... the dominated too always have certain capacities, and sometimes very significant capacities, to exercise some sort of influence over the ways in which events unfold” (144).7 Ortner (2006, 139–53) calls this modality of agency the “agency of projects” as opposed to the “agency of power,” which would include domination and resistance. The agency of projects or intentions refers to the ability of people to pursue their particular (culturally shaped) goals. “It is about people having desires that grow out of their own structures of life, including very centrally their own structures of inequality” (147).

Reproduction and change can thus not be explained directly as a function of structure or agency respectively—where structures would be responsible for their reproduction, whereas the exhibition of agency of individual actors would end up in their transformation, a conceptual division of labor, so

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7 Bourdieu ([1997] 2000, 234) as well argues that when situations of “mismatch” between positions and dispositions multiply and “generate tensions and frustrations,” the “relative autonomy of the symbolic order ... can leave a margin of freedom for political action aimed at reopening the space of possibles.” And even though “the more power one has over the world, the more one has aspirations that are adjusted to their chances of realization” (226), “the belief that this or that future, either desired or feared, is possible, probable or inevitable can, in some historical conditions, mobilize a group around it and so help to favour or prevent the coming of that future” (235).
to speak—and only through the complex interplay of structures, agency, awareness, and power in the temporal unfolding of events.

3.2.2 Reproduction and Transformation

At this point it is necessary to consider more closely the dynamic of situations which lead to structural transformation, and in order to do this I will turn to Sahlins' (1981) concept of the “structure of the conjuncture.” One of the main points of Sahlins’ work is that there can never be total reproduction or total transformation of cultural order and that “in all change there is continuity” (Sahlins 2000, 9). Because continuity and change are both grounded in practice and because of the temporal structure of all practices, relating past to present conditions, the outcome of practices will never be a complete reproduction or transformation. Sahlins' (1981, 8) aim is to show “how events are ordered by culture” and “how, in that process, the culture is reordered,” in short, how the reproduction of a structure becomes its transformation.

A key concept in Sahlins' model is that of the event. He understands an event as an historical incident which “makes a difference” (Sahlins 1991, 45) insofar as it impacts the cultural order in place while being interpreted according to the logics of that same order. “There is no event without system. For the definition of a ‘something-happened’ as an event, as well as its specific historic consequences, must depend on the structure in place” (42). Therefore, “one cannot be reduced to the other, the structure to the event nor vice versa, and yet each is somehow determining the other” (47). Structures and events are thus both contingent and cultural at the same time. Not only the cultural analyst, but the actors themselves interpret historical events with regards to the cultural structures in place.

Sahlins introduces the concept of the *structure of the conjuncture* to capture this dynamic. The “structure of the conjuncture” is the structure that emerges from the practices of actors that interpret a given event in culturally informed ways. Sahlins’ (1981, 33) main project is to examine the “interplay between pragmatic ‘structures of the conjuncture’ and the received cultural order, as mediated by the constituted interests of the historical actors” in determining the outcome of historical events.

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The most famous example of the structure of the conjuncture is Sahlins’ account of the events that led to the death of Captain Cook in Hawaii in 1779 and the transformations that followed. “Hawaiian history,” writes Sahlins (1981, 9), “often repeats itself, since only the second time it is an event. The first time it is myth.” The incidents that led to Cook’s death and the ones that followed were “historical metaphors of a mythical reality” (11). Cook’s arrival was interpreted through the logic of the mythical theory of Hawaiian culture and the actions that followed were informed by the same logic. For the Hawaiians he was a form of the god Lono (11), a god that arrives every year to replace the respective ruling chief. As such he was killed after his (unpredicted) return and subsequently incorporated into the Hawaiian genealogy. This, however, had a lasting impact on Hawaiian culture. Not only his bones, but also the goods that the British had brought with them were integrated into the Hawaiian prestige system in the service of subsequent chiefs and set out to transform that system, effecting a “revolution in Hawaiian theology and politics” (28). To acquire European goods—necessary within the prestige system for the reproduction of the distinction of the Hawaiian nobility and the underlying population (29–30)—the Hawaiians got involved in trade relations with the Europeans. And as commercial exchange “has its own sociology” (38), in the long run it resulted in class formation, the transformation of cultural categories of person and personal relationships, and in the abolition of the tabu system. Even though all parties involved, Hawaiians and Europeans alike, acted “according to their own determinations of social persons, their interests and intentions” (35) and in line with the Hawaiian cultural tendency to “encompass the advent of Europeans within the system as constituted, ... the project of cultural reproduction failed” (50). The unprecedented long-term consequences of “putting culture into practice” (35) were thus profound transformations of the cultural order.

Kulick (1992) uses the concept of the structure of the conjuncture to explain language shift in the village of Gapun in Papua New Guinea. While Gapuners always spoke many languages and multilingualism was highly valued (69), the local language, Taiap, has fallen out of use as children acquire competence primarily in Tok Pisin, a regionally dominant language and the one most widely used in Papua New Guinea. Kulick analyzes multiple factors that contribute to this development. Most salient among them is the indexical mapping of the two languages onto the two parts of the dual self of Gapuners. Taiap has come to be associated with the negative part of the self, called hed, and Tok Pisin
with the positive part of the self, save (Kulick 1992, 80–90). This is due to a parallel association of Taiap with tradition, women, and backwardness, and Tok Pisin with modernity, men, Christianity, and the world beyond Gapun (Kulick 1998), engendered by such factors as Gapun's increasing contact with the outside world, the presence of missionaries and other agents of the broader society, and inflow of consumer goods through trade (Kulick 1992, 161–75). The perceived relative underdevelopment of Gapun was explained through an overabundance of hed and while the development of save has always been a goal to be achieved it has become especially important now. While in earlier times, Taiap was appropriate for the expression of both, hed and save, the use of the two languages had now come to be indexical of one or the other. “In using Tok Pisin, villagers are thus expressing an important and highly valued aspect of self … but … they are also constituting a situation in which their vernacular is becoming less and less desirable and important.” Taiap is “losing its ability to express positive aspects of self” (21); language shift is imminent.8

Sahlins’ aim was to develop a general model for reproduction and change and he questions “whether the continuity of a system ever occurs without its alteration, or alteration without continuity.” But in the case of the Gapuners in Papua New Guinea, as in the case of Captain Cook and the Hawaiians many reasons for the failure of reproduction can be traced to the fact that different cultural orders were at play. It is not that a “structure” or “cultural order” was overthrown by the contingencies of unprecedented events, but rather, in both cases multiple orders or structures were at play. In Gapun, language shift followed the conjuncture of the traditional conception of the self with cultural orders (and resources) brought by missionaries and other outsiders. Cook’s fate as the “historical image of a mythical theory” was mediated by both, by “his own practical rituals for dealing with ‘the natives’ and Hawaiian ritual practices for dealing with ‘the gods’” (Sahlins 1981, 17).

8 Gapuners also view children as very agentive (bikhed, “willful”), born with hed (Kulick 1992, 101, 215). They claim that they do not speak the local language because they do not want to and there is nothing anyone could do about it. Nor would one, given that the development of linguistic competence in Tok Pisin indexes the child’s desired development of save. There are also many other factors, like the perception of the vernacular as difficult and too complicated for young children (196), the association of Tok Pisin with baby-talk (198), the parent’s interpretation of children’s early vocalizations as Tok Pisin (201–2), and an ideology of linguistic accommodation to the hearer (75) that obliges caregivers to accommodate to the children (believed to be competent in Tok Pisin). Thus, as children in Gapun are construed as Tok Pisin speakers they are at the same time constructed as such through socialization practices that expose them mainly to that language.
Sahlins himself recognizes that “the word ‘structure’” is an “oversimplification” and that the characteristic of an event is the “connections it makes between different orders of structure” (quoted in Sewell Jr. 2005, 210). In order to account for such cases of cultural encounters Sewell adds to Sahlins’ concept its reverse: the conjunction of structures.

The “structure of the conjunction,” as Sahlins conceptualizes it, may be said to arise from a “conjunction of structures.” What makes possible the peculiar dynamic that characterizes events is the conjoining in a given situation of structures that previously either had been entirely disjoint or had been connected only in substantially different ways. (221)

The analysis of every and any situation of cultural reproduction and change must start from the structure of the conjunction of structures, conceived as the emergent structure of the contingencies of events that are lived by agentive actors who interpret the events in light of their own cultural schemas and drawing on their own cultural resources and capital. In the following section I will draw on this theoretical framework in order to understand the encounter of the Aché with Paraguayan society—itself the outcome of a series of historical events that range back in time far beyond the decision of some Europeans to cross the Atlantic—and the linguistic and language ideological transformations that followed.

### 3.3 Becoming Aché

Let us begin with the way the Aché explain the origin of and hostile relationship between themselves and the Paraguayans. In good Amerindian fashion they start at a time when the Aché and the Paraguayans were still undistinguishable from one another and lived together in the forest.

The-ones-that-would-become-the-Aché were gathering *pichu* larvae in the forest from the *jakaratia* tree that they had previously chopped down. They called the others to come and join them, but the-ones-that-would-become-the-Paraguayans did not come. They stayed in one place. So the-ones-that-would-become-the-Aché reminded them: “The larvae from the *jakaratia* tree is about to come out.” But again, the-ones-that-would-become-the-Paraguayans said nothing. They built large houses in the midst of many *kbei‘i* trees instead. They had cut all the trees around their houses and piled up the logs there. The Aché also saw the gardens where the corn was sprouting up. The Aché looked at them: “Come here to eat the larvae from the tree.” But the house-builders were angry. They threw stones at the Aché. They shot them with firearms. The Aché got scared and ran away. (Translated and summarized by Francisco Mbepegi, Warren Thompson, and Jan David Hauck)
And thus they lived as enemies until the twentieth century. We recorded this myth several times in 2010 and 2011 as part of the language documentation project, but versions that explained the diversification of Aché and Paraguayans were already documented in the 1960s and 70s (Münzel 1983, 16–7). The myth is an instance of a transformation or permutation (Lévi-Strauss 1955) of Amerindian mythological material adapted to the current state of affairs—a phenomenon widely reported across the continent. At the same time it is also the rationalization and justification of that state of affairs, of the hostile relationship of Aché and Paraguayans in Aché terms. And by depicting the separation of the two groups as the result of an infringement on part of the Paraguayans it is also a moral statement (Londono-Sulkin 2012). The Paraguayans did not respond to the call to come and eat pichu larvae with the Aché, they no longer roamed the forest but “stayed in one place,” and they cut the trees, built houses, planted corn, and violently attacked the Aché with stones and firearms. Earlier versions of the myth reported by Münzel (1983, 16–7) also focus on the ways in which the Paraguayans-to-be disturbed the moral order, such as possessing tools that they were not supposed to have.

Since the Aché “ran away,” scared of the attacks, it also explains their nomadic life as a result of that event. One version that we recorded in 2011 adds that the Aché ran away also because they were seeing the many cut trees, wyra djywa-py-re wechã reko-bu (tree cut-P-PST see PROG-COND). In this way they cast their nomadic life retrospectively as a consequence of the experience of violence and deforestation. Many early reports of life before contact explain the reason for continuous movement with the need to minimize encounters with Paraguayans and other hostile groups. This is the “mythical reality” of Aché history, a reality of which (re-)encounters with the Paraguayans soon would become “historical metaphors” (Sahlins 1981, 11).

3.4 Encountering the Other

While the Aché conceived of the Paraguayans as originally Aché (i.e., “human” or “persons”) who out of their own volition became what they are now, the Paraguayans and their predecessors had less favorable ideas about the Aché. Early reports by Jesuits about forest dwellers that might have been Aché or culturally similar groups depict them as the “wildest” of all Indians, “physically deformed up
to monstrosity, as similar to monkeys as to men, especially looking at their noses, for which one can justifiably call them snub-nosed" (del Techo [1651] 1967, 13, my translation). A century later others (relying partly on the same earlier reports) find their customs to be the “most barbaric that were discovered in America” and “of their reason stood out so little that they hardly differ from animals, they seem more like beasts on two feet than men with souls, or else some satyrs or fauns of the ancient poets” (Lozano [1745] 1873, 412, my translation).

The terms on which the Paraguays encountered the Aché were thus very different from those on which the latter encountered the former. While to the Aché the Paraguays were part of the same humanity, differentiated from true Aché in mythical time, to the Paraguays and their predecessors the humanity of the Aché was always in question, never a given, they were situated somewhere half way between man and beast, incomplete humans at best. But since they inhabited the same geographical territory and later the same nation-state, it was important to establish whether or not they were potential subjects—religious subjects for the Jesuits, national citizens for the Paraguays. To the Aché, Paraguays were ex-Aché. To the Paraguays the Aché could potentially be Paraguays-in-potentia. This was one dimension of their mutual misunderstanding (Viveiros de Castro 2004b) that would impact the further turn of events. But there were others.

3.4.1 First Encounters

Whether or not the Aché ever had sustained relations with other groups before the European invasion cannot be established. Since Aché is a contact language and language contact involves speaker contact there must have been some social contact in history; but whether or not the contact was frequent, what type of relations it involved, and whether it was peaceful or not is unknown. In the few reports from the colonial period (del Techo [1651] 1967; Lozano [1745] 1873) no evidence of peaceful contact with forest-dwelling indigenous groups who might have been Aché is found. A description that most closely resembles the Aché is that of a group called Guachagui and Guayagui by Lozano ([1745] 1873, 415–21), who also reports that members of this group were captured by Indians from the Jesuit missions, settled there, and easily converted (Melià and Münzel 1973; Münzel 1983, 53–67; Hill and Hurtado 1996, 44–8). After the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1768 there is no mention of groups that could have been Aché until
the late nineteenth century, when references to the “Guayaki,” as the Aché were called by neighboring
groups, surface in reports of travelers and explorers. All of these depict them as bellicose hordes
of forest dwellers. Melià and Münzel (1973, 10) argue therefore that if there were peaceful contacts
these likely did not last beyond the early colonial period. Hill and Hurtado (1996, 59–60) also claim
that there was no physical contact with any indigenous group, probably since the time of the Spanish
conquest, or even before (cf. Miraglia and Saguier Negrete 1969, 143).

I have mentioned in the previous chapter that this lack of sustained relations with other groups and
their languages and therefore no necessity for translation might be a partial explanation for the lack
of metalinguistic theories among the Aché (see Vilaça 2016, 57–8). However, even before settlement
the expansion of the colonial frontier and resulting population movements brought the Aché into
contact with members of groups speaking other languages. We do not know in what terms such other
communication was conceived and whether translation was deemed possible or necessary. As the term
djawu could refer to both, human talk as well as animal noise, no adjustments were needed to interpret
others’ talk in familiar terms.

While also affirming that the Aché had previously been evading any contact with other groups,
Mayntzhusen (1911) reports that five Mataco indians, who had been captured on a Chaco expedition
in the late nineteenth century and held at a sugar factory in south-eastern Paraguay, after managing
to escape had found refuge among one of the southern Aché groups from the Jakui river. The Mataco
had been fully integrated into the group through marriage, learned the Aché language, and had taught
these weaving techniques in turn.9 While such integration of members of enemy groups is common
among Amerindians it should nonetheless not be taken as the norm for the Aché and does not say
anything about relations between groups. Even half a century later when the other Aché subgroups
were contacted, none of them remembered peaceful relations with other groups, not even between
see below).

9 Mayntzhusen (1911, 338) mentions a few Spanish words that the Aché must have learned from those Mataco, such as
tabaku (tobacco), batata (potato), and caballu (horse). He does not mention any Mataco words used by the Aché.
As mentioned in chapter 1, we can distinguish five ethnolinguistic subgroups of Aché: Northern, Yvytyrusu, Ñacunday, Ypety, and Jakui Aché. Relations among those groups were exclusively hostile. A group from the Jakui river Aché was the first group to be settled in 1910 by German landowner Mayntzhusen. Mayntzhusen had come to Paraguay in 1900 and acquired land in the Itapúa department in south eastern Paraguay on the banks of the Paraná river. After several unsuccessful attempts to contact Aché, in 1910 on a forest expedition he managed to ambush and abduct a few members of a family from the Jakui subgroup and brought them to his colony. These then returned to the forest and convinced other members of the subgroup to settle on Mayntzhusen's lands. Mayntzhusen had a scientific interest in the Aché (he later also studied anthropology) and was the first to report extensively on this group.

When he returned to Germany during World War I most Aché disappeared from his colony, some might have gone back to the forest, others to surrounding villages as laborers. Mayntzhusen returned to Paraguay in 1920. With the help of Aché that had remained on the colony he also contacted a group of Ñacunday Aché in 1934 but did not convince them to follow him to his lands (Mayntzhusen 1935). Further attempts to contact other Aché groups were unsuccessful. After Mayntzhusen’s death in 1949 the remaining Jakui Aché integrated into Paraguayan society.

3.4.2 Captors and Captives

Since the late nineteenth century with the advancement of the colonial frontier settler violence against the Aché rapidly increased, often in retaliation for the killing of livestock on part of the Aché, but also to satisfy the growing demand for Aché children on the slave market (Mayntzhusen 1925, 1948; Melià and Münzel 1973; Münzel 1973b; 1983, 68–82). The Chaco War (1932–35) was a blessing for the Aché since it detracted resources from the eastern parts of Paraguay, but the 1940s and 50s saw an increase of attacks by colonists and made it harder for the Aché to continue their nomadic life. The beru, “flies” as they called the Paraguayans, captured more and more Aché who then worked for their owners, the

10 The Ypety group has been referred to in early reports as the group from the Yñarô River (Cadogan 1960, 1965; Melià et al. 1973) but in order to avoid confusion with the Ñacunday group whose range extended to the Yñarô as well, I follow Hill and Hurtado (1996, 49) in referring to the group settled in 1959 by the Ypety River.
women as mistresses, the men on the land and helping their masters to track down other Aché (Melià and Münzel 1973; Münzel 1983). The expansion of agriculture reduced the range of movement of the Aché. P. Clastres describes in detail the fate of a group of Ypety Aché under the leadership of Jyvukugi:

Jyvukugi’s duty consisted of leading his people not only where there was an abundance of game but also, even more importantly, far away from the Beelu [white people]. By keeping the tribe constantly on the move, sleeping only a few nights in one camp—even at the risk of not following the rules strictly about holding initiation ceremonies for boys when their lips were pierced and for girls when their blood came down—for a long time Jyvukugi had managed to guarantee the tribe a life that was almost peaceful, troubled only occasionally by the death of an irondy struck down by the white men’s thunder. Now it had become very difficult: there were too many white men, they were coming in everywhere at once, and, worst of all, they were taking the children. And yet how was one to confront them, with their chuvi, the thunder that killed from so far away? Arrows were worthless against them, and the hunters did not really rely on them, in spite of the old women with dried up vaginas, the very ancient waimi, who cried out to them in voices full of hate as they left at dawn to go hunting: “Go along the white men’s road! Hide behind a fallen tree and wait for them! Shoot them with arrows and dig out their eyes! Then hang their bodies head downward!” They expected nothing but death from the white men. (P. Clastres [1972] 1998, 66–7)

In 1953 Jyvykugi’s group was ambushed and captured by an Indian hunter named Pichín López. López and his men brought the about forty Aché to the village San Juan Nepomuceno in order to sell them. In lack of a room large enough to lock them up they left them outside in a corral. At night Jyvukugi escaped with most of his group. But their freedom should not last. The dwindling forest “had become more a prison than a shelter for them, they were coming into contact with the Beelu more and more often, their hunters were killing more and more cows and horses, and the retaliation of the white men was increasingly brutal” (75).

A campaign at the initiative of Paraguayan scholar and officer for Indian affairs, León Cadogan, succeeded in legally banning manhunts in 1957 and recognizing the Aché as fully human as all other inhabitants living on Paraguayan territory. López was arrested and expelled from Paraguay for having sold thirty Aché. It is also reported that he was tied up by Aché that were working for him after killing one of their relatives in the forest (Münzel 1973a, 155n230; 1983, 95). After López’s expulsion some of those Aché returned to Jyvukugi’s group. It was not uncommon for Aché who had been living among the Paraguayans to return to the forest to their relatives for periods of time. These returning Aché should be instrumental in initiating a process that led to their eventual settlement (Thompson, n.d.).
In order to understand this process it is important to take into account how the events of that time were interpreted by the Aché.

As Thompson (n.d.) points out, the Aché did not conceive of having been captured by Paraguayans and working for them in terms of a relationship of master and slave, but rather as a process of adoptive filiation. They were becoming their owners’ “children.” References to Paraguayans such as López as āpā (father) are frequent in early ethnographic reports (Melià et al. 1973). Mayntzhusen was called āpā wachu (big father) by the Jakui Aché. This is a widespread phenomenon among Amerindian groups. War captives are incorporated into their captors’ kinship network through a process of familiarization and consanguinization by which they pass from a status of less-than-persons to that of full humans (Descola 1994; Vilaça 2002; Santos-Granero 2009; Fausto [2001] 2012; Thompson, n.d.).

Rather than being a fixed status, captive slavery in native tropical America was a process—a process in which slaves shifted from a marginal condition as recent war prisoners to their integration as subordinates and, eventually, to their (or their descendants’) assimilation into their masters’ kinship networks. (Santos-Granero 2009, 173)

From the perspective of the captors, captives were regarded as “people in the making” (185), i.e., as potential humans that had yet to become fully humanized through socialization. But from the perspective of the captives the “becoming-son” of another by adoptive filiation at the same time implied a “becoming-other,” another important theme among Amerindian groups (Viveiros de Castro [1986] 1992, 2002; Lévi-Strauss [1991] 1995; Vilaça 2016). Note that this logic was perfectly compatible with that of the Paraguayans, who likewise thought of the Aché as “people in the making,” i.e., “Paraguayans in the making,” yet to be fully “humanized,” albeit on different grounds (Bejarano 1977).

The conjuncture of two different structures (Sewell Jr. 2005, 139–43), the Amerindian cultural schemas such as adoptive filiation and other-becoming, transposed to the context of the encounter with Paraguayans who were incorporated as “fathers” into the logic of kin relations, together with the incorporation of the Aché as “resources” (slaves, wage laborers, mothers) into the reproductive mechanisms of Paraguayan society, ended up working towards the same goal in the long run—the transformation of Aché society. More immediately though, the return of the ex-captives aggravated a conflict over the leadership of Jyvukugi’s group (Münzel 1973a, 94–5; 1983, 97). This internal conflict would influence the further turn of events.
3.4.3 A Consequential Decision

Close to San Juan Nepomuceno a farmer, Manuel de Jesús Pereira owned some land adjacent to the forest. He used to be among López’s group of Indian hunters. He had captured a few Aché from Jyvukugi’s group who were still working for him. P. Clastres describes:

This crude and clever Paraguayan ... was never violent with his Indians; they were never overworked in his fields and were well fed. He managed to persuade them that, incredibly enough, he was a Beeru who was not rauy, brutal. He had even made some effort to learn their language. Because of this, the two [Aché] felt no fear or distrust and gradually became convinced that Arroyo Moroti (White Stream, which was the name of the place) would be the salvation of the tribe, the island of peace where the only Beeru who would protect the Indians lived. One day they disappeared. (P. Clastres [1972] 1998, 75–6)

The Aché returned to Jyvukugi’s group in order to convince them to voluntarily come to live on Pereira’s estate. One member of Jyvukugi’s group reports them to have said:

Ãpã Pereira, Pichigi ekollã, duwe ãpã Pereira watama nande go; ãpã Pereira tapype ñande ohowerã, papa Pereira djuka djwellã. (Münzel 1973a, 95, orthography adapted)

Father Pereira, not Pichigu [Pichín López], he did not come, someone else, Father Pereira, he is coming; we will go to Pereira’s house, Pereira does not want to kill [us]. (my translation)

Jyvukugi decided to follow their advice. Clastres’ report continues:

The white man who had cleverly set himself up as a model of goodwill compared to the other white men, who were very violent, was not surprised to see the two Indians emerge from the woods one night several weeks later followed by the whole tribe: Jyvukugi, yielding under the pressure put on him by the two Indians—one of whom was his brother—and exhausted from his life of continuous, desperate flight, had given up everything and come to ask for help and protection in the white man’s world. The nomads had reached their final stopping place. (P. Clastres [1972] 1998, 76)

And so in 1959 Arroyo Moroti became the first new Aché settlement since the disintegration of Mayntzhusen’s colony, home to 30 Ypety Aché. Pereira’s lands were declared a reservation and he was appointed administrator by the Paraguayan government (Münzel 1983, 100).

It was thus the conjuncture of several factors that led to the sedentarization of the Aché. On the side of the Paraguays it was the official policy that banned manhunts, López’s expulsion, and Pereira’s new strategy to set an example for treating the Aché living with him differently and thereby
convincing them to voluntarily seek his protection—a strategy that Mayntzhusen had already used. On the side of the Aché, as Thompson (n.d.) observes, “it was the movement between the ties of adoptive filiation that some Aché had to Paraguayans and the consanguineal ties they had with their band members that would initiate the settlement of the first Ache reservation.” As a response to this dynamic and to settle the internal conflict in his group and to consolidate his own position as leader, it became Jyvukugi’s “project” (Ortner 2006, 144) to make peace with the beru, the Paraguayans, and to lead his group to a new life. Sedentarization must therefore be interpreted by no means only as a coercive process engendered by foreign agents, of which the Aché were passive victims, but as much as the result of their own agentive response to historical events, events that they mobilized for their own projects and that they interpreted in their own terms.

Nonetheless, it must also not be forgotten that the encounter with Paraguayan society did not happen on equal terms. It is to Bourdieu’s credit to make no pretense of the fact that in encounters of societies that differ fundamentally in terms of culture and in terms of power the “inertia” (Bourdieu [1997] 2000, 172) of the habitus of the powerless instead of being translated into some sort of agency or resistance most of the time leads merely to difficulties at adaptation and leaves little space for autonomous projects.

In situations of crisis or sudden change, especially those seen at the time of abrupt encounters between civilizations linked to the colonial situations or too-rapid movements in social space, agents often have difficulty in holding together the disposition associated with different stages, and some of them, often those who were best adapted to the previous state of the game, have difficulty in adjusting to the new established order. Their dispositions become dysfunctional and the efforts they may make to perpetuate them help plunge them deeper into failure. (161)

In view of the recent history of the Aché, even a favorable reading must come to the conclusion that their dispositions as hunter-gatherers have indeed become mostly useless on the reservation, and that their extreme lack of capital (Bourdieu [1983] 2001; [1997] 2000, 225–7) and resources (Sewell Jr. 2005, 133), due to their devaluation on the one hand (e.g., hunting skills) and misappropriation on the other (e.g., deforestation), leads to a stark imbalance in power. But an imbalance did not only exist in the relations between Aché and Paraguayans, but also among different Aché groups and would be largely responsible for the further dynamics in Arroyo Moroti and subsequent communities. Different
language skills were an important part of these inequalities, which in turn also impacted language shift and language awareness.

### 3.5 Becoming Paraguayan

P. Clastres spent most of the year 1963 in Arroyo Moroti and his beautifully written *Chronique des indiens Guayaki* is a detailed document of what early settled life was like. A few months before his arrival, in May 1962 Jyvukugi’s group was joined by a large new group of Aché led by Karewachugi that came to live with them (P. Clastres [1972] 1998, 90). These Aché were the traditional enemies of Jyvukugi’s group, belonging to the subgroup from the Yvytyrusu mountains. According to Clastres, the Ypety and Yvytyrusu groups although inhabiting adjacent territories had not encountered each other within living memory of any of their members. *Irollangi* to each other, those-who-are-not-friends, they reciprocally feared the others as cannibals, as *ache uagi*, Aché-eaters.

> The two groups had tacitly agreed to avoid meeting, and they were both careful not to set foot on each other’s hunting territory. If hunters came across tracks that did not belong to their own group, they knew that they had come too far and were stepping on ground that belonged to the *Iroiangi*, the Strangers. (81)

These *irollangi* had been contacted earlier by Jyvukugi’s men at the initiative of Pereira, for whom more Aché also meant more resources from the government. He was the one to receive food and other items from Asunción that were to be distributed among the Aché—but which he also partly sold to neighboring campesinos (P. Clastres [1972] 1998, 80; Hill and Hurtado 1996, 50).

#### 3.5.1 Capturing New Aché

Early during my fieldwork I interviewed an elder of the Yvytyrusu subgroup, Paywagi, who was taken to Arroyo Moroti as a small child. Djawagi, another elder, and Chimbegi, a schoolteacher, are also participating in the discussion. This is what Paywagi remembers:
CHIMBEGI: Go kllumi, (2.5) De krumi: krumi ichakrâbu,
Please tell us, (2.5) As a child, when you were small,

(2.2)

Bae de mandu’â, baeçha de wêwe kadji de owâ Arroyo Morotïpe.
What do you remember, how you left the forest in order to go to Arroyo Moroti.

(.3)

Mmm de pouwaregi.
Mmm when you were young.

(.4)

PAYWAGE: Go (.3) ache uagirô o ore (.) ore eruwâ,
The (.3) Ache Uagi [Ypety Aché], they went in order to bring us,

(1.1)

O– oma âpâ Budjagidji (.8) ache– ache matâ.
They went with Father Budjagi [Percíra] (.8) to take the Aché out [of the forest].

(1.6)

Gobu cho krumi pykei (.5) djache eru::,
I was a small child then, (.5) they carried me,

(1.2)

DJAWAGE: Krumi ichakrâ= A small child

PAYWAGE: =Ichakrâ (.2) acheua, ache uagi.
Small (.2) the Ache Uagi.

(2.6)

Kadji (.8) cho (1.5) chinko año wata (.) praruwyte.
In the forest (.8) I (1.5) was five years old, I was still too weak to walk a long walk.
10 chimbegi: Praruwyte.
Still weak.
(.8)

11 paywagi: Che djachi eru ache uagi Marco Krumbygi.
The Ache Uagi Marco Krumbygi carried me.
(.3)

12 Karėkrumbygi gogi ache [inanbyty.
Karėkrumbygi, that's how we used to call him.

13 chimbegi: [K– Karėkrumbygi.
Karėkrumbygi.
(.4)

14 djawagi: Ache ua djawu Karėkrum[by
The Ache Ua call him Karėkrumby

15 chimbegi: [Go Karėkrumbygi a’e
Yes, it's Karekrumbygi

16 paywagi: Go cho djachiare (.5) çhe krumibu.
He was my carrier (.5) when I was a child.
(1.7)

17 Gobu o– ore eruma (.8) āpā Budjagi tapype,=
Then they brought us (.8) to father Budjagi's house,

18 =Āpā Budjagi edjāwē (. ) ģkō emi ache uagi djāwē,
The Ache Uagi were living close to father Budjagi as well,
(1.2)

19 Ore matāwā, (.6) ore (.8) ore kwallā,
We (.8) we didn't know (.6) that they were going to take us,
(1)
Achew– ache ache uagi ore endape (. ) ĕkõmbu.
When the Achew– Ache Uagi came to our place [in the forest].

(.8)

Äpā Budjagi rupi eruma emi.
Father Budagi was with them, he had brought them.

(1.4)

Pukama eru (1.8) kydjellā ache (. ) puka reko bwedji.
They came shouting (1.8) the Aché weren't afraid, they were shouting.

(.8)

“Myroẽme!” A– Ache amo Marco Kru– Karēkrumbygi,
“Don't run!” the Aché Marco Karēkrumbygi [called],

CHIMBEGI: Mmm
Mmm

PAYWAGE: Gobu (.8) Kwyragi (1) gobu duwe ache tārā ĩwe manobama go chuepurā.
There was also (.8) Kwyragi (1) and many other Aché were there, the old ones they have
now all died.

(.7)

Go tārā oma,
Many went there,

(.4)

CHIMBEGI: Pende kwe– [pende matāwā,
In order to take you out [of the forest],

PAYWAGE: [Ore ore ore matāwā.
To take us out [of the forest].

(1.3)

Gobu nama (.4) “Kyjemẽ āpă, praru gogi;”
Then they said (.4) “Don't be afraid of the Paraguayan, he is kind,”

CHIMBEGI: Mmm
Mmm
“Ore djăwē waty ore kuweandy gogi.”
“He lives always with us, he always takes care of us.”

(7)

Kwama āpā djawu āpā djawu prowima gogi,
They already knew Guaraní, they already spoke it a little,

Ore kwallāete gobu, āpā djawu.
We didn't know it at all back then, Guaraní.

(1.1)

Go ore eruma, Ka– ka budjellā wachupe ore eru::
Then they took us, They took us far away from the big forest

((several lines omitted))

Kowe ache (.6) kowepe ēkögī.
The Aché here (.6), the ones that live here.

(7)

Kwa wywy ache, kowepe edjo rawe emi=
All the Aché remember, they came here and

=Gobu emi gogi oho budjellāpe ēkō ka wachupe,
Then they left again to go to live in the big forest far away,

(1)

Kwapa ache gogi.
The Aché know all that.

(9)

Kwa ache uagi (.3) ache gatu.
The Ache Uagi know (.3) and the Ache Gatu.

Mmm

Mmm
59 DJAWAGE: Ache irollā (5) kwapa.
The enemy Aché (5) they all know.

(5)

60 PAYWAGE: Ache uagirò ore āpāite, ore na gononga, ore āpāite,
The Ache Uagi are our true fathers, that's how we say, our true fathers,

61 Ore k- [ore pych– ore pychyare,
Our, our cap– our captors,

62 CHIMBEGI: [Go- gorò pende pychyare.
They, they are your captors.

63 DJAWAGE: [((

( )

64 PAYWAGE: [Ore [(
Our ( )

65 CHIMBEGI: [Ache uagi.
The Ache Uagi.

66 DJAWAGE: Mâtāa: [(6) Mâtāare goqi=
The ones who took you out [of the forest]

67 PAYWAGE: [Ache Uagi. (.6) Gorò ore āpā.
The Ache Uagi. (.6) They are our fathers.

68 CHIMBEGI: Mmm
Mmm

69 PAYWAGE: Āpā Budjagi na ore na’a “āpā Budjagi” Pereira[pce.
Father Budjagi, we call Pereira “father Budjagi.”

70 CHIMBEGI: [[Ngo,
Yes,

(.8)

71 DJAWAGE: Āpā Budjagi=
Father Budjagi
Paywagi’s description can be read as a blueprint of all subsequent extractions of the Aché from the remaining subgroups. Pereira himself is quoted to have said, “The secret is that the Aché extract themselves from the forest. That is the only way how to get them out of the forest” (quoted in Münzel 1983, 97, my translation from German translation). Pereira’s project of attracting further Aché was here congruent with that of those Aché living on the reservation. The motives of the latter were multiple, many stated the need for women as the most important reason. Another reason was to find relatives (Melià and Münzel 1973; Münzel 1973a, 1978). Aché in the forest were often promised that they would find their missed kin on the reservation in order to convince them to leave, promises that were often not true (Münzel 1983, 113). Furthermore, it gave younger generations an easy opportunity to gain political power.

Young men also sought to dominate the older men who had been politically powerful in the forest. At the reservation, the traditional power structure was turned upside down. Teenage boys and young men who adapted rapidly to the new customs, technology, and language quickly used their new political and economic leverage to their advantage over older men. (Hill and Hurtado 1996, 53)

Another reason might have also been the need to take captives, since taking captives would convert the Aché themselves into captors, into ãpã (Viveiros de Castro 2002; Santos-Granero 2009; Fausto [2001] 2012). This is what the interpretation of lines 60 to 62 of Paywagi’s account suggests. After listing all the Aché groups that were living at Arroyo Moroti, the ache gatu (the “good Aché,” who from his perspective are those of his own group, the Yvytyrusu Aché), the ache uagi (the “Aché eaters,” the “cannibal” Aché from the Ypety subgroup11), and the ache irollã (the “enemies,” again the latter), he goes on to claim that the ache uagi are their “true fathers.”

11 Note that Clastres calls the Ypety Aché “Ache Gatu” (the good Aché), which makes perfect sense in perspectival logic since he was mainly working with members of that group.ACHE uagi are always the others.
Paywagi here describes the *ache uagi*, the Ypety Aché from Arroyo Moroti who captured his group as their “true” or “real” fathers. And he adds “that’s how we say … our *pychyare* (captors).” He is explaining the logic of adoptive filiation to me, the outsider, with the term *ãpã* that is also used for “Paraguays.” And Djawagi, an elder from the Northern subgroup follows up:

“The ones who took you out of the forest.” From the perspective of Paywagi’s group the Ypety Aché were their *ãpã*, their captors, just as Paraguays such as López and Pereira were those of the Ypety Aché. And Paywagi goes on to explain that they also called Pereira their father, “Father Budjagi.”
Jyvukugi’s group was the last of the Ypety Aché. Others had either died in the forest from epidemics, were killed by Paraguayans, or working for them as slaves or wage laborers. Of the Yvytyrusu subgroup all remaining members were settled in 1962 and 63 (P. Clastres [1972] 1998, 80–98). The Yvytyrusu Aché might have preferred to continue their relationship to the Ypety Aché as irollängi, but in Arroyo Moroti they were forced to live together. Thereby, the status of the two groups was far from equal. Three years of living with the white men, the Ypety Aché had acquired knowledge and skills that the newcomers were lacking.

When the [Yvytyrusu Aché] joined the camp, Jyvukugi’s people became very conscious of having arrived two and a half years earlier and adopted a haughty attitude toward them, as though they were initiates dealing with neophytes, or even lords dealing with their subjects. A hierarchy was established right away between the two tribes; or rather, the Strangers accepted what the others wanted without arguing, because in the same way that the Paraguayan chief was the [Ypety Aché’s] only protection against the white man’s world, Karewachugi and his people needed the protection of the other Indians. (98)

The power dynamics between these two groups informed by the logic of adoptive filiation would be characteristic of encounters between already settled Aché and newly extracted bands in all subsequent settlements (Münzel 1983, 110, 163; Thompson, n.d.); they follow a common pattern between indigenous populations that are marginalized and disenfranchised but already integrated into nation-states to some degree, and their newly “contacted” neighbors who come to join them (Bessire 2014).

3.5.2 Language Contact and Shift

The disadvantages of the newcomers were many and one of them was their lack of linguistic skills. Although Pereira had made some efforts at learning Aché (P. Clastres [1972] 1998, 75; Münzel 1983, 96), he communicated with them in a mixture of Aché and Guaraní (P. Clastres [1972] 1998, 105) or
directly in Guaraní (Münzel 1983, 103). Unfortunately, neither Clastres nor any other early ethnographers reports details about everyday language practices in the early settlements, but here are some illuminative remarks:

When the Paraguayan [Pereira] had something to tell [the Aché], he would have them gather in front of his daub house and talk to them in a strange and confusing mixture of [Aché] and Guarani. Only three or four [Ypety Aché] managed to understand this jargon—it was incomprehensible to the others. The speech had to be translated for them, and this was done on the spot by the few who understood. (P. Clastres [1972] 1998, 105)

If one of the reasons for the absence of a notion of language among the Aché was their lack of contact with other groups, in Arroyo Morotí, the Aché were now constantly exposed to Guaraní. And for the first time messages in one language were translated into another, as in the passage above. This was the first step on the way to constituting Aché as a language, as one type of *djawu* and Guaraní as another. And while it is still a long way from translating something to language as a bounded system, abstractable from the speech situation or even indexical of ethnic identity, it is nonetheless an important factor among others that I will discuss in due course.

However, the encounter with the Paraguays and their language was not only consequential for the transformation of *djawu* into language but also for the further development of Aché language practices. The fact that Guaraní and Aché came to be understood as codes that were able to equally express a certain content, did not mean that they were two “equal” languages. Aché and Guaraní were of very different usefulness in the newly established communities and speaking one or the other meant access to different communities of speakers who were endowed with very different socioeconomic status.

That the *beru* possessed valuable tools like machetes, steel axes, or pots, was known to the Aché while still in the forest and often they would approach Paraguayan settlements at night in order to seize these items. Now the Aché were at their goodwill in order to acquire such tools, or had to work for them. Either way they needed to interact with them—in Guaraní. Moreover, in the Amerindian logic familiarization or consanguinization are not automatic changes of status that captives would undergo but the result of long processes of gradual socialization. Thereby they would adopt the customs and
cultural habits of their captors, including their language (Santos-Granero 2009, 78–100). Their project of other-becoming also had a linguistic dimension (Vilaça 2016).

Pereira himself, no doubt, was the person with the greatest political and economic power in Arroyo Moroti. He was the ultimate ãpã to whom the Aché had surrendered. It is to his credit that he learned some Aché, as I have mentioned, but little did it do to help elevate the status of Aché, and as time progressed it is clear that the Aché were accommodating to him and other Paraguayans rather than the other way around. Pereira’s “confusing mixture” that Clastres reports might very well be the origin of the currently dominant code, the Aché-Guarani intermediate language “Guaraché” that I have been observing during my fieldwork. Thus, in the early years at Arroyo Moroti not necessarily Guarani but Guaraché itself might have been the “target” of language shift (Jourdan 1991).

In 1968 the reservation was transferred from Arroyo Moroti to Cerro Moroti, further to the North (Münzel 1983, 100), in order to attract the Northern Aché (Hill and Hurtado 1996, 50). Of central importance for understanding the slow process of Paraguayanization is the fact that extraction and settlement of the Aché was not a one-time event but a slow process that spanned two decades. In probably ten separate extractions between 1970 and 1978 all Northern Aché were settled either in Cerro Moroti or, in the last two extractions in 1975 and 1978, in Manduvi, a new reservation set up by Catholic missionaries towards the east, closer to the Paraná River (50–5). Thus from the settlement of the first group of Ypety Aché in 1959 until the last 24 individuals from the Northern groups appeared in 1978, at least fourteen groups of different sizes surrendered one by one to those already settled.

Each group of newcomers was at a disadvantage to already established inhabitants of the camps. Less in number, weakened by disease, and frightened by persecutions and the progress of the agricultural frontier, the newcomers had no choice but to try to adapt as quickly as possible to the new environment, new power structures, and new cultural habits, a process also culturally expected of them as new “children” to their captors. They started wearing Western clothes, shaping their huts in the style of Paraguayans, and working on the fields (Münzel 1983, 103, 117, 171). Münzel (1983, 165), who visited Cerro Moroti between 1971 and 1972, reports that the Aché had an ambivalent attitude towards the Paraguayan way of life. While they despised working on the fields, especially the younger ones “ad-
mired the language of the Paraguayans.” It was the languages of power surrounding the communities and its mastery an important goal to achieve for every Aché.12

3.5.3 Objectifying Language and Culture

Economic pressure from Paraguayans and the requirements of consanguinization were not the only factors behind changing language practices and changing language awareness. Already Pereira had started to teach Guaraní explicitly to his “children.” And such lessons should be highly instructive for understanding the beginnings of the objectification of language—and culture. Let us briefly return to Paywagi’s account from the early years in Arroyo Moroti of which I have quoted at length above. The following excerpt continues directly after his discussion of the ache uagi (the Ypety Aché) and āpā Budjagi (Pereira), as fathers/captors.

Transcript 3.4

74 kwewegi: De (.9) pende djawumaba (1.1) ache djawu?
You (.9) did you speak (1.1) the Aché language?

75 paywagi: Ache djawubu,
When we spoke Aché,

76 kwewegi: Ache djawu, pende ēh::
The Aché language, you ēh::

77 Pendeba (.6) djawu kwadjwe beru– d– ēh::
Did you (.6) want to know how to speak the Paraguay– d– ēh::

78 paywagi: Kwa[ll]-
Didn’t kn–

12 An exception were the Aché from the Nacunday river who were all extracted at the same time in 1976 by a missionary family, settled on new land in the area, and remained separate from the other Aché for a long time thereafter—only in the 1990s did they start to frequently visit and intermarry with other villages. The Nacunday Aché show the greatest allegiance towards their heritage language.
The Paraguayans' language— [Guaraní]

They didn't know Guaraní at all back then.

We didn't know Guaraní at all.

Eh: You didn't know it at all?

We didn't know it at all,

Yes And then then you wanted to know how to speak?

You wanted to know how to speak Guaraní,

Then our father
90 Ápã Budjagi (.2) ore krumi:: krumi::
Father Budjagi (.2) we children children

91 DJAWAGI: [(djawu )]
(speak )

(1.1)

92 PAYWAGE: Die doce año rekobu, ore rahama idja tapype.
When we were ten, twelve years old, he took us to his house.

93 CHIMBEGI: Mmm
Mmm

94 PAYWAGE: Orepe kllu'u ápã djawu.
He taught us Guaraní.

95 CHIMBEGI: Mmm
Mmm

96 PAYWAGE: Ore, We,
(.2)

97 CHIMBEGI: Āh:
Āh:

(.8)

98 PAYWAGE: Çhe– Krumi tãrã gope reko idja rey nonga ápã Budjagi.
I– Father Budjagi had many children there as if they were his children.

(.3)

99 Idja breko emi ore ei nonga.
His wife as well, she was like our mother.

(.3)

100 Ore kononga djapo ipo budja idjape. ((makes praying gesture))
We asked her for her blessings, like this.

(.7)
101 DJAWAGE: ( [ )
( )

102 CHIMBEGI: [Idja breko äpä go?=
His wife was Paraguayan?

103 PAYWAGE: =Äpä ore äpä gogi.
Paraguayan, they were our fathers.
( .2)

104 Emi äpä Budjagi gononga ore djapo. ((makes praying gesture))
To father Budjagi as well, we did like this.
( .4)

105 DJAWAGE: Mmm
Mmm

106 KWEEWEGI: Åh:
Åh:

107 CHIMBEGI: Åh:
Åh:

108 PAYWAGE: Baiçha “tupanoi” guara[nipe.
How is it, “tupanoi” [blessing] in Guaraní.

109 CHIMBEGI: [“Tupanoi”
“Tupanoi”
( .2)

110 PAYWAGE: Ache djawu “ipo budja.”
In Aché “ipo budja” [to approach with hand].

111 KWEEWEGI: “Ipo budja,”
“Ipo budja,”
( .3)

112 PAYWAGE: Gobu äpä Budjagi orepe rama idja tapype.
Then father Budjagi took us to his house.
“Cho ymarã pende cho rahata” ei.  
“I am taking you in order to raise you” he said.

Krumi tårã rama idja tapype.  
Many children he took to his house.

Orep– orepe klluwã ãpã djawupe.  
To teach us in Guaraní.

“Pende ãpã nonga djawuta, pende djawulläwerã achepe.”  
“You will speak like the Paraguays, you won’t speak in Aché.”

Gope orepe klluma ãpã djawu nonga djapowã.  
There he taught us to speak like the Paraguays.

Goware ore embe mumbullã.  
Therefore we didn’t pierce our lips.

Âpã Budjagirõ ore ymare, idja tapype ore::  
Father Budjagi was the one who raised us, we lived in his house.

Tårã reko idja ray tårã nonga reko, idja tapype.  
Many lived in his house, as if he had many children.
Mmm

We didn't live with our parents anymore.

You all slept separately.

You slept on the other side,

You slept on the other side,

Father Budjagi is our—Father Budjagi's house was our home.

Many children were gathered there—

Was father Budjagi::

Was father Bugjagi::

Was father Budjagi (1) when he had you there, ang— (.2) angry

Was he angry when you spoke in Aché? Or was he not?

He wasn't angry.
CHIMBEGI: Mmm (.6) go
Mmm (.6) the
(.4)

KWEWEGE: Àpà But– àpà Butagi eh–
Father But– father Butagi eh–

CHIMBEGI: Àpà Budjagi,
Father Budjagi,

KWEWEGE: Budjagi,

DJAWAGE: Àpà Budjagi ( )
Father Budjagi ( )

CHIMBEGI: Pràdjàllà [ache djawubu?
He didn't get angry when you spoke in Aché?

PAYWAGE: ( )
( )

CHIMBEGI: Da'c kononga “Ani djawu a[che,”
He didn’t go like “Don’t speak Aché,”

PAYWAGE: Na djawui,=
He didn't say that,

DJAWAGE: Na djawui.
He didn't say that.

CHIMBEGI: Mmm [dja–
Mmm spea–

PAYWAGE: Orepe ina:. (8) Ore kllu'u idja tapype rabu na,
He said to us (.8) When he took us to his house he told us,

“Pende djawullà werà kowebu achepe.”
“Now you will not speak in Aché.”
(.3)
Gonoga dema. “Pende kwa gatuwâ âpâ djawu nonga?”
(Just that. “So you will know well how to speak like Paraguayans?”

Gonoga na’a orepe.
That’s what he said to us.

Gobu (.) inama, (.5) a[ché, kowe ñande papa Rario nonga. ((touching ddja’s arm))
Then the Aché said (.5), now just like our father Rario here.

Âpâ nonga, go– ore âpâ wywy mumbudjwe ore embe.
Like our fathers, all our fathers want to pierce our lips.

CHIMBEGI: Mmm
Mmm

PAYWAGE: Pukama Pereirape. (1) “Ore mumbudjwe ore rey embe,” e’i.
We called Pereira. (1) “We want to pierce our sons’ lips,” they said.
(.4)

Gobu Pereira, âpâ Budjagi ina, “Mumbueme go â– âpâ achellâma.”
Then Pereira, father Budjagi said, “Don’t pierce, they are now Paraguayans, they are no longer Aché.”

CHIMBEGI: Mmm
Mmm
(.2)

PAYWAGE: “Âpâ nongama gogi.”
“They are now like Paraguayans.”

Pereira started to teach Guaraní directly to Paywagi and his companions (line 94). He taught them the language and also instructed them in Guaraní (line 116). This implies the constitution of both practices as languages that could be taught, learned, spoken, translated, and which also could be abandoned. And he not only taught them Guaraní and spoke to them in the language, but also told them not to speak Aché among themselves (lines 148–9). All this goes a long way towards explaining imminent language shift.
At the same time as they were socialized into speaking in Guaraní and Guaraché and adopting the habits of the Paraguayans, they were also socialized into different cultural schemas that would determine how they understood themselves and the Paraguayans. The word ãpã as I have argued above was used for Paraguayans given the relationship of the Aché to those as their captors. Today none of the younger speakers would be able to make that connection. To them it is a bivalent referential term, which means “father” on the one hand and “Paraguayan” on the other, but not Paraguayan qua father.

In the interview the discrepancy between these two uses is apparent in lines 102 and 103. Chimbegi, a younger speaker and school teacher, asks Paywagi whether Pereira’s wife was also Paraguayan, using ãpã as a generic referential term. Paywagi, while obviously understanding what he meant, nonetheless recasts it by responding with ãpã ore ãpã gogi, “they were our fathers/Paraguayans.”

This could be analyzed as a repair in conversation analytic terms (see chapter 4). By clarifying Chimbegi’s use of ãpã through the use of the first person plural exclusive possessive pronoun ore (our) in ore ãpã gogi, (they were our fathers), Paywagi restores the deictic referentiality of ãpã (It would not make sense to translate it as “our Paraguayans”). Of course, for Paywagi, these two uses are unproblematic. But Chimbegi and other younger speakers are no longer aware of the original meaning and function of ãpã and use it as a bivalent term or homonym for either “Paraguayan” or “father” but not for Paraguayan qua father (qua captor). The relationship between Aché and Paraguayans to them is no longer conceived of as that between captors and captives but between two different ethnic groups.

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13 The other terms for Paraguayans were beru, “flies,” and simply parawajó (Münzel, personal communication, September 29, 2016).
In discussing the dialectics of the encounter between the Southern Tswana and British Nonconformist missionaries in the colonial and post-colonial history of South Africa, Comaroff and Comaroff (1991; 1997) show how the two cultural orders that came together in the structure of the conjuncture of the encounter came to be understood as precisely that, as two cultural orders. While in the beginning, the categories “Tswana” or “Southern Tswana” had no indigenous significance (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 39), the exchange of signs and goods and the contradictions and conflicts that arose in that exchange, led the Tswana to “objectify their world in relation to a novel other, thereby inventing for themselves a self-conscious coherence and distinctness” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997, 212). The Comaroffs call this the “colonization of consciousness,” the consciousness of the Tswana was slowly altered by the missionizing project even as they resisted its content or message. Being drawn into discursive and economic exchange with the Europeans, “the Southern Tswana had no alternative but to be inducted, unwittingly and often unwillingly, into the forms of European discourse,” they could not avoid “internalizing the terms through which they were being challenged” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 213). And by accepting the “terms” they were “coming to feel, and to re-recognize one’s self as, a “native” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997, 19), as distinct from the Europeans. “For the Tswana, the encounter slowly brought forth an explicit sense of opposition between sekgoa (European ways) and setswana (Tswana ways), the latter being perceived for the first time as a system of practices” (212).

In an interesting turn of the discussion Paywagi relates the teaching of Guarani and proscription of speaking Aché to something apparently completely unrelated, the embe mumbu. The embe mumbu is the an initiation ceremony of young men that the Aché practiced in the forest. The central part of the ritual is the piercing (mumbu) of a young man’s lip (embe), that turns him into an adult and hunter (P. Clastres [1972] 1998, 166–81). In the interview above Paywagi relates Pereira’s disapproval of them talking in Aché to his discouragement of them piercing their lips (lines 119–120, 155, 157). They were told to speak like the Paraguayans and therefore they also didn’t pierce their lips anymore.

119 PAYWAGI: Gope orepe klluma āpā djawu nonga djapowā. (.7)
Go-pe ore-pe klu-la āpā djawu nonga djap-owā.
DEM-LOC ILEX-DOM tell-IAM Paraguayan speak like do-PURP
There he taught us to speak like the Paraguays. (.7)
Therefore we didn’t pierce our lips. Go-wa-re (DEM-OF-PST) marks a temporal and causal connection, “thus” or “therefore.” They shouldn’t speak in Aché, and therefore they also should no longer pierce their lips. Bywangi constructs these two practices together as cultural habits that had to be left behind. Before settlement, to not perform the embe mumbu was never an option. It was only a matter of the appropriate age; when the time had come the adolescent would approach his father and ask him to arrange for the initiation ritual to be performed. Embe mumbu here used to mark the passage into adulthood. But now its meaning had changed, or had started to change. Pereira turned it into an index of Aché “culture,” understood as a set of practices in opposition to the practices of the Paraguayans. No longer a marker of adulthood it had become an index to differentiate between those who had already assimilated to the Paraguayan way of doing things and those who had not. From a marker of status within the system of cultural habits of the Aché, it had come to stand for that system of habits (see Silverstein 1985).

Practices such as the embe mumbu and speaking Aché, once taken for granted they were now “perceived for the first time as a system of practices” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997, 212) belonging to the Aché that were conceived of in explicit opposition to the practices of the Paraguayans. They were objectified as “culture” and as such they could be changed—the practices as well as the practitioners. As he reports Pereira to have said, achellãma, āpã nongama gogi, “they are no longer Aché, now they are already like the Paraguayans.”

155 PAYWAGE: Gobu Pereira, āpã Budjagi ina, “Mumbueme go ā- ūpã achellãma.”

157 “Āpã nongama gogi.”
If at first reservation Aché were capturing forest Aché in order to become ãpã, i.e., fathers qua captors, as the notion ãpã was being objectified as referring to Paraguayans in general, the meaning of becoming ãpã also changed. Becoming ãpã now turned into a project that meant at the same time un-becoming Aché. In Münzel’s (1973a, 103, 120; 1983, 98, 107; 1986, 214) work on Aché narratives, songs, and poetry, based on recordings made in the early 1970s in Cerro Moroti, there are a number of lines that translate as “when we were still Aché” or “the ones who are no longer Aché.” While, given the deictic quality of the term ache, this could also be translated as “no longer human” or “no longer persons,” in the context of the songs and of the experiences on the reservation it is most likely that it has come to be conceived of in opposition to becoming ãpã, becoming Paraguayan. It is thus that Aché consciousness was “colonized” and a new cultural logic became hegemonic by which practices such as the embe mumbu and speaking Aché turned into indexes of “Aché culture” and as such could be abandoned (Robbins 2005a).

3.5.4 Humiliation and Discontinuous Change

To theorize the active abandonment of projects of cultural reproduction and resulting discontinuous change Robbins (2005a) draws on Sahlins’ (1992, 2000) theory. This might be surprising at first, given that most of Sahlins’ work is primarily concerned with showing that “in all change there is continuity” (Sahlins 2000, 9). Even profound cultural transformations like the many seen in contexts of colonial and post-colonial encounters are never merely the result of an abandonment of indigenous orders of meaning under the structural pressure of a dominant other. If, how, and to what degree cultural orders are altered depends on the dynamics of the events of the encounter that are informed by the cultural orders of colonizer and colonized alike, thereby reproducing and altering both. As I have discussed above, his model is so compelling because it encompasses continuity and change without dissolving either into a function of structural constraints or individual agency respectively. This is why his model is equally useful to theorize discontinuous change.

Sahlins (1992) addresses this question himself in a later paper. In view of the eventual complete abandonment of projects of cultural reproduction, particularly under the influence of globalized marked capitalism and processes of missionization, Sahlins (1992, 24) remarks that “coercion and
destruction” is insufficient to explain why people turn away from cultural traditions and, instead of reinventing them, actively try to assimilate into the dominant society. This statement is in line with a more explicit aim of his later work to take indigenous agency seriously in reproducing but also changing culture (Sahlins 2000, 9–10; 2004). Even the most radical change as the result of situations in which different cultural orders at play correlate with an unequal distribution of power cannot be assumed to be simply a function of inequality and power difference. For radically discontinuous transformations Sahlins (1992, 23) suggests that a “necessary stage in the process of modernization” is the “experience of humiliation.”

To “modernize,” the people must first learn to hate what they already have, what they have always considered their well-being. Beyond that, they have to despise what they are, to hold their own existence in contempt—and want, then, to be someone else. (24)

Robbins takes this argument up in an edited volume about cultural transformation in Melanesia (Robbins and Wardlow 2005), arguing with Sahlins that “in order for humiliation to dislodge people from their attachment to those categories it must first be felt within them” (Robbins 2005a, 15). Only then can humiliation instill a “global inferiority complex” (Sahlins 1992, 24) that can lead “people actively to want to change” (Robbins 2005a, 11). As they bring their own cultural categories into the colonial encounter it is according to those categories that they make sense of what is happening in the first place; humiliation must be experienced first in indigenous terms and the indigenous experience had to be transformed in such a way that it could be turned back against itself.

The experience of violence, death, and disease, and humiliations suffered during the contact period have certainly had an effect on the disposition of the Aché to abandon their own linguistic and cultural practices. And as they became constituted in opposition to those of the Paraguayans, the project of becoming āpā had become the project of becoming “Paraguayan” as understood by these, as an exclusive process that implied un-becoming Aché. Once their culture and language was objectified and indexically attached to the category of “being Aché” as Paywagi discusses above, the Aché made a conscious effort to abandon these practices at Pereira’s request.

The success or failure of cultural transformation thus depends on the degree of colonization of indigenous consciousness and experience and its relation to indigenous projects and prospects. People
must learn to “actively want to change” in order for radical transformations to happen, i.e., they must have their own projects and aspirations that are defined somehow in opposition to cultural reproduction. An attention to indigenous experience and agency is therefore at least equally important for understanding processes of radical change as it is for situations of slow transformation. For the coming decades, in Cerro Morotí and subsequent communities, missionaries were one of the driving factors behind the process of “becoming Paraguayan,” the constitution of Aché “culture” and “language” and their abandonment, but also their subsequent resurrection.

3.6 Becoming Christian

The past decade has seen a rise of interest in cultural transformations as the result of the introduction of Christianity in small-scale communities around the world (Robbins 2004; Cannell 2006; Keane 2007; Bialecki, Haynes, and Robbins 2008; Robbins, Schieffelin, and Vilaça 2014; Vilaça 2016). The growing literature in the anthropology of Christianity has been a productive field for an exploration of the structure of the conjuncture of structures in colonial and post-colonial encounters. The work of the Comaroffs (1991; 1997) is an example of changes that were first and foremost the result of the influence of missionaries, others are those of Robbins (2004), Keane (2007), and Vilaça (2016). Such studies are doubly relevant here, for they are all concerned with cultural contact and change and they also provide a comparative basis for analyzing Christianity among the Aché.

While the Comaroffs (1991; 1997) explicitly discuss transformations that result from their encounter with missionaries, they have been taken to task on this lately by Robbins (2007). Robbins criticizes their work not for their focus on Christianity, but for their neglect of it. How so? Their exclusive focus on the terms of the encounter while disregarding the Christian message (8) and thereby downplaying the specific role of Christianity as a religion (as opposed to the missionaries or colonial agents) for cultural transformation, prevented them from adequately addressing the impact that its introduction can have on radical and discontinuous change. While acknowledging the strengths of the Comaroffs’ work “as an account of historical change,” specifically also “as charting for the political-economic realm the way in which important discontinuities were introduced into Tswana culture” (9), Robbins stresses
that the Christian message in itself relies on and promotes a radical break with the past, a fact that is ignored in the Comaroffs’ account.

Christian converts tend to represent the process of becoming Christian as one of radical change. One does not evolve into a convert. One does not convert by slow, almost imperceptible steps such that one might become Christian without even knowing it. ... Conversion ... is always an event, a rupture in the time line of a person’s life that cleaves it into a before and after between which there is a moment of disconnection. Most kinds of conversionist Christianity mark this moment and ritualize it, as with rites of baptism that ... are unique amongst the world religions. (Robbins 2007, 11)

Christianity is so efficient in promoting the abandonment of projects of cultural reproduction precisely because humiliation is an important part of it. In Christian terms “without identifying oneself as debased, one cannot move toward salvation” (Robbins 2005b, 46). At the same time, Christianity “encourages converts to become conscious of their ‘culture,’ a hypostatized image of their past way of life. Once people have objectified their culture, it is but a short step for them to begin making conscious efforts to discard it and replace it with something new” (47). Reflexive awareness of (objectified) culture is here required to suspend the “inertia” of the habitus (Bourdieu [1997] 2000).

Among the Aché we have seen the basic dialectic between other-becoming, humiliation, objectification, and cultural transformation already before the arrival of missionaries. When these took over they should reinterpret much of what was happening and mobilize it for their own projects. Their presence and activities have impacted linguistic and cultural continuity and discontinuity in complex ways as I will discuss in the next section.

3.6.1 Teaching the Word of God

Among the vast literature in the anthropology of Christianity many studies pay special attention to language practices and language ideologies (Handman 2007, 2010; Keane 2007; Robbins 2007; Schiefelin 2007, 2014; Stasch 2007; Vilaça 2016). This is not surprising “given the particular emphasis that Christians place on language in their focus on the biblical text, their understanding of Christ as the Word, and the centrality of speech in Protestant ritual life and social understanding” (Bialecki, Haynes, and Robbins 2008, 1146). As my focus here is on the phenomenological emergence of language I will
limit my discussion to the ways in which missionary language practices and ideologies have impacted this but not other cultural domains, although the Christianization of the Aché is a fascinating topic in itself.\textsuperscript{14} 

The Aché were exposed to missionaries continuously since 1972 when Pereira was dismissed because of the disastrous medical situation in Cerro Moroti (Münzel 1983, 140). The reservation in Cerro Moroti was taken over by North American missionaries of the New Tribes Mission (NTM), an international US-based organization dedicated to spreading the Gospel among “unreached tribal people.”\textsuperscript{15} NTM is a non-denominational mission with a fundamentalist Evangelical orientation. Founded in 1942, NTM recruits missionaries in the West, trains them in basic linguistics and Bible translation, as well as to survive harsh physical conditions through boot camps (Johnston 1985, 123, 218–24; Vilaça 2016, 30–4), to finally send them overseas to preach the Gospel to those “2,500 of the world’s 6,500 people groups [where] there is no church, nor is there any work being done to establish a church.”\textsuperscript{16} New Tribes missionaries were in charge of Cerro Moroti between 1972 and 1991.

Another mission, led by Catholic missionaries of the Order of the Divine Word (Societas Verbi Divini), was established in 1974 further to the east, but for the following discussion I will be mainly focusing on the New Tribes missionaries, since these have proven to be far more influential in the Aché communities. Even the majority of Aché on the Catholic mission converted to Evangelical Christianity and not to Catholicism.

Having been receptive to the Christian message, and collaborating with the missionaries in the translation of the scriptures for a number of years, the first Aché from Cerro Moroti converted in 1978 and others were soon to follow (Maybury-Lewis and Howe 1980, 47).

In 1978, only months after the first conversions of four of the missionaries’ young informants, the Aché of Cerro Moroti converted en masse to evangelical Christianity. Evangelical Christianity spread to other communities through kin relations, and in some cases, new converts forcibly brought their relatives to Cerro Moroti from other communities to convert them. The spread of

\textsuperscript{14} I refer to the work of my colleague Warren Thompson for a thorough exploration of Aché Christianity.


evangelical Christianity was all the more effective given that in the Catholic mission to the north, the missionaries placed little emphasis on religious instruction and conversion in their early years (Thompson 2012, 2).

Missionaries continue to frequent the communities today, although most do not live there anymore as they did in the early years. As more and more Aché were trained as pastors, they now administer church services themselves.

In 2001 Letra Paraguay started its activities in the communities.¹⁷ Letra Paraguay forms part of the Wycliffe Global Alliance, an association of organizations dedicated to translating the Bible into all languages of the world. Founded in 1942 as Wycliffe Bible Translators and restructured in the 1990s into an umbrella organization, Wycliffe’s goal is to have started a translation project for every Bible-less language by 2025. Wycliffe provides linguistic training to missionaries of its member organizations through the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), based in Dallas, Texas.¹⁸ Letra Paraguay finished the translation of the New Testament into Aché in 2013.

There are important differences between NTM and Wycliffe/SIL. For the former Bible translation is part of the goal to establish local churches,¹⁹ whereas for the latter it is an end in itself (Handman 2007, 176). They also differ in their ideological orientations towards language, culture, and religion and their respective relationships. In what follows I will consider the New Tribes missionaries’ practices first and then turn to those of SIL via Letra Paraguay.

3.6.1.1 New Tribes Missionaries in Cerro Moroti

Missionaries are agents of change by definition. I have argued above that already before the arrival of missionaries, in the early years on the reservations “becoming Paraguayan” was a project that included giving up both, language and other cultural practices. At first sight, this seems to be compatible

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with the project that New Tribes missionaries would start in 1972. On the NTM website we find the following statement:

We work in the tribal culture and language: These tribes’ cultures and languages have isolated them from the Gospel. Missionaries must learn their language and understand their culture in order to clearly present the Gospel and effectively plant a church. 20

Tribal culture and language are here presented as the reason for the fact that these tribes are not Christian and an obstacle to them becoming so. Learning local languages and cultures on the part of the missionaries is therefore a means to an end that sees both changed. However, while converts are encouraged to abandon cultural practices incompatible with the Christian doctrine, giving them access to the Gospel is not achieved by teaching them trade or international languages but by translating the scriptures into their heritage language. This process of translation necessarily involves profound transformations of the language in question in order to be able to accurately represent the Christian message. Here is an excerpt from a report by New Tribes missionary Claudia Heckart, describing the beginning of their work among the Aché, which gives an insight into this process:

We have begun translation work here in Cerro Moroti to be able to share this precious treasure with these people in their own language. They have a brief outline thus far, introducing Christ, telling why He came and what His death meant, and telling about Adam and Eve and Noah. Now we are working on more detailed stories of the life of Christ. We can’t start actual Scripture translation yet for lack of adequate vocabulary in their language. ...

Let’s try John 3:16. ...

“For God...” By this time they kind of know who God is, so we’ll put that word in, which is literally ‘Big Father.’

“...so loved...” Be sure we get the right kind of love; there are many concepts of ‘love.’ We must understand their language enough to know what they think. We’ve had no problem here.

“...the world...” Well, they’ve seen no travel brochures, have taken no furloughs. The concept of ‘world’ is pretty big, but we can get around that by saying ‘all people’ since God really wasn’t meaning the ground anyway. And we’re not working on technical translation anyway yet. We just need to get the general message across.

“...that he gave his only begotten son...” Hopefully they won’t yet ask what happened to His wife, so that He only had one son.

“...that whosoever believeth...” Does anyone have a concise definition of ‘believe’? The informant suggested ‘listens to the words of,’ which we will use for now; but we’ll keep our ears open for a better word.

“...in him...” Inside of Him. Right now we’ll settle for ‘the ones who listen well to what He says. (This statement implies believing them because if you don’t believe, you won’t pay attention and listen well.)

“...should not perish...” Oh goodie, we won’t die! Doesn’t matter if a snake bites us now; we can laugh at tigers! We’d better qualify that to say ‘our spirits will never die.’ It shouldn’t be too comforting to be told that the much-feared evil spirits will never die. Fortunately, we have won the confidence of these people, and they readily discuss these topics with us, so we have found their word for spirit, or soul (There’s a pretty fine line even in English.), and nobody feels scandalized when we use the word in this context. So far so good. And we always keep an open mind, and wide-open ears.

“...but have everlasting life.” Well, we almost made it. We’ll tackle ‘life’ first. We must find out if the word ‘alive’ or ‘living’ can stand in as ‘life.’ After much discussion and several examples, it is discovered it can. But the word ‘everlasting’ brought the slowly rumbling wagon to a dead stop. There is a word for something similar to ‘once upon a time,’ indicating an unknown not definite existence. This has been used in telling about the creation. But this word projects to the past, not the future. Any mother can tell her child when he began. (And we don’t want to preach reincarnation!) After a few weeks we tried a different approach. Eternal, or everlasting, means ‘not ending, never stopping,’ and they do have a neat little negative suffix. When this concept was presented to the informant he picked it up right away, gave a word for it, and added two more suffixes which indicate ‘state of being; condition.’ So now we have a word which means ‘state of being, without an end.’ Now we can finish the verse, and tell them the rest of the beautiful promise.

This gives you an idea of the job we are tackling. There are almost 100 believers here, ‘babes in Christ,’ who have no ‘sincere milk of the Word’ on which to feed. They are existing on a ‘starvation diet’ spiritually. (Heckart 1979, 6–7)

Several assumptions are underlying such practice. The starting point for translation work is the notion of the Aché as a “people” with their “own language” (note the singular) in which the missionaries have now begun to share the Gospel. Aché groupness or ethnicity, the belonging of the Aché language to this group, and the correlation of linguistic with group boundaries are implicit in these ideas. Furthermore the language is imagined as a transparent medium that gives access to the natives’ soul. Following a type of folk-Whorfianism the missionaries “must understand their language enough to know what they think.” Note that understanding is here a matter of degree (and of learning) and the goal is to reach a certain critical threshold (implied by the word “enough”) that will then allow the missionaries to get the “right kind of” translations for Biblical concepts. Translation is understood mainly as a matter of words and concepts. If no appropriate term exists new words have to be made up to communicate
ideas such as “everlasting,” a “state of being without an end.” It is the “lack of adequate vocabulary” that is still impeding full translation of the scriptures.

This implies effability and commensurability of Aché with other languages. Missionaries in general rely on a “conception of language and translation in which the change of language does not comprise any obstacle to the integrity of the message” (Vilaça 2016, 54), assuming that “translating Christian concepts ... would be simple, transparent, and straightforward” (Robbins, Schieffelin, and Vilaça 2014, 570). For Heckart, not even precise translation was required, they “just need to get the general message across.” The missionaries were not Biblical literalists. In the end it was not the words that mattered, the individual signifiers that vary between languages, but the Word as the ultimate signified (Keane 2007, 63–7).

3.6.1.2 Heart Language

Why then teach in the native language at all? Why not continue teaching the natives Guaraní, which already has a Bible? The answer to this question lies in the missionaries’ assumption that a speakers’ first language is the medium that most directly speaks to the soul. Just as the missionaries must understand the natives’ language in order “to know what they think,” it is only through their language that they will be able to alter their thoughts—by altering the meanings of their language. Handman (2007) has analyzed this language ideological complex among SIL Bible Translators in Papua New Guinea. Central to SIL’s initiative of Bible translation is the notion of “heart language” (I will return to important differences between NTM and SIL below, but the following general observations apply to both).

Heart language, in the most basic sense, refers to a speaker’s first native language. But more important, heart language is the language through which God will be able to communicate to a group of people. In missions literature, it is the medium through which one speaks to the soul. (171)

This idea assumes a “deep relationship between linguistic knowledge and the self.” According to former Wycliffe President George Cowan, “when a person speaks in his mother tongue, it isn’t just his intellect that is involved, but his whole self, including his emotions and will” (quoted in Handman
And, because SIL defines a first language as the respective heritage language of a local language community, Bible translation not only facilitates God's communication to a particular self, but to a “whole community of selves” (Handman 2007, 173). Handman points to the affinity of this idea with the Saussurean concept of langue. Imagined as intimate unconscious grammatical knowledge, deposited in the brain of each community member, a “heart language is both the site of epistemic ethnolinguistic group authenticity and the site of personal, interiorized truth” (174). In this way language points at the inner true self and at the group of speakers at the same time, and this is why scientific ideas of language were so popular with the evangelist. Bible translation was an efficient way to address entire communities by working with individuals at the same time as God would ultimately speak to multiple individual selves through the translated Biblical texts.

Such ideas about language that underlie missionary practice imply a radical disassociation of language from culture, which is why the maintenance of native languages is not problematic but mandatory for spreading the Gospel. The point is no longer to abandon cultural and linguistic habits together, but to maintain the language while changing the culture. As Schieffelin (2014, S227) argues for the Papua New Guinean Bosavi, “while the mission insisted on discontinuity in cultural domains, it simultaneously privileged continuity in linguistic ones, an orientation grounded in this mission’s own conceptions of culture and language.” Language maintenance concerns only the linguistic code and “the fact that the code is the ‘same’ ” does not mean “that there is continuity in thinking … for those who become Christian” (S229).

3.6.1.3 Converting Words

This transformation of ways of thinking and feeling is achieved through the manipulation of linguistic meaning and content in the ways that Heckart reports above. Language has become a means to change the culture through the translation and invention of concepts. Converting people starts by “converting words” (Hanks 2010). Words and concepts are conceived as parts of “culture,” as Handman (2007, 181) points out. The “heart language is language as unconscious grammar” and the “culture is the messy and unsystematic lexicon.” For the missionaries “it is the grammar of heart language that allows translation to be successful, [while] it is the cultural lexicon that makes translation difficult” (184).
The objectification of language and culture thus started to follow two very different paths. While up until now cultural and linguistic habits were part of the same burden to be overcome, equally constituted as a hindrance to adjusting to the new established order (Bourdieu [1997] 2000: 161), with the missionaries, Aché ways of speaking acquired a new usefulness in communicating the Word of God. Such renewed attention to and concomitant revalorization of their heritage language may be one of the reasons why language shift has considerably slowed down—although it might have been too late to preserve its original form. The “confusing mixture” in which Pereira used to address the Aché had by now come to be established as the dominant code in the communities: Guaraché. The missionaries helped perpetuate it further, as they too relied heavily on Guarani for preaching. Bible classes by New Tribes missionary Dean Goddard were held “primarily in the trade language [Guaraní], though Dean uses as much of their own language [Aché] as he can” (Heckart 1979, 7). Nonetheless, the fact that Aché now had a new place and function likely contributed to halting a complete shift to Guaraní.

Most importantly though, the missionaries' activities impacted the notion of language of the Aché. At first *djawu* as a human activity was not distinct from animal sound or other noise. In the early settlement period it came to be constituted as part of a bundle of Aché cultural habits that had to be left behind. Now, through the mission encounter this bundle was split apart and a radical break between language and culture was introduced. In order to be able to communicate the Gospel, language was purified from other cultural practices. For the first time it was turned into a code, a transparent medium through which God could speak to the hearts of the Aché.

While I would be hesitant to attribute to the Aché a notion of language similar to that of the “moderns” that I have discussed above (Bauman and Briggs 2003; Keane 2007), I do think that the Aché started to conceive of language primarily as linguistic form, abstracted from the concrete communicative situation. Language was becoming an autonomous object, which could be written down and recorded, but which first and foremost communicated the Word of the Christian God, *ãpã wachu*, the “big father,” a God maybe as far removed from the lifeworld of the Aché as language was now from their speaking.
3.6.2 Post-millennial Purification and Hybridization

The conceptual distinction of language and culture was central to the activities of the New Tribes missionaries, as it was for Wycliffe/SIL Bible translators. And although for the former translation was a means to achieve their main goal, the establishment of local churches, while it was an end in itself for the latter, an ideology that treats language as fundamentally independent of culture was common to both. As Vilaça (2016, 47) observes, “cultural integrity or change is clearly a secondary issue” for the missionaries. “As in all other spheres or questions, the ‘true’ core and objective of missionary action rises above everything else.”

However, an important difference exists in their respective approaches to culture. While this difference might not be clearly articulated in either organization’s program, it becomes apparent when considering their activities and emphases. It is also related to the ways in which SIL has become involved in the past two decades in global efforts to respond to the decline of linguistic diversity through language documentation and revitalization. Since the Wycliffe/SIL-associated organization Letra Paraguay started their activities in the Aché communities only after the turn of the century, it is illuminative for understanding the ways in which the meanings of language and culture among the Aché have shifted further. Thereby it is important to notice that Bible translation was but one among many other factors that influenced these developments.

What are the ideas of language and culture and their relationship for Wycliffe/SIL? On the Wycliffe website we find the following statement:

Wycliffe works all around the world. Currently our efforts serve languages spoken in more than 90 countries. The majority of the remaining translation needs represent minority languages—relatively small people groups, many of which struggle to maintain their identity in the shadow of majority culture. Often these groups have no written language of their own, and many struggle to gain the literacy skills they need to prosper in the majority culture.

The benefits of translation and literacy for these minority language groups are many. They include better health as a result of access to medical information, economic growth due to the acquisition of marketable skills, and the preservation of culture thanks to a written history.  

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How can an institution dedicated to proselytization claim to contribute to the “preservation of culture” of small people groups who “struggle to maintain their identity”? The answer here is a conceptual distinction made between religion and culture. While we saw “language” above being detached from culture, here “culture” (or cultural “identity”) is selectively distinguished from all those habits that are not in line with Christian religious beliefs and practices and reinvented as a particular subset of characteristics that determines group identity. What goes against common sense of any anthropologist, religion is no longer a “cultural system” (Geertz 1973), but constituted as autonomous domain, a path to individual salvation, radically distinct from culture and tradition.

One former New Tribes missionary once told a colleague of mine that when he started proselytization among the Aché he was merely “filling a void.” As the Aché did not have a religion before, he was not changing anything, but merely adding something that would help them cope with modern society. Among the people involved with the Aché he is the most outspoken about the need for language revitalization and cultural preservation in order to combat factionalism and growing intra-community inequalities, which he attributes to the loss of “culture.” Keeping religious and cultural spheres separate allows him to advocate cultural and linguistic maintenance while misrecognizing his own role as contributing to cultural change. And fashioning language into the bearer of culture helps him to turn activities for language revitalization into the main site for cultural maintenance.

In an interesting way this parallels the making of language in modern Europe that I have mentioned in the previous chapter, first, its purification into an autonomous domain, the Lockean “Third Province,” and later its attachment to national traditions, i.e., to “culture,” by Herder and followers (Bauman and Briggs 2003). Among the Aché, once language had been constituted as an object independent of other pre-Christian cultural habits, and once culture had been stripped off everything religious, it was safe to bring them back together in efforts to maintain and revitalize both. In a paradigmatic Herderian hybridization, language was turned into the bearer of culture and faithful representation of their ethnic identity. For Aché “culture” it was one of the last resorts, given that most other activities that could have been considered symbolic had been abandoned.

22 Warren Thompson, personal communication, November 10, 2011.
Letra Paraguay could now happily translate the Bible into Aché, thereby contributing to the “integral development” of the communities23 and without going against “other” efforts at linguistic-cultural revitalization. Many younger Aché are working in Bible translation alongside other cultural activities such as the organization of annual “cultural weeks,” heritage language classes in school, the showcasing of traditional Aché discourse genres at gatherings and on a community radio, and other forms of language and cultural activism. Language, in a complicated way purified from tradition and yet indexing it, purged of religious habits and yet able to transparently communicate the Word of God, detached from but yet again attached to culture has now become a true object, a major issue, a “matter of concern” (Latour 2004) in the post-millennial Aché communities.

3.7 Cultural (Re-)Invention and Language Activism

The objectification of language (and culture) among the Aché is, however, not only the product of missionary influence and Bible translation but must be understood in a broader context of what has come to be known as “ethnogenesis” in the literature. Ethnogenesis refers to the process by which a group comes to define itself “in relation to a particular sociocultural and linguistic heritage,” often also as the specific response to ongoing processes “of conflict and struggle over a people’s existence and their positioning within and against a general history of domination” (J. D. Hill 1996, 1). A large body of anthropological literature has explored ethnogenesis in relation to the colonial encounter in the Americas (Whitten 1976; J. D. Hill 1996; Bartolomé 2006; Gallois 2007; Whitten and Whitten 2008, 2011).

Ethnogenesis can be understood as a creative adaptation to a general history of violent changes—including demographic collapse, forced relocations, enslavement, ethnic soldiering, ethnocide, and genocide—imposed during the historical expansion of colonial and national states in the Americas. (J. D. Hill 1996, 1)

While ethnogenesis should not be seen as the exclusive product of the encounter with an alien Other, a process unknown in the pre-Columbian Americas (Hornborg 2005), without doubt the European

conquest and the post-colonial expansion of nation states resulted in profound transformations in the self-understanding of indigenous groups and their relationship to other such groups (Viveiros de Castro 2002; Gallois 2007).

One of the strengths of the Comaroffs’ (1991; 1997) account of the Southern Tswana’s encounter with British missionaries is the attention given to the ways in which the two cultural orders have come to be understood as two cultural orders as I have mentioned above. As in many parts of the world, ethnicity, “far from being a primordial impulse, was a profoundly historical creation” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 287).

Ethnic consciousness, we would argue, has its origins in encounters between peoples who signify their difference and inequalities ... by cultural means. ... [T]he genesis of their own ethnicity in its modernist sense, occurred in response to the (increasingly unequal) terms in which they were engaged by significant others along the colonial frontier. (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997, 388)

Sahlins (2000, 492) has pointed out that “the people’s humiliation is a double-edged sword” that can be “turned back against foreign dominance.” The “punitive experience of ‘modernization’ risks provoking a self-consciousness of the indigenous culture, as possessed of values better than and distinct from Westernization” (Sahlins 1992, 24). Once it was invented as “culture” through the othering project of the colonizers, it could easily be turned against those who invented it. Comaroff and Comaroff (1991) call this the “consciousness of colonization” (as opposed to the “colonization of consciousness,” discussed earlier). Through the “colonization of consciousness” the “natives” began to “conceive of their own conventions as an integrated, closed ‘system’ ” (18) and this objectification of culture together with the “consciousness of colonization” and its contradictions became the basis for initiatives for cultural revitalization. They have “discovered they have their own ‘culture.’” Before they were just living it. Now their ‘culture’ is a conscious and articulate value. Something to be defended and, if necessary, reinvented” (Sahlins 1992, 24–5).

The memories of experiences of violence and cultural trauma in particular lend themselves well to the subsequent revalorization or formation of ethnic identity in the collective imagination (Antze and Lambek 1996; Alexander et al. 2004; Eyerman 2001). As Lambek and Antze (1996, xv) argue, memory “is widely called upon today to legitimate identity, indeed, to construct it or reconstruct it.” It is
thereby culturally shaped through tropes, idiom, and narrative practice; it is as much the “product of discourses” as it is “narratively and dialogically organized” (Lambek and Antze 1996, xiii, xv).

While previous generations of Aché might have tried their best to overcome the fetters of tradition, to “modernize,” and to forget and abandon their bad habits such as piercing their lips, engaging in club fights, ritual wailing, singing traditional songs, and speaking Aché, for the new generations the value of such practices has changed. Now (re-)constituted as “culture” in collective memory, they have become treasures to be guarded, documented, revitalized, and displayed in annual “cultural weeks.” Missionaries and Bible translators, although maybe the most important agents, are not the only ones that contributed to this reinvention of culture and language and culture by means of language.

In order to close this chapter I will briefly mention five further developments that have further fostered linguistic objectification in relation to the development of Aché ethnicity. Since all of these processes are well-known among endangered language communities (Avineri and Kroskrity 2014) across the world, I will not consider them in detail here.

First, language ideological contact: The increasing contact with the Paraguayan national society and languages brought with it necessarily also the contact with Paraguayan language ideologies. Paraguay is a bilingual country and discourse about its two languages, Guaraní and Spanish in relation to national identity is pervasive in the public sphere. The now global Herderian ideology of language as marker of ethnic and national identities has fallen on fertile ground in Paraguay. This might be due in part to the Guaraní cosmology that I have mentioned in chapter 2, and was certainly influenced also by the role Guaraní played for national resistance in two wars and populist politics of governing elites that sought to diminish the influence of outside powers in the colonial and post-colonial history by fostering Guaraní (Gynan 2001). The Guaraní language is today highly iconic for national identity in Paraguay and it is likely that this iconicity was recursively projected onto Aché (Irvine and Gal 2000), and such ideologies have “trickled down” (Kroskrity 2009a, 196) into local consciousness. Aché language activists highlight the importance of the difference between Aché and Guaraní frequently.

Second, changing legal frameworks: Reflecting the growing international concern about the decrease of linguistic diversity and language endangerment (Hale 1992; Grenoble and Whaley 1998; UN-
ESCO 1997; Evans 2010), in November 2008, Paraguay’s new government approved the *Ley de Lenguas*, the “law of the languages” that would grant the indigenous groups of Paraguay the rights (including rights to resources) to promote their heritage languages (see Errington 2003; Whiteley 2003). The law recognizes the autonomy of indigenous education and guarantees indigenous groups support and resources for the development of a curriculum and an appropriate pedagogical infrastructure respecting the communities’ traditional forms of transmission of knowledge. The Division of Indigenous Education (DGEEI) of the Ministry of Education of Paraguay (MEC) is currently implementing this law in conjunction with newly established cultural councils of all indigenous groups of Paraguay. Casting language maintenance and revitalization as the prime site for cultural maintenance, this law and events such as congresses for indigenous education and workshops for educators continue to contribute to a growing awareness about the fate of minority languages of Paraguay.

Third, language documentation and orthography development: In the same spirit, in 2008 we started the Aché Documentation Project, recording and transcribing myths and other cultural texts (see chapter 1). This project has placed additional emphasis on the traditional language as spoken by the elders, on “authentic” Aché without interferences from other languages, and has developed a standardized orthography together with representatives from the communities. Orthography development has proven a key site where the difference between Aché and Guaraní could be emphasized. At a meeting with representatives from all communities, after a discussion of linguistic and pedagogical principles and comparing several ways in which the Aché language had been written beforehand by anthropologists and missionaries, the Aché decided upon an orthography that would be maximally different from Guaraní. Phonemes specific to Aché were represented by graphemes not present in the Guaraní alphabet. The orthography became thus an iconic representation of the emblematic distinctiveness of the Aché language, a type of second-order iconic index of Aché cultural identity (Silverstein 2003).

Fourth, together with a few concerned individuals from Asunción, a group of Aché have founded an NGO called Centro de Comunicación y Cultura, Ache Djawu / Palabra Aché (Center for communication
and culture, Aché word), aiming at the “revitalization of the Aché language by its own community.”

They have published a book with testimonios of Aché elders, narrated in the Aché language, which has been distributed among the communities. They have also organized a series of events and workshops concerning the Aché language, produced a DVD with documentary videos, and maintain a Facebook page and blog.

Lastly, the Krendy community in which I did my field research won a government-funded project to install a community radio station in the village. The radio was installed in January 2014. Since the first days of operation this radio has proven to be an invaluable platform for metalinguistic and cultural-political discourse and sparked new interest in language revitalization and documentation. Elders have been invited to sing and tell stories on the radio, “improper” language use by younger generations has been discussed, and schoolteachers and elders debated about the correctness or incorrectness of particular linguistic forms.

In all of these ways “language” has become an object that is being claimed and mobilized from interested subjectivities in the sociocultural orders of contemporary Aché society. The Aché language has thus finally arrived among the Aché at the same time as it is on the verge of disappearance. And whether the Aché will succeed or not in their revitalization efforts, the constitution of the Aché language as an object bespeaks profound cultural, ideological, and ontological transformations.

CHAPTER 4

Language as an Interactional Achievement

In the previous chapter I discussed the diachronic emergence of language among the Aché. I have analyzed the historical processes that contributed to language becoming a legitimate object of speakers’ attention, the subject of metalinguistic and metapragmatic discussions, and an important index of ethnic identity to be maintained or revitalized. I have suggested that in the structure of the conjunction of structures of their encounter with Paraguayans and missionaries, the Aché started to conceive of ways of speaking primarily in terms of linguistic form (words, sounds), separable from content and context. The code became arbitrary in what regards the relationship between signifier and signified, but at the same time non-arbitrary in terms of the appropriateness of certain words and sounds for the linguistic indexing of identity. Language became ideologically purified and indexically hybridized at the same time (Bauman and Briggs 2003). The following set of language ideologies is underlying such a notion of language:

(a) There is something like language (type) of which particular languages are instances (tokens).

(b) A specific set of speech practices that resembles those that the elders are imagined to have been using before contact with the Paraguayans is one such token, the “heritage language” of the community, ache djawu.

(c) Languages are not “neutral” categories. A heritage language is the appropriate medium of communication for a given community as it is thought to be linked somehow to ethnicity or indigeneity. But a heritage language might also be seen as backward, outmoded, old-fashioned, and obsolete. There are always multiple and often contradictory language ideologies at play.
What remains to be shown is how these ideologies impact language use in the Aché communities and at the same time, what practices sustain them. If my analysis is correct and language has emerged as an important object in the everyday lifeworld of the Aché today, how does this manifest in everyday interaction? And how is the constitution of language achieved interactionally? Language ideologies range from explicitly held beliefs, available to discursive consciousness, to unstated presuppositions or feelings, deeply rooted in practical consciousness that must be read from language use (Kroskrity 2010). Here I will focus on the latter end of this spectrum and analyze how an ideology of language as code manifests in and is reproduced by children's everyday linguistic behavior, analyzing mainly levels (a) and (b) above. Since the analysis of language ideologies as they surface in children's interactions must also ask how children come to have such ideologies in the first place, I will start with a brief consideration of language socialization.

4.1 Socializing Language Attention

The language socialization paradigm is founded on the premise that “language is a fundamental medium in children's development of social and cultural knowledge and sensibilities” (Ochs and Schieffelin 2011, 1). It is through language that children become “speakers of culture” (7), i.e., that they acquire the social and cultural competence necessary to function as members of a given collective, a “habitus” in Bourdieu’s (1990, [1972] 1977) sense.

The theory of language socialization is informed by the argument that language (structure and use), thought, and culture are interrelated and mutually dependent, known as “linguistic relativity” (Schieffelin and Ochs 1986; Ochs 1988, 1996; Hill and Mannheim 1992; P. Lee 1996; Lucy 1997; Leavitt 2006). This idea, commonly associated with the names of Sapir (1921) and Whorf (1956)—who were influenced by earlier formulations of von Humboldt, Boas, and Bloomfield—holds that while there is no direct way how to infer a particular “world view” as a function from the linguistic structure of a language (linguistic determinism), certain grammatical categories operating below the speakers' metalinguistic awareness can play “a key role in structuring cognitive categories and social fields by constraining the ontology that is taken for granted by speakers” (Hill and Mannheim 1992, 387). Acquiring competence
in a language the novice is by the same token socialized into cultural and ontological presuppositions (Gadamer [1966] 1993).\(^1\) Culture and ontology, in turn, provide the norms of use of language.\(^2\) And knowledge of a language is an important part of being a competent member of a collective. As Schieffelin and Ochs (1986, 163) put it, language socialization encompasses “socialization through the use of language and socialization to use language.”\(^3\)

Knowledge to use a language requires, of course, not only knowledge of the lexicon and grammar but importantly also pragmatic and communicative competence (Hymes 1972). In order to be able to use language appropriately in context, novices need to be sensitive to indexical meanings, i.e., the ways in which linguistic forms are conventionally associated with particular features of context—stances, relationships, thoughts, feelings, knowledge, activities, social identities and the like (Ochs 1990, 1996). The use and nonuse of particular linguistic forms depends on their indexical appropriateness for a given communicative situation and for achieving particular pragmatic goals (Ochs and Schieffelin 1995; Garrett and Baquedano-Lopez 2002; Kulick and Schieffelin 2004).\(^4\) Since the indexical value of linguistic forms is informed by the assumptions that speakers have about them, language ideologies are among the most important aspects of language that novices are socialized into; but they also inform socialization practices in turn (Riley 2011).

Beliefs about how and when children are thought to develop linguistic competence, whether they do so alone or with the help of caregivers, and whether or not acquisition routines or specific linguistic

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1. Grammatically encoded T/V distinctions require speakers to always define their relationship with an interlocutor along those lines in interaction. In the same way, the grammatical encoding of animacy/inanimacy can give clues the ontological status of other beings. In Cashinahua humans and potential humans (most animals but also certain objects) are grammatically distinguished from nonhuman objects (Camargo 2006). In Urarina language, things are not grammatically distinguished from plants, animals, or humans (Walker 2009). If an Aché child learns that the word for the buzz of bees and people’s talk is the same, *djawu*, it will start thinking about both along similar lines.

2. It might be culturally inappropriate to use a honorific T-form to a stranger in France; it depends on the ontological status of a garden plant or of a dog, how (and if) one should speak to it (Descola:1994; Kohn 2013).

3. This parallels the practice theoretical dialectic discussed in the previous chapter, that structures are the outcome of practices, while practices are informed by those structures (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 1990; Giddens 1979).

4. This is crucial for a study of language change. If language mediates children’s development of socio-cultural competence, children mediate a language’s development. How they are socialized into using specific codes and attributing values and indexical meanings to them impacts the evolution of any given language (Garrett and Baquedano-Lopez 2002; Kulick and Schieffelin 2004; Garrett 2011; Nonaka 2011).
forms to speak with children exist, all make important differences for practices of socialization (S. B. Heath 1982; Ochs and Schieffelin 1984; Ochs 1988; Schieffelin 1990; Kulick 1992, 1998; Bunte 2009). For example, like many communities the Aché do not regard children as conversational partners. This does not mean that children are completely ignored or never spoken to by adults. As soon as babies utter sounds that might be interpretable as words, parents and older siblings start engaging in dyadic exchanges with them, usually only consisting of a single word. This word is spoken to the child who is expected to speak it back, which in turn triggers the caregiver to repeat it again and so forth, ten to fifteen turns in one sequence. If the word refers to a person or object that is co-present in the interaction the caregiver often gestures at it, not with the hand but with a head nod, eye movement, or maybe a pointed lips gesture (Sherzer 1973). As soon as children are older they are verbally directed to collaborate in everyday activities, such as getting water or running errands. These directives usually take imperative forms. Parents also frequently direct children not to do certain things.

But children are not thought to be legitimate initiators of a communicative exchange. They are rarely sanctioned to produce the first pair part of an adjacency pair. If they do so they are ignored—and that happens quite frequently. I have come to notice a stark discrepancy between children’s disposition to ask questions and parents’ reluctance to answer them. Children frequently ask questions—even questions to which the answer is obvious—but parents almost never respond. For example, on a hunting trek, a hunter is calling from afar as he has spotted some prey. A hunter from the camp where the children are runs off. The children know that the other adults in the camp know what prey he is being called for and ask whether it is a paca or an armadillo or a peccary. But no adult replies. The children are completely ignored. At home in the community as well, children often ask questions about what is going on elsewhere but no adult ever answers these questions. Making small children repeat words, directing children to do or not do certain things, or ignoring their questions are all language socialization routines that teach children culturally appropriate behavior.

Children are used to collaborating with adults in activities related to foraging, such as gathering fruits and larvae, cleaning the camp from shrubs, or setting up campfires, but also in the village in household activities or tending gardens. While children are scolded if they do not fulfill adults’ expectations they are rarely explicitly told how to do it (see de León 2015). They are expected to learn by
what Rogoff et al. (2003) have called “intent participation,” and, more recently, “learning by observing and pitching in” (Rogoff 2014). Intent participation is the predominant mode of socializing children among many hunting and gathering collectives (Hewlett and Lamb 2005).

Children everywhere learn by observing and listening-in on activities of adults and other children. Learning through keen observation and listening, in anticipation of participation, seems to be especially valued and emphasized in communities where children have access to learning from informal community involvement. They observe and listen with intent concentration and initiative, and their collaborative participation is expected when they are ready to help in shared endeavors. (Rogoff et al. 2003, 176)

Younger children often rely on their older siblings and peers to copy the ways in which they participate in community life. Older children are important secondary caregivers of their younger siblings as soon as these are able to walk (Weisner and Gallimore 1977). Among the Aché as among other recently sedentarized hunter-gatherer groups (Hirasawa 2005; Takada 2010), responsibility for child care has shifted towards older siblings after settlement.

In order to become competent members of their community, children must not only learn cultural and linguistic norms, but also how to interpret, move within, and attend to the environment that surrounds them, composed of living beings, material objects, and culturally significant spaces. To orient novices “to notice and value certain salient and relevant activities, persons, artifacts, and features of the natural ecology” (Ochs and Schieffelin 2011, 8), is one of the most important tasks of socialization practices, whether explicit or implicit. Language socialization is thus first and foremost the “education of attention” (Gibson [1979] 2014, 243) through culturally specific practices into culturally specific modes of perceiving the world, interacting with it, and orienting oneself in it, as many researchers have pointed out (James 1891; Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2012; Ochs and Schieffelin 1984; Csordas 1990; Ingold 1991; Descola 2009; Throop 2010; Brown 2011).

The analysis of everyday face-to-face interaction between children and adults across societies showed that in the process of becoming acceptable members of their community, children are made to participate in a range of social acts realized (predominantly but never exclusively) through

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5 This also holds true for discourse genres such as singing. An elder women explicitly answered my curious question about whether the children were instructed to sing traditional songs, explaining that her granddaughter would develop that skill by herself when she was old enough.
speaking that are explicitly aimed at directing and redirecting their social, emotional, and moral engagement with their surrounding world—a world made of people, animals, food, artifacts, things of nature, and, at times, spirits or other kinds of supernatural beings. (Duranti 2009, 205–6)

Most important for the discussion here, language itself, while being the most important medium of socialization can at the same time be attended to as a meaningful entity of the lifeworld. As novices are socialized into particular language ideologies (Riley 2011), they are also socialized into perceiving language in certain ways. And as they learn how to attend to dogs, tractors, people, fire, or bugs, they also learn how to attend (or not attend) to language. In other words, whether or not (or to what extent) language is a relevant and salient object in the everyday lifeworld of a given community depends on the socialization of its members into a culturally specific mode of attending to a certain set of (mostly verbal) behaviors as language—into an ideology of language as code.

In light of the discussion of Amerindian language ideologies in chapter 2, the code is, of course, not the only aspect of language that can be turned into an object or that speakers can become metalinguistically aware of. Which features are highlighted and made salient depends on specific local ideologies and socialization practices. But for the discussion here I will concentrate on the code. In chapter 3 I have discussed that in the encounter with Paraguayans and missionaries and more recently as a part of ethnic identity formation and a response to language endangerment, the Aché started to conceive of their speech practices primarily as defined by what Jakobson ([1956] 1980) calls the code. In the following sections I will discuss data that shows how such a conception surfaces in children's everyday interactions, while at the same time being sustained through specific strategic employments of the code.

The most important site where children's conscious and creative use of the code comes to the fore are interactions in the peer group. The peer group is the primary site of socialization of children into the larger collective of which they are part, where children learn affective stances, evaluate and assess each other's behavior, negotiate social hierarchies and group membership (M. H. Goodwin 1990, 1998, 2006; Kyratzis 2004; de León 2007; Goodwin and Kyratzis 2011). Here children explore different roles and relationships and how they are enacted through the use of language. The use of different language forms by children holds a wealth of information about language ideologies and social and
cultural identities, as children creatively employ them in playful interaction, especially, but not only, in multilingual settings (Cazden 1974; Cekaite and Aronsson 2004; Aronsson 2011; Paugh 2012; Minks 2013; García-Sánchez 2014; Gilmore 2015). It is in these playful exchanges—“the fun, the fantasy, the giggles, the joyful intensity, the delightful mischievousness, and the close bonds of friendship that fill the lives of young children” (Gilmore 2015, 36)—where the power of language to create context, to bring about different interactional framings, and to enact shifts in the worlds that they are inhabiting is most salient. Thereby, language is not only a powerful means to achieve changes in the ways in which people and objects are perceived and attended to in playful interaction, but language itself can become an object of play as we will see in the examples in the next section.

4.2 Metalinguistic Repairs and Language Play

I will begin with the example of a repair that I opened the introduction with. Let us recall, in conversation analytic terms a repair is the interruption of ongoing talk in order to attend to any type of trouble with it (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977; Hayashi, Raymond, and Sidnell 2013a). The repair acts on a particular part or aspect of the preceding utterance, which is repeated, corrected, or substituted. The troubling part is preserved in modified form (C. Goodwin 2013, forthcoming) and therefore “highlighted” (C. Goodwin 1994) for the participants. It is constituted as trouble through the repair operation. A metalinguistic repair is a repair where the trouble is the code that was used and where the repair operation is the substitution of the item in question with a referentially equivalent term from a different language, thereby highlighting the code.

4.2.1 Repairs for the Anthropologist

Here is the interaction again. I am including the full transcript with three tiers for marking each morpheme for the language it corresponds to concerning the lexicon/etymology (blue), phonetics/phonology (pink), and morphosyntax (orange), as I have explained in detail in chapter 1.
Setting: A group of children have been playing in the trees in front of a small wooden house. They make plans to go and hide in the nearby bushes and as they notice me following them with my video camera, six-year-old Pikygi turns to me to let me know.6

1 PIKYGI: (Ore) hota ka'aguypE.

We’ll go to the forest.

2 BUPIGI: Kwewe, ha’ekuera guatata kadji.

Kwe’we ha’e-kuera guata-ta kadji
Kwewegi 3-PL walk-PROSP forest
– G-G B-G A
– G-G G-B A
– B-G A-B A

Kwewegi, they will go to the forest.

3 (?): Kadji

kadji
Forest

4 ALL: ((general laughter))

6 Legend: □ lexicon; □ phonetics; □ morphosyntax. Kwewegi is the name I have been given.
We can describe this repair as an “other-replacement.” Someone other than the speaker of the trouble source repairs it by embedding an alternative term in a subsequent utterance. Jefferson (1987) distinguishes between “exposed” and “embedded” correction, depending on whether it is designed to shift the ongoing interaction towards the correction itself as the main activity to be accomplished, or whether it is meant to go unnoticed and embedded in subsequent talk. Here Bupigi’s “correction” seems to be of the “embedded” type. He does not overtly address the trouble, he does not turn to Pikygi to induce her to “repair” her utterance but simply provides an alternative, offering a replacement. However, the repetition of the word kadji in line 3 might be seen as “exposing” the correction and making it available to further elaboration by the others, specifically by Bupigi’s brother Kwategi—part of the group on their way to the forest that Pikygi referred to by the first person exclusive pronoun ore—who echoes Bupigi’s repair and expands on it (lines 5 and 6).

The main target of the repair is ka’aguy, which is being replaced by kadji, and Bupigi also substitutes guata for ho. I have argued in chapter 1 that Bupigi here shows awareness of the code that Pikygi used, mainly on the lexical level, substituting the Guaraní word for “forest” with its Aché equivalent. I have further argued that replacing the word “go” (ho) with “walk” (guata) also hints at semantic, pragmatic, and morphosyntactic considerations. The appropriate way to express that one is walking through the forest in Aché uses kadji and the verb wata—given that kadji cannot take the locative suffix -pe, which in turn would be required by ho—and Bupigi’s intention was to produce a well-formed Aché utterance.
After Bupigi’s intervention the others turn around, realize what he has done, repeat the word *kadji* and all start giggling. Bupigi’s brother then takes the repair up and also turns to me, now correctly informing me of their plan to go to the *kadji* (see chapter 1 for a detailed analysis of the linguistic construction of this sequence).

A number of observations are in order. First, Pikygi’s utterance as such can be seen as a type of meta-commentary on what they are going to do. After noticing me with the video camera, she momentarily departs from the course of action (walking towards the bushes) to explain it to me. The others are not involved here. Bupigi now intervenes in the interaction between Pikygi and me and initiates a side sequence (Jefferson 1972). The aspect of Pikygi’s utterance that was highlighted by the repair was the code that she used, the unmarked way they usually talk, Guaraché. Bupigi carefully crafted his utterance as a metalinguistic repair, providing the way Pikygi should have addressed me, in Aché. At first, this can be seen simply as following the conversational principle of recipient design. According to Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974, 727), recipient design refers to how “talk by a party in a conversation is constructed or designed in ways which display an orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the co-participants.” For example, if I were unable to understand Guaraché, displaying sensitivity to me as a participant in the conversation would involve switching to a language I understand. The explanation for this repair could then have been that Bupigi perceived my lack of comprehension and provided an ad hoc translation. This was not the case here, since I do understand Guaraché and the children were aware of this. But recipient design does not only concern understanding, and any attribute of the recipient deemed relevant in the conversation. The choice of an honorific register or of baby talk, for example, are the result of recipient design. In multilingual contexts people often use different codes to talk to different participants depending not only on their perceived competence, but also on their relationship to each other (Auer 1998a; Woolard 2004). Speakers need not necessarily be aware of their use of different codes; recipient-based code choice is often part of practical but not discursive consciousness (Giddens 1979). In our case, however, the fact that it is a repair suggests Bupigi is certainly discursively aware of the code and that the design of the utterance was a deliberate decision.
Before taking the analysis of this repair any further, let me add another example of a metalinguistic repair that illustrates the effect of recipient design for the choice of code when talking to me quite well.

Transcript 4.1

Setting: A group of children has followed one of the adults to the nearby fields to help planting manioc. A number of them soon are engaged in play. I am alternating between filming the ones playing and the ones working. Under a tree a couple of yards away a baby tapir is lying down. The animal was brought home from a previous forest trek as a pet animal. One of the children, Membogi (6), is encouraging me to film it.

1 Membogi: EY CH:: (.4) EY EH ((comes walking towards me))

2 Enoẽmi:: mbo::mbyry bori–? ((points to tapir))

3 Brovi,

7 Legend:  ■ lexicon;  ■ phonetics;  ■ morphosyntax.
The word for tapir is *brewi* in Aché and *borevi* in Guaraní. The differences between the two words are typical for Aché–Guaraní distinction. The first vowel of the three-syllable Guaraní word *borevi* is elided in Aché in order to conform to the Aché preference for bisyllabic stems, thereby producing the word-initial consonant cluster, which is one of the main distinguishing phonological features of Aché. While I have heard both versions among the children in casual interactions, Membogi is here deliberately trying to produce the Aché version for me, but has problems pronouncing it right. Unlike the previously analyzed metalinguistic repair, this is a self-repair (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977; Levelt 1983). He starts with *bori* (line 2), realizes he got it wrong and self-repairs in line 3. But he got it wrong again, *brovi*. He restarts the sentence in line 4 and now manages to produce the correct form, *brewi*. Note that the word for tapir is the only plain Aché word in this interaction.

These two metalinguistic repairs imply that Membogi and Bupigi take the code Aché to be preferable over Guaraché or Guaraní for talking to me. As the recipient of their utterances, they attempt at designing them in a way that conforms to what they assume to be Aché, i.e., *ache djawu*. Why am I an “*ache djawu*-worthy” interlocutor to them? What are the language ideologies that inform their code choice? I usually talk back to them in (unmarked) Guaraché, not in Aché, so their aim is certainly not to match how I talk.
As mentioned in chapter 1, when I first visited the Aché communities I was a member of a team to document their language. We were mostly interviewing and recording the elders, who performed traditional Aché speech genres such as songs and wailing, told us their life history narratives and myths, mostly in what was perceived as “pure” Aché. As part of the documentation we also organized meetings about language revitalization and orthography development together with teachers and community activists. And we did linguistic research on the Aché language through grammatical elicitations and the transcription of the recordings together with community members. Thus, my association with the Aché was largely mediated in the first years through work on their heritage language. This has most certainly not escaped the children’s attention.

For my doctoral dissertation research I made explicit that I was not interested in original or traditional Aché, ache djawu, but in the way the children speak in general, kromi djawu (child speech), how they grow up learning to speak different languages, what languages they use, and how they learn them. However, given my previous interests and given the importance that Aché has acquired in the communities in language activism and revitalization efforts, I am sure my points were not taken very
seriously by community members. And, although I never observed it, to demonstrate allegiance to their heritage language and interest in language revitalization, I suspect that parents and other caregivers might have explicitly told their children to talk to me in Aché.

More importantly though, children must be seen as active participants that have their own ideas, goals, and interpretations of the various communicative situations in which they are involved, and their use of Aché and other languages, especially in a metalinguistic repair such as the ones that I am analyzing, cannot be attributed solely to their caregivers’ instruction. Therefore, my previous role in the communities as language documentation researcher primarily associated with the elders should not be seen as a “status,” which would require them to talk to me in Aché, but rather as a resource that the children explore for their own ends, often in playful ways. For them I might be a kind of a playground on which they can test out their language skills. My fieldnotes include many examples that would support such an interpretation. Here is one example.

Transcript 4.2

Quoted from fieldnotes: A few children have come to visit me in my room behind the storehouse. Bupigi comes up to me to ask for a cup of water.8

1 BUPIGI: Kwewe cho tykuwerã y:::

Kwewe cho tyku-werã y
Kwewe ISG drink-PROSP water
– A A-A B
– A B-B B
– B A-B B

Kwewe I want to drink wa:::ter

Bupigi would not use such a well-formed Aché sentence, using the highly marked first person pronoun cho and the Aché prospective suffix -werã, only to request water, but rather to say, “Hey, look how I am speaking to you, could you give me some water?”

8 Fieldnotes, November 26, 2013, 7:40am. Legend: □ lexicon; □ phonetics; □ morphosyntax.
Here is the same type of interaction with Bupigi and two other children. I am quoting at length from my fieldnotes.

Transcript 4.3

*Quoted from fieldnotes*: Bupigi, Gunegi, and Irongi are in my room. Tokangi [the father of two of them] just left after having been drinking tereré with me. There is still some [iced] water left in the thermos. The children ask me (I do not know who started):⁹

1 **ALL:** Çhe tykuwerã, çhe tykuwerã (*repeated multiple times*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>çhe</th>
<th>tyku-werã</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ISG</td>
<td>drink-prosp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>A-A</td>
<td>G A-A</td>
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<td>G</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>A-B</td>
<td>B A-B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I want to drink, I want to drink

In one of these “çhe tykuwerã” turns I ask Gunegi as if I had not understood:

2 **KWEWEGI:** Ba’e?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ba’e</th>
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<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>what</td>
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<td>A</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

What?

3 **GUNEGI:** Çhe tykuta

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>çhe</th>
<th>tyku-ta</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ISG</td>
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I want to drink

My question has here initiated a repair, but this time into the other direction. Gunegi substitutes the Aché prospective suffix -werã with its Guaraní equivalent -ta. Having been happily repeating çhe

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⁹ Fieldnotes, November 19, 2013, 5pm. **Legend:**  ■ lexicon;  ■ phonetics;  ■ morphosyntax.
tykuwerã with his siblings, my question threw him off and he became uncertain and now produces the “correct” Guaraché version of the sentence. Let us see what the fieldnotes reveal of what happens next.

Transcript 4.4

Quoted from fieldnotes: They drink their water. After that they start hitting each other with the red pillow. ... The game continues for a while. At some point, Gunegi, with the pillow in his hand, exits through the door saying in a low voice as if talking to himself:

1 Gunegi: "Che pachotawerãº

che pacho-ta-werã

1SG hit-PROSP-PROSP

G A-G-A

G A-B-B

A ‘-?-?

°I will will hit°

Gunegi has now combined the Aché and Guaraní prospective markers and put both one after the other on the word for “hit.” While che pacho-ta-werã is ungrammatical in either language from a linguistic point of view, it shows that Gunegi is here playing with different suffixes as if to try them out and see how they sound or what they do.

This little sequence is a rich example how children playfully experiment with different linguistic forms that they encounter in their everyday lifeworld. Using a specific code or switching from one to the other in a repair are never only requirements of participants or interactional context, but rather expressive and creative means that children explore for a variety of interactional ends. “Language” is here easily converted into a toy just like the red pillow they were playing with (Cazden 1974; Paugh 2012; Minks 2013; Gilmore 2015).

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10 Fieldnotes, November 19, 2013, 5pm. Legend: □ lexicon; □ phonetics; □ morphosyntax.
4.2.2 Shifting Frames in Play

Understanding it in terms of playing with language will also further illuminate my analysis of the earlier example, involving Pikygi, Bupigi, and Kwategi. Let us recall, the children are on their way to the forest, Pikygi turns to me to comment on their plan, Bupigi intervenes with a metalinguistic repair and thereby calls the others’ attention towards the interaction with me. The others laugh and finally his brother reframes and thereby resolves the repair. Here is the transcript one more time.

Transcript 1.9

Setting: A group of children have been playing in the trees in front of a small wooden house. They make plans to go and hide in the nearby bushes and as they notice me following them with my video camera, six-year-old Pikygi turns to me to let me know."

1 PIKYGI: (Ore) hota ka'aguype.

We'll go to the forest.

(1)

2 BUPIGI: Kwewe, ha'ekuera guatata kadji.

Kwewegi, they will go to the forest.

(.5)

Legend:  ■ lexicon;  ■ phonetics;  ■ morphosyntax. Kwewegi is the name I have been given.
3  (?)  Ka|dji
   kadji
   forest
   A
   A
   A

Forest

4  ALL:  [(general laughter)]

5  KWE|TUG|I:  KweWE, ORE HOTA AMO– () KAD|JI ogape,
   Kwewe  ore  ho-ta  amo  kadji  oga-pe
   Kwewegi  plex  go-prosp  dem  forest  house-loc
   –     B    G-G    G   A     G-B
   –     B    G-B    B   A     B-B
   –     B    A-B    B   A     B-B

Kwewegi, we’ll go there– () to the forest home,

6  KAD|JI oga (.) ORE WE|DJATA depe.
   kadji  oga  ore  wedja-ta  de-pe
   forest  house  plex  leave-prosp  2sg-dom
   A     G    B    A-G    B-B
   A     G    B    A-B    B-B
   A     B    B    A-B    B-A

Forest home (.2) we’ll leave you behind.

We might analyze these shifts of attention as what M. H. Goodwin (1996, 2006), expanding on Goffman’s (1979) concept of “footing,” calls “shifting frames.” A change of footing occurs when the framing of the interaction changes, which usually goes hand in hand with shifts in the alignment, stance, posture, or language of the participants (4–5). A frame is the “structure of intelligibility” of an interaction, for example, “whether a communication is to be heard as serious or playful” (M. H. Goodwin 1996, 71). The first such shift of frame is Pikygi’s utterance. She turns away from her playmates and enters into a facing formation and a brief interaction with me. The interactional frame here is a reflexive frame, an interaction about another interaction.

Bupigi now enacts a second shift in the interactional frame. His utterance is a second-order reflexive interaction. His repair acts as a commentary about Pikygi’s commentary, more precisely, about
one aspect of it, about the language she used. Bupigi’s intervention thereby manages to shift the attention of the entire group of children towards the interaction with me. The ongoing action has been suspended, all children turn around and attend to the new activity that has become relevant. From going to hide in the bushes they turn to engaging with me in meta-talk about what they were going to do. The entire group is thus “shifting frame” from one interactional intelligibility structure to another. But by enacting a metalinguistic repair, Bupigi not only manages to shift the group to a reflexive interactional frame but at the same time manages to create another frame of play. His shift of language in addressing me creates a new game in which language has become the object of play (Paugh 2012; Minks 2013).

Now let us look more closely at how Bupigi’s simple replacement caused this shift in the entire group. The children are walking away from me, only Pikygi briefly turns around for her comment. Bupigi comes from behind directly addressing me, causing me to turn around. He is talking to me, he does not overtly try to get the attention of his playmates. However, his utterance is loud enough for the others to hear it; they are most certainly ratified overhearers, intended indirect recipients of the utterance (Goffman 1979, 7–9; Schieffelin 1990). Thus, while it seems to be constructed as an “embedded” replacement (Jefferson 1987), Bupigi’s intention was not necessarily for it to go unnoticed and we must not think of the utterance designed only for me as the recipient. It was certainly meant to be overheard by the others as indirect, or second-order, co-recipients.12 His intentions were clear to his playmates. Noticing Bupigi’s use of the word kadji they immediately recognized the interactional frame to which he intended to shift, and exposed and expanded it.

This suggests that the Aché language was already constituted as a potential object of play and kadji as a pragmatically salient (Errington 1988) marker of it, so that Bupigi could easily mobilize it in his utterance. Within a context of language activism and frequent metalinguistic discussions, language teaching in school, and an environment where different languages are heard frequently on the radio and TV and in interactions with outsiders, language is a readily available resource for children to

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12 Maybe even I am even the second-order recipient. A possible alternative analysis would be that the first-order indirect recipients were his playmates and that their interpretation of his utterance hinged on me being the direct but second-order recipient. Most likely both interpretations are correct, each addressing a different communicational level.
explore. It took half a second silence for processing the information and an unidentified speaker to repeat the word *kadji* (line 3) for all of them to start laughing.

Laughter is a multifaceted conversational device that can be used to accomplish a variety of different actions. Never merely expressing a given “inner state,” laughter is used to act on a particular aspect of a prior utterance or interaction, such as its playfulness, humor, or inappropriateness—thereby also marking it as playful, humorous, or inappropriate—for covering-up certain interactional mishaps as, for example, a lack of understanding, or for the display of mutual understanding and affinity, affiliation or disaffiliation (Jefferson 1972, 1985; Sacks 1974; O’Donnell-Trujillo and Adams 1983; Jefferson, Sacks, and Schegloff 1987; Glenn 2003). In the interaction at hand the laughter of the children in line 4 functions as a second pair part to the repair initiation by Bupigi, displaying the acknowledgement of the humorous intent of the speaker and alignment with him, not unlike the laughter invited by a joke (Sacks 1974). The 0.5 second silence is here likely due to processing time on part of the intended overhearers, given that they were not engaged in conversation with Bupigi at the time of his intervention and walking away from us. When the unidentified speaker in line 3 repeats *kadji* all immediately start laughing, thereby recognizing and constituting Bupigi’s utterance as laughable and accepting Bupigi’s shift of frame. Bupigi’s brother Kwategi then extends the response sequence initiated by the laughter and reframes Bupigi’s utterance from his perspective (*ore hota*, “we will go”).

Bupigi’s repair caused laughter because it was funny. And why was it funny? Because Aché is not the way they usually talk. It is archaic, it is outdated, it is out of context, it is “grandparents’ talk.” There might be a large variety of different associations that it evokes for the children. There might be even a mock aspect of using it (J. H. Hill 1998a). Such is the case with adolescents who I have been observing frequently to explicitly make fun of the way the elder generations speak, by using expressions and sounds that are distinctively Aché or Guaraché. For example, they use the voiceless palato-alveolar affricate [ʧ] in words of Spanish origin to replace either the voiceless alveolar sibilant [s], as in achuka for azúcar (sugar), or the voiceless alveolar plosive–flap consonant cluster [tɾ], as in ocho for otro (other). Another mock feature is the use of Aché grammatical morphemes that are no longer used, as in *pacho eme* instead of *ani pacho* (don’t hit). *Eme* is an Aché prohibitive modal, but the only form used today across generations is the Guaraní preposition *ani*.

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Lastly the Aché negative suffix -llà that has been substituted in Guaraché with the Guaraní circumfix n(d)- ... -i is also used for mocking as I have experienced myself. A few minutes after the repair sequence just analyzed, some of the children return to playing with Aché, this time explicitly to make fun of me. They turn to me, say cho kwallà and everybody laughs and giggles.\textsuperscript{13} This particular mock practice is due to the fact that, in the early months of my fieldwork, when I did not yet fully understand what the children were asking me I would often respond with cho kwallà, “I don’t know,” using the Aché that I knew from the documentation project. No one uses cho kwa-llà (1SG know-NEG) and rather Guaraní nd-ai-kua-i (NEG-1SG-know-NEG). My use of the archaic form to show my lack of understanding had caused considerable amusement among the children and ever since they have been making fun of me by repeating this phrase, even though I adapted pretty quickly to talking in Guaraché with them.

\textsuperscript{13} Fieldnotes, November 16, 2013, 5:25pm.
This inevitably brings me to the question about the relationship between me and my data. If my presence is causing the children to engage in these metalinguistic repairs and playing with languages, can I take my data to be representative of their normal everyday engagement with and awareness of languages? Is the data that I have collected not skewed by my presence as outsider? I am studying the results of a long history of contact of the Aché with Paraguayans and other outsiders. Throughout the past decades the Aché communities were frequented by outsiders with a variety of interests and backgrounds that spoke other languages, such as missionaries, Bible translators, social workers, government officials, construction workers, anthropologists, and linguists. Some missionaries still live in the communities and Paraguayan school teachers are employed in the schools. They are all part of the post-contact community life of the Aché. A community radio was installed in 2014 while I was there and radio hosts would frequently talk about language, shift back and forth between Aché, Guaraní, and Spanish, and invite elders to discuss language issues and perform traditional genres. The Aché are exposed to other languages through other radio stations and on a few television sets that some possess. And lastly, the children are explicitly instructed in different languages in the schools. My presence does not distort the picture I would get without myself because there is no picture to distort. I am a part of their multilingual, language-aware environment.

Yet I am only a part. Metalinguistic awareness and “languages” as objects of play or discussion also surface in interactions that do not involve me or other adults. In what follows I will turn to three interactions in which my only role is that of the videographer and which demonstrate further aspects of language awareness among the Aché children.

4.2.3 Enacting Roles

The first interaction takes place in early December, and involves Gunegi, Djawagi, and Anegi. Gunegi is the same six-year-old boy who has experimented above with the two prospective suffixes -ta and -werä. Djawagi is another boy of around the same age. Anegi is a nine-year-old girl, Gunegi’s cousin. Warukugi, now almost two years, is Gunegi’s baby sister.
Transcript 4.5

Setting: Many children are playing outside. Some are engaged in hopscotch, others are dragging each other around on a big plastic plane, still others are sitting on the ground playing with sand and little stones. Among this latter group are Gunegi, Djawagi, and Anegi. The hopscotch players are nearby and the three are partly watching them, partly engaged in their own interaction. All of a sudden, without any prompt Gunegi imitates the ringtone of a cellphone.¹⁴

1 GUNEGI: Tilili ti (puts left hand to ear))
   Tilili ti (imitating cellphone sound))
   (1.9)

2 Tilili tili (tamyĩ ocho myĩ) (gesticulating wildly with right hand))
   Tilili tili (tamyĩ ocho myĩ) (unintelligible word-sounds)

3 DJAWAGI: (briefly looks at Gunegi, then also imitates a phonecall))

4 (screaming and laughter from hopscotch game))

5 KANDJEGI: (comes jumping very fast over hopscotch fields))

6 ANEGI: (laughs, looking at hopscotch game))

7 Pya'e vai oho Kandjegi oho.
   pya'e vai oho Kandjegi oho
   fast bad go Kandjegi go
   G G G – G
   G G G – G
   B B G – G
   Kandjegi went super fast.

8 WARUKUGI: (comes crawling towards Gunegi and Djawagi, holds a stone in her stretched out hand))

9 GUNEGI: Çhe ipope me'ẽta.
   çhe ipo-pe me'ẽ-ta
   ISG hand-LOC give-PROSP
   G A-B B-G
   G B-B B-B
   B B-B A-B
   She’s gonna put it into my hand.

¹⁴ Legend: ■ lexicon; ■ phonetics; ■ morphosyntax.

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10  WARUKUGI:  
((hands stone to her brother))  

11  DJAWAGI:  Eme’ê ramo?  
e-me’ê  ramo  
IMP-give EGRESS  
G-B  B  
B-B  B  
G-G  G  
Give it back to her?  

12  GUNEGI:  Hola ba’eteko çha’a.  
((putting the hand holding the stone to his ear))  

13  ((throws stone away))  

14  ANEGI:  (h)h(h)h(h)h\[(h).hã::  

15  DJAWAGI:  [(h)h(h)h(h)h  
(h)h(h)(h)h  

16  ANEGI:  “Mb(h)a’(h)e(h)t(h)eko” he’i (h)h (h)h(h)ha  
mba’-teko  he’i  
thing-life  3.say  
G-G  G  
G-B  G  
G-G  B  
“W(h)h(h)a(h)c’(h)s up,” he said (h)h (h)h(h)ha  

17  GUNE (.) “Hola ba’eteko.”  

Gune  hola  mba’-teko  
Gune  hello  thing-life  
–  S  G-G  
–  S  G-B  
–  S  G-G  

GUNE (.) “Hello what’s up.”
In line 2 Gunegi is pretending to be talking on the imaginary cellphone in his hand. The words tamyĩ ocho myĩ are not intelligible but imitate the sound of spoken discourse in a different language. Ocho might hint at the Spanish word otro (other), myĩ could be Guaraní moĩ (put), but it is clear that Gunegi was not aiming at producing an intelligible message, but to imitate the form of speaking on a cellphone in order to accurately embody the role of a call recipient (see Minks 2013). Djawagi picks up Gunegi’s role play and also imitates answering a call, but at that moment some action is going on in the hopscotch game and they are distracted by that. Then Gunegi’s baby sister, Warukugi, comes crawling from behind in order to hand him a stone (lines 8–11). In Gunegi’s hand the stone is now immediately converted to a “real” phone and with the new device he returns to his earlier activity (Note multiple shifts in interactional frames here). Now he correctly addresses the caller with an intelligible utterance (line 12).

*Hola* is the Spanish word for “hello” used widely in Paraguay across languages, genres, and registers. *Mba’ete*ko (thing-life) is a common greeting in Guaraní translating as “What’s up?” or “How’s life?” and equally widespread. *Çha’a* is a contraction of the colloquial Guaraní expression čhe ra’a, “my friend,” mostly used between men indexing solidarity; it roughly corresponds in tone to the English “dude” (Kiesling 2004), as I have mentioned in chapter 1. Now Gunegi did catch Anegi’s attention and she and Djawagi both burst out in laughter (lines 14 and 15). Anegi picks up her cousin’s utterance and highlights it as laughable by repeating and quoting *mba’ete*ko and *hola mba’ete*ko (lines 16 and 17).

Similar to Bupigi’s metalinguistic repair that I have discussed extensively above, the joke that causes Anegi’s and Djawagi’s laughter is the code. Gunegi produces a phrase that is not only intelligible as appropriate to the opening sequence of a phone conversation, but also intelligible as belonging to a specific language, Guaraní. And the code that triggers his playmates’ laughter here is not Aché but Guaraní. Gunegi’s earlier unintelligible attempt at the opening of a phone conversation (line 2) did not result in laughter or call others’ attention, probably also because it got drowned in the other interactions. His well articulated Guaraní greeting in line 12 had a very different effect. By repeating and thus highlighting (C. Goodwin 1994) *mba’ete*ko, Anegi is pointing out Gunegi’s word choice as something that stands out from the rest of what is going on in the many micro-interactions that are occurring during their play. It is not that it would be exceptional to greet someone on the phone in
Guaraní. This is how most Aché would answer the phone today, and incorporating a cellphone into his play, Gunegi is also accurately incorporating the interactional routines surrounding it. His language use, though, is different from the ways in which the Aché children and their parents usually interact, and Anegi is attending to that fact and pointing it out. The next example takes place a month later.

**Transcript 4.6**

**Setting:** A group of children is climbing the trees next to the soccer field in the center of the village. Irongi (7), Pikygi (6), Bupigi (6), and Wachugi (5) are high up in the tree looking for fruits to throw down. Kwategi (7) is standing on a branch half way up. Gunegi (6) has just started to climb the tree from below and is approaching Kwategi. Anegi (9) is walking towards the tree. Bupigi is calling for Anegi and Kwategi to come (probably to catch some fruit).15

1 **BUPIGI:** ANE:: KWA[TE:: EDJU PYA:E:: ((shouting from high up))

   Ane Kwate e-dju pya’e
   Anegi Kwategi IMP-come fast
   – – G-B G
   – – B-A G
   – – G-B B

   ANEGI:: KWATEGI:: COME QUI::CK

2 **ANEGL** 

   [Gune eguedjy raẽ ((tries to get Gunegi to stop climbing))

   Gune e-guedjy raẽ
   Gunegi IMP-descend first
   – – G-G B
   – – B-G B
   – – G-G B

   Gunegi, come down first

3 **WACHUGI:** Çhe guedjy raẽ-ta ((from somewhere high up))

   çhe guedjy raẽ-ta
   1SG descend first-PROSP
   G G B-G
   G GA B-B
   B A B-B

   I’ll go down first

   (1.4)

15 Legend: □ lexicon; ■ phonetics; □ morphosyntax.
4 ANEGI:  
((to Gunegi from below)) DJEINA

djei-na
get.away-ATTEN
G-G
A-B
B-G

GET OUT OF MY WAY

(2)

5 KWATEGI:  
((to Gunegi from above)) EgueDjY

e-guedjy
IMP-descend
G-G
B-GA
G-G

Go [back] DOWN;;;;

6 GUNEGI:  
((starts climbing down again))

(1.6)

7 KWATEGI:  De wa’ata ina.

de  wa’a-ta   ina
2SG  fall-prosp  prog
B   A-G   G
A   A-B    B
B   A-B    B

You're gonna fall.

8 ANEGI:  (h)h(h)

9 KWATEGI:  Wawerã?

wa-werã
fall-Prosp
A-A
A-A
A-B

You're gonna fall?

10 ANEGI:  (h)h(h)h(h) .h(h)
11 KWATEGI: Wawerá?
wa-wērā
fall-prosp
A-A
A-A
A-B

You're gonna fall?

12 ANEGI: Lladju vai čha’a eru
lladju vai čha’a eru
ripe bad dude bring
A  G  G  A
A  G  G  B
B  B  G  B

The fruit is overripe, dude, give it to me

13 KWATEGI: LA::: PUTA::::::: (someone on a branch above him is climbing down)
la puta
det whore
S  S
S  S
S  S

GO:::DDAMNI:::::::T

(1.4)

14 TU::: ÇHE WA’ATA:::
tu čhe wa’a-ta
ideo 1sg fall-prosp
A  G  A-G
A  G  A-B
A  B  A-B

TU::: I'M GONNA FALL

15 ANEGI: EYTYPAGE
e-yty-pa-ke
imp-let.fall-compl-intns
G-A-B-G
B-B-B-B
G-G-B-G

COME ONE, THROW IT (referring to the fruit)

Anegi and Kwategi are bothered by Gunegi's attempt to climb the tree and make him come back down again (lines 2–6). In line 7 Kwategi says de wa’ata ina (you're going to fall down), a phrase that is
associated with adults getting their children to stop climbing the trees. The Aché children climb every
tree they can in and around the village or on hunting treks to find fruits, little bugs, or just for fun.
Caregivers and other adult onlookers often half-heartedly call them to come back down by warning
them with the phrases de wa’a-ta ina or de ho’a-ta ina (2SG fall-prosp prog). Wa’a and ho’a are the two
renderings in Aché and Guaraní of the cognate verb “to fall,” Guaraní -ta and ina mark prospective and
progressive aspect respectively. The Guaraní pronunciation of the verb is more frequent, or a version
where the verb is pronounced somewhere between wa’a and ho’a as hwa’a.

Kwategi, trying to get Gunegi down from the tree is here enacting the role of an adult by using that
phrase, which might also have caused him to render it more on the Aché side of the pronunciation. His
rendition comes fairly close to how I have heard adults say it with falling intonation on the progressive
ina. In his next two turns Kwategi now repeats the phrase but substitutes the Guaraní prospective
suffix -ta with Aché -werã and also drops the progressive. It is thus a metalinguistic self-repair that
turns the phrase into full Aché. Kwategi thus not only uses an adult or caregiver phrase as a resource
in the playful interaction climbing the tree, but also goes on to experiment with one aspect of that
phrase, the code, to see what it does. He pronounces it with rising final intonation that could hint at
an insecurity of its correctness or possible effects. No one picks it up, though, and Kwategi returns
to using the -ta prospective aspect marker in line 14 when he himself is about to fall down.

Note also the use of the Spanish interjection la puta in line 13. As used by the Aché (and in Paraguay
in general), la puta is a general expression of frustration, which is not thought to be vulgar as it might
in English. In interaction, depending on how it is rendered prosodically, it may correspond to English
expressions such as “damn (it),” “goddamnit,” “shit,” or “son of a bitch.”

4.2.4 Correcting Pronunciation

Finally, I will return to the second example of a repair that was discussed in the introduction and
chapter 1. It was recorded on a hunting trek in the forest on a cold morning in August. The men

16 It is not clear what Anegi’s laughter in lines 8 and 10 responds to, it might have been Kwategi’s turns, but she might
also be attending to some other aspect of the interactions on the tree, or the fruit that someone is about to pass down.
Her face is not visible on the video so I cannot make any inferences.
had left the camp to go hunting and women and children were sitting around the fires. A few dogs
were also still around the camp. Since the interaction immediately prior to the analyzed sequence is
important but was not captured on video I will quote from my fieldnotes:

Bupigi was calling out “perrita, perrita, perrita” [Spanish, “doggy”] referring to the little dog. Anegi
[his sister] commented about his use of the [alveolar] trill [r] that he had pronounced in a very
Spanish way. She repeats the same word but with a slightly more retroflexed pronunciation [which
is common in Paraguayan Spanish]. Benjamin becomes conscious of it and goes on to experiment
a little bit with the different pronunciations.17

My notes suggest that through the discussion of the pronunciation of the Spanish word perrita, which
was the name of one of their dogs, the children’s metalinguistic senses have already been “tuned” to
being receptive to linguistic and maybe especially phonetic particularities. Here Anegi seems to be
correcting Bupigi’s pronunciation of the word, but the next opportunity for Bupigi to showcase his
own metalinguistic awareness was not far away.

Their little one-and-a-half-year-old cousin tries to stand up from where she was sitting. Anegi
orders her to sit back down.18

Transcript 1.10

1 ANEGI: Eguapy.
   e-guapy
   IMP-sit
   G-B
   B-G
   G-G
   Sit down.
   (.2)

17 Fieldnotes, August 14, 2013, 9am.
18 Legend: □ lexicon; □ phonetics; □ morphosyntax.
In conversation analytic terms this is a straightforward “other-correction.” Other-corrections are a highly constrained and dispreferred type of repair in adult conversation (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977), but less so among children (M. H. Goodwin 1983, 1990; Field 1994). Enticed and entitled by the earlier discussion of the different pronunciations of [r], Bupigi here corrects his sister’s pronunciation of the syllable-initial consonant [ɡu] to [w]. The code Aché has become here an object of dispute.

In the repairs discussed above, the difference between Aché and Guaraní was explored for a variety of ends, but the interactions did not necessarily imply that the trouble source was causing trouble because it was perceived as incorrect language use. For the children, ka’aguype is not the “wrong” word and kadji the “right” one, -ta the “incorrect” and -werã the “correct” suffix. The difference between Guaraché and Aché was a resource that could be drawn upon in a playful frame to achieve different reactions from the co-participants. The code was an object of play.

But in the present case one form is clearly preferred over the other, as Bupigi makes clear by framing his correction with “that’s not it” (nda’e) and “one says” (ei). This is a classic metapragmatic framing that explicitly comments on Anegi’s language use by drawing attention to the code, using metapragmatic expressions for metalinguistic commentary “it is not x, one says y” (see Silverstein 1976, 1993). This commentary “exposes” (Jefferson 1987) the correction and calls the participants’ attention to it. Thus the code is here not an object of play but an object of dispute. The children use their metalinguistic knowledge in order to assess each others’ linguistic competence.

Such examples of playing with different language forms and disputing about them show that in their everyday lifeworld the Aché children have turned language into a phenomenological object amenable to manipulation and usable for a variety of interactional ends. Not merely a multi-lingual
environment then, the Aché children are growing up in a multi-lingual environment. They are not only employing resources of multiple languages to enact different roles or social identities and achieve pragmatic goals, but they are also turning these resources themselves into objects of play and negotiation. Different linguistic forms are not only different words for the same things, but can themselves become different things. Of course, the distinction between the use of different language forms for their potential to index identities and relationships in play on the one hand, and the use of those forms as objects of play on the other, is never clearcut and it is best to think of it as that between two aspects of multilingual language play that are always co-present and where sometimes one sometimes the other aspect gains prominence. However, the examples that I have selected here all privilege the metalinguistic dimension in that the use of the code is foregrounded as such and only secondarily as an index of some social aspect of the participants or the interaction.\(^{19}\) Therefore, borrowing from Husserl’s phenomenology I analyze these metalinguistic repairs as phenomenological modifications of the utterances. In what follows I will briefly consider some aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology that are important for an understanding of phenomenological modification.

4.3 Language, the Lifeworld, and its Modifications

Cherygi is an experienced Aché hunter. He knows the forest, he was born in it and throughout his life has continued to go hunting frequently, despite the fact that now they live in a village, that the forest reserve is the only chunk of forest left, and that the animals are no longer as abundant as they once were. Cherygi knows what to look for when he is walking through the forest. He rarely returns to the camp as pane, i.e., unsuccessful, without prey. Even if it is only an armadillo, he always brings something. On this day, we have just left the dirt road on which we came walking and entered a small path into the bush as Cherygi stops and looks to the ground. He briefly points at the ground with his machete, turns around to say a few words to the ones following, and continues walking. On the

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\(^{19}\) An exception to this might be transcript 4.5 where Gunegi is using Guaraní first and foremost in order to accurately enacting the role of the receiver of a phonecall. However, it is the language form he uses that triggers Anegi’s laughter and in her turns the code gets highlighted.
ground there is an empty spot not covered with leaves where the brown soil is visible and reveals a few marks. I barely notice them but Cherygi knows that peccaries were here only hours earlier.20

As Cherygi was walking, looking to the ground he all of a sudden spotted the marks that the peccaries had left. His professional vision (C. Goodwin 1994) turned a small difference in the composition of the soil into a sign, an index of the peccaries. Husserl (1901, 39–42) calls such a shift in Cherygi perception of the ground a *phenomenal modification* (Duranti 2015, 188–9). As the peccary marks stood out from the ground for Cherygi they came to “mean” something, they acquired a meaning through the ways in which he apprehended them.

Husserl uses the concept of modification (*Modifikation*) in a variety of different ways. As “phenomenal” modification it is used to refer to the constitution of meaning through intentional acts, which lies at the foundation of all language (Husserl 1900, 1901; Merleau-Ponty [1960] 1964; Duranti 2015). But Husserl also modifies modification with other adjectives, such as “intentional” or “phenomenological” modification, among others (Duranti 2015, 188). Intentional modification is closely related to Husserl’s notion of *constitution*, maybe the most important of his concepts, which I have been mentioning on and off in the previous chapters, to be briefly defined in what follows.

### 4.3.1 Constitution and Intentional Modification

The term *Konstitution* refers mostly to the process by which sensations of whatever kind acquire a being, sense, and meaning for us as objects of our intentionality (Husserl 1900, 1901, [1913b] 1976, 1952; Sokolowski 1970). “By ‘intentionality,’ we understand the distinguishing property of experiences: ‘being consciousness of something’” (Husserl [1913a] 2014, 162), the fundamental “aboutness of our interpretive acts, that is, the property that they all share of being about something, whether visible or invisible, hearable or silent, external or internal, physical or psychological” (Duranti 2015, 26). Through our “being-directed-at” (*Gerichtetsein-auf*) (Husserl [1913b] 1976, 75) that something, we “constitute” it as a phenomenon and it “acquires objectivity” for us (Sokolowski 1970, 46). Objects appear to us as they appear as the result of this constitution in intentional experience, i.e., of directing our

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20 Video recording December 7, 2013, 10:08am.
attention towards them in specific ways (Husserl [1913b] 1976, 1952, [1936a] 1976). “Our way of relating to entities in the world, whether real or imaginary, does not ‘create’ them out of nothing, but it ‘constitutes’ them, that is, it ‘objectivates’ them—makes them acquire objectivity—through distinct intentional acts” (Duranti 2015, 190).

The way we constitute objects does not need to remain the same all the time, in fact it rarely does. Changes in our relation, attitude, or disposition towards an object are what Husserl ([1913b] 1976, 1952) calls intentional modifications. For example, among the many nutritious resources that the Aché extract from the forest are a type of larvae that they call kracho. They can be up to a finger long, are found normally in fallen trees, and are a delicacy for the Aché; especially the Aché children love to eat them alive, as soon as they come out of the rotting wood. They are also roasted over the fire. As I had just started working with the Aché in 2009, one of the first trials for me was to eat such a kracho which I did reluctantly. Throughout the following years as I continued visiting different Aché communities there were always occasions where I could not avoid being offered kracho. As time went by though, I modified my relation to them and especially in the forest they began to appear and taste less disgusting every time. Through my fieldwork with the Aché, from a repulsive worm the kracho turned into an always welcome snack on hunting treks. “The ‘phenomenon’—in the sense of what it appears to be for [me]—changes as a result of [my] way of relating to it” (Duranti 2015, 191).

Duranti (2015, 192–7) illustrates intentional modifications with the ways in which a jazz instructor instigates students to change both their ways of listening as they listen to recordings of great jazz artists, as well as how they listen to each other while playing. By pointing out specific aspects of the music they should be attending to, he tries to make them modify the way they listen and thereby modifies the entire listening experience.

Intentional modifications can be the result of processes of socialization but they can also happen very quickly. I might look in admiration at a certain bee hive but my admiration might change into fear as they start attacking me (see Duranti 2015, 191, figure 9.1). A writing project might be a site that provides a wonderful opportunity for exploring my ideas but it might turn into a nightmare as the deadline approaches. All things that we encounter in our everyday lives, physical or ideal, abstract
or concrete, are what they are for us as the result of the intentional modifications through which we constitute them.

4.3.2 The Lifeworld in the Natural Attitude

Normally we are not “conscious,” i.e., not discursively aware of our constituting of objects. The acts of attending to them remain in the background of our experience. As we are absorbed in “coping” (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015) with the world, we are not reflexively aware of it, for which Husserl ([1913b] 1976) has the term “natural attitude,” die natürliche Einstellung. The natural attitude is the stance that we have as we live our lives “pre-reflectively,” i.e., prior to conscious reflection (Husserl 1939; Throop 2003, 2005). The things of the world are “simply there for me” (Husserl [1913a] 2014, 48), I may or may not attend to them, I may or may not notice them, but I surely take them for granted, they “stand there immediately as objects of use” (50).

The world that we find ourselves in and that we experience as the result of the natural attitude is what Husserl came to call die Lebenswelt, the lifeworld, in his later writings (Husserl [1936a] 1976, 1939). Broadly speaking, “lifeworld” refers to the world how it is given to us in everyday experience as we are coping with it in the natural attitude, i.e., how it appears to us, how it is constituted by and for us, and how we make sense of it as we are inevitably always in the world as experiencing beings. The lifeworld is thereby always an inter-subjective world, mutually constituted by our being with others with whom we share it.

[We], each “I-the-man” [Ich-der-Mensch] and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this “living together.” We, as living in wakeful world-consciousness, are constantly active on the basis of our passive having of the world [Welthabe]; it is from there, by objects pre-given in consciousness [Bewußtseinsfeld], that we are affected; it is to this or that object that we pay attention, according to our interests; with them we deal actively in different ways; through our acts they are “thematic objects.” (Husserl [1936b] 1970, 108)

The lifeworld and its objects can be “pregiven” in consciousness because they are not only intersubjectively constituted, but also historically. The more central focus that Husserl gives to the Lebenswelt particularly in Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, the last
book published during his lifetime, coincides with an important reorientation towards considering history and temporality in his phenomenological analyses, and importantly not only the history of ideas, but also the cultural history of a society (Husserl [1936a] 1976; Carr 1974; Ströker [1936] 2012). The everyday lifeworld and the natural attitudes from which it results as intersubjective lifeworld are the products of the history of a given community, i.e., the result of past experiences and practices that are inscribed in the habitus of its members (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 1990; Throop and Murphy 2002). Novices are socialized into the natural attitude as the attitude that governs and guides their everyday coping with the lifeworld. This is also why Duranti (2015, 197) suggests to recast it as the “cultural attitude,” the attitude and stance that we acquire through socialization into becoming culturally competent members of our collective. Aché novices are socialized into immediately recognizing particular features of the environment as salient and important for their survival as they grow up, whereas members of other collectives might not recognize the same features at all, as they have been socialized differently.

The pregivenness of the objects of the lifeworld that allows us to attend to them, turning them into “thematic objects” or not (Husserl [1936b] 1970, 108), is thus the result of the socialization of the members of a given collective across their lifespan into a habitus on the one hand, and the cumulative result of past socializations throughout the history of the collective on the other. And as the historical trajectories of different collectives differ, how objects are constituted, the ontological properties we attribute to them by attending to them in particular ways, their significance, meaning, and values, may therefore also differ between collectives.

4.3.3 The Phenomenology of Language

Language has a somewhat special role in a phenomenology of the lifeworld. First of all, it is the fundamental medium through which we are socialized into it, into a natural–cultural attitude (Gadamer [1966] 1993). As such language precedes it, it is pregiven as an a priori part of it. At the same time, as we become competent language users, language becomes pregiven for us, as the fundamental way in which we experience, participate in, and constitute the lifeworld. Merleau-Ponty ([1960] 1964, 84–6; [1961] 1964, 78–85) analyzes a shift in Husserl’s understanding of language from “one of the objects supremely
constituted by consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty [1960] 1964, 84) in his early writings, where the goal of his phenomenological reflection was to arrive at a universal grammar, underlying and yet independent of empirical languages (Husserl 1900, 1901)—not unlike the modernizing project of Locke (see chapter 2)—to “the original way of intending certain objects, as thought’s body ... or even as the operation through which thoughts that without it would remain private phenomena acquire intersubjective value and, ultimately, ideal existence” in his later writings (Merleau-Ponty [1960] 1964, 84–5). In the “Origin of Geometry” language has become the key term linking the horizon of objects to the horizon of humanity, of our fellow human beings with whom we can talk about objects by sharing a language (Husserl [1936a] 1976, 368–70). Human beings, objects, and the world are all “inseparably interwoven” (370) with language, it is fundamental to the intersubjective constitution of the lifeworld. “Language is much more like a sort of being than a means” (Merleau-Ponty [1960] 1964, 43; see Heidegger [1959] 1985; Gadamer [1960] 1986; Dillon [1988] 1997, 177–223).

The phenomenological study of language should therefore aim at “recover[ing] an experience which is anterior to the objectivizing of language and certainly anterior to the scientific observation of it” (Merleau-Ponty [1961] 1964, 80) and “return to the speaking subject” (Merleau-Ponty [1960] 1964, 85; see Pos 1939). Normally, as we are speaking, we are not attending to the language we use as an entity before us. We are not reflexively aware of the ways in which language is constituted, the ideologies that guide its use and the way it functions. In the natural attitude, as we are absorbed in speaking we do not reflect on our speaking, language is “simply there” (Husserl [1913a] 2014, 48) to be used by us, intrinsically conjoined with experience (Ochs 2012). We do not think about the words that we use to ask a question, to greet someone, we do not perceive them as language.

However, at times language can get in our way and become an object that we have to attend to. This happens frequently when language is not immediately available to us or no longer transparent, when our everyday unobtrusive language-using breaks down and we have to attend to the medium of communication in its own right. We are trying to say something but we are unable to find the right word. We do not understand what someone has just said. Maybe it was mispronounced. Or it was in a foreign language. In such moments the communicative code (Jakobson [1956] 1980) itself emerges as an object of our attention.
Such moments need not happen only unwittingly. We can actively turn our attention to the code. This happens most explicitly when we attend a language class and the teacher teaches us new words and grammatical rules. Here we deliberately reflect on language and try to make theoretical sense of it. In these cases, language appears for us as an entity that is independent from the content of the message, independent of the world it refers to, independent from the communicative action that we are performing. And as it becomes a thematic object, the object of theoretical reflection, it undergoes a phenomenological modification.

4.4 The Phenomenological Modification of Language

Duranti explains the difference between phenomenal and intentional modifications on the one hand, and phenomenological modifications on the other, as follows:

In the former we maintain the same “attitude” (e.g., the “natural attitude”) but the “object” changes meaning for us (e.g., from a noise to a person’s voice, from a baby’s crying to a cat’s meowing). In the latter we change our stance or positioning. For example, we go from being a participant in a situation (e.g., a teacher, a guest, a parent, a mechanic) to an observer of ourselves and others participating in that situation. (Duranti 2015, 198)

Through such a phenomenological modification we step out of the natural attitude and enter into what Husserl (1952) calls a “theoretical attitude.” He introduces the theoretical attitude and phenomenological modification in the second book of his three-volume *Ideas* in relation to a discussion of the natural sciences and their constitution of nature. While he depicts the attitude of the scientists as the theoretical attitude *par excellence*, he makes clear that anyone in any situation can enter a theoretical attitude.

*This characteristic change of attitude belongs, as an ideal possibility, to all acts, and accompanying it is always the corresponding phenomenological modification. That is, all acts which are not already theoretical from the outset allow of being converted into such acts by means of a change in attitude.* (Husserl 1952, 8, translation as quoted in Duranti 2015, 198)

Duranti (2015, 198) uses the Husserlian notion of phenomenological modification in order to explore “the difference between being ‘in’ an experience and stepping ‘out’ of it to make it, through language,
into the object of our reflection.” My aim here is to specifically understand the difference between using language and turning language itself into an object of our reflection.

Language undergoes *phenomenal* modifications even if we do not reflect on it. For example, as I am transcribing a video recording of the Aché children, one child says a word that I do not understand. As I listen again and again, all of a sudden I get what she meant and the unidentifiable sound changes into a meaningful word, i.e., it acquires a meaning as a specific word. Here language has undergone a phenomenal modification, similar to the peccary marks on the forest soil. Nonetheless, as I am listening over and over again, I am not reflecting on the word. I might be reflecting on the context and on the rest of the sequence to figure out what it could mean. But I am not theoretically aware of the word as a particular word.

But then I notice that the word I have just figured out the meaning of has a different form. Maybe it is lacking a particular suffix. Or it is pronounced in a specific way. Maybe that is why I did not understand it at first. As I attend to this aspect of the code I change my stance towards it. I am now in a theoretical attitude reflecting about that particular feature of the word in question. It has become an object of my reflection. Such a shift in our attention to language can also happen in everyday language use, as it breaks down or is disturbed. We suspend our unreflected use of language, and we attend to the communicative code (Jakobson [1956] 1980) in its own right. Here language undergoes a *phenomenological* modification, it becomes an “object before thought” (Merleau-Ponty [1960] 1964, 84).

In the same way, in the interactions that I have analyzed earlier, Bupigi, Kwategi, and their peers turn language into an object of reflection through metalinguistic repairs and language play. They do not specifically “theorize” or “contemplate” about the words. But as Bupigi substitutes *kadji* for Pikygí’s *ka'aguy* (transcript 1.9), as Anegi laughs about Gunegi’s use of Guaraní *mba'eteko* (transcript 4.5), they attend to these particular words qua words. They “step out” of the ongoing flow of the interaction and enter into a theoretical attitude—if only for a few moments, and if only to return to a different play frame (M. H. Goodwin 1996) right away, but they briefly suspend the activity in order to attend to language in use in its own right. Repairs, laughter, and the playful manipulation of language invite phenomenological modifications as particular words, sounds, or other aspects of the code are highlighted and become salient to the children’s metalinguistic awareness as objects of their
reflection and humorous appreciation. This is how the difference of code and meaning is constituted in interaction.

4.5 Enlanguagement

In an ideological context informed by language endangerment, activism, and documentation, where language is a frequent “object of discourse” (Foucault [1969] 2002, 49), it is not surprising to find the children creatively manipulating different linguistic resources in their play. Thereby the children not only become consciously or discursively aware of elements of different languages that they know. Rather, the metalinguistic repairs themselves create the difference between these elements. Since everything is potentially a repairable (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977), it is the repair operation that constitutes its target as a trouble source, in this case the trouble source “code.” The difference between the two codes Aché and Guaraní is therefore not only the motivation of the repair but at the same time its result. The phenomenological modifications not only constitute the difference between code and meaning, but by the same token the difference between one code and the other. Borrowing a term from the study of pidgin and creole genesis (Jourdan 2006), I will call this process “enlanguement.”

Jourdan (2006, 135) has coined the term enlanguement in order to describe “the process by which sociocultural groups create for themselves the language that becomes the medium of their new cultural life.” In situations of colonial and post-colonial encounters of groups speaking different languages, the necessity of communication across ethnolinguistic boundaries often results in the creation of a pidgin language or lingua franca, a code that is widely understood by different groups, but which is only used in a limited range of communicative settings. Such a language can undergo a process of what has been called “creolization,” generally understood as its “nativization,” i.e., becoming the native language of subsequent generations and being learned by children as their first language (Sankoff and Laberge 1973).

Jourdan (1991, 2006, 2009) emphasizes that creole genesis does not happen automatically, but depends on socio-cultural factors that require a pidgin to become nativized. As long as there is no socio-cultural context that would require a pidgin to become a community language it will not be
learned as first language by children and thus not develop into a creole. This is what her use of the term enlanguement tries to capture. Along those lines we could see Guaraché as the result of a process of enlanguement of the Aché as they were settled in reservation communities. Importantly “language” is understood here as an attribute of a group—it is people that become “enlanguaged” (Jourdan 2009).

While this formulation is useful in some regards, for the purpose of my discussion here I will be departing from Jourdan’s definition. I am less interested in “the acquisition of speakers by a language” (Sankoff and Laberge 1973) but rather in how particular linguistic features become “enlanguaged.” Thereby I find Agha’s (2007) notion of enregisterment more helpful. He understands enregisterment as the process “through which a linguistic repertoire becomes differentiable within a language as a socially recognized register of forms” (190). His goal is to understand how a language becomes internally differentiated, linking linguistic differences to differences in cultural value and therefore the political economy of languages (Gal 1989). My goal here is not to understand the formation of different registers within a language, but rather how disparate linguistic resources are assembled to form languages as such.

In the metalinguistic repairs discussed above we see how specific words or sounds are picked out of the flow of the utterance and turned into tokens of a particular language. While language differences are irrelevant in Guaraché as unmarked code, as some elements are highlighted (C. Goodwin 1994) through repairs they become pragmatically salient and recognizable as elements of a specific code. Errington (1988, 18) defines as pragmatically salient those elements that are “relatively interactively important” as they are available to native speakers’ awareness as markers of particular speech styles, which—in the case of Java that he analyzes—are important indexes of status and status distinctions. Here I use pragmatic salience to describe referentially equivalent linguistic alternants whose pragmatic difference becomes available to native speakers’ awareness in terms of their assignability to one language or another. Examples of pragmatically salient markers of Aché–Guaraní distinction would be the word kadji vs. the word kaáguy or the sound [ʧ] vs. the sound [ʃ]. Particular features become pragmatically salient through socialization practices that orient speakers to notice differences of linguistic forms as differences of languages through phenomenological modifications. I suggest therefore
reconceptualizing enlanguement parallel to how Agha uses enregisterment as the process through which speakers are oriented to notice particular pragmatically salient linguistic features as belonging to different languages, thereby constituting these as distinct entities and at the same time constituting “language” as an object of the lifeworld. To illustrate this point, I will briefly turn to data from a language class in school.

4.6 Constituting Language in the Classroom

School is an environment that requires a theoretical attitude almost by definition. As students are instructed how to read, write, speak, count, calculate, draw, sit, stand, walk, run, and know a wide variety of different things, they are continuously engaging in phenomenological modifications. They are constantly required to reflect and contemplate on different subjects and they are explicitly socialized into a theoretical mode of engaging with the world. In language classes, whether they teach reading, writing, grammar, or second and third languages, language is necessarily turned into an object of reflection as letters on a page are turned into meaning, as utterances are made to conform to grammatical rules, and as words are translated from one language into the other. As students’ language use is corrected by teachers, such phenomenological modifications necessarily also socialize children into perceiving differences between codes, and perceiving these differences as those between correct and incorrect language use. Language teaching inevitably results in enlanguement.

The Aché children all go to school. Each community has a primary school and some even have a highschool. While I was doing my field research in Krendy in 2013, my focal children went to fourth grade, second grade, and a preschool class. Among the many classes I filmed, most instructive were language classes, not only for the explicit instruction of different languages, but also for the language used for teaching. The medium of instruction was mostly Guaraché, no matter if the subject was Spanish, Guaraní, or Aché. Most teachers are Aché who studied outside of the communities. Only for higher grades Paraguayan teachers from surrounding villages are hired, with the exception of one preschool teacher who also was Paraguayan.
While there are many interesting interactions in the schools that would merit detailed analysis, for the purpose of my discussion of the phenomenological constitution of language and of linguistic difference here I will only focus on one such interaction as it is particularly instructive. The recording is from a communication class in second grade where they are taught their heritage language, Aché. On this particular day the teacher has written a few sentences in Aché in on the blackboard that tell the story of an elder having gone fishing and catching fish. He is explaining the sentences to his students. I am providing simplified glosses since I am not interested in the linguistic construction of the story but in the interaction that follows. All morphemes are in Aché. The sentences on the blackboard read the following:

![Figure 4.3: Story on blackboard](image)
Transcript 4.7

Pira ra’a chupape | Pira mechâma ype | Pira rama ache urã | Ache urã pira rama chupape | Pira rapama ache urã | Ache chuegi pira ra’a chupape

pira ra’a chupa-pe pira mechâ-ma y-pe pira ra-ma ache u-rã ache u-rã fish carry ?-LOC fish see-IAM water-LOC fish carry-IAM people eat-PROSP people eat-PROSP pira ra-ma chupa-pe pira ra-pa-ma ache u-rã ache chue-gi pira ra’a fish carry-IAM ?-LOC fish carry-COMPL-IAM people eat-PROSP people old-DET fish carry chupa-pe

?-LOC

He took the fish to the ? | He saw the fish in the water | He took the fish for the people to eat | For the people to eat he took the fish to the ? | He took all the fish for the people to eat | The old man took the fish to the ?

The teacher started by having the class repeat word by word the entire story, pointing to each word on the blackboard as they were reading it. Then he elicited the meaning of specific words that the children did not know. The transcript below starts at the moment where the teacher in collaboration with his students has successfully managed to explain all words except for chupa, which I have also left untranslated in the transcription. Now the teacher tries to elicit its meaning. Let us solve the riddle by closely following the Aché children. Here is the interaction that follows the teacher’s question about the meaning of chupa in detail.21

Transcript 4.8

1 TEACHER: Chupape. Ba’êçhagua “chupape.”

chupa-pe ba’ê-çha-gua chupa-pe
?-LOC thing-like-of ?-LOC
A-B G-G-G A-B
A-B A-G-G A-B
B-B B-B-G B-B

Chupape. What does “chupape” mean?

———
21 Legend:  ■ lexicon;  ■ phonetics;  ■ morphosyntax.
2 CHILDREN: Tupa? Tupa? ((overlapping speech))

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{tupa} & \quad \text{tupa} \\
\text{bed} & \quad \text{bed} \\
\text{G} & \quad \text{G} \\
\text{B} & \quad \text{B} \\
\text{B} & \quad \text{B}
\end{align*}
\]

Bed? Bed?

3 TEACHER: Tupa, chupape.

Bed, chupape.

4 KRIROGI: Tupape de ŋenota,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{tupa-} & \quad \text{pe} & \quad \text{de} & \quad \text{ŋe}-\text{no-ta} \\
\text{bed-LOC} & \quad \text{2SG} & \quad \text{lay.down-PROSP}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{G} & \text{B} & \text{G-G} \\
\text{B-B} & \text{A} & \text{G-B} \\
\text{B-B} & \text{B} & \text{A-B}
\end{array}
\]

In the bed you lay down,

(8)

5 TEACHER: Bae ani ňe'embrei [ ( )

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{bae} & \quad \text{ani} & \quad \text{Ŝe'-mbe-rei} \\
\text{thing} & \quad \text{PROH} & \quad \text{say-COMPL-FRUSTR}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{G} & \text{G} & \text{G-B-G} \\
\text{A} & \text{B} & \text{G-B-G} \\
\text{G} & \text{G} & \text{A-B-G}
\end{array}
\]

What? Don't say just anything.

6 KRIROGI: [Djupi?

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{djupi} & \quad \text{go.up} \\
\text{G} & \quad \text{A} \\
\text{A}
\end{align*}
\]

Climb?

22 I use the label “children” for turns where several or all children are responding together in unison.
7 GARAGE: Pap\[a, papa papa S B B Papa,

8 TEACHER: [“Chupa,” mâ bìa kuaa ta “chupa.”

chupa mâ-ba ku aa-ta chupa ? who-Q know-PROSP ?

A G-A B-G A
A B-B B-B A
B B-B A-B B

“Chupa,” who knows what “chupa” means?

9 FAGI: Chupa, Chupa,

10 TEACHER: E’upi ge pende ipo.

e-upi-ke pende ipo
IMP-raise-INTNS 2PL hand

G-A-G B A
B-A-B B B
G-G-G B B

Raise your hands.

11 RYTAGI: [Chipa?

chipa cheese.roll
G A B

Cheese roll?

12 TEACHER: Da’e ai “chipa”=

da’e avei chipa
NEG.COP as.well cheese.roll
G G G
A B A
G G B

It’s not “cheese roll” either.
13 **krachogi:** =“Chipa” e’i gua’u

chipa    he’i    gua’u
cheese.roll  3.say  kidding
G    G    G
A    G    G
B    B    G

She just said “cheese roll”

14 **teacher:** “Chupape,” () Ba’eçhaguaba=

chupa-pe  ba’e-ça-gua-ba
?-LOC    thing-like-of-Q
A-B    G-G-G-A
A-B    A-G-G-A
B-B    B-B-G-B

“Chupape,” () What’s that?

15 **chachugi:** =Tupa?= Bed?

16 **teacher:** Pira raama? () Moõpe rahata.

pira  raa-ma  moõ-pe  raha-ta.
fish  carry-IAM  where-LOC  carry-PROSP
B    B-B    G-B    B-G
B    B-B    G-B    G-B
B    A-B    B-B    A-B

He takes the fish, () Where does he bring it?

17 **children:** Tupape,

tupa-pe
bed-LOC
G-B
B-B
B-B

Into the bed,

18 **teacher:** Chu - pa - pe (.) Ba’eçhagua “chupape."

chupa-pe  ba’e-ça-gua  chupa-pe
?-LOC    thing-like-of  ?-LOC
A-B    G-G-G    A-B
A-B    A-G-G    A-B
B-B    B-B-G    B-B

Chu - pa - pe (.) What does “chupape” mean?
19 CHILDREN:  
[pa - pe  
   pa - pe  
(1.5)

20 DJAWAGI:  
Pyahupa?  
pyahu-pa  
new-COMPL  
G-B  
G-B  
B-B  
All new?

21 TEACHER:  
Da’e [go ai.  
da’e  
go  
avei  
NEG.COP  
DEM  
as.well  
G  
A  
G  
A  
B  
B  
B  
G  
It’s not that either.

22 KRIKOJI:  
[Da’e .hh [P–  
No .hh P–  

23 RYTAGI:  
[Palanganape moi?=  
palangana-pe  
moi  
bowl-LOC  
put  
S-B  
G  
S-B  
G  
B-B  
A  
He puts it into the pot?

24 TEACHER:  
=Da’e “palangana” chupa ai.  
da’e  
palangana  
chupa  
ai  
NEG.COP  
bowl  
?  
as.well  
G  
S  
A  
G  
A  
S  
A  
B  
B  
B  
B  
Chupa doesn’t mean “pot” either.  
(3)
25 RYTAGE: Nokô?

nokô

carrying.basket
A
B

Carrying basket?

26 TEACHER: Da’e ai, djawy ai, måba otro kúaata ai.

da’e avei djawy avei må-ba otro kuaa-ta avei
NEG.COP as.well err as.well who-Q other know-PROSP as.well
G  G  G  G  G  A  S  B-G  G
A  B  A  B  B-B  S  G-B  B
B  B  A  B  B-B  S  A-B  B

That’s not it either, you’re wrong again, who else knows?

27 URUGI: [[Pira raha amope

pira raha amo-pe
fish carry DEM-LOC
B  B  G-B
B  G  B-B
B  A  B-B

He takes the fish there

28 RYTAGE:||(1.5)

(1.5)

29 TEACHER: Chupape “chupape” e’i. ((points to board))

chupa-pe chupa-pe he’i
?-LOC ?-LOC 3.say
A-B  A-B  G
A-B  A-B  B
B-B  B-B  B

Chupape, it says “chupape.”

30 KRAGI: Amogi?

amo-gi
DEM-DET
G-A
B-B
B-B

That one?
31 TEACHER: Ba’e pepillata

    ba’e     pe-pilla-ta
thing 2PL-catch-PROSP
G       G-S-G
B       B-B-B
B       G-G-B

How are you going to find out?

(i)

32 Ñande– (. ) Ñande hobu peka moõpe ñande eruta.

    ñande  ñande ho-bu peka moõ-pe ñande eru-ta
1PL.IN 1PL.IN go-COND fish where-LOC 1PL.IN bring-PROSP
G       G       G-A       S       G-B       B       B-G
G       G       G-A       G       G-B       G       B-B
B       B       A-A       A       B-B       B       A-B

We– (. ) When we go fishing, where do we bring the fish?

(.6)

33 KRAGE: Ule-pe.

    hule-pe
plastic.bag-LOC
S-B
S-B
B-B

In a plastic bag.

34 MEMBOGE: Ule|pe

    hule-pe
plastic.bag-LOC
S-B
S-B
B-B

In a plastic bag.

35 TEACHER: [Ñande?

    ñande
1PL.IN
G
G
B

We?
36 GARAGI: Nokōlpe.

nokō-pe carrying.basket-LOC
A-B
B-B
B-B

In the carrying basket.

37 TEACHER: [Ba’eçha kwagi hera. (points with circling gesture to roof)]

ba’è-çha kwa-gi hera
thing-like DEMDET name
G-G G-A G
A-G A-B G
B-B A-B B

How is this called?

38 PIRAGI: Oga-ba=

oga-ba house-Q
G-A
B-A
B-B

House?

39 TEACHER: =Nande tapype ñande oikohape ñande edjuta?

ñande tapy-pe ñande oi-ko-ha-pe ñande edju-ta
IPL.IN house-LOC IPL.IN 3-live-NMLZ-LOC IPL.IN come-PROSP
G A-B G G-G-G-B G B-G
G B-B G B-B-G-B G A-B
B B-B B G-G-G-B B A-B

To our house, to the place where we live, we come.

40 Ba’erã ñande eru-ta pira gope.

ba’è-rã ñande eru-ta pira gope
thing-PURP IPL.IN bring-PROSP fish DEM-LOC
G-B G B-G B A-B
A-B G B-B B B-B
B-B B A-B B B-B

Why are we going to bring the fish there.
41 CHILDREN: Ñande u aguã?=  
ñande u aguã  
IPL.IN eat PURP  
G A G  
G B G  
B A B

In order to eat it?

42 TEACHER: =Ñande bakuta.  
ñande baku-ta  
IPL.IN cook-PROSP  
G A-G  
G A-B  
B A-B

We're going to cook it.

43 Da’e ñande utama gobu, primero ba’è ñande djapota?  
da’e neg.cop  
ñande u-ta-ma eat-PROSP-IAM  
primero first  
ba’è thing  
IPL.IN do-PROSP  
G G A-G-B A-A S G G G-G  
A G B-B-B B-A S A G A-B  
B B A-B-B B-B S B B A-B

It's not that we're gonna eat it right away, first, what are we going to do with it?

44 CHILDREN: Bakuta, pirota, ((overlapping speech))  
baku-ta piro-ta  
cook-PROSP skin-PROSP  
A-G G-G  
A-B B-B  
A-B A-B

We'll cook it, We'll skin it,

45 TEACHER: Ñande baku haguã, ñande eru raëta ñande chupa-pe ñande oga.  
ñande baku haguã  
ñande eru raë-ta  
ñande chupa-pe  
ñande oga  
IPL.IN cook PURP IPL.IN bring first-PROSP IPL.IN community-LOC IPL.IN house  
G A G G B G-G G A-B G G  
G A G G B B-B G A-B G B  
B A B B A G-B B B-B B B

In order to cook it, we bring it to our community, to our house.

The original meaning of the Aché word *chupa* was “camp” or “clearing.” After settlement it has come to designate “village” or “community.” It is not a word that is well known to the children, however. In trying to translate the term they come up with a number of either phonetically similar or contextually
appropriate referential items, drawn from all three languages that form part of their repertoire, Aché, Guaraní, and Spanish.

They begin with *tupá* (line 2). *Tupá* is the Guaraní word for “bed.” While semantically it seems far from what it could be, *tupá* is actually cognate to Aché *chupa*. Montoya ([1639] 1876, 404) lists *tupá* in relation to “being sleepy” and as “lecho, cama, lugar” (bed, place). Whatever the original pre-Columbian “proto”-meaning was, in Guaraní it has come to mean “bed,” while in Aché it turned into “camp” and, more recently “community.” Therefore, the children’s Guaraché speaker intuition here is not too far off. But, as Krirogi (line 4) rightly observes, in the bed you lay down, you do not put the fish there. She observes the lexical shape of *chupa* and throws in the suggestion *djupi* (to climb), as it also starts with a sequence of affricate, back rounded vowel, and bilabial plosive (line 6). But the teacher ignores her suggestion, as well as that of Garagi, *papa*.

Also going by morphology Rytagi tries with *chipa*. *Chipa* is a traditional Paraguayan cheese roll. The word is originally Guaraní but used in Paraguay in all languages. Note that it is pronounced here with a syllable-initial affricate [ʧ], whereas in Paraguayan Guaraní the standard pronunciation would be with a fricative [ʃ]. But while it comes fairly close to *chupa* in its lexical shape, the teacher says it is wrong (line 12).

*Pyahu* is a Guaraní adjective meaning “new,” -*pa* a completive suffix. Taken together they end on -*upa* but it is rather far-fetched (line 20).

Rytagi has another idea: *palangana*, a Spanish word for “bowl” or “pot” (line 23). Now the children have given up looking for a word that would somehow resemble the form of *chupa* and started to try with words that would make sense in the context of the story. In this case the children take the locative suffix -*pe* to mean “in” rather than “to.” In both Aché and Guaraní—and hence Guaraché as well—*pe* can designate direction as well as containment. To put the fish into the pot to cook it is a quite reasonable choice. Alas, it is not what the teacher was looking for (line 24).

Another possibility would be to carry the fish in a *nokô*, the traditional carrying basket (line 25). *Nokô* is an Aché word that is frequently heard, given that the women use the carrying baskets not only
on forest treks but also to bring home manioc and garden vegetables from the fields. Again, it would make sense from context, but it is not what *chupa* means.

If he did not carry it in a nokò, maybe he carried it in a *hule* (line 33). *Hule* is an old Spanish word for “rubber,” which has come to mean “plastic bag” in Paraguay. But the teacher ignores the suggestion.

Finally, he helps them out (line 37): *Baëçha kwagi hera?* (What is the name of this?), he asks, with a circling gesture pointing towards the roof and around him. The students get his reference. *Ogaba?* (house-Q), one asks, and finally the teacher has them where he wants them. He still specifies the meaning of *chupa* slightly, first translating the Guaraní word *oga* (house) into Aché, *tapy*, and then providing a more accurate description with the Guaraní construction *oikoha*, “the place where one lives.”

39 TEACHER: Ñande tapy-pe ñande oikohape ñande edjuta?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ñande</th>
<th>tapy-pe</th>
<th>ñande</th>
<th>oikohape</th>
<th>ñande</th>
<th>edjuta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1PL.IN</td>
<td>house-LOC</td>
<td>1PL.IN</td>
<td>3-live-NMLZ-LOC</td>
<td>1PL.IN</td>
<td>come-PROSP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>A-B</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G-G-G-B</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>B-G</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>B-B</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>B-B-G-B</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>A-B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>B-B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>G-G-G-B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A-B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To our house, to the place where we live, we come.
The children have learned the word *chupa* as a new Aché word. Through the teacher’s instructions, *chupa* has undergone a *phenomenal* modification and transformed from an enigmatic sign on the blackboard into a word with a specific meaning. At the same time, it has undergone a *phenomenological* modification, as the children have learned to recognize it as a part of the Aché language, as an alternative signifier for such things as *oga*, *tapy*, and *oikoha*. *Chupa* has been enlanguaged as a sign token of Aché.

Given that Guaraché is the children’s first language it is not surprising that we encounter words from all three languages that it combines—Aché, Guaraní, and Spanish—in their suggestions as they try to come up with the meaning of *chupa*. In the above transcription I have labeled each item for its etymological origin and phonological shape. For me as analyst who has access to historical data about Aché, Guaraní, and Spanish the assignment of such labels is fairly straightforward, although it gets complicated by the current convergence on different linguistic levels. But for the Aché children who are growing up learning Guaraché as their first language these words are not words of different “languages” but simply words of everyday language use. They do not recognize them as Aché or as Guaraní or as Spanish because that distinction is not meaningful to them in interaction. Only as they are explicitly taught the Aché language some words become enlanguaged as words of Aché, such as *chupa*. The other words do not differ with regards to their respective “code,” and solely with regards to their referential content, as candidate referents for *chupa*.

As perceived by the children and thus as meaningful to them in interaction, we might thus more accurately classify the words not as either Aché, or Guaraní, or Spanish, or bivalent, but rather as Guaraché, as the dominant unmarked code of the community. Only the word *chupa* would deserve the label Aché, since in this case the teacher is explicitly teaching it as an Aché word. Without reproducing the full interaction let us briefly look at the words again, this time contrasting the analysis of language according to etymology to language as interactionally meaningful. I am listing the words on a single line, retaining the line identifying etymological origin of the items (blue) and adding a new line (green) to identify the assignment of linguistic belonging in the classroom interaction.²³

---

²³ *Legend:* ▲ lexicon; ▪ interaction.
While the identification of each morpheme by its parent code is not incorrect from an etymological and historical point of view, as they are used in everyday interaction they are not words of different languages. Just as the difference between the English words “wood” and “forest” is not perceived as a difference of languages, the former Old English, the latter Old French, in Guaraché lexical or phonological differences between words are not differences of language either. Except for situations such as the search for the meaning of *chupa*. Here, the difference between *chupa* and all the other words is indeed a difference of language, of code, *chupa* being an Aché word, the other words non-Aché, and hopefully one of them with a meaning equivalent to *chupa*.

There is an important point that results from such an analysis. If it is only in the situation of the classroom that the items appear as items of different languages, the consequence must be that the difference between Aché and non-Aché cannot be prior to the situation. As Guaraché by definition does not distinguish between elements from Aché and Guaraní (or Spanish), only through phenomenological modifications such as the enlanguaging of *chupa* is a distinction between Aché and Guaraché produced. *Chupa* is not by itself an “Aché word” whereas *chipa* and *tupa* are “Guaraché words.” By virtue of Guaraché being a mixed code composed of Aché and Guaraní, *chupa* could as well be labeled as belonging to Guaraché. The linguistic difference between them emerges in the classroom as the children make their suggestions of potential alternative referents for *chupa*. In the same way it emerges in the substitution of *kaaguy* with *kadji* in metalinguistic repairs. In other words, enlanguagement is not simply the metalinguistic mobilization of a distinction that is already present in some way in the words themselves, but rather the interactional production of such a distinction. By paradigmatically substituting semantically equivalent constituents, Aché and Guaraché emerge as distinct languages.

But do they? Even an analysis along the lines just suggested does not seem to be entirely correct. Yes, *chupa* (or *kadji*) emerge as elements of the Aché language, but does that mean that the other elements are enlanguaged as Guaraché in the same way? I do not think so. In the classroom, as in everyday interactions, Guaraché is not a language that is somehow opposed to Aché. I argued in chapter 1 that
we must not analyze language use in the Aché communities as constantly codeswitching between Aché and Guaraní, since switching itself is the “unmarked code” (Muysken 2011, 312), a “fused lect” (Auer 1999) or “alloy” (Alvarez-Cáccamo 1998).

In metalinguistic repairs, on the other hand, the children are deliberately switching into Aché, the switches seem to be intentional, meaningful, and strategic codeswitches (Woolard 2004). However, they are not switches between Aché and Guaraní. The children are not switching between one code and another; rather they are switching into a code and out of it. It would be more accurate to analyze Guaraní as a ground against which Aché emerges as a figure, as a language or code (Auer 1998b, 1999). Chupa indeed has come to be a linguistic item, i.e., an arbitrary signifier belonging to the “language” Aché. But not by virtue of being a word that was used while the Aché were still living in the forest, and rather by the ways in which it is positioned by the teacher vis-à-vis the other words in the classroom language game.

4.7 The Interactional Emergence of Language

In developing his theory of perception, Merleau-Ponty ([1942] 1963, [1945] 2012) was influenced importantly by gestalt psychology. Gestalt psychologists claim that experience is always structured in terms of figure–ground relations. The most basic units of perception are figures on a background that cannot be reduced to multiple sensory impressions. The Gestalt is different from the sum of its parts (Koffka 1935). To return to Cherygi, looking at the forest soil and making out peccary marks, as he looks to the ground the marks appear to his eye as a figure that stands out against the ground of soil and shrubs. He does not “compose” them out of multiple perceptual units, a little broken twig here, an imprint on the soil there, but they appear at once, as a whole, at the same time as the “unmarked” soil fades into the background. But whereas, according to Merleau-Ponty ([1942] 1963, 136–51; [1945] 2012, 47–51), gestalt psychologists believed figure–ground structures to exist as properties of the things themselves, influenced by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty insists that that a Gestalt must always exist for a perceiving subject (Dillon [1988] 1997, 69–72). The key term that links sensation and perception is therefore attention (Waldenfels 2004; Depraz 2004).
Attention is the active constitution of a new object that develops and thematizes what was until then only offered as an indeterminate horizon. At the same time that it sets attention to work, the object is continuously recaptured by attention, and reestablished as subordinate to it. The object only gives rise to the “knowing event” that will transform it through the still ambiguous sense that it offers to attention as needing-to-be-determined, such that the object is the “motive” [motif] of and not the cause of this event. (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2012, 33)

However, even if I looked attentively to the ground, I would not have been able to see the marks as peccary marks. They do not present themselves to me as a figure as I have not been socialized into a “professional vision” (C. Goodwin 1994) that would allow me to perceive a *Gestalt* of peccary prints on the forest soil. They appear to Cherygi as the result of his “education of attention” (Gibson [1979] 2014, 243) into a hunter–gatherer habitus in which reading animal marks on the forest soil is a crucial part of everyday coping with the world. In this habitus, the phenomenal modifications that constitute the peccary marks for Cherygi happen below the threshold of his conscious awareness. He does not reflect on the marks as peccary marks but reads them instantly as a sign at the very same moment that they appear to him as a figure. They are given to him within the natural attitude as part of preobjective experience.

Unlike the *phenomenal* modifications of the peccary marks, metalinguistic repairs and language teaching result in *phenomenological* modifications where the *Gestalt* is reflexively constituted, but the basic mechanism is the same. As *kadji* or *chupa* are enlanguaged, Aché as a language is constituted as figure while the other elements fade into the background. The background of everyday speaking is thus not just “monolectal” (Meeuwis and Blommaert 1998, 76) or “monolingual” (Auer 1998b, 20), but rather *nonlinguistic*. Thus the following schema emerges:24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>chupa</th>
<th>tupa</th>
<th>djupi</th>
<th>papa</th>
<th>chipa</th>
<th>pyahu-pa</th>
<th>palangana</th>
<th>nokō</th>
<th>hule</th>
<th>oga</th>
<th>tapy</th>
<th>oi-ko-ha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>camp</td>
<td>bed</td>
<td>climb</td>
<td>father</td>
<td>cheese.roll</td>
<td>new-COMPL</td>
<td>pot</td>
<td>basket</td>
<td>plastic.bag</td>
<td>house</td>
<td>house</td>
<td>3-live-NMLZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G-B</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>G-G-G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>figure (A)</td>
<td>ground</td>
<td>ground</td>
<td>ground</td>
<td>ground</td>
<td>ground</td>
<td>ground</td>
<td>ground</td>
<td>ground</td>
<td>ground</td>
<td>ground</td>
<td>ground</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24 Legend: ■ lexicon; □ interaction.
If we analyze the metalinguistic repair of transcript 1.9 in this light, we arrive at a similar picture. As kadji emerges as a figure in the repair, the remainder of the utterances fades into the nonlinguistic background.

**Transcript 1.9**

1 **PIKYGE**: (Ore) hota ka’aguype.

   ore   ho-ta   ka’aguy-pe
   1PLEX go-PROSP forest-LOC

   We’ll go to the forest.

2 **BUPIGI**: Kwewe, ha’e-kuera guata-ta kadji.

   Kwewe   ha’e-kuera   guata-ta   kadji
   Kwewe   3-PL   walk-PROSP   forest

   Kwewe, they will go to the forest.

But wait! What about guatata? Did we not analyze guatata as the second element of the repair operation? Indeed, it would be correct to extend the figure label to guatata kadji as a whole. However, it would be even more appropriate to label the entire utterance as an Aché figure. Gestalt psychology teaches precisely that a figure emerges as a whole and not as discrete elements. Here the whole is not the constituents kadji or guatata kadji, but Bupigi’s entire utterance. As ka’aguy is substituted on the paradigmatic axis by kadji, that substitution enacts a change on the syntagmatic axis so that the other elements juxtaposed with kadji are perceived as Aché as well. Just as in gestalt psychological experiments, where missing parts of a figure are filled in as we attend to it as a whole, Bupigi’s sentence containing a pragmatically salient metalinguistically repaired element is perceived as Aché as a whole.

Irvine and Gal (2000) have called such rendering invisible of particular aspects of linguistic phenomena *erasure*. They define erasure as the process by which “facts that are inconsistent with the ideological scheme either go unnoticed or get explained away” (38). As a primordial mechanism of perception, erasing “inconsistent” linguistic facts is what all we language users do, and the counterpart to what Goodwin (1994) calls “highlighting.” Thus by metalinguistically highlighting his sentence
as Aché, Bupigi erases the mixed character of the remaining constituents. To complete the picture, the following representation captures the way in which the metalinguistic repair functions.

_Transcript 1.9_

1 _PIKYGI:_ (Ore) hota ka‘aguype.
   ore ho-ta ka'aguy-pe
   IPELEX go-PROSP forest-LOC

   ------------- _ground_ --------------

   We'll go to the forest.
   (i)

2 _BUPIGI:_ Kwewe, ha'ekuera guatata kadji.
   Kwewe ha'e-kuera guata-ta kadji
   Kwewe 3-PI. walk-PROSP forest

   ------------- _figure (A)_ --------------

   Kwewe, they will go to the forest.

Pikygi’s utterance is unmarked, the ground against which Bupigi’s words emerge as a figure. But retrospectively, as the intended object of the repair, it is also constituted as a particular code, namely as “non-Aché.” “Aché” and other languages are not labels that we can assign to particular elements in advance but only in context of their actual strategic employment in interaction. But even then such assignments may shift in the unfolding of the interaction, such that while Pikygi’s utterance was unmarked as ground up to Bupigi’s intervention, subsequently it was reconstituted as a non-Aché utterance.

Discourse, Schegloff (1981, 73) argues, is an “achievement, ... produced over time [and] incrementally accomplished, ... which involves collaboration with the other parties present, and ... is shaped by the sociosequential organization of participation in conversation.” In a parallel way, Auer (1998b) takes codes and code-differences as the interactional achievement of switching between them:

The definition of the codes used in code-switching may be an interactional achievement which is not prior to the conversation (and to be stated once and for all by the linguist) but subject to negotiation between participants. If anything, it is not the existence of certain codes which takes priority, but the function of a certain transition in conversation. (15)
Following Schegloff and Auer, I propose that language itself is also best seen as an interactional achievement. In metalinguistic repairs and language teaching we can see the collaborative construction of language as an object and meaningful aspect of the children’s utterances. As they highlight particular words and phrases, language is constituted as a distinct entity, different from the participants and the meaning of the utterance. Before, it was a transparent medium that was employed for interactional goals; now it has become opaque. From a window-onto-the-world it has turned into a thing-in-the-world.

Metalinguistic repairs and language teaching are thus some of the most primitive means by which language as code is created as linguistic difference is produced. On the one hand, the repair operation constitutes the difference between code and message as the former becomes its intended object. And on the other, since this difference is the result of the substitution of one element with another, it hinges on the difference between those two elements, i.e., the difference between one code and another. The two levels of difference are thus mutually constituted and constitutive, they are two sides of the same coin. Language and languages are thus the outcome of metalinguistic practices and not their condition (see T. J. Taylor 2010, 2016).

In light of this discussion I would like to return to the claims made in chapters 2 and 3 and specify these. In chapter 2 I have argued that before contact with Paraguayan society there was no such thing as language among the Aché. This “absence” of language must be understood in two ways. Communicative practices were not conceived of as language. They were neither conceived of as a representational medium such as the Lockean–Saussurean autonomous code, nor were they conceived of as part of a human soul or subjectivity as among the Guaraní, nor were they conceived of as an independent force in the world, as among the Mapuche. But at the same time, I suggest that in addition to the absence of such conceptions that can reasonably be called “beliefs” (Silverstein 1979) about language, we must assume that no metalinguistic practices were in place that would have constituted language as an object of the lifeworld.

That is not to say that the Aché never encountered people who spoke differently, had to translate to them, or realized they were unable to communicate or to translate. But I hypothesize that such translation or non-understanding was not that between “languages” (Heryanto 1990). While the pheno-
nomenal modification of a sign into another sign, of a ground into a figure, is part of all processes of human and nonhuman perception and communication, the phenomenological modification of a sign into an object of reflection is of a different kind.

In chapter 3 I have analyzed language ideological transformations that led to the objectification of language, ideologically purified as “code,” and indexically hybridized as an emblem of culture or identity. But these ideological modifications must have happened through metalinguistic practices such as Pereira’s language teaching and the translation of the Bible by New Tribes missionaries. I do not have interactional data of such language practices from the 1960s and 70s, thus I will not be able to identify metalinguistic discussions and practices that might have taken place before, but I hypothesize that for language to have emerged as a meaningful “object of discourse” (Foucault [1969] 2002, 49) it must also have emerged as a meaningful object in interaction.

In Paraguay as elsewhere, languages are not objects of the lifeworld that are just there, to be used by us for different ends. Rather, languages emerge in interaction as the result of the ways in which speakers phenomenologically modify ongoing discourse and thereby create distinctions between meaning and code and one language and another. To paraphrase Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 2012, 69), metalinguistic practices “end” in language; they do not begin with it.
Conclusion

This dissertation was concerned with the interactional and ideological origins of language. Starting from the analysis of Aché children’s everyday use of linguistic resources of multiple origins in what could be described as a mixed code (Guaraché), and also their occasional conscious manipulation of certain pragmatically salient elements to mark their talk as a specific code, I have developed a framework for analyzing how language emerges as a meaningful ideological and experiential category. I have suggested that instead of taking language and languages for granted and describing the Aché children’s practices as simply using and mixing elements from different languages, speaking a new (mixed) language, or switching between languages, it might be more productive to look at how language and linguistic difference is produced in ongoing interaction, thereby reducing the risk of imposing categories onto our data that are not meaningful locally.

Linguistic anthropologists have been wary of the concept of language for a long time. In particular, narrow definitions of language as conceived in the Western intellectual tradition as bounded, homogenous, and primarily defined by symbolic reference or denotation have been subject to critique. Our alternatives have been either to expand what we mean by “language” to include a range of practices that had usually been confined to the extra-linguistic, or to abandon it in favor of notions of “discourse” or “representation” (see chapter 2). Both of these strategies have proven very successful for capturing heretofore unexplored dimensions of human communicative interaction and produced a wealth of new scholarly work; but, they have also bypassed the question of what language actually is and how it is produced. In this dissertation I have put this question back to the center of the analysis.

For a comprehensive exploration of language I have proposed a twofold approach that analyzes the emergence of language in its ideological and interactional dimensions. On the one hand, I have suggested a focus on that aspect of language ideologies that we might call the ontological status of language, i.e., local presuppositions of what language is. This allows us to look at what we usually take
to be different “languages,” i.e., different tokens of the same type and thus arbitrary and translatable, as potentially fundamentally different kinds of things in a given local lifeworld, not necessarily equivalent ontologically (Course 2012a). We approach language as an equivocation, indexing potential referential alterity (Viveiros de Castro 2004b). And we must also allow for language not to have been constituted in any way (Heryanto 1990).

On the other hand, I have pointed out how we can analyze the emergence of “language” in interaction as the product of specific practices. Here I take a phenomenological approach, understanding the ontological status of the meaningful entities of our lifeworld as the result of our mode of attending to them. The deliberate highlighting of the code through metalinguistic repairs, language play, and language teaching, discussed in detail in chapter 4, is one means by which language—and a very specific type of language—is constituted through attending to it in a particular way. The context of the Aché communities provides a unique opportunity to explore the emergence of language in both of these ways.

As I have argued in chapter 2, before contact with Paraguayan society language had not been constituted as a legitimate object of attention for the Aché. Drawing on arguments by Heryanto (1990), Bauman and Briggs (2003), Course (2012b), and Kohn (2013), and comparing language ideologies across the Americas and more specifically those of the Aché with their Guaraní neighbors, I conclude that language did not exist as an entity of the lifeworld of the Aché and should be located in the pre-objective (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2012) realm.

I have further argued that the ideological constitution of speech practices as language and metalinguistic awareness thereof is one result of the structure of the conjuncture of the encounter with Paraguayans and missionaries and their languages and language ideologies, discussed in chapter 3. At the same time, the encounter has led to rapid changes of the speech practices of the Aché. Within a context informed by national and global ideologies of language that link heritage languages to national or ethnic identities, the speech community has now retrospectively constituted the presumed way of speaking before contact as a “language,” ache djatwete (Aché speech-REAL) that is now perceived to be in an “endangered” state. Note that the ideological emergence of language is here correlated with its assumed decline as a practice.
The constitution of language led furthermore to the classification of the currently dominant speech practices in the Aché community as the “mixing” of two “languages,” Aché and Guaraní. Guaraché itself is not conceived of locally as a language—there is most certainly no guarache djawuete, no “real Guaraché language”—and merely serves as a negative index of the vitality of Aché. However, even today we cannot assume Aché and Guaraní to exist as languages prior to Guaraché—and Guaraché to be the result of combining them. Guaraché, by definition does not distinguish between the two codes through the convergence of which it originated. Thus, independently of their ontological status before contact, from an experiential perspective Aché and Guaraní are the result of the separation of elements into two different codes. This separation in turn feeds back into the constitution of language as code, distinct from speaker, content, and context.

To return one last time to the Aché children, in their everyday interactions on the playground and in the forest it is irrelevant whether a lexical item belongs to Aché or to Guaraní. The linguistic difference between the two codes and that between code and message is the outcome of the deliberate substitution of one code with the other in metalinguistic repairs and language play which make them metalinguistically recognizable as different codes. This allows the constituents in question to emerge as pragmatically salient elements, as referentially equivalent alternants, available to native speakers’ awareness in terms of their assignability to one or the other “language.” This is the basic process how language is made, which I have called “enlanguagement,” borrowing a term from studies of pidgin and creole genesis (Jourdan 2006) and redefining it by drawing on work on the semiotic differentiation of language registers (Agha 2007), language socialization (Ochs and Schieffelin 2011), and phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2012).

In a discussion of the importance of practice theory for the study of gender, Ortner (1996, 1) fruitfully exploits the double meaning of the verb “make” to point out the importance of looking not only at the ways in which “cultural categories, or historical subjects, or forms of subjectivity are—passive
voice—made,” i.e., how they are “constructed within the framework of a given cultural, ideological, or discursive formation,” but also “how actors ‘enact,’ ‘resist,’ or ‘negotiate’ the world as given, and in so doing ‘make’ the world.”

In a parallel way, my title “Making Language” aims at capturing that on the one hand, “language” as a category and object is “made” by particular language ideologies, it is a cultural and historical product, while on the other hand, speakers, in using and manipulating “language” for a variety of ends, also actively make it by attending to their speech practices as language and thereby creating it as an experiential or phenomenological object and meaningful category. The Aché children do not merely “use” different “languages” that are somehow already there as given entities in their lifeworld, but by employing a multiplicity of linguistic resources in their everyday interactions they end up making language, languages, and making them over.

To conceptualize the making of language I have relied importantly on insights from phenomenology. Drawing on Husserl (1952) and his interpreters (Duranti 2015) I have suggested to understand metalinguistic repairs and other interactional strategies for making language as phenomenological modifications by which language is constituted as an object of reflection. I have also used Merleau-Ponty’s ([1945] 2012) theory of perception to conceptualize these phenomenological modifications as the “figuring out” of language from a ground of communicative behavior. I have here focused on the code (Jakobson [1956] 1980) as the critical element, the separation of which from ongoing talk turns that talk into language, but other aspects of it might serve the same purpose. Importantly I have suggested that only occasionally language emerges as a Gestalt. Most of the time our language use is not the use of “language” and analyzing something as language should be restricted to those moments in interaction when we can trace it as a phenomenological object. Language and languages thus do not exist once and for all but must be seen as dynamic interactional achievements.

In this dissertation I have traced the origin of language in ideology and interaction, diachronically and synchronically. I have discussed the historical processes through which language emerged as an object in the lifeworld of the Aché. I have also discussed the interactional means through which language is produced. These are the two sides of enlanguagement, understood as the ideological, i.e. reflexive production of language as a distinct category, as well as the everyday orientation and socialization.
of speakers to notice particular pragmatically salient linguistic features as belonging to different languages. Focusing on the phenomenological constitution of language and linguistic difference, enlanguement bridges the domains of ideology and interaction in order to provide an integrated account of how language is made.
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