Title
The Russian Second Generation in Tallinn and Kohtla-Jarve: The TIES Study in Estonia

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7cx7f5v5

Journal
RUSSIAN REVIEW, 71(2)

ISSN
0036-0341

Author
Taagepera, R

Publication Date
2012-04-01

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Peer reviewed
Tallinn, Estonia’s capital, is a city of two tales. They hinge on the Soviet soldier’s statue the Estonian government relocated in 2007, leading to ethnic riots. One tale is that he liberated Tallinn in 1944. The other is that he enslaved it. These conflicting tales are parts of two broader tales about Estonia. One tale is that of an age-old province within a grand Russian empire, where the Russians naturally move around. To call them immigrants during the rare abnormal interruptions is ludicrous and insulting. The other tale is that of a distinct
Finno-Ugric country, which in 1918 finally came into its own, after centuries in the crosswinds of German, Swedish, and Russian imperial designs. The Russians presently in Estonia were purposefully settled there during the Soviet occupation of 1944-91, as a civilian garrison to reinforce the military one. To call them immigrants understates their origin, akin to those Germans Hitler settled in Poland.

This volume is a welcome addition to document the resulting imbroglio where every interpretation of numerical data depends on whether the present Russian minority of 25 percent is seen as colonial immigrants or part of an age-old mix. The editors, Raivo Vetik and Jelena Helemäe, try to find a middle ground by terming them “semi-immigrants” (p. 18), but some semi-conditions are statistical fictions. Try to imagine a 1.5-humped camel.

The book focuses on a crucial generation, the first generation of Russians growing up in independent Estonia. They face some of the same issues faced by second-generation immigrants in Western Europe. They also differ. Their parents were as educated as the locals (whom they dominated) and had no incentive to integrate during Soviet rule. When the French in Algeria lost their dominant position they returned to their ancestral land, but the socioeconomic contrasts between Estonia and Russia make even a perceived second-class condition in Estonia seem preferable. The second generation faces an identity conundrum. Will they keep hoping for a restoration of derzhava, consequently neglecting to learn Estonian as a second language and complaining about the resulting reduced economic prospects? Or will they try to integrate? And how easy or difficult does the majority make it for them?

Each chapter analyzes interviews in two locations: Tallinn, where Russophones form half the population, and Kohtla-Järve, a mining area where they are a strong local majority. The differences in responses are rather small. Many young Russophones “lack the vital need or desire to learn” Estonian (p. 43), so that only 27 percent deem themselves fluent in Estonian (p. 69), constraining higher education opportunities (p. 85), employment (p. 101), and income. Those Russophones whose secondary education has been in Estonian-language schools tend to break even with ethnic Estonians (pp. 109–11, 139). In sum, 54 percent of the respondents aged 15–29 feel a strong connection to Estonia (p. 208), and 41 percent have never been to Russia (p. 219).

All chapters are strongly grounded in second-generation studies in the West, pointing out similarities and differences in Estonia. Chapters by different authors show some overlap and redundancy. A single bibliography would be preferable to eleven separate ones. There is no index. Hence, for instance, the effects of ethnic segmentation in the Soviet Estonian economy and housing, from which many present problems derive (pp. 30, 95, 114, 122–123, 229, and so on), must be pieced together by the reader. Analysis is overly dependent on multivariable regression, the results of which are reported without showing the means, medians, and ranges of inputs. This reduces the usefulness of these tables to glancing at the significance asterisks.

Is successful integration in Estonia a glass half-full or half-empty? The editors feel it is half-empty, leaving “fertile ground for ethnic conflict” (p. 236). One can also view it as half-full, given that integration efforts since the restoration of independence have lasted only twenty years, during which period only one ethnic riot has occurred. New majorities and minorities need time to learn how to act in their respective roles. After almost a century of separation from Hungary, the Slovaks and their Hungarian-speaking minority still have not mastered these skills. Both sides still feel threatened, a feature the editors highlight (p. 19) in the case of Estonia. This book is a much-needed complement to second-generation studies in Western Europe.

Rein Taagepera, University of California, Irvine