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Thomas Aquinas On the Nature and Experience of Beauty

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

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in

Philosophy

by

Christopher Scott Sevier

June 2012

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DEDICATION

I lovingly dedicate this work to my wife, Jackie, and to my own three Graces, my daughters Eliana, Emma, and Eden, whose beauty – expressed in love, splendor, joy, and abundance – are to me perpetual signs of the expansive goodness of God.

“And so it is that all things must desire, must yearn for, must love, the Beautiful and the Good... And we may be so bold as to claim also that the Cause of all things loves all things in the superabundance of his goodness, that because of this goodness he makes all things, brings all things to perfection, holds all things together, returns all things. The divine longing is Good seeking good for the sake of the good.”

- Dionysius the Areopagite

“This willingness continually to revise one’s own location in order to place oneself in the path of beauty is the basic impulse underlying education. One submits oneself to other minds (teachers) in order to increase the chance that one will be looking in the right direction when a comet makes its sweep through a certain patch of sky.”

- Elaine Scarry

1 Dionysius the Areopagite, The Divine Names IV, 708A-B.

The present study is an investigation into a little studied aspect of the thought of Thomas Aquinas, namely, his view of the nature and experience of beauty. Aquinas has defined beauty, provisionally, as “that which pleases when seen.” This study is structured around the three key components of the definition: (1) the things themselves, including the formal constituents of beauty found in things, (2) Aquinas’ philosophical psychology of perception, and (3) desire and pleasure. My aim is to examine the connection between Aquinas’ account of beauty and the experiences of beauty.
desire and pleasure and their relation to his moral thinking, on the one hand, and his account of aesthetic pleasure and its implications for his moral thinking, on the other. From this discussion, as well as from a careful examination of select texts from his commentary on Dionysius’ *De divinis nominibus*, I shall argue that Aquinas holds spiritual or moral beauty to be his primary aesthetic concern, and only derivatively does he concern himself with natural or physical beauty. The study concludes with a comparison between the commentaries of Aquinas and his mentor, Albertus Magnus, highlighting the great similarity between the two accounts as well as what appears to be a significant dependence of Aquinas’s thought upon that of his teacher with respect to this subject. This study also highlights one area, namely beauty, in which Aquinas’ thought is significantly more Platonic than Aristotelian.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

There are very few areas of Aquinas’ thought that have not been the subject of intense scrutiny. The subject of this study is one of the rare exceptions. With the exception of Kevin O’Reilly’s recent *Aesthetic Perception*, no other book-length attempt to examine Aquinas’ account of beauty has been published in English in the last twenty years.\(^1\) It is my intention to provide a thorough

\(^1\) Kevin O’Reilly, *Aesthetic Perception: A Thomistic Perspective* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007). Other book-length treatments include Armand Maurer’s *About Beauty: A Thomistic Interpretation* (Houston, Tx: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1983); Umberto Eco’s *Il problema estetico in Tommaso d’Aquino* (Gruppo Editoriale Fabbri, Bompiani, Sonzogno, Elas S.p.A., Milan, 1970), translated into English by Hugh Bredin as *The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988) as well as his *Sviluppo dell’estetica medievale in Momenti e problemi di storia dell’estetica*, vol. 1 (Milano:Marzorat editore, 1959), translated into English by Hugh Bredin as *Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986); and Leonard Callahan’s dissertation *A Theory of Esthetic According to the Principles of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1927). O’Reilly’s work is an attempt “to work out some of the implications of the dynamic interplay between reason, emotion and the body for our response to and appreciation of objects of beauty” (O’Reilly, 17), and it is partially a defense of Jacques Maritain’s presentation of Aquinas’ aesthetics in his *Art and Scholasticism* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1934), against some charges raised by Umberto Eco in *The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas*. Maurer’s work is a collection of lectures centered on the theme of beauty’s grounding in existence, foremost in the existence of God. Eco’s book situates the aesthetics of Aquinas in the context of general medieval aesthetic theories in order “to place Thomistic thought in its proper historical setting, and thus construct a ‘code’...of medieval aesthetic terminology” (Eco, x). His treatment of Aquinas’ aesthetics is both thorough and subtle, grounded in a study of the primary texts, but is, according to Kevin O’Reilly, nevertheless defective to the extent that “it fails to appreciate sufficiently the implications of what is the most important principle underlying Aquinas’ account of human nature: humans are unitary composite beings” (O’Reilly, 16). Lastly, Callahan’s dissertation is an attempt to find a *via media* between two extremes he finds in both medieval Europe as well as in our contemporary American culture, namely, the two vices of (a) making beauty out as an object of worship or (b)
examination of Aquinas’ account of the nature of beauty, adopting the methodology set forth by Umberto Eco in his work on the subject: “to explain and clarify every term and every concept in the original texts in the light of the historical circumstances to which they belonged…to be genuinely faithful to Aquinas.”

In other words, my primary goal is to give a substantial statement of Aquinas’ account of beauty through careful exegesis of key texts. It is my hope that this will contribute something of value to our understanding of this underrepresented feature of Aquinas’ thought.

Aquinas did not write a Treatise on Beauty, but beauty is an important topic to which he repeatedly refers throughout his corpus. In order to determine what his collected views on beauty entail, it is necessary to piece them together from a variety of passages in very disparate texts, none specifically devoted to the topic of beauty, except indirectly as in the case of his commentary on De divinis nominibus of Pseudo-Dionysius, where the agenda is set by the work that is the subject of his commentary. Some commentators have suggested that there

deemonizing beauty, particularly physical beauty, as an evil. His statement of Aquinas’ position is an attempt to locate Aquinas’ thought somewhere between these two erroneous extremes.


4 Thomas Aquinas, In librum beati Dionysii de divinis nominibus expositio (hereafter In de div. nom.), in C. Pera, P. Caramello, and C. Mazzantini, eds., Opera Omnia (Torino: Marietti, 1950). Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius [Dionysius the Areopagite], De divinis nominibus (hereafter DN.), in J. P.
is a specific methodology fitted to the task. Eco, in his substantial and influential contribution to the topic states:

It is necessary, therefore, to choose an appropriate pathway through his works. Such a pathway is suggested by traditional interpretations, but also by the structure of Aquinas’s own system. This system begins with God, considered in himself as exemplary cause and the fullness of being, and proceeds to deal with God in relation to his creatures, God as efficient cause and redeemer. It then passes on to the human actions which pertain to eternal life, considering them both generically and in particular, as passions and habits, virtues and vices.⁵

According to Eco, then, in order to appreciate Aquinas’ thoughts on the nature of beauty, or anything else, we ought to begin with God, the source and foundation of beauty, and then trace it down to the particulars of human experience. This certainly accords well with the approach taken explicitly by the Neoplatonists, including Dionysius, who view all created things as emanating from the Creator, with those things which are farthest from their source participating in the attributes of the Creator less than those which are closer in proximity. Thus, beauty is most fully beauty at the source, since the source is, in

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⁵ Eco (1988), 19.
fact, Beauty itself. The everyday beautiful objects of sensation are the things that participate the least in beauty and which, therefore, have the greatest defect, or ugliness. But even these most distant objects have some participation in beauty, and therefore direct the contemplative eye back toward the source, in a kind of return. This is why the Neoplatonic vision of the created world has been described as one of “emanation and return” or *exitus et reditus*. As commentator, Aquinas will also follow this trajectory, taking the text of Dionysius line by line, and explaining in great detail its meaning. This may not be the only way to approach Aquinas’ view of beauty, but when considering his commentary on *de divinis nominibus*, at least, it seems unavoidable.

In contrast to the Neoplatonic approach, one might also approach the study of Aquinas’ view of beauty from the opposite direction, beginning instead

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See, for instance, M.-D. Chenu, “Le plan de la Somme Théologique de S. Thomas,” *Rivue Thomiste* 45 (1939): 93-107, cited in Paul Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 173. Rorem asserts that this essentially Neoplatonic view was incorporated, in large part on account of Dionysius’ influence, into the thinking of such thinkers as Eriugena and Aquinas. *Ibid.*, 51. More recently, Nicholas Lombardo has argued that Aquinas’ most mature work, his *Summa Theologiae*, is characterized by an overall *exitus-reditus* structure, in which creation emanates from God, its ultimate origin, in an act of desire (i.e., Divine will), and then returns to God through desire (in his account of humans, the focus is also primarily on the will, the rational appetite, though this is not the only sort of desire that is exhibited in creation or in human beings). With respect to both God and creatures, according to Lombardo, “appetite is the engine driving the *exitus-reditus.*” Nicholas E. Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), xi, 30. Catherine LaCugna adds that while the structure of the *Summa Theologiae* generally follows the template established by Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Aquinas “reorganized the contents of the Summa according to the Dionysian cycle of emanation and return,” and also that Aquinas went beyond the Lombard by dividing the section on God into two parts: *De Deo Uno* (ST I, QQ. 2-26) and *De Deo Trino* (ST I, QQ. 33-43), a division which also “had roots in the Dionysian division of treatises on the divine names.” Catherine Mowry LaCugna, *God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), 146-7. The topic of desire will be taken up in greater detail in chapter three.
with the human experience of beauty in particulars, tracing these to the psychological capacities that facilitate those experiences, and then proceed from there to the more abstract features of beauty, terminating in the Source of beauty, God. This sort of approach might be more appropriate with respect to an investigation of those texts that are more clearly indebted to Aristotle’s empiricist approach to human knowledge.\(^7\) I will, therefore, take my methodological cues from the texts themselves, allowing Aquinas to set the terms of investigation, with this one structural departure, namely, that I will begin, in chapter two, with

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\(^7\) See, for example, Aquinas, ST I.78.4 ad 4 where he states, “Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive” [Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet intellectus operatio oriatur a sensu, tamen in re apprehensa per sensum intellectus multa cognoscit quae sensus percipere non potest]. Thus, though the intellect has the ability to have knowledge of things not perceptible by the senses, i.e., immaterial essences, even these are known through the operation of the senses. Thus, all human knowledge “has its origin in the senses.” The qualification “human” knowledge is to set apart the subject of our discussion, namely human knowledge, from knowledge obtained by other species of rational beings, especially immaterial rational beings, e.g., God and angels. Aquinas himself characterized the two different approaches of Plato and Aristotle in this way, as in one of his latest (1267-1268) works. *Quaestio disputatae De spiritualibus creaturis* (hereafter *De spir. creat*.), art. 3, resp., 40-41: Harum autem duarum opinionum diversitas ex hoc procedit quod quidam, ad inquirendum veritatem de natura rerum, processerunt ex rationibus intelligibilibus, et hoc fuit proprium Platonicerum; quidam vero ex rebus sensibilibus, et hoc fuit proprium philosophiae Aristotelis, ut dicit Simplicius in commento Super praedicamenta. His proximate source is Simplicius’ *Commentary on the Categories*, vol. 1, prologus, 8.1.70–9.1.85. Simplicius’ commentary was written in Greek around 538, but it had little impact on the Latin-speaking West until it was translated into Latin by William of Moerbeke in 1266. Aquinas appears to be the first Latin author to reference the commentary. See Michael Chase, “The Medieval Posterity of Simplicius’ *Commentary on the Categories*: Thomas Aquinas and al-Fârâbî,” in Lloyd A. Newton, ed., *Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), 9-10. The late date of the *De spir. creat.* implies that it is one of his best informed in terms of Neoplatonic writings, of which he was increasingly coming in contact as translations, like that of Simplicius’ Aristotelian commentaries, became available in his last years. For more on this, see Wayne J. Hankey, “Aquinas and the Platonists,” in *The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A Doxographic Approach*, eds. Stephen Gersh and Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, with the assistance of Pieter Th. van Wingerden (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), 279-324, esp. 285ff. Cf. Wayne Hankey, “Thomas’ Neoplatonic Histories: His Following of Simplicius,” *Dionysius* 20 (2002): 153-178.
an investigation of Aquinas’ psychology, and this will put us in contact with his more Aristotelian texts. This means we will be considering the subjective nature of his account of beauty first, postponing our investigation of the objective features of beauty until chapters four and five, where I will consider, more directly, the Neoplatonic texts, especially the commentary on De divinis nominibus. I will often refer to the objective and subjective features of beauty in...
Aquinas’ account. Since this is an important classificatory division in this work, I should say a word about it here. The issue relates to where the features under discussion are located. A feature of some object x, if objective, is located in the object x itself. That is why it is objective. Objective features of an object are publicly accessible, and presumably do not vary across a range of subjects who might be considering them. On the other hand, a feature of x, if subjective, is located, at least partially, in the perceiver of x. Subjective features are really features of subjects, not the objects of their attention. For example, consider a cup of hot tea. There are objective facts about the tea: it has a certain volume, viscosity and an exact temperature. These features are rooted in the tea itself, independent of the subjective states of nearby persons. However, if one of those persons should pick up the cup of tea, take a sip, and subsequently burn her lip, she may very well render a judgment that is seemingly about the tea, viz., the tea is hot. Heat is a subjective notion, which is to say, it is a relative notion. Relative to the temperature of an average human lip, the tea may seem quite hot. Relative

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University of America Press, 2007), 245. Cf. the introduction to Aquinas’ Commentary on the Book of Causes, translated by Vincent A. Guagliardo, et al., with an introduction by Vincent A Guagliardo (Washington, CD: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), xii. It should also be noted that Aquinas is not thought to have ever had direct access to any of Plato’s writings. R. J. Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism: A Study of the Plato and Platonici Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), xxi. There were, apparently, only three works of Plato available to the Latin West in the thirteenth century, i.e., the Meno, Phaedo and Timaeus. Raymond Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition: Outlines of a Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi (London: The Warburg Institute, 1939), 27-28. Henke claims that it is certain that Aquinas did not use either the Meno or Phaedo and that there is no evidence that Aquinas was directly acquainted with either Cicero’s or Chalcidius’ translations of the Timeaus. Henle, xxi. His sources for the views he attributes to Plato seem to come primarily from Aristotle or from the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle’s corpus.
to the sun, it is quite cool. We make such judgments all the time, but it is understood that the speaker is not speaking in objectiver terms, but from a certain perspective.

When it comes to Aquinas’ account of beauty, there are, as we shall see, both objective and subjective features that are involved in aesthetic experience, since these pertain to both objects (e.g., things, actions, people, etc.) and subjects (perceivers of such things). In this study, I will be investigating both aspects of Aquinas’ account, and in the section below I will outline exactly why and where these investigations will arise.

1.2 Plan of the work

In the chapters which follow, I will attempt to provide as exhaustive an account as is possible of Aquinas’ account of beauty from a careful examination and explication of the relevant texts, using as a guide Aquinas’ most fundamental definition of beauty, namely, “we call those things beautiful which please when seen.” In this definition, there are three discrete constituents

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10 Since Aquinas did not know Greek, references to original sources will be to the Latin translations to which Aquinas had access. On Aquinas’ use of the Greek language, see Auguste Pelzer, “Les versions latines des ouvrages de morale conservés sous le nom d’Aristote en usage au XIIe siècle,” in Philosophes Médiévaux 8 (1964), 185; and Marie-Dominique Chenu, Towards Understanding St. Thomas, translated by A.-M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964), 152, 216. According to Chenu, though Aquinas (and the same applies to Albert) did not know Greek, he sometimes had access to information about it. This probably came in the form of the commentaries accompanying various translations. See Pelzer, loc. cit.

11 Summa Theologiae (hereafter ST) 1.5.4 ad 1: pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent. English translations, unless otherwise noted, will be taken from Summa Theologica: Complete English
involved in aesthetic experience, and these also fall under one of two headings.

The view that we find operative in Aquinas regarding the nature of beauty has two notable aspects, already mentioned: an objective and a subjective aspect. On the one hand, there are objective features of things in the world, and the objective features provide the formal grounds for the experience of beauty. The three formal conditions of beauty, according to Aquinas, are proportion (or harmony), integrity (or perfection), and splendor (or color). Most often, discussion of these features focuses not on beauty per se, but rather on beautiful things: people, animals, music and human acts. The beauty of these things is grounded in objective features of the things themselves. From this aspect, beauty is objective.

On the other hand, there are subjective conditions for the experience of beauty as well. The formal features may well be present, but without a cognizer

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Edition in Five Volumes, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981). Socrates posits, though he ultimately rejects, a similar view in Plato’s Hippias Major (hereafter Hipp. Maj.) 297e: “Just see; how would it help us towards our goal if we were to say that that is beautiful which makes us feel joy; I do not mean all pleasures, but that which makes us feel joy through hearing and sight?” 

Socrates posits, though he ultimately rejects, a similar view in Plato’s Hippias Major (hereafter Hipp. Maj.) 297e: “Just see; how would it help us towards our goal if we were to say that that is beautiful which makes us feel joy; I do not mean all pleasures, but that which makes us feel joy through hearing and sight?”

Ibid., 298a: “The beautiful is that which is pleasing through hearing and sight”

English translation is from Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias, translated by H. N. Fowler, the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926).

12 ST I.39.8 co: Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, integritas sive perfectio, quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas, unde quae habent colorum nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur.

13 Contra O’Reilly, who suggests that “in so far as aesthetic matters are concerned, Aquinas’ attention is focused on beauty rather than on beautiful things, on pulchrum rather than on pulchra.” O’Reilly, 28. O’Reilly’s assessment is based on examination of one question in the Summa Theologiae, namely, ST I.5.4, in which he notes that Aquinas mentions pulchrum seven times and pulchra only once. Such a judgment does not seem to me warranted on the basis of so little evidence.
to perceive and order these features intelligibly, there can be no aesthetic experience – neither aesthetic pleasure nor aesthetic judgment. Viewed from this aspect, beauty is subjective. A dual-aspect view of beauty as comprised of both objective and subjective features will be popularized by Kant some five hundred years later, though admittedly the similarities between Aquinas’ and Kant’s accounts are largely superficial.\textsuperscript{14} These two aspects – the objective and the subjective – come together in Aquinas’ canonical definition of beauty, and in a way that is characteristic of Aquinas’ \textit{Summa Theologiae}, he has provided a very terse definition that rewards exploration. Firstly, there are the \textit{things themselves}, namely, the objects, and their relevant constituent features. An investigation into the things themselves will reveal the objective aspect of beauty. Secondly, there is the \textit{perception} involved in aesthetic experience. Thirdly, there is the \textit{pleasure} attending aesthetic experience. An investigation into these last two features of aesthetic experience would involve an examination of Aquinas’ philosophical psychology: firstly, of his account of perception in general, and secondly, of his account of the emotions. An examination of these latter two subjects would together reveal the subjective aspect of beauty.

\textsuperscript{14} Kant is not concerned with the nature of beauty \textit{itself}, but with aesthetic \textit{judgments}, since he holds that beauty is not a property of things but a consciousness of a subjective feeling attending the free play of the imagination (see, \textit{e.g.}, Kant, \textit{Critique of the Power of Judgment} [\textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}] §1, 5:203-204). For Kant, aesthetic \textit{judgments} appear to have a dual aspect - both objective and subjective - but modern commentators are divided about this. For instance, Karl Ameriks thinks Kant endorses only the objective aspect of aesthetic judgment, while Hannah Ginsborg is critical of the view. See Karl Ameriks, “Kant and the Objectivity of Taste,” in \textit{British Journal of Aesthetics} 23 (1983): 3-17; and Hannah Ginsborg, “Kant on the Subjectivity of Taste,” in Herman Parret, ed., \textit{Kants Ästhetik} (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1998).
The chapter divisions are, in part, structured around one constituent of the definition each. Chapter two will focus on the first subjective constituent of beauty, namely, perception. It begins, firstly, with an investigation into Aquinas’ account of human psychology in general, and then proceeds to a discussion of one particular aspect of human psychology, namely, sensation. The specific questions that are addressed in this chapter include: What does Aquinas understand to be taking place in episodes of human sensation? How does sensation work? How do the raw data of those things we call beautiful find their way into the mind of the human subject? This chapter is largely mechanical in nature, and we will find that Aquinas’ account of the machinations of the human perceptual apparatus is heavily indebted to Aristotle. Attention here will be given to an understanding of the psychological mechanisms by which physical objects are perceived and judged, with particular attention paid to the perception and judgment of beautiful objects. Particular works that will be consulted include Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae pars prima, his Disputed Questions de Anima, as well as his commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima, De sensu et sensatu, and Physics.

Chapter three, which along with chapter four, constitutes the heart of the present study, focuses on the second half of the subjective aspect of beauty, namely, the role of desire and pleasure in Aquinas’ psychology and ethics, and how these relate to aesthetic experience. I begin with an examination of Aquinas’ notion of appetite. We will find that, for Aquinas as for Aristotle and Augustine,
appetite is always aimed at the good. Because of its fundamental orientation to the good, and because the goods at which human appetites aim may be actual or merely apparent goods, appetite is directly related to morality. We shall see that Aquinas, following Augustine, has tied the good to being so that a thing is actually good insofar as it is related to the absolute good or highest being. An individual is, therefore, morally accountable not only for his actions, but as we shall see also for what he takes to be good, and, by extension, to what he desires. One’s desire is therefore an indication of the status of one’s soul or character, and so one’s desires are subject to moral evaluation. This discussion of desire gives an entrée into Aquinas’ moral theory in general and virtue theory in particular, since it is in his account of the virtues that we find how exactly one is to correctly form one’s character so that it refers one to actual rather than merely apparent goods.

We will also see that since appetite is satisfied when the object of desire has been attained, and this results in the experience of pleasure, therefore just as one’s desires implicate one’s moral status so do one’s pleasures. Here is where this discussion connects with aesthetic experience, for Aquinas has defined beauty, or the experience of beauty, with respect to pleasure. Desire and pleasure are intimately connected, and because of their fundamental relation to the good, and because human beings have some measure of control over their desires and pleasures since these are under the guidance of reason and will, they are subject
to moral evaluation and can be improved through moral education. Through the course of this chapter, we will have occasion also to speak of the causes and effects of pleasure, on the nature of love and its relation to desire, and I will say, finally, a word about disinterested pleasure and desire, since these are of interest to those familiar with formal aesthetics since the eighteenth century. The key text for this chapter is the *secunda pars* of the *Summa Theologiae*, but especially that section known by contemporary philosophers as the *Treatise on the Passions*, which is comprised of questions 22-48 of the *prima secundae*.

Having addressed the two components of the subjective aspect of beauty, in chapter four I will turn to an investigation of the objective aspect, focusing on the three formal constituents of beauty, namely, proportion, clarity, and integrity, as well as an investigation into the knowledge of beauty and the transcendentality of beauty.\(^{15}\) In this discussion, I will consider the relationship between the beautiful and the good, and discuss whether Aquinas considered beauty to be a transcendental on a par with being, goodness and truth. I will also examine the issue whether, in the end, the transcendentality of beauty needs to

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\(^{15}\) By “transcendentality” or “transcendental” I am referring to properties, or predicates, that transcend the Aristotelian categories, and which may be predicated of every existing thing, regardless of its categorization. Thus, Jorge J. E. Gracia: “Although most predicates may be truthfully predicated of only some beings, there are others that seem to apply to every being. The very term ‘being’ itself seems to be one of these, but there are others. Among the most commonly noticed are ‘one’, ‘true’, ‘good’, ‘thing’, and ‘something’.” Jorge J. E. Gracia, “The Transcendentals in the Middle Ages: An Introduction,” in *Topoi* 11 (1992), 113. A question of great relevance to our topic is whether ‘beauty’ is also one of the transcendental predicates, and one that we will consider in chapter four. Cf. Jan A. Aertsen, “Beauty in the Middle Ages: A Forgotten Transcendental?” in *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 1 (1991): 68-97.
be established in order to draw the implications for morality and moral formation suggested by the discussion in chapter three. This chapter will be concluded with a discussion of the technical notion of *honestum*, a discussion of which figures prominently in question 145 of the *secunda secundae*. This discussion is essential to our project because in a series of four short articles, Aquinas establishes the relationship of *honestum* (which is a term in Latin that is analogous to the Greek τὸ καλὸν) to virtue (article one), to beauty (article two), to the useful and pleasant (article three), and finally to temperance (article four). Aquinas argues that there is a sense in which beauty is the same as *honestum*, where *honestum* is taken to be moral goodness and beauty as moral beauty. Here we see the centrality of the notions of spiritual or moral good and beauty to physical or natural good and beauty, an emphasis that will emerge as prominent also in Aquinas’ commentary on Dionysius’ *de divinis nominibus*, which is explored in the next chapter.

The aim of chapter five is to compare Aquinas’ account of beauty with those of his two primary sources on the subject, namely Dionysius and Albertus Magnus. Here I will first provide a survey of Dionysius project and conclusions regarding the nature of beauty and of beautiful things in his *de divinis nominibus*. After this, I will compare a narrow selection of text in Aquinas’ *In de divinis nominibus* with parallel material in Albert’s commentary on the same. From the comparison of these two commentaries on Dionysius’ text we will be able to see
firsthand the stark similarities between the two account, suggesting that Aquinas’ account of beauty is heavily dependent upon that of his mentor. Both are very careful to stick close to the teachings of Dionysius himself, tempering that author’s Platonism with a measure of Aristotelianism, but by no means obscuring it entirely. We find here, as nowhere else, a very strong Platonic impulse in Aquinas that is infrequently acknowledged.

Our final chapter will be devoted to summarizing the conclusions of this study, highlighting those of the greatest significance, namely, those relating beauty to virtue in Aquinas’ thought, after which I will address some potential problems arising out of this investigation. One such problem is the problem of objective standards for evaluation. Since the implications of this study include that persons may be evaluated morally on account of their aesthetic experience, both in their judgments and in the pleasure they receive from such experience, one may well wonder how we can establish clear objective grounds for measuring beauty. I will argue that this problem, while significant, is no more challenging than the analogous problem of establishing objective standards for moral evaluation in general, and suggest that a solution to the one will, in turn, provide a solution for the other. The second objection I will consider is one that arises whenever an attempt is made to tie aesthetics to ethics, namely, the problem of alienation of those members of a society who do not measure up to that society’s standards of beauty. Since any view that would result in the
justification of the aged, the infirm or the disabled would be morally unconscionable, we will need to examine whether Aquinas’ view entails such a conclusion. If so, it must be rejected. I will argue that, in fact, his account does not entail such a conclusion, and that the key to seeing this is to note Aquinas’ emphasis on spiritual or moral, rather than physical or natural, beauty. Such problems arise, I suggest, because human societies tend easily to fall prey to the temptation to invert the proper order of values. This solution, of course, fits well into the worldview of Aquinas who, following Augustine, has objective grounds in being to establish a right ordering of values. Apart from a commitment such as this, it will be much more difficult to argue that there is a proper order of values, and so the problem reasserts itself.

Lastly, I will suggest possible lines for future research, including extending the discussion of the role of beauty in Aquinas’ account of human flourishing and moral education, a much greater examination of both Thomas Aquinas’ and Albertus Magnus’ commentary on *de divinis nominibus*. Both of these documents are in need to translation, and both have been grossly underappreciated. A study of either or both of these would be of great services to the scholarly community, and a more in-depth comparison than I have given of the two would likewise be a worthwhile project. I have provided what I take to be merely the beginning of this larger project, and hope to have the leisure to take it up again in the future.
CHAPTER 2

PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPONENTS OF BEAUTY

One of the key statements thought to characterize Aquinas’ view of the nature of beauty and of beautiful things is found in a passage in which he treats of the good in general. In the pars prima of his Summa Theologiae, article four of question five, Aquinas says,

Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) ST I.5.4 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. Sed ratione different. Nam bonum proprii respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem. Pulchrum autem respicit viam cognoscitivam, pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent. It should be noted that what the Dominican Fathers here render as “beauty and goodness,” namely pulchrum et bonum is better translated as “the beautiful and the good.” The rendering of this phrase in noun form may be merely stylistic, but it also may be an instance of interpretation, namely, of objectifying these concepts in a way that predisposes a particular result to our inquiry. It is a concern of this investigation to determine whether, in Aquinas’ view, beauty, like goodness, is a transcendental and objective feature of the world. It is likely that Aquinas is reiterating here in Latin the common (especially in Plato and Aristotle) Greek expression καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν, which is best rendered as “the fine and the good,” though Aquinas would not have had access to the Greek phrase itself. See Plato, Republic 520c (which also includes “the just”); see also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter NE) 1124-4 where this phrase occurs in its contracted form καλοκαγαθία. English translations will be taken from Nicomachean Ethics, Revised, by H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934). Gabriel Richardson Lear, in her book, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, generally translates καλὸν as “the fine” since she says that “it best captures the aesthetic and moral connotations present in the Greek word kalon as applied to action” though she occasionally translates it as “beautiful” when the context so dictates. Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good
Question five, in which this statement is situated, addresses the issue of goodness in general, and article four of that question addresses the specific issue of goodness in general.

(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 124 n.1. Lear also points out the frustrating fact that Aristotle nowhere in his *Nicomachean Ethics* explains what he means by *kalon*, a “striking omission” since “Aristotle repeatedly describes virtuous actions as *kalon* and describes the virtuous person as one who is fixed on *to kallon*.” *Ibid.*, 126. She offers a tentative explanation for this omission later in the same text when she asserts that “we cannot fully understand the fineness of virtuous actions without a substantive account of *eudaimonia*” which Aristotle will not have until he concludes his investigation at the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. *Ibid.*, 146. Lear’s rendering of *kallon* as “the fine” in order to capture both “the aesthetic and moral connotations” implied in the term has recently received support from Terrence Irwin who, in a presentation at Princeton University’s Classical Philosophy Conference devoted to ancient theories of beauty on December 4, 2011, noted that for the ancient Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, *kallon* included both an aesthetic as well as a moral connotation. Moreover, Irwin notes that this dual use of *kallon* was later picked up by medieval thinkers like Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, in their interpretation of the new Latin translations of Aristotle, even though *kallon* was nearly always there translated as *pulchrum* (apparent beauty) instead of *honestum* (moral beauty or excellence). This present study is greatly indebted to Irwin’s brilliant presentation, and has benefitted immensely especially from his attention to bibliographic detail. Unfortunately, the author would not at this time extend permission to reproduce or cite the text of the paper itself in publication. However, I do wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to professor Irwin’s work on this topic, which is of central importance to my thesis. The issue of the relationship between *honestum* and *kallon* will be taken up again in chapter four. Some of professor Irwin’s comments, especially as they relate to the dual intention of *kallon* in Aristotle, can be found in his “The Sense and Reference of *Kalon* in Aristotle,” in *Classical Philology* 105 (2010): 381-402. For instance, he asserts that “the reference of *kalon* is wider than the reference of “beautiful” and also wider than the reference of “morally right.” But I believe that, none the less, Aristotle uses *kallon* both to pick out beauty and to pick out moral rightness, which he recognizes as two distinct properties.” *Ibid.*, 382. He also states, “Aristotle does not seem to think we equivocate if we say that a bird’s plumage and a brave action are both *kala*. At the same time, it does not imply that different things are *kalon* because of some one property that makes them all *kalon*.” *Ibid.*, 396.

2 ST I.5 Pro: Deinde quaeritur de bono, et primo de bono in communi. Question five’s larger context is Aquinas’ treatise on the divine nature which comprises *pars prima* questions 1-26, in which Aquinas is working systematically through the divine attributes. This is followed by his treatise on the Trinity (questions 27-43), and then finally of God’s acts in creation (questions 44-119). The treatment of God’s goodness in question five follows his treatment of goodness in general (question four).
question whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?³ Beauty is not Aquinas’ primary concern here, but is considered only indirectly, since the subject of the question is the nature of goodness. Nevertheless, we can learn something about his conception of beauty from what he says.

In the customary format of a disputation, the model that he adopts for the *Summa*, Aquinas first raises several objections to the position he will, in the end, endorse, namely, that the good *does* have the aspect (*ratio*) of a final cause.⁴ The first objection is the one that concerns us here, since the passage now under consideration is his reply to that objection. Its challenge is that, according to Dionysius (in *De Divinis Nominibus* IV), “goodness is praised as beauty.”⁵ However,
it is added, beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness, the objector concludes, seems likewise to have the aspect of a formal, and so presumably not a final, cause.

In his response, Aquinas first agrees with the implicit identity claim being made between goodness and beauty, for he says, “beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally.” Indeed, this is very close to Dionysius’ language, for he asserts that we do not distinguish between “good” and “beautiful” when these terms are applied to that Cause which gathers all things into one. The qualification, *in subjecto*, which the Fathers of the English person, some part of a person, or any artefact or material object, means ‘beautiful’, ‘handsome’, ‘attractive’, and its normal antonym is *aiskhros*, ‘ugly’… The characteristics by virtue of which a person is *kalos* are usually visual.” Additionally, Dover asserts that *kalos* and *aiskhros* were also extended to moral discourse, being “applied very freely indeed by the orators to any action, behaviour or achievement which evokes any kind of favourable reaction and praise or incurs any kind of contempt, hostility or reproach… *Kalos* thus most oftentimes corresponds to our ‘admirable’, ‘creditable, honourable’, and *aiskhros* to ‘disgraceful’, ‘shameful’, ‘scandalous’; they are among the most important tools of manipulative language.” Kenneth James Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 69-70. This corresponds to the orthographical rules endorsed by Oxford’s *Greek-English Lexicon*, edited by H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, who state that καλός means “beauty” (especially when applied to bodies), while καλόν can mean either “beautiful,” when applied to an outward form or to persons, or it can mean “good” or “fine” when applied to action, in which case it assumes a moral character. A *Greek-English Lexicon*, edited by Henry George Liddell, and Robert Scott, with corrections and additions by Henry Drisler (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1870), 698, 699. Dover does mention, however, a special reinforcement role played by καλός when combined with another adjectives, as expressed by the formula ‘x καλός’ or ‘καλός x.’ Examples of such are ‘καλός and just’ or ‘good and καλός’ and the like. Dover, 72-73. These formulae are found in abundance in ancient Greek literature.

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6 ST I.5.4 obj. 1: *Sed pulchrum importat rationem causae formalis.*

7 ST I.5.4 obj. 1: *Ergo bonum habet rationem causae formalis.*

8 ST I.5.4 ad 1: *pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem.*

9 Dionysius, DN IV.7, 701C: *Bonum autem et pulchrum non separandum in ipsa in uno omnia comprehendenti causa.* Quotations from Dionysius in Latin will be provided from the Sarracens translation unless otherwise noted.
Dominican Province have rendered “fundamentally” might be more perspicuously interpreted as “in essence” or “in reality,” the emphasis being that the beautiful thing and the good thing are really identical, in a sense, namely, they refer to the same thing. To put it another way, there is just one thing that is referred to both as good and as beautiful. Aquinas is not speaking in the abstract here, but is referring to concrete individuals.

Aquinas then gives the explanation for this identity: “for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently (propter hoc) goodness is praised as beauty.”\textsuperscript{10} The force of the propter hoc (literally, “on account of this” or “for this reason”) connects the identity statement with its explanation. Goodness is praised as beauty because each has the same foundation, namely, form. It is this common foundation on form that accounts for both of them being considered under the category of formal cause. But this does not exhaust their causal powers, for a thing may be considered either as a cause or as having a cause under more than one genus. Indeed, a complete explanation of a thing will need to make reference to each of the four causes, not merely one.\textsuperscript{11} The case is

\textsuperscript{10} ST I.5.4 ad 1: …quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut pulchrum.

\textsuperscript{11} Aquinas, for example, commenting on a passage from Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (75\textsuperscript{b}30) on definitions, states: “To understand this, note that it is possible for the same thing to have different definitions taken from different causes (diversis causis). Moreover, there is an order among the causes, such that the explanation (ratio) of one cause is taken from another cause. Thus, the explanation of the matter (ratio materiae) is taken from the form (ex forma), for the matter must be such as the form requires. The efficient cause (efficiens), in turn, explains the form (ratio formae); for every agent (agens) produces what is like itself (sibi simile), so that the mode of the form (modus formae), which follows from the agent’s action, depends on the mode of the agent (modum
different when considering not a thing to be explained but that cause by which it is explained. The beautiful and the good are here being considered as causes, not as things to be explained by way of causes, and as such they need not be considered under all four categories of causes. Indeed, it would seem counter-intuitive to consider either the good or the beautiful under the aspect of a material cause, in themselves, though it may make sense to speak this way of some object that manifests these in the particular. Nevertheless, it would be the particular thing, and not the good or the beautiful, in that case that would be considered as the material cause of some response in the perceiver.

Both in his reply to the first objection and again in the corpus of this article, Aquinas states that the good, being what all things desire, has the nature of an end (habet rationem finis) and so, he concludes, in the corpus, the good implies final causality (rationem finis importat). The good has, therefore, both the

agentis). Finally, the explanation of the efficient cause (ratio efficiens) is taken from the end (a fine), since every agent acts for an end. Therefore, a definition which is taken from the end is the explanatory principle and cause (ratio et causa) by which other definitions taken from other causes are proved.” Aquinas, Expositio libri Posteriorum Analyticorum (hereafter In PA), lib. I, lect. 16, n. 5. English translations are from Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, translated by Richard Berquist (Notre Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Books, 2007). In this passage, Aquinas establishes both the priority of the final cause in a complete explanation as well as the unity of the four causes in an explanation of a subject. The language is evocative of an explanatory goal. In order to gain understanding, it is necessary to properly order the various causes. The ratio for matter is derived from the form, the form is derived from the agent, and the agent is ordered to the end. The ratio of each cause can be understood, individually, as a specific and partial explanation of the subject; taken together, they constitute a complete explanation. Cf. ST I-II.55.4 co: “For the perfect essential notion of anything is gathered from all its causes” [Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex omnibus causis eius.].

12 ST I.5.4 ad 1: Sed ratione differunt. Nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem. Cf, I.5.4 co:
nature of a formal cause and the nature of a final cause. This does not, however, imply that the beautiful has the nature of a final end as well, since the good and the beautiful do differ in some respect, namely, *in ratio*, that is, in meaning. In fact, the implication is that the beautiful does not have the nature of a final cause, since it is properly related to a cognitive, rather than an appetitive, power. For it is desire, and not cognition, that is related to an end, since the end is the object of desire; the end is what moves the appetite. The good is the proper object of desire, but the beautiful is not.\(^{13}\) Though it must be remembered that the good and the beautiful are in some sense identical, nevertheless, it is under the aspect of the good (*sub ratione boni*) that an object is desired and so has the aspect of an end.

At this point, we might note the presence of a seeming contradiction or tension in Aquinas’ thought regarding the nature of beauty considered under the aspect of a formal cause and not as under the aspect of a final cause. For what he says here seems to be in conflict with what he says elsewhere, where he seems to adopt the Neoplatonic notion that beauty causes the movement in things. Dionysius says, for instance, that “beauty ‘bids’ all things to itself (whence it is called ‘beauty’) and gathers everything into itself.”\(^{14}\) Dionysius here links the

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\(^{13}\) *Ibid.*.

\(^{14}\) Dionysius, DN IV, 701D: *et sicut omnia ad se ipsum vocans, unde et callos dicitur, et sicut tota in totis congregans*. The Greek κάλλος is simply transliterated into Latin as *callos*. 
Greek noun “beauty” (καλλος) etymologically with the Greek verb “to call” (καλεω), an association he owes to Plato. Thus beauty seems to be an object of appetite, drawing all things to itself, and therefore to have the aspect of an end.

In commenting on this passage, it is notable that Aquinas makes no mention of the tension between this and our previous passage from the Summa Theologiae, though they were written at roughly the same time. Aquinas approaches Dionysius’ statement within the context of a discussion about how God is the cause of harmony (consonantia) and brightness (claritas) in all things, in which he says that harmony may be understood in two ways: First, according to the order of creatures to God (secundum ordinem creaturarum ad Deum); second, according to [created] things in their ordering towards each other (secunda autem consonantia est in rebus, secundum ordinationem earum ad invicem). His discussion of the etymological link in question arises during his discussion of the first sort of harmony. He says that God is the cause of the harmony (Deus est causa

15 Cf. Plato, Cratylus 416c: “Is not mind that which called (καλεσαν) things by their names, and is not mind the beautiful (καλου?)” English translation is from The Dialogues of Plato, volume I, third edition, edited by Benjamin Jowett (London: Oxford University Press, 1892), 361. The etymological link expressed here is philologically false. Cf. Liddell and Scott, op. cit.

16 The timeline provided by Jean-Pierre Torrell lists the dates as follows: for In de div. nom., 1266-68, and for ST pars prima 1-74, 1265-67. J.-P. Torrell, op. cit., 328.

17 In de div. nom. IV, lec. 5: Deus…est causa consonantiae et claritatis in omnibus.

18 In de div. nom. IV, lec. 5: Deus sit causa consonantiae in rebus; est autem duplex consonantia in rebus: prima quidem, secundum ordinem creaturarum ad Deum et hanc tangit cum dicit quod Deus est causa consonantiae, sicut vocans omnia ad seipsum, inquantum convertit omnia ad seipsum sicut ad finem, ut supra dictum est et propter hoc pulchritudo in Graeco callos dicitur quod est a vocando sumptum; secunda autem consonantia est in rebus, secundum ordinationem earum ad invicem; et hoc tangit cum subdit, quod congregat omnia in omnibus, ad idem.
consonantiae) in things as ordered to himself, and in calling all things to himself.\textsuperscript{19} He notes that in calling all things to himself, God converts (convertit) all things to himself as to an end (\textit{sic\hspace{1em}ut\hspace{1em}ad\hspace{1em}finem}), though he does not explain the nature of the “conversion.”\textsuperscript{20} Since God is Beauty itself, this calling, or drawing, itself is related etymologically to the thing doing the calling, which is the object, i.e., presumably the end, of the creatures which are drawn. Aquinas is apparently aware of the etymological connection in the Greek original,\textsuperscript{21} though specific reference to the Greek is found in neither of the primary Latin translations he was using.\textsuperscript{22} He concludes, at the end of this passage, that “since all things, in all things, are found in a certain order, it therefore follows that all things are ordered to the same [i.e., God].”\textsuperscript{23}

Later on in the commentary, in \textit{lectio} eight, he makes a similar claim, asserting that “all that exists comes from the Beautiful and the Good, which is God, as \textit{ex pricipio effectivo}, and is in the Beautiful and the Good as in a maintaining or preserving principle; and is converted to the Beautiful and the

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{In de div. nom.} IV, lec. 5: \textit{Deus est causa consonantiae, sicut vocans omnia ad seipsum.}

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{In de div. nom.} IV, lec. 5: \textit{inquantum convertit omnia ad seipsum sicut ad finem.}

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{In de div. nom.} IV, lec. 5: \textit{ut supra dictum est et propter hoc pulchritudo in Graeco callos dicitur quod est a vocando sumptum.}

\textsuperscript{22} That is, in the translations by Eriugena and Sarracens, except that where Eriugena translates \textit{κόλλος} as \textit{pulchrum}, Sarracens transliterates the same as \textit{callos}, thereby preserving something of the Greek original. Note that Aquinas retains the transliteration in his commentary. Specific mention of the Greek origin does not arise in Latin translations of \textit{The Divine Names} until the fifteenth century translations of Ambroise le Camaldule and Marsilio Ficino.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{In de div. nom.} IV, lec. 5: \textit{et ex hoc quod omnia in omnibus inveniuntur ordine quodam, sequitur quod omnia ad idem ultimum ordinentur.}
Good, desiring the same as an end, and not only as an end, as something desired, but also insofar as all substances and actions are ordered, in themselves, as to an end.”

This looks very much like a denial of the very thing Aquinas asserted in the passage from the *Summa Theologiae* with which we began, namely, that beauty does *not* have the aspect of an end, and therefore is not related to the appetitive faculty. Rather, it seems that all things are ordered to the Beautiful and the Good, namely, God, as an end. However, he does have a final qualification, which is brief and imprecise, but which may allow for some room to relieve the tension. A few short lines after this last passage, he says, “However, it [i.e., God or the Beautiful and the Good] does not move a thing because of some extraneous end, but by its own grace with respect to its own intention, and in order that it be attained by things.”

This suggests that what moves a thing toward its ultimate end, *viz.*, God, is not internal to the created thing, but extrinsic to it precisely because the source of the movement is intrinsic to God himself, in order that all contingent things may reach their ultimate end. This movement is not a movement of the appetite, however, but a movement of grace; otherwise, there could be no guarantee that all things would appropriate the ultimate end.

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24 *In de div. nom.* IV, lec. 8: *omne quod est, est ex pulchro et bono quod est Deus, sicut ex principio effectivo; et in pulchro et bono est, sicut in principio contentivo vel conservativo; et ad pulchrum et bonum convertitur, ipsum desiderans, sicut ad finem, et non solum est finis ut desideratus, sed etiam inquantum omnes substantiae et actiones ordinantur in ipsum, sicut in finem.*

25 *In de div. nom.* IV, lec. 8: *Non autem movet res propter aliquem finem extraneum, sed gratia sui ipsius, quantum ad suam intentionem, et propter ipsum attingendum a rebus.*
To return to our previous passage, beauty, in contrast with the good, relates not to the appetitive but to the cognitive faculty. It is not an object of desire, and does not have the aspect of a final cause. It is in this context that we get Aquinas’ famous definition of beautiful things as “those which please when seen.” He explains the relation of beauty to cognition in that beauty “consists in due proportion” (in debita proportione consistit), because the senses “delight in things duly proportioned” (delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis). This itself is the result of a kind of harmony since the reason given why the senses delight in things duly proportioned is that this represents a kind of likeness to themselves (in sibi similibus), because “each sense is a sort of ratio” (nam et sensus ratio quaedam est). The senses are themselves proportioned to the things perceived. The point seems to be drawn from his commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Book III (426a27-b8), where he says:

26 ST I.5.4 ad 1.
27 ST I.5.4 ad 1: pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam.
28 ST I.5.4 ad 1: pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent.
29 The English Fathers translate ratio here as “reason” but a better translation, especially given the context, would be “proportioned” since the discussion relates to the way in which the senses are fitted to the object of sensation by a kind of similitude. I have therefore left ratio untranslated.
30 According to Torrell, Aquinas composed his Sententia libri De anima (hereafter In DA) at the same time (1267-68) that he was composing questions 75-89 (the treatise on human nature) of the Summa Theologiae. Aquinas was not required to teach on Aristotle so it seems that his investigation into the De Anima was for the purpose of deepening his knowledge of human psychology. Torrell speculates that this investigation may have been prompted by the publication in November 1267 of Moerbeke’s translation of De Anima. Torrell, op. cit., 173-174. Quoting R.-A. Gauthier, Torrell notes that “Saint Thomas will find this formula so useful that he will apply it again when, in the margin of the Secunda Pars of the Summa theologiae, he will write his
Next, when Aristotle says **But if harmony**, etc., he indicates on the basis of the above remarks his solution to another question—namely, why some sense objects harm sense and others are pleasant for it. And he says that since **harmony** (i.e., vocal sound that is consonant and proportioned) is a kind of vocal sound, and since **vocal sound** is in a certain way the same as **hearing**, and since **harmony** is a kind of proportion, it is necessary that **hearing** be a kind of proportion. And since any proportion is harmed by overabundance, so an extreme sense object does harm to a sense... But if pure sense objects are brought down into a proportioned mixture, then they are made pleasant... For sense takes pleasure in things that are proportioned; these things are similar to it, because **sense** is a kind of proportion.\(^{31}\)


\(^{31}\) Aquinas, *In DA III.2, 426a27-b8* (219-244): Deinde cum dicit: Si autem symphonia etc., demonstrat ex premissis solutionem alterius questionis, quare scilicet quedam sensibilia corrumpant sensum et quedam delectent. Et dicit quod, cum symphonia, id est vox consonans et proportionata, sit vox quedam, et vox quodam modo sit idem quod auditus, et symphonia sit quedam proportio, necesse est quod auditus sit quedam proportio. Et quia quolibet proportio corrumpitur per superhabundanciam, idcirco excellens sensibile corrumpit sensum... Set si pura sensibilia deducuntur ad proportionatam mixtionem, efficiuntur delectabilia... sensus enim in proportionatis delectatur, sicuti in sibi similibus, eo quod sensus est proportio quedam. The English translation is from *A Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima*, translated by Robert Pasnau (New Have: Yale University Press, 1999), 307-308. Author’s boldface. The bold text is included in Pasnau’s translation to indicate where Aquinas quotes Aristotle exactly in his exposition of the text. The Latin translation of the *De anima* used by Aquinas is that of William of Moerbeke. For a discussion of Moerbeke’s translation and its use by Aquinas, see *Ibid.*, xv-xvii. There is an additional issue that we might as well raise here, and that is the role of the medieval commentator. It is an open question whether Aquinas, in commenting on Aristotle’s (or others’) works, should be taken as merely reporting on or explaining the author’s thoughts or, additionally, to be endorsing them. While it is not decisive, Pasnau points out that on only very rare occasions does Aquinas explicitly voice his disagreement with a text on which he is commenting (e.g., in his commentary on *Physics* book VIII, lec. 2). Pasnau furthermore thinks it is significant that Aquinas “is not very interested in historical scholarship for its own sake,” citing as justification for this characterization, a discussion in Aquinas’ commentary on *De Caelo* I.22, about the correct interpretation of Plato, in which Aquinas is reported to have said: “Whichever of these is so makes no difference to us. For the study of philosophy is not about knowing what individuals thought, but about the way things are.” From this, Pasnau concludes: “Presumably this sentiment informs all of his Aristotelian commentaries.” *Ibid.*, xxi. A similar sentiment is expressed by Torrell in *op. cit.*, 239. Pasnau’s view seems to be echoed in the words of David Burrell and Isabelle Moulin that, in commenting on a particular text (in this context, referring to Aquinas as commentator and the text being Dionysius’ *De divinis nominibus*), “the commentator makes the original text his own.” David Burrell and Isabelle Moulin, “Albert, Aquinas, and
Aquinas explains that, for Aristotle, harmony (*symphonia*) as regards sound (by which he means a kind of mean between extremes of pitch) is a kind of proportion (*proportio*); that is, it is well-suited to the sense organ by offending neither with an overabundance of pitch nor with a lack of sufficient pitch.\(^{32}\) This suggests that Aquinas understands Aristotle as holding that proportion is a kind of ‘fit’ between the sense (in this case, hearing) and its object, and it is clear that Aquinas means this case to generalize to the other senses. The result of such a ‘fit’ between the sense and its object is pleasure. The greater the proportion of the object to its sense, the greater the pleasure experienced by the percipient. He repeats his dictum that “sense is a kind of proportion” (*sensus est proportio*...
quaedam), but again leaves this unexplained. Nevertheless, it suggests that the senses themselves have a kind of internal proportion with which the proportionality of the object of sense is particularly appropriate. There is, therefore, a kind of harmony between the sense and the sensibilium, and pleasure is the result.

To apply this to our passage in the *Summa Theologiae*, it seems that the beauty apprehended in beautiful things, as a result of form, is both something perceived through the senses, and also that which, in the act of perception, provides the soul with some sort of pleasure, though apparently this pleasure is not related to the satisfaction of desire, since a thing is not desired under the aspect of beauty. A complete understanding of Aquinas’ theory of the nature of beauty will, therefore, have to begin with an understanding of what operations take place in the perception of the objects to which beauty is thought to apply, which is the subject of our first investigation. A complete understanding of the nature of beauty will also require understanding the link between the good and the beautiful, the relationship between both the cognitive and the appetitive faculties with the good and the beautiful, a distinction between the different kinds of pleasure, and finally an understanding of the causal relationship between the object’s form and the subject’s perception. For now, I will turn to consider Aquinas’ general account of human psychology and how it relates to the perception of beauty.
2.1 On Human Psychology

An aesthetic judgment (e.g., the judgment that some thing is, or is not, beautiful) begins with perception. Therefore, we need to be clear on Aquinas’ understanding of perception, and this requires that we understand what the components are which are involved in perception. Perception itself seems, ostensibly, to relate corporeal organs directly with corporeal objects. To describe what is going on this way would not, however, adequately represent Aquinas’ account since Aquinas’ theory contains reference to non-corporeal components as well.

Aquinas views human beings as composite beings with two essential components; that is, human beings have a material component and an immaterial (or formal) component. In non-technical terms, human beings are composed of both body and soul, for he says, “it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body.”\textsuperscript{33} It seems clear that, with this statement, Aquinas is specifically rejecting the Platonic view of soul as a separable substance, for in the next line he states: “Plato, though supposing that sensation was proper to the soul…could maintain man to be a soul making use of the body.”\textsuperscript{34} Plato’s view, as Aquinas understands it, was that a human being just

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} \textit{ST} I.75.4 co: \textit{manifestum est quod homo non est anima tantum, sed est aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore.}
\item \textsuperscript{34} \textit{ST} I.75.4 co: \textit{Plato vero, ponens sentire esse proprium animae, ponere potuit quod homo esset anima utens corpore. Cf. ST I.76.1 co: …quod Socrates intelligit secundum se totum, sicut Plato posuit, dicens}
\end{itemize}
is a soul, and has a body, or, as Aquinas puts it, borrowing the phrase from Aristotle, for Plato “the relation of the soul to his body is that of a sailor to his ship or of a clothed man to his garments.” Aquinas wishes to assert, to the contrary, that a human soul without its body is not capable of achieving its fullest human potential, though it can continue to exist apart from the body. So while separable existence is possible for the human soul, it is only in connection to a material body that the soul can achieve the “fullness of its specific nature.”

This seems to go beyond the Aristotelian view that the soul is merely the

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35 Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima (hereafter QDA) 1 co: Sed ulterius posuit Plato, quod anima humana non solum per se subsisteret, sed quod etiam haberet in se completam naturam speciei. Ponebat enim totam naturam speciei in anima esse, dicens hominem non esse aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, sed animam corpori advenientem; ut sit comparatio animae ad corpus sicut nautae ad nautam, vel sicuti induti ad vestem. The imagery of the body’s relation to the soul being like that of the sailor to a ship is originally from Plato, and recounted (though not endorsed) by Aristotle, from whom Aquinas receives it. See Aristotle, De Anima I.3-4. Cf. Plato, Phaedo 115c-e; Phaedrus 245c-246a; Alcibiades 129e-130130c. The English translation is from Questions on the Soul, translated by James H. Robb (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1984).

36 QDA I ad 4: “Although a human soul is able to subsist per se, still it does not per se possess a complete specific nature” [Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet anima humana per se possit subsistere, non tamen per se habet speciem completam]. Cf. QDA I ad 12: “Although a soul depends on its body to the extent that without its body a soul does not attain the fullness of its nature, yet a soul is not so dependent on its body that a soul cannot exist apart from its body” [Ad duodecimum dicendum quod etiam anima aliquam dependantiam habet ad corpus, in quantum sine corpore non pertingit ad complementum sua speciei; non tamen sic dependet a corpore quin sine corpore esse possit.]. It is presumably on account of this dependence that Aquinas holds that the soul has a “natural inclination” to be united to a body. See, e.g., ST I.76.1 ad 6: “To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself…so the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body” [Ad sextum dicendum quod secundum se convenit animae corpori uniri…ita anima humana manet in suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata, habens aptitudinem et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem].

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“principle of life,” though it certainly is that by which living things are alive. It is on account of this, that Aquinas asserts that “the soul is the form of the body.” For Aristotle, however, neither the human soul nor the human body could exist qua human apart from one another. That is, when separated, the soul ceases to exist and the body ceases to be human, though it remains, for a time, as a merely corporeal aggregate. The soul, for Aristotle, is not the body, but it is “that by means of which we live, perceive, and think,” and it is on account of this that he calls it “a kind of principle and form, and not matter or subject.”

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37 QDA I co: Manifestum est enim id quo vivit corpus, animam esse, vivere autem est esse viventium: anima igitur est quo corpus humanum habet esse actu. Cf. ST I.75.1 co: “To seek the nature of the soul (animae), we must premise that the soul (anima) is defined as the first principle of life in those things which live: for we call living things animate (animata), and those things which have no life, inanimate (inanimatas).” It should be clear that Aristotle’s use of the term “soul” has almost nothing in common with the Christian notion of the soul. For Aristotle, all living things have a soul, by virtue of which they are living things. The presence of soul is what unites them under the class of living (animate) as opposed to non-living (inanimate) things. In this respect, the human soul serves the same purpose in human beings as do the souls of non-human animals and plants. There are, of course, differences in complexity and in the kind of capacities that each living thing has, based on the type of soul that it has, but this is not to mitigate the fundamental similarity in function served by soul across the categories of living things.

38 QDA I co: Huiusmodi autem forma est. Est igitur anima humana corporis forma. Cf. ST I.76.1 co, where he asserts that, in human beings, it is specifically the “intellectual soul” that is the form of the human body: “We must assert that the intellect (intellectus) which is the principle of intellectual operation (qui est intellectualis operationis principium) is the form of the human body (sit humani corporis forma)...” and also “this principle by which we primarily understand (quo primo intelligimus), whether it be called the intellect (intellectus) or the intellectual soul (anima intellectiva), is the form of the body (est forma corporis). This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (Et haec est demonstratio Aristotelis in II de anima).” Cf. Aristotle, De Anima ii.2. One feature of the rational soul that sets apart human beings from other kinds of material substances is that of intellect or mind. See Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter SCG) II.60.

Aquinas is in full agreement with this sentiment. Commenting on this statement and appealing to an analogy between soul and health, he says: “Likewise, too, we are said to be living through body only insofar as it has soul. This is the reason why he [Aristotle] says here that soul is the first thing through which we live, sense, etc.”

Aquinas seems to agree, initially, with Aristotle regarding the separability of the soul. For Aristotle states that there are three ways of speaking of substance, namely in terms of species, in terms of matter and in terms of their composite. Matter, he says, is potentiality, species is actuality, and in their conjunction is an “ensouled” body. Aristotle then concludes that “the soul does not exist without a body and yet is not itself a kind of body.” Aquinas, demonstrating his fundamental agreement, says “based on the true claim that he has demonstrated, he adduces a number of further conclusions.” And Aquinas asserts that Aristotle has demonstrated that the soul is the body’s species or form (species sive forma), for he says that “Aristotle shows that this conclusion follows from the

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40 In DA II.2, 414-12 (210-212): similiter etiam corpore non diciumr esse viventes nisi in quantum habet animam, et propter hoc hic dicitur quod anima est primum quo vivimus et sentimus etc.

41 Aristotle, De Anima II.4, 414-14-18: Tripliciter enim dicta substancia, sicut diximus, quarum hoc quidem species, illud vero materia, aliud autem ex utrisque, horum autem materia quidem potencia, species autem actus, postea ex utrisque animatum, non corpus est actus anime, set ipsa corporis cuiusdam.

42 Aristotle, De Anima 414-19: Et propter hoc bene opinantur quibus videtur neque sine corpore esse neque corpus aliquod anima.

43 In DA II.4, 414-4 (158-161): Et circa hoc duo facit: primo demonstrat propositum; secundo ex veritate demonstrata quasdam conclusiones ulterioris inducit, ibi: Et propter hoc bene opinantur etc. Italics mine.
premises” and “from the demonstration given earlier [414a4-12] that either body or soul is the species, and since body, as we have just said, is not soul’s species, it remains that soul is body’s species.”

Aquinas thus seems to be in agreement with Aristotle as regards the human soul’s relation to its body. He does make a significant deviation, though it is not without precedent in Aristotle. His view, which is more akin to Plato than to Aristotle, is that the human soul is capable of existence apart from the body, and that it is, in fact, immortal on account of its separability; though, at the same time, he rejects Plato’s view that the soul is eternal, as well as Plato’s

44 In DA II.4, 414a14-18 (219-235): Quarto iibi: Tribliciter enim dicta substantia etc., ostendit conclusionem sequi ex premissis… Et ideo, cum sequatur ex predicta demonstratione quod vel corpus vel anima sit species, et corpus, ut nunc dictum est, non sit species anime, <relinquitur> quod anima sit species corporis.

45 ST I.76.1 ad 6: “To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself…so the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body” [Ad sextum dicendum quod secundum se convenit animae corpori uniri…ita anima humana manet in suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata, habens aptitudinem et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem]. As has been previously noted, Aquinas had no direct access to Plato’s works. The views he attributes to Plato have their origin primarily in the works of Aristotle, Augustine and Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle. It is not clear that he was aware of the textual origin of this view.

46 ST I.75.6 co: “We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible… whatever has existence per se cannot be generated or corrupted except per se… Now it was shown above that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is… For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist.” Cf. ST I.75.2-3.

47 See, for example, QDA 14 ad 7: “A soul possesses the power to exist always, but it did not always have this power; and therefore it is not necessary that a soul should always have existed, but rather that in the future it will never cease to be” [Ad septimum dicendum quod anima habet virtutem ut sit semper, sed illam virtutem non semper habuit; et ideo non oportet quod semper fuerit, sed quod in futurum nunquam deficiat]. Cf. ST I.44.1 co: “It must be said that every being in any way
doctrine that the soul alone constitutes the human person. He sides with Aristotle in holding that the body is an essential constituent of a properly functioning human being, and that, while the soul can exist apart from the body, in such a state the human soul would be deficient in some way, unable to properly carry out the activities of a human life. He states:

The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object... Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses in order to perform its act of perception.

This passage indicates fairly clearly that Aquinas believes that while the body is an important constituent of a human being, and in fact necessary for the

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48 ST I.75.4 co. He says, in fact, that Plato’s account would be correct, if the operation of the sensory part of the soul were independent of the body; for then, presumably, the body would be a superfluous piece of equipment, since the operations of the senses could be performed without a body, as is the case with pure intellectual beings, e.g., angels and God. However, Aquinas takes himself to have shown, in the preceding article, that the activity of the sensory part of the soul is necessarily shared with the body – his prime example is that of sense perception - and, therefore, some vital operation of the human person would be lost without the body. Given this, he concludes that the human being is a composite of body and soul. So for Aquinas, sensation is an essential feature of human nature and since the body is necessary for sensation, the body is essential to human nature. This implies that were it not for sensation, human nature would not require a body at all. Cf. ST I.76.1 co: “it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses. But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man.”

49 ST I.75.2 ad 3: Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organum quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione objecti...autem indigere corpore non removet intellectum esse subsistentem, alioquin animal non esset aliquid subsistens, cum indigeat exterioribus sensibilibus ad sentiendum.
proper operation of the intellect, nevertheless, the body is not strictly necessary for the existence of the soul. At least, it suggests that the intellect’s dependence upon the body for its activity is not by itself sufficient to rule out the possibility of a disembodied subsistence of the soul. Two articles later, he adds:

Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human species.\(^{50}\)

Thus it seems clear that for Aquinas the human soul is not, contra Plato, a person. At least, a person is not merely her soul. Nevertheless, contra Aristotle, the human soul can exist apart from the body. His is, therefore, a kind of hybrid account of human souls, and this is one of the more innovative features of his psychology. Such passages as those which have just been cited have led Robert Pasnau to classify Aquinas’ view as an example of “reductive hylomorphism,” the view that a substance, in this case a human being, is properly “just one thing.” He states that Aquinas rejects metaphysical (read: substance) dualism, namely, the view that a human being is composed of two separable parts. He states, rather, that Aquinas’ view is that “the matter and form are conceptually different, but there is no real difference, no way to split the material part off from the formal part. These are simply different ways of describing the same thing.

\(^{50}\) ST I.75.4 ad 2: *Ad secundum dicendum quod non quaelibet substantia particularis est hypostasis vel persona, sed quae habet completam naturam speciei. Unde manus vel pes non potest dici hypostasis vel persona. Et similiter nec anima, cum sit pars speciei humanae.*
Aquinas does not ascribe to a metaphysical dualism of matter and form, potentiality and actuality.” Pasnau seems to be pointing out that Aquinas cannot be a metaphysical dualist since he does not hold to the separable existence of matter, but that does not seem to be his only concern here, as I think the quote illustrates. The target of his claim is not merely the material but also the formal side of the distinction, a role that is played by the soul. Both, he says, are necessary to the existence of the substance. Further, he states that “Aquinas looks like a dualist, even a substance dualist, inasmuch as he explicitly identifies the rational soul as a subsistent form and even as a substance. Not surprisingly, many characterize him in just this way.” He points out, in a footnote to this comment, that Paul Hoffman, Eleonore Stump and Richard Swinburne identify Aquinas as a dualist in the way that he denies. What prevents Pasnau from labeling Aquinas a substance dualist? He gives, as his primary reason, that Aquinas characterizes “the hand, the eye, and (by extension) the body’s other organs” as subsistent as well, and that “[i]f the soul’s subsistence makes Aquinas a dualist, then the hand’s subsistence seems to give us a third substance, the


eye’s subsistence a fourth, and so on.”\textsuperscript{54} But he need not draw this conclusion, for Pasnau himself notes, two paragraphs later, that the soul is subsistent in a way unlike these material parts of the body, and that it is, in fact, “the substantial form that gives identity and existence to each part” so that “such considerations don’t apply to the soul itself, because it \textit{is} the substantial form.”\textsuperscript{55} He concludes, therefore, that “the human soul is potentially separable from the rest of a human being in a way that no other part is.”\textsuperscript{56} I think this is the correct conclusion to derive; and, given this, Pasnau is committed to the view that Aquinas should be classified as some sort of dualist, though what sort is not clear. Given Aquinas’ commitment to the view that matter is not a substance, perhaps Pasnau is correct to reject the traditional dualist terminology. Still, the proper classification for this view has proved challenging to contemporary philosophers, perhaps on account of a desire to label Aquinas’ view in a manner that will be comprehensible to contemporary philosophers of mind.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{54} Pasnau (2002), 66.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid}. Emphasis his.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{57} Hoffman’s locution of “subject dualist” is an attempt to avoid the substance language, and focus on the integrated nature of the human being while retaining a sense of the duality. See Hoffman, \textit{op. cit.}, 76-77, where he asserts that Aquinas “believes that the human soul is a spiritual, incorporeal subject that is capable of subsisting apart from the body.” Hoffman’s view is that a human being, the subject, is composed of a material component (the body) and an immaterial component (the human soul). The soul is not to be identified with the subject, nor is the body to be so identified. Rather, the subject, or person, is the composite. Nevertheless, the soul is able to survive apart from the body. Strictly speaking, then, the subject does \textit{not} survive apart from the body. This implies that, for Aquinas, a disembodied soul is not properly a person, that a person does not continue to exist though a person’s soul does. How does the human soul
The alternative suggested by Pasnau is that if Aquinas’ hylomorphism is taken to be reductive, it is “reductive in the direction of form.”58 This is a result of his admittedly unorthodox view of Aquinas’ ontology, in which all reality is to be explained in terms of grades of actuality.59 There are not two types of substance, on Pasnau’s view; rather, there are “two classes of actuality.”60 I think this is correct. One text not cited by Pasnau, but which may, I think, provide evidence for his alternative, is found in the second book of Summa Contra Gentiles, where Aquinas asserts that “body and soul are not two actually existing substances; rather, the two of them together constitute one actually existing substance. For man’s body is not actually the same while the soul is present and when it is absent; but the soul makes it to be actuality.”61 Aquinas seems to indicate here that it is the body that cannot exist (presumably qua human body) in actuality apart from the soul. His view seems to be that there is no human function after separation with the body? Aquinas devotes the whole of question 89 to giving an answer, but he does so in terms of possible solutions, and does not endorse any in particular. At any rate, a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this essay. I should further note that Hoffman seems to have abandoned the locution “subject dualist” in his later writings for the locution “subsistence dualist,” which is how he characterizes the dualisms of both Aquinas and Descartes. See Paul Hoffman, “Cartesian Composites” in Essays on Descartes (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 43.

58 Pasnau (2002), 133.
59 Ibid., 131-140.
60 Ibid., 136.
61 SCG II.69.2: Non enim corpus et anima sunt duae substantiae actu existentes, sed ex eis duobus fit una substantia actu existens: corpus enim hominis non est idem actu praesente anima, et absente; sed anima facit ipsum actu esse.
being (or person\textsuperscript{62}) unless both human soul and the matter that is informed by it (i.e., the human body, made so by the presence of a human soul) are present, but it seems that the body has a dependence upon the soul that is not reciprocated. This leaves the ontological status of the human soul after the death of the body somewhat mysterious, though I think it cannot be argued that Aquinas held that the human soul ceases to exist after the death of the body. The soul’s continued existence may be a mystery, but he does not on that account deny its continued existence.

The body, by contrast, cannot exist without the presence of the soul. What he may, in fact, be implying is that the separated soul is not a substance, and it is on this account that Aquinas cannot properly be called a “substance dualist.”\textsuperscript{63} Aquinas therefore wishes to maintain that the human soul is subsistent in a unique and superior way to other kinds of souls, as the unique and proper human form; it is a \textit{species}-specific superlativity.\textsuperscript{64} While this is quite different

\textsuperscript{62} Aquinas, \textit{Quaestiones disputatae de Potentia} (hereafter \textit{De Potentia}) IX.2 ad 14: “The separated soul is a part of rational nature and not a whole rational human nature: wherefore it is not a person” [\textit{Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod anima separata est pars rationalis naturae, scilicet humanae, et non tota natura rationalis humana, et ideo non est persona}]. English translation is from \textit{On the Power of God}, translated by the English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1952).


\textsuperscript{64} ST I.76.1 co: “For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other animals. Whence Aristotle that the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly belonging to him. Man must therefore derive his species from that which is the principle of this operation. But the
from the general account of soul given by Aristotle regarding living things, there is some room in the account for the move that Aquinas has made, for Aristotle himself notes a difference in the rational soul that distinguishes it from everything else: “Concerning the intellect and the potentiality for contemplation the situation is not so far clear, but it seems to be a different kind of soul, and this alone can exist separately, as the everlasting can from the perishable.” And commenting on this passage, Aquinas observes that this is a potential problem for the general account, but also that, as Aristotle has said, “nothing is yet clear” since it might yet turn out that there is a bodily organ associated with the use of intellect. Nevertheless, the human soul has a *prima facie* presumption of being an

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65 Aristotle, *De Anima* II.2, 413b24: De intellectu autem et perspectiva potencia, nihil adhuc manifestum est, set videtur genus alterum anime esse et hoc solum contingere separari sicut perpetuum a corruptibili. Relique autem partes anime, manifestum ex his quod non separabiles sint, sicut quidam dicunt. Hamlyn notes that this is “another reference to the ambiguous role of the intellect in Aristotle’s scheme.” Aristotle, *De Anima: Books II and III*, 90. The ambiguity introduced here is not resumed until *DA* III.5, a controversial chapter that likely includes some corrupted text, in which Aristotle introduces the distinction between the active and passive intellects. Hamlyn asserts that in this passage “Aristotle is not ascribing to us a disembodied existence in that form,” where “that form” refers to the active intellect. *Ibid.*, 140-141. Whatever it is that is separated and which “alone is immortal and eternal” (430b23), Hamlyn thinks that it cannot be the active intellect. Aquinas confirms this in his commentary on this passage. He states “it is clear that he is speaking here of the whole intellective part, which is called separated, of course, because it has its operation without a corporeal organ...and thus he concludes that that part of soul alone, the intellective part, is imperishable and everlasting. This is what he presupposed earlier in Book II [4.413b25-27]: that this sort of soul is separated from the others ‘as the everlasting from the perishable.’ It is called everlasting, however, not because it always was but because it always will be. Thus the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* XII [1070b21-26] that a form never exists before its matter, but soul remains after its matter – ‘not all of it, but intellect.’” In *DA* III.5, 430b22-23 (206-220): *et sic patet quod hic logitur de tota parte intellectiva, quod quidem dicitur separata ex hoc quod habet operationem sine organo corporali ... et hoc est quod supra supposuit in II, quod hoc genus anime separatur ab aliis « sicut perpetuum a corruptibili ». Dicitur autem perpetua non quia semper fuerit, set quia semper erit; unde Philosophus dicit in XI Metaphysicæ quod forma numquam est ante materiam, set posterius remanet anima, « non omnis, set intellectus ».
entirely different sort of soul from those falling under the general account, and only such a soul, that is, a soul that has no associated bodily organ, could be a candidate for separability from the soul’s other parts.\textsuperscript{66}

It is in defense of the separability of the human soul, and along these very grounds, that Aquinas mounts his demonstration in question one of his \textit{Disputed Questions on the Soul}, already introduced, in which he considers the question: “Whether a human soul can be both a form and an entity?”\textsuperscript{67} Against his own position, which answers the question in the affirmative, he raises eighteen objections, each of which challenges either one or the other of the predicates or their compatibility. The first objection raised to challenge the view that the soul is the form of the body seems to represent what Aquinas takes to be the Platonic view.\textsuperscript{68} Those objections raised to challenge the position that the soul is a subsistent entity represent Aquinas’ materialist adversaries. In addressing these objections, he is challenging those who assume a fundamental incompatibility of the two predicates. Aquinas will therefore attempt to argue for an Aristotelian \textit{tertium quid} that supports both predicates, i.e., that the human soul is both form

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{In} DA II.4, 413\textsuperscript{b}24 (104-119): \textit{Deinde cum dicit: De intellectu autem etc., ostendit in qua parte anime possit esse dubium. Et dicit quod de intellectu et quocunque nomine vocetur perspectiva potencia, id est speculativa, nihil est adhuc manifestum…set tamen, quantum in superficie apparebat, videtur quod sit alterum genus anime ab aliis partibus anime, id est alterius naturae et alio modo esse habens, et quod hoc solum genus anime possit separari ab aliis partibus anime…}

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{QDA pro. I: utrum anima humana possit esse forma et hoc aliiquid.}

\textsuperscript{68} This seems to be the view he attributes to Plato at ST I.75.4 co: \textit{Cum igitur sentire sit quaedam operatio hominis, licet non propria, manifestum est quod homo non est anima tantum, sed est aliud compositum ex anima et corpore. Plato vero, ponens sentire esse proprium animae, ponere potuit quod homo esset anima utens corpore. Cf. Plato, Phaedo 87b.}
and entity. In the customary style of the medieval disputation, Aquinas will address the specific problems of each of these in his replies. However, we need not consider these in detail here. It will be sufficient for our project to examine his defense of both predicates in the two *sed contra* passages as well as in his response since these constitute the explanation of his view of perception, of sensible things and of intelligible things. We will need to understand both if we are to appreciate his view of aesthetic perception.

First of all, Aquinas points out Aristotle’s distinction between primary and secondary substances, and notes that it is the notion of primary substance that relates to entities or individuals. To be an individual entity (*hoc aliquid*), in the sense that is in question, a thing must be an individual in the genus of substance, and the separated soul is a *hoc aliquid*. And for some thing to be

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69 QDA I 10: *Dicendum quod hoc aliquid proprie dicitur individuum in genere substantiae. Dicit enim philosophus in praedicamentis, quod primae substantiae indubitant hoc aliquid significant; secundae vero substantiae, etsi videantur hoc aliquid significare, magis tamen significant quale quid. Cf. Aristotle, *Categories* V, 3b10-23. James Robb, in his translation of this passage, notes that the Latin term *hoc aliquid* is a translation of the Greek *tode ti* and serves to denote a particular thing that subsists of itself or *per se*. Robb translates *hoc aliquid* throughout as “entity.” See *Questions on the Soul*, p. 51, n. 1. What Aristotle referred to as *tode ti*, and Aquinas referred to as *hoc aliquid*, is the substance (or organism). Duns Scotus introduces another notion, that of *haecceitas* (haecceity), as the constituent of the substance that individuates it. As such, it is not identical to the *tode ti* or *hoc aliquid*, but is its individuating constituent. Paul Vincent Spade gives the following description of Scotus’ *haecceitas*: “The principle of individuation is some special entity... Against Henry of Ghent, it is something positive. Against Giles of Rome, it must be part of *what* the individual is, not its existence (which instead answers the question *whether* it is). Against the theory of quantity, it must somehow combine with the specific nature to form a *substantial* unity, not a merely accidental unity. And above all, against the theory of matter, it cannot itself need to be individuated — it must be ‘by itself a ‘this’.’ This mysterious factor, whatever it is, is what Scotus calls the ‘individual difference’ and what later came to be known as haecceity (= ‘thisness’).” *Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham*, translated and edited by Paul Vincent Spade (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), xiii. Duns Scotus invented the term *haecceitas*, but it does not occur in his *Lectura* or *Ordinatio* where he discusses
considered an individual in the genus of substance, requires the satisfaction of two conditions: the thing in question must be, first, capable of subsisting per se, and it must, secondly, be complete in a given species and genus of substance. But the human soul, or what is the same thing for Aquinas, the intellective principle of the human soul, does in fact satisfy these two conditions. It satisfies


70 QDA I co: Individuum autem in genere substantiae non solum habet quod per se possit subsistere, sed quod sit aliquid completum in aliqua specie et genere substantiae. Cf. Aristotle, Categories V, 3a28-31. Paul Hoffman has suggested that for Aquinas the notion of being capable of per se subsistence involves two notions which are, in fact, synonymous, namely having complete being and having perfect being. Appealing to the passage under consideration, Hoffman says that “the soul subsists per se because it has a per se operation, and moreover, in response to the objection that the soul is united to the body accidentally, he concedes that the soul has complete being. Aquinas also says that the soul separated from the body has perfect being. The notions of being complete and perfect were apparently used interchangeably by Aquinas... Thus...the mind is a complete thing in the sense of being capable of subsisting per se.” Hoffman, “Cartesian Composites,” 43. Something which is able to subsist per se, that is, something that is a complete thing considered in itself, is called an ens per se or a substance. This is illustrated in ST 1.75.2 sc, where Aquinas, endorsing the view of Augustine reproduced there, asserts that “the nature of the human intellect (mentis humanae) is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance (substantia), that is, something subsistent (scilicet aliquid subsistens).” For Aquinas, something can be an ens per se in a strong or in a weak sense. A human being is an ens per se in the strong sense, while a human hand is an ens per se in the weak sense. Both a human being and a human hand are capable of subsistence, but only the human being is “complete in a specific nature” (completo in natura alicuius speciei). Cf. Hoffman, “The Union and Interaction of Mind and Body (Part 1)” in Ibid., 85. To return to our passage in QDA 1 co, Aquinas attributes this view to Aristotle. He says that Aristotle, in the Categories, asserts two uses of the word “substance.” By the first and primary use of “substance” is intended entity in an unqualified way. This is substance in the sense applied to human beings. However, he says that Aristotle uses the term “substance” in a “qualified way” to refer to those distinguishable parts of a human being like a human hand or foot. Cf. Aristotle, Ibid. Cf. also Paul Hoffman, “Descartes and Aquinas on Per Se Subsistence and the Union of Soul and Body,” in Essays on Descartes (2009), 88-97.

71 Throughout QDA 1, Aquinas seems to treat the following locutions as synonymous: human soul (anima humana), rational soul (anima rationalis), and intellective soul (anima intellectiva). In ST 1.75 co he states, further, that “the human soul (anima humana), which is called the intellect (intellectus) or the mind (mens), is something incorporeal and subsistent (subsistens).” In that
the first because it is capable of subsisting *per se*, that is, on its own and not merely as a part of some whole.\textsuperscript{72} That the human soul subsists *per se* is implied by its mode of functioning, namely, by the fact that it is capable of operating *per se*; that is, it operates independently of any body or corporeal organ.\textsuperscript{73} And this *per se* operation is not a contingent fact about the human soul but a necessary one, he says, because intellective operation (that is, understanding) is an essential operation of the human individual.\textsuperscript{74} Therefore, the human soul satisfies the first condition for being considered an entity. The question whether it satisfies the second condition is a more complex issue.

Ultimately, Aquinas will conclude that the human soul does satisfy the second condition as well, but that it does so in a way that must be qualified. First of all, he says that it is not the human soul itself that is capable of possessing the

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\item article, he also equates the “principle of intellectual operation” (*principium intellectualis operationis*) with the human soul (*anima hominis*), and the “intellectual principle” (*intellectuale principium*) with the mind (*mens*) or intellect (*intellectus*). It therefore appears that, for Aquinas, each of the locutions mentioned here is interchangeable with the others.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{72} The human soul does, in fact, exist as one (very important) component of a whole, namely, an individual human being; but it does not exist merely as a part. It does not derive its existence by its participation in the greater whole, as is the case with the corporeal components of a human individual. The human soul, unlike the other human components, is capable of an independent existence, as we shall see presently.

\textsuperscript{73} QDA I sc 1: *Est autem hoc aliquid et per se subsistens, cum per se operetur. Non enim est intelligere per organum corporum, ut probatur in III de anima*. Cf. Aristotle, *De Anima* III.4, 429a23-26: *Vocatus itaque anime intellectus (dico autem intellectum quo opinatur et intelligit anima) nichil est actu eorum que sunt ante intelligere. Unde neque miscere est rationabile ipsum corpori: qualis enim aliquis utique fiet aut calidus aut frigidus, si organum aliquod erit, sicut sensitivo; nunc autem nullum est.*

\textsuperscript{74} QDA I co: *Et sic oportet quod anima intellectiva per se agat, utpote propriam operationem habens absque corporis communione*. Cf. QDA I ad T1: *Ad undecimum dicendum quod intelligere est propria operatio animae, si consideretur principium a quo egreditur operatio.*
fullness of the specific human nature, but rather the whole human individual.\textsuperscript{75} The view he is rejecting here he attributes to Plato, who held “that the full nature of the species is in the soul, defining a human being not as something composed of soul and body but as a soul using a body.”\textsuperscript{76} Aquinas, as we have already seen, denies the view that the human soul is identical to the human being, which, if true, would imply that the human soul could achieve the fullness of its specific nature \textit{per se}. Instead, Aquinas adopts the view “that the soul is an entity, as being able to subsist \textit{per se} but not as possessing in itself a complete specific nature, but rather as completing human nature insofar as it is the form of its body.”\textsuperscript{77} Additionally, the human soul is obviously the form of the body, and is not merely conjoined to it accidentally, as in the opposing view, since the body without the soul immediately begins to degrade.\textsuperscript{78} The human soul, therefore, gives to the human body both life and, what is to say the same thing, its principle of organization, without which chaos ensues. But to convey being or life, he says,

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\item \textsuperscript{75} QDA I ad 3: Ad tertium dicendum quod anima humana non est hoc aliquid sicut substantia completam speciem habens; sed sicut pars habentis speciem completam, ut ex dictis patet…; similarly, QDA 1 ad 4: Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet anima humana per se possit subsistere, non tamen per se habet speciem completam; unde non posset esse quod animae separatae constituerent unum gradum entium.
\item \textsuperscript{76} QDA I co: Sed ulterius posuit Plato, quod anima humana non solum per se subsisteret, sed quod etiam haberet in se completam naturam speciei. Ponebat enim totam naturam speciei in anima esse, dicens hominem non esse aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, sed animam corpori advenientem.
\item \textsuperscript{77} QDA I co: Relinquitur igitur quod anima est hoc aliquid, ut per se potens subsistere; non quasi habens in se completam speciem, sed quasi perficiens speciem humanam ut forma corporis. Cf. ST I.75.2 ad 1: Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit pars speciei humanae, potest dici hoc aliquid primo modo, quasi subsistentis, sed non secundo modo, sic enim compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid.
\item \textsuperscript{78} QDA I co: Et praeterea, si anima esset in corpore sicut nauta in navi, sequeretur quod unio animae et corporis esset accidentalis. Mors igitur, quae inducit eorum separationem, non esset corruptio substantialis; quod patet esse falsum.
\end{itemize}
is the characteristic of a form; and so the human soul must be the form of the human body.\textsuperscript{79} Thus he concludes that, because the soul is the form of the body, and since the soul is also capable of subsisting \textit{per se}, as we have seen, it is correct to say that the human soul is both a form and an entity.\textsuperscript{80} And this is just what he asserted in the first \textit{sed contra}. However, it is still unclear in what sense he can attribute \textit{hoc aliquid} status to the human soul given his commitment to the composite nature of the human being. It must be by virtue of its role as the form of the human body that the soul can be said to convey the fullness of the specific nature to the human being, for without the soul, as he has said, there is no human being, but rather a corpse with merely a likeness (initially) to a human being. In fact, without the soul, there is, strictly speaking, no body at all, since a body is by definition informed matter, and matter, apart from form, does not exist except in potentiality.\textsuperscript{81} The soul is, then, unlike the other parts of the body.

\textsuperscript{79} QDA I co: \textit{Manifestum est enim id quo vivit corpus, animam esse, vivere autem est esse viventium: anima igitur est quo corpus humanum habet esse actu. Huiusmodi autem forma est. Est igitur anima humana corporis forma.}

\textsuperscript{80} QDA I co: \textit{et similiter est forma et hoc aliquid.}

\textsuperscript{81} He says, for instance, that composed substances (as opposed to simple ones) entail both form and matter, but that neither one of these alone is the essence of the substance. Instead, a thing (i.e., a substance) is assigned to a genus or species on the basis of it being something actual, which matter is not. Additionally, he says that the definition of a real thing (i.e., a substance) is that it contains in addition to form also matter. Therefore, the essence of a substance cannot be either form or matter, but requires both. This is found in a relatively early work, his \textit{De ente et essentia} (hereafter \textit{De ente}). \textit{De ente 23-26: In substantiis igitur compositis forma et materia nota est, ut in homine anima et corpus. Non autem potest dici quod alterum eorum tantum essentia esse dicatur. Quod enim materia sola rei non sit essentia, planum est, quia res per essentiam suam et cognoscibilis est, et in specie ordinatur vel gener; sed materia neque cognitionis principium est. Neque secundum eam aliquid ad genus vel speciem determinatur, sed secundum id quod aliquid actu est. Neque etiam forma tantum essentia substantiae compositae dici potest, quamvis hoc quidam asserrere contentur. Ex hiis enim quae dicta sunt...}
human being, like the hand, which while it is a constituent of the human being cannot convey life to the human being in its fullness. Of course, one could say the same thing about the human heart or brain, for without these the human being would also cease to exist. But though the human being could not live without these specific corporeal parts, they are fundamentally different from the soul in the role that each plays in the whole. For a human heart is on account of its
corporeality corruptible, and therefore cannot fulfill the role of form, as the soul is able to do.\textsuperscript{82} Therefore, there does seem to be a significant difference between certain vital corporeal organs and the soul by which the whole receives both its existence and its species, for “the essential principles of a given species are not ordered toward existence only, but to the existence of that species.”\textsuperscript{83} I think it has been sufficiently shown that Aquinas holds, contrary to the Platonic view, that the human soul is the form of the human body, that from which it derives its life and its species, and therefore that the human being is not to be identified with his soul, but rather with the body-soul compound, the ensouled body. In this way, he is able to provide a sufficient explanation for the necessary union of soul and body, at least at some time.\textsuperscript{84} At the same time, he has shown, against the materialists, that the human soul is subsistent, since it has an operation (i.e., the intellect) which is independent of the body. This view, which constitutes an

\textsuperscript{82} QDA 1 ad 14: \textit{Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod illud quod proprie corrumpitur, non est forma neque materia, neque ipsum esse, sed compositum. Dicitur autem esse corporis corruptibile, in quantum corpus per corruptionem deficit ab illo esse quod erat sibi et anima commune, quod remanet in anima subsistente. Et pro tanto etiam dicitur ex partibus consistens esse corporis, quia ex suis partibus corpus constituitur tale ut possit ab anima esse recipere.}

\textsuperscript{83} QDA I ad 16: \textit{Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod principia essentialia alicuius speciei ordinantur non ad esse tantum, sed ad esse huius speciei.}

\textsuperscript{84} The reason for the qualification is that Aquinas, following Avicenna, says that while it is the body that individuates a human being, once the body perishes, the separated soul remains individuated. It does so on the basis of its prior attachment to a particular body. \textit{De ente} 211-212: \textit{Et licet individuatio eius ex corpore occasionaliter dependeat quantum ad sui inchoationem, quia non acquiritur sibi esse individuatum nisi in corpore cuius est actus: non tamen oportet ut subtrahito corpore individuatio pecet, quia cum habeat esse absolutum ex quo acquisitum est sibi es se individuatum ex hoc quod facta est forma huius corporis, illud esse semper remanet individuatum. Et ideo dicit Avicenna quod individuatio animarum et multiplicatio pendet ex corpore quantum ad sui principium, sed non quantum ad sui finem.}
original, though still recognizably Aristotelian, view of human nature, preserves both the unity of the human being (a problem for the Platonic view), as well as the immateriality (and, therefore, potential immortality) of the human soul (a problem for the materialist views). These aspects will both be important in our discussion of perception.

The soul, on Aquinas’ view, is what directs, in one way or another, the great variety of living functions. It is the soul that is responsible not only for the higher, that is, rational, functions of human beings, but also for sensation (in humans and lower animals), and for nutrition, growth, and reproduction (in humans, lower animals and plants). Following Aristotle’s account, there are three different kinds of soul, ordered hierarchically, with the higher-order souls containing the functions of the lower-order souls as well as additional powers, where “powers” refers to the soul’s capacities either to act or to be acted upon.85 These “powers” are, he says, the soul’s various properties.86 These powers are distinguished by their acts, which are, in turn, distinguished by their objects.87

85 Aristotle, De Anima II.3, 414a29-b19. Cf., Aquinas’ commentary on the same and ST I.78.1. For the active intellect, see Aristotle, De Anima III.5. For both Aristotle and Aquinas, each living substance has only one soul. The human being has a rational soul, but it contains the functions found in the lower types of soul as well. See, e.g., Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (London: Routledge, 1993), 31.

86 QDA XIII ad 18: potentiae animae sint proprietates quaedam.

For acts are defined by reference to their objects and acts derive their species from their objects.\textsuperscript{88} So Aquinas will enumerate just as many “powers” as he requires in order to account for the various functions of the soul, some of which are active while others are passive.\textsuperscript{89} Plants have the simplest sort of soul, called the vegetative or nutritive soul, containing the power merely of nutrition, growth and reproduction.\textsuperscript{90} Animals have a higher order soul, the sensory soul, which includes those powers of the lower, vegetative soul, plus the power of sensation and, in most cases, mobility.\textsuperscript{91} In many higher-order animals, there may also be lower forms of cognition. The highest order of soul is the rational soul. This is the sort of soul possessed by human beings, which, for Aquinas, contains, in addition to the powers of sensation and nutrition, the powers of will and intellection.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{88} QDA XIII co: Dicendum quod potentia secundum id quod est, dicitur ad actum; unde oportet quod per actum definiatur potentia, et secundum diversitatem actuum diversificentur potentiae. Actus autem ex obiectis speciem habent.

\textsuperscript{89} QDA XIII co: Actus autem ex obiectis speciem habent: nam si sint actus passivarum potentiarum, obiecta sunt activa; si autem sunt activarum potentiarum, obiecta sunt ut fines.

\textsuperscript{90} ST I.78.2. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima II.2, 4. Aquinas also refers to these three types of soul, particularly as they occur together in the one human soul, as “powers” or “grades of powers” (italics mine), as he does in QDA XIII co: Sic igitur manifestum est quod sunt tres gradus potentiarum animae: scilicet secundum animam vegetabilem, sensitivam et rationalem. Referring to these different types of soul as “powers,” in this context, no doubt helps avoid the appearance that the human soul is an aggregate rather than simple.

\textsuperscript{91} ST I.78.3-4. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima II.2, 413a20-b23.

\textsuperscript{92} Aquinas holds that the human soul has the power of intellection, which is a power of apprehension, and the will, which is a power of appetition (which accompanies intellect [\textit{nam appetitus sequitur apprehensionem}]). With the intellect, a human understands, and with the will, she desires or loves. In this distinction, Aquinas is following the thought of Augustine who, in \textit{De trinitate} IX.2, listed both as the constituents of mind (\textit{in mente}). See ST I.79.1 obj. 2 and ad 2.
The intellect, according to Aquinas, is both an active\(^{93}\) and a passive\(^{94}\) power. And, as we have already seen, it has a unique status among the parts of the soul in that it operates independently of any bodily organ. However, we have also seen that it has an intimate connection to the body since Aquinas asserts that

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\(^{93}\) The active intellect is that power of the soul to make material objects, as presented to the senses, actually thinkable. It does this by the power of abstraction. ST I.79.3 co: *Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, quae intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem reductur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.*

\(^{94}\) ST I.79.2 co: *Tertio modo, dicitur aliquam pati communiter, ex hoc solo quod id quod est in potentia ad aliquid, recipit illud ad quod erat in potentia, absque hoc quod aliquid abiiciatur. Secundum quum modum, omne quod exit de potentia in actum, potest dici pati, etiam cum perfectetur. Et sic intelligere nostrum est pati. Quod quidem hac ratione appareat. Intellectus enim, sicut supra dictum est, habet operationem circa ens in universal... Unde omnis intellectus creatus, per hoc ipsum quod est, non est actus omnium intelligibilium, sed comparatur ad ipsa intelligibilia sicut potentia ad actum... Intellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium, et in principio est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, ut philosophus dicit in III de anima. Quod manifeste apparat ex hoc, quod in principio sumus intelligentes solum in potentia, postmodum autem efficiamur intelligentes in actu. Sic igitur patet quod intelligere nostrum est quoddam pati, secundum tertium modum passionis. Et per consequens intellectus est potentia passiva. Considered as a passive power, the intellect is therefore "the potentiality to receive thoughts of all kinds." Kenny (1993), 43.
the content of the operation of the rational soul has its origin in the operation of
the senses, though it also surpasses the operation of mere sensation.\textsuperscript{95} For one
thing, Aquinas says that the soul has a kind of dependence upon the body in that
the soul cannot achieve the fullness of human perfection on its own since, as we
have seen, the human soul is not identical to the human being, though it can
nevertheless subsist without the body.\textsuperscript{96} Furthermore, the data that the intellect
has to work with has its origins in sensation. For while the human soul is able to
attain intelligible truths that transcend body, as is also the case with the angels
who do not have bodies, nevertheless, human beings, being essentially

\textsuperscript{95} ST I.78.4 ad 4; 79.1. Cf. Aristotle, \textit{De Anima} II.3, III.8. To say that the intellect has its origin in
the senses is just to say that the raw data that are the objects of the intellect come only by way of
the senses, and so the intellect is dependent upon the deliverances of the senses in this way. This
represents Aquinas’ empiricism regarding cognition. This cannot be, strictly speaking, true
however. For Aquinas indicates that there are certain indemonstrable (\textit{indemonstrabilia}) or
necessary truths (\textit{necessaria}) which are grasped immediately, and from which the intellect is able
to proceed by means of ratiocination to contingent truths (\textit{contingentia}). ST I.79.9 co, obj. 3, and ad
3. Cf. Aristotle, NE VI.1, 1138\textsuperscript{b}35-1139\textsuperscript{a}15. Presumably, then, the intellect, while lacking any
specific content (and this is what Aquinas means by his comparison of the mind to \textit{a tabula rasa}),
evertheless has an innate power to grasp certain of these \textit{indemonstrabilia}. Aquinas departs from
Aristotle, however, in his denial that there are two separate parts of the soul, one relating to
necessary truths and another relating to contingent truths. Instead, Aquinas asserts that since
both of these are proportioned to their proper objects, and the proper objects are the same for
both, namely, all objects (the active intellect being the power to \textit{act} on all things, and the potential
intellect being the power of \textit{becoming} all things), therefore there must be only one part of the soul
that understands both necessary and contingent things (\textit{Esset ergo contra rationem utriusque
intellectus, si alia pars animae esset quae intelligit necessaria et quae intelligit contingentia}). Aquinas, In
NE VI, 1139\textsuperscript{a}12-13, L. 1, n. 11, 1119. English translations will be taken from \textit{Commentary on
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics}, translated by C. I. Litzinger (Notre Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Books,
1993).

\textsuperscript{96} QDA I ad 12: \textit{Ad duodecimum dicendum quod etiam anima aliquam dependentiam habet ad corpus, in
quantum sine corpore non pertingit ad complementum suae speciei; non tamen sic dependet a corpore quin
sine corpore esse possit.}
embodied, grasp these intelligible truths differently than the angels; that is, human beings “receive such knowledge from sensible things.”

It is by virtue of the power of intellecction that the human being is able to conceive of objects as falling into kinds or categories, and the ability to abstract common features of the world which are not readily apparent through mere sensation, whose proper objects are particulars. Beautiful objects are such particulars, and beauty, if objective, is a feature that must be abstracted from the sensible perception of these particulars since we do not perceive beauty directly. These particular objects of perception have features that, through intellecction and upon reflection, we have come to identify as beautiful or its converse. Additionally, it is by virtue of the power of will, the appetitive power of the rational soul, that human beings desire goods appropriate to the soul, and beauty is such a good. I will turn to a discussion of desire in chapter three.

97 QDA II ad 15: Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod iste modus cognoscendi est naturalis animae, ut percipiatur intelligibilis veritatem infra modum quo percipiunt spiritualiues substantiae superiores, accipiendo silicet eam ex sensibilibus. Regarding the differences in cognition between angels and humans he says that they differ in species just as humans and angels differ in species. The intelligible species apprehended by human beings are abstracted from phantasms, but by angels innately. QDA VII ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intelligere Angeli et animae non est eiusdem speciei. Manifestum est enim, quod si formae quae sunt principia operationum, differunt specie, necesse est et operationes ipsas specie differre… Species autem intelligibiles quibus animae intelligunt sunt a phantasmatibus abstractae; et ita non sunt eiusdem rationis cum speciebus intelligibilibus quibus Angeli intelligunt, quae sunt eis innatae… Unde et intelligere hominis et Angeli non est eiusdem speciei.

98 ST I.79.1 ad 2: “The appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason.” Cf. Aristotle, De Anima III.9, 43222-b7; Augustine, De trinitate X.11. According to Aquinas, the proper object of the will is universal goodness. ST I-II.2.8 co: Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum.
The picture that emerges from this brief treatment of Aquinas’ treatise on human psychology is that what is makes human beings unique among animals is the capacity for reason. However, as already indicated, human beings are not merely rational creatures. Rather, human beings are distinguished from other rational beings by their essential embodiment. It is the body, moreover, (under the direction of the soul) that is responsible for mediating sensation, through which human beings initially come in contact with beautiful objects. This requires some explanation. It will, therefore, be helpful to examine Aquinas’ account of sensation.

2.2 On Sensation in General

The space that Aquinas devotes to sensation in his Summa Theologiae is notoriously brief. As Robert Pasnau has pointed out, Aquinas devotes only two articles to the topic, and what he does say is heavily indebted to Aristotle and Avicenna.99 We should not, however, overlook Albert’s influence on Aquinas, since both wrote commentaries on Aristotle’s De sensu et sensato100 as well as

99 ST I.78.3-4. Pasnau, 171-172. It is worth pointing out that Pasnau’s book is specifically devoted to an explication of Aquinas’ treatise on human nature found in Summa Theologiae, pars prima QQ. 75-89. It therefore necessarily ignores Aquinas’ writings on the subject outside of the ST.

commentaries on the *De anima*,\(^\text{101}\) which include some discussion of sensation as well, though the focus of these texts is broader in scope.\(^\text{102}\) What Aquinas has to say about sensation is important to this inquiry since our contact with and apprehension of beauty begins with sensation. That is, the paradigmatically beautiful things, whether presently experienced material objects or similar objects recalled via memory, or even noble deeds of courage or compassion, all come to us initially through perception of the external world.\(^\text{103}\) We see a beautiful face, flower, or heroic act of self-sacrifice. We hear a beautiful piece of

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\(^{102}\) In fact, Aquinas’ commentaries on the *De Anima*, the *De Sensu* and the *De Memoria* are likely among the first of his Aristotelian commentaries, and appear to have been precipitated by the new translation of Aristotle’s *Parva Naturalia* (of which the *De Sensu* and the *De Memoria* are parts) by William of Moerbeke. See the translator’s introduction to Aquinas, *Commentaries on Aristotle’s “On Sense and what is Sensed” and “On Memory and Recollection,”* 5. The translators of this work suggest that these were, in fact, the first three commentaries Aquinas wrote on the Aristotelian corpus. The probable reason why Aquinas undertook an exposition of these three in sequential order is the unity of theme that connects them. Aquinas states, in his prologue to the *De Sensu* that the proper order of investigation should lead from the “more similar to the dissimilar” and hence it is fitting that, having discussed the nature of the soul itself in the commentary on the *De Anima*, he now proceeds to an investigation of *De Sensu* since “sensing itself pertains more to soul than to body.” *Ibid.* In *De Sensu*, tr. 1, lib. 1, n. 6: *Sed quia oportet per magis similia ad dissimilia transire, talis videtur esse rationabili ter horum librorum ordo, ut post librum de anima, in quo de anima secundum se determinatur, immediate sequatur hic liber de sensu et sensato, quia ipsum sentire magis ad animam quam ad corpus pertinet; post quem ordinandum est liber de somno et vigilia, quae important ligamentum et solutionem sensus.* This chronology is slightly different than that offered by Torrell, who includes among Aquinas’ first Aristotelian commentaries, during the same time period (1267-1270), his commentary on the *Physics*. Torrell, 328-329. Cf. *Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis in Opera Omnia*, Tomus II (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1884). Giles Emery asserts that the Latin text of Aristotle reproduced in the Leonine edition of this commentary is not the one that Aquinas knew. Torrell, 342 (a brief catalogue of Aquinas’ works, compiled by Giles Emery for the English translation, is included in Torrell, 330-361).

\(^{103}\) I will leave aside, for now, consideration of objects of beauty that may be intuited apart from sense perception, i.e., the beauty of a mathematical formula or of the idea of justice, etc. My primary object of concern is Aquinas’ account of our everyday objects of beauty. An account of such exotic objects of beauty will, in any case, have to be fitted into an account of everyday objects of beauty if our conception of beauty is to be a univocal one.
music. All of these can be recalled at will from memory. This represents one of Aquinas’ fundamental Aristotelian heritages, for Aristotle had said that “unless one perceived things one would not learn or understand anything, and when one contemplates one must simultaneously contemplate and image; for images are like sense-perceptions (αἰσθήματα), except that they are without matter.” Aquinas, commenting on this passage, affirms that Aristotle has here shown “the intellect’s dependence on the senses” and he adds:

So Aristotle says, first, that since no real thing (res) intellectually cognized by us exists apart from sensible extensions – as if separated from them in being – in the way that sensible things seem separated from one another, it is necessary that our intellect’s intelligible objects exist in sensible species, in being: both those that are spoken of through abstraction, viz., mathematical entities, and also natural things, which are conditions and states that belong to sensible things. And for that reason without sense a human being cannot learn anything (acquiring knowledge for the first time) or intellectively cognize (making use of knowledge it has). Instead, when one actually contemplates (speculatur) anything, one must at the same time form a phantasm for oneself. Phantasms are likenesses of sensible things, but they differ from them in that they exist outside of matter, for “sense is capable of taking on species without matter,” as was said earlier [II.24.424a18-19], whereas phantasia is movement by an actualized sense [cf. III.6.429a1-2].

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104 Aristotle, *De Anima* III.8, 432-8-9. This paragraph, Hamlyn notes, “encapsulates what is sometimes referred to as Aristotle’s empiricism, and is the source of the dictum that there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses.” *De Anima*, notes on the text, 149-150.

105 In DA III.13, 432-9-10, (72-89): *Dicit ergo primo quod, quia nulla res intellecta a nobis est preter magnitudines sensibles, quasi ab eis separata secundum esse, sicut sensibilia videntur ab invicem separata, necesse est quod intelligibilias intellectus nostri sint in speciebus sensibilibus secundum esse, tam illa que dicuntur per abstractionem, scilicet mathematica, quam naturalia, que sunt habitus et passiones sensibilium. Et propter hoc sine sensu non potest aliquid homo addiscere quasi de novo acquirens scientiam neque intelligere quasi utens scientia habita, set oportet, cum aliquid speculatur in*
So not only do we grasp an external object through our senses when first exposed to that object, but even when recalling the image, and its features (including those objective features in which its beauty resides), we do so through a kind of stored sensation or image, namely, what he calls a *phantasm*. Thus the perception of beauty, at least in its paradigmatic cases, begins with the senses. Nevertheless, according to Aquinas, beauty is related to knowledge. For he states, in the canonical definition given above, that “beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen.” This is given by way of explication of the distinction between beauty and goodness, for these are “identical fundamentally” since they are “based upon the same thing, namely, the form.” But though they are identical in some fundamental way, nevertheless beauty and goodness differ *ratione*. That is, goodness relates to

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106 The notion of *phantasms* is one whose parameters are difficult to circumscribe. Aquinas says, in *In DA III.8, 432*-3-10 (84-85), that *phantasms* are “likeness of sensible things” [*Phantasmata enim sunt similitudines sensibilium*], but that they are immaterial or, literally, they “exist outside of matter” [*quia sunt praeler materiam*] and, further, that *phantasia* is “movement by an actualized sense” [*Phantasia autem est motus factus a sensu secundum actum*] (*Ibid.*, 85-89). Pasnau characterizes them as “sensory representations” (2002, 278), as “the leftover impressions from those sensory images” (*Ibid.*, 279) and as “the remnants of sensation” (*Ibid.*, 280). A potentially less ambiguous locution would be “sensory effects.”

107 *ST I.5.4 ad 1*: *Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivum, pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placet.*

108 *ST I.5.4 ad 1*: *pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam.*
appetite while beauty to cognition. This provides the justification for attributing to Aquinas the view that the perception of beauty, in its paradigm cases, begins with the senses, since for him, as for Aristotle, knowledge is not innate, but rather begins in sense perception.

In order to show how this process works, Aquinas speaks generally of the soul having “parts” (or alternatively “capacities,” “powers,” or “faculties”). There are a number of English equivalents used in part because there are a number of Latin equivalents (e.g., potentia, virtus and vir), and it is unclear exactly how they differ from one another, if they differ at all. What Aquinas seems 109 ST I.5.4 ad 1: Nam bonum proprie respicit appelleatum…Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam.

110 ST I.79.2 co: “But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first like a clean tablet on which nothing is written, as the Philosopher says” [Intellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium, et in principio est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, ut philosophus dicit in III de anima]. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima III.4, 429b29-430a1 (Moerbeke’s text as reproduced in In DA): Oportet autem sic sicut in tabula nichil est actu scriptum, quod quidem accidit in intellectu. With regard to this passage in De Anima, Aquinas goes on to say that Aristotle’s view precludes not only that of the ancient naturalist philosophers, but, what relates more to our present concern, that it precludes the view of Plato, namely, that the human soul has innate knowledge and that all learning is therefore remembering. In DA III.4, 429b29-430a1 (53-60): Et per hoc excluditur tam opinio antiquorum Naturalium… quam etiam opinio Platonis, qui posuit naturaliter animam humanam habere omnium scienciam…dicens quod addiscere nihil aliud est quam reminisci. Furthermore, he says, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics that “in us sensitive knowledge is prior to intellectual, because intellectual knowledge in us proceeds from sense.” In PA I.4.16: Cognitio autem sensitiva est in nobis prior intellectiva, quia intellectualis cognitio ex sensu procedit in nobis.

111 Pasnau (2002), 144. Pasnau suggests that there are at least four different ways of conceiving of the various kinds of potentiality, as found in Aquinas, namely: (a) the potential of matter for form, (b) the potential of essence for existence, (c) the potential of an entity for being acted upon, and (d) the potential of an entity for acting on another. Ibid., 146. Potentialities of types (c) and (d) are best captured by the term “capacities” and potentialities of type (d) are best captured by the term “power,” since this is the most fundamental of the four. Ibid., 147. Cf. Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiariam (hereafter In Sent.) I, ed. by P. Mandonnet and M. F. Moos (Paris: P. Léthielleux, 1929-47), d. 42, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod esse primam potentiam non
primarily to be concerned with in his discussion of perception (and sensation more generally) is its passivity, that is, the soul’s capacity to be affected, to receive (or be acted upon by) phenomena (sense impressions) from the objects of sensation (*sensibilia*). In addition to the passive capacities of the five external senses, of which perception is our primary concern, human beings are also able to actively extract the formal data from the material bearers of that data, and

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*convenit materiae secundum principalem significacionem potentiae: quia, ut dictum est, in corp. art., potentia primo imposita est ad significandum principium actionis; sed secundo translatum est ad hoc ut illud etiam quod recipit actionem agentis, potentiam habere dicatur; et haec est potentia passiva; ut sicut potentiae activae respondet operatio vel actio, in qua completur potentia activa; ita etiam illud quod respondet potentiae passivae, quasi perfectio et complementum, actus dicatur. Et propter hoc omnis forma actus dictur, etiam ipsae formae separatae; et illud quod est principium perfectionis totius, quod est Deus, vocatur actus primus et purus, cui maxime illa potentia convenit.*

112 See, for example, ST I.77.3 co: “the object is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving cause” [*Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passive, sicut principium et causa movens*]. Indeed, it is on account of its object that the function of each capacity is derived. “Therefore the powers are of necessity distinguished by their acts and objects” [*Unde necesse est quod potentiae diversificentur secundum actus et objecta*.] Ibid. Aquinas has a rather complex division of *sensibilia*, which I will merely mention here. There are two basic categories of *sensibilia*: (a) *per se sensibilia* (ST I.78.3 ad 2) and (b) *per accidens sensibilia* (in the ST, these are defined primarily negatively, in contrast to *per se sensibilia*, e.g., ST I.78.3 ad 2; 85.6 co; and 87.1 ad 1). The category of *per se sensibilia* is further divided into (a₁) proper *sensibilia* and (a₂) common *sensibilia*. The proper *sensibilia* are the most direct objects of sensation, such as colors, sounds, tastes, and smells. The common *sensibilia* are indirect objects of sensation, such as shape, number, motion, rest, etc. The (b) *per accidens sensibilia* are organic wholes, individuals or things, such as dogs, human beings, etc. See, e.g., *In DA II*.6, 418-27. For a detailed account of the different types of *sensibilia*, see Pasnau (2002), §§ 6.3-4 and 9.2.

113 Including the so-called “common sense,” which Aquinas describes, in ST I.78.4 ad 1, as “the root source” of the external senses [*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus interior non dicitur communis per praedicationem, sicut genus; sed sicut communis radix et principium exteriorum sensuum*]. This leaves open the exact relationship between the external senses and the common sense. However, in ST I.78.4 ad 2, Aquinas asserts that perception of a sensible quality is completed when the impression is made upon the external sense, and a second and separate impression then follows in the common sense [*Unde oportet ad sensum communem pertinere discretionis iudicium, ad quem referantur, sicut ad communem terminum, omnes apprehensiones sensuum; a quo etiam percipiantur intentiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquid videt se videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur; in qua immutacione perfectur visio, et ex qua immutacione sequitur alia immutatio in sensu communi, qui visionem percipit*. Pasnau refers to this common sense as a kind of second-order perception, distinct from the perception of the external senses. See Pasnau (2002), 196.
then to retain, store, retrieve, reflect upon, and ultimately render judgments about that data. These capacities are active since they extract objects for cognition (the intelligible forms or *species intelligibilis*) rather than merely receive the objects of sensation (the *sensibilia*). The object for cognition, viz., the intelligible form, once distinguished from its material vehicles, can be directly apprehended, or “seen,” by the intellect and be used to produce a kind of knowledge (i.e., knowledge by acquaintance); cognition obtained about the form itself is intellectual cognition; cognition obtained about the sensory object is sensory cognition.

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114 The Latin translation of *νόητα*.

115 The Latin translation of *οἰοθήτα*.

116 Aquinas uses “sight” (*visio*) and “apprehension” (*apprehensio*) interchangeably, and both can, and often do, refer to knowledge (cognition) obtained through both the senses and the intellect. See, for instance, ST I.67.1 co: “Any word may be used in two ways – that is to say, either in its original application or in its more extended meaning. This is clearly shown in the word sight [*visionis*], originally applied to the act of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most trustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge obtained through the other senses... Further, sight is applied to knowledge obtained through the intellect” [*Respondeo dicendum quod de aliquo nomine dupliciter convenit loqui, uno modo, secundum primam eius impositionem; alio modo, secundum usum nominis. Sicut patet in nomine visionis, quod primo impositum est ad significandum actum sensus visus; sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem huius sensus, extensum est hoc nomen, secundum usum loquentium, ad omnem cognitionem aliorum sensuum... et ulterior etiam ad cognitionem intellectus*]. Cf. ST I-II.27.1 ad 3: *pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet*. There is much room here for confusion. Aquinas also says that it is the quiddity of the thing (quidditas rei) that is the proper object (proprium objectum) of intellection (intellectus) rather than the intelligible species (species intelligibilis), which is a kind of mental representation (similitudo) of the quiddity or essence (essencie), since the intelligible species is the form of the thing that resides in the mind of the individual cognizer and is numerically distinct from the form of the thing as it resides in the mind of a different individual cognizer as well as numerically distinct from the quiddity of which it is a representation. See, e.g., Quaestiones de quodlibet (hereafter Quodlibet) VIII.2.2: *Set intellectus cognoscit ipsum naturam et substantiam rei, unde species intelligibilis est similitudo ipsius essencie rei et est quodam modo ipsa quidditas et natura rei secundum esse intelligibile, non secundum esse intelligibile, non secundum esse naturale prout est in rebus; et ideo omnia que non cadunt sub sensu et imaginacione, set sub solo intellectu, cognoscuntur per hoc quod essencie vel quidditates corum sunt aliqua modo in intellectu*. Cf. ST I.85.6 co: *Obiectum autem*
The power that is responsible for abstracting the formal constituent from its material vehicle is called the *agent intellect*. There are two Thomistic concepts here that require explanation: abstraction and agent intellect.\(^{117}\) Abstraction is a psychological event by which some material object in the external world is caused to produce an intelligible *species* (image or concept), which is not material, in the mind.\(^{118}\) Because “nothing corporeal can make an impression on the

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\(^{117}\) I refer to these as “Thomistic” rather than “Aristotelian” concepts because while Aquinas adopts the Aristotelian account as his starting point, he by no means sticks to it slavishly. It is not clear that Aristotle’s text encourages or even allows such adherence at any rate. The *locus classicus* for the Aristotelian doctrine of the active intellect is the very brief *De Anima* III.5, which has been the battle ground for vigorous debate, going back to early antiquity. Aquinas seems to appreciate that, for Aristotle, the notion of the active intellect serves to play a primarily functional role, and is not thoroughly worked out. He says, in his commentary, that Aristotle’s reason for positing the notion in the first place was simply to counter Plato’s view that the forms of sensible things exist independently of the things themselves. *In DA III.10, 430a-10-17 (54-63): Inducitur autem Aristotiles ad ponendum intellectum agentem ad excludendum opinionem Platonis, qui posuit quiditates rerum sensibilium esse a materia separatas et intelligibiles actu, unde non erat ei necessarium ponere intellectum agentem; set quia Aristotiles ponit, quod quiditates rerum sensibilium sunt in materia et non intelligibiles actu, oportuit quod poneret intellectum aliquem qui abstraheret eas a materia et sic faceret eas intelligibiles actu.*

\(^{118}\) In a recent essay, Jeffrey Brower and Susan Brower-Toland assert: “Aquinas’s notion of intelligible species is roughly the same as the contemporary notion of a concept, especially insofar as the latter is taken to include mental representations that both (i) function as subpropositional units of thought (and hence can be combined to form propositional thoughts), and (ii) tend to have a content that is general (as opposed to singular) in nature.” Jeffrey Brower and Susan Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation: Concepts and Intentionality,” in *The Philosophical Review* 117 (2008), 194.
incorporeal,” Aquinas, following Aristotle, attributes to the soul a power “which by lighting up the phantasms, as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible...by which power the human soul makes things actually intelligible.” For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, an act of creaturely cognition occurs when the cognizer undergoes a kind of change or alteration, namely, that of acquiring the form of the object cognized. Interpreters disagree about whether

119 ST I.84.6 co: Nihil autem corporeum imprimere potest in rem incorpoream.

120 ST I.79.4 co: qui quasi illustrando phantasmata, facit ea intelligibilia actu...per quam anima humana facit intelligibilia in actu. Aquinas qualifies this, and simultaneously departs from Aristotle, by asserting that given that there is such a power of the soul so described and designated “active intellect,” its operation will depend upon participation in some superior intellect [intellectu superiori] or “separated intellect” [intellectus separatus], which he asserts is God Himself [Sed, dato quod sit aliquis talis intellectus agens separatus, nihilominus tamen oportet ponere in ipsa anima humana aliquam virtutem ab illo intellectu superiori participatam, per quam anima humana facit intelligibilia in actu... Sed intellectus separatus...est ipse Deus, qui est creator animae, et in quo solo beatificatur]. Cf. SCG II.76.3 where Aquinas states that “the function of the agent intellect in regard to the intelligible species is simply to render them fit vehicles for the possible intellect’s understanding” [Non igitur facit eas nisi tales quales competunt intellectui possibili ad intelligendum]. Cf. also QDA V co: “For, as the operation of the possible intellect consists in receiving intelligible [species], so also does the proper operation of the agent intellect consist in abstracting them, for it makes them actually intelligible in this way. Now we experience both of these operations in ourselves, because we receive our intelligible species, and abstract them as well” [Sicut enim operatio intellectus possible est recipere intelligibilia, ita propria operatio intellectus agentis est abstrahere ea: sic enim ea facit intelligibilia actu. Utramque autem harum operationum experimur in nobis ipsis. Nam et nos intelligibilia recipimus et abstrahimus ea].

121 In De Sensu, tr. 1, lib. 5, n. 3: Est autem motus iste secundum alterationem: alteratio autem est motus ad formam, quae est qualitas rei visae. Cf. Brower and Brower-Toland, 197. Examples include QDVer X.4 co: “All cognition follows some form which is the principle of cognition in the knower” [omnis cognition est secundum aliquam formam, quae est in cognoscente principium cognitionis] and ST I.75.5 co: “Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower” [Sic autem cognoscitur unumquodque, sicut forma eius est in cognoscente anima]. Cf. SCG I.44.5: “Again, a thing is intelligent because it is without matter. A sign of this is the fact that forms are made understood in act by abstraction from matter” [Item. Ex hoc aliqua res est intelligens quod est sine materia: cuius signum est quod formae fiunt intellectae in actu per abstractionem a materia]. Brower and Brower-Toland exclude from this definition of cognition any reference to divine cognition since, for Aquinas, “God is both omniscient (i.e., always cognizing the things he can congnize) and immutable (i.e., incapable of undergoing change).” Ibid., 196 (italics in original). This form which exists in the mind of the knower is the previously mentioned species intelligibilis which is separate from the actual essence of the thing (quidditas rei). Cf. Quodlibet VII.2.2; QDVer. q. 1, a. 12 co; CT I.85 co.
the reception of the sensible form is immaterial or material in nature. In either case, one might think of it as a kind of surgery performed by the active intellect on the sensible image (phantasm) in order to remove and discard an obstruction, viz., its material component, in order to facilitate the intellectual apprehension, namely cognition, of the remaining purely intelligible object (species). As has already been discussed, Aquinas, following Aristotle, holds the position that there are two sorts of intellect in human beings, namely, active and passive. The divine intellect, unlike created intellects, is pure actuality and, as such, contains no potentiality. God’s intellect, in fact, just is his essence. In the created intellectual beings, viz., angels and humans, intellect is not identical with essence,


123 For Aquinas, there are three known species of intellect (or kinds of intelligent beings). The first sort of intellect, the divine intellect (or God), is uncreated and contains no potentiality; divine understanding is direct, immediate, and complete. Both angelic and human intellects are created, and so contain some measure of potentiality, though their modes of intellection are different, namely, angelic knowledge is innate while human knowledge is gained empirically.

124 SCG I.47.2: “Now, the divine essence, which is the intelligible species by which the divine intellect understands, is absolutely identical with God and it is also absolutely identical with His intellect” [Ipsa autem divina essentia quae est species intelligibilis qua intellectus divinus intelligit, est ipsi Deo penitus idem; estque intellectui ipsius idem omnino].
but is merely one among several powers.\textsuperscript{125} The complex intellect in human beings is, to an extent, passive, namely, to the extent to which it is capable of receiving form. He states,

\begin{quote}
[T]he human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first like a clean tablet on which nothing is written, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii.4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually.\textsuperscript{126}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{125} ST I.79.1 co: “the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul” [intellectus sit aliqua potentia animae, et non ipsa animae essentia].

\textsuperscript{126} ST I.79.2 co: Intellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium, et in principio est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, ut philosophus dicit in III de anima. Quod manifeste apparet ex hoc, quod in principio sumus intelligentes solum in potentia, postmodum autem efficimur intelligentes in actu. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima III.4, 429\textsuperscript{b}29-430\textsuperscript{a}1. Commenting on this passage in De Anima, Aquinas says that by speaking of the intellect in this way, Aristotle has ruled out not only the views of the ancient naturalists, who claimed that the souls are composed of all things (in order to be able to cognize all things), but also the view of Plato who held that the human soul has knowledge naturally, i.e., innately. See in DA III.4, 429\textsuperscript{b}29-430\textsuperscript{a}1 (53-60). The human soul is not composed of matter, according to Aquinas, for its objects are incorporeal. Also, human beings do not cognize naturally, on account of our union with a body. It is on account of the union with a body that human souls are lower than other intellectual beings, specifically the separated substances (i.e., the angels), and it is on account of its low position, and consequent proximity to matter, that makes it potentially embodied. “A (human) soul, because it is the lowest among spiritual substances, has a greater affinity than higher substances with corporeal nature, so that it is able to be its form” [Ad undecimum dicendum quod anima, quia est infima inter substantias spirituales, maiorem habet affinitatem cum natura corporea, ut possit esse eius forma, quam superiores substantiae]. De spir. creat., art. 5 ad 11. The English translation is from On Spiritual Creatures, translated by Mary C. Fitzpatrick and John J. Wellmuth (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1949). Cf. SCG II.91. For his summary of the views of both Aristotle and Plato on separated substances, see De substantiis separatis, especially cap. II and III. On the hierarchy of intellectual substances, and the place of human beings in it as its lowest members along with the view that what is highest in man (principalissimum in homine) is what is shared with the “superior substances” (substantiis superioribus), see in NE X, LXI:C: 2110. Because human beings are composite beings (i.e., composed of matter and form), human nature is “incomplete” without a body, in comparison to the separated substances, which “are subsistent and complete in their nature” (substance separae, quannvis non sint composite ex materia et forma, sunt tamen hoc aliquid, cum sint subsistentes in actu et complete in natura sua). In DA II.1, 412\textsuperscript{a}6-11 (101-108).
From this account, it might seem that the intellect is merely passive, having only the power to be affected. If this were so, however, a problem would immediately emerge, which Aquinas raises in article three of question 79 in the *pars prima*. Given the incorporeality of the intellect, if it were *entirely* passive, how could it be affected by objects of sensation, which are material objects? Plato, he says, did not need to posit an active intellect, since for him material things are already actually intelligible on account of their intelligible forms, which subsist apart from their material vehicles. It is on account of the immateriality of these subsisting forms that material objects are intelligible to us, that is, the immaterial intelligible forms directly affect and inform the immaterial passive intellect, with the matter being only contingently related and so superfluous or, more likely, obstructive to the process. However, on Aquinas' hylomorphic view, forms do not subsist apart from matter, and so are not directly intelligible to human beings.

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Aristotle, *De Anima* I.1, 402a22-b8, along with Aquinas' endorsement at *In DA* I.1, 402a22-b8 (172-190). Separated souls, because *non sint composite ex materia et forma*, are therefore not subject to generation or corruption (*cum sint sine generatione et corruptione*), and so are able to contemplate objects directly and without sensation (*eorum intellectus per se speculatur ea que sunt secundum se intelligibilia, unde non indigent sensibus ad cognitionem intellectivam consequendam*). In *DA II.3*, 414b33-415a13 (64-74). This is in part because being entirely incorporeal, the intellect of separated substances is in actuality with respect to intelligible objects, whereas human beings, on account of our corporeality, are in potentiality with respect to intellection and must be brought into actuality by something exterior. See *In DA II.3*, 415a16-22 (173-190), *In DA III.4*, 429a18-24 (181-188), and *In DA III.6*, 430b20-26 (193-213), where Aquinas cites *Metaphysics* XII as his source for this evaluation. Cf. Aristotle, *Met. XII.1075a21-24, 1074b33-35, 1072b26-30, and 1073a4-5*, 26. A potential scriptural source of this view is Psalm 8:5, which refers to human beings as having been created by God “a little lower than the angels” (*minuisti eum paulo minus ab angelis*). This verse is numbered as Psalm 8:6 in the old Vulgate, and in the text that Aquinas quotes in his commentary on the Psalms. See *Super Psalmo* 8, n.5. *In psalmos Davidis expositio* (Parmae, 1863). It remains to be seen, on account of this distinction in intellection between corporeal and incorporeal beings, whether superior beings (i.e., God and angels) are capable of aesthetic perception. I must withhold judgment on this issue for the present.
cognizers. It is, rather, the material constituent (or its sensible qualities) that is immediately available to human perception. Thus Aquinas, commenting on a passage in De Anima III.4, 428b18-22, states:

Now from the things the Philosopher says here we can see that the intellect’s proper object is the quiddity of a thing - a quiddity that is not separated from the things, as the Platonists claimed. Thus that which is the object of our intellect is not something existing outside sense objects, as the Platonists claimed, but something existing in sense objects, although intellect apprehends the quiddities of things differently from the way they are in sense objects.

According to Aquinas’ exposition, then, Aristotle holds the proper object of the intellect (proprium objectum intellectus) to be its quiddity (quiditas rei) or form, its intelligible content, which is found in the material thing (in rebus sensibilibus existens) and must be extracted from the material object in order to be cognized. It is to this problem of getting the intelligible content from the material object of perception (res sensibles) that the notion of the active intellect provides a solution, since the active intellect has, as its primary purpose, extraction of the

127 The exceptions to this are separated intellects. Aquinas says, for instance, in SCG II.91 that at least some human intellectual substances exist apart from bodies. SCG II.91.1: Ex praemissis autem ostendi potest esse aliquas substantias intellectuales corporibus non unitas. This is based on the fact, proven in the long chapter 89 of SCG II that the human intellect is united to the body as its form. Also in chapter 91 of SCG II, he also concludes, following Aristotle, that there are a plurality of incorporeal intellectual substances. SCG II.91.9: Sunt igitur plures substantiae intellectuales corporibus non unitae. Cf. Aristotle, Met. XI.8.

128 In DA III.8, 429b18-22 (239-247): Apparet autem ex hoc quod Philosophus dicit hic quod proprium objectum intellectus est quiditas rei, que non est separata a rebus, ut Platonici posuerunt. Unde id quod est objectum intellectus nostri non est aliquid extra res sensibles existens, ut Platonici posuerunt, set aliquid in rebus sensibilibus existens, licet intellectus apprehendat alio modo quiditates rerum quam sint in rebus sensibilibus. Cf. Quodlibet VII.2.2; QDVer. q. 1, a. 12 co; CT I.85 co.
formal (i.e., immaterial) intelligible properties from the material ones, in the process of abstraction.129 “Nothing,” he says, “can be reduced from potentiality to actuality except by something in a state of actuality.”130 We must, therefore, assign to the intellect some power to make material things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the immaterial species from their material conditions. And it is the agent intellect that answers to this description.131 It is by virtue of this power of the agent intellect that the human soul extracts the intelligible content from sensible objects.132 The sensible qualities of the objects are perceivable by the


130 Ibid.

131 Ibid. Cf. ST I.84.6 co: “Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation, according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required, for the agent is more noble than the patient, as he says. Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above, causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction” [Nihil autem corporeum impressere potest in rem incorpoream. Et ideo ad causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius, quia agens est honorabilius patiente, ut ipse dicit. Non tamen ita quod intellectualis operatio causetur in nobis ex sola impressione alicuius rerum superiorum, ut Plato posuit, sed illud superius et nobilius agens quo vocat intellectum agentem, de quo iam supra diximus, facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in actu, per modum abstractionis cuiusdam].

132 In De Sensu Pr. (1-9): “As the Philosopher says in On the Soul III, ‘just as things are separable from matter, so also is what pertains to intellect’: for everything is intelligible inasmuch as it is separable from matter. Hence what is by nature separate from matter is of its very self intelligible in actuality; but what is abstracted by us from conditions of matter is made intelligible in actuality by the light of our agent intellect” [Sicut Philosophus dicit in III De anima, «sicut separabiles sunt res a materia, sic et que circa intellectum sunt»: unumquodque enim in tantum est intelligibile in quantum est a materia separabile. Unde ea quae sunt secundum naturam a materia separata, sunt secundum seipsa intelligibilia actu: quae vero a nobis a materialibus conditionibus sunt abstracta, fiunt
senses themselves, through an alteration of the sense organs, when the object of sensation is present.\textsuperscript{133} These sensible qualities differ according to the sense organ; each sense power (and organ) having its own proper object: for sight, color; for hearing, sound; for smell, odor; etc.\textsuperscript{134} In an act of understanding precipitated by the perception of an object of sense, there is, first, the action of the perceptible objects on the senses, which brings the human being from a state of mere potentiality to a state of actuality, in which act the human being can be said

\textit{intelligibilia actu per lumen nostri intellectus agentis}. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima IV.4, 429b21-22: \textit{Omnino ergo sicut separabiles res a materia, sic et que circa intellectum sunt}. Cf. ST I.85.1 ad 1: “This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from thephantasm; that is, by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms” [\textit{Et hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari, vel speciem intelligibilem a phantasmatisbus, considerare silicet naturam speciei absque consideratione individualium principiorum, quae per phansmatmata representantur}].

\textsuperscript{133} In De Sensu Pr., 436a (226-231): “Now the sense-power (\textit{sensus}) differs from intellect and reason because intellect or reason (\textit{intellectus vel ratio}) is of universals (\textit{universalium}), which are everywhere and always, but the sense-power is of individuals, which are here and now. And so sense, according to its proper nature (\textit{propriam rationem}) is apprehensive only of what is present.” [\textit{Differt autem sensus ab intellectu et ratione quia intellectus vel ratio est universalium, quae sunt ubique et semper, sensus autem est singularium, que sunt hic et nunc. Et ideo sensus secundum suam propriam rationem non est cognoscitivus nisi presencium}]. \textit{Ibid.}, 436a1 (346-350): “Since a sense-power (\textit{sensus}) is affected (\textit{paciatur}) by something sensible, as was shown in the book \textit{On the Soul}, and sensible things (\textit{sensibilia}) are bodily and material, what is affected by the sensible is necessarily bodily” [\textit{quia cum sensus paciatur a sensibili, sicut ostensum est in libro De anima, sensibilia autem < sint > corporalia et materialia, necesse est corporeum esse quod a sensibili patitur}]. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima I.5, 410b25-26; II.5, 416a33-34; II.11, 423a31-424a1. \textit{Ibid.}, tr. 1, cap. 1, 436b8 (25-27): “He (Aristotle) calls sensing an ‘affection’ (\textit{passionem}) because the action of sense (\textit{actio sensus}) comes about in being-affected (\textit{paciendo}), as was proved in \textit{On The Soul II}.” [\textit{Vocat autem sentire passionem, quia actio sensus in paciendo fit, ut probatum est in II De anima}]. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima II.5, 416a32-35; II.11, 423a31-424a1.

\textsuperscript{134} In De Sensu tr. 1, cap. 5, 439b6 (10-16): “Accordingly he (Aristotle) first speaks of proper sensible objects, those perceived in relation to each sensitive part, that is, each individual sense-organ, which he says to distinguish them from common sensibles. The proper sensibles are color, sound, and odor, which are sensed through sight, hearing, and smell; and taste and touch – that is, the objects of these senses” [\textit{Dicit ergo primo quod de sensibilibus propriis que sensciuntur secundum unumquodque sensitivum, id est secundum singula organa sensuum (quod dicitur ad differenciam sensibilium communium), scilicet de colore, sono et odore, que sensciuntur per visum, < auditum > et odoratum, et de gustu et tactu, id est de sensibilibus horum sensuum}].
to perceive the object of sense; second, having perceived the object of sensation, by abstracting the intelligible form from its material condition, the soul gains understanding.¹³⁵ The form that is extracted in this process is intelligible and, as such, is immaterial just as the intellective soul which extracts it is immaterial.¹³⁶ This activity of extraction is not limited to human beings, but is also performed by other animals. The difference is that what is extracted by human souls is universal and what is extracted by the lower animals is particular. In either case, there is intelligible content that is extracted and this intelligible content is immaterial in nature.¹³⁷ Anthony Kenny characterizes the “specifically human

¹³⁵ QDA VII ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum quod anima intellectualis principia et conclusiones intelligit per species a phantasmatibus abstractas. Cf. ST I.84.3 co. Cf. ST I.84.6 co.

¹³⁶ QDA II ad 19: Ad decimumnonum dicendum quod anima, licet uniatur corpori secundum modum corporis, tamen ex ea parte qua excedit corporis capabilitatem, naturam intellectualem habet; et sic formae receptae in ea sunt intelligibiles et non materiales.

¹³⁷ In De Sensu tr. I, cap. I, 436ª10 (40-59): “Accordingly he first says that every animal, inasmuch as it is animal, necessarily has some sense-power: for the nature (ratio) of animal, by which it is distinguished from what is non-animal, consists in its being sensitive. The reason is this. An animal reaches the lowest level of knowing things, which surpass things that lack knowledge by being able to contain several beings in themselves, by which their power is shown to be more open and to extend to more things. And inasmuch as a knower has a more universal grasp of things, its power is more absolute, immaterial, and perfect. Now the sensitive power that is in animals is certainly open to what is outside, but only in the singular. Hence it also has an immateriality inasmuch as it is receptive of forms of sensible things without matter (in quantum est susceptiva specierum sensibilium sine materia), but it has the lowest immateriality in the order of knowers, inasmuch as it can receive these forms only in a bodily organ” [Dicit ergo primo quod omne animal in quantum est animal necesse est quod habeat sensum aliquem; in hoc enim quod est sensitivum esse consistit ratio animalis per quam a non animali distinguitur. Attingit enim animal ad ininfimum gradum cognoscencium. Que quidem alis rebus cognitione carentibus preminet in hoc quod plura encia in se continere possunt et ita virtus eorum ostenditur esse capacior et ad plura se extendens; et quanto quidem aliquod cognoscens universalioribus habet rerum comprehensionem, tanto virtus eius est absolutior et inmaterialior et perfectior. Virtus autem sensitiva, que inest animalibus, est quidem capax extrinsecorum, set in singulari tantum; unde et quandam inmaterialitatem habet in quantum est susceptiva specierum sensibilium sine materia, infimam tamen in ordine cognoscencium in quantum huiusmodi species recipere non potest nisi in organo corporali].
ability to acquire complicated concepts from experience, and to grasp geometrical truths presented in diagrams” as what Aquinas likely has in mind when speaking about the activity of the agent intellect. The agent intellect is, according to Kenny, responsible for the formation of both concepts and beliefs.

Most of Aquinas' discussion of abstraction occurs with respect to abstraction by the intellect. However, he does briefly discuss, by way of contrast, abstraction by the senses. In Summa Theologiae pars prima question 84, while discussing the question whether the form that is received in the perceiver is in the same mode as the form occurring in the external object (to which he gives a negative answer), he states that the senses which receive the forms of sensible things do so immaterially, that is, without receiving matter. The example he gives is that of receiving the color gold without receiving gold itself (sicut colorem auri sine auro). He concludes that “through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary.” Intellectual knowledge (sensibilis cognitio), he later says, is caused by the senses (a sensu

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139 Ibid.

140 ST I.84.1 co: Et per hunc etiam modum forma sensibilis alio modo est in re quae est extra animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui suscipit formas sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem auri sine auro. Et similiter intellectus species, corporum, quae sunt materiales et mobiles, recipit immaterialiter et immobilitatem, secundum modum suum, nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis. Dicendum est ergo quod anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora cognitione immateriali, universali et necessaria.

141 Ibid.

142 Ibid.
causatur); however, such sensible knowledge (sensibilis cognitio) is merely the material cause (materia causae) of intellectual knowledge (intellectualis cognitionis).\(^{143}\) It is interesting to note that, in the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas does not speak so much of the power of sensation, as of the soul’s knowledge of sensible things. His reason for this is stated at the beginning of question 84 where he says that the powers of the intellect and appetite are of special concern to the theologian, while the other powers of the soul (including sensation) are not.\(^{144}\) Presumably, the sensitive power of the soul is, rather, the provenance of the natural philosopher since this power is shared with the lower animals. The primary concern, for the philosopher no less than the theologian, is to know how it is that the soul knows sensible things. And Aquinas states that “the intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal species; but through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the soul by their own essence.”\(^{145}\) For, as he asserts in the *sed*

\(^{143}\) ST. I.84.6 co: “According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause” [Secundum hoc ergo, ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae].

\(^{144}\) ST I.84 pro: Consequent considerandum est de actibus animae, quantum ad potentias intellectivas et appetitivas, aliae enim animae potentiae non pertinent directe ad considerationem theologi.

\(^{145}\) ST I.84.1 ad 1: Cognoscit enim corpora intelligendo, sed non per corpora, neque per similitudines materiales et corporeas; sed per species immateriales et intelligibiles, quae per sui essentiam in anima esse possunt. As has already been stated, in human beings, the soul understands the sensible through the intellect, with the power of sensation acting as the material cause of the intellectual
contra of the same question, knowledge is in the intellect, and therefore if the intellect has no knowledge of bodies, there can be no science of bodies, and this is destructive to the natural sciences. It will be, perhaps, appropriate to recall here an important qualification to Aquinas’ view of knowledge, about which it was earlier reported that it has its origin in the senses. To this, Aquinas adds that the intellect is able to exceed the senses: “Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive.” The power of intellect, being higher than the sensory power, is able to perceive more even of sensible objects than the sensory power is capable.

The power to which Aquinas attributes the retaining and storing of sensible species (sensibilia) is called either phantasy (phantasia) or imagination (imaginatio), which he says, are the same (quae idem sunt); these sensory species knowledge. However in higher rational beings, knowledge of sensible things is not gained in this way. For he says, following Augustine, that if intellectual knowledge were limited to intelligible things, in the same way that sensible knowledge is limited to sensible things, then neither God nor angels could have any knowledge of sensible things. He rejects this view, however, and instead asserts that while “the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the higher power” nevertheless “the higher power operates in a more excellent manner those things which belong to the lower power.” ST I.84.1 ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XXII de Civit. Dei, non est dicendum quod, sicut sensus cognoscit sola corporalia, ita intellectus cognoscit sola spiritualia, quia sequeretur quod Deus et Angeli corporalia non cognoscerent. Huius autem diversitatis ratio est, quia inferior virtus non se extendit ad ea quae sunt superioris virtutis; sed virtus superior ea quae sunt inferioris virtutis, excellenteri modo operatur. Cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei XXII, 29.

146 ST I.84.1 sc: scientia est in intellectu. Si ergo intellectus non cognoscit corpora, sequitur quod nulla scientia sit de corporibus. Et sic peribit scientia naturalis, quae est de corpore mobili.

147 ST I.78.4 ad 4: Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet intellectus operatio oriatur a sensu, tamen in re apprehensa per sensum intellectus multa cognoscit quae sensus peripere non potest.
are retained, as it were, in a kind of storehouse (thesaurus) of images (phantasms) received via the senses.¹⁴⁸ These are important powers, not only for the recollection of past information, which is necessary for even the most rudimentary tasks such as seeking food which is not immediately present to our senses; but more importantly, perhaps, because it is by the mediation of the phantasms that we are able to have knowledge of particulars. For, Aquinas asserts, in the act of abstraction described above, the intelligible product (inteligibilium), which is the object of knowledge (scientia), of the event of abstraction is a universal (universalium).¹⁴⁹ In order to gain an understanding of particular individuals, phantasms are employed, since particulars are individuated by matter, and matter is known through the senses whereas

²¹⁴⁸ ST I.78.4 co: Ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quae idem sunt, est enim phantasia sive imaginatio quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum.

¹⁴⁹ In De Sensu, tr. 1, lib. 1, n. 11: “Now the sense-power differs from intellect and reason because intellect or reason is of universals, which are everywhere and always, but the sense-power is of individuals, which are here and now. And so sense, according to its proper nature (ratio) is apprehensive only of what is present.” [Differt autem sensus ab intellectu et ratione; quia intellectus vel ratio est universalium, quae sunt ubique et semper; sensus autem est singularium quae sunt hic et nunc. Et ideo sensus secundum suam propriam rationem non est cognoscitivus nisi praesentium]. Cf. In DA II.5, 417v19-29 (38-55): Deinde cum dicit: differunt autem etc., quia posuerat similitudinem inter sentire in actu et considerare, vult ostendere differenciam inter ea. Cuius quidem difference causam assignare incipit ex differencia obiectorum, scilicet sensibilium et intelligibilium, que senciuntur et considerantur in actu: sensibilia enim que sunt activa operationis sensitive, scilicet visible et audibile, et alia huiusmodi, sunt extra animam. Cuius causa est, quia sensus secundum actum sunt singularium, que sunt extra animam, set sciencia est universalium, que quodam modo sunt in anima. Ex quo patet quod ille qui iam habet scientiam non oportet quod querat extra sua objecta, set habet ea in se, unde potest considerare ea cum vult, nisi per accidens impediatur; set sentire non potest aliquis cum vult, quia sensibilia non habet in se, set oportet quod assint et extra.
universals are known through intellection.\textsuperscript{150} The universal, or form (e.g., human being), is therefore the \textit{direct} object of intellect, and the particular, the individual composed of matter and form (e.g., this human being), is the \textit{indirect} object of intellect, and the \textit{direct} object of sensation.\textsuperscript{151}

From all of this, it can be seen that, in perception of a natural object (a tree, for instance), a variety of powers and processes are involved. The rational soul receives the intelligible form of the tree, which is immaterial, extracting the form from whatever physical vehicle may be responsible for the delivery, namely, the raw \textit{sensibilia} (e.g., the specific colors and shapes circumscribing the material object), which is produced by the object itself, the \textit{singularis} (e.g., this tree).\textsuperscript{152} The intelligible form is reflected upon immediately, and often stored in the

\textsuperscript{150} ST I.86.1 co: \textit{Respondeo dicendum quod singulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia principium singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia individualis, intellectus autem noster, sicut supra dictum est, intelligit abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem ab huiusmodi materia. Quod autem a materia individuali abstrahitur, est universale. Unde intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium. Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare, quia, sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata.}

\textsuperscript{151} ST I.86.3 co: \textit{Est autem unumquodque contingens ex parte materiae, quia contingens est quod potest esse et non esse; potentia autem pertinet ad materiam. Necessitas autem consequitur rationem formae, quia ea qua consequuntur ad formam, ex necessitate insunt. Materia autem est indviduationis principium, ratio autem universalis accipit secundum abstractionem formae a materia particulari. Dictum autem est supra quod per se et directe intellectus est universalius; sensus autem singularium, quorum etiam indirecte quodammodo est intellectus, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur contingentia, prout sunt contingentia, cognoscuntur directe quidem sensu, indirecte autem ab intellectu, rationes autem universales et necessariae contingentium cognoscuntur per intellectum. Cf. ST I.86.1 co: Unde intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium. Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare.}

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Ibid.}
imagination for later retrieval. Certain judgments are made possible by the two powers of abstraction and imagination. Through abstraction, the universal form becomes the object of reflection, and by the power of imagination is the universal joined to the image of the particular object of perception so that one may conceive not merely of the notion of a tree, but of this tree. This, then, is Aquinas’ theory of perception, not only of sensibles but, as we have seen, of intelligibles as well. It is, thus, a kind of two-story or parallel account of perception. For human beings, any sort of perception begins in sensory perception, but most perception does not stop there since human beings tend to intellectually order (or categorize) their objects of perceptions. We do not typically merely accept what is presented to us, but we tend to think of things as falling under kinds. Rather than settle for “I see a patch of green against a patch of blue” we prefer “I see a tree against a backdrop of blue sky.” It is, in some sense, a process that we cannot avoid except through great effort.\footnote{The historical movement in the arts known as “Impressionism” was an artistic attempt to achieve just this sort of appearance apart from interpretation. This is well illustrated by a comment made by one of the best known among the Impressionists, Claude Monet, who described the process as follows. “When you go out to paint, try to forget what objects you have before you, a tree, a house, a field, or whatever. Merely think, here is a little square of blue, here an oblong of pink, here a streak of yellow.” Quotation appeared originally in Lilla Cabot Perry’s “Reminiscenses of Claude Monet from 1889 to 1909” in \textit{Magazine of Art} 18 (1927): 119-125. Cited in Horst Woldemar Janson and Anthony F. Janson, \textit{History of Art: The Western Tradition}, 6th edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 677.} This ordering is a kind of intellectual perception, which is made possible by abstraction. As we shall see, aesthetic perception (that is, perception of beauty in an object of perception) goes beyond sensory perception, though it certainly involves sensory perception as a
necessary constituent. It is, therefore, a kind of intellectual perception, and so it
must be at least partially formal and objective in character.

Adopting, as a starting point, Aquinas’ definition of beautiful things as
“those which please when perceived”\textsuperscript{154} coupled with his objective constituents
of beauty, namely, integrity, proportion and clarity,\textsuperscript{155} we can say, provisionally,
that to perceive an object as beautiful is to first apprehend its proper and
common \textit{sensibilia}, though an appreciation of these will depend, in part, on
apprehending them in the context of a particular instance of \textit{per accidens sensibilia}.
For to grasp a human being as a beautiful member of its kind is to have an
understanding of \textit{human being} as an ideal against which one can compare \textit{this
particular human being} for integrity, proportion and clarity, and (presumably)
noting a high level of congruence between the particular and the ideal. I will
return to this with greater attention in chapter four. For now, I think it will be
worth noting why it is, on Aquinas’ view, that humans can perceive beauty while
lower animals cannot. Obviously, many of the lower animals have the same
capacities to perceive the various \textit{sensibilia} that humans do, and in some case
with even greater acuity. What humans have, and animals lack (so far as we
know), is the ability to compare particular sensible details against universal

\textsuperscript{154} ST I.5.4 ad 1: \textit{pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent.}

\textsuperscript{155} ST I.39.8 co: \textit{Nam ad pulchristudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, integritas sive perfectio, quae
enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas, unde
quae habent colorem nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur.}
concepts or ideals. Such universal concepts are the creation of the agent intellect. Aquinas explicitly denies that the lower animals are capable of perceiving beauty, stating: “Whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake.” Both the lower animals and the rational animal take pleasure in the sight of sensible objects, but whereas the lower animals make such pleasure only as it relates to the satisfaction of bodily needs for survival, the rational animal alone may take pleasure in sensible objects for their beauty, which is connected in some sense to cognition. The denial of aesthetic pleasure to the lower animals occurs in the context of explaining why humans uniquely, among animals, stand upright [habere staturam rectam] and have their sensory apparati situated “chiefly in the face” [sensus praecipue vigent in facie]. This is so, he says, because “the senses are given to

156 Regarding the role of the active or agent intellect, see ST I.79.3 co: “We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect” [Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem]. For the denial that lower animals are capable of forming universal concepts, see Aristotle, NE VII.3, 1147b5: “Hence the lower animals cannot be called unrestrained, if only for the reason that they have no power of forming universal concepts, but only mental images and memories of particular things.”

157 ST I.91.3 ad 3: cum cetera animalia non delectentur in sensibilibus nisi per ordinem ad cibos et venerea, solus homo delectatur in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilium secundum seipsam.

158 Ibid.
man, not only for the purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, for which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge.”

It is clear from this discussion that, for Aquinas, there is a further subjective feature of aesthetic perception; and perhaps it is this feature that sets aesthetic perception apart from other sorts of intellectual perception. I am referring to the pleasure attending aesthetic perception. We next need to discuss what sort of pleasure this is and how it is distinguished from other sorts of pleasure that do not qualify as aesthetic.

159 ST I.91.3 ad 3: quia sensus sunt dati homini non solum ad vitae necessaria procuranda, sicut aliis animalibus; sed etiam ad cognoscendum.
CHAPTER 3
HUMAN DESIRE AND PLEASURE

3.1 On Appetite

As we have seen, Aquinas has defined beauty, in part, with respect to the pleasure produced in the perception of beautiful things. What sort of pleasure is produced in aesthetic perception; that is, what sort of pleasure is properly produced in the apprehension of beautiful objects? Aquinas does not tell us. He does, however, have a fairly sophisticated account of human pleasure and desire,1 and with some examination, we should be able to determine which sort

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1 Aquinas’ discussion of pleasure and delight occurs in a section of the *Summa Theologiae* that is often referred to (by contemporary philosophers, not by Aquinas) as the *Treatise on the Passions*, comprised of questions 22-48 of the *prima secundae*. Paul Gondreau has noted that Aquinas’ treatise “dwarfs the only known historical precedents, both of which Aquinas draws upon, namely, Nemesius of Emesa’s short treatise on the passions in his *De natura hominis* (which Aquinas misattributes to Gregory of Nyssa) and, following this, John Damascene’s treatise on the same in his *De fide orthodoxa* (Aristotle left us no systematic treatment of the passions).” Paul Gondreau, “The Passions and the Moral Life: Appreciating the Originality of Aquinas,” *The Thomist* 71 (2007): 426. Nicholas Lombardo adds that at the time of its completion, Aquinas’ treatise “probably constituted the longest sustained discussion of the passions ever written,” the longest sustained discussion on the subject prior to which being that of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* which, he notes, is “neither as long nor as systematic as Aquinas’s.” Lombardo, op. cit., 1. And, to highlight the centrality of the passions to Aquinas’ thought, Servais Pinckaers has pointed out that the *Treatise on the Passions* is “the largest treatise in the entire *Summa*, comprising twenty-seven questions of one hundred thirty-two articles.” Servais Pinckaers, “Reappropriating Aquinas’s Account of the Passions,” in *The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology*, ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 273. Cf. Nemesius of Emesa, *On the Nature of Man* [*De natura hominis*], translated with an introduction and notes by R. W. Sharples and P. J. van der Eijk. Translated Texts for Historians, Volume 49 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008), esp. §§ 16-21; and John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* in *Writings: The Fount of Knowledge*, translated by Frederic H. Chase, Jr. *The Fathers of the Church*, Volume 37 (New York: The Fathers of the Church, 1958), esp. Book II; and Aristotle, *Rhetoric* (hereafter *Rhet.* ) II.1-17, 1377a15-1391b7.
or sorts of pleasure would be fitting to accompany aesthetic perception. Our initial task is to examine his account of human pleasures, which will, in turn, require an investigation into the nature of human desires and their satisfaction. After giving a thorough account of the nature of human pleasures in general, we will turn to an investigation of the concept of disinterested interest and disinterested pleasure to determine whether these have any analogue in the thought of Aquinas and, if so, whether these concepts provide an illuminating way to think about Aquinas’ view of aesthetic perception.2

Aquinas discusses pleasure largely in the context of the passions (passiones), which are properly related to the sensory, that is, bodily appetite, which suggests that, for human beings, Aquinas takes corporal pleasure to be the

2 By the locution “aesthetic perception,” I mean something quite broad and non-technical, namely, perception of beautiful objects or events. Ignoring the obvious sensory connotations implicit in its natural connection to the Greek word οἰκονομίας, I extend it’s application to any perception of beauty, whether sensory or not. The notion of disinterested interest was raised by Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, according to whom, aesthetic judgments are disinterested in the sense that they do not involve a particular kind of interest, namely, self-interest. The notion was given currency, however, when it was given a more thorough explication in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, according to whom, aesthetic judgment cannot involve any reference to the satisfaction of human desire. Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, edited by Lawrence E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); see especially, “An inquiry concerning virtue or merit.” Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment [Kritik der Urteilskraft] (hereafter KU), edited by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5: 203-211 (89-96). Jerome Stolnitz has claimed that the notion of “disinterestedness” was original to the modern period, either occurring not at all in the ancient, medieval and renaissance periods, or, where it does (e.g., in Aquinas), it does so only in a “cursory and undeveloped” way. While this last remark is intended to suggest that Aquinas has only a nascent conception of the modern notion of “disinterestedness,” nevertheless it stands as an admission that there is at least some analogue in Aquinas’ thought. I will investigate the extent that a comparison could be made between the two below. Jerome Stolnitz, “On the Origins of ‘Aesthetic Disinterestedness,’” in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 20 (1961): 131. Cf. ST I-II.27.1.
most basic or, at least, the most immediate and accessible sort of pleasure. In his Treatise on the Passions, Aquinas defines the passions as “the movements of the sensitive appetite.” Accordingly, pleasure (or delight) is one of the passions of the sensitive appetite; more specifically, pleasure is an affectio, which can arise

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3 This is further suggested by his comments in his discussion of whether corporal pleasures are greater than spiritual and intellectual pleasures in ST I-II.31.5 co. There he says that, considered in themselves, spiritual pleasures are greater than corporal pleasures, but considered “in relation to us,” that is, from the perspective of human cognizers, corporal pleasures are greater. He lists several reasons why this is so, the first of which is that “sensible things are more known to us, than inteligible things” [sensibilia sunt magis nota, quoad nos, quam intelligibilia].

4 ST I-II.31.1 co: motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur. This definition is carried forward from ST I-II.22.3, in which he argued that the passions belong to the sensitive appetite as opposed to the intellectual appetite, viz., the will.

5 ST I-II.23.4 co: “passions (passiones) differ in accordance with their active causes, which in the case of the passions of the soul (passionum animae), are their objects...when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest (appetitus quietationem), as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of delight (delectationem) or joy (gaudium).” Here, Aquinas uses the word delectatio, but he frequently alternates between this term and placere (as in the formal definition of beauty already mentioned, ST I.5.4 ad 1). So far as I can tell, for Aquinas, there seems to be no technical difference in meaning between these two terms except that delectatio (and its cognates) is used when the noun form is called for, and placere (and its cognates) is used when the predicate form is needed.

6 ST I-II.31.1 co: “The movements of the sensitive appetite (motus appetitus sensitivi), are properly called passions (passio)... Now every emotion (affectio) arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite (motus appetitus sensitivi): and this must needs be said of delight (delectationi).” Aquinas names Aristotle as the source of this view. See, e.g., the long discussion of pleasure in Rhet. I.11 from which Aquinas here quotes: delectatio est quidam motus animae, et constitutio simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem. Cf. also ST I-II.33.2 co: delectatio est affectio appetitus. Though the standard translation of the Summa Theologiae by the English Dominican Fathers, and many volumes of the Blackfriars' translation as well, consistently translates affectio as “emotion,” there are problems with trying to locate the modern notion of emotion in Aquinas’ thought since there is no direct Latin equivalent. Aquinas, therefore, never specifically discusses what we refer to as emotion. Aquinas wrote, instead, about appetites or desires, passions, affectations, and other related concepts. Nicholas Lombardo writes that the closest equivalent is affectus or affectio, i.e., affection. Lombardo, 15-16, esp. n. 58. For Aquinas, the word “passion” (his passio) has a narrower meaning than our word “emotion” (his affectio), so that what we think of as emotions has some overlap with the passions in Aquinas’ thought, but they ought not be treated as synonymous, as is implied by some translators. Ibid., 16. Lombardo notes, for instance, that while it is accurate to regard many of the passions as emotions, for Aquinas, there are also some affectations that are not passions, but which correspond to the category of emotion, like some kinds of joy or love. But the passions encompass not only the body but also the soul.
with respect to reason or with respect to external, i.e., bodily, sources. Since pleasures arise in the context of appetite, it will perhaps be helpful to chart the terrain of appetite in Aquinas’ thought. Specifically, we need to determine the distinction he makes between appetite and desire, and then we can see how these relate to pleasure.

For Aquinas, appetite is related to ends, and it is what propels, or draws, creatures to various good objects. A difficulty is raised in the fact that Aquinas makes no firm distinction between appetite (appetitus) and desire (desideria), for he uses both terms to refer to the movement of some object toward some good object or away from some bad object, though he sometimes uses appetite (appetitus) as an inclination or tendency to movement. This latter notion, of

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There are both passiones corporalis and passiones animae. Nevertheless, there are some passions of the body that do not well comport with our notion of emotion, such as itches and pains, etc. Ibid., 16-17. Lombardo argues that it is ill-advised to attempt to read a contemporary notion of “emotion” back into Aquinas, in part because of the difficulties just mentioned, and in part because of the ambiguities surrounding our modern conception of emotion, which is the subject of intense debate. Ibid., 15. For more on Aquinas’ view of the relationship between the passions and the emotions, see Claudia Eisen Murphy, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions,” in Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8 (1999), 166-167; Peter King, “Aquinas on the Passions,” in MacDonald and Stump, eds., Aquinas’s Moral Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 101-132; and Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 26-61.


8 For appetitus as inclination, see ST I-II.8.1 co. Cf. Aristotle NE I.1. For appetitus as a movement toward an object. See, e.g., ST I-II.8.1 co. For desiderium as movement toward an object, see ST I-II.31.3 co.
inclination, also seems to overlap with his concept of love (amor). So what we seem to have in Aquinas are two notions: one of movement towards an object, and another of whatever it is that initiates that movement. Aquinas’ seems to use desiderium unequivocally of the first and amor unequivocally of the latter. He seems to use appetitus for both. Though a bit confusing, I do not think anything of importance hangs on this distinction, and so I will generally treat appetite and desire as synonyms, meaning movement towards an end, unless context suggests he intends it as tendency or inclination.

Goodness and desire are intimately related in Aquinas’ thought. He says that “the essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable,” and the authority to which he appeals for this assertion is Aristotle’s famous dictum that “the good is what all desire.” Aquinas does not mean by this that whatever objects human beings desire is, on account of that desire, good – the desire does not make the object good (that is, there is a distinction between true goods and those which merely seem good); rather, the order of explanation goes the other way. The goodness of an object elicits desire, with varying levels of

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9 Aquinas’ notion of “love” (amor) as the “principle of motion” (principium motus tendentis) towards a desired object seems to play the role of initiating movement to an end. ST I-II.26.1 co: In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum.


11 The definition does not mean to say that something is good because it is desired but rather the converse: something is desired because it is good. Through the effect, in this case the appetite, the
cognition – the good is the proper object of appetite (and false goodness, i.e., merely apparent goodness, elicits illicit desire, sometimes called *cupiditas*, though this locution can also refer simply to goods perceived by rational beings as good

cause is manifested, that is, the good. The nature of the good is such that it is appetible.” Jan Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 300. Cf. ST I-II.34.2 ad 3: “All things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But just as it happens that not every good which is desired is of itself and verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good” [*Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc modo omnia appetunt delectationem, sicut et bonum, cum delectatio sit quies appetitus in bono. Sed sicut contingit non omne bonum quod appetitur, esse per se et vere bonum; ita non omnis delectatio est per se et vere bona*]. Aquinas draws a parallel between the appetite/good relationship on the one hand and the cognition/truth relationship on the other. For Aquinas states: “Since the good…expresses a relation to appetite, and true, a relation to the intellect, the Philosopher says that good and evil are in things, but true and false are in the mind. A thing is not called true, however, unless it conforms to an intellect. The true, therefore, is found secondarily in things and primarily in intellect…” However, “a natural thing...is said to be true with respect to its conformity with the divine intellect in so far as it fulfills the end to which it was ordained by the divine intellect. This is clear from the writings of Anselm and Augustine, as well as from the definition of Avicenna, previously cited: ‘The truth of anything is a property of the act of being which has been established for it’ (*veritas cuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei*).” *De Ver.* I.2 co. He adds that “true is predicated primarily of a true intellect and secondarily of a thing conformed with intellect (*verum per prius dicitur de intellectu vero, et per posterius de re sibi adaequata*). True taken in either sense, however, is interchangeable with being, but in different ways. Used of things, it can be interchanged with being through a judgment asserting merely material identity, for every being is conformed with the divine intellect and can be conformed with a human intellect. The converse of this is also true.” *De Ver.* I.2 ad 1. Aquinas therefore holds that truth is something that resides in the intellect, i.e., conformity of a natural thing to an intellect, but also that truth is a property of an act of being, as asserted by Avicenna. That is, truth is the relation between a thing and its being, which is established by God. Given that this is so with respect to the cognition/truth relationship, it is true *a fortiori* with respect to the appetite/good relationship since he says, following Aristotle, that “good and evil are in things” whereas “the true and the false are not in things but in the mind” *De Ver.* I.2 sc. For Aquinas, both the good and the true are modes of being and so derive their character from being itself, though good is more correctly predicated of objects and truth of intellect. It seems correct to say that, for Aquinas, truth depends (in a way) on a cognizer, i.e., truth relates to propositions which are in the intellect, and similarly, good depends (in a way) on a desirer (though not necessarily a sentient desirer), i.e., the good is good for something. Both the good and the true ultimately reduce to or in some way qualify being, and so are rooted in the divine nature, which is absolute being, which is the ground of the objectivity of good and true. We can say, derivatively, then that beauty is also independent of human cognizers, since the objective constituents of beauty (which we will take up in the next chapter) are always present to the divine intellect in a way that is somewhat analogous to Berkeley’s divine perceiver. George Berkeley, *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* in *The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne*, Vol. 2, edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1964), 212, 214-5.
as opposed to goods which attract without the use of reason – the merely apparent good is an improper object of appetite, specifically of inordinate appetite). The order of explanation must be this way (i.e., the good determines what is desirable) because, according to Aquinas, the good (bonum) is a transcendental or primary (prima) entity, convertible with being (cum ente convertitur), and a primary entity is not explained by appeal to anything anterior since nothing is anterior to primary entities, certainly not human desires. Instead, primary entities are understood by their consequents, as causes are known by their effects; and in this way are goods often identified, namely, by their

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12 See, for instance, ST I-II.84.1 co for Aquinas’ characterization of cupiditas as appetitus inordinatus, that is, a desire for mutable goods (boni temporals) as opposed to goods that truly perfect human nature. The Fathers of the English Dominican Province translate cupiditas, in this context, as “covetousness.” In this usage, Aquinas is following the example of Augustine, who frequently uses cupiditas with this negative connotation. Cf. also ST I-II.30.2 ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum quod illa praedicatio est per causam, non per essentiam, non enim cupiditas est per se amor, sed amoris effectus, vel aliter dicendum, quod Augustinus accipit cupiditatem large pro quolibet motu appetitus qui potest esse respectu boni futuri. Unde comprehendit sub se et a morem et spem. Cf. Augustine, De diversis quaedestionibus octoginta tribus, Q. 33. Likewise, Aquinas states, in ST I-II.18.4 ad 1, that “the good in view of which one acts (bonum ad quod aliquid responciens operatur) is not always a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good (sed quandoque verum bonum, et quandoque apparent). And in the latter event, an evil action (actio mala) results from the end in view.” For an example of Aquinas’ use of cupiditas as a desire that exceeds the purely natural desires (i.e., a desire involving reason), see ST I-II.30.3 co: “Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways. First, because it is suitable to the nature of the animal; for example, food, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be natural. – Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one apprehends something as good and suitable, and consequently takes pleasure in it: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be not natural, and is more wont to be called cupidity.” [Dupliciter autem aliquid est delectabile. Uno modo, quia est conveniens naturae animalis, sicut cubis, potus, et alia huiusmodi. Et huiusmodi concupiscientia delectabils dicitur naturalis. Alio modo aliquid est delectabile, quia est conveniens animali secundum apprehensionem, sicut cum aliquid apprehendit aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, et per consequens delectatur in ipso. Et huiusmodi delectabils concupiscientia dicitur non naturalis, et solet magis dici cupiditas.] Sometimes, however, Aquinas (again following Augustine’s practice) frequently uses cupiditas to mean simply “desire,” as he does in ST I-II.25.2 sc: Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes passiones ex amore causantur, amor enim inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia est. Amor ergo est prima passionum concupiscibilis. Cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei XIV.7, 9.
desirability (both real and apparent).\textsuperscript{13} So the common feature of every proper appetite is that it is aimed at or terminates in some good end, and the kind of appetite it can only be determined by the level of cognition involved in the movement towards that end.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} In NE I, 1094\textsuperscript{a}18, L.1, n. 9: Deinde cum dicit: ideo bene enuntiaverunt etc., manifestat propositum per diffinitionem boni. Circa quod considerandum est, quod bonum numeratur inter prima: adeo quod secundum Platonicos, bonum est prius ente. Sed secundum rei veritatem bonum cum ente convertitur. Prima autem non possum nulli notificari per aliqua priora, sed notificantur per posterioria, sicut causae per proprios effectus. Cum autem bonum proprie sit motivum appetitus, describitur bonum per motum appetitus, sicut solet manifestari vis motiva per motum. Et ideo dicit, quod philosophi bene enunciaverunt, bonum esse id quod omnia appetunt. Aquinas seems to worry that his readers will think that Aristotle means that good is identified with the thing desired rather than taking the good as the principle of (i.e., what accounts for) desire. Strictly speaking, good is being, since the two are convertible, and this means that ultimately desire is for being, though being as picked out as good. The good is known by its relation (as principle) to appetite. “Good” is therefore a relational concept, not unlike the relation of cause to effect mentioned in this passage. In spite of this relational understanding of the good, the account is still an objectivist one, since being is objective. Where cognition grasps being (as true), appetite seeks being (as good). Likewise, beauty may be understood as being that is perceptually manifested (i.e., being - or, at least, good - as perceived).

\textsuperscript{14} Aquinas, following Aristotle, points out that human appetite has two objects as ends, it is drawn to good objects and avoids evil objects. And, in fact, the same object may sometimes be good or bad depending upon circumstances or under different aspects. One of these, the good, has a perfecting or completing aspect, and so is an appropriate terminus for the appetite. Such an end is what Aristotle refers to as a thing’s \textit{\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\sigma} (Aquinas’ use of \textit{finis} often has this connotation as well, though this can only be determined by the context). Because appetite \textit{per se} has this twofold orientation (i.e., it cannot make comparisons or judgments), cognition is required to aid the appetite in distinguishing its proper and perfecting ends from those that are instead harmful. Aquinas says that the apprehensive power is able to discern the thing under the aspect of intention. This explains why a person might be drawn to food when hungry but not when full. For if one is hungry, then consumption of food has a perfective role (it promotes health), while if one is already full, then the same has a defective role (it promotes infirmity). ST I-II.22.2 co: ...in nomine passionis importatur quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est agentis. Magis autem trahitur anima ad rem per vim appetitiva quam per vim apprehensivam. Nam per vim appellitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in seipsis sunt, unde philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphys., quod bonum et malum, quae sunt objecta appetitivae potentiae, sunt in ipsis rebus. Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem, secundum quod in seipsa est; sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum. Unde et ibidem dicitur quod verum et falsum, quae ad cognitionem pertinenc, non sunt in rebus, sed in mente. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis inventur in parte appetitiva quam in parte apprehensione. Cf. Aristotle, Met. VI.4, 1027\textsuperscript{a}17-1028\textsuperscript{a}5. Cf. ST I-II.45.4 co: Virtus autem sensitiva non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, sed subitum habet iudicium.
Appetite, or desire, then will be understood as a movement toward some good end.\textsuperscript{15} This tendency to move towards an end can occur without any

\textsuperscript{15} Appetite can also indicate as a tendency toward a movement away from evil, but Aquinas, following Augustine and Dionysius, holds that good is ontologically prior to evil, which is parasitic on the good. This has prompted Robert Miner to assert, “because appetite is a tendency toward what is perceived as good, it correlative implies a motion away from evil… Inclination toward a perceived good is the cause of repugnance from evil, but the converse is not true. Repulsion from evil occurs solely as a reflex of the more basic attraction toward some good, of which the shunned evil is the privation. Thus Aquinas writes that evil is the object of the appetite only secondarily and indirectly, and that ‘the acts of the will and appetite that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil, as joy is prior to sorrow and love is prior to hate. For what exists \textit{per se} is always prior to that which exists \textit{per aliud}.’” Miner, 26. Cf. ST I.20.1 co: “We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to the good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil.” Miner is seemingly less careful than Aquinas in his presentation of appetite’s movement away from evil, for according to Aquinas, properly speaking the good alone is able to move the appetite. He speaks of evil moving the appetite only derivatively and, we might say, by way of analogy. Aquinas would not countenance, with contemporary art theorists, that ugliness (taken as a kind of evil as beauty is taken as a kind of good) in art has the power to move a person. A person may be moved by viewing a representation of ugliness, but it is not directly moved by the ugliness. Rather, there is some good toward which the appetite is moved on account of the object perceived. Perhaps it is the ideal to which the object is compared and of which the object falls short that is the prime mover. Though Aquinas is silent on the issue, it is obvious that he would reject the contemporary view that ugliness is in fact capable of moving the soul. That this notion has some intuitive appeal is perhaps evidenced by Eco’s observation regarding the historical lack of scholarly discussion of ugliness. Umberto Eco, \textit{On Ugliness}, translated by Alastair McEwen (New York, NY: Rizzoli, 2007), 8. One reason often cited for favoring ugliness over beauty in contemporary art is that it is a truer reflection of our world. This view seems to be motivated by a desire for the true, which is, according to Aquinas, convertible with the good. Thus any movement occasioned by an appreciation of the ugly as an expression of the true could be assimilated into Aquinas’ view of appetite, though he would presumably reject the connection made between the ugly and the true. Regarding the disappearance of beauty from aesthetics, Arthur Danto asserted that beauty could not be part of the definition of art given the contemporary assumption that anything can count as a work of art, since “not everything is beautiful.” Arthur C. Danto, \textit{The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the Concept of Art} (Peru, IL: Open Court Publishing Co., 2003), 25. This disappearance of beauty from art was, according to Danto, liberating for both artists and philosophers of art. The separation of art and aesthetic considerations “was probably the major conceptual discovery in twentieth-century art. It effectively liberated artists from the imperative to create only what is beautiful, and at the same time freed the philosophy of art from having to concern itself with the analysis of beauty, which had been the central preoccupation of the discipline of aesthetics since its establishment in the eighteenth century.” Arthur C. Danto, “Beauty for Ashes,” in \textit{Regarding Beauty}, edited by Neal Benezra and Olga M. Viso (Munich: Haus der Kunst, 2000), 184. While
knowledge, by a purely natural inclination (*appetitum inclinantur*), as is the case with plants and inanimate objects (e.g., plants are drawn to the sun, water and nutrients, while rocks are drawn to the earth so long as nothing interferes with their movement).\(^{16}\) This movement can occur with some knowledge, but not under the aspect of the good (*sub ratione boni*), as is the case with animals and, often, human beings when moved by sensation (*appetitus sensitivus*) without reason (e.g., animals and humans are both drawn to nourishment, but unlike plants they are conscious of both the object and of the movement toward it).\(^{17}\) Finally, this movement can be accompanied by a knowledge of the object perceived under the aspect of the good, a movement of the will (*voluntas*), as is often the case with human beings (e.g., when a pilgrim chooses to drink water from a flowing stream over water from a still pool because she recognizes that the first is more likely to be potable while the second poses a greater health

Aquinas does not speak directly to this challenge, Augustine does. “Augustine explains beauty itself in the following way. Human beings can love only beautiful things... We are mistaken when we think we love something which appears ugly to us because there are no ugly things. Objects which appear ugly to us are ugly only in contrast to those things which have more beauty.” Patricia K. Ellsmere, “Augustine on Beauty, Art, and God,” in Richard R. La Croix, ed., *Augustine on Music: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays* (Lewiston, NY/Queenston, Ontario: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1988), 98. Cf. Augustine, *De Musica* VI: 4, §7; 5, §§9-12; 13, §38; 14, §47; 17, §56. For an English translation, see *On Music*, translated by R. C. Taliaferro. The Fathers of the Church Series: Writings of Saint Augustine, Vol. 4 (New York, NY: CIMA Publishing Co., 1947).

\(^{16}\) ST I,59.1 co: *omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinantur in bonum, sed diversimodo. Quaedam enim inclinantur in bonum, per solam naturalem habitudinem, absque cognitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata. Et talis inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis.*

\(^{17}\) Ibid.: *Quaedam vero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem sic quod cognoscant ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscent aliquid bonum particular; sicut sensus, qui cognoscit dulce et album et aliquid huiusmodi. Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens, dicitur appetitus sensitivus.* Robert Miner summarizes the sensitive appetite as “the inclination in beings possessing sensation (i.e., animals with bodies) toward particular goods perceived as pleasant or useful.” Miner, 25.
Thus is displayed a basic hierarchy among appetites, deriving from the degree of cognition involved in the movement of the appetite. Natural appetite is the lowest in the hierarchy since it is employed without knowledge on the part of the thing itself. Sense appetite occurs with some knowledge, but not the highest form of knowledge since it entails only knowledge of particular sensory goods. Rational appetite, or will, is the highest since it inclines toward goods, of whatever kind, perceived under the universal category of the good, and it has the potential, when used in accordance with right reason, to discriminate merely apparent goods from true goods, and so to choose the latter over the former.

Thus, for Aquinas, the two kinds of desire or appetite most relevant to the study of human psychology are sensory appetite and intellectual (or rational) appetite, each having its own corresponding type of pleasure. In this, Aquinas is

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18 Ibid.: Quaedam vero inclinantur ad bonum cum cognitione qua cognoscunt ipsam boni rationem; quod est proprium intellectus. Et haec perfectissime inclinantur in bonum... quasi inclinata in ipsum universale bonum. Et haec inclinatio dicitur voluntas.

19 Nevertheless, all appetite is dependent upon apprehension, so according to Aquinas, in things lacking sentience (e.g., plants), their appetitie is dependent upon divine apprehension. As Robert Miner puts it, “beings that have natural forms but lack the capacity for apprehension are directed toward an end as apprehended by God.” Miner, 20. These are what Aquinas refers to as “moved by another and not by themselves.” ST I-II.1.2 co: Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non magis ageret hoc quam illud...illa vero quae ratione carent, tendunt in finem per naturalem inclinationem, quasi ab alio mota, non autem a seipsis... Nam tota irrationalis natura comparatur ad Deum sicut instrumentum ad agens principale, ut supra habitum est.

20 For the explicit identification of rational appetite (appetitus rationalis) with will (voluntas) see ST I-II.6 pr: “the will is the rational appetite” (volutas est rationalis appetitus). Cf. ST II-II.58.4 ad 1; and In Sent III, lib. 3, i. 5, n. 6.

21 The idea that the conformity of appetite, of the senses as well as of the intellect, to reason is a key component in Aquinas’ ethical theory. Lombardo devotes an entire chapter of his book to the interplay between reason and passion as central to the development of virtue and, therefore, to human flourishing. See Lombardo, chapter 4.
following the conventional thought of his time. Robert Miner, in his recent study of Aquinas’ *Treatise on the Passions*, gives the following simple formulation: “the sensitive appetite tends toward concrete singulars that are apprehended by the senses, whereas the rational appetite tends toward universal goods that are perceived by the intellect.” Following Aristotle, Aquinas asserts that desires are

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22 “This was the standard mid-thirteenth century view, the emotions being regarded as reactions of two sensitive motive powers activated by the sensitive estimative powers.” Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 239. Nicholas Lombardo notes that the idea of distinguishing between two kinds of affection, namely, that of the senses and that of the mind, can be traced back at least to Peter Lombard. Lombardo, 75, n.1. Cf. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae III.17.2: in nobis duplex est affectus, mentis scilicet et sensualitatis.*

23 Miner, 21. Miner nevertheless goes too far when he cautions that, without further distinguishing these appetites by their proper objects, this “simple formulation” can lead to misunderstandings. Anthony Kenny exhibits the sort of misunderstanding he has in mind. Kenny reads Aquinas as asserting that since the rational appetite is aimed only at the universal, and the sensitive appetite only at the particular, it seems Aquinas has a hard time explaining how humans could have a *sensitive* desire for a universal. He thinks Aquinas would have a difficult time, for example, explaining my desire for a steak. He thinks Aquinas is committed to the view that I could only have a sensitive desire for this or that particular steak; but that seems incorrect, since when I have a desire for steak, I am not imagining some particular steak, but rather any steak will do. Kenny sees this as a shortcoming of Aquinas’ view. Robert Miner suggests that Kenny has overlooked two important passages in which, taken together, Aquinas can be seen to affirm that the sensitive appetite can, in fact, have a universal for its object. Aquinas says, in *De Ver.* 25.1 co: “But because [the sensitive appetite] does not tend only to this or only to that thing, but to every being which is useful or pleasurable to it, it is higher than natural appetite. For this reason it too has need of an apprehension by which to distinguish the pleasurable from what is not pleasurable.” To this, he adds, ST I-II.29.6 co: “There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as considered in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider the universal man, and another to consider a man as man…the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite, can tend to something universally.” Taken together, Miner says, these two texts “suggest that the object of the sensitive appetite is both universal and particular, though not in the same respects… The sensitive appetite is not moved by reflection on the logical concept of a steak. For the sensitive appetite to be moved, there must be some phantasm of a steak. Yet this phantasm is a universal in the second way of speaking that Aquinas mentions.” *Ibid.*, 22. Emphasis in original. The English translation of the *De Ver.* is from *Truth*, Vol. III (QQ. 20-29) by Robert W. Schmidt (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), 213. Cf. Kenny (1993), 62. It does not seem possible for Miner to make his case on the basis of the two passages cited since, for Aquinas, a universal is just a concept, and the sensitive appetite does not form concepts. A phantasm is a particular sensory image, even if it does in some sense functionally “stand in for” a universal concept. Furthermore, it will not do to appeal to the estimative power of animals since this consists of low-level cognition rather than
ultimately determined by their objects: typically, particular sensory objects elicit sensory desire, the obtaining of which result in sensory pleasure (delectatione), while objects of the intellect elicit intellectual desire, and result in intellectual pleasure, namely, joy (gaudium) or enjoyment (fruitio). Aquinas holds that sensory desire is essentially the desire for objects of the sense, and Aquinas powerfully insists that our desires for good things in general, be qualitatively determined by the goodness of the objects desired: whatever is good is desired, and whatever is not good is not desired. Sensation. Kenny therefore seems to be right about this. On Aquinas’ view, the sensitive appetite cannot form concepts; so sensory desires can only be aimed at particular objects. Though it may seem counterintuitive, my desire for steak is not a sensory desire, but rather a rational one. However, Aquinas also says, in ST I-II.31.3 co: “whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa” (Omne autem quod concupiscimus secundum naturam, possimus etiam cum delectacione rationis concupiscere, sed non e converso). Thus it seems that whatever has once been the object of sensory desire can, at a later time, be the object of rational desire; and presumably, with respect to food, this rational desire is stimulated by the physical sensation of hunger.

24 ST I-II.31.3 co: “Joy, as Avicenna states, is a kind of delight (gaudium, ut Avicenna dicit in libro suo de anima, est quaedam species delectationis). For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are natural (sicut sunt quaedam concupiscientiae naturales), and some not natural, but consequent to reason (sed consequuntur rationem), as state above (Q. 30, A. 3), so also some delights (delectationum quaedam) are natural (sunt naturales), and some are not natural but rational (quaedam non naturales, quae sunt cum ratione).” Cf. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II.13; Nemesius, De natura hominis XVIII; Avicenna, De anima IV.5. For more on intellectual pleasure, see ST I-II.11; for more on sensory pleasure, see ST I-II.31. Cf. Aristotle, NE III.10, 1117b28-29. Nevertheless, Aquinas also asserts that the will (the rational appetite) can take pleasure in sensible goods as well as in rational goods, though not vice versa. ST I-II.31.3 co: Omne autem quod concupiscimus secundum naturam, possimus etiam cum delectacione rationis concupiscere, sed non e converso. Unde de omnibus de quibus est delectatio, potest etiam esse gaudium in habentibus rationem. Miner asserts that the particular goods that arouse sensitive desire are not bare particulars (this or that individual thing), but rather “the pleasant or useful, which Aquinas construes as ‘some particular goods’ in relation to the common ratio of goodness. By comparison to the good as such, the ‘good qua pleasant’ or ‘good qua useful’ stand as particular goods. This reading...suffices to account for how the sensitive appetite tends toward particular good, which nonetheless has an aspect of universality.” The contrast is between the bonum particulare, which is the proper object of the sensitive appetite, and the bonum honestum, or the good simpliciter, which is the direct object of the will alone. Miner asserts that “the primary object of the sensitive appetite is the pleasant.” Miner, 24. The useful seems to take a secondary role for Aquinas. This accords well with Miner’s characterization of the pleasant as the proper object of the concupiscible appetite and the useful as the proper object of the irascible appetite, since for Aquinas the irascible appetite is dependent upon the concupiscible. He argues this thesis in chapter two, section four. Ibid., 46-53. Miner’s use of bonum honestum here is interesting. He characterizes it as “the good simpliciter,” but this does not capture the full force of the locution. He is right in contrasting it with the bonum particulare or the bonum utile, the "useful good." The phrase is significant because it seems to capture the sense of the phrase καλὸν τὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ("the fine and the good") which is so central to understanding the marriage of moral and aesthetic value in ancient Greek thought. A parallel expression, Τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ κάλλος ("goodness and beauty") is found in Dionysius, DN IV.7, 701C. An even closer
humans and the lower animals are capable of sensory pleasure, but that only rational beings are capable of enjoyment, since this involves apprehending the attainment of the object as falling under the universal categories of end and good (*universalis ratio finis et boni*), and this belongs to the rational soul alone. Sensory pleasure, on the other hand, results when a sensory object is apprehended as having an aptitude or “fitness” to the appetite (that is, it appears to satisfy the desire), and when, through the movement of desire, the object has been obtained and the subject rests in the object, which is its end. The movement toward a parallel is the contraction of the two, which is sometimes found in Greek literature, *viz.*, καλοκαγαθία. Cf. Aristotle, NE IV.3, 1124a4. For the phrase *bonum honestum* in Aquinas, see, e.g., ST I-II.39 where it is specifically contrasted with the *bonum utile* (the “useful good”). In his *De malo* Q. 1, a. 5 sq 3, the contrast is between the *bonum honestum* and the *bonum delectabile* (the “pleasant good”). All three appear together in his In NE VIII, l. 2 n. 2. In Aquinas’ usage, *bonum honestum* is associated with virtue, and, in fact, the Fathers of the English Dominican Province typically translate *bonum honestum* as “virtuous good.”

Though this comes with a qualification. Aquinas, following Aristotle, asserts that while rational beings are capable of deriving pleasure from each of the five senses, lower animals are capable of deriving pleasure from touch alone. ST I-II.35.2 ad 3: “Consequently man alone (*solus homo*), who is a perfectly cognizant animal (*qui est animal perfectum in cognitione*), takes pleasure (*delectatur*) in the objects of the other senses for their own sake (*secundum se ipsa*); whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, as stated in *Ethic.* iii.10.” Cf. Aristotle NE III.10, 1118a16-18, 23-1118b15.

ST I-II.11.2 co: “Wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge, although they attain an end (*pertingant ad finem*), have no enjoyment of the end (*non inventur frutio finis*): this is only for those that are endowed with knowledge (*sed solum in his quae cognitionem habent*). Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect (*perfecta, et imperfecta*). Perfect knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is the end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and the good (*universalis ratio finis et boni*); and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone (*et talis cogitio est solius rationalis naturae*).” The will can be moved not only by intellectual goods but by sensual goods also, so long as these are apprehended under the species of the universal good. ST I-II.10.3 ad 3: “The will (*voluntas*) is moved (*movetur*) not only by the universal good (*a bono universali*) apprehended by the reason (*per rationem*), but also by good (*a bono*) apprehended by sense (*per sensum*).”

ST I-II.25.2 co: “Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end (*tendit ad finem*), has, in the first place, an aptitude (*aptitudinem* or proportion (*proportionem* to that end (*ad finem*), for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved (*movetur*) to that end; thirdly, it
sensitive appe

here asserts that all sentient beings, the brute animals included, have in common the awareness to assign the cause of delight (causa delectationis), viz., the presence of a becoming good. Aquinas here asserts that all sentient beings, the brute animals included, have in common the awareness of attaining its object of desire. The result of this awareness, he says, is a movement of the sensitive appetite, and this movement is called delectatio. It is important to note that, though

rests (quiescit) in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love (amor), which is complacency in good (complacentia boni); while movement (motus) towards good is desire or concupiscence (desiderium vel concupiscencia); and rest (quies) in good is joy or pleasure (gaudium vel delectatio). For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good (Delectatio enim est frutio boni), which enjoyment is, in a way, the end (quodammodo est finis), just as the good itself (ipsum bonum) is, as stated above (Q. 11, A. 3 ad 3). This notion of “resting in” the end is an important concept since it features in Aquinas’ definition of beauty. Here, Aquinas uses the term quies instead of the familiar placeo. He also uses a term related to placeo, namely, complacentia, in a way that is synonymous with aptitudo or proportio to good, which is also called love (amor). Michael Waldstein notes that “words composed of the two roots ‘com’ and ‘placeo’ are very rare in classical Latin. ‘Complacentia’ as a noun is not found in classical Latin at all, nor in the Latin fathers. It seems to have entered philosophical and theological discourse in the Middle Ages.” Michael Waldstein, “Covenant and the Union of Love in M. J. Scheeben’s Theology of Marriage,” in Scott Hahn, ed., Letter and Spirit, Volume 3: The Hermeneutic of Continuity: Christ, Kingdom, and Creation (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Road Publishing, 2007), 140 n. 5. Waldstein notes further that this conception of complacentia seems to trace its origin to the Vulgate’s translation of εὐδοκία in God the Father’s blessing of Jesus at his baptism in Mark 1:11: “You are my beloved Son, in you I am well pleased (εὐδόκεισαι, complacui).” Ibid., 140. Cf. Frederick E. Crowe, “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas,” Theological Studies 20 (March 1959): 1-39, (June 1959): 198-230, (September 1959): 343-395. Crowe characterizes the quietatio experienced in attaining the object of desire as a “psychological repose of the will.” Ibid., 3. Love (amor) or desire (appetitu) is, according to Crowe, more complex since it has a dual role: “in one role love is passive, quiescent, complacent; in the other it is active, striving, tending to an object. It is the latter role that is regularly to the fore in St. Thomas, but it is the former, often only implicit in his thought, that is basic both psychologically and ontologically. And the real problem is that St. Thomas never brought these two notions into careful confrontation or worked out extensively their relations to one another, with the result that two contrasting and unintegrated lines of thought show up in a whole series of questions.” Ibid. One such line of thought is the bifurcation introduced by Anders Nygren between the pagan Greek notion of ἐρως and the Christian one of ἀγάπη. Crowe suggests that both are “derivative from complacency; complacency is ontologically and psychologically passive, but both ἀγάπη and ἐρως are consequent active forms, seeking the good of the other or seeking the good of self.” Ibid., 4. Cf. Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, translated by Philip S. Watson (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). Brute animals, like humans, tend toward ends that are apt, but without the knowledge of the aptitude. Aquinas makes it clear elsewhere (ST I.II.11.2 co) that in such cases it is God who both knows and directs animals via their natural instincts (naturalem instinctum) toward their fitting ends. There is however a sense in which Aquinas speaks of sentient beings (humans and other animals) having an awareness of achieving their ends, as opposed to other natural things. An example is ST I-II.31.1 co: “Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it (hoc non sentiunt), whereas animals do (sed animalia hoc sentiunt). And from this perception (ex isto sensu) there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite (causatur quidam motus animae in appetite sensitivo); which movement is called delight (iste motus est delectatio). Accordingly by saying that delight is a movement of the soul, we designate its genus. But saying that it is an establishing in keeping with the thing’s nature, i.e., with that which exists in the thing, we assign the cause of delight (causa delectationis), viz., the presence of a becoming good.” Aquinas here asserts that all sentient beings, the brute animals included, have in common the awareness of attaining its object of desire. The result of this awareness, he says, is a movement of the sensitive appetite, and this movement is called delectatio. It is important to note that, though
sense object apprehended as good is called sensory desire, and these movements are also called the “passions of the soul” (*passiones animae*). The generic sensitive appetite is further subdivided into two species: the concupiscible and irascible appetites, which are also distinguished by their objects.\(^{28}\) The concupiscible part has, as its object, sensible good and evil *simpliciter*, while the irascible part has, as its object, sensible good and evil apprehended as arduous.\(^{29}\) The division of the perception of the object obtained is involved here, it takes place at the level of sense appetite, and the sort of delight attributed here, namely, *delectatio*, is Aquinas’ general term for delight. Given his earlier constraint on enjoyment to rational creatures (ST I-II.11.2 co), it seems plausible to take his use of *fruitio* in ST I-II.25.2 in a loose or analogical, rather than the strict, sense. The discussion there is, in any case, related to the question of the proper order of the passions to one another. While we might wish that Aquinas were more consistent in his use of the terminology, the text does not require the implication that all sentient beings experience enjoyment in the strict sense.

\(^{28}\) ST I.81.2 co: “The sensitive appetite (*appetitus sensitivus*) is one generic power (*una vis in genere*), and is called sensuality (*sensualitas*); but it is divided into two powers (*potentias*), which are species of the sensitive appetite (*species appetitus sensitivi*) – the irascible (*irascibilem*) and the concupiscible (*concupiscibilem*).” Cf. ST I-II.23.1 co: “The passions (*passiones*) of the irascible part differ in species (*differunt specie*) from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers have different objects (*diversae potentiae habeant diversa obiecta*), as stated in the First Part (Q. 77, A. 3), the passions of different powers (*passiones diversarum potentiarum*) must of necessity be referred to different objects (*ad diversa obiecta referantur*)… In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of these powers.”

\(^{29}\) ST I.81.2 co: “Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension (*Quia igitur appetitus sensitivus est inclinatio consequens apprehensionem sensitivam*)… there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers (*sint duae appetitioe potentiae*) – one through which the soul is simply inclined (*simpliciter inclinatur*) to seek what is suitable (*quae convenientia*), according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible (*concupiscibilis*); and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable (*quae convenientia impugnant*), and inflict harm (*nocumenta inferunt*), and this is called the irascible (*irascibilis*).” This scheme yields the following structure to the passions: Under the concupiscible power fall passions oriented to goods, namely, love (*amor*), desire (*desiderium*), and pleasure (*delectatio/gaudium*), and passions oriented to evils, namely, hate (*odium*), aversion (*fuga*), and sorrow (*dolor/tristitia*). Under the irascible power fall passions oriented to goods the obtaining of which is difficult, namely, hope (*spes*) and audacity (*audacia*), and passions oriented to threats, namely, desperation (*desperatio*), fear (*timor*), and anger (*ira*). With the exception of anger, each of these are arranged in to contrary pairs. Knuuttila (2004), 245-246. Together, these eleven passions constitute Aquinas’ classification of the emotions (for lack of a better word though, as previously stated, there is no direct correspondence between these and contemporary
sensitive appetite into the concupiscible and the irascible appetite may seem confusing, but it is, I think, illuminated by a consideration of one of Aquinas’ recorded prayers. In his prayer “For the attainment of heaven” (Qua ad Caelum adspirat), in which he is anticipating his beatitude in Patria, Aquinas pens the following lines: “With you, most merciful Father, may my mind (mea rationalis) attain the enlightenment of wisdom, my desire (concupiscibilis) what is truly desirable, and my courage (irascibilis) the praise of triumph.”

Here, the concupiscible appetite is identified simply with bodily appetites and inclinations, while the irascible appetite is identified with self-protective inclinations. Presumably, the association of the irascible appetite here with the virtues of courage or fortitude is due to the fact that these are the virtues associated with overcoming hardship, and so with perfecting this particular species of sensory appetite. In contrast, the concupiscible appetite is most often associated with temperance since temperance is the virtue relating to the proper subjugation of

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sensory desire to reason. Reason (\textit{rationalis}) is also represented here, along with its associated virtue, wisdom (\textit{sapientiae}). Thus we can see that the structure of this passage is guided by an underlying concern to represent all four of the cardinal virtues, as they surely must be present in a maximal degree in the state of beatitude.

Now among human appetites are included what Aquinas refers to as the “passions of the soul” (\textit{passionis animae}) or simply “passions” (\textit{passionis}). These passions are movements of the sense appetite either toward (\textit{prosecutio}) some sensory goods or away from (\textit{fuga}) some sensory evils, since all appetitive movements (\textit{omnes autem motus appetitivae potentiae}) are reducible either to pursuit or retreat (\textit{reducitur ad prosecutionem vel fugam}),\textsuperscript{31} and these movements all begin with perception, either of sense or intellect (\textit{apprehensum sensu aut intellectu}).\textsuperscript{32} Passions have in common that they involve being acted upon. This is, in fact, the strict meaning of the word \textit{passio}, which is “to be affected,” and it

\textsuperscript{31}ST I-II.22.3 sc: \textit{Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus, in II libro, describens animales passiones, passio est motus appetitivae virtutis sensibilis in imaginatione boni vel mali. Et aliter, passio est motus irrationalis animae per suspicionem boni vel mali. Cf. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II.22. These movements are either toward an object or away from an object. Aquinas says that every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either of pursuit or of avoidance. ST I-II.45.2 co: \textit{sicut iam pluries dictum est, omnes huiusmodi passiones animae ad appetitivam potentiam pertinent. Omnis autem motus appetitivae potentiae reducitur ad prosecutionem vel fugam. This movement happens in two ways. First, the soul is ordered to objects that are good or evil in themselves, and these are the direct objects of the appetitive power. On the other hand, it is often not to a thing that is good or evil in itself to which the soul is drawn or from which it is repelled, but rather that thing conceived under an aspect, or as intended, and these involve the influence of the apprehensive power.}

\textsuperscript{32}ST I-II.62.4 co: \textit{Non enim potest in aliquid motus appetitivus tendere…nisi quod est apprehensum sensu aut intellectu. Human appetite is therefore dependent upon apprehension – either of the senses or the intellect.}
involves some potentiality in the object being affected by some exterior object or agent, which is why, according to Aquinas, passions can be appropriately ascribed to human beings but not to God even though God does have appetite, namely, rational appetite (or will).

So the passions are the soul’s movement

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33 ST I-II.22.1. Aquinas lists three different meanings of the word *pati*, the verbal form of *passio*, from the general to the more narrow. In its most general sense, it means anything which is affected, and this only requires that something is in potentiality with respect to something else; something is received, but nothing is lost. The immaterial soul can be “passive” in this way, as when it receives some new knowledge of which it was previously unaware. The second and third ways require that something be lost in being affected. In the second way, something is lost which is unsuitable to the thing being affected, as when a person is cured from some illness; the person thus moves from a state of potentiality with respect to health to a state of actuality by losing whatever was making him ill. In the last way, something is lost which is suitable to the thing being affected, as when a person loses his health; the person thus moves from a state of potentiality with respect to illness by being deprived of his health. In its strictest sense, this last sort of passion is properly so called, because it involves suffering. This last sense, says Aquinas, necessarily involves a bodily change which he reiterates two article later. ST I-II.22.3 co: *Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, passio proprie invenitur ubi est transmutatio corporalis.*

34 God has will because God has intellect, and will is a consequent of intellect, according to Aquinas. ST I.19.1 co: *Respondeo dicendum in Deo voluntatem esse, sicut et in eo est intellectus, voluntas enim intellectum consequitur.* However, he goes on to say that while in human beings the will is found in the appetitive power, which is so-called because it aims at some good not possessed, appetite can also be directed toward goods already possessed; and it is in this sense that it can be said that God both possesses will and that will is properly classified as an appetite. ST I.19.1 ad 2: “Will (*voluntas*) in us belongs to the appetitive part (*pertinent ad appetitivam partem*), which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess; but also the loving (*amet*) and delighting (*et delectetur*) in what it does possess (*quod habet*). In this respect will is said to be in God.” An implication of this is that “appetite” and “passion” cannot be synonymous terms, but rather that the passions are a species of appetite, as already stated. This should not be surprising because Aquinas has said that what is proper to passion, taken in the strict sense, is a corporal organ, while there is no such need for a corporal transmutation with the movement of the rational appetite (the will) since this appetite is not exercised by means of a corporal organ. ST I-II.22.3 co: *Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, passio proprie invenitur ubi est transmutatio corporalis. Quae quidem invenitur in actibus appetitus sensitivi; et non solum spiritualis, sicut est in apprehensione sensitiva, sed etiam naturalis. In actu autem appetitus intellectivi non requiritur aliqua transmutatio corporalis, quia huiusmodi appetitus non est virtus alicuius organi. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur in actu appetitus sensitivi quam intellectivi.* When love and joy are ascribed to God, Aquinas says, these are simple acts of the will, lacking in passion. Angels also experience love and joy in this manner and human beings may, though these are often associated with a passionate response because of our corporeality. ST I-II.22.3 ad 3: *Ad tertium dicendum quod amor et gaudium et alia huiusmodi, cum attribuuntur Deo vel Angelis, aut hominibus secundum appetitum intellectivum, significant simplicem actum voluntatis cum similitudine effectus, absque passione.*
toward some good. Ultimately, it is the good object that is responsible for initiating the movement. Another way of putting this is to say that the good object is the final cause of the movement of the passions, as of any appetite. Aquinas says further that the separate passions are distinguished one from the other by their intentional objects or the “active cause” or “activator” (activa) of their movements, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects (obiecta). The good object, then, is both the source and the terminus, the beginning and end, of the appetite’s movement. Individual goods, then, qua

35 ST I-II.1.2 co: “an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another.” Cf. ST I-II.1.3 ad 3: “For a movement does not receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its per se terminus.”

36 ST I-II.23.1 obj. 3: Praeterea, passiones et actus differunt specie secundum objecta. By distinguishing between goods pursued or evils avoided per se, on the one hand, and those goods pursued and evils avoided per accidens, viz., good mixed with evils and vice versa, on the other hand, Aquinas is able to produce a taxonomy of four paradigmatic passions: hope, fear, daring and despair. Ibid.: Prosecutio autem vel fuga est alicuius et per se, et per accidens, per se quidem est prosecutio boni, fuga vero mali; per accidens autem potest prosecutio esse mali, propter aliquod bonum adiunctum, et fuga boni, propter aliquod malum adiunctum. Quod autem est per accidens, sequitur ad id quod est per se. Et ideo prosecutio mali, sequitur prosecutionem boni, sicut et fuga mali sequitur fugam mali. Haec autem quatuor pertinent ad quatuor passiones, nam prosecutio boni pertinent ad spem, fuga mali ad timorem, insecutio mali terribilis pertinent ad audaciam, fuga vero boni pertinent ad desperationem. Unde sequitur quod audacia consequitur ad spem, ex hoc enim quod aliquis sperat superare terribile imminens, ex hoc audacter insecutur ipsum. Ad timorem vero sequitur desperatio, ideo enim aliquis desperat, quia timet difficultatem quae est circa bonum sperandum. Hope attends the pursuit of a straightforward good while fear attends the avoidance of a straightforward evil; daring pursues an evil that it hopes to overcome, while despair fears that the attainment of a good (for which it ought to hope) will not obtain on account of some difficulty involved with its attainment.

37 ST I-II.23.4. co: Respondeo dicendum quod passiones differunt secundum activa, quae sunt obiecta passionum animae. “Active cause” is the term favored in the English translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, while “activator” is Miner’s locution. See Miner, 59.
goods imitate their Creator – the supreme good (*summum bonum*)\(^{38}\) – in this Neoplatonic cycle of emanation and return.

3.2 On the Role of Pleasure

As has already been noted, pleasures arise in the context of obtaining an object of desire.\(^{39}\) Aquinas systematically treats of pleasures in Questions 31-34 of the *prima secundae*, treating first of pleasure in itself (Question 31), second, of the various causes of pleasures (Question 32), third, of the effects of pleasure (Question 33), and finally, of the morality of pleasures (Question 34).\(^{40}\) If the length of discussion on some topic is an indication of its importance, then we may conclude that *prima facie* the section on pleasure (*delectatio*) is particularly significant to Aquinas’ understanding of the passions. It is the longest section in the *Treatise* after the section on Sorrow.

3.2.1 Pleasures Considered in Themselves

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\(^{38}\) Aquinas says that we may speak of the “highest good” (*summum bonum*) in two ways. There is a qualified kind of human happiness (*beatitudo creatae*) which is the highest good for human beings among temporal or created goods (*summum bonum inter bona humana*); however God is the highest good without qualification (*Deus est summum bonum simpliciter*). *In Sent IV, D. 49, Q. 1, a. 2 qc. 1 ad 2. Cf. ST I.6.2 co: Respondeo dicendum quod Deus est summum bonum simpliciter.*


\(^{40}\) Robert Miner, *op. cit.*, devotes the whole of his chapter 7 to a discussion of these four questions, and I am deeply indebted to his careful study.
Regarding pleasure in itself (de ipsa delectatione secundum se), Aquinas argues in Question 31, article one, that pleasure is a passion (delectatio est passio animae) in the strict sense; namely, pleasure is a movement of the animal (i.e., sensitive) appetite (delectatio sit motus in appetitu animali). However, in article two he adds that delectatio is also the termination of that movement (terminus motus). Thus, delectatione has a two-fold nature, and the two separate aspects appear to be in tension. Aquinas attempts to resolve this tension by distinguishing, in animals, between two different kinds of motion or, as the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province has it, a “two-fold movement” (duplex motus): the first motion is “according to the end” (secundum intentionem finis) which belongs to the appetite (qui pertinet ad appetitum); the second sort of motion is “according to the execution” (secundum executionem).

41 ST I-II.31. pr.

42 ST I-II.31.1 co: “The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly called passions (motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur), as stated above. Now every emotion (affectio) arising from a sensitive apprehension (apprehensione sensitiva), is a movement (motus) of the sensitive appetite (appetitus sensitivi): and this must needs be said of delight (delectationi), since, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. I.11) ‘delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing’... It is therefore evident that, since delight (delectatio) is a movement (motus) of the animal appetite (appetitus animali) arising from an apprehension of sense (apprehensionem sensus), it is a passion of the soul (delectatio est passio animae).” Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. I.11.

43 ST I-II.31.2 co: “We must say that delight (delectatio), of itself (secundum se) indeed, is not in time: for it regards good already gained (est enim delectatio in bono iam adepto), which is, as it were, the term of the movement (quod est quasi terminus motus).” Though to be fair, Aquinas’ analysis of pleasure is not quite this simple. The aspect mentioned here, for instance, is not simply a coming to rest in the object, but also has a two-fold nature. He says at I-II.32.8 ad 2 that “pleasure (delectatio) includes two things; rest in the good (quietem in bono), and perception of this rest (et huiusmodi quietis perceptionem).”
which belongs to the external operation (qui pertinet ad exteriorem operationem). The first sort of movement does not cease when the object of desire is obtained.  

This passion is still affected by the object of desire even after the object has been attained, and so the appetite delights in the object already attained. It is in this sense that pleasure is identified with motion. The second sort of pleasure is that which attends the apprehension of the desired object (consecutus est bonum in quo delectatur). This is the sort of pleasure that results when the movement of execution ceases (cesset motus executionis), that is, the repose of the appetite (quies quaedam appetitus). It is in this sense that pleasure is called “rest,” which coincides with the contemporary notion of satisfaction.

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44 ST I-II.31.1 ad 2: “And so, although in him who has already gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases (cesset motus executionis), by which he tends to the end (quo tenditur ad finem); yet the movement of the appetitive faculty does not cease (non tamen cessat motus appetitivae partis).”

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.: “since, just as before it desired that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which it possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the appetite (delectatio sit quies quaedam appetitus), if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good (praesentia boni delectantis) that satisfies the appetite (quod appetitui satisfacit), nevertheless there remains the impression made on the appetite by its object (remanet immutatio appetitus ab appetibili), by reason of which delight is a kind of movement (ratione cuius delectatio motus quidam est).”

47 Ibid. Though this passage neglects to mention apprehension, we should not take it as indicating that here Aquinas is advocating the view that obtaining the end alone is sufficient for delight. Rather, the reason he focuses exclusively on the cessation of motion is to address the complaint raised in the second objection that because the appetite has ceased movement, it cannot properly be called a passion. In response, he says that the movement is twofold: on the one hand, according to the intention of the end, which belongs to appetite, and on the other, according to execution, which belongs to external operation. And even though delight does involve the cessation of movement according to the latter, “there remains the impression made on the appetite by its object,” and it is on account of this impression that delight is said still to be a kind of movement. For though the striving toward the desired object has ceased, desire has given way to delight, which is really the same movement of the soul only directed toward a good obtained rather than a good hoped for. A clearer statement of the two-fold requirement for delight is
Thus pleasure has a dual nature – it is both a kind of motion and a kind of rest. This dual nature is exposed further in the consideration of whether pleasure occurs in time. Pleasure, in itself (secundum se), Aquinas asserts, does not occur in time since it occurs all at once (tota simul), attending the attainment of the desired object. This aspect of pleasure, namely, when considered as repose in its object, is an essential feature of pleasure. That it is an essential feature of pleasure is evidenced by the fact that even God and the angels can experience this type of pleasure. Only human beings experience the temporal sort of pleasure, namely, pleasure that is in motion, because only human beings are capable of attaining good objects imperfectly or partially. This is possible because of the circumstances in which human beings often experience pleasures, which are fleeting; it also may have to do with the fleetingness of the objects of pleasure themselves, rather than with the nature of pleasure itself, where such objects are imperfect or partial. Most often this has to do with corporeal goods. These objects of desire, he observes, if they are subject to change (i.e., if they are corruptible or otherwise transitory), may implicate delectatio in temporality, but only accidentally.

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48 The issue of the temporality of some pleasures versus the atemporality of others will be explored in greater depth in the section below in which the pleasures of the body and of the intellect are compared.

49 ST I-II.31.2 co: Sed si illud bonum adeptum transmutationi subiaceat, erit delectatio per accidens in tempore.
The significance of this seemingly abstruse discussion is that the atemporal aspect of pleasure, namely, pleasure construed as a kind of rest in its object, seems to be more essential to pleasure than its counterpart, namely, pleasure construed as a kind of motion. Aquinas seems to be asserting as much when he says, comparing delectatio to other passions, which do not have “a good obtained” (obiecto bonum adeptum) as their proper objects (as is the case with delight), that “it belongs more to delight not to be in time” (magis delectationi convenit non esse in tempore). Pleasure, most fundamentally, is rest in its desired object. Thus, when Aquinas defines beautiful things as those which please (placent) when perceived, we may take it that this pleasurable experience is a paradigmatic sort of pleasure; it is not some abstract or esoteric form of pleasure that can be understood only by reference to some more mundane or accessible pleasure. For rational beings, at least, aesthetic pleasure (that is, pleasure in the beautiful) is a fundamental pleasure.

Aquinas attributes aesthetic pleasure to rational beings alone because beauty is fundamentally related to reason. In his discussion of the relation of the moral virtues to the contemplative life, he says:

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50 ST I-II.31.2 ad 3: Ad tertium dicendum quod aliae passiones non habent pro obiecto bonum adeptum, sicut delectatio. Unde plus habent de ratione motus imperfecti, quam delectatio. Et per consequens magis delectationi convenit non esse in tempore.

51 ST I.5.4 ad 1: pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placet.
Beauty (pulchritudo), as stated above, consists in a certain clarity and due proportion (consistit in quadam claritate et debita proportione). Now each of these is found radically in the reason (Utrumque autem horum radicaliter in ratione inventitur); because both the light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the reason (consistit in actu rationis), there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence (per se et essentialiter inventur pulchritudo)... On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation (pulchritudo participative), in so far as they participate in the order of reason (inquantum scilicet participant ordinem rationis).52

It is by virtue of this close connection to reason that Aquinas states that “beautiful” is applied to sights and sounds, and not to smells or tastes or touch.53

3.2.2 Pleasures Considered in Relation to One Another

Aquinas, in article three, turns his discussion to a comparison of the two primary kinds of pleasure found in human beings, namely bodily (i.e., sensory)
pleasure and intellectual pleasure. The ostensible question at hand is “whether delight (delectatio) differs from joy (gaudio).”54 The short answer to the question is given in the sed contra: all animals are capable of delectatio, but only rational beings are capable of gaudium. Because of this fundamental distinction, the two cannot be identical. 55 All delectatio, Aquinas has argued, follows from perception.56 The difference between delectatio and gaudium is rooted in the distinction between sensory and intellectual perception. Delectatio, as corporal or sensory pleasure, requires only sensitive apprehension, though as we have seen, in rational animals, concupiscencia can be augmented by reason so that it may also be a source of intellectual pleasure. Since non-rational animals (brutis animalibus) lack reason, this augmentation is not possible for them; nor does it occur necessarily or universally even in rational animals, and very likely does not, for instance, in very young members whose command of reason is undeveloped. This exceptional use of rationality, applied even to objects of bodily desire, is classified by Aquinas (and attributed to Aristotle) as going beyond what is natural to man (supra naturales), or as “peculiar and acquired” (propriae et appositaes).57 Here in Question 31, article three, Aquinas is applying what he has

54 ST I-II.31 pr: utrm [delectatio] differat a gaudio.


56 ST I-II.31.1 co.

57 ST I-II.31.3 co: concupiscitia est appetitus boni delectabilis. Dupliciter autem aliquid est delectabile. Uno modo, quia est conveniens naturae animalis, sicut cibus, potus, et alia huiusmodi. Et huiusmodi
argued regarding concupiscentia, in Question 30, article three, to delectatio. Just as some concupiscentiae are natural (naturales), and some are not natural (non naturales) but are, rather, rational (cum ratione), so likewise with delectatio. Rational animals, unlike brute animals, are capable of experiencing both bodily pleasure (delectatio) and intellectual pleasure or joy (gaudium). And as already asserted, gaudium can be based in bodily pleasures (delectiones) or it may be based on no bodily pleasure but instead be a purely intellectual pleasure. As Robert Miner states, some things are “objects of rational desire, but contain no ground in natural sensitive desire.” Such are the pleasures that, when in keeping

concupiscentia delectabilis dicitur naturalis. Alio modo aliquid est delectabile, quia est conveniens animali secundum apprehensionem, sicut cum aliquis apprehendit aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, et per consequens delectetur in ipso. Et huiusmodi delectabilis concupiscentia dicitur non naturalis, et solet magis dici cupiditas. Primae ergo concupiscentiae, naturales, communes sunt et hominibus et aliis animalibus… Sed secundae concupiscentiae sunt propriae hominum, quorum proprium est excogitare aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, praeter id quod natura requirit.unde et in I Rhetoric., philosophus dicit primas concupiscentias esse irrationales, secundas vero cum ratione. Et quia diversi diversimode ratiocinantur, ideo etiam secundae dicuntur, in III Ethic., propriae et apposita, scilicet supra naturales. Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. I.11. This is opposed to the uses which Aquinas attributes to Aristotle as “common and necessary” (communes et necessarias), that is, the “natural concupiscence” (concupiscentiae naturales) which is common to all animals (communes sunt et hominibus et aliis animalibus), whether rational or brute. Cf. also NE III.11.

58 ST I-II.31.3 co: Est enim considerandum quod, sicut sunt quaedam concupiscentiae naturales, quaedam autem non naturales, sed consequuntur rationem, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam delectionum quaedam sunt naturales, et quaedam non naturales, quae sunt cum ratione.

59 ST I-II.31.3 co: Delectamur enim et in his quae naturaliter concupiscimus, ea adipiscentes; et in his quae concupiscimus secundum rationem. Sed nomen gaudii non habet locum nisi in delectione quae consequitur rationem, unde gaudium non attribuimus brutis animalibus, sed solum nomen delectionis. Omne autem quod concupiscimus secundum naturam, possimus etiam cum delectione rationis concupiscere, sed non e converso. Unde de omnibus de quibus est delectatio, potest etiam esse gaudium in habentibus rationem.
with right reason, “humans have in common with the angels.”\footnote{Miner, 165. He says that the attainment of these objects of rational desire “causes both the highest pleasures, the ones humans have in common with the angels” (ST I-II.31.4 ad 3) as well as “the most depraved pleasures” (ST I-II.31.7). \textit{Ibid.}} Thus, in human beings, there are two kinds of pleasures, each related to one of the two kinds of appetite. \textit{Delectatio} is related to the sensitive appetite, while \textit{gaudium} is related to the intellectual appetite.\footnote{For an illuminating discussion on the importance of the distinction between \textit{delectatio} and \textit{gaudium} for Aquinas’ moral theory, see Servais Pinckaers, \textit{Morality: The Catholic View}, translated by Michael Sherwin (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2001), 76-81.} Therefore, as Miner points out, there is no apparent need for Aquinas to ask, as he does in article four, “whether \textit{delectatio} is in the intellectual appetite.”\footnote{ST I-II.31 pr: \textit{utrum \[delectatione\] sit in appetitu intellectivo}. Miner, 165.} Why, then, does Aquinas raise this question? Miner suggests that the question is prompted by a scriptural concern since the \textit{sed contra} makes reference to Psalm 36:4: \textit{Delectare in domino}.\footnote{ST I-II.31.4 sc. Cf. Miner, 165.} Nevertheless, Aquinas answers this question by asserting that there are two ways to speak of \textit{delectatio}, namely, there is a kind of \textit{delectatio} that relates to the sensitive appetite and there is another kind of \textit{delectatio} that relates to the intellectual appetite. These differ in an important way, strictly speaking, since “delight of the sensitive appetite (\textit{delectatio appetitus sensibilis}) is accompanied by a bodily transmutation (\textit{cum aliqua transmutatione corporali}), whereas delight of the intellectual appetite (\textit{delectatio autem appetitus intellectivi}) is nothing but the mere movement of the will
This is not to dismiss or forget his earlier assertion that “a certain delight (delectatio quaedam) arises from the apprehension (sequitur apprehensionem) of the reason (rationis)” which he here affirms. Nevertheless, it is clear that this is an example of the power of reason exerted upon the sensitive appetite in order to give delectatio a kind of intellectual character. Delectatio, it seems, is related to the intellectual appetite only analogously or in a manner of speaking.

Additionally, Aquinas’ reply to the second objection also implies that he is using delectatio in an analogous way when it is applied to the intellectual appetite. For there, he states that “delight (delectatio) has the character of a passion (rationem passionis), properly speaking (proprie loquendo), when accompanied by bodily transmutation” which delight necessarily lacks in the intellectual appetite, since such is a “simple movement.” Delectatio is really only a passion (habet rationem passionis), strictly speaking, when accompanied by a bodily mutation. So delectatio without the bodily transmutation is a “passion” in name only. Without this corporeal transmutation, such delight is, instead, “according to a simple movement” (secundum simplicem motum), the examples of

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64 ST I-II.31.4 co: Hoc tamen interest inter delectationem utriusque appetitus, quod delectatio appetitus sensibilis est cum aliqua transmutatione corporali, delectatio autem appetitus intellectivi nihil aliud est quam simplex motus voluntatis.

65 ST I-II.31.4 co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, delectatio quaedam sequitur apprehensionem rationis. Cf. ST I-II.31.3 co.

66 ST I-II.31.4 ad 2: delectatio habet rationem passionis, proprie loquendo, inquantum est cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Et sic non est in appetitu intellectivo, sed secundum simplicem motum.
which he provides are God and the angels. Since neither God nor angels are corporeal and so cannot experience any corporeal transmutation, these examples only serve to reinforce the idea that Aquinas is using *delectatio* in an analogical sense when it is applied to the human soul’s experience of God.\(^67\) One positive result of this discussion is that we have discovered another sense in which human uniqueness is exhibited, since humans are again shown to straddle, albeit in a new way, two otherwise separate domains: the corporeal (specifically, animal) and the incorporeal (or rational). For, in Aquinas’ view, humans alone of all known beings are capable of experiencing both *delectatio* (along with brute animals) and *gaudium* (along with God and angels).\(^68\) Because of this uniqueness, while human beings may share some form of aesthetic pleasure with brute animals as well as with God and angels, it is possible that there will be some form of aesthetic experience that is wholly unique to human beings.

According to Robert Miner, article five represents the “dramatic center” of Question 31.\(^69\) Having divided human pleasure into the bodily or sensible and

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\(^67\) ST I-II.31.4 ad 2: *secundum simplicem motum, sic enim etiam est in Deo et in Angelis*. His cited authorities are Aristotle and Dionysius. Cf. Aristotle, NE VII.14; Dionysius, *De coelesti hierarchia* (hereafter CH.).

\(^68\) ST I-II.31.4 ad 3: *Ad tertium dicendum quod in nobis non solum est delectatio in qua communicamus cum brutis, sed etiam in qua communicamus cum Angelis. Unde ibidem Dionysius dicit quod sancti homines multoties fiunt in participatione delectionum angelicarum. Et ita in nobis est delectatio non solum in appetitu sensitivo, in quo communicamus cum brutis; sed etiam in appetitu intellectivo, in quo communicamus cum Angelis*. Cf. Dionysius, CH 15, 340A. Cf. also Miner, 165.

\(^69\) Miner, 165. The only consideration that Miner seems to base this assertion upon is the comparative bulk of the article, especially its *corpus*. He notes that the *corpus* of article 5 contains 481 words, and notes that no *corpus* in any of the other seven articles in Question 31 exceeds 300 words. *Ibid.*, 165-166.
the spiritual or intellectual in the previous article, Aquinas now compares the two classes of pleasure in order to consider which are greater (superioris). As is generally the case, Aquinas’ answer to the question is anticipated by and will be a response to the objections. Each of the objections raises some reason for thinking that bodily pleasure is greater than intellectual pleasure. The first objection simply notes the observation that while everyone seeks pleasure, as Aristotle taught, more people seek sensible pleasures than intellectual ones. The second objection is that the greatness of a cause is known by its effect, and bodily pleasures have greater effects (fortiores effectus) than do those of a spiritual nature. The third objection notes that bodily pleasures have to be actively restrained (tempare et refranare) on account of their “vehemence” (vehementiam), whereas this is not true of spiritual pleasures. The conclusion of each of these is

70 ST I-II.31 pr: de comparatione delectationum superioris appetitus, ad delectationem inferioris. While in the proemium, Aquinas uses the terms superiores, in the bulk of the article, he uses the terms maiores (as in arg. 1, arg. 3, and the corpus), fortiores (as in arg. 2), firmior (as in the corpus), maxima (as in the sed contra and the corpus) and magis (modifying some other adjective, like dilecta or sentiuntur, as in the corpus). There seems to be no significance to the switch in terminology. I take it he is using these terms in roughly the same (indeed, in the commonsensical) way, namely, that when two things are compared, one will exceed the other in the category of comparison. Here the categories of comparison all relate to the ways that pleasure can be considered good.


73 ST I-II.31.5 obj. 3: Praeterea, delectationes corporales oportet temperare et refranare, propter earum vehementiam. Sed delectationes spirituales non oportet refranare. Ergo delectationes corporales sunt maiores.
that therefore bodily pleasures are greater (maiores: obj. 1, 3; fortiores: obj. 2) than spiritual or intellectual pleasures.

Against these empirical observations, in the sed contra Aquinas sets the authorities of the psalmist and Aristotle; both assert the supremacy of spiritual pleasures to sensible ones.\textsuperscript{74} In the corpus, Aquinas concedes that the empirical observations have merit, and that to all appearances, bodily pleasures are greater than intellectual pleasures. However, to stop at this would be to consider only one side of the issue. The two classes of pleasure may be compared from two different aspects: first, these may be compared from an objective perspective, i.e., “in themselves and absolutely speaking” (secundum se et simpliciter loquendo); second, they may be compared from a subjective or relative perspective, i.e., “in relation to us” (quoad nos).\textsuperscript{75} It is in this latter sense that bodily pleasures appear greater than intellectual ones. Aquinas has three reasons why bodily pleasures seem greater to us than intellectual ones, and he has three conditions of pleasure, a consideration of which shows why intellectual pleasures are objectively better than bodily ones.

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\textsuperscript{74} ST I-II.31.5 sc: Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo CXVIII, quam dulcia faucibus meis eloquia tua, super mel ori meo. Et philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod maxima delectatio est quae est secundum operationem sapientiae. Cf. Psalm 118:103; Aristotle, NE X.7.
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\textsuperscript{75} ST I-II.31.5 co: Sed si comparentur delectationes intelligibles spirituales delectationibus sensibilibus corporalibus, sic, secundum se et simpliciter loquendo, delectationes spirituales sunt maiores...Sed quoad nos, delectationes corporales sunt magis vehementes.
\end{flushright}
First, Aquinas lays out three conditions of (i.e., requirements for) pleasure:76 (1) “the good which is brought into conjunction” (bonum coniunctum), that is, the object of desire (namely, some real or apparent good); (2) “that to which it is conjoined” (id cui coniungitur), that is, the power of the soul (the sensory or intellectual appetite); and (3) “the conjunction itself” (ipsa coniunctio), that is, the relation between the other two (namely, the obtaining of the desired object by the desiring appetite).77

Regarding the first of these, Aquinas says that “spiritual good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good.”78 A sign of this, he says, is that men will often refrain from even the greatest of bodily pleasures in order to avoid the loss of some spiritual pleasure, like honor. Regarding the second, Aquinas says that “the intellectual faculty is much more noble (multo nobilior) and more knowing (magis cognoscitiva) than the sensitive faculty.”79 For this, he offers neither an explanation nor a sign, but leaves it as a brute observation. Perhaps he takes it as self-evident, though he is not typically reluctant to point out when he takes a proposition to be self-evident (per se notum).80 Finally, regarding the

76 Ibid.: Et hoc apparet secundum tria quae requiruntur ad delectationem.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.: Nam ipsum bonum spirituale et est maius quam corporale bonum; et est magis dilectum.
79 Ibid.: Similiter etiam ipsa pars intellectiva est mucho nobilior, et magis cognoscitiva, quam pars sensitiva.
80 As in ST I.2, where Aquinas discusses the existence of God, and particularly in article one, where he addresses the question of the self-evidence of God’s existence (utrum Deum esse sit per se notum). In the corpus of article one, he says that God’s existence is self-evident (per se notum) in
conjunction of the good object and the power to which it is conjoined (either the spiritual good to the intellective power or the corporeal good to the sensitive power), Aquinas says that, in the case of spiritual pleasure, there is a “more intimate” (*magis intima*), “more perfect” (*magis perfecta*), and “more firm” (*magis firma*) conjunction than is true with respect to corporeal pleasure.\(^1\) In this case, he provides an explanation. The conjunction of a spiritual good to the intellectual power is more intimate (*intimior*) because, he says, “the senses stop (*sistit*) at the outward accidents (*exteriora accidentia*) of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates (*penetrat*) to the essence (*ad rei essentiam*); for the object of the intellect is *what a thing is* (*quod quid est*).\(^2\) So the knowledge of a thing gained through the intellect is “deeper” (Aquinas’ sense of *intimior*) than the knowledge of a thing gained through the senses; intellectual knowledge is knowledge of substance or of two ways: first, it is self-evident in itself though not self-evident to us (*secundum se et non quoad nos*), and second, it is self-evident in itself and also to us (*secundum se et quoad nos*). That is, some things (the existence of God being one) are self-evident in themselves, whether they are apprehended as self-evident by human cognizers. It is self-evident in the sense that once one has grasped the relevant facts about *x*, one would see that it must be the case that *x*. One might think of self-evidence in this sense as being similar to Kant’s notion of the *synthetic a priori*. Certain logical or mathematical truths are like this. Presumably at one point, the Pythagorean theorem was not known to be true, or not known to be self-evidently true, though by now it is generally regarded to be so. Nevertheless, prior to human cognizers attaining this realization, the theorem was presumably true, and self-evidently so. The appreciation of that fact, however, requires a fairly sophisticated prior understanding of some basic principles of geometry. Once these are grasped, the truth of the theorem becomes, to that cognizer, self-evident. Likewise with God. God’s necessary existence is self-evident to those who have all of the relevant facts. However, obtaining the relevant facts proves to be quite difficult for most. Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* [*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*], edited and translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), (hereafter *KrV*) Introduction 5:B14-B18 (143-146).

\(^1\) ST I-II.31.5 co: *Coniunctio etiam utriusque est magis intima, et magis perfecta, et magis firma.*

\(^2\) Ibid.: *Intimior quidem est, quia sensus sistit circa exteriora accidentia rei, intellectus vero penetrat usque ad rei essentiam; obiectum enim intellectus est quod quid est.* Italics in the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province.
essence, rather than a superficial knowledge of a thing’s accidents. And “the apprehension of quod quid est is intrinsically more satisfying than the sensation of a thing’s external qualities.”\(^\text{83}\)

Next, he says that the conjunction involved in spiritual pleasure is “more complete” (perfectior) because the conjunction involved in corporeal pleasure “implies movement, which is an imperfect act” (adiungitur motus, qui est actus imperfectus) while the conjunction involved in spiritual pleasure does not since “intelligible things are without movement” (sed intelligibilia sunt absque motu).

This means that spiritual pleasure is experienced “all at once” (totae simul) rather than in a temporal sequence.\(^\text{84}\) Corporeal pleasure cannot be experienced in all its fullness at once. It must unfold, and so its intensity is distributed and so diffused over the entire temporal sequence in which it unfolds. This temporal movement is clear in his choice of examples of corporeal pleasures, namely, “those of the table and of sex” (patet in delectatione ciborum et venereorum).\(^\text{85}\) Intelligible pleasures, on the other hand, are experienced completely all at once, and for as long as they endure. Finally, the conjunction involved in spiritual pleasure is “more firm” (firmior) than is the conjunction involved in corporeal pleasure since

\(^{83}\) Miner, 168.

\(^{84}\) ST I-II.31.5 co: Perfectior autem est, quia conjunctio sensibilis ad sensum adiungitur motus, qui est actus imperfectus, unde et delectationes sensibiles non sunt totae simul, sed in eis aliquid pertransit, et aliquid expectatur consummandum, ut patet in delectatione ciborum et venereorum. Sed intelligibilia sunt absque motu, unde delectationes tales sunt totae simul.

\(^{85}\) Ibid.
the good objects of bodily pleasure are themselves “corruptible” (*corruptibilia*) and “soon pass away” (*cito deficiunt*), whereas the objects of spiritual pleasure are “incorruptible” (*incorruptibilia*).86

Aquinas is not saying that bodily goods are, on this account, not really goods. He is merely saying that comparatively, they are lesser goods than are spiritual goods since they can be enjoyed, when they are enjoyed, only temporarily and never more than in part. Intellectual pleasures are unlike this. Many of them can be enjoyed at will, and the enjoyment of them does not involve this fleeting or transitory character. For all of these reasons, then, Aquinas concludes that the intellectual pleasures are superior to bodily pleasures.

How is it that our empirical experience of pleasure can be so at odds with the true state of things? The distinction and conflict between appearance and reality has a long pedigree and is familiar to students of, *inter alia*, both Plato and Descartes. Here we see a case in which that distinction is both clear and of utmost concern to human beings. For what is of more concern to us than desire and its attending pleasures? The motivating factor of pleasure on virtually every realm of human activity can hardly be underestimated.87 Here we see a stark

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86 *Ibid.*: *Est etiam firmior, quia delectabilia corporalia sunt corruptibilia, et cito deficiunt; bona vero spiritualia sunt incorruptibilia.*

87 This is not to suggest that pleasure (and its opposite, pain) are the only things that motivate human beings. Psychologists have argued that there are a variety of things other than merely “hedonic” concerns that motivate human beings, such as the desires for value, truth and control.
difference between the conclusions of a comparison based on the pleasures secundum se and these same pleasures taken quoad nos. Nevertheless, Aquinas does not ignore our common empirical judgments on the matter. He recognizes that there are, in fact, good reasons why bodily pleasures seem so much greater than intellectual ones. Nevertheless, on account of our rational nature, we are able to delineate the appearance of things from the reality, and can accordingly make decisions that are somewhat independent of our affective inclinations. This subjugation of the passions to reason is essentially that in which the virtue of temperance consists. 88

The first reason he gives for the merely apparent superiority of bodily pleasures is that sensible things are more known to us (magis nota) to us than intelligible things. 89 Secondly, he says that sensible pleasures, because they are passions of the sensitive appetite, are accompanied by bodily changes (cum aliqua

It may be that the hedonic principles of pleasure and pain function instead as “feedback signals” of success or failure. This does not, however, diminish the integral role of pleasure in human motivation. For more on this topic, see Tory Higgins, Beyond Pleasure and Pain: How Motivation Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), esp. 14, 43-45, 264.

Aquinas says, for instance, that “moderation (moderatio) or restraint (refrenatio) is praised and has the character of goodness (rationem boni) especially when emotion (passio) is particularly forceful and reason needs to restrain it in order to meet the mid-point of virtue. Emotion (passio), though, is most forceful in pursuing the greatest pleasures (delectationes maximas), which are those of touch (quae sunt delectationes tactus). That is why temperateness (temperantia) counts as the cardinal virtue in this area, as it holds in check sensual desires (concupiscencias) for what is pleasurable (delectabilium) to the senses involving touch (tactum).” Disputed Questions on the Cardinal Virtues (Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus, Q. 5: De virtutibus cardinalibus) (hereafter QD card.) V.1 co. The English translation is found in Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues, edited by E. M. Atkins and Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 246.

ST I-II.31.5 co: Primo, quia sensibilia sunt magis nota, quoad nos, quam intelligibilia.
transmutatione corporali), whereas this is not true of intellectual pleasures except only in the event that there is some kind of reaction on the part of the intellectual appetite on the sensitive appetite. Aquinas does not explain what is meant exactly by the provisional case, but presumably he means that occasionally the experience of intellectual pleasure can be so intense as to cause a corresponding reaction in the sensitive appetite, perhaps in the event that one is so elated at some good news (e.g., the birth of a child) that he actually weeps for joy. This would be a bodily reaction to an intellectual pleasure. That this is what he has in mind is suggested by what he says in a question 38, article 4, on the alleviation of pain and sorrow by contemplation of truth: “In the powers of the soul there is an overflow (redundantia) from the higher (a superiori) to the lower (ad inferius) powers; and accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation (delectatio contemplationis), which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses (mitigandum etiam dolorem qui est in sensu).” Nevertheless, this is a rarer occurrence, as Aquinas affirms, when he says in his reply to the second objection, that “bodily transmutation arises more from bodily

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90 Ibid.: Secundo etiam, quia delectationes sensibiles, cum sint passiones sensitivi appetitus, sunt cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Quod non contingit in delectionibus spiritualibus, nisi per quandam redundantiam a superiori appetitu in inferiorem.

91 ST I-II.38.4 ad 3: Ad tertium dicendum quod in viribus animae fit redundantia a superiori ad inferius. Et secundum hoc, delectatio contemplationis, quae est in superiori parte, redundat ad mitigandum etiam dolorem qui est in sensu.
pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite.”92 Thirdly, Aquinas says that sensible pleasures are often sought as “remedies for bodily defects or troubles” (medicinae quaedam contra corporales defectus vel molestias), which are the cause of sorrow (tristitiae).93 Because bodily pleasures mitigate these bodily tristitias, they are felt more intensely (magis sentiuntur) and so are more welcome (magis acceptantur) on account of the troubles that they alleviate. There are, he says, no corresponding spiritual tristitias that are alleviated by spiritual pleasures.94 As Miner states, “for the embodied creature, sensible pleasures provide quick relief for pains” and “nothing is more natural for a creature in pain than to seek a bodily remedy.”95 As was stated before, one mark of intellectual pleasures is that they are experienced tota simul while sensitive pleasures are experienced sequentially and in part. For immediate and temporary relief of immediate and temporary pains, the timeless pleasure of the intellect will not do. What is needed in such cases is corporeal medicine, and one powerful form that this can assume is corporeal pleasure. The most effective remedy for thirst is to drink something that will quench the thirst, and the most

92 ST I-II.31.5 ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum quod transmutatio corporis magis contingit ex delectationibus corporalibus, inquantum sunt passiones appetitus sensitivi.

93 ST I-II.31.5 co: Tertio, quia delectationes corporales appetuntur ut medicinae quaedam contra corporales defectus vel molestias, ex quibus tristitiae quaedam consequuntur.

94 Ibid.: Unde delectationes corporales, tristitiae huiusmodi supervenientes, magis sentiuntur, et per consequens magis acceptantur, quam delectationes spirituales quae non habent tristitias contrarias, ut infra dicetur.

95 Miner, 169.
intense form of pleasure related to thirst is always the initial feeling of water on
one’s throat when one is quite dehydrated. It is at the point of halting and
reversing the trend of thirst that pleasure is most intense and most welcome.

In article five, Aquinas has argued that intellectual pleasures are superior
to bodily ones, while also doing justice to our common experience of the
superiority of the bodily pleasures. He will next turn, in article six, to a
comparison of the various bodily pleasures. The question he seeks here to
address is, as the Father’s of the English Dominican Province gloss it, “whether
the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by the other
senses.” He begins the corpus by raising a distinction, borrowed from Aristotle,
between two ways in which the senses are loved, namely, for the purpose of
knowledge (propter cognitionem) or on account of their utility (propter utilitatem).
However, because knowledge is of itself an object of great intrinsic value for and
proper to human beings, Aquinas says that the sensible pleasures arising from
knowledge are proper to man (proprie hominum), whereas the sensible pleasures
which are loved primarily for their utility are common to all animals (communes
omnibus animalibus). This then gives rise to a further duality of perspectives by

96 ST I-II.31 pr: Sexto, de comparatione delectationum sensitivarum ad invicem.
97 ST I-II.31.6 co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, unumquodque, inquantum amatur,
efficitur delectabile. Sensus autem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys., propter duo diliguntur, scilicet
98 Ibid.: Sed quia apprehendere ipsam cognitionem tanquam bonum quoddam, proprium est hominis; ideo
primae delectationes sensuum, quae scilicet sunt secundum cognitionem, sunt proprie hominum,
which to compare the strength of pleasure afforded by the senses. If, on the one hand, we consider the sensible pleasures according to their relation to knowledge (*ratione cognitionis*), it is clear, Aquinas asserts, that sight (*visum*) provides the greatest pleasure than any of the other senses. 99 If we, on the other hand, consider the sensible pleasures according to their relation to utility (*ratione utilitatis*), he says that the greatest pleasure is afforded by touch (*tactum*) since, he says, “the usefulness of sensible things is gauged by their relation to the preservation of the animal’s nature” and “the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this usefulness.” 100 Aquinas concludes: “Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the greatest in respect of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that the pleasure of touch is, absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*), greater than the pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within

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99 *Ibid.*: *Si igitur loquamur de delectatione sensus quae est ratione cognitionis, manifestum est quod secundum visum est maior delectatio quam secundum aliquem alium sensum.*

100 *Ibid.*: *Si autem loquamur de delectatione sensus quae est ratione utilitatis, sic maxima delectatio est secundum tactum. Utilitas enim sensibilium attenditur secundum ordinem ad conservationem naturae animalis. Ad hanc autem utilitatem propinquius se habent sensibilia tactus.* Included as species of the sense of touch are the senses of taste and smell. For Aristotle says, and Aquinas agrees, that “taste is a kind of touch [gustus vero tactus quidam est]” (*In de sensu* VIII, 440*30*), and that “odor and flavor…are almost the same affection. But the two of them are not in the same things [De odore vero et sapore, dicendum. Fere enim eadem est passio, non in eisdem autem est utrumque eorem]” (*In de sensu* VIII, 440*28*).
the limits of sensible pleasures.”  

What is his justification for this assessment? It is evident, he says, “that in everything, that which is natural (naturale) is most powerful (potentissimum).”  

And the natural pleasures associated with touch are the most natural, since these are most intimately related to our survival (e.g., to food and to sex). This is, of course, speaking “within the limits of sensible pleasure.” With that qualification, the pleasures of touch are greater than the remaining sensible pleasures. However, this is not the only way to compare the relative strength of the sensible pleasures. If we do not confine our comparison to the sensible pleasures qua sensible, but rather, as Aquinas says, “consider the pleasures of sight, inasmuch as sight is the handmaid of the mind” then the pleasures of sight exceed those of touch.  

This is because, as he argued in article five, the intellectual pleasures are superior to the sensible pleasures. Sight’s close relationship to the intellectual pleasures elevates its status above even the greatest of the other sensible pleasures.

From these last two articles, we have reached some insightful conclusions about pleasures. Sensible pleasures, strictly speaking, are strongest since they are ordered to survival. As such, these pleasures are extremely useful to human

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101 *Ibid.*: *Cum igitur delectatio tactus sit maxima ratione utilitatis, delectatio autem visus ratione cognitionis; si quis utramque comparare velit, inveniet simpliciter delectationem tactus esse maiorem delectatione visus, secundum quod sistit infra limites sensibilis delectationis.*

102 *Ibid.*: *Quia manifestum est quod id est naturale in unoquoque, est potentissimum.*

103 *Ibid.*: *Sed si consideremus delectationes visus, secundum quod visus deservit intellectui; sic delectationes visus erunt potiores, ea ratione qua et intelligibiles delectationes sunt potiores sensibilibus.*
beings both individually and socially. Nevertheless, human beings are rational beings; and rational beings are susceptible to a superior class of pleasures, namely, those of the intellect. The greatest pleasures of which human beings are capable are intellectual in nature. Aquinas does not suggest, however, that these ought to be pursued exclusively, to the neglect of the bodily pleasures. He never denigrates the bodily pleasures as unfitting for human beings. There is, however, a discernible hierarchy of pleasures, ordered by reason. And to the extent that aesthetic pleasure is related to reason, since beauty relates essentially to cognition, it will be among the superior pleasures available to human beings. We will see, when we turn to consider question 34, that one’s personal ordering of pleasures, namely, whether in accordance with or in opposition to, reason, will determine the moral status of human pursuit of pleasure.

The discussions in the last two articles of Question 31 are shorter, but still important. Article seven asks the question whether any pleasure can be unnatural? The primary objection is that since “pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies,” and “the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural place,” therefore, “no pleasure is non-natural.” To this, he adds, in the third objection that “natural movement tends to a natural

104 ST I-II.31 pr: Septimo, utrum sit aliqua delectatio non naturalis.
end” and therefore “every pleasure is natural” since pleasures tend toward a natural end.\textsuperscript{106} The worry Aquinas is raising here seems to be that since pleasures are the natural consequence of an awareness of the attainment of a naturally good object, then no pleasure can be unnatural. Are pleasures then any help to us in determining which goods to pursue? Do they help guide our actions? To this concern, Aquinas addresses his corpus, which, in this article, fulfills the requirements of the replies so that he does not include any replies beyond the corpus itself.

Aquinas states that we speak of something’s being natural when it is “in accord with nature” (secundum naturam), this being adopted from Aristotle’s definition in the Physics.\textsuperscript{107} However, this definition must be qualified since “in man, nature can be taken in two ways.”\textsuperscript{108} The first way that we speak of nature with respect to human beings is from the perspective that intellect and reason (intellectus et ratio), which is the principle and highest part of man’s nature (potissime hominis natura), since it is on account of intellect and reason that the human species is distinguished from other animal species.\textsuperscript{109} From this

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\textsuperscript{106} ST I-II.31.7 obj. 3: Praeterea, constitui in propriam naturam, cum sentitur, causat delectationem; ut patet ex definitione philosophi supra posita. Sed constitui in naturam, unicum est naturale, quia motus naturalis est qui est ad terminum naturalem. Ergo omnis delectatio est naturalis.


\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.: Natura autem in homine dupliciter sumi potest.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.: Uno modo, prout intellectus et ratio est potissime hominis natura, quia secundum eam homo in specie constituitur.
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perspective, the pleasures that are most fitting (convenit) to man are those in accordance with reason (secundum rationem). Examples of this sort are the pleasures attending contemplation of truth or works of virtue.

This point should not be overlooked. Aquinas is saying that since the highest part of man is his reason, therefore those pleasures associated with reason are the pleasures most appropriate to man. One might say, these are the most human of pleasures, though technically this would be correct only if one confines one’s comparison of humans to other animals, since intellectual pleasures are also appropriate to purely intellectual beings like God and angels. This again suggests the particular aptitude of aesthetic pleasure to human nature, since aesthetic pleasure is as we have seen radically grounded in reason. To the extent that we are to favor the cultivation of the highest part of human nature, viz., reason, it will be appropriate, and perhaps even necessary, to cultivate love of beauty and its accompanying pleasure into a flourishing human life.

On the other hand, what is natural may be defined in terms of what man shares in common with the other animals, and which is, in this sense, not

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110 Ibid.: Et secundum hoc, naturales delectationes hominum dici possunt quae sunt in eo quod convenit homini secundum rationem.

111 Ibid.: delectari in contemplatione veritatis, et in actibus virtutum.
considered with respect to reason. From this perspective, the pleasures that are natural to man are those that attend whatever promotes survival, either of the individual (as in the case of food, drink, or sleep) or of the society (as in the case of sex). Therefore, pleasures can be natural in two ways: either they attend activities that conform to reason or else they attend activities that promote human survival. Still, it is not accidental to his account that since “intellect and reason is the principle part of man’s nature” (intellectus et ratio est potissime hominis natura), therefore the pleasures associated with intellect and reason still rank higher than do the bodily pleasures. We must recall that he has already argued as much in article five. Nevertheless, Aquinas states that under both modes of thinking about the pleasures natural to man, we will find “some that

112 Ibid.: Alio modo potest sumi natura in homine secundum quod condividitur rationi, id scilicet quod est commune homini et aliis, praecepue quod rationi non obedit.

113 Ibid.: Et secundum hoc, ea quae pertinet ad conservationem corporis, vel secundum individuum, ut cibus, potus, lectus, et huiusmodi, vel secundum speciem, sicut venereorum usus, dicuntur homini delectabilia naturaliter.

114 Robert Miner notes that “those who describe the performance of opera or the study of higher mathematics as ‘unnatural’ appeal implicitly to animal nature as the standard.” Miner, 171. Miner is suggesting, I take it, that such an approach neglects the intellect as the primary normative standard of what is “natural” for human beings. I suspect he has in mind those who attempt to explain human pleasures in terms of evolutionary naturalism. Psychologist Paul Bloom, for instance, reporting the findings of various psychological researchers, characterizes these sorts of “higher pleasures,” such as the pleasure attending the reading of fiction, as evolutionary accidents. In spite of the various benefits that one could enumerate for the reading of fiction (e.g., conveyance of moral norms, etc.), Bloom says, “as evolutionary explanations, such accounts are superfluous. Once you have a creature that responds with pleasure to certain real-world experiences and doesn’t fully distinguish reality from imagination, the capacity to get pleasure from stories comes for free, as a lucky accident.” Paul Bloom, How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We Like What We Like (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2010), 173. On the other hand, Miner states that, if we take reason to be the “relevant standard” for human beings, then such higher pleasures may be “entirely natural.” Miner, Ibid.
are not natural (innaturales) speaking absolutely (simpliciter loquendo), and yet connatural (connaturales) in some respect” (secundum quid). That is, something that is truly unnatural to man in both senses, because it neither is in accordance with reason nor contributes to bodily preservation, can nonetheless come to be connatural to man on account of some corruption of his nature.

One homely example Aquinas provides, where this corruption is located in the body (ex parte corporis), is the sick man’s preference for foods which are, in fact, bitter because, on account of his ailment, he takes them to be sweet. He is presumably taking sweetness to be a sign that a food will promote health and bitterness as a sign that a food is unhealthy, perhaps as a sign of spoilage. Thus men prefer sweetness to bitterness for sweetness will lead men to eat foods that are, on the whole, good for the preservation of the body. An illness can, however, thwart this generally reliable bio-feedback mechanism, causing a man to prefer flavors that may well lead him to partake of foods that will instead make him even sicker. An example he gives which pertains to corruption in the soul (ex parte animae) is when a man develops an appetite for cannibalism or sexual desire for beasts or for same-sex intercourse. These, according to Aquinas, are not

115 Ibid.: Secundum utrasque autem delectationes, contingit aliquas esse innaturales, simpliciter loquendo, sed connaturales secundum quid.

116 Ibid.: Quae quidem corruptio potest esse vel ex parte corporis, sive ex aegritudine, sicut febricitantibus dulcia videntur amara et e converso.
according to human nature (*non sunt secundum naturam*), presumably because these do not promote the perseverance of the *species*.\footnote{Ibid.: *vel etiam ex parte animae, sicut propter consuetudinem aliquid, delectantur in comedendo homines, vel in coitu bestiarum aut masculorum, aut aliorum huiusmodi, quae non sunt secundum naturam humanam*. It is interesting to note that the Father’s of the English Dominican Province did not see fit to translate the phrase *aut masculorum* in their English translation of this passage.}

The final article of Question 31 has to do with contrary pleasures.\footnote{ST I-II.31 pr: *Octavo, utrum delectatio possit esse contraria delectationis.*} It is a very short article, and primarily serves to remind the reader that one cannot pursue every pleasure, since the attainment of one sometimes prohibits the attainment of another.\footnote{ST I-II.31.8 co: “Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to repose in natural bodies, as stated above. Now one repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary termini (*Dicuntur autem duas quietes esse contrariae, quae sunt in contrariis terminis*); thus repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low place. Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul that one pleasure is contrary to another (*Unde et contingit in affectibus animae duas delectationes esse contrarias*).” Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* V.6.} This article can be thought of as a final caution to use wisdom and discretion in choosing which pleasures to pursue.

From our discussion thus far, we have learned several important details about human pleasures. First, we have seen that the pleasures of intellect and reason are superior to the pleasures of the body. Second, both rational and corporeal pleasures are typically natural. Third, due to a corruption of human nature, some pleasures, which are unnatural, become connatural, and therefore pleasure is not always a sure guide to action. Rather, we must examine each pleasure to determine whether it accords with reason or with the preservation of the individual or species. Only then will we be able to determine whether the
pleasure is natural. If it is natural, then we can decide which pleasures to pursue based upon the hierarchy of pleasures already determined. Bodily pleasures are to be pursued to the extent that they promote our individual survival or the survival of the species, but this pursuit is to be subordinated to and guided by reason. Presumably, the pleasures of the intellect are to be pursued unless they interfere with the preservation of the body or of the community. Finally, we are reminded that the attainment of one pleasure may often prohibit the attainment of another pleasure, and so we are cautioned to use wisdom in choosing which pleasures to pursue.

3.3 On the Causes of Pleasure

The next two questions, thirty-two and thirty-three, address, respectively, the causes and effects of pleasure. Having addressed the nature of pleasure, it is to these that we now turn our attention. First, what are the causes of pleasure? The eight articles addressed in this question each provide a possible answer: activity (operatio), motion (motus), hope and memory (spes et memoria), sorrow (tristitia), actions of others (actiones aliorum), doing good to others (benefacere alteri), likeness (similitudo), and wonder (admiratio). There is some debate

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among commentators regarding which is the best division of these eight articles, but Miner, following Cajetan, has plausibly suggested that the main division is between the first (*operatio*) and the remaining seven.\textsuperscript{121} This is because *operatio* is the only direct cause of pleasure, whereas each of the others serves as indirect causes of pleasure to the extent that they are various causes of the required *operatio*.\textsuperscript{122} This means that the first article is the most important one for understanding how pleasure is caused. This article addresses the question whether an *operatio* is the proper cause of pleasure?\textsuperscript{123} In the *corpus*, Aquinas reminds us that he has already treated of the causes of pleasure, to an extent, in the first article of the previous question. There he had argued that there are two things required for pleasure: the attainment of a suitable good (*consecutio boni convenientis*), and knowledge of the attainment (*cognitio huiusmodi adeptionis*).\textsuperscript{124} And there he also had argued that each of these consists in a kind of *operatio* since “actual knowledge is an *operatio*” and “the attainment of the suitable good is by


\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. One modification Miner makes to Cajetan’s scheme is to adopt Santiago Ramírez’s suggestion that the last two, *similitudo* and *admiratio*, hold a special place in that they are set apart as the formal (namely, *similitudo*) and efficient (namely, *admiratio*) causes of pleasure. Cf. Santiago Ramírez, *De passionibus animae in I-II Summae Theologiae divi Thomae expositio* (qq. XXII-XLVIII) in Victorino Rodriguez, ed., *Obras completas de Santiago Ramírez*, Vol. V. (Madrid: Instituto de Filosofia Luis Vives, 1973), 234.

\textsuperscript{123} ST I-II.32 pr: *Primo, utrum operatio sit causa propria delectationis*.

\textsuperscript{124} ST I-II.32.1 co. Cf. ST I-II.31.1.
means of an *operatio*.” Finally, he says, “the proper *operatio* itself is a suitable good (*bonum conveniens*).” The conclusion he draws from these considerations is that “every pleasure must needs be the result of some *operatio*.“ And, as we can now see, every pleasure is the result of the two-fold *operatio* of (a) attaining the suitable good, and (b) knowledge of the attainment of the good. The argument is rather tight in this article on account of the lengthier previous discussion in Question 31. The remaining articles in Question 32 relate to the various indirect causes of this two-fold *operatio*, and as they merely qualify this discussion in ways that will not illuminate our present aim, I will not rehearse them here.

Given that the two-fold *operatio* of obtaining the good along with its awareness is the proper and direct cause of pleasure, we may now be in a position to consider in what ways beauty can be said to be a cause of pleasure. We recall that Aquinas’ primary definition of beauty asserts that those things are called beautiful which please when seen. We need to connect this now with the attainment (with awareness) of some good. Here we encounter a kind of paradox for, on the one hand, Aquinas says that beauty has to do with cognition rather than with desire (the object of which is the good), and pleasure results from the

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125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.: Unde oportet quod omnis delectatio aliquam operationem consequatur.
128 The interested reader will find an account of these in the Appendix.
attainment of the good. This implies that beauty is merely an indirect cause of pleasure. On the other hand, Aquinas asserts that the beautiful and the good are fundamentally identical, differing only in reason. To the extent, then, that beauty is to be identified with goodness, it can be said of beauty that it is a direct cause of pleasure.

Perhaps the solution to this paradox lies in the fact that the beautiful and the good are merely distinguished in ratio. The same object can be apprehended under the aspect of the good or under the aspect of the beautiful. Under the aspect of the good, it is the object of the appetite, viz., desire (when the object has not yet been attained), or delight (when the object has been attained). Under the aspect of the beautiful, it is an object of cognition. Nevertheless, Aquinas, again in the same definition, has said that what we call “beautiful” is any object that pleases when perceived, that is, when it has been grasped by reason via one of the more rational senses such as vision or hearing.

The particular goodness of the object, which is what produces pleasure when obtained, is desired in two ways, depending on the sort of good it is. For an intellectual good is apprehended in one way, a sensory good in another. The goods are good in different ways: they may be good for the survival of the individual or species (sensory goods) or they may be good for meeting a good of a rational nature. Sight, though a corporeal sense, may produce a higher sort of pleasure because of its close relation to intellect and reason. These pleasures are
sensed, but not merely sensed. Some cognitive grasp is involved in the obtaining of these goods. Certainly some cognition is involved in the awareness of the good’s attainment.

It may be difficult to completely divorce cognition from any sort of pleasure, on Aquinas’ view, given that one of the two requirements for pleasure is awareness of a good’s attainment. This is supported by Aquinas’ assertion, in Question 31, article three, that “whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently, whatever can be the object of delight (delectatio), can also be the object of joy (gaudium) in rational beings (habentibus rationem).” 129 Another support can be found in article six, where Aquinas asserts that “because it is proper to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it follows that the former pleasures of the senses, i.e., those which arise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the senses, as loved for their usefulness, are common to all animals.” 130 Thus by virtue of its connection to cognition, aesthetic pleasures must not be thought to be excluded from the types of goods capable of producing pleasure directly.

129 ST I-II.31.3 co: Omne autem quod concupiscimus secundum naturam, possimus etiam cum delectatione rationis concupiscere, sed non e converso. Unde de omnibus de quibus est delectatio, potest etiam esse gaudium in habentibus rationem.

130 ST I-II.31.6 co: Sed quia apprehendere ipsam cognitionem tanquam bonum quoddam, proprium est hominis; ideo primae delectationes sensuum, quae scilicet sunt secundum cognitionem, sunt propriae hominum, delectationes autem sensuum inquantum diliguntur propter utilitatem, sunt communes omnibus animalibus.
Again, as has already been shown, for Aquinas the pleasures associated with the intellect are more proper to man as man than are the pleasures produced solely by the senses. There may be a sense in which, strictly speaking, it is under the aspect of “good” that an object is desired, but I think we have sufficient textual license to say that, for Aquinas, a beautiful object may be the object of desire or an object the obtaining of which produces pleasure – indeed the highest kind of pleasure, \textit{viz.}, intellectual pleasure.

Recall Aquinas’ claim that the good is what all seek, and that the notion of the good (\textit{ratione boni}) is that which calms desire (\textit{quietur appetitus}). Further, he says that our notion of the beautiful (\textit{rationem pulchri}) is that which calms the desire (\textit{quietur appetitus}) in a certain kind of way, namely, by being seen or known (\textit{in eius aspectu seu cognitione}).\footnote{ST I-II.27.1 ad 3: \textit{Ad tertium dicendum quod pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus, sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus.}} So, according to Aquinas, when a good object is obtained and we are aware of having obtained it, the appetite can be calmed, either wholly or in part, and when this good is obtained \textit{via} sight or intellect, we call it beautiful. The good is always that which, as the object of desire, calms desire. The beautiful adds something over and above the good in calming desire, namely, it does so in a certain way, namely, through apprehension, either by sight or by understanding.\footnote{Even in this division, the senses that afford aesthetic pleasure are closely related to cognition. This is why, Aquinas says that the senses that regard the beautiful are the most cognitive,
beautiful” adds something additional to the notion of “the good” (or, better, restricts the notion of “the good”), perhaps it is best to think of the beautiful as a mode of the good. But this is to introduce into our discussion the debate over whether beauty is a transcendental concept in Aquinas’ thought, and that discussion will have to wait until the following chapter. For the present, let us resume our discussion of pleasure, turning to Question 34, which regards the effects of pleasure.

namely, sight and hearing, since these minister to reason. Ibid. It is because they are disconnected from reason that tastes and smells are not called “beautiful.” Ibid.: In sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum, non utimur nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores. Even here, his language is cautious. He does not say that the “lower” senses are related not at all to cognition, but that “those senses chiefly regard the beautiful (praecipue respiciunt pulchrum), which are the most cognitive (maxime cognoscitivi), viz., sight and hearing.” Emphasis mine.

133 To say that beauty is a “mode of goodness” is to say that it is a way of delimiting goodness to a certain subclass of goods. Admittedly, in speaking of it this way, I run the risk of inviting confusion since the use of the term modus in the later Middle Ages is anything but univocal. Aquinas, for instance, makes extensive use of modus and its cognates, but he does not employ the term in the same was as either Scotus or Suárez. Little scholarly attention has been paid to Aquinas’ use of modus, and so its metaphysical importance has been insufficiently appreciated. For instance, in a recent article, John Tomarchio faults Jan Aertsen for failing to distinguish between Aquinas’ use of modi essendi (modes of existing) and modi entis (modes of being) in Aertsen’s study of the doctrine of the transcendentals (Aertsen, op. cit). Aquinas himself seems to conceive not only the Aristotelian categories in this way, but also the transcendentals, all of which are, for him, “modes of being” (modi entis). That is, categories like “Substance” or transcendental categories like “the good” are ways of delimiting being: “special modes of being” (i.e., the Aristotelian categories) or “general modes of being” (i.e., the transcendentals). See John Tomarchio, “Aquinas’s Division of Being According to Modes of Existing,” in The Review of Metaphysics 54 (2001), 587-589, esp. n. 5. Cf. Aquinas, De Ver. I.1; ST I.5.3 ad 1. To import Aquinas’ use of modus as it relates the canonical transcendentals (being, the good, the one and the true) into our discussion of beauty would mean thinking of beauty as a way of delimiting the sense of “the good” to that subclass of things whose goodness is in some sense perceptible.
3.4 On the Effects of Pleasure

What are the effects (effectus) of pleasure? Aquinas answers this question in four articles, addressing, in article one, whether expansion (dilatare) is an effect of pleasure, in article two, whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself (sui sitim, vel desiderium), in article three, whether pleasure hinders the use of reason (impediat usum rationis), and in article four, whether pleasure perfects action (perficiat operationem). Miner cautiously affirms Ramírez’ proposal that the first three articles describe the effects of pleasure considered as efficient cause, and article four describes the effects of pleasure considered as final cause. Miner adjusts the scheme, however, by further subdividing them along the lines of their authorities. He claims that the first two articles represent a non-Aristotelian view of the effects of pleasure, while the last two articles represent questions that arise from Aristotelian texts. His main reason for suggesting this division is that there is not a single reference to Aristotle between the first two articles, while the final two articles either mention or quote Aristotle eleven times. I see no reason to question this suggestion. The first two articles rely primarily on scriptural authorities, and the last two clearly represent Aristotelian concerns. Miner

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136 Ibid., 178.
further suggests that the first two articles “establish the role of spiritual pleasure in preparing the heart to receive God.”\textsuperscript{137}

I do not intend to examine the first two articles in detail, but I do wish to point out some important results found therein. In the first article, which asks whether “expansion” (\textit{dilatatio}) is an effect of pleasure, Aquinas makes an important claim. In his reply to the second objection, Aquinas says that “desire includes a certain expansion (\textit{aliquam ampliationem}) arising from the imagination of the thing desired,” which increases in the presence of the object.\textsuperscript{138} He is not saying that pleasure itself increases as the desired object is brought nearer in proximity (but as yet not obtained) – such would be counterintuitive, indeed; rather, his point is that there is an expansion of the mind or soul (\textit{animus}) in the presence of the desired object, and especially in the presence of the object already attained, that is, in which one is already taking pleasure (\textit{rei iam delectanti}).\textsuperscript{139} This is the idea that “pleasure is the end of desire” (\textit{delectatio sit finis desiderii}).\textsuperscript{140} The way he speaks in this article suggests the idea that one’s capacity for enjoyment increases as one obtains, and is aware of the joy one takes in, the object of desire. Thus when I obtain the object I desire, my love for that object is actually

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Ibid.}, 180.

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{ST} I-II.33.1 ad 2: \textit{Ad secundum dicendum quod desiderium habet quidem aliquam ampliationem ex imaginatione rei desideratae, sed multo magis ex praesentia rei iam delectantis.}

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Ibid.}: \textit{Quia magis praebet se animus rei iam delectanti, quam rei non habitae desideratae, cum delectatio sit finis desiderii.}

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Ibid.}. 
increased, rather than diminished, by having attained it. This is in contrast to the experience of sensory pleasures, in which obtaining one’s object typically results in a lessening of desire. Think of the case of hunger. When hungry, I greatly desire food; but after I have eaten my fill, my hunger has completely dissipated (albeit momentarily). Aquinas is saying that, at least with respect to intellectual desires, the opposite is the case. And so with respect to beautiful objects, we might infer from this that beholding a beautiful object (as happens when, for instance, we listen to a lovely piece of music) actually increases one’s love for the object. This quality of expansion suggests important implications for moral education for, if correct, the more one is exposed to virtuous behavior, the greater will one’s love of virtue increase, in a kind of virtuous cycle. This article actually seems to anticipate the discussion of the subsequent articles, especially article two, which considers whether pleasure increases desire, and article four, which considers pleasure as the completion or fulfillment (perficiat) of an operation.

Article two regards the question whether pleasure incites desire for more pleasure. In responding to this question, Aquinas distinguishes between pleasure in actu and pleasure in memoria. Considering it as it is in reality (Secundum quidem igitur quod est in actu), pleasure does not of itself cause thirst or

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141 ST I-II.33 pr: Secundo, utrum delectatio causat sui sitim, vel desiderium.

142 ST I-II.33.2 co: Respondeo dicendum quod delectatio dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, secundum quod est in actu; alio modo, secundum quod est in memoria.
desire for itself, but only accidentally (*per accidens*), so far as these are considered as a craving (*appetitus*) for something not possessed, since pleasure is an affection of the appetite in respect of something actually present.¹⁴³ However, a good can be possessed in part, not completely, as is often the case with bodily goods. When this happens, one can experience both the possession of the desired object while still retaining desire for the object. This can happen in two ways.¹⁴⁴ In one way, it pertains to the nature of the object (*ex parte rei habitate*). For instance, a piece of music is such that the piece, taken as a discrete whole, cannot be possessed all at once (*non est tota simul*), but unfolds successively.¹⁴⁵ In the other way, it pertains to the agent himself (*ex parte habentis*). For instance, our knowledge of the divine is, in this world, incomplete. While having a partial knowledge of the divine, that partial knowledge simultaneously encourages

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*: *Secundum quidem igitur quod est in actu, delectatio non causat sitim vel desiderium sui ipsius, per se loquendo, sed solum per accidens, si tamen sitis vel desiderium dicatur rei non habitae appetitus, nam delectatio est affectio appetitus circa rem praesentem.*

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*: *Et hoc potest esse vel ex parte rei habita, vel ex parte habentis.*

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*: *Ex parte quidem rei habitae, eo quod res habita non est tota simul, unde successive recipitur, et dum aliquis delectatur in eo quod habet, desiderat potiri eo quod restat; sicut qui audit primam partem versus, et in hoc delectatur, desiderat alteram partem versus audire. This should not be thought to impugn Aquinas’ earlier statement that the more intellectual pleasures (e.g., of sight and sound, of which the enjoyment of music is a paradigm aesthetic pleasure) are grasped *tota simul* rather than temporally. While it is true that one cannot experience a piece of music all at once, the pleasure one feels in listening to a piece of music can be thought of as being complete at every part of the hearing since one is not required to have heard the entire piece before one can experience complete enjoyment of the music. It is not as though, as for instance with eating, that one’s pleasure increases incrementally with each subsequent “bite” until one has reached fullness, after which one no longer desires the object. In this sense, the piece of music is enjoyed *tota simul* for the entire duration of the piece.*
(excitat) in us a desire for perfect knowledge (\textit{perfectae cognitionis}).\textsuperscript{146} When considered \textit{in memoria}, pleasure generates a desire for more pleasure because we naturally desire to experience again some pleasure that we have experienced in the past, which can be brought to mind and become a potential object of future attainment.\textsuperscript{147}

Considered more broadly, if we take bodily pleasures as contrasted with spiritual pleasures, it is clear, Aquinas thinks, that bodily pleasures do not generate desire for more pleasure in the same way that spiritual pleasures do for the simple reason that bodily pleasures have a natural limit or “saturation point.” As has already been noted, once a man has eaten his fill, he no longer desires food. The pleasures of the intellect do not have this sort of limitation. There is no such limit for spiritual or intellectual pleasures; in fact, Aquinas says that it is when such pleasures reach the point of perfection (\textit{consummationem}) that they afford the greatest delight (\textit{magis delectabiles}), in contrast to the pleasures of the body.\textsuperscript{148} In this, we see a reiteration of the superiority of the intellectual pleasures over those of the body.

\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Ibid.}: Ex parte autem ipsius habentis, sicut cum aliquis aliquam rem in se perfectam existentem, non statim perfecte habet, sed paulatim acquirit. Sicut in mundo isto, percipientes aliquid imperfecte de divina cognitione, delectamur; et ipsa delectatio excitat sitim vel desiderium perfectae cognitionis.

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Ibid.}: Si vero consideretur delectatio prout est in memoria et non in actu, sic per se nata est causare sui ipsius sitim et desiderium, quando scilicet homo reedit ad illam dispositionem in qua erat sibi delectabile quod praeteriit.

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Ibid.}: “if by thirst or desire we understand the mere intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more than all others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves (\textit{sic delectationes spirituales maxime faciunt sitim vel desiderium sui ipsarum}). Because bodily pleasures
Article three asks whether pleasure can be a hindrance to the use of reason. Aquinas has just shown, in the previous article, that spiritual pleasure can actually encourage the pursuit of further intellectual pleasure, by increasing one’s desire to know more fully what one knows only in part. In this respect, spiritual pleasures are not a hindrance, but an aid to the use of reason. Aquinas affirms this at the beginning of the corpus when he quotes Aristotle’s saying that “appropriate pleasures increase activity...whereas pleasures arising from other sources are impediments to activity.” So pleasure taken in the act of contemplation actually helps the act of reasoning rather than hindering it, since pleasure helps us to pay closer attention to what produces pleasure, and attention fosters activity.

become distasteful by reason of their causing an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even when they are protracted; as is evident in the case of pleasures of the table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in bodily pleasures (perfectum in delectationibus corporalibus), he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another kind. Spiritual pleasures (delectationes spirituales), on the contrary, do not exceed the natural mode of being (non superexcrescunt naturalem habitudinem), but perfect nature (sed perficiunt naturam). Hence when their point of perfection is reached (consummationem), then do they afford the greatest delight (tunc sunt magis delectabiles).”

149 ST I-II.33 pr: Tertio, utrum delectatio impediat usum rationis.


151 Ibid.: “there is a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning; and such pleasure does not hinder the act of reason, but helps it; because we are more attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure (quia illud attentius operamur in quo delectamur), and attention fosters activity (attentio autem adiuvat operationem).”
Bodily pleasures (*delectationes corporales*), on the other hand, may impede the use of reason (*impediunt usum rationis*), and this can happen in three ways.\(^{152}\) Firstly, through distraction.\(^{153}\) As he has just noted, we tend to pay attention to whatever gives us pleasure. It is difficult to concentrate on reasoning when one is simultaneously experiencing some bodily pleasure. Secondly, by being contrary to reason.\(^{154}\) This happens because some pleasures, especially those taken in excess, are contrary to the order of reason. He appeals to a saying by Aristotle that pleasure destroys prudence,\(^{155}\) and the implication seems to be that pleasures work against reason in making wise choices, since prudence tends to discount immediate bodily pleasures in favor of other considerations. Prudence can be ignored, temporarily, if one chooses to focus attention instead on the immediate bodily pleasure. In this way, too, then pleasure is at odds with the use of reason. Thirdly, by binding reason.\(^{156}\) In this case, bodily pleasures, because of their physiological affects, can temporarily obstruct the operation of reason. The example Aquinas gives is that of drunkenness, on account of which a man is rendered incapable of rational thought.\(^{157}\)

\(^{152}\) *Ibid.*: *Sed delectationes corporales impediunt usum rationis tripli ratione.*

\(^{153}\) *Ibid.*: *Primo quidem, ratione distractionis.*

\(^{154}\) *Ibid.*: *Secundo, ratione contrarietatis.*

\(^{155}\) Aristotle, *NE VI.5, 1140b17-20.*

\(^{156}\) ST I-II.33.3 co: *Tertio modo, secundum quandam ligationem.*

\(^{157}\) *Ibid.*: *Tertio modo, secundum quandam ligationem, inquantum scilicet ad delectationem corporalem sequitur quaedam transmutatio corporalis, maior etiam quam in aliis passionibus, quanto vehementius*
Article four asks whether pleasure (*delectatio*) perfects activity (*perficiat operationem*). Having just discussed the ways in which bodily pleasure can inhibit the proper use of reason, Aquinas now turns to the ways in which pleasure can perfect human activity, including reason. Pleasure perfects operation in two ways: first, as regards the end, and second, as regards the agent. First, he says, pleasure perfects an operation as regards the end (*per modum finis*); not in the sense of being that for which the activity is undertaken, but regards the end in the sense that any good, when added to another good, completes it (*omne bonum completive superveniens*). A good that is added to some good object increases the goodness of the original object; it thus magnifies the goodness, and thereby completes it. Second, Aquinas says that pleasure perfects an operation as regards the agent (*ex parte causae agentis*), and this is related to the first, since pleasure, when added to an obtained good, increases the intensity of desire for the object. Pleasure adds to the desirability of the object...
of desire. Or, as Miner puts it, “if the object of pleasure coincides with the object of reason, the activity in pursuit of that object will be especially intense,” and he recalls the dictum of Aristotle recounted in the previous article that “appropriate pleasures increase activity.”¹⁶² Thus pleasure can, if appropriate to reason, encourage greater and better use of reason. Thus, in contrast with the hindrance that bodily pleasures can effect in the use of reason, as we saw in the last article, in his response to the first objection in article four, he asserts that pleasure that perfects an act of reason strengthens (fortificat) the use of reason.¹⁶³ Thus pleasure can be used well or poorly; and when used well, can be a great aid in support of a flourishing life.

Thus, from this discussion, we have learned a number of things regarding the effects of pleasure, but of primary interest to our investigation are the findings that (a) intellectual pleasures expand the soul’s capacity for the objects of desire, (b) intellectual pleasures are an aid, rather than a hindrance, to the use of reason, which is the highest part of human nature and so that part which it is most human to pursue, and (c) that intellectual pleasures complete an object of desire, in a sense, by crowning its attainment with enjoyment. It thus encourages and inflames desire for the object. When that object is of a noble character, this is

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¹⁶² Miner, 181. ST I-II.33.3 co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., delectationes proprie aedagunt operationes extraneae vero impediunt. Cf. also NE X.5, 1175-30-1175b1.

¹⁶³ ST I-II.33.4 ad 1: Delectatio autem quae consequitur actum rationis, fortificat rationis usum.
a very good thing for moral development. This, I take it, was what Plato had in mind when he said that the aim of moral education is to teach us to love the the fine (το καλον). We may be reminded of Plato’s account of Diotima’s “ladder of love” in the *Symposium*, in which the lower, visible goods are but the merest approximation to the True Good, the Ultimate, which is the real object of desire even in those baser objects, in spite of our ignorance of that fact. Nevertheless, such baser goods, precisely because of their accessibility, are necessary stepping stones to the larger world of the forms, which is our true home.\footnote{164} For Plato, as for a host of Neoplatonic minded thinkers – including Dionysius and Boethius, and, less explicitly so, Aquinas – the lure of the beautiful and the good is but a sign that we are on the right path in our homeward journey, the *reditus* of Neoplatonic thought.\footnote{165} The beautiful, as Socrates states in his second speech in

\footnote{164} *Symposium* 210a-e.

\footnote{165} Characteristic of the path of Philosophy as “homeward journey” are these passage from Boethius’ *Consolatio* III.12p: “Then she [Lady Philosophy] said: ‘Since this is how you feel, I think there is only a little more left for me to do for you to come back (*reviso*) to your homeland (*patria*) safely, capable of grasping happiness.’” See also *Ibid.*, IV.1p: “And since I have just shown you and you have seen the form of true blessedness, and also recognized wherein it is placed, when we have run through all those things I think it necessary to set out first, I shall show you the way which will bring you back home (*viam tibi quae te domum revehat ostendam*). And I shall affix to your mind wings, whereby it may raise itself aloft, so that with all disturbance dispelled, you may return safely to your homeland, under my guidance, on my path, and in my carriage (*sospes in patriam nec ducta, mea semita, meis etiam vehiculis revertaris*).” This latter passage is even more reminiscent of the upward ascent of Diotima’s ladder. The English translation of the *Consolatio* is from *Boethius: Theological Tractates, The Consolation of Philosophy*, translated by Stewart, Rand and Tester, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973).
the *Phaedrus*, is simply the most visible and most loved of the forms.\textsuperscript{166} It is for this reason that it is the most useful as a propaedeutic for moral education.

3.5 On Love

There is another pressing issue that remains to be discussed, and which ought to be interjected before moving on to a consideration of the moral aspect of pleasure (in Question 34): namely, love (*amor*), which figures prominently in Aquinas’ treatment of the passions. In Question 25, which addresses the issue of the order of the passions (*de ordine passionum*), Aquinas states, in the second article, here following Augustine, that love is the first of the concupiscible passions.\textsuperscript{167} Combined with the conclusion of the first article, namely, that the concupiscible passions precede the irascible passions,\textsuperscript{168} the result is that love is first among all of the passions. By “first” (*prima*) here, he suggests that love (*amor*) initiates a temporal sequence of efficient causes, among which are included *appetitus* and *desiderium* with the effect, and therefore last in the order, being *delectationem*, for he explains, in the corpus:

\textsuperscript{166} *Phaedrus* 249d-250e.

\textsuperscript{167} ST I-II.25.2 sc: “On the contrary, Augustine says that all the passions are caused by love (*omnes passiones ex amore causantur*); since love yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy. Therefore love (*amor*) is the first (*prima*) of the concupiscible passions (*prima passionorum*).” Cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XIV.7, 9: *amor enim inhiens habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens, coque fruens, laetitia est.*

\textsuperscript{168} ST I-II.25.1 co: *Et sic patet quod passiones irascibilis et principium habent a passionibus concupiscibilis, et in passiones concupiscibilis terminatur.*
Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end (tendit ad finem), has, in the first place (primo), an aptitude or proportion to that end (aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem), for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end (movetur ad finem); thirdly, it rests in the end (quiescit in fine), after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion (ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio) of the appetite to good is love (amor), which is complacency in good (qui nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni); while movement towards good is desire (desiderium) or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure (gaudium vel delectatio). Accordingly, in this order [i.e., the order of execution], love precedes desire (amor praecedit desiderium), and desire precedes pleasure (desiderium praecedit delectationem).

The temporal ordering is clear from this passage: first in the sequence is an aptitude or proportion (aptitudinem seu proportionem) of the appetite (appetitus) to some end, and this aptitude or proportion is love (amor). Next in the sequence is a movement toward that end, and this movement is desire (desiderium vel concupiscencia). Last in the temporal sequence is pleasure (delectationem), which results from obtaining the object of desire. The temporal nature of this sequence is further supported when it is observed that this order is the order of execution (ordo consecutionem) as opposed to the order of intention (ordo intentionem), which has the opposite arrangement of constituents, and which has the character of final, rather than of efficient, causation and so does not exhibit a temporal

169 ST I-II.25.2 co: Manifestum est autem quod omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem, primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo, movetur ad finem; tertio, quiescit in fine post eius consecutionem. Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est desiderium vel concupiscencia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel delectatio. Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem, amor praecedit desiderium, et desiderium praecedit delectationem.
sequence.\textsuperscript{170} Love is temporally prior to desire, which is in turn temporally prior to pleasure. Love is here prior to desire, and, potentially, prior also to appetite. It is characterized in a way that implies it is distinct from both.

The priority of love among the passions is again confirmed when, in Question 26, Aquinas turns to the question of the first passion; namely, love. From this point, the progression of his discussion of love is parallel to the progression of his discussion of pleasure. He first addresses love in itself (Question 26),\textsuperscript{171} then the causes of love (Question 27),\textsuperscript{172} and finally the effects of love (Question 28).\textsuperscript{173} Part of the difficulty with Aquinas’ discussion about love is that it is at times difficult to see how love differs from either desire or pleasure.\textsuperscript{174} We have seen from his discussion in Question 25 that he does sometimes distinguish them. However, he also makes claims about love that are similar to claims he makes about both desire and pleasure. We might think of love, then, as a meta-passion, one that encompasses both desire and pleasure, since these relate

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{170} \textit{Ibid.}: “Now good (\textit{bonum}) has the aspect of an end (\textit{rationem finis}), and the end is indeed first in the order of intention (\textit{prior in intentione}), but last in the order of execution (\textit{posterior in consecutionem}). Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions (\textit{ordo passionum concupiscibilis}) can be considered either in the order of intention (\textit{secundum intentionem}) or in the order of execution (\textit{secundum consecutionem}). In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end.”
  \item \textsuperscript{171} ST I-II.26 pr: \textit{de ipso amore}.
  \item \textsuperscript{172} ST I-II.27 pr: \textit{de causa amoris}.
  \item \textsuperscript{173} ST I-II.28. pr: \textit{de effectibus amoris}.
  \item \textsuperscript{174} Christopher Malloy argues that in his earlier works, Aquinas gave desire priority over love, and that he reversed this position in his more mature writings. See Christopher Malloy, “Thomas on the Order of Love and Desire: A Development of Doctrine,” in \textit{The Thomist} 71 (2007): 65-87.
\end{itemize}
to the absent good and the present good, respectively. Love would then be the generic passion that has the good *simpliciter* as its object, where as desire has the good as an end not yet possessed as its object while pleasure has the good as an end already possessed as its object. This may very well be true, and this reading may be supported by several passages, such as the following: “The object of *amoris* is more general than the object of *dilectionis*: because *amor* extends to more than *dilectio* does.” He clarifies this in the corpus, saying that “*dilectio* implies, in addition to *amorem*, a choice (*electionem*) made beforehand” and on account of this “*dilectio* is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will (*in

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175 This seems to be the conclusion reached by Mark Drost at the end of his article comparing love with desire and delight, when he states: “Love is what desire and delight have in common: a union through intention.” Mark P. Drost, “In the Realm of the Senses: Saint Thomas Aquinas on Sensory Love, Desire, and Delight,” in *The Thomist* 59 (1995), 58. The notion of delight as union (*coniunctio*) with the good is derived from ST I-II.35.1 co, where Aquinas characterizes *delectatio*, in part, as a “union with some good” (*coniunctio boni*). Drost is using the Blackfriars translation, which translates *coniunctio* as “union” where the Fathers of the English Dominicant Province translate it as “conjunction.” Drost states that “the metaphors of motion, rest, approach, and retreat play a significant role in Aquinas’s descriptions of the intentionality in various emotional states,” for the various characterizations of the emotions in Aquinas “make sense only if they are comprehended as intentional stances of an appetitive agent.” *Ibid.*, 48, 51. Thus, desire and delight both intend the good object, either as an object to be pursued or as an object as obtained, while love intends the good object *simpliciter*. This leads me to think that Aquinas primarily thinks of love as synonymous with appetite. In any case, his use is inconsistent. He does not speak of love in a univocal sense.

176 ST I-II.26.3 ad 2: *obiectum amoris est communius quam obiectum dilectionis, quia ad plura se extendit amor quam dilectio*. Cf. ST I-II.25.2 co: *Manifestum est autem quod omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem, primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo, movetur ad finem; terto, quiescit in fine post eius consecutionem. Ipsa autem aptitudo sine proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est desiderium vel concupiscientia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel delectatio*. Here he characterizes the “aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good” as *amor*, “movement towards good” as *desiderium vel concupiscientia*, and “rest in good” as *gaudium vel delectatio*. What is unclear is what, exactly, he means by distinguishing the aptitude or proportion to the good as distinct from movement towards or rest in the good.
voluntate tantum), and only in the rational nature (est in sola rationali natura).”

And there is, we should not forget, the claim that, according to the order of execution (ordo consecutionem), “love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure,” which implies that these notions are to be kept distinct since a thing cannot precede itself. Nevertheless, we still have a problem in that Aquinas has defined the passions as being distinguished by their objects, and in every case except for love and hatred, which is love’s contrary, the passions are uniformly distinguished by a present or absent object. Only love, on this view,

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177 ST I-II.26.3 co: Addit enim dilectio supra amorem, electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura.

178 ST I-II.25.2 co: amor praecedit desiderium, et desiderium praecedit delectationem. The order of execution (ordo consecutione) is oppsed to the order of intention (ordo intentione). Aquinas’ point is that the good is either the beginning or end of movement, depending on which kind of order is under review. According to the order of intention, the good comes first, because it is the good which sets everything else into motion (this is to think of the good as a final cause). However, according to the order of execution, the good comes last, because the movement does not cease until it obtains the good (this is to think of the good as an efficient cause). Ibid.: Bonum autem habet rationem finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in consecutione. Potest ergo ordo passionum concupiscibilis attendi vel secundum intentionem, vel secundum consecutionem. If we take the ordo consecutione as representing a chain of efficient causality (i.e., love causes desire and desire results in pleasure when its object is obtained), then it seems we must take “precedes” (est prior) as indicating a temporal sequence. And, as Aquinas argues in his Secunda via for God’s existence, the argument from efficient causality (ex ratione causae efficientis), “there is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible” [Secunda via est ratione causae efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum efficientium, nec tamen inventur, nec est possibile, quod alicui sit causa efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossibile].

179 Aquinas says that the the different powers (concupiscible and irrascible) are distinguished according to their object, as in ST I-II.23.1 co: Respondeo dicendum quod passiones quae sunt in irascibili et in concupiscibili, differunt specie. Cum enim diversae potentiae habeant diversa obiecta, ut in primo dictum est, necesse est quod passiones diversarum potentiarum ad diversa obiecta referantur. He further states that the concupiscible passions are distinguished by the presence or absence of their objects, as in ST I-II.30.2 co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum delectabile secundum sensum est communiter obiectum concupiscibilis. Unde secundum eius differentias, diversae passiones concupiscibilis distinguuntur...Est autem alia ratio virtutis motivae ipsius finis vel boni, secundum quod est realiter praesens, et secundum quod est absens. He also states that both passions and actions are
has an object that may be either present (i.e., obtained) or absent (not yet obtained), the distinction of which determines the peculiar character of love as either pleasure or desire, respectively.

It is on account of the basic ambiguity between love on the one hand and desire and pleasure on the other that I have not, thus far, focused attention on his treatment of love. Nevertheless, the placement of love in Aquinas’ system makes it incredibly important. Robert Miner notes, for instance, that the primacy of love among the passions anticipates the primacy of caritas among the virtues.180 This is further evidence of the intimate connection between the passions and the virtues introduced at the beginning of this chapter. Whether we take love as essentially synonymous with both desire and pleasure, depending on whether we are discussing absent or present goods, or as subsuming both under the genus of tendency toward good in the abstract, we may be able to learn something valuable by considering isolated passages in his treatment of love. There are several, in particular, which bear upon the topic of beauty.

Question 27, on the causes of love (de causa amoris), begins with an article which asks whether the good alone is the cause of love.181 Three objections are

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180 Miner, 131. Cf. ST. I-II.62.4 co: *Sic enim caritas est mater omnium virtutum et radix, inquantum est omnium virtutum forma.* Cf. also ST II-II.23.8 co.

181 ST I-II.27 pr: *Primo, utrum bonum sit sola causa amoris.*
raised against this view. Objections one and two note that evil seems to be a cause of love.\textsuperscript{182} To these, Aquinas rehearses the standard Augustinian reply regarding privation, namely, that evil (as a privation of good) cannot be loved directly but only as it seems good in some way \textit{(sub ratione boni)}, namely, that it seems to lead to some other good.\textsuperscript{183} Objection three provides an objection relying on the authority of Dionysius, namely, that beauty \textit{(pulchrum)} also is beloved by all \textit{(omnibus amabile)}, and the implication seems to be that beauty is therefore also a cause of love.\textsuperscript{184}

In the \textit{corpus}, Aquinas first reiterates what love is. He states that love belongs to the appetitive power, which is passive. This means that love is not distinct from appetite, though it is distinct, as we have seen, from desire. Love’s object stands in a certain relationship to love, namely, as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore, he concludes, the cause of love is love’s object, which is the good.\textsuperscript{185} To this, he repeats, in his third reply, the famous dictum


\textsuperscript{183} ST I-II.27.1 ad 1: \textit{Ad primum ergo dicendum quod malum nunquam amatur nisi sub ratione boni, scilicet inquantum est secundum quod bonum, et apprehenditur ut simpliciter bonum.}

\textsuperscript{184} ST I-II.27.1 obj. 3: \textit{Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, IV cap. De Div. Nom., quod non solum bonum, sed etiam pulchrum est omnibus amabile.}

\textsuperscript{185} ST I-II.27.1 co: \textit{amor ad appetitivam potentiam pertinet, quae est vis passiva. Unde objectum eius comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius. Oportet igitur ut illud sit proprie causa amoris quod est amoris objectum. Amoris autem proprium objectum est bonum...relinquitur quod bonum sit propria causa amoris.}
from his definition of the beautiful in ST Ia.5.4 ad 1, namely, that “the beautiful is the same as the good (pulchrum est idem bono), and they differ in aspect only (sola ratione differens).” Here, however, he provides a justification for the assertion. I have quoted this in its entirety already, but it bears reproducing here as well:

The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently, those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz., sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression beautiful, for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that good means that which simply pleases the appetite; while the beautiful is something pleasant to apprehend.

This passage has quite a bit packed into it, and will require some analysis. First, the beautiful and the good are the same in that each is the object of desire (bonum sit quod omnia appetunt). This seems to imply that there is an identity relationship between the two. However, it must be said that while the beautiful is good, the good is not necessarily beautiful. There is a qualification. Our notion

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186 ST I-II.27.1 ad 3: pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens.

187 ST I-II.27.1 ad 3: Ad tertium dicendum quod pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus, sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus. Unde et illi sensus praeципue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes, dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum, non utinam nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores. Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam, ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitu; pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.
of the good, he says, is that which calms the desire, that is, that in which desire comes to rest once its object has been attained. The notion of beauty, on the other hand, is that which calms desire by being seen or known (*cognitione quietetur appetitus*). It seems, therefore, that Aquinas conceives of the beautiful as a subcategory, or mode, of the good. He confirms this by saying, further, that beauty adds something to the good (*addit supra bonum*), namely, “a relation to the cognitive faculty” (*quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam*). Thus we get our final division, in which the good is that which pleases (*complacet*) the appetite *simpliciter* while the beautiful is that which pleases (*placet*) the appetite in a qualified way, namely, when apprehended (*id cuius ipsa apprehensio*). This has an obvious connection to the debate over the transcendentality of beauty, which as I have already said will be addressed in chapter four. For now, we may note that beauty seems to be, at least, a tertiary transcendental if, as it appears, beauty is a mode of goodness, for goodness is in turn a mode of being, taking being as primary. Beauty, for Aquinas, is intimately connected to the good, which is the

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188 Here we see a clear example where Aquinas uses *complacet* and *placet* interchangeably.

sola causa amoris, and Aquinas’ principal authority on the priority of the good is Dionysius.\textsuperscript{190} His dependence on Dionysius is important to our study for a couple of reasons. Firstly, on account of the role of good and beauty in Dionysius. Secondly, on account of the profound Platonic influence conferred on Aquinas’ thought via Dionysius. I have already spoken briefly of the latter in chapter one. The former will receive a greater treatment in chapter five. For now, let us turn to discuss the final section of Aquinas’ treatment on pleasure, namely, the morality of pleasure.

3.6 On the Morality of Pleasure

In Question 34, Aquinas turns to examine the morality of pleasure.\textsuperscript{191} Commentators have puzzled over Aquinas’ purpose in addressing the morality of pleasure in particular when he has already addressed the morality of the

\textsuperscript{190} Miner, 131. “The first three Articles elucidate a point that is fundamental for Aquinas’ thinking about the passions, namely that good is the sola causa amoris. But if love is the cause of the other passions, it follows that good must be the cause of all the passions. Aquinas’ principal auctoritas on the primacy of the good is Dionysius. That Dionysius is among the most important authorities for Aquinas’ thinking about love (only Augustine can compete with him) is often neglected. If Question 27 on the cause of love is thoroughly Dionysian in its identification of the power of good to cause love, Question 28 on the effects of love will manifest an even greater dependence upon the Areopagite.”

\textsuperscript{191} ST I-II.34 pr: Deinde considerandum est de bonitate et malitia delectationum.
passions in general in Question 24. Cajetan’s suggestion that since all the other passions terminate in either pleasure (delectatione) or sorrow (tristitia), they are therefore implicated in a special way in pleasure and sorrow seems plausible. It may simply be the case that, unlike most of the other passions, pleasure in particular has a long and controversial philosophical history, having been targeted for discussion by most of the major figures and schools of the Hellenistic tradition.

The articles themselves are structured so as to address the concerns of each of the major ancient schools of philosophy. Article one addresses the Stoic view that all pleasures are evil. Article two addresses the Epicurean view that all pleasures are good. Rejecting both of these extreme positions, Aquinas turns to a consideration of the more moderate view of Plato. Article three investigates the Platonic position that some pleasure might be the highest good. In article four, he concludes, citing both Augustine and Aristotle in support of his view, that not only is the Platonic view correct in asserting that

192 ST I-II.24 pr: Deinde considerandum est de bono et malo circa passiones animae.
193 Sorrow is treated in Questions 35-39.
194 Cajetan, 236. Cf. Miner, 182.
195 ST I-II.34 pr: Primo, utrum omnis delectatio sit mala.
196 Ibid.: Secundo, dato quod non, utrum omnis delectatio sit bona. Albert Plé suggests, and Miner concurs, that Aquinas does not have an adequate grasp of the historical Epicurus’ view on the matter. Rather, his information is “incomplete and deformed by the calumnies spread by the Stoics, and more or less repeated by the Christian tradition.” Somme Théologique, vol. 2, translated by Aimon-Marie Roguet, with commentary and introduction by Albert Plé (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1984), 235 n.8. The English translation of Plé’s text is quoted in Miner, 185 n.17.
197 Ibid.: Tertio, utrum aliqua delectatio sit optimum.
some pleasure is the highest good, but that in fact pleasure itself is the measure (mensura) or rule (regula) for judging good and evil in morality.\textsuperscript{198} Let us consider each of these in turn.

In article one, Aquinas examines what he takes to be the Stoic position, namely, that all pleasures are evil. Aquinas gives two reasons for denying that all pleasures are evil. Firstly, he cites scripture as affirming the goodness of delight (delectatio) in the Lord.\textsuperscript{199} Since scripture cannot lead to evil, therefore not all pleasures can be evil. Secondly, he recalls a discussion in Aristotle’s \textit{Ethics} that some have mistakenly held that all pleasures are evil on account of considering only sensible and bodily pleasures while ignoring the intelligible pleasures.\textsuperscript{200} It is this failure to distinguish the two types of pleasure, he surmises, that led the ancients to judge all pleasures evil, on account of the evils of the more evident bodily pleasures.\textsuperscript{201} Aquinas had already noted, as we have seen, in Question 33, article three, that there are several ways in which the bodily pleasures can hinder the use of reason, on account of which these pleasures may be considered evil.

But, he says, the ancients were wrong to hold the position that all pleasures are

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Ibid.}: Quarto, utrum delectatio sit mensura vel regula secundum quam iudicetur bonum vel malum in moralibus.

\textsuperscript{199} ST I-II.34.1 sc: \textit{Sed contra est quod in Psalmo XXXVI, dicitur, delectare in domino. Cum igitur ad nihil mali auctoritas divina inducat, videtur quod non omnis delectatio sit mala}. Cf. Psalm 36:4.

\textsuperscript{200} ST I-II.34.1 co: \textit{Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., aliqui posuerunt omnes delectationes esse malas. Cuius ratio videtur fuisse, quia intentionem suam referebant ad solas delectationes sensibles et corporales, quae sunt magis manifestae}. Cf. Aristotle, NE X.2-3, 1172b9-1174a12.

\textsuperscript{201} \textit{Ibid.}: \textit{nam et in ceteris intelligibilia a sensibilibus antiqui philosophi non distinguébant, nec intellectum a sensu, ut dicitur in libro de anima}. 158
evil since it was based on a deficient account of pleasures. He concludes, following Aristotle, that some pleasures are good and some are evil. He reminds the reader that, in the moral order, good and evil depend on agreement or disagreement (convenit vel discordat) with reason (rationi), and that some pleasures are in accordance with reason and others are not. The higher, that is, the intellectual, appetites tend to agreement with reason while the lower, that is, the corporeal, appetites tend to disagreement with reason. He does not intend this to imply that all corporeal pleasures are evil, however. All pleasures, including corporeal pleasures, derive their character from their end. Thus the character of any pleasure is going to be determined by the good obtained which produces the pleasure and the operation by which the good was obtained. Though it is true that corporeal pleasures may have a greater tendency toward evil than intellectual pleasures, for the reasons outlined above, nevertheless moral judgments regarding pleasures depend upon this agreement of pleasure with reason. Consequently, not all pleasures are evil. Some are morally good.

202 Ibid.: Sed haec existimatio non fuit conveniens.


204 Ibid.: Est enim delectatio quies appetitivae virtutis in aliquo bono amato, et consequens aliquam operationem. Unde huius ratio duplex accipi potest. Una quidem ex parte boni in quo aliquis quiescens delectatur. Bonum enim et malum in moralibus dicitur secundum quod convenit vel discordat ab eum, ut supra dixit est, sicut in rebus naturalibus aliquid dicitur naturale ex eo quod naturae convenit, innaturale vero ex eo quod est a natura discordans...ita et in moralibus est quaedam delectatio bona, secundum quod appetitus superior aut inferior requiescit in eo quod convenit rationi; et quaedam mala, ex eo quod quiescit in eo quod a ratione discordat, et a lege Dei. Cf. ST I-II.18.5 co.

205 Ibid.: Dicendum est ergo aliquas delectationes esse bonas, et aliquas esse malas. Est enim delectatio quies appetitivae virtutis in aliquo bono amato, et consequens aliquam operationem.
In article two, Aquinas takes up what he characterizes as the Epicurean position, namely, that every pleasure is good. Aquinas rejects this view for the same reason he rejected the previous one; that is, he holds with Aristotle that some pleasures are good and some are evil. He characterizes the Epicurean error in identifying pleasure with the good itself, a consequence of which is that every pleasure is good. The error of the Epicureans is, therefore, in their identification of pleasure with the good simply (bonum simpliciter).


207 ST I-II.34.2 co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut aliqui Stoicorum posuerunt omnes delectationes esse malas, ita Epicurei posuerunt delectationem secundum se esse bonum, et per consequens delectationes omnes esse bonas. It seems clear that Aquinas did not have direct access to Epicurus’ texts. Rather, the likely source of his knowledge of Epicureanism is Cicero, who makes several references to Epicurus’ position, even occasionally giving what he calls a “translation” from Greek into Latin, e.g., the De finibus and Tusc. Disp. Cicero has often been accused of being a hostile and unreliable reporter on Epicurus’ views, though this view is challenged by Michael Stokes, who argues that though Cicero does argue against Epicureanism as opposed to the Stoicism he favors, we need not take Cicero as particularly or egregiously misrepresentative. Nevertheless, Epicurus’ views on pleasure are subtle and easily misunderstood. David Glidden argues that contemporary philosophers still misread Epicurus even when they have a much greater cache of texts from which to draw than did his medieval detractors, since philosophers tend to obscure the distinction among physiological, psychological, and ethical considerations in general, and especially in the case of hedonism. See Michael C. Stokes, “Cicero on Epicurean Pleasures,” in Cicero the Philosopher, edited by J. G. F. Powell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 145-170; David K. Glidden, “Epicurus and the Pleasure Principle,” in The Greeks and the Good Life, edited by David J. Depew (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1980), 177-197. Cf. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. III.41-42, and De finibus 2.32. A representative of the standard sorts of criticism of Cicero’s presentation of Epicurus mentioned here can be found, inter alia, in J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, eds., The Greeks on Pleasure (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), and J. M. Rist, Epicurus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). There are a number of other texts by Epicurus which have been preserved by Diogenes Laertius, primary among which is his Letter to Menoeceus, which can be found in Cyril Bailey, Epicurus: The Extant Remains (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926). For the Greek texts, see Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, 10.121-135, translated by R. D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925).

208 Ibid.: Qui ex hoc decepti esse videntur, quod non distinguiebant inter id quod est bonum simpliciter, et id quod est bonum quod hunc.
Aquinas says that, while pleasure is the repose of the appetite in some good, nevertheless a pleasure may be one of two types: either a pleasure simply \textit{(simpliciter delectatio)} or a relative pleasure \textit{(delectatio...huic)} insofar as the good obtained is a good simply \textit{(bonum simpliciter)} or a relative good, such as something apparently good \textit{(bona secunda quid vel apparens bona)}.\textsuperscript{209} He states this even more clearly in his reply to the third objection: “All things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself and verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good.”\textsuperscript{210} The factor that in each case determines the true value of the good or pleasure is its accordance with reason. A good desired in accordance with reason is a true good. A pleasure attending the attainment of a good that is in accordance with reason is a good pleasure. If these are not in accordance with reason, then their goodness is merely apparent or remotely proximate to the absolute good. To the extent that these fall short of absolute or true goodness, they are to that degree morally lacking. It is on account of this that Aquinas can say, following Augustine, that

\textsuperscript{209} Ibid.: \textit{Et quia delectatio est quies appetitus in bono, si sit bonum simpliciter illud in quo quiescit appetitus, erit simpliciter delectatio, et simpliciter bona. Si autem non sit bonum simpliciter, sed quoad hunc, tunc nec delectatio est simpliciter, sed huic, nec simpliciter est bona, sed bona secundum quid, vel apparens bona.}

\textsuperscript{210} ST I-II.34.2 ad 3: \textit{Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc modo omnia appetunt delectationem, sicut et bonum, cum delectatio sit quies appetitus in bono. Sed sicut contingit non omne bonum quod appetitur, esse per se et vere bonum; ita non omnis delectatio est per se et vere bona.}
while care of one’s body is good, care of one’s body at the expense or neglect of care of one’s soul is bad.\textsuperscript{211}

Having discounted the two extreme views, Aquinas next turns to examine what he takes to be Plato’s view, which is in agreement with neither the Stoics nor the Epicureans. Plato’s view, he says, was that some pleasures are good and some are bad.\textsuperscript{212} And with this view Aquinas concurs. Nevertheless, he raises two criticisms against Plato’s view. The first criticism is directed at Plato’s view that pleasures are always in the process of becoming. That is, he takes it that

\textsuperscript{211} In ST II-II, Question 26, on the order of charity, Aquinas addresses the issue of the hierarchy of proper objects of love, first by arguing that there is a proper order of love (in article one), and then going on to specify the relations between different objects. For example, he says that we ought to love God more than our neighbor (article two), and that we ought to love God more than ourselves (article three). Cf. Augustine, \textit{De Doctrina Christiana} (hereafter \textit{De Doct. Christ.}) I.22. When he comes to the discussion of whether we ought to love our neighbor more than ourselves (article four), he introduces a distinction between the two natures of man, for man has both a soul and a body. Loving oneself involves loving one’s soul, and in this respect, we ought to love ourselves (i.e., our souls) more than we love others. This is justified in part because it is on the basis of love for our own souls that we are able to love the souls of others. That is, I am to love my neighbor as myself. Cf. \textit{Matthew} 22:39; \textit{Leviticus} 19:18. However, he also argues (article five) that we ought to love our neighbor’s soul more than our own body, we ought to love our own soul over our neighbor’s body. In every instance, soul ought to be loved more than body. This has to do with the intimacy of the union between lover and loved. One soul is more intimately connected to another soul than even one’s own body is connected to his soul. Cf. Augustine, \textit{De Doct. Christ.} I.27. Cf. also the parallel discussion on the order of the virtues in \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae de Caritate} (hereafter \textit{QD Caritate}), article 9. According to the chronology given in Torrell (2005, 329), Aquinas wrote his \textit{Disputed Questions on the Virtues}, of which his \textit{QD Caritate} is the second part, at the same time he was composing the \textit{secunda secundae}. For those who would doubt that these statements have moral implications, it is good to recall that for Aquinas, love (\textit{caritas}) is a virtue, that is, its possession makes its possessor good. In this, he is following Aristotle’s discussion of virtue in the \textit{Ethics}. Not only this, but he there notes that not only is \textit{caritas} a virtue, but it is the most powerful of the virtues. \textit{QD Caritate} 2 co: \textit{Respondeo dicendum, quod caritas absque dubio virtus est... Sic igitur patet quod caritas non solum est virtus, sed potissima virtutum}. Cf. Aristotle, NE II.6, 1106\textsuperscript{a}17.

\textsuperscript{212} ST I-II.34.3 co: \textit{Respondeo dicendum quod Plato non posuit omnes delectationes esse malas, sicut Stoici; neque omnes esse bonas, sicut Epicurei; sed quasdam esse bonas, et quasdam esse malas.}

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Plato’s view of pleasure is that of a movement only.\textsuperscript{213} Plato reaches this conclusion, he thinks, by focusing solely on bodily pleasures, which do have this movement in common.\textsuperscript{214} But if that were true, then the highest good could not be found in pleasure, since movement implies imperfection as the movement is driven by some deficiency or lack in the agent who sees, in the object, something that will remedy the deficiency.\textsuperscript{215} Aquinas thinks this view is mistaken. He has already shown that there are some operations, namely, operations of the intellect, which are complete or experienced \textit{tota simul}, namely the intellectual pleasures, and such are capable of producing perfect pleasure.\textsuperscript{216} He reiterates that this view is clearly false since it does not take into account the intellectual pleasures, since, as in the example of knowledge, these are not only found having the nature of becoming (as in gaining knowledge), but also in the act of contemplation (e.g., upon knowledge already attained).\textsuperscript{217}

The second criticism he raises against Plato’s view is that Plato conceives of the highest good as the supreme good simply (\textit{simpliciter sumnum bonum}),

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{213} \textit{Ibid.}: \textit{aestimavit omnes delectationes consequi generationem et motum}.

\textsuperscript{214} \textit{Ibid.}: \textit{cum videret delectationes sensibiles et corporales in quodam motu et generatione consistere, sicut patet in repletione ciborum et huiusmodi}.

\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Ibid.}: \textit{Unde, cum generatio et motus sint actus imperfecti, sequeretur quod delectatio non haberet rationem ultimae perfectionis}. The deficiency is typically remedied only in part and but temporarily. Consider the case of hunger (a deficiency) which is temporarily alleviated by the consumption of food (the object of desire).

\textsuperscript{216} ST I-II.31.2, 33.2.

\textsuperscript{217} ST I-II.34.3 co: \textit{Sed hoc manifeste apparet falsum in delectationibus intellectualibus. Aliquis enim non solum delectatur in generatione scientiae, puta cum addiscit aut miratur, sicut supra dictum est; sed etiam in contemplando secundum scientiam iam acquisitam}.
\end{footnotesize}
which is the good itself, abstracted from particulars and unparticipated (ipsum bonum quasi abstractum et non participatum), which is God (ipse Deus est); whereas Aquinas says that the issue under review is merely the highest human good (optimo in rebus humanis).218 There are two ways of thinking, therefore, of the highest good, namely, the thing itself or the use of the thing.219 We can think of the highest good in itself, which is the final end of all things. This is the good itself or God. Or we can think of the attainment, or enjoyment (fruitio), of the highest good, which he says implies a certain pleasure in the last end.220 This enjoyment of the highest good—a certain pleasure—is therefore the highest human good.221 It is, he says, “perfect repose in the perfect good.”222

In the final article in this series, Aquinas addresses the question whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which we judge moral good and evil. In the corpus, he provides the following argument, which I have presented formally:

i. Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will.223

218 Ibid.: Alio vero modo, quia dicebat optimum illud quod est simpliciter summum bonum, quod scilicet est ipsum bonum quasi abstractum et non participatum, sicut ipse Deus est summum bonum. Nos autem loquimur de optimo in rebus humanis.


220 Ibid.: Et secundum hoc, ultimus finis hominis dici potest vel ipse Deus, qui est summum bonum simpliciter; vel fruitio ipsius, quae importat delectationem quandam in ultimo fine.

221 Ibid.: Et per hunc modum aliqua delectatio hominis potest dici optimum inter bona humana.

222 ST I-II.34.3 ad 3: quod est perfecta quies in optimo.

223 ST I-II.34.4 co: bonitas vel malitia moralis principaliter in voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Cf. ST I-II.20.1.
ii. It is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil.\footnote{Ibid.: \textit{Utrum autem voluntas sit bona vel mala, praecipue ex fine cognoscitur.}}

iii. The end is taken to be that in which the will reposes, and the repose of the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure.\footnote{Ibid.: \textit{Id autem habetur pro fine, in quo voluntas quiescit. Quies autem voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitus, in bono, est delectatio.}}

iv. Therefore, a man is reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will, since that man is good and virtuous who takes pleasure in the works of virtue, and that man evil who takes pleasure in evil works.\footnote{Ibid.: \textit{Et ideo secundum delectationem voluntatis humanae, praecipue indicatur homo bonus vel malus; est enim bonus et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus virtutum; malus autem qui n operibus malis.}}

As far as the first premise goes, Aquinas is drawing this from an earlier discussion in Question 20, which investigates the goodness and malice in external human actions.\footnote{ST I-II.20 pr: \textit{Deinde considerandum est de bonitate et malitia quantum ad exteriores actus.}} Article one of that Question considers whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will or in the external action.\footnote{Ibid.: \textit{Primo, utrum bonitas et malitia per prius sit in actu voluntatis, vel in actu exteriori.}} In his conclusion, he distinguishes two ways in which an act can be considered good or bad: in itself (\textit{viz.,} in regard to its genus) or as related to an end.\footnote{ST I-II.20.1 co: \textit{Uno modo secundum genus suum...Alio modo...ex ordine ad finem.}} In both cases, he concludes that the will is the principle of action. Specifically, regarding an act as ordered to an end, he rehearses a familiar distinction, namely, between the order of intention (\textit{in intentione}) and the order of execution (\textit{in executione}). It is clear that an act follows from the end; that is, the end is prior...
(finis est prior), in the order of intention. And this is the aspect from which the act derives its moral quality. This conclusion is supported by appeal to Augustine in the sed contra, whom he quotes as saying “it is by the will that we sin, and that we behave aright.” Therefore moral good and evil are first in the will.

The second premise finds its origin in a couple of places. First, he stated in Question 18, on good and evil acts in humans in general, in the second article, that “just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object.” However, this must be qualified, for in the first two articles of Question 20, he states that there are two ways in which an external act may be good or bad: first with respect to its genus and the circumstances in which the action is done, and second, from its relation to the end. The first of these has to do with the object itself. Some ends are good in themselves, such as the giving of alms. The second, however, has to do with one’s intention regarding the end. So even if the end itself, say almsgiving, is good according to its genus, nevertheless the action itself may still be bad if one’s intention in doing

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230 ST I-II.20.1 ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum quod finis est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in executione.


232 ST I-II.18.2 co: Sicut autem res naturalis habet speciem ex sua forma, ita actio habet speciem ex obiecto.

233 ST I-II.20.1 co: Respondeo dicendum quod aliqui actus exteriores possunt dici boni vel mali dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum genus suum, et secundum circumstantias in ipsis consideratas... Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse bonum vel malum ex ordine ad finem.
it is bad, as is the case when someone performs a good act for the wrong reasons, as when one gives alms in order to gain the approval of men. The end is the will’s proper object. Therefore, the second of these, viz., the action’s relation to the end, depends entirely upon the will. The goodness of the object in itself is often independent of the will. Almsgiving is good while adultery is bad. While almsgiving can be done with an evil intention, adultery cannot be done with a good intention. We can, therefore, discern that the will is evil if we are able to discern (cognoscitur) either that the object itself is evil or that the intention is evil.

Premise three is evident from our previous discussions, since Aquinas has already established that the end, that is, the object of desire, is that in which the will reposes when the object has been obtained, and this repose produces pleasure (delectationem) or joy (gaudium).

From these three premises follows the conclusion that a man can be judged to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will, since the virtuous man takes pleasure in the works of virtue while the evil man

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234 Ibid.: finis sit proprium objectum voluntatis.

235 ST I-II.20.2 co: Et illa quidem quae est secundum ordinem ad finem, tota dependet ex voluntate.

236 ST I-II.34.4 co: Utrum autem voluntas sit bona vel mala, praecipue ex fine cognoscitur.

237 For instance in ST I-II.23.4 co: cum adeptum fuerit bonum, dat appetitus quietationem quandam in ipso bno adepto, et hoc pertinet ad delectationem vel gaudium.
takes pleasure in the works of evil.\textsuperscript{238} Because sense pleasures are related to universally pleasurable objects, Aquinas says that they cannot be the rule and measure of moral goodness and malice.\textsuperscript{239} Nevertheless, the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with reason, while this is not true of the evil man.\textsuperscript{240} In his reply to the second objection he adds, “that man is good, whose will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.”\textsuperscript{241} The point of this article then is that persons, and their actions, may be judged to be morally good or bad on the basis of their attending pleasures.

To this, I would like to add that while Aquinas does not consider sensory pleasures to be the measure and rule of morality, as we saw in the last passage, nevertheless sensory pleasures also admit of moral judgments and can be indicators of a morally good or bad will. Aquinas holds that morally good pleasures of the sense appetite arise when the object of desire corresponds to

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\item \textsuperscript{238} ST I-II.34.4 co: \textit{Et ideo secundum delectationem voluntatis humanae, praecipue iudicatur homo bonus vel malus; est enim bonus et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus virtutum; malus autem qui in operibus malis.}
\item \textsuperscript{239} Ibid.: \textit{Delectationes autem appetitus sensitivi non sunt regula bonitatis vel malitiae moralis, nam cibus communiter delectabilis est secundum appetitum sensitivum, bonis et malis. That is, since sensory pleasures are really extraneous to the will, these do not tell us anything about the moral character of the person who experiences them. Eating when hungry will always be pleasurable irrespective of whether the eating is done in the proper way, i.e., what is eaten ought to be eaten, and ought to be eaten when it is eaten, and how, etc. These considerations relate primarily to reason, and it is in virtue of their being done in accordance with reason that these constitute a kind of measure of moral character.}
\item \textsuperscript{240} Ibid.: \textit{Sed voluntas bonorum delectatur in eis secundum convenientiam rationis, quam non curat voluntas malorum.}
\item \textsuperscript{241} ST I-II.34.4 ad 2: \textit{Nam ille bonus est cuius voluntas quiescit in vero bono; malus autem, cuius voluntas quiescit in malo.}
\end{enumerate}
one’s natural state. Examples of such attainment include obtaining food when one is hungry, drink when one is thirsty. These are the kinds of desires ordered toward the well being of the individual. Likewise, sexual desires are ordered toward the well being of the species. Since each of these is ordered toward a good and natural end, the fulfillment of these desires is also naturally good. So long as these are obtained in a manner in accordance with reason, the accompanying pleasures are also judged to be morally good.242 For sentient beings, namely, animals and human beings, this involves consciousness of obtaining an object of desire or longing, and for this reason the attainment of

242ST II-II.153.2 co: "A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order of reason (contra ordinem rationis). Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything to its end in a fitting manner (convenienter ordinet in suum finem). Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, so, too, is the preservation of the nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the preservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race." With regard to sexual acts, Aquinas qualifies what he means by satisfying this desire in accordance with reason, namely, “in keeping with the end of human procreation (quod est conveniens ad finem generationis humane).” Cf. Augustine, De bono coniugali xvi: “For as food is to the health of the individual, so sexual intercourse is to the health of the nation (Quod enim est cibus ad salutem hominis, hoc est concubitus ad salutem generis). Each is not without its physical pleasure (delectatione carnali), but if restrained and confined to natural use by the controlling reins of temperance, it cannot be lust (quae tamen modificata et temperantia refrenante in usum naturalem redacta libido esse non potest). But just as there is food which is unlawful for sustaining life, so fornication or adultery is illicit in the furtherance of offspring. Analogous to the food which is unlawful in pander to the belly and throat is the illicit intercourse sought in lust without any offspring in view.” Ibid., xvii: “Marriage exists among all nations for the same purpose of begetting children (Ipsae quidem nuptiae in omnibus gentibus eadem sunt filiorum procreandorum causa), and…marriage was established so that they would be born with due order and honor.” However, “men today, because of the honourable status of marriage, are allowed as pardonable indulgence (secundum ueniam concedatur), though it is not of the essence of marriage (quamuis ad nuptias non pertineat), that extended use of sex which goes beyond the necessity to beget children (id est progressum illum qui excedit generandi necessitatem quod illi non habebant). Both the Latin text and the English translation from Augustine, De bono coniugali, De sancta virginitate, edited and translated by P. G. Walsh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).
such pleasure is, for sentient beings, called “delight.” The desired object may be something that delivers sensory or cognitive satisfaction, viz., “rest” (quies), and pleasure is the result. So, for instance, he states in his discussion of the virtue of hope, that desire (appetitu) in the soul is formed by some good (bonum), which results in love (amor) for that good. From this relationship between the one desiring and the object desired, a kind of natural movement (motus naturalis) ensues, drawing the lover toward the object of its desire. When the lover obtains (pertingit) the object of his desire (rem amatam), then the soul achieves a state of rest (quies), which is also characterized by joy (gaudium) or pleasure (delectatio). Pleasure is thus not the proper aim of desire, but it is, in a sense, a natural byproduct of (or reward for) attaining the object of desire, and the attainment of

243 ST I-II.31.1 co. “Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it (hoc non sentiunt), whereas animals do (sed animalia hoc sentiunt). And from this perception (Et ex isto sensu) there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight (iste motus est delectatio). Accordingly by saying that delight is a movement of the soul, we designate its genus. But saying that it is an establishing in keeping with the thing’s nature, i.e., with that which exists in the thing, we assign the cause of delight (causa delectationis), viz., the presence of a becoming good.” As has already been noted, this passage need not imply that brute animals, i.e., non-rational sentient beings, while aware of the obtaining of the object of desire, experience enjoyment (fruitio, gaudium), but only delight (delectatio) in obtaining the object of the sense appetite. It is precisely, and strictly, as an object of the rational appetite that enjoyment is produced in the rational creature upon the attaining (with awareness) of the object of desire.

244 Quaestiones disputationae de virtutibus, Q.4: De spe (hereafter QD spe), a.3 co. Cf. ST I-II.34.1 co: Est enim delectatio quies appetitivae virtutis in aliquo bono amato. Aquinas states elsewhere (ST I-II.33.1 ad 2) that “pleasure (delectatio) is the end of desire (finis desiderii).”
that object is the aim of desire. Pleasure is the natural resulting state of the soul when desire has been satiated by obtaining its object.  

Here again, we might do well to recall Aquinas' definition of the beautiful (pulchrum) as "that whose very apprehension (apprehensio) pleases (placet)." We recognize an object as beautiful because it presumably satisfies a natural longing for the visible good. This is a narrow application (to the field of vision) of a general metaphysical principle we find in Aquinas, namely, that all activity, all motion (including generic change or alteration), can be described as driven (or pulled) by good objects through appetite. All things, according to Aquinas, are drawn by an internal motivation or principle of action to attain the end natural to

245 This account oddly similar to contemporary evolutionary conceptions of pleasure, though of course the origins of the explanations are dissimilar. Paul Bloom writes that there is an evolutionary justification for the pleasure we take, for example, in drinking water (and the pain involved in being deprived of it): "Animals need water to survive, and so they are motivated to seek it out. Pleasure is the reward for getting it; pain is the punishment for doing without." Bloom, 4. He further asserts that "most nonhuman pleasures make perfect sense from this perspective." Ibid., 5. What is more complicated is how to explain the seemingly uniquely human pleasures like "art, music, stories, sentimental objects, and religion." Ibid. Some thinkers wish to explain these "higher," or non-adaptive, sorts of pleasures as the products of culture, but Bloom denies that this is all there is to it. Rather, the "intellectual flexibility of our species" that is able to produce "biologically arbitrary" ideas and, ultimately, culture explains why there is such variety among individual or even cultural tastes; but Bloom artues that there is actually "a fixed list of pleasures and we can't add to that list." Ibid., 6-7. Regarding the biological rewards system, psychologist Jonathan Haidt says, "it is no accident that we find the carnal pleasures so rewarding. Our brains, like rat brains, are wired so that food and sex gives us little bursts of dopamine, the neurotransmitter that is the brain's way of making us enjoy the activities that are good for the survival of our genes." Jonathan Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truths in Ancient Wisdom (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 16.

246 ST I-II.27.1 ad 3: pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet. The English translation is my own.
things of the kind they are. Such an end is, for that thing, its good since good is the proper object of appetite.  

As we found in chapter two, a visible object can be the source of both bodily as well as intellectual perception, and therefore may be a source of both bodily and intellectual pleasure. Since in human beings both of these bear some relation to reason, they are subject to moral evaluation, as we also have seen. We have discussed the ways bodily pleasures can adversely relate to reason by interfering with it in several ways. When pleasures conflict with reason, they are vicious. However, pleasures that are in accordance with reason have the opposite effect of strengthening reason, and so are good.

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247 ST I-II.26.1 co: “Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good is the object of both... natural things (res naturalis) seek (appetunt) what is suitable (convenit) to them according to their nature (secundum suam naturam), by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author of their nature.” Cf. ST I.6.1 ad 2: “All things (omnia), by desiring (appetendo) their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being... And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire (appetitum naturalem) without knowledge (habent absque cognitione), as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.” Cf. Also ST I.103.1 ad 1: “A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man... Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto (quasi ab alio actum vel directum in finem), as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the arrow.” This claim represents a general metaphysical view of natures, and has to do with the natural inclinations shared by all natural substances directed toward a completed or perfected state of final actuality. See Scott MacDonald, “Egoistic Rationalism: Aquinas’s Basis for Christian Morality,” in Michael D. Beaty, ed., Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 331.

248 ST I-II.33.3 co., ad 1, ad 2 and ad 3.

249 ST. I-II.33.3 co: “there is a certain pleasure (delectatio) that is taken in the very act of reason (de ipso actu rationis), as when one takes pleasure (delectatur) in contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure (delectatio) does not hinder (non impedit) the act of reason, but helps it.” Cf. ST I-II.33.4 ad 1: “It is not every pleasure (non omnis delectatio) that hinders (impedit) the act of reason, but only bodily pleasure (sed delectatio corporalis); for this arises, not from the act of reason, but
Good pleasures, morally speaking, are those, whether of the higher or of the lower appetites, which result when a desire comes to rest in its object in accordance with reason.\textsuperscript{250} Thus, Aquinas asserts that the temperate man does not eschew all desires or pleasures, but shuns only those, whether of the body or of reason, that are contrary to reason.\textsuperscript{251} Aquinas is, in this respect, no Platonist or Stoic. For Aquinas, desire and pleasure, including those of the body, are fundamentally ordered toward human good and flourishing, and therefore ought not to be shunned except in the service of other goods.\textsuperscript{252} The pursuit of one’s desires, presuming they are ordered by reason, is all to the good. In fact, following rightly ordered desires is a necessary part of becoming virtuous, and so is integral to moral formation and ethical behavior. To this effect, Paul Gondreau has pointed out the significance of Aquinas’ placement of his discussion of the passions in the moral \textit{secunda pars} of the \textit{Summa Theologiae} from the act of the concupiscible faculty (\textit{actum concupiscibilis}), which act is intensified by pleasure (\textit{delectationem}). On the contrary, pleasure (\textit{delectatio}) that arises from (\textit{consequitur}) the act of reason (\textit{rationis}), strengthens (\textit{fortificat}) the use of reason (\textit{rationis usum}).”

\textsuperscript{250} ST I-II.34.1 co: \textit{in moralibus est quaedam delectatio bona, secundum quod appetitus superior aut inferior requiescit in eo quod convenit rationi.}

\textsuperscript{251} ST I-II.34.1 ad 2: \textit{temperatus non fugit omnes delectationes, sed immoderatas, et rationi non convenientes.}

\textsuperscript{252} So Nicholas Lombardo has stated that “for Aquinas, the ascetic restraint of desire and pleasure is appropriate only to the extent that it serves other desires. He assigns no positive value to the pursuit of deprivation for the sake of deprivation, as though pain and suffering had positive value in themselves. In fact, he judges such behavior to be vicious, as in his treatment of the vice of insensibility. For Aquinas, asceticism is always in the service of a greater good; sacrifice for its own sake is pointless and unethical.” Lombardo, 251. Further, he says that “Aquinas’s method presupposes that human desire is fundamentally oriented toward the good. It does not work without this presupposition. Consequently, it is incompatible with many understandings of the human person – materialist and secular as well as religious – because they lack Aquinas’s confidence in the fundamental orientation of human desire.” \textit{Ibid.}, 237.
instead of in the metaphysical pars prima, where we might reasonably have expected to find it.\footnote{Gondreau states that “Aquinas prefers the moral life, not the more metaphysical study on the human soul, as the backdrop for his study on the emotions. Such a move allows him to drive home the point that the emotions play a necessary first step in our striving for happiness, in our attaining the end of seeing God. Although the passions incline us to the lowest kind of goods, to bodily goods, which cannot bring us complete fulfillment as rational beings, these goods do participate in goodness itself – they are, after all, ‘good.’ These interim lower goods remain ordered ultimately to the perfect and sufficient good (sumnum bonum), to the absolute perfection of God.” He goes further: “By being inclined internally to limited bodily goods, we are already on the road, as it were, to the highest good. We are set on a trajectory, even if only in its initial stages, that has as its ultimate end point God himself. It bears insisting: the life of spiritual and moral excellence is not bereft of the enjoyment of earthly and bodily pleasures. On the contrary, such enjoyment is foundational to the life of holiness and moral perfection. The life of holiness is inclusive of our desires, not at odds with them.” Gondreau, 427-428.} Human desires are what put us on the road toward moral improvement and, ultimately, moral perfection (though this is not strictly attainable in the present life). And since pleasure accompanies the attainment of these goods at which we aim, the function of which is our improvement, pleasure is a sign of the completion of that progress as well as a just reward.\footnote{Thus, Aquinas says that a thing may be necessary to something in one of four ways: it may be a preparation for it, a perfection of it, an aid to attaining it, or attendant upon it. It is in this fourth way that delight (delectatio) is necessary for ultimate happiness (beatitudinem), because it is necessarily caused by the attainment of the ultimate good, that is, it would be impossible to attain the ultimate good and lack delight. ST I-II.4.1 co: Respondeo dicendum quod quadrupliciter aliquid requiritur ad aliud. Uno modo, sicut praeambulum vel praeparatorium ad ipsum, sicut disciplina requiritur ad scientiam. Alio modo, sicut perfunciens aliquid, sicut anima requiritur ad vitam corporis. Tertio modo, sicut coadjuvans extrinsecum, sicut amici requiruntur ad aliquid agendum. Quarto modo, sicut aliquid concomitans, ut si dicamus quod calor requiritur ad ignem. Et hoc modo delectatio requiritur ad beatitudinem. Delectatio enim causatur ex hoc quod appetitus requiescit in bono aepeto. Unde, cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam adeptio summi boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine delectatione concomitante.}

Desires aren’t to be shunned, for without them, it would be impossible for human beings to aim at, much less attain, happiness. And given the centrality of happiness to Aquinas’ psychology, the implication is that desire (and with it pleasure) is incredibly important indeed.
We have seen that desires are fundamentally aimed at the good and so at flourishing, and further that it is the visual good that produces aesthetic pleasure. But why exactly are aesthetic pleasures ordered to human flourishing? In many cases, we desire an object that we see because it is an object that falls under some category of good that we know to be desirable in some other way. So a stag may appear to us as good because it represents food, and that is good for sustaining life. And there may be a kind of pleasure at the sight of the stag, when it is seen as a portent that we are going to be able to feed ourselves and our families. Taken this way, aesthetic pleasure would be simply instrumental and subservient to some other pleasure, e.g., the pleasure of satiating hunger. We may, in this case, perceive the stag as beautiful, but its beauty is not related to its utility as food. It is not because it is edible that it is beautiful. In fact, perceiving the stag as beautiful and perceiving it as dinner are not necessarily related. We may find the stag beautiful, and have no desire to eat it (as may be the case for a vegetarian). We may find the stag beautiful and, on account of its beauty, desire not to eat it (perhaps we think its value as a beautiful object supersedes whatever value it might have as food). Perhaps the stag’s beauty could be lost entirely on an individual, and he may nevertheless still desire to eat it (since it would still be good for the satisfaction of hunger); or he may simply lack any desire to eat it

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255 On the present view, of course, for someone to entirely fail to perceive the beauty of the stag would imply that his character has been ill-formed. I am simply attempting to delimit a range of potential responses, and illustrate the point that one’s aesthetic perception is not inextricably bound to the utility value of the object in question.
(again, considering the case of the vegetarian). The two issues of aesthetic beauty and utility seem to come apart. In many cases, whether I eat the stag or not will not be influenced by the stag’s beauty, but by something else (e.g., hunger, moral values about the ethical status of animals, etc.). So its beauty may not necessarily be taken as a sign of its utility. However, since beautiful things are pleasing to us, beauty is indicative of some kind of good.

In Book II of the Republic, Plato famously delineated three classes of goods: a thing may be good for its own sake (intrinsically good), good for its consequences (i.e., instrumentally good) or the combination of the two. Aquinas also has a threefold division of goods:

“For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of the movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g., a place or form; or a state of resting that thing. Thus, in the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that

256 Though, of course, the physically appealing aspects of any number of objects classified as edible may be a sign of its virtue. A shiny red apple looks more appealing than one that is brown and soft. These physical features are external indicators of the nutritional state of the object. It is in this respect that beauty can serve in an instrumental capacity. But though it can serve this way in some instances, it is not essentially tied to this instrumentality. It is in this respect that we may say that the beauty of the apple attests to the integrity of the apple. Integrity is one of the formal constituents of beauty that we will consider in the next chapter.

257 Plato, Republic II, 357a-d.
sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is called the pleasant.”

We see therefore that, for Aquinas, a key indication that something is good is that it is the object of appetite (that at which appetite aims), so long as it terminates some part of the movement of appetite (either the thing aimed at, which terminates the movement absolutely, or the means to that end, which terminates the movement relatively). So we have a basic classificatory system in which the good is that which terminates the movement of the appetite. If x terminates that movement relatively, then it is called “the useful” (utile). However, if x terminates the movement absolutely, this can be done in two ways: x may terminate the movement as a thing sought for its own sake, in which case it is called “the virtuous” (honestum), or x may terminate the movement by bringing it to a state of rest in the thing desired, in which case it is called “the pleasant” (delectatio). In Aquinas’ classificatory system, what he calls utile

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258 ST I.5.6 co: Nam bonum est aliquid, inquantum est appetibile, et terminus motus appetitus. Cuius quidem motus terminatio considerari potest ex consideratione motus corporis naturalis. Terminatur autem motus corporis naturalis, simpliciter quidem ad ultimum; secundum quid autem etiam ad medium, per quod itur ad ultimum quod terminat motum, et dicitur aliquis terminus motus, inquantum aliquam partem motus terminat. Id autem quod est ultimus terminus motus, potest accipi dupliciter, vel ipsa res in quam tenditur, utpote locus vel forma; vel quies in re illa. Sic ergo in motu appetitus, id quod est appetibile terminans motum appetitus secundum quid, ut medium per quod tenditur in aliud, vocatur utile. Id autem quod appetitur ut ultimum, terminans totaliter motum appetitus, sicut quaedam res in quam per se appetitus tendit, vocatur honestum, quia honestum dicitur quod per se desideratur. Id autem quod terminat motum appetitus ut quies in re desiderata, est delectatio.
apparently overlaps with Plato’s notion of the good that is done solely for the sake of some good consequence; that is, it has merely instrumental value. It appears, however, that the two systems diverge after this, and Aquinas’ classification of goods is, perhaps unsurprisingly, consistent rather with Aristotle’s classification of goods into the useful, the pleasant and the fine (or beautiful).259

Whereas Plato has a fairly simple system, really two kinds of goods along with their combination, Aquinas’ system is a bit more complex. For him, there are two ways for the appetite to terminate absolutely, and it is not, at first glance, clear what the relevant difference is. The example he gives for the virtuous good (the *bonum honestum*) is a place or a form (*locus vel forma*), whereas the example he gives for the pleasant good (*delectatio*) is a state of resting that thing (*quies in re illa*). We might be tempted to suggest that perhaps what he means is that the pleasant relates to a good that is able to assuage the desire without its obtaining its object whereas the virtuous just is the obtaining of that object. But this cannot be the case since, as we have already seen, according to Aquinas, it is when the lover obtains (*peringit*) the object of his desire (*rem amatam*), that the soul achieves a state of rest (*quies*), which state he also characterized as joy (*gaudium*)

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259 See, for instance, NE II.3, 1104b30-34, where Aristotle lists the pleasant (*ἡδός*), the useful (*συμφέρω*), and the fine (*καλόν*) as three objects of desire; but see also the whole of NE VIII, but especially 1156a5-1156b24, where these classes are employed to describe the three sorts of friendship possible among human beings, namely, friendships based on pleasure (*ἡδονή*), friendships based on utility (*χρήσιμος*), and friendships based on virtue (ἀρετή).
or pleasure (*delectatio*).\textsuperscript{260} Additionally, as already stated, for Aquinas “pleasure (*delectatio*) is the end of desire (*finis desiderii*).”\textsuperscript{261} He does qualify this statement regarding the three goods, in his response to the third objection, where he says that these are not all on par; that is, goodness is not univocal in each of these three. Rather, goodness is primarily predicated of the virtuous (*de honesto*), and only analogically of the other two, first of the pleasant (*de delectabili*), and lastly of the useful (*de utili*).\textsuperscript{262} Thus, taking the virtuous (*honestum*) as the object obtained (that at which the appetite was aimed), we can think of both of the other two types of goods as derivative in some way. Whereas the useful (*utile*) is only some means by which the end is obtained or is some point at which the end is partially obtained, the pleasant (*delectatio*) seems either to be the act or the result of obtaining the end itself (*honestum*). And this is consistent with what we have already said about pleasure, namely, that it is a consequence or by-product of obtaining the desired object.

Aquinas’ threefold division of goods turns out to be quite different from that of Plato’s classification. For Aquinas, there is a good that has mere instrumental value, and there is a good that is good for its own sake. So far, this is similar to Plato’s account, but to which Aquinas adds (instead of the

\textsuperscript{260} QD spe, a.3 co. Cf. ST I-II.34.1 co: *Est enim delectatio quies appetitivae virtutis in aliquo bono amato.*

\textsuperscript{261} ST I-II.33.1 ad 2: *delectatio sit finis desiderii.*

\textsuperscript{262} ST I.5.6 ad 3: *Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum non dividitur in ista tria sicut univocum aequaliter de his praedicatum, sed sicut analogum, quod praedicatur secundum prius et posterius. Per prius enim praedicatur de honesto; et secundario de delectabili; tertio de tili.*
combination of the two) the pleasure one has upon obtaining the object of desire. And this is our primary concern, since Aquinas has defined the beautiful as that which pleases when apprehended. As we can now see more clearly, aesthetic pleasure, like all kinds of pleasure, is closely related to the good. Desire is for the good, and when the object of desire (the good) is obtained, a secondary good is produced, which is pleasure. Now it does not seem to matter what sort of good is in question or what sort of appetite, whether these be of sense or intellect, since this description is purely formal; either way, when the object of desire is obtained, pleasure is produced. And when the object of desire that is obtained is a visible good, the pleasure produced is aesthetic pleasure, and the object that gives rise to the pleasure is, on that account, called “beautiful.”

This is not the end of the story, for if we will recall Aquinas’ discussion about the beautiful and its relation to the good in *Summa Theologiae* I.5.4, we ought also to recall the way he distinguishes the two as relates to their causes. There he said that the good, as the object of appetite, has the nature of a final

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263 Nevertheless, some interesting similarities remain. For instance, on Plato’s classification, the third class of goods, namely, those that are both good for their own sake as well as good for some consequence is considered by Socrates to be the highest class of goods, and it is to this class of goods that he assigns justice (and, presumably, the other virtues as well for the same sorts of reasons). Here we may note that Aquinas places beauty in his third class of goods, to which we may add that he elsewhere has identified beauty with virtue (see, e.g., ST II-II.145.1). Since, following Augustine, Aquinas considers the virtues among the highest class of goods, therefore he must also, by implication, consider beauty among the highest class of goods as well. This implies that the disagreement between the two accounts is merely superficial, and that, in fact, Aquinas’ view is much closer to Plato’s than it seems here.

264 It is on account of being a visible (or presumably also auditory) that it receives the appelation of “beautiful,” though it is not exclusively so for, on Aquinas’ account, such an object is also called “good” and, if an act or something that perfects an at, it will be called “virtuous” as well.
cause, while the beautiful relates to the cognitive faculty, and so has the nature of a formal cause. What does he mean by his suggestion that beauty relates to the cognitive faculty, and what is its significance? Key to understanding this is his discussion of proportion, which will not receive a thorough treatment until chapter four. For now, we will simply assert that what is visually well proportioned is pleasing to sight because sight itself (along with all of the external senses) is itself a kind of proportion. “The senses,” he says, “delight (delectatur) in things duly proportioned (debita proportione), as in what is after their own kind – because every sense is a kind of ratio, just as is every cognitive faculty.” In other words, the senses are made to fit with the objects of sense, just as we have said in the second chapter. On this view, the recognition of proportionality in an object is simply the recognition of the intrinsic goodness or the degree of perfection of that object compared to its ideal or archetype, and cognized under the aspect of the visible.

The senses, furthermore, are here classified as cognitive faculties (to the extent that they relate to ratio, either the ratio of the creature or, as with non-

265 ST I.5.4 ad 1: Nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem.

266 Ibid.: Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent. Unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis virtus cognosciiva. Et quia cognition fit per assimilationem, similitudo autem respicit formam, pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis.

267 Ibid.: ...quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis virtus cognosciiva. The Fathers of the English Dominican Province translate ratio here as “reason,” but it is unclear whether it is best translated as “reason” or as “ratio” (which is suggested by the use of proportio). For this reason, I am leaving it untranslated.
rational creatures, the ratio of the creator). They are not merely passive recipients, but are directive. This ought to be familiar from our discussion of the passive and active intellect in the second chapter. There is an active cognitive function in play with respect to objects of sensation. It is for this reason that we are able to perceive objects under various aspects, including, what is of importance here, what appears under the aspect of the good or of the beautiful. Indeed, it is clear that Aquinas holds that these are grounded in the same object, since he says that “beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty.”\textsuperscript{268} There is, of course, intense debate about whether Aquinas held that beauty was a transcendental along with the good,\textsuperscript{269} but, perhaps surprisingly and significantly, for our purposes here, the outcome of this debate is not significant.

Even if Aquinas does not consider beauty a transcendental on par with the other transcendental notions, it is clear that he holds it to be at least an aspect or mode of the good, as has already been asserted. We ought, therefore, to expect that we shall find beauty wherever we find goodness, though the beauty of an

\textsuperscript{268} Ib.	extsuperscript{bid}: pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut pulchrum.

object will not be identical with its goodness, but rather with its goodness as perceived in some way, whether that perception be via the senses or the intellect. If beauty turns out to be a transcendental in the strict sense, beauty will, like goodness, express an intelligible feature of being. If not a transcendental in the strict sense, beauty would nevertheless express an intelligible feature of goodness. In either case, wherever you find goodness you will also find beauty; and perceiving an object under the aspect of the beautiful is a cognitive function.

But then a puzzle arises here, for the good also must be apprehended in part through the use of a cognitive faculty. Indeed, this was implied when Aquinas said that beauty and goodness “are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty.”\(^{270}\) It would seem then not that beauty is apprehended under one aspect, namely, the aspect of form, and goodness under another, namely, the aspect of end, as though these were completely separate. Rather, beauty is apprehended under the aspect of form, but goodness is apprehended under the aspects of both form and end. This means that understanding the nature and role of the formal constituents of beauty is going to be central to an appreciation of Aquinas’ account of beauty. This is the subject of the next chapter. Before turning to that discussion, however, I wish to briefly consider whether there is any analog in Aquinas’ account of

\(^{270}\) ST I.5.4 ad 1: *pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut pulchrum.*
beauty to what has come to be known, in contemporary discussions of aesthetics, as disinterested pleasure.

3.7 On Disinterested Pleasure and Desire

Pleasure is important primarily because of its necessity as a constituent of happiness, as has already been shown. We have seen that, for Aquinas, delight is intimately related to the satisfaction of desire. And desire is what moves us toward the good ends without which a happy life would be impossible. Achieving the good object, coupled with awareness of it, produces pleasure. In rational beings, this is a particular kind of pleasure he calls fruitio. It is the fruit or product of the satisfaction of desire. Regarding the notion of fruit (fructus), he says that it has two implications: “first that it should come last; second that it should calm (quietet) the appetite (appetitum) with a certain sweetness (dulcedine) and delight (delectatione).” Pleasure, taken as the fruit of desire, therefore seems inescapably “interested.” It is reasonable then to wonder whether it is possible (or, alternatively, anachronistic), to attribute to Aquinas’ account of beauty the notion that today goes by the appellation of “disinterested desire.”

Edgar De Bruyne noted that “Aquinas agrees with Aristotle and Cicero that most of the pleasures of taste are biological, practical, and egotistical” while

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271 ST I-II.4.1 co.

272 ST I-II.11.3 co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad rationem fructus duo pertinent, scilicet quod sit ultimum; et quod appetitum quietet quadam dulcedine vel delectatione.
maintaining, in contrast, that “the pleasures of the eyes... are disinterested and esthetic.” What does De Bruyne mean by referring to aesthetic pleasures as “disinterested?” In an attempt to provide an answer to this question, Eco suggests that disinterested pleasure is “pleasure which is its own end, which is not connected with the satisfaction of animal needs or with utility.” The textual justification Eco gives in support of this suggestion refers the reader to two short statements about the nature of play, both in the *Summa Theologiae*. On the basis of these two passages, Eco claims that Aquinas’ notion of play is paradigmatically disinterested.

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274 The focus here on disinterested pleasure or desire should not be confused with the notion, familiar to aesthetic theorists, of disinterested attention, which is a characterization of aesthetic experience as involving a certain sort of attention, namely, one which is free of personal investment. It is a technical term for a specialized form of attention. Of concern to us here is whether the pleasure involved in an aesthetic experience is disinterested, not whether one’s attention to the object of aesthetic experience is disinterested. In any case, Noël Carrol has argued that the notion of disinterested attention is a mistaken one. Proponents of the concept have conflated the notions of attention and motivation; and when these two notions are pulled apart, the concept of attention that remains is not distinguishable from simple attention. For more on this discussion, see Carrol’s *Philosophy of Art: A Contemporary Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), chapter 4, especially pp. 182-189. Cf. Noël Carrol, “Art and Interaction,” in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* XLV, 1 (1986): 57-68.

275 Eco (1988), 17. This is in contrast with more contemporary notions of disinterest, which generally relate to one’s own benefit. One such definition is given by J. C. Maxwell, who defines disinterested desire as “one whose object is something other than a future state of the person desiring.” J. C. Maxwell, “Disinterested Desires,” in *Mind*, New Series 52 (1943), 39. Such contemporary views of disinterested desire may receive some inspiration from Kant’s characterization of disinterested judgments in his third *Critique*, where he suggests that an aesthetic judgment, for example, “does not in itself even ground any interest.” Kant, *KU* §2, 5:205n (91).
The first reference is to a passage the context of which is a discussion regarding the end of man, specifically, whether whatever man wills, he wills for the sake of the last end. In response to the first objection, which suggests jesting as a counterexample to the assertion that all things are ordered to a last end (since jests are not serious, but all things ordered to a last end must be of a serious nature, that is, they must be useful), Aquinas replies: “Actions done jestingly (actiones ludicrae) are not directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the jester (ad bonum ipsius ludentis), in so far as they afford him pleasure or relaxation (delectantes vel requiem). But man’s consummate good is his last end (bonum autem consummatum hominis est ultimus finis eius).” This is an instance of play (ludo), which Eco describes as “an activity whose end is its own fulfillment, and which causes a psychic relief necessary for our biological rhythms.”

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276 ST I-II.1 pr: Sexto, utrum homo ordinet omnia in ultimum finem.

277 ST I-II.1.6 ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actiones ludicrae non ordinantur ad aliquem finem extrinsecum; sed tamen ordinantur ad bonum ipsius ludentis, prout sunt delectantes vel requiem praestantes. Bonum autem consummatum hominis est ultimus finis eius.

278 Eco (1988), 17. Johan Huizanga similarly defines the “disinterestedness,” with respect to play (ludo), as standing outside of “ordinary life,” that is, “outside the immediate satisfaction of wants and appetites, indeed it interrupts the appetitive process. It interpolates itself as a temporary activity satisfying in itself and ending there…. An intermezzo, an interlude in our daily lives.” Johan Huizanga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (London: Routledge, 2008), 9. Originally published as Homo Ludens: Versuch einer Bestimmung des Spielelementes der Kultur (Köln: Akademische Verlagsanstalt Pantheon, 1938). This represents the second of Huizinga’s three formal constituents of play, that of being outside of “real” life. The other two formal characteristics of play are its freedom and its limited scope. Ibid., 8-9. That is, first, all true play is done freely, uncoerced. This is why the notion of “professional sport” is oxymoronic. The same goes for the ancient gladiatorial games in which the primary participants were slaves. Lastly, play is confined in both space and time. Play has a confined space, often involving formal boundaries, and it is of limited duration, having both a beginning and an ending. It is on account of these formal characteristics that Huizinga justifies his central thesis that human culture is an extension of play, citing, as an example, the realm of the sacred, or ritual, which incorporates all
Because play has no other end but the good of the acting subject, and the good of the subject is ultimately ordered to the last end, namely happiness, play is also so ordered. It therefore requires no external justification, but rather is an end in itself, good in itself. Eco calls this sort of pleasure “disinterested” because it is not ordered to some merely intermediary (or instrumental) good. It is intrinsically valuable; yet because it is also a constituent of human happiness, being ordered to the last end, it is a good that points beyond itself.279

The second reference is to a passage occurring in the context of a discussion regarding virtues and vices, specifically those relating to movements of the body. The question here addressed is whether there can be any virtue associated with play.280 Aquinas’ opinion on this matter is that just as the body needs rest from its labor, on account of its finite nature, so the soul also needs occasional rest from its labor, since the works of reason, no less than the works of

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279 Play, therefore, satisfies Plato’s conception of the highest class of goods, namely, being both good for its own sake (an end in itself) and good for its consequences (a means to a greater good). Cf. Republic, 357a-d.

280 ST II-II.168 pr: utrum possit esse aliqua virtus circa actiones ludi.
the body, are wearisome to man.281 He says that “the soul’s rest is pleasure (delectatio)” and so “the remedy for weariness of soul must needs consist in the application for some pleasure, by slackening the tension of the reason’s study.”282 And such rest for the soul, wherein the soul seeks no further end than its own delight (dilectatio animalis), is called playful (ludicra) or humorous (iocosa).283 And since play can be regulated by reason, through employing means in conformity with modesty, therefore, play can be a virtue.284 In fact, he says, as a virtue, play is subsumed under the category of modesty.285

There is at least one qualification, however, that we must take note of with respect to play. In his reply to the second objection, based on a saying by John Chrysostom that the devil is the author of fun (ludo), Aquinas states that the object of Chrysostom’s worry was about the “inordinate use of fun” (inordinate ludis utuntur) and not fun itself.286 His primary caution here involves those who

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281 ST II-II.168.2.co: sicut autem fatigatio corporalis solvitur per corporis quietem, ita etiam aportet quod fatigatio animalis solvatur per animae quietem.

282 ST II-II.168.2 co: Quies autem animae est delectatio, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Et ideo oportet remedium contra fatigationem animalem adhibere per aliquam delectationem, intermissa intentione ad insistendum studio rationis.

283 ST II-II.168.2 co: Huiusmodi autem dicta vel facta, in quibus non quæritur nisi dilectatio animalis, vocantur ludicra vel iocosa. This, again, is one of Huizinga’s formal characteristics of play, namely, that it steps outside of “real” life, having no extrinsic end. Huizinga (2008), 8-9.

284 ST II-II.168.2 co: Huiusmodi autem secundum regulam rationis ordinantur. Habitus autem secundum rationem operans est virtus moralis. Et ideo circa ludos potest esse aliqua virtus.

285 ST II-II.168.2 co: sub modestia continetur.

286 What the Fathers of the English Dominican Province here translate as “fun” is ludo, what Huizinga and Eco translate as “play.” Huizinga challenges the identification of fun and play. Fun, he implies, is a characteristic of play, itself unanalyzable and irreducible to “any other
would “make the pleasure of games their end” (praecipue eorum qui finem in delectation ludi constituant).

Apparently, Chrysostom conceived of play as something that ought to be properly directed at some further end. Is this also Aquinas’ view? If so, then it would seem to contradict his saying that pleasure is an end in itself.

First of all, I do not think that we need to read Aquinas as endorsing Chrysostom’s view. It seems reasonable to take him to be merely clarifying the view. However, even if we do take this to represent Aquinas’ view as well, we need not take him to be denying that play (or even the pleasure of play) is a proper end in itself, but rather that it is the inordinate use of the pleasure of play that is not a proper end of man, and that the inordinate use of pleasure is particularly characteristic of those who do make the pleasure of games an end in itself. In his third reply, he says: “playful actions themselves considered in their species are not directed to an end; but the pleasure derived from such actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and accordingly if this be done

\[\begin{align*}
\text{mental category.} & \quad \text{He notes that he is unaware of any other modern language has an exact equivalent of the English word “fun.” Huizinga (2008), 3.}
\end{align*}\]

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\end{align*}\]
with moderation, it is lawful to make use of fun.” In this passage, Aquinas is asserting that the end of play is “recreation and rest of the soul” (\textit{animae recreationem et quietem}). And we have already seen that the soul’s rest is its repose in the good, which produces pleasure or enjoyment; and the attainment of the good, though not necessarily the pleasure produced by this attainment, is the soul’s proper aim. Understood this way, there does not seem to be any contradiction within his view.

It therefore seems clear, from what he says in this article, that Aquinas views the pleasure of play as an end in itself, which when undertaken in the right sort of way, has a virtuous character. Play is an intrinsic good of both body and soul. It is no mere instrumental means to some other benefit (though it may also be that). As such, Eco’s characterization of the sort of pleasure that we derive from play as disinterested seems fitting. Eco gives a further insight into what he takes the disinterested nature of such pleasure to be when he comments that it, like disinterested contemplation, is “not a response to some compulsion rooted in the exigencies of life, but is rather a higher activity appropriate to a spiritual

\footnotesize{288 ST II-II.168.2 ad 3: \textit{Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsae operationes ludi, secundum suam speciem, non ordinantur ad aliquem finem. Sed delectatio quae in talibus actibus habetur, ordinatur ad quandam animae recreationem et quietem. Et secundum hoc, si moderate fiat, licet uti ludo.} An implication of this characterization of the nature of the goodness of play is that it would seem to exclude any notion of “professional sport.” Not that professional sports are absolutely ruled out from being classed as one sort of good or another, but that the goodness of professional sport is different from the goodness of recreational play. However similar these are in outward form, there is nonetheless a very significant difference between an activity whose goodness is derived from the end of leisure and professional sport whose end may be fame, wealth, honor or simply competition in general. For we must recall that, for Aquinas, the character of an object or activity is derived from its end.}
creature.” In fact, in commenting on the opening passage of Boethius’ *De Hebdomadibus*, Aquinas, drawing on a passage from *Ecclesiasticus*, compares play (*ludo*) to the contemplation of Wisdom (*contemplatio sapientiae*). Here, Aquinas says:

Just as the contemplation of Wisdom requires taking possession of one’s own mind beforehand in order to fill one’s whole house with the contemplation of Wisdom, so, too, through intention one must be totally within, lest attention be drawn to diverse things. And therefore he adds: *and there call them in*, that is, there gather together your whole attention. Thus, once the interior of the house has been totally emptied, and through attention one is totally present in it, he explains what must be done by adding: *and there play*. Here one must consider that the contemplation of Wisdom is suitably compared to play on two counts, each of which is to be found in play. First, because play is delightful and the contemplation of Wisdom possesses maximum delight, whence *Ecclesiasticus* {30} XXIV <27> says by the mouth of Wisdom: “My spirit is sweet above honey.” Second, because things done in play are not ordered to anything else, but are sought for their own sake, and this same trait belongs to the delights of Wisdom.

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289 Eco, loc. cit., 17.


Here, we see that Aquinas considers these two comparable because, first, they are both delightful: play is delightful (*ludus delectabilis est*), and contemplation of Wisdom possesses maximum delight (*contemplatio sapientiae maximam delectationem habet*); and, second, because they are both ends in themselves, sought for their own sakes (*propter se quaeruntur*), not ordered to some other end (*non ordinantur ad aliud*). Of course, it remains to be seen whether we can rightfully attribute this same disinterested nature to the pleasure that is involved as an essential constituent in beauty.

In order to justify the move from the disinterested nature of the pleasure we receive in play to the disinterested nature of the pleasure we receive in aesthetic vision, Eco refers to the way that aesthetic pleasure differs from most of our other sorts of pleasures, which have primarily to do with touch. All of these pleasures, as tactile pleasures, are governed by temperance and it is in the context of a discussion on the nature of temperance that Eco bases his observations on the disinterested nature of aesthetic pleasure.\(^{292}\) That is, those pleasures that we might call “interested” are, again, associated with biological needs. These are the sorts of needs that human beings share with many members of the animal kingdom, and are related to survival.\(^{293}\) They would include the

\(^{292}\) ST II-II.141.4 co: *Unde relinquitur quod temperantia sit circa delectationes tactus.* Cf. Aristotle, NE 1118a24-25.

\(^{293}\) Huizinga points out that play, at a fundamental level, is common both to man and other animals. He rejects the view that, in either case, play is essentially connected to promoting skills
pleasures of food, drink, and reproduction. This observation essentially parallels Aquinas’ division of the senses of sight and sound from the remaining senses, which are all associated with touch. The essential difference between the two groups is the relationship between the senses and reason. Aquinas has stated, as already noted, that sights and sounds are called beautiful, but not tastes or odors, since only sight and sound are significantly related to reason. Those things we call beautiful, whether sights or sounds, are beautiful precisely because of the particular way in which their goodness is apprehended, namely, through cognition, for the beautiful is what calms desire by being seen or known (ad rationem pulchri pertinent quod in eius aspect seu cognition quietetur appetitus). This connection to cognition provides the justification for placing the pleasures of sight and of sound into a separate category from the rest, just as it provides the justification for classifying them as disinterested in the way just explained.

Eco refers the reader to a passage in which Aquinas discusses the difference between the pleasure that a lion experiences from that experienced by necessary for survival. He notes that many attempts have been made to ground play in terms of some biological function. These all have in common that they all “start from the assumption that play must serve something which is not play.” He states that if any one of them were really decisive, it would “either exclude all the others or comprehend them in a higher unity.” This, he asserts, is not the case; rather, their answers tend to overlap rather than exclude one another. He adds that “as a rule they leave the primary quality of play as such, virtually untouched.”

Huizinga (2008), 2.

294 ST I-II.27.1 ad 3.

295 Ibid.
a human being in seeing a stag. When the lion sees the stag, he sees it as a predator in view of his prey. His pleasure is that of one whose hunger is soon to be satisfied. In this sense, a human being is capable of experiencing the same sort of pleasure, if he is hungry and in possession of sufficient skill to warrant optimism at the sight of the stag in that circumstance. But there is another sort of pleasure, which the man, when not adopting the stance of the predator, may experience, but of which presumably the lion is never capable. This is aesthetic pleasure, or pleasure at the sight of an animal which is beautiful to behold. The object of aesthetic pleasure is not enjoyed because of any biological need that it might be thought to satisfy, but because of the pleasure experienced by the perceiver in the mere apprehension of its physical qualities. The aesthetic pleasure represents an appreciation of exceptional physical beauty or prowess that ends in the experienced enjoyment, that does not, in other words, see that beauty or prowess as useful to the perceiver in any way beyond the immediate pleasure which is evoked in the perception. The difference is in how the pleasure is connected to other, specifically biological, needs. For the lion, or even the hungry man, the pleasure is directly connected to the notion of satisfying hunger. We might say, to modify an expression of which Aquinas is fond, that the stag, viewed from the perspective of the predator, is viewed under the aspect of food.

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296 ST II-II.141.4 ad 3.
In a case of aesthetic perception, the stag is viewed under the aspect of the beautiful. To quote Aquinas,

Hence, whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake.\textsuperscript{297}

To view aesthetic pleasure this way is not to view the subject as uninterested in the object of pleasure, but rather to be interested in a certain way, to have an impartial interest.\textsuperscript{298} It is a universalized sort of interest, divorced from any idiosyncratic need or perspective of the individual; an interest that a rational being in any time or place could in principle share. That is, it is an interest that springs from reason rather than from any bodily desire. Aesthetic pleasure, we find again, is something that can properly be enjoyed only by rational beings. The objects of aesthetic pleasure are not enjoyed merely for their instrumental value. Nor are they enjoyed merely for being sensorily pleasurable, though aesthetic pleasure begins with the senses, and arises out of formal qualities that are sensorily perceived. It is to the formal qualities that we must now turn our attention.

\textsuperscript{297} ST I.91.3 ad 3: \textit{Unde, cum cetera animalia non delectentur in sensibilibus nisi per ordinem ad cibos et venerea, solus homo delectatur in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilium secundum seipsam.}

\textsuperscript{298} Roger Scruton, \textit{Beauty} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 28. This is the view that Scruton attributes to Kant. He conceives what he calls “disinterested interest” to be the fundamental motivation for Kantian moral judgment, asserting that “[f]rom that posture of disinterested enquiry we are led inexorably, Kant thought, to the categorical imperative.” \textit{Ibid.}
CHAPTER 4

OBJECTIVE COMPONENTS OF BEAUTY

4.1 On the Formal Constitutive Elements of Beauty

In Aquinas, we find two different conceptions of beauty, each of which has an ancient pedigree. Edgar De Bruyne classifies these two different conceptions as *l’esthétique musicale* and *l’esthétique de la luminiere.*¹ The first of these concerns the aesthetic of proportion (i.e., spatial proportion, such as in the relation of parts to wholes, architectural proportion, and the like; or temporal proportion, such as in the interval between musical notes, etc.). The second concerns the aesthetic of light (i.e., light and color). De Bruyne traces the first of these back to a Pythagorean myth, transmitted to the thinkers of the Middle Ages by Boethius, which tells the story of Pythagoras, passing a forge, and noting the harmonious sounds produced by striking hammers of differing weights on the anvil.² Thus, the story goes, was born the aesthetic of proportion. The second

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type defines beauty as “radiance, splendor, and brilliance” which are, according to De Bruyne, “the chief characteristics of Plato’s forms.” As such, this aesthetic sees beauty primarily as an intelligible quality. De Bruyne asserts that these two “theories” of beauty were held to be in opposition, and that it was an aim of writers in the thirteenth century to attempt a reconciliation of the two.

It has long been noted that attempts to describe beauty in terms of formal or structural qualities have dominated the scene. This view, or cluster of views, has been described, in a unified way, as the “Great Theory” of beauty. This theory, which has its origins in ancient Greek thought, “declared that beauty consists in the proportions of the parts, more precisely in the proportions and arrangements of the parts, or, still more precisely, in the size, equality, and

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3 Ibid., 16.

4 Ibid., 59. De Bruyne asserts that Bonaventure (following the Cistercians and the School of Chartres), sacrifices light to proportion, while Thomas of Vercell sacrifices proportion to light. Others simply seek to juxtapose the two, while Robert Grosseteste derived both color and proportion from the more fundamental energy of light. Cf. De Bruyne (1946), vol. II, 47; III, 59. Likewise, Eco states that the aesthetics of proportion, as an aesthetics of multiples, when applied to God, an indivisible perfection, contained “the seeds of a contradiction,” a contradiction between an aesthetics of quantity and an aesthetics of quality. It is to accommodate the beauty of simples (e.g., light and color), which are ostensibly left out of an aesthetics of proportion, that the aesthetics of light was invented. Eco (1986), 43-44.

5 This expression, as far as I can tell, originated with Władysław Tatarkiewicz. See, for example, his “The Great Theory of Beauty and Its Decline,” in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 31 (1972): 165-180. For Tatarkiewicz, the Great Theory consists primarily of proportio, and secondarily of various modifications, one of which is claritas. He does not mention integritas in this account, and the reason is made clear in his later History of Aesthetics, where he notes that the addition of integritas was an innovation by Aquinas, and one which is not well-developed. Władysław Tatarkiewicz, History of Aesthetics, Volume II, translated by Adam and Ann Czerniawski (London and New York: Continuum International Publishing, 2005), 253. Beyond the Great Theory’s impressive dominance and breadth of scope in aesthetics, Tatarkiewicz also asserts its singular prominence as a general cultural theory. “There have been few theories in any branch of European culture which have endured so long or commanded such widespread recognition.” Ibid., 167.
number of the parts and their interrelationships."\(^6\) This view, namely, the aesthetic of proportion, has been traced back as far as Pythagoras, in its narrowest form, namely, that focusing solely on mathematical proportion, and endorsed to one degree or another by both Plato and Aristotle.\(^7\) The aesthetic of proportion view can still be found operative today, outside of professional philosophical circles at least, having survived a number of accretions, notably the inclusion of “brilliance” or “splendor” (adopted from the competing view, namely, the aesthetic of light) as well as the concept of “integrity” or “perfection,” which may, in fact, be a simple refinement of the proportion view since the notion of integrity seems to be a version of the proportion view, considered from the viewpoint of the whole rather than from the perspective of the relative parts. Aquinas’ view of beauty falls squarely into a tradition that descends from both of these ancient pedigrees, and he endorses the presence of three formal constituents: *proportio*, *claritas* and *integritas*. He says,

> For beauty includes three conditions, integrity or perfection (*integritas sive perfectio*), since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due proportion or harmony (*proportio sive consonantia*); and lastly, brightness, or clarity (*claritas*), whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color.\(^8\)

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\(^7\) Aristotle, *Met.* XIII.3, 1078a33-b2; Plato, *Timaeus* 53-54.

\(^8\) ST I.39.8 co: *Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, integritas sive perfectio, quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas, unde quae habent colorum nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur.* This is the only reference to all three elements in Aquinas. Whereas he often speaks of *proportio* and *claritas* together (e.g., *In de div. nom.* IV, lec. 5), nowhere else does he include *integritas* as well. This may be due, in part, to the long tradition,
The immediate textual context wherein these conditions of beauty are enumerated by Aquinas is a question regarding the Trinitarian nature of God’s essence, specifically, whether the church fathers (specifically, Hilary) have accurately characterized the various relationships holding between the members of the Holy Trinity: Father (eternity), Son (species) and Holy Spirit (use). Aquinas states that whatever knowledge of God is possible for the human intellect must be attained solely through its knowledge of creatures and through extending from Cicero through Augustine, of pairing (and limiting the formal elements to) the two ancient aesthetic strands inaugurated by Pythagoras ( proportio ) and Plotinus ( claritas ). Cf. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. VI.13; Augustine De civitate Dei, CXXII.19; XI.22. The source for integritas is unknown, though it is possible that it stems from the same Pythagorean tradition that gave Aquinas proportio . One possible source is Vitruvius’ De architecture, Book I, cap. 2, § 5: Decor autem est emendatus operis aspectus probatis rebus compositi cum auctoritate. Is perficitur statione, quod graece ἐξάρχηθε ἐγγίζει, seu consuetudine aut natura. The word decor is sometimes translated “propriety” (as it is in the translation by Morris Hicky Morgan) or as “consistency” (as it is in the translation by Joseph Gwilt). Because of its ambiguity, some translators simply transliterate it as “decor” (as in the translation by Frank Granger). All of these attempt to express the notion of “aptness” or “fit” that is suggested by the context of the passage. Vitruvius, The Architecture of Marcus Vitruvius Pollio, translated by Joseph Gwilt (London: Priestly and Weale, 1826); Vitruvius, The Ten Books on Architecture, translated by Morris Hicky Morgan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914); and Vitruvius, On Architecture (De architectura), Volume I: Books 1-5 translated by Frank Granger (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931). This interpretation is consonant with John Haldane’s interpretation of Aquinas’ three formal constituents of beauty, namely, that “the thing in question must be possessed of the elements or aspects apt to something having the relevant form or nature ( integritas ), these elements must be properly related to one another ( proportio ), and these states must be manifest when the entity is perceived or contemplated ( claritas ).” John Haldane, “Aquinas, Thomas,” in Steven Davies, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Robert Hopkins, Robert Stecker, and David E. Cooper, eds., A Companion to Aesthetics, second edition (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 146. On Haldane’s interpretation, then, integritas seems to be a variety of proportion, viz., it is the fit between a thing and its form, or ideal. As we will see, it is likely that Aquinas views integritas the same way, namely, as a kind of proportio .

The wider context is Aquinas’ Treatise de Deo, which comprises QQ. 2-43 of the pars prima. This treatise is further broken down into two parts: de Deo uno (QQ. 2-26) and de Deo trino (QQ. 27-43). These can be further subdivided thus: the divine essence (QQ. 2-11), knowing and naming God (QQ. 12-13), the divine operations (QQ. 14-26), the divine relations (QQ. 27-28), naming and knowing the divine persons (QQ. 29-32), and the divine persons (QQ. 33-43). Our passage falls into this last section on the divine persons. Cf. Catherine M. LaCugna, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), chapter five.
the mode derived from creatures,\textsuperscript{10} and so for his investigation into the three persons of the Trinity, he will adopt the same method used in the investigation of creatures. The first point to be considered in the investigation into any creature, and the only one that is relevant here, is “the thing itself taken absolutely, considered as a being.”\textsuperscript{11} It is here, in a discussion of God conceived absolutely in his being (\textit{consideratur absolute Deus secundum esse suum}), that the three formal conditions of beauty (\textit{proportio}, \textit{integritas}, and \textit{claritas}) are mentioned. Aquinas inherits a division of the godhead that originated with St. Hilary, the fourth century Bishop of Poitiers, as follows: “\textit{eternity} is appropriated to the Father, \textit{species} to the Son, \textit{use} to the Holy Ghost.”\textsuperscript{12}

The enumeration of the three conditions of beauty falls under the discussion of the Son taken analogically as “species or beauty,” for Aquinas says, “[s]pecies or beauty (\textit{species}...\textit{sive pulchritudo}) has a likeness (\textit{similitudinem}) to the property of the Son (\textit{filii}).”\textsuperscript{13} That Aquinas is speaking analogically is clear from the fact that he has just described the Father in terms of \textit{eternity}, which he says is “a being without a principle” which “has a likeness (\textit{similitudinem}) to the

\begin{enumerate}
\item[	extsuperscript{10}] ST I.39.8 co: \textit{Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus noster, qui ex creaturis in Dei cognitionem manuducitur, oportet quod Deum consideret secundum modum quem ex creaturis assumit.}
\item[	extsuperscript{11}] ST I.39.8 co: \textit{Nam primo, consideratur res ipsa absolute, inquantum est ens quodam.}
\item[	extsuperscript{13}] Ibid.: \textit{Species autem, sive pulchritudo, habet similitudinem cum propriis filii.} It is clear that Aquinas consideres \textit{species} and \textit{pulchritudo} to be synonyms.
\end{enumerate}

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property of the Father.” The use of the term similitudinem is a key indication that analogy is intended. Aquinas does not intend the reader to take it that the Son is a species (in the contemporary usage of that term, meaning a division) of God any more than the Father is taken to be the eternity of God since, according to what Aquinas has said elsewhere, all three persons of the Trinity are equally eternal. The sense of species common in the Middle Ages, is that of appearance.

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14 Ibid.: eternitas enim, inquantum significat esse non principiatum, similitudinem habet cum proprio patris, qui est principium non de principio.

15 Reference to “likeness” (similitudinem), as in the familiar phrase “image and likeness” (imaginem et similitudinem), referring to the creation of human kind, has a long commentary tradition. Even those doctors of the church who did not write commentaries on the book of Genesis, in which is found the scriptural source of the phrase, still found occasion to discuss it. Aquinas is an example, frequently referring to Genesis 1:26-27. Typically quoting the entire phrase, he nevertheless typically focuses on the meaning of “image,” suggesting that he considers these parallel terms. Of the “image” which man shares with God, he says that it has to do with the rational soul (rationem et intellectum) rather than the body (ST I.3.1 ad 2), that it has to do with the proximity of man to God as opposed to other animals, who are said rather to be “according to their kind” which signifies their remoteness (remota) from the divine image (ST I.72 ad 3). There is, likewise, a greater distance between the likeness of God in man and the likeness of God the Father in the Son, who is the perfect image of God (ST I.93.1 obj. 2). Aquinas considers an objection to the idea that man is made in the image of God based on Colossians I:15, namely, that only the “First-Begotten” (primogenitus omnis creaturae), namely the Son, is the “image of the invisible God” (imago Dei invisibilis). To this, Aquinas responds (ST I.93.1 ad 2), saying that “The First-Born of creatues (primo genitus omnis creaturae) is the perfect Image of God (imago Dei perfecta), reflecting perfectly (perfecte implens) that of which He is the Image (cuius imago est), and so He is said to be the Image (imago), and never to the image (ad imaginem). But man is said to be both image (imago) by reason of the likeness (propter similitudinem); and to the image (ad imaginem) by reason of the imperfect likeness (property imperfectionem similitudinis).” This response is owing, in part, to the authority of Augustine, whom Aquinas quotes as having said that “Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an image” (ubi est imago, continuo est et similitudo; sed ubi est similitudo, non continuo est imago). ST I.93.1 co. Cf. Augustine, De diversis questionibus octoginta tribus, Q. 74. Commenting on this statement, Aquinas concludes that “likeness is essential to image” and that “an image adds something to likeness – namely, tht it is copied from something else.” Ibid. Nevertheless, it is clear that in the case of the Son, the copy is perfect, lacking nothing that is found in the exemplar. The exactness of the image or likeness in the Son is owing, presumably, from the fact that the Son is “begotten” of the Father, a relation not shared with any other being.

16 See, for example, his tacit endorsement of Athanasius’ formulation of the co-eternity of the individual members of the trinity at ST I.10.2 sc: Sed contra est quod dicit Athanasius, aeternus pater, aeternus filius, aeternus spiritus sanctus, and again at ST I.42.2 sc: Sed contra est quod Athanasius dicit,
or aspect; but its denotation in this passage, under the influence of Augustine, is even narrower, namely, “beauty.”

The common meaning of *species* in the Middle Ages, popular well before the time of Aquinas and still in vogue in his lifetime, was the notion of projection or appearance. Thus, the Son is literally the “projection” or “manifestation” of the Father, and in this sense the Son is likened to the beauty of the Father.

In order to see how Aquinas relates beauty especially to the Son, it may be instructive to first see how he relates eternity especially to the Father, since he clearly attributes eternity to all three members of the Trinity.

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17 “Appearance” is the primary meaning, in fact, deriving from the verb *specio*, “to look.” *Species*, as a kind or division in the contemporary sense, is also derived from this fundamental use since the primary basis on which simple divisions are made is similarity of appearances. The use of *species* to mean “beauty” also relates primarily to its association with appearance. For Aquinas’ attribution to Augustine of its meaning as “beauty,” see Aquinas, *Responsio ad magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis de 108 articulis* (hereafter *De 108 articulis*) Q. 57: *Augustinus autem speciem interpretatur pulcritudinem.* The reference seems to be to Augustine, *De trinitate* VI.10 [11]: *In qua imagine speciem nominavit, credo, propter pulchritudinem.*


19 ST I.10.2 sc: “Athanasius says in his Creed: The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal.” Cf. ST I.42.2 co: “We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father.”
sense in which the Father is said to be similar to the principle of eternity that is not true of the other two persons of the Trinity. Aquinas says that *eternity* has a particular meaning (*significat*) of “a being without a principle” which is akin to (*similitudinem*) the property of the Father. There is a feature of the Father that is uniquely without a principle or, as he puts it, “a principle without a principle” (*principium non de principio*). In keeping with the reference to eternity, I think it is best to take *principio* as meaning here simply “beginning” or “origin,” which is its primary meaning. Thus, we should understand the claim to be that the Father is essentially a beginning-less beginning, which is equivalent, I take it, to

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20 ST I.39.8 co: *Aeternitas enim, inquantum significat esse non principiatum, similitudinem habet cum proprio patris, qui est principium non de principio.*

21 That this interpretation is warranted is supported by the fact that Aquinas, four lines later, will refer the reader to a saying by Augustine on the Trinity, in which passage Augustine makes a similar claim regarding a famous passage by Hilary (“no mean authority”) on the same triadic metaphor for the trinity, namely, *aeternitatis, speciei* and *usus*. There Augustine says that by “eternity” is meant only that the Father has no father. Augustine, *De trinitate* VI.10 [11]: “I have searched into the hidden meaning of these words as far as I can, that is, of the Father, and the Image, and the Gift, of eternity, and of form, and of use. And I do not think that he intended more by the word eternity, than that the Father has not a father from whom He is” [*Et quia non mediocris auctoritatis in tractatione scripturarum et assertione fidei uir exstitit, (Hilarius enim hoc in libris suis posuit), horum uerborum, id est patris et imaginis et muneri, aeternitatis et speciei et usus, abditum scrutatus intelligentiam quantum ualeo, non eum secutum arbitror in aeternitatis uocabulo nisi quod pater non habet patrem de quo sit...*]. The English translation is from *On the Trinity*, translated by Arthur West Haddan, *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, Volume 3, edited by Philip Schaff (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co, 1887). Cf. Hilary of Poitiers, *De trinitate* II (PL 10), the English translation of which can be found in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, Volume 9, edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co, 1899). Aquinas had earlier (Q. 33) addressed the notion of the Father as *principium* of the entire godhead. ST I.33.1 sc: *Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in IV de Trin., pater est principium totius deitatis*. He points out specifically the meaning of *principium* as that from which another proceeds. ST I.33.1 co: *Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen principium nihil aliud significat quam id a quo alicui procedit, omnem enim a uiu alicui procedit quocumque modo, dicitus esse principium; et e converso. Cum ergo pater sit a quo procedit alius, sequitur quod pater est principium.*
Aristotle’s unmoved mover\textsuperscript{22} or to what Aquinas elsewhere calls the uncaused cause.\textsuperscript{23} The Father is the unique ungenerated origin and source of everything else, including the other two members of the Trinity, for the Son is begotten of the Father and the Spirit proceeds from the Father.\textsuperscript{24} Aquinas notes that there are

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\textsuperscript{22} Aristotle, \textit{Met.} XII.6, 1071a1-1072a19.
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\textsuperscript{23} ST I.2.3 co. The locution “uncaused cause” is a popular reference to what Aquinas actually calls the “first efficient cause” in his \textit{Secunda via} argument for God’s existence. ST I.2.3 co: \textit{est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam Deum nominant}. C.f. William L. Rowe’s \textit{The Cosmological Argument} (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 21.
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\textsuperscript{24} The issues raised by the doctrine of procession are numerous, and bear upon this discussion particularly in the way it points out certain Platonic leanings in Aquinas’ thought, inherited largely from Dionysius. Aquinas states (ST Ia.27.3 co) that there are two instances of procession from God (\textit{in divinis sunt duae processiones}), which he says (in ST Ia.27.1 co) is best understood as a kind of “intellectual emanation” (\textit{emanationem intelligibilen}); these two processions are the Son and the Holy Spirit. Regarding the procession of the Son, he goes on to say (ST Ia.27.2 co) that it is proper to refer to it as generation (\textit{generatio}). The second and third members of the Trinity seem to be ontologically dependent upon the first person in a way that the first is not dependent upon the other two, though Aquinas is careful to avoid saying that the Son and Spirit are causally dependent upon the Father, since that would introduce a kind of subordination that would disrupt the equality of the members of the Trinity and, therefore, their unity. ST I.33.1 ad 1. Since the emanation is eternal, the Father does not ever exist without the other two. One might be tempted to say, rather, that the Son and the Spirit are modalily dependent upon the Father. To the extent that such an interpretation might be considered to come too close to modalism (or Sabellianism), in which there are not three persons but only three modes of one being – which was condemned as heresy at the council at Constantinople in 680 because it effectively denies the reality of the Trinity – it is highly unlikely to have been countenanced by Aquinas. Apart from considerations of heterodoxy, there stands the textual and historical fact that Aquinas simply does not employ the language of modal distinction, which first appears in the sixteenth century in the thought of Francisco Suárez. See Francisco Suárez, \textit{Metaphysical Disputation 18} in \textit{On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18 and 19}, translated by Alfred J. Freddoso (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 109. Suárez indicates that what he intends by the locution “modal distinction” may be what John Duns Scotus meant by his “formal distinction,” though he is undoubtedly incorrect about this. \textit{Ibid.} Cf. John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} 1.8.1.4 n. 193 (Vatican, 4: 261-62). Scotus also never says that the Son or the Spirit are formally dependent upon the Father, but merely that there is a formal distinction between them. There is a difference between them, including a kind of dependence that is related to their origins, but he does not (in fact, cannot) explain what this means. For an indepth assessment of the difference in meaning of the various kinds of distinctions employed in the Middle Ages, including those of Aquinas, Scotus and Suárez, see Sandra Edwards, \textit{Medieval Theories of Distinction}, Ph.D. Dissertation (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 1974). For an analysis of Suárez’ use of modes in particular, see Stephen Menn, “Suárez, Nominalism, and Modes,” in Kevin White, ed., \textit{Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery} (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997). The exact nature of the emanation of the Spirit has been a matter of significant historical
dispute and is partially responsible for the Great Schism between the Western and Eastern branches of the early Church, which would then become the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches, respectively. See, for instance, the discussion on the use of filioque (which means “and the Son,” referring to the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son as opposed to proceeding from the Father through the Son) in later versions of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan creed (originally produced in AD 381 without the filioque addition), which was favored and later adopted by the Western Church (at the council of Trent in 1546) and rejected by the Eastern Church, in Philip Schaff (ed), *The Creeds of Christendom*, sixth edition, vol. 1: *The History of Creeds*. Revised by David Schaff (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1983), 26, and *Ibid.*, vol. 2: *The Greek and Latin Creeds*, 57-61. The filioque controversy was a major theological issue during the lifetime of Aquinas, and he was called to the Second Council of Lyons to advise on the matter. Brian Davies, *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 205. For a more recent treatment of the filioque issue, see A. Edward Siecienski, *The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal Controversy* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). For a thorough treatment of intellectual emanation, see Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* in F. Crowe and R. Doran, eds. *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, Volume II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); see also his *The Triune God: Systematics* in *Ibid.*, Volume XII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), chapter two. The idea of procession in God has its root in the Christian scripture. St. Thomas begins the section of the *Summa* on divine procession (ST I.27-28) with a quote from the gospel of John regarding the procession of the Second Person of the Trinity, Jesus. ST I.27.1.sc: *Sed contra est quod dicit dominus, Ioan. Viii, ego ex Deo processi, et dicitur verbum cordis, significatum verbo vocis.* Christopher Hughes suggests that the primary source of Aquinas’ thinking about the Son as intelligible procession from the Father came from his reading of the first chapter of John’s gospel. Christopher Hughes, *On a Complex Theory of a Simple God* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 192. Regarding the procession of the Third Person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, see John 15:26: *Cum autem venerit paracletus, quem ego mittam vobis a Patre, Spiritum veritatis, qui a Patre procedit ille testimonium perhibebit de me.* The idea of procession also has roots in later Platonism. From Plotinus on, later Platonist thinkers wrestled with the question how the One gave rise to the many. The One was taken to be simple and undifferentiated and yet the ultimate source of the process that makes up the cosmos. The starting place for many such thinkers was the first and second hypotheses of Plato’s *Parmenides*, in which the One is said both to be (second hypothesis, 155d-e) and not to be (first hypothesis, 142a). Of particular importance of this concept to Aquinas is Dionysius, in whom the language of procession is abundant. Dionysius applies the term “procession” to God both internally (i.e., to the relation among the members of the Trinity) and externally (i.e., to the relation of God to creation). Dionysius, following Porphyry, applies the first and second hypotheses of the *Parmenides* to the same being, namely, God (for Dionysius) or the One (for Porphyry). The first hypothesis (that the One is not) refers to the transcendentality of God with respect to the creation, and the second hypothesis (that the One is) refers to the creative aspect of God. Cf. Plato, *Parmenides* 142a, 155d-e; Dionysius, DN II.11, 649B; IV.10, 708A; XI.2, 952A; CH IV.1, 177C; EH III.3, 429A; Plotinus, *Enneads* III.8.10.5ff; Proclus, *Elements* prop. 133. For more on this, see Sarah K. Wear and John Dillon, *Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition: Despoiling the Hellenes* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), esp. chs. 3-4. Fran O’Rourke adds that Aquinas “enthusiastically adopts from Dionysius the Neoplatonist language of
two processions in God: an intellectual procession and a procession of will. The procession of the intellect is called the Word, while the procession of the will is called Love. These processions are the second and third persons of the Trinity respectively.25 “Word” (verbum) is an analogy for the procession of Son from Father. “Love” (amor) is an analogy for the procession of the Spirit from both the Father and the Son.26 In all of this, it is clear that Aquinas in no way rejects the traditional view that the Son and the Holy Spirit are co-eternal with the Father. All three members of the Trinity are eternal. However, the Father is said to be eternal in a particular kind of way that is not true of the other two members of the Trinity: the Father is eternal in an ungenerated way. This is true neither of the Son nor of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, this gives us some insight into the way

emanation and diffusion to describe the free and total causation of the universe of beings by God.” He gives, as evidence for this assessment, Aquinas’ perfusive adoption of such Neoplatonic terms as emanatio, diffusio and effusio, especially in the context of creation. Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 239. An example of Aquinas’ use of this Neoplatonic terminology with regard to creation can be found in ST I.45.1 co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, non solum oportet considerare emanationem alicuius entis particularis ab aliquo particulari agente, sed etiam emanationem totius entis a causa universalis, quae est Deus, et hanc quidem emanationem designamus nomine creationis.

25 ST I.27.3 co; ST I.37.1 co.

26 He discusses the relations of these two processions in ST I.36.2 co, where he states that the Spirit must proceed from the Son (in addition to the Father) in order to ensure that there are three separate persons rather than simply two. In the next article, he says that the Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son. ST I.36.3 co. For Aquinas, the Spirit just is the love of the Father for the Son and the love of the Son for the Father. ST I.37.2 sc: Sed contra est quo Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod spiritus sanctus est quo genitus a generante diligitur, genitoremque suum diligiet. Cf. Augustine, De trinitate VI.5. Aquinas attempts to address an apparent retraction of this statement by Augustine by distinguishing two ways that we may take “to love,” namely, either essentially or notionally. He thinks it is not proper to say that the Father and the Son love each other by the Spirit, if “to love” is taken essentially. However, if taken notionally, according to which “to love” means “to spirate love” (spirare amorem), then he thinks it is proper to say that the Father and the Son love each other (and creatures) by the Spirit. See, e.g., ST I.37.2 co.
Aquinas is going to compare the Son to a kind of species. It will be analogous to the way in which the Father is compared in a special way to eternity. Beauty has a likeness to a property of the Son in including within it the three formal conditions of integrity, proportion and clarity.\textsuperscript{27}

Aquinas’ explanation of this similarity unfolds in two stages. First, he briefly enumerates the three conditions of beauty (\textit{ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur}), namely, integrity or perfection (\textit{integritas sive perfectio}), due proportion or harmony (\textit{debita proportio sive consonantia}), and brightness or clarity (\textit{claritas}).\textsuperscript{28} Second, he explains in what way each of these bears a likeness to a property of the Son. In the following sections, I will give consideration to each of these conditions in turn, closing each section by returning to this passage and showing how Aquinas relates each of these to a property of the Son.

4.1.1 \textit{Proportio sive Consonantia}

The first constituent of the triad that we will consider, \textit{proportio}, represents the oldest known, and most widespread, philosophical theory of beauty, and has been credited to Pythagoras (ca. 570 to ca. 480 BC), who developed an entire

\textsuperscript{27} ST I.39.8 co: \textit{Species autem, sive pulchritudo, habet similitudinem cum propriis filii.}

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.: \textit{Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, integritas sive perfectio, quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas, unde quae habent colorem nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur.}
metaphysical system based on mathematics. This is the idea that beauty has to do primarily with the relations holding between the object itself and something else or, paradigmatically, of the parts of an object to the whole of which they form part. Some related terms, which help to grasp the scope of intended meaning, are harmonia, which relates primarily to hearing, and symmetria, which relates primarily to sight. The application of these concepts relates primarily to music and architecture, respectively, but the Pythagoreans thought that these were only the most ostensible expressions of due proportion. Because of the pervasiveness of mathematics in their ontology, the Pythagoreans considered every instance of beauty to be an expression of due proportion. The popularity of this theory is due, in no small part, to its adoption by Plato and Aristotle into

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29 For some recent treatments of Pythagoras and his work, see Christoph Riedweg’s Pythagoras: His Life, Teaching, and Influence, translated by Steven Rendall (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), and for the most comprehensive account of the pervasive influence of Pythagoras on medieval thought, see Christiane Joost-Gaugier, op. cit. Joost-Gaugier characterizes the tradition of thought stemming from Pythagoras, beginning in the sixth century BC, as “a syncretic science-religion built around a loosely related set of notions – including vegetarianism, simplicity of dress, hygiene, moral instruction, musical harmony, metapsychosis..., cosmic order, and theories of number.” Ibid., 6. For a similar treatment of Pythagoras’ influence on Renaissance thought, see her Pythagoras and Renaissance Europe: Finding Heaven (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). A representative sample of Pythagorean logicisms is given by Eco, a couple of which will here suffice. First: “Everything that can be known has a Number; for it is impossible to grasp anything with the mind or to recognize it without this (i.e., Number).” Second: “Virtue is harmony, and so are health and all good and God himself; this is why they say that all things are constructed according to the laws of harmony.” Both quotations are attributed to Philolaus of Tarentum, and are taken from Hermann Diels and W. Krantz, ed., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, fifth edition (Berlin, 1934-54), translated by Kathleen Freeman as Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1948), 44; quoted in Eco (1988), 72-73.

30 ST I.12.1 ad 4: “Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another... In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion.”

31 Tatarkiewicz (1972), 167.
their broader theories. But it is also due, at least in part, to the fact that it is a fairly intuitive account of beauty. That is, it is an intuitive account of some expressions of beauty, namely, beauty that admits of quantitative analysis. It has been said to fall short of capturing the beauty of simples, such as light and color. This explains, in part, the later emergence of aesthetic theories based on light as well as the inclusion of claritas among the constituent of beauty. The proportion theory has several benefits. It is simple, explanatory, and easy to apply (in the cases to which it is applicable). It also demystifies beauty, to the extent that it describes beauty in terms of public, measurable features of objects; this also means that, as a result, beauty is (at least partly) an objective feature of objects rather than a merely subjective feature of human experience. A notable example of this can be found in the musical aesthetics of Boethius, who applied the Pythagorean theory of beauty to music to great and lasting effect. The beauty of music, an unquestionably aesthetic domain, can easily be cast in terms of

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32 Eco (1988), 74; Tatarkiewicz (1972), 167. Cf. Plato, *Philebus* 26a, 64e; Aristotle, *Poetics* 1450b38, 1078b31; *Topics* 116b21, and *Met.* 1078b1. Joost-Gaugier states that later Pythagoreans were responsible for popularizing the notion that Plato was a follower of Pythagoras. She suggests that this connection may not be factually correct, but that, nevertheless, “the compatibility of the two sets of doctrines worked to the advantage of both.” Joost-Gaugier (2006), 7. According to Joost-Gaugier, the continuing interest in Pythagoras and the set of doctrines that came to be associated with him were likely due more to the interest, maintained throughout the Middle Ages, in Plato’s *Timeaeus*, in which number is said to be a universal and divine principle explaining and governing all things, along with the popularity of late Antique authors such as Macrobius and Boethius. *Ibid.* Cf. Boethius, *De musica*; Macrobius, *Commentarium in Somnium Scipionis* (hereafter *In Som. Scip.*), translated into English by William Harris Stahl as *Commentary on ‘The Dream of Scipio’* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952).

33 Boethius, *De musica.*
proportion and harmony. Indeed, many of our words related to these concepts gained their currency in their application to music theory.  

In Aquinas, proportion is but one component of a general theory of beauty. It is not yet clear whether Aquinas holds, explicitly or implicitly, that every instance of beauty must meet the condition of proportion, but some commentators have taken him to hold that view. So, for example, at the end of his thorough treatise on the different intensions of proportion in Aquinas, Umberto Eco notes that these may be summarized under two categorical headings, namely, psychological proportion and ontological proportion, the first of which he says seems “primarily to allow the aesthetic act” while the latter “is

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34 See, for instance, Eco (1988), 79-80, and Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1966), 27-28. Boethius is held to have popularized one of the chief Pythagorean ideas regarding beauty, namely the notion of musica mundana, the “music of the spheres,” which is the idea that the planets each create a different note in the musical scale as they rotate in their orbits around the earth, a “harmony” that is inaccessible to human ears. In actuality, the notion is first attributed to Pythagoras by Nicomachus of Gerasa, a first century follower of Pythagoras, in his Manual of Harmonics, itself an elaboration of his earlier Introduction to Arithmetic. Joost-Gaugier notes that Nicomachus explains that “music, like astronomy, is a science inspired by Pythagoras and rooted in mathematics, and that ‘the motions of the stars [astronomy] have a perfectly melodious harmony [music].’” Joost-Gaugier (2006), 54. Cf. Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introduction to Arithmetic, translated by Martin Luther D’Ooge, with essays by Frank E. Robbins and Louis C. Karpinski (London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1926) I.V.2. Cf. also Nicomachus of Gerasa, The Manual of Harmonics of Nicomachus the Pythagorean, translated with commentary by Flora R. Levin (Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press). Nicomachus defined music as “composed of discrete tones separated by fixed intervals,” a definition he attributes to “the Pythagoreans,” which Joost-Gaugier asserts exhibits “more loyalty than accuracy, since it appears to have originated with Aristotle’s pupil Aristoxenus.” Joost-Gaugier (2006), 35. Joost-Gaugier also notes, however, that “Aristoxenus is believed to have received his first musical instruction from his father, who could have known and been directly influenced by Pythagoras.” Ibid., 20. Cf. Nicomachus of Gerasa, Manual of Harmonics, chapters 1 and 2. Cf. Aristoxenus of Tarentum, Elementa harmonica, edited by Rosetta da Rios. Romae: Typis Publicae Officinae Polygraphicae, 1954.
the ground of the causes of aesthetic pleasure.”35 Kevin O’Reilly, commenting on this passage, stipulates that each are to be taken individually as necessary (but insufficient) conditions for the “actualization of aesthetic beauty,” but that when taken together they do, in fact, constitute the sufficient condition for such actualization.36 I take it he means that for an aesthetic judgment to take place, there must be present both a perceptible object of beauty (the ontological aspect) as well as a perceiver with the requisite psychological capacity to appreciate it (the psychological aspect). To put it another way, aesthetic perception is not possible without both an object to exhibit the objective aspects of proportion and a perceiver to apprehend and order those objective features. If O’Reilly’s interpretation and endorsement of Eco’s characterization of the proportion view is correct, then both of these authors are committed to the view that, for Aquinas, every instance of beauty must meet both of these two conditions. This seems to me largely correct. Aesthetic judgments, according to Aquinas, imply the

35 Eco (1988), 95. For Aquinas, proportion is a habitudo, viz., a relation between one thing and another. Cf. SCG III.54.14: proportio significat quancumque habitudinem unius ad alterum, ut materiae ad formam, vel causae ad effectum. The fundamental types of objective (or ontological) aspects of proportion are, according to Eco: (i) the suitability of matter to receive form (SCG II.80-81.7), (ii) the natural relation between essence and existence (SCG II.53.2), (iii) sensible or quantitative relations between fixed items (ST II-II.141.4 ad 3), (iv) purely relational fit between things, e.g., logical or moral relations (ST II-II.142.2 co, 145.2 co), and (v) the “fit” between a thing and its form or ideal (ST I.44.3 ad 1, I.73.1 co). Ibid., 83-89. Additionally, proportion has psychological aspects related to the fit between the senses and their objects and the intellect and its object (ST I.5.4 ad 1; In DA III.2, 426-27 b8). Ibid., 93. This list, according to Eco, is not exhaustive; in fact, an exhaustive list is, in principle, not possible. Rather, proportion, “because it is constitutive of beauty and thus coextensive with it, has its own transcendental character… (it) has an infinity of analogues.” Ibid., 97.

36 O’Reilly, 22.
presence of both objective and subjective constituents. Beauty itself may turn out to be wholly objective, for Aquinas, if it can be shown that beauty is a transcendental. Certainly, in any case, beautiful things have objective formal properties, namely proportio, claritas and integritas. Nevertheless, aesthetic judgments themselves are cognitive events, and such presuppose the presence of a cognizer.

The burden of evidence for justifying the attribution of this view to Aquinas rests upon the characterization of the psychological aspect of proportion. This aspect has to do with the particular relationship between the subject’s senses and the objects of sensation, namely, a relationship of compatibility or fittedness. Eco states that, for Aquinas, the senses are naturally fitted to their objects and that this sort of fit is a kind of proportion. Eco refers to two passages that bear witness to this sense of proportion. The first is a passage from the pars prima of the Summa Theologiae, by now familiar, where Aquinas states:

[B]eauty (pulchrum) consists in due proportion (debita proportione); for the senses delight in things duly proportioned (in rebus debite proportionatis), as in what is after their own kind - because even sense (sensus) is a sort of reason (ratio quaedam), just as is every cognitive faculty.  

[^37^] ST I.5.4 ad 1: Unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis virtus cognoscitiva.
The second reference is to a passage in Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, in which Aquinas asserts:

And he [Aristotle] says that since every harmonious and well-balanced sound is, as a sound, identical somehow with the faculty of hearing, the fact that the sound is a kind of harmony implies that hearing is the same. Now harmony or proportion is destroyed by excess; an excessive sense-object is therefore destructive of the faculty... As though the sense (sensus) itself in each case were a kind of proportion (quaedam proportio).38

The important feature of this passage to which Eco wishes to draw our attention is the fact that where the Latin translation of Aristotle uses ratio, Aquinas substitutes proportio. The English translation of the Latin text of Aristotle reads:

If voice is a kind of harmony (si autem symphonia vox quedam est), and if the voice and the hearing of it are in one sense one and the same, though in another sense not, and if harmony always implies proportion (proportio autem est symphonia), it follows that what is heard is a kind of ratio (rationem quandam esse).39


39 Aristotle, De Anima III.2, 426-27-30: Si autem symphonia vox quedam est, vox autem et auditus est sicut unum et est non sicut unum aut idem, proportio autem est symphonia, necesse est, et auditum rationem quandam esse. The Latin translation of this passage is reproduced in Aquinas’ commentary at In DA III.2, cap. xxvi (Commissio Leoninia, T. 45/1). The English translation is found in Eco, and is presumably Bredin’s. Eco (1988), 93.
Eco suggests that, on account of this terminological substitution, we ought to understand *ratio* as synomymous with *proportio* when we encounter it in the aforementioned passage from the *Summa Theologiae*. Aquinas should be understood, in that passage, to be defining *proportio* as “a disposition of the senses toward the sensible, in the manner of a potency.” This view is, Eco suggests, consonant with contemporary views of the mind, namely, that there is an isomorphic relationship “between the field of perception and the structures of the mind.”

Eco points out that, for Aquinas, there is an analogous proportion between the intellect and its object. He refers to a question in the *Summa Theologiae, pars prima*, which asks whether any created intellect can see the essence of God? In answer, Aquinas says that there are two senses of proportion. In the first, it means simply the relation of quantities to one another. This is the most basic and therefore familiar notion of proportion. The important notion of proportion for answering the question at hand, though, is the second sense. Aquinas proposes the following second sense of proportion: “every relation (*habitudo*) of one thing to another is called proportion (*proportio*

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40 ST I.5.4 ad 1.
41 Eco (1988), 94.
42 Ibid.
44 ST I.12.1 ad 4: *Ad quartum dicendum quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, certa habitudo unitus quantitatis ad alteram.*
And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect of its cause (ut effectus ad causam), and as potentiality to its act (ut potentia ad actum); and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned, that is, specially fitted, to know God.”  

This suggests that, for Aquinas, there is a special relationship between the intellect (in this case the intellectus creatus) and the intelligible object (in this case, Deum), which relation is one sense of proportion. Specifically, he speaks of proportion as a habitudo, which is a term that seems to represent both the sense of a relation, as it does in the passage just quoted, as well as a tendency toward an end or object, as it does elsewhere. If correct, this interpretation implies that there is an element of proportion, of one kind or another, in every instance of aesthetic perception. This interpretation becomes more plausible when we consider what

45 ST I.I.12.1 ad 4: “Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another... In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God (proportio creaturae ad Deum), inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect to its cause, and as potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God (intellectus creatus proportionatus esse potest ad cognoscendum Deum).”

46 SCG III.54.13 (this is labeled 14 in the Latin text): “Now, the proportion of the created intellect to the understanding of God is not, in fact, based on a commensuration in an existing proportion, but on the fact that proportion means any relation of one thing to another (proportio significat quacumque habitudinem unius ad alterum), as of matter to form, or of cause to effect. In this sense, then, nothing prevents there being a proportion of creature to God on the basis of a relation of one who understands to the thing understood (nihil prohibet esse proportionem creaturae ad Deum secundum habitudinem intelligentis ad intellectum), just as on the basis of the relation of effect to cause.” As this passage makes clear, for Aquinas, proportion is an intimate and organismic connection between two relata, as an effect is the natural terminus of its cause. This is the sense of habitus as the tendency of something, e.g., an appetite, toward its natural object.

47 That this view has received little attention is perhaps not as surprising when one considers that the notion of psychological proportion seems to have been limited to Aquinas. Edgar de Bruyne notes “that Aquinas was alone among his contemporaries in drawing a distinction between
Aquinas has said about the nature of the relation between any created thing and
the Creator. For in a discussion about the relationship between God and the
creatures which proceed from God, Aquinas endorses Augustine’s view that
God is the ultimate exemplar of all created things, and that the form of each
individual thing is identified with an idea in God’s intellect.\footnote{ST I.44.3 co: “God is the first exemplar cause of all things... And therefore we must say that in
the divine wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas – i.e., exemplar
forms existing in the divine mind. And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things,
in reality are not apart from the divine essence.” Cf. ST I.44.3 sc: “The exemplar is the same as the
idea. But ideas, according to Augustine, are the master forms, which are contained in the divine
intelligence. Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God.” Cf. Augustine, De diversis
questionibus octoginta tribus, Q. 46.}

Therefore, Aquinas says that though creatures do not attain to a likeness of God according to species,
they do attain to a kind of likeness to God, namely the likeness of a copy to its
exemplar in the divine intellect, such as a constructed house represents the idea
of that house in the mind of the architect who designed it (\textit{domus quae est in mente
artificis}).\footnote{ST I.44.3 ad 1: \textit{Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet creaturae non pertingant ad hoc quod sint similes
Deo secundum suam naturam, similitudine speciei, ut homo genus homini generanti; attingunt tamen ad
eius similitudinem secundum representationem rationis intellectae a Deo, ut domus quae est in materia,
domui quae est in mente artificis.} Since this is a statement about the relationship of every created thing
to the Creator, there is an inherent proportion between every created thing and
its exemplar idea in the divine intellect. Since every instance of aesthetic
perception involves something created as an essential constituent, every instance

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"Edgar de Bruyne, \textit{Études d’esthétique médiévale}, vol. 3 (Brugge: De Tempel, 1946), 302: “Thomas se distingue de plusieurs de ses contemposans et plus particulièrement d’Ulric de Strasbourg par la distinction qu’il met entre la proportion psychologique et la proportion ontologique.” The English translation is provided by O’Reilly, 20.
\end{flushright}
of aesthetic perception therefore necessarily involves at least some kind of proportion. It might be objected that this sort of proportion, if it were the only type of proportion involved in some individual case of aesthetic perception, would not be sufficient to account for the production of aesthetic pleasure or of an aesthetic judgment unless we also have access to the exemplars in the divine mind. This is probably true. However, just as there is a kind of fit between the individual and its idea in the divine intellect to which God alone has access, so do humans have ideals to which objects conform to one degree or another. In this sense, to the extent that we have some notion of what an x is (and particularly of an ideal x), we will judge any individual instance of x by its fit to the exemplar in our own minds. Here, if anywhere, it seems to me, is the root of the subjectivist intuition that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder,” since aesthetic judgments will vary according to the individual person’s conception of the ideal by which he judges the particulars of aesthetic experience.\footnote{Though these human conceptions are not strictly proper ideals since they are imaginative constructs rather than \textit{noeta}, that is, the objects apprehended by intellect (\textit{nous}) which constitute true knowledge (\textit{episteme}). The standard by which human ideals are properly measured are the exemplars in the divine intellect, that is, the divine ideas (\textit{eide}).}

Though the proportion theory may succeed as an account of some kinds of beauty, nevertheless, as a general account of beauty, it does seem to contain at least one outstanding defect. Notably, certain kinds of objects, namely, those lacking dimensionality or complexity, such as expressions of color or light, seem to be recalcitrant to descriptions in terms of proportionality (other than that of
the fit of some object \( x \) to its exemplar in divine or human ideal). The same recalcitrance might be thought to threaten the theory of proportion, when it is applied to events, such as human acts, or to character traits. To the extent that we deem Aquinas committed to such a view, as seems to be the case, this is a problem that must be addressed.\(^{51}\) However, it is possible that such events or character traits may turn out also to have a kind of proportion to the divine ideas, along lines similar to those just discussed. To see this, let us return to the passage regarding the Trinity.

Insofar as beauty is likened to a property of the Son with respect to \textit{proportio}, Aquinas says the Son is “the express image of the Father.”\(^{52}\) Beauty, in this context, has to do with a representation’s approximation to the thing of which it is a representation. Just as the Son is said to be an express image, that is, a perfect likeness, of the Father, so a representation is said to be beautiful to the degree that it accurately reproduces or represents the object of which it is a representation. This is the notion of proportion as “fit” or aptitude (\textit{aptitudo}).\(^{53}\) Thus, Aquinas says, “an image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents


\(^{52}\) ST I.39.8 co: \textit{Quantum vero ad secundum, convenit cum proprio filii, inquantum est imago expressa patris}.

\(^{53}\) Thus Aquinas sometimes speaks of \textit{proportio} or \textit{aptitudo} as a kind of tendency toward or fittingness of an appetite to the object which is its end. ST I-II.25.2 co: \textit{Manifestum est autem quod omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem, primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil enim tendit in finem non porportionatum}.
(perfecte repraesentat) even an ugly thing (rem turpem).” So even if an object, say a tree, is in reality an ugly representative of its kind, nevertheless a painting of the same tree, to the extent that it is an accurate representation of that tree, will be called beautiful. Presumably, the tree itself is called beautiful to the extent that it accurately represents some ideal form or idea of tree, perhaps in human or divine imagination. Again, Aquinas appeals to Augustine’s treatise on the Trinity, wherein he attributes to Augustine, the statement, “Where there exists wondrous proportion (tanta convenientia) and primal equality (prima aequalitas),” etc. Again, we are helped by an examination of the passage in which this quotation is extracted. Augustine there says,

For if an image perfectly fills the measure of that of which it is the image, then the image is made equal to that of which it is the image, not the latter to its own image. And in respect to this image he (i.e., Hilary) has named form, I believe in account of the quality of beauty, where there is at once such great fitness, and prime equality, and prime likeness, differing in nothing, and unequal in no respect, and in no part unlike, but answering exactly to Him whose image it is.

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54 ST I.39.8 co: Unde videmus quod aliqua imago dicitur esse pulchra, si perfecte repraesentat rem, quanvis turpem.

55 Ibid. Et hoc tetigit Augustinus cum dicit, ubi est tanta convenientia, et prima aequalitas, et cetera. Cf. Augustine, De trinitate VI.10 [11]: ubi iam est tanta congruentia et prima aequalitas et prima similitudo...

56 Augustine, De trinitate VI.10 [11]: Imago enim si perfecte implet illud cuius imago est, ipsa coaequatur ei non illud imaginii suae. In qua imagine speciem nominavit, credo, propter pulchritudinem ubi iam est tanta congruentia et prima aequalitas et prima similitudo nulla in re dissidens et nullo modo inaequalis et nulla ex parte dissibilis, sed ad identidem respondens et cuius imago est.
From this passage, the meaning of beauty as proportion, first in Augustine and derivatively in Aquinas, emerges. The beautiful image “fills the measure of that of which it is the image,” in respect of which it is “made equal to” (coaequatur) that of which it is the image. This is the sense in which he says there is “such great fitness (tanta congruentia), and prime equality (prima aequalitas), and prime likeness (prima similitudo).” The image and that of which it is an image “differ in nothing,” are “unequal in no respect,” that is, are “in no part unlike.” What he is making clear, through a series of parallel expressions, is that the appellation of beauty, applied to an image, relates to its approximation to its object or exemplar. It is in this sense that the Son is said to be an express image of the Father, since the image (i.e., the Son) “answers exactly to Him whose image it is.”

What Augustine makes clear, in the passage to which Aquinas defers, is that the equality of the Son to the Father consists in part due to the absolute approximation of the Son to the Father, of the image to the exemplar. There is, in fact, no gap between the image and the thing of which it is the image. In this case alone is the image exact, indistinguishable from that of which it is the image.

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57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.: sed identidem respondens ei cuius imago est.
60 The Stoics made much of the puzzle of indistinguishables, e.g., coins imprinted by the same mint or wax impressions made by the same signet ring. Aquinas was aware of this debate through Cicero. See, e.g., Cicero, Academica 2.57, 77; Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 1.58. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 7.4-5. Cf. Plato, Theaetetus 191c8.
This exact fitness of image can be found in exemplary form only within the
godhead itself, for no creature can attain to such an exact likeness. Human beings
are like God, and are said to be created in God’s image; but with human beings,
as with any created being, there is always a gap between the exemplar and the
imitation. Thus Aquinas contrasts two ways in which something can be said to
be an image. In the example he provides, the exemplar is the King. In one way,
something can be said to be in the image of the King because they share the same
nature, as in the case of the King’s son. In another way, something can be said to
be in the image of the King because it shares a likeness, but not of the same
nature, such as you’d find in the King’s likeness on a coin. The likeness of the
Son to the Father is of the first type, while the likeness of human beings to God is
of the second type. There is a qualitative difference, rather than one merely of
degree, between the two sorts of likenesses. The Son is the exact image of the
Father, and that is why the Son is said to be “the image of the Father,” whereas human beings are imperfect images,
and so are not called simply “image” (homo non solum

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61 ST I.35 2 ad 3: “The image of a thing may be found in something in two ways. In one way it is
found in something of the same specific nature; as the image of the king is found in his son. In
another way it is found in something of a different nature, as the king’s image on the coin. In the
first sense the Son is the Image of the Father; in the second sense man is called the image of God.”

62 Ibid.
dicitur imago), but are more appropriately said to be “to the image” (ad imaginem).\textsuperscript{63}

It is in this sense of image, as exact likeness, that both Augustine and Aquinas may be said to hold the view that “beautiful” is an appellation properly applied only to God, since this exact representation of the Father can be found in no created thing, but in the Son alone. It is in this sense that beauty in things is merely relative to, and dependent upon, the beauty of God by way of participation.\textsuperscript{64} It is why Dionysius will list “Beauty” among the divine names.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{64} In de div. nom. IV, lec. 5, n. 349.

\textsuperscript{65} Though “Beauty” (\textit{pulchrum} [τὸ καλὸν]) is not the most fundamental name of God for Dionysius. Pride of place goes rather to “Good” (\textit{bonum} [τὰγαθὸν]), which he says is “the most important” (DN III.1, 680B). Nevertheless, in the Greek, there is often little difference in meaning between τὸ καλὸν and τὰγαθὸν, for τὸ καλὸν could also have the meaning of “morally fine,” “noble,” or “esteemed.” In individual authors, one seems to take priority over the other, as in Aristotle’s Ethics, where τὸ καλὸν is favored over τὰγαθὸν. As evidence of the similarity in meaning between the two, the phrase καλὸν τὸ καὶ ἄγαθον (“the fine and the good”) was a common Greek idiom, and is consistent with the ancient practice of parallelism. See Terrence Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 37-38. In a recent article, Rachel Barney argues that, for Plato, the good and the fine are nearly identical, but importantly different, for while it may be true that everything good is fine and everything fine is good, nevertheless there is an important psychological distinction, namely, that “to be fine is to be the appropriate object and characteristic cause of admiration; to be good is to be the appropriate object and characteristic cause of desire.” Rachel Barney, “Notes on Plato on the Kalon and the Good,” in Classical Philology 105 (2010), 377. C.f. Plato, Republic VI, 507b-509a; Lysis 216d; Timaeus 87c; Meno 77b; and Symposium 204d-e. Dionysius himself affirms this basic parallel in his affirmation, “the beautiful is the same as the good” (DN IV.7, 704B: Propter quod et idem est bono pulchrum [Διὸ καὶ ταύτ’ ἵστη τάγαθῳ τὸ καλὸν]). In his privileging of the good, Putnam explains that Dionysius is simply being a good Platonist. For Dionysius, “good” has primacy even over “being,” since, as he explains, while “being” applies only to things which exist, “good” has a wider extension than “being” because it “extends to beings and nonbeings.” DN V.1, 816B: Etenim boni Dei nominatio totos causae omnium processus manifestans, et ad existentia et ad non existentia extenditur, et super existentia est [Haec vero entis in Omnia existentia extenditur, et super Omnia est]. The bracketed text is taken from Eriugena’s translation, since this sentence is omitted from Sarracens’ translation (curiously, since a variation of the same occurs in the Greek text as well as in the oldest Latin translation by Hilduin). It might also be said, on the other hand, that in so conjoining “Beauty” and “Good,” he is being a good Plotinian, for whom the beautiful and the
God is Beauty itself, and everything else is merely called “beautiful” by way of participation. God alone is what Dionysius calls the “Supersubstantial Beautiful” (Supersubstantiale vero pulchrum pulchritudo), the Cause of the harmony and splendor in all other things (causa consonantiae et claritatis in omnibus). This will be very important for our discussion because most of what Aquinas has to say about beauty will be found in the context of his commentary on Dionysius’ De divinis nominibus, and because Dionysius is one of the most pervasive influences among all of Aquinas’ authorities. Dionysius’ identification of Beauty with God is, therefore, of great moment for Aquinas’ view of beauty as apprehended by human cognizers.

The most serious challenge to the aesthetic of proportion remains the theory’s inability to account for the beauty of simple i.e., non-complex, objects or experiences, as in expressions of color or light. It is, in part, on account of this


66 Dionysius, DN IV.7, 701C: Pulchrum autem et pulchritudo non sunt dividenda in causa quae in uno tota comprehendit. Hae enim in existentibus in participaciones et participantia dividentes, pulchrum quidem esse dicimus quod participat pulchritudine, pulchritudinem autem, participationem pulchrafacientis tota pulchra causae. Supersubstantiale vero pulchrum pulchritudo quidem dicitur propter traditam ab ipso omnibus existentibus juxta proprietatem uniuscujusque pulchritudinem; et sicut universorum consonantiae et claritatis causa. John Scotus Eriugena’s translation of the same passage renders Το δὲ καλὸν καὶ κάλλος (“goodness and beauty”) as bonum et pulchrum instead of John Sarracens’ pulchrum et pulchritudo. For a comparison of the two, see Dionysiaca I, 178. Cf. Ibid., 701D: Pulchrum autem, sicut pulcherrimum simul et superpulchrum.

67 In addition to his extensive commentary on De divinis nominibus, Aquinas explicitly cites the Dionysius no less than 1700 times in his writings (far more if the implicit references are included). This is strong evidence that, for Aquinas, Dionysius was an authority to be ranked on par with St. Augustine. Paul Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 37. Cf. M.-D. Chenu, Introduction à l’étude de saint Thomas d’Aquin (Montréal: Institut d’études médiévales, 1950), 193.
deficiency that theories of beauty given in terms of integrity or clarity have been put forth as correctives.\

4.1.2 *Claritas*

The first classical thinker to point out the deficiency of proportion alone in accounting for all instances of beauty was Plotinus. He noted that if beauty consists entirely in due proportion, then something would be left out, namely, the beauty found in color or light. Speaking of the beauty of symmetry, he notes, “Even here we have to recognize that beauty is that which irradiates symmetry rather than symmetry itself and is that which truly calls out our love.” The suggestion seems to be that beauty exposes or reveals symmetry rather than merely being comprised of it. He makes a couple of comparisons to illustrate the defect he finds in aesthetic theories based solely on proportion. One is a comparison between a living person and a corpse. Another is between a living

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68 The insufficiency of the proportion view to account for all instances of beauty is now widely acknowledged. Eco asserts, for instance, that Aquinas “does not identify this proportional relation with beauty as such, but with only one of the many types of beauty.” Eco (1988), 86. Nevertheless, I have suggested that simples might still be subsumed under this theory if one considers the relation of the object to its ideal (whether human or divine).

69 Plotinus, *Enneads* VI.7.22. Translated into English by Stephen MacKenna (London: Penguin, 1991). There is no indication that Aquinas had access to any part of the *Enneads*, since no Latin translation was available until the fifteenth century, when Marsilio Ficino translated it from the Greek and published it, along with a commentary, in 1492. Consequently, I will not provide the Latin translation of the text. According to Dominic J. O’Meara, however, Aquinas, like many of his Medieval forebears, was aware of Plotinus’ identity and importance. Dominic J. O’Meara, *Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 114. It is possible, therefore, that Aquinas was aware of this aesthetic tradition, though there is no textual support in favor of the thesis.
person, who is ugly, and a beautiful statue. In both cases, he states that what makes the first member of each pair more beautiful than the other is the radiance of life, caused by the presence of a soul, which has “more of the Idea of The Good.” The reason living objects have more of the Idea of The Good than inert objects is that they contain a “glow of the light of the Good,” which “awakens and lifts the soul and all that goes with it.” He refers to visible light and color as being but physical manifestations of The Good, on account of which they incite desire. It is the Idea of The Good that illumines intelligible reality and by which objects are intelligible and beautiful, whether alive or inert. In his comparison with the corpse and the statue, there is every implication that these objects contain some measure of beauty. Notice the reference is to a corpse that is, presumably, only recently deceased; for he says it retains a “faint trace” of the glory of beauty. The idea seems to be that where the soul is recently departed, the body contains a residue of the Idea of the Good which had formerly taken up

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70 Ibid. That Plotinus can appeal to comparisons of this sort, in which physical beauty is related to the presence and expression of soul, is itself further evidence of the marriage, in ancient Greek thought, of the fine (τὸ καλὸν) and the good (τἀγαθὸν), and of the fine and the beautiful as two aspects of καλὸν / pulchrum.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.: “The intense love called forth by Life and Intellectual-Principle is due not to what they are but to their receiving from above something quite apart from their own nature. Material forms containing light incorporated in them need still a light apart from them that their own light may be manifest; just so the Beings of that sphere, all lightsome, need another and a lordlier light or even they would not be visible to themselves and beyond. That light known, then indeed we are stirred towards those Beings in longing and rejoicing over the radiance about them, just as earthly love is not for the material form but for the Beauty manifested upon it. Every one of those Beings exists for itself but becomes an object of desire by the colour cast upon it from The Good.”

73 Ibid.
residence there. The sculpture is likewise described as “handsome,” presumably for similar reasons; there is a kind of similitude to a body that is infused with the Idea of the Good, namely, the living human being. The beauty of the sculpture is a borrowed beauty, one dependent upon its ability to capture the unique radiance of a living person. This becomes even clearer when we consider one other pair of objects he considers, namely, portraits. Some, he says, are “more beautiful” than others, and when they are, it is on account of being the “most living.” He presumably means those portraits best representing their objects with life-like qualities. In each of these cases, it is not mere symmetry that accounts for the beauty of the objects in question, but there is something else: a kind of light, an illumination or expression by approximation to The Good. That Aquinas has something like this in mind becomes clear when we consider what he has to say about beauty and the contemplative life. In ST II-II.180. 2 ad 3, he reiterates the two most familiar formal constituents of beauty, namely clarity and proportion, and he relates them to reason:

Beauty, as stated above, consists in a certain clarity (quadam claritate) and due proportion (et debita proportione). Now each of these is found radically in the reason (radicaliter in ratione); because both the light that makes beauty seen (lumen manifestans), and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; wherefore it is written (Wis. viii. 2) of the contemplation of wisdom: I became a lover of her beauty. On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation (in virtutibus

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74 Ibid.
autem moralibus invenitur pulchritudo participative), in so far as they participate in the order of reason (participant ordinem rationis); and especially is it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially darken the light of reason (lumen rationis). Hence it is that the virtue of chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal pleasures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says (Soliloq. i. 10).  

This passage is remarkable for a number of reasons. First, here Aquinas gives us an explanation of what is meant by claritas as a constituent of beauty. He says of claritas that it is “the light that makes beauty seen” (lumen manifestans) and it is clear by what Aquinas says here that it is the “light of reason” (lumen rationis) to which he refers. The entire passage takes place in the context of establishing that the contemplative life is a life that includes the moral virtues,

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76 This phrase is reminiscent of the Plotinian dictum, already mentioned, that “beauty is that which irradiates symmetry rather than symmetry itself and is that which truly calls out our love.” Plotinus, Enneads VI.7.22. This “irradiation” seems to have the character of “manifestation,” or communication of some intelligible quality, that is, of form. Symmetry alone cannot do it, says Plotinus; it must have a means of active expression. For Plotinus, then, there seem not so much to be two separate types of beauty, but rather beauty must incorporate both symmetry and clarity. Or, it may be, that beauty may be, in some cases, reducible simply to clarity (as in simple beauties such as light or color), but it cannot be reduced simply to symmetry.

77 That this, too, is consistent with Plotinus’ view is suggested by the following from Enneads I.6.2: “This, then, is how the material thing becomes beautiful – by communicating in the thought (Reason, λογος) that flows from the Divine.”
and Aquinas here makes the argument that because the contemplative life is founded on reason, there is beauty in the contemplative life. But there is more. He also argues that beauty is in the moral virtues by participation to the extent that the moral virtues participate in the order of reason. So beauty is tied to reason in both of these instances, and it is on account of beauty’s link to reason that beauty is found in both the contemplative life and the moral virtues. More than any other passage, this one seems to cement the close link of beauty to virtue, and most clearly establishes that one of beauty’s essential constituents is the communication of something intelligible. Leo Elders suggests that this intelligible something is form. This is why, in ST I.5.4 ad 1 Aquinas can say that the beautiful and the good are identical fundamentally, namely, because they are based on the same form. Plotinus made the same connection. Aquinas is also

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78 Leo Elders, The Metaphysics of Being and St. Thomas Aquinas in a Historical Perspective, translated by John Dudley (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), 140. Here he states: “The order and clarity which constitute the beautiful arise from the essential form of the beautiful things. The form is the ultimate basis of their beauty and is itself beautiful. It is a most intense participation in God’s beauty and lustre.”

79 Plotinus, Enneads VI.7.33: “When therefore we name beauty (κάλλος), all such shape must be dismissed; nothing visible is to be conceived, or at once we descend from beauty to what but bears the name in virtue of some faint participation. This formless Form is beautiful as Form (Τὸ δὲ ἀμορφὸν εἴδος καλὸν, εἶπερ εἴδος ἐστὶ), beautiful in proportion as we strip away all shape, even that given in thought to mark difference, as for instance the difference between Justice and Sophrosyny, beautiful in their difference.” Ultimately, for Plotinus, behind every beautiful thing is a Form of Beauty in which those beautiful things are called “beautiful” by way of participation in Beauty, itself a formless Form, that is, a Form that is not itself informed by some other Form. Cf. Enneads VI.7.32: “You see the splendor over all the manifold Forms or Ideas; well might we linger here: but amid all these things of beauty we cannot but ask whence they come and whence the beauty. This source can be none of the beautiful objects; were it so, it too would be a mere part. It can be no shape, no power, nor the total of powers and shapes that have had the becoming that has set them here; it must stand above all the powers, all the patterns. The origin of all this must be the formless – formless not as lacking shape but as the very source of even shape Intellectual.”
making evident why it is that we always find claritas and proportio together, namely, because they are both grounded in reason.

The insistence on the inclusion of this notion of clarity, introduced by Plotinus, gained a foothold in the medieval canon due largely in part to its adoption by Dionysius, who proposed the notion of beauty as “the cause of harmony (ἐυσμοστίας, consonantiae) and splendor (ἀγλαίας, claritatis) in all things.” Dionysius adds, and elevates, this aspect of light, which he has inherited from two ancient sources: first, from the Platonism of Plotinus and, second, from the Christian scriptures, particularly the gospel of John, which is replete with allusions to light. The first member of the pair relates to order or proportion. The second to clarity or splendor. In his commentary on this passage, Aquinas notes that in this formulation, Dionysius is showing in what the nature of beauty consists (in quo consistat pulchritudinis ratio), since the beauty

80 Dionysius, DN IV.7, 701C: καὶ ὡς τῆς πάντων εὐσμοστίας καὶ ἀγλαίας αἰτίαν [et sicut universorum consonantiae et claritatis causa]. For a full treatment of Dionysius’ theory of beauty, see Putnam, Loc. Cit.


82 “The first of them is harmony, a quality akin to order, arrangement, and measure. Its presence makes of the Dionysian universe not a ‘geometric alignment’ but a beautiful place in which to live.” Putnam, 73. The phrase, “geometric alignment,” is taken from René Roques’ “La notion de hiérarchie selon le Pseudo-Denys: l’ordre hiérarchique,” in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge XXIV (1949), 190. Later Putnam says, “Whatever word he uses, Denis expects his world to be well-ordered and beautifully arranged.” Ibid., 76.
in created things is the effect of God, the Cause, who is called “Beauty” on account of being the source of all beautiful things, and this is consonantiae (Dionysius’ ἔναρμοστίας) and claritatis (Dionysius’ ἀγλοῖας).83 So Aquinas, in his commentary, changes the Dionysian formulation, since where Dionysius stated simply that beauty is the cause of harmony and splendor, Aquinas says that these constitute the very essence of beauty. Dionysius’ is a simple causal claim; Aquinas’ an ontological one. Aquinas is not drawing an unwarranted conclusion, however, since Dionysius has already identified God, as the Cause of beauty in all things, with what he calls the “Supersubstantial Beauty.”84 Dionysius draws a distinction between what we call “beautiful” and “beauty” as found in created things and their ultimate cause, which is most properly designated “Beauty,”

83 In de div. nom. IV, lec. 5: Et in quo consistat pulchritudinis ratio, ostendit subdens quod sic Deus tradit pulchritudinem, inquantum est causa consonantiae et claritatis in omnibus. Again, this is reminiscent of Plotinus. Cf. Enneads VI.7.32: “The origin of all this must be the formless – formless not as lacking shape but as the very source of even shape Intellectual.” Ibid., VI.7.33: “Shape and idea and measure will always be beautiful, but the Authentic Beauty, or rather the Beyond-Beauty (τὸ δὲ ὄντως ἢ τὸ υπέρκολον), cannot be under measure and therefore cannot have admitted shape or be Idea: the primal Beauty (πρῶτος), the First (πρῶτων), must be without Form; the beauty of that higher realm must be, simply, the Nature of the Intellectual Good (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις).”

84 Dionysius, DN IV.7, 701D: Τὸ δὲ υπερσυνόιον καλὸν κάλλος [Supersubstantiale vero pulchrum pulchritudo]. Cf. Aquinas, In de div. nom. IV, lec. 5: Deus qui est supersubstantiale pulchrum. Aquinas says that Dionysius uses the prefix “super” in order to show an excellence that exceeds the genus. So things within a genus can be compared, and as such you could have, for instance, “hot,” “hotter,” and “hottest.” But the sun, he says, is super-hot because it far exceeds the other members of the genus. It is in this way that God is supersubstantial beauty or “superbeautiful.” In de div. nom. IV, lec. 5: Excessus autem est duplex: unus in genere, qui significatur per comparativum vel superlativum; alius extra genus, qui significatur per additionem huius praepositionis: super; puta, si dicamus quod ignis excedit in calore excessu in genere, unde dicitur calidissimus; sol autem excedit excessu extra genus, unde non dicitur calidissimus sed supercalidus, quia calor non est in eo, eodem modo, sed excellentiori. Et licet iste duplex excessus in rebus causatis non simul conveniat, tamen in Deo simul dicitur et quod est pulcherrimus et superpulcher; non quod sit in genere, sed quod ei attribuuntur omnia quae sunt cuiuscumque generis. Cf. The “Beyond-Beauty” (τὸ υπέρκολον), of Plotinus’ Enneads VI.7.33. Cf. Plato, Phaedo 100d.
and is identified with God, in whom he says the “beautiful” and “beauty” do not differ, but are gathered together into one. Aquinas, then, is merely making explicit what is perhaps less so in the Dionysian text, in keeping with his role as expositor. Indeed, Dionysius himself makes the connection more explicit a few lines later when he gives a characterization of the Beautiful which can only be taken as a reference to God:

The Beautiful is therefore the same as the Good, for everything looks to the Beautiful and the Good as the cause of being, and there is nothing in the world without a share of the Beautiful and the Good… This – the One, the Good, the Beautiful – is in its uniqueness the Cause of the multitudes of the good and the beautiful. From it derives the existence of everything as beings.

With respect to created things, Aquinas goes on to say that, for Dionysius, we call a person “beautiful” on account of the fitting proportion of its members as well as a clear and vivid color. Possession of clarity (clarum) is in this

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85 Dionysius, DN IV.7, 701C: Τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ κάλλος ὀὐ διαίρετον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐν ἐνι τὰ ὀλοκληρωμένας αἰτίας [Pulchrum autem et pulchritudo non sunt dividenda in causa quae in uno tota comprehendit].

86 Dionysius, DN IV.7, 704B: Τί οὖν καὶ ταύτων ἐστὶ τάγαθῳ τὸ καλὸν, ὅτι τὸ καλὸ καὶ ἀγαθῷ κατὰ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν πάντα ἐφίεται, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, ὁ μὴ μετέχει τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ… Τούτῳ τὸ ἐν ἀγαθῷ καὶ καλὸν εἰνίκως ἐστὶ πάντων τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν εἰκόνας [Propter quod et idem est bono pulchrum; quoniam bonum et pulchrum secundum omnem causam cuncta desiderant, et non est aliquid existentium quod non participet pulchro et bono… Hoc unum pulchrum et bonum singulariter est omnium multorum pulchrorum et bonorum causa]. The entire project of the work makes it undeniable that “the Good” (bonum), “the Beautiful” (pulchrum), and “the One” (unum) are names by which God is known. Cf. Plotinus, Enneads I.6.9: “the Primal Good and the Primal Beauty have the one dwelling-place and, thus, always Beauty’s seat is There.” Cf. also Enneads V.1.5, V.8.18, V.7.32-33; Plato, Phaedrus 247c, 249d-250e; Phaedo 98b; Republic 508d-e, 509b; Symposium 210a-212a; Augustine, Confessions X.xxvii (38), XLiv (6).

87 In de div. nom. IV, lec. 5: sic enim hominem pulchrum dicimus, propter decentem proportionem in quantitate et situ et propter hoc quod habit clarum et nitidum colorem.
instance paired with vivid color (nitidum colorem), by which combination he seems to be referring to complexion. We call a person “beautiful” whose figure and limbs are proportionate and whose skin is clear and bright, that is, without blemish. When applied to things other than persons, beauty (pulchrum) relates to the splendor (claritatem) of its own genus (sui generis), whether it be of a spiritual or corporeal nature, in addition to due proportion. Each created thing is beautiful to the extent that God makes it beautiful, giving to each a beauty appropriate to the properties of its kind. And the properties relative to kind, viz., to genera, depend on form, and therefore upon formal qualities, like claritas. What can Aquinas mean by “splendor of its own genus” if not the intelligibility of the object’s form made manifest to others? And this is consistent with what Aquinas has already said elsewhere.

Eco suggests that the notion of claritas solves a particular problem intrinsic to the notion of proportion, namely, that proportion does not have the power of self-expression. I take it that what he means is that proportion, while an objective feature of things, is nevertheless a relation between objects or events, and in order for relations to be perceived by a created intellectual being, these

88 Ibid.: Unde proportionaliter est in caeteris accipiendum, quod unumquodque dicitur pulchrum, secundum quod habet claritatem sui generis vel spiritualem vel corporalem et secundum quod est in debita proportione constitutum.

89 Ibid.: Et in quo consistat pulchritudinis ratio, ostendit subdens quod sic Deus tradit pulchritudinem, inquantum est causa consonantiae et claritatis in omnibus.

90 ST II-II.180.2 ad 3, where Aquinas refers to claritas as “the light that makes beauty seen” (lumen manifestans).

features must be somehow made intelligible, that the created intellect is incapable of apprehending these relations and making intelligible sense of them on its own. Order, according to Eco, is a transcendental law. This order is objectively found in proportion. The question is how created intelligences, especially those as dependent as human beings are upon sensation, are able to detect the presence of intelligible order that transcends the power of sense. Aquinas’ answer, it seems, is that the Idea of the Good, what Eco calls the “perfect organism,” makes its presence intelligible to intellectual creatures, in effect by broadcasting its proportion. That is the role of claritas. It is “the fundamental communicability of form, which is made actual in relation to someone’s looking at or seeing of the object.” It is this communicated form, resplendent with actuality of form and goodness, that we call beauty, the

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92 Ibid. We may take, as an example of this objective order in the created world, Aquinas’ so-called “Fourth Way,” that is, his fourth argument for the existence of God. ST I.2.3 co: “The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the like... Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.” Aquinas mentions the objective ordering of things in an argument for God’s governance of the world in ST I.103.1 co: “Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their being governed.” This order is also exhibited in his discussion of the celestial hierarchy, namely, of angels. See, e.g., De spir. creat., art. 8 resp.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid., 119. Eco, furthermore, refers even to the “fit” between the created intellect, the “receiver,” and the communicated “perfect organism,” as a kind of proportion; it is a proportion “between the knowing subject and the object.” The perfect organism “expresses” or “declares” itself. It too is a sign, but a self-referential sign; it is a sign that points only to itself in order to reveal itself to another. It is presented to the other as form. “Proportion presents itself as clarity. It is its own clarity. It is fullness of form, therefore fullness of rationality, therefore the fullness of knowability; but it is a knowability which becomes actual only in relation to the knowing eye.” Italics his.

95 Ibid.
manifestation of the Good to a perceiver.\textsuperscript{96} As Aquinas makes clear, in his account of the six days of creation, when speaking of the two senses of “light,” saying:

Any word may be used in two ways – that is to say, either in its original application or in its more extended meaning. This is clearly shown in the word \textit{sight}, originally applied to the act of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most trustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge obtained through the other senses. Thus we say, “\textit{Seeing how it tastes},” or \textit{smells}, or \textit{burns}. Further, sight is applied to knowledge obtained through the intellect, as in those words: \textit{Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God}

\textsuperscript{96} For the notion of \textit{claritas}, and also beauty (here \textit{decorem}), as expression or “display” (though with no explicit reference to form), see Aquinas’ discussion of “glory” (\textit{gloria}) as a species of clarity (\textit{claritas}) in ST II-II.132.1 co: “Glory (\textit{gloria}) signifies (\textit{significat}) a certain clarity (\textit{claritatem quandam}), wherefore Augustine says that to be glorified is the same as to be clarified (\textit{unde glorificari idem est quod clarificari}). Now clarity (\textit{claritas}) and comeliness (\textit{decorum}) imply a certain display (\textit{manifestationem}): wherefore the word glory properly denotes the display (\textit{manifestationem}) of something as regards its seeming comely (\textit{decorum}) in the sight of men, whether it be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since, however, that which is clear simply (\textit{simpliciter clarum est}) can be seen (\textit{conspici}) by many, and by those who are far away, it follows that the word glory properly denotes that somebody’s good is known (\textit{notitiam}) and approved (\textit{approbationem}) by many, according to the saying of Sallust: \textit{I must not boast while I am addressing one man.” Cf. Augustine, \textit{Super Joan., Tract. LXXXII} (cap. XV.8-10). The Fathers of the English Dominican Province note that the quotation here misattributed by Aquinas to Sallust is actually from Livy, \textit{Hist.}, lib. XXII, c. 39. It becomes clear, in the way that Aquinas responds to one of the objections, that “glory” is not a univocal concept. The objector worries that Cicero and Augustine both urge a desire for vainglory, which implies that such would not be a sin. It is not the perverse sort of empty praise that would in fact be a sin that is advocated by these wise men, however. Rather, it is true praiseworthiness of character that is encouraged (as a worthy end in itself), and the sort of good reputation (or “glory”) that one might expect to accompany it (but only as a means to some good end). Thus, the sense in which glory signifies clarity is when what is manifest to others is a reflection of the reality of the underlying soul or character. Aquinas says in ST II-II.132.1 ad 3: “It is requisite for man’s perfection that he should know himself; but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being useful for something, either in order that God may be glorified by men, or that men may become better by reason of the good they know to be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the testimony of others’ praise the good which is in him, may himself strive to persevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is praiseworthy that a man should \textit{take care of his good name}, and that he should \textit{provide good things in the sight of God and men}: but not that he should take an empty pleasure in human praise.” Cf. Augustine, \textit{Contra Maximinum haereticum Arianorum episcopum libri duo. III}; Cicero, \textit{De inventione} II.
And thus it is with the word light. In its primary meaning, it signifies that which makes manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to that which makes manifest to cognition of any kind.\footnote{ST I.67.1 co: Respondeo dicendum quod de aliquo nomine dupliciter convenit loqui, uno modo, secundum primam eius impositionem; alio modo, secundum usum nominis. Sicut patet in nomine visionis, quod primo impositum est ad significandum actum sensus visus; sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem huius sensus, extensum est hoc nomen, secundum usum loquentium, ad omnem cognitionem aliorum sensuum (dicimus enim, vide quomodo sapit, vel quomodo redolet, vel quomodo est calidum); et ulterius etiam ad cognitionem intellectus, secundum illud Matth. V, beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. Et similiter dicendum est de nomine lucis. Nam primo quidem est institutum ad significandum id quod factit manifestationem in sensu visus, postmodum autem extensum est ad significandum omne illud quod factit manifestationem secundum quamcumque cognitionem.}

A thing is made manifest to the intellect by a kind of illumination, the apprehension of which, when it is good, creates enjoyment – which, when a visible good, we call aesthetic enjoyment. In making itself known to us, through beauty, the good elicits our love. As Aquinas states, “for a thing is not beautiful because we love it; rather, because it is beautiful and good, it is loved by us; for our will is not the cause of things, but is moved by things.”\footnote{In de div. nom. IV, lec. 10: non enim ideo aliquid est pulchrum quia nos illud amamus, sed quia est pulchrum et bonum ideo amatur a nobis; voluntas enim nostra non est causa rerum, sed a rebus movetur.} Thus are we rightly drawn more intensely to those things that exhibit goodness and beauty in the highest degree. And since nothing exceeds God in goodness and beauty, God is necessarily the highest possible object of our love, and for the same reason God is the only wholly appropriate object of our love. We cannot know God but through those things by which He chooses to make Himself known to His creatures. And His method of manifestation is through beauty. To love beauty in truth is \textit{de facto} to love God. And perhaps this view gives some intelligibility to
Plato’s claim regarding beauty’s connection to education: “for the object of
education is to teach us to love what is beautiful.” This certainly comports with
Aquinas’ connection of pleasure and of love to the virtues, as explained in
chapter three. What we love says a great deal about our character. If we love
what is good and beautiful, we (i.e., our souls) are to that degree good and
beautiful. To teach one to love the good, whose manifestation is the beautiful, is,
therefore, to teach that one to become good, beautiful and virtuous. It is training
in virtue.

To return now to our previous passage on the persons of the Trinity,
insofar as beauty is likened to a property of the Son with respect to claritas,
Aquinas says that the Son is the Word (inquantum est verbum), the light (lux est)
and splendor of the intellect (et splendor intellectus). Aquinas attributes this
claim to John Damascene, but he says that Augustine alludes to the same idea
when he says “As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak,

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taught him that the true object of any love is the Form of Beauty rather than the beautiful things
in themselves. See *Symposium* 210a-212a. According to Diotima, there is a natural progression for
human cognizers. We at first are pleased by the senses, and so come to love a beautiful person
(by which is meant a beautiful body), and, eventually and by extension, beautiful people (bodies).
Through reflection, we can come to love the beautiful souls that animate these bodies. Further
reflection will lead us to love beautiful ideas, and eventually beauty itself. This will lead in turn
to love of wisdom, viz., the knowledge, understanding or contemplation of beauty.

100 ST I.39.8 co: Quantum vero ad tertium, convenit cum proprio filii, inquantum est verbum, quod
quidem lux est, et splendor intellectus, ut Damascenus dicit. Cf. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*
III.3.
the art of the omnipotent God,” etc.\textsuperscript{101} Discerning the intention of Aquinas by consulting the referenced passage in Augustine is less helpful in this instance since, in this passage, it is difficult to see how the quoted text references any feature of beauty that differs substantively from what he has said about integrity. Here he says that the “perfect Word” lacks nothing (\textit{cui non desit aliquid}), which seems quite similar to the notion of integrity as wholeness or perfection. Additionally, he compares the perfect Word to “a certain skill (\textit{ars quaedam}) of the omnipotent and wise God,” which seems better taken as a reference to the Holy Spirit than to the Son, since it was the Holy Spirit that was characterized in the triad at the beginning of this passage as \textit{usus}, whereas the Son was likened to \textit{species} or form. Aquinas attempts to clear this up in the next sentence, saying:

Use (\textit{usus}) has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided that \textit{use} be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of \textit{to enjoy} (\textit{frui}); according as \textit{to use} is to employ something at the beck of the will, and \textit{to enjoy} means to use joyfully, as Augustine says. So \textit{use}, whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other, agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what Augustine says: \textit{That love, that delectation, that felicity or beatitude, is called use by him} (Hilary). But the \textit{use} by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as the Gift.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Ibid. Et hoc tangit Augustinus cum dicit}, tanquam verbum perfectum cui non desit aliquid, et \textit{ars quaedam omnipotentis Dei, et cetera}. Cf. Augustine, \textit{De trinitate} VI.10 [11]: \textit{tamquam verbum perfectum cui non desit aliquid et \textit{ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis dei...}

\textsuperscript{102} ST I.39.8 co: \textit{Usus autem habet similitudinem cum proprivi spiritus sancti, largo modo accipienti usum, secundum quod uti comprehendit sub se etiam frui; prout uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, et frui est cum gudio uti, ut Augustinus, X de Trin., dicit. Usus ergo quo pater et filius se invicem fruuntur, convenit cum proprius spiritus sancti, inquantum est amor. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, illa dilectio, delectatio, felicitas vel beatitudo, usus ab illo appellatus est. \textit{Usus vero quo nos fruimer Deo, similitudinem habet cum proprio spiritus sancti, inquantum est donum}. Cf. Augustine, \textit{De}
According to the clarification, usus indeed regards a likeness to a property of the Holy Spirit, taken in a “wide sense,” but it relates to the Son also because the Holy Spirit is taken as a kind of use that is shared between the Father and the Son, namely, a kind of mutual enjoyment. Augustine expresses it this way: “Therefore that unspeakable conjunction of the Father and His image is not without fruition, without love, without joy.” 103 Therefore, Augustine can compare the Holy Spirit’s relation to the two other members of the Trinity as “the sweetness (suavitas) of the begetter and of the begotten (genitoris genitique), filling all creatures according to their capacity with abundant bountifulness and copiousness, that they may keep their proper order and rest satisfied in their proper place.” 104

In spite of this rather rich elaboration, we seem no closer to an understanding of the sense in which the Son is an exemplar of the notion of

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103 Augustine, De trinitate VI.10 [11]: Ille igitur ineffabilis quidam complexus patris et imaginis non est sine perfruitione, sine caritate, sine gaudio. Note the emphasis on the pleasure enjoyed by and among the members of the Trinity. It is this community of enjoyment, of pleasure, that one enters when one attains the beatific vision, the visio Dei, which for Augustine as for Aquinas is the ultimate end and perfection of the human being. That joy, inaugurated by the visio Dei, though not mentioned by Aquinas specifically, must be conceived under his system to be true aesthetic pleasure. Aquinas states that God alone is man’s happiness (ST I-II.2.8 co), and this happiness is found in the vision of the Divine Essence (ST I-II.3.8 co). Further, Aquinas says that delight (delectatio) is necessary for happiness (beatitudinem) in this way, namely, that it naturally attends the attainment of a good (requiescit in bono adepto), and that since the attainment of God is the attainment of the Highest Good (summi boni), that cannot be without delight (ST I-II.4.1 co). In the same article (ST I-II.4.1 ad 2), he says that “the very sight of God cause delight” (ipsa visione Dei causatur delectatio).

104 Ibid.: et est in trinitate spiritus sanctus, non genitus sed genitoris genitique suavitas ingenti largitate atqui uberitate perfundens omnes creaturas pro captu earum ut ordinem suum teneant et locis suis acquiescant.
Claritas, based at least upon the references provided by Aquinas. Specifically, Augustine seems to be relating the three notions of eternity, species and use to the three members of the Trinity, where use refers to the Holy Spirit. It is difficult to see how Aquinas expects this reference to help us understand the way in which the Son is an exemplar of claritas, or how claritas is a feature of the beautiful.

There is, however, a rather commonsensical way in which we can understand the Son’s relation to claritas, when Aquinas compares the Son, as the Word, to the “light and splendor of the intellect.” The metaphoric language here suggests the notion of intelligibility, which is quite often expressed in terms such as “light” or “clarity.” Of course, we would expect the Son, who is called “the Word” (Verbum), to embody intelligibility. Claritas is applied to God, then, as the ultimate ratio underlying the intelligibility of everything else, taking all that is not God to be an expression of divine understanding; it is to view creation as divine expression. This is perhaps most concretely expressed in the

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105 ST I.39.8 co.

106 John 1:1: In principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum. Cf. Revelation 19:13: Et vestitus erat vestem aspersam sanguine et vocatur nomen eius Verbum Dei. The first of these is clearly intended to refer to the coeternal second person of the Trinity, i.e., the Son, who became incarnate as the man Jesus of Nazareth. The latter reference is the one place in the Bible where the phrase Verbum Dei is applied to Jesus. It usually refers to the commands, precepts or prophetic words of God. See, inter alia, Luke 8:11, 11:28 and Acts 6:2.

107 See, e.g., the creation account in Genesis 1: “In the beginning (in principio) God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was formless and void, and darkness was over the surface of the deep (et tenebrae super faciem abyssi)... Then God said, ‘Let there be light’; and there was light (dixitque Deus fiat lux et facta est lux). God saw that the light was good (et vidit Deus lucem quod esset bona).” Cf. the analog in John 1:1-5: “In the beginning (in principio) was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came into being through Him, and apart from Him nothing came into being.
experience of visible light and color. This sense is unfortunately only pried with difficulty from the present text.

4.1.3 *Integritas sive Perfectio*

The last of the formal constituents of beauty has to do with the wholeness or perfection of an object, which is said to be beautiful on account of its similitude to the ideal member of the *species*.\(^\text{108}\) It is a comparative feature of objects, again pertaining to a kind of fit between the particular instance and its paradigmatic ideal. This is so whether there actually is an instance of the paradigmatic ideal, of which there may very well be none outside of the Divine Ideas.\(^\text{109}\)

Of the three formal constituents, *integritas* is the least represented, being mentioned only once in conjunction with the other two as conditions of

In *Him* was life, and the life was the Light of men (*in ipso vita erat et vita erat lux hominum*). The Light shines in the darkness (*et lux in tenebris lucet*), and the darkness did not comprehend it (*et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt").

\(^{108}\) The entry for "integritas" in *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas* gives the following definition: "the undiminished or unimpaired condition of a thing, completeness, soundness, integrity." Roy J. DeFerrari, Sister M. Inviolata Barry, and Ignatius McGuiness, *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas based on The Summa Theologica and selected passages of his other works* (Baltimore, MD: The Catholic University of America Press, 1948), 574.

beauty. There are only a handful of passages in which integrity is treated with respect to beauty, and the cumulative effect is to render a notion that is difficult to divorce from the notion of proportion. Indeed, its inclusion in the definition of formal constituents of beauty seems to be original to Aquinas. The tradition he inherited knew only two elements of beauty, namely proportio and claritas. Thus, in the pars prima, question seventy-three, article one, Aquinas refers to one way a thing can be perfect:

The first perfection (perfectio) is that according to which a thing is substantially perfect (res in sua substantia est perfecta), and this perfection is the form of the whole (forma totius); which form results from the whole having its parts complete (ex integritate partium).  

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110 ST I.39.8 co is the only occurrence of the three together. Both proportio and claritas receive treatment elsewhere in Aquinas. Cf., ST I.91.3 co (proportio); ST II-II.142.4 co (claritas); ST II-II.145.2 co, and 180.2 ad 3 (proportio and claritas together). Eco, 242 n.1.

111 Tatarkiewicz (2005), 253.

112 ST I.73.1 co: Prima quidem perfectio est, secundum quod res in sua substantia est perfecta. Quae quidem perfectio est forma totius, quae ex integritate partium consurgit. It should be noted that the locution forma totius is a mysterious notion. Other than to contrast it with forma partis (“as a whole differs from a a part”), in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Aquinas never clarifies his use of the phrase, and there is no scholarly consensus as to its meaning. According to Gregory Doolan, “a forma partis is a form that is found together with matter whereas a forma totius embraces both form and matter inasmuch as it is the very quidity of a species and, as such, is composed of both principles - although not as individuated.” Doolan, op. cit., 164. Cf. Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis exposicio, (hereafter, In Met) VII, lect. 9, n. 1469, in M. R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi, eds., Opera Omnia (Taurino-Rome: Marieti), 432. Likewise, Armand Maurer states that the forma totius is “the whole essence, including both form and matter in a material substance” while the forma partis “is a part of the essence and excludes matter.” Aquinas, The Division and Methods of the Sciences: Questions V and VI of his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, 4th edition, translated with an introduction and notes by Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986), 27 n.16. Cf. Armand Maurer, “Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas,” in Mediaeval Studies 13 (1951), 165-176. What seems clear is that Aquinas does not take forma totius to be synonymous with substantial form (which, for Aquinas, is the human soul, the form of the body); rather, forma totius is metaphysically posterior to, and arises from, the substantial form. See Guyla Klima, “Man = Body + Soul: Aquinas’s Arithmetic of Human Nature,” in Brian Davies, ed., Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 257-259.
The idea Aquinas is advancing here is that a thing’s approximation to its perfect form is the integrity (or completeness) of its parts or the arrangement of its parts. Taken this way, integrity refers to the fact that an object is not lacking in any of its parts nor are any of its parts defective in any way. Rather, the object is complete, attaining to its ideal form. It is perhaps understandable why some might consider the notion of *integritas* to be a species of *proportio*, since the distinction between the two is unclear.\(^\text{113}\) Taken this way, both have to do with the relationship between the whole and its parts. Where *proportio* has to do with a certain harmonious arrangement of the parts to the whole, *integritas* seems to do with the purity of the parts themselves and the completion of the whole taken as a whole. The idea seems to be the same as is meant by appeal to structural integrity in engineering. A building has structural integrity if there are no defects in parts, either through defective parts of by way of missing parts. An architectural structure has integrity if it is complete, and if its parts are individually and collectively without flaw such that the building is able to successfully perform its function. A beautiful object, therefore, is a completed whole, lacking in defect. Contrariwise, an ugly object is one that has some defect or flaw. Ugliness is, then, a kind of privation; it is a lack of beauty, just as evil is a lack of good.\(^\text{114}\) That Aquinas has this in mind, by his use of *integritas*, seems

\(^{113}\) Eco (1988), 99.

\(^{114}\) *In de div. nom. IV*, lec. 21: *Dicit ergo primo quod, sicut dictum est quod in Daemonibus et in animabus non est malum quasi aliquid existens, ita et neque in corpore est malum quasi aliquid existens. Malum*
born out in the familiar passage from *pars prima* question thirty-nine, where, explaining what he means by *integritas*, he says, “those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly.” The phrase *hoc ipso* lets us know that it is “on account of this,” namely, on account of having a defect (*diminuta*), that a thing is deemed ugly (*turpia*). Its ugliness is proportionate to the distance between the object and its perfect exemplar, and in this way, ugliness is simply a species of evil taken as privation. Thus, one can understand *integritas* in terms of *proportio* or, alternatively, *proportio* in terms of *integritas*. Eco therefore asserts, and O’Reilly agrees, that these two are, to use O’Reilly’s phrase, “mutually implicative.” While Eco means, primarily, that each of these terms implies the other so that an attempt to define one refers one to the other, the suggestion is that in Aquinas’ use, *proportio* and *integritas* are intimately connected, with *proportio* doing most of the heavy lifting. Aquinas’ inclusion of *integritas* implies that he saw, where others had not, that *proportio* was inadequate, on its own, to

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115 ST I.39.8 co: quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt.

116 O’Reilly, 23; Eco, 121. Eco uses the term “reciprocally implicative” since he considers all three of the formal conditions to be implicative of the others. I prefer O’Reilly’s terminology, however, because there seems to be a mutuality between *proportio* and *integritas* that is qualitatively different from the sort of implication held between either of those two and *claritas*. Eco thinks that each of these implies the other, but that is to say one thing; it is another thing to say, as O’Reilly does, that *proportio* and *integritas* are mutually subsumed one unto the other. It is tantamount to an identification, though he does allow for there to be a logical distinction between the two. *Ibid.*
account for all of the structural beauty of objects. The paucity of reference to *integritas* in Aquinas’ work may simply reflect caution in innovation.

Returning to our familiar passage on the members of the Trinity, with respect to *integritas*, Aquinas says that beauty is likened to the Son “inasmuch as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the Father.”\(^\text{117}\) This is further explained by appeal to a passage in Augustine’s *De trinitate*, wherein Aquinas reports Augustine as stating, “Where – that is, in the Son – there is supreme and primal life.”\(^\text{118}\) This quote must be understood in its context, of course, for Aquinas, in the common style of medieval commentators does not provide the entire quote, but merely the beginning. This is why he follows the direct quote with *etcetera*. In the referenced passage, Augustine gives more content to this idea of “prime and absolute life” (*prima et summa vita*), which he attributes to the Son. He clarifies this statement by saying that, for the one who has this prime and absolute life, “it is not one thing to live, and another to be, but the same thing to be and to live,” and likewise, regarding prime and absolute intellect (*primus ac summus intellectus*), “to whom it is not one thing to live, another to understand, but to understand is to live, and is to be, and all things

\(^{117}\) *Ibid.*: *Quantum igitur ad primum, similitudinem habet cum proprio filii, inquantum est filius habens in se vere et perfecte naturam patris.*

\(^{118}\) *Ibid.*: *Unde, ad hoc innuendum, Augustinus in sua expositione dicit, ubi, scilicet in filio, summa et prima vita est, et cetera. Cf. Augustine, De trinitate VI.10 [11]: ubi est prima et summa uita...*
are one.” From this passage, it is clear what Augustine is attributing to the Son, namely, a likeness to the Father in terms of his essential nature. Just as in the Father, to exist is to live and to understand, so also in the Son. This is a reference to the absolute simplicity of God, in whom there is no distinction between esse and essentia, that is, what He is and that He is, or even between His essence and any individual attribute, such as understanding. This is Aquinas’ basic notion, then, of integritas, namely, lacking any composition of parts. Nothing can be more perfect, or more intimately integrated, than something that is entirely simple, that is, in which even the most basic of distinctions, that between essence and existence, fails to obtain. It is in this basic simplicity, this complete unity of being, that the Son is like the Father. This kind of integritas is, of course, impossible for human beings. Nevertheless, we should expect there to be a kind of analogue in human beings if beauty can be appropriately attributed to them. An example is found, not in Aquinas, but in a work with which he was familiar, namely, the Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor, who says “the integrity

119 Augustine, De trinitate VI.10 [11]: ubi est prima et summa uita cui non est aliud uivere et aliud esse, sed idem et esse et uivere, et primus ac summus intellectus cui non est aliud uivere et aliud intellegere, sed id quod est intellegere, hoc uivere, hoc esse est unum omnia tamquam uerbum perfectum cui non desit aliquid et ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis dei plena omnium rationum uiuentium incommutabilium, et omnes unum in ea sicut ipsa unum de uno cum quo unum.

120 See, for instance, Aquinas, De ente 77-80, 89-91; esp. 89: Aliquid enim est, sicut Deus, cuius essentia est ipsummet suum esse; et edeo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi dicentes quod Deus non habet quiditatem vel essentiam, quia essentia sua non est aliud quam esse eius.

121 That Aquinas was familiar with this work is illustrated by the fact that he references it by name in at least one work of undisputed authenticity, namely, in his Super de trinitate III.5.1 ad 3. There are, however, numerous references to Hugh of St. Victor without attribution to particular works.
(integritas) of human nature, however, is attained in two things – in knowledge (scientia) and in virtue (virtute), and in these lies our sole likeness to the supernal and divine substances." The Latin text of the passage is even closer to Aquinas’ formulation (integritas sive perfectio) than the translation, for it affirms that this integritas of human nature “is perfected” (perficitur) in knowledge and virtue. Further confirmation that Hugh’s use is consonant with that of Aquinas is that this statement immediately follows Hugh’s description of the role of Philosophy, by which he means the project embraced by all of the arts taken together, theoretical, practical and mechanical:

Of all human acts or pursuits, then, governed as these are by Wisdom, the end and the intention ought to regard either the restoring (reparetur) of our nature’s integrity (integritas), or the relieving of those weaknesses to which our present life lies subject. What I have just said, let me more fully explain. In man are two things – the good and the evil (bonum et malum), his nature and the defective state of his nature (natura et vitium). The good, because it is his nature, because it has suffered corruption (curruptum est), because it has been lessened (minus est), requires to be restored by active effort (exercitio reparandum est). The evil, because it constitute a deficiency (vitium est), because it constitutes a corruption (corruption est), because it is not our nature, requires to be removed (excludendum est), or, if not able to be removed completely, then at least to be alleviated through the application of a

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123 ST I.39.8 co.
remedy. This is our entire task – the restoration of our nature and the removal of our deficiency (*natura reparetur et exeludatur vitium*).\textsuperscript{124}

Aquinas makes no specific reference to this passage, but its presence in a work with which Aquinas has demonstrated familiarity suggests that he may have been aware that *integritas* – as perfection or being without defect or blemish – already had some currency with reference to morality, even if it as yet had no such currency with respect to natural or physical beauty. Given sufficient reason to believe that, for Aquinas, aesthetic beauty is to some extent isomorphic with respect to moral beauty, this suggests how Aquinas may have come to extend the concept to the aesthetic domain, thereby adding a new formal constituent to the canon. Such a connection between aesthetic and moral beauty has already been suggested, but an even stronger case can be made for this connection by attending to Aquinas’ discussion of moral excellence, or *honestum*, in ST II-II.145.

4.2 On *Honestum*

In the *pars secunda* of the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas addresses the topic of man. This study begins, in the *prima secundae* with a discussion of man’s end, leads through a discussion of the passions and habits. The greater part of this

\textsuperscript{124} Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicum* I.5: *omnia autem humanarum actionum seu studiorum, quae sapientia moderatur, finis et intentio ad hoc spectare debet, ut vel naturae nostrae reparetur integritas vel defectuum, quibus praesens subiacet vita, temperetur necessitas. dicam apertius quod dixi. duo sunt in homine, bonum et malum, natura et vitium. bonum quia natura est, quia corruptum est, quia minus est, exercitio reparandum est. malum quia vitium est, quia corruptio est, quia natura non est, excludendum est. quod si funditus exterminari non potest, saltem adhibito remedio temperandum est. hoc est omnino quod agendum est, ut natura reparetur et exeludatur vitium.*
latter discussion is devoted to a study of the virtues, a discussion that spans not only the latter part of the *prima secundae*, but the whole of the *secunda secundae* as well. The last section of the *secunda secundae* deals with the issues of fortitude and temperance. Near the end of this treatise, Aquinas includes a question on what the Fathers of the English Dominican Province translate as “honesty” (*honestum*).\(^{125}\) The first thing to note, is that in the second article, regarding the

\(^{125}\) ST II-II.145. This very short question is comprised of only four questions, regarding (1) the relation between the honest (*honestum*) and the virtuous (*virtutem*), (2) its relation to the beautiful (*decorem*), (3) its relation to the useful (*utile*) and the pleasant (*delectabile*), and (4) whether honesty is part of temperance? The Fathers of the English Dominican Province inform us in a footnote (ST II-II, p. 1775) that the meaning of *honestum* is “moral goodness,” and so it is to be understood that, in the second question regarding its relation to the beautiful, *decorum* means “moral beauty.” Altogether, Aquinas’ terminology related to beauty can be very confusing. Aquinas makes use of several terms for what we may be tempted to translate simply as “beauty.” In this question, because Aquinas is primarily concerned with moral beauty, his primary term is *decorum*. Nevertheless, he also employs the term *pulchritudo*, which is his most general term for beauty, but with qualifiers such as *spiritualis* or *intelligibilem* to distinguish the subject of this question from natural beauty. Occasionally, for clarity’s sake, he will add the qualifier *corporalis* to *pulchritudo* where this relates to natural or physical beauty. As we will see, for Aquinas, *honestum* sometimes means “beauty” (though he seems to confine its use to moral, and not natural, beauty), and it can sometimes mean “virtue.” He makes these identifications clear in the first two articles of our present question. Since Aquinas did not have access to the works of Aristotle in the original Greek, he knew them only in Latin translation. Because of this, he was likely unaware that where Aristotle often distinguishes between τὸ καλὸν and τὴν ἀγαθὸν, both of these typically come to him as simply *bonum*. Nevertheless, Terrence Irwin, in a recent presentation, pointed out the striking fact that both Albert and Aquinas seem often to treat *bonum* as *honestum* in the very places where Aristotle used τὸ καλὸν rather than τὴν ἀγαθὸν. Terrence Irwin, “Moral Goodness: The Kalon and the Honestum,” presentation at the Classical Philosophy Conference, Ancient Theories of Beauty, Princeton University, December 4, 2011. One explanation for this is that they simply employed the terminology they had at their disposal for interpreting Aristotle’s intention. They may have assumed that Aristotle had used the same term for both but that, as is true of many words, it had a range of meanings. Whether this explanation is correct, the fact remains that quite often (though certainly not always) their use of *honestum* tracks Aristotle’s use of τὸ καλὸν. It is also possible that Albert and Aquinas recognize the distinctions in Aristotle because of their familiarity with Cicero’s distillation of Aristotle’s thought, especially in his *De oficiis*. Cicero, it has been noted, typically renders τὸ καλὸν as *honestum* (and hardly ever as *pulchrum*) in his own translations. See, e.g., J. G. F. Powell, “Cicero’s Translations from Greek,” in J. G. F. Powell, ed., *Cicero the Philosopher* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 299.
relationship between honestum and decorem, Aquinas makes the following comparison between natural and moral beauty:

Spiritual beauty (pulchritudo spiritualis) consists in a man’s conduct or actions being well proportioned (bene proportionata) in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason (spiritualem rationis claritatem). Now this is what is meant by honestum, which we have stated to be the same as virtue (idem esse virtuti); and it is virtue that moderates according to reason all that is connected with man. Wherefore honestum is the same as spiritual beauty (honestum est idem spirituali decori). Hence Augustine says: “By honestum I mean intelligible beauty (inteligibilem pulchritudinem), which we properly designate as spiritual (quam spiritualem nos proprie dicimus).”

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Thus a virtuous act is a beautiful act for the same reason that a virtuous body is a beautiful body: because they exhibit both bene proportio and a certain claritas, the formal constituents of beauty that we have already encountered and which Aquinas typically mentions in conjunction. In the case of the body, proportio concerns the relation of the parts to the whole, and claritas relates to color. In the case of a virtuous act, these two things, proportio and claritas, are

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As has already been noted, Aquinas’ usual formulation includes proportio and claritas, but not integritas, possibly because, in Aquinas’ mind, integritas is a species of proportio. The exception to this rule is ST I.39.8 co.
related to each other. He says that the action is well proportioned to the spiritual claritas of reason. Presumably, by this he means that the action is consonant with (i.e. directed by) reason. It is the light of reason that provides claritas here, and an action that is well ordered to reason is also called well proportioned. This is consistent with what Aquinas says elsewhere about virtuous activity, and he here reiterates that honestum is the same as both virtue and spiritual beauty.\textsuperscript{128}

In the article that follows, Aquinas says “a thing is said to be honestum if it is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite, which tends to that which is in accordance with reason.”\textsuperscript{129} Therefore, we can say that a virtuous act is a beautiful act, and it is beautiful because the external action we can see reflects a virtuous (or morally beautiful) interior, of which the external action is but an expression.\textsuperscript{130} This is another example of beauty taken as a sign; in this case, the beauty of an external action is taken as a sign of a rightly ordered character. Aquinas considers an objection to his view, namely, that “it seems that honestum is not the same as the beautiful” (videtur quod honestum non sit idem quod decorum),

\textsuperscript{128} ST I-II.55.4 ad 2: “Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says that the good of the soul is to be in accord with reason.” Cf. Dionysius, De divinis nominibus IV.

\textsuperscript{129} ST II-II.145.3 ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod honestum dicitur quod propter appetitum appetitu rationali, qui tendit in id quod est conveniens rationi.

\textsuperscript{130} ST II-II.145.1 ad 3: “Now honor is an attestation to someone’s excellence (excellentia), as stated above. But one attests only to what one knows; and the internal choice (interior electio) is not made known save by external actions (exteriores actus). Wherefore external conduct (exterior conversatio) has the character (ratione) of honesti, in so far as it reflects (est demonstrativa) internal rectitude (interioris rectitudinis). For this reason honestum consists radically in the internal choice (interiori electione), but its expression (significative) lies in the external conduct (exteriori conversacione).” Cf. ST I-II.55.4 co; I-II.55.4 ad 2; II-II.145.1 co; II-II.145.2 co; II-II.145.3 ad 1.
which seems to arise from an erroneous reading of Cicero. The anticipated objection states: “the aspect of honestum is derived from the appetite, since honestum is what is desirable for its own sake. But the beautiful (decorum) regards rather the faculty of vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the same as honestum (Ergo decorum non est idem quod honestum).” To this objection, Aquinas responds:

The object that moves the appetite is an apprehended good (bonum apprehensum). Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful (apparet decorum) as soon as it is apprehended, it is taken to be something becoming and good (conveniens et bonum). Hence Dionysius says that the beautiful and the good are beloved by all. Wherefore honestum, inasmuch as it implies spiritual beauty (spiritualem decorem), is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully says: Thou perceivest the form and the features, so to speak, of honestum; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom.

What Aquinas seems to be saying is that though the aspect of honestum is derived from appetite (because it is perceived as good which is the object of appetite), this does not disqualify honestum from being identified with the

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131 ST II-II.145.2 obj. 1. Cf. Cicero, De Inventione. II.53: Quod aut totum aut aliqua ex parte propter se petition, honestum nominabimus.

132 Ibid.

beautiful (decorum) because while the object moves the appetite under the aspect of the good, if it is a particular sort of good, namely, one that is visually perceived, it is also apprehended as beautiful. This is, therefore, an instance in which we see well-illustrated the concept, first raised in the pars prima, that beauty and goodness in a thing are the same (pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem) since they are founded on the same thing (super eandem rem fundantur), namely, the form (formam).\textsuperscript{134} Beauty and goodness are identical in an object or act that is apprehended visually, and so we see here, again, that beauty is but the good perceived in a certain way, namely, visually (and also, presumably, audibly). We might think of it that here, again, beauty is taken as a sign; in this case, beauty (visible goodness) is a sign of invisible or internal or inherent goodness.

From what Aquinas has to say about honestum, it is clear that there is a kind of beauty attributed to the soul, an interior and invisible beauty, which we can know only through external acts. This sort of beauty is a moral quality. It is what the ancients attributed to the virtuous person, certain a fine-ness or nobility of the soul. Given the prominent place Aquinas gives in his writings to moral matters, it is perhaps not surprising that he has more to say about this sort of beauty than he does about physical beauty, even though he sometimes speaks of the moral beauty by comparison to physical beauty (as he does in ST 145.2 co).

\textsuperscript{134} ST I.5.4. ad 1.
Presumably, he makes this sort of comparison because human beings are, in
general, more familiar with sensory or natural beauty than with moral beauty,
the former being derived primarily from the senses while the latter (even though
mediated by the senses) must be perceived under the aspect of its relation to
right reason or virtue, which is not equally accessible to all, but is dependent
upon one’s perceptual and valuational training.

4.3 On the Knowledge and Experience of Beauty

The discussion up to this point has brought us to a point where we can
properly understand what happens, according to Aquinas’ account, in the
process of experiencing beauty. We are, first of all, presented with an object that
has certain sensory qualities, such qualities which express certain underlying
formal features, namely, proportion, clarity and integrity. These formal features
are expressed through certain sensory information, which causally interact with
our sense organs, archetypically, the eye. The agent intellect causes the material
sensory information to become intelligible to the incorporeal intellect through the
process of abstraction, which produces a universal concept. The imagination
connects the abstracted universal to the stored sensory information in order to
produce the concept of this particular, which is related to a universal species, and
against which it can be compared. Inherent in such a comparison is a notion of
fittingness between the image of this particular and the species under which it
falls (or the archetype to which it approximates). The closer the approximation to the archetype, the better the “fit.” The better the fit, the more beautiful the object. Additionally, we can say that the more beautiful the object or the greater the love of the perceiver for the object, the greater the pleasure produced in the perceiver upon apprehension of the beautiful object. It is not entirely clear how much the pleasure experienced relates to the cognitive act of aesthetic judgment. For one can judge that an object is beautiful on account of its formal features alone, i.e., in terms of proportion, integrity and clarity, without having an accompanying affective experience. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the pleasure one takes in an object relates to one’s character, and so it is no mean feature of the experience. Additionally, it is entirely possible that one is first alerted to the presence of a beautiful object on account of a pleasurable experience, and only upon reflection picks out the formal features that ground the aesthetic experience. The pleasurable experience can thus be a signal for the presence of beauty as well as a product of it. And as discussed in chapter three, by encouraging a love for noble objects, one increases the pleasure experienced in their presence. This, in turn, reinforces the love for those noble objects, which encourages nobility of soul or virtue of character. Additionally, we need not think that the affective and cognitive experiences involved in an aesthetic episode are so very separate, for I am more inclined to favorably appraise an object that gives me pleasure. There is therefore a psychological feedback mechanism for judgment, and not just for
inciting desire.\textsuperscript{135} In this way, the perceiver is able to render an aesthetic judgment of individual objects. Additionally, to the extent that each object participates in goodness (or, at least, to the extent that goodness is apparent to the perceiver as beauty), to that degree is desire for the object incited in the perceiver, since an object is loved by us because it is beautiful and good.\textsuperscript{136} It is on account of the fit between the actual goodness of the object and the desire for the object on the part of the perceiver, that the perceiver can be judged as virtuous or not, since a sign of virtue is loving the good (and a sign of vice is, on the other hand, loving its opposite). It is also on account of its relationship to the good, that beauty is deemed by some to be a transcendental concept.

4.4 On the Transcendentality of Beauty

Before addressing the question whether beauty is a transcendental, we should first get clear about the meaning of transcendentality in the thirteenth century, and outline the historically canonical transcendentals, \textit{viz.}, Being, the True, and the Good. Once this has been accomplished, we can then investigate whether and how, for Aquinas, beauty is related to the transcendentals.

\textsuperscript{135} We might recall Eco’s statement that the medieval worldview was much more integrated than our contemporary one. The medieval view of beauty indicates “a cultural model whose values, though distinct for us, were integrated for them.” Eco (1988), 13. Likewise, “the medieval sensibility, like medieval culture as a whole, was an ‘integrated’ sensibility.” \textit{Ibid.}, 15.

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{In de div. nom. IV}, lec. 10: \textit{non enim ideo aliquid est pulchrum quia nos illud amamus, sed quia est pulchrum et bonum ideo amatur a nobis.}
In defining the notion of transcendentality, I can do no better than to quote Jorge J. E. Gracia’s introductory article on the concept:

Although most predicates may be truthfully predicated of only some beings, there are others that seem to apply to every being. The very term ‘being’ itself seems to be one of these, but there are also others. Among the most commonly noticed are ‘one’, ‘true’, ‘good’, ‘thing’, and ‘something’. 137

So defined, it should be clear that the transcendentals are those properties which are predicated of every class of existent thing. This is the reason for the designation: they transcend normal categories of classification, such as the

137 Jorge J. E. Gracia, “The Transcendentals in the Middle Ages: An Introduction,” in Topoi 11 (1992), 113. Gracia notes further that “the term used by scholastics in the Middle Ages to refer to the transcendentals is transcendentia, usually found in the plural. The term transcendentalia, used by modern commentators, is not recorded in medieval texts. The historical origin of the technical term transcendentia is yet to be established, but the verb transcendere was in use in Classical Latin to mean climb, pass, cross, overstep, surmount, exceed, and excel. The noun transcendentia is also recorded. Transcendentibus is used by Roland of Cremona before 1232.” Ibid., 119. Cf. Henri Pouillon, “Le premier Traité des Propriétés transcendentales. La Summa de bono du Chancelier Philippe,” in Revue Néoscolastique de philosophie 42 (1939), 44 n. 11; H. Knittermeyer, Der Terminus transcendental in seiner historischen Entwicklung bis zu Kant (Marburg: J. Hamel, 1920); and G. Schulemann, Die Lehre von den Transcendentalien in der scholastischen Philosophie (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1929). While present in a nascent form in both Plato and Aristotle, the doctrine of the transcendentals nevertheless failed to receive any systematic treatment until the early thirteenth century, when it appeared in the Summa aurea of William of Auxerre and the Summa de bono of Philip the Chancellor. This can be explained in part by the fact that it was not until this time that Aristotle’s corpus appeared in Latin translation, and Plato remained largely known only second-hand in the Latin West until the fifteenth century. Ibid., 118. Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, ed. J. Ribaillier, et al., Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, (Rome: Grottaferrata, 1980-87); Philip the Chancellor, Philippii Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de bono, ed. Nicolaus Wicki (Bern: Franke, 1985). For a detailed discussion of the transcendentals in Philip the Chancellor’s Summa de bono, see Aertsen (1996), 25-40. No similar treatment of the transcendentals in the thought of William of Auxerre has yet been undertaken. This lack of scholarly interest may be due in part to the fact that, according to Aertsen, there is no analogous concern in William’s Summa to the concern Philip’s Summa displays for the relations between being, good and true. Ibid., 26.
familiar scheme introduced by Aristotle.\footnote{138}{Aristotle, \textit{Categories} 1\textsuperscript{b}25-2\textsuperscript{a}4.} Gracia lists three parts of the medieval doctrine of the transcendentals: (A) Being \textit{qua} being has certain attributes; (B) Being \textit{qua} being and its attributes are transcendental; and (C) The attributes of being \textit{qua} being are convertible with it.\footnote{139}{Gracia (1992), 113. Being \textit{qua} being is that being common to all beings; it is not the unique being of any one thing or any group of things. Panayot Butchvarov agrees with this, going so far as to assert that the inquiry into being \textit{qua} being can be called “a transcendental inquiry.” Panayot Butchvarov, \textit{Being Qua Being: A Theory of Identity, Existence, and Predication} (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1979), 5.} The traditional medieval transcendentals are Being, One, True, and Good.\footnote{140}{The primary source of these, for medieval thinkers up to the thirteenth century, were Augustine, Boethius and Dionysius. Cf. Augustine, \textit{De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum} II.6; \textit{Soliloquiorum animae ad Deum} II.5; Boethius, \textit{De Hebdomadibus} (entire); and Dionysius, DN IV.7, 704B.} Of these, Being is primary and fundamental.\footnote{141}{De Ver. 21.2 ad 5: \textit{Ad quintum dicendum, quod ens non dicitur esse prius bono illo modo dicendi prius quem obiectio tangit, sed alicui modo, sicut absolutum respectivo}. English translations are from \textit{On Truth} (\textit{De Verititate}), 3 vols, translated by Robert W. Mulligan and Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952-54).} As Aquinas states, following Avicenna, “since being is what is first conceived by the intellect... every other noun must either be a synonym of being or add something at least conceptually.”\footnote{142}{De Ver. 21.1 co: \textit{Cum autem ens sit id quod primo cadit in conceptione intellectus, ut Avicenna dicit, oportet quod omne aliud nomen vel sit synonymum enti... vel addat aliquid ad minus secundum rationem.}} The remaining transcendentals are therefore secondary in the sense of being derived from or added to the most fundamental concept, \textit{viz.}, Being. Each of the secondary transcendentals must be identical to, add to, or qualify Being in some way. In fact, Aquinas delimits three different ways that something can be added to another thing.\footnote{143}{\textit{Ibid.}: \textit{Dicendum est, quod tripliciter potest aliquid super alterum addere.}}
First, what is added is something extraneous to the original thing, like adding a coat of paint to a house.\textsuperscript{144} The transcendentals cannot be added in this way since there is literally nothing extraneous to Being since whatever might be added already falls under the concept of Being as existing.

Second, what is added can narrow the original concept, as “human being” narrows the concept “animal” since a human being is an animal, but a particular species of that concept.\textsuperscript{145} “Animal” is the broader concept, and “human being” is a way of delimiting a narrower class within that concept. This can thus be thought of as the genus-species relationship. The genus is narrowed in some specified way to divide one subcategory of that genus from the rest. The species “human being” is separated from the remaining members of the genus “animal” by the addition of the concept of reason. In a general sense, the genus of Being may be subdivided into species, themselves further genera, namely, Aristotle’s ten categories of Being.\textsuperscript{146} But none of the other transcendentals can be added to

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.: Uno modo quod addat aliquam rem quae sit extra essentiam illius rei cui dicitur addi; sicut album addit aliquid super corpus, quia essentia albedinis est praeter essentiam corporis.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.: Alio modo dicitur aliquid addere super alterum per modum contrahendi et determinandi; sicut homo addit aliquid super animal: non quidem ita quod sit in homine aliqua res quae sit penitus extra essentiam animalis, alias oportet dicere, quod non totum quod est homo esset animal, sed animal esset pars hominis; sed animal per hominem contrahitur, quia id quod determinate et actualiter continetur in ratione hominis, implicito et quasi potentialiter continetur in ratione animalis. Sicut est de ratione hominis quod habeat animam rationalem, de ratione autem animalis est quod habeat animam, non determinando ad rationalem vel non rationalem; ista tamen determinatio ratione cuius homo super animal addere dicitur, in aliqua re fundatur.

\textsuperscript{146} Cf. Aristotle, Categories 1\textsuperscript{b}25-2\textsuperscript{a}4.
\end{footnotesize}
Being in this sense, since they apply to each of the ten categories as well as to Being itself.\footnote{Cf. Aristotle, NE I.6, 1096a19-23.}

Third, something can be added to another thing in an entirely conceptual way.\footnote{De Ver. 21.1 co: Tertio modo dicitur aliquid addere super alterum secundum rationem tantum; quando scilicet aliquid est de ratione unius quod non est de ratione alterius: quod tamen nihil est in rerum natura, sed in ratione tantum, sive per illud contrahatur id cui dicitur addi, sive non. Caecum enim addit aliquid supra hominem, scilicet caecitatem, quae non est aliquid ens in natura, sed rationis tantum ens est comprehendentis privationes; et per hoc homo contrahitur, non enim omnis homo caecus est; sed cum dicimus talpam caecam, non fit per hoc additum aliqua contractio.} Aquinas suggests that it is in this sense that we add the concept “blindness” to a human being.\footnote{Aristotle’s famous example of this sort of conceptual addition, namely of creating a compound concept similar to Aquinas’ blind man, was the property of being snub-nosed. Ultimately, Aristotle says that, among the categories, only substances are unqualifiably definable. The remaining categories are defined by way of addition. See Met. VII.5, 1030b14-1031a14.} The concept “human being” does not include the concept “blindness,” but some human beings do have “blindness;” so it is an addendum to the original concept. Nevertheless, blindness has the distinction of being a privation rather than a real entity, and this is why it falls under the third category of addition rather than of the first. Likewise, the secondary transcendentals are added to Being conceptually. There are two kinds of conceptual additions: negations and relations.\footnote{Ibid.: Id autem quod est rationis tantum, non potest esse nisi duplex, scilicet negatio et aliqua relatio.} Regarding the secondary transcendentals, One (or Unity) alone is a negative addition. For the concept “One” adds to the concept “Being” by expressing a \textit{negative way of existing},

\[\text{\textit{\ldots}}\]
namely, as undivided.\textsuperscript{151} Both True and Good are positive additions, and therefore since they are conceptual additions, they must be relational.\textsuperscript{152} There are various kinds of such relations, each of which requires a kind of one-way dependence of one thing upon the other, but not vice versa. Examples include knowing and known, sensing and sensed, measure and measured, and perfecting and perfected.

Aquinas says that both True and Good add to Being some relation of perfecting, of which there are two possible types.\textsuperscript{153} First, something can perfect another thing by way of its defining nature. The True perfects the mind in this way, for truth exists in the mind, according to Aristotle.\textsuperscript{154} Second, something can perfect another thing by way of its existence in reality as a specific nature. The Good perfects things this way because the good exists in things rather than in

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.: Sic ergo supra ens, quod est prima conceptio intellectus, unum addit id quod est rationis tantum, scilicet negationem: dicitur enim unum quasi ens indivisum. Cf. Aristotle, Met. X.2, 1053\textsuperscript{b}21-24; Aquinas, In Met. III, n. 2199.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.: Sed verum et bonum positive dicuntur; unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum. Illa autem relatio, secundum philosophum in V Metaph., inventur esse rationis tantum, secundum quam dicitur referri id quod non dependet ad id ad quod referitur, sed e converso, cum ipsa relatio quaedam dependentia sit, sicut patet in scientia et scibili, sensu et sensibili. Cf. Aristotle, Met. V.15, 1021\textsuperscript{a}26-32.

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.: Oportet igitur quod verum et bonum super intellectum entis addant respectum perfectivi. In quolibet autem ente est duo considerare: scilicet ipsum rationem speciei, et esse ipsum quo aliquid subsistit in specie illa; et sic aliquod ens potest esse perfectivum dupliciter.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.: Uno modo secundum rationem speciei tantum. Et sic ab ente perfectitur intellectus, qui percipit rationem entis. Nec tamen ens est in eo secundum esse naturale; et ideo hunc modum perficiendi addit verum super ens. Verum enim est in mente, ut philosophus dicit in VI Metaphys.; et unumquodque ens in tantum dicitur verum, in quantum est conformatum vel conformabile intellectui. Cf. Aristotle, Met. VI.4, 1027\textsuperscript{a}25.
minds. And Aquinas says that the way that the existence of one thing perfects another relates to what it perfects as a goal. It is for this reason that Aristotle asserts: “good is well defined by those who say it is what everything desires.”

So the Good is that which perfects a thing by being its goal and end or, secondarily, by leading to its goal or end as a means to that end. Further, Aquinas says that the True and the Good are convertible as to subject, though they differ logically. For “the true considered in its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a particular good, since it is something appetible: and in like manner the good considered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite is something true, since it is something intelligible.”

What about beauty? Does Aquinas consider it to be a transcendental? The inclusion of beauty among the transcendentals was an innovation of the thirteenth century, but was, by Aquinas’ time, already becoming accepted. Specific references to Beauty among enumerations of the transcendentals are

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156 Ibid.: In quantum autem unum ens secundum esse suum est perfectivum alterius et consummativum, habet rationem finis respectu illius quod ab eo perficitur; et inde est quod omnes recte definientes bonum ponunt in ratione eius aliquid quod pertinet ad habitudinem finis; unde philosophus dicit in I Ethicorum, quod bonum optime diffinierunt dicentes, quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Cf. ST I.6.3; Aristotle, NE I.1, 1094a3.

157 ST II-II.102.2 ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verum et bonum subiecto quidem convertuntur, quia omne verum est bonum, et omne bonum est verum. Sed secundum rationem, invicem se excedunt, sicut intellectus et voluntas invicem se includunt; nam intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et multa alia, et voluntas appetit ea quae pertinent ad intellectum, et multa alia.

158 ST II-II.109.2 ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verum et bonum subiecto quidem convertuntur, quia omne verum est bonum, et omne bonum est verum. Sed secundum rationem, invicem se excedunt, sicut intellectus et voluntas invicem se includunt; nam intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et multa alia, et voluntas appetit ea quae pertinent ad intellectum, et multa alia.
relatively late, finding its first mention in Alexander of Hales’ *Summa Theologica* in 1245. Aquinas’ own teacher, Albertus Magnus, stated in his commentary on *De divinus nominibus* that “a thing has as much beauty as it has being.” And Aquinas’ contemporary Bonaventure made an even stronger claim, asserting: “being has four conditions, namely, the one, the true, the good and the beautiful.”

Does beauty add anything conceptually to Being? Strictly speaking, Aquinas nowhere says that it does. However, he asserted, in a previously discussed passage from the *pars prima* of his *Summa Theologiae*, that the Beautiful and the Good are mutually convertible, differing only *in ratio*, that is, in meaning. This

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159 Eco points out that this work, the *Summa Fratris Alexandrii* was actually composed by three Franciscan authors: Alexander, John of La Rochelle, and a third author referred to as “Brother Considerans.” Eco (1988), 43.

160 Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium de divinis nominibus* (*De pulchro et bono*) Q. 9, expos: *quantum enim unumquodque habet de pulcritudine, tantum habet de esse*. Since this work is as yet untranslated, all English translations are my own. More needs to be said regarding this passage, especially since it comes from the exposition portion of the question in which Albert’s chief concern is simply to accurately report what Dionysius is asserting, and not yet to comment upon it, whether to endorse or deny it. However, it seems clear to me from the objections and his replies that he is, in fact, in agreement with Dionysius’ position on the convertibility of Beauty and Being. I will consider this passage in more detail in the next chapter.

161 This quote is from a little studied text of Bonaventure, identified only as “M. 51c,” which, on account of its late discovery, is not included in the critical Quarrachi edition of Bonaventure’s *opera omnia*. M. 51c: *Cum assignantur quattuor conditiones entis communiter, scilicet unum, verum, bonum, pulchrum quaeritur qualiter distinguuntur*. This passage is quoted in Emma J. M. Spargo, *The Category of the Aesthetic in the Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure* (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1953), 36 n.3. The authorship of the manuscript is undisputed since it bears the signature of Bonaventure. *Ibid.*, 34. The entire text of M. 51c has been reproduced in Edgar de Bruyne’s *Etudes d’esthétique médiévale*, vol. III (Brugge: De Tempel, 1946), 190-191. There is to date no English translation of the manuscript.

162 ST I.5.4 ad 1. *Ratio* can also be interpreted as “proportion,” but the present context suggests that “meaning” better represents Aquinas’ intention. Interpreting *ratio* as “proportion” here would render the sentence even more opaque.
seems to imply that Aquinas did take Beauty to be a transcendental, but in a qualified way, namely, as a conceptual addition to the secondary transcendental Good, which is convertible with Truth and Unity. Beauty might be taken, therefore, as a kind of tertiary or supernumerary transcendental, qualifying the secondary transcendental Good in some way.\textsuperscript{163} For, if Being is convertible with Good (i.e., they are either synonymous or “good” adds something conceptually to “being”), and Good is convertible with Beauty (i.e., they are either synonymous or “beauty” adds something to “good”), then, taking convertibility as a kind of equivalence, by the law of transitivity, Being is convertible with Beauty (i.e., they are either synonymous or “beauty” adds something to “being” by adding something to “good”); and therefore, Beauty is a transcendental. Nevertheless, Jan Aertsen anticipates and challenges just such a move. He asserts that the transcendentals, properly speaking, “express a general mode of being,” which is to say that they must add something conceptually to Being directly.\textsuperscript{164} He reminds us that Aquinas nowhere identifies the beautiful with Being, but only with Good.\textsuperscript{165} “The beautiful is convertible with the good and adds

\textsuperscript{163} Of course, against this view stand the facts that Aquinas nowhere explicitly acknowledge the transcendentiality of beauty, and that if beauty is such a tertiary or supernumerary transcendental, it seems to be the only one of its kind. At least, apart from beauty, no other concept has ever contended for inclusion among the transcendentals. As has already been noted, the terminology of the transcendentals did not come into common use until after Aquinas, so it might be less surprising not to find him speaking this way. Nevertheless, this highlights the speculative nature of the debate over the transcendentality of beauty in his system.

\textsuperscript{164} Aertsen (1996), 344.

\textsuperscript{165} Aertsen also reminds us that Aquinas nowhere lists the beautiful among the transcendentals, even in his most comprehensive account of them in \textit{De Veritate} I.1. \textit{Ibid.}, 336. To this objection, he
something to it. It even seems to be a property of the good."\textsuperscript{166} In spite of the convertibility of the Beautiful with the Good, and of the convertibility of the Good with Being, Aertsen denies that any addition to the Good would thereby imply an addition to Being. His reason is as follows:

According to Thomas the beautiful adds, “an ordering to the cognitive power,” but in his order of the transcendentals, the good presupposes the true and the relation to the cognitive power is that which “the true” adds to “being.” One can therefore not interpret the addition of the beautiful to the good in such a way that this addition would be equivalent to an addition to being.\textsuperscript{167}

According to Aertsen, then, considered subjectively (i.e., as it relates to cognizers), the Beautiful presupposes the True. Considered objectively (i.e., considered absolutely or without qualification), the Beautiful presupposes the Good. It is the True and the Good, which directly modify Being. In either case, the Beautiful adds nothing new to Being.

notes (and rejects as unconvincing) Maritain’s response that the reason for beauty’s absence from the list of transcendentals in De Veritate I.1 is “that it can be reduced to one of them,” i.e., to the good. Instead, he asserts, “If the beautiful is really a transcendental, then it must add a value to being conceptually that cannot be reduced to another transcendental.” \textit{Ibid.} Cf. Maritain (1934), 172 n. 63. In contrast to Maritain, who sees the beautiful as implicit in the list of transcendentals in the De Veritate, Francis Kovach acknowledges that the list is complete, and that Aquinas had not yet realized, at the time of writing the De Veritate, that beauty is a transcendental. However, by the time of the writing of the commentary on the \textit{De divinis nominibus}, ten years later, Aquinas was coming to this realization. Aertsen, \textit{Ibid.}; Kovach (1961), 75-76, 183. Another possibility is suggested however by what has already been noted regarding the identification, in ancient thought, of τὸ καλὸν and τὸ γαθὸν, and by the fact that medieval thinkers like Albert and Thomas may have picked up on this identification.

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Ibid.} He goes so far as to assert that “this idea is strengthened by the fact that ‘clarity’ and ‘consonance,’ which form the proper ratio of the beautiful, are said to be contained in the notion of the good (\textit{sub ratione boni}).”

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Ibid.}
If Aertsen is correct about this, then beauty is not a transcendental on par with Being, Good, and True in Aquinas’ thought. I do not intend to argue that Aertsen is incorrect about this. He is quite clear that he stands more or less alone against the opinions of an “impressive series of scholars” who do interpret Aquinas as holding that beauty is a transcendental. In spite of this, his offers up persuasive arguments that, to my knowledge, have yet to be adequately addressed. Nevertheless, as we have seen, so far as the ancients are concerned, there is an intimate connection between the κόλαν and the good. Aertsen is aware of this fact, as he takes pains to point out. However, because he does not consider the possibility that Aquinas also shared this connection (as is suggested by his use of bonum and honestum), his case is as yet inconclusive.

Rather than moderate the debate over the transcendentality of beauty, I wish to suggest that even if Aertsen is correct, I do not believe it will have any

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169 Aertsen characterizes Dionysius’ identification of goodness and beauty as “a typical representative of Greek thought, for in Hellenic culture the beautiful and the good are brought together in a single notion.” Aertsen (1996), 341.
significant practical effect on how we interpret Aquinas’ view of beauty. The reason is that it makes no difference to the extension of the concept of Beauty whether it is convertible with Being or merely with Good. Since everything that exists is good, on account of the convertibility of Being and Good, and since everything that is good is also beautiful, on account of the convertibility of Good and Beautiful, therefore, everything that exists is also beautiful. The notion of beauty extends to all things that have being. In the end, I think it makes very little practical difference whether or not we wish to call Beauty a primary transcendental, on par with the canonical transcendentals. All that is required for our purposes, I believe, is that beauty be convertible with the good, and that, as I believe has been demonstrated, enjoys sufficient textual warrant. The fact is that Beauty will be attributable to the exact class of entities to which Being is attributable. This is sufficient to justify the objectivity of Beauty, if such justification was still required. After all, the objectivity of beauty seems to be sufficiently established by its grounding in the formal features of things, namely, proportio, integritas and claritas. Furthermore, for the success of our conclusions regarding the importance of beauty to virtue and human flourishing, the connection that must be established is that between Beauty and the Good; and Aquinas’ endorsement of the convertibility of Beauty and the Good is uncontroversial. The beautiful is convertible with the good. The good is what all desire, and the attainment of which produces pleasure. Both what we value as
good and that from which we derive pleasure both implicate the moral status of our character. Since what we love and in what we take pleasure are subject to moral development and evaluation, we should take care to train both ourselves and our children to love what is good and what is beautiful. This applies with greatest force, of course, to moral goodness and moral beauty.
CHAPTER 5

COMPARISON WITH SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCES

In this chapter, I shall discuss the most important influences on Aquinas’ idea of beauty. By far, the most important authority for the medieval doctrine of the beautiful is Dionysius, and his most important work for the notion of the beautiful is his De divinis nominibus.¹ In this chapter, therefore, I shall briefly examine the relevant fourth chapter of this work, and explore the commentary on the same by Aquinas’ teacher and mentor, Albert the Great.² A comparison of these texts with Aquinas’ own commentary on De divinis nominibus should complete our investigation, giving us Aquinas’ most mature and sustained treatment of the notion of beauty.³ Our first task is to consider the treatment of beauty in Dionysius.

¹ Aertsen (1996), 339. Cf. Dionysius, DN IV. Chapter four of The Divine Names has been the focus of most scholarly studies of the work since its importance is unquestioned. While the structural division of the DN as a whole has been a matter of dispute since at least the time of Aquinas, there is at least general agreement that the first three chapters deal with preliminary issues relating to theology, epistemology and method. There is also general agreement that chapters four through eleven represent the “processions” of God, but how to properly distinguish the various processions is in dispute. A point of agreement is the centrality of chapter four on goodness and beauty, which constitutes over a quarter of the text. For a state of the art discussion of the structure of the DN see Christian Schäfer, The Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite: An Introduction to the Structure and the Content of the Treatise On the Divine Names (Leiden and Boston: E. J. Brill, 2006).

² Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysium de divinis nominibus (De pulchro et bono).

³ Aquinas, In de div. nom. IV.
5.1 Dionysius the Areopagite’s *De Divinis Nominibus*

The theories of beauty that were popular in the thirteenth century are no doubt rooted in the thought of such ancient thinkers as Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle, but this body of thought was largely transmitted to the medieval world through two key fifth century figures: Boethius and Dionysius.4 Though both were considered authorities of the first-rank in the Middle Ages, the latter enjoyed a particularly high level of respect because of a long tradition identifying him with the biblical figure of Dionysius who, according to the book of Acts, was a convert of the Apostle Paul.5 Dionysius is also important as a conduit of unmixed Neoplatonic thought, in contrast to Boethius, whose writings reflect more of a synthesis between Platonism and Aristotelianism.6 It is likely on account of its more Platonic nature that the *De divinis nominibus* of Dionysius is able to convey such a rich account of beauty.

First of all, I must say a word about the specific metaphysical worldview that underlies Dionysius’ discussion of beauty. For it is so radically different from that of Aquinas that it seems inevitable that the two accounts must diverge.

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4 The most important texts conveying Boethius’ thinking about beauty for the latter Middle Ages were his *De musica* and *De arithmetica*.


To the extent that Aquinas is unaware of these metaphysical underpinnings in *De divinis nominibus*, he will see more common ground than points of disagreement. We might wonder, for instance, how Aquinas can so ostensibly adopt the authority of a work the commitments of which run so counter to the heavily Aristotelian metaphysical scheme underlying his own study and use of the work. This can only be explained by appeal to a certain level of ignorance, on Aquinas’ part, regarding the Platonism of the Areopagite.

Of particular importance in this regard, is Dionysius’ commitment to the view that to be is to be intelligible. This is the intention behind his dicta that God is “beyond being,” “nameless,” and “unknowable,” since knowledge is necessarily of being, so that what is beyond being cannot be known. Eric Perl argues that to treat these statements as merely judgments about the finitude of human knowledge is to fail to appreciate the seriousness of Dionysius’ commitment to Neoplatonic metaphysics. It is not merely that God, as an object of knowledge, exceeds the human cognitive capacities. Rather, God is literally

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7 According to Eric Perl, this is the foundational principle of Neoplatonic thought. “The identification of being, τὸ ὄν, that which is, as that which can be apprehended by νόησις, intellection, is the basis not only for the Platonic and Neoplatonic identification of being as form or idea (ἐἶδος, ἴδεα), and the associated view that the sensible is less than completely real, but also of the Neoplatonic insistence that the One or Good, the source of reality, is itself ‘beyond being.’” Eric Perl, *Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2007), 5. This view is first expressed by Parmenides, and becomes the center of Plato’s metaphysics. *Ibid.* Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 247c; *Timaeus* 27d-28a.

8 Dionysius, DN I.4, 593A-C; I.6, 596A; I.7, 596C. In these characterizations, we see a clear echo of Plato as, for instance, in *Republic* VI, 509b: “the Good is not being, but is beyond being” [ὁικ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ ἐτί ἐπέκεινα τής οὐσίας].

unintelligible. For what is intelligible is determinate, and therefore finite. If God is not finite, then neither is God intelligible. However, since to be is to be intelligible, in the Neoplatonic metaphysics to which Dionysius is committed, neither is God a being. This is why Dionysius can say that God is “beyond being.” God neither is nor is not. He is neither Being itself nor a being. He is not some “other” kind of being beyond the being that other beings have since that would subsume God under a larger class of beings; rather, “He is all things, and no thing,” simultaneously immanent and transcendent. Any attempt to determine what God is would imply treating God as an object of intellection, and therefore limited. Perl argues that we must resist the temptation “to mitigate the force of his negations by interpreting his thought in the light of later theories which attempt to allow for ‘infinite being’ and thus break with the fundamental Neoplatonic principle that to be is to be intelligible and therefore to be finite.”

The notion of “infinite being” is, according to Neoplatonic metaphysics, an oxymoron. It cannot be maintained while still adhering to the Neoplatonic

10 Dionysius, DN I.1, 588A: “That is why we must not dare to resort to words or conceptions concerning that hidden divinity which transcends being” [Καθόλου τοιγαρών οὐ τολμήτευν εἰπεῖν οὔτε μὴν ἐνοησαί τι περὶ τῆς ὑπερουσίου καὶ κρυφίας θεότητος].

11 Dionysius DN I.6, 596C: “that he is all, that he is no thing” [πάντα τὰ ὅντα καὶ οὐδέν τῶν ὅντων].

12 Perl (2007), 13. An example of this later medieval tendency to divide “being” into finite and infinite can be found in the thought of Duns Scotus, who says that before “being” is divided up into the traditional ten categories, it is first divided into infinite and finite: Sed tunc est dubium, quaelia sunt illa praedicata, quae dicuntur de Deo [formaliter], ut sapiens, bonus, etc. Respondeo: ens prius dividitur in infinitum et finitum quam in decem praedicamenta, quia alterum istorum, scilicet [ens] finitum, est commune ad decem genera. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. VIII, part I, Q. iii, in Opera Omnia, Vol. IV (Civitas Vaticana: typis Polyglottis Vaticani, 1956).
commitment to the identification of being and intelligibility. This kind of apophaticism is markedly different from that of Aquinas, for whom the unknowability of God is a feature of the finite cognitive capacities of created rational beings.\footnote{For Aquinas, there is a proportionate relation between the object of cognition and the cognizer, and for Aquinas, the infinite is out of proportion to the finite intellect, and it is for this reason that human knowledge is bound primarily to created things. In de div. nom. I, lec. 1: hoc est ergo quod concludit, quod nullo modo aliquis debet audere dicere, ore, nec etiam cogitare aliquid de occulta deitate supersubstantiali, quae est super omnum substantiam, et per hoc est occulta nobis quibus creatae substantiae sunt proportionatae ad cognoscendum et per consequens ad loquendum… de eo quod ab aliquo solo scitur, nullus potest cogitare vel loqui, nisi quantum ab illo manifestatur. Soli autem Deo convenit perfecte cognoscere seipsum secundum id quod est. Nullus igitur potest vere loqui de Deo vel cogitare nisi inquantum a Deo revelatur. Quae quidem divina revelatio in Scripturis sacris continetur. Et hoc est quod dicit quod convenit ipsi, scilicet Deo soli, attribuere supersubstantialem scientiam ignorantiae supersubstantialitatis, idest supersubstantialitatis divinae ignoratae; quae quidem supersubstantialitas non ignorata est propter aliquem suum defectum, sed propter suum excessum, quia scilicet est super rationem et intellectum creatum et super ipsum substantiam creatam quae est objectum commensuratum intellectui creato, sicut essentia increata est proportionata scientiae increatae.}

This commitment has other consequences that seem equally incompatible with Aquinas’ metaphysical views. For instance, Perl states that another consequence is that Dionysius is neither a theist nor an atheist, since both share the same metaphysical starting point of treating God as a being (which is either affirmed or denied).\footnote{Perl (2007), 15. Cf. Fran O’Rourke, \textit{Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas} (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 20: “The pre-eminent cause of all things is so transcendent to our ways of reflection that they must both, whether negative or affirmative, be denied, so as to be understood in a pre-eminent sense. Truly speaking, God may neither be denied, nor affirmed; he is a realm utterly other than the poverty which constitutes the world of human measure.” Cf. Dionysius, DN II.4, 641B.}

Nevertheless, Dionysius often speaks of God as the cause of things in the world, either of their being, their beauty, or their intelligibility.\footnote{Dionysius, DN I.1, 588B; I.3, 589B; I.7, 596C.} How is it that God can be the cause of such things if God is no thing, has no
being? For God is not one cause among many – not even the First Cause, which would again implicate God in finitude for the reasons already mentioned. What Dionyius means by “cause,” when applied to God, is the Neoplatonic notion of emanation, which may be understood as Platonic participation. It is, according to Perl, “the ‘vertical’ causation of a lower ontological level by a higher one.”

According to Perl, we can best get an idea what is meant by “cause” and “effect” in Dionysius’ works by appeal to the doctrine of participation in Plato. With respect to beauty, Plato says,

[I]f there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything... nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful... it is through Beauty that beautiful things are made beautiful.17

This passage exhibits the Platonic notion of participation as causation that is “vertical” rather than “linear.” The cause is that by which the effect has the specific property in question. “A Platonic form is the intelligible nature, present in many things, by which they are such things. As such a nature, it is at once immanent in and transcendent to the instances that participate in it.”

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16 Perl (2007), 17.
17 Plato, *Phaedo* 100c-e.
Dionysius says that all things, including the divine, that are revealed to us are “known only by way of whatever share of them is granted,” that is, they are known only through their participations, while their actual nature “is beyond all intellect and all being and all knowledge.”\(^\text{19}\)

In contrast to the interpretation of Dionysius given by Perl, Caroline Putnam asserts that Dionysius speaks of God in “hyperbolic” language, and that this language should not suggest to us that God is literally a non-being.\(^\text{20}\) A superficial reading of Dionysius lends itself to this view, she claims, for Dionysius makes claims that ostensibly support such an interpretation. For instance, Dionysius says that “the ‘super-essential Thearchy’ is spoken of as ‘beyond substance and the good.’”\(^\text{21}\) A careful reading, she suggests, shows that these expressions “merely stress the ‘hyper’ mode in which being, unity, and goodness are predicated of God; for He is described elsewhere as the ‘true being,’ ‘eternal being,’ ‘transcendent being,’ the ‘being who is really perfect in Himself,’ the ‘being above all being.’”\(^\text{22}\) Thus, on Putnam’s view, Dionysius makes use of

\(^{19}\)Dionysius, DN II.7, 645A. Cf. Psalm 198: 13-14: “The splendor of his name reaches beyond heaven and earth” (\textit{quoniam sublime nomen eius solius / Gloria eius in caelo et in terra}).

\(^{20}\)Putnam (1960), 5.


\(^{22}\)Ibid., 5-6. Cf. \textit{Ecclesiastical Hierarchy} (hereafter EH), IV.3, 7, 481A (“true being”); DN IX.4, 912C (“eternal being”); \textit{Celestial Hierarchy} (hereafter CH) XIII.4, 305D (“transcendent being”); CH X.3,
hyperbolic language in order to express the true archetypal nature of God over against derivative beings that merely imitate the exemplar through participation. This language serves as a constant reminder that while we must say something about God, nevertheless, what we say is always analogous at best. Thus, at the end of the De divinis nominibus, regarding the “Godhead which transcends every being,” Dionysius proclaims:

There is no name for it nor expression. We cannot follow it into its inaccessible dwelling place so far above us and we cannot even call it by the name of goodness. In our urge to find some notion and some language appropriate to that ineffable nature, we reserve for it first the name which is most revered. Here, of course, I am in agreement with the scripture writers. But the real truth of these matters is in fact far beyond us.23

Something positive can be said of God, for scripture makes positive claims about God, chief among which is the claim that God is good or goodness itself. However, even this “most revered” name for God exceeds the sufficiency of our language or concepts. Fran O’Rourke takes this passage to be both an admission of the inadequacy of our names for God and an indication that some names are

273C (“being who is really perfect in Himself”); and DN IX.4, 912C (“being above all being”). Putnam cites Étienne Gilson as an example of a thinker who once endorsed the superficial view but who, upon closer examination of the text, changed his mind on this matter. For his earlier view, see Étienne Gilson, Le Thomisme, 5th edition (New York: Random House, 1956 [original 1919]), 138. For his later view, in support of Putnam’s thesis, see Étienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), 84. Though Putnam’s work is listed in Perl’s bibliography, he does not engage her work in the text, and so does not directly confront her claim.

23 DN XIII.3, 981A-B.
more rightly predicated of God. The “most proper” name is “Goodness.” In fact, O’Rourke claims that, in Dionysius, God’s divinity is identical with his goodness. This is, of course, a matter of dispute, but numerous scholars have argued that for Dionysius the good has priority over being. For instance, Putnam argues that the concept of good has a greater extension than that of being, since “the good reaches even to the things which are not but which may be, while being extends only to the things which are.” Further, Dionysius says that the Good is “that which truly is and which gives being to everything else.” In elevating “good” to the position of priority even over being, Dionysius is following in the Platonic tradition. The same dispute regarding which transcendental, whether being or goodness, has priority arises likewise in Aquinas. Nevertheless, I do not intend at this time to engage this particular debate, since I have already conceded that for Aquinas “being” and “good” are convertible. I have thus far, and without exacting argument, adopted the position

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24 O’Rourke, 66.


26 Putnam (1960), 11. Cf. DN V.1, 816B, where Dionysius states: “The divine name ‘Good’ tells of all the processions of the universal Cause; it extends to beings and nonbeings and that Cause is superior to being and nonbeings. The name ‘Being’ extends to all beings which are, and it is beyond them.”

27 DN V.4, 817C.

28 Putnam (1960), 10. Cf. Republic VI, 505b, 509b; VII, 518c. Cf. also Plotinus, Enneads V.5.3-11. Putnam is careful to point out, however, that Dionysius departs significantly from the Neoplatonic doctrine of necessary emanationism that is characteristic of thinkers like Plotinus and Proclus. For Dionysius, creation is a free and spontaneous act of the Trinity. See Putnam (1960), 11. Cf. EH I, 373C; DN IX.4, 912C. Cf. also Plotinus, Enneads III.2.2; and Proclus, Elements props. 31, 33, 37-39.
that being is, for Aquinas, more fundamental and that the good is a mode of being. This may well turn out to be false, but I do not think it bears greatly on our current discussion of beauty and its relation to the good. Additionally, it may not be entirely true to say that, for Dionysius, goodness is prior to being since, as even Putnam has noted, Dionysius sometimes – especially in chapter five of the *De divinis nominibus*, which is devoted to a discussion of “Being” as one of the divine names – deviates from his standard elevation of good over being to assert the primacy of being as “the most fundamental of participations.” For there, especially, God is presented as Being itself.

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29 Where it may have an effect is in the proper classification of the beautiful, specifically, whether it is a secondary or tertiary transcendental. If “being” has priority, and “good” is a way of expressing “being,” then “good” is a secondary transcendental; and if “beauty” is a further way of being “good,” then “beauty” will be a tertiary transcendental. This much I have conceded in chapter four. Nevertheless, it may be that Aquinas follows Dionysius, and so Plato, more closely here than he does Augustine, and that he considers “good” to be the most fundamental concept, with “being” as a way of expressing “good” (the other way being expressed by non-beings). On this view, “beauty” would be on par with “being,” both being ways of expressing “good.” I think there are good reasons, some of which were touched upon in chapter four, to hold that Aquinas follows Augustine in seeing being as most fundamental, and a thing’s goodness being tied to its being (and, specifically, its relationship to ultimate being, *viz.*, God). In either case, however, “beauty” is connected primarily to “good” and that relationship is my primary focus; the relative position of “beauty” with respect to “being” is not a concern at present.

30 Putnam (1960), 6. As evidence, she quotes DN V.4, 817C: “He who is (ὁ ὄν), is by power and superessentially the substantial cause and the fashioner of being (ὁν), subsistence (ὑπαρξείς), substance (ὑπόστασις), essence (οὐσία), nature (φύσις), …the being of all that is in any manner whatever….From Him who is come eternity, essence, existence, time, becoming and what becomes, things which inhere in existent things, and those which subsist in any independent fashion. For God is not being according to such and such a mode, but in an absolute and indefinable way, because He embraces in Himself beforehand the fullness of being.” It is interesting to note that this passage is ostensibly about the good, for Dionysius begins this passage saying, “But now let me speak about the Good (τὸ ἀγαθὸν, bonum), about that which truly is (ἀληθῶς ὄν, vere existens) and which gives being to everything else (καὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν ἀπαντῶν οὐσιοτοιῶν, et existentium universorum substantificum).”

31 Ibid. Cf. DN V.4, 820A-B: “Being precedes the entities which participate in it. Being in itself is more revered than the being of Life itself and Wisdom itself and Likeness to divinity itself.
Especially in his discussion of beauty, goodness has the priority over being and unity in Dionysius.\textsuperscript{32}

Concerning the relationship of beauty to goodness, an examination of \textit{De divinis nominibus} will, I believe, prove Dionysius to be a significant source of inspiration for Aquinas’ thought regarding beauty. This can be seen both in the connection between beauty and goodness, on the one hand, and in the relationship between beauty and its formal constituents, on the other.

5.1.1 Beauty and Goodness in Dionysius

We now know that, for Aquinas, beauty and goodness are intimately related. Here we want to investigate a strong possible source of the connection. There is good reason for thinking that Dionysius is in fact Aquinas’ primary source for linking the two. We have already seen that Dionysius gives priority of place to goodness, often elevating it even above being since he holds that goodness is synonymous with God, who in some difficult-to-define sense transcends being. What is the connection, in Dionysius, between goodness and beauty?

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}, 9.

Whatever beings participate in these things must, before all else, participate in Being. More precisely, those absolute qualities of which things have a share must themselves participate in being itself. Consider anything which is. Its being and eternity is Being itself. So therefore God as originator of everything through the first of all his gifts is praised as ‘He who is.’”
The short answer is that, for Dionysius, goodness and beauty are connected because they are both names of God. While true, this is not very illuminating. However, the connection is much more intimate than the mere coincidence of two names picking out the same referent. In fact, according to Eric Perl, Dionysius uses these names “conjointly and interchangeably.” 33 A prominent example that has already been mentioned is found in De divinis nominibus IV.7, 704B:

The Beautiful (τὸ καλόν, pulchrum) is therefore the same as the Good (τάγαθω, bono), for everything looks to the Beautiful and the Good as the cause of being, and there is nothing in the world without a share of the Beautiful and the Good.34

Dionysius is clear here that the beautiful, just as the good, is a transcendental property shared by every existing thing. What Luibheid translates here as “there is nothing in the world without a share of the Beautiful and the Good” can be translated more literally as “there is no existing thing that does not participate in the beautiful and the good,” where, of course, it is understood that what is participated in is the Godhead.35 Luibheid calls attention to this by

33 Perl, 42. Cf. DN IV.7, 704B; IV.8, 704D; IV.10, 705C-708A; IV.18, 713D.
34 DN IV.7, 704B: Διὸ καὶ ταύταν ἐστὶ τάγαθω τὸ καλόν, ὅτι τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ κατὰ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν πάντα ἐφίηται, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ τι τῶν ὄντων, ὁ μὴ μετέχει τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ. Sarracens’ translation of the same reads: Propter quod et idem est bono pulchrum; quoniam bonum et pulchrum secundum omnem causam cuncta desiderant, et non est alicud existentium quod non participet pulchro et bono.
35 This view is clearly adopted by Aquinas, who in ST I.13.2 co, says that “when we say, ‘God is good,’ (Deus est bonus) the meaning (sensus) is not, ‘God is the cause of goodness,’ or ‘God is not evil’; but the meaning is, ‘Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God,’ (id quod
capitalizing “Beautiful” and “Good.” These are not mere forms or concepts but the ultimate source of all. If Aquinas is reluctant to explicitly list the beautiful among the transcendentals, Dionysius quite clearly treats it as having a universal extension and overlapping entirely with the good.

Dionysius is, in all likelihood, Aquinas’ ultimate authority for the convertibility of the good and beautiful. Carolyn Putnam traces this identification of the beautiful and the good in Dionysius primarily to Plato.36 Goodness, in Dionysius, is the motive force behind all movement, both of Creator and of creation. For it is the goodness of the Godhead that motivates the Thearchy to create in the first place, and it is the goodness of the Godhead that will draw creatures back to their source. Dionysius says of “the divine subsistence” or “this essential Good” that “by the very fact of its existence, [it] extends goodness into all things.”37 He expands on this, saying:

\[ \textit{bonitatem dicimus in creaturis, praexistit in Deo} \] and in a more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is good \( (\textit{quia est bonus, bonitatem rebus diffundit}) \); according to what Augustine says, ‘Because He is good, we are.’” Cf. Augustine, \textit{De doct. Christ.} I.32.


37 DN IV, 693B: \textit{Εἰπὲ δὲ οὖν, ἐπὶ αὐτὴν ἢδη τῷ λόγῳ τὴν ἀγαθωμομίαν χαράμεν, ἢν ἐξηρμένως οἱ θεολόγοι τῇ ὑπὲρθείᾳ θεότητι καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων ἀφορί ζουσιν αὐτὴν, (ὁς οἴμαι), τὴν θεαρχικὴν ὑπαρξίν ἀγαθοτητα λέγοντες, καὶ ὅτι τῷ εἶναι τάγαθον (ὡς οὐσιωδές ἄγαθον) εἰς πάντα τὰ ὁντα διατίνει τὴν ἀγαθοτητα. [Si oportet igitur iam sermone ad ipsam eamus boni nominationem, quam excellenter attribuunt theologi superdeae Deitati et ab omnibus determinant, ipsam (sicut reor) thearchicam essentiam
And so it is that all things must desire, must yearn for, must love, the Beautiful and the good... And we may be so bold as to claim also that the Cause of all things loves all things in the superabundance of his goodness, that because of this goodness he makes all things, brings all things to perfection, holds all things together, returns all things. The divine longing is Good seeking good for the sake of the good. That yearning which creates all goodness of the world preexisted superabundantly within the Good and did not allow it to remain without issue. It stirred him to use the abundance of his powers in the production of the world.\textsuperscript{38}

Both in the expression of God's movement to create and in the creaturely return to God as final end, Dionysius asserts that the origin of all movement is goodness, which results in love or desire (\textit{έρως, amor}). For Dionysius, as for Aquinas, this love or desire aims at the good, though Dionysius is even more explicit that it is “the beautiful and the good” which is the object of desire.\textsuperscript{39} It is out of love that God creates, and it is out of love that creatures seek their origin

\textit{bonitatem dicentes, et quoniam ea quae est bonum (ut substantiale bonum) ad Omnia existentia extendit bonitatem.}

\textsuperscript{38} DN IV, 708A-B: Πάσαν οὖν ἔστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔφετον καὶ ἐραστόν καὶ ἀγαπητόν... Παρρησιαστείς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο εἶπεν ὁ ἄλλης λόγος, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πάντων αἴτιος δὶ αὐτῷ ἐρεμίας ὑπερβολής πάντων ἑρᾶ, πάντα ποιεῖ, πάντα τελείοι, πάντα συνεχεῖ, πάντα ἑπιστρέφει, καὶ ἔστι καὶ ὁ θεῖος έρως ἄγαθος ἀγαθὸν διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν. Αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ ἀγαθοεργός τῶν ὅντων έρως ἐν τάγαθῳ καθ’ ὑπερβολὴς προσόρχων οὐκ εἶπεν αὐτὸν ἁγιὸν ἐν ἐαυτῷ μενείν, εἰκινείς δὲ αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ πρακτικοῦσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀπάντων γενητικὴν ὑπερβολὴν. [Omnibus igitur est pulchrum et bonum desiderabile et amabile et diligibile... Confit autem et hoc dicere verus sermo quod et ipse omnium causa, propter bonitatis exessum, concita amat, concita fecit, concita perficit, concita continent, concita convertit. Et est divinus amor bonus boni propter bonum; ipse enim bonus operans existentium amor, in bono secundum exessum praecessit, non dimissit ipsum sine germine in se ipso manere, movit autem ipsum ad operandum secundum omnium generativum exessum.] The capitalized words such as “Beautiful,” “Cause” and “Good” are found in Luibheid’s English translation, presumably to pick out their special use in Dionysius as proper names of God.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.: τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν [pulchrum et bonum]. Though, as pointed out in an earlier chapter, the phrase τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν was a common Greek idiom.
as their end. Love therefore expresses the movement both of procession and return, which is to say that it explains all motion.

In this, Dionysius is keeping very close to his Neoplatonic roots. As Perl points out, many take this “doctrine of God as productive love” as a “uniquely Christian aspect of his thought.”\(^\text{40}\) This, however, is not the case. Perl notes that this account “recalls and coincides in meaning with Plotinus’ description of the ‘overflow’ of the One, or rather of the One as Overflow, which is the production of being.”\(^\text{41}\) And this movement, whether of procession from God to creatures or the return of creatures to God is all the same ontological reality. As Perl says, “God’s procession to the being, the being’s procession from God, the being’s reversion to God, and God’s reversion of the being to himself, are all one, for all describe the being’s dependence on God as its constitutive determination. This single metaphysical motion, by which all things are, is the full meaning of the divine name Love.”\(^\text{42}\)

We can see the cyclical and unified nature of this movement, as well as its ultimate origin in God, in many places in the Dionysian corpus, but it is well illustrated in the following passage:

\(^{40}\) Perl (2007), 44.


\(^{42}\) Ibid., 47.
In this divine yearning shows especially its unbeginning, and unending nature traveling in an endless circle through the Good, from the Good, in the Good and to the Good, unerringly turning, ever on the same center, ever in the same direction, always proceeding, always remaining, always being restored to itself.\textsuperscript{43}

What is clear from this and the preceding passages is that it is God, conceived under the name of “Good” that is responsible for all movement – this is the notion of God as “the causal good,” or “the good from whom all things come.”\textsuperscript{44} To the extent that for Dionysius “Good” and “Beautiful” are convertible, it is likewise God conceived under the name of “Beautiful” that is responsible for this movement, whether the movement of God to create or of creatures to return to God. What, we might well ask, does “good” or “beautiful” mean in this context?

For Dionysius, “good” and “beautiful” are not univocal notions. First and foremost, these terms have their true sense in God alone. “Good” and “beautiful” when applied to creatures are at best to be taken in an analogous and derivative sense. Dionysius makes this clear throughout his corpus, often employing the hyperbolic language for which he is known, when referring to the Good or Beautiful as understood as identified with the Godhead, making use of such locutions as the “essential Good” (\textit{\upiota\pi\varphi\varepsilon\upsilon\varsigma\ \alpha\gamma\sigma\theta\omicron\tau\alpha, essentiam bonitatem}),\textsuperscript{45} the

\textsuperscript{43} DN IV, 712D-713A. Cf. Proclus, Elements prop. 13.

\textsuperscript{44} Putnam (1960), 11. Cf. DN I.5, 593C; II.4, 641A; IV.1, 693B-696C; EH III.3.3, 428D; V.3.7, 513C.

\textsuperscript{45} DN IV.1, 693B.
“transcendent Good” (ὑπεράγαθόν ἐστιν ἁγαθότητα, superbonitatem bonam), the “all-beautiful” (πάγκαλον, pulcherrimum) and the “beautiful beyond all” (ὑπέρκαλον, superpulchrum). These hyperbolic expressions serve to emphasize the fact that these terms are not being used in the same way as when applied to created things. There is some kind of similarity certainly, for the goodness and beauty of creatures owes its goodness and beauty to God through participation. Nevertheless, these attributes when applied to the Godhead are so far beyond the normal range of their use – so “other” than those of which we are familiar – that they are almost unrecognizable or, to put it more strongly still, incomprehensible. And the ultimate incomprehensibility of God is precisely what Dionysius repeatedly affirms. If it were not for the reliable testimony of the Holy Scriptures, which constitute God’s self-revelation to his creatures, we could not affirm any positive claim about God. Nevertheless, we do know from the

46 DN IV.2, 696C.
47 DN IV.7, 701D.
48 For apophaticism in Dionysius see, for instance, MT III, 1033C: “The fact is that the more we take flight upward, the more our words are confined to the ideas we are capable of forming; so that now as we plunge into that darkness which is beyond intellect, we shall find ourselves not simply running short of words but actually speechless and unknowing... But my argument now rises from what is below up to the transcendent, and the more it climbs, the more language falters, and when it has passed up and beyond the ascent, it will turn silent completely, since it will finally be at one with him who is indescribable.” Cf. MT III, 1000B. On positive ascriptions to God see, for example, DN I.1, 585B-588A: “Here too let us hold on to the scriptural rule that when we say anything about God, we should set down the truth ‘not in the plausible words of human wisdom but in demonstration of the power granted by the Spirit’ to the scripture writers... Let us therefore look as far upward as the light of sacred scripture will allow.” Cf. I Corinthians 2:4. For apophaticism in Aquinas see, for instance, ST I.12.4 co: “It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the
scriptures that God is good and, in fact, that in some sense, “good” properly applies only to God. Whenever “good” is attributed to created things, it is done so only by degrees of comparison to the archetype. It is in their application to God that our words or concepts get their primary signification, though we know them, even in their perfected sense when applied to God, first in reference to creatures. Therefore, Aquinas can say that while these names “belong properly to God” and “are applied primarily to Him,” nevertheless, as they are used and understood by creatures, they fail strictly to apply to God.  

knower. Hence the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the mode of anything’s being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the knower... Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect, as an object made intelligible to it.” This last qualification is realized, according to Aquinas, only in the beatific vision, which cannot occur in this present life, but in the next (ST I.12.11 co), not according to the “natural faculty” but according to the “glorified faculty” (ST I.12.6 ad 3). On positive ascriptions to God see, for example, ST I.12.13 ad 1: “Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God ‘what He is,’ and thus are united to Him as to one unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and One.” For more on the history of apophaticism, especially in Aquinas, see David Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986); Wayne Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas’ Doctrine of God as Espoused in the Summa Theologicae (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); and, more recently, Kevin Hector, “Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas: a Re-reformulation and Recommendation” in Scottish Journal of Theology 60 (2007):377-393. The reference in Hector’s title is to Victor Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God: A Reformation of Thomas Aquinas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967). For apophaticism in Dionysius, see Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Deirdre Carabine, The Unknown God. Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena (Louvain: Peeters, 1995); and Janet Williams, “The Apophatic Theology of Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite,” in Downside Review 117 (1999): 157-172.


50 ST I.13.3 co: “our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God – viz. the perfections which they signify
This does put us at a disadvantage in attempting to speak about God, and hence the supreme caution adopted by Dionysius, and to a lesser degree by those like Aquinas who follow him. Nevertheless, Dionysius does attribute a number of names to God, among which are included the very important "Good" and "Beautiful." These are the central names for God expounded in the central – and, by far, longest – fourth chapter of De divinis nominibus. Dionysius never

(perfections ipsas significatas), such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification (modum significandi). As regards what is signified (quod significant) by these names, they belong properly to God (proprie competent Deo), and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him (per prius dicuntur de eo). But as regards their mode of signification (modus significandi), they do not properly and strictly apply to God (non proprie dicuntur de Deo); for their mode of signification applies to creatures (hebent enim modum significandi qui creaturis competit)." Commenting on this passage, Joseph Buijs explains, "he [Aquinas] draws a distinction between what is signified (res significata) and the way in which it is signified (modus significandi). Consequently, such attributes [e.g., goodness] are both affirmed and denied. They are affirmed of God with respect to what is signified, a perfection that is present in God in a pre-eminent way; they are denied to God with respect to the way in which they signify, because we can only understand them in deficient human terms." Joseph Buijs, "The Negative Theology of Maimonides and Aquinas," in The Review of Metaphysics 41 (1988), 730. That this is the view also held by Dionysius ought to be clear from his repeated use of hyperbolic language to set apart locutions as applying to God from those that fall in some sense under the same genus but to a much lesser degree when applied to creatures.

This is not to suggest that Dionysius was the only source of Aquinas’ apophaticism. Aquinas illustrates his awareness of several apophatic traditions, including those of Avicenna, Maimonides and Dionysius, all of which he compares and, in some sense, attempts to reconcile, in In I Sent, d. 2, a. 1, 3 co. Cf. Brian Davies, “Aquinas on What God is Not,” in Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae: Critical Essays, edited by Brian Davies (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 138; and Alexander Broadie, “Maimonides and Aquinas on the Names of God,” in Religious Studies 23 (1987):157-170.

Dionysius affirms, at the beginning of chapter three of The Divine Names, the priority of the good over other names. DN III.1, 680B: "For a start, then, let us look, if you will, at the most important (panteλη, [perfectam]) name, ‘Good’ (ἀγαθωμήσια, [boni]), which shows forth all the processions of God.”

Putnam (1960), 1-2. The fourth chapter takes up a full third of the thirteen-chapter work. Though the chapter actually raises a number of names, including “light,” “love,” “ecstasy,” and “zeal,” the name “good” is its dominant subject. Cf. The Divine Names, translated by Colm Luibheid, 71 n. 133. As the first line of chapter four indicates, “Good” is the name that the sacred writers have “preeminently established” (ἀγαθωμήσια χαράμεν [excellenter attribuunt]) for the
gives a definition of beauty, but Carolyn Putnam suggests the following as a summary of his teaching: Beauty is “a state of perfection in which relationships, if there be any, are so unified and well-ordered that a certain radiance results.”

According to this description, beauty has several constituent features, namely, unity, order and radiance. Dionysius explicitly mentions two: “harmony” (eusarmosstia, consonantia) and “splendor” (aglaia, claritas).

As we have seen, these constituents also figure prominently in Aquinas’ characterization of beauty.

5.1.2 The Formal Constituents of Beauty in Dionysius

For Dionysius, as for Aquinas, beauty has certain notable features, namely, harmony and splendor. With respect to harmony, Dionysius makes use of a number of related terms, all borrowed from Platonic sources, including a number of terms for “order” (taξις, κόσμος, μέτρον, λόγος, and ἀρμονία, which are

“supra-divine God” (τῷ ὑπερθεῷ θεότητι [superdeae Deitati]) from which all the other names derive (ἀπὸ πάντων ἄφορίζουσιν [ab omnibus determinant]).

54 Ibid., 15. Italics hers. Putnam asserts that this definition is drawn from DN IV.7, 701C, and “corresponds to what he says about beauty throughout his writings.” Ibid., n. 91.

55 DN IV.7, 701C: “But the ‘beautiful’ which is beyond individual being is called ‘beauty’ because of that beauty bestowed by it on all things, each in accordance with what it is. It is given this name because it is the cause of the harmony and splendor (eusarmosstiaς καὶ ἀγλαίας αἵτινον, consonantiae et claritatis causa) in everything, because like a light it flashes onto everything the beauty-causing impartations of its own well-spring ray.” Cf. Plato, Hipp. Maj. 287c: “Then are not all beautiful things beautiful by the beautiful?” (Ἄρ’ ὁν ποιᾷ τὰ καλὰ πάντα τῷ καλῷ ἵστι καλὰ).

56 Ibid. Cf. Aquinas ST I.39.8 co: Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, integritas sive perfectio, quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et eterum claritas, unde quae habent colorem nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur. Aquinas, as has been noted already, in this passage alone adds to the dyad of consonantia and claritas a third constituent, viz., integritas, which is absent from other discussions of beauty whether in Aquinas or his sources. See chapter four, n. 8.
sometimes “receiving an aesthetic stress” by the addition of εὐ, as in εὐκοσμία, εὐκόσμως and εὐκοσμος). Summarizing Roques’ study, Putnam notes the several senses of “order” expressed by these terms: (1) as an arrangement or divine command, i.e., an expression of God’s will (τάξις); (2) as an arrangement, suitableness, good order or universe (διακόσμησις, from κόσμος); (3) as a common standard (μέτρος or, when applied to creatures, συμμετρία); (4) as accord or agreement between things (ἀρμονία). Each of these terms captures a different sense of orderly relation between the different parts of a whole or of the arrangement of wholes with respect to one another, and ultimately of all things with respect to the Source of all, from whence the order of all things is derived. Of these, Putnam notes that the terms most closely allied with beauty are ἀρμονία, ἔφαρμογή, and ἐὔφροσνεια. The internal harmony and order of the divine being is subsequently shared with the beings who are lower in the hierarchy (viz., every created thing), and therefore the source of the harmony of the entire created world is rooted in the Godhead; that is, the harmonies of


58 Ibid., 74. Cf. Roques (1954), 36-40 (τάξις), 40-59 (διακόσμησις), 59-64 (μέτρον, συμμετρία), 64-66 (ἀρμονία).

59 Ibid., 75. Putnam notes that while a hapax, ἐὔφροσνεια nevertheless is significant because it is the word that Dionysius selects “for the harmony which belongs to beauty itself.” Ibid., 75-76. Cf. DN IV.7, 701C: Τὸ δὲ ἑπερούσιον καλὸν κάλλος μὲν λέγεται διὰ τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πᾶσι τοῖς ὅσι μεταδιδομένη ὀικεῖοι ικάστῳ καλλωσί, καὶ ὡς τῆς πάντων ἐφαρμοστιὰς καὶ ἁγιασάς αἴτιον [Supersubstantiale vero pulchrum pulchritudo quidem dicitur propter traditam ab ipso omnibus existentibus iuxta proprietatem uniuscuiusque pulchritudinem; et sicut universorum consonantiae et claritatis causa].
created things are participated harmonies. Not only does Dionysius say that the internal harmony of the Godhead is the source of the harmony of created things, but, again emphasizing the close link between beauty and harmony, he says that the beauty of the Godhead is also the source of the harmony of created things:

From this beauty comes the existence of everything, each being exhibiting its own way of beauty. For beauty (καλὸν, [pulchrum]) is the cause of harmony (ἔφαρμογαι, [concordiae]), of sympathy (φιλία, [amicitiae]), of community (κοινωνίαν, [communiones]). Beauty (τῶ καλὸν [pulchro], lit., “the beautiful”) unites all things (τὰ πάντα ἕνωται [pulchro omnia uniuntur]) and is the source of all things.

Not only is beauty the source of harmony, sympathy (love) and community, he here also affirms that beauty is the source (ἀρχὴ [principium]) of all things — a claim he will make even stronger a few lines later when he asserts:

The Beautiful is therefore the same as the Good, for everything looks to the Beautiful and the Good as the cause of being, and there is nothing in the world without a share of the Beautiful and the Good.

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60 EH I.2, 372D-373A: “ Nonetheless, it is still necessary to discuss how that hierarchy and every hierarchy, including the one being praised by us now, has one and the same power throughout all its hierarchical endeavor, namely the hierarch (τὸν ἱερὸν) himself, and how its being (οὐσία) and proportion (ἀνάλογον) and order (τάξις) are in him divinely perfected and deified, and are then imparted (μεταδόον) to those below (ὑποβιβηκόντο) him according to their merit, whereas the sacred deification occurs in him directly from God.”

61 DN IV.7, 704A: Ἐξ τοῦ καλοῦ τούτου πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως οὔσαι τὸ ἤνωσε κατὰ τὸν ὁικεῖον λόγον ἔκαστα καλὰ, καὶ διὰ τὸ καλὸν αἱ πάντων ἔφαρμογα καὶ φιλίᾳ καὶ κοινωνίᾳ, καὶ τῶ καλῶ τὰ πάντα ἕνωσε. Καὶ ἀρχὴ πάντων τὸ καλὸν [Ex pulchro isto omnibus existentibus est esse secundum propriam rationem singular pulchra, et propter pulchrum omnium concordiae et amicitiae et communions, et pulchro omnia uniuntur. Et est principium omnium pulchrum].

62 DN IV.7, 704B: Διὸ καὶ ταυτῶν ἔστι τάγαθω τὸ καλὸν, ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ κατὰ πάσαν αἰτίαν πάντα ἔφιεται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τί τῶν ὄντων ὃ μὴ μετέχει τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ [Propter quod et idem est bono pulchrum; quoniam bonum et pulchrum secundum omnem causam cuncta desiderant, et non est aliquid existentium quod non participet pulchro et bono].
The Good, and (because of their identification) also the Beautiful, is the cause not only of harmony, but also of the very existence of things. There is nothing that exists which lacks a share in the good and the beautiful. The harmony and beauty of creation is the result of ordering of divine Wisdom. The entire world is an ordered and integrated hierarchy, beginning with the Godhead, the source of all, and extending downward to every existing thing. As the source of all is good and beautiful, therefore every existing thing is likewise good and beautiful, though to a lesser degree. Everything is good and everything is beautiful. There is, strictly speaking, no evil in the world, for he says, “Evil is not an inherent part of nature as a whole...Rather, evil lies in the inability of

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63 It would be fair to say that, for Dionysius, “good” and “beauty” properly apply to God alone, and merely eponymously to material things, excepting the incarnation of God in Jesus of Nazareth. Indeed, there is scriptural warrant for this, in Jesus’ response to a question from a rich young ruler in Mark 10:18: Iesu autem dixit ei: «Quid me dicis bonum? Nemo bonus nisi unus Deus.» There is a long commentary tradition that views this statement as a tacit agreement, on the part of Jesus, with the rich young ruler’s appellation. E.g., Origin states: “There is no other secondary goodness existing in the Son than that which is in the Father. So the Savior himself rightly says in the Gospel that ‘none is good save one, God the Father.’ The purpose of this statement is to make it understood that the Son is not some other ancillary ‘goodness,’ but of that alone which is in the Father; whose image he is rightly called. For he neither springs from any other source than from original goodness itself (if that were so, there would seem to be a different goodness in the Son from that which is in the Father), nor has the goodness that is in him any dissimilarity or divergence from that of the Father.” Origin, De principiis I.2.13. English translation is from On First Principles, translated by G. W. Butterworth (London: SPCK, 1936), quoted in Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, New Testament II: Mark, edited by Thomas C. Oden and Christopher A. Hall (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1998), 140.

64 DN VII.3, 872B: “As scripture says, Wisdom (σοφία [sapiential]) has made and continues always to adapt everything. It is the cause of the unbreakable accommodation and order of all things (τῆς ἀλήτου τῶν πάντων ἐφάρμογης καὶ τάξεως αὐτία [indissolubilis omnium concordationis et ordinis causa]) and it is forever linking the goals of one set of things with the sources of another and in this fashion it makes a thing of beauty of the unity and the harmony of the whole (τῆς μιᾶς τῶν πάντων συμπονίας καὶ ἀρμονίας καλλιεργοῦσα [unam omnis consipirationem et harmonium pulchre operans])."
things to reach their natural peak of perfection.” There is no evil in any part of the world, not even in matter. Thus, he can assert additionally, breaking with traditional Gnosticism: “there is no evil in our bodies.” Instead, “ugliness and disease are a defect in form and a lack of due order.” Any such defect is “not pure evil but a lesser beauty [good].” It is impossible for any existent thing to be purely evil for with a complete loss of goodness and beauty it would lose its existence as well. Here we can clearly see the view of evil as privation that is so familiar to readers not only of Augustine but of Aquinas as well. Whatever exists is good, for being and goodness are intimately tied together. What Dionysius makes more explicit than either Augustine or Aquinas is the intimate connection

65 DN IV.26, 728C: Ἄλλα οὖν ἐν τῇ ὁμοιότητι τὸ κακὸν... ἄλλα τὸ τοῦτο τῇ φύσει κακὸν τὸ ἀδυνατέων τὰ τῆς ὑποστάσεως φύσεως ἐκτελεῖν [Sed neque in tota natura malum...sed hoc est naturae malum, impotentem esse ea quae sunt propriae naturae pericere].

66 DN IV.27, 728D: Ἄλλα οὖν ἐν σώματι τὸ κακὸν [Sed neque in corpore est malum]. Cf. DN IV.28, 729A: “There is no truth in the common assertion that evil is inherent in matter qua matter, since matter too has a share in the cosmos, in beauty and form... Surely matter cannot be evil. If it has being in no way at all, then it is neither good nor evil. If it has some kind of being then it must derive from the Good, since every being owes its origin to the Good.”

67 Ibid.: Άλλα οὖν ἐν σώματι τὸ κακὸν, ἄλλα ἦττων καλὸν [hoc autem non omnino malum, sed minus bonum]. Sarracens here translations καλὸν as bonum, as do all the early translators until Ambroise le Camaldule [1386-1439], who translates it as pulchrum. Later translators, excepting Ficino, will follow Ambroise in translating καλὸν as pulchrum rather than bonum. Luibheid translates this as “beauty.” Brackets mine. It seems that “good” might be the better choice here on linguistic grounds since bonum, rather than pulchrum, is the better contrast with malum, with which it is here being juxtaposed. Possibly, later translators chose pulchrum since the defect in the immediate textual context refers to a material body. It probably makes no substantive difference either way, on account of the identification of the beautiful with the good. Cf. DN IV.24, 728A: “What it [evil] is actually is a deficiency and a lack of the perfection of the inherent virtues.”
between being, the good and also beauty. For all three thinkers, evil exists only as a defect of the good, of being, and of beauty.

Regarding splendor or clarity, it is likely that no other feature of Dionysius’ (or Aquinas’) account of beauty owes more to Platonic and Neoplatonic thought. The theme of light is a prominent one in Plato, most famously in his analogies of the cave and of the sun in the Republic. In these metaphors – and especially in the argument of Phaedrus 250d – Putnum suggests, “beauty becomes the link between the world of phenomena and the world of ideas. Alone of them all, beauty still shines on earth, even to our senses, with some of the brilliance which it had when we first saw it in the other life.” The theme of light is even more pronounced in the Neoplatonists. This is most

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69 God as light or as expressed in or through light is, of course, also a theme that runs throughout the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures as well. See, for example, Isaiah 60:19: “The sun shall no longer be your light by day nor for brightness shall the moon give light to you; but the Lord will be to you an everlasting light, and your God your glory” (non erit tibi amplius sol ad lucendum per diem nec splendor lunae inluminabit te sed erit tibi Dominus in lucem sempiternam et Deus tuus in gloriam tuam); Psalm 27 (26 in Vulgate):1 “The Lord is my light and my salvation” (Dominus lux mea et salutare meum); and Habakkuk 3:3-4: “His [God’s] glory covered the heavens, and the earth was full of His praise. His brightness was like the light; He had rays flashing from His hand” (Gloria eius et laudis eius plena est terra / splendor eius ut lux erit cornua in manibus). Cf., John 1:4-5: “In Him was life, and the life was the light of men. And the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it” (in ipso vita erat et vita erat lux hominum / et lux in tenebris lucet et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt).

70 Republic VII, 514A-519D (the cave); VI, 507B-511E (the sun).

71 Putnam (1960), 78. Cf. Phaedrus 250D: “Now beauty (περὶ δὲ κάλλους), as I said, was radiant (ἐλαμψε) among the other objects; and now that we have come down here we grasp it sparkling through the clearest of our senses. Vision, of course, is the sharpest of our bodily senses, although it does not see wisdom. It would awaken a terribly powerful love if an image of wisdom came through our sight as clearly as beauty does, and the same goes for the other objects of inspired love. But now beauty alone (κάλλος μόνον) has this privilege, to be the most clearly visible (ἐκφανέστατον ἐναι) and the most loved (ἐρασμωτάτον).”
prominently so with Plotinus, who was “the first in this line of thinkers to make light a major element in his universe.” Plotinus asserted that “all things proceed from light and dwell in light, and they are all the same in the very radiance which brings them into being.” According to Plotinus, the One is light itself, and enlightens created souls with a divine illumination of knowledge through νοῦς (an intermediary) as “the moon welcomes light from the sun.” The light of created things is, thus, a derivative and, indeed, reflective light. There is only one source of light, which is the One, and Plotinus speaks of light as primarily a kind of intellectual property. True beauty, according to Plotinus, is spiritual rather than physical, and “the true quality of beauty must be radiance.” And for Plotinus, it is primarily the radiance in even material things, rather than harmony, that compels us to call them beautiful.

The Neoplatonist tradition is not Dionysius’ only source for this aspect of his aesthetics, but he also draws significantly on the texts of sacred scripture, especially the writings of John the evangelist, who emphasizes that God the Son

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72 Ibid., 79. Nevertheless, the stoics also placed an emphasis on the “light of reason,” but their source was the same as Plotinus, namely, Plato. See Lucretius, De rerum natura I.146, 2.15, 3.1-2; Seneca, Ep. 79.12; Cicero, Pro Sulla. 40; Macrobius, Saturnalia I.7.32. Cf. Plato, Republic VI, 508a ff.

73 Plotinus, Enneads VI.7.36. Cf. Ibid., VI.8.18.

74 Ibid., VI.7.21.

75 Ibid., V.3.8-9.


is light, and James who emphasizes the Father as the source of light. Following sacred scripture, he also characterizes God as dwelling in “unapproachable light.” Dionysius uses many different forms of light terminology to describe God or the divine attributes. The light is divine wisdom. Light is also divine beauty, which flashes forth and fills all creatures with light. Scripture itself is characterized as a light that leads ultimately to the divine splendor that is the Source.

Putnam asserts that, while harmony and clarity are obvious elements of the Dionysian account of beauty, the third element in the Thomistic formula is also present, but in a less explicit way. She takes it that a number of phrases, particularly in chapter four of De divinis nominibus, taken together suggest the notion of what she calls “wholeness,” or what we have called integritas. She provides some examples:

...
Dionysius says that beauty is apportioned to each being “in the measure proper to it,” or “according to its λόγος”; that beauty gathers “all in all in itself” (οικον αυτοσ συνάγων); that beauty makes things one (τῶ καλὸ τὰ πάντα ἡμωταῖ).85

From these remarks and others presumably like them, she derives the presence of a third constituent that would be comparable to Aquinas’ integritas. She suggests that the term that best captures this notion is “sameness” or “identity” (ταὐτότης) rather than “perfection” or “completion” (e.g., τελειότης, ὀλότης, or ὀλοκληρία).86 She specifically singles out two passages where ταὐτότης is paired with harmony and beauty as “coming from the all-transcendent cause.”87 Putnam asserts that the term is used in several ways by Dionysius, but the one that is most pertinent to our discussion is the suggestion that Dionysius uses it “to stand for a being’s inner unity, without any implied or stated relationship to something else.”88 An example is found in the second chapter of De divinis nominibus, where Dionysius links it with “self-possession” (ἰδιότης):

Thus, regarding the divine unity beyond being, they [the sacred scriptures] assert that the indivisible Trinity holds within a shared undifferentiated unity its supra-essential subsistence, its supra-divine divinity, its supra-excellent goodness, its supremely individual identity beyond all that is, its oneness beyond the source of oneness, its ineffability, its many names, its unknowability, its wholly belonging to

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85 Putnam (1960), 85. Cf. DN IV.7, 701C, 704A.
86 Ibid., 85-86.
87 DN XII.3, 969D-972A; and CH XV.4, 333A. Putnam (1960), 86.
88 Putnam, Ibid.
the conceptual realm, the assertion of all things, the denial of all things, that which is beyond every assertion and denial, and finally, if one may put it so, the abiding and foundation of the divine persons who are the source of oneness as a unity which is totally undifferentiated and transcendent.\textsuperscript{89}

The Godhead possesses a measure of stability of identity that is inherent to itself and only to itself, and, as a result of this, some measure of identity is imparted to some creatures according to their capacities.\textsuperscript{90} Whether applied to God or creatures, however, this stability of identity seems to be a measure of a being’s perfection. Human beings receive a special identity on account of the unique way in which we are able to receive an intellectual “enlightenment” from the Godhead, which Dionysius calls the “identity of truth.”\textsuperscript{91} Regarding this measure of perfection, Dionysius further states that “nothing tries to lose its individuality... For everything loves to be at peace with itself, to be at one, and never to move or fall away from its own existence and from what it has.”\textsuperscript{92} In fact, that this stability of identity is part and parcel of beauty is reinforced by recollecting what Dionysius has said about evil and ugliness, namely, that these are the result of some sort of privation or defect of being, good or beauty. Thus, Putnam says that according to Dionysius, “each being is beautiful when it is

\textsuperscript{89} DN II.4, 641A.
\textsuperscript{90} DN IX.4, 912C.
\textsuperscript{91} Putnam (1960), 86-87. Cf. DN VII.4, 872C-D.
\textsuperscript{92} DN XI.3, 952B-C.
established in the λόγος which befits it; in the unaltered safeguarding of the
qualities proper to its nature,” and, likewise, that “signs of the absence of beauty
and goodness are... indefiniteness, instability, inconstancy, lack of finality.”93

Putnam suggests one final passage in support of her thesis, from the first
chapter of De divinis nominibus, a passage enumerating a number of sayings from
the scared writers regarding the Trinity. The salient passage is as follows: “They
[the sacred writers] call it Cause of beings since in its goodness it employed its
creative power to summon all things into being, and it is hailed as wise and
beautiful because beings which keep their nature uncorrupted (ἀπαράφθαρτο) are
filled with divine harmony (ἀρμονίας ἐνθέου) and sacred beauty (ιερᾶς
ἐυπρεπείας).”94 Here, it seems, that Dionysius has linked an uncorrupted (or
perfect) nature with harmony and beauty. This is very possibly a notion similar
to the one employed by Aquinas, namely, integritas, and could offer an
explanation for its inclusion as one of his constituent features of beauty. Before
we consider this from the perspective of Aquinas’ commentary on the same, we
will first explore a more immediate source of his thought, namely, his teacher
and mentor Albert the Great.

5.2 Albert the Great’s De Pulcro et Bono

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93 Putnam (1960), 87-88. Cf. DN I.4, 592A; IV.7, 701C, 704A; and IV.32, 732C.

94 DN I.4, 592A; καὶ ἀνομαζεται, ὥς αἰτίαν δὲ τῶν ὄντων, ἐπειδὴ πάντα πρὸς τὸ εἶναι παρήχῃ διὰ τὴν
αὐτῆς οὐσιοτοιοῦ ἀγαθότητα, σοφίαν δὲ καὶ καλήν, ὅτι τὰ ὄντα πάντα τὰ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως
ἀπαράφθαρτα διασοώζοντα πάσης ἀρμονίας ἐνθέου καὶ ιερᾶς εὐπρεπείας ἐστὶν ἀνάπλα.
There is no doubt that Aquinas’ thinking was heavily influenced by his great teacher, Albert. It is likely this is in no case truer than with respect to his views on beauty. Aquinas was exposed early on in his academic career to Dionysius’ De divinis nominibus through a series of lectures begun by Albert at the University of Paris and which were to continue at the new stadium generale which was inaugurated by the Dominicans in Cologne in 1248, and over which Albert was the first to preside, with Aquinas serving in the capacity of assistant as well as student.95 The text with which I am concerned in this investigation is not his longer and later Super Dionysium de divinis nominibus, but rather an earlier document fragment which has come down to us also bearing the title Super Dionysium de divinis nominibus, also called De pulchro et bono.96 This document was previously mis-attributed to Aquinas since it was penned by his hand. It is, in all likelihood, either an earlier draft of the commentary or else a reportatio, viz., notes from Albert’s course on the text. Scholars typically regard it as a copy that

95 Torrell, 24-26. According to Torrell, the Dominican order distinguished two levels of schools, the studium solemn and the studium generale. The studium solemn operated at the provincial level and was for ordinary training in philosophy and theology. The studium generale, on the other hand, was interprovincial and a university-level training regimen, open only to the most capable students. Ibid., 19 n. 8. Cf. Burrell and Moulin, 634.

Aquinas made either for his own personal study or in his service as Albert’s secretary.  

Albert’s commentary identifies itself as expository in nature, that is, as an *expositio*. This means that it is a very close, line-by-line, study of the text at hand rather than a more general explanation of its meaning, as in a *sentencia*. I will not undertake such a careful study of the commentary itself, but am going to confine myself to a fairly small range of texts, namely, those that correspond to Aquinas’ fifth lecture on *De divinis nominibus* chapter four, and parallel passages in the *Summa Theologiae*. Even within this narrow space, I will highlight such passages as seem to me salient to an appreciation of the relationship between Dionysius, Albert and Aquinas, especially those that suggest particular tributaries to Aquinas’ thought or which indicate a divergence of Aquinas from these sources.

The first observation I wish to highlight is a claim, early on in the commentary, which illustrates a point on which Albert seems to depart from the Areopagite where Aquinas does not. In *De pulchro* question one, Albert is making a point about the method of investigation, and he claims that one ought to investigate the simple before discussing the composite. Therefore, before

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97 Ibid., 21, 25.

discussing the beautiful (pulcro) itself, it is best to distinguish beauty from the
desirable (de diligibili). His reason for considering the desirable prior to the
beautiful is that the desirable is simple (simplex est) whereas the beautiful
involves a composite (habet intentionem compositum) since the nature of beauty
consists in a certain harmony of parts. Now this suggestion is presented in the
form of an argumentum. Typically, in medieval commentaries adopting the
disputation format, as Albert’s commentary does, a series of arguments (or
objections) would be enumerated, followed by the author’s view (in Albert’s
case, a solution or solutio), and this is followed by a set of replies to each of the
arguments, and these provide justification for the author’s solutio.

One must always be careful in citing an argumentum as evidence of an
author’s viewpoint, since that argumentum will very often be rebutted in the
replies. In our present case, however, Albert’s replies relate to the more general
methodological concern of whether one ought to address the simple before
moving on to the more complex. Albert never addresses, much less does he
refute, the notion that the beautiful is a complex rather than a simple notion. The
implication is that Albert is in agreement with this viewpoint. If correct, this
would significant because it would mark a significant departure from Dionysius
on the part of Albert.

99 De pulchro q. 1, a. 1, arg. 1: Videtur quod prius determinandum esset de diligibili, quam de pulcro.
100 Ibid.: Simplex est enim ante compositum; sed pulcrum habet intentionem compositam, quia, sicut
dicitur infra in littera, ratio pulcri consistit in quadam consonantia diversorum.
We have already detailed Dionysius’ commitment to clarity or splendor as a prominent feature of the beautiful, and we have seen that Aquinas likewise counts *claritas* among the constituent features of the beautiful. Therefore, here we would here have an instance in which Aquinas sticks close to Dionysius even where Albert is at odds with the Areopagite, suggesting that, for Aquinas, Dionysius has greater authority than his mentor. This would not be surprising when we recall that Aquinas invokes the authority of Dionysius by name over 1700 times in his corpus.\(^{101}\) Nevertheless, it does not seem to me that we ought to understand Albert as limiting the beautiful to those things that display a harmony of parts. The reason is that, in article two of this question, Albert will affirm his commitment to clarity as a constituent of the beautiful. There Albert gives the characterization of beauty (*pulcrum*) for which he is known, namely, that it is the “splendor of form” (*splendorem formae*), and this, he notes, takes priority even over the proportion or harmony of its material parts, just as with bodies it is the brilliance of colors that make the body beautiful over against the proportion of parts which, in some sense, merely completes the beauty.\(^{102}\)

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\(^{101}\) Compare this to the fact that, in those works that are considered undisputed, Aquinas mentions Albert by name only once, in his *In Sent I*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 3 co, where his authority is simply added to that of Augustine.

\(^{102}\) *De pulchro*, q. 1, a. 2 co: *Dicendum quod pulcrum in ratione sui plura concludit: scilicet splendorem formae substantialis vel actualis supra partes materiae proportionatas et terminates, sicut corpus dicitur pulcrum ex resplendentia coloris supra membra proportionate, hoc est quasi differentia specifica compleins rationem pulcri...Sic igitur dicimus quod pulcrum et honestum sunt idem in subiecto. Differunt autem in ratione, quia ratio pulcri in universali consistit in resplendentia formae super partes materiae proportionatas, vel super diversas vires vel actiones; honesti autem ratio consistit in hoc, quod trahit ad se desiderium: decus vero dicitur secundum proportionem potentiae ad actum.* This passage indicates that
Article two seems to concern itself primarily with the relationship between the beautiful and honestum, a matter of great concern for Aquinas, as has already been shown. Albert there raises a series of arguments and replies in a cumulative case for identifying the beautiful and honestum, but not without qualification. The first argumentum states that things which share the same definition are the same (idem), and some authorities (Albert identifies Cicero as an example) give the same definition to honestum as to beauty. The second argumentum adds that Dionysius is one of these thinkers identifying the beautiful and the good. However, he qualifies what he means by this, asserting that the beautiful is not identified with the useful good (non est autem idem bono utili) since utility is not the end of the beautiful (utile non est finis sicut pulcrum), nor is while pulcri and honestum are the same in subject, they differ in meaning since the meaning of pulcri in general consists in resplendentia formae, which is beyond or above the proportion of a thing’s partes materiae, or its diverse powers or actions. This makes it sound as though beauty has to do more with its form than with the arrangements of its physical parts. But then this would seem to leave out entirely any consideration of beautiful acts, since these do not have physical parts. We need not draw this implication, however, if we understand that partes materiae has a wider extension than merely physical things. See, for instance, the discussion to follow on the virtues. The comparison is completed by his assertion that the meaning of honestum is that it leads to its object of desire. Here he seems clearly to be using honestum as a synonym for bonum, which is the object of desire. What we should not be tempted to conclude from this is that the beauty of things is different from the beauty of actions. Though typically pulchrum is used to describe objects and honestum to describe actions, this is not the use of honestum in this case. We should not presume, therefore, that Albert is here divorcing beautiful actions from resplendentia formae. Rather, the resplendentia formae is the most fundamental source of every kind of beauty, being above or behind the various kinds of proportion, viz., of mere parts (physical or otherwise), powers, or actions.

103 De pulchro q. 1, a. 2, arg. 1: Videtur enim quod pulcrum sit idem quod honestum. Quorum enim diffinitiones sunt eadem, ipsa sunt eadem; sed eadem diffinitio est honesti et pulcri. Ulterior enim diffinitur a Tullio, in principio de officiis, quod sua in nos trahit, a sua dignitate nos allicit etc.: ergo bonum et pulcrum sunt idem. We have already seen that honestum, at least in Aquinas, has the force of “morally good,” which is the same sense that it has in Cicero. See, e.g., Cicero, De officiis, text and translation by Walter Miller, Loeb Classical Library (London and New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1913), 10 footnote.
beauty the same as the pleasurable good (nec iterum bono delectabili), since the pleasurable is often ugly (quod frequenter turpe est). He is likely thinking of sexual pleasures, since these were commonly thought to be of a base nature. He concludes, therefore, that since these are the three species of goods, the beautiful must be the same as the honestum, that is, the virtuous or moral good. Albert seems to have in mind here Aristotle’s three-fold division of friendship based on three loveable qualities: the useful, the pleasant and the virtuous. He is presenting these three as though an exhaustive taxonomy of the species of good. If, Albert seems to suggest, Dionysius identifies the beautiful with the good, then the beautiful must be identified with one of these three species of the good. He has ruled out both the useful and the pleasant, and therefore, by process of elimination, it seems that the beautiful must be identified with honestum.

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104 In fact, turpe often seems to have the intended connotation of “base” or “disgraceful” in certain contexts, that is, where it refers to bodily desires, especially sexual desires. See, e.g., ST II-II.145.4 co: “As stated above, honestum is a kind of spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful (turpe) is opposed to the beautiful (pulchrum); and opposites are most manifest of one another. Wherefore seemingly honestum belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels that which is most disgraceful (turpissimum) and unbecoming (indecentissimum) to man, namely animal lusts (brutales voluptates).” Cf. ST II-II.145.4 ad 3: “Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds in check are the most deserving of reproach (cohibitionem vitiorum magis exprobrabilium), as stated above.”

105 De pulcro q. 1, a. 2 arg. 2: Ad idem: Dionysius infra dicit quod pulcrum est idem bono; non est autem idem bono utili, quia utile non est finis sicut pulcrum, nec iterum bono delectabili, quod frequenter turpe est; ergo cum bonum tripliciter tantum dicatur, relinquitur quod sit idem bono quod est honestum.

106 See NE II.3, 1104a30-34, where Aristotle lists the pleasant (ηδονή), the useful (σωφρόνεια), and the fine (καλόν) as three objects of desire; and also the whole of NE VIII, especially 1156a5-1156b24, where these classes are employed to describe the three sorts of friendship possible among human beings, namely, friendships based on pleasure (ηδονή), friendships based on utility (χρήσιμος), and friendships based on virtue (ἀρετή).
Albert’s replies to the first two arguments are brief, but he will add to or expand upon them in his responses to objections five and six and again in the solutio. To the first, he says simply that while the definitions of the beautiful and the good do share something in common, namely, they are generally the same in the subject; nevertheless, they are not identical because beauty adds something to the good, completing it.\textsuperscript{107} To the second, he answers that although beauty is the same as honestum, it is not according to meaning (ratione) but according to the subject only.\textsuperscript{108} This is a distinction he will raise several times, and which recurs also in Aquinas, as we have seen, namely, that the good (here honestum, the “moral good”) and the beautiful (presumably likewise here the “moral beautiful”) are the same in one sense, but also differ in another, viz., they are the same in subject (sunt idem in subiecto), but differ in meaning (differunt in ratione).\textsuperscript{109}

The third argumentum raises another related objection, namely, that “corporeal beauty consists in the harmony of its parts, but the soul consists in modes of virtues; therefore, spiritual beauty consists in virtue.” This argument

\textsuperscript{107} De pulchro q. 1, a. 2 ad 1: Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, dicendum quod illa diffinitio convenit utrique propter universalitatem subiecti, cum super hoc addit pulcrum differentiam quondam quam complet ratione ipsius.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum, quod quanvis pulcrum sit idem honesto, non tamen oportet quod secundum rationem, sed subiecto tantum.

\textsuperscript{109} See, e.g., De pulchro q. 1, a. 2 co, where he states it twice; Ibid., ad 5; Ibid., ad 6. Cf. Aquinas, ST I.5.4 ad 1: pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. Cf. also ST II-II.145.3 co, where the comparison is between honestum and delectabile.
concludes, on the authority of Cicero, that “virtue is a species of _honestum_, and that, therefore, beauty is the same as _honestum._”\(^{110}\) The reference is presumably to _De Inventione_ II.53, wherein Cicero gives a definition of _honestum_, namely, “anything that is sought wholly or partly for its own sake.”\(^{111}\) The two species of _honestum_ listed here are: (1) anything sought wholly for its own sake, which he calls “simple,” and (2) anything sought partly for its own sake, which he calls “complex.”\(^{112}\) The virtues, taken as a whole, overlap entirely with the first species, namely the “simple,” for he says that “everything (omnes res) in this class is embraced in one meaning and under one name, virtue.”\(^{113}\) The second species, which he here calls the “complex” case, applies to those things that are sought not only for their own sake, but also for some further advantage as well. This corresponds to Plato’s class of highest good, namely, those things that are both

\(^{110}\) _De pulchro q. 1, a. 2, arg. 3:_ *Ad idem: pulcritudo corporalis consistit in corporum commensuratione; sed animae composition consistit in modo virtutis; ergo in virtute consistit spiritualis pulcritudo; virtus autem est species honesti, secundum Tullium: ergo pulcrum est idem honesto._

\(^{111}\) Cicero, _De Inventione_ II.53: *Quod aut totum aut aliqua ex parte propter se petitur, honestum nominabimus._ The English translations of this work are taken from Cicero II: _De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica_, translated by H. M. Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949).

\(^{112}\) _Ibid._: *Quare, cum eius duae partes sint, quarum altera simplex, altera iuncta sit, simplicem prius consideremus._

\(^{113}\) _Ibid._: *Est igitur in eo genere omnes res una vi atque uno nomine amplexa virtus._ Though, it should be noted that these two things, virtue and _honestum_, cannot strictly speaking overlap completely because, in the previous section (i.e., section 52), Cicero says that there are three classes of things to be pursued: those sought for their intrinsic value, those sought for their instrumental value, and those sought for both intrinsic and instrumental value. In that section, he says that under the category of things sought for the sake of their intrinsic value are included virtue, knowledge and truth (virtus, scientia, veritas). So unless he intends “virtue” as a general heading that would cover not only the virtues, but also knowledge and truth, then virtue is only one of the intrinsically valuable goods to be sought, and, as he tells us here, whatever is sought for its own sake is called _honestum_. Therefore, to reiterate, virtue is a species of _honestum_.

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intrinsically valuable and which also have good consequences.\textsuperscript{114} These are things that Cicero characterizes as having both “intrinsic worth” (\textit{dignitas}) and also some “advantage” (\textit{utilitas}).\textsuperscript{115} Examples include glory, rank, influence, and friendship.\textsuperscript{116} It seems clear that what is most important for some thing being characterized as honestum is that it has intrinsic value. The virtues are of this type in a unique way, namely, that they are sought solely on account of their intrinsic value. Indeed, then, the class of virtues is a species of honestum. Is the objector right in deriving from this that pulcrum is the same as honestum?

To this objection, Albert responds, saying “beauty (\textit{pulcritudo}) does not consist in parts, as is the case in material things, but in resplendence of form as in the forms; from which it does not follow that it [beauty] is the same as honestum, except in the subject.”\textsuperscript{117} The dialogue is a bit confusing since the contrast he is drawing is between beauty, on the one hand, which is simple, and material things, on the other, which are complex instead of comparing beauty, which is simple, with virtue, which is complex. Nevertheless, if we take it that he has Cicero’s four virtues in mind when he is speaking of \textit{materialibus}, then we may take him to be saying that though honestum, taken as coextensive with virtue, is

\textsuperscript{114} Plato, \textit{Republic} II, 357a-d.

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{De Inventione} II.55: \textit{Nunc de eo in quo utilitas quoque adiungitur, quod tamen honestum vocamus, dicendum videtur. Sunt igitur multa quae nos cum dignitate tum quoque fructu suo ducunt.}

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Ibid.}: \textit{quo in genere est gloria, dignitas, amplitudo, amicitia.}

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{De pulchro} q. 1, a. 2, ad 3: \textit{Ad tertium dicendum, quod pulcritudo non consistit in componentibus, sicut in materialibus, sed in resplendentia formae sicut in formali; unde ex hoc non sequitur quod sit idem honesto, nisi in subiecto.}
comprised of four constituents, *viz.*, “material,” parts, which are the four virtues, nevertheless *pulcrum* is not likewise comprised of parts. A direct comparison, therefore, fails on this account since *pulcrum* is simple whereas virtue, and so *honestum*, is not.

Albert also seems to intend *pulcritudo* to be understood here primarily as spiritual or moral beauty since it lacks the qualifier *corporalis* that was included in the objection. Rather, the beauty of souls is to be found in a *resplendentia formae*, just as we find in the forms themselves. The beauty that is appropriately attributed to souls, which are simple, is itself simple. He reinforces this in the *solutio* where he says, firstly, that the nature of beauty contains many things, among which he includes splendor of form and harmony of parts, whether applied to corporeal things or not.\(^{118}\) Another feature of beauty, he says, is that it attracts the desire insofar as it has the nature of a good and an end.\(^{119}\) In this respect, we can see in what way the beautiful and the good are the same, namely, both have the nature of an end. Thirdly, he says that beauty encompasses all, and that on account of the resplendence of its form, it causes beauty (that is, the beauty of beautiful things).\(^{120}\) Again, here, we can see that the beautiful and the

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\(^{118}\) *De Pulchro* q. 1, a. 2, co. *Solutio*. *Dicendum quod pulcrum in ratione sui plura concludit: scilicet splendorem formae substantialis vel actualis supra partes materiae proportionatas et terminatas, sicut corpus dicitur pulcrum ex resplendentia coloris supra membra proportionate, hoc est quasi differentia specifica complens rationem pulcri.\(^{118}\)

\(^{119}\) *Ibid.*: *Secundum est quod trahit ad se desiderium, et hoc habet in quantum est bonum et finis.*

\(^{120}\) *Ibid.*: *Tertium est quod congregat omnia, et hoc habet ex parte formae cuius resplendentia facit pulcrum.*
good are the same since they are co-extensive, viz., they extend to all things (omnia), or are convertible with being. Fourthly, he says that the cause of the beauty in all things is the First Beauty.\textsuperscript{121} Here we can see that Albert, following Dionysius closely, is drawing a direct parallel between the First Beauty and the Source of all, the Highest Good, the Absolute Being. The convertibility of Being, Good and Beauty is implied.

Several other objections raised in article two are of interest primarily on account of Albert’s responses. For instance, in objection five, he says that whatever are of the same genus and species are also the same, but the same species are assigned by the philosophers to beauty and honestum, and therefore they are the same.\textsuperscript{122} In objection six, he says that those things whose opposites differ are likewise different, but while the opposite of beauty is disgrace (oppositum pulcri est turpe), the opposite of good is bad (honesti autem malum), and therefore beauty and honestum are different.\textsuperscript{123} Interestingly, though these two arguments arrive at contradictory conclusions, Albert’s response to them is the same: pulcrum and honestum are the same in the subject (sunt idem in subiecto) but

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}: \textit{Quartum est ipsius pulcritudinis primae, quae per essentiam suam causa est pulcrituinis, scilicet omnem pulcritudinem facere.}}
\footnote{\textit{De pulchro q. 1, a. 2 arg. 5}: \textit{Ad idem: quaecumque sunt eorum generum, et earundem specierum, ea quoque sunt eadem: sed species eadem assignantur a philosophis honesto et pulcro; ergo sunt idem.}}
\footnote{\textit{De pulchro q. 1, a. 2 arg. 6}: \textit{Ad oppositum: quorum opposite differunt, ipsa quoque differunt; sed oppositum pulcri est turpe, honesti autem malum; et haec differunt: ergo pulcrum et honestum differunt.}}
\end{footnotes}
differ in reason (*sed ratione differenti*).\(^{124}\) The analysis here, as in his response to objections one and two, is not detailed, but presumably what he intends to say is that there is a sense in which beauty and *honestum* are the same, that is, in the subject, while there is another sense in which they differ, that is, in meaning. In other words, they have the same denotation, but differ in connotation.

The last two objections are also of note because Albert concedes them both. In objection seven, he says that if beauty and *honestum* were the same, then the two names would be synonyms, and that, therefore, there could be no difference at all between them. However, he notes that Cicero assigns a difference between the two in *De officiis*, and, they are not the same.\(^ {125}\) Likewise, in article eight, Albert says that whatever things are separated according to being are also separated according to essence, since sometimes one of them is able to exist apart from the other; and something can be beautiful but not good, as is evidenced in the book of Proverbs.\(^ {126}\) In the passage to which he refers, Albert

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\(^{124}\) *De pulchro q. 1, a. 2 ad 5:* *Ad quantum dicendum, quod sicut honestum et pulcrum sunt idem in subiecto, et differunt in ratione, ita etiam eadem possunt esse species utriusque secundum subiectum, sed ratione differenti.* *Ibid.*, ad 6: *Ad sextum dicendum, quod similiter est in natura quod pulcrum et bonum sunt idem in subiecto, sed non in ratione.

\(^{125}\) *De pulchro q. 1, a. 2 arg. 7:* *Ad idem: si pulcrum et honestum essent idem, tunc ista nomina essent synonyma; et sic nulla differentia esset inter ea, cum Tullius assignet in libro de officiis differentiam unius ad alterum: ergo non sunt idem.* Albert may have in mind *De officiis I.27* where Cicero says that a certain propriety (*decorum*) while blended (*confusum*) with virtue, is mentally and theoretically distinguishable (*distinguitur*) from it.

\(^{126}\) *De pulchro q. 1, a. 2 arg. 8:* *Ad idem: quaecumque separatur secundum esse, sunt etiam separabilia secundum essentiam; sed pulcrum separat al honesto secundum esse. Potest enim aliquando esse pulcrum sine bono, sicut dicitur in Proverb: fallax gratia et vana est pulcritudo: ergo sunt diversa secundum essentiam.* Cf. Proverbs: 31:30.
contrasts the relative emptiness of physical beauty with the substantive value of virtue, which is inward beauty.\footnote{127}{The context in which this saying appears, Proverbs 31:10-31, is a lengthy description of the qualities of an excellent wife. Her many virtues are enumerated: she is trustworthy, she does good and not evil, she is hard working and shrewd in business matters, she cares for her household and for the poor, she is strong but her words are kind. She is wise. Albert quotes the penultimate verse in the passage, in which the vanity of outward beauty is said to pale in comparison to what we may take to be the pinnacle of inward beauty, \textit{viz.}, fear of the Lord, presumably the spring of her many virtues. The woman described here receives the highest praise for her many virtues, but not on account of her physical beauty, which is, by comparison, impotent.}

To both of these final arguments, Albert concedes, on the basis of the distinction already made with respect to arguments one, two, five and six, namely, that beauty and \textit{honestum} may be the same in subject, but differ in meaning, though he here provides an example of an instance in which they are separated in subject as well. Therefore, he is not committed to a complete coextension of the two terms, but only a general coextension. So we have, from this rather lengthy discussion, a fairly detailed account achieved by a kind of accumulation, a remnant of which survives in Aquinas simply as a conclusion, namely, that beauty and goodness are the same in subject but differ in meaning.\footnote{128}{ST I.5.4 ad 1.}

If anything, our examination of this question reveals an interesting comparison between Albert and Aquinas, which is born out by further investigation, namely, that whereas Albert is quite thorough in his examination of this particular text, Aquinas evinces a rather terse summary. Even in Aquinas'}
commentary on the same passage, he does not really add much content to Albert’s basic conclusion, though he does include a reference to cognition:

Though the beautiful and the good are the same in the subject, since both clarity and consonance are included in the nature of the good, they differ in meaning; for beauty adds something to the good, an order to the cognitive power [to know] that [a thing] is of such a kind.129

Nevertheless, what we have here is essentially the same conclusion as reached by Albert, but without consideration of the objections nor provision of argument. The reasons for Aquinas’ brevity are not available to us, though it is characteristic of Aquinas to condense Albert’s teaching on a subject, and in the process lose some of the subtlety typical of his mentor’s thought. We might speculate on the basis of Aquinas’ stated aims in his prologue to the Summa Theologiae, namely, that he is eager to avoid the kinds of errors that cause trouble especially in the instruction of beginners (for whom the Summa was written), examples of which include “the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments” as well as “frequent repetition” which, he says, produces “weariness

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129 In de div. nom. IV, lec. 5: Quamvis autem pulchrum et bonum sint idem subiecto, quia tam claritas quam consonantia sub ratione boni continentur, tamen ratione different: nam pulchrum addit supra bonum, ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam illud esse huiusmodi. Cf. ST I.5.4 ad 1: Bonum prorpie respicit appetitum... Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim dicuntur, quae visa placent; unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit, quia sensus delectantur in rebus debite proportionatis sicut in sibi similibus, nam et sensus ratio quaedam est et omnis virtus cognoscitiva. Cf. also ST I-II.27.1 ad 3: Et sic patet, quod pulchrum addit supra bonum quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam ita quod bonum dicitur id, quod simpliciter complacet appetitum.
and confusion” in the student. His aim is, rather, to set forth only what is necessary “as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow.”\textsuperscript{130}

It is clear that Aquinas sees as his project to address, at least in the \textit{Summa}, only those matters that are absolutely necessary and only to the extent required for an understanding of the subject under investigation. In light of this stated aim, we are well advised to take the structural features of that work as significant for determining what Aquinas deems most important, and also for what is not. This does not account for the relative brevity found in Aquinas’ commentary on \textit{De divinis nominibus}, since there he is ostensibly expositing the text, and he furthermore has Albert’s copy at hand. There is no need to be uncharitable and assert that Aquinas is less than scholarly in his examination of the text; rather, it is better to say that his aims are simply not those exclusively of the scholar. Albert is, in this regard, more of an academic in his approach to Dionysius’ text whereas Aquinas’ aims are, as he says, more practical in nature. He aims to help the reader grasp what is important and true, to understand, and nothing more. If an exhaustive account is not warranted, he will not pursue the matter as far as he might. Presumably, this is the case with respect to these passages, both those of the \textit{Summa} and of his commentary. For the one who wishes to see the medieval acumen at work in comprehensive fashion, he may find Albert’s examination more satisfying than what we are likely to find in Aquinas.

\textsuperscript{130} ST Prologue.
Another interesting passage that I wish to consider is found in De pulchro Question three, article one, wherein Albert considers the nature of beauty (pulcritudine). Specifically, in Question three, he is addressing that part of the text which, he says, begins with et sicut tota et cetera. The complete text from De divinis nominibus upon which Albert is commenting is this: et sicut omnia ad se ipsum vocans, that is, “it [beauty] calls all things to itself.” Here I am only interested in one particular objection and response, because of its apparent influence on, or consonance at least, Aquinas’ position. The second argumentum there asserts:

If it is said that it [the supreme beauty] makes beauty, not as an agent, but as form – On the contrary, that in which motion does not terminate, but which is a consequence of motion, does not produce the being of the form, because form is the terminus of the motion of nature; but beauty is not the terminus of motion, but is a consequence of motion; therefore, it [the supreme beauty] does not produce the being of form, and thus it is not proper to beauty to produce formally.

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131 Question three regards the nature of beauty and the beautiful. In article one, he treats only of the nature of beauty. De pulchro q. 3 expos.: Hic accredit ad tractatum suum, et dividitur in partes duas. In prima determinat de pulcritudine. In secunda de pulcro.

132 Ibid.: Hic acedit ad tractatum suum, et dividitur in partes duas… Tertia ibi: et sicut Omnia ad se et cetera.

133 DN IV.7, 701C. The Latin text quoted here, which was used by Albert, is the Saracens translation, and this passage can be found in Dionysia I, 180.

134 De pulchro q. 3, a. 1 arg. 2: Si dicatur quod non facit pulcritudinem sicut agens, sed sicut forma. Contra: id ad quod non terminator motus, sed consequitur ad motum, non facit esse formae, quia forma est terminus motus naturae; sed pulcritudo non est terminus motus, sed consequens motum; ergo non facit esse formae, et sic non est eius formaliter facere pulcritudinem.
To this objection, Albert responds, saying that “although beauty is not the terminus of *per se* motion, it is still a terminus of *per accidens* motion, since it is said in Book Six of the *Physics* that *per accidens* motion is a feature of all things; however, it is not necessary that everything that gives being through a form be a terminus of *per se* motion.”135

The terminology of “motion” can be confusing if one does not realize that what is being discussed here is what we would rather call “change,” particularly change from one state to another. The distinction between *per se* motion and *per accidens* motion becomes clearer understood this way, since *per se* change is the sort of change between contrary extremes which are the two *termini*, like hot and cold or being and unbeing, whereas *per accidens* change is change between intermediary states.136 There will always be *per accidens* motion between two contraries, but these are not explanatory in the same way that *per se* change is supposed to be. To explain the movement of something that is cold to something that is noticeably warmer requires the presence of heat, which would fall under the genus hot. The movement from being cold to being hot is going to involve the thing in a passage through a number of intermediate states, but these are not explanatory of the change itself. This does not mean, of course, that everything

135 *Ibid.*, ad 2: *Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis pulcritudo non sit terminus motus per se, est tamen terminus motus per accidens; quia sicut dicitur in VI physicorum, motus per accidens est in omnibus; non autem omne quod dat esse per modum formae oportet quod sit terminus motus per se. Cf. *Aristotle, Physics V*, 224b26. Albert erroneously attributes this saying to Book VI of the *Physics* rather than to Book V.

136 *Physics V*, 224b1.
must start from one of the two extremes, for Aristotle says that an intermediary can be a starting point.\textsuperscript{137} Rather, what is significant is not the starting point, the \textit{terminus a quo}, but rather the ending point, the \textit{terminus ad quem}, for that is what gives the movement its character and initiates its motion.\textsuperscript{138}

Against this background, we can see that the objector here in question three seems to be concerned that beauty, since it is not an agential cause of beauty in things, but a formal cause, will therefore not really have any causal power to produce the beauty in things, but the beauty of things will merely be a consequence of some other causal process. That is, the worry seems to be that beauty is merely a consequence of some motion, not a cause of it. Against this rather abstruse line of argument, Albert responds by saying that while beauty is not the terminus of \textit{per se} motion, it is nonetheless the terminus of \textit{per accidens} motion. And here he adds that it is not necessary for everything that is productive of being through a form to be the terminus of \textit{per se} motion. Albert does not here offer any explanation for this assertion. We must look, instead, to his \textit{solutio} for clarity.

In the \textit{solutio}, Albert notes, firstly, that the subject about which Dionysius is speaking, in the text under discussion, is the nature of beauty in general (\textit{de natura pulcritudinis in universal}i), which is shared by all beautiful things, as a form

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Ibid.}, 224b30.

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Ibid.}, 224b7. Cf. Aquinas, \textit{In Physicorum} V, l. 1, n. 5.
Thus, what makes all beautiful things beautiful, what gives them their beauty, is that each participates in the form of beauty. The form of beauty, which is shared, Albert says, “proceeds (procedit) from the beauty (a pulcritudine) which is the first performance (effectu) of beauty (pulcritudinis), through its form (per suam formam), which is beauty (pulcritudo est), just as a mover in the case of motion.” On account of this, he concludes that the beauty that is in the cause agrees in causing the beauty of every beautiful thing, as formal cause... it makes all things beautiful, and it makes all beauty, according to which it makes this or that beauty to be in this or that thing.

This passage, though a bit confusing on account primarily of the Dionysian text rather than Albert’s exposition, is very similar to what we see Aquinas saying about the very same passage. Here is what Aquinas says, regarding this passage:

Then when he [Dionysius] says, “But the beautiful, etc.,” he shows how they are attributed to God. And concerning this he does three things: first, he sets forth that the beautiful and beauty are attributed to God and to creatures differently; second, in what way they are

139 De pulchro q. 3, a. 1 co: Solutio. Dicendum quod Dionysius hic loquitur de natura pulcritudinis in universali, quae est communis omnibus pulcris, ut forma eorum.

140 Ibid.: quanvis appetitur secundum naturam eorum in quibus recipitur, secundum quod procedit a pulcritudine quae est in primo effectu pulcritudinis, per suam formam quae pulcritudo est sicut agens in motum.

141 Ibid.: Unde pulcritudini quae est in causa convenit facere pulcritudinem omnium, sicut effectivum formale, non autem pulcritudini quae est pulcritudo formalis pulcrorum prout in se considerantur; facit Omnia pulcra, et facit omnem pulcritudinem, secundum quod facit hanc vel illam pulcritudinem esse in hoc vel in illo... facit omnia pulcra, et facit omnem pulcritudinem, secundum quod facit hanc vel illam pulcritudinem esse in hoc vel in illo.
attributed to creatures where [he says], “For these things, etc;” third, how they are attributed to God, where [he says], “But the supersubstantial, etc.” He says, therefore, first, that in the first cause, namely God, the beautiful and beauty are not to be divided as if the beautiful were other than beauty, since the first cause alone, because of its simplicity and perfection, comprehends the whole (that is, all things) in one; whence, even if the beautiful and beauty differ in creatures, nevertheless, God comprehends both in himself as one and the same.”

From this, we can see that Aquinas posits two things, namely, beauty and the beautiful, which are different in creatures but the same in God, who is also called the first cause (causa prima), namely, the Source of all. He goes on to clarify that beauty and the beautiful are attributed to creatures on account of either participating (participans) or participated (participatum), where the beautiful is called that which participates in beauty and beauty is the participation of the first cause, which makes all things beautiful: for the beauty of the creature is nothing other than the similitude of the divine Beauty in things by participation.

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142 In de div. nom. IV, lec. 5: Deinde, cum dicit: pulchrum autem et cetera, ostendit quomodo Deo attribuitur; et circa hoc, tria facit: primo, praemittit quod differenter attribuitur Deo et creaturis pulchrum et pulchritudo; secundo, quomodo attribuitur creaturis; ibi: haec enim et cetera; tertio, quomodo attribuitur Deo; ibi: supersubstantiale et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod in causa prima, sicilicet Deo non sunt dividend pulchrum et pulchritudo, quasi alid sit in eo pulchrum et pulchritudo; et hoc ideo quia causa prima propter sui simplicitatem et perfectionem sola comprehendit tota, idest omnia in uno, unde etsi in creaturis different pulchrum et pulchritudo, Deus tamen utrumque comprehendit in se, secundum unum et idem.

143 Ibid.: Deinde, cum dicit: haec enim et cetera, ostendit qualiter attribuuntur creaturis; et dicit quod in existentibus, pulchrum et pulchritudo distinguuntur secundum participans et participatum ita quod pulchrum dicitur hoc quod participat pulchritudinem; pulchritudo autem participatio praeae causae quae omnia pulchra facit: pulchritudo enim creaturae nihil est alid quam similitudo divinae pulchritudinis in rebus participata.
Here it is clearer what sort of causal power the form of beauty has, and how it causes beauty in creating things that are beautiful, namely, the beauty of things is caused by participation in the form of beauty, which is here identified as God himself. Aquinas goes on to say that we in fact give God, who is the supersubstantial beauty, the name “Beauty” on account of the fact that God is the cause of the beauty in created things, which is to say, that God is the cause of consonantia and claritas in all things, which are the formal constituents of beauty.\textsuperscript{144} He goes on from here to discuss in what way it can be said that God is the cause of claritas and consonantia. He concludes this analysis by summarizing it this way:

And this can be understood according to the statements of the Platonists that superior things are in inferior things by participation (\textit{secundum participationem}), but the inferior things are in the superior things through a certain excellence (\textit{per excellentiam quamdam}), and thus all things are in all things (\textit{omnia sunt in omnibus}). And because all things in all things are found in a certain order, it follows that all things are ordered to the same end (\textit{omnia ad idem ultimum ordinentur}).\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Ibid.}: \textit{Dicit ergo primo quod Deus qui est supersubstantiale pulchrum, dicitur pulchritudo propter hoc quod omnibus entibus creatis dat pulchritudinem, secundum proprietatem uniuscuiusque: alia enim est pulchritudo spiritus et alia corporis, atque alia huius et illius corporis. Et in quo consistat pulchritudinis ratio, ostendit subdens quod sic Deus tradit pulchritudinem, inquantum est causa consonantiae et claritatis in omnibus.}

\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Ibid.}: \textit{Et potest hoc intelligi, secundum sententiam Platonicorum, quod superiora sunt in inferioribus, secundum participationem; interiora vero sunt in superioribus, per excellentiam quamdam et sic omnia sunt in omnibus; et ex hoc quod omnia in omnibus inveniuntur ordine quodam, sequitur quod omnia ad idem ultimum ordinentur.}
Thus Aquinas explains that this causation is to be understood in Platonic concepts, and that the cause of the existence of something (e.g., beauty) in created (i.e., inferior) things is to be found in the existence of beauty in an uncreated (i.e., superior) thing, namely, God. Thus is formed a kind of unified chain of beings, in which the lower beings and their features are explained in terms of some connection, called participation, with the higher things. And Aquinas has made clear, following Dionysius, that God is the highest being in the chain: a trinity of Being itself, Good itself, and Beauty itself. And God, as Being, Good, and Beauty, is the sufficient cause of all being, good, and beauty found in created things. Here, in a way that is perhaps more pronounced than anywhere else in Aquinas, we find a very strong form of Platonism.

That this participation is a sufficient explanation to explain the efficient causation of things, he later says:

Then when he [Dionysius] says “From this beautiful, etc.,” he shows how the beautiful is said of God according to cause... He says, therefore, first that from the Beautiful, esse comes to all existing things...but every form, through which a thing has esse, is a certain participation of the divine brightness... Whence it is clear that from the divine beauty, the esse of all things is derived... Then when he says, “And he is the principle, etc.,”...he first designates according to which notion the beautiful is called a cause... He says, therefore, first that the Beautiful is the principle of all things and as a cause containing, that is, preserving, all things; for these three things seem to pertain to the notion of an efficient cause (causa effectiva); that it give esse, move, and preserve.146

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146 Ibid.: Deinde, cum dicit: ex pulchro isto et cetera, ostendit quomodo pulchrum de Deo dicitur secundum causam... Dicit ergo primo quod ex pulchro isto provenit esse omnibus existentibus...
Aquinas is explaining why it is that beauty, though a formal cause of the beauty in created things, can nevertheless also be an efficient cause, namely, because beauty satisfies all of the conditions of an efficient cause, which is to bestow being, to move, and to preserve. God, the supersubstantial Beauty, bestows being on all things; he moves all things – first as an outwards expression of creation, and also as a drawing force, the ultimate good or end of all desire, in the cycle of emanation and return; and finally, he preserves all things, since it is by him all things hold together.\footnote{Colossians 1:17: et ipse est ante omnia, et omnia in ipso constant.}

He explains that there are two ways of acting: one acts from the desire for an end that it does not yet possess. This is the activity of an imperfect agent. There is another way of acting, however, which is the activity of a perfect agent (\textit{agentis perfecti}). The perfect agent, which is God, acts out of love.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}: Sed causa agent, quaedam agit ex desiderio finis, quod est agentis imperfecti, nondum habentis quod desiderat; sed agentis perfecti est ut agat per amorem eius quod habet et propter hoc subdit quod pulchrum, quod est Deus.} And, he adds:

The Beautiful, which is God, is an effective and moving and containing cause by a proper love of beauty. For since it loves proper beauty, it wants to multiply it as far as possible, namely through communication of its own similitude. But, second, that the Beautiful, which is God, is

\begin{verbatim}
omnis autem forma, per quam res habet esse, est participatio quaedam divinae claritatis… unde patet quod ex divina pulchritudine esse omnium derivatur… Deinde, cum dicit: et est principium et cetera…primo, assignat secundum quam rationem pulchrum dicitur causa… Dicit ergo primo quod pulchrum quidem est principium omnium sicut causa effectiva dans esse; et sicut causa movens et sicut causa continens, idest conservans omnia; haec enim tria videntur ad rationem causae efficientis pertinere: ut det esse, moveat et conservet.
\end{verbatim}

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the end of all things as the final cause of all things; for all things are made that they might imitate the divine Beauty in some way.”  

Here he explains that the Beautiful, namely God, is not only efficient and formal cause of all things, but also the final cause of all things. This is the goal of participation, namely, that the participating things might enjoy a share and a likeness of God himself. And he goes on to add that “since in so many ways the Beautiful is the cause of all, thence it is that the Good and the Beautiful are the same, since all things desire the Beautiful and the Good as a cause in all ways, and since there is nothing that does not participate in the Beautiful and the Good, while anything is beautiful and good according to a proper form.” By this last phrase, he presumably means to exclude things that exist as mere privations, like evil or ugliness. So again Aquinas reiterates the convertibility of the Beautiful and the Good from the fact that just as the Good is a cause of all things so is the Beautiful a cause of all things, and if these are both the cause of all things “in so many ways,” therefore are they the same. Nevertheless, he adds his familiar

149 Ibid.: pulchrum, quod est Deus, est causa effectiva et motiva et continens, amore propriae pulchritudinis. Quia enim proprium pulchritudinem habet, vult eam multiplicare, sicut possibile est, scilicet per communicacionem suae similitudinis. Secundo ait quod pulchrum, quod est Deus, est finis omnium sicut finalis causa omnium rerum. Omnia enim facta sunt ut divinam pulchritudinem qualitercunque imitentur.

150 Ibid.: Deinde, cum dicit: propter quod et cetera, infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis; et dicit quod, quia tot modis pulchrum est causa omnium, inde est quod bonum et pulchrum sunt idem, quia omnia desiderant pulchrum et bonum, sicut causam omnibus modis; et quia nihil est quod non participet pulchro et bono, cum unumquodque sit pulchrum et bonum secundum proprium formam.
qualification, namely, that “the beautiful adds to Good an order to a cognitive power determining it to be of this kind.”\textsuperscript{151}

This is the end of Aquinas’ fifth lecture on book four of \textit{De divinis nominibus}. Though brief, I hope that this very short survey of this text and the corresponding passages in Albert has illustrated just how intimate is the connection between the two thinkers on the subject of beauty. These indicate to me a profound consonance between the two, and very likely an equally profound dependence on the part of Aquinas. Albert’s affinities for Platonism have long been recognized, and I hope that this present study illustrates that, at least with respect to the subject of beauty, Aquinas shares some of this same affinity when it comes to illuminating the nature of the beautiful and the good.

\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Ibid.}: Quamvis autem pulchrum et bonum sint idem subiecto, quia tam claritas quam consonantia sub ratione boni continentur, tamen ratione differunt: nam pulchrum addit supra bonum, ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam illud esse huiusmodi.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS, PROBLEMS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

6.1 Summary Remarks

This project originated in the intersection of two areas of interest: Aquinas’ ethics, especially his rich account of the virtues and moral development, and objectivist theories of beauty. In my exploration into ancient and medieval views about the nature of beauty, I encountered some surprising conclusions. First, the objectivity of beauty has for the greater part of Western history been more or less uncritically assumed. Second, this commitment to beauty’s objectivity has not meant the wholesale exclusion of beauty’s subjectivity.

At least with respect to later medieval theories of beauty, like the one we find in Aquinas, an analysis of beauty was thought to involve two separate aspects. On the one hand, there are objective features of objects or actions in the world, and the objective features provide the formal grounds for the existence and experience of beauty. Examples of this are proportion (or harmony), integrity (or perfection) and splendor (or color). Most often, these discussions focused not on beauty in the abstract, but rather on beautiful things, viz., particulars such as beautiful buildings, people, animals, art or beautiful deeds. Beautiful particulars are proportionate, without blemish, and radiant (in both a
literal and an intelligible sense). Beauty is objective. On the other hand, there are subjective conditions for the experience, viz., the perception and enjoyment, of beauty. The formal features may well be present, but without a cognizer to perceive and order these features intelligibly, there can be no such thing as aesthetic pleasure or aesthetic judgment. The experience of beauty is subjective. The view, viz., that beauty has both objective and subjective features, will be popularized by Kant some five hundred years later, though admittedly the similarity between the two accounts is largely superficial.¹

These two aspects come together in Aquinas’ canonical definition of beauty in the pars prima of the Summa Theologiae, in a discussion on the transcendental property of goodness. There he says: “We call those things beautiful which please when seen.”² In a way that is characteristic of Aquinas’ Summa, he has provided a very simple definition that rewards exploration. For in this definition, we have at least three discernible components, each of which invites examination. First, there are the particulars themselves – the objects, persons, actions, etc., and their formal features. An examination of these

¹ Kant is not concerned with the nature of beauty itself, but with aesthetic judgments, since he holds that beauty is not a property of things, but rather the consciousness of a subjective feeling attending the free play of the imagination (see, e.g., Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment [Kritik der Urteilskraft] §1, 5:203-204). For Kant, aesthetic judgments have a dual aspect - both objective and subjective - but modern commentators are divided about this. For instance, Karl Ameriks argues that Kant endorses only the objective aspect of aesthetic judgment, while Hannah Ginsborg is critical of this view. See Karl Ameriks, “Kant and the Objectivity of Taste,” in British Journal of Aesthetics 23 (1983): 3-17; and Hannah Ginsborg, “Kant on the Subjectivity of Taste,” in Herman Parret, ed., Kants Ästhetik (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1998).

² ST I.5.4 ad 1.
particulars involves an examination of the formal criteria of inherent beauty. Such an examination, which is found in chapter four, reveals the objective nature of beauty. Second, there is the perception involved in aesthetic judgment. This investigation takes us into Aquinas’ philosophical psychology, and into his account of perception in general. Such an examination, which is found in chapter two, reveals one-half of the subjective aspect of beauty. Third, there is the pleasure attending the perception of beauty. An examination into this aspect, which is the subject of chapter three, reveals the second-half of the subjective aspect of beauty. In this present study, I have attempted a complete examination of the components of this definition, which I hope has shed some helpful light on Aquinas’ overall view of beauty. It is to this project that the bulk of the present study has been devoted. Lastly, in chapter five, I examined two of Aquinas’ principal sources, namely, Dionysius’ De divinis nominibus and a fragment of Albert’s commentary on that work, which has come down to us in Aquinas’ own hand. What, then, can we now conclude regarding Aquinas’ view of beauty?

Aquinas had a voluminous output by any standard. Just considering those works attributed to him in which his authorship is undisputed, he produced over eight million words - eight times the impressive output of Aristotle, one of the most prolific writers of antiquity. It is perhaps surprising, then, that Aquinas wrote very little about beauty or aesthetic experience. This is even more baffling when one considers the importance to medieval thinkers of the so-called
“transcendentals,” among which beauty is supposed to have been included.3 This has been one area of intense scholarship among contemporary historians of medieval philosophy for the past fifty years, and is seemingly the only area of scholarship in which beauty has been studied in depth. But then the interests of historians of philosophy often diverge from the interests of those historical figures whom they study. Nevertheless, two very important contemporaries of Aquinas wrote in much greater detail about beauty than he did, which is at least an indication that beauty may have been more than of merely periphery interest to thirteenth century thinkers. Aquinas’ mentor, first at Paris and later at Cologne, Albert the Great, wrote a good deal about beauty.4 So also did Bonaventure, Aquinas’ colleague at the University of Paris.5

Aquinas himself wrote a commentary on Dionysius’ De divinis nominibus, the fourth chapter of which treats extensively of “beauty” as one of the divine

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3 Though, admittedly, at the time Aquinas is writing the pars prima, 1265/6-1268, the addition of beauty to the list of transcendentals was still a fairly new innovation. Its first in print appearance along with the canonical transcendentals seems to have been in Alexander of Hales’ Summa Theologica in 1245.

4 The work I am considering here is Albert’s Super Dionysium de divinis nominibus (De pulchro et bono), referred to here simply as De pulchro. Albert’s course on De divinis nominibus, from which this text, written in Aquinas’ own hand, is thought to originate, is dated to 1249-1250. Aquinas studied with Albert in Paris 1245-48, and then in Cologne, as student and assistant, 1248-51/52.

5 See, for example, Bonaventure, In Primum Librum Sententiarum (Quaracchi edition, Volume I, 1882); Ibid., In Secundum Librum Sententiarum (Quaracchi, Vol. II, 1885); Ibid., Itinerarium mentis in Deum (Quaracchi, Vol. V, 1891). The latter is available in several English translations, but see Itinerarium mentis in Deum, with Latin and English text, translated by Zachary Hayes. Works of St. Bonaventure, Volume II, revised and expanded (Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 2002). On August 15, 1257, Aquinas and Bonaventure were both appointed to the Paris faculty, the consortium magistrorum, after some lengthy and bitter dispute between the Dominicans and Franciscans, which had held up the appointments of both men. Cf. Torrell, 76-79.
names. His commentary on this chapter constitutes the longest sustained treatment of beauty to be found in Aquinas’ corpus, and even here it is difficult to separate Aquinas the philosopher from Aquinas the expositor; the relationship between medieval commentators and the texts on which they comment is a complex one. Nevertheless, Aquinas’ corpus has been hailed as such a marvel of internal coherence, that it has been likened to a medieval computer, in which one part of the whole can be deduced by examining the other parts, and in which even those things about which Aquinas is silent may be reliably inferred from the rest. With this in mind, I have attempted to deduce from what Aquinas says about beauty that it is intimately connected to his moral theory, as well as what implications we might reasonably draw from this connection.

In the central chapter of this work, we saw that pleasure, for Aquinas, arises in the context of some instrumental good obtained. Things in the world are good, to one extent or another. Some things are good to eat, others good to wear, and some are good for promoting virtue. There are all kinds of goods in the world, and in fact everything that exists is good to some extent. Nothing that exists is wholly lacking in value; if per impossibile some object were to lose every

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6 In librum beati Dionysii de divinis nominibus expositio can be found in Opera Omnia (Torino: Marietti, 1950). Currently there is no available English translation of this work.

7 Eco (1988), 202. An alternate analogy might be to compare his work to the notion of homoeomerous (i.e., uniform) parts in Anaxagoras, who taught that every division of matter is a division into uniform parts, and that, therefore, there is “a portion of everything in everything.” See, e.g., Aristotle’s reports of this view in De caelo 302a28-33 and Met. 1007b25. For a brief treatment of this doctrine, see Gareth B. Matthews, “On the Idea of There Being Something of Everything in Everything,” in Analysis 62.1 (2002), 1-4.
bit of goodness it possessed, it would simply cease to exist.\footnote{This is based on the view of evil (malum) as privation, or defect, which Aquinas inherits from Augustine and Dionysius. This view sees evil as inherently parasitic on the good. See, for example, ST I.48.1 co. Cf. Augustine, \textit{De libero arbitrio} (hereafter \textit{De lib. arb.}), Lib. II.20; \textit{Enchiridion} 14. Cf. also Dionysius, DN IV, 720B, 725A.} According to Aquinas, good has an attractive quality. That is, when we are attracted to an object, what we are attracted to is its goodness. This applies to both sensible and intelligible goods.

An object can be considered as good under many, sometimes competing, aspects. Aquinas says that we develop an appetite for an object when we apprehend it \textit{sub ratione boni} (under the aspect of the good).\footnote{ST I.82.2 ad 1: “The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of the good (\textit{sub ratione boni}). But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one.”} Appetite aims at the good.\footnote{ST I.5.1 co: “the essence of goodness consist in this, that it is in some way desirable.” Cf. Aristotle, NE I.1, 1194\textsuperscript{a}3: “the good is what all desire.” Cf. Also Plato, \textit{Meno} 77b. Contemporary philosophers often refer to this view as the “Guise of the Good” thesis, and it has been the subject of intense scrutiny in recent years. See, for instance, the recent collection of essays in \textit{Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good}, edited by Sergio Tenenbaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).} In fact it is impossible to be attracted to anything unless it is apprehended in this way, which explains why we can be attracted to something harmful, since nothing that exists is wholly instrumentally bad.\footnote{ST I-II.27.1 ad 1: “Evil is never loved except \textit{under the aspect of good (sub ratione boni)}, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is considered as being good simply.” This view of human motivation, common among medieval thinkers, has been contested by Michael Stocker. See his “Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology,” in \textit{The Journal of Philosophy} 76 (1979): 738-753.} The movement of the appetite toward the good object so apprehended is what Aquinas refers to
as desire.\textsuperscript{12} And desire, when fulfilled by obtaining its object, is rewarded with pleasure.\textsuperscript{13} Again, it does not matter whether the desire is a sensory desire or an intellectual one; obtaining the desired object is rewarded with pleasure.

Desire is the point of intersection of a number of very important issues. It is related to Aquinas’ account of the passions, a notion that doesn’t quite overlap exactly with our contemporary notion of the emotions.\textsuperscript{14} At root, passion refers to something’s power of receptivity or ability to be affected. Consequently, the passions are also sometimes referred to as the affections, though in fact, his word translated as “passion” (\textit{passio}) has a narrower meaning for Aquinas than his word typically translated as “emotion” or “affection” (\textit{affectio}).\textsuperscript{15} Likewise, a terminological distinction can be made between “appetite” (\textit{appetitus}) and “desire” (\textit{desiderium}). When Aquinas uses “appetite” (\textit{appetitus}), he typically means something like an inclination towards some good, whereas, “desire”

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12}See, e.g., ST I-II.27.4 ad 2: “Desire (\textit{desiderium}) for a thing always presupposes love (\textit{amor}) for that thing.”
\item \textsuperscript{13}ST I-II.25.2 co: “pleasure is the enjoyment of the good.” Cf. ST I-II.31.1 ad 1. Cf. Aristotle, \textit{De Anima} II.1, 412a22-28. It must be added that, for Aquinas, merely obtaining the object of desire is not sufficient to produce pleasure. What is also required is an awareness of having obtained the object of desire. See, e.g., ST I-I.31.1 co.
\item \textsuperscript{14}This is not to suggest that there is any consensus among contemporary philosophers regarding the emotions. On the contrary, this lack of consensus regarding the emotions is one of the factors that makes the current interest in and debate over ancient and medieval theories of emotions that more problematic. Some philosophers have even suggested that an attempt at a universal or interdisciplinary categorization of the emotions is a hopeless endeavor. See, e.g., Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, “Enough Already with Theories of Emotion,” in \textit{Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotion}, ed. Robert C. Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 269-78. Cf. Richard Sorabji, \textit{Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
\item \textsuperscript{15}For Aquinas, there are some affections that are not passions, e.g., some kinds of love or joy.
\end{itemize}
(desiderium), as already stated, relates to actual movement toward some good.\textsuperscript{16} With these terminological distinctions in place, we can say that the human soul has a fundamental receptivity (passio) to external stimuli, whether of a sensory or intelligible nature, which allows it to be affected in certain ways, namely, that it may apprehend the object as good (or, what is the same thing, desirable), which produces an inclination (amor or appetitus) for the object; this inclination in turn elicits movement of the soul toward the object (desiderium). If the object is obtained, then pleasure results, either of a sensory (delectatio) or intellectual (fruitio) nature, and sometimes both.\textsuperscript{17}

Additionally, in Aquinas’ system, desire and pleasure are intimately tied to his account of the virtues, which are central to his moral theory. To the extent that Aquinas’ moral theory is committed to psychological eudaimonism, desire,

\textsuperscript{16} For appetitus as inclination, see ST I-II.8.1 co. Cf. Aristotle NE I.1. For desiderium as movement toward an object, see ST I-II.31.3 co. Nevertheless, Aquinas sometimes uses appetitus as a movement toward an object. See, e.g., ST I-II.8.1 co. This is confusing, but a charitable reading of Aquinas suggests he may simply be speaking more loosely in this instance, with appetitus standing in for the more narrow desiderium. It is also possible he is simply inconsistent.

\textsuperscript{17} Aquinas characterizes this as a three-stage process, characteristic of all natural movements (naturalibus invenimus). First is a principle or beginning (principium [ἀρχὴ]) of the movement itself (ipsius motus), followed by the natural movement (motus naturalis) flowing from the form, and finally resulting in resting (quies) in the things natural place (in proprio loco). Relating this to desire in the soul (appetite animali), he states: “The desire (appetitus) is formed in a certain way by something good (per bonum), and the result is love (amor), which unites the one who loves to the thing that is loved. From this it follows next that, if the good that is loved is at a distance, desire (appetitus) tends towards it through a movement of longing (desiderii) or hope (spei). The third stage then follows, i.e., joy (gaudium) or pleasure (delectatio), when one attains (pertingit) the thing one loves.” Disputed Questions on Hope [Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus Q. 4 (hereafter QD Spe)] a. 3 resp. Aquinas is not entirely consistent in his use of the terms delectatio and fruitio. His usual term for general delight is delectatio, though he often employs this term to mean corporeal or sensory pleasure. Aquinas’ use of fruitio is more consistent, almost always referring to intellectual pleasure (or restricting its application to rational beings, as in ST I-II.11.2 co), though there are exceptions. ST I-II.25.2 is an example of fruitio used in the general sense.
emotion, and pleasure are all intimately tied to his account of the virtues, which are central to his moral theory. In short, it implies the connection between psychology, ethics, and aesthetics. Some of this is familiar territory, but it has been an aim of this study to show more clearly how desire, the emotions (or affections), and pleasure are related to the virtues, and, specifically, how they form the link between beauty and virtue.

6.2 Beauty and Virtue

Desire is of such central importance because of its intimate connection to the good. The good, or what is perceived as good, is what elicits and draws desire. What we desire, therefore, shows what we take to be good. Because there is often a gap between what is really good and goods that are merely apparent,
one of the main goals of moral development is to train us to desire what is in fact
good. Training in the virtues is of utmost importance in this regard.

Aquinas’ ethics places the acquisition of the moral virtues in a place of
prominence. The primary moral virtues, the “cardinal virtues,” are for Aquinas
the same that we find in the classical world: prudence, justice, temperance and
fortitude. The cultivation of the virtues was, for Aquinas as for Plato and
Aristotle, a necessary component in a happy life, which is the goal of ethics (as of
living in general), since a virtue is simply that which makes something perform
its characteristic activity well. And the moral virtues are those virtues that
pertain only to created rational beings namely, humans and angels, of which our
only concern here are the moral virtues related to humans. For Aquinas, each of
the moral virtues perfects a particular power of the soul: Prudence, the most
important for Aquinas, perfects the intellect. Justice perfects the will (i.e., the
rational appetite). Fortitude perfects the irascible passions (i.e., sensory appetite
that relates to the arduous, e.g., dangers or hardships). Temperance perfects the
concupiscible passions (i.e., sensory appetite that relates to sensory goods, e.g.,

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19 See, for example, ST I-II.61.2 co. Cf. QD card.) a. 1 resp. Cf. also Cicero, De Invenzione II.159-165;
Plato, Republic IV, 427e-434d.

20 Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus, Q. 1: de virtutibus in communi (hereafter QD comm.) a. 1 resp.
Cf. Aristotle, NE II.6, 1106a17. Though, according to Aristotle, and in contrast to both Plato and
the Stoics, virtue is insufficient for happiness. See, e.g., Aristotle, NE I.5, 1095b29-1096a2; VII.13,
1153b14-28.
food, drink and sex).\textsuperscript{21} It may be obvious that justice, fortitude, and temperance relate to appetite, since justice relates to the rational appetite and both fortitude and temperance relate to the two aspects of the sensory appetite. What may be less apparent is that prudence, too, relates to appetite. Though directly relating to intellect, Aquinas states that prudence involves applying right reason to action, which cannot be done without a right appetite; and therefore prudence is not only an intellectual virtue, but also a moral virtue - the only virtue to fall into both categories.\textsuperscript{22} Also, Aquinas, following Augustine, affirms that prudence essentially involves knowing what things to seek (appetendere) and what things to avoid.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, all four of the cardinal moral virtues, for Aquinas, involve and perfect the appetite.

It may now be clearer why desire plays such an important role in Aquinas’ moral theory. Just as the virtues perfect the appetite, so our desires reflect the degree to which the soul has been conformed to right reason through the exercise of and habituation in the virtues. Our desires are, therefore, morally good if they, in fact, aim at real, and not merely apparent, goods. They are, on the other hand, morally bad if they aim at merely apparent goods, especially if those

\textsuperscript{21} QD card. a. 1 resp: Harum autem quatuor virtutum prudentia quidem est in ratione, iustitia autem est in voluntate, fortitudo autem in irascibili, temperantia autem in concupiscibili. Cf. QD comm. a. 12 ad 25: Ad vicequinquagesimum dicendum, quod in parte rationali sunt duae virtutes, scilicet appetitiva, quae vocatur voluntas; et apprehensiva, quae vocatur ratio. Unde in parte rationali sunt duae virtutes cardinales: prudentia quantum ad rationem, iustitia quantum ad voluntatem. In concupiscibili autem temperantia; sed in irascibili fortitudo.

\textsuperscript{22} ST II-II.47.4 co.

\textsuperscript{23} ST II-II.47.1 sc. Cf. Augustine, De diversis questionibus octoginta tribus, Q. 61.
apparent goods are pursued in a way that precludes pursuit of some greater good. Therefore, if we know what a person desires, what appears good to her, then assuming we know whether the object in question really is good, and whether it ought to be desired or not, we can tell whether she is of virtuous or vicious character. In the same way, I can thereby know whether I am moving in the direction of moral improvement or its converse.

Another way of expressing this idea is to say that a person’s desires reveal her character. This is what Aristotle meant when he said that the pleasures or pains a man experiences when performing certain acts are “signs” (σημεῖα) of the states of character since pleasures and pains are the things with which moral excellence (ἡθική ὁρήστι) is concerned, and because the virtues have to do not only with actions but also with feelings (πάθη). Thus we get his definition of moral virtue as “the quality of acting in the best way in relation to pleasures and pains.” Aquinas, commenting on this passage, concurs, stating “in every moral virtue it is requisite that a person have joy (delectatio) and sorrow (tristitia) in the things he ought (oportet) ... because the purpose of any moral virtue is that a man be rightly ordered in his pleasures and in his sorrows.”

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24 ST I-II.34.4 co; ST I-II.34.4 ad 3. Cf. QD comm. a. 10 ad 18.
25 Aristotle, NE II.3, 1104b3-9, 14-16. Cf. NE II.5, 1105a26; II.2, 1104b14; II.6, 1106a17, 25.
26 Aristotle, NE II.3, 1104b27-29.
27 Aquinas, In NE II, 1104a3ff, L. 3, n. 3: Hoc enim requiritur in omni virtute morali, ut aliquid delectetur et tristetur in quibus oportet. In the Latin text of Aristotle that Aquinas has received, Aristotle’s λύπη (generally translated into English as “pain”) has been rendered tristetur (generally translated into English as “sorrow”). Presumably, this is to emphasize the fact that in
Morality, for Aquinas, is primarily an interior matter, viz., a matter of reason and will, and only partly related to exterior activities since outward appearances do not tell the whole story and may, in fact, be misleading. A man may do the right thing for the wrong reason, in which case the action is in fact immoral. An external action may simply be morally ambiguous apart from knowledge of the agent’s motivation. Outward acts are sometimes sufficient for moral evaluation, however, as when an external action is unambiguously wrong; for though an action that is morally permissible may be performed in a way that renders it immoral (e.g., a soldier may kill an enemy combatant out of bloodlust rather than duty), an action that is unambiguously immoral cannot be performed in such a way as to render it morally good (e.g., one cannot commit adultery in a way that is virtuous or morally praiseworthy).

Aquinas, like Aristotle, thought that the pleasures associated with the life of virtue were the highest pleasures, and that the happiest person is the one whose life is not only characterized by virtuous activity, but whose virtuous performing an odious activity, one may, but need not, experience physical pain, while one almost always experiences some form of psychic pain or “sorrow.” We should note that the section of the Summa Theologiae concerning the virtues was written at the same time as his commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics and his Disputed Questions on the Virtues, and it is believed that his own ethical views were heavily influenced by his study of Aristotle’s account of the virtues. There is sufficient historiographical evidence available to show conclusively that Aquinas’s commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, his Disputed Questions on the Virtues, and the Secunda Secundae of the Summa Theologiae, which includes the section on the virtues, were all composed simultaneously in Paris in 1271-72. Torrell, 205, 227, and 329.

28 ST I-II.18.5 co; ST I-II.18.6 co. The proper end of the action is the object of the will rather than the object of the exterior action. Therefore, since human actions derive their species from the end (ST I-II.18.6 sc), good and evil is primarily attributed to the act of the will.
activity is also accompanied by pleasure. Therefore, we can see that just as
appetite for an object can inform us regarding the moral praiseworthiness or
blameworthiness of a person’s character, so also can a person’s pleasure inform
us of the same. When we know in what sorts of things a person takes pleasure
and to what extent,\textsuperscript{29} then we may be in a position to evaluate the moral status of
that person’s character; that is, assuming that we have access to the relevant
criteria and are, ourselves, truly virtuous.

The issue of beauty comes into this discussion because Aquinas has
defined beauty, or at least beautiful things, in terms of pleasure; that is, he states:
“we call those things beautiful which please when seen.”\textsuperscript{30} So just as we can say
that what a man desires and in what a man takes pleasure both tell us something
about his character, so also can we say that what a man finds beautiful likewise
tells us something about his character. What we desire, what gives us pleasure
and what we find beautiful all have this in common: they are all susceptible to
moral evaluation, according to Aquinas. And perhaps this is what we should
have suspected. For in the same passage where Aquinas gives his famous
definition of the beautiful, he also says, “beauty and goodness in a thing are
identical fundamentally; for they are based on the same thing, namely, the form;

\textsuperscript{29} ST I-II.31.6 co. Cf. ST I-II.25.2 ad 1; and ST I-II.27.4 ad 1.

\textsuperscript{30} ST I.5.4 ad 1.
and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically.”\textsuperscript{31}

Given this formal equivalence between goodness and beauty, since the good is what all things desire and is the object of desire, and since our character is subject to moral evaluation on the basis of what we desire (\textit{i.e.}, on the basis of what we perceive as good, and since as has been shown Aquinas takes it that good is objective and judgments about the good can be more or less accurate), perhaps it was inevitable that we should determine that what a person finds beautiful also to be subject to moral evaluation.

6.3 Problems for Aquinas’ View of Beauty

We come now to consider some problems for this view. I wish to consider two here. Firstly, I will address the strictly practical problem of objective measurement of aesthetic value. This is a formidable problem, and one to which I do not have a satisfactory solution, though I will gesture at a possible solution. Secondly, I will address a problem that is both theoretical and practical in nature: namely, that a view like Aquinas’ which seeks to marry the ethical to the

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.} Here also we see, perhaps, a remnant of the Greek dualism of the fine (\textit{τὸ καλὸν}) and the good (\textit{τὸ ἀγαθὸν}). According to Nicholas Riegel, though the notion of the beautiful (\textit{τὸ καλὸν}) is evidently important in Plato, its precise relation to the good (\textit{τὸ ἀγαθὸν}) has yet to be specified. This is due, in part, to the fact that there typically seems to be little difference in use between the two concepts. Riegel, in fact, argues that, for Plato, the two notions are, in concrete particulars, coextensive, though they are formally distinct, and that, contrary to what we might expect, for Plato the good is discovered primarily through the beautiful. The human virtues, for instance, are known to be good because they are first perceived as beautiful. See Nicholas Riegel, \textit{Beauty, τὸ καλὸν, and its Relation to the Good in the Works of Plato}, Ph.D. Dissertation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), especially chapters two (on the coextension of the beautiful and the good in concrete particulars) and three (on their formal distinction).
aesthetic runs the risk of underwriting or perpetuating societal marginalization of certain groups that are already vulnerable to alienation.

6.3.1 The Problem of Objective Standards of Evaluation

It is one thing to say that what one finds aesthetically pleasing is subject to moral evaluation. It is another thing to actually put this into practice. Whether it can be made practicable or not will depend in large part on whether there is an objective and accessible standard to which we may compare any individual aesthetic pleasure, and that we can be a proper judge. Though this may seem an insurmountably difficult project, we ought to note that it is no more or less difficult than the analogous project of measuring and evaluating non-aesthetic pleasure. We know that a person has virtuous character when what she perceives as good actually is good. There is the epistemological problem of accessibility to the actual good, of course, and this is the same problem we find with respect to moral evaluation of aesthetic values. Minimally, we would need to have a fixed standard of goodness, since beauty is convertible with (though presumably dependent upon) goodness\textsuperscript{32}, against which to measure the apparent goodness

\textsuperscript{32} Another way of saying this is to employ the concept of modes, namely, that beauty is a mode of goodness, or a way of delimiting goodness to a certain subclass of goods. To speak of it this way might be confusing because the use of the term “mode” in the later Middle Ages is not univocal. Aquinas, for instance, does use the term “mode,” but he does not use the language of modal distinction (which is an intermediate category between the real and mental distinctions), as is found later in Francisco Suárez. See Francisco Suárez, \textit{On the Various Kinds of Distinctions (Disputationes Metaphysicae, Disputatio VII, de varis distinctionum generibus)}, Translated with an introduction by Cyril Vollert (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1947). So if we say
we perceive in things. Any sort of consensus on this matter, in a pluralistic culture, is probably a hopeless dream. It is, nevertheless, perfectly coherent within the worldview of Thomas Aquinas. Furthermore, it may be that there are objective goods that are accessible to all. These may be found in an account like that provided by Augustine’s hierarchy of values, in which the good is grounded in being. Aquinas follows Augustine’s lead in adopting the view that a thing is good to the extent that it exists or is actual.\textsuperscript{33} If the beautiful is convertible with the good, as it is in Aquinas, then it would seem that the beautiful is also intimately related to being, and that a thing is therefore beautiful to the extent that it exists or is actual. Its beauty, as its goodness, would then be directly related to its existence or actuality. God is the being with the highest degree of being, goodness, and beauty because God exists most fully.\textsuperscript{34} Everything else has


\textsuperscript{34} ST I.44.1 co.
being and, consequently, goodness and beauty by participation in God who is being itself, good itself, and beauty itself. The goodness and beauty of created things is, therefore, derivative and proportionally related to its proximity to and participation in absolute goodness and beauty.\textsuperscript{35} Ugliness, like evil in general, is directly related to a defect or privation of being.\textsuperscript{36}

From this we may infer that, in creatures, the greater the degree of participation in goodness, the greater degree of participation in beauty, at least as relates to visible goods, including actions.

6.3.2 The Problem of Alienation

One possible source of tension in Aquinas’ view arises from the fact that since beauty is tied to goodness, and the goodness of human beings is expressed in the human virtues, especially the moral and intellectual virtues, then it seems reasonable that a human being would increase in goodness as one ages, since presumably one becomes wiser with experience. And \textit{ex hypothesi} as one’s goodness increases so ought one’s beauty. Yet if one were to focus primarily on physical beauty, as is so often the case, experience does not bear this out. There seems to be an inverse relationship between aging and beauty, which seems to peak rather early in one’s developmental cycle. Does Aquinas’ view therefore

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\textsuperscript{35} ST I.4.2 co; ST I.44.4 co.

\textsuperscript{36} ST I.47.1 co.
imply that we ought to judge the elderly as morally inferior to their younger counterparts? What about the physically disfigured? Are we to presume that any outward expression that falls short of a cultural ideal is thereby an indication of a bad soul? This, I think, is a worry that many people share with respect to any kind of moral aesthetics, and why such theories most often are met with immediate skepticism and caution. The worry is well expressed by eighteenth century thinker Johann Herder who, reflecting on a famous maxim, “in the countenance dwells the spirit,” raises the following concern:

If this rule is universally true, then surely Mother Nature can have given us no better letter of recommendation to our fellow men than a favorable face – but on the other hand wretched are we indeed if an unfavorable physique means that we must not only forgo the consolation of seeking redress in our soul but also arouse the general suspicion that “our spirit is worth nothing” or “our heart is bad.” Why? Because our body, the dwelling place of the soul, is so unalluring.\textsuperscript{37}

We certainly do not need any additional justification for the marginalization of society’s most vulnerable groups.\textsuperscript{38}


\textsuperscript{38} While some groups have long been recognized as being singled out for discrimination, e.g., the elderly, the disabled, the homosexual, and religious, ethnic, or racial minorities, etc., only recently has there been a public push to recognize the ugly as a discriminated class worthy of legal protections. See, for example, the recent article by economist, Daniel S. Hamermesh, “Ugly? You May Have a Case” in \textit{The New York Times}, August 27, 2011. Article last accessed May 5, 2012 online at URL = <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/28/opinion/sunday/ugly-you-may-have-a-case.html?_r=1&hp>.
An answer to this tension can be found in considering what Aquinas has to say about *honestum*, that is, moral goodness, and considering its relation to beauty *vis-à-vis* the hierarchy of values. Aquinas, comparing the beauty of actions to the beauty of bodies, states:

Spiritual beauty (*pulchritudo spiritualis*) consists in a man’s conduct or actions being well proportioned (*bene proportionata*) in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason (*spiritualem rationis claritatem*). Now this is what is meant by *honestum*, which we have stated to be the same as virtue (*idem esse virtuti*); and it is virtue that moderates according to reason all that is connected with man. Wherefore *honestum* is the same as spiritual beauty (*honestum est idem spirituali decori*). Hence Augustine says: “By *honestum* I mean intelligible beauty (*inteligibilem pulchritudinem*), which we properly designate as spiritual (*spiritualis*)”.

A virtuous act is a beautiful act for the same reason that a virtuous body is a beautiful body: because they exhibit *bene proportio* and *claritas*. the formal constituents of beauty that we encountered in chapter four. In the case of the body, *proportio* concerns the relation of the parts to the whole, and *claritas* relates to color. In the case of a virtuous act, these two things, *proportio* and *claritas* are


40 As has already been noted, Aquinas’ usual formulation includes *proportio* and *claritas*, but not *integritas*, possibly because, in Aquinas’ mind, *integritas* reduces ultimately to a kind of *proportio*. A notable exception to this rule is ST I.5.4 ad 1, where Aquinas presents what is taken to be the “canonical” definition of the beautiful.
related to each other. He says that the action is well-proportioned to the spiritual *claritas* of reason. Presumably, by this he means that the action is consonant with (i.e. directed by) reason. It is the light of reason that provides *claritas* here, and an action that is well-ordered to reason is also called well-proportioned. This is consistent with what Aquinas says elsewhere about virtuous activity, and he here reiterates that *honestum* is the same as both virtue and *decorum* (spiritual beauty).41

From what Aquinas has to say here and in the following articles about *honestum*, it is clear that there is a kind of beauty attributed to the soul, an interior and invisible beauty, which we can know only through external acts. This sort of beauty is a moral quality. It is what the ancients attributed to the virtuous person, certain a fine-ness or nobility of the soul. In this, Aquinas is remarkably similar to both his immediate and distant forbears. What is shown here is that Aquinas does not deviate in any significant way from that tradition, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, and running through Cicero, Augustine, Dionysius and Albert the Great, namely, of linking the beautiful and the good. He is remarkably consistent with thinkers as distant as Cicero, who says:

> This property, therefore, of which I am speaking belongs to each division of moral rectitude (*honestum*); and its relation to the cardinal

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41 ST I-II.55.4 ad 2: “Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says that the good of the soul is to be in accord with reason.” Cf. Dionysius, DN IV.
virtues is so close, that it is perfectly self-evident and does not require any abstruse process of reasoning to see it. For there is a certain element of propriety perceptible in every act of moral rectitude (in omni virtute); and this can be separated from virtue theoretically better than it can be practically. As comeliness and beauty of person (venustas et pulchritudo corporis) are inseparable from the notion of health, so this propriety (decorum) of which we are speaking, while in fact completely blended with virtue (totum illud quidem est cum virtute confusum), is mentally and theoretically distinguishable from it (sed mente et cogitatione distinguitur).42

And, speaking of the same, a few paragraphs later, he reiterates:

For, as physical beauty (pulchritudo corporis) with harmonious symmetry of the limbs (apta compositione membrorum) engages the attention and delights (delectate) the eye, for the very reason that all the parts combine in harmony and grace (omnes partes cum quodam lepore consentiunt), so this propriety (decorum), which shines out (elucet) in our conduct (vita), engages the approbation of our fellow-men by the order, consistency, and self-control (ordine et constantia et moderatione) it imposes upon every word and deed.43

In these two short passages, we see the very same view that is on offer in Aquinas. Just as there are certain formal features that govern physical beauty, namely, harmony of parts and a certain kind of splendor, so also are these same formal properties what characterize the beauty of the soul, which is expressed

42 Cicero, De officiis I.27: Quare pertinent quidem ad omnem honestatem hoc, quod dico, decorum, et ita pertinent, ut non recondite quodam ratione cernatur, sed sit in prompt. Est enim quiddam, idque intellegitur in omni virtute, quod deceat; quod cogitatione magis a virtute potest quam re separari. Ut venustas et pulchritudo corporis secerni non potest a valetudine, sic hoc, de quo loquimur, decorum totum illud quidem est cum virtute confusum, sed mente et cogitatione distinguitur.

43 Ibid., I.28: Ut enim pulchritudo corporis apta compositione membrorum movet oculos et delectate hoc ipso, quod inter se omnes partes cum quodam lepore consentiunt, sic hoc decorum, quod elucet in vita, movet approbationem eorum, quibuscum vivitur, ordine et constantia et moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum.
through good deeds. There is a sense in which the deed and the character on
which it depends are distinct, but they are not entirely separable since the deed is
merely an outward expression of the character or soul underlying the activity
that we see. The beautiful soul, the good character, broadcasts itself (Cicero says
this beauty, this decorum, “shines out” or elucet) in external conduct. This shining
out is remarkably similar, of course, to the language used by Dionysius and
Albert to describe the effusion of the goodness and beauty of the Source of all,
Albert’s respelendentia formae, or Aquinas’ claritas.

Given the prominent place Aquinas gives in his writings to moral matters,
it is perhaps unsurprising that he has more to say about moral or spiritual beauty
than he does about physical beauty, even though he sometimes speaks of the
moral beauty by comparison to physical beauty. Presumably, he makes this sort
of comparison because human beings are, in general, more familiar with sensory
or natural beauty than with moral beauty, the former being derived primarily
from the senses while the latter (even though mediated by the senses) must be
perceived under the aspect of its relation to right reason or virtue, which is not
equally accessible to all.

Ultimately, for Aquinas the degree of beauty one is able to apprehend in
an object (or in an act) depends a great deal upon our ability to perceive it under
the appropriate aspect. With regard to a beautiful action, we must be able to

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44 As he does, for instance, in ST II-II.145.2 co.
perceive the action under the aspect of the virtuous, which requires us to recognize virtuous behavior when it confronts us. With regard to a beautiful object, in addition to perceiving the object’s parts in relation to the whole, we must also be able to perceive the object under the aspect of its ideal, in order to judge the particular objects proportion to its perfect exemplar. To see this, consider a case proposed by Plotinus. We are to imagine two objects – a man and a marble statue of a man; all things being equal, the man has greater beauty than the marble statue on account of the fact that the man has a greater share in being than the statue, since he exists in a greater way than the non-living statue.\textsuperscript{45} He makes a similar comparison between a living man and a corpse. The living man has a greater share of being than the corpse, and so has more beauty, even though the two may be fairly indistinguishable (assuming the corpse is recently deceased). In both cases, the presence of a soul, of the principle of life, causes the living man to have a greater share of being, and so to have greater beauty; what Plotinus calls the “glow of the light of the good.”\textsuperscript{46} To fail to appreciate the greater beauty of the living person over the statue or the corpse is to betray a

\textsuperscript{45} Plotinus, \textit{Enneads} VI.7.22. For Aquinas, who takes being to be the highest ontological category, and which is fully represented only in God, a thing has a greater share in being that exists in a more perfect way, i.e., which is most actual. God is pure actuality, and so is His own being. Things have a greater share in being if they exist more like unto God. As has been stated, this means that living things exist more fully than non-living things, sentient things exist more fully than non-sentient things, and rational things exist more fully still. A man has a fairly high level of being since in addition to being alive, he is also sentient and rational. A statue, in contrast, is not a living thing, though it bears a resemblance to a living being, in this case, a man.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid.}
disorder in the soul. Perhaps the perceiver is enamored of the beauty of the marble, or of its relative incorruptibility or more perfect proportions. Certainly Aquinas will agree that, all things being equal, more perfect proportions in a thing will increase its objective beauty (and this includes the proportion of the statue to the man of whom it is a representation). But in addition to proportion, as we have seen there is something else that is constitutive of beauty, namely, radiance (*claritas*), which has to do with the communicability of being. And a living thing has more radiance, since it has within it the light of life, and in this case of sentience and rationality, than a non-living thing. This is what is brought out explicitly in the examples given by Plotinus.

There is another sense in which the beauty of things may be taken to function as signs. The beauty of the harp can be a sign of the *musica mundi*, the beauty of creation, of its order, of its goodness, which bespeaks praises to its creator. The beauty of the harp can also be a sensuous beauty, however, that bespeaks the richness of carnal rapture or of self-indulgence, satisfying the desire simply to be entertained. What divides the good from the bad use of beauty

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47 This was discussed in chapter four. *Claritas* is often translated as “light,” “splendor,” “radiance,” and the like, but its fundamental meaning for Aquinas seems to be intuitively intelligible. This, at least, is the way that Jacques Maritain has famously characterized *claritas*. His reading may have been influenced by his reading of Albert the Great, who expressed *claritas*, or his preferred phrase, *splendor formae*, in this way. Taking *claritas* this way means understanding it as the intelligibility of the very form of the thing. If this way of characterizing *claritas* strikes many as too overtly Platonic for Aquinas, it is certainly understandable, though one minor aim of this investigation has been to show that his thinking is more Platonic than is usually allowed. Maritain (1934), 24-5. Cf. John G. Trapani, Jr., *Poetry, Beauty, & Contemplation: The Complete Aesthetics of Jacques Maritain* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 154-5.
turns primarily on the intentionality of the user. And this again introduces a crucial subjective feature to aesthetic experience. The same beautiful object can be used to reflect on God’s greatness or as a vehicle of self-absorbed hedonism. The first use will bring us closer to God, and therefore, to a greater participation in being. The second will have the opposite effect. Properly marking the absolute position of things upon this continuum will, in all likelihood, be quite impossible, but this is probably not necessary. It may be sufficient to get a general sense of the relative position of the competing goods with which we are daily confronted. Choosing the best among the competing goods available to us each day is a big enough challenge, and sufficient for making gradual progress. It is unlikely, however, that we will make progress apart from intentionality about our own or our children’s formation. It matters what sorts of goods we present to ourselves, to our children, and to our students. This will in turn have a great impact on what sorts of things become the objects of our affections, and this is important because our appetites will naturally gravitate toward those very objects we have learned (intentionally or not) to love. We must, therefore, choose our loves well.

For those of us concerned with moral education, what we need to do is to teach our children to love what is good, and to love the highest goods the most. Love of God, therefore, is paramount. God’s laws or precepts, to the extent that we have access to these, would also be extremely important, since they
presumably reveal something about the deep structure of God’s moral character. Even if we were to assume, however, that something like the Decalogue is an uncontroversial representation of God’s Law, it gives only very general guidance. It is for this reason, perhaps, that Aquinas places such an emphasis on the role of Natural Law, since this is supposed to be available to all human beings through conscience. But in addition to choosing to love God’s revealed precepts, and those things that are the common possession of everyone with conscience, we must also constantly put before our ears and eyes objects of beauty, but in such a way that they are seen for what they are, as signs and not merely as ends in themselves. The kind deed, of giving one’s coat to a homeless man, is itself worthy of honor since it is an expression of the virtuous character of the one who cares for his fellow man. The same deed is, more importantly, an expression of God’s great care for the suffering of his creatures. It is beautiful because it is a sign of goodness, which has two referents: one immediate, and imperfect, in the good character of the individual; the other ultimate, and perfect, in God alone. Every good deed, therefore, is a beautiful deed, and its beauty (as ultimately all beauty) derives from the beauty of God. It is in this respect that Stendhal’s famous phrase, *viz.*, “la beauté n’est que la promesse du Bonheur,” could have some currency in Aquinas’ economy, since for Aquinas true and perfect happiness is found in God alone.48

48 Stendhal (Henri Beyle), *De L’amour: Seule édition complète, augmentée de préfaces et de fragments*
Aquinas repeatedly demonstrates that when it comes to beauty, his primary concern – indeed, his paradigm of beauty – is moral, intellectual or spiritual beauty. In his longest treatment of beauty, his commentary on Dionysius’ *The Divine Names*, he is careful to note that the aim of the work is not to discuss sensible names as they relate (analogously) to God, but rather to discuss intelligible names.\(^{49}\) Thus, when Dionysius speaks there, in the long fourth chapter, of “Beauty” as one of the names of God, we are to understand this primarily as a moral or spiritual beauty. Certainly, this is how Aquinas understands him. Where we find beauty in creatures, primarily in virtuous behavior but also in physical features, this is merely a likeness to, an approximation of, and so a sign pointing to, the divine Beauty.\(^{50}\) And this divine Beauty is God himself, the cause of beauty in created things, namely, the *consonantia* and *claritas* in things.\(^{51}\)

To return, then, to our problem case, our investigation into Aquinas’ use of *honestum* can help explain why a moral aesthetics, at least one based on

\(^{49}\) *In de div. nom. IV*, lec. 4: Non enim est intention huius libri, tractare de nominibus sensibilium translates in Deum, sed de nominibus intelligibilibus. According to Dionysius, the sensible names of God were treated in his (possibly fictitious) *Symbolic Theology*.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., lec. 5: pulchritudo enim creaturae nihil est aliud quam similitude divinae pulchritudinis in rebus participata.

\(^{51}\) Ibid.: Dicit ergo primo quod Deus qui est supersubstantiale pulchrum, dicitur pulchritudo propter hoc quod omnibus entibus creatis dat pulchritudinem, secundum proprietatem uniuscuiusque: alia enim est pulchritudo spiritus et alia corporis, etque alia huius et illius corporis, et in quo consistat pulchritudinis ratio, ostendit subdens quod sic Deus tradit pulchritudinem, inquantum est causa consonantiae et claritatis in omnibus.
Aquinas’ thought, cannot be used to justify the marginalization of the disfigured or the infirm. The reason is that beauty is of two types: physical or natural beauty and spiritual or moral beauty. While it is true that we expect one’s physical beauty to diminish over time, we do not expect one’s moral beauty to likewise diminish. If beauty as a species of good is directly tied to proximity to the highest good, this explains why one sort of beauty would diminish while the other would increase over the course of a lifetime.

On the hierarchy of values, spiritual (i.e., eternal) goods rank higher than do physical (i.e., temporal) goods. Goods of the soul are eternal and goods of the body are temporal. All physical goods are subject to corruption and ultimate degradation. This is one reason Augustine exhorts us merely to use goods of this sort and not to love them. The human body, though part of the human being, is nevertheless a physical good and so corruptible in this sense. The human soul, on the other hand, is not subject to corruption in this way. Any defect is related to its proximity to the Source, which, for rational beings, is tied to choice. The human soul can approach the Source through the inculcation of the virtues or it can retreat from the Source through their neglect.

We might expect then that as a person ages and gains experience in living, she comes to value the life of virtue rather than the alternative. On the view at hand, then, as she increases in moral goodness, she is correspondingly increasing in spiritual or moral beauty, even though her physical beauty, in contrast,
decreases. Since, for Aquinas, spiritual or moral beauty is of greater (perhaps infinitely greater) value than physical beauty, as this person ages and increases in virtue, she likewise increases in the sort of beauty that really matters. This beauty, while not as readily apparent to the observer as physical beauty, is nevertheless also outwardly apprehended, but in the evidence provided by her good deeds. The moral beauty expressed in self-sacrificial or philanthropic activities is a sign of the goodness of that person’s soul in a way that is analogous to the physical beauty of youth, which may be thought of as a sign of that person’s bodily strength and health. We may here recall Aquinas’ assertion that the connection of a spiritual good to the intellectual power, and consequent pleasure attending this conjunction, is more intimate, more perfect, and more firm than is the case with corporeal goods since the intellect penetrates to the essence of the thing whereas the senses stop at the external accidents.⁵² Spiritual goods and spiritual pleasures are simply deeper than bodily goods and pleasures.

All things considered, it would be better to have both physical and moral beauty simultaneously, though this is likely to be quite rare, since it requires that one either achieves virtue and so moral beauty relatively early in life or else retain one’s physical beauty relatively late. Nevertheless, if one had to choose, Aquinas’ view implies that it is far better to have moral, rather than physical,

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⁵² ST I-II.31.5 co: Coniunctio etiam utriusque est magis intima, et magis perfecta, et magis firma. Intimior quidem est, quia sensus sistit circa exteriora accidentia rei, intellectus vero penetrat usque ad rei essentiam; objectum enim intellectus est quod quid est.
beauty. Such a view, if attractive, implies that when a culture places the higher value on surface beauty, we elevate the wrong sorts of values; and, consequently, we are more apt to treat others unjustly. This is a problem that has moved philosophers to challenge the culturally accepted values elevating the virtues of the body over the virtues of the soul since Socrates, though admittedly most of these challenges have not ended so poorly for the philosophers as in that case. But neither sadly have the results of such projects had much lasting effect upon the cultures in which they are raised. Human beings seem strongly inclined to favor outward over inward beauty. But those who would follow Aquinas’ moral and aesthetic thinking, at least, will find no justification for doing so.

6.4 Suggestions for Future Research

One thing that is clear to me, after having completed this study, is that there is much left to do. Minimally, the debate over the transcendentality of beauty needs to be resolved, as best as is possible. So long as that is left outstanding, any project such as the current one will of necessity be merely elliptical in nature, contingent upon the resolution of this one great lacuna.

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Another project that I believe would be both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable for further research would be the completion of a useful translation of Albert’s *Super de divinis nominibus*, accompanied perhaps by a very close comparison of that work to Aquinas’ own commentary on the same. In truth, this had been my original intention for this project, but it proved to be too large already by the time came to undertake this endeavor. Instead, I have had to be content with the evaluation and comparison of only a handful of passages. I believe that Albert’s thinking on this matter deserves more attention in its own right, and also as a means of illuminating Aquinas’ thinking as well. One thing I hope has emerged from this study is the dependence of Aquinas’ thinking about beauty on Albert. Aquinas’ contributions to the field of aesthetics, and even of moral aesthetics, are not great. Indeed, he is content to borrow from his sources quite liberally though not, I think, perniciously. Aquinas’ aim is always to find the truth, and to communicate it to his students. I do not think he has any great interest in claims to originality. Nevertheless, where he is often very cautious, as he is in his teaching on beauty, we may find a greater wealth of information that is more or less consistent with Aquinas’ own views in his great teacher. Albert seems much more ready to adopt more of a Platonic view of beauty than is Aquinas, and this perhaps supplies him with more freedom of expression, since Aquinas is often concerned to stick more closely to Aristotle than he is to Plato. It
is my hope to further my investigation into the thought of Albert on beauty at a later time.

Related to this, it would be of immense interest, I think, to trace this tradition of moral aesthetics forward. We know, for instance, that it reemerges in the eighteenth century, but not much has been said about the genealogical progression from the ancients to the moderns. I hope that this study has shown that the view did not simply disappear in the Late Roman period only to reemerge again in the eighteenth century without any continuity. At the very least, we see that Dionysius’ writings were instrumental in carrying it forward until the thirteenth century. We know that in addition to his valuable translations and commentaries on the works of Plato, Marsilio Ficino composed a Latin translation also of the De divinis nominibus in the fourteenth century. It is possible, and perhaps even likely, that the chain was never in fact broken. This suggestion warrants an investigation.

6.5 Concluding Remarks

From this study, it is clear that Aquinas’ view will not be universally appealing. In order to accept his view of the nature of beauty, and the implications of his view of beauty for moral education, we are required also to accept his view of the hierarchy of values which is tied to Being as the primary ontological reality, and as the basis for all value judgments, as well as its
converse, the view of evil as privation. We have to accept the convertibility of the transcendentals, and of the objectivity of being and goodness. We must also accept the objective standards of goodness forwarded in divine revelation as Aquinas sees it. For a vast number of people, these assumptions cannot be countenanced, and for them, this study can hold out little of interest. However, for those who do share Aquinas’ basic underlying worldview, the conclusion is, I think, quite profound and immediate. We must learn to love the beautiful, for our virtue (and so our happiness) depends, in part, upon it.
APPENDIX

On the Indirect Causes of Pleasure

The eight articles in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, Question 32 address the issue of the various causes of pleasure. The articles in this question each provide a possible answer, as follows: activity (*operatio*), motion (*motus*), hope and memory (*spes et memoria*), sorrow (*tristitia*), actions of others (*actiones aliorum*), doing good to others (*benefacere alteri*), likeness (*similitudo*), and wonder (*admiratio*). In the main text, I confined my discussion only to the first article, which has to do with the only *direct* cause of pleasure, which was said to be a two-fold operation: (i) attainment of the object of desire and (ii) awareness of this attainment. There I mentioned that the remaining seven articles concerned the *indirect* causes of pleasure, and I did not pursue the discussion of these in the main body because our primary concern there was to locate beauty with respect to pleasure. Since it was determined that beauty is a direct cause of pleasure, I did not wish to weary the reader with a lengthy discussion of the indirect causes of pleasure in the main body. However, since I am aware that this may be of interest to some readers, I have decided to reproduce that discussion here, since this does enrich

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one’s conception of Aquinas’ moral psychology, especially of his account of
pleasure.

Article 2: Motus

Article two addresses the question whether motion (*motus*) is an indirect
cause of pleasure.\(^2\) Because it is part of human nature to be mutable, we naturally
find change pleasant.\(^3\) It is because of our mutable nature that things we
sometimes find pleasant we do not at other times. His example is that we enjoy
fire in the winter but not in the summer.\(^4\) The fire is, presumably, the same, but
our experience of it as pleasurable or not is relative to climatic conditions. This is
to consider the matter from the perspective of the agent, i.e., the one who is
pleased (*ex parte nostra qui delectamur*). On the other hand, to consider the matter
from the perspective of the pleasing good to which we are united (*ex parte vero
boni delectantis quod nobis coniungitur*), change is also pleasant. This is because
continued action increases effect (e.g., the longer you are exposed to fire, the
warmer and drier do you feel).\(^5\) If exposure to the good continues beyond the
agent’s natural limit (*superexcedit mensuram naturalis habitudinis*), the object will

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\(^2\) ST I-II.32 pr: *Secundo, utrum motus sit causa delectationis.*

\(^3\) ST I-II.32.2 co: *transmutatio efficitur nobis delectabilis propter hoc, quod natura nostra transmutabilis est.*

\(^4\) Ibid.: *et propter hoc, quod est nobis conveniens nunc, non erit nobis conveniens postea; sicut calefieri ad ignem est conveniens homini in hieme, non aulem in aestate.*

\(^5\) Ibid.: *ex parte vero boni delectantis quod nobis coniungitur, fit etiam transmutatio delectabilis. Quia actio continuata alicuius agentis auget effectum, sicut quanto aliquis diutius appropinuat igni, magis calefit et desiccatur.*
cease to cause pleasure and may even begin to cause pain instead. Removal of
the object will, at that point, cause pleasure.\textsuperscript{6} Lastly, considered from the
perspective of knowledge of the conjunction of the agent and the object (ex parte
vero ipsius cognitionis), change is pleasant because human beings desire to know
an object all at once and perfect (totum et perfectum).\textsuperscript{7} But when it is impossible to
know an object all at once (cum ergo aliqua non poterunt apprehendi tota simul), then
the human cognizer will take pleasure in the change his knowledge experiences
as his intellect grasps first one part of the object and then another in succession
until the whole has been perceived, though not all at once (et sic totum sentiatur).\textsuperscript{8}
In comparison to human beings, whose nature is mutable, Aquinas says that for
a being whose nature was immutable, whose natural limit could not be exceeded
by continued exposure to the objects of its desire, and who could perceive the
whole object at once, change would not produce pleasure.\textsuperscript{9} He adds to this that
“the more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of being
continual” (et quanto aliquae delectationes plus ad hoc accedunt, tanto plus continuari
possunt),\textsuperscript{10} by which he seems to mean that to the extent that these human

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.: Naturalis autem habitudo in quadam mensura consistit. Et ideo quando continuata praesentia
delectabilis superexcedit mnsuram naturalis habitudinis, efficitur remotio eius delectabilis.

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.: Ex parte vero ipsius cognitionis, quia homo desiderat cognoscere aliquod totum et perfectum.

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid.: Cum ergo aliqua non poterunt apprehendi tota simul, delectat in his transmutatio, ut unum
transeat et alterum succedat, et sic totum sentiatur.

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.: Si ergo sit aliqua res cuius natura sit irtransmutabilis; et non possit in ea fieri excessus naturalis
habituidinis per continuationem delectabilis; et quae possit totum suum delectabile simul intueri, non erit ei
transmutatio delectabilis.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
operations approximate those of an immovable nature, the greater the possibility for human pleasures to be “capable of being continual.” And we have already seen that there is a class of human pleasures that approach the unchangeable nature, and that is the class of intellectual pleasures. Therefore, to the extent that we consider this from the perspective of the bodily pleasures, change is an indirect cause of pleasure, but from the perspective of the intellectual pleasures, change is not a cause of pleasure. There is, of course, the possibility of a great range of variation since many of the intellectual pleasures may, as we have seen, have bodily effects as well. Pleasures that are related to the corporeal appetite will tend to have definite limits in terms of exposure to good objects. The pleasures related to the intellectual appetite will tend not to have such limits. Therefore, the intellectual pleasures can be enjoyed more continuously and, as we have also seen, all at once.

Article 3: Spes et Memoria

Article three addresses the question whether hope (spes) and memory (memoria) cause pleasure.\(^{11}\) The first objection raised against an affirmative answer to this question is that “pleasure is caused by a present good (bono praeenti)” whereas both hope and memory regard absent goods (absenti).\(^{12}\) In

\(^{11}\) ST I-II.32 pr: Tertio, utrum spes et memoria [sit causae delectationis].

\(^{12}\) ST I-II.32.3 obj. 1: Videtur quod memoria et spes non sint causae delectationis. Delectatio enim est de bono praeenti, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed memoria et spes sunt de absenti.
reply, Aquinas says that while it is true, strictly speaking (simpliciter), that hope and memory regard absent goods, namely future and past goods, respectively, nevertheless, in some sense (secundum quid), they regard goods that are present, namely, according to apprehension by itself (i.e., memoria) or according to apprehension with the supposed possibility of attainment (i.e., spes). For memory regards goods by apprehension only, making past goods present before the mind. Hope, on the other hand, regards goods both by apprehension as well as by the supposed possibility of attainment, making supposed future goods present before the mind as goods that may be attained. Nevertheless, Aquinas concedes that pleasures produced by goods actually present to the senses are greater than goods present merely before the mind; next is the pleasure of hope which combines both apprehension with expectation of attainment; and least is the pleasure of memory which relates to apprehension only. Nevertheless, this does not diminish the fact that both hope and memory are genuine indirect causes of pleasure, though to a lesser degree. They are indirect, to reiterate, because they do not directly cause pleasure, but rather they cause the mind to

13 ST I-II.32.3 ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod spes et memoria sunt quidem eorum quae sunt simpliciter absentia, quae tamen secundum quid sunt praesentia, scilicet vel secundum apprehensionem solam; vel secundum apprehensionem et facultatem, ad minus aestimatam.

14 Ibid.

15 ST I-II.32.3 co: Et quia maior est coniunctio secundum rem quam secundum similitudinem, que est coniunctio cognitionis; itemque maior est coniunctio rei in actu quam in potentia, ideo maxima est delectatio quae fit per sensum, qui requirit praesentiam rei sensibilis. Secundum autem gradum tenet delectatio spei, in qua non solum est delectabilis coniunctio secundum apprehensionem, sed etiam secundum facultatem vel potestatem adipiscendi bonum quod deletat. Tertio autem gradum tenet delectatio memoriae, quae habet solam coniunctionem apprehensionis.
perform an activity (operatio), namely, that of bringing of some absent good before the mind as though present.\footnote{Miner, 175.}

Article 4: Tristitia

Article four addresses the question whether sadness (\textit{tristitia}) causes pleasure.\footnote{ST I-II.32 pr: \textit{Quarto, utrum tristitia [sit causa delectationis]}.} Like article three, article four regards a passion of the soul. Sadness, Aquinas notes, can be considered in two ways, either according to act (i.e., a present sadness) or according to memory (i.e., a remembered sadness); and both may be a cause of pleasure.\footnote{ST I-II.32.4 co: \textit{Respondeo dicendum quod tristitia potest dupliciter considerari, uno modo, secundum quod est in actu; alio modo, secundum quod est in memoria. Et utroque modo tristitia potest esse delectationis causa.}} A present sadness can be a cause of pleasure because of its relation to hope, namely, the hope of future relief of sadness can bring some pleasures.\footnote{Ibid.: \textit{Tristitia siquidem in actu existens est causa delectationis, inquantum facit memoriam rei dilectae, de cuius absentia aliquis tristatur, et tamen de sola eius apprehensione delectatur.}} A remembered sadness can cause pleasure because reflection on a past sadness simultaneously produces pleasure on account of its removal, since the absence of evil is also considered a good thing.\footnote{Ibid.: \textit{Memoria autem tristitiae fit causa delectationis, propter subsequentem evasionem. Nam carere malo accipitur in ratione boni, unde secundum quod homo apprehendit se evasisse ab aliquibus tristibus et dolorosis, accrescit ei gaudii materia.}} Thus, as with hope and memory, sadness likewise causes pleasure indirectly by causing the mind to perform an operation (operatio); in the case of sadness, the mind either reflects upon a future release from a present sadness or else reflects upon a
present freedom from a past sadness. These reflections of the mind are the direct cause of pleasure.

Article 5: Actiones Aliorum

While both articles three and four focused on passions, articles five and six both focus on actions. Article five considers the question whether the actions of others cause us pleasures.\(^{21}\) He answers this is the affirmative, stating that there are three ways that another’s actions can cause us pleasure, and all relate to some good of our own. First, we may obtain some good through the action of another.\(^{22}\) That is, the other person’s act directly benefits us in some way, and it is always pleasing to receive some benefit. Second, we may obtain knowledge of some good through the action of another.\(^{23}\) The example he gives is that of being praised by another, by which we come to value some good we already possess.\(^{24}\) The value of such praise, and so the strength of the pleasure we receive from such praise, is related to the value we place on the one who praises us. If we judge that person a wise and good person, her praise will produce in us more

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\(^{21}\) ST I-II.32 pr: *Quinto, utrum actiones aliorum sint nobis delectationis causa.*

\(^{22}\) ST I-II.32.5 co: *Uno modo, inquantum per operationem alicuius consequimur aliquod bonum.*

\(^{23}\) Ibid.: *Alio modo, secundum quod per operationes aliorum effectur nobis aliqua cognitio vel aestimatio proprii boni.*

\(^{24}\) Ibid.: *Et propter hoc homines delectantur in hoc quod laudantur vel honorantur ab abliis, quia scilicet per hoc accipiunt aestimationem in seipsis aliquod bonum esse.*
pleasure.\textsuperscript{25} Additionally, flattery produces pleasure in some because flattery masquerades as praise.\textsuperscript{26} Presumably, flattery would produce no such pleasure when the flatterer is recognized as being neither good nor wise. Lastly, because on account of love we consider the good of some other as though it were our own, as with close friends, we derive pleasure from good that accrues to those we love.\textsuperscript{27} Thus am I pleased when my friend receives some good. Likewise, Aquinas says that, because of hatred, we receive some pleasure on account of an evil action of our enemy, that is (I take it), when our enemy is deprived of some good.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, we are pleased when our friends are rewarded and our enemies are punished.

\textit{Article 6: Benefacere Alteri}

Article six considers the question whether doing good to another causes us pleasure.\textsuperscript{29} He has just argued, in article five, that the actions of others can cause us pleasure. Now he wants to explore whether our actions toward another

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\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid.}: Et quia ista aestimatio fortius generatur ex testimonio bonorum et sapientum, ideo in horum laudibus et honoribus homines magis delectantur.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid.}: Et quia adulator est apparens laudatur, propter hoc etiam adulationes quibusdam sunt delectabiles.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid.}: Tertio modo, inquantum ipsae operationes aliorum, si sint bonae, aestimantur ut bonum proprium, propter vim amoris, qui facit aestimare amicum quasi eundem sibi.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.}: Et propter odium, quod facit aestimare bonum alterius esse sibi contrarium, efficitur mala operatio inimici delectabilis. My gloss on this passage is due to the verse Aquinas chooses to illustrate its point, namely, 1 Corinthians 13:6: \textit{caritas non gaudet super iniquitate, congaudet autem veritati}, which seems incompatible with a reading of \textit{efficitur mala operatio inimici delectabilis} as “the evil action of an enemy becomes an object of pleasure,” as the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province has it.

\textsuperscript{29} ST I-II.32 pr: Sexto, utrum benefacere alteri sit causa delectationis.
can cause us pleasure. Aquinas says that they can, but, as with the previous article, only as they relate to some good of our own. Again, this can happen in three ways. The first way that our actions toward others can cause us pleasure relates to the effect (ad effectum) of the act, namely, the good conferred on the other. This is the sort of pleasure we experience when we confer a good upon our friend whose good, on account of our love, we consider an extension of our own good. He seems to be adopting Aristotle’s treatment of virtuous friendship as outlined in the Ethics book XIII-IX. I delight in my friend’s good as though it

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30 ST I-II.32.6 co: Uno modo, per comparationem ad effectum, quod est bonum in altero constitutum.

31 Ibid.: Et secundum hoc, inquantum bonum alterius reputamus quasi nostrum bonum, propter unionem amoris, delectamur in bono quod per nos fit aliis, praeципue amicis, sicut in bono proprio.

were my own. The second way that our actions toward others can cause us pleasure relates to the end (ad finem) of the act, as when we believe that by doing some good to another we will, thereby, incur some reward whether from God or from men.  

This sort of pleasure attends the expectation that our good deeds will be paid back to us in kind, and thus it is a species of hope, which we have already seen is a cause of pleasure. It seems to arise in the context of utilitarian relationships, corresponding loosely to what Aristotle refers to as friendships of utility.  

These differ from friendships typical of those characteristic of the first way, in which the friend in question is loved as one’s own self, indeed, as “another self.” Here, the friendship is one of mutual benefit. The third way that our actions towards others can cause us pleasure relates to the principle (ad principium) of the act, and this is delineated into three ways. The first principle relates to the faculty of doing good (facultas benefaciendi), by which a man, on account of his good done for another feels himself to abound in goodness.

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33 ST I-II.32.6 co: Alio modo, per comparationem ad finem, sicut cum aliquid, per hoc quod alteri benefacit, sperat consequi aliquod bonum sibi ipsi, vel a Deo vel ab homine.

34 Ibid.: Spes autem delectationis est causa.

35 Aristotle, NE XIII.3, 1156a11-13. Of course, utility relationships need not be friendships in any sense of the phrase. When I engage a taxi to get me to the airport, I engage the driver in a kind of utilitarian relationships, but hardly one that constitutes a friendship. Nevertheless, the types of Aristotelian friendships, which are themselves based on the three sorts of goods (i.e., the good itself, utility, and pleasure) seem to provide some of the structural inspiration for Aquinas’ text here.

36 Aristotle, NE IX.4, 1166a31-32: ἵστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτὸς. Cf. NE IX.9, 1170b6-7: ἐπερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν. For Aquinas’ use of this expression, see, for instance, ST I-II.28.1 co: Et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse.

37 ST I-II.32.6 co: Tertio modo, per comparationem ad principium. Et sic hoc quod est benefacere alteri, potest esse delectabile per comparationem ad triplex principium.
As an example, Aquinas notes the pleasure men take in their children as well as in their own works, both of which are instances in which a man is able to share some of his own good. A second principle relates to man’s habitual inclination to do good, on account of which doing good becomes, as it were, second nature. It is on account of this habituation that the “liberal man” (liberales) takes pleasure in doing good to others. Delight in doing good - in practicing virtue - is the primary sign of a virtuous person. The last principle relates to motive (motivum), as when a man is moved by someone he loves to do good for another. We do not mind making sacrifices for those we love, because, according to Aquinas, “love is the principle cause of pleasure” (amor praecipua causa delectationis est).

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38 Ibid.: Quorum unum est facultas benefaciendi, et secundum hoc, benefacere alteri fit delectabile, inquantum per hoc fit homini quaedam imaginatio abundantis boni in seipso existentis, ex quo possit alius communicare.

39 Ibid.: Et ideo homines delectantur in filiis et in propriis operibus, sicut quibus communicant proprium bonum.

40 Ibid.: Aliud principium est habitus inclinans, secundum quem benefacere fit alicui connaturale.

41 Ibid.: Unde liberales delectabiliter dant alicui.

42 ST I-II.34.4 co: Respondeo dicendum quod bonitas vel malitia moralis principaliter in voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Utrum autem voluntas sit bona vel mala, praecipue ex fine cognoscitur. Id autem habetur pro fine, in quo voluntas quiescit. Quies autem voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitus, in bono, est delectatio. Et ideo secundum delectationem voluntatis humanae, praecipue iudicatur homo bonus vel malus; est enim bonus et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus virtutum; malus autem qui in operibus malis.

43 ST I-II.32.6 co: Tertium principium est motivum, pula cum aliquid movetur ab aliquo quem diligat, ad benefaciendum alicui.

44 Ibid.: omnia enim quae facimus vel patimur propter amicum, delectabilia sunt, quia amor præcipua causa delectationis est.
Article 7: Similitudo

Articles seven and eight constitute another break in the scheme. Miner, following Ramírez, argues that while articles two through six regard the “immediate or perfective” causes of pleasure (as these relate to the “proper cause” which was operatio, discussed in the first article), articles seven and eight constitute a kind of “coda” to the discussion, turning to a consideration of the formal (objective) and efficient (subjective) causes of pleasure, respectively.45 Article seven considers the question whether likeness (similitudo) is a cause of pleasure.46 In support of an affirmative answer, Aquinas first notes, in the sed contra, that similitudo is a cause of love (causa amoris), as had been previously asserted in ST I-II.27.3,47 and that love also is a cause of pleasure, as had just been asserted in ST I-II.32.6,48 from which it follows, by transitivity, that similitudo is likewise a cause of pleasure.49 Turning to the corpus, Aquinas notes that similitudo is a kind of unity (unitas), and so whatever is like us, on account of its oneness with us, is a cause of pleasure.50 According to Miner, this similitudo is a formal cause of pleasure because “we are substantially one with ourselves” and, on

45 Miner, 173. Ramírez, 234.
46 ST I-II.32 pr: Septimo, utrum similitudo sit causa delectationis.
47 ST I-II.27.3 co: Respondeo dicendum quod similitudo, propri loquendo, est causa amoris.
48 ST I-II.32.6 co: amor pacipua causa delectationis est.
49 ST I-II.32.7 sc: Sed contra est quod similitudo est causa amoris, ut dictum est supra. Amor autem est causa delectationis. Ergo similitudo est causa delectationis.
50 ST I-II.32.7 co: Respondeo dicendum quod similitudo est quaedam unitas, unde id quod est simile, inquantum est unum, est delectabile, sic et amabile, ut supra dictum est. Cf. ST I-II.27.3 co.
account of this, “we love ourselves most. Therefore, we are essentially drawn to what is like ourselves, and take pleasure when we attain it.”\textsuperscript{51} We can see this more clearly, perhaps, if we consider what Aquinas says about \textit{similitudo} as a cause of love in Question 27. There, he distinguishes two kinds of \textit{similitudo}. First, there is a kind of \textit{similitudo} that arises from each thing having the same quality \textit{in actu}.\textsuperscript{52} Second, there is a kind of \textit{similitudo} that arises from one thing having a quality \textit{in potentia} and \textit{quadam inclinatione} that another has \textit{in actu}.\textsuperscript{53} The first sort of \textit{similitudo} is the one that concerns us here, which is a cause of the love of friendship (\textit{amorem amicitiae}) or well-being (\textit{benevolentiae}).\textsuperscript{54} The reason for this is that on account of two persons being alike (\textit{similes}), that is, having the same form (\textit{habentes unam formam}), this causes them to be one in form (\textit{unam in forma}).\textsuperscript{55} On account of this oneness of form, the affections of the two are drawn to one another, as to a kind of unity, with the result that each one desires good to his friend as to himself.\textsuperscript{56} This is contrasted with the second kind of \textit{similitudo} that causes, rather, concupiscence, or friendships founded on either utility or

\textsuperscript{51} Miner, 176.

\textsuperscript{52} ST I-II.27.3 co: \textit{Uno modo, ex hoc quod utrumque habet idem in actu, sicut duo habentes albedinem, dicuntur similes.}

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.: \textit{Alio modo, ex hoc quod unum habet in potentia et in quadam inclinatione, illud quod aliud habet in actu, sicut si dicamus quod corpus grave existens extra suum locum, habet similitudinem cum corpore gravi in suo loco existenti.}

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.: \textit{Primus ergo similitudinis modus causat amorem amicitiae, seu benevolentiae.}

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.: \textit{Ex hoc enim quod aliqui duo sunt similes, quasi habentes unam formam, sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa, sicut duo homines sunt unum in specie humanitatis, et duo albi in albedine.}

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.: \textit{Et ideo affectus unius tendit in alterum, sicut in unum sibi; et vult ei bonum sicut et sibi.}
pleasure.57 These kinds of friendship, unlike true friendship (i.e., those founded on the basis of character), are not founded on any formal property, but upon some benefit conveyed by the friend. This is why Aristotle says that these friendships tend not to last, since they are founded on accidental and impermanent features.58 In such friendships, there is a kind of likeness, but it is fleeting as are the friendships founded on this sort of likeness. True likeness breeds true unity that lasts. Nevertheless, both types of similitudo cause pleasure.

Article 8: Admiratio

Article eight considers the question whether wonder (admiratio) is a cause of pleasure.59 Aquinas first recalls that it is pleasant to obtain the good we desire.60 He then defines wonder (admiratio) as a desire for knowledge (desiderium quodam sciendi), which arises when a man sees an effect the cause of which is unknown to him or which surpasses his knowledge or faculty of


58 Aristotle, NE XIII.3, 1156-17-20: “Hence, these friendships are so by accident, because it is not as being the man that he is that the beloved is loved, but rather in so far as he provides something: friends of the one sort provide something good, those of the other sort pleasure. Hence, such friendships break up easily, since the friends do not stay alike for long.” The English translation is Pakaluk’s.

59 ST I-II.32 pr: Octavo, utrum admiratio sit causa delectationis.

60 ST I-II.23.4 co: Tertio, cum adeptum fuerit bonum, dat appetitus quietationem quandam in ipso bono adepto, et hoc pertinet ad delectationem vel gaudium.
understanding.61 This wonder becomes a cause of pleasure so long as it is conjoined with hope (adiunctam spem) of obtaining the knowledge desired.62 On account of this, he says, all things wonderful (omnia mirabilia) are pleasing (sunt delectabilia).63 Aquinas also notes that the greater one’s desire for the desired object, the greater is the pleasure upon attaining it.64 One cannot downplay the integral role played by hope in the increase in pleasure for, as he has already noted and reiterates here again, desire resulting from hope of obtaining the object of desire is also a cause of pleasure; indeed, since hope implies a kind of certainty (certitudinem) of obtaining the object, the pleasure caused by hope can be greater (magis) than pleasure caused by love or concupiscence.65

61 ST I-II.32.8 co: Est autem admiratio desiderium quodam sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et ignorat causam, vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius. Wonder gives pleasure, Aquinas states, not on account of ignorance, but on account of the desire to learn something new. ST I-II.32.8 ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod admiratio non est delectabilis inquantum habet ignorantiam, sed inquantum habet desiderium addicendi causam; et inquantum admirans aliquid novum addiscit, scilicet talem esse quem non aestimabat.

62 Ibid.: Et ideo admiratio est causa delectationis inquantum habet adiunctam spem consequendi cognitionem eius quod scire desiderat.

63 Ibid.: Et propter hoc omnia mirabilia sunt delectabilia.

64 Ibid.: Et ideo quanto alicuius rei amatae magis crescit desiderium, tanto magis per adeptionem crescit delectatio.

65 Ibid.: Et etiam in ipso augmento desiderii fit augmentum delectationis, secundum quod fit etiam spes rei amatae; sicut supra dictum est quod ipsum desiderium ex spe est delectabile. Cf. ST I-II.32.3 ad 3: etiam amor et concupiscencia delectationem causant. Omne enim amatum fit delectabile amanti, eo quod amor est quaedam unitio vel connaturitas amantis ad amatum. Similiter etiam omne concupitum est delectabile concupiscenti, cum concupiscencia sit praecipue appetitus delectationis. Sed tamen spes, inquantum importat quandam certitudinem realis praesentiae boni delectantis, quam non importat nec amor nec concupiscencia, magis ponitur causa delectationis quam illa.
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