Title
“People of bad disposition”: The Failed French Colony at Fort Caroline as a Site of Local Conflict within a Transimperial System

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As the work of Frank Lestringant has amply demonstrated, the efforts of the French to establish American colonies in Florida and Brazil during the 1550s and 1560s were closely connected to the factional and sectarian strife that was taking place in the French homeland at the same time. During the Religious Wars of the sixteenth century, a series of virulent conflicts and cruel persecutions played out in French society, but these brutal events were generated from within a broader matrix that stretched from Paris to Florida and beyond. The civil wars in France were not only domestic in nature—they were linked to geopolitical pressures and imperial rivalries. And the Religious Wars in France were not only civil wars—they were part of the widespread ideological and political tumult that followed in the wake of the transnational Reformation, rippling out from Germany. That implosion and splintering of Western Christendom generated an instability that shaped colonial and imperial rivalries and gave those rivalries an added viciousness. The distance is not so far from the ink spilled by Martin Luther in Germany to the French Protestant blood spilled at Matanzas Bay and La Caroline.

It may be useful to think of the events at Fort Caroline in Florida, and the nasty, brutish, and short history of the French colony there, not in terms of a French national or imperial history, not in terms of Florida history, but rather as a small episode in a swirling pattern of global aggression that burst forth from Western Europe and spread its violent commerce from Paris, London, Lisbon, and Madrid to Mexico, Peru, India, and beyond. I am suggesting that here we should think globally even as we act locally in reading the textual and archeological traces left by the French on the banks of the St. Johns River during the mid-1560s.
So, while looking at the large-scale framework in which these events occurred, we should note the coincidence of three epochal shifts that shaped the imperial ambition of France under the heirs of François I and gave it new and virulent forms: the Reformation, the founding of European colonies in the New World, and the early phase of capitalism in its initial global form. These three new forms of conflict and aggression—in religion, empire, and economics—were all transnational in nature. They all demanded a systematic practice of ideological and physical hostility that linked French people, through colonization, warfare and plunder, to other cultures and economies.4

First, the Protestant Reformation, beginning with Luther’s 95 theses in 1517, led to an irrecoverable splintering of Western Christendom. After Luther’s break with Rome, there followed a continuing fragmentation of Protestantism into the competing groups led by Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, and others. The process of branching and dividing continued as additional sects emerged and evolved. Lutherans, Calvinists, Unitarians, and other groups formed antagonistic relations from the start and often fought with each other in spite of their shared opposition to Roman Catholic doctrine and papal authority. This religious and social upheaval generated the German Peasants’ Wars of 1524-25, which provoked the slaughter of 100,000 peasants.5 Eventually, conflict between Protestants and Catholics would erupt in the Thirty Years’ War, which would devastate Europe between 1618 and 1648.6 The Reformation gave a new form to the tension between aristocratic factions, nascent nation-states, and social classes in Europe, and these tensions soon spread wherever European colonizers and merchants traveled.

Second, with Columbus’s arrival in the Americas in 1492 (rivaling and building on the accomplishments of the Portuguese navigators whose ships made their way around Africa to India), the tense competition between Western European powers found new sites and new routes. The hostility that pitted Protestants against Roman Catholics, Spaniards against Frenchmen, and so on, was quickly borne overseas, where it rooted in the recently established New World settlements, in the slaving ports of Africa, and in the entrepôts of Eurasia. This global struggle began with competitive efforts at the discovery of new navigational knowledge and continued with the foundation of permanent settlements on land. Royal patronage was extended to sponsor many expansionist ventures, in the hope of first discovering new navigational routes and then establishing commercial or colonial relations that would enable Europeans to profit from trade and the importation of luxury goods, precious metals or other commodities. For example, the Italian navigator Giovanni Caboto (known in English as John Cabot) was hired in 1496 by the English monarch, Henry VII, to seek a Northwest passage to the Indies; and such efforts continued, including in 1524 the French king’s sponsorship of Giovanni da Verrazano’s voyages to find a Northwest passage. Later, throughout the sixteenth century, there would be violent raids and confrontations as rival imperial powers strove to establish their colonies and correspondent spheres of influence.7 The western European merchants
and colonial administrators supported and recruited hands-on support from a class of violent mercenaries and ruthless pirate-captains, including the Spanish conquistadors and their followers, those who sailed with the Hawkins brothers, and Francis Drake, Thomas Cavendish, and others. These unscrupulous plunderers were the originators of the Atlantic slave trade (or “triangular trade”) and the destroyers of complex indigenous civilizations in the New World. They mercilessly exploited the labor of maritime workers and colonized peoples, and they used violent technologies to gain territory and profit—for themselves, but also for their patrons among the elite classes at home who aimed to expand their power and increase profits from their investments in overseas ventures.

This brings us to the third of these interconnected forms of aggression—capitalism. At the same time that pirates and mercenaries like Cortes and Drake were establishing colonies and raiding across the globe, Europe was experiencing the emergence of capitalism. There were many implications of this emergence, but one of the earliest manifestations of capitalism involved the crucial role of long-distance trade in forming and reproducing merchant elites whose “primitive accumulation” of capital was reinvested to expand capitalism further and strengthen the rising bourgeois classes. Toward the end of the first volume of Capital, Marx describes how, during early modernity, long-distance trade and European imperialism, before the coming of “industrial capitalism,” helped to hasten the onset of the capitalist mode of production:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of the European nations, with the globe for a theatre.

... The different momenta of primitive accumulation distribute themselves now, more or less in chronological order, particularly over Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England.... These methods depend in part on brute force, e.g., the colonial system. But, they all employ the power of the State, the concentrated and organised force of society, to hasten, hot-house fashion, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power.
While these transformations described by Marx brought wealth and power to a new class of capitalists, they could be quite destructive to the power of royal and aristocratic elites. Investment in voyages of reconnaissance, in supplying, populating, and fortifying the new colonies, and in conducting wars, was extremely expensive. As David Graeber has pointed out, Hernán Cortés and his followers, along with many other early colonizers and adventurers, were caught in a cycle of debt that helped motivate their ceaseless pursuit of plunder, precious metal, property, and slaves (what Graeber calls their “unrelenting drive for more and more and more” [316], paraphrasing the conquistador Bernardo de Vargas Machuca who, on the title page of his book about the Indies, declares, “A la espada y el compass/Mas y mas y mas y mas”). From the start, the New World colonies and their founders were caught up in a process of debt-servicing. The early expansion of the Protestant Reformation was also fueled by debt-ridden rulers, like Henry VIII or the Hohenzollern Margrave Casimir of Brandenburg-Ansbach (1481-1527), who hoped to finance their schemes for conquest and pay off their huge debts with capital obtained by confiscating Church property and land. At the same time, royal and imperial expenditure on war and colonization became dependent on a powerful class of financial elites in Europe who could provide the necessary loans. A case in point is the 543,000 ducats that Carlos V of Spain borrowed from the Fuggers to use as his Trinkgeld for bribing the imperial electors, so that he could become Holy Roman Emperor. Both at home and abroad, to gain and maintain power, to conduct warfare, and simply to maintain royal solvency or credit, required the financial support of leading capitalists and merchant financiers. In large part because of the restructuring of transnational flows that occurred after Da Gama and Columbus led the way, these early capitalists developed new economic methods and established new organizations in various capitalist forms that went beyond the traditional practices of medieval banks and moneylenders. For instance, joint-stock corporations like the English and Dutch East India Companies were created to organize investment in overseas commerce and to manage the risk involved in long-distance voyages to develop trade and expand empire.

But leaving aside these larger historical developments that marked the beginnings of globalization, let us zoom in closer on French society, caught up as it was in the restless power struggles of its monarchs and nobles, the conservative anxieties of religious reactionaries, and the radical demands of the Calvinists for freedom to worship in their way. The violent enforcement of religious dogma, the growth of resistance from various Protestant movements, and powerful class tensions rippled through France and her neighboring territories. War, both civil and foreign, was almost incessant. A shift occurred in 1557 with the Double Default of the Spanish and French monarchies and the concurrent rise of Protestant resistance to both Spanish- and French-Catholic rule. In April of 1559 the signing of the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis ended forty years of war between France and the Habsburg empire. Weakened by internal dissension, and at the expense of its influence in Europe, France continued
its unsuccessful struggle to restore lands that had been conquered over the previous forty years. In particular, the reign of François II saw the decline of French influence throughout Europe, to the benefit of Spain. And after François II died in November of 1560, France withdrew from Scotland, Brazil, Corsica, Tuscany, Savoy, and most of Piedmont as Charles IX came to the throne. This was a time of tremendous tension, conflict and instability, a time when the usual dynastic and imperial struggles between aristocratic magnates were further exacerbated and inflected by sectarian strife as well as by disruptions to the traditional class system produced by the emergence of capitalism and the rising power of bourgeois elites and the new merchant class.

The mid-1560s in western Europe were marked by war reparations, by restitution of territories, by prisoner exchanges, by ransom payments and the freeing of prisoners of war who had become galley slaves, and by the demobilization of soldiers and mercenaries: these exchanges form an important part of the context surrounding the attempted settlement of Florida by the French and their overseas conflict with the Spanish that took place between 1562 and 1568. Within the French homeland, there were militias arming on all sides, explosions of mob violence, assassinations, conspiracies, polarization producing fanaticism, martyrdoms and atrocities, fleeing refugees, and episodes of tense negotiation in between periods of open war. The French monarchy was weakened by a series of young and incapable kings and by the rising tide of violence between mobs and armies led by Roman Catholic and Protestant zealots whose faith was mobilized by a fear of their religious rivals. The assassination of François, Duc de Guise, by Jean de Poltrot at the siege of Orleans in February of 1563 was a turning point that led to further escalation of sectarian tensions. Under torture, Poltrot “confessed” to acting at the behest of Coligny, the Huguenot leader. The sons of François—Henri, the new Duc de Guise, and Louis, the Cardinal of Guise—vowed to avenge the death of their father. The crisis that followed led to the period in France known as “The Armed Peace,” which lasted from the end of the “First War of Religion” in 1563 until the renewal of open warfare in 1567. The cult of personal honor and the code of the vendetta ruled the day as the cycle of revenge went round and round. This internal violence would reach a peak in 1572 at the time of the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre.

Let us now move from France, riven by sectarian violence, to the maritime matrix that connected France, via its ports, to the global system. Across the North Atlantic Sea, New France was a zone of fishing and fur trading that supported an itinerant and disorderly French presence without permanent colonies. The First Nation peoples there were still in firm control of their lands. In Brazil, by 1560 a shaky French colony under Nicolas Durand de Villegagnon had been founded but then had failed after relations with the Tupi peoples were mismanaged and the brazilwood trade proved inadequate to sustain a permanent presence. The colony was overtaken by the Portuguese, who subsequently bought off Villegagnon’s claim to the area.

Midway between Brazil and Acadia, along the Atlantic coast, the French saw
the potential for settlement and resource extraction in an area that was under Spanish claims but remained unsettled and unoccupied. As Jonathan Hart shows in his analysis of competing empires and their various narrations of early colonial history, “even amidst civil strife...the French considered the model of Spain” (21) in both negative and positive ways as they sought to establish their own colonial foothold in Florida. In 1562 an expedition commanded by the Protestant navigator Jean Ribault led to the establishment of a small settlement at Charlesfort (on Parris Island), but it was quickly abandoned by those who were left behind when the beginning of the Religious Wars in France prevented Ribault and the Huguenots from returning to re-supply the fort as they had promised. After peace broke out in 1563, a new Huguenot effort was mounted to establish a permanent settlement in America. This time, it was led by René Goulaine de Laudonnière, a French Protestant sea captain from Dieppe who had sailed with Ribault. The colony he built at Fort Caroline lasted a bit longer, but it was also destined to fail.

The colony did not survive for a variety of reasons, though of course Spanish aggression was the final cause of its demise. But the usual problems had already weakened the settlement long before Ribault’s fleet arrived to resupply it. These included the following:

1) inadequate supplies from the homeland  
2) poor relations with local peoples  
3) internal strife, including poor organization of labor and unrealistic expectations on the part of French soldiers and gentlemen  
4) weak leadership and the difficulty of enforcing order  
5) conflict with other colonial powers  
6) bad luck, hostile nature, hurricane, bad timing.

Some of these reasons are cited by Laudonnière himself in his printed account of the French colonial enterprise in Florida. Probably composed in 1565, not long after the massacres took place there, Laudonnière’s Histoire Notable de la Floride is carefully and gracefully written. It systematically reconstructs these disastrous events in a manner that excuses Laudonnière himself from responsibility for the humiliation and death of French colonists, sailors, and soldiers while deflecting blame, primarily onto his co-religionist Jean Ribault who, according to Laudonnière, “should have given more attention to his duties than to the inventions of his spirit” (170). The Histoire Notable avoids the extreme rhetoric and imagery of atrocity that one encounters in other contemporary writings that fueled the religious war by offering immoderate words and shocking images of Spanish cruelty and inhumanity. For example, in the narrative written by Nicolas de Challeux, a 66-year-old Huguenot carpenter who survived the massacre at Fort Caroline, which was printed in 1566, there are typical images of cruelty and atrocity. According to Challeux, the Spanish, after their attack on Fort Caroline, “dismember[ed] the bod[ies], … pulling out the dead men’s eies,
they did sticke them on their Dagger poynettes, and then with exclamations, tauntes, and mockings, threwe them towards the Frenche men that were upon the water” (Challeux C-D3v).

Laudonnière is careful to avoid this kind of imagery, and he also eschews the overliden, heavy-handed providentialism of Challeux and other Huguenot propagandists, while casting himself in the role of a rational leader in a desperate situation who did the best he could and managed, by quick thinking, to escape with a few men and return to France after first landing in Swansea, Wales. His version of the story owes a great deal to the well-established conventional features of the discovery narrative, a transnational literary form that was already highly developed by 1560s in Europe. This kind of ethnographic writing attempts to conceal—beneath the generic features of first encounter, trifling, servile Natives, fecund flora and fauna, the promise of gold, and so on—the powerful impulses toward plunder and disorder that constantly threatened the New World colonial enterprise and caused conflict between competing European powers. Both the violent rupture produced by the Reformation and the intense desire for easy wealth acquired through plunder or the discovery of precious metals—these fantasies haunt Laudonnière’s attempt to communicate a rational humanist account of the French colonial failure in Florida. When his subordinates at Fort Caroline complain about the labor required to construct a secure fortress and ask to go off seeking gold or plundering Spanish settlements instead, Laudonnière laments, “Their manner of reasoning seemed strange to me, inasmuch as they imagined that the king had set up this voyage to make them rich upon their arrival, and they seemed much more interested in their own greed than in service to the king” (93). The specter of religious difference is also repressed under the sign of royal authority and nation: Laudonnière emphasizes French vs. Spanish difference, not Protestant vs. Catholic. But the three disruptive forces I cite above—religious difference, imperial ambition, and proto-capitalist greed—are all present in the story.

Consistent with the mercenary pirate culture that prevailed among early colonial adventurers, many of the French colonists at Fort Caroline wished to avoid the communal, manual labor necessary for a sustainable colony and hoped, instead, for easy riches obtained through violence. When the latter did not occur and the undersupplied colony grew short of resources for survival, internal conflict soon grew to become a serious crisis. Consistent with the age of plunder in which he lived, Laudonnière’s time as the governor of Fort Caroline was strongly marked by a series of mutinies and desertions. The largest of these was the departure in December of 1564 of sixty-six of his men who took two barques and went on a long plundering voyage to Cuba, Haiti, and Jamaica. This piratical expedition was to blame, at least in part, for provoking the later Spanish attack on Fort Caroline. One of these mutineers, Francois Jean, was reported to have led the Spanish under Pedro Menendez de Aviles to the site of the French fortifications. Francois Jean was a typical mercenary renegade, a turncoat maneuvering through the trans-imperial conflict zones of the
day. By the mid-sixteenth century, what Laudonnière dealt with at Fort Caroline had become the norm: a struggle on the part of leaders to maintain authority and control over unruly men, products of a European culture of warfare for hire, who were driven by gold-lust and were willing to obtain quick wealth, freedom, and power by any means necessary. Laudonnière explains “the causes of the difficulties” thusly, claiming first that it was not “lack of food” that motivated the mutineers:

But I recollected how all new conquests made at sea or on land were usually beset by internal rebellions, which are easily started because of the great distances from the homeland and because of the hope soldiers have of profiting from them. We are well informed by this of ancient histories, and by what recently happened in the adventures of Christopher Columbus after his first discovery, and by what happened to Francisco Pizarro and Diego d’Almagro in Peru and Hernando de Cortes. A hundred other things came to my mind to reassure and fortify me. (106)

And later in his account, defending himself against charges that as governor he had “played the king,” Laudonnière writes,

It is very difficult, almost impossible, in commanding a body of men brought together from various nations, such as we have in our wars, yes, I say it is impossible to evade having among them people of bad disposition, who are difficult to manage and who easily conceive a hatred against the commander because of corrections made for the purpose of military discipline. (152)

When the mutineers returned after suffering a defeat in Jamaica at the hands of a superior Spanish force, Laudonnière responded in a way that he deemed “impossible to evade” —by reestablishing authority through violence when he executed the four chief mutineer-pirates.

In his narrative Laudonnière tries to blame Jean Ribault for dooming the French colony by choosing to arm the French fleet and then sail forth against the Spanish just before a hurricane struck, but he admits that in the end he acceded to Ribault’s call for aggression. This aggression is legitimated, according to Laudonnière, by a letter written to Ribault by Coligny, a letter that Ribault shows to Laudonnière. In that dispatch,

there was a postscript, ...written in these words, “Captain Jean Ribault, as I was closing up this letter I received advice
that Don Pedro Menendez has departed from Spain to go to the coast of New France. See that he does not encroach upon us any more than he would want you to encroach upon them. (160)

This “post-script” makes plain the fundamental impetus for the cycle of mimetic violence that worked both globally and locally to perpetuate religious conflict and imperial rivalry, as all sides fought for control over extractive commodities and commercial profit. Mutual and overlapping encroachment was “inevitable,” and so this postscriptive pretext was always present to authorize preemptive colonial and sectarian violence, even to the point of atrocity.

Nonetheless, there was an alternative to this logic and to this structure of cyclical murder, enslavement, captivity, and theft. A very different interpretation of events is offered, for example, by the simple carpenter Challeux. Though his narrative exhibits the conventional Calvinist framework of providentialism, it also presents, as part of that framework, a radical Christian attack on the fundamental values of empire and capitalism—the pernicious, satanic forces that for Challeux are the heart of the problem and the cause of his suffering and the sufferings of many others. Part of what is radical about Challeux’s view is that in the end, this devout Huguenot does not distinguish between Protestant and Roman Catholic, Spanish or French, but sees instead a shared vice that pits human being against human being in a world where “covetousness gapeth continually.” This is how Challeux concludes his narrative:

Here hast thou (gentle Reader) seene the discourse of two sorts of people, wherein thou mayst judge with indifferencie and see what covetousnesse causeth, being both desirous of gains, and in specially the monstrous crueltie of the one part.... God keepe us from murther and bloudshedde, and give us grace to feare him, and honour his holy name aright. Amen. (Challeux E2r-v)

Though Challeux reserves the label of “monstrous crueltie” for the Spanish under Menendez (and he believes they were aided by the local Amerindians), both “sorts of people,” French Protestants and Spanish Catholics, are “desirous of gains.” And for Challeux, it is the idolatry of those who leave home and family to follow gain and worship Mammon, a heresy afflicting Protestant and Catholic alike, that forms the fundamental cause of the violence and suffering that afflicted the French colony and brought it to an end. But of course the cycles of violence, both in France and in the Americas, were never halted (and only rarely decelerated) during the sixteenth century by objections like those of a Las Casas or a Challeux. They continued, with an acceleration and expansion that grew to become nothing less than genocide. The next cycle of violence was seen quite clearly in the events that followed the
massacres in French Florida.

Though it may be yet another apocryphal story based in the sectarian polemics of the age and their sensationalizing tendencies, it was reported that Menendez’s soldiers hung up the dead bodies of the French at Fort Caroline with a sign that read, “I do this not to Frenchmen but to Lutherans” (Parkman 510). This story is repeated and answered in the texts that recount the vengeance against the Spanish taken in 1568 by French soldiers who were led by a French-Catholic captain and mercenary, Dominique de Gourgues. Embittered by the cruelty and indignity that he had received during his time as a prisoner of war, but undoubtedly motivated by the opportunity for plunder, de Gourgues determined to avenge the death of his Protestant compatriots, though he was himself a Catholic. He sold everything he had and borrowed money from his brother Antoine in order to raise a mercenary force and hire three ships to carry his men to Florida. He sailed to Cuba with two hundred men, while concealing his intended goal. Once in Cuba, he revealed his true intentions, and his crew approved his target for revenge. De Gourgues then sailed north to attack Fort Caroline, which had been renamed Fort San Mateo and held a small garrison of Spanish soldiers. He enlisted the aid of Fort Caroline's old allies, the Saturiwa and Tacatacuru, Timucua peoples from the area. The fort soon surrendered to de Gourgues' forces. The French and Indians then executed their Spanish prisoners in retribution for the massacres at Fort Caroline and Matanzas Bay. It was reported that “Captain Gourgues had them engrave on a pine board with a hot iron, ‘I do this not to Spaniards, not to sailors, but to traitors, thieves and murderers’” (Parkman 510).

This revenge cycle that played out on the margins of empire was a product, in a specific sense, of the leadership and vision of Gaspar de Coligny, who, from the French metropolitan center but looking toward the maritime zone and overseas, sought to move Protestant energies outward in an effort to weaken and displace Spanish and Portuguese power as it was manifested in their New World colonies. But it is not simply the result of any one “great man,” monarch, or faction at the French court. Rather, these events should also be understood as events within a large-scale network of globalizing empires and permanent war that was messy and unstable, especially in the border zones where hybridity, adaptation, and improvisation were the order of the day among the European settlers. This was an environment in which the official peacetime relations that pertained in Europe were not applicable: France and Spain had signed a treaty in 1559 and were no longer at war, but when the French king and Catherine de Medici protested the massacres in Florida, the Spanish monarch Philip II responded by saying that the murdered men were pirates and that Coligny was to blame, not Menendez. Rather than punishing Menendez, the king promoted and rewarded him. He even praised Menendez in writing for “the justice he has done upon the Lutheran corsairs” (cited in Parkman 1.151).

The history of early Spanish colonizing efforts in Florida, from Ponce de Leon in 1513 to Tristán de Luna in 1561, is a story of uninterrupted struggle and failure, but
when the French began their efforts to establish a colony on the east coast in 1562, this provoked a Spanish reaction that would finally lead to a lasting Spanish settlement at St. Augustine. And yet, even after the first fort was built and the settlement sustained there, Florida remained a mosquito-infested, disease-ridden imperial borderland, which was established and defended for logistical, strategic reasons and not because it provided profits to the empire in any direct way. St. Augustine was a military outpost, not a plantation producing cash crops for export to Europe. Florida remained, over the next two centuries, a relatively undesirable territory that proved to be more trouble to protect and maintain than it was worth. For this reason, even after the Spanish wiped out the French colonists in 1565 and then established a fort at St. Augustine in an effort to deter further efforts on the part of European competitors, Florida did not become a vital center of Spanish colonial life. It would remain a dispensable, vulnerable borderland, and it was to be traded back and forth between the imperial powers as part of the continuing wars that ensued in the centuries to follow. Nonetheless, the early Florida colonies were positioned at a strategic point in the trans-imperial matrix that, during the sixteenth century at least, was considered valuable by the European imperial powers and worth fighting for. Today, we may look back to the French and Spanish colonies as the beginning of what Florida went on to become as a part of the United States, but we need to see that these beginnings were undertaken and energized by large-scale imperial and geopolitical considerations, not because Florida offered any substantial local productivity or commodity extraction. And so, to grasp the significance of these events, it requires much more than a microhistorical vision of the past; rather, the local should be seen as part of a much larger geopolitical network, and the local events at Fort Caroline should be understood as participating in and being shaped by a deterritorializing historical process that was playing itself out on a global scale. And finally, we should understand that this greater historical process was defined and structured by the early capitalist economies of western Europe and the globalizing empires that were part and parcel of that developing commercial system.

Notes


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