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"Expert" Racism: Police, politicians, the wealthy, and the production of racial boundaries in a Los Angeles neighborhood and beyond

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“Expert” Racism:
Police, politicians, the wealthy, and the production of racial boundaries
in a Los Angeles neighborhood and beyond

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Sociology

by

Ana Muniz

2012
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

“Expert” Racism:
Police, politicians, the wealthy, and the production of racial boundaries
in a Los Angeles neighborhood and beyond

by

Ana Muniz
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology
University of California, Los Angeles, 2012
Professor Stefan Timmermans, Chair

My primary research question is: how do people in positions of power or with extensive resources at their disposal use information to control socially “deviant” groups and shape the physical geography of the city? I present four case studies that reconstruct the process of knowledge creation and the role of knowledge collection in both force and management in the areas of gang injunctions, broken windows/order maintenance policing, zoning, and development. The first three case studies focus on the Los Angeles neighborhood of Cadillac-Corning. I explore how housing development and school enrollment created the neighborhood’s boundaries in the 1960s. I address the puzzle of why how this small neighborhood came to be exceptional compared to the rest of the area in which it sits in terms of housing, demographics,
stigmatization, and disproportionate policing. I also use historical documents and interviews I return to the 1980s during the emergence of Los Angeles City’s first gang injunction in Cadillac-Corning, a landmark policy that spread to the rest of the city and nation. I analyze where the gang injunction protocol and prohibitions come from; for what purposes was the original injunction created; and how the gang injunction shaped racial and spatial criminalization and the broken windows theory. The third case study follows community groups predominately composed of West Los Angeles homeowners and business owners as they cooperate with and challenge the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office. I use ethnography to describe how community groups appropriate the broken windows theory espoused by the LAPD and LA City Attorney’s Office in attempts to shape the physical appearance and behavior of residents in the La Cienega Heights (formerly Cadillac-Corning) neighborhood. Conflict occurs in community policing partnerships when educated, wealthy and politically powerful civilians challenge police tactics of controlling deviant others.

My project goes beyond a neighborhood study. The policies and practices developed in Cadillac-Corning spread to the rest of the city, state, and nation. Lastly, I seek to use my research to actively disrupt the current modes of knowledge production that rest upon accepted arguments about disorder, race, and deviance. I engage in research with social justice organizers in Inglewood, California according to a model that complicates dominant conceptions of methodology, expertise, and subject matter.
The dissertation of Ana Muniz is approved.

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2012
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Anyone from a working class or poor neighborhood of color knows that excessive force is very real. People endure arbitrary stops several times a week because they “fit the description of a suspect”, meaning they are the wrong color and in the wrong place. Police will handcuff, aggressively question, sexually harass, and brutalize the people they stop, many of them youth. If the person being questioned has tattoos, those are going to be photographed and entered into a database. Once at home, it is difficult to sleep through the night without interruptions by the floodlights and grating blades of low-flying choppers. Lockdowns, curfews, and murders of residents by police are common. Moreover, the last quarter of the 20th century has ushered in a resurgence of retribution resulting in public shaming and harsh sentencing (Garland 2001). For example, the death penalty is again gaining popularity. “America’s toughest Sherriff” Maricopa County Sherriff Arpaio has been lauded for forcing male inmates to wear pink jumpsuits and sleep in tents outside in both freezing and sweltering weather.

Spectacle thrives and it is terrifying, stressful, and threatening. In the last half of the 20th century, police departments in large metropolitan areas have grown and become militarized, resulting in the gross overrepresentation of Blacks and Latinos in jails, prisons, and ICE detention centers (Smith 1995; Gilmore 2007). Bonilla-Silva (2001:104) argues that as legal segregation and the informal vigilante-style techniques used to terrorize people of color lessened after the 1930s, the control of blacks and other people of color have been primarily transferred to the criminal justice system. State action obscures the violence of racial inequality that is glaringly obvious in White vigilantism (Rios 2006; Marable 1983). Although the lynching and beatings of people of color has no doubt decreased significantly since the 19th century, racist policies encourage a resurgence of racist violence. For example, the current anti-immigrant legislation facilitates vigilante violence against Latinos and Indigenous Peoples.
Alongside brutality, less invasive forms of control also emerge. Fernandez (2008:24) defines power as “an individual’s or institution’s ability to coerce another into behavior or actions in which they would not otherwise engage”. Power is not only forceful, but also about control through surveillance (Fernandez 2008), categorization (Scott 1999), internalization of discipline (Foucault 1977), and conformity for the sake inclusion in a community (Rose 1999). Control stretches the range between hard and soft techniques (Staples 2001). A myriad of insidious control tactics exists. Domination appears and disappears as soon as we name it. It creeps inside of us as we discipline ourselves and others. There is tension between insidious attempts at control and the use of force. These two threads of control swirl together. At certain moments, subtle control escalates into brutal punishment by the state. This is what I examine.

For the sake of clarity I imagine the two concepts on a continuum. On one side, authorities, with the help of professionals such as city planners and data analysts, attempt to control populations through actuarial policing, environmental alterations, and routine surveillance. Staples (2000:3) refers to this as the “micro-politics of everyday”, the “meticulous rituals of power”. When management breaks down, in place of management techniques, or alongside them, the state enacts the other end of the spectrum in the form of force. Force includes militarized raids and police brutality. In reality, the distinction between the two is fuzzy. There are many practices in between and authorities choose and combine them in different ways at different moments. I look at the factors that affect when, why, and how methods of control and force are used against whom and by whom.

My primary research question is: how do people in positions of power or with extensive resources at their disposal use information to control socially “deviant” groups and shape the physical geography of the city? As I explain above, the primary tension of my project is that
between control through management and the use of force. My ultimate aim is to identify the knowledge institutional authorities and influential people use and for what purposes. I identify the frameworks that have become central to how people in institutions understand and act upon racialized deviance. Moreover, I use the information I gather to experiment with forms of knowledge production that will be useful for direct action in social justice movements.

I am interested in the following:

1. The deployment and reproduction of control and force.

   Practices of force and management, including containment, suppression, detention, surveillance, removal, and criminalization, feed into one another. I try to identify when one breaks down, when the other takes over, how escalation happens, how tactics reconcile, parallel, compliment, or clash, and who is implicated. I locate historically when some of the policies that influence police practice were put into place.

2. Naturalized Categories.

   Categories, practices, and rituals that are taken for granted now/seem normal have emerged from intense political and social struggle. I am interested the historical and contemporary actors that have the most power to determine categories, policies, and practices. I will trace how the original categorizations and practices take on a momentum of their own well into the future and how they affect further decisions, and physical and social space.

3. Intervention.

   My friend and I were talking about how tired we are of college educated people incessantly discussing how to bridge theory and practice. His critique was, “It definitely doesn’t happen by reading more fucking theory!” I do not study control, force and power for its own sake. I will try to take what I have learned and apply it in self-critical, collaborative attempts to intervene in
protocol. I explore strategies for affecting change as well as the implications of being partially in and challenging injustice system.

**Dissertation Outline**

I present four case studies that reconstruct the process of knowledge creation and the role of knowledge collection in both force and management in the areas of gang injunctions, broken windows/order maintenance policing, zoning, and development. The second chapter introduces the site of my ethnographic study, the neighborhood of Cadillac-Corning, and the first case study. I show how housing development and school enrollment created the neighborhood’s boundaries in the 1960s. I address the puzzle of why this small neighborhood came to be exceptional compared to the rest of the area in which it sits in terms of housing, demographics, and disproportionate policing. The changes in the 1960s set a legacy of stigmatization of the neighborhood. Through current times, police, influential civilians, and local government attempt to control, contain, watch, and detain Cadillac-Corning residents who they conceptualize as deviant.

For the second case study, I use historical documents and interviews I return to the 1980s during the emergence of Los Angeles City’s first gang injunction in Cadillac-Corning, a landmark policy that spread to the rest of the city and nation. In the third chapter, I analyze where the gang injunction protocol and prohibitions come from; for what purposes was the original injunction created; and how the gang injunction shaped racial and spatial criminalization and the broken windows theory. The gang injunction and building of databases were the result of extensive ethnographic documentation by police and City Prosecutors. Gang injunctions manage populations through environmental manipulation, strict regulation, surveillance, and arrest.
The secondary tension of my study is the dynamic of power between government and citizenry. Expert information is applied through institutions. However, conflict occurs when educated, wealthy and politically powerful civilians challenge police tactics of controlling deviant others. The third case study is ethnographic. Chapter four follows community groups predominately composed of West Los Angeles homeowners and business owners as they cooperate with and challenge the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office. I use ethnography to describe how community groups appropriate the broken windows theory espoused by the LAPD and LA City Attorney’s Office in attempts to shape the physical appearance and behavior of residents in the La Cienega Heights (formerly Cadillac-Corning) neighborhood. To what extent has broken windows saturated the lens through which community groups view the world? How do they use broken windows to relate to local government? I answer these questions through a concrete study of the melding of two practices that are theoretically at-odds—community policing and broken windows policing.

The LAPD is becoming more sophisticated with computer simulation-driven officer deployment. However, I demonstrate that the attempts are often not successful in the way they intend. Instead, police often respond unsystematically with force. The master plan breaks down. Spontaneous decisions, strong emotion, and unpredictable, uncontrollable contexts sabotage the façade of scientific professionalism. Moreover, the machine grates when groups not recognized as legitimate by authorities take on the expert role. Games are played with real consequences for people who do not see the game happen. My project goes beyond a neighborhood study. The policies and practices developed in Cadillac-Corning spread to the rest of the city. Furthermore, as Los Angeles acts as a model for law enforcement policy and practice, the subject of my project has national relevance, particularly in the current era of zero tolerance policing.
Lastly, I seek to use my research to actively disrupt the current modes of knowledge production that rest upon accepted arguments about disorder, race, and deviance. The last case study is active intervention. I engage in research with social justice organizers according to a model that complicates dominant conceptions of methodology, expertise, and subject matter.

The Rise of Statistics and Population Management

Experts such as public health officials, social scientists, and urban planners advise the state on how to control space and people. Scholars trace the roots of this practice to the late 18th century, when Western enlightenment thinkers sought the improvement of humanity through the study and manipulation of bodies, minds, and behavior (Staples 2000; Yiftachel 1998; McMullan 1998; Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983; Rose 1999). “Society” became a thing in itself, separate from the state (Scott 1999:92). Over time, fields of professional specialists, experts, counselors, teachers, doctors, and statisticians obsessively studied, documented, and tracked populations. Rationalization, universality, objectivity, and conformity came to be synonymous with progress. The authority of knowledge came in part from separation of the information produced from the producer of the information (Holloway 2002:60). According to this view, knowledge objectively stands on its own without being affected by the context in which it was produced. Hence, the erasure of the personal first person tense from much scientific literature. Today, as in the past, knowledge collection and production forms a hierarchy that seeks to reproduce itself through endless refinement. The authority of academic disciplines and professional fields depends upon the accumulation of specialized knowledge. The collectors of knowledge gain status over those from whom the knowledge is being collected. Thus, power and knowledge are inseparable.
Statistics in particular provided authorities with information on citizens and a technique of discipline. Authorities discovered they could use population information to assess risk management and cost-benefit calculations. One use of statistical distributions has been to create measurements of normality by distilling an average that is considered acceptable and a threshold of unacceptability that must not be breached (Foucault 2007:4-5). Foucault (2007:59) presents the smallpox vaccine as one example. Medical and government staff first determined if the whole population’s risk of death from inoculation was lower than the risk of death from the disease. A distribution of cases was laid out to determine a normal expectation of infection and rates of death. Subpopulations of risk were calculated from the characteristics of a particular person’s case (class status, age, location, etc.). Government staff then conducted inoculations to reduce the likelihood of infection in the highest risk-populations, thus bringing those populations in line with the “normal curve” of infection and mortality (Foucault 2007:62).

The type of calculations that were used in the smallpox vaccine is different from previous medical treatment that cared for individuals after infection through quarantine and treatment. With inoculation, pre-emptive calculation and reduction of risk for the whole population took priority. Similar methods are used to reduce crime rates. “Actuarial policing”, for example, uses predictive tools to pre-empt crime, rather than simply react. Risk assessments track the likelihood that one will commit a crime according to various risk factors. One example is racial profiling in which police believe that specific races of people are criminally inclined. The logic of actuarial policing makes law enforcement more concerned with types of people (poor, brown, black, Muslim, homeless, young, etc.) than the acts that individual people actually commit.

In Los Angeles and many other police departments, actuarial policing currently works hand in hand with the broken windows theory of policing. The broken windows theory posits
that targeting physical and social disorder (litter, graffiti, homeless people, and loitering youth) prevents escalation to violent crime (Wilson & Kelling 1982). The difference between orderly and disorderly is supposed to be unproblematic and obvious. Although explicitly race neutral, broken windows targets are disproportionately poor, young people of color.

Neither inoculations nor actuarial policing would function without categorization. Populations that have low social status or are higher in age are at greater risk for disease infection. Police target low-income areas of a city. Statistical analysis facilitates simplification and categorization. Scott (1999) provides the example of scientific forestry. State planners value only wood that can be used for revenue. Other purposes are largely ignored. The forest is not a habitat but a monetary resource. The state systematically alters the forest in order to yield the highest growth from high-priced lumber. Plants that do not generate revenue are categorized as weeds—a useless nuisance. Weeds are cleared to make room for the growth of lumber. However, the lack of diversity in the habitat can backfire as economically valuable trees become vulnerability to pests, weather damage, and low soil quality.

Similarly, Scott (1999:54) argues that state authorities have planned and mapped cities to make policing easier. Aesthetically, urban planners and police are particularly concerned with making things look ‘orderly’ in upper-class neighborhoods and business districts. Much planned order has no doubt been beneficial and truly increased safety, such as centralized traffic control. However, for other things like the segregation of living, retail, and work spaces, there is no guarantee that the order is better at ground level (Jacobs 1961). For example, the placement of public transportation in sparsely populated places makes it unsafe for women in particular. Planning according to men’s concerns builds gender inequality into the city (Fenster 1999). Although there is a myriad of literature on the impact of state categorization and planning on
marginalized peoples, my study also focus on the effect on influential civilians. How do categorizations spill over into the language, ideology, and actions of wealthy and well-organized city residents?

**Planning Urban Inequality**

The tools that improve living conditions can also be used to institutionalize inequality (Yiftachel 1998). Throughout the 20th century, the applied knowledge of planning professions and academic disciplines has determined the physical movement and social access of people of color. Traditional urban planning takes place by looking at the city from above, as grid space, while local street level places are largely ignored. The result is attempts by city planners and police to erase the complexity and multiple-usage of objects and spaces. Hayward (2004:142) notes that public benches are supposed to be only for sitting. Physical manipulations, such as rounded seats and benches with armrests in the middle, dissuade other uses like sleeping or skateboarding. However, the state’s ongoing “project of legibility” is always flawed and never fully realized (Scott 1999:80). People skateboard anyway; they dodge documentation. Similar kinds of simplification, categorization, and manipulation are done with populations of people that are labeled ‘deviant’.

Kuklick (1980) demonstrates how early urban theories of Chicago sociologists were adopted by urban planners and politicians. In particular, Burgess’ 1920s ecological model of the city maps urban space into concentric zones. Burgess conjectured that as groups progressed socially they moved from the center of the city toward the outside. Immigrants began in lower-class neighborhoods in the center of the city but supposedly moved to the periphery as they
assimilated to dominant cultural norms. Burgess and others held the evolutionist belief that lower-class people needed to evolve to the intellect and sophistication of the upper classes.

Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was created by the 1934 National Housing Act, which increased government power to intervene in the housing market and influence residential growth (Kuklick 1980:830). The theories of Chicago sociologists are cited extensively in historical and modern government publications on housing policy. For example, after receiving a PhD from Chicago, Homer Hoyt became employed with the FHA. He authored *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities*, published by the FHA in 1939 and still cited as the guide to urban development in FHA publications. The publication followed Burgess’ social evolutionist ecological model, in which race and class segregation were considered natural law. Hoyt’s publication warned that when appraising the property and the buyer in mortgage lending practices, the presence of an “inharmonious race” would devalue an entire area (Kuklick 1980:832). In FHA maps of investment potential, one black owner would mean that the whole block was marked a black area, precluding it from investment. FHA lending practices preferred the construction of new buildings rather than the improvement of old buildings. Thus, they focused construction on the periphery of the city in wealthier neighborhoods, allowing the city center to fall into disrepair. The practices resulted in subsidies to rich and middle class. The FHA also adopted racist practices like the red-lining of black neighborhoods and the exclusion of blacks from loans and insurance coverage, institutionalizing housing segregation.

The Chicago model conjectured that the future structure of the city would continue in the same way as in the past. Consequently, the early Chicago model of a segregated concentric zoned city became a self-fulfilling prophecy as it was institutionalized in government code and
practice. The obsolete theory remains professional practice, although the current language of the guidelines is more euphemistic. Workplace rules function through an impersonal power in which an employee merely facilitates pre-determined policy devoid of first person references (Sennett 1981; Bogard 2006). Through anonymous protocol, the final product is separated from the original thinker (Holloway 2002: 60). The Chicago model of the city was distilled into standard protocol that any FHA bureaucrat could use to assess a buyer. Sociological theories that are nearly a century old remain ingrained in city protocol even though they are no longer considered legitimate by contemporary sociologists. The entities that originally created the categories and codes, however, have become largely invisible. Moreover, the social model for housing policy has extended into other government agencies and private banking institutions.

Zoning is another governmental power-knowledge practice that shapes and reinforces neighborhood-based racial inequality. Silver (1997) notes that in 1908 Los Angeles was the first city in the nation to implement a use zoning ordinance to prevent industry and slums from intruding into upper class residential areas. In the 1920s southern city officials hired northern professionals to craft racially discriminatory zoning laws against undesirables. Designated black zones were said to be planned with sufficient housing and in close proximity to adequate services. In reality, black neighborhoods had neither adequate housing nor services. However, racial segregation was accomplished. Although white-only and black-only zones did not hold up in court, Silver argues that they remain ingrained in the process of city planning. For example, cities permit black neighborhoods to be zoned for unhealthy uses, such as industry, dumping, and prison building. Urban planners traditionally view order as compartmentalization into single-use spaces—one area for commercial activity, another for residences, and so on. Segregation of use has thus been inscribed in zoning hidden by efficiency-based language (Aoki 1993; Scott 1999).
Racial segregation becomes institutionalized and reproduced through housing policy protocol. Scholars have documented that residential segregation in turn affects and is affected by school segregation (Haurin & Brasington 1996) and police presence. Less attention, however, seems to have been paid to the role of residents, particularly homeowners, in establishing zoning patterns and housing policy protocol. Policy is often set through negotiation between residents and local government.

**Modern Policing**

Power flows through a network of governance at multiple sites such as hospitals and schools that seek to “help” or “civilize” (Foucault 1977). Power is something that can never be acquired because no one being or site actually possesses power. Literally everyone is implicated in power. However, people have unequal relationships to power depending on intersections of race, class, gender, and sexuality, for example.

Perhaps no other American institution is more obviously imbued with racist power than the modern police force. Police objectives initially became linked to state objectives in 18th century England (McMullan 1998). As the state began to document the inhabitants within its territory, police work was imbued with a scientific rationale. Foucault identifies five objectives with which police were tasked. The first was to maintain more people in less expansive territory in order to make surveillance manageable. Secondly, the police oversaw the orderly provision of life sustaining necessities, such as food. Third, they addressed the health of the population, for example, ventilation and the width of roads. Fourth, through the function of the police the state had an interest in preventing idleness and making citizens useful for the state (Foucault 2007:321). Fifth, the police facilitated circulation of goods and people, including control of the
vagrant poor (Foucault 2007:326). The police ensured that people communicated and coexisted with one another and were producing in such a way as to strengthen the state. The five primary tasks of the police arose with urbanization. Police ensured that social and economic regulation, circulation, exchange, and cohabitation in the town (Foucault 2007:336). Early police were a body of regulation. Post-eighteenth century, however, economic regulation and population management were transferred to other state institutions. The police became exclusively tasked with the negative functions of preventing disorder, the role of the police as we know it today.

Scientific expertise and management was integral to the development of the modern police force and has continued into more recent times. In 1930s, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) administrators began to develop scientific systems for assigning officers to parts of the city (Escobar 1999:164). Under Hoover, the FBI allied with local police to fight the “war on crime”, aggressively confront “criminals”, show force, and develop scientific crime-fighting methods. During this time period, police became concerned about the link between race and criminality. After 1923, the LAPD began compiling and annually publishing racial breakdowns of arrests. After the release of police publications the press began to report on arrests and small incidents rather than solely high-profile crimes. The police and press claimed that Mexican-American criminality could be proven by high arrest rates. As the LAPD concentrated officers in Mexican-Americans areas, inevitably arrests rose (Escobar 1999:286). In circular logic, the increase in arrests fed the belief that Mexican-Americans were criminal. The emerging field of criminology gave legitimacy to idea that some races were inclined to criminality, whether for biologically or socially based reasons. By the 1940s the LAPD had fully developed a racial theory of crime based that shaped policy and practice. The department institutionalized the theory that Mexican-Americans were more criminal than whites.
Scholars argue the modern urban police force is increasingly concerned with collecting information to control specific “at-risk” groups (Beckett & Herbert 2010; Cohen 1985; O’Malley 1996). Actuarial policing is wildly popular with police departments. With financial support from the U.S. Department of Justice, the LAPD currently works with researchers at UCLA to develop computer-based predictive policing models. Based on analysis of previous crimes, police will be able to predict the time and location of future crimes and feuds between gangs (Rubin 2010; Rubin 2011). The façade of objectivity and technical nature of risk-management makes actuarial policing more readily acceptable to more people (O’Malley 1996). Using a color-blind risk management framework, police and whites supporters can hold positions that support racial inequality while sounding pragmatic (Bonilla-Silva 2001).

With actuarial policing, knowledge about people is organized into categorization systems that shape subject creation. For example, the categorization of youth and homeless as disorderly and the act of intensively policing them in turn affects subject creation. Groups targeted by policing practices come to be seen by broad swaths of society as dangerous subjects. Dominant groups spread their construction of certain groups of people as deviant through public discourse, mass media and public institutions, including schools. In a feedback mechanism, the subject creation facilitates discriminatory policing initiatives (Harcourt 2001). The police, often undergirded by public anxiety, target groups to prevent some problem from happening even if they do not yet know what the “problem” is (Staples 2000).

Sanchez (2010) documents Prostitution Free Ordinance Zones in East Portland. A 1995 City ordinance deems that people arrested for prostitution within 500 feet of a Prostitution Free Ordinance Zone are not allowed in the zone for 90 days. If they are convicted, they are banished from the zone for one additional year. Prostitutes are targeted because their visibility supposedly
upsets the ‘quality of life’ in the neighborhood and attracts other crime. However, men driving in their privately owned cars that solicit prostitutes are not targeted. Sanchez argues gender and class biases direct police concern to women that defy confinement to private spaces. Men are considered to be engaging in ‘normal’ and non-disruptive male behavior. Sanchez argues that the police practice of exclusionary zones encourages residents to police the public morality of women and lower-classes.

Similarly, in Los Angeles, the institutionalization and reproduction of inequality in bland and blind protocol is evident in southern California’s gang injunctions. Gang members are labeled as a “broken window” to be preemptively addressed before an illegal act has been committed. Low income urban youth of color are deemed suspicious when they are in public space. I ask how the links between gang member, youth of color, and broken windows came to be inscribed in policy.

**The Pitfalls of Benevolent Reform**

Movement activists and academics have challenged and changed policies that reproduce inequality. Struggle between ‘experts’ with different political goals and professional conclusions challenges state authority. Nelkin (1975) documents two cases in which plans for neighborhood modification were halted by scientific challenges from outside the government. In the first, the New York State Electric and Gas Company proposed the construction of a power station in 1973 near neighborhoods inhabited by Cornell University scientists. Initially, local scientists argued that the plant would harm a nearby lake. The New York State Electric and Gas Company hired consultants that produced research refuting claims that the power station would pollute the lake. The community, led by the scientists, responded with the new argument that radiation would be
hazardous. Faced with opposition from a highly educated and credentialed community, the New York State Electric and Gas Company then dropped the plan.

In the second case, a new 9200 foot runway was proposed at Boston’s Logan airport. Working class Italian communities in downtown east Boston opposed the measure. Residents argued that the construction was unjust and that they did not need experts to know that. Nonetheless, they ultimately defeated the proposal with the help of technical expertise provided by the city, who also opposed the runway.

In each case, both sides presented their argument as a de-politicized technical choice. Nelkin (1975: 48) concludes, however, that political leanings were central to the debate, in both the airport and power plant controversy, it was the existence of technical debate more than its substance that stimulated political activity. In each case the fact that there was disagreement among experts confirmed the fears of the community and directed attention to what they felt was an arbitrary decision-making procedure in which expertise was used to mask questions of political priorities.

The effectiveness of ‘expert’ knowledge depended less on the validity of the evidence than whether is reinforced a side of the debate. The introduction of opposing evidence undermined the gas company’s and the airport’s expert authority. Nelkin’s case supports the Foucauldian claim that the human sciences attain a high level of importance even when they do not contribute innovative knowledge (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983). Authority does not come from the science itself. Rather, positivism acts as an “overlay” for the real explanation of power, which is the ability to manipulate technologies of discipline with accumulated knowledge (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 10). “Reason” and “truth” are not an objective reality, but another ideology, another way of gaining power.
Leftist social movements have also impacted policy and protocol. Moore (1996) argues that protest movements from the 1950s to the 1970s challenged scientific logic, objectivity and authority. The anti-Vietnam movement in particular criticized the alliance between academics and the U.S. military. It was no longer possible for scientists to claim that they were insulated from politics. They had to develop new organizations and new ways of joining science and politics.

Generally, academic prestige and financial support depend on two sometimes contradictory achievements. Researchers must differentiate science from other occupations so as to emphasize their value. But they must also demonstrate that science is beneficial to society at large. Moore argues that activist scientists achieved both goals by sidestepping the question of the scientific process and content. To attack other researchers or question if scientific content was swayed by politics would have undermined the moral authority of science. Instead, scientists criticized the misuse of results by non-scientists. The new public service science organizations focused on making results accessible to the public and providing expert testimony in courts and regarding legislation. Thus, scientists successfully reclassified themselves as serving the public and not the state while maintaining scientific autonomy and expertise.

Epstein (2007) maps the process by which activists in the 1980s successfully challenged clinical researchers. Advocacy groups argued that clinical drug were not inclusive of women and people of color. For example, women were underrepresented in studies of heart disease treatment and prevention. The opposition to reform was powerful, consisting of politicians, pharmaceutical representatives, and researchers. Despite the powerful opposition, Epstein cites the strength and diversity of the reform coalition as the reason for its success. The reform coalition was led by scientific and political spokespeople as well as elite advocacy and medical professional
organizations. Furthermore, federal health officials blocked opposition. Instead, they sought to control the direction of reform. Federal officials held working groups to develop guidelines that would disrupt neither scientific methodology nor autonomy. For example, the guidelines only applied to later stages of trials that would result in the licensing of new drug or revision of care standards.

Epstein’s and Moore’s articles offer a similar important conclusion. In both cases, outside challenges to science had some impact, but left established forms of knowledge production and political practice untouched. In Moore’s case, scientists avoided challenges to the content of their science. They kept intact the public’s assumption that scientists are first and foremost a united group of professionals without competing commitments (Marks 1997).

In the case described by Epstein (2007), the drafters of the guidelines avoided serious debates about large theoretical questions. Activists competed with medical researchers to establish relevant categories. In their opposition to the model of the ‘standard human’, activists transferred political differences of race, gender, and age onto biomedical differences. Epstein points out that class was not considered an inclusionary factor in medical guidelines despite its potential relevance for health behaviors. Social movement definitions of political difference offered a pre-determined classification system that could be readily transferred to biomedical categories in a process Epstein (2007: 91) terms “categorical alignment work”.

Epstein argues that as officials used political categories they reinforced the assumption that the identities are biomedically based. Thus, Epstein (2007: 135) concludes that social movements did not abolish the use of the ‘standard human’ but rather created a slightly different form based on the smaller group levels of gender, race, and age he terms “niche standardization”.

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Most activists that successfully reform policy are organized into professionalized interest groups that advocate for niches of a community. Membership is required for recognition from the state.

Most people, however, do not join social movements or advocacy groups. Fine (2008) contends that Participant Action Research (PAR) constitutes an epistemological challenge to dominant methods. Often, PAR is carried out in partnerships between sanctioned institutions and local groups. McIntyre (2000) identifies three principles as central to PAR. First, researchers and community members collectively investigate a problem. Second, Participant Action Researchers rely upon knowledge that is indigenous to the local community in order to better understand the problem. Lastly, Participant Action Researchers use their results to take individual and/or collective action to deal with the problem. I seek to go beyond social movement organizations that are professionalized advocacy groups. How do we avoid the pitfalls outlined above while avoiding the paralysis that comes from being overly self-reflective?

**Methodology**
In my project I use participant observation, formal and informal interviews, and archival research to study how influential citizens and authorities collect knowledge, come to define deviance and institute practices to control allegedly deviant groups. In the tradition of institutional ethnography (D. Smith 2005, 1990, 1977; G. Smith 1990), I move from participant observation to mapping the texts and bureaucratic functions of institutions.

For the chapter, “How Does a Neighborhood Become a Neighborhood?” I analyzed zoning maps, ordinances, and building safety documents from the LA City Archives. I examine how the neighborhood has been shaped historically by housing development by tracing
construction and zoning changes in the Cadillac-Corning neighborhood and surrounding areas through approximately 100 pages of documents.

To explore the origin of gang injunctions in chapter three, I engaged in archival research and interviews. Robert Ferber, one of the City prosecutors responsible for drafting LA City’s first original injunction in Cadillac-Corning, provided me with the injunction documents, court declarations from attorneys, law enforcement, and residents, his notes on the case, memorandums, and paper work from the served injunctions. I analyzed press releases from politicians, the LAPD, and the LA City Attorney’s Office, and newspaper archives regarding Cadillac-Corning.

To examine the role of community partnerships in broken windows policing in chapter four, I conducted participant observation in the mid-city Los Angeles neighborhood of Cadillac-Corning (now called La Cienega Heights) from the summer of 2007 to the summer of 2011. I lived in the 18-square-block neighborhood and attended 38 regular monthly community meetings and emergency town halls held by community groups that participated in crime prevention partnerships. I also attended two LAPD West Division COMPSTAT meetings during the research period. I followed community group members throughout their efforts to set up a neighborhood watch system in La Cienega Heights. I had regular informal conversations and interaction outside of meetings with the members of all of the groups. I took shorthand notes on flyers that were handed out during the meetings or in small notebooks. Immediately after the meetings, I wrote extended field notes on my computer. The data resulted in 250 pages of single-spaced field notes, which I open-coded.

In addition to numerous field interviews, I conducted in depth interviews with ten particularly active community group members; four prosecutors from the LA City Attorney’s
Office who worked in Cadillac-Corning for significant portions of their careers; eight LAPD officers assigned to the area from the 1970s to current; and the Field Deputy from the area’s City Council District Office. Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed. The interviews were conducted in peoples’ homes, offices, with officers on their beats, and at restaurants. Each interview lasted between one to two hours. I analyzed approximately 60 documents that included petitions, letters between community groups and authorities, email communication over public listservs, and plans of action for task forces drafted by community groups and authorities.

Community group members are not representative of neighborhood residents. Their high levels of formal community involvement make them unique. It is precisely this uniqueness and unrepresentativeness, however, that interests me. Community groups have plans to shape the neighborhood in specific ways. They reach out to leaders in local government, the police, the City Attorney’s Office, and business interests to control access to the neighborhood, resource distribution, the appearance of the area, and the behavior of residents.

Noticeably absent from my observations and interviews are the majority of residents that neither participated in community groups nor held positions of institutional power. I have intentionally chosen not to focus on the traditional subjects of urban ethnography. To study gangs, for example, takes for granted the legitimacy of the definition of gang membership in the first place and it’s racialized way of ordering the world. A widely obscured political struggle has gone into the creation of the term gang so as to evoke images of violent youth of color. Much urban ethnography is concerned with using low income people of color as research objects to be alternately feared and pitied by highly educated voyeuristic consumers of ethnographic texts (Kelley 1998). I have no interest in adding myself to the many sets of ever present eyes that
watch and try to offer explanations for people labeled deviant. More interesting to me is how a small group of people are able to acquire, or alternately, not able to acquire, the power to influence policies and enforcement, as well as how their actions are informed by the ways they think about those they seek to control or force out. Several privileges, including a light skin tone, an advanced education, and the legitimacy of association with a research institution, provided me with access to the arenas of the watchers and planners.

Lastly, I conducted participant observation with prison abolition organizers at the Youth Justice Coalition (YJC) in Inglewood, California as we collaboratively develop a model of community based research. The YJC works to dismantle the Los Angeles County injustice system that has ensured the massive lock-up of people of color, widespread police brutality and corruption, regular violation of youth and communities' Constitutional and human rights, and the build-up of the world's largest prison system. I assisted organizers with community-based research projects, the dissemination of results, and the use of results for direct action tactics. Again, my focus is not the organizers themselves or the communities in which they work. My concern is the knowledge-power relationship. Consequently, I pay great attention to the reaction of media, elected officials, and law enforcement to the process and results of action research.

_A note on quotation marks:_

When presenting primary qualitative data, I use double quotation marks when repeating something that was recorded in a formal interview. I use single quotation marks when the data was gathered via shorthand notes during ethnographic observation or an informal field interview.
The neighborhood

La Cienega Heights (formerly Cadillac-Corning) is a predominantly working class black and Latino immigrant neighborhood on the edge of the more affluent West Los Angeles jurisdiction. The housing is dense, with narrow alleyways in between and behind apartment buildings. Parking along both sides of every street essentially creates one lane roads throughout the neighborhood. There is lively foot traffic, particularly in the early morning and late afternoon. Mothers lead their children to and from the nearby elementary school, high school students skateboard between home and class, vendors sell fruit, gardeners load plants and tools in the back of their trucks, neighbors talk to one another across their fences, and people rush to the nearby bus lines. Before school, many will stop at Joe’s Market on Cadillac, a tiny convenience store near the elementary school that has been there for over 50 years. The neighborhood consists primarily of two and three-story apartments built in the 1960s punctuated occasionally by a single family home built in the 1920s. Most apartments are surrounded by rod-iron fences (some with spikes pointing inward) that were installed in the 1970s and 1980s. Crossing the street to a surrounding neighborhood is an abrupt change from dense city life to an almost suburban space of trim lawns, ample parking, quiet sidewalks, and large houses. Most of the residents in the surrounding neighborhoods are upper class, white, and many are Jewish.
Many apartment buildings in Cadillac-Corning have spiked rod iron fences.

According to the 2000 Census, 86 percent of the housing units were renter-occupied (US Bureau of the Census 2000a). The census tract was 28 percent white, 33 percent black or African-American, three percent Asian, and 32 percent Hispanic or Latino (US Bureau of the Census 2000b). Forty percent of residents were foreign born, the overwhelming majority of which were from Latin America, especially Mexico (US Bureau of the Census 2000c). The median household income was $28,180. Thirty-two percent of families were below poverty level (US Bureau of the Census 2000d). The census tract for La Cienega Heights also includes six blocks from the neighborhood to the north.

In comparison, in the census tract to the north 70 percent of the housing units were
renter-occupied according to the 2000 census (US Bureau of the Census 2000e). Residents were 70 percent white, 11 percent black or African-American, six and one-half percent Asian, and 10 percent Hispanic or Latino (US Bureau of the Census 2000f). The median household income was $45,641 with nine percent of families below poverty level (US Bureau of the Census 2000g). It appears that the area to the north included more owner-occupied units and more whites than La Cienega Heights. Furthermore, the inhabitants in the renter-occupied units to the north had on average higher incomes than those in the La Cienega Heights census tract.

The tract to the immediate west had a drastically different makeup than La Cienega Heights with 95 percent owner-occupied units, a medium household income of $114,097, and only two percent of families below poverty level (US Bureau of the Census 2000h; US Bureau of the Census 2000i). The area to the west was 90 percent white, five percent Asian, and three and one-half percent Hispanic or Latino (US Bureau of the Census 2000j). The surrounding neighborhoods also had a significant Jewish population.
In the 2005-9 American Community Survey, the La Cienega Heights census tract had about the same amount of renter-occupied units but fewer families below poverty level than in the 2000 Census (US Bureau of the Census 2009a). The white population remained stable. The black population decreased to 19 percent while the Latino/Hispanic population increased steeply to 51 percent (US Bureau of the Census 2009b). The area to the north still consisted of higher-rent apartments and the racial make-up was about the same as in 2000 (US Bureau of the Census 2009c; US Bureau of the Census 2009d). The tract to the immediate west remained overwhelmingly white and owner-occupied (US Bureau of the Census 2009e; US Bureau of the Census 2009f).

I chose La Cienega Heights as the field site in which to explore the research questions
for two primary reasons. First, there is very little firsthand qualitative work on broken windows, particularly outside of New York City where former Police Commissioner William Bratton instituted the policing method (Jang 2009). The increasing popularity of the broken windows theory amongst the LAPD after Bratton’s tenure as Police Chief makes Los Angeles an important field site. The only other fieldwork I am aware of that has been done in Los Angeles examined LAPD officers, but not community partners, in a low income community of color (Wagers 2008). I chose La Cienega Heights and the surrounding areas because it offered an opportunity to examine the struggles that occur when defining disorder, neighborhood boundaries, and “the community” amongst elite citizens that have more power to challenge police. Community group members were not representative of neighborhood residents. Their high levels of formal community involvement made them unique. It is precisely this uniqueness and unrepresentativeness, however, which interested me. Community groups had plans to shape the neighborhood in specific ways. They reached out to leaders in local government, the police, the City Attorney’s Office, and business interests to control access to the neighborhood, resource distribution, the appearance of the area, and the behavior of residents.

Secondly, for nearly four decades, the police, the City Attorney’s Office, organized business owners, and homeowners associations in bordering neighborhoods have tried to alter La Cienega Heights. The neighborhood served as a site of experimentation in which policies and protocols were developed and perfected before they spread to the rest of the city and, at times, the rest of the country. For example, in 1987 the gang injunction was first implemented in La Cienega Heights (at the time called Cadillac-Corning). In 1997 La Cienega Heights became one of the Los Angeles’ first sites to experiment with the SARA (Scanning, Analysis,
Response, and Assessment) Model. The SARA model is a problem-solving policing method in which officers collaborate with Neighborhood Prosecutors, landlords and community groups to fight crime, blight, and quality of life offenses. The SARA method is now widely used by police departments nationally.
Chapter 2

A Neighborhood is Born: 
Housing Development, Racial Change, and Boundary Building

On the surface the concept of “neighborhood” seems simple. People use the term unproblematically to describe collections of blocks where we live. But how do these spaces come to be understood as *neighborhoods* in the first place? How does there come to be a general understanding that one area has a cohesive identity that is distinct from another area across the street? How did Cadillac-Corning come to be an African-American and Latino neighborhood surrounded by more affluent white and Jewish inhabitants?

Although it did not have the name Cadillac-Corning until the late 1970s, the boundaries of the neighborhood emerged in the 1960s as single family homes were replaced with multi-unit dwellings. Three primary factors combined to configure the social and physical layout of Cadillac-Corning’s 18-square-blocks in such a way as to constitute a neighborhood. First, from 1960 to 1965, there was a steep increase in the amount of apartments built in the neighborhood. The development came from within the neighborhood as individual owners built income property on their lots. Second, in the 1970s, residents moved out of the neighborhood and sold the apartments that they owned to management companies. This wave of changes to the housing came from outside the neighborhood as offsite owners turned multiple apartments into large complexes. Most of these changes occurred between the major streets of Robertson Boulevard and La Cienega Boulevard and the smaller streets, Sawyer Street and Cadillac Avenue—the future boundaries of Cadillac-Corning. Third, from 1965 to 1970 the local high school, Hamilton High, became racially integrated. As the high school shifted from a Jewish to an increasingly
African-American student body, so did Cadillac-Corning. These changes set a trajectory for the neighborhood that reaches into current times.

The ideal of the single family home was central to Los Angeles’ sprawling development (Fishman 1987:156-157). From the beginning, Los Angeles was also notably anti-union, white supremacist, and racially segregated (Davis 2006; Soja 2000). Academics, urban planners, and policy makers have relied upon one another’s knowledge and professional expertise to develop segregated neighborhoods through racist housing policy (Kuklick 1980), zoning practices (Silver 1997), and divestment in minority areas (Wacquant 2008; Aoki 1993). Urban planning often excludes the voice of those not in power (Fenster 1999). The use of space is determined according to the needs of business, dominant racial and ethnic groups, and property owners. The planning process is a tangle of complicated language and obscured procedures that exclude less powerful people but ultimately control their access to resources and space. Cadillac-Corning became a site for multi-unit housing development on the Westside through the efforts of middle-class homeowners, not city planners. Homeowners fought on both sides of the struggle for multi-unit development, sometimes for surprising reasons. City government, however, was the gatekeepers of change. Permission to develop new housing relied on the approval of city planners.

The first houses were built in the Cadillac-Corning area in the 1920s. Through the 1930s and 1940s architect and Bel-Air developer Elwain Steinkamp built Spanish-style houses and duplexes characterized by tile roofs, courtyards, and large glass windows (Oliver 1989). The shopping center where a Ross and CVS now stand was a dairy farm at the time. Bill, a Jewish man who lives in the neighborhood to the south of Cadillac-Corning, knows the history. He grew
up in the area and graduated from Hamilton High School in 1966. He recalled, ‘Most of the time I was there it was about 90 percent white and about 80 percent Jewish.’

Laura, a black female Cadillac-Corning resident, graduated Hamilton in 1971, when desegregation was in full swing. She was born and raised in an adjacent middle-class neighborhood. She moved into the neighborhood after attending college in 1977. Her sister was scheduled to attend Hamilton the following year. Her parents helped her find the apartment. They thought the area was safe, affordable, and it was close enough where her sister could visit after school. Laura remembered, “My parents were ok with me living in an apartment because of the house and apartment mix. There were not just apartments on the street.” Laura explained that when she first moved into the neighborhood, many apartment buildings were owned by individuals, “so they were very mindful of the type of tenants they rented to and the type of tenant they rented to was a lot different than what’s available now. When the big management companies started to purchase the buildings and take them over, there just seemed to be a shift in the type of person that you would see living in the neighborhood.”

Building permit documents and city council case files confirm Brenda’s observations that new apartments were built by individual owners living on the property or within several blocks. Between 1960 and 1965, many of the neighborhood’s current apartments were originally built. I now turn to one example that demonstrates a motivation for property development as well as the opposition.

The Fight for Preuss Road: “Tenementization” or Needed Development?

Preuss Road sits on the western border of the neighborhood. The case files from a requested zone change provide insight into the lives of some homeowners in the area as well as the state of housing in the neighborhood at the time. Furthermore, the conflict over the proposed re-zoning
ordinance demonstrates that the actions of individual homeowners can re-shape the neighborhood physically and socially, with effects that last for decades afterward.

Sam Ladin, the owner of two properties on South Preuss Road applied to the City Council to have the zone changed from R2-1 (duplexes) to R3-1 (multiple units) and the building setback line changed from 25 to 15 feet. The building setback line determines how close to the street a building can extend. The request for a smaller setback line indicates plans to construct larger buildings on the property. He unsuccessfully attempted the changes in 1955 and again in 1963. Residents opposing the zone change cited five primary reasons for their resistance: it would ruin the residential character of the street; cause overcrowding; strain local services; reduce property values; and there did not exist demand for new development in the neighborhood.

In the 1963 case, a married couple on Preuss Road wrote in a letter,

I purchased the property and moved into the area because of the existing deed restrictions limiting the area to private residences. A change in zoning would destroy the residential character of the neighborhood and deprive my family of the benefits of our property […] Also there is no need for additional units in this area. The adjoining streets to the East, Shenandoah, Bedford, Sherbourne, etc., are already zoned for multiple units, yet many single family dwellings still remain and very many of the apartment buildings have ‘for

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<th>1920s</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1961-66</th>
<th>1963</th>
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<tr>
<td>First Houses Built In Cadillac-Corning Area</td>
<td>Homeowner Zone Change Attempt on Preuss Fails</td>
<td>Interstate 10 Freeway Construction</td>
<td>Homeowner Zone Change Attempt on Preuss Fails</td>
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rent’ signs […] Finally, a 15’ setback eliminates lawns and planting areas, creates a tenement-like neighborhood, and completely destroys the character and value of the residential homes remaining (Levenson 1963).

The reasons stated by these homeowners were repeated in other letters of opposition as well. Several residents stated that they bought their homes because the of deed restrictions that guaranteed a residential area. Couples and families placed import on living amongst “nice, quiet” single-family residences (Stevenson 1963). In addition to changes in lifestyle that the zone change would bring, residents also worried about lowered property values. Opponents claimed that Preuss was still a high class residential area with “2-story residences in the $40,000 to $60,000 class” on the edge of a neighborhood being “tenementized” (“Building Setback Line” 1963:1; Baum 1963). They believed that apartment development “would only overburden the school, the fire protection facilities, and the police departments in the area” and “result in the parking of many more automobiles and our already crowded streets” (Stevenson 1963).

Opponents of the ordinance reveal what the state of development was in the rest of the neighborhood by 1963. A report by opposing residents claimed that current apartments were not filled, indicating a lack of need for further development,

A survey of the area immediately east of Preuss Road extending to La Cienega Boulevard discloses that in this area, which has already been zoned R3-1, there are 138 lots currently containing one-family bungalows and 19 containing duplexes or 4-flat buildings, all of which are susceptible to development as multiple dwellings under the existing zoning in the area, in addition to which in this same area, there are 64 multiple dwellings, 36 of which show existing vacancies (“Building Setback Line” 1963:1). The City Planning Commission Report confirms the change to multiple dwellings,
There are eleven (11) multiple dwellings in the 1900 block of Preuss Road at the present. The block to the south is 69% multiple dwellings; the block to the east is 71% multiple dwellings […] The area has undergone a complete change from single residences and R2-1 to multiple dwellings in the past eight years. Construction is still going on (Roberts and Davis 1963).

It appears that the boundaries of the neighborhood were implicitly set by 1963. Officials and residents refer to the area between La Cienega Boulevard and Robertson Boulevard as a unit to be internally compared. By 1963 most of the streets in the neighborhood were already zoned for multiple unit apartment buildings. Preuss represented an anomaly.

Several residents also wrote letters of support. Some Preuss Road residents wanted the opportunity to supplement their income by building additional housing. For example, one woman wrote,

When Mr. Sam Ladin first filed a request for change of Zone from R2-1 to R3-1 1900 Block Preuss Road, Tract 1250 several years ago my late husband and I definitely disapproved and worked against it […] Now that we are completely surrounded by apartments and as there are now seven or eight courts in the 1900 block of Preuss Road why should not we be allowed the same privilege of building income apartments on our property as other have in this area. We have large lots adequate for such income buildings. We are also paying exorbitant taxes for the privilege of keeping our homes (Harton 1963).

Several residents cited prohibitive taxes as the motivation to build multiple units on their property (Minear 1963),
Dissatisfaction with taxes could indicate the early stirrings of the 1970s tax revolt. In 1978 California passed Proposition 13, a Constitutional Amendment that decreased property taxes and restricted annual increases (O’ Sullivan, Sexton, & Sheffrin 1995). Although property taxes did not rise sharply until 1973, some scholars trace inordinate tax burdens for homeowners and the “seeds” of revolt to the mid 1960s (Sears & Citrin 1982).

Also, supporters viewed the eventual development of Preuss as an inevitability; “This is not a high class residential area. We are surrounded by apartment houses and courts. In fact the 1900 block on Preuss Road is the only 1900 block from La Cienega Blvd. to Robertson Blvd. which still remains R2-1” (Tlacil 1963).

The re-zoning request was rejected on the basis of resident opposition and insufficient demonstration of demand for additional housing in the area. However, the request was successful when Stanley Bernson, the owner of a lot on Preuss Road, applied for it seven years later in
1970. Although the City Planning Commission suggested that the ordinance not be adopted, the City Council overrode their opposition. At the hearing for the proposed zone change, 17 residents appeared in favor, 12 in protest.

As opposed to their rejection of the request in 1963, the City Council justified their approval in 1970 on the basis of increased demand for housing,

There has been a significant change in circumstances since the previous disapproval of R3 zoning in 1963. Since 24 (41 percent) of the 58 building sites within a 300 foot radius have changed from single or duplex type buildings to apartments in the last five and one-half years, this shows a significant trend in the development of the area during said period.

Those in favor of the zone change including the applicant’s representative stated that the circumstances have changed in the area since the last request in 1963. Besides, a very low vacancy factor for apartments, the existing zoning is C-2 on the west and R-3 on the east and south […] They are of the opinion that the present R-2 zoning has become inappropriate and unrealistic in the view of the old dwellings and changing character of the neighborhood (“Motion” 1970).

By 1970, the neighborhood was nearly equally split between single family homes and multi-unit lots. The city council report states that east of Preuss Road to La Cienega Boulevard there were 250 lots with single-family homes and 207 parcels containing apartments, duplexes, or 4-flat buildings (“Motion” 1970).

The City Council report also states that during the 1963 request, Interstate 10 was in process of being constructed, during which a large amount of property zoned for multiple units was demolished (City of Los Angeles Department of City Planning 1969:9). Interstate 10 passes
a few blocks south of Cadillac Avenue. From 1961 to 1966 the city demolished swaths of
apartment housing on the edge of Cadillac-Corning to clear a path for the new freeway.

The action of a homeowner on Preuss changed the possibilities for property owners on
the whole street. The homeowner who petitioned to have the zone changed confirmed the
changes that were already happening on streets around Preuss. Officially re-zoning the street
formalized a phenomenon in progress, the development of homes into apartments. Similar re-
 zoning and apartment development occurred in a domino effect on streets throughout the
neighborhood in the 1960s, the amalgamation of which created a series of blocks that were
distinct from others nearby. This distinct unit of blocks came to be known by residents, law
enforcement, and government agencies as a neighborhood.

The Arrival of Property Management Companies

While most of the development included one to five additional units on a property, some
property owners demolished homes and built large complexes. For example, in 1960 a man who
lived on Guthrie Avenue built a two-story, 22-unit apartment complex on property the next block
over. The complex also included a 21-car garage and a swimming pool (City of Los Angeles
Department of Building and Safety 1960). The next year, 1961, another homeowner on Guthrie
developed a three story, 14-unit apartment building on Corning Street (City of Los Angeles
Department of Building and Safety 1961a).

A few people who lived outside the area bought and developed property in Cadillac-
Corning during the 1960s development boom. On Chariton Street, homes were demolished to
make way for two 15-unit apartment complexes (City of Los Angeles Department of Building
and Safety 1961b; 1962). Small companies began to purchase and develop property in the 1960s
as well. In 1966, Exclusive Apartments, Inc. successfully changed the setback line to 15 feet on five lots on the northeast side of Chariton Street. The change brought the five lots in line with rest of Chariton, which already had a 15 foot setback line. Exclusive Apartments, Inc. demolished the homes on the lots and constructed apartment buildings (City of Los Angeles Department of City Planning 1966:4).

Moreover, landlords with large apartment complexes increasingly sold their property to management companies. The trend accelerated during the 1970s and 1980s. This is the second wave of housing changes that determined the composition of Cadillac-Corning. Most prominent in the neighborhood is Fred Leeds Property Management, which has properties in California, Arizona, and New York. The company currently oversees large swaths of properties in Cadillac-Corning. The entrance of large property management companies is significant for two reasons. First, several management companies combined properties to construct larger complexes. Instead of one to three units, apartments swelled sometimes to 20 units or more. Secondly, property managers lived off-site. The link between renters and tenants was looser, perhaps allowing for more egalitarian rental practices. Property management companies began accepting Section 8 renters. Rental prices decreased and tenants stayed for shorter periods of time than they had previously. The changes in housing were followed by the demographic change from a Jewish to African-American residential area, a shift that was important in the development of Cadillac-Corning’s reputation.
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<th>1966</th>
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<tr>
<td>Exclusive Apartments, Inc.</td>
<td>Homeowner Zone</td>
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<td>Zone Change Attempt</td>
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Map 1. Preuss to Sherbourne, Cadillac to Sawyer, pre-1950. Exclusively single-family residences and duplexes.
Map 3. Holt to La Cienega, Cadillac to Sawyer, pre-1950. Note the dairy farm north of Sawyer.
Hamilton High School: Integration and Militarization

During WWII, employment in the defense industry brought large numbers of African-Americans to Los Angeles. The rapid expansion of the aerospace industry and the establishment of military bases opened up new job opportunities. Until 1948, racially restrictive covenants to maintain “neighborhood stability” were common throughout the United States (Collins 2006; Gordon 2008:71). African-Americans were confined to the southern part of the city.

After the war, Jews also migrated to Los Angeles in large numbers. Jewish veterans from across the nation purchased homes in Los Angeles. Despite being shut out of the WASP downtown elite by a wave of anti-Semitism in the 1920s, Jews were able to enter retail, Hollywood, and Westside real estate. Consequently, Jewish elites formed a Westside power center around Century City, just west of Cadillac-Corning (Leonard 2003).

Hamilton High School opened in 1931. In the mid 1960s, Hamilton and the surrounding neighborhoods were overwhelmingly white, Jewish, and upper-middle class. Although the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) adopted an “open school transfer policy” for integration purposes in 1954, it was not until 1966 that the LA School Board issued open-transfer permits to minority students (Turpin 1967b). LAUSD experimented with methods to encourage racial integration. For example, in January 1967 the LA Board of Education commenced the Mid-City Secondary Education Project, slated to last at least one year, to encourage voluntary integration. Seven-hundred and fifty students were voluntarily bused to 10 specialized instruction centers, one of which was Hamilton High School (Turpin 1967a). As black parents transferred their children west from predominantly black schools, they found Cadillac-Corning was one of the few affordable places on the Westside.
Hamilton was central to integration struggles on the Westside of Los Angeles. Jewish and black groups formed (sometime uneasy) coalitions to end school, housing, and employment segregation, white supremacist violence, and police brutality (Lockard 1968; Eley and Casstevens 1968; Greenberg 2006). In the wake of World War II, the Holocaust, and the Red Scare, black and Jewish organizations allied to challenge institutional anti-Semitism and anti-black racism (Collins 2006:27). For example, when in 1964 proposition 14 passed, repealing 1963 Rumford Fair Housing Act, only Jewish and black communities voted overwhelmingly against the proposition (Leonard 2003:48).¹

On Sunday, September 15, 1963 Denise McNair (age 11), Addie Mae Collins (age 14), Carole Robertson (age 14), and Cynthia Wesley (age 14) were killed and 22 other people were injured, by an explosion at the Birmingham, Alabama 16th Street Baptist Church. The dynamite that ripped through the brick was planted by Kl Klux Klan members Robert Chambliss, Herman Cash, Thomas Blanton and Bobby Cherry. The 16th Street Baptist Church was used as a meeting place for civil rights leaders and a base for the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) to register black voters (Sikora 1991). Five

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<th>1931</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hamilton High Opens</td>
<td>LAUSD Adopts Open School Transfer Policy</td>
<td>LA School Board Issues Open-Transfer Permits To Minority Students</td>
<td>Mid-City Secondary Education Project Voluntary Integration</td>
</tr>
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</table>

¹ The act was reinstated in 1964 when the California Supreme Court found the constitutional amendment unconstitutional. However, the law did not cover the rental of rooms in or attached to an owner-occupied residence. California’s law prohibited racial discrimination only in real estate broker activities. The legal regulations would not have been applicable to this case, as black families in Cadillac-Corning began to rent, not purchase, housing at the time. Nonetheless, the movement to end housing segregation may have applied informal pressure to landlords to rent to black tenants.
days later, 1800 hundred miles to the west, CORE members, local clergy, black and white students from Hamilton and other high schools began a hunger strike at a Los Angeles Board of Education meeting to protest a special report on de facto segregation. Many of the white students cited their Jewish background as motivation to participate in the protest. A 17-year-old female Hamilton student remarked, “I went to temple first. Then I thought I would do something more for my religion and my country” (“School Board” 1963).

The Board of Education also fielded demands from predominantly black South Los Angles high schools, like Jordan, and East Los Angeles high schools, such as Roosevelt and Garfield (McCurdy 1968). East Los Angeles high schools pushed for bilingual instruction, more Mexican-American administrators, quality food, improved building conditions, and a ban on corporal punishment. Students were transferred to other high schools as a disciplinary measure for their participation in civil rights protests. Several black students at Hamilton had their transfer permits cancelled for slight rule infractions or political activity (“Hamilton High” 1973).

Locally, student debate over tactics and goals paralleled those of the civil rights movement nationally. While some aimed for integration, others felt it was a “farce” that was “tearing down minority cultures”. Some black students let white students know that they had no desire to become “only dark imitations of you.” Moreover, some students believed nonviolence was the way to achieve change. On the other hand, a Venice High School student weighed the tactic of force, “Since our riots there have been changes in our school. We got black history and Mexican-American history” (“All White School” 1969).
Increasing numbers of white parents sought transfers out of Hamilton, especially to the nearly all white Culver City High School. In 1968, eight percent of Hamilton students were black (Faris 1970). In 1969, 12 percent of students were black. By 1970, the number of black students reached 20 percent in a student body of 3,000 students. The same year, Hamilton’s white enrollment dropped 22 percent from the previous year (“Hamilton High” 1973). By the 1971-1972 school year, black enrollment had reached 34 percent and minority enrollment was at 43 percent. In 1972 black-white enrollment reached a 50-50 split (Smith 1972). For the first time in district history, the Los Angeles Board of Education banned transfers of minority students into and white students out of Hamilton in order to
“racially stabilize” the school (Greenwood 1972). Only two other schools were included in the ban, middle schools that were also on the Westside.

School Board policies were implemented in the area of the city where the maintenance of segregation was most under threat. Transfers were banned in the borderland spaces where the affluent Westside bumped up against the corridor to the south and east of the city. School segregation and housing segregation relied upon one another because the state of housing prices is tied to the quality of public schooling (Haurin & Brasington 1996; Kane, Staiger, & Riegg...
The desegregation of Hamilton facilitated the desegregation of Cadillac-Corning and vice-versa.

The white migration from Hamilton was later reflected in Cadillac-Corning. As one white parent moving from the area warned, “When the school goes all black, then the neighborhood goes all black” (“Hamilton High” 1973). By 1973, only 40 of approximately 800 black students at the school were bused. Most black students lived in the neighborhoods surrounding the school. Throughout the city, upwardly mobile Jewish families moved to more affluent neighborhoods (Leonard 2003). White Jews with light skin color and job skills were able to move into entrepreneurship and white collar work by the 1950s. However, they retained a presence as landlords to new Cadillac-Corning residents. According to Neil C. Sandberg, American Jewish Committee regional director, many Jews concerned about Black Nationalism and anti-Semitism had pulled away from solidarity with blacks. Hoping to prevent further Jewish flight, the American Jewish Committee held meetings in the area around Hamilton to engage residents on the racial change in neighborhoods and schools (Jones 1970).

In 1960, Cadillac-Corning was 99.6 percent white (US Bureau of the Census 1960a). Most of the residents were professional, managerial, clerical, or sales workers (US Bureau of the Census 1960b). Twenty-three percent of the population was foreign born, mostly from Poland and Russia (US Bureau of the Census 1960c; 1960d). The surrounding neighborhoods were strikingly similar in their racial and class make-up.

In 1970, the neighborhood was still about 98 percent white (US Bureau of the Census 1970a). Renter occupied units had risen from 62 percent to 82 percent of housing (US Bureau of the Census 1970b). The 1980 census tells a completely different story. Over the course of the 1970s, Cadillac-Corning had become 25 percent white, 60 percent black, and 9 percent “Persons
of Spanish Origin” (US Bureau of the Census 1980a). The census tract to the north was 72 percent white (US Bureau of the Census 1980b). The area to the west, that includes Beverlywood Estates, was over 90 percent white (US Bureau of the Census 1980c). The average household income (in 1979 dollars) in Cadillac-Corning was $15,802 (US Bureau of the Census 1980d). To the west, it was over $50,000 and 97 percent of housing units were owner-occupied (US Bureau of the Census 1980e; 1980f).

In 1973, the *Los Angeles Times* issued a five-part special on Hamilton. The series portrayed Hamilton so negatively that white transfers surged after it was printed. The *Los Angeles Times* even issued a statement highlighting Hamilton’s positive attributes and encouraging parents to keep their kids at the school (Zuckerman & Bleviss 1973). Principal Josephine Jimenez complained several years later that the reputation of the school never recovered from the series of articles (Curtis 1984). The first article was entitled “Boredom and Tension Replace ‘Golden Age’”. The special grieved for the downfall of a segregated Hamilton,

Once it was the very image of an All-American high school on the suburban fringes of Los Angeles. Now it is an urban high school, with all the pressures and troubles which accompany that change in status. Apartment houses and homes surround the rear and two sides of the 21-acre campus, while the Santa Monica Freeway and a somewhat weary commercial district of small stores and businesses are its close neighbors to the front. Some veteran members of the faculty look yearningly back on that period and call it Hamilton’s golden age. Their memory is of classrooms full of parent-prodded, anxious-to-succeed students who did not question a teacher’s authority and who often bit off more work than they were even assigned. It was, says one teacher, “like an exclusive prep school” (“Boredom and Tension” 1973).
After the ‘Golden Age’, white teachers, students, and administration accused black students of bringing violence, drugs, conflict, and militancy to school. At one point, when a fire damaged the first floor at Hamilton, white parents and teachers initially blamed black students for imitating the 1967 Detroit and 1965 Watts uprisings, which were sparked by police actions in black neighborhoods.\(^2\) It was later discovered that a white student started the fire (Faris 1970).

The *LA Times* articles detailed white students fears:

Whites talk in apprehensive tones about being jostled in the halls or not using the bathrooms because they might be beaten up or exorted for loose change by blacks […] White students tend to shun school dances and athletic events at night, largely because they or their parents fear violence at the hands of blacks […] There are white students who stay away from school dances because blacks laugh at the way they dance. One coach, lamenting the problems he has getting some white boys to go out for sports, thinks the youngsters are not only unsure they can measure up to blacks athletically, but are also fearful of them (“Hamilton High” 1973).

Teachers struggled with educating a racially and socioeconomically diverse classroom. One Hamilton teacher commented, “It’s not unusual to have a kid who is the son of a doctor and another who is from a family of seven and does not know who is father is in the same class” (“Frustration” 1973). Teachers complained that students were less willing to take commands

\(^2\) At the same time researchers were hard at work trying to devise ways to manage black ‘disorder’ and ‘mob behavior’. Up until Watts 1965, riots had been the result of white mobs, backed by police, blowing through black and brown neighborhoods, beating and killing residents, destroying businesses, and burning homes. With Watts, black residents armed themselves and fought back, to the surprise and terror of white civilians and government officials. Up north in Palo Alto, Stanford psychologist Philip Zimbardo was conducting experiments in which he planted an abandoned car in public to observe the conditions under which it would be vandalized (Harcourt 2001:131-132). Wilson and Kelling (1982) later used the study as the centerpiece of their “Broken Windows” theory, named for the window Zimbardo had to shatter with a sledgehammer to incite “respectable whites” to collective vandalism of the car. In the Broken Windows theory, however, the bodies of “disorder” would be brown and black, not respectably white.
than in the old days and they exhibited more “attitude”, challenging teachers on the content of their instruction and directions in the classroom. For the first time in district history, the teachers union went on strike to demand a greater role in administrative decisions.

In 1970, Hamilton qualified for the first time as an “inner city school”. The new designation earned Hamilton resources for 13 additional teaching positions. Some of the positions were converted to hire armed security agents instead of educators (“Bureaucracy” 1973). Hamilton also started to lock the school’s gates during school hours and LAPD cars regularly patrolled the perimeter. As black students entered Hamilton in greater numbers, the school became more militarized. Suspensions and arrests of black students rose steeply. Black students complained that they felt as if they were in a prison. A Los Angeles Times staff writer recounted the school’s daily disciplinary routine: “The signal that a security agent is needed is one bell, sounded throughout the school by a control device in the school’s main office. One hears it periodically during the day, and it is a somewhat ominous sound. Everyone knows there is a problem, and maybe trouble.” One armed security agent bragged “We don’t slap them on the hand, put it that way. If they’re definitely wrong, they’ll be booked” (“Security” 1973).

In 1978, LAUSD announced that no student could transfer to a school in which the student’s racial group already made up more than 50 percent of enrollment (Trombley 1980). Hamilton’s Humanities and Music Magnet Programs were started to encourage voluntary integration—this time of white students. In 1979, the Board of Education planned to move the

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magnet school from Hamilton’s campus to a site in Temescal Canyon, a white and wealthy community off the Pacific Coast Highway and Sunset Boulevard. If whites could not stop black students from moving into the school, maybe they could move the entire school. Their attempt to move the school was halted by a judicial review that warned of hardship on minority students and homeowners association and environmental opposition (Trombley 1979; Baird 1980). The judicial review not-so-subtly reminded the Board’s lawyer of the 1970 California Superior Court decision that found the Board guilty of intentional segregation in the location of new schools and setting of attendance boundaries.

By 1984, minorities made up 78% of the student population. Instead of moving their kids away, some white parents tried to lure whites back and reverse Hamilton’s “brain drain” (Curtis 1984). Parents in the affluent Cheviot Hills and Beverlywood neighborhoods held public meetings to convince their neighbors of the desirability of Hamilton, stressing its safety and academic performance. When that was unsuccessful, luring turned to pulling. Parents threatened to sue the school district unless they investigated the number of students who had illegally migrated out of Hamilton to schools more west and more white. Parents replied that they would just enroll their children in private school rather than return to Hamilton.

Since the civil rights era, Hamilton has remained the center of social justice consciousness on the Westside. For example, in 1994 when California passed Proposition 187, which prohibited undocumented people from accessing health care, public education, and other social services, Hamilton students walk out of school (Steinberg 1994). The walkout was the only protest on that side of the city.

Today, Hamilton High is essentially a two track school. The campus consists of the “original school” and two magnets. The two magnets have larger percentages of white students,
higher test scores, and better college attendance rates than the predominately black and Latino original school. One of the few homeowners in Cadillac-Corning, a white woman in her 40s, is involved in fundraising for Hamilton sports. This is her characterization of Hamilton students at the original school during a conversation with members of the local Neighborhood Council in 2010:

We need to face it. We are a diverse neighborhood. We have a lot of Hispanic and African American students. They live in La Cienega Heights [Cadillac-Corning]. They have relatives that live even further out in the jungle and in Baldwin Hills. Most of them are not gifted enough intellectually to succeed in academic life. But athletics inspire kids to go to college.iii

The white Jewish man from a bordering neighborhood who was facilitating the meeting concurred, ‘Yeah, they will be dropped on Holt and Bedford and Shenandoah after they don’t graduate.’ Holt and Bedford and Shenandoah are streets in Cadillac-Corning. The implication is that youth that are pushed out of Hamilton High School will end up on the streets of Cadillac-Corning.

A predominantly white teaching staff has continued to struggle with an increasingly black and Latino student body. After receiving accusations of racism, one male teacher commented, “Being Jewish, I had never thought of myself as being part of an oppressor group” (Munoz 1994). The racial fights these days are between black and Latino students, with white magnet school students safely tucked away. Many of the black and Latino students live in Cadillac-Corning. The policing of the youth of color that walk from Cadillac-Corning to Hamilton has since been expanded and refined. The Neighborhood Council outfitted the Hamilton High School Security Agents, the Los Angles United School District Police Department Officer, and the
Assistant Principal with cell phones. The phones provide “the community” with access to the various punitive entities at Hamilton High, as the meeting facilitator explained:

Every day in the morning and afternoon, Hamilton students flood the community.

Hamilton wants to expand the safe zone because they have liability issues. We want to keep the community safe from some of the knuckleheads that may be in the groups of students. The purpose of the phones is to call in, not for calling out. We have a list of numbers. If anyone sees anything out of the ordinary, they can call and report it. iv

The Recreation Center that youth from Cadillac-Corning and Hamilton go to is lovingly nicknamed the “big blue cage” in reference to the tall bright blue fence that surrounds the cramped gym, community rooms, childcare center, and basketball courts. A sign at the entrance announces that the community center is a designated “LAPD drop-in spot”. Another warns that anyone who participates in drug sales and gang activities in the “enhancement area” will suffer increased sentences if convicted. A small sign to the side cheerily encourages patrons to “enjoy the park!”

The Center’s manager at the time, a young white woman explained her disciplinary methods, which predominantly consist of calling the police,

One kid graffitied his chair. But I knew it was him because it was his saying. Like, he is the only kid who says this thing. My director just brought the chair in and set it on my desk. I called [Officer] Rashad, he took a picture. Then these kids were smoking weed in the bathroom. Same thing. I leaned out of my office window and took a picture of them. I told them that if they didn’t leave that I would call the police. Earlier they had rented out a ball so I had their keys and there driver’s licenses. They left for about an hour then
came back, played basketball, and tried to get their licenses back. I was like, ‘I told you guys to leave!’ So, I called the cops.

When asked about the youth that use the recreation center, she elaborated,

Yeah, it’s all La Cienega Heights. They all live there. Well, Hamilton is where all the kids who get kicked out go. Yeah, my girlfriend is the principal at Culver and she says that the kids she won’t take at her school go to Hamilton. She’s like, ‘that’s where all the rejects go. The kids who can’t act right.’

Building and Reinforcing Neighborhood Boundaries

By the early to mid-1960s the current boundaries of Cadillac-Corning emerged. Although it had not been named, residents of the neighborhood and surrounding areas, members of the City Council and City Planning Commission, and reporters referred to the blocks between Robertson Boulevard, La Cienega Boulevard, Sawyer Street, and Cadillac Avenue as a unit. City institutions played a large part in establishing the boundaries of Cadillac-Corning and as I will explain in the next chapter, an even bigger part in the naming and stigmatization of the neighborhood. The administrative boundaries laid out in planning reports and ordinances overlaid the informal neighborhood boundaries known by locals. As I discuss above, the development and desegregation of multi-unit housing, and the desegregation of Hamilton High School worked in tandem to transform 18-square-blocks from a series of single-family residences inhabited by middle-class Jews to an area housing working class black and later, Latino apartment renters. The school and the neighborhood make-up were mutually reinforcing.

The apartments would come to solidify the neighborhood boundaries and reputation of Cadillac-Corning in the 1970s and 1980s. In the late 1980s, groups formed in the surrounding
neighborhoods, such as Good Neighbors and Neighbors United, to roll back zoning to permit only single-family residents. The groups were dedicated to a “quiet” and “safe” family haven—for a particular type of family, of course, one that buys a 3-bedroom ranch house (Oliver 1989). The neighborhoods bordering Cadillac-Corning received single-residence zoning. Cadillac-Corning, however, remained multi-unit (see map below).

![2011 Zoning Map of Cadillac-Corning](image)

2011 Zoning Map of Cadillac-Corning. The boundary between zones permitting single-family housing (BLUE) and multi-unit housing (PURPLE) align nearly perfectly with the boundaries of the neighborhood (Robertson-Sawyer-La Cienega-Cadillac). GREEN is businesses, YELLOW is government buildings.

Even in the 2000s, the apartments remain the defining characteristic and point of attack for residents in affluent neighborhoods around Cadillac-Corning. One landlord’s wildly applauded comments at a community meeting are commonplace among property owners,
I have been in the neighborhood for three years. I own two buildings. I believe that it is up to landlords to get rid of the neighborhood’s crime problem. Landlords need to raise rents and renovate their buildings to get rid of the riff raff. If any other landlords are interested, talk to me after the meeting about getting together. Thank you.\textsuperscript{vi}

In 2003, blue signs went up at the entrances proclaiming the neighborhood “La Cienega Heights”. A dozen or so people in the neighborhood’s community group voted to rename and “rehabilitate” the reputation of the area. But the renaming has not dulled the reputation that has been decades in the making. There are still whispers at homeowner’s association meetings in the surrounding wealthier, distinctly less black and Latino neighborhoods. At a community meeting, a non-descript 30-something white man with dark rimmed glasses straight out of a Mac advertisement confided to a fellow Beverleywood Homeowners Association member, “I drive Cadillac every day. My wife is terrified.” The young professional woman he whispered to, so pale and frail she looked as if she might fade into the wallpaper behind her, managed to work up a gasp, “Oh my god, I would be scared too.”\textsuperscript{vii} Local media reinforces the stigmatization of the neighborhood by referring to Cadillac-Corning as a “tough pocket” that the good forces of gentrification have not been able to “revitalize” (Blankstein & Gencer 2006).

\textbf{Conclusion}

The 1960s constituted a shift in the physical and social landscape of the area that would eventually become known as the Cadillac-Corning neighborhood. Financial imperatives motivated homeowners to build multiple units on their property. While some residents fought to maintain the single-family home ideal, city government agreed with property owners who argued
for apartment development. The second wave of housing development occurred when management companies purchased properties and built large apartment complexes.

Hamilton High School is also significant for several reasons. First, the high school was one catalyst for the racial and class changes that occurred in the surrounding area. Moreover, Hamilton is a source of community identity. Generations of residents take pride in being Hamilton alumni. People look to the high school as a sort of folk indicator if what is going on. The racial change, perceived safety, and academic performance of the school also formally affect property values.

From the 1960s onward, Cadillac-Corning became categorized as a high density, lower income, predominantly black area. The ecology of the neighborhood made it an intermediate area in which defense of racial boundaries could be enacted. For the institutions of city government and planning, this categorization is what mattered in the decision making processes; it determined whether they approved the construction of a grocery store, motel, apartment building, mall, dump, or community center in the area. In this way, inequality became ingrained in the process of city planning. As I demonstrate in the next chapter on gang injunctions, institutional authorities made decisions that replicated the stigmatization of the neighborhood.

Cadillac-Corning has a legacy of hosting marginalized and stigmatized groups. Initially, Jews moved west into the area to gain access to employment and housing. Forty years later, black families migrated west into Cadillac-Corning for the same reason. Currently, Cadillac-Corning is home to recent Latino immigrants in search of the same things—reasonably priced housing, proximity to employment, and quality education for their children. For generations, the neighborhood offered opportunities to groups rejected elsewhere in the city, acting as a narrow passageway into the affluent Westside.
Laura, the woman from the beginning of this chapter, reflected on the arrival of Latinos to Cadillac-Corning,

I struggle personally with it as a black person. I am almost 55 now. I remember watching with my parents the desegregation struggles in the south. My family is from the south. And now that many neighborhoods in LA are being “taken over” [makes quotation gestures with her hands] by Hispanics, it’s difficult. My friend was just going on this rant the other day, and I said, ‘remember they used to talk about us like that.’ We used to be the ones that people would run from. But sometimes, like when any new social group moves into an area, sometimes their culture fits an area and sometimes it does not. What I have a problem with is people who don’t respect property. Like, if I was walking and I got tired, I wouldn’t just lie down on someone’s lawn because that is someone else’s property.

Authorities in LA have also bestowed a legacy of state violence, surveillance, and control on the neighborhood and its inhabitants. As I will expand on in the next chapter, the exceptionality of the neighborhood makes it a lightning rod for City government. The majority of the firepower for the 64-square-mile West Division of the LAPD is concentrated within the boundaries of Cadillac-Corning. The local Council Office assigns a Field Deputy to drive though the streets and alleyways of the neighborhood daily to address graffiti. In comparison to the rest of Los Angeles, Cadillac-Corning is not exceptionally unsafe or impoverished. However, relative to the affluent and sanitized West Los Angeles, it is stigmatized with a mix of pity, fear, and hatred. The ripple effects of piecemeal midcentury changes in housing development, transportation, and enrollment at the local high school are imprinted on the physical layout and social makeup of the neighborhood today.
Chapter 3

‘On a Bike with a Pager? You’re Going to Jail!’
Racial Criminalization of the Mundane in Gang Injunctions

Since the 1990s, gang injunctions have gained national popularity. In an effort to expand their anti-gang strategies beyond criminal sanctions for individuals, city prosecutors and police are turning to civil law suits against neighborhood gangs based on the claim that their behavior is a nuisance to non-gang involved residents. Injunctions then restrict the movements of those labeled gang members. Police officers have the discretion to decide who is served with an injunction (Caldwell 2010). In addition to naming ten to 30 specific people on the injunction, prosecutors also list hundreds of “John Doe’s”, to be indentified at a later point (Myers 2009). If alleged gang members are listed on an injunction, they are not allowed to engage in behavior that is otherwise legal, including but not limited to, congregating in groups of two or more, standing in public for more than five minutes, wearing certain clothes, and making certain gestures.

Gang injunctions are popular in Southern California. As of March 2012, there were 44 gang injunctions in the City of Los Angeles alone (Office of the City Attorney of Los Angeles 2012). Injunctions can cover the geographic area of one neighborhood block or several square miles. One of latest injunctions in Los Angeles County covers 16 square miles (Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office 2011). Alleged gang members in gang injunction areas have their personal information, social contacts, and tattoos entered into the CalGang Database. By 2003, 47 percent of African American men in Los Angeles County between the ages of 21 and 24 were entered into the Los Angeles County CalGang Database (Siegel 2003). Alleged gang members on the CalGang Database are subject to enhanced sentences. The gang injunction model has begun to spread; civil gang injunctions have been obtained in at least seven states
outside California (Maxson 2004). Law enforcement in other states has attempted to implement injunctions but been refused by courts.

Although gang injunctions currently blanket Southern California, “the first court order that represented the modern day gang injunction” was designed with close attention to one neighborhood (Myers 2009:288). In this article I examine Los Angeles City’s first gang injunction, which was instituted in 1987 against the Playboy Gangster Crips (PBGs) in the Cadillac-Corning neighborhood. Through primary documents and interviews with the authors of the Cadillac-Corning injunction, I offer insight into the primary actors and political struggles behind the polished injunction. I take the reader through the obscured process of designing and implementing the first gang injunction. I also provide empirical evidence for theoretical arguments (Boga 1993; Stewart 1998; Barajas 1997; Roberts 1999) that the control and criminalization of black youth is the root intent of injunctions.

I will demonstrate two primary points that emerged from my multi-methodological examination of the Cadillac-Corning injunction. Prior this research, I often wondered why Los Angeles City’s first gang injunction was implemented in Cadillac-Corning. It was neither the area with the most murders nor assaults. Cadillac-Corning, however, was a threat to the boundaries of white, middle and upper class areas. My first point is that part of the reason Cadillac-Corning was targeted for the injunction is that it threatened geographic racial and class separation and control. Despite the sanitization of race in gang injunction policy, fear of black men and stereotypes about black families were central to the rationale of the injunction. Race is central in the evidence that was presented to attain the injunction. However, the injunction itself has no references to race. An examination of the production process reveals that the injunction’s innovation was based on racial containment in Cadillac-Corning. The injunction was
meticulously designed to control the movement of black youth by criminalizing activities and behavior that is unremarkable and legal in other jurisdictions. The injunction shored up racial boundaries.

Secondly, although the gang injunction as a general policy has become decontextualized from the original locations in which it was conceived, injunctions continue to have racially disproportionate effects. The Cadillac-Corning injunction sparked a high profile court struggle, a “critical juncture” that set the pattern for future injunctions (Mahoney 2001). Critical junctures occur when an institutional response is created to address a problem. Future actors are likely to use the policy set at the critical juncture (Gains et al. 2005; Levin-Waldman 2009). Because Cadillac-Corning was the site of the critical juncture, some of the social and physical characteristics of Cadillac-Corning became inscribed in gang injunction policies. In the 1980s, police and city prosecutors immersed themselves in Cadillac-Corning to identify a specific set of problems. They tailored the prohibitions and the practical implementation of the injunction to the neighborhood with close attention to its racial dynamics, physical layout of housing, traffic flow, and alleyways. Some of the prohibitions do not make sense out of context. For example, why would it be criminal for someone to stand on a milk crate or ride a bike? These prohibitions come from observations of the geography, daily routines, and people in the neighborhood.

Law enforcement and policy makers sought to control the movement of black youth and upset the Playboy Gangster Crips’ (PBGs) drug operation through the criminalization of routine behavior in a target area. Attorneys decided what to enjoin through observation of the gang in the context of the neighborhood. Subsequent gang injunctions do not have the multi-year ethnographic background investigation that was carried out in Cadillac-Corning. The rules are in place but the politics that produced them have disappeared from view. What remains is the
criminalization of racial groups and spaces under the guise of routine “race-neutral” policy protocol.

**The Criminalization of Race and Space**

Compared to other areas of sociological inquiry, literature on gang injunctions is relatively sparse. Most social science research on gang injunctions assesses their effectiveness in reducing crime rates in hot spots. The results, primarily from quantitative studies, are mixed: some find slight short-term reductions in crime (Grogger 2002; Maxson, Hennigan & Sloane 2003; O’Deane 2008) while others conclude that injunctions do not address the root causes or long-term effects of gang violence (Klein 1998; ACLU 1997). Meares and Kahan (1998) argue that gang injunctions could reduce visible gang activity through the establishment of new community norms, while enhanced sentences communicate to other youth the legal consequences of gang involvement. Allan (2004:240) views gang injunctions as “far less draconian than other civil remedies used to curb gang activity” because they do not explicitly target the families of alleged gang members. Allan (2004:240) and others (Livingston 1997) also argue that injunctions avoid arbitrary enforcement by differentiating “hard-core members of targeted gangs” from “innocent” people as well as limiting enforcement to specific locations, people, and conduct.

Alternative literature demonstrates, however, that injunctions displace gangs into adjacent areas without addressing the root problems of gang violence (Klein 1998; ACLU 1997). Moreover, crime rates and calls for service are notoriously inefficient measures of actual crime. Researchers also find that police often fail to include the community in the development process of injunctions (Miranda 2008). In a rare study that includes interviews with people listed on gang injunctions, Caldwell (2010) argues that injunctions may encourage gang activity. Caldwell
examines the injunction against the Venice Shoreline Crips in the gentrifying Oakwood area, concluding that gang injunctions increase isolation amongst alleged gang members and other neighborhood youth. Gang injunctions amplify the multiple levels of marginality already suffered by people in gang injunction areas (Caldwell 2010:260; Vigil 2003). First, Caldwell found that by leading to the incarceration of low-level peripheral members, the injunction tied individuals closer to the gang. People were exposed to gang networks in prison and jail that they otherwise may not have encountered. Second, putting the label of gang member on people encouraged them to adopt the identity, rather than shaming them out of it (Becker 1997). Thirdly, the gang injunction destabilized the entire community by creating tension between residents and law enforcement. Lastly, the injunction precluded alleged gang members from participating in positive community activities. The injunction inhibited opportunities for family formation and employment—the very activities that help people leave gangs (Caldwell 2010:262-263).

Still others argue that the myopic focus on crime rates misses the overarching effect gang injunctions have on marginalized communities (Bickel 2012; Barajas 2007; Boga 1993; Roberts 1999; Stewart 1998). In particular, scholars assert that gang injunctions are used to control black and Latino communities through two mechanisms of criminalization. First, injunctions formally criminalize the physical space of the neighborhood. Consequently, mundane behavior by residents in injunction areas becomes defined as criminal. Secondly, gang membership as a group status is criminalized. Alleged gang membership is not portrayed as an act or part of a larger identity, but rather the defining characteristic of a person. “Gang member” comes to define entire racial groups by acting as a code word for low-income urban blacks and Latinos.

In the first mechanism of criminalization, City governments use civil law to regulate public behavior and access to space (Roberts 1999; Strosnider 2002; Boga 1993). Specifically,
law enforcement is able to remove alleged gang members from public space, not because they have committed a crime, but rather because they are allegedly gang affiliated and therefore, threatening to middle class elements. Boga (1993:493) continues that gang injunctions allow law enforcement to “eliminate the troublesome presence of the underclass and racial Other”. Low-income youth of color can be moved from white, middle class residential areas and commercial centers and contained in target neighborhoods. Barajas (2007) also notes that gang injunction neighborhoods tend to border areas that are undergoing revitalization projects and have increasing property values.

The criminalization of mundane behavior in gang injunctions relies upon authorities’ ability to successfully section off the target neighborhood as a violent context. Alleged gang members within the criminalized neighborhood do not have to do anything to become suspects. Their simple presence constitutes a potential crime. In an examination of gang injunctions Boga (1993:492) decries the treatment of youth in public space,

What causes alarm, however, is that municipalities are on the verge of decreeing that youths affiliated with street gangs are not suitable for any public space at any time. […]

The removal of gang members from their own neighborhood streets represents a literal example of this metaphorical sanitization of the public realm.

In the second mechanism of criminalization, gang injunctions portray alleged gang membership as a criminal master status that makes a person unfit for public space at any time. Through the criminalization of urban, low-income, black and Latino neighborhoods, gang injunctions criminalize not just a select group of alleged gang members, but entire racial groups as well. Stewart (1998) argues that gang injunctions employ a façade of race neutral language to control the movement of communities of color through the use of gangs as a proxy for low-
income urban blacks and Latinos. Stewart compares modern gang injunctions to vagrancy ordinances. Originating in the 14th century, vagrancy ordinances ensured that undesirable groups were maintained within boundaries defined by majority groups. After the Civil War, Southern officials attempted to regain control over former slaves through the Black Codes, vagrancy ordinances that targeted blacks specifically. Black Codes, like gang injunctions, labeled a marginalized group as inferior and deviant and created a duel track criminal justice system; one for protected whites, and another for African-Americans that guaranteed their captivity (Bickel 2012).

The Black Codes defined vagrancy in "painstaking detail, and yet, paradoxically, they were even broader and vaguer than before" (Stewart 1998:2261-2262). For example, in Mississippi, vagrants were defined as "runaways, drunkards, pilferers; lewd, wanton, or lascivious persons, in speech or behavior; those who neglect their employment, misspend their earnings, and fail to support their families; and all other idle and disorderly persons" (Stewart 1998:2261-2262). Officials justified the policing of African-Americans under the rationale that they fit the description of vagrants. Whites were also subject to Black Codes if they associated with blacks on equal terms or engaged in sexual relations with blacks.

Similarly, gang injunctions criminalize such a broad range of mundane activities within the target community that anyone who fits the racial profile of gang member is subject to stops, detainment, and enhanced sentencing. Those who socialize with people already classified as gang members are often categorized as gang associates and subject to police harassment and detainment (Santos & Romo 2007). Through gang association charges, entire families, groups of friends and neighborhoods become entangled in gang injunction restrictions or torn apart by prohibitions on socializing. People are entered into the gang database through field interviews
during police stops. Yoshino (2008) reports that almost 90 percent of Field Interview cards document minority youths. By 2000, two-thirds of people in the Los Angeles County CalGang Database were Latino and one-third was African American (Yoshino 2008:128). Despite claims that a protocol is in place to prevent arbitrary enforcement by police, on-the-spot judgments by patrol officers (*not* gang unit cops) are a primary means of determining enforcement (Katz, Webb & Schaefer 2000). Technological failure and police misconduct also lead to erroneous documentation (Wright 2005).

The classification of urban low income black and brown people as alleged gang members is the dominant justification for heavy surveillance, control, detainment, and harsh sentencing in Los Angeles. Bowker and Star (1999:81) argue that in a classification system people cease to be individuals. Classified spaces cease to be complex, contradictory, and unpredictable environments. Instead, we become types of people in types of places. Like nearly all classification systems, the classification of neighborhoods as “target areas” and people as “gang members” is a site of social and political struggle. However, after a classification system has been in place for a while, the messy politics behind the creation of the system are forgotten (Bowker & Star 1999:45). Successful innovations spread through mimicry (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Over time classifications are naturalized or disguised as purely technical and the entities that created them become invisible (Sennett 1980; Bowker & Star 1999). The act of forgetting includes the removal of authors from bureaucratic documents; the obscuring of the physical sites in which classifications and protocols developed; and erasure of the political negotiations that determine classifications. Bowker and Star emphasize the importance of going back to original texts because they function as a prototype for later documents.
In the realm of academia, researchers assess whether or not gang injunctions “work”, whatever that means (Grogger 2002; Maxson, Hennigan & Sloane 2003; O’Deane 2008; Livingston 1997; Allan 2004; Meares & Kahan 1998). They try to figure out how to use injunctions to change “deviant” community norms. But to ask if gang injunctions work or to study gangs takes for granted the legitimacy of the definition of gang membership in the first place and it’s racialized way of ordering the world. I return to the prototypical gang injunction to explore the following questions: How did Los Angeles City’s first gang injunction protocol and prohibitions develop? For what purposes was the injunction created? Who were the authors of the injunction and what were their views of the people they sought to enjoin? How was the gang injunction shaped by racial and spatial criminalization? How did the physical characteristics of neighborhood of Cadillac-Corning affect what was prohibited on the injunction?

To The Corner of Cadillac and Corning

They know that the juvenile laws are much more relaxed because we only slap their [sic] hand and give them a few days in camp […] When they sell their dope, they use a complex system of lookouts and warning signals to avoid detection by the police, including undercover officers. They will have gang members standing on all corners, as well as in second story windows with good vantage points. They even use young 8 and 9 year old kids as lookouts, who ride around on bicycles looking for cops. When they think they see the police they whistle or they give a hand signal and they have the guy stash his dope and then the dealer runs and hides in one of the apartments […] All of the proceeds from these drugs eventually get filtered through the gang, to the lookouts, to the dealers,
the distributors, the apartment managers who cooperate with them, and so on. And so often you see these 17 year olds kids running around in brand new cars down there and not even working after school jobs like you and I used to know.

-LAPD officer’s testimony in favor of PBG injunction, October 1987

(City of Los Angeles v. Playboy Gangster Crips 1987a)

In the 1980s, Los Angeles street gangs were exploding into popular consciousness. Rock cocaine was about to become big business. In his declaration of support for the PBG injunction, an LAPD officer pleaded with the judge, “Can you imagine meeting 15 year old kids who have $5,000 cash in their back pocket? Or meeting a high school junior who has the keys to a brand new Mercedes?” (City of Los Angeles v. Playboy Gangster Crips 1987b). A probation officer in the Cadillac-Corning area reflected the frustration of the police and the city prosecutors with the juvenile system: “Try to rehabilitate some of them if you can. I tried at first to help some of the kids, but I soon learned that it was a wasted effort” (City of Los Angeles v. Playboy Gangster Crips 1987c). Professionals in the juvenile punishment industry argued that probation had not worked. Jail had not worked either. They wanted something else in Cadillac-Corning; a more powerful tool.

Robert Ferber and Bruce Coplen would give it to them. In the mid 1980s they were young city prosecutors working under Mayor James Hahn. They had just formed a brand new gang division. As we sat in his office on a sunny spring morning over 20 years later, Robert, a white male, remembers that the gang division was still a bit of a joke: “I was named a gang attorney, but we did misdemeanors. And, in fact, when I joined the gang unit there were no
resources. There was no desk. [...] The cops were downstairs in a crummy little room and they got a desk together for me so I would have a chair to sit in.”

Robert was assigned to the West Los Angeles area. When he asked some West LAPD officers what the “worst area” in the division was, they took him to the corner of Cadillac Avenue and Corning Street. The neighborhood gained its name from the intersection that was infamous among West LAPD officers. In an interview, an LAPD Officer who worked Cadillac-Corning explained, “It was just the two major streets where all the activity was. It was where all the problems were occurring. [...] Officers knew that’s where you go when you want to pick up some crimes.”

Robert learned all of the ins and outs of the Cadillac-Corning neighborhood. He spent a year riding in police cars, covertly filming the PBGs’ early morning hour drug operations, and talking to residents. He identified what behavior to enjoin on the injunction through his conversations with authorities and residents as well as his own in-depth observations of the neighborhood.

He paid close attention to mundane routines, including city services. Robert explained how he attempted to look at the neighborhood in its entirety,

The same garbage truck guys would go down the street where there were no gangs and if they threw something into the truck and something flew out, they’d get out, pick it up and put it in the truck. When they went down the streets in the gang neighborhoods, they’d throw the garbage in the truck, garbage would fly out, they would just go on.

Street maintenance would come out. I’d watch street maintenance. They’d fill the potholes in Westwood but in Cadillac area they wouldn’t bother. You couldn’t get them to come out. Street lights were not maintained but three blocks away all the lights were
replaced. You saw that all of the government services were being doled out in a discriminatory way. And nobody made a decision about it. It was an unconscious human thing of why would I care about that piece of garbage that fell out of my truck? The whole place is a shit hole. And plus people are going to shoot me for that. Why would I do it when there’s graffiti everywhere? When there’s crap everywhere? The city doesn’t give a shit. They look at all the lights are out and so everybody that is providing a service is saying, ‘why should I bother when nobody else is caring?’

Cadillac-Corning was, and remains, a neighborhood predominately composed of closely spaced two and three story apartment buildings interspersed with single-family homes. Robert noted that escape routes abounded in the narrow walkways between apartments and a maze of alleys that could easily be reached through open windows and holes in chain-link fences. In the next section, I will return to a discussion of how the attorneys enjoined behaviors around fences, gates, windows, and alleys in order to preclude escape routes.

Through his close study of Cadillac-Corning, Robert compiled a binder that was a crude early version of the current digital gang databases, which catalogued people he could identify as PBG members or as associated with the gang. The binder was filled with the names and faces of black youth. In his testimony, an LAPD officer made apparent who would be targeted in the injunction: “It’s funny. If you walked or drove through RD 869 [Cadillac-Corning], you’d think the neighborhood just has young black males by the looks of who dares to walk outside.” He characterized black gangs as far more threatening than Latino gangs:

They don’t even do the things that you’ll sometimes see the Mexican gangs do, like play football or have a picnic. They have only one purpose in life…to profit from crime […] Unlike the Mexican gangs where there is a very strict hierarchy and strict decisions as to
who will commit a crime, in the black gangs there is less respect for that hierarchy and all the players are scrambling to be the number one guy (City of Los Angeles v. Playboy Gangster Crips 1987d).

The greater comfort with Latinos extended beyond gangs into stereotypes about family values, competence, and morality. Robert argues that the police initially ignored black gangs based on assumptions about family structure: “Law enforcement kind of rested on their laurels thinking they will never get to be really organized because we see in the black community they can’t pull their families together.”

Law enforcement quickly realized their mistaken assumption about social disorganization as they tried unsuccessfully to stop the PBG’s flourishing drug trade. Individual arrests by undercover officers did not stop the overall operation. In his declaration to the court Robert stated, “For every gang member caught dealing rock cocaine, there are two more to take his place” (City of Los Angeles v. Playboy Gangster Crips 1987e). The court testimonies are further filled with amazement that a black gang had such a “sophisticated communication network”, “elaborate escape routes”, and “an organization that’s run more like a business than you would believe” (City of Los Angeles v. Playboy Gangster Crips 1987e; 1987a; 1987d).

The authorities grudgingly admitted that the alleged gang members were not as stupid and disorganized as they had assumed them to be. Instead, police, probation workers, and city prosecutors labeled them as morally inferior and savagely aggressive. As one officer stated, “Over the years, I’ve realized that if some of these people chose to be legitimate they would be millionaires. They’re not lazy by any means but hardworking business people…only they’re ruthless and will kill for what they want” (City of Los Angeles v. Playboy Gangster Crips 1987d).
The process behind the production of the injunction reveals not just who it was crafted to control, but also who it was supposed to protect. Since the 1970s, Cadillac-Corning has been a predominately working class black (and later Latino) neighborhood surrounded by middle and upper class white Jewish areas. A city prosecutor commented in an interview,

We had a community just north of Sawyer. The single family homes, you know, 18th Street and Airdrome, where you could like, rob people or burglarize their houses to feed the drug dealers, to get your drugs, then you go back and you rob again […] It was kind of like a circle because you had pockets of wealth all around this gang, drug user kind of haven.\(^{iii}\)

But the pockets of wealth were also the drug dealers’ biggest clients. An officer who grew up and later worked in the area explained that Cadillac-Corning, located about a mile south of Beverly Hills, was the preferred drug market of affluent whites.\(^{iv}\) News reports and court documents about the injunction repeatedly recounted the story of a white teenager murdered by the PBGs after a drug deal gone bad. In a court declaration, an officer regretfully described the misperceptions held by affluent drug buyers,

They get lulled into a false sense of security, somehow thinking it’s safer to buy here on Corning Street than on Figueroa […] All kinds of people go into that neighborhood to buy drugs. A lot of middle and upper class people. All ages, races, ethnic backgrounds, from every profession, too (City of Los Angeles v. Playboy Gangster Crips 1987a).

Councilmen Zev Yaroslavsky wrote to the City Attorney at the time, James Hahn about the PBGs’ presence in Cadillac-Corning, “The gang activity in this community has had a very negative effect upon the neighbors in bordering communities” (Office of Zev Yaroslavsky 1987).
Joan Howarth, the ACLU attorney who argued in court against the injunction, remembered visiting the neighborhood. In our interview she argued that the purpose of the gang injunction was to define class boundaries, ‘The issue was not that it was such a terrible neighborhood. But it was close to more prosperous neighborhoods. That was the point of it.’

Thus, the selection of Cadillac-Corning as the site of Los Angeles City’s first gang injunction was part accident. City prosecutors and the LAPD did not strategically pick the Cadillac-Corning neighborhood or the Playboy Gangster Crips gang from the rest of the city. Rather, the city prosecutors that drafted the injunction worked in the West Los Angeles area. It was not an accident, however, that Cadillac-Corning was singled out in West Los Angeles. Cadillac-Corning was a threatening space.

The final gang injunction itself does not mention race explicitly. It simply lists names, locations, and prohibited behavior. Nonetheless, unequivocally racist ideas about black youth, morality, intelligence, and family life are woven throughout the interviews, primary documents, and court proceedings in which authorities record their observations and argue for the injunction. Officers and city prosecutors built the injunction off of racial stereotypes about black families and youth, fear of young black men, and the perceived threat they posed to surrounding areas. In the twenty year period prior to the injunction, Cadillac-Corning underwent a significant demographic change from a middle-class white Jewish area to a solidly black and working class neighborhood. As the number of black families swelled, so did the police presence and the panic of white neighbors. For years, wealthier whites from nearby neighborhoods had enjoyed Cadillac-Corning as a convenient drug market. However, Cadillac-Corning garnered attention after several white drug patrons were murdered or robbed. Law enforcement was not concerned with gangs per se, which is a form of social organization that has spanned time, place, race and
ethnicity. Rather, police and city prosecutors were concerned with a black gang running a drug business in close proximity to affluent white neighborhoods. Police and city prosecutors designed a policy to contain black youth within Cadillac-Corning’s apartments or push them out of the neighborhood altogether. Thus, in the final injunction document, the term “gang” is really a reference to black men.

From the Corner to the Courtroom

First, city prosecutors had to define the modern street gang. A gang was defined as “a group of individuals who associate together for a number of purposes.” Those purposes include the “sale of narcotics; commission of thefts, burglaries, and robberies; occupation of territory; and
acquisition of ‘status’ and ‘power’ through group-concerted action and intimidation” (People v. Playboy Gangster Crips 1987).

City Prosecutors argued that a street gang constitutes an “unincorporated association” because it meets the fit the following criteria:

(1) a group whose members share a common purpose, and (2) who function under a common name under circumstances where fairness requires that the group be recognized as a legal entity. Fairness includes those situations where persons dealing with the association contend their legal rights have been violated. […] That they are, in fact, proud of their name is clearly established through reading graffiti and from their statements” (People v. Playboy Gangster Crips 1987).

Furthermore, “An unincorporated association and all of its members are legally responsible for all acts or omissions of members connected with association activity” (People v. Playboy Gangster Crips 1987). As an unincorporated association, gangs as organizations are held liable for the actions of their members. The actions of individual members, in turn, are assumed to advance the illegal profit generating activities of the gang. The perception was that prosecuting the gang as a unit rather than a collection of individuals was absolutely necessary to disrupt the communication network and coordinated business operation of the PBGs. Many groups fit this description that are not prosecuted as unincorporated associations including fraternities, conspiring Enron executives, and corrupt police.

Even though the gang did not have an official membership from which to draw individuals to prosecute, Robert explained that the injunction against the gang as an unincorporated association was nonetheless constitutional,
It went back to the 1950s with the communists where they determined that not everybody was a card carrying member of the communist party but people were. And there’s no card carrying members of right to life. A hundred people are surrounding an abortion clinic. The government wanted to know, how do we go after them? And they, they already carved this out. How do you go after a group that all has similar values, similar goals? They are part of the same—they want the same, they all want to do the same thing. They are active but they haven’t given themselves a name. Or they have but there’s not membership. But you know who they are. You can describe them.xvi

The injunction prohibited alleged gang members from engaging in otherwise legal activity in the area covered by the injunction on the grounds that it was a public nuisance under civil law. City prosecutors argued the following in the memorandum,

> It is the contention of the People that all of these acts, taken together, constitute a public nuisance as defined in Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480, in that these acts are injurious to health, or offensive to the senses, or obstruct the free use of property so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property of an entire community or neighborhood, as well as by a considerable number of persons (People v. Playboy Gangster Crips 1987).

They claimed that the public nuisance posed by gang members justified the restriction of constitutional rights. For example, the PBG injunction sought to prohibit alleged gang members from congregating in groups of two or more and from loitering for more than five minutes. Restrictions on association would upset communication and drug solicitations in Cadillac-Corning. Alleged gang members who did not live in Cadillac-Corning would not be allowed into the neighborhood. For those that did live or work in Cadillac-Corning, “24 hours would be
allowed to obtain letters of residence or employment.” Of the Fifth Amendment right to travel, Robert and Bruce stated in the court memorandum, “The right of every American to come and to go must frequently, in the face of sudden danger, be temporarily limited or suspended” (People v. Playboy Gangster Crips 1987). Of course, there is nothing temporary about gang injunctions since they do not have an expiration date but instead, are indefinite. Up until 2008, there was no exit process that allowed one to be removed from the gang database if they could prove they were no longer involved in a gang or had been wrongly added (Vannoy 2009:285). The removal procedure is not widely utilized, perhaps because people are reluctant to request removal from the same institution that put them on the gang database in the first place.

As I noted earlier, the attorneys and West LAPD Officers conducted extensive ethnographic observation on which they based the injunction prohibitions. Police complained that suspects often escaped pursuit through routes between apartment buildings and in alleyways. Police alleged that suspects would use objects to boost themselves out of windows and over fences. Consequently, the injunction stated that alleged gang members were prohibited from climbing trees and fences or positioning milk crates and cinder blocks under windows or near fences. Within the injunction area, alleged gang members were not allowed to carry binoculars, pagers, cell phones, or flash lights. These were considered contraband that a lookout would carry. They were also prohibited from standing on balconies or rooftops where they could act as lookouts and warn others about approaching police. Black youth on bikes were fair game as well. In our interview, Robert explained that the injunction gave an officer the authority to say, “You’re on a bicycle with a pager. You’re going to jail. Oh, you’re on the thing [injunction]. You’re going to jail for five days.” Instead of an undercover officer busting one person for selling drugs, the injunction allowed a uniformed officer to make large sweeps.
The injunction identified a variety of actions that were “precursors” to the ultimate crimes of drug dealing and violence. The goal was to arrest alleged gang members before they did anything technically illegal. Robert laid out the problem and his proposed solution in his declaration to the court,

If law enforcement was able to prevent the gang members from doing all those things that are intrinsic to the purchase and sale of rock cocaine, we would be able to interrupt drug sales. This means stopping them from having lookouts, loitering in the area and trespassing on private property. If, for example, police officers were able to stop and detain gang members before they dealt their drugs to be sure they are not in possession of any contraband, then law enforcement would be able to slow down and interfere with the drug dealing […] The legal remedies provided by the criminal justice system alone are simply inadequate in the war against property crime, drug sales, and violence wrought upon the citizens of Cadillac/Corning by the Playboy Gangster Crips” (City of Los Angeles v. Playboy Gangster Crips 1987e).

Robert clarified how important the politics of geography are to the criminalizing effect of the injunction,

This little crime of trespassing would be nothing in the court out of context but in the context of what’s going on in the community, it’s a big crime […] We would go in and say, ‘He’s got a suspended license but, your honor, he’s this person in this neighborhood. So when somebody would get a $300 fine, you’d get a $3000 fine for a suspended license. We’d literally get 90, 120 days in jail” (emphasis added).

Relatively progressive groups, however, trusted authorities’ use of the injunction. President of the Los Angeles chapter of NAACP, Raymond L. Johnson Jr., supported the
Cadillac-Corning injunction because he believed it would “return the community back to the people” (Feldman 1987a). He further stated that authorities adequately assured him that the injunction would only be used to target a small group of hard core gang members.

Joan Howarth from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) had a different perspective on the proposed injunction stating, “This is the first time that I would characterize anything going on in the City of Los Angeles as coming close to a police state” (Feldman 1987a). In an interview, she remembered first reading about the proposed injunction in the LA Times over her morning coffee. Joan noted that the case was odd because she did not have named clients. Rather, she was defending the constitutional rights of the “John Doe’s”. The ACLU challenged the injunction on the grounds that the injunction left alleged gang members without basic legal protections. The result was three months of court appearances, which attracted groups of spectators and was covered extensively in local and national news.

During his consideration of the injunction, Judge Deering expressed skepticism that civil sanctions would work considering that more severe criminal sanctions had been ineffective against the PBGs (Feldman 1987b). He criticized the use of civil sanctions on the basis that they would be time consuming and result in a maximum jail sentence of only five days. Judge Deering advised the City Attorney’s Office to file criminal charges against alleged gang members instead. Robert explained in the interview, however, that there were benefits to a civil, rather than criminal, injunction once the City Attorney’s brought someone into court,

When a gang member comes in on a gang injunction they don’t have a right to council. They don’t have a right to a jury trial. They don’t have the right to a speedy—all of those rights that we have to deal with, which I respect. I had a tool that gave me all of these advantages. Why give the defendant back so much stuff? xx
The gang injunction developed a two-tiered criminal justice system in Los Angeles in which people of color in stigmatized neighborhoods could be disproportionately targeted and punished for behavior considered innocuous in any other context. The use of the civil court system further stacked the odds against defendants.

The final injunction prohibited gang members from the intimidation of residents, trespassing, obstruction of traffic, littering, vandalism, and public urination. Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Warren Deering struck down the many of the restrictions in the original court order as unconstitutionally far overreaching and “too broad to grant”, including a sunset to sunrise curfew for juvenile gang members; a prohibition against congregating in groups of two or more; a ban on wearing gang related colors; and loitering in public for more than five minutes (Feldman 1987a). The judge made no allusions to racial inequality as a concern.

Although some of the prohibitions sought by prosecutors were thrown of the Cadillac-Corning injunction, they were drawn on for inclusion in later injunctions. Many of the restrictions Judge Deering opposed in 1987 are standard parts of gang injunctions today. For example, in 1993, the same prosecutors that wrote the Cadillac-Corning injunction attained an injunction against the Blythe Street Gang. The Blythe Street injunction included (but was not limited to) prohibitions against possessing baseball bats, metal pipes, glass bottles, chains, rocks, screwdrivers, marbles, razors, large metal buckets, whistles, flashlights, markers, car parts without written proof of purchase, and pagers in places open to public view. Approaching vehicles, climbing trees, standing on buildings, and associating with alleged gang members was also prohibited (People v. Blythe Street Gang 1993).

In 1995, the Sixth District Court of Appeals ruled that under public nuisance law only criminal conduct could be prohibited. According to the ruling, since standing in public space and
wearing certain colors were not criminal conduct, they could not be prohibited in the injunction. In 1997, however, the California Supreme Court overturned the 1995 decision, thus upholding key non-criminal provisions in gang injunctions, including the non-association prohibition (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna 1997). After the 1997 decision, injunctions with these prohibitions were once again routinely implemented.

The injunction prohibitions eventually invaded private space too. When authorities chased people, they often retreated into friends’ apartments. In later injunctions, prosecutors attained court orders stating that an alleged gang member could not be in another’s residence without written permission. The order allowed police to enter and remove people from apartment units.

In Summary, the injunction was shaped, first, by ethnography conducted by prosecutors and police. City prosecutors decided which activities to prohibit from their meticulous observation of the neighborhood. They were primarily interested, not in criminal activities, but in the routine behavior that could lead to crimes. They targeted actions like hanging out, riding a bike, and carrying tools, which the ACLU and the presiding judge considered unconstitutionally broad. Although some prohibitions were thrown out, they later returned to injunctions. The prohibitions and protocols, laced with racial control, set forth in the Cadillac-Corning injunction built the path for future injunctions. The injunction was then shaped by the interplay in court proceedings. The prosecutors, police officers, neighborhood context, and court struggle that created the path are buried in archives. But what they set in motion is detrimental to youth of color in Los Angeles more than two decades later.

Discussion and Conclusion: The Injunction is Institutionalized
The injunction had effects even when prosecutions were not pursued. City prosecutors announced the times and places that they would be serving alleged gang members so as to attract media and residents. The LAPD Officer in charge of coordinating enforcement efforts discussed the injunction’s informal effects, “Interestingly enough, we didn’t really arrest that many people on the injunction but there was something about the public notification to the gang and the community meetings that just had a tremendous effect in reducing their criminal activities” (People v. Blythe St. Gang 1993). Perhaps the biggest “success” of the injunction was the effect on informal social control.

An LAPD Officer explained that, as more injunctions are implemented, the list of alleged gang members subject to injunction restrictions and gang enhancements continually expands, “When they add new members to the gang or when we see these guys starting to hang out and we identify these new members, we just add them on to the court order. So it just continues growing. So we never stop.”xxii

Near the end of our interview, Robert argued that the gang injunction was not intended to be such a blunt, widely used policy. Gang injunctions have become a primary standardized policy for police and city prosecutors rather than the last resort. He leaned his elbows on his desk, his tone slipping from a nostalgic excitement to resigned and serious, “They’re proud of the fact that they can advertise, you know, the City Attorney, there were 55 gang injunctions or 60, whatever. It’s a shotgun approach.” He shakes his head slightly and adds, “That’s not what my baby was about.”xxiii

The now naturalized classification systems of gang membership and target areas began with specific racial struggles in particular geographies during a contentious historical moment. In
order to specifically tailor the injunction so as to control the movement of black youth and upset the Playboy Gangster Crips’ (PBGs) drug operation, police and city prosecutors conducted an in-depth study of the Cadillac-Corning neighborhood. They sought to control black youth through the prohibition of precursors to crime—mundane behavior that is legal outside of the context of the target neighborhood and criminalized people. Although race politics are central to their observations and interpretation of a street gang, any references to race were sanitized out of the legal definition. In the years since the Cadillac-Corning injunction, a protocol has been developed to streamline the implementation of gang injunctions. In the process, the authors were erased, the neighborhood’s role was forgotten, and the gang membership label was naturalized as a stand-in for explicit racial references.

I provide a rare sociological and historical analysis of the landmark injunction and insight into the mindset of its authors. Although the wording of gang injunction policies is sanitized of race, Cadillac-Corning’s injunction specifically targeted black youth as violent offenders from deviant families. Injecting historical memory and physical context back into those processes reveals what has been abstracted out. The gang injunction was not implemented in the area with the most gang activity, assaults, or murders. Rather, it was instituted where borders separating black and white, wealthy and working class were becoming porous. The target of Los Angeles City’s first gang injunction was not meticulously picked by the City Attorney and the LAPD from a map of the city that broke down crime rates. The gang injunction was instituted where a black gang and drug business began negatively affecting white, middle and upper class people. Although the injunction’s initiation in West Los Angeles was largely accident, the identification of Cadillac-Corning as the LAPD West Division’s “worst area” was intentional. Some of the choicest real estate in the country is right across the street. Cadillac-Corning was and, in many
ways still is, an abrupt dividing line in which authorities attempt to contain people of color. The legacy of the injunction is still imprinted on the reputation of and policing tactics in Cadillac-Corning 20 years later. The practice of building gates at the end of alleyways to preclude getaway routes is still standard. Police continue to target youth on bicycles as suspected lookouts for the drug business.

The development of gang injunctions is the development of a dual system of criminal justice in which low-income urban people of color are targeted and given harsh punishment for things which are considered innocuous outside of stigmatized neighborhoods and the criminalized status of gang membership. The powerful label of gang member has evolved such that it is used to justify violent state action. It is a status that sparks fear in the general public. Police, policy makers, and media outlets constantly exploit the gang membership label in a way that legitimizes repression. For example, on a regular basis major newspapers and news channels will report some version of the headline, “Police Shoot Gang Member”. Because the person is an alleged gang member no more questions are asked—regarding the context of the shooting, how the police and media are certain the person was an alleged gang member, and why it is even be relevant. The dehumanized view of alleged gang members that police and prosecutors influences media representations and everyday citizen interactions with black and Latino youth.

The war on gangs is a primary reason California’s massive system of incarceration and surveillance continues to balloon. In addition to spreading to other cities, the injunction has been expanded to target other groups as well. Police and city prosecutors have recently used injunctions to target drug dealing in skid row and to attack graffiti crews. Whether injunctions are used to wage a war on gangs, drugs, or art, it all ends up being a war on LA’s least powerful communities. Gang injunctions involve an initial process of de-racialization followed by
unspoken re-racialization. The disproportionate effect of gang injunctions on people of color means that gang injunctions are working like they are supposed to. It is a problem at the base of the idea of the injunction, not simply a blemish to be administratively corrected.
Chapter 4

The Chaos of Upstanding Citizens:
Disorderly Community Partners and Broken Windows Policing

How do residents in community groups define deviance, community, and their relationship to local government? Relying upon approximately two years of multi-method ethnography, I argue that despite law enforcement attempts at dissuasion, community group members utilize the broken windows theory to portray street vending as a harbinger of crime. Residents request police action and demand government services based on the self-adopted identities of victim and consumer-citizen. The police, in turn, enact a model of community policing in which the public is restricted to a supportive role as informants and guarantors of quality-of-life issues. Both sides of the partnership deploy broken windows arguments in conflicting visions about the disorderly other.

With the fall of the detached professional style of policing prevalent in the 1970s, new models of law enforcement have emerged in American cities to address formal and informal social control. Two prominent models, broken windows policing and community policing, entail distinct roles for community members and law enforcement. Community policing involves cooperation between police and residents in the development of crime prevention strategies. Broken windows policing places emphasis on order maintenance by officers with community members in a supporting role. Despite the traditional theoretical differences in the two paradigms, in practice many urban police forces implement both simultaneously (DeMichele & Kraska 2001). Some researchers view community policing programs as a potential challenge to the hard line antidemocratic nature of the broken windows model (Herbert, 2001; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux 1990). Critical scholars, however, argue that community policing is a top-down
rather than collaborative endeavor in which the police use community groups for their own purposes (Crawford 1997; Garland 2001).

Even these critical scholars have dedicated less attention to how community groups use partnerships for their own ends. I have conducted a sustained ethnographic examination of a community-police partnership, with particular attention to neighborhood resident participation. I focused on the civilian side of partnerships because arguments about the democratizing or anti-democratic leanings of policing models hinge on community participation. An exclusive focus on police agency can portray law enforcement as all powerful. But ‘the community’ is not always a purely well-intentioned yet powerless, reactive entity in the face of police authority. Looking at the interaction between the community and the police from the perspective of community groups could reveal how certain sets of citizens become authorized to speak over others. A view from the perspectives of community group members also has the potential to reveal the myriad forms of subtle power wielded by citizens as they interact with police.

I demonstrate how community group members have taken broken windows ideology and used it for their own ends in attempts to oppose street vending in their area. I found that despite official attempts to diminish the expectations of community group members, residents in community groups utilized the broken windows theory to portray vending as a harbinger of crime. I built upon the work of Duggan (2003) and Simon (2007) to explore the ways community group members used consumer citizen and victim identities to relate to government in the era of broken windows and community policing. Community group members approached partnerships as if community policing and broken windows enforcement were seamlessly compatible. The few individual community group members that had extensive resources at their disposal applied pressure to authorities to extract an enforcement response. Less well-positioned community
group members opportunistically took direct action against vendors, overstepping their partnership role in the eyes of authorities.

Ultimately, each side of the community partnership molded the policing models for self-serving ends. Harcourt (2001) examined the use of broken windows arguments among policy makers and police. I have used his concept of harm arguments to expand research on the use of broken windows logic into community groups. Drawing upon the community policing literature (Crawford 1997; Garland 2001; Herbert 2001; Lyons 1999) I added an analysis of how broken windows provided a lens through which tensions in a community partnership played out in a racially and socioeconomically diverse area.

**The “Community” in Community Partnerships**

Throughout the early and mid 20th century police in American cities strived to keep their distance from the neighborhoods they policed (Garland 2001). Detachment was not only intended as an antidote to rampant corruption but also as a way to shield departments from public scrutiny. Professionalization gave the appearance that policing could be scientifically efficient and apolitical (Lyons 1999). However, social unrest, high profile cases of police brutality and consistently high crime rates are a few factors that sparked misgivings about professionalized policing in the 1970s.

Police departments across the country have turned to community policing measures in the realization that informal social control exercised through everyday relationships and institutions is more effective than legal sanctions (Garland 2001). When I use the term “community partnerships” I refer to programs that bring the police, organized residents, and at times, other relevant government agencies together to develop problem solving projects as a fear reduction
and crime prevention strategy. There are several directions community partnerships can take and a variety of tensions and contradictory elements that can arise in the implementation of community policing. These tensions and contradictions warrant attention because they speak to struggles over what constitutes the legitimate voice of the community. Partnerships are the vehicle through which law enforcement “empowers” neighborhood residents to “take back” their neighborhoods from criminals. Herbert (2001) and Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) see community partnerships as a possible avenue for infusing a democratic process into crime reduction strategies if citizens are equal partners with officers. These scholars view an ideal partnership as one in which officers, city employees, and community group members develop programs and decide the direction of resources together.

However, Crawford (1997) and Garland (2001) note that more often community partnerships are an opportunity for police to manage the public’s expectations for enforcement. Through “responsibilization strategies” authorities claim that the primary reason for crime is the community’s failure to prevent it (Crawford 1997: 266). Thus, officials contradictorily reassure the public through a litany of ‘tough on crime’ talk while simultaneously redirecting accountability for crime rates. Here, a community partnership is part public relations ploy and a forum for police to appease residents as well as co-opt, disarm, and preempt resistance and discontent. Despite residents’ hope that community partnerships will deliver individualized attention and resources from police, they often bring the opposite result. Crawford (1997: 166) argues, “in the ‘double-speak’ of criminal justice rhetoric, the notion of ‘community ownership’ frequently translates into ‘the community must mobilize its own resources’”. Consequently, select people with financial and political resources, such as private business owners, reappear in the leadership positions of community partnerships (Crawford 1999). In this type of community
partnership, police develop their own agenda and then “tap community partnerships only insofar as they are a resource for the police department, reversing the power flow from empowering communities to empowering the police” (Lyons 1999: 36).

Nevertheless, appointing civilians who possess power, wealth, or influence could bring tension to a partnership, as they also can leverage their resources to persuade police to respond to their needs. Powerful and wealthy civilians can use their resources to support police. However, they may also be able to forcefully challenge claims of responsibility and blame made by officials.

Law enforcement officials intentionally shape the composition of community partnerships as well. In a study of community partnership programs initiated by the New York Police Department (NYPD) under William Bratton in the 1990s, Chesluk (2004) argues that officials in community partnerships do not simply find the community. Rather, “the police determine in part the nature of the ‘community’ and how they will speak” by enlisting well-organized groups of citizens to combat “undesirables” (Chesluk 2004: 256-7). They pick specific groups and deem them to be “the community”.

Regardless of the dynamic a community partnership develops, Crawford argues that community groups have moral overtones of exclusion. Community-based crime prevention programs necessitate that “we”, the law-abiding citizens, identify and take action against criminal outsiders. Crawford (1997: 169) explains, “Exclusion is not so much an unfortunate by-product of the practice of community-based crime prevention initiatives but an essential element of its operation.” But we still do not know how, in practice, the “community” uses the rhetoric of community partnerships and broken windows policing to create specific community boundaries and garner state resources.
**Broken Windows**

Unlike community policing, broken windows (also called order maintenance or zero tolerance policing) implies a more passive role for residents who are viewed as being unable to battle disorder in their neighborhoods (Herbert 2001). Proponents of the broken windows theory argue that the accumulation of small acts of disorder creates an environment conducive to serious crimes like robbery or assault. Disorder causes a general feeling of fear to which law-abiders react by fleeing into their homes or to more orderly gated estates. Conversely, the “wrong” kinds of people are supposedly attracted to disorderly areas because they are seen as easy places to commit crimes. The concept of disorder is necessarily vague and indefinitely expansive so as to allow for ample police discretion. A few signs of so-called physical and social disorder are litter, graffiti, truants, loiterers, people who are homeless, and street vendors (Parenti 2001).

Preventative policing grants the police discretion to target signs of disorder in order to prevent the escalation to violent crime (Bratton & Malinowski 2008; Wilson & Kelling 1982). Despite official race neutrality in the language of the broken windows theory, definitions of disorder are laced with implications about race, class, and public space (Roberts 1999; Stewart 1998). The practice of broken windows policing relies upon a racial ideology that connects the dark/foreign other to unpredictable chaos and criminality. The disorderly people targeted by police are overwhelmingly lower-class, Black, Latino, and using public space.

Harcourt (2001: 194) argues that the disorder-crime nexus hinges upon “harm arguments” that flourish in political and legal debates. Those who deploy harm arguments contend that certain actions are harmful rather than simply annoying, morally offensive, or aesthetically objectionable. Harcourt takes loitering as one example. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s anti-loitering ordinances prohibited public idleness insofar as it posed a nuisance to others.
With the rise of the broken windows theory policy makers and law enforcement justify similar ordinances by arguing that loitering is a broken window that attracts crime, such as gang activity (Harcourt 2001). Loiterers, homeless people, unattended youth, and so on, are deemed responsible for the potential neighborhood spiral into crime and urban decay. Thus, loitering is transformed from an inconvenience to disorderly and harmful behavior that justifies police intervention.

Researchers have extensively debated the theoretical and empirical merit of the disorder-crime continuum (Harcourt 2001; Sampson & Raudenbush 2004; Xu, Fiedler & Flaming 2005) and the effects of order maintenance policing on public life, informal economies, arrests patterns, and fear of crime (Duneier 2001; Hinkle & Weisburd 2008; Jang, Hoover & Lawton 2008; Parenti 2001; Stewart 1998). Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) contend that order maintenance policing can effectively reduce fear of crime. Hinkle and Weisburd (2008), however, find that the visible police intervention launched to restore order can decrease general feelings of safety. Davis (2002: 8) and Crawford (1997: 271) maintain that rather than increasing feelings of safety, the constant monitoring of disorder and danger “paradoxically generate[s] radical insecurity” so as to “institutionalize anxiety” in middle-class urban residents. Residents in turn demand greater responsiveness from both public and private agents of security. However, just because authorities have the discretion to act on something does not mean they will. It is the difference between what broken windows allows police to do and what it would obligate that the police do. Order maintenance means that “broad criminal laws […] allow the police to take people off the streets because they look suspicious” (Harcourt 2001: 128). The police have broad discretion to remove people deemed undesirable. Whether and how they respond to disorder is contingent on multiple extralegal factors.
Despite distinct roles for residents and officers as an ideal type, community policing programs can be made compatible with the broken windows theory through an emphasis on informal social control, moral binaries and the construction of an exclusive community (DeMichele & Kraska 2001; Herbert 2001). Under a circular logic, the degeneration of community is both the cause and the result of crime (Crawford 1997). Crime and disorder cause law-abiding people to retreat into their homes in fear. The lack of interaction breeds yet more fear, causing people to become further detached. Thus, strengthening community is both a means and an end (Sasson 1995). However, compared to the ideal of community policing, residents are more limited in their actions under the broken windows policing model. Properly behaved residents are to upkeep their property, observe disorderly others, and alert officers to signs of disorder. Fear is reduced, order restored, and community is built through the formal and informal social control of an Other.

In comparison to much of Los Angeles, La Cienega Heights was a relatively safe neighborhood. Most years there were no homicides in the neighborhood. However, in comparison to the rest of the West Los Angeles division, the area was considered a problem neighborhood that monopolized the resources of the LAPD. Although the efforts to “clean up” the neighborhood had some impact and caused chaos in the lives of La Cienega Heights residents, police and community partners did not see any long term “success”. Police and long-term residents in the surrounding neighborhoods complained that had been dealing with the same problems for 40 years. I wanted to understand how a small group of people were able to acquire, or alternately, not able to acquire, the power to influence policies and enforcement, as well as how their actions were informed by the ways they thought about those they sought to control or force out. My case study is a concrete attempt to meld community partnerships with broken
windows policing. My purpose is neither to argue that a certain type of partnership is good or bad nor to pin down disorder. Duneier (2001: 289, 315) recommends that the ambiguity of broken windows should be addressed with efforts to “define disorder with greater accuracy” through the “systematic study” of the people who may increase or decrease safety. However, I do not believe that sociological knowledge production is somehow a more just or competent method for determining hierarchies of what and who is (un)safe or (in)decent or (un)civil. Reshuffling the disorder-crime continuum does not confront that the framework of broken windows gives a few the discretion to draw “the line between order and disorder in the first place” (Harcourt 2001:130). Similarly, attempting to determine the relative merit of partnerships misses the much larger question of how community partnerships saturated with broken windows ideology structure struggles to define community and safety, identify disorder, and control neighborhood space through the management of people and property.

Vendors as the Broken Window: Community Groups and Harm Arguments

We are a community seeking to revitalize its livability and image. We have truly bought into Chief Bratton’s broken windows credo and believe that a neighborhood that looks neglected invites crime and deviant behavior.

-La Cienega Heights (LACH) Community Group in a document addressed to the West Los Angeles Police Department (WLAPD) Captain, June of 2005.

Residents of La Cienega Heights who attended community meetings in the spring of 2008 had recent violence on their minds. During ten days in late March and early April, three shootings, one resulting in a fatality, occurred in the area. It was rumored that the shootings were gang
related. Frustrated, anxious people filled the cafeterias of the local schools after work to demand answers. How could they let this happen again? What were they planning to do to protect ‘law-abiding’ residents? The West Los Angeles Police Department (WLAPD) Captain and other uniformed officers sat in a panel at the front of the room with the Neighborhood Prosecutor from the City Attorney’s Office and a detective in a charcoal grey suit. They repeatedly assured everyone that they were making progress on the case. The criminals would be arrested and punished. Resources were going to be poured into the neighborhood.

There was one surprising topic that popped up in all of the open question sections at the end of each meeting. Laura, a member of the La Cienega Heights (LACH) Community Group, asked the newly-assigned Senior Lead Officer, Angela, what the WLAPD planned to do about the persistence of illegal vendors,

Laura: Summer is coming, during which the neighborhood will be invaded by vendors. It doesn’t frame the neighborhood well.

Angela: I just shooed away some vendors by the Bank of America. Dealing with the vendors is like mowing the lawn. If you don’t stay on top of it, they grow back thicker. But they are not a very high priority. Burglaries are picking up and all crime picks up in the summer, including gang activity.

Laura: They may not just be selling wares. They observe, they tip off. It’s the broken windows theory.

Angela: It is very much a blight on society. It is very much a broken windows problem. If you can send me the information on where they are and when—times are very important—I can forward the information onto patrol for them to take care of.
Laura’s statement exemplifies how community groups considered vendors to be outside elements that assaulted the community. This instance is just one of many examples during which residents in community groups demonstrated an awareness of the broken windows theory of crime, however misconstrued, that the LAPD formally espoused. The LACH Community Group adopted the paradigm of broken windows. It shaped their work and their interaction with local government services. Residents essentially reversed broken windows logic. Rather than identifying vending as a cause of disorder that could lead to murder, their focus on vending was sparked by a murder. The leap from murder to vendors was mediated by fuzzy concepts like “blight” that were used with such frequency they came to encompass an increasingly broad range of people, activities, and spaces. Laura’s interaction with Angela also highlights the tension between the LAPD’s broken windows ideology, the daily practice of police work, and the department’s attempt to institute community policing.

Vending took a variety of forms in the neighborhood. After more than a year and a half, I barely noticed the horn that announced the arrival of the Latino produce vendor in front of my house anywhere from two to five times a day. The tune to the first couple lines of ‘La Cucaracha’ blared through the static of a loudspeaker attached to the top of the white truck. The broken horn could not play the full first two lines of the song though. Instead, the music spiked, dipped, and broke up before trailing off limply: La cucaracha, la cuca-racha, ya no quier-es cam-i-nar... Another older Latino vendor parked his produce truck at the same spot every day, remaining stationary to sell products. Two ice cream trucks played lullabies as they lumbered up and down the neighborhood’s narrow streets. Additionally, a young Latino man with small bells dangling from the handle of a push cart sold ice cream and pork rinds throughout the day.
Around sunset a middle-aged Latina pushing a cart shouted out her product, “taaaamtaaaaales!”

During the spring and summer a man set up a fruit stand at a busy four-way-stop.

How did residents in the LACH Community Group link vending to crime? In hopes of eradicating vending from the neighborhood, they attacked the practice from a number of angles. At first, they complained that vendors were an annoyance. The LACH Community Group initially argued that their quality of life was being affected through small but compounding infractions. They alleged that noise pollution from vendors’ horns and bells, congregation of crowds around the trucks, and litter created a feeling of disorder that made them generally fearful as well as lowered property values. In response, police argued that quality of life offences are extremely difficult to catch in the act. For example, to cite a vendor for noise pollution the police would have to monitor vendors and measure the decibels of their horns. After they failed to extract an enforcement response, they turned to harm arguments that more forcefully associated vendors with harm. For example, community group members claimed that the graffiti on vending trucks constituted a visual blight that attracted violent crime. Furthermore, the LACH Community Group complained that the vendors constituted a health risk to the community. They demanded coordination between the WLAPD and the Los Angeles County Health Department to shut down the carts and confiscate their goods for selling food in sub-grade conditions. Again, police responded that they did not have the personnel to launch a coordinated operation. The LACH Community Group also complained that the undocumented immigration status of many vendors indicated that they were not taxed or properly licensed. Community group members argued that vendors further undercut taxed and licensed businesses when they pulled customers away. Officers claimed that they would target illegal vendors if businesses filed complaints. On the contrary, several businesses actually protected vendors by renting out space to them.
Finally, community group members’ requests became structured around increasingly explicit connections between vendors and danger through claims that vendors were themselves perpetrators of criminal activities. At the end of 2008, LACH Community Group members began telling authorities they had reason to believe that one of the vendors started to sell marijuana and other drugs as well as food. One recurring story involved an ice cream man who was caught a few years previously selling toy guns near the elementary school. At times, people said he was also selling pellet guns, fireworks, or cigarettes. More important than the details of the story, was the function of the narrative. It was a documented example that community group members could use as leverage against those who were unconvinced by their harm arguments. The story explicitly connected the vendor with the predation of children as justification for the aggressive eradication of all vendors. Either you were invested in the anti-vending crusade or you sided with violent gang members, child predators, and drug dealers.

Community groups marshaled broken windows arguments to prompt action from various local government agents. Community groups began with complaints that vendors brought disorder into the physical environment and that police should have addressed annoyances that affected their quality of life. They then sought other local government agencies to regulate and enforce various violations. Eventually, they returned to appeals to law enforcement, but this time through the lens of social disorder and the explicit connection of vendors to criminal behavior. Community group members increasingly linked vendors to active predation because appeals through broken windows logic did not convince authorities. A deconstruction of harm arguments highlights the ambiguity involved in locating vendors on the disorder-crime continuum. A lot of work goes into the separation of disorderly deviants and orderly law-abiders.
Daily life defies clean categorization. There is not just one form of disorder. Accordingly, part of defining disorder is deciding who is supposed to restore order.

Ironically, the ever-expanding scope of harm arguments complicated an official law enforcement response because different harm arguments implied the jurisdiction of very different agencies. There was no one institution to address vending. Despite all of the institutional representatives that met in community partnerships the process to report vendors was unclear. At times vending violated health codes. In some situations, vending qualified as an illegal activity. Community group members felt they held up their half of community policing. They became frustrated when authorities responded to the ambiguity with inaction.

**Not Every Broken Windows is Repaired: The Police Resist Community Demands**

Community group members believed that, as an institution that spread the broken windows gospel, the LAPD should have targeted illegal vending. A Senior Lead Officer and Neighborhood Prosecutor were assigned to the area specifically for the purpose of addressing local ‘quality of life’ concerns on a long-term basis. In community meetings and in the press, LAPD officers constantly talked about their belief in broken windows. For example, at a community meeting an LAPD officer talked about the importance of quickly addressing disorder,

> When we see graffiti, we try to get it removed as soon as possible because the broken windows theory that we follow says that if we clean it off quickly people will be less tempted to put more graffiti on top of it. Our goal is for the gang to see that they cannot thrive here and move on to another area.
The mediation of enforcement through reporting technology exemplified the push and pull between police and community groups over their relative power in partnerships. The COMPSTAT system (short for “Computerized Statistics”) structured officer deployment and accountability in the broken windows model of policing (Bratton & Malinowski 2008; Parenti 2001). COMPSTAT mapped up to date crime trends with higher crime areas getting more police. Commissioners and chiefs ranked LAPD divisions at monthly COMPSTAT meetings according to the percentage that captains brought down crime in their reporting districts.

Police often advised residents to report vendors. Community group members were told that the more they could document disorder, the more resources would be distributed to the area. It was a recurring tactic of appeasement that officers could fall back on when other responses proved insufficient.

Community group members were conscious of the COMPSTAT system and the broken windows theory. They actively tried to make their areas look in dire need of police resources. According to one community group member,

People need to report *everything*. They see a lot but they don’t report it because they think nothing will happen. But when people make reports, it goes into COMPSTAT, and COMPSTAT determines officer deployment. So when no one reports, and officers look to COMPSTAT to decide where to send officers, they look at the map, and say, ‘well, you live in a country club, there’s no crime there’. xxvii

But the process was not so straightforward. Although the point of broken windows is to focus on minor, not even technically illegal, offenses as a preventative measure, the daily reality of police work often necessitated deviation from this model. Vending was a low priority compared to robberies or assaults. Thus, a dedicated response was unlikely even if residents
reported vendors consistently. From the perspective of the police, community group members overstepped their role. Police, not residents, decided enforcement.

The broken windows model granted officers broad discretion. An officer did not target *every* disorderly behavior. Rather, broken windows logic meant they could rely on a litany of charges of disorder to justify targeting the person or group at hand. For example, in a study of the LAPD Herbert (1997) discovered that police were reluctant to arrest street vendors as long as they did not challenge the police for territorial control. Nonetheless, police could not always brush off community groups based on the privilege of discretion. They still had to give at least a nod to the guidelines of community policing. Officers also justified their non-enforcement of vending ordinances by contesting community group members’ definition of insiders and outsiders. For example, after years of unsuccessful demands for the citation and arrest of vendors, the LACH Community Group called for the assignment of a new Senior Lead Officer. The Senior Lead Officer under fire responded to the anger of LACH Community Group members in a letter,

>This is also a social problem that politicians and government has been trying to solve for years. As a side note when other officers and myself attempt to cite these individuals we have been yelled at and ridiculed by citizens who claim that we are harassing and racial profiling these vendors. There is support for these vendors by people who say that this is a victimless crime and who claim that these vendors are merely serving a community who wants, needs and welcomes their services.

The Senior Lead Officer pointed out that a sizable proportion of residents who were not involved in community groups showed approval of vendors by keeping them in business. When police enlisted residents in community partnerships they opened up a floodgate for which they
were not prepared. Because “every moment of discomfort can be read as a potential broken window and therefore the first step on the road to chaos,” residents bombarded police officers with a myriad of complaints (Chesluk 2004: 255). Like the officers in Lyons’ (1999) study of a community partnership in Seattle, officers did not automatically imbue more educated, wealthy and active community members with the authority to represent the community. Officers constructed a broader definition of community, at least momentarily, when community groups overstepped their role. Officers were flexible in their loyalty to broken windows logic depending upon the practical situations they faced. Nonetheless, the self-appointed community was determined to not be so easily dismissed.

**Community Groups Take Action: Empowerment as Victims and Consumers**

In the summer of 2008 a white homeowner expressed his frustration with the persistence of illegal vending on his block,

> I do not care if the renters in the owner neglected apartments want the vendors here, many of which are illegal aliens and or leaching off of the welfare system or taking advantage of Section Eight. I have already witnessed a surge in foot vendors this summer alone, some of which in broken English have told me they just got here from El Salvador. What's the chance they are here legally, operating a legal business? How is it that renters and illegal vendors have more rights in this neighborhood than the law abiding, hard working tax-paying home-owning citizens?xxix

His statement is a common example of the way homeowners in the community groups talked about vendors and the patrons of vendors. The group that they considered to have a legitimate voice in the neighborhood was quite narrow. In their calls for action from authorities,
the members of community groups revealed how they imagined themselves in relationship to other residents as well as to local government. To these ends, residents in community groups blended the frames of consumerism and victimization. They viewed local government not as a general public service, but as an entity that must respond to an exclusive group of investors. The most obvious ground for entitlement was through the payment of property taxes. Community group members also made less concrete claims to entitlement. Because of their status as deserving urban citizenry (white or honorary white, “productive”, not poor) they saw themselves and their property as constantly victimized by bad people. Community partnerships provided an avenue for residents to voice their demands and ideas about community within broken windows logic.

The security of self, property, and lifestyle was demanded was an entitlement of inclusion in the good, deserving community. Duggan (2003) argues that homeowners create exclusion through identification with the place in which they pay property taxes. Under the “consumer citizenship” model of government, they claim to be entitled to local government services in return for their investment (Duggan 2003: 38). The claim to exclusive services is far from purely economic. Rather, the localities to which homeowners identify are racial. High taxes are linked to “the high cost of welfare for poor, minority, urban residents—the same communities blamed for crime” (Simon 2007: 109). Community group members’ claims for entitlement were saturated with racially coded implications about who is and who is not deserving of support from the state. “Illegal aliens”, “broken English”, “just got here from El Salvador”, “leaching off of the welfare system or taking advantage of Section Eight”, “fatherless children” (stated by the same man) signal that the people being talked about were poor, black or brown, undeserving, and criminal. The victim is someone who pays while others are free-riders.
Besides envisioning themselves as deserving of services because of taxes or long-term neighborhood involvement, residents in partnerships appealed to crime victimization. Scholars have noted that a victimization frame is often strategically successful in gaining legal footing (Garland 2001; Glassner 1999; Harcourt 2001; Simon 2007). Simon (2007: 89-90) argues that with the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act the crime victim arose as an “idealized subject”. Legislation centered on the imagined interests of the victim. The exaltation of the victim as model citizen created incentives for people to embrace the identity. Therefore, “people deploy the category of crime to legitimate interventions that have other motivations” (Simon 2007: 4). The process of defining dangerous others entailed the simultaneous definition of the self as potential victim.

Although community groups were dominated by property owners, the few renters in the groups also claimed to be invested in the neighborhood and entitled to services and a police response. In a regression of marginalization, long-time renters distanced themselves from people they considered unworthy and criminal, such as new renters or undocumented immigrants. For example, one of the few renters active in the LACH Community Group, a black woman, referred to working renters as the apartment dwellers deserving of a place in the community: ‘What I mean when I say working renters is that these were not transient renters. Many had been in the neighborhood for 20 years.’ Renters leveraged the time or energy they invested and their status as good people to elicit a response from police, local government, and city prosecutors. Community group members believed that they got nothing back for all their hard work and material investment; not even extensive special treatment from local bureaucracies. Meanwhile, undeserving and lazy others lived charmed lives blessed with protection by the state.
Empowerment through Politicking

Whereas most of the members of the LACH Community Group had little sway with police and neighborhood prosecutors, members of the Community-Police Advisory Board (C-PAB) often maintained daily communication with the WLAPD Captain and negotiated their concerns with him or her directly. C-PAB members were mainly white homeowners from affluent Westside neighborhoods.

David, a white business owner on the board of C-PAB, was active in his Neighborhood Council and a member of the Chamber of Commerce. David had little tolerance for residents who insisted that police were the answer to community problems. He told me that the community had to be empowered to solve its own problems, ‘We have a responsibility to take matters into our own hands. We can’t wait for the cops or the city to solve this. It is a matter of personal responsibility’. At a neighborhood watch meeting for La Cienega Heights, David explained how his neighborhood association successfully solicited city services,

City government is like a big tree. And I can be an arborist but you guys have to learn how to work the system. My suggestion is that if you want something to get done submit a request in writing, email is fine, to your city council person. And report it to your neighborhood council. The neighborhood council advises the city council on quality of life issues. And don’t forget about it. Keep calling and checking up on it […] you have to know who to go to but also how to talk to them.

The WLAPD Captain confirmed the soundness of David’s advice, ‘David is right about persistence. If someone calls me once, obviously I look at it. But if someone calls me 15 times, guess what? The person who calls me once is going on the backburner.’
David played a central role in a lawsuit which blocked the Pico-Olympic Traffic Initiative proposed by Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa and then City Councilmember Jack Weiss. The purpose of the initiative was to alleviate a portion of Los Angeles’ notorious traffic problems by changing the parallel Pico Boulevard and Olympic Boulevard into one way streets during rush hours. The neighborhood councils along Pico felt they were left out of the decision process when the initiative was crafted. Furthermore, businesses were convinced they would lose revenue from the extensive parking restrictions that would accompany the change in traffic signals. With donations from Westside homeowners, David and the Chamber of Commerce hired a lawyer and successfully defeated the initiative.

David used leverage he gained from the Pico-Olympic Traffic Initiative lawsuit to facilitate anti-vending enforcement. At a Public Safety Meeting the WLAPD Captain, with David at his side, explained to a crowd of angry residents why it is not practically feasible for the police to confiscate vendor’s goods.

Captain: We don’t have space for confiscated goods. That would require a warehouse and the problem is that property in West LA is expensive. The pushcarts are technically evidence in a crime. But we are working on—

David (cutting in): C-PAB is currently working on getting space. Along Pico there are some owners of public storage places who are very grateful to us for stopping the Pico-Olympic traffic initiative.xxxii

The purpose of C-PAB was to provide a liaison between the community and the police. C-PAB members were supposed to represent the concerns of the community. Alternately, C-PAB members assisted the LAPD in community policing efforts such as Neighborhood Watch. Police-appointed liaisons in community-police partnerships structured community expectations
of police (Chesluk 2004). Thus, the groups legitimated LAPD actions as backed by popular support and a democratic process. In a way, David was trying to help the WLAPD Captain by providing him with resources to which he would not otherwise have access and appease demanding residents.

Although the police had state authority, some community group members were much wealthier and in many ways, more politically connected than the police captains with whom they partnered. David’s unique position also brought subtle tension to police power. The sincerity of the Captain’s desire to address vending was checked when community group members viably offered solutions. Interestingly, however, such power differentials may backfire. During the course of this research, David was ousted from C-PAB. The newly appointed captain made use of her right to remove any C-PAB member. When other C-PAB members demanded transparency over the circumstances of David’s removal, she would only comment that they had a ‘difference of opinion’. She replaced David with a ‘more respectful’ soft spoken white man in his 60s from Bel-Air. At least in the arena of C-PAB, it appears the police held onto ultimate authority. Most community group members, however, did not have the resources to battle the WLAPD Captain. They had a more immediate and direct method to confront vending.

**Empowerment through Vigilantism**

The Neighborhood Prosecutor explained in an interview why she believed that vending was such a salient issue for community group members,

> People don’t like strangers in their neighborhood. So it’s perceived that if you have this person sitting there selling fruit, somehow these people are doing something else—some other illegal activity. xxxiii
Community group members insisted that vendors had no place in the neighborhood. But the vendors were not strangers in the sense that they were unfamiliar to residents. There was a general consistency day after day in the people who drove the produce trucks, sold ice cream from push carts, and set up fruit stands at busy corners. Patrons developed amicable acquaintanceships with the vendors they regularly bought from. The police also knew the vendors who frequented the neighborhood.

Community group members who opposed vending recognized particular vendors. One LACH Community Group member burst out of his house to yell at a vendor he claimed was arrogant for repeatedly ignoring requests to stop honking his horn. In another instance, a member of the group was arrested after a vendor called the police to report harassment. LACH Community Group members harbored vehement anger at the vendors they believed filed false battery claims against them. When community group members could not elicit a response from authorities, they took enforcement into their own hands. A LACH Community Group member started a 2008 letter with the line “word from the front” as if to imply the existence of a war between some residents and vendors. He continued, “If something dramatic is not done soon with regard to shutting down these vendors, escalation of confrontation is inevitable”.xxxiv

Community group members positioned themselves as under siege from a litany of undeserving, criminal people and from the very institutions that were supposed to protect them. They simultaneously defined community narrowly while employing populist language to justify taking action into their own hands.

In order to get a response from the authorities, residents tracked vendors, called the police, and refused to leave until the police agreed to meet their demands for a citation or arrest. Another LACH Community Group member advanced a sort of ultimatum to the Neighborhood
Prosecutor, “If this area is not policed, we will have to do it ourselves, at great personal risk.” She admitted to me that she personally struggled with the turn the community group took: “We have had to do citizens arrests. We have had to follow people we saw breaking into houses or doing graffiti and hold them until the police get there. At what point does it turn into vigilantism? We don’t want to do that.”xxxv There was uncertainty and unease in all parts of the partnership as to when the “informal regulation of criminal deviance” slipped from neighborly vigilance into uncontrollable vigilantism (Johnston 1996: 220). What are the police to do when the residents who are supposed to restore order become themselves disorderly? For the core members of community partnership groups, crime prevention became all-encompassing. They maintained constant communication with police, City Prosecutors, and government officials, checked COMPSTAT crime maps daily, and discussed any signs of possible danger with each other via call chains. Look for deviance through a broken window and you will see it, sometimes driving a produce truck.

**The Disorder of Upstanding Citizens**

Community and broken windows policing presume very different legitimate roles for community members. Yet, both policing approaches are not incompatible and may be used to the advantage of community members. This study showed that once a community buys into the premise of broken windows they may relinquish their presumed passive role and try to hold the police accountable to the causal link between disorder and crime. Community group members turned the tables, demanding protective services in the name of looming disorder. How much did community group members, a small but vocal portion of the neighborhood population, actually associate vendors with crime and danger? Community group members themselves may not even
have been certain as to why they felt as they did about vendors. It is difficult to disentangle true motivations from instrumental tactics. It is evident, however, that community group members used harm arguments selectively and strategically to prompt a desired response from authorities. When their harm arguments were rejected, community group members turned to making more direct connections between vending and danger, for example, through claims that vendors dealt drugs and burglarized homes.

Community group members explicitly stated that they were using the broken windows framework and they expected the police to do the same. For years, community groups were told by police that it was important to follow the broken windows model by erasing graffiti immediately, fixing broken street lights, and up-keeping their lawns and houses. Residents, however, turned expectations back on the police. They were comfortable engaging with academic theories. They understood how COMPSTAT and officer deployment worked enough to actively manipulate police technology. Using the broken windows framework heightened the level of attention residents expected from police and other local government agencies. The community’s warm embrace of broken windows surveillance put the police in the awkward position of having to qualify the causal links between street vending and serious crime. A policy that was supposed to give law enforcement discretion to single out disorder was used to encourage them to spend scarce resources. It was community group members that sought preventative action on the assumption, however tenuous, that the worst situation would materialize. In taking a risk management framework, community groups overestimated the likelihood of danger, especially in a neighborhood where murders and violent crime were relatively rare. Although the stated intent of community partnership programs was to reduce fear,
the broken windows theory allowed community group members to argue that potential danger was everywhere.

Battles over vending in the racially and socioeconomically mixed area highlight that, contrary to the claims of broken windows advocates, what constitutes disorder is far from obvious. Order does not magically arise out of disorder. Rather, constructing order produces the problem of disorder. Moreover, what is order in one context becomes disorderly in another context (Berg & Timmermans 2000: 47). Here, harnessing the broken windows argument in the framework of community policing gave community groups leverage to define street vending as disorder. Community groups became quite chaotic in their own way as they scrambled from one line of logic to another. In the end, community group members never got the dedicated systematic enforcement they wanted. The tentacles of formal and informal social control functioned unevenly and uneasily. It involved a variety of actors who often worked at cross-purposes.

Community group members saw broken windows logic as offering a promised land of order that was worth almost any cost. But their frantic need to tame disorder haphazardly affected the daily lives of vendors and other groups they criminalized. Moreover, there was a lifelessness that permeated the spaces where there loomed fear of anything that winked openly of the uncomfortable or of indecency or wild beauty. In many cities unsanctioned art is attacked as criminal graffiti (Ferrell 1995:79). Skateboarding is categorized as a public nuisance (Hayward 2004:142). The community group was like many urban entities that continue to arrange and regulate public space in their own binary vision such that any complexity is erased. Street vendors selling food were feared as door to do deliverymen of chaos and crime. The ordering
obsession suffocated any traces of creativity and excitement. The “utopia” of controlled space, the numbing need for “civility” and blank walls, is no place to end up.

The next chapter documents an attempt to conduct and perform research in a way that does not seek to impose stifling order and control. Rather, community organizers in Inglewood and I try to use lively, artistic research to reframe the public safety debate. I use the research on power in Los Angeles in the preceding chapters to our strategic advantage as we challenge the mass incarceration and criminalization of youth of color, and implement alternatives.
Chapter 5.

The following is a description of work done by trial and error, an on-going, open-ended story. It is told from my perspective, but it is not really about me or the organizers with whom I conducted and presented research on the youth injustice system in Southern California. We spent months creating and carrying out surveys, interviews, statistical research, and video projects. For many, it was the first time they had done a research project. It was a soulful, demanding, and at times, surprising experience. I provide little description of this process. In doing so, I realize I may be leaving out the part that is of the most interest to outsiders. But those are our memories to hold. When I write about meetings, for the most part, I do not include the statements made by other Youth Justice Coalition (YJC) organizers. I do not feel that it is my place to use their words to tell my story. The narrative is told by me. The excerpts from the report (done in the landscape page setting) are collaborative endeavors, produced by the collective of the YJC, of which I am a part. The majority of my description is about the interaction with elected officials and law enforcement that have no idea what to make of the hybrid strain of knowledge, art, and ethics that we bring into being. Conversations with people in power become very strange when they cannot hide. Their ethics and morals are revealed a bit. They become very quiet or very loud. They stare you down or they do not look at you at all. If you get them at the right moment, they let themselves slip and open up a little.
Youth Justice Coalition members Kim, Kruti, and I were sitting in the main entrance of the Electrical Workers Union Hall in Chicago. We had just eaten our first meal in days that had not come from the heat racks of a fast food kitchen. We had dined on Puerto-Rican spiced chicken and yucca in the wooden pews of a Victorian church while a Latin band strummed guitars and beat bongos by the front altar. People had moved pews aside to make a dance floor. A woman was twirled by her lover, his arms unfurled around her like ribbons. Her cotton dress swirled, encircling their legs in soft turquoise folds. We were on the last leg of a four day bus trip from Los Angeles to Detroit for the June 2011 United States Social Forum—a national gathering in which organizers held workshops and shared movement strategies. The Youth Justice Coalition (YJC) was scheduled to give a presentation on the war on gangs in Los Angeles. No one had showered since LA. Sleep touched us rarely in contorted positions across bus seats that became freezing during the early morning hours. One student packed only a change of shirt and his skateboard. The Electrical Workers Union offered us respite for a night from our make-shift mobile beds. Most of the YJC spread out sleeping bags on the concrete floor of the basement, next to the bathrooms. I was a level up, beyond the handful of steps that lead through a white oval archway. Someone had tossed open the windows that lined one side of the square Union Hall as a lightning storm cracked in the June heat. The trees outside bowed toward the sidewalk under the force of the wind.

As I traced the ribs of the old wood floor of the empty hall with my index finger, we reminisced about the many times we had been the only group to bring youth, formerly incarcerated people, and their families to juvenile justice summits, retreats, meetings, and actions. There was the time we lobbied to pass a bill to ban juvenile life without parole. The
United States is the only country that sentences people under 18 to die in prison. In some instances, youth were sentenced to life without parole simply for being present at a scene where a murder occurred. Often, adult co-defendants in the case received lesser sentences than the youth involved. We had met with state legislators seated behind mahogany desks wedged between the American flag and the lumbering bear on California flag. As they rocked in their oversized leather chairs, lawyers and professional foundation workers dryly related the horrors of juvenile life without parole. Meanwhile, youth who had experienced the horrors sat next to them, silently practicing the few lines they would recite that had been approved beforehand. So many, many times the words of youth had been muffled by the people wanting to help them for fear that they would step out of proper talking points. Maybe they would let slip a “Fuck You!” born from months in solitary confinement, exposure to sadistic guards, and jailhouse Staph Infections. As a preventative measure, their words were sterilized by a marketing strategist. At the end of the brief meeting, the lobbying lawyer handed the legislator a report on juvenile life without parole. The consultant and foundation was listed as author on the glossy front page of a report on youth incarceration—not the youth trapped in the system that gave their stories, not the community workers who contacted the youth’s families to give their stories. The rest of the report consisted of stats picked from government websites and translated into colorful graphs. Despite their good intentions, did they not really realize that the lines on the graph were actually people? Did they care about the bodies in front of them or about the idea of them?

It was time for us to break from this abusive relationship. We were done being patronized. We were done doing most of the work in shitty conditions, having our stories taken from us, then getting thrown aside when we were no longer needed. There was no reason, beside the problem of funds, that we could not generate more effective information. It was time for us to
produce our own knowledge, our own truth. No one could speak for youth but themselves—not well-meaning progressives, politicians, police, teachers, researchers, and certainly not me. But I did have to step up to my role in helping bring that about. I could challenge dominant knowledge in such a way as to open up space for youth to speak.

Moreover, the “evidence” behind California’s mass prison expansion and the criminalization of youth had been driven for decades by conservative researchers (Wilson & Kelling 1982; Dilulio 1995; Murray 1984). Wilson and Kelling’s “broken windows” theory laid the foundation for zero tolerance policing (See Chapter Four). John Dilulio’s “Super-Predators” thesis, in which a demographic surge of teenage black males would supposedly cause the largest crime wave in American history, paved the way for harsh policies in which juveniles are given extreme sentences in adult courts. Dilulio would later eat his words when juvenile crime rates continued to decrease. As the director of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives under George W. Bush, he retracted and apologized for the Super-Predator theory (Cohan 2002). By then the damage was done; youth detention centers were built and filled as the myth of the Super-Predator spread. The Manhattan Institute has funded former LAPD Chief William Bratton to carry out private security contracts across the U.S. and in Latin America (Seigel 2007). The YJC was founded by youth wounded by these policies. So there we were, on a bus to Detroit this month, on a bus to Sacramento last month, and on a bus to god knows where next month to undo the damage done by all the Wilsons, Kellings, Brattons, and Dilulios.

In addition to starving the system, we were also trying to build something else. Alternative models of knowledge had been circling in my mind for years. For example, in the now banned Tucson Unified School District Social Justice Education Project, high school students themselves investigated the roots of neighborhood and school disparities. The students
then used the results to pressure district, city, state, and national elected officials to improve their schools, including replacing urinals, repairing tiles in ceiling, fixing broken water fountains, and updating library books (Cammarota 2008: 132-133). I remember walking with these students leading up to the 2006 May Day uprisings, in which cities throughout the nation had unprecedented numbers at their May 1st marches to protest anti-immigrant legislation and demagoguery. A trail of 20 or so middle and high school students dragged themselves by my Westside Tucson white adobe. Their bodies looked tired. It was around 100 degrees. The early afternoon sun that seared overhead made everything brown—the earth, the people’s skin. Forty dust-covered tennis shoes and sandals scraped along the pinkish gravel lining Broadway Boulevard. Several students had the wooden posts of signs balanced upon one shoulder, the statements—“No One Is Illegal”, “Viva La Raza”—pointed horizontally toward the shocking blue sky. Their exhausted bodies were mismatched with their ignited voices. Some of them had marched 12 miles to downtown from schools all over the sprawling city. Students had helped youth from other schools join the walkout by cutting open barbed wire-topped fences with bolt cutters after administration had chained the gates shut to prevent students from leaving. Many of the student organizers of the walkout initially networked and raised their political consciousness in Mexican-American Studies Classes. They had done it—the thing that was being beat to death in reading groups and college classrooms—turning theory and research into uprising.

There was a similar now-disbanded youth action research group in California, Youth in Focus. For years, I followed the work of Oakland-based Data Center, an organization that uses community action research for grassroots organizing. The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) has been doing research since the 1960s to uncover American exploitation and political violence in Latin American. The Youth Justice Coalition had been doing incredible
research for years. Now it was time to dedicate more resources toward building an infrastructure in which useful research could be produced quickly and released widely in a popular media onslaught. Because we had sparse resources, research was a side project that we worked on in between teaching, dealing with death, violence, and police harassment. Consequently, by the time we released information, it was obsolete, not widely publicized, and less effective than it could have been.

I had reservations. It could not work. It could become another oppressive form of standard knowledge production. It could become static and routine. There have been plenty of challenges that further refined and disguised exploitation by researchers. Protest movements from the 1950s to the 1970s challenged scientific logic, objectivity and authority. The anti-Vietnam movement, in particular, criticized the alliance between academics and the U.S. military (Moore 1996). In response, scientists sidestepped questions about the ethics and legitimacy of scientific processes and content. Instead, scientists criticized the misuse of results by non-scientists. Groups of researchers formed new public service science organizations that focused on making results accessible to the public and providing expert consultation. Thus, scientists successfully reclassified themselves as serving the public while maintaining scientific autonomy and expertise. Established relationships between researchers and the state remained constant and scientists avoided challenges to the content of their work.

In the 1980s, activists confronted clinical researchers’ formulation of the ‘standard human’ that researchers use to measure the effectiveness of pharmaceutical drugs (Epstein 2007). Advocacy groups and some groups of medical researchers argued that clinical drug trials were not inclusive of women and people of color. For example, women were underrepresented in studies of heart disease treatment and prevention. To satisfy the new demands, federal health
officials held working groups to develop new guidelines that would not greatly disrupt established scientific methodology or autonomy. For example, the guidelines stated that inclusion requirements only applied to later stages of trials that would result in the licensing of new drug or revision of care standards. The drafters of the guidelines avoided serious debates about large theoretical questions. Activists competed with medical researchers to establish relevant categories. In their opposition to the model of the ‘standard human,’ activists transferred political differences of race, gender, and age onto biomedical differences. As officials used political categories, they reinforced the assumption that racial identities are predominantly biomedically based. Social movements did not abolish the use of the ‘standard human’ but rather created a slightly different form based on the smaller group levels of gender, race, and age (Epstein 2007: 135). The overall methods of knowledge production and political practice went untouched.

We did not want to become another well-meaning group that re-invented the wheel. We did not want our work to become ammunition that could be used to harm ourselves and our allies.

The thing I told no one was that I still felt like a child. I did not and still don’t feel as if I have any answers. I get paralyzed when people expect me to fill the role of expert. Maybe most importantly, the most worthwhile things in my life had not been logical, factual, explainable or provable. It was the lack of those qualities that made art, struggle, laughing, crying, music, sex, love, and dancing beautiful. (I cringe when I see emails for a working group in my department entitled, “The Scientific Study of Sexuality.”) I could not remember the last time I read about a new idea. I did not want to trademark any new terms. There were already too many. I didn’t care if I was cited in other people’s articles. I did not want to point out directions for other people to
do further research either. I was in no place to hand out prescriptions. I had less desire to ‘find myself’ than to lose myself once in a while. I wanted people to oppose LA’s fucked up treatment of youth because they believe it as a gut-level ethical belief, not because investigating murders of youth or locking them up is getting too costly for the state. Maybe we could do both—present information on the juvenile injustice system that hit people on a visceral level and entered them, became entwined in their insides. It was in Detroit that we decided to at least try. And our goal would be to explode the legitimacy of “expertise.”
RealSearch projects are conducted by youth, families, grassroots organizers, and other community members to explore the issues that are important to us. Most research is conducted from the protection and isolation of a university tower, science laboratory, or corporate boardroom. Real Search takes those of us in the community out from under the microscope. Beyond the role of storyteller, we are claiming our rights as researchers, analysts, problem solvers, and the architects of programs and public policy.

Specifically, Real-Search aims to give youth and communities opportunities to search for and distribute the truth about our lives, with our analysis and our solutions. We are answering questions that are important to us, will benefit us, and will be an accurate reflection of our worlds.

Why RealSearch is Needed
Traditional research generally reflects the perceptions of white, middle and upper class people “exploring” low income communities and communities of color, taking our knowledge, experiences, and solutions, and publishing it for their own benefit and profit. At times, the work also benefits the researched community. But, more often, research spreads misinformation, flawed analysis and failed solutions leading to our further oppression.

The most serious harm includes:
(1) DUSTY SHELF RESEARCH — “Research” that only uncovers what the community has always known. In other words re-searching the same conditions over and over again only to arrive at the same conclusions. The result of such studies is not to implement solutions, but to postpone or prevent action. The solutions that are so desperately needed to alleviate real suffering are proposed – but never enacted – for decades. Such studies not only replace the real need for policy change, but also weaken the community’s ability to hold governments or corporations accountable. How many times have we heard policy makers hide behind the claim that they have ordered “a study of the issue,” “an investigation the facts,” “the input of key stakeholders,” or “the gathering of more data.”

(2) RESEARCH THAT IS NOT PART OF A LARGER MOVEMENT-BUILDING EFFORT — When research is not accountable to, and conducted in consultation with community leaders, it doesn’t have the people power needed to push for the implementation of proposed solutions. In other words, once the research is published, there is no follow-up organizing pressure put on the authorized government or corporate leaders.

(3) RESEARCH THAT CAUSES IRREPARABLE HARM, DAMAGE OR DEATH — The majority of traditional academic, government, and private foundation researchers construct theories that serve to maintain or broaden inequalities in society. In fact, the idea that research is unbiased and ethical has been disproven over and over again throughout history – (eugenics, the syphilis experiments at Tuskegee and in Guatemala, and widespread experimentation on human subjects in Nazi Germany to name a few examples.) After all, research is a human creation, impacted by all the prejudices and hidden agendas that we carry as humans. When the means of funding and promoting research is almost entirely in the hands of people with more class, race, political and educational privileges, the results rarely challenge existing power dynamics, and lead to years – even decades – of harm. (Think Dilulio’s predictions of a generation of youth super-predators, or Wilson and Kelling’s theory of broken windows policing, and the impact both these theories have had on the massive incarceration rates of youth of color.)

Yet, the myth that research results in unbiased truth remains a core part of society’s beliefs. Policy makers regularly site biased and failed research in their implementation of harmful policies. Mainstream media quotes study after study without any real investigation or counter-analysis. To add salt to the wound, the fame and financial fortunes collected are not shared with the people who have lived the studied experiences or who suffer the results of biased analysis.

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1 RealSearch is a project of the Youth Justice Coalition @ Chuco’s Justice Center: 1137 E. Redondo Blvd., on the border between South Central L.A. and Inglewood, 90302. Mail: PO Box 73688, L.A., CA 90003. 323-235-4243 / Fax: 323-846-9472 / freelanow@yahoo.com / http://www.youth4justice.org
Its 20 minutes to 11am on Tuesday, April 19, 2011. Four organizers and I prep in a grayish-green room on the fourth floor of City Hall. Over the next months we are meeting with every City Councilmember’s Office to discuss our first research or “RealSearch” report entitled, “Cross the Line: Why LA must challenge the idea that police budgets are untouchable in order to support youth and build safer communities” and to outline our policy recommendations: the 1% Campaign and the establishment of a Department of Youth Development.

“Cross the Line” was the result of eight months of research that interrogated former Los Angeles Police Department Chief William Bratton’s frequent statement that Los Angeles is one of the most under-policed cities in the nation, particularly in comparison to New York City. For years, various policy makers and media uncritically repeated his claim. For example, an August 2010 *Los Angeles Times* article on predictive policing technology argued, “The city is one of the most severely under-policed in the country, with just shy of 10,000 police officers on its payroll. At any given time, only a fraction of them are on duty, spread across 469 square miles that are home to more than 4 million people” (Rubin 2010). Supported by the “more cops, less crime” campaign of the Mayor and City Council, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) enjoyed a largely unchecked expansion starting in 2005. The logic of police and law enforcement advocates is frustratingly circular. If crime is up, police and their advocates reason that we need more cops. If crime is down, they claim it is because we have a lot of police, so if we have more police, crime will go down even more. No matter what the situation, the police always claim to be in need of more money. It is impossible to hold police accountable since they can take credit for low crime rates while denying responsibility for high crime rates and police violence.
Youth Justice Coalition members spent weeks going through budgets for all the cities within LA County. We retrieved budgets from the website for each city’s Finance Department. When the information was not available on-line, we called the Finance Departments or City Halls directly to get the information. If the 2010-2011 budget was not yet approved, we used the proposed budget. In some cases, city governments did not have the number of sworn personnel (officers who have been through a police academy and completed all requirements so as to be sworn in as uniformed officers). In these cases, we called the Police Department’s Personnel Manager directly to get the number of sworn personnel. Despite a California law requiring city budgets be accessible to the public, several departments’ budgets were not easy to find (California Attorney General’s Office 2004). Vernon, Maywood, and Bell, for example, did not have their budgets online. Furthermore, Bell’s City Hall contact was a disconnected number. It took weeks to get some of the budgets. In some cases, we personally had to travel to City Halls to pick up paper copies of the budget.

For the presentation to Council members, we have enlarged the main points from the report that demonstrate why the comparison to New York portrays an inaccurate view of policing in Los Angeles. I do not know it yet, but the first appointment, with Councilman Tom LaBonge’s Office, will be more of a hazing than a meeting. Upon entering his office, we receive word that LaBonge’s aid, a thin blonde middle-aged woman named Lisa will meet with us. She retrieves us from the waiting room, barely acknowledging our presence, and leads us back to a conference room. She’s a billboard for the high-end brand Chanel—their logo is displayed on her gold earrings, tangle of necklaces, and peaks up from the upturned tag of her black dress. She is accompanied by an elderly white man, wearing a blue sweater, khaki shorts, and knee-high socks.
with white tennis shoes. She introduces him as a retiree who now volunteers to advise on budget issues. A retired what I am not sure. I am also unsure of why he is a budget adviser.

After brief introductions, we begin with the first chart that shows the often obscured extent of policing in Los Angeles County. Listed are (1) the numbers of sworn personnel for 57 police departments in Los Angeles County as well as (2) the most current annual budget for 51 police departments in Los Angeles County. We explain that while New York is a vertical city, Los Angeles County is spread over a larger geographic area, which contains multiple independent cities with their own police departments. In total, Los Angeles County employs 26,861 sworn officers, not including civilian personnel. Officers from different departments often cover overlapping jurisdiction, meaning that in some places, people are subject to layers of policing. The amount that Los Angeles County spends annually on law enforcement, $3,770,459,539, would be the 168th largest on a list of 227 national economies (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 2010).
POLICE LINE DO NOT CROSS

CROSS THE LINE
WHY MUST CHALLENGE THE IDEA THAT POLICE BUDGETS ARE UNTOUCHABLE IN ORDER TO SUPPORT YOUTH & BUILD SAFER COMMUNITIES

A Report by the Youth Justice Coalition
## Police Departments in Los Angeles County – Budget and Personnel Data

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<th>Sworn/Uniformed Personnel</th>
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## Services

- **Los Angeles School** 340 1,600,000
- **Manhattan Beach** 65 20,479,375
- **Monrovia** 52 13,218,035
- **Montebello** 87 18,591,606.00
- **Monterey Park** 82 114,990,974
- **Palos Verdes Estates** 25 5,988,650
- **Pasadena** 348 60,849,678
- **Pomona** 152 36,881,529
- **Port of Los Angeles** 204 23,687,661
- **Redondo Beach** 100 33,436,688
- **San Fernando** 37 7,264,934
- **San Gabriel** 59 11,416,692
- **San Marino** 28 5,047,107
- **Santa Monica** 214 67,998,258
- **Sierra Madre** 17 3,642,276
- **Signal Hill** 35 7,656,490
- **South Gate** 83 20,861,349
- **South Pasadena** 36 6,882,686
- **Torrance** 238 64,038,998
- **Vernon** 51 9,446,785
- **West Covina** 112 28,761,394
- **Whittier** 128 19,123,607
- **UCLA** 62 State Funded
- **CSULA** 21 State Funded
- **CSUDH** 16 State Funded
- **USC** 82 State Funded
- **CSULB** 27 State Funded

**TOTAL** 26,861 3,770,459,539
The retiree squirms to the edge of his seat, cutting in: ‘Well, but what you are not considering is that many cities contract with the Sherriff’s Department for services, so they do not have their own police departments. You are overestimating those numbers.’ I respond,

Our methodology takes into account the cities that do not have their own departments. You will not see any of the cities, like Compton for example, that contract with the Sherriff’s Department listed on here. We also do not count the budgets of University or College Police Departments because that money comes from state budgets, not County or City. We did list the numbers of offices from University or College Police Departments because they interact with the general public, especially around campuses like USC, where the police shelter a privileged, largely white and Asian student body from the surrounding Latino and African-American neighborhoods.

Lisa stares at me, eyes wide open, lips clenched, but says nothing. The retiree puts his hands from the table onto his lap, then back on the table while shifting in his seat. He stares at our presentation posters silently.

Our next chart shows that when all law enforcement in Los Angeles County—not just LAPD—are taken into account, not only are the numbers of personnel comparable to other large cities, but Los Angeles County law enforcement offices are also among the highest paid personnel in the county. LAPD Officers in particular are paid the highest salaries of any of the ten largest cities in the U.S. During the 2010-2011 Fiscal Year, about 42% of the total city workforce and 39% of city salaries went to the LAPD (City of Los Angeles Mayors Office 2011a). Meanwhile, the Los Angeles Community Development Department underwent a 35.7% reduction funding and a 9.1% reduction in regular staffing (City of Los Angeles 2011a:109); the
Los Angeles Department of Recreation and Parks had a 1.6% reduction in funding and a 23.8% reduction in regular staffing (City of Los Angeles 2011b:693); the Los Angeles Department on Disability was cut by 10% in funding and 23% in staffing (City of Los Angeles 2011c:183); and the Los Angeles City Ethics Commission had a 3.9% reduction in funding and a 12.5% reduction in staffing (City of Los Angeles 2011d:233).

The retiree cuts in, ‘Well, we had Bratton. He was a superstar [as if that makes it ok]. Of course his salary is going to be high. But we have a new chief now.’

‘We know. All our information is up to date. This is the new Chief, Charlie Beck’s salary. And we are not just talking about the Chief, but also about officers of all ranks.’

For a few minutes longer they try to refute several maps, graphs, and charts of our presentation but are forced back on every point. Eventually they listen to the rest of the presentation with vacant faces. More silence…

We point out that local police departments receive federal, state, and private money in addition to their city budgets—money that is often spent without transparency. For example, West Los Angeles’ Police and Community Together (PACT) is made up of wealthy residents from West Los Angeles, Palisades, and Bel-Air that donate to the West Division. A West Los Angeles Community-Police Advisory Board Member described PACT as ‘how we fund the police department without actually giving money directly to the police department.’ In 2010, PACT agreed to replace funding that was cut for additional ammunition.xxxvi

Finally, we present our recommendations. As part of our “1% Campaign”, we propose diverting just one percent of city and county law enforcement resources to fund three public safety initiatives that have proven track records in saving both money and the lives of youth: (1) 500 Community Intervention Workers on the street with a living wage, health benefits, and life
insurance; (2) 50 comprehensive youth centers, each with budgets of $500,000 a year, open 3pm to midnight in neighborhoods with the highest levels of incarceration and reentry; (3) 25,000 Youth Jobs with a guarantee of employment for all youth returning to the community from juvenile halls, Probation Camps, DJJ/CYA, or state prisons as well as youth on gang injunctions and gang databases. Furthermore, we demand that these programs are not run by probation, corrections or police administrations (as many resources for youth are currently administered), but through the establishment of a County Department of Youth Development with the maximum involvement of youth, parents and community-based, non-profit organizations. We also request that the LAPD and LA County Sherriff’s Department release data on police stops, ticketing, school suspension, detention, and arrest on R²EGGO³ (Race, Referring Agency, Ethnicity, Gender, Geography/Zip Code, Offense, Officer and Outcome).

‘You want us to take away money from the police? Haaaaaaa,’ Lisa cackles as she slams her palms down on the long oval conference table. ‘If I did that I would have a line of people outside my door!’

However, Lisa does take an interest in our cost-saving comparison between a gang intervention worker and a police officer because it addresses saving money. ‘This is the point you should be emphasizing! And it would be even cheaper because we wouldn’t have to pay them full-time wages and benefits!’ She obviously missed the part where our comparison includes living wages and full benefits for underpaid, overworked, and underappreciated community intervention workers. But at least some fraction of our world is sinking in, finally. Lisa continues, ‘But what you are saying is that people in your neighborhoods would not trust an officer but would trust an intervention worker? I find that hard to believe.’

Okay, maybe it’s not sinking in.
We explain to her that if a youth wants to turn in a gun, they are going to go to an intervention worker, not an officer. Lisa opens her eyes wide, quickly turning to the retiree. Her white knuckles against the dark blue office chair indicate that a youth turning in a gun is not a situation with which she is very familiar.

Lisa wonders, ‘If there is any evidence that gang intervention works in other areas. You know, the areas more in the middle. Not a nice area, but not a ghetto area like yours either. You should do some research on that comparing different places.’

We also explain that there are things that the City Council can do that cost no money. For example, earlier in the week, LAPD Chief Beck released a directory that police are not to issue truancy tickets if students are on their way to school.

Many youth at the YJC were pushed out of Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) schools by truancy ticket policies. If a minor is not in school during school hours, they are issued a truancy ticket. If they are late, they are given a ticket as they walk through school doors. If they do not pay, the fine increases. The build-up of truancy tickets results in a warrant. Consequently, youth stop going to school altogether or end up locked up because of the warrant. Lisa, ‘Well, I think truancy tickets are a good thing. If a student is not in school, they should get a ticket.’

We explain that sometimes students do not have money to take the bus, so it takes them a while to get to school. Or the bus is late. Or they have to get little brothers and sisters and cousins to school first.

‘They are probably up to no good.’

Lisa begins to rise, ending the meeting abruptly. A visibly flustered Lisa rushes us out of the office, the stooped retiree lagging behind.
The Differences Between Community Intervention Workers and Law Enforcement Officers

VIEW OF L.A.: Police are trained to see youth, families and neighborhoods based on what’s broken, what needs to be fixed, what is lacking, and what makes people either potential victims or perpetrators. Profiling is a key aspect of police training.

EAR TO COMMAND: Working within a military hierarchy, listening to superiors and following orders are the most essential skills of an officer, in order to maintain strict discipline and ensure advancement on the job.

ON THE CLOCK: LAPD Officers (and other police in L.A. County) receive overtime for hours above a 40-hour workweek. The 40-hour week includes paid lunch, sick leave and vacation time. They also have the option of longer shifts, working 4 days on, 3 days off, or 3 days on 4 days off.

TOOLS: A loaded gun – which is carried at all times on and off duty - (LAPD rookies are issued a semi-automatic Glock 22.40 caliber), Olopene Capsicum (OC) spray, a X26 Taser, a baton, a bullet proof vest, a radio, and handcuffs, all the equipment necessary to “subdue and detain any threat.” Even the best-known officers are seen by the community as “armed and potentially dangerous.”

TOOLS: A cell phone with access to e-mail and texts to be notified immediately of all shootings and emergencies. Despite the fact that many interventionists have been killed or severely injured, they choose not to wear bulletproof vests, because this could reduce the street credibility and respect they need to build trust and save lives.

SUCCESS Is measured by drops in crime and increases in arrests.

UNIFORM: The maintenance of a crisp uniform, a badge and boots establish an officer’s demeanor as strict, in control, and separate from the civilian world/community.

VIEW OF L.A.: Interventionists see youth, families and neighborhoods according to their strengths and potential, and as a key asset to L.A.’s future. The work focuses on linking people to what they need to succeed.

EAR TO THE STREET: Listening to the community is the most essential skill of an interventionist, including controlling rumors, preventing retaliations, hearing and addressing youth and families’ concerns, mediating conflicts, and buildings truces and cease fires between enemy neighborhoods and individuals.

FADED TATTOOs and tattoos removed indicate that an interventionist is from the streets, but no longer ruled by the streets. Because an interventionist is rooted in community, they have the trust and relationships – both in the neighborhood and in jails and prisons – needed to solve conflicts and prevent future violence. This is known in the field as a “license to operate.”

NO CLOCK: The City and County of L.A.’s paid interventionists are required to be on call, 24-7, 365 days a year, but are paid only 40 hours or less a week. In addition, 100% of the paid and volunteer peace workers surveyed reported that they are on call 24-7, every day of the year.

SUCCESS is measured by the number of lives saved, the number of conflicts solved, and the fights, shootings and wars prevented.

UNIFORM: Comfortable and casual, the interventionist is most often seen in a polo, hoodie or windbreaker with a logo and/or positive message aimed at stopping the violence. Comfortable sneakers enable them to chase a youth down and get them into school, out of a fight or safely home. Their look communicates that they are accessible and friendly.

Cost to tax payers of a First Year LAPD Officer: Salary (without overtime), benefits, uniform, equipment, training and car: $150,000. This does not include supervision, life insurance and retirement/pension costs, all of which are also paid from local tax revenues.

Cost to tax payers of an experienced Community Intervention/Peace Worker: Approximately 85% of L.A. County’s Community Intervention/Peace Workers are volunteers. 10% work part-time for $8-$13 an hour. The YJC estimates that approximately 5% of interventionists - about 50 people in the County - receive full-time salaries through City or County funds at an average* annual cost of $50,000 or less per person, including FT salaries ranging from $18,000 - $35,000, minimum benefits, on-time equipment costs consisting of a phone, and minimal training costs. Even salaried intervention workers report that they pay for their monthly phone charges, travel (gas and maintenance on their own car), and uniform. Interventionists do not receive life insurance or government retirement/pensions. A minute number of peace workers earn more than $35,000 a year. Most have been doing the work for years, some for decades. The YJC will be doing a more thorough report on the field of intervention in future reports.

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3. PUBLIC HEARING FOR THE L.A. CITY BUDGET

Through the downtown May heat I reach the entrance to City Hall at five minutes to 10am. The
cop at the front door sings orders into the static of a radio. He pauses to elbow his partner at the
sight of a woman in a tight grey skirt in front of me. They stare as she rushes up the steps. As
usual, I put my bag through the security scanner. I walk through the metal detector up to the desk
where the lady asks for my identification. She pulls out her clipboard and writes down my name
and my destination, the third floor. She hands me a City Hall visitor sticker with the number
three written on it in red. I rush inside a mirrored elevator framed by swirling, flowery brass
work that looks like frosting squeezed onto the trim of a wedding cake. When I exit, I hear the
undifferentiated murmur of voices ricocheting off the marble floors.

At the end of a corridor is a large meeting hall with high ceilings. Wooden benches on
each side of a central aisle look like pews. The City Council sits up front at the elevated pulpit.
Hundreds of fire fighters in white t-shirts are present to protest the proposed closing of two fire
houses. They fill the seats and lean, arms crossed in casual conversation with one another, along
each side of the hall. Much of the meeting is dedicated to a discussion of the proposed cuts to the
Fire Department. To sustained applause, firefighters and citizens urge the Fire Chief and City
Council not to go through with the proposal. About two-thirds of the firefighters clear the hall
after their item is heard.

Two hours later, public comments about the budget are the last item. Before people have
a chance to comment, the Chair of the Budget Committee, Bernard Parks, mentions that he
thinks it might be important to give a brief overview of the proposed budget. The brief overview
turns into an hour long discussion in which each city councilmember has to question the Fire
Chief about how the proposed cuts will affect their district. They ‘will not stand for a plan that
will compromise the safety of their constituents.’ Each Council member emphasizes that they can stand it less than the Councilmember who spoke before them. Several members of the public who have been waiting to speak during the allotted public comment section rise and leave. When the public speakers’ cards are finally called, several are skipped because people already left; maybe to pick up children from school, to a job in an office, a construction site, or a restaurant…who knows.

The man who speaks before us is from the police union. He talks about the importance of not cutting the police budget. The woman who speaks before him is a citizen. She is white, probably in her 20s. She stresses that ‘Police and Fire are basic needs—don’t cut them.’ Someone sitting next to me from the Librarians Guild observes in a whisper that obviously education and housing are not considered basic needs.

When the first person from the Youth Justice Coalition is called we all go up and stand behind them in support. Members of the Youth Justice Coalition forcefully deliver spoken word and personal stories to a visibly baffled City Council. They talk about the mass locking up of youth and the importance of alternatives. “Cross the Line” is passed from us to an LAPD officer to the Council members. Bernard Parks rests his chin on his hand and crinkles his eyebrows together as he turns over the pages. Eric Garcetti smirks and whispers to his aid as he sifts through the packet. Some Council members scowl as they consider the report, other simply stare at it blankly. A council member to the far right—I do not catch who—walks out with the report in hand while talking on his blackberry. I just see the last wisps of grey on his head slip out a back door.

I give the following statement:
My name is Ana Muniz. I am from the Department of Sociology at UCLA and a proud member of the YJC. For the past four years, I have conducted rigorous research on criminal justice in Los Angeles City, including inside the LAPD and LA City Attorney’s Office. I would like you to consider two findings relevant to these budget discussions. First, the claim that Los Angeles is under policed compared to the nations’ largest cities, and, thus, in need of the 4.7% increase in funding requested this fiscal year, is untrue and can be refuted with systematic evidence. Moreover, the police are an institution that costs the city millions of unaccounted for dollars in legal expenses for racial profiling, police brutality, and civil rights violations.\textsuperscript{4}

Secondly, police have never been and should not be the first line of public safety. I urge the mayor and city council to take steps that will save money and the lives of youth in Los Angeles. Specifically, re-divert funds to community intervention, youth centers, and youth jobs. And work to establish a Department of Youth Development that is independent of police and probation administrations to administer these funds.

\textsuperscript{4} For example, only the most recent, high profile Los Angeles Police Department case is the $12,750,000 settlement for the May 1, 2007 police attack on an immigrant rights march in Mac Arthur Park in which LAPD officers beat unarmed civilians and journalists. Over the past two years, the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office has spent millions of dollars on litigation. In another example, a series of shootings of unarmed black and brown men in Inglewood in 2008 resulted in a U.S. Justice Department investigation of the Inglewood Police Department and a multi-million dollar, out of court settlement. Most recently, it was uncovered that Randy Adams, Chief of the Bell Police Department, received millions of dollars of disability pay during his term. The Bell Police Department looks to be headed in the direction of the Compton Police Department, which was forced to disband when its extensive corruption came to light.

“Outside Counsel Contracts for May Day Litigation” Los Angeles City Administrative Officer. Council File: 08-0854-S1. 06/17/2008.
No one claps. We leave. On the way out, an older pale man in a Presidential candidate-looking blue suit with red and white striped tie looks up from his iphone long enough to scowl at me.

4. THREE DAYS LATER
I drove to the Empowerment Congress Public Safety Executive Committee Meeting in South LA with the ending to a Milan Kundera (1982:263) book laced in my brain: “I found little comfort in the thought that the masks hid other (more human) faces, since the real horror of it all lay in the fact that the masked faces were so fiercely devoted to the inhumanity and vulgarity of the masks.” After meetings with elected officials, Kundera’s observation resonates as too true.

I just finished the book and this sentence on one of the last pages infected me, made me lightheaded as I flowed through the lava of freeway traffic guided by habit. The Empowerment Congress was founded by then City Councilman and current member of the County Board of Supervisors, Mark Ridley-Thomas, to involve the community of the Second Supervisorial District in democratic government.

We have a power point presentation that explains the “Cross the Line” report, the ‘1% Campaign’ and the proposal for a County Department of Youth Development. After we finish the presentation, Ridley-Thomas’ Senior Deputy for Justice and Public Safety Issues, an older Latino man, responds with a half-laugh, ‘You don’t understand at all how the politics of this works. I mean, I’m in favor of it, but I can’t just take money away from the police.’

The Co-Chair, an older black woman with large octagon glasses, ventures, ‘What if instead of taking one percent of the police budget, you introduce some sort of tax to pay for your youth centers?’
Cutting in, the Senior Deputy concurs, ‘Yes. It doesn’t really matter where the money comes from.’

I respond with far more euphemisms but my pre-filtered response went something more like this: Like hell it doesn’t! Why are you all so scared of the police? You are elected officials. You are supposed to decide where money goes. We do care where the money comes from. It is vital that the money going into community-based alternatives to incarceration comes from punitive departments like the police and the prison system because that will redefine public safety, not as violent repression, but as autonomously-driven youth and community development. It is time to challenge the police. This is cowardice passing for diplomacy. I am reminded of when we met with a Latino City Council member whose kid had recently been arbitrarily stopped by police. As much as he wanted to, the Council member stressed that, nonetheless, he was unwilling to oppose the police department’s demand for yet more funds. ‘I just can’t…’ he reluctantly offered, ‘but keep up the good work.’

The Senior Deputy continues, ‘What you need to do is a pilot study to show that these alternatives work. The police have statistics to show us that prove that they deserve more money because they are bringing crime down and their arrests are going up.’

A YJC member responds by asking why the police do not have to prove that their tactics work before they get millions of dollars to put them into practice. As far as the research goes, studies have shown for years that prisons and jails do nothing but lead to recidivism and, thus, more jails and prisons.

The meeting ends after prolonged silence. The Senior Deputy offers to work with us to improve our power point to present to Ridley-Thomas. Ridely-Thomas’ Public Safety Deputy gives me his card and says we should “touch base”. He would love to talk about how to “move
forward” with the 1% campaign (He never returns my email). Upon leaving the meeting, I fear that Anais Nin (1948:97-98) may have been more perceptive than Kundera when she wrote, “[…] the mask tainted the blood […] like the women who had been painted in gold and died of the poison, the mask and the flesh could melt into each other and bring on infection.” Maybe with the passage of time the mask and the flesh become sutured together.

5. THURSDAY, AUGUST 4, 2011. THREE IN THE AFTERNOON.

The Community Corrections Partnership Meeting in downtown Los Angeles. Los Angeles County will release inmates due to prison overcrowding. Politicians, law enforcement, and the media have whipped up panic about an invasion of parolees. They are sure the City is bound to become as lawless as Gotham. The issue at hand is the re-entry process—will community based services or the department of corrections be the main provider of re-entry services?

Another ugly room with 70s-style wood paneling. The room is brown. It is not deep brown like rich desert clay. It is not light brown, light steaming café con leche, either. One beige plank is indistinguishable from the next. There are four walls of repetition unbroken by idiosyncrasies, imperfections, or art. Faded brown curtains block the warmth emanating from outside and the view of liquid silver mountains in the distance. The smell of bleach cleanser, coffee, and old carpet dominates the senses. Two long tables in the center of the room are each filled with about 20 people each. Four rows of bald spots interspersed with the occasional Nancy Grace/Hillary Clinton close-crop and feathered power-lady hair. They are mostly law enforcement, wearing the monotone beige of the Sherriff’s uniform. There are probation officers, too. There are also white men in charcoal grey or beige suits who are ex-officers or wish that they had been. The group is finished off with a sprinkling of accomplices of color—just enough
but not too much. For example, there is a middle-aged black probation officer whose daughter still received a promotion after she slept with a youth under her supervision in juvenile camp. There is one ‘community representative’ from a foundation. He is a non-voting member. His questions are ignored. About 10 rows of chairs in the back are for the public. They are filled predominantly by black representatives from community based organizations such as All of Us or None, CURB, faith-based groups, and our contingent of mostly black and Latino male and female organizers from the Youth Justice Coalition.

This morning, I read in the Los Angeles Times about a 2008 case in which officers claimed a Compton couple assaulted them. Now, it actually looks like they assaulted the couple. Same shit. So many stories like this, only usually the unarmed civilians are shot and killed by officers who can’t ever seem to differentiate a gun from a cell phone or lighter.

As the tall, wiry Chief Baca rises to speak, a baby releases a choking sob that slices through my thoughts. I feel like doing the same—or giggling hysterically. I’m not really sure which.

Baca continues, ‘The idea that law enforcement cannot do rehabilitation is a thing of the past. With our leadership classes, the transformation of the mind is our goal. With our classes prisoners will believe they can get a job.’ I wonder what good the belief is if there are no actual jobs available. Or, if one is precluded from even applying for a job because they have to check the box that asks, ‘have you ever been convicted of a felony?’ The world is an ugly place when the transformation of belief does not match up with the transformation of reality.

The ‘re-entry’ services to parolees consists of round the clock tracking. The Department of Corrections is requesting $7 million dollars to hire 58 people to track parolees. Eight of the 58 personnel will be predictive crime analysts. Surveillance is the main goal, including the possible
introduction of satellite controlled electronic monitoring. The Sherriff’s Department is also looking for ‘alternative facilities’ in which to hold inmates so that they can get around releasing people altogether. Over and over again, people from the Sherriff’s Department stress that their programs are information driven and evidence-based, but they do not present evidence.

At 4:30pm, the moderator of the meeting decides to ‘rearrange the agenda’ so as to introduce a special item and push public comment back. Comments from those of us sitting in the ten rows at the back will for sure be cut short—the suits and the uniforms never work past five. Near 5:00, public comments commence and are restricted to two minutes each. We present our “Welcome Home L.A.” proposal, which pushes for (1) a halt on prison and jail expansion (2) “Ban the Box” that asks if the applicant has been convicted of a felony on employment applications (3) a $24 monthly Metro pass for all no income, low-income youth, and people released from lock-up and (4) that all people released from prison are provided with documents to work or attend school, including a California Identification Card, birth certificate, health records, and school transcripts. We stress that the police are trained to enforce the law above all else—not to act as social workers that will assist criminalized people.

A member of the YJC, a young black woman, speaks about the importance of Ban the Box and shifting funds to youth centers and intervention workers. As occurred with nearly everyone that spoke, she is cut off by the meeting moderator: ‘Ma’am, thank you for your comment.’ She ignores him and continues. ‘Ma’am, thank you, your time is up!!’ She wraps up her statement and sits down. During the public comment section Baca is hunched over the table quietly talking on his phone.

The meeting moderator announces, ‘That concludes the public comment section. The meeting is adjourned.’ The meeting is promptly adjourned with all the speaker’s cards are done.
It happens so fast that at first we are not sure what is happening. ‘That’s it?’ ‘When will we get answers?!’ ‘Business as usual!’ Shouts of disbelief follow the suits and uniforms rushing out the door.

Baca is a superstar, literally signing autographs after the meeting. He asks one of the youth organizers if she would like one—‘Noooooo.’ She responds. Baca looks confused and turns back to his admirers.

CONCLUSION

Our presentation refuted that popular claim that Los Angeles is under policed, particularly when compared to New York. Ours was the first systematic challenge to the claim that most of the council people and their aides had heard. Up until then, they had relied on the ‘under policed LA’ talking point as justification for the policies that provided ample funding for the police while defunding other vital programs. While he was the superstar Police Chief, Bratton put out this talking point, which lawmakers and the media repeated like parrots. Talking points such as this help form the general belief that the cornerstone of public safety is police and prisons. We redefined public safety as a question. What would the world need to look like if youth are going to stop dying in the streets and in prison? We offered our vision and do-able steps—community intervention workers, youth centers, and youth jobs.

I am not saying we changed the minds and hearts of the people with whom we met. I would guess that no one changed their position in the end. No one who staunchly supported the police as the beacon of public safety left transformed. Whatever people believe, there is research to support it. It is truly amazing what people will accept if it comes with a statistic and a footnote.
They probably either fell back on other research that supported their beliefs, or, if none was available, they claimed that ‘ivory tower’ researchers were overly-intellectual quacks that had nothing to teach them. To divert our challenge, elected officials requested we do yet more research [point (1) “Dusty Shelf Research” of our RealSearch manifesto, see page 6]. Notably, no one volunteered to pay for the research. We are supposed to do it on our own, for free, only to have it thrown aside and told we need research in another area.

However, they were silenced for a few minutes, which in my opinion, is an achievement with these people. Most importantly, they were silenced because, even for a few minutes, they could not hide behind a talking point or a number. Evidence is political. Elected officials and the institutions they fund hide behind numbers and studies. During one of the meetings, a councilman’s aid, a young guy with dark slicked-back hair and a pinstriped suit, had sighed, “We get research and we believe it is true because the guys at UCLA say it’s true.” There are ‘guys’ and UCLA that say conflicting things. Policy makers pick the ones that produce research that aligns with what they already believe to be true and with the interests if their financial backers. The authority of expert knowledge lies in the status of the collectors of knowledge, not necessarily in the substance of the knowledge itself.

The challenge was important. Every time they think to pull out the ‘under policed L.A.’ justification, in council meeting or to the press, they know we are watching them, that we will refute it, and that we are able to do so. It took a lot of effort and time in the first place for them to consider the possibility that we were competent enough to conduct research, since they see us as a bunch of no-good troublemakers. I do not care what they think about us and I don’t even particularly care what they believe. I care what they can do. And if it is more difficult for them to pass policing that harm Los Angeles’ youth, great. We need to produce “Cross the Line” on a
myriad of subjects so that people in power are put in the position more often and with more visibility. What is useful is not research in itself but a specific type of research that we do and how we use it. Research is one part of a movement in which knowledge can be used for actions, education, art, and to undermine public officials.

When people unexpectedly have the logic, research, and facts they rely upon undermined, their true feelings come out instead. For small pockets of time, the people we met with revealed what they actually thought. They had to say that they pass punitive policies because they think we are trouble-makers from a “ghetto area,” up to no good—not because the information they have is irrefutable. Or they divulge that their own child has been victimized by the police but that they feel trapped by the political game to which they singed themselves over. That is the best that I can hope for with the research process and result. Not that I provide a rationalization for someone to hide behind, not even that I uncover “truth”. But that it cracks the mask open and reveals the spectrum of someone’s humanity, revealing their vulnerability, passion, hate, and ugliness. Maybe that will get us somewhere if we are able to do it more often.

The people that were already supportive of us were equally unhelpful and, at times, more patronizing than those that hated us. They patted us on the head and told us to keep up the good work. But they did not agree to take our challenge further.

To the general public we provided an alternative claim to what the City government and police were saying. By questioning their position with well-done research, we undermined their complete authority a little—just by asking the question.

We are starting to see authorities incorporate bits of what we have been repeating for years. Finally, there are words like “realignment”, “intervention”, and “diversion” creeping into
their policies. That is the long, necessary process through which movements unconsciously persuade.

I am certain that our presence had some immediate influence. The original City Budget cut the number of summer jobs for youth to zero. The final budget allotted 2000 youth jobs. We were told by City Council members and aids that the 2000 jobs were a direct result of our insistent disruption, testimonies, and publicity of our research. It is a small first step, but it is somewhere to start. Two-thousand people with jobs they would not have had otherwise is far more an accomplishment than an article in an obscure academic journal.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

I sought to analyze how people with different types of power—state force, wealth, political connections, etc.—use their resources to identify certain groups as deviant and act upon those groups. I was interested in the circumstances under which they instituted mechanisms of control and force, the categorization systems they used to label people, and, on the other hand, methods of intervention that disrupt the categorization systems and methods of force and control. The primary findings are as follows:

1. The process of building policies, categories, and militarized practices is not always a simple top-down affair.

   Change came from unexpected places. When I stepped into the archives to examine the roots of apartment building in Cadillac-Corning, I expected to find that development companies and city planners from outside the neighborhood were responsible for the transition from single-family homes. Most of the original multi-unit development, however, was initiated by homeowners within Cadillac-Corning desiring additional income. Homeowners advocated on both sides of the issue with city government as the ultimate gatekeepers of development. Simultaneously, school desegregation policies allowed black families to enter Westside schools. Those families found Cadillac-Corning to be an accessible neighborhood in which to settle. The amalgamation of zone and set-back line changes by individual homeowners and small developers combined with the policy of school desegregation to result in racial turnover. The racist policies and practices that increased the militarization of Hamilton High School and Cadillac-Corning ended up stigmatizing the neighborhood. In a cycle, the stigmatization of the neighborhood
resulted in a greater police presence that lead to further stigmatization and the continuation of repressive policies.

In the tug of war between the police and residents in community partnerships, I was surprised to see more conservative militancy in community groups than the within the police department. Community groups were anti-egalitarian. They bypassed the state at times and took on the punishment of deviant groups through various levels of vigilantism. Community groups turned community policing on its head, making demands on the police more than they aided officers. The police and “community” conflicted in the way they defined disorder and the preferred method of addressing those deemed disorderly. The interplay between residents, business groups, homeowners associations, police, city and government determined the building and continued shaping of the neighborhood. The frameworks used by police, such as broken windows, affected citizen expectations. As community groups pushed back on police, they, in turn, manipulated authority’s use of frameworks. There was a tension between different types of power— influence, wealth, force, and authority. While police had a monopoly on authoritative force, wealthy residents had political connections and resources that even the police did not.

“Community” conjures up warm, fuzzy romanticized images of people knowing, helping, and caring for one another (Lyons 1999; Crawford 1999). Community is a widely used and vague term. There are lots of communities as defined by various people and constituency groups. Community can also be the enemy. It can be a means for creating and reproducing inequality. In Cadillac-Corning, community groups became the official institutional spokespeople for the community because of their wealth, education, visibility, and political connections.

One lesson for organizers is the emergence of unlikely allies. The agencies of government and community groups often work at cross purposes, opening up pockets of
weakness. For example, the Cadillac-Corning gang injunction author’s criticism of the current injunction process could impact public perception of gang injunctions in a way that is favorable to those challenging injunctions. The most effective way to launch challenges is to be up to date on the political context so as to exploit short-lived vulnerabilities that arise during power struggles. Organizers must respond in time to the unexpected and often unsystematic nature of force and control.

2. Accidents of history have lasting effects.

There was not necessarily a big brother system that planned and instituted control in the cases which I probed. The target of L.A. City’s first gang injunction was not meticulously picked by City Attorneys and the LAPD from a map of the city that broke down crime rates. Rather some prosecutors had an idea and they happened to be stationed in the West LA Division. Nonetheless, they set a precedent in which gang injunctions could be used to maintain racial borders. Moreover, the legacy of the injunction is still imprinted on the reputation of and policing tactics in Cadillac-Corning 20 years later. The practice of building gates at the end of alleyways to preclude getaway routes is still standard. Police continue to target youth on bicycles as suspected lookouts for the drug business. Similarly, the binders that police and city prosecutors used to document alleged gang members evolved into an ever-expanding gang database that sweeps 1000s of youth into system. The messy daily micro-politics of decision-making added up to matrix of repressive policies and practices (Staples 2001).

Although there was no ultimate master plan, the rise of certain people to positions of influence and the deployment of control and force were far from arbitrary. Contingency is everywhere. There is always the possibility that unexpected actors and situations arise that
change the path of history. The path taken, however, is directional in important ways. Certain people are able to capitalize on the chances presented. Like with the validation of ‘community’, people with material and social resources make arguments and take advantage of contingency. The majority of the working class, black and Latino residents did not have the resources to become the ‘community’ in the community partnership. Instead, a privileged minority was able to take advantage of the opportunity to declare themselves community spokespeople. They then urged and at times, attempted to force, police and city government to take repressive action against the majority of residents with far reaching consequences.

3. “It is only through these empty rituals that brutality becomes possible” (Nafisi 2003).

Political struggles are easily forgotten. The contentious process of creating categories and institutionalizing protocol often disappear, leaving only the categorization systems, protocols, and repeated practices. People carry out institutional ritual that, while seemingly benign, brutalizes the vulnerable. Critical junctures occur when a choice is made to address a problem (Mahoney 2001). An institutional response is then created to deal with the problem. Initially, practices are often instituted because of a combination of accident and influence by well resourced, capitalizing people. In their policy behavior, future actors within this institution are likely to follow the path set at the critical juncture. As authorities pull from available tools at hand, there are incentives to some decisions while others are restricted. People within institutions are socialized into the values of the institution (Gains et al. 2005; Levin-Waldman 2009). Often, these values are inscribed as protocol so that they seem more like good common sense than subjective values. Once instituted, infrastructure takes on a life of its own. The intentions of original actors matter little once a practice is put into place.
The gang injunction, for example, is a critical juncture. Returning to the testimony for the Cadillac-Corning gang injunction exposes how police and city attorneys explicitly targeted black youth that were threatening to surrounding white, middle class areas. All the policies I address have racially disproportionate effects, yet authorities claim they are race-neutral. For example, although the wording of gang injunction policies are sanitized of race, the testimony that informed Cadillac-Corning’s injunction specifically targeted black youth as violent offenders from deviant families. Injecting historical memory and physical context back into those processes reveals what has been abstracted out. In policies regarding housing, schools, gang repression, and broken windows policing, there is a simultaneous sanitization of race and racially disproportionate effects. Policies like gang injunction and broken windows policing, although they do not explicitly call for racially disproportionate treatment, will result in negative outcomes for people of color. The policies were created to do so and they are successful in that respect.

Furthermore, there is no ‘final’ category or practice. Casually used categorization requires constant up-keep. With street vendors, community group members’ arguments were not sufficient. Community groups had to constantly demonstrate to police that vendors were the disorderly deviants and they, the orderly law-abiders.


*if something is in the middle of either/or,*

*if it is ambiguous, given the available classification of things,*

*if it is mestiza,*

*if it threatens by its very ambiguity the orderliness of the system, of schematized reality,*

*if given its ambiguity in the univocal ordering it is anonymous, deviant,*
can it be tamed through separation?

(Lugones 1994:45)

The policies I examined were first implemented in racially threatened spaces. Policies of force and control were not instituted where need it greatest, but where the threat to the status quo was greatest. Borders separating black and white, wealthy and working class were becoming porous. The Los Angeles School Board first banned transfers at Hamilton High School and two nearby middle schools because they were located in the corridor between the wealthy white part of the city and the rest of LA. At the time, Hamilton was undergoing white panic at rapid black integration in the neighborhood and schools. The desegregation era militarization of the high school spilled over in to the militarization of the local neighborhood and vice versa. Moreover, the gang injunction was not implemented in the area with the most gang activity, assaults, or murders. The gang injunction was instituted where a black gang and drug business began negatively affecting white, middle and upper class people. Although the injunction’s initiation in West LA was largely accident, the identification of Cadillac-Corning as the LAPD West Division’s “worst area” was intentional. Some of the choicest real estate in the country is right across the street. Cadillac-Corning was and, in many ways still is, an abrupt dividing line in which authorities attempt to contain people of color.

During my research one homeowner in a community group exclaimed, ‘This isn’t Bel-Air. No one around here is just a kid!’ Cadillac-Corning is not Bel-Air. The police retorted, however, that it is not South Central or East Los Angeles, the height of stigmatized territory in LA, either. The shoring up of threatened lines developed Cadillac-Corning as a sort of borderland space. Borderlands are places of untamed and destabilizing ambiguity. They are geopolitical spaces in flux. There is a lot at stake, which is why community groups, police, and
policy makers dedicate so much time and resources to those spaces. They tried to turn upheaval into stasis and reestablish smudged lines. As Lugones highlights in the poem above, Cadillac-Corning was the site of a struggle to turn ambiguous classification into order and separation.

5. Re-defining deviance, violence, and public safety.

A piece of knowledge becomes truth when it stops being challenged (Latour 1988). Legitimate fact stops being challenged when it is backed by a heterogeneous network of support, including a diverse association of experts, replicable experimental demonstrations, and cited publications. A statement is fully transformed into fact when human agency is erased and replaced with natural law (Law 2004:37). Knowledge that dominates is certain and final. Thus, subjective language and first person narrative are erased from scientific publications and protocols. Legitimate knowledge, as opposed to fiction, is supported by coalitions that persist for long periods of time. Humanities and social science claims tend not to have diverse support. When a single citation or study is challenged, the entire claim breaks down (Ward 1996). Ward (1996:108) concludes, “science is an associationally stronger, not better, form of knowledge than literature, poetry, lay knowledge, or art.” Making knowledge is political.

Knowledge in itself does not impact debates. The level of importance that a study gains is not solely dependent on its content. For example, policy makers acknowledge expert knowledge when it reinforces their side of a debate (Nelkin 1975). Community action researchers can make research impactful by building diverse associational networks, challenging accepted pieces of knowledge through alternate data, and upsetting and humanizing the standard process of knowledge production by ensuring that people remain visible. Getting the public and officials to think differently is a long process of stopping the momentum of baseless talking points,
introducing smartly packaged alternative vocabulary, applying public pressure, and taking away the numbers that authorities hide behind.

Community action research is distinguished from mainstream academic research because the people most impacted by a problem are at the helm of planning and conducting the research. Secondly, the people most impacted have the opportunity to offer solutions to the problem. Third, the ‘action’ part of community action research does not happen without the right presentation. Although often glossed over in discussions, the performance of the research can take more time than conducting research. Research is rarely convincing on its own. Our communities may not have monetary resources for huge media campaigns but we do have style. We can rally people with research.

In the last chapter, I detailed how the findings in the “Cross the Line” report were counter-intuitive. We caught people’s attention and opened up challenges. To the general public, we revealed another truth, one that countered what they had heard or introduced them to something that they never thought about. We are currently rallying this audience to put pressure on policy makers and other institutional authorities, such as the Chief of Police, who can issue directives and the City Attorney, who drafts and introduces policies. It is not a matter of convincing people in power, but using organizing and research to force their hand. With “Cross the Line”, we created diverse forms of presentation. The written report is visually striking, artistic, and interesting. We held several actions at high profile events, including the Mayor’s State of the City Address. During actions, we distributed a four page summary of the report. Some YJC members also formed a theater group to communicate the results of the research in the form of guerilla theater. Additionally, we are trying to build diverse associational ties with a coalition of people working for social justice at the intersections of race, economics, gender,
sexuality, disability, and more. We are still working through decisions about allies. With whom do we want to make associational ties? With whom will we absolutely not? Importantly, these are decisions that need to be made collaboratively by those who completed the research and those whom the actions will impact.

Our report probably got attention, in part, because of ties to UCLA. On some level, we aim to have greater credibility by using the institutionally recognized tool of research. Consequently, we probably reinforce mainstream knowledge-production in some ways. What I hope, however, is not to pull research out of academia to be used by non-academics. I think we can mess with what research is in our production of information, organizing, art, and policy. Academic studies can reproduce inequality. Studies of the effectiveness of gang injunctions or broken windows policing, for example, reproduce inequality by taking for granted the existence of what needs to be explained in the first place (the orderly/disorderly divide, the racialized categorization of gang member). Community action research that is done outside the traditional confines of academia, offers different possibilities. Nonetheless, we can never be completely outside the system. We are implicated one way or another. Doing ‘community’ action research poses its own problems. Who is the community and who says that it is inevitably a good thing? For example, there are consistent disagreements in strategy sessions between large national non-profits dedicated to youth justice and grassroots groups. The national non-profits are staffed by (mostly white, middle class) lawyers and strategists. Consequently, they think like lawyers and policy and media strategists. Their main concern is how to get short-term policies passed at all costs. So, if policy makers understand the framework of victim, offender, gang member, and juvenile delinquent, then generally, youth justice lobbyists talk to officials in that language. But I do not want to win a policy campaign only to reinforce oppressive and false concepts of victim
versus offender. We have to challenge dominant thought in order to eventually shift the terms of the debate rather than always meeting them on their terms. Other organizers and I want to build a movement not just achieve a policy. Good policy will come as the result of a movement and a movement will build short-term policy that can achieve the maximum good for people in the long-run.

Part of upsetting accepted knowledge is re-defining expertise. Challenging the concept of expert needs to be done with the right’s rejection of evidence and science in mind. I do not reject all expertise, but rather the misplacement of expertise in the hands of people that are not on the ground and have never experienced the things that their policies prescribe. Often, well intentioned outside reformers have bad results for the communities they try to ‘help’. Intentions are nothing on which to base measurements of success. Research can be used anywhere on the knowledge-power continuum. Research informs policy which lays the framework for practices of repression. When policy is exclusively developed by outsiders, who are not the people most affected by those policies, living spaces become grid space and complex human beings becomes types of people. Classification necessarily erases contradictions and complexity. People are targeted not for acts, but for the risks they pose. They are preemptively managed. Everyone labeled deviant is a potential harm to be controlled, sanitized and dealt with now, before it, whatever it is, happens.

As a researcher, I do not seek to create projects from gaps in academic literature, but rather, to add my skill set to groups of people already doing work (Montoya & Kent 2011). The people at the Youth Justice Coalition and I are trying to build something, but, to be honest, we are not really sure what. It is almost as if we do not have the right language for it yet. Maybe as we build it, the language will follow. We are building a research—or RealSearch—
infrastructure. I am not sure if it will be a “center”. So far, it is an ever-changing collective of youth organizers, people who have been through the system, and community members that come through Chuco’s Justice Center. We go wherever inquiry is called for. And we use that knowledge to inform social justice campaigns through public education and organizing. Research is one piece of the onslaught.

While we continue to organize with the results of “Cross the Line” and push for the 1% Campaign, our next project will focus on gang injunctions. Gang injunctions are a primary tool used by criminal justice institutions in Los Angeles to target urban youth of color for disparate surveillance and detainment. The first step is finding out basic information, the lack of which is a big obstacle in the face of authorities that claim gang injunctions “work”. The monopolization of high level research by those in power ensures the continuation and expansion of unjust punitive policies. We are going to complete the first systematic analysis of (1) the effect of gang injunctions on those most affected—residents, targeted youth of color, undocumented people, women and girls (2) and the mechanisms that allow gang injunctions and the CalGang Database to continue to have these effects.

The mixed methodology study will illuminate the impact of the war on gangs from the perspective of affected communities with a focus on two injunctions in particular: (1) The Rolling 60’s Crips on Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard and (2) The 18th Street gang on Crenshaw Boulevard. The alleged members of the Rolling 60’s Crips are traditionally African-American. The 18th Street gang is historically Latino. Thus, there will be racial diversity in the study. Furthermore, as both injunctions were implemented after 2003, there is likelihood that there will be residents that lived in the area both before and after the injunction and therefore can compare the two time periods. The study will pay particular attention to two overlooked and
vulnerable populations increasingly targeted by gang injunctions—young women and immigrant youth.

A research team of youth, organizers, and community members will design and conduct a survey of residents in gang injunction areas and alleged gang members to assess how being listed on a gang injunction affects one’s employment, education, and family; and how residents’ feelings of safety have been affected by the injunction. The following research topics will be covered:

- How does an individual enter the gang database?
- Once in the database, what happens to a person on a daily basis?
- How are community members’ feelings of safety affected?
- Are undocumented youth at higher risk for deportation?
- How are all the preceding factors affected by the gender of the alleged gang member?

The research team will then conduct open-ended interviews with a sample of the people who completed the survey. Additionally, we will conduct participant observation of interaction between authorities and targeted youth to collect information on how the police identify and record alleged gang members. The research team will keep journals detailing their strategies, encounters, and reflections on the research process. These notes will be compiled later to create a handbook for community-based youth action research.

We will widely and creatively disseminate information on the processes and effects of gang injunctions. Our goal is to produce a publication on gang injunctions absent of technical jargon, translated into Spanish, as well as a high level publication that will help policy analysts and academics in other parts of the United States understand gang injunctions. We will also complete one art, music, or theater project that communicates research findings at town hall events and actions. The reports will be released via a press conference and action to local

In addition to the end result, the process of research and organizing should be meaningful. Throughout projects I have done with you, I see a new way of looking at the world opening for them every day. They gain confidence as they connect the personal trauma in their lives to larger systems of inequality. The anger they have internalized against themselves or their families is transformed into a commitment to challenge the injustice system and build something else. Research in itself should be an act of organizing, learning, healing, and resisting.
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i Interview by Author. Cadillac-Corning Resident, Los Angeles, April 14, 2009.

ii Interview by Author. Cadillac-Corning Residents, Los Angeles, August 16, 2008.

iii Ethnographic observation. Education Committee Meeting, Los Angeles, April 14, 2009.


viii Interview by Author. Cadillac-Corning Residents, Los Angeles, August 16, 2008.


x Interview by Author. Officer Andrey Wilkins, Los Angeles, February 27, 2009.


xii Ibid.

xiii Interview by Author. Capri Maddox, Los Angeles, September 18, 2009.