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Maintaining True Believers: The Evolution and Moderation of Extremist Movements

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Maintaining True Believers:
The Evolution and Moderation of Extremist Movements

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Islamic Studies

by

Matthew James McKinney

2012
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Maintaining True Believers:
The Evolution and Moderation of Extremist Movements

by

Matthew James McKinney

Doctor of Philosophy in Islamic Studies

University of California, Los Angeles, 2012

Professor Steven Spiegel, Chair

Despite contextual conditions unique to every manifestation of political Islam, there exist certain commonalities among movement identity politics which allow for an analysis of how collective action changes over time. The initial formation of group identity in these movements is frequently exclusionary – interpersonal networks are a primary source of recruitment and members of these organizations craft an “us versus them” mentality through which like-minded individuals are brought into the organization. Armed with a common grievance, members of these movements will attempt to achieve change through micro-level activities.

While many organizations are content to affect this micro-level reform of society from within, other organizations will seek more comprehensive reform through a strategy of macro-level change. When such organizations are embedded in a society with free and fair elections, many will turn to the political arena in an effort to express their grievances, compete for resources, and bring about macro-level changes that are somewhat consistent with their initial goals. Success in the political arena, however, requires any exclusionary movement to soften their discourse in an attempt to capitalize on the sentiments of a wider segment of the population.
Engaged in an act of “speech distancing” from the exclusionary rhetoric that marked their roots, these movements carve out a new political space in which their new recruits are a far more heterogeneous mix of different ethnic, religious, and ideological groupings. Ultimately, if this inclusionary process continues, this new generation of recruits can bring about a moderation of the movement’s foundational political platform and political outlook.

Alternatively, a subset of hawkish members of the group may believe the organization has compromised its core values. This new set of individuals, defining itself as the organization’s “true believers,” may form a splinter movement which returns to extremist ideologies and possibly violent acts.

This process is neither unidirectional nor deterministic for all exclusionary movements. Yet all radical organizations exist on a point somewhere along this continuum. An analysis of how organizations progress within these stages is therefore important towards improving our understanding of social movement dynamics.
The dissertation of Matthew James McKinney is approved.

Richard Anderson
Carol Bakhos
Michael Morony
David Rapoport

Steven Spiegel, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles
2012
DEDICATIONS

After ten years at the University of California, Los Angeles, first as an undergraduate and then as a graduate student, I have a lot of great personal and professional memories. Thanks to all those friends and colleagues who helped me grow as a person and contributed to who I am today.

The Islamic Studies Program is not a department, and its students often find themselves without adequate faculty support. Therefore, I make a special dedication to all the UCLA professors and staff who made time for an Islamic Studies orphan. I couldn’t have made it without your support.

Special thanks to Dr. Steven Spiegel for his guidance and advice, Dr. Richard Anderson for always challenging my academic assumptions, and Dr. Carol Bakhos for giving me the opportunity to acquire teaching and lecturing experience. Additional thanks to other professors who have made a significant impact on my time here, including Dr. Michael Morony, Dr. David Rapoport, Dr. James Gelvin, Dr. Leonard Binder (my first instructor in Islamic Studies back in 2003), Dr. Michael Fishbein, Dr. Deborah Larson, Dr. Carol Pateman, Dr. Richard Hovannisian, Secretary Warren Christopher, Dr. Amy Zegart, Dr. Yona Sabar, Dr. Damon Woods, Dr. Kantathi Suphamongkhon, and our wonderful Islamic Studies academic counselor Magda Yamamoto.

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Chapter 1: Introduction –

“Whoever amongst you sees anything objectionable, let him change it with his hand, if he is not able, then with his tongue, and if he is not even able to do so, then with his heart, and the latter is the weakest form of faith.” – Statement attributed to the Prophet Muhammad by Abu Sa’id al-Khudri.

In the wake of an evolving public understanding of Middle Eastern politics in recent years, a number of commentators have adopted a reductionist view of political Islam which paints its various manifestations as somehow reflecting a deep seeded, backwards looking trend among the region’s inhabitants. Its practitioners, it is argued, nostalgically seek a purer time in which Islam was the solution to all of society’s malaise. Such explanations emphasize a so called connection between religion and violence, arguing that most Islamic political movements present violent, fundamentalist strands of thought to their members and draw both inspiration and justification for their crimes from religious tradition.

In response to such reductionist views, academic work on successful Islamist political organizations in recent years has been largely dominated by a research methodology which emphasizes Social Movement Theory (SMT) as a primary tool of analysis. In particular the theoretical lenses of SMT have served as a means of bringing culture back into the analysis of Islamic organizations in a way which does not paint Islam as a catch all explanation for group identity politics (See Wictorowicz 2004, Wickham 2002, Gunning 2008). Additionally, these theorists sought to fill a gap left by rational actor models of collective action – specifically, why citizens are willing to engage in collective mobilization when rational self-interest dictates that they should abstain.

While a number of comparative works in SMT have revolutionized the way in which we understand the successful formation of Islamist groups, such studies typically focus only on initial group mobilization. As a result, the analysis of Islamic groups as social movements has
been rather static, focusing primarily on a retroactive narrative of how a movement initially formed. The creation of a distinct political identity is analyzed solely as a definitive and finite period of time during which a movement’s elites employ a toolbox of cultural symbols and political prognoses to develop a base of like-minded supporters.

Such an approach is useful for understanding how a movement initially forms – yet it also neglects how group identity can change in fundamental ways over the course of several years. The ideological composition of a movement is not fixed and will respond to fluid changes to normative trends in society, the perception of new political opportunities and constraints, and as the result of suddenly imposed grievances, and a number of other factors. And yet many commentators assume a relatively static modus operandi for organizations like Hamas, Hizballah, The Muslim Brotherhood, or other well known movements which have employed violence as a political tactic. It is not unusual for one to hear political commentators, politicians, or scholars to cite inflammatory passages from their foundational charters as evidence of the uncompromising nature of their political leadership today (see Levitt, 2006, Schanzer and Pipes, 2008). In the introduction to his recent book on Hamas’ rivalry with Fatah, Jonathan Schanzer defined both the Hamas of today and the Hamas of the late 80s as virtually the same movement – “a violent, totalitarian organization that…vows to continue down the same path…the driving ideological force behind Hamas is radical Islam…[and it] seeks to implement a strict interpretation of the Quran [sic] and shari’a in all Muslim lands.”¹

Yet any view of these movements as static or monolithic fails to comprehend the complex nature of evolutionary group dynamics. Unquestionably, Hamas, Hizballah, and many similar movements have committed heinous acts of murder against innocent civilians over the

¹ Schanzer, Jonathan, Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine, Palgrave, Macmillan, 2008, pg. 4-5
past several decades. Yet so long as we continue to conceptualize these organizations as unchanging entities bent on terror, we will continue to miss opportunities to affect meaningful internal change.

Over the last several years Hamas, Hizballah, the Muslim Brotherhood, and many other organizations have engaged in the act of speech distancing – dramatically decreasing inflammatory rhetoric in favor of more moderate and pragmatic characterizations of their political situation. Islamic symbolism is important for each movement (as it is for many other manifestations of political Islam), yet those symbols are also highly fluid, justifying a range of policies from complete rejection of the status quo to tempered participation in the system.

Many such exclusionary movements have adapted their rhetoric primarily as a means of capturing public support from a wider segment of the population. Hamas initially rejected political participation in post-Oslo Palestine but underwent a significant reassessment of its situation in time for a series of municipal elections and ultimately the 2006 parliamentary elections. Accompanying this strategic shift, the movement attempted to realign its image by issuing a series of political statements and manifestos which pledged itself towards the change and reform of the Palestinian Authority’s bureaucracy. At the same time, the use of Islamic and resistance rhetoric, heretofore prevalent in the movement, was now significantly downplayed. At the close of Lebanon’s civil war, Hizballah significantly softened its violent rhetoric in an effort to maintain its relevance. By the early 1990s it had minimized its exclusively Islamic outlook to form political alliances with Walid Jumblat’s Druze list, with Amal and with the Progressive Socialist Party, and formed a coalition with Maronite Christians and Michel Aoun. The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt spent years espousing rhetoric which incited violence against the state and called for the implementation of shari’a law. Yet by the 1990s a younger generation of
professionals was coming to power. This generation, active on university campuses in the 70s and 80s in demanding social change, now committed the movement to participation in the political process and government reform by working within the system. An even younger generation of Muslim Brotherhood members is now coming into its own, utilizing social media to push forward an agenda of constitutionalism, progressive legal and social changes to the Egyptian state, and open and free political participation for the Brotherhood and all other political opposition parties.

The stories of each of these movements share certain commonalities, despite the various structural conditions unique to each of their societies. A detailed study of the similarities in each organization affords us an opportunity to understand how group dynamics change over the course of several decades. Ultimately, any movement can be analyzed as an evolutionary and dynamic entity. While initial group formation involves the solidification of an exclusionary “us versus them” type of rhetoric, many illiberal movements embedded in a society with free and fair elections will eventually turn to the political arena to express their grievances and compete for resources. Over time discourse in any such movement softens in an attempt to capitalize on a wider segment of the population. This in turn can potentially moderate their political platform, their members, and certainly their new recruits.

It must be stressed that the continuum of group behavior described in subsequent chapters will be neither unidirectional nor deterministic. Once a group begins the process of inclusionary identity politics there is no guarantee that it will eventually moderate its behavior completely. Some movements may backslide into exclusionary identity politics if their forays into inclusiveness fail to garner the movement any justifiable benefits. Indeed many fear that the failures of Hamas’ current experiment with parliamentary politics will lead the movement to
return to political violence. And even if inclusiveness is a successful political gambit for a movement, one may justifiably ask whether such a change in rhetoric is merely a tactical realignment for propaganda purposes and not a meaningful change in the ideological orientation of a movement. Yet whether any of these movements “really mean it” initially is secondary to what real and meaningful changes come out of this shift in rhetoric. The leadership of a movement which commits itself to broad based recruitment of this sort may find it exceedingly difficult to get out of that commitment. Engaged in the act of speech distancing from the exclusionary rhetoric that marked their roots, these movements carve out a new political space in which their new recruits and sympathizers are a far more heterogeneous mix of different ethnic, religious, and ideological groupings. Any attempt to significantly realign the movement back to its initial exclusionary orientation would lead to a collapse of this coalition of new sympathizers.

At the same time, the evolution of a movement towards more inclusive politics creates significant dangers for its continued cohesion. An organization which has spent years cultivating a set of “true believers” – devoted individuals who are ideologically committed to the original goals of the movement – must slowly adapt its members to any significant ideological shift. If an organization moves too fast towards a new political orientation and does not adequately prepare its followers for the change, the movement may split between two strains – hardliners committed to what they see as the original “lost” (and often extremist) ideals of the organization and a more pragmatic strain which values inclusion and political participation. There are numerous examples of the danger of such fragmentation, including the split between the IRA and the Real IRA, inclusionary and exclusionary elements of the Tamil Tiger leadership, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s generational splits, the Amal-Hizballah divide of the 1980s, the Palestinian
Ikhwan-Hamas split in the late 80s, and even today between Hamas’ leadership cadre in Gaza and its more violent Salafist-leaning elements.

Ultimately, the tension between a movement’s moderates and those who still consider themselves to be the true believers of the organization can lead to a complete fracture of the group. To avoid this split, a movement’s leadership must slowly adapt its followers to changes in the group’s ideological direction. Similarly, leadership is structurally prevented from eliminating or fully minimizing parts of its extremist activities. While many in the West may demand that organizations like Hamas or Hizballah fully commit to the ideas of democratic participatory politics and renounce violence, such a move would in fact ensure mass defections from their ranks and their ultimate irrelevance. Moderation for these movements must be a far more gradual process.

The fact that so many organizations share a similar evolution of identity politics is an interesting phenomenon that few scholars have accurately identified and explored. This dissertation will identify a gap in academic knowledge about extremist group identity and mobilization by examining the common trends found in several case studies, including Hamas, Hizballah, and the Muslim Brotherhood. I will ultimately draw conclusions about what conditions must be present for moderation to occur. In addition to qualitative analysis of this process, my project will statistically analyze how rhetoric in these movements changes over time by analyzing the use of certain types of terms and language in speeches, political statements, official movement documents, media, and other forms of political outreach.

While my work will focus on Islamist movements, many aspects of this hypothesis will have wider applicability for the evolution of exclusionary movements in other parts of the world as well – from the IRA to the Tamil Tigers. Most insurgent organizations exist on a continuum of
collective mobilization between initial exclusionary rhetoric and later inclusionary discursive strategies. In identifying commonalities among these stages of group behavior we can better understand identity politics and the evolution of social action.

Chapter 2 of this dissertation will trace the process of initial group formation, recruitment, and the crafting of an exclusionary group identity. The initial formation of this identity typically involves the crafting of a discourse which bifurcates society into like-minded supporters and opponents. This chapter argues that the degree to which any fledgling movement can recruit like-minded individuals rests primarily on two factors – the ability of a movement’s leaders to emit political prognoses which have a high degree of resonance with a subset of society, and the presence of dense interpersonal networks from which potential recruits can be drawn. In this early stage, recruitment is limited and exclusive, and the ideological goals of the movement are often extremist in nature.

Chapter 3 will examine the later stages of an exclusionary movement. Over time, the parochial strategies of most exclusionary movements fail to affect any real political change. Extremist activity, meanwhile, only attracts a certain subset of the general populace. The ability of a movement to grow and achieve their goals therefore depends on establishing a broader appeal, and thus softening of their exclusionary discourse. The most important means by which a movement may grow at this point involves the efforts of extremists to capture a wider segment of the population through moderating exclusionary rhetoric, termed “speech distancing.”

Chapters 4 through 6 will examine our specific case studies, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Muslim Brotherhood. The formative years of all three organizations were exclusive and parochial. It was only after a number of years that each decided to engage with the political processes of their respective governments and accomplish their goals through another means.
The discursive study of these movements allows for a quantitative analysis of how terms and symbols have changed over time. After coding the different types of popular frames and cues utilized by each movement, later chapters will compare and contrast each movement’s exclusionary and inclusionary period, as well as other key points in each movement’s lifespan. Those frames and cues will be divided into two types – exclusionary and inclusionary. Exclusionary frames will include those statements which emphasize the uniquely Islamic character of movements, the insularity of the group, and attempt to specifically alienate other ethnic or religious spheres of power within the state (e.g. Maronites, Copts, Druze, Sunnis, Shi’a, etc.). Inclusionary frames will include those that promote nationalism, multiculturalism, dialogue, cooperation, or political prescriptions for change which would find resonance with any religious or ethnic group. Violent frames will be coded on a case by case basis, correlated with popular opinion polls at the time on general societal support for resistance.

Numerous commentators have argued that the rhetoric of these organizations has changed little from their formative period. Others argue that these organizations are becoming more moderate over time. Importantly, while commentators in each group employ a moderate statement here or an extremist statement there to back up their claims, to date no one has attempted a quantitative analysis of how discourse in these movements has changed over time. While it would be an impossible project to assemble and code every public statement or every official party document ever made, an analysis of several key texts over the course of each movement’s lifespan would allow us to judge whether there is any truth to either perspective.

The analysis of Hamas’ evolving rhetoric will center on two major forms of expression – official party documents dating from over twenty years and a thematic analysis of the organization’s public radio program “Voice of Palestine.” As there are only a handful of major
documents published by Hamas over the course of its twenty years of existence, an analysis of several key discursive changes will be presented. These documents include its 1988 charter, a corpus of recruiting leaflets and pamphlets dating from the First Intifada period, a memorandum from the late 1990s entitled “This Is What We Struggle For,” and its 2006 electoral manifesto, the Change and Report List. Certain identity cues and recruiting frames change significantly over the course of the movement’s lifetime – most notably those which promote Islamic values, those which promote political violence, and those that promote inclusive politics. The quantitative section of analysis will demonstrate a serious shift away from exclusionary rhetoric over time into more inclusive forms of expression.

A topical analysis of the major programming of “Voice of Palestine,” available online through the Hamas website, will yield one further indicator of whether or not the dynamic described in this dissertation is in fact taking place. With access to an archive which contains an hour by hour written summary of the type of programming conducted by the station, I coded the type and frequency of different categories of programming over time (whether religious, educational, news, etc.). Analysis focuses on a period of programming a year before the 2006 election with the programming during December, 2005 and January, 2006 – the months leading up to the 2006 elections. The results are revealing – religious programming dropped off significantly in the lead up to the 2006 election, replaced by campaign speeches, electoral coverage, and other programming which promoted reform issues which the average Palestinian could identify with.

Hizballah offers us the best corpus of statements for analysis as several of its major leaders have been issuing public statements for nearly thirty years. Quantitative analysis of Hizballah will focus primarily on the public statements of its current leader, Hassan Nasrallah,
and of its spiritual leader (Marja’iyya), Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. In addition to statements made during the formative years of the movement, particular emphasis will be paid to the period surrounding the passage of the 1989 Taif Agreement and Hizballah’s entrance into politics. The analysis will continue into the 1990s and 2000s with additional emphasis paid to statements made around the time of major Lebanese elections and episodes of monumental political importance for the movement, including the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the 2006 war.

The case of the Muslim Brotherhood offers us a unique opportunity to examine cuing differences between generations. The three generations of Brotherhood leadership which I will analyze include the early formative leadership (1930s-1960s), the middle generation (1960s-1990s), and the current youth of the Brotherhood (1990s-today). This analysis will focus on an ongoing dichotomy in the organization between those who seek violent resistance against the Egyptian state or Islamic exceptionalism and those who believe in political inclusion and participatory politics.

The seventh and final chapter will tackle the ultimate outcome of the process of political inclusion for these movements. As an organization moves away from its exclusionary phase of identity formation into a more inclusionary phase of outreach and recruitment, there is a high potential for that movement to moderate in important ways. The problem remains, however, how to determine if an organization’s leaders are sincere in their inclusionary language. Is this new found effort to soften exclusionary discourse merely a ruse to buy time and new recruits, or a profound shift in the ideological orientation of a movement’s leaders?

While permanent moderation is by no means the inevitable outcome of speech distancing and political inclusion, the potential for a major ideological shift towards a more liberal political and social outlook is far greater once a movement has shifted towards more inclusive rhetoric.
This chapter will explore three significant ways in which unintended moderation can occur – 1) through the social-psychological processes known as self-perception theory and cognitive dissonance, 2) through simple demographic changes in the group’s composition following inclusive outreach, and 3) through existing theories of political inclusion which posit the existence of a socialization function of participatory politics which fundamentally moderates illiberal groups.

Ultimately, this dissertation fills a gap in our understanding of evolutionary group dynamics. To date, many academics have analyzed identity politics of various movements at a particular snapshot in time. While advances in Social Movement Theory can help us to understand how a movement initially forms, a more dynamic understanding of how movements change and evolve over time is lacking. The leaders of Hamas, Hizballah, and the Muslim Brotherhood have employed a number of symbols to justify a wide variety of (often contradictory) political platforms and over time each movement has softened its rhetoric, particularly as it began as transition into the political process. As such, each case offers us an excellent opportunity to analyze and compare how social movements evolve, particularly how individuals are identified and targeted for mobilization, how language is instrumental in shaping societal and political perceptions, and how discourse cues individuals to believe that they’re a part of a particular social identity.

Each movement’s demonstrated ability to effectively employ cultural framing ensures that compromise is possible on even the most important matters of principle. For many of these movements, justifying political inclusiveness is simply a matter of shifting how symbols are employed. This contrapuntal strategy is one of the most time honored traditions of each
organization, yet it is one which has not been adequately identified or explored in academic literature.

The cases under review in this dissertation and the underlying theories developed in it have wider implications for the moderation of any extremist or illiberal movement. While many of these organizations initially seek micro-level change through exclusionary movement politics many will eventually soften their discourse in an attempt to capitalize on a wider segment of the population. This in turn will moderate their political platform, their members, and certainly their new recruits. This process is certainly not unidirectional as the potential for reversal is always present. Nevertheless, it is a phenomenon that must be better understood and if we are to understand how movements like Hamas, Hizballah, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other similar organizations evolve and how best to encourage peaceful participation in the political process rather than a return to the strategy of violence.
Chapter 2: Identifying Mobilization Potential and Creating an Exclusionary Group Identity

Introduction:

In all three of the cases under examination, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Muslim Brotherhood, there existed a formative period in which the creation of a distinct group identity necessitated the creation of an “other” in society. For Islamic movements this type of rhetoric typically involves both a criticism of foreign powers and the use of the frame of *takfir* (a term which denotes a Muslim who has declared himself through actions or behavior to be an unbeliever, a *kafir*) to criticize domestic rivals. The Muslim Brotherhood’s principal adversary was initially the perceived state of *jahiliyya*, ignorance and unbelief, which ran rampant in society and was embodied in the authoritarian Egyptian state. The group initially framed its response to this enemy in social outreach and *da’wa* practices aimed at reforming society from within. When such attempts failed to garner immediate benefits, many younger members of the Brotherhood adopted a more active approach aimed at participation in the political process. At every level of the movement’s social engagement, the establishment of horizontal networks played a key role in the development and execution of the ideological platforms. For many of the movement’s early members those network ties were developed in prison. The repressive policies of Nasser and later Mubarak saw thousands of members and sympathizers of the Brotherhood rounded up and imprisoned in close quarters where they established lasting professional relationships and friendships. In subsequent generations younger members of the Brotherhood established key horizontal relationships at universities and later, through the internet, where blogs and website have offered unique forms of protest against the Egyptian state.
Hizballah officially formed in 1983 with the goal of establishing independence and sovereignty for Lebanon through the expulsion of foreign powers. For Hizballah, the constructed “other” has always been a mix of foreign aggressors, including Israel, the United States, and various other international actors. Numerous tracts written in the formative period of the movement railed against the Zionist project and cancerous foreign schemes to destroy the Lebanese state. The February, 1985 Hezbollah open letter to “The Downtrodden in Lebanon in the World” painted their struggle as one between the oppressor (*mustakbirun*) and oppressed (*mustad’ifin*). In it the United States and Israel are blamed for Lebanon’s (and the larger world’s) instability. Importantly, the group has always adapted a pragmatic relationship with its more immediate “other” – Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Druze rivals for power.

Hamas’ process of recruitment and identity formation has depended on a dual strategy of *da’wa* practices for recruitment and the use of cues to establish a unique social identity which defines itself in opposition to both Israel and more secular forms of resistance. From the start, Hamas’ assertion that they were the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people necessitated a certain degree of identity consistency by establishing the means to care for the people. But the use of social services has also proved vital for the organization’s survival - the movement has utilized its *da’wa* practices to garner recruits and societal support as well as establish dense interpersonal networks. This program of *da’wa* services, the *Mujama’ Islami* model, was established prior to Hamas’ founding by a leading figure in Palestinian society, Sheikh Yassin. Yassin and other members of the Palestinian *Ikhwan* (the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood) sought the reform of society from within and under this program social services in the territories flourished and the number of mosques doubled between 1967 and 1987. Even though it was established primarily as a resistance organization, Hamas adopted the social
services model of the *Ikhwan* and significantly expanded existing infrastructure by funding private clinics, distributing food goods and founding a number of social centers, including the Islamic Workers Union in 1992, the Scientific Medical Association in 1997 (which offered extensive medical and dental services to impoverished Palestinian citizens), the Association for Science and Culture and provided education from kindergarten through eighth grade. By providing social services to Palestinian society Hamas not only established a reputation for piety and social munificence but created dense interpersonal networks both horizontal between middle class individuals and vertical with lower class individuals. Recruitment into the organization became easier once these networks had been established.

Once recruitment began along interpersonal lines, the movement’s leaders were able to reach out to like minded individuals through the use of certain social cues. In establishing a unique political identity, Hamas’ cuing painted the “other” as the occupying Israeli state and its secular Palestinian rivals, most notably the PLO. The cue of resistance against Israel easily gained a high degree of frame resonance with a population that was in the throes of an *intifada* against Israeli occupation. A more immediate challenge for the movement, however, was how to set themselves apart from a number of other resistance movements and the firmly entrenched Palestinian leadership found in the PLO. One of Hamas’ earliest cues was to synthesize the nationalism commonly associated with the platform of the PLO with certain Islamic principles that were unique to the Palestinian *Ikhwan* and other Muslim social movements in the territories. It its foundational charter Hamas’ leaders broached this very issue:

That is why, with all our appreciation for The Palestinian Liberation Organization - and what it can develop into - and without belittling its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are unable to exchange the present or future Islamic Palestine with the secular idea. The Islamic nature of Palestine is part of our religion and whoever takes his religion lightly is a loser.
Until such a day, and we pray to Allah that it will be soon, the Islamic Resistance Movement’s stand towards the PLO is that of the son towards his father, the brother towards his brother, and the relative to relative, suffers his pain and supports him in confronting the enemies, wishing him to be wise and well-guided.” (Article 27)

“Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part of our religious belief. Nothing in nationalism is more significant or important than waging Jihad when an enemy treads on Muslim land. While other nationalisms are concerned with material, human, and territorial causes, the nationalism of the Islamic Movement has all this in addition to the more important divine qualities that give it soul and life.” (Article 12)

Hamas’ leaders would thus establish themselves in opposition to the PLO by painting the rival organization as secularist and corrupt – offering a pious Islamic alternative to the PLO while at the same time co-opting their nationalist agenda. By providing “the best of both worlds” – nationalist goals in a religious framework, Hamas sought to capitalize on a wider segment of Palestinian society. It is a strategy that the movement utilizes even today – successfully employing this argument as a campaign strategy in 2005 and 2006 and in the midst of ongoing peace negotiations between Israel and Fatah.

In all of these cases we can observe similar dynamics of identity formation. The presence of dense social connections (wasta) along with the establishment of centers of networking (such as those established through da ’wa practices) allows individuals with close personal ties to adopt a similarly constructed discourse and a set of values, norms, and symbols for interpreting the environment around them.

Classical Theories of Social Movement Identity Formation –

Social movement theorists have long struggled with how to explain how collective action and identity formation occur in the early, formative period of any organization. Specifically, how can proto-movements attract supporters, exploit resources, and respond to various grievance-based trends in society. Early forms of social movement theory began to appear in the 1960s and 1970s as a number of theorists focused on American cases of movement formation. These early
attempts tended to emphasize grievance based reasons for the formation of social movement organizations. Subsequent theorists built on this trend by beginning to focus their attention not on grievances but on opportunities. Resource mobilization theorists, as they came to be known, argued that grievances are present in every society and are not alone cause for the rise of social movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977; Jenkins, 1983). The availability of resources and opportunities for collective action were considered far more important for explaining how social movements are formed, they argued.

Emerging out of this literature was a body of work on “political opportunity.” These theorists argued that structural changes in political organization were primarily responsible for societal shifts that gave rise to social movements. A regime crisis, the holding of open elections, the end or lessening of state repression, and many other changes in political opportunity structure can create favorable shifts in power relationships. These changes affect the relationship between state and society and may ultimately give rise to improved bargaining situations for dissidents in society.

The final body of literature concerned framing, the discursive process of a movement’s leaders packaging ideas and positions into easily understandable rhetoric and then disseminating those ideas to a wider audience. A social movement’s message, after all, can be an elaborate ideology of grievances and prescriptions for change. Simplifying the complexities of that ideology and streamlining meaning for society at large is the job of any social movement hoping to attract like-minded individuals. For framing to function in the dynamics of a social movement, a segment of the population must feel aggrieved over some issue and also optimistic that acting collectively can somehow redress the issue (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988).
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s these three bodies of literature were increasingly packaged together under the methodology of Social Movement Theory (SMT). Successful social movements, it was argued, emerge out of the successful exploitation of all three processes. At the societal level, changes occur within the political, cultural, and economic environment. Political opportunities and constraints then develop which influence the behavior of individuals and groups. Proto-movements, often preexisting organizational bodies, provide initial sites for mobilization where the group can compete for resources. The leaders of movements, capitalizing on changes in society then frame grievances and prescriptions, construct a collective identity with members, and seek out like-minded individuals in larger society. Contention at this point becomes routinized into particular repertoires of collective action.

While social movement theorists typically utilize these three factors to explain how some movements succeed and others fail, many scholars have grown weary of the classic SMT model. By the late 90s, several pioneers of the theory had grown dissatisfied with trends and developments in the field and decided to refine classic SMT. Soon a second wave of social movement literature emerged which attempted to refine which aspects of group dynamics should be examined. The culmination of much of this work was “Dynamics of Contention,” by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. Classical SMT, as they defined it, was conceptually limited by a number of weaknesses. First, it focused on static rather than dynamic relationships. Many of the conditions analyzed by classic social movement theorists were treated as constants rather than continually changing factors. Second, SMT focused exclusively on individual social movements rather than broader trends in the dynamics of contention. Third, while most literature in SMT developed out of analysis of movements in American society in the 1960s, the relatively open political environment that marked the socio-political milieu of that time and place had little
applicability to movements in other areas of the world. The literature, therefore, neglected to focus on organizational obstacles that many groups suffer from in more closed and repressive societies. Finally, classic SMT focused exclusively on the origins of contention rather than on later phases of movement activity.

McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly therefore concluded that a new model was necessary which utilized some elements of classic SMT while at the same time identifying more dynamic mechanisms that related variables together. Their new model of the dynamics of contention differed in a number of ways. First, rather than examine opportunities and constraints at the structural level, they began to view changes in “political opportunity” as primarily determined by attribution from individuals. A political opportunity might be objectively “open,” but is not significant until actors can both identify the opening and perceive it as an opportunity. Second, rather than examine the existence of mobilizing structures, the authors focus on the active appropriation of sites and organizations by challengers in an attempt to streamline mobilization. Third, rather than seeing “framing” as a tool of movement leaders, the authors expanded their view to incorporate interactive construction of disputes among “challengers, their opponents, elements of the state, third parties, and the media.”

Fourth, rather than discussing the development of action repertoires the authors focused instead on broader dynamics of collective action that occur across a number of different movements. Finally, rather than examine specific episodes of contention the authors looked at the mobilization process in general, focusing on comparative variables between movements from diverse geographic and social settings. The question of the origin of contention, a classic agenda of social movement research, was considered as merely an empirical variant.

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2 McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 44
SMT had classically become a way of analyzing interests and capacities and applying them to whole collectivities – then explaining the behavior of individuals in terms of their relationship to the collectivity. While continuing this trend, the authors state that over the course of their work they had discovered the necessity of taking strategic interaction, consciousness, and historically accumulated culture into account. They write,

“We treat social interaction, social ties, communication, and conversation not merely as expressions of structure, rationality, consciousness, or culture but as active sites of creation and change. We have come to think of interpersonal networks, interpersonal communication, and various forms of continuous negotiation – including the negotiation of identities – as figuring centrally in the dynamics of contention.”

The authors’ attempt to address several of the methodological limitations of classical SMT is commendable for its impact on the academic field in subsequent years, yet this second wave of SMT suffers from significant flaws. Their stated need for an attempt to clarify SMT presents the first problem. The authors’ argument that classic SMT is in many ways static and places a number of variables in somewhat limited theoretical boxes (political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, framing) is well taken, as is their criticism of scholarly trends which focus on particular movements rather than comparative dynamics, yet other criticisms paint an unfair conceptualization of what SMT is and what analytical directions it has taken. The authors’ criticism that original SMT literature was grounded in American social movements and thus lacked wider theoretical applicability is inaccurate. This argument neglects a number of works which applied and adapted SMT to broader global currents (e.g. Klandermans et. al, 1988; Misha and Sela, 2000). Furthermore, the years following the publication of *Dynamics of Contention* saw the successful application of classic SMT to a number of social movements in closed political environments across the world (including Wickham, 2002; Wiktorowicz et al.,

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2004; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2005; Gunning 2008). Despite the origin of classic SMT in the American political system, there has been no shortage of successful academic works which have applied its principle methodologies to a wide variety of social movements across the globe.

Ultimately, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s attempt to rectify what they view as the conceptual limitations of classic SMT only further complicates what they are trying to accomplish. Rather than develop a dynamic model which incorporates and improves SMT, they manage to throw out what worked about the theory in favor of an overly complex and ultimately non-theoretical account of how contention operates. Their definitions of the mechanisms and processes that make up particular episodes of contention lack theoretical specificity and while they spend much of their time diving into particular historical case studies, the authors do not come away with any framework or pattern for understanding how just how contention forms.

The greatest weakness of both the first and second waves of SMT is that its scholars rely on a laundry list of factors to analyze the success or failure of a movement. Ultimately, such an approach limits one’s ability to comparatively analyze a handful of organizations on similar terms. Within this analytical jumble of factors, most scholars have largely subsumed the power of discourse under other, less important factors. Resource mobilization theorists, for example, prioritize a movement’s access to funds. But while a movement may have a better chance of success if it has access to greater resources or political opportunities, it is only if their basic message has resonance with the populace that they can hope to achieve success. Political opportunity structures, after all, are present in every society, yet the presence of opportunity structures does not determine whether or not a movement can successfully win attitudinal and ideological support from its society. Resource mobilization is important for a movement, particularly its later stages, but is not a necessary precondition for the success of an organization.
Proto-movements can hold rallies, marches, or distribute inexpensive literature without access to broad resources. Changes in political opportunity or the ability of a movement to mobilize resources may ultimately contribute to its success or failure, but the primary factor affecting movement growth is the ability to attract like-minded individuals to their cause.

Unlike classic SMT theories which rely on a laundry list of factors for analysis, this dissertation will argue that the most important factor in determining the success or failure of a movement is its leadership’s ability to craft and disseminate a discourse which 1) resonates with potential recruits, 2) establishes, over time, a shared identity among its members, 3) is adaptable to change when faced with new socio-political realities or major shifts in the group’s modus operandi.

Group Identity Formation as a Discursive Process –

In any given society, a certain subset of individuals could be theoretically mobilized by a social movement. Bert Klandermans has called this a society’s “mobilization potential.”⁴ There are, of course, certain people whose attitudes and backgrounds will exclude them from participation in a social movement. In some cases, one’s entire identity would necessarily exclude an individual from participation in a group – an African American is unlikely to ideologically ally himself with a white supremacist group, for example. Other times, an individual might hold limited sympathies with a movement but is unlikely to participate or

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change his behavior in any significant way – a passerby may cringe at a vegan movement’s pamphlet depicting caged and tortured cows but would not go out of his way to stop eating meat.

Organizations must therefore identify the segment of society which they can potentially motivate through their actions and words and then cultivate 1) a form of rhetoric which will attract both like-minded individuals and potential sympathizers; 2) demobilize antagonists; 3) establish interpersonal networks through which the movement’s message can be disseminated; and 4) convince individuals to voluntarily sacrifice for the good the movement, including *time* needed to participate in a group activities (such as meetings, rallies, marches, etc), *money and other resources* donated to the cause, and, in some organizations, potential physical *harm* suffered at the hands of the movement’s enemies.

At the most fundamental level of group formation, a collective identity must be generated among participants. Successful collective action then occurs due to a transformation in the collective consciousness of participants.⁵ Though this may often be an unconscious process, the ability of a movement’s leaders to intentionally manipulate discourse significantly increases the likelihood that a movement will succeed. The construction of collective identity becomes increasingly multifaceted and fluid over time, but its initial formation involves the crafting of a discourse which bifurcates society into like-minded supporters and opponents. Some discursive cues emitted by the group will attract like minded individuals, but only by emitting other discursive cues which negatively construct other elements of society. As Richard Anderson notes,

> “When [groups] emit discursive cues to a distinctive identity, *some* individuals in the population conclude that they and the [group] have something in common. These individuals may feel superior to, different from, [“When [groups] emit discursive cues to a distinctive identity, *some* individuals in the population conclude that they and the [group] have something in common. These individuals may feel superior to, different from, *other* elements of society. As Richard Anderson notes,

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marginal to, or alienated from the population as a whole. If so, when [a group] presents themselves as distinct, such individuals’ self-perception as distinctive provides them with a reason to feel similar to the [group]…Consciousness of a distinctive social identity shared with the [group] motivates the enforcers to join in discriminating against anyone who bears the opposed, negatively constructed identity of the population.\(^6\)

The initial stage in any group identity formation must also involve setting one’s organization apart from alternative choices. In a highly competitive environment, movements often have to contend with an array of possible choices facing potential recruits. To offer one example, potential insurgents in Palestinian society have been pulled between the recruiting mechanisms of dozens of groups – from the more popular factions of the PLO to more radical variants of Palestinian nationalism found in Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the vast panoply of smaller movements. In any such environment, the first movement to successfully capture public attention and organize has the advantage of setting the agenda of debate to a certain degree.\(^7\) Subsequent groups seeking to capitalize on public sentiment are forced to contend with the success of the initial movement by crafting an identity which sets them apart from their predecessors. In the Palestinian case, the PLO was the dominant representative of Palestinian resistance for more than twenty years and had the advantage of setting much of the agenda in a secular-nationalist tone. When alternative resistance groups emerged in the late 1980s they were of a highly different character, emphasizing religious cues and seeking to put forth what they considered to be a more authentic nationalism – one which combined the nationalist resistance program of the PLO with religious symbolism emphasizing the pious righteousness of their followers.

\(^6\) Anderson, Richard, “Discursive Change and the Spread of Political Identity,” unpublished manuscript

\(^7\) Tarrow, Sydney, Power in Movement: Collective Action, Social Movements and Politics. Cambridge University Press, 1998
A successful effort to mobilize individuals for a given cause thus involves a series of both conscious and unconscious efforts at cueing individuals in broader society. Movement leaders put forth a particular set of beliefs and norms and attract like minded individuals while also constructing an “other,” which may include state authorities, foreign governments, or individuals in society who have adopted a significantly different set of values. But as groups are dynamic entities facing fluid systemic changes in resource access, political openings, and societal trends among their base support, leaders in social movements need to actively adapt their discourse to respond to a wide variety of changing circumstances. In particular, the movement elite are faced with the constant task of streamlining meaning for constituents, opponents, and observers (Snow & Benford, 2000). By presenting complex social processes or political platforms through the use familiar symbols, a social movement can then effectively mobilize a broad social base.

This process has been referred to as framing by some scholars. The term originally came from Goffman, for whom the term denoted the “schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large.”

Frames can include words, phrases, repeated themes, or any combination of discursive means to repeatedly convey a core idea or concept to supporters. Snow and Benford popularized the term years later by analyzing how frames gain traction in proto-movements and may be successfully exploited to gain adherents.

For example, the Muslim Brotherhood’s most common campaign slogan, “Islam is the Solution,” has been employed for years, whenever the group fielded candidates for parliament. This rather vague phrase can mean many things to many people, and can alternatively been

interpreted as 1) a reference to the pious, moral nature of a movement; 2) the presentation of the movement as an alternative to largely secular governments which have thus far failed to improve one’s society; 3) the suggestion that Shari’a law be implemented; 4) the common da’wa notion that reform of society as a whole comes from the increased piousness at the individual level; or 5) a catch all phrase which promises that an Islamic majority in government would somehow solve all of society’s social problems. Notably, most movements who have employed this slogan do not have a comprehensive political program describing exactly how Islam is the solution. Most either have a largely secular socio-economic reform platform or an ideological goal of implementing Shari’a law. The frame “Islam is the Solution” is therefore a powerful means of attracting support – it excites religious zeal while also remaining vague enough that an individual can read into its meaning anything he or she wants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Islam is the Solution”</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
<td>A popular Brotherhood slogan often parroted by other Islamist groups; despite its many meanings, more commonly employed as offering a religious alternative to the failed secular programs of the Egyptian government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of resistance</td>
<td>Hizballah, Hamas</td>
<td>Both groups employ the concept of legitimate resistance when discussing Israel – Hizballah more commonly employs this concept to justify their continued existence as an armed movement, state within a state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilayat al-faqih</td>
<td>Hizballah</td>
<td>Guardianship of the Jurisconsult; commonly used in Hizballah’s early history, the notion that the group was beholden to the leadership of Iran’s supreme ayatollah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression of the Shi’a Minority</td>
<td>Hizballah</td>
<td>Frequent use of early Shi’a history, including the Battle of Karbala, martyrdom of Imam Hussayn, to convey the concept of self-sacrifice, a pious man’s need to struggle against inequity; often used to refer to Israeli, U.S. repression against the group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Palestine is Waqf”</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Notion that historic Palestine is indivisible, Hamas will never recognize Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabr</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>The concept of “patience” often used to justify short</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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term setbacks, changes in group strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Movement</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Hudna, tahdiyya</em></td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>The concept of “ceasefire” or “truce,” rooted in the prophet Muhammad’s lifetime, as a justification for suspension of violence against Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Islam is our frame of reference”</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>A popular frame used by Hamas prior to the 2006 election when running on a secular campaign platform – most campaign documents and speeches would start with this line but would not further discuss the concept of religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Fitna</em></td>
<td>Hamas, Hizballah</td>
<td>A pejorative term meaning communal strife, often employed as a warning; used by Hizballah at the end of the Lebanese civil war and Hamas in the middle of the 2007 conflict with Fatah in Gaza</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Commonly Employed Frames by Hamas, Hizballah, The Muslim Brotherhood

Frame Resonance, Frame Dissonance –

Individuals hold a vast number of beliefs, values, and norms – all of which are arrayed hierarchically in terms how important they are to that individual. Successfully efforts at framing must “somehow fit within the larger belief system or ideology within which the movement seeks to effect change and resonate within the belief system of potential movement sympathizers.” In other words, frames must hold a degree of *resonance* with an element of society. As we shall see in later chapters, in the initial, exclusionary phase of any organization that resonance need only affect a small subset of society. In later years, as a movement becomes more inclusionary, it must adapt its rhetoric so that its frame resonance will affect a much larger segment of society.

Snow and Benford have noted that how relevant a frame is to an individual depends on several factors. First, does the frame have *empirical credibility*? In examining the interconnection of frames and real world events, does a movement make diagnoses of problems

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and prognoses for their solutions which actually fit the evidence?\textsuperscript{10} Although Snow and Benford fail to note it, it should be mentioned that for some deeply religious movements, empirical credibility may be somewhat suspended. If all things are possible with God on your side, then empirically unrealistic prognoses for solutions may be a significant element of your movement’s framing.

Second, does the frame have \textit{experiential commensurability}? In other words, does the rhetoric of the movement actually harmonize with an individual’s experience or is its framing too abstract or erudite to be easily understood by everyday participants? Again, the cases under examination in this dissertation provide us an interesting dilemma. Arabic is a rare example of a diglossia – a language in which two idiolects coexist more or less evenly among native speakers. For speakers of Arabic, the local dialects of the language exist alongside the formal form, \textit{fusha}, also known as literary Arabic, classical Arabic, or Modern Standard Arabic. \textit{Fusha} is the only form of Arabic taught in the classroom and any individual who has attended secular or religious schools has at least some rudimentary knowledge of the differences between the two variants. Highly educated Arabic speakers can easily switch back and forth between the two variants, a process called \textit{code-switching},\textsuperscript{11} often times mixing elements of \textit{fusha} vocabulary with more common dialect sentence structure.

The ability of educated individuals to employ \textit{fusha} can both increase and inhibit the ability to converse with other individuals in the Arabic speaking world. On the one hand,


individuals employing intelligible *fusha* can transcend the ineffectiveness of communicating with dialects as individuals employing different dialects are often unintelligible to one another. Yet even if the intricacies of *fusha* are largely unintelligible to the general public, the use of *fusha* is often symbolically important, harkening back to the formative period of Islam in an effort to demonstrate to ones audience that the speaker is educated, pious, and just in his cause. Thus, Osama bin Laden’s messages to the Arab world were typically given in *fusha* and Saddam Hussein in his speeches to the region in the midst of the first Gulf War employed (rather poor) *fusha* for its symbolic value rather than for purely communicative purposes. The use of *fusha* by the movements under examination in this dissertation varies according to the medium in which the rhetoric is being presented. The television and radio stations used by both Hamas and Hizballah employ both formal Arabic and dialect in various broadcasts and in more conversational programs. Campaign speeches candidates of both movements are often given in one’s dialect in an effort to better reach the masses.

Finally, Snow and Benford ask “does the frame have *narrative fidelity*?” Do the “proffered framings resonate with cultural narrations, that is, with the stories, myths, and folk tales that are part and parcel of one’s cultural heritage and that thus function to inform events and experiences in the immediate present.”12 For many Islamist groups the easiest means of assuring narrative fidelity is to tie modern events with parallels in the life and times of the Prophet Muhammad. Shi’a will more typically employ the story of Muhammad’s grandson Husayn, who was killed in the Battle of Karbala in 680. For Shi’ites, the story of Husayn represents a majority

verses minority paradigm in which a good, pious man sacrificed his life in a struggle against hopeless odds. Most Muslims are familiar with this story and the lessons it embodies. Shi’a groups will often employ it in the modern period because of the high narrative fidelity and frame resonance it holds with impoverished, oppressed Shi’a youth seeking inspiration.

Ultimately, the most successful frames resonate with individuals when they relate to one’s personal experiences, are clearly explained, and draw upon commonly understood symbols or parables. It is the work of leaders to constantly adapt frames to discover what works best for constituents. The act of framing is dynamic and fluid, but is also largely a directed, active process. Movement actors are seen as agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, bystanders, and observers (Snow & Benford, 1988). Framing for them “denotes an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction”13

As a social movement begins to form and grow, commonly constructed grievances and potential prescriptions for change will form into definite frames which will come to identify the group. In the identity formation phase, some frames will work while others will fail. In establishing diagnoses of existing social problems and prognoses for change, some prescriptions will achieve a higher level of resonance. Ultimately, for any movement to be successful it must employ a number of frames which have a high degree of frame resonance and which cover a wide variety of experiential situations.14


Yet group identity construction is not at all deterministic in this early stage. Movements must craft master frames which they then employ to recruit potential supporters, however individuals consistently deal with information which contradicts a group’s proffered discourse. The individual in question must either suppress this new information or seek an internal accommodation which moderates their opinion. A group can engage with popular external criticism in an open, but one-sided way, thus appearing to be holding an honest discussion of the issues while actually putting forth propaganda to its own members.\textsuperscript{15}

The potential for frame dissonance is a constant threat to the cohesion of a movement. Therefore, while groups must actively engage in the act of identity construction they must also work to minimize the dissonance of supporters due to other external information. Movements must also minimize the dissonance that accompanies changes in goals and strategies by adapting their framing accordingly. We will explore this process in later chapters – each of the groups under examination have had to create new master frames to prepare supporters for a possibly unpopular shift in strategy, for example, a strategic shift towards the use of suicide bombing, the decision to engage in a cease-fire with an external enemy, or to participate in elections.

Frames can be adjusted to respond to a wide variety of situations, yet at times they can also constrain behavior. So long as leaders are bound to societal norms or construct their own norms of behavior through the consistent use of certain frames, their decision making is constrained in significant ways. Katzenstein identifies two types of norms at work in this process – constitutive norms (which express actor identities) and regulatory norms (which define

standards of appropriate behavior). Together these two bodies of norms establish expectations about who the actors will be and how they will behave in a particular environment (Katzenstein, 1996). In this way, cultural norms an individual deems important significantly shape the way preference formation occurs and a general understanding of what options are ultimately feasible for an organization.

**Spheres of Recruitment –**

A movement which has crafted frames with a high degree of resonance can only successfully expand its popularity if it is able to distribute those frames to a wider audience. As such, the movement needs to exploit a number of spheres of recruitment of two major types: 1) Media and 2) Social networking. Types of media spheres can include television or radio programming, internet websites, magazines, books, newspapers, public rallies, religious sermons, graffiti, posters and pamphlets, among others. The freer-and open the society is, the easier it is to construct spheres of recruitment in plain sight. Social networking spheres of recruitment, meanwhile, involve the interpersonal relationships between those who already support a movement and their efforts to recruit family, friends, and acquaintances.

**Media –**

In the midst of military operations during its first year of existence, Hamas launched a concurrent media campaign designed to spread word of the organization’s activities and goals and attract potential recruits from Palestinian society. Hamas’ nascent activities were restricted to inexpensive copying of pamphlets, much of which took place at public locations, including a
small library in Hebron. Within years, Hamas had expanded its limited media operations to include the distribution of martyrdom videos, cassette recordings of the Friday sermons of sympathetic imams, and even some radio and print media. The organization’s expanding media presence provided a means of spreading Islamic cultural frames to justify military operations against Israel and attract like-minded supporters to join the movement.

Within only a few years, Hamas had developed an extensive media empire devoted to conveying its frames to a wide audience. Hamas’ Voice of al-Aqsa radio, and its two leading television stations, Al-Aqsa and Al-Quds, broadcast news and variety programming as well as live coverage of events with a sympathetic bias towards the group. The organization also owns and operates a number of newspapers, including Al-Risala (The Message) and Felesteen (Palestine).

Similarly, Hizballah’s satellite television station, Al-Manar (The Lighthouse), was launched in 1991 with the help of Iranian funds and has been the primary means by which the organization has spread its message to the entire region. The organization’s print media and websites, most notably http://www.english.moqawama.org/index.php present a blatantly pro-Hizballah discourse which suggests the movement can do no wrong. Any anti-Hizballah media coverage which finds its way into other independent Lebanese media sources is often addressed by Hizballah’s media empire with perhaps its most common frames – the “Israeli conspiracy.”

An excellent example of the use of this frame can be found in the midst of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon investigation into the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri. When information leaked suggesting Hizballah members would be indicted for the assassination,

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Hizballah’s media operations began a months-long campaign designed to cast doubt on the Tribunal’s findings. Al-Manar and other Hizballah-controlled media sources argued that the Tribunal’s entire case was based on circumstantial evidence and testimony from false witnesses. Further, Hizballah media began suggesting the assassination had in fact been planned by Mossad and spent months uncovering “evidence” of Israeli involvement. In August, 2010, Hassan Nasrallah spoke to reporters via satellite and presented intercepted Israeli drone video footage of Hariri’s motorcade route, which he argued implicated Israel in the assassination. Hizballah-controlled media also argued that purported information implicating Hizballah members largely rested on circumstantial evidence drawn from cell phone records from Lebanese telecommunications companies penetrated by Israeli intelligence services. Hizballah’s months-long media campaign eventually paid off – almost all aspects of the Tribunal’s investigation had been leaked and repeatedly dissected by Hizballah apologists that by the time the findings of the Tribunal were officially published, they debuted to little fanfare from the Lebanese public.

Hamas and Hizballah’s media empires are one of the most important means by which frames are conveyed to the public. As many scholars have noted, average citizens are typically at a significant informational disadvantage vis-à-vis leadership elites. As such, they compensate by employing heuristic cues that allow them to make reasoned judgments with small amounts of information.17 Academics to date have focused their analysis of the role of media almost solely on western societies, studying the means by which politicians or mainstream media bodies shape consistent opinions among the public (Campbell et al. 1960, Zaller 1992, Holsti 2004). Studies agree that consumers overcome their inability to independently weigh information by relying on

informational shortcuts, many of which are formed by relying on the opinions of political and media elites (Iyengar & Kinder 1987, Krosnick & Kinder 1990, Larson 2000). As Baum and Porter note,

“When leaders employ culturally congruent frames, the public’s information disadvantage is exacerbated by the one-dimensional tone of media coverage. The media provide what the market demands: coverage consonant with a dominant and culturally congruent frame offered by the administration.”

Many of the lessons derived from these studies, although based on western cultures, can be applied to mass media consumption in the Middle East and elsewhere. In fact, the process is even further accelerated when combined with the blatant bias of privately run media established by movements like Hizballah or Hamas. The power of media in distributing movement frames is an essential element of attracting like-minded individuals. Subsequent chapters will further examine the effect media operations have on these movement’s supporters and opponents. Perhaps most importantly, the sphere of media serves as the most important means by which the gradual ideological realignment of a movement takes place. Media for these movements is a source of propaganda which insures followers have an ideologically-consistent basis for which to support a given course of action. When a group moves towards an inclusionary political agenda, significant changes occur in how ideas are presented in their media.

*Networking –*

The second element of recruitment is the presence of dense interpersonal networks from which members can conscript friends and family members into the organization. Numerous scholars have noted that individuals who have friends or family members involved in social

movements are more inclined to get involved themselves (Snow et al. 1980; McAdam 1986, 1988; della Porta 1988, 1995; Gould 1993; Kriesi 1993). A body of literature by network theorists has also emerged in recent years which attempts to trace the effect of interpersonal relationships on the development of social movements. Conceiving of a network of nodes (composed of distinct sets of individuals, organizations, neighborhoods, regions, family members, etc.) these scholars trace how two or more nodes are directly linked in an effort to promote collective mobilization.

At the individual level, potential recruits are linked through both “private” and “public” ties to the organization. As such, a potential recruit may be privately recruited through a direct interpersonal relationship with a family member or close friend, or an individual may be recruited due to an ongoing relationship with a public aspect of the organization (for example, a Hamas-run hospital or a Hizballah-funded youth group). An individual may participate in a number of public nodes – a church or mosque, a medical clinic, or a political rally through which he may be exposed to the recruitment efforts of an organization – and will develop private nodes of interpersonal relationships in these settings.

In highly repressive societies, interpersonal connections serving as a mechanism for recruitment and socialization become far more important (Diani and McAdam 2003). As most insurgent organizations do not have a recruiting office and are, especially in their early years, highly insular, recruitment frequently depends on the existence of close personal ties of movement members with friends and family. These social networks often become the sole conduits for activism in closed societies and recruitment tends to be direct and personal. It is only later, after a movement has captured a larger share of power relative to the state that more overt, public forms of mobilization become possible.
One example of this networking process can be found in the formation of Jordan’s Islamic Action Front. Founded in 1992 by a group of professional Muslims, the organization established a number of Islamic charitable clinics to provide quality health care to Muslims in the community. While a number of scholars and commentators have historically assumed that the establishment of these Islamic clinics was merely a recruiting front for political parties and terrorist organizations seeking to reach low-class members of the population, a study by Janine A. Clark has demonstrated that a different and more significant dynamic is occurring. These clinics are predominately located in middle class, not poor neighborhoods, and do not serve as recruiting offices but rather as a public space for the establishment of horizontal networking between members of the middle class, from doctors to donors to volunteers to patients (Clark, 2003). As a networking space, clinics are locations where interpersonal ties develop along horizontal lines. Within this network, the development of new social identities and the diffusion of new ideas become possible and the framework for broader collective action in the form of a political party can take place. Many individuals are eventually recruited into the folds of the sponsoring organization, but it is through a subtle process depending on interpersonal relationships rather than an overt recruiting mechanism.

The Muslim Brotherhood has similarly relied on the presence of dense personal networks as a means of expanding its influence. The Brotherhood’s most successful efforts to recruit members have come from its efforts to fight the perceived state of jahiliyya, ignorance and unbelief, which ran rampant in society and was embodied in the authoritarian Egyptian state. The group initially framed its response to this enemy in social outreach and da’wa practices aimed at reforming society from within. Many younger members of the Brotherhood subsequently adopted a more active approach aimed at participation in the political process. At every level of
the movement’s social engagement, the establishment of horizontal networks played a key role in the development and execution of the ideological platforms. For many of the movement’s early members those network ties were developed in prison. The repressive policies of Nasser and later Mubarak saw thousands of members and sympathizers of the Brotherhood rounded up and imprisoned in close quarters where they established lasting professional relationships and friendships. In subsequent generations younger members of the brotherhood established key horizontal relationships at universities and later, through the internet, where blogs and website have offered unique forms of protest against the Egyptian state.

Hamas’ process of recruitment and identity formation has similarly depended on da’wa practices and the establishment of dense interpersonal networks. From the start, Hamas’ assertion that they were the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people necessitated a certain degree of identity consistency by establishing the means to care for the people. But the use of social services has also proved vital for the organization’s survival - the movement has utilized its da’wa practices to garner recruits and societal support as well as establish extensive horizontal relationships throughout society. This program of da’wa services, the Mujama’ Islami model, was established prior to Hamas’ founding by a leading figure in Palestinian society, Sheikh Yassin. Yassin and other members of the Palestinian Ikhwan (the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood) sought the reform of society from within and under this program social services in the territories flourished and the number of mosques doubled between 1967 and 1987. Even though it was established primarily as a resistance organization, Hamas adopted the social services model of the Ikhwan and significantly expanded existing infrastructure by funding private clinics, distributing food goods and founding a number of social centers, including the Islamic Workers Union in 1992, the Scientific Medical Association in 1997 (which offered
extensive medical and dental services to impoverished Palestinian citizens), the Association for Science and Culture and provided education from kindergarten through eighth grade. By providing social services to Palestinian society Hamas not only established a reputation for piety and social munificence but created interpersonal networks both horizontal between middle class individuals and vertical with lower class individuals. Recruitment into the organization became easier once these networks had been established.

In all of the cases under examination in this dissertation, we can observe the dynamics of identity formation being highly dependent on interpersonal networking. The presence of dense social connections (wasta) along with the establishment of centers of networking (such as those established through da’wa practices) allows individuals with close personal ties to adopt a similarly constructed discourse and a set of values, norms, and symbols for interpreting the environment around them. These interactions are further reinforced by media spheres which establish certain norms, convey movement frames, and generally help to minimize the cognitive dissonance of followers.

**Creating True Believers** –

Why do individuals accept costs to oneself in response to group needs? In summarizing an entire corpus of academic work on identity formation, Richard Anderson has noted three particularly important processes towards explaining this phenomenon. First, when individuals are drawn to a social identity through discursive cues they will voluntarily accept costs to the self and widen perceptual gaps between members of one’s own social identity and members of a contrasted identity. Second, cues can cause an individual to become less consciously aware of the interpersonal differences among members of their group and more aware of the differences
between groups bearing opposed social identities. Third, experimental data has shown us that even arbitrary cues (such as the labeling of two groups of people into a red team and white team) can stimulate a social identity and cause individuals to voluntarily accept costs.\textsuperscript{19}

By the time a distinct social identity within the group has been crafted and disseminated through the use of cuing, the “personal self” of individual members recedes in favor of one’s social identity. This process has interesting implications for the free rider problem. Mancur Olson (1965) famously argued that rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve collective benefits so long as those benefits are public goods which cannot be withheld according to whether or not the individual participated in the initial collective action. Olson’s model, however, does not sufficiently contend with the notion of collective identities. As many scholars of social movements have noted, individual logic is often supplanted by the sense of group fate and the dense personal ties and obligations typical of most developed organizations.

In this setting, individuals must evaluate the efficacy of individual participation by analyze a number of factors – 1) Expectations about the number of other participants, 2) expectations about one’s own contribution to the probability of success, and 3) expectations about the probability of success if many people participate.\textsuperscript{20} Yet an individual’s ability to correctly judge the efficacy of his or her participation is usually highly unlikely. Individuals adopting a collective identity often participate in collective action based on a belief that nobody will benefit unless large numbers participate – specifically, due to the inability of an individual to


fully understand their personal capacity to contribute. Such individuals overestimate their ability to aid the movement (Fantasia, 1988).

Once an individual is exposed to a movement’s ideology and repeatedly consumes the group’s master frames, that individual will become increasingly sympathetic to the movement’s goals over time. It is through these interpersonal networks that group socialization occurs – individuals with close personal ties will adopt a constructed discourse and a set of values, norms, and symbols for interpreting the environment around them. A social movement may emerge out of the socialization function of these interpersonal networks, or an existing social movement may capitalize on existing ideological trends within society. Ultimately, however, individuals engage in collective action because they share a commonly constructed set of beliefs with others about an issue of political contention.21

Through this process of socialization, a type of group cognition develops over time. Doug McAdams notes that such cognitions “are overwhelmingly not based upon observation or empirical evidence available to participants, but rather upon cuings among groups of people who jointly create the meanings they will read into current and anticipated events.”22 Collective action then occurs because individuals in a group are socialized into accepting costs to oneself and into believing that their contributions make a difference to those around them. McAdams notes,

“The existence of some sort of collective group setting provides a context in which all-important social-psychological processes can occur. The movements, however rudimentary they are, provide the leaders, communication, technologies, etc. needed to translate attributions into concrete action. Finally, these collective settings supply the established structures of solidarity incentives on which most social behavior depends – the

21 Diani, Mario and Doug McAdam, Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action, Oxford University Press, 2003
22 McAdam, “Micromobilization Contexts,” in From Structure to Action edited by Klandermans et al., p.137
myriad interpersonal rewards that attend ongoing participation in any established group or informal association. The motivation to participate is a function of perceived costs and benefits. Movements control these costs and benefits to a varying extent as perceptions can be manipulated. The individual remains the ultimate focus of the choice process – but at the same time the generation of expectations on which choice depends remains a profoundly social process, requiring attention to and information about other relevant actors.”

In some cases, the creation of a group identity can be the result of an overt, consistent effort by a movement’s leadership to subject its members to an indoctrination program. Hamas, for example, has developed such an identity formation and indoctrination program for members of its military. According to a translation of *Darb al-Ashwaak: Hamas, al-Intifada, al-Sultah* (Pinprick Strikes: Hamas, the Intifada, and Leadership), a memoir written by a Hamas member, prospective recruits of the organization went through a series of rituals and training before joining fully:

“A prospective member of Hamas must first attempt to observe all the required Muslim prayers of the day. Once the member's transformation and sincerity in observing Islamic rituals is satisfactory to the recruiters, he is brought into a small usra (family) that monitors the person's spiritual progress. At this stage, recruits typically learn two sections of the Qur’an (Amaa and Tabarak) and learn selected hadiths (prophetic sayings). In addition, the recruit is introduced to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology of takfir (excommunication), the need to isolate oneself from sin, and to the jihad as a means of warfare. Not everyone successfully completes the indoctrination period, which lasts 18 months. However, if the person does succeed, he becomes an operative member and is assigned to a membership cell. During the indoctrination period, the recruit is assessed for skills, leadership potential, and ability within the membership cell. Based on his evaluation, and if he shows leadership abilities, he is given further training, designated a full member, and assigned as a captain or lieutenant.”

We can expect members who have been subjected to such lengthy indoctrination to have a more stable *operational code*, an internally constructed set of truths. The operational code approach tries to explain various political phenomena, including bargaining style, the selection of political goals, the adoption of risk-taking strategies and tactics, the exercise of political influence, and the formulation of particular worldviews (Walker, 1983). Much of the operational

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code approach is based on a study conducted by Ole Holsti in 1977. In it, Holsti develops a typology of political belief systems which is based on the assumption that an individual’s view of the nature of political life is central to the formation of that individual’s political belief system. The study’s researchers asked a number of questions which helped to frame different political outlook typologies based on whether an individual views the political system as harmonious or conflictual. After matching this belief system with motivational imagery, the study concluded that operational code types are internally consistent, interdependent, and resistant to change. Individuals continually reinforce their belief system in an attempt to guard against cognitive dissonance, a process which accounts for the persistence of certain belief systems.

For the organizations under examination in this dissertation, some indoctrinated subsets of an organization (for example, Hamas’ military wing) have a very strongly consistent operational code which permits them to minimize cognitive dissonance and internalize sacrifice for the good of the group’s ideological goals. Work on social identity theory has demonstrated that many such individuals have an innate desire for self-esteem and are likely disposed to believe that members of their own group cannot be responsible for reprehensible acts (Tajfel, 1978). Scholars have also demonstrated that one of the formidable obstacles to a compromise settlement come from the emotional commitment of more hawkish subsets of a group to “the cause.”

For the vast majority of the common members of a group, individual operational codes can be slowly modified by a movement’s leaders given the right set of adaptive frames. But, we shall see that in more extreme, indoctrinated subsets of an organization, one’s operational code

has been constructed to be much more resistant to change. Ultimately, the true believers of such organizations are often unwilling to give up on a movement’s original goals and ideologies and are often those responsible fracturing a movement between its hawks and doves.

A Note on the Role of Religion in Identity Formation –

Academia has long struggled with the role of religion in group dynamics and identity formation. In this dissertation religion will be treated as one means by which an organization can recruit individuals, not a sui generis factor which pre-determines how actors will behave. Religious organizations, just like secular organizations, face the problem of mobilizing a populace which is exposed to a panoply of ideas. Religious symbols and cues offer a prospective movement’s leaders a toolbox from which to draw ideas. But, as we shall see in later chapters, religious discourse does not mean a movement is inflexible in its positions – religious symbols can often be adapted to fit the changing political or social needs of an organization. In short, religious beliefs do not establish a fixed, inflexible identity in actors or groups.

Despite evidence of the adaptability of religious frames, many scholars have attempted to simplify a complex phenomenon like religion into a singular unit of analysis which predetermines behavior. But, as Hasenclever and Rittberger note,

“The impact of religious traditions on conflict behavior is deeply ambiguous: They can make violence more likely, insofar as a reading of holy texts prevails that justifies armed combat; on the other hand, they can make violence less likely, insofar as a reading of holy texts prevails that delegitimizes the use of violence.”

One can identify here a major hazard of cultural approaches to international relations which rely on macro-level definitions of identity. There is far too much internal variation in any

macro-level identity for it to be an effective unit of analysis. The tendency of scholars like Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington to reduce religion and other forms of culture to a binding set of beliefs which necessitate certain interaction outcomes with states of a different culture is overly simplistic. One cannot employ the concept of “religion” as a taxonomic tool and catch-all definition, the term is unquantifiable and subjective to the individual human experience.

In a collection of works on military culture and preference formation Katzenstein noted the importance of norms for expressing actor identity and defining standards of appropriate behavior – norms which then “establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and…how these particular actors will behave.”27 Katzenstein’s formulation provides us with one means of understanding how religion can function in an organization to establish norms of behavior for its supporters. Through the presence of constitutive norms, certain modes of behavior are established within bureaucratic culture of like-minded people.

Another scholar, Bruce Lincoln, similarly criticized the reductionist trend of Lewis and others, arguing that “any attempt to reduce religion to a single, monolithic entity, whereas even in the politically and technologically simplest societies, multiple religious forms, styles, contents, currents of opinion, and organizational structures are always present.”28 Lincoln is instead interested in the ways in which religion is used to facilitate the leap from non-violence to


violence – “the discourses [people] develop and circulate may be intended to persuade others, but above all they help overcome their own subjective (i.e. moral) inhibitions.”

In the end Lincoln concludes that religion is often used as a frame of justification for violent activities – but it is *not* a sui generis cause of violence. No religious tradition is more inclined than any other to turn to justifications for violence but religious discourse can be deployed in any tradition in such a way as to “suspend the ethical.” And, of course, the leadership of a movement can easily use religious frames can easily used to manipulate potential adherents to sacrifice for pious reasons.

Conclusions –

Deconstructing the process of identity formation is by no means easy. Competing bodies of norms, many of which may be in conflict with one another, are constantly at play in an individual’s mind. The leadership of a movement or a country, for example, takes into consideration bodies of institutional norms, international relations norms, and societal norms. At the bureaucratic level, operating norms do not exist in a vacuum from societal norms. At the group level, social movements face not only norms particular to their organization’s history and practices, but also respond to changing societal norms. At the individual level, people face different bodies of societal norms depending on their particular religious, ethnic, cultural, or social orientation. Tracing identity formation from this jumble of competing bodies of norms has the potential to be highly problematic.

Yet by examining the role of framing in the formation of identity at the group level, we can begin to see how cultural norms have a direct, measurable impact. By examining a group’s policy trends, its leader’s interviews and speeches, and case studies of behavior and crisis management, we can trace how adaptive framing responds to changes in a group’s outlook. What are the assumptions of a group’s leadership about the nature of politics and conflict? Do they view the international political system as conflictual or harmonious? How do they approach the concept of compromise or negotiation? Most importantly, when the answer to any of the above questions changes for a group’s leadership – how does that leadership then adapt its framing to change the perspective of lower-level members? Such an analysis of culture at the group level yields interesting observations about how norms are strategically used by the movement elite and how new norms are established, transmitted, and ultimately internalized by a segment of society at large.

This chapter has outlined how identity formation occurs through a set of processes – 1) a leadership’s construction and manipulation of frames, 2) conveyance of frames and recruitment through social networks and media outreach, and 3) the internalization of frames by individual members over time and the construction of a group identity. A successful social movement is thus one which can relate to broader ideological trends in society, then convey a set of prescriptions, symbols, rituals, narratives, and cultural frames through a combination of media outreach and interpersonal networking. Over time, those efforts can enable any group to achieve significant gains in membership among its mobilizing potential and carve out a particular niche in a society’s political spectrum.

Subsequent chapters will examine how individual movements have used this process to form a contingent of committed, loyal followers. We will also examine how the formation of a
solidified group identity can often cause problems for a movement if it attempts to adapt framing to respond to new political realities. While the initial stages of movement recruitment may depend exclusively on dense interpersonal connections, the success of its later stages (if it hopes to grow in any significant way through broader recruitment) involves the ability of its leaders to gain a platform to emit discursive cues to broader society. It is during this expansion phase that a movement begins to compromise or realign some of its early goals – a transition which is particularly difficult for those true believers which have adopted an uncompromising conviction to the movement’s early frames.
Chapter 3: Speech Distancing and the Shift towards Inclusion

Introduction –

In the previous chapter we traced the initial stages of group identity formation, a process which often involves the crafting of an exclusionary discourse in order to build a core set of adherents. Over time, an identity group is constituted around this discourse, and a set of symbols, norms and beliefs will set them apart from most members of the general populace. While more broad-based recruitment is an important strategy for any organization, the need to acquire a core of like-minded, dedicated individuals is of greater importance initially. For insurgent organizations or organizations in repressed society, this need is paramount. Donatella della Porta’s work on Italian left-wing terrorism in the 70s offers one study of how recruitment tended to be through direct and personal channels rather than a strategy of public outreach (della Porta, 1988). As an organization grows and political opportunities open up, however, it may choose to broaden its recruitment strategy to a wider segment of the population. The exclusionary discourse and interpersonal networking of many insurgent movements in their early stages ensures a core set of trusted members and limits the danger of free-riding. But so long as the movement is reclusive and/or extremist (limited to only a small spectrum of individuals on the left or the right), their ability to expand their mobilization potential and affect significant political change comes into question.

The ability of a movement to grow therefore depends on establishing a broader appeal, and thus softening of their exclusionary discourse. This can happen in two significant ways. First, the movement’s ideology may not be particularly extremist or anathema to wider ideological trends in society, however the group’s strategy for recruitment may be structured
such that only a small number of family or friends are broad into the folds of the organization. Few, if any attempts may be made to recruit members outside of that dense interpersonal network. Such a movement is exclusionary such that it seeks horizontal connections and socialization for its own sake rather than recruiting a large segment of the populace. Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizballah, and numerous smaller movements offer us examples of this process – all were founded by a dense interpersonal group of religious officials, intellectuals and professionals who had identified a social malaise in their societies. Initial efforts centered around the contribution of individual members to solve a social problem rather than on broad-base recruitment – for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood the initial solution to the problem of repression and the perceived decline of Islamic civilization was to focus on internal rejuvenation of traditional Islam in society. In both cases, dissatisfaction with inadequate social welfare services led a group of professionals and intellectuals to develop a series of Islamic-oriented clinics and social services and teach what they viewed as a more traditional form of Islam. For Hizballah, the perceived problem was foreign influence, to which an initially limited form of violent resistance was seen as the political prognosis for Lebanon’s ills.

It was only later that the exclusionary “do it yourself” pioneering spirit of these organizations softened – arguably, because the limited scope of reform which they were pursuing did not lead to any corresponding payoff towards the achievement of their goals. While initial efforts centered on the ability of a close core of individuals to affect change through micro-level strategies, all of these movements subsequently turned to broad-base recruitment and participation in the political system in an effort to address their grievances at the macro-level and better accomplish their goals.
Terrorist Groups and Political Parties: Common Linkages

The impulse of older exclusionary movements to solve problems through macro-level strategies like participation in the political system is not uncommon. In particular, academic work done on the linkages between terrorist groups and political parties is an important component of understanding why extremist organizations turn to the political arena. In a study conducted by Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perliger, of 399 identified terrorist groups, 31% had significant links to political parties in the state.\textsuperscript{30} Importantly, these types of linkages span a wide variety of relationships from political movements that form terrorist groups to terrorist groups that form political parties, to (most commonly) existing political parties that support a terrorist group through financial or political assistance.

Figure 1: Types of relationship between political parties and terrorist groups

For Weinberg et al, terrorist acts represent one tactic used to achieve a political goal. As such, terrorist tactics can often prove an attractive means by which a political party can further its ultimate objectives. They note,

“For our purposes it is important to stress that terrorism is not an ideology but an activity. Presumably then it is an activity that a variety of political groups and organizations may engage in full time or sporadically. We believe it makes sense to think of any human group that relies on terrorist violence as its primary means of political expression as a ‘terrorist group.’ On some occasions terrorist activity may be sustained over long periods of time and then suspended or displaced by other forms of political activity. On others, terrorist violence may be used by a group or organization for a brief period and then abandoned, only to be employed at some later time as the presumed need for its use arises again.”

For the purposes of this dissertation, we are only examining the process by which extremist movements form a political wing and move into participatory politics. However, the multitude of cases in which a legitimate political party engages in or funds extremist violence is important evidence that the moderation thesis proposed in this dissertation is not unidirectional. Exclusionary groups engaging in participatory politics can backslide into extremist practices, or totally abandon the process. Similarly, a faction of a political party can break away to form its own terrorist group should it become dissatisfied with the direction of the parent party.

But for the movements under examination here, the road towards political inclusion is fraught with difficulties. Why, then, does an organization choose to enter into the political process? There are many possibilities. Clandestine, insurgent activities or micro-level reform efforts such as engagement in da ’wa practices may only meet with limited success over a lengthy period of time. An organization may simply grow frustrated with the apparent lack of progress of their current strategies and choose to engage in the political process in an effort to obtain greater access to resources or recruits for their movement. Alternatively, a movement may be willing to engage in the political process but is unable to do so during its early stages due to state

repression or other factors. If changes in the status quo of the political order occur it may offer an opportunity to an organization if it correctly identifies those potential political opportunities. In some cases a major political shift, such as national independence or a coup d’état, may offer a fundamentally different political landscape which a terrorist organization must adapt to. For example, the IRGUN terrorist organization which fought against the British occupation of Palestine in the 1930s and 40s transitioned into the Herut party after the establishment of Israel as an independent country. Similarly, Hizballah was forced to contend with the end of the Lebanese civil war and the signing of the Taif Accords and adapted itself into a more virulent nationalist political organization.

In other cases, effective government repression of organizations may make the potential for military success against the state relatively difficult to achieve. Rather than continuing to resist militarily, an insurgent organization may turn to the world of politics to represent their positions and compete for resources and recruits. An excellent example can be found in the Muslim Brotherhood. Faced with a high degree of authoritarian repression from the Egyptian state, the Brotherhood began running candidates in parliamentary elections. While the movement was outlawed as a political party by Egyptian authorities, a number of candidates who were ostensibly members of the Brotherhood ran as independents in the 1990s and 2000s. Hamas members undertook a similar strategy in the Palestinian Authority elections of 1996 and 2000, in which the movement formally boycotted participation but still allowed members to run for office on the tickets of other political parties. In a vast number of other cases, political participation and military resistance runs hand in hand. Hamas, Hizballah, the PKK, the Tamil Tigers, and a number of other terrorist organizations have both a military wing and a political wing.
The degree to which either body gains predominance depends entirely on contextual conditions, but in general a movement’s political wing is able to gain greater public legitimacy by actually working within the recognized confines of a lawful political system. This fact has interesting implications for the ability of a movement’s moderates to essentially define the agenda. However, the journey of an exclusionary movement towards participation in politics is a complicated process which involves significant ideological shifts. Not all movements are able to successfully make the transition – if a movement’s experiment with democracy fails, it may regress back to extremist behavior. State repression in Egypt, for example, has at times emboldened the Muslim Brotherhood’s exclusionary voices and limited the moderation of the organization. However, if a movement is able to engage in free and fair elections, and benefits from their decision to participate, it is more likely that moderate voices will be emboldened by the process. Yet before an exclusionary group can successfully benefit from its participation in the political process, it must adapt its behavior in significant ways.

**Speech Distancing** –

For an exclusionary party (particularly an extremist party) to capture sufficient seats to affect political change it must in some way appeal to a wider segment of the population and therefore soften exclusionary rhetoric (rhetoric which sets members of the group apart from and above members of the general populace) and craft a platform which is more inclusive and tolerant (identify commonalities such as nationalism, deemphasize divisive identity cues like religion or ethnicity in diverse societies, and set forward an actionable political agenda to respond to identified socioeconomic and political problems). This process can be termed an act of *speech distancing* – an exclusionary group attempts to capture a wider segment of the
population by distancing itself from the more combative or parochial frames it has historically used.

For example, in multi-sectarian societies, exclusionary Islamic movements are much more likely to minimize their use of Islamic frames when appealing to a wide audience. This process has been extremely important for Hizballah in a nation where Shi’a Muslims comprise only 30% of the population (Sunnis comprise another 30% but are unlikely to respond positively to Shi’a-associated imagery or frames). Even in Muslim-majority nations like Egypt or in Gaza and the West Bank, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have been incentivized to appeal to Christians or secular Muslims. As such, both parties encourage the participation of Christians on their parliamentary election tickets and typically run secular technocrats rather than overtly religious individuals. An important aspect of speech distancing for these movements is to deemphasize the exemplary, special nature of their organization and their religious beliefs and to instead emphasize the importance of unifying nationalist symbols and frames. All three organizations under examination in this dissertation have utilized the concept of Lebanese, Palestinian, or Egyptian nationalism as a core tenet of their political programs, and we will examine each of these cases in detail in subsequent chapters.

Through this process of speech distancing a movement can capitalize on common ideological trends in society and recruit a much larger number of people. Broad base recruitment, as has been noted, involves the successful ability of a movement to emit discursive cues to a wide audience. As a movement’s leaders emit discursive cues to a distinct identity, a portion of individuals in the wider population identify commonalities between their personal identity and
the group identity and are more likely to join the movement in question.\(^{32}\) When shifting to a broad-based recruitment strategy, a movement will depend on the various spheres of recruitment laid out in the previous chapter. The point at which an organization attempts an inclusionary shift in its discourse is more likely to be in its later stages – as such, the movement in question is more likely to have a significantly larger budget than in its early years and also has access to or control over multiple forms of media. The ability of the movement to communicate its more moderate frames to a broad segment of the populace is highly dependent the state of its media empire. As we shall see in later chapters, Hamas effectively shifted a great deal of its radio programming in the run up to the 2006 elections by emphasizing nationalist frames over its typical Islamist programming. Similarly, Hasan Nasrallah’s speeches evidence a marked shift in tone and frame emphasis depending on the political situation in Lebanon at any given time.

It seems that so long as it is perceived as politically advantageous for a group to do so, it will continue to engage in this strategy of speech distancing. While the group consistently depends on a certain level of communal support for its very survival, it is within the framework of the democratic process that the movement will maximize its strategy of speech distancing to reach the largest base possible. As Richard Anderson notes,

“No cued to recognize group differences between themselves and the electoral politician, members of the audience become more attentive to individual differences among political speakers. Beginning to distinguish among contestants for political power, the popular audience perceives multiple potential anchors of identification. A member of the popular audience begins taking sides with the contestant who seems more similar to the self.”\(^{33}\)

Again, in all three of our case studies involvement in politics necessitated a significant softening of exclusionary rhetoric and the introduction of inclusionary cues and frames. For Hizballah, the shift to inclusionary politics occurred in the midst of a national reconciliation at

\(^{32}\) Anderson, Richard, “Discursive Change and the Spread of Political Identity,” \textit{unpublished manuscript}

\(^{33}\) Anderson, Richard, “Discursive Change and the Spread of Political Identity,” \textit{unpublished manuscript}
the close of the Lebanese civil war. The passage of the Taif Accords in 1989 nominally ended fifteen years of infighting and promoted, at least in theory, a new era of multiculturalism and power-sharing. The provisions of the Taif agreement called for the disarming of all national militias. Hizballah, however, was allowed to keep its arms and serve as a “resistance force.” While the organization was able to maintain its major centers of power in the state, its leaders realized the need to adapt to the new Lebanese model. Whereas only years before leaders like Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah and Hassan Nasrallah had railed against the corruption of their Christian countrymen, the movement now sought pragmatic political alliances with leading Maronite figures. Early in the 1990s, as the movement began its entry into politics, its leaders formed several legislative coalitions with Michel Aoun and other Maronite Christian parties. Moreover, Hizballah joined Walid Jumblat’s Druze list in the east and allied itself with Amal and the Progressive Socialist Party in the south.

U.S. policy makers, encouraged by this sudden shift in Hizballah’s modus operandi, hoped to further encourage the movement to transform fully into a political party. While the organization is still listed on the US list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), various administrations have discussed the possibility of lifting this designation if Hizballah continues its moderation. For example, the George W. Bush administration sought to encourage this shift. In a statement President Bush called on the organization to disarm – “[Although] we view Hizballah as a terrorist organization, I would hope that Hizballah would prove that they are not by laying down their arms and not threatening peace.”34 A White House spokesman put the choice even

more plainly – “Organizations like Hizballah have to choose. Either you’re a terrorist organization or you’re a political organization.”\textsuperscript{35}

In Palestine, the act of speech distancing occurred most dramatically in the lead up to the 2006 parliamentary elections. As Hamas’ West Bank campaign manager Farhad Assad noted shortly after the movement’s victory, “[we] won the confidence of the voters…the polls all said the people’s first concern was about corruption, and then the security situation…And they showed that 25 percent of the people cared about religion.”\textsuperscript{36} Responding to these conditions, Hamas’ candidates ran under the slogan “Change and Reform,” largely downplaying the movement’s foundational religious ideology. The “Change and Reform List,” the movement’s political manifesto for the election, stressed their commitment to fighting corruption in the PA, reinforce public liberties and citizen rights, allow freedom of thought and expression in media, and bring reforms to educational policy, healthcare, agriculture, and a great deal many more issues of concern to the Palestinian public. Again, Islam was only referred to as a “frame of reference,” and overt religious statements and Qur’anic citations occurred far less frequently than in previous party documents.

For the Muslim Brotherhood, the organization has long struggled between its moderate and exclusionary voices. However, every significant foray into participatory politics in its 80 year history featured a significant component of speech distancing. The first tentative experiments with this process occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, when a new generation of Brotherhood members emerged from professional trade unions. This younger generation

believed in the ideals of pluralism and participatory politics and sought to engage with the Egyptian state. Yet the state’s authoritarianism consistently limited the extent to which the Brotherhood actually benefited from participatory politics. A younger generation of Brotherhood millennials picked up and expanded upon this mantle over the past decade by emphasizing the need for constitutional reform, human rights, and political inclusion for all Egyptians regardless of religion or gender. This more moderate strain of young Brotherhood members has frequently been at odds with the movement’s conservative strain, but the organization as a whole has shifted its rhetoric in significant ways over the past decade. More recently, the organization has evolved in its views on participatory politics by deemphasizing the exclusionary frames of Muslim piousness and instead promoting an anti-authoritarianism, pro-Egyptian nationalism discourse.

Over the past five years, in what many have termed “the charm offensive,” the Brotherhood has shifted its rhetoric to be far more inclusive of Coptic Christians, women’s rights, and a host of other moderate topics. This offensive has paid off for the organization in election after election.

**Consequences of Moderation**

In all three of our cases, a shift to political participation saw a significant evolution of a movement’s frames towards inclusion. Yet this shift is not without its consequences – an organization which does not sufficiently prepare its followers for the inclusionary shift may suddenly face significant dissent within its ranks. If a group has systematically committed itself to certain constructs over the course of its existence, it will constrain decision making in significant ways. In effect, the group has established a norm for itself which is extremely difficult to challenge in subsequent years without first significantly, and slowly preparing members for the change. To offer one example, from the start of the movement in 1988 the
senior leaders of the Palestinian movement Hamas committed themselves to a master frame which put forth that historic Palestine was indivisible and therefore that recognition could never be granted to the Israeli state. This belief was enshrined in a number of speeches, official documents, and public statements through the use of Islamic symbolism – in particular the concept of *waqf*, which was reinterpreted to mean that the land of Palestine was a religious endowment from God and could therefore not be negotiated away. When Hamas came to power in the Palestinian elections of 2006, much of the international community demanded that Hamas’ leadership recognize Israel’s right to exist, yet its leaders have found themselves fundamentally bound to this core frame. This is not to say that Hamas can never compromise on this principle – merely that its leaders are unlikely to commit to a fundamental shift in its operating norms without first laying the groundwork for the change by slowly altering their discourse about what the historic land of Palestine represents.

Organizations must therefore offer transitory frames to justify the shift to political participation. More often than not, organizations put forth the frame that political participation is a separate means of achieving the movement’s goals, distinct and parallel to political violence. Hamas, for example, was able to bring along many of its more hawkish members by promoting the frame of *sabr* (patience) to justify ideological shifts in the organization. Hizballah, meanwhile, was able to successfully make the transition because of large structural changes accompanying the end of the Lebanese civil war. The Muslim Brotherhood, as we shall see later, has had the most problems with this transition – both because of a repressive state which constrained the ability of the Brotherhood to participate in politics, and because of the lack of consistent frames from leadership over the inclusionary path. Yet for all three of our cases, the act of speech distancing has led to a remarkable moderation of the movement’s rhetoric, decision
making, and ideological outlook. While this process is not unidirectional, the evolution of these groups has interesting consequences for how a movement’s decision making becomes increasingly constrained by what adherents expect it to say and do.

Conclusion –

How successful is the act of speech distancing in moderating an organization? This dissertation argues that the bounds of acceptable behavior for an organization are highly constrained by certain constitutive norms. So long as an organization decides to exist on the fringe of society, it can engage in reprehensible acts without significant consequences to the loyalty of its core members. However, when an organization attempts to broaden its appeal and, in essence, move itself towards the center, the bounds of acceptable behavior are significantly more constrained. A movement which engages upon this path must deemphasize what makes them unique from mainstream society and instead emphasize unifying frames like nationalism, anti-corruption, bureaucratic reform, social services, and other “safe,” populist political platforms. Yet in order to maintain its core set of members, an organization must also satisfy its hawks by continuing to internally promote the movement’s religious exceptionalism and possibly even continue to conduct acts of political violence against an “other.” In essence, the movement in question can find itself increasingly constrained by the demands of both its moderate and hawkish camps.

Importantly, the rhetoric of resistance can be either a unifying or dividing type of discourse. But in order for political violence to be unifying, it must almost always be directed at an external third party perceived as an aggressor. Under such conditions, resistance to a foreign power is viewed as legitimate and even supported by a large percentage of the population, and calls for violence may find a great deal of support. Christian, Druze, and Sunni support for
Hizballah, for example, has been relatively high during periods of Israeli incursions into Lebanon and Hamas’ resistance to Israel has often been popular among a large number of Palestinians. Yet the legitimacy of resistance does not give an organization free reign to commit any heinous act it wants. In the 1990s, Hamas struggled with how to promote frames justifying the tactic of suicide bombing. While this tactic eventually became more acceptable to a wider segment of the population, it initially faced a great deal of revulsion from centrists and moderates in the organization, and larger Palestinian society. Similarly, while Hizballah’s frame of legitimate resistance against Israel played well among large segments of the Lebanese populace, their cross-border raid in 2006, which prompted a war with Israel, led to significant domestic criticism of the organization. In both cases, the organization’s true believers immediately accepted the violent tactics proffered by the parent organization. But both movements had to expend a far greater amount of effort to convince those centrists who questioned the new tactics. For both of these organizations, defensive resistance was a far more powerful (and justifiable) frame to utilize than offensive resistance.

Yet just as an organization is constrained in how violent it can get, it is also constrained by how moderate it can get. Within each of these moderating organizations there will exist a segment of followers who believe in the necessity of continued extremist tactics. Some of these individuals will stress the need for violent resistance over political participation while others will balk at the idea of allowing political participation from Christians, secularists, or women. The self-proclaimed “true believers” of an organization may soon find themselves dissatisfied with the new direction of their movement and may be pulled towards the exclusionary frames of alternative insurgent choices.

Interestingly, organizations engaging in the act of speech distancing and political participation become increasingly bound by a range of justifiable, acceptable behavior. While movements can manipulate frames to slightly extend those bounds, they are a significant constraining factor in a group’s decision making. The constitutive norms which bound an organization’s behavior can only be changed slowly, and are often only significantly affected by macro-level structural changes. For example, the economic collapse of a society can significantly shift a populace’s willingness to accept radical behavior, paving the way for organizations which proffer extremist frames to seize a wider segment of the population. Similarly, the opening of the political process or the decision of an organization to fully engage in participatory politics presents another structural change which constrains an organization’s decision making towards more moderate behavior.

Our next three chapters will dive deeper into case studies of organizations which are in the midst of this process. In all three examples, an early, formative period saw the crafting of an exclusionary discourse. Similarly, all three movements later decided to engage in participatory politics and shifted their rhetoric towards inclusionary frames. Yet while all three organizations have moderated their beliefs over time, they still must contend with their true believers. Those movements which have made the transition successfully are those which have maintained a core set of leadership which offers an evolutionary, but largely consistent set of frames. The need for a gradual shift towards moderation is paramount, and only those movements which are able to prepare their more radical followers for the transition are likely to survive without suffering mass defections and ultimately, fragmentation.
Chapter 4: Hamas in Transition

“Every negotiation with the enemy is a regression from the causes, concession of a principle, and recognition of the usurping murderers’ false claim to a land in which they were not born.” – Widely distributed Hamas leaflet, August 18, 1988

“We are not interested in a vicious cycle of violence…if Israel withdraws to the ’67 borders, then we will establish a peace in stages…We will establish a situation of stability and calm which will bring safety for our people…When Israel declares that it will give the Palestinian people a state and give them back all their rights, then we are ready to recognize them.” – Isma’il Haniyah, Leading Hamas figure and former PA Prime Minister, February 26, 2006

“[we] won the confidence of the voters…the polls all said the people’s first concern was about corruption, and then the security situation…And they showed that 25 percent of the people cared about religion.” – Hamas campaign manager in the West Bank, Farhad Assad on Hamas’ 2006 election program, which focused on corruption and bureaucratic reform while minimizing Islamic values

Introduction –

Hamas offers us a fascinating example of how a militant movement seeks to maintain the legitimacy of its resistance principles while adapting to a new political system. As with many other nationalist movements, political violence is a key part of what defined Hamas’ organizational bona fides. The very birth of Hamas, after all, was due to a perceived need to organize and structure violent resistance against an occupying power. Over time, this need for resistance became a primary component of the organization’s basic operating principles – so much so that peace initiatives often proved to be a significant identity crisis for the members of the movement.

For Hamas, the sudden passage of the 1993 Oslo Accords threatened the organization in such a way. Hamas by that point was still a relatively young organization, having spent five years organizing violent attacks against Israeli targets in the territories and in Israel proper. The Accords represented an existential threat to the organization on some levels. Hamas had emerged in the midst of the Intifada as a legitimate resistance group and leading nationalist movement in the eyes of many Palestinians – and, importantly, as an alternative to the tired practices of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), whose exiled leadership in Tunis was losing control of daily events in the Palestinian territories.

With the passage of the Oslo Accords, the PLO was able to make a separate peace with Israel in an attempt to retake the reigns of Palestinian leadership and marginalize the appeal of Hamas. Hamas, meanwhile, had to contend with the initial popularity of the Accords among the Palestinian public while simultaneously attempting to either preserve their core resistance identity or adapt it to new political opportunities. While political violence continued sporadically for the next decade, eventually dropping off to low level harassment after the end of the second intifada, Hamas attempted to broaden its appeal to the Palestinian public (and its own relevance) by softening many of their more extremist points of view and engaging in free and fair elections. Thus, a movement which had boycotted Palestinian Authority elections in 1996 engaged in limited participation in 2000, and then officially entered into the political scene in 2004 and 2006.

This chapter will provide a narrative of Hamas’ initial creation and evolution over time with an emphasis paid to their strategies of public outreach, justifications for political violence, and eventual attempts to morph into a political party. Hamas must be viewed as a dynamic and fluid organization if we are to understand this evolution. In particular, this approach allows us to understand how Hamas’ leaders have responded to a number of systemic conditions and adapted their cultural framing accordingly – engaging in the strategy of speech distancing and softening rhetoric over time in order to capitalize on a much broader segment of the population.

Foundational Efforts (1988-1993) –

By the late 1980s, the forerunners of Hamas, the Palestinian Ikhwan, found themselves oscillating between two political trends commonly seen in national liberation groups. While the
traditional strategy of the Ikhwan was to change society from within through extensive social activism, a wide segment of its supporters sought to achieve national liberation for the Palestinian people through armed struggle.

For years the Ikhwan had created an extensive network of charities, schools, and social networks, establishing Islamic morals throughout society with the hope that by changing the very character of Palestinian society, political and economic changes would follow suit. It was in the midst of these efforts that Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who would later become the principle founder of Hamas, was attempting to fundamentally change not just Palestine, but the culture of the entire region. Yassin was initially a leading voice of caution in the Ikhwan, advocating what would become the party’s official program - a transnational, pan-Islamic revival of the entire region which did not stress Palestine in particular. Yet as a number of Islamic revival movements swept through society during the early 1980s, some members of the Ikhwan came to the realization that their particular appeal in Palestinian society would collapse unless their rhetoric began to specifically address strategies for the liberation of Palestine.\(^{38}\)

During this period a number of members of the Ikhwan began to defect from the group, stressing the need to adopt a more active approach towards liberating Palestine. It was at this point that the nascent Islamic Jihad (largely made up of disaffected Ikhwan members) gained notoriety after undertaking a number of military operations against Israel. The threat of greater defection amidst accusations of inaction both from other Palestinian groups and its own members convinced the Ikhwan to take an increasingly active role in confronting Israel. This process began in the mid-80s with Ikhwan-organized student protests, stockpiling of weapons, and

\(^{38}\) Tamimi, Azzam, *Hamas: A History from Within*. Olive Branch Press, Massachusetts, 2007, p. 31-32
general preparations for the formation of a military wing. Ultimately, this process culminated in the formation of Hamas at the outset of the first Intifada.

Hamas, therefore, was an organization born in violence – a movement which was to be a Palestinian liberation group that stressed Islamic principles for its members while at the same time emphasized violent attacks against the state of Israel. But Hamas was also born into fierce intra-Palestinian competition, and it is important to note that the original use of the strategy of violence for Hamas grew out of competition with rival Palestinian factions. In particular the strategy of violence was aimed at maximizing its appeal to a broad social base in the atmosphere of the first Intifada. As such, the discourse which the organization cultivated aimed to demonstrate that Hamas, an Islamic resistance movement, was ideologically and tactically superior to its secular, Palestinian rivals. Its charter directly refers to this contradiction:

“Secularism completely contradicts religious ideology. Attitudes, conduct and decisions stem from ideologies.

That is why, with all our appreciation for The Palestinian Liberation Organization - and what it can develop into - and without belittling its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are unable to exchange the present or future Islamic Palestine with the secular idea. The Islamic nature of Palestine is part of our religion and whoever takes his religion lightly is a loser.

Until such a day, and we pray to Allah that it will be soon, the Islamic Resistance Movement's stand towards the PLO is that of the son towards his father, the brother towards his brother, and the relative to relative, suffers his pain and supports him in confronting the enemies, wishing him to be wise and well-guided.” (Article 27)

Despite an emphasis on the Islamic nature of the movement, Hamas’ political platform as outlined in its charter is strikingly similar to the nationalist policies advocated by PLO. In a separate article of the charter it is stated that:

“Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part of our religious belief. Nothing in nationalism is more significant or important than waging Jihad when an enemy treads on Muslim land. While other nationalisms are concerned with material, human, and territorial causes, the nationalism of the Islamic Movement has all this in addition to the more important divine qualities that give it soul and life.” (Article 12)
One of Hamas’ earliest frames, therefore, was to synthesize nationalism with Islamic principles. Its leaders sought to carefully define themselves in opposition to Fatah and other secular movements while at the same time co-opting their nationalist agenda. By providing “the best of both worlds” – nationalist goals in a religious framework, Hamas sought to capitalize on a wider segment of Palestinian society.

Glenn Robinson has identified two other foundational cultural frames utilized by Hamas which are useful for our discussion here – “Islam is the Solution” and “Palestine is Waqf.” A number of passages from the movement’s foundational charter sought to convey the notion that “Islam is the Solution” – a popular trope among a number of Islamic political movements:

“The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinct Palestinian Movement which owes its loyalty to Allah, derives from Islam its way of life and strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine. Only under the shadow of Islam could the members of all religions coexist in safety and security for their lives, properties and rights. In the absence of Islam, conflict arises, oppression reigns, corruption is rampant and struggles and wars prevail.” (Article 6)

“Hamas finds itself at a period of time when Islam has waned away from the reality of life. For this reason, the checks and balances have been upset, concepts have become confused, and values have been transformed; evil has prevailed, oppression and obscurity have reigned; cowards have turned tigers, homelands have been usurped, people have been uprooted and are wandering all over the globe. The state of truth has disappeared and was replaced by the state of evil. Nothing has remained in its right place, for when Islam is removed from the scene, everything changes.” (Article 9)

“Allah is its goal, the Prophet its model, the Qur’an its Constitution, Jihad its path and death for the case of Allah its most sublime belief.” (Article 8, the self-proclaimed “slogan” of Hamas)

In this sense, Hamas’ leaders were merely continuing the traditional strategy of the Palestinian Ikhwan to Islamize and reform society from within. In particular, its leaders sought to paint Palestinian society as existing in a state of jahiliyya, a theme which a number of passages

in the charter evoke. Only when society itself reforms will significant political and economic changes follow suit.

Additionally, the charter emphasized the conceptualization of all of Palestine as an Islamic *waqf*:

“The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine has been an Islamic Waqf throughout the generations and until the Day of Resurrection, no one can renounce it or part of it, or abandon it or part of it… This is the status [of the land] in Islamic Shari’a, and it is similar to all lands conquered by Islam by force, and made thereby Waqf lands upon their conquest, for all generations of Muslims until the Day of Resurrection. This [norm] has prevailed since the commanders of the Muslim armies completed the conquest of Syria and Iraq.” (Article 11)

While the concept of *waqf* has traditionally been used to denote the religious endowment of a building, such as a school, hospital, or mosque, Hamas here expanded its use to a broader concept of God-given sovereignty over a clearly denoted stretch of land. While the language of this passage may be more indicative of the *dar al-Islam, dar al-harb* distinction of denoting land held by Muslims in relation to land held by non-Muslims, the charter does not employ these terms. Historic Palestine is simply a religious endowment given by God and one which cannot be abandoned.

Aside from these other initial frames, Hamas focused much of its early framing efforts on justifying the legitimacy of its resistance. The organization’s first years were marked by sporadic, limited operations – in its first year Hamas carried out only ten attacks, ranging from shootings to roadside explosive attacks. As its military wing developed these attacks grew more sophisticated, leading to kidnappings of Israeli soldiers and expanding operations into the West Bank.40 Alongside these efforts, the organization developed an extensive campaign of Islamic

cultural framing justifying military operations against Israel. A number of pamphlets distributed during this period illustrate the organization’s strategy:

Let any hand be cut off that signs [away] a grain of sand in Palestine in favor of the enemies of God…who have seized…the blessed land. (March 13, 1988)

Every negotiation with the enemy is a regression from the cause, concession of a principle, and recognition of the usurping murderers’ false claim to a land in which they were not born. (August 18, 1988)

Publicly released statements and the rhetoric of Hamas’ leaders further added to the religious fervor surrounding the call to violence.

The formation of Hamas’ formal military wing, the ’Izz al-Din al-Qassam, in the early 90s fundamentally changed the dynamics of the movements strategic interaction with Israel. The brigade, with its numerous wings in Gaza and the West Bank, formulated a compartmentalized, hierarchical organizational structure that was far more resistant to the efforts of Israeli counter-terrorist operations than previous manifestations of militancy.

Justification for violent tactics, while somewhat preliminary in the late 80s and the early 90s, soon became a major aspect of the movement’s framing. As the PLO grew increasingly moderate during this time, Hamas attempted to establish itself as the prominent party of military resistance to Israel. As a result, the movement adjusted its frames accordingly, a topic that we will turn to next.


In the wake of the Oslo process Hamas began an expansion of its coercive violence against Israel. Attacks began to grow more and more violent, culminating in a massive suicide

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bombing campaign following the Oslo Peace Process and the Declaration of Principles (DOP). While Hamas was content at first to allow the peace process to play itself out it soon became apparent that the organization was facing an existential crisis. There was a very real danger of a “separate peace” between the PLO and Israel in which Hamas was left out of the bargaining process. Even more troublesome was the possibility that a centralized Palestinian Authority under the auspices of Yasser Arafat would seek to eliminate the unpredictable Hamas, which was viewed as a direct threat to the peace process by both Israel and most members of the PLO. Hamas found itself in a difficult position concerning Palestinian public opinion. The nascent achievements towards the peace process achieved by the DOP had a high degree of public support, and Hamas’ leaders faced a dilemma in justifying the use of violence in general and the tactic of suicide bombing in particular. Hamas leaders, at various point, wavered between a number of reasons for this new, bloody escalation of the conflict.

At times its use seems to have been a matter of coercion – ending the occupation. A leading member of Hamas, Musa Abu Marzuq, stated:

“The military activity is a permanent strategy that will not change. The modus operandi, tactics, means, and timing are based on their benefit. They will change from time to time in order to cause the heaviest damage to the occupation.”

Attempts were also made to explain the strategic logic of suicide bombing. Imad al-Faluji stated,

“All that has been achieved so far is the consequence of our military actions. Without the so-called peace process, we would have gotten even more…We would have got Gaza and the West Bank without this agreement…Israel can beat all Arab armies. However, it can do nothing against a youth with a knife or an explosive charge on his body.”

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42 Interview in the periodical Filastin al-Muslima (June, 1994)

43 Statements by Imad al-Faluji, quoted in Pape, Robert A., Dying to Win. Random House, New York, 2005, p. 70
At other times the use of suicide bombing was clearly demonstrative, exacting revenge for a particular incident while at the same time establishing a crude doctrine of deterrence against possible future Israeli actions. In February 1994, an American-born Jewish settler, Baruch Goldstein, walked into the al-Haram al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron and gunned down 29 Muslims in the midst of the dawn prayer. Hamas’ leaders may have been more interested in utilizing suicide bombing as a tactic to spoil the nascent Oslo process, but its spokesmen ostensibly justified the campaign as a response to the Hebron Massacre.44

While conducting sporadic suicide bombings against Israel over the next several years, Hamas would also have to wage a public relations battle among its base to ensure continued support for the strategy. As a means of mitigating the potential for public disapproval of Hamas following Israeli reprisals and economic boycott, these attacks were usually justified in response to particular Israeli aggression against either Palestinian society in general or the Palestinian resistance in particular. The assassinations of the Islamic Jihad leader Fathi Shiqaqi in October, 1995 and a leading member of the Qassam brigade, Yahya ‘Ayyash (known as al-muhandis, the engineer) in January 1996, for example, lead to a sustained recruitment effort by Hamas intermediary Hasan Salama and a wave of suicide bombings in February and March, 1996. Other suicide bombings were justified to the Palestinian people as the only means of deterring attacks like the massacre perpetrated by Baruch Goldstein or the general pattern of Israeli incursions into the occupied territories.45

Although Hamas couched its justification of suicide bombing as a means of protecting the community, it was also quick to adapt its strategies in response to eddies of changing public

opinion. A year after the Hebron Massacre, a high degree of public support for the signing of the Taba accord in September 1995 was met by a corresponding suspension of terrorist attacks in an effort to avoid interrupting the Israeli withdrawal and the PA Council elections.\textsuperscript{46}

Yet justifying the attacks in terms of reciprocity was only one way of mobilizing support for suicide operations – religious cultural frames also began creeping into the movement’s discourse as a means of rationalizing the tactic. A particularly illustrative episode can be found in 1995-1996, when a number of Muslim scholars affiliated with the PA issued \textit{fatwas} condemning Hamas’ use of suicide bombing as a tactic. Hamas responded with its own religious clergy, which issued \textit{fatwas} calling suicide bombers \textit{shahid} (martyr) and justifying their actions in religious terms. At the same time a book was published in Damascus at Hamas’ behest in which the tactic of suicide bombing was given a number of religious justification and the PA’s religious clerics were mocked as non-authoritative amateurs.\textsuperscript{47}

Suicide bombing perpetrated by Hamas and other groups continued as an intermittent tactic into the new millennium, reaching a peak in 2001-2002 when 305 individuals were killed in 89 separate attacks.\textsuperscript{48} While the strategy of suicide bombing was politically feasible for Hamas in the wake of the start of the second intifada, the desire of the movement to employ the tactic significantly dropped off by 2003-2004 as the movement began a more forceful entry into politics. During this period the tactic of suicide bombing drastically declined, to be replaced by a dramatic increase in rocket attacks launched from Israel into Gaza and the West Bank (see figure


\textsuperscript{48} Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1). While it continued to bombard Israel with rocket fire Hamas effectively ended its use of suicide bombing during the period it entered into the political process. Only three attacks were claimed in 2005 and one attack was claimed in 2008 by members of the ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigade (though it now appears that the attack was carried out by either the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade or Islamic Jihad). 49

![Suicide Bombings and Rocket Attacks in Israel, 2001-2007](SuicideBombingsandRocketAttacksinIsrael20012007.png)

Figure 1: Created with data from the Israel Foreign Ministry 50

There appear to be a number of possible reasons for this switch in tactic. First, Israeli security forces had become more effective at disrupting suicide bombing attacks during this period. 2002 saw the start of Operation Defensive Shield which some have credited with a major disruption of terrorist operations. Second, 2005 saw the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the


Gaza Strip, which may have significantly lessened the perceived need to launch suicide bombing campaigns. Third, the creation of the separation wall has been cited by many as a primary reason for the drop in suicide operations as access to Israel became significantly restricted as a result of the drop in the number of Palestinians working there over this period. Fourth, Fatah security forces and the Palestinian Authority in general, with an influx of financial assistance from Israel and the West, may have been successful in restricting suicide attacks or in deterring Hamas and other groups from utilizing suicide bombings as a tactic (though this does not explain the drop in attacks after the expulsion of Fatah from Gaza in 2006). Fifth, the second intifada had significantly petered out by 2004, robbing Hamas of a base of popular support for continued bombings. Sixth, Hamas’ leadership was certainly aware of the international condemnation accompanying the tactic of suicide bombing and may have wanted to distance themselves from the negative connotations of a tactic that was increasingly becoming associated with the “Global War on Terror” and insurgent movements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Seventh, Hamas’ sudden emphasis on political participation during this time may have led the group to distance themselves from this tactic in an attempt to secure international support as a legitimate political party rather than a terrorist organization. Finally, as Hamas prepared to enter into the political process a number of unilateral tahdi’a, or brief ceasefires/periods of calm, were issued by Hamas which necessitated a drop in attacks, notably between June and August of 2003, in March of 2005 prior to the PA elections, and in mid-2008.

Whatever the reason or combination of reasons for the sudden decline in suicide bombings, it is important to note that five of the eight explanations above relate in whole or in part to Hamas’ efforts to put a better face on its organization and distance itself from the bloody tactics of its past. Rocket attacks, while still a form a political violence, provided a suitable
alternative for Hamas, both because of the strategic limitations of continuing a suicide bombing campaign and due to the organization’s efforts at promoting a better image as it began a transition into politics. Rockets and mortar bombardments were a more “conventional” means of targeting Israel, often in response to an Israeli incursion into Gaza, as well as a consistent low-level, low-casualties form of controlled pressure.

Hamas’ military wing calculated (ultimately in error) that the Qassam rockets, while a nuisance to Israel, would not provoke such a reaction as to elicit a full-scale invasion of Gaza. The Israeli military, after all, would have to reoccupy the whole of Gaza in order to effectively stem the tide of Qassam rockets. While the rocket barrages generated an environment of fear in southern Israel during this period, casualties and structural damage remained relatively low. At the same time, the launching of Qassam rockets kept the issue of Gaza omnipresent in the minds of Israel’s leaders and international players. So long as rockets continued to bombard towns like Ashkelon and Sderot, and Israel continued to respond with limited military strikes into Gaza, questions about the effectiveness of the economic boycott of Gaza and the political boycott of Hamas would continue to be asked. Even more momentously, caught in such a dilemma the possibility of a sustained lengthy cease-fire began to seem more attractive to members of the Israeli government and public, even as opponents warned that a ceasefire would only be used by Hamas to strengthen its military capabilities.

Importantly, while Hamas’ leaders relied on a various frames to justify the tactics of violence they also relied on a number of Islamic cultural frames to justify ceasefires or long term truces. The two most important frames used in this respect are hudna and tahdi’a. As early as the 1990s, several prominent members of Hamas’ leadership, including Sheikh Yassin, Isma’il Haniya, Mahmoud Zahar, and Hasan Yousuf, made repeated statements offering a hudna, an
indefinite truce in return for an Israeli withdrawal to its 1967 borders. Prospective lengths for a *hudna* have been variously given at five, ten, or twenty years, with the possibility of renewal. Similarly, Hamas’ Political Bureau has issued a number of unilateral declarations on establishing an unofficial calm (*tahdi‘a*), including in June of 2003 (which ended with a series of suicide bombings after IDF forces conducted operations against known Hamas bomb makers on August 8 of that year) and in March of 2005 as the organization prepared to enter into the political process.

Perhaps most significantly, a brief *tahdi‘a* with Israel in 2008, negotiated through Egyptian intermediaries, saw rocket fire into Israel drop off precipitously, from 1075 total rocket strikes and 1204 mortar shells between January and June of 2008 to only 12 rocket strikes and 14 mortar shells from July to October of that year. After an Israeli incursion into Gaza in 2008, rocket fire and mortar strikes resumed, but was quickly brought under control again by December, presumably after pleas from the Jordanian and Egyptians for Hamas to return to the terms of the ceasefire.

This period of calm demonstrates four important facts – first, that Hamas is largely able to control its own forces from launching attacks when it wishes, second, that it is largely able to prevent other autonomous groups (most notably Islamic Jihad) from launching a significant campaign of attacks on Israel, third, that Hamas can abide by the terms of its ceasefires so long as it believes that Israel is reciprocally doing the same thing. Finally, the latest calm following the end of the 2008-2009 war in Gaza has renewed the doctrine of deterrence in the eyes of the

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51 The Israeli Foreign Ministry, “The Hamas Terror War Against Israel,” November 30, 2008: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Missile+fire+from+Gaza+on+Israeli+civilian+targets+Aug+2007.htm#statistics
Israeli military. Hamas, responsive to the unpopularity of the conflict among the Gazan public, has all but ceased its rocket fire against Israel. Hamas’ new war has been one of public relations, both at home and abroad, and the blockade of Gaza has become its primary cause and means of attacking Israel and maintaining public support.

**Overlapping Levels of Public Opinion** –

This chapter has argued so far that Hamas is incredibly sensitive to domestic perceptions of the organization. Whatever the underlying strategic reasons for Hamas’ adopting various tactics of political violence, it is important to realize that the movement is able to utilize Islamic cultural frames both to justify violence and to justify peace, depending on the larger strategic interests at play. This is paramount for our purposes of understanding how the movement evolved over this period and for illustrating just how important public opinion is to the movement. Indeed, while it may be tempting to view the dynamics of this strategic interaction as only concerning Israel and Hamas, the strategy of coercive violence employed by Hamas must be understood on four overlapping levels – 1) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 2) relations between Palestinian resistance groups, 3) public opinion, and 4) intra-Hamas conditions.

An excellent example of these contending interests can be found in the decision to engage in a suicide bombing campaign following the initial successes of the Oslo peace process. On the first level, Hamas wanted to act as a spoiler to what it saw as an illegitimate and unfair peace agreement. The best way to accomplish this was to sow mistrust of the peace process in Israeli society. Suicide bombings were strategically carried out at opportune times – in early 1994 as the Cairo agreement on the establishment of a self-governing PA in Gaza and Jerico was being
negotiated. Hamas, excluded from the political process, was effectively making its presence known while also weakening the stability of the peace process.

On a second level, relations with the PLO were growing increasingly strained at this time. The PLO would inevitably get the blame for any successful attack carried out by members of Hamas. The newly established PA wanted to prove that it had control of its territories, and that suicide bombers were not using autonomous Palestinian zones of control to plan and launch terrorist attacks into Israel. Some internal Hamas members worked through the PA at this time to establish a cessation of hostilities with Israel, in large part due to sustained pressure from the PA security forces to shut down their military operations.

Third, public opinion was of great importance to the organization and Hamas’ leadership attempted to provide strong justifications for the resumption of violence. As mentioned earlier, Hamas used the Cave of the Patriarchs massacre as a political justification to launch a campaign of suicide bombings – even as those suicide bombings served separate strategic and political goals. At the same time, when public opinion signaled a high degree of support for the peace process later that year with the signing of the Taba accord in September 1995 (see figure 2), there was a corresponding suspension of terrorist attacks in an effort to avoid interrupting the Israeli withdrawal and the PA Council elections.\(^\text{52}\)

Public opinion has always remained of paramount importance to the organization, as it is highly depended on widespread support from the population. This is what Robert A. Pape calls the “social logic of suicide terrorism” – communal support enables a terrorist group to replenish its membership, and is essential to enable a suicide terrorist group to avoid detection, surveillance and elimination by hostile security forces, and is necessary to promote a culture of martyrdom in which an individual suicide bomber is encourage to carry out an attack.\textsuperscript{53} To this end, Hamas’ campaign of religious and nationalist rhetoric, its cultivation of pro-martyrdom civil discourse through the circulation of written justifications, religious rulings, and videos of bombers themselves, and its establishment of well-endowed social assistance organizations through its charitable wing has gone a long way towards keeping public support of Hamas

\textsuperscript{53} Pape, Robert, \textit{Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism}. Random House Publishing, 2005, p. 81
relatively high. Hamas has been wise enough not to disrupt this public support – providing extensive justification to the Palestinian public during campaign periods and halting those campaigns when public opinion turned against them.

Lastly, the internal dynamic of Hamas are equally important when analyzing the use of violent tactics. The Oslo Accords provided an example of an existential conflict for the organization – if the peace process came to fruition, Hamas as an entity would lose much of its purpose and may very well cease to exist. Yet the organization’s internal and external leadership had very different approaches towards addressing Oslo. By 1995, while Hamas’ internal leadership in Gaza began to support an agreement for the cessation of hostilities, Hamas’ external leadership was skeptical, refusing the truce.\footnote{Mishal, Shaul and Sela, Avraham, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. Columbia University Press, New York, 2000, p.70-71} In 1996, as the PA prepared to hold elections, Hamas’ internal leadership sought to participate in the electoral process, only to be refused once again by the organization’s external leadership.

Aside from the internal-external divide of the organization’s leadership, there is also a principle agent problem. It appears, for example, that two suicide bombings in 1997 were independently organized by military intermediaries of Hamas, including Muhammad Daif and Ibrahim Muqadmah, and perpetrated by clandestine subgroups in the ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigade.\footnote{Mishal, Shaul and Sela, Avraham, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. Columbia University Press, New York, 2000, p.76} This incident proves that there is room for independent local initiative by rouge members of Hamas.

Another example can be seen following a series of rocket attacks in May of 2007, as Hamas’ internal leaders struggled to maintain a tentative truce with Isarel. The ‘Izz al-Din al-
Qassam Brigades spokesman, Abu Obeida, stated, “The cease-fire has been over for a long time, and Israel is responsible for that…We are ready to kidnap more and more, and kill more and more of your soldiers.” The internal leader Ismail Haniya and his spokesman, Ghazi Hamad, strongly disavowed this statement, stressing “the importance of maintaining the truce and protecting it.”

While Hamas’ response to the Oslo Peace Process indicates that there are several levels of external pressure which contribute to the organization’s tactical decision, it also demonstrates that the organization has difficulty at times in presenting a unified strategic justification for its actions. Alternative justifications for the 1994 suicide bombing campaign, for example, include the need to establish Hamas’ importance as an actor in negotiations, a specific retaliation for the Cave of the Patriarchs massacre in Hebron, the need to derail the peace process and maintain its organization’s purpose for existence, the need to coerce Israel into further concessions or a quicker withdrawal from the territories, and the need to respond to and influence public support of the organization.

Whatever the most important reason, or combination of reasons, that led Hamas to engage in a suicide bombing campaign in 1994, the decisions of its leadership were based on logical calculations, not mindless ideology. Subsequent decisions, including the switch to rocket attacks in the early 2000s and the logic of entering into the political process were responses to various structural constraints. Mahmud al-Zahar, a particularly hawkish member of Hamas’ political wing, stated the organization’s modus-operandi best –

“We must calculate the benefit and cost of continued armed operations. If we can fulfill our goals without violence, we will do so. Violence is a means, not a goal. Hamas’ decision to adopt self-restraint does not contradict

our aims, including the establishment of an Islamic state instead of Israel…We will never recognize Israel, but it is possible that a hudna could prevail between us for days, months, or years."\(^{57}\)

The Electoral Transition (2004-Present) –

Throughout the 1990s, Hamas had largely opposed the Oslo Process, criticizing Arafat and the PLO and boycotting the 1996 PA elections. Yet, as noted, Hamas’ leaders responded to public support of the peace process at various points, moderating its position. As such, they also carefully allowed Arafat enough rope to hang himself. As one of Hamas’ leading members, Musa Abu Marzuq, put it:

“From the outset, Hamas has said that this type of agreement will not work. The Oslo agreement is a very obscure document which, because of its special nature, will never be able to free Palestine from Israeli occupation. It will not put the Palestinians on the road to an independent state. Decisions in Oslo will always be made by the stronger party, which in this instance is Israel. The Palestinians will achieve nothing from the Oslo agreement, and we told Yasir Arafat so from the outset."\(^{58}\)

It was at this point that Hamas began to cultivate one of the cultural frames that would be of paramount importance a decade later as the movement began a transition into the political process – sabr, patience. Utilized by the Prophet Muhammad in his campaigns against the idolaters of Mecca in 7\(^{th}\) century Arabia, sabr holds that while God is with the faithful, the fulfillment of specific political goals of a movement may take some time to accomplish and the community must be patient in the intervening period. Hamas has seized upon this particular religious precept as a means of justifying its overall political program. The concept of sabr began appearing even at the organization’s inception, when numerous leaflets called for patience in the community:

Know that victory demands sabr and God is on the side of the righteous. (January 1988)

\(^{57}\) Al-Quds, October 12, 1995

Know that the road with the Jews is long and will not end soon (April 1, 1988)

Spare no efforts [to fan] the fire of the uprising until God gives the sign to be extricated from the distress. Invoke God’s name often, for with hardship comes ease (January 1988)\textsuperscript{59}

As the organization evolved, \textit{sabr} grew increasingly connected to specific policies of the organization, particularly in periods of crisis or change. \textit{Sabr}, for example, was used as a means of marginalizing short-term political setbacks, including the organization’s expulsion from Jordan, as well as a justification for significant changes in its political strategy, including its decision to enter into the political process. It has also used the concept of \textit{sabr} as an overall means of preserving the ideological core components of the organization. Specific policies, such as the destruction of Israel as a political entity and the creation of an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine have “remained on the books,” even as Hamas’ political platform has grown increasingly secular and distanced from such heated rhetoric.

While still maintaining loyalty to its principles, Hamas’ political leadership began to soften much of the Islamist rhetoric that had so strongly characterized its previous speeches and writings. By the late 90s the movement’s leadership and public documents were speaking less about religious principles of behavior, instead utilizing a new cultural frame – “Islam as a Frame of Reference.” The memorandum “This is What We Struggle for,” written in the late 90s, focused primarily on the socio-economic factors of the conflict and only briefly refers to Islam as “Hamas’ ideological frame of reference” –

“The fundamentals from which Hamas derives its legitimacy are mirrored in the very name it chose for itself. Its Islamism means that it derives its guiding principles from the doctrines and values of Islam. In other words, Islam is Hamas’ ideological frame of reference. It is from the values of Islam that the movement seeks inspiration in its mobilization effort and in compensating for the huge difference in material resources between Palestinian people and their supporters on the one hand and Israel and its supporters on the other.”

The end of the document is again notable in that it abandons the “Islam as Waqf” frame that had so far characterized the movement. Rather, it puts forth four conditions, limited in scope to the West Bank and Gaza, which would entail “the cessation of all hostilities on the part of Hamas” –

1. The withdrawal of Israeli occupation troops from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
2. The evacuation of all Jewish settlements.
3. The release of all Palestinian prisoners.
4. The recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

Alongside these developments was a sustained effort by much of Hamas’ political leadership to tacitly, if not explicitly, recognize the existence of the state of Israel. Hamas’ new Prime Minister, Isma’il Haniya, stated in an interview with the Washington Post on February 26, 2006:

“We are not interested in a vicious cycle of violence…If Israel withdraws to the ’67 borders, then we will establish a peace in stages…We will establish a situation of stability and calm which will bring safety for our people…When Israel declares that it will give the Palestinian people a state and give them back all their rights, then we are ready to recognize them.”

Even Hamas’ hawkish members echoed such sentiments, Khalid Mash’al referred to Israel as an “existing reality” while Mahmoud Zahar termed it an “established fact.”

Another document from this period, an internal memorandum written by Hamas’ political bureau in 2000, laid out a comprehensive summary of the organization’s history, its mistakes, its political program, and its ideology. This document, which focuses primarily on the socio-economic and nationalistic goals of the organization, marks a sharp contrast to the religious rhetoric of the organization’s 1988 charter.


By 2004, Hamas’ political leadership accelerated this process of speech distancing as it decided that the time had come to begin participating in municipal and local elections. Despite broad support in some areas of Palestinian society, Hamas’ leaders faced an uphill battle against a well-entrenched and determined enemy, Fatah. The highly clientelistic and state-centered nature of Palestinian politics had given a natural advantage to Fatah in municipal and legislative elections since their inception in the mid-90s. Extensive clientelistic networks between civic associational life and the state reinforced Fatah’s position and had always ensured a strong level of support for its candidates. Hamas’ leadership realized, since the movement’s inception, that successful organizational competition could only be maintained through similar clientelistic practices, and therefore had employed its own clientelistic practices, its Islamic dawa of charitable associations and social welfare support, as an effective counterweight. As such, the democratic process was largely subverted in Palestinian society as the beneficiaries of state patronage felt the obligation to support the status quo and beneficiaries of Hamas’ charitable activities felt the obligation to oppose it.

Yet within this framework, Palestinian society was increasingly turning against the perceived corruption of Fatah’s leaders and a largely stalled peace plan. As Hamas began its transition into a political party, this development provided them with the perfect opportunity to reach a broader base. Soon, alongside the successful ability of dawa institutions to stimulate political mobilization among Hamas’ constituents was a sustained effort to couch the organization’s political platform in terms that were accessible to a wider audience. While this might suggest that the movement was merely responding to public opinion in an effort to gain a

short-term tactical victory in the polls, it is also reflective of a deeper tendency among the leadership to consistently align its policies with what it perceives to be trends in public opinion. As Hamas scholar and close ally Azzam Tamimi has noted, “Hamas is very sensitive to public opinion within its constituency. This ties in with the difficulty of their decision making. When it comes to elections, hudna (ceasefire), etc., they have always tried to measure public opinion. That is why when Hamas says any peace agreement is subject to a referendum, they mean it.”

Responding to these conditions, Hamas’ candidates ran under the slogan “Change and Reform,” largely downplaying the movement’s foundational religious ideology. The “Change and Reform List,” the movement’s political manifesto for the election, stressed their commitment to fighting corruption in the PA, reinforce public liberties and citizen rights, allow freedom of thought and expression in media, and bring reforms to educational policy, healthcare, agriculture, and a great deal many more issues of concern to the Palestinian public. Again, Islam was only referred to as a “frame of reference,” and overt religious statements and Qur’anic citations occurred far less frequently than in previous party documents. This shift in rhetoric, an act of “speech distancing,” was necessary for Hamas to perform well in the Palestinian elections. In order for an extremist organization like Hamas to capture sufficient seats to affect political change it must in some way appeal to a wider segment of the population. It is this intensive period of speech distancing that we will now explore more directly.

Voice of Hamas: Discursive Shifts and Speech Distancing in Radio –

So far this chapter has traced the outlines and trends of Hamas’ transition from an organization focused on exclusionary identity and political violence into an organization attempting to broaden its appeal by moderating its language. The remainder of this chapter will
trace the specific methods which the organization used to convey its new message to a domestic audience. As noted, Hamas candidates for the 2006 legislative elections ran under the slogan “Change and Reform,” a political doctrine which downplayed extremist or religious ideologies and focused instead on fighting corruption in the Palestinian Authority, reinforcing public rights and freedom of expression, bringing sustained reform to education, healthcare, agriculture, and generally improving the average lives of citizens in the West Bank and Gaza.

As noted in the introductory chapter, one of the most important means for any organization to capitalize on and influence broader ideological trends in society is by successfully appropriating various spheres of recruitment – including television, radio, internet websites, magazines, books, newspapers, etc. Through these mediums, an organization can emit discursive cues to a wider audience – thereby crafting a distinct identity in which a portion of the individuals in society can identify commonalities between their personal identity and the group identity.63

This remainder of this chapter will test the process of speech distancing by analyzing shifts in programming on the Hamas-run “Voice of al-Aqsa” radio program, available online through Hamas’ website, in the lead-up to the 2006 legislative elections. We will trace the type of programming from late 2005 until the elections at the end of January, 2006 and compare them to previous periods of programming in early 2005. The data will demonstrate that religious programming dropped off significantly in the lead up to the 2006 election, replaced by campaign speeches, electoral coverage, and other programming which promoted reform issues which the average Palestinian could identify with while simultaneously decreasing the instances of divisive programming which had previously marked much of Hamas’ media outreach.

63 Anderson, Richard, “Discursive Change and the Spread of Political Identity,” unpublished manuscript
In preparation for its participation in the January 2006 Gaza legislative elections and subsequent to its takeover of the Gaza Strip, Hamas focused much of its efforts on creating an extensive media wing to rival both foreign broadcasting and the programming of its domestic rival, Fatah. To complement its radio station Al-Aqsa Radio, Hamas created Al-Aqsa Television – a local and satellite broadcasting channel which aired reports sympathetic to the organization. Additionally, its leaders created several daily newspapers and a number of websites. In the aftermath of the June, 2007 civil war and expulsion of Fatah, Hamas shut down most PA and Fatah-allied media outlets, ensuring that Hamas’ message would gain predominance among residents of the Gaza Strip.

Today, Hamas’ media empire includes a number of daily newspapers, radio stations, television stations, and web programming. The organization’s leading television stations, Al-Aqsa and Al-Quds, broadcast news and variety programming as well as live coverage of events with a sympathetic bias towards Hamas. Al-Aqsa TV gained a great deal of predominance in the midst of the 2008 war as the station became the site of a pitched battle, both on and off the airwaves. The network’s programming provided Hamas with a propaganda outlet in the early days of the war. As Aviv Shir-On, the Israeli foreign ministry Deputy Director of Public Affairs, admitted, “In the war of the pictures we lose.”64 Despite the extensive public outreach attempts made by Israeli officials to justify the war, their decision to stop Western journalists from entering the Gaza Strip effectively ceded to Hamas the ability to set the agenda of footage leaving Gaza’s borders. Its news stations repeatedly broadcast pictures of dead Palestinian children, candlelight vigils for martyrs, footage of demolished homes and primarily emphasized the economic and security plight of a Palestinian people under siege.

64 Shabi, Rachel, “Special spin body gets media on messages, says Israel,” The Guardian, January 10, 2009
Despite an IDF air strike against its media headquarters on the second day of the conflict and attempts to hack the system (Israeli hackers briefly took over the station’s signal and broadcast an animated clip of Hamas’ senior leaders being gunned down), the station remained operational until ground forces seized the building a week later. The station continued to operate intermittently for the next several weeks thanks to mobile vehicle broadcasting. Hamas’ leaders also utilized a second television station based in Beirut and operating with the assistance of Hizballah’s television station al-Manar TV.

Even in times of peace, regular programming on Al-Aqsa television has been the site of a war of words between Israel, Hamas, and the international community. Elements of Hamas’ programming on Al-Aqsa Television feature subject matter which Western commentators have singled out as particularly controversial. Perhaps the most notorious elements of Hamas’ media campaign involve its children’s programming, much of which extols the virtues of martyrdom and resistance on behalf of Palestinians. Many western commentators are familiar with Farfour the mouse, a large Mickey-Mouse-like character on Al-Aqsa TV’s children’s television program “Tomorrow’s Pioneers.” The program, similar in structure and format to Sesame Street, featured Farfour and a young Palestinian girl who daily espoused radical Islamist and anti-Israeli viewpoints. “Tomorrow’s Pioneers” became the focus of international criticism as allegations were heaped upon Hamas’ media wing for attempting to brainwash a generation of Palestinian youths. In the midst of this criticism, Hamas’ program director decided to martyr Farfour the mouse – he was beaten to death by Israeli interrogators and replaced by Nahoul the bumblebee (martyred February, 2008) and later Assoud the rabbit (martyred January, 2009).

65 Chiche, Fabrice, and Nir Boms, “The Other Gaza War: Hamas Media Strategy During Operational CAST LEAD and Beyond,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 3:2
While Al-Aqsa Television has been the focus of most of the international criticism leveled at Hamas’ media wing, Voice of al-Aqsa radio has carried broadcasts which are similarly controversial in nature. A children’s program which began airing in the early months of the radio station taught Islamic history and current affairs, but often digressed into lengthy sermons on the virtues of violent resistance. One episode in 2005 called on Palestinian parents "to teach their children that rights can only be taken by force and cannot be begged and restored at tables [of negotiation]....teach them that victory grows if it is watered by blood. Teach them that the mujahid does not care if he has not much resources but always looks at how high his aim is. Remind them of the martyrs, detainees, and the injured. I repeat what I said; namely, that the intifada is not a mere event and a remembrance but a daily event. Talk to your children about it....if you pass by the house of a martyr, tell your son, ‘My son, this is the house of Martyr so and so, that he was martyred during the first intifada, that he was a mujahid and that he stormed a settlement.’ Remind them that there is a detainee in Israeli jails who lived in this or that house, that they should shoulder the cares of the nation, and that victory requires a price.”

Because of high illiteracy rates, Hamas has preferred to rely on television and radio broadcasting. The organization does, however, own and operate a number of newspapers, most notably Al-Risala and Felesteen. Most written news is provided through online sources – much of it provided in English in order to reach a global audience. Hamas run or allied websites include the Palestinian Dialogue Forum (http://www.paldf.net), an internet dialogue site containing forums on major news stories and cultural topics, Gaza Talk (http://www.gazatalk.com), which provides news, photos and videos of ongoing developments in Gaza, Link TV (http://www.linktv.org), a news site modeled after CNN, The Palestinian

66 Voice of al-Aqsa broadcast, Friday, December 9, 2005, 0705-0830 GMT.
Information Center (http://www.palestine-info.info/), a news site containing stories and commentary, and the Al-Qassam Brigade website (http://www.qassam.ps/), the official website of Hamas’ military wing. Additionally, Hamas created and employed PALtube, a Hamas version of YouTube devoted to covering news stories and providing anti-Israeli and anti-Fatah polemics (http://www.paltube.org).

While extensive, most of Hamas’ media outreach is in its infancy – developed in the wake of the organization’s electoral victory and subsequent take-over of the Gaza Strip. Its television stations, websites, and newspapers provide a method of outreach to its domestic constituency and potential foreign sympathizers. Few elements of the organization’s media arm are as entrenched and developed as its radio station, “Voice of al-Aqsa.” As the technology required to regularly broadcast information is relatively simple, Voice of al-Aqsa has remained operational even in periods of conflict with its television and written news counterparts faced intermittent shut-downs. It is to an analysis of this station’s regular programming that we will now turn to in order to examine changes in exclusionary and inclusionary rhetoric over time.

**Voice of al-Aqsa: Regular Programming** –

The Gaza based radio program provides daily programming on social, religious, and political topics of every day concern for Palestinians. A great deal of the regular programming on the station is news-oriented or focused on various social issues important to Palestinians. In examining a week of regular programming on the station in early December, 2005, I have compiled a list of regular programming as well as totals for inclusionary and exclusionary content during this period.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Type of Programming</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Muslim Morning</td>
<td>A live program which addresses various social and religious issues. Topics often include lectures on health issues, culture and history, advice about daily life, commercials and sports news.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Whisper into the Ears of the Youths</td>
<td>Program addressing youth issues in Palestine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature and Life</td>
<td>Science program on various topics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Under the Shadow of the Prophet</td>
<td>A series on the life of the Prophet Muhammad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pioneers of Tomorrow</td>
<td>Discussion of Muslim martyrs in history. Includes phone-in conversations with young Palestinians who express their aspirations to become martyrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Blessed Plant</td>
<td>Conversational program which discusses various Islamic charitable societies in Gaza and the West Bank. Frequently involves interviews with Hamas associated individuals running social service programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Oasis of Martyrs</td>
<td>The life and times of various Palestinian martyrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lest We forget</td>
<td>Coverage of various issues related to the nakbah and other major disasters in Palestinian history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is in the Box?</td>
<td>A quiz show featuring live listener participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Oasis of Literature</td>
<td>Discussion of various works of Palestinian and Arab literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World of Technology</td>
<td>Coverage of the latest technology and computer news, phone-in tech help.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Creative and the Talented</td>
<td>Interviews with various Palestinian innovators and leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Aqsa Doctor</td>
<td>Medical advice for listeners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Issue Under Discussion</td>
<td>Panel discussion on various political and social topics, frequently anti-Israeli. Participants are often drawn from local universities, newspapers, and government and are almost always pro-Hamas. On Thursday, December 8, 2005, for example, the panel includes Ghazi-Hamad, managing editor of the Al-Risalah (pro-Hamas) newspaper; Dr. Attallah Abu-Sidah, lecturer at the Islamic University and one of the Hamas leaders in Rafah; and writer Mu'min Busaysu, director of the Arab Research and Studies Center. The topic up for discussion that week is what would happen to the cooling down process, or ongoing hudna, should “Zionist aggression against Palestine continue.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eye on the Zionist Press</td>
<td>A program which deals with issues in Israel. For example, on Sunday, December 4, 2005, the program addressed a published Mosad report on events in Gaza, the “Zionist election and parliamentary life in the Zionist entity,” and coverage of an American expert who has argued that the occupation is negatively impacting the democratic process in Palestine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Forum</td>
<td>Live discussion and phone-in participation on</td>
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youth issues. On Monday, December 5, 2005, the program discussed Internet use and whether it is beneficial or harmful for youths.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free Men Behind Bars</td>
<td>Recorded messages to Palestinian prisoners from their friends and relatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First of the Two Qiblahs</td>
<td>Nationalistic and religious commentary on issues concerning the al-Aqsa mosque.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Price of Resistance and Victory</td>
<td>Lectures, speeches and songs on nationalism and religious topics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Encyclopedia</td>
<td>Program which addresses various political topics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Today's Harvest</td>
<td>Program discussion various news topics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Eye on Society</td>
<td>Live program providing social advice to listeners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Festivities of the Hereafter</td>
<td>Lectures on God and the afterlife.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have Your Say</td>
<td>Coverage of election issues, candidates, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birds of Mercy</td>
<td>Live program on Palestinians who have lost friends or family in the resistance as well as social advice to the handicapped and other listeners who have been injured in conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Moonlight</td>
<td>Live program on life under occupation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eternal Journey</td>
<td>Nationalistic songs, talks and anti occupation discussions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrows of Fortune [siham al-khayr]</td>
<td>Series on resistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Journey of Immortality</td>
<td>Religious program, including religious songs and prayers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figure 3: Type of Programming on Voice of al-Aqsa Radio, December 4-11, 2005)
Figure 3 illustrates the type of programming featured on a sample week in early December, 2005. The content under examination in this figure includes the programs listed above as well as regular news coverage and other types of broadcasting. The numbers illustrated here create a base-line of regular programming which we can use in comparison to program coverage in immediate weeks leading up to the January, 2006 parliamentary elections.

Much of the content aired by Voice of al-Aqsa during this period was inclusionary in nature (57%) – addressing social issues, the dilemma of Palestinian prisoners, economic hardships, and various other issues which the average Palestinian could identify with. A sizable chunk of programming (43%) was overtly religious in nature, including sermons and lectures, as well as coverage of current events which was couched in exclusionary rhetoric.

Speech Distancing Prior to the 2006 Elections –

In the weeks leading up to the January PA elections, Al-Aqsa radio devoted a great deal of its programming time to the speeches of Hamas candidates. Many of these speeches focused on social and political reform in Palestine and largely minimized the religious and resistance qualities of the movement. While candidates often referred to Islam as a legitimate “frame of reference” for their activities, they also emphasized the movement’s tolerance of all religious and political persuasions. Frequent appeals were made to the Christians of Palestine, who are referred to as fellow sufferers in the Palestinian cause. Candidates stressed that whatever conservative social views and religious ideology the movement held would only assist in reforming the corrupt and inefficient PA and that should they emerge victorious, Hamas’ leaders would not attempt to impose Shari’a law in Palestine. As such, most of the frames utilized by the movement
focused on social welfare assistance, women’s issues, bureaucratic reform, and economic development.

The speeches carried on al-Aqsa radio in mid to late January convey this message repeatedly through the day. In one speech, a recording from a campaign rally on January 11, Hamas candidate Said Siyam states that Hamas views participation in the PLC as primarily “a way of fighting corruption.” Another Hamas candidate statement by Fathi Hammad was aired soon after. Hammad argued that the Change and Reform List had been launched based on a comprehensive program “to liberate Palestine, return the Palestinian refugees to their land, and establish an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.” Hamas’ campaign, he argued, would “build a civil, advanced Palestinian society based on political pluralism.” He added that the Hamas’ campaign pledge is to adhere to the constant principles of the of the Palestinian people “in order to get the prisoners released, to preserve public liberties, and to fight corruption…[as well as] plan to reform the economy, to unite Palestinian society in the face of challenges, and to care for the families of martyrs and prisoners.”

Candidates appeared daily on Voice of al-Aqsa to discuss their personal campaign pledges and the goals of the larger Hamas movement. These speeches almost entirely shied away from the use of religious terminology and even refrained from actively speaking about Israel. Statements were primarily constrained to topics concerning bureaucratic reform and improving the daily lives of Palestinians. The statement of Dr. Muhammad Shihab, Hamas candidate in the northern Gaza Constituency, is indicative of most other candidate statements in the run up to the election –

“We are tired of the corruption, injustice, deprivation, unilateralism, and discrimination, we will never repeat that bad example…the Change and Reform List believes that the homeland is for all citizens…[citizens should] take part in the battle of [its] construction.
No single faction can liberate and build the homeland, solve the problems of the homeland, or determine the cause alone…we will serve all citizens without any discrimination or factionalism, rely on our people’s energy and qualifications, and be ready for all forms of cooperation and alliance in the service of the higher interests of the people and their sacred cause.

We will excuse those opposing us and our method, will not deny anybody his rights, and will preserve our achievements, constant principles, institutions, and national authority…we will complete the liberation and preserve our legitimate right to resistance and its arms…we will also work to purge all our Palestinian institutions of all forms of administrative and financial corruption, to reconstruct what has been destroyed by the occupation, to attract investors, to provide jobs, and to achieve self-sufficiency through long-term plans and program…we will spread the values of peace, civil society, social cooperation, and internal accord and will try to end the arms chaos…we are carrying out a sacred religious and national duty.”

Another candidate, Dr. Ahmad Bahr, issued a statement on the radio program:

“Out of its sense of responsibility, the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, has decided to take part in the legislative elections to reform the Palestinian situation, to ease the suffering of our Palestinian people, to reinforce their steadfastness and unity, and to protect them from corruption and security-related chaos….the Change and Reform List is taking part in the elections in loyalty to our mujahid people, who have offered martyr after martyr, foremost of whom are our nation’s imam Shaykh Ahmad Yasin and leader Abd-al-Aziz al-Rantisi.

The Change and Reform List has adopted an honest national program to preserve and maintain Palestinian principles…. [the movement] will reform the law and the educational curriculum…fight administrative and financial corruption, graft, and nepotism; use human resources and the Palestinian people’s material potential to promote development, increase revenue, and achieve self-sufficiency and economic independence; ease the suffering of the Palestinian people; promote their steadfastness; and end unemployment.”

These statements are indicative of a larger process of speech distancing in the period leading up to the January, 2006 parliamentary elections. By coding different news items in January as either exclusionary (advocating overt religious messages or extremist views) or inclusionary (advocating multiculturalism, mutual security issues, or other issues that average Palestinians could identify with), an extensive database covering the types of news programming aired by Voice of al-Aqsa in the three weeks leading up to the elections demonstrates interesting results. Exclusionary commentary and programming dropped off significantly during this period and was restricted almost entirely to religious songs and the occasional sermon. Interestingly,

67 Programming on January 13, 2006
68 Programming on January 16, 2006
even Friday sermon broadcasts, live from Gaza mosques, were topically restricted to the upcoming elections and corruption allegations against Fatah.

Figure 4 documents the type of programming aired by Voice of al-Aqsa in the three weeks prior to the elections. Inclusionary coverage increased dramatically towards the end of the months – as did the total number of news stories in absolute terms. Exclusionary programming popped up occasionally but was largely subsumed during this period. Most days would also include an update on violence in Iraq and brief commentary on issues in the Israeli press, most notably coverage of Ariel Sharon’s hospitalization. Programming termed “other” refers to this type of fact-based coverage, which did not contain overtly exclusionary or inclusionary commentary.

(Figure 4: Numbers of Inclusionary, Exclusionary, and Other Types of Stories prior to Elections)
Daily commentary would almost always begin with an update on major security issues affecting Palestinians. These were typically defensive in nature – covering Israeli incursions into Gaza, airstrikes, checkpoints, or the arrests of prominent resistance leaders or everyday civilians. The few offensive, resistance-oriented issues which were covered tended to focus the efforts of other Palestinian groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine or Islamic Jihad.

(Figure 5: Violence-Related Coverage by Type)

In place of Hamas’ typical programming, the main emphasis of news stories during this period was the election. Coverage of election news increased, understandably, during this period (Figure 5).
(Figure 6: Number of Stories Covering Election News Prior to 2006 Palestinian Elections)

(Figure 7: Types of Campaign Coverage)
Of this coverage, most was general reporting. A significant number of campaign speeches or interviews were covered as well. Only 3% of coverage was direct, overt criticism of the Palestinian Authority or of Fatah. While most candidates spoke of “fighting corruption,” streamlining bureaucracy, and provided other subtle criticisms of the Palestinian Authority, very few news items were overt harangues against Fatah itself.

**Outlook for Future Moderation**

One may justifiably ask whether or not such a change in rhetoric was merely a short-term ruse to win votes or indicative of a larger shift in Hamas’ modus operandi. While permanent moderation is by no means the inevitable outcome of speech distancing and political inclusion, the potential for a major ideological shift towards a more liberal political and social outlook is far greater once a movement like Hamas has shifted towards more inclusive rhetoric. When an organization like Hamas decides to broaden its recruitment to its larger society or engage in the political process and begins to adapt its rhetoric to be more politically inclusive and approachable to the general public, the organization may suddenly be faced with an influx of new recruits or sympathizers – individuals who were attracted to the organization based on its new platform. The organization in question would therefore have to maintain a degree of consistency with that platform if it hopes to maintain support from these new recruits. Most individuals who supported Hamas in the 2006 elections did so because of its political platforms for change, reform, and nationalistic unity, not merely because of the organization’s symbolic resistance to Israel or perceived piousness. Should Hamas renege on its political platforms they would lose significant support among their base.
Ultimately, we cannot authoritatively speak about the “true intentions” of Hamas’ leaders. Yet whether their newfound moderation is a short-term strategic goal or a permanent ideological shift, any movement which initially commits itself to limited political inclusion may ultimately commit to full moderation.

Conclusion –

As we have seen, Hamas’ leaders have employed a number of cultural frames to justify a wide variety of (often contradictory) political platforms. Similarly, over time the movement has softened its rhetoric, particularly as it began its transition into the political process. Hamas’ leadership is, for the most part, comprised of strategically minded individuals who respond to specific systemic problems and adjust their tactics accordingly. A combination of two processes are likely to explain these shifts – 1) Hamas is engaging in active strategic thinking and cost benefit analysis, changing its system of symbols over time in an attempt to capitalize on a wider segment of the population, and 2) Discourse has changed as a result of repeated interaction with other movements (e.g. the PLO) and both conscious and unconscious responses to systemic changes (e.g. the Oslo Accords, the formation of the Palestinian Authority, the advent of democratic elections in the 90s and 2000s).

Whatever the underlying factors for this gradual shift, Hamas emerges as an important case study for the role and function of cultural frames in social movements. In particular, Hamas offers us a means of examining just how important sustaining popular opinion is to a movement. Hamas’ leadership undertakes very few projects without first considering societal perceptions and attempting to craft a discourse which is approachable to the general public.
In terms of religious justifications for both violent and peaceful tactics, Hamas represents a fascinating case study. The organization’s relationship with religious ideology can best be defined as that of a movement utilizing cultural framing to justify particular courses of action. Hamas’ demonstrated ability to effectively employ cultural framing ensures that it can compromise on even their most important matters of principle while at the same time justifying decisions in religious or cultural terms. This contrapuntal strategy is one of the organization’s most time honored traditions, justifying political violence in Islamic symbolism when it is political advantageous to do so, yet employing other types of Islamic symbols alongside attempts to moderate, including its efforts to justify a long term peace agreement through *hudna*, and a call for patience, *sabr*, while it entered the political process. Rather than describing the relationship between religion and violence as causal, however, one must understand that religion is a tool of Hamas’ leadership to justify the particular tactics and overall strategies of its otherwise nationalist agenda. Religion, while a powerful tool of rhetoric for recruitment and justification of particular policies of the group, is by no means a monolithic force of identity which necessitates particular courses of action.

As this chapter has demonstrated, twenty years of adaptation and change have led Hamas to a unique point in its history. As it currently stands, the movement is not likely to engage in violence for violence’s sake, nor will religious tendencies in the movement necessitate an unending violent struggle against Israel. This is a unique opportunity for external governments to study and perhaps influence the direction the movement takes. And yet Hamas largely continues to be treated in counter-terrorism terms. Rather than encouraging moderation through participation in the political process, Hamas was marginalized as an international pariah. Unfortunately, the process of Hamas’ moderation from an organization which prioritized
violence to one which prioritizes the political game is not unidirectional, and the failure of
Hamas to ultimately emerge as a legitimate political party may only result in the organization
returning to the use of suicide bombings and other violent tactics.

Yet, if the Hamas is encouraged in its efforts to moderate and is provided with incentives
to do so, there is a much better chance that the movement will continue down the path of
political inclusion and moderation. Hamas’ leaders, both internal and external, have reacted to
numerous constraints both domestically and internationally, and have adjusted their political
positions accordingly. This has led to a sustained moderation in the movement in the last years –
but a moderation which will only continue so long as the movement continues to perceive it to be
advantageous to do so.
Chapter 5: Hizballah – From Party of God to Party of Lebanon

“[Although] we view Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, I would hope that Hezbollah would prove that they are not by laying down their arms and not threatening peace.” – President George W. Bush, 2005

“Organizations like Hezbollah have to choose. Either you’re a terrorist organization or you’re a political organization.” – White House spokesman Scott McClellan, 2005

Introduction –

In 1985, Hizballah published an “Open Letter” to the people of Lebanon in which it established a manifesto for its political goals – principle among these goals were armed opposition to Israel, strict adherence to the Iranian supreme leader Khomeini, and total devotion to Islamic principles as the group’s sole means of guidance. An early passage of the letter reads, “We in Lebanon are not a closed organizational party, nor a narrow political framework. Rather, we are a nation tied to the Muslims in every part of the world by a strong ideological and political bond, namely Islam…God has established Islam as a religion for the world to follow.”

In spite of the parochial and exclusionary nature of the language in Hizballah’s 1985 charter, political realities would set in over the next several years. By the end of the Lebanese civil war and the signing of the Taif Accords a new political reality emerged, forcing Hizballah to adapt to a very different Lebanon than the one it was born into. Hizballah would evolve over the next two decades into an organization highly concerned about its public image and its place in Lebanese society. Sensing an opportunity for greater influence after the passage of the Taif Accords, Hizballah’s leaders would slowly adapt to political life, a transition which necessitated engagement with Lebanon’s other sects. Over time, Hizballah’s leadership softened exclusionary language which emphasized their unique, Shi’a Muslim background, and instead built upon the

idea of Lebanese unity. The chief frame of which was the idea that Hizballah was the only group capable of defending the people of Lebanon against Israel.

While still facing a significant number of detractors at home, Hizballah’s message of unity and resistance would find a great deal of frame resonance with the people of Lebanon – not only among their Shi’a base, but among numerous Christians, Sunnis, and Druze in the country. Over time, Hizballah would forge alliances with many of these sects’ political parties, consistently attempting to cultivate an image of national unity. Thus, while Hizballah continued to be engaged in nefarious acts of terrorism at home and abroad, it was being consistently pushed towards the notion that it was accountable for its behavior; that in order to maintain its always tenuous position in Lebanon, Hizballah would have to become an integral part of the framework of inclusionary Lebanese politics.


The late 1970s and 1980s were marked by a sudden resurgence of the Shi’ite community in Lebanon, brought on by a groundswell of enthusiasm over the success of the Iranian Revolution. By 1979 much of this enthusiasm was centered on Amal, a political reform movement largely composed of middle class doctors and lawyers. Amal had recently benefited from Shi’ite outrage over the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, a respected Shi’ite cleric who had vanished during a visit to Libya in 1978. During this period Amal rebuilt itself from a largely defunct group to a well respected party capable of mobilizing large numbers of Shi’a in southern Lebanon. This reputation was further cemented during Israel’s brief invasion of Lebanon in 1978. Thousands of Shi’ite in the south were displaced during this period, increasingly caught in the cross fire between the Israeli army and Palestinian militants. Amal militiamen provided both a form of limited resistance and a number of proto-social services during this period.
Historically, Shi’ite movements in Lebanon had focused on peaceful means to affect major political and social change in the country. Musa al-Sadr, for example, had spent decades emphasizing *da’wa* social services and promoting religious piety. By the summer of 1969, al-Sadr and his contemporaries had organized a *da’wa* program which recruited from political, social, and religious circles of Shi’ite youth. Al-Sadr primarily recruited those youth who regularly attended his lectures, speeches and religious sermons, as well as those who were drawn by his widely disseminated books, *Our Philosophy* and *Our Economy*. Over the next decade Lebanon’s Shi’ite reformists would draw extensively from ideological and financial support from the Iranian and Iraqi Shi’ite clergy. By the mid-70s, al-Sadr was able to draw enough support to hold massive rallies in Lebanon, drawing tens of thousands of people from all segments of society. Al-Sadr was able to utilize this support to form, alongside Greek Catholic archbishop Gregoire Haddad, *Harakat al-Mahrumin* (The Movement of the Deprived). Despite this early effort at multi-confessional inclusionary politics, *Harakat al-Mahrumin* soon became dominated by its Shi’ite components. Under al-Sadr’s charismatic leadership the group promoted religious symbolism as a means of mobilizing Lebanon’s Shi’a community. In particular, al-Sadr relied upon a reinterpretation of select moments from the history of Shi’ism to emphasize that political activism was not only necessary to save their sectarian community, but was also a religious obligation for all those who sought to honor authentic, historic Shi’ism.

Al-Sadr and his associates would spend the next several years cultivating this sense of Shi’ite political identity and constructing an extensive network of social services. The *da’wa* efforts of their movement emphasized a reform of Lebanese society from within. By the mid-70s, 

70 Alagha, Joseph, *The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology*. Amsterdam University press, 2006, p. 28
71 Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar, *In the Path of Hizbullah*. Syracuse University Press, 2004, p. 21
however, al-Sadr and other members of his organization found themselves increasingly under threat from Israeli incursions into Lebanon – as well as significantly threatened by internal actors among Lebanon’s other confessions. Accordingly, al-Sadr founded an offshoot militia group in 1975 called Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya (The Brigades of the Lebanese Resistance), also known by its acronym AMAL. Amal from its inception painted itself as both a political organization and a resistance party. Amal under al-Sadr’s leadership attempted to preserve and improve the Shi’ite relationship with Lebanon’s Christians, even going so far as to defend Christian villages in the Biqa’ Valley during the early phases of the civil war. But Amal also primarily sought to defend Lebanon’s Shi’ites against rival Christian and Sunni militias and elements of the PLO who were increasingly growing in influence during this period.

Amal’s success as a resistance and political party ebbed and flowed during this period, but the organization suffered a major blow in 1978 when al-Sadr disappeared under mysterious circumstances while on a state visit to Libya. The party’s leadership gap could not be sufficiently filled by Nabih Berri or other of Amal’s secondary leaders and soon the movement suffered a significant slump in its mobilization efforts. The Iranian Revolution would sufficiently energize Lebanon’s Shi’ite base but the organization lacked a firm hierarchy and delineation of responsibilities. Instead, the group could better be characterized as an ad-hoc, decentralized organization of middle class individuals which embraced several broad ideological currents but lacked a clear modus operandi.

While it dabbled in resistance during this period, Amal became increasingly focused on the provision of da’wa services to Lebanon’s Shi’a. It was this practice of slowly changing society from within which grew increasingly unpopular with an element of Lebanon’s Shi’ite

youth. Just as elements of the Palestinian *Ikhwan* would split away to form a more active movement called Hamas, large numbers of Amal’s supporters sought a more aggressive means of reforming society from within and fighting Lebanon’s external enemies.

A confluence of several factors would give these elements their chance to form a new movement. First, the new Iranian clerical regime began an aggressive outreach to Shi’ite allies in the region, particularly in Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon. In response to the intrusion of Iranian officials into domestic Iraqi affairs during this period, Saddam Hussein began a repressive crackdown on Iraq’s Shi’a community, many of whom would flee to Lebanon. Iran’s clerics encouraged these refugees to infiltrate the ranks of Amal in an effort to challenge the movement’s inclusionary politics and social reform agenda. Instead, these new members, including a young individual named Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, would carry with them a more radical message of active, violent resistance.73

The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon would offer fertile ground for the seeds of this new resistance message to grow. Lebanon’s Shi’a were initially grateful that the Israeli army was uprooting their Sunni rivals in the PLO, but this thankfulness soon soured as the invasion gave way to a massive refugee problem among Lebanon’s southern Shi’a. The Lebanese-Israeli accord brokered in May of 1983 allowed for a continued Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, further exacerbating tension among Shi’a in the south. Resentment over this occupation, along with resentment of Western troops stationed in Lebanon, was further exacerbated by the sub-national power vacuum left by the fleeing PLO.

Significant splits in Amal had already begun to occur prior to the Israeli invasion in the summer of 1982. In June, leading Amal figure Sayyid Husayn al-Musawi broke away to form

73 Alagha, Joseph, *The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology*. Amsterdam University press, 2006, p. 32
Islamic Amal and soon droves of Amal supporters began to defect from its ranks, leaving Nabih Berri the leader of an increasingly defunct organization. At the onset of the invasion many of these disparate elements began to coalesce in the Biq’a Valley around several Shi’ite clerics. That summer a committee of nine clerics traveled to Tehran to seek the opinion and permission of Khomeini over the formation of a new movement. The movement called itself Hizballah, the Party of God, after a Qur’anic verse: “those who accept the mandate of God, his prophet and those who believed, Lo! The Party of God they are the victorious.” (Surat al-Ma’ida, 5:56).74

Hizballah would exist as a decentralized organization for the next three years, dependent on the zeal of young Shi’ite activists and ideological and financial support from Iran and the more ambivalent Syria. The organization made an effort to conduct regular violent acts against Israel and continued Amal’s tradition of providing some social services, but it was still primarily an ideological organization which looked to external clerics in Iran for its inspiration. In particular, Hizballah’s cadres looked to the guardianship of the jurisconsult (wilayat al-faqih), the clerical authority embodied in Ayatollah Khomeini’s theories. In essence, the wali al-faqih serves as an intermediary between God and the ummah (Muslim community) and is imbued with sacred knowledge of the divine and hidden meaning of the Qur’an.

In these early years, Hizballah embraced Khomeini’s theories on the supreme jurisconsult to argue for obedience and fealty to Iran’s clerical leadership. This notion was further embedded in the minds of supporters through the use of religious and historic symbolism. The 7th century story of the massacre of Imam ‘Ali and his son Hussein was a particularly instructive episode often used by Hizballah’s leadership. Hassan Nasrallah, for example, often argued that “If the

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74 Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar, In the Path of Hizbullah. Syracuse University Press, 2004, p. 25
Ummah had obeyed the Prophet as to ‘Ali’s wilayat, the history of Islam would have changed.”

Nasrallah further noted, “Where is the force in us? What is Hizballah’s secret? The power is in the obedience to Khamenei’s wilayat. The secret of our strength, growth, unity, struggle, and martyrdom is wilayat al-faqih, the spinal cord of Hizballah.”

Shifting Cues (1985-1990) –

While Hizballah’s early years were marked by blind allegiance to Iranian authority embodied in the leadership of Khomeini, the organization soon began to carve out its own sector of Lebanese society, a process which necessitated greater engagement with Lebanon’s other political and sectarian movements. The clearest such shift in Hizballah’s modus operandi took place in 1985 when the group published its “Open Letter,” a political manifesto which signaled the intention of the group to engage directly with Lebanese society and continue its resistance against Israeli occupation. The Open Letter, much like Hamas’ foundational charter, is marked by a rough and often naïve style of writing, far from the polished discourse which would mark the later stages of the movement. Much of the letter is composed of harangues against Israeli and American policy in Lebanon, and while this resistance message certainly established frame resonance with the majority of the populace, the document’s religious prose and other exclusionary forms of rhetoric which make up the letter’s core ultimately limited its appeal to greater Lebanon.

75 Nasrallah, Sayyid Hasan “Min wilayat ‘Ali ila wilayat al-faqih” (From the guardianship of Ali to the guardianship of the jurisconsult), al-Ahd, May 26, 1995, p. 27

76 Nasrallah, Sayyid Hasan “Min wilayat ‘Ali ila wilayat al-faqih” (From the guardianship of Ali to the guardianship of the jurisconsult), al-Ahd, May 26, 1995, p. 27
Yet while the majority of this document is composed of overtly exclusionary language, perhaps its most interesting moments are those passages which try to present a rudimentary inclusionary tone – albeit in an inconsistent way. Hizballah’s message to its Christian countrymen is most notable among these. On the one hand, the Letter promises peaceful coexistence with their Christian countrymen:

“If you were deceived and misled into believing that we anticipate vengeance against you – your fears are unjustified. For those of you who are peaceful, continue to live in our midst without anybody even thinking to trouble you.”

At the same time, much of the document’s later sections are an indictment of attempts by Christian militias and politicians (in particular their Phalangist rivals) to bring in outside influence and monopolize the Lebanese political system. The section ends with a message that Hizballah leaders would never dream of conveying today; a call for all Christians in Lebanon to convert to Islam:

“We don’t wish you evil. We call upon you to embrace Islam so that you can be happy in this world and the next. If you refuse to adhere to Islam, we would not force you to do otherwise, rather we just expect you to respect and honor you covenants with the Muslims and not to aggress against them. Free yourselves from the consequences of hateful confessionalism. Banish from your hearts all fanaticism and parochialism. Open your hearts to our Call (da’wa), which we address to you. Open yourselves up to Islam where you’ll find salvation and happiness upon earth and in the hereafter.”

It is notable that Hizballah makes some early attempts at inclusionary language, although its limited passages of outreach are eclipsed by both criticism of Christian politics and calls for the community to convert to Islam. Although their proto-attempts at inclusionary language in the Open Letter fell on deaf ears, the document is notable as an agenda setter in which Hizballah stated the core frames of its resistance credentials and goal of liberating Lebanon:

77 Hizballah Open Letter
78 Hizballah Open Letter
“Through its local agents, the United States has tried to give the impression that [we are] a handful of fanatics and terrorists who are only concerned with blowing up, drinking, gambling, and entertainment spots…[however] each of us is a combat soldier when the call of jihad demands it and each of us undertakes his task in the battle in accordance with his lawful assignment within the framework of action under the guardianship of the leader jurisprudent [Khomeini].”

The letter attempts to portray Hizballah as the best form of resistance to the “Zionist entity” – especially since the movement was based among and drew support from those in the south who were directly occupied by Israel. As such, the letter repeatedly addresses Hizballah’s ultimate goal of liberating Lebanon from Israeli control through armed resistance, not through dialogue or negotiation,

“The negotiations with the enemy can only be regarded as a conspiracy aiming at acknowledging the Zionist occupation and according it legitimacy as well as privilege on the crimes it had committed against the oppressed in Lebanon…[we will not cease] until the Zionists evacuate the occupied lands, which is seen as a step in the right direction to obliterate them from the face of the earth.”

In many regards, Hizballah’s framing in the 1980s lacked a clear focus. Like many Islamic movements bourgeoning at the time, Hizballah utilized exclusionary discourse to paint itself as a separate entity above and beyond its Lebanese compatriots. Continued utilization of exclusionary frames was perfectly understandable given the fragmented nature of the Lebanese state at the time. Hizballah only had to rule its particular fiefdom in the south, and while some limited interaction with Lebanon’s other sects was necessary, its primary contingency remained the Shi’a community. Yet “resistance” was the one frame which could unify potential sympathizers from cross-sectarian groups. In fact, Hizballah’s skillful resistance framing enabled the group to recruit a number of Christians to join the movement’s rank. Perhaps most notably, while many assume a connection between the tactic of suicide bombing and religion, the

79 Hizballah Open Letter
80 Hizballah Open Letter
majority of suicide bombers targeting Israel during this period were from secular socialist organizations, and a total of 8% of suicide bombers were Christians. The frames of self-sacrifice and resistance were clearly powerful slogans which cut across religious and ethnic lines. It is this discursive trend that would in later years become Hizballah’s primary means of attracting cross-sectarian support.

Yet in the immediate years preceding the Taif accords, Hizballah seems to have felt no need to reach out and co-opt its sectarian rivals in any substantial way. The group would go so far as to engage Amal in a miniature war from 1988 to 1990 and continuously vowed to liberate the country from Israel’s Christian Maronite allies. Although Hizballah’s resistance stance was one the majority of the population could in theory support, the movement’s insistence on an Islamic system of governance ultimately limited its number of potential recruits. During this period Hizballah’s leaders and scholars continually stated their belief that Lebanon was destined to become an Islamic state – the only form of political system that was capable of delivering justice, liberty, and security. Yet Hizballah leaders also allowed themselves enough wiggle room to opt out of such a maximalist goal – its Open Letter and the speeches of several of its leaders emphasized that there was no compulsion in religion, and while they believed Lebanon’s sects would eventually accept Shi’a Islam, Hizballah did not intend on ever forcing the populace into such a commitment. Like Hamas’ strategy of sabr (patience), this allowed Hizballah to preserve its core goals on paper while significantly altering its exclusionary language once the movement decided to engage in the political process.

The 1990s and 2000s would witness movement leaders significantly increasing inclusionary rhetoric and outreach to rival sectarian groups. Perhaps most importantly to its evolution as a movement, Hizballah’s message to the Christian community would become much more nuanced over time – expanding in the immediate post-Taif Accord Period, increasing during Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, when many of Lebanon’s Christians expressed solidarity with Hizballah, and finally solidifying with the strong political alliances between Hizballah and several major Christian sects, most notably Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM).


In many ways the signing of the Taif Accords and the end of the Lebanese civil war represented an existential crisis for Hizballah. While the organization had to date been content to run their section of Lebanon with only limited interaction with other sectarian groups, Hizballah was now facing the possibility of a unified and functional Lebanese state which would demand the submission of the resistance. The organization faced a particularly significant problem when in March, 1991 the government attempted to implement a section of the Taif Accord calling for the dissolution of all armed militias. Hizballah launched a public relations campaign aimed at demonstrating the continued need of the resistance for the protection of Lebanon. The campaign soon paid off – Hizballah was granted a special exemption to keep its arms and bases and was given the title of “resistance movement” rather than militia.

83 Alagha, Joseph, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology. Amsterdam University press, 2006, p. 150
Despite this brief reprieve, Hizballah’s leadership was well aware that the movement would have to adapt to a new Lebanon. At the forefront of its internal debate was the extent to which the movement would participate in society, and if they would front candidates for the upcoming 1992 parliamentary elections. Responding to these pressures, Hizballah quickly began softening its exclusionary rhetoric by engaged in a policy of intifah, or opening up. The first such attempt came with a January, 1991 political declaration which called for intellectual and ideological freedom as well as unity among Lebanon’s various factions.84 Leading Hizballah member Sayyid Abbas soon issued a four point political program which laid out the organization’s approach to engaging Lebanese society – 1) The need for continued resistance against Israel, 2) An end to all internal discord (fitna) and the need to engage in serious public open debates on all political and social issues with both allies and former enemies, 3) A start of the process of “Lebanonisation,” or intifah, which stresses pluralism and national unity, and 4) Increased effort towards improving socio-economic and communal life in Lebanon.85

Hizballah followed up on this new discursive change with a number of key actions – Hizballah members in 1992 would visit the Maronite Patriarch in what would become a defining moment of outreach for the organization. Hizballah also allowed Christian and Sunni representatives to begin speaking on behalf of the organization at the municipal level. Finally, Hizballah would establish key alliances with Christian politicians, going so far as to back a number of Christian candidates in future municipal and parliamentary elections. Hizballah scholar Joseph Alagha has compiled a number of additional anecdotal examples of symbolic shifts by the movement towards inclusive politics: 1) Following the withdrawal of Israel from

84 Hizballah Central Press Office, January 3, 1991
southern Lebanon in 2000, the logo on Hizballah’s flag, “The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon” was replaced by “The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon,” 2) Hizballah’s weekly newspaper al-‘Ahd changed its name to al-Intiqad, dropped its regular Qur’anic verses, removed the portraits of Khomeini and Khamina’i on the cover, and put “AD” dates before “AH” (Islamic hijra dates) equivalents, 3) During municipal elections in 1998, Hizballah removed all religious and ideological symbols from areas near Christian polling stations, 4) At a number of events from 2004-2005, Hizballah demonstrators increasingly marched with Lebanese flags, banners, and slogans rather than Hizballah’s own.86

Hizballah’s marked change towards inclusionary politics paid off in the 1992 parliamentary elections, aided in part by the decision of a number of Christian parties to boycott the elections that year. While changing rhetoric assisted in Hizballah’s electoral advances, the organization depended greatly on a base which it had already established in previous years. Not only did Hizballah have a core constituency of Shi’a supporters in the Biq’a, Southern Lebanon, and the suburbs of Beirut, but the movement was also able to further exploit a political base through its continued use of the “resistance” frame and through the provision of da’wa services. Da’wa assistance in the form of medical, financial, and other social services assisted a number of impoverished Shi’ites in the country and even benefited a number of Christians. By this point the organization had established a number of key institutions, including the Financial Assistance Committee, which granted 130,000 scholarships and provided interest free loans to over 135,000 families, and the Islamic Health Organization, a Hizballah offshoot which constructed several

86 Alagha, Joseph, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology. Amsterdam University press, p. 171
hospitals and provided affordable medical assistance regardless of one’s sect. Hizballah microfinance initiatives, most notably al-Qard al-Hasan (The Good Hand) provide hundreds of small loans to individuals and businesses every month, primarily in Shi’ite dominated areas. Hizballah’s social assistance programs were highly dependent on Iranian financial support, estimated to be as much as $100 million annually depending on the political climate in Tehran. Hizballah also benefited from domestic support in the form of religious alms (zakat), Ramadan gifts, an obligation of the devout to donate a fifth of their yearly income (khums), and other impromptu forms of donations.

But core supporters gleaned from Hizballah’s social services were not enough. In order to be truly successful in politics, the organization’s leadership knew it would have to reach out to potential recruits from Lebanon’s other sects, most importantly the Christian community. From the early post-Taif Accord days, Hizballah depended on a degree of multi-sectarian support in Lebanon. While demographic research in Lebanon has been historically problematic in determining totals of religious affiliation, the U.S. State Department has determined that approximately 27% of the population is Shi’a, 27% are Sunni, 21% are Maronite Christian, 8% are Greek Orthodox Christian, 5% are Druze, 5% are Greek Catholic, with the remaining 7% belonging to various smaller Christian denominations. In such a configuration, no religious or political group can afford to be an island unto itself. While the primary base of Hizballah was

87 Pape, Robert, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Random House Publishing, 2005, p. 188
located in the Shi’ite dominated south and suburbs of Beirut, the movement’s resistance message was approachable enough to attract candidates from Lebanon’s extensive Christian and smaller Druze population. And although much of Lebanon’s Sunni community (both native Sunnis and Palestinian refugees) maintained a degree of independence from Hizballah, both groups shared a common patron in Syria. As a result, Syria was able to ensure a close working relationship between Hizballah and many of its Sunni funded movements in the north.

Hizballah’s intifah policy in the early 90s went a long way towards establishing a basis of trust and cooperation between sects, and as the organization increasingly shifted away from exclusionary religious ideology towards national unity, it also played up its resistance credentials. In many ways, Hizballah’s discursive positioning made it all things to all people – impoverished Shi’ites saw the organization as a harbinger of social welfare assistance, many other citizens saw the organization as a legitimate resistance force against Israel, and Lebanese from all sectors of society increasingly viewed the organization as a legitimate political and social force with which engagement and cooperation were a necessity.


“They resist with their blood. Resist with your vote.” – Hizballah campaign poster

Hizballah’s resistance credentials soared in 2000 when Israel announced it would unilaterally withdraw from most of southern Lebanon. Hizballah’s leadership seized on the moment to stress that it was Hizballah which had forced Israel out. Within days, Nasrallah would address a crowd of tens of thousands in the small border town of Bint Jbeil. In what would

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become known as the “Victory Speech,” Nasrallah would use this moment not only to stress Hizballah’s accomplishment, but to emphasize the need for Lebanese unity:

“I would like to say to all the Lebanese people: you have to see this victory as a victory for all the Lebanese, not only for Hizballah or for any other movement. This is not a victory for one sect and a defeat for another…this is Lebanon’s victory.” 93

The sudden rejuvenation of Hizballah’s resistance frame allowed the movement’s political candidates to capitalize on Israel’s withdrawal just in time for the 2000 parliamentary elections. Hizballah won nine seats for itself in the election – and surely would have won a handful more away from Amal had it not been for Syrian and Iranian machinations to limit Hizballah’s total candidates. Iran and Syria allegedly feared that bloodshed between Amal and Hizballah would erupt should Hizballah capture Amal’s southern seats in the 2000 election. Both countries therefore engaged in balancing act to limit the number of candidates Hizballah would run while funding a number of Amal’s social welfare projects, thereby ensuring that Amal would maintain relevancy after the elections. 94 The Resistance and Development Bloc, an Amal-Hizballah led coalition, would capture all twenty-three seats in southern Lebanon and more than a quarter of the total seats in parliament. 95

Despite modest political gains and an increase in the movement’s popularity, Nasrallah and other Hizballah leadership also sensed the danger in Israel’s withdrawal. The movement, after all, did not want its resistance message to become obsolete. In numerous speeches, Nasrallah would stress the continued Israeli occupation of Sheba Farms and the presence of Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails as justification for continued operations against Israel. As

Nasrallah stressed in his Victory Day speech, “The choice is yours, and the example is clear before your eyes. A genuine and serious resistance can lead you to the dawn of freedom.”

Hizballah soon established military posts along Lebanon’s border with Israel, operational bases, and maintained regular patrols and transportation infrastructure. By October, 2000, Hizballah had begun cross-border operations aimed at killing or capturing Israeli soldiers. Periodic raids over the next several years would lead to sustained Israeli military casualties along the border.

While Hizballah’s resistance credentials were growing during this period, Amal and other rival movements were facing a high degree of internal discord. Hizballah would move to form a number of consensus lists with Christians in Lebanon and engage in key alliances across-sectarian lines. By the 2004 Lebanese Municipal Elections, Hizballah’s power and influence in the south were unquestioned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Hizballah Seats</th>
<th>Amal Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon and Nabatiyyah</td>
<td>1163</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biq’a</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1653</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The provision of social welfare services and a consistently sustained message of “resistance” served to solidify Hizballah’s base in the south and the suburbs of Beirut. Yet despite a continued increase in domestic support among its base during this period, Hizballah’s detractors would increasingly view the organization as beholden to foreign allies and a fundamental danger to Lebanese stability. Moreover, many voices began to openly question the

96 Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar, In the Path of Hizbullah. Syracuse University Press, 2004

97 Data from Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, compiled from al-Intiqad, May 14, 2004 and May 28, 2004
continued need for Hizballah to exist as an autonomous, armed fighting force now that Israel had withdrawn from Lebanon. Yet continued Syrian interference in the country and select assassinations against key opposition figures would serve to squelch much of the potential discontent against Hizballah and its allies. Tensions between these two camps would ebb and flow over the early 2000s, finally reaching a boiling point over an unexpected assassination in early 2005.

March 8 and March 14 (2005) –

On 14 February, 2005 while driving through downtown Beirut, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was killed along with twenty-one others when a massive car bomb was detonated alongside his motorcade. The Syrian government was almost immediately blamed for the attack due to an ongoing public rift between Hariri and the Syrian government, which still maintained a sizeable military presence in the country. Hariri’s assassination set in motion a series of demonstrations against Syrian influence in the country, collectively termed the Cedar Revolution. Most significant among these demonstrations was the 1-month commemoration of Hariri’s assassination on March 14th, 2005, when tens of thousands of Lebanese citizens marched in central Beirut demanding the withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country. Domestic Lebanese and international pressure soon culminated in the total withdrawal of Syrian troops on April 26, 2005.

Hizballah during this time maintained its traditional rhetoric blaming unrest on Israeli and U.S. meddling in domestic Lebanese affairs. The movement embraced Syrian president Assad, holding a massive rally on March 8 in support of Syrian assistance in Lebanon. Hizballah and its allies, cognizant of increasing anti-Syrian sentiment among the population, attempted to stress the importance of Syria as a stabilizing factor in Lebanon – their role in ending the Lebanese
Civil War and their support of Hizballah’s resistance against Israel. But this message, while it had its supporters, would largely fall on deaf ears in Lebanon.

The turmoil of 2005 saw the formation of two major political coalitions in Lebanese politics – the 14 March coalition, led by Rafik Hariri’s son, Sa’ad Hariri, and the 8th March Coalition, led by a number of pro-Hizballah and pro-Syrian political parties. While Syria was still an omnipresent force in Lebanese politics, the 14 March coalition provided a more sustained alternative path to Syrian and Hizballah influence than had ever been seen before in Lebanon.

As anti-Hizballah rhetoric increased among segments of the population, Hizballah viewed its situation as increasingly tenuous. Hizballah’s predicament during this period forced its hand at greater integration and cooperation with different sectarian groups. The withdrawal of Syria forced Hizballah to deal more closely with several pro-Syrian Christian and Sunni parties. The formation of the 8 March coalition saw the combination of a number of those parties which had extensively depended on Syrian patronage in previous years – Hizballah, Amal, Marada, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and others. The 8 March coalition acquired a number of multi-sectarian allies in the initial period after its formation (see figure 1), one of the most significant of which came in February of 2006 when Michel Aoun, leader of the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, signed a memorandum of understanding with Hizballah and moved his party from the 14 March Coalition to 8 March.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats in Parliament</th>
<th>Primary Demographic Base</th>
<th>Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hizballah</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Hassan Nasrallah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amal</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Nabih Berri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Michel Aoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Marada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Maronite Christian</td>
<td>Suleiman Franjieh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Social Nationalist Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Assad Hardan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Name</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Assem Qanso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kataeb-Opposition Faction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Maronite Christian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Bloc</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>Elias Skaff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Tashnaq)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Armenian Orthodox Christian</td>
<td>Hovig Mekhitirian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Democratic Party</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Talal Arslan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Nasserite Organization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Osama Saad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Liberation Party</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Omar Karami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Labor Front</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Fathi Yakan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Unification Movement</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Wiam Wahhab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Dialogue Party</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Fouad Makhzoumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Democratic Party</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Alawi</td>
<td>Ali Eid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next six years would witness repeated dueling between the coalitions over issues of Hizballah’s role and influence in the government, its arms and right to exist as a paramilitary force outside the rubric of the official Lebanese state, and questions over its role in the assassination of Rafik Hariri.

**The July War (2006)** –

Until July, 2006, Hizballah had boosted its resistance cuing with regular cross-border raids and katyusha rocket attacks against Israel. Nasrallah and other senior Hizballah figures had capitalized on the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 to stress that it was the resistance’s weapons and sacrifices that had pushed out the Israeli occupation. Yet while Hizballah’s leadership rejoiced in the propaganda victory accompanying the withdrawal, the movement also faced a significant problem in redefining the continued need for armed resistance now that Israel was gone. Hizballah would now emphasize Israel’s continued occupation of the Sheba Farms and other small swaths of Lebanese territory, regular territorial violations of
Lebanese airspace and cross-border raids, as well as the continued threat of a renewed full-scale Israeli attack and occupation of southern Lebanon.

Hizballah’s military wing would conduct regular cross-border attacks and rocket launches with the intention of leveraging increased pressure on Israel to fully withdraw from Lebanese territory and hand over Lebanese prisoners. When Hizballah fighters in July, 2006 conducted a cross-border raid which killed eight Israeli soldiers and captured two more, its leadership surely did not expect any abnormal reaction from Israel. However, this incident would spark a month long war which would devastate much of Lebanon’s infrastructure and lead to over 1,100 dead Lebanese civilians.

While these events had the potential to significantly weaken Hizballah domestically if average citizens had blamed the organization for the collective punishment suffered by Lebanon, the organization was able to spin the events of the July war to perpetuate the belief that Hizballah continued to be needed to defend Israel. Hizballah was also able to perpetuate the belief that they had “won” the war by merely surviving while applying a steady degree of pressure against Israel. During a month of fighting, Hizballah fighters had killed 121 IDF soldiers and wounded 628 while indiscriminate rocket fire lead to forty-four civilian dead and almost fourteen-hundred wounded in Israel.98 99

Although the message that Hizballah had “won” had a high degree of frame resonance in Lebanon and the wider Arab world, a substantial number of domestic critics and political rivals began to openly accuse Hizballah of causing the war in the first place. Estimates of the bill for

98 Winograd Commission Report

reconstruction exceeded $4 billion and Lebanon faced massive infrastructure damage to roads, bridges, ports, and Beirut’s airport.\textsuperscript{100} Cognizant of this criticism and sensing an opportunity to win more popular support, Hizballah would spend the next several years pouring (mostly Iranian and Syrian) money into reconstruction efforts. Hizballah’s \textit{Jihad al-Bina’} Development Organization was at the forefront of efforts to reconstruct Lebanon and present the organization in a kinder, gentler light.

While Nasrallah and other Hizballah members continued to insist that Israel used Hizballah’s cross-border raid as a pretext for a pre-planned invasion, Nasrallah also admitted in a television interview that there had been a potential miscalculation on Hizballah’s part – “If any of us had a 1 percent concern that Israel was going to reply in this savage manner we would not have captured those soldiers.” Nasrallah went on to call for a national unity government in Lebanon and pledged that Hizballah’s arms would never be pointed against fellow Lebanese – only Israel. It was a pledge that Hizballah would soon violate.

\textbf{Military Coups and Political Coups (2008-2011) –}

Political tension between Hizballah and its rivals would reach a boiling point in May of 2006 when the 14 March-led Lebanese government attempted to shut down Hizballah’s telecommunication network and remove the security chief at Beirut International Airport, widely believed to be an ally of Hizballah.\textsuperscript{101} Hizballah initiated a civil disobedience campaign and held

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\textsuperscript{101} “Hezbollah takes over west Beirut”, \textit{BBC news}. May 5, 2009: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7391600.stm..
\end{flushleft}
a number of marches in protest of the government’s attempts to target the organization. This campaign soon broke out into sporadic violence between pro-14 March and pro-8 March demonstrators. What resulted over the next several days was a miniature civil war in which Hizballah fighters took to the street against militias allied with 14 March, seizing control of a number of neighborhoods in West Beirut and the surrounding area. Hizballah allies in the Sunni-dominated areas surrounding Tripoli were not as successful – a number of Hizballah’s allies in the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) and associated militias were killed in heavy fighting with supporters of 14 March.\footnote{Aussie’s death sparks Lebanon alert”. The Sydney Morning Herald. 2008-05-12. \url{http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/aussies-death-sparks-lebanon-alert/2008/05/12/1210444296256.html}.}

Despite fears that Lebanon would again descend into the precipice of civil war, Hizballah responded to a request by the Lebanese Armed Forces to withdraw its militants and turn over captured positions to army units. Hizballah instead pledged to return to its civil disobedience campaign in protest of the government’s attempts to challenge its telecommunications network.\footnote{Robert F. Worth, “Hezbollah to Withdraw Gunmen in Lebanon,” The New York Times, May 11, 2008: \url{http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/11/world/middleeast/11lebanon.html?hp}.} While Hizballah was ultimately successful in securing its interests from 14 March’s attempts to undermine the organization, the nature of Hizballah’s armed takeover of Beirut stoked fears in many Lebanese that the movement would never fully buy into the concept of the Lebanese state – that when its interests were threatened, it would take arms against its countrymen. Nasrallah would speak to these issues directly over the next several months, explaining repeatedly that May’s fighting was a result of aggressive action taken by 14 March against the resistance – not an attempt by Hizballah to take over the government of Lebanon.
“Reconciliation is not a one-sided decision. Reconciliation can never take place on the basis of a one-sided decision. It is a two-sided decision. When both sides took the decision, reconciliations came successively. In such reconciliations we are serious, truthful, attentive and ready to all what promotes a positive atmosphere in our nation. Details are not of any value. We are ready to all what might reassure the people in Lebanon – all regions in Lebanon especially our dear capital, the city of Beirut, and its noble people.”

Nasrallah would go on to stress that Hizballah would ultimately be accountable to the people of Lebanon, pledging the organization’s commitment to democracy and even going to far as to promise coalition building with its rivals in 14 March:

“Our interior instructions to our brothers and sisters – and several days ago to the families of our martyrs – say that we do not want to dominate over Lebanon neither do we want to hold the reins of power in Lebanon. We believe that Lebanon's interest and our interest in Lebanon on all levels that we stay together, work industriously, build and face challenges….We've always been callers for people to be the arbitrator. We always do respect people and their will and choice. We are all concerned in ensuring in Lebanon a positive agreeable atmosphere for a sound and noble political competition that'll lead to parliamentary elections that'll give birth in turn to a new authority. Here I tell you should the opposition win the majority in the parliament God willing, Hezbollah will call and assert its support to a national unity government in which the other party is represented so that it will be a partner in the nation's administration. We do not look forward to parliamentary elections that give birth to a new majority that will leave out anybody. We must learn from the events of the past decades in our history – from the last century onwards. We must learn that this Lebanon can't be ruled with majority.”

The 8th and 14th March Coalitions would soon meet in Doha, hammering out a national unity government in which both parties would share governing responsibilities. A little over a year later, in the June, 2009 parliamentary elections, the Hizballah-led 8 March coalition would continue to maintain their largest coalition yet, securing a total of 57 seats in the new government (see table 3).
Several months of political debate would lead to the formation of a new unity government led by Prime Minister Sa’ad Hariri, son of the assassinated former prime minister Rafik Hariri, and composed of a 30 member cabinet – fifteen seats were held by March 14, ten seats by March 8, and five seats were considered to be independent. Importantly, Hizballah only took two seats on the cabinet (the Ministry of Administrative Reform and the Ministry of Agriculture), content to let its allies take the most significant portfolios. Yet the composition of the new cabinet was particularly significant in that it gave Hizballah and its allies a blocking-

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Seats in Parliament</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hizballah</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Hassan Nasrallah</td>
</tr>
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<td>Amal</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>Nabih Berri</td>
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<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Michel Aoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Marada</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Maronite Christian</td>
<td>Suleiman Franjieh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Social Nationalist Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Assad Hardan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party</td>
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<td>Fathi Yakan</td>
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<td>None</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Fouad Makhzoumi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arab Democratic Party</td>
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<td>Alawi</td>
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<td>Emile Rahme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party (Joined 2011)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Walid Junblatt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Glory Movement (Joined 2011)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Najib Miqati</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
third in the government. Should it choose to do so, the 8 March coalition could withdraw its ministers from the cabinet and constitutionally collapse the government.

Hizballah would exercise this provocative option in January, 2011, when it once again believed its core interests were at stake. Pressures had steadily mounted in recent months surrounding implications that Hizballah had been involved in the assassination of Rafik Hariri. The United Nations sponsored “Special Tribunal for Lebanon” (STL) investigation into the assassination of Hariri was reportedly close to releasing the names of Hizballah members it would indict as suspects in the assassination. Fearing that Sa’ad Hariri would continue Lebanon’s cooperation with the STL, Hizballah withdrew its allied cabinet members and constitutionally collapsed the Lebanese government.

Five months later Hizballah would reach what is arguably the high point of its political influence in Lebanon – an 8-March led cabinet comprised of key allies from across Lebanon’s sectarian divide. A Sunni ally with Lebanon’s new Prime Minister Najib Miqati, the support of Michael Aoun’s Christian Free Patriotic Movement, and for the first time, a political alliance with the influential Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. While it cannot be said that Hizballah controls all parties in its coalition, this past year’s developments evidence just how powerful the organization has become politically. While it is constitutionally limited from securing its own majority in the parliament, Hizballah has succeeded in forming political alliances across sectarian lines, a move which is ultimately aimed at ensuring its interests in Lebanon.

**Shifting Cues (1982-2011)** –

Unlike case studies of other Islamist groups, Hizballah offers us a unique example of a movement whose leadership has remained relatively intact over the course of thirty years.
Hassan Nasrallah in particular offers us an extensive body of discourse which spans nearly the entire life of the organization and which can be analyzed for significant shifts in cuing over time. Nasrallah’s speeches from across this period will be analyzed for the recurrence of words associated with a number of thematic topics – religion, resistance, political cooperation with other domestic sects, nationalism, anti-Israeli sentiment, anti-U.S. sentiment, and reference to foreign allies (Syria and Iran). For example, the most common words which appeared in Nasrallah’s speeches and are associated with the theme of “violence” are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>مقاومة (Resistance)</th>
<th>خطف (Abduct)</th>
<th>سلاح (Weapon)</th>
<th>إبادة (Destruction)</th>
<th>حارب (Fight)</th>
<th>ظلم (Oppress)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>هدم (Destroy)</td>
<td>شهيد (Martyr)</td>
<td>ثورة (Revolution)</td>
<td>جهاد (Jihad)</td>
<td>اغتيال (Invade)</td>
<td>انتصار (Victory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>هاجم (Attack)</td>
<td>جيش (Army/Armies)</td>
<td>عدوان (Aggression)</td>
<td>دم (Blood)</td>
<td>صاروخ (Rocket)</td>
<td>نفخ (Liberate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>تعرف (Battle)</td>
<td>سلاح / منطاد الطيران (Air force/craft)</td>
<td>مجد (Soldier)</td>
<td>حظر (Kill)</td>
<td>ضغط (Defeat)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>محتل / احتل (Occupy/occupied)</td>
<td>سلاح البحرية (Navy)</td>
<td>قتلة (Bomb)</td>
<td>اغتيال (Assassinate)</td>
<td>قطاع (Troops)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>عملية (Operation)</td>
<td>حربي (Military)</td>
<td>جرح (Wound)</td>
<td>مjahid (Mujahid)</td>
<td>قضى (Execute)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: The most commonly occurring words associated with the theme of “violence” in Nasrallah speeches

A quantitative analysis was conducted by determining the total occurrences of types of thematic words as a percentage of the total speech. Percentiles from various speeches were then compared over time to see how types of themes have changed over time.

To maintain the maximum degree of consistency possible, only a body of speeches are compared here and analyzed for how terms shifted over time – interviews, written documents, and other forms of discourse would have to be treated as separate bodies for their own analysis. Nasrallah, after all, significantly shifts his discourse when speaking to an English language news service as opposed to those assembled at a Hizballah rally. Yet because Nasrallah’s speeches are
carried on every major domestic Lebanese news service, one should not assume that Nasrallah is only speaking to supports. On the contrary, major segments of Nasrallah’s speeches directly address rival political parties and Hizballah detractors, and when major events occurred in Lebanon over this time, Nasrallah’s rhetoric towards these parties shifted accordingly. The goal of analyzing this body of speeches was therefore to examine how Nasrallah, when speaking before similar audiences over a large period of time, adjusted his rhetoric in response to larger domestic and international events.

When speeches from several different years are compared, there is a clear trend which emerges – changes in the frequency of violence or national unity or anti-U.S. sentiment cues can clearly be associated with major events. For example, words associated with violence reach an average high point of .04% of Nasrallah’s total words in several speeches following the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon in 2000, decrease by over half in subsequent years and rise again in the wake of the 2006 war. Cues associated with political cooperation, pluralism, and Lebanese nationalism and unity, meanwhile, show distinct spikes in the election years of 2000, 2005, 2009, and in the aftermath of the Rafik Hariri assassination and the 2011 collapse of the Sa’ad Hariri government.

Figure 1 illustrates changes in these themes over the past decade. The most significant discursive shifts during this period involve changes in discourse on political cooperation/nationalism and violence. Religious discourse during this period remained relatively constant and low, typically at less than .01% of the words in Nasrallah’s speeches. References to foreign allies (Syria and Iran) also remain fairly low, although spikes are associated with Nasrallah’s unconditional support to the Assad regime in the months preceding Syria’s decision to withdraw from Lebanon. Similarly, while there was scant reference to the United States in
Figure 1: Frequency of Frames by Type in Nasrallah Speeches, 2000-2011
2000, anti-U.S. rhetoric reached a high point in Nasrallah’s speeches in the lead up to and immediate aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war. References to the U.S. dropped off in subsequent years but increased in the wake of the STL investigation.

One of the most significant changes in cuing occurs in response to two major events – the 2005 withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and the 2006 war. As noted earlier, Hizballah viewed the withdrawal of its closest political patron as a major threat to the organization. As a result, the movement felt compelled to reach out to its domestic rivals in a much more direct way. While not shying away from the group’s support for Syria, Nasrallah also emphasized the need for political cooperation and unified Lebanese nationalism. After the 2006 war, Nasrallah and other leaders felt comfortable returning for a brief time to Hizballah exceptionalism – the notion that Hizballah was the sole organization capable of safeguarding the Lebanese people from external aggression (see figure 2).
Throughout 2005 in the immediate wake of the Hariri assassination, Nasrallah stressed the need for political compromise and cooperation with Lebanon’s multifaceted political parties. During that period, Nasrallah paid little attention to the divisive nature of Lebanese sects – there were no Christians, Druze, Shi’a, Sunnis – there were only Lebanese. Hizballah’s fear of changing events in 2005 led Nasrallah to carefully craft a message which stressed the importance of Lebanese nationalism and unity. In the wake of the 2006 war, however, Nasrallah clearly shifted his message away from political unity towards the exemplary nature of Hizballah as Lebanon’s resistance force and primary defender. As such, Nasrallah and other senior officials would utilize the war to specifically address a concern which had been repeatedly raised during the Cedar Revolution – the continued need for Hizballah to maintain its arms and exist as a
separate force independent of the Lebanese state. At the September, 2006 rally to commemorate Hizballah’s “victory” in the war, Nasrallah spoke directly to these critics –

“I tell you, while we are in the resistance festival, that this is the natural key to tackling the issue of the resistance. Here we come to the issue of the weapons and to those who are dying to resolve this issue. I tell them: Don’t tackle the results. Come and let us tackle the causes. I am not after slogans, but logic. Argue with us on the basis of logic.

The resistance is the result of several causes – the occupation, the arrest of prisoners, the plunder of waters, the threat to Lebanon, and the attack on Lebanese sovereignty. These are the causes. Tackle the causes and the results will be tackled easily.

When we build a strong, capable, and just state that protects Lebanon and the Lebanese, it will be easy to find an honorable solution to the question of the resistance and its weapons. I would like the Lebanese to hear clearly. I and my brothers get excited sometimes and say all kinds of things. Let us speak with some responsibility. We do not say that these weapons will remain forever. And, it is not logical for these weapons to remain forever. There is bound to be an end to them. The natural key is to tackle the causes and the results will disappear.”

Another key change in the aftermath of the 2006 war was a sharp decrease in reference to foreign assistance. Notably, in the aftermath of the Hariri assassination Nasrallah would offer continuous support to Hizballah’s Syrian patron. In 2005, Hizballah likely viewed the possibility of a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon as a potential existential threat to the movement. The issue of Syria’s involvement in the country clearly split the populace along sectarian and political lines. By 2006, however, the perceived decline of Syrian control of Lebanon allowed Hizballah to paint itself as an autonomous power in the country, independent from foreign control and principally devoted to the defense of their fellow Lebanese citizens. Nasrallah would therefore adapt his rhetoric to substantially decrease any reference to Syrian or Iranian support. Hizballah, in the frames perpetuated by its leadership, was a self-governing fighting force which fought for the independence of the Lebanese people.

The same methodology used to examine Nasrallah’s speeches can also be applied to the two most important documents of the organization: its 1985 “Open Letter,” widely considered its foundational charter, and the 2009 “Manifesto” which sought to replace the Open Letter as the document which embodied Hizballah’s goals. The changes in themes from 1985 to 2009 are
notable: religious cues in 2009 dropped by almost 60% whereas references to Lebanese nationalism and unity nearly doubled (see figure 3).

(Figure 3: Occurrence of frames by thematic type as a percentage of total speech, 1985 Open Letter and 2009 Political Manifesto)

Both changes in Nasrallah’s rhetoric, and changes in the 2009 political manifesto evidence Hizballah’s repeated attempts to put forth a type of pro-nationalist discourse which is easily digestible by the Lebanese populace. What has emerged after almost thirty years of existence is an organization which places far less emphasis on the exclusionary rhetoric of religion and political sectarianism. The organization now stresses its resistance role as defender of Lebanon while at the same time calling for political cooperation across sectarian lines. The organization can no longer turn its back on this set of popular frames. To do so would cost the movement a significant percentage of its core membership, including many of its Christian,
Sunni, and Druze allies, as well as moderate Shi’a who do not support a militant path for the movement.

Conclusion –

Hizballah offers us a prime example of an organization that has shifted its rhetoric in fundamental ways from an exclusionary body emphasizing internal cohesion of like-minded individuals to an organization that emphasizes broader inclusionary frames in an effort to recruit a greater percentage of the population. Despite ebbs and flows in the organization’s popularity, this strategy has proved to be largely effective over the years. In particular after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizballah was able to capitalize on its resistance credentials to attract a greater number of allied supporters. Speech distancing has been the best way for the organization to increase its appeal to alternative sectarian groups, as well as placate detractors who fear the organization will use its arms against Lebanon.

Has this speech distancing paid off for Hizballah in the Lebanese parliament? Despite a modest increase in seats in 2000 and a larger increase in 2005, Hizballah’s numbers in parliament have remained relatively stable (see table 5). Yet it must be stressed that this is not indicative of Hizballah’s broader appeal – the number of Shi’ite seats in parliament is fixed by the constitution. Additionally, Hizballah was limited in how many seats it could achieve due to the “Syrian-Iranian” ceiling placed on it during many of these elections. Syria and Iran, after all, hoped to keep the peace between Hizballah and Amal by ensuring Hizballah could only win so many seats in any given election. Despite a limit in its total number of seats, Hizballah greatly expanded the number of political allies it brought into its coalition by reaching out to sectarian rivals. With the incorporation of Druze, Christian, and Sunni allies post-2005, Hizballah
expanded its coalition from 30 in 2000 to 54 in 2005 to 67 in the 2009-2011 period, eventually securing enough seats take control of the government of Lebanon.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Hizballah</th>
<th>Amal</th>
<th>Christian and Sunni Allies</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Total parliamentary seats for Hizballah and its allies, 1992-2011

*2011 does not indicate an election year, but the January government collapse in which 8 March acquired a number of independent parties, as well as the support of the Druze PSP bloc.

Hizballah’s parliamentary successes are due in large part to the ability of the organization to cultivate a largely non-sectarian, religiously neutral tone over the last several years. The changes illustrated in Nasrallah’s discourse, and among its two charters, clearly demonstrate that Hizballah is savvy enough to play the political game in Lebanon. The organization is well aware that despite its special status, it cannot be an island unto itself. Nasrallah and most of Hizballah’s other leaders must manage a somewhat fragile place for the organization in Lebanese society. This speech distancing has paid off as the organization has been able to craft significant political alliances with a number of its former rivals, as well as politicians from across all of Lebanon’s sects and regions. While Hizballah is clearly the strongest force in the country and can wield undue influence over some government policies, it cannot exist on Shi’a support alone. Without their Christian, Sunni, and Druze political allies, Hizballah would have to impose its will through armed confrontation. Although strength of arms would sustain their organization for a time, it would come at the price of plunging Lebanon into another vicious civil war. In the end, this is a
dilemma which Hizballah is well aware of, and actively seeks to avoid by engaging in the political arena.
Chapter 6: The Muslim Brotherhood Between Generations

“Allah is our objective; the Quran is our law, the Prophet is our leader; Jihad is our way; and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations.” – Muslim Brotherhood credo written by founder Hasan al-Banna

“We believe that the political reform is the true and natural gateway for all other kinds of reform. We have announced our acceptance of democracy that acknowledges political pluralism, the peaceful rotation of power and the fact that the nation is the source of all powers. As we see it, political reform includes the termination of the state of emergency, restoring public freedoms, including the right to establish political parties, whatever their tendencies may be, and the freedom of the press, freedom of criticism and thought, freedom of peaceful demonstrations, freedom of assembly….removing all obstacles that restrict the functioning of civil society organizations” – Dr. Mohamed El-Sayed Habib, First Deputy Chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood, 2006

Introduction –

The Muslim Brotherhood is a particularly illustrative example of the dangers of the ideological fragmentation that can occur when a movement is torn between its moderate and extremist strains. At several points during the Brotherhood’s over 80 years of existence, a framing shift in the organization threatened increased defections and severe fissures between the hawks and doves in the movement. All of these fissures involved generational splits in the Brotherhood and centered on the debate over inclusionary political participation versus exclusionary, violent resistance against the Egyptian government. These four major periods of fragmentation include 1) defections in the late 1930s, when some members of the Brotherhood sought to abandon da’wa reform and instead actively resist British occupation, 2) the Nasserite era of repression, in which Brotherhood scholar Sayyid Qutb attempted to direct the movement towards violent resistance, 3) the 1980s and 1990s struggle for Brotherhood leadership which took place between the exclusionary “old guard” and a new generation of middle class moderates, and 4) a generational split in the new millennium between conservative forces in the

Brotherhood and youths who sought to work within the Egyptian political system to bring about inclusive political reforms for all Egyptians regardless of sex or sectarian background.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Muslim Brotherhood Leader</strong></th>
<th><strong>Years in Power</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hassan al-Banna</td>
<td>1928-1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan al-Hudaybi</td>
<td>1949-1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umar al-Tilmisani</td>
<td>1972-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Hamid al-Nasr</td>
<td>1986-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa Mash’ur</td>
<td>1996-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma’mun al-Hudaybi</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed al-Mahdi Akef</td>
<td>2004-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Badie</td>
<td>2010-present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1: Muslim Brotherhood Leadership Years in Power**

This chapter’s examination of the Muslim Brotherhood is our last case study primarily because the Brotherhood’s longevity offers a partial model for how political inclusion, or lack thereof, can seriously shift the balance of power between an organization’s moderates and its extremists. As such, many of the lessons of the Muslim Brotherhood can be applied to Hizballah, Hamas, or any other extremist movement that starts down the inclusionary path. Importantly, the lesson of the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrates the difficulty in maintaining an organization’s self-proclaimed “true believers” – those who believe they are committed to a purer, more extreme ideological goal (in this case, violent resistance against the state in order to purge it of disbelief).

The Muslim Brotherhood’s example also demonstrates how stunting a movement’s effort down the path of inclusion emboldens the exclusionary voices of that group. In every episode in which moderate voices in the Brotherhood were repressed by the Egyptian state, its hawkish members were able to make significant strides forward. Alternatively, when the Brotherhood was given a degree of political freedom, the majority of its members embraced the notion of non-violent, inclusionary political participation. Our examination of the Brotherhood’s history will
evidence how the battle for its ideological direction has been pulled between these two very different sets of leaders, two sets of beliefs, and two sets of frames.

**Exclusionary Origins** –

In 1928 a group of Egyptian workers frustrated with British employment policies approached a schoolteacher named Hassan al-Banna about his calls for an Islamic revival. Al-Banna had recently delivered a number of Friday sermons at the local mosque about the need to cure social ills by reforming society from within. Many of al-Banna’s ideals had been derived from the writings of 19th century Islamic scholar Jamal Eddin al-Afghani, who, responding to the threat of western imperialism, believed that Islam could be a guide for achieving progress and reform in the region. Seeing an opportunity to directly apply the theories of Afghani, al-Banna, along with the Egyptian workers, officially founded the Society of the Muslim Brothers.  

In its early years the Muslim Brotherhood, as it later came to be known, engaged in a number of micro-level social reforms aimed at achieving the revitalization of Egyptian society. Al-Banna and his supporters funded an evening school which was focused on Islamic education and morality and funded the construction of a mosque, completed in 1931. By the early 1930s, the Brotherhood had begun to attract a degree of favorable public attention and over the next several years expanded from three branches to over 300. In this first decade, the Brotherhood’s leaders focused most of their early efforts on *da‘wa* practices, seeking to increase recruitment through the provision of social services and slowly socialize supporters into accepting the idea that Islam was the solution for all of Egypt’s ills. By organizing the collection

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of yearly Islamic taxes (*zakat*), the Brotherhood was able to amass a hefty budget during these early years, and applied much of this money towards the provision of social services to local Egyptians, funding schools, mosques, and a variety of charitable organizations. New Brotherhood branches followed a pattern during this time – after a headquarters was established in a town or village, the Brotherhood would immediately begin construction on a mosque, a school, a club, or another public space in which it could distribute the movement’s ethos.\(^{109}\) The Brotherhood’s model for creating horizontal interpersonal networks was so successful that it has served as a model for many successive Islamist social movements in the region, including Hamas and Hizballah.

Yet the Brotherhood’s efforts also led to growing concerns among some circles of Egyptian society. By maintaining an exclusionary discourse favoring an Islamic revival, the Brotherhood faced antipathy from local Christians, many of whom began to request that the state intervene to halt the Brotherhood’s expansionary efforts.\(^{110}\) For its part, the Brotherhood began efforts aimed at combating the efforts of Christian missionaries in the country and expanding its Islamic frames to a wider audience. Accordingly, the Brotherhood authorized funding for the creation of several spheres of recruitment – two weekly magazines, *Majallat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* and *Majallat al-Nadhir*, and a number of printed indoctrination texts for members called *vasa’il*. Many of these *vasa’il* were written by Banna and established a number of the movement’s basic frames on the state of Egyptian society and the need for Islamic reform. Concurrently, the Brotherhood began to hold weekly lectures at all of its headquarters, branches,


and Mosques which conveyed these frames to members and potential recruits every week.¹¹¹ The Brotherhood continued its meteoric rise, and by the late 1930s had made inroads into courting civil servants, the educated and other parts of the middle class.

Yet not all of the Brotherhood’s actions during this time were restricted to peaceful recruitment of like-minded individuals. Concurrent with its da’wa practices, the Brotherhood also created a special apparatus to fight the British in Egypt and the Jews in Palestine.¹¹² By the late 1930s, a debate emerged between those who sought to flex the Brotherhood’s growing power in the political realm, and those who sought to engage in political violence in order to achieve the liberation of the Egyptian people. As Muslim Brotherhood scholar Paul Mitchell notes,

“As the Society grew more powerful and institutionalized…some of the members became inclined to demand the fulfillment of its mission. For this group, its mission was clear and uncomplicated by political considerations; it was the moral salvation of Egypt, if necessary with ‘the force of the hand.’ The group turned, in the context, to the Prophetic tradition which said: ‘He among you who sees an abomination must correct it with his hand; if he unable, then with his tongue; if he is unable, then with his heart. The last of these is the weakest of the faith.’ Banna, in this dispute, rejected the application of the Tradition in favour of the Qur’anic verse (16:125): ‘Call unto the way of thy Lord with wisdom and fair exhortation, and reason with them in the better way. Lo! Thy Lord is best aware of him who strayeth from His way and He is Best Aware of those who go aright.’”¹¹³

The efforts of Banna and other Brotherhood leaders to restrain hawkish members of the movement led to increased defections between 1937 and 1939, many of whom flocked to join the ranks of a rival movement, The Society of Our Master Muhammad’s Youth. The advent of World War II enabled the Brotherhood to increase its agitation efforts against the British and limit further defections. An effort by the Egyptian government to crack down on the activities of the Brotherhood during this period further galvanized its more radical supporters. Increasingly,


the Brotherhood interacted with other provocateurs in Egyptian society and disaffected members of the Egyptian military, including a young Anwar al-Sadat, whom Banna held a number of meetings with in the early 1940s.

Responding to the limited progress achieved by da’wa efforts to date and increasingly blocked from participatory politics by the government, the Brotherhood in the 1940s became increasingly willing to engage in radical behavior. By 1943, a Muslim Brotherhood insurgent body known as “the secret apparatus” (al-jihaz al-sirri) had significantly expanded its role in the organization, organization sabotage and espionage efforts against the British and infiltrating communist movements, which the Brotherhood considered to be a significant threat to Egyptian society. Brotherhood propagandists, encouraged by the anti-British and anti-Jewish example of Nazi Germany, also distributed copies of Mein Kampf and The Protocols of the Elders of Zion to members.

After the end of the war, the Brotherhood expanded its efforts into a larger civil disobedience campaign and joined with other nationalist movements in nationwide strikes and demonstrations. Yet the efforts of the Brotherhood increasingly came into conflict with Egypt’s other leading opposition movement, the Wafd, and the two groups would struggle not only with the British, but also with one another over the immediate post-war years. Increasingly, some senior leaders in the Brotherhood believed that the only way their movement could successfully co-opt a majority of Egyptians was through the creation of a formal, secular political party and possibly unification with secular oppositionists like the Wafd.114 Yet this notion was fundamentally anathema to Banna and other core members of the Brotherhood. Banna would write,

“My Brothers: you are not a benevolent society, nor a political party, nor a local organization having limited purposes. Rather, you are a new soul in the heart of this nation to give it life by means of the Qur’an…You should feel yourself the bearers of the burden which all others have refused. When asked what it is for which you call, reply that it is Islam…If you are told that you are political, answer that Islam admits no such distinction. If you are accused of being revolutionaries, say ‘We are voices for right and for peace in which we dearly believe, and of which we are proud.’”

As the nationalist struggle expanded and turned increasingly violent in the post-war years, the Egyptian government broadened its efforts to crack down on opposition efforts. With increasing frequency, government troops seized arms caches in the Brotherhood’s possession and, at various points, members of the Brotherhood’s secret apparatus were implicated in the assassinations of Egyptian officials and British troops. On December 6th, 1949, the Egyptian government shut down newspapers of the Brotherhood. On the 8th of December, government radios broadcast an order from the Interior Ministry which officially outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood. Accused of terrorist actions and planning the overthrow of the Egyptian state, police surrounded the Brotherhood headquarters, arrested its members, and seized its bank accounts.

Brotherhood members associated with the secret apparatus instituted a terrorist campaign in subsequent weeks, successfully assassinating the Egyptian prime minister and, months later, his successor. Once again, the movement’s hawks threatened to usurp the ideological direction of the movement. Despite statements from Banna denouncing the militant wing’s violent tactics and his concerted efforts to reverse the decree outlawing the group, control of Brotherhood slipped out of his fingers. In February, 1949, Banna would be assassinated by military police, likely on the orders of the Prime Minister. Although the organization was able to regain a degree of legitimacy in the next several years, the advent of the Free Officers Coup in 1952 brought a renewed level of unrest to the Egyptian political scene. In 1954, an attempted assassination of

115 *Risalat bayn al-ams wa’l-Yawm*, p. 28-31
President Gamal Abd al-Nasser was blamed on the Brotherhood. The movement was once again outlawed, its leadership was arrested, and the group was subjected to an unprecedented level of repression over the next several years.

**Sayyid Qutb, the Ideology of Violence, and the Threat of Fragmentation** –

The assassination of Banna and increased repression by the Egyptian state convinced many members of the Brotherhood that peaceful political integration into the Egyptian state was an illusion. Early attempts by the Muslim Brotherhood to enter into the political arena in the late 30s and early 40s had been repeatedly blocked by the Egyptian government, and now the Brotherhood had been outlawed completely. Banna’s assassination threw the movement into further chaos as Brotherhood members were now no longer receiving coherent frames from a unified leadership. Now, the Brotherhood was split between several camps – a conservative group headed by Banna’s brother, a militant faction led by Salah al-Ashmawi, and a moderate faction who favored continued efforts to legitimize the Brotherhood and participate in parliamentary politics.

Hassan al-Hudaydi emerged as a compromise successor to Banna during this time, but was increasingly unable to control the Brotherhood’s disparate factions. Despite the Brotherhood’s enthusiasm at the success of the Free Officer’s Coup in 1952, the new Egyptian regime soon renewed state repression against the Brotherhood and other Islamists, arresting many of their members and shutting down their institutions. As such, many Brotherhood members were increasingly drawn towards extremism and began to re-build the secret apparatus without Hubaydi’s knowledge. Meanwhile, a Brotherhood scholar named Sayyid Qutb began espousing a violent ideology which was increasingly attractive to more hawkish members of the
Brotherhood. Qutb’s popular frames, many of which were laid out in his work *Milestones*, included the notion that Egypt was in a state of *jahiliya* (pre-Islamic ignorance), and that the only solution was to submit to *al-hakimiyya* (the total sovereignty of God). The combination of these two frames became the new ideological structure by which hawkish members of the Brotherhood were able to streamline complex political phenomena. Qutb’s framing on a political prognosis for the ills of *jahiliya* was simple – the leaders of repressive Muslim states were *takfiri* (unbelievers) and it was acceptable to struggle against such governments in order to bring about God’s will.

Qutb’s ideology of violence against fellow Egyptians was a marked departure from the prognoses of Banna and other early Brotherhood members. While Banna was not opposed to the concept of using violence against the British, Zionists, or other external powers, he had always avoided armed struggle against the Egyptian state itself, and had denounced attacks against Egyptian targets. But Qutb’s new frames resonated with Brotherhood members who had been repressed by the Nasser regime. However, many members of the Brotherhood’s founding generation were growing increasingly concerned that Qutb was hijacking the movement. As Alison Pargeter notes,

“While Qutb’s radical thinking was making waves in Islamic circles around the world, it also prompted a major crisis within the Brotherhood as the more traditional older generation rejected his new ideas, which rang alarm bells for them….some of the brothers who were in prison with Qutb were not happy with his ‘separatist and confrontational’ ideas, believing they undermined the philosophy of the Brotherhood.”

Hubaydi’s hesitant leadership at times further exacerbated the tension between the Brotherhood’s hawks and doves. As previously noted, in order to prevent fragmentation the core

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leadership of a movement has to present constant, coherent, and largely consistent frames to constituents. When a movement’s leadership fails to do this, defections increase and splinter movements start to emerge. Hubaydi initially praised *Milestones*, stating that the work had vindicated his faith in Qutb, who now “embodied the future of the Muslim dawa.” Yet by the mid-1960s, Hubaydi was growing increasingly concerned about the late Qutb’s growing radical influence. In a belated attempt to reframe the extremist debate, Hubaydi wrote a book, *Du’aa La Qadat* (Preachers not Judges). In it, Hubaydi rejected Qutb’s *jahilia* frame, arguing that Egyptian society only needed assistance and education from the Brotherhood – in short, micro-level *da’wa* reform. Qutb’s execution in 1966, coupled with Egyptian state repression of radicals and the Brotherhood senior leadership’s belated attempts to minimize the extremist camp saved the movement from complete fragmentation – however, many of its members defected to groups who espoused a more radical ideology in line with Qutb’s frames. Extremist groups, including *al-Takfir wal-Hijra* were largely composed of Brotherhood defectors, and continued their violent struggle against the Egyptian state over the next several years.

The Qutb-Hubaydi debate is still articulated in the Brotherhood today. Even after Qutb’s execution, his ideas resonated with many “true believers” in the following decades. His frames on violent resistance became the basic means by which the Brotherhood’s hawks have rejected the idea of political pragmatism and coexistence. Further, Qutb’s ideology helped to create an ideological groundwork for movements like Hamas to later be founded. While the official Brotherhood position is to reject the concept of political violence, many hawkish members still revere Qutb’s prognosis of violent action as the best means of achieving lasting reform in Egyptian society.

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A New Generation and the Return to Inclusion –

In 1973, the Muslim Brotherhood elected a new general guide, Umar al-Tilmisani. Under Tilmisani’s leadership, the Brotherhood successfully expanded their efforts to recruit university students by establishing student unions and teacher’s clubs across Egypt.\footnote{Rubin, Barry, ed., The Muslim Brotherhood: The organization and Policies of a Global Islamic Movement. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 43} This recruitment drive marked the start of one of the most significant generational splits experienced by the Brotherhood – by the late 1970s, these students had entered the labor market and continued promoting the Brotherhood’s message through professional trade unions. This new generation of Brotherhood members seized on accusations that the leadership bodies of Egypt’s two dozen professional unions were corrupt and inefficient. Over time, the Brotherhood members were able to mobilize enough support to begin seizing control of the trade unions. The doctor’s union fell under the Brotherhood’s control by 1984, followed by the engineer’s union in 1986 and the pharmacist union in 1988.\footnote{Rubin, Barry, ed., The Muslim Brotherhood: The organization and Policies of a Global Islamic Movement. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 44}

The Brotherhood’s coup in the professional world and influx of a younger generation of members allowed the movement to attempt another foray into the political world. By the mid-1980s, Brotherhood members began forming a number of political parties which, while semi-autonomous from the Brotherhood itself, professed the movement’s reform ideology. Hizb al-Shura was formed in 1986, followed by various attempts to form a party called Hizb al-Islah, and Hizb al-Amal in 1995.\footnote{Rubin, Barry, ed., The Muslim Brotherhood: The organization and Policies of a Global Islamic Movement. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 45} However, the Egyptian government repeatedly turned down their applications to set up a political party. Brotherhood members responded by forming a number of
political alliances, most of which were with secular parties or former rivals. The Brotherhood ran candidates on the Wafd ticket in the 1984 elections and won eight parliamentary seats, and allied with the Labor and Liberal parties in the 1987 elections, winning 36 seats.

During these years, one of the Brotherhood’s most famous slogans emerged as a popular rallying call, “al-Islam huwa al-hall” (Islam is the solution). The frame played very well among religious supporters and among potential recruits living below the poverty line. Those who had experienced the failed policies of the Nasserist era sought an alternative platform for the economic revival of Egypt. The Brotherhood’s financial ability to successfully run clinics, schools, mosques, and social welfare programs gave the organization an excellent track record from which to claim they could revive the Egyptian economy. The group further improved its image following a 1992 Cairo earthquake that left thousands homeless – while the government provided inadequate and slow services to the disaster victims, the Brotherhood quickly mobilized its urban and rural branches to provide timely disaster relief throughout much of Egypt. The Brotherhood also tapped into popular sentiments by emphasizing peaceful change and reform rather than radical extremism embodied by rival organizations like Gama’a al-Islamiyya. According to an opinion poll conducted in 1994, 86% of Egyptians believed that Islamist groups who resorted to violence did not benefit the country while 73% of respondents said nonviolent Muslim groups did benefit Egyptian society.\(^{123}\)

The Brotherhood was able to successfully capitalize on their image as an efficient and socially-minded organization to increase their showing at the Egyptian polls over the course of the late 80s and early 90s. Despite the ability of the government to conduct widespread voter fraud, the Mubarak regime was content to allow the Muslim Brotherhood just enough seats in

parliament to convince them they had a stake in the system. This process, which Diamond defines as “the trap of liberalized autocracy” was an effective means by which an authoritarian dictatorship could control extremist movements which attempt a foray into politics. However, by 1992, the growing influence of the Brotherhood and the failure of the 1992 Algerian elections convinced Mubarak to end this experiment and instead curb the influence of the Brotherhood and other Islamist groups. The government moved against professional and student unions in an attempt to purge Islamists from their leadership, and increasingly targeted social programs associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. By the mid-90s, the Brotherhood had lost control of most of its professional unions. A campaign of arrests and voter fraud further weakened the status of the Brotherhood, and by the 1995 elections the government was able to seize over 94% of the seats in parliament. By the end of the year, the Brotherhood had lost all of its parliamentary seats.

Once again, the perceived failure of inclusionary politics spurned another resurgence of the exclusionary old guard. Internal divisions over the next decade would see the Brotherhood once again torn between two camps – the professional middle class moderates who, since the 1970s, had called for political participation, improved women’s rights, and cooperation with secularists and Coptic Christians, and the old guard who continued to be distrustful of political pluralism.

In 1996, the Brotherhood’s leader Abu al-Nasr died and was replaced by Mustafa Mash’hur, a hardliner member of the Brotherhood’s “secret apparatus.” Mash’hur’s election threatened the inclusionary reform progress of the 1970s generation. Mash’hur’s exclusionary

statements, including his remarks that the Copts should be relegated to dhimmi status and be forced to pay tribute to the ruling Muslims of Egypt, threatened the more moderate image the Brotherhood had cultivated for decades. With the hardliners back in control, the possibility of fragmentation once again endangered the Brotherhood’s position in Egyptian politics. Without Mash’hur’s knowledge, a prominent contingent of the Brotherhood’s 1970s generation joined with several Coptic politicians to form Wasat (Center), a new political party with a civic platform emphasizing pluralism. The Brotherhood’s old guard leadership attempted to derail the new party’s efforts, stating that the “time was not right” for the Brotherhood to engage in participatory politics.125

The Brotherhood’s inclusionary efforts largely stalled for the next several years. It wasn’t until the death of Mash’hur and his successor and the election of Mahdi Akif in 2004 that the Brotherhood renewed its efforts to participate in elections. In March 2004, Akif held a press conference at which a new manifesto was presented – in it, the Brotherhood called for religious, social, political, economic, and cultural reforms, to improve the relationship with Copts, and to improve the status of women.126 Despite continued tension between hawks and doves in the Brotherhood, the movement was now able to reassert an inclusionary path towards political participation. The Brotherhood’s efforts at political inclusion had largely stalled due to state repression – from Banna’s early efforts to involve the movement in politics in the late 1930s and early 1940s, to Nasserite repression in the 1950s, to the trap of liberalized autocracy envisioned by Mubarak in the 1980s and 1990s. Every failure of political inclusion had given rise to a


resurgence of the exclusionary ideology embodied in the hawkish camp. But by the turn of the millennium, international pressure on the Mubarak regime gradually led to a return of the government’s liberalized autocracy strategy, setting the stage for a younger generation of inclusive-minded Brothers to once again steer the movement towards inclusionary politics.

The Muslim Brotherhood Triumphant

In the run-up to the 2005 parliamentary elections, thousands of Brotherhood members participated in pro-democracy demonstrations against the Mubarak regime’s attempts to limit oppositionist participation in the government. Brotherhood candidates were once again forced to run as independents in the election. However, the candidates’ use of popular Brotherhood frames, most notably “Islam is the Solution” made them easily identifiable to potential supporters. Yet the Brotherhood’s candidates also engaged in the act of speech distancing in order to curry favor among other segments of the population. The Brotherhood launched what some have since called the “charm offensive.” Candidates stressed that conditions for Coptic Christians would be far better under the Brotherhood’s leadership. Brotherhood leaders also distanced themselves from Mash’hur’s controversial remarks a decade earlier by assuring Copts that they would be “fully citizens, not dhimma.” Some members of the Brotherhood went so far as to suggest they would end the unpopular church building permit system which Copts felt was unfair and discriminatory.127

Brotherhood leaders were savvy enough to engage in speech distancing on an international stage as well. The group formed its first English language website and launched a

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127 Osman, Tarek, Egypt on the Brink, Yale University Press, 2010, p.101
campaign to fight Western misconceptions about the Brotherhood. In a Guardian article titled “No Need to be Afraid of Us,” Muslim Brotherhood Vice President Khairat el-Shatir stated,

“No single political, religious, social or cultural group should be excluded from Egypt's political life. The objective must be to end the monopoly of government by a single party and boost popular engagement in political activity...we would hope to contribute to achieving significant political and constitutional reforms: in particular, to remove restrictions imposed by the regime on political activity and give the parliament a much bigger say than it has now. Without real powers to question the executive, parliament will remain a mere facade....we would hope to contribute to greatly needed social, cultural and economic reforms. Such reforms can take place only once the grip of the state executive is regulated by an independent legislature and independent judiciary.

The success of the Muslim Brotherhood should not frighten anybody: we respect the rights of all religious and political groups. So much damage has been inflicted on the country over the past century because of despotism and corruption that it would be impossible to embark on wider political reform and economic development without first repairing the damage to our basic institutions. Free and fair democratic elections are the first step along the path of reform toward a better future for Egypt and the entire region. We simply have no choice today but to reform.”

When the votes were finally tallied, the Brotherhood had won 20% of the seats in parliament and now constituted the largest single opposition bloc. Alternative opposition parties failed to gain more than a handful of seats in the parliament. Despite widespread voter fraud on behalf of the Mubarak regime, the Brotherhood had gained a significant presence in the parliament and its more moderate members were now able to once again assert an inclusionary path for the organization.

Yet the Brotherhood’s path over the next several years was not an easy one – thousands of members were arrested by state security and potential candidates were regularly blocked from running in local elections. By the parliamentary elections of 2010, the Mubarak regime attempted to undercut the Brotherhood’s parliamentary presence once and for all. Widespread voter fraud and repression cost the Brotherhood all but one of its parliamentary seats. However, the public realized the elections for the sham they were. As one Brotherhood spokesperson put it,

128 El-Shatir, Khairat, “No Need to be Afraid of Us.” The Guardian, November 22, 2005: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/nov/23/comment.mainsection
“We lost seats and a much deserved representation in the parliament. But we won people's love and support and a media battle that exposed [irregularities in] the elections.”  

The Brotherhood’s exile from the political stage did not last long. The advent of the Arab Spring afforded the Brotherhood a national stage from which to become the dominant party in Egypt. While the Egyptian revolution was carried out by oppositionists of all types and ideological backgrounds, the Brotherhood was the only oppositionist group in Egypt which was highly organized, well funded, and recognizable to average citizens. Yet the Brotherhood also seemed to maintain a low profile during the early days of the revolution. Some old guard members even attempted to limit the participation of younger members. The Brotherhood eventually became more assertive in its participation and by February, 2011 was calling for the end of the Mubarak regime and the formation of a national unity government.

Yet tension between the party’s exclusionary elements remained during this period. Dissent between inclusionary members and some members of the conservative old guard even led to a wave of defections after senior leadership in the Brotherhood decided not to field a candidate in the presidential elections. Several younger members of the Brotherhood broke away to form a new party, “Egyptian Current,” which they emphasized would be a secular party, and inclusive of women and Christians. Dr. Abdul Momen aboul Fotouh, a prominent member of the Brotherhood who defected to form the party, stated “We are convinced that Egypt is currently in need of political parties that rise beyond specific ideologies. The Egyptian mainstream political

current should have a real voice in the country’s politics.” The party adopted the slogan “Freedom, Building, and Pioneering.”

The defection of a number of Brotherhood youths to “Egyptian Current” evidenced an ongoing debate within the ranks of the organization. Many of the group’s millennials had in previous years attempted to carve out an ideological space unique from the movement’s older members. The new Brotherhood youths turned to blogs, online forums, and other social mediums to express their beliefs. These youths crafted their own set of frames during this time – they supported constitutional reform, equal rights for citizens, and free and fair elections. At a time when many members of the Brotherhood looked on participatory politics (the benefits of which were constrained by state repression) with skepticism, these youths embraced the possibility of engaging with the state, fielding parliamentary candidates, and reforming Egyptian society slowly from within.

The Brotherhood’s leadership was initially unable to adopt a set of consistent frames about the group’s direction amidst quickly changing events on the ground. Brotherhood leaders at first refused to get actively involved in street demonstrations. When the group did begin encouraging participation in rallies at Tahir Square and elsewhere, it did so almost reluctantly. Younger members sought a more dynamic approach and defections increased as many members flocked to groups which offered proactive framing and encouraged active demonstrations against


the state. As many as 2000 Brotherhood members defected during the first few months of unrest.  

The Brotherhood’s core leadership soon responded to growing tension in its ranks by fully embracing party politics. The Brotherhood formed a new party, Freedom and Justice, and participated in the parliamentary elections staggered throughout November, 2011 to January, 2012. Brotherhood candidates during this election were clearly aware of the need for speech distancing in order to increase their share of the popular vote. While the party continued to use its classic slogan “Islam is the Solution,” it also advocated a largely secular reform program. Brotherhood members distanced themselves from the party’s previous, controversial platform that women and Christians should not hold senior offices in the government. The Brotherhood now said senior posts should be open to all Egyptian citizens. The Brotherhood also proclaimed that its new Freedom and Justice Party would be open to any Egyptian who agreed with the movement’s platform. In May, 2011, Rafiq Habib, a Coptic Evangelical Church member and intellectual was appointed as the movement’s vice-president.

The group’s speech distancing worked. When the votes were tallied, the Brotherhood had taken 47.2% of the vote. The more radical Islamist party Al-Nour received 24.3%. Despite periodic attempts by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and other old guard members of the Mubarak regime to limit the power of the Brotherhood, the group was able to make further progress in the presidential elections – Brotherhood member Mohamed Morsi was elected. Morsi’s acceptance remarks were notable for his pledge to represent all Egyptians, and his declared support for the rights of Coptic Christians. Morsi and other members of the Brotherhood have continually attempted to reassure Egyptians, and the international community

writ large, that Egypt under Brotherhood leadership will continue to be respectful of women and minorities, and that party politics will continue to be inclusionary. Yet the Brotherhood is not without its detractors, and the success of its inclusionary experiment and overall future is still very uncertain.

Conclusions –

A number of western commentators over the past year expressed a great deal of concern over the ascendancy of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many are worried about the status of women, Christians, and the future of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Israel is also justifiably worried about the future of the Egyptian state and the potential for relations to quickly deteriorate. Yet as this dissertation has argued, the Brotherhood’s commitment to and success with the inclusionary path is likely to further commit the organization to participatory party politics. Any significant betrayal of the Brotherhood’s inclusionary path would lead to significant defections from its ranks and ultimately fragment the party between hawks and doves.

Yet the inclusionary path is not unidirectional – and if one organization epitomizes the potential for massive ideological shifts and defections, it’s the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the organization’s previous failures at fully committing to the inclusionary path are largely the result of authoritarian repression. Limited Brotherhood forays into participatory politics were consistently blocked by the Egyptian state, and this repression emboldened the group’s exclusionary voices and led to significant setbacks towards moderation. Moreover, the inability of the movement’s leadership at various points to offer a consistent vision of the political future of the Brotherhood led to periodic schisms, many of which were centered on the ideological differences between the younger and older generations of the movement. The Brotherhood’s
ascendancy following the Arab Spring will be highly illustrative of how free and full participation in the functions of government can ultimately moderate the more extreme voices of a liberalizing movement.

The Muslim Brotherhood offers an interesting case study of how the shift towards inclusion can be a long and difficult process for an organization. And the Brotherhood offers us another important lesson – unless a movement’s leadership is able to offer a continuous and largely consistent set of frames, lower level members will often be encouraged to defect to other groups. The Brotherhood’s various experiments with inclusionary politics caused strain among its more hawkish members. Repeatedly, the inability of senior Brotherhood members to co-opt these hawks led to mass defections, internal strife, and threatened to weaken the relevancy of the organization. The Brotherhood repeatedly faced two possible fates – moderation or fragmentation. In our final chapter, we will examine how this process occurs for all movements which start down the path of inclusion.
Chapter 7: Conclusion – Moderation or Fragmentation

In November of 1997, several members of the Irish Republican Army met at a small country farmhouse to discuss their leadership’s decision to participate in the Northern Ireland peace process. A month prior at an IRA General Army Convention, Quartermaster General Michael McKeivitt and several of his political allies had denounced the leadership’s decision to abide by a ceasefire with the British, and had announced their resignations from the executive council. McKeivitt soon invited several high ranking allies and low-level members to discuss the abrupt change in the modus operandi of their resistance organization. After a heated exchange in which the disaffected members agreed that the leadership had betrayed the liberation goals of the movement, the body decided to form a new organization which would carry on the resistance – the Real Irish Republican Army. The Real IRA began recruiting from the ranks of their former associates, seeking out those who weren’t yet ready to put down their weapons. The movement soon launched a renewed terror campaign which aimed to disrupt the peace process and marginalize the newly moderated ranks of the IRA.

The story of the Real IRA emphasizes the dangers inherent to the abrupt moderation of an organization. The transition from an exclusionary movement to an inclusionary political party is by no means easy, and many groups do not have the stamina to successfully make the change. As a result of the tensions inherent to this process, many organizations become schizophrenic in nature – internal splits develop between hawks and doves, military political wings, religious moderates and extremists, or younger and older generations, and soon the organization lacks the clear, unified message it once projected to supporters. When an organization’s members are torn between past goals and future trajectories, there is a danger the group will fragment among
ideological lines. While this fragmentation does not necessarily mean the end of the group itself, it does have significant implications for the success of the movement’s inclusionary path.

If a transition is to be successful, strong leadership is needed in order to contain contrarian movements within the group. When leaders adjust their framing to attract a larger segment of the populace, they must also stay true to enough of their core goals so as to not alienate their base. In the case of Hamas and Hizballah, both organizations have balanced an increase in inclusion framing with a preservation of the resistance frames which initially defined their organization. This balancing can be a precarious process – movements which do not sufficiently prepare their followers for the inclusion transition can face mass defections among their ranks, an internal coup, a marginalization of those leaders that support inclusion, or a schism resulting in two movements – one moderate, one extreme.

Scholars of these movements face an additional problem when analyzing their trajectories. As an organization moves away from its exclusionary phase of identity formation into a more inclusionary phase of outreach and recruitment, there is a high potential for moderation to occur. However, it remains difficult to determine if an organization’s leaders are sincere in their inclusionary language. Is this new found effort to soften exclusionary discourse merely a ruse to buy time, votes and new recruits, or a profound shift in the ideological orientation of a movement’s leaders?

While permanent moderation is by no means the inevitable outcome of speech distancing and political inclusion, the potential for a major ideological shift towards a more liberal political and social outlook is far greater once a group has shifted towards more inclusive rhetoric. This can happen in at least three significant ways – 1) through the social-psychological processes known as self-perception theory and cognitive dissonance, 2) through simple demographic
changes in the group’s composition following inclusive outreach, and 3) through existing theories of political inclusion which posit the existence of a socialization function of participatory politics which fundamentally moderates illiberal groups.

**Cognitive Theories of Moderation** –

Social psychologists have long questioned the effect of contradictory beliefs on attitudinal change. Early efforts to trace this process led to the development of the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, which postulates that people seek to reduce the uncomfortable feelings accompanying the presence of contradictory ideas by justifying or rationalizing their opinions or by changing their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors to accommodate the divergence. A similar brand of scholarship, Self-Perception Theory, argues that when individuals hold conflicting beliefs they look to their own behavior in an effort to determine what their beliefs really are.

Cognitive dissonance can affect a group at both the membership and the leadership levels. Leon Festinger originally coined the phrase in his 1956 work, *When Prophecy Fails*, which examined the effect of belief disconfirmation on a group of cultists which had prophesized the imminent end of the world at the hand of extra terrestrials. When the world failed to end as predicted, many members justified their cognitive dissonance by concluding the date had merely been delayed. As a result, the movement suffered only a limited defection of its members. A similar phenomenon took place in 2011 among the followers of messianic preacher Harold


Camping. Camping relieved a number of his followers of their life-savings by predicting the world would end on May 21. When the world did not end as Camping had predicted, he refined his date to October 20th and maintained a significant number of his followers. It was only after his prophecy failed a second time that Camping himself publicly gave up his role as prophet. These two cases offer us interesting examples of how individuals in a group will seek to minimize dissonance. In both occurrences, members refused to accept a high dissonance path (e.g. conclude that their prophet is false), and instead rationalized away failed predictions, thereby maintaining trust in their leaders.

This same phenomenon can occur at the leadership level as well. Most commonly, leaders will try to minimize cognitive dissonance by emphasizing that choices which led them to a particular path were correct. This can be a particularly useful skill when leaders commit the organization to a controversial course of action. The act of minimizing dissonance accompanying individual choices has been demonstrated repeatedly. In a series of experiments conducted by Jack Brehm, a number of test subjects were asked to rate two appliances and were then offered a choice of which item they would like to take home as a gift. When asked to rate the items a second time, participants significantly increased their rating of the item they had chosen to take home and significantly lowered their rating of the item they left behind.¹³⁶ Brehm’s experiment is meant to demonstrate how individuals tend to cope with a difficult choice. Similar work on cognitive dissonance, as well as research on “choice-supportive bias” shows that people tend to make past choices seem better than they actually were. This has interesting implications for leaders of an organization who commit to an inclusionary path. If external, structural changes

induce an organization’s leaders to fundamentally change a group’s goals (for example, to enter into politics), those leaders will become increasingly induced to accept that decision as justified, even when facing short-term setbacks.

Self-perception theory may also hold an answer to why a group’s leaders may moderate over time. The theory posits that people develop their attitudes by looking to their own behavior. In this paradigm, attitudes come from observing one’s behavior rather than attitudes determining how one behaves. As Deborah Larson notes,

“Whenever internal cues or feelings are ambiguous and difficult to label, the person is no better off than an outside observer, who must also rely on external evidence to make some judgment about that individual’s private beliefs or emotions. Deprived of any access to their cognitive process, people trying to figure out their attitudes on a particular subject will often use their actions as a guide to their inner states.”

A leader who by circumstance starts his movement down a path of inclusion must change his behavior in accordance – he must adopt a new set of frames and publically convey these ideas in speeches, interviews, and in the organization’s public statements. Self-perception theory would argue that even if the leader in question held lukewarm feelings about political inclusion, his behavior would ultimately inform his beliefs. The leader would eventually adopt the inclusionary frames he has been disseminating as his own closely held viewpoint. In essence, the wolf in sheep’s clothing would eventually come to see himself as a sheep. This change does not happen overnight. Rather, it is a slow, deliberate process in which an individual’s beliefs gradually evolve over time.

Both self-perception theory and the theory of cognitive dissonance assume that attitude change comes from behavior change, although each theory disagrees on how active the


individual is in this process. Self-perception theorists would argue that an individual is largely passive when constructing his identity, whereas cognitive dissonance theorists believe the individual is highly active in rationalizing why he does what he does. Interestingly, while both theories disagree on the path to identity construction, both would offer an identical prediction of how our hypothetical leader would reconstruct his belief system. Under cognitive dissonance theory, a leader who adopts inclusionary discourse rationalizes his choice with previously held contradictory beliefs and will increasingly buy into the validity of his new course of action. In self-perception theory, the leader’s adoption of a new set of behaviors (in this case inclusionary discourse) gradually affects and ultimately defines his beliefs.

Given our analysis thus far of evolving rhetoric in exclusionary movements, these social-psychological approaches offer one means of analyzing the effect that changing discourse has at the group level. The movements under examination here face cognitive dissonance on at least two significant levels – the movement’s leaders must commit to an attitudinal change towards inclusion and the group’s individual members must adopt that same ideological shift. For leaders, the initial decision to enter into politics may only be tactical. However, those leaders will increasingly buy into the new framework they are espousing. Similarly, so long as leaders offer a clearly defined explanation for why a movement is shifting its organizational priorities, individual members (many of whom have devoted years of their life to the organization) are apt to trust the group’s new course of action at least in the short-term. However, if a leadership adopts radical changes too quickly, dissonance among the organization’s true believers is maximized, and the group faces the potential for sudden mass defections to organizations which proffer more hawkish frames. Therefore, for this transition to be successful leaders must endeavor to minimize the potential for cognitive dissonance. Since inclusionary politics may
directly contradict the established modus operandi of an organization, a leadership must be careful to adjust its framing gradually, preserving as many of the group’s original goals as possible.

When entering into the political arena, a number of organizations offer a frame which justifies this shift as a strategic goal aimed at increasing the profile of their movement and its objectives. Political participation, in this sense, becomes another battlefield – a movement can continue attempts to achieve its goals through physical force while also leveraging its power in the parliamentary chamber to the same end. This contrapuntal strategy becomes the method by which an organization can shift its priorities while also retaining membership.

This process is understandably confusing to the outside observer, particularly one who refuses to trust the movement in question. The U.S., Israel, and many other states are thus unlikely to allow this political evolution to play itself out – particularly if the organization in question refuses to give up violence as a strategy. Thus, when Hamas transitioned more fully towards the political process in 2004 and won a parliamentary majority in 2006, most western states refused to deal with the organization unless it renounced violence and recognized Israel. From Hamas’ perspective, it had all but ended active military resistance during that same period – to recognize Israel or renounce violence would have created a level of cognitive dissonance among its members which would have torn the movement apart.

Instead, Hamas approached inclusionary politics during this period in a much more cautious way. Hamas’s leaders have been adept at changing the modus operandi of the organization in seemingly contradictory ways, but they must exercise caution when doing so. As such, leaders have been effective at utilizing particular cultural frames, most notably sabr (patience), as a means of justifying a wide variety of ideological shifts and tactical setbacks
while maintaining its core ideological commitments. The movement accordingly justified its
decision to enter into politics (a decision which was highly controversial internally) through the
use of the sabr frame. The resistance against Israel, its leadership argued, would not cease –
party politics was simply another means of achieving the movement’s goals. And since these
goals were not likely to be achieved through use of force alone, leaders argued that political
participation and sabr was needed.

Other groups are able to more easily justify the inclusionary change to their supporters
due to a sudden change or opening in the political realm. For example, after the signing of the
Taif Agreement, Hizballah’s leadership was forced almost overnight to rethink their
demonization of rival political and religious spheres of power and began to speak about
Lebanese nationalism and multiculturalism. Hizballah’s inclusionary shift was particularly
dangerous for the organization since it occurred so suddenly. Because of the short timeframe for
change, the potential for cognitive dissonance among its members was far greater. Had the shift
occurred in peace time without context, the organization would have surely split. However, since
Hizballah’s new program occurred alongside the end of Lebanon’s bloody civil war and because
the organization was able to preserve its commitment to fight the external “Israeli” enemy, it was
able to minimize dissonance and retain its members.

Dissonance in the Muslim Brotherhood has at times reached such a high level that
defection is common – generational splits resulting from divergent ideological trends have
occurred repeatedly in the movement. Because the older generation of leadership could not
successfully adopt an ideological outlook for the organization which took into account the
priorities of younger members, the Muslim Brotherhood has had a significant number of
defectors from its ranks over the years. Repeatedly, these younger members have not been able
to rationalize their goals with the strategy and outlook of the larger Brotherhood. As a result of this dissonance, lower-level members have often split off to join or form separate movements and political parties. These new groups are more consistent with the belief system of these individuals, which ultimately minimizes the uncomfortable feeling of belonging to a group which does not advocate what you believe.

These case studies offer us interesting examples of the cognitive theory of moderation. Politically inclusive language may merely be a strategic decision by a movement’s leaders and does not necessarily suggest the presence of a major ideological shift towards permanent moderation. Yet even if moderating rhetoric was merely a ruse for organizations seeking short term political gains while maintaining illiberal beliefs under the surface, social psychology offers one method by which we can analyze the effect of inclusive language on leaders and individual members. Leaders of illiberal movements who justify resistance and exclusionary politics while later justifying political inclusion and tolerance face a problem of dissonance for which they need to adapt their belief system. Similarly, most individual members who have devoted time and effort to an organization are much more likely to rationalize inconsistent data and limited organization shifts rather than defect outright. When taking account of their newfound moderate language and politically inclusive policies, social psychology demonstrates that individuals will often update their belief system to match their current behavior, thus moderating the group in significant ways over time.

Demographic Changes –

The second major way through which organizations can potentially moderate at the political inclusion stage is through simple demographic changes. The argument is relatively
straightforward – if a movement starts out as exclusionary with a limited number of highly socialized recruits, there is little room for alternative viewpoints, strategies, or dialogue. The organization by its very nature is hierarchical and insular. When an organization decides to broaden its recruitment to its larger society or engage in the political process, it begins to adapt its rhetoric to be more politically inclusive and approachable to the general public. If this strategy is successful, the organization will suddenly be faced with an influx of new recruits or sympathizers – individuals who were attracted to the organization based on its new platform. The organization in question would therefore have to maintain a degree of consistency with that platform if it hopes to maintain support from these new recruits.

Many individuals who support Hamas, Hizballah, or the Muslim Brotherhood in their political orientation have done so because of their political platforms for change, reform, social assistance, and nationalism, not merely because of their symbolic resistance to an external enemy or their perceived Islamic piousness. Should any of these parties renege on their political platforms they would lose significant support among their base. Hezbollah, after all, depends on political alliances with moderate Muslim and Christians, the Muslim Brotherhood depends heavily on secular or moderately religious individuals, and a number of Hamas’ politicians and supporters are secular, moderate technocrats.

It is important to note that public opinion has always remained of paramount importance to these organizations since they are highly dependent on support from the population to maintain their relevance. When applying this process to Hamas and Hizballah during their more active phases of terrorism, Robert A. Pape discussed the “social logic of terrorism” – communal support enables terrorist groups to replenish membership, is essential to enable operatives to avoid detection, surveillance and elimination by hostile security forces, and is necessary to
promote a culture of martyrdom in which an individual is encourage to carry out an attack.\(^{139}\)

When these movements shifted towards inclusion, they became dependent on the population in a different way – active public support meant more votes, more parliamentary seats, and ultimately more power over the state. Yet in order to maintain this popular support, these movements must stay true to a platform which is ultimately uniting, not divisive. Over time, any organization which started out as exclusionary faces a significant problem with inclusionary recruitment – new recruits expect a commitment to inclusionary frames which leaders promised. Jillian Schwedler writes about the ultimate effect of this phenomenon – even if a movement’s leaders haven’t fully committed to moderation, their range of action is constrained. Further, they become discursively trapped by what their base expects them to say:

“The appearance of moderation may have little to do with whether political actors have actually become more moderate, and it may have everything to do with elevating certain political trends or disadvantaging others. That is, inclusion may not turn radicals into moderates or revolutionaries into reformers, but rather deny radicals a large support base.”\(^{140}\)

While a recruitment influx can constrain the spectrum of what leaders say and do in the short term, such a change in the demographics of the group can also have significant long-term changes. Over time, this new cadre of recruits may come to dominate the internal dynamics of the movement, particularly over the course of decades as older generations of leaders die off and younger cadres rise up to take their place. The case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is illustrative of the effect of generational change – members of the Brotherhood in the 1940s-1980s were committed to acts of political violence against the Egyptian state and the movement’s secret military wing was possibly involved in the assassination of Egyptian Prime

\(^{139}\) Pape, Robert A., *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Random House, 2005, p. 81

Minister Mahmoud Pasha in 1948 and a number of other Egyptian officials. By the late 1980s and 1990s a new generation of Muslim Brothers sought more active engagement in the political system and the expansion of da’wa efforts to reform society from within. In recent years, young members in their 20s and 30s took to the internet to advocate major institutional reform of the Egyptian state. Young bloggers pushed for the expansion of human rights and the formation of a new constitution which safeguarded freedom of expression for all Egyptian citizens. Many of these generational splits were laid bare during the Arab Spring, when internal splits in the Brotherhood developed between the old guard and younger members.

Generational splits were also a leading cause for the formation of both Hizballah and Hamas. Younger members of both of these organizations, dissatisfied with the direction that their movements were currently moving, sought more active and violent resistance against the state of Israel rather than relying on internal social change through da’wa efforts. In both cases this disagreement eventually led to the splintering of the former movements (Amal and the Palestinian Ikhwan) and the creation of new organizations, Hizballah and Hamas. The direction any movement takes is thus highly dependent on the dominant ideological trends among separate demographic components of the organization, and ultimately which of these sub-groups is able to successfully take the reins of leadership.

Thus, in the long-term demographic changes can affect the ideological direction (and ultimate viability) of a movement. In the short-term, however, demographic changes in a movement are most clearly evidenced in the need for leaders to stay consistent with their

inclusionary promises. Earlier we discussed how leaders must minimize dissonance when committing to inclusion lest their previous base defect. Yet leaders must also minimize dissonance once the inclusionary transition has been accomplished. If leaders default on their inclusionary promises, they will lose a significant portion of their new base - ultimately, this concern can commit leaders to an almost inescapable process of continuing the process of moderation.

Inclusion-Moderation –

The third possible means by which an illiberal movement may moderate at the political inclusion stage involves the socialization function of participating in government. Known as the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis, this trend in scholarship argues that radical movements which participate in government learn the value of tolerance and pluralism over time. As Jillian Schwedler notes,

“...The challenge is to channel dissenting voices and competing groups into state-controlled spaces of political contestation by providing opposition voices with immediate incentives (e.g., legal status, the right to publish a newspaper, and the ability to put forth alternative political agendas) and the promise of future political gains (e.g., access to political power through elections)...political inclusion leads ideological actors to redefine what strategies and practices are justifiable, and in ways that are more inclusive and tolerant (and thus less ideological)...How do shifts in the imaginable and the justifiable affect actors and their practices in politically consequential ways?"143

Inclusion-Moderation literature argues that over time political participants are forced to engage in a dialogue with rival ideologues – at the end of the day, the process of horse trading helps participants to understand the perspective of their rivals. Ultimately, participants are engaged in a highly structured process of interaction which has the potential to reshape ideas,

beliefs, and political agendas and largely suppresses intolerant and radical agendas (Bermeo, 1992; Wickham, 2002). Thus, the very act of participating in politics becomes a mechanism for constraining radicalization and promoting pluralism.

Academic work on this phenomenon has traced how a number of movements have fundamentally shifted the direction of their ideology over time due to this socialization process. Schwedler argues that scholarship on the inclusion-moderation hypothesis tends to focus on one of three phenomena: 1) the strategic behavior of moderates and radicals working within particular structural constraints; 2) attitudinal evidence about varying levels of toleration between inclusive and exclusive political actors; 3) the evolution of a political actor in terms of her actions, beliefs, and objectives before and after political inclusion.¹⁴⁴

Unfortunately, scholarship on the transition of individual political actors though this process is scarce. It is exceedingly hard to psychoanalyze Mish’al, Nasrallah, or other leaders to determine how their specific beliefs have evolved over time. It is far more common for scholars to analyze how individuals in general may change their beliefs due to particular constraints or openings over time:

“In short, the actor’s ontology is variable: his or her objectives, interests, will and thus identity are caught up in a process of continual reconfiguration, a process that is intimately related to the constant reconfiguration of the network of interactions in which he or she is involved.”¹⁴⁵

All three of the case studies under examination in this dissertation demonstrate strong evidence of inclusion-moderation trends. Perhaps the best example of this theory can be seen in Hizballah’s interactions in the Lebanese political sphere since the early 90s. Hizballah’s “Lebonisation” process following the Taif Accords was a concerted effort by the group to find a


place in the new political realities of the country. Ever since this period, Hizballah has been forced to engage in a direct political dialogue with its rivals – many of whom the group had been at war with during the Lebanese civil war. By 2012, Hizballah’s number of Sunni and Christian parliamentary allies had grown 300% from the 1990s.

While this shift in parliamentary allies is direct evidence of Hizballah’s efforts to inclusively reach out to other sectarian groups, it also suggests that the group was becoming increasingly reliant on these allies to hold its coalition together. Hizballah now had to keep members of its sectarian coalition happy through horse trading of political positions and the provision of resources. A particularly difficult member of the coalition, leader of the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, Michel Aoun, went so far as to demand 11 seats on the cabinet of the new government in 2011, enough seats to veto any decision made by the government. Aoun, whose votes in parliament were necessary to confirm the new government, also demanded several key ministries and a number of influential appointments throughout the bureaucracy. Hizballah also had to satisfy demands from Druze leader Walid Jumblatt (whose votes in parliament were also necessary to appoint a new prime minister) and several other influential Sunni allies in the 8 March coalition. In short, Hizballah is unable to simply impose its will on its allies – it must constantly negotiate with the provincial demands of its sectarian allies and establish a power-sharing arrangement which keeps all sides happy.

Since its birth, Hamas has been consistently forced to work closely with its main rival Fatah, and more broadly the entire PLO. Hamas’ charter is lined with numerous references to the noble struggle of the PLO, but also seeks to put forth the idea that Hamas’ plan for Palestinian liberation, which included Islamic piousness and the provision of social welfare services, was fundamentally superior to its secular rival. Although Hamas did not always agree with the
trajectory of PLO efforts in the 1990s, it would typically allow Arafat enough leeway to conduct negotiations with the Israelis. And while Hamas did attempt to work as a spoiler to peace at various points, it refrained from attacking PLO targets directly, even in the midst of sustained Israeli efforts to encourage Arafat to launch security campaigns against Hamas strongholds. Notably, direct Hamas violence against the PLO was almost unheard of until the Gaza conflict in 2007.

When Hamas came to power following the 2006 elections, many feared the group would use its position to impose Shari’a throughout Gaza. Such commentators forgot that Hamas came to power due to broad middle class and secular support, and that the movement primarily ran secular or minimally religious technocrats, not clerics. Hamas also ran on a platform of change and reform, not the implementation of Islamic law – in fact, references to Islam throughout the campaign reached historic lows for the movement. Hamas’ participation in the electoral process during this period was clearly a socializing factor – its leaders knew what slogans and issues the Palestinian people cared about and adapted the movement’s rhetoric in order to be more inclusive of divergent issues.

For the Muslim Brotherhood, the greatest test of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis is yet to come – at the conclusion of parliamentary elections which began in November, 2011 the movement won approximately 37.5% of parliamentary seats, a plurality surpassing any of its political rivals. How the Brotherhood will behave now that it has secured a majority is still to be determined, yet the party will certainly be responsible for the same sort of horse trading common to other parties in their position. Few political groups can impose their own will at ease – instead, structured interaction between groups and with one’s constituency defines the boundaries of appropriate behavior. For the Muslim Brotherhood, limited political participation over the years
has taught them how the political game is played. Interestingly, many scholars have noted President Mubarak had in fact manipulated the idea of “inclusion-moderation” to placate dissent in Egypt – while ensuring his National Democratic Party always secured a majority, Islamists were allowed to gain a small percentage of the vote and just enough of voice in parliament to satisfy some of their demands. Ultimately, Mubarak was offering the opposition just enough power and resources through the political process to keep them happy and socialize them towards working within the system.\textsuperscript{146}

Despite significant shifts towards the inclusion-moderation paradigm, it should again be stressed that the process is not unidirectional – both Hamas and Hizballah have had moments where, if they believed their core interests were threatened, they employed their arms to intimidate political rivals. The two most significant examples of this include a miniature civil war between Fatah and Hamas in 2007 and Hizballah’s armed takeover of portions of Beirut in 2008. Both incidents are reminders that while these groups are content to engage in the democratic process, they retain the ability to utilize force, or the threat of force to put forth their agenda when they believe their core interests have been challenged.

For Hamas, this came soon after securing a majority of parliamentary seats in the 2006 election. In the wake of the election, Israel, the U.S., and other international actors began a campaign to strengthen the power of Fatah and its security services. Many policy makers at the time believed a stronger Fatah military arm could minimize Hamas’ sway over the Gaza strip. For its part, Hamas believed this effort posed a possible existential threat. In December, security forces fired on a Hamas rally in Ramallah, wounding 20. Tensions increased in the following months, reaching a crescendo in June, 2007 when the militias of both Fatah and Hamas took to

the streets in sustained fighting that left more than 100 dead. As a result of the fighting, Hamas consolidated its control over the Gaza Strip, forcing out most senior Fatah members. Fatah, meanwhile, would retain control over most of the West Bank, where its presence was stronger. Tensions between the two groups remain to this day, however a series of reconciliation agreements since 2007 have attempted to craft a way forward to a more unified Palestine. Negotiations towards a unified government have stalled at several points, however renewed negotiations in 2011 and the announcement of a reconciliation agreement suggest new parliamentary and presidential elections could occur at some point in the next year.

Hizballah’s armed struggle against its political rivals took place in mid-2008 following a sustained effort by the rival 14 March coalition to remove a Hizballah ally from his position as security chief at Beirut International Airport, seize control of Hizballah-associated telecommunications lines, and induce Hizballah to give up its arms. Nasrallah declared these moves an effective declaration of war against the organization and its fighters soon took to the streets. The militias of several of Hizballah’s prominent adversaries in the 14 March responded in kind, leading to sustained fighting in Beirut. Hizballah’s forces seized control of large sections of the capital, but soon the fighting spread north to Tripoli and other Sunni and Druze strongholds where Hizballah’s position was less secure. Hizballah’s Sunni militia allies in the north, including the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, were overwhelmed by the militias of 14 March, and the conflict soon threatened to spiral into a full-scale civil war.

During this period Hizballah carefully focused its efforts on combating the militias of its rivals rather than targeting the state in any way. In particular, Hizballah avoided targeting Lebanon’s popular, multi-sectarian military, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Yet despite its willingness to take up arms against the militias of Prime Minister Sa’ad Hariri and others in 14
March, Hizballah did not seek to plunge the country into a greater conflict and soon acquiesced to a LAF request to turn over control of the parts of Beirut it had seized to the military.

Both of these instances of armed conflict evidence how fraught the path of moderation can be. Both Hamas and Hizballah are political parties which have become increasingly socialized by participatory politics, yet they are also organizations with powerful military components. Those military components represent a clear threat to domestic rivals – both Fatah and 14 March have attempted to seriously undercut the ability of Hamas and Hizballah to wage war. After all, both Fatah and 14 March realize that force, or the threat of force, can be used by their rivals to influence the path democracy takes. Yet in both cases, Hamas and Hizballah have only played the violence card when their core interests were threatened by their rivals’ own military component. Essentially, what has to change is not the commitment of these parties to the democratic process, but the trust deficit which exists between rival domestic actors.

While the transition to participatory politics has at times been an uneasy one for exclusionary groups, the cases under examination here demonstrate how increased interaction can induce movements towards better understanding, and working with “the other.” In some cases this process can become messy, as it was in Gaza in 2007 and Lebanon in 2008. Yet for every example of failed interaction, there are subsequent efforts by domestic rivals to work through their differences and reach a political understanding with one another.

Moderation through inclusion in the political process ultimately depends on contextual conditions unique to every organization, however this hypothesis offers one means through which movements like Hamas, Hizballah, and the Muslim Brotherhood have been or may be socialized towards moderation. As Schwedler notes,

“Moderation not of political practices but of worldview – from one ideological in its rigidity to one more open and tolerant of alternative views – can be identified through evidence that, for a particular actor, these and other boundaries have been gradually redrawn to include or at least tolerate a wider diversity of actors, practices,
and narratives. For all political actors, but particularly for ideological actors, adopting new practices requires that one justify that move in terms of one’s core beliefs, goals, and commitments. Choosing to participate in pluralistic political practices may make sense strategically, but to be considered within the realm of the possible, one must be able to justify it in terms of one’s ideology.\textsuperscript{147}

**Fragmentation** –

Although the moderation of exclusionary movements is ultimately possible through social-cognitive or demographic changes, such a transition may ultimately fragment an organization into two or more parts. Interestingly, both Hamas and Hizballah were born in such circumstances. Hamas was formed as a militant offshoot of the Palestinian *ikhwan*, and was largely comprised of members who were dissatisfied with the failure of the *ikhwan*’s leadership to engage Israel in active military resistance. Hizballah, meanwhile, was largely made up of disaffected members of the Amal organization in Lebanon. The leadership of both organizations is almost certainly aware of the dangers of fragmentation and consistently seeks ways to minimize internal opposition.

Ultimately, strong leadership is needed to reign in possible dissent and prepare both high level and lower level members for any shift in an organization’s core goals. This can occur in one of two ways. First, an organization can stay true to its long-term goals while adjusting its framing to legitimize short-term setbacks or changes in strategy. As noted earlier, Hamas’ leaders have repeatedly used the concept of *sabr* to justify a wide range of setbacks and policy changes. Second, an organization can fundamentally change its modus operandi through the infusion of new frames, cuing, and the gradual construction of a new identity for its members. Hizballah, as mentioned earlier, cultivated a completely new set of frames based on national

unity and political inclusiveness while also justifying its militant role as the protector of Lebanon.

In both cases, leadership was able to adjust its framing in such a way that it could minimize dissonance among its members. Yet even if an organization is able to stay largely intact, any shift in ideology will lead to at least some lower-level defections. An organization can weather any such defections so long as dissent is contained and defectors have only a limited platform from which to air their grievances against the parent organization. Perhaps the best example of this problem in our case studies is Hamas’ sustained difficulty with Salafist organizations in the Gaza Strip ever since it took power. Most of these organizations have decried Hamas’ policy of political participation, its cease-fires with Israel, and its secular reform program and call for the creation of an Islamic state in Gaza, the implementation of Shari’a law, and military action against Israel. This framing has proved attractive to some members of Hamas’ military wing – by some estimates most Salafist organizations are comprised of young, low-ranking former members of the military wings of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Resistance Committees, and Fatah.\(^\text{148}\)

In August 2009, Hamas’ tension with Salafist groups reached a boiling point when the spiritual leader of *Jund Ansar Allah* (Soldiers of God’s Supporters) denounced Hamas and declared an Islamic Emirate in Palestine. Hamas soon responded to this challenge through force of arms, storming the group’s mosque and killing almost two dozen of its supporters, including the movement’s leader. Yet despite its conclusive victory over the group, Hamas has had to continually engage in a containment policy against other Salafist organizations. In particular,

Hamas has had to constrain the propensity of these groups to launch rockets and conduct cross border raids. Hamas does not seek a new round of fighting with Israel and must therefore keep its Salafi population in check.

Hamas’ experience with military defectors over the past several years illustrates one additional structural reason why many moderating organizations face potential fragmentation – the presence of semi-autonomous military and political wings, each of which can hold on to vastly different ideologies. While a political wing is likely to be committed to the track of inclusion and moderation, the organization’s more militant elements in its military wing may desire to continue down a path of violent resistance. If an organization shifts too suddenly away from the path of resistance, it faces the potential for mass defections from its military wing. Hamas and Hizballah have largely kept their organizations intact due to the preservation of resistance ideology. Without the preserved resistance component, both movements may have become highly fragmented organizations which spawned exclusionary, hawkish offshoots comprised of former military members.

As noted in previous chapters, the entire identity formation process for a member of the militant wing is far different than that of a political supporter – militants become highly socialized through repeated rituals emphasizing martyrdom and resistance. Terrorism scholar Max Abrahms has further argued that terrorists are often unwilling to give up the resistance lifestyle because of its social function,

“The natural systems model, a leading approach in organization theory, posits that people participate in organizations not to achieve their official goals, but to experience social solidarity with other members….the preponderance of empirical and theoretical evidence reveals that terrorists are rational people who use terrorism primarily to develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists.”

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Abrahms’ work incorrectly views terrorist groups as monolithic, conflating the motivations of lower-level members with an organization’s leadership as well as differences between hawks and doves and, shockingly, dismisses the idea that individuals are not attracted to terrorist organizations due to resonance with its political platforms but rather primarily because of affective ties with its members. Yet he correctly points out that a terrorist group will often engage in actions to preserve the social unit, even at the expense of achieving some of its goals in the near-term. The social logic of terrorism outlined by Abrahms, Pape and others suggests that a semi-autonomous military wing of a moderating party can create significant problems for the parent organization, possibly leading to mass defections and fragmentation over time.

In organizations like Hizballah, the military components of the organization have always been fairly centralized under the auspices of its central leadership. Hamas has not been as lucky – significant fractures have emerged in recent years between its military and political wings, and well as its internal and external leadership. Elements of the each of the group’s main centers of power have been based either in Damascus, Gaza, or the West Bank, and as such the organization has not benefited from a central, localized command structure. Discussions of Hamas in previous chapters have shown how miscommunication has frequently occurred as a result – external and internal leaders have often made public statements at odds with one another or with Hamas’ accepted platform. Furthermore, Hamas’ political leaders have often suffered from a principle agent problem when dealing with the military wing – while political leaders may agree to ceasefires with Israel, members of the *Iz al-Din al-Qassam* brigade may carry out autonomous attacks. For example, a wave of suicide bombings in March, August, and September, 1997 may in fact have been conducted by elements of Hamas’ military wing without
the express approval of its political leaders. Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood’s “Secret Apparatus” has often existed under such autonomy that the majority of members were not even aware of its existence. At various points the Secret Apparatus has operated in direct contradiction of the orders of the Brotherhood’s leadership. In the late 1940s, for example, these militants launched a campaign of violence against the Egyptian state despite Hasan al-Banna’s efforts to reign in the organization and reestablish peaceful relations with the government.

Such sub-organization autonomy does not bode well for the long term survivability of a movement – different bodies may ultimately decide on the superiority of their ideological strategies and attempt to either take over the leadership of a movement or defect to form their own. By promoting the view that there exists a lack of communication and cohesion between various manifestations of the organization, detractors often effectively argue that peace with such a fragmented organization is impossible. What utility could be found in agreeing to a ceasefire with Hamas’ internal leadership if autonomous members of the Iz al-Din al-Qassam brigades will continue to carry out rocket attacks against Israel?

Previous periods of tahdiyya and hudna have proven that most disparate elements of Hamas can follow the “party line” the majority of the time, yet the complicated organizational dynamics of the movement further evidences the difficult position leaders are often in. Hamas’ organizational dynamics and its recent experience with military defectors to Salafist groups is illustrative of the dangers of organizational moderation – any group will have a number of hawks who will refuse to adopt the party’s inclusionary efforts and will form, or defect in favor of,

another group whose resistance ideology is more in line with their own. An organization can never satisfy all of its constituents all of the time.

Ever-adaptive leadership framing can minimize dissonance among lower level members. However, when an organization fails to adapt at all its leaders risk the possibility of appearing to be irrelevant fossils to the younger members of the organization. For example, while the core constituency of the Muslim Brotherhood, and much of its youth membership, remains intact, recent episodes have illustrated the great difficulty organizations face over ideological differences and changes in political opportunity. The threat of lower-level defection is always a potential existential problem for the movements under examination here, and ultimately defines the boundaries of its leadership’s acceptable discourse. Organizations which start down the inclusionary path must not radically shift the direction of the movement. As a result, while an organization like Hamas regularly deals with Israel in a de-facto manner, they are far less likely to recognize it de-jure any time soon – were the organization to suddenly recognize Israel and sign a peace treaty, it would likely face mass defections from its lower ranks.

All three of the movements under examination have faced difficulty in maintaining cohesion among ranks. For its part, Hizballah has been the most successful thanks in large part to its unified command structure, leadership cult of personality, and strong framing efforts over the years. Yet Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood continue to face problems which limit their ability to minimize dissonance among members. While both organizations remain strong and viable, cracks in the unification of their membership frequently emerge – consistent framing efforts by the leadership of both movements is needed to ensure these cracks do not become fissures.
Final Thoughts –

This dissertation has examined the evolution of movements from exclusionary, insular groups connected by interpersonal networks to those with a broad program of outreach and recruitment. What is the ultimate fate of an organization which commits itself to the inclusionary path? We’ve seen what factors enable a group to make this successful transition – adaptive framing and other forms of discursive signals which gradually prepare its members for an ideological shift towards a more moderate outlook. Organizations which do not sufficiently prepare their supporters are doomed to splinter.

In the early chapters of this dissertation we saw that in the nascent phase of every movement, recruitment is based solely on interpersonal relationships. The leadership of these groups develops powerful frames which identify problems in society and offer plausible prognoses to cure those ills. These frames are then passed person to person through social networks or through limited uses of media, such as pamphlets. If a movement’s frames have a high degree of resonance with potential supporters, it will soon see its ranks grow.

After a time, a movement which espouses exclusionary frames (e.g. the implementation of shari’a law in society) will reach the limits of its mobilizing potential and is forced to make a choice – continue appealing to a limited segment of the populace, or attempt to expand the power and influence of the group by softening exclusionary rhetoric and appeal to a greater segment of the population. Those movements which choose the latter will frequently channel their efforts through the public spectrum by forming a political wing and fielding candidates in parliamentary elections. In this phase, movements seeking to capture a greater percentage of seats in parliament will attempt to appeal to citizens from all sectarian backgrounds and political beliefs, and will
therefore attempt to minimize the exclusionary aspects of their organization in favor of unifying nationalist ideals.

Finally, a movement’s leadership who fully commits to a change in the modus operandi of the organization faces the potential for large scale dissent among the hawks in their ranks. As such, an organization’s leadership has to carefully craft a new set of frames which prepare lower-ranking members for a political transition. Such movements will also, out of necessity, have to maintain their paramilitary or terrorist components in order to satisfy hawks, even if though elements of their organization will be rarely used. If hawks are not sufficiently brought into the inclusionary process, the danger for the movement to fragment into a moderate camp and an even more violent splinter camp is a real possibility.

In total, this dissertation has laid out three major phases in the existence of any extremist group, terrorist organization, or other exclusionary social movement. Some of these organizations remain in the exclusionary phase for their entire existence. Others may start down the path of political participation but never fully attempt to integrate their party into the national system. But for the organizations under examination in this dissertation, the inclusionary process has yielded significant political gains and led to a gradual moderation in each case.

Questions will likely remain among observers as to whether or not this shift is only a political game for individuals like Nasrallah, Mish’al, or the senior leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. Ultimately, we cannot authoritatively speak about the “true intentions” of the leaders of exclusionary movements when they begin down the inclusionary path. Yet whether their newfound moderation is a short-term strategic goal or a permanent ideological shift, social-psychological and demographic factors already outlined demonstrate how movements which initially commit themselves to limited political inclusion may ultimately commit to full
moderation. Ultimately any of these paths are dangerous for internal group dynamics. Ideational dissonance, demographic changes, or moderation through political socialization can create sub-groups within the movement which prioritize vastly different goals and strategies. Time and time again radical movements have splintered between a moderate wing and a more radical offshoot. It is therefore important to note that while elements of a radical organization may commit to moderation, sub-groups may ultimately splinter off from the whole and return to violent tactics of the past.

Ultimately, this is the life-cycle of exclusionary social movements – some commit to the inclusionary path and become moderate in their outlook, only to spawn more exclusionary groups. There will always be contrarians and hawks in every movement, many of whom will, out of dissatisfaction with a parent group’s trajectory, defect to form their own group. While movements can do their best to moderate the influence of internal detractors, there is always a potential that the hawkish voices will find a home in a new generation of opposition groups.

This dissertation has explored how the starting down the road of inclusion ultimately changes the character of an exclusionary movement. Permanent moderation is by no means the inevitable outcome of speech distancing and political inclusion, but the potential for a major ideological shift towards a more liberal political and social outlook is far greater once a movement has started down that path. For some, the process of moderation becomes inescapable – either the group in question will fully commit to inclusionary language and its leaders and members will moderate over time, or it will split into two or more factions as hawks attempt to reassert the group’s original direction.

Interestingly, while lower-level members may grow dissatisfied with the inclusionary direction of a movement, core-leadership rarely defects from this path and is much more likely to
carefully weigh the consequences of its decisions. This is not to say that leaders do not make
mistakes – yet they are also unlikely to embark upon irrational paths of action. Thus, several
“nightmare scenarios” often bandied about in media and policy circles are highly unlikely under
the current leadership of these groups: the notion (largely inspired by 2008 unrest) that Hizballah
will attempt to militarily take over Lebanon, fears after Hamas’ 2006 electoral victory that the
group would attempt to impose Shari’a law in Gaza, and renewed concerns that the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt will do the same following the collapse of the ruling Egyptian secular
establishment.

Can these groups attempt anything so radical? Yes. Will they? No. Nasrallah, Mish’al,
Badie, and other leaders in similar positions with similar concerns are well aware of the
constitutive norms which bound the limits of acceptable behavior. All three groups are ultimately
dependent upon the support of their constituencies and in the end will not do anything to
seriously jeopardize that base.
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